Transgression, Regress, and Progress in the Theology
1
2
Anders-Christian Jacobsen
Progress in Origen and the Origenian Tradition
EARLY CHRISTIANITY
IN THE CONTEXT
OF ANTIQUITY
Edited by Anders-Christian Jacobsen,
Christine Shepardson, Peter Gemeinhardt
Advisory board:
Hanns Christof Brennecke, Ferdinand R. Prostmeier
Einar Thomassen, Nicole Kelley
Jakob Engberg, Carmen Cvetkovic
Ellen Muehlberger, Tobias Georges
Volume 25
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der vorliegenden Publikation
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Notes on the quality assurance and
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the academic advisory board.
Gaetano Lettieri / Maria Fallica /
Anders-Christian Jacobsen (eds.)
Progress in Origen and the
Origenian Tradition
Bibliographic Information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek
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The conference and the publication of this book have been supported by
The European Union, Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme Marie
Sklodowska-Curie program, ITN-HHFDWC-676258 and by Gruppo Italiano di Ricerca su
Origene e la Tradizione Alessandrina (GIROTA)
ISSN 1862-197X
ISBN 978-3-631-86459-3 (Print)
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DOI 10.3726/b20250
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© Gaetano Lettieri / Maria Fallica /
Anders-Christian Jacobsen (eds.), 2023
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Table of Contents
List of Contributors ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 7
Gaetano Lettieri – Anders-Christian Jacobsen – Maria Fallica
Introduction ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 9
Gaetano Lettieri
Progress: A Key Idea for Origen and Its Inheritance ������������������������������� 17
Anders-Christian Jacobsen
Transgression, Regress, and Progress in the Theology of Origen of
Alexandria ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 55
Francesco Berno
Gnosticismo e mistica: una relazione complessa� Sull’anima gnostica e
la genesi dell’antropologia cristiana �������������������������������������������������������� 65
Patricia Ciner
The Tradition of Spiritual Progress in the West: The Legacy of
Plotinus and Origen for Contemporary Neuroscience ���������������������������� 91
Ryan Haecker
The First Principles of Origen’s Logic: An Introduction to Origen’s
Theology of Logic �������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 105
Vito Limone
The Use of Eros in Gregory of Nyssa’s Homilies on the Song of Songs ��� 113
Tobias Georges
From reading to understanding: Profectus in Abelard and Origen �������� 113
Massimiliano Lenzi
Reason, Free Will, and Predestination� Origen in Aquinas’
Theological Thought ���������������������������������������������������������������������������� 141
6
Table of Contents
Pasquale Terracciano
Blurred Lines: Origen the Kabbalist ����������������������������������������������������� 165
Maria Fallica
Charity and Progress: Erasmus in the Origenian Tradition ������������������� 187
Stefania Salvadori
The Idea of Progression between Humanism and Reformation: The
Case of Sebastian Castellio ������������������������������������������������������������������� 201
Elisa Bellucci
Wait for Better Times: Eschatological Expectations in Philipp Jacob
Spener, Johann Wilhelm Petersen and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz ��������� 213
Joshua Roe
Hamann and the Parody of Progress ���������������������������������������������������� 235
Andrea Annese
Origene e la tradizione alessandrina in Antonio Rosmini ��������������������� 253
Enrico Cerasi
Two Types of Christian Apokatastasis: Origen and Karl Barth ������������� 275
Elisa Zocchi
Origen as Hegel: The Notion of Aufhebung in Balthasar’s
Interpretation of Origen ����������������������������������������������������������������������� 283
Ludovico Battista
Myth and Progress: Hans Blumenberg’s Reading of Origen of
Alexandria ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 315
Bibliography ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 339
General Index ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 379
List of Contributors
Andrea Annese
University of Bologna
Ludovico Battista
Sapienza Università di Roma
Elisa Bellucci
Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg
Francesco Berno
Sapienza University of Rome
Enrico Cerasi
Università telematica Pegaso
Patricia Ciner
National University of San Juan
Maria Fallica
Sapienza University of Rome
Tobias Georges
Georg-August-Universität Göttingen
Ryan Haecker
Peterhouse, Cambridge
Anders-Christian Jacobsen
Aarhus University
Massimiliano Lenzi
Sapienza University of Rome
Gaetano Lettieri
Sapienza University of Rome
Vito Limone
University Vita-Salute San Raffaele, Milan
8
List of Contributors
Joshua Roe
University of Freiburg
Stefania Salvadori
Herzog August Bibliothek Wolfenbüttel
Pasquale Terracciano
University of Rome Tor Vergata
Elisa Zocchi
Westfälische Wilhelms Universität Münster
Gaetano Lettieri – Anders-Christian Jacobsen – Maria Fallica
Introduction
The challenge of making a genealogy of the idea of progress – one of the
most crucial driving forces of the Western culture in the modern age, brutally challenged by the twentieth century – has at its core the question about
the role of Christianity� The comprehension and meta-comprehension of
Western history has been intertwined with the task to define the nature
of “modernity” and its (supposed) genesis as a process of “secularization” of
theological-political concepts� One of the most debated theses on the genesis
of the concept of progress was formulated by Karl Löwith,1 who described
the interpretations of history as belated products of biblical eschatological
views� This volume intends to approach this problem from another, contested genealogy, which in some sense can be seen as a heresiology: namely,
Origenism�
The history of the reception of Origen of Alexandria (ca� 185–c� 253), the
exegete and philosopher who shaped the history of Christian hermeneutics
from the third century onwards, is characterised by the continuous debate
surrounding the legitimacy of his doctrine inside the Church, the boundaries
of which were only then in the making� At the same time, the almost inevitable confrontation with his theological model took place� By invoking the
name of the master of Alexandria, this journey through the Christian traditions over the centuries, from Late Antiquity to contemporary times, offers
the possibility of appreciating a more nuanced understanding of the “history
of the Christian idea of progress”� This is done through the lens of a perspective which is at the same time marginal and hegemonic as well as both
heretical and at the heart of orthodoxy�
The volume builds on the results of the international conference on Origen
and the Origenian Tradition on Progress, held in Rome from the 14th to the
16th of May 2018� The conference was organised in collaboration between
the Marie Skłodowska-Curie ITN Project The History of Human Freedom
and Dignity in Western Civilization and the Sapienza University of Rome,
with its funded project La Wirkungsgeschichte di gnosi e origenismo in età
moderna�
We, as organisers, shared the idea that the notion of progress (attested
especially in the terms προκοπή, προκόπτω, πορεύω, προσάγω / profectus,
1
K� Löwith, Meaning in History� The Theological Implications of the Philosophy
of History, Chicago 1949�
10
Introduction
proficio, procedo) is a structural concept in the thought of Origen, who
deploys it systematically�2 The strategy of following the Nachleben of the
idea of progress rests on the presupposition of the systematicity of Origen’s
thought and the complex symmetry between the beginning, found in the preexistence of the intellects, and the end, found in the apocatastasis� This symmetry is studied in the first papers of the volume (i�e� by Gaetano Lettieri and
Anders-Christian Jacobsen), which offer respectively a broad panorama of
the theme and a detailed reference to one aspect of this theology of progress�
As a result of the need of persistently being vigilant of the risk of “overexposing the continuity between discrete phenomena,” as Francesco Berno puts it
in his paper, the contributions attempt to describe a history of the concept
of progress as found in the Origenian inheritance marked by a thorough
philological, historic-critical analysis of key texts and authors� Therefore,
we use the marker of “Origenism”, further specified by the key concept of
“progress”, as a historical concept,3 fully convinced of the potential of these
categories to disclose new meaning of the history of progress and the history
of Western thought, leaving the field open to new investigations� As one of
the most refined critics of the idea of progress, Theodor Adorno, once wrote,
it is necessary to continue to interrogate history – and the concept of progress itself – knowing that “discontinuity and universal history have to be
thought together”; if not so, the risk would be to elevate “mere facticity” to
the rank of “the only thing to be recognized and accepted”,4 thereby risking
a theodicy of the present�
After the Origenian beginnings with the two already mentioned contributions (Lettieri, Jacobsen), Berno shows a disambiguation of the mystical
semantic field in Greek Valentinianism� Berno retraces the thesis of a Gnostic
origin, albeit reinvented and radically modified, of the later Christian mystics� The Catholic Alexandrian school of Clement and Origen “selected and
2
3
4
See F� Cocchini, Il progresso spirituale in Origene, in: M� Sheridan / J� Driscoll
(eds�), Spiritual Progress: Studies in the Spirituality of Late Antiquity and Early
Monasticism, Rome 1994, 29–45; G� Lettieri, Progresso, in: A� Monaci Castagno
(ed�), Origene. Dizionario. La cultura, il pensiero, le opere, Rome 2000, 379–392�
The bibliography on the theme is very broad: here we can mention C�L� Becker,
The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers, New Haven 1932;
E�L� Tuveson, Millenium and Utopia: A Study in the Background of the Idea
of Progress, Berkeley 1949; J� Baillie, The Belief in Progress, London 1951;
T� Mommsen, St. Augustine and the Christian Idea of Progress: The Background of
The City of God, in: JHI 12 (1951), 346–374; J�B� Bury, The Idea of Progress: An
Inquiry Into Its Origin and Growth, New York 1955; R� Nisbet, History of the
Idea of Progress, New Brunswick 1994�
Th�W� Adorno, Negative Dialectics, New York 1973, 319 (or� ed� Berlin 1958)�
Introduction
11
enriched, with extraneous themes” the Gnostic reflection, thus presenting
it in a modality that the latter intended to transcend, the mystical one, seen
by the Gnostics as psychic and imperfect� Thus, while Berno’s contribution
tends to distinguish and separate, Patricia Ciner’s essay recovers the Platonic
common ground between Plotinus’ and Origen’s mystical anthropologies�
Ciner proposeses an actualisation of the models of Plotinus and Origen in
the light of some currents of contemporary neuroscience� Ryan Haecker’s
reflection closes this first section on Origen and his context, building the case
for the full inclusion of Origen in the history of logic� Haecker links Origen’s
first principles of theology with his understanding of logic as a formalisation of the divine Logos into logoi, which is refracted images of the Eternal
speech�
Vito Limone’s contribution focuses on one of the most decisive heirs of the
Origenian tradition, namely Gregory of Nyssa� Limone examines Gregory’s
notion of “intensified agape” – which, as Limone shows, is a reformulation from Origen� Furthermore, Gregory identifies a force which drives the
human soul in a movement that can now be truly progress without end� The
conciliation between opposite principles in the soul – namely its passionate desire and its goal, impassibility – happens in the endless intensification
of this desire� In Gregory, therefore, the contradiction of one of the major
tenets of Origen’s system, i�e� the finite nature of God, is the paradoxical
possibility of perfecting the system without postulating an end to its driving
force, i�e� the ascensional movement of progress�
With Tobias Georges’ essay we enter the Middle Ages� Hans Urs von
Balthasar famously compared his system to a “jar breaking into a thousand
pieces,” so that, while “the name of the master was being overwhelmed and
stoned”, “the fragrance of the ointment” poured all over the house� Von
Balthasar told the fate of Origen’s inheritance which was under attack from
the very beginning�5 In the Middle Ages, the heterodox parts were removed
and Origen’s inheritance was made “completely harmless”�6 Origen’s powerful image, originating in the Song of Songs, expresses the dissemination
and the simplification of Origenian ideas in the mediaeval cloisters and
5
6
For the events that preceded and caused Origen’s departure from Cesarea see
M� Simonetti, La controversia origeniana: caratteri e significato, in: Aug 26
(1986), 7–31; R� Williams, Arius: Heresy and Tradition, London 22001, 117–174;
E� Junod, L’Apologie pour Origène de Pamphile et la naissance de l’origénisme,
in: StPatr 26 (1993), 267–286; E� Prinzivalli, Magister Ecclesiae, Il dibattito su
Origene fra III e IV secolo, Rome 2002, 9–15�
H� U� von Balthasar, Origenes. Geist und Feuer. Ein Aufbau aus seinen Schriften,
Salzburg 1938; Eng� tr� Origen. Spirit and Fire. A Thematic Anthology of His
Writings, Washington 1984, 2�
12
Introduction
universities� Georges’ portrait of Abelard is an example of this cautious and
“tactical” approach to Origen, mediated by the now overwhelming authority
of Augustine� The critique of Origen, dependent on an Augustinian stance,
is the subject of Massimiliano Lenzi’s contribution� Lenzi analyses Thomas
Aquinas’ theology of predestined grace as an anti-Origenian device� Lenzi,
furthermore, shows us a coherent Augustinian perspective in Aquinas’ soteriology, albeit expressed in the language of medieval Aristotelianism� The
advantage of following Aquinas’ perspective consists in seeing the systematic nature of Origen’s system clearly evaluated (and rejected) by another
famously systematic thinker, namely Aquinas, who judged inadequately and
thus condemned both Origen’s ontology and soteriology�
Pasquale Terracciano illustrates in his contribution one of the ways
Origen entered the Modern Age, namely through the quest for an original,
ancient, and unitary wisdom, which for many scholars and theologians took
the form of the study of the Kabbalah� Terracciano reads Giovanni Pico
della Mirandola’s famous defense of Origen through this innovative key� He
then proceeds to complete the portrait of Origen, “Cabalae studiosus,” in
a very comprehensive picture with the works of Francesco Zorzi, Cornelius
Agrippa, and Jean Bodin at its center� The last link of the chain, evoked in
the final pages of Terracciano’s essay, brings us to one of the most audacious
evocations of Origen’s authority, made by Giordano Bruno, which underscores the radical potentiality of Origen’s thought in the hands of one of the
most innovative, meta-dogmatic thinkers of the Early Modern Age�
While the sixteenth century signified the rediscovery of Origen as a master
of esotericism, it was also the age of one of the most integral attempts to
recover Origen’s authority – and superiority over Augustine – in terms of
biblical exegesis, anthropology, and soteriology, namely that of Erasmus of
Rotterdam� Erasmus’ Origenism, as pointed out in Maria Fallica’s essay, is
an integral recovery of the category of progress, which leaves out Origen’s
most audacious doctrines revived by the “kabbalist” vein and instead leads
in the direction of a metaphorisation and spiritualisation of the revelation�
Erasmus’ reception of Origen mediated other fertile receptions of humanists and theologians across Europe, especially in figures who remained at
the borders of the new confessional identities� Stefania Salvadori’s contribution analyses the case of Sebastian Castellio, one of the fathers of the
modern idea of tolerance, who takes up and radicalises Erasmus’ position�
He thereby uses Origen in the construction of “a new dynamic, progressive and universal model of salvation, a complex soteriological device whose
direction is entrusted to human reason�”
The seventeenth century sees the development and the interplay of the
various modes of reception of Origen already experimented with between
the Middle Ages and the Early Modern Age: Origen the defender of free will,
Introduction
13
Origen the rationalist, Origen the Kabbalist are all possible and compoundable models� Elisa Bellucci’s contribution confronts the eschatological paradigms of Philipp Jacob Spener, the Petersen spouses, and Gottfried Wilhelm
Leibniz on the crucial theme of the Nachleben of one of the most disconcerting and yet fully coherent doctrines of Origen: the expectation of the apokatastasis, the recapitulation of all things in God, which is now, as Bellucci
explains, a widely diffused tenet in the Kabbalistic tradition� Following the
Petersens’ exegesis, the faith in the progressive action of a merciful God,
manifesting Himself through the apparent contradictions of history, makes
possible the conciliation between Luther and Origen, weighted in the latter’s
favor: the action of the Spirit in history is directed toward a progressive,
total revelation of the kingdom of love�
Joshua Roe’s contribution follows from a very peculiar viewpoint the history of the idea of progress in its most fortunate era, the Enlightenment,
adopting the critical stance of Johann George Hamann� In his attempt to
revisit and complicate current discourses on progress by showing their dark
spots, the Prussian philosopher paradoxically uses the “progressive” Origen
as a proof of the impossibility of eliminating the historical, sensitive, and
irrational parts of human existence from the glorious account of its progressive destiny�
Andrea Annese’s essay brings us to the post-Enlightenment Italian Church
of the XIX century� Annese examines the difficult confrontation with modernity in the figure of Antonio Rosmini, the creator of a new “Christian apologetics” with the retrieval of the Church Fathers and Origen at its core�
As John Henry Newman states, Rosmini’s way to conjugate tradition and
free theological discussion rested on the principle of the development of
dogma: the history of the Christian doctrine as a seed, which needs the development intrinsic to a living entity to fully disclose its profoundest meaning�
Rosmini’s perspective shows the reformist aspect of theological progress,
rejected by the Catholic Church of its time and reevaluated in the twentieth
century; an Origenian fate, one might say�
The last three essays of our volume reflect on three of the most important
figures of the twentieth century who critically retrieved Origen’s role in the
history of Christian theology: Karl Barth, Hans Urs von Balthasar, and Hans
Blumenberg� Enrico Cerasi returns to a subject frequently discussed in the
volume: the possible convergence between Origenism – here in the form of
the doctrine of apokatastasis – and the Reformed tradition, heavily influenced by Augustine’s theology� Cerasi interprets this convergence in Barth
as only apparent, founded as it is in a very different theological focus, and
indeed diverging in the idea of progress, which proves to be a litmus test for
discerning ideological trajectories� Spirit and progress make their appearance again with Elisa Zocchi’s study on von Balthasar’s complex parallel
14
Introduction
between Origen and Hegel, in which the long shadow of another, powerful
theology of history emerges: that of Joachim of Fiore� Progress is Aufhebung,
dialectical synthesis, and this progress is moved into God� Notwithstanding
the disturbing similarities, Balthasar redeems Origen’s theology from what
he considers the sin of Hegelianism, i�e� the reduction of divine freedom to a
logical necessity and of human freedom to titanic effort� Ludovico Battista’s
essay, lastly, bring us to the theme with which we have started this brief
introduction, namely the reconstruction of Western secularisation� Battista
does this with the help of one of the most radical opponents to Christian
genealogies of modern thought: Hans Blumenberg� Given Blumbenberg’s
intense confrontation with Augustinism and its theological absolutism,
Battista shows his cursory and “strained re-interpretation” of the Origenian
tradition, considered anti-Christian in its results� Blumenberg’s firm refusal
of any kind of Christian origins of the rationalist, enlightened, and liberal
modernity is perhaps the best way to close a volume devoted to tracing a
genealogy of a theology of progress�
The philosophical gesture of Blumbenberg, so charged with its Nietzschean
accents, brings us back again to the ambiguities of a history of progress and
history itself� Indeed, as many of the essays gathered in this volume will show,
another name for progress can be accommodation, the classical rhetorical and
legal principle which was incorporated into Christian theology and rabbinic
thought� As Amos Funkenstein’s masterpiece, which corrected and resumed
Löwith’s analysis, has shown that “grand historical speculations, which saw
in the whole of history an articulation of the adjustment of divine manifestations to the process of intellectual, moral, and even political advancement of
mankind” grew from the shared Jewish and Christian hermeneutical presupposition that “God adjusted his acts” to the capacity of the human recipient
to understand them�7 In the shift from apocalyptic thought (with the idea of
the irruption of novelty, crucial to the birth of the concept of history) to eschatology, revolutionary thought became “evolutionary”, and thus progressive�
Progress and apocalypse will continue to be alternatives, mediated in the
neo-apocalyptic thought of Augustine;8 but it will be the Origenian tradition
7
8
A� Funkenstein, Theology and the Scientific Imagination from the Middle Ages to
the Seventeenth Century, Princeton 1986, 213�
The crucial role of Augustine in the concept of progress and in its ambiguity is well
described within the complex problematisation of the idea of progress proposed by
Theodor Adorno, which saw “in the Augustinian theologumenon of an immanent
movement of the species toward the blessed state” the presence of the “motive of
irresistible secularization”: “in Augustine one can recognize the inner constellation
of the ideas of progress, redemption, and the immanent course of history, which
should not dissolve into one another, lest they reciprocally destroy each other� If
Introduction
15
that will enhance this model� The heirs of Origen’s theological quest – e�g�
Gregory of Nyssa, Eriugena, Eckhart, Cusanus, the Florentine humanists,
Erasmus, Bruno, the Cambridge Platonists, Leibniz, Lessing, Kant, Fichte,
the German Liberalität, Newman, Jaspers, Pareyson, Ricoeur, and Marion
as well as the constant fidelity to Origen in the Jesuits from the sixteenth to
the twentieth century –9 will build a theological alternative to the emerging
hegemony of the absolute voluntarism of Augustine, based on the confession
of the elective omnipotence of God, on the mono-energistic interpretation of
the gift of grace, and on the tragically negative anthropology which forms
its counterpoint� In building an “open”, speculative, rationalistic mysticism,
Origenism will open the borders of religion while insinuating a progressive,
9
progress is equated with redemption as transcendental intervention per se, then
it forfeits, along with the temporal dimension, its intelligible meaning and evaporates into ahistorical theology� But if progress is mediatized into history, then the
idolization of history threatens and with it, both in the reflection of the concept
as in the reality, the absurdity that it is progress itself that inhibits progress� […]
The greatness of the Augustinian doctrine was its for-the-first-time� It contains
all the abysses of the idea of progress and strives to master them theoretically�
The structure of his doctrine unabatedly expresses the antinomian character of
progress� Already in Augustine, as then again at the height of secular philosophy
of history since Kant, there is an antagonism at the center of this historical movement that would be progress since it is directed toward the kingdom of heaven;
the movement is the struggle between the earthly and the heavenly� All thought
about progress since then has received its draft from the weight of the historically
mounting disaster� While redemption in Augustine forms the telos of history, the
latter neither leads directly into the former, nor is the former completely unmediated by the latter� Redemption is embedded in history by the divine world plan
but is opposed to it after the Fall� Augustine realized that redemption and history
can exist neither without each other nor within each other but only in tension,
the accumulated energy of which finally desires nothing less than the sublation of
the historical world itself�” (Th�W� Adorno, Critical Models: Interventions and
Catchwords, tr� H�W� Pickford, New York 1988 (or� ed� Frankfurt 1969))�
See G� Lettieri, Origenismo in Occidente: secc. VII-XVIII, in: Monaci Castagno
(ed�), 2000, 307–322; G� Lettieri, Σκιαγραφείν / Scrivere ombra. La teologia
congetturale di Gregorio di Nissa e la sua eredità, in: M� Raveri / L�V� Tarca
(eds�), I linguaggi dell’assoluto, Mimesis, Milan / Udine 2017, 143–172, then in
G� Lettieri, Il differire della metafora� Il transfert del desiderio da Gregorio di Nissa
e Agostino a Ricoeur e Derrida, Rome 2021, 167–126; G� Lettieri, Eriugena e il
transitus di Agostino nei Padri greci. Apocatastasi ed epektasis nel Periphyseon, in
Adamantius 22 (2016), 349–397; G� Lettieri, Newman alessandrino, Postfazione
a J�H� Newman, Lo sviluppo della dottrina cristiana, Milan 2003, 421–452; G�
Lettieri, Il differire della metafora. II. Ricoeur e Derrida interpreti divergenti di
Agostino, in: Filosofia e teologia 28 (2014), 127–171, then in Lettieri, 2021,
91–166�
16
Introduction
tendentially meta-dogmatic stance, characterised by its liberal and “humanistic” traits and optimistic with regard to human freedom, reason, and the
inalienable dignity of the human being� The pages that follow will tell some
of this story�
In conclusion, we would like to thank Teresa Piscitelli (University of
Napoli Federico II), Luca Arcari, and Marco Rizzi – respectively, the former
president, the treasurer, and the new president of GIROTA (Gruppo Italiano
di Ricerca su Origene e la Tradizione Alessandrina) – for the support to
the conference and this publication� The support of one of the most important groups of research on Origen and the Alexandrian tradition was truly
important and significant for our endeavour� Further, we express our gratitude to the Marie Skłodowska-Curie ITN Project The History of Human
Freedom and Dignity in Western Civilization for supporting the conference
as well as the publication of the volume� Finally, we owe Margrethe Birkler
a debt of thanks for her huge effort in correcting and aligning the footnotes
and the bibliography as well as creating the index for this contribution�
Gaetano Lettieri
Progress: A Key Idea for Origen and Its
Inheritance
Abstract: The essay presents the theme of progress in a systematic way in Origen’s
production, as a key word to understand all his works and his Nachleben� Origenism
is here intended as an interpretation of Christian religion as universal religion of
enlightened reason, which is rationalised and interiorised�
Keywords: Universalism, Reason, Rationalisation, Spirit, Metaphor, Mysticism
To Manlio Simonetti
I would like to start my contribution mentioning my late mentor, Manlio
Simonetti� I consider him the greatest Italian and international Origen
scholar of the last fifty years� He was full professor of Storia del cristianesimo at Sapienza for many decades and he passed away in Rome on the
2nd of November 2017� My simple considerations here are no more than
a pale reflection of his bright, free and profound teaching, to which many
of us owe the passion and knowledge of Origen, the humble adherence to
a thorough and accurate analysis of his texts and contexts, and finally the
understanding of the relevance and complexity of the traditions of thought
which depend upon him�
I will propose here only some schematic introductory notes, aimed at clarifying the subject of this volume� Anders-Christian Jacobsen, Maria Fallica
and I share the idea that the notion of progress (attested especially in the
terms προκοπή, προκόπτω, πορεύω, προσάγω / profectus, proficio, procedo)
is a structural concept in the thought of Origen, who deploys it systematically�1 Moreover, the concept of progress has proven its capability to radiate
its influence through the whole of Western theology and philosophy, as their
papers will show� This thought of theological progress has indeed generated an extraordinary intellectual dynamism; it inspired a rational critique
towards whatever kind of static objectification in the religious and conceptual field; it has released an impetus towards new interpretations of God
and truth�
1
See F� Cocchini, Il progresso spirituale in Origene, in: M� Sheridan / J� Driscoll
(eds�), Spiritual Progress: Studies in the Spirituality of Late Antiquity and Early
Monasticism, Rome 1994, 29–45; G� Lettieri, Progresso, in: A� Monaci Castagno
(ed�), Origene. Dizionario. La cultura, il pensiero, le opere, Roma 2000, 379–392�
18
Gaetano Lettieri
As a matter of fact, Origenism presents itself as the most advanced synthesis of the Christian re-interpretation of the Old Testament’s legacy and the
classical paideia, in which the Christian religion is interpreted as a universal
religion of enlightened reason and of freedom from error and violence; a religion of moral formation and of unbounded interiorisation of the religious
revelation, a religion of brotherhood and peace among men� The presupposition of this history of freedom – confident of the possibility of leading
humanity from the deceptions and lacerations of earthly history to the unanimous ascent to the intelligible heaven – is the affirmation of the dynamic
and progressive nature of the relationship between reason and Truth, desire
and Spirit� Hence the acknowledgement of the critical and dynamic nature
of dogma itself, interpreted as the understanding of the transcendent, incomprehensible, and yet processual nature of God� Critically assumed, dogma
does not pretend to define God: it is an adequate conjecture which confesses
Him as a movement of unbounded revelation, a ubiquitous process of solicitation and gratification of human desire� Man, called to recognise himself
as a created, yet divine image of the Logos, discovers his absolute dignity�
This dignity requires a continuous movement of overcoming of the self, a
tireless rational challenge of every kind of external worship, an affirmation
of human freedom, able to escape every mundane and exterior bond� The
analogy between human and divine, mediated by the revelation of Christ as
the Logos incarnate, unfolds as a boundless anagogy which culminates in
a speculative mysticism� The critique of every kind of religious littera occidens as an idolatrous stopping place of the outburst of the rational desire
seeks to rise to an interior and fusional relationship with the Logos and his
Spirit� The aim is to reach the logical dimension of an eternal gospel, universal because fully rational, which calls men to unveil Truth in themselves
and unveil themselves in the inextinguishable transcendence of the loving
relationship between Father and Son� This mystic yet processual intimacy is
open to man’s participation�
Let us proceed in stages, by identifying the idea of progress as the systematic principle of the Origenian system, capable of vivifying its entire
articulation�
1� The Origenian idea of progress is a catholic anti-dualistic dispositive,
which ontologically recants the apocalyptic perspective of the early
Christian kerygma, fluidifying the sclerotic heretical theological dualism�
The universal progress of all, in movement towards the perfect final reunification in God, solves the apocalyptic antithesis between old and new,
the world of darkness and the world of light, lex occidens and Spiritus
vivificans, nature and grace, transforming it into a process of morality
and knowledge� The economical aut-aut of Paul and John, made more
Progress: A Key Idea for Origen and Its Inheritance
19
rigid by Gnostics and Marcionites as theological dualism, is followed by
the Proto-Catholic and progressive et-et of Origen, ontologically projected: the ascensional progress of the rational desire connects the material/
historical world and the intelligible realm through analogy and anagogy,
in the mediation of Christ Logos incarnate� This Proto-Catholic principle
A) gives the “reformistic” missionary-universalist imperative precedence
over the “revolutionary” eschatological-elective one� This idea starts the
spreading of the gospel in mundane space and secular time, and then in
logical transcendence, rather than in the spasmodic waiting for the disruptive judgement of this eon and the immediate entry of the elects into
God’s kingdom� The apocalyptic kingdom in heaven is surrogated by the
universal Church in fieri, which progressively rises into heaven� B) This
apocalyptic principle, re-interpreted by Origen in a Platonic sense, tends
to be reconfigured as the wisdomic revelation of the logical and intelligible nature of God, rather than eschatological revelation of an elective
charisma, which, here and now, tears out the elects from the darkness of
this world, dominated by the evil Archon� The eschatological and charismatic notion of Spirit is now ontologised and rationalised�2 The eschatological historical novelty of the gift in the charismatic intimacy with
God becomes rational introduction in the very tissue of being, in the
ontological furtherness of Wisdom; apocalypse becomes spiritual gnosis,
progressive understanding of the inner and natural participation in the
gift of the image� This means the relativisation of the apocalyptic urgency
of the conversion, as an ultimate, absolute decision� In Origen’s perspective, there is still time, it is never too late, there is always another possibility, there are still other lives and worlds, in which there will always
be the possibility to progress�3 Compared to the fractional and strained
time of the Proto-Christian apocalyptic, Origen maintains a very lengthy
2
3
See Or�, princ� 1�1,2–4: Consuetudo est scripturae sanctae, cum aliquid contrarium corpori huic crassiori et solidiori designare vult, spiritum nominare, sicut
dicit: “Littera occidit, spiritus autem vivificat”. In quo sine dubio per litteram
corporalia significat, per spiritum intellectualia, quae et spiritalia dicimus (1�1,2);
Sanctus Spiritus subsistentia est intellectualis et proprie subsistit et extat (1�1,3);
Deus Spiritus est, et eos qui adorant eum, in Spiritu et veritate oportet adorare”.
Et vide quam consequenter veritatem Spiritui sociavit, ut ad distinctionem quidem corporum Spiritum nominaret, ad distinctionem vero umbrae vel imaginis
veritatem (1�1,4)� See Or�, Joh� 13�110� The original text is here and throughout
the volume, if not otherwise mentioned: for De principiis from P� Koetschau
(ed�), De Principiis, GCS 5, Berlin 1913; for the Commentarii in euangelium
Iohannis, E� Preuschen (ed�), Der Johanneskommentar. Origenes Werke 4, GCS
10, Berlin 1903�
See Or�, princ� 2�1,1–3; 2�3,1–7�
20
Gaetano Lettieri
time, gradually ascending to God, universally redeemed� The doctrine of
universal progress through the succession of eons and worlds envisages a
Catholic “purgatorial” metaphysics, which mediates between the present
of sin and the final future of perfection, guaranteeing the procrastination
of judgement that will be the final one only when it will not be in any
case punitive� The very existence of evil is only provisional, and therefore
its punishment can only be relative, intentionally progressive because of
its remedial nature: the judgement of conviction is never final, but always
medicinal, able to disclose the possibility of future goodness over the
evil which has been condemned, a possibility already latent in the creature�4 If the “original” sin is a fall from protological perfection, it does
not imprison in a perverted dimension from which the creatural freedom
cannot escape; sin is only a stopping place, a temporary alienation from
which freedom can emerge, stimulated by the Logos� Universal progress
is unstoppable acceptance, gradual conversion, and ultimate redemption
of the all in the unity of the Logos�5 Marcionites and Gnostics tended
to radicalise into a theological dualism the Pauline opposition between
the economy of the Law and the economy of Grace (for the Gnostics,
this opposition was also the explanation of the division of all humanity
in different natures: the spiritual becomes a divine nature, ontologically
elected)� They contrasted the autistic, “powerful” God of the creation,
of the ontological subordination, of the Law, with the relational and
4
5
See Or�, princ� 2�10,6; Or�, Cels� 4�72–73; 6�46� The original text for Contra
Celsum, here and throughout the volume, is from P� Koetschau (ed�), Contra
Celsum I-IV. Origenes Werke I, GCS 2, Berlin 1899, and P� Koetschau (ed�),
Contra Celsum V-VIII, De oratione Origenes Werke II, GCS 3, Berlin 1899�
For the translation, here and throughout the volume, see H� Chadwick, Contra
Celsum, Cambridge 1980�
Or�, princ� 1�6,3–4: Interim tamen tam in his quae videntur et temporalibus saeculis
quam in illis quae non videntur et aeterna sunt omnes isti pro ordine, pro ratione,
pro modo et meritorum dignitatibus dispensantur: ut in primis alii, alii in secundis,
nonnulli etiam in ultimis temporibus et per maiora ac graviora supplicia nec non
et diuturna ac multis, ut ita dicam, saeculis tolerata asperioribus emendationibus
reparati et restituti eruditionibus primo angelicis tum deinde etiam superiorum
graduum virtutibus, ut sic per singula ad superiora provecti usque ad ea quae sunt
invisibilia et aeterna perveniant, singulis videlicet quibusque caelestium virtutum
officiis quadam eruditionum specie peragratis. Ex quo, ut opinor, hoc consequentia ipsa videtur ostendere, unamquamque rationabilem naturam posse ab uno in
alterum ordinem transeuntem per singulos in omnes, et ab omnibus in singulos
pervenire, dum accessus profectuum defectuumve varios pro motibus vel conatibus
propriis unusquisque pro liberi arbitrii facultate perpetitur… Dispersio illa unius
principii atque divisio ad unum et eundem finem ac similitudinem reparatur� See
Or�, princ� 2�3,7�
Progress: A Key Idea for Origen and Its Inheritance
21
“patiens” God of donation, of filiality through grace, of Spirit, whereas
Origen interprets the two economies of the littera and of the Spiritus as
the two subsequent historical steps and the two ontological levels of the
redemptive action of the same God, who encourages the moral and intellectual progress which is open to the autonomous desire of the intellectual
creature� Origen maintains, as opposed to the Gnostics, that there is only
one human nature: this nature is theomorphic and only the progress of
freedom determines the levels of perfection of man (sclerotised into irreducibly different natures by Gnostics), in a process of re-appropriation
of their forgotten divine identity, possessed by everyone (the inner imago
Dei)� Every creature is free, fluid, able to “cross the natures” and become
psychical from material and spiritual from psychical� If between God
and creature there is analogy (divinising participation in the intellectual
nature of the absolute difference which separates Creator and creature)
and the call for intimacy, then intellectual progress is the only possible
relation to the transcendent God: the adjustment of the image to the
Archetype can only be approximative, hence tirelessly dynamic� In other
words, the Origenian idea of progress can be sustained only starting from
a Catholic postulation: more time, more space, universality of the levels,
delay of the eschaton, quantitative surrogate (in terms of duration of
the world and extension of his conversion to Christianity) of the qualitative crisis, tendential coincidence between salvific revelation and gift
of the created being� This postulation means a relativisation of the “violent,” “destructive,” eschatologically innovative notion of apocalypse,
envisaging an ontological retractation of the latter� The divine revelation
always exists, is inscribed in the theomorphic nature of the first creation
(the creation of the intellects), so that the salvific revelation of God is
but the retrieval of the protological one� The apocalypse therefore is not
judgement, exclusion, punishing annihilation, fracture and catastrophe
of time, but a calling back and a universal inclusion, a re-affirmation of
the universal donation of the participation in God, a progressive conversion of time into eternity� The Origenian apocalypse does not elect by
discriminating, by separating the future realm of grace, and by destroying the old world of sin; it encompasses all things, having the ability of
reforming and renovating the world and history in steps, by guiding their
progressive ascension to God�
2� Origen reconstructs Christianity as humani generis instructio:6 spiritual
culture, intellectual progress, and mystic-speculative interiorisation of the
religious� If the Spirit is identified with the divine intellectual substance,
6
Or�, princ� 4�3,12�
22
Gaetano Lettieri
the fruition of the Spirit is seen as a gradual process of learning, cultural growth, rational formation� His Christianity is didactic and liberal, promoting the free intellectual progress of the subject; recanting
in himself the entire classical παιδεία, he orients it toward the formation
of man to absolute Truth, which is the personal truth of God, of the
union with God, of the intimate equality with God, gifted to the logoi
from the Logos� Starting from the identification of the three constitutive elements of the liberal arts (ingenium, doctrina, studium), the salvific revelation is reconstructed as rational culture (doctrina spiritalis),
able to form and promote the natural intellect (interpreted as imago Dei)
through the application and the effort of its want (the desiderium of the
liberum arbitrium)�7 Here we find the subordination of the charismatic
and eventual dimension of the Hebrew and Proto-Christian notion of
Spirit as compared to the ontological dimension of the Greek notion of
immaterial Truth� This means that the relationship with the revelation
of God is seen as a meritorious process of gradual rational formation, in
a synergistic fashion� The Spirit is not a supernatural force which bursts
in the mortal and sinful nature of man, in order to gift it ex nihilo, ex
abrupto with a charismatic fullness approaching the eschatological intimacy with God� Instead, the Spirit is the divine nature already implicitly
7
Or�, princ� 1�1,6: Indiget sane mens magnitudine intellegibili, quia non corporaliter,
sed intellegibiliter crescit. Non enim corporalibus incrementis simul cum corpore
mens usque ad vicesimum vel tricesimum annum aetatis augetur, sed eruditionibus
atque exercitiis adhibitis acumen quidem elimatur ingenii, quaeque sunt ei insita ad
intellegentiam provocantur, et capax maioris efficitur intellectus non corporalibus
incrementis aucta, sed eruditionis exercitiis elimata� See Or�, Cels� 3� 45–50, for an
actual apology of the liberal culture, which allows the progression of intelligence
and virtue: “And it is no hindrance to the knowledge of God, but an assistance, to
have been educated, and to have studied the best opinions, and to be wise” (Καὶ οὐ
κωλύει γε πρὸς τὸ γνῶναι θεὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ συνεργεῖ τὸ πεπαιδεῦσθαι καὶ λόγων ἀρίστων
ἐπιμεμελῆσθαι καὶ φρόνιμον εἶναι)� For a relativization of the Pauline contraposition
between “wisdom of the cross” and “man’s wisdom” (1 Cor 1: 17–31), see Or�,
Cels� 3�47, where there is an apology of the wisdom of God as (Platonic!) knowledge of His intellectual and over-sensible nature, as opposed to the materialistic
(Epicurean, stoical) wisdom of this world� See Or�, Joh� 13�36: Καὶ ἐπίστησον, εἰ
οἷόν τ’ ἔστιν ἀνθρωπίνην σοφίαν μὴ τὰ ψευδῆ καλεῖν δόγματα, ἀλλὰ τὰ στοιχειωτικὰ
τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ εἰς τοὺς ἔτι ἀνθρώπους φθάνοντα· τὰ δὲ διδακτὰ τοῦ πνεύματος τάχα
ἐστὶν ἡ πηγὴ τοῦ ἁλλομένου ὕδατος εἰς ζωὴν αἰώνιον; the apocalyptic Pauline antithesis which opposes the logoi of human wisdom (διδακτοὶ ἀνθρωπίνης σοφίας λόγοι)
to the teachings of the Spirit (διδακτοὶ πνεύματος) is interpreted in an antidualistic
(and Catholic) manner as distinction of elements and levels of a single process
of knowledge, organised in an inchoative human component and divine refining
component�
Progress: A Key Idea for Origen and Its Inheritance
23
present in the inner part of every intellect, which has to progressively
take himself back, thanks to the continuous solicitation of the Logos,
who tries to attract the freedom by a rational, non-violent persuasion to
collaborate with God�8 In this fully Proto-Catholic perspective, between
history/natural and eschatology/supernatural there is ontological continuity, intellectual progression, and gradual and meritorious transfiguration, instead of fracture and irreducible apocalyptic crisis, catastrophic
final overthrow of the natural in the supernatural due to the formidable
and salvific irruption of God in history� This movement substitutes the
free election of the community, separated from the perverted and damned
world, with the process of the progressive and universal conversion of
the world to the Logos� The necessity of rational spiritualisation of the
religious favors a systematic interiorising interpretation of the historical
salvific religion: the authentic knowledge of the evangelical revelation is
the interiorisation, the progress from the external sign to the inner Logos,
and therefore the intellectual and moral appropriation of the objective
and historical sacred events� Christianity becomes a metaphor/translatio
which produces the universal moral and intellectual progress. Origenian
Christianity is hence rationalistic: the divine is the rational inside me,
so that every exterior materialisation of the sacred is provisional, symbolic, littera occidens, if maintained as reific objectification of the sacred�
The landing place of spiritual progress, hence, is the mystical overcoming
of all the exterior signs which still separated Logos and logoi: only he
who again becomes logos in the Logos, god in God, christ in Christ,
and through Him one in the One can have a deep understanding of the
gospel� The ratio mystica is the rational interiorisation of the Christian
religious cultic system, ontologically relativised as approximate signs
of the spiritual cult, namely of the inner intellectual identity between
Christ and christs, His images� Ecclesial mediation is still necessary in
pedagogical terms, but is provisional in ontological terms, because the
peak of progress is the interiorisation of the relationship between logos
and Logos, the only absolute mediator� If the scope of the divine revelation is to make man progress, until he is transformed in god,9 then the
fulfillment of religion as a historical structure of subordinate mediation
between God and man is its overcoming in the mystical reaching of the
8
9
See Or�, Cels� 6�58�
Or�, Joh� 20�268: “We have presented these comments that we may flee being
men with all our strength and hasten to become “gods” (ταῦτα δὲ παρεθέμεθα
ἵνα πάσῃ δυνάμει φεύγωμεν τὸ εἶναι ἄνθρωποι καὶ σπεύδωμεν γενέσθαι θεοί)� The
English translation, here and throughout the volume, is from R� E� Heine, Origen.
Commentary on the Gospel according to John Books 1–10, Washington 1989�
24
Gaetano Lettieri
union with God, the intimate equality with God bestowed on the logoi
by the Logos�10
3� The theological system of Origen maintains at the same time identity
and progress between the beginning and the end of all� The progress
of the end compared to the beginning depends on the novelty of creatural freedom, which progresses up to the point of loving “actively”
the identical perfection of the beginning, which was only “passively”
participated in originally� It is the history of freedom which makes the
Origenian system swerve from the classical idea of the eternal return
of the identical�11 The structural overlapping between the pre-existence
of the intellects created in the image12 and their universal eschatological
apocatastasis,13 and therefore between the perfection of the beginning
and the perfection of the end,14 should not be construed as an ontological
10 See Or�, Joh� 2�19–24; 32�118; 1�91–93: “In the so-called restoration (ἐν τῇ
λεγομένῃ ἀποκαταστάσει) […] those who have come to God because of the Word
which is with him will have the contemplation of God as their only activity (μία
πρᾶξις ἔσται τῶν πρὸς θεὸν διὰ τὸν πρὸς αὐτὸν λόγον φθασάντων ἡ τοῦ κατανοεῖν τὸν
θεόν), that having been accurately formed in the knowledge of the Father, they may
all thus become a son (ἵνα γένωνται οὕτως ἐν τῇ γνώσει τοῦ πατρὸς μορφωθέντες
πάντες † ἀκριβῶς υἱός), since now the Son alone has known the Father (ὡς νῦν
μόνος ὁ υἱὸς ἔγνωκε τὸν πατέρα) […] no one has known the Father even if he be an
apostle or prophet, but that it will occur whenever they become one as [the] Son
and the Father are one (ἀλλ’ ὅταν γένωνται ἓν ὡς <ὁ> υἱὸς καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ἕν εἰσιν);”
1�201: “Now it is very clear even to the common crowd how our Lord is teacher
and interpreter (διδάσκαλος καὶ σαφηνιστής) for those striving for piety, and lord
of servants who have “the spirit of bondage in fear”� But when they progress and
hasten to wisdom (προκοπτόντων <δὲ> καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν σοφίαν σπευδόντων) and are
judged worthy of it (ταύτης ἀξιουμένων) – since “the servant does not know what
his lord wishes” – he does not remain their lord; he becomes their friend (οὐ μένει
κύριος, γινόμενος αὐτῶν φίλος)�”
11 See Or�, Cels� 4�67–69�
12 I find myself in complete disagreement with the nevertheless refined attempt to
cast doubt on the notion of preexistence of the intellects made by M�J� Edwards,
Origen against Plato, Ashgate 2002, 87–122� It seems misleading to me the
revival and systematisation of this ill-founded thesis made by P� Tzamalikos,
Origen: Cosmology and Ontology of Time, Leiden 2006: see G� Lettieri, Dies una.
L’allegoria di “coelum et terra in Principio” ricapitolazione del sistema misticospeculativo di Origene, in: Adamantius 23 (2017) 45–84; and B�P� Blosser, Become
Like the Angels. Origen’s Doctrine of the Soul, Washington 2012, 157–182�
13 See the good introduction by I� Ramelli, The Christian Doctrine of Apokatastasis: A
Critical Assessment from the New Testament to Eriugena, Leiden 2013, 1–221�
14 See Or�, princ� 1�6,1–4: Semper enim similis est finis initiis; et ideo sicut unus
omnium finis, ita unum omnium intellegi debet initium; et sicut multorum unus
Progress: A Key Idea for Origen and Its Inheritance
25
return of the identical, but as a free and loving retractatio of the divine gift
of the original perfection� Even though the doctrine of the apocatastasis
ends up by identifying the eschatological gift with the compelling realisation of the ontological perfection of the theomorphic derivate, still the
end is new compared to the beginning� The end fulfills and improves the
beginning, regaining it after freely loving it, mindful, moreover, of
the vanity of sin and the redemptive merciful passion of Christ� The gift
of the original participation in the divine is then “renewed”, “fulfilled”,
and “stabilized” through the progressive conciliation between mercy
and sin, grace and freedom�15 This means an eschatological reinterpretation of ontology, in which the freedom itself of man cooperates: it is
the free creature that defines, in conjunction with the redemptive action
of the Logos, the final perfection of the being� The doctrine of the created
noes as pre-existing images of God seems to be opposed to the notion
of progress, introducing on the contrary an exaltation of protological
perfection, so that the end is seen as returning to the beginning, rather
than as historical-donative progress� Is this not a loss of the evangelical
and Pauline novitas of the eschatological advent of grace? If the creature
which falls is still divine in an inalienable way, is sin only a very contingent phenomenon, a provisional growth in the divine totality which
proceeds from God and returns to God, in circles? From this perspective, is progress only the ascensional movement of a circular ontological
process, in which divine and human freedom end up being captured and
interpreted as parts of an absolute necessity? Is the Origenian system a
Hellenistic system of the circular return of the perfection of the identical,
and hence a system of the divinity of the ontological, of the eternal necessity of nature (despite its being created)? Is universal freedom subtracted
in the prevalence of the metaphysical necessity of the inalienable participation of the intellectual in the absolute Intellectual? Nevertheless,
there is a fundamental difference between the beginning and the end in
Origen: the theomorphic perfection of the creature is “subjected” to its
free appropriation, so that God’s creation reaches perfection only when
it is perfectly loved by all creatures� Therefore, the gospel is the eschatological announcement of love as the final and perfect love of the freedom
of the creature, able to cooperate with God in the redemption of all
things� The only discrepancy between the beginning and the end is the
finis, ita ab uno initio multae differentiae ac varietates, quae rursum per bonitatem
Dei, per subiectionem Christi atque unitatem Spiritus Sancti in unum finem, qui
sit initio similis, revocantur (1�6,2); Dispersio illa unius principii atque divisio ad
unum et eundem finem ac similitudinem reparatur (1�6,4)�
15 See Or�, Joh� 13�236–246�
26
Gaetano Lettieri
progress of love, the risk of the freedom of desire, which adheres to the
Love which puts it into being and in his intimacy� The major problematical point of the Origenian system is at the same time the deepest and
most original height of this thought: the paradoxical identification of the
pathic love of God for His free creatures introduces contingency, instability, historicity in the Absolute, which is not omnipotent in His exposition to the freedom of His creatures� Hence Augustine’s accusation,
which condemned Origen’s eschatology as insecura, always exposed to
the instable arbitrariness of creatures, responsible for new falls and new
conversions; this would lead to extrinsical redemptive measures of God,
with the subsequent capture in the useless eternal returning of progress
and regress� In reality, for Origen the extraordinary mercy of God, the
memory of the fall and the redemption and the free loving choice of the
participation in God are sufficient safeguards against a new fall, fixing
god/God in God� This way, the system of Origen is clearly and explicitely
different from the eternal return of the identical, with its circular cycle of
dilation and contraction� The freedom of love saves the ontological perfection of the divine from the condemnation of the vanity of the eternal
return of the identical�
4� The Origenian theology of progress is tendentially anti-hierarchical: as in
the Beginning, so in the end every diversitas of quality stops, and there is
absolute equality amongst creatures; this equality is a model to which the
Christian communities start to get close to slowly but surely� The ontological becoming is the passage from the original unity of the intra-divine
perfection of the “first creation” to the free differentiation of the intellects and their love, which concurs with God in the determination of the
“second creation�” The second creation is ordained according to different orders and ontological and historical hierarchies: they are determinations which arose after the original logoi (identified with the “man in the
image”),16 and therefore they are adventitious, precarious, provisional
conditions, which gradually will be absorbed in the progressive return of
all in the Beginning, namely the ecstatic Son, who sinks into the unified
16 See Or�, Joh� 2�144–148: “Everything made “according to the image and likeness
of God” is man (πᾶν τὸ “κατ’ εἰκόνα καὶ ὁμοίωσιν” γενόμενον θεοῦ ἄνθρωπον εἶναι)
[…] In the case of the higher powers, the names are not names of the natures of
living beings, but of orders (τὰ ὀνόματα οὐχὶ φύσεων ζῴων ἐστὶν ὀνόματα ἀλλὰ
τάξεων) of which this or that spiritual nature has been prepared by God (ὧν ἥδε
τις καὶ ἥδε λογικὴ φύσις τέτευχεν ἀπὸ θεοῦ) […] Their substance is nothing other
than man (ὧν τὸ ὑποκείμενον οὐκ ἄλλο τί ἐστιν ἢ ἄνθρωπος), and to this substance it
has chanced to be a throne, or dominion, or principality, or power (τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ
συμβέβηκε τὸ θρόνῳ εἶναι ἢ κυριότητι ἢ ἀρχῇ ἢ ἐξουσίᾳ)�”
Progress: A Key Idea for Origen and Its Inheritance
27
contemplation of the Father� “In the Beginning,” before the creation of
time and the world, the Logos creates in himself a plurality of intellects,
all created in the image of God, and therefore identical in perfection
and freedom� Hence, the diversified level of perfection of the creatures
is secondary, relying on the diversified exercise of their freedom, which
determines different levels of approximation of the theomorphic desire,
and consequently different levels of ontological perfection� If, in the
Beginning, the creatures are all created identical by the Son because they
enjoy an identical deified gift of the Spirit, in the end the creatures will
be identical because they all will choose to love Him freely� Any ontological and secular order (τάξις), inasmuch as it is secondary, is provisional,
tends to be overcome, raised in an unrelenting movement of an ascensional progress, which is at the same time ontologically unified and free,
and therefore articulated in different individual movements of different
anagogical speeds� Every ontological structure is precarious, a temporary
stopping point, compared to the dynamism of intellectual desire, which
takes every particular reality as a point of outburst of its allegorical quest
of the One (the point of origin of the ontological becoming and the goal
to which it reconverts himself and is fulfilled)� Every different reality is,
therefore, vivified from an underlying movement of auto-transcendence
towards the protological/eschatological divine identity� This movement
can be halted only apparently: the mystical apocatastasis is therefore the
suppression of all the hierarchical ontological and mundane diversitates,
always physically realised, and recapitulated in the mystical body, which
is entirely rational and incorporeal, reunited in love with the Head,
the Logos�
5� The intellectual creature is naturally progressive, being ontologically
ecstatic (as an allegorical substance) and free (determined by his desire,
which makes him lean towards the other)� The mens imago is ecstatic,
because it is a) ontologically dependent on the Father and the Son/Image
which gives it existence and welcomes it in His intimacy, making it part
of the divinising Spirit, in which the mind is called upon to progress
up to likeness and unity with the Logos; and b) free, called upon a free
love to the God who constitutes it, hence characterised by the dynamism
of its “desiderium�”17 Indeed, the mens imago exists only going outside
17 See Or�, princ� 2�11,4: Quae a Deo facta pervidemus, ineffabili desiderio ardet
animus agnoscere rationem. Quod desiderium, quem amorem sine dubio a Deo
nobis insitum credimus; et sicut oculus naturaliter lucem requirit et visum, et
corpus nostrum escas et potum desiderat per naturam: ita mens nostra sciendae
veritatis Dei et rerum causas noscendi proprium ac naturale desiderium gerit.
Accepimus autem a Deo istud desiderium non ad hoc, ut nec debeat umquam
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itself: as a real “ontological allegory”, it exists only by referring to the
other, to the divine archetype which lights it up and attracts it� Hence, the
imago is adumbratio, ὑποτύπωσις, impetus, sketch, symbol, and a sign
which in itself refers to itself as other (in God)� Man is the hypothesis
of an ontological impetus towards the divine, a symbol fulfilled only by
progress in God� The mens imago, being free, can suspend, invert, forget,
or love and remember, in its conversion, the dependence relationship
towards the other� Therefore, freedom, desire, and progress are inextricably linked: the created intellect, being free, has to go beyond itself,
beyond every stopping point of its desire�18 The original sin is satiety of
desire of God, a provisional stop of the progressive desire, a paralysis of
the allegorical nature of the image, a contradictory freedom which incarcerates freedom in an autistic stasis, materialising appropriation of the
desire in itself of the creature, which, as a contingent being, can only fall
in the inadequacy of its accidental nature� Only the continual conversion
nec possit expleri; alioquin frustra a conditore Deo menti nostrae videbitur amor
veritatis insertus, si numquam desiderii compos efficitur. Unde et in hac vita qui
summo labore piis studiis ac religiosis operam dederint, quamvis parva quaeque ex
multis et inmensis divinae scientiae capiant thesauris, tamen hoc ipsum, quod animos suos mentemque erga haec occupant atque in hac semet ipsos cupiditate praeveniunt, multum utilitatis accipiunt ex hoc ipso, quod animos suos ad inquirendae
veritatis studium amoremque convertunt et paratiores eos faciunt ad eruditionis
futurae capacitatem (sicut, cum aliquis velit imaginem pingere, si ante futurae
formae liniamenta tenuis stili adumbratione designet et superponendis vultibus
capaces praeparet notas, sine dubio per adumbrationem iam inposita praeformatio
ad suscipiendos veros illos colores paratior invenitur), si modo adumbratio ipsa
ac deformatio stilo domini nostri Iesu Christi “in cordis nostri tabulis” perscribatur. Et idcirco fortasse dicitur quia “omni habenti dabitur et adicietur”. Unde
constat habentibus iam deformationem quandam in hac vita veritatis et scientiae
addendam esse etiam pulchritudinem perfectae imaginis in futuro� Here it should
be noted that the notion of image is articulated in a double dimension: that of
adumbratio or deformatio and that of perfecta imago, which perfectly matches
the notion of similitudo, which is described in the subsequent note�
18 Or�, princ� 2�11,1: Certum est quia nullum animal omnimodis otiosum atque
immobile esse potest, sed omni genere moveri et agere semper et velle aliquid gestit;
et hanc inesse naturam omnibus animantibus manifestum puto. Multo ergo magis
rationabile animal, id est hominis naturam necesse est semper aliquid movere vel
agere� Or�, princ� 2�11,7: Et ita crescens per singula rationabilis natura, non sicut
in carne vel corpore et anima in hac vita crescebat, sed mente ac sensu aucta ad
perfectam scientiam mens iam perfecta perducitur, nequaquam iam ultra istis
carnalibus sensibus inpedita, sed intellectualibus incrementis aucta, semper ad
purum et, ut ita dixerim, “facie ad faciem” rerum causas inspiciens, potiturque
perfectione, primo illa, qua in id ascendit, secundo qua permanet, cibos quibus
vescatur habens theoremata et intellectus rerum rationesque causarum�
Progress: A Key Idea for Origen and Its Inheritance
29
of the desire in God, the inexhaustible progress of love can transfigure
the ontological contingency of the creature, allowing to it the fulfillment
of the ecstatic and divinising dimension of the imago Dei, its deepest
identity, which is still inchoative� The divinisation is then the free progress of the image, called to attain the likeness, the ultimate perfection
and finally the very unity with God, which can only be dynamic, in its
nature of unlimited desire, inexhaustible unifying love, freely chosen�19
Therefore, even regression, the fall, sinful bewilderment, and the experience of evil are inscribed in the still progressive reality of desire: sin is
the perversion, the suspension and paradoxical contradiction of desire�
Anyway, sin becomes a “redemptive” experience of lacking and insatiability in the realm of creatures and materiality (what imprisons and
weighs down, instead of releasing love’s desire towards the other); this
experience inflames a very deep desire for God, the only reality which, in
19 See Or�, Cels� 4�30 and Or�, princ� 3�6,1: Summum bonum, ad quod natura rationabilis universa festinat, qui etiam finis omnium dicitur, a quam plurimis etiam
philosophorum hoc modo terminatur, quia summum bonum sit, prout possibile
est, similem fieri Deo […] Hoc namque indicat Moyses ante omnes, cum primam conditionem hominis enarrat dicens: “Et dixit Deus: Faciamus hominem ad
imaginem et similitudinem nostram”. Tum deinde addit: “Et fecit Deus hominem,
ad imaginem Dei fecit illum, masculum et feminam fecit eos, et benedixit eos”.
Hoc ergo quod dixit “ad imaginem Dei fecit eum” et de similitudine siluit, non
aliud indicat nisi quod imaginis quidem dignitatem in prima conditione percepit,
similitudinis vero ei perfectio in consummatione servata est: scilicet ut ipse sibi
eam propriae industriae studiis ex Dei imitatione conscisceret, quo possibilitate
sibi perfectionis in initiis data per imaginis dignitatem, in fine demum per operum
expletionem perfectam sibi ipse similitudinem consummaret� Further into the text,
this same likeness is called to improve, culminating in the paradoxical (and ontologically “impossible”) perfect unity with God: In quo [=John 17:21�24] iam videtur ipsa similitudo, si dici potest, proficere et ex simili unum iam fieri, pro eo sine
dubio quod in consummatione vel fine “omnia et in omnibus Deus” est (3�6,1)�
The eschatological, apocatastatic unity with God can only be dynamic: hence,
progressive� See Or�, Cels� 4�23–30, where man’s dignity (as opposed to worms,
which Celsus polemically compared to the amorphous and miserable mass of
Christians) is indicated in its natural power of virtuous progress, recognising
the theomorphic image which is its own� See Or�, Cels� 4�25, Chadwick, Contra
Celsum, 1980, 201: “And yet, whatever is the nature of the rational being, it would
not be reasonable to compare it to a worm, (Καίτοι γε ὁποῖον δὴ τὸ λογικὸν οὐκ
ἂν εὐλόγως σκώληκι παραβάλλοιτο), since it possesses tendencies towards virtue
(ἀφορμὰς ἔχον πρὸς ἀρετήν)� These general inclinations towards virtue prohibit
us from comparing with a worm those who potentially possess virtue, and who
cannot entirely destroy its seeds (Αὗται γὰρ αἱ πρὸς αὐτὴν ὑποτυπώσεις οὐκ ἐῶσι
σκώληκι παραβάλλεσθαι τοὺς δυνάμει ἔχοντας τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ τὰ σπέρματα αὐτῆς
πάντῃ ἀπολέσαι οὐ δυναμένους)�”
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His transcendence, can truly satisfy the desire� From the point of view of
an anthropology of freedom, even fall and sin are ways of verifying the
vanity of creatures outside of God, and hence providential trials of sorrow and frustration of the desire� These trials, contracting the desire, are
experimental in projecting it with a greater impetus towards a finally liberating furtherness; in eschatological time, they fix this desire more thoroughly in God� It is clear that this progressive, meta-secular, rational,
and mystical reduction of man to his deep-seated rational and theomorphic dimension runs the risk of idealistically misplacing the unique singularity and historicity, the risky contingency of his being, characterised
by vain hopes, gratuitous and unredeemed sorrow, and the urgency of
final and irreversible decisions� The idea of progress hence is a speculative dispositive which tends to remove existence into essence� It is not a
coincidence that the “existential” and confessive theology of the mature
Augustine, which is focused on the crucial value of the event, defines
itself in a systematic breakup with the Origenian theological model�
6� Freedom propels being, the mind becomes what it loves: despite fall,
regression, and materialisation, man returns to be god in progress, in the
son and thanks to the son� The fall from the “identical” divine pleroma
to the ontologically different and hierarchic world depends on a materialising regression; the conversion to the Logos starts a divinising process,
which will reveal the accidental and provisional state of matter, which is
only a relative function of the level of self-consciousness of the intellect�
The original fall causes an almost general alienation from God, who is
absolute immaterial Light, divinising Fire� Therefore, human beings are
intellects which had regressed from the deifying union with God and had
fallen in the ontological defect of their contingency and made obscure,
materialised� Their embodiment is the effect of the cooling of the free
and loving intellectual desire which united them with God by making
them participants of the Spirit of the Logos� On a provisional basis,
the quality of man’s desire (qualified as material, psychic and spiritual/
perfect, as in the Pauline tripartition, as well as the Gnostic one) determines the ontologically progressive configurations of creatures (from the
demonic to the human and angelic)� Freedom determines the continuous
and progressive steps of the perfection of being, which culminates in the
Christic self-understanding as divinised image, united with God� In the
apocatastasis, the material sensible dimension will again become pure
contingency assumed in the participation of God; the body will dissolve
because there will not be any point of resistance or ontological opacity
in the presence of the absolute Light in which the intellect will be welcomed� The historical and corporeal dimension of the subject is not original but adventitious; on the contrary, the true and deep identity of the
Progress: A Key Idea for Origen and Its Inheritance
31
subject is the protological, purely intellectual and incorporeal dimension,
in which matter is recapitulated in pure rational principle ((λόγος τις,
insita ratio)�20 Matter, in proportion to the progress of the singular intellect to whom it is inherent, gradually progresses from its “secondary”
dimension (which is solid and completely resistant) to its “primary”
dimension (purely “ideal”)� At last, recapitulated in its singular formal
principle, purely intellectual, matter is mere potentiality or a rational
trace of contingency of the singular rational creature� A profound question arises: what kind of singularity is that of a free, purely intellectual
subject, originally devoid of any type of historicity, physicality, or personal relationships with emotional and pathic values? Moreover, in the
beginning, from what kind of “experience” and personal expectation
does freedom, which is fully identical in every ontologically identical
intellect, choose differently? Does not the Platonizing ontological idea of
the freedom, equality, and fraternity of the protological intellects standardise in an abstract and essential way the singularity of the subject,
misplacing its historical, concrete reality? Indeed, the endless diversity
of history and creation is completely absorbed in the unified, essential,
bright universal omnipotence of the theophanic need�
7� Christ, the embodied Logos, is God in progress, precisely because He is
the merciful Deus Patiens: He progresses by adapting himself patiently
(down to incarnation and death) to the defective conditions and the longings of salvation of every singular intellect, which he converts again to
himself in an ascensional process of increasingly true, intellectual, mystical metamorphoses�21 The ontological progress of the creature depends
20 Or�, Cels� 5�23: “A certain power is implanted in the body (λόγος τις ἔγκειται
τῷ σώματι), which is not destroyed, and from which the body is raised up in
incorruption (ἀφ’ οὗ μὴ φθειρομένου ἐγείρεται τὸ σῶμα ἐν ἀφθαρσίᾳ)”; Or�, princ�
2�10�3: Etiam nostra corpora velut granum cadere in terram putanda sunt; quibus
insita ratio ea, quae substantiam continet corporalem, quamvis emortua fuerint
corpora et corrupta atque dispersa, Verbo tamen Dei ratio illa ipsa, quae semper
in substantia corporis salva est, erigat ea de terra et restituat ac reparet�
21 See Or�, princ� 1�2�1–4; and Or�, Cels� 2�64: “Although Jesus was only a single
individual (Ὁ Ἰησοῦς εἷς ὢν), He was nevertheless more things than one, according
to the different standpoint from which He might be regarded (πλείονα τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ
ἦν); nor was He seen in the same way by all who beheld Him (τοῖς βλέπουσιν οὐχ
ὁμοίως πᾶσιν ὁρώμενος)� Now, that He was more things than one, according to the
varying point of view (ὅτι μὲν τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ πλείονα ἦν), is clear from this statement,
“I am the way, and the truth, and the life”; and from this, “I am the bread”; and
this, “I am the door”, and innumerable others� And that when seen He did not
appear in like fashion to all those who saw Him, but according to their several
ability to receive Him (Ὅτι δὲ καὶ βλεπόμενος οὐχ ὡσαύτως τοῖς βλέπουσιν ἐφαίνετο,
ἀλλ’ ὡς ἐχώρουν οἱ βλέποντες), will be clear to those who notice why, at the time
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on the merciful revelatory and redemptive progress of the Logos, who
becomes all things to all to contain and convert all the creation in
Himself: the God who eternally becomes “man”, uniting Himself with
the totality of the created intellectual body, is the first and the last, the
creative beginning and the redeemed end, the donative act (the Son as
Logos who created in Himself and unifies Himself with the perfect, then
lapsed and redeemed creatures) and the mystical act (the Son as Wisdom
who plunges Himself in the Father, surrendering to Him all the creatures
that He has unified in Himself)�22 Christ is God in progress, universal
motion and translatio, the One who becomes multiple, the Eternal who
becomes time, the absolute need who welcomes in Himself the contingency and the fall of creatural freedom, to reconvert it to Himself and in
Himself� The progress of the creatures can exist only because there is the
accommodation of the Logos to the imperfect and progredient desire of
the creatures� In His dialectic power, the Logos assumes multiple ἐπίνοιαι
(denominations/configurations) μορφαί (representations), μεταβολαί and
μεταμορφώσεις (passages, transformations, metamorphoses) – in other
words, intellectual, historical, biblical theophanies in which He manifests Himself through ascensional steps of revelation and truth – these
steps allow the creatures to grow in the understanding and desire of
God� The Logos, therefore, is the becoming other of the Logos in
Himself with the purpose of accommodating the becoming other of creatural freedom: creatural freedom thereby mercifully advances the Son in
Himself, for others� Precisely because He is identified with the catholic
universal truth, the Logos is able to embrace all things in Himself, not
to exclude anything, and to hold together the extremes by elevating the
when He was about to be transfigured on the high mountain, He did not admit all
His apostles (to this sight), but only Peter, and James, and John, because they alone
were capable of beholding”; “For there are different appearances, as it were, of the
Word (Εἰσὶ γὰρ διάφοροι οἱονεὶ τοῦ λόγου μορφαί), according as He shows Himself
to each one of those who come to His doctrine (καθὼς ἑκάστῳ τῶν εἰς ἐπιστήμην
ἀγομένων φαίνεται ὁ λόγος); and this in a manner corresponding to the condition
of him who is just becoming a disciple (ἀνάλογον τῇ ἕξει τοῦ εἰσαγομένου), or of
him who has made a little progress (ἢ ἐπ’ ὀλίγον προκόπτοντος), or of him who has
advanced further, or of him who has already nearly attained to virtue, or who has
even already attained it (ἢ ἐπὶ πλεῖον ἢ καὶ ἐγγὺς ἤδη γινομένου τῆς ἀρετῆς ἢ καὶ ἐν
ἀρετῇ γεγενημένου) […] And let these remarks be an answer to the suppositions
of Celsus, who does not understand the changes or transformations of Jesus, as
related in the histories (τὰς ὡς ἐν ἱστορίαις λεγομένας μεταβολὰς ἢ μεταμορφώσεις
τοῦ Ἰησοῦ), nor His mortal and immortal nature�” (Or�, Cels� 4�16)� See also 4�15;
6�78; 6�77�
22 See Or�, Joh� 1�91–93; 1� 216–225�
Progress: A Key Idea for Origen and Its Inheritance
33
desire of the creature from the inferior to the superior level, from the
fleshly to the rational, from the external to the internal, from the temporary to the fulfilled, from the partial to the complete; in other words,
from the other to the One on whom this desire depends and from whom
it derives� This means that reality in the Christian-catholic perspective
is a process of continuous conversion, of universal progress of the flesh/
matter to the rational/intellectual, of freedom into grace, of the Law
into Gospel, of the human into the divine� This process of conversion
depends on the mediation of the embodied Logos, who is the dialectical
pivot of the universal becoming of reality, interpreted as the totality of
the free image progressively elevated in God by the desire of His love�
For Origen, the Christian religion is catholic because it can account for
the original unity of dualism, its provisional nature, and its progressive reduction to unity� The Son is God who becomes, who progresses
in Himself: He-is-the-God-who-becomes-Man, the Man-who-becomesGod, the person of the paradoxical, mystical translatio of the two into
one, of love as fusion of the absolute distance between Creator and creature, of the allegorical transfiguration of the rational created being in the
created Logos�
8� The historical and biblical revelation of the embodied Logos is reconstructed as ἀναγωγή of διαφωνίαι: the four Gospels prospect a progressive revelation of Christ’s revelation, which culminates in the gospel of
John� The intelligence of the exegete is called to rise up from the historical body of the Word, which constitutes the metaphorical historical
facts of Jesus’ life, to the rational depth of the Son, who introduces the
mystical body of the elects in an eternal movement of intra-trinitarian
love� The relationship between the synoptic Gospels and the fourth
Gospel theorises a progressive intelligence of the revelation, therefore
an abysmal theological deepening, which arises from the historical
Jesus to the eternal Logos: the διαφωνίαι are defectus litterae if carried
to extremes, whilst they have to be elevated allegorically in a mysticalspeculative symploché. Therefore, in Or� Joh� 10�15–21, the divergencies
between the gospels are reconstructed as singular and diversified stages
of a unique process of knowledge, as diachronic “freeze-frames” of an
organic spiritual προκοπή, common to all evangelists, which depends
on Christ’s manifold revelation�23 He is therefore able to accommodate
23 Or�, Joh� 10�15: “But to grasp some notion of the evangelists’ intention (τοῦ
βουλήματος τῶν εὐαγγελίων), we must also say the following� Assume that God,
his words to the saints, and his presence, which is present with them when he
reveals himself at special times in their progress (τήν τε παρουσίαν, ἣν πάρεστιν
αὐτοῖς ἐξαιρέτοις καιροῖς τῆς προκοπῆς αὐτῶν ἐπιφαινόμενος), are set before certain
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Gaetano Lettieri
every individual, to reveal Himself as prepared to adapt Himself to every
level of his free desire of knowledge and love,24 from the inferior, still
prisoner of the flesh one from which the individual starts to free himself,
to the purely spiritual one� The latter culminates in the knowledge of the
inexhaustable transcendence of the Logos: a transcendence which still
allows an intimate union� Revelation is indeed an anagogic mediation of
translatio, identified with the embodied Logos Himself, who through His
different bodily appearance (σωματικῶς) urges the believers to progress
through the ascendant reaching of “something made clear to them in a
purely intellectual manner” (τὸ καθαρῶς νοητῶς αὐτοῖς τετρανωμένον)
(10�18): to pass from the historical gospel to the eternal one, the pure,
eternal, intelligible and universal ascensional revelation of the Logos�25
people who see in the Spirit� Since there are several and they are in different places,
and by no means all receive the same benefits (πλέοσιν οὖσιν τὸν ἀριθμὸν καὶ ἐν
διαφόροις τόποις, οὐχ ὁμοειδεῖς τε πάντη εὐεργεσίας εὐεργετουμένοις), assume that
each one individually reports what he sees in the Spirit (ἑκάστῳ ἰδίᾳ ἀπαγγεῖλαι ἃ
βλέπει τῷ πνεύματι) about God, his words, and his manifestations to the saints�”
24 Or�, Joh� 10�21: “Therefore Jesus too is many things in his aspects (Καὶ ὁ Ἰησοῦς
τοίνυν πολλά ἐστιν ταῖς ἐπινοίαις); it is likely that the different evangelists took
their thoughts from these aspects and wrote the Gospels (ὧν ἐπινοιῶν εἰκὸς τοὺς
εὐαγγελιστὰς διαφόρους ἐννοίας λαμβάνοντας), sometimes also being in agreement
with one another concerning certain things (ἐσθ’ ὅτε καὶ συμφερομένους ἄλλους
περί τινων ἀναγεγραφέναι τὰ εὐαγγέλια)�”
25 On the dialectic understanding of Catholic theology, see Or�, Joh� 13�98–110: very
interestingly, the orthodox dogma, which worships God in spirit and truth, is
presented as the virtuous midpoint between two partial, and therefore imperfect,
interpretations; the historically founded faith of the Jews and the simple Catholics,
represented by the Jewish collocation of the Temple in the historical material
Jerusalem, and the speculative heretical knowledge, represented by the Samaritans,
who located the true Temple in the Garizim, which is still materialistic because it
is exclusive� An equivalent opposition is in 13�51–52: the opposition between the
literalist exegetes of the Scriptures and the Gnostic ones; the latter, allegorising
Scripture, deserts the “five husbands” of the historical and sensible interpretations,
uniting themselves with the “false sixth husband”, the allegorical, spiritual and
intellectual interpretation of the heretics� The Catholic exegesis is the mediation,
the dialectic connection between two partial and exclusive interpretations; the
intelligible truth can be reached only as the deep knowledge of revelation, recognized as universal: this means that the revelation is connected with the historical
and sensible creation, and is not opposed to it in a dualistic way� Ἐπὰν δὲ μετὰ τὸ
ὡμιληκέναι τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἀνακῦψαί τις θέλων καὶ προτραπεὶς ἐπὶ τὰ νοητὰ περιτύχῃ
λόγῳ προφάσει ἀλληγορίας καὶ πνευματικῶν οὐχ ὑγιαίνοντι, οὗτος μετὰ τοὺς πέντε
ἄνδρας ἑτέρῳ προσέρχεται, δούς, ἵν’ οὕτως εἴπω, τὸ ἀποστάσιον τοῖς προτέροις πέντε
καὶ κρίνων συνοικεῖν τῷ ἕκτῳ� Καὶ ἕως ἄν γε ἐλθὼν ὁ Ἰησοῦς εἰς συναίσθησιν ἡμᾶς
ἀγάγῃ τοῦ τοιούτου ἀνδρός, ἐκείνῳ σύνεσμεν (13�52)�
Progress: A Key Idea for Origen and Its Inheritance
35
Therefore, to understand Jesus in His totality means to retrieve His progressive movement of ascent and descent, and reconnect in a unique
process His different “comings”, His manifold “adaptations”, the progressive steps of His becoming all things to all: “But who is so wise, and
has such competence as to learn everything in regard to Jesus (πάντα τὸν
Ἰησοῦν μαθεῖν) from the four evangelists, and to be capable of understanding each thing by himself (καὶ ἕκαστον ἰδίᾳ χωρῆσαι νοῆσαι), and
to keep in sight all his visits and words and works in each place? (καὶ
πάσας αὐτοῦ τὰς καθ’ἕκαστον τόπον ἰδεῖν ἐπιδημίας καὶ λόγους καὶ ἔργα;)”
(10�36)�
9� The Proto-Christian theological reflection is reconstructed as a dogmatic
process, an in fieri understanding of God, a work in progress, a communal conjectural process, which results in the Catholic dogmatic synthesis, able to harmonise dissonant interpretations� As a result, the term
“heresy”26 means a necessary partial interpretation, which only progressively is recomposed in a more profound meaning� I point out here
the very original pluralistic and “sectarian” interpretation of Christian
origins proposed in Contra Celsum 3�11–13, in analogy with the conjectural and pluralistic nature of the philosophical sects/schools�27 The
26 See G� Lettieri, Il νοῦς mistico. Il superamento origeniano dello gnosticismo nel
“Commento a Giovanni”, in: E� Prinzivalli (ed�), Il Commento a Giovanni di
Origene: il testo e i suoi contesti, Villa Verucchio 2005, 177–275; G� Lettieri,
Origene interprete del Cantico dei cantici. La risoluzione mistica della metafisica
valentiniana, in L�F� Pizzolato/M� Rizzi (eds�), Origene maestro di vita spirituale,
Milan 2001, 141–186; G� Lettieri, Reductio ad unum. Dialettica cristologica e
retractatio dello gnosticismo valentiniano nel Commento a Matteo di Origene,
in: T� Piscitelli (ed�), Il Commento a Matteo di Origene, Brescia 2011, 237–287;
G� Lettieri, Tolomeo e Origene: divorzio/lettera e sizigia/Spirito, in Auctores nostri
15, 2015, 79–136�
27 On the systematic progress of science as a paradigm of the progress of revelation
and of theology and supreme science, see Or�, Joh� 13�301–305 and 13�316–321�
Οἶμαι δὴ ὅτι ἐπὶ πάσης τῆς ἐκ πλειόνων θεωρημάτων τέχνης καὶ ἐπιστήμης σπείρει
μὲν ὁ τὰς ἀρχὰς εὑρίσκων, ἅστινας ἕτεροι παραλαμβάνοντες καὶ ἐπεξεργαζόμενοι
αὐτὰς ἑτέροις τὰ ὑπὸ αὐτῶν εὑρημένα παραδιδόντες, αἴτιοι ἐξ ὧν εὑρήκασιν γίνονται
τοῖς μεταγενεστέροις οὐ δυνηθεῖσιν τάς τε ἀρχὰς εὑρεῖν καὶ τὰ ἑξῆς ἐπισυνάψαι καὶ τὸ
τέλος τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἐπιθεῖναι, τοῦ συμπληρωθεισῶν τῶν τοιούτων
τεχνῶν καὶ ἐπιστημῶν πλήρη τὸν καρπὸν ὡς ἐν θερισμῷ αὐτῶν ἀναλαβεῖν� Εἰ δὲ τοῦτο
ἐπὶ τεχνῶν ἐστιν ἀληθὲς καί τινων ἐπιστημῶν, πόσῳ πλέον ἐπὶ τῆς τέχνης τῶν τεχνῶν
καὶ ἐπιστήμης τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἔστι συνιδεῖν� Τὰ γὰρ εὑρεθέντα ὑπὸ τῶν προτέρων
ἐπεξεργασάμενοι οἱ μετ’ αὐτοὺς παραδεδώκασιν τοῖς ἑξῆς ἐξεταστικῶς προσιοῦσιν τοῖς
εὑρεθεῖσιν ἀφορμὰς τοῦ τὸ ἓν σῶμα τῆς ἀληθείας μετὰ σοφίας συναχθῆναι (13�302–
303)� Very interesting is Or�, princ� 3�3,3, in which Origen leans towards the
hypothesis that demons themselves inspire philosophy and heresies “in good
faith”, non laedendi hominis prospectu, sed quia haec vera esse ipsi illi “mundi
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Gaetano Lettieri
reflections on the revelation of the original communities, always biblically founded, are described here as divergent but still needed attempts
to understand revelation: therefore, as διαφωνίαι, hermeneutical dissonances, and a plurality of believing opinions which show the conjectural
nature of the Christian theological investigation, interpreted historically as a real work in progress� The understanding of God’s mystery,
albeit revealed enigmatically as always exceeding limited human understanding, proceeds harmonically through a plural work of progressive
understanding, careful listening to the διαφωνίαι, “philologically discordant” conjectures which the universal church is bound to harmonise
by combating the “absolutist” pretensions of the heresies�28 Therefore,
huius principes” arbitrentur, ideo etiam ceteros docere cupiant ea, quae ipsi vera
esse opinantur. Sicut enim, verbi causa, Graecorum auctores vel uniuscuiusque
haeresis principes cum prius ipsi errorem falsae doctrinae pro veritate susceperint
et hanc esse veritatem apud semet ipsos iudicaverint, tunc demum etiam ceteris
haec eadem persuadere conantur, quae apud semet ipsos vera esse censuerint: ita
putandum est facere etiam principes huius mundi, in quo mundo certae quaeque spiritales virtutes certarum gentium sortitae sunt principatum et propter hoc
mundi huius principes appellatae sunt� Therefore, philosophical truths and heretical errors are described as reached by a positive, albeit imperfect and misguided,
need of communion in truth, rather than a malevolent will of deceit and perdition� In fact, the different liberal disciplines, poetry, and magic itself are seen as
originating from the angelic powers, described, ambiguously, at the same time,
as inspiring deceits but also as revealers of ancient, authentic albeit inchoative,
wisdom, which was ordained from the divine providence itself: Sunt praeterea
etiam aliae praeter hos principes speciales quaedam mundi huius energiae, id est
virtutes aliquae spiritales, certa quaeque inoperantes, quae ipsae sibi pro arbitrii
sui libertate ut agerent elegerunt, ex quibus sunt isti spiritus, qui inoperantur
‘sapientiam huius mundi’: verbi causa, ut sit propria quaedam energia ac virtus,
quae inspirat poeticam, alia, quae geometriam, et ita quaeque singulas quasque
huiuscemodi artes disciplinas que commoveant […] Sed et hi, quos magos vel
maleficos dicunt, aliquotiens daemonibus invocatis supra pueros adhuc parvae
aetatis, versu eos dicere poemata admiranda omnibus et stupenda fecerunt� See
also Or�, In Iesu Naue homiliae 23�3 (Origen, In liber Iesu Nave homilia, ed� W� A�
Baehrens, in Origenes Werke 7, Leipzig, 1921)� Therefore, here an admiration for
the secular wisdom and the burden of the apocalyptic condemnation of this world
exist side by side: they can however be compatible if progressively interpreted: even
in the deceit or in the mundane inspiration of the celestial powers lies dormant a
will for communion with man and a yet inchoative search for truth�
28 “He [Celsus] says, in addition, that “all the Christians were of one mind” (ὅτι
ἓν ἐφρόνουν πάντες), not observing, even in this particular, that from the beginning there were differences of opinion among believers regarding the meaning
of the books held to be divine (οὐδ’ ἐν τούτῳ ὁρῶν ὅτι ἀρχῆθεν περὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς
πεπιστευμένοις θείοις εἶναι βιβλίοις ἐκδοχὴν γεγόνασι διαφωνίαι τῶν πιστευόντων) […]
from the very beginning, when, as Celsus imagines, believers were few in number,
Progress: A Key Idea for Origen and Its Inheritance
37
if the heresiological activity of Origen is systematic, still he is always
aware that heresy means partial opinion, διαφωνία of knowledge, which
can even contribute to the symphony of the orthodox and catholic –
which means progressive and universal – understanding of the revealed
Truth� As I have tried to show in various essays, even the Valentinian
Gnosticism itself is abrogated and condemned only to be understood in
a deepest, allegorical and mystical level� In this way the dualistic rigidity
is interpreted as littera occidens, which the spiritual understanding fluidifies and vivifies, making understanding progress in an allegorical way�
This means that Origen explicitly accepts the providential need for heresies, interpreted, through a daring exegesis of 1 Cor 11:19, as progressive ciphers of the universal truth of revelation�29
10� At the origin of the process of dogmatic definition of the Christian
revelation, Origen maintains a dynamic and critical interpretation of
dogma: the true dogma is the total one, insofar as it is progressive, able
to take on in itself the different Judeo-Christian and even heretical interpretations (therefore also the Greek Philosophical ones) of God and of
Christ as partial, fragmentary� True dogma is critical, because it denies
there were certain doctrines interpreted in different ways” (Or�, Cels� 3�11)� But
above all: “So, then, seeing Christianity appeared an object of veneration to men,
as Celsus supposes (ἐπεὶ σεμνόν τι ἐφάνη τοῖς ἀνθρώποις χριστιανισμός), not to the
more servile class alone (οὐ μόνοις, ὡς ὁ Κέλσος οἴεται, τοῖς ἀνδραποδωδεστέροις),
but to many among the Greeks who were devoted to literary pursuits (ἀλλὰ καὶ
πολλοῖς τῶν παρ’ Ἕλλησι φιλολόγων), there necessarily originated heresies, not
at all, however, as the result of faction and strife, but through the earnest desire
of many literary men to become acquainted with the doctrines of Christianity
(ἀναγκαίως ὑπέστησαν οὐ πάντως διὰ τὰς στάσεις καὶ τὸ φιλόνεικον αἱρέσεις ἀλλὰ
διὰ τὸ σπουδάζειν συνιέναι τὰ χριστιανισμοῦ καὶ τῶν φιλολόγων πλείονας)� The consequence of which was, that, taking in different acceptations those discourses
which were believed by all to be divine, there arose heresies (Τούτῳ δ’ ἠκολούθησε,
διαφόρως ἐκδεξαμένων τοὺς ἅμα πᾶσι πιστευθέντας εἶναι θείους λόγους, τὸ γενέσθαι
αἱρέσεις), which received their names from those individuals who admired, indeed,
the origin of the logos, but who were led, in some way or other, by certain plausible reasons, to discordant views” (ἐπωνύμους τῶν θαυμασάντων μὲν τὴν τοῦ λόγου
ἀρχὴν κινηθέντων δ’ ὅπως ποτ’ οὖν ὑπό τινων πιθανοτήτων πρὸς τὰς εἰς ἀλλήλους
διαφωνίας) (Or�, Cels� 3�12)�
29 Or�, Cels� 3�13: “As the great proficient in philosophy is he who, after acquainting
himself experimentally with the various views, has given in his adhesion to the best
(ὡς ὁ πάνυ προκόπτων ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ἀπὸ τοῦ πλείονα ἐγνωκέναι ἐγγυμνασάμενος
αὐτοῖς καὶ τῷ κρατήσαντι προσθέμενος λόγῳ), so I would say that the wisest
Christian was he who had carefully studied the heresies both of Judaism and
Christianity” (οὕτως εἴποιμ’ ἂν καὶ τὸν ἐπιμελῶς ἐνιδόντα ταῖς ἰουδαϊσμοῦ καὶ
χριστιανισμοῦ αἱρέσεσι σοφώτατον Χριστιανὸν γενέσθαι)�
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Gaetano Lettieri
all the reciprocally exclusive and static interpretations of the mystery of
Christ (Christ as only God: Docetism; Christ as only man: Ebionism) and
of God (polytheism, Monarchianism; theological dualism)� True dogma
is systematic, only insofar as it is dynamic, because it elevated the different theological διαφωνίαι in the unified Truth of the becoming of God, so
that these διαφωνίαι are interpreted as temporary moments of the understanding of the eternal relational intra-divine Process and the eternal
process of incarnation of the Logos in humanity, which is intimately
created and loved� Therefore, both the Trinity and Christ’s person are
interpreted as processual, progressive, dynamic, relational, dialectic,
absolute realities� Dogma is the idea which moves reason, instead of
stopping it; it is the idea which fluidifies the exclusive littera of the ontological antitheses or of the exclusive, inadequate, and therefore idolatrous truths (idolatrous precisely because partial and static)�30 Dogma is
processual, metadogmatic, spiritual, insofar as it tries to think according
to a processual idea which accommodates the excess of Truth in human
terms� Now, truth is always in excess, not because it is not simple, but
30 A� N� Whitehead, Religion in the Making, Lowell Lectures 1926, Cambridge 1927,
133: “Idolatry is the necessary product of static dogmas� But the problem of so
handling popular forms of thought as to keep their full reference to the primary
sources, and yet also to keep them in touch with the best critical dogmas of their
times, is no easy one� The chief figures in the history of the Christian Church who
seem to have grasped explicitly its central importance were, Origen in the Church
of Alexandria, in the early part of the third century, and Erasmus in the early part
of the sixteenth century� Their analogous fates show the wavering attitude of the
Christian Church, culminating in lapses into dogmatic idolatry� It must, however,
be assigned to the great credit of the Papacy of his time, that Erasmus never in his
lifetime lost the support of the court of Rome� Unfortunately, Erasmus, though a
good man, was no hero, and the moral atmosphere of the Renaissance Papacy was
not equal to its philosophic insight� In the phrase of Leo X, the quarrel of monks
began; and yet another golden opportunity was lost, while rival pedants cut out
neat little dogmatic systems to serve as the unalterable measure of the Universe”�
Whitehead, 1927, 117: “A dogma – in the sense of a precise statement – can never
be final; it can only be adequate in its adjustment of certain abstract concepts� But
the estimate of the status of these concepts remains for determination� You cannot
rise above the adequacy of the terms you employ� A dogma may be true in the
sense that it expresses such interrelations of the subject matter as are expressible
within the set of ideas employed� But if the same dogma be used intolerantly to
check the employment of other modes of analyzing the subject matter, then, for
all its truth, it will be doing the work of falsehood� Progress in truth – truth of
science and truth of religion – is mainly a progress in the framing of concepts, in
discarding artificial abstractions or partial metaphors, and in evolving notions
which strike more deeply into the root of reality�”
Progress: A Key Idea for Origen and Its Inheritance
39
because it is personal and therefore relational: this means a subversive
notion of the progressive dimension of Truth, which is intimately connected with its apocalyptic (and therefore concerning revelation) value�
Precisely because it is personal, the achievement of Truth depends on
a donative revelation, therefore an apocalypse, eschatologically never
fulfilled�
11� The secret of the trinitarian dogma is the absolute perfection of the
loving progress of the Son� If the Origenian Trinity is interpreted as
an eternal and donative processual manifestation of divine persons, in
a relationship of reciprocal subordination, God in Himself is absolute
progress� Only as a single will, a single desire, a single love, do the
three subordinate divine hypostases reach perfect unity�31 God is one
not ontologically, but dynamically, thanks to the eternal ascensional
process of the spiritual desire of the Son, who comes together perfectly
in the knowledge and love of the Father� The unity of the Trinity is processual and loving, not ontological and essential (as in the dogma which
would later be defined at Nicaea and refined in Constantinople: perfect
unity of the three hypostases in the identical divine οὐσία)�32 If the Son,
as Sophia, had not remained in the perennial desire and in the eternally
progressive contemplation of the Abyss of the Father, he would not
have subsisted hypostatically�33
12� The secret of the Christological dogma is the human perfection of
loving progress, prompted by the love of the Logos� Similarly, loving
progress is the key to the Christological mystery, since it defines the
31 See Or�, Joh� 13�228: Πρέπουσα βρῶσις τῷ υἱῷ τοῦ θεοῦ ὅτε ποιητὴς γίνεται τοῦ
πατρικοῦ θελήματος, τοῦτο τὸ θέλειν ἐν ἑαυτῷ ποιῶν ὅπερ ἦν καὶ ἐν τῷ πατρί, ὥστε
εἶναι τὸ θέλημα τοῦ θεοῦ ἐν τῷ θελήματι τοῦ υἱοῦ, καὶ γενέσθαι τὸ θέλημα τοῦ υἱοῦ
ἀπαράλλακτον τοῦ θελήματος τοῦ πατρός, εἰς τὸ μηκέτι εἶναι δύο θελήματα ἀλλὰ <ἓν>
θέλημα· ὅπερ ἓν θέλημα αἴτιον ἦν τοῦ λέγειν τὸν υἱόν· “Ἐγὼ καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ἕν ἐσμεν”
(John 10:30)�
32 Or�, Cels� 8�12: “We worship the Father of truth, and the Son, who is the truth;
and these, while they are two, considered as subsistences (ὄντα δύο τῇ ὑποστάσει
πράγματα), are one in unity of thought, in harmony and in identity of will (ἓν δὲ τῇ
ὁμονοίᾳ καὶ τῇ συμφωνίᾳ καὶ τῇ ταυτότητι τοῦ βουλήματος)�” See M� Simonetti, Sulla
teologia trinitaria di Origene, in: VetChr 8 (1971) 273–307, then in M� Simonetti,
Studi sulla cristologia del II e III secolo, Roma 1993, 109–143; and M� Simonetti,
La crisi ariana nel IV secolo, Roma 1975, 11–15�
33 See Or�, Joh� 2�18: “by being “with the God”, the Logos always continues to be
“God” (τῷ εἶναι “πρὸς τὸν θεὸν” ἀεὶ μένων “θεός”)� But he would not have this
if he were not with God, and he would not remain God (οὐκ ἂν μείνας θεός), if
he did not continue in unceasing contemplation of the depth of the Father (εἰ μὴ
παρέμενε τῇ ἀδιαλείπτῳ θέᾳ τοῦ πατρικοῦ βάθους)�”
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Gaetano Lettieri
dialectic identity of the Son (already “embodied” in the protology in
the mystical body of the totality of the logoi), in which the intellect of
the man Jesus progresses in the love of the Logos� The unity of Christ, a
fusion of divine nature and human nature, is reached dynamically, in a
processual way, as the meritorious peak of the indesinenter progressive
desire of the creature;34 it is not an ontological unity (Origen does not
yet know the Chalcedonian single and identical ὑπόστασις of Christ, in
which human and divine nature join)� However, freedom, movement of
desire, and the contingency of the created intellect of Jesus are assumed
as intimate in the very becoming of the Son in God, precisely because
they are prompted by the ubiquitous love of the Son�
13� The mystical Apocatastasis maintains a progredient unity� Origenian
mystical thought, albeit in its unitive nature, is still ecstatic35 and hence
progressive,36 insofar as it is the peak of the progress of all intellects,
unified identically in the Son and all having become christs,37 and refers
to the ulteriority of the Father, who ontologically withdraws as unattainable� The relationship of the One-All38 (the Son with His mystical
body) can only be simul perfectly unitive and progressive� The secret of
the hypostasis of the Son is mystical-spiritual, hence processual in a dialectic meaning: paradoxically, the human becomes divine in Christ� This
34 Or�, princ� 2�6,5–6: Verum quoniam boni malique eligendi facultas omnibus
praesto est, haec anima, quae Christi est, ita elegit “diligere iustitiam”, ut pro
inmensitate dilectionis inconvertibiliter ei atque inseparabiliter inhaereret, ita ut
propositi firmitas et affectus inmensitas et dilectionis inextinguibilis calor omnem
sensum conversionis atque inmutationis abscideret, ut quod in arbitrio erat positum, longi usus affectu iam versum sit in naturam… Illa anima, quae quasi ferrum
in igne sic semper in Verbo, semper in Sapientia, semper in Deo posita est, omne
quod agit, quod sentit, quod intellegit, Deus est: et ideo nec convertibilis aut
mutabilis dici potest, quae inconvertibilitatem ex Verbi Dei unitate indesinenter
ignita possedit� See 2�6,1–7; 4�4,4–5; Or�, Joh� 32�325–326: “τὸ ἀνθρώπινον τοῦ
Ἰησοῦ μετὰ τοῦ λόγου γεγονέναι ἕν�”
35 Or�, Cant� 4�30: Foris enim est et extra corpus posita mens eius qui longe est a
corporalibus cogitationibus, longe a carnalibus desideriis, et ideo ab his omnibus
foris positum visitat Deus�
36 Or�, Cant� 2�5,29: Anima quae in profectibus quidem posita est, nondum tamen ad
summam perfectionis adscendit […] pro eo quidem quod proficit pulchra dicitur�
37 See Or�, Joh� 1�197–199�
38 See Or�, Joh� 1�119: “The God, therefore, is altogether one and simple (Ὁ θεὸς
μὲν οὖν πάντη ἕν ἐστι καὶ ἁπλοῦν)� Our Savior, however, because of the many
things, since God “set” him “forth as a propitiation” and firstfruits of all creation, becomes many things, or perhaps even all these things (πολλὰ γίνεται ἢ καὶ
τάχα πάντα ταῦτα), as the whole creation which can be made free needs him (καθὰ
χρῄζει αὐτοῦ ἡ ἐλευθεροῦσθαι δυναμένη πᾶσα κτίσις)�”
Progress: A Key Idea for Origen and Its Inheritance
41
means that Christ is the hypostatical and mystical progress of the totality
of the human in the divine� The human is the body of the Logos, namely
the Logos who becomes logoi�39 In Or�, princ� 1�6�8, mystical perfection
is openly reconstructed as insatiable infinite progress�40 Therefore, in the
hom� 27 in Num� there is a dynamic exegesis of the multae mansiones
of John 14:2�41 The faith in the incarnation of the Logos is the first of
the multae mansiones (as many as forty-two, through which Origen
reconstructs the exodus from Egypt and the entrance into the promised
land) which the ascensional progress of the soul – profectio (progression)/profectus mentis (mind’s progress)42 – must tirelessly undertake to
39 Or�, Cels� 3�41: “And with respect to His mortal body, and the human soul which
it contained, we assert that not by their communion merely with Him, but by their
unity and intermixture (οὐ μόνον κοινωνίᾳ ἀλλὰ καὶ ἑνώσει καὶ ἀνακράσει), they
received the highest powers, and after participating in His divinity, were changed
into God (τῆς ἐκείνου θειότητος κεκοινωνηκότα εἰς θεὸν μεταβεβληκέναι)”�
40 Or�, princ� 1�6,8: “In qua [sancta et beata vita], cum post agones multos in eam
perveniri potuerit, ita perdurare debemus, ut nulla umquam nos boni illius satietas
capiat, sed quanto magis de illa beatitudine percipimus, tanto magis in nobis vel
dilatetur eius desiderium vel augeatur, dum semper ardentius et capacius Patrem
et Filium ac Spiritum Sanctum vel capimus vel tenemus / And when after many
struggles we have been able to attain to it [the holy and blessed life], we ought so
to continue that no satiety of that blessing may ever possess us; but the more we
partake of its blessedness, the more may the loving desire for it deepen and increase
within us, as ever our hearts grow in fervor and eagerness to receive and hold fast
the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit�” It should be noted that even the opposite
process of the fall, initiated by the satiety in the fruition of God, is prospected as
gradual and “progressive”: Si autem aliquando satietas cepit aliquem ex his, qui
in summo perfectoque constiterunt, gradu, non arbitror quod ad subitum quis
evacuetur ac decidat, sed paulatim et per partes defluere eum necesse est (ita ut
fieri possit interdum, si brevis aliquis lapsus acciderit, ut cito resipiscat atque in
se revertatur), non penitus ruere, sed revocare pedem et redire ad statum suum
ac rursum statuere posse id, quod per neglegentiam fuerat elapsum/ But if at any
time satiety should possess the heart of one of those who have come to occupy
the perfect and highest stage, I do not think that such a one will be removed and
fall from his place all of a sudden� Rather must he decline by slow degrees, so that
it may sometimes happen, when a slight fall has occurred, that the man quickly
recovers and returns to himself� A fall does not therefore involve utter ruin, but
a man may retrace his steps and return to his former state and once more set his
mind on that which through negligence had slipped from his grasp” (1�6,8)�
41 See Or�, hom� 27 in Num� 2�3� For the original text of the Homiliae in Numeros,
here and throughout the volume, see Origen, W�A� Baehrens (ed�), Homiliae in
Numeros, in Homilien zum Hexateuch. Origenes Werke VII, GCS 30, Leipzig
1921, 1–285� For the English translation, see Th�P� Scheck, Origen, Homilies on
Numbers, Downers Grove 2009�
42 Or�, hom� 27 in Num� 13�1�
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Gaetano Lettieri
go from the world to the intelligible realities� The final stage is, at last,
the knowledge of God, mediated by the celestial Logos�43 Therefore,
in the extraordinary hom� 27 in Num�, Origen describes the supreme
knowledge of God as an endless peregrinatio, unbounded progress
of knowledge and beatitude, a provisional character of every beatific
understanding of God,44 anticipating the mystical theology of Gregory
43 Or�, hom� 27 in Num� 3�2: Post haec iam proficere et adscendere ad singulos
quosque fidei et uirtutum gradus nitamur; quibusque si tam diu immoremur donec
ad perfectum ueniamus, in singulis uirtutum gradibus mansionem fecisse dicemur,
usque quo ad summum peruenientibus nabis institutionum profectuumque fastigium promissa compleatur hereditas / “And let this be the first stage for us who
wish to go out of Egypt� In it we abandoned the cult of idols and the worship of
demons (not gods) and believed that Christ was born of the Virgin and the Holy
Spirit, and that the Word made flesh came into this world� After this, let us now
strive to go forward and to ascend one by one each of the steps of faith and the
virtues� If we dwell in them for such a long time until we come to perfection, we
will be said to have made a stage at each of the steps of the virtues until, when we
reach the height of our instruction and the summit of our progress, the promised
inheritance is fulfilled” (Scheck, 2009, 171)� See Or�, princ� 3�11,6�
44 Or�, hom� 27 in Num� 4�2–3: Eorum uero qui sapientiae et scientiae operam dant,
quoniam finis nullus est – quis enim terminus Dei sapientiae erit? – ubi quanto
amplius quis accesserit tanto profundiora inueniet, et quanto quis scrutatus fuerit
tanto ea ineffabilia et incomprehensibilia deprehendet; incomprehensibilis enim
et inaestimabilis est Dei Sapientia, idcirco eorum qui iter sapientiae Dei incedunt,
non domos laudat – non enim peruenerunt ad finem –, sed tabernacula miratur in
quibus semper ambulant et semper proficiunt, et quanto magis proficiunt tanto
iis proficiendi uia augetur et in immensum tenditur, et ideo istos ipsos profectus
eorum per spiritum contuens, tabernacula ea nominat Israel. Et uere si quis scientiae cepit aliquos profectus et experimenti aliquid in talibus sumpsit, scit profecto quod, ubi ad aliquam uentum fuerit theoriam et agnitionem mysteriorum
spiritalium, ibi anima quasi in quodam tabernaculo demoratur. Cum uero ex his
quae repperit, alia rursus rimatur et ad alios proficit intellectus, inde quasi eleuato
tabernaculo tendit ad superiora et ibi collocat animi sedem sensuum stabilitate
confixam. Et inde iterum ex ipsis alios inuenit spiritales sensus quos priorum sine
dubio sensuum consequentia patefecerit, et ita semper “se ad priora extendens”(see
Phil 3:13) tabernaculis quibusdam uidetur incedere. Numquam est enim quando
anima scientiae igniculo succensa otiari possit et quiescere, sed semper a bonis
ad meliora et iterum ad superiora a melioribus prouocatur� / “But there is no end
for those who are energetic in their pursuit of wisdom and knowledge – for what
limit will there be to God’s wisdom? –� For the more one approaches it, the more
he will find greater depths, and the more one has investigated, the more he will
discover ineffable and incomprehensible things� Indeed, God’s wisdom is “incomprehensible and beyond reckoning” On that account, for those who undertake
the journey of God’s wisdom, he does not praise their houses – for they have not
reached the end – but he expresses admiration of the tabernacles in which they
Progress: A Key Idea for Origen and Its Inheritance
43
of Nyssa, who, however, in his doctrine of epektasis, will start from
an assumption which is still absent in Origen: the ontological infinity
of God� The darkness of the absolute transcendence of God seems to
be enlightened by the mediation of the Son and the Spirit, but only
progressively�45 Progress is the name of the dialectical paradox which
reveals the perfect loving unity of the ontological difference: because
of that, perhaps only in the Commentary to the Song of Songs does the
erotic metaphor reach its greatest ontological and theological deepness,
in its Christological value� The secret of ontology is progress, freedom
of pathic love, persuasion of the enlightenment of knowledge, conversion of desire: God is the trinitary passion of desire and knowledge of
the other, so that the understanding of the relational freedom is the
secret of being. Being is unbounded progress of the loving relationship�
Every theological unity is reached at the level of the freedom of (human
and divine) desire, and not at the ontological level (because the Son is
inferior to the Father and the Spirit to the Son, according to Origen’s
subordinationism, which also prescribes that the creatures are ontologically inferior to the Son and to the Spirit)�46
are always on the move and making progress� And the more progress they make,
the more the road to be traveled is lengthened for them and extends into the measureless� And for this reason, beholding through the Spirit these stages of their
progress, he names these things the “tabernacles of Israel�” And truly, if someone
has made some progress in knowledge and has acquired some experience in such
matters, he really knows that when he has come to some idea and recognition of
spiritual mysteries, his soul tarries there, as it were, in a kind of tabernacle� But
when, on the basis of these things it has discovered, it again fathoms other things
and advances to other understandings, it picks up its tabernacle from there, so
to speak, and heads for the higher things� And there it establishes a seat for its
mind, fixed in the stability of the meanings� And once again from there, on the
basis of these things, it finds other spiritual meanings, which doubtless are logical
inferences that have come to light by the previously apprehended meanings� And
in this way, always “striving for what is ahead,” the soul seems to advance by
means of tabernacles, as it were� For there is never a time when the soul that has
been set on fire by the spark of knowledge can sink into leisure and take a rest,
but it is always summoned from the good to the better, and again from the better
to the superior�” (Scheck, 2009, 105–106)�
45 See Or�, Joh� 2�174�
46 See Or�, Joh� 13�151: πάντων μὲν τῶν γενητῶν ὑπερέχειν οὐ συγκρίσει ἀλλ’
ὑπερβαλλούσῃ ὑπεροχῇ φαμὲν τὸν σωτῆρα καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον, ὑπερεχόμενον
τοσοῦτον ἢ καὶ πλέον ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρός, ὅσῳ ὑπερέχει αὐτὸς καὶ τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα τῶν
λοιπῶν, οὐ τῶν τυχόντων ὄντων (151)� On the progressive waning of the absolute
divine glory, which decreases from the Father to the Son, who is His perfect reflection (ἀπαύγασμα), and even more from the Son to the Holy Spirit, so that to the
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14� The historical diffusion of the Christian churches creates providential
religious, cultural, and political progress, which is realised universally�
The eschatological experience of freedom, equality, and fraternity of
the Proto-Christian community, animated by the Spirit of Christ, is projected back to the nature of man, created in the image of God: every
creature lives, therefore, as part of the inner, albeit forgotten, participation in Christ� History becomes the field of the progressive affirmation of
a spiritual “democracy”, witnessed by the church, which declares every
hierarchy (τάξις), mundane as well as celestial, as provisional: every
rational creature is absolutely free, intellectually superior to every kind
of provisional alienation or mundane subordination, hence inscribed in
an unstoppable process of reciprocal recognition of equality, brotherhood and a common sharing of the divine filiality� In a long and very
important excursus of Contra Celsum (5�25–50), Origen proposes “a
mystical and secret view”47 on the division of global civilisations and
their dependence upon the government of angels, and then on the universal progress of civilisations and political ideals that Christianity
is spreading universally by asserting the only rational religion� What
emerges is an extraordinary sketch of a theology of Christian history,
able to recant and exalt “the law of nature (ὁ τῆς φύσεως νόμος)”48 of
created logoi arrive only partial reflections (μερικὰ ἀπαυγάσματα) of that glory, see
Or�, Joh� 13�350−353�
47 Or�, Cels� 5�28: “Let us venture to lay down some considerations of a profounder
kind (ὀλίγα τῶν βαθυτέρων), conveying a mystical and secret view (ἔχοντά τινα
μυστικὴν καὶ ἀπόρρητον θεωρίαν) respecting the original distribution of the various
quarters of the earth among different superintending spirits�”
48 “As there are, then, generally two laws presented to us, the one being the law of
nature, of which God would be the legislator, and the other being the written law
of cities, it is a proper thing, when the written law is not opposed to that of God,
for the citizens not to abandon it under pretext of foreign customs; but when the
law of nature, that is, the law of God (ὁ τῆς φύσεως τουτέστι τοῦ θεοῦ), commands
what is opposed to the written law (τὰ ἐναντία τῷ γραπτῷ νόμῳ προστάσσει),
observe whether reason will not tell us to bid a long farewell to the written code,
and to the desire of its legislators (ὅρα εἰ μὴ ὁ λόγος αἱρεῖ μακρὰν μὲν χαίρειν εἰπεῖν
τοῖς γεγραμμένοις καὶ τῷ βουλήματι τῶν νομοθετῶν), and to give ourselves up to the
legislator God, and to choose a life agreeable to His Word (ἐπιδιδόναι δὲ ἑαυτὸν τῷ
θεῷ νομοθέτῃ καὶ κατὰ τὸν τούτου λόγον αἱρεῖσθαι βιοῦν), although in doing so it
may be necessary to encounter dangers, and countless labours, and even death and
dishonour (Or�, Cels� 5�37)�” “We Christians, then, who have come to the knowledge of the law which is by nature “king of all things” (Ἡμεῖς οὖν οἱ Χριστιανοὶ
τὸν τῇ φύσει πάντων βασιλέα ἐπιγνόντες νόμον) and which is the same with the law
of God (τὸν αὐτὸν ὄντα τῷ νόμῳ τοῦ θεοῦ), endeavour to regulate our lives by its
prescriptions, having bidden a long farewell to those of an unholy kind (μακρὰν
Progress: A Key Idea for Origen and Its Inheritance
45
Greek philosophy, in open polemic with the conventionalist relativism
of Celsus, who was strongly conditioned by an Epicurean perspective�
Celsus declares that religions, cults, systems of government, and moral
rules are basically fortuitous, changing from one nation to another�
On the contrary, Origen claims that every pagan nation, submitted to
lapsed angelical intellects, participates at an ethical-religious level proportionate to the level of alienation from the original divine perfection
from which humanity lapsed� The only nation which remained faithful
to God was Israel, in which men with less guilty and more advanced
intellects are gathered in their homeward path to the Logos� Starting
from Israel, Christianity spreads as a universal religion, converting the
heathen, putting every nation in motion, spreading ideals of freedom,
universal peace, rational conversion to the only true God and to the
“home” of the Church, which introduces humanity to the transcendent
heavenly Jerusalem, namely the eschatological, universal, identical participation in the Logos of the “children of peace”, freed at last by the
Logos/Teacher from the error of idolatry, reciprocal violence, and indifference towards the notions of what is true and just�49 Against philosophers, who restrict the relationship with Truth to a few intellectuals,
unduly reserving the common good to the exclusive fruition of the few,50
χαίρειν φράσαντες τοῖς οὐ νόμοις νόμοις) (Or�, Cels� 5�40)�” “For we see that it is
a religious act to do away with the customs originally established in the various
places (Ὁρῶμεν γὰρ ὅτι ὅσιον μὲν τὰ ἐξ ἀρχῆς κατὰ τόπους νενομισμένα λύειν ἐστὶ)
by means of laws of a better and more divine character, which were enacted by
Jesus, as one possessed of the greatest power (νόμοις κρείττοσι καὶ θειοτέροις, οἷς
ὡς δυνατώτατος ἔθετο Ἰησοῦς), who has rescued us “from the present evil world”
and “from the princes of the world that come to nought” (Or�, Cels� 5�32)�”
49 Or�, Cels� 5�33: “All the nations come to the house of God, and the many nations
go forth, and say to one another, turning to the religion which in the last days has
shone forth through Jesus Christ […] For we no longer take up “sword against
nation”, nor do we “learn war any more” (Οὐκέτι γὰρ λαμβάνομεν “ἐπ’ ἔθνος
μάχαιραν” οὐδὲ μανθάνομεν “ἔτι πολεμεῖν”), having become children of peace (υἱοὶ
τῆς εἰρήνης), for the sake of Jesus, who is our leader, instead of those whom our
fathers followed, among whom we were “strangers to the covenant” and having
received a law, for which we give thanks to Him that rescued us from the error
(λαμβάνοντες νόμον, ἐφ’ ᾧ χάριτας ὁμολογοῦντες τῷ ἡμᾶς ῥυσαμένῳ ἀπὸ τῆς πλάνης
λέγομεν) […] Our Superintendent, then, and Teacher, having come forth from the
Jews, regulates the whole world by the word of His teaching (Ὁ χοροστάτης οὖν
ἡμῶν καὶ διδάσκαλος ἀπὸ Ἰουδαίων ἐξελθὼν ὅλην νέμεται τῷ λόγῳ τῆς διδασκαλίας
ἑαυτοῦ τὴν οἰκουμένην)�” See Or�, Cels� 7�59–60�
50 Or�, Cels� 6�1: “Those, on the other hand, who turn away from the ignorant
as being mere slaves (Ὅσοι δέ, πολλὰ χαίρειν φράσαντες ὡς ἀνδραπόδοις τοῖς
ἰδιώταις) and unable to understand the flowing periods of a polished and logical
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Origen proclaims the universal significance of the Christian gospel, able
to adapt the revelation of the Truth to every step of intellectual and
moral progress, to reach and save every man�51 Precisely because it is
universal and accessible through a necessary duty of rational intelligence, the Truth has to be communicated to all, but can be enjoyed
only progressively� The Christian Catholic economy is therefore universalistic and “democratic” because it is aimed at converting the whole
rational creature, an image of God; consequently, if “democratic”, it
can only be a progressive and forward-thinking culture, directed at
gradually and persuasively attracting every single creature, without violence� In Or�, Cels� 4�31, after comparing the original Hebrew nation
to “a whole nation devoted to philosophy (ἔθνος ὅλον φιλοσοφοῦν)”,
for which the deepest truths were mediated through rites which contained “innumerable symbols (μυρία σύμβολα)” of the celestial truths,
Origen declares that, after the progressive corruption of the religion of
Israel, “Providence, having remodelled their venerable system where it
needed to be changed, so as to adapt it to men of all countries, gave
to believers of all nations, in place of the Jews, the venerable religion
of Jesus” (4�32), with which God reveals his power� And if the spreading of Christianity from the beginning was strongly hindered by evil
powers and the political forces of the heathen, “yet, notwithstanding,
the word of God, which is more powerful than all other things, even
when meeting with opposition, deriving from the opposition, as it were,
a means of increase, advanced onwards, and won many souls, such
discourse (καὶ μὴ οἵοις τε κατακούειν τῆς ἐν φράσει λόγων καὶ τάξει ἀπαγγελλομένων
ἀκολουθίας), and so devote their attention solely to such as have been brought
up amongst literary pursuits (μόνων ἐφρόντισαν τῶν ἀνατραφέντων ἐν λόγοις καὶ
μαθήμασιν), confine their views of the public good within very strait and narrow
limits (οὗτοι τὸ κοινωνικὸν εἰς κομιδῇ στενὸν καὶ βραχὺ συνήγαγον)�”
51 Or�, Cels� 6�1: “Now we maintain, that if it is the object of the ambassadors of the
truth to confer benefits upon the greatest possible number (Φαμὲν οὖν ὅτι, εἴπερ
τὸ προκείμενόν ἐστι τοῖς πρεσβεύουσι τὰ τῆς ἀληθείας πλείους ὅση δύναμις ὠφελεῖν),
and, so far as they can, to win over to its side, through their love to men, every
one without exception, intelligent as well as simple (καὶ προσάγειν, ὡς οἷόν τε
ἐστίν, αὐτῇ διὰ φιλανθρωπίαν πάνθ’ ὅντιν’ οὖν οὐ μόνον ἐντρεχῆ ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνόητον),
not Greeks only, but also Barbarians (πάλιν δ’ αὖ οὐχὶ Ἕλληνας μὲν οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ
βαρβάρους) – and great, indeed, is the humanity which should succeed in converting the rustic and the ignorant (πολὺ δὲ τὸ εὐήμερον ἐὰν καὶ τοὺς ἀγροικοτάτους
καὶ ἰδιώτας οἷός τέ τις γένηται ἐπιστρέφειν) –, it is manifest that they must adopt
a style of address fitted to do good to all, and to gain over to them men of every
sort (δῆλόν ἐστιν ὅτι καὶ χαρακτῆρος ἐν τῷ λέγειν φροντιστέον αὐτῷ κοινωφελοῦς
καὶ δυναμένου πᾶσαν ἐπαγαγέσθαι ἀκοήν)�”
Progress: A Key Idea for Origen and Its Inheritance
47
being the will of God (ἀλλ’ ὁ πάντων δυνατώτερος τοῦ θεοῦ λόγος, καὶ
κωλυόμενος ὡσπερεὶ τροφὴν πρὸς τὸ αὔξειν τὸ κωλύεσθαι λαμβάνων,
προβαίνων πλείονας ἐνέμετο ψυχάς· θεὸς γὰρ τοῦτ’ ἐβούλετο)�”52 In a dialectical way, the violent obstacle to the redemptive power of the religion
of Jesus multiplies its force, making it progress universally� In short,
God promotes the universal progress of all and of every singular part,53
so that the entire universe is the living all which progresses gradually
(because freely) but in harmony, overcoming the provisional resistances
of the temporary evil creatures54 in the universal participation in God�
15� The Origenian justification is a synergistic, dialogical, gradual process;
it is not a free, irresistible, and immediate, mono-energistic event: the
relationship between grace and freedom is, hence, understood as concurrent progress of the free human will and the persuasive divine provocation, leading to the divinisation of the creature� The freedom of man
has to fulfil and perfect the divine gift of the created imago Dei, which
the merciful revelation of God exhorts humanity to rediscover in itself,
and perfect, through a free, fully conscious and loving desire�55 The
event/advent of God is progressive, never absolute and unconditioned;
salvation is not a gift created ex nihilo (as for the mature Augustine),
but is an admonition and a suasio which asks an autonomous answer,
52 Or�, Cels� 4�32; see 7�26�
53 Or�, Cels� 4�99: “God takes care (Μέλει δὲ τῷ θεῷ), not, as Celsus supposes, merely
of the whole (οὐχ, ὡς Κέλσος οἴεται, μόνου τοῦ ὅλου), but beyond the whole, in a
special degree of every rational being (ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὸ ὅλον ἐξαιρέτως παντὸς λογικοῦ)�
Nor will Providence ever abandon the whole (οὐδέ ποτε ἀπολείψει πρόνοια τὸ
ὅλον); for although it should become more wicked, owing to the sin of the rational
being, which is a portion of the whole, He makes arrangements to purify it, and
after a time to bring back the whole to Himself (οἰκονομεῖ γάρ, κἂν κάκιον γίνηται
διὰ τὸ λογικὸν ἁμαρτάνον μέρος τι τοῦ ὅλου, καθάρσιον αὐτοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ διὰ χρόνου
ἐπιστρέφειν τὸ ὅλον πρὸς ἑαυτόν)�”
54 See Or�, Joh� 13�245: “ἕτερα δέ, ἀπειθήσαντα τῷ λόγῳ, χρῄζει πόνων, ἵνα μετὰ τοὺς
πόνους λόγοις προσαχθέντα ὕστερόν ποτε τούτοις τελειωθῇ�”
55 Or�, princ� 2�9,7: Per gratiam vero misericordiae suae omnibus providet atque
omnes quibuscumque curari possunt remediis hortatur et provocat ad salutem�
See the pre-Pelagian sentences in Or�, prin, 3�1�1–6; and 3�1,19–24; in particular,
see 3�1,20, where, referring to Phil 2:13 (which attributed to God the impetus to
will and act good) Origen is making only the gift of the unspecified velle (quod
volumus ex Deo habemus) dependent on God; then this velle is determined by the
human free will autonomously: Ita ergo est et quod dicit Apostolus quia virtutem
quidem voluntatis a Deo accipimus, nos autem abutimur voluntate vel in bonis
vel in malis desideriis� So, nostri operis est recte vel minus recte vivere, et non vel
ex his, quae extrinsecus incidunt, vel, ut quidam putant, fatis urgentibus cogimur
(3�1,6)�
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calls for a progressive adequation of freedom to its profound identity
of image, hence to the becoming god in God, logos into the Logos� The
Logos, therefore, intimately radiates an attractive grace in every created logos�56 The Logos is an ever-working attractive Light, but which
never forces the free will of the creature: it is only the freedom of the
creature which makes effective and persuasive the call of the logos,
the calling/admonition of God�57 The progress of freedom is therefore
the dynamic creatural adequation to the transcendent perfection of God,
who providentially attracts all in Himself with His Logos�58 Instead, a
“determinant” grace of God can be seen at an ontological level: if in
the apocatastasis all creatures come back to the Principle (in the Logos,
which is Wisdom which immerses in the Father, contemplating Him and
loving Him), it is the theomorphic nature inscribed in the mens imago
which “determines” the free desire of the creature� Universal progress is
universally guaranteed, because the freedom of the intellectual creatures
56 Or�, princ� 1�3,6: In corde omnium esse significat Christum secundum id, quod
verbum vel ratio est, cuius participio rationabiles sunt�
57 “God conveys His admonitions throughout the whole of Scripture, and by means
of those persons who, through God’s gracious appointment, are the instructors
of His hearers (νουθετεῖ γὰρ διὰ πάσης γραφῆς καὶ διὰ τῶν χάριτι διδασκόντων θεοῦ
τοὺς ἀκούοντας) […] And therefore it must not be said that it is because God
is incapable of persuading men that they are not persuaded (Διὰ τοῦτο οὐ παρὰ
τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι τὸν θεὸν πείθειν λεκτέον τοὺς μὴ πειθομένους μὴ πείθεσθαι), but
because they will not accept the faithful words of God (ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὸ ἐκείνους
μὴ δέχεσθαι τοὺς πειστικοὺς λόγους τοῦ θεοῦ) […] For that one may (really) desire
what is addressed to him by one who admonishes, and may become deserving
of those promises of God which he hears (ἵνα γάρ τις θέλῃ ἅπερ λέγει ὁ νουθετῶν
καὶ εἰσακούσας αὐτῶν ἄξιος γένηται τῶν τοῦ θεοῦ ἐπαγγελιῶν), it is necessary to
secure the will of the hearer, and his inclination to what is addressed to him (τῆς
προαιρέσεως τοῦ ἀκούοντος δεῖ καὶ τῆς πρὸς τὰ λεγόμενα ἐπινεύσεως)”(Or�, Cels�
6�57); so, “persuasion does not come from God, although persuasive words may be
uttered by him (κἂν τὸ πειστικοὺς λέγεσθαι λόγους ἀπὸ θεοῦ ἔρχηται, τό γε πείθεσθαι
οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπὸ θεοῦ)�” See Or�, Cels� 3�1,1–6�
58 Or�, Cels� 5�21: “We maintain that all things are administered by God in proportion to the relation of the free-will of each individual, and are ever being brought
into a better condition, so far as they admit of being so (ἡμεῖς δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν
τῆς σχέσεως τῶν ἐφ’ ἡμῖν ἑκάστου οἰκονομεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ λέγοντες τὸ πᾶν καὶ
ἀεὶ ἄγεσθαι κατὰ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον) and know that the nature of our
free-will admits of the occurrence of contingent events (καὶ τὴν τοῦ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν φύσιν
γινώσκοντες ἐνδεχομένου ἃ ἐνδέχεται), for it is incapable of receiving the wholly
unchangeable character of God (οὐ γὰρ δύναται χωρῆσαι τὸ πάντῃ ἄτρεπτον τοῦ
θεοῦ)�”
Progress: A Key Idea for Origen and Its Inheritance
49
is, as a matter of fact, the one which in the end restores them to their
profound autonomy, identity, property (albeit ontologically donated)�
16� The allegorical method reveals the idea of intellectual progress as
the hermeneutical key of the Bible, which musters an unbounded
Christological translatio from history to the eternal Being, from sensible and accidental differences to the rational and mystical Truth; the
latter is in itself articulated in progressive steps of deepening understanding� The allegorical hermeneutic is a progressive deciphering of
the Truth, which hides and reveals itself in the Bible to put intelligence
into motion, which is prompted by the gift and the disappearance of the
Logos, who, with His coming and goings, addresses Himself towards
the unattainable transcendence of the Father to Whom at last He introduces all things�59 However, the intimate secret of allegory is the desire’s
59 See Or�, princ� 4�3,14: Quantumcumque enim quis in scrutando promoveat et
studio intentiore proficiat, gratia quoque Dei adiutus sensumque inluminatus, ad
perfectum finem eorum, quae requiruntur, pervenire non poterit. Nec omnis mens,
quae creata est, possibile habet ullo genere conpraehendere, sed ut invenerit aliquantulum ex his, quae quaeruntur, iterum videt alia, quae quaerenda sunt; quodsi
et ad ipsa pervenerit, multo iterum plura ex illis, quae requiri debeant, pervidebit
[…] Unde et optabile est ut pro viribus se unusquisque semper “extendat ad ea
quae priora sunt, ea quae retrorsum sunt obliviscens” (Phil 3:13), tam ad opera
meliora quam etiam ad sensum intellectumque puriorem per Iesum Christum,
salvatorem nostrum, cui est gloria in saecula / “For however far one may advance
in the search and make progress through an increasingly earnest study, even when
aided and enlightened in mind by God’s grace, he will never be able to reach the
final goal of his inquiries� For no created mind can by any means possess the
capacity to understand all; but as soon as it has discovered a small fragment of
what it is seeking, it again sees other things that must be sought for; and if in turn
it comes to know these, it will again see arising out of them many more things that
demand investigation […] It is therefore to be desired that each one according to
his capacity will ever “reach out to the things which are before, forgetting those
things which are behind”, that is, will reach out both to better works and also to
a clearer understanding and knowledge, through Jesus Christ our Savior, to whom
is the glory forever�” (The English translation here is from G� W� Butterworth,
On First Principles, Oregon 2012, 311–312)� On the continuous progress of the
intelligence, prompted and guided by the revelation of the entire Trinity, see Or�,
princ� 1�3,8: Unde et inoperatio Patris, quae esse praestat omnibus, clarior ac
magnificentior invenitur, cum unusquisque per participationem Christi secundum
id, quod “sapientia” est, et secundum id, quod scientia est et “sanctificatio” est,
proficit et in altiores profectuum gradus venit; et per hoc quod participatione
Spiritus Sancti sanctificatus est quis, purior ac sincerior effectus, dignius recipit
sapientiae ac scientiae gratiam, ut depulsis omnibus expurgatisque pollutionis
atque ignorantiae maculis, tantum profectum sinceritatis ac puritatis accipiat, ut
hoc quod accepit a Deo ut esset tale sit, quale Deo dignum est [eo], qui ut esset
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desire of the person: spiritual truths/meanings of the revealed event/
cult/word/sign are not a concept or an idea, except as littera, which
refers to the personal Logos� The Logos is a Person/a Face (πρόσωπον),
a relational hypostasis, Logos of logoi, a divine desire of human desire,
so that the latter could become the desire of God, a reflexive knowledge
of His desire for relationship� Consequently, the inexhaustibility of the
Origenian hermeneutic depends on the recognition of the inexhaustibility of the other’s desire, who talks, calls, reveals Himself through
signs, at last communicating Himself in a boundless loving relationship�
The same dynamic relation between the Logos’ cataphatic theology
(progressive through His manifold ἐπίνοιαι) and the Father’s apophatic
theology60 is characterised by an allegorical processuality: the Son is the
unbounded metaphor of the Father, the progress of the universal logos
pure utique praestitit ac perfecte; ut tam dignum sit id quod est, quam est ille qui id
esse fecit. Ita namque et virtutem semper esse atque in aeternum manere percipiet
a Deo is, qui talis est, qualem eum voluit esse ille qui fecit. Quod ut accidat et ut
indesinenter atque inseparabiliter adsint ei, qui est, ea, quae ab ipso facta sunt,
sapientiae id opus est instruere atque erudire ea et ad perfectionem perducere et
Spiritus Sancti confirmatione atque indesinenti sanctificatione, per quam solam
Deum capere possunt. Ita ergo indesinenti erga nos opere Patris et Filii et Spiritus
Sancti per singulos quosque profectuum gradus instaurato, vix si forte aliquando
intueri possumus sanctam et beatam vitam / “Thus the working of the Father,
which endows all with existence, is found to be more glorious and splendid, when
each one, through participation in Christ in his character of wisdom and knowledge and sanctification, advances and comes to higher degrees of perfection; and
when a man, by being sanctified through participation in the Holy Spirit, is made
purer and holier, he becomes more worthy to receive the grace of wisdom and
knowledge, in order that all stains of pollution and ignorance may be purged and
removed and that he may make so great an advance in holiness and purity that the
life which he received from God shall be such as is worthy of God, who gave it to
be pure and perfect, and that which exists shall be as worthy as he who caused it
to exist� Thus, too, the man who is such as God who made him wished him to be
shall receive from God the power to exist forever and to endure for eternity� That
this may come to pass, and that those who were made by God may be unceasingly
and inseparably present with him who really exists, it is the work of wisdom to
instruct and train them, and lead them on to perfection, by the strengthening and
unceasing sanctification of the Holy Spirit, through which alone they can receive
God� In this way, then, through the ceaseless work on our behalf of the Father,
the Son and the Holy Spirit, renewed at every stage of our progress, we may perchance just succeed at last in beholding the holy and blessed life�”(Buttherworth,
2012, 39)� See also Or�, princ� 2�11,6; 3�6,6; 3�6,9; 4�4,10; Or�, Joh� 20�308�
60 On the treatment of the apophatic nature of the supreme theological knowledge,
see Or�, Cels� 6, especially 6�15 e 6�20�
Progress: A Key Idea for Origen and Its Inheritance
51
towards the transcendent One, to whose bosom He relentlessly returns,
without exhausting His exceeding perfection�61 To interpret means to
progress from the immediate scriptural letter (and its narrative) to the
ulterior meaning: the understanding of the text is the progress of the
intellectual desire,62 the immersion in an abysmal metaphor, the ability
to grasp the immense wealth of meaning hidden in the revealed trace,
in the parable, in the enigma or in the Scriptural fragment�63 However,
61 See Or�, Joh� 32� 344–353�
62 See Or�, princ� 4�1,1: “If Celsus had read the Scriptures in an impartial spirit, he
would not have said that “our writings are incapable of admitting an allegorical
meaning” (Εἰ δ’ ἀδεκάστως ἀνεγνώκει τὴν γραφὴν ὁ Κέλσος, οὐκ ἂν εἶπεν οὐχ οἷα
ἀλληγορίαν ἐπιδέχεσθαι εἶναι τὰ γράμματα ἡμῶν) […] the historical portions also
were written with an allegorical purpose (καὶ ταῖς ἱστορίαις ὡς σκοπῷ τροπολογίας
γεγραμμέναις) (Or�, Cels� 4�49)�” “For we must not suppose that historical things
are types of historical things, and corporeal of corporeal� Quite the contrary: corporeal things are types of spiritual things, and historical of intellectual (Οὐ γὰρ
νομιστέον τὰ ἱστορικὰ ἱστορικῶν εἶναι τύπους καὶ τὰ σωματικὰ σωματικῶν, ἀλλὰ τὰ
σωματικὰ πνευματικῶν καὶ τὰ ἱστορικὰ νοητῶν) (Or�, Joh� 10�110)�” On the still
progressive eschatological education as the continuation of Scriptural exegesis,
progressive reintroduction to the intimacy with the Logos of God, at last with the
unity with God Himself, see P�W� Martens, Origen and Scripture. The Contours
of the Exegetical Life, Oxford 2012, 234–242; on the progressive character of
the Origenian hermeneutic, see also K�J� Torjesen, Hermeneutical Procedure and
Theological Method in Origen’s Exegesis, Berlin 1986: “The progress of the soul
toward perfection, participation in the Logos – in his universal pedagogy – is made
possible through exegesis of the sacred text” (147); see 121–124�
63 Or�, Cels� 3�45: “Solomon, too, because he asked for wisdom, received it (Καὶ
Σολομὼν δέ, ἐπεὶ σοφίαν ᾔτησεν, ἀπεδέχθη) […] and the evidences of his wisdom
may be seen in his treatises (καὶ τῆς σοφίας αὐτοῦ τὰ ἴχνη ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς συγγράμμασι
θεωρῆσαι), which contain a great amount of wisdom expressed in few words
(μεγάλην ἔχοντα ἐν βραχυλογίᾳ περίνοιαν), and in which you will find many laudations of wisdom, and encouragements towards obtaining it (ἐν οἷς ἂν εὕροις πολλὰ
ἐγκώμια τῆς σοφίας καὶ προτρεπτικὰ περὶ τοῦ σοφίαν δεῖν ἀναλαβεῖν) […] And to
such a degree does the Logos (ὁ λόγος) desire that should be wise men among
believers, that for the sake of exercising the understanding of its hearers (ὑπὲρ τοῦ
γυμνάσαι τὴν σύνεσιν τῶν ἀκουόντων), it has spoken certain truths in enigmas, others in what are called dark sayings, others in parables, and others in problems (τὰ
μὲν ἐν αἰνίγμασι τὰ δὲ ἐν τοῖς καλουμένοις σκοτεινοῖς λόγοις λελαληκέναι τὰ δὲ διὰ
παραβολῶν καὶ ἄλλα διὰ προβλημάτων)�” See 7�10: “The prophets have therefore, as
God commanded them, declared with all plainness those things which it was desirable that the hearers should understand at once for the regulation of their conduct
(χρήσιμα καὶ συμβαλλόμενα τῇ τῶν ἠθῶν ἐπανορθώσει); while in regard to deeper
and more mysterious subjects, which lay beyond the reach of the common understanding (ὅσα δὲ μυστικώτερα ἦν καὶ ἐποπτικώτερα καὶ ἐχόμενα θεωρίας τῆς ὑπὲρ
τὴν πάνδημον ἀκοήν), they set them forth in the form of enigmas and allegories, or
52
Gaetano Lettieri
a real understanding of the Origenian allegory (deeply indebted to the
unrestrained Valentinian allegory) means the comprehension of its
Christological – hence ontological – structure: the Bible for Origen is
Christic, based on the unbounded progress from the littera to the Spiritus,
ontologically, then gnoseologically interpreted as sensible reality and
immaterial reality, flesh and Logos� But the Scriptures are only an introductory dimension, mediated by senses,64 to the knowledge of the divine
Truth, progressively known by the intellect which advances into it� The
same logos of the Logos, grasped beyond Scripture through the “flesh”
of Scripture, is at the same time articulated in different intellectually
deepening steps: so that every “cataphatic” understanding of the revelation is littera, as opposed to the ulterior spiritual understanding, which
Christ Himself discloses to the interpreter� Inasmuch as it is projected
to the recognition of a personal relationship with the Father, who is
ontologically at once simple and overflowing, the peak of the allegorical
progress can only be apophatic, hence rationally unbounded and only
mystically and lovingly available “in ecstasy�”
17� The ontology of the Origenian revelation is a speculative mysticism: the
gospel of the theophanic progression maintains a Platonizing ontologisation and a Catholic “secularization” of the eschatological Spirit� The
apocalyptic revelation becomes an ontological theophanic flux, of which
Christ’s historical revelation is a religious sign� The progressive interpretation of the being, crossed by amorous desire and by creatural freedom,
has an additional and coherent horizon of development in Gregory of
Nyssa and the consequent tradition of thought� The fracture between
old and new aeon is mediated and reconstructed as the dialectical difference of progressive ontological levels, which the freedom of the creature must tread to come back to the Beginning, immerging itself in the
absolute mystical interiority of God� Hence history becomes the provisional sign of a rational furtherness, which has to be conquered in interiority� Christianity, which embraces in itself the totality of the human
attempts to convert to an ulterior Truth, reveals the peak of a universal
of what are called dark sayings, parables, or similitudes (ταῦτα δι’ αἰνιγμάτων καὶ
ἀλληγοριῶν καὶ τῶν καλουμένων σκοτεινῶν λόγων καὶ τῶν ὀνομαζομένων παραβολῶν
ἢ παροιμιῶν ἀπεφήναντο)� And this plan they have followed, that those who are
ready to shun no labour and spare no pains in their endeavours after truth and
virtue might search into their meaning, and having found it, might apply it as
reason requires (ἵν’ οἱ μὴ φυγοπονοῦντες ἀλλὰ πάντα πόνον ὑπὲρ ἀρετῆς καὶ ἀληθείας
ἀναδεχόμενοι ἐξετάσαντες εὕρωσι καὶ εὑρόντες, ὡς λόγος αἱρεῖ, οἰκονομήσωσιν)�”
64 See Or�, Joh� 13�27–30; 37� “Οἶμαι δὲ τῆς ὅλης γνώσεως στοιχεῖά τινα ἐλάχιστα καὶ
βραχυτάτας εἶναι εἰσαγωγὰς ὅλας γραφάς, κἂν πάνυ νοηθῶσιν ἀκριβῶς (13�30)�”
Progress: A Key Idea for Origen and Its Inheritance
53
cataphasis, which culminates in an exceeding mystical apophasis� The
eschatological end is not the final event which invades all by destroying
perverted nature and granting an unprecedented intimacy with God, but
is the peak of a very slow ascensive progress of the intelligence which
becomes God� However, the becoming God, precisely because it is ontologically ecstatic, can also only be progressive� Therefore, the reform of
Gregory of Nyssa is latent in Origen’s theology and represents its most
coherent and originally innovative landing: Gregory introduces: (a) the
idea of the infinity of God (which is absent in Origen, who connects the
infinite and the unlimited with evil, which is limited, defined, converted
by God),65 fully transcendent and irreducible to the finity of creatures;
(b) the Nicaean – Constantinopolitan idea of the perfect ontological
equality of the persons of the Trinity, participants in the singular divine
οὐσία; (c) the idea of theological knowledge as conjectural and infinitively progressive (so that every cataphasis is littera of a subsequent apophasis, in infinitum); (d) the mystical doctrine of the ἐπέκτασις as infinite
progress of desire, beatitude, and unbounded knowledge of the divine
infinity� Here the ontological, gnoseological, psychological retractation of the apocalyptic eschatology, in a progressive, Catholic way is
clear: ad infinitum, all of human knowledge becomes the theophanic
event, the final coming of God in the finite mind of man, so that history
progressively enters into the eternal, without ever grasping it� An end
without end…
65 See Or�, Cels� 4�63 and 4�69�
Anders-Christian Jacobsen
Transgression, Regress, and Progress in the
Theology of Origen of Alexandria
Abstract: The basic structure of “movement” in Origen’s theology is progress� However,
progress in Origen’s theology can only be understood at the background of transgression
and regress� Progress is salvation from sinful transgression and regress� Thus, the terms
transgression, regress and progress define the coherent structure underlying Origen’s
theology� This article explores how Origen understand transgression and regress and
which terminology he uses to express transgression and regress�
Keywords: Transgression, Regress, Progress, Sin, Salvation
Progress in Origen of Alexandria was the well-chosen theme of the conference, of which this article is a product� The title is well-chosen because
the term “progress” captures the essence of Origen’s theology: How do the
fallen rational beings – the noes (νόες) – find their way back to their divine
source? I will try to answer this question briefly, but the focus of my contribution will be on rational beings’ transgression and regress which cause
the need for progress: How and why did these rational beings end up in a
situation which they need to progress from? I use some figures to explain
this� Using figures is always risky since the nature of figures is to simplify
reality in order to be able to grasp reality� Thus, the readers should be aware
that the figures that I present in the following will not capture all aspects of
Origen’s theology�1
1
This approach to Origen’s theology participates in the long-standing discussion
about whether Origen was a systematic or non-systematic thinker� This discussion
has divided modern Origen research since the first decades of the twentieth century, cf� U� Berner, Origenes, EdF 147, Darmstadt 1981� Among the main representatives of a systematic interpretation of Origen’s theology is Harnack (see e�g�
A� v� Harnack, Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte, Bd� 1–3, Tübingen 1931–325),
Kettler (see e�g� F� H� Kettler, Der ursprüngliche Sinn der Dogmatik des Origenes,
Berlin 1966), and Koch (see e�g� H� Koch, Pronoia und Paideusis. Studien über
Origenes und sein Verhältnis zum Platonismus, Berlin / Leipzig 1932)� The main
figure in the non-systematic interpretation of Origen is H� Crouzel (see e�g�
H� Crouzel, Origène est-il un systématique?, in: BLE 60 (1959), 81–116� Reprint
in: H� Crouzel, Origène et la philosophie (Theol [P] 52), Paris 1962, 179–215)� The
majority of contemporary Origen scholarship follows Crouzel’s approach� This
approach is supported by a general postmodern critique of systematic thinking�
56
Anders-Christian Jacobsen
1. The Structure of Origen’s Theological Thinking
The first figure that I will present aims at giving an overall idea of the structure in Origen’s theology�
I hope that the figure is more or less self-explanatory; however, I will still
provide a few comments� It is important to notice that according to Origen
there is movement and motion (progress and regress) in all parts of reality
outside of God� No standstill is possible except in God� We should also
notice that the history of creation and salvation in Origen’s mind has three
main phases, which I call the first and the second act of creation and the salvation / restoration� This process of creation and salvation is circumscribed
by God, who is eternal and without motion� The Logos and the Wisdom
were eternally in God and the νόες were in the Logos as plans to be realised�
This is similar, says Origen, to the plans of a ship or a building, which are in
the mind of the architect before they are realised and materialised in the concrete building of the ship�2 The first act of creation is the externalisation of
first the Logos and the Wisdom and then the νόες from God� This condition
2
As will be clear from the following I argue for a more systematic interpretation of
Origen’s theology�
Or�, Com� in Joh� 1�113–115; Or�, princ� 1�2,2� A�-C� Jacobsen, Christ the Teacher
of Salvation, Münster 2015, 124–125�
Transgression, Regress, and Progress in the Theology
57
is often called the “pre-existence” in Origen research, meaning that this is
the condition of existence “before” the materialisation of the rational beings�
It is important to be aware of the use of concepts of time such as “pre-” or
“before” being problematic when describing the first element of creation
in Origen’s theology, because this element is placed outside time� However,
we cannot avoid using categories of time�3 The second act of creation is,
according to Origen, a fall from the pre-existence into the physical world
characterised by difference and embodiment�4 This fallen state is, according
to Origen, a fall away from the divine origin, which necessitates the progress
back to God� This is the process of salvation, in which the major event and
turning point is the incarnation of Logos� Logos leads the νόες back to God�
The process of progress towards God is disturbed by elements of regress� In
the following I will elaborate on these elements in Origen’s understanding
of the creation and salvation history, but first a few remarks concerning the
terminology�
2. Transgression and Regress – the Terminology
The following short list of terms which Origen uses to describe the rational
beings’ transgression and regress is in no way comprehensive,5 but a first
attempt to identify the terminology used by Origen to express how rational
beings become separated from God� It is my impression that this theme is
understudied in Origen research� A systematic, digitally supported study of
Origen’s use of ἀμαρτία and related terms could shine new light on Origen’s
understanding of rational beings’ existence� Origen uses the following terms:
• Παράβασις = transgression, digression, deviation� 18 times in Origen’s
works� 15 from fragments of his commentary to the Romans quoting
Rom� 4:15� 3 in dubious Psalm fragments�
• Παρέκβασις = transgression, deviation from� 2 times in Origen: Com� Joh�
1�94; Com Math 16�8�
• Neglegentia (ἀπροσεξίᾳ) = neglect� 10 times in Origen, for example princ�
2�9,2; 2�9,6�
3
4
5
See concerning the idea of pre-existence in Origen’s theology, P� Martens, Origen’s
Doctrine of Pre-Existence and the Opening Chapters of Genesis, in: ZAC 16
(2013), 516–549�
Or�, princ� 2�8,3� Jacobsen, 2015, 267–268�
The occurrences of these terms were counted using Thesaurus Linguae Graecae
(TLG)� When studying Origen’s terminology one of the major problems is that
a huge part of his works only survived in Latin� Deep studies of Origen’s terminology must compare the rare parts of his corpus that have been transmitted both
in Greek and Latin�
58
Anders-Christian Jacobsen
• Desidia = idleness, laziness or apathy� 2 times in Origen, for example
princ� 2�9,2�
• Ἀμαρτία = sin� 1531 times in Origen�
This terminology will guide the following description of how the νόες transgressed the original order of being, how they progressed from the fallen state
resulting from their transgression, and finally how regression is an integrated
element in the νόες’ progress�
3. Transgression and Regress
This figure indicates where the rational beings’ transgression is located in the
structure of Origen’s theology� The first and foundational act of transgression
happens when the rational beings turn away from God and Logos� That is the
second act of creation – or the fall – where difference and materiality come into
being� However, this foundational act of transgression is repeated continuously
during the process of progress� That is what I label “regress”� I will return
to that�
Transgression, Regress, and Progress in the Theology
59
The νόες’ transgression is sin and neglect, and results in regress and falling out of the divine state of existence into embodiment and diversity�6
Why do all human beings, according to Origen, experience this transgression and regress as an existential condition? Origen’s answer seems to be
clear: freedom! God created all rational beings with freedom� Rational beings
are created in the image of God, who is unconditioned freedom� Therefore,
rational beings are also free – until they use their freedom to transgress� This
does not mean that they lose their freedom, but that it becomes limited,
resulting in the rational beings needing help in order to progress back to
total freedom� Origen expresses it this way:
For the creator granted to the minds created by him the power of free and voluntary
movement, in order that the good that was in them might become their own, since
it was preserved by their own free will; but sloth and weariness of taking trouble
to preserve the good, coupled with disregard and neglect of better things, began the
process of withdrawal from the good�7
The rational beings should integrate freedom in their own existence, but the
opposite happened: they misused freedom to neglect and transgress�
As shown above, Origen uses different terms for this transgression� One of
these terms is παράβασις, which means transgression, digression, deviation�
Fifteen of these occurrences are found in fragments of his commentary to the
Romans, quoting Rom� 4:15, and three in dubious Psalm fragments� Rom
4:15 says: “For the law brings wrath, but where there is no law there is no
transgression” (ὁ γὰρ νόμος ὀργὴν κατεργάζεται· οὗ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν νόμος οὐδὲ
παράβασις)� In the cases where the term is used in the interpretation of Rom�
4:15 Origen mainly discusses whether there was any transgression before
the Law of Moses, and he concludes that there were transgressions before
Moses� In Rufinus’ translation of Origen’s commentary to the Romans,
we find the same discussion of Rom 4:15, but in Rufinus’ translation this
6
7
Jacobsen, 2015, 265–268�
Or�, princ� 2�9,2: Voluntarios enim et liberos motus a se conditis mentibus creator
indulsit, quo scilicet bonum in eis proprium fieret, cum id voluntate propria servaretur; sed desidia et laboris taedium in servando bono, et aversio ac negligentia
meliorum, initium dedit recedendi a bono� The English translation of princ� in the
article is from G� W� Butterworth, On First Principles, Oregon 2012�
Concerning Origen’s understanding of human freedom, see further Or�, princ�
1�5,3; 2�9; 3�1; Or�, orat� 6�1–5, and further C� Hengstermann, Origenes und
der Ursprung der Freiheitsmetaphysik, Adamantiana 8, Münster 2016; H� S�
Benjamins, Eingeordnette Freiheit. Freiheit und Vorsehung Bei Origenes, Leiden
1994, 58–70; A�-C� Jacobsen, Body and Freedom in Origen, in: A� Fürst (ed�),
Perspectives on Origen and the History of his Reception, Münster 2021, 31–47�
G� Lekkas, Liberté et progrès chez Origène, Turnhout 2001�
60
Anders-Christian Jacobsen
also leads to considerations about whether Paul was thinking of the Law of
Moses or on the natural law (Com. in Rom� 4�4)� Thus, the occurrences of
παράβασις do not shed any light over Origen’s understanding of the transgressions that lead to the need for progress�
Origen also uses παρέκβασις twice� This word has the same denotation
as παράβασις: transgression, deviation from� However, in Com� Joh� 1�94
as well as in Com� Math� 16�8, the term bears no theological meaning;
instead Origen uses the word speaking about digressions from the theme he
is discussing�
In princ� 2�9,2 and 2�9,6 we find neglegentia, which probably is a translation of ἀπροσεξία, a word that occurs 10 times in Origen� In both cases
neglegentia is used to describe the negligence or carelessness that the νόες
showed towards the good from which and in which they originally existed�
They used their free will to turn away from their origin� However, the use
of neglegentia indicates that the νόες did not make a clear and judicious
decision to turn away from God, but did so because of sloppiness and carelessness (cf� the quotation above)�
In princ� 2�9,2 we also find the term desidia, which means idleness, laziness or apathy� Desidia is used in the same passage in princ� 2�9,2 as neglegentia and thus underpins that the νόες’ neglect of the good was a result of
inactivity towards the good and not of an active decision to move away from
God� This suggests that that the connection between the rational beings’
free will and their fall is not as straightforward as often believed� The combination of neglegentia and desidia in princ� 2�9,2 might reflect a common
combination of terms in Origen when he writes about human fall and transgression� Thus, we find ἀπροσεξία (neglegentia) combined with ἀμελεία
(desidia) in Fragmenta in Lamentations (fragment 20, line 25) where Origen
also writes about the fall of the soul�
In On Prayer 29�13 Origen uses ἀπροσεξία to describe the carelessness
and neglect which causes rational souls to descend into evil� All rational
souls, Origen says, have the free choice to choose the better and ascend to
the summit of all good, or to choose the opposite and descend to a great
depth of evil� As in princ� 2�9,2, this decision or choice is not made deliberately but is a result of ἀπροσεξία – carelessness and neglect� The passage from
On Prayer deserves to be quoted:
I believe that God in dealing with every rational soul has regard always to its eternal
life� It always is in possession of freedom of choice, and it is by its own responsibility that it either finds itself in a better state on ascending to the summit of all
good, or, on the contrary, descends through carelessness to such or such great depth
of evil� And as a quick and accelerated recovery induces some to make little of the
illnesses into which they have fallen as being readily curable, so that in fact they suffer a relapse after having recovered, so God will be acting reasonably in such cases
Transgression, Regress, and Progress in the Theology
61
if He bears with their wickedness however it grows, and even overlooks its aggravation to where it becomes incurable� For through long continuance in evil and by
having their fill of the sin they lust after, they by their satiety are to perceive the
harm they have suffered and to hate what formerly they cherished� In this way they
can be healed and enjoy with greater security the health of soul restored to them�8
These examples of how Origen uses ἀπροσεξία as an explanation of how
rational souls transgress and descend are important, because they show that
transgression and fall caused by carelessness and neglect is not only nor
mainly considered by Origen to be an event at the beginning of the world,
but a constant existential condition for all rational souls in this world� There
is a constant struggle in rational human beings between progress and regress�
God will interfere in this struggle in the right moment when the rational
beings have suffered enough from the consequences of their transgression
and therefore are mature enough to receive God’s intervention in their lives�
Furthermore, and as importantly, Origen’s use of ἀπροσεξία in these examples shows how Origen understands rational beings’ free choice� Rational
beings’ free choice is not first and foremost a rational choice, but decisions
characterised by neglect and carelessness or by the experience of God’s
mercy, when the suffering caused by neglect and transgression has made the
rational beings mature enough for God’s help� I find that these precisions
of Origen’s understanding of rational beings’ free choice are important in
order to understand that for Origen, rational beings’ choices are always to a
certain degree conditioned by neglect of or openness towards God’s mercy�
In addition to the already mentioned terms Origen uses ἁμαρτία (sin) 1531
times� Thus it is clear that ἀμαρτία is Origen’s main term for the νόες’ transgression, the neglect of and turning away from God� One example is enough
to show that Origen uses ἁμαρτία in a rather traditional way to describe
human beings’ transgression:
8
Or�, orat� 29�13: ἡγοῦμαι δὴ τὸν θεὸν ἑκάστην λογικὴν οἰκονομεῖν ψυχὴν, ἀφορῶντα
εἰς τὴν ἀΐδιον αὐτῆς ζωὴν, ἀεὶ ἔχουσαν τὸ αὐτεξούσιον καὶ παρὰ τὴν ἰδίαν αἰτίαν ἤτοι
ἐν τοῖς κρείττοσι κατ’ ἐπανάβασιν ἕως τῆς ἀκρότητος τῶν ἀγαθῶν γινομένην <ἢ>
καταβαίνουσαν διαφόρως ἐξ ἀπροσεξίας ἐπὶ τὴν τοσήνδε ἢ τοσήνδε τῆς κακίας χύσιν�
ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ ταχεῖα θεραπεία καὶ συντομωτέρα καταφρόνησίν τισιν ἐμποιεῖ τῶν, εἰς ἃ
ἐμπεπτώκασι, νοσημάτων ὡς εὐθεραπεύτων, ὥστε καὶ δεύτερον ἂν μετὰ τὸ ὑγιᾶσθαι τοῖς
αὐτοῖς περιπεσεῖν, εὐλόγως ἐπὶ τῶν τοιούτων περιόψεται τὴν ἐπί τι κακίαν αὔξουσαν,
καὶ ἐπὶ πλεῖστον χεομένην ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀνίατον ὑπερορῶν, ἵνα τῷ προσδιατρῖψαι τῷ κακῷ
καὶ ἐμφορηθῆναι ἧς ἐπιθυμοῦσιν ἁμαρτίας κορεσθέντες αἰσθηθῶσι τῆς βλάβης, καὶ
μισήσαντες ὅπερ πρότερον ἀπεδέξαντο δυνηθῶσι θεραπευθέντες βεβαιότερον ὄνασθαι
τῆς ἐν τῷ θεραπευθῆναι ὑπαρχούσης ὑγείας τῶν ψυχῶν αὐτοῖς· The English translation is from J� J� O’ Meara, Prayer, Exhortation to Martyrdom, Ancient Christian
Writers, New York 1954, 120–121�
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Anders-Christian Jacobsen
Further, in regard to the kingdom of God we must also consider this, that just as justice has no participation with injustice, and light has no fellowship with darkness,
and Christ has no concord with Beliar, so the kingdom of sin cannot be reconciled
with the kingdom of God� If, therefore, we wish to be under the kingship of God, let
not sin reign in our mortal body, nor let us obey sin’s injunctions when she invites
our soul to the works of the flesh, and acts in which God has no part� But rather let
us mortify our members which are upon the earth, and bring forth the fruit of the
Spirit, so that the Lord may walk in us as in a spiritual paradise, ruling alone as king
over us with His Christ, who sits in us on the right of the spiritual power, which
we pray to receive, and who will continue to sit there until all His enemies within
us become His footstool, and all principality and power and virtue be brought to
naught in us�9
Ἁμαρτία is to choose to be under the wrong domain: the domain of injustice
rather than justice, the domain of darkness rather than light, the domain of
Beliar rather than the domain of Christ� As the biblical quotations in the
passage show, this is Pauline theology� As we have seen in the examples
above, where Origen employs the term ἀπροσεξία he manages to translate
this Pauline understanding of sin into his own theological thinking�
To sum up, transgression understood as neglect and laziness toward keeping the good is the reason for the “second creation” or the fall of the νόες,
as well as for the constant regress which according to Origen is a universal
existential condition for human beings�
4. Progress and Salvation
Even though I decided to focus my contribution on transgression and regress,
it is necessary at this point to add some words about progress, because transgression, regress, and progress belong closely together� According to Origen,
progress is an expression of rational beings’ correct use of their free will to
choose God’s help to be under his domain� As the rational being decided
9
Or�, orat� 25�3: ἔτι δὲ περὶ τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ βασιλείας καὶ τοῦτο διαληπτέον, ὅτι, ὥσπερ
οὐκ ἔστι „μετοχὴ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ ἀνομίᾳ“ οὐδὲ „κοινωνία φωτὶ πρὸς σκότος“ οὐδὲ
„συμφώνησις Χριστῷ πρὸς Βελίαρ,“ οὕτως ἀσυνύπαρκτόν ἐστι τῇ βασιλείᾳ τοῦ θεοῦ
βασιλεία τῆς ἁμαρτίας� εἰ τοίνυν θέλομεν ὑπὸ θεοῦ βασιλεύεσθαι, μηδαμῶς „βασιλευέτω
ἡ ἁμαρτία ἐν τῷ θνητῷ ἡμῶν σώματι,“ μηδὲ ὑπακούωμεν τοῖς προστάγμασιν αὐτῆς, ἐπὶ
„τὰ ἔργα τῆς σαρκὸς“ καὶ τὰ ἀλλότρια τοῦ θεοῦ προκαλουμένης ἡμῶν τὴν ψυχήν· ἀλλὰ
νεκρώσαντες „τὰ μέλη τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς“ καρποφορῶμεν τοὺς καρποὺς „τοῦ πνεύματος,“
ἵνα ὡς „ἐν“ „παραδείσῳ“ πνευματικῷ κύριος ἡμῖν ἐμπεριπατῇ, βασιλεύων ἡμῶν μόνος
σὺν τῷ Χριστῷ αὐτοῦ, ἐν ἡμῖν „ἐκ δεξιῶν“ καθημένῳ ἡμῶν μόνος σὺν τῷ Χριστῷ
αὐτοῦ, ἐν ἡμῖν „ἐκ δεξιῶν“ καθημένῳ ἧς εὐχόμεθα λαβεῖν „δυνάμεως“ πνευματικῆς
καὶ καθεζομένῳ, „ἕως“ πάντες οἱ ἐν ἡμῖν ἐχθροὶ αὐτοῦ γένωνται „ὑποπόδιον τῶν
ποδῶν“ αὐτοῦ καὶ καταργηθῇ ἀφ’ ἡμῶν πᾶσα ἀρχὴ καὶ ἐξουσία καὶ δύναμις� Cf� O’
Meara, 1954, 86�
Transgression, Regress, and Progress in the Theology
63
to turn away from the divine, they should also decide to turn back to God�
However, according to Origen this is not possible right away, because the
νόες’ will is paralysed and confused because of their transgression� The will
has to be redirected towards God� This is the salvific work of Christ� I have
tried to describe this salvific process in the following figure:
As can be seen from the figure, the process of progress back to God has several phases in which the Logos acts in different ways: passively as a model to
follow and actively as a master who commands and demands� As the model
to be followed Logos presents himself as a moral and spiritual model� As the
master who acts and orders, he uses the whip to punish, and bitter medicine
and sharp tools to heal, or he acts as the teacher who teaches moral and spiritual doctrines to the rational beings� Origen says that Logos accommodates to
the needs of the fallen rational beings at different levels� Logos becomes everything that rational beings need:
God, therefore, is altogether one and simple� Our savior, however, because of the
many things, since God ‘set’ him ‘forth as a propitiation’ (Rom 3,25) and first fruits
of all creation becomes many things, or perhaps even all these things, as the whole
creation which can be made free needs him� And for this reason he becomes the light
of men when men, darkened by evil, need the light which shines in the darkness and
64
Anders-Christian Jacobsen
is not grasped by darkness� He would not have become the light of men if men had
not been in darkness�10
There are different stages in this process of progress� The first stage is moral
purification, healing, and education� The next stage consists of spiritual
training and education� As mentioned earlier Origen is convinced that this
salvific process will lead to the final restoration and salvation of all, but
it is not a linear process of progress� There will be experiences of regress�
Rational beings must choose to enter into this process, but this free decision
is inspired and supported by Logos� Without the help of Logos progress
would be impossible�11
5. Conclusion
In the short paragraphs above, I have tried to argue that there is a clear
structure in Origen’s theological thinking, and that the terms “progress”,
“transgression” and “regress” can be used to describe this structure� Seen
from one perspective, this does not say a lot, because almost every early
Christian theology can fit into this structure� Seen from another perspective,
it does say a lot, because it indicates that Origen’s theology participates in a
very basic common way of understanding Christian theology� At this level,
Origen is not anything special� However, when it comes to the unfolding of
the different elements in this structure, his theology differs in many respects
from most other early Christian theologies� What makes Origen outstanding
is that he manages to stick to a common theological structure, but at the same
time he develops most of the elements of this structure in a unique manner�
10 Or�, Joh� 1�119–120: Ὁ θεὸς μὲν οὖν πάντη ἕν ἐστι καὶ ἁπλοῦν· ὁ δὲ σωτὴρ ἡμῶν
διὰ τὰ πολλά, ἐπεὶ «προέθετο» αὐτὸν «ὁ θεὸς ἱλαστήριον» καὶ ἀπαρχὴν πάσης τῆς
κτίσεως, πολλὰ γίνεται ἢ καὶ τάχα πάντα ταῦτα, καθὰ χρῄζει αὐτοῦ ἡ ἐλευθεροῦσθαι
δυναμένη πᾶσα κτίσις� Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο γίνεται φῶς τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὅτε ἄνθρωποι ὑπὸ
τῆς κακίας σκοτισθέντες δέονται φωτὸς τοῦ ἐν τῇ σκοτίᾳ φαίνοντος καὶ ὑπὸ σκοτίας
μὴ καταλαμβανομένου, οὐκ ἄν, εἰ μὴ γεγόνεισαν ἐν τῷ σκότῳ οἱ ἄνθρωποι, γενόμενος
ἀνθρώπων φῶς� The English translation is from R� E� Heine, Origen. Commentary
on the Gospel according to John Books 1–10, Washington 1989�
11 See concerning Origen’s understanding of salvation Jacobsen, 2015, where this
theme is developed in detail�
Francesco Berno
Gnosticismo e mistica: una relazione
complessa. Sull’anima gnostica e la genesi
dell’antropologia cristiana
Abstract: The present contribution aims at providing an in-depth analysis of the
Gnostic use of the “mystical” semantic field, by scrutinising and investigating the
occurrences of “μυστικ-” and “μυστηρι-” in the Greek Valentinian production and
in the related heresiological production. Such a survey leads to recognise a recursive
connection between the “mystical experience” and the Valentinian anthropological
class of the psychics.
Keywords: Mysticism, Gnosticism, Soul, Spirit, Allegory
1. Introduzione, tesi e alcune considerazioni di metodo
In un contributo fondamentale per la comprensione non solamente del Vangelo di Filippo – a cui è precipuamente dedicato – ma anche del fenomeno
gnostico tutto, Jacques Ménard introduce la propria riflessione affermando
che quella gnostica è una “mistica di identificazione”, grazie a cui l’anima si
libera dalle pastoie della materia per penetrare la sfera della Verità.1
La dichiarazione è di quelle che necessitano di poche specificazioni, ed, in
effetti, la corposa nota acclusa dallo studioso testimonia del vasto ed immediato consenso che essa dovette raccogliere negli studî precedenti. Spicca in
particolare, tra questi, il nome di Henri-Charles Puech, raffinato conoscitore
ed interprete della logica del pensiero gnostico e delle prime manifestazioni
della mistica cristiana, impegnato lungamente in una valutazione delle relazioni tra i due fenomeni.2 Di “mystic composition” tout court aveva del
resto parlato Søren Giversen in riferimento all’Apocrifo di Giovanni.3
1
2
3
J.E. Ménard, L’Évangile selon Philippe. Introduction, texte, traduction, commentaire, Paris 1967, 10–11.
Si vedano le osservazioni in H.-Ch Puech, La ténèbre mystique chez le PseudoDenys l’Aréopagite et dans la tradition pratistique, in: Études carmélitaines 23
(1938), 33–53, perfezionate poi nel primo volume del celebre H.-Ch Puech,
Enquête de la gnose, Paris 1978.
S. Giversen, Apocryphon Johannis: The Coptic Text of the Apocryphon of Johannis in the Nag Hammadi Codex II with Translation, Introduction and Commentary, Copenhagen 1963, 12.
66
Francesco Berno
Siamo, con Ménard, alla fine degli anni ‘60; la scoperta del fondo di Nag
Hammadi aveva già infiammato la critica e rivoluzionato i nascenti Gnostic
Studies, ma i testi copti giacevano, almeno in larga parte, ancora inediti nei
rispettivi manoscritti. I primi studî critici su di essi concordarono nel riconoscervi un marcato retroterra mistico, tanto nelle modalità d’espressione, quanto
nella dottrina. Basti ricordare qui i rappresentativi nomi di Frederik Wisse4 e
Birger Pearson,5 ma la rassegna potrebbe allungarsi senza difficoltà.
Una maggior cautela lessicale e metodologica, unita ad una sempre più percepibile settorializzazione della ricerca, ha reso più difficile il rinvenimento di
asserzioni tanto radicali e nette nei contributi seriori, sebbene tale minor ricorrenza non paia certo da interpretare come una mutata convinzione della critica.
La copiosa produzione di April DeConick,6 volta ad evidenziare la continuità tra le speculazioni gnostiche e certe manifestazioni di un early Jewish
mysticism, ne è testimonianza autorevole e feconda. La studiosa americana –
che certo non opera in un vacuum, ponendosi a sua volta nel solco d’una
fortunata linea di ricerca –,7 intende infatti sostenere la saldatura tra esperienze profetico-sapienziali del mondo giudaico e la pretesa di un contatto
diretto, via Cristo, con il Padre: la visio Dei veterotestamentaria viene sostituita dalla visio Christi neotestamentaria, e questa, a sua volta, in una sorta
di “superamento” rivelativo, dalla possibilità di attingimento sacramentale,
ritualmente mediato, al mistero del Salvatore («the “democratization” of the
mystical»).8 Ciò permetterebbe d’attingere ad una definizione non-monastica
del fenomeno mistico, ovvero svincolata dalla definizione storica più prossima ch’esso ha assunto nel corso del pensiero cristiano.
In una serie di illuminanti contributi,9 Guy Stroumsa ha argomentato in
favore di una tesi opposta, nel suo complesso, a quanto abbiamo fin qui
4
5
6
7
8
9
Cfr. F. Wisse, The Nag Hammadi Library and the Heresiologists, in: VigChr 25
(1971), 205–223.
Cfr. B.A. Pearson, Anti-Heretical Warnings in Codex IX from Nag Hammadi,
in: M. Krause (ed.), Essays on the Nag Hammadi Texts, Leiden 1973, 145–154.
Cfr. almeno A.D. DeConick, What Is Early Jewish and Christian Mysticism?
in: A.D. DeConick (ed.), Paradise Now: Essays on Early Jewish and Christian
Mysticism, Atlanta 2006, 1–24 e A.D. DeConick, Early Christian Mysticism,
in: G.A. Magee (ed.), The Cambridge Handbook of Western Mysticism and Esotericism, New York 2016, 69–79.
Si vedano le osservazioni in C. Gianotto, Tendenze mistiche in alcuni scritti di Nag
Hammadi, in: C. Giuffré Scibona / A. Mastrocinque (eds.), Ex pluribus unum.
Studi in onore di Giulia Sfameni Gasparro, Roma 2015, 367–368.
A.D. DeConick, Early Christian Mysticism, 2016, 75.
Si vedano, in particolare, le osservazioni sul tema in G.G. Stroumsa, Another
Seed: Studies in Gnostic Mythology, Leiden 1984, 2–4; G.G. Stroumsa, Caro
Salutis Cardo: Shaping the Person in Early Christian Thought, in: History of
L’anima gnostica e la genesi dell’antropologia cristiana
67
osservato. Lo studioso sostiene infatti che la mistica cristiana inizi proprio
là dove finisce la stagione dello gnosticismo ed in diretta ed esplicita polemica con esso. La gnosi cristiana sarebbe erede di preesistenti tradizioni
di sapere esoterico,10 la cui forzata soluzione da parte della nascente ortodossia avrebbe fornito il vocabolario e l’armamentario concettuale per la
nascita dell’antropologia “cattolica” e del suo misticismo. Del tutto analogamente alla celebre proposta sulla genesi del fenomeno gnostico elaborata
da Robert Grant,11 secondo cui questo originerebbe dalla deluse aspettative
apocalittiche, allo stesso modo la genesi del fenomeno mistico è identificata
nelle deluse aspettative gnostiche, ovvero nel venir meno della proiezione
dell’intuizione teologica fondativa su di un orizzonte mitico, seppur oramai
avvertito come insincero e strumentale – una «nur halbwegs Mythologie»,
per dirla con Kérényi.12 Ad una tale prospettiva storico-evolutiva, Stroumsa ne affianca una teorico-concettuale, attraverso cui rendere conto del
carattere finanche antitetico di mistica e gnosi: se la prima tenta, infatti,
una interiorizzazione dell’esperienza religiosa, la seconda perviene ad una
esteriorizzazione della coscienza, che si sostanzia in mito, immagine, narrazione, oggetto visibile.
La dipendenza di una simile proposta dall’interpretazione evolutiva del
fenomeno gnostico sviluppata da Hans Jonas13 appare, del resto, evidente,
assecondando il riconoscimento di una risoluzione del portato esoterico
originario in una filosofia speculativa, entro l’orizzonte di una progressiva
metaforizzazione del mito. La sconfitta sul piano storico e pubblico delle
istanze dualiste e mitologizzanti fatte proprie dai diversi sistemi gnostici,
quindi la loro disattivazione teorica e marginalizzazione pratica, coincide
10
11
12
13
Religions 30 (1990), 25–50; G.G. Stroumsa, From Esotericism to Mysticism in
Early Christianity, in: H.G. Kippenberg / G.G. Stroumsa (eds.), Secrecy and Concealment: Studies in the History of Mediterranean and Near Eastern Religions,
Leiden 1995, 289–310; G.G. Stroumsa, Hidden Wisdom. Esoteric Traditions and
the Roots of Christian Mysticism, Leiden-Boston 22005, 3–9; 46–62.
A parere dello studioso, l’esoterismo gnostico si sostanzia in una doppia prospettiva: da un lato, nel carattere segreto in sé delle dottrine rivelate, quindi del
contenuto sostantivo dell’atto di apocalisse; dall’altro, nell’identificazione di una
comunità eletta chiamata a custodire tale deposito di gnosi, che comincia ad
interpretarsi come luogo privilegiato di accesso alla divinità stessa.
R.M. Grant, Gnosticism and Early Christianity, New York / London 1976.
K. Kérényi, Mythologie und Gnosis, Winterthur 1942, 41.
Faccio qui riferimento, in primis, al celeberrimo H. Jonas, Von der Mythologie
zur mystichen Philosophie, Göttingen 1954, e al denso H. Jonas, Myth and Mysticism. A Study of Objectification and Interiorization in Religious Thought, in: The
Journal of Religion 49 (1969), 315–329.
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Francesco Berno
con l’affermarsi di una filosofica attitudine monista, in grado di saldare
la neo-formata antropologia cristiana con i migliori esiti della riflessione
pagana.14
In ultima analisi, quindi, l’esperienza religiosa che la tradizione mistica
cristiana è chiamata a sublimare e riconoscere come vertice ultimo del contatto con il divino, segreto di un uomo-interiore oramai platonicamente
declinato, è, per l’appunto, ciò che aveva trovato squadernamento ed oggettivazione nel mito gnostico.
Agli occhi di Stroumsa, misticismo e gnosticismo sarebbero dunque categorie radicalmente contraddittorie, sia se guardate da una prospettiva storica di definizione ed evoluzione del dogma, sia se valutate nella propria
essenza concettuale più intima.
In un recente contributo, Gaetano Lettieri sonda ciò che possiamo identificare come una via media,15 riconoscendo, nello sprofondamento gnostico
dei semi spirituali nell’Abisso del Padre, la matrice – comunque ibrida nella
propria struttura, poiché platonicamente dispiegata e, al contempo, dualisticamente connotata – dell’abbandono estatico di qualsiasi proprietà religiosa, sino all’attingimento dell’identità ontologica del singolo gnostico con
il proprio Principio. Solo attraverso tale arditissima pretesa, certo ripensata
cattolicamente ed universalizzata nella propria protologizzazione del corpo
ecclesiale e del soggetto spirituale, “è stato storicamente possibile approdare
a una teologia spirituale cristiana dogmaticamente articolata.”16
Il ventaglio delle posizioni che emergono anche da una tanto cursoria e
limitata ricognizione è sintomatico dell’oscurità, storica e teorica insieme,
della questione che stiamo cercando di mettere a fuoco. Del resto, le nozioni
ed i termini in gioco sono davvero massimi e generalissimi. Se ‘gnosticismo’
è categoria da molti avversata, da alcuni dismessa, dai più guardata con crescente sospetto,17 quella di ‘mistica’ – e torneremo oltre su questo punto – è
14 Per una veloce analisi delle interpretazioni del mito gnostico fornite dalla critica
novecentesca, mi permetto di rimandare a F. Berno, L’Apocrifo di Giovanni. Introduzione storico-critica, Roma 2019.
15 G. Lettieri, Più a fondo. L’ontologia apocalittica valentiniana e le origini della
teologia mistica cristiana, in: I. Adinolfi / G. Gaeta / A. Lavagnetto (eds.), L’antiBabele. Sulla mistica degli antichi e dei moderni, Genova 2017, 71–116.
16 Lettieri, 2017, 99; corsivo originale.
17 Oramai classiche le (pur divergenti) critiche all’utilizzo del termine ‘gnosticismo’
mosse in M.A. Williams, Rethinking “Gnosticism”: An Argument for Dismantling
a Dubious Category, Princeton 1996 e K.L. King, What is Gnosticism?, Cambridge
2003. Si veda, inoltre, l’equilibrato bilancio in G. Chiapparini, Gnosticismo: fine di
una categoria storico-religiosa?, in: Annali di Scienze religiose 11 (2006), 181–217.
Recente ed autorevole è infine la presa di posizione “pro-gnostica” in E. Thomassen, The Coherence of “Gnosticism”, Berlin-Boston 2020.
L’anima gnostica e la genesi dell’antropologia cristiana
69
normalmente specificata da un aggettivo o da un genitivo limitativi. E con
buoni motivi. Come pensare, dunque, di darne ragione e di indagarne la
relazione? Come sperare anche solo di definirle? Sed contra, dietro i termini, riposano i testi, e le grandezze appena menzionate – fossero anche
etichette di comodo – indicano nondimeno delle opzioni d’interpretazione
di tali opere, che possono esprimersi anche diversamente: presenta lo gnosticismo una nozione piena di ‘persona’? interpreta il contatto con il divino
come il potenziamento estremo delle precondizioni e delle attitudini innate
alla salvezza della natura creata? pianifica una prassi sacramentale che guidi
l’adepto a sempre più sublimi misteri? ovvero, al contrario, nulla di tutto ciò
è rinvenibile, ed anzi è possibile identificare un sistema di pensiero incompatibile con tali opzioni? tutte le esperienze unitive, di intimo contatto e di
connessione profonda con il divino, possono e devono dirsi ‘mistiche’?
Alla luce, dunque, di tali difficoltà definitorie e, al contempo, dell’urgenza
di affrontare più direttamente lo spinoso rapporto tra mito e mistica, appare
opportuno enunciare sin da subito le due tesi, intimamente correlate, che
si intende qui sostenere, per procedere a ritroso e recuperare via via gli elementi che credo le supportino.
Il lettore non tarderà a notare la natura arrischiata e talvolta unilaterale
di alcune delle argomentazioni affidate alle pagine che seguono. Esse, tuttavia, prima ancora che proporre affermazioni conclusive, intendono primariamente presentare le nozioni in campo nel modo più radicale e “nudo”
possibile, così che possa mettersi a fuoco in modo maggiormente nitido il
loro complesso intrecciarsi ed ibridarsi.
In primo luogo, quanto segue vuole mostrare che lo gnosticismo – ovvero
quella forma di gnosi cristiana che conobbe il proprio massimo sviluppo
nella seconda metà del II secolo per poi essere precocemente sconfitta dagli
sforzi eresiologici dei polemisti della Grande Chiesa –18 presenta sì elementi
che possono a buon diritto dirsi ‘mistici’, talvolta ben dispiegati e non recessivi, ma essi appaiono configurati all’interno di una struttura complessiva
di pensiero che non esiterei a definire ‘anti-mistica’. Essi, infatti, non solo
appaiono quantitativamente minoritari rispetto ad una più generale tendenza della speculazione gnostica, ma quest’ultima pare concedere loro una
18 Si accoglie qui la nota distinzione, canonizzata dal documento finale del colloquio
di Messina (atti in U. Bianchi (ed.) Le Origini dello Gnosticismo. Colloquio di
Messina 13–18 Aprile 1966, Leiden 1967), tra una generica ‘gnosi’, ubiquitariamente rinvenibile – come aspirazione ad una sapienza superiore a quella correntemente rivelata – in ogni tradizione religiosa e sapienziale, ed il più discreto
fenomeno della gnosi cristiana, cui si attribuirà convenientemente la denominazione di ‘gnosticismo’.
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Francesco Berno
specifica collocazione all’interno della propria struttura; e tale collocazione –
come vedremo – è subordinata a ben individuabili istanze superiori.
Prima facie, lo gnosticismo appare infatti come un complesso e stratificato
apparato teorico-mitico, capace di sublimare e diluire potenzialmente ogni
definizione teorica. Lo sforzo narrativo gnostico si presenta all’interprete
quale una delle più significative zone d’ombra che ancora persistono nello
studio di questo fenomeno. All’interno del mito gnostico, ed in particolare
all’interno della sua variante più raffinata, composita e scritturisticamente
dedotta, ovvero il racconto pleromatico valentiniano,19 è possibile rinvenire
virtualmente ogni affermazione teologica ed il suo contraddittorio. Parafrasando Jonas, tutto funge da materiale a portata di mano: la rivelazione
veterotestamentaria, l’altra rivelazione giudaica – ovvero l’eresia enochica –,
l’annuncio cristiano, l’opaca verità della filosofia pagana, quella ancor più
opaca della mistagogia; tutto viene assunto e, quindi, implicitamente, tutto
viene relativizzato, giacché sottoposto ad una radicale rilettura cristologica e
cristocentrica.20 Si è persino tentati d’affermare che, così come la tradizione
19 Nella sua forma più completa e coerente, esso è attestato dai primi otto capitoli del
primo libro dell’Adversus haereses di Ireneo di Lione (collettivamente denominati
come Grande Notizia). Postulato dall’Epistola a Flora tolomeana, il mito valentiniano ricorre, in forme parziali, contratte o riassunte, in numerosi scritti copti
del fondo di Nag Hammadi. Basti qui menzionare il Trattato Tripartito (NHC
1.5) e la Esposizione valentiniana (NHC 11.2). La Grande Notizia fa esplicito
riferimento ai discepoli di Tolomeo, ovvero alle dottrine elaborate in seno allo
stadio d’evoluzione dell’insegnamento dell’eresiarca Valentino contemporaneo
all’attività ireneana presso Roma, centro di irraggiamento della Scuola valentiniana; del fondatore, Ireneo pare avere conoscenza solo indiretta. Ciò, insieme
alla scarsissima documentazione in nostro possesso sulla teologia di Valentino,
ha indotto la critica a ritenere che il complesso mito valentiniano – almeno nella
forma assai elaborata a noi nota – sia una creazione seriore rispetto al suo insegnamento, maggiormente orientato verso una esegesi di stampo medio-platonico
delle scritture ispirate. Così C. Markschies, Valentinus Gnosticus? Untersuchungen
zur Valentinianischen Gnosis mit einem Kommentar zu den Fragmenten Valentins,
Tübingen 1992. Su una posizione ben più prudente, tendente ad identificare già
agli albori della riflessione valentiniana tutte le precondizioni per lo sviluppo di
una mitografia tanto raffinata, si è invece attestato E. Thomassen, The Spiritual
Seed. The Church of the Valentinians, Leiden-Boston 2006.
20 Cfr. G. Lettieri, Deus patiens. L’essenza cristologica dello Gnosticismo, Roma
1996. I fili che costituiscono la narrazione gnostica, corrispondenti ad altrettante
“fonti”, sono apprezzabili con particolare evidenza nel testo da molti reputato
come la matrice fondamentale della speculazione gnostica tutta: l’Apocrifo di Giovanni. Su questo tema ci leggeranno con profitto le dense osservazioni in Z. Pleše,
Poetics of the Gnostic Universe. Narrative and Cosmology in the Apocryphon
of John, Leiden-Boston 2006, 43–73 e Z. Pleše, Intertextuality and Conceptual
Blending in the Apocryphon of John, in: Adamantius 18 (2012), 118–135.
L’anima gnostica e la genesi dell’antropologia cristiana
71
eresiologica sostiene che i seguaci di Carpocrate intendevano esaurire nel
mondo tutti i peccati del mondo per poter sfuggire al mondo,21 allo stesso
modo l’interprete valentiniano voglia esaurire tutte le narrazioni possibili
delle modalità di rivelazione storica del divino giudicate come erronee o
parziali, per poterle così superarle. Tanto antica è la novità cristiana che
essa, da un lato, non può che attendere ab aeterno ad ogni sforzo umano
di comprendere la natura di Dio, essendone la necessaria, silente precondizione, e, dall’altro, non può che denunciarli tutti come tentativi di volar
sanz’ali, ossia di pervenire ad una conoscenza del Padre senza essere Figli.22
Fornire un thesaurus cifrato di ciò che la gnosi chiama a superare: questo
è, ad avviso di chi scrive, il fine primo – destruens, sacrificale – del mito
gnostico, così ingenuo, insincero, lontano dallo stesso vertice della teologia
gnostica – che il pur tardo Vangelo di Filippo definisce con limpida semplicità ed immediatezza attraverso la compenetrazione di essenza tra Padre
e Figlio: “il Padre è nel Figlio, il Figlio è nel Padre: questo è il Regno dei
cieli”.23 Si porrebbe qui – ma è, questo, un vaso di Pandora che è possibile
solo additare con timore – lo spinosissimo problema della consapevolezza
gnostica del carattere meramente artificiale dell’elaborazione mitografica: il
mito che diviene trasparente, un mito “di ritorno”, poiché elaborato – altra
fecondissima intuizione di Stroumsa – in un contesto storico-culturale in cui
le più pressanti urgenze metafisiche erano state già affrontate mediante una
concettualità non-mitica.24
Ciò che è invece fondamentale notare è come tale vera e propria
ἀνακεφαλαίωσις della rivelazione rappresenti un fecondissimo deposito di
materiale pronto a rielaborazioni, con una straordinaria capacità plastica di
essere assorbito e riconfigurato, riscritto ed emendato, in un processo non
solo di pletorica produzione di nuovi testi e nuove rivelazioni – precocemente
21 Cfr. Ir., adv.haer. 1.25,4.
22 Si pensi a come tale incapacità storica di conoscere il Padre senza esserne abilitati
da una identità di essenza sia ristrutturata nella narrazione gnostica del peccato
di Sophia, colpevole di volersi unire al Padre senza aver un compagno legittimo
che garantisca la liceità dell’atto.
23 NHC 2.3,74, 23–24.
24 G.G. Stroumsa, Another Seed, 1984, 2: “[i]n opposition to primitive, or even
to early Greek mythology, the Gnostic myths arose in a mental world where
metaphysical problems had already been addressed in non-mythological ways,
and it arose precisely as a rejection of these ways. Thence stems the ambiguity of
Gnostic thought, the artificality of its mythology, whose figures are often hardly
more than hypostasized abstract entities”. Si veda inoltre G. Bennett, God as a
Form: Essays in Greek Theology, Albany 1976, 144, e soprattutto D.M. Burns,
Apocalypse of the Alien God. Platonism and the Exile of Sethian Gnosticism,
Philadelphia 2014, 48–76.
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Francesco Berno
riconosciuto e stigmatizzato dai polemisti della Grande Chiesa: si ricordi la
“moltitudine indescrivibile di testi apocrifi” menzionata da Ireneo in adv.
haer. 1.20,1 – ma anche di continua generazione di raffinatissima teologia
speculativa.25
Queste considerazioni introducono di necessità una seconda tesi: se noi
scorgiamo nella gnosi cristiana una teologia mistica, o l’origine stessa della
possibilità d’una teologia mistica, è per una sorta di inganno della vista,
dovuto alla lente distorsiva della gnosi cattolica alessandrina, che fu in grado
di selezionare ed arricchire con motivi allotrî la riflessione gnostica, stilizzandola e presentandola come ciò che invece essa intendeva trascendere, vale a
dire come una modalità – pur imperfetta, quindi da perfezionare “cattolicamente” – di incontro mistico con il divino.
In tale contesto, appare particolarmente centrale il ruolo giocato dalla
nozione valentiniana di ‘psichico’, identificante – sia detto, per ora, grosso
modo – la natura non graziata, eppur credente, ovvero la massa dei fedeli
della Grande Chiesa, non toccati dalla gnosi, esterni ai misteri paterni, ma
comunque passibili di una salvezza parziale, di secondo livello.26 In essa
ed attraverso essa, lo gnosticismo comincia ad elaborare una nozione di
‘uomo naturale’, che, una volta eliminata la complessa speculazione sull’elemento pneumatico che risiede in alcuni eletti – quindi, detto altrimenti,
25 Per la nozione di ‘riscrittura’ come pratica eminente dell’elaborazione testuale e
teorica gnostica, rimando a D.M. Burns, Esotericism Recorded: Text, Scripture,
and Parascripture, in: A. DeConick (ed.), Religion: Secret Religion, Farmington
Hills 2016, 213–229.
26 Questo scritto accoglie pressoché pienamente l’opzione “tradizionale” di interpretazione dell’escatologia gnostica, che vi scorge una conseguenza del rigido
determinismo delle nature protologiche: gli ilici, uomini puramente naturali dotati
del solo simulacro del corpo carnale, subiranno la distruzione; gli psichici, fedeli
devoti e moralmente retti, ma altro dal Padre, sono abilitati a scegliere, attraverso
le opere, tra la distruzione ilica o la cooptazione in uno stato di beatitudine eterna
all’esterno del Pleroma, prossimi a Dio ma non in lui risolti; gli spirituali torneranno ad inabissarsi nel Padre. Recentemente (e, a parere di chi scrive, in modo
non convincente), nuove proposte ermeneutiche hanno tentato di ammorbidire
tale tripartizione, mostrandone, in sintesi, la natura originariamente volontarista.
Altrimenti detto, non sarebbe la natura di ogni uomo a determinarne destino, ma è
la diversa ricezione del messaggio di Cristo a configurare, in ogni interiorità, diversificati stati di relazione con il divino, che potevano essere altrimenti. Si vedano, in
particolare, E. Thomassen, Saved by Nature? The Question of Human Races and
Soteriological Determinism in Valentinianism, e I. Dunderberg, Valentinian Theories on Classes of Humankind, entrambi in: C. Markschies / J. van Oort (eds.),
Zugänge zur Gnosis. Akten zur Tagung der Patristischen Arbeitsgemeinschaft
vom 02. -05. 01. 2011 in Berlin-Spandau, Leuven-Walpole 2013, rispettivamente
129–150 e 113–128.
L’anima gnostica e la genesi dell’antropologia cristiana
73
una volta “decapitato” il sistema gnostico – sarà chiamata a divenire apicale nella riflessione antropologica alessandrina. In estrema sintesi: i grandi
pensatori della scuola d’Alessandria (e, tra tutti, Origene), attraverso un
serrato dibattito critico con le più ardite opzioni gnostiche, restituirono ad
una dimensione tecnicamente teologica la speculazione gnostica sull’uomo
spirituale, rendendo di conseguenza autonoma la riflessione antropologica
sull’uomo psichico. Il medesimo processo si può analizzare – ma solo cenni
verranno forniti in tal senso in questo scritto – da una prospettiva ecclesiologica, ovvero nella negazione “cattolica” e nel riassorbimento della pretesa
gnostica di rappresentare il verus Israel, la minoranza egemonica invisibile
del corpo visibile dei fedeli in Cristo, condotta sino all’apicalizzazione di
quest’ultimo.27 Come in sede antropologica la componente psichica – quindi
l’anima – diviene la più alta istanza soterica del composto umano, così,
parallelamente, in sede ecclesiologica la componente psichica – la Grande
Chiesa – afferma la propria autonomia.
2. De comparando: cosa si intende per ‘mistico’ in questo
scritto.
Se la nozione di ‘gnostico’, pur nella propria più o meno condivisibile
questionabilità storiografica, identifica già in antico una serie di fenomeni
storico-religiosi discreti,28 e se, di conseguenza, è riconoscibile un pur provvisorio perimetro di testi che pare lecito sussumervi, assai più evanescente e
spinosa è quella di ‘mistica’. Essa, a rigore, designa un fenomeno tipicamente
moderno.29 Non mi è possibile soffermarmi adeguatamente su questo certo
27 Sul tema rimando a F. Berno, Notes on a Leading Minority: Gnostic Para-Religious
Self-Understanding, in: Studi e Materiali di Storia delle Religioni 83/2 (2017),
357–365.
28 Molto è stato scritto sul tema dell’utilizzo antico dell’etichetta di ‘gnostico’ da
parte degli eresiologici. Mi limito a ricordare N. Brox, Gnostikoi als häresiologischer Terminus, in: Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft 57 (1966),
105–114 e D. Brakke, The Gnostics: Myth, Ritual, and Diversity in Early Christianity, Harvard 2010, 29–50. Si veda, infine, il cursorio ma efficace bilancio in
G. Chiapparini, Valentino gnostico e platonico. Il valentinianesimo della ‘grande
notizia’ di Ireneo di Lione: fra esegesi gnostica e filosofia medioplatonica, Milano
2012, 14–15.
29 Si veda, per un primo orientamento, la voce “Mystique”, in M. Viller / C. Baumgartner / A. Rayez (eds.), Dictionnaire de spiritualité ascétique et mystique: doctrine
et histoire, Paris 1932–1995. Cfr. inoltre R.C. Zaehner, Mysticism, Sacred and
Profane, Oxford 1957; E. Ancilli, La mistica: alla ricerca di una definizione, in: E.
Ancilli / M. Paparozzi (a cura di), La mistica. Fenomenologia e riflessione teolo
gica, Roma 1984, 17–40, B. McGinn, The Presence of God: A History of Western
74
Francesco Berno
rilevantissimo aspetto, che pure riveste un ruolo centrale nella comprensione
della storia del concetto prima dell’apparizione di quel cluster lessicale e
tematico che permette di identificalo ed analizzarlo con rigore scientifico.
Emerge, in sintesi, una preistoria di analogia, a caduta ed in dipendenza
da preesistenti forme giudaiche di relazione tra il fedele ed entità praeterumane, quasi-divine, che lo abilitavano a personalissime visiones Dei.30 Possiamo parlare solo analogamente di una mistica giovannea, di una mistica
paolina,31 forse finanche, retrocedendo, d’una mistica gesuana –32 quindi di
una mistica messianica –,33 guidati dal marcatore suggerito e “codificato” da
Michel de Certeau,34 ovvero dalla dimensione esistenziale dell’assenza del
corpo amato, sublimata nella ricerca di un surplus di presenza e di intimità.
La sottrazione violenta ed improvvisa del corpo del figlio Dio, intercettando
un percorso di progressivo innalzamento della cristologia, genera dunque
dinamiche di intensificazione, rilancio e interiorizzazione della pretesa di un
contatto diretto con il Senso nel/del mondo. Perfettamente “mistica”, in tale
prospettiva, è quindi l’affermazione paolina circa la possibilità per il Padre
di trarre Senso dal nulla, di costituire Essere dal non-Essere, di qualificare
gratuitamente il luogo dell’indegnità – la carne – come luogo legittimo (ed
anzi, più proprio, più pieno) della teofania.35
La notevole potenza speculativa di tali nozioni, che ne ha garantito e ne
garantisce tuttora una spiccata efficacia euristica, non può che decretarne
30
31
32
33
34
35
Christian Mysticism I. The Foundations of Mysticism, New York 1994, e C.-A.
Bernard, Le Dieu des mystiques, Paris 2000.
Per una introduzione e generose indicazioni bibliografiche, cfr. P. Schäfer, The
Origins of Jewish Mysticism, Tübingen 2009.
Si pensi al fecondissimo A. Schweitzer, Die Mistik des Apostels Paulus, Tübingen 1930.
Si vedano le ampie osservazioni in M. Pesce, Si può parlare di Mistica per Gesù?,
in: I. Adinolfi / G. Gaeta / A. Lavagnetto (a cura di), L’antiBabele. Sulla mistica
degli antichi e dei moderni, Genova 2017, 51–69.
Cfr. M. Idel, Messianic Mysticism, New Haven 2000. Si veda, inoltre, A. Destro,
Mystic Experience in Context. Representing Categories and Examining “Social
Practices”, in: S.C. Mimouni / M. Scopello (eds.), La mystique théorétique et
théurgique dans l’Antiquité GrécoRomaine. Judaïsmes et Christianismes, Turnhout 2016, 109–118.
M. de Certeau, La Fable mystique: XVIe et XVIIe siècle, Paris 1982.
Cfr. 1 Cor 1:26–29: Βλέπετε γὰρ τὴν κλῆσιν ὑμῶν, ἀδελφοί, ὅτι οὐ πολλοὶ σοφοὶ κατὰ
σάρκα, οὐ πολλοὶ δυνατοί, οὐ πολλοὶ εὐγενεῖς·ἀλλὰ τὰ μωρὰ τοῦ κόσμου ἐξελέξατο
ὁ θεός, ἵνα καταισχύνῃ τοὺς σοφούς, καὶ τὰ ἀσθενῆ τοῦ κόσμου ἐξελέξατο ὁ θεός,
ἵνα καταισχύνῃ τὰ ἰσχυρά, καὶ τὰ ἀγενῆ τοῦ κόσμου καὶ τὰ ἐξουθενημένα ἐξελέξατο
ὁ θεός, τὰ μὴ ὄντα, ἵνα τὰ ὄντα καταργήσῃ, ὅπως μὴ καυχήσηται πᾶσα σὰρξ ἐνώπιον
τοῦ θεοῦ.
L’anima gnostica e la genesi dell’antropologia cristiana
75
anche, di converso, un’assai problematica maneggiabilità sul piano storico,
esponendo l’interprete al costante rischio di sovraesporre continuità tra
fenomeni discreti. Come figurarsi, ad esempio, ciò che dovettero provare
gli animi più fini dei secoli IV, V, VI, assistendo alla caduta dell’Impero – il
Senso che, letteralmente, abbandona il mondo–,36 se non in stretta analogia con la percezione dell’assenza sviluppata nella comunità di Giovanni,
o in Paolo? Il suicidio di Virio Nicomaco Flaviano, raffinato “umanista”,
pontifex maior, editore di Livio e di Virgilio, che preferì la morte alla vista
del destino del mondo all’indomani della vittoria di Teodosio su Eugenio –
di cui pur aveva erroneamente vaticinato il successo –,37 non risponde, in
ultima analisi, ad una omologa testimonianza martiriale?
In conseguenza di ciò, il nostro approccio deve farsi necessariamente
“fenomenologico”, volto cioè all’identificazione di uno standard compa
rativo di definizione della mistica, sotto cui far ricadere la domanda circa
la scaturigine cristiana della nozione ed il ruolo giocato dallo gnosticismo
storico. Certo provvisoriamente, e con ampia possibilità di revisione e senza
alcuna pretesa d’esaustività, propongo qui non tanto dei “motivi” mistici –
sarebbe operazione arrischiatissima, metodologicamente azzardata, finanche
naïve –, quanto delle precondizioni storico-critiche di possibilità del darsi di
un’esperienza mistica, che accorpo, per comodità d’esposizione, nei seguenti
quattro punti:
(a) la postulazione di una gerarchia di sostanze, quindi di una scala entis
stabile ed ordinata, con (possibili) evidenti ripercussioni in sede cosmologica. La rivelazione mistica, l’apocalisse privata, si presenta, dunque,
quale atto di gratuita effrazione di tale gerarchia, singolare, non partecipabile, solo problematicamente comunicabile;
(b) la percezione di un effettivo iato tra soggetto e Dio, ovvero l’affermazione di una infinita distanza creaturale tra un principio monoteisticamente connotato ed il proprio prodotto, quindi la teorizzazione di uno
scarto ontologico tra natura umana e natura divina;
36 Cfr. P. Dufraigne, Adventus Augusti, adventus Christi. Recherces sur l’exploita
tion idéologique et littéraire d’un cérémonial dans l’antiquité tardive, Paris 1994.
Notevoli le osservazioni sul rituale dell’adventus, quindi sulla visibilità deittica
dell’identità divina dell’Imperatore, in F. Guidetti, Gerarchie visibili: la rappre
sentazione dell’ordine cosmico e sociale nell’arte e nel cerimoniale tardoromani,
in: C. O. Tommasi / L.G. Soares Santoprete / H. Seng (eds.), Hierarchie und Ritual.
Zur philosophischen Spiritualität in der Spätantike, Heidelberg 2018, 9–42.
37 Cfr. G. Rinaldi, Pagani e cristiani. La storia di un conflitto (secoli IIV), Roma
2016, 268–269.
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Francesco Berno
(c) il completo sviluppo di un’antropologia dell’uomo ad immagine, pienamente platonizzata, attraverso cui si affermi la secolarizzazione e l’indipendenza delle attività psichiche umane dal principio creatore;
(d) l’emersione di una piena nozione di ‘persona’, con particolare riferimento all’individuazione di un nucleo egemonico cui riferire volontà,
intelligenza ed autodeterminazione del soggetto.
Quanto segue tenterà di dimostrare che a) lo gnosticismo cristiano è (intenzionalmente) sfornito di tale complesso di condizioni, e che b) tuttavia,
esso comincia a elaborare al proprio interno una dottrina dell’uomo nongraziato, intesa e contrario rispetto alla natura che lo gnostico è chiamato a
riattivare in sé ed esprimere.
3. Mistico, ovvero psichico.
Per stringere più dappresso l’argomento e fondarlo criticamente, è necessaria una pur cursoria analisi terminologica dei lemmi di nostro interesse.
Preliminarmente si dirà che il corpus preso in considerazione è costituito dai
testi e dai frammenti trasmessi in greco ed in latino,38 principalmente d’ambito valentiniano, con solo sporadici sondaggi presso le opere preservate
in lingua copta e presso il problematico orizzonte della corrente setiana.39
Ciò risponde, in primo luogo, ad un’esigenza di controllo cronologico sulle
fonti selezionate, stante la persistente difficoltà nel definire origine, natura,
provenienza del fondo di Nag Hammadi.40 L’incertezza nella collocazione,
insieme cronologica e dottrinale, dei testi copto-gnostici ha infatti conseguenze di rilievo sulla nostra analisi, rischiando di fornirci dati che risentono
dell’ibridazione di tali opere con fenomeni storico-religiosi seriori. I due
secoli che separano la produzione gnostica in greco dalla sua traduzione
(assai verosimilmente – e, in alcuni casi, certamente – accompagnata da un
38 L’edizione di riferimento è M. Simonetti (ed.), Testi gnostici in lingua greca e latina,
Milano 1993.
39 Per una prima definizione di quest’ultima, rimando a H.-M. Schenke The Pheno
menon and Significance of Gnostic Sethianism, in: B. Layton (ed.), The Redisco
very of Gnosticism, Vol. II, Leiden 1981, 588–616. Cfr. inoltre J.-M. Sevrin, Le
dossier baptismal séthien. Études sur la sacramentaire gnostique, Québec 1986.
40 La bibliografia sul tema è sempre più cospicua. Si vedano le condivisibili osservazioni di carattere metodologico in S. Emmel, The Coptic Gnostic Texts as a
Witnesses to the Production and Trasmission of Gnostic (and Other) Traditions,
in: J. Frey / E. Edzard Popkes / J. Schröter (eds.), Das Thomasevangelium. Ent
stheung – Rezeption – Theologie, Berlin 2008, 33–49.
L’anima gnostica e la genesi dell’antropologia cristiana
77
significativo processo di interpolazione e di riscrittura)41 conoscono l’emersione, infatti, di una serie di esperienze religiose ed opzioni dottrinali, quali il
monachesimo, la strutturazione di una cristologia ortodossa, l’affermazione
del monoepiscopato, tutte tese a conferire struttura e stabilità all’esperienza
escatologico-carismatica delle origini, attingendo a piene mani dal platonismo coevo.42
Ma soffermiamoci, appunto, sui nostri testi.
Prevedibilmente, il termine μυστήριον è assai raro.43 In particolare, esso
non compare mai nei dettati i cui processi di riscrittura eresiologica appaiono trascurabili, quali i frammenti di Valentino, i lacerti eracleoniani di
commento al Quarto Vangelo, gli Excerpta ex Theodoto, la tolomeana Epi
stola a Flora, la cosiddetta Lettera dottrinale valentiniana. È invece ricorrente in quei testi in cui sicure tracce di rimaneggiamento ed accomodazione
appaiono evidenti e profonde, quali, in primis, la Grande Notizia di Ireneo.
Ciò non può che far ritenere che il termine risenta di un precoce uso polemico, quindi denigratorio, da parte del vescovo di Lione, che intende così
accostare la gnosi agli empî misteri greci: “iniziati ai misteri” (μεμυημένοι
μυστήρια; Ir. adv.haer. 1.6,1) è appellativo tipico,44 ripreso con convinzione
41 Cfr. A. Camplani, Sulla trasmissione dei testi gnostici in copto, in: A. Camplani
(ed.), L’Egitto cristiano. Aspetti e problemi in età tardoantica, Roma 1997, 127–
175.
42 Cfr. le (postume) riflessioni in E. Troeltsch, Der Historismus und seine Überwind
ung. Fünf Vorträge, Berlin 1924. Si veda inoltre G. Lettieri, Un dispositivo cri
stiano nell’idea di democrazia? Materiali per una metodologia della storia del
Cristianesimo, in: A. Zambarbieri / G. Otranto (eds.), Cristianesimo e democrazia.
Atti del I Convegno della CUSCC (Pavia, 21–22 settembre 2009), Bari 2011,
19–134.
43 Ciò anche a motivo della sua pressoché totale assenza negli scritti evangelici –
con la sola celeberrima eccezione dell’occorrenza del suo plurale in riferimento al
Regno (Mc 4, 11 // Mt 13, 11 // Lc 8, 10), e del suo uso non-tecnico negli scritti
paolini e nell’Apocalisse giovannea, in cui pur compare, complessivamente, venticinque volte. Per una introduzione, cfr. A.E. Harvey, The Use of Mystery Lan
guage in the Bible, in: JTS 31 (1980), 320–336. Si veda inoltre la voce μυστήριον,
in G. Kittel (ed.), Grande lessico del Nuovo Testamento, Brescia 1971, vol. VII,
coll. 645–716.
44 Cfr. Ir., adv.haer. 1.1,6 (“ci sarà consumazione allorché tutto l’elemento spirituale sarà stato formato e perfezionato secondo la gnosi: sono costoro gli
uomini spirituali che hanno perfetta conoscenza di Dio e di Achamoth, iniziati ai
misteri: sostengono che costoro sono essi stessi”). Cfr. inoltre Ir., adv.haer. 1.1,
3 (“questi sono i grandi e mirabili ed indicibili misteri [τὰ μεγάλα καὶ θαυμαστὰ
καὶ ἀπόρρητα μυστήρια] che essi presentano come loro frutto, se mai qualcuna
delle cose dette in quantità nelle scritture si può accomodare ed adattare alla loro
invenzione”). Si veda infine una occorrenza isolata, ove Ireneo qualifica come
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Francesco Berno
anche dall’anonimo Autore della Refutatio omnium haeresium.45 Filologicamente parlando, almeno nella sua fase pristina di elaborazione dottrinale,
quella gnostica è dunque una interpretazione senza mistero dell’evento cristiano; l’accento sul carattere misterioso, obliquo della gnosi condivisa dalla
comunità eletta, quindi sulla necessità di mantenere esotericamente il segreto
sulla comunicazione elettiva delle dottrine dispensate dal Salvatore a sempre
più ristrette cerchie di confidenti, emerge (seppur in modo assai problematico sul piano testuale)46 con nettezza solo nelle tarde fonti copte. Non si può
trattenere l’impressione – nell’attesa di studi sistematici sul tema –47 che tale
transizione sia segno di radicalmente mutati ambienti redazionali, portatori
di altrettanto radicalmente mutate prospettive ed esigenze teologiche.
Diverso e ben più complesso è il panorama che emerge da una ricognizione, nel medesimo corpus testuale, sull’uso del lemma μυστικ-, che pare
aver invece avuto un peso significativo nella riflessione gnostica, necessitando
dunque di maggiore attenzione critica. Si rileverà subito che un’occorrenza
assai rivelativa è rinvenibile proprio in un luogo in cui il dettato dell’autore
gnostico è riportato verosimilmente ad verbum: ExTheo 66.48 Il contesto
prossimo entro cui interpretare l’excerptum è la riflessione valentiniana sulle
45
46
47
48
‘mistero’ i trent’anni di vita privata del Salvatore: Ir., adv.haer. 1.1,3 (“per questo
dicono che il Salvatore – non lo vogliono chiamare Signore – per trent’anni non ha
fatto nulla di manifesto, volendo mostrare il mistero di questi eoni [ἐπιδεικνύντα
τὸ μυστήριον τούτων τῶν Αἰώνων]”).
Ps.-Ippolito, Ref 6.36,1 (“egli ha rivelato e insegnato il grande mistero riguardante
il Padre e gli eoni, ed egli non l’ha rivelato a nessuno”); sui setiani, Ref 5.8,26–29
(“questi sono i misteri che tutti dicono arcani […] nessuno ha mai udito questi
misteri se non i soli gnostici”). Sul rapporto tra misteri pagani e cristiani, si veda
G. Sfameni Gasparro, Dai misteri alla mistica: semantica di una parola, in: E.
Ancilli / M. Paparozzi (a cura di), La mistica. Fenomenologia e riflessione feno
menologica, Roma 1984, vol. 1, 73–113.
Cfr. ad esempio E. Thomassen, Gos. Philip 67:27–30. Not ‘in a Mystery’, in: L.
Painchaud / P.-H. Poirier (eds.), Coptica — Gnostica — Manichaica: Mélanges
offerts à WolfPeter Funk, Québec-Louvain 2006, 925–939.
Per un primo sondaggio si veda K.L. King, Mystery and Secrecy in The Secret
Revelation of John, in: C.H. Bull / L. Ingeborg Lied / J.D. Turner (eds.), Mystery
and Secrecy in the Nag Hammadi Collection and Other Ancient Literature: Ideas
and Practices. Studies for Einar Thomassen at Sixt, Leiden-Boston 2012, 61–85,
con relative ulteriori indicazioni bibliografiche.
Ὁ Σωτὴρ τοῦς ἀποστόλους ἐδίδασκεν, τὰ μὲν πρῶτα τυπικῶς καὶ μυστικῶς, τὰ δὲ
ὕστερα παραβολικῶς καὶ ᾐνιγμένος, τὰ δὲ τρίτα σαφῶς καὶ γυμνῶς κατὰ μόνας. L’annosa questione relativa alla possibile attribuzione a Clemente stesso di molti (se
non di tutti gli) excerpta è stata recentemente riconsiderata in G. Chiapparini (ed.),
Clemente di Alessandria. Estratti da Teodoto, Frammenti delle perdute ipotiposi,
Milano 2020.
L’anima gnostica e la genesi dell’antropologia cristiana
79
diverse modalità di manifestazione e, dunque, di rivelazione del Salvatore.
Teodoto identifica – in modo, peraltro, perfettamente tipico –49 tre livelli di
comunicazione cristico-gesuana: in primo luogo il Salvatore ha insegnato ai
proprî discepoli per figure e misteri (τυπικῶς καὶ μυστικῶς), in secondo luogo,
per parabole ed enigmi (παραβολικῶς καὶ ᾐνιγμένος), infine, chiaramente ed
apertamente, da solo a soli (σαφῶς καὶ γυμνῶς κατὰ μόνας).
L’insegnamento μυστικῶς del Salvatore viene presentato come il più basso,
iniziale, meramente protrettico, certo necessario eppur trasceso dall’intelligenza spirituale dell’inteprete gnostico. Si noti che l’isomorfismo tra la
tripartizione proposta dal frammento e la più generale tripartizione valentiniana delle nature50 non deve condurre in alcun modo a proposte di sovrapposizione – come invece intende Simonetti51 –, poiché diversa è la scala di
applicazione. A tal proposito, tutte le nostre fonti sono concordi: Cristo non
si rivela agli ilici, essendo questi totalmente esclusi dalla salvezza – con, del
resto, evidentissime ricadute cristologiche;52 ergo, la proposta di Teodoto
deve collocarsi interamente all’intero dell’ambito psichico-pneumatico.
Un interessante parallelo lo dimostra con chiarezza.
In AdvHaer 1.3,1,53 Ireneo entra nel merito della speculazione valentiniana
sulla relazione iconica tra Pleroma e mondo, identificando ciò che assai più
modernamente è stato definito da Sagnard come ‘esemplarismo inverso’:54
ogni evento pleromatico si riverbera nel mondo visibile – e, quindi, nella
rivelazione del Salvatore – in forma parziale e cifrata. Così, tutti gli ipsissima
49 Si vedano le complesse tripartizioni dell’origine e della natura della Legge giudaica
delineate da Tolomeo nel proprio enchiridion cifrato, l’Epistola a Flora, riguardo
cui rimando a G. Lettieri, Tolomeo e Origene: divorzio/lettera e sizigia/Spirito,
in: Auctores Nostri 15 (2015), 79–136.
50 Cfr. supra, nota 26.
51 Simonetti, Testi gnostici, 1993, 521–522.
52 Cristo assume su di sé esclusivamente le primizie della natura psichica e pneumatica. Per una bibliografia sul tema, unitamente a nuove proposte di interpretazione intorno all’annoso dibattito sulla ‘divisione in due scuole’ della speculazione
valentiniana, mi permetto di rimandare a F. Berno, Inauguratio quaedam dividen
dae doctrinae Valentini: Inconsistencies about Valentinianism’s Split into duae
cathedrae between Adversus Valentinianos and De Carne Christi, in: A. Destro /
M. Pesce et alii (eds.), Texts, Practices, and Groups. Multidisciplinary Approaches
to the History of Jesus Followers in the First Two Centuries. First Annual Meeting
of Bertinoro (2–4 October 2014), Turnhout 2017, 317–334.
53 [Τ]αῦτα δὲ φανερῶς μὲν μὴ εἰρῆσθαι διὰ τὸ μὴ πάντας χωρεῖν τὴν γνῶσιν αὐτῶν,
μυστηριωδῶς δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ Σωτῆρος διὰ παραβολὠν μεμηνῦσθαι τοῖς συνεῖν
δυναμένοις οὕτως.
54 F.M.M. Sagnard, La gnose valentinienne et le témoignage de saint Irénée, Paris
1947, 239–265.
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Francesco Berno
verba appaiono intimamente ambigui, veicolando, da un lato, una verità
puramente letterale, trasparente quanto incompleta, dall’altro, facendosi
veicolo d’una rivelazione eccedente la capacità di comprensione della massa
cattolica. Vi è dunque la necessità di una comunicazione equivoca tra Gesù
ed i suoi discepoli spirituali, affinché il messaggio sia oggetto di interpretazione, quindi sia (potenzialmente) comprensibile solo agli eletti.55 Cristo
non parla loro in modo aperto, ma μυστηριωδῶς e διὰ παραβολῶν (e si noti
come qui si identifichino e si unifichino le prime due categorie del testo precedente), alludendo cifratamente alle verità pleromatiche, che non possono
essere trasmesse φανερῶς. Esse, infatti, devono venire consegnate ad una
realtà spuria, non unitaria, necessitante di diversi livelli di comunicazione.
Mistica è, quindi, la parola storica del Salvatore, capace di concentrare
provvisoriamente il darsi del pieno possesso della gnosi e, al contempo, l’appello alla volontà di προκοπή dello psichico, ovvero dell’uomo non dotato di
Spirito, non consustanziale al Padre, che pure è abilitato ad una ermeneutica
parziale della scrittura divina.56 Altrimenti detto, la parola μυστική è quella
che dice la potenzialità dell’atto di rivelazione, la sua natura necessariamente
ibrida, capace dunque di intercettare la protensione naturale degli elementi
psichici, che solo in alcuni di essi diverrà matura, facendosi frutto compiuto
che toglie e supera la propria stessa matrice mistica.57 Su questo punto, dalle
55 Vi è, poi, una seconda, più profonda motivazione: vi è una differenza – non ontologica, ma avventizia, storica – tra il divino intra-pleromatico e quello alienato nel
mondo (=gli gnostici), tipicamente esemplificate nella relazione tra ‘destra’ e ‘sinistra’ (cfr., ad esempio, ExTheo 21–23). L’elemento spirituale decaduto necessita
d’una formazione secondo la gnosi, che riattivi il ricordo delle realtà pleromatiche
e lo abiliti all’attingimento del proprio luogo naturale. Sulla nozione di mondo
come “scuola comune” per psichici e pneumatici, si vedano Ir., adv.haer. 1.6,1;
1.7,5, e TratTrip 104.18–25 e 123.11–16. Cfr. infine A. Kocar, “Humanity Came
to Be According to Three Essential Types”: Ethical Responsibility and Practice in
the Valentinian Anthropogony of the Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5), in: L. Jenott
/ S. Kattan Gribetz (eds.), Jewish and Christian Cosmogony in Late Antiquity,
Tübingen 2013, 193–221.
56 Assai problematico è, invece, il caso del valentiniano Marco, detto ‘il mago’,
giacché la Verità che gli si rivelò in corpo di donna è presentata da Ireneo –
presumibilmente citando verbatim da testimonianze (scritte o orali) attribuibili
alla cerchia del valentiniano – come μυστική (Ir., adv.haer. I, 13, 6). Del resto, la
posizione di Marco all’interno dell’evoluzione del pensiero gnostico è oggetto
di acceso dibattito. Cfr. in merito N. Förster, Marcus Magus: Kult, Lehre und
Gemeindeleben einer valentinianischen Gnostikergruppe. Sammlung der Quellen
und Kommentar, Tübingen 1999.
57 Cfr. EpFl 7, 10: ἃ καὶ εἰς τὰ ἑξῆς τὰ μέγιστά σοι συμναλεῖται, ἐάν γε ὡς καλὴ καὶ
ἀγαθὴ γονίμων σπερμάτων τυχοῦσα τὸν δι᾽αὐτῶν καρπὸν ἀναδείξῃς.
L’anima gnostica e la genesi dell’antropologia cristiana
81
fonti a nostra disposizione emerge infatti un riconoscibile consenso: l’intelligenza spirituale è chiamata a superare l’intellezione mediana della parola
sacra che è propria di coloro che sono in cammino verso il Padre.
Si noti, inoltre, che ExTheo 67, ovvero il testo che segue immediatamente il
luogo da cui avevamo principiato l’analisi, nel commentare Rm 7, 5 (“Allorché eravamo nella carne”) disegna una dialettica tra una “verità parziale”
della parola di Cristo – necessaria alla salvezza di coloro che credono!58 – ed
una “verità piena”, espressa per allusione, dunque comunque interna e concentrata nell’unico e medesimo atto di rivelazione. L’insegnamento di Cristo
a Salome (“la morte ci sarà fino a quando le donne partoriranno”; dal Van
gelo degli Egiziani; cfr. Strom III, 63, 1), destinato a straordinaria fortuna
nell’esegesi gnostica,59 contrae in sé la propria intellezione psichica – ovvero
il riferimento alla generazione terrestre – e, nascosta in essa, la propria intellezione spirituale – ovvero il riferimento alla generazione celeste di Sophia.
Il Rivelatore consegna alla creazione una apocalisse unitaria; è l’intelligenza
del singolo interprete che opera da amplificatore della differenza, risolvendo
l’unitarietà del messaggio in funzione della natura cui appartiene. In alcuni –
gli psichici –, la rivelazione rimarrà mistica, ovvero opaca ed allusiva, capace
di guidare e condurre al fine etico-morale su cui modellare le proprie opere,
rimanendo dunque ultimamente estrinseco dato di fede, estraneo dall’intimità con il Padre; in altri – gli spirituali –, essa si scoprirà capace di farsi
altro da sé e di trasformarsi nel pieno possesso della conoscenza, nell’attingimento diretto dei pensieri del Padre, nella visione senza mediazione della
fonte stessa della sua Parola.
4. Un abbozzo d’antropologia?
L’orizzonte fin qui segnalato si inquadra coerentemente in un più
vasto disegno in cui la componente psichica di Adamo è sistematicamente connotata dai caratteri della razionalità e della giustizia,60 della
attiva libertà di scelta e della autodeterminazione,61 della progressione
58 [Ἀ]ναγκαίαν οὖσαν διὰ τὴν σωτηρίαν τῶν πιστευόντων.
59 Cfr. G. Sfameni Gasparro, Le motivazioni protologiche dell’enkrateia nel cristia
nesimo dei primi secoli e nello gnosticismo, in: U. Bianchi (ed.), La tradizione
dell’enkrateia. Motivazioni ontologiche e protologiche. Atti del Colloquio Inter
nazionale, Milano 20–23 aprile 1982, Roma 1985, 149–237; 239–252.
60 Cfr. ExTheo 54,1: Ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ Ἀδὰμ τρεῖς φύσεις γεννῶνται, πρώτη μὲν ἡ ἄλογος,
ἧς ἦν Κάιν, δευτέρα δὲ ἡ λογικὴ καὶ ἡ δικαία, ἧς ἦν Ἄβελ, τρίτη δὲ ἡ πνευματική, ἧς
ἦν Σήθ.
61 Cfr. ExTheo 56,3: τὸ μὲν οὖν πνευματικὸν φύσει σῳζόμενον, τὸ δὲ ψυχικὸν αὐτεξούσιον
ὄν επιτηδειότητα ἔχει πρός τε πίστιν καὶ ἀφθαρσίαν καὶ πρὸς ἀπιστίαν καὶ φθορὰν κατὰ
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Francesco Berno
morale,62 dunque dello stesso desiderio estatico di congiungersi a ciò che,
κατὰ φύσιν, essa non possiede.63
Alla luce di quanto abbiamo sopra evidenziato, appare lecito concludere –
seppure, per ora, solo provvisoriamente – che la natura psichica sia mistica
per eccellenza, poiché chiamata ad uno sforzo di compensazione del proprio defectus naturae, declinato nel superamento della distanza ontologica
tra creatore e creatura e delle strutture di mediazione che tale iato postula;
sforzo che, pur compiuto, non condurrà ad una salvezza piena.64 Gli psichici
non sono Figli, sono esclusi dall’eredità paterna e dunque si scoprono sottoposti a quella perversa logica di subordinazione rispetto al creatore che,
agli occhi degli gnostici, permea il rigido monoteismo giudaico-cattolico,
esemplificato dal dominio – giusto ed imparziale, legale, pertanto del tutto
inconsapevole dell’economia del Dio sommo, che lo trascende – esercitato
dal Demiurgo sulla propria creazione. L’alienazione dello psichico è dunque
eo ipso desiderio di unio mystica con il Dio che crea, non con quello che
salva, identificando proprio nella nozione di mediazione, che caratterizza la
relazione subordinata tra Demiurgo e creazione, la possibilità del realizzarsi
di una intimità con la propria origine.65 Le quattro “precondizioni” sopra
evidenziate – distanza ontologica tra Creatore e creatura con conseguente
percezione di una scala entis che garantisca tale margine; identificazione di
62
63
64
65
τὴν οἰκείαν αἵρεσις, τὸ δὲ ὑλικὸν φύσει ἀπόλλυται; Ir., adv.haer. 1, 6, 1: καὶ τὸν Σωτῆρα
δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦτο παραγεγομέναι τὸ ψυχικόν, ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτεξούσιόν ἐστιν, ὅπως αὐτὸ σώσῃ;
Ir., adv.haer. 1.7,5: τὸ ψυχικόν, ἐὰν δὲ τὰ βελτίονα ἕληται, ἐν τῷ τῆς Μεσότητος τόπῷ
ἀναπαύεσθαι, ἐάν δὲ τὰ χείρω, χωρήσειν καὶ αὐτὸ πρὸς τὰ ὅμοια; cfr. inoltre Ir., adv.
haer. 1.6,4.
Cfr. ExTheo 57: γίνεται οὖν ἐκ τῶν γενῶν τῶν τριῶν τοῦ μὲν μόρφωσις τοῦ
πνευματικοῦ, τοῦ δὲ μετάθεσις τοῦ ψυχικοῦ ἐκ δουλείας εἰς ἐλεθερίαν; Ir., adv.haer.
1.4,2: ἐκ μὲν γὰρ τῆς ἐπιστροφῆς τὴν τοῦ κόσμου καὶ τοῦ Δημιουργοῦ πάσαν ψυχὴν
τὴν γένεσιν εὶληφέναι; fr. 40 di Eracleone (apud Origene, InGv 13.60 – ad Gv
4:46): καὶ οὐκ αθάνατόν γε εἶναι ἡγεῖται τὴν ψυχὴν ὁ Ἡρακλέων, ἀλλ᾽ἐπιτηδείως
ἔχουσαν πρὸς σωτηρίαν, αὐτὴν λέγων εἶναι τὸ ἐνδυόμενον ἀφθαρσίαν φθαρτὸν καὶ
άθανασίαν θνητόν, ὅταν καταποθῇ ὁ θάνατος αὐτῆς εἰς νεῖκος.
Si vedano le osservazioni in merito in M. Simonetti, Ψυχή e ψυχικός nella gnosi
valentiniana, in: Rivista di Storia e Letteratura Religiosa 2 (1966), 1–47.
Vero e proprio leitmotiv gnostico è che “nulla di psichico entrerà nel Pleroma”.
Si veda, a mero titolo d’esempio, Ir., adv.haer. 1.7,1. Sul tema, rimando a E. Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed. The Church of the Valentinians, Leiden-Boston 2006.
È appena il caso di notare che, nelle fonti gnostiche, il riassorbimento escatologico del divino extra-pleromatico nella pienezza paterna è sempre narrato come
ritorno e reintegrazione dell’elemento pneumatico nel proprio luogo naturale, e
mai come μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος. Cfr., in proposito, Vangelo di Verità (NHC II,
3) 20.30 – 22.8.
L’anima gnostica e la genesi dell’antropologia cristiana
83
una autonomia personale di un centro egemonico creato (anima), in pieno
e libero potere del soggetto – sono tutti coerentemente dislocati dalla riflessione gnostica a livello psichico, come strutture imperfette e anamorfiche di
un rapporto comunque mediato con Dio, da cui lo gnostico è naturalmente
esentato.
Ciò conduce ad un ultimo, fondamentale passaggio dell’argomentazione,
che getta retrospettivamente la propria luce su quanto finora evidenziato.
Dobbiamo infatti chiederci se e quanto, nella gnosi cristiana del II secolo,
queste complesse speculazioni giungano ad essere pensate come antropologicamente identificative, vale a dire, se vengano spinte sino all’emersione d’una
nozione di ‘persona’. È infatti da sottolineare con la massima chiarezza un
assioma di primaria importante per il “sistema gnostico”: le tre classi che
strutturano la creazione rappresentano altrettante modalità di relazione con
il divino, e non proprietà ontologiche del soggetto. Sed contra, se una precoce (sebbene, a parere di chi scrive, ultimamente inessenziale) platonizzazione delle categorie concettuali gnostiche conduca ad elaborare un abbozzo
di riflessione veracemente antropologica, esso è da rinvenire proprio nella
proposta valentiniana in merito alla nozione di uomo psichico – uomo pensato, dalla gnosi, grecamente.
Tale dialettica fonda l’oscura ambiguità della riflessione gnostica sulla
nozione di individuo, ove riconosciamo la chiara tendenza a risolvere ogni
istanza antropologica in una cristologia,66 apparendo solo embrionali i tentativi di qualificare diversamente, nella loro componente antropologica, i
primi due elementi (ilico e psichico), rispetto al terzo (pneumatico): Adamo
non semina nello Spirito e nel soffio,67 poiché questi sono divini. La generazione umana si impegna a tramandare, dunque, esclusivamente l’animalità del sinolo, mentre l’inserimento della particella pneumatica
nell’uomo risponde a logiche su cui la teologia (pur gnostica, illuminata
dallo Spirito) non ha presa. Ancor più incisivamente, si veda la ricorrente
affermazione secondo cui le nozioni di immagine e somiglianza, di genesiaca dipendenza, sono riferibili unicamente al composto ilico-psichico,68
66 A. Orbe, Cristología gnóstica. Introducción a la soteriología de los siglos II y III,
2 volumi, Madrid 1976.
67 ExTheo 55.2: οὔτ᾽οὖν ἀπὸ τοῦ πνεύματος οὔτ᾽οὖν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐμφυσήματος σπείρει ὁ
Ἀδάμ. θεῖα γὰρ ἄμφω καὶ δι᾽αὐτοῦ μέν, οὐχ ὑπ᾽αὐτοῦ δέ, προβάλλεται ἄμφω. τὸ δὲ
ὑλικὸν αὐτοῦ ἐνεργὸν εἰς σπέρμα καὶ γένεσιν, ὡς ἂν τῷ σπέρματι συγκεκραμένον καὶ
ταύτης ἐν ζωῇ τῆς ἁρμονίας ἀποστῆναι μὴ δυνάμενον.
68 Si veda la strutturalmente equivoca (ma assai netta) attestazione della redazione lunga dell’Apocrifo di Giovanni (NHC 2.1,15, 2–3 // BG 8502, 1.23,16–
19), ove vediamo il Demiurgo ordinare agli angeli di fare l’uomo ad immagine
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Francesco Berno
giacché lo spirituale – è proprio il caso di dirlo – fa storia
a sé.69
Nondimeno, pur nella diversità essenziale della trattazione gnostica di tali
componenti, la gnosi storica pensa le proprie nature come stati di relazione con
Dio (due statiche – ilica e pneumatica –, ed una – quella psichica – mistica),
quindi in senso universalistico, non personale. Lo Spirito che qualifica gli eletti
altro non è se non Dio stesso che si manifesta, nolente, ad extra.
Una simile articolazione appare nitida quando si volga lo sguardo ad un
aspetto spinosissimo ed ambiguo della speculazione valentiniana, vale a dire
l’uso della nozione di “immagine”. Le fonti greche a nostra disposizione ci restituiscono due evidenze di primario interesse: da un lato, (1), i casi in cui l’εἰκών è
connotata in senso esplicitamente antropologico sono straordinariamente rari, e
de facto limitati ad Ir., adv.haer. 1.5, 2; dall’altro lato e correlativamente, (2) tale
nozione è dislocata in modo sistematico a livello psichico: è il Demiurgo ad essere
immagine del Dio sommo; sono le realtà psichiche ad essere immagine di quelle
pneumatiche.70 In sintesi: la struttura ad immagine del sistema valentiniano (il
già ricordato “esemplarismo inverso” di Sagnard) pare governare il rapporto
tra psichico e pneumatico molto più di quello tra pneumatico intra- ed extrapleromatico.
È solo con la complessa fase storica descritta dalla ricezione alessandrina
del sistema dottrinale valentiniano71 che assistiamo a quella disarticolazione
dell’apparizione luminosa riflessa sulle acque ed a propria (=del Demiurgo) somiglianza: ⲁⲙⲏⲉⲓⲛⲉ ⲛⲧⲛ
ⲛⲟⲩⲣⲱⲙⲉ
ⲕⲁⲧⲁ ⲑⲓⲕⲱⲛ ⲙⲡⲛⲟⲩⲧⲉ
ⲁⲩⲱ ⲕⲁⲧⲁ ⲡⲛⲉⲓⲛⲉ.
̄ ⲧⲁⲙⲓⲟ
̄
̄
̄
̄
69 Cfr. ExTheo 54, 1: ὅτι δὲ πνευματικὸς ὁ Σήθ, οὔτε ποιμαίνει οὔτε γεωργεῖ, ἀλλὰ
παῖδα καρποφορεῖ, ὡς τὰ πνευματικά. καὶ τοῦτον, ὃς ἤλπισεν ἐπικαλεῖσθαι τὸ ὄνομα
κυρίου, ἄνω βλέποντα, οὗ τὸ πολίτευμα ἐν οὐρανῷ, τοῦτον ὁ κόσμος οὐ χωρεῖ.
70 Cfr. Valentino, fr. 5 (ὁπόσον ἐλάττων ἡ εἰκὼν τοῦ ζῶντος προσώπου, τοσοῦτον
ἥσσων ὁ κόσμος τοῦ ζῶντος αἰῶνος. Τίς οὖν αἰτία τῆς εἰκόνος; μεγαλωσύνη τοῦ
προσώπου παρεσχημένου τῷ ζωφράφῳ τὸν τύπον, ἵνα τιμηθῇ δι᾽ὀνόματος αὐτοῦ. Οὐ
γὰρ αὐθεντικώς εὑρέθη μορφή, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὄνομα ἐπλήρωσεν τὸ ὑστερῆσαν ἐν πλἀσει);
EpFl 6.5 (αἱ γὰρ εἰκόνες καὶ τὰ σύμβολα παραστιτικὰ ὄντα ἑτέρων πραγμάτων καλῶς
ἐγίνοντο μέχρι μὴ παρῆν ἡ ἀλήθεια. παρούσης δὲ τῆς ἀληθείας τὰ τῆς ἀληθείας δεῖ
ποιεῖν, οὐ τὰ τῆς εἰκόνος); ExTheo 15.5 (εἰκόνα δὲ τοῦ Μονογενοῦς τὸν Δεμιουργὸν
λέγουσιν. διὸ καὶ λυτὰ τῆς εἰκόνος τᾶ ἔργα, ὅθεν καὶ ὁ κύριος εἰκόνα τῆς πνευματικῆς
ἀναστάσεως ποιήσας τοὺς νεκροὺς οὓς ἤγειρεν, οὐκ αφθάρτους τὴν σάρκα, ἀλλ᾽ὡς
αὖθις ἀποθανουμένους ἤγειρεν) e 32.1 (ἐν πληρώματι οὖν ἑνότητος οὔσης ἕκαστος
τῶν Αἰώνων ἰδὶον ἔχει πλήρωμα, τὴν συζυγίαν. ὅσα οὖν ἐκ συζυγίας, φασί, προέρχεται,
πληρώματά ἐστιν, ὅσα δὲ ἀπὸ ἑνός, εἰκόνες).
71 Sulle complesse dinamiche di riprovazione e accettazione, fluidificazione ed assimilazione che legano lo gnosticismo alla cosiddetta gnosi cattolica, rimando a
G. Lettieri, Reductio ad unum. Dialettica cristologica e retractatio dello gnosti
cismo valentiniano nel Commento a Matteo di Origene, in: T. Piscitelli (ed.), Il
L’anima gnostica e la genesi dell’antropologia cristiana
85
programmatica del paradigma cristologico/antropologico gnostico, che condurrà a pensare la mistica come atto eminentemente umano, dunque come
tensione estatica verso un Dio sempre sfuggente ed ontologicamente eccedente la propria creatura. Tale radicale riconversione sarà realizzata dalla
gnosi cattolica (e, più generalmente, dalla teologia cattolica contemporanea
e successiva; si pensi al ruolo non sottostimabile svolto da Tertulliano72 e
dalla scuola cappadoce),73 mediante un duplice livello di intervento: (1) da
un lato, attraverso l’autonomizzazione dell’elemento psichico, ricettacolo
oramai pienamente platonizzato di una nozione piena di individuo, e, dall’altro, (2) mediante lo svincolamento della sua natura relazionale con il divino,
verso la definizione di un soggetto indipendente ed autonomo. Emerge così
la centralità dell’anima come organo apicale (ovvero senza alcunché di
antropologicamente eccedente e identificata iuxta propria principia, sebbene
comunque in dipendenza da una memoria del sua origine spuria)74 e veracemente umano dell’azione morale, cui attribuire la Spannung estatica del
differire di Dio dall’uomo,75 insieme al conseguente esercizio d’attenzione,
72
73
74
75
Commento a Matteo di Origene. Atti del X Convegno di Studi del Gruppo Italiano
di Ricerca su Origene e la Tradizione Alessandrina, Brescia 2011, 237–287.
Esplicita è, nel pensatore africano, l’identificazione tra la natura dell’anima umana
e l’elemento intermedio valentiniano, condotta attraverso la negazione ad Adamo
del possesso della natura ilica e pneumatica. Cfr., ad esempio, De Anima 21.
Si ricordino, ad esempio, i celebri luoghi in cui Gregorio di Nissa, nutrito della
migliore tradizione apofatica pagana (su cui si vedrà D. Carabine, The Unknown
God. Negative Theology in the Platonic Tradition. Plato to Eriugena, Louvain
1995), afferma la conoscibilità della sola economia divina e la corrispettiva inconoscibilità della natura di Dio in sé, avvolta nella tenebra, sino all’appropriazione
per fede dell’oggetto amato, in attesa della chiarificazione escatologica (cfr., ad
es., Greg. Nys. InCant 6; Greg. Nys., c. Eun. 1.371). Medesime tematiche ed
espressioni in Gregorio di Nazianzo (Greg.Naz. or. 28.3; 38.7). Cfr. E. Peroli,
Il Platonismo e l’antropologia filosofica in Gregorio di Nissa. Con particolare
riferimento agli influssi di Platone, Plotino e Porfirio, Milano 1993.
Cfr. F. Berno, Intelletto e anima / caldo e freddo: una dialettica valentiniana in
Origene?, in: Adamantius 22 (2016), 130–138.
Cfr. Clem. Al. strom. 2.10,47, ove si afferma che la conoscenza della Sapienza,
la più alta contemplazione, è lo sforzo di conoscere di Dio come più è possibile
(ὑπομιμνῄσκει δὲ ἠρέμα ζητεῖν τὸν θεὸν καὶ ὡς οἷόν τε γινώσκειν ἐπιχειρεῖν, ἥτις ἂν εἴη
θεωρία μεγίστη, ἡ ἐποπτική, ἡ τῷ ὄντι ἐπιστήμη, ἡ ἀμετάπτωτος λόγῳ γινομένη. αὕτη
ἂν εἴη μόνη ἡ τῆς σοφίας γνῶσις, ἧς οὐδέποτε χωρίζεται ἡ δικαιοπραγία), ovvero –
come si legge in Strom 7.10,57 – attraverso la progressione per l’ascesa mistica sino
al luogo in cui l’anima troverà il proprio riposo (ὅθεν καὶ ῥᾳδίως εἰς τὸ συγγενὲς
τῆς ψυχῆς θεῖόν τε καὶ ἅγιον μετοικίζει καὶ διά τινος οἰκείου φωτὸς διαβιβάζει τὰς
προκοπὰς τὰς μυστικὰς τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἄχρις ἂν εἰς τὸν κορυφαῖον ἀποκαταστήσῃ τῆς
ἀναπαύσεως τόπον, τὸν καθαρὸν τῇ καρδίᾳ πρόσωπον πρὸς πρόσωπον ἐπιστημονικῶς
καὶ καταληπτικῶς τὸν θεὸν ἐποπτεύειν διδάξασα).
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Francesco Berno
apprendimento, incessante messa alla prova d’una conoscenza acquisita,
chiamata a divenire habitus;76 differenza che abbiamo visto essere solo puramente apparente (e, comunque, non antropologicamente connotata) per lo
gnostico, giacché l’essenza inalienabile di questo era qualificata come eternamente identificabile con il Padre e solo storicamente da questi distolta.
L’oscurità delle parole del Salvatore – argomenta Origene–77 è funzionale a
rallentare la conversione degli estranei, affinché essi possano adeguatamente
ponderare il proprio difetto e non sottovalutarne l’entità, sì che l’identificazione gnostica di diversi livelli, reciprocamente “isolati” e non comunicanti,
di esegesi scritturistica risponde paradossalmente ad una incapacità di corretta interpretazione spirituale della Scrittura, quindi ad una solo parziale
allegorizzazione:78 gli gnostici sono tacciati di letteralismo, poiché inabili ad
76 Cfr. Clem. Al. strom 6. 9, 77, 5–78, 6, 1: σωτήριος γάρ τις ὁ τῷ σωτῆρι ἐξομοιούμενος,
εἰς ὅσον ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει χωρῆσαι τὴν εἰκόνα θέμις, ἀπαρα βάτως τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἐντολὰς
κατορθῶν· τὸ δ’ ἔστι ἔχει θρῃσκεύειν τὸ θεῖον διὰ τῆς ὄντως δικαιοσύνης, ἔργων τε
καὶ γνώσεως· τούτου φωνὴν κατὰ τὴν εὐχὴν οὐκ ἀναμένει κύριος, «αἴτησαι» λέγων
«καὶ ποιήσω· ἐννοήθητι καὶ δώσω». Καθόλου γὰρ ἐν τῷ τρεπομένῳ τὸ ἄτρεπτον
ἀδύνατον λαβεῖν πῆξιν καὶ σύστασιν, ἐν τροπῇ δὲ τῇ συνεχεῖ, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀστάτου
τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ γινομένου, ἡ ἑκτικὴ δύναμις οὐ σῴζεται. ὃ γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν ἔξωθεν
ὑπεισιόντων καὶ προσπιπτόντων ἀεὶ μεταβάλλεται, πῶς ἄν ποτε ἐν ἕξει καὶ διαθέσει
καὶ συλλήβδην ἐν ἐπιστήμης κατοχῇ γένοιτ’ ἄν; καίτοι καὶ οἱ φιλόσοφοι τὰς ἀρετὰς
ἕξεις καὶ διαθέσεις καὶ ἐπιστήμας οἴονται. ὡς δὲ οὐ συγγεννᾶται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλ’
ἐπίκτητός ἐστιν ἡ γνῶσις καὶ προσοχῆς μὲν δεῖται κατὰ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἡ μάθησις αὐτῆς
ἐκθρέψεώς τε καὶ αὐξήσεως, ἔπειτα δὲ ἐκ τῆς ἀδιαλείπτου μελέτης εἰς ἕξιν ἔρχεται,
οὕτως ἐν ἕξει τελειωθεῖσα τῇ μυστικῇ ἀμετάπτωτος δι’ ἀγάπην μένει· οὐ γὰρ μόνον τὸ
πρῶτον αἴτιον καὶ τὸ ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ γεγεν<ν>ημένον αἴτιον κατείληφεν καὶ περὶ τούτων
ἐμπέδως ἔχει, μονίμως μονίμους καὶ ἀμεταπτώτους καὶ ἀκινήτους λόγους κεκτημένος,
ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ περὶ κακῶν περί τε γενέσεως ἁπάσης καὶ συλλήβδην εἰπεῖν,
περὶ ὧν ἐλάλησεν ὁ κύριος, τὴν ἀκριβεστάτην ἐκ καταβολῆς κόσμου εἰς τέλος ἀλήθειαν
παρ’ αὐτῆς ἔχει τῆς ἀληθείας μαθών, οὐκ, εἴ πού τι φανείη πιθανὸν ἢ κατὰ λόγον
Ἑλληνικὸν ἀναγκαστικόν, πρὸ αὐτῆς αἱρούμενος τῆς ἀληθείας, τὰ δὲ εἰρημένα ὑπὸ
κυρίου σαφῆ καὶ πρόδηλα ἔχει λαβών. L’intelligenza dei misteri è rivelata, potenzialmente, all’interezza della creazione, come affermato da Origene in Or., princ.
1.2, 3. Essa è pertanto chiamata ad un inesausto sforzo di ricerca: cfr. Or., princ.
4.3,13.
77 Cfr. Or., princ. 3.1,16 13–14 (τὸ ὅτι οὐκ ἐβούλετο τοὺς μὴ ἐσομένους καλοὺς
καὶ ἀγαθοὺς συνιέναι τῶν μυστικωτέρων ὁ σωτὴρ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐλάλει αὐτοῖςἐν
παραβολαῖς. νῦν δέ, κειμένου τοῦ μήποτε ἐπιστρέψωσι, καὶ ἀφεθῇ αὐτοῖς, ἡ ἀπολογία
ἐστὶ χαλεπωτέρα). Cfr. inoltre Or., princ. 3.1,16, 20–25.
78 Cfr. princ. 4.2,2,1–4 (Αἰτία δὲ πᾶσι τοῖς προειρημένοις ψευδοδοξιῶν καὶ ἀσεβειῶν ἢ
ἰδιωτικῶν περὶ θεοῦ λόγων οὐκ ἄλλη τις εἶναι δοκεῖ ἢ ἡ γραφὴ κατὰ τὰ πνευματικὰ μὴ
νενοημένη, ἀλλ’ ὡς πρὸς τὸ ψιλὸν γράμμα ἐξειλημμένη).
L’anima gnostica e la genesi dell’antropologia cristiana
87
articolare una reale dinamica evolutiva dell’esegesi, a motivo della natura
intimamente statica, non comunicante con il divino, dell’anima gnostica.
Si risolve così, in altri termini, il dipolo che conflava insieme ciò che, ex
post, è cattolicamente definibile come antropologia e teologia, con una netta
(quanto anti-gnostica) separazione dei due ambiti. Il vertice della tripartizione gnostica delle nature (e quindi della teologia gnostica tout court), lo
Spirito, viene – certo problematicamente79 – sottratto all’ambito del possesso
elettivo da parte di una élite pneumatica e ricollocato in una sfera di assoluta trascendenza, istituendo una relazione di desiderio con la natura creata.
Non più un monologo tra Dio e la sua componente incarnata nella materia,
ma un dialogo tra Creatore e creatura, del tutto analogo a quello che univa
Demiurgo ed elemento psichico. Ciò che, infatti, la gnosi chiamava a superare, ovvero l’anima e la limitatezza demiurgica cui essa è vincolata, diviene
perno e motore della protensione verso tale assoluta trascendenza, facendosi
organo, oramai pienamente configurato, della libera ricerca di Dio.
5. Considerazioni conclusive
Obiettivo di questo scritto è stato mostrare la complessità strutturale della
nozione di mistica, quando applicata alla riflessione gnostica. Se da un lato,
infatti, essa coglie un movimento di fondo, una pretesa sottesa all’intera
impalcatura concettuale eterodossa, ovvero la rivendicazione di un contatto
diretto, immediato, unitivo con il Padre, quindi una obliterazione amorosa
d’ogni identità personale, dall’altro, intercetta specifiche opzioni dottrinali
elaborate dalle scuole gnostiche in relazione alla parzialità della capacità
redentiva e conoscitiva dell’anima.
Da una analisi lessicale del corpus testuale selezionato, è emerso un uso
ricorrente e tecnicamente avvertito del termine ‘mistico’, sempre connesso
alla natura mediana degli psichici, quindi alla potenzialità della rivelazione,
chiamata a superare il proprio stesso carattere mistico – protettico, parziale,
opaco – per farsi conoscenza limpida della medesima natura che identifica il
Padre ed il proprio corpo, gli pneumatici.
79 Si pensi alla “indecisa” collocazione dello Spirito nel pensiero origeniano, scisso
tra una dimensione propriamente trinitaria (intra-pleromatica) ed ipostatizzata
ed il ruolo di ricettacolo della beatitudine degli eletti, quindi come Chiesa extrapleromatica. Cfr. L. Perrone, La pneumatologia di Origene alla luce delle nuove
Omelie sui Salmi, in: F. Pieri / F. Ruggero (eds.), Il divino in/quieto. Lo Spirito
santo nelle tradizioni antiche. Atti del IX convegno annuale della Facoltà Teologica
dell’EmiliaRomagna. XV convegno annuale del Gruppo Italiano di Ricerca su
Origene e la Tradizione Alessandrina (Bologna 2–3 dicembre 2014), Brescia 2018,
101–117.
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Francesco Berno
Abbiamo inoltre visto come lo gnosticismo sempre più evidentemente si
imponga quale straordinario laboratorio teologico, in grado di elaborare veri e
propri ambiti specializzati di riflessione dottrinale. Tra tali “teologie minori”,
vale a dire tra tali contesti di elaborazione teorica non coincidenti con il vertice
dell’interpretazione gnostica del messaggio cristiano, ma ad esso subordinati,
si è ulteriormente rilevata la raffinatissima speculazione intorno alla nozione di
‘psichico’, che viene dalla gnosi identificata con l’ambito della teologia naturale, della ricerca di Dio (genitivo esclusivamente oggettivo) non sostenuta in
modo efficace della Spirito, dunque disponibile agli sforzi non graziati della
creatura. Essa appare, dunque, come il marcatore d’uno stato di relazione con
il Padre: non Figli, non consustanziali al Principio, ma creature, prodotti.
All’interno di tale categoria, nondimeno, comincia ad emergere un principio di autonomia del soggetto desiderante ed estatico, che è messo in
grado – sebbene ancora embrionalmente – di esercitare le proprie capacità
epistemiche e morali; l’uomo psichico è colui che può esprimere in modo
potenzialmente efficace volontà e libero arbitrio, approssimandosi ad una
delle due classi che specificano il dualismo terminale d’ogni sistema gnostico: quella degli spirituali – qualora le sue opere rispondano alle richieste
letterali, etiche, della parola evangelica; quella degli ilici – qualora la sua
volontà fallisca.
Su tale ibrido principio si innesta in modo assai efficace l’opera di ricezione cattolica della speculazione gnostica, che 1) identifica tale ambito non
più come una condizione riservata ad uno specifico elemento antropologico,
ma come lo status universale dell’essere umano, quindi come il dono concesso all’interezza della creazione in misura eguale, e 2) supplisce alle categorie gnostiche (ontologicamente povere) di identificazione di un soggetto
ancora semitico, carismatico, paolino, con categorie (ontologicamente forti)
di identificazione di una soggetto “greco”.
Non può che seguirne che la pretesa (veracemente gnostica) di andare
più a fondo di Platone, di conoscere intimamente i misteri paterni, differisca
radicalmente dalla risultante storica della sua assimilazione all’interno del
corpo dogmatico cristiano; ed in tale distanza di mostra l’equivocità, finanche la mera omonimia, della nozione di ‘mistica’. Se la teologia alessandrina
“ortodossa” realizza il contatto tra anima e Dio nel perfezionamento e nel
potenzialmento, attraverso la costanza dell’esercizio, delle facoltà naturali
della creatura – sostenute da un iter contemplativo variamente codificato
e, parallelamente, da una stabile prassi rituale –,80 lo gnosticismo identifica
nell’anima l’organo di mediazione per eccellenza, che condanna lo psichico
80 Fenomeni non a caso guardati con altalenante sospetto dalle fonti gnostiche, ben al
di là del quadro, comunque opacissimo, offerto da Ireneo in Ir., adv.haer. 1.21,2–
5. Sul tema del “sacramento gnostico”, cfr. F. Berno, L’allegoria templare e la
L’anima gnostica e la genesi dell’antropologia cristiana
89
ad un rapporto di subordinazione con il proprio Creatore; lo Spirito che
qualifica alcuni uomini come eletti è invece sottratto ad ogni logica “prestazionale”:81 esso è l’essenza segreta che, senza merito, senza sforzo, senza
esercizio, senza ordine, condividono Cristo e Cristi, sì che nessuna protensione, nessuna estasi, è richiesta al Padre per farsi Figlio e Figli, e a questi per conoscerlo. Ci si può spingere ad affermare – certo con generosa
approssimazione – che, per i valentiniani, la natura o nega Dio, pervertendolo e cercandolo idolatricamente (elemento ilico) o si converte (elemento
psichico), mentre gli gnostici sono “tutto Grazia”, marcando uno iato profondo rispetto alla tendenza mistica a naturalizzare il dono, divinizzare la
natura, assorbire il divino nell’umano.
E tuttavia, è proprio grazie all’esperienza gnostica ed al suo larvale platonismo che la mistica penetra nel DNA del cristianesimo, muovendo dallo
scavo in una dimensione antropologica non identificata come veracemente
salvifica, seppure apicale quanto agli sforzi della volontà e della razionalità
creaturali.
topologizzazione del corpo di Cristo nel Vangelo di Filippo (NHC II, 3), in: Studi e
Materiali di Storia delle Religioni 82/2 (2016), 992–1008, con relative indicazioni
bibliografiche. Cfr. inoltre A. Cosentino, Il battesimo gnostico. Dottrine, simboli
e riti iniziatici nello gnosticismo, Cosenza 2007.
81 Si pensi alla natura originariamente prestazionale della ἀρετή classica, qui interpretata come psichica potenzialità naturale, efficace nell’orizzonte del proprio
mediano campo di applicabilità. Cfr., ad esempio, A.W.H. Adkins, Moral Values
and Political Behaviour in Ancient Greek from Homer to the Fifth Century, London 1972.
Patricia Ciner
The Tradition of Spiritual Progress in the
West: The Legacy of Plotinus and Origen
for Contemporary Neuroscience
Abstract: Plotinus and Origen have left beautiful words of love for the divine as a
legacy to the history of humanity. In this paper, we attempt to show that the mystical
framework of the West was forged in their conjunction and that their reflections,
along with the subsequent tradition that they began, were decisive for reflections on
mysticism that neuroscientists currently carry out. Our proposal seeks to be a continuation and update of the so-called “mystical tradition” for the third millennium.
Keywords: Plotinus, Origen, Mystical anthropology, Neuroscience
1. Introduction
Plotinus and Origen have left a legacy of beautiful pages of love for the
divine to all of humanity. Throughout their work, they have shown the path
of return to the first beginning, teaching us that only there may the human
soul find fullness and meaning.1 In this paper, we will attempt to demonstrate
how together these thinkers shaped the mystical foundation of the West,
and how their reflections established the beginnings of a mystical tradition
that was decisive, not only for philosophers and theologians writing about
mysticism in the West, but also for research currently being carried out by
neuroscientists. Here we seek to provide a continuation for and update of
the so-called “mystical tradition” for the third millennium. From this initial
hypothesis, we formulate three main objectives that will allow us to prove
our point:
(a) To highlight the characteristics of mystical anthropology, understood as
a philosophical position that assumes the existence of a dimension independent from the psychophysical compound.
(b) To point out the distinctive characteristics of Plotinus’s and Origen’s
mysticism, placing special emphasis on the notion of spiritual progress
1
See P. Ciner, Plotino y Orígenes. El amor y la unión mística, Mendoza 2000.
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Patricia Ciner
as an engine that allows for the reinstallation and contemplation of the
mystical dimension.
(c) To initiate wider reflection on the possibility of accepting this mystical
dimension or not, as part of the great debate that contemporary neuroscience has begun.
2. Characteristics of Mystical Anthropology
In his wonderful and almost unbeatable work The Mystical
Phenomenon: Comparative Studies, Juan Martín Velasco has characterised
mystical anthropology as follows:
The expressions that the mystics offer this anthropology are notably different and
are conditioned by the historical, cultural and religious circumstances in which they
live and think. But all have one fact in common: the presence in each man of a
space beyond himself, his condition of being inhabited by an excessus that fills and
overflows him.2
With this fundamental characteristic as a base, the mystics discover a dimension that exists independently of the biological, psychological, or cultural
dimension. We have given the name “mystical dimension” to this non-spatial
and independent place that allows for objective contemplation, both of the
human being himself and of the cosmos, a space that undoubtedly gives the
human being freedom with respect to all interior and exterior conditioning.3
The various names and metaphors that the mystical traditions have used to
refer to this sacred space – Atman, the Center of the Soul, the Depth of the
Soul, the Secret Tabernacle, etc. – provide evidence for the existence of this
eternal dimension where communication between the soul and the divine is
produced. In order to understand the fundamentals of this anthropology,
which, of course, underlie both Plotinus’s and Origen’s works, it is necessary
to remember that the word mystic comes from the Greek verb μύω which
means to close, to shut down.4 Evidently, in this expansive shutting down of
the soul to the divine, we find the point common to all of humanity’s spiritual traditions. In this sense, and with a very synthetic definition, we may
state that “mysticism is the expansion of the human soul that leads to an
2
3
4
J. Martín Velasco, El fenómeno místico: estudio comparado, Madrid 1999, 260.
P. Ciner, Neurociencias y Experiencia Mística: Aportes para la constitución de
una antropología mística, in: Conocimiento y curación de sí. Entre filosofía y
medicina, in R. Pereto Rivas / S. Vásquez (eds.), Conocimiento y curación de sí.
Entre filosofía y medicina, Buenos Aires 2017, published online.
F. García Bazán, Aspectos inusuales de lo sagrado, Madrid 2000, 79–80;
R. Panikkar, De la Mística. Experiencia plena de la Vida. Barcelona 2005, 31–56.
The Tradition of Spiritual Progress in the West
93
integral state of union. This expansion is possible because, in one way or
another, human beings participate in the divine and can therefore know him,
love him and become closer to him.”5 One of the fundamental bases of universal mysticism, which was initiated in the West by Plotinus and Origen, is
precisely the inherent capability of human beings for spiritual progress. This
clear anthropological optimism is the distinctive stamp of the mysticism of
Plotinus and Origen.
3. The Issue of Spiritual Progress in
Plotinus’s and Origen’s Work
Our specific objective in this section – beyond the controversial topic of
whether or not both of these thinkers had a common teacher in Ammonius
Saccas –6 will be to highlight the larger coincidences between the two with
respect to the issue of spiritual progress, as well as with respect to the metaphysical and theological coordinates of their respective systems. We believe
that only in this way will we be able to completely understand the great
originality and depth of both thinkers, allowing for clarification of their
true legacy for Western mystical tradition. With respect to some coincidences, coincidences which allow for the possibility of spiritual progress, it is
important to point out the following: (a) the ontological similarity between
divinity and all human souls which brings with it the possibility for interaction between both natures, (b) free will as a constitutive condition of the
human soul,7 and (c) both authors’ understanding that all interior transformations must be manifested in coherent conduct with each and every one of
the existing beings.
With respect to the differences between these thinkers, our decision to
begin our analysis first with Plotinus and to later continue with Origen is
neither a mere whim nor evidence of a misunderstanding of chronological
criteria.8 We are perfectly aware that Origen was approximately twenty
years older than Plotinus, according to data provided by various historical
accounts. Therefore, the decision to order our work in this way forms part
of our working hypothesis, as we attempt to both show and respect the
traditions that both thinkers assumed, and not only follow the chronology
5
6
7
8
See Ciner, 2017.
See J. Igal, Introducción, in Plotinus, Enéadas: IIIIV, Madrid 1985, 14–16;
H. Crouzel, Orígenes un teólogo controvertido, Madrid 1998, 19–21.
See A. Fürst, Origen’s Legacy to Modern Thinking about Freedom and Autonomy,
in: A. C. Jacobsen (ed.), Origeniana Undecima, Origen and Origenism in the
History of Western Thought, Leuven 2016, 3–27.
See Ciner, 2000, 29–30.
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Patricia Ciner
in which their lives developed. Plotinus is fundamentally a continuation of
and of course also an innovator of the Platonic-Pythagorean tradition, while
Origen, despite all the philosophical influences that he may have received
and all the criticism that he had to withstand throughout history, is an eminently Christian theologian. Having said this, we will now begin our task,
presenting a selection of texts belonging to both thinkers in order to exemplify the characteristics that spiritual progress assumes for each. Our analysis
will focus on the model of the wise man that both advocate; σπουδαῖος in
Plotinean terms and τέλειος in the language of Origen. We will begin with
Plotinus.
4. The Legacy of Plotinus
On this occasion we will focus our reflections on the Ennead Treatise 5.1,10,
as the fundamental postulates of Plotinus’s system are condensed magnificently in this text. We will then proceed to open the rest of Plotinus’s corpus.
The Neoplatonic teacher begins this treatise, which Porphyry entitled On
the Three Primary Hypostases, looking for the cause of the distance that he
sometimes observed in human souls. With words that continue to have great
impact despite the passing of the centuries, he states:
What is it, then, which has made the souls forget their father, God, and be ignorant
of themselves and him, even though they are parts which come from his higher
world and altogether belong to it? The beginning of evil for them was audacity and
coming to birth and the first otherness and the wishing to belong to themselves.
Since they were clearly delighted with their own independence, and made great use
of self-movement, running the opposite course and getting as far away as possible,
they were ignorant even that they themselves came from that world; just as children who are immediately torn from their parents and brought up far away do not
know who they themselves or their parents are. Since they do not anymore see their
father or themselves, they despise themselves through ignorance of their birth and
honour other things admiring everything rather than themselves, and astonished
and delighted by and dependent on these [earthly] things, they broke themselves
loose as far as they could in contempt of that from which they turned away; so that
their honour for these things here and their contempt for themselves is the cost of
their utter ignorance of God¨ (ἀτιμάσασαι ἑαυτὰς ἀγνοίᾳ τοῦ γένους).9
This fragment clearly explains Plotinus’s conception that the nature of the
human soul is similar to the divinity and that precisely from this ontological
lineage comes the possibility of joining the first beginning. Upon forgetting
this lineage, souls momentarily lose the meaning and direction of their existence. We use the term “momentarily” because in Plotinus the theological
9
Plot. (edit. En 5.1 (10), 1–10).
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category of “original sin” does not exist, and for this reason ascension
towards the One consists of remembering original nature, which cannot be
erased or destroyed by anyone or anything. This is precisely the path of spiritual progress.10
In this fragment, Plotinus, who was undoubtedly one of humanity’s great
mystical teachers, urges souls to remember their true destiny and to not
cease attempting to do so. This is why he also insists that they remember that
they possess an eye capable of seeing. This eye, according to what is detailed
in 3.5,50, is the ἔρος. The reunion of the soul with its true lineage happens
when it makes contact with the three Hypostases: the One, the Intelligence
and the Soul. These are transcendental, but at the same time immanent to
the soul itself. For this reason, this journey is not carried out in time or space
but rather consists of discovering the divinity that inhabits each soul. As
they are fundamentally omnipresent, the three Hypostases are in all beings;
however, they are in the human soul in a special way. Therefore, we may
say that the presence of the One is received with “what is similar to him in
us, as in us there is some of him.”11 Plotinus calls this point the “center of
the soul” (τὸ κέντρον),12 a point which coincides with the Universal Center,
and which will be the mystical location where the soul arrives at a state of
complete happiness. These considerations of the three hypostases allow us to
characterise Plotinism as “a mysticism of immanence within a metaphysics
of transcendence.”13 This characterisation can be understood through the
notion of παρουσία, as in this notion we find the key for access to this incredible system: the possibility of a presence that manifests itself to all beings,
but without exhausting itself in any one of them, as all that which follows
the One is the image of him and therefore capable of understanding him.14
Plotinus ends 5.1 by presenting the existence of a supraintellectual level in
the human soul, which in reality never makes any contact with matter. Upon
activating this level, the wise man can not only direct and control the passions and wishes of the psychophysical compound but can also carry out the
specific task of spiritual progress, joining itself directly to the One.
In the words of the Neoplatonic teacher:
10 P. Ciner, Plotino y el linaje divino in: G. Grammatico / A. Arbea (eds.), El ascenso.
Pegaso o las almas del mundo, Santiago de Chile 2001, 87–96.
11 En 3., 8.9,21–23 Ἔστι γάρ τι καὶ παρ’ ἡμῖν αὐτοῦ· ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν, ὅπου μὴ ἔστιν, οἷς ἐστι
μετέχειν αὐτοῦ. We use in this paper the following translation: A. H. Armstrong,
Plotinus, (Loeb Classical Library. Tomes I-VII, Cambridge 1966–1989).
12 En 6. 9(9).10,16–18.
13 See H.Ch. Puech, Position spirituelle et signification de Plotin, in: Bulletin de
l’Association Guillaume Budé 61 (1938), 13–46, 31.
14 P. Ciner, Plotino y Orígenes. El amor y la unión mística, Mendoza 2000, 83–106.
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How then can you see the sort of beauty a good soul has? Go back into yourself
and look; and if you do not yet see yourself beautiful, then, just as someone making
a statue which has to be beautiful cuts away here and polishes there and makes one
part smooth and clears another till he has given his statue a beautiful face, so you
too must cut away excess and straighten the crooked and clear the dark and make it
bright, and never stop working on your statue¨ till the divine glory of virtue shines
out on you, till you see self-mastery enthroned upon his holy seat. 15
5. The Legacy of Origen
During the twentieth century, scholars Margarite Harl,16 Josep Rius Camps,17
and Henri Crouzel18 have emphasised the key role that the doctrine of divinisation has played in Origen’s theology. In one way or another, all three
have shown that the ontological similarity between the soul and the divine
allows for access to the Son’s mysteries themselves, considered as the LogosSofia. Respecting the contributions made by these specialists, and through
an analysis of fragments from Book 20 of the Commentary on the Gospel of
John, in this section we will highlight the characteristics of the process which
leads to divinisation of the human soul. We have chosen this book because it
is undoubtedly one of the true gems to be penned by the Alexandrian, as in
this work readers find the distinctive notes of the true children of God19 to
be magnificently condensed.
On this occasion, we will only delve into Origen’s exegesis of one verse
of the Gospel of John in order to understand the Alexandrian’s position on
divinisation. The verse in question is John 8:37, the verse with which Origen
begins Book 20. The corresponding exegesis extends from fragment 2 to
fragment 47 of the Commentary on the Gospel of John. John’s verse can be
translated as follows: “I know that you are Abraham’s seed, yet you seek to
kill me because you have no room for my word.”20
We have translated the term σπέρμα as seed and not as descendants
because in this way the comparison that Origen makes with the term son
τὸ τέκνον (son), makes sense. In all cases, this term is identical in meaning
to the word semen, and as such Origen’s constant references to the medical
15 En 1.6, 91–15.
16 M. Harl, Origène et la Fonction Revélatrice du Verbe Incarné, Paris 1958.
17 J. Rius-Camps, El dinamismo trinitario en la divinización de los seres racionales
según Orígenes, Rome 1970.
18 H. Crouzel, Origéne et la “Connaissance Mystique”, Toulouse 1959.
19 See P. Ciner, Devenir hijo de Abrahán: exégesis y mística en el Comentario al
Evangelio de Juan de Orígenes, in: Patrística, Biblia y Teología. Caminos de
diálogo, Buenos Aires 2017, 73–81.
20 John 8:37.
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theories of his time can be understood.21 Therefore, using the somatic paradigm as a base, in which male semen allows for the development of a child
in the maternal womb until reaching maturity, Origen develops a beautiful
doctrine of the laws of spiritual inheritance. In this doctrine, the possibility
of being born a child of God is given with the activation of contemplation
and the spiritual senses. For this reason, Origen teaches that though not
all men have come into existence with the same seminal reasons activated,
and as such not all men can be called “sons of Abraham,” all do indeed
have in their ontological base, which is none other than the νοῦς of preexistence,22 seeds of justice.23 Contemplation and its subsequent manifestation
21 See J. C. Alby, La medicina filosófica del cristianismo antiguo, Santa Fe 2015,
chp. III.
22 See P. Ciner, Pensar y escribir desde un paradigma de la relacionalidad: El
Comentario al Evangelio de Juan de Orígenes, in: Adamantius 23 (2017), 406–
407: “We will focus our analysis on the controversial doctrine of preexistence
which the French specialist H. Crouzel maintains is «Origen’s favorite hypothesis
and at the same time the strangest of his theology». Nevertheless, we do not accept
that this doctrine is simply a hypothesis for the Alexandrian. Rather, we believe it
is a fundamental pillar of his doctrine, without which all the beauty and depth of
his subsequent developments would crumble completely. For this reason, we have
attempted to clarify the word preexistence (in Latin praexistentia) as we believe that
this word does not do justice to Origen’s intention of explaining how the eternity
of the beginning is communicated and coexists with the material dimension that is
subject to time and space. It is essential to highlight that the verb used in the text
of the Condemnations of the Council of Constantinople was προϋπάρχω, which is
also the verb Origen uses (Or., Joh. 2.129) to refer to the Logos that exists from the
beginning in the soul. This verb is made up of the prepositions πρó and ὑπó, which
mean before and under, and of the verb ἄρχω, which among its multiple meanings
could be translated as “to give origin to, to begin, to precede, to be the cause of,”
etc. If we join the nuances of this complex verb and apply them to Origen’s work
in which “to give origin to” makes reference to the eternal wisdom of God and
his Son, we believe it should be understood as “the eternity of the beginning that
exists before time and which underlies it.” It is also important to mention that
the term preexistence has not been utilised by Rufinus in the Latin text of Prin, as
when he refers to this doctrine which appears repeatedly in this work, he uses the
expression «first creation». This implies that perhaps this term began to be both
popular and ambiguous perhaps with the Council of Constantinople. We believe
that this clarification is evidence of the relationality paradigm from which Origen
thought and wrote, as it explains the connection between the state of intellectual
creatures before the fall and their subsequent existence in the physical dimension.
It is therefore essential to show the lack of precision that the term preexistence has,
attempting in this way to achieve a better and more precise proposal.”
23 Or., Joh. 20.14: “It is not possible, however, that one participates in no way at all
in the seed of the just” (πλὴν οὐκ ἔστιν τις μηδαμῶς μετέχων σπέρματος δικαίων).
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in works will allow them to diligently watch over and cultivate these seeds
in order to become children of God. The comparison that Origen makes
between Abraham and his brothers Nahor and Haran is illuminating.24 With
clear anti-gnostic intention, Origen chooses three brothers to show that their
“spiritual genes” were identical, but that the decisions made by each led
them to three different moral ways of life. This identity of the beginning
will allow for an understanding of the equal conditions of preexistence and
the causes of the subsequent emergence of evil seeds. In effect, for Origen,
the seeds of evil (for example, those of Cain) which appear in human souls
are neither the result of a being’s original constitution nor of a decision
made by God to privilege some creatures over others. If the former occurred,
there would be no free will, and if the latter occurred, God would be unjust.
Contrasting these two theological and anthropological situations has certainly been a large effort on the part of Origen against Gnostic teaching. The
seeds of evil emerge as a consequence of carelessness in the harvesting of
original seminal reason. One of the most interesting aspects of this exegesis
is Origen’s clarification of the fact that Abraham was not really the son of
Abraham, which, in the words of J. Rius Camps, supposes a “manipulation”25 of the same seminal reasons that allow for the fulfillment, through
the use of responsibility and diligence, of the lot of seeds given by God. For
this reason, Origen optimistically states:
For just as Abraham became Abraham although he was not of the seed of Abraham,
but of the seed of those mentioned previously, so it is possible that someone, by
cultivating the better seeds which were sown in himself, become another Abraham,
not all being of Abraham’s seed, but himself being sufficient to sow seed even as
Abraham.26
24 See Or., Joh. 20.3,13: “What we said, therefore, about the seed of Abraham must
be understood as the seed of Sem, Noah and the just men who preceded them,
whose distinctive properties Abraham, Nahor and Aran seem to have taken up in
common germinally when they were born. Abraham, however, must be understood
to have cultivated the generative principles of all the just men before him that he
had in himself, and to have added to these his own distinctive holy quality so far
as his own distinctive seed is concerned, in which those after him who are called
¨seed of Abraham¨ could participate. Aran, on the other hand, must be understood
to have paid very slight attention to himself and the ancestral seeds in himself,
whence he could produce Lot, who even for a certain time was redolent of salvation. And Nahor must be understood to have been inferior to both brothers”.
25 See Rius Camps, 1970, 199.
26 Or., Joh. 20.3, 16: ὡς γὰρ Ἀβραάμ, οὐκ ἐκ σπέρματος Ἀβραὰμ τυγχάνων ἀλλὰ
τῶν προειρημένων, γέγονεν Ἀβραάμ, οὕτω δυνατόν τινα τὰ κρείττονα τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ
ἐγκατασπαρέντων γεωργήσαντα γενέσθαι ἄλλον Ἀβραάμ, οὐ πάντως ἐκ σπέρματος
Ἀβραὰμ ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸν ἱκανὸν σπείρειν ὡς Ἀβραάμ.
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It is also necessary to show that another of the hermeneutic keys important
for understanding this book is Origen’s use of the following verbs: χωρέω,
γίγνομαι and προκόπτω. Through the use of these verbs, the Alexandrian
explains the dynamic quality of the process of becoming a child of God,
going against the Gnostics to show that true filiation is not given by nature
(φύσις), but rather through adoption (τῆς υἱοθεσίας χωρῆσαι). Of course, this
does not in any way invalidate his doctrine of preexistence, which states that
since the eternity of the beginning27 intellectual creatures do not ever lose
direct contact with the divine, independent of the transitory state that they
assume when making use of their free will (angel, man, or demon).
We shall see how Origen applies these three verbs in the following
fragment:
These, however, to whom the Word speaks are not likely to receive the Word since
he cannot proceed into them because of the surpassing superiority of his greatness, since they are still only seeds of Abraham. But if, in addition to being seed of
Abraham, they had cultivated the seed of Abraham and given it over to greatness
and growth, the Word of Jesus would have proceeded in the greatness and growth
of the seed of Abraham. And you will add that to the present time the Word does
not continue in those who have not advanced beyond being seed of Abraham nor
come into the state of being his children. But these also wish to kill the Word, and to
crush him, as it were because they do not contain his greatness. It is also possible to
see those who do not contain the Word because their vessels are too small wishing
to kill the unity of the Word’s greatness, since they can contain his members after
he has been destroyed and crushed. If the Word should in this way, come to be in
those who will destroy him, as it were, he will say, ¨All my bones were scattered.¨
If indeed, then, anyone of us is seed of Abraham, and the Word of God does not
continue in him still, let him not seek to kill the Word, but by changing from being
seed of Abraham to having become a child of Abraham, he will be able to contain
the Word of God whom he did not contain till then.28
Briefly analysing the meaning of these verbs, we can state the following:
(a) With respect to the verb χωρέω, which is the first to appear in this fragment, we can say, just as H. Crouzel explains,29 that it is one of Origen’s
favorites throughout his work. This term, which can be translated as “to
make space, to be capable of,” indicates that the increase in the ability
to contain the Logos is precisely a fundamental characteristic of the perfects (οἱ τέλειοι). In this sense, the active potential of the soul to activate
27 P. Ciner, Unidad y Polisemia de la noción ἁρχή en el Comentario al Evangelio de
Juan de Orígenes, in: Teología y Vida, LII 1–2 (2011), 93–104.
28 Or., Joh. 20.6,40, 45.
29 χωρεῖ. For the uses of this verb, see H. Crouzel, Origène et la “Connaissance
Mystique”, Paris 1960, 393–395.
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the seminal reason, provided by the Logos as a type of maternal womb,
represents the value given to the feminine aspect, both in his theology
and in his mysticism.
(b) With respect to the verb προκόπτω and its noun form προκοπή, Origen
has pointed out in this fragment, and throughout the entire Commentary
on the Gospel of John, that the path of spiritual progress, which is the
only path to divinisation, requires both humility and consistency on the
part of the human being, as well as the grace of God and his Son, in
order to be realised.30
(c) Through the use of the verb γίγνομαι, which can be translated as “to
become”, Origen explains that to be a child of God it is necessary to perfect the seminal reason given by God in preexistence in order to become
completely similar to the Son. We can almost state that these seminal
reasons coincide with the ἐπίνοιαι of the Son, as is stated in Book II, that
the Son of God could be called the son of wisdom and justice.31
We conclude this section by stating that the birth of the condition of the
Son of God represents the culmination of spiritual progress and implies,
as Lorenzo Perrone has shown in his article on free will,32 the complexity
of Origen’s synergic model, “where divine initiative does not suppress the
responsibility of man, but rather requires it.”33
30 On some occasions, sufficient importance has not been given to the doctrine of
grace and this has caused unjust accusations. The most significant of these accusations was that of Jerome, which lasted for centuries, and by way of which he
accused the Alexandrian of inspiring the Pelagian doctrine in these terms: doctrina
tua origenis ramusculus est. This accusation was based on the false idea that the
Alexandrian considered that salvation could be achieved exclusively by one’s own
effort. Nothing could be further from Origen’s theology. In this sense, we believe
it is essential to show that in his system the doctrine of free will and the doctrine
of grace are absolutely inseparable.
31 Or., Joh 2.1,5–6: “It is not strange for the saint thus to be a son of Wells, for a
son frequently receives his name from virtuous deeds. One may be called a son ¨of
light¨ because ¨his works¨ shine ¨before men¨, another a son ¨of peace¨ because he
has the ¨peace of God which surpasses all understanding,” and further, one may
be called a ¨child of wisdom¨ because of the benefit that comes from wisdom, for
Scripture says, ¨Wisdom is justified by her children.¨ So, therefore, he who searches
all things by the divine Spirit, even the depths of God, in order to speak plainly
about him -¨O the depth of the riches and wisdom and knowledge of God!¨- can
be a ¨son of wells¨ to whom the Word of the Lord comes.”
32 See L. Perrone, Libre Albedrío, in Diccionario de Orígenes, en A. Castagno, Burgos
2003, 499–508.
33 Perrone, 2003, 508.
The Tradition of Spiritual Progress in the West
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6. Neuroscience and Mystical Experience34
Continuing with the question referring to the existence of a strictly “mystical”
dimension, it is necessary to analyse an issue that seems to have divided specialists in the fields of Neuroscience and Phenomenology of Religion. Here
we refer to the existence or not of an entity that transcends the psychophysical compound, and which in the West has been called the soul. The starting
point for this debate is precisely the search for an explanation of the process
that leads human beings to reach that experience for which, in the words of
Plotinus, “it is necessary to cast aside kingdoms and control of the entire earth,
sea and sky,”35 etc.
We will start by saying that the “majority” of neurobiologists working before
the 1980s seemed to have had a unanimous opinion on the complex topic
of the relationship between the notions of soul-mind-brain-body, concepts
loaded with metaphysical history. Generally speaking, almost all affirmed that
Platonic or Cartesian dualism had only been a product of immense ignorance
of the functioning of the brain, and in this sense it was necessary to set these
ideas aside in favor of more certain explanations. Francis Crick, 1962 Nobel
Prize winner for his discovery of the molecular structure of DNA together with
James Watson, was one of the first to denounce dualism as an “error of the
philosophical and spiritual tradition of humanity”:
The explanation of consciousness is one of the great unresolved issues of
modern science. In fact, one of the problems that burdens current neurobiology is the relationship between the mind and the brain. In the past, the
mind (or soul) was considered separate from the brain, though it interacted
with it in some way. Currently, the majority of neurologists believe that
all the aspects of the mind, including its most disconcerting attribute, consciousness or knowledge of itself, can probably be explained as the behavior
of large sets of neurons that interact.36
Nevertheless, this paradigm has begun to change substantially in the
last two decades. In effect, there are some prestigious specialists who
have clearly warned that the “paradigm of the soul” is not incompatible
with the affirmation of the location of brain structures that make possible the mystical experience. Among them is Canadian scientist Mario
Beauregard, author of The Spiritual Brain,37 who together with Denyse
34 See P. Ciner, Alma versus cerebro: un debate acerca del origen de la experiencia
mística, in: El Hilo de Ariadna 6, (2009), 46–52.
35 En 1.6.6, 35.
36 See R. Carter, El Nuevo Mapa del Cerebro Humano, Barcelona 2002, 204.
37 M. Beauregard, The Spiritual Brain. A Neuroscientist’s Case for the Existence of
the Soul, New York 2008.
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O’Leary has opened an interesting dialogue between neuroscience and the
thousand year old mystical traditions, setting forth a paradigm which has
been called “post-materialist science.”38 In this book, and opposing other
neurological suppositions, Mario Beauregard explains and demonstrates,
through the use of MRI studies, that neither consciousness nor mystical
experience are sub-products of the brain, though of course they are experienced through the use of the brain. That is to say that there exists a
level or dimension independent of the brain from which it is possible to
understand this experience. In this sense, Beauregard’s work continues
the tradition of the soul in Western terms, or the tradition of the simple
witness in Eastern terms. Allan Wallace’s book, Contemplative Science.
Where Buddhism and Neuroscience Converge, has also shown that contemplation has just as much scientific rigor as any other method of positivist science. The works of Plotinus and Origen are cited in both texts, as
well works by mystics who continued with the traditions opened by these
teachers.
7. Conclusions
We are completely aware of the fact that our ideas regarding the possibility of a mystical anthropology could be harshly criticised by approaches
coming from various current psychological and philosophical positions,
as they consider it impossible to separate the integrality of the dimensions
which constitute the human being. Nevertheless, our objective has been
to show that human freedom requires an independent dimension capable
of objectifying all that which happens to a person, both internally and
externally, in such a way as to allow for contemplation of the situation,
and from this contemplation to effect transformations and changes. Only
in this way will a human being have true ownership of himself. For this
reason, we believe that it is essential and necessary to update the mystical tradition of spiritual progress set forth by Plotinus and Origen for
the third millennium. The fact that various neuroscientists have taken
up these thinkers’ ideas once again shows promise for a fruitful dialogue
between fields that have at times been completely separated. In addition,
it allows for understanding that a human being is a multiple unit, where
the different levels of its entity can and should coexist harmoniously and
38 M. Beauregard / G.E. Schwartz / L. Miller / L. Dossey / A. Moreira-Almeida
/ M. Schlitz /R. Sheldrake / C. Tart, Manifesto for a PostMaterialist Science,
in: Explore 10 (2014), 272–274.
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in balance. This great truth of Mystical Anthropology seeks to recognise
and discover this secret space where the most marvelous experiences of
human life take place, and from where one can contemplate the transitory
and contingent nature of life, knowing that there exists a reality which
transcends us.
Ryan Haecker
The First Principles of Origen’s Logic: An
Introduction to Origen’s Theology of Logic
Abstract: Origen has been acknowledged as a great theologian, but he has not yet been
recognised as a logician. He hardly ever appears today in histories of logic. Ancient
logic has typically been narrated to begin with Aristotle and end with the early Stoa.
Origen’s logic has come to be relegated to little more than a footnote to Stoic logic.
Robert Somos has recently argued that Origen’s logic cannot be simply reduced to
Stoic logic. Yet he has declined to develop its implications into a genuinely theological
interpretation of Origen’s logic. Origen has, however, clearly indicated a theological
interest in logic, when, in the prologue to the Commentary on the Song of Songs, he
describes how logic may be “interwoven” in and through all of the sciences, even as
it is presupposed in language and rhetoric, and, most of all, as it is completed in what
he calls the mystical or “epoptic” science of theology. This “epoptic” science appears
to supersede logic as the science of the intelligible attributes or epinoia of the Logos,
communicated by Christ, through the Trinity. Origen’s logic is, on this account, not,
as it has so often been misread, simply a machinic calculation of Stoic or Peripatetic
syllogisms, but, more mysteriously, a way of speaking in and with the Logos, which,
beginning with the Sophia, can be communicated by Christ, in and through the divine
hypostases of God as Trinity.
Keywords: Logic, Trinity, Sophia, Logos, Dialectic, Syllogism, Platonic logic,
Aristotelian logic, Stoic logic, Theology of logic
1. Introduction: Origen’s Theology of Logic
Origen has been acknowledged as a great theologian, but he has not yet
been recognised as a logician. He hardly ever appears in histories of logic.
Ancient logic has, instead, typically been narrated to begin with the first
formalisation of logic by Aristotle and end with the early Stoa. Nothing of
any importance is thereafter thought to have been added again before the
second formalisation of logic among the medieval scholastics. No notable
innovations are observed to have been introduced by the Middle Platonists
or the Church Fathers. And Christian theology has come to be written out of
the history of logic. Historians of logic have, accordingly, tended to exclude
the theological from the logical. Origen has come to be almost entirely forgotten from the history of ancient logic. Neither he nor any of his illustrious
contemporaries now feature in our standard historical narrative. And when
he is mentioned at all, he usually appears as little more than a marginal
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source for only a few lost Stoic syllogisms. Origen’s contributions to the
history of logic have thus regrettably come to be considered among Origen
scholars as little more than a marginal footnote to ancient Stoic logic in
anticipation of modern mathematical logic.
This near complete neglect of Origen’s contributions to logic is all the
more regrettable in that Origen had, perhaps uniquely among the Church
Fathers, not only deployed the tools of Stoic syllogisms, but had on at least
one occasion offered a tantalising description of the place of logic within
theology. He describes, in the prologue to the Commentary on the Song of
Songs, how logic may be “interwoven” in and through all of the sciences,
even as it is presupposed in language and rhetoric, and, most of all, as it
can be completed in what he calls the “epoptic” or mystical science of theology.1 Plato had previously spoken of the “epoptic” as an initiation into
the philosophical mysteries, of the wisdom of love, and of the divine ideas.2
Plutarch had thereafter provided the first testimony for this tripartite hierarchical classification of philosophy into Ethics, Physics, and Epoptics.3 And
Clement of Alexandria, in the Stromata, had previously divided philosophy
into four parts: (1) History; (2) Ethics; (3) Physics; and (4) Epoptics.4 The
word “epoptic” designates, for Origen, that which is beyond the bounds of
the optical, the invisible and incorporeal epinoiai, like the love that can be
shared between the Church and Christ in God as Trinity.5 Origen’s description of the interweaving of logic in and through the mystical or “epoptic”
science of theology thus sets logic in a direct relationship to theology, a relationship which we can call a “theology of logic”.
The “theology of logic” is, I propose, a new way to study the subject of
logic as it should now and always be studied for the sacred science of theology. It does not hold the logical apart from the theological, but rather and
more radically begins and ends before any separation of logic and theology.
It can be doubly distinguished, on the one hand, from theoretical or philosophical logic, which asks what are the rules of logic, and from practical
1
2
3
4
5
The translation is from R. P. Lawson, Origen. The Song of Songs: Commentary
and Homilies, Ancient Christian Writers 26, Westminster Maryland 1957, 39–46.
The manuscript translation of “enoptics” has recently been revised as “epoptics”,
meaning beyond the optical, and, implicitly, the intelligible aspects or epinoiai of
the first principles. Cf. R. Somos, Logic and Argumentation in Origen, Münster
2015, 20–27.
Plat., smp. 210a; Plat., Phdr. 250c; Plat. L. 7, 333e.
Plut., De Iside 382d. Cited in P. Hadot, Die Einteilung der Philosophie in Altertum,
in: ZPhF 36/ 3 (1982), 439–440.
Clem., Strom., 1.28. Cited in Hadot, 1982, 439–440.
Lawson 1957, 21–24. 30–39. 47–52.
On the First Principles of Origen’s Logic
107
or applied logic, which asks how these rules of logic can be programmed as
an instrument with which to compute any and all conclusions. It asks, not
merely “what is logic?”, but, more importantly, “why is there logic at all?”
The theology of logic thus starts with no standing presumption as to the universal and invariant necessity of logic, but rather asks so as to answer what
we can consider to be the more originary, absolute, and genuinely theological question of the contingent grounds for our very belief in the truth of
logic. I wish, with this essay, to explore the first principles of Origen’s logic
as an early contribution to a Christian theological interpretation of logic,
that is, to a theology of logic.
2. The Controversy Concerning Origen’s Logic
Origen has, in the Preface to his Commentary on the Song of Songs, illustrated how the science of logic can be interwoven in and through all three
of the philosophical sciences of Ethics, Physics, and Epoptics.6 This “interweaving” of logic in and through theology can, as I have argued, be studied
as the locus classicus for any theological interpretation of Origen’s logic,
or of Origen’s “theology of logic”.7 Yet its precise meaning has come to be
contested. Origen initially appears simply to have substituted the old Stoic
science of “Logic” for the new Platonic science of “Epoptics”. Since the
Stoic science of “Logic” had included the study of language, such a substitution has suggested that Origen had intended to reduce the study of logic
to language.8
Marguerite Harl has, for this reason, read Origen to restrict the scope of
logic to the first science of ethics, and to reduce the science of logic to little
more than a “science of language”.9 In contrast, Róbert Somos has observed
that such a reduction of logic to language conflicts with Origen’s own statement, preserved in the Greek text of the Commentary on Genesis and extant
in the Philocalia (14.2), that it is not possible to discuss ethical, physical
and theological problems “without precise knowledge of how to explain
6
7
8
9
Lawson, 1957, 40–44.
R. Haecker, Restoring Reason: Theology of Logic in Origen of Alexandria,
Doctoral Dissertation, University of Cambridge 2021.
P.W. Martens, Origen and Scripture. The Contours of the Exegetical Life, Oxford
2012, 79
M. Harl, Les trois livres de Salomon et les trois parties de la philosophie dans les
Prologues des Commentaires sur le Cantique des Cantiques d’Origène aux Chaînes
exégétiques grecques, in J. Dummer (ed.), Texte und TextKritik 133, Berlin 1987,
249–269. 252.
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Ryan Haecker
their meaning and without elucidating them according to the logical part.”10
Since not only ethical and physical, but even theological problems can only
be answered by logic, and a science of language that lacks the analytical validation of the syllogism, cannot legitimately distinguish the valid, invalid, or
sophistical arguments of which he speaks, Origen could not be understood
to have reduced the study of logic to language.11
Origen has, on the contrary, not at all dispensed with logic, but rather
described the study of logic (logice / logike), “connected and intertwined
throughout with the three studies” of ethics, physics, and epoptics, as it concerns “the meanings and proper significances” of words “and their opposites”, “the classes and kinds of words and expressions”, and “the form of
every saying.”12 Logic is, for Origen, this science of speaking reasonably of
any science. Although it is admittedly never located in any separate or secular science, it can continue to operate in and with the sciences of Ethics and
Physics until it can be completed in and by this Epoptic or mystical science
of theology. Logic is “interwoven” in and through all of the sciences, not, as
it ostensibly appears, because it is not scientific, but, to the contrary, because
it is virtually presupposed to operate in the immanent exercise of all of the
philosophical sciences, as ultimately in the science of theology.
Origen appears, at this point, to signal the irreducibility of logic to any
study of language. Yet his logic has continued to be treated as little more
than a scholastic exercise in Stoic logic. For he has, in two clear cases from
Contra Celsum, deployed otherwise unknown examples of Stoic syllogisms.
Origen presents the “Idle Argument” for the purpose of answering Celsus’
argument that Christ can, by his foreknowledge, be culpable for his betrayal,
by arguing, to the contrary, that if foreknowledge of an event is true, then
the cause of this event must be necessarily true, and not at all dependent
upon foreknowledge.13 Similarly, Origen presents the “Argument of Two
Conditionals” for the purpose of answering Celsus’ argument that, if even
the prophets prophesied that God “would serve as a slave and be sick and
die”, then, because, for Celsus, God cannot be supposed to suffer and die,
“it would be impossible to believe in the predictions that he should suffer
and do these things.”14
Origen has thus responded to Celsus on his own terms with the standard repertoire of Stoic logic. However he has not deployed these arguments as primary exemplars of logic, much less of the dialectic of the Logos,
10
11
12
13
14
Somos, 2015, 22–23.
Lawson, 1957, 42.
Lawson, 1957, 40.
Translation in H. Chadwick, Contra Celsum, Cambridge 1980, 84.
Translation by Chadwick, 1980, 406.
On the First Principles of Origen’s Logic
109
but rather, more selectively and strategically, as a “second-best” apologetic
device with which to dialectically neutralize criticisms of Christianity. He
has introduced the Contra Celsum as a work of persuasion with which to
respond to the accusations against Christianity, in imitation of the accusations against Christ, who, once he had been accused, remained silent,“but
despised and nobly ignored his accusers.”15 In imitation of Christ, apologetics is only a second-best counter-argument, as such arguments can neither
create nor destroy the “love of Christ and the love of God which is in Christ
Jesus.”16 Since, furthermore, these syllogisms can destroy the key premises of
Celsus’ criticisms, but cannot create the conditions for the “love of Christ”,
the Idle Argument and the Argument from Two Conditionals cannot, as
has often been mistakenly believed, be considered as primary exemplars of
Origen’s logic, but, rather, and more restrictively, can only be regarded as
logical devices of a secondary, prophylactic, and apologetic dialectic.
Origen has, in his exercise of the “Idle Argument” and the “Argument
from Two Conditionals”, preserved for posterity two arguments that show a
signature of Stoic logic. Scholars have since scoured the Origenian corpus for
further evidence of an abiding influence of Stoic logic. Henry Chadwick first
called attention to this Stoic influence.17 John Rist described how “Origen
is a considerable supplier of material, some of it of great interest to the historian of Stoic logic”; how he “seems to know [Chrysippus’] work at first
hand”; and how he confidently uses such arguments without any comment.18
Louis Roberts further observed how “Origen’s works […] have been greatly
influenced by Stoic logic” and “a good deal more Stoic logic may lurk hitherto undetected in Origen.”19 And Ronald Heine has summarised this scholarly consensus when he writes that “nearly everyone who has worked on
Stoicism in Origen’s thought, has focused almost exclusively on the Contra
Celsum,” which, he concludes, shows that “there is a structure beneath the
discursiveness, and the structure comes from Stoic logic.”20 Chadwick, Rist,
Roberts, and Heine have thus concluded the scholarly communio opinio
15
16
17
18
Translation by Chadwick, 1980, 3.
Translation by Chadwick, 1980, 4.
H. Chadwick, Origen, Celsus, and the Stoa, in: JTS 48/189/190 (1947), 34–49.
J.M. Rist, Importance of Stoic Logic in the Contra Celsum, in: H.J. Blumenthal
/ R.A. Markus (eds.), Neoplatonism and Early Christian Thought. Essays in
Honour of A.H. Armstrong, London 1981, 64–78.
19 L. Roberts, Origen and Stoic Logic, in: Transactions and Proceedings of the
American Philological Association 101 (1970), 433–444.
20 R.E. Heine, Stoic Logic as Handmaid to Exegesis and Theology in Origen’s
Commentary on the Gospel of John, in: JTS 44/1 (1993), 90–117.
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that the underlying structure of Origen’s logic is little more than an adjunct
to Stoic logic in anticipation of modern mathematical logic.
However, Róbert Somos has, in the only full-length monograph on
Origen’s logic, Logic and Argumentation in Origen, resolutely rejected this
communio opinio. He argues, against the reduction of Origen’s logic to Stoic
logic, that Origen had already adapted the arsenal of early imperial argument for a new Christian theological agenda. He observes that, due to the
proliferation of handbook manuals of Stoic, Peripatetic, and Platonic logic,
the Church Fathers had generally used Stoic technical terms, without, for
this reason, presupposing any direct Stoic influence. The terms of Origen’s
logic may thus admittedly appear Stoic even as these terms had been adapted
for new theological purposes. And since, already in Alcinous’ Didaskalikos,
there appears something of a syncretism of logical elements, Somos concludes that it is not possible to demonstrate that Origen’s use of logic was
directly influenced by or at all definitively indebted to any particular philosophical school.21 The evidence for such a direct Stoic influence upon
Origen thus seems to run dry, for the extant sources of ancient logic appear
to scarce, and the available evidence, too conflicting, to come to any certain conclusions about a clear chain of influences flowing from the Stoa to
Alexandria. The technical vocabulary of Origen’s logic may thus admittedly
often appear Stoic, even as he had adapted Stoic terms for new Christian
theological purposes.22
Somos recommends that we should read Origen’s logic as “a mixed
Stoic-Aristotelian logic intermediated by Middle Platonism than direct Stoic
sources.”23 We can trace the sources of Origen’s logic, through the branches
of these Stoic formulae, to its roots in Platonic ontology. And it is, I suggest,
this Platonic ontology, rather than Stoic logic, that hints at the overriding
theological purpose of Origen’s logic. Philo had allegorically interpreted the
Stoic tripartition of Logic-Physics-Ethics, and interpreted logic as a prophylactic “hedge” with which to defend the physical community and ethical
virtues.24 And Clement had similarly presented logic, not only as a prophylactic, but moreover as a propaedeutic for faithful Christian “gnosis”. Somos
has attributed to Clement, before Origen, an anti-Stoic view of logic as an
“anagogical process” with a “theological function”, which, he says, is “a
central element of Christian theological consideration” centred on the first
principles of Christian theology.25 Logic is for Origen, not merely, as it has
21
22
23
24
25
Somos, 2017, 17. 206.
Somos, 2017, 17.
Somos, 2017, 202.
Somos, 2017, 18. Cf. Gen. 9:20.
Somos, 2017, 19.
On the First Principles of Origen’s Logic
111
been for Philo, a prophylactic instrument for defending virtue from sophistical and sceptical dissolution, but, rather, and more radically than Clement,
“pervades the entirety of knowledge” with “theological relevance.”26
3. Conclusion: The First Principles of Origen’s Logic
Origen should, I suggest, be read, not only as a theologian, but also as a
logician. For he has, more radically than Clement and Philo, linked logic to
the first principles of theology. The first principles are, in Origen’s On First
Principles, those of the three archai that are indexed by the titular headings
of God, Christ, and the Holy Spirit. He summarises these three archai when
he writes: “Therefore we call this blessed and archiken (sovereign, sustaining
all things) <power> the Trinity.”27 The titular “first principles” of On First
Principles are thus defined and distinguished as the “archiken trinitatem”
of God, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. God as Trinity is the first principle,
not only of Origen’s theology, but also of Origen’s logic. For Christ the Son
contains all of the intelligible attributes (epinoiai), of the Wisdom (Sophia)
and the Word (Logos), which can be communicated by Christ to the created
cosmos of signs, language, and logic. Logic is thus for Origen a determinate
speech (logoi) of the Logos, which has, as its first beginning, the Sophia of
Christ in God as Trinity.
The Sophia and the Logos of Christ are the first principles of Origen’s logic.
Sophia is the first of the divine attributes or epinoia. It is announced to
Solomon before it had been articulated by Socrates.28 It is called the “flawless mirror of the working of God” as the “image of his goodness” in the
reflection of the radiance in creatures from and for God. It is prior to any
and all other epinoiai. Yet it can, by its beginning (arche), also contain the
reasons (logoi) and the species (logoi spermatikoi) of all created spirits, substances, and signs.29 All of the forms of logic can then be “prefigured in
Wisdom herself”, where Wisdom, Solomon says, “was created the beginning
of the ways of God”, which “contain[s] within herself the beginning and the
reasons and the species of the entire creation.”30 Hence, it is, Origen writes,
“begotten beyond the limits of any beginning that we can speak of or understand”, whether of the Logos, of language, or of logic.31 Sophia is thus the
26 Somos, 2017, 24.
27 The translation is from J. Behr, Origen. On First Principles, I, Oxford 2017; cf.
Or. Joh. 1.4.3., 84–5, fn.78; I.L.E. Ramelli, Origen and the Platonic Tradition,
in: Religions 8/21 (2017), 5.
28 Or. prin. 1.2.2, Behr, 2017, 43.
29 Or. prin. 1.2.2, Behr, 2017, 43.
30 Or. prin. 1.2.2, Behr, 2017, 43.
31 Origen, Origen. On First Principles, 2017, 1.2.2, 43.
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first divine attribute that virtually contains all of the divine attributes, the
Logos, and its logic.
The Word (Logos) is the totality of words (logoi, which can be formulated into language, and formalised into logic (logike).32 Logic is, accordingly,
not simply a static inventory of Academic, Peripatetic, or even Stoic argument forms, but, in Origen, the dynamic formalisation of the logoi of natural language into the formulae of logike, which forever reflects the Logos of
Christ into the logic of the Logos. This logic of the Logos may, moreover, be
“outlined and prefigured” in Sophia, as it envelops any alternative logic within
the dialectical circuit of Sophia.33 And the eternal completion of the dialectic
of the epinoiai, implies, that logic is, not primarily a simulation of argument in
the formal syllogistic, but rather has been eternally begotten in the dialectical
circuit of the divine attributes or epinoiai of Christ in God as Trinity.
Origen’s logic is, as this essay has argued, not, as it has so often been misread, a machinic computation of Stoic or Peripatetic syllogisms, but, more
mysteriously, a determinate speech of the Logos, which, with Sophia, can be
communicated by Christ, through the divine hypostases of God as Trinity.
Sophia can, accordingly, be said to contain “within herself the beginning
and the reasons and the species of the entire creation,” of the Logos, and of
logic, as she can “prefigure” the divine attributes, of the Logos, and of this
logic of the Logos.34 The logic of the Logos is “outlined and prefigured” in
Sophia, not only posterior to, but prior to any articulation of formal logic.
And any articulation of the formal logic of the Aristotelian and Stoic syllogistic is, thereafter, no more than the formal simulation of the Logos into so
many forms of valid arguments. Since, finally, the Logos, is itself the totality
of the logoi, and, as such, the totality of all forms that can be formulated in
language, and formalised into logic, Origen’s logic must, in the last analysis,
be absolutely irreducible to any articulation of secular, formal, and mathematical logic. The Logos is, for Origen, an operation that is begotten in eternity, even as it is articulated in time, and, indeed, in any use of logic.
32 I.L.E. Ramelli, The Logos/Nous OneMany between ‘Pagan’ and Christian
Platonism. Bardaisan, Clement, Origen, Plotinus, and Gregory of Nyssa, in: N.
Baker Brian / J. Lössl / M. Vinzent (eds.), Studia Patristica CII: Including Papers
Presented at the Seventh British Patristics Conference, Cardiff, 5–7 September
2018, Leuven 2021, 11–44.
33 Or., prin. 1.2.2; Behr, 2017, 43.
34 Or., prin. 1.2.2, Behr, 2017, 43.
Vito Limone
The Use of Eros in Gregory of Nyssa’s
Homilies on the Song of Songs
Abstract The chief aim of this paper is to explore the use of the term eros in Gregory’s
homilies on the Song of Songs. After an overview of the state of the art and the purpose of the research, the paper will focus on the use of eros in two main sources of
Gregory, respectively in the Greek fragments of Origen’s commentary on the Song, and
in Plotinus’ Ennead III 5. The paper will then investigate the use of eros in Gregory’s
homilies, in particular in three key texts in which eros occurs.
Keywords: Gregory of Nyssa, Origen, Song of Songs, Eros, Agape
1. State of the Art and Aim of the Research
The study by Anders Nygren, Eros and Agape, published in 1930, formulates a key distinction between the meanings of two terms occurring both in
the Greco-Roman and in the Christian lexica.1 According to A. Nygren, the
word “agape” (ἀγάπη) is not very frequently applied in classical Greek,2 but
it is popular in the early post-apostolic era,3 and it denotes, on the one hand,
1
2
3
I am deeply indebted to Mrs. Vera Obbágy for her revision of the English, and to
Prof. Giulio Maspero for having carefully read a draft of this paper.
The study of A. Nygren was originally in Swedish; in the course of this research
we shall follow the Italian translation of it: A. Nygren, Eros e agape. La nozione
cristiana dell’amore e le sue trasformazioni, It. trans. N. Gay, Collana di Studi
Religiosi, Bologna 1990 (see, in particular, 431–443). For an overview of the
occurrences of the term “eros” in the literary corpus of Gregory of Nyssa see
also: G. Horn, L’amour divin. Note sur le mot «eros» dans S. Grégoire de Nysse,
in: RAM 6/24 (1925), 378–389.
As already demonstrated by C. Spicq, in the classical Greek agape means “hospitality” and, especially in the philosophical terminology of Aristotle, “disinterested
love”; on this topic see: C. Spicq, Agape: Prolégomènes à une étude de théologie
néotestamentaire, Studia Hellenistica 10, Louvain 1955, 38–40; see also: Aristot.,
eth. nicom. 1167B.31.
See: Nygren, 1990, 91–134. Concerning the circulation of this term in the
Christian everyday language see: C. Spicq, Agapè dans le Nouveau Testament.
I: Analyse des textes, Études bibliques, Paris 1958, 179; with respect to the reception of this term in the theological vocabulary of the Christians, with a focus on
Clement of Alexandria, see: F. Draczkowski, Kościół-Agape według Klemensa
Aleksandryjskiego, Lublin 1983, 73–74.
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Vito Limone
the spiritual and incorporeal love and, on the other hand, the love of God
towards humankind or the divine Son, or the love of each man towards God
or other men. On the contrary, the word “eros” (ἔρως) signifies, in general,
the desire for appropriation and, in particular in the Platonic vocabulary,
the ascent of man to the divine, as it results from the Symposium and the
Phaedrus.4 On the basis of this theory, A. Nygren argues that, in the attempt
to harmonise the Greek terminology with the content of Revelation, the
Christians end up overlapping the aforementioned meanings of eros and
agape; in the case of Gregory of Nyssa, A. Nygren is persuaded that he is
responsible not only for the superimposition of eros and agape, but also for
the identification of agape with eros, so that in Gregory’s corpus agape is
utilised with the meaning of eros.5
Over the past few years the above-mentioned thesis of A. Nygren has
received criticisms. In the view of some scholars, A. Nygren’s approach to
Gregory is affected by two biases: firstly, he claims that Gregory does not
distinguish the meaning of eros from that of agape, in contrast with what
is documented in his writings;6 secondly, he implies that Gregory’s lexical choices are strongly influenced by his intention to combine Platonism
and the holy Scripture. In particular, J. Daniélou thinks that the overlap
of the meanings of agape and eros in Gregory originates from the fact that
Gregory understands eros as a specification of agape; in light of this argument, J. Daniélou underscores that the use of eros and agape in Gregory’s
corpus is not simply a replacement of the Platonic eros with the Pauline
agape, but it is an original reformulation of both of them.7 Both F. Dünzl and
4
5
6
7
As it was already proved by A. Nygren in: Nygren, 1990, 150–155.
See supra, fn. 1. Given that Gregory identifies agape with eros, one of the paradoxical consequences is that, since in 1 John 4:8 God is defined as agape, Gregory
needs to explain why an egoistic form of love is ascribed to God himself. This is
evidenced by A. Nygren in: Nygren, 1990, 442–443; on this: Greg. Nys., de an.
et res. (PG 46, 96C).
Gregory is aware of the meaning of agape as love of God for humankind, see: Greg.
Nys., orat. cat. (GNO 3/4, 17.2–3); hom. in Cant. 4 (GNO 6, 123.5–11); XV
(GNO 6, 461.14), or as love of man for the divine, see: Greg. Nys., c. Eun.
I (GNO 1, 127.7); hom. in Eccl. VIII (GNO V, 425.10); inst. (GNO 8/1, 61.7).
At the same time, he knows that the term eros is also provided with a meaning
which refers to passions and desires, as it is evidenced by the adjectives οὐράνιος
and καθαρóς, see: Greg. Nys., virg. (GNO 8/1, 328.11), μακάριος e ἀπαθής, as it
results from: Greg. Nys., inst. (GNO 8/1, 40.10), and θεῖος, see: Greg. Nys., hom.
in Cant. VI (GNO VI, 192.1.4); see also: Greg. Nys., hom. in Eccl. VI (GNO 5,
387.18).
J. Daniélou, Platonisme et théologie mystique. Doctrine spirituelle de Saint
Grégoire de Nysse, Théologie 2, Paris 1944, 199–208, in particular 205. The key
text on which the interpretation of J. Daniélou is based is the following: Greg.
The Use of Eros in Gregory of Nyssa’s
115
W. Völker are in line with the argument of J. Daniélou: the former evidences
that the meanings of agape and eros in the corpus of Gregory are not to be
interpreted on the basis of their meanings in the ancient lexicon;8 the latter
reinforces the reading of J. Daniélou, and assumes that Gregory attributes
a totally new meaning to eros.9 Finally, C. Moreschini underestimates the
distinction that A. Nygren makes between eros and agape, considering it as
too strict, and emphasises the semantic fluidity of the mystical terminology
of Gregory, which stands up against the aforesaid scheme of A. Nygren.10
Given the distance of Gregory’s language from the traditional vocabulary,
the main objective of the present research is to focus on the use of eros only
in his Homilies on the Song of Songs (henceforth, hom. in Cant.).11 Without
any claim to reassessing the genesis and fortunes of eros in the early imperial period, especially in the background of Gregory, since this topic has
already been explored in detail by A. Nygren himself and other scholars,
Nys., hom. in Cant. 13 (GNO 6, 383.7–12) – we shall mention this text again
in the course of the present article (see infra, fn. 48). The view of J. Daniélou
has been recently restated by G. Maspero in: G. Maspero, Amore (ἀγάπη, ἔρως),
in: G. Maspero / L.F. Mateo-Seco (eds.), Gregorio di Nissa: Dizionario, Rome
2007, 60–66.
8 F. Dünzl, Braut und Bräutigam. Die Auslegung des Canticum durch Gregor von
Nyssa, Beiträge zur Geschichte der biblischen Exegese 32, Tübingen 1993, 369–
379, in particular 372.
9 W. Völker, Gregorio di Nissa filosofo e mistico, It. trans. C.O. Tommasi, Milan
1993, 223–224.
10 C. Moreschini, L’amore nei Padri Cappadoci, in: Dizionario di spiritualità biblico
patristica. I grandi temi della S. Scrittura per la «lectio divina». III: AmoreCarità
Misericordia, Rome 1993, 287–290. See also what C. Moreschini says in: C.
Moreschini, I padri cappadoci. Storia, letteratura, teologia, Rome 2008, 337–339;
id., Le “Omelie sul Cantico dei Cantici” di Gregorio di Nissa, in: V. Limone /
C. Moreschini (eds.), Origene, Gregorio di Nissa. Sul Cantico dei Cantici, Milan
2016, 129–131.
11 They are dated after the year 394, in particular the Life of Moses; on this see: Dünzl,
1993, 32; see also: id., Gregor von Nyssa’s Homilien zum Canticum auf dem
Hintergrund seiner Vita Moysis, in: VChr 44/4 (1990), 371–381. Two comprehensive studies on Gregory’s hom. in Cant. are: A. Meis, Orígenes y Gregorio de Nisa,
«In Canticum», in: G. Dorival / A. Le Boulluec (eds.), Origeniana Sexta: Origen
and the Bible / Origène et la Bible, BEThL 118, Leuven 1995, 599–616; ead., Das
Paradox des Menschen im “CanticumKommentar” Gregors von Nyssa und bei
Origenes, in: W.A. Bienert / U. Kühneweg (eds.), Origeniana Septima: Origenes
in den Auseinandersetzungen des 4. Jahrhunderts, BEThL 137, Leuven 1999,
469–496.
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Vito Limone
our study will consist of three main sections.12 The first section (2.) will be
devoted entirely to the main patristic source of Gregory’s exegesis of the
Cant., that is, Origen of Alexandria, who is explicitly quoted and consulted
by Gregory in the course of the hom. in Cant.13 In this section a particular
attention will be dedicated to the Greek fragments of Origen’s commentary
on the Cant. (henceforth, com. in Cant.), passed down to us in the partial
Latin translation of Rufinus. The second section (3.) will mention the use of
eros in the philosophical backdrop of Gregory, in particular in Plotinus: this
section will take into account the Ennead 3.5, which is entirely about eros
(Περὶ ἔρωτος). In conclusion, on the basis of the data collected in Sections 2
and 3, we shall investigate the main passages of the hom. in Cant. in which
eros occurs, and we shall demonstrate that Gregory exposes a view of eros
already documented in his Origenian and Neoplatonic sources.
2. The Use of Eros in the Greek Fragments
of Origen’s com. in Cant.
As mentioned above, Origen’s com. in Cant., originally in ten books, has
been passed down to us in the partial Latin translation by Rufinus, dated
to 410–411.14 Nevertheless, an epitome, transmitted under the name of
Procopius of Gaza (V century AD), contains several Greek fragments of
Origen’s comment on the Cant. (henceforth, fr. in Cant.). These fragments
were edited, for the first time, by C. de la Rue in 1740,15 then published
by F. Oberthür in 1785 and by K.H.E. Lommatzsch in 1842–1843,16 reedited by A. Mai in 1837,17 and finally collected by M.A. Barbàra in a recent
12 Concerning the use of eros in the early imperial period see: A. von Harnack,
Der »Eros« in der alten christlichen Literatur, in: SPAW 1 (1918), 81–94. For
A. Nygren see supra, fn. 1.
13 The explicit reference to Origen in Gregory’s comment on the Cant. is: Greg. Nys.,
hom. in Cant. 1 (GNO 6, 13.3). Concerning the debts of Gregory’s exegesis of the
Cant. to Origen’s reading of the Cant. see: F. Dünzl, Die Canticum-Exegese des
Gregor von Nyssa und des Origenes im Vergleich, in: JbAC 36 (1993), 94–109.
14 On the dating of Origen’s com. in Cant. see: G. Fedalto, Rufino di Concordia
(345c.–410/411): tra Oriente e Occidente, Rome 1990, 149; see also: C.P.
Hammond, The Lat Ten Years of Rufinus’ Life and Date of his Move South from
Aquileia, in: JThS n.s. 28.2 (1977), 372–429 (393–394, 429).
15 C. de la Rue (ed.), Origenis opera omnia. III, Paris 1740, 11–104 = PG 13,
36–216.
16 On this see: H. Crouzel, Bibliographie critique d’Origène, Instrumenta Patristica
8, Steenbrugis 1971, 156–167, 173.
17 A. Mai (ed.), Procopi Gazaei veterum Patrum in Canticum Canticorum, in: id. (ed.),
Classicorum Auctorum e Vaticanis codicibus editorum. X, Rome 1837, 257–430 =
The Use of Eros in Gregory of Nyssa’s
117
edition which also includes other fragments from the Philocalia and further
exegetical catenae.18 Though the scholars still disagree about the significance
of these fragments,19 they give us access to some original Greek passages of
Origen which are left out in the Latin translation by Rufinus, for instance the
fr. in Cant. 1 (app.), and they allow us to compare the original Greek text
that they pass down to us with the Latin version by Rufinus. This comparison between the original Greek text of the fr. in Cant., on the one hand, and
the com. in Cant. in Rufinus’ Latin translation, on the other hand, has led
us to prove that Rufinus translates the terms ἔρως and ἀγάπη, which recur in
the fr. in Cant., respectively with amor, or cupido, and caritas, or dilectio,
and that sometimes he uses the Latin word amor to translate both ἔρως and
ἀγάπη.20 The fact that the word amor is used by Rufinus to translate both
eros and agape discourages us from assuming that the Latin version of the
com. in Cant. is the most faithful source for our exploration of the use of
eros in Origen, and it urges us rather to focus on the Greek fr. in Cant.
PG 87, 1545–1780; id. (ed.), Origenis: Scholia in Canticum Canticorum = PG 17,
253–288, 369–370.
18 M.A. Barbàra (ed.), Origene: Commentario al Cantico dei Cantici: Testi in lingua
greca, BP 42, Bologna 2005.
19 M.G. Guérard in: M.G. Guérard, Procope de Gaza: Épitomé sur le Cantique des
Cantiques: Les trois plus anciens témoins, Paris. Gr. 153, 154, 172, in: Byzantion
73 (2003), 9–59, is persuaded that the fr. in Cant. are our main source for the
reconstruction of the original Greek text of Origen’s com. in Cant., whereas
A. Rickenmann in: A. Richenmann, Sehnsuch nach Gott bei Origenes: Ein Weg
zur verborgene Weisheit des Hohenliedes, StSSpTh 30, Würzburg 2002, 204,
and J.M. Auwers in: J.M. Auwers, Cant. 2,1 au miroir de la chaîne de Procope,
in: EThL 79 (2003), 329–346, are more cautious about considering the fr. in Cant.
as totally Origenian. M. Harl has put forward a further hypothesis: according to
her, the Greek text of Origen’s com. in Cant. known to the compiler of the epitome
might have been different from the original Greek text of the com. in Cant.; on
this see: M. Harl, La bouche et le coeur de l’apôtre: deux images bibliques du
sens divin de l’homme (Proverbes 2,5) chez Origène, in ead., Le déchriffrement
du sens: Études sur l’herméneutique chrétienne d’Origène à Grégoire de Nysse,
EAA 135, Paris 1993, 157, fn. 8. Nevertheless, the quotations of biblical texts in
Origen’s fr. in Cant. are the same as in the parallel Latin texts in com. in Cant.;
on this see: Barbàra, 2005, 97–99.
20 On this see: V. Limone, I nomi dell’amore: Un’indagine sulla traduzione latina
del Commento al Cantico dei Cantici di Origene, in: ZAC 19/3 (2015), 407–429;
id., Amore e bellezza in Origene. Una ricerca sui lessici erotico ed estetico nella
traduzione latina del Commento al Cantico dei Cantici, in: RCCM 58/1 (2016),
123–142; id., Il Commento al Cantico dei Cantici di Origene. Aspetti esegetici e
letterari, in: Limone / Moreschini, 2016, 35–51.
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Vito Limone
First of all, it is worth noting that Origen is aware that there is a difference
between the meanings of eros and agape, as results from the fr. in Cant. 2
(app.), transmitted by the so called Barberinian catena (thirteenth century),
of which we also have the corresponding Latin translation of Rufinus.21 At
the beginning of this fragment we read the caveat that some Greeks have
understood eros as the tension of the soul to the “vault of heaven” (οὐρανία
ἀψίς), an expression which reminds us of Plato’s Phaedrus (247B.1),22 and
that the holy Scripture does not ignore the ambivalence of eros, so that it
uses eros for passional and carnal love, for example that of Amnon for his
sister Tamar (2 Sam. 13:1–2), and agape for spiritual and theocentric love,
for example that of Isaac for Rebekah (Gen. 24:67), or that of Jacob for
Rachel. Nonetheless, Origen points out that the Scripture is not always consistent with this distinction: in fact, in Prov. 4:6 eros is applied to a spiritual
entity, namely, Wisdom.23 In sum, we can deduce two main results from
what is contained in the fr. in Cant. 2 (app.): firstly, eros is an ambiguous
term; secondly, though the holy Scripture intends to prevent the reader from
falling victim to the ambivalence of eros and to apply two different terms,
eros and agape, to denote two different meanings of eros, it ends up treating
them as synonyms.
Besides the above-mentioned occurrence of eros, this word recurs another
five times in the Greek fr. in Cant. In particular, in the fr. in Cant. 10 Origen
comments on Cant. 1:8: “If you do not know yourself, most beautiful of
women, follow the tracks of the sheep and graze your young goats by the
tents of the shepherds”, and defines ἐραστής, “lover”, the bridegroom, that
is, Christ, who threatens the bride, that is, the Church, to abandon her, if
she follows the shepherds, namely, the demons.24 In the fr. in Cant. 23 and
21 Orig., fr. in Cant. 2 (app.) (290, ed. Barbàra). See: M.A. Barbàra, La catena sul
Cantico dei Cantici trasmessa dal codice Barberiniano gr. 388, in: Adamantius 14
(2008), 329–351.
22 This formula is quoted by Origen also elsewhere, see: Orig., c. Cels. 1.20 (SC 132,
126); 5.2 (SC 147, 18); 8.44 (SC 150, 118). On the use of this formula in the early
Christian literature, with a focus on Origen, see: A. Méhat, Le «lieu supracéleste»
de saint Justin à Origène, in: P. Courcelle (ed.), Forma futuri. Studi in onore del
Cardinale Michele Pellegrino, Turin 1975, 282–294; see also: C. Markschies,
Gott und Mensch nach Origenes. Einige wenige Beobachtungen zu einem großen
Thema, in: A. Raffelt (ed.), Weg und Weite. Festschrift für Karl Lehmann, Freiburg
2001, 98, fn. 8 (now in: C. Markschies, Origenes und sein Erbe. Gesammelte
Studien, TU 160, Berlin 2008, 92, fn. 8).
23 The parallel Latin translation also mentions Wis. 8:2: Orig., com. in Cant., prol. 2,
22 (SC 375, 106–108). With respect to the difference between fr. in Cant. 2 (app.)
and the corresponding Latin version of Rufinus see: Limone, 2015, 424–425.
24 Orig., fr. in Cant. 10 (162, ed. Barbàra).
The Use of Eros in Gregory of Nyssa’s
119
25, respectively about Cant. 2:8 and 2:9, the Alexandrine uses the adverb
ἐρωτικῶς to express, in the former case, the tension of Christ to the soul and,
in the latter case, the tension of the soul to Christ.25
A particular attention is to be paid to the fr. in Cant. 32 and 44. On the
basis of what we read in these fragments, Origen believes that Christ progressively moves away from the soul, and that this progressive separation of
Christ and the soul increases the love of the soul for Christ, so that at the
height of the soul’s desire Christ appears to the soul. In this context Origen
uses the formula ἐπιτείναι τὸν ἔρωτα to signify that the love of the soul for
Christ is intensified and increased by the absence of Christ.26
In light of the data collected so far we can infer the following consequences.
First, Origen is informed about the semantic ambivalence of eros, which
can denote either carnal and passional love, or spiritual love, as it is evident
from the Phaedrus.
Then, the holy Scripture attempts to distinguish the opposite meanings of
eros, and names the carnal and passional love “eros”, and the spiritual love
“agape”. Nevertheless, the Scripture is not faithful to this distinction.
While in his writings Origen generally attributes to eros the meaning of
carnal love, as results from his comments on Prov. 30:16, or on the biblical
episodes in which the passion of Samson (Judg. 13:1–7), or that of the old
men for Susanna (Dan. 13:10) are narrated,27 in the fr. in Cant. he applies to
eros a solely spiritual meaning, since it signifies only the love of Christ for
the soul, and vice versa.
Finally, it is worth mentioning once again that the Alexandrine uses the
formula ἐπιτείναι τὸν ἔρωτα to mean that the love of the soul for Christ
is “intensified” by the absence of Christ himself. We shall return to this
formula later.
3. The Use of Eros in Plotinus’ Ennead 5
As said above, the treatise n. 50 on eros (Περὶ ἔρωτος) of Plotinus, corresponding to the Ennead 3. 5 and dated to 268–269, contributes to the
understanding of the use of eros in the hom. in Cant. of Gregory.28 This
25 Orig., fr. in Cant. 23; 25 (186; 190–192, ed. Barbàra).
26 Orig., fr. in Cant. 32; 44 (208; 224, ed. Barbàra).
27 Respectively: Orig., fr. in Prov. 30.16 (M. Richard [ed.], Les fragments d’Origène
sur Prov. XXX,15–31, in: J. Fontaine / C. Kannengiesser [eds.], Epektasis: Mélanges
patristiques offerts au Cardinal Jean Daniélou, Paris 1972, 389); fr. in Prov. 30.17
(Richard, 1972, 390); com. in Ioh. 28.5,34 (SC 385, 74–76).
28 On this see: Porph., vit. Plot. 6.13–14 (10, eds. Henry / Schwyzer); see also: J. Igal,
Cronología de la Vida de Plotino de Porfirio, Bilbao 1972, 124–126; L. Brisson,
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Vito Limone
treatise consists of two main parts: the former, that is, enn. 3.5,1, contains
a discussion about the definition of eros as “passion” (πάθος) of the soul;
the latter, namely, enn. 3.5,2–9, is an exegesis of what Plato says about eros,
especially in the Symposium.29
With respect to the former part, it recovers the Platonic definitions of eros as
“passion”, as evidenced in the Phaedrus (252B.2) and restated by Aristotle,30
and as “desire for beauty”, as is documented in the Symposium (240C–209E),
and it conflates them. In fact, Plotinus argues that eros is a passion, since it is
the desire for beauty which is activated by the experience of beauty, or by the
remembrance of it.
In relation to the latter part, Plotinus compares what Pausanias says in
the Symposium (180C.3-E.3), that there is an Aphrodite Urania and an
Aphrodite Pandemia and that, as a consequence of this, there is a Eros
Uranius and a Eros Pandemius,31 with what Socrates in the same dialogue
declares to have learned from Diotima of Mantinea; that Eros is a daemon,
son of Penia and Poros.32 The allegorical interpretation leads Plotinus to
solve the above contradiction: on the one side, he understands the Aphrodite
Pandemia as the third hypostasis, namely, the World Soul, and the Eros
Uranius as the desire of the World Soul for the Noûs, which is the second
hypostasis, and he intends the Aphrodite Pandemia as the individual soul
and the Eros Pandemius as the desire of the individual soul for the One, or
Good, that is, the first hypostasis;33 on the other side, combining the Platonic
perspective with the Aristotelian categories, Plotinus underlines that the
29
30
31
32
33
Plotin: une biographie, in: id. et alii (eds.), Porphyre. La vie de Plotin. II, Paris
1992, 1–29.
Respectively: Plot., enn. 3.5,1 (319–321, eds. Henry / Schwyzer), and: 3.5.2–9
(321–333, eds. Henry / Schwyzer).
Aristot. apud Herm. Alex., in Plat. Phaedr. 252B.2 (34.4–6, ed. Couvreur).
What Plato has Pausanias say in symp. 180C.3–E.3 is also documented in the
Greek mythological tradition, for instance: Hesiod., theog., v. 190; Hom., iliad.
5311–372; Xenoph., symp. 8.9–10.
Plot., enn. III 5, 2 (321–323, eds. Henry / Schwyzer). For an overview of the
conception of eros in Plotinus see: A.H. Armstrong, Platonic Eros and Christian
Agape, in: The Downside Review 79/255 (1961), 105–121 (now in: id., Plotinian
and Christian Studies, VCSS 102, London 1979, sec. IX).
Plot., enn. III 5, 2 (322–323, eds. Henry / Schwyzer). Plotinus interprets the
Aphrodite Pandemia as the World Soul and, at the same time, the individual soul;
on this see: A.M. Wolters, Plotinus on Eros: A Detailed Exegetical Study of Ennead
III. 5, Toronto 1984, 83.
The Use of Eros in Gregory of Nyssa’s
121
Eros Pandemius in the individual soul results from the co-existence in the
soul itself of a formal principle (Poros) and a material principle (Penia).34
To sum up, there are two main aspects of eros which Plotinus evidences
in enn. III 5.
First, in line with the Platonic Phaedrus, eros is considered as a passion,
since it is the desire for beauty which is activated by the experience, or the
reminiscence, of beauty.
Secondly, on the basis of the myths in the Symposium, Plotinus regards
eros as the desire of the World Soul for the Noûs, or of the individual soul
for the One.
4. The Use of Eros in the hom. in Cant. of Gregory of Nyssa
As is Origen, Gregory too is aware of the semantic ambiguity of the word
“eros”. This is documented by many passages in the writings of Gregory in
which he adds to this word some adjectives which specify the incorporeal
nature of eros, for example “heavenly”, “pure”, “blessed”, “impassible”,
and “divine”.35 Although he attributes to eros a material meaning, he sometimes overlaps eros with agape, and he indifferently speaks of a disposal of
eros and agape (διάθεσις ἐρωτική, and ἀγαπητική),36 or of an arrow of eros
and agape (βέλος τοῦ ἔρωτος, and τῆς ἀγάπης).37 In addition, the definition
of Gregory of agape as “intimate relationship to what is desired”38 is identical to the definition of phíltron, which is originally equivalent to eros and
is used already by Gregory of Nazianzus with reference to the love of God.39
On the basis of what we saw above in Origen and Plotinus, we shall now
explore the use of eros in the hom. in Cant. of Gregory of Nyssa: though
these homilies attest to a limited number of occurrences of eros, they present
34 Plot., enn. III 5, 4 (325, eds. Henry / Schwyzer). This harmonisation of Platonic
and Aristotelian elements is in line with the philosophical method which Plotinus
learned at the Alexandrian school of Ammonius Saccas; on this see: H. Langerbeck,
The Philosophy of Ammonius Saccas and the Conception of Aristotelian and
Christian Elements Therein, in: JHS 77/1 (1957), 67–74.
35 About this see supra, fn. 239.
36 Greg. Nys., hom. in Cant. 1 (GNO 6, 38.4); 9 (GNO 6, 264.5).
37 Greg. Nys., hom. in Cant. 4 (GNO 6, 128.1); XIII (GNO 6, 383.8).
38 Greg. Nys., an. et res.: ἡ πρὸς τὸ καταθύμιον ἐνδιάθετος σχέσις (PG 46, 93C). On
this: Daniélou, 1944, 201–202.
39 Greg. Nys., hom. in Eccl. 8: φίλτρον ἐστὶν ἡ ἐνδιάθετος περὶ τὸ καταθύμιον
σχέσις δι’ἡδονῆς καὶ προσπαθείας ἐνεργουμένη (GNO 5, 417.13–14). About this
see: Moreschini, 1993, 281–283, 289–290. See also: Orig., fr. in Cant. 30 (200,
ed. Barbàra).
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the semantic scheme in which Gregory utilises it. In this regard, there are
three key texts (a.-c.) to which we shall recall the attention of the reader.
The first text (a.) is found in the opening lines of the hom. in Cant. I, in
particular in the course of the allegorical interpretation of the characters of
the bridegroom and the bride of the Cant. This text runs as follows:
What is described there is an account of a wedding, but what is intellectually discerned is the human soul’s mingling with the Divine. That is why the one who is
called “son” in Proverbs is here called “bride”, and Wisdom, correspondingly, is
transferred into the role of bridegroom. This is to assure that the human person,
once separated from the bridegroom, might be betrothed to God as a holy virgin
(see: 2 Cor. 11:2), and, once joined to the Lord, may become “one spirit” (1 Cor.
6:17) through being mingled with that which is inviolate and impassible, having
become purified thought rather than heavy flesh. Therefore since it is Wisdom who
speaks, love (ἀγάπησον) her as much as you are able, with your whole heart and
strenghth; desire (ἐπιθύμησον) her as much as you can. To these words I am bold to
add, «Be in love» (ἐράσθητι), for this passion, when directed toward things incorporeal, is blameless and impassible, as Wisdom says in Proverbs when she bids us to
be in love (ἔρωτα) with the divine Beauty.40
In line with Origen’s reading, Gregory identifies the bridegroom with the
Wisdom, the bride with the individual soul. He explains that the content
of the Cant. is the “union” (ἀνάκρασις) of the Wisdom and the individual
soul,41 and states that this union originates from the erotic desire of the individual soul for the divine Wisdom. In support of this interpretation, Gregory
quotes Prov. 4:6, in which we read the exhortation that the Wisdom be the
object of eros, depending upon an argument already formulated by Origen.
Therefore, both Origen and Gregory, based on Prov. 4:6, define eros as the
desire of the soul for the divine Wisdom. In addition, Gregory states that,
in the desire for the divine Wisdom, which is an incorporeal being, the soul
sees its passion transforming into impassibility.42 Gregory repeats this thesis
some lines later, in the course of his interpretation of the Holy of Holies,
40 Greg. Nys., hom. in Cant. 1 (GNO 6, 22.18–23.12). See also: Orig., com. in Cant.,
prol. 2. 22 (SC 375, 106–108); fr. in Cant. 2 (292, ed. Barbàra), see supra, fn. 21.
The English translation of the texts a.-c. is by R.A. Norris Jr.; see: R.A. Norris
Jr. (ed.), Gregory of Nyssa: Homilies on the Song of Songs, WGRW 12, Atlanta
2012, respectively 25 (a.), 203–205 (b.), and 403–405 (c.).
41 This word is derived from the terminology of the ancient mysteries, as is also
attested in Clement, see: Clem. Alex., strom. 7.12, 79, 4 (SC 428, 244), and
Origen, see: Orig., c. Cels. 3.41 (SC 136, 196); com. in Ioh. 13.11,67 (SC 222, 66).
Additionally, in the just mentioned texts of Origen this word occurs together with
another word typical of the mysteric terminology, that is, ἕνωσις. This formula is
also quoted by Gregory; see: Greg. Nys., hom. in Cant. 1 (GNO 6, 23.5).
42 See: Greg. Nys., hom. in Cant. I (GNO 6, 23.9–10).
The Use of Eros in Gregory of Nyssa’s
123
which he understands as the inaccessible, divine beauty, to which the soul
turns its own gaze towards, and thanks to which it transforms its own passion into impassibility.43 To sum up, Gregory defines the eros for Wisdom as
the passion for an impassible being, and he also highlights that this passion
progressively converts itself into impassibility and disappears only as soon
as it is totally converted into impassibility.
This occurrence of eros displays Gregory’s attempt to harmonise two
principles, inconsistent with each other. The first principle is that the passional faculty is a natural constituent of the soul, as mentioned above in
Plotinus, and the soul has the opportunity to keep the passions under control, that is, the so called “metropátheia”. In this regard, Gregory is in accordance with the view of Plato, who in the Phaedrus (246A–257B) divides the
faculties of the soul into rational, spirited, and appetitive, later restated by
Aristotle44 and Posidonius, who divides the faculties of the soul in rational
(λογιστικόν) and passional (παθητικόν).45 According to this principle, eros
is that passional faculty of the soul which belongs to the soul by nature,
from which it can not get free, and which it is committed to control. With
respect to the second principle, it is the impassibility, that is, the so called
“apátheia”: this is formulated by the most orthodox Stoics, for instance
Chrysippus and Zeno, who regard the passions as the psychophysical effects
of wrong judgments, and are persuaded that the passions can be eradicated
by the proper functioning of our rational capacity, but it is also restated by
the Neoplatonists, for example Plotinus, who understands the rational faculty of the soul as separable from its passional faculty.46 In contrast with the
former principle, for the latter principle eros is a passion of the soul, from
which the soul can and has to get free. As aforesaid, the occurrence of eros
in the text (a.) shows the purpose of Gregory to combine the above opposite
principles: on the one hand, he considers eros as a passion of the soul and, in
43 Greg. Nys., hom. in Cant. I (GNO 6, 27.12).
44 Aristotle shares the theory of the “metropátheia”, as in: Aristot., eth. nicom.
1227B.6–12; eth. eud. 1221B.11–17, and strongly rejects the opposite theory
of the “apátheia”, that is, the eradication of passions, which he ascribes to the
Academy, in particular Speusippus; see: Aristot., eth. nicom. 1104B.25; eth. eud.
1222A.3. On this topic see: R. Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic
Agitation to Christian Temptation, Oxford 2002, 195–196.
45 Posidonius apud Galen., placit. philos. 4.7,23–24 (284–286, ed. de Lacy). For an
overview of Posidonius’ theory of passions, which attempts to combine Stoic and
Platonic elements, see: I.G. Kidd, Posidonius on Emotions, in: A.A. Long (ed.),
Problems in Stoicism, London 1972, 200–215.
46 Plot., enn. 1.1,1–6 (48–54, eds. Henry / Schwyzer); 1.8,4 (125–126, eds. Henry /
Schwyzer); 2.3,9 (171–173, eds. Henry / Schwyzer).
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particular, as a passional desire for the impassibility; on the other hand, he
claims that at the height of eros the passion converts itself into impassibility.
The second text (b.) further demonstrates that the former of the above
two principles, that the passional faculty belongs to the soul by nature, is
essential to the use of eros in Gregory’s hom. in Cant. The passage which is
worth mentioning is found in his exegesis of the “bridal bed” of Cant. 3:7–8,
that in his description is surrounded by scary and armed warriors. The text
runs as follows:
For what ornamentation can be supplied for a bridal bed by sixty hoplites, whose
study is the terror of battle, whose finery is a sword held before the body, whose
terror is that which comes by night? (By the term “fear”, after all, the text indicates
the fearful consternation aroused by certain nocturnal terrors, and this is what it
attributes to these hoplites). So we ought by all means to look for a sense in these
expressions that is consonant with our earlier interpretations.
What sense is that, then? It seems that the divine beauty evokes love (ἐράσμιον)
because it is fearsome; it reveals itself as coming from elsewhere than any corporeal
beauty. For here it is what is pleasant to the eye and gentle, and set apart from any
fierce or fearsome disposition, that induces passionate desire in us, but that unsullied Beauty is a fearsome and terrible strength. For since the passionate and filthy
lust for things bodily, which resides in the fleshly members like a band of robbers,
lays snares for the intellect and frequently seizes it and carries it off captive to its
own will, which has become hostile to God, as the apostle says: «The mind of the
flesh is hostile toward God» (Rom. 8:7), on this account it is appropriate for a
divine love (θεῖον ἔρωτα) and longing to originate out of what stands in opposition
to corporeal desire, so that wherever feebleness and indulgence and lazy relaxation
give rise to such desire, in that place a terrible and astonishing strength may become
the stuff of divine love (θείου ἔρωτος). For it is when manly strength has given fright
to that which mothers pleasure, and has put it to flight, that the soul’s pure beauty
is revealed, it being unsullied by any affliction of corporeal desire.47
Recovering a distinction already known to Origen and Plotinus, Gregory
mentions two forms of eros: one is directed to corporeal things, the other is
directed to incorporeal things, in particular to God. Then, he comments that
the desire for incorporeal things entails control over the pleasures, so that
the scary appearance of the warriors around the bridal bed is an allegory of
control over the corporeal passions. Once again, Gregory consents to the
Platonic perspective, that the passional faculty is a constituent of the soul
and is divided into two main forms.
Finally, the last and most known text on eros (c.) is found in the comment on Cant. 5:8: «I am wounded with love», in which Gregory utilises the
formula that eros is an «intensified agape» (ἀγάπη ἐπιτεταμένη). The text is
as follows:
47 Greg. Nys., hom. in Cant. 6 (GNO 6, 191.6–192.7).
The Use of Eros in Gregory of Nyssa’s
125
Anyone, therefore, who focuses attention on the church is in fact looking at Christ –
Christ building himself up and augmenting himself by the addition of people who are
being saved. She, then, who has put the veil off from her eyes sees the unspeakable
beauty of bridegroom with a pure eye and in this way is wounded by the incorporeal
and fiery arrow of love, for agape when intensified is called love (ἐπιτεταμένη γὰρ
ἀγάπη ὁ ἕρως λέγεται). This occasions people no shame if love’s archery is not fleshly;
on the contrary, they boast the more in their wound when they receive the dart of
immaterial desire in the very depth of the heart. And this is exactly what the bride did
when she said to the young women: «I am wounded by love» (Cant. 5:8).48
Concerning the above text, two aspects are to be singled out. First, what
the scholars have completely overlooked is that Gregory’s definition
of eros as intensifed agape (ἀγάπη ἐπιτεταμένη) is a rephrase of Origen’s
formula: ἐπιτείναι τὸν ἔρωτα, as said above.49 Moreover, since in the aforementioned text Gregory uses the expression «is called» (λέγεται), he must
depend upon an external source, namely, Origen himself or a popular view
of eros.50 As was stated above, and as we saw in Origen, the notion of
agape and that of eros as passional desire for impassibility overlap with
each other.51 In the last text of the hom. in Cant. Gregory applies to the
notion of eros that of intensification,52 which is also found at the beginning
of his homilies:53 the inextinguishable transcendence of the divine nature
in relation to human nature entails that the passional desire of the soul for
the impassible God is not destined to get to the end, but it increases progressively and indefinitely – the higher the divine nature is in relation to the
human nature, the more “intensifed” is the passional desire of the soul for
the impassible.54 From this conception we can infer a significant difference
48
49
50
51
Greg. Nys., hom. in Cant. 13 (GNO 6, 383.3–14).
See supra, fn. 26.
Greg. Nys., hom. in Cant. 13 (GNO 6, 383.9).
In the hom. in Cant. eros is generally used by Gregory with reference to the incorporeal love of the soul for the divine Logos, for instance: Greg. Nys., hom. in Cant.
XV (GNO 6, 416.11). Furthermore, in: Greg. Nys., 13 (GNO 6, 378.12–21) eros
and agape are utilized as synonyms and treated as interchangeable.
52 See also: Greg. Nys., hom. in Cant. 2 (GNO 6, 46.8–9).
53 Greg. Nys., hom. in Cant. 1 (GNO 6, 31.8).
54 This is at the heart of the mystical doctrine of Gregory, as has already been outlined by: G. Lettieri, Il corpo di Dio. La mistica erotica del Cantico dei Cantici
dal Vangelo di Giovanni ad Agostino, in: R.E. Guglielmetti (ed.), Il Cantico dei
Cantici. Atti del Convegno Internazionale dell’Università degli Studi di Milano
e della Società Internazionale per lo Studio del Medioevo Latino (S.I.S.M.E.L.)
(Gargano sul Garda, 22–24 maggio 2006), MM 76, Florence 2008, 3–90 (69–80).
A different view of the relation between Origen and Gregory about the notion of
eros is found in: I. Ramelli, Apokatastasis and Epektasis in Hom. in Cant.: The
Relation between Two Core Doctrines in Gregory and Roots in Origen, in:
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Vito Limone
between Origen and Gregory: in fact, for the Alexandrine, at the height of
the passional desire of the individual soul for Christ the desire itself is satisfied and exhausted by the appearance of Christ.
The definition of eros attested in the text (c.) leads us to prove the argumentative strategy through which Gregory attempts to harmonise the
above-mentioned opposite principles. On the one side, he acknowledges the
passional faculty of the soul as a constituent of the soul itself and, therefore,
he underscores that the soul is not allowed to get free from that faculty; on
the other side, he argues that in the passional desire of the soul for impassibility the passion transforms itself into impassibility. The notion of “intensification”, which reminds us of another key idea in Gregory’s thought, that is,
the so called “epéktasis”, is the basis on which the above opposite principles
have the chance to co-exist: by nature, the soul is affected by the passional
desire for impassibility; nevertheless, the impossibility for the passional
desire to be converted into impassibility urges the passional desire to seek for
impassibility, namely, to be “intensified” indefinitely up to the impassibility.
5. Concluding Remarks
In light of what was claimed above about the use of eros in Origen and
Plotinus, respectively in the above Sections 2 and 3, we can now summarise
the outcomes of our exploration on the use of eros in Gregory’s hom. in
Cant. as follows.
First, though Gregory is aware of the semantic difference between eros
and agape in his hom. in Cant., he attributes to eros the meaning of incorporeal love, so that the terms, eros and agape, overlap with each other in line
with what Origen already did.
Secondly, Gregory defines eros as the passional desire for impassibility, on
the basis of the view that the passional faculty belongs to the soul by nature.
As mentioned before, eros is a passion also for Plotinus, although he regards
the rational faculty as separable from the passional faculty.
Finally, Gregory’s doctrine of the infinite difference between human nature
and the divine nature is conflated with the theory of the “intensification” of
eros: though the passional desire for impassibility can not transform itself in
the impassibility and is not to be exhausted, it seeks for impassibility endlessly. As said earlier, this is a breaking point between Gregory and Origen.
G. Maspero / M. Brugarolas / I. Vigorelli (eds.), Gregory of Nyssa: In Canticum
Canticorum. Commentary and Supporting Studies. Proceedings of the 13th
International Colloquium on Gregory of Nyssa (Rome, 17–20 September 2014),
Supplements to VChr 150, Leiden 2018, 312–339.
Tobias Georges
From reading to understanding: Profectus
in Abelard and Origen
Abstract: In the final passage of his letter 8 (“The rule”), Abelard talks of “advancing
by understanding” (intelligendo proficiens) – meaning understanding the Scriptures.
It is argued that this formulation is strongly influenced by Origen, namely his homily
on Genesis 13. Abelard actually seems to have had great sympathy for Origen’s focus
on understanding (intellectus) and rational perception (rationabilis sensus).
However, the term profectus is not a key one for Abelard; and when he refers to
Origen as a role model for his theological method of moving from reading to understanding the Scriptures in letter 1 (Historia Calamitatum), it becomes difficult to say
where he is really influenced by Origen and where he imagines it. Following Jerome,
Abelard praises Origen in the exegetical context, but in his “theological” treatises,
most of his – rare – references to him are polemic.
Keywords: Exegesis, Monasticism, Reception History.
Introduction
If one reflects on progress in the Origenian tradition with a special focus on
Peter Abelard, initially the Latin term profectus (“progress”) does not seem
to be a key one for him: On the whole, the concept of profectus does not
play a major role in Abelard’s writings.1
Nevertheless, there is a special and interesting passage where Abelard is
indeed speaking of profectus with a certain emphasis, and in this very passage Origen might be standing in the background. In his letter 8, Abelard
says: “It is clear that sacred Scripture is a mirror of the soul, in which anyone
who lives by reading and advances by understanding perceives the beauty of
his own ways or discovers their ugliness, so that he may work to increase the
one and remove the other.”2
1
2
As evidence for this, one might scroll through the vocabulary indices in modern
critical editions of Abelard’s works: the terms profectus or proficere do not figure
there. For a general approach to Abelard’s thought, see J. Jolivet, La théologie
d’Abélard, Paris 1997; J. Marenbon, The philosophy of Peter Abelard, Cambridge 1997; S. Ernst, Petrus Abaelardus, Zugänge zum Denken des Mittelalters 2,
Münster 2003.
Speculum anime Scripturam sacram constat esse in quam quilibet legendo uiuens,
intelligendo proficiens, morum suorum pulcritudinem cognoscit vel deformitatem
deprehendit, ut illam uidelicet augere, hanc studeat remouere. Abelard, Ep. 8.115
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Tobias Georges
“Advancing by understanding”, intelligendo proficiens is a concept which
at least fits well into Abelard’s overall thought, and the formulation sounds
like it was taken from Origen. So, in the context of this volume it might be
worth starting from this passage in order to investigate the role of profectus
in Abelard, and Origen’s impact on him.
As it is not that clear from the start if, when talking of intelligendo pro
ficiens, Abelard consciously refers to Origen, this connection first has to be
substantiated. Thus this contribution’s aim is, firstly, to argue that in this
special passage Abelard is actually influenced by Origen when talking of
progress by understanding. Secondly, it will be discussed how far-reaching
Origen’s influence is on Abelard, as reflected in this passage.
1. Intelligendo proficiens as a formulation taken from Origen
In order to shed light on the passage quoted above, explain it, emphasise its
importance, and see how Origen fits in, it first needs to be contextualised.
It is taken from Abelard’s letter 8 directed to Heloisa and her nun’s convent that she led at the place called Paraclete, which he had founded – the
authenticity of Abelard’s letter exchange with Heloisa (Abelard’s letters 1–8)
is assumed here, with good reason.3 In letter 6, Heloisa had asked Abelard
to send her a history of women living a vita religiosa and a rule for her convent;4 Abelard fulfilled this wish with his letters 7 (“the history”) and 8 (“the
rule”). So the quote stems from a monastic context, is part of Abelard’s rule
written for Heloisa and her nuns’ community, and comes at a very prominent place of that rule.
After depicting his ideal of the nuns’ communal life, its spiritual foundations, virtues, and also practical issues like daily routine, special tasks
and duties, dressing, eating and drinking, with this quote he starts the rule’s
final paragraph which is clearly marked as dealing with a new topic, that is,
extraordinary praise of the sacred Scripture and his urgent request to study
it.5 In this paragraph, the Bible is characterised as the source for knowing
God, his will and oneself, for knowing about good and evil and about how
3
4
5
(D. Luscombe (ed.), The Letter Collection of Peter Abelard and Heloise, OMT,
Oxford 2013, 494f.).
On Abelard’s letters 1–8 and their original background, see Luscombe (ed.), 2013.
On the authenticity of letters 1–8 – which has been thoroughly discussed – see
especially Marenbon, 1997, 82–93; T. Georges, Quam nos divinitatem nominare
consuevimus. Die theologische Ethik des Peter Abaelard, Arbeiten zur Kirchenund Theologiegeschichte 16, Leipzig 2005, 127–133.
Abelard, Ep. 6.3 (Luscombe (ed.), 2013, 218–220).
On those contents, see Georges, 2005, 140–160.
From reading to understanding
129
to live and act in the world, especially for those following a religious life.6
As the Bible is that source, Abelard urges his readers to study it intensively, meaning they should not only read and hear it – in a superficial sense
without any real understanding – but they should grasp its meaning and be
transformed within the soul: as Abelard puts it, the Scripture is a mirror
of the soul in which the latter can see its own behaviour – of course, in the
light of God’s truth. Helped by this insight, it can increase the beauty and
remove the ugliness of its ways, that is, direct its acts according to God’s
will. In order to reach this goal, the soul’s understanding is fundamental,
and the crucial step from mere reading to deeper understanding is, in this
introduction to the rule’s final paragraph, expressed as profectus, by the
formulation intelligendo proficiens. The term proficere / profectus gets even
more emphasised in this opening passage when, with the following sentences, Abelard underlines his picture of the Scripture as a mirror of the soul by
referring to Gregory the Great, in whose words this term is reiterated twice:
“Reminding us of this mirror, St Gregory says in the second book of his
Morals: ʻSacred Scripture is set before the mind’s eye as if it were a mirror in
which our inward face may be seen reflected. For there we see our beauty or
recognize our hideousness, there we perceive how far we are advancing and
how far we are from advancing.ʼ”7
This quote seems to be the model for Abelard’s initial phrase: Not only
do we find the term proficere / profectus twice (Ibi sentimus quantum pro
ficimus, ibi a profectu quam longe distamus), but also the picture of the
Scripture as a mirror for one’s inner being (anima or mens) and its beauty
(pulcra or pucritudo) or the opposite (feda or deformitas). So, if this quote
was taken from Origen, we would have clear evidence for Abelard referring
to him with this idea of progress. Unfortunately, the quote is not from Origen, but St. Gregory, and in the sentences directly following Origen is not
mentioned: Abelard points to many authorities – especially biblical authorities – underlining his incitement to study and to understand the Scripture,
but initially Origen is not among them. So why should it be assumed that
Origen stands in the background of Abelard’s idea of “advancing by understanding”?
If we look closely at his quote from St. Gregory, we find one aspect that
is fundamental for Abelard but missing in the citation: “understanding the
6
7
Abelard. Ep. 8.115–128 (Luscombe (ed.), 2013, 494–516).
Hoc nobis speculum beatus commemorans Gregorius in secundo Moralium
ait: ʻScriptura sacra mentis oculis quasi quoddam speculum opponitur ut interna
nostra facies in ipsa uideatur. Ibi etenim feda, ibi pulcra nostra cognoscimus. Ibi
sentimus quantum proficimus, ibi a profectu quam longe distamus.ʼ Abelard,
Ep. 8.115 (Luscombe (ed.), 2013, 494f.).
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Tobias Georges
Scripture”, intelligere. Together with Abelard, Gregory stresses the inner
transformation caused by perceiving biblical texts as “progress”, but he does
not place emphasis on the act of “understanding”. On the contrary, this feature is crucial for Abelard, who in the final paragraph does not tire of urging
his readers to move from reading the scripture to understanding it. Intelligere
/ intellectus is the term Abelard stresses most in the final paragraph.8 Right
after the above quote from St. Gregory, Abelard says: “But whoever looks at
scripture without understanding is like a blind man holding a mirror to his
eyes, unable to see what sort of man he is.”9 So it seems to be Abelard who
introduces the emphasis on “understanding” into Gregory’s picture.10 He
pursues this emphasis until the end of the rule, where just before concluding
he asks: “But who can obediently keep the words or the precepts of the lord
unless he has first understood them?”11
The question of the authorities that Abelard gives for his emphasis on understanding leads us to Origen. Of course, from the start of the final passage, Abelard tries to give authorities for this emphasis, but most of the texts he quotes
as authorities appeal to perceiving or studying the Scripture or the word of God
in a way that is rather unspecific. Further, it is Abelard who reads the precise
focus on intelligere into those texts. Just to give an example, Abelard can refer
to “the Apostle” (Paul – in fact, the quote is from Eph 5:18f.) and his “general
exhortation to study the Scriptures […]: ʻBe filled with the Holy Spirit; speak to
yourselves in psalms, hymns, and spiritual songs.ʼ”12 And then Abelard interprets this quote in his special way: “For a man who speaks to himself or with
himself understands what he is saying or by understanding makes his words
fruitful.”13
8
9
10
11
12
13
The only units within the final paragraph (Abelard, Ep. 8.115–128) where the
term intelligere / intellectus is not mentioned explicitly are Ep. 8.124 and 8.128!
In most of the units it is mentioned several times.
Qui autem Scripturam conspicit quam non intelligit quasi cecus ante oculos spe
culum tenet in quo qualis sit cognoscere non ualet. Abelard, Ep. 8.115 (Luscombe
(ed.), 2013, 494f.).
Abelard’s combination of Gregory’s picture and his emphasis on understanding
also seems to be echoed in the preface to the Problemata Heloissae (PL 178, 678B).
Quis autem uerba vel praecepta Domini sui servare obediendo poterit, nisi hec
prius intellexerit? Abelard, Ep. 8.128 (Luscombe (ed.), 2013, 516f.).
Vnde et Apostolus generaliter ad Scripturarum stadium nos adhortans […]
inquit: […] ʻImplemini Spiritu sanctu, loquentes uobismetipsis in psalmis et ymnis
et canticis spiritalibusʼ. Abelard, Ep. 8.116 (Luscombe (ed.), 2013, 496f.).
Sibi quippe uel secum loquitur qui quod profert intelligit uel de intelligentia uer
borum suorum fructum facit. Abelard, Ep. 8.116 (Luscombe (ed.), 2013, 496f.).
From reading to understanding
131
Even if there are some authorities’ texts mentioning the term intellectus /
intelligere en passant,14 in Abelard’s quotes his special focus on moving from
reading to understanding only becomes apparent when he finally moves to
Origen. Having observed that in his own time, the zeal to study and understand the Scripture was fading, namely in the monasteries, he turns to the
imagery of the “Philistines who harassed Isaac when he was digging wells
by filling them with heaps of earth to try to keep water from him”15 taken
from Gen 26:12–33 in order to sharply criticise those who keep monks and
nuns away from studying the Bible – and, on the contrary, to exhort the
ascetics to continue striving for understanding of the Bible. Abelard’s allegorical interpretation of this imagery relies totally, as we will see, on Origen.
Abelard first explains his imagery explicitly by saying:
For we are surely digging wells when we penetrate deeply into the hidden meanings
of Holy Scripture. As we reach into the depths Philistines furtively fill them up,
letting loose the earthly thoughts of an evil spirit and, as it were, taking away from
us the water we found of sacred learning.16
The first authority he refers to for this imagery’s interpretation is actually,
once more, St. Gregory. Perhaps this reference to Gregory is supposed to
link with that of the Scripture as mirror of the soul and make Gregory the
overarching authority for Abelard’s imagery. Yet in fact we do not find the
source for the imagery of the “Philistines who harassed Isaac when he was
digging wells” in Gregory, but rather in Origen, and even Abelard quickly
goes on to say: “St. Gregory, if I am not mistaken, had read the Homilies on
Genesis of the great Christian philosopher Origen on Genesis.”17
Again, it is true that in the context Abelard points to18 we do not find
a trace of Gregory referring to Origen, at least explicitly or consciously.
Nevertheless, with those words, Abelard points to Origen as the fundamental authority, and we can infer from what he goes on to say that this is entirely correct. Abelard continues, praising Origen with the words: “For that
zealous digger of spiritual wells [scil. Origen] strongly urges us not only to
14 See Abelard, Ep. 8.119; 8.120; 8.121.
15 [I]lli sunt qui tamquam Allophili fodientem puteos Ysaac persecuntur et
eos replendo congerie terre aquam ei satagunt prohibere. Abelard, Ep. 8.125
(Luscombe (ed.), 2013, 510f.).
16 Nos enim nimirum puteos fodimus cum in Scripture sacre abditis sensibus alta
penetramus. Quos tamen occulte replent Allophili quando nobis ad alta tenden
tibus immundi spiritus terrenas cogitationes ingerunt et quasi inuentam diuine
scientie aquam tollunt. Abelard, Ep. 8.125 (Luscombe (ed.), 2013, 510–513).
17 Legerat iste, nisi fallor, magnis Christianorum philosophi Origenis homelias in
Genesi. Abelard, Ep. 8.126 (Luscombe (ed.), 2013, 512f.).
18 The text of St. Gregory quoted here is from Moralia in Iob 16.18,23.
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Tobias Georges
drink of them but also to dig our own. He says in the eleventh19 Homily of
his exposition:”20
In what follows, Abelard gives five long quotes from Origen’s homilies
12 and 13 on Genesis, that is, from Rufinus’ translation. The quotes remain
close to the text and perfectly show that those homilies are the source for
his imagery taken from Gen 26:12–33 and its interpretation. Furthermore,
in those quotes we finally find a true model for Abelard’s urgent request
to study the Scripture and struggle for understanding it. This is especially
highlighted by Origen’s / Rufinus’ following words quoted in that context:
So try also, my listener, to have your own well and your own spring, so that, when
you take up a book of the Scriptures, you also may start to show some understanding of it from your own perception; and try too […] to drink from the spring of
your own ability. You have within you a source of living water, open channels and
flowing streams of rational perception, as long as they are not clogged with earth
and rubbish.21
According to those words, the one who gets in touch with the “Scripture”
should move on to “show some understanding” (intellectum proferre) from
his or her “own perception” (ex proprio sensu). This comes very close to
what Abelard wants in his final paragraph, much closer than all the quotes
from other authorities. The quotes from Origen / Rufinus stress “understanding” (intellectus) and “rational perception” (rationabilis sensus), two key
terms that closely match Abelard’s focus and are reiterated in the following
sentences: “Those which the Philistines had filled with earth are surely men
who close their spiritual understanding, so that they neither drink themselves nor allow others to drink.”22 – “He who is a Philistine, and has a taste
19 Actually, the homily Abelard refers to here is the twelfth. See also Luscombe (ed.),
2013, 512.
20 Ille quippe spiritualium puteorum fossor studiosus non solum ad eorum potum
sed etiam effossionem nos vehementer adhortans, expositionis praedicte Homelia
undecima ita loquitur. Abelard, Ep. 8.126 (Luscombe (ed.), 2013, 512f.).
21 Tempta ergo et tu, o auditor, habere proprium puteum et proprium fontem ut
et tu, cum apprehenderis librum Scripturarum, incipias etiam ex proprio sensu
proferre aliquem intellectum et […] tempta et tu bibere de fonte ingenii tui. Est
intra te natura aque vive, sunt vene perhennes et irrigua fluenta rationabilis sensus,
si modo non sint terra et rudibus completa. Abelard, Ep. 8.126 (Luscombe (ed.),
2013, 512f.).
22 Quos […] Philistini terra repleuerant, illi sine dubio qui intelligenciam spiritalem
claudunt ut neque ipsi bibant, neque alios bibere permittant. Abelard, Ep. 8.126
(Luscombe (ed.), 2013, 512f.).
From reading to understanding
133
for earthly things, does not know where in earth to find water, where to find
a rational perception.”23
Thus, we have good evidence that Origen is indeed Abelard’s first authority for his efforts at understanding the Scripture. Nevertheless, the term
profectus does not figure in the quotes from Origen / Rufinus.
Is Gregory his only authority for this term? Does Abelard use the term
rather independently of Origen, and does he mix the two authorities for his
idea of “progressing by understanding”? It can be assumed with good reason that at least the term intelligendo proficiens is shaped by Origen, because
even if it does not figure in Abelard’s quotes, we find a close parallel to it in
Origen / Rufinus, in the very context where the former is taking his quotes
from: in his homily 13 on Genesis, exactly between the passages quoted by
Abelard, Origen / Rufinus states:
If, therefore, also you hearing those words today should faithfully perceive what is
said, Isaac would work also in you, he would cleanse your hearts from earthly perceptions. And seeing these mysteries which are so great to be lying hidden in divine
Scriptures, you progress in understanding, you progress in spiritual perceptions.24
Here we not only find the term proficere, but also its combination with the
term intellectus: proficitis in intellectu (“you progress in understanding”). It
is very probable that this formulation in this very context strongly influenced
Abelard’s expression intelligendo proficiens. Seeing Abelard’s quotes from
homily 13 on Genesis, it is quite certain that he also knew this passage. It is
easy to imagine that Abelard, with those words of Origen / Rufinus in mind,
gave his final paragraph a concise title and read it into St. Gregory whom he
thought to be influenced by Origen as well.
2. Intelligendo proficiens – how far-reaching is Origen’s
impact on Abelard?
As we see from the final section of letter 8 – and this is true for Abelard’s
whole work as well25 – intelligere (“understanding”) and the move from
23 Qui Philistinus est […] et terrena sapit, nescit in omni terra inuenire aquam,
inuenire rationabilem sensum. Abelard, Ep. 8.126 (Luscombe (ed.), 2013, 514f.).
24 Si ergo et uos hodie haec audientes fideliter percipiatis auditum, operator et in
uobis Isaac, purgat corda uestra a terrenis sensibus, et uidentes tanta haec myste
ria in scripturis diuinis esse latentia proficitis in intellectu, proficitis in spiritalis
sensibus. Or., hom. 13.4 in Gen. (A. Fürst / C. Markschies (eds.), Origenes. Die
Homilien zum Buch Genesis, trans. P. Habermehl, Werke mit deutscher Übersetzung 1/2, Berlin 2011, 244). The translation is taken from R.E. Heine (trans.),
Origen. Homilies on Genesis and Exodus, FaCh 71, Washington 1982, 192.
25 On this, see the following reflections about Abelard’s Theologia.
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Tobias Georges
reading to understanding were crucial topoi for Abelard. But if his expression intelligendo proficiens in letter 8 was strongly influenced by Origen,
then we must ask: How far-reaching is Origen’s impact on Abelard’s conception of moving from reading to understanding?
First of all, in Abelard’s references to Origen highlighted above, there is
an important link that leads us to Abelard’s reception of Origen that goes
beyond letter 8. When Abelard praises “the great Christian philosopher Origen”26, he uses a wording that we find several times in his letter exchange
with Heloisa.27 In that context, Origen is depicted as “the great” or even the
“greatest of the Christian philosophers” because he is a model for ascetic
life, especially for Abelard, with his longing for chastity that he illustrates
by pointing several times to Origen’s assumed self-castration.28 However,
the role of Origen, “the philosopher”, reaches further: It is even his way of
teaching that Abelard describes as a model. This becomes obvious from the
passage in letter 1 (Historia Calamitatum), where Abelard calls him sum
mum Christianorum philosophorum29: Abelard tells how he entered, after
his castration, the monastery of St. Denis, and how his former students from
Paris urged him to continue teaching. So he withdrew to a monk’s cell where
he could “devote” himself “to teaching as before”. But while, before, he had
primarily taught the “profane arts” (secularium artium disciplinam), now
he “applied” himself “mainly to the study of the Scriptures (sacre plurimum
lectioni studium intendens)”, using his former skills to attract his students.
The sacra lectio is what he then calls “the true philosophy”, uera philo
sophia, and subsequently he refers to Origen, the “greatest of the Christian
philosophers”, as a model for his procedure. For our perspective on “from
reading to understanding”, it is very interesting how Abelard depicts the
26 magnis Christianorum philosophi Origenis. Abelard, Ep. 8.126 (Luscombe (ed.),
2013, 512f.).
27 On this, see T. Georges, “Summus Christianorum philosophorum” – Origen as
Christian philosopher in Peter Abelard, in: A.-C. Jacobsen (ed.), Origeniana unde
cima: Origen and Origenism in the History of Western Thought, Leuven 2016,
435–439. Abelard talks of Origen as a “great” or even the “greatest Christian
philosopher” twice in Historia Calamitatum (Luscombe (ed.), 2013, 52f. 104f.),
once in Ep. 5 (id. (ed.), 2013, 200–203), once in Ep. 7 (id. (ed.), 2013, 344f.), and
once in Ep. 8 (id. (ed.), 2013, 512f.), see above. In addition, in Ep. 7 (Luscombe
(ed.), 2013, 344f.), Abelard refers to Origen as the first among the great doctors
of the church.
28 See Historia Calamitatum (Luscombe (ed.), 2013, 104f.); Ep. 5 (id. (ed.), 2013,
200–203); Ep. 7 (id. (ed.), 2013, 344f.). While Abelard cannot approve of Origen’s
laying hands upon himself, he praises his “purity”, linking his castration to his
own that was, on the contrary, acted upon him by God’s mercy.
29 Abelard, Ep. 1.34 (Luscombe (ed.), 2013, 52f.).
From reading to understanding
135
contents of his teaching the Scriptures, that is, of sacra lectio or uera philo
sophia, right at the start of the next paragraph:
Now it happened that I first applied myself to expounding the basis of our faith using
analogies based on human reason, and I composed a treatise on the theology of the
Divine Unity and Trinity for the use of my students who were asking for human and
philosophical reasons and who were demanding something intelligible rather than
mere words.30
In fact, the treatise he refers to seems to be the first draft of what was to become
his Theologia, and the method he describes exactly matches the one he shows
in that writing:31 “expounding the basis of our faith using analogies based on
human reason”, and moving from “mere words” – that is, mere reading and
hearing the Scriptures – to “something intelligible” (que intelligi possent). So it
becomes clear that when Abelard calls Origen summum Christianorum philo
sophorum, he imagines him to be the model for the method he himself uses in
his theological masterpiece – and which, of course, he echoes in the final passage of letter 8. In that perspective, Abelard even imagines Origen as a model
for himself. It is no surprise that Abelard, as a theologian, several times depicts
himself as a Christian “philosopher”32.
The question is: In what way does this idea of Origen as a theological role
model reach beyond mere imagination? This question must be asked because
in Abelard’s Theologia, as well as in his other “theological” treatises, as
distinguished from his “exegetical” and “ascetic” works, there are few references to Origen, none of which are clearly positive, most even polemic,33
e.g., when, in Theologia scholarium 2.11, he points to “those innumerable
30 Accidit autem mihi ut ad ipsum fidei nostre fundamentum humane rationis simi
litudinibus disserendum primo me applicarem, et quendam theologie tractatum
de unitate et trinitate divina scolaribus nostris componerem, qui humanas et phi
losophicas rationes requirebant, et plus que intelligi quam que dici possent effla
gitabant. Abelard, Ep. 1.35 (Luscombe (ed.), 2013, 54f.).
31 To illustrate this, the quote from the Historia Calamitatum should be compared
with the prologue of the Theologia Scholarium (E.M. Buytaert / C. Mews (eds.),
Petri Abaelardi opera theological, 3, CChr.CM 13, Turnhout 1987, 313). On
the Theologia and its different versions, see I. Klitzsch, Die „Theologien“ des
Petrus Abaelardus: Genetischkontextuelle Analyse und theologiegeschichtliche
Relektüre, Leipzig 2010.
32 See, e.g. Abelard, Confessio fidei ad Heloisam 3 (C.S.F. Burnett, ‘Confessio fidei ad
Heloisam’: Abelard’s Last Letter to Heloise? A Discussion and Critical Edition of
the Latin and Medieval French Versions, in: Mittellateinisches Jahrbuch 21 (1986),
152f.); id., Historia Calamitatum (Luscombe (ed.), 2013, 52f.); id., Ep. 13 (E.R.
Smits (ed.), Peter Abelard: letters IX–XIV, Groningen 1983, 275).
33 On this, see Georges, 2016.
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Tobias Georges
heretic doctrines that Origen had said in his books ʻPeriarchesʼ”34 – actually,
Abelard edited his Theologia in at least three versions, as the Theologia
summi boni, Theologia Christiana and Theologia scholarium.35 The wording
intelligendo proficiens from letter 8 or the praise of Origen, the philosopher,
do not reappear from this or the other letters, and in the methodological
reflections that we find at the start of the Theologia scholarium, Origen is
not mentioned at all.
For an initial understanding of those contradictory findings, some background about Abelard’s general reception of Origen is useful.36 This reception
entails a clear-cut distinction between two realms of Origen’s works, and this
distinction as such echoes the general way Origen was treated in the West in
Abelard’s days: For this treatment, Jerome was most responsible. This is because
he had distinguished sharply between Origen the “theologian” (dogmatistes),
and the biblical “commentator” (interpres), e.g., in the crucial words: “I have
merely praised the simplicity of his [scil. Origen’s] rendering and commentary
and neither the faith nor the dogmas of the Church come in at all. […] I have
praised the commentator but not the theologian (laudavi interpretem, non dog
matisten).”37
This distinction was echoed by the Decretum Gelasianum, which referred
explicitly to Jerome’s outlook on Origen.38 Jerome and the Decretum Gela
sianum were important authorities showing that the Alexandrian had to
be dealt with cautiously. Furthermore, a severe distinction had to be made
between the biblical “commentator” and the dogmatistes, and further the
idea that Origen’s exegetic works could be rich and used legitimately, while
his dogmatic writings and views clearly had to be rejected. In fact, those
34 Unde et beatus Ieronimus epistolam ad Avitum presbyterum direxit, ut haeretica
illa quae in libris Periarches Origenes innumera posuerat ex parte manifestet.
Abelard, Theologia scholarium 2.11 (Buytaert / Mews (eds.), 1987, 412).
35 On the Theologia and its different versions, see above, n. 318.
36 For this background, refer to Georges, 2016.
37 Simplex interpretatio atque doctrina simplici voce laudata est. Nihil ibi de fide,
nihil de dogmatibus conprehensum est. […] Laudavi interpretem, non dogmati
sten. Hier., Ep. 84.2 (I. Hilberg (ed.), Hieronymus Epistulae, CSEL 55, Vienna
1996, 122). The translation is taken from P. Schaff / H. Wace (eds.), Jerome: Illu
strious Men. Commentaries. Letters. Etc., NPNF 6, Grand Rapids 1986, 176.
38 Decretum Gelasianum (H. Denzinger / P. Hünermann (eds.), Kompendium der
Glaubensbekenntnisse und kirchlichen Lehrentscheidungen, Freiburg 392001,
165): Item Origenis nonnulla opuscula, quae vir beatissimus Hieronymus non
repudiat, legenda suscipimus. Reliqua autem omnia cum auctore suo dicimus
renuenda.
From reading to understanding
137
authorities shaped Origen’s general reception in the medieval West.39 Like
his contemporaries, Abelard knew this distinction very well,40 and he strictly adhered to it, at least on the surface. While, as we have seen, he openly
rejected Origen in his “theological” works, in his commentary on Romans,
that is, his major contribution in the field of commenting on the bible, we
find the exact opposite:41 Abelard often referred to Origen and quoted long
passages from his commentary on Romans, that is, from Rufinus’ Latin translation. Abelard quoted Origen to support or add to his own interpretation
and held him in high esteem. It is this side of his reception that is echoed
in his letter exchange with Heloisa when he praises Origen as the “greatest
of the Christian philosophers”. Here, he is writing in a monastic-spiritual
milieu where he feels free to praise the great ascetic Origen, that is, the biblical commentator and not the theologian. Of course, this distinction is artificial, as can be seen from Abelard’s reference in letter 8: He praises Origen,
the great biblical exegete and his urge to understand the Scriptures; but at
the same time, he takes his method as a model for what he does in his Theo
logia. So, Origen’s reception certainly crosses the borders between the inter
pres and the dogmatistes, and Abelard must have been aware of this. It can
be assumed with good reason that Origen’s different treatment in Abelard’s
different genres is influenced, at least to a certain extent, by tactics. Someone
like Abelard, condemned as a heretic twice during his lifetime, knew that
he was suspected, that he had to play things shrewdly and that it was not a
good idea to praise Origen in a work called Theologia.42
So, this background about Abelard’s general reception of Origen would
leave us the possibility that the former’s theological method and his urge
to move from reading to understanding was indeed shaped a great deal by
the latter, without Abelard explicitly referring to Origen in his theological
treatises merely for tactical considerations. However, when we look at what
Abelard actually knew from Origen, we come back to the restricted focus
on exegetical writings: from Abelard’s exegetical and monastic-spiritual
works, we can see that he had really read Origen’s exegetical works, like
his commentary on Romans and his homilies on Genesis, that is, Rufinus’
39 On this, see L. Perrone, Origenismus, in: 4RGG 6 (2003), 664f.; G. Lettieri, Ori
genismo (in Occidente, secc. VII–XVIII), in: A. Monaci Castagno (ed.), Origine.
Dizionario. La cultura, il pensiero, le opere, Rome 2000, 308–321 (309f.).
40 See e.g., Abelard, Theologia Scholarium 2.4 referring to Hier., Ep. 61.1f.
41 See Georges, 2016, 433f.; R. Peppermüller, Einleitung, in: id. (ed.), Abaelard –
Expositio in Epistolam ad Romanos. Römerbriefkommentar. Lateinisch Deutsch,
vol. 1, FC 26,1, Freiburg 2000, 7–59.
42 On Abelard’s life and condemnations, see M.T. Clanchy, Abelard: a medieval life,
Oxford 1997.
138
Tobias Georges
translations.43 Conversely, we glean no evidence for Abelard having really
read Origen’s theological masterpiece, that is, his De principiis / Peri archon.
When Abelard refers to this work in his Theologia 2.11 and in the prologue to his Sic et Non, it is through the lens of Jerome, and with Jerome’s
words he qualifies Origen as a heretic, without entering into the text of Peri
archon – actually, in Theologia scholarium 2.11, he erroneously calls this
writing Peri arches. This leaves us with the impression that while Abelard
basically had a critical view of Jerome’s distinction, this distinction nevertheless shaped the selection of works from Origen he read and his knowledge of Origen’s thought. And, moving back to the question of in what way
Origen really was a theological role model for Abelard, this suggests that
imagination played an important role. As we can see from Abelard’s quotes
from Origen’s homilies 12 and 13 on Genesis, he could know Origen’s urge
to understand the Scriptures and for rational perception. This urge closely
matched his own theological method and seems to have inclined Abelard to
make him – at least in the monastic and exegetical context – a great authority
as the “greatest of the Christian philosophers”. However, beyond the quotes
from letter 8, when Abelard refers to Origen, showing real knowledge of his
writings, it seems that he exclusively focuses on exegetical questions. Thus,
it is difficult to say what Abelard really knew from Origen’s thought, and
one can be inclined to think that much of Abelard’s theological role-model
Origen is made from imagination – of course, caused by Origen’s focus on
“understanding” that could also be found in his exegetical works, and aided
by the picture Eusebius of Caesarea made of Origen in h.e. 6, which Abelard
knew.44 Actually, Eusebius had depicted Origen as a great Christian philosopher.45
Conclusion
So how about profectus in Abelard and Origen? It has been argued here
that in the final passage of letter 8, when Abelard talks of “advancing by
understanding” (intelligendo proficiens) – meaning understanding the Scriptures – the formulation is strongly influenced by Origen, namely his homily
on Genesis 13. Abelard actually seems to have had great sympathy for Origen’s focus on understanding (intellectus) and rational perception (rationa
bilis sensus). However, the term profectus is not a key one for Abelard; and
when he refers to Origen as a role model for his theological methodology
43 On Abelard’s reading of Origen’s Commentary on Romans, see Georges, 2016,
433f., on the former’s reading of the latter’s homilies see above, p. 100.
44 See Abelard, Ep. 1.34 (Luscombe (ed.), 2013, 52).
45 See e.g., Eus., h.e. 6.18.
From reading to understanding
139
of moving from reading to understanding the Scriptures, it gets hard to say
where he is really influenced by him and where he imagines it. Beyond the
quotes from letter 8, we do not have firm evidence. Of course, this may also
be caused by Abelard’s tactical, two-fold use of Origen. Yet if we look at
the sources to which Abelard refers for his methodology more generally,
there are others who stand out more as potential influencers, namely Latin
writers like Jerome, whom Abelard likes to quote throughout his work,
and especially in his letter exchange with Heloisa.46 When we are talking of
Jerome, we certainly have to consider his own strong dependence on Origen,
and there may be an important impact of Origen on Abelard through Latin
authorities like Jerome. However, this influence is hidden and refracted, and
it would be difficult to substantiate. The first authority for Abelard is – of
course, after the Bible – certainly Augustine. There is no doubt that for Abelard and his contemporaries Augustine is this first authority in theology and
in questions of method.47 He is the one Abelard quoted most throughout
his works, and Abelard referred to him especially for his focus on reason
(ratio) and understanding (intellectus). This can be seen, for example, in the
prefaces to Theologia scholarium and to Sic et Non where Augustine is the
authority, which is no surprise, as with De doctrina Christiana he had written a whole work explaining how to move from reading to understanding.48
Interestingly, however, Augustine is not mentioned in the final passage of letter 8. Perhaps this is caused by Abelard’s wish in this letter to depict Origen,
the great philosopher, as the model for his method. Yet if we look closely at
Abelard’s conception of “advancing by understanding” in the letter, I think
we can finally grasp a certain difference between Origen and Abelard which
makes Abelard stand closer to Augustine, and which shall be highlighted
in order to bring this paper to a conclusion. For Abelard, profectus seems
to be quite a linear move from “reading” the Scriptures (legere) to “understanding” them (intelligere), and it seems that this linear move rather resembles what we find in Augustin’s De doctrina Christiana. On the contrary,
46 See e.g. Abelard, Ep. 8.123 (Luscombe (ed.), 2013, 508).
47 On Augustin as authority in 12th-century writers and in Abelard see T. Georges,
Ethik in der Zeit der Frühscholastik. Zwerge auf den Schultern des Riesen Augu
stin, in: A. Müller (ed.), Der christliche Neubau der Sittlichkeit. Ethik in der Kir
chengeschichte, Publikationen der Wissenschaftlichen Gesellschaft für Theologie
53, Leipzig 2018, 39–53.
48 For the impact of De doctrina Christiana on Abelard’s method, see especially the
preface to Abelard, Sic et Non (B.B. Boyer / R. McKeon (eds.), Peter Abailard.
Sic et Non. A Critical Edition, Chicago 1976, 89–104.; Translation by P. Throop
(trans.), Yes and No: the complete English translation of Peter Abelard’s Sic et
Non, Charlotte 22008, 11–25).
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in Origen’s quotes from homilies 12 and 13 on Genesis, the focus does not
appear to be so much on the linear move. Of course, there is a profectus in
understanding the Scriptures, but the dichotomy of legere and intelligere is
not crucial. In Origen, “advancing by understanding” rather means going
deeper in circles, entering more and more into the hidden meaning of the
Scriptures. In the passages Abelard quotes from homily 13, Origen / Rufinus
demand: “But let us never cease from digging wells of living water.”49 –
“Even if the Philistines obstruct us […], let us carry on digging wells.”50 To
those who do not cease from this struggle, Origen / Rufinus say: “you progress in spiritual perceptions (proficitis in spiritalibus sensibus).”51
This idea of progress shows a slightly different accent from Abelard’s.
Thus, in order to sum up the question of Origen’s impact on Abelard talking
of intelligendo proficiens, one could use Abelard’s famous title: Sic et Non.
49 Nos uero numquam cessemus puteos aque uiue fodiendo. Abelard, Ep. 8.126
(Luscombe (ed.), 2013, 514f.).
50 Etiamsi obsistunt Philistini […], nos tamen perseueremus cum ipso puteos
fodiendo. Abelard, Ep. 8.126 (Luscombe (ed.), 2013, 514f.).
51 Or., hom. 13.4 in Gen. (Fürst / Markschies (eds.) / Habermehl (trans.), 2011, 244).
The translation is taken from Heine (trans.), 1982, 192.
Massimiliano Lenzi
Reason, Free Will, and Predestination: Origen
in Aquinas’ Theological Thought*
Abstract: The aim of this paper is to show that Aquinas develops a theology of predestined grace, by challenging the Origenian metaphysical and eschatological application of
the principle of distributive justice. According to Thomas, the general reason why some
are saved and others damned is to be related, just as in the case of creation, to divine
goodness, which demands a multiformity of grades in order to be adequately represented
by creatures.
Keywords: Predestination, Grace, Mediaeval theology, Distributive justice
Looking at the reception of the Patristic tradition in medieval thought,
Origen stands out as a well-known author as well as a problematic figure,
particularly for Thomas Aquinas. One cannot be surprised to find, in
Aquinas’ works, a large number of quotations from the Alexandrian writer
(there are more than one thousand occurrences of the term “Origen” in
its different grammatical inflections); on the other hand, the disparity of
judgement that emerges about them is also not surprising.1 The image
of Origen arising from those quotations is that of an undisputed teacher
of exegesis and spirituality, but also that of a dangerous theologian,
whose protological, Christological and eschatological mistakes are above
all a consequence of his “abuse” (corruptio vel abusus) of philosophy.2
*
1
2
I wish to thank Frosty Loechel, Maurizio Mottolese and Catherine Roberts for
deeply revising my English and offering several helpful suggestions.
See G. Bendinelli, Tommaso d’Aquino lettore di Origene: un’introduzione,
in: Adamantius 15 (2009), 103–120 (103). I borrow here some of his wording.
Bendinelli proposes some examples of this disparity in judgment, distinguishing
the reception of Origen as a “heresiarch” (105–112) from that as an “exegete”
(112–120).
Thomas Aquinas, Super Boetium De Trinitate 2.3 (Sancti Thomae de Aquino
Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII P. M. edita cura et studio Fratrum Praedicatorum,
t. 50, Roma-Paris 1992). Aquinas refers to Origen’s adherence to Platonism and,
more generally, to “the views of the ancient philosophers”, which would have led
Origen to develop the doctrines of subordinationism (see id., Super Boetium De
Trinitate 3,4, as well id., Summa theologiae 1.32,1, ad 1 (Sancti Thomae Aquinatis
Opera omnia iussu impensaque Leonis XIII P. M. edita cura et studio Fratrum
Praedicatorum, t. 4, Rome 1888)), pre-existence of the soul (see id., Summa contra
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Massimiliano Lenzi
According to Aquinas, the connaturality of faith and reason, which are
both divine gifts, rules out the possibility of a conflict between philosophy
and revelation: the condition being, that the practice of philosophy would
depend on straight reason (we shall see below that such straightness, as a
specific feature of natural integrity, must be thought of as a determination
of divine grace).3
Indeed – this will be my crucial claim – Aquinas believes that Origen has
neglected precisely the primacy of grace, bringing forth in this way a systematic and extreme rationalisation of the Christian message.4 This emerges,
first of all, from Aquinas’ criticism against the Platonizing doctrine of the
pre-existence of the νόες – a basic pillar of the Origenian theological system,
which preserves the free self-determination of intellectual beings. Aquinas
not only rejects this doctrine from a dogmatic point of view, he also criticises
its theoretical implications and its conceptual assumptions. In his opinion,
the Origenian doctrine reveals a deep misunderstanding of the gratuitous
and projectual character of creation, and above all of the specific diversification of creatures, which can not be reduced to a “penal” reason.5 Most
importantly the Origenian doctrine disregards the equally undue and projectual character of redemption, which Aquinas seems to consider (in line
3
4
5
Gentiles 2.83 (Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Opera omnia iussu edita Leonis XIII
P. M. cura et studio Fratrum Praedicatorum, t. 13, Rome 1918)), and corporeity
of all creatures (see id., Quaestio disputata de spiritualibus creaturis 5, ad 1 (J.
Cos (ed.), Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII P. M. edita, t. 24/2, Rome 1992), and
id., Quaestiones disputatae de potentia 6,6, ad 2 (P. Bazzi et alii (ed.), Quaestiones
disputatae, vol. 2, Turin 101965).
About grace as a condition of the natural perfection of reason, see my Fede e
grazia. Tommaso d’Aquino e il naturale esercizio della ragione, in: Filosofia e
teologia 32 (2018), 223–230. In Aquinas’ concordism, it is impossible that the
right reason might be contrary to faith, simply because it is impossible to prove
the opposite of truth (see Thomas Aquinas, Super Boetium De Trinitate 2,3). In
order to not contradict faith, all that philosophy has to do is to conform to its own
rational nature. Therefore, the primacy of theology – the duty of which, according
to Aquinas, is to judge the conclusions of reason and to condemn as false those
contrary to revelation (Summa theologiae 1.1,6, ad 2) – paradoxically turns out
to be a guarantee of the “autonomy” of philosophy.
Aquinas captures here an undoubtedly authentic aspect of the systematic and
speculative method of Origen’s thought. See G. Lettieri, Dies una. L’allegoria di
«coelum et terra in Principio» ricapitolazione del sistema misticospeculativo di
Origene, in: Adamantius 23 (2017), 36–76 (37–43).
See here and after Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1.118,3 (Sancti Thomae
Aquinatis Opera omnia, t. 5, Rome 1889).
Reason, Free Will, and Predestination
143
with Augustine) as an authentic and predestined moral re-creation from the
nothingness of sin.6
Roughly put, one may say that in Aquinas’ perspective the abuse of
reason has brought Origen to an erroneous rationalisation of divine omnipotence. Such a claim might appear surprising and paradoxical, given that
the Aristotelian Aquinas is usually considered a promoter of philosophical
sciences and autonomy of reason, as well as the interpreter of an authentic
emancipation of human being and nature from divine causal absolutism – a
kind of absolutism that is traditionally related to Augustinism. But I believe
that matters should be seen differently. In Aquinas’ thought, concerning the
autonomy of reason, Aristotle plays a functional role but in a substantially
theological context. With regard to human emancipation, Aquinas undoubtedly endows human will with an irreducible causal efficacy, but the subordinated and conditioned feature of that will remains equally undisputable.
Human efficacy, just as the causal efficacy of any creature, is the efficacy of
the secondary cause, subjected as such to the infallibility and immutability
of divine government. Hence, any conclusion about the individual’s capacity
of self-determination, in order to be critically inferred, should consider to
what extent that capacity fits in with the irresistible and fatal character of
the divine purpose.
In the following pages, therefore, I wish to show how indeed the Aristotle
of Aquinas, by means of a systematic and never neutral exegetical appropriation, turns out to be completely suitable to a theology of the predestined grace – a theology that is substantially Augustinian and, consequently,
anti-Origenian.
1. Let me start with a few remarks about the Platonizing doctrine of the
pre-existence of the νόες and their diversification on the basis of merit. My
intention here will be to show that Aquinas challenges exactly the rational
principle that, in his opinion, Origen invokes, equally improperly, regarding
the issue of predestination.
In chapter forty-four of the second book of his Summa contra Gentiles,
Aquinas writes that Origen, in his Peri Archon,
6
I have dealt with creation and redemption in Augustine’s and Aquinas’ thought
respectively in Il nulla nelle Confessioni di Agostino tra creazione e conversione,
in: M. Lenzi / A. Maierù (eds.), Discussioni sul nulla tra medioevo ed età moderna,
Florence 2009, 21–35 and in In nihilum decidere. “Negatività” della creatura e
nichilismo del peccato in Tommaso d’Aquino, in: Consecutio Rerum. Rivista critica della Postmodernità 1 (2017), 65–87, available on-line (www.consecutio.org);
reprint in: M. Aiello / L. Micaloni / G. Rughetti (eds.), Declinazioni del nulla. Non
essere e negazione tra ontologia e politica, Roma 2017, 67–89.
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Massimiliano Lenzi
wished to oppose the objections and errors of the early heretics who endeavoured
to prove that the heterogeneous character of good and evil in things has its origin
in contrary agents. Now, there are, as Origen saw, great differences (multam distan
tiam) in natural as well as human things which seemingly are not preceded by any
merits (nulla merita praecessisse videntur); some bodies are luminous, some dark,
some men are born of pagans, others of Christians, etc. And having observed this
fact, Origen was impelled to assert that all diversity found in things resulted from
a diversity of merits, in accordance with the justice of God (omnem diversitatem in
rebus inventam ex diversitate meritorum, secundum Dei iustitiam, processisse). For
he says that God, of His goodness alone, first made all creatures equal (aequales),
and all of them spiritual and rational; and these by their free choice (per liberum
arbitrium) were moved in various ways, some adhering to God more, and some less,
some withdrawing from Him more, and some less; and as a result of this, diverse
grades in spiritual substances were established by the divine justice (diversi gra
dus in substantiis spiritualibus ex divina iustitia sunt subsecuti), so that some were
angels of diverse orders, some human souls in various conditions, some demons in
their differing states.7
Whether Aquinas would here depend on Origen directly (as I suppose)
or not, there is no doubt that he captures, in this rigorous albeit compendious exposition, some authentic elements of the Peri Archon. According
to Origen, indeed, the pre-existence of souls is the assumption itself that,
against the Gnostics, allows the equity of God to be safeguarded, by tracing
back the diversity of creatures to their earlier free choice rather than to an
unmotivated and thus unequal diversity of nature. Given the biblical and
Pauline presupposition that on God’s part there is no injustice (Rom 9:14)
nor partiality (Rom 2:11), Origen assumes that in the beginning God created
perfectly equal beings, since there was no reason to differentiate the distribution of the conditions, and that subsequently He “dispenses everything in
accordance with the merit and progress of each (omnia pro meritis singulo
rum profectibusque dispensat)”.8 But this is precisely the point that Aquinas
7
8
Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles 2.44 (J.F. Anderson (transl.), St. Thomas
Aquinas, On the Truth of the Catholic Faith. Book two: Creation, New York
1956). See also id., Quaestiones disputatae de potentia 3,16; 3.18; id., De sub
stantiis separatis 12 (Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII
P. M. edita cura et studio Fratrum Praedicatorum, t. XL/D-E, Rome 1968); id.,
Summa theologiae 1.47,2; 1.65,2; id., Quaestiones disputatae de malo 5,4 (Sancti
Thomae de Aquino Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII P. M. edita cura et studio
Fratrum Praedicatorum, t. 23, Roma-Paris 1982), and id., Super Epistolam ad
Romanos lectura 9,3, § 767 (R. Cai (ed.), S. Thomae Aquinatis Super Epistolas
S. Pauli lectura, vol. I, Turin 81953).
So Or., princ. 1.8,4 (J. Behr (ed. and transl.), Origen, On First Principles, OECT,
2 vols., Oxford 2017). Yet, Aquinas seems to summarise here princ 2.9,5–7 (but
see also princ. 1.7,4).
Reason, Free Will, and Predestination
145
calls into question: the view that the criterion of justice that determines the
diversity of creatures would be a principle of due distribution. Against this
idea, Aquinas concludes:
Now, Origen seems not to have taken into consideration the fact that when we give
something, not in payment of a debt, but as a free gift, it is not contrary to justice if
we give unequal things, without having weighed the difference of merits; although
payment is due to those who merit. But, as we have shown above, God brought
things into being, not because He was in any way obliged to do so, but out of pure
generosity. Therefore, the diversity of creatures does not presuppose a diversity of
merits. And again, since the good of the whole is better than the good of each part,
the best maker is not he who diminishes the good of the whole in order to increase
the goodness of some of the parts; a builder does not give the same relative value
to the foundation that he gives to the roof, lest he ruin the house. Therefore, God,
the maker of all things, would not make the whole universe the best of its kind, if
He made all the parts equal, because many grades of goodness would then be lacking in the universe, and thus it would be imperfect.9
Briefly, Aquinas seems to argue here that, since creation presupposes absolutely nothing (except its very reason, i.e. divine goodness), there is nothing,
apart from His own goodness, to which God owes something. Consequently,
it is not because of a debt of justice that God made the universe. As Augustine
had claimed, God brought things into being by pure generosity, in order that
His goodness might be manifested through creation.10 And when something
Videtur autem Origenes non perpendisse quod, cum aliquid non ex debito sed
liberaliter damus, non est contra iustitiam si inaequalia damus, nulla diversitate
meritorum pensata, cum retributio merentibus debeatur. Deus autem, ut supra
ostensum est, ex nullo debito, sed ex mera liberalitate res in esse produxit. Unde
diversitas creaturarum diversitatem meritorum non praesupponit. Item, cum
bonum totius sit melius quam bonum partium singularium, non est optimi fac
toris diminuere bonum totius ut aliquarum partium augeat bonitatem: non enim
aedificator fundamento tribuit eam bonitatem quam tribuit tecto, ne domum faciat
ruinosam. Factor igitur omnium, Deus, non faceret totum universum in suo genere
optimum, si faceret omnes partes aequales, quia multi gradus bonitatis in universo
deessent, et sic esset imperfectum (Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles 2.44;
transl. Anderson).
10 Hanc autem positionem [scil. the Origen’s opinion, according to which the diver
sity of creatures was preceded by and depends upon the diversity of merit and
demerit] Augustinus reprobat. Causam enim creaturarum condendarum, tam
spiritualium quam corporalium, constat nihil aliud esse quam Dei bonitatem,
inquantum creaturae suae, sua bonitate creatae, bonitatem increatam secundum
suum modum repraesentant (Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae de potentia
3,18), referring to August., civ. 11.23 (B. Dombart / A. Kalb (eds.), Augustinus,
De civitate Dei, books 11–22, CCSL 48, Turnhout 1955). Cf. analogously Thomas
Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1.47,2.
9
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Massimiliano Lenzi
is given out of pure liberality, “there is no injustice in dealing unequally
with equal persons”, since the gift is undue and it depends on the giver, not
on the receiver.11 On the other hand, if God creates the world in order to
manifest His goodness, some degree of multiplicity and inequality appears
to be inherent. Divine goodness could not be displayed in the universe with
the same uniformity and simplicity featuring God.12 It has to be shown
through many different forms and grades, all arranged “for the perfection
of the whole (propter perfectionem totius)”.13 Hence, the difference in status
among the creatures in this world depends on God’s wisdom and on His plan
of creation – what makes God like a very skilful architect, who subordinates
matter to form, adapting every single part to the completeness of the whole.
The point I wish to make here, then, is that the same anti-Origenian position
that Aquinas asserts at the ontological and cosmological level (about creation), works also at the soteriological level (about predestination), where it
takes on a further and consistent anti-Pelagian connotation – which would
deserve special attention.
2. In the question twenty-three of the first part of the Summa, asking
“whether the foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination (utrum
11 These words seem to hint at the Aristotelian concept of analogy as principle of
equal distribution. See Arist., EN 5.3, 1131a18–26 (L. Bywater (ed.), Aristotelis
Ethica Nicomachea, Oxford 211991), about which Thomas Aquinas, Sententia
libri Ethicorum 5.4 (Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII
P. M. edita cura et studio Fratrum Praedicatorum, t. 47/2, Rome 1969): when
the principle of liberality prevails, the giving does not appear as a payment or a
reward (see id., Sententia libri Ethicorum 8.6), but rather as an undue and free
act. Cf. id., Quaestiones disputate de potentia 3,16, ad 19: Non […] est contra
iustitiam quod inaequalia aequalibus dentur nisi quando alicui redditur debitum;
quod in prima rerum creatione non potest dici. Quod enim ex propria liberalitate
datur, potest dari plus vel minus secundum arbitrium dantis et secundum quod
eius sapientia requiritur.
12 See Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1.47,1: Unde dicendum est quod distinc
tio rerum et multitudo est ex intentione primi agentis, quod est Deus. Produxit
enim res in esse propter suam bonitatem communicandam creaturis et per eas
repraesentandam. Et quia per unam creaturam sufficienter repraesentari non
potest, produxit multas creaturas et diversas […]: nam bonitas quae in Deo est
simpliciter et uniformiter, in creaturis est multipliciter et divisam.
13 In constitutione rerum non est inaequalitas partium per quamcumque inequali
tatem praecedentem vel meritorum vel etiam dispositionis materiae; sed propter
perfectionem totius. Ut patet etiam in operibus artis: non enim propter hoc differt
tectum a fundamento, quia habet diversa materiam; sed ut sit domus perfecta
ex diversis partibus, quaerit artifex diversam materiam, et faceret eam si posset
(Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1.47,2, ad 3).
Reason, Free Will, and Predestination
147
praescientia meritorum sit causa praedestinationis)”, Aquinas – who, as
we will see rejects this hypothesis in the wake of Augustine –preliminarily
formulates an argument in favour, which is clearly based on the aforementioned Origenian principle – ratio Origenis14 – of distributive justice.
Given that – Aquinas relates – “there is no injustice in God” (Rom 9:14),
that “it would seem unjust that unequal things be given to equals”, and that
“all men are equal as regards both nature and original sin, and inequality in
them arises from the merits or demerits of their actions”, the conclusion can
be reached that “God does not prepare unequal things for men by predestinating and reprobating, unless through the foreknowledge of their merits
and demerits”.15 It has to be maintained that such a humanistic idea, according to which predestination – with particular reference to Rom 8:28–30 and
9:10–18 – consists in a foreknowledge of the free self-determination of the
creature (or, knowledge of the merits earned by the souls in their previous
life), is really Origenian in character and considered as such by Aquinas. It
is therefore in a consistent and legitimised way that Aquinas formulates this
argument here by implicitly employing an Origenian reasoning.16
14 So Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae de potentia 3.16, ad 19. Cf. analogously id., Summa theologiae, 1.47,2, ad 3: ratio […] quae movit Origenem.
15 Praeterea, non est iniquitas apud Deum, ut dicitur Rom 9, 14. Iniquum autem esse
videtur, ut aequalibus inaequalia dentur. Omnes autem homines sunt aequales et
secundum naturam et secundum peccatum originale: attenditur autem in eis inae
qualitas secundum merita vel demerita propriorum actuum. Non igitur inaequalia
praeparat Deus hominibus, praedestinando et reprobando, nisi propter differen
tium meritorum praescientiam (Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1.23,5, ar.
3; transl.: The “Summa Theologica” of St. Thomas Aquinas. Literally translated
by Fathers of the English Dominican Province, vol. 1, London 1911). See also
id., Scriptum super libros Sententiarum 1.41,1,3, ar. 2 (P. Mandonnet (ed.), S.
Thomae Aquinatis Scriptum super libros Sententiarum, t. I, Parisiis 1929), e id.,
Quaestiones disputatae de veritate 6,2, ar. 8 (Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera
omnia iussu Leonis XIII P. M. edita cura et studio Fratrum Praedicatorum, t. 22/
1.2, Rome 1970).
16 On the predestination as foreknowledge of future merits (i.e., the merits of the
post-Adamic man) in Origen’s thought, see Or., comRom 1.5; 7.6 (C.P. Hammond
Bammel (ed.), Der Römerbriefkommentar des Origenes. Kritische Ausgabe der
Übersetzung Rufins, Vetus Latina 16; 33–34, Freiburg 1990–1998); id., phil. 25.1–
2 (É. Junod, (ed.), Origène, Philocalie 21–27. Sur le libre arbitre, SC 226, Paris
1976), and id., homNum 3.2,2 (L. Doutreleau (ed.), Origène, Homelies sur les
Nombres I, SC 415, Paris 1996), about which cf. Thomas Aquinas, De veritate 6,2,
ar. 7, and M. Belcastro, La predestinazione nel Commento alla Lettera ai Romani
di Origene. Trasformazione e normalizzazione di un paradosso, in: Adamantius 21
(2015), 211–243. About the idea that God separates the creatures (with reference
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In his answer Aquinas appeals, first of all, to the creation of the world,
since the general reason why some are saved and others damned is to be
related, just as in the case of creation, to divine goodness, which demands a
multiformity of grades in order to be adequately expressed and represented
by creatures. Thomas’ major claim is that God does not save everyone,
even though He could do that, for the sake of an adequate manifestation
of his goodness. If the “moral order” – considered here correspondent to
the “metaphysical” one – consisted entirely of the saved, i.e. those who
have benefited from God’s mercy, it would be imperfect.17 Such order, in
effect, would not adequately represent the divine goodness, which has to
be expressed also in the form of justice, through the just condemnation of
sinners. This is the reason why – Aquinas insists, resorting to quotations
from Augustine and Paul – God elects some and damns others, although
the fact that He saves this one and reproves that one “has no reason, except
the divine will”.
Let us directly examine Aquinas’ text, which deserves to be quoted in full
for its impressive radical coherence.
The reason for the predestination of some, and reprobation of others, must be
sought for in the goodness of God. Thus He is said to have made all things through
His goodness, so that the divine goodness might be represented in things. It is necessary that the divine goodness, which in itself is one and undivided, should be manifested in many ways in His creation; because creatures in themselves cannot attain
to the simplicity of God. Thus it is that for the completion of the universe there are
required different grades of being; some of which hold a high and some a low place
in the universe. That this multiformity of grades may be preserved in things, God
allows some evils, lest many good things should never happen, as was said above
[scil. q. 22, a. 2]. Let us now consider the whole of the human race, as we consider
the whole universe. God wills to manifest His goodness in men; in respect to those
whom He predestines, by means of His mercy, in sparing them; and in respect of
others, whom he reprobates, by means of His justice, in punishing them. This is
to 2 Tim 2:20–21) “not from the beginning, according to his foreknowledge”, but
as a consequence of the previous acts of the souls, see instead Or., princ. 3.1,21–22
(transl. Behr), about which Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles 3.161 (Sancti
Thomae Aquinatis Opera omnia, t. 14, Rome 1926), and id., Summa theologiae
1.23,5, and A. Monaci Castagno, L’idea della preesistenza delle anime e l’esegesi
di Rm 9, 9–21, in: H. Crouzel / A. Quacquarelli (eds.), Origeniana secunda, Roma
1980, 69–78, according to which Origen shifted his thought from the pre-existence
of the souls to the divine foreknowledge. See also M. Harz, La préexistence des
âmes dans l’ouvre d’Origène, in: L. Lies (ed.), Origeniana quarta, Innsbruck 1987,
238–258 (251–252).
17 See also P. Porro, Thomas Aquinas. A Historical and Philosophical Profile,
Washington 2015, 390, from which the quotations are taken.
Reason, Free Will, and Predestination
149
the reason why God elects some and rejects others. To this the Apostle refers, saying: What if God, willing to show His wrath (that is, the vengeance of His justice),
and to make His power known, endured (that is, permitted) with much patience
vessels of wrath, fitted for destruction; that He might show the riches of His glory
on the vessels of mercy, which He hath prepared unto glory (Rom ix. 22, 23). He
also says: But in a great house there are not only vessels of gold and silver; but also
of wood and of earth; and some, indeed, unto honor, but some unto dishonor (2
Tim ii. 20). Why He chooses some for glory, and reprobates others, has no reason;
except the Divine Will. Whence Augustine [On John 26:2], says: “Why He draws
one, and another He does not draw, seek not to judge, if thou dost not wish to fall
into error”.18
This way of looking at the eschatological order implies that, just as in the
case of any teleological explanation, the final condition has to be understood
from the point of view of the final cause. This is to say that we understand
why elects and rejects have the characteristics they have by grasping their
contribution to the realisation of the divine plan, i.e. the representation of
18 Ad tertium dicendum quod ex ipsa bonitate divina ratio sumi potest praedestina
tionis aliquorum, et reprobationis aliorum. Sic enim Deus dicitur omnia propter
suam bonitatem fecisse, ut in rebus divina bonitas repraesentetur. Necesse est
autem quod divina bonitas, quae in se est una et simplex, multiformiter reprae
sentetur in rebus; propter hoc quod res creatae ad simplicitatem divinam attingere
non possunt. Et inde est quod ad completionem universi requiruntur diversi gradus
rerum, quarum quaedam altum, et quaedam infimum locum teneant in universo.
Et ut multiformitas graduum conservetur in rebus, Deus permittit aliqua mala
fieri, ne multa bona impediantur, ut supra dictum est. Sic igitur consideremus
totum genus humanum, sicut totam rerum universitatem. Voluit igitur Deus in
hominibus, quantum ad aliquos, quos praedestinat, suam repraesentare bonita
tem per modum misericordiae, parcendo; et quantum ad aliquos, quos reprobat,
per modum iustitiae, puniendo. Et haec est ratio quare Deus quosdam eligit,
et quosdam reprobat. Et hanc causam assignat apostolus, ad Rom. 9 [22–23],
dicens: volens Deus ostendere iram (idest vindictam iustitiae), et notam facere
potentiam suam, sustinuit (idest permisit) in multa patientia, vasa irae apta in
interitum, ut ostenderet divitias gloriae suae in vasa misericordiae, quae praepa
ravit in gloriam. Et 2 Tim. 2 [20] dicit: in magna autem domo non solum sunt
vasa aurea et argentea, sed etiam lignea et fictilia; et quaedam quidem in hon
orem, quaedam in contumeliam. Sed quare hos elegit in gloriam, et illos reproba
vit, non habet rationem nisi divinam voluntatem. Unde Augustinus dicit, super
Ioannem [XXVI, 2]: ‘quare hunc trahat, et illum non trahat, noli velle diiudicare,
si non vis errare (Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1.23,5, ad 3; translated by
Fathers of the English Dominican Province). Differently id. Scriptum super libros
Sententiarum 1.41,1,3, ad 2, where, in spite of reaffirming that gratia datur gratis
et non redditur meritis, he treats the different ways employed by human beings in
order to receive grace as those dispositions that are able to explain predestination
with regard to its effect.
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divine goodness. If this representation must be displayed, then the order
has to be such and such. Briefly, it is hypothetically necessary. Indeed, the
achievement of the purpose is never unconditional as such, but it is obtained
by adapting the means to the end. According to Aquinas, nonetheless, an
inscrutable element of arbitrariness has to be added, insofar as nothing does
really determine the whole process, except God’s own will. Aquinas himself
makes this clear in the subsequent lines. First, he extends the analogy with
the order of creation, comparing the indifference of the sinner to the uniformity of the primary matter, which has been arranged and distinguished
by God into different forms in order to achieve the perfection of the universe. Secondly, he develops a further analogy with the artificer, comparing
the indifference of the sinner to the uniformity of building materials, such
as stones, explaining that it is only for technical reasons that the architect
assigns different functions to each of them:
Also in the things of nature, a reason can be assigned, since primary matter is altogether uniform, why one part of it was fashioned by God from the beginning under
the form of fire, another under the form of earth, that there might be a diversity
of species in things of nature. Why this particular part of matter is under this particular form, and that under another, depends upon the simple Will of God; as
from the simple will of the artificer it depends that this stone is in this part of the
wall, and that in another; although the plan requires that some stones should be
in this place, and some in that place. Neither on this account can there be said to
be injustice in God, if He prepares unequal lots for not unequal things. This would
be altogether contrary to the notion of justice, if the effect of predestination was
granted as a debt, and not gratuitously. In things which are given gratuitously, a
person can give more or less, just as he pleases (provided he deprives nobody of
his due), without any infringement of justice. This is what the master of the house
said: Take what is thine, and go thy way. Is it not lawful for me to do what I will?
(Matt 20:14, 15).19
19 Sicut etiam in rebus naturalibus potest assignari ratio, cum prima materia tota sit
in se uniformis, quare una pars eius est sub forma ignis, et alia sub forma terrae,
a Deo in principio condita, ut scilicet sit diversitas specierum in rebus naturalibus.
Sed quare haec pars materiae est sub ista forma, et illa sub alia, dependet ex sim
plici divina voluntate. Sicut ex simplici voluntate artificis dependet, quod ille lapis
est in ista parte parietis, et ille in alia, quamvis ratio artis habeat quod aliqui sint
in hac, et aliqui sint in illa. Neque tamen propter hoc est iniquitas apud Deum, si
inaequalia non inaequalibus praeparat. Hoc enim esset contra iustitiae rationem,
si praedestinationis effectus ex debito redderetur, et non daretur ex gratia. In his
enim quae ex gratia dantur, potest aliquis pro libito suo dare cui vult, plus vel
minus, dummodo nulli subtrahat debitum, absque praeiudicio iustitiae. Et hoc
est quod dicit paterfamilias, Matth. 20 [14–15]: tolle quod tuum est, et vade. An
non licet mihi quod volo facere? (Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1.23,5,
ad 3; transl. by Fathers of the English Dominican Province). The same example
Reason, Free Will, and Predestination
151
Briefly, the fact that one is saved and another lost depends – just as in the
case of the original distinction of beings – on the principle of the proper
manifestation of divine goodness, namely, that every difference among creatures is required not per se, but only on account of the perfection of the
whole.20 Hence, it is better, and as such pre-ordained by God, that someone
is condemned rather than all are saved, so that the good of justice is manifested and appreciated. For the same reason, God permits certain evils or
defects (for example, the slaying of animals, or tyrannical persecution), in
order that the pertinent goods may not be hindered (the life of the lion,
or the patience of martyrs).21 However, the fact that specifically this one
would be saved and that one would not, depends on the unfathomable will
of God, with no implication of any form of injustice or partiality. We know
indeed that when something is given out without being due – as occurs in the
case of the gift of grace, which depends exclusively on God’s liberality and
mercy –, no partiality (personarum acceptio) takes place. For, as Aquinas
writes elsewhere once more invoking Matt 20:14–15, “anyone may, without
injustice, give of his own as much as he will, and to whom he will”22 –
of the stones, and their different placement according to art, again recurs in id.,
Super Evangelium S. Ioannis lectura 6,5, § 938 (R. Cai (ed.), S. Thomae Aquinatis
Super Evangelium S. Ioannis lectura, Turin 61972), and in id., Super Epistolam
ad Romanos lectura 9,4, § 788. As Henry of Ghent (cf. Quodlibeta 8,5 (J. Badius
(ed.), Henrici de Gandavo Quodlibeta, Paris 1518, 309rK)) seems to suggest (see
also Ioannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio 1.41, 19 (Ioannis Duns Scoti Opera Omnia
studio et cura Commissionis Scotisticae ad fidem codicum edita, VI, Liber primus.
Distinctiones 26–48, Civitas Vaticana 1963)), Aquinas could have in mind here
Arist., ph. 2.6, 197b9–11 (D. Ross (ed.), Aristotelis Physica, Oxford 101992), on
Protarchus’ dictum, according to which the stones of which altars are made, are
more fortunate than those that are trodden under foot. Cf. furthermore Thomas
Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles 3.161, where the analogy is with the potter (et
sicut ex simplici voluntate procedit artificis ut ex eadem materia, similiter dispos
ita, quaedam vasa format ad nobiles usus et quaedam ad ignobiles), and contains
an overt anti-Origenian purpose (per hoc autem excluditur error Origenis, qui
dicebat hos ad Deum converti et non alios, propter aliqua opera quae animae
eorum fecerant antequam corporibus unirentur).
20 See analogously Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1.23,7.
21 Si enim omnia mala impedirentur, multa bona deessent universo: non enim esset
vita leonis, si non esset occisio animalium; nec esset patientia martyrum, si non
esset persecutio tyrannorum (Summa theologiae 1.22,2, ad 2).
22 Alia est datio ad liberalitatem pertinens, qua scilicet gratis datur alicui quod ei non
debetur. Et talis est collatio munerum gratiae, per quae peccatores assumuntur
a Deo. Et in hac donatione non habet locum personarum acceptio, quia quilibet
potest absque iniustitia de suo dare quantum vult et cui vult, secundum illud
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which is properly, in its evangelical foundation, an Augustinian
claim.23
3. As has emerged, within his anti-Origenian polemic, Aquinas establishes
a deep correspondence between creation and redemption, two events that
Matth. 20 [14–15]: “an non licet mihi quod volo facere? Tolle quod tuum est, et
vade” (Summa theologiae 2–2.63,1, ad 3 (Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Opera omnia,
t. IX, Rome 1897); transl.: The “Summa Theologica” of St. Thomas Aquinas.
Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province, vol. 10, London
/ New York 1918).
23 Cf. Aug., persev. 8,17 (M.A. Lesousky (ed. and transl.), The De dono perseverantiae
of Saint Augustine, Washington 1956). About the consistent Augustinianism manifested here by Aquinas, see also P. Porro, «Rien de personnel». Notes sur la question
de l’acceptio personarum dans la théologie scholastique, in: Revue de sciences philosophiques et théologiques, 94 (2010), 481–509 (507), and id., Divine Predestination,
Human Merit and Moral Responsibility. The reception of Augustine’s Doctrine of
Irresistible Grace in Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent and John Duns Scotus, in: P.
D’Hoine / G. Van Riel (eds.), Fate, Providence and Moral Responsibility in Ancient,
Medieval and Early Modern Thought. Studies in Honour of Carlos Steel, Leuven
2014, 553–570 (569–570). In this regard, Porro suggests an interesting comparison
with Henry of Ghent, according to whom God cannot intentionally will the sin, but
He just punishes those who sin, and this is the reason why the analogy between moral
and metaphysical order has to be rejected (cf. Quodlibeta 8,5, 309vM-310rM). In
the same direction, see also Guillelmus de Ockham, Scriptum in librum primum
Sententiarum 41 (G.I. Etzkorn / F.E. Kelley (eds.), Guillelmi de Ockham Opera
theologica, 4, St Bonaventure, New York 22000, 601) and notably Petrus Aureolus,
In primum librum Sententiarum 41,1, Rome 1596, 939–940: Secundo vero deficit in
eo quod ait non esse aliquam causam in speciali, quare iste praedestinatus sit et ille
reprobatus; sed hoc esse solum ex simplici voluntate divina et pro libito eius: omnis
enim qui pro libito voluntatis aliquem affligit et punit et in peccatum labi permittit
ad hoc solum ut puniat et affligat crudelis est et iniustus; delectatur enim per se in
poenis […]. Praeterea: licet […] possit artifex disponere pro libito voluntatis absque
nota crudelitatis & iniustitia, utpote aedificator potest lapides ponere istum inferius
& illum superius […] absque nota iniuriae […] et similiter figulus ex eadem massa
potest facere vas in honorem & vas in contumeliam absque hoc, quod isti iniurietur;
et similiter Deus absque iniuria potest ponere unam partem materiae sub forma
ignis & aliam sub formam terrae; nihilominus in habentibus experientiam boni &
mali, honoris & contumeliae, illud fieri non potest absque iniuria; quia debitum est
naturae ut fiat sub factione quae apta nata est sibi inesse: et ideo non est absque
iniuria facere hominem in sempiterna tristitia & miseria, absque eius demerito pro
solo libito facientis […]. Praeterea: licet in gratuitis possit tribuere plus vel minus cui
vult distributor absque ullo praeiudicio iustitiae, non tamen verum est quod possit
cui vult poenam infligere absque iniuria et sic intelligitur verbum patrisfamilias […];
ergo non potest esse absque iniuria, quod fiat reprobatio absque causa pro solo libito
voluntatis.
Reason, Free Will, and Predestination
153
are utterly free and unconditional from the viewpoint of the ontological and
moral nothingness of the creature, but are provided of an intrinsic finality
which justifies the recurrent analogy with art. In this regard, it should be
noted that the image of God as craftsman – and therefore the image of a
God that is not only Creator (creator), but also Maker (factor) –24 is not
an accessory or merely metaphorical, but represents a structural theoretical pivot, which intersects the biblical theme of the “potter”, and at once
actively appropriates an Aristotelian teleological view of nature, resorting
to the analogy with art and technology in a continuous manner.25 The result
is that Aquinas, by extending the Pauline theological perspective through
the Aristotelian teleology, feels himself theoretically and exegetically legitimised to consider the creature as an instrument of divine purpose, and to
attribute to God, as craftsman, the task to use it in accordance with His
own purpose.
I shall return below to the “anti-Origenian” motif of the Creator employing the human being as a tool. Before that, however, in order to evaluate
such instrumental condition of the creature correctly, avoiding any attempt
of neutralisation,26 it is worth pointing out that in the Commentary on the
24 Inde est quod fides catholica Deum omnipotentem non solum creatorem sed etiam
‘factorem’ nominat, nam facere proprie est artificis qui per voluntatem operatur
(Thomas Aquinas, Compendium theologiae I.96 (Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Opera
omnia iussu Leonis XIII P. M. edita cura et studio Fratrum Praedicatorum, t. 42,
Roma 1979). It seems to me extremely significant, then, that in at least one case
Aquinas defines the Aristotelian God as “maker” too: Est autem attendendum
quod Aristoteles hic ponit Deum esse factorem caelestium corporum et non solum
causam per modum finis, ut quidam dixerunt (id., In libros Aristotelis De caelo et
mundo expositio I.8 (Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Opera omnia iussu impensaque
Leonis XIII P. M. edita cura et studio Fratrum Praedicatorum, t. 3, Rome 1886)).
Cf. M.F. Johnson, Did St. Thomas Attribute a Doctrine of Creation to Aristotle?,
in: New Scholasticism 63 (1989), 129–155.
25 See W. Wieland, Die aristotelische Physik, Göttingen 31992, 254–277.
26 I refer to B. Shanley, Divine Causation and Human Freedom in Aquinas,
in: American Catholic Philological Quarterly 72 (1998), 99–122 (106–108), who
quotes Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones de veritate 24,1, ad 5, as an argument for
restricting the category of instrumental causation. Yet, here and elsewhere (cf. id.,
Summa theologiae 1–2.68.3, ad 2 (Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Opera omnia, t. 6,
Rome 1891), cited infra, note 33, and ibid. 2–2.23,2), Aquinas does not properly
exclude that the human being, as a creature, would be an instrument of God, under
the full and unconditional control of His providential design. He rather excludes
that this condition would be similar to that of a tool which has no faculty of action.
On this topic, see also S.A. Long, St. Thomas Aquinas, Divine Causality, and the
Mystery of Predestination, in: S.A. Long / E. W. Nutt / T.J. White (eds.), Thomism
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Sentences, Aquinas displays the same technical scheme, with its strong teleological commitment, in a very different manner: the material suited to
buildings here appears given by nature, and the task of the builder would
only be that of choosing the stones according to their natural predispositions.27 This is, I believe, a synergical interpretation – not by chance shared
by Origen.28 It is fitting to a synergistic model of predestination, whereby,
although God gives grace only out of His goodness, He nonetheless predestines those receiving it, on the ground of His foreknowledge about their
autonomous and meritorious preparation to receive it.29
It seems then to me extremely significant that in the Summa theologiae – in
the light of an evident theological shift, although without an explicit retraction –, Aquinas judges this early position as basically Pelagian (or, one might
say, Semi-Pelagian30), joining it to the Origenian doctrine of the previous
27
28
29
30
and Predestination: Principles and Disputations, Ave Maria, Florida 2016, 51–76
(53–62).
See Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum super libros Sententiarum 1.47,1,3: Verbi gratia,
aedificator in constitutione domus habet duos motus voluntatis. Unum quo vult
formam domus inducere in materiam sine hoc quod aliquid consideret determi
nate de partibus domus. Alium motum habet quo, considerato quod lapis iste est
aptus ad fundamentum, vult ipsum in fundamento collocare (cf. also ibid. 46,1,1,
ad 4). Analogously, as regards the natural model of the prime matter: Diversitas
autem recipientium attenditur, secundum quod aliquid est magis aptum et paratum
ad recipiendum. Sicut autem videmus in formis naturalibus, quod per dispositio
nes accidentales, sicut calorem et frigus et hujusmodi, materia efficitur magis vel
minus disposita ad suscipiendum formam; ita etiam in perfectionibus animae ex
ipsis operibus animae anima efficitur habilior vel minus habilis ad consequendum
perfectionem suam (ibid. 17.1,3).
Compare Or., princ. 3.1,24: […] cum Deus fingit vasa, alia quidem ad honorem,
alia vero ad contumeliam, putandum est quod honoris vel contumeliae causas
tamquam materiam quandam nostras vel voluntates vel proposita vel merita habet,
ex quibus singulos nostrum vel ad honorem vel ad contumeliam fingat, dum motus
ipsae animae et propositum mentis de se ipso suggerat illi, quem non latet cor
et cogitatio animi, utrum ad honorem fingi vas eius, an ad contumeliam debeat
(and analogously id., comRom 7.15,5). According to Origen, just like the young
Aquinas, the freely self-determined human wills are similar to diversely prepared
matters, from which God draws correspondingly some vessels unto honour and
others unto dishonour (see also R. Penna, Interpretazione origeniana ed esegesi
odierna di Rm 9, 6–29, in: L. Perrone (ed.), Il cuore indurito del Faraone. Origene
e il problema del libero arbitrio, Genova 1992, 119–140 [133–139]).
Illi enim Deus proponit gratiam infundere quem praescit se ad gratiam preparatu
rum (Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum super libros Sententiarum 1.41,1,3, ad 1).
See also J.P. Wawrykow, God’s Grace & Human Action. ‘Merit’ in the Theology
of Thomas Aquinas, Notre Dame 1995, 38, note 84; 187, note 87, and Porro,
2014, 560. On the Semi-Pelagian doctrine of the initium fidei as human “merit”
Reason, Free Will, and Predestination
155
merits of souls.31 The mistake now imputed to that opinion is that it takes
human free desire – being the initium fidei, or any other kind of preparation
and condition of grace, compare D. Ogliari, Gratia et Certamen. The Relationship
between Grace and Free Will in the Discussion of Augustine with the socalled
Semipelagians, Leuven / Paris / Dudley (Ma) 2003.
31 Fuerunt igitur quidam, qui dixerunt quod effectus praedestinationis praeordina
tur alicui propter merita praeexistentia in alia vita. Et haec fuit positio Origenis,
qui posuit animas humanas ab initio creatas, et secundum diversitatem suorum
operum, diversos status eas sortiri in hoc mundo corporibus unitas […]. Fuerunt
ergo alii, qui dixerunt quod merita praeexistentia in hac vita sunt ratio et causa
effectus praedestinationis. Posuerunt enim Pelagiani quod initium benefaciendi sit
ex nobis, consummatio autem a Deo. Et sic, ex hoc contingit quod alicui datur
praedestinationis effectus, et non alteri, quia unus initium dedit se praeparando, et
non alius (Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1.23,5). On the historical relationship between Origenism and Pelagianism, see. G. Bostock, The Influence of Origen
on Pelagius and Western Monasticism, in: W. A. Bienert / U. Kühneweg (eds.),
Origeniana septima, Leuven 1999, 381–396. According to Aquinas, Pelagius was
not only the theorist of human self-sufficiency (compare for example Scriptum
super libros Sententiarum 1.17,1,1, ar. 8; ad 8, and ibid. 26,1,4), but also that of
the more subtle synergy between human free preparation and gift of grace, previously shared by Aquinas: cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles 3.149; 152;
id., Quaestiones de quolibet, 4,3 (R.-A. Gauthier (ed.), Sancti Thomae de Aquino
Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII P. M. edita, t. 25/1–2, Rome 1996); id., Summa
theologiae 1–2.114,5, ad 1 (Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Opera omnia, t. VII, Rome
1892); ibid. 2–2.6,1 (Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Opera omnia, t. VIII, Rome 1895);
id., Super Epistolam ad Romanos lectura 3,3, § 302; 7,3, § 579; 9,2, § 758; 9,3,
§ 771; id., Super secundam Epistolam ad Corinthios lectura, 3, lect. 1, § 86 (Cai
(ed.), S. Thomae Aquinatis Super Epistolas S. Pauli lectura, vol. I); id., Super
Epistolam ad Ephesios lectura 1,1, § 12 (Cai (ed.), S. Thomae Aquinatis Super
Epistolas S. Pauli lectura, vol. II, Turin 81953); id., Super Epistolam ad Philipenses
lectura 1,1, § 12; 2,3, § 76 (Cai (ed.), vol. II); id., Super secundam Epistolam ad
Timotheum lectura 2,4, § 86 (Cai (ed.), vol. II); id., Expositio in Matthaeum 6,6
(A. Guarenti (ed.), S. Thomae Aquinatis Catena aurea in quatuor Evangelia, vol.
I, Turin 21953). The discovery of Semi-Pelagianism is traced back to the reading of the De predestinatione sanctorum by H. Bouillard, Conversion et grâce
chez s. Thomas d’Aquin, Paris 1941, 92–122, followed by H. Pesch / A. Peters,
Einführung in die Lehre von Gnade und Rechtfertigung, Darmstadt 1981, 64–68
and, with some adjustment, by Wawrykow, God’s Grace & Human Action, 266–
276. See also M. Paluch, Saint Augustine et saint Thomas. Le De praedestinatione
sanctorum dans l’œuvre de Thomas d’Aquin, in: Revue de sciences philosophiques
et théologiques 87 (2003), 641–647. I would, however, underline here the deep
conceptual consistence of Aquinas’ perspective, matured in a theoretical context
that was no less Aristotelian than Augustinian (cf. M. Lenzi, Tra Aristotele e
Agostino. Forma, materia e predestinazione in Tommaso d’Aquino, in: M. Lenzi
/ C.A. Musatti / L. Valente (eds.), Medioevo e filosofia. Per Alfonso Maierù, Rome
2013, 151–172).
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for grace – as the cause (of the things willed) rather than the effect of predestination. So doing – this is the point that Aquinas wishes to make here – the
free will of the creature comes to be separated from the unique condition of
possibility of its action, i.e. the potency of the First Cause, by virtue of which
any secondary cause can act (and correctly act):
there is no distinction – Aquinas writes – between what flows from free will, and what
is of predestination; as there is not distinction between what flows from a secondary
cause and a first cause. For providence of God produces effects through the operation
of secondary causes, as was above shown [scil. 22,3]. Whence, that which flows from
free will is also of predestination […], even the preparation for grace. For neither
does this happen otherwise than by divine help, according to the prophet Jeremias
[5:21]: Convert us, O Lord, to Thee, and we shall be converted.32
In the process of justification, too, the creature seems to play an instrumental and material role. To be ordered to the final end, i.e. to the goodness
of the divine purpose of salvation, means for the human being to be moved
and informed by God, in accordance with His intention to manifest His
own mercy.33 And just as the instrument performs his function by virtue of
32 Non est autem distinctum quod est ex libero arbitrio et ex praedestinatione; sicut
nec est distinctum quod est ex causa secunda et causa prima, divina enim providen
tia producit effectus per operationes causarum secundarum, ut supra dictum est.
Unde et id quod est per liberum arbitrium est ex praedestinatione […], etiam ipsa
praeparatio ad gratiam, neque enim hoc fit nisi per auxilium divinum, secundum
illud Thren. ultimi: converte nos, domine, ad te, et convertemur (Thomas Aquinas,
Summa theologiae 1.23,5; transl. by Fathers of the English Dominican Province).
Compare also id, Summa contra Gentiles 3.70 and especially id., Ad Romanos
lectura 8,6, § 703: sub praedestinatione cadit omne beneficium salutare, quod est
homini ab aeterno divinitus praeparatum […]. Unde ponere quod aliquod meritum
ex parte nostra praesupponatur, cuius praescientia sit ratio praedestinationis, nihil
est aliud quam gratiam ponere dari ex meritis nostris, et quod principium bonorum
operum est ex nobis et consummatio est ex Deo.
33 Still in a polemic context against Origen, see Thomas Aquinas, Super Evangelium
S. Ioannis lectura 15.3, §§ 2022–2024: Fuerunt tamen aliqui qui dicerent, quod
merita nostra praecedentia sunt causa illius electionis: et hic fuit error Origenis
[…]. Sed contra hoc est, quod dominus dicit: non vos me elegistis. Alii autem dicunt
quod verum est quod merita in actu existentia non sunt causa praedestinationis,
sed praeexistentia in praescientia Dei; dicentes quod quia Deus scivit aliquos
bonos futuros et bene usuros gratia, ideo proposuit eis gratiam se daturum. Sed
si hoc esset, sequeretur quod ideo elegit nos, quia praescivit nos ipsum electuros.
Et sic electio nostra praevia esset electioni divinae, quod est contra sententiam
domini […]; sed electio divina est causa influentiae maioris boni in uno quam in
alio […]. Ideo autem Deus uni magis quam alteri bonum influit, ut reluceat ordo
in rebus: sicut apparet in rebus materialibus, quod materia prima quantum est de
Reason, Free Will, and Predestination
157
the agent, so it is by virtue of God – who establishes the aims and rules of
the action – that the human being accomplishes all her acts. The latter are
indeed pre-ordered to redemption, that is to say, they are hypothetically
necessary. In sum, Aquinas does not deny human agency, but rather human
autonomy, excluding that the human being would be the primary cause of
her action and, as such, unconditioned author of her own initiative. My
assumption is that this view – according to which the human being acts only
inasmuch as she is acted upon, and is acted upon in order that he act34 – is
purely Augustinian, although it is expressed in the language and through the
conceptual structures of medieval Aristotelianism, with its own metaphorical strategies.
4. Indeed, in order to understand the reason for and significance of such
an instrumental role, it is necessary to assume the creatural constitution of
the human being, in accordance with the underlying metaphysical pattern
shaping Aquinas’ thought. Although this is not the place to adequately investigate that matter, we may notice that for Aquinas the origin of the creature
from nothing does not represent – as some scholars misleadingly argue – an
extrinsic and ultimately indifferent way to bring the world into existence. In
other words, the creation from nothing is far from a mere deist hypothesis
about nature, where the latter appears to be autonomous and self-sustaining.
Rather, the making of the world ex nihilo constitutes the principle itself – in
the dual meaning of “beginning” and “cause” – of an intrinsic and finalised
dependence, and – consequently – a fundamental factor of intelligibility,
which explains why the world is how it is, what is its nature, its functioning
and its destiny.35
When Thomas claims that the human creature, considered in itself (sibi
autem relicta in se considerata), is simply “nothing” (nichil est),36 pure lack
of being, therefore senseless and powerless, he means that this “negativity”
represents the creature as regards its perseity, i.e. from the viewpoint of
se, est uniformiter disposita ad omnes formas. Ipsae etiam res antequam sint, non
sunt dispositae ad hoc vel illud esse; sed ut servetur ordo in eis, diversas formas et
diversum esse sortiuntur a Deo. Et similiter in creatura rationali quidam eliguntur
ad gloriam, quidam reprobantur.
34 Ratio illa procedit de instrumento cuius non est agere sed solum agi. Tale autem
instrumentum non est homo; sed sic agitur a Spiritu sancto, quod etiam agit, in
quantum est liberi arbitrii (id, Summa theologiae 1–2.68,3, ad 2).
35 I work here on some themes developed in Lenzi, In nihilum decidere, 2017.
36 Thomas Aquinas, De aeternitate mundi, (Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Opera omnia
iussu Leonis XIII P. M. edita cura et studio Fratrum Praedicatorum, t. 43, Rome
1976, 88).
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Massimiliano Lenzi
properly understood autonomy and independence. “All things would fall
into nothingness (omnia in nihilum deciderent)”, Thomas writes, “were they
not upheld by the hand of the Almighty (nisi ea manus omnipotentis conti
neret)”.37 Made in its groundlessness to be embraced and sustained by divine
government, any creature finds in the power of God its natural and constitutive place. This explains, among other things, why the first human being
was created in grace, and why nature, albeit distinct from grace, cannot be
separated from the latter if not with laceration.38 Given such a peculiar condition of union without confusion, as a remarkable article by Jean-Pierre
Torrell showed, it is only by grace that nature, as creature, is preserved in its
complete and perfect integrity, namely in its full functionality.39
The relationship that, as we have observed before, exists between God
as primary cause and the human being as secondary or instrumental cause,
expresses exactly this condition of causal implication and containment. This
occurs through a creative theologisation of the flux metaphysics found in the
De causis, where the action of the secondary cause is always rooted in and
overdetermined by the power of the primary cause. Therefore, Aquinas constantly states that God “is the cause enabling all operating agents to operate”,
adding that “if divine influence were to cease, every operation would cease”.40
By applying the Proclian causal hierarchy to the teleological structure featuring the natural and artificial processes described by Aristotle, Aquinas
makes the secondary causes of Neoplatonic emanationism akin to the instrumental causes of Aristotelian finalism. The result is that of a strict cosmological and “providential determinism”, according to which – as Thomas
writes in compliance with the medieval adage opus naturae est opus intel
ligentiae – “the intention of the primary cause aims down to the last effect
37 Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae de potentia. 5,1, sc 3 (transl.: On
the power of God by Saint Thomas Aquinas, literally translated by the English
Dominican Fathers, vol. 2, London 1933), quoting Gregorius Magnus, mor. 16.37
(M. Adriaen (ed.), S. Gregorii Magni Moralia in Iob. Libri XI-XXII, CCSL 143A,
Turnholti 1979). But see also Aug., Gen litt 4.12 (I. Zycha (ed.), S. Aureli Augustini
De Genesi ad litteram, CSEL 28, Prague 1894)
38 Compare Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1.95,1.
39 See J.-P. Torrell, Nature et grâce chez Thomas d’Aquin, in: Revue thomiste 101
(2001), 167–202.
40 Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles 3.67 (V.J. Bourke (transl.), St. Thomas
Aquinas, On the Truth of the Catholic Faith. Book three: Providence, New York
1956). Aquinas expresses the same perspective, as he argues that “in all agent
causes arranged in an orderly way the subsequent causes must act through the
power of the first cause” (ibid.).
Reason, Free Will, and Predestination
159
through all intermediate causes”.41 In fact, when one does not understand
that the instrumental constitution of the creature has an eminently theological and providential value, he shall fail to comprehend the sense itself of the
divine causality. Most importantly, however, he shall not understand how
Thomas, explaining predestination, could adopt on a philosophical level all
those biblical auctoritates – like Prov 21:1 (The heart of the king is in the
hand of the Lord; whithersoever He will, He shall turn it) or Phil 2:13 (It is
God Who worketh in us, both to will and to accomplish, according to His
good will) –, which incontrovertibly testify the unconditioned availability of
human desires, fully inspired and used by God. This is indeed a very significant point, because it is precisely about the correct interpretation and understanding of these Scriptural verses that Aquinas returns to in his argument
with Origen, with much theoretical and critical coherence:
Some people – Thomas writes –, as a matter of fact, not understanding how God
could cause a movement of the will in us without prejudice to freedom of will, have
tried to explain these texts in a wrong way. That is, they would say that God causes
willing and accomplishing within us in the sense that He causes in us the power of
willing, but not in such a way that He makes us will this or that. Thus does Origen,
in his Princip1es, explain free choice, defending it against the texts above.42
41 Intentio primae causae respicit usque ad ultimum effectum per omnes causas
medias (Thomas Aquinas, Super Librum de causis expositio 1,1 (H.D. Saffrey
(ed.), Fribourg 1954)), that should be read in concert with id., Quaestiones dis
putatae de veritate, 3.1 (R.W. Mulligan (transl.), Truth by St. Thomas Aquinas,
Vol. 1, Questions 1–9, Chicago 1952): “We see also that a thing acts because of an
end (propter finem) in two ways. The agent himself may determine his end – and
this is true of all intellectual agents – or the end of the agent may be determined
by another principal agent (ab alio principali agente). For example, the flight of an
arrow is toward a definite end, but this end is determined by the archer. Similarly,
an operation of a nature (operatio naturae) which is for a definite end (ad determi
natum finem) presupposes an intellect that has pre-established the end of the nature
and ordered it to that end (praesupponit intellectum praestituentem finem naturae
et ordinantem ad finem illum naturam). For this reason, every work of nature is
said to be a work of intelligence (ratione cuius omne opus naturae dicitur esse opus
intelligentiae)”. I owe the expression “providential determinism” (“determinismo
provvidenziale”) to P. Porro, Lex necessitatis vel contingentiae. Necessità, contin
genza e provvidenza nell’universo di Tommaso d’Aquino, in: Revue des sciences
philosophiques et théologiques 96 (2012), 401–450 (430).
42 Quidam vero non intelligentes qualiter motum voluntatis Deus in nobis cau
sare possit absque preiudicio libertatis voluntatis, coacti sunt has auctoritates
male exponere: ut scilicet dicerent quod Deus causat in nobis velle et perficere, in
quantum causat nobis virtutem volendi, non autem sic quod faciat nos velle hoc
vel illud, sicut Origenes exponit in III Periarchon, liberum arbitrium defendens
contra auctoritates praedictas (Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles 3.89;
transl. Bourke). The reference is to Or., princ., 3.1,20: “To this we must answer
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Origen appears indeed to share the opinion according to which if will and
action really depend on God then “it is not we who have done the more
excellent deeds, but we seemed to do so, while it was God who bestowed
them”.43 Instead, according to Aquinas, even if our activity is determined
by God, we are the ones who have undoubtedly acted by our power, yet
as a creature can do, namely as a secondary cause, which acts by virtue of
the power of the first cause, just as a tool acts by virtue of the power of the
craftsman.44
The idea that even human will would be a tool in God’s hands, and that
God could change its inclination as He pleases,45 fits in well with Aquinas’
theory of providence. He is convinced that, insofar as God is the cause of
being as being, also the accidents of being – “among which are found neces
sity and contingency” – are subject to divine providence. The power of God
is not only that of producing, in accordance with His own intentions, certain effects rather than others, but also that to establishing the modality –
either necessary or contingent – of their realisation.46 Thus, as He wants
43
44
45
46
that the statement of the Apostle [scil. Phil 2:13] does not say that to will evil
things is of God or that to will good things is of God, nor that to do good things
or evil things is of God, but he speaks generally, that to will and to do are of God”
(transl. Behr).
οὐχ ἡμεῖς τὰ διαφέροντα πεποιήκαμεν, ἀλλ’ ἡμεῖς μὲν ἐδόξαμεν, ὁ δὲ θεὸς ταῦτα
ἐδωρήσατο (Or., phil., 21.19; transl. Behr). See also id., princ. 3.1,20.
Illud autem in cuius virtute agens agit, est causa non solum virtutis, sed etiam
actus. Quod in artifice apparet, in cuius virtute agit instrumentum, etiam quod ab
hoc artifice propriam formam non accepit, sed solum ab ipso applicatur ad actum.
Deus igitur est causa nobis non solum voluntatis sed etiam volendi (Thomas
Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles 3.89).
See for example Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1–2.9,6, ad 3: Ad tertium
dicendum quod Deus movet voluntatem hominis sicut universalis motor ad uni
versale obiectum voluntatis, quod est bonum. Et sine hac universali motione homo
non potest aliquid velle. Sed homo per rationem determinat se ad volendum hoc
vel illud, quod est vere bonum vel apparens bonum. Sed tamen interdum specialiter
Deus movet aliquos ad aliquid determinate volendum, quod est bonum: sicut in
his quos movet per gratiam.
Sicut autem dictum est, ens in quantum ens est, habet causam ipsum Deum: unde
sicut divinae providentiae subditur ipsum ens, ita etiam omnia accidentia entis
in quantum est ens, inter quae sunt necessarium et contingens. Ad divinam igitur
providentiam pertinet non solum quod faciat hoc ens, sed quod det ei contingen
tiam vel necessitatem. Secundum enim quod unicuique dare voluit contingentiam
vel necessitatem, praeparavit ei causas medias, ex quibus de necessitate sequatur,
vel contingenter. Invenitur igitur uniuscujusque effectus secundum quod est sub
ordine divinae providentiae necessitatem habere. Ex quo contingit quod haec
conditionalis est vera: si aliquid est a Deo provisum, hoc erit (Thomas Aquinas,
In Metaphysicam Aristotelis commentaria, 6.3, § 1220 (M.-R. Cathala (ed.), Turin
Reason, Free Will, and Predestination
161
that the human being would be saved freely, God prepares, in order for this
to be done, a contingent cause such as human will. But this does not mean
that the predestined could, as such, not be saved. Any effect that would be
under the infallible control of divine providence, although determined by
contingent proximate causes, is ineluctably necessary; nevertheless, it happens – as Aquinas emphasises – in the hypothetical manner of conditional
necessity:
The fact that the one who has been predestined, will be saved without fail, depends
on the certainty of predestination; yet, the issue here is not an absolute necessity,
but a conditional one, since – necessarily – if that one has been predestined, he will
be saved; but this is not absolutely necessary.47
In fact, one may well be perplexed facing this conclusion.48 Prima facie, it is
not clear what allows one to exclude that the good will of the predestined,
without being absolutely necessary, would be causally determined and therefore necessitated by divine action. Aquinas nevertheless, excludes it. And
as far as I can see, he comes to this stance on the basis of the absolute and
unconditional character of the divine power, which drives intimately and
appropriately, being the “intimate” cause of any creatural force.49 It follows
then that God can move human will in full conformity with its nature, that
is to say, with the same natural spontaneity by which it moves itself, having
created its power from nothing.50
47
48
49
50
1935); transl. J.P. Rowan, St. Thomas Aquinas Commentary on the Metaphysics
of Aristotle, vol. 1, Chicago 1961). On this topic, in addition to the already mentioned Porro, Lex necessitatis vel contingentiae, see also my Si aliquid est a Deo
provisum. Aristotele, il caso e il futuro contingente in Tommaso d’Aquino, in: M.
Leone / L. Valente (eds.), Libertà e determinismo. Riflessioni medievali, Roma
2017, 197–233 (218–233).
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod hic praedestinatus omnino salvatur ex certitudine
divinae praedestinationis: non tamen est ibi necessitas absoluta, sed conditionalis;
quia si talis est praedestinatus, necessario salvatur: non autem est necessarium
simpliciter (Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones de quolibet 11.3, ad 1).
Cf. also Petrus Aureolus, In primum librum Sententiarum 40,4, 934: Sed nec iste
modus evadit, quia cum replicatio ista & conditio immutabilis sit, frustratorium
est conari in oppositum consequentis.
Compare Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1.105,5 (transl. by Fathers of the
English Dominican Province, vol. 5, London 1922): “And because in all things
God Himself is properly the cause of universal being which is innermost in all
things (magis intimum in rebus); it follows that in all things God works intimately
(in omnibus intime operetur). For this reason in Holy Scripture the operations of
nature are attributed to God as operating in nature (quasi operanti in natura)”.
For example, cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1.106,2 (transl. by Fathers
of the English Dominican Province, vol. 5): “The operation of the will is a certain inclination of the willer to the thing willed. And He alone can change this
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To summarise, the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo, framed within a universal
teleological scheme, allows one to account for and support a strong antiOrigenian and anti-Pelagian interpretation of all those biblical auctoritates
that, as we have seen, put human desires in the hands of God. Such an interpretation, making the agentiality of the human being subjected to the divine
purpose of salvation and the unconditional power of creation, assumes that
God is able to cause good will without forcing it – that means, according to
Thomas and his theoretical but somewhat anodyne imagery, that God moves it
spontaneously, or without prejudice to its freedom of will.
In this perspective, the human being can be regarded as free not only and
not so much – as Origen leaned to stating polemically51 – because he considers himself free (for he is unaware of being an actor and performer of a
predetermined process), but rather because he is involved in an intrinsically
causal relationship, where the creature cannot be nor act out of the divine
power sustaining it. Here, there is no place for freedom if the latter is taken
as an absolutely autonomous activity. Outside God there is not freedom, just
because there is no condition of possibility. Outside God there is only “nothingness”, and whatever form of freedom regarded as “une totale indépendance libertaire vis-à-vis de Dieu”52 – i.e. vis-à-vis the only condition of sense
and existence for creatures – would necessarily imply a tragic and impossible
nihilistic act of annulment and degradation. Hence, only God appears to
be the measure and condition of freedom, and authentic human freedom –
namely, the possibility to act in accordance with the integrity of rational
nature – appears to be caused, restored and contained by divine grace. After
all, even according to Origen – let us think of the doctrine of the final apocatastasis, i.e. the unavoidable and infallible progress towards good –, the
autonomy of the creature is certainly not absolute, nor to the detriment of
God’s providence.53 Excluding that God could move good will for the fear
inclination, Who bestowed on the creature the power to will (virtutem volendi): just
as that agent alone can change (potest mutare) the natural inclination, which can
give the power to which follows that natural inclination. Now God alone gave
to the creature the power to will (solus autem Deus est qui potentiam volendi
tribuit creaturae), because He alone is the author of the intellectual nature (quia
ipse solus est auctor intellectualis naturae)”. See however also ibid. 105,4, ad 1;
111,2; 1–2.9,6 and id., Summa contra Gentiles 3.88.
51 Compare above, note 43.
52 S. A. Long, Providence, liberté et loi naturelle, in: Revue thomiste 102 (2002),
355–406 (362).
53 With regard to the doctrine of the final apocatastasis, Gaetano Lettieri has spoken
of a “paradossale prevalere nel sistema origeniano di un determinismo della grazia
a scapito della capacità di autonomia (quindi di perdizione finale) della libertà, ma
in senso del tutto opposto” with respect to the irresistibility of the Augustinian
Reason, Free Will, and Predestination
163
of undesirable deterministic effects, would mean ruling out the possibility
of considering human freedom in the only way that is theologically consistent: the paradoxical way of a “given freedom”, an undue and free release of
the capacity to will the good. Insofar as Thomas claims that this redemption
occurs through an intrinsic movement of the will, accomplishing its intimate
and natural desire of conversion, the metaphysical consistency of a theory of
freedom eminently theological and Christian, cannot be denied.54
grace (G. Lettieri, Il nodo cristiano. Dono e libertà dal Nuovo Testamento all’VIII
secolo, Rome 2009). See analogously id., Apocatastasi logica o apocalisse della
carne? Origene e Agostino paradigmi divergenti d’identificazione storicosociale
cristiana, in: E. Canone (ed.), Animacorpo alla luce dell’Etica. Antichi e moderni,
Florence 2015, 133–146, and compare the historical remark by V. Grossi, La pre
senza di Origene nell’ultimo Agostino (426–430), in: R. J. Daly (ed.), Origeniana
quinta, Leuven 1992, 558–564 (561).
54 See also O. H. Pesch, Thomas von Aquin. Grenze und Größe mittelalterlicher
Theologie. Eine Einführung, Mainz 19892, 177–178.
Pasquale Terracciano
Blurred Lines: Origen the Kabbalist
Abstract: The essay explores a side of Origen’s Renaissance mnemohistory. Starting from
Pico della Mirandola’s account of the Kabbalah, in which Origen assumes a privileged
role, to the end of Sixteenth century, when sometimes he would himself be considered
among the Kabbalists, the article shows how this paradigm would affect the history of
Renaissance philosophy.
Keywords: Christian Kabbala, Allegory, Esoteric teaching, Prisca theologia
In a pivotal page of the Oratio de hominis dignitate, Giovanni Pico della
Mirandola has written:
I come now to those things that I deduced from the ancient mysteries of the Hebrews
and that I cite as confirmation of the sacrosanct and Catholic faith. So that these things
notbe considered, by those who are ignorant of such matters, imaginary trifles or the
fables of storytellers. I wish to explain to all men what they are and what they are alike;
where they come from; by whom and by how many enlightened authors they are confirmed; and how enigmatic, how divine, how necessary they are for those of our own
faith for the safeguard of our religion against the importunate calumnies of the Jews.
Not only the famous doctors of the Hebrews, but also from among men of our opinion
Esdras, Hilary and Origen write that Moses on the mount received from God not only
the Law, which he left to posterity written down in five books, but also a true and more
occult explanation of the Law.1
Through this passage, Pico states the existence of an esoteric and perfect
knowledge divulged to Moses; in the following lines he asserts that this
revealed doctrine is the mysterious Kabbalah. For corroborating the Christian
conformity of his theory, he referred to a biblical author, Esdras, and two
theologians, Origen of Alexandria and Hilary. This statement can also be
found in the preface of Pico’s Apology, (into which Pico merged a large part
of the Oratio) written after the condemnation of several theses contained
in his Conclusiones;2 moreover, the account of the double revelation is
1
2
G. Pico della Mirandola, On the Dignity of Man [Oratio de hominis dignitate],
English translation by F. Borghesi / M. Papio / M. Riva, Cambridge 2012, 253–255.
G. Pico della Mirandola, Apologia, ed. P. E. Fornaciari, Florence 2010. As it
is well known, in December 1486, the 23-year-old Pico published 900 theses
(Conclusiones) to be disputed in Rome. Pico’s disputation never came about, and
his Conclusiones faced the first Inquisitorial action in the history of printing (see
S. Farmer, Syncretism in the west: Pico’s 900 theses, Temple 1998, 533; R. Hirsch,
166
Pasquale Terracciano
extensively contained in the defence of the thesis according to which “there
is no revealed science better than Magic or Kabbalah to certify the divinity
of Christ.” In the Quaestio quinta de magia et cabala of the Apologia, Pico
indeed clarifies the mythical origin of the Kabbalah as the hidden doctrine
that God gave to Moses and then orally transmitted until Ezra decided to
write it down in seventy books; this secret teaching also corresponds to the
anagogical method of reading the Scripture.3
Origen of Alexandria assumes a privileged role in his account. The Church
Father confirms the existence of an esoteric tradition in Christianity, starting with Jesus himself.4 Origen has explained that when Paul talks of “sentences of God” (eloquia Dei), he was referring to this secret revelation at the
Sinai;5 furthermore he has witnessed the oral diffusion of this doctrine in the
Sanhaedrin;6 he is aware, as the Kabbalists, of the hermeneutical richness of
numerology;7 he is the only Christian theologian who has explicitly quoted
Jewish masters in his books, and he is also the authority for understanding
why the Jews themselves don’t follow the Kabbalah.8 Moreover, the section
on language of Origen’s Contra Celsum was employed by Pico for turning
Plato’s Cratylus into a theurgist dimension, following a similar line of reasoning of Marsilio Ficino, whose lesson was crucial.9 Indeed, in apparent
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Printing, Selling and Reading, 1450–1550, Wiesbaden 1967, 89). From those 900
theses thirteen propositions were extracted, deemed unacceptable or dangerously
close to heresy: the defence of these theses was gathered into the Apologia.
Pico della Mirandola, 2010, 178.
Pico della Mirandola, 2012, 259. The passage of Origen is Or. Cels. 3.21. The
thesis has been held also by his master Clement of Alexandria. See G. Stroumsa,
Hidden wisdom. Esoteric Traditions and the Roots of Christian Mysticism, Leiden/
Boston 22005, 113.
Pico della Mirandola, 2010, 180.
Pico della Mirandola, 2010, 182
Pico della Mirandola, 2010, 172.
Pico della Mirandola, 2010, 188–190.
Pico della Mirandola, 2010, 177: Similiter de nominibus quod habeant ali
quam activitatem naturalem etiam notum est omnibus. Quam quidem activi
tatem naturalem non habent ut significativa sunt ad placitum, sed ut sint in se
quaedam res naturales. Ideo dixi nomina illa habere virtutem in Magia naturali
non ut significativa sunt, nisi forte essent aliqua quibus significatio esset natu
ralis, sicut Stoici dicunt de omnibus nominibus, quibus ut adversantur peripa
thetici, ita Plato in Cratilo assentitur de his quae sunt recte imposita. Origenes
autem de hebraicis hoc sentit, et ideo dicit quod quaedam nomina hebraica
in sacris litteris…fuerunt sic riservata et non mutata in aliam linguam, in qua
non retinuissent suam naturalem significationem et consequenter virtutem. See
Or. Cels, 1.24–25. Cfr. M. Ficino, The Philebus Commentary [In Philebum],
ed. and tranls. by M.J.B. Allen, Temple 1975, 141 and Ficino, Argumentum in
Blurred Lines: Origen the Kabbalist
167
concordance with Cratylus – which debated the question of whether the
meaning of words was derived from human agreement or if it was intrinsic
in the genesis of the words – Origen testifies to the unique natural “power”
(vis) of certain Hebrew words which do not denote created things, but are
directly related to the divine mysteries: these formulas could not be translated without losing their natural meaning and their “power”.
The depth and the limit of Pichian Origenism have been widely explored
from the second half of the twentieth century,10 also because the longest
and most erudite section in Pico’s Apologia regards the thesis according to
which it is “more rational to believe that Origen is saved, than to believe
he is damned”.11 Pico’s fervour has suggested that the issue of the personal
salvation of the Church Father could shed light on several other parts of
the Apologia, and that the defence of Origen could ultimately become a
Cratylum, in Id., Opera, Basel 1579, II, 1309. For the philological problems
and the inner philosophical reasons that underlie Ficino’s choice as well as
for an interpretation of the crucial role that the reference assumes in Ficino
and Pico, see F. Bacchelli, Giovanni Pico e Pierleone da Spoleto. Tra filosofia
dell’amore e tradizione cabalista, Florence 2001, 39 (n. 133), and G. Bartolucci,
Vera Religio. Marsilio Ficino e la tradizione ebraica, Milano 2017, pp.79–93.
See also V. Perrone Compagni, Abracadabra: le parole nella magia (Ficino,
Pico, Agrippa), in: Rivista di Estetica 19 (1/2002), 105–130 (120–128) and
S. Touissant, Ficin, Pic de la Mirandole, Reuchlin et le pouvoir des noms: à
propos de Néoplatonism et de Cabale chrétienne, in: W. Schimdtt-Biggermann
(ed.), Kristliche Cabbala, Stuttgart 2003, 67–79.
10 For a general overview of the interpretation of the Apologia and the Oratio connected with Origenism see W. G. Craven, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, Symbol
of his age. Modern Interpretations of a Renaissance Philosopher, Genève 1981.
E. Wind, The revival of Origen, in: D. Miner (ed.), Studies in Art and Literature for
Belle da Costa Greene, Princeton 1954, 412–424; then in E. Wind, The eloquence
of the Symbol, Oxford 1992; L. Giusso, Origene e il Rinascimento, Rome 1957;
H. Crouzel, Pic de la Mirandole et Origène, in: BLE 66 (1965), 174–194 and 272–
288; Id., Une controverse sur Origène à la Renaissance: Jean Pic de la Mirandole
e Pierre Garcia, Paris 1977; M. Schär, Das Nachleben des Origenes im Zeitalter
des Humanismus, Basel / Stuttgart 1979; D. Nodes, Origen of Alexandria among
the Renaissance Humanists and Their Twentieth Century Historians, in: D. Kries
/ C. Brown Tkacz (eds.) Nova Doctrina Vetusque: Essays on Early Christianity
in Honor of Frederic W. Schlatter, S. J., New York 1999, 51–64; P. Terracciano,
Omnia in figura. L’impronta di Origene tra ‘400 e ‘500, Rome 2012; A. Fürst /
C. Hengstermann (Hg.), Origenes humanista, mit Pico della Mirandolas Traktat,
De salute Origenis disputatio, Münster 2015; P. Terracciano, The Origen of
Pico’s Kabbalah: Esoteric Wisdom and the Dignity of Man, in: JHI 79/3 (2018),
343–361.
11 Farmer, 1998, 435.
168
Pasquale Terracciano
defence of Pico. The debate was directed toward Origen’s possible influence
in Pico’s theory of eternal punishments, to his critical attitude concerning
the dogma in the ecclesiastic authority, and, above all, to his ascendency
in Pico’s doctrine of the dignity of man.12 Surprisingly, the role of Origen
in the Pichian shaping of the Christian Kabbalah has been poorly analysed, in
spite of the fact that, in the fatal years 1486–1487, the only direct references
to Origen – excluding the mentions in the De salute Origenis disputatio –
are all concerned with Kabbalistic issues.13 Despite a renowned tradition
which has inquired after the possibility that Origen was the secret inspiration of Pico’s anthropology, it can instead be reasonably argued that the
Mirandulane was primarily attracted by Origen as the preferred advocate of
the long chain of hidden wisdom which Pico was on the point of revealing in
1486, and that it is only through this point that he affected Pico’s doctrines.14
The image of the Church Father as master of secret wisdom – already
present in Antiquity in a scattered way – had a profound legacy in the sixteenth century and is one of the ways in which Origen was received. He was,
obviously, also read as the exegete of the free will and the theologian of infinite mercy; but the esoteric aspect is nonetheless relevant. In the following
pages, by inquiring into the characteristics of this heritage, a fragmentary,
collateral aim can be pursued regarding the legacy of the Mirandulane. The
history of the reception of Pico’s works is, in fact, far from complete.15 In
the last decade a few studies have been devoted to this topic: in particular,
12 E. Garin, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, vita e dottrina, Florence 1937, 141;
E. Cassirer, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola. A Study in the History of the
Renaissance Ideas, in: JHI 3 (1942), 330; Giusso, 1957; E. P. Mahoney, Giovanni
Pico della Mirandola and Origen on Humans, Choice and Hierarchy, in: Vivens
Homo 5/2 (1994), 359–376; G. Busi / R. Egbi, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola.
Mito, Magia, Kabbalah, Milan 2014, XXXII. For a critique on the Origenian influence on the debate on the eternal punishment developed in the second section of
the Apologia see the sources published by G. Mariani, Giovanni Pico e Roberto
da Lecce. Annotazioni su una ritrovata fonte dell’Apologia e l’origenismo quat
trocentesco, in: Schifanoia XLVI-XLVII (2014) 137–148.
13 Pico della Mirandola, 2010, 24–26; for Heptaplus and in Comento see Id. De
hominis dignitate. Heptaplus. De Ente et uno et scritti vari, a cura di E. Garin,
Florence 1942; 172–174 (Heptaplus); 580 (Comento).
14 Terracciano, 2018.
15 E. Garin, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola: Comitato per le celebrazioni centena
rie in onore di Giovanni Pico, Parma (1963), 55; O. Kristeller, Giovanni Pico
della Mirandola and its Sources, now in Id. Studies in Renaissance, Thought and
Letters III, Roma 1993, 227–304; S. Campanini, Il commento alle Conclusiones
Cabalisticae nel Cinquecento, in: F. Lelli (ed.) Giovanni Pico e la cabbalà, Florence
2010, 167–230 (170).
Blurred Lines: Origen the Kabbalist
169
the surprising vitality of the Conclusiones Cabalisticae throughout the successive century has been brought to light.16 The same must be supposed for
the Quaestio quinta de magia et cabala contained in the Apologia, for which
we do not have a similar study. The debate Pico began on the true Kabbalah
carried on through a list of commentators, of advocates and opponents.
2. The use of Origen by Pico is deeply rooted in his global project of
rethinking ancient traditions in order to elaborate a new image of man and
cosmos. Cutting the elements from this project might cause them to change
their function. The primary features of the portrait of Origen that Pico constructs are two: the expositor of the natural connection between special
names and objects (correlated to the interpretation of the Cratylus), and the
witness of the diffusion of the Kabbalah. They became part of the common
assemblage used in the debate on magic and esoteric arts. It is well known
to Renaissance scholars, however, that under the uniform reproduction of
blocks of texts – basically a series of unvaried plagiarisms that flood from
book to book – the quotations often refer to different, and sometimes opposite, doctrines. In this process, although the two features are interweaved
and often remained linked in tradition for a certain span of time, they will
have a partially different fate. Indeed, the meaning of the support of Origen
to Pico’s Kabbalah, pulled out from visible and invisible wires to Pico’s
entire project, will gradually change and have its own future life; the first
element, instead, will be altered in lesser extension, even if it is destined to
a long fortune too, partially yet known to scholarship.17 Origen’s belief in
the miraculous power of certain names had a wide echo indeed. The argument, derived from Ficino, was used a few years later by Polidoro Vergili in
his De Inventoribus (1499), and by Paolo Ricci, Galatino, Reuchlin (who
employs exactly the same words of Ficino’s Cratylum),18 Zorzi, Agrippa,19
16 Campanini, Il commento, 2010.
17 A. Coudert, Some theories of a Natural Language from the Renaissance to the
Seventeenth Century: Studia Leibnitiana 7, Magia Naturalis un die Enttehung
der modernen Naturwissenschaften, Wiesbaden 1978; B. Vickers, Analogy versus
Identity: The Rejection of Occult Symbolism, 1580–1680, in: Id. (ed.), Occult and
Scientific Mentalities in the Renaissance, Cambridge 1984; J. Bono, The Word
of God and the Languages of Man: Vol. 1: Ficino to Descartes, Madison 1995;
M. J. B. Allen, Marsilio Ficino on Significatio, in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy
26 (2002), 30–43.
18 J. Reuchlin, De Verbo Mirifico, W.-W. Ehlers / L. Mundt / H.-G. Roloff / P. Schäfer
(eds.), Stuttgart / Bad Cannstatt 1996, 198.
19 Reuchlin 1996, 430–434 in Lib. 3, Cap. 9 De divinis nominibus eorundemque
potentia et virtute; 430. Unde Origenes praecipit ea in suispsis characteribus incor
rupte conservanda et Zoroastes etiam vetat barbara et antiqua verba mutari; nam
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Pasquale Terracciano
Giulio Camillo and many others. The legacy of this reading of the Cratylum
would require a specific essay to explore properly; however, it is useful to
keep in mind that it often flowed in parallel with the Kabbalistic exposition,
on which I will concentrate in the following pages.
The account of the secret revelation received by Moses, as could be
expected, poured into the debate on Christian Kabbalism, often relying on
Pico’s own words. This didn’t happen immediately. The cost of the fecund
originality of Pico laid in some ingenuity and in several contradictions.
Among those who would take up the Pichian report, those more prepared
in Jewish studies would cut and edit his account. Johannes Reuchlin, proud
of his Kabbalistic library and, perhaps, sceptical of the authenticity of the
supposed ancient books bought by Pico and of his list of Kabbalists,20 passed
over the chain of Christian sources proposed by Pico and insisted on a wider
enumeration of Jewish sources and Kabbalists.21 The first controversialists
skipped – to the best of my knowledge – the Pauline interpretation proposed
through Origen. Paolo Ricci reflected on the relationship between allegorism, and Kabbalah derived from Moses, but did not comment on the role
of Ezra and Origen.22 Galatino, who also reflected upon the relationship
between the allegorical sense and Kabbalistic interpretation, said nothing on
the role of the Greek Father in his report of the genesis of the Kabbalah.23
20
21
22
23
(ut inquit Plato in Cratilo) omnia divina verba, sive nomina, vel a diis primum
vel ab antiquitate, cuius initium haud facile scitur, vel a barbaris prodita sunt;
Iamblichus quoque similiter praecipit ea non esse ex sua lingua in aliam trans
ferenda: ‘Non enim eandem – inquit – mentem servant nomina in aliam linguam
interpretata.
J. Reuchlin, De Arte cabalistica libri tres, W.-W. Ehlers / F. Felgentrau (eds.),
Stuttgart / Bad Cannstatt 2010, 114–116. For his kabbalistic library see J. Reuchlin,
L’arte cabbalistica (De arte cabalistica), G. Busi / S. Campanini (eds.), LI-LXX,
Venice 1995.
A characteristic of De Arte Cabalistica is the absence of a Christian interlocutor
in the debate: this element could maybe explain the choice of Reuchlin, deeply
committed to showing his astonishing knowledge of Jewish sources. It could be
worth adding that, although his project agrees with the idea that the final aim
of the Kabbalah is in showing the truth of the Christianity, Reuchlin works also
towards a recovery of Pythagorean wisdom as a forgotten part of the Kabbalah.
According to him, furthermore, the revelation of the hidden law went back from
Adam and not from Moses, so he was less interested than Pico – and probably
found more dangerous – in putting Christian exegetes in this history of the dissemination of the Kabbalah.
P. Israelite (Ricius), In cabalistarum seu allegorizantium eruditionem Isagoge,
Augsburg 1510, f. 4. 7v.
P. Galatino, Opus de Arcanis Catholicae veritate, Basel 1550 (first edition Ortona a
Mare 1518), 20 f. He reports, anyway, the issue of the uniqueness of the language,
Blurred Lines: Origen the Kabbalist
171
Meanwhile, the Kabbalah-allegorical interpretation left visible traces in
the editorial history of Origen’s texts. In the 1513 Venetian edition of De
Principiis, the editor, Constantius Hyerothaus, declared that Dyonisus the
Aereopagite had enhanced a method of interpretation which was called
Kabbalah by the Jews and consisted of allegorical and anagogical reading,
“on which Origen had many times written”.24 The fact that these words
appeared in Venice cannot be a coincidence. In effect, the crucial turn that
gave precedence to Pico’s version of the revelation to Moses and to the role
of Origen in this must be dated to those years in the Serenissima, represented by the work of the Venetian Friar Francesco Zorzi.25 In his monumental volumes, De Harmonia Mundi (1519–25) and In Sacram Scripturam
Problemata – which enjoyed a broad European reception in the sixteenth
and seventeenth century – the presence of Origen is explicit and pervasive,
according to the aforementioned witness of the Contra Celsum; ibidem, 92–93,
following Reuchlin, De Verbo Mirifico, 1996, 198.
24 Sublimis Origenis Opus Peri archon: seu De principijs: correctum & ordinatum: ac
vndequaque cautis erroribus: & in abstrusis sensibus interpretatum. Addito trac
tatu De natura materie ad inuenta Origenis: & Methodo in disciplinam eius
dem: a Constantio Hyerotheo: […] Item Apologia Pamphili martyris & Ruffini
Aquilegie presbyteri pro Origene, Venice 1514: De quibus beatissimus quoque
meminit Dionysius in his quae scripsit de ecclesiatica Hierarchia. Ex his prodiit
illud interpretandi genus (quod Cabale sensus est apud Hebraeos: magia ex natura
apud barbaros et graecos) quum litterae sententia, per allegoriae et anagogiae
intelligentiam ducitur, de quare eleganter hic noster Origenes plurima.
25 For a general bibliography P. Giovanni Degli Agostini, Notizie istorichocritiche
intorno alla vita e le opere degli scrittori viniziani, 2 vols., Venice 1754, 332–
363; U. Vicentin, F. Zorzi Teologo Cabalista O. F. M., in: Le Venezie francescane
31 (1954), 121–162; 174–226; C. Vasoli, Profezia e ragione. Studi sulla cultura
del Cinquecento e del Seicento, Napoli 1974, 189–292; Id., Francesco Giorgio
Veneto e Marsilio Ficino, in: G.C. Garfagnini (ed.), Marsilio Ficino e il ritorno
di Platone. Studi e documenti, Florence 1986. For his role in the history of the
Christian Cabala, seeJ. L. Blau, The Christian Interpretation of the Cabala in the
Renaissance, New York 1944; F. Secret, Les kabbalistes chrétiens de la Renaissance,
Paris 1964; C. Wirszubski, Francesco Giorgio’s Commentario on Giovanni Pico’s
Kabbalistc Theses: JWCI 37 (1974), 145–156; F. Yates, The Occult Philosophy in
the Elizabethan Age, London 1979, 29–36; G. Busi, Francesco Zorzi. A methodo
logical dreamer, in: J. Dan (ed.) The Christian Cabbala, Cambridge 1997, 97–125;
S. Campanini, Le fonti ebraiche del De Harmonia Mundi di Francesco Zorzi,
in: Annali di Ca’ Foscari 38 (1999), 29–74; S. Campanini, Francesco Zorzi: armo
nia del mondo e filosofia simbolica, in: A. Angelini / P. Caye (eds.), Il pensiero
simbolico nella prima età moderna, Florence 2007, 239; Id., Saggio introduttivo
to F. Zorzi, L’Armonia del Mondo, Milan 2010.
172
Pasquale Terracciano
to the extent that the role of the Church Father is the key to understanding
his syncretistic Pantheon.
The richness of Zorzi’s knowledge of patristic and Jewish sources is integrated into a coherent Neoplatonic system, combined with Pythagoric and
Vitruvian fascinations. Zorzi held a strong conviction that the Kabbalah could
prove the truth of Christianity. His own predilection for Origen derives from
his role as cultural broker of the different ancient wisdoms. Specifically, following the path of Giovanni Pico’s interpretation, he considered Origen the
Christian exegete most familiar with the secret philosophical doctrines of the
Jews. According to Zorzi, Origen and Plato had themselves followed secret
Jewish teachings. Furthermore, he stated that Origen in his Peri Arcon testified
that Enoch was the first who wrote on the secret doctrines of the Kabbalah.26
In De Harmonia Mundi, in reviewing the list of Jewish masters “that tune
up the chorus of the divine truths”, Zorzi detailed the order of those who
had received the interpretation of the Kabbalah after Ezra. He reproduced
there, with few omissions, the same Reuchlian list expressed in De Arte
Cabbalistica that included only Jewish rabbis.27 Zorzi extended the reception to St. Paul, St. John, Dyonisus, and Origen as commentators of these
doctrines, grafting the erudite and detailed accounts of Reuchlin onto Pico’s
framework. Concerning the Alexandrian, Zorzi adds that:
Origen, either because he tried to hide the precepts revealed by God, to avoid sinning, according to the rules of the prophet, or because, having sworn to his master
Ammonio, did not dare to reveal what was boiling in his mind, apparently remains
on the surface in order to allude the hidden core to the initiates. Nevertheless, on
the ground of a few sentences expressed in the Contra Celsum, someone argues
that he has moved away from that school, and has come to enjoy the mysterious
fruits, simply following the platonic doctrines. However (if I’m not mistaken), his
doctrine, as well the doctrine of Plato, in many places closely recalls the Hebrew
theology.28
26 Zorzi, 2010, 194: Cabalistae autem, qui a vero oraculo acceperunt (nam cabala
ore receptio dicitur) vel ab doctis ab huiusmodi didicerunt, secretiora legis sensa
prosequentes, de multis qui scripserunt, ii sunt, primus Hanoc, de quo meminit
Thadeus in epistola, et Origenes in Periarchon.
27 Zorzi, 2010, 196 f., compare with Reuchlin, 2010, p. 108 f.: the most significant
omission regards the notice that Jesus of Nazareth, different from the Christan
Jesus, was a disciple of Yehoshua, son of Perahiah.
28 Zorzi, 2010, 196–198: Ezra primus (ut fertur) haec monumenta sacratissima com
misit septuaginta voluminibus, quae prius ore tantummodo docebantur…Ex his
autem, qui verum Messiam secuti sunt, Paulus noster, et Iohannes magnifica illa
sensa ubique persequentes caeteris altius scripsere. Sed ex his, qui commentaria
aedidere (ut videre videor) nullus secretiora illa sacramenta olfecit nisi Dyonisus
et Origenes, sed hic, aut quia studebat cum Propheta abscondere eloquia Dei
Blurred Lines: Origen the Kabbalist
173
This passage from Zorzi is decisive: he explicitly suggests that Origen not
only knows of the existence of the secret wisdom but also understands
its “hidden core”, and that his doctrines resemble those of the Hebrews.
For this reason, Zorzi regards Origen as a significant exponent of ancient
esotericism.29 He draws a line that, through Origen’s education under the
teaching of Ammonius Sacca, connects the exegesis of the Church Father
to the Jewish tradition. Origen thus would have learned from Ammonius,
“or better from Hebrew rabbis”, the fourfold interpretation of Scripture:30
he then refined the method, becoming the greatest master in this kind of
exegesis. The need to move beyond the letter of the Holy texts arises from
the common consciousness of the role of hidden doctrines in the structural
esotericism of the divine mysteries. According to Zorzi, both Origen and the
Kabbalists worked towards an “exegesis of a shadow” because they were
both aware of the existence of curtains that veil the wisdom. The point has
for him a double implication: it is a fundamental testimony to the truth of
the Kabbalah, and a confirmation of the preeminent role of Origen among
Christian theologians. This consideration does not come without effect. On
the contrary, in Zorzi’s pages one frequently sees the duplex action (if not an
actual overlap) of Hebrew hermeneutics and Origenian exegesis.
Along these lines, from the preface of De Harmonia Mundi, Origen is the
guide who directs Zorzi’s hermeneutics, focused on grasping the meaning of
the numerical proportions that permeate the world. He appears as the most
significant example in the Christian tradition of the legitimacy of an allegorical interpretation of the text. The need to hunt for the deep sense contained
in the composition and in the forms of the alphabetical character – a typical Kabbalistic preoccupation – is confirmed through the argument of the
inevitable loss of vis in the translation of special names (by means of the
aforementioned reference to the Cratylus / Contra Celsum). If the Kabbalah
sibi credita, ne peccaret, aut quia iuratos a praeceptore Ammonio non est ausus
palam producere ea, quae bulliebant in mentem, ideo per corticem semper levius
decurrit, ea tamen lege, ut secretiorem medullam innuat expertis, quamvis ex
quibusdam verbis dictis contra Celsum nonnulli asserant ipsum ab huiusmodi
schola declinasse, et tantummodo Platonica dogmata secutum penetrasse ad illa
secretiora pabula. Sed (ni fallor) in multis eius doctrina, sicut et Platonica, redolet
hebraicam Theologiam. The underlines correspond to the intervention of the censorship, [G.M. Guanzelli], Indicis librorum prohibitotorum et expurgandorum,
Rome 1607, which orders to cancel these lines.
29 Zorzi, 2010, 198. This passage was also censored.
30 Zorzi, 2010, 350: Quo modo interpretandi saepius utitur omnium interpretum
sacrarum literarum apud nostros facile princeps Origenes, prout ab Ammonio,
immo a sapientibus Haebreis acceperat.
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could be considered his blueprint in these issues, Origen provided Zorzi with
a justification for advancing some daring readings.31
Zorzi often follows Ficino and Pico step by step. However, concerning
the genesis of the Kabbalah, by merging Pico’s account with the information received from Reuchlin,32 Zorzi was fundamental in creating the patchwork destined to be influential in the following centuries. Zorzi’s books
were quite successful: De Harmonia Mundi, in particular, was published
in Paris in 1546 and 1564, and then translated into French by Lefèvre de
la Boderie in 1578. Furthermore, the role of Zorzi was not restricted to the
editorial destiny of his main books. First, Zorzi also worked towards a close
and systematic commentary of the Conclusiones, which survived tortuously
in an exegetical tradition inside the Franciscan Observance, through the
enlarged and revisioned version by Arcangelo of Borgonovo. In the version
by Arcangelo of Borgonovo, Origen is, as expected, set to guarantee the
transmission of the knowledge of the sublime things, protected by the veil of
allegory, which is nothing more than the Kabbalah.33 But in the Franciscan
Order there were also understandable hostilities regarding this kabbalistic
shadow over Christianity: one of the most important Franciscan preachers,
31 One of the examples is Zorzi, 2010, 1686: Quae (ut Origenes ait) non sunt
intelligenda secundum carnem, sicuti Ebioniti toto (aut aiunt) coelo aberrantes
senserunt, qui re et nomine pauperrimi sunt, sed secundum spiritum, vel in sensu
morali, de quo diximus, vel in sensu allegorico, ut nunc latius explicabimus; ibid.
760, after a disquisition on the symbolic value of the tetragrammaton: Si autem
a sensu anagogico ad sensum moralem Origenem sequentes transcendere volueri
mus arbores sunt virtutes plantae et infusae nobis a coelesti agricola a quo omne
datum optimum et omne domum perfectum and hereinafter: Ad superiorem autem
sensum redeundo, in quem alibi idem Origenes consentit, omnis arbor est omne
genus personarum, sive rex fit, aut servus, civis, aut rusticus, artifex, aut et mulier.
32 Supra n.27. In addition to the list of the Esdra’s followers, it is possible to grasp
the Reuchlin’s influence, among the other topics, in the exposition of difference
between Talmudists and Kabbalists, see Zorzi, 2010, 194 and Reuchlin, 2010, 122.
33 Arcangelo of Borgonovo, Apologia, Bologna 1564, 318, 330. For the most recent
account on the history of the manuscripts of Arcangelo of Borgonovo, his dependence from Zorzi and his diffusion in the Observance see S. Campanini, Il com
mento alle Conclusiones Cabalisticae nel Cinquecento, in: F. Lelli (ed.), Giovanni
Pico e la cabbalà, Florence 2010, 183–210. Arcangelo of Borgonovo assembled
part of this material also in in his vernacular Kabbalistic book, Arcangelo di
Borgonovo, In Decharatione sopra il nome di Giesu secondo gli Hebrei, Cabalisti,
Greci, Caldei, Persi et Latini, intitolato Specchio di Salute, Ferrara 1557, where
he reports the issue of the ineffability of the name of Jesus before the proclamation of the Gospel according Origen (151), and moreover the topic of the power
of the divine names as key to understanding the Kabbalah (1), following Contra
Celsum.
Blurred Lines: Origen the Kabbalist
175
Bernardino Ochino (who in 1542 would escape among the Protestants)
delivered a homily “On the true Kabbalah” (Della vera cabala) in Venice
in 1539, probably addressed against Zorzi’s Problemata.34 Ochino reviewed
the account of the reception from Ezra, clarifying that the true Kabbalah is
the Pentateuch and the real knowledge of the hidden mysteries is the simple
faith in Christ.35
Second, because his works were subjected to a long inquisitorial process
of expurgation in the second half of the century, the Catholic censors were
indirectly pushed to face the connection between Origen and esotericism
and kabbalism. Beginning with the first interventions, the hostilities of the
censors were in fact directed against the syncretism of Zorzi, the special
blend of Platonic and Kabbalistic doctrines that made the charge of correcting his texts “harder than cleaning stables”.36 The final expurgation,
published by Guanzelli, in 1606, tried to polish – with varying results – the
connections between Christian doctrine, Platonism, and Jewish mysteries,
advocating the complete eradication of Pico’s version on the origin of the
Kabbalah.37 As a consequence, the censor also attempted to brush the esoteric stains from the figure of Origen. Guanzelli erased the asserted resemblance between the doctrines of Origen and Plato with that of Jewish
theology, and purged the entire passage about the education of Origen
under Ammonius, the esoteric practice of those teachings, and especially
the presence of truth in the Kabbalah.38 It is interesting to note that, parallel
34 Terracciano, 2010, 291–297 (297)
35 Sermones Bernardini Ochini Senensis, [n.p. (Ochino)], Geneva 1543, Sermone
xiiii, Della vera Cabala.
36 As an internal document of the Congregation for the Defence of Faith has
denounced in 1583: see C. Vasoli, Nuovi documenti sulla condanna all’Indice e
la censura delle opere di Francesco Giorgio Veneto, in: C. Stango (ed.) Censura
ecclesiastica e cultura politica in Italia tra Cinquecento e Seicento, Florence 2001,
55–78 (76).
37 See the examples at n. 28. 29. 38. The expurgation of Zorzi’s work has been
studied by A. Rotondò, La censura ecclesiatica e la cultura: Storia d’Italia 5**.
I documenti, Torino 1973, 1397–1456 (1428); Id., Nuovi documenti per la sto
ria dell’Indice dei libri proibiti (1527–1638), in: Rinascimento (1963) 145–211;
Id., Cultura umanistica e difficoltà di censori. Censura ecclesiastica e discussi
oni cinquecentesche sul platonismo, in: J. Guidi (ed.), La pouvoir et la plume.
Incitation, contrôle et répression dans l’Italie du XVI siècle, Paris 1982, 15–50
(22–23); E. Rebellato, Il miraggio dell’espurgazione. L’Indice di Guanzelli del
1607, in: Società e Storia, CXXII 2008, 715–742; S. Ricci, Inquisitori, censori,
filosofi sullo scenario della Controriforma, Roma 2008.
38 [Guanzelli] Indicis, 1607, 512; on Zorzi, 2010, 196–198: Sed ex his, qui com
mentaria aedidere (ut videre videor) nullus secretiora illa sacramenta olfecit nisi
Dyonisus et Origenes. Sed hic, aut quia studebat cum Propheta abscondere eloquia
176
Pasquale Terracciano
to this process, at least one author engaged in restoring the orthodox body
of Christianity had begun to highlight Origen’s commitment to opposing
the esoteric way of writing: this is the case of Giovan Battista Crispo in his
De caute Platone legendo (who probably followed the French editor of the
new Opera Omnia of Origen).39
Returning to the reception of Zorzi’s work, however, its influence might
also be measured by the simple fact that the most authoritative book on
magic in the sixteenth century, the De Occulta Philosophia of Cornelius
Agrippa, was reviewed by the author after an attentive scanning of the De
Harmonia Mundi.40
3. In the third book of his De Occulta Philosophia (1533), in order to
justify the idea that Christian truth could be better served in silence, Agrippa
related a list of prisci philosophi, who had secretly revealed the deepest
doctrines. The list included Origen, as a disciple of the secret teachings of
Ammonius, and Jesus, who had divulged some truths only to his intimate
followers.41 The presence of Origen in the enumeration of the masters of
esoteric wisdom seems to have been secured during this time. In De Occulta
philosophia, Agrippa further faced the position of Origen, “not inferior to
the most magnificent philosophers”, on the issue of the miraculous power
of names,42 but he did not make any reference to Origen as a witness to the
genetic process of the Kabbalah, something he certainly knew. The esoteric
39
40
41
42
Dei sibi credita, ne peccaret: aut quia iuratos a praeceptore Ammonio non est
ausus palam producere ea, quae bulliebant in mentem. Ideo per corticem semper
levius decurrit, ea tamen lege, ut secretiorem medullam innuat expertis: quamvis
ex quibusdam verbis dictis contra Celsum nonnulli afferant ipsum ab huiusmodi
schola declinasse, et tantummodo Platonica dogmata secutum penetrasse ad illa
secretiora pabula. Sed (ni fallor) in multis eius doctrina /sicut et Platonica/ redolet
hebraicam Theologiam. The underscore corresponds to the intervention of the
censor.
Namely G. Genebrard in Origenis Adamantii…Opera, Paris 1574; G. B. Crispo,
De Ethnicis philosophis caute legendis disputationum, Rome 1594, 1.
V. Perrone Compagni, Una fonte di Cornelio Agrippa: il “De harmonia mundi”
di Francesco Giorgio Veneto, in: Annali dell’Istituto di Filosofia [Università di
Firenze] IV (1982), 45–74.
P. Zambelli, White Magic, Black Magic in the European Renaissance, Leiden
2007, 171.
H.C. Agrippa von Nettesheim, De Occulta philosophia, ed. by V. Perrone
Compagni, Lib. I, LXXIV (De proportione, correspondentia, reduction literarum
ad signa coelestia et planetas secundum varias linguas cum tabella hoc indicante)
242; Lib III, Cap. XI (De divinis nominibus eorundemque potentia et virtute),
430–434; in both places Agrippa subterraneously dialogues with Ficino, Pico
and Zorzi.
Blurred Lines: Origen the Kabbalist
177
revelation as presented to Moses, and affirmed by Paulus, Origen, Hylarius,
and Ezra, is indeed completely outlined in De Triplice ratione cognoscendi
Deum, with the details present in Pico and Zorzi.43 It is furthermore reiterated in De vanitate in a drier form (without the mention of Origen). As is
well-known, De vanitate is an attack on all the forms of human knowledge,
including the unorthodox ones, among them magic and the Kabbalah. I will
not dwell here on the interpretation of the meaning of De vanitate with
respect to Agrippa’s other texts: however, as expected – with respect to the
aim of the book – the account of the genesis of the Kabbalah is harshly contested.44 The Kabbalah is in fact divided into two parts: the so-called Bresith
i.e. a cosmology, “which exposes with philosophical reasons the mysteries
of the law and of the Bible” (ch. 47), and the part called Mercantia, which
is “almost a certain symbolic theology of the most sublime contemplation
of divine and angelic virtues, and of sacred names, and signs; in which the
letters, numbers, shapes, things, the names of the characters lines, points and
accents, all are significant of the deepest things and profound mysteries.” ’
The first one is the wisdom attainable through the anagogical sense, while
the second is the technical kabbalistic method.45
If Agrippa in truth agrees with the possibility of esoteric teaching, he
nonetheless attests to having found in those Jewish texts nothing but a certain superstition. The passage dialogues with Pico’s account of the Apology,
showing its possible incongruities:
Nevertheless, I am sure that God reveals to Moses and other prophets many things
that were covered under the skin of the words of the law; mysteries that can not
be communicated to the ignorant common people. So, I know that this art of the
Kabbalah - of which the Hebrews are so proud and with great difficulty I have
43 V. Perrone Compagni, Ermetismo e cristianesimo in Agrippa. Il De triplice ratione
cognoscendi Deum, Florence 2005, IV. 122–123.
44 H.C. Agrippa von Nettesheim, De incertitudine et vanitate scientiarum declamatio
invectiva, Antwerp, l530; the Italian vulgarisation is C. Agrippa, Della vanità delle
scienze tradotto per M. Ludovico Dominichi, Venice 1549.
45 Agrippa, 1549, 63–64. He referred to Ma’aseh Bereshit (Work of the Beginning, ie.
the physics) and Ma’aseh Merkavah (Work of the Chariot, the metaphysics). The
distinction came to Pico from Maimonides and Abraham Abulafia: see C. Black,
Pico’s Heptaplus and Biblical Hermeneutics, Leiden 2006, and B. Copenhaver,
Number, Shape and Meaning in Pico’s Christian Cabala, in: A. Grafton / N. Siraisi
(eds.), Natural Particulars: Nature and Disciplines in Renaissance Europe,
Cambridge 1999, 35–36. In distinguishing the two kinds of Kabbalah, in the
exposition of the Apology, Pico used the Hebrew name only for the Ma’aseh
Merkavah (however, he has referred to Ma’aseh Bereshit in his Conclusiones). So,
it could be argued that the page of Agrippa also crosses Reichlin, 2010, 70.
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investigated – is nothing but then a pure superstition, and a part theurgic magic.
And if, as they boast the Jews, this art would come from God and it would be
fruitful to the perfection of life, to the health of the man, to the worship of God,
to understand the truth; but, for sure, the divine spirit - which, abandoned the synagogue came to teach us all truth – it would not have hidden to the Church until
these times, because the Church really knew all the divine things. And the divine
devotion, the baptism, and the other sacraments of health are revealed and perfect
in every language. Each language has the same and equal virtue, and still has equal
piety: nor there is another name in heaven, or in the earth, in which we have to save
ourselves, and we will operate then the name of Jesus, in which it has summarized,
and it will contain all things.46
In order to attack the divine genesis of the esoteric Kabbalah, Agrippa questioned the supremacy of the Hebrew language, showing acute awareness
of the interdependence of the two elements in Pico’s line of reasoning. The
promptness of the rhetorical transition – in a sentence, from the relationship
between synagogue and Church to the nature of language in the sacrament –
must be explained through the question of the magical power present in all
the vocabularies, which involves the refusal of the philo-Hebrew position
expressed in the crucial page of the Contra Celsum. There is no specificity of
the Kabbalah as the expression of a sacred language because every language
is valid for reaching God.
Reflecting on the status of the Kabbalah had, however, become common in
texts approaching magic and witchcraft. In the index of the antiparacelsian
book of Erastus, the Disputationum de medicina nova Philippi Paracelsi,
issued in four parts from 1571 and 1573, Origen is expressly referred to
as “Cabalae studiosus”. In demonstrating that Paracelsus had dabbled in
demonic magic in his reference to the Kabbalah, Erastus notes the existence
of two kinds of this science: the first one permissible but limited to investigating abstruse enigmas in the Scripture – of which Origen was the most
compromised interpreter - and the second demonic and necromantic. In no
way could Paracelus’ speculation be considered an anagogical interpretation
of the Scripture, and as such it had to be condemned.47 In the last chapter of
his books, he further clarifies his position on the Kabbalah. Erastus is resolute
in confuting “Pico’s version” of the genesis of the Kabbalah, by denouncing
the absence of evidence and the nonexistence of Esdra’s books: furthermore,
he is engaged in dismantling each one of his sources, including Origen. With
an ironic undertone, he states that “to Origen great injury is not done”,
46 Agrippa, 1549, 63–64.
47 T. Lieber (Erastus), Disputationum de medicina nova Philippi Paracelsi, Basel
1573, 18: abstrusos Scripturae sensus investiganti et enigmate eiusdem expli
canti: in qua nimius fuit Origenes.
Blurred Lines: Origen the Kabbalist
179
because his interpretation of Romans is not misunderstood, but rather is
useless for the kabbalistic account.48 Erastus sternly concludes that if the
Cabala is nothing but a theologia mystica and an anagogical interpretation,
the texts of this theology are nonetheless lacking unless the New Testament
is considered the real Kabbalah, as a spiritual explanation of the old Law. If
it is anything else, it must be considered a diabolic creation, and if Paracelsus
followed it, he must have found his way to the Tartarean region, and not
the Heavens.
4. When Friar Sixtus of Siena wrote the section on Ezra in the tome of his
Bibliotheca Sancta devoted to the books of the Old Testament, he centered
it on Pico’s version of the genesis of the Kabbalah.49 Furthermore, he considered it more profoundly in the third tome of the Bibliotheca, where he dealt
with the different methods of explaining the Scripture. After the fourfold
reading, he dedicated a section to a less usual tripartite technique, which
insisted on explanations defined as Elementaris, Physica and Prophetica.
The interpretation focused “on the elements” is divided in Resolutoria and
Componentem (or arithmetical): the first deepens the significance of single
letters, while the second inquires as to the position of the elements and the
composition of a new order. Sixtus reports that according to the Jews this is
a part of the Kabbalah, their most secret allegorical wisdom derived from the
Mosaic revelation.50 He admits his lack of expertise in the Jewish discipline,
but adds that also the Ancient Greeks were peritissimi in this method: not
only “Plato in Cratylum, where he has debated on a not dissimilar science
on the true sense (etymologia) of the words”, but also Esopus, Orpheus, and
Linus amongst the others.51
48 Erastus, 1573: the confutation of the Kabbalah is at 275–282; of Origen at 281–
282: Origenis non fit summa iniura, si non fallor. Etenim verba Apost. ad Roman
3, Credita eis sint eloquia Dei, exponens, scribit, hoc modo. Considerandum est,
quod non dixit literas, sed eloquia Dei ipsis credita fuisse. Et his concludunt.
Origenis censuisse Iudaeis praeter legem scriptam, aliam datam fuisse: quod recte
intellectum libenter concedimus. At Cabalam recta et Scripturae consentanea inter
pretatio nihil iuvabit.
49 Sixtus Senensis, Bibliotheca Sancta, Köln 1576 (first edition, Venice 1566), 71. At
the end he clarified the usual distinction between a licit and necromantic Kabbalah,
adding that, however, according to the Inquisition all the books related with the
Kabbalah have to be considered damned.
50 Sixtus Senensis, 1576, 150: Hoc est eius Secretioris, et Anagogicae, vel Allegoricae
sapientae, quam partem eorum a maioribus per manus traditam paulo post tem
pore Mosis acceperunt.
51 Ibid., 150–151. As example of the method, he follows Pico’s exposition of the
letter of the word Bereshit, as exposed in Heptaplus.
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If Sixtus – who dedicated several pages of examination of the doctrines of
Zorzi – derived his report, as is probable, from the Venetian Franciscan
or directly from Pico is not important. What is worth noting is that the
Bibliotheca Sancta – a companion of supreme Catholic orthodoxy, per the
intention of the author – was one of the most consulted sources by the authors
committed to defending Tridentine spirituality, among them Possevino and
Crispo; but it also affected, for example, the Piazza Universale of the polygraph Tommaso Garzoni, published in 1586, which would meet with great
success.
Garzoni wrote an entire paragraph on the Kabbalists,52 partly summarising the Pichian tractate in the Apology, partly translating into vernacular
the content of the second book of Sixtus of Siena, and partly using De vani
tate of Agrippa (through the vernacular translation of Domenichi, which
constitutes a source that innervates all the pages of Garzoni).53 Throughout
his ample discussion, he is primarily concerned with demonstrating that
the Kabbalah is not commendable at all. In another of Garzoni’s books,
the Serraglio de gli stupori del mondo, published posthumously in 1613,
he returned to the Kabbalah and the role of Origen with more extensive
attention. Furthermore, with the aid of Aristotle, he challenged the aforementioned interpretation of the Cratylus, which provided an opening for
the despicable belief in magic.54 Garzoni reveals here all his sources on the
Jewish doctrines: Pico, Garcia, Alessandro Farra,55 Celio Rodigino (Ludovico
Ricchieri),56 and Arcangelo da Borgonovo.
The Serraglio was published posthumously in 1604. It ought to be called,
per the author’s original intent, the Palagio of the Incanti, but its name was
changed when a Venetian nobleman, Strozzi Cicogna, edited a book of the
same name in the meantime: Palagio degli incanti e delle gran maraviglie
de gli spiriti e di tutta la natura. For a long time, Cicogna was charged with
having plagiarized Garzoni. In reality, he did no such thing, though he certainly knew Garzoni’s books. However, the coincidence in the intersection
of the two books is surprisingly relevant to this discussion. Cicogna in fact
entitled the paragraph of his Palagio, in which he discussed Pico’s version,
52 T. Garzoni, La piazza universale di tutte le professioni del mondo, eds. P. Cherchi
/ B. Collina, Turin 1966, 424–455.
53 O. Niccoli, Garzoni Tommaso, in: DBI 52 (1999), accesed at https://www.trecc
ani.it/enciclopedia/tomaso-garzoni_%28Dizionario-Biografico%29/.
54 Garzoni, 1966, 507 f.; on the language, 513.
55 A. Farra, Settenario, Casal Maggiore 1571, 161 f. Farra assembled doctrines contained in the Heptaplus and in the letter of Giulio Camillo to Giulia Martinenga.
56 C. L. Rodigino, Lectionum antiquarum libri 30, Basel 1550 (first edition 1542),
I. 10. 350–351 (a first draft, with 16 books, has been published in 1516).
Blurred Lines: Origen the Kabbalist
181
“On the strange opinion of the Kabbalists and Origen, on the duration and
restoration of this Palace, where it is shown what is the Kabbalah.”57 After
recalling the history of the reception of Moses, he adds that Origen and
the Kabbalists have maintained the same idea of the creation and destruction of the worlds that follow precise cycles. God does indeed continuously
create infinite worlds and decide to destroy them at his prerogative: divine
activity shapes cycles of 7000 years (for the earthly words) and 49,000 (for
the celestial ones) and then arranges a Great Jubilee, which allows the unity
of all the blessed and the rest of matter for one thousand years. He states
that the angels are not mentioned in the cycle, because they are considered still alive from the first creation. According to Cicogna, this doctrine
explains why Solomon believed that matter preexists formless before the
creation, which is the deeper meaning of his oracular worlds: nihil sub sole
novum.58
The author himself remains baffled by these strange and dangerous ideas
(strana opinione). After all, Venice’s jail had played host just a few years
earlier to a famous prisoner, who, in the wake of Salomon, had affirmed
the cyclical revolution and the infinity of the worlds: Giordano Bruno. The
Palagio is a cluster of other sources that brings us to wonder, from where
did these doctrines arise, if Origen had never proposed this detailed cyclical
arithmetic?
5. From the second half of the century the routes through the established
patchwork of the Christian Kabbalah became more intertwined and the knot
more effectively tangled. The long comradeship between Origen and the
Kabbalists could easily provoke confusion. Several doctrines present contents with dangerous similarity: the pre-existence of the soul and the transmigration, the ideas on angels and demons, and the doctrine of the infinite
worlds are all elements which suggest that a unique doctrine was supported
by the Church Father and the Kabbalists. Yet in 1548, for instance, Marco
Montalbano della Fratta, in his Discorsi de principii della nobiltà e del gov
erno che ha da tenere il nobile et il principe nel reggere se medesimo debated
“the opinion of some theologians that the evil angels must be saved.” He
concludes that “the Kabbalist believes that some Demons must be saved, a
thing that Origen has clearly conceived.”59 In the edition of Epitome of the
57 S. Cicogna, Palagio de gli incanti, Venice 1607, 124 f: “Della strana opinione de’
Cabalisti, et d’Origene circa la duratione, et ristabilizione di questo Palagio, ove
si mostra che cosa sia la Cabala.”
58 Cicogna, 1607, 126–127.
59 Marco della Fratta et Montalbano, Discorsi de principii della nobiltà e del governo
che ha da tenere il nobile et il principe nel reggere se medesimo, Venezia 1551,
91 “eglino per questo giudicano i Cabalisti, che alcuni Demoni debbano esser salvi,
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Qur’an the orientalist Johann Albrecht Widmanstetter, in order to denounce
Islamic errors, traced a line that connects Muhamed and Origen as scholars
of the Kabbalistic doctrines, regarding their complex chronology of the Last
Judgment.60 The timing of the end of the worlds, in spite of the similar reference on the cycles of 7000 years, recalls what Cicogna will affirm, but it
is not identical.
The solution is in France. It was the attentive reader of Origen, Jean Bodin,
who wrote in his Démonomanie (1580) the passage in which, debating the
divine creation of form and matter, he affirms that according to Origen and
the people who believe like him:
God has continually created a succession of countless worlds, and when He wished
He destroyed them: that is, the elemental world every seven thousand years, and
the celestial world every forty-nine thousand years, uniting all the blessed spirits
in Himself, and letting matter remain confused and formless for a thousand years.
Then He renews by His power all things in their first condition and beauty. Because
of this they say that no mention is made of the creation of Angels at the creation
of the World, in order to show that they had to remain immortal after the corruption of the preceding worlds, which the Prince of Mirandola considered certain in
his positions on the Kabbala. This is what the Hebrews maintain in their secret
philosophy, as does Origen. This opinion, although is not accepted by some theologians, because it seems that one is entering too far into the profound secret of God,
nonetheless cuts short the impiety of those who […] say that it is a very strange
thing that God after a hundred thousand years, indeed after an endless eternity,
had decided three or four thousand years ago to make this world, which must soon
perish […]. This accords with the saying of Salomon, in which he imagines matter
formless before the creation of this world, and also when he stated that there is
nothing new under the sun. If, however, there had been countless worlds in succession which must not be preserved, still one must admit that the first matter was
created by God.61
il che chiarissimamente Origene ha sentito”. The first edition is in 1548. I would
like to thank Lucio Biasiori for his indication.
60 J.A. Widmanstetter, Mahometis Abdallae filii theologia dialogo explicata,
Nuremberg 1543: Annotatio XIIII: Cabalistae, a quibus doctrinae suae ineptias
acceperat Mahometes, scribunt extreme dii Iudici die, septem inferiores numera
tiones at triadem supremam redituras, quarum singuale denum milium anno
rum adpellatione continerentur. Quod si ex his duas medias tollas, reliquae erunt
quinque numerationes, de quibus Iudaei perperam hereticos edocuerant. Ex harum
perversa doctrina, multa hausit Origenes, quae postea a patribus damnata fuere.
61 J. Bodin, On the the DemonMania of Witches [De la démonomanie des sorciers],
English translation by R.A. Scott, Toronto 1995, v. I, ch. 5, 73–74. According to
the editors “Bodin’s remark reflects a common misunderstanding of Origen’s belief
in “Apocatastasis””, 73 (n.123).
Blurred Lines: Origen the Kabbalist
183
The allusions to the Origenian doctrine of the infinity of the world, also connected to his agreement with the mysteries of the Hebrews, are as frequent
in Bodin’s texts as they are in the Universae Natura Theatrum (1596)62 or in
the Colloquium Heptaplomeres (published posthumously in 1857).63 Bodin
is without any doubt the source for Cicogna, who used exactly the same
world of the Démonomanie translated into the vernacular by Ercole Cato
(published in Venice, at the press of Manutius, in 1587).64 Cicogna placed
Bodin’s opinion in the middle of the by then well-established account of
Pico’s Kabbalah. His “editing” was probably induced by Bodin’s reference
to the Pichian doctrine on angels and worlds contained in the Conclusiones
Cabalisticae, that Cicogna fastens – not without reasons – to the entire survey
of the Kabbalah in the Apology,65 adding another piece to this tradition.
Nevertheless, only a part of the puzzle is disclosed. The messianic time
plan of divine activity is indeed not Origenian,66 nor is it present in Pico
in these terms (despite the enigmatic reference to the forty-nine “gates of
understanding” and the fact that its Heptaplus is structured around the symbolism of seven and forty-nine).67 The doctrine of the regeneration of the
world every 7000 years, following the account of the creation, is in fact
Talmudic. The annotation in the Italian version of the Démonomanie as well
those contained in the Universae Natura Theatrum shed light on Bodin’s
source: the third book of Dialoghi D’amore,68 (1535), in which Leone Ebreo
62 I have consulted J. Bodin, Universae Naturae Theatrum, Paris 1605, I. 21 and, in
particular 36. On the book see A. Blair, The Theater of Nature. Jean Bodin and
Renaissance Science, Princeton 1997.
63 J. Bodin, Colloquium of the Seven about Secrets of the Sublime [Colloquium
Heptaplomeres], ed. M. Leathers Kuntz, University Park 2008, 109; the same
doctrine of the seven thousand years will be referred both to Origen and the secret
wisdom of the Jews.
64 J. Bodin, La demonomania degli stregoni [De la démonomanie des sorciers], translated by E. Cato, Rome 2006, 66.
65 For the doctrine on the angels recalled by Bodin, cfr. Pico, Heptaplus, 1942, 8.3
and Conclusiones in Farmer, 1998, Conclusiones 29.2; 30.28.
66 Origen however sometimes mentioned the symbolism of the number 7, as in Or.
Hom. Gen. 2.6, which is also mentioned in Zorzi, 2010, 646.
67 Furthermore, Pico reports that amongst the “decreta veteris hebraicae disciplina” it
is revealed that the six days of the creation are to be understood as the six thousand
years of the world Pico, Heptaplus, 1942, 348 f.; however, he explicitely refused
the possibility of deducing the time of the end of the world, 352.
68 Leone Ebreo, Dialoghi d’amore, ed. D. Giovannozzi, Rome 2008, III. 1: M.
Granada, Sobre algunos aspectos de la concordia entre prisca theologia y cris
tianismo en Marsilio Ficino, Giovanni Pico y Leon Hebreo, in: Daimòn. Revista
de filosofia 6 (1993), 41–60 (53).
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Pasquale Terracciano
unpacked this Jewish doctrine, derived from Nachmanides, presenting it as
Kabbalistic and considering it not very distant from the same Platonic tradition.69 According to the “figurative” interpretation, in the Pentateuch the
number of days must correspond to the number of years, and the celestial
year to a millennium. Thus, the words of Lev. 25,70 should be interpreted
considering the rest of the seventh “day” – namely after 7000 years – an era
called scemit’ (schmittot: remission): after seven scemita (49,000 years) there
will be a great Iobel (yovel, Iubileum), which will be the perfect quiet, the
return and restoration of all things, which will be followed by a renewal of
the world. The fact that astrological theories concerning the revolution of
the heavens concord with the chronologies of the theologians leads Leone
to propose the common origin of these doctrines in the reception of the
divine message through Adam and Moses. He furthermore adds that these
theologians read the beginning of Genesis as “before that God creates and
separates from the Chaos the Heavens and the Earth” (instead of “in the
beginning God creates the Heavens and the Earth”); so, they had believed
in a state before the Creation of primordial waters and primordial darkness,
where the Chaos / matter was in potentia and confused.71
Bodin’s text is grounded in this cosmogony. The reappraisal of the
Dialoghi D’amore was indeed made in the context of a reflection on the
creation, facing the belief in the eternity of matter, existent before the intervention of divine activity. The doctrine of the successive worlds – erroneous,
but toward which Bodin has a benevolent attitude in this context – could
be indeed useful against the objection of those who impiously believe in a
period of inactivity of God: according to Bodin, the belief in continuous successive worlds does not deny, in fact, the divine creation of the first matter.
What is to be noted is that Leone doesn’t mention Origen. Despite the fact
that Bodin’s attitude toward reading theological doctrines in Jewish terms
is notorious – and was denounced soon enough by the censor Marcantonio
Maffa at the end of the sixteenth century –72 the attribution of those doctrines to Origen is undeniably noteworthy. The introduction could possibly be explained by the relevant paragraphs on these issues present in De
69 Leone Ebreo, 2008, 238: “Mi piace vederti fare Platone Mosaico e del numero dei
Cabalisti”. Leone Ebreo was the son of the famous Kabbalist Isaac Abrabanel.
70 Lev. 25:3–11.
71 Leone Ebreo, 2008, 236–237; As it seems, Leone interweaves his explanation
with Pico’s interpretation around natural and supernatural water, contained in
the Heptaplus.
72 M. Valente, Bodin in Italia. La Démonomanie des sorciers e le vicende della sua
traduzione, Florence 1999, 42–43.
Blurred Lines: Origen the Kabbalist
185
Principiis, and it was evidently affected by the knowledge of the precedent
pattern of Pico and Zorzi and, possibly, by the words of Widmanstetter.
The text of Bodin would be influential: after Strozzi Cicogna, it was taken
up again by Valderrama in his Teatro de las religiones (1612), and then it
returned to the forefront in France, in 1617, through the translation of De
la Richarderie as Histoire générale du monde et de la nature, ou Traictez
théologiques de la fabrique, composition, et conduite générale de l’univers
divisée en trois livres. Between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the
traces of Origen’s presence as a Kabbalistic disciple were disseminated in
several other books. Four years after the Démonomanie, the Franciscan Jean
Benedecti used this notice in his Somme des péchés et le remède d’iceux com
prenant tous les cas de conscience, a know-how book for confessors.73 He
advised against following Origen in his angelology, because he had placed
the creation of the angels before that of the world: he was in fact a scholar
of Pythagoras, Plato, and the Kabbalists. Scipion du Pleix would then entitle
an entire section of his Métaphysique ou science surnaturelle (1620) “Erreur
des Cabalistes et d’Origen”, challenging their doctrine of the transmigration
of souls.74
It was maybe due to these images of Origen that Giordano Bruno made
particular use of the doctrines of the Church Father. Actually, Bruno was
familiar with Origen from his Neapolitan years in a monastery and was
engaged in a continuous and deep confrontation with his exegetical solutions.75 However, the doctrine that he referred to him in several of his pages
seems influenced by this tradition. In his Heroic Frenzies of 1585, introducing the doctrine that states that every thousand years everything is turned
upside down, including the souls, Bruno indeed affirms:
Among philosophers, I have only seen Plotinus declare expressly, like all the great
theologians, that such a revolution is not for everyone, nor everlasting, but for one
73 J. Benedicti, Somme des péchés et le remède d’iceux comprenant tous les cas de
conscience, Paris 1595, 7: “Origène, ou d’autres en son nom, qui ayas estudié a
l’escole des Cabalistes, de Pythagore et de Platon, ont escrit les ames avoir esté
crées avec les anges devant le monde”.
74 S. du Pleix, Métaphysique ou science surnaturelle, Lyon 1620 (I ed. Paris 1617),
243. Also Jean de Croy presented a similar argument in his book devoted to the
intersections between the patristic and the mysterious doctrine of the ancient theologies, the Specimen conjecturarum et observationum in quaedam loca Origenis,
Iraenaei, Tertulliani, et Epiphanii, in quo varia scripturae sacrae Chaldeorum,
Phoenicum, Pythagoreorum et Rabbinorum theologiae et philosophiae arcana
indicantur et aperiuntur (s.l.) 1632.
75 P. Terracciano, Origene, in: M. Ciliberto (ed.) Giordano Bruno. Parole, concetti,
immagini, Pisa 2014, 1385–1390.
186
Pasquale Terracciano
time only. And among the theologians, only Origen, like all the great philosophers,
has dared to say, following the Sadducees and many others censured sects, that the
revolution is vicissitudinous and eternal.
The Nolan underscores the necessity that the last doctrine remains esoterical, and insists on its relation with Salomon’s verset nihil sub sole novi.76
Furthermore, writing about transmigration or on the infinity of worlds, he
states a strong relation between Origen and the Jewish tradition (though apparently embodied by the Sadducees and not by the Kabbalistic).77 The witness of
Bruno testifies once again the strength of the nexus between Origen and the
Hebrews in the second half of the sixteenth century; moreover, it could suggest
his possible reading of the Démonomanie. Bruno’s interpretation of Origen as
the theologian of the eternal cyclicity is indeed in contrast with the traditional
issue attributed to Origen, the apocatastasis, which is a final moment of rest.
Despite the attitude of Bruno to overturn his sources, it has been noted that this
doctrine is compatible with the ideas taken up by Bodin in those years. In the
Démonomanie, Bruno could have detected Origen as an exponent of continual
cycles of creation and destructions of the things; connected with (his beloved)
Salomon’s verset and tied with the Jewish tradition; settled in the philosophical
debate on the issue of the infinity of the worlds; read on the edge of the contraposition of theologians and philosophers.
The verification of this hypothesis would have to be conducted through
a systematic comparison of the two books, something that is not possible
here. For our purposes, however, these last rings of the chain show the consolidation, at the end of the sixteenth century, of the topos of a kabbalistic
Origen, diffused for apologetic, controversistic or philosophical motives; a
topos that will continue for centuries in the European esoteric circles.78
76 Eccl/Qoh 1:9; G. Bruno, On the heroic frenzies [De gli Eroici furori] trans. by
I. Rowland, Toronto 2013, 27.
77 For instance, G. Bruno, De Triplice Minimo, 1591, in: F. Fiorentino [F. Tocco
/ H. Vitelli /V. Imbriani / C. M. Tallarigo] (eds.), Bruni J. Nolani Opera latine
conscripta, publicis sumptibus edita, Neaples [-Florence], 3 vols. in 8 tomes, 1879–
1891, I, 1–2, 153. Bruno used the word “Saduchini”. Very probably it is not a
reference to the Sadducees (whose typical idea is not the transmigration of souls,
but its opposite: mortality and the absence of any kind of afterlife), but the vernacularisation of the Hebrew words zaddiqim (“the righteous ones”). It could be
adding, however, that the principal apparition of the Sadducees in the Gospel is
in Mc 12, 18–27, where they debated with Jesus on the levirate: the Kabbalistic
interpretation of the levirate is exactly the basis for the doctrine of metempsychosis
(the gilgul). I would like to thank Brian Ogren and Giacomo Corazzol for their
suggestions.
78 See D. P. Walker, The Decline of Hell. SeventeenthCentury Discussion of
Eternal Torment, Chicago 1964; A. Coudert, The Impact of the Kabbalah in the
Seventeenth Century. The Life and Thought of Francis Mercury van Helmont
(1614–1698), Leiden 1999.
Maria Fallica
Charity and Progress: Erasmus in the
Origenian Tradition
Abstract: The aim of the paper is to explore the category of progress in Erasmus’
thought, thus highlighting his reception of Origen. The paper investigates Erasmus’
understanding of moral progress, exegetical progress, and the progress of the rational
mind in key texts of his production. Particular attention is given to the anti-Lutheran
aspect of this theology of progress.
Keywords: Luther, Catholic Church, Charity, Justification, Ecclesiology
Erasmus of Rotterdam was a man of moderation: it was his professed ideal,
theologically declined and strategically emphasised against his opponents,
first of all Luther. This image, carefully cultivated, comes to mind when confronted with his reception of Origen, famously loved auctor whose influence
on Erasmus has been conclusively proved by André Godin’s masterpiece,
Érasme lecteur d’Origène.1 Moderation is certainly at work in his complex
reappraisal of Origen; Erasmus retains almost nothing of the Alexandrian’s
most daring speculations on the protological and eschatological level, and
the allegorical “excesses” of Origen’s hermeneutics are often condemned.
However, this explicitly moderate approach should not obscure the radical
Origenian inheritance in the thought of the Dutch humanist, in terms of a
liberal, progressive culture, capable of educating mankind and representing
the true, Christian philosophy in the bosom of the Roman Catholic Church.
Therefore, this paper looks in the direction of a comprehensive reading of
Erasmus’ thought2 under the category of progress, which will provide a
broadened understanding of Origen’s influence on Erasmus, given the premise of this volume, namely the crucial nature of the category of progress
in Origen.
1
2
A. Godin, Érasme lecteur d’Origène, Geneva 1982.
Thus, my reading will refer to the entirety of his production, in the conviction that,
although anything but a systematic philosopher, Erasmus held firm some basic
theological tenets, which he adapted to the cultural, political, and religious circumstances of his age, not without faux pas and misunderstandings. On Erasmus’
biography and its effects on his thought, see J. D. Tracy, Erasmus, the Growth of
a Mind, Geneva 1972; R. Schoeck, Erasmus of Europe: Making of a Humanist,
1467–1500, Edinburgh 1993; M. Barral-Baron, L’enfer d’Érasme, Geneva 2014.
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Maria Fallica
1. Raise Yourself: Progress from the Letter to the Spirit
It is possible to read a major part of Erasmus’ thought in line with the fifth
canon3 of his Enchiridion, the handbook of the Christian knight, which
introduces us to his Platonic (Origenian) reading of the Pauline dualism
between the letter and the spirit:
My brother, do not progress slowly by dint of reluctant effort, but by moderate
exercise arrive at quick and vigorous adulthood in Christ. Embrace zealously this
rule, not to be willing to crawl along the ground with unclean animals, but supported on those wings whose growth Plato thinks are induced in our minds by the
heat of love and shoot out anew, raise yourself as on the steps of Jacob’s ladder from
the body to the spirit, from the visible to the invisible, from the letter to the mystery,
from sensible things to intelligible things, from composite things to simple things.4
The rule indicates the exegetical movement, which goes from the letter to
the spirit, in true Origenian fashion,5 as well as the movement of the heart
of the true Christian, who, as the title of the Enchiridion suggests, is an
athlete in Christ: the gymnastic part of the philosophy of Christ is strongly
stressed throughout the entire production of Erasmus.6 If, as Albert Rabil
has said, the concept that learning will make one a better person is the key
to Erasmus’ program of scholarship and reform,7 the heart of this learning is
the true understanding of the Scriptures. In reading Scripture, the only goal
is to be changed, seduced, moved to tears and then be transformed by the
text itself, which is food for the soul, and it will transform the soul day by
day, taking away vices and adding piety. Therefore, exegesis is to proceed
from the flesh of Scripture to its mystical spirit; according to the Pauline
metaphor, very dear to both Origen and Erasmus, the believer must progress
from milk to solid food (1 Cor 3:2).
3
4
5
6
7
For instance, this is the interpretation of A. Auer, Die vollkommene Frömmigkeit
des Christen: nach dem Enchiridion militis Christiani des Erasmus von Rotterdam,
Düsseldorf 1954, 81; see also Godin, 1982, 43 f.
Desiderius Erasmus, Enchiridion, in id., Spiritualia (Enchiridon / De contemptu
mundi / De vidua), CWE 66 tr. C. Fantazzi, Toronto 1988, 84. A very interesting
chapter of Jacob Vance’s book, J. Vance, Humanism, Mysticism, and Evangelism in
Erasmus of Rotterdam, Bishop Guillaume Briçonnet, and Marguerite De Navarre,
Leiden 2014, 20–49, reads in terms of secrecy the dualism letter/spirit in Erasmus,
indicating the Origenian root of this mechanism and pointing out texts from the
Ratio, the Enchiridion and the Sileni Alcibiadis.
See Godin, 1982, 253 f.
The theme of spiritual warfare, commonplace in devotional texts, can nonetheless
be traced back to Origen; cf. Godin, 1982, 33 f.
A. Rabil, Desiderius Erasmus, in Renaissance Humanism: Foundations, Forms,
and Legacy II Humanism Beyond Italy, Philadelphia 1988, 222.
Charity & Progress: Erasmus in the Origenian Tradition
189
This progress is vehementer velle,8 to will and to meditate, namely, to
exercise this will. As the disciples in Acts went into the upper room, the
cenaculum, after the ascension of Jesus, removing from the lower part of
the house, the believer must be far removed from sordid cares and “prepare himself as a dwelling of the Holy Spirit.”9 Stare vero in via Domini,
retrogredi est,10 admonishes Erasmus in his De puritate tabernaculi, the last
of Erasmus’ written works, and perseverance is the key to proceeding in the
via pietatis.
This path to salvation also encompasses the sustainment of the sacraments confessed by the Church, which Erasmus held, even though his sacramental theology was often accused of being dangerously close to “Swiss”
leanings.11 Erasmus stresses the importance of the inner, willful participation of the soul, again going from the simple letter to the spirit. Baptism is
not enough, if it is not accompanied by the constant exercise of embracing
Christ in the depths of the heart and acting in a Christian spirit:
8
D. Erasmus, Enarratio In Primvm Psalmvm, ed. A. Godin, in: C. Béné / S. Dresden
/A. Godin (eds.), Enarrationes In Psalmos Pars Prior, ASD V-2, Amsterdam 1985,
19–80 (52).
9 The editor of the English translation quotes Rabanus and Hugh for this exegesis,
but it is worth mentioning Or., Cels. 8, 22 (the perfect Christian, like the apostles
of Jesus who “went up to the upper room” [Acts 1:13–14], spends time in supplication and prayer to become worthy of some measure of the tongue of fire
from God); cf. Desiderius Erasmus, Paraphrase on Acts, CWE 50, tr. R. D. Sider,
Toronto 1995, 10 and 165 n. 77.
10 D. Erasmus, Enarratio Psalmi XIV qui est de puritate tabernaculi sive ecclesiae
Christianae, ed. A. Godin, in C. Béné / S. Dresden /A. Godin (eds.), 1985, 300.
11 Not without some good reasons: see Erasmus’ ambiguous judgement of Johannes
Oecolampadius’ doctrine of the Eucharist: “learned, well written and thorough”.
He added that “I would also judge it pious, if anything could be so described
which is at variance with the general opinion of the Church, from which I consider it perilous to dissent” (cf. Desiderius Erasmus, Ep. 1636, in Letters 1535–
1657, CWE 11, tr. A. Dalzell, Toronto 1994, 343–344). Oecolampadius’ theology
was heavily dependent on Patristic and Origenian motives; see L. Lies, Origenes’
Eucharistielehre im Streit der Konfessionen: die Auslegungsgeschichte seit der
Reformation, Innsbruck 1985. In particular, Erasmus’ Latin translation of Origen’s
Fragmentum commentariorum Origenis in evangelium secundum Matthaeum
(Basel 1527) was contested and caused accusations of heterodoxy for Erasmus’
doctrine of the Eucharist; defending his translation, made “in good faith”, from
a man that “no one reads today as a dogmatist”, Erasmus even suggested that
“perhaps even now the church has not clearly defined how the body is present in
the Eucharist beneath the accidents or beneath the actual bread”(cf. Ep. 2263, in
Letters 2204–2356, CWE 16, tr. A. Dalzell, Toronto 2015, 167); cf. Godin, 1982,
574–592.
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Maria Fallica
For obtaining the prize of salvation we do not suppose it is enough to have been
admitted through baptism into the household of Christ, to have been delivered by
his kindness from the tyranny of sins and restored to freedom – unless we henceforth keep ourselves free from any association with base desires.12
The vigorous stance of the athlete, running the course, can stand next to the
violence which will conquer the reign, extorting divine mercy: the weapon
for conquering is penance, the continuous cry of the soul. The figure of
the penitent, so crucial for a Roman Catholic Church which was answering
Luther’s attack on the indulgences and the entire penitential system, is paradoxically enforced in its powerful weakness, able to “extort” mercy from
God’s hands.13
2. The Economy of Progress and the Preeminence
of Charity: The Anti-Lutheran Erasmus
The mention of Luther introduces one of the most eloquent adversaries of
an Origenian and liberal theology of progress,14 with whom the differences
exploded in the debate of 1524. The crucial presupposition of Erasmus’ proactive and dynamic vision is the full force of human free will, which, as
Luther famously recognised, was the most substantial point upon which to
attack. As the synergistic model of the Διατριβή says, Adam was created with
an intact reason and will, able to persevere in innocence. The original sin
obscured the logos, and the human capacity to judge, and the human will
12 Desiderius Erasmus, Paraphrase on 1 Corinthians, tr. E.A. Phillips Jr, in Paraphrases
on the Epistles to the Corinthians, The Epistles to the Ephesians, Philippians,
Colossians, and Thessalonians, CWE 43, ed. R.D. Sider, Toronto 2009, 128.
13 Desiderius Erasmus, De immensa misericordia Dei, ASD V-7, ed. C.S.M.
Rademaker, Leiden 2013, 90; cf. G. Lettieri, Machiavelli interprete antiluterano
di Erasmo. L’Esortazione alla penitenza (1525) epitome del De immensa Dei
Misericordia (1524), in: Giornale critico di storia delle idee 2 (2017), 27–103.
14 On Luther and Origen, see M. Schulze, Martin Luther and the Church Fathers,
in: I. Backus (ed.), The Reception of the Church Fathers in the West From the
Carolingians to the Maurists, vol. 2, Leiden 1997, 573–626 (616–620); J. F.
Dechow, Origen’s Shadow over the Erasmus/Luther Debate, in: G. Dorival /
A. Le Boulluec (eds.), Origeniana sexta: Origène et la Bible/Origen and the
Bible: Actes du Colloquium Origenianum Sextum Chantilly, 30 août3 septembre
1993, Louvain 1995, 739–757; G. Pani, “In toto Origene non est verbum unum
de Christo”: Lutero e Origene, in: Adamantius 15 (2009) 135–149; P. Walter,
Inquisitor, non dogmatistes. Die Rolle des Origenes in der Auseinandersetzung
des Erasmus von Rotterdam mit Martin Luther, in: A. Fürst / C. Hengstermann,
Autonomie und Menschenwürde: Origenes in der Philosophie der Neuzeit,
Münster 2012, 169–183.
Charity & Progress: Erasmus in the Origenian Tradition
191
was made unable to do good, but it was not abolished. This means the permanence of the natural law in human nature, as is testified to by the capacity
of the Greek philosophers to discover God’s omnipotence and to determine
moral precepts coherent with those of the Gospel. Erasmus’ texts against
Luther reiterate the point again and again: in On the freedom of the will the
believer is urged to “strive with all our might, have recourse to the remedy
of penitence, and entreat by all means the mercy of the Lord, without which
no human will or endeavor is effective”.15 The possibility for the ancient
philosophers to attain moral goodness, in its anti-Augustinian stance, is a
landmark component of this theology of freedom. Thus, in a passage of the
Hyperaspistes, Erasmus claims that
A person who understands much through human reason and believes certain truths
about God, who has drunk in a love of wisdom from the books of philosophers,
who has striven for a habit of virtue according to his own small measure, is somewhat more capable than a crude soldier who has lived in a profound state of ignorance and the grossest vice and who never gave a thought to God. And so does a
person have what he has not received? Not at all. But it does not follow that since
he did not receive it as a gift but as a legacy, therefore he did not receive it.16
Against what he calls the “Stoic notions”17 of Luther regarding the totally
sinful nature of good actions performed without grace, Erasmus will continue to defend “gradations of faith and of charity which have not yet
attained effective faith, which is only given by God”,18 and the existence
of “a certain kind of charity towards God through his [the human] natural power”,19 “some will to goodness, however minuscule” which “springs
from nature”.20 Pagan philosophy is the best example of this, allowing us
to dismiss Luther’s idea, which, in Erasmus’ words, is that “the tolerance of
Socrates is no less grievous an offense in the sight of God than the cruelty
of Nero”.
The striving of the ages towards goodness has a value that can constitute
a legacy for all generations: Erasmus’ program of reform is based on the possibility of moral gradations,21 and, therefore, of progress.
15 M. Luther, On the Bondage of the Will, in Luther and Erasmus: Free Will and
Salvation, eds. E. G. Rupp / P. Saville Watson, Louisville 1969, 114.
16 D. Erasmus, Hyperaspistes Book 2, tr. C.H. Miller, CWE 77, ed. C. Trinkaus,
Toronto 2000, 742.
17 Erasmus, 2000, 737.
18 Ibid.
19 Erasmus, 2000, 744.
20 Erasmus, 2000, 743.
21 See on this an interesting paragraph in M. Caldwell, Skepticism and Belief in Early
Modern England: The Reformation of Moral Value, New York 2017, 53–55.
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Maria Fallica
The fuel of this race is described in terms of charity, the cardinal virtue
which was the manifesto of the late mediaeval Italian curial and confraternal
culture,22 and which was the “Italian way to Paul”. This would be a reading
of the Epistles in which the Paul of the Corinthians was prominent, instead
of what would be the Romans-oriented Paul of the Reformations: the primacy of charity vs. the primacy of faith.23
Accordingly, Erasmus’ philosophia Christiana can be read in terms of a
humanistic version of the Pauline race in the ninth chapter of the first letter
to the Corinthians. Erasmus lauds Paul’s commitment to the race, his willingness to subdue his body and make it obedient to the spirit, speeding up
towards the prize, as a real boxer fit to fight. But for the humanist what is
truly remarkable in Paul is his ability to temper himself and his eager race to
the weakness of others.24 Indeed, in dealing with the Corinthians, Erasmus
comments admiringly:
He [Paul] is such a squid, such a chameleon […] with such freedom does he himself
twist and turn like a man who threads the windings of a maze and appearing to
us in a fresh guise every time. How humble and ingratiating he sometimes is, as he
beseeches them by the mercy of Christ […] elsewhere he abases himself and calls
himself an offscouring, misbegotten and unworthy […] in one place he acts the part
of an intelligent and sober man; in another he dons the mask of one who is foolish and beside himself […] Always Christ’s business is his main concern; always he
thinks of the well-being of his flock, like a true physician leaving no remedy untried
which may restore his patients to perfect health.25
Charity is the regulative measure of Paul’s race, the carpenter’s rule26 of
Christian life. If charity is this regulative force, the mode of its application is
accommodation: a distinctive, albeit traditional, theological-rhetorical dispositive of Erasmus, which embraces the Greek συγκατάβασις (condescension) and συμπεριφορά (accommodation), technical terms broadly employed
in early Christian interpretations of Paul’s attitude in becoming “all things
22 See A. Prosperi, Tribunali della coscienza. Inquisitori, confessori, missionari,
Torino 1996, 17; I follow here the interpretation of Erasmus’ anti-Lutheran attitude, especially in the Concio De immensa Dei misericordia, and its Roman context, proposed by Lettieri, 2017, 32–44.
23 Prosperi, 1996, 21.
24 Erasmus, 2009, 16–17.
25 Erasmus, 1982, 249 (it is the epistle to Erard de La Marck, ep. 916 Allen,
5 February 1519).
26 “If we have Christian charity like a carpenter’s rule, everything will easily be set
straight by that”: Erasmus, 1982, 79 (this is the preface to the 1518 edition of the
Enchiridion, and consist of a letter to Paul Volz, ep. 858 Allen, 14 August 1518).
Charity & Progress: Erasmus in the Origenian Tradition
193
to all people” (1 Cor 9:19–23),27 used especially by Clement of Alexandria,
Origen, and John Chrysostom. This attitude is explicitly praised elsewhere to
criticise “that kind of downrightness, edgy and harsh and unsmiling, among
inexperienced people that require everyone to live solely in their own way,
and whatever pleases others they condemn.”28 Harshness and lack of charity
are shown by the incapability of accommodating themselves to others; here
is another clear example of Erasmus’ gradual morality.
Paul’s attitude, his enacting ability, the willingness to change role as a good
actor, but above all his charitable nature are all an imitation of a model, the
highest possible. In Erasmus’ Explanation of Psalm 85, published in Basel in
1528, there is a beautiful exegesis of David as Christ, “the perfect example
of a poor man”,29 who prays in the Psalm to the Father for the salvation of
the church and the spreading of the Father’s glory. God answers the cry of
God’s people to have mercy in Christ, with different kinds of mercy:
He has mercy when he alleviates suffering and grants relief so that our weakness can
endure it […] He has mercy when he bestows grace, when he strengthens, and when
he saves […] He has mercy when he allows his people to fall into error and commit
serious offences […] Nor is the Lord’s mercy of one kind only, for his mercies are
manifold, available to all who cry out to him. One kind of mercy sets free, another
anticipates; one accompanies, another follows; one protects, another consoles; one
beats in order to correct, another bestows in order to enrich. Need I say more? As
his wisdom is beyond measure, so is his mercy.30
It is impossible not to think here about Origen’s concept of the epinoiai
of Christ,31 from which, in Erasmus’ reading, the highest is mercy, the
true expression of the Lord’s charity. The connection with Origen on this
point is clear in Erasmus’ mind, as we can see in his annotation on Romans
12:1, when he mentions Origen’s preference for the plural for the word
mercy: Christ’s love is multifaceted, plural.32 This love can make a bird out
27 M. Mitchell, Pauline Accommodation and “Condescension” (συγκατάβασις): 1 Cor
9:19–23 and the History of Influence, in: T. Engberg-Pedersen (ed.), Paul Beyond
the Judaism/Hellenism Divide, Westminster 2001, 197–214.
28 Desiderius Erasmus, Adages II1 to IV 100, CWE 31, tr. M. Mann Phillips, Toronto
1982, 134.
29 Desiderius Erasmus, An Explanation of Psalm 85, tr. C. White, in id., Explanations
of the Psalms, CWE 64, ed. D. Baker-Smith, Toronto 2003, 28.
30 Erasmus, 2003, 48.
31 Cf. Or., princ. 1.2; Or., Joh. 1.125–292 f.
32 Cf. D. Erasmus, Annotationes in Novum Testamentum. Pars tertia, ASD VI-7,
ed. P.F. Hovingh, Leiden 2012, 286: per misericordiam. Διὰ τῶν οἰκτιρμῶν, id
est, per miserationes. Consentientibus in lectione Chrysostomo ac Theophylacto.
Annotauit numeri rationem et Origenes, putans in eo esse emphasim immensae
Dei misericordiae.
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Maria Fallica
of a donkey, Erasmus promises. Christ’s love, willing to embrace everyone,
puts wings on the soul, accelerating the race.33 But everyone who desires to
fly up to the Lord has to put off the old man from his youth, the start of
the spiritual age: “for piety, too, has a period of infancy, of adolescence,
of youth, and of manhood, but it has no old age – for old age is the mark of
sinners.”34 It is interesting to note a parallel passage in the prefatory letter of
the Enchiridion, which, after having paralleled piety to a human being, with
stages of infancy, growth and adult strength, invites “every man according
to the measure that is given him […] to strive upwards towards Christ.”35
Ages are paralleled with the four elements, each with its given place: “but
fire, which has the highest station, gradually sweeps all things into itself and
transforms them so far as it may to its own nature. Water it evaporates and
turns into air, and air it rarefies and transforms into itself”.36
Erasmus preaches an “obliging and kind” Lord, who by granting charity
makes his commandments easy to bear and is fair and humane in his judgment of our deeds. He recognises our inadequacies and forgives our weakness if we have been unable to raise up our hearts to him as far as we should;
He gives assistance to our slender resources and pardons us for our indifference, giving support and relief while human beings make progress; He is not
only kind and humane but also πολυέλεος, in other words, very merciful.37
“The kindness of divinity accommodating itself to our weakness” is evident in His willingness to “not reveal himself to us entirely at once but lead
us gradually and through distinct stages to such a lofty philosophy”,38 as
Erasmus’ Ecclesiastes explains the gradualism in revelation, from the law of
nature to the gospel. A God misericors and miserator tolerated the blindness
of the Jews for many centuries, and afterwards the more pitiful and odious
relapses of Christians, even after baptism, with a patience that cannot be
worn down.39
God’s tolerance is imitated by the Fathers, in their acceptance of superstitious rituals: an interesting passage from Modus orandi Deum suggests
to “put up with” contemporary popular customs, until “the opportunity to
correct it without causing civil uproar should present itself.”40
33
34
35
36
37
38
Erasmus, 2003, 55.
Erasmus, 2003, 56.
Erasmus, 1988, 16.
Erasmus, 1988, 16.
Erasmus, 2003, 57.
Desiderius Erasmus, The Evangelical Preacher, tr. J.L.P. Butrica, in id., Spiritualia
and Pastoralia, CWE 68, ed. F. McGinness, Toronto 2015, 1084.
39 Erasmus, 2003, 95.
40 Desiderius Erasmus, On Praying to God, tr. J.N. Grant, in id., Spiritualia and
Pastoralia, CWE 70, ed. J.W. O’Malley, Toronto 1998, 198.
Charity & Progress: Erasmus in the Origenian Tradition
195
God’s path through history, then, proceeds in a very long line of gradual
revelation, but contradictions and errors on the part of His people are plainly
visible, as Erasmus states dolefully in the comment on Ps. 85:
No age is without its Herods, who massacre infants, none which does not have
its Annas and Caiaphas, its own Scribes and Pharisees; this is the case even during
the church’s most peaceful periods, not only in this most turbulent century when
the nets are so torn by differences of opinion and character that they can hardly be
mended even by those who are in the apostolic succession – although we read in the
Gospels that the disciples did manage it.41
The answer is clear in Christ’s prayer: He “prays for progress, that the
church might stand firm in faith and love and might ever progress towards
better things. He has redeemed and cleansed his bride, but without God’s
protection no one is able to stand firm in what is good, unless God’s grace
directs and guides those who have been called. He prays, therefore, for Peter,
in other words, for the church, to prevent its faith growing weak.”42
Erasmus’ appeal to the necessity of remaining within the Church became
at the same time more urgent, as the years passed and the wound of the
divide in Western Christianity became more deep-seated: this is evident in
many texts from the years 1527–1529. But this necessity to stay within the
embrace of the Church, the spiritual one, but visibly expressed by Peter
and the sacraments of baptism and penance, goes far back in time. Indeed,
already in the preface of the Enchiridion of 1518 as well as in the Ratio,
Erasmus explained the cooling of the fire of charity and the true role of
Christ in rekindling this fire: “let Christ remain what he is, the centre, with
several circles running round him. Do not move that central mark from its
place”.43 Around Christ, the center, there are three circles: the first is the one
of those nearest to Christ; priests, bishops, cardinals, popes, who “should
embrace the intense purity of the centre and pass on as much as they can to
those next to them”. The second circle is that of the lay princes who defend
the public peace; the third circle is the common people, to whom indulgence
must be given, attempting to make them follow the center. From one circle
to another, there are various degrees of tolerance; the church permits certain rituals and even superstitions, which allow for the weakness of youth
until they acquire sufficient strength.44 To live in history is to compromise,
preserving long-held religious habits to accommodate with old suits, in the
attempt to lead to spiritual freedom. Progress is not (only) a line, but also
41
42
43
44
Erasmus, 2003, 90.
Erasmus, 2003, 72.
Erasmus to Paul Volz, ep. 858 Allen, 14 August 1518.
Cf. Erasmus, 1985, 118; id., 1997, 96.
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Maria Fallica
runs in circles, coming near the center. As Georges Chantraine has pointed
out, in the ecclesiology of circles presented in the Ratio, Erasmus reinterprets
the hierarchic system of the Pseudo-Dionysius, dynamised through the centripetal force of Christ and the centrifugal force of the earthly passions.45
With the proviso of the maintenance of the theological and anthropological presuppositions crucial to Erasmus’ thought (freedom of the will and
charity as guidelines), all human structures stand in a circle governed by love
for one’s fellow man. This means reasoning in terms of consensus and perseverance under Peter’s guidance. In the meantime, the best praise that can
be given to a speculative theologian is his attitude to silence, his reticence to
define, his exhortation to unity and love.46
3. The Progress of the Mind: The Radical Erasmus
The profile of Erasmus’ theology presented so far risks appearing to be the
portrait of a very domesticated theologian, spiritual heir to the great philological tradition of Origen and Jerome, fully at ease in the embrace of the
Roman Catholic seat. This reading, without the brusqueness of this summary, has been authoritatively proposed in Erasmus scholarship,47 in opposition to an important alternative reading of his figure, that of a liberal,
progressive thinker, who was an important ring in the chain of a process of
secularisation of Christianity.48 Moreover, the inheritance of his thought in
the so-called Radical Reformation, which has been widely studied in the last
45 Cf. G. Chantraine, « Mystère» et «Philosophie du Christ» selon Érasme: Étude de
la lettre à P. Volz et de la «Ratio verae theologiae», Namour 1971, 124. Chantraine
sees an evolution from the Enchiridion to the Ratio, from a vertical ascent of the
individual to the collective, dynamic, Christocentric movement of the Church.
46 I allude here to the Preface to the edition of Hilary (1523), in which Erasmus
spends many words in praising the silences of Hilary, much more than the words
devoted to the actual doctrines explained in the De Trinitate of the Latin Father.
47 See for instance one of the most fervent defenses of Erasmus’ Roman Catholic
stance, the recent edition of T.P. Scheck, Erasmus’s Life of Origen: A New
Annotated Translation of the Prefaces to Erasmus of Rotterdam’s Edition of
Origen’s Writings 1536, Washington 2016; Scheck, following Henri de Lubac’s
judgement, calls Erasmus “a greatly misunderstood figure in the history of Catholic
theology”(Scheck, 2016, XV), recalling the very disparaging note on the Catholic
Encyclopedia of 1917 by Joseph Sauer, or the harsh appraisal of Joseph Lortz.
48 In the second volume of his invaluable study on the image of Erasmus’ personality and thought through the centuries, Bruce Mansfield traces back the “liberal
view” to the period 1750–1920, when liberal optimism itself considered Erasmus
a valuable frontrunner: “Its essence was: Erasmus stood for a more open religion,
for more critical scholarship, for a more tolerant society” (B. Mansfield, Man on
His Own: Interpretations of Erasmus, c. 1750–1920, Toronto 1992, 373).
Charity & Progress: Erasmus in the Origenian Tradition
197
decades, has rightfully questioned the global interpretation of Erasmus himself.49 The value of contemporary scholarship in dealing with these conflicting interpretations of Erasmus is, first of all, the full recognition of Erasmus’
stature as theologian and, in the second place, the appreciation of the complexity of his personal position.
I think that the category of progress, in the terms that I have sketched
here, helps us understand the complex theological, ecclesiological, and political positions of a man who received the offer of a cardinal’s hat from Paul
III and inspired the anti-Trinitarian thinkers, who was protected and paid by
the Popes and attacked by Catholic universities, who could be revered in life
and damned shortly after his death.
The progress in circles towards an all-consuming fire span throughout
history and human constructions, revealing their nature as human, imperfect
compromises. I find very revealing the delineation of an historical, progressive determination of dogmas even from the synoptic Gospels to John,50 a
text toward which Erasmus does not conceal his distance.51
I would like to offer an example of this “progressive” theology, choosing
a very sensitive question such as Erasmus’ position on divorce, as debated
in his letter to one of his opponents, the Dominican inquisitor of Cologne,
Jacob of Hoogstraten, who had criticised the edition and translation of the
New Testament. Erasmus admitted that he had recorded his “pity for people
who are loosely held together by an unhappy marriage, and yet would have
no hope of refraining from fornication if they were released from it”.52 The
preference for a wide path towards salvation53 means for Erasmus – who
49 See at least C. Gilly, Erasmo, la reforma radical y los heterodoxos radicales espa
ñoles, Castellò de la Plana 2005; P.G. Bietenholz, Encounters with a Radical
Erasmus: Erasmus’ Work as a Source of Radical Thought in Early Modern
Europe, Toronto 2009; G. Dodds, Exploiting Erasmus: The Erasmian Legacy
and Religious Change in Early Modern England, Toronto 2009.
50 John’s Gospel, Erasmus states clearly, for instance in the Preface to his Paraphrase,
was due to the spreading of groups of heretics; if it were not for them, the other
Gospels would have been sufficient for Christian life (cf. Desiderius Erasmus,
Paraphrasis in Euangelium Ioannis Apostoli, LB 7, Lyon 1706, 490–497).
51 I have specifically dealt with this theme in M. Fallica, La potenza della parola.
Erasmo e l’incipit del prologo di Giovanni, in: L. Geri (ed.), Erasmo inquieto,
Rome 2022, forthcoming.
52 Ep. 1006 Allen, Erasmus to Jacob of Hoogstraten, 11 August 1519, in D. Erasmus,
Letters 993 to 1121, tr. R.A.B. Mynors, CWE 7, Toronto 1987, 49.
53 Sometimes there is a cautious but visible sympathy for the Origenian apokatastasis; see the already mentioned Concio de immensa misericordia Dei, where
Erasmus alludes, without mentioning the name of the author, to the theory of the
salvation of all creation: nec defuere qui tantum tribuerent misericordiae diui
nae, vt impios etiam daemones ac damnatos homines crederent aliquando post
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Maria Fallica
hastens to specify that “I am no innovator; I refer the whole question to the
church’s discretion” – the wish of a charitable man who can “pity those who
are set for perdition”. Erasmus continues defining a protrusive value of the
attitude of charity: “Christian charity often wishes for something that is not
possible, and it is often a pious act to wish for something you cannot bring
about.” He accuses his adversary of trying to
prolong the discussion to great lengths, adducing every possible argument to prove
that after a divorce remarriage is unlawful, as though I were unaware of the opinions of the early Fathers or the decrees of the church on this subject.54
However, and here the idea of progress comes into play, Erasmus affirms that
“the spirit of Christ may not have revealed the whole truth to the church all
at once. And while the church cannot make Christ’s decrees of no effect,
she can none the less interpret them as may best tend to the salvation of
men, relaxing here and drawing tighter there, as time and circumstance may
require.” The evocation of a full disclosure of Christ’s truth is not connected
to a free gift of the Spirit but to the interpretation, made by the Church, in
accordance with the principle of accommodation. The belief in progress in
the understanding of what Christ has revealed makes possible the hermeneutical action of the exegete and the Church. “The Gospel is not superseded;
it is adapted by those to whom its application is entrusted so as to secure
the salvation of all men. Nor is a thing superseded when it is better understood.”55 And if Erasmus wishes to leave the right to decide to the Church,
the rhetorical question posed to the Inquisitor is very telling:
If you say that it is unlawful to take things which are generally accepted and question them, what are we to make of the saintly Doctors who are not afraid to submit
for discussion whether the Eucharist is a sacrament, whether simple fornication is
a sin?56
It is clear that Erasmus claims the right to do what the saintly Doctors did,
thanks to the natural gift of understanding which allows the creature to discern truth and progress in it. Christ speaks now better than before in the text
longas seculorum periodos recipiendos in gratiam (D.Erasmus, De immensa Dei
misericordia Concio, ASD V-7, ed. C.S.M. Rademaker, Leiden 2013, 54). Erasmus
continues asserting that, despite the preeminence of its author, this theory has been
deemed heretical, and he is citing it as a witness to what extent the most erudite
exegetes lauded God’s mercy. Erasmus’ appreciative tone is very clear; see on this
P. Terracciano, Omnia in figura. L’ombra di Origene tra ‘400 e ‘500, Rome 2012,
156–157.
54 Erasmus, 1987, 50.
55 Erasmus, 1987, 50.
56 Erasmus, 1987, 52.
Charity & Progress: Erasmus in the Origenian Tradition
199
of the New Testament, as is said in Erasmus’ Paraclesis – a very telling word
chosen for the preface of the Novum Instrumentum. Through this title,
which clearly alludes to the outpouring of the Spirit, Erasmus wants to hint,
in the words of James Kearney, that “the promise of the Father is fulfilled
not in Pentecost but in the written text of Scripture”,57 now fully restored by
Erasmus himself. In this sense, Erasmus can really be considered a proponent of the immanence of the possibility of love and true understanding in
the human being, challenging dogmatic structures and borders. Naturally,
the center and goal of human experience remains Christ, the fire, who will
“sweep all things into itself and transform them so far as it may to its own
nature”,58 putting an end to all the human efforts and speculations. The Son,
who is the beginning, the progress, the consummation,59 will transform the
faithful in many Christs. The flesh of the Lord, which at some time became
an impediment to the faith of the disciples,, will no longer be an obstacle.
This weak God, fully revealing Himself only in the kenosis of love, will
make the creature more and more like Himself. It will be the repuerescentia,
as Erasmus’ beautiful coinage suggests: to be like infants, or maybe like spirits. Because, “God tolerates the life of the flesh for a while, if it is gradually
dissolved into the spirit, but he does not tolerate it forever.”60
This weakness and frailness of the divine voice who will not break the
bruised reed, who does not impose his grace but persuades and caresses,
who prefers to be read in the page of a book, who stays in the heart of the
believer, will provoke scandal and admiration in Erasmus’ readers. Some
of the most innovative voices in the panorama of the Reformation, such as
the Socinians or the Anti-Trinitarians, will follow some of his more daring
hints, and his lesson will not be forgotten in the Catholic Reformation: but
the careful and complex building of his thought, with all his rebalancing and
forward thrusts, will be difficult to imitate.
57 J. Kearney, The Incarnate Text: Imagining the Book in Reformation England,
Philadelphia 2009, 67.
58 Erasmus, 1988, 16.
59 D. Erasmus, An Explanation of The Apostles’ Creed, tr. L.A. Perraud, in id.,
Spiritualia and Pastoralia, CWE 70, 246.
60 D. Erasmus, A Commentary on the Second Psalm, “Why Did the Nations Rage?”,
tr. M. Heath, in: D. Baker-Smith (ed.) Expositions of the Psalms, CWE 63, Toronto
1997, 96.
Stefania Salvadori
The Idea of Progression between Humanism
and Reformation: The Case of Sebastian
Castellio
Abstract: Although the Reformation was mainly rooted in the Augustinian tradition,
Origen’s teaching still found echos within the protestant and reformed church. In
the sixteenth century, Sebastian Castellio rejected in his dispute with the church of
Geneva the doctrine of predestination and outlined a theology of salvation inspired by
Erasmus, which was based on an ethical dynamism guided by the natural reason. The
present contribution aims to show how Castellio, without quoting Origen directly,
still developed a theology of progress and relativised so the Lutheran concepts of sola
scriptura and sola fide.
Keywords: Biblical hermeneutics, Free will, Predestination, Grace
Within the Protestant world, Origen’s reception was influenced, if not determined, by Erasmus and his dispute with Luther on free will.1 Luther’s severe
judgment – which he had formulated during his time at the Wartburg and
then repeated until his judgment in the Tischreden in 1532, “Origenem
hab ich schon in bann gethan”2 – left no room for further discussion.
However, this did not mean that Origen completely disappeared from the
intra-Protestant debate. Leading figures such as Zwingli, Oecolampadius, or
Capito did not hesitate to refer to Origen in their works of biblical exegesis,
testifying that the varied nature of the Reformation cannot be reduced to the
Saxon, or Luther’s, model.3 An important group of theologians, who conceived of themselves as an integral and even leading part of the Reformation,
did not renounce the humanistic tradition. Instead, they experimented with
new forms of conciliation between the two souls of the European sixteenth
1
2
3
See the contribution by Maria Fallica in this volume. See also Walter, 2012, 169–
183; Schär, 1979, 273–280.
See WATr 1, 106 Nr. 252: “Hieronymus potest legi propter historias, nam de fide
et doctrina verae religionis ne verbum quidem habet. Origenem hab ich schon in
bann gethan. Chrisostomos gillt bey mir auch nichts, ist nur ein wesscher. Basilius
taug gar nichts, der ist gar ein munch; ich wolt nit ein heller umb yhn geben.”
See Schär, 1979, 245–273; I. Backus, Ulrich Zwingli, Martin Bucer and the Church
Fathers, in: I. Backus (ed.), The Reception of the Church Fathers in the West: From
the Carolingians to the Maurists, Leiden 1996, 627–660.
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Stefania Salvadori
century, that is, between the Lutheran ultra-Augustinianism and the proOrigen Erasmian model. It is unsurprising that the major proponents of these
attempts at mediation acted both in the Catholic world and in the more anticonfessional, spiritualistic groups of the Reformation. Origen’s reception
emerged not only in the exegetical works of “orthodox” Reformers, who
were particularly indebted to Erasmus, but also in the writings of free thinkers, who are often subsumed under the label of the “heterodox groups”.4
Among these “heterodox groups” Sebastian Castellio marked the theological discussion in the second half of the sixteenth century and, indirectly,
Origen’s reception in the Protestant world. His name is still connected to –
and to some extent confined within – the history of the doctrine of modern
tolerance,5 but Castellio’s work offered a theological option whereby Luther’s
call to sola scriptura and sola fide was combined with Erasmus’s ethical
teachings. Indeed, Castellio’s theological system expressed and reinterpreted
the agenda of the pamphlet De libero arbitrio, but he framed his work as a
restoration of the original message of Luther, in opposition to his new opponents: John Calvin and Theodore Beza.6
This contribution aims to articulate three essential passages of Castellio’s
theological work. In these passages, central assumptions of reformed
doctrine were both accepted and distorted to adapt to the principle of progression as a pivotal element of his soteriological teaching. The first passage
comes from his translations of the Bible and the Defensio suarum translatio
num Bibliorum. He redefines the sola scriptura principle as a consequence
of a dualistic conception of the Scriptures (spiritus/litera) which results in
his proclamation of the autonomy of the translator and reader dealing with
the sacred texts. The second passage comes from the Dialogi quatuor. He
describes the relativisation of the sola fide principle as one of the poles of
soteriology, which is configured primarily in ethical (not doctrinal) terms as
an experience of freedom and consequently responsibility. The third passage is from the De Arte Dubitandi, which was published posthumously.
He describes the concept of progress as immanent in the soteriological
4
5
6
The distinction between orthodoxy and heterodoxy, especially in the first half of
the sixteenth century, can hardly be applied as a clear historiographical category.
Among the traditional analyses of Castellio, see F. Buisson, Sébastien Castellion,
sa vie et son oeuvre (1515–1563). Études sur les origines du protestantisme libéral
français, Paris 1892, Reprint: Genève 2009; H.R. Guggisberg, Sebastian Castellio
1515–1563. Humanist und Verteidiger der religiösen Toleranz im konfessionellen
Zeitalter, Göttingen 1997; B. Mahlmann-Bauer (ed.), Sebastian Castellio (1515–
1563). Dissenz und Toleranz, Göttingen 2018.
For an historical introduction see U. Plath, Calvin und Basel in den Jahren 1552–
1556, Basel / Stuttgart 1974.
The Idea of Progression between Humanism & Reformation
203
movement that corresponds to a predestination to grace (instead of predestination to damnation) and is led by reason.
1. Sola Scriptura; but which Scriptura?
It is unclear whether, and to what extent, Castellio personally read and assimilated Origen’s theology. The few direct quotations or references Castellio
uses in his writing are clearly mediated by other authors. For example, in
his De haereticis, Origen is quoted in passages reproduced from Sebastian
Franck’s Chronica, Zeytbuch und Geschychtbibel (1531).7 When Castellio
quoted from Origen’s exegetical works, he did not discuss the works in
detail but referred to them as an important church authority in connection with other authors dear to him, especially Erasmus. It is probably due
to the mediation of the great humanist, whose texts Castellio assimilates
widely and deeply, that themes and echoes of the Origenian tradition emerge
not only in Castellio’s exegetical works, but also in the very fundaments of
his theological system.8 This is confirmed by Theodore de Beza, who summarised Castellio’s (as well as Erasmus’s and Ochino’s) theology of grace as
a Pelagianism directly stemming from Origen.9
Whether or not Beza’s judgment was radicalised by his animosity against
Castellio, their dispute over the interpretation of the sacred Scriptures in the
middle of the sixteenth century reenacted Erasmus and Luther’s dispute over
free will in 1524/25, so reviving Origen’s reception in the Protestant Church.
Castellio quoted the Adamantine several times in general terms, but it was
from Erasmus that he mediated Origen’s teaching, especially on the discussion of the true essence of the sacred text as a coexistence and opposition
of letter and spirit. Castellio’s doctrine of tolerance is itself a consequence
of this hermeneutical premise, which he developed in his exegetical works,
including his adnotationes to his Latin Biblia of 1551,10 and the translation
7
S. Castellio, De haereticis an sint persequendi, et omnino quomodo sint cum eis
agendum, Luteri et Brentii aliquorunque multuorum tum veterum tum recentiorum
sententiae. Liber hoc tam turbolento tempore pernecessarius, et cum omnibus, tum
potissimum principibus et magistratibus utilissimus, ad discendendum, quondam
sit eorum in re tam controversa, tacque pericolosa, officium, Magdeburg [Basel]
1554, 96 and 98 and 104. For an historical introduction see also H.R. Guggisberg,
Sebastian Franck and Sebastian Castellio. Ein Diskussionbeitrag, in: J.-D. Müller
(ed.), Sebastian Franck (1499–1542), Wiesbaden 1993, 293–303.
8 See for example K. Schindler, Castellio reading Erasmus, in: Mahlmann-Bauer
(ed.), 2018, 203–225.
9 See T. Beza, Correspondance, Paris 1962, vol. 2 (1556–1558), 190.
10 S. Castellio, Biblia. Una cum eiusdem annotationibus, Basel, Johan Parcus /
Oporinus, 1551.
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Stefania Salvadori
of the same into French in 1555,11 and especially in his defense of these
biblical translations against Beza in the Defensio suarum translationum
Bibliorum (1562).12
In his Defensio, Castellio looked at Scripture as the privileged source for
understanding the divine message; the principle of Sola Scriptura was therefore formally confirmed. However, Castellio drew an unexpected conclusion
from this principle: if Scripture discloses God’s truth, it must be accessible to
all Christians in order to guide them through the darkness of ignorance and
error towards the eternal and final salvation.13 This salvation corresponds with
what Castellio described as the complete revelation of justice and divine love.
Nevertheless, Castellio was aware that Scripture is in reality not clear and evident; it contains mysteries which cannot be understood, ambiguous passages,
and even manifest errors and inconsistencies. True Christians may even consider Scripture insufficient to ensure salvation, while false prophets may use
it to justify all kinds of intolerance.14 Castellio therefore did not hesitate to
disclose the true nature of Scripture as a Janus Bifrons, that is, an oracle that
simultaneously saves and condemns, depending on how the believer reads and
interprets its passages.
According to Castellio, the Bible is not the Word of God in its exclusive,
eternal sense. Instead, the Bible is one of the many manifestations of the
Word of God, expressed in this specific case through human language. One
should therefore distinguish between the eternal, divine, and meta-historical
Word (the spiritus), and its materialisation in a historical, human, and imperfect word (the litera).15 To describe the true nature of the Bible, Castellio
repeatedly quoted the Pauline verse “the letter kills, the Spirit gives life” (2
Cor 3:6). In the introduction to the Bible française, he developed this verse
by referring to a tradition which came to Erasmus from Paul via Origen: as
the body is the seat of the soul, so the letter is the seat of the Spirit.16
11 S. Castellio, La Bible nouvellement translatée avec la suite de l’histoire depuis les
tems d’Esdras jusqu’aux Maccabées, e depuis les Maccabées jusqu’à Christ: item
avec des Annotacions sur les passages difficiles, Basel: Herwagen, 1555.
12 S. Castellio, Defensio suarum translationum Bibliorum, et maxime Novi Foederis,
Basel 1562. An overview of Castellio’s hermeneutics can be found in H. Liebing, Die
Schriftauslegung Sebastian Castellios, in: H. Liebing, HumanismusReformation
Konfession. Beiträge zur Kirchengeschichte, ed. by W. Bienert / W. Hage, Marburg
1986, 29–124.
13 Castellio, Defensio 1562, 141.
14 Castellio, Defensio 1562, 144.
15 Castellio, Defensio 1562, 144 f.
16 See the introduction Le moyen pour entendre la Sainte écriture, in Castellio, La
Bible 1555, 3: «Ainsi que l’homme est fait du corps e de l’ame, tellement que le
cors est le logis de l’ame: ainsi les saintes écrittures sont faites de la lettre e de
The Idea of Progression between Humanism & Reformation
205
Letter and Spirit are therefore two separate areas where one must correctly read the former in order to access the latter. Starting from these common premises, Castellio identified two options. First, one could stop at the
external words without grasping the divine meaning, like animals do with
human language or wicked people do with the Spirit. Second, one could
approach the Letter by considering its ambivalent nature: it is a human
product with historical limits and specific linguistic forms that expresses a
meta-linguistic, divine content.17
This irremediable gap between Letter and Spirit defines the translator’s
work. A translator is called from time to time to adapt the sacred text to
different historical contexts and different readers, in the same way as a tailor
makes a custom-made suit (the litera) without changing the body of his purchaser (the spirit).18 More generally, this gap urges all Christian readers to
distinguish different degrees of clarity and evidence in Scripture. To deal
with this Janus Bifrons and extract God’s saving message, one must be able
to distinguish between four elements of Scripture. First, the clear and indisputable contents which even publicani et meretrices can grasp,19 that is the
first principles (God exists, God governs the world, God is righteous, and
Christ’s ethical example).20 Second, the mysteries that postlapsarian human
reason cannot grasp, and consequently should be simply believed and worshipped without further investigation. Third, clear errors or inconsistencies in the translation or transmission of the sacred text that must be freely
17
18
19
20
l’esprit, tellement que la lettre est comme une boite, gosse, ou coquille de l’esprit.
Et comme les betês peuvent bien voir le cors d’un homme, e ouir sa voix, mais elles
ne peuvent voir son ame, ni entendre son parler, sinon quelque peu de mots, voire
a grand peine: […] ainsi les méchans peuvent bien voir la letre, e ouir les mots de
saintes écrittures, que c’est qui y est raconté, commandé ou defendu: mais quant
a l’esprit de la letre, e où c’est que veut aller ferir la pensée de Dieu, les méchans
n’y entendent rien, a cause qu’il n’ont pas l’esprit de Dieu qui parle: tout ainsi
que les bêtes non pas l’esprit de l’homme qui parle, pour pouvoir entendre ses
parolles. Car comme il n’y a que de l’esprit de l’homme qui sache les affaires de
l’homme: ainsi les affaires de Dieu nul ne le sait, sinon l’esprit de Dieu, e ceux que
l’esprit de Dieu enseigne. Or est-ce qu’il n’enseigne que les enseignables, c’est-adire ceux qui par fois viennent a Christ nôtre justice, e sont humbles, e prêts a
laisser le jugement de la chair, e leur volonté même, pour faire la volonté de Dieu.»
See the dedicatory epistle A trespreux e tresvictorieux prince Henri de Valois,
in Castellio, La Bible 1555, 2. See also Castellio, Defensio 1562, 143–144 and
227–229.
See the dedicatory epistle to Edward VI King of England in Castellio, Biblia 1551.
See also Castellio, Defensio 1562, 19.
See Castellio, De haereticis 1554, 5.
Castellio, Defensio 1562, 161. See also Castellio, La Bible 1555, 4.
206
Stefania Salvadori
amended. Fourth, doubtful passages for which no person can express a clear
judgment, but every person can form an interpretation.21
Such a partial obscurity of Scripture does not represent a simple imperfection, nor does it reveal the inability of postlapsarian nature to grasp the
divine message. On the contrary, according to Castellio, the obscurity corresponds to the divine will and consequently Christian soteriology, which
urges believers to use all their natural faculties to extract from the sacred
text God’s truth and thereby gain full beatitude.
2. Free Will beyond sola scriptura
Because of its (partial) obscurity, Scripture cannot represent the unique
norm for Christian life. Since its obscurity corresponds to God’s will, it
cannot be bypassed simply by turning to a full and sudden understanding
by faith, as Beza claimed.22 According to Castellio, in order to understand
Scripture as God wishes, there is no need for a sudden complete regeneration
of human postlapsarian nature per fidem. This is because the understanding
of Scripture corresponds to a progressive justification, that is, a gradual process of transmutation per scientiam. The circular dynamic established by
Luther between internal and external claritas scripturae23 is consequently
broken and relocated in Castellio’s theological system in the line of spiritual
progress, of a primarily ethical rather than doctrinal improvement.
Having rejected the absolute clarity of Scripture revealed by faith and
postulated the freedom of both translators and common readers to interpret
Scripture, Castellio thought it necessary to determine principles external to
Scripture, in order to distinguish acceptable from unfounded interpretations.
The distinction was necessary to avoid radical relativism and, consequently,
21 See the introductory text Advertissement touchant cête translacion, Castellio, La
Bible 1555, 5 f. and Castellio, Defensio 1562, 49.
22 See for an historical overview on the discussion between Castellio and Beza
S. Salvadori, Socrate contre Aristote. Sébastien Castellion et la discussion sur les
modèles rhétoriques, in: M. C. Gomez-Géraud (ed.), Sébastien Castellion: des
Ecritures à l’écriture, Paris, 2013, 371–392 and S. Salvadori, Il martire e l’eretico.
La discussione fra Castellione e Calvino sulla possibilità di errare, in: L. Ronchi
de Michelis / L. Vogel (eds.): Giovanni Calvino e il calvinismo: La migrazione
di uomini, idee, libri, Dimensioni e problemi della ricerca storica, Roma, 2/
2010, 53–65.
23 See for example W. Mostert, Scriptura sacra sui ipsius interpres. Bemerkungen zu
Luthers Verständnis der Heiligen Schrift, in P. Bühler / G. Ebeling (eds.), Glaube
und Hermeneutik. Gesammelte, Aufsätze, Tübingen, 1998, 9–41. For an overview
see also the contribution by Albrecht Beutel in: A. Beutel (ed.), Luther Handbuch,
Tübingen 32017, 408–418.
The Idea of Progression between Humanism & Reformation
207
the chaos of personal opinions. Castellio found his principles in Christianity’s
certain and indisputable tenets: to obtain eternal life it is necessary and sufficient to believe that God alone is the source of all good and all justice, and it
is necessary to follow Jesus’ ethical teaching.24 Christ, the “second Adam”,25
opened the way to human justification not only through his sacrifice, but
also through the concrete example of his life.26
These principles are the simplicitas of the true Christian doctrine of which
general knowledge is sufficient to direct daily human existence by distancing
believers from sin and urging them to heal all evil through the practice of
the Christian virtues. According to Castellio, to distinguish the divine message’s essence from inscrutable mysteries, obscure passages, and manifest
errors, one must assess the concrete effects in individual lives. Only true
Christian doctrine can regenerate and convert souls, illuminate minds with
God’s truth, and establish love and compassion in the world. Castellio often
used the analogy of a doctor: just as a capable doctor is one who cures disease without too many explanations, as opposed to one who lets his patients
die despite claiming to be an expert, so too is a good doctrine a real instrument of salvation and healing of spiritual diseases, not a set of precepts and
ineffective dogmas.27
Castellio was aware of the possible contradictions. If the main purpose
of true Christian doctrine is to heal the postlapsarian nature and restore
human beings to their original righteousness, the question to be answered
is why God allowed it to be mixed up with human opinions or sentences.
More precisely, Castellio asked why these obstacles exist in Scripture if it
is the privileged expression of divine truth, and what role they play within
the human soteriological experience. Castellio’s answer was that scriptural
obscurity provides a testing ground for human free will, where natural faculties are called to fulfill the potential God has created and ordered in them,
instead of remaining inactive and consequently unproductive. By fulfilling
their potential, people with greater merit can win the final prize, that is,
perfect knowledge and a blessed life. In this way, Castellio not only justified
24 S. Castellio, De Arte Dubitandi et confidendi, ignorandi et sciendi, ed. by E. Feist,
Leiden 1981, 19–22.
25 See for example S. Castellio, Traicté des heretiques, a savoir si on les doit per
secuter; et comment on se doit conduire avec eux, selon d’avis, opinion er sen
tence, de plusieurs autheurs, tant anciens que modernes, Rouen [alias Lyon, Pierre
Freneau], 1554, 8.
26 See S. Castellio, Dialogi IIII […]. Eiusdem opuscula quedam dignissima quorum
inscriptiones vera pagella ostendet, Arisdorf [Basel,], 1578, 27 f.
27 See Castellio, Dialogi 1578, 246–263; see also Castellio, De Arte Dubitandi 1981,
101 f.
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Stefania Salvadori
scriptural obscurity, which was considered by his adversaries to be pure
blasphemy, but also transformed it into a greater and undoubted demonstration of infinite divine mercy.
Scriptural obscurity reveals the wisdom of the Creator to all who examine
it teleologically. One may ask why God did not want to provide food to each
bird in its nest. According to Castellio, the answer is that He had endowed
birds with wings to obtain food elsewhere, and at the same time, “noluit
igitur alas, opus suae sapientiae, esse otiosas”.28 One might also ask why
God hid gold and other useful metals in the depths of the earth such that
their extraction was difficult, instead of placing them directly on the ground.
In the same way, the answer is that God has provided human beings with
the instruments – hands and intellect – to work hard and satisfy their own
needs.29 This principle is to be extended to the difficulties of the soul: scriptural obscurities correspond with God’s will, according to which true believers must grasp the eternal truth with their own intellect and put the truth
into practice by behaving virtuously daily, so as to gain salvation. In opposition to the Reformed doctrine of imputed righteousness, Castellio constantly
repeated that Christians are saved “sine merito” (because Jesus’ sacrifice for
the forgiveness of all sins is given by grace), but not “sine opera” (because
the complete transformation of the postlapsarian nature is achieved by a
personal and free practice of justice).30
Free interpretation, free will, and intellectual and moral effort are therefore unavoidable preconditions of the human soteriological process. The
process cannot be solved by a mere appeal to faith or the imputation of
righteousness, but is always matched by the good free will of true believers
to place themselves in the school of Jesus Christ and transform their soul.
The progressive dynamic of Castellio’s soteriology is clearly summarised in
his De Arte Dubitandi, where he describes Christian life with the example of
a wild tree (the postlapsarian sinful nature) slowly (through daily discipline)
turning into a fruit tree (the restored nature) if a new shoot (Christ’s ethical
example, freely recognised and imitated) is grafted onto it.31 This progressive
dynamic also coincides with the doctrine of predestination to grace.
3. Progression and Predestination to Grace
Having shown that scriptural obscurity provides a testing ground for human
free will where natural faculties are called to fulfill the potential God has
28
29
30
31
Castellio, De Arte Dubitandi 1981, 58 f.
Ivi.
Castellio, De Arte Dubitandi 1981, 59 f.
See for example Castellio, De Arte Dubitandi 1981, 145 f.
The Idea of Progression between Humanism & Reformation
209
created and ordered in them, Castellio finally describes in his last work, De
Arte Dubitandi, the essence of these faculties, namely the natural senses and
reason. The latter in particular is the essential gnoseological instrument in
distinguishing prima principia from mysteria, and manifest errors from possible interpretations of single passages in the Bible.
Castellio defines reason as a filia Dei which existed before the Scriptures
and the ceremonies, and its existence will have no end. Even God cannot
destroy it because reason is his everlasting speech, his everlasting truth, which
was manifested in Christ, which ruled the Creation from the very beginning,
and which enables all human beings to pass judgment on right and wrong,
and to distinguish truth from error within Scripture.32 Also, the human conscience originates from reason and is a sort of native divine intelligence, an
imago Dei in all human beings.33 Therefore, Castellio’s description conflates
rationalism and spiritualism in order to place within reason a natural manifestation of divine truth in the interior life of men. That means, however,
that all human beings have at their disposal a secure device – reason – for
isolating the divine truth (spiritus) from its historical expression (verba).
Once recognised, divine truth will guide their lives in a sure way, will allow
them to practice justice and, thus, to reach salvation. To sum up, natural
reason as a manifestation of divine truth in the human soul ensures to all
humankind a predestination to grace.
Castellio consequently describes how reason works to distinguish truth
from error, i.e. by adapting human gnoseological faculties to the different
passages in the Bible, depending on whether they must be believed or they
can be understood, ignored, or doubted.34 Reason indeed recognises the different degrees of authority and clarity in Scripture by virtue of Scripture’s
resemblance to its own essence, which is once again God’s everlasting veri
tas. That is why reason also determines the dynamic between faith and comprehension, central to the soteriological process for Christians.
32 Castellio, De Arte Dubitandi 1981, 66: Nam ratio est ipsa, ut ita loquar, dei filia,
quae et ante literas et cerimonias omnes atque adeo ante orbem conditum fuit
et post literas et cerimonias omnes atque adeo post mutatum novatumque hunc
mundi statum semper futura est neque magis quam ipsemet deus aboleri potest.
Ratio, inquam, est aeternus quidam sermo dei longe tum literis tum ceremonis et
antiquior et certior, secundum quam deus suos et ante cerimonias et literas docuit
et post easdem ita docebit, ut sint vere divinitus docti.
33 Ivi, Loquitur enim hic Paulus de sua cuiusque coscientia, quae est quaedam natu
ralis scientia cognitioque sui cuiusque vel recte vel pravi facti a ratione proficiscens.
See also Castellio, Defensio 1562, 62–65.
34 Castellio, De Arte Dubitandi 1981, 49.
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Stefania Salvadori
According to Castellio, faith represents the beginning of a process of
learning and purification, through which each single Christian should draw
divine truth from the sacred text and on this basis devote himself to ethical practice following Christ’s model of justice. Conversely, knowledge only
takes shape progressively through concrete ethical experience, and reaches
its fullness only at the end of the soteriological process. By positioning faith
and knowledge respectively at the beginning and at the end of the process of
interior regeneration, Castellio aims to rule out the possibility of a sudden
and radical transmutation of the postlapsarian nature which would exclude
all idea of progress. That is why he rejects both the idea of a fides which is
at the same time a full cognitio Dei given by grace to the few predestined to
salvation (which was the position of the Reformed Genevan Church, according to Castellio)35 and the idea of a blind faith in whatever one might dream
(which would result in complete chaos). Indeed Castellio describes faith as
a conscious – and therefore not blind – trust in God and in his son, Christ,
who are already recognised as almighty and righteous in the prima principia.
From this point of view, faith is always intermingled with knowledge, and
both of them undergo a combined process.36
The dynamics of salvation have to be described in terms of chronological succession and progressive improvement which guides true believers
from a simple faith (in the clear essence of Christian teaching and Jesus’
ethical example) through a virtuous practice of these basic meanings (which
enables true believers to really experience and therefore fully understand the
eternal truth), up to a full knowledge of God’s wisdom (as an experienced
healing doctrine, which does not match with dogmas and theoretical contents, but rather embodies the godly wisdom in ruling the Creation). In this
progressive soteriological process, faith degrades from its initial maximum
to a final minimum, since a truth, once experienced, is no longer believed,
but rather known.37 Meanwhile knowledge progressively expands, since the
35 On the equation of justification and saving cognitio Dei in Reformed and Protestant
orthodoxy, see A. McGrath, Iustitia Dei. A History of the Christian Doctrine of
Justification, Cambridge 2005. On faith and knowledge in Castellio’s works see
S. Salvadori, Fides (non) est actio intellectus. Castellio’s and Ochino’s Views of
the Relationship Between Faith and Reason, in: Mahlmann-Bauer (ed.), 2018,
151–172.
36 Castellio, De Arte Dubitandi 1981, 92–94.
37 Castellio, De Arte Dubitandi 1981, 52: Est igitur credere dictis seu veris seu falsis
fidem habere. Saepe enim non minus creditur falsis quam veris, id quod de sci
endo dici non potest, quippe falsa quae sunt, sciri non possunt, at credi possunt.
Denique fides Christiana virtus est, id quod nemo inficiabitur. At scientia quomodo
virtus est, non video nec eam in sacris literis ut virtutem laudari comperio, nisi
forte scientiae verbum alicubi pro affectu ponatur, de qua hic non agimus. Et, ut
The Idea of Progression between Humanism & Reformation
211
transmutation of fides into scientia by means of experienced truth includes
new regions of meaning, until the believer reaches a full cognitio Dei which
corresponds to a perfect beatitudo.38
In the symmetrical relationship between faith and knowledge, Castellio
also places doubt and ignorance as natural (and therefore right and necessary) human instruments to approach the divine truth. Doubt and ignorance
are indeed closely linked to the progressive dynamic between fides and sci
entia, since they offer a temporary solution for those scriptural contents that
faith must not include (i.e. adiaphora that can be ignored since they are not
essential to salvation) and that knowledge cannot yet incorporate (i.e. the
mysteria, for example the Trinity, whose impossible rational interpretation
generates only false doctrine and intolerance).39 Both doubt and ignorance,
however, will find a complete solution at the end of the soteriological process, being set aside to privilege the practice of justice, or clarified in a new
and complete revelation.
Castellio’s teaching reformulated the dispute on free will between
Luther and Erasmus in a new historical context. Like Erasmus with Luther,
Castellio accused Reformed Orthodoxy of making the soteriological process static and believers passive, and therefore irresponsible: If Scripture is
immediately clear only to those who by faith have been justified by God and
therefore released from sin, their process of regeneration will be reduced to
the mere imputation of grace as a radical, yet fictive fracture between condemnation and grace without respect to human personal efforts. On this
basis, Castellio says, no one would feel compelled to do good. On the other
hand, the unelected would be condemned to get stuck eternally in hopeless
evil. Once again, on this basis, no one would be encouraged to do good.
According to Castellio, the doctrine of predestination, by denying free will
and moral responsibility, results in predestination to damnation. It contrasts, therefore, with the same divine will of universal salvation that Jesus
announced as a reward for personal moral efforts. And yet Castellio had not
paucis absolvam, ubi scientia incipit, ibi fides desinit, ut, qui ante dixit “Credo”,
idem iam dicat “Scio”.
38 Castellio, De Arte Dubitandi 1981, 95.
39 According to Castellio, all struggles emerge from the incorrect attitude shown
towards the sacred text. As believers and particularly theologians do not want to
confess their ignorance or doubts, they often show a shameless self-confidence.
Arguing to know and to judge everything and everyone, they thus engender intolerance and persecutions because they are forced to use violence in order to impose
their opinion, which is grounded on rhetoric instead of on manifest realities (see
here, 192 n. 22). They cannot, however, conceal their malice since their intolerance
clearly opposes Christ’s example of justice and mildness.
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Stefania Salvadori
simply taken up Erasmus’ teaching. He rather radicalised the humanistic
discussion on Scripture and developed a new dynamic, progressive, and universal model of salvation, a complex soteriological device whose direction
is entrusted to human reason. According to Castellio, progress, evolution,
and teleologically-oriented dynamism are therefore the propria not only of
Christian doctrine and life, but of God’s creation itself. Precisely his attempt
to combine Humanism and the Reformation in a new theological solution
would make a slow but clear reception of Origen’s thought possible in the
radical movements within the Protestant world of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
Elisa Bellucci
Wait for Better Times: Eschatological
Expectations in Philipp Jacob Spener, Johann
Wilhelm Petersen and Gottfried Wilhelm
Leibniz
Abstract: The millenarian expectation was a widespread phenomenon in the seventeenth century, one that encouraged several people to take an active role in order
to improve social, political and religious conditions. This contribution shows the
reshaping and the consequences of this eschatological paradigm through the example
of three authors: P.J. Spener, J.W. Petersen and G.W. Leibniz.
Keywords: Millenarism, Pietism, Eschatology, Apokatastasis, Leibniz
The millenarian waiting for Christ’s promised reign was an increasing phenomenon throughout the seventeenth century. After such a position was
rejected in the three main statements of faith of Lutheranism, Calvinism
and Anglicanism, it flourished anew especially in Protestant territories.1 In
England, in the Netherlands and in Germany heterodox or radical groups
supported – with some differences – the idea of the imminent coming of
Christ’s reign. This waiting was usually linked to the idea of the defeat
of the Antichrist, of the beginning of better times, of the clear appearance of
Truth all over the world, and, finally, of the gathering of all believers in the
true spiritual church.2 Whereas, on the one hand, such a position perpetrates
1
2
Chiliasm – or millenarianism – is the position which supports the idea that Christ’s
one-thousand-year reign is a future event before the end of the world and before
the Last Judgment. This position was condemned in article 17 of the Confessio
Augustana, in the article 41 of the 42 Articles of the Anglican church and in article
26 of the Confessio Helvetica Posterior, see R. Bauckham, Chiliasmus, in: TRE
(1981), 723–745.
An all-encompassing overview on millenarian positions between sixteenth and seventeenth century in Protestant territories is missing; to get an idea on the diffusion
of this phenomenon and on the different positions see G. Seebaß, Apokalyptik/
Apokalypsen, in: TRE (1978), 189–289 (280–284); Bauckham, Chiliasmus,
in: TRE (1981), 737–741. The revival of this position has its roots in the Italian
abbot Joachim of Fiore and on his idea of a future third epoch of the Spirit,
see R.E. Lernen, Joachim von Fiore, in: TRE (1988), 84–88; on the diffusion of
his ideas in the following centuries see J. Delumeau, Angst im Abendland. Die
Geschichte kollektiver Ängste im Europa des 14. bis 18. Jahrhunderts, M. Hübner/
214
Elisa Bellucci
a paradigm common to several protestant environments, i.e. the feeling of
being at the end of times and that the world is living in its last stage, on the
other hand – as Johannes Wallmann has remarked – the perspective of an
upcoming long glorious epoch before the end of the times means a break with
the historical view which, following the Augustinian tradition, considers the
present period as the last one before God’s Last Judgment.3 Both those who
awaited the end of times and those who believed in the upcoming reign of
Christ were unified by the hope for an imminent salvation thanks to Christ’s
return, as Hartmut Lehmann has remarked.4 Nevertheless, the hope for a
better condition before the Judgement Day opened new anthropological perspectives: the accent was no more only on human fallen nature, whose only
possibility of redemption was God’s mercy, now the active role of men was
also considered an important factor in preparing for God’s reign.5
This study focuses on three figures who contributed to spreading and
shaping the millenarian expectation in German territories between the
end of seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth century. Philipp
Jacob Spener, considered one of the first prominent figures of the pietistic
movement, supports the idea of future better times for the church already
in his text considered programmatic Pia Desideria (1675).6 The position
of the theologian remains unchanged for several years, until the religious
3
4
5
6
G. Konder/ M. Roters-Buruck (transl.), Hamburg 1985, 309–357. For contributions on single authors or groups see PuN 14 (1988); J. Wallmann, Reich Gottes
und Chiliasmus in der luterischen Orthodoxie, in: J. Wallmann, Theologie und
Frömmigkeit im Zeitalter des Barock, Tübingen 1995, 105–123; H. Lehmann, Das
Zeitalter des Absolutismus. Gottesgnadentum und Kriegsnot, Stuttgart 1980, 123–
134; K. von Greyerz, Wissenschaft, Endzeiterwartung und Alchemie in England
des 17. Jahrhunderts, in: A.C. Trepp / H. Lehmann (eds.), Antike Weisheit und
kulturelle Praxis. Hermetismus in der Frühen Neuzeit, Göttingen 2001, 205–218;
C. Hill, Antichrist in seventeenthcentury England, London/ New York ²1990;
H. Hotson, Paradise Postponed. Johann Heinrich Alsted and the Birth of Calvinist
Millenarianism, Dordrecht 2000; M.D. Goldish / R.H. Popkin, Millenarianism
and Messianism in Early Modern European Culture, 4 vols., Dordrecht 2001.
See J. Wallmann, Der Pietismus, Göttingen 1990, 49.
See Lehmann, 1980, 124.
On Luther’s eschatological and anthropological positions see J.E. Strohl, Luther’s
Eschatology, in: R. Kolb / I. Dingel / U. Batka (eds.), The Oxford Handbook
of Martin Luther’s Theology, Oxford 2014, 353–362; N. Slenczka, Luther’s
Anthropology, in: Kolb / Dingel / Batka (eds.), 2014, 212–232.
Philipp Jacob Spener (1635–1705) is considered one of the founders of German
Pietism, a movement which arose in the Lutheran church but that was shaped also
by contact with several other authors or traditions outside the pure Lutheran confession. For an introduction to Pietism see M. Brecht, Geschichte des Pietismus,
4 vols, Göttingen 1993–2004; D. Shantz, An Introduction to German Pietism,
Wait for Better Times: Eschatological Expectations
215
authorities of the city of Hamburg urged him to clarify his standpoint on
different issues, among them also the chiliastic one, that, as said, was condemned in Confessio Augustana 17.7 This request was urged also because
of some agitations which were arising around one of Spener’s long-term
friend: the theologian Johann Wilhelm Petersen. The theological positions
of this last were signed by the meeting with Spener – as well as other authors
who gathered around him – in Frankfurt in the 1670s. In this environment
Petersen met also Johanna Eleonora von und zu Merlau, whom he married
in 1680.8 The couple became one of the prominent supporters of the millenarian expectation in Germany at the end of the century. Although the
defense of chiliastic ideas cost Johann Wilhelm his place as superintendent of
Lüneburg, this event did not prevent the theologian and his wife from supporting the Millennium. Their already ample production was enriched since
1698 by several other treatises on the apokatastasis doctrine, i.e. the idea of
universal salvation and return of all creatures to God.
Both the Petersens and Spener attracted Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s attention, whose eschatological position was also strongly shaped by, among
7
8
Baltimore 2013; R. Osculati, Vero Cristianesimo. Teologia e società moderna nel
pietismo luterano, Bari 1990.
On this article see I. Dingel, Die Bekenntnisschriften der EvangelischLutherischen
Kirche, Vollständige Neuedition, Göttingen 2014, 113. This article rejects the idea
of a future earthly reign of Christ condemning explicitly Jews and Anabaptists.
On Johann Wilhelm Petersen (1649–1727) and Johanna Eleonora von und zu
Merlau (1644–1624) see M. Matthias, Johann Wilhelm und Johanna Eleonora
Petersen. Eine Biographie bis zur Amtsenthebung Petersen im Jahre 1692, Göttingen
1993; R. Albrecht, Johanna Eleonora Petersen. Theologische Schriftstellerin des
frühen Pietismus, Göttingen 2005; S. Luft, Leben und Schreiben für den Pietismus.
Der Kampf des pietistischen Ehepaares Johanna Eleonora und Johann Wilhelm
Petersen gegen die lutherische Orthodoxie, Herzberg 1994. Moreover, see the
biographies of the two auhtors: LebensBeschreibung Johannis Wilhelmi Petersen,
Der Heiligen Schrifft Doctoris, vormahls Professoris zu Rostock, nachgehends
Predigers in Hanover an St. Egidii Kirche, darnach des Bischoffs in Lübeck
Superintendentis und HoffPredigers endlich Superintendentis in Lüneburg, auff
Kosten eines wohlbekantes Freundes, 1719; B. Becker-Cantarino, The Life of Lady
Johanna Eleonora Petersen, Written by Herself, Chicago 2005. For the beginning
of Pietism in Frankfurt and the network of auhtors which shaped not only this
movement but also the Petersens’ position see J. Wallmann, Philipp Jaocb Spener
und die Anfänge des Pietismus, Tübingen ²1986; A. Deppermann, Johann Jaocb
Schütz und die Anfänge des Pietismus, Tübingen 2002. After their marriage the
couple started working and writing on the same topics. It seems that the leading
force was Johanna Eleonora, but most of the treatises were written by Johann
Wilhelm. I especially take in consideration the texts of the latter, but the contents
adressed are the same, and for this reason I often use both authors as a subject.
216
Elisa Bellucci
other authors, the two Pietistic theologians.9 The German philosopher was
interested both in the chiliastic discussion and in Petersen’s standpoint on
universal salvation. It was Leibniz himself that encouraged Petersen to write
one of his last texts on apokatastasis, Urania.
In the following pages I will briefly delineate the main features of each
position to show similarities and differences and to delineate the reshaping
of this eschatological paradigm.
1. Philipp Jacob Spener: Hoffnung kunfftiger besserer Zeiten
The role that Pietism played in encouraging believers to engage themselves
and to cooperate in the making of a better condition of the church cannot
be underestimated. Such a positive stance on the future is, of course, neither a novelty of Pietism, nor a proper distinctive mark of this movement.
However, Pietism had at least the merit to receive this impulse and to spread
it in different ways.10
In the Pia Desideria (published in 1675) Philipp Jacob Spener denounces
the corrupted situation not only of the Catholic but also of the Lutheran
church of his days, a corruption which the theologian links especially to scholastic theology, since this leads to nothing else than arid discussions.11 The
Pia Desideria does not stop, however, at a mere complaint; God promised
a better condition of the church on the Earth. Such a condition is described
9
For a general introduction on Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) see M.R.
Antognazza, Leibniz. An Intellectual Biography, New York 2009.
10 The beginning of the eschatology in Pietism and in Spener and the sources of this
position are discussed in Wallmann, ²1986, 324–353. The personal engagement
of believers in cooperating and in the making of God’s reign is exemplified also
by missionary impulses which came from different pietistic communities, starting
from Halle, see K. Rennstich, Mission – Geschichte der protestantischen Mission in
Deutschland, in: U. Gäbler (ed.), Der Pietismus im neunzehnten und zwanzigsten
Jahrhundert, Göttingen 2000, 308–320; H. Wellenreuther, Pietismus und Mission.
Vom 17. bis zum Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts, in: H. Lehmann, Geschichte des
Pietismus. Glaubenswelt und Lebenswelt, Göttingen 2004, 168–194.
11 See B. Köster (ed.), Philipp Jacob Spener. Pia Desideria. Deutschlateinische
Studienausgabe, Gießen 2005. Already Luther had depicted the Catholic Church
as Babel, identifying it with the Antichrist. According to Spener, not only the
Catholic Church, but also the Lutheran church is partly corrupted, and the main
cause of this corruption is the scholastic theology which cannot grasp God’s living word. On the figure of the Antichrist in Spener’s eschatology, see H. KrauterDierolf, Die Eschatologie Philipp Jacob Speners, Tübingen 2005, 54–61. The idea
that not only the Catholic but also the own church was partly corrupted and was,
therefore, seen as a part of the Antichrist is shared by several millenarian authors
also in other confessions, particularly in the English church, see Hill, 1990.
Wait for Better Times: Eschatological Expectations
217
by the theologian through the expressions “better condition”, “more blessed
and more glorious condition”, “other and better condition”, and it is linked,
on the one hand, to the conversion of Jews and to the fall of Rome, on the
other hand, to an increase of piety and to an improvement of the church
itself.12 To support this idea, Spener mentions Scripture and the fathers of
the church, yet without giving any precise indication about biblical passages
nor quoting ancient authors directly.13 His position can be summarised in
the expression “hope for a better condition of the church”. However, the
theologian neither mentions the Millennium nor explains what this better
condition really means.14
The Pia Desideria remained for some time the only text in which Spener
publicly expressed his view on future better times. In the following years this
topic was faced in several private letters, that, however, do not show any
significant change or further explanation. The theologian is, instead, always
clear in distancing his view from any kind of chiliastic position.
Such a standpoint remains the same until 1690, when new discussions
around the chiliastic issue began in the cities of Hamburg, Lüneburg and
Celle. The main spark which ignited these debates was a certain position
publicly expressed by the theologian and Spener’s friend Johann Wilhelm
Petersen. The latter – at that time superintendent of the city of Lüneburg –
was preaching the first resurrection of the martyrs and the beginning of
Christ’s reign. The debate fired up when the Petersen couple housed the
young Rosamunde Juliane von der Asseburg, a noblewoman who had
been experiencing internal locution with Christ since her childhood. The
12 I give for each passage the Latin and the German version preceeded by the number
of the page: Köster, 2005, 89: „Si scripturam S. Inspiciamus, dubitandum non est,
quod Deus Ecclesiae in terris conditionem adhuc meliorem pollicitus sit“ / 88: „daß
GOTT noch einigen bessern zustand seiner Kirchen hier auff Erden versprochen
habe“; 91: „totam veram Ecclesiam multo beatiori & gloriosi conditione, quam
nunc gaudet, restitutum iri“/ 90: „daß nicht die gesamte wahre kirche werde in
einen viel seligern und herrlichern stande gesetzt werde“; 97: „Ecclesia nostra
emendaretur“/ 96: „damit es doch mit unser kirchen in andern und bessern stande
gebracht werde möchte“. On the conversion of Jews and the fall of Rome see ibi,
90–93. On the effects of this improvement on personal piety and on the church
itself see ibi., 89: „amor Ecclesiae impellere nos debent, ut defectus emendemus,
piorum deisderia impleamus, & errantibus portam agnoscendae veritatis aperiamus ampliorem“/ 88: „Unterdessen soll uns sowol Gottes Ehr als liebe der Kirchen/
solche zu bessern/ frommer hertzen verlangen zu erfüllen/ und den irrenden die
pforte zu der erkantnuß der warheit weiter zu eröffnen“.
13 Köster, 2005, 88–89.
14 On the eschatological position of Spener and, particularly, on the meaning of the
expression “hope for future better times” see Krauter-Dierolf, 2005.
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Elisa Bellucci
Petersens protected her defending the truthfulness of her visions and using
these as a further sign and proof for the Millennium.15 Spener’s standpoint
can be better understood in relationship with that of the Petersens’. The
Petersens’ chiliastic expectation was developed in around twenty texts, most
of them authored by Johann Wilhelm Petersen and written in response to
other theologians. The position of the couple, however, does not undergo
any substantial change through the texts; rather, it is better clarified.16 The
typifying features of their chiliastic view are already present in the first
treatise on this topic: Schrifftmässige Erklährung und Beweis Der Tausend
Jahre.17 The Petersens’ millenarian position is defined as pre-millenarian,
which means that Christ will appear at the beginning of the Millennium; on
the contrary, those positions according to which Christ will be manifested
only at the end of the millenarian reign are defined as post-millenarian,
as Spener’s standpoint is. The first one is a more radical position, since it
entails the beginning of a new Earth and a new time, whereas the second
indicates a betterment of this world. According to the Petersens, the beginning of the Millennium is signaled by the first resurrection of the elected,
i.e. of true believers or born-again (Wiedergeborene), who will reign with
Christ from heaven – Christ will not come back physically on the Earth. The
Petersens identify, therefore, a double reign or a double church: the heavenly church governed by Christ and the resurrected, and the earthly church
15 On Rosamunde Juliane von der Asseburg and her relationship with the Petersens
see M. Matthias, 1993, 254–301. Some of Rosamunde’s dialogues with Christ
are reported in a treatise in which J.W. Petersen defends her: SendSchreiben
An einige Theologos und GottesGelehrte/ Betreffend die Frage Ob Gott nach
der Auffahrt Christi nicht mehr heutiges Tages durch göttliche Erscheinung den
Menschenkindern sich offenbahren wolle und sich dessen gantz begeben habe? /
Sampt einer erzehlten Specie Facti Von einem Adelichen Fräulein/ was ihr vom
siebenden Jahr ihres Alters biß hieher von Gott gegeben ist, s.l. 1691.
16 On the chiliastic position of the Petersens see W. Nordmann, Die Eschatologie des
Ehepaares Petersen, in: Zeitschrift des Vereins für Kirchengeschichte der Privinz
Sachsen und Freistaates Anhalt 26 (1930), 83–106 and 27 (1931), 1–19. For the
beginning of the discussion see Matthias, 1993 which analyses the discussion only
until 1692. A list of Petersen’s texts on chiliasm can be found at the end of J.W.
Petersen, Nubes Testium Veritatis De Regno Christi Glorioso, In Septima Tuba
Futuro Testantium. Libri Tres, Zunnerus, Francofourti ad Moenum 1696, § 46,
178–180, which mentions the treatises written until 1696. In my dissertation I am
preparing a chapter which analyses the discussion around chiliasm in more detail
and which takes all texts into consideration.
17 J.W. Petersen, Schrifftmässige Erklährung und Beweis Der Tausend Jahre/ und der
daran hangenden ersten Auferstehung/ Aus der Offenbahrung S. Johannis am 20.
Cap., written in the year 1690 but published auf kosten einiger Freunde in 1692.
Wait for Better Times: Eschatological Expectations
219
ruled by the converted Jewish people. The earthly church will be, anyway,
led by the heavenly church. The conversion of the Jews is a point shared
by the Petersens and Spener. On the contrary, Spener refused to admit the
first resurrection and the division of heavenly and earthly church. Whereas,
on the one side, Spener disagrees with his friend Petersen on the two points
mentioned above, on the other side, starting from the 1690s – i.e. from the
beginning of the discussions in Hamburg – he defends the Petersens’ chiliastic view, and, in general, any chiliastic view which is not against Confessio
Augustana 17, yet without defining his own chiliastic position. Spener’s first
assertions on chiliastic positions are quite circumspect. In the first text of
the discussion, Erfordetes Bedencken, Spener refers to Jerome’s position and
states that: Licet hanc sententiam non sequamur, tamen damnare non pos
sumus, quia multi Ecclessiasticorum virorum et Martyrum eam tenuerunt,
et unusquisque sensu suo abundet, et Domini cuncta judicio reserventur.18
The following year, 1691, in Die Freyheit der Glaübigen he explains that the
chiliastic issue does not belong to the fundamental articles of faith, and does
not touch these articles, neither directly nor indirectly, for this reason, whoever supports this harmless opinion cannot be rejected from the Christian
brotherhood.19 At the same time, he defends this position in relationship
to orthodoxy. As already explained, the main problem in supporting chiliastic ideas was their condemnation in article 17 of the Confessio Augustana.
According to Spener, the discussion around the millennium and its rejection
in the Confessio originated in a misunderstanding with the word chilias
mus. It is necessary to distinguish between a chiliasmus crassus, i.e. the wait
for a second coming of Christ on the Earth, and a chiliasmus subtilis and
subtilissimus, according to which the better condition of the church or the
coming of the reign does not imply Christ’s physical second coming. In the
18 D. Philipp Jacob Speners/ Chursächsischen OberHoffPredigers und Kirchen
Raths/ etc. Erfordertes Theologisches Bedencken/ über den Von Einigen des
E. Hamburgischen Ministerjj publicirten Neuen ReligionsEid, Ploen 1690. In
the same chapter Spener explains that Millennialism does not belong to the fundaments of faith, otherwise all the fathers from the old church and the whole
community who with them supported such a position should be rejected from
the Christian brotherhood. He then quotes some authors who supported the
millenarian expectations: Papias, Justin, Irenaeus, Polycrate, Nepote, Melito,
Victorinus, Hilarius Pictaviensis, Tertullian, Clement of Alexandria, Coracione,
Lactantius, Severus Sulpicius, Apollinaris.
19 Die Freyheit der Glaübigen, von dem Ansehen der Menschen in GlaubensSachen
/ In gründlicher beantwortung der so genanndten Abgenöthigten SchutzSchrifft/
Welche im Namen Des Evangelischen hamburgischen Ministerii Von Herrn
D. Johann Friederich Meyern/ außgefertiget worden/ Gerettet von Philipp Jacob
Spenern/ D., Franckfurt am Mäyn/ Zunners 1691, 5.24–25; 74.
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Elisa Bellucci
view of Spener, Rev 20 indicates a one-thousand-year long condition of the
church during which Satan will be imprisoned and will not seduce heathens
on the Earth until the end of this epoch, whereas believers will reign with
Christ.20 Following this definition, he can then explain that the CA refuses
only the first kind of chiliasm, i.e. the chiliasmus crassus, by condemning the
Jews and the Anabaptists position, but all other kinds of Millennium, where
Christ’s second coming on the Earth is not believed, are not condemned.21
Spener’s standpoint develops during the discussion, taking on the defense
of millenarianism in an increasingly clear way. His point of view remains,
however, ambiguous: on the one hand he clearly explains why chiliasm is not
against CA 17, he defends the position of his friend Johann Wilhelm, and
he bases his view on Rev 20, while on the other hand he avoids labeling his
position as “chiliastic”, and distances himself from some of Petersen’s tenets.
This ambiguous stance, which advocates chiliasm and at the same time
stands back from it, depends upon Spener’s biblical hermeneutic, based on
two important premises: progress in revelation and reading of Scripture
through the illumination of the Holy Spirit. In Freyheit der Glaübigen he
states that faith is neither based on the Apostles’ words nor on the authority
of people who belong to the church, it is rather based directly on God’s revelation through his words given in Scripture, words which are “sealed” in
men’s heart by the Holy Spirit.22 A reading of Scripture without Holy Spirit
is just dead literal knowledge.23 This issue is directly linked to the second
point: progress in revelation. In another text, Behauptung der Hoffnung
20 Spener, 1691, 5.3,64.
21 Spener, 1691, 5.4,65.
22 Spener, 1691, 1.5–8: „Die freyheit der Christen von der dienstbarkeit der menschen
hat zum grund/ daß eines jeglichen Christen glaube unmittelbar beruhe auff der
offenbahrung Gottes in seinem wort/ so er vor das wahre wort Gottes erkennet/
und solche warheit in seinem hertzen durch den Geist Gottes versiegelt ist. Also
wie unsers wesen grund ist das licht der vernunfft/ so ist der grund deß glaubens die
göttliche offenbahrung/ und das principium, Deus dixit, Gott hats gesagt: Welches
wir in der schrift finden/ und nachmal der Geist bezeugt/ daß Geist warheit ist.“
23 Spener, 1691, 5.20: „Wie aber II. nicht aller glaube/ der die wahre lehre hat/ deßwegen der wahre glaube ist/ sondern wol auch nur ein historischer glaube (dabey
allein eine büchstäbliche erkänntnüß ohne licht und leben des Geistes ist) seyn
kan“. Spener had already dealt with this problem some years before. Particularly
his text Die allgemeine Gottesgehlertheit (1680) is significant on this regard, see
K. Aland / B. Köster, Die Werke Philipp Jacob Speners. Studienausgabe. Band I,
Teil 2, Giessen/ Basel 2000, 1–353 (12): „Der erste pietistische Streit ist gar kein
Streit zwischen Pietismus und Orthodoxie. Er ist, wenn man schärfer zusieht,
gleich jenen Streitigkeiten zwischen Labadie und Wolzogen ein Kampf, in dem
der Pietismus seinen eigentlichen Gegner anvisiert: den Rationalismus“.
Wait for Better Times: Eschatological Expectations
221
künfftiger Besserer Zeiten (1693), Spener defends the Millenarian position
against the evangelical passage from Luke 18:8: “when the Son of man
cometh, shall he find faith on the earth?”. To this passage Spener counters
with a verse from Dan 12:4: “Many shall run to and fro, and knowledge
shall be increased”.24 Spener comments on this verse, claiming that God
increasingly gives his light to souls and lets them understand his promises
progressively.25 He adds also that the nearer the last times approach the
more God gives men his light.26
2. The Couple Johann Wilhelm and Johanna Eleonora
Petersen: From Millenarianism to Universal Salvation
These same premises – Spirit as hermeneutical principle and progress in
revelation – are shared by the theologians Johann Wilhelm and Johanna
Eleonora Petersen to support first their position on the Millennium and then
on apokatastasis. In their respective autobiographies both authors explain
how God progressively revealed different truths to them. Johann Wilhlem
Petersen writes:
Jetzo aber will ich nur dem geliebten Leser kund thun, wie Gott der Herr nach
seiner Liebes-Weißheit nach und nach, von Zeit zu Zeit ein Geheimniß nach dem
andern, als von dem noch künnftigen Fall Babels, von der Juden Bekehrung in der
letzen Zeit, von dem Zustande der Seelen nach dem Tode, von dem Reiche Jesu
Christi in der siebenden Posaunen, von der Wiederbringung aller Dinge, und von
24 P.J. Spener, Behauptung Der Hoffnung künfftiger Besserer Zeiten/ In Rettung Des
ins gemein gegen dieselbe unrecht angeführten Spruchs Luc. XIIX, v. 8. Doch
wann des menschen Sohn kommen wird/ meynest du/ daß Er auch werde glauben
finden auff Erden?, Frankfurt 1693.
25 Spener, 1693, 5: “So dann nicht zu zweiffeln ist/ daß der Herr sein licht immer
in mehrere seelen geben/ und ihnen seine weissagungen/ die lang unverstanden
geblieben waren/ deutlicher zu gewissen verstand offenbahren wird: Wie es dorten
geheissen/ Dan 12,4”. See also 347: „Lasset uns Gott hertzlich anruffen/ daß er
uns die augen und hertzen mehr und mehr öffnen wolle/ daß wir von allen diesen
dingen die uns noch bevorsthehen/ so viel doch lernen verstehen/ und in seinem
licht einsehen/ als er uns nöthig zu seyn findet. Es stehet die verheissung/ Dan. 12,4.
Daß viele werden darüber kömmen/ und das es vorher jeden verborgen gewesen/
und das meiste wie ein versigelt buch geblieben war/ viel verstand darinnen finden“. Same statement in a letter An Johann Christoph Holtzhausen in Frankfurt
a.M (10.10.1687), see J. Wallmann (ed.), Philipp Jacob Spener. Briefe aus der
Dresdner Zeit 1686–1691, Band 1, Tübingen 2003, 639–647 (647): „Nun, der
Herr öffne uns allen mehr und mehr die augen in seinem wort, dessen reichtum
immer weiter und tieffer einzusehen, zu seinem so viel mehrern preiß“.
26 Spener, 1693, 348: „Ich will auch nicht zweiffeln/ je näher die zeit ist/ je mehr
werde der Herr licht geben/ daß einige solche zeit genaue finden werden“.
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Elisa Bellucci
dem Geheimniß der Erstgebohrnen aller Creaturen, und von dem Geheimniß des
Vaters, und des Shons, und des heiligen Geistes aus seinem Wort mir entdecket
habe.27
In her autobiography, Johanna Eleonora describes the same discoveries,
with the difference that she also links these discoveries to divine dreams
and revelations.28 However, godly revelations through dreams are never the
ultimate reason to accept certain truths. She explains: “I do not consider
my dreams and visions as grounds of divine truth but as true instruction
with which God the Lord has guided my investigations in holy scripture”.29
Petersen’s eschatological expectation is built primarily on Scripture, especially on Rev 20, but not only. Scripture, in turn, is interpreted through the
action of the Holy Spirit, which discloses God’s wisdom concealed in it.
In GlaubensGespräche mit Gott Johanna Eleonora explains that true faith
starts with reading God’s word, whose reading must always be mediated by
the illumination of God’s Spirit, without which there is just a literal knowledge of Scripture based on “fleischliche Vernunft” (carnal reason).30 Also a
passage from Johann Wilhelm Petersen’s Die Warheit des Herrlichen Reiches
Jesu Christi (1692) explains that a person not illuminated by God’s spirit can
understand the literal meaning of Scripture, but only a “geistliche Mensch”
(spiritual man) can understand “geistliche Dinge” (spiritual things); the
Scripture contains a deeper meaning then the literal one.31 In Specie facti,
27
28
29
30
Petersen, 1719, 343.
See Becker-Cantarino, 2005, §§ 35–38, 89–98.
Becker-Cantarino, 2005, § 36, 92.
GlaubensGespräche Mit Gott:In Drey unterschiedene Theile abgefasset/ Also
daß Der I. Theil/ Das Werck des Glaubens in der Krafft/ Der II. Theil/ Das
Zeugniß/ die Macht und Herrlichkeit des Glaubens/ Der III. Theil/ Das Ende des
Glaubens/ welches ist der Seelen Seligkeit/ vorstellet / In dieser letzten Glaublosen
Zeit zur Auffmunterung und Erweckung des Glaubens auffgesetzt Von Johanna
Eleonora Petersen/ Gebohrne von und zu Merlau, 1691, 174: „Da sind wir alle
unter dem Unglauben beschlossen/ weil wir alle ünglaubig sind/ so lange wir
natürliche Menschen bleiben; wenn wir aber geistlich werden/ so werden wir
glaübig/ und werden vom Unglauben erlöset als Gefreyete des Herren/ der sich
über uns erbarmet/ und von solchem Unglauben abgehollfen hat“; 199: „Wenn
da die Seele mit Ja antowrtet will [scil. to the question do you believe in the son of
God?]/ so fällt ihr dein Geist in die Rede/ und spricht zu ihr durch Erinnerung der
Worte“; 210: „Ja mein heyland/ dein Geist ist es/ der den Glauben in uns würcket/
und dein Geist ist es auch/ der uns treibet dem Glauben nachzujagen“.
31 J.W. Petersen, Die Warheit Des Herrlichen Reiches Jesu Christi: Welches In der
siebenden Posaune noch zu erwarten ist. Geschrieben zu Magdeburg im Jahr nach
der Geburth Christi 1692, (s.l.) 1692, 4: „Aber nun es eine ausgemachte Sache ist/
daß der naturliche Mensch nichts begreiffet/ was der Geistes Gottes ist/ sondern
nur allein der geistliche Mensch geistliche Dinge begreiffen könne/ so folget auch/
Wait for Better Times: Eschatological Expectations
223
the text in defense of Asseburg’s visions, the theologian explains that many
promises are concealed in God’s word, promises that he discloses when the
times of their accomplishment is about to happen.32
The same spiritual hermeneutic is also at the base of the apokatastasis
doctrine, or universal salvation, a doctrine which the Petersens embraced
thanks to the reading of Jane Lead’s treatises and on which they wrote several texts starting from 1698.33 The second treatise on this topic, Mysterion
apokatastaseos panton, authored by Johann Wilhelm but published anonymously under the pseudonym “member of the German Philadelphian
Society”, constitutes a sort of anthology of authors and texts that along
the centuries supported the doctrine of universal salvation.34 In addition to
daß ein viel Grösserer und Geheimeres in der heiligen Schrifft verborgen liegen
müsse/ als die äusseren Worte von den meisten pflegen eingesehen zu werden […]
Es hat dieses der berühmte höllandische Professor Coccejus, welchen wir gewiß
in exegesi Sacra viel schuldig seyn“.
32 See J.W.Petersen, 1691, § 35: „sondern daß vielmehr in seinem Worte verheissungen da liegen/ daß er/ ehe da komme der grosse und erschreckliche Tag des heren/
seine Schrifft gelehrte zum himmelreich gelehret/ seine Weisen und Propheten
zur Warnung der Welt/ und zum Trost seiner Gläubigen senden wolle“. See also
Petersen, Die Warheit, 1692, 1.2: „es ist wohl möglich/ daß Gott der Herr etwas
auff eine gewisse Zeit solte verschlossen und versiegelt haben/ welches er nimmer
mehr eröffnen wolle? Vielmehr ist es sein bündiger und fester Schluß/ daß alle
Dinge/ die biß auf eine gewisse Zeit nach Gottes heiligen Rath und Willen haben
müssen verschlossen bleiben/ alsdenn nothwendig klar und offenbahr werde müssen/ wenn nun die eingeschrenckte Zeiten vorbey geflossen sind. Also muß einmahl
nach eben solcher Verheissung Gottes das/ was in einem Geheimnüß verborgen
war/ nothewendig an des Tages Licht kommen/ daß die erwachtete Zeiten das
jenige sehen/ welches die Vorhergehenden noch nicht haben sehen mögen“.
33 For the meaning of this doctrine see H. Rosenau, Allversöhung, in: RGG (1998),
322–323. The Petersens developed this doctrine reading some treatises of the
English theosophist Jane Lead, that contained the doctrine of universal redemption. Also in this case, the ultimate reason to accept this truth was not a mere
conviction but God’s revelation through the reading of Scripture mediated by Holy
Spirit. For an introduction to this doctrine see Albrecht, 2005, 271–300.
34 J.W. Petersen, Mysterion Apokatastaseōs Pantōn, Das ist: Das Geheimniß Der
Wiederbringung aller Dinge, Darinnen In einer Unterredung zwischen Philaletham
und Agathophilum gelehret wird, Wie das Böse und die Sünde … solle auffge
hoben und vernichtet; Hergegen die Creaturen Gottes … durch Jesum Christum,
Den Wiederbringer aller Dinge, … errettet werden … / Offenbahret durch Einen
Zeugen Gottes und seiner Warheit, 1700. The pseudonym refers to the English
Philadelphian Society, whose leading force was Jane Lead herself. This was a
Christian society unbound from any particular confession; among their main tenets
there were also the chiliastic expectation and the doctrine of universal salvation.
See A. Hessayon, (ed.), Jane Lead and her transnational legacy, London 2016.
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Elisa Bellucci
the above mentioned Jane Lead, Origen, the Kabbalistic tradition – especially Christian Kabbalah – and even Luther are also quoted.35 How can
the Petersens conciliate Luther’s standpoint with that of Origen? The two
theologians not only hold two different positions, but Origen’s position was
also rejected expressly by Luther.36 In answering this question, we can notice
how the Petersens make use of the Spirit as a hermeneutical principle, and to
which consequences the idea of progress in revelation leads.
The Petersens report a letter by Luther to Hans von Rechenberg, where
the theologian of Wittenberg answers the question of whether it is possible that someone who dies without faith can be saved. Luther’s answer
refuses, at first, Origen’s position, since, according to the Alexandrian, God
will undoubtedly save everyone, the devil included; a position that, according to Luther, cannot be asserted with certainty. Instead, the theologian of
Wittenberg remarks that without faith nobody can be saved. He seems, then,
to reconsider his position and admits: “who would doubt that He [scil. God]
can do that [scil. to save everyone]? But, that He will actually do that is
impossible to prove.”37 Starting from this assertion, the Petersens claim that
Luther could not grasp the truth of universal salvation thoroughly because
the situation of the church was not completely fallen yet and times were not
ripe enough to understand how big and how deep God’s mercy and love
are.38 What was admitted by Luther as a remote possibility becomes for
the Petersens a certainty clearly revealed by the Spirit through the reading
of Scripture. The idea of a progressive revelation allows the Petersens to
bring together and to harmonise two authors – Origen and Luther – that
35 On the sources used by Petersen in this treatise to speak about apokatastasis see
E. Bellucci, Origenian, English and Kabbalistic Influences in Johann Wilhelm
Petersen’s Apokatastasis Doctrine. The case of Mysterion apokatastaseos pan
ton, in: A. Fürst (ed.), Origen’s Philosophy of Freedom in Early Modern Times.
Debates about Free Will and Apokatastasis in 17thCentury England and Europe,
Münster 2019,181–195.
36 For Luther’s rejection of Origen and the perpetration of this position in other
reformed authors see Terraciano, 2012, 140–144; T.P. Scheck, Origen and the
History of Justification. The legacy of Origen’s Commentary on Romans, Notre
Dame 2008, ch. 6.
37 Petersen, 1700, Vorbericht, 30–31. For the letter see WA 10.2, 322–326: Ein
Sendbrief über die Frage, ob auch jemand, ohne Glauben verstorben, selig werden
möge (1522.). Translation mine. This letter is quoted also in Johanna Eleonora’s
Das ewige Evangelium Der Allgemeinen Wiederbringung Aller Creaturen, 1698,
the first text in which the couple supports the doctrine of universal redemption.
Das ewige Evangelium is thoroughly reported also inside J.W. Petersen’s Mysterion
apokatastaseos panton, from which I quote.
38 Petersen, 1700, I, 66.1,37.
Wait for Better Times: Eschatological Expectations
225
supported two totally different standpoints. The direct consequence of this
position is that it is always possible to question the established orthodoxy, as
several orthodox theologians had reproached to the Petersens’ eschatology.39
Orthodoxy is overcome by Spirit, the concealed pilot of history, and theologians are passive instruments through which this progressively reveals itself:
a so deep wisdom is concealed in Scripture, that it is better to be silent and not to
seek to grasp it through reason, […] but to arrest ourselves to the Spirit of revelation, to wait with a silent heart, in this way what was obscure to us, will become
clear.40
39 One of the main charges directed at the Petersens was that of fanaticism. Particularly
the superintendent of Lübeck August Pfeiffer wrote in his Antichiliasmus, oder
Erzehlung und Prüfung des betrieglichen Traums Derer so genannten Chiliasten
Von der noch zukünfftigen Tausendjährigen güldenen Zeit/ oder sichtbahren
Reiche Christi auff Erden vor dem jüngsten Tage: Darinnen Nicht allein dieses
Schwarms eigentliche Beschaffenheit/ … ausführlich beschrieben/ … Sondern auch
der Chiliasten Einwürffe/ … beantwortet werden, Lübeck 1691 that to support
millenarianism is against the hermeneutical principle of analogia fidei, according to
which all parts of Scripture should harmonise with each other and it is not possible
to establish a new article of faith based on obscure and controversial passages,
as is the Revelation of John. On the contrary, the position of those authors who
support millennialism is based on dreams and imagination and is against faith. For
this reason, Pfeiffer defines those authors who support chiliasm as “Schwärmer”,
which means fanatic, enthusiasts. On Pfeiffer’s standpoint and the reaction of
the Petersens see Luft, 1994, 170–197. Another charge which goes in the same
direction was that of the dean of the faculty of theology in Rostock Johann Fecht,
who, with regard to the doctrine of universal redemption, defined the Petersens
“new prophets” or “new evangelists”; see Disputatio Theologica Inauguralis,
libellum recentissumum, sub rubrica Das ewige Evangelium der allgemeinen
Wiederbringung aller Creaturen / examinans, quam jussu maxime Reverendi ordi
nis Theologicii, in illustri Universitate Rostochiensi, Praeside Dr. Johanne Fechtio,
Rostock 1699.
40 J.W. Petersen, Mysterion Apokatastaseōs Pantōn, Oder Das Geheimniß Der
Wiederbringung aller Dinge, Durch Jesum Christum. Tomus Secundus: Worinnen
auf verschiedene Schrifften, und Einwürffe gründlich und bescheidentlich geant
wortet, und, was etwa im erstem Tomo undeutlich seyn möge, erläutert wird,
Pamphilia 1703, II, IV, 11: „Es ist eine solche Tieffe der Weißheit in h. Schrifft
verborgen/ darum ist gut/ daß wir stille seyn und nicht mit der Vernufft darin
zufahren/ nich diß oder das darauß zu folgern suchen/ sondern um den Geist der
Offenbahrung anhalten/ und darauff mit stille, hertzen warten/ so wird uns klar
gemacht werde/ was uns sonsten dunckel war/ und werden fest gemacht/ darinen
wir zuvor gewancket/ der Herr ist true/ der wird es thun“ (my translation).
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3. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Spe meliorum
The discussions on the Millennium and on universal salvation also caught
Leibniz’s attention, whose opinion can be reconstructed from his correspondence with several authors.41 Leibniz expresses a quite favorable position
both on the Millennium and on apokatastasis, although the theologian does
not spare criticism on several points.
Leibniz got to know Petersen’s position thanks to the duchess Sophie of
Hannover, who wrote to him about the revelations of the young visionary
Rosamunde Juliane von der Asseburg. However, Petersen’s is not the
only position discussed by Leibniz; other millenarians, such as Antoinette
Bourignon, Pierre Jurieu and Franciscus Mercurius van Helmont, are also
involved in Leibniz’s discussion on the Millennium.42 Despite the similar
positions hold by these authors, Leibniz expresses different opinions towards
them. The position of the philosopher of Leipzig recalls, on the one hand,
that of Spener, whose opinion he knew and shared, on the other hand it also
presents similarities with orthodox theologians’ criticism of chiliasm.
In agreement with Spener, Leibniz does not condemn the wait for the onethousand-year reign of Christ, stating that the Revelation of John seems to
support such a position and that the Confessio Augustana condemns only
those Millenarians who cause public disorders: “Et je ne voudrois pas non
plus qu´on tourmantât ceux qu´on appellee Chiliastes ou Millenaries, pour
une opinion à la quelle l´Apocalypse paroist si favorable. La Confession
d´Augsbourg semble n´estre contre les Millenaries Turbateurs du repos public.
Mais l´erreur de ceux qui attendant en patience le Royaume de Jesu Christ
paroist tres innocente”.43 In line with this statement, he rejects Bourignon’s
41 On Leibniz’s position about the millenarian position see also M.R. Antognazza
/ H. Hotson, Alsted and Leibniz. On God, the Magistrate and the Millennium,
Wiesbaden 1999, 125–214; A.P. Coudert, Leibniz and the Kabbalah,
Dordrecht 1995.
42 Leibniz’s position towards these authors is analyzed in Antognazza / Hotson, 1999,
158–192.
43 Leibniz an Herzogin Sophie (Hannover, 13. (23.) Oct. 1691), in: G. Scheel /
K. Müller/ G. Gerber (eds.), Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. Allgemeiner politischer
und historischer Briefwechsel, vol. 7, n. 31, Berlin 1992, 33–37 (36–37). For
Leibniz’s position on Spener see: Leibniz an Herzog Rudolf August (Hannover,
29. Dec. 1691) (8. Jan. 1692)), in: Scheel / Müller/ Gerber 1992, 72–75 (75): „Es
hat sonsten H. Spenerus auf begehren der Churfürstin zu Brandeburg Durchl einen
außführl. Brief an höchstgedachte Churfürstin geschrieben, über die 3 puncta,
1) jungfrau Rosimunda, 2) den Chiliasmus des Superintendenten Petersen, und
3) den Pietismus zu Leipzig“; see also Leibniz an Landgraf Ernst von Hessen
Rheinfels (Hannover, Anfang Main 1692), in Scheel / Müller/ Gerber 1992,
n. 156, 323–326 (324): “On distinguera tousjours entre Mr. Spener, et des gens
Wait for Better Times: Eschatological Expectations
227
millenarian view, since it is based on a pessimistic vision of the world and
on the idea that only Christ’s coming can renovate a human being’s heart.
According to Leibniz, this position creates sects instead of helping cooperation: “Il me semble que je reconnois que fue Mons. Labadie, feu Mad.lle
Bourignon, et William Penn avec ses confreres, ont eu ce defeaut, d’estre
secteraires ou condemnatifs”.44 On the contrary, he appreciated the position
of the German Kabbalist Franciscus Mercurius van Helmont, who believed
that human initiative had an important role to play in preparing for the
millennium.45 On the other side, following the position of several orthodox
theologians, he criticises the epistemological premises of millenarians, who,
as in the case of Rosamunde Juliane von der Asseburg, build their views on
imagination, an imagination which is reinforced in several cases by histories of miracles, which help developing phantasy.46 Therefore, in line with
orthodox theologians, Leibniz seems to consider the millenarian position
a fanatic position, as this statement on Antoinette Bourignon suggests: “Je
tiens qu’elle a beaucoup de zele, mais je ne sçay si elle a assés de lumieres et
assés de charité”.47
Leibniz never involved himself directly on discussions on the orthodoxy of
millenarianism. The issue which interested him was the epistemological base
upon which millenarians grounded their position. The philosopher’s standpoint is summarised in his remarks on the journey of William Penn, where
he quotes not only the Quaker theologian, but also several other authors
that had a position similar to him and who Leibniz defines “nouvelle predicateurs”, such as Franciscus Mercurius van Helmont, Knorr von Rosenroth,
44
45
46
47
pieux, sages, et sçavans comme Luy, et entre quelque malaviséz qui abusent de
ces Principes, et qui donnent dans les visions, ou dans le Chiliasme grossierˮ;
Leibniz an Heinrich Avemann (Hannover, 29. Dec. 1691 (8. Jan. 1692), in: Scheel
/ K. Müller/ Gerber 1992, n. 276, 502: “Spenerus multo circumspectius in literis
quas ad Serenissimam Electricem Brandeburgicam impulsu matris interrogantem
dedit, judicium suum interponere nondum audet, defectu Notitiae, et ut mihi
videtur potius ad vim imaginationis inclinat, quae mea quoque sentetntia estˮ ;
Leibniz an Joh. Freidrich Leibniz (Wolfenbüttel Hälfte September 1692), in: G.
Scheel / K. Müller/ G. Gerber (eds.), Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. Allgemeiner
politischer und historischer Briefwechsel, vol. 8, n. 386, Berlin 1992, n. 386,
614: Seckendorfum ego mirifice colo, Spenerum maximi facio, ambobus amicis
utor, vellemque consilia eorum in Republica et Ecclesia plurimum possent.
Leibniz to Andreas Morell, 10 (20) Dec. 1696, quoted in Antognazza / Hotson,
1999, 188. For Leibniz’s position on Antoinette Bourignon see ibid., 167–170.
See Antognazza / Hotson, 1999, 189.
For the position of orthodox theologians see e.g. the standpoint of August Pfeiffer
quoted above, footnote n. 39.
Quoted in Antognazza / Hotson, 1999, 167.
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Henry More, Pierre Poiret, Weigelians, Bohemists, Quiestists, and Labadists.
Commenting on their way of preaching based on the interior illumination of
God’s Spirit, Leibniz states:
Je ne sçay pas aussi, si ces personnes possedent veritablement dans leur entendement, cette lumiere qu´ils s´attribuent. La lumiere n´est autre chose que la connoissance des grandes verités, mais on n´en remarque point icy. […] Pourveu qu´on
tache aussi d´acquerir cette lumiere veritable, sans laquelle je ne crois pas qu´on
puisse avoir le veritable amour de Dieu, puisque on ne sçauroit aimer sans connoistre, et sans remarquer les beautés de ce qu’on aime.48
True knowledge of God and true charity are based on the presence of eternal
truths in mind, and, in turn, these can be recognised through certain evidence: “La veritable marque de l’esprit et de la grace de Dieu est d’éclairer
et de rendre meilleur”.49
However, Leibniz’s stance in front of these authors is not only polemic; on
the contrary, he finds the character of such people useful to awaken spirits
and to turn them towards reason:
je le trouve [scil. the telling of William Penn’s journey] fort utile pour connoistre
les differens caracteres de la nature humaine, et j’approuve même qu’il y ait des
personnes qui prennent des biais extraordinaires pour tirer les autres de leur assoupissement c’est pour cela qu’il leur faut pardoner certaines practiques affectées et qui
paroissent bizzares. Le monde est abbandoné à la bagatelle, on ne pense point à ce
qui fait la veritable felicité.50
He explains then that passions are a good way to detach men from vanities
of the world, to awake their reason, and to lead it to the contemplation of
eternal truths: “les seul raisons ne suffisent point pour les faire rentrer en
eux-mêmes, il faut quelque chose qui touche les passions et qui ravisent les
ames, comme fait la musique et la poësie […] et generalement en tous ceux
dont l’imagination est vive, dominante, et contagieuse, comme me paroist
estre aussi celle de ces nouveaux predicateurs.”51 Imaginations and passions
are not true knowledge; they are, however, a way to move human beings to
the knowledge of eternal truths and, in this way, to the knowledge of God.
This kind of knowledge, in turn, pushes men to conform themselves to God’s
order and to achieve happiness progressively:
48 See G.W. Leibniz, Extrait d’un journal du voyage que William Penn a fait, in: F.
Beiderbeck et al. (eds.), Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. Politische Schriften, vol. 6,
Berlin 2008, n. 51, 339–360 (359).
49 See G.W. Leibniz, Remarques sur le journal du voyage que William Penn a fait;
in: Beiderbeck, 2008, n. 52, 360–365 (365).
50 Leibniz, Extrait, 358.
51 Leibniz, Extrait, 359.
Wait for Better Times: Eschatological Expectations
229
Il est visible que l´amour de Dieu et de l´ordre divin qui en resulte, fera que nous
tacherons aussi à nous conformer à cet ordre et à ce qui est le meilleur. Cela fait que
les sages ne sont point mécontens de ce qui est passé, sçachant bien qu’il ne peut
manquer d’estre le meilleur. […] Car tout le veritable bonheur ne consiste uniquement que dans un progrés perpetuel de joyes provenant de l’amour coeleste.52
Leibniz’s interest in the chiliastic issue does not stop here. The philosopher
comes back to this problem some years later in connection with the publication of Johann Wilhelm Petersen’s texts on apokatastasis. The name of
Johann Wilhelm Petersen appears in the correspondence of the Lutheran
theologian of Helmsted Johann Fabricius, where the latter indicates to
Leibniz some authors who had written on the middle condition of the soul,
among them also the Petersens.53 Anyway, Fabricius’ correspondence is not
the only one where the Petersen’s name appears. The millenarian theologian
is quoted in several other letters authored by Leibniz in these years, e.g. those
to the English theologian Thomas Burnet. As in the case of the Millennium,
Leibniz seems to appreciate Petersen’s work Mysterion apoakatasteos pan
ton and, at the same time, to stand back: “ce livre est fait avec beaucoup
d’erudition et de jugement; l’auteur apporte tous les passages des anciens
et de modernes favorables à cette doctrine, et il soutient son sentiment contre des savans adversaires avec beaucoup de moderation et de zele. Je l’ay
parcourou avec plaisir. Et quoyque je n’aye garde de la suivre, je ne laisse
pas de reconnoistre son merite”.54 And also: Petersianos Versus magna cum
voluptate legi: explorata mihi erat eruditio Viri. […] Mihi semper omnia
eius scripta mirifice placuere, etiam ubi non plane de veritate sententiae sum
persuasus.55 Despite his doubts about Petersen’s ideas, Leibniz considered his
text interesting, and suggested to him that he write a poem in Virgilian verses
where he should describe the development of the cosmos from the creation
of the world up until universal salvation:
52 Leibniz, Extrait, 364.
53 Johann Fabricius an Leibniz, (Helmstedt, [Mitte] Februar 1700), in: Scheel /
Müller/ Gerber 2005, n. 224, 406–409.
54 Leibniz an Thomas Burnett of Kemney, (Hannover, 27 Februar 1702), in: M.L. Babin / G.van den Heuvel / R. Widmaier (eds.), Gottfried Wilhlelm Leibniz.
Allgemeiner politischer und historischer Briefwechsel, vol. 20, Berlin 2006, n. 467,
808–818.
55 Viri Illvstris Godefridi Gvil. Leibnitii Epistolae Ad Diversos, Theologici, Ivridici,
Medici, Philosophici, Mathematici, Historici Et Philologici Argvmenti / E Msc.
Avctoris Cvm Annotationibvs Svis Primvm Divvlgavit Christian. Kortholtvs,
A. M. Ordinis Philosophici In Academia Lipsiensi Assessor, Et Collegii Minoris
Principvm Collegiatvs, Leipzig 1734, Epistola LXXXIII (ad Io. Fabricius,
Hannover, 14 Oct. 1706), 116–117.
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Saepe mecum cogitavi, a nemine melius, quam ab ipso Carmen Uranium vel potius
titulo Uraniados condi posse, quod iusto opera, ad Virgilianam mensuram, civitatem Dei et vitam aeternam celebraret. Incipiendum esset a Cosmogonia et Paradiso,
quae librum primum vel primum et secudum complecterentur. Tertius, quartus,
quintus, si ita videretur, darent lapsum Adami et redemptionem generis humani per
Christum, et Historiam Ecclesiae perstringerent. Inde poetae ego certe facile permitterem libro sexto descriptionem regni millenarii, et septimo irruentem cum Gogo
Magogoque, eursumque tandem divini oris spiritu, Antichristum. Tum octavo
haberemus diem iudicii, poenasque damnatorum; nono autem, decimo et undecimo
felicitatem Beatorum magnitudinemque et pulchritudinem Civitatis Dei et felicium
habitationis discursationesque per immense universi spatial ad lustranda mirifica
opera Dei; accederet et descriptio ipsius Regiae coelestis. Duodecimus concluderet
omnia per apokatastasin panton, malis ipsis emendates et ad felicitatem Deumque
reductis, Deo iam omnia in omnibus sine exceptione agente.56
Should one conclude that Leibniz changed his position and became a supporter of the Millennium and of universal salvation – as some scholars
argue?57 Whereas in his correspondence Leibniz always shows an ambiguous standpoint, his position on this topic appears totally clear in some
texts. In System of theology, written most likely between 1682 and 1689,
Leibniz denies the possibility of an eternal salvation: “nor is there any necessity to recur to the merciful theory devised by Origen, who, affixing his own
capricious interpretation to that mysterious passage of Paul, in which it is
said that all Israel should be saved, extend the divine mercy eventually to
every creature.”58 Although this text was written before the discussions on
chiliasm and on apokatasatsis – so that one could argue that Leibniz’s idea
changed meanwhile – the same standpoint is re-asserted in Theodicy, published in 1710 – the same years in which he corresponded with Fabricius.
Dealing with the problem of why God permits evil, here Leibniz also takes
into consideration the possibility of universal salvation. The philosopher
explains that some people are reviving Origen’s opinion, among them Johann
56 Leibnitii Epistolae Ad Diversos, 1734, Epistola CVI (ad Io. Fabricius, Brunswigae
3 Sept. 1711), 148–149. Leibniz followed the composition of the text and corrected it several time, however without never seeing it completed, the poem was
indeed published in 1720. For the development of this issue see Antognazza/
Hotson, 1699, 192–199.
57 Allison Coudert strongly supports this position, see Coudert, 1995. Coudert’s position is refused by Antognazza and Hotson, whose conclusions I share but whose
position does not take into consideration some important texts were Leibniz takes
a clear position on apokatastasis and Origen, see Antognazza / Hotson, 1999,
197–199.
58 G.W. Leibniz, A System of Theology, transl. and ed. C.W. Russell, London
1850, 161.
Wait for Better Times: Eschatological Expectations
231
Wilhelm Petersen, who, in his Mysterion apokatastaseos panton, created an
astronomical system with Kabbalistic connotations:
There is a man of wit who, pushing my principle of harmony even to arbitrary
suppositions that I in no wise approve, has created for himself a theology well-nigh
astronomical. […] The vision seemed to me pleasing, and worthy of a follower
of Origen: but we have no need of such hypothesis or fictions, where Wit plays a
greater part than Revelation, and which even Reason cannot turn to account. For
it does not appear that there is one principal place in the known universe deserving
in preference to the rest to be the seat of the eldest of created beings; and the sun of
our system at least is not it.59
Leibniz’s interest – and also enthusiasm – for the apokatastasis doctrine finds
the same explanation as in the case of the Millennium: the metaphorical
language of poetry has the effect of arousing passions and encouraging men
hoping for better things, as Leibniz had already stated when commenting on
William Penn’s journey and as he concludes in the letter to Johann Fabricius
on Petersen’s poem Urania: et poetae indulgerentur, quae difficilius ferren
tur in dogmatista. Tale opus immortalem praestaret auctorem et mirifici
usus esse posset ad animos hominum movendos spe meliorum, et verioris
pietatis igniculos suscitandos.60 What cannot be accepted from the point of
view of orthodox doctrine can be expressed by the metaphorical language
of poetry. Awakening human beings’ passions and encouraging men to act,
poets become, in this way, new prophets of an undefined better future and
unending progress.
4. Conclusions
Through these three authors, we have followed the development of a paradigm: the hope and wait for better times. In comparison to the Lutheran
eschatological view according to which the world was living its last stage
and God was about to come to reward believers and to punish sinners, this
paradigm discloses a more positive and optimistic perspective both on the
world and on human beings. Indeed, such an idea had not only a theoretical but also a practical character. Spener encouraged believers to improve
the Lutheran church, the Petersens to get confessional reunion, and Leibniz
to the improvement of human beings and, as a consequence, of the world.
Whereas these three authors share a common paradigm, the epistemological premises and the perspectives which they open presents some differences.
59 G.W. Leibniz, Tentaminum Theodicaeae, de bonitate Dei, libertate homines, et
origine mali, §§ 17–18.
60 Leibnitii Epistolae Ad Diversos, 1734, Epistola CVI (ad Io. Fabricius, Brunswigae
3 Sept. 1711), 148–149.
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Elisa Bellucci
Spener grounds his “hope for better times of the church” on Scripture, but,
at the same time, he distances his position from any chiliastic standpoint.
Although recognising this truth is not necessary in terms of salvation, he
advocates freedom of thought for single believers or communities on this
point, based on the idea that God progressively reveals his mysteries and
that every believer can grasp the true sense of Scripture thanks to a reading
illuminated by God’s Spirit.
In the wake of Spener, the Petersens also states that believing in the promised one-thousand-year reign is not necessary in terms of salvation. On the
other hand, taking Spener a step further, they use the spiritual hermeneutic
to claim that God always discloses more of the meaning of his word and
that the action of the Spirit overcomes pure orthodoxy. The same hermeneutical stance is at the base also of the apokatastasis doctrine, which is
nothing else than a deeper understanding of God’s word thanks to Spirit’s
illumination. Specifically, it is the discovery that God is essentially love and
that his primary quality is mercy and not justice. The couple becomes, in this
way, supporter of the Origenian idea of universal redemption, an idea which
comes, nevertheless, only secondarily from Origen. The Petersens started
taking it into consideration by reading the theosophist Jane Lead. In addition to the English writer, the Kabbalistic tradition with the figure of Adam
Cadmon linked to the cosmic Christ influenced the couple and helped them
to embrace apokatastasis.61
The Kabbalistic tradition was also well known to Leibniz, thanks to the
contacts with Franciscus Mercurius van Helmont and Anne Conway. As
Allison Coudert states, it was most likely the relationship with van Helmont
that made Leibniz so receptive towards Petersen and his work.62 After all, it
is not without meaning that, in writing a review on Petersen’s Mysterion apo
katastaseos panton, Leibniz links this work with that of the English philosopher Anne Conway and with that of the German Kabbalist van Helmont.63
61 On the role of Adam Cadmon in the Petersens’ apokatastasis doctrine and the
correlated cosmic Christ borrowed from the Kabbalistic tradition see W. SchmidtBiggemann, Philosophia Perennis. Historical Outlines of Western Spirituality
in Ancient, Medieval and Early Modern Thought, Dordrecht 2004, 359–368;
Bellucci, 2019.
62 See Coudert, 1995, 116. See this study for the influence of the Kabbalah on
Leibniz. Particularly, it was the Kabbalistic concept of tikkun which made Leibniz
so receptive to the idea of universal salvation. In the Lurianic Kabbalah the tikkun
is associated to the tohu and they represent two spiritual stages, respectively the
process of exile or collapse from the unity which is on God (tohu) and the process
of redemption or rectification with God (tikkun).
63 See G.E. Guhrauer (ed.), Leibnitz’s Deutsche Schriften, zweiter Band, Berlin 1840,
342–347.
Wait for Better Times: Eschatological Expectations
233
Whereas Leibniz rejects the Kabbalistic tradition together with chiliasm and
apokatastasis because of their epistemological premises, comparing them to
Quakerism, i.e. to a kind of thought based only on imagination, on the
other side, he recovers this tradition from a practical point of view.64 It is a
“preparatory” and helpful support to awake reason through passions and
imagination, and to encourage men to improvement and progress. Leibniz’s
idea of improvement is untied from any scriptural foundation, but not from
a metaphysical system centered on the idea of God as creator of “the best
of all possible worlds”, as well as on a moral view where human beings are
encouraged to achieve the common good and the worship of God.65
64 See Remarques sur le journal du voyage que William Penn a fait, in: Politische
Schriften, Sechster Band, n. 52, 362: “Mais icy tout ce qui est de William Penn,
me paroist écrit avec beaucoup d’artifice et de reserve, en termes recherchés et
mysterieux, qui sentent un peu trop la cabale et le dessein de regenter; sans qu’on
y trouve assés de quoy profiter par quelque doctrine utile”.
65 Also Douglas Shantz has remarked the ethical character of Leibniz’s stance, see
D. Shantz, Conversion and Revival in the Last Days. Hopes for Progress and
Renewal in Radical Pietism and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, in: F. van Lieburg/
D. Lindmark (eds.), Pietism, Revivalism and Modernity. 1650–1680, Newcastle
upon Tyne 2008, 42–62.
Joshua Roe
Hamann and the Parody of Progress
Abstract: This paper develops a challenge to an “Enlightenment” idea of progress
based on the work of Johann Georg Hamann. Hamann uses language to express the
complexity of life and reveal the simplifying assumptions of his contemporaries (e.g.
Kant and the followers of Leibniz and Wolff). The use of parody by Hamann offers
a rebuke to reductive accounts of progress and reason without rejecting progress or
reason entirely.
Keywords: Hamann, Third Earl of Shaftesbury, Christian Tobias Damm, Herder,
Parody, Enlightenment
Introduction
“It is as if discovering that it is possible to live with four fingers we
have decided to cut off the fifth one.” This quote, attributed to Anatoly
Lunacharsky, about the poor quality of engineering training in the Soviet
Union epitomises the ideology of modernisation employed by Stalin in the
1960s.1 This Stalinist ideology assumed that through technology, communism could achieve a better society and dispose of the need for religion,
tradition etc. In a similar vein, Hamann envisages the hubris of the visions
of progress in eighteenth century Prussia in a similar vein. Today, in part
due to influence of Habermas, the idea of progress in eighteenth century
Prussia is primarily associated with Immanuel Kant.2 Habermas associates
the Kantian values of progress with the Western tradition, but postcolonial scholarship has shown that the association between progress and Kant
has, at best, ignored the wider global development of progress, or at worst
propagated the inherent superiority of “the West” or “European races”.3
1
2
3
A. Curtis, The Engineers’ Plot: A Fable from the Age of Science, in: Pandora’s
Box, BBC, 1992.
J. Habermas / J. Derrida, February 15, or What Binds Europeans Together. A Plea
for a Common Foreign Policy, Beginning in the Core of Europe, in: Constellations
10 (2003), 291–297.
For an example of the ignorance of global ideas of enlightenment and
their irreduciblity to Kant etc. see S. Conrad, Enlightenment in Global
History: A Historiographical Critique, in The American Historical Review 117
(2012), 999–1027. For the stronger case of the negative impact of this discourse
see D. Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical
Difference, Princeton 2000.
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Joshua Roe
This article will challenge the association between Kant and progress from a
different direction, in which the relationship between Hamann and progress
testifies to the absence of consensus on progress and Enlightenment in eighteenth century Prussia.
Johann Georg Hamann (1730–88) was sceptical of the credence his
contemporaries placed in reason and progress and responded by parodying
their attitudes. The adoption of parody in response to progress embodies his
belief that a captivating style is as important as the content of the argument,
and is not incidental to his argument. In adopting this approach, Hamann’s
style resonates with Shaftesbury and Kierkegaard. It is difficult to determine
the exact way in which Shaftesbury’s own style influenced Hamann due to his
tumultuous life and intellectual development, even though Hamann translated Shaftesbury’s Characteristics between 1753 and 1755.4 Nevertheless,
Hamann and Shaftesbury shared the belief that good style was as important to philosophy as content. Hence, Hamann’s parodies of progress challenge his contemporaries’ attitudes in terms of both the form and content of
philosophy.
Hamann’s main claim is that the world is too complex to be comprehended by narrow uses of reason. The most systematic account Hamann
gives of this idea is in his Metacritique, which is a response to Kant’s Critique
of Pure Reason (1781). Hamann identifies three fallacies with Kant’s use of
reason that he names the three purisms of language, tradition and experience. These represent aspects of the same basic problem of reducing the
world to a rational abstract understanding. Nevertheless, language is the
foremost aspect that Hamann addresses, and the reduction of language is
the same accusation that Hamann makes against Damm and Herder. Their
misconceptions of progress have their roots in their misunderstandings of
language. In language, Hamann highlights the complexity of the world that
is always intertwined with history and sensation.
The targets of Hamann’s challenge to progress are not easy to determine.
They could be broadly defined as “rationalists”, but such a generalisation
risks masking the extent of differences among the uses of rationalist philosophy. The group most widely known as proponents of rationalism in the
eighteenth century were the students and disciples of the so-called LeibnizWolff philosophy. The basic tenet of this school was that everything followed the principles of sufficient reason and non-contradiction. However,
these principles were not uniformly used, and instead an array of different
4
For a more detailed discussion of the reception of Shaftesbury in Hamann see
L. Amir, Humor and the Good Life in Modern Philosophy: Shaftesbury, Hamann,
Kierkegaard, Albany 2014.
Hamann and the Parody of Progress
237
interpretations emerged from those who openly opposed the LeibnizianWolffian school to religion, such as Thomasius, to those who sought greater
congruence between religion and rationalism, such as Buddeus or Brucker.
Hamann’s challenges to rationalist ideas reflect this diversity in the array of
different people he addresses.
Origen plays a significant role in the discussions of progress at this time,
but there is wide variation on how Origen was received. Origen was cast
as both aligned with progress and responsible for the regression of philosophy. This variance is reflective of the variance in the idea of progress itself,
which should likewise not be restricted to its most famous proponents, like
Leibniz and Wolff, because the breadth of their influence is more due to others who adapted their ideas into broader cultural usage. Hamann’s appeals
to Origen encapsulate this variance. Indeed, the use of parody in his references to Origen draws attention to the idiosyncrasies within the idea of progress. Hamann uses these idiosyncrasies to show that the ideas and attitudes
of progress were not as universal or as rational as they purported to be.
1. The Biography of Hamann
Born in Königsberg in 1730, Hamann’s early life would follow that of
Kant, who was his senior by six years. They went to the same school and
were taught by the same teacher, Martin Knutzen (1713–1751). Knutzen
taught philosophy and promoted the principles of Wolffian rational philosophy, even though he was also in the shadow of Pietism and was educated
under a prominent Pietist, Friedrich Albert Schulz.5 Accordingly, Knutzen
tried to combine these two influences, as Watkins surmises: “Against the
background of Leibniz and Wolff, what is particularly significant is not that
Knutzen argues for a position that is opposed to Leibniz’s and Wolff’s views,
but rather that he does so on the basis of Leibnizian-Wolffian principles.”6
Unlike Kant, Hamann did not pursue philosophical study, instead choosing to study law, but left university without completing his studies, instead
taking up the position of Hofmeister (house-master) under Johann Christoph
Berens (1729–1792). In late 1756 Hamann set off for London, and in late
spring 1757 he began the task set by Berens of trade negotiations with the
5
6
In his brief history of philosophy, Knutzen does mention Origen, but only as
one of the Christians, who like other Roman and Greek philosophers, followed
the ideas of their predecessors. M. Knutzen, Elementa Philosophiae Rationalis
Seu Logicae Cumgeneralis Tum Specialioris Mathematica Methodo in Usum
Auditorum Suorum Demonstrata, Königsberg / Leipzig 1747, 31.
E. Watkins, Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason: Background Source Materials,
New York 2009, 55–56.
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Joshua Roe
Russian Embassy. However, in light of the Seven Years’ War (1756–63), in
which Prussia was at war with Russia, these negotiations were probably
futile, and Hamann was not warmly received by the Russian ambassador.
Hamann did not take the failure well; he squandered all his money, ran
up a debt indulging on food, alcohol and sex, and fell into a depression.
Eventually he ended up living in a Garret. As Hamann recounts it, in his
despair he turned to the Bible, and upon reading Exodus he found an allegory for his trials and tribulations in his life and especially in London. It
was only at his nadir could he recognise the true love and grace of God.
His reliance on reason to direct his life had distracted him from seeing God
in creation, and at this point he committed himself to be a servant of God.
Hamann’s change of beliefs put him on a course of conflict with his then
employer, Berens, who was suspicious of Hamann’s proclivity to believe in
the will of God based on his conversion rather than follow reason (and
thereupon religion). Nevertheless, neither Berens nor Kant rescinded their
friendship, but tried to disabuse Hamann of what was, according to them,
his enthusiasm.7
However, this account of his conversion does not tell the whole story, since
it focuses mainly on his individual experience, as if he was a lone agent trying
to understand the world. The irony is that this kind of individualism reflects
the “purism” that he would later accuse Kant of engaging in by denying history, language and experience. For example, the Biblical Reflections that he
wrote during his time in London draws on the work of James Hervey, who
is especially noteworthy due to the link Hervey draws between the Bible as
scripture and the Bible as a book of nature.8 Furthermore, when Hamann
was in London he also had extensive contact with the German-speaking
Moravian community in London.9 The contradiction within Hamann’s conversion reveals more about his connection to rational philosophy that he
would have liked to admit. By presenting his conversion as his own individual reading of the Bible, he is echoing the ideal of rational philosophy
that sought to uncover truth through individual reflection. Indeed, the idea
of purifying language, tradition, and sensation required for individual reflection of reason easily transposes to revelation.
If this makes Hamann as equally guilty of purification, parody provides
some mitigation, because the purpose of parody is to draw attention away
7
8
9
J. Betz, After Enlightenment: The PostSecular Vision of J. G. Hamann, Oxford
2012, 29–32.
A. Regier, Exorbitant Enlightenment: Blake, Hamann, and AngloGerman
Constellations, Oxford 2018, 133–134.
Regier, 2018, 152.
Hamann and the Parody of Progress
239
from the author as an authority and focus on the claims of a text, irrespective of whether the author is equally culpable of the same accusations. This
presupposes the imperfection of the author as the possessor of truth, which
is evident in the embellished description of Hamann’s own conversion.
Perhaps Hamann’s own attempt to decentre himself represents an admission
he was as complicit to the worldview of the Enlightenment that he had tried
to critique. The evidence for this is in the last work that Hamann intended
to publish, Disrobing and Transfiguration: A Flying Letter to Nobody, the
Well Known (1786): “Take no thought to add a cubit either to me or to
my stature… So that the world is not pillaged to dress up and transfigure a
corrupt sinner with the nimbus of a ‘holy man’ ”.10 Hamann does not shy
away from drawing analogies between Biblical imagery and his contemporary intellectual world, as he compares the destroyed city of Jerusalem to
Wolffians.11 Given Hamann’s inclination to draw such parallels, his identification of being a corrupt sinner may refer not merely to the traditional
understanding of sin but also to the “sins” of rational philosophy.
2. Progress in Eighteenth Century Prussia
Who were the proponents of progress? The idea of progress in Prussia,
at least prior to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (1781), was most closely
associated with the joint philosophical school of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz
(1646–1716) and Christian Wolff (1679–1754). Leibniz and Wolff were often
grouped together as advancing the “Leibnizian-Wolffian school” of philosophy, which was a term also adopted by Hamann. Nevertheless, there are
important differences between the philosophies of Leibniz and Wolff which
complicate the picture, as Dyck states: “Wolff’s rational psychology borrows hardly anything from Descartes and much less than might be expected
from Leibniz.”12 The Leibnizian-Wolffian school should be further qualified,
with respect to Hamann, because he addresses a wide range of people who
offer their own adaptation of the Leibnizian-Wolffian school of philosophy.
Indeed, the array of people who Haman addresses highlights the difficulty in
asserting a progressive philosophy, because the society is more diverse than
its most prominent figures.
In addition to the Leibnizian-Wolffian school of philosophy, Hamann’s
life also coincided with that of Immanuel Kant, in terms of both geography
and chronology. Consequently, Hamann becomes one of the earliest critics
10 J. Hamann, Writings on Philosophy and Language, ed. K. Haynes, Cambridge
2007, 238–239.
11 Hamann, 2007, 232–233.
12 C. Dyck, Kant and Rational Psychology, Oxford 2014, 4.
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Joshua Roe
of Kant’s critical philosophy, although it should also be recognised that
Hamann’s engagement with Kant represents a later part of Hamann’s life.
His critique of Aufklärung, or rather the ideas that would become associated with the Aufklärung during Hamann’s life, was developed prior to his
famous Metacritque aimed against Kantian philosophy. Nevertheless, Kant
was one of the foremost advocates of progress during this period. The initial publication of the Critique of Pure Reason (1781) received little attention. The prominence of this work only arose when Karl Leonhard Reinhold
began to publish a series of letters in the journal Merkur in 1786, lauding
the achievements of the Critique of Pure Reason in resolving the dispute
between religion and faith and reason. Indeed, it was Reinhold’s intervention that initiated the explicit connection between religion and Kant’s critical
project. This association culminated in the Religion within the Boundaries
of Mere Reason (1793) that advocated the idea of a rational religion.13
The association between progress and rational religion, as found in Kant
and Reinhold, meant the subordination of revelation to reason. This means
rejecting “positive religions”, which constitute historical forms of religion.14
The problem with revelation is that it is only available to particular people,
since revelation is restricted to a particular time and place. In contrast,
reason is accessible to everyone, which means only reason is legitimate to
provide a universal foundation for religion and the moral progress that religion provides. In other words, tradition and revelation are obstacles to the
progression of society because they are only accessible for particular people
and are not comprehensible by everyone.
The plurality of voices around the idea of progress complicates the role of
Origen. If Leibniz were regarded as the main proponent of progress, then the
influence of Origen is relatively clear and decisive. In his Theodicy (1710),
Leibniz invokes Origen to support his claim that religion is not opposed to
reason, which was part of a wider discussion between Pierre Bayle (1647–
1706) and Jean Le Clerc (1657–1736), both of whom also appealed to
Origen. In the first essay of the Theodicy, “Preliminary Dissertation on the
Conformity of Faith with Reason” Leibniz gives his account of the rationality of God and creation in opposition to Pierre Bayle. In particular,
Leibniz objects to Bayle’s rejection of the ability of human reason to know
God. Instead, humans are left to faith without justification in order to accept
13 K.J. Marx, The Usefulness of the Kantian Philosophy: How Karl Leonhard
Reinhold’s Commitment to Enlightenment Influenced His Reception of Kant,
Berlin / Boston 2011, 30–34.
14 I. Kant, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason and Other Writings, eds.
A. W. Wood / G. Di Giovanni, Cambridge 1998, 113–115.
Hamann and the Parody of Progress
241
religion. In opposition to Bayle, Leibniz argues that reason is in fact capable
of knowing God or the “sole principle in all things”. Reason allows human
beings to know this God independent of any revelation, but this conception of reason is not strictly universal. Leibniz explains his understanding of
reason by appealing to Origen and in particular Origen’s arguments against
Celsus. According to Leibniz, Origen showed Celsus that Christianity was
in fact rational and did not entail the rejection of reason.15 Leibniz also adds
that Origen accordingly did not see the justification of faith as appropriate
for most Christians because they are incapable of such reflection. Only a few
people are capable of understanding the good through reason. Leibniz, identifying with Origen, claims that reason is the true and best way to understand
the “good”. Revelation is acceptable, but is only a substitute for people who
are unable to use reason effectively.16
However, given the close association of Wolff with Leibniz and the wider
impact of this school, it is necessary to consider the array of interpretations
of Origen, rather than solely that of Leibniz. In the early eighteenth century, two figures dominated the history of philosophy: Christian Thomasius
(1655–1728) and Johann Franz Buddeus (1667–1739). Thomasius in general defended a rational theology, which he saw as opposed to Lutheran
orthodoxy.17 However, this did not mean that Thomasius was polemical
to pietism, indeed he was a friend with August Hermann Francke (1663–
1727), the founder of the orphanage in Halle. Nevertheless, he was opposed
to some aspects of Pietism, namely the emphasis onr feeling (also known
as “fanaticism”) and their rejection of Wolff.18 His contribution to the history of philosophy was to develop the “eclectic” approach to philosophy,
which meant collecting the best elements from different philosophers to create a new philosophy (or alternatively syncretism referred to the negative
side of this practice in which a philosophy could only derivatively combine
others’ thought).19 Perhaps surprisingly, given his defence of Christian philosophy, Thomasius does not receive Origen positively. For example, in his
Introduction to Philosophy of the Court (1688), which outlines legal principles in light of the history of philosophy, he downplays the significance of
Origen. For Thomasius, Origen was deceived by Plato and produced his own
15 G. Leibniz, Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man, and
the Origin of Evil, ed. A. Farrer, Chicago 1985, 102.
16 G. Leibniz, 1985, 134.
17 L. Beck, Early German Philosophy: Kant and His Predecessors, Cambridge
1969, 135.
18 G. Santinello / G. Piaia (eds.), Models of the History of Philosophy: Volume
II: From Cartesian Age to Brucker, Dordrecht 2010, 315.
19 Santinello / Piaia (eds.), 2010, 303.
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peculiar heresy, even though others consider him to follow the wisdom of
Pythagorus and Zeno, Thomasius is himself dismissive of this tradition.20 In
contrast, Buddeus seems to oppose rational philosophy to Pietism, although
he never fully committed to Pietism and his criticism of rational philosophy
was used polemically to condemn Wolff as an atheist in spite of Buddeus’
own appreciation of rational philosophy.21 Buddeus’ approach to the history of philosophy was set in terms of different schools of philosophy. He
broadly opposed Greek philosophy to Kabbalah as he saw it as unable to
grasp the revealed truth of scripture. Nevertheless, Plato (and subsequently
Plotinus) recognised many truths.22 Buddeus’ overriding concern was with
the Kabbalah, which he opposed to Valentinianism as a corruption of the
original truth. Likewise, Buddeus’ appeals to Origen fall in line with his
overall approach of opposing Kabbalah to Valentinian Gnosticism. He credits Origen with expounding the Kabbalah and refuting Valentinius.23 In both
Thomasius and Buddeus, Origen is one figure among many, at least with
respect to any idea of progress. This is mainly due to the overarching framework in which they approach the history of philosophy. Origen is addressed
insofar as he fits within a particular school and his merits and faults are
set in line with the schools of thought in which he is placed. The work of
Thomasius and Buddeus would be influential for later developments in the
history of philosophy, pre-eminently in the work of Brucker.
The sphere of influence of Johann Jakob Brucker (1696–1770), a historian of philosophy from Halle, dominated the view of Origen in the latter
half of the eighteenth century. Brucker presented the history of philosophy
as a history of different philosophical systems. Origen was grouped within
the “Alexandrian” school but Brucker considered him to be mostly derivative, or in his terminology “syncretic”. In contrast, Brucker was favourable
towards the system of Leibniz and Wolff as the most advanced system of
philosophy. Brucker’s attitude towards the history of philosophy reflects his
own background of Pietism, both in Halle and under the tutelage of Buddeus
in Jena, and the pervasive Leibnizian-Wolffian philosophy. Consequently,
Brucker developed a combined view of Pietism and rationalist philosophy,
which results in his view that Origen, and to a lesser extent the Church
Fathers in general, were too Platonic and not Christian enough. The significance of Brucker lay in the breadth of his influence: “The success of Brucker’s
20 C. Thomasius, Introductio Ad Philosophiam Aulicam, Sive Lineae Primae Libri
de Prudentia Cogitandi, Leipzig 1688, 28.
21 Santinello / Piaia (eds.), 2010, 343–344.
22 Santinello / Piaia (eds.), 2010, 356–357.
23 Cf. J. Buddeus, Introductio ad historiam philosophiae Ebraeorum, Halle 1702,
37. 437–443.
Hamann and the Parody of Progress
243
works on the general history of philosophy was extended in the second half
of the eighteenth century by a series of textbooks produced for the universities, higher and lower secondary schools, and technical schools.”24
3. Hamann’s Critique of Kant’s Critique
Hamann’s remarks on progress do not easily form a systematic thought on
an idea of progress but neither does he adopt a Luddite position. Instead,
his critical marks on progress always concern a particular use of progress.
He frequently bases his response on the idiosyncratic way in which progress
is interpreted. Nevertheless, his corpus includes some systematic elements.
His Metakritik über den Purismum der Vernunft (1784) aimed at Kant’s
Critique of Pure Reason appears to be an exception to his use of parody and
indirect communication. This essay sets out three problems with Kant’s use
of pure reason. This reason is not pure with respect to history, experience
and language. It is not historically pure because reason has a history, which
means that reason is dependent on tradition rather than developed anew
with each generation. Reason is not pure with respect to experience because
sensation always accompanies reason. Similarly, language shapes our use
of reason, complete with the ambiguities of language that make language
something that is not completely under human control. Hamann introduces
these three purisms of reason in that respective order but their weighting follows the inverse direction.25 In fact, Hamann does not separate these three
purisms of reason rather they represent three aspects of the central problem
of abstracting reason from the real world.
Language is the most important exemplar in which the purism of reason
betrays its error. Where Kant ascribed the source of errors in metaphysics
to ambiguities, Hamann finds this essential to the practice of metaphysics.
The problem that leads Kant astray is that he tries to detach language from
its empirical richness. According to Hamann, Kant reduces Metaphors “to
nothing but hieroglyphs and ideal relations”.26 The use of the term hieroglyphs invokes more than mere impenetrability.
In the eighteenth century, hieroglyphs were almost a cultural trope
that represented an understanding of ancient Egyptian religion, which in
the hieroglyphs contained the mysterious truths of the universe. This was
popularised by the novel Life of Sethos, Taken from Private Memoirs of
the Ancient Egyptians by Jean Terrasson (1670–1750), who purported that
24 G. Piaia / G. Santinello, (eds.), Models of the History of Philosophy. Vol. III. The
Second Enlightenment and the Kantian Age, Dordrecht 2015, 475.
25 Hamann, 2007, 207–208.
26 Hamann, 2007, 210.
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Joshua Roe
he had accessed letters of the ancient Egyptians as a historical source for
Egyptian religion. However, while this may have helped it sell more copies,
his depiction of Egyptian religion could not match the actual evidence of
Egyptian religion available at that time.27 This work had a wide influence,
from the Pietists to the Illuminati, and propagated the idea that the importance of Egyptian religion lay in its individualisation. For the Pietists this
referred to the process of self-understanding and progression in the stages
towards the kingdom of God, whereas for the lodges of the freemasons and
illuminati it supported individual moral progress, which took the form of a
monthly report on moral progress.28
The role of hieroglyphs for Hamann concerns their role in the development of writing, in which Hamann could have been following Johann Georg
Wachter’s stages of curiological (a term coined by Clement of Alexandria to
refer to a form of writing in which objects referred to pictures rather than
symbols), hieroglyphic and characteristic.29 However, because of the popularity of this idea during this period it is difficult to determine the exact
source. Nevertheless, the ascription of hieroglyphs carries further significance because he refers positively to Origen for his poetry and use of allegory in relation to the hieroglyphic.30 The development of language from the
curiological and hieroglyphic affirms the empirical root of language because
curiographs and hieroglyphs clearly refer to an empirical object rather than
any abstract notion of concepts or reason. Furthermore, the association of
these early forms of writing with history, such as the Egyptians, or later with
Clement or Origen of Alexandria also reveals how historical development
plays an important role.
4. Origen between Allegory and Literalism
Hamann’s engagement with Origen reflects his understanding of the relationship between language and reason. In Aesthetica in Nuce (1762) Hamann
engages with both Origen and progress. The primary target of the essay is
Johann David Michaelis (1717–1791), who argued against mystical interpretations of scripture but also makes a more general reflection of the relationship between aesthetics and rationalism.31 He invokes the idea of progress in
relation to the state of the human soul: “Make use of this sleep, and build
27 J. Assmann, Religio Duplex: How the Enlightenment Reinvented Egyptian
Religion, Cambridge 2014, 80–81.
28 Assmann, 2014, 79–83.
29 T. German, Hamann on Language and Religion, Oxford 1981, 36.
30 J. Hamann, Sämtliche Werke III, ed. J. Nadler, Vienna 1999, 125.
31 Betz, 2012, 114.
Hamann and the Parody of Progress
245
from this Endymion’s rib the latest edition of the human soul, which the
bard of midnight songs beheld in his morning dream.”32 Haynes notes that
this is a reference to Edward Young (1683–1765) and his Conjectures on
Original Composition (1759).33 Young suggests the “latest editions of the
human mind” may not be the best possible.34 He offers this as a challenge to
his own contemporary defenders of progress, who assume that the current
human condition is the most advanced. Young does not deny progress, in
fact, he affirms that the sciences make important advances, but he questions
whether the current state is praiseworthy for being the most developed.35
Like Hamann, Young appeals to the more emotional and sensory aspects of
life as opposed to the connection of mechanistic reason to progress.36 The
allusion to progress in Young by Hamann challenges a narrow view of progress and attempts to raise awareness of the aesthetic dimensions of human
life, which would be a requisite of the progress of reason.
In the same essay, Hamann invokes the figure of Origen to parody the
way rationalist philosophers overextend their use of reason: “Have you a
wiser understanding of the letter of reason than the allegorical chamberlain
of the Alexandrian Church had of the letter of the Scriptures when he castrated himself for the sake of the Kingdom of Heaven?”37 The accusation is
that rational philosophy is used to detriment of facets of life. The figure of
Origen is significant in this respect because the notion of rhapsody, which
is both in the subtitle and style of Hamann’s essay, alluded to an interpretative approach that situated itself in the tradition of Alexandrian Platonism.38
Betz assumes that Hamann is invoking Origen in purely a negative sense in
this passage. However, this misunderstands the nature of Hamann’s parody,
which relies upon ambiguity, as well as Hamann’s more nuanced understanding of Origen. The ascription of Origen as the allegorising Chamberlin
reveals this second dimension in Hamann’s thought. Elsewhere, he credits
32 Hamann, 2007, 68.
33 E. Young, The Poetical Works of Edward Young, London 1741, 273. There is
evidence of Origen reception in Young when in one of his early poems he refers to
Origen by name and the idea that even the devil may be saved. The significance of
this citation, however, should not be overstated. Firstly, it is directed against John
Tilotson, who was regarded as endorsing apokatastasis, and secondly, it appears
over forty years prior to his Conjectures.
34 E. Young, Conjectures on Original Composition: In a Letter to the Author of Sir
Charles Grandison, London 1759, 74.
35 Young, 1759, 74–75.
36 W. Ripley, ‘An Age More Curious, Than Devout’ The CounterEnlightenment
Edward Young, in: Eighteenth-Century Studies 49 (2016), 507–529 (508).
37 Hamann, 2007, 81.
38 German, 1981, 27–28.
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Origen with his use of poetry, allegory and hieroglyphs.39 In agreement with
his understanding of hieroglyphs outlined above, the emphasis on poetry
and allegory for Hamann represents the sensory aspects of life that cannot
be reduced to the abstract speculations of reason. Hence, when he refers to
Origen as the allegorising Chamberlin he is invoking his positive character.
The literalist interpretation of Origen required for the apocryphal story of
auto-castration contradicts Hamann’s praise of allegory. This suggests that
Hamann does not give the story much credence but is using it as a rhetorical
device. By referring to the apocryphal story of auto-castration Hamann suggests that even the most extreme offenders of literalism still recognise of the
complexity of life contain in the allegorical: “The prince of this aeon takes
his favorites from among the greatest offenders against themselves.”40 The
implicit assumption is that even if the most extreme picture of Origen cannot, because he still maintained the value of allegory and poetry, expunge
the aspects of life that seem superfluous to reason, then the rationalist philosophers of Hamann’s age are even less capable of fulfilling this task.
The centrality of language is continuous in Hamann’s thought, from
Aesthetica in Nuce through to the Metacritique and the emphasis he places
on allegory, poetry and hieroglyphs shows how his understanding of
language builds on the empirical and historical dimensions of reason. Kant’s
omissions of history, sensation and ambiguity allowed him to claim that
his use of reason was universal and was not restricted to dogmatic religious
rule. Instead, Hamann’s charge against the purism of reason is that reason
depends on factors, namely language, history and sensation, which lie outside of pure reason.
5. The Progress of Language and Reason
The overriding concern with language, and Hamann’s opposition to attempts
to purify language, is evident in similar challenges against ideas of progress.
A decade prior to the Metacritique, he wrote the essay A New Apology of
the Letter h (1773). This essay is a comment on a debate at that time over
German spelling reform, most notably the proposal to remove the silent
letter h in German words such as thun or Ihre. The target of the essay is
Christian Tobias Damm (1699–1778), who was a classical philologist and
follower of the Leibnizian-Wolffian school of rationality.41 Hamann refers to
him condescendingly as an “extraordinary religious teacher” (he had been
the prorector of the Köllnische Gymnasium in Berlin) and having studied
39 Hamann, 1999, 125.
40 Hamann, 2007, 81.
41 Betz, 2012, 109.
Hamann and the Parody of Progress
247
at a “rather doubtful university” (Halle).42 Damm was in favour of spelling reform because spelling should more closely reflect spoken language by
removing letters that were no longer pronounced. The approach of Hamann
is to set Damm’s proposals against demands of the principle of sufficient
reason. There are two main reasons why Damm’s argument may be justified: firstly, on the basis that it was not pronounced, and secondly that the
h was accidentally inserted. Against the first point, Hamann retorts that
Damm’s proposal is itself insufficient because he does not propose to remove
other unpronounceable features in written language like double letters.
Damm’s claim is further undermined by his continued use of the silent h in
his writing, which for Hamann is evidence that even Damm does not take
his own proposal seriously.43 In another manner of rejecting the superfluity
of the silent h, Hamann highlights the etymological significance of the letter,
which would make für [for] and führ [follow] indistinguishable.44 Together
these problems lead Hamann to conclude that Damm has been overindulgent about the progress of universal reason, which has led him to believe
that expanding the use of the principle of sufficient reason could resolve all
the ills of society. Indeed, it is as if the lack of this principle is a corrupting
force: “With the luxury of letters the soul of the child further receives its very
first impressions of harmful superfluity and of opulence in the fashions of
artificial diligence and wit, at which universal, sound, and practical human
reason, religion, and orthography, alas!”45 The point is that spelling reform
is only a small part of life so that even if it were brought into line with the
principle of sufficient reason there would still be numerous other aspects of
life that remain superfluous to the principle of sufficient reason.
In light of Hamann’s dismissal of Damm and the hubris of universal reason,
it might seem that he was entirely opposed to reason and any notion of progress based upon it. However, Hamann does not reject progress as such, but
attempts to uncover the complexity of progress, rather than its superficial
assertion. Language is one of the primary places in which the complexity of life
becomes evident. The evidence for the nuance of Hamann’s position on progress is evident through his engagement with Herder.
42
43
44
45
Hamann, 2007, 147–149.
Hamann, 2007, 150.
Hamann, 2007, 151.
Hamann, 2007, 153.
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Joshua Roe
6. Hamann and Herder on the Origin of Language
Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–1802) was another resident of Königsberg
and studied under Kant in 1762.46 Herder also became acquainted with
Hamann in 1764. He was considered a prodigy of Kant but publically broke
with Kant, and his view on progress, in 1784 when Herder published Ideas
on a Philosophy of the History of Mankind.47 However, prior to this essay,
Herder’s ideas concerning progress also show some disagreement with Kant,
which is evident from an intellectual exchange between Herder and Hamann.
In 1771, the Berlin Academy set the question of its annual essay competition
in philosophy to ask whether language has a natural or supernatural origin.
Herder submitted an essay and won the competition. Herder’s answer to
the question the Berlin Academy posed was that language had a natural
origin in human beings, although this does not deny divine influence insofar
as every aspect of creation has its origin with the divine. Hamann saw the
Berlin Academy as serving the interests of Frederick the Great and Herder’s
act of submitting an essay was an implicit approval of Frederick’s authority.
This political grievance, alongside philosophical differences, led Hamann to
publish several responses to Herder’s essay, most notably including The Last
Will and Testament of the Knight of the Rose Cross (1772) and Philological
Ideas and Doubts (1772).
Herder’s essay, entitled Treatise of the Origin of Language is divided into
three sections, which together form a synthesis. The first section addresses
the initial appearance of language and the complexity and variation found
in animals and the “oldest Eastern languages.” The second concerns the
rational relation to language that indicates the more developed form of
human language. The third section focuses on the process of language and the
effects of such processes on the development of language. In the first section,
Herder opposes Condillac, who argued that language has a natural origin
through repetition, to Rousseau, whose notion of élan assumed the origin
of language as inexplicable.48 Instead, Herder claims that the complexity in
the sounds and tones of “early languages” shows that language formation
is non-representational.49 Such variation emanates from the physicality of
language, for example in its relation to breath, which is part of animal rather
than divine nature. Furthermore, the plurality of sounds, because of their
ambiguity, cannot be attributed to divine perfection.50 In the second section,
46
47
48
49
50
M. Kuehn, Kant: A Biography, Cambridge 2001, 129.
Kuehn, 2001, 292.
J. Herder, Herder: Philosophical Writings, ed. M. Forster, Cambridge 2002, 76.
Herder, 2002, 79.
Herder, 2002, 71–72.
Hamann and the Parody of Progress
249
Herder claims that human language is fundamentally different from animal
language and reason because human sensation is free to be more than mere
representation. For example, a child does not learn a language passively by
merely watching their parents, but also invents their own language by speaking it for itself.51 This active nature of language development, and its effect
of creating rationality, which can give meaning to representations, separates
human language from animal language, whilst simultaneously asserting
that language and reason have a natural rather than supernatural origin.
Nevertheless, Herder assumes that reason is plural because of its association
with language and insists that language is inseparable from reason. The third
section reinforces the plurality of reason and language. Like the first section, Herder begins with the sounds of animals and especially the names
given to these sounds: such as the bleating of the sheep, the dog barking or
the ancient mystery of what the fox says.52 Humans then shape these sensory experiences into verbs. Hence, language is based in sensation before it
becomes representation. The basis in sensation produces variation because
early forms of language closely resemble the cacophony of different sounds.
This aspect of language is common to both animals and humans but once
the ability to abstract from sensation is developed the distinction between
humans and animals has emerged. Progress in language happens through
the transition from immediate sensation to representation. Human progress
is essentially individual and an ongoing process throughout one’s life: “We
are always growing out of a childhood, however old we may be, are ever
in motion, restless, unsatisfied”.53 Humans inevitably pursue the herd or
society so that progress is never exclusively in an individual subject but also
shapes a wider social relation. Individuality remains, however, so that progression in language will not lead to one language, society or herd.54 There
will always remain a plurality of languages because of the individual focus of
progress. Therefore, Herder has a clear preference for progress in language
(notably with a Western bias) but the kind of progress that he envisages is
different from Kant’s later idea of rational religion, because Herder recognises the positive value of particularity in language that does not lead to a
universal value. Instead, Herder’s progress moves according to particular
trajectories that are not universally accessible to all human beings.
Herder’s preference for sensation and multiplicity, along with his rejection of both Condillac’s naturalism and Rousseau’s supernaturalism, leads
51
52
53
54
Herder, 2002, 92.
Herder, 2002, 98.
Herder, 2002, 131.
Herder, 2002, 147.
250
Joshua Roe
Betz to conclude that Herder’s view of language is largely in agreement with
Hamann.55 However, Herder still insisted that language is comprehensible
as a natural phenomenon. Hence, Hamann objected that Herder’s response
was still too naturalistic because language could be understood consistently
purely naturalism even though it also had a supernatural cause. Instead,
Hamann took the view that everything came from God and language could
only be understood from God: “because in accordance with the highest philosophical probability the creator of these artificial instruments desired and
was obliged to implant the use of them too, the origin of human language
is therefore certainly divine.”56 In a footnote to this passage from The Last
Will and Testament of the Knight of the Rose Cross, Hamann uses Tertullian
and Lactantius to support his position but he does not follow the stereotype
of the opposition between Tertullian and Origen because elsewhere he attributes a similar idea to Origen with his use of allegory.
The question of natural or supernatural origin has implications for progress insofar as Hamann claims that Herder repeats Condillac’s error in a
different mode: “However, if a higher being or an angel is going to take effect
through our tongues, any such effect, as with the talking animals in Aesop’s
fables, must be expressed in analogy with human nature, and in this respect
the origin of language nor, even less the progress of language can seem or be
anything but human.”57 The assertion of the natural basis of language and
the progress of language is really an illusion and makes the same mistake
of Condillac by associating the result of language with its origin. Hamann
infers that Herder’s belief in the progress of language is misguided because
he assumes it to have a human origin. Implicitly progress in language is not,
according to Hamann, a credit of human reason, but is grasped indirectly
like an analogy.
Hamann also ridicules Herder’s understanding of progress in Philological
Ideas and Doubts. Herder outlined three natural laws, one of which
stated: “The human being is a freely thinking, active being, whose forces
operate forth progressively. Therefore, let him be a creature of language!”58
For Hamann, this law produces the absurdity that the first word is sufficient for a language to be created because of the necessity of progression.
He extends this criticism to Herder’s appeal to reflection the essential disposition of the human being and the progressive nature of language and
the human soul.59 Here, Hamann uses a similar method as in the The Last
55
56
57
58
59
Betz, 2012, 141–142.
Hamann, 2007, 100.
Hamann, 2007, 100.
Herder, 2002, 127.
Hamann, 2007, 127.
Hamann and the Parody of Progress
251
Will and Testament of the Knight of the Rose Cross, when he writes: “I
therefore take only part of his legislation of the origin of a continually progressing human language and a continuing progressing human soul which
is thoroughly misjudged, misunderstood, and obscured.”60 Using the voice
of Herder himself, Hamann parodies the way that Herder rejected the naturalistic explanations of others while still adopting their principles as natural
laws. This challenge to Herder shows that Hamann does not support the
mere rejection of universalism but is also concerned with discerning different kinds of plurality. In fact, Hamann’s point of contention is that Herder’s
pluralism is disingenuous since he actually maintains universal principles.
7. Conclusion
The complexity and ambiguities essential to language undermine any assertion of progress based upon a narrow understanding of reason. Hamann
admonishes the ideas of progress amongst his contemporaries on these
grounds. However, he does not thereby reject any notion of progress.
Progress should instead affirm and build upon the complexities and ambiguities that constitute life. The development of progress does not cancel out or
redeem the errors of human society, which is what the defenders of progress
like Wolff, Leibniz, Kant and their followers tried to do by trying to remove
the complexities and ambiguities that are present in language, history and
the senses.
The complexities highlighted by Hamann also reflect in the plurality of
different conceptions of reason and progress employed by “rationalists”.
These divergences emanate from the different amalgamations of schools
found during this time. This also reflects the variety of interpretations of
Origen employed by these figures. For example, Thomasius, Buddeus and
Brucker all have one foot in both Pietism and Wolffian philosophy but they
each try to reconcile these differences in subtly different ways, which lead to
different presentations of the relation of reason to history.
Rather than trying to synthesise the array of “enlightenment” attitudes,
Hamann engages with the idiosyncrasies of “enlightenment” culture by
examining their internal contradictions and addressing a broad range of
attitudes. This is clear from his critical responses to both Damm and Herder.
Hamann deals with each account on its own terms and highlights the internal
contradictions within each as he identifies problems in Damm’s attempt
to underscore the purity of the principle of sufficient reason and Herder’s
reconciliation of nature and ambiguities in language. Consequently, it is
60 Hamann, 2007, 128.
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Joshua Roe
misleading to claim, as Isiah Berlin does, that Hamann is an irrationalist or
opponent of Enlightenment.61 Hamann’s criticism of Herder is the inverse of
his criticism of Kant or Damm insofar as he claims they do not achieve what
they claim. In this way the accusation of purism cuts both ways; it offers a
challenge to assertions of both universals and particulars. Nevertheless, they
all endorse progress and, as such, Hamann’s concern is not progress itself
but the contradictions that are within the respective presentations of progress, both with respect to universalising ideas of progress, such as in Kant
and Damm, and the non-universalising idea of progress offered by Herder.
Instead, Hamann infers the validity of progress and reason on the condition
that they reflect the complexity of life that is evident in language, history and
sensation.
The same logic could apply to our beliefs about progress today. For
example, to the paradox of a liberalism that grants rights of free speech
etc. to anyone, so long as they agree with liberal ideals. Alternatively, in an
Origenian context, it would be like a doctrine of apokatastasis that believes
in the salvation of everyone, or rather, everyone except Augustinians, who
are still going to hell! Parody does not challenge the values themselves but
rather how they are applied, which is also the effect of Hamann’s criticism
of Enlightenment. An example given by Merold Westphal illustrates this
point: Imagine I find a wallet on the ground, it has the owner’s number and
address so that I can easily return it to its owner, but then I remember the
golden rule. “Do unto others as you would have done unto yourself” and
I think to myself, if I lost my wallet I would like to be taught a lesson so
I keep the wallet. The problem in this case is not whether the golden rule is
a good principle but how it is applied.62 In the same way, Hamann’s parody
of progress highlights irrational motivations that lie within uses of reason.
Appealing to the value of rationality is not a universal remedy and may even
obfuscate the real issue by using reason to silence the real problem.
61 I. Berlin, Three Critics of the Enlightenment. Vico, Hamann, Herder, London 2000.
62 M. Westphal, Religious Uses of Atheism. Marx, Nietzsche, Freud, Huemoz 2000.
Andrea Annese
Origene e la tradizione alessandrina in
Antonio Rosmini
Abstract: This essay aims at providing data about the role of Origen and the Alexandrian tradition in Antonio Rosmini’s thought. Origen is one of Rosmini’s auctoritates
in several significant issues, such as the election of bishops and the (non-ordained)
“priesthood of all believers.” But Rosmini also rejects some of Origen’s views, e.g.
in his exegesis of John’s Prologue. The last part of this study deals with the “Alexandrian” heritage in Rosmini’s (and J.H. Newman’s) thoughts on the doctrinal, dogmatic, hermeneutical, and ecclesiological progress.
Keywords: Antonio Rosmini, Origen, Alexandrian tradition, John Henry Newman,
Exegesis
Nonostante l’ispirazione patristica sia stata fondamentale per la strutturazione del pensiero di Antonio Rosmini (1797–1855), ad oggi la bibliografia
specifica è ancora tutt’altro che abbondante.1 Pochissimi lavori hanno davvero approfondito la ricezione rosminiana di determinate fonti patristiche
(o hanno condotto una mappatura delle evidenze), indagine che rappresenta
un passo ulteriore rispetto all’intavolare semplici confronti o accostamenti.
Obiettivo di questo saggio è fornire e commentare alcuni dati sulla presenza di Origene e della tradizione alessandrina nel percorso speculativo di
Rosmini.
1
Cfr. in particolare A. Quacquarelli, La lezione patristica di Antonio Rosmini.
I presupposti del suo pensiero, Roma 1980; Id., Le radici patristiche della teologia
di Antonio Rosmini, Bari 1991; M. Bettetini / A. Peratoner, Linee per uno studio
sull’uso delle fonti patristiche nelle opere di Rosmini, in: Rivista Rosminiana
91 (1997), 483–519; A.J. Dewhirst, Antonio Rosmini and the Fathers of the
Church, Guildford 2005. Vi è attenzione al tema negli studi di G. Lorizio, ad es.
Eschaton e storia nel pensiero di Antonio Rosmini. Genesi e analisi della Teodicea
in prospettiva teologica, Roma / Brescia 1988, 206–210, sulla Teodicea, e Id.,
Antonio Rosmini Serbati 1797–1855. Un profilo storicoteologico (seconda ediz.
riveduta), Roma 2005, passim. Sul tema specifico della ricezione rosminiana di
Agostino (giustapposto a Tommaso d’Aquino) nell’elaborazione della teoria delle
tre forme dell’essere, mi permetto di rinviare ad A. Annese, Il pensiero estetico
di Rosmini. Prospettive teologiche, Roma 2014, 385–430. Alcuni spunti anche
in P. Sguazzardo, Sant’Agostino e la teologia trinitaria del XX secolo. Ricerca
storicoermeneutica e prospettive speculative, Roma 2006, 539–547.
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Andrea Annese
È però opportuna una breve premessa per chiarire la rilevanza di un’indagine di questo tipo focalizzata su Rosmini, chiedendosi quali elementi essa
possa fornire riguardo il tema dell’eredità di Origene o dell’origenismo. Non
si tratta soltanto di investigare il caso specifico dell’opera del Roveretano.
Il rapporto di Rosmini con la patristica (ma anche con la scolastica) riveste
interesse per il suo significato storico: il progetto rosminiano è quello di
un’ambiziosa sintesi speculativa (una nuova summa o “enciclopedia”)2 tra
ragione filosofica e kerygma – sintesi in cui il recupero dei “Padri” ha un
ruolo decisivo – in un contesto storico-culturale come quello post-illuminista,
ormai ben più secolarizzato rispetto a quello delle fonti che Rosmini intende
riattualizzare, e dove emergono nuove dottrine e forze, anche socio-politiche
(da quelle più moderatamente “progressiste” a socialismo e comunismo,
direttamente affrontati da Rosmini nei suoi scritti). Dal punto di vista teologico le reazioni a questo contesto andavano dal razionalismo teologico liberale, ai Risvegli, alle chiusure di marca intransigente. Le Chiese risposero,
complessivamente, con una sempre maggiore strutturazione identitaria, dogmatica, gerarchica: nella Chiesa cattolica, almeno dalla Rivoluzione francese
in poi la tendenza maggioritaria era stata di chiusura nei confronti della
“modernità” (spesso polemicamente associata alle rivoluzioni) e di ogni liberalismo e “riformismo”, da Pio VI (un esempio, il breve Quod aliquantum
del 1791) alla Mirari vos di Gregorio XVI al Sillabo di Pio IX (1864), fino
alle condanne dello stesso Rosmini tra 1849 e 1887. Rosmini tentò invece
un confronto dialettico con le sfide della “modernità”: il suo recupero dei
Padri e della “tradizione” non è di tipo conservatore o nostalgico,3 ma entra
in dialogo con determinati elementi “moderni”, “liberali”, “riformisti”,4
2
3
4
Cfr. K.-H. Menke, Vernunft und Offenbarung nach Antonio Rosmini. Der apologetische Plan einer christlichen Enzyklopädie, Innsbruck / Wien / München 1980,
trad. it. Ragione e rivelazione in Rosmini. Il progetto apologetico di un’enciclopedia cristiana, Brescia 1997; P.P. Ottonello, L’enciclopedia di Rosmini, Venezia
2009 (seconda ediz. accresciuta).
Cfr. ad es. D. Menozzi, La Chiesa cattolica e la secolarizzazione, Torino 1993,
136–137; G. Miccoli, Chiesa e società in Italia fra Ottocento e Novecento: il mito
della cristianità, in: Id., Fra mito della cristianità e secolarizzazione. Studi sul
rapporto chiesa-società nell’età contemporanea, Casale Monferrato 1985, 21–92
(53). Si vedano questi due saggi, più in generale, per il contesto storico-culturale
che si sta richiamando qui. Rosmini si distaccò presto dall’influsso dei pensatori
controrivoluzionari e “intransigenti”, che aveva apprezzato in gioventù.
Sul riformismo di Rosmini nel contesto dell’atteggiamento della Chiesa del tempo
cfr. anzitutto L. Malusa, Critiche e condanne sulle posizioni del “riformismo”
di Antonio Rosmini, in: G. Picenardi (ed.), Rosmini e Newman padri conciliari.
Tradizionalismo, riformismo, pluralismo nel Concilio Vaticano II, Stresa 2014,
123–157.
Origene e la tradizione alessandrina in Rosmini
255
con le ineludibili questioni del proprio tempo – in ciò è stato accostato ai
suoi contemporanei John Henry Newman e Johann Adam Möhler5 (peraltro, secondo Antonio Quacquarelli, i tre erano legati proprio dalla figura di
Origene, anche se non solo da essa).6 L’opera di Rosmini si configura come
una nuova apologetica cristiana,7 nel senso – come negli “apologisti” del
II secolo – di un tentativo di dimostrazione della “legittimità” razionale e
culturale della religione (cristiana), e ciò proprio in dialettica con il tempo
presente. Si sbaglierebbe nel fare di Rosmini un campione del riformismo
radicale, disconoscendone gli elementi conservatori, ma si sbaglierebbe
anche nel vedere solo questi ultimi, depotenziando gli aspetti più innovativi
e critici, persino esplosivi, del suo pensiero (una lettura né apologetica né
banalizzante delle Cinque Piaghe, in tal senso, risulterebbe illuminante). La
formula che meglio sintetizza la sua prospettiva è forse quella enunciata da
Maria Adelaide Raschini, «rinnovamento a partire dalla tradizione.»8
1. Iniziando dunque a stringere il fuoco e a censire le evidenze, il primo
dato da considerare testimonia il significativo interesse di Rosmini per la tradizione alessandrina: egli progettò di scrivere un’opera specificamente dedicata a questo tema, che però non venne mai portata a compimento. Di tale
progetto, oltre alle lettere in cui Rosmini ne parla,9 resta traccia in un manoscritto (ASIC A,2,51/B, ff. 141–148) – di datazione ignota –10 che doveva
5
Quacquarelli, 1991, V-VI: «Möhler, Rosmini e Newman, indipendentemente l’uno
dall’altro, approfondiscono la Patristica per aprire un discorso con il pensiero
dell’Ottocento». Su Möhler e Rosmini cfr. anche Id., 1980, 10.
6 Quacquarelli, 1991, VI: «Origene lega Rosmini, Newman e Möhler. La vasta
filosofia origeniana aveva entusiasmato Newman […]. Per Möhler Origene aveva
dimostrato che se la Chiesa si fosse basata sui principi mutevoli dell’ermeneutica
non sarebbe mai esistita, perché avrebbe dovuto continuamente cambiare la sua
fede. Secondo Rosmini, Origene segna un progresso nelle ricerche della conoscenza
di Dio, per l’attenzione posta nello studio della Bibbia e per il grande rispetto
che aveva di essa. Per la tesi del sacerdozio dei fedeli, Origene non era una delle
autorità più notevoli?». Cfr. 92, e più in generale tutto il saggio alle pp. 79–94.
7 Cfr. Menke, 1997; Lorizio, 2005, 88.
8 M.A. Raschini, Dialettica e poiesi nel pensiero di Rosmini, Venezia 1996, 175.
9 Cfr. A. Rosmini, Epistolario Completo [d’ora in poi EpC], 13 voll., Casale Monferrato 1887–1894, n. 3177, vol. 6, 268–269, a don Andrea Fenner a Milano, Stresa
18 aprile 1837: «Scriverei con gran piacere la lettera sulla Scuola Alessandrina,
ma n’ho deposto il pensiero perché non ho tempo, e perché non ho qui le opere di
Giordani che mi bisognerebbero: lasciamo andare». Solo pochi mesi prima aveva
scritto al pittore Giuseppe Craffonara: «Sappia poi che io non ho abbandonato
punto il pensiero della Scuola Alessandrina» (n. 3007, vol. 6, 74, Torino 6 dicembre 1836).
10 Si possono tentare delle congetture in base alle fonti citate qui da Rosmini: le più
recenti sono la Biografia universale antica e moderna di L.-G. Michaud, uscita in
256
Andrea Annese
forse fungere da materiale preparatorio, intitolato proprio Scuola Alessan
drina.11 Esso consiste di materiale di taglio prosopografico o biografico: si
tratta, sostanzialmente, di informazioni biografiche su quarantacinque personaggi (poco si dice sulle dottrine), dall’evangelista Marco – secondo la
tradizione, fondatore della Scuola alessandrina – fino a Proterio, patriarca
di Alessandria nel V secolo (ma l’ordine cronologico non è sempre rispettato: ad esempio, nel corso dello scritto viene citato Ciro di Faside, 7° secolo).
Vi si menzionano sia autori “ortodossi” che ritenuti “eterodossi”, come gli
gnostici Carpocrate e Basilide o il marcionita Apelle; vi figurano anche personaggi non cristiani ma comunque legati ad Alessandria, come Ipazia. Tra i
nomi prevedibilmente presenti vi sono Panteno, Clemente, Origene, Dionigi,
Gregorio Taumaturgo, Atanasio, Cirillo. Da alcune brevi notazioni è possibile risalire ad almeno alcune delle fonti utilizzate da Rosmini: il materiale
è tratto in gran parte da storie ecclesiastiche come quelle di Antoine Henri
de Bérault-Bercastel, Friedrich Leopold von Stolberg e Giuseppe Agostino
Orsi,12 nonché dal Compendio della Storia degli Eresiarchi di Giacomo
Simidei (Napoli 1737), che va da Simon Mago al giansenismo. Per quanto
riguarda ciò che Rosmini riporta di Origene – l’autore cui è dedicato più
spazio (63 righe) in queste note manoscritte – basti qui rilevare che il Roveretano insiste sulla vita frugale di Origene e sul suo ruolo di testimone della
fede durante le persecuzioni, nonché ovviamente sui suoi talenti speculativi
e filologici: in particolare, ne riporta «l’ardore straordinario per lo studio
della Sacra Scrittura» e il fatto che l’Alessandrino fu il primo a commentarla
trad. it. a Venezia (in 65 voll.) negli anni 1822–1831, e la Storia della religione
di Gesù Cristo di F.L. von Stolberg, trad. it. Roma 1817–1828, in 6 voll. (ma in
teoria Rosmini potrebbe aver usato le edizioni originali, leggermente anteriori).
Per il terminus ante quem si può invece prendere a riferimento la lettera in cui
dice di non poter più scrivere l’opera sulla Scuola alessandrina, che è del 1837 (v.
nota precedente). Il ms. potrebbe allora collocarsi, con una stima prudente, tra il
1817 e il 1837, forse tra i tardi anni Venti e i primi anni Trenta dell’Ottocento.
11 Un breve cenno ad esso in Quacquarelli, 1980, 51, nota 16. Ho qui occasione di
ringraziare il p. Eduino Menestrina del Collegio Rosmini di Stresa e il p. Alfonso
Ceschi del Centro Internazionale di Studi Rosminiani di Stresa, grazie ai quali
potei ottenere, qualche anno fa, una fotoriproduzione del manoscritto.
12 A.H. de Bérault-Bercastel, Histoire de l’Église, 24 voll., Paris 1778–1790, trad.
it. Storia del cristianesimo, 36 voll., Venezia 1793–1805 e altre ediz. successive
(Rosmini possedeva quella del 1828–1831); F.L. von Stolberg, Geschichte der
Religion Jesu Christi, 15 voll., Hamburg 1806–1818, trad. it. Storia della religione
di Gesù Cristo, del conte Federigo Leopoldo di Stolberg […], 6 voll., Roma 1817–
1828; G.A. Orsi, Della istoria ecclesiastica, 21 voll., Roma 1747–1762 (Rosmini
ne possedeva diverse edizioni, di cui in forma completa quella in 42 voll., con il
titolo Storia ecclesiastica, Venezia 1822–1826).
Origene e la tradizione alessandrina in Rosmini
257
per intero. Non viene fatta parola delle condanne dell’origenismo, anche
se più avanti si parla della controversia con Demetrio (paragrafo n. 41 del
manoscritto).
Rosmini conobbe gli scritti di Origene molto presto (in linea con la sua
abituale precocità come lettore): la prima traccia certa risale agli anni 1812–
1813, quando, nel Dialogo fra Cieco e Lucillo, egli fa riferimento (generico)
alle «Omelie su passi biblici» di Origene, lodandolo come esegeta.13 In un’opera di poco successiva, Il giorno di solitudine (1815), si menzionano nuovamente le Omelie origeniane, cui si aggiunge stavolta il Contra Celsum. Negli
anni seguenti i riferimenti cresceranno, sia per quantità che per livello di
approfondimento dei testi. Rosmini possedeva diverse edizioni (latine) delle
opere di Origene, ad esempio la Merlin di inizio Cinquecento e un’edizione
del 1743 basata su quella del de La Rue.14
Alle menzioni elogiative appena riportate se ne affiancano altre, dal tono
forse ancor più lusinghiero. In Delle Cinque Piaghe della Santa Chiesa Origene è definito «grande formatore di Vescovi e di Martiri» (n. 31, nota 13),15
oppure «il grande Origene» (ibid. e n. 28, nota 9) o «questo grand’uomo»
(n. 45, nota 48); nelle Lettere sopra le Elezioni Vescovili a Clero e Popolo
Rosmini lo chiama «lume splendidissimo» della «tradizione della Chiesa
Alessandrina.»16 Diversi interpreti hanno affermato che la stima di Rosmini
per Origene ha anche il significato della riscoperta di un autore che all’epoca
13 Cfr. G. Radice, Annali di Antonio Rosmini Serbati. Volume primo (1797–1816),
Milano 1967, 105 (si vedano anche i voll. successivi degli Annali, che registrano
le opere lette e/o consultate da Rosmini fino al 1838).
14 Rosmini possedeva la ristampa del 1519 (custodita a Stresa) dell’edizione Merlin
(1512), in tre voll. (quattro tomi): Operum Origenis Adamantii tomi duo priores
[…]; Tertium tomus […]; Quartus tomus […], Parisii 1519. L’edizione settecentesca (a Rovereto) è Origenis opera omnia et quae ejus nomine circumferuntur: latine
versa et ex variis editionibus & codicibus […] collecta […] ex recentissima editione
Parisiensi domni Caroli Delarue […], 3 voll., Venetiis 1743 (essa mancava quindi
del quarto vol. dell’edizione de La Rue, quello aggiunto nel 1759, che conteneva
il Commento a Giovanni). Rosmini possedeva poi una trad. francese del Contra
Celsum: Traité d’Origène contre Celse, Amsterdam 1700, anch’essa custodita
a Rovereto, così come la seguente edizione delle opere di Clemente: Clementis
Alexandrini Opera quae extant, Venetiis 1757.
15 Utilizzo la seguente edizione: A. Rosmini, Delle Cinque Piaghe della Santa Chiesa.
Testo ricostruito nella forma ultima voluta dall’Autore con saggio introduttivo e
note di Nunzio Galantino, Cinisello Balsamo 1997.
16 Ivi, 368. Rosmini pubblicò le tre Lettere tra il 1848 e il 1849, sia in edizioni a sé
che (due di esse) in alcune edizioni delle Cinque Piaghe, e prevedeva di stamparne
una nuova versione in Appendice all’edizione riveduta di quest’ultima opera. Le
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Andrea Annese
non era particolarmente valorizzato, almeno in certi ambienti, a causa
dell’aura di condanna plurisecolare che lo circondava.17
Vi sono però anche diverse occasioni in cui Rosmini muove ad Origene
dei rilievi. Nella Psicologia scrive che Origene «sembra che dia all’uomo due
anime nell’opera De’ principî 3.4, e dice che quando la Scrittura nomina
la carne, si dee intendere l’anima della carne. Egli è certo che si dee intendere il principio sensitivo; ma questa è un’attività, non un’anima distinta
nell’uomo.»18 Più precisamente, però, in quel luogo del De principiis Origene espone diverse teorie, lasciando al lettore il giudizio. In un passo della
Teodicea (n. 601, nota 92)19 Rosmini pone Origene tra coloro che non concepiscono l’esistenza di «spiriti puri», sostanze spirituali prive di corpo o
veste corporea (anche eterea): il riferimento è a princ. 1.6,4 (ma anche lì
Origene lascia aperta la questione).20 Rosmini qui dipende dalla Summa the
ologiae di Tommaso d’Aquino (1.51,1, sugli angeli), citata esplicitamente: fa
riferimento anche agli altri autori menzionati da Tommaso, ossia Agostino,
Gregorio Magno, Giovanni Damasceno, Bernardo, cui aggiunge Leibniz e
Charles Bonnet. Ma è soprattutto nel suo incompiuto e postumo commento
al Prologo del vangelo giovanneo, L’introduzione del Vangelo secondo Gio
vanni commentata (la cui stesura iniziò nel 1839, venne interrotta, quindi
ripresa tra gennaio e luglio 1849 e poi definitivamente interrotta) che
Rosmini riserva a Origene le critiche più significative. In quest’opera Origene viene menzionato circa quindici volte, e in alcune di esse il riferimento è
mediato da Tommaso d’Aquino (in particolare da Super Evangelium S. Ioan
nis lectura). In realtà, dal punto di vista quantitativo i riferimenti rosminiani
17
18
19
20
cito pertanto dall’edizione di Galantino menzionata nella nota precedente (cfr. ivi,
102 e 109 per queste informazioni sulle Lettere).
Bettetini / Peratoner, 1997, 494; Quacquarelli, 1991, 20. 71.
A. Rosmini, Psicologia, a cura di V. Sala, 4 voll., Roma 1988–1989, n. 717,
nota 29.
A. Rosmini, Teodicea, a cura di U. Muratore, Roma 1977, 355.
Si potrebbe anche ragionare sull’apparentemente contraddittoria affermazione che
appare poco oltre nel testo origeniano, princ. 1.7,1 (eds. H. Crouzel / M. Simonetti, t. 1, SC 252), sulle anime/nature razionali come incorporee. Oltre a rilevare
la diversità di contesti e di questioni cui Origene si rapporta (che contribuisce a
spiegare le “discrepanze”, non semplicemente ascrivibili agli interventi rufiniani),
e la modalità congetturale con cui Origene si pone qui, si può anche chiarire
questo punto tramite l’argomento che, per l’Origene, l’anima è in sé immateriale,
ma de facto è sempre accompagnata dal corpo (e da diversi “tipi” di corpo): cfr.
il commento di Manlio Simonetti in Origene, I princìpi, a cura di M. Simonetti,
Torino 2010 (1968), ad loc. e 64–69.
Origene e la tradizione alessandrina in Rosmini
259
a Origene sono qui in maggioranza positivi,21 ma i punti di dissenso sono,
qualitativamente, di particolare densità. Ad esempio, nelle parole «Nel principio era il Verbo», scrive Rosmini,22 la parola principio non va intesa come
“Dio/Padre” – opinione che egli riporta essere stata espressa da Clemente
Alessandrino, Origene (Jo. «l. I, c. I» nella citazione rosminiana),23 Cirillo
Alessandrino, Gregorio di Nissa, Agostino (De Trinitate 6.2,3) –, altrimenti
si sarebbe usato un altro tempo verbale;24 inoltre, la relazione del Verbo
con il Padre viene espressa subito dopo («e il Verbo era presso Dio»). L’in
cipit di Giovanni, per Rosmini, significa che «il Verbo era avanti che fosse
il mondo», prima di tutte le cose, prima del tempo, nell’eternità. Contro
Origene, Rosmini intende dunque arché in senso cronologico, non ipostatico. Più avanti Rosmini rifiuta l’interpretazione origeniana della frase «E il
Verbo era Dio [καὶ θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος]» (Gv 1,1), per quanto riguarda l’assenza
dell’articolo davanti a theos: Rosmini non cita direttamente brani di Origene, ma scrive che «si reputa» che qui l’Alessandrino sia caduto in errore,
«narrandosi ch’egli n’abbia riferito il Verbo essere per essenza Verbo, non
per essenza Dio».25 Qui Rosmini gli oppone l’autorità di Giovanni Crisostomo e Teofilatto di Ocrida, facendo inoltre riferimento agli ariani (come
sostenitori della medesima “erronea” dottrina): l’omissione dell’articolo
21 Cfr. A. Rosmini, L’introduzione del Vangelo secondo Giovanni commentata, a
cura di S.F. Tadini, Roma 2009, 64, 87, 129, 132, 134, 144 (riferimento ambiguo), 146 (qui la lode è mediata da Tommaso), 172, 178 (altra lode mediata da
Tommaso), 201 (Tommaso cita Origene, apparentemente approvando). Particolarmente interessante il riferimento a p. 172, dove Rosmini afferma che Origene
(come altri) legge giustamente «in principio» di Gn 1,1 come «nel Verbo», cfr.
Or., hom. in Gen. 1.1, che il Roveretano cita qui in latino dall’edizione del 1519;
cfr. Homilien zum Hexateuch in Rufins Übersetzung. 1. Teil, ed. W.A. Baehrens,
GCS 29, Leipzig 1920.
22 Rosmini, L’introduzione, 2009, 64.
23 Ma Or., Jo. 1.102 (ed. C. Blanc, t. 1, SC 120, Paris 1966). Che “principio” sia il
Padre, è qui espresso in forma non apodittica – più avanti, Origene (sulla base di
Pr 8,22) chiarisce che il principio è la Sapienza (il Figlio come Sapienza), 1.111.
1.289–292.
24 Per Rosmini la forma verbale era (ἦν) «esprime il presente del passato», indica
una «relazione di tempo, che non avrebbesi espressa se colla parola principio si
avesse voluto indicare il Padre»: si sarebbe detto «il Verbo è nel Padre», mentre
con l’imperfetto ἦν sembrerebbe che il Verbo «avesse cessato di essere nel Padre»
(Rosmini, L’introduzione, 2009, 65–66); ovvero, se il “principio” fosse il Padre,
aver usato l’imperfetto implicherebbe dire che il Verbo prima era nel Padre, per
poi a un certo punto non esserlo più.
25 Rosmini, L’introduzione, 2009, 143, nota 92.
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indicherebbe un’inferiorità di natura del Verbo rispetto al Padre.26 Altra
occasione di dissenso è una ben nota questione filologica: la punteggiatura
dei vv. 3–4, che manca nei manoscritti più antichi ed è disomogenea in quelli
successivi. Si è letto ὃ γέγονεν (quod factum est) come legato a ciò che lo
precede («senza di lui niente è stato fatto di tutto ciò che esiste. In lui era la
vita»), oppure come l’inizio della frase successiva (ὃ γέγονεν ἐν αὐτῷ ζωὴ ἦν,
quod factum est in ipso vita erat, «Ciò che è stato fatto in lui era la vita»).
Rosmini si schiera in favore della prima opzione (impostasi a partire dal
IV secolo), che vuole il punto dopo ὃ γέγονεν: si oppone dunque a Origene
(fautore dell’altra lettura), da lui definito qui «precursore» degli «errori» di
eunomiani e macedoniani.27 Poco oltre Rosmini esplicita questo riferimento,
scrivendo che questi versetti, se correttamente intesi, confutano sia le opinioni degli ariani sul Verbo, sia «l’errore di Origene» e poi dei macedoniani
sullo Spirito Santo come «fatto dal Verbo»: lo Spirito, spiega Rosmini, non è
considerabile tra le cose che sono state fatte (lì si intendono solo le cose cre
ate).28 Il quarto e ultimo riferimento “critico” riguarda ancora la concezione
26 La spiegazione di Rosmini è che qui Giovanni «non pone l’articolo alla voce Dio
perché è costruito come predicato, e quando si costruisce come predicato non
si usa di anteporre l’articolo» (ivi, 143); inoltre, ciò può contribuire a evitare la
confusione tra le due Persone (144).
27 Ivi, 151, nota 2. Sulla punteggiatura di questi vv. cfr. R. Schnackenburg, Das
Johannesevangelium. 1. Teil, Freiburg 31972, trad. it. Il vangelo di Giovanni.
Parte prima, Brescia 1973, 301–303, secondo cui vi sono buone ragioni esegetiche in favore della lezione con il punto dopo ὃ γέγονεν; cfr. anche B. Metzger, A
Textual Commentary on the Greek New Testament, London / New York 1971,
195–196, anch’egli a favore di questa opzione, in base a considerazioni sullo stile
e la dottrina giovannei. Così leggono anche le principali traduzioni italiane. La
28a edizione del Novum Testamentum Graece Nestle-Aland (NA28) pone però il
punto prima: πάντα δι’ αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο, καὶ χωρὶς αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο οὐδὲ ἕν. ὃ γέγονεν ἐν
αὐτῷ ζωὴ ἦν, καὶ ἡ ζωὴ ἦν τὸ φῶς τῶν ἀνθρώπων. In sintesi, almeno fino alla prima
metà del IV secolo era grandemente maggioritaria l’interpunzione che fa iniziare
una nuova frase con ὃ γέγονεν, sia nei manoscritti che negli autori cristiani (dagli
gnostici a Clemente, Ireneo, Origene ed altri). Quando però, nel IV secolo, essa
fu utilizzata in senso ariano e macedoniano (per sostenere la creaturalità dello
Spirito), come “reazione ortodossa” prese piede l’altra versione, per rimuovere la
potenzialità di un’ermeneutica “eretica” del passo giovanneo; la “nuova” versione
si impose anche nella liturgia. Tra le più antiche occorrenze di tale interpunzione
sono stati segnalati Epifanio, anc. 74 (così Simonetti, che la definiva «aberrante»!
Cfr. E. Prinzivalli / M. Simonetti, La teologia degli antichi cristiani (secoli IV),
Brescia 32015, 166) e, ancor prima, Adamanzio (prima metà del IV sec.), dial.
4.15 (ed. W.H. van de Sande Bakhuyzen, GCS 4, Leipzig 1901, 172), cfr. Schnackenburg, 1973, 302.
28 Rosmini, L’introduzione, 2009, 152. Per l’opinione di Origene cfr. Jo. 2.73. 2.76.
Origene e la tradizione alessandrina in Rosmini
261
subordinazionista della Trinità: sempre sul tema della creazione, Rosmini
ribadisce (contro gli ariani) che il Verbo non ha virtù minore del Padre, non
è a lui inferiore, «né» – qui Rosmini cita ancora Tommaso d’Aquino (Super
Io., cap. 1, l. 2) – «è ministro o strumento del Padre come delirò Origene»
(ut deliravit Origenes nel latino di Tommaso).29
2. È opportuno ora approfondire i riferimenti a Origene presenti nelle
Cinque Piaghe: si tratta di una delle opere rosminiane in cui l’Alessandrino
è più citato.30 Non è possibile ripercorrere qui in dettaglio le vicende dell’opera, che come è noto è una delle più importanti e discusse di Rosmini: iniziata nel 1832–1833, interrotta in attesa di tempi più favorevoli rispetto
a quelli della Mirari vos di Gregorio XVI, ripresa con l’elezione di Pio IX
(il cui inizio di pontificato appariva “riformista”), completata e pubblicata
anonima nel 1848, essa fu messa all’Indice l’anno successivo e poi “riabilitata” solo dopo il Concilio Vaticano II.31 Come si evince dal titolo, la
Chiesa “piagata” è accostata al Cristo crocifisso, con terminologia ripresa
da Innocenzo IV (discorso di apertura del Concilio di Lione, 1245) e da un
brano di Ludovico Antonio Muratori su Paolo III e il Consilium de emen
danda Ecclesia (1537).32 Le “piaghe” descritte da Rosmini sono: (1) la
29 Ivi, 181. Di questi quattro riferimenti critici, solo nel primo caso Rosmini rinvia
direttamente a un testo di Origene (Jo. 1.1, riferimento peraltro impreciso, come si
è visto). Per quanto riguarda i passi in cui lo cita approvandone le tesi, solo quelli
alle pp. 64, 129, 132, 172 contengono riferimenti diretti, tutti al Commento a Gio
vanni (libri I e II) tranne l’ultimo (prima omelia sulla Genesi). Si tratta comunque
di rinvii ai testi, senza citazioni, tranne nell’ultimo caso (unica citazione verbatim
da Origene, in trad. latina, in questo testo rosminiano). Il fatto che il Commento
a Giovanni non fosse presente nelle edizioni origeniane possedute da Rosmini
(quella del 1743, come detto, era precedente al volume dell’edizione de La Rue
che includeva il Commento) può far pensare a una conoscenza solo indiretta di
quell’opera, da parte del Roveretano, anche se egli potrebbe averla consultata in
altro modo. Le Homiliae in Genesim erano invece in entrambe le edizioni a sua
disposizione.
30 Per una preziosa indagine statistica sui riferimenti patristici in Rosmini (che non
comprende però tutte le opere rosminiane) cfr. Bettetini / Peratoner, 1997.
31 Per approfondire cfr. M. Marcocchi / F. De Giorgi (eds.), Il ‘Gran Disegno’ di
Rosmini. Origine, fortuna e profezia delle «Cinque Piaghe della Santa Chiesa»,
Milano 1999.
32 Cfr. Lorizio, 2005, 334: l’impostazione «in chiave di staurologia del corpo mistico»
è stata «suggerita al Roveretano dalla lettura del discorso con cui Innocenzo IV
aprì il 23 giugno 1245 il Concilio di Lione, “somigliando la Chiesa a Cristo in
croce” e dimostrando “com’ella, a suo tempo, fosse di [ma: “da”] cinque acerbissime piaghe addolorata” [la citazione è tratta da Rosmini, Risposta ad Agostino
Theiner, proemio]. Di notevole importanza ci sembra inoltre il foglietto, rinvenuto dal Traniello in una delle copie del libro rosminiano, contenente un brano
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divisione tra clero e popolo dei fedeli durante le funzioni religiose, causata
dalla mancata comprensione, da parte del popolo, della liturgia (anche per
l’ignoranza del latino); (2) l’insufficiente formazione del clero, qui accusato di privilegiare ormai la vuota ripetizione di formule invece di unire
conoscenze teoriche e prassi evangelica; (3) la disunione dei vescovi (anche
nei confronti del papa), causata dal loro crescente attaccamento al potere
e all’ambizione; (4) la nomina dei vescovi affidata al potere civile; (5) la
«servitù dei beni ecclesiastici», ossia l’ingerenza del potere secolare nella
gestione dei beni ecclesiastici e la progressiva diffusione, all’interno della
Chiesa, dell’amore per le ricchezze e i beni temporali. Per contrastare tutto
ciò, Rosmini auspica un rinnovamento interno alla Chiesa, incentrato su
alcune categorie chiave, in particolare unità, libertà e povertà. L’insistenza
rosminiana sull’unità è fondata su una concezione forte del sacerdozio di
tutti i fedeli, ossia sull’idea di una partecipazione consapevole e attiva alla
liturgia anche da parte dei laici. Libertà significa che la Chiesa dev’essere
libera dalle ingerenze del potere civile. La Chiesa inoltre deve tornare ad
essere povera, deve svincolarsi dall’amore dei beni e delle cariche terrene.
È, quest’ultimo punto, il fulcro di tutto il testo rosminiano: nelle argomentazioni del Roveretano, è stata la perdita dell’originaria povertà della
Chiesa la causa prima della corruzione, e il processo degenerativo sarebbe
iniziato in particolare quando i vescovi si sono occupati di questioni temporali inerenti al potere civile (secondo Rosmini il periodo chiave è l’alto
Medioevo, più precisamente il VI secolo). Rosmini auspica un recupero
dello spirito della Chiesa dei primi cinque secoli, un ritorno alla Scrittura
e ai Padri.
L’intero testo è intessuto di riferimenti patristici, sia espliciti che impliciti: in filigrana ad alcune affermazioni e all’impostazione stessa dell’opera
si riconoscerà l’ecclesiologia agostiniana del corpus permixtum.33 Rispetto
del Muratori sul Consilium de emendanda Ecclesia, redatto nel 1537 da una
commissione di cardinali, istituita l’anno prima da Paolo III, a cui “stava così a
cuore la riforma della Chiesa, che […] senza aspettare il Concilio, applicò egli a
curarne le piaghe”»; cfr. F. Traniello, Società religiosa e società civile in Rosmini,
Bologna 1966, 211; L.A. Muratori, Annali d’Italia, Milano 1838 (1744–49), vol.
4, 374A: il papa «seriamente s’applicò egli stesso a curarne [i.e. della Chiesa] le
piaghe». In una lettera del 1853, lo stesso Rosmini fornisce altri riferimenti alla
formula delle “piaghe” (EpC, n. 7350, vol. 12, 16–17, a don P. Bertetti a Roma,
Stresa 9 febbraio 1853). Il Consilium è citato da Rosmini in Cinque Piaghe, n. 4.
33 Rosmini afferma ad esempio che «la Chiesa è una società composta di uomini, e,
fino che sono in via, di uomini soggetti alle imperfezioni e miserie della umanità»
(n. 58). Sulla concezione agostiniana della Chiesa come corpus permixtum di giusti
Origene e la tradizione alessandrina in Rosmini
263
ad altri scritti rosminiani, comunque, nelle Cinque Piaghe i Padri vengono
citati particolarmente come esempi di vita o di prassi, ancor più che come
auctoritates a conferma di ragionamenti teologici o filosofici. In questa
sede è d’obbligo concentrarsi su Clemente di Alessandria e (soprattutto)
Origene. Il primo viene citato esclusivamente nel capitolo II, sulla «insufficiente educazione del clero»: qui Rosmini esalta la prassi formativa dei primi
secoli – descritta, in opposizione a quella ottocentesca, come non meramente
nozionistica e mnemonica, ma vivificante –, in particolare citando proprio la
«scuola d’Alessandria», «dove furono maestri sempre degli uomini straordinarii per dottrina e santità» (n. 29, nota 11; cfr. n. 35).34 Brani di Clemente
(dagli Stromata e dal Pedagogo) vengono evocati in riferimento al metodo
di Panteno, all’importanza della Scrittura come testo di istruzione, alla disci
plina arcani: le «verità più sublimi», non adatte a tutti, venivano trasmesse
solo a voce e solo a coloro che ne erano degni (n. 42, nota 41; n. 43). Anche
Origene viene citato qui sul tema della paideia, nonché su povertà e libertà
del clero (n. 31, nota 13, con lunga citazione da hom. in Gen. 16.5, cfr.
GCS 29, 142–143). Sulla paideia Rosmini, basandosi sulle testimonianze di
Girolamo e Gregorio Taumaturgo, ricorda che Origene – in un percorso pro
gressivo – partiva dalla correzione dei costumi, quindi passava alle «scienze
profane» (la filosofia e tutte le discipline della enkyklios paideia), e solo
dopo gli studi preliminari introduceva nelle «dottrine di Dio» attinte dalle
Scritture (n. 44, nota 47). Altro elemento che Rosmini intende sottolineare
è che Origene non si serviva di compendi, ma leggeva e commentava con
l’allievo direttamente i testi filosofici (ibid.).
Nelle Cinque Piaghe, però, la questione in cui l’auctoritas di Origene
gioca il ruolo più importante è probabilmente quella della presenza del
popolo nell’elezione dei vescovi (elezione dei vescovi «a clero e popolo»).
L’elezione dei vescovi (che per Rosmini, coerentemente con l’insistenza sulla
libertà della Chiesa, non deve essere soggetta al potere civile) è l’argomento
cui viene dedicato lo spazio maggiore in quest’opera del Roveretano, nonché ovviamente nelle citate Lettere sopra le Elezioni Vescovili in appendice.
Su un punto così cruciale, prevedibilmente, gli autori chiamati a supporto
sono diversi: ad Origene Rosmini affianca altri testimoni (da Cipriano ad
Atanasio), convinto di essere in continuità con un amplissimo consensus
patrum, nonché con canoni e decreti successivi, un insieme di fonti dalle
e peccatori, buoni e malvagi, cfr. De doctrina christiana 3.32,45; De civitate Dei
18.49; De fide et operibus 5.7. Più in generale, sulle fonti patristiche delle Cinque
Piaghe cfr. Quacquarelli, 1991, 19–54; l’introduzione e gli indici di N. Galantino
nell’ediz. citata, 1997, 69–70 e 414–418; Bettetini / Peratoner, 1997, 515–519.
34 Convinzione di Rosmini è che «solo de’ grandi uomini possono formare degli altri
grandi uomini» (n. 27).
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quali trae conferma dell’opinione che «il popolo ha un diritto divino di avere
una qualche parte nell’elezioni de’ Pastori che il debbano pascere e condurre
a salvamento.»35 Origene sembra però occupare una posizione di preminenza: anzitutto, è la prima fonte patristica (più precisamente, la prima fonte
non scritturistica in assoluto) citata in questo capitolo IV dell’opera. Basterà
qui menzionare uno solo dei luoghi in cui l’Alessandrino viene evocato da
Rosmini su questo tema. Affermando che la presenza dell’intero popolo dei
fedeli, nell’elezione del vescovo (ma anche nel caso di altri uffici ecclesiastici), è garanzia che la scelta ricada sul candidato migliore per dottrina e
prassi, Rosmini cita subito – e direttamente – Origene:
Origene nell’Omilia XXII sui Num., e nella VI sul Levit. dice che “nell’ordinazione
del Vescovo, oltre all’elezione di Dio, si ricerca la presenza del popolo, affine che
tutti sien rassicurati, che si elegge in Pontefice il più eccellente e più dotto che sia,
e il più santo, e il più distinto in ogni virtù. Il popolo sarà dunque presente, perché
nessuno abbia a dolersi, e che sia tolto ogni scrupolo” (n. 77, nota 6).36
Il riferimento alla sesta omelia sul Levitico torna più avanti, dove si cita il
medesimo passo (relativo all’elezione di Aronne al sacerdozio, alla presenza
del popolo, Lv 8,3–4), ma più in esteso e con parte del testo latino (n. 113,
nota 124 = hom. in Lev. 6.3). Lo stesso passaggio verrà citato ancora, stavolta esclusivamente in latino, nella prima Lettera sopra le Elezioni Vesco
vili, dove torna anche il rimando alla ventiduesima omelia sui Numeri.37
Come accennato, Origene è inoltre una delle fonti principali di Rosmini
per la tesi del sacerdozio dei fedeli (concettualmente, niente affatto disarticolata da quella dell’elezione dei vescovi “a clero e popolo”), fondata
sulla teologia battesimale.38 Nella Filosofia del diritto Rosmini parla di
«carattere sacerdotale di ogni fedele» (parte II, n. 891): appone subito una
35 A. Rosmini, Sopra le elezioni vescovili a clero e popolo. Lettera I, in: Id., Cinque
Piaghe, 1997, 355–383 (374); cfr. Cinque Piaghe, n. 77: nei primi secoli vigeva il
principio «il clero giudice, il popolo consigliere».
36 Cfr. Or., hom. in Num. 22.4, GCS 30, 208–209; hom. in Lev. 6.3, GCS 29, 362–
363. La citazione rosminiana, più precisamente, mi sembra riferirsi al passo delle
Homiliae in Leviticum, non a Homiliae in Numeros, anche se con qualche scostamento. Ecco il passo origeniano nella trad. latina: Licet ergo Dominus de consti
tuendo pontifice praecepisset et Dominus elegisset, tamen convocatur et synagoga.
Requiritur enim in ordinando sacerdote et praesentia populi, ut sciant omnes et
certi sint quia qui praestantior est ex omni populo, qui doctior, qui sanctior, qui
in omni virtute eminentior, ille eligitur ad sacerdotium et hoc adstante populo, ne
qua postmodum retractatio cuiquam, ne quis scrupulus resideret.
37 Rosmini, Lettera I, rispettivamente 368 e 369.
38 Cfr. Quacquarelli, 1980, 64; Id., 1991, 92. 133–147. Ma anche Id., La lezione
liturgica di Antonio Rosmini. Il sacerdozio dei fedeli, Stresa 1970.
Origene e la tradizione alessandrina in Rosmini
265
nota rinviando alla fonte biblica, 1Pt 2,9, e aggiungendo che «di questo
primo grado di sacerdozio di cui sono rivestiti tutti i fedeli, parlano i più
antichi Padri della Chiesa.»39 Le auctoritates richiamate qui sono Ireneo,
Tertulliano e Origene: in particolare, per quest’ultimo il riferimento è a
hom. in Lev. 9.9 (su Lv 16,12), dove si legge «tutti quelli che sono stati
unti con l’unguento del sacro crisma, sono divenuti sacerdoti, come anche
Pietro dice a tutta la Chiesa: Voi stirpe eletta, regale sacerdozio, nazione
santa [1Pt 2,9]. Siete dunque stirpe sacerdotale e perciò avete accesso al
santuario.»40
Agisce, in questa concezione di Rosmini, la sua sottolineatura dell’unità
della Chiesa, interpretata come corpo mistico di Cristo nel quale il battesimo
introduce. Egli però distingue nettamente questo «primo grado di sacerdozio» (come viene definito nel passo poc’anzi citato), ovvero il sacerdozio
comune a ogni cristiano, battesimale, da quello ordinato, conferito per
imposizione delle mani: il primo era da Rosmini chiamato anche «sacerdozio interno» o «privato e individuale», mentre il secondo «esterno» o «pub
blico e sociale» (Filosofia del diritto, II, n. 894).41
3. Nell’impossibilità di seguire qui la traccia di tutti i riferimenti rosminiani a Origene è opportuno concentrarsi ora sul tema del progresso, quello
principalmente da tematizzarsi in questa sede. Se si dovesse rispondere a
una domanda secca riguardo l’appartenenza o meno di Rosmini alla “tradizione origeniana del progresso” (come teoria del progresso teologico),
provando ad esempio a rintracciare degli indicatori di tale appartenenza
come la dottrina dell’apocatastasi oppure la traiettoria de-dogmatizzante
o meta-dogmatizzante, forse la (prima) risposta dovrebbe essere negativa.
Rosmini non recupera le dottrine più peculiari di Origene, né può essere
definito un autore che relativizza il dogma: la sua posizione contro il razio
nalismo teologico è ben nota (sebbene possa essere interessante notare che,
39 «I. Petr. II, 9. Di questo primo grado di sacerdozio di cui sono rivestiti tutti i fedeli,
parlano i più antichi Padri della Chiesa. Sant’Ireneo († 201) Contra haereses, IV,
20. — Tertull. († 215) De Orat., c. XXVIII. –– Origene († 234 [ma 254]) Homil.
IX, in Levit. n. 9. — La Chiesa greca separata ha mantenuto la stessa dottrina
circa il sacerdozio privato di cui partecipa ogni fedele, e che si chiama anche
spirituale o mistico per distinguerlo dal sacerdozio sacramentale proprio de’ soli
preti» (A. Rosmini, Filosofia del diritto, a cura di M. Nicoletti / F. Ghia, 4 voll.,
Roma 2013–2015, parte II, n. 891, nota 1).
40 Ho utilizzato qui la trad. di M.I. Danieli in: Origene, Omelie sul Levitico, Roma
1985, 227; per il testo vedi GCS 29, 436. Su queste omelie origeniane cfr. M. Maritano / E. dal Covolo (eds.), Omelie sul Levitico. Lettura origeniana, Roma 2003.
41 Cfr. anche A. Rosmini, Dell’educazione cristiana, a cura di L. Prenna, Roma 1994,
n. 304.
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tra i “razionalisti” generati dal platonismo alessandrino, egli collocava gli
gnostici ma non Origene).42 Se si volesse schematizzare la storia del pensiero
cristiano a partire dall’influsso esercitato dai due giganti della letteratura
cristiana antica, Origene e Agostino, dunque (certo con una semplificazione)
in “origenismo/i” e “agostinismo/i”, come due polarità opposte, Rosmini –
sia dal punto di vista della dottrina della grazia che, più in generale, nell’impostazione teologico-filosofica – si situerebbe in una “cattolica” via media.
Tuttavia sarebbe un errore limitarsi agli elementi più evidenti e incamminarsi
verso immediate banalizzazioni, senza seguire la traccia che emerge da altri
dati. I numerosi elogi che Rosmini, come si è visto, ha tributato a Origene
non vanno certamente considerati una pura espressione retorica. In Rosmini
sono presenti quelli che possono essere definiti degli “elementi alessandrini”,
e qui proprio il concetto di progresso torna a giocare un ruolo non marginale. Nel pensiero rosminiano, macchina di sintesi che recepisce ed elabora
originalmente le proprie molteplici fonti, agiscono determinati elementi alessandrini/origeniani, pur venendone esclusi altri della medesima tradizione
speculativa, così come, per altro verso, la ricezione rosminiana di Agostino
ne accoglie l’ontoteologia trinitaria ma ne “disattiva” la dottrina della grazia
indebita e predestinata.43
Nella considerazione di questi elementi ci si imbatte ancora nel Rosmini
“dialettico” cui si è accennato all’inizio di questo contributo, ovvero un
autore che, come il suo contemporaneo Newman, si interroga su come conciliare «autorità, dogma e tradizione» con «libertà, razionalità e modernità»,44 ossia garanzia dogmatica con sviluppo (o progresso) della libera
riflessione teologica. La soluzione che entrambi propongono è il principio dialettico dello sviluppo della dottrina cristiana o dello sviluppo del
dogma. Ad esso Newman dedica An Essay on the Development of Chri
stian Doctrine (1845),45 opera conosciuta – anche se forse solo tramite
42 Cfr. anzitutto A. Rosmini, Il razionalismo teologico, a cura di G. Lorizio, Roma
1992.
43 Su quest’ultimo aspetto cfr. A. Annese, La dottrina della grazia in Rosmini. La
dialettica tra naturale e soprannaturale, in: Rivista Rosminiana 111 (2017),
111–138.
44 Cfr. G. Lettieri, Newman alessandrino, Postfazione a J.H. Newman, Lo sviluppo
della dottrina cristiana, a cura di L. Obertello, Milano 2003, 421–452 (426). Su
Rosmini e Newman, con particolare attenzione per questo aspetto, cfr. A. Annese,
Rosmini, Newman e la critica al razionalismo teologico. La dialettica tra ragione,
kerygma e autorità e il principio dello sviluppo dottrinale, in: Studi e Materiali di
Storia delle Religioni 82/2 (2016), 1009–1042.
45 Sulla teoria newmaniana dello sviluppo dottrinale cfr. O. Chadwick, From Bossuet
to Newman. The Idea of Doctrinal Development, Cambridge 1957; I. Ker, John
Henry Newman. A Biography, Oxford 2009, 257–315.
Origene e la tradizione alessandrina in Rosmini
267
mediazioni, e probabilmente non letta integralmente – e citata da Rosmini
nel suo incompiuto e postumo Il linguaggio teologico (la cui stesura iniziò
nel 1854 e non fu mai completata a causa della morte dell’autore l’anno
successivo).46 Questo testo di Rosmini era stato concepito come risposta alle
accuse di «oscurità o di noviloquio»47 mossegli dai critici. Qui il Roveretano
intendeva mostrare come vada intesa l’oscurità del linguaggio teologico, e
come vi sia un’oscurità dalla funzione “positiva”, quella delle parabole e
allegorie contenute nelle Scritture, atte a velare «la soverchia luce della dottrina», finché gradualmente non la si possa comprendere.48 In questa vita,
scrive Rosmini, le «cose divine» sono per l’uomo un misto di luce e tenebre,
e si deve insistere nel tentare di illuminare le tenebre, «sebbene il velo non si
possa rimovere del tutto giammai»; «questa è quella sapiente economia, che
Iddio usò cogli uomini.»49 Per realizzare questo tentativo sarà necessario e
46 «Fra i quali eretici non mancarono di quelli, che […] viddero che la Chiesa di
Cristo, appunto perché non era qualche cosa di morto, ma una società vivente per
tutti i secoli, era consentaneo che avesse il suo naturale sviluppo come un effetto
della sua vita; e questo fu il filo che segnò loro la via e li fece rinvenire la porta
della Cattolica Chiesa. Nominerò due soli di questi Carlo <Ludwig von Haller>
[…] e <Giovanni Enrico> Newman, che su questo svolgimento naturale della
dottrina e delle pratiche Cristiane compose quel libro, che fu il preludio della
sua conversione» (A. Rosmini, Il linguaggio teologico, a cura di A. Quacquarelli,
Roma 1975, 64–65). Su Il linguaggio teologico (e con riferimenti al tema dello
sviluppo) cfr., oltre all’Esame storicocritico di Quacquarelli (ivi, 103–145), anche
Menke, 1997, 235–237; Lorizio, 2005, 393–398; sul progresso teologico si veda
anche Quacquarelli, 1991, 93–94.
47 Rosmini, Il linguaggio teologico, 21.
48 Ivi, 27. Il passo può riecheggiare toni origeniani/alessandrini: «come il Maestro
degli uomini velava colle parabole o con una forma enigmatica, la soverchia luce
della dottrina, e n’apriva il mistero a’ suoi discepoli di mano in mano che potevano sopportarne la grandezza, così anche l’inviato di GESÙ Cristo può e deve
adattare il suo insegnamento a’ vari generi di persone, e talvolta gli può venir bene
lasciare qualche parte perché non involga equivoco intorno alle verità da credersi,
per eccitare opportunamente il pensiero e stuzzicare il desiderio di penetrare più
addentro nella loro intelligenza di que’ tra suoi discepoli che sono più ferventi».
Sul «velo delle parabole» cfr. anche Rosmini, Teodicea, n. 924.
49 Rosmini, Il linguaggio teologico, 35; cfr. 41, sulle «cose altissime e misteriose della
Religione» dove si trova «una propria oscurità non mai del tutto superabile». Tra
i diversi brani di Rosmini che si potrebbero citare ancora, cfr. almeno Teosofia, a
cura di M.A. Raschini / P.P. Ottonello, 6 voll., Roma 1998–2002, n. 33; Teodicea,
nn. 51 e 74; Antropologia soprannaturale, a cura di U. Muratore, 2 voll., Roma
1983, vol. 1, 107–108: «Fra queste tenebre e fra questa luce cammina il cristiano
in questa vita per un alto ordine della divina Provvidenza: acciocché cioè colle
tenebre più meriti credendo, e colla luce più gli s’acuisca il suo desiderio dell’eterna luce, e sia da questo saggio di visione e da questo desiderio sostenuto, ed
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naturale uno sviluppo, un progresso della teologia e del suo linguaggio; la
dottrina cristiana è come un “seme” che deve svilupparsi.50 La metafora del
seme e della pianta è finalizzata a sostenere che il depositum fidei non viene
alterato, né diminuito, né accresciuto: lo sviluppo era già insito in esso (come
la pianta “è” nel seme), non è un’aggiunta estrinseca. Il «progresso» e l’«incremento», l’«accrescere» la dottrina, vanno intesi come un approfondire,
connettere, illuminare.51
Queste affermazioni trovano significativa analogia con le tesi dell’Essay di
Newman. Per i due pensatori (come, in parte, anche per Möhler),52 il cristianesimo è sviluppo, progresso, è qualcosa di vivente. La riflessione teologica
cristiana, conseguentemente, non può che configurarsi come uno sviluppo
progressivo, poiché non tutto ciò che era contenuto nel deposito “rivelato”,
kerygmatico, poteva essere compreso subito: di qui quella che Newman
chiama la «teoria dello sviluppo dottrinale [the Theory of Development of
Doctrine].»53 Attraverso tale sviluppo – che sarebbe provvidenzialmente
previsto e guidato,54 rientrando nell’economia divina – la “verità” rivelata
in origine viene dispiegata e chiarita. Ma anche per Newman il “mistero
divino” manterrà un lato mai totalmente esauribile nella sua trascendenza.55
La chiave ermeneutica che l’esegeta può adottare sarà in particolare l’interpretazione allegorica delle Scritture, che ne sappia illuminare lo spirito
oltre la lettera.56 Newman è più esplicito di Rosmini nel parlare di “metodo
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
avvalorato nelle sue operazioni e nella sua aspettazione»; ma anche altri passi da
quest’ultima opera, ad es. ivi, 62–65.
Qui Rosmini fa esplicito riferimento alla parabola del granello di senape (cfr.
Mc 4,30–32 e paralleli), significativamente interpretato come simbolo dello «sviluppo» della «dottrina» (Il linguaggio teologico, 67–68; cfr. 54 per l’immagine
della «pianta»). La stessa parabola è interpretata con la medesima finalità in
Newman, Lo sviluppo, 104.
Cfr. Il linguaggio teologico, 49–55, in partic. 49: «il deposito consegnato da Cristo
agli apostoli e da questi tramandato […] non può essere né diminuito, né accresciuto, né in alcun minimo apice mutato»; 54: «nulla aggiungendo che sia novo
sostanzialmente».
Vedi però C.M. Shea, Newman, Perrone, and Möhler on Dogma and History: A
Reappraisal of the “NewmanPerrone Paper on Development”, in: Newman Studies Journal 7 (2010), 45–55 (in partic. 49), sulle differenze tra Newman e Möhler.
Newman, Lo sviluppo, 66; per il testo inglese cfr. An Essay on the Development
of Christian Doctrine, London 1878, rist. 1909 (uniform edition), 29–30.
Newman, Lo sviluppo, 96, 104–105.
Ivi, 102–103.
Ivi, 328–335 per l’allegoria; 90–92 per la dialettica lettera/Spirito. Su tutti i temi
appena citati, e la loro ispirazione “alessandrina”, cfr. Lettieri, 2003, in partic.
422–423. 429–430. 433. 444–445. 448–449.
Origene e la tradizione alessandrina in Rosmini
269
allegorico”, che equipara qui all’«interpretazione mistica [mystical interpre
tation]» (termine che comunque sembra preferire);57 Rosmini, in generale,
non usa molto il termine “allegoria” (che infatti è assente nel Linguaggio
teologico),58 ma nei contenuti il suo pensiero è affine. Sia ne Il linguaggio
teologico che nell’Antropologia soprannaturale, in particolare, egli sostiene
che le Scritture non contengono letteralmente tutto ciò che Dio voleva rivelare:59 occorre uno sviluppo teologico, un’interpretazione più profonda, in
un certo senso allegorica.60 Tale processo di sviluppo teologico ed esegetico
è, per il Roveretano, accompagnato dall’assistenza dello Spirito (che Gesù
promise «alla sua Chiesa»,61 con riferimento al Paraclito di Gv 14,26): nel
Linguaggio teologico egli cita la nota affermazione paolina «la lettera uccide,
lo Spirito vivifica» (2Cor 3,6),62 e il punto chiave della sua posizione è proprio che la teologia sia concepita come qualcosa di vivente, progressivo.
Secondo questa concezione, tale sviluppo o progresso non va lasciato all’arbitrio individuale, ma sarà guidato e garantito dogmaticamente da un’auto
rità, anch’essa prevista dall’economia divina: la Chiesa.63 Ciò garantirebbe
57 Cfr. in particolare Lo sviluppo, 328 (338 nell’originale ingl.).
58 Allegoria è termine poco presente negli scritti di Rosmini: cfr. Antropologia sopran
naturale, vol. 2, 121–123, sul linguaggio simbolico (vedi anche 22. 26–28); 297–
299, sull’eucaristia, dove Rosmini afferma che le parole di Gesù in Mc 14,25 (cfr.
Mt 26,29), «io non berrò più del frutto della vite fino al giorno in cui lo berrò
nuovo nel regno di Dio», non vanno intese in senso «puramente allegorico e figurato» (298): Gesù avrebbe lì fatto riferimento a un vino reale ossia a una futura
celebrazione dell’eucaristia dopo la sua resurrezione. Cfr. poi Del divino nella
natura, a cura di P.P. Ottonello, Roma 1991, n. 88 (sulle interpretazioni allegoriche
dei miti classici); Logica, a cura di V. Sala, Roma 1984, n. 735 (il parlare allegorico
come potenziale origine di «sofismi»).
59 Si veda almeno Il linguaggio teologico, 67–68; Antropologia soprannaturale, vol.
1, 166–167; vol. 2, 21–22. 88 (la Scrittura chiama a «penetrar[e] il senso nascosto»
dei suoi simboli/segni/enigmi).
60 In generale Rosmini, nell’esegesi, si pone in una via media tra allegorismo e letteralismo, e utilizza diffusamente la lettura tipologica. Cfr. L. Losacco, La lettura
biblica di Rosmini ne «L’introduzione del Vangelo secondo Giovanni commen
tata», Stresa 1986; B. Salmona, La Sacra Scrittura come fonte di Rosmini, in: Rivista Rosminiana 91 (1997), 301–371; G. Ferrarese, La Scrittura nella genesi della
teologia rosminiana, in: Annali di Storia dell’Esegesi 16/1 (1999), 241–272.
61 Rosmini, Il linguaggio teologico, 67.
62 Ivi, 68.
63 Per Rosmini cfr. ad es. ivi, 35–36. 49. 52. 67. Per Newman cfr. Lo sviluppo,
105–119, in partic. 108 (78 nell’ediz. ingl.): «Proporzionalmente alla probabilità
di veri sviluppi nella dottrina e nel culto, vi è anche la probabilità che nel piano
divino sia stata predisposta un’autorità esterna a cui spetta pronunciarsi su di essi
e che possa, quindi, separarli dalla massa delle speculazioni affatto umane, dalle
stravaganze, dalle corruzioni e dagli errori, nei quali e fuori dai quali vengono
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il mantenimento di un’identità (comunque dinamica) pur nel fluire del progresso, al di là delle «apparenti incongruenze e alterazioni [apparent incon
sistencies and alterations]» – per usare le parole di Newman –64 riscontrabili,
lungo i secoli, nella dottrina e nel culto cristiani. Garantirebbe, inoltre, la
“correttezza” del progresso teologico, ossia la distinzione tra la novità «pia e
commendabile» e quella «profana», «riprovevole» (così si esprime Rosmini),
o tra il «grano» e le «impure zizzanie.»65 Ecco allora la dialettica cui si
accennava, tra l’autorità e la libera riflessione personale: la garanzia autoritativa avrebbe lo scopo non di «indebolire la libertà o il vigore del pensiero
umano nel campo della speculazione religiosa, ma quello di resistere alle sue
stravaganze e di disciplinarle».66 Lo sviluppo teologico dovrà inoltre seguire
un canone, un principio guida67: qui sia Rosmini che Newman si confrontano con Vincenzo di Lérins (V secolo), ma – significativamente – non è il
ben noto “canone” di Vincenzo (quod ubique, quod semper, quod ab omni
bus creditum est, Commonitorium 2.5)68 che essi pongono al centro, bensì
l’analogia tra crescita della dottrina e crescita del corpo umano, ad indicare
il permanere della medesima (id)entità. Entrambi citano lo stesso passo del
Commonitorium (23.4–5): Imitetur animarum religio rationem corporum,
quae, licet annorum processu numeros suos euoluant et explicent, eadem
64
65
66
67
68
a crescere. È questa la dottrina dell’infallibilità della Chiesa [the doctrine of the
infallibility of the Church]».
Ivi, 49 (9 nell’ediz. ingl.).
Rosmini, Il linguaggio teologico, rispettivamente 57 e 53. Sull’autorità ecclesiastica
come garante, attraverso il dogma, della “correttezza” dello sviluppo teologico,
cfr. ad es. il passo seguente: «Le verità, che si contengono nel deposito della fede
[…] vennero col progresso del tempo, per le fatiche de’ santi e dotti uomini, e
soprattutto per le dogmatiche decisioni della Chiesa ad arricchirsi, e prendendo
unità di disegno, di ordine, e metodo, a costituire la scienza della sacra Teologia»
(ivi, 35–36, cors. mio).
J.H. Newman, Apologia pro vita sua, a cura di F. Morrone, Milano 2001, 393;
cfr. 385 sull’infallibilità della Chiesa come mezzo provvidenziale, stabilito da Dio
«per frenare quella libertà di pensiero che naturalmente in sé è una tra le nostre
più grandi doti naturali, e per salvarla dai propri eccessi suicidi». Cfr. A. Rosmini,
Degli studi dell’Autore, nn. 30. 38. 41. 42 (in: Id., Introduzione alla Filosofia, a
cura di P.P. Ottonello, Roma 1979), per la posizione analoga espressa dal Roveretano.
Rosmini lo sintetizza sostanzialmente come «il principio della coerenza con ciò
che è rivelato» (Il linguaggio teologico, 54); Newman delinea sette diversi criteri
(cfr. la Parte II dell’Essay).
Vincenzo di Lérins, Commonitorium, ed. R. Demeulenaere, CCSL 64, Turnhout 1985.
Origene e la tradizione alessandrina in Rosmini
271
tamen quae erant, permanent. […] Parua lactantium membra, magna iuue
num: eadem ipsa sunt tamen.69
Vorrei insistere sul piano ecclesiologico appena menzionato, che insieme
a quello ermeneutico è al cuore della concezione rosminiana del progresso
teologico. È la Chiesa stessa, ossia l’autorità che deve promuovere lo sviluppo (ermeneutico) teologico e vigilare su di esso, ad essere concepita da
Rosmini come una «società vivente», con un suo «naturale sviluppo.»70
Essa, per il Roveretano, è un organismo vivente, è il corpo mistico di Cristo, in evoluzione e cammino verso la sua perfezione ultima.71 Come «Gesù
progrediva [προέκοπτεν] in sapienza ed età e grazia» (così Rosmini traduce
Lc 2,52), «così si può dire […] che anche la Chiesa, fatta ad immagine e
similitudine di Cristo, venga continuamente crescendo in età e sapienza»;72
in tale progresso le dottrine – sviluppo del depositum fidei – vengono formate, consolidate, custodite (ma non alterate), spiega Rosmini citando
ancora, dal latino, Vincenzo di Lérins (Comm. 23.17–18 e poi 23.9), e commentando: «questo è quel solo progresso [profectus è nel testo di Vincenzo,
23.9] che è possibile nella Chiesa, il solo incremento di cui è suscettivo lo
stesso dogma, secondo Vincenzo Lirinese, tutto consistente nelle forme, e
nelle manifestazioni ognora più esplicite» (mentre la dottrina, in sé, resta la
medesima). Ma la concezione dinamica ed organica della Chiesa consente
anche un collegamento con un altro tema fondamentale: ciò che si potrebbe
chiamare il riformismo di Rosmini, cui si è accennato in apertura parlando
delle Cinque Piaghe. Se la Chiesa è una società vivente in continuo sviluppo,
ne consegue per Rosmini che essa possa e debba riformarsi dopo periodi di
crisi o di corruzione – o, ancor più significativamente, che essa debba rinnovarsi costantemente, come giustamente è stato notato da Giovanni Miccoli.73 Nelle Cinque Piaghe si auspica appunto un consistente rinnovamento
interno alla Chiesa e un ritorno di essa allo “spirito” dei primi secoli. Il tema
69 Per Rosmini vedi Il linguaggio teologico, 51–55. 59; per Newman, Lo sviluppo,
49–64. 148. 180. 189. 214. 397; la citazione da Commonitorium 23 è a p. 51 in
Rosmini (che riporta quasi l’intero capitolo del testo di Vincenzo) e 189 in Newman. Il “canone” di Vincenzo non è nemmeno citato in quest’opera di Rosmini,
mentre nell’Essay di Newman se ne sottolinea la problematicità (cfr. in partic.
49–64).
70 Rosmini, Il linguaggio teologico, 64 (cit. supra, nota 46).
71 Cfr. Rosmini, L’introduzione del Vangelo secondo Giovanni, lez. LIX e XC; Degli
studi dell’Autore, nn. 102–103; Filosofia del diritto, II, nn. 713–716. 724–725.
72 Rosmini, Il linguaggio teologico, 53, cors. mio.
73 Cfr. Miccoli, 1985, 53: «La concezione della storia della Chiesa che Rosmini
enuncia [nelle Cinque Piaghe] comporta del resto una necessità di rinnovamento
costante, che già la Mirari vos aveva bollato come pretesa “assurda e sommamente
oltraggiosa”».
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del progresso si è rivelato dunque in grado di connettere e intrecciare diversi
fili dipanatisi fin qui.
In chiusura si può tentare un provvisorio bilancio dei dati emersi. In questa
sede non era possibile proporre che una selezione dei moltissimi riferimenti
rosminiani a Origene e alla tradizione alessandrina, così come dei “temi
alessandrini” rintracciabili nel pensiero del Roveretano. Oltre ai puntuali
riferimenti a Origene, in particolare nelle Cinque Piaghe, si è fatto cenno a
temi più generali come la disciplina arcani (con i vari riferimenti rosminiani
a Clemente)74 e soprattutto la concezione della dispensazione progressiva
delle verità rivelate e della conseguente progressività dell’interpretazione
umana di esse: in aggiunta al citato Il linguaggio teologico, si possono ricordare diverse sezioni dell’Antropologia soprannaturale (tra cui alcuni passi
citati supra), come pure i passi della Teodicea (ad esempio il n. 338) che
descrivono l’azione della grazia divina come pedagogia progressiva. Ulteriori tematiche da approfondire potrebbero essere quella del cosmo come
sistema simbolico («complesso di simboli» o «segni») significante le realtà
spirituali/soprasensibili (o l’intero universo «sensibile-soprasensibile»)75 o
quella dell’inserimento della filosofia nella storia della salvezza (qui Rosmini,
nell’Introduzione alla Filosofia, recepisce apertamente Clemente, ad esempio
citandone la metafora dei “tre testamenti”),76 e gli spunti potrebbero moltiplicarsi.77 In ogni caso, si può concludere affermando che se una caratteristica sostanziale dell’“origenismo” – come è stato sostenuto – è il tematizzare
il progresso della libera razionalità della creatura nella comprensione del
dogma (e della dottrina cristiana), senza mai esaurirli (e in dialettica con la
74 Va comunque rilevato che Rosmini, su questo aspetto, pur riferendosi a Clemente
mostra una posizione meno radicale dell’Alessandrino.
75 Cfr. soprattutto la prima parte del IV libro dell’Antropologia soprannaturale, in
partic. vol. 2, 17–18. 21. 37. Si veda anche Teodicea, nn. 673. 676.
76 Rosmini, Degli studi dell’Autore, n. 71, nota 31 (con riferimento a Clem., str.
6.8,67,1; cfr. 6.5,42,1–3). In questo testo rosminiano, più in generale, grande è
l’influenza di Clemente, che viene citato più volte, e sempre in luoghi “strategici”
(come l’esergo della parte III o la conclusione dell’opera, dove si riprende l’esegesi
allegorica alessandrina dell’episodio biblico di Agar e Sara). L’Alessandrino è qui
importante fonte di Rosmini sulla relazione tra ragione e kerygma e tra filosofia
e cristianesimo. Cfr. Annese, 2014, 37–54.
77 Ad esempio, in EpC, n. 3548, vol. 6, 657–660, ad Antonio Mazzetti a Rovereto,
Rovereto 21 giugno 1838, Origene è auctoritas in favore del celibato ecclesiastico
(con citazione da hom. in Num. 23.3).
Origene e la tradizione alessandrina in Rosmini
273
progressiva “paideia rivelativa” divina),78 Rosmini può ben essere inserito
nella traiettoria dei pensatori che, certo in molteplici e differenti modi, trasmettono l’eredità del grande teologo alessandrino.
78 Cfr. G. Lettieri, Progresso, in: A. Monaci Castagno, Origene. Dizionario. La cul
tura, il pensiero, le opere, Roma 2000, 379–392; Id., 2003, in partic. 423, 433,
451–452 (sull’“origenismo” di Newman); Id., Progress: A Key Idea for Origen
and Its Inheritance (in partic. i parr. 2, 9, 16), in questo volume.
Enrico Cerasi
Two Types of Christian Apokatastasis:
Origen and Karl Barth
Abstract: This essay studies the presence of Origen in Karl Barth’s theology. At first
sight, Origen seems to have little relevance in Barth’s work. But if one studies the
doctrine of apokatastasis matters change. Apokatastasis seems to be an unsolved
problem for Barth’s theology. Barth does not accept what he calls Origen’s “philosophical optimism”, but at the same time he thinks that God’s grace must be absolutely
more powerful than any resistance.
Keywords: Apokatastasis, Grace, Philosophical optimism, Creation
A Gaia, per il passato e per il presente
Notably,1 Karl Barth’s theology – including his magnus opus, the unfinished
Die Kirchliche Dogmatik (1932–1967) – does not contain a considerable
number of Origen’s quotations. Indeed, I have counted just 26 of them: not
so many in a work of more than 9,000 pages, especially in relation to the 234
times he cites Luther, the 132 Augustin, and 396 times Calvin! Surely one
cannot estimate an author’s influence just by counting the quotations. Yet,
Origen is quoted less, and occasionally, without a serious discussion of his
theology. The only notion that attracts Barth’s attention is the one of Christ
as God’s autobasileia. Particularly in the latest volumes of the Dogmatik,
Barth quotes it more and more, suggesting agreement with Origen at least on
this point. However, in my opinion, under the appearance of agreement lies
a deep difference, as we shall see at the end of the present work.
The same goes for the concept of Apokatástasis. This word appears only
four times, all of them in Kirchliche Dogmatik II/1 – that is in the doctrine
of God, while we would expect to find it in the doctrine of redemption.
Anyway, Barth’s discussion of the concept is far from clear. On the one hand
he is attracted by this doctrine, because he does not see any possibility for
objecting to it. On the other hand, though, he cannot subscribe to it. In
his opinion, an evangelical theologian cannot affirm the Apokatástasis pan
ton. Not because it is in itself false, but because it is an abstract concept
that is assumed without taking Christ into consideration. In other words,
Apokatástasis is a philosophico-anthropological doctrine, assumed by setting
1
See T. Greggs, Barth, Origen, and Universal Salvation. Restoring Particularity,
Oxford 2009.
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aside God’s revelation in Jesus Christ, and is therefore incompatible with
God’s freedom. Apokatástasis results from an historical-anthropological
optimism, not from Christ. An evangelical theologian can neither affirm nor
deny Apokatástasis, as it is an unsolvable mysterium. Only God knows it.
Nevertheless, in my opinion, Barth’s radical Christo-centrism is the only
basis of his Apokatastatical theology. Let us consider the doctrine of creation, as it results from Kirchliche Dogmatik III/1. Perhaps this is not Barth’s
most famous topic, yet it is emblematic. In the Preface Barth confesses the
embarrassment he feels when dealing with it. I remember that in the first two
parts of Kirchliche Dogmatik – the rightly famous doctrines of the Word
of God and of God – he showed that God is not Unitarian but Trinitarian,
knowable only by His revelation in Jesus Christ, and never by natural knowledge. In Barth’s opinion the Thomistic doctrine of analogia entis – which is
the philosophical basis of natural theology – is Antichrist’s invention (and,
incidentally, the only reason not to be catholic) because it denies that God
is totally different from the world.2 We know God only because he revealed
himself through Jesus Christ; but in Jesus Christ God revealed himself as a
Trinitarian God, that is, as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Who is the Father?
In the doctrine of God, Barth affirms that the Father is the one who freely
loves Jesus Christ, the one who has eternally elected Jesus Christ. In other
words, Jesus Christ is eternally at the heart of God’s life, both ad intra and
ad extra.3
In this way Barth designs a doctrine of God that is thoroughly Christcentred; but what about the doctrine of creation? At first, it seemed reasonable to him to compare the Bible’s witness with the discoveries of natural
sciences.4 Which theologian, in effect, does not work in this way? Nowadays
it’s impossible to ignore the discoveries of natural sciences. However, Barth
decided that an evangelic theology must be non-apologetic, i.e. any attempt to
demonstrate that Christian faith is not in disagreement with natural sciences
must be avoided a priori. Apologetic, in fact, is the attempt to demonstrate
that Christian theology – in particular modern Protestant theology – does
not disagree with (and perhaps supports) science and culture.5
2
3
4
5
See K. Barth, Die Kirchliche Dogmatik I/1: Die Lehre vom Wort Gottes.
Prolegomena zur Kirchliche Dogmatik, München 1932.
See K. Barth, Die Kirchliche Dogmatik II/1: Die Lehre vom Gott, Zürich, 1940.
See K. Barth, Die Kirchliche Dogmatik III/1: Die Lehre vom der Schoepfung,
Zürich 1945.
See K. Barth, Die protestantische Theologie im 19. Jahrhundert, Zürich 1946.
On the apologetic, see also: H. W. Frei, Types of Christian Theology, edited by
G. Hunsinger / W. C. Placher, New Haven and London 1992. See also: W. C. Placher,
Unapologetic Theology. Christian voice in a Pluralistic Conversation, Louisville,
Kentucky 1989. See also: E. Cerasi, Verso un’ermeneutica postcritica. L’influenza
Two Types of Christian Apokatastasis
277
In any case, in Barth’s opinion an apologetic theology contradicts God’s
revelations in Jesus Christ. It follows that an evangelic doctrine of creation
must be based on the Christian (and in particular St. John’s) kerygma of the
creation of the World in Jesus Christ. Creation is not an act of God which
is antecedent to and independent from Jesus Christ, as both the Fathers and
the Reformers have taught. Rather, in Barth’s opinion creation is the condi
tio sine qua non of the Covenant. For the Covenant between God and man
to be possible, creation is necessary, because it is nothing but the theatre of
the Covenant. It follows that it is impossible to conceive the World (that is
the Being of philosophers) setting aside God’s grace in Jesus Christ.
The consequences of this unusual doctrine emerge in a paragraph of
the Kirchliche Dogmatik: Got und das Nichtige.6 What is das Nichtige? In
which relation is it with God? In Barth’s opinion, das Nichtige has no ontological independence; it has no reality but the negation which is a necessary
part of God’s “Yes” to the Covenant. Creation is God’s “Yes”, the Yes to
the Covenant, but this amazing Yes has as necessary condition: a “No”, that
is, something which God does not want, a negation, a not-creating will!
To create something he had to not-create, i.e. to leave in the Nothing the
not-wanted. In other words, to will God had to refuse the not-wanted; to
affirm, God had to deny – but this denial became dramatically real in human
sin. Sin is an ontological contradiction because its content is Nothing, while
Nothing is a real contradiction, and humans have become slaves of its paradoxical not-real reality.
Christ’s cross is God’s judgment about das Nichtige and therefore his final
overcoming. God’s judgement! Contrary to Heidegger and the twentieth
century’s existentialism, Barth affirms that das Nichtige is in first place God’s
problem and not a human one; indeed, God and not humans has overcome
the Nothing in the cross and the resurrection of Christ. Since Christ is risen
there is no place for this negation, for this paradoxical not-real reality.
Anyway, to understand the meaning of the cross we must go back to the
doctrine of God, and in particular to the discussion of Calvin’s doctrine of
predestination.7 In my opinion, this is maybe the most absorbing part of Die
6
7
di Karl Barth sulla teologia postliberale, Torino 2009. See also E. Cerasi, Quale
ermeneutica narrativa? La critica di Frei a Ricoeur, in: «Protestantesimo» 62
(2007), 111–135.
See K. Barth, Die Kirchliche Dogmatik III/3, Zürich, 1950, § 50: Gott und das
Nichtige. There is an Italian translation of this paragraph: K. Barth, Dio e il
Niente, ed. R. Celada Ballanti, Brescia 2000.
See K. Barth, Die Kirchliche Dogmatik II/2, Zürich 1942, §§ 3235. There is an
Italian translation of this part of the Dogmatik: K. Barth, La dottrina dell’elezione
divina. Dalla dogmatica ecclesiale di Karl Barth, a cura di A. Moda, Torino 1983.
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Kirchliche Dogmatik, and one of the major discussions of this topic. It is a
notoriously controversial topic for modern thought. From Wesley to Kant,
till Max Weber and beyond, moral responsibility – that is, one of the major
achievements of western civilisation – has been considered incompatible
with predestination. On the contrary, Barth thinks that in Calvin’s opinion
predestination is a way to guarantee God’s freedom, that is, his free will, in
the absence of which we necessarily get Hegelian absolute idealism.
In other words, Calvin just wanted to preserve God’s freedom, because the
Christian God is a God who has preferences and aversions. In Barth’s opinion
this is undeniable, but the point is to think of God’s election Christologically.
While Calvin explains – or better, he renounces explaining – God’s election
through the ad hoc hypothesis of an obscure and absolute decree of God which
divides humans in elected and damned, Barth stresses that the ratio of election
must be found in Jesus Christ, and only in him. Electing Jesus Christ, loving
forever and ever the man Jesus, God has freely determined himself as the Father
of Jesus Christ, the God who has freely and forever said “Yes” to Jesus Christ.
In other words, there is no God but the God who elected Christ. And there is
no elected but the man Jesus Christ. It is useless to look for the identity of the
elected by using human reason to separate them from the damned. Puritans,
who looked for signs of their own election in their conscience or in their economic success, have misunderstood the evangelic revelation. They looked for
signs of the election in the wrong place. According to the evangelic witness,
only Christ is the elected and the saint of God.
Nevertheless, as seen above, election needs a correspondent damnation.
Electing Christ, God must damn. Contrary to the logic of § 55 about Got
un das Nichtige, in this case the object of damnation is Jesus Christ himself.
In Barth’s opinion, Christ is the only elected and the only damned. The man
beloved by God is the only one on whom the wrath of God fell down. A terrible wrath, really catastrophic, but suffered only by Christ. If Christ is the
only man elected by God, he is the only damned too. There is no wrath of
God but the cross of Christ.
Barth expounds his very radical opinion by means of a large number of
biblical quotations, especially from the Old Testament. Yet in the present
work I would like to stress the consequences of this unconventional theology. If in the cross and in the Eastern morning God revealed his overcoming of the Nothing, what about the sacred history, as it is witnessed by
Scripture?
Contrary to what he wrote in the Römerbrief, in die Kirchliche Dogmatik
Barth does not deny history.8 In his opinion, the election-damnation of Jesus
8
See E. Cerasi, Il paradosso della grazia. La teoantropologia di Karl Barth,
Prefazione di G. Lettieri, Roma 2006. See also E. Cerasi, L’umanità di Israele.
Two Types of Christian Apokatastasis
279
Christ implies the election-damnation of the community. Notice that there
is just one community. According to Barth, there are not an old and a new
Covenant (the Covenant is unique and undeniable because it is wanted by
God); but there are two times: the time of waiting (for Christ) and the time
of memory (of Christ). As the community of waiting, Israel is the first time;
as the community of memory, the Church is the second time of God’s people.
Israel and the Church are the two ecstasies of the unique time of God.
It follows that Israel is elected not just as itself, but rather as people who
wait for the event of Christ. Despite that, if this event were really absolutus,
i.e. in no relation with anything, as it appears in the Römerbrief, it would be
unconceivable. Instead, to be conceivable and therefore theological, it must
have a time; but – as I said – not a past (as if Christ were not already present
in Israel) but a waiting; and not a future (as if after his death and resurrection he were not still present) but a time of memory. Christ has neither a past
nor a future, because there is no time in which he was not already present or
a time in which he will not still be present; but there are – in Israel and in the
Church – waiting and memory of Christ.
This is the paradoxical reasoning lying behind Israel’s election: Israel has
been elected as the time of waiting for the Christ. However, Israel itself could
be damned if it aimed at taking possession of its election. If it were to “own”
its election, it would lose its faith, as eventually happened. But, in Barth’s
opinion, according to Rom. 11 it is unconceivable that Israel remains in
an endless incredulity. Why? Because the content of incredulity is… – das
Nichtige, which has been overcome by God in the cross and in the resurrection of Christ. Israel’s separation from the Covenant cannot be real: it has no
real content; it is just an illusory appearance. In other words, even if Israel
refused Christ, its refusal gains no reality after God overcomes das Nichtige,
as the sin does not have any content left.
It is long-winded but not very difficult to apply this logic to human beings.
Let us consider the case of Judas –9 the damned par excellence. Judas is the
one who, according to all the Gospels, voluntarily refused the Lord’s grace
even if he too was sanctified during the Last Supper. He separated himself
from Christ. Undoubtedly, he is the Traitor. Separated forever? On the basis
of the previous considerations about the Apokatástasis, we should give no
answer to this question. But Barth does answer! Who is Judas? He is defined
by his actions, not by his “soul”. Judas is the one who delivered Christ to
9
Note sulla teologia della storia di Karl Barth, «Il Pensiero. Rivista di filosofia»,
XLV, 1, (2006), 85–99.
See E. Cerasi, Il paradosso di Giuda. L’altra faccia della teologia di Karl Barth,
in M. Marchetto (ed), L’ira degli Dèi, Venezia 2006, 141–158. See also Cerasi,
2006, 221–227.
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the pagans, who in turn crucified him. Therefore, he is clearly a reprobate.
Nevertheless, his action is the same and the opposite of that of Saint Paul.
According to 1 Cor. 11, Saint Paul too delivered Christ to the pagans – the
same Christ who Judas delivered to the unbelievers. Hence Judas’ and Paul’s
deliveries are opposite but specular actions.
Should we say that Judas and Paul are in a complexio oppositorum relation? Maybe, but I consider this concept somewhat “static” for describing
Barthian theology. I prefer to say that Judas and Paul are two “shadows”, or
better – as for the time of waiting and the time of memory – two ecstasies of
the same event, the same delivery. Certainly, Judas’ is the action of one who
is damned, whereas Paul’s is the action of a saint, even considering that Paul
too was a persecutor of Christ before the Damascus revelation. According
to the biblical narrative, it is impossible to separate their actions, for they
are just two ecstasies of the same event. But theology does not just have
a narrative rationale.10 One cannot differentiate Judas’ from Paul’s actions
just because they are “shadows” of the first and amazing delivery: the one
of God! According to Rom. 1, before Judas and Paul did it, God led humans
to the sin, while according to Rom. 4, 28 God himself conducted his Son
to die, overcoming in this way the first delivery. In other words, Judas’ and
Paul’s actions are just shadows of the delivery by which God has overcome
Sin and the Nothing.
In my opinion, this is the “literal” meaning of Barth’s discourse. It is not
hard to see the consequences of this theology. Even if Barth does not say it,
Apokatástasis is the meaning of what happened in the crucifixion and the
resurrection of Christ. Nothing escapes this event because Nothing itself is
overcome by this event. Human incredulity is without content; it might be
the case that there are men who imagine themselves to be without God, but
there is surely no God without men.
If what we noticed in this work is true, why is Barth so cold about
Apokatástasis? As we have seen, in his opinion it is more of a philosophical than theological concept, which is based on an anthropological optimism more than on God’s revelation in Christ. Nevertheless, we have seen
that Apokatástasis is nothing but the consequence of the crucifixion and
the resurrection of Christ. Why, therefore, does Barth not subscribe to this
doctrine?
10 On theology and narrative, see H. W. Frei, The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative.
A Study in Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century Hermeneutics, New Haven and
London 1974. See also H. W. Frei, Theology and Narrative: Selected Essays, edited
by William C. Placher / G. Hunsinger, New Haven and London 1993. See also: N.
Frye, The Great Code: The Bible and Literature, Toronto 2006.
Two Types of Christian Apokatastasis
281
Maybe Barth, becoming less paradoxical and more orthodox than in the
Römerbrief, preferred to be more careful about topics as this one.11 But
actually he did not become less paradoxical and more orthodox!12 In my
opinion, the Kirchliche Dogmatik is as paradoxical as the Römerbrief. The
consequence of God’s revelation in Jesus Christ in the Dogmatik is maybe
more radical than in the Römerbrief. Through the crucifixion and the resurrection of Jesus Christ, God overcame the Nothing; secular history is nothing but the time of memory (sometime of the lack of memory!) of this event.
Is it possible that Barth had felt a little bit of fear for his doctrine? Is it possible that with the denial of the Apokatástasis Barth was actually retracting
his radical Christological theology?
I do not think so. Neither do I think that Origen’s theology of Apokatástasis
results from a historico-anthropological optimism and not from Christ, as
Barth said. Instead, in Origen’s theology the Apokatástasis arises from the
firm belief that Christ’s action is still in progress13 and the eternal Gospel is
not already revealed. Contrary to this, Barth holds that since Christ is the
eternal decision of God, the future is not “open”, and it is not “opaque”.
In other words, in Barth’s theology the future does not have any relevance
for theology. If Christ really is the autobasileia of God, as Origen said, it is
very difficult to still hold that revelation is in progress. One can struggle for
political progress, or fight against Hitlerian totalitarianism,14 but one cannot
think that God’s decision is still open.
This is, I think, is the radical difference between Barth and Origen.
Therefore, in Barth’s terms we could say that Origen’s theology is not
Christological enough to be Apokastatic. Conversely, in Origen’s opinion,
Apokatástasis signifies that God’s revelation in Christ did not yet express its
true meaning. In other words, we can read Origen and Karl Barth as two different types of Apokatástasis. Barth’s Apokatástasis depends on God’s once
andforall decision in Jesus Christ; Origen’s depends on an idea of cosmic
11 See H. U. von Balthasar, Karl Barth. Darstellung und Deutung seiner Theologie,
Einsiedeln 1976.
12 See B. L. McCormack, Karl Barth’s Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology: Its
Genesis and Development 1909–1936, Oxford 1995; see also G. Hunsinger,
Disruptive Grace. Studies in the Theology of Karl Barth, Grand RapidsCambridge 1999.
13 See Lettieri, Progresso, 2000.
14 See D. Cornu, Karl Barth et la Politique, Genève, 1967. See also S. Rostagno (ed.),
Barth contemporaneo, Torino 1990. See also E. Cerasi, “Più che leninismo”. Note
sulla teologia politica di Karl Barth, in: «Per la filosofia», XX, 57 (2003), 1–17. See
also E. Cerasi, Anarchismo nel cristianesimo? La voce di Karl Barth, in; «Giornale
critico di storia delle idee», eds. A. Tagliapietra / S. Ghisu, 4 (2011), 31–51.
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Enrico Cerasi
progress toward the universal salvation, which implies the development of
revelation. In short, we can express Origen’s point of view through the following words, taken from one of Newman’s sermons:
Scripture, I say, begins a series of developments which it does not finish; that is to
say, in other words, it is a mistake to look for every separate proposition of the
Catholic doctrine in Scripture. […] For instance, the Athanasian Creed professes to
lay down the right faith, which we must hold on its most sacred subjects, in order
to be saved. This must mean that there is one view concerning the Holy Trinity, or
concerning the Incarnation, which is true, and distinct from all others; one definite,
consistent, entire view, which cannot be mistaken, not contained in any certain
number of propositions, but held as a view by a believing mind, and not held but
denied by Arians, Sabellians […] and other heretics. That idea is not enlarged, if
propositions are added, nor impaired if they are withdrawn: if they are added, this
is with a view of conveying that one integral view, not of amplifying it. That view
does not depend on such propositions: it does not consist in them; they are but specimens and indications of it. And they may multiply without limit. […] The question,
then, is not whether this or that proposition of the Catholic doctrine is in terminis
in Scripture, unless we would be slaves to the letter, but whether that one view of
the Mystery, of which all such are the exponents, be not there […]. One thing alone
has to be impressed on us by Scripture, the Catholic idea, and in it all are included.15
Certainly, Barth did not want to be a slave of the letter. Scripture is nothing
but the exponent of the God’s decision, revealed once and for all in the cross
and the resurrection of Jesus Christ. While for Origen the meaning of Christ
is still progress until Apokatástasis panton, for Barth Apokatástasis is the
once and for all revealed in Christ.
15 John H. Newman, Fifteen Sermons Preached before the University of Oxford, in
John H. Newman, Scritti filosofici, ed. M. Marchetto, Milan 2005, 602–604.
Elisa Zocchi
Origen as Hegel: The Notion of Aufhebung
in Balthasar’s Interpretation of Origen
Abstract: In his works, Hans Urs von Balthasar traces a parallelism between Origen’s
and Hegel’s theological synthesis based on the idea of sublation (Aufhebung). Two
notions are pivotal for him: spirit and progress. For each of them, Balthasar gives two
possible interpretations that bring Origen closer or farther from Hegel.
Keywords: Aufhebung, Spirit, Hegel, Titanism
1. Introduction
In 1938 Hans Urs von Balthasar published an anthology that clearly presents Origen as a master of spiritual life, titled Spirit and Fire.1 Spirit and
Fire itself is the narration of the soul’s spiritual progress towards God, “a
suggestive anthology of many short Origenian passages put together, arbitrarily but genially, in order to describe the phases and the development of
spiritual life”.2 In 1936, three years before the publication of Spirit and Fire,
Balthasar had already published the long essay Le Mysterion d’Origène, presenting a reading of Origen in sacramental terms.3 In this short but dense
essay, Balthasar discovers a parallelism between the Alexandrian and Hegel.
Both Origen and Hegel are fundamental names in the thought of Hans
Urs von Balthasar, as will become evident later in his production. As for
Origen, Balthasar says that “I never feel so at home elsewhere as I do with
him”4; Origen is “the most sovereign spirit of the first centuries, who has set
1
2
3
4
Von Balthasar, 1984.
M. Simonetti, La teologia dei padri, in: G. Canobbio / P. Coda (ed), La teologia
del XX secolo – un bilancio. Prospettive storiche, Roma 2003, 359–389 (375)
n. 67. Simonetti also worked on an anthology which, similarly to Balthasar’s Spirit
and Fire, presents the Origenian idea of the soul’s journey to God: M. Simonetti
/ G. Bonfrate / P. Boitani, Il viaggio dell’anima, Milano 2007.
H. U. von Balthasar, Le Mysterion d’Origène (I), in: Recherche de Science Religieuse
26, no. 5 (1936) 513–562, here 553; H. U. von Balthasar, Le Mysterion d’Origène
(II), in: Recherche de Science Religieuse 27, no. 1 (1937) 38–64. This will be collected in 1957 in one volume, without modifications: H. U. von Balthasar, Parole
et Mystère chez Origène, Paris 1957.
“Origenes bleibt für mich der genialste, der weiträumigste Ausleger und Liebhaber
des Wortes Gottes.” H. U. von Balthasar, Geist und Feuer. Michael Albus: Ein
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Elisa Zocchi
his mark for good or ill on the totality of Christian theology,”5 “the most
inspired, the most wide-ranging interpreter and lover of the Word of God.”6
Balthasar admits Spirit and Fire to be “the weightiest (book) of all I have
published”7 and the book that “gives me greatest joy.”8 Despite many critiques, it has been widely demonstrated that Hegel is one of the most present
names in Balthasar’s work and a constant term of comparison for his theology.9 Years after his studies of the Alexandrian, Balthasar acknowledges
the strong connection between the two thinkers: “Origen, who was for me,
as once for Erasmus, more important than Augustine, became the key to the
entire Greek patristics, the early Middle Ages and, indeed, even to Hegel and
Karl Barth.”10 How is Origen a resource to understand Hegel? The key to
this statement is offered by the Epilogue to Le Mysterion d’Origène, the only
Gespräch mit Hans Urs von Balthasar, in H. U. von Balthasar, Zu seinem Werk,
Einsiedeln 20002, 103–132 (131).
5 “Ein anderer Freund, Henri de Lubac, wies auf die Alexandriner, und so kam,
dass ich Origenes fand und staunend in ihm den überlegensten Geist der ersten
Jahrhunderte erkannte, der die ganze christliche Theologie im Besten wie im
Schlimmen gestempelt hat; eine Auswahl, die ich nicht anders nennen konnte
als Geist und Feuer, sollte sein inneres Bild in seiner ganzen verwegenen Höhe
neu erstehen lassen, und dies wenig erkannte Buch scheint mir noch heute das
gewichtvollste von allem, was ich vorlegen konnte.” H. U. von Balthasar, Zu
seinem Werk, 2000, 10–11; eng. tr. H. U. von Balthasar, My Work. In retrospect,
San Francisco 1993, 11.
6 “Nirgends ist mir so wohl wie bei ihm.” von Balthasar, 2000, 131.
7 Cfr. n. 5.
8 von Balthasar, 1993, 108–109. “Wurde ich gefragt, an welchen von meinen
eigenen Büchern ich am meisten Freude habe, welche ich vielleicht zuweil noch in
die Hand nehme, so wäre die Antwort: sicher meine Origenes-Auswahl Geist und
Feuer, denn in Origenes erkannte ich jene Genialität für das Katholische, der ich
nachstreben möchte.” von Balthasar, 2000, 92.
9 As an example, Hegel is mentioned 280 times just in Balthasar’s trilogy (115
times in Herrlichkeit, 115 times in Theodramatik and 50 in Theologik). “From
his first book to his last, von Balthasar thinks eye to eye with Hegel.” P. Henrici,
Zur Philosophie Hans Urs von Balthasars, in K. Lehmann-W. Kasper (ed.), Hans
Urs von Balthasar. Gestalt und Werk, Köln 1989, 25–85; Eng. tr. Hans Urs von
Balthasar. His life and work, San Francisco 1991 (157). The most recent contribution on this is C. O’Regan, Anatomy of Misremembering: Von Balthasar’s
Response to Philosophical Modernity. Volume 1: Hegel, Chestnut Ridge 2014. See
also S. Zucal, L’interpretazione teologica di Hegel nel primo Balthasar, «Filosofia
oggi» 3 [1985], 523–548; id. L’ambiguità prometeica dell’escatologia hegeliana
nell’interpretazione teologica di H. U. von Balthasar, in: Verifiche 14, no. 2–3
(1985): 211–256.
10 “Origenes (für mich, wie einst für Erasmus, wichtiger als Augustinus) wurde zum
Schlüssel für die ganze griechische Patristik, das Frühmittelalter, bis ja hin zu
Origen as Hegel: The Notion of Aufhebung
285
text where Balthasar exposes a detailed connection between the two thinkers. The text is dense and synthetic, but allows for a complete understanding
of the link between these fundamental thinkers for Balthasar. Specifically,
the parallelism is drawn in Le Mysterion d’Origène on the term Aufhebung.
In this contribution I will present the meaning this term assumes, for
Balthasar, in the thought of Origen. Balthasar’s understanding of Aufhebung
(translated in the English edition as “sublation”) revolves around two fundamental notions: spirit and progress. These two terms are pivotal in the
thought of both Origen and Hegel, and it is on these two fundamental ideas
that Balthasar draws his analysis. Two interpretations of each notion can be
drawn in Balthasar’s work.
There are two possible interpretations of the notion of spirit, the first being
Titanism (I1), and the second what Balthasar calls “the law of love” (I2).
(I1) Titanism: the difference between the spirit of man and the spirit of God
is not clearly formulated; Origen did not allow the Logos to be Logos
but reduced him to the Pneuma; the goal of man is therefore to fight, as
the Titans did, to win the lost condition of gods.
(I2) The law of love: in Origen’s words on God’s sacrifice for humanity,
Balthasar sees the overcoming of Titanism. Spirit is not conceived in
a tragic, dualistic way, but rather as the divine gift of love through
Christ.
A useful resource to understand Balthasar’s reflections on spirit is his interpretation of Maximus the Confessor as a “corrective” to Origen. For
Balthasar, Maximus’ reflection on movement solves the problematic risk of
Titanism ran by Origen.
The issue of movement introduces Balthasar’s reflection on the notion of
progress, to which he gives two possible interpretations:
(I1) Temporal progress: the pilgrimage of the soul on earth will end with
death and judgment; in the final condition there is no movement and
progress anymore.
(I2) Eternal progress: in the final condition progress and movement remain
present, although in a non-material form.
Reflecting on the idea of spiritual and ontological progress in Origen,
I will present these two interpretations as Balthasar exposes them. A useful
resource to understand the notion of progress is Balthasar’s interpretation of
Joachim of Fiore.
Hegel und Karl Barth.” H. U. von Balthasar, Zu seinem Werk, 2000, 76; eng. tr.
My work, 1993, 89.
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Elisa Zocchi
At the end of the exposition of the notions of spirit and of progress and of
their two possible interpretations, I will delve into the tension itself between
I1 and I2. This tension is visible not only in Origen but also in Balthasar
himself, who does not seem willing to let the tension be simply solved by
choosing a more “Hegelian” or less “Hegelian” Origen.
2. Aufhebung: The Shared Achievements
If one must pass a critical judgment of the whole of his [scil. Origen’s] theological
synthesis (…) we are tempted to compare it to that of Hegel, whose advantages as
well as whose dangers it seems to share. The idea of superseding, Aufhebung, seems
to us to be the nerve-centre of the two systems. With both authors, an obscurity
is refracted which is not accidental: the restoration of the world in God, of what
is material in what is spiritual, of symbol in truth, is the restitution of the original
state. Origen gives this cyclic movement an expression which is wholly mythical
and metaphorical; Hegel gives it a construction which is wholly intellectual. But the
basic idea has not changed.11
The first common feature between Origen and Hegel is the idea of the eschatological condition as the restitution of an original state. More than this lies,
however, behind the Aufhebung. Aufhebung means superseding the original condition by reaching a higher state that however still contains what
is superseded. Balthasar uses the example of the flesh in Origen: the flesh is
only a moment in the circular movement of eternity, a step. Nevertheless,
the flesh is not completely eliminated, exactly as the New Testament is not
simply spiritual, contra the letter of the Old Testament; rather it is the letter
pervaded with spirit. The question therefore becomes whether the material,
the letter, is overthrown or upheld. To find an answer we can move to the
other occurrences of the term Aufhebung in Balthasar’s work on Origen.
The term appears two times in Spirit and Fire and twice in Balthasar’s
personal notes.12 The first occurrence is in section II – Word, chapter Word
11 von Balthasar, 19572, 113. “S’il fallait porter un jugement critique sur l’ensemble
de cette synthèse théologique, - synthèse, du reste, trop schématique, trop rigide,
nous en convenons, pour l’esprit mobile d’Origène, - nous serions tenté de la
comparer à celle de Hegel, dont elle semble partager les avantages mais aussi les
dangers. L’idée de Aufhebung nous semble le nerf des deux systèmes. Chez les
deux auteurs, une obscurité non accidentelle s’y reflète: la restitution du monde
en Dieu, du matériel dans le spirituel, du symbole dans sa vérité, est la restitution
de l’état primitif. Origène donne de ce mouvement cyclique une expression toute
mythique et imagée, Hegel une construction tout intellectuelle. Mais l’idée de fond
ne varie pas.”
12 I express much gratitude to the Balthasar’s Archive in Basel, especially to Claudia
Müller, who allowed me to have access to and work on the preparatory material
to Origenes. Geist und Feuer.
Origen as Hegel: The Notion of Aufhebung
287
as Flesh, in the last paragraph, entitled The law of sublation (Das Gesetz der
Aufhebung). The second occurrence is in section III – Spirit, chapter Life in
the spirit, first paragraph (The Spiritual God).
3. The Law of Sublation
The whole objective salvation-historical event: the incarnation of the WORD in
scripture, in Christ and in his mystical body, the Church, stands under the same
formal basic law which is set forth here (in the Hegelian double meaning) as sublation [Aufhebung]. In the creaturely bipolarity of image and truth, the fundamental movement goes from the first to the second, from body to spirit. But this
takes place in such a way that the bodily image is both broken off and preserved.
Origen consistently expresses this event in the image of shining upon and being
shone upon. Old and new covenant, above all Moses and Christ, as well as John
and Christ stand in this relationship; but also the earthly Christ and the eternal
Christ, indeed the earthly Christ and the Church (to the extent that its fate is
symbolically represented in the life of Christ), and finally, the whole earthly salvation event (Moses-Christ-Church) and the eschatological, otherworldly, fulfilling event.13
Aufhebung is described as the formal basic law of Origen’s salvation-history,
and therefore of incarnation. Aufhebung describes in fact the movement
from the body to the spirit, from image to truth. This is not a simple overcoming: the body/image is both broken off and preserved in the spirit/truth.
Here we find the answer to the previous question: the material world is
not simply overthrown but upheld. As a way of example, Balthasar quotes
Origen’s Commentary to Romans 3,2: “No one of the saints nor the Lord
himself destroys the law; rather its temporal and transient glory is destroyed
and superseded by the eternal and perduring glory.” In virtue of this
13 von Balthasar, 1984, 175. “Das Gesetz der Aufhebung. Das gesamte objective
heilsgeschichtliche Geschehen: die ‘Inkarnation’ des WORTES in der Schrift, in
Christus und in Seinem mystischen Leibe, der Kirche, steht unter die gleichen formalen Grundgesetze, das hier als ‘Aufhebung’ (im Hegelschen Doppelsinn) herausgestellt wird. In der geschöpflichen Doppelpoligkeit von Gleichnis und Wahrheit
geht die Grundbewegung vom ersten zum zweiten, vom Körper zum Geist. Dies
aber so, dass das körperliche Gleichnis zugleich abgebrochen wird und bewahrt
bleibt. Origenes drückt dieses Geschenen durchgehends im Bild des Überstrahlens
und Überstrahltwerdens aus. In diesem Verhältnisse stehen Alter Bund und Neuer
Bund, vor allem Moses und Christus, Johannes und Christus. Aber auch der
irdische Christus und die Kirche (sofern deren Schicksal gleichnishaft im Leben
Christi dargestellt wurde), endlich das gesamte irdische Heilsgeschehen (MosesChristus-Kirche) und das eschatologische, jenseitige, erfüllende Geschehen.” von
Balthasar, 1938, 254 f.
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Elisa Zocchi
preservation we can speak of progress in Origen – otherwise we would have
a mere repetition of the beginning with no progress at all. The circularity of
the system tracked by Balthasar lies indeed in this Aufhebung: the movement
is “forwards” and not simply “back”.
Balthasar’s recognition of the Hegelian Aufhebung is visible also in his
interest for the Origenian topic of the spiritual senses and spiritual body. In
the eschatological condition the level of the letter/body is not simply physically lost, but spiritually elevated. The Aufhebung is therefore spiritual, not
ontological: the letter is elevated, not annihilated.
A confirmation of the importance of the Aufhebung is found in the drafts in
preparation to Spirit and Fire. In the aforementioned chapter Word as Flesh,
the very first section is Christ. This is once again divided into sections; the
first is Old covenant and new covenant, divided into two parts: Demolition
of what was preliminary (Abbruch des Vorläufigen) and The definitive in
what was preliminary (Das Engültige im Vorläufigen). The titles of these
sections in the draft are indeed, respectively, Negativ der Aufhebung and
Positiv der Aufhebung. In the section on the negative – i.e. on what is overthrown – Balthasar claims that “all the embodiment of the Word in scripture
is only preparation for his incarnation in the flesh”. In this sense, Christ is
not utterly a fulfilment of the Old Testament, but also a “rejection of the
people’s servitude to the letter.”14 The passages then quoted are texts on the
letter being broken, on the passage to spirit (HLv 2,2), and on Christ who
“destroys what seemed great on earth, and transferred the worship of God
from the visible to the invisible” (HNm 23,1).
In the section on the positive of Aufhebung Balthasar then shows that the
fulfilment is more than just rejection or destruction. The “definitive in what
was preliminary” implies that already the preliminary itself has a definitive
aspect, and it is destined somehow to remain.
But in the very demolition, the eternal form of the law comes to the fore. This form
is so much taken up with pointing to Christ and educating to him that the order of
salvation itself encompasses and contains both. Law is thus understood as in transition, but can be brought to completion only through Christ. In Christ, the dead
letter has become thundering word, Moses and Elias take up into him. Christ, in
fulfilling the types, is only taking back what is his own: even the just ones of the old
covenant are already members of his mystical body.15
14 von Balthasar, 1984, 113. “Das ganze Verleibung des WORTS in der Schrift ist
nur Wegbereitung Seiner Menschwerdung im Fleische. […] Christus ist nicht nur
Erfüllung als Überholung des Gleichnisses, sondern Erfüllung als Verwerfung des
buchstabendienenden Volkes.” von Balthasar, 1938, 173.
15 von Balthasar, 1984, 117. “Aber im Abbruch selbst tritt die Ewigkeitsgestalt des
Gesetzes hervor. Diese Gestalt hat es in seiner Hinweisbeziehung zu Christus, als
Erziehung zu Ihm in, so sehr, dass die Heilsordnung beides umspannt und in sich
Origen as Hegel: The Notion of Aufhebung
289
Through Christ, the Old Testament and the entire order of salvation are
not simply destroyed, but contained and brought “back” to him. Balthasar
reports passages on the transfiguration (HLv 6,2; CMt 12,43), where Origen
explains the presence of Moses and Elias in the glory of Christ as the inclusion and elevation of the law in the revelation. These passages show what
Balthasar considers an achievement of both Origen and Hegel: the idea of
progress as preservation of what is upheld and not as merely surpassing
something negative.
4. Life in the Spirit
We can now move to the second occurrence, in the following section
(III – Spirit).
Jesus said, if I do not go away, the Holy Spirit will not come to you. If the whole
sense-perceivable and sacramental salvation-event does not get “sublated” [aufge
hoben], it has failed to fulfil its purpose, namely, to be internalized as life within
souls. This internal appropriating of the revelation of the WORD as SPIRIT is the
re-forming of a sinful, fleshly human being into a temple of God the Father.
Only in Christianity did it become clear what it really means to say God is a Spirit.
The Holy Spirit is the heart of the mystery of the Christian idea of God: Spirit as
person. The Holy Spirit is a co-agent in the salvation-event and dispenses grace.
This is a straightening up of the warped human being, entrance into God’s intimacy,
inner life, prayer, divine wisdom, that union with God whose first fruit was Christ,
guaranty of beatitude.
Everywhere then, as in Paul, Irenaeus, Justin, and most of the theologians before
Origen, as a result of the theory of the triple division of the human being, the Holy
Spirit and the human spirit overlap without sharp boundaries. Now Origen did
expressly emphasize their difference. However, the idea of grace as a participation
of the human spirit in the divine and as a living indwelling of the divine in the
human spirit makes this border fluid. That is why Origen and the majority of the
great Greek Fathers speak so often of “divinization”.16
fasst. Gesetz wird also begriffen um Übergehen, dies aber kann nur durch Christus
vollzogen werden. In Christus ist der tote Buchstabe tönendes Wort geworden,
Moses und Elias in Ihn hinein vergangen. Christus nimmt, indem Er die Sinnbilder
erfüllt, damit nur das Seine in Sich zurück: durch die Gerechten des Alten Bundes
sind schon Glieder Seines mystischen Leibes.” H. U. von Balthasar, Geist und
Feuer, 1938, 179.
16 von Balthasar, 1938, 183. “Jesus hat gesagt: Wenn ich nicht hingehe, so wird der
Heilige Geist nicht zu euch kommen. Wenn das gesamte sinnbildliche und sakramentale Heilsgeschehen nicht aufgehoben wird, dann hat es seinen Sinn nicht
erfüllt: sich als Leben in den Seelen zu verinnerlichen. Diese innere Aneignung der
Offenbarung des WORTES als GEIST ist die Umbildung des sündigen, fleischlichen Menschen zu einem Tempel Gottes des Vaters. Der folgende Teil schildert
diese Neugestaltung in ihrem Werden und ihren Stufen, der Schlußteil (‟Gott”)
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Elisa Zocchi
In this passage Balthasar clearly recognises that the purpose of the entire
worldly history of salvation is to be upheld and finally internalised within
the soul.17 We reach one of the fundamental elements of Origen’s thought,
the idea of divinisation: the internal appropriation of the revelation makes
the human being a temple of the spirit.
After this first overture on the occurrences of Aufhebung in Balthasar’s
texts on Origen, we can delve into its use, specifically in the understanding of
two concepts: spirit and progress. Both notions present a tension in Origen
that Balthasar addresses in the above mentioned Epilogue of Le Mysterion
d’Origène. Starting from the notion of spirit, I will present the two elements in tension, in order then to show how the same tension is mirrored
in the issue of progress. I will call the first element of the tension I1 and the
second I2.
5. The Notion of Spirit
The Shared Risks: Titanism and Daimonic Struggle (I1)
The “overlapping” of Holy and human spirit is one of the most complex
doctrines in Origen’s theology, which Balthasar oversimplifies with “Origen
did expressly emphasize the difference.”18 In the very same passage, however,
he also acknowledges that “the idea of grace as a participation of the human
spirit in the divine and as a living indwelling of the divine in the human
spirit makes this border fluid.”19 Later in time, he similarly acknowledges
wird das Eintreten der Seele in das Reich GOTTES, des Vaters, beschreiben. Erst
im Christentum wurde offenbar, was das wirklich heißt: Gott ist ein Geist. Der
Heilige Geist ist das Herzgeheimnis der christlichen Gottesidee: Geist als Person.
Der Heilige Geist wirkt mit beim Erlösungsgeschehen und spendet die Gnade.
Diese ist Aufrichtung des verkrümmten Menschen, Eintritt in die Vertraulichkeit
Gottes, inneres Leben, Gebet, göttliche Weisheit, jene Einigung mit Gott, deren
Erstling Christus war, Pfand der Seligkeit. Überall also gehen, wie schon bei Paulus,
Irenäus, Justin und den meisten Theologen vor Origenes, infolge der Lehre von
der Dreiteilug des Menschen, der Heilige Geist und der Menschengeist ohne starre
Grenze ineinander über. Zwar hat Origenes ausdrücklich ihre Unterscheidung
betont. Aber die Idee der Gnade als Teilnahme des menschlichen Geistes am
Göttlichen und als lebendige Einwohnung des Göttlichen im menschlichen Geiste
macht diese Grenze gleichsam flüssig Darum spricht Origenes und die Mehrzahl
der großen griechischen Väter so oft von ‘Vergottung’.” von Balthasar, 1938, 265 f.
17 All the passages quoted in this section are on the line of the famous Origenian
statement “what good is it to me if the Word comes to dwell in the world, but
I have no part in him?”
18 Cfr. n.16.
19 Cfr. n.16.
Origen as Hegel: The Notion of Aufhebung
291
the overlapping of divine and human spirit as a shared risk between Origen
and Hegel: “Hegel did not permit the Spirit to be Spirit: he reduced him to
the Logos, just as Origen did not allow the Logos to be Logos but reduced
him to the Pneuma.”20 For Balthasar, this fluid notion of spirit is the first risk
shared by Origen and Hegel. The fluid and loose border between human
and divine spirit in both Origen and Hegel produces the transformation of
the idea of spiritual progress into what Balthasar calls Titanism. Titanism is
the most important element behind the risks shared by Origen and Hegel in
Balthasar’s “genealogical” approach to the notion of spirit.
In Origen’s cosmology, man acquires a body as a consequence of the fall.
In this sense, the earthly life is described by Balthasar, following Maximus
the Confessor, with the term πεῖρα.
The metaphysics of Origen’s On First Principles was a metaphysics of πεῖρα: a necessary, if also painful, ‘experience’ of sin and distance from God. This seemed to be
the only way to imbue the soul with enough of a sense of dependency, and of longing for the lost blessings it once had, to prevent it - at least for a long time - from
falling away from God again. We have shown elsewhere how much this theory is
influenced by Origen’s intellectualism and from the old Platonic tradition of the
daimons.21
Balthasar is referring to the epilogue of Le Mysterion d’Origène, where he
tracks the common feature at the basis of the idea of Aufhebung in both
Origen and Hegel: the Greek daimon. In both systems “something of the
Greek daimon survives: the struggle and its beauty have an absolute value.
So, the world and God remain in a secret but tragic opposition.”22 “Over
and over, down to Hegel and Bardjaev, this speciously deep thought was
20 “Aber Hegel hat den Geist nicht Geist sein lassen, sondern ihn auf den Logos
reduziert, ähnlich wie Origenes den Logos nicht Logos sein ließ, sondern ihn
auf das Pneuma reduzierte.” H. U. von Balthasar, Spiritus Creator, Einsiedeln
1988, 104; eng. tr. Explorations in Theology III – Creator Spirit, San Francisco
1993, 115.
21 von Balthasar, 2003, 129. “Die Metaphysik des Peri Archon war in der Tat
eine Metaphysik der πεῖρα, das heißt der notwendigen, wenn auch schmerzlichen ‘Erfahrung’ der Sünde und der Gottferne. Nur so schien eine genügende
Anhänglichkeit und Sehnsucht nach dem verlassenen Urguten der Seele eingeflößt
werden zu können, die sie – wenigstens für lange – vor einem erneuten Abfall von
Gott zu bewahren vermöchte. Wir zeigten anderswo, wie sehr diese Lehre vom
Intellektualismus Origenes’ und von alter platonischer Dämonie beeinflußt ist.”
von Balthasar, 31988, 125.
22 “[…] survit quelque chose du δαίμων grec pour qui la lutte et sa beauté ont un
sens absolu, pour qui donc le monde et Dieu doivent rester en une secrète mais
tragique opposition.” von Balthasar, 1957, 114.
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Elisa Zocchi
to haunt Christian metaphysics: that love without pain and guilt remains
simply a joke, a game.”23
What does Balthasar mean with Greek daimon? The main feature of this
“old Platonic tradition” is for Balthasar the reduction of the notion of eros.
Movement is thought of as the attempt to overcome the distance between
subject and object without any acceptance of this distance as positively
given. This distance is not given by a creator, and therefore valuable in and
of itself, but rather something to eliminate with human strength, through
the pain of the ascent. The connection between spiritualism and Titanism is
clear: if the divine and human spirits are identical, man is nothing else than
a göttliche Funke, as Balthasar elsewhere recognises in Origenism.24 In this
sense, the love for God is nothing else than a struggle to go back to an original, lost condition of Gods – exactly as the Titans. The struggle assumes an
absolute value, rather than being only a medium to reach God. Balthasar
elsewhere accuses Origen of Titanism:
Origen, who otherwise can look right into the eye and the heart of scriptural texts
with incomparable candor, not uncommonly, before the decisive words about the
“folly of the cross”, the “helplessness” and the “weakness” of the Christian, begins
to blink and squint. For, like so many today, he confuses in the end the heroic and
the Christian. The heroic is an exalted form of the natural virtue; the Christian,
however, is the supernatural form of the death and resurrection of Christ extended
to the whole natural world of values.25
The categories of “Titanism” and “heroic” point to the same features – the
reduction of the supernatural intervention of God and the principle of human
virtue as the only element at play in the divinisation of man. Balthasar’s
reference to “so many today” provides evidence to the legitimacy of the
23 von Balthasar, 2003, 130. “Immer wieder, bis auf Hegel und Bardjajew, wird dieser
scheintiefe Gedanke in der christlichen Metaphysik sein Wesen treiben, dass die
Liebe ohne Schmerz und Schuld nur ein Scherz und ein Spiel bleibe.” von Balthasar,
1988, 125.
24 H. U. von Balthasar, Patristik, Scholastik und wir, in: Theologie der Zeit 1939
n.3, 65–104 (70); eng. tr. H. U. von Balthasar, The Fathers, the Scholastics, and
Ourselves, in: Communio 1997, 347–396 (354).
25 H. U. von Balthasar, Spirit and Fire, 1984, 18, italics added. “Origenes, der sonst
mit unvergleichlichem Freimut den Schrifttexten ins Auge und ins Herz zu schauen
weiß, beginnt nicht selten vor den entscheidenden Worten von der ‘Torheit des
Kreuzes’, der ‘Ohnmacht’ und ‘Schwäche’ des Christen, gleichsam zu blinzeln und
zu schielen. Denn wie heute so manche verwechselt er im Letzten das Heldische
und das Christliche. Das Heldische ist ein erhabener natürlicher Tugendwert, das
Christliche dagegen ist die über die ganze natürliche Wertewelt gebreitete übernatürliche Form des Todes und der Auferstehung Christi”. H. U. von Balthasar,
Geist und Feuer, 1938, 37.
Origen as Hegel: The Notion of Aufhebung
293
connection between “Titanism” and “heroic”. If we look at Balthasar’s production in this time, we will notice that in 1937, exactly between the publication of Le Mysterion d’Origène and Geist und Feuer, Balthasar publishes
the first volume of his revised and expanded doctoral dissertation on the
eschatological principle in German culture: Apokalypse der deutschen Seele.
Studien zu einer Lehre von letzten Haltungen.26 In 1947, the same work will
be edited again with no changes in content but with a different, significant
title - Prometheus. Studien zur Geschichte des deutschen Idealismus.27 The
myth of Prometheus is fundamental to understanding Balthasar’s approach
to idealism and especially to Hegel, “Schlußgestalt der Prometheus-Welt.”28
The fact that Balthasar, writing on Origen, refers to the heroic, proves that
the connection between these two interests of his study is more than merely
chronological. If we examine a later definition of Titanism, it becomes even
clearer:
In all forms of Titanism, ultimately, the person is sacrificed. This is also what happens in Hegel, even though in him alone reason and spirit remain the all-embracing
reality. Hegel is able to describe in the most graphic terms the lower level of individual existence, of the subjective spirit linked to a body, of the heart with its anticipatory intimations, of a consciousness initially imprisoned within itself; but in the
end, after all, the individual standpoint must be abandoned, for reconciliation is
brought about by the objective Spirit, and it allows no absolute claims to challenge
the all-embracing reality. The claim of the individual man, Jesus Christ, cannot be
ultimate in the Hegelian system but only symbolic. But the principle of the system
itself is drawn from Johannine theology.29
26 H. U. von Balthasar, Apokalypse der deutschen Seele. Studien zu einer Lehre von
letzten Haltungen. Bd. I: Der deutsche Idealismus, Salzburg 1937.
27 H. U. von Balthasar, Prometheus. Studien zur Geschichte des deutschen Idealismus,
Heidelberg 1947. A third edition is edited by Johannes Verlag in 1998.
28 H. U. von Balthasar, Apokalypse der deutschen Seele. Studien zu einer Lehre von
letzten Haltungen. Bd. I: Der deutsche Idealismus, Einsiedeln 31998, 611.
29 H. U. von Balthasar, TheoDrama. Theological Dramatic Theory. Vol. 2. Dramatis
Personae: Man in God, San Francisco 1990, 423. “In allen Formen des Titanismus
wird in letzter Folge die Person geopfert. Sie zerglüht im Bauch des Moloch des
Absoluten, mag dieser der Wille oder das Leben oder der Tod sein. Sie zerglüht
auch bei Hegel, dem als einzigem die Vernunft, der Geist, das Umfassende bleibt. Hegel kann die unteren Stufen des individuellen Daseins, des leibverbundenen subjektiven Geistes, des Herzens mit seinen antezpierenden Ahnungen, des
zunächst in sich selbst gefangenen Bewußstseins aufs anschaulichste beschreiben,
aber schließlich muß der Einzelstandpunkt doch aufgegeben werden, der objektive
Geist ist das Versöhnende, der keine Absolutheitsansprüche dem Umfassenden
gegenüber duldet. Der Anspruch des einzelnen Menschen Jesus Christus kann
in Hegelschen System kein endgültiger, sondern nur ein symbolischer sein.
Aber das Systemprinzip ist aus johanneischer Theologie hergeleitet.” H. U. von
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Elisa Zocchi
The same is stated in Apokalypse I, where Balthasar, analysing the kind of
unity brought by the Spirit, claims that in Hegel this unity is given by knowledge, in an openly Titanic way. It is important to understand Balthasar’s
interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy as a speculative Valentinian gnosis,
which he derives from Baur.30 It is exactly this Gnosticism that brings
Origen closer to Hegel in Balthasar’s reading. In fact, Balthasar considers
Hegelian metaphysics under three genealogical categories: Neo-Platonic
(in its Proclean form), apocalyptic (in its Joachimist form), and Gnostic (in
its Valentinian form). These genealogical categories “are used to describe
German Idealism and its theological trajectory which, for Balthasar, functions as a major derailment of Christian theology precisely because it seems
to be so respectful to Christianity and to speak its language so well.”31 It is
of primary importance to notice that these elements appear in a very similar shape in Balthasar’s consideration of Origen – in both their positive
and in their problematic features. I will show Balthasar’s admission of a
possible Joachimite reading of Origen’s eschatology of progress – and how
Balthasar characterises Joachimism as a pneumatic, “Jewish-Gentile” form
of Gnosticism.32 Furthermore, much could be said about the idealistic reading of Neo-Platonism popular in France in the years of Balthasar’s formation,
the major example being Émile Bréhier. As for Gnosticism, Balthasar’s reading of the intellectualistic and Titanic tendency in Origen’s concept of progress is clearly connected to his consideration of a certain gnostic tendency.
We can now move a step further in the analysis of Aufhebung. Behind the
idea of a synthesis that is never to be reached is for Balthasar the concept
of movement. This consideration is drawn in comparison with Maximus
Balthasar, Theodramatik. Bd. II: Die Personen des Spiels, 1. Teil: Der Mensch in
Gott, Einsiedeln 1976, 388. Interestingly, Balthasar affirms: “such a principle is
unknown in the ancient world. (…) The Faustian, Promethean attitude, which
dominates the Age of Idealism, draws its nourishment from the anthropological
heightening of tension introduced by Christianity”. Ibi, 421. “Ein solches Prinzip
ist der alten Welt unbekannt. (…) Das Faustisch-Prometheische, dass das Zeitalter
des Idealismus beherrscht, zehrt von den anthropologischen Überspannungen, die
das Christentum eingeführt hat.” H. U. von Balthasar, Theodramatik. Bd. II: Die
Personen des Spiels, 1. Teil: Der Mensch in Gott, Einsiedeln 1976, 386.
30 C. O’Regan, Balthasar and Gnostic genealogy, in: Modern Theology 22/4 (2006),
609–650; id., Gnostic Return in Modernity, Albany 2001; id., Von Balthasar and
Thick Retrieval: PostChalcedonian Symphonic Theology, in: Gregorianum 77/2
(1996), 227–260.
31 O’Regan, 2006, 624 f. O’Regan then asks whether one of these categories is “more
disclosive, more alethic”; his answer will be Gnosticism.
32 H. U. von Balthasar, TheoDrama. Theological Dramatic Theory. Vol. 4. The
Action, Einsiedeln 1994, 446.
Origen as Hegel: The Notion of Aufhebung
295
the Confessor, who strongly criticises the spiritualism accepted by many
Origenists. The reasons behind the choice of looking at Maximus are two.
First, in the chapter of the Kosmische Liturgie Balthasar once again openly
relates Origen and Hegel. Secondly, the pivotal points of this connection are
the issues of spirit and progress.
6. A Useful Resource: Maximus the Confessor
in the Kosmische Liturgie
While motion, for Origen, rested completely on the creature’s undetermined
freedom of will, and while this freedom, due to its extreme instability, was doomed
to plunge the creature sooner or later into sin, for Maximus motion is fundamentally an orientation of nature, which as such is good. The freedom of the creature is
no longer elevated to some quasidivine height and left there completely by itself; it
rests on the solid base of nature, whose previously indicated direction it simply has
to realize for itself.33
Balthasar considers motion, in Origen, as a concept associated only to the
creature’s undetermined freedom of will. This freedom is unstable because of
a weak orientation of nature towards the good. Or, we could say, in light of
what he stated on Titanism, it is because of the victory of the Greek daimonic
over goodness in itself. In this interpretation of the spirit, God and the world
(i.e. the pre- and post-lapsarian conditions) are dialectically opposed: the
pre-lapsarian condition seems to be fully known as good only in virtue of the
post-lapsarian painful experience. Therefore, the current earthly condition
is only dialectically established from the thesis as a result of the freedom of
choice of the rational creature. Balthasar quotes Maximus’s famous critique
of Origenism in a passage that clearly focuses on this point:
If they say to us that the intellects could have [scil. adhered to the divine goodness],
but simply would not do so, because they wanted to experience something different,
then Beauty, in their eyes, would not be a good necessarily worth desiring simply
because of itself, because it is beautiful, but would only be [scil. desirable] because
of its opposite - not as something loveable absolutely, through its own nature.34
33 von Balthasar, 2003, 130, italics added. “Während Bewegung bei Origenes ganz
auf der indifferenten Wahlfreiheit des Geschöpfs beruhte und diese es bei ihrer
äußersten Labilität früher oder später unvermeidlich in Schuld stürzen mußte, ist
Bewegung bei Maximus auf einer Sinnrichtung der Natur gegründet, die als solche
eine gute ist. Die Freiheit des Geschöpfs ist nicht mehr in eine quasi-göttliche Höhe
emporgetrieben und ganz allein auf sich selbst gestellt, sie ruht auf einem Grund
von Natur auf, deren vorgezeichnete Richtung sie nur mitzuvollziehen hat.” von
Balthasar, 1988, 126.
34 Balthasar quotes from PG 91, 1069C.
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Elisa Zocchi
For this reason Balthasar sees Origen, together with Hegel, as a thinker of
progress in the sense of Aufhebung: they both fall into the temptation of
considering being-with-God only dialectically good - not desirable in and
of itself, but because of the experience of its opposite. The final synthesis is
achieved only because of the antithesis, and not in virtue of its desirability
in se. In Origen(ism), motion is negative, as Balthasar continuously states in
Cosmic Liturgy: it is because of motion that the rational creatures fell away
from God.35 On the contrary, Balthasar explains, in Maximus freedom rests
on the solid ground of nature: God shaped the rational creatures already
in movement to be with him – motion as such is good. The problem for
Balthasar lies in the notion of beginning. “Maximus – like Origen – was
convinced of the finitude of all motion, both in the [scil. material] world and
in the wider realm of the aeon. Yet their convictions had different reasons
behind them. For Origen, motion was connected with the fall, while for
Maximus it was an ontological expression of created existence.”36 While
motion for Maximus is natural, for Origen and this first interpretation it
is not.
The problem is the confusion of stability as the product of becoming and
movement as the product of stability. For Maximus it is clear: stability is not
a potential condition of becoming, but rather the end stage of the realisation of a potency that must be already contained in the creature. Stability
is the contradictory of motion, not of becoming. For this reason, stability
for him can only be the end-point of the process, and absolutely different
from the beginning, which can only be “becoming”. The relation between
rest and movement is therefore in Maximus triadic: coming to be – move
ment – coming to rest. Movement (freedom) is up to man, but comes from a
divine initiative (coming to be). In this structure, motion is a consequence of
the first moment, the coming-to-be initiated by God. “The middle concept
35 One further example: “In Origen there is also a connection between number
and movement: the latter is simply the philosophical name for sin and the fall.
For that reason, movement is only an unnatural condition of the creature, something that will ultimately end; the very numerical sequence strives to return to a
unity that is above number”. H. U. von Balthasar, Cosmic Liturgy, 2003, 107.
“Nun besteht freilich auch bei Origenes […] ein Zusammenhang zwischen Zahl
und Bewegung: diese letztere ist nichts als der philosophische Name für Sünde und
Abfall. Darum ist Bewegung nur ein naturwidriger und aufzuhebender Zustand
des Geschöpfes, der Lauf der Zahl strebt in die überzahlenhafte Einheit zurück.”
von Balthasar, 1988, 101 f.
36 von Balthasar, 2003, 141. “Maximus […] mit Origenes von der Endlichkeit
aller Welt- und äonischen Bewegung überzeugt war. Freilich aus verschiedenen
Gründen: für Origenes war Bewegung an Abfall geknüpft, für Maximus ist sie
ontologischer Ausdruck des Geschaffenseins.” von Balthasar, 1988, 136.
Origen as Hegel: The Notion of Aufhebung
297
of these three, movement, expresses the insight that although the origin and
goal, the coming to be and the coming to rest, of finite being are in themselves identical, they are not identical for finite being.”37 This non-identity is
for Maximus a certain distance (Abstand, διάστημα) in the finite being itself,
and it is in virtue of this undeniable distance that movement continues. The
reason for Maximus’ ability to integrate movement as a positive element in
his system is the Aristotelian concept of ἐνέργεια, of a natural activity of the
substance. “As soon as motion (kinesis) is no longer seen simply (in Platonic
fashion) as a sinful falling away but is seen (in Aristotelian fashion) as the
good ontological activity of a developing nature, the highest ideal [scil. for
existence] can also be transformed from a Gnosis that conquers the world
by seeing through its reality into a loving, inclusive affirmation even of finite
things”.38 For Balthasar, Origen lacks this affirmation of finitude because of
a lacking Aristotelian ἐνέργεια.39
We can now read Origen’s and Maximus’ notion of movement in Hegelian
terms. In Origen the triadic movement is the opposite of Maximus’: stasis
(pre-lapsarian condition), kinesis (movement, the fall), genesis (becoming,
the earthly life). The antithesis (movement) is established by the thesis (stability), but the reason for the transition to the synthesis (the earthly life)
is only dialectical: there is no real distance between rest and becoming,
since stability is not the contradictory of becoming, but of motion. Indeed,
freedom in the pre-lapsarian condition and freedom as movement (fall
and post-lapsarian) is the same (with the exception of the burden of the
flesh). Origen does not set a distance between becoming and movement.
Consequently, he assimilates becoming and rest: the result is a tragic restlessness. On the contrary, for Maximus becoming is a fundamental element
(thesis): it is the beginning of every movement. Its antithesis (movement)
is its natural (and not dialectical) development, making the synthesis (rest)
37 von Balthasar, 2003, 137. “Der mittlere Begriff dieser Dreiheit, die Bewegung,
drückt aus, dass, obwohl der Ursprung und das Ziel, der Entstand und der
Stillstand des endlichen Seins, an sich identisch sind, sie es doch nicht für das
endliche Sein selbst sind.” von Balthasar, Kosmische Liturgie, 1988, 132.
38 von Balthasar, 2003, 135, italics added. “Sobald die Kinesis nicht mehr (platonisch) schuldhafter Abfall, sondern (aristotelisch) gute Seinsbewegung einer sich
entfaltenden Natur ist, kann das oberste Ideal sich aus einer Gnosis überwindenen
Durchschauens in die Agape wahrenden Bejahens auch der Endlichkeiten verwandeln.” von Balthasar, Kosmische Liturgie, 1988, 130.
39 For a detailed comparison of the notion of perpetual progress in Gregory of
Nyssa and Maximus the Confessor in relation to Origenism see P. M. Blowers,
Maximus the Confessor, Gregory of Nyssa, and the Concept of Perpetual Progress,
in: Vigiliae Christ. 46/2 (June, 1992), 151–171.
298
Elisa Zocchi
the natural contradictory of the antithesis (movement). There is no dialectical opposition here, but an Abstand, διάστημα, given by earthly movement
(specifically, time and space). Since movement is a natural development of
the beginning, and not its dialectical antithesis, it is not merely negative,
but a positive development. The lack of this Abstand makes Origenism, for
Balthasar, a “Tragizismus”40: there is no distance between becoming and
rest. If these are contemporary, movement is clearly negative and not natural
anymore. The connection is clearly drawn by Balthasar: “we have shown
elsewhere how much this theory is influenced by Origen’s intellectualism and
from the old Platonic tradition of the daimons.”
To conclude, two elements of this analysis are in line with Balthasar’s idea
of Titanism: the metaphysics of experience as the idea that “love without
pain and guilt remains simply a joke, a game”41 and the tragic eternal opposition of rest and movement.42 Ultimately, the problem is given by the dialectic position of the antithesis to the thesis itself: becoming (antithesis) is
not given by God, but by an absolute human freedom, in the falling away
from God (movement). The experience of becoming is therefore a necessary
experience to appropriate one-self, a titanic struggle. Because of the coexistence of becoming and rest, the experience (movement) is not loved as a gift,
but a negative moment to fight against. In this titanic struggle, we see the
element that brought Balthasar to compare Origen to Sartre.
In resisting Gnosticism and determinism, Origen takes up an extreme position that
formally brings him close to modern views like those of Secrétan or Sartre: the
creature is identical with freedom (that is, finite freedom, the freedom to choose),
and so in preexistence all souls are essentially identical; they only attain their own
particular nature on the basis of their decision.43
40 von Balthasar, 1988, 124.
41 von Balthasar, 2003, 130. “Immer wieder, bis auf Hegel und Bardjajew, wird dieser
scheintiefe Gedanke in der christlichen Metaphysik sein Wesen treiben, dass die
Liebe ohne Schmerz und Schuld nur ein Scherz und ein Spiel bleibe.” H. U. von
Balthasar, Kosmische Liturgie, 1988, 125. Balthasar refers here to G. W. F. Hegel,
Phänomenologie des Geistes, Leipzig 1907, 13. As for Origen, Balthasar quotes
here passages as “for it is not possible to get to the other side without enduring
the temptations of waves and contrary wind”. Or., CMt 11, 5–6.
42 von Balthasar, 2003, 129. “Wir zeigte anderswo, wie sehr diese Lehre vom
Intellektualismus Origenes’ und von alter platonischer Dämonie beeinflußt ist.”
von Balthasar, Kosmische Liturgie, 1988, 125.
43 von Balthasar, 1990, 218. “Origenes geht, immer in der gleichen Abwehrbewegung,
bis in ein Extrem, das ihn formal modernen Standpunkten wie dem Secrétans oder
Sartre annähert: das Geschöpf ist identisch mit (endlicher, also Wahl-)Freiheit,
deshalb sind in der Präexistenz alle Seelen wesensgleich und gewinnen ihre besondere Natur erst aufgrund ihrer Entscheidung.” von Balthasar, 1976, 197.
Origen as Hegel: The Notion of Aufhebung
299
Movement is nothing more than freedom (“elevated to some quasi-divine
height and left there completely by itself”); the consequence of this movement/freedom is becoming (experience, πεῖρα), which is the only way through
which the creature experiences the radical positivity of the rest-in-God. This
positivity is only dialectically experienced. Freedom is therefore ambiguous,
as in Sartre: the earthly condition is a consequence of an act of freedom, and
at the very same time a necessary experience.
The difference between this “Hegelian” Origen and Maximus is summarised by Balthasar: “A chasm separates Maximus from Hegel. For with
Hegel, the struggle is itself the basis of synthesis; but with Maximus everything depends on a prior, unconstrained, free act of the person who steers the
struggle from above and on the voluntary character of that person’s ineffable
self-immolation.”44 In Maximus, the origin of becoming lies in a free divine
act, in the divine initiative. In this Hegelian Origen, on the contrary, the
divine initiative does not find an adequate space.
After the comparison between Origen and Maximus, Balthasar suggests
that “with [t]his reinterpretation, the Origenist philosophy of ‘experiencing
the opposite’ as a way of coming to know the good is refuted in its demonic
aspect, while its central truth is assimilated.”45 What is the central truth of
this metaphysics of experience? Despite apparently following Maximus in
his critique of Origen, in fact, Balthasar has a different perspective on the
issue, showing that what Maximus formulates is nothing else than the development of seeds already present in Origen.
7. Surpassing Hegel: The Law of Love (I2)
Behind Titanism in Origen lies a central truth. The second part of the
Epilogue of Le Mysterion d’Origène hints at this central truth. Here, after a
long passage on the similarities between Hegel and Origen, Balthasar makes
a list of the elements that brought Origen to surpass Hegel and, in general,
the daimonic tendency.
1. “The text that describes the final unity between God and the creature
come from an inspiration that is far from the ancient Greek genius”;
44 von Balthasar, 2003, 268 f. “Von Hegel trennt ihn ein Abgrund. Denn bei Hegel
begründet der Kampf selbst die Synthesis, bei Maximus bleibt alles aufgehängt an
einem vorgängigen, souveränen und freien Akt der Person, der von oben her den
Kampf lenkt, und an der Freiwilligkeit ihrer unaussprechlichen Vernichtigung.”
von Balthasar, 1988, 266.
45 von Balthasar, 2003, 135 f., italics added. “Damit ist die origenistische ‘Philosophie
der Erfahrung des Gegenteils’ als Weg zur Erkenntnis des Guten in ihrer Dämonie
überwunden, in ihrem wahren Kerne aber angeeignet.” von Balthasar, 1988, 131.
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Elisa Zocchi
2. “the unforgettable experience of the sin”;
3. “the eternal memory of the Passion (CIo 2,4)”;
4. “especially the deep awareness of the law of love: ‘no satiety of the good
should ever seize us, but the more we perceive of its blessedness, the more
the desire for it in us should be expanded and extended.’ (princ. I,3,8)”
These four elements make it possible for Origen to surpass Titanism and the
daimonic tendency: “the eternally tragic and dualistic Eros leaves room to
the love of Christ.”46
These four elements show the relation between God and man, not anymore as a tragic dialectic opposition, but as a dramatic game of two freedoms.
Every element of necessity is given up, and freedom is fully at play – not only
on the human side, but also on the divine. In fact, they present the element of
human freedom in relation to divine freedom. (1) The final unity is achieved
by man in the relation between his freedom to follow Christ and the divine
freedom in dispensing grace. (2) The experience of sin is the consequence
of human freedom from the very beginning of creation. (3) The Passion is
the greatest exercise of divine freedom, specifically the freedom of the Son
in obeying the Father: the love of God for humanity, passio Caritatis, takes
the shape of the sacrifice of the unique Son so that we can become adoptive
children. (4) Freedom is continuously nourished by love: the more they experience the divine freedom of self-giving, the more creatures experience the
desire to be with him.
These elements allow the similarity between God and man to be kept in
their freedom (although being infinite for God and finite for man), while
not merging them in a unique spirit. In a certain sense, we can consider
46 “Non seulement les textes pathétiques qui décrivent l’unité finale entre Dieu et les
créatures sont issus d’une inspiration bien éloignée de l’ancien génie grec, mais
l’expérience inoubliable du péché, le souvenir éternel de la Passion, et avant tout
la connaissance profonde de la loi de l’amour – ”Plus nous connaissons cette béatitude éternelle, plus augmente et grandit en nous le désir que nous en avons…“,
- tout cela entraîne loin de Platon. L’Érôs éternellement tragique puisqu’il se nourrit
d’un dualisme a déjà cédé à l’Amour du Christ.” von Balthasar, 1957, 115. CIo
2,4 is a passage deeply loved by Balthasar. Here Origen remembers the importance
of the earthly suffering of Christ. “Now, in John’s vision, the Word of God as He
rides on the white horse is not naked: He is clothed with a garment sprinkled
with blood, for the Word who was made flesh and therefore died is surrounded
with marks of the fact that His blood was poured out upon the earth, when the
soldier pierced His side. For of that passion, even should it be our lot some day to
come to that highest and supreme contemplation of the Logos, we shall not lose
all memory, nor shall we forget the truth that our admission was brought about
by His sojourning in our body.”
Origen as Hegel: The Notion of Aufhebung
301
Balthasar’s reading of Origen in light of the analogia entis: the affinity
between divine and human spirit is not to be read as consubstantiality.47
Between the two there is a distance that is not simply a negative, though necessary, experience, but rather a difference that allows the ever greater dramatic play. Tragedy is therefore overcome by the free love of God, opening
up to a dramatic play. Already Balthasar recognises in Origen the element
that he attributed to Maximus in his overcoming Hegel: the “prior, unconstrained, free act of the person who steers the struggle from above and on
the voluntary character of that person’s ineffable self-immolation”48 – the
person being Christ.
We start seeing how the issue of progress emerges parallel to the issue of
spirit. The four elements show that the law of Aufhebung has to be understood not as a necessary development, but as a free progress. This connection is openly traced by Balthasar when, asking if there is “identity between
the divine Logos and the logos in us”, he answers:
There is infinite proximity, a proximity that allows the eternal movement, proximity
that the term παρ-ουσία reveals both as presence and to come (adventus, ἐπιδημία).
It is always present, but as someone who never ceases to come: “Christ’s words are
always fulfilled and at the same time on their way to fulfilment; every day they are
fulfilled and their fulfilment will never be exhausted” (CMt Ser 54). From this open
space, always filled and still always open, flows the eternal movement of the creature, feature not only of the anthropology of Gregory of Nyssa and of Augustine,
but already and fully of the anthropology of Origen.49
The creatures move in the open space between presence and “to-come”. The
question to face now is exactly that of progress: is this an eternal progress
or is it, as Maximus accused Origenism of, rather a progress limited to the
earthly condition? Will the progress cease once the creatures are reunited
with God, or does this παρουσία-feature reveal something of the ontological
structure of the creatures and, maybe, of the Creator himself?
47 Lettieri, 2005, 207.
48 Cfr. n. 44.
49 “Proximité infinie, mais qui permet le mouvement éternel, proximité que le terme
mystérieusement riche de l’Écriture παρ-ουσία (parousie) révèle comme étant à la
fois une ‘présence’ et un ‘avenir’ (adventus, ἐπιδημία). Il est toujours là, mais comme
quelqu’un qui ne cesse d’arriver: ‘Les paroles du Christ sont toujours accomplies
et en même temps en train de s’accomplir; chaque jour elle s’accomplissent et
leur accomplissement ne sera jamais achevé.’ C’est donc de cet intervalle toujours
comblé et toujours ouvert que naît ce mouvement éternel de la créature, qui ne
caractérise pas seulement l’anthropologie de Grégoire de Nysse et d’Augustin,
mais déjà pleinement celle d’Origène.” von Balthasar, 1957, 21 f.
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Elisa Zocchi
8. The Notion of Progress
Balthasar addresses Origen’s idea of progress in Le Mysterion d’Origène.
He considers the “historicity of the redemptive drama”: “the history of God
with humanity, figured in the life of Christ, phenomenic in the life of the
Church, and told in the Bible, is movement and act.”50 A few lines later,
Balthasar draws the clear connection with the Hegelian Aufhebung: “World
and individual history are abstract (in the Hegelian sense) in relation to the
big ‘aeonian and noumenal’ history (Bardjaev) that happens at the edge of
time and eternity, between God and the world. The Church suffering on
earth is nothing else than the Celestial Jerusalem.”51 Once again we see how
Balthasar finds a point of connection between Origen and Hegel, this time
concerning the notion of progress. As anticipated, Balthasar delves deeper in
this issue and asks: “does progress have a limit?”52
Balthasar analyses both the possibility of progress as temporal (I1) and
of progress as eternal (I2). The entire epilogue of Le Mysterion is in fact a
continuous back and forth. Not only, as we have seen, between two interpretations of spirit, but also on two opposite interpretations of progress.
These two possibilities are once again the centre of Balthasar’s comparison
of Origen with Hegel.
The first interpretation is that Origen limits progress to this life, while the
beginning and the end are moments of rest in/with God. This is suggested,
claims Balthasar, by some specific passages in Origen’s corpus.53 Following
this interpretation, “in the other world we will see God as He is; faith, the
free gift of self and foundation of all knowledge; hope, so strongly underlined; the role of suffering – these elements seem to find space only in this
temporary life.”54 This interpretation will become the major thesis of many
50 “L’histoire de Dieu avec l’humanité, figurée dans la vie du Christ, ‘phénoménale’
dans l’histoire de l’Église, racontée par la Bible, est mouvement et acte.” von
Balthasar, 1957, 72.
51 “C’est l’histoire extérieure et l’histoire individuelle qui sont ‘abstraites’ (au sens
hégélien de mot) par rapport à cette grande histoire ‘éonienne et nouménale’
(Berdiaeff) qui se déroule aux confins du temps et de l’éternité, entre Dieu et le
monde. L’Église qui souffre sur terre n’est autre que la Jérusalem céleste.” von
Balthasar, 1957, 73.
52 “Le progrès indéfini a-t-il une limite?”. von Balthasar, 1957, 23.
53 Or., Cels. 7.42; id., CRm 5,8.
54 “Certaines paroles d’Origène semblent le restreindre à cette vie. Dans l’autre
monde nous verrons Dieu comme il est. La foi, libre don de soi et fondement
de toute connaissance, l’espérance si fortement soulignée, le rôle dilatant de la
souffrance, tout cela ne semble avoir une place que dans cette vie passagère.“ von
Balthasar, 1957, 23 f.
Origen as Hegel: The Notion of Aufhebung
303
Origenists, stressing the temporal role of the actual aeon as a struggle to
go back to the pre-lapsarian condition of stasis. This is also the kind of
Origenism that, as we have seen, Maximus the Confessor criticised and tried
to overcome with his system. Balthasar, however, opens a second interpretation: “other expressions show that the eternity itself is a progress.”55
“There is no change and no end in the love of God” (CCt 3). The new chalice that
Christ promised to drink with us will be eternally new: ‘because the knowledge of
the secrets and the revelation of the mysteries are always renewed by the Wisdom
of God, not only for men, but also for angels and celestial virtues’ (CCt 2); the
gnostic already possesses, Origen always searches (cfr. CRm 4,6); God always hides
in order to awaken our desire (cfr. CCt 2).56
Balthasar claims that if this second interpretation is correct, “Origen is not
breaking the tradition that goes from Iraeneus to Gregory of Nyssa.”57 In
this sense, progress and movement are included in eternity, and not reserved
to the present condition as a way of punishment. We can now analyse
Balthasar’s two interpretations.
9. Temporal Progress: Origenism and Hegel (I1)
Paradoxically, the idea of daimonic struggle (I1) is not connected, as one
might initially think, to an eternal progress, but only to a temporal one. If
we start from the idea of the human spirit as a divine sparkle fallen away
from a static pre-lapsarian total unity with God, Maximus would be right: if
the creatures fell once, there is not enough fascination and goodness in God
to keep them from falling again. In this sense, the virtuous dynamism of
Aufhebung is limited to the earthly aeons and is not able to be maintained
in the eschatological condition, since the eschatological condition has to be
the complete rest in God. The titanic struggle is unable to be transferred to
the eschatological level: the struggle remains continuous in the many aeons,
but never truly eternal (in God). As rest in God was discovered as good only
dialectically, once the antithesis will be overcome, movement will not be
55 “Mais d’autre paroles montrent assez que l’éternité même est un progrès.” von
Balthasar, 1957, 24.
56 “Mais d’autre paroles montrent assez que l’éternité même est un progrès: ‘Il n’y a
aucun changement ni aucune fin dans l’amour de Dieu’. Le ‘nouveau calice’ que
le Christ a promis de boire avec nous sera éternellement nouveau: ‘Car toujours se
renouvellent la connaissance des secrets et la révélation des arcanes par la Sagesse
de Dieu, non seulement aux hommes, mais aussi aux anges et aux vertus célestes.’.”
von Balthasar, 1957, 24.
57 “Origène ne rompt donc pas avec la tradition qui va d’Irénée à Grégoire de Nysse.”
von Balthasar, 1957, 24.
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Elisa Zocchi
necessary anymore. For this reason, the first pole of Origen’s thought presented by Balthasar in Epilogue, what I called I1 (Titanism), coincides with a
notion of progress reduced to the earthly condition, but never eschatological.
The question to face now mirrors exactly the question that Balthasar faced
in the Epilogue: is this Origen’s real and only approach to the problem? We
know that this is what will remain in Origenism, to the point that Maximus
the Confessor will, as we have seen, strongly criticise this position and “complete” it with an Aristotelian notion of movement. If, however, spirit was not
only to be read in the titanic frame, but also in light of the divine sacrifice
and the law of love, do we maybe also find this “law of love” behind a different notion of progress?
Before answering this question, I believe the problem given by the interpretation of progress as only earthly (I1) to be more easily understandable
through Balthasar’s attitude towards an author whose forerunner has often
been considered to be Origen himself.
10. A Useful Resource: Joachim of Fiore
A further way to understand the relation between Origen and Hegel in the
eyes of Balthasar on the issue of progress is to look at a third name that often
appears alongside them in Balthasar’s analysis: Joachim of Fiore. His idea of
an age of the spirit clearly shows, despite some important differences, many
connections with Hegel’s idea of final age of the spirit. Balthasar does not
directly draw the line Origen-Joachim-Hegel, but we can easily reconstruct
it by reading a passage of TheoDrama 3 where he presents the role of the
spirit in the trinity. Balthasar openly states that in Christologies “like that of
Origen and Hegel” there is a tendency towards the identification of the Son
and the Spirit.
This kind of identification can seem to be based on the “twostage
Christology”: an obedient Jesus “according to the flesh” is exalted after the
Resurrection and “designated Son of God in power according to the Spirit
of holiness” (Rom 1:4), with the result that the identity can be proclaimed,
thus: “the Kyrios is the Spirit” (2 Cor 3:17).58
58 H. U. von Balthasar, TheoDrama, Theological Dramatic Theory. Vol. 3. The
Dramatis Personae: Persons in Christ, San Francisco 1993, 189 f. “Sie [scil. die
Identifikation] kann sich scheinbarauf die ‘Zweistufenchristologie’ stützen, nach
der ein zunächst ‘dem Fleisch gemäß’ gehorsamer Jesus nach der Auferstehung
‘zum Sohn Gottes in Kraft gemäß dem Geist der Heiligung’ erhöht worden wäre,
so dass jetzt anscheinend Identität ausgesagt werden kann: ‘der Kyrios ist der
Geist’.” H. U. von Balthasar, Theodramatik. Zweiter Band. Die Personen des
Spiels. Teil 2. Die Personen in Christus, Einsiedeln 1978, 173.
Origen as Hegel: The Notion of Aufhebung
305
In a vision of the spirit as eschatological truth, the problem becomes the
apparent secondary role of the Cross and the Resurrection. This is known
to be one of the critiques that Balthasar directs at Origen in the foreword to
Spirit and Fire. He also has a similar critique of Hegel. Referring specifically
to his thought, Balthasar states:
At a level incomparably higher than that of Valentinian Gnosis, we find repeated
here the same process of turning the mystery of the Cross into a piece of philosophy, and in both cases the God-man (the primordial Man), by his self-revelation
coincides in the last analysis with the self-understanding of man himself.59
This Christological issue mirrors the very same critique that de Lubac in the
same year of Theodramatik II2 directs at Joachim of Fiore in his La posté
rité spirituelle de Joachim de Flore.60 Joachim is considered responsible for
the weakening of Christocentrism in the Christian message. For de Lubac
the problem of Joachim’s thought is simple: even against his own intentions, his eschatology seems to reduce Christ as a mere sign for the Spirit,
and “detached from Christ, the Spirit can become anything”.61 Meaning,
Joachim reduces the Trinity into a dynamic process enclosed in time and
therefore finite. This critique of spiritualism very closely mirrors Balthasar’s
concern with Hegel and Origen’s weak distinction between human and
divine spirit, and the consequent weak role of the Cross. It is indeed clear
that for Balthasar Origen and Joachim could be seen as very closely related
for this reason.
We might be tempted to interpret Origen as a forerunner of Joachim because of his
inclination to identify the glorified Christ with the Pneuma. Nevertheless, Origen’s
difference from Joachim stands out most markedly in the fact that he designates
the Scripture of the Old Covenant, taken by itself, as “letter”, while he regards the
Scripture of the New Covenant as letter permeated by the Pneuma. In this respect,
59 “Auf einer unvergleichbar höheren Stufe als der der valentinianischen Gnosis wiederholt sich hier der gleiche Prozeß einer Verphilosophierung des Kreuzmysteriums,
wobei in beiden Fällen der sich offenbarende Gottmensch (Ur-Mensch) schließlich
mit dem Selbstverständnis des Menschen zusammenfällt.” H. U. von Balthasar,
Theologie der Drei Tage, Einsiedeln 1990, 60 f; eng. tr. H. U. von Balthasar,
Mysterium Paschale: The Mystery of Easter, San Francisco 2000, 62.
60 H. de Lubac, La postérité spirituelle de Joachim de Flore. Vol. I. De Joachim
à Schelling, Paris 1978; id. La postérité spirituelle de Joachim de Flore. Vol. II
De SaintSimon à nos jour, Paris 1981. De Lubac, quoting a letter of Moltmann
to Karl Barth, affirms that “Joachim is more alive today than Augustine.” Ibid,
Vol. I (7). Similarly, Balthasar considered Origen to be “impossible to overestimate” and “to rank beside Augustine and Thomas”. von Balthasar, 1984, 1; von
Balthasar, 1938, 11.
61 de Lubac, 1981, 439.
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Elisa Zocchi
Origen is the founder of the spiritual interpretation of Scripture from which Joachim
will be the first to diverge.62
This paragraph sheds light on Balthasar’s double attitude. A few years earlier
he accused Origen of reducing the Logos to Pneuma, while here he stresses
the clear distinction between them. While it could be considered a problem,
I think Balthasar’s attitude mirrors the openness of the question in Origen
himself, who often acknowledges his thought to be a living quest for answers
and not a fixed list of truths. On the one hand, Balthasar openly admits that
Origen could be considered a forerunner of Joachim in virtue of his idea of
spirit. On the other hand, however, the value of the letter – i.e. the permanence of what is aufgehoben – distances Origen’s spiritual interpretation
of the Scripture from Joachim: the New Testament is the letter permeated
by the spirit, not pure spirit. For this reason, Balthasar does not fully consider Origen a forerunner of Joachim. He therefore follows de Lubac, who,
despite acknowledging the presence in Origen of a tripartite scheme shadowimage-truth that might sound similar to the Joachimite idea of progress,
states a fundamental difference:
There is not really anything more in common between Origen and Joachim of
Fiore than this name, eternal gospel – but this is a biblical title drawn from the
Apocalypse – and the idea that this eternal gospel consists in the thorough spiritual
interpretation of the Gospel. But they completely disagree on the nature and time
of this interpretation.63
De Lubac underlines the spiritual sense as being contained in the literal
meaning of the Scripture. Between the two senses there is a clear “break”
given by the Incarnation. What Joachim traces between the two Testaments
is for de Lubac, however, a typological correspondence between two “literal senses” – diminishing therefore the new spiritual sense disclosed by the
62 “Wollte man Origenes als einen Vorläufer Joachims erklärend, weil er eine
Neigung hat, den verklärten Christus mit dem Pneuma gleichzusetzen, so sticht
seine Unterscheidung von Joachim darin am stärksten heraus, dass er die Schrift
Alten Bundes, für sich allein genommen, als ‘Buchstabe’ bezeichnet, während er die
Schrift Neuen Bundes als einen vom Pneuma durchdrungenen Buchstaben ansieht.
Hierhin ist er der Begründer jener geistlichen Schriftdeutung, von der Joachim als
erster abgewichen ist.” H. U. von Balthasar, Theologik. Zweiter Band. Wahrheit
Gottes, Einsiedeln 1985, 190 f.; eng. tr. H. U. Von Balthasar, TheoLogic. Vol.
2: Truth of God, San Francisco 2004, 209.
63 de Lubac, 2002, 251 f. “Entre Origène et Joachin de Flore il n’y a guère de commun que ce nom d’Évangile éternel – mais c’est une appellation biblique tirée
de l’Apocalypse – et l’idée que cet Évangile éternel consiste dans l’interprétation
spirituelle achevée de l’Évangile, – mais sur la nature et sur le temps de cette
interprétation, ils s’opposent complètement.” de Lubac, 1950, 220 f.
Origen as Hegel: The Notion of Aufhebung
307
Incarnation. Here we can clearly see the difference between I1 and I2. If
Joachim grounds the fulfilment in the earthly future, meaning that the age
of the spirit will happen in time, for Origen the eternal gospel is no longer
in time: “Origen’s eternal gospel is the antithesis and anticipated antidote
of that of the Calabrian monk. (…) In brief, it is completely eschatological.”64 De Lubac’s discovery allows one to have a better understanding of
Balthasar’s “preference” for the second interpretation: for Origen progress
is not only limited to this earthly time, but rather eternity itself is progress.
The key to answering this question is Balthasar’s own attitude towards
Joachim of Fiore. Balthasar is less negative towards Joachim than de Lubac,
despite recognising a gnostic tendency in him and openly rejecting the identification of Logos and Spirit. He does in fact positively judge Joachim’s
intuition of a relation between Trinity and time.65 Balthasar, fascinated
by the vision that Joachim had when working on the Book of Revelation,
believes his understanding of the spirit to be the wrong development of a
right intuition: the spirit as procession from the concordantia of Father
and Son. Balthasar writes that Joachim “saw two things: the Revelation as
plenitudo – and this as the result of the inherent relationship between Old
and New Covenants.”66 To be clear, considering the relationship between
the two Covenants “inherent” and of concordance might not correspond to
what Joachim actually wrote. Balthasar justifies his reading by explaining
that the vision Joachim had “blinded him”, who, “unable to withstand the
lightning flash of the vision, will attempt to translate this into an uncertain
language of historical theology.”67 The spirit is first and foremost a person in
eternal relation to the other two persons of the trinity. In this sense Balthasar
still speaks of progress, a progress which is an eternal dynamism rather than
64 de Lubac, 2002, 252. “ L’Évangile éternel de celui-ci est l’antithèse et l’antidote
anticipé de celui du moine calabrais. […] Bref, il est tout eschatologique.” de
Lubac, 1950, 221.
65 J. Servais, De Lubac e von Balthasar: due approcci a Gioacchino da Fiore?,
in: Rassegna di teologia 381/2 (1997), 149–167, 160 f. For Balthasar’s analysis
of the gnostic tradition following from Joachim, see the introduction to H. U. von
Balthasar, Irenäus. Gott in Fleisch und Blut. Ein Durchblick in Texten, Einsiedeln
1981, 10 f.
66 H. U. von Balthasar, Explorations in Theology III – Creator Spirit, San Francisco
1993, 144. “Er sah zweierlei: die Apokalypse als plenitudo – und diese resultierend aus der innern Bezogenheit zwischen Altem und Neuem Bund.” H. U. von
Balthasar, Skizzen zur Theologie III. Spiritus Creator, Einsiedeln 1967, 131.
67 H. U. von Balthasar, Explorations in Theology III – Creator Spirit, 1993, 144.
“Joachim wird dieses – dem Blitz der Vision nicht standhaltend – in eine unsichere
geschichtsthelogische Sprache zu übersetzen suchen.” H. U. von Balthasar, Skizzen
zur Theologie III. Spiritus Creator, Einsiedeln 1967, 131.
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Elisa Zocchi
a dialectic movement enclosed in time. This interpretation underlines the
Paulinian and Origenian idea that from the event of the Cross “the history of
Christianity (both of visible and of invisible Christianity) is the portrayal of
the fullness of Christ by the creative Spirit (Eph 1:23).”68 A dimension
of waiting remains, as Balthasar recognises in considering Origen’s system
a metaphysic of πεῖρα: the mystical body experiences and suffers until the
final day. “Intra-historically speaking, the truth is not only above, but also
ahead.”69 This applies not only to the historical level: as de Lubac, Balthasar
makes Origen’s Homily on Leviticus 7 a constant reference for his idea of
faith and hope present even inside the Trinity itself and in the eschatological time. Balthasar continues with his own theology of the procession of
the spirit from the relationship between Father and Son, openly admitting
that it is not actually Joachim speaking, but Balthasar himself. Balthasar’s
considerations are nevertheless interesting for his interpretation of Origen,
because the solution to the Joachimite “problem” comes from the same element that brings Balthasar to I2, and to an interpretation of Origen that
does not fully coincide with the Hegelian solution: the “law of love”. After
this excursus we can therefore go back to our question, analysing more in
depth I2: eternal progress.
11. Eternal Progress: Origen beyond Hegel (I2)
I believe that the law of love, which has been characterised as a “good
distance” between God and man due to their freedom, is strictly connected
to the concept of eternal progress, allowing Origen to surpass Hegel.
When presenting the concept of Aufhebung we mentioned Balthasar’s
interest in the spiritual senses and the spiritual body. For Balthasar the spiritual body is the sign of an ultimate non-identity between the Trinity and
man, what I called distance. “This fundamental non-identity is the materiality of every creature.”70 The spiritual body suggests also that becoming
was already included in the beginning for Origen, and not only later for
Maximus. Spiritual corporeality shows that there was no real stasis in the
beginning, since where there is matter (however light and non-fleshly this can
be) there is movement. By way of acknowledging a certain Aristotelian element in Origen, specifically the hylomorphism, we can understand the reason
68 von Balthasar, 1993, 170. “Die Geschichte der Christenheit (der sichtbaren und
unsichtbaren) ist die Darstellung durch den schöpferischen Geist der Fülle Christi
(Eph 1,23).” von Balthasar, 1967, 154.
69 Servais, 1997, 167.
70 “Cette non-identité foncière est la matérialité de toute créature, si pure soit-elle.”
von Balthasar, 1957, 42.
Origen as Hegel: The Notion of Aufhebung
309
Balthasar did not consider Maximus to be radically opposed to Origen, and
why he also believed Origen was on the same line with tradition. These two
points are clear in Origen’s own description of the beginning:
Now the fact that he said “he made him in the image of God” and was silent about
the likeness points to nothing else but this, that man received the honour of God’s
image in his first creation (prima conditione), whereas the perfection (perfectio)
of God’s likeness was reserved for him at the consummation (in consummatione).
The purpose of this was that man should acquire it for himself by his own efforts
to imitate God, so that while the possibility (possibilitate) of attaining perfection
was given to him in the beginning (in initiis) through the honour of the “image,” he
should in the end (in finis) through the accomplishment of these works obtain for
himself the perfect “likeness”.71
Motion is not merely described as a falling away from God, but as a teleological progress implicit in the very moment of creation – before the fall.
Movement is therefore part of the creature. What is the reason behind this?
Why should it be better to freely progress towards God instead of necessarily being with him? If we don’t pose this question, we would be stuck in
the non-sense that Maximus accuses Origen of: if we were with God and
decided freely to move away from him, the logical consequence would be to
admit that divine beauty is not strong enough to fascinate us.
Despite the complexity of the issue, I think Balthasar is correct in his suggestion to move beyond the passages where the beginning is described as
a static condition, and to try to consider this issue in the broader frame of
Origen’s system. If likeness has to be achieved, the final unity is richer than
the initial condition. In this sense, we see that what Balthasar stated in the
Epilogue of Le Mysterion (“the synthesis is never achieved [scil. because] …
the final unity is not richer than the abstract unity of the beginning”) is not
fully true. Balthasar himself states that by being “created in the image of
God, the creature has to assimilate herself [scil. to God] to become what he
will never actually be. This is his way to imitate the generation of the Son,
eternally renewed.”72
The idea of striving for something that will never be achieved could still
remind us of Titanism, of a lost battle. We understand, however, that the
struggle to conform oneself to the likeness is not titanic, but good in and
of itself as a struggle. This passage, in fact, not only states the presence of a
certain distance (represented by the spiritual body) between God and man,
71 Or., princ. 3.6,1.
72 “Créée à l’image, la créature devra s’assimiler pour devenir ce qu’elle ne sera
jamais. Ce sera façon d’imiter la génération du Fils, éternellement renouvelée.”
von Balthasar, 1957, 41.
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Elisa Zocchi
but also acknowledges the positivity of this distance: it is good because it
imitates the eternal generation of the Son. Progress therefore has its roots
in the presence of a certain dynamism in the divine itself – precisely, in the
difference between the Father and the Son.
Balthasar’s statement brings us back to Hegel: through Aufhebung Hegel
brings movement and progress into God, as Balthasar positively recognises.
The question becomes, therefore: why? What moves the thesis to reach a
synthesis? In Hegel it is because of an element dialectically posed. Meaning,
it is because of something lacking in the thesis which needs to be reached
and successively overcome. For Hegel, the spirit is not a third person who
transcends the world, but God’s achievement through the world. In this
sense, creation is due to a lack, to something negative. Consequently, the
Covenant is not an act of divine free love, but rather an act of divine need.
Balthasar seems to share the idea of contemporary scholars, but differs
from them slightly. Hegel, as many Fathers, thinks of the Trinity within the
exitusreditus scheme but, differently from the Fathers, does not arrive to
God’s love and abundance, but to God’s lack of it.73 Love, despite playing
an important role for Hegel, is for Balthasar not properly Johannine and
agapic, coming from an ontological abundance, but rather a desire whose
only aim is to fulfil a lack.
This mirrors Maximus’s critique to Origenism, the idea of a metaphysics
of πεῖρα and of an only dialectically achieved progress to the spiritual.
Balthasar, without denying this aspect, reads Origen in a different light. He
shows how experience can be seen not only as the dialectical opposition of
the spirit, but also as its analogical reflection. The πεῖρα is for Hegel only a
moment for the absolute to reach itself. There is more in Origen, where the
experience seems to be more than a simple product of the human fall. Hegel
is paradoxically more Neo-Platonic than Origen. For Hegel, unity precedes
multiplicity. Origen, on the contrary, moves from the Johannine indication
that the Word was originally with God: from the very beginning there is a
relation between the Father and the Word. For this reason Hegel’s antithesis
remains entangled in a tragic monism, while Origen’s πεῖρα is a moment of
a dramatic relationship.
Balthasar means this when he underlines that the contrary tendency to
an idea of progress that is only negative (I1), i.e. only present in this mortal
life, is the law of love dilated to the eternity (I2). “This [scil. the Hegelian]
tendency is counterbalanced by what is deeper in Origen. He knows that the
real knowledge is love: ‘The friendship with Christ in the Holy Spirit, this
73 A. Chapelle, Hegel et la Religion, vol. 2, Paris 1964–1971, 106.
Origen as Hegel: The Notion of Aufhebung
311
is the knowledge of God’ ”.74 For this reason, Balthasar claims that Origen
was already very close to the solution that Gregory of Nyssa will achieve “by
stepping beyond the tragic attitude”. Gregory’s synthesis of movement and
rest is achieved by “excluding from the eternal vision of God the possibility
of satiety”: not by eliminating the movement in itself, but by eliminating
only its tragic dualism and by introducing movement into rest itself, i.e. into
God. The introduction of movement is not due to lack but to superabundance. Balthasar believes Origen to have already formulated this solution: in
the unique sacrifice of Christ God made himself “becoming”.
It won’t be enough to take off our sandals; in order to walk in this life, we have to
let our feet be washed by Jesus, and take off everything what we have: money and
bag, mantel and stick, “because this path is rich enough to provide you with all
what you will need along the way” (CIo 1.26). Isn’t it in fact that God made him
self becoming for us?75
The above quoted passage on image and likeness from Peri Archon clearly
expresses the difference between Origen and Hegel. In the passage we
acknowledge with Balthasar the presence in Origen of a dramatic dynamism
taking over the Greek tragedy. God creates a free man, therefore running the
risk of a fall with all its consequences. The framework of Origen is wholly
different than that of Hegel: if in Hegel it is the Absolute who, in order to
become himself, establishes the negation; for Origen, God does not create
man in order to fulfil himself, but completely out of gratuitous love. The
necessary point is to understand the reason behind God’s “making himself
becoming/movement for us” and of the eternal generation of the Son. We
find here the beginning of what will become Balthasar’s own theology: why
is it good not only for man, but also for God, to run the risk of becoming?
12. The Reason behind Origen’s Ambiguity
The Epilogue of Le Mysterion d’Origène is a continuous back and forth
between Origen “not daring to this solution” because of the “mark of the
daimon” and his being “already very close” to the resolution, the law of
74 “Mais cette tendance se trouve dans cesse démentie par ce qu’il y avait de plus
profond en lui. Origène sait que le vrai savoir est l’amour: ‘L’amitié avec le Christ
dans le Saint-Esprit, telle est en effet la connaissance de Dieu.’ ” von Balthasar,
1957, 116.
75 “Il ne suffira même pas de quitter ses sandales, il faudra encore se laisser laver les
pieds par Jésus pour marcher dans cette voie, et même se dépouiller de tout: monnaie et sac, manteau et bâton, ‘car cette voie est assez riche pour subvenir par ellemême à toutes les nécessités du voyage.’ N’est-elle pas Dieu, qui s’est fait Devenir
pour nous?” von Balthasar, 1957, 76.
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Elisa Zocchi
love. Balthasar presents both attitudes, and states what he believes to be the
real answer for Origen. Particularly interesting for us is Balthasar’s recognition of the reason behind Origen’s ambiguity.
The reason for this ambiguity lies for Balthasar in the role of mediation
and of the symbolic structure of reality in Origen. For Balthasar, progress is
continuous for a very specific reason: because the hermeneutical process in
the God-World relation is substantially eternal. God always reveals himself
in a mediated form, through a veil, with the consequent growth of our desire
for him.76 The same happens in the eschatological condition: we will enjoy
an ever-greater richness of the spirit, and not a static condition, because of
the eternality of the matter, because of the spiritual body.
But the letter, opaque as mortal flesh, is not less temporary, and overcomes itself
towards a Word that will be full Truth, eternal Good News. This will not anymore
be made out of fleshly words, but of spiritual words, although, being eternal matter,
the speaking Word and the spoken word never fully coincide.77
Balthasar traces the ambiguity of Origen’s idea of progress back to his idea of
symbol. For Balthasar the synthesis of movement and rest is not completely
achieved in Origen because of his intellectualism and forgetfulness of the
eternal value of the symbolic structure of the world - i.e. the forgetfulness of
the positive value of mediation and difference. In Origen there is always “a
tendency to overcome the symbols, to rip up the ultimate veils, to overcome
even the Logos to ‘see’ the abyss of the Father, to know rather than live, to
overrate the sign of the Word underrating the sign of Love.”78
It is true that Origen, in his thirst for knowledge, has maybe minimized the eternal
value of the structure of the symbol. Clemens of Alexandria knew it better: “Truth
is always greater and more splendid when discovered through a veil. It happens
here what happens with those fruits seen through the transparency of the water or
76 “God hides in order to awake more and more our desire”, says Balthasar commenting Cant. Comm. 2. “Dieu se cache pour exciter toujours davantage nostre
désire.” von Balthasar, 1957, 119, note 13.
77 “Mais la lettre, opaque comme la chair mortelle, n’en reste pas moins provisoire,
en tend à se dépasser elle-même dans le sens d’une Parole qui, elle, serait tout
entière Vérité, éternelle Bonne Nouvelle; qui ne serait plus faite de paroles sensibles, mais de paroles spirituelles, bien que, la matière étant éternelle, la Parole
parlante et la parole parlée ne doivent jamais coïncider tout à fait.” von Balthasar,
1957, 75.
78 “Tendance à survoler les symboles, à déchirer les dernier voiles, à dépasser même
le Logos pour ”voir“ l’abîme du Père, à savoir au lieu de vivre, à surestimer enfin
le signe de la Parole en sous-estimant celui de l’Amour.” von Balthasar, 1957, 116.
Origen as Hegel: The Notion of Aufhebung
313
with those bodies whose grace is underlined or suggested by the clothes” (Strom.
5.56,5).79
The minimisation of the eternal value of the symbolic structure is for Balthasar
the fruit of a certain tendency towards intellectualism and Gnosticism in
Origen’s thought; the same that moves him towards a titanic and heroic
interpretation of the life of the Christian. By sometimes diminishing the role
of mediation (in its many forms: the flesh, Christ, the letter…), Origen drifts
towards the risks he shares with Hegel.
In conclusion, it is worth noting that while for de Lubac Joachim operates
a “secularization” of the eschatological promise, for Balthasar Hegel is the
greatest example of a secularisation of metaphysics, to which the antidote is
the doctrine of the analogia entis. It is not without meaning that Joachim of
Fiore was condemned in the Fourth Lateran Council, the same council where
the doctrine of analogia entis was formulated in the shape that Balthasar so
often implicitly refers to in his works on Origen. The absence of mediation
is exactly the contrary of the solution that Balthasar will propose, not only
in his reading of Origen, but also in his own theology: the doctrine of ana
logia entis.
13. Conclusion
To conclude, Balthasar appreciates the similarity between Origen and Hegel
in the sense of Aufhebung, but considers a fundamental difference between
them. The difference lies in an alternative understanding of spirit: utterly
intellectualistic and spiritualistic for Hegel, dominated by the law of love
as abundance and sacrifice in Origen (although not without ambiguities).
In virtue of this law of love, Balthasar recognises that in Origen progress is
not limited to this life but destined to remain in eternity. Exactly because the
human spirit and the divine spirit are not the same, the tension is eternal.
Taking a step further, we recognise that the reason behind this difference lies in the moment of creation: if for the German Idealist creation happens as an act of lacking, for Origen it happens as a creative act of love, of
superabundance. God, in his generosity, provides the rational creatures their
freedom in order to be freely loved as He freely created them. The mystery
of love in Balthasar’s own theology will take the shape of intra-trinitarian
79 “Il est vrai qu’Origène, dans sa passion de savoir, a peut-être minimisé la valeur
éternelle de la structure du symbole. Clément en savait davantage: ‘La vérité paraît
plus grande et plus auguste quand on la découvre à travers un voile: il en est d’elle
comme de ces fruits vus à travers la transparence de l’eau ou de ces formes dont
les vêtements soulignent et insinuent la grâce’ (Strom. 5.56,5).” von Balthasar,
1957, 135, n. 48.
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Elisa Zocchi
freedom, the mystery of the relation between the three persons: the Father
“allows” the Son to be, and from their mutual love proceeds the Spirit.
This mysterious law of filial love revealed by the Gospel, especially in the
Prologue of the Gospel of John (a fundamental text for both Origen and
Balthasar) is for Balthasar exactly the element that “saves” Origen from the
risks of the Aufhebung – the logical necessity. At the same time, it is this element that allows Origen to “sublate” the Valentinian Gnosis (the same that,
for Balthasar, is present in Hegel) into a truly Christian Gnosis. The elevation to the spiritual level is not a titanic achievement already included in a
necessary order of the elected, but a gift coming from the free relation with a
free God. The law of love is therefore law of freedom. If in Hegel progress is
always enclosed in a determinism of the Spirit which reduces God’s freedom
to a logical necessity, in Origen human freedom appears to always be related
to the free creative act of love of God. This opens up the dramatic struggle
and the everlasting progress, which is ultimately rooted in the ever-greater
freedom and irreducible otherness of God himself.
Ludovico Battista
Myth and Progress: Hans Blumenberg’s
Reading of Origen of Alexandria
Abstract This article is dedicated to an analysis of the passages that the philosopher
Hans Blumenberg dedicated to Origen of Alexandria within his interpretation of
the genesis of modern rationality. On the one hand, it highlights the importance
of a modern “Origenian” tradition, exemplarily represented by Nicola Cusano and
Giordano Bruno as protagonists of the “epochal threshold”. On the other hand,
however, it shows how Blumenberg rejects the idea of a Origenian “humanistic” and
rationalistic theological “matrix” at the basis of modernity, reinterpreting Origen as a
completely Platonic thinker and even a remythologizer – therefore “paganizer” – with
respect to biblical theological devices, originally eschatological and apocalyptic in
their nature. In other words, according to Blumenberg, Origen could not but become
heretical for the Christian orthodox tradition – which would settle on a PaulineAugustinian dominant line – and consequently his modern rediscovery and reception
would have “anti-Christian” outcomes.
Keywords: Modernity, Augustine, Metaphor, Gnosis, Bruno, Cusano
One of the main focuses of Blumenberg’s philosophy is probably the attempt
to define the connection between Christianity and modern thought. The first
period of his research culminated in his masterpiece, The Legitimacy of the
Modern Age (first edition in 1966),1 which brought to an end a long work
on the history of Christian theology. This work was originally started by
the identification of the Christian devices of historicisation and deconstruction of the ancient metaphysics. In his first academical works Beiträge zum
Problem der Ursprünglichkeit der mittelalterlichscholastischen Ontologie
(1947), and Die ontologische Distanz (1950), a young Blumenberg had suggested that the possibility of a critique of the old static and metaphysical conception of the world should be identified right in the Augustinian tradition.
According to this first interpretation, Augustin was the first to develop, in
his doctrine of illumination, an apocalyptical and historicising conception of
“truth” that even contemporary philosophy (e.g. Heidegger) would inherit.
By suspending the tendency of knowledge to metaphysical objectification
of the world, the doctrine of God’s absoluteness and the conception of his
illumination as an “event” of grace allow us to reach the historical nature of
1
H. Blumenberg, Die Legitimität der Neuzeit, Frankfurt 1966.
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Ludovico Battista
the human ways of “signification”, their “facticity” and “performativity”.
In other terms, Blumenberg recognised in Augustinian thought a system of
demythologisation that allows reaching the primary – not absolute, but historical – narrative substructure of the philosophical conceptuality, and in
this way the philosopher provided several crucial arguments in favour of a
Christian origin of modern “historicization processes”.2
However, by facing the theoretical and political risks resulting from the
identification of a connection between the nature of modern political and
juridical structures and Christian theology, Blumenberg gradually became
conscious of the need to avoid every secret apology of religion that would be
implied in the thesis of the modern age’s debt to it. In order to ward off any
theological conception that would endanger the autonomy of modern rationality, the later Blumenberg so distinguished between a theological principle
of deconstruction and destruction of the ancient worldview, and the modern,
anthropocentric re-foundation of knowledge based on a radical rejection
of the anti-humanistic logic of any theological absolutism. Therefore, he
changed his point of view, portraying a new anti-theological image of
modern rationality. According to this premise we can understand the main
purpose of his masterpiece Die Legitimität der Neuzeit, which meant to disjoin the connection between the Augustinian deconstruction of metaphysics
and modern self-affirmation, by identifying in Augustinianism the cause of
the crisis and the fall of the medieval world, and by defining the modern age
in terms of de-Christianisation, or in other words, as a radical liberation
2
About this reconstruction, I dare to suggest my monograph, L. Battista,
Blumenberg e l’autodistruzione del cristianesimo. La genesi del suo pensiero: da
Agostino a Nietzche, Roma 2021. Blumenberg’s first reformulation of phenomenology recognises the crucial role played by the Christian experience of Endlichkeit
(finiteness) and Geschichtlichkeit (historicity). Blumenberg attempted to mediate
between Heidegger’s and Husserl’s philosophy by rediscovering the metaphorical
language of philosophical tradition. Such an attempt, however, implicitly ties in
with the Augustinian deconstruction of Greek metaphysics. Evidently, the question of secularisation, before becoming the controversial topic of his masterpiece,
the Legitimacy of modern Age, is already present here. The subsequent disclosure of the consequences of this first interpretation makes it possible to understand the importance of the later confrontation with the secularisation category,
but also the ongoing relevance of Augustine, although his thinking increasingly
emerges as a paradigm to be overcome. For a reconstruction of the evolution
of Blumenberg’s thought see the great volume by K. Flasch, Hans Blumenberg.
Philosoph in Deutschland: Die Jahre 1945–1966, Frankfurt 2017; and the first
part of the fundamental work of P. Stoellger, Metapher und Lebenswelt, Tübingen
2000, 17–69.
Hans Blumenberg’s Reading of Origen of Alexandria
317
from what preceded it.3 Blumenberg wanted to highlight the legitimacy of
self-affirmation, and consequently he was forced to change his perspective
by adopting Nietzsche’s perspectivism, in which man should become the sole
point of reference of his rational performances, substituting God as “creator” of meaning. Augustinian theology is now tendentially defined as a
failure in human history for its inability to provide answers to the human
need for meaning. Only a new start, a new paradigm for knowledge, intrinsically humanistic and anthropocentric, and opposed to the theocentric one
of Augustin, can provide what modern men need.
The position expressed by Blumenberg in the Legitimacy of the Modern
Age rejects every philosophical thesis that would acknowledge a causal relationship between Christian theology and modern thought, for example, that
of K. Löwith about the derivation of modern faith in progress from Christian
faith in providence, but primarily C. Schmitt’s and E. Voegelin’s theses, which
use it as ground for a new political theology.4 However, Blumenberg seems to
identify tout court Christian theology with Absolutism, Augustinianism and
an Augustinian line of thought in the later Middle Ages. Therefore, it seems
also possible to problematise this thesis, by noting that in the Legitimacy of
the Modern Age Blumenberg himself situates the epochal threshold between
the medieval and the modern world right in that period which straddles the
Copernican revolution, between two philosophical figures who, though they
do not belong to an Augustinian trajectory of thought, do really deal with history of Christian theology: Nicholas of Cusa and Giordano Bruno.
On closer inspection, we might note that already since a 1957 article,
Nachahmung der Natur. Zur Vorgeschichte der Idee des schöpferischen
Menschen,5 the starting point for understanding the modern figure of man
3
4
5
On closer inspection, however, the previous conviction regarding the role of
Augustinian devices of historicisation is still present in the Legitimacy of modern
Age. One may think, for example, about Blumenberg’s interest in the debate
between Clark and Leibniz on Newton’s philosophy, in which Blumenberg recognizes that the “radical materialization of nature” is in some way a consequence of
theological absolutism. The modern revival of epicureism is to be counted among
the materialistic consequences of that omnipotence theology that forbids thinking
of reality as a connection of fixed, unchangeable and ontological structures. Cf.
Blumenberg, 1966, 103–111.
K. Löwith, Von Hegel Zu Nietzsche, Stuttgart 1939, ²1945; Id., Meaning in
History, Chicago 1949; C. Schmitt, Politische Theologie. Vier Kapitel zur Lehre
von der Souveränität, Berlin 1922, München ²1934; E. Voegelin, The New Science
of Politics, Chicago 1952.
H. Blumenberg, Nachahmung der Natur. Zur Vorgeschichte der Idee des schöp
ferischen Menschen in: Studium Generale 10 (1957), 266–283, now in Id.,
Ästhetische und metaphorologische Schriften, Frankfurt 2001, 9–46. I also recall
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as “creator” was represented by Cusanus, whose Idiota is considered as
the terminus a quo for the history of the human self-attribution of a technical, creating power, not only reproducing nature. As Blumenberg explains,
the real turning point from an ontological point of view is not the concept of omnipotence, but its combination with that of infinity, which allows
us to experience the world as a “fact”, that is, as a reality that does not
exhaust the infinite scope of possibilities.6 But there is also another implicit
motivation to explain Cusanus’ choice. The preference for Cusanus over
Augustine is based on a crucial reason for the entire self-restructuring of
Blumenberg’s analysis: the identification of a similar theological device based
on God’s transcendence, the docta ignorantia, which historicises and deconstructs any claim to reach the truth of God, but that can, however, be framed
within a humanistic horizon that prevents any pessimistic condemnation of
the human desire for knowledge. The true key notion for understanding
the modern “metaphorisation” and “technicisation” of knowledge cannot
be the absoluteness of God, but it must be identified in the concept that
replaces it, “infinity”, which is compatible with the anthropological need of
6
the fact that in 1957 Blumenberg edited a selection of Cusanus’ writings, Nikolaus
von Cues: Die Kunst der Vermutung, with a long introduction.
Blumenberg, 2001, 34–35: „[…] erst wenn die potentia Gottes als potentia infinita
gesehen wird, tritt die logische Nötigung auf, das possibile nicht mehr von der
potentia (und den in ihr implizierten Ideen) her, sondern umgekehrt die potentia vom possibile her zu definieren. Damit erst wird der logische Umfang des
Möglichkeitsbegriffes maßgebend und zugleich der Ideenkosmos für die Frage,
was das omnia als Umfang der omnipotentia bedeute, gleichgültig. Das hat zur
Folge: der Begriff der Rationalität wird auf den der Widerspruchlosigkeit reduziert, während noch bei Augustin der Begriff der ratio nicht von dem der exemplarischen Idee zu lösen war, also einen endlich-gegenständlichen Bezug implizierte.
Jetzt erst kann der für unsere Frage nach dem ontologischen „Spielraum“ des
Schöpferischen entscheidende Schritt Fuß fassen: der als endlich gedachte Kosmos
schöpft das unendliche Universum der Seinsmöglichkeiten – und das heißt: der
Möglichkeiten der göttlichen Allmacht – nicht aus und kann es nicht ausschöpfen.
Er ist notwendig nur ein faktischer Ausschnitt dieses Universums, und es bleibt
ein Spielraum unverwirklichten Seins – der freilich noch auf lange unbefragtes
Reservat Gottes sein wird und zu der Frage des Menschen nach seinen eigenen
Möglichkeiten noch nicht in Bezug tritt. Aber zum erstenmal wird in der Erörterung
des Allmachtsbegriffs dieser Spielraum überhaupt ontologisch impliziert und als
Hintergrund der Weltrealität mitverstanden. […] Die Welt als Faktum – das ist
die ontologische Voraussetzung für die Möglichkeit der Erwägung, schließlich
für den Antrieb und die Lockung, im Spielraum des Unverwirklichten, durch das
Faktische nicht Ausgefüllten, das originär Menschliche zu setzen, das authentisch
„Neue“ zu realisieren, aus dem Angewiesensein auf „Nachahmung der Natur“
ins von der Natur Unbetretene hinaus verzustoßen.“
Hans Blumenberg’s Reading of Origen of Alexandria
319
approaching progressively to God. The following investigations on Bruno,
in this sense, will specify this profound intuition about the emancipating and
humanistic effects (not fully emerged with Cusanus) of a theology of God’s
“Unendlichkeit”, “infinity”. Therefore, it seems legitimate to ask whether he
did not disregard the possibility of identifying an “other”, not Augustinian
Christian theological tradition that could allow us to consider in a different
way the relationship between theology and modern thought.7
The figures of Nicholas of Cusa and Giordano Bruno remind us of a
theological tradition that we could generically define as “Origenian”. This
tradition is characterised by the affirmation of the spiritual progress of
the creatural desire, thanks to which man obtains autonomy and dignity,
becoming free and responsible for his own salvation. The Origenian tradition claims men’s free will, and relativises theological dogmas and religious practices as mere symbols of the inner, moral progress of the human
soul, which should elevate itself to the higher, rational meaning of Christian
revelation. On the one hand, the Origenian reinterpretation of the biblical
notion of man as “made in the image of God” connects the freedom of the
will to the “divine” power of the human intellect, capable of an anagogic
progression from the material world to the first principle, God. On the other
hand, this platonic, anagogic movement towards God tends to mitigate the
radical dualism between God and His creation: the Origenian tradition relativises any ontological and metaphysical datum as a temporary stage or
step in the self-revealing of God, as a mere “cypher” or “trace” (metaphor)
of divine transcendence that should be transcended by the human seeking
for God. The history of Origenism testifies to the progressive affirmation of
an allegorical method of interpretation of the Scriptures that allows reconnecting any religious practice, dogmatic conception, and biblical story to its
anthropological meaning for the progress of human soul towards perfection.
It could be very interesting to analyse some passages in Blumenberg’s
Legitimacy of the Modern Age about Nicholas of Cusa, where he shows
7
I consider valuable the volume by E. Brient, that raised the crucial problem of
identifying a possible missing side of Blumenberg’s reflection, that of medieval
mysticism, from Scotus Eriugena to Meister Eckhart and then to Cusanus. The
great limit of Brient’s work, however, is precisely that of tracing this trajectory only
back to Plotinus’ reflection, rather than back to the Origenian patristic side – in
particular to Gregory of Nyssa – which would have made it possible to connect
in a more intrinsic way the problem of the immanentisation of the infinite, starting from the reflection on an Origenian Christological device, not merely (neo-)
Platonic. Cfr. E. Brient, The Immanence of Infinite, Yale 2002. See also E. Brient,
Blumenberg Reading Cusanus. Metaphor and Modernity, in M. Moxter (ed.)
Erinnerung an das Humane, Tübingen 2011, 122–144.
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that the emancipative power of the modern metaphorising of knowledge
emerges in relation to Cusanus’ doctrine of “docta ignorantia”. According
to him, truth is the goal of an infinite progress: this means that in each
divine revelation there can be found only what may be described as traces
or vestiges of the divine. God leaves traces to excite human desire: traces,
or metaphors, which are „als die […] Verweisung eines flüchtigen und zu
verfolgenden Zieles“.8 Cusanus insists that in our attempt to know we inevitably speak in symbols, in metaphors that are not analogical and static
references to something that can be simply considered as truth, but “selfdestructing metaphors”, because they need to be immediately destroyed after
being conceived, in order to pursue the goal of the infinite and ever-elusive
truth of God.9 The infinite (as Cusanus’ example of God as “infinite sphere”
shows) explodes the “metaphor” as a mere provisory step pointing the transcendence of truth. But Cusanus’ formula is not a resigned acceptance of
the impossibility of reaching a true knowledge of God, but a method for
approaching the ever-elusive truth that also involves “a critical reflection
on the surpassability of the state of knowledge at any time.”10 As Elizabeth
Brient stated in her research on Blumenberg’s reading of Cusanus, the docta
ignorantia abandons the metaphysical and epistemological pretension of traditional scholasticism with “its passive contentment with the static intended
stock of knowledge.”11 Cusanus and Bruno reject both the belief in the definitiveness and completeness of the stock of inherited knowledge, and transform the sacrificium intellectus into the necessary procedure of intelligence
that must renounce being satisfied with all finite content in order to pursue
true fulfilment. The knowledge becomes conjectural. The conception of a
knowledge that is not merely static but procedural is the true presupposition of the docta ignorantia, which can be understood as the “mystical”
condition – a symbolic immersion in darkness – of the relationship with
truth as “hunting”: only ignorance can become wise, because only the insipient can relentlessly search for the infinite divine wisdom. If God transcends
our ability to grasp it definitively and adequately, we engage ourselves in a
8 Blumenberg, 1966, 461.
9 Cf. Blumenberg, 1966, 454.
10 Blumenberg, 1966, 463: „Die Wahrheit ist im Bilde keineswegs gegenwärtig,
wenn nicht das Bild immer sogleich als solches aufgehoben wird. Denn jedes Bild
repräsentiert zwar die Wahrheit, ist aber zugleich als Bild schon von ihr abgefallen
und hoffnungslos entfernt. Dieses Generalrezept will sowohl auf die Sprache der
Offenbarung und der Mystik als auch auf die Bildlichkeit der Welt selbst angewendet werden, die nur „funktioniert“, wenn sie als Spur im Sinne jenes das Denken
in Bewegung setzenden Signals verstanden wird.“ See also Brient, 2011, 126–130.
11 Brient, 2011, 130.
Hans Blumenberg’s Reading of Origen of Alexandria
321
process of transcendence that corresponds to the self-transcendence of the
human knower.
Of course, this procedural dimension of knowledge opens the way to the
birth of modern science, and to a conception of progress as the development
of the human spirit that produces its emancipation from the state of constraint in which nature holds him. It is therefore clear why Cusanus represents such an important episode in the analysis of the genesis of modernity.
The discourse on the “metaphorical” status of knowledge in Cusanus is,
however, also extraordinarily meaningful for understanding Blumenberg’s
entire reflection, as we consider the philosopher’s research about “metaphor” and his project about a “metaphorology” as resulting from his
analysis of Cusanus’ “Sprengmetaphorik”.12 In the same years of these analyses, Blumenberg elaborated a philosophical project that wanted to rediscover the inconceptual, metaphorical, and rhetorical background of Western
conceptual and metaphysical reflection, in order to historicise its theoretical
performances by reconnecting them to their anthropological, existential, and
historical background. The whole “inconceptual” project of Blumenberg’s
philosophy is clearly inseparable from the need to clarify the ground of legitimacy for modern self-understanding of rationality.13 If the philosopher is
now able to go back to those metaphorical roots that surreptitiously guide
the same rational discourse, it is also because Western rationality has passed
through a turning point, by deconstructing the static and metaphysical
nature of ancient cosmological knowledge. This deconstruction was initially
attributed by Blumenberg to an Augustinian trajectory, but, after his radical
rejection of the implicit anti-humanism of Augustin, it is rather attributed
12 Blumenberg, 1966, 463, 465: „Die Heterogenität von Begrifflichkeit und
Bildlichkeit fällt in sich zusammen, wenn einmal beide als Mittel vorläufiger
Anweisungen des Denkens in Richtung auf eine nie ganz zu erreichende, zu vereinnahmende, zu bewältigende Gegenständlichkeit gesehen worden sind. Solche
Disjunktionen, solche Alternativen verschwinden für die docta ignorantia in dem
Augenblick, in dem sie sich als Aspekte einer Bewegung herausstellen: docta vero
ignorantia omnes modos, quibus accedi ad veritatem potest, unit. […] Die Polemik
zwischen Herrenberger und Cusaner zeigt, dass die „wissende Unwissenheit“
zunächst das traditionelle Schema von Begriff und Metapher, von Eigentlichkeit
und Bildlichkeit der Rede durchbrochen hat.“ See also H. Blumenberg, Paradigmen
zu einer Metaphorologie originally in: Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte 6 (1960), 7–
142; re-edited and commented by A. Haverkamp, Frankfurt 2013, 174–180 (174–
175): „Die Metapher ist zur Bewegung fähig, kann Bewegung darstellen, wie es die
zum Transzendieren anleitende Sprengmetaphorik Cusaners am eindringlichsten
bestätigt, die mit den geometrischen Figuren operiert und sie transformiert.“
13 Therefore, to clarify Blumenberg’s argument about the genesis of modernity also
implies facing the problem of the status of the “metaphorological” project.
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to the figure of Cusanus, who constitutes, together with Bruno, a new trajectory of the genesis of the modern conception of rationality, that from the
point of view of the history of theology, we could define “Origenian”.
Bearing in mind Blumenberg’s interest and competence in the Patristic
sources of Christian theological reflection, it is therefore surprising that he
had not dedicated any specific attention to Origen. Origen’s name is certainly hidden in his crucial analysis about heretical gnosis, which occupied
him during all the 1970s. It is not possible here to consider all these analyses. However, in one of his most famous essays, titled Wirklichkeitsbegriff
und Wirkungspotential des Mythos,14 we find a couple of pages dedicated
to Origen, which are very interesting in briefly clarifying the philosopher’s
point of view. First of all, Blumenberg declares his appreciation for Origen,
describing him as the greatest thinker of the Greek patristic, if not of the
entire patristic:
Vielleicht war Origenes gerade deshalb der größte Denker der griechischen, wenn
nicht der gesamten Patristik, weil er im Prozess der Auseinandersetzung von antiker Metaphysik und biblischer Lehre den äußersten and kühnsten Versuch einer
Versöhnung machte.15
According to Blumenberg, the theology of Origen is characterised by the
epochal and extreme attempt to find a Versöhnung, a reconciliation, between
two antithetical worldviews: on one side the biblical conception of God,
according to which He is a personal, absolute and omnipotent figure, creator
ex nihilo; on the other side, the Greek philosophy, mainly Platonic, which
tends to rationalise the divine, and to include it in a metaphysical system
that has a certain stability and immutability which is guaranteed by the
eternal repetition of historical cycles or eons. The fundamental feature of the
biblical worldview is the notion of divine omnipotence, which has peculiar
effects upon the conception of men and world: the absoluteness of God prevents the possibility for man to know Him, to elaborate knowledge of Him
and to secure it in a humanly acceptable logic. The notion of divine election
produces the crisis of human devices of Selbst-Behauptung, self-affirmation
facing God. The idea of omnipotence blocks any human attempt to decrease
the experience of the absoluteness, namely it denies any value to magical
practices, to myths and other human strategies for making the experience of
14 H. Blumenberg, Wirklichkeitsbegriff und Wirkungspotential des Mythos, originally in M. Fuhrmann (ed.) Terror und Spiel. Probleme der Mythenrezeption,
München 1971, ²1990, 11–66, riedited in H. Blumenberg, Ästhetische und metaphorologische Schriften, Frankfurt 2001, 327–406.
15 Blumenberg, 2001, 387.
Hans Blumenberg’s Reading of Origen of Alexandria
323
reality tolerable.16 Actually, early Christianity is an eschatological variation
of ancient Judaism, which implies the radicalisation of the omnipotence and
of the personality of God, since it waits for a final saving divine intervention.
Therefore, Christianity is characterised by an anti-mundane ethic. It demythologises the world by denying any natural presence of God in it, but it also
implies a pessimistic view of man and of the natural order. Christian man
is in a limited situation, in a series of ending events, with the consequence
of an interpretation of history as linear and precarious, because of the inner
exigency to leave an open space for the saving intervention of God, which is
definitive and unrepeatable, and therefore absolute.17
16 Blumenberg, 2001, 335: „Das Verbot des Dekalogs (Exodus 20,7), den
Gottesnamen unnütz zu gebrauchen, ist die eigentliche und strikte Gegenposition
zu aller Mythologie und ihrer Leichtigkeit, mit der unfixierten Gestalt und
Geschichte des Gottes und der Götter umzugehen.“ Ibid, 338: „Der Mythos stellt
nicht vor Entscheidungen, er fordert keine Verzichte. […] Das biblische Verbot, den
Gottesnamen unnütz zu gebrauchen, zwingt ebenso in die Richtung der Abstraktion
wie in die der unerbittlichen Ausschließlichkeit; es weiß um die entbannende und
entpflichtende Kraft der mythischen Freiheit des Umgangs mit den Götternamen,
den Götterbildern und den Göttergeschichten.“ Ibid., 355: „Dagegen sollte die
Entschiedenheit des biblischen Gottes und seines Heilswillens stehen, ohne jeden
Ausweg in allegorische Deutbarkeit und Bedeutsamkeit. An diesem Punkt wendet
sich der Wahrheitsbegriff der Theologie viel entschiedener und reflektierter gegen
den der Mythologie als in der Frage der Pluralität oder Unizität des Göttlichen.“
We also must notice that these and the following themes will have a similar focus
in H. Blumenberg Arbeit am Mythos, Frankfurt 1979, although we are not going
to go into this text in detail.
17 Blumenberg, 2001, 375–376: „In der radikalen Eschatologie der neutestamentlichen Heilserwartung ist am wenigsten von jenem „Spielraum“ der Umständlichkeit;
die Verbindung zwischen dem Heilsbedürfnis und der Heilserfüllung ist als die
kürzeste aller möglichen verheißen, die Macht der Gottheit wird unmittelbar
auf elementare Weise als wirksam erwartet. […] Der Schwund der Eschatologie
gibt Raum für ein Anwachsen der Mythologie. Wenn nicht alles täuscht, war es
die kritische Energie des genuinen biblischen Monotheismus, seiner absolutistischen Züge und vor allem seiner Schöpfungsidee, was die Remythisierung des
Christentums zum Stillstand brachte und spätestens mit Augustin die Züge einer
Dogmatik prägte, die mit Allmacht und Freiheit Instrumente zur „Ökonomie“
aller Fragen besaß. Der an der Radikalisierung der Schöpfungsidee entwickelte
Begriff der Allmacht wurde zum spekulativen Lieblingsprinzip der theologischen
Scholastik, die die Umwege und Umständlichkeit der göttlichen Heilsfürsorge
auf ein konsistentes System von Heilsnotwendigkeiten zurückzuzwingen suchen
mußte.“ Cf. U. Wilckens, Zur Eschatologie des Urchristentums. Bemerkung zur
Deutung der jüdischurchristlichen Überlieferung bei Hans Blumenberg, in H. J.
Birkner / D. Rössler (eds.), Beiträge zur Theorie des neuzeitlichen Christentums,
Berlin 1968, 127–142
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The Greek mentality, on the contrary, does not tolerate one definitive
story, because it is familiar with the proliferation of variations of the same
myth: with its repetitions and constantly different receptions, the Greek
myth allows a continuous elaboration and reinterpretation of itself, namely
the possibility to rationalise its meaning for human societies.18 The myth
does not tolerate the idea of “omnipotence” of a God,19 and it does not tend
towards “absoluteness”, but in the opposite direction with respect to the
categories that underlie religion and metaphysics:20 it has „eine elementare
Disposition, sich nicht an den Abgrund des Absoluten treiben zu lassen.“21
Greek religion was therefore malleable to anthropological exigencies: in this
sense, philosophy is born thanks to the highly sophisticated religion of the
Greeks, and the same Platonic philosophy is the Aufhebung of myth’s work,
because it inherits and preserves its functioning device, that is, the explanation of multiplicity and differences of things by considering them as variations or copies of archetypes.22
Therefore, according to Blumenberg’s point of view, the encounter
between ancient Christianity and Hellenism is particularly ambiguous,
because of the unavoidable collision between two different perspectives on
history: on the one hand, a linear structure, on the other a circular one. This
encounter should have rapidly produced an attenuation of the eschatological
18 Blumenberg 2001, 335: „Dadurch erscheint alles am Mythos als Kontrast: seine
Leichtigkeit, seine Unverbindlichkeit und Plastizität, seine Disposition für
Spielbarkeit im weitesten Sinne, seine Ungeeignetheit zur Markierung von Ketzern
und Apostaten. Mythologie spricht von ihren Gegenständen wie von etwas, was
man hinter sich hat, nicht nur im Epos mit der Freude, die aus dem Abstreifen
und Hintersichlassen traumatischer Ängste und Drohungen gespeist sein könnte,
sondern auch in der Tragödie […] Nicht der Stoff der Mythos, sondern die ihm
gegenüber zugestandene Distanz des Zuschauers ist das entscheidende Moment.“
Ibid., 341: „Die mythologische Tradition scheint auf Variation und auf die dadurch manifestierbare Unerschöpflichkeit ihres Ausgangsbestandes angelegt zu
sein, wie das Thema musikalischer Variationen darauf, bis an die Grenze der
Unkenntlichkeit abgewandelt werden zu können. […] es darf Vertrautes vorausgesetzt werden, ohne daß eine besondere Sanktion besäße oder dem Zwang einer
konservativen Behandlungsweise unterworfen wäre.“
19 Blumenberg, 2001, 372: „Von herausragender Wichtigkeit für den Mythos und
seine Rezeption ist dabei die Negation des Attributes „Allmacht“. […] Allmacht
verwehrt es im Grunde, von ihrem Träger eine Geschichte zu erzählen. Geschichten
sind, topographisch vorgestellt, immer Umwege, während absolute Macht sich im
Diagramm der kürzesten Verbindung zweier Punkte auslegt.“
20 Blumenberg, 2001, 344: „Der Mythos tendiert nicht ins Absolute, sondern in der
Gegenrichtung zu den Kategorien, die Religion und Metaphysik bestimmen.“
21 Blumenberg, 2001, 373.
22 Cfr. Blumenberg, 2001, 363–364.
Hans Blumenberg’s Reading of Origen of Alexandria
325
projection to the end of the cosmos and a rediscovery of the positive meaning of the world and its institutions. But, at the same time, it should have
threatened the deepest conception of biblical thought: divine omnipotence.
Regarding Origen, this equivocal process became evident in its heretical
consequences: according to Blumenberg, Origen would inexorably become
heretical, because, by attempting a full harmonisation, he was reintroducing
the “myth” right into the heart of his theological system.
Zu der wohl exemplarischen Kollision von mythologischer und geschichtlicher,
zyklisch-geschlossener und linear-offener Grundfigur kam es, als zu Beginn des
3. Jahrhunderts Origenes die kosmische Wiederkehr zur christlichen Metaphysik
machen wollte.23
Blumenberg individuates the focus of Origen’s theological reflection in the
fact that the destruction of the world for him is no more the last, unique
eschatological event, which brings our history to a definite end, but a recurring episode that is part of the more general, providential economy by which
God governs the cosmos and human affairs. Through the succession of
countless worlds and their destruction, God aims at the progressive education and edification of His creatures, who are free to choose their destiny, and who, at the same time, have multiple chances to make the good
choice and return to God. In this view, the succession of worlds is like a
cosmic ritual, and the possibility of multiple existences borrows the strategy
of mythical and platonic thought.
Der theologischen Heilsgeschichte nahm er die vom antiken Wirklichkeitsbegriff
her notwendig anstößige Faktizität des Einmaligen. Er verlieh dieser Geschichte
dafür die höchste Sanktion, die ein aus der mythischen Grundfigur herkommendes
Weltverständnis zu vergeben hatte, nämlich die der Wiederholung […].24
The Origenian cosmic order, according to Blumenberg’s reading, does not
vanish definitively after the judgment, but it is destroyed and reconstructed
again.25 The eschatological punishment is valid for just one eon; it is medicinal, not final. Each world’s cycle reflects the free progression of the creatural desire in the race towards God. Every soul occupies its place in the
cosmic order according to its previous merits and faults. The possibility for
23 Blumenberg, 2001, 387.
24 Blumenberg, 2001, 387.
25 Blumenberg, 2001, 387: „Hatten zuvor nur die Gegner des Christentums zur
Verwechselung der biblischen Eschatologie mit der stoischen Ekpyrosis geneigt
und den Anhängern des neuen Glaubens beschleunigende Wünsche hinsichtlich
des Weltbrandes vorgeworfen, so soll nun das endgültige Ende der Welt zum
innerweltlichen Ereignis, zur wiederkehrenden Episode eines kosmischen Rituals
werden.“
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demons to get salvation also implies going beyond the straight seriousness of
a unique story, and the idea of the inexorability of evil.26
God does not need to definitively revoke the Creation; therefore, the
divine judge does not come into conflict with the creator. The structure of
repetition allows the reconciliation between grace and nature: grace does not
come down to earth “from above”, as a miracle, but it is finally reabsorbed
into the inner and natural participation in the gift of the divine Image. In
other words, the divine gift is not eschatological, but it is the ontological
and natural gift of human freedom. The theme of the intellects’ boredom or
satiety does not have the same seriousness of the forthcoming Augustinian
doctrine of “original sin”,27 because it explains the presence of evil in the
world as an unavoidable tortuosity planned by God himself. Consequently,
Origen does not have any positive conception of God’s infinity or omnipotence: the cosmos is inserted at the core of the theological system, as necessary self-limitation of God.28 The world cannot be the opaque manifestation
of a fathomless will, but it should be intended as the necessary unfolding of
a uniform and rational divine plan that guarantees the freedom of the creatures. The world is part of the become-other of God, as temporal duplication
of His eternal Trinitarian Becoming, and eternal reconciliation of God with
His creature. The uniqueness of historical facts is dissolved into the eternal
becoming of the Spirit.
But – and this is the crucial point – all these anti-eschatological achievements are made possible, according to Blumenberg, by the revival of the
fundamental feature of the ancient worldview: the mythical cyclicity or
circularity.
Das System des Origenes ist noch nicht theologisch im Sinne der späteren Tradition,
sondern es bringt noch einmal […] die Umständlichkeit einer mythischen Struktur
zur Geltung.29
26 Blumenberg, 2001, 388: „Was hier interessiert, ist die Verbindung dieses Prinzips
der begrenzten göttlichen Macht mit der Auflösung der Einzigkeit der heilsgeschichtlichen Fakten im Schema der Wiederholung des Weltlaufs ohne Festlegung
der Akteure jeder Weltperiode auf ihre in der vorhergehenden eingenommenen
Rollen.“
27 Cf. Blumenberg, 2001, 389.
28 Blumenberg, 2001, 388: „Der mythische Akzent liegt auf der Welt, nicht auf
der Macht, die über sie verfügt. Am deutlichsten wird dies am Verhältnis des
Origenes zum neu heraufkommenden theologischen Prinzip der Omnipotenz, das
die theologische Spekulation des folgenden Jahrtausends als der Epoche zwischen
Mythologie und Wissenschaft bestimmen sollte.“
29 Blumenberg, 2001, 387.
Hans Blumenberg’s Reading of Origen of Alexandria
327
The theologian of Alexandria transfers the mythical device to an ontological level. But this way, according to Blumenberg, Origen inevitably had to
become heretical, because of the explicit mythisation of the Christian worldview. The complexity of the mythical structure collides with the biblical
doctrine, in particular with the absolutism of a theological metaphysics that
later would prevail over the first, with Augustinian and scholastic theology.
Origenes ist an der Unvereinbarkeit der Wirklichkeiten gescheitert, die er zusammenzwingen wollte. Sein Entwurf beruhte einerseits auf dem Grundriß einer Struktur,
die noch hinter die traditionsbestimmende antike Metaphysik auf Kategorien des
Mythos zurückgreift, anderseits auf einer Anerkennung des absoluten Ranges der
Freiheit aller Subjekte, einer Konzeption, die den Schöpfer nur noch als Richter zu
integrieren vermochte.30
Blumenberg’s reading of Origen is a good illustration of his entire interpretation of the relationship between Christianity and Western rationality.
The philosopher is not interested in an accurate reconstruction of Origen’s
work and thought, but mainly in the problem of explaining the genesis and
the development of the modern deconstruction of the absoluteness of God
that would explode in the modern age. Blumenberg is interested in showing that the essence of myth conflicts with any theological absolutism, and
precisely for this reason the rediscovery of classical culture and myth in the
Renaissance was to produce the same contradictions and the same process of neutralisation of theological absolutism that was already visible in
Origen.31 In this way, Blumenberg rejects the idea of a christian (Origenian)
“humanistic” and rationalistic theological “matrix” at the basis of modernity, by reinterpreting Origen as a completely Platonic thinker and even a
30 Blumenberg, 2001, 391.
31 Blumenberg, 2001, 391: “Aus dem Scheitern des Origenes folgte, daß die
Endgültigkeiten des einmaligen Heilsprozesses zwischen Schöpfung und Gericht
der Geschichte dieser einen Welt absoluten Rang gaben. Konsequenz war aber
auch die Ungeheuerlichkeit der Vorstellung von der massa damnata als eines
ebenso unabänderlichen wie zur Ertaubung humanen Empfindens zwingenden
absolutistischen Verhängnisses; ihre Artikulation erfolgte als Widerspruch zur
Apokatastasis des Origenes und der mit ihr gegebenen Möglichkeit der Ablösung
selbst noch des Satans in seiner Rolle wie der Dämonen und der Verdammten.
Hier wird die Antithese von Mythos und Geschichte, von Wiederholungsund Endgültigkeitsstruktur am deutlichsten, zugleich damit das Potential der
Mythologie, zum Ausdrucksmittel des Vorbehalts und Widerspruchs gegenüber
den Absolutismen einer theologischen Metaphysik zu werden.“ About the connection between myth and history in Blumenberg, and about the risk of remythization
of history, cf. F. Cassinari, Il mito della storia. La dialettica della ragione storica
nella riflessione di Hans Blumenberg, in A. Borsari (ed.), Hans Blumenberg. Mito,
metafora, modernità, Bologna 1999, pp. 227–256.
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remythologizer – therefore “paganizer” – with respect to biblical theological
devices, originally eschatological and apocalyptic in their nature.
This strained interpretation of Origenian thought is also evident from
other short passages on Origen, for example in the Passion according to
Matthew:
Sogar Origenes, tiefgründigster der frühen Theologen, hatte nicht behauptet, dass
bei seiner Apokatastasis Gottes Widersacher vom untersten Pfuhl der Hölle heraufgezogen werde; er hatte nur bei der Wiederholung des Weltlaufs offenlassen wollen,
dass jeder wieder alles, von oben bis unten, werden und sein könne.32
Blumenberg tends to describe Origen’s thought as not really apocatastatic
(tending towards a definite end of universal salvation), and therefore eschatological, but rather radically cyclical: God’s immense mercy in no way
implies a determinism (not even natural or ontological) of salvation, so it
is not certain that the devil will finally be saved, because the problem is not
identifying a real end of the world: rather, at stake is the assurance of total
freedom of spiritual positioning within the eternal system of the worldly
roles of evil and good.33
In this way, according to Blumenberg, questions of eschatological salvation, as well as of grace and forgiveness, i.e. the traditional instruments of
a theological-political logic of world government, tend to disappear into a
mythical-platonic structure. Worried about admitting the idea of modern
thought being indebted to Christian theology, Blumenberg always outlines
an historical antithesis between two different tendencies or principles. On
the one hand, the dogmatic assertion of the absoluteness and omnipotence
of God, identified tout court with the core of Christian religion, on the
other hand, a pagan, anti-theological, mythical way of emancipation from it
that allows men to assume a positive role in the cosmic order, and to break
free from every overly strict metaphysical boundary through the power of
imagination, of narrations, and through the work of platonic idealisation.34
Consequently, modern progress has more in common with the “myth” than
32 H. Blumenberg, Matthäuspassion, Frankfurt 1988, 82015, 292.
33 Blumenberg, 2001, 388–389: „Die Harmonisierung von mythischem Zyklus und
heilsbezogener Freiheit der individuellen Subjekte besteht darin, dass zwar in jedem
Umlauf der Welt dieselben „Stellen“ im System, vom Engel bis zum Satan, zu
vergeben sind, dass aber ihre Verteilung Resultat des Gerichts über die vorhergehende Weltepoche ist. Die Freiheit bringt jedesmal wieder Bewegung in das Reich
beseligter Ruhe und Ungeschiedenheit des göttlichen Geistes und der den Gott
genießenden Geister.“
34 This results also from the considerations on gnosticism which will be carried out
in Arbeit am Mythos.
Hans Blumenberg’s Reading of Origen of Alexandria
329
with faith in the sovereignty of God, because it necessarily conflicts with the
anti-humanistic and nihilistic heart of the kerygma of Christian origins.
Now it is becoming (hopefully) clearer why Origen does not occupy any
privileged role in Blumenberg’s analysis. According to the philosopher, his
figure is ambiguous, and his theological system is too equivocal, because of
the compromise between the efforts of Platonic philosophy that would be
renewed at the threshold of modern age and the dogmatic residues of theological absolutism. The turn of modernity has a connection with Origenian
theology insofar it renews its mythising and anti-theological effects, letting
modern men emancipate themselves from any theological metaphysics. At
the same time, this way it becomes possible to problematise Blumenberg’s
thesis, by noting his strained interpretation, which has the paradoxical
consequence of dividing Origen from the essence of Christianity. The philosopher of the Legitimacy of the Modern Age is obliged to recognise a
discontinuity inside Christian history, between two different sources: one
biblical and the other Hellenistic. In this way, the whole Origenian tradition,
including Cusanus and Bruno, is surprisingly described as having an antiChristian destiny. As the author writes emblematically in Die Lesbarkeit der
Welt, every Pelagianism tends to increase the quality of the Creation, and, by
allowing nature to absorb the entire quality of the divine, tends to become
pantheistic, as in Giordano Bruno’s and Spinoza’s thought:
Insofern ist, ganz unabhängig von Zusammenhängen ihrer Herkunft, die Metapher
vom Buch der Natur ihrer dogmengeschichtlichen Zuordnung nach pelagianisch.
Sobald es auf Abwehr von Dualismen nicht mehr ankam und die Natur die ganze
Qualität der Gottheit in ihrer Selbstausschüttung zu absorbieren begann, mußte
sie antichristlich werden und wurde es. Jeder Pelagianismus tendiert, wie weit der
Weg auch sein mag, darauf, die Qualität der Schöpfung unlimitiert zu steigern, und
damit auf einen Pantheismus wie den Giorndano Bruno und Spinoza.35
The Pelagian (and Origenian) idea of the human freedon and capacity to
reach God on the basis of good works or merits testifies to a paradigm that
subordinates divine power, and consequently the theological structure
that mediates with it, to human spiritual autonomy. This fact does not
mean that Blumenberg denies that there would be a Christian humanism,
but only that, as time went on, the ambivalence between anthropocentric
and theocentric motifs inside Christian theology would prove to be antinomic. The anthropological interest seems to demand the pantheistic overcoming of Christian dualism.
This interpretation explains why Blumenberg ended up inserting Cusanus
inside an epochal threshold whose completion is actually Giordano Bruno.
35 H. Blumenberg, Die Lesbarkeit der Welt, Frankfurt 1981, 21986, 35–36.
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In this way, indeed, Blumenberg points out how the category of infinity
can produce the modern self-affirmation only with Bruno’s final rejection
of Christological dogmatics. Cusanus is considered only as a forerunner of
the epochal threshold, because he forces the theological-eschatological perspective into a single, unstable structure, that is, the need of maintaining
the factor of God’s transcendence, but at the same time the contradictory
approaching of man and, through him, of the cosmos to the qualities of
that transcendence. According to Blumenberg, the concept of divine infinity
should paradoxically lead to the overcoming of the dualistic and hierarchical
relationship between mundane copies and origin, since the notion of copy or
trace has to absorb the entire ambit of human thinkability and knowability.
If Creation is neither an act of authority nor the decree of a Sovereign who
reserves the right to govern it, but the expression of God’s gift of infinity,
indirectly this means the exponential growth of the quality of creation, as in
a movement of absorption of the prerogatives of the absolute by the world,
which makes it the “self-limitation of God”:
Aber schon hier, beim Cusaner, ist klar, daß die Schöpfung nicht mehr der bloße
Hoheitsakt der Gottheit ist, nicht mehr das souveräne Dekret beliebigen Inhalts, das
die Nominalisten als Inbegriff der Transzendenz ansahen, sondern ein Akt, in den
die Essenz des Urhebers unausweichlich investiert werden mußte, bei dem es keinen
willkürlichen Vorbehalt geben konnte. Das Universum ist Gleichnis des Absoluten,
es entfaltet in Zeit und Raum die ursprüngliche Einheit, die complicatio, und
daher ist Bewegung die Grundbestimmung der Natur, denn sie ist die Entfaltung
ursprünglicher Einheit, die explicatio quietis.36
Making the world the appearance of the invisible God also means making
God “the invisibility of the visible.”37 The difference between earthly and
otherworldly sight tends to disappear, and the world can become the place
of the relationship with the divine truth, which no longer has eschatologicalmetaphysical dimension.
What distinguishes Cusanus from Nolanus is the persistence of the theological framework, which does not allow the former to carry out the pantheistic effects of his doctrine. Cusanus bases the possibility of the relationship
between creation and God on the truth of the Incarnation. Though by making it the revelation of the eternal logic of determination and contraction
of God in the world, that is, of the manifestation of the invisible infinity of
God in the finite limit, the whole system of the docta ignorantia finds its own
keystone in the second person of the Trinity. This is the only singular and
36 Blumenberg, 1966, 474–475.
37 Blumenberg, 1966, 465: „Die Welt ist nicht nur die Erscheinung des unsichtbaren
Gottes, sondern Gott ist die Unsichtbarkeit der Sichtbaren selbst.“
Hans Blumenberg’s Reading of Origen of Alexandria
331
paradoxical point of tangency between finite determination and the indeterminate infinity of God the Father, or rather the impossible overlap – dogmatically postulated – between the circumference and the polygon inscribed
in it towards which Creation tends. This device allows Cusanus’ Platonism
to preserve a theological government of the dialectics between the invisible (and proper) essence in God and its earthly revelation. Cusanus’ system
remains a compromise between theological personalism and the rediscovery
of the quality of the world.38 The “paradox” of the Incarnation guarantees
the possibility of temporal progress and a hierarchy between sensible and
supersensible, as well as the necessity of faith as a meta-intellectual leap in
the absolute centre; in other words, a way of eschatologically reaching the
coincidence of divine and human, unity and difference, inside the Trinity.
From this point of view the cosmos is still subject to theological hypotheca,
being conceivable only as an ambiguous and momentary self-limitation of
God, who can never exhaust the ulteriority of the divine abyss.39
38 Blumenberg, 1966, 545–547: „Die Verleiblichung des Wortes war beim Cusaner
Ergänzung und Vollendung der Schöpfung, complementum et quies, wie es in der
Predigt Dies Sanctificatus heißt. Erst in dieser göttlichen Selbsteinfügung in die
Schöpfung aktualisiert sich die Macht Gottes vollends […]. Das aber hatte zur
Voraussetzung, daß die Zeit, durch die ein Abstand zwischen der Schöpfung und
der Inkarnation inmitten der Geschichte gelegt wird, ein rein menschliches Maß der
Sukzessivität ist, das an die innere und wesentliche Einheit des göttlichen Handelns
angelegt wird. Dem entsprach die Theorie des Cusaners von der Zeit als einer aus
dem Menschengeist produzierten Kategorie. In der Zeitform menschlicher Rede
ist es dann zulässig und notwendig zu sagen, daß die Schöpfung unvollständig und
unvollendet war und einen Vorbehalt des der Gottheit Möglichen enthielt, bevor
sie ihr christologisches Komplement empfing. […] Trotz der Anstrengung, das
voluntaristische Element aus seiner Metaphysik zu eliminieren, hatte doch auch
der Cusaner es nur gleichsam weiter zurückverlegt, im Dunkel der spekulativen
Vorgeschichte der Schöpfung schwerer erkennbar werden lassen. […] Man kann
greifen, daß dies ein verzweifelter Versuch ist, die Faktizität der Welt als rationales Ärgernis zu beheben und gleichzeitig die Personalität Gottes zu retten; aber
gerade die Angestrengtheit dieses Versuches markiert den Weg, der statt auf die als
unmöglich erscheinende Lösung des Problems auf seine Eliminierung hinführt.“
39 Blumenberg, 1966, 520: „Hier gerät das Nachdenken über die Allmacht,
das bewegendste Motiv der spätmittelalterlichen Spekulation, in eine seiner
Antinomien: wenn das Universum die schöpferische Potenz seines Ursprungs
erschöpfte, wäre es zugleich die Begrenzung dieser Potenz, insofern es das Nichtmehr-Können manifestierte; insofern das Universum aber das Werk des höchsten
Weisheit und Güte sein soll, die sich in ihm manifestiert, ist es unvorstellbar, daß
jene Potenz sich in ihrer Selbstverschwendung nicht vorausgabt haben und das
größte ihr Mögliche nicht realisiert haben könnte. So muß die Schöpfung einerseits
die höchste mögliche Vollkommenheit besitzen und darf doch andererseits nicht
die Grenze des in ihrem Ursprung Möglichen erreichen. Anders formuliert: wenn
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The sense of Cusanus’ speculation is still that of reaching a soterical otherworldliness and an eschatological gnosis: it is in the final apocatastasis of
all reality that the movement of reunification between God and creature is
resolved: it is in Jesus Christ that God has given Himself totally, not in the
world.40 It should be noted that also in this case Blumenberg – exactly as in
the case of Origen – deconstructs Cusanus’ philosophy as a failed attempt to
hold together irreconcilable reasons:41 anthropological against theological.
Wenn der Cusaner versucht, den Menschen als ein Geschöpf der göttlichen
Selbstverschwendung zu beschreiben, so handelt er dabei, als sei ihm bewußt, daß
sich beim Versagen dieser Anstrengung die Steigerung des Menschen nicht mit der
Theologie, sondern gegen die Theologie vollziehen würde.42
The relevance of the Nolanus consists of producing the definitive collapse
of the theological-escatological system, through which the possibility of
escaping from the dualistic configuration of the Christian world is definitively reached.43 The problem with which Cusanus had struggled, and with
which every confrontation with the crisis at the end of the medieval era had
40
41
42
43
Gott die Welt nicht zu dem höchstmöglichen vollkommenen Werk machen konnte,
weil er dabei sich selbst widersprochen hätte, dann hätte er dieses Werk nicht
wollen dürfen. Darauf beruht der in dem Predigtzitat ausgeführte Gedanke, daß
das Universum überhaupt nicht wäre, wenn es nicht zur Vollkommenheit hätte
gebracht werden können. Diese Antinomie wird durch die Inkarnation „gelöst“.“
Blumenberg, 1966, 499: „Für den Cusaner war es noch ganz fraglos, dass die
Welt trotz ihrer Unendlichkeit dem Menschengeist keinen wesensgemäßen, voll
genügenden Gegenstand darbieten konnte.“
Blumenberg, 1966, 487–488: „Der Cusaner hat versucht, zwischen der Scylla des
scholastischen Rationalismus und der Charybdis des Nominalismus hindurch zu
manövrieren. […] Aber dabei kommt heraus, wie wenig dieses Lehrstück für die
dem Cusaner sich geschichtlich stellende Aufgabe wirklich leistet, sobald es nicht
mehr und nicht nur mystische Verdunkelung, sondern Harmonisierung destruktiv
unverträglicher Positionen zustande bringen soll.“
Blumenberg, 1966, 497–498.
Blumenberg, 1966, 524: „Bruno starb für einen Widerspruch, der sich gegen
das Zentrum und die Substanz des christlichen Systems richtete.“ See also ibid.
527: „An dieses Universum hat sich die Gottheit bereits in der Schöpfung voll
ausgegeben, und da sie gegenüber der Unendlichkeit der Welten nichts zurückhielt und zurückhalten konnte, bleibt ihr gegenüber keinem Wesen dieser Welt
etwas nachzuholen, keine Möglichkeit des „Übernatürlichen“. Nur der unendliche
Kosmos selbst kann Phänomenalität, so etwas wie Verleiblichung der Gottheit sein,
die als Person – also an ein bestimmtes, durch eine Zeitstelle faktisch gemachtes
Weltwesen gebunden – zu denken, dem Nolarer unvollziehbar geworden ist. Beim
Nolaner sind die im System des Cusaners sorgfältig verhehlten oder noch geschichteten Konflikte voll durchgehalten, im Ternar von Theologie, Kosmologie und
Anthropologie sind Alternativen gestellt und entschieden.“
Hans Blumenberg’s Reading of Origen of Alexandria
333
to deal – the stabilisation of the world against theological absolutism – is
now achieved by the overlapping of deity and worldliness. This could only
be reached, however, by overcoming the dogma of the Incarnation on which
the whole tradition was based, precisely because it was a paradoxical, divine
medium between the finite and the infinite.44
Christ’s place, that of the second person of the Trinity and the generated manifestation of the divine, could be taken by the divinisation of the
cosmos itself, that cosmos which Christianity had once relegated to a place
of shadow and sin. If the world is the supreme theophany, the only-begotten,
it now becomes the eternal emanation of God himself, the self-reproduction
or self-exhaustion of his donating and generative power in the physical
infinity of the universe.45 Without an absolute centre, high and low, above
and below, true and false, they lose their absolute significance; history can
once again have a cyclical conformation, and man no longer has a final
direction towards which to direct his curiosity, but he can ground his theoretical performances on himself and on his needs.46
44 Blumenberg, 1966, 540: „Das Problem, mit dem der Cusaner gerungen hatte und
mit dem jede Auseinandersetzung mit der endmittelalterlichen Krise es zu tun
haben mußte: die Stabilisierung der Welt gegenüber der Infragestellung durch den
theologischen Absolutismus, wird nun nicht mehr über eine Bildlichkeitsbeziehung,
sondern durch die Kongruenz von Gottheit und Weltlichkeit erreicht. Man kann
dies getrost als „Naturalisierung“ bezeichnen, weil es die Stelle der göttlichen
Willenshoheit mit der Notwendigkeit der Selbstübertragung des Göttlichen in das
Weltliche […] umbesetzt.“
45 Blumenberg, 1966, 545: „Das Universum des Giordano Bruno, als die notwendige
und rückhaltlose Vollstreckung der potentia absoluta des Schöpfergottes, besetzt
den systematischen Stellenraum, der beim Cusaner durch die innertrinitarischen
Zeugung einer göttlichen Person, durch die Erschaffung der Welt und durch die
Verklammerung beider in der Menschwerdung des Gottessohnes besetzt worden war“.
46 Blumenberg, 1966, 549–551: „Damit ist zugleich etwas gesagt über die Weise, wie
Welt in der Gottheit gründet und aus ihr hervorgeht: nämlich als die sich manifestierende Unverborgenheit des sich nicht vorenthalten könnenden Gottes. Daß eine
Welt ist, liegt im Wesen, nicht im Willen der Gottheit begründet. Die Welt ist das
Korrelat der Impersonalität Gottes, und deshalb ist sie Manifestation, aber nicht
Offenbarung. Offenbarung setzt das Verbergenkönnen und Fürsichbehalten als
Möglichkeit voraus. Die Welt ist nicht Mitteilung der Gottheit, und darum nicht
das „Buch der Natur“, sie ist nicht ausdruckshaft akzentuiert, nicht „Ordnung“ im
Sinne einer dem Willen und seinen Setzungen entspringenden und einem anderen
Willen verbindlich zu machenden Beurkundung. Die Natur des Nolaners provoziert nicht die Hermeneutik einer lex naturalis. Sie ist azentrish, indifferent in jeder
ihrer Gestalten gegenüber jeder anderen und auf jeder ihrer Stellen gegenüber
allen anderen; daher ist sie erfüllt von Bewegung und von der Metamorphose
der Gestalten, daher ist sie […] beherrscht von principium rationis insufficientis,
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Ludovico Battista
As a result, the human desire can finally legitimately enjoy the world and
rediscover the sensible realities as its legitimate objects.47 The progress of the
human intellect, which passed from the sensible to the supersensible and to
the eternal truths in God, no longer finds a point of vertical arrest in the faith
in Christ, but it is forced into an incessant horizontal movement, an eccentric, heroic fugue: it is forced to pass from one object to another, since there
is nothing that can exhaust its critical fury, in the absolute relativisation of
any metaphysical hierarchy. The universe becomes a set of traces, signs, or
varied manifestations of the inscrutable abyssal infinity of God. The human
desire, by crossing and consuming every determination in the movement of
erotic fusion with nature, finally finds pleasure in the search itself, in the
insatiability of wandering; it discovers nothing behind the phenomena but
itself and its own necessity, and this discovery causes the positive liberation
soweit man irgendeine andere Frage als die nach dem Seinsrecht des Ganzen stellt.
„Pluralität der Welten“ ist hier nicht nur rhetorische Hyperbel, sondern notwendiger Ausdruck des Prinzips der Vorbehaltlosigkeit im Ursprung des Wirklichen.
[…] Das Pathos der Pluralität der Welten […] beruht auf der metaphysischen
Versicherung, daß die Gottheit alles hergegeben und der Welt überlassen habe, in
der deshalb aus allem alles werden kann. Mag das hier auch noch nicht als Appell
an den Wirkungswillen des Menschen aufgefaßt werden können, so impliziert es
doch so etwas wie einen metaphysischen Urbefehl, wie ihn Bruno in der Vorrede zu
den Eroici Furori der Verwandlerin Kirke in den Mund legt, die Welt von Gestalt
zu Gestalt zu durchlaufen und sich im Kreislauf der Formen Realität um Realität
zuzueignen. Wenn die Welt so nichts anderes als die wesenhafte Unverstelltheit
der Gottheit selbst ist, der Ding gewordene Widerspruch zum deus absconditus
der Theologie, dann kann es auch in der Zeitlichkeit ihres Bestehens keine ausgezeichneten Augenblicke geben, dann hat es keinen Sinn, von einem Anfang zu
sprechen, in dem der Bestand der Welt als eine eidetisch feste und sich immer erhaltende oder immer wieder regenerierende Substanz gesetzt worden ist, so daß alles
Weitere nur von diesem „Anfang“ abhängig wäre. Die Zeit selbst wird vielmehr
zur realen Dimension der stetigen, aber in jedem ihrer Augenblicke gleichwertigen
Selbstreproduktion Gottes“.
47 Blumenberg, 1966, 538–539: „Sie [die implizite Kritik an den theologischen
Grundvorstellungen des Christentums] wendet sich gegen die voluntaristische
und nominalistische Begründung der „Rechtfertigung“, also gegen die dem
späten Mittelalter und der Reformation gemeinsame Doktrin des unergründlichen
Dualismus von Erwählung und Verwerfung. Was Wohlgefälligkeit des Menschen
bei der Gottheit sein kann, darf weder der Verborgenheit noch einer rational nicht
zugänglichen Offenbarung überlassen sein. […] Die Bäume, die in den Gärten des
Gesetzes wachsen, sind von den Göttern dazu bestimmt, Früchte zu bringen, und
zwar solche Früchte, von denen die Menschen sich nähren und erhalten können
und an denen die Götter kein anderes Interesse und Wohlgefallen haben als dieses –
das ist deutlich gegen ein Paradies gerichtet, in dem verbotene oder der Gottheit
allein vorbehaltene Früchte wachsen.“
Hans Blumenberg’s Reading of Origen of Alexandria
335
of libido and curiositas. The cyclical and anti-eschatological structure of
myth, through Platonism, triumphs again over theological absolutism, as
was also shown about Origen’s theology.
In this regard, an explicative note on Origen (number 34 of part VI,
chapter III) is also contained in the Legitimacy of the Modern Age. In this
note, Blumenberg cites the preface to De gli eroici furori, in which Bruno
makes the sorceress Circe pronounce the command to traverse the world
from form to form and to appropriate reality after reality in the succession of forms, recalling the fact that in this context Bruno himself refers to
Origen. He points out, however, that the Nolanus’ interpretation is somewhat misleading, because Origen’s apocatastasis must not be conceived as
the “lawfulness of a physical revolution” of the contents of the world, but
as the institution of new worlds “in a temporal succession”, because of the
need to respect the free moral decision of the previous stage. In this way,
Blumenberg emphasises the difference between Bruno and Origen: while
in Bruno the universe is an “impersonal” eternal becoming of worlds, and
for this reason the infinite succession of worlds is also simultaneously conceived of spatially, in Origen the universe remains structured according to a
“theological personalization”, for which the plurality of worlds is “a succession of judgment and creation in time.”48 Despite this due clarification, the
comparison presupposes the identification of a similar assertion about the
cyclical structure as a way of human relief (Entlastung) from absoluteness
(of time and God).49 Nonetheless, the philosopher’s reading confirms the
48 Blumenberg, 1966, 550n: „Kirke personifiziert hier die omniparente materia.
Aufschlußreich ist die in diesem Zusammenhang gegebene Fehlinterpretation der
Apokatastasis des Origenes, die als Gesetzlichkeit einer physischen Revolution
des Weltbestandes aufgefasst ist, während bei Origenes selbst die jeweils neue
Weltsetzung Ergebnis und Gestaltwerdung der freien sittlichen Entscheidung der
vorhergehenden Weltphase ist […]. Dieses beiläufige Mißverständnis ist deshalb
so aufschlußreich, weil der Nolaner die gerade seine Authentizität indizierende
Differenz zu dem großen Weltsystematiker Origenes übergeht, die in der durchgehenden Personalisierung des Universums dort, in der konsequenten Impersonalität
hier besteht. Dem entspricht, daß die Pluralität der Welten bei Origenes eine
Folge von Gericht und Schöpfung in der Zeit, bei Bruno eine Gleichzeitigkeit im
Raume ist.“
49 About the notions of absolutism as a key-term for understanding the spirit of
Blumenberg’s philosophy, see O. Marquard, Entlastung vom Absoluten, in F.J.
Wetz / H. Timm (eds.), Die Kunst des Überlebens, Frankfurt 1999, 17–22. The
theme of absolutism will keep a constitutive role also in Blumenberg’s complex
reflection on myth. Blumenberg uses the phrase “absolutism of reality” to indicate an anthropological, de-theologised concept, which allows explaining the
roots of our experience of “finiteness” (Endlichkeit). See B. Merker, Bedürfnis
nach Bedeutsamkeit. Zwischen Lebenswelt und Absolutismus der Wirklichkeit,
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crucial value of Origen to facing the problem of modern rationality’s debt
towards Christian theology.
Conclusion
To problematise Blumenberg’s perspective on Origen, one may question
whether we should not consider even him as an heir of a German philosophical trajectory that, from Cusanus to Leibniz, Lessing, and the so-called
Liberalität, has its theological roots in the radical and rationalist religious
movements that have arisen with the rediscovery of Origen during the
Reformation. Is Blumenberg’s study about metaphors as “non-conceptual”
temporary tools to elaborate our experience of reality not itself historically
dependent on the Origenian way of considering the process of knowledge?
Does the philosopher’s metaphorology not reveal a “christian” background,
the protrusion of the absolute, or of the gratuitous (originally conceived
theologically), inside the immanence of the subject, that justifies the creative dynamism and freedom of human imagination, open to the future?
Does the Origenian tradition not condition his strained interpretation of
the pagan myth, conceived of as being capable of an anti-dogmatic process
of historicisation and “dissemination” of meaning? It is difficult to deny
the philosopher’s dependence upon the Liberalität tradition, and upon hermeneutics of unavailable and elusive ulteriority, specially when considering
his biographical trajectory of research that leads to Cusanus and Nolanus,
which had started from the purely theological investigations of Augustine
and had then searched other humanistic and non-Augustinian restitutions of
the transcendence. The same continuous, close confrontation with Christian
theology, even after the anthropological turning point of his philosophy,
confirms that Blumenberg developed his reflection on the metaphor and on
the non-conceptual through the analysis of this “Origenian” trajectory of
thought. This impression is further reinforced by the author’s strained reinterpretation of Origen, Cusanus and Nolanus, which seeks to distinguish
within the history of Christian theology between a Greek-platonic, Pelagian
in: F.J. Wetz / H. Timm (eds.), Die Kunst des Überlebens. Nachdenken über Hans
Blumenberg, Frankfurt 1999, 207–225., 68–98; P. Caloni, La ragione sulla soglia
tra assolutismo e contingenza della realtà, in: Dianoia 27 (2018), 149–161. About
Blumenberg’s philosophical anthropology, see also J.C. Monod, L’interdit anthro
pologique chez Husserl et Heidegger et sa transgression par Blumenberg, in: Revue
Germanique Internationale 10 (2009), 221–236; F. Gruppi, Dialettica della cav
erna. Hans Blumenberg tra antropologia e politica, Milano – Udine 2017.
Hans Blumenberg’s Reading of Origen of Alexandria
337
and ultimately anti-Christian principle, and an Augustinian, eschatologicalapocalyptic personalism or absolutism.50
On the other hand, Blumenberg’s refusal to interpret in this way modernity and his own metaphorology depends on the theoretical and philosophical necessity to contrast any theological device of metaphysical insurance
with the self-legitimating anthropological background of modern knowledge, which the thesis of self-assertion makes evident. He is is aware of
the historical problems that Origen represents, of the link between modern
rationality and theological devices that he brings to light, but he wants to
outline an alternative, mythologising and anti-Christian conception of the
50 I find noteworthy the investigation carried out by E. Brient into Cusanus, where
the author demonstrates the possibility of reversing Blumenberg’s argumentations. Brient 2002, 250–251: “[…] Cusanus’ Christology serves the fundamental
‘assertion need’ or measure. This is a need which Bruno does not yet recognize,
but one which becomes more and more pressing as celebration of the world’s
infinity gives way to an uncanny sense of homelessness and orientationlessness in
the newly infinitized universe. […] Blumenberg is surely correct when he identifies
human self-assertion as a characteristically modern existential attitude toward the
world, and he is right to identify the primary expression of that self-assertion in
the extraordinary productivity and progress of modern science. The possibility of
that progress, however, presupposes an understanding of nature as a law-like and
yet inexhaustible field of investigation directing thought ‘toward an objectivity’,
to use Blumenberg’s formulation, ‘that is never entirely to be reached, received
or accomplished’. The peculiarly modern notion of such a regulative ideal, guiding the (potentially unending) progress of knowledge, finds its origins precisely
in that limited concept which Cusanus took to be the intersection of two orders
of infinity: the mind’s unending capacity to transcend itself, and the absolute
infinity of reality, which is not other than what it is.” What Brient overlooks,
however, is precisely the fact that in Blumenberg’s perspective the same category
of progress is ambiguous, for the theological background that remains in the
idea of a teleology of reason that should progressively gain a definitive truth and
assert itself against every myth. On the contrary, the choice of Bruno as paradigm
for the epochal threshold confirms the point of view of an inconceptual theory,
which, by completely getting free from any teleological system, affirms reason in
its mythopoietic and metaphorical capacity. Blumenberg’s investigation, therefore, is not an apology of Enlightenment modernity as a project of universal and
absolute rationality, but a reflection on the weakened and functional status of
reason, that rediscovers the function of the myth, echoes Nietzschean reflections,
and aims at a complete anthropologisation of knowledge. See this lapidary statement by J. Goldstein about Blumenberg’s theory of modern age: «Modernität
ist Perspektivität», which opens the article: J. Goldstein, Deutung und Entwurf.
Perspektiven der historischen Vernunft, in Deutung und Entwurf. Perspektiven der
historischen Vernunft, in: F.J. Wetz / H. Timm (eds.), Die Kunst des Überlebens.
Nachdenken über Hans Blumenberg, Frankfurt 1999, 207–225.
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genesis of modern rationality. Blumenberg wants to delete or remove any
genetic trace of Christian theology, considering the only way to emancipate
rationality to be the inevitable overcoming of Christian apocalyptic, absolutism, and dualism. The case of Origen perfectly demonstrates this radical
attempt.
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General Index
Absolutism 14, 143, 316–317,
327, 329, 333, 335, 337–338
Accommodation of the Logos,
the 14, 32, 63, 192–193, 198
Allegory 27–28, 33–34, 37, 49,
52, 65, 124, 131, 170–171,
173–174, 179, 187, 238, 244–
246, 268–269, 272, 319, 323
Anthropology 12, 15, 30, 65,
91–93, 98, 102, 168, 196, 214,
301, 318–319, 321, 324, 329,
332, 335–336
Apokatastasis 10, 13, 24–25, 27,
30, 40, 48, 162, 182, 186, 197,
215–216, 221, 223–224, 226,
229–233, 245, 252, 275–276,
279–282, 327–328, 332, 335
Apologetics 109, 186, 276–277
Apophatic theology 50, 52
Aufhebung, the notion of 14,
283, 285–288, 291, 293–296,
300–300, 302–303, 308, 310,
313–314, 324
Augustinism 14, 143
Bride 118, 122, 125, 195
Bridegroom 118, 122, 125
Charity 190–196, 198, 228
Christianity 9, 21–23, 37, 44–46,
52, 109, 166, 170, 172, 174,
176, 195–196, 207, 241, 289,
294, 308, 315, 323–324, 327,
329, 333
Christology 39, 43, 49, 52, 70,
74, 77, 79, 83, 85, 141, 278,
281, 304–305, 319, 330–
331, 337
Conversion 19–21, 23, 26, 28,
30, 33, 40, 43, 45, 86, 163, 217,
219, 238, 267
Cosmology 177, 291
Creation 20–21, 25–27, 31–32,
34, 40, 56–58, 62–63, 70,
81–83, 86, 88, 97, 111–112,
179, 181–186, 197, 209–210,
212, 229, 238, 240, 248, 261,
276–277, 300, 309–310, 313,
319, 326, 330–331, 335
Cross (of Christ) 22, 261, 277–
279, 282, 292, 305, 308
Culture 9, 21–22, 46, 187, 192,
251, 254–255, 276, 293, 327
Daimon(s) 291–292, 295, 298–
300, 303, 311
Damnation 203, 211, 278–279
Desire 11, 18–19, 21, 26–30,
32–34, 37, 39–41, 43–44, 47–
53, 82, 87evil, 114, 119–122,
124–126, 155, 159, 162–163,
190, 267, 300, 303, 310, 312,
318–320, 325, 334
Diversity 31, 59, 144–145,
150, 237
Divinization 29, 47, 96, 100, 290,
292, 333
Dogma 13, 18, 34–35, 37–39, 68,
88, 136–137, 142, 168, 173,
176, 189–190, 197, 199, 207,
210, 231, 246, 254, 265–266,
269–272, 275–277, 319, 323,
328–331, 333
Dualism 18–20, 33, 38, 88,
101, 188, 300, 311, 319, 329,
334, 338
Ecclesiology 73, 196–197,
262, 271
Enlightenment 13, 43, 235–236,
239, 251–252, 337
Epektasis, the concept of 43, 126
380
General Index
Epoptic, the concept of 106–108
Eros, the concept of 113–126,
292, 300
Eschatology 14, 23, 26, 39, 44,
52–53, 72, 141, 149, 187, 214–
216, 222, 225, 231, 286–288,
293–294, 303–305, 307–308,
312–313, 323–326, 328, 330–
332, 337
Evil 19–20, 29, 45–47, 53, 60–61,
63, 94, 98, 128, 131, 144,
148, 151, 160, 207, 211, 230,
326, 328
Fall, the (theology) 15, 20, 26,
29–30, 32, 41, 57–58, 60–62,
97, 296–297, 309–310
– Second act of creation 56–58
Freedom of will 14, 18, 20–21,
23–28, 30–33, 40, 43, 47–48,
52, 59–60, 88, 92, 102, 156,
196, 295, 300, 319, 326, 328
Fulfillment 288, 301, 307, 320
Gnosticism 66–72, 75–76, 84,
88–89, 294, 303, 307
– Valentinianism 10, 37, 52,
70–72, 76–80, 82–85, 89, 242,
294, 305, 314
God, nature of 11, 18–19
Good, the 43, 59–60, 62, 145,
151, 163, 241, 295, 299–300
Grace 12, 15, 18, 20–21, 25, 33,
47–50, 89, 100, 142–143, 149,
151, 154–156, 158, 162, 191,
193, 195, 199, 203, 208–211,
228, 238, 266, 271–272, 277,
279, 289–290, 300, 313, 315,
326, 328
Growth 22, 25, 99, 188, 194,
270, 312, 330
Heresiology 9, 37, 69, 71, 73, 77
History (the concept of) 9–10, 13–
15, 21, 23, 31, 44, 49, 52–53,
94, 101, 106, 278, 281, 302,
323–324, 327, 333
Humanism 12, 15–16, 212, 329
Imago Dei 21–22, 27, 29, 44, 47,
59, 209
– mens imago 27–28, 48
Impassibility 11, 122–126
Incarnation 31, 38, 41, 57,
282, 287–288, 306–307, 330–
331, 333
Intellect/Nous/ Rational being 10,
19, 21–31, 40, 45, 47, 52, 55,
57–64, 120–121, 124, 159, 208,
295, 319–320, 326, 334
Intensification 11, 125–126
Judaism 37, 323
Judgement 19–21, 214, 277
Justice 62, 81, 97, 100, 144–145,
147–151, 204–205, 207–
211, 232
– Injustice 62, 144, 146–147,
150–151
Justification 47, 156, 206–207,
210, 240–241
Kabbalah 12, 165–183, 186, 224,
232, 242
Kingdom of God 62, 244, 269
Knowledge of God 22, 42, 100,
210, 228, 311, 320
Language 106–108, 111–112,
178, 204–205, 231, 236, 238–
239, 243–244, 246–252,
294
Law 20, 33, 44–45, 59–60, 79,
97, 165, 170, 177, 179, 237,
287–289, 314
– law, natural 44, 60, 191, 194,
250–251
Law of love, the 285, 299–301,
304, 308, 310–311, 313
Laziness 58, 60, 62
General Index
Logoi 11, 22–24, 26, 40–41, 44,
50, 111–112
Logos 11, 18–20, 22–25, 27,
30–34, 37, 38–42, 45, 48–52,
56–58, 63–64, 96–97, 99–100,
108, 111–112, 125, 285, 291,
300–301, 306–307, 312
Love 13, 25–30, 33–34, 39–40, 43,
46, 91, 106, 109, 113–114, 118–
119, 121–122, 124–126, 188,
191, 193–196, 199, 204, 207,
224, 232, 238, 285, 292, 298–
301, 303–304, 308, 310–314
Marcionism 19–20, 256
Mercy of God 26, 61, 134, 148,
151, 156, 168, 190–191, 198,
208, 214, 224, 230, 328
Millenarianism 213–215, 218–
221, 225–227, 229–230
Mysticism 15, 18, 52, 66–68,
73–74, 91–93, 95, 100, 319
Nag Hammadi codices 66,
70, 76, 78
Natural science 276
Neglect 57, 59–62
Neuroscience 11, 91–92, 101–102
Ontology 12, 25, 43, 52, 110
Origenism 9–10, 12–13, 15,
18, 155, 167, 254, 257, 266,
272–273, 292, 295, 298, 301,
303–304, 310, 319
Paideia, the concept of 18,
263, 273
Pelagianism 100, 154, 329, 336
Perfection 20–21, 24–30, 39–42,
45, 48, 50–51, 142, 146, 150–
151, 178, 248, 309, 319
Philosophy
– Ancient logic 105, 110
– Aristotelianism 12, 110, 112,
120, 143, 153, 155, 158, 297,
304, 308
381
– Platonism 77, 89, 114, 141,
175, 245, 266, 331, 335
– Middle Platonism 110
– Neo Platonism 294
– Rational philosophy 237–239,
242, 245
– Scholasticism 105, 127, 320
– Stoicism 109
Pietism 214–216, 220, 237, 241–
242, 251
Predestination 143, 146–150,
154, 156, 159, 203, 208–209,
211, 277–278
Protology 40, 68
Rationality 240, 246, 249, 252,
316, 321–322, 327, 336–338
Rational perception 132–133, 138
Reality 15, 27, 29, 31, 33, 38, 52,
55–56, 103, 277, 279, 293, 297,
318, 323, 332, 335–337
Reason 38, 52, 98, 100, 135, 139,
142–143, 190–191, 203, 205,
209, 212, 222, 225, 231, 233,
236, 238, 240–241, 244–247,
249–252, 278, 293, 337
Recapitulation 13
Redemption 14–15, 20, 25–26,
142–143, 152, 157, 163, 214,
223–225, 232, 275
Regress 26, 29, 55–59, 61–62, 64
Resurrection 217–219, 269, 277,
279–282, 292, 304–305
Revelation 12–13, 18–19, 21–23,
32–37, 39, 46–47, 49, 52,
70–71, 75, 79–81, 87, 114, 276,
278, 280–282, 289–290, 303,
305, 307, 319–320, 330–331
Sacrament 66, 69, 88, 172, 175,
178, 189, 198, 283, 289
– Baptism 178, 189, 190,
194–195
– Eucharist 189, 198
– Penance 190, 195
Scriptural obscurity 207–208
382
General Index
Silence 176, 196
Sin 20–21, 25, 28–30, 47, 58–59,
61–62, 71, 95, 143, 147, 152,
190, 198, 207, 211, 239, 277,
279–280, 291, 295–296, 300,
326, 333
Sophia 71, 81, 111–112
Soteriology 12, 202, 206, 208
Soul 11, 28, 40–43, 46, 51, 60–
62, 73, 83, 85–86, 88, 91–102,
118–127, 129. 141, 144, 147–
148, 155, 181, 185–186, 188–
190, 194, 204, 207–209, 221,
229, 244–245, 247, 250–251,
279, 283, 285, 289–291, 298,
319, 325
Spirit 13, 18–19, 21–25, 27,
30, 34, 41, 43–44, 49–52,
62, 80, 83–84, 87–89, 100,
111, 122, 130, 157, 174, 178,
182, 188–189, 192, 198–199,
202–205, 213, 220–225, 228,
230, 232, 260, 268–269, 271,
276, 283–295, 300–308, 310,
312–314, 321, 326
Titanism 285, 290–293, 295,
298–300, 304, 309
Transformation 32, 93, 102, 130,
208, 291
Transgression 55, 57–64
Trinity 38–39, 49, 53, 106, 111–
112, 135, 211, 282, 304–305,
307–308, 310, 330–331, 333
Truth 17–18, 22, 31–32, 34,
36–39, 45–46, 49–52, 65,
70, 80–81, 107, 129, 142,
170, 172–173, 175–176, 178,
191, 198, 204, 206–211, 213,
221–224, 228, 232, 238–243,
286–287, 299–300, 305–306,
308, 312, 315, 318, 320, 330,
334, 337
Understanding 36–37, 49, 128–
139
Early Christianity in the Context of Antiquity
Edited by Anders-Christian Jacobsen,
Christine Shepardson, Peter Gemeinhardt
The series ECCA (Early Christianity in the Context of Antiquity) seeks to publish monographs and edited volumes that take as their theme early Christianity and its connections
with the religion(s) and culture(s) of antiquity and late antiquity. Special attention is given
to the interactions between religion and culture, as well as to the influences that diverse
religions and cults had on one another. Works published in ECCA extend chronologically
from the second century B.C.E. to the fifth century C.E. and geographically across the
expanse of the Roman empire and its immediate neighbors.
Die Reihe ECCA (Early Christianity in the Context of Antiquity) zielt auf die Publikation
von Monographien und Sammelbänden, die sich thematisch mit dem frühen Christentum
und seinen Beziehungen zu Religion(en) und Kultur(en) der Antike und Spätantike
befassen. Dabei gilt das besondere Augenmerk den Wechselwirkungen, die Religion und
Kultur aufeinander ausüben, sowie den Einflüssen, die die verschiedenen Religionen und
Kulte aufeinander hatten. Zeitlich erstrecken sich die in ECCA publizierten Arbeiten auf
das 2. Jh. v. Chr. bis zum 5. Jh. n.Chr., geographisch auf den Raum des Imperium
Romanum und seiner unmittelbaren Nachbarn.
Vol.
1
David Brakke / Anders-Christian Jacobsen / Jörg Ulrich (eds.): Beyond Reception. Mutual Influences between Antique Religion, Judaism, and Early
Christianity. 2006.
Vol.
2
Jakob Engberg: Impulsore Chresto. Opposition to Christianity in the Roman
Empire c. 50-250 AD. 2007.
Vol.
3
Anders-Christian Jacobsen / Jörg Ulrich (eds./Hrsg.): Three Greek Apologists. Drei griechische Apologeten. Origen, Eusebius, and Athanasius.
Origenes, Eusebius und Athanasius. 2007.
Vol.
4
Anders-Christian Jacobsen / Jörg Ulrich / David Brakke (eds.): Critique and
Apologetics. Jews, Christians and Pagans in Antiquity. 2009.
Vol.
5
Jörg Ulrich / Anders-Christian Jacobsen / Maijastina Kahlos (eds.): Continuity and Discontinuity in Early Christian Apologetics. 2009.
Vol.
6
Blossom Stefaniw: Mind, Text, and Commentary. Noetic Exegesis in Origen
of Alexandria, Didymus the Blind, and Evagrius Ponticus. 2010.
Vol.
7
Anna Tzvetkova-Glaser: Pentateuchauslegung bei Origenes und den frühen
Rabbinen. 2010.
Vol.
8
Jakob Engberg / Uffe Holmsgaard Eriksen / Anders Klostergaard Petersen
(eds.): Contextualising Early Christian Martyrdom. 2011.
Vol.
9
Marie Verdoner: Narrated Reality. The Historia ecclesiastica of Eusebius of
Caesarea. 2011.
Vol. 10
Doris Sperber-Hartmann: Das Gebet als Aufstieg zu Gott. Untersu-chungen
zur Schrift de oratione des Evagrius Ponticus. 2011.
Vol. 11
Jörg Ulrich / Anders-Christian Jacobsen / David Brakke (eds.): Invention,
Rewriting, Usurpation. Discurse Fights over Religious Traditions in Antiquity.
2012.
Vol. 12
Jan Dochhorn (ed.): “For it is Written”. Essays on the Function of Scripture
in Early Judaism and Christianity. With the Assistance of Malte Rosenau.
2011.
Vol. 13
Finn Damgaard: Recasting Moses. The Memory of Moses in Biographical
and Autobiographical Narratives in Ancient Judaism and 4th-Century Christianity. 2013.
Vol. 14
Nicole Hartmann: Martyrium. Variationen und Potenziale eines Diskur-ses
im Zweiten Jahrhundert. 2013.
Vol. 15
Jakob Engberg / Anders-Christian Jacobsen / Jörg Ulrich (eds.): In Defence
of Christianity. Early Christian Apologists. 2014.
Vol. 16
Birgitte Secher Bøgh (ed.): Conversion and Initiation in Antiquity. Shifting
Identities – Creating Change. 2014.
Vol. 17
Julia Hillner / Jörg Ulrich / Jakob Engberg (eds.): Clerical Exile in Late Antiquity. 2016.
Vol. 18
Anna Usacheva: Knowledge, Language and Intellection from Origen to
Gregory Nazianzen. A Selective Survey. 2017.
Vol. 19
Dirk Rohmann / Jörg Ulrich / Margarita Vallejo Girvés (eds.): Mobility and
Exile at the End of Antiquity. 2018.
Vol. 20
Kyung-mee Jeon: The Rhetoric of the Pious Empire and the Rhetoric of
Flight from the World. A Socio-Rhetorical Reading of the Life of Melania the
Younger. 2018.
Vol. 21
Maria Louise Munkholt Christensen: Relating through Prayer. Identity Formation in Early Christianity. 2019.
Vol. 22
Tobias Georges (Hrsg.): Von Justin bis zu Hildegard von Bingen. Ausgewählte Aufsätze von Jörg Ulrich zur Geschichte und Theologie des
Christentums in Antike und Mittelalter. 2020.
Vol. 23
Fabio Dalpra / Anders-Christian Jacobsen (eds.): Explorations in
Augustine’s Anthropology. 2021.
Vol. 24
Philip Polcar: Hieronymus' Witwenbüchlein für Salvina (epist. 79). Text,
Übersetzung, Einführung und Kommentar. 2022.
Vol. 25
Gaetano Lettieri / Maria Fallica / Anders-Christian Jacobsen (eds.): Progress
in Origen and the Origenian Tradition. 2023.
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