Comp. by: Jaganathan
Stage : Proof
ChapterID: 0004149853
Date:18/7/18
Time:19:17:45
Filepath:D:/BgPr/OUP_CAP/IN/Process5/0004149853.3d
Dictionary : OUP_UKdictionary 159
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 18/7/2018, SPi
On Living Mirrors and Mites: Leibniz’s
Encounter with Pascal on Infinity
and Living Things Circa
OHAD NACHTOMY
Throughout his life, Leibniz had a keen interest in Pascal’s work. The
evidence collected over the past century by scholars such as Baruzi,1
Grua, Mesnard,2 and recently presented by Frédéric de Buzon and
Maria Rosa Antognazza, clearly shows that, from early in his career,
Leibniz was very well informed about Pascal’s work.3 For example, we
know that Leibniz had already bought a copy of Pascal’s Pensées by
(just a year after its publication).4 In a letter to Graevius of ,
he speaks of Pensées as a ‘small book of gold’ (libellum aureolum) which
‘by the profoundness of its thought and the elegance of explication
compares with any of the greatest men’ (A II. i. ). Before his arrival
in Paris in , and certainly during his stay there until , Leibniz
was in contact with the Jansenist circle (including Arnauld, Nicole,
Saint Amour, Roannez, and Gilberte Pascal) and was also associated
with a group loyal to Pascal (‘les pascalins’, as Mesnard called them).
In , Leibniz conducted a study of Pascal’s Letters to A. Detonvile.
Pascal’s mathematical work, referred to Leibniz by Huygens, was one
of the most important sources for his mathematical studies in –,
leading to his early development of the calculus.5
1
J. Baruzi, Leibniz et l’organisation religieuse de la terre [L’organisation religieuse] (Paris: Félix
Alcan, ); and J. Baruzi, Leibniz (Paris: Bloud, ).
2
J. Mesnard, ‘Leibniz et les papiers de Pascal’ [‘Pascal’], in Leibniz à Paris, vol. I
(Wiesbaden: F. Steiner, ), –.
3
F. de Buzon, ‘Que lire dans les deux infinis? Remarques sur une lecture leibnizienne’
[‘Lecture leibnizienne’], Les Études Philosophiques, (), –; M. R. Antognazza, Leibniz:
An Intellectual Biography [Intellectual Biography] (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ),
. For more details of Leibniz’s early reception of Pascal, see Mesnard, ‘Pascal’, –.
4
See A I. i. for the receipt of Leibniz’s purchase of Pascal’s work.
5
Antognazza, Intellectual Biography, –.
Comp. by: Jaganathan
Stage : Proof
ChapterID: 0004149853
Date:18/7/18
Time:19:17:45
Filepath:D:/BgPr/OUP_CAP/IN/Process5/0004149853.3d
Dictionary : OUP_UKdictionary 160
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 18/7/2018, SPi
Ohad Nachtomy
In the beginning of , Leibniz was busy developing a calculating
machine expressly designed to supersede Pascal’s own calculating
machine in performing automatic multiplication, division, and extraction
of square and cube roots, in addition to summation and subtraction.6
In , Leibniz received Pascal’s unedited manuscripts from E. Périer
(A II. i. ), which he studied with Tschirnhaus, and then recommended
for publication in .7 This marks the last two years of Leibniz’s stay
in Paris (–) as a particularly intense period in his reception of
Pascal’s work (which was, of course, only one among his many interests
during these years).8
Pascal’s work continued to play a subtle and complex role in Leibniz’s
thought. Among other things, Pascal certainly was, for Leibniz, a source
of inspiration, as well as a source both for comparison and a certain degree
of competition. While Leibniz was clearly impressed with Pascal’s mathematical and experimental work,9 his reaction to his philosophical work
and methodological remarks was much more nuanced and critical.10 The
present chapter focuses on a specific text—a comment Leibniz makes on
fragment of Pascal’s Pensées in the Port-Royal edition, , then
entitled Connaissance générale de l’homme. However brief, this comment
is of great interest—both philosophical and historical.11
Leibniz’s comment was published by Gaston Grua under the title
Double infinité chez Pascal et Monade (Gr –). In this text, Leibniz
refers to Pascal’s notion of the infinitely large and infinitely small and to
6
See A VI. ii. ; see also Antognazza, Intellectual Biography, .
See Leibniz’s letter to Oldenburg in A III. i. –. See also Antognazza, Intellectual
Biography, ; De Buzon, ‘Lecture leibnizienne’, .
8
Mesnard even thinks that it was due to his discovery of Pascal that these years (–)
were so exceptionally rich for Leibniz. See Mesnard, ‘Pascal’, .
9
De Buzon, ‘Lecture leibnizienne’, .
10
For example, Leibniz was critical of Pascal’s Esprit géométrique and his theory of
definition. See, for example, A VI. iv. and ; and see, De Buzon, ‘Lecture leibnizienne’,
; and M. Laerke, Les lumières de Leibniz. Controverses avec Huet, Bayle, Regis, et More
[Les lumieres] (Paris: Classiques Garnier, ), – for more details. For Leibniz’s attitude
regarding the use of mathematics in the service of theology in relation to Pascal, see Baruzi,
L’organisation religieuse, –.
11
I do not pretend to analyze here the complex relations between the two philosophers,
or to consider all aspects of Leibniz as a reader of Pascal. For Leibniz’s references to Pascal, see,
for example, Leibniz’s letter to Burnett, February , GP iii. ; his letter to Seckendorff,
June , A II. i. . For a more thorough discussion of the way Leibniz read Pascal, see
V. Carraud, ‘Leibniz lecteur des Pensées de Pascal’ [‘Pensées de Pascal’], XVIIe siècle, (),
–; De Buzon, ‘Lecture leibnizienne’; and Laerke, Les lumières.
7
Comp. by: Jaganathan
Stage : Proof
ChapterID: 0004149853
Date:18/7/18
Time:19:17:45
Filepath:D:/BgPr/OUP_CAP/IN/Process5/0004149853.3d
Dictionary : OUP_UKdictionary 161
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 18/7/2018, SPi
On Living Mirrors and Mites
the way Pascal uses infinity to describe living beings through the
example of a mite (ciron). In his comment, Leibniz argues that Pascal
did not go far enough in employing infinity, and, in contrast to Pascal’s
mite, he employs a completely different image—that of a living mirror
(miroir vivant)—as an illustration of a living being. This chapter compares these evocative images and draws some conclusions concerning
the similarities and differences between Leibniz’s and Pascal’s employment of infinity in capturing some essential features of living beings
through their respective use of the images.
Although not yet published in English (in print), this text has been
the object of studies and commentaries in German and especially in
French (more details in the next section). It has recently been revisited,
reedited, and published by Frédéric de Buzon, with an appendix
presenting a new reconstruction of the text.12 We know, for the
following reasons, that Leibniz composed the text sometime around
: the reference to his ‘system of pre-established harmony, which
has just recently appeared on the scene’ dates the text to shortly after
the New System (), and the text contains the word ‘monad’, which
appears in Leibniz’s writings in this period, as well as the expression
‘living mirror’ (miroir vivant). While the figure of a mirror appears in
earlier texts such as the Discourse on Metaphysics as well as in Leibniz’s
Paris Notes, the term miroir vivant appears only later—in this note, in
his correspondence with Sophie (), in his correspondence with
De Volder, as well as in texts such as the Monadology (§) and the
Principles of Nature and Grace (§), among others.13 I am unaware of
earlier occurrences of the expression.
The composition of this text circa , however, presents something of a puzzle: if Leibniz knew Pascal’s Pensées well from , why
did he compose this reaction to Pascal only years later? Is there
anything in Leibniz’s development that could account for this text at
this time, given that he had been commenting on Pascal’s work
throughout his career? More specifically, what prompts him to see
Pascal’s remarks on infinity as the ‘entry point’ (une entrée) into his
12
F. de Buzon, ‘Leibniz. Double infinité chez Pascal et monade. Essai de reconstitution
des deux états du texte’ [‘Double infinité’], Les études philosophiques, (), –.
13
See Leibniz’s letter to De Volder (GP ii. –/AG ), and Leibniz to Rémond,
February (GP iii. ).
Comp. by: Jaganathan
Stage : Proof
ChapterID: 0004149853
Date:18/7/18
Time:19:17:45
Filepath:D:/BgPr/OUP_CAP/IN/Process5/0004149853.3d
Dictionary : OUP_UKdictionary 162
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 18/7/2018, SPi
Ohad Nachtomy
philosophical system at this point in time?14 I will address this question
towards the end of the chapter.
Although the text is very short, it is extremely rich and interesting.
One commentator has gone so far as to say that Leibniz’s encounter
with Pascal gave him the occasion to succinctly summarize the
whole of his own philosophy.15 Even if this is overstated, there is
some truth to the remark. The text is indeed one of the most succinct,
condensed—and I would say beautiful—expressions of Leibniz’s philosophy at the time that his monadological phase begins to take shape.16
In any event, the text certainly merits more attention than it has
received in the English-speaking world.17 Indeed, part of my motivation here is to draw attention to this text, as well as to provide a new
English translation of its first version. Another part of my motivation is
to highlight and articulate some of the neglected philosophical significance of the text. I focus on Leibniz’s usage of infinity, in contrast to
Pascal’s, and especially his attempt to capture the nature of living
things—a topic that has received little attention in any of the previous
commentaries on the text. I certainly do not wish to suggest that this is
the exclusive significance of the text; but it is an important topic that
has been neglected. In particular, I attempt to bring out the contrast
between the two central images—that of Pascal’s mite (ciron), which is a
standard illustration of a minute animal in the pre-microscope era, and
that of Leibniz’s living mirror (miroir vivant)—to capture the way
infinity figures in their respective depictions of living beings.18 In
14
De Buzon, articulates the question as follows: ‘ . . . comment une sorte de résonance
philosophique se met en place dans Double infinité et Monade, par laquelle un auteur peut
faire entendre une pensée dans la sienne, à titre de commencement ou d’entrée, à un certain
moment de son propre développement?’ (‘Lecture leibnizienne’, ).
15
‘On voit comment les pages de Pascal sont, pour Leibniz, l’occasion de donner, en un
raccourci saisissant, toute sa philosophie.’ E. Naërt, ‘Double infinité chez Pascal et Monade’
[‘Pascal et Monade’], Studia Leibnitiana, (), –, at .
16
For two remarkable accounts of Leibniz’s development in this period, see Michel
Fichant’s introduction to his edition of G. W. Leibniz, Discours de métaphysique suivi de
Monadologie et autres textes (Paris: Gallimard, ), –; and D. Garber, Leibniz: Body,
Substance, Monad (Oxford: Oxford University Press, ).
17
See Patrick Riley, Leibniz’ Universal Jurisprudence: Justice as the Charity of the Wise
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, ), –. This text is translated in Lloyd
Strickland’s website of Leibniz’s short texts. See url <http://www.leibniz-translations.com/
pascal.htm>.
18
In copying Pascal’s text, Leibniz makes some alterations and additions. In particular,
after: ‘des cirons dans lesquels il retrouvera ce que les premiers ont donné, trouvant encore
Comp. by: Jaganathan
Stage : Proof
ChapterID: 0004149853
Date:18/7/18
Time:19:17:45
Filepath:D:/BgPr/OUP_CAP/IN/Process5/0004149853.3d
Dictionary : OUP_UKdictionary 163
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 18/7/2018, SPi
On Living Mirrors and Mites
light of the current interest in the life sciences of the early modern
period in general, and Leibniz’s views in particular, revisiting the text
from this particular angle seems timely.19
In sections –, I present the text and the major differences between
Pascal’s and Leibniz’s uses of infinity in describing the nature of living
things. In section , I offer an account of the content of the text and
its appearance around by looking at the role Leibniz’s view of
infinity plays in his definition of living beings in the New System of
. In section , I argue that, in spite of superficial similarities,
Leibniz’s use of infinity to define living beings stands in stark contrast
to Pascal’s use of infinity. Whereas Pascal uses infinity to emphasize
divisibility and disparity, alongside our inability to comprehend the
infinite world surrounding us, Leibniz uses infinity to emphasize the
intrinsic unity that each living being must have, the inherent harmony
among all living beings, and our sense of belonging to an infinite world
precisely because we, as imitations of an absolutely infinite being, are
infinite too (though to a lesser degree).
.
THE TEXT
As already noted, sometime around , Leibniz was busy copying
fragment of the so-called Port-Royal edition of Pascal’s Pensées. Once
he was done with what looks like a hasty (and imprecise) transcription,
Leibniz turned to compose a comment. His comment begins with a
dramatic and curious statement:
Ce que Mons. Pascal dit de la double infinité, qui nous environne en augmentant et en diminuant, lorsque dans ses Pensées (n. ) il parle de la
connaissance générale de l’homme, n’est qu’une entrée dans mon système.20
dans les autres la même chose’, Leibniz adds between parentheses: ‘ou des choses analogues’
(second line). This suggests that Leibniz takes the ciron more generally as an illustration of
living things. This addition by Leibniz has been noted by both Baruzi, L’organisation religieuse,
, and Naërt, ‘Pascal et Monade’, .
19
For Leibniz’s contribution to the life sciences, see F. Duchesneau, Les modèles du vivant de
Descartes à Leibniz (Paris: J. Vrin, ); F. Duchesneau, Leibniz, le vivant et l’organisme
[Le vivant] (Paris: J. Vrin, ); J. E. H. Smith, Divine Machines: Leibniz and the Sciences of Life
[Divine Machines] (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, ); J. E. H. Smith and
O. Nachtomy (eds.), Machines of Nature and Corporeal Substances in Leibniz [Machines of Nature]
(Dordrecht: Springer, ).
20
Version (folio r–v), in De Buzon, ‘Double infinité’, .
Comp. by: Jaganathan
Stage : Proof
ChapterID: 0004149853
Date:18/7/18
Time:19:17:45
Filepath:D:/BgPr/OUP_CAP/IN/Process5/0004149853.3d
Dictionary : OUP_UKdictionary 164
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 18/7/2018, SPi
Ohad Nachtomy
What M. Pascal says of the double infinity, which surrounds us while increasing and decreasing, when in his Pensées (n. ) he speaks of the general
knowledge of man, is but an entry point into my system.
Leibniz proceeds to write a single page comment. The importance of
this text was already noted by Gerhardt in 21 and then by Baruzi
in ;22 it was reedited by Grua in under the charming title
‘Double infinité chez Pascal et Monade’, which facilitated further commentaries by Guitton,23 Costable,24 Serres,25 Naërt,26 McKenna,27 and
Carraud,28 among others. While there are a fair number of commentaries on this text in French, to the best of my knowledge there is none
in English. Even in French, there is very little in the existing literature
on the implications of Leibniz’s comment for his view of living things.
With the recent commentary by Frédéric de Buzon, this too is beginning to change.29 In , de Buzon published a commentary in which
he notes the significance of Leibniz’s notion of natural machine vis-à-vis
Pascal, as well as providing a new edition that presents two different
versions of the text in meticulous detail. The first version is a marginal
comment added to a transcription of the passage from the Pensées, with
the note, ‘Was am Rande von mir addiert, habe ich besser auf ein ander Papier
geschrieben’. The second version is an expansion of the marginal note,
now on a separate piece of paper. While de Buzon emphasizes the
similarity between Leibniz’s notion of a natural machine and Pascal’s
21
C. I. Gerhardt, ‘Leibniz und Pascal’, in Sitzungsberichte der Königlichen Akademie der
Wissenschaften zu Berlin, Band (Berlin: Verlag der Königlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften,
), –.
22
Baruzi, L’organisation religieuse, –.
23
J. Guitton, Pascal et Leibniz (Paris: Aubier, ).
24
P. Costabel, ‘Notes relatives à l’influence de Pascal sur Leibniz’, Revue d’histoire des
sciences, (), –.
25
M. Serres, Le système de Leibniz et ses modèles mathématiques [Le système de Leibniz], vol.
(Paris: PUF, ), –.
26
Naërt, ‘Pascal et Monade’.
27
A. McKenna, De Pascal à Voltaire. Le rôle des Pensées de Pascal dans l’histoire des idées entre
et , vols. (Oxford: The Voltaire Foundation, ).
28
Carraud studies the philosophical relations between Leibniz and Pascal in some detail.
See Carraud, ‘Pensées de Pascal’, and V. Carraud, Pascal et la philosophie [La philosophie] (Paris:
PUF, ).
29
Another commentary that does touch on this question, though indirectly, is Naërt,
‘Pascal et Monade’.
Comp. by: Jaganathan
Stage : Proof
ChapterID: 0004149853
Date:18/7/18
Time:19:17:45
Filepath:D:/BgPr/OUP_CAP/IN/Process5/0004149853.3d
Dictionary : OUP_UKdictionary 165
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 18/7/2018, SPi
On Living Mirrors and Mites
view, I argue that there are significant differences in their views, which
are also expressed in the images they use.
De Buzon’s publication is the immediate occasion for the present
article, as well as the source for the text translated into English here.
Since the text is dense and difficult to translate, I first cite it in French
(in De Buzon’s version) and then offer a translation. The first version of
Leibniz’s response to Pascal reads as follows:
Jusqu’ici M. Pascal. <Was am Rande von mir addiert, habe ich besser auf ein
ander Papier geschrieben.> Ce qu’il vient de dire de la double infinité n’est
qu’une entrée dans mon système. Que n’aurait-il pas dit, avec cette force
d’éloquence qu’il possédait, s’il y était venu plus avant, s’il avait su que toute la
matière est organique, et que la moindre portion contient, par l’infinité
actuelle de ses parties, d’une infinité de façons, un miroir vivant exprimant
tout l’univers infini, de sorte qu’on y pourrait lire (si on avait la vue assez
perçante aussi bien que l’esprit) non seulement le présent étendu à l’infini, mais
encor le passé, et tout l’avenir [infini pour chaque moment] infiniment infini,
puisqu’il est infini par chaque moment, et qu’il y a une infinité de moments
dans chaque partie du temps, et plus d’infinité qu’on ne saurait dire dans toute
l’éternité future. Mais l’harmonie préétablie passe encore tout cela et donne
cette même infinité universelle dans chaque [presque néant] <premier presque
néant (qui est en même temps le dernier presque tout et le seul pourtant qui
mérite d’être appelé une substance après Dieu)> c’est-à-dire dans chaque point
réel, qui fait une Monade, dont moi j’en suis une, et ne périra non plus que
Dieu et l’univers, qu’il doit toujours représenter, étant [un Dieu] [comme
Dieu] en même temps moins qu’un Dieu et plus qu’un univers de matière: un
comme-Dieu diminutif, et un comme-univers éminemment, et comme
prototype, les mondes intelligibles étant en ectype les sources du monde
sensible dans les idées de Dieu.30
Here is my English translation:
Up until here it is Pascal. What he just said of the double infinity is nothing but
an entry point to my system. What wouldn’t he have said with his powerful
eloquence if he had advanced further, if he had known that all matter is
organic, and that the least portion contains, through the actual infinity of its
parts, a living mirror expressing all the infinite universe in an infinity of ways,
so that one could read in it (if one had a sufficiently penetrating sight and
mind) not only the present extended to infinity but also the past and all the
30
De Buzon, ‘Double infinité’, .
Comp. by: Jaganathan
Stage : Proof
ChapterID: 0004149853
Date:18/7/18
Time:19:17:45
Filepath:D:/BgPr/OUP_CAP/IN/Process5/0004149853.3d
Dictionary : OUP_UKdictionary 166
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 18/7/2018, SPi
Ohad Nachtomy
future [infinite at each moment] infinitely infinite, since it is infinite at any
moment and there are an infinity of moments in any part of time, and more
infinity than one could ever say in all of future eternity? But the preestablished harmony goes beyond all that and captures this same universal
infinity in each primary almost-nothing (which is at the same time the final
almost-everything [presque tout] and the only thing which deserves to be called
a substance after God), that is, in each real point, which makes a Monad, of
which I am one, and will not perish anymore than God or the universe, which
it must always represent, being at the same time, less than God and more than
the material universe: as a diminutive-God and an eminent universe, and as a
prototype, the intelligible worlds being in ectype the sources of the sensible
world in God’s ideas.
This is obviously a complex text. It contains several astounding claims.
First, Leibniz claims that Pascal does not realize that all matter is
organic. This indicates that Leibniz is presupposing his panorganic
view that all beings are ultimately composed of living beings.31 Second,
organic matter is actually divided to infinity. This is a familiar theme,
which is present in Leibniz’s work from his early writings. Third, and
perhaps most remarkable as well as most novel, is the claim that,
however small, each portion of matter contains a living mirror that
expresses the infinitely large universe. The mirroring Leibniz notes
here is due not merely to the actual division of matter to infinity but
also to the existence of something living and active in each portion of
matter. Fourth, such a living mirror contains ‘not only the present
extended to infinity but also the past and all the future’, which is
reminiscent of Leibniz’s doctrine of marks and traces that he ascribes
to individual substances in the Discourse on Metaphysics (articles and )
and elsewhere. Fifth, Leibniz’s new system of preestablished harmony
goes beyond all that in showing that such a living mirror, however
minute and particular, captures universal infinity: in being almost
nothing but at the same time almost all, it is the only real point that
makes a Monad, which (sixth) deserves to be called the only real
31
The division to infinity of organic bodies and the existence of microscopic animals
comes up in a letter Leibniz writes to Malebranche in : ‘There is even room to fear that
there are no elements at all, everything being effectively divided to infinity in organic bodies.
For if these microscopic animals are in turn composed of animals or plants or other heterogeneous bodies, and so on to infinity, it is apparent, that there would not be any elements’
(A I. ii. , translated by Smith, Divine Machines).
Comp. by: Jaganathan
Stage : Proof
ChapterID: 0004149853
Date:18/7/18
Time:19:17:45
Filepath:D:/BgPr/OUP_CAP/IN/Process5/0004149853.3d
Dictionary : OUP_UKdictionary 167
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 18/7/2018, SPi
On Living Mirrors and Mites
substance besides God, and (seventh) of which I am one; (eighth) it is
like a diminutive-God, and thus (ninth) it will not perish and (tenth)
will always represent God and the universe (in being a living mirror).
Surely my dissection of this dense text into a list of claims can be
contested. What cannot be contested, I think, is that Leibniz brings
together here some of his familiar theses with some new ones in a
remarkable and dense text. Since this is one of the earliest appearances
of the term ‘monad’ as well as the expression ‘living mirror’, it is
not obvious how to interpret these notions in this context. It is fairly
clear, however, that, in this passage, a living mirror is likened to a
substance and that it makes a monad, which is both active and representative; and, that it is exemplified through the I. The I, the Ego, or
Moy, are recurrent examples of the true unity of substance that Leibniz
uses in many other texts, both earlier and later than this one. I believe
that this example is significant. It suggests that by ‘living mirror’ (as well
as by ‘monad’), Leibniz intends here to refer to a complete and true
substance, rather than to some constituent of it. But, what does the
qualification of a mirror as living add to the figure of a mirror simpliciter
that Leibniz had already used in earlier texts? The qualification of a
mirror as living indicates something important about the way Leibniz
sees the mirroring relation and the capacity of each substance, however
small, to represent the world.
On the reading I will develop, this representation is accounted for
both () by virtue of the replication of internal structure among all living
substances (in particular, their common infinite structure); and () by
virtue of the active perception of each natural machine or living substance. The active representation that I ascribe to a natural machine is
grounded in the form or entelechy, which is a principle of perception.
One might say that there are two types of mirroring going on: () the
infinite structure of the machine mirrors the universe, by changing in
ways that track changes everywhere in the universe; () this mirroring is
able to occur because the machine is unified by a form, which itself is a
‘living mirror’ representing the infinite structure of its body and, hence,
of the universe as a whole. In this way, Leibniz’s two means of accounting for the mirroring relation are connected to one another.32
32
I am grateful to Don Rutherford for helping me to clarify the different kinds of
mirroring and the strong relation that mirroring has to the notion of entelechy.
Comp. by: Jaganathan
Stage : Proof
ChapterID: 0004149853
Date:18/7/18
Time:19:17:45
Filepath:D:/BgPr/OUP_CAP/IN/Process5/0004149853.3d
Dictionary : OUP_UKdictionary 168
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 18/7/2018, SPi
Ohad Nachtomy
Leibniz’s text raises other interesting questions. For example, what is
the status of the term ‘monad’ in this period and how does it compare
with the later usage of ‘monad’ in texts such as the Monadology and the
Principles of Nature and Grace? I will touch on this question toward the
end of the chapter. In the next two sections, I am mainly interested in
presenting the following theme. Like Pascal, Leibniz conceives of
human beings as placed between two infinities. Yet, unlike Pascal,
for Leibniz, human beings (as well as other living beings) are themselves
seen as infinite creatures; and, as such, they are placed between the
absolute infinity of God and infinitely divisible matter. As we shall see,
Leibniz’s notion of the infinite is quite different from Pascal’s. Whereas,
for Pascal, humans are seen as finite creatures facing and realizing their
place between the infinitely vast and the infinitely minute, for Leibniz,
humans are placed high up on a graded hierarchy of infinity and
perfection—‘the only thing which deserves to be called a substance
after God . . . but at the same time, less than God and more than the
material universe: as a diminutive-God and an eminent universe’.
.
APPROACHING INFINITY: LEIBNIZ VERSUS PASCAL
Before further developing this theme, I would like to bring out some of
the general differences between Pascal’s and Leibniz’s conceptions of
infinity. Pascal’s approach is clearly expressed in the passage to which
Leibniz is responding. According to Pascal, the point of philosophical
reflection is to make us realize the particularity of the human situation.
Philosophical reflection reveals that we occupy a middle position
between two infinities: on the one hand, a universe that extends to
infinity; on the other hand, everything made of matter is divisible
without end—ad infinitum. In his Pensées, Pascal urges us to recognize
our intermediate position between the infinitely large and the infinitely
small, both of which we do not fully understand. As Pascal says, we
perceive the infinite but do not understand its nature.33 According to
Pascal, this should lead to a realization of our true condition as finite
creatures: creatures with a limited understanding facing the infinitude
of the universe as well as the infinite and incomprehensible nature of its
33
Pensées, fragment : ‘Nous connaissons qu’il y a un infini, et ignorons sa nature.’
Comp. by: Jaganathan
Stage : Proof
ChapterID: 0004149853
Date:18/7/18
Time:19:17:45
Filepath:D:/BgPr/OUP_CAP/IN/Process5/0004149853.3d
Dictionary : OUP_UKdictionary 169
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 18/7/2018, SPi
On Living Mirrors and Mites
Creator. These considerations serve as a reminder of humility in
pressing the limited capacities of human reason in contrast to the
infinite nature of divine wisdom and power.34
Pascal uses the mathematical (quantitative) sense of infinity to draw
an analogy with the infinite wisdom and power of God. As he writes,
A unit added to infinity does not add anything to it; nor does a foot to an infinite
measure. The finite annuls itself in the presence of the infinite and becomes pure
nothing. So is our spirit in front of God’s; so is our justice in front of divine
justice. . . . We know that there is an infinite but we don’t know its nature. As
we know that it is false that numbers would be finite, so it is true that there is
the infinite in number. But we don’t know what it is: it is false that it would be
even, it is false that it would be odd, for, in adding a unit, it does not change its
nature, it is a number and each number is either even or odd. . . . Thus one can
know well that there is a God without knowing what it is.35
Pascal’s aim in drawing this analogy between arithmetical infinity and
the infinity of God is clear. His epistemological point, regarding the
unbridgeable gap between the finite and the infinite, serves a theological purpose. The upshot of Pascal’s analogy is to cast the human
relation to God as a relation between a finite/limited mind and an
infinite/unlimited one—with respect to power and with respect to
knowledge and wisdom. At the same time, the relation between our
finite mind and God is rather subtle. We know and recognize the
infinite but do not understand its nature, just as we must admit infinity
of number though we cannot comprehend its nature. For Pascal, the
point of contemplating the infinite is precisely to make us realize
our finitude and our limited nature in the face of the infinite and
incomprehensible nature of God. Thus, according to Pascal, just as
we know that there is infinity by sensing it with unambiguous clarity,
34
‘La dernière démarche de la raison est de reconnaître qu’il y a une infinité de choses qui
la surpassent. Elle n’est que faible si elle ne va pas jusque là.’ Pensées, fragment .
35
‘L’unité jointe à l’infini ne l’augmente de rien, non plus qu’un pied a une mesure
infinie. Le fini s’anéantit en présence de l’infini, et devient un pur néant. Ainsi notre esprit
devant Dieu; ainsi notre justice devant la justice divine. . . . Nous connaissons qu’il y a un
infini et ignorons sa nature. Comme nous savons qu’il est faux que les nombres soient finis,
donc il est vrai qu’il y a un infini en nombre. Mais nous ne savons ce qu’il est: il est faux qu’il
soit pair, il est faux qu’il soit impair; car, en ajoutant l’unité, il ne change point de nature;
cependant, c’est un nombre et tout nombre est pair ou impair. . . . Ainsi on peut bien
connaître qu’il y a un Dieu sans savoir ce qu’il est.’ Pensées, fragment .
Comp. by: Jaganathan
Stage : Proof
ChapterID: 0004149853
Date:18/7/18
Time:19:17:45
Filepath:D:/BgPr/OUP_CAP/IN/Process5/0004149853.3d
Dictionary : OUP_UKdictionary 170
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 18/7/2018, SPi
Ohad Nachtomy
even if we cannot comprehend it, so we sense (and thus know) that
there is a God but at the same time we recognize that we cannot
comprehend his nature. As Pascal famously writes, ‘we know the truth
not only through reason but also through the heart’ (Pensées, fragment
). Unlike Leibniz, who demands a proof for both the existence of
God, seen as an infinite being, and the impossibility of an infinite
number, Pascal demands only a clear and acute perception; that is all
one needs and all one can ask for.
Leibniz’s attitude toward the infinite is very different. Although
Leibniz is acutely aware of the paradoxes threatening infinity—and
especially its quantitative variants, as clearly evidenced in his early
reading of Galileo’s Dialogues on Two New Sciences—he is not opposed
to using infinity in his philosophy.36 Although Leibniz argues that there
is no infinite number, since this is a contradictory notion, infinity
nonetheless figures in almost every aspect of his philosophy. According
to Leibniz, the actual world is but one of infinitely many possible
worlds; possible worlds, in turn, are conceived by God’s infinite
intellect;37 and God himself is seen as an infinite and most perfect
being. The actual world, too, consists of infinitely many individual
substances, each of which involves relations to infinitely many others
and ‘exhibits an infinite series of operations’.38 In an early note, Leibniz
36
‘Among numbers there are infinite roots, infinite squares, infinite cubes. Moreover,
there are as many square numbers as there are numbers in the universe. Which is impossible.
Hence it follows either that in the infinite the whole is not greater than the part, which is the
opinion of Galileo and Gregory of St. Vincent, and which I cannot accept; or that infinity
itself is nothing, i.e. that it is not one and not a whole’ (Fall , ‘Notes on Galileo’s Two
New Sciences’; A VI. iii. /LOC ).
37
Monadology §; Theodicy §.
38
Comments on Fardella, A VI. iv. /AG . ‘Je suis tellement pour l’infini actuel,
qu’au lieu d’admettre que la nature l’abhorre, comme l’on dit vulgairement, je tiens qu’elle
l’affecte partout, pour mieux marquer les perfections de son auteur. Ainsi je crois qu’il n’y a
aucune partie de la matière qui ne soit, je ne dit pas divisible, mais actuellement divisée, et par
conséquent, la moindre particelle doit être considérée comme un monde plein d’une infinité
des créatures différentes’ (Leibniz to Foucher, GP i. ). See also Monadology §: ‘Every
portion of matter is not only divisible to infinity, as the ancients realized, but is actually
subdivided without end, every part into smaller parts, each part divided into parts having
some motion of their own’ (AG ). Contrast this with Aristotle’s view expressed in his
Generation of Animals .: ‘But nature flies from the infinite; for the infinite is imperfect, and
nature always seeks an end’ (b). J. Barnes (ed.), A. Platt (trans.), The Complete Works of
Aristotle, vol. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, ), . As I argue below, there is
a sense of infinity in Leibniz that means precisely absolute perfection and completion. But, of
course, this is not completion in Aristotle’s teleological sense.
Comp. by: Jaganathan
Stage : Proof
ChapterID: 0004149853
Date:18/7/18
Time:19:17:45
Filepath:D:/BgPr/OUP_CAP/IN/Process5/0004149853.3d
Dictionary : OUP_UKdictionary 171
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 18/7/2018, SPi
On Living Mirrors and Mites
writes that every part of the world, regardless of how small, ‘contains an
infinity of creatures’ which itself is a kind of ‘world’ (A VI. iii. ).39
Leibniz’s confidence in using infinity is related to the success of his
early mathematical work on infinite series, the development of the
calculus,40 and his syncategorematic interpretation of the infinitely
small.41 It goes without saying that Leibniz’s method of handling the
infinitely small demonstrates that a finite mind is capable of comprehending the infinite in this context. It is worth noting that this attitude
goes against the warnings of both Descartes and Pascal of the dangers of
going beyond our finite capacities.42
Given this background, it is not surprising that, in his remarks on
Pascal, Leibniz does not criticize Pascal for using infinity. Rather, he
complains that Pascal has not gone far enough in describing nature as
infinite; that he does not recognize how pervasive infinity is in nature,
and how central it is for understanding the nature of living things and of
reality itself. Hence, Pascal’s reflections, Leibniz says, are but an entrée to
his system (‘n’est qu’une entrée dans mon système’). Thus, according to
Leibniz, Pascal is not so much wrong as not sufficiently advanced in his
employment and analysis of infinity. As we shall see in section ,
this subtle critique implies some significant differences between Leibniz
and Pascal.
.
PASCAL’S MITE AND LEIBNIZ’S LIVING MIRROR
Leibniz’s general reproach in this text seems fairly clear: while Pascal did
much to ascribe infinity to nature, he did not go far enough. However,
since Pascal fully embraces the infinity of nature, the reasons behind
Leibniz’s reproach are not so clear; they require further specification.
Here is what Leibniz says in the second version of the text:
39
G. W. Leibniz, De Summa Rerum: Metaphysical Papers, –, George H. R. Parkinson
(ed.) (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, ), .
40
Ironically, it owes some of its inspiration to Pascal’s mathematical work. See, for
instance, Antognazza, Intellectual Biography, –.
41
For details regarding Leibniz’s approach to the infinitely small and infinitely large, see
Arthur’s introduction to LOC.
42
In fact, Leibniz’s method consists in translating infinite magnitudes into finite ones, just
smaller than any assignable.
Comp. by: Jaganathan
Stage : Proof
ChapterID: 0004149853
Date:18/7/18
Time:19:17:45
Filepath:D:/BgPr/OUP_CAP/IN/Process5/0004149853.3d
Dictionary : OUP_UKdictionary 172
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 18/7/2018, SPi
Ohad Nachtomy
What would he have not said, with that powerful eloquence he possessed, if he
had gone further, if he had known that all matter is organic throughout, and
that however small a portion one takes contains, representatively, by virtue of
the actual diminution to infinity that it encompasses, the actual increase to
infinity that is in the universe outside that portion—that is to say, that each
little portion contains, in an infinity of ways, a living mirror expressing the
entire, infinite universe . . . ?43
Leibniz argues that, however small, each part of matter is organic and
makes up a ‘living mirror’ that expresses the whole universe. Leibniz’s
use of this image (a living mirror) is new and curious. While Leibniz
refers to the notion of a mirror earlier in his career, to the best of my
knowledge, this is the first time that the notion of living mirror shows
up in his writings.44 Leibniz’s use of this image draws on Pascal’s
reference to both the infinitely small and the infinitely large but alters
it, so that each portion of matter, however small, is organic and
represents the infinitely large universe around it by virtue of being a
living mirror of it. This in turn implies that any such portion of matter
is considered as a living thing, not an aggregate and not just matter
(which is always further divisible). In this way, a living mirror, which
may be smaller than any given size, expresses a universe that may be
larger than any assigned magnitude, so that the infinitely small represents the infinitely large.45
It is important to stress that such a mirror is an active, living being—c’est
un miroir vivant, he writes—so that the mirroring is not just the replication
of structure but also the inner activity of perception, rather than the
mere passive reflection of an ordinary mirror. According to Leibniz,
the ontological bedrock of the real world consists of organic things. As
43
‘Que n’aurait-il pas dit avec cette force d’éloquence qu’il possédait, s’il était venu plus
avant, s’il avait su que toute la matière est organique partout, et que sa portion quelque petite
qu’on la prenne, contient représentativement, en vertu de la diminution actuelle à l’infini
qu’elle enferme, l’augmentation actuelle à l’infini qui est hors d’elle dans l’univers, c’est-à-dire
que chaque petite portion contient d’une infinité de façons un miroir vivant exprimant tout
l’univers infini . . . ’ (De Buzon, ‘Double infinité’, ).
44
For a survey and some analysis of Leibniz’s use of mirrors, see C. Marras, ‘Mirrors that
mirror each other’, in Herbert Breger, Jürgen Herbst, and Sven Erdner (eds.), VIII.
Internationaler Leibniz-Kongress. Einheit in der Vielheit. Vorträge Teil u. . (Hannover:
Gottfried-Wilhelm-Leibniz-Gesellschaft, ), –.
45
With much insight but without any explication Baruzi, L’organisation religieuse
remarked: ‘Ainsi se transforme le “ciron” de Pascal’, . I hope my comments make the
nature of this transformation more explicit.
Comp. by: Jaganathan
Stage : Proof
ChapterID: 0004149853
Date:18/7/18
Time:19:17:45
Filepath:D:/BgPr/OUP_CAP/IN/Process5/0004149853.3d
Dictionary : OUP_UKdictionary 173
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 18/7/2018, SPi
On Living Mirrors and Mites
he writes: ‘all organic bodies are animate, and all bodies are either
organic or collections of organic bodies’ (A VI. iv. /LOC ). As
we know from later texts, from this period the Leibnizian universe
becomes populated by infinitely many living beings for which he will
adopt the term ‘monad’. In light of his view that nature consists of
living beings and that an essential feature of living beings is that,
however small, their inner nature represents (while being a part of)
the infinitely large universe, Leibniz’s response to Pascal seems not
only more specific but also to signal a radical break from Pascal’s aims
of using infinity, as well as from his interpretation of the infinitely
small and the infinitely large.
To examine this more closely, let us compare Pascal’s depiction of a
mite with Leibniz’s depiction of a living being as a living mirror. Here is
what Pascal says:
What is a man in the infinite? Who can comprehend it? But to show him
another prodigy equally astonishing, let him examine the most delicate things
he knows. Let a mite be given him, with its minute body and parts incomparably more minute, limbs with their joints, veins in the limbs, blood in the
veins, humours in the blood, drops in the humours, vapours in the drops.
Dividing these last things again, let him exhaust his powers and his conceptions, and let the last object at which he can arrive be now that of our
discourse. Perhaps he will think that here is the smallest point in nature.
I will let him see therein a new abyss. I will paint for him not only the visible
universe, but also everything he is capable of conceiving of nature’s immensity
in the womb of this imperceptible atom. Let him see therein an infinity of
worlds, each of which has its firmament, its planets, its earth, in the same
proportion as in the visible world; in this earth of animals, and ultimately of
mites, in which he will find again all that the first had, finding still in these
others the same thing without end and without cessation. Let him lose himself
in wonders as amazing in their minuteness as [are] the others in their vastness.46
46
The passages continues thus: ‘For who will not be astounded at the fact that our body,
which a little while ago was imperceptible in the universe, itself imperceptible in the bosom of
the whole, is now a colossus, a world, or rather a whole, in respect of the final smallness which
we cannot reach? He who regards himself in this light will be afraid of himself, and observing
himself suspended in the mass given him by nature between those two abysses of the Infinite
and Nothing, of which he is equally removed, will tremble at the sight of these marvels; and
I think that, as his curiosity changes into admiration, he will be more disposed to contemplate
them in silence than to examine them with presumption.’ Pensèes, fragment . For the
Comp. by: Jaganathan
Stage : Proof
ChapterID: 0004149853
Date:18/7/18
Time:19:17:45
Filepath:D:/BgPr/OUP_CAP/IN/Process5/0004149853.3d
Dictionary : OUP_UKdictionary 174
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 18/7/2018, SPi
Ohad Nachtomy
Pascal’s imagery here is quite astonishing. In fact, it seems rather similar
to Leibniz’s early view that the infinitely small implies new abimes in the
form of worlds within worlds to infinity.47 But there is an important
difference: in Leibniz’s notion of the living mirror, the infinitely vast
world is represented by virtue of both the nested structure that develops to infinity and its active perception. For Leibniz, there is an
inherent, structural connection between the infinitely small and the
infinitely large in the very constitution of the world. The two infinities
are not disparate, as in Pascal, but rather are intrinsically connected, in
the sense that they map onto one another. This is accentuated by
Leibniz’s insistence that these mirrors are living mirrors. In this way,
each minute constituent of the world expresses all the rest through
isomorphic relations, and perception of those relations, which are at the
heart of his system of pre-established harmony.48 Leibniz’s notion of
the living mirror is thus consistent with the famous homomorphism
Leibniz sees between each constituent of the world and the world as a
whole. ‘C’est tout comme ici, partout et toujours’, as he sometimes expresses
this idea.49 The inner structure of each monad resembles the structure
English cited here, see ‘Leibniz: Double Infinity in Pascal and Monad’, Lloyd Strickland,
Leibniz-Translations.com, n.d., url <http://www.leibniz-translations.com/pascal.htm>.
47
As early as his ‘Theory of Concrete Motion’ (–), Leibniz articulates the doctrine
(mentioned by Pascal as well) that, in every bit of matter, there are worlds within worlds, and
that this goes on to infinity. In this context, the doctrine appears as a consequence of the
infinite divisibility of the continuum. Leibniz writes: ‘any atom will be of infinite species, like
a sort of world, and there will be worlds within worlds to infinity’ (A VI. ii. /LOC
–). A similar view appears several years later in Leibniz’s notes from Paris (), where
he writes that every part of the world, regardless of how small, ‘contains an infinity of
creatures’ which is itself a kind of ‘world’ (A VI. iii. ). Similarly, in the dialogue ‘Pacidius
to Philalethes’, Leibniz says: ‘in any grain of sand whatever there is not just a world, but an
infinity of worlds’ (A VI. iii. /LOC ).
48
In order to avoid any misunderstandings, it is perhaps worth emphasizing that Leibniz’s
view does not imply the existence of infinitely small beings, which Leibniz flatly denies. For
Leibniz, infinitesimals are not entities but useful fictions. Rather, for any finite living being, no
matter how small, there is a smaller one. This is what the actual infinity involves, according to
Leibniz.
49
In our text this point is expressed quite explicitly as follows: ‘chaque petite portion
contient d’une infinité de façons un miroir vivant exprimant tout l’univers infini qui existe
avec elle; en sorte qu’un assez grand esprit, armé d’une vue assez perçante, pourrait voir ici
tout ce qui est partout’ (De Buzon, ‘Double infinité’, ). See also Leibniz’s letter to Sophie
Charlotte of May , G iii. –. For this reason, ‘God sees in each portion of the
universe the whole things. . . . He is infinitely more discerning than Pythogoras, who judged
the height of Hercules by the size of his footprint’ (Theodicy §).
Comp. by: Jaganathan
Stage : Proof
ChapterID: 0004149853
Date:18/7/18
Time:19:17:46
Filepath:D:/BgPr/OUP_CAP/IN/Process5/0004149853.3d
Dictionary : OUP_UKdictionary 175
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 18/7/2018, SPi
On Living Mirrors and Mites
of every other, so that active perception of its own structure mirrors
that of the world.
.
THE WONDERS OF INFINITY AND THEIR THEOLOGICAL
UNDERTONES: DESPERATION VERSUS CELEBRATION
As we have just seen, there is a sharp difference in the use of infinity
between Pascal and Leibniz. For one thing, there is a strategic difference in what they use infinity for. The claim of Pascal’s reflection on
the infinite is that awareness of its paradoxical nature reveals our true
nature as finite, cognitively and rationally limited beings, and thus
incapable of comprehending the infinity of nature surrounding us. In
particular, Pascal’s aim in his description of a mite is to astound, even to
shock, his readers. Obviously, Pascal’s ultimate goal here is not a cool
and scientific description of the living world.50 Rather, he urges his
readers to lose themselves (‘qu’il se regarde comme égaré’) in the marvels
of infinity, which are astonishing in both their vastness and their
minuteness. But these marvels are meant to bring out the inherent
frustration and disproportion of human intelligence as it finds itself
caught between them, ‘incapable of understating the infinity which
surrounds us’.51
While Leibniz is obviously impressed with the wonders of infinity,
he rejects Pascal’s call to lose ourselves in its wonders. Whereas in Pascal
the human mind loses itself in despair between the infinitely large and
the infinitely small, nothing is more foreign to Leibniz’s spirit—either
being lost or being in despair. Instead, while it is well known that
50
For an elaboration of Pascal’s attitude, stressing the consideration of human beings
rather than the contemplation of nature, see Carraud, La philosophie, – (secs. –).
Carrauld also adds the following perceptive remark: ‘Le regard pascalien est regard sur l’autre
aveugle, regard sans être regardé, sans réciprocité, sans miroir’, Carraud, La philosophie, .
He notes that the notion of a mirror, so typical of the Renaissance, does not appear even once
in the Pensées. It is all the more striking therefore that Leibniz is contrasting the notion of a
living mirror to that of Pascal’s mite.
51
‘Car enfin qu’est-ce que l’homme dans la nature? Un néant à l’égard de l’infini, un tout
à l’égard du néant, un milieu entre rien et tout, infiniment éloigné de comprendre les
extrêmes. La fin des choses et leurs principes sont pour lui invinciblement cachés dans un
secret impénétrable, également incapable de voir le néant d’où il est tiré et l’infini où il est
englouti.’ Pascal, Pensèes, fragment ; see also url <http://www.penseesdepascal.fr/Transition/
Transition-moderne.php>.
Comp. by: Jaganathan
Stage : Proof
ChapterID: 0004149853
Date:18/7/18
Time:19:17:46
Filepath:D:/BgPr/OUP_CAP/IN/Process5/0004149853.3d
Dictionary : OUP_UKdictionary 176
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 18/7/2018, SPi
Ohad Nachtomy
optimism is one of Leibniz’s trademarks, the celebration of the infinite
is an aspect of his optimistic spirit that has not been sufficiently appreciated.52 In contrast to Pascal’s awe and desperation in the face of the
infinite,53 in Leibniz we find marvel and celebration of the infinite. As
we noted above, infinity figures in almost every aspect of Leibniz’s
philosophy. This is very vivid in our text: ‘through the actual infinity of
parts’, Leibniz writes, ‘the least portion contains . . . a living mirror
expressing all the infinite universe in an infinity of ways, so that one
could read in it . . . not only the present extended to infinity but also the
past and all the future [infinite at each moment] infinitely infinite’. For
Leibniz, contemplation of the infinite provides no reason for despair;
rather, Leibniz turns Pascal’s despairing attitude into a celebration of
infinity. While Pascal attempts to make our rational aspirations more
humble, Leibniz is ever optimistic about the capacity of human reason
to further extend itself, in general, and with respect to the notion of
infinity, in particular.
As with Pascal, Leibniz’s attitude has some theological motivation. In
fact, both thinkers believe that the contemplation of the infinite will
lead us to God.54 But it will do so in very different ways. For Leibniz,
celebrating infinity is strongly related to his conviction that infinity is
an essential aspect of nature, in general, and our nature, in particular.
Therefore, studying infinity constitutes a way to appreciate and admire
the glory of God as its creator. Rather than despair in the labyrinthine
and awesome nature of infinity and our disproportion to it, Leibniz
maintains that we should study and appreciate infinity as a constitutive
and positive aspect of nature, including our own. More precisely,
52
This is especially the case when contrasted with the notorious aspect of his optimism
that was made infamous by Voltaire in Candide. On the contrast between Leibniz’s optimistic
attitude and Pascal’s pessimistic one, though in a different context, see Naërt, ‘Pascal et
Monade’, and yet in another context, see Laerke’s recent penetrating remark: ‘La situation du
géomètre leibnizien se rapproche beaucoup de celle de l’“homme, dans l’infini” dont parle
Pascal, et qui se trouve “suspendu dans la masse que la nature lui a donnée entre ces deux
abîmes de l’infini et du néant, dont il est également éloigné” ’ (Lafuma [i.e., Pensées, fragment]
). Toutefois, et contrairement à la vision plutôt austère de Pascal, pour Leibniz, cette
suspension dans l’infini n’a rien d’épistémologiquement tragique: Pascal exige trop de la
science démonstrative’ (Les lumières, ).
53
‘Que fera(-t-)il donc sinon d’apercevoir quelque apparence du milieu des choses dans
un désespoir éternel de connaître ni leur principe ni leur fin.’ Pensées, fragment .
54
‘Ces extrémités se touchent et se réunissent a force de s’être éloignées et se retrouvent
en Dieu, et en Dieu seulement.’ Pensées, fragment .
Comp. by: Jaganathan
Stage : Proof
ChapterID: 0004149853
Date:18/7/18
Time:19:17:46
Filepath:D:/BgPr/OUP_CAP/IN/Process5/0004149853.3d
Dictionary : OUP_UKdictionary 177
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 18/7/2018, SPi
On Living Mirrors and Mites
infinity is a constitutive aspect of the way created things are made in the
image of God. To put it differently, for Leibniz, infinity is part of the
likeness between God and his creatures, so that the infinite in nature is a
manifestation of the infinity of its creator. Thus, Leibniz’s extensive use
of infinity in describing the natural world derives not only from his
mathematical work but also from his theological and metaphysical
commitments. Leibniz’s mathematical work taught him how to treat
the quantitative infinite in a rational manner, but he certainly also uses
it to further his theological commitments.
Some of Leibniz’s theological commitments can be illustrated by
what Lea Schweiz has recently called ‘a sacramental view of nature’.
According to this view, ‘the whole of the created order [can be seen] as
exhibiting one of the key principles of Lutheran sacramental theology,
namely, the finite is capable of the infinite (finitum capax infiniti)’.55 The
finite, created world is made in the image of God and, for this reason, it
is seen as capable of presenting and manifesting the infinite essence
and perfection of God. This theological commitment was certainly
controversial. In Malebranche, for example, we find a diametrically
opposed view.56 This commitment goes some way towards explaining
why Leibniz complains that Pascal, despite being one of the few to
have made so much of the notion of infinity, did not go far enough.
It would also explain why Leibniz finds Pascal’s description of the
infinitely large and the infinitely small to be on the right track, but to
55
As Schweitz writes: ‘Lutheran sacramental theology affirms that finite matter in the
forms of bread, wine, and water is a means of grace and a vehicle for the divine. Said another
way, the sacraments are instances when the “finite is capable of the infinite”. The material
elements of the sacraments are means of real and transformative encounters with the divine
because they are capable of the infinite in, with, and under the finite.’ See L. Schweitz, ‘On
the Continuity of Nature and the Uniqueness of Human Life in G. W. Leibniz’, in
O. Nachtomy and J. E. H. Smith (eds.), The Life Sciences in Early Modern Philosophy [Life
Sciences] (New York: Oxford University Press, ), –, at . For further information
on Leibniz’s Lutheran heritage, see U. Goldenbaum, ‘Leibniz as a Lutheran’, in A. Coudert,
Richard H. Popkin, and Gordon M. Weiner (eds.), Leibniz, Mysticism, and Religion (Dordrecht,
NL: Kluwer, ), –.
56
‘On ne peut concevoir que quelque chose de créé puisse représenter l’infini; que l’être
sans restriction, l’être immense, l’être universel puisse être aperçu par une idée, c’est a dire, par
un être particulier, par un être diffèrent de l’être universel & infini. Mais pour les êtres
particuliers, il n’est pas difficile de concevoir qu’ils puissent être représentés par l’être infini qui
les renferme dans sa substance très efficace, et par conséquent très intelligible.’ (Recherche de la
vérité, OC i. ).
Comp. by: Jaganathan
Stage : Proof
ChapterID: 0004149853
Date:18/7/18
Time:19:17:46
Filepath:D:/BgPr/OUP_CAP/IN/Process5/0004149853.3d
Dictionary : OUP_UKdictionary 178
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 18/7/2018, SPi
Ohad Nachtomy
ultimately remain no more than the entry point to his new system of
pre-established harmony.
Leibniz’s ascription of infinity to the created world through the
principle that the finite is capable of (perceiving/manifesting/expressing)
the infinite raises, however, a serious problem. The relation between
God and his creatures is commonly understood at the time as a
categorical divide between an infinite entity and finite entities. If
Leibniz regards creatures as infinite as well, how would he account
for the difference between creatures and the Creator? In fact, Leibniz’s
comment on Pascal provides us with an important clue. Most early
modern philosophers—for example, Pascal, Descartes, and Spinoza—
endorse this dichotomy. The gist of Leibniz’s approach is to cast the
difference between creatures and the Creator not in terms of a categorical divide, but rather in terms of degrees. Leibniz’s description of a
living mirror in our text as ‘being at the same time, less than God and
more than the material universe: as a diminutive-God’ implies this
notion of degrees. Traditionally, the categorical distinction between
finite and infinite was seen as capturing the distinction between God
and individual things. In sharp contrast to this tradition, our text
suggests that Leibniz draws the distinction in terms of degrees: the
absolute infinity of God is set above the infinity of creatures, which is set
above the infinite divisibility of matter and the infinity of mathematical
things. This is consistent with Leibniz’s earlier distinction between three
degrees of infinity that apply to three degrees of being (found in his
annotations on Spinoza’s letter on the infinite, in ).57 At the same
time, this distinction has to cohere with Leibniz’s position regarding the
status of infinite magnitudes, viz., his rejection of infinitely large (number,
line, shape, speed) and infinitesimal magnitudes.
As we have seen, Leibniz’s comment on Pascal provides some insights
into Leibniz’s attitude towards infinity in general and its application to
57
‘I usually say that there are three degrees of infinity. The lowest is, for the sake of
example, like that of the asymptote of the hyperbola; and this I usually call the mere infinite
[tantum infinitum]. It is greater than any assignable, as can also be said of all the other degrees.
The second is that which is greatest in its own kind [maximum in suo scilicet genere], as for
example the greatest of all extended things is the whole of space, the greatest of all successives
is eternity. The third degree of infinity, and this is the highest degree, is everything [omnia], and
this kind of infinite is in God, since he is all one; for in him are contained the requisites for
existing of all the others’ (February , A VI. iii. /LOC ).
Comp. by: Jaganathan
Stage : Proof
ChapterID: 0004149853
Date:18/7/18
Time:19:17:46
Filepath:D:/BgPr/OUP_CAP/IN/Process5/0004149853.3d
Dictionary : OUP_UKdictionary 179
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 18/7/2018, SPi
On Living Mirrors and Mites
living beings in particular. The text points to the contrast between the
ways in which Leibniz and Pascal conceive of the relation between
the finite and the infinite. It suggests that Leibniz understands the gap
between the finite and the infinite not as a categorical distinction, as it
was traditionally understood, but as one of degree. Thus, for Leibniz,
every created thing is seen as infinite, to some degree.58
. WHY THIS RESPONSE TO PASCAL AT THIS TIME
(CIRCA )? LEIBNIZ’S DEFINITION OF LIVING
BEINGS IN TERMS OF THE INFINITE COMPLEXITY
OF NATURAL MACHINES
Now let us return to the question raised at the beginning of this
chapter: how do we account for the fact that this particular reaction
to Pascal comes only at this stage of Leibniz’s career (circa )? As
I noted at the outset, Leibniz was familiar with Pascal’s work and
commented on it from very early in his career. However, Leibniz
drafts this comment on Pascal shortly after his New System of .
What could account for this particular response to Pascal’s piece on
the double infinity at this point? Certain changes that took place in
Leibniz’s views might make sense of it. My interest here is not so much
in the causes that prompted Leibniz to compose the text, which, for all
we know, may be accidental, but the reasons that could account for the
content of his response.
Attending to the development of Leibniz’s definition of living
beings, and his use of infinity as part of this definition in particular,
throws some light on this question. The full story of Leibniz’s development on this question would require a paper of its own. It is also not
an uncontroversial story.59 But, there are some striking and noteworthy facts that stand out in this connection: the notion of a natural
machine with its nested structure to infinity comes to the foreground as
58
I have begun to explore this interesting issue (in relation to degrees of perfection and
degrees of being) in Nachtomy, ‘Infinity and Life: The Role of Infinity in Leibniz’s Theory of
Living Beings’ [‘Infinity and Life’], in Nachtomy and Smith (eds.), Life Sciences, –, and will
develop it in a forthcoming monograph.
59
For my version of the story, see O. Nachtomy, ‘Leibniz on Artificial and Natural
Machines’ [‘Leibniz on Artificial and Natural Machines’], in Smith and Nachtomy, Machines
of Nature, and Nachtomy, ‘Infinity and Life’.
Comp. by: Jaganathan
Stage : Proof
ChapterID: 0004149853
Date:18/7/18
Time:19:17:46
Filepath:D:/BgPr/OUP_CAP/IN/Process5/0004149853.3d
Dictionary : OUP_UKdictionary 180
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 18/7/2018, SPi
Ohad Nachtomy
Leibniz’s prime model of living beings only after . This has been
argued for in several articles; to my mind, it is made especially clearly by
Michel Fichant.60
In the New System, Leibniz no longer uses infinity merely to describe
nature as worlds within worlds to infinity, as he has done previously;
instead, infinity now becomes one of the defining features of living
beings. In the New System, Leibniz draws the distinction between living
and non-living things in terms of the difference between natural and
artificial machines. He articulates his position against Descartes’s reductionist view that living things are nothing but subtle machines, akin to
artificial ones but more complex. Leibniz argues that the difference is
not merely one of degree. Rather, there is a difference in kind between
human-made machines and the natural machines of divine creation.
The difference, Leibniz notes, is that natural machines are machines
in the least of their parts, so that they are machines within machines
ad infinitum. As he writes,
I believe that this [Descartes’s] conception [in which the difference between
natural machines and ours is merely one of degree] does not give us a
sufficiently just and worthy idea of nature, and that my system alone allows
us to understand the true and immense distance between the least productions
and mechanisms of divine wisdom and the greatest masterpieces that derive
from the craft of a limited mind; this difference is not simply a difference of
degree, but a difference of kind. We must then know that the machines
of nature have a truly infinite number of organs, and are so well supplied
and so resistant to all accidents that it is not possible to destroy them.
A natural machine still remains a machine in its least parts, and moreover, it
always remains the same machine that it has been, being merely transformed
through the different enfolding it undergoes, sometimes extended, sometimes
compressed and concentrated as it were, when it is thought to have perished.
(GP iv. /AG ).61
60
See M. Fichant, ‘Leibniz et les machines de la nature’, Studia Leibnitiana, (),
–; Duchesneau, Le vivant; Smith and Nachtomy, Machines of Nature; Smith, Divine
Machines; and R. Arthur, Leibniz [Leibniz] (Cambridge: Polity Press, ).
61
In a later piece (May ) entitled by the English translators ‘On Body and Force,
Against the Cartesians’, Leibniz writes: ‘a natural machine has the great advantage over an
artificial machine, that, displaying the mark of an infinite creator, it is made up of an infinity of
entangled organs. And thus, a natural machine can never be absolutely destroyed just as it can
never absolutely begin, but it only decreases or increases, enfolds or unfolds, always preserving, to a certain extent, the very substance itself and, however transformed, preserving in itself
Comp. by: Jaganathan
Stage : Proof
ChapterID: 0004149853
Date:18/7/18
Time:19:17:46
Filepath:D:/BgPr/OUP_CAP/IN/Process5/0004149853.3d
Dictionary : OUP_UKdictionary 181
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 18/7/2018, SPi
On Living Mirrors and Mites
By virtue of being a divine creation rather than a result of human
production, a natural machine is both infinite (thus bearing the mark
of its creator) as well as a single, indestructible entity, which remains
one and the same as long as it acts.62 Unlike an artificial machine, a
natural machine cannot be composed or decomposed; its variation and
change of states do not destroy its unity as it is ‘merely transformed
through the different enfolding it undergoes’. It is created as one
functional unit, however complex its internal states may be. As a
consequence, it remains the same as long as it lives—which is forever,
unless annihilated by God. Hence, a natural machine always preserves a
certain degree of life or primitive activity. In his recent book, Richard
Arthur writes:
what makes a natural machine the same machine in its least parts is its possession
of a substantial form or monad. It does not have to have the same parts from
one instant to another, so long as the parts it does have contribute to its own
functions and end. For this it needs to be the source of its own actions, and also
to have a law or “program” for the development and unfolding of these
actions. Each of these two aspects of Leibnizian forms is crucial.63
As Arthur adds: ‘it is the internal law governing the unfolding of the
states of a substance that accounts for it having a genuine unity, as
opposed to the accidental unity of an artificial machine’.64 What gives a
natural machine—a machine with an infinitely complex structure—its
unity is an internal law of production. This internal law functions as a
program for self-organization and self-regulation, so that each Leibnizian
substance is also causally self-sufficient. According to Leibniz, a living
being is infinite both in the sense of being ever active and in its nested
some degree of life [vitalitas] or, if you prefer, some degree of primitive activity [actuositas]’
(GP iv. /AG ).
62
This is clearly articulated later in the Monadology: ‘Thus each organized body of a living
being is a kind of divine machine or natural automaton, which infinitely surpasses all artificial
automata. For a machine constructed by man’s art is not a machine in each of its parts.
For example, the tooth of a brass wheel has parts or fragments which, for us, are no longer
artificial things, and no longer have any marks to indicate the machine for whose use the
wheel was intended. But natural machines, that is, living bodies, are still machines in their least
parts, to infinity. That is the difference between nature and art, that is, between the divine art
and our art’ (Monadology §, AG ).
63
Arthur, Leibniz, .
64
Ibid. For some differences between Arthur’s interpretation and mine, see my review of
his () book and his reply in The Leibniz Review, (), –.
Comp. by: Jaganathan
Stage : Proof
ChapterID: 0004149853
Date:18/7/18
Time:19:17:46
Filepath:D:/BgPr/OUP_CAP/IN/Process5/0004149853.3d
Dictionary : OUP_UKdictionary 182
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 18/7/2018, SPi
Ohad Nachtomy
structure, ad infinitum.65 The infinity and unity of living beings is intrinsically related, of course, to the fact (noted earlier in this section) that they
are ‘divine machines’, created by an infinite creator.66
It is arguable that Leibniz’s view of a natural machine is very similar to
Pascal’s description of a mite, in that each of its parts is further divisible
to infinity. Frédéric de Buzon has noted this similarity. He writes:
That the parts of living beings are also living beings, and this to infinity, is
exactly Leibniz’s conception of natural machines, whose difference from
artificial machines is only that they are ‘machines in the least of their parts’.67
De Buzon is right in pointing to the notion of a natural machine as the
most pertinent novelty in the background of Leibniz’s comment on
Pascal. He is also right to observe a similarity in the appeal to infinity by
both. At the same time, there is a very significant dissimilarity in the
role infinity plays in Leibniz’s and Pascal’s respective views of living
beings. Whereas for Pascal the infinitely small derives from the divisibility of matter, for Leibniz, the infinity of a natural machine is related
instead to the intrinsic unity and indestructibility of substances.
According to Leibniz, the distinctive feature of a natural machine (in
contrast to an artificial machine) is that it is not infinitely divisible.
In fact, it is not divisible at all. Rather, I would argue that the infinite
structure of a natural machine, produced by an internal law of generation, is what makes it an indivisible and indestructible unity. The unity
and indestructibility of a natural machine is due to its internal law of
development—in informing the change of its states to infinity, the law
functions as a unifying principle as well. While the states change ad
infinitum, the law remains one and the same. The law thus makes it
65
In a letter to Lady Masham from Leibniz writes: ‘I define an organism or a natural
machine, as a machine each of whose parts is a machine, and consequently the subtlety of its
artifice extends to infinity, nothing being so small as to be neglected, whereas the parts of our
artificial machines are not machines. This is the essential difference between nature and art,
which our moderns have not considered sufficiently’ (GP iii. ).
66
See also Leibniz’s Fifth Letter to Clarke (arts. , , in AG –).
67
‘Que les parties des êtres vivants soient aussi des êtres vivants, et ce à l’infini, est
exactement la conception des machines de la nature, dont la différence avec les machines
de l’art est que les premières sont “machines jusques dans leurs moindres parties” ’. De Buzon,
‘Lecture leibnizienne’, . See also Considérations sur les principes de vie et sur les natures
plastiques, GP vi. , and Smith and Nachtomy (eds.), Machines of Nature.
Comp. by: Jaganathan
Stage : Proof
ChapterID: 0004149853
Date:18/7/18
Time:19:17:46
Filepath:D:/BgPr/OUP_CAP/IN/Process5/0004149853.3d
Dictionary : OUP_UKdictionary 183
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 18/7/2018, SPi
On Living Mirrors and Mites
infinite and one thing.68 In addition, infinity is also what makes a
natural machine a divine machine, that is, a machine that cannot be
composed or decomposed by humans but must be created or annihilated as a natural unity by God.
As we have seen, Leibniz begins to articulate this conception of a
natural machine in the New System of . Thus, we are now in a better
position to see why this particular response to Pascal was not likely to
come up earlier in Leibniz’s career, despite his long familiarity with
Pascal’s work. Given this background, it should not surprise us that
Leibniz would claim that Pascal did not see the full significance of infinity
as a defining feature of living beings shortly after coming to define living
beings through the nested structure ad infinitum of natural machines.
One might wonder at this point what exactly the relation between
the notion of a natural machine and that of a living mirror is. The term
‘mirror’ does not appear in the New System. Leibniz, however, comes
close to implicating it in several passages in which he discusses the
representative nature of the soul:
This is what makes every substance represent the whole universe exactly and in
its own way, from a certain point of view. . . . And since this nature that pertains
to the soul is representative of the universe in a very exact manner (though more
or less distinctly), the series of representations produced by the soul will correspond naturally to the series of changes in the universe itself. . . . Since every mind
is like a world apart, self-sufficient, independent of any other creature, containing infinity, and expressing the universe, it is as durable, subsistent, and absolute
as the universe of creatures itself. (GP iv. –/AG –)
The definition of a natural machine as a machine in the least of its parts
implies a view of a living being as an infinitely complex structure of
machines within machines to infinity. I called this feature a ‘nested
structure’ that develops ad infinitum. Against this background, depicting
a living being as a living mirror brings out a new feature of Leibniz’s
view: the inner perception of its proper structure (of the infinitely
small, in Pascal’s terms) allows a representation of the infinitely large,
by virtue of the isomorphic relation between the inner structure of
68
I provide some further arguments in support of these claims in O. Nachtomy, ‘Leibniz
on Nested Individuals’, British Journal for the History of Philosophy, (), –, and
‘Leibniz on Artificial and Natural Machines’.
Comp. by: Jaganathan
Stage : Proof
ChapterID: 0004149853
Date:18/7/18
Time:19:17:46
Filepath:D:/BgPr/OUP_CAP/IN/Process5/0004149853.3d
Dictionary : OUP_UKdictionary 184
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 18/7/2018, SPi
Ohad Nachtomy
each living being and that of all others. Hence, the role of active
mirroring derives from inner perception that would represent the
external world. Perhaps this is why the figure of a mirror that already
appears in the Discourse on Metaphysics (art. ) now becomes a living one,
so that it comes to exemplify the very nature of a living being. It is
worth observing that the notions of mirror and living mirror also come
up in other texts circa . To see this, let us take a closer look at
Leibniz’s letter to Sophie, written on November .69
In this letter, we find Leibniz expressing many of the points just noted
(while using the terms ‘mirror’, ‘living mirror’, and ‘machine of nature’),
and strongly echoing some of the doctrines presented in the New System.
After noting that some Cartesians have complained that he attempts to
reestablish the view that animals are entitled to have souls (des amés) and
that all bodies involve some vigor and life (de la vigueur et la vie), rather
than being mere extended mass, he writes these famous lines:
My fundamental meditations turn on two things, namely on unity and on
infinity. Souls are unities and bodies are multitudes, but infinite ones, so that
the slightest grain of dust contains a world of an infinity of creatures. And
microscopes have revealed more than a million living animals in a drop of
water. But unities, even though they are indivisible and without parts, nevertheless represent the multitudes, in much the same way as all the lines from the
circumference are united in the centre of the circle, which alone faces it from
all the sides even though it does not have any size at all. The admirable nature
of sentiment consists in this reunion of infinity in unity [cette réunion de l’infini
dans l’unité], which also makes each soul like a world apart, representing the
larger world in its way and according to its point of view, and that consequently each soul, once it begins to exist, must be as durable as the world itself,
of which it is a perpetual mirror. These mirrors are likewise universal, and each
soul exactly expresses the universe in its entirety . . . 70
I need not stress, I believe, the striking similarity between this text and
Leibniz’s comment on Pascal. A bit later in the same letter Leibniz notes
that the secte Machinale has gone too far in reducing animals to machines,
thus downgrading the majesty of nature. He then argues that if we had
a better grasp of the infinite, we would have an altogether different idea
of Nature, seeing its majesty rather than seeing it reduced to mere
69
70
A I. xiii. –. I use Strickland’s English translation of the letter in LS.
Leibniz to Sophie, November , A I. xiii. /LS .
Comp. by: Jaganathan
Stage : Proof
ChapterID: 0004149853
Date:18/7/18
Time:19:17:46
Filepath:D:/BgPr/OUP_CAP/IN/Process5/0004149853.3d
Dictionary : OUP_UKdictionary 185
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 18/7/2018, SPi
On Living Mirrors and Mites
machines, or, as nothing more than a ‘workman’s shop’ (la boutique d’un
ouvrier), as the otherwise clever author of the Entretiens sur la pluralité des
mondes (Fontenelle) believes. Leibniz then continues:
The Machines of nature are infinitely above ours. For besides the fact that they
have sensation, each contains an infinity of organs, and what is even more
marvelous,71 it is for that reason that every animal is resistant to all accidents
and can never be destroyed, but only changed and strengthened by death, just
like a snake sheds its old skin.72
The term ‘living mirror’ comes up at the very end of the letter:
And it is in this that consists the advantage of minds [esprits] for which
the sovereign Intelligence has made everything else, so as to make itself
known and loved, multiplying itself so to speak in all these living mirrors
that represent it.73
.
DIVISIBILITY AND DISPARITY IN PASCAL VERSUS
UNITY AND HARMONY IN LEIBNIZ
As we have seen, at this stage of Leibniz’s thought, the infinity of natural
machines is not a principle indicating division, as in Pascal; rather, it is a
principle of unity. This also explains why the term ‘monad’ is evoked in
this context. And I say this without implying any commitment to the
later connotations of the term in Leibniz’s later writings.74 As I have
71
My translation differs slightly from LS here.
‘Les Machines de la nature sont infiniment au-dessus des nôtres. Car outre qu’elles ont
du sentiment, chacune contient une infinité d’organes; et ce qui est encore plus merveilleux,
c’est par cela que chaque animal est a l’épreuve de tous les accidents et ne saurait être jamais
détruit, mais seulement change et resserré par la mort, comme un serpent quitte sa veille
peau.’ (A I. xiii. /LS –).
73
A I. xiii. /LS .
74
Though the resemblance between Leibniz’s use of living mirrors here and his use of
monads is quite striking, we need to be cautious about what Leibniz means by ‘monad’ in this
context. Since our text dates from shortly after the publication of the New System it comes at
the moment when Leibniz is just beginning to use the term ‘monad’ in his philosophy. When
first introduced, it is unclear whether ‘monad’ is just another term for a genuine unity, in
which case it could apply both to a corporeal substance and to a non-extended soul-like
entity. The term ‘monad’ clearly indicates a genuine unity. I also think that the notion of a
living mirror provides us with some clues as to how a genuine unity can be made compatible
with infinity—that is, its having an infinitely complex structure that resembles that of the
world. This line seems to be strongly supported by Leibniz’s remarks on (the union of) infinity
and unity in the letter to Sophie cited above.
72
Comp. by: Jaganathan
Stage : Proof
ChapterID: 0004149853
Date:18/7/18
Time:19:17:46
Filepath:D:/BgPr/OUP_CAP/IN/Process5/0004149853.3d
Dictionary : OUP_UKdictionary 186
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 18/7/2018, SPi
Ohad Nachtomy
argued elsewhere, the unity of a natural machine with its structure of
machines nested one within the other to infinity derives from its inner
source of activity—its entelechy, which is in turn informed by its
internal law of development. Its internal law of development may also
account for the infinity of a natural machine.75
Furthermore, Leibniz’s usage of infinity in his comment on Pascal
does not only signal unity as opposed to divisibility but also harmony
and connectedness as opposed to the disparity and disproportion
emphasized by Pascal. The notion of a living mirror not only encapsulates the infinitely small but also allows a representation of the infinitely
large by virtue of inner perception.76 As Leibniz writes to De Volder, a
living mirror is a ‘concentrated world’, whose inner structure expresses
the structure of the universe (GP ii. –/AG ). Moreover, a
living mirror expresses the world through active perception whose
role is to reveal the diversity of each such individual through its active
principle. This, I believe, is why the notion of a living mirror is
connected to that of entelechy, that is, the source of action (perception)
in a substance is also what accounts for the mirroring:
Entelechies must necessarily differ, that is, they must not be entirely similar to
each other. Indeed, they must be sources [principia] of diversity, for different
ones express the universe differently, each from its own way of viewing things;
it is their duty to be so many living mirrors of things, that is, so many
concentrated worlds.77
Leibniz’s use of infinity through the notion of a living mirror suggests that
each individual being, no matter how minute, forms an integral part of a
well-connected and harmonious system. Whereas Pascal exploits the
infinite division of the organic world to stress our alienation from and
incomprehension of the world surrounding us, in Leibniz, infinity serves
to stress a sense of connectedness among individual substances, a sense of
harmony and, for that reason, one might even say, a sense of belonging.78
75
See Nachtomy, ‘Leibniz on Artificial and Natural Machines’.
For an interesting discussion of related issues, see Serres, Le système de Leibniz, –.
77
Leibniz to De Volder, June , GP ii –/AG . For more on the connection
between entelechies and living mirrors, see GP vi. .
78
‘L’“homme, dans l’infini” se trouve “suspendu dans la masse que la nature lui a donnée
entre ces deux abîmes de l’infini et du néant, dont il est également éloigné”.’ Pascal, Pensées,
fragment ; cited in De Buzon, ‘Double infinité’, –.
76
Comp. by: Jaganathan
Stage : Proof
ChapterID: 0004149853
Date:18/7/18
Time:19:17:46
Filepath:D:/BgPr/OUP_CAP/IN/Process5/0004149853.3d
Dictionary : OUP_UKdictionary 187
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 18/7/2018, SPi
On Living Mirrors and Mites
Indeed, for Leibniz, infinity need not make the world strange and
incomprehensible to us. Rather, being made in the image of God, we
are infinite as well, and should feel at home in a world in which every
aspect bears the mark of an infinite creator.79
.
CONCLUSION
Unlike most thinkers of the period (including Descartes, Malebranche,
and Pascal), Leibniz ascribes infinity to created beings as one of their
essential features. He rejects the sharp dichotomy between an infinite
creator and finite creatures, as well as the epistemological imperative
(explicit in both Descartes and Pascal) that, as finite minds, we cannot,
and thus should not even attempt to, grasp the infinite. By contrast,
Leibniz argues that the infinite need not be dreaded but should rather
be investigated, so that the glory of God and its expression in the
created world becomes more apparent and comprehensible. Thus, for
him, created substances are imitations of their creator in this respect
(infinity). The kind of infinity related to being is not quantitative, so
creatures do not possess an infinitesimal magnitude.80 It is rather infinity
related to a program of action that lasts for as long as creatures act.
As Leibniz writes in the second version of his note on Pascal,
. . . all these wonders are surpassed by the envelopment of what is (infinitely)
above all greatnesses in what is (infinitely) below all smallnesses; that is to say,
our pre-established harmony, which has only recently appeared on the scene,
and which yields even more than (entirely) universal infinity, concentrated in
the more than infinitely small and absolutely singular, by placing, virtually, the
whole series of the universe in each real point which makes a Monad (or
substantial unity), of which I am one; that is, in each substance truly one,
unique, primitive subject of life and action, always endowed with perception
and appetition, always containing in what it is the tendency to what it will be,
to represent everything else which will be.81
79
At the same time, the kind of infinity Leibniz ascribes to created beings is not the same
as the absolute infinity he ascribes to God. It is also not the (quantitative) infinity he employs
in mathematics. I develop this point elsewhere (Nachtomy, ‘Infinity and Life’).
80
I argue for this in a forthcoming monograph.
81
‘Mais toutes ces merveilles sont effacées par l’enveloppement de ce qui est <infiniment>
au-dessus de toutes les grandeurs dans ce qui est <infiniment> au-dessous de toutes les petitesses;
c’est-à-dire notre harmonie préétablie, qui vient de paraître aux hommes depuis peu, et qui donne
Comp. by: Jaganathan
Stage : Proof
ChapterID: 0004149853
Date:18/7/18
Time:19:17:46
Filepath:D:/BgPr/OUP_CAP/IN/Process5/0004149853.3d
Dictionary : OUP_UKdictionary 188
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 18/7/2018, SPi
Ohad Nachtomy
Leibniz goes on to say that this substantial unity, which is a primitive
subject of life, or a ‘living mirror’, is like a ‘diminutive God’. It is like
God in that it is a living, active being that will never cease to act and
perceive. But, unlike God, it is a particular and thus limited expression
of God, and its perceptions are often indistinct and confused.
Leibniz’s response to Pascal thus clearly brings out the close and
interesting relation he sees between infinity and living beings. On the
face of it, Leibniz does not dispute Pascal’s description of living beings
as infinite; he argues that Pascal did not go far enough in ascribing
infinity to living beings. But, as we look more closely into this text and
its implications, Leibniz’s turns out to be an altogether different sense
and use of infinity. Had Pascal comprehended the true nature of the
organic world, Leibniz thinks, he would see that infinity cuts more
deeply into the nature of things—that it is the mark of living beings,
which constitute the fundamental ontology of the universe. Furthermore, each living being mirrors the whole universe by virtue of being
infinite itself, and it thus constitutes a living representation of the
universe. Leibniz’s notion of a living mirror illustrates his view that
each living being, whose inner structure develops to infinity, actively
represents the infinitely large world. At the same time, it constitutes a
principle of unity that stands above the infinite divisibility of matter.
While the wonders of infinity invoke awe and astonishment, they also
deserve admiration and contemplation and, I would go so far as to say,
celebration. Thus, according to Leibniz, contemplating and studying
the infinite will yield a sense of comprehension and belonging, rather
than Pascal’s sense of fear, alienation and despair.82
Bar Ilan University
cette même plus qu’infinité <tout à fait> universelle, concentrée dans le plus qu’infiniment petit
tout à fait singulier, en mettant virtuellement toute la suite de l’univers dans chaque point réel qui
fait une Monade <ou unité substantielle> dont moi j’en suis une; c’est-à-dire dans chaque
substance véritablement une, unique, sujet primitif de la vie et action, toujours doué de perception
et appétition, toujours renfermant avec ce qu’il est la tendance à ce qu’il sera, pour représenter
toute autre chose qui sera.’ De Buzon, ‘Lecture leibnizienne’, .
82
Financial support for this publication was provided by grant / from the Israel
Science Foundation. I would like to thank Rodolfo Garau, Liat Lavi, and Barnaby Hutchins
for very useful comments and suggestions. Alexis May from the Institute for Advanced Study
at Princeton assisted with the final formatting issues. Earlier versions of the paper were
presented at the ENS Lyon, the annual meeting of the North America Leibniz Society at
Yale, and in Bran, Romania. I am very grateful to all participants in these seminars for their
useful comments. The final version benefited from two perceptive referees for this journal.