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THE INTERNATIONAL PLATO SOCIETY<br />
UNIVERSITÀ DI PISA<br />
DIPARTIMENTO DI FILOLOGIA, LETTERATURA E LINGUISTICA<br />
X SYMPOSIUM PLATONICUM<br />
The <strong>Symposium</strong><br />
Pisa, 15 th - 20 th July, 2013<br />
Proceedings I
The International Plato Society<br />
Università di Pisa<br />
Dipartimento di Filologia, Letteratura e Linguistica<br />
X <strong>Symposium</strong> Platonicum<br />
The<br />
<strong>Symposium</strong> <strong>Symposium</strong><br />
Pisa, 15 th - 20 th July, 2013<br />
Sotto l’Alto Patronato del Presidente della Repubblica<br />
Con il Patrocinio dell’Università di Pisa
MONDAY, 15 TH JULY, 2013 3<br />
Eros and Life-Values in Plato's <strong>Symposium</strong><br />
STEPHEN HALLIWELL 7<br />
The Ethics of Eros: Eudaimonism and Agency 13<br />
Telos and Philosophical Knowledge in Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong> (Yuji Kurihara) 15<br />
Il ruolo e l'importanza della dimensione esperienziale ed empirica nel Simposio (Maurizio Migliori) 20<br />
Who loves? The question of agency in Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong> (Carolina Araújo) 21<br />
Eudaimonist Closure in the Speeches of Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong> (David T. Runia) 27<br />
Method, Knowledge and Identity 33<br />
Ὁµολογία and ὁµολογεῖν in <strong>Symposium</strong> (Lesley Brown) 35<br />
The Kind of Knowledge Virtue Is: Rational Ecstasy in Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong> (Kendall Sharp) 40<br />
The Protreptic Power of Love: Eros, Care for the Self and Personal Identity<br />
in the <strong>Symposium</strong> (Annie Larivée) 41<br />
Diotime contre Aristote: qu’est-ce qui fait l’identité à soi du vivant? (Alexis Pinchard) 53<br />
Reading the <strong>Symposium</strong>: Text and Reception 67<br />
Stylistic Difference in the Speeches of the <strong>Symposium</strong> (Harold Tarrant) 69<br />
Lettori antichi di Platone: il caso del Simposio (POxy 843) (Margherita Erbì) 75<br />
Revisiting the <strong>Symposium</strong>: the paradoxical eroticism of Plato<br />
and Lucian (Ruby Blondell - Sandra Boehringer) 80<br />
<strong>Symposium</strong> 212a6-7: the Most Immortal of Men (Gerard Boter) 88<br />
Immortalità personale senza anima immortale: Diotima e Aristotele<br />
MARIO VEGETTI 95<br />
TUESDAY, 16 TH JULY, 2013 105<br />
Wichtige Manuskripte als Meilensteine in der Textgeschichte von Platons Symposion<br />
CHRISTIAN BROCKMANN 109<br />
The Frame Dialogue: Voices and Themes 111<br />
A Rejected Version of the <strong>Symposium</strong> (Menahem Luz) 113<br />
Narrazioni e narratori nel Simposio di Platone (Lidia Palumbo) 114<br />
The Functions of Apollodorus (Matthew D. Walker) 119<br />
Agatone agathos: l’eco dell’epos nell’incipit del Simposio (Dino De Sanctis) 125<br />
No Invitation Required? A Theme in Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong> (Giovanni R.F. Ferrari) 130<br />
Diotima and kuèsis in the Light of the Myths of the God’s Annexation<br />
of Pregnancy (Anne Gabrièle Wersinger) 134<br />
Phaedrus and Pausanias 141<br />
Phaedrus and the sophistic competition of beautiful speech (Noburu Notomi) 143<br />
Eros sans expédient: Banquet, 179b4-180b5 (Annie Hourcade Sciou) 149<br />
Eros protrepōn: philosophy and seduction in the <strong>Symposium</strong> (Olga Alieva) 153<br />
La natura intermedia di Eros: Pausania e Aristofane a confronto con Socrate (Lucia Palpacelli) 161<br />
Philotimia and Philosophia in Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong> (Jens Kristian Larsen) 169<br />
La pédérastie selon Pausanias: un défi pour l’éducation platonicienne (Olivier Renaut) 174<br />
Eryximachus 181<br />
Eryximachus’ Medicine in the <strong>Symposium</strong> and Plato’s Love (Hua-kuei Ho) 183<br />
La medicina di Erissimaco: appunti per una cosmologia dialogica (Silvio Marino) 188<br />
Eryximachus’ Physical Theory in Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong> (Richard D. Parry) 193<br />
The concept of harmony (187 a-e) and its cosmological role<br />
in Eryximachus’ discourse (Laura Candiotto) 194<br />
Sophrosyne in the <strong>Symposium</strong> (Richard Stalley) 201<br />
El dilema “Erixímaco” (Ivana Costa) 205
The Realm of the Metaxy 207<br />
Le Banquet de Platon: une philosophie de la relation? (Michel Fattal) 209<br />
Perché tanta morte in un dialogo sull’amore e sulla vita? Riflessioni sul rapporto<br />
amore-morte-immortalità nel Simposio di Platone (Arianna Fermani) 220<br />
La nozione di intermedio nel <strong>Symposium</strong> di Platone (Cristina Rossitto) 226<br />
Reproduction, Immortality, and the Greater Mysteries in Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong> (Thomas M. Tuozzo) 234<br />
Gli eroi e la natura demonica di Amore: Proclo interprete di Symp. 201e-204b (Piera De Piano) 239<br />
Socrates as a divine intermediary in the Apology and <strong>Symposium</strong> (Gerard Naddaf) 246<br />
Agathon 247<br />
Why Agathon’s Beauty Matters (Francisco J. Gonzalez) 249<br />
La mimesis di sé nel discorso di Agatone: l'agone fra poesia e filosofia nel Simposio (Mario Regali) 258<br />
Die Poetik des Philosophen: Sokrates und die Rede des Agathon (Irmgard Männlein-Robert) 263<br />
EROS SOTER: How Can Love Save Us? (Aikaterini Lefka) 268<br />
Agathon’s Gorgianic Logic (Richard Patterson) 276<br />
Tragedy and Comedy at Agathon’s Party: Two Tetralogies in Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong> (Nicholas Riegel) 277<br />
Literary Form and Thought in Aristophanes’ Speech 283<br />
Platonic Fables as Philosophical Poiesis (Rick Benitez) 285<br />
Tra Henologia ed Agathologia: Aristofane e Diotima a confronto sulla concezione del Bene<br />
e sulla Dialettica (Symp. 189a1-193a2 e 201d1-212c3) (Claudia Luchetti) 286<br />
The Comic and the Tragic: A Reading of Aristophanes’ Speech<br />
in Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong> (Suzanne Obdrzalek) 303<br />
Aristofane e l’ombra di Protagora: origini dell’umanità e orthoepeia nel mito<br />
degli uomini-palla (Michele Corradi) 304<br />
What Socrates learned from Aristophanes (and what he left behind) (Samuel Scolnicov) 309<br />
Split Personalities in the <strong>Symposium</strong> and the Bible: Aristophanes’ Speech and<br />
the Myth of Adam and Eve (Roslyn Weiss) 313<br />
WEDNESDAY, 17 TH JULY, 2013 317<br />
Sokrates’ Rollen im Symposion: sein Wissen und sein Nichtwissen<br />
THOMAS ALEXANDER SZLEZÁK 321<br />
Chi è il Socrate del Simposio?<br />
GIUSEPPE CAMBIANO 326<br />
Diotima and the Ocean of Beauty 329<br />
Symposion 210d4: τὸ πολὺ πέλαγος τοῦ καλοῦ (Francisco L. Lisi) 331<br />
L'océan du beau: les Formes platoniciennes et leur extension (210a-212a) (Arnaud Macé) 336<br />
Socrates’ Thea: The Description of Beauty in <strong>Symposium</strong> 211a and the Parmenidean<br />
Predicates of Being (Manfred Kraus) 344<br />
L'interpretazione plotiniana (Enneade III 5) della nascita di Eros (Symp. 203b-c) (Angela Longo) 345<br />
Eros, Poiesis and Philosophical Writing 347<br />
On the Early Speeches’ Developement of a Methodology (Philip Krinks) 349<br />
Boasting and self-promotion in Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong> (Gabriel Danzig) 355<br />
La difficile analogia tra poesia e amore (Giovanni Casertano) 365<br />
Onoma e holon in Symp. 204e-206a: che cosa nomina il nome “eros” (Francesco Aronadio) 371<br />
The Picture of Socrates 373<br />
Alcibiades’ Refutation of Socrates (Edward C. Halper) 375<br />
Platon als Lehrer des Sokrates (Rafael Ferber) 382<br />
Sócrates aprendiz y maestro de Eros: conocimiento erótico y profesión de ignorancia<br />
en Platón, <strong>Symposium</strong> (Graciela E. Marcos de Pinotti) 383<br />
Platone, la virtù e un gioco di specchi: guardare il filosofo con gli occhi<br />
del φιλότιµος (Federico M. Petrucci) 389<br />
2
Monday<br />
15 th July, 2013
Cornelia J. de Vogel Lecture<br />
Chair: Noburu Notomi
Eros and Life-Values in Plato's <strong>Symposium</strong><br />
Stephen Halliwell<br />
Olympiodorus’s commentary on the first Alcibiades, and likewise the anonymous Prolegomena to<br />
Platonic Philosophy, recounts that shortly before his death Plato dreamt that he had turned into a swan<br />
which frustrated a group of pursuing bird-catchers by moving rapidly from tree to tree. (Real swans,<br />
you will appreciate, are not to be found in trees – but we are in a forest of symbols here.) Simmias the<br />
Socratic, the story continues, decoded the dream as showing that the significance of Plato’s thought<br />
would always elude its interpreters: no matter how hard they try, they will never capture its meaning.<br />
Plato’s works, like those of Homer, we are told, are open to an irreducible plurality of interpretations.<br />
Whatever the exact origins of this anecdote (which draws, of course, on motifs and tropes<br />
from Plato’s own writings), it undoubtedly reflects a long history of ancient debates – both inside and<br />
outside the Academy – about how to read Plato’s dialogues. Such debates have their modern<br />
counterparts, and that is as it should be: we are still hermeneutic bird-catchers and the beautiful swan<br />
continues to escape our grasp. This is as true of individual dialogues as of the whole oeuvre whose<br />
parts they constitute. In the case of the <strong>Symposium</strong>, everyone agrees on the work’s multi-layered<br />
texture of registers, voices and dramatic psychology: it was surely in the forefront of Nietzsche’s<br />
mind when he characterised Plato’s writing in general as ‘polygeneric’ and quasi-(or proto-)novelistic.<br />
Yet even the <strong>Symposium</strong> is regularly exposed to readings which enlist it in the cause of a doctrinally<br />
systematic Platonism – the system usually being posited ‘behind’ the work but visible through it,<br />
provided one has the right kind of discernment. Such readings treat the speech of Diotima (whom I<br />
take as a fictionalised projection of Socrates’ ‘mantic’ persona) not just as a climactic moment in the<br />
dialogue, but also as a definitive key to everything else around it. But to treat the <strong>Symposium</strong> as<br />
though we can effectively transcribe its message in that way is arguably to collapse its complexity<br />
into a reductive simplicity.<br />
On the alternative hermeneutic adopted in this paper, Plato’s (written) philosophy in each of<br />
his dialogues resides not in a single message which requires interpreters to extract and codify it, but in<br />
the whole web of relations between its parts. What this means, among other things, for the<br />
<strong>Symposium</strong> is that the speech of Diotima-Socrates, despite (or even because of) its unique features,<br />
does not nullify everything that has preceded it nor even tell us exactly what we should think about all<br />
the earlier speeches. The work itself, in its totality, sets up a configuration of perspectives – all of<br />
them coloured by the elusive element of role-playing undertaken by the symposiasts (not least<br />
Socrates himself) – which makes it impossible for Diotima’s account of mystical transcendence to<br />
resolve all the questions so intricately posed by the dialogue’s succession of ideas.<br />
I intend to concentrate here (with some drastically selective and abbreviated remarks) on the<br />
<strong>Symposium</strong>’s treatment of erōs as a focus for its participants’ idealised reflections on life-values –<br />
values putatively capable of shaping and informing an entire life. That this is one profitable way of<br />
following some of the work’s various thematic threads may seem paradoxical in the light of the fact<br />
that in archaic and classical Greek culture erōs/Eros – whether conceived of as divine, personified, or<br />
purely naturalistic/ psychological, and whether or not conjoined with Aphrodite – is predominantly<br />
associated with psychosomatic upheaval and loss of control: with types of experience, in other words,<br />
that violently destabilise the course of a life, threatening it with madness and even, in extreme cases,<br />
with destruction. Such traditional ideas are much more in evidence (both echoed and philosophically<br />
recast) in Phaedrus than in the <strong>Symposium</strong>. In the latter, erōs’s psychosomatic dangers are largely<br />
suppressed. Instead, the concept is treated by almost everyone (with the obtrusive if complex<br />
exception of Alcibiades) as a source of life-unifying meaning and motivation.<br />
It is important, however, to remember that Plato could expect his first readers to be familiar<br />
with a much wider range of earlier Greek patterns of thought about erōs than we can now fully<br />
reconstruct (though we can detect some of their traces). It is not, I suggest, a sheer coincidence that in<br />
one fragment of Euripides (897 TrGF) Eros is described as ‘an education in wisdom’ (παίδευµα<br />
σοφίας), called a daimōn with whom humans ‘consort’ (προσοµιλεῖν, cf. Symp. 203a3), and regarded<br />
as something into which it is possible to be ‘(un)initiated’ (ἀτέλεστος) and which the young are urged<br />
not to flee from but ‘to use correctly’ (χρῆσθαι...ὀρθῶς)? Other fragments of Euripides too (esp. 388,<br />
661), as well as some passages in the surviving plays, contain clear indications of a conception of erōs<br />
that splits into a polarity of negative and positive, the latter capable of being harmonised with such
Stephen Halliwell<br />
values as σοφία and σωφροσύνη. It is not a matter of positing direct links between the <strong>Symposium</strong><br />
and such texts but of recognising that the richness of the dialogue’s play of ideas, and the depth of its<br />
cultural and literary resonances, must have been even greater for its earliest readers than it is for us<br />
now.<br />
In ways that intersect at many points with older Greek ideas about Eros/erōs, the<br />
<strong>Symposium</strong>’s ensemble of characters use the stylised, intense, but also playfully fantasised conditions<br />
of the drinking-party to adopt positions, in their various styles of discourse, on how erōs can function<br />
as a life-guiding and life-unifying value. One consequence of this, on my reading (though not on<br />
everyone’s), is a cumulative – and not just a Socratic – ‘desexualisation’ of erōs: a distancing of it<br />
from the specifically sexual domain of physical pleasure, and its conversion, even ‘sublimation’, into<br />
other kinds of motivating goals. More specifically, all the main participants (with the conspicuous<br />
exception of Alcibiades, whose whole persona is stamped with the intermittency of its impulses) seek<br />
to escape from a conception of erōs tied to the purely episodic workings of sexual desire.<br />
This is seen with special piquancy (as well as pathos) in the contribution of Aristophanes. The<br />
ostensibly corporeal incompleteness of the divided figures in his fable might be thought to lend their<br />
yearning desire (πόθος, cf. 191a6) a superficially sexual tenor, and the same goes for their repeatedly<br />
stressed need for embraces and physical entwinement (with four occurrences of the verb<br />
συµπλέκεσθαι, 191a-e, whose senses certainly include sexual congress). Yet, in a delicious touch of<br />
dramatic irony, none other than Zeus himself misunderstands the predicament of the creatures whose<br />
separation he had himself caused. Overcome by pity, he thinks it sufficient to rearrange their genitals<br />
for the sake of specifically sexual συµπλοκή between them (191c4), thereby allowing them ‘to<br />
experience physical satisfaction/satiety (πλησµονή), cease from agitation, turn instead to work, and<br />
take care of the rest of their lives’ (191c6-8).<br />
Zeus’s mistaken assumption is that humans’ erotic desires are fundamentally bodily and can<br />
be dealt with – at any rate where males are concerned (191c5-6) – by a mechanism of merely somatic<br />
release. He also supposes that the bulk of a human life is (or can be) detached from erōs. But the story<br />
tells us otherwise. It discloses that the most urgent desire of human ‘souls’ (not bodies) is for<br />
something other than sexual intercourse, as well as something they cannot consciously recognise but<br />
only instinctively ‘divine’ (µαντεύεται, 192d1: Diotima-Socrates is not the only ‘mantic’ figure in the<br />
work). Such desire craves non-episodic satisfaction distributed across a whole lifetime (cf.<br />
διατελοῦντες... διὰ βίου, 192c2-3). But a lifetime of what? That phrase refers directly to partners who<br />
never live apart. Yet the allegorical wish-fulfilment of ‘fusion’ into a single entity (192d-e) dissolves,<br />
rather than clarifying, the sense of what lovers want. Aristophanes’ formula for escaping the episodic<br />
dissolves the coherence of individual identity itself.<br />
8<br />
*<br />
Aristophanes (about whose speech I’ll say a little more in sequence below) is not alone in inhabiting<br />
the realms of fantasy. There are puzzles about every attempt in the <strong>Symposium</strong> to forge a connection<br />
between erōs and the underpinning values of a life. I am deeply unpersuaded that solutions to any of<br />
these puzzles are encoded within the text itself.<br />
Phaedrus, who sets a rhetorical tone of idealisation for the whole discussion, has difficulty<br />
stabilising his entire perspective on erōs. He moves between an asymmetrical erastēs-erōmenos<br />
paradigm and a more general conception which allows a wife like Alcestis to count as a ‘lover’; and<br />
even his use of the former vacillates over how far the workings of erōs need involve an active-passive<br />
dynamic. But those uncertainties do not prevent the speech from broaching one version of the idea of<br />
erōs as a transformative power: a power, as Phaedrus specifically sees it, to build a whole life around<br />
a relationship between ‘self’ and a special ‘other’.<br />
Phaedrus’s speech includes a salient statement of the conviction that erōs is the most<br />
important source of life-shaping value. ‘As regards that which should guide human beings in their<br />
entire life if they are to live well (ὃ γὰρ χρὴ ἀνθρώποις ἡγεῖσθαι παντὸς τοῦ βίου τοῖς µέλλουσι καλῶς<br />
βιώσεσθαι), this is something neither kinship nor honour nor wealth nor anything else can bring about<br />
in the way that erōs can’ (178c5-d1). The idea of ‘guiding’ a life conveyed here by the verb ἡγεῖσθαι<br />
recurs several times later in the dialogue: Aristophanes calls Eros our ‘leader (ἡγεµών) and<br />
commander (στρατηγός)’ (193b2); Agathon likewise twice calls Eros ἡγεµών (197d3, e2, adding<br />
musico-festive imagery to Aristophanes’ military metaphor); and Diotima sees the ascent to perfect<br />
beauty as starting with a relationship in which an older person correctly ‘guides’ and leads another<br />
(ὀρθῶς ἡγῆται ὁ ἡγούµενος, 210a6-7).<br />
Phaedrus’s statement of erōs’s capacity to guide a whole life follows immediately on the
Stephen Halliwell<br />
proposition that erastēs and erōmenos are the greatest good for each other, but it thereby<br />
simultaneously shifts the terms of reference of his speech beyond the specifically sexual. The sexual<br />
component in erōs is in fact nowhere explicitly addressed in the speech; at most, Phaedrus takes the<br />
operations of physical desire for granted. But his overall case requires the supposition that (perhaps<br />
initially) sexual impulses can be channelled into the development of an ethical self. (I will just<br />
mention in passing that if we look for a latent theory of what sexual impulses per se amount to,<br />
Phaedrus’s only – and belated – answer seems to be that they are responses to bodily beauty: 180a5.<br />
Note that this is the only reference to sensory beauty in his speech; all his other uses of καλός<br />
vocabulary are ethically slanted.) Phaedrus’s account of erōs leaves no room for bodily gratification<br />
as an end in itself. On both his homoerotic and his gender-neutral models, physical desire is overlaid<br />
by the beloved’s status as a kind of ethical mirror for the lover’s self-image.<br />
That process appears to grow through a series of stages: first, a shame-centred desire not to be<br />
thought bad; second, the ‘philotimic’ desire to be seen as good in the beloved’s eyes; third, the<br />
willingness to sacrifice self-interest (even to the point of death) for the benefit of the other. But<br />
Phaedrus blurs the picture by converting erastēs/erōmenos asymmetry into something more like<br />
reciprocity (the beloved will feel the same shame, the same philotimia, and even the same selfsacrificing<br />
impulses as the lover, 178e-9a); and he even hints at an element of emotional reciprocity<br />
too (n.b. ἀγαπᾶν at 180b2, the same verb used of lovers by Pausanias at 181c6 and by Diotima at<br />
210d2). The bridge from asymmetry to reciprocity remains, however, very uncertain. Phaedrus’s<br />
idealism exceeds its supporting theory. But he sets an agenda for what follows by advancing the far<br />
from negligible thesis that erōs can define a life by passionately motivating an individual to seek<br />
ethical self-confirmation and self-realisation in the perceptions of another.<br />
*<br />
Pausanias’s speech differs from Phaedrus’s, though it does not respond to it directly (and Plato makes<br />
sure he thwarts any readerly desire for narrative completeness, 180c1-2), by openly acknowledging<br />
what the latter had relegated to the background: the (putative) root of erōs in physical desire. Given<br />
Pausanias’s claim that ‘there is no Aphrodite without Eros’ (οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνευ Ἔρωτος Ἀφροδίτη,<br />
180d4) – i.e., apparently (despite the suspicion of invalid logic), that erōs is inseparable from sexual<br />
attraction (always part of Aphrodite’s ‘entourage’) – it might seem strange at first sight to discern any<br />
movement towards the ‘desexualisation’ of erōs in Pausanias’s case. But it is also true that Pausanias<br />
hedges round his notion of Uranian Aphrodite/Eros precisely by excluding many, even most, actual<br />
practices and patterns of sexual desire. In addition, he specifically denies that erōs need be a response<br />
to physical beauty (182d7), thereby locating its centre of gravity elsewhere.<br />
His concern, reinforced by a prescriptivism lacking in Phaedrus’s case, is to claim that what<br />
starts (and may continue) as a sexual impulse can be made the basis of a lifelong relationship between<br />
whole persons, not just their bodies. ‘Pure’ lovers, those ‘impelled’ by Uranian Aphrodite with<br />
attraction towards young males on the cusp of adulthood, ‘are prepared...to form lifelong partnerships<br />
and a fully shared way of life’ (παρεσκευασµένοι...ὡς τὸν βίον ἅπαντα συνεσόµενοι καὶ κοινῇ<br />
συµβιωσόµενοι,...: 181d3-5). ‘The lover of good character remains (sc. a lover) throughout life, since<br />
he is fused with something of lasting value’ (ὁ δὲ τοῦ ἤθους χρηστοῦ ὄντος ἐραστὴς διὰ βίου µένει,<br />
ἅτε µονίµῳ συντακείς, 183e5-6.). As with Phaedrus, there is a gesture here in the direction of<br />
reciprocity. Yet Pausanias feels a need to retain a distinction between erōs and philia between the<br />
partners (182c6): to that extent he leaves unanswered questions about what it means for such<br />
asymmetry to underlie ‘a fully shared way of life’.<br />
Because Pausanias’s speech has been predominantly discussed in relation to historical<br />
reconstructions of the social mores and protocols of male homosexuality in classical Greece<br />
(something I leave on one side here), and because he himself visibly takes pains to try to reconcile his<br />
version of ‘pure’ erōs with acceptance of sexual pleasure, it is easy to read his contribution to the<br />
symposium as a self-serving translation of his own erotic orientation into a statement of normativity.<br />
But in the thematic structure of the work his speech unmistakably adheres to a version of erōs as a<br />
source of unifying value that reaches beyond sexual desire as such. What’s more, unlike Phaedrus,<br />
who saw erōs as drawing out the lover’s (and the beloved’s) better self through practical virtue,<br />
Pausanias sees this ‘better self’ as realising itself partly through intellectual virtue. In this respect he<br />
stands in a particularly significant relationship to the later speech of Diotima-Socrates: after all,<br />
Pausanias alone of the first five speakers links his ideal erōs with the idea of ‘philosophy’ (184d1, cf.<br />
182c1), and he alone likewise brings the concept of phronēsis into the equation (184d7). Despite these<br />
verbal correspondences between Pausanias and Diotima, however, a gulf remains between them.<br />
9
Stephen Halliwell<br />
Pausanias ties his whole case to the fulfilment of erōs in a relationship between two persons; Diotima<br />
will abandon any such premise once ‘philosophical’ erōs has progressed beyond its earliest stages.<br />
That, indeed, will be part of what makes her vision hard to come to terms with.<br />
10<br />
*<br />
If Phaedrus and Pausanias, despite differences of nuance, agree in presupposing a relationship<br />
between two individuals as the matrix of ideal erōs, Eryximachus is the first, though not the last,<br />
contributor to suspend such an assumption. His alternative vantage-point has something in common<br />
with older Greek sensibilities. The idea of Eros not as a specifically human phenomenon but a force<br />
manifesting itself in the cosmos as a whole is already present in Hesiod’s theogonic account of the<br />
primeval emergence of Eros, and the quasi-Empedoclean traits of Eryximachus’ theory have also been<br />
widely noted. But Eryximachus goes so far in expanding the scope of erōs, and in equating it with a<br />
series of other values (especially ἁρµονία and ὁµόνοια, but also φιλία, σωφροσύνη, and δικαιοσύνη),<br />
that he produces a more diffusely generalised conception of it than anyone else in the dialogue. When<br />
he concludes that ‘all Eros, taken in its entirety, possesses all power’ (πᾶσαν δύναµιν ἔχει<br />
συλλήβδην...ὁ πᾶς Ἔρως, 188d4-5) it is impossible (and unnecessary) to distinguish between<br />
rhetorical hyperbole and theoretical universalism.<br />
Eryximachus’s interweaving of medicine, physics, and musical theory radically<br />
depersonalises (and therefore desexualises) erōs to the point where relationships between individuals<br />
assume no more than a minor role within the larger scheme of things. Although he twice reiterates<br />
Pausanias’s tenet that it is right for only good men to be allowed sexual gratification in homoerotic<br />
relationships, he does so both times by way of analogy to his own preoccupation with medicine and<br />
other arts (186b-c, 187d-e). It is open to readers to draw further general inferences about the<br />
conditions which such relationships would have to satisfy on Eryximachus’s terms: most significantly,<br />
they would presumably have to instantiate reciprocal rather than asymmetrical or hierarchical desires<br />
(in keeping with the principle of ἐρᾶν ἀλλήλων, 186d6, whose immediate context is medical) and they<br />
would have to incorporate ethical virtue (µετὰ σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης, 188d5-6). Even so, it<br />
looks as though one might practise Eryximachean values without ever being, in any sense, ‘in love’<br />
with another person at all – or, at any rate, with one individual more than any other. There is at least a<br />
degree of affinity here with Diotima. The paradox in Eryximachus’s case is that erōs is given such a<br />
pervasive presence in the world that it is impossible to disentangle it from all the other values that<br />
might be identified in a life.<br />
*<br />
One of the <strong>Symposium</strong>’s many moments of dramatic irony occurs when Eryximachus suggests at the<br />
end of his speech that he has maybe ‘omitted many things’ and invites Aristophanes to fill the gaps.<br />
For all its mythic apparatus, Aristophanes’ narrative turns out to have a psychological kernel far<br />
removed from Eryximachus’s all-embracing thesis. According to the comic poet, erōs makes only one<br />
thing really matter in life: the self-‘completion’ in a unique relationship to another soul, and (despite<br />
some residual use of the asymmetrical lexicon of ‘lovers’ and ‘beloveds’) the perfect mutuality of<br />
such a relationship.<br />
I have already drawn attention to one strand in Aristophanes’ speech which it shares with<br />
those of the other symposiasts: its stress on the impulsion of erōs towards a unified, non-episodic state<br />
of being. But if we probe further into the allegorised core of his story, several points make it<br />
distinctive. One is a vein of pathos (remember Zeus’s pity) beneath the comic veneer. While all the<br />
speakers propose erōs as the means for a human life to achieve supreme fulfilment, Aristophanes<br />
alone modifies such idealism by striking a note of uncertainty: he mentions that few humans actually<br />
find their true beloved (193b5-6) and he leaves the outcome of their quest rhetorically hypothetical (if<br />
we are pious to the gods, we will all find our unique ‘other half’? cf. Diotima’s criticism of<br />
Aristophanes’ moral ambiguity at 205d-e) and perhaps even contradictory (fulfilled erōs depends on<br />
piety yet involves the recovery of the ‘original’ condition in which humans offended against the<br />
gods).<br />
Another telling feature of Aristophanes’ contribution is that it implies a conception of human<br />
identities as essentially given and unchangeable, not something to be shaped or developed along<br />
extended life-paths. This is related to his emphatic appeal to ‘human nature’: apart from Diotima-<br />
Socrates (see 206c4, 212b3), Aristophanes is the only speaker to use this concept and indeed to<br />
identify it with erotic completion, thereby turning erōs into a kind of biological imperative. But the
Stephen Halliwell<br />
principle of a universal ‘human nature’ does not itself generate or require the idea that each individual<br />
can find erotic fulfilment only with a single, uniquely suitable partner: the two notions might even be<br />
thought to be in tension with one another. Admittedly, there is a reading of the allegory available to us<br />
which can assimilate that last point. But it is a reading that tips over from pathos into pessimism.<br />
There is one final feature of Aristophanes’ speech I want to highlight. This is the fact that he<br />
is the only symposiast who makes no use at all of the καλός word-group (or its opposite, αἰσχρός).<br />
Aristophanic erōs, it seems, has no need for a concept of ‘beauty’ (still the best general equivalent, for<br />
all the well-known pitfalls of translation). Can we say why that should be? Relations between the<br />
various speakers’ usage of kalos vocabulary are more complex than sometimes claimed. Phaedrus had<br />
made one passing (and belated) reference to physical beauty as a defining property of an erōmenos<br />
(180a5) but had predominantly applied kalos terms to the virtuous actions prompted by erōs (178c-d,<br />
179c). Pausanias had followed Phaedrus’ ethical emphasis (esp. 180e-1a, 183d) but diverged from<br />
him in the former respect: an erōmenos need not be physically beautiful (182d7). Either missing or<br />
ignoring that last detail (see 186a4), Eryximachus generalised καλὸς ἔρως (186d1) to make it<br />
coextensive with all relations of harmonious homonoia. Agathon will in turn complicate things by<br />
calling the (symbolic) god Eros himself κάλλιστος (195a7) but also, at the same time, taking all erōs<br />
to be a response to beauty (197b).<br />
Where in this kaleidoscope of views does Aristophanes fit? I suggest, in brief, two reasons<br />
why he makes no space for beauty in the foreground of his picture: the first, because beauty, unless<br />
subjectively perspectivised (which it had been, for instance, by Sappho 16 PLF, ἔγω δὲ κῆν’ [sc.<br />
κάλλιστον] ὄττω τις ἔραται, and cf., more obliquely, Plato Rep. 5.474d-e), will not sit easily with<br />
Aristophanes’ emphasis on the unique fit between every pair of ideal partners; secondly, because to<br />
make beauty the specific object of erotic desire would be hard to square with Aristophanes’<br />
disconcerting suggestion that the yearning soul does not understand its own desires and cannot<br />
identify their true object (192c-d). Aristophanes might have followed Phaedrus and Pausanias in<br />
applying kalos vocabulary to virtuous actions. But if he had done so this would have been marginal to<br />
his argument: it would have left untouched everything which makes his speech sui generis within the<br />
<strong>Symposium</strong>.<br />
*<br />
Agathon deserves a little better than the superciliousness many modern scholars show towards him<br />
and like to suppose that Plato builds into his depiction. He is a poet (high on his recent success) and<br />
self-consciously thinks of himself as performing in the small, intimate ‘theatre’ (194a-b) of his own<br />
celebratory party. He is also, as Socrates correctly notes, someone who can adopt a Gorgianically<br />
mannered rhetoric. His speech (and this is itself a Gorgianic mode) is a kind of prose-poem – both<br />
stylistically and rhythmically. It has nothing to say about lovers and beloveds, and very little that is<br />
directly sexual, though he does refer to sexual desire with the twin terms ἵµερος and πόθος (197d7),<br />
the former used by no one else and the latter only by Aristophanes. (Contrast the absence of both<br />
terms from the discourse of Diotima-Socrates with their importance for the ‘Stesichorean’ Socrates of<br />
Phaedrus.) Agathon’s speech purports to be a description of a god. Taken strictly on that level, it is<br />
not actually refuted by the combined views of Socrates and Diotima: Diotima thinks gods are of<br />
necessity happy and in possession of goodness and beauty (202c), precisely what Agathon had<br />
predicated of Eros in the first place (195a5-7). The problem, of course, is that no one can plausibly<br />
take Agathon to be talking strictly about Eros in separation from erōs. And once one tries to decode<br />
Agathon’s description of Eros as an account of human experience of desire, it becomes vulnerable to a<br />
logical elenchus of the kind Socrates undertakes.<br />
And yet. Is a logical elenchus the most appropriate mode of response to a prose-poem (and a<br />
serio-comic one at that: 197e7), especially an elenchus that picks on the idea of Eros/erōs as beautiful<br />
while neglecting (till Diotima makes the point at 204c) the ambiguity that runs through Agathon’s<br />
speech between Eros/erōs as subject and object of desire? We can redeem some of the interest of<br />
Agathon’s speech by taking it, in part at least, as a celebration of the aesthetics of erōs: a free-floating<br />
evocation of some of the sensory qualities (of form, texture, etc.) of objects of desire, the states of<br />
mind associated with their enjoyment and contemplation, and even the creative drive within poetry<br />
itself (196d-e), something Diotima herself will touch on (209a-d).<br />
If Socrates’ interrogation of Agathon forms a kind of hinge in the <strong>Symposium</strong> – the point at<br />
which readers are faced with a clash between fundamentally different kinds of discourse – it is a hinge<br />
which can turn in both directions. Socrates subjects Agathon’s poetic flights of fancy to logical<br />
analysis, and Diotima does the same to Socrates’ own thoughts. But as Socrates’ mantic alter ego,<br />
11
Stephen Halliwell<br />
Diotima cannot get all that far, it seems, without turning back herself to a more visionary mode of<br />
discourse.<br />
12<br />
*<br />
It may seem preposterous to leave myself so little space for Diotima herself. But I have little to say<br />
(for now) – confident that others will make up for this deficit.<br />
Among the <strong>Symposium</strong>’s multiple perspectives on erōs as a source of life-values, special<br />
weight is lent to the idea of philosophy itself as a unifying form of life. This point of view is marked<br />
programmatically at the outset, where Apollodorus recounts how the three years since he became a<br />
devotee of philosophy have been orientated around a daily obsession with the words and actions of<br />
Socrates (172e) and bluntly tells his money-making friends that he pities their own lives as wretchedly<br />
squandered on meaningless ends (173c-d). Socrates-Diotima links philosophy directly with erōs: at<br />
203d Diotima characterises Eros as ‘philosophising throughout his life’ (φιλοσοφῶν διὰ παντὸς τοῦ<br />
βίου); at 211d she describes contemplation of absolute beauty, in a somewhat odd trope, as the ‘place’<br />
in life where a human being should ideally live, ἐνταῦθα τοῦ βίου...βιωτὸν ἀνθρώπῳ. (ἐνταῦθα τοῦ<br />
βίου ought to mean ‘at this point/stage in life’ but cannot do so here.) Concomitantly, she condemns<br />
the body-centred way of life of many people (ironically including Socrates, 211d5). The impact of<br />
Socrates himself on others’ lives is underlined, but also complicated, by the psychologically tangled<br />
comments of Alcibiades both on the magnetic (Sirenesque) attraction exercised by Socrates and on<br />
the reproach he expresses to the life that Alcibiades actually leads when apart from him.<br />
Modern scholars have no difficulty accepting that the Platonic Socrates represents an entire<br />
way of life. But when Socrates speaks about the philosophical life he is not always speaking<br />
transparently about himself: that is so, very obviously, in his idealised account of philosophers in the<br />
Republic. In the <strong>Symposium</strong>, the gap between Socrates the person and Socrates as mouthpiece for a<br />
vision of the ultimate inspiration/aspiration of a philosophical life is difficult to gauge, since it is<br />
embedded in Socrates’ mantic ‘ventriloquism’ of the views of Diotima. Even if we try to close that<br />
gap by merging the two voices into one, that leaves us with a very strange Socrates and a set (literally)<br />
of philosophical ‘mysteries’.<br />
For anyone seeking to understand a philosophical way of life, the central enigma of Socrates-<br />
Diotima’s vision is how the ascent to apprehension of absolute beauty (with the finality of a sudden<br />
revelation, 210e4) is supposed to inform the rest of life. Diotima is emphatic that it can do so: ἐνταῦθα<br />
τοῦ βίου...βιωτὸν ἀνθρώπῳ, to repeat that telling if peculiar formulation. But the formulation<br />
continues θεωµένῳ αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, so that the implication (of the present participle) is that the erotics<br />
of philosophy involve living in the constant, vivifying presence of the transcendent vision (just as the<br />
fleshly lover tries to live in the constant presence of a beloved, 211d6 – with an allusion to<br />
Aristophanes’ speech). The emphasis is repeated at 211e-12a, where again a form precisely of life<br />
(βίος) entails a continuous state or condition described by present participles (βλέποντος, θεωµένου,<br />
συνόντος). Yet because pure, unmixed, ‘divine’ beauty is somehow independent of the material world<br />
(211e), it remains uncertain how the former can give shape to a life conducted in the latter.<br />
The mysterious ambiguity of Diotima’s vision is parallel to the ambiguity of Socrates himself,<br />
represented as a figure who both does and does not seem to have need of others – capable of engaging<br />
fully in social activity (even to the point of saving people’s lives in battle, 220d-e) but equally of<br />
withdrawing, as we hear near both the start and the end of the dialogue (174d, 220c), into his own<br />
impenetrable world of ‘noetic’ absorption. Is the Socrates we see and hear about in the <strong>Symposium</strong><br />
supposed to be living in the perpetual contemplation of absolute beauty? The dialogue cannot, and<br />
does not purport to, tell us. It requires us to recognise the challenge of trying to make sense of both<br />
Socrates and Diotima (and of the other characters as well), but its own enticing rewards – the rewards<br />
of engaging dialogically as readers of Platonic philosophy – do not promise the availability of final<br />
answers in the text itself.
The Ethics of Eros: Eudaimonism and Agency<br />
Chair: Luc Brisson
1. Introduction<br />
Telos and Philosophical Knowledge in Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong><br />
Yuji Kurihara<br />
At the top of the “Ladder of Love” we suddenly encounter two mysterious subjunctives: τελευτήσῃ<br />
(211c7) and γνῷ (c8), which the transmitted text retains.<br />
ἄν τι ἅπτοιτο τοῦ τέλους. τοῦτο γὰρ δή ἐστι τὸ ὀρθῶς ἐπὶ 211b7<br />
τὰ ἐρωτικὰ ἰέναι ἢ ὑπ’ ἄλλου ἄγεσθαι, ἀρχόµενον ἀπὸ c1<br />
τῶνδε τῶν καλῶν ἐκείνου ἕνεκα τοῦ καλοῦ ἀεὶ ἐπανιέναι,<br />
ὥσπερ ἐπαναβασµοῖς χρώµενον, ἀπὸ ἑνὸς ἐπὶ δύο καὶ ἀπὸ<br />
δυοῖν ἐπὶ πάντα τὰ καλὰ σώµατα, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν καλῶν<br />
µάτων ἐπὶ τὰ καλὰ µαθήµατα, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν µαθηµάτων ἐπ’ c6<br />
ἐκεῖνο τὸ µάθηµα τελευτήσῃ, ὅ ἐστιν οὐκ ἄλλου ἢ αὐτοῦ c7<br />
ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ µάθηµα, καὶ γνῷ αὐτὸ τελευτῶν ὃ ἔστι c8<br />
καλόν. ἐνταῦθα τοῦ βίου, ὦ φίλε Σώκρατες, ἔφη ἡ Μαν- d1 1<br />
These subjunctives are mysterious not only because, without a conjunction such as ἵνα or ὡς, they<br />
cannot be explained grammatically in the infinitive construction (c1-d1) but also because these key<br />
words entangle us in philosophically enigmatic questions: What is the telos of the Ladder of Love?<br />
Why is the verb γνῷ used here, which is the only instance of a purely cognitive verb in this passage,<br />
despite numerous appearances of sensory verbs, such as seeing and touching? While commentators<br />
and translators have ingeniously emended the text to avoid grammatical problems, very few have<br />
dealt seriously with the philosophical questions it raises.<br />
In this paper, assuming that the text’s grammatical deviation is connected to philosophical<br />
implications in this context, I would like to claim that Plato thinks of the telos of the Ladder of Love<br />
as living the philosophical life, not merely grasping the Form of Beauty. 2 Considering the way the<br />
philosophical life has to do with Beauty itself, I shall demonstrate Plato’s view of the importance of<br />
philosophical knowledge to human beings.<br />
2. Two Possible Emendations and Slings’s Solution<br />
As noted above, the two subjunctives, τελευτήσῃ (211c7) and γνῷ (c8), as they stand, are so<br />
ungrammatical that any interpreter must either explain them in context or emend the text accordingly.<br />
With regard to the latter, roughly speaking, there are two possible emendations: (i) ἔστ᾽ ἄν for καὶ<br />
(211c6) and (ii) ἵνα for καὶ (c8), using τελευτῆσαι instead of τελευτήσῃ (211c7). 3 (i) is more<br />
traditional and traceable to the Aldina edition of the 16th century, the reading of which might derive<br />
from ἕστ᾽ ἄν in a minor medieval manuscript, Vind. phil. 21(Y). 4 According to this emendation, the<br />
final stage of the Ladder of Love consists of (a) reaching the science of Beauty itself from the<br />
beautiful sciences and (καὶ 211c8) (b) knowing Beauty itself. Although this reading, in a sense, is<br />
based on a manuscript, “ἔστ᾽ ἄν is a non-Platonic form” 5 and, as Brockmann has shown, 6 Y belongs to<br />
the family of a much more reliable manuscript, Clark. 39 (B), whose reading is καὶ at 211c6; today<br />
few editors adopt this emendation. 7<br />
More recent editors and translators, 8 on the other hand, have basically followed (ii), although<br />
it is not authorized by any existent manuscript. This requires us to assume that τελευτῆσαι with<br />
ἐπανιέναι (c2) explains τοῦτο (b7). Interestingly, however, since ἵνα plus the subjunctive introduces a<br />
1<br />
I use the text of OCT of Burnet (1901), except τελευτήσῃ (211c7). Burnet emended it by τελευτήσαι, following Usener<br />
(1875).<br />
2<br />
To this extent, my claim is not new; cf. White (2004). See also Sheffield (2006) esp. 149; Howatson (2008) xxii.<br />
3<br />
(ii) is Usener’s emendation in Jahn and Usener (1875) 107.<br />
4<br />
Brockmann (1992) investigates existent manuscripts and editions in detail. For 211c5-8 and Y, see 81-2.<br />
5<br />
Bury (1932) ad loc.<br />
6<br />
See Brockmann (1992), Stemma Codicum.<br />
7<br />
Schanz (1881) changes καί (211c6) to ὡς, to which Bury (1932) ad loc., objects by saying that ὡς, in the final use, is “very<br />
rare in all good prose writers except Xenophon.”<br />
8<br />
Dover (1980) 158; Rowe (1998) 200; cf. Bury (1932) ad loc.
Yuji Kurihara<br />
final clause that shows purpose, according to this emendation the final stage of the ladder consists in<br />
(b) knowing Beauty itself as a result or purpose of (a) reaching the science of Beauty. This differs<br />
from the reading of (i), which supposes that both (a) and (b) constitute the final stage, 9 whereas (ii)<br />
posits a causal or teleological relation between (a) and (b), specifying (b) as the final stage. Although<br />
Christopher Rowe, who, like most scholars, supports (ii), notes that “none of the editorial solutions to<br />
the problems looks particularly attractive, but none makes much difference to the sense,” 10 we must<br />
stress that whether we adopt (i) or (ii) does affect our understanding of the final stage of the ascent, so<br />
we must be more cautious in considering the relation between (a) and (b).<br />
What, then, is the telos of the ascent? We must answer this philosophical question by referring<br />
back to Diotima’s original account of the ascent at 210a4-211b5, which our passage merely<br />
recapitulates. As a matter of course, we will find a similar, but more complicated description of the<br />
final stage of the ascent at 210c6-e5. After beautiful activities, says Diotima, the guide must lead<br />
(ἀγαγεῖν sc. δεῖν) the lover to the different kinds of knowledge, so that (ἵνα) the lover may next see<br />
(ἴδῃ) the beauty of the kinds of knowledge and may no longer be (ᾖ) worthless and petty by clinging<br />
to particular beautiful objects, but may give birth to (τίκτῃ) many beautiful, magnificent words and<br />
thoughts in unlimited philosophy, contemplating the great sea of beauty, until (or in order that; ἕως<br />
ἄν) he will behold (κατίδῃ) a certain single kind of knowledge, which is of Beauty itself. Diotima then<br />
calls Socrates’ attention to the issue of finality and continues as follows: the lover, who comes now<br />
towards the final goal of matters of love, will suddenly behold (κατόψεται) Beauty itself.<br />
Obviously, just like its recapitulation, this description reveals a causal or teleological relation between<br />
seeing the beauty of kinds of knowledge and seeing the single knowledge of Beauty itself. It is also<br />
clear that in addition to seeing the knowledge of Beauty itself, Diotima further mentions seeing<br />
Beauty itself, without specifying their mutual relationship. It seems natural that these two distinct—at<br />
least verbally—activities of seeing correspond to the above (a) and (b) in the recapitulation,<br />
respectively. 11 If so, our understanding of the relation between (a) and (b) will directly serve to<br />
explain the telos of the ascent in the original description.<br />
Let us now turn to the other attempt to understand our two problematic subjunctives. S. R.<br />
Slings tries to elucidate them in context and concludes that the text is correct. 12 After asserting that no<br />
solutions introducing a conjunction explain the corruption, Slings compares our two relevant<br />
passages—210c6-d6 and 211b7-d1—and argues that the subjunctives without ἵνα describe the final<br />
stage of the ascent. He points out three factors that combine to produce a reasonable account: first, in<br />
Diotima’s original description “the steps themselves had been in the infinitive and the result in the<br />
subjunctive,” whereas in the recapitulation “the whole process focuses on the result.” Second,<br />
describing the stage of knowledge, Diotima uses the lengthy ἵνα clause including three subjunctives:<br />
ἴδῃ, ᾖ, and τίκτῃ. Third, in the recapitulation “the whole process of ascent is in turn one long string of<br />
prepositional phrases,” depending on and following the single infinitive ἐπανιέναι: “psychologically<br />
speaking, it is easy to understand that after all the prepositional phrases the influence of this infinitive<br />
is weakened.” “Therefore,” Slings concludes, “when a new verb is necessary,” the parallelism<br />
between the original account and the recapitulation “causes a shift from infinitive to subjunctive.”<br />
Judging by the textual fact that the sentence including the subjunctives in question, which<br />
itself is extraordinarily long, condenses and recapitulates even more complicated original sentences,<br />
Slings’s solution seems to me attractive by appealing to the speaker’s psychology in this passage.<br />
Moreover, in examining several passages in the Platonic corpus, Slings shows that “the rules and<br />
habits of the spoken language, in other words, oral grammar, do indeed play a decisive part.” 13 I<br />
prefer to accept this account, which is based on “oral grammar,” to emending the text, for it is<br />
plausible that Plato is here most vividly imitating and representing an oral communication between<br />
Diotima and Socrates, in full awareness that the subjunctives are “ungrammatical” in the written<br />
language. What, then, does Slings think of the final stage of the ascent? By reading the subjunctives<br />
as they stand, he must take it for granted that καὶ (211c8) is a copulative conjunction; he then must<br />
hold that the final stage consists of (a) seeing the knowledge of Beauty and (b) seeing or knowing<br />
Beauty itself, 14 which is in agreement with the reading of (i). Slings, however, does not explain what<br />
9<br />
It is, of course, possible that καί is a consecutive καί, “and so,” in which case the final stage itself can be divided into two<br />
steps.<br />
10<br />
Rowe (1998) 200.<br />
11<br />
Scholars agree that ἐπιστήµη and µάθηµα are interchangeable here.<br />
12<br />
Slings, (1997) 208-10, to my knowledge, is the only scholar who reads the text as it is, except Nehamas and Woodruff<br />
(1989) 59 n.93, who note on τελευτήσῃ: “Here we follow the manuscripts, rejecting Usener’s emendation. The finite verb<br />
form of the manuscripts is more vivid”; but they take καί like ἵνα and translate: “so that in the end he comes to know…”<br />
13<br />
Slings (1997) 204.<br />
14<br />
Slings, (1997) 210 n.92, actually denies splitting up the final stage into two parts, criticizing Burnet’s solution that changes<br />
16
Yuji Kurihara<br />
they are and how they are related, except saying that (b) is merely the final result. From a<br />
philosophical viewpoint, his standpoint is far from clear. Thus, we must now shift from philology to<br />
philosophy.<br />
3. What is the Telos of the Ladder of Love?<br />
Although I have focused on the distinction between (a) seeing the knowledge of Beauty and (b) seeing<br />
or knowing Beauty itself, few scholars care about it, but group them together, despite the fact that<br />
most of them actually follow the emendation of (ii). Terence Irwin, for example, divides the whole<br />
process of ascent into six stages: S1=a single beautiful body; S2=the beauty in all bodies; S3=the<br />
beauty of souls; S4=the beauty of practices and laws; S5=the beauty of sciences; S6=Beauty Itself. 15<br />
If one reads ἵνα for καὶ (211c8) either causally or teleologically, then one must distinguish between<br />
(a) and (b); otherwise, one would be inconsistent. Hence, because I now follow the transmitted text<br />
and read καὶ (c8), I need not explain a causal or a teleological relation between (a) and (b). However, I<br />
must explain how (a) and (b) are both distinct and related to each other. 16<br />
Let us begin by considering (a) seeing the knowledge of Beauty at 210d6-e1. As the text<br />
indicates, this follows the previous stage in which the lover engages in philosophy and sees the beauty<br />
of various kinds of knowledge, while contemplating the great sea of beauty and giving birth to<br />
beautiful and magnificent words and thoughts. To compare these two stages, we must note that it is in<br />
philosophy (ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ἀφθόνῳ d6; ἐνταῦθα d6) that the guide leads the lover from studying<br />
different kinds of knowledge to the single knowledge of Beauty itself. The lover then must start to<br />
study each subject of knowledge according to its proper method and the overall curriculum of<br />
philosophy. Beauty in each kind of knowledge is different from beauty in bodies and activities or<br />
laws, in that knowledge concerns universals instead of particulars, such as a little boy, a person, or an<br />
activity (d2-3). Being led by the guide correctly, step-by-step, the lover observes beautiful subjects of<br />
all kinds of knowledge as in the great sea of beauty spread in front of him. Without being possessed<br />
by any particular kind of knowledge, by following the guide the lover tries to swim across the great<br />
sea through understanding a series of philosophical subjects and producing reasonable accounts and<br />
theories of them in due order.<br />
Next, the lover is led to see the knowledge of Beauty, which must be distinct from seeing the<br />
beauty of each kind of knowledge in the previous stage. In astronomy (cf. R. 528e-530c), for example,<br />
the lover may look up at the night sky, observe the celestial objects, and suddenly comprehend the<br />
real motions of the heavenly bodies based on the universal law behind apparent movements of the<br />
sensible stars, so that he can give an account of the law by discussing it with the guide. In this case,<br />
the lover sees the objects of knowledge—the celestial objects, the heavenly bodies, and the universal<br />
law—in front of him and with the guide, as well as seeing its beauty, acquires knowledge of it.<br />
Similarly, the lover may well see (κατίδῃ 210d7) the knowledge of Beauty somehow in front<br />
of him before acquiring it. Now that the object of knowledge is Beauty itself, not the beauty of<br />
something else, he cannot rely on sensible objects in order to discover something hidden behind them.<br />
Instead, he witnesses how the knowledge of Beauty manifests. This time, however, there is no other<br />
medium through which he learns to see beauty. Because the knowledge in question concerns Beauty<br />
itself, the knowledge of Beauty directly emerges through the philosophical dialectic between the<br />
guide and the lover. Not only does the guide try to teach the lover what Beauty itself is, but she also<br />
actualizes and exemplifies her knowledge of Beauty here and now. Differently from the previous<br />
stage in which the lover studies each kind of knowledge with the guide and succeeds in seeing its<br />
beauty, the lover at this stage cannot yet produce beautiful words and thoughts by himself, but<br />
receives them from the guide through dialectic, thus learning what the knowledge of Beauty must be<br />
like, even before possessing it. 17 The guide is a model of the acquisition of that knowledge and the<br />
lover begins to imitate the model in order to know Beauty itself next.<br />
Diotima goes on to explain (b) how the lover learns to see Beauty itself: “Anyone who has<br />
been guided and educated in love matters to this point, contemplating beautiful things in order and<br />
correctly and coming now to the final stage of love matters, will suddenly behold something<br />
τελευτήσῃ to τελευτήσαι and leaves γνῷ unchanged.<br />
15 Irwin (1977) 167; cf. Moravcsik (1971) 286; Blondell (2006) 154-5. An exception, again, is Nehamas and Woodruff<br />
(1989) xxi, who say: “But even the love of knowledge … is not the final stage of the ascent,” but it is surprising that they do<br />
not distinguish between seeing beauty of kinds of knowledge and seeing the knowledge of Beauty; so their reading of the<br />
subjunctives does not serve to explain the final stage of the ascent.<br />
16 This copulative καί may be either successive or epexegetical. As I shall show below, it must be successive.<br />
17 At 202a Plato posits correct belief between knowledge and ignorance, in that it hits the truth without giving a reason for it.<br />
17
Yuji Kurihara<br />
wonderfully beautiful in its nature” (210e2-5). In my reading of the subjunctives, (b) seeing Beauty<br />
itself constitutes the final stage, in addition to (a) seeing the knowledge of Beauty. How, then, are<br />
these two cognitions related to each other?<br />
As F. C. White points out, most scholars presuppose that the telos of the Ladder of<br />
Love consists in the lover’s contemplation of Beauty itself. White, on the other hand, argues, “the<br />
higher mysteries reach their summit … in the philosopher’s bringing forth of true virtue and in the<br />
immortality that this bestows.” 18 White is right in following Diotima’s generic definition of love<br />
(205a-206a) and taking into account the “Lesser Mysteries” (208e-209c) for the sake of (ὧν ἕνεκα<br />
210a1) the “Greater (Higher) Mysteries.” In the Lesser Mysteries, the lover encounters a beautiful<br />
person and educates (παιδεύειν 209c2) him to become a good man (τὸν ἄνδρα τὸν ἀγαθὸν c1) by<br />
begetting virtue (a3-4, b8, c3) and rearing it together (c4-7). Similarly, according to White, the true<br />
lover in the Greater Mysteries begets true virtue, which amounts to the philosophical works and<br />
external discourse shared with his beloved. Thus, the true lover as a philosopher can attain<br />
immortality by leaving true virtue as such behind for the future generations. 19<br />
I agree with White that the telos of the Ladder of Love is not characterized merely as seeing<br />
Beauty itself but as the philosophical activities of the lover and the beloved. As White stresses,<br />
Diotima explicates the philosophical life as worth living for the lover who is contemplating Beauty<br />
(cf. 211d1-3). However, White’s analysis is not sufficient to ensure that the lover’s philosophical life<br />
must involve the beloved’s engagement in it, for the text only indicates the interaction of the lover<br />
with Beauty, not with the beloved (211d-212a). 20 To resolve this problem, as I propose, we should<br />
look into Diotima’s two-step account of the final stage of the ascent. First, (a) Diotima describes the<br />
lover’s learning process of Beauty itself, which is led by the guide who manifests and actualizes her<br />
knowledge of it. Although the lover has not acquired knowledge of Beauty, as long as he is a student,<br />
he actually participates in that knowledge and engages in philosophical activities with the guide, who<br />
lives a philosophical life. While as teacher the guide attempts to explain what Beauty is, the lover<br />
makes every effort to receive the guide’s explanation as correct. This is how the lover sees the<br />
knowledge of Beauty appearing in the dialogical interaction between him and the guide. Second, (b)<br />
Diotima goes on to state that the lover suddenly (ἐξαίφνης 210e4) beholds Beauty itself, which must<br />
mean that the lover succeeds in acquiring the knowledge of Beauty. This knowledge, as we saw,<br />
appears in the philosophical dialogue between the teacher and the student. By beholding Beauty itself,<br />
therefore, the lover then becomes a philosophical guide and begins to educate a beautiful person to be<br />
good, just like the lover in the Lesser Mysteries does. Thus, the lover’s acquisition of the knowledge<br />
of Beauty is no doubt a momentary experience, but it never ends at this point. While contemplating<br />
Beauty itself, 21 the lover continues to actualize his knowledge through philosophical engagement with<br />
the beloved. In this dialogical nature of that knowledge, we can conclude that the telos of the Ladder<br />
of Love resides in the lover’s philosophical life and involves the beloved’s engagement in it.<br />
Consequently, Diotima represents the final stage of eros as both (a) the ascent and (b) the<br />
descent of philosophy, at the summit of which the lover suddenly changes his role from student to<br />
teacher. By following the transmitted text and reading τελευτήσῃ (211c7) and καὶ γνῷ (c8), we will<br />
discover that these two sides of philosophy are closely related to each other at the final stage of the<br />
Ladder.<br />
4. Socratic Eros and Platonic Education<br />
I have thus far elucidated the dialogical nature of knowledge of Beauty in this passage. As knower,<br />
the guide aims to explain what Beauty is, while as pupil, the lover accepts the guide’s explanation as<br />
correct and tries to understand it, even though he himself cannot yet give an account of Beauty. Only<br />
in succeeding in leading the lover to behold Beauty, can the guide legitimately call herself a knower<br />
for the first time, thus proving her teaching ability. In other words, it is then that the guide becomes<br />
“wise about love matters” (ταῦτά [sc. τὰ ἐρωτικά] τε σοφή 201d3) and can educate the lover. In the<br />
same way, the lover encounters a new lover and initiates him into the mystical rites of philosophy by<br />
teaching the matters of love. It is not until he succeeds in leading another lover to contemplate Beauty<br />
that the lover-guide partakes of immortality, thus being loved by the gods. Therefore, the true virtue<br />
18 White (2004) 366.<br />
19 White (2004) 374-8.<br />
20 Cf. Sheffield (2006) 145-6, 149; Blondell (2006) 155-6. Interestingly, White, (2004) 372, does read ἵνα for καί (211c8)<br />
and virtually admits the finality of having knowledge of Beauty itself.<br />
21 Note Plato’s frequent uses of present participles here (θεωµένῳ αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν 211d2-3, θεωµένου καὶ συνόντος αὐτῷ<br />
212a2; cf. ἐφαπτοµένῳ 212a5). See also ὁρῶν (211d5) and ὁρόντες (d6); cf. θεᾶσθαι (d7).<br />
18
Yuji Kurihara<br />
that the lover delivers must be philosophy itself.<br />
Finally, I suggest that the dialogue form adopted here supports this reading. Plato describes<br />
how Socrates becomes a philosophical guide (ἐπίστασθαι or δεινὸς τὰ ἐρωτικά, cf. 177d7-8, 198d1,<br />
207c3; 193e5) with the help of Diotima’s initiation or teaching (διδάσκειν, cf. 201d5, 204d2, 207a5),<br />
being aware that he needs a teacher (207c5-6). Having been persuaded by her, Socrates establishes his<br />
own principle of life (πίστις; cf. πεπεισµένος 212b2) and turns to persuade (b3) other people whom he<br />
thinks are pregnant. In this way, he actualizes his dialogical knowledge of Beauty in the form of<br />
philosophy. Similarly, through writing his dialogues, Plato too guides his readers in the philosophical<br />
life. In reading this passage, we experience variously overlapping philosophical dialogues based on<br />
freedom (cf. φιλοσοφίᾳ ἀφθόνῳ 210d6), which goes beyond our slavish everyday conversation (cf.<br />
φλυαρίας θνητῆς 211e3; cf. R. 515d3). 22 Plato’s creation of this mystic mood surely affects our<br />
psychology and leads us to accept the irregularity of the subjunctives in question.<br />
BIBLIOGRAPHY<br />
Blondell, R. (2006), “Where is Socrates on the ‘Ladder of Love’?” in J.H. Lesher, D. Nails, and<br />
F.C.C. Sheffield, Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong>:<br />
Issues in Interpretation and Reception, Washington D.C.<br />
Brockmann, C. (1992), Die Handschriftliche überlieferung von Platons <strong>Symposium</strong>, Wiesbaden.<br />
Bury, R.G. (1932), The <strong>Symposium</strong> of Plato (2 nd ed.), Cambridge.<br />
Dover, K.J. (1980), Plato: <strong>Symposium</strong>, Cambridge.<br />
Howatson, M.C. (tr.) (2008), Plato: The <strong>Symposium</strong>, edited with F.C.C. Sheffield, Cambridge.<br />
Irwin, T. (1977), Plato’s Moral Theory, Oxford.<br />
Jahn, O., and Usener, H. (eds.) (1875), Platonis <strong>Symposium</strong>, Bonn.<br />
Moravcsik, J.M.E. (1971), “Reason and Eros in the ‘Ascent’–Passage of the <strong>Symposium</strong>,” in J.P.<br />
Anton and G.L. Kustas (eds.), Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy, Albany: 285-302.<br />
Nehamas, A. and Woodruff, P. (tr.) (1989), Plato: <strong>Symposium</strong>, Indianapolis.<br />
Rowe, C.J. (1998), Plato: <strong>Symposium</strong>, Warminster.<br />
Sheffield, F.C.C. (2006), Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong>: The Ethics of Desire, Oxford.<br />
Slings, S.R. (1997), “Figures of Speech and their Lookalikes,” in E.J. Bakker (ed.), Grammar as<br />
Interpretation, Leiden: 169-214.<br />
White, F.C. (2004), “Virtue in Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong>,” Classical Quarterly 54: 366-78.<br />
22 Rowe, (1998) 197, notes “the somewhat telegraphic style of the whole passage.”<br />
19
ABSTRACT<br />
Il ruolo e l'importanza della dimensione<br />
esperienziale ed empirica nel Simposio<br />
Maurizio Migliori<br />
Una visione che metafisicizzi alla seconda potenza i concetti cardine dell’impianto metafisico di<br />
Platone è portata a ignorare l’attenzione che il filosofo ha sempre per il concreto e l’empirico e quindi<br />
a rischiare di perdere l’unità della filosofia dell’Ateniese.<br />
Tale attenzione nel Simposio si manifesta a vari livelli:<br />
1. Troviamo una valorizzazione della dimensione sociale, a partire dal convito stesso e dalla<br />
cura con cui viene presentato e concluso, dalla natura dei presenti e da tanti altri elementi, ad esempio<br />
nell’intervento di Alcibiade.<br />
2. A livello filosofico, nei vari discorsi abbiamo molte affermazioni che dividono o unificano<br />
troppo i due piani, fisico e metafisico, e che vengono poi smentite o corrette. Per fare degli esempi, si<br />
pensi a come Diotima (208C-D) trascende la posizione di Fedro che descrive in termini solo umani e<br />
sociali la potenza di amore (178 C-180A); si pensi a come viene superata la posizione di Pausania che<br />
separa e contrappone le due Afroditi, mentre già Erissimaco sente il bisogno di ricollegare i due<br />
ambiti, cosa che trova il suo completamento nella trattazione di Diotima; si pensi alla visione mitica di<br />
Aristofane, che unifica in modo eccessivo i soggetti, cosa che viene poi smentita esplicitamente da<br />
Diotima (205D-E) in nome del bene.<br />
Gli esempi potrebbero moltiplicarsi: si tratta di ricostruire il sottile gioco di riferimenti e<br />
correzioni interne che Platone opera fin dalla prima parte del testo. Infatti, la contrapposizione tra il<br />
discorso vero di Socrate e quello non vero degli altri (198D-199B) non implica la loro falsità, dato il<br />
modello triadico esplicitato senza alcuna apparente ragione da Diotima, la quale sostiene che c’è<br />
qualcosa di intermedio fra sapienza ed ignoranza (201E-202A), affermando così che non è corretto<br />
lavorare in un quadro binario per concetti come sapere-non sapere, bello-brutto, buono-cattivo.<br />
3. Infine l’empiria ha un importante ruolo nella trattazione di Diotima, che parte sia<br />
dall’affermazione che tutti sono gravidi sia dalla naturale tendenza di un mortale a diventare<br />
immortale (207B-E); questa riguarda sia l’essere umano, sia il corpo, sia l’anima e le attività spirituali<br />
(208A-C). Nel processo ascensivo, che non è necessario ricondurre all’anamnesi ma che allude ai suoi<br />
concetti fondamentali, Diotima mette in gioco vari elementi empirici, in una connessione stretta anche<br />
perché i veri misteri sono «quelli perfetti e oggetto di iniziazione, in funzione dei quali sono anche i<br />
precedenti, se si procede correttamente» (210A1-2). Così si arriva a scorgere all’istante (210E4)<br />
quell’unica scienza, che ha per oggetto la bellezza, Idea divina (211E3) che porta l’essere umano<br />
stesso in una sfera divina e lo fa essere in qualche senso immortale.<br />
Dunque questo processo, svolto da sé o sotto la conduzione di una guida (211C) parte da dati<br />
elementari e via via per successive purificazioni, viste come necessari gradini, giunge ad una<br />
conoscenza improvvisa che ha natura diversa dal processo che l’ha resa possibile, un dato importante<br />
per il tema della conoscenza del Bene.
Who loves? The question of agency in Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong><br />
Carolina Araújo<br />
According to the ancient models of praise 1 , the excellence proper to the praised is to be lauded in<br />
preference of its other features, like genealogy or wealth. When it comes to the praise of Eros in<br />
Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong>, Phaedrus’ speech announces that he is the cause without which no human being<br />
accomplishes great deeds (178c2-3; 178d2-4). To explain what is this causal function, Phaedrus<br />
describes the divine manifestation not according to the traditional epiphany, but to enthusiasm, a<br />
model in which the internal presence of the god produces the human excellence in what then becomes<br />
a simultaneously human and divine deed (αὐτὸς ὁ Ἔρως ἔνθεον ποιήσειε πρὸς ἀρετήν - 179a7; τοῦτο<br />
ὁ Ἔρως τοῖς ἐρῶσι παρέχει γιγνόµενον παρ' αὑτοῦ - 179b2-3). In general, it is hard to distinguish<br />
Eros from individual desire or motivation of actions, but it is also hard to distinguish it from an<br />
external stronger force that commands this same individual. 2 This tension between the divine and the<br />
human share in a cooperative work of motivation seems to me a leitmotiv in the dialogue, and in this<br />
paper I will try to explore some consequences of taking it as a key to the text’s interpretation, an<br />
unusual approach in view of the long-lasting mainstream of readings of the <strong>Symposium</strong> according to<br />
the object of love.<br />
Resuming Phaedrus’ speech, we can easily see its inconsistency in dealing with enthusiasm:<br />
On the one hand, he claims that Eros is the cause of shame and desire of honor in human beings<br />
(178d2), motivations that are connected with the visibility of the action (178d5; e2; 179a3), in which<br />
lovers and beloveds act as a spectacle to each other (178d4-5; e1-2; e4-5; 179d2; e1-2). On the other<br />
hand, he claims that the beloved is more honored by the gods because he does not act by enthusiasm<br />
(180a7-b5), but only as a response to the lover. 3 More interesting than the inconsistency, though, is<br />
the equivocal use of enthusiasm as both an internal and an external motivation, better said, between<br />
inspiration (by the god) and aspiration (for honor). As we can see in the case of shame, aspiration can,<br />
while inspiration cannot, take the form of a restraint on previous motivations.<br />
Pausanias is more strongly committed to the enthusiastic model, using it to describe agency<br />
for both good and bad actions (180e4; 181b8, d1). In this setting, restraint has a central role, either<br />
produced externally by rules (181d7-e1; 182a1; 182a3-6), or internally by good agents, who are<br />
voluntary servants (181e3-182a1; 184c2-3; 181c4). The fact that rules differ in quality (182d1-5)<br />
would be an objection to this system, but Pausanias proves himself to be more refined than a simple<br />
conventionalist. 4 He claims that better rules are those successful in turning external into internal<br />
restraint, i.e., in promoting excellence (184c3; 185b1-5), through a device of long-lasting tests of<br />
internal motivations (βασανίζειν - 184a1; 183e6-184a5). In doing so, he evaluates actions according<br />
to the perseverance of the agent and the stability of the object of love, i.e., the soul in contradistinction<br />
to the decaying body (183e1-2; e6). Time and persistency reveal the good lover, for whom love is an<br />
aspiration (for excellence) through restraint.<br />
Eryximachus operates a wide extension of the enthusiastic model in considering it present in<br />
everything that moves towards something, including the gods (186a3-6; κατ' ἀνθρώπινα καὶ κατὰ θεῖα<br />
πράγµατα - 186b2). The cosmic approach makes Eros an overall power that must be directed towards<br />
the good if happiness is to be produced (188d4-5). In his approach to arts, Eryximachus presents<br />
human knowledge as the mastering of Eros and its effects (ἐπιστάµενος ἐµποιῆσαι καὶ ἐνόντα ἐξελεῖν,<br />
ἀγαθὸς ἂν εἴη δηµιουργός - 186d3-4). Eros is the object on which the arts work with the aim of<br />
producing harmony (ὡς ἂν κοσµιώτεροι γίγνοιντο οἱ µήπω ὄντες - 187d5-6; 188b3-6; c1-2; c6-7) 5 and<br />
1 Aristotle, Rhetoric, I, 9 (1327b28-1328a9).Anaximenes of Lampsarcus, Ars Rhetorica, 35, 3.1-4.5 (1440b14-28).<br />
2 “Usando la terminologia contemporanea, si potrebbe dire che la persona amata è al tempo stesso l’origine e la meta della<br />
forza che si qualifica come desiderio in colui che ama e lo fa tendere verso di essa”. (Calame: XXVIII-XXIX).<br />
3 The problem is not “that the love of which Phaedrus speaks is not the ultimate source of excellence” (Corrigan & Glazov-<br />
Corrigan: 53-4), because love (in the lover) is still necessary for the action of the beloved; the problem is that Phaedrus has<br />
two concepts of enthusiam: desire for honor is still the motivation in the beloved.<br />
4 Dover seems to discard Pausanias’ commitment to excellence, persistence and love of the soul as a disguise for his personal<br />
interest: “the difference between good and bad eros lies in whole context of the ultimate physical act, not in the presence or<br />
absence of the act itself”(1964: 34) or “The eros of which he approves is a protracted relationship, in which the resistance of<br />
the eromenos makes great demands on the erastes, but there are circumstances in which resistance should cease” (1978: 91).<br />
However even if the sparse biographical information available on Pausanias should count more than the text itself, he would<br />
still defend a relationship in which the sexual act is not the first aim.<br />
5 In saying that there is an erotic knowledge (187a5) and that Eros guides the arts (πᾶσα διὰ τοῦ θεοῦ τούτου κυβερνᾶται -<br />
186e4-187a1) he means that Eros is an art object, a formula that should be understood in a sense similar to ἄρχουσί γε αἱ<br />
τέχναι καὶ κρατοῦσιν ἐκείνου οὗπέρ εἰσιν τέχναι. (Rep., 342c8-9) or πᾶσα ἡ πρᾶξις καὶ ἡ κύρωσις διὰ λόγωνἐστίν. διὰ ταῦτ'<br />
ἐγὼ τὴν ῥητορικὴν τέχνην ἀξιῶ εἶναι περὶ λόγους (Gorg., 450b9-c2).
Carolina Araujo<br />
if everything is enthusiastically moved, Eryximachus’ artist is not. He does not love; he is moved by<br />
the greatest power of knowledge, the only one that, bringing things to their ends, generates happiness<br />
(188d5-10). 6<br />
The first attitude of Aristophanes in his speech is to defend Eros as a cause of human<br />
happiness, turning him into the divine physician that promotes the healing of human beings (189c9d3).<br />
According to his myth, Eros is the longing for the previous half (191a5-b1; c8-d3; 192b5;<br />
192e10-193a1), which could have been deadly had not Zeus provided human beings with temporary<br />
relief (191b6-8) and ways of reproduction (191c4-5). Sex is not Eros, but as well as the rules (192b2),<br />
it is a device to ensure all other non-erotic human actions (ἐπὶ τὰ ἔργα τρέποιντο καὶ τοῦ ἄλλου βίου<br />
ἐπιµελοῖντο - 191c7-8), in particular the sacrifices and honors to the gods (190c4-5). However, this<br />
purpose of the gods is not clear to humans; to us Eros is an obscure motivation (192c4-d5), an<br />
indefinable stroke (ἐκπλήττονται - 192b7), a suffering (τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν καὶ τὰ παθήµατα αὐτῆς<br />
– 189d5-6) in opposition to the actions expected from humans. Notwithstanding Eros is our own<br />
nature (191c8-d2), each erotic suffering is a reminder that we are not the god that Eros is. We suffer,<br />
Eros heals; his philanthropy consists in a unique inverted enthusiasm: he leads to constant failure in<br />
achieving the goal, i.e., to become whole, and through this suffering he inspires non-erotic actions.<br />
Eros is a cause of happiness inasmuch as it reminds us that happiness is not the fulfillment of our<br />
desires, but a gift from the gods and that therefore we ought to act piously (193a7-b1). 7<br />
This brings us to Agathon’s complaint that all the previous speeches have taken the<br />
enthusiastic model for granted in not distinguishing the god himself from his effects in human beings.<br />
According to him, Eros is the highest paradigm of happiness, beauty, goodness and youth (195a6-8),<br />
whose presence is to be found in the characters and the souls both of humans and gods (ἐν γὰρ ἤθεσι<br />
καὶ ψυχαῖς θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων - 195e4-5) that present these properties. Hence Eros manifests itself<br />
not through enthusiasm, but according to a principle of affinity, i.e., attraction of the similar (ὅµοιον<br />
ὁµοίῳ ἀεὶ πελάζει - 195b4-5) and repulsion of the opposite (196a7-8). 8 Moreover, this is not a<br />
compulsive movement; Eros is a choice to the detriment of the kingdom of Necessity (195c6; 197b7).<br />
Both gods and human beings are voluntary servants of Eros, to use Pausanias’ expression (196b6-7;<br />
c1-2); a choice justified because Eros is the strongest of all desires (196d2-3). Agathon’s model<br />
merges inspiration, restraint and choice into aspiration 9 : given the principle of affinity, the most<br />
powerful internal motivation is the one toward the external paradigmatic object (δῆλον ὅτι κάλλους –<br />
αἴσχει γὰρ οὐκ ἔπι ἔρως - 197b5; ἐκ τοῦ ἐρᾶν τῶν καλῶν πάντ' ἀγαθὰ γέγονεν - 197b8-9), an external<br />
final cause presented to both gods and humans. Happy are those who choose happiness and the ones<br />
who choose Eros love.<br />
Notoriously this is Socrates’ point in the elenchus based on the formula τινος ὁ Ἔρως ἔρως<br />
(199d1-2; e6-7). We can see here that Socrates distinguishes lover and beloved, claiming three points:<br />
i) the presence of Eros is necessary to the act of love; ii) it is the lack in the agent that marks his<br />
difference from the object (200a8-b1; αὐτῶν τούτων ὧν ἐνδεής ἐστιν - 202d1-3) and iii) love is a<br />
desire to possess the object and this possession is happiness (200b6-8; 205a1-3). Altogether, these<br />
claims result in Socrates’ striking treatment of Eros, and not of the human being in which Eros<br />
manifests himself, as the lacking subject (201c4; 204a1-7). Diotima’s speech, claiming that Eros is<br />
not a god, but a daimon (202d5-e1; 203a4-8), is introduced precisely to reject the enthusiastic model<br />
through a defense of the unity of the love agent. It is not only the case that both daimones and human<br />
6 In presenting Eryximachus as “the exemplar of authority that persuades” (170), Edelstein lists all the advice given by him<br />
to other characters, but unfortunately he does not make any connection between this position and the authoritative content of<br />
his speech.<br />
7 The contradiction pointed by Corrigan and Glazov-Korrigan, “if we are pious, we shall be restored to our original nature.<br />
But our original nature was violent and impious” (74), is not a contradiction, but the moral of Aristophanes’ myth.<br />
“Therefore the final problem is how to establish a working relation between this rebellion, the attempt to return to the<br />
original nature, and the Olympian gods, to whom men owe their lives” (Strauss: 127). “... the 'whole' which Aristophanes'<br />
lovers seek is not only physically inaccessible to them; its attainment lies under the eternal interdict of the gods. Eros is,<br />
therefore, an endless, unterminating, perpetual desire.” (Halperin: 169). The difficulty in Halperin’s reading lies not in his<br />
interpretation of Aristophanes’ speech, but in his thesis that the speeches prior to Aristophanes would treat Eros as a simple<br />
appetite in Halperin’s terms.<br />
8 Sedley spots this principle but he is too ready to relate it to the argument of causality in Phaedo, 102a9-107a1; the result is<br />
a retreat to the enthusiastic model: “if you desire something, your doing so is secondary to, and caused by, the presence in<br />
you of the relevant desire, itself the primary subject of the desiring” (56). Defending a “principle of affinity” we can claim<br />
that choice is Agathon’s relevant contribution to the causal role of Eros.<br />
9 Stokes calls attention to the problem: “The ‘absolute’ use may, or may not, imply, or require supplement by a general<br />
expression in the genitive case. It is simply not clear from Agathon’s speech which view he wishes to take, or how he would<br />
answer to these questions.” (118). However, the use of both forms is precisely Agathon’s point according to his principle of<br />
affinity, a principle Stokes seems to neglect in his analysis of self-predication in Agathon’s speech (140).<br />
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beings lack something 10 ; it is the case that, as lovers, they are one and the same, the daimonic man<br />
(δαιµόνιος ἀνήρ - 203a5). 11 Some light is shed on this matter by Burkert’s analyses of the Greek<br />
religion; according to him:<br />
Daimon does not designate a specific class of divine beings, but a peculiar mode<br />
of activity. For daimon and theos are never simply interchangeable either. (…)<br />
Daimon is occult power, a force that drives man forward where no agent can be<br />
named. The individual feels as it were that the tide is with him, he acts with the<br />
daimon, syn daimona, or else when everything turns against him, he stands against<br />
the daimon, pros daimona, especially when a god is favouring his adversary. (…)<br />
Every god can act as a daimon, not every act of his reveals the god. Daimon is the<br />
veiled countenance of divine activity. There is no image of a daimon, and there is<br />
no cult. Daimon is thus the necessary complement to the Homeric view of the gods<br />
as individuals with personal characteristics; it covers that embarrassing remainder<br />
which eludes characterization and naming. 12<br />
If we can understand a daimonic action as one in which reasons are unclear, we can see that<br />
his communication function (202e3-7) is not a simple transmission, but an interference and we also<br />
see how Socrates merges Agathon’s voluntary submission to paradigmatic objects (200e7-201a1) and<br />
Aristophanes’ enigmatic suffering (200e; 205d-e). This mixed model is compatible with Diotima’s<br />
description of right opinion as something that has reality as its object, but is not capable of giving a<br />
rational account of it (202a5-9). This is the tension that forces Eros to be a philosopher (ἀναγκαῖον<br />
Ἔρωτα φιλόσοφον εἶναι 204b4). If love is desire for happiness though the possession of love’s<br />
paradigmatic though enigmatic objects, then i) it is a universal human action (κοινὸν οἴει εἶναι πάντων<br />
ἀνθρώπων - 205a5-8; d1-3) 13 ; ii) it is an internal feeling that marks actions of constant pursuit (206b1-<br />
4); iii) its daimonic character marks its failure in its task of constantly giving reasons, turning it into a<br />
constant rescue of knowledge (208a3-7). If so, Diotima’s universal human Eros mirrors Socrates’<br />
daimonion in the Apology 14 , said to always turn him away from a previous motivation (ἀεὶ ἀποτρέπει<br />
µε τοῦτο ὃ ἂν µέλλω πράττειν - 31d2-3; ἐναντιουµένη, εἴ τι µέλλοιµι µὴ ὀρθῶς πράξειν – 40a4-5).<br />
Socrates’ singularity is that, as a gift since childhood, his daimonion is committed to rectitude. 15<br />
What the <strong>Symposium</strong> shows is that this rectitude is not necessarily a gift. Diotima presents us<br />
an educational process towards a stage that would unify happiness, understood as the possession of<br />
goodness throughout time and described as pregnancy, and immortality, described as giving birth in<br />
beauty at the right age mediated by logos; a dynamic of acquiring and creating. If we shall not forget<br />
the lesser mysteries when heading to the higher, what establishes rectitude in loving (210a4-6; 210e2-<br />
3; 211b5-6) and designs the scala amoris is the exercise of mortal desire for immortality 16 , constantly<br />
10 Dover (1980: 139-140) presents the problems of the inference, but not the consequence of this common agency.<br />
11 “Insofar as we all have a certain striving for the good and the beautiful in us, we are all ‘daemonic’ beings, the children of<br />
Poros and Penia” (Frede: 403). An objection could be made to the thesis of the daimonic human beings based on Diotima’s<br />
personification of Eros in the myth of Poros and Penia, but the myth should be understood as a response to Aristophanes’<br />
account – obviously recalling his comic personification of Penia in Ploutos. An approach to the myth that would claim<br />
divine status for Eros, would also have to attribute it to Penia, which is of course against both Socratic models of gods and<br />
daimones (see 203b8; c6). Moreover is notable that in its conclusion, the myth claims that Eros can be neither a god nor<br />
ignorant (204a1-7), leaving untouched the Aristophanic hypothesis of its being human in nature.<br />
12 Burkert: 180. Besides Homer, this interpretation is compatible for example with Hesiod, Op. 121-3; Theognidea, 380-381;<br />
Heracleitus, fr. 112; Plato, Cratylus, 397d10-398c4.<br />
13 A note should be made about animals. Having defined their love as desire for immortality, Diotima claims procreation as<br />
more general goal for love, since it is common to all living beings (207d1), however she is very clear about the constant<br />
limits imposed on human beings because of their inability to give a logos of their object of love (208a5-b1), a task obviously<br />
proper only to us.<br />
14 For the opposite argument, see Belfiore: 24.<br />
15 “Socrates is the archetype of the erotikos because he is permanently besotted (with knowledge, with handsome young<br />
men) and never manages to achieve a finality” (Davidson: 36). See 211d3-5: τοὺς καλοὺς παῖδάς τε καὶ νεανίσκους δόξει σοι<br />
εἶναι, οὓς νῦν ὁρῶν ἐκπέπληξαι καὶ ἕτοιµος εἶ καὶ σὺ καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοί; 216d2-3: Σωκράτης ἐρωτικῶς διάκειται τῶν καλῶν<br />
καὶ ἀεὶ περὶ τούτους ἐστὶ καὶ ἐκπέπληκται. Socrates’ rectitude in being permanently in love responds to Phaedrus’ shame,<br />
Pausanias’ restraint, Eryximachus’ harmony and Aristophanes’ piety. As such, it agrees with Agathon’s transformation of<br />
constraint into aspiration.<br />
16 Although I do not agree with Brisson’s translation “recherche”, he is right in finding in meletan a notion that “prend à la<br />
fois en compte les notions d’oubli et de mémoire” (212). Sheefield rejects this continuity in the ladder by defending an<br />
object-driven analysis: “In Socrates’ own speech the central contrast between the desiring agents of the lower and the higher<br />
mysteries is that between the love of honour and the love of wisdom” (202; see 137-153); the onus it has to deal with is the<br />
function of laws and activities in the higher mysteries (210c4) in clear relation to the mention of Lycurgus’ and Solon’s<br />
immortal children in the lower mysteries (209d4-e3). Ferrari, who takes the same position, is aware of the problem, and<br />
23
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changing objects due to the acknowledgement of their limits in comparison to the reality that strikes<br />
us (κατανοῆσαι - 210a8; b2; b4; b7; c3), meanwhile obstinately devoted to producing logos about this<br />
obscure paradigmatic object (210a7-8; c1-2; d5). Time and again the lover fails to give an account of<br />
reality, however, through the memory of the logos he produces and the effect of this memory, he<br />
becomes humanly immortal. All the stages consist in love’s action inasmuch as they all intend the<br />
sudden sight of beauty (210e4-6) 17 and they are all right if constantly trying to rescue from oblivion<br />
this fleeting moment through logos, (σχεδὸν ἄν τι ἅπτοιο τοῦ τέλους - 211b6-7 in opposition to ἱνα<br />
γνῷ αὐτὸ τελευτῶν ὅ ἐστι καλόν – 211c8-d1): the unity of the ladder is given both by the unity of<br />
beauty and by action of the lover. 18 This permanent exercise of love is real excellence (212a5-7) and<br />
its immortality takes place in others by means of all the erotic speeches produced along the journey. 19<br />
Alcibiades presents the effect of these speeches in his eulogy for Socrates as the daimonic<br />
agent (214d3; 221c4-6). 20 According to his imagery, gods are inside Socrates (215b3) 21 , causing him<br />
to be hubristic for being simultaneously excellent and disdainful (215b7, see also 175e7; 216d6-7; e2-<br />
5; 219d4-7; 222a3). This internal divine nature, said to be also νοῦς (222a2-3) makes Socrates a<br />
unique human being (221d2), capable of producing speeches that produce possession (κατεχόµεθα –<br />
215d6). In a reappraisal of the enthusiastic model, the daimonic possession or philosophical madness<br />
(218b3) is presented as an effect of speech on human beings, felt as an Aristophanic suffering<br />
(ἐκπεπληγµένοι– 215d5-6; ἔπασχον - 216e5), which arouses the divine in others through the distress<br />
(ἐτεθορύβητό - 215e6) about the way one ought to live (216a1-2). The speech is hence not only a<br />
product of love that can immortalize actions, as poets and legislators do; it is a producer of love,<br />
immortalizing the production of speeches by producing daimonic lovers. 22 The daimonic way of<br />
living qua possession is irresistible – and here Pausanias’ voluntary servitude comes back to the fore<br />
(ποιητέον εἶναι ἔµβραχυ ὅτι κελεύοι Σωκράτης 217a1-2; 218a3-5) in again a merging of<br />
Aristophanes’ and Agathon’s meanings of love (216d2-3; 221d1-6; see also 177d7-8; 198d1-3) –, but<br />
Alcibiades is simply incapable of living it (216b3-5). Both Alcibiades’ mistake about Socrates 23 and<br />
states that “the philosophic initiate begins, then, at a level lower than that attained by the honor lover in the Lesser Mysteries<br />
(whom he will overtake in the due course)” (256). What the higher mysteries seem to reveal is how the constant exercise of<br />
lack and reasoning, described in the lesser mysteries, can result in excellence.<br />
17 Being an educational process between at least two people, the ladder is the action of a lover to turn someone else also into<br />
a lover, and it is as the common way of living of lovers that love takes place among individuals. If this daimonic way of life<br />
is marked by the constant experience of falling short of giving an account of the reality that strikes us, beauty is the constant<br />
object of love in persons, bodies, souls, laws, activities, etc. This constancy implies that even the vocabulary of “exclusive”<br />
or “inclusive” interpretations, proposed by Moravcsik (293), is misleading, not to mention the whole debate about love for a<br />
person as a person. For this topic, see my To orthos paiderastein: righteousness and eroticism in Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong>,<br />
forthcoming.<br />
18 Halperin (186) seems to neglect this daimonic model of action in claiming that the link between the stages is made only in<br />
objective and not in subjective terms, although he recognizes that Plato considers the lover’s sexual desire identical to the<br />
philosopher’s desire (188).<br />
19 “What is generated at the summit is, for the first time, not described as a kind of discourse, but rather as ‘true virtue’”<br />
(Ferrari: 259). The form of beauty will cause the experience of failure in the attempt to give an account of it, because i) it is<br />
sudden; ii) because it is loved, it is never possessed. Hence it determines the rectitude of all the process without a logos of<br />
itself, the same kind of rectitude that must be implied in a right opinion, an internal state ratified by practical effectiveness.<br />
All the speeches in the ladder are about beauty (in diverse instances) and they fall short because of their object. “If Socrates<br />
has indeed been gazing on the Form of Beauty, the offspring he produces will be not logoi, but interior virtues. Such virtues<br />
may, however, be manifested in action”. (Blondell: 158). The evidence of excellence in actions is what explains Alcibiades’<br />
mistaken claim about Socrates’ inner states.<br />
20 Robin: 109, 161-164; however, we cannot accept Robin’s theses that Eros is the nous or the soul, (125, 137) nor is the<br />
feeling of love cut off from philosophy (159), a theory that would destroy the principle of lack and desire for immortality.<br />
Robin’s intellectualism even considers Platonic love as an inferior principle of action (164-165), a conclusion based in its<br />
synthetic function that would, again, hold against his identification of Eros and nous. Interestingly enough some of Robin’s<br />
claims can also be found in Nussbaum: “It is, we see, the old familiar eros, that longing for an end to longing, that motivates<br />
us here to ascend to a world in which erotic activity, as we know it, will not exist”. (183). Closer to our approach here is<br />
Belfiore’s definition of Socratic eros as: “a passionate desire for the wisdom, beauty and other good things that one<br />
recognizes that one lacks”(3).<br />
21 Reeve’s understanding of agalmata as “an image for what is itself necessarily beyond image”(138) seems to imply a too<br />
radical philosophical experience in what Alcibiades sees in Socrates. What Alcibiades sees is the success in speeches and the<br />
excellence in actions, i.e., Socrates’ efficiency in performing tasks that Alcibiades would like to perform equally well.<br />
22 Lear insightfully suggests the connection between beauty and immortality through memory, which “makes one wonder<br />
whether his quasi-immortality is not something altogether different from enduring for a very long time in the minds of<br />
others” (111); a point of view shared by Price: “so long as the boy lives, and does not deteriorate, the man’s virtues will be<br />
alive in him” (28). However these approaches do not consider Socratic love as a producer of lovers in which it is one’s own<br />
excellence instead of the memory of someone else’s deeds that immortalizes the love.<br />
23 So Alcibiades’ unreliableness lies in his ignorance and misunderstanding of reasons, not in his description of past facts or<br />
phenomena, his parresia, which is assured by the silence of Socrates himself. “Plato’s text encourages his readers to adopt a<br />
hermeneutic of suspicion towards Alcibiades’ interpretation of Socrates, but not towards the veracity of incidents that he<br />
recounts” (Lane: 47). “In Alcibiades' speech, Socrates is sophos, and therefore godlike and lacking in desire, rather than the<br />
24
Carolina Araujo<br />
his alleged incapacity rest on his supposition of a conquest, of achieving a definitive internal divine<br />
state which would infallibly cause success in actions and speeches, and not as an exercise. If he is not<br />
to conquer this kind of excellence, Alcibiades feels slighted and charges Socrates of hubris (214d3;<br />
219c5-6). Confronted with Socrates’ concept of Eros, Alcibiades is the first to realize that he is unable<br />
to love, that loving is too difficult a task for a human being; it involves dealing with what is beyond<br />
control.<br />
What is offered here is the sketch of an argument that would require more than a whole book.<br />
The aim is obviously to seize the occasion for a dialogue about agency in the <strong>Symposium</strong>, egoistically<br />
aiming to benefit myself from the audience’s objections. What I claim is that the narrative in the<br />
<strong>Symposium</strong> transfigures Eros as a cause of action. What was at first a force greater than human, a<br />
divine cause of human accomplishments, has proved to demand control, internal or external, through<br />
laws, knowledge or piety. Socrates claims that this control can be replaced by aspiration and instead<br />
of inspiration he suggests constant exercise, the heaviest of tasks, condemned by those unable to<br />
properly love, but not by Plato.<br />
Works cited:<br />
Allen, R. The <strong>Symposium</strong>. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991.<br />
Belfiore, E. S. Socrates’daimonic art: love for wisdom in four Platonic dialogues. Cambridge:<br />
Cambridge University Press, 2012.<br />
Blondell, R. Where is Socrates on the ‘ladder of love’? In: Lesher, J.; Nails, D.; Sheffield, F. 147-178.<br />
Brisson, L. Le Banquet. Paris: Flammarion, 2007 (5 th ed).<br />
Burkert, W. Greek religion. Cambridge: Harvard, 1985.<br />
Calame, C. (ed.) L’amore in Grecia. Roma: Laterza, 2006.<br />
Davidson, J. The Greeks and Greek love: a radical reappraisal of homosexuality in Ancient Greece.<br />
London: 2007.<br />
Dover, K. <strong>Symposium</strong>. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980.<br />
_____. Greek homossexuality. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978.<br />
_____. Eros and nomos: Plato, <strong>Symposium</strong>, 182a-185c. Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies,<br />
11, 1964. 31-42.<br />
_____. Aristophanes’ speech in Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong>. Journal of Hellenic Studies, 66, 1966. 41-50.<br />
Edelstein, L. The role of Eryximachus in Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong>. In: Temkin, O, & Temkin, C. L.<br />
Ancient medicine: selected papers of Ludwig Edelstein. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1967. 153-171.<br />
Ferrari, G. R. F. Platonic love. In: Kraut, R. The Cambridge Companion to Plato. Cambridge:<br />
Cambridge University Press, 1992. 248-276.<br />
Frede, D. Out of the cave: what Socrates learned from Diotima. In: Rosen, R. & Farrell, J. (ed.)<br />
Nomodeiktes: Greek studies in honor of Martin Ostwald. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan<br />
Press, 1993. 397-422.<br />
Halperin, D. Platonic Eros and what the men call love. Ancient Philosophy, 5, 1985. 161-204.<br />
Lane, M. Virtue as love of knowledge in Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong> and Republic. In: Scott, D. (ed.)<br />
Maieusis: Essays on Ancient Philosophy in honour of Miles Burnyeat. Oxford: Oxford University<br />
Press, 2007. 97-135.<br />
Lear, G. R. Permanent beauty and becoming happy in Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong>. In: Lesher, J.; Nails, D.;<br />
Sheffield, F. 96-123.<br />
Lesher, J.; Nails, D; Sheffield, F. Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong>: issues in interpretation and reception.<br />
Washington: Harvard Center for Hellenic Studies, 2006.<br />
Moravcsik, J. Reason and Eros in the “ascent”- passage of the <strong>Symposium</strong>. In: Anton, J. P. & Kustas,<br />
G.L. (eds.) Essays in Ancient Greek philosophy. Albany: SUNY Press, 1971. 285-302.<br />
Nussbaum, M. The fragility of the goodness: luck and ethics in Greek tragedy and philosophy.<br />
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.<br />
Nightingale, A. W. The folly of praise: Plato’s critique of encomiastic discourse in the Lysis and the<br />
Sumposium. Classical Quaterly, 43, 1993. 112-130.<br />
Price, A. W. Love and friendship in Plato and Aristotle. Oxford: Clarendon, 1989.<br />
philosophos who restlessly schemes after perfection” (Nightingale: 127).<br />
25
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Reeve, C. D. C. A study in violets: Alcibiades in the <strong>Symposium</strong>. In: Lesher, J.; Nails, D.; Sheffield,<br />
F. 124-146.<br />
Robin, L. La théorie platonicienne de l’amour. Paris: PUF, 1964.<br />
Sedley, D. The speech of Agathon in Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong>. In: Reis, B; Haffman, S. (eds.) The virtuous<br />
life in Greek ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 47-69.<br />
Sheefield, F. C. C. Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong>: the ethics of desire. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.<br />
Stokes, M. C. Plato’s Socratic conversations: drama and dialectic in three dialogues. Baltimore: The<br />
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.<br />
Strauss, L. On Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong>. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001.<br />
26
Eudaimonist Closure in the Speeches of Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong><br />
David T. Runia<br />
The theme for my paper today is one that has intrigued me for a long time. It goes back to my<br />
inaugural lecture in Leiden pronounced almost exactly twenty years ago. The title of the lecture,<br />
written in Dutch and only published in that language, was Bios eudaimon, not easy to translate, but let<br />
us say ‘a life well lived’. 1 The lecture took its starting-point in the observation that numerous literary<br />
works in the ancient world with a philosophical content (however loosely defined) ended with the<br />
theme of the good life, most usually associated with the key philosophical term eudaimonia. This<br />
applied not only to Greek and Latin philosophical works, but also to writings in the Hellenistic-Jewish<br />
and Christian traditions.<br />
A key text for my argument was taken from Plato’s enormously influential work, the<br />
Timaeus. As you all know, the work is for the most part not really a dialogue, but a lengthy<br />
monologue by the Pythagorean natural philosopher Timaeus. After giving an extensive account of the<br />
origin and structure of the cosmos and of its most important and complex inhabitant—linked to each<br />
other in the crucial macrocosm–microcosm relation—Timaeus ends with a brief account of what the<br />
best life is for the human being at the centre of his discourse. It is only when the human being<br />
constantly cares for his divine part and brings its motions in conformity (homoiôsis) with the rational<br />
motions of the universe that he can be supremely eudaimôn and that will mean that the goal (telos)<br />
will have been achieved, the best life offered to human beings by the gods (Tim. 90c–d).<br />
It will be noted that this passage does not actually constitute the final words of Timaeus’<br />
monologue. He in fact ends with a hymn to the cosmos (92c). But it does in my view represent the<br />
climactic moment of his speech and Plato underlines this by immediately afterwards saying that he<br />
has virtually reached the end (telos) of his account of the universe up to the genesis of the human<br />
being. There is an obvious play on words between the goal of human life just mentioned and the<br />
completion of the discourse. As Carlos Steel and others have pointed out, 2 the ultimate purpose of the<br />
Timaeus is not science but ethics, to set out the basis in natural philosophy for the key questions of<br />
human existence. So effectively the climax and end-point of the work is this passage on the good life.<br />
But let us quickly turn to the dialogue that is our focus in this conference, the <strong>Symposium</strong>. In<br />
my oration at the time I noted that at least four of the speeches in this work end with the subject of<br />
eudaimonia and the good life. 3 In my paper today I wish to expand this observation and very briefly<br />
examine all seven speeches in the <strong>Symposium</strong> in relation to the theme of closure outlined above. How<br />
do the individual speeches end? Why do a majority of the speeches end with the theme of eudaimonia<br />
(and/or related themes), but a minority do not? What might the reason be for this state of affairs and<br />
how does it fit in with Plato’s purpose for the dialogue?<br />
I would argue that this is a topic of intrinsic interest, based on an observation that I have not<br />
come across anywhere in the literature (which of course does not mean that it has not been made<br />
somewhere in the vast output of Platonic scholarship). I also hope that, in studying the speeches of the<br />
<strong>Symposium</strong> from this point of view, we may also be able to shed some light on an interesting recent<br />
controversy which focuses on the question of the purpose of the five speeches prior to that of Socrates<br />
(and Diotima) in the dialogue. Are these ‘essentially individual contributions with each attempting to<br />
go one better than the one before in an apparently haphazard way’, with each of the speakers<br />
representing a type as well as an individual, as Christopher Rowe has argued? 4 Or do the speeches<br />
follow each other in a deliberate sequence which might even have a dialectical purpose, with<br />
Socrates’ speech purposefully correcting and superseding what has preceded, as argued by Frisbee<br />
Sheffield? 5 I will return to this question during the course of my paper. But let us now turn to the first<br />
speech and how it ends.<br />
The first speaker, Phaedrus, has hardly begun his encomium of Eros before he mentions the<br />
theme of living well. The key characteristic of Erôs is that he has the power to inspire excellence<br />
(aretê). Through love a sense of shame at acting shamefully and a sense of honour in acting<br />
honourably is instilled in the lover and this leads to fine and noble deeds (178c5–d4). Such deeds the<br />
gods reward, in the case of Alcestis when she returns from the dead, in the case of Achilles when he is<br />
1 Runia (1993).<br />
2 Steel (2001).<br />
3 Runia (1993) 5–6.<br />
4 Rowe (1998) 8.<br />
5 Sheffield (2006) 30 and passim.
David T. Runia<br />
transported to the isles of the blessed. The gods honour excellence all the more when it belongs to and<br />
is inspired by love. The final words of the speech could not be more emphatic (180b6–8): 6 ‘Therefore<br />
I say that Erôs is the most ancient of gods, the most honoured and the most powerful in helping men<br />
gain aretê and eudaimonia, whether they are alive or have passed away.’<br />
The next speaker, Pausanias, develops the theme of the excellence inspired by love further.<br />
Love in itself neither honourable nor shameful. Its nature depends entirely on the deeds to which it<br />
leads (183d4–6). Common love is attached to the body rather than the soul and its outcome is<br />
predictably vulgar (181b, 183e). How different is the higher form of love which looks to the soul. Not<br />
only does it lead to aretê, but also, Pausanias suggests, to a love of wisdom (philosophia) (184c3–d1).<br />
Only in this case is it permitted for a young man to take a lover, when the lover is able to make the<br />
young man better and wiser, and when the young man is eager to be taught and improved by the lover<br />
(184d7–e5). The speech ends with praise of heavenly love, which compels the lover and the beloved<br />
to focus all their efforts on the pursuit of aretê, in marked contrast to what happens in the case of<br />
vulgar love (185b5–c2). The theme of eudaimonia and the good life is not utilized here. It is perhaps<br />
implicit in the earlier mention of the ‘love of wisdom’, but not made explicit. As Frisbee Sheffield has<br />
noted, what needs clarification here is the nature of the above-mentioned wisdom and how it is to be<br />
achieved. 7<br />
The next speaker is the physician Eryximachus and his opening words, directed at the<br />
previous speaker Pausanias, are of immediate interest for our theme. Literally he says that ‘as<br />
Pausanias started off well in his logos but did not complete (apetelese) it well, I must attempt to place<br />
a telos on his logos’ (185e7–186a2). The term logos gives rise to the usual difficulties. Should we<br />
translate ‘argument’ with Reeve and most scholars, or ‘theme’ with Rowe? Or are other translations<br />
such as ‘account’ or even ‘speech’ also possible? We recall the text in the Timaeus discussed at the<br />
outset where telos is the ‘end of an account’. It would certainly be going too far to argue that<br />
Eryximachus is alluding to the fact that his predecessor’s speech did not end with the theme of<br />
eudaimonia and the good life, but that might be taken as at least part of what was missing. The<br />
comment also indicates to us the importance of ending an argument or a speech in the appropriate<br />
way.<br />
So what does Eryximachus say himself? As befits a physician, he focuses on the role of love<br />
in various sciences, although oddly less in medicine than in music, mantic and astronomy. The two<br />
kinds of love identified by Pausanias can be seen in all the phenomena studied by these sciences.<br />
When permeated by the higher kind of love, harmony, health and goodness result, while the other<br />
kind brings on injustice and destruction (188a3–9). Like Phaedrus, Eryximachus emphasizes the<br />
power of Erôs. In fact this theme introduces the climax of his speech, just a few words before its end: 8<br />
‘So much and so great is the power that Erôs has; or rather Erôs taken together as a whole has all<br />
power, but it is the one that is brought about (apoteloumenos) with moderation and justice in relation<br />
to those things that are good, both among us and among the gods, who has the greatest power,<br />
providing us with all eudaimonia, enabling us to associate and be friends both with each other and<br />
with the gods, who are superior to us.’ Here too, as we saw in Phaedrus’ case, the speech ends with<br />
the themes of power, excellence and eudaimonia, to which is added the rich motif of ‘friendship with<br />
god’, another key aspect of what is regarded as constituting the good life that is the goal of human<br />
existence.<br />
Aristophanes now takes over from Eryximachus and, although the comic poet’s speech has a<br />
quite different approach from that of the physician, he does start off with the same theme of Erôs’s<br />
power and the god’s ability to heal human ills and provide the human race with eudaimonia (189c4–<br />
d2). But in order to understand this, Aristophanes says, we need to know the ‘nature of human beings<br />
and what happens to them’ (189d5–6), and so he goes on to tell his famous story of the originally<br />
unified creatures that are now in a divided state. There is only one way for the human race to flourish<br />
(i.e. be eudaimôn), Aristophanes claims as he comes to the end of his speech: we must bring erôs to<br />
its conclusion (ektelesaimen) and return to our original nature (193c3–5). Hence we must praise Erôs,<br />
for ‘he promises the greatest hope of all: if we treat the gods with due reverence, he will restore to us<br />
our original nature, and by healing us, he will make us blessed and eudaimones.’<br />
These are the climactic words of Aristophanes’ speech. Even more emphatically than previous<br />
speakers, he ends with the theme of the blessed state of eudaimonia, the good life for human beings.<br />
The ‘original nature’ (archaia phusis) is of course our state before we were divided. But it is<br />
fascinating to note that in the Timaeus passage discussed at the outset of our paper the phrase returns<br />
6<br />
For the most part I use the translation Nehemas and Woodruff (1997), though I modify it when required.<br />
7<br />
Sheffield (2006) 25.<br />
8<br />
Using Rowe’s more literal version here.<br />
28
David T. Runia<br />
and its meaning deepened: it is the original state in which humans were made before they plunged into<br />
the stream of genesis, that state that allows them to reach the telos of human existence which is the<br />
best life given to human beings by the gods (Tim. 90d5–7). Plato is telling us across the years that<br />
behind the humour and fun of Aristophanes’ story lies a deeper message.<br />
Next comes Agathon with his florid and mannered speech in praise of the god. At the outset<br />
he describes Erôs as the most blessed (eudaimonestatos) of the gods (195a6), but he does not dwell on<br />
the themes of human aretê and eudaimonia that have been so prominent so far. His speech thus makes<br />
no contribution to our theme, except perhaps that its absence is telling. Agathon’s speech is all style<br />
and no substance, in contrast to what is about to come.<br />
We now arrive at the climactic speech of the dialogue, Socrates reporting the words of<br />
Diotima. Time forbids us to mention more than just what is essential for our theme. Firstly there are<br />
two key passages which both speak of the end (telos). Early in their conversation (204e–205a)<br />
Diotima famously makes the point about goodness and eudaimonia. You can ask why one desires<br />
good things and the good, but when the answer is ‘for the sake of eudaimonia’ you cannot go further,<br />
since there is no point in asking why you might want to be eudaimôn. You have reached the endpoint<br />
(telos). This argument surely sheds light on why three of the five previous speeches have ended on the<br />
theme of the good life. The other passage records the climax of the quest for the beautiful, when the<br />
lover ascends to the goal of his erotic activities (telos tôn erotikôn) and all of a sudden sees the<br />
marvellous sight of the beautiful itself (210e3–5). This, the priestess declares, is the life worth living<br />
for a human being (211d2–3).<br />
All the themes that we have discussed so far then come together wonderfully well in the final<br />
words of Diotima’s speech (211e4–212a7, slightly abbreviated): ‘Do you think it would be a poor life<br />
for a human being to look there (i.e. at divine Beauty) and to behold it and be with it? Or haven’t you<br />
remembered that in that life alone, when he looks at Beauty in the only way that Beauty can be seen—<br />
only then will it be possible to give birth to true aretê. The friendship of the gods belongs to anyone<br />
who has given birth to true aretê and nourished it, and if any human being could become immortal, it<br />
would be he.’ Through the particular emphasis of this dialogue and its theme of erôs, the good life and<br />
wisdom are identified with the quest for and attainment of true Beauty and true aretê. In other words,<br />
what is described here is the state of eudaimonia. To be sure, the concept does not appear here, but<br />
this is exactly what being a friend (or beloved) of the gods and (qualified) immortality refer to. 9 We<br />
recall that the theme of friendship with the gods also occurred in the final lines of Eryximachus’<br />
speech earlier.<br />
We are now in a position to draw some conclusions. Four of the six speeches—those of<br />
Phaedrus, Eryximachus, Aristophanes and Diotima—end with the theme of eudaimonia and the good<br />
life. The theme is introduced and linked to the crucial role of aretê in Phaedrus’ opening speech. It is<br />
broadened and elaborated by Eryximachus. In Aristophanes’ speech the key aspect (even if comically<br />
presented) of the human ‘original nature’ is added: by restoring us to our original nature Erôs can heal<br />
us and make us eudaimones. This is theme is years later greatly deepened in the Timaeus. Finally<br />
Socrates through Diotima teaches how it is love of wisdom and love of beauty resulting in true aretê<br />
that brings about the friendship of the gods and such immortality as is available to human beings. Two<br />
of the speeches—those of Pausanias and Agathon—do not end with the theme. It is no coincidence<br />
that they are the speeches that contribute least to the advancement of thought in the dialogue. The<br />
sequential build-up of thought that we have noted makes me want to side with Sheffield against Rowe<br />
on the question of whether the speeches preceding that of Socrates can be seen to represent a<br />
dialectical progression that leads the reader on the path to the climax of the work in Diotima’s speech.<br />
Let us now turn to the question of why Plato might have adopted this procedure of ending the<br />
four speeches as we have described them. When we add the fact that he ends other very significant<br />
works in his corpus in a similar way—I am thinking the Gorgias, both books I and X of the Republic,<br />
the Politicus, as well as the Timaeus already mentioned (and also, I might add, a number of pseudo-<br />
Platonic works 10 ) 11 —we must conclude that the method is very deliberate. I have often wondered<br />
whether Plato was making use of some kind of standard method that had developed in the rhetorical<br />
and philosophical practices in the fifth and late fourth centuries. It would require further research to<br />
investigate this possibility (any help would be most appreciated).<br />
But it is by no means necessary to lean on such an hypothesis, since very good reasons can be<br />
9<br />
For being theophilês cf. Aristotle NE 10.9 1178b30–32, and for immortality cf. Tim. 90c1–2 (where it is also qualified).<br />
10<br />
Including the Clitophon, which Simon Slings in the English edition of his fine commentary now things may well be<br />
authentic; see (1999) 227–234.<br />
11<br />
See the listing in Runia (1993) 5–6.<br />
29
David T. Runia<br />
given for why Plato might want to end his speeches with the themes of aretê, eudaimonia and the<br />
good life. It has everything to do with the role of protreptic in his philosophy. It can be argued that the<br />
question ‘how should one live’ as so strikingly formulated in the Gorgias (492d5), is the central theme<br />
of Plato’s philosophy. The main subject of the <strong>Symposium</strong> is erôs, but of course with a specific<br />
philosophical focus: how can love, that phenomenon that plays such a central role in both the cosmos<br />
and in human life, contribute to the achievement of the central quest of human beings, to live the good<br />
or even the best life. Implicit is the so-called protreptic argument, namely that all human beings desire<br />
to achieve the state of eudaimonia and the good life, that only philosophy can bring about this state,<br />
that one should therefore change one’s way of life and practise philosophy, and thereby achieve one’s<br />
goal (telos) and become eudaimoon. 12 It is significant that, as we saw, Diotima expounds in her<br />
speech (205a) a key proposition of that argument, namely that in achieving eudaimonia, the<br />
attainment of the highest good, one reaches the end-point of the argument. So, by placing the<br />
protreptic theme so emphatically at the end of four main speeches, and particularly as the climax of<br />
the most important speech, that of Diotima–Socrates, Plato has created a philosophical framework that<br />
gives the theme of love its ultimate place. The themes of aretê and eudaimonia are of course not<br />
exclusively philosophical. It is clever how Plato introduces them right from the start in seemingly<br />
non-philosophical contexts and then gradually deepens them until in the climax of the dialogue they<br />
play a key role.<br />
I also cannot resist returning to my earlier hypothesis about a possible link between the theme<br />
of the telos and the closure of a literary piece, in the case of the <strong>Symposium</strong>, the speech. As we have<br />
seen, in Diotima’s speech Plato emphasizes both the end of an argument (205a3) and the end of a<br />
quest (210e4) in connection with eudaimonia and the good life. I believe that this connection with the<br />
end may still have played a role in bringing about the striking feature of the speeches that we have<br />
focused on, namely that they end so deliberately with the theme of the goal of human life. Admittedly,<br />
unlike in the Timaeus, there is no direct literary reference to the telos in any of these conclusions, 13<br />
but it seems to me that the conjunction of the two kinds of end may have contributed in the<br />
background.<br />
But there is remains a seventh speech which we have not yet discussed. After Socrates has<br />
finished recounting what he learnt from the priestess Alcibiades bursts in. His quite lengthy speech<br />
falls outside the formal arrangements of the <strong>Symposium</strong>, but nevertheless it must be seen as the<br />
seventh speech in the dialogue’s sequence. And it too builds up to a climax. Alcibiades returns to the<br />
hollow statues of Silenus as the image of Socrates. These are now ‘truly worthy of a god, bursting<br />
with figures of virtue inside, of great, no indeed of the greatest importance for anyone who wants to<br />
be a truly good man (kalos kagathos) (222a3–6)’. We have here the climax of Alcibiades’ speech,<br />
before he closes with a brief peroration. Plato returns to the theme of aretê now personified in the life<br />
and logoi of Socrates (219d, 221d). This recalls above all the ending of the speech of Pausanias,<br />
where as we saw the role of aretê is central, but also of the other speeches (except that of Agathon 14 )<br />
in which it is explicitly mentioned or implicitly assumed. 15 But here Plato does not go the further step<br />
and have Alcibiades speak of eudaimonia and the good life. I am convinced that this is very<br />
deliberate. Alcibiades comes under Socrates’ sway and feels the attraction of the life of excellence<br />
and virtue, but he does not go the further step of embracing that life, as of course his very behaviour<br />
on that night demonstrates. He stops short of doing what he ought and so the good life promised by<br />
the philosophical life embodied by Socrates will elude him. In a parallel way, too, that is why the final<br />
speech of the dialogue does not exhibit the full-blown conclusion involving eudaimonia and the good<br />
life that we have seen to be a key feature of the majority of speeches preceding it.<br />
Bibliography<br />
A. Nehemas and P. Woodruff, ‘<strong>Symposium</strong>’ in J. M. Cooper (ed.), Plato Complete Works<br />
(Indianapolis 1997) 458–505.<br />
C. J. Rowe, Plato: <strong>Symposium</strong> (Warminster 1998).<br />
D. T. Runia, Bios eudaimoon (inaugural lecture, Leiden 1993).<br />
F. C. C. Sheffield, ‘The Role of the Earlier Speeches in the <strong>Symposium</strong>: Plato’s Endoxic Method,’ in<br />
J. H. Lesher and D. Nails (edd.), Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong>: Issues in Interpretation and Reception<br />
12 For this argument see esp. the locus classicus Euthd. 278e–282d. On philosophical protreptic in the fourth century and in<br />
Plato see Slings (1999) 59–164.<br />
13 But note the use of verbs involving the role of τέλος: ἀποτελούµενος 188d6; ἐκτελέσαιµεν 193c4.<br />
14 Agathon only praises the aretai of Erôs, not those of human beings affected by him.<br />
15 See the speech of Phaedrus 180b6; of Pausanias 185b7; of Eryximachus 188d5–6 (moderation and justice); of<br />
Aristophanes 193d4 (piety towards the gods); of Diotima 212a5.<br />
30
David T. Runia<br />
(Washington DC 2006) 23–46.<br />
S. R. Slings, Plato : Clitophon, Edited with Introduction, Translation and Commentary, Cambridge<br />
Classical Texts and Commentaries 37 (Cambridge 1999).<br />
C. Steel, ‘The Moral Purpose of the Human Body: a Reading of Timaeus 69–72’, Phronesis 46 (2001)<br />
105–128.<br />
31
Method, Knowledge and Identity<br />
Chair: Graziano Arrighetti
Ὁµολογία and ὁµολογεῖν in <strong>Symposium</strong><br />
Lesley Brown<br />
As readers of Plato you will know how widely he uses ὁµολογεῖν, ὁµολογία and related terms. In this<br />
short paper, part of a larger study, I make some general remarks and then examine some key uses in<br />
<strong>Symposium</strong>.<br />
The standard translation of the verb is ‘to agree’, and it is very convenient that English ‘agree’<br />
has all the key uses and constructions of ὁµολογεῖν - notably ‘agree that’ (such and such),<br />
corresponding to ὁµολογεῖν with accusative and infinitive; and ‘agree to …’ , that is, promise to,<br />
completed with infinitive. Des Places, Lexique, sv ὁµολογεῖν has a very helpful entry 1<br />
I quote:<br />
1) “reconnaître”, “concéder” (que). 2) “s’engager” (à) ; 3) “s’accorder” (avec).<br />
We could refer to ὁµολογεῖν (1) as ‘to agree that ….’ and ὁµολογεῖν (2) as ‘to agree to do ……’, but,<br />
for reasons I’ll explain later, ‘agree that …’ is misleading as a translation in some contexts of<br />
ὁµολογεῖν (1). Instead I’ll label use (1) declarative ὁµολογεῖν, and I’ll label use (2) ὁµολογεῖν as<br />
promising (though here ‘agree to do …’ is fine as a translation). I shall also argue that “reconnaître”<br />
and “concéder” are misleading as translations for ὁµολογεῖν (1), for much the same reason as “agree”<br />
is misleading. As I explain below, “agree that” and “reconnaître”/ “concéder” (que) all trigger<br />
presuppositions which are absent from ὁµολογεῖν. See Sec III below for my arguments on this. In this<br />
paper I shall not be able to discuss use 3), which is far rarer in Plato.<br />
Another reason for the label ‘declarative’ is this: in Greek ὁµολογεῖν (1) is always a public<br />
speech act (or the equivalent of a speech act, such as nodding assent). This contrasts with the English<br />
‘agree that …’, which can signify a private, unexpressed concurring, as in I could tell that Mary<br />
agreed that Tom was to blame, though she said nothing. One who ὁµολογεῖ that such and such is the<br />
case gives it as their opinion that such and such is the case; of course one can do so insincerely. In<br />
other words, ὁµολογεῖν represents a speaking (or other public indication of assent, such as nodding),<br />
not an unexpressed believing. You may find this surprising, not least since its complement<br />
construction is almost invariably the accusative and infinitive – which typically indicates a verb of<br />
thinking rather than a verb of saying. 2<br />
Likewise the noun ὁµολογία has uses analogous to each of the uses of the verb.<br />
Corresponding to (1) ὁµολογία can be an assertion or declaration or admission (or its content: the<br />
thesis asserted or declared). Corresponding to (2) ὁµολογία can be a promise (or what is promised);<br />
or, more formally, a treaty or pact, or term of a treaty. The participle ὡµολογηµένα can be used both<br />
for theses declared or asserted and for things promised. 3<br />
Section II: ὁµολογεῖν and its cognates in <strong>Symposium</strong>; Eryximachus’ use.<br />
As Robert Wardy has noted, 4 ὁµολογεῖν and its cognates are prominent at certain points in our<br />
dialogue. In what follows I offer a close examination of passages using the term, and will draw some<br />
conclusions different from those of Wardy. In the final part I shall argue for a thesis that has some<br />
important bearing on passages throughout Plato’s works in which Socrates is conducting his usual<br />
kind of cross examination of his interlocutors, viz. that we should not invariably translate ὁµολογεῖν<br />
(1) by ‘agree’.<br />
As in all dialogues, ὁµολογεῖν (1) is prominent. Given that our dialogue is narrated, it is no<br />
surprise that we find it as one of the verbs of reported speech. Apollodorus tells his friend that he had<br />
a narration from Aristodemus, but checked a few points with Socrates himself: καί µοι ὡµολόγει<br />
καθάπερ ἐκεῖνος διηγεῖτο (173b6). And it is used to report the interlocutor’s assent, as at : Οὐκοῦν<br />
1 Platon, Oeuvres Complètes, Tome XIV, Paris 1970.<br />
2 K-G II.2 357; Fournier, H., (1946) Les verbs “dire” en grec ancien, p15ff.<br />
3 ὁµολογήµατα – more rarely found in Plato –are things asserted/admitted when these are rather weighty (cf. Gorg 480b3,<br />
Tht 155b4).<br />
4 R.Wardy, (2002) ‘The Unity of Opposites in Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong>’ O.S.A.P. 2002.
Lesley Brown<br />
ἀδελφοῦ ἢ ἀδελφῆς; Ὁµολογεῖν (199e7). 5<br />
As well as being used in the narration of conversational exchanges, it is also used within those<br />
conversations themselves, especially those of a dialectical nature. As Wardy noted, the stretch known<br />
as the elenchus of Agathon contains ‘a sustained stream of ὁµολογία vocabulary’, though I don’t<br />
agree with him that it is ‘without parallel in the Platonic corpus’. 6 In Section III I examine what I<br />
have called the declarative use, ὁµολογεῖν (1).<br />
ὁµολογεῖν (2), to promise, is also a very common use of the verb, even if somewhat rarer, in Plato,<br />
than (1). When Agathon praises Eros for never using force, he remarks that all serve Eros willingly,<br />
and ἅ δ’ἂν ἑκὼν ἑκόντι ὁµολογήσῃ (whatever is undertaken willingly on both sides) the laws call just<br />
(196c1). At 198c5 and 199a 5 Socrates uses the verb when he claims to have been unaware of the<br />
rules of eulogising when he promised to take his turn in praising Eros. 7<br />
But before these everyday and unremarkable occurrences we have a stretch making important<br />
use of ὁµολογ- vocabulary where it is harder to classify the uses: the speech of Eryxymachus. To back<br />
up his claims about the ubiquitous importance of Eros, Eryxmachus appeals to Heraclitus’ saying<br />
(187a4-6) on the unity of opposites, τὸ ἓν γάρ φησι “διαφερόµενον αὐτὸ αὑτῷ συµφέρεσθαι,” “ὥσπερ<br />
ἁρµονίαν τόξου τε καὶ λύρας” . He goes on to criticise it in a short stretch containing six occurrences<br />
of ὁµολογ- vocabulary. How intriguing, then, that in Plato’s version of the Heraclitus saying itself we<br />
find not the word ὁµολογεεῖ transmitted by Hippolytus, but συµφέρεσθαι. Most scholars accept<br />
Plato’s version as the correct one, though Kahn is a fervent proponent of reading ὁµολογεεῖ : an<br />
‘unexceptional text transmitted by our most reliable ancient source.’ 8 Marcovich, who is among the<br />
majority preferring συµφέρεται, offers the reason that ‘Plato uses this word although ὁµολογεῖ would<br />
better suit his purpose’ –sc. given the argument Eryximachus proceeds to mount invoking ὁµολογ-<br />
terminology. 9<br />
Leaving aside the question of the text of the Heraclitus fragment, I turn to Eryxymachus’<br />
comments on the saying, which many have found crass. In response to Heraclitus invoking the<br />
harmonia of a bow or a lyre, Eryxymachus retorts:<br />
ἔστι δὲ πολλὴ ἀλογία ἁρµονίαν φάναι διαφέρεσθαι ἢ ἐκ διαφεροµένων ἔτι εἶναι. ἀλλὰ ἴσως τόδε<br />
ἐβούλετο λέγειν, ὅτι ἐκ διαφεροµένων πρότερον τοῦ ὀξέος καὶ βαρέος, ἔπειτα ὕστερον<br />
ὁµολογησάντων γέγονεν ὑπὸ τῆς µουσικῆς τέχνης. οὐ γὰρ δήπου ἐκ διαφεροµένων γε ἔτι τοῦ ὀξέος<br />
καὶ βαρέος ἁρµονία ἂν εἴη· ἡ γὰρ ἁρµονία συµφωνία ἐστίν, συµφωνία δὲ ὁµολογία τις—ὁµολογίαν δὲ<br />
ἐκ διαφεροµένων, ἕως ἂν διαφέρωνται, ἀδύνατον εἶναι· διαφερόµενον δὲ αὖ καὶ µὴ ὁµολογοῦν<br />
ἀδύνατον ἁρµόσαι—ὥσπερ γε καὶ ὁ ῥυθµὸς ἐκ τοῦ ταχέος καὶ βραδέος, ἐκ διενηνεγµένων πρότερον,<br />
ὕστερον δὲ ὁµολογησάντων γέγονε. τὴν δὲ ὁµολογίαν πᾶσι τούτοις, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ ἡ ἰατρική, ἐνταῦθα ἡ<br />
µουσικὴ ἐντίθησιν, ἔρωτα καὶ ὁµόνοιαν ἀλλήλων ἐµποιήσασα·(187a6-c3)<br />
But it is quite illogical to say that a harmony is at variance, or composed out of things that are still at<br />
variance. Perhaps what he meant to say was that it has come to be from the high and the low, which<br />
were previously at variance, but which then later struck an agreement under the agency of musical<br />
expertise. For surely if the high and the low were still at variance, a harmony would not come from<br />
them, for harmony is concord, and concord is a kind of agreement, and it is impossible for agreement<br />
to come from things at variance with each other, for as long as they are at variance with each other,<br />
and impossible in turn to harmonise what is at variance and not in agreement; just as rhythm, too,<br />
comes about from the quick and the slow, from things which had been at variance previously, but<br />
which later struck an agreement. What establishes the agreement among all these things, like<br />
medicine in its sphere, is music, by implanting in them love and unanimity with each other. (tr. Rowe<br />
1998).<br />
Rowe (1998 p 149) protests against this criticism: ‘of course something can be simultaneously<br />
in disagreement and in agreement, if what’s meant is something like a bow or a lyre’, and again ‘ we<br />
do not need to ask whether ‘the high and the low’ are the sort of things that could strike an agreement;<br />
who would seriously disagree that a ‘harmony’ in the sense defined [sc. a set of sounds which a lyre<br />
5<br />
However, nowhere in the corpus do we find “οὐχ ὡµολόγει”, despite Euclides mentioning it as one of the tiresome<br />
narrative devices he will avoid (Tht. 143c).<br />
6<br />
Wardy (2002) p 51. Protagoras 350c6-e7 is one passage where ὁµολογία terms are found in a greater density.<br />
7<br />
198c6 ἡνίκα ὑµῖν ὡµολόγουν ἐν τῷ µέρει µεθ’ ὑµῶν ἐγκωµιάσεσθαι τὸν Ἔρωτα, / 199a5 οὐ δ’ εἰδὼς ὑµῖν ὡµολόγησα καὶ<br />
αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ µέρει ἐπαινέσεσθαι.<br />
8<br />
Kahn (1979) 195-9. He renders ‘how a thing at variance with itself speaks in agreement’, and argues that it must echo or<br />
anticipate D50: ο ὐ κ ἐ µοῦ , ἀ λλὰ τοῦ λόγου ἀ κούσαντας ὁ µολογεῖ ν σοφόν ἐ στιν ἓ ν πάντα<br />
ε ἶ ναι.<br />
9<br />
Marcovich (1967) p125.<br />
36
Lesley Brown<br />
would produce if tuned to produce those notes] represents some sort of concord between high and<br />
low?’.<br />
I suggest that careful attention to the ὁµολογ- vocabulary shows how skilfully Eryximachus<br />
has engineered this reductio of Heraclitus. Rowe (quoted above) insists that something can be<br />
simultaneously in agreement and disagreement, if what’s meant is something like a bow or a lyre. But<br />
(as Rowe is aware) by the repeated phrase ὕστερον ὁµολογησάντων Eryximachus indicates that he is<br />
thinking of the required agreement, not simply as concord, but as an explicit ‘coming to terms’’ or, in<br />
Rowe’s apt translation: ‘striking an agreement’. Closely connected to ὁµολογεῖν (2), (to promise), the<br />
use of ὁµολογεῖν for ‘to make terms’ is commonly found in (for instance) Herodotus. 10 So<br />
Eryximachus’ language uses the metaphor of making terms or a truce, and as such he invokes a kind<br />
of agreement where it is not possible to be simultaneously in agreement and disagreement. (Compare<br />
Republic IV, 437b, where epineuein and ananeuein are among the enantia Socrates uses to illustrate<br />
his principle that the same thing can’t be or do or suffer enantia simultaneously.)<br />
The series of ‘equivalences’ Eryximachus offers – from ἁρµονία to συµφωνία to ὁµολογία τις<br />
involves a carefully designed slide from a mere state of being in harmony (possible between divergent<br />
things) to a sort of homologia (note the tis). And, since this set of equivalences follows the use of<br />
ὁµολογησάντων to indicate the act of striking agreement, it is this sense of ὁµολογία which is<br />
uppermost in the reader’s mind: ὁµολογία as a contract or promise or a treaty or term of a treaty. 11 In<br />
the last sentence of the passage quoted above, we should again understand ὁµολογία not as a mere<br />
state of being in concord, but as an agreement struck (to use Rowe’s term): the lively metaphor makes<br />
music responsible for a deal done between high and low (187b2), or (in the case of rhythm) between<br />
short and long. Implanting love and concord -so Eryximachus claims- is the necessary means to get<br />
the warring elements to strike an agreement.<br />
To sum up: the criticism Eryximachus offers of Heraclitus’ saying may be perverse, but the<br />
terms in which it is couched show how cleverly he introduces a kind of agreement about which it<br />
cannot be claimed, with Rowe , that ‘of course something can be simultaneously in agreement and<br />
disagreement’. Personifying the elements (first high and low, then long and short) the learned doctor<br />
makes it clear that the sort of ὁµολογία and ὁµολογεῖν he attributes to them is an act of coming to<br />
terms, and that does require that the parties no longer be at odds with each other.<br />
Section III: ὁµολογεῖν in dialectical contexts; declarative ὁµολογεῖν.<br />
The stretch known as the elenchus of Agathon, and the following elenchus by Diotima of Socrates,<br />
feature plentiful uses of ὁµολογεῖν(1), as Wardy notes. He finds a pervasive polarity between<br />
ὁµολογία and ἀνάγκη, one that ‘comes into its own during dialectical exchanges’. 12 And he glosses<br />
all the ὁµολογ- vocabulary in terms of agreement - something that might seem uncontroversial. But I<br />
aim to cast doubt on that. I have come to the conclusion that the active ὁµολογεῖν, in its declarative<br />
use, should not invariably be translated ‘agree’, and indeed that it can be misleading about the nature<br />
of Socratic questioning to do so. I’ll now try to convince you of this.<br />
When you read English translations of Plato you will find all over the place Socrates saying<br />
‘but a little while ago you agreed that p’ or saying ‘from what you agreed it follows that such and<br />
such’ or asking ‘do you agree that p?’, translating forms of ὁµολογεῖν. But this, I now believe, can be<br />
misleading. In English ‘agree that p’ triggers a presupposition that another person (usually the<br />
speaker) holds the belief that p. Let me tell you about a controversy over the forthcoming referendum<br />
concerning independence for Scotland. When it was first announced, the Scottish administration<br />
proposed the following question: Do you agree that Scotland should be an independent country? This<br />
sparked strong objections, on the ground that the question implied ‘Do you agree (with us who are<br />
asking the question) that Scotland should be an independent country?’. (A more neutral question has<br />
now been proposed in its place.) English ‘agree that p’ is used in such a way that it typically conveys<br />
‘agree with the speaker that …’, in its second and third person uses (you agree (d) / he agrees/agreed<br />
that…). Sometimes the agreeing described is with a third party. I can say ‘Mary agreed with Jane that<br />
Tom was to blame, but I thought they were both wrong’. But normally if I say ‘you/she agreed that p’<br />
or ask ‘do you/does she agree that p?’I imply that I too hold the belief that p.<br />
Something similar applies to the French verbs used by des Places for ὁµολογεῖν (1):<br />
10 Powell, Lexicon to Herodotus: of 37 occurrences of ὁµολογεῖν, 20 signify ‘to reach an agreement’.<br />
11 All 12 occurrences in Herodotus of ὁµολογία are for a treaty or truce. The related use for a contract is common in Plato,<br />
with Crito 52a, 54c and Cratylus 435c being noted occurrences.<br />
Wardy, p49. The polarity is perhaps rather between ἀνάγκη and what is ἕκων.<br />
37
Lesley Brown<br />
“reconnaître”, “concéder” (que). “Reconnaître” (I believe) is a factive verb; I cannot say of someone<br />
‘il reconnaît que’ p but then go on to deny p myself. Nor (I think) can one say we were wrong to<br />
reconnaître that so and so. But both of these are possible, as I shall show, for Greek ὁµολογεῖν (1).<br />
Here is my evidence that when speaker A describes B as ὁµολογεῖν a certain thesis, speaker A need<br />
not endorse the thesis, or imply that anyone else holds it. Sometimes when Socrates uses ὁµολογεῖν to<br />
refer to what the interlocutor assents to, he plainly does not endorse the thesis.<br />
(i) At Meno 79, Meno has accepted both (1) to do whatever one does with justice is virtue and (2)<br />
justice is a part of virtue. Socrates continues:<br />
So it follows, from what you assert (συµβαίνει ἐξ ὧν σὺ ὁµολογεῖς) that doing whatever one does with<br />
a part of virtue, that is virtue. (Meno 79b4-5)<br />
The conclusion – virtue is doing what one does with a part of virtue – is one that is rejected, so at<br />
least one of the premises must be rejected too. When Socrates addressing Meno uses ὁµολογεῖς,<br />
Socrates is certainly not endorsing both (1) and (2).<br />
(ii) Next recall the famous self-refutation argument in Theaetetus : 13<br />
Socrates: Secondly, it has this most exquisite feature: as regards the opinion of those who hold a<br />
belief contrary to his opinion (namely the belief that his is false) Protagoras – I presume – concedes<br />
(συγχωρεῖ) that theirs is true, seeing that he professes that all men judge what is (ὁµολογῶν τὰ ὄντα<br />
δοξάζειν ἅπαντας). Theod: Undoubtedly. Soc: And if he agrees (ὁµολογεῖ) that the opinion of those<br />
who think him wrong is true, then wouldn’t he be conceding (συγχωροῖ) that his own opinion is false?<br />
Theod :Necessarily. Soc. But the others don’t concede (συγχωροῦσιν) that theirs is false? Theod:<br />
Indeed not. Soc: But Protagoras, for his part, admits (ὁµολογεῖ) this judgement to be true, given what<br />
he’s written. (Theaetetus 171a6-b8)<br />
You will note that this passage has three uses of συγχωρεῖν and three of ὁµολογεῖν. I’ll come back to<br />
the difference between these. For now, it is the first occurrence of ὁµολογεῖν that provides me with<br />
the evidence I want: ὁµολογῶν τὰ ὄντα δοξάζειν ἅπαντας (171a8-9). Socrates is noting that<br />
Protagoras professes that all men judge what is, i.e. that all beliefs are true. Now this – that all beliefs<br />
are true - is something Protagoras alone believes or maintains, so it is wrong to render it (as translators<br />
regularly do) ‘seeing that he agrees that …’. The verb ὁµολογεῖν here indicates merely that the person<br />
in question gives it as their opinion that p. This text shows it can’t be taken to imply that in giving a<br />
certain opinion they are concurring with the speaker, or with any other parties.<br />
(iii) We find just such an occurrence in our dialectical stretch in <strong>Symposium</strong> 201b9. Socrates is<br />
challenging Agathon’s description of Love as beautiful. He has got Agathon to admit that Love<br />
desires what is beautiful and that one loves what one lacks and does not possess; so Agathon will have<br />
to admit that Love is not beautiful. In the course of this stretch we get (201a10) ὡµολόγει and a line<br />
later Socrates asking/reminding Agathon thus: Οὐκοῦν ὡµολόγηται, οὗ ἐνδεής ἐστι καὶ µὴ ἔχει,<br />
τούτου ἐρᾶν; ‘Wasn’t it agreed/ maintained that etc.’ For those two occurrences ‘agree’ is harmless<br />
enough, but now see what follows. (201b9):Ἔτι οὖν ὁµολογεῖς Ἔρωτα καλὸν εἶναι, εἰ ταῦτα οὕτως<br />
ἔχει; To translate ‘agree’ here is surely incorrect. 14 Dover (1990) ad loc has noticed a problem, but his<br />
comment shows that he clings to the meaning ‘agree’ for ὁµολογεῖς. He writes: “‘agree (sc with<br />
popular belief)’; Socrates himself does not believe that Eros is καλός”. I find this implausible. To cast<br />
around for another party with whom the question implies Agathon shares the view – as Dover does -<br />
is unnecessary. Instead we must recognise that, unlike ‘agree’ (and unlike ‘reconnaître’ and<br />
‘concéder’), ὁµολογεῖν does not trigger the presupposition that some other person shares the view<br />
which someone ὁµολογεῖ. Waterfield 15 has it right with ‘Do you still maintain that Love is<br />
attractive?’. 16<br />
Why does this matter? I think it can affect how we understand the tone and implications of<br />
dialectical exchanges; they may be far less consensual than the translation ‘agree’ suggests. When<br />
Socrates is the speaker, his uses of ὁµολογεῖν (to record or recall what has been said) are typically<br />
taken to imply his endorsement of the theses in question. This matters for how Socratic inquiry is<br />
13<br />
I pass over issues of text and interpretation of this argument. Cf L.Castagnoli, Ancient Self-Refutation (2010).<br />
14<br />
Rowe (1998) ad loc ‘Do you still agree that Love is beautiful?’. Wardy (p51) wrongly cites it as ‘a final invitation to<br />
agree’.<br />
15<br />
R.Waterfield tr Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong>, Oxford World’s Classics 1994; cf C. Gill (Penguin tr) : Do you still suppose that …’<br />
16<br />
Cf. Menander’s Samia (524, cf. 651) The Samian woman, Chrysis, to help a pair of lovers, is pretending that the girl’s<br />
baby is her own. When the young man eventually explains the situation to his father, he says ‘Chrysis is not the child’s<br />
mother, she’s doing this as a favour to me ὁµολογοῦσ’ αὑτῆς,’ (proclaiming that the baby is hers). Once again, ‘agree’<br />
would be wrong as a translation here.<br />
38
Lesley Brown<br />
understood, and it’s relevant to the debate between the constructive and destructive readings of<br />
Socratic inquiry or elenchus. 17 But if my arguments are correct, then we cannot assume, when<br />
Socrates uses ὁµολογεῖν or describes theses as ὡµολογηµένα, that Plato is representing Socrates as<br />
endorsing them. 18 Surprising though it may seem, the ὁµο- in ὁµολογεῖν no longer has its original<br />
force: the one who ὁµολογεῖ that p may not be saying the same as anyone else – as the text from<br />
Theaetetus quoted above shows. Perhaps the only remaining force of the ὁµο- prefix is that one who<br />
ὁµολογεῖ says/expresses belief in/ the same as the logos says – as in Heraclitus Fr.50 (cf note 8 above)<br />
- but not necessarily the same as someone else believes or maintains. My conclusion is that the active<br />
ὁµολογεῖν in its declarative use should not be uniformly translated ‘agree’, though of course it is safe<br />
to do so when it is clear from the context that the speaker or someone else also holds the thesis in<br />
question. 19 The verb’s connotations are less consensual than the translation ‘agree’ warrants,<br />
something which its frequent use in forensic contexts demonstrates, with the antonym ἐξαρνεῖσθαι,<br />
and its connexion with bringing witnesses (cf. Symp 215b7). 20<br />
Finally a few words about the relation between συγχωρεῖν and ὁµολογεῖν. Adorno in a noted<br />
article 21 explored the relations between these terms. I agree with his claim that there is an important<br />
distinction, but not with his explanation, viz. that while ὁµολογεῖν indicates rational assent, συγχωρεῖν<br />
has emotional or affective overtones. No, the distinction is simpler than that, I believe. Like ‘agree’<br />
or ‘concede’ in English, συγχωρεῖν does carry the implication that what X is said to συγχωρεῖν is also<br />
maintained by another relevant person; the συν- prefix has retained its force. But the same does not<br />
apply to ὁµολογεῖν. There is less agreeing in Socratic discussion than you may have thought.<br />
References<br />
Adorno,F., (1968) ‘Appunti su omologein e omologia nel vocabolario di Platone’ 49-65, in<br />
Adorno,F., Pensare Storicamente, Firenze 1996<br />
Benson, H, (2000) Socratic Wisdom New York, Oxford 2000<br />
Des Places, E.,(1970) Platon, Oeuvres Complètes, Tome XIV, Lexique Paris 1970<br />
Dover, K.J. (1980) Plato, <strong>Symposium</strong> (Cambridge 1980)<br />
Fournier, H., (1946) Les verbs “dire” en grec ancien, Paris 1946<br />
Irwin, T.H. (1995) Plato’s Ethics, Oxford , ch 2<br />
Kahn, C.H., (1979) The Art and Thought of Heraclitus Cambridge 1979<br />
Kennedy, J.B. (2011) The Musical Structure of Plato’s Dialogues, Acumen 2011<br />
Marcovich, M.,(1967) Heraclitus, Merida 1967<br />
Powell, J.E., (1938) A Lexicon to Herodotus, Cambridge 1938<br />
Rowe, C.J. (1998) Plato: <strong>Symposium</strong> (translation and commentary), Aris and Phillips 1998<br />
Vlastos, G., ‘The Socratic Elenchos’ O.S.A.P. 1983<br />
Wardy, R., (2002) ‘The Unity of Opposites in Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong>’ O.S.A.P. 2002<br />
17 Champions of the constructive reading include Vlastos (1983) and Irwin (1995). Champions of the minimalist or<br />
destructive reading include Benson (2000) and M.Frede (‘The skeptic’s two kinds of assent’ p203-4 in Essays in Ancient<br />
Philosophy (Oxford 1987)<br />
18 Benson (a destructivist), writes of it as an objection to his reading that Socrates frequently introduces his remarks with ‘we<br />
agree’ or ‘it was agreed that’ (i.e. with ὁµολογοῦµεν or ὡµολόγηται); cf. Benson (2000) p47n52. Rep 339d5 is a case where<br />
Socrates uses ὡµολόγηται for theses which only Thrasymachus had maintained.<br />
19 Middle uses do convey mutual agreement, and are more frequent with διοµολογεῖσθαι and ἀνοµολογεῖσθαι (cf. Symp<br />
199c1 ἀνοµολογησάµενος παρ’ αὐτοῦ).<br />
20 Space does not permit discussion of the analysis by J.B.Kennedy (2011). Agreement as a species of harmony is of great<br />
weight for his hypothesis that key points in Symp corresponding to musical notes are marked in various ways. As K.<br />
acknowledges (p51), in his interpretation the genus ‘harmony’ is given a wide interpretation; its first alleged occurrence is<br />
when Apollodorus stops as requested (172a5).<br />
21 F.Adorno (1968) ‘Appunti su omologein e omologia nel vocabolario di Platone’ in Pensare Storicamente (1996).<br />
39
ABSTRACT<br />
The Kind of Knowledge Virtue Is:<br />
Rational Ecstasy in Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong><br />
Kendall Sharp<br />
At the close of Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong>, Socrates is seen “compelling [Agathon and Aristophanes] to agree<br />
that it belongs to the same man to know how to make [epistasthai poein] comedy and tragedy, and the<br />
man who is a tragedy-maker by technê is also a comedy-maker” (223d). This scene evokes Socrates’<br />
argument, from Ion, that the poets’ knowledge is not a technê but a divine gift. Two other dialogues,<br />
Protagoras and Meno, also end on the related theme that virtue, although knowledge, cannot be taught<br />
by instruction like technê-knowledge (Protagoras), and comes to people by divine gift (Meno). Yet<br />
Socrates in Ion and Phaedrus describes divinely inspired knowledge as a type of mania. Two urgent<br />
questions thus arise: If not by instruction, then how do humans acquire by divine gift the knowledge<br />
that is virtue? Second, if this knowledge comes by divine gift, then why is virtue not a type of<br />
madness? In this paper, I argue that by concluding with this scene, Plato associates <strong>Symposium</strong> with<br />
these questions, and indicates that he has answered them in the speeches of Socrates and Alcibiades.<br />
In these speeches, Plato sets forth a picture about the kind of divinely inspired knowledge virtue is,<br />
and about Socrates’ role in helping others obtain it by divine gift and become virtuous.<br />
The picture emerges when the two speeches are read in light of our two questions. While<br />
virtue is not technê-knowledge, Socrates claims another type of knowledge, which he calls “ta<br />
erôtika” (Smp. 177d, 198d). Socrates’ speech can be read as answering our two questions by<br />
describing this erotic knowledge. This knowledge fits the bill because it comes by divine gift (Lysis<br />
204bc), but leaves its recipients in their right minds nevertheless, for it results in part from extensive<br />
training in rational discourse (logoi) (Smp. 210a-d). Alcibiades in his speech makes clear that this<br />
training in rational discourse consists in precisely Socrates’ characteristic conversational practice. He<br />
also displays the non-technê, divine aspect of this knowledge in his own experience of it. Not only<br />
does he inadvertently echo Socrates’ use of metaphors from the mystery religions. Alcibiades’ speech<br />
also connects Socrates’ eulogy of Eros to his model in Ion for sharing divine inspiration. In that<br />
dialogue, Socrates describes how the poet’s divine inspiration is obtained, not through instruction like<br />
a technê, but during moments of personal contact with one who already possesses the gift (535e-<br />
536d). This matches very closely how Alcibiades describes the beneficial influence of Socrates on<br />
himself, as turning him to philosophy only when he is in Socrates’ presence. When he is not with<br />
Socrates, this beneficial influence fades, and Alcibiades’ focus shifts back to his more usual political<br />
ambitions (216a-b). If Socrates’ speech is understood as answering our two questions, then the<br />
knowledge that is virtue is erotic knowledge of to kalon. At different degrees of initiation, this<br />
knowledge comes by divine gift to those who philosophize, but only after the soul is prepared by<br />
training in the rational logoi of Socrates’ conversational practice (210a-e).
The Protreptic Power of Love.<br />
Eros, Care for the Self and Personal Identity in the <strong>Symposium</strong><br />
Annie Larivée<br />
Note: Only the parts of the text in 11 points font will be read at the conference (i.e. part of the intro as<br />
well as parts of the section on Aristophanes and ‘Socra-tima’s’ speeches). The paper will be read in<br />
English<br />
Plato’s Socrates cares intensely about what others care about. This is not to say that he would<br />
care for the same things as his fellow citizens, but rather he is aware of “the importance of what we<br />
care about” to borrow a phrase from Frankfurt. In other words, he wishes to provoke, in others,<br />
something like a reorientation of care. But can that be done? And if so, how? How can the<br />
philosopher, as an expert in the care of the soul, hope to awaken a concern for something that most<br />
people do not care about in the least? I believe that in the <strong>Symposium</strong> Plato offers a protreptic strategy<br />
based on a universally shared human experience, namely, the experience of love. Why love? Part of<br />
the answer is that there is something inherently protreptic about love: when in love, what one<br />
previously cared so much about seems not to matter much anymore as the person’s attention becomes<br />
intensely focused and turned in a new direction. Such a radical reorientation of one’s attention,<br />
priorities and care also has the power to affect the self deeply and to transform it in unexpected ways.<br />
In what follows, I will try to describe the role played by eros in the strategy for reorienting care found<br />
in the <strong>Symposium</strong> and the complex ways in which this dialogue promotes care for the self. We will<br />
also see how a particular conception of the self is linked to the use of that specific strategy.<br />
The Prologue: loving Socrates and caring about what really matters<br />
As is often the case in the dialogues, the prologue provides subtle hints of what will later<br />
reveal itself as a crucial question of the text. Here, the power of love to reorient care is evoked early in<br />
the prologue when Apollodorus refers, twice, to the impact his relation to Socrates has had on his way<br />
of life and priorities. Within a couple of days Apollodorus, a relatively recent but extremely devoted<br />
follower of Socrates 1 , is asked, by two different friends, to share the story of the symposium where<br />
Socrates made his famous speech on eros. When his friend Glaucon first asks him to recall his<br />
memories about the event, Apollodorus replies that he did not attend the symposium (that actually<br />
took place a long time ago) and goes on to explain his situation in this antagonistic fashion: “it’s been<br />
less than three years that I’ve been Socrates’ companion and made it my job to know exactly what he<br />
says and does each day. Before that, I simply drifted aimlessly. Of course, I used to think that what I<br />
was doing was important, but in fact I was the most worthless man on earth—as bad as you are this<br />
very moment: I used to think philosophy was the last thing a man should do” (172e-173a). In<br />
reporting his recent conversation with Glaucon to the second, anonymous friend, he asserts that<br />
philosophia is the only thing he personally cares about, the only thing that is worthy of any attention<br />
in his view. Speaking or hearing about philosophy, he explains, provides him with overwhelming joy,<br />
whereas listening to the type of topics that rich business people (such as the friend with whom he is<br />
currently speaking!) usually discuss seems absolutely pointless to him and devoid of importance<br />
(173c-d). 2 That declaration clearly echoes Socrates’ famous invitation, in the Apology (as well as in<br />
1 In fact, given Apollodorus’ extreme enthusiasm, ‘devoted’ seems a bit of a weak word. The intensity of his devotion to<br />
Socrates suggests that there is some kind of eros is involved. Also, Apollodorus, who has not attended the banquet himself,<br />
has heard the story from Aristodemus who also was, in the past, a fervent follower of Socrates. There is, therefore,<br />
something like a chain of eros between Socrates and his disciples, his passionate followers learning more about him through<br />
the stories told by other passionate disciples. An interesting question, in the context of Diotima’s teaching on immortality, is<br />
to wonder how Socrates was able to generate replicas of himself, his followers imitating his behaviour, adopting his values,<br />
learning his past speeches and conversations...<br />
2 “... my greatest pleasure comes from philosophical conversation, even if I’m only a listener, whether or not I think it will be<br />
to my advantage. All other talk, especially the talk of rich businessmen like you, bores me to tears, and I’m sorry for you and<br />
your friends because you think your affairs are important when really they’re totally trivial. Perhaps, in your turn, you think<br />
I’m a failure, and believe me, I think that what you think is true. But as for all of you, I don’t just think you are failures –I<br />
know it for a fact.”
Annie Larrivée<br />
the Alcibiades, among other dialogues), to care primarily for the soul, philosophia, and intelligence,<br />
rather than one’s wealth or reputation. (In what follows, I will refer to this order of priorities as<br />
‘Socrates’s hierarchy of care’). These apparently innocent comments from the prologue are<br />
significant, for they reveal the correlation between being intensely devoted to and enamoured with<br />
Socrates, and starting to care about the right things in life, things that truly matter and deserve<br />
attention. 3 The speeches on love carefully memorized and later retold by Apollodorus shed light on<br />
other aspects of the possible connection between love and care. The first two, in particular, seem to<br />
offer a vision of love that is compatible with the Socratic exhortation to care about the self (as soul).<br />
However, as we will now see, such a rapprochement is problematic in many ways.<br />
Phaedrus: taking care of oneself in order to be loved<br />
The core idea of Phaedrus’ eulogy 4 , as summarized in its conclusion, is simple: Eros is the most<br />
powerful force that enables human beings to acquire virtue and eudaimonia. 5 At first glance,<br />
Phaedrus’ praise, with its emphasis on the role of eros in “living well” (178c5-6) seems in harmony<br />
with the Socratic hierarchy of care –an impression made even stronger by the fact that he depreciates<br />
the role of kinship, public honor and wealth in this good life (178c6-d1). It is love, he claims, that is<br />
the source of the greatest goods in so far as it imparts this “guidance each person needs for his whole<br />
life, if he is to live well” (178c5-6, note that the ‘guiding love’ he has in mind is pederastic).<br />
However, the resemblance between the role Phaedrus attributes to love and Socrates’ hierarchy of<br />
care remains superficial; Phaedrus’ account is centered on love’s power to trigger an intense concern<br />
for oneself, but the form that this concern takes is clearly unsocratic. He in no way suggests that love<br />
leads to virtue by inciting the lover or the beloved to care for the state of his soul (there is no mention<br />
of the psuche in Phaedrus’ speech). In the wake of the traditional heroic ideal, he thinks of virtue and<br />
eudaimonia essentially in terms of actions, and more importantly, actions that are (or could be)<br />
witnessed, seen by the loved-one. 6 His understanding of virtue and eudaimonia is somehow ‘external’<br />
as it is focused on the public (or at least, ‘visible’) performance of fine actions and the achievement of<br />
great and beautiful deeds (megala kai kala erga, 178d4). Phaedrus holds that love is the source of fine<br />
deeds (mostly courageous ones in the context of war) and an obstacle to shameful acts, for a lover<br />
would rather die than be seen performing dishonourable acts by his beloved. Thus what love seems to<br />
trigger, beyond a care for virtue as such, is a fear of shame and a desire to be admirable (kalon) in the<br />
beloved’s eyes.<br />
Now, needless to say, from a Socratic point of view this emphasis on visibility raises<br />
questions. First, one can wonder if eros is the principle of a genuine form of individual and political<br />
betterment or if it only triggers a concern for the way one appears to be. 7 This problem appears later in<br />
the interlude between Aristophanes’ and Agathon’s speeches when Socrates asks Agathon if it is<br />
really the case that he would only be ashamed of doing something disgraceful if it was witnessed by a<br />
group of intelligent individuals and would not mind at all if it happened before a crowd of ordinary<br />
people (194c). 8 With this remark Socrates seems to question the idea that the quality of an action<br />
somehow depends on the ‘audience’ that witnesses it. This echoes his well known attack on the care<br />
for doxa, reputation, and appearances.<br />
Let us note in passing that the value Phaedrus attributes to love-motivated self-sacrifice at the<br />
end of his eulogy also raises important questions for my inquiry. Can self-sacrifice be, in certain<br />
3<br />
The prologue also subtly evokes a theme that will be crucial in Diotima’s speech, namely the necessity to constantly<br />
reactivate one’s memories and to repeat and thus recreate what one knew in order to maintain one’s identity, 208a. Indeed,<br />
Apollororus twice mentions the fact that he was well exercised (ouk ameletetos einai 172a1, ouk ameletetos echo, 173c1),<br />
having apparently memorized, told and retold Socrates’ speech (as well as the other guests’).<br />
4<br />
Despite the fact that Eryximachus was the one to suggest a eulogy to eros, the idea originates from Phaedrus and since<br />
Phaedrus is also presented as learning a speech about love by heart in the Phaedrus, we can infer that eros was a topic to<br />
which he had given quite a bit of thought. That, coupled with the fact that he is the first to speak, makes his speech<br />
important: it is his speech that sets the scene and to which the other guests will react.<br />
5<br />
“Love is the most ancient of the gods, the most honored, and the most powerful in helping men gain virtue and blessedness,<br />
whether they are alive or have passed away” 180b. Eros’ capacity to lead to eudaimonia at the level of the polis is mentioned<br />
at 178d, e. Although Phaedrus does not explain what this contribution consists in, we can infer that he is thinking of its<br />
collective usefulness in the context of war and as a motive for self-sacrifice.<br />
6<br />
On the importance of being or not being seen, see 178d-e, 178a. Vernant [1991] 105-7, provides insightful explanations on<br />
this aspect of Greek culture.<br />
7<br />
And if the latter is the case, could this concern for the actions witnessed by the beloved lead, eventually, to a real<br />
improvement of the lovers' character?<br />
8<br />
“ –S:...if you did run into wise men, other than yourself, you’d certainly be ashamed at the thought of doing anything ugly<br />
in front of them. Is that what you mean? –A.: That’s true, he said. –S.: On the other hand, you wouldn’t be ashamed to do<br />
something ugly in front of ordinary people. Is that it?”<br />
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situations, an appropriate form of care for the self? If so, what does this reveal about the self that is<br />
thus cared for? Does this self have to be an immortal psuche in order for self-sacrifice to make sense<br />
as a form of self-care? Phaedrus evokes the fate of two mythological heroes, Alcestis and Achilles, to<br />
show that their love-induced self-sacrifices pleased the gods and earned them special rewards, but he<br />
does not show how self-sacrifice is intrinsically valuable or explain how it depends on or relates to<br />
immortality. It is, however, a step taken by ‘Socratima’ in their own speech as we will see. 9<br />
Pausanias: giving in to virtuous lover in order to better one’s soul<br />
With his focus on a type of love that is ‘heavenly’ –i.e. directed at the soul, as opposed to ‘common’<br />
eros, focused on the body (180a-b) –, Pausanias seems to hold a position on eros that is closer to the<br />
spirit of Socrates’ hierarchy of care. Pausanias praises Eros as a source of care for the self, i.e. care for<br />
the soul. This is what the concluding sentence of his speech makes clear: “Heavenly love” is highly<br />
valuable for individuals and states as it compels both the lover and the beloved to care for virtue<br />
(185b-c). 10 But, again, is this convergence more than superficial?<br />
True, there are significant similarities. According to Pausanias’ account the contribution that<br />
eros makes to the care for the self is not dependant on fear of shame or a concern for the way one<br />
looks in the eye of the loved-one. As a matter of fact, far from leading the lover to consistently present<br />
himself in a favorable light in order to impress the beloved, eros can lead him to behave in a way that<br />
would be considered slavish in any other circumstances (183a-b). Pausanias does not attempt to<br />
explain how this phenomenon (the power of eros to diminish the lover’s concern for his image, his<br />
own integrity or sense of dignity) can be reconciled with his view that love’s value lies in its power to<br />
promote care for the self. We will have, again, to wait for Socratima’s speech to learn more about this.<br />
Pausanias’ views seem more compatible with the Socratic conception of care for the soul in<br />
that the value he attributes to love is centred on a type of relationship that provides the conditions for<br />
a continuous, life-long process of self-improvement, rather than one that consists in episodic displays<br />
of heroism. Here, the beneficial effects of love are linked to a process that takes time and this<br />
temporal dimension of eros as a form of care is threefold. First, the type of love that is valuable (i.e.,<br />
soul-focused) requires time as it involves a process of betterment based on a life-long union (181d).<br />
Second, it also requires time since the beloved has to put the lover to the test before he can<br />
agree to a relationship (so as to make sure that the lover’s motivation is the beloved’s betterment,<br />
184a). Finally, the priority it assigns to the soul is also a condition that makes the relationship stable<br />
over time (183e). Indeed, in terms that are reminiscent of the Alcibiades, Pausanias argues that the<br />
permanence of the relationship depends on the stability of its object: the love of the erastes devoted to<br />
the vulgar Aphrodite won’t endure because the object of his love (the body) won’t endure either,<br />
whereas the love directed to the beloved’s soul will persist (183e). 11 In brief, whereas Phaedrus<br />
praised eros for its capacity to inspire heroic gestures that benefit the polis as well as the individual (a<br />
claim that still needs to be clarified in cases where self-sacrifice is involved), Pausanias puts the<br />
emphasis on the capacity of a certain type of enduring relationship, namely a soul-focused homoeroticism<br />
12 to contribute to the care for the self. 13<br />
Now, despite these similarities, the compatibility of this account with the Socratic hierarchy<br />
of care is only partial. Indeed, while Pausanias’ description clearly states that the heavenly eromenos<br />
cares about the state of the beloved’s soul (his only concern is the contribution the relationship can<br />
make to his own improvement), the nature of the erastes’ interest is not unambiguous. Pausanias’<br />
explanations concerning the fact that it is perfectly fine for the beloved to give in to the lover’s<br />
advances once he has put his motivation to the test (184a) indicates that the erastes’ efforts are to be<br />
rewarded with sensual pleasure. But if it is really the soul that the heavenly lover is after, why must<br />
the outcome of the relationship be sexual? Pausanias explains that the erastes cares for the soul in the<br />
9 I take the freedom to use that combination name inspired by contemporary ‘power-couples’ such as ‘Brangelina’ to refer to<br />
Diotima’s speech as retold by Socrates. Since there are some parts where Socrates obviously makes personal additions to<br />
Diotima’s teachings (for ex.: 205e), and since we can also infer that he acts as a filter and recalls only what seems pertinent<br />
to him, and finally, since it is his decision to use parts of her teachings as a ‘praise’ for Eros, I think it is more prudent to<br />
attribute the authorship of the speech and the ideas contained in it to both of them conjointly.<br />
10 “Love’s value [i.e. “”Heavenly love”] to the city as a whole and to the citizens is immeasurable, for he compels the lover<br />
and his loved one alike to make virtue their central concern (pollen epimeleian anagkazon poieistai pros areten ton te eronta<br />
auton autou kai eromenon).”<br />
11 We find a parallel passage in the Alcibiades, at 131c-d.<br />
12 Contrarily to Phaedrus, he associates that fine type of eros exclusively with homoerotic love, 181d<br />
13 This account is more clearly focused on the benefits of love for the individual and even if Pausanias mentions benefits to<br />
the polis, he does not explain their nature.<br />
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sense that he will choose an intelligent eromenos (as opposed to an unintelligent one, 181b, d) and<br />
will contribute to the improvement of his beloved’s soul. However, what the erastes, himself, seems to<br />
get out of this relationship is bodily pleasures. The eromenos, then, seem to be the one who genuinely<br />
cares for the soul (his own soul) in so far as it is his soul that really benefits from the relationship. All<br />
this raises the question: aside from sexual pleasures, what else could the erastes get out of the<br />
relationship? In what way can it make a contribution to the lover’s self-care? 14 Or is he entirely<br />
altruistic? Pausanias does not say and we will have, again, to wait for Socratima’s speech to get an<br />
answer.<br />
In all honesty, Pausanias gives the impression that he is using the Socratic topos of the ‘care<br />
for the soul’ as a rhetorical tool enabling older men to persuade beautiful youth to choose someone,<br />
who, like himself, cares for the soul in the sense that he is devoted to ‘philosophy’ instead of choosing<br />
an erastes who can provide him with financial resources and political influence (183a)... His<br />
declaration to the effect that only one type of servitude is acceptable, namely to become the servant of<br />
the person we know will make us better in terms of knowledge or virtue also seems to point in that<br />
direction (184c, 184d-e). Seen in that light, when addressed to the potential beloved, the Socratic<br />
invitation to care for one’s intelligence and soul (instead of wealth and honor) could be ‘translated’ as<br />
follows: “I urge you to choose an erastes like me, a soul-oriented philosopher, instead of letting<br />
yourself be seduced by wealthy and politically powerful lovers!” And in truth, we cannot exclude that<br />
Socrates’ exhortation to care for the soul can be interpreted in that way, for it is an invitation<br />
addressed to youth to look for a mentor, a virtuous educator who ‘specializes’ in the soul instead of<br />
putting themselves in the care of men of power or wealth. The difference is that Socrates does not use<br />
this exhortation in order to seduce youths sexually.<br />
There are other aspects of Pausanias’ explanations that indicate that his exhortation is more<br />
self-interested (ambiguously motivated) than Socrates’. For instance, he declares, apparently<br />
unconcerned, that an eromenos should not be ashamed if it turns out that the erastes to whom he gave<br />
his favours ends up not being capable or willing to fulfil his promises. Such a mistake in evaluation,<br />
he explains, is nothing that the eromenos should feel ashamed of, for it reveals his willingness to<br />
entrust himself to someone he thought could make him better (185b). Socrates, for his part, does not<br />
take such a risk lightly. In many dialogues, Plato portrays him assisting young people in assessing the<br />
‘credentials’ of individuals who present themselves as potential mentors or educators. 15 We find an<br />
allusion to that vulnerable situation of youths in the <strong>Symposium</strong> when Socrates ironically mocks<br />
Alcibiades’ conviction that he is able to correctly assess Socrates’ value despite his own lack of<br />
experience. 16 Instead of encouraging potential eromenoi to just take a chance with an erastes who<br />
seems capable of teaching them virtue, he encourages them to be vigilant and critical, and to realize<br />
that in such relationships they are exposing the most precious part of themselves to harm and<br />
corruption, namely their soul (Prot., 312c, 313a-b). Pausanias is not nearly as scrupulous. In truth, he<br />
seems not to care much about their fate.<br />
Eryximachus: Eros as the principle at the core of therapeutic arts<br />
Although the relevance of Eryximachus’ speech for the question that interests me is not<br />
immediately evident, it does offer a good occasion to contrast the attempt to reorient care found in the<br />
<strong>Symposium</strong> with conversion modes found in other dialogues. At first glance, with his eulogy,<br />
Eryximachus seems to invite us to get away from the anthropocentric (not to say ‘pederastocentric’)<br />
perspective of the previous speeches by drawing our attention, instead, to diverse physical phenomena<br />
in which measure and harmony are manifestations of the ‘Heavenly Eros’ described by Pausanias.<br />
This invitation to modify our view point involves a radical conversion of our attention as it<br />
encourages us to abandon the familiar perspective of personal love (which is something that most<br />
people have experienced and care a lot about) to pay attention to an ‘erotic’ feature shared by diverse<br />
physical phenomena (a highly general, not to say universal, viewpoint, the existence of which most<br />
people are not aware of). Are we here given an avant-goût of the type of ‘ascent’ referred to in<br />
Socratima’s speech? I believe it is not the case for several reasons.<br />
First, whereas the type of conversion promoted by Socratima is progressive (the change of<br />
perspective is achieved gradually, by passing through different stages), Eryximachus seems to invite<br />
14 This question must be asked about Socrates. What does he get (or hope to get) out of his relationship with Alcibiades for<br />
example? Since he refrained from having any sexual contact with him, are we to believe that his attempt to help the youth<br />
improve was completely selfless and altruistic?<br />
15 The prologue of the Protagoras is probably the best example.<br />
16 219a.<br />
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us to abruptly abandon our common understanding of eros. There is no transition between the<br />
ordinary and the ‘scientific’ viewpoints. It would therefore perhaps be more appropriate to compare<br />
this shift of perspective to the ‘imaginary flight’ (as Pierre Hadot calls this type of spiritual exercise)<br />
that Socrates depicts in the Theaetetus (173c-177c). The abrupt alteration of one’s ordinary<br />
perspective –characteristic of the philosopher engaged in the ‘homoiosis theoi’— requires that one<br />
stops looking at things from the viewpoint of ordinary practical human interests in order to adopt<br />
something like an objective view of phenomena. Given that Eryximachus mentions music and<br />
astronomy in his speech, it would also be tempting to see a convergence with the passage of the<br />
Republic where Socrates identifies the disciplines that can help achieve the conversion of the whole<br />
soul required of philosophers (Rep. 518c). But in reality, these comparisons are mistaken.<br />
Despite a shift to a certain level of generality, the perspective adopted by Eryximachus<br />
remains, in fact, deeply anthropocentric. It is, however indirectly, focused on what human beings<br />
typically care about and need. Indeed, the object of his praise and his attention is not really eros as a<br />
unique principle of harmony at play in different physical phenomena. What really interests him is the<br />
capacity to produce that type of order and harmony in spheres that are crucial to human survival and<br />
well-being with the help of arts such as medicine, agriculture, gymnastics, music, and divination. Not<br />
only does Eryximachus focus more on the ‘heavenly’ (i.e. measured) character of eros than on what<br />
makes it ‘erotic’ in the first place, but he does not even praise Heavenly Eros as a factor of harmony<br />
and order as such; rather he praises the arts and experts who know how to generate such an order and<br />
who are aware of its importance. The competent physician, for example, has the capacity and<br />
responsibility to create the type of eros that leads to health and concord in individual bodies, and to<br />
avoid the type of eros that leads to excess, illness, and destruction (Asclepios’ art relied on that<br />
capacity as he knew how to create love and concord, 187d-e). Moreover, not only is his eulogy<br />
directed at those who can promote heavenly eros in spheres useful to human beings, but the majority<br />
of the arts that Eryximachus praises are directed toward the care of the body and not of the soul.><br />
Aristophanes: an a-therapeutic and a-protreptic conception of love<br />
Aristophanes’ speech is, no doubt, the one that resonates the most with contemporary readers.<br />
In fact, the social discourse that helps to shape our contemporary experience of love shares so many<br />
traits with the aristophanic narrative that one suspects that Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong> has, somehow, made a<br />
contribution to its production at some point in Western history. 17 The emphasis on love as a search for<br />
our ‘soul mate’, the belief that there is someone out there who is ‘the one’, our ‘second half’ that will<br />
make us feel ‘whole again’, the supreme importance attributed to the couple as the primordial<br />
relationship outside of which the individual remains, somehow, lacking and incomplete are all<br />
elements of the contemporary experience of love that bear a striking similarity to Aristophanes’<br />
fanciful story. And, perhaps we should add to this list of common features the fact that, in contrast<br />
with the previous speeches, Aristophanes makes no reference (explicit or implicit) to the capacity that<br />
love has (or can have) to contribute to one’s improvement. 18<br />
There is, indeed, no mention at all of a connection between eros and care for the self in<br />
Aristophanes’ account. Love is portrayed as an experience of intense need and search for a lost half,<br />
and perfection as something that belongs (exclusively) to the past. No process of self-improvement or<br />
self-care could ever bring peace to the individual anxious to be (however imperfectly) reunited with<br />
their lost half. Finding one’s lost half –an event that depends on chance as M. Nussbaum noted 19 –<br />
does not lead to a betterment of the (previously separated) self, but only brings a (partial) relief by<br />
soothing the distress linked to the feeling of deep need and restlessness caused by the traumatic<br />
separation. If there is care involved, then, it’s only in the minimal sense that one tries to repair, as well<br />
as one can, something that has been deeply broken, to partially heal something like an original<br />
wound 20 . No matter how captivating and powerful Aristophanes’ story is, it does not really constitute<br />
a praise of eros. His colorful, comical, and moving narrative gives a vivid picture of some of the<br />
emotions felt in one’s search for love, but if this description were the only story one could tell about<br />
eros, love would appear as something rather miserable and absurd. Not only because of its orientation<br />
17 In the Renaissance probably (to be researched).<br />
18 Ch. Taylor [1991], among others, is certainly right to underline the crucial role of personal love for self-discovery and<br />
self-expression in contemporary culture, but this is different from self-improvement and self-care.<br />
19 “The creatures ‘search’ and ‘come together’, but it is plainly not in their power to ensure the happy reunion. It is difficult<br />
to accept that something as essential to our good as love is at the same time so much a matter of chance.” Nussbaum [1986]<br />
174.<br />
20 Love attempts to “heal (iasasthai) human nature”, 191d.<br />
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toward a (irrecoverably) lost perfection, or its conception of the self as a deficient entity whose<br />
integrity depends on a (precarious) relationship with another (equally deficient) human being, but also<br />
because Aristophanes’ story evokes those aspects of love that are potentially asocial (the lovers are so<br />
absorbed in one another that they care for nothing else), self-destructive (they let themselves die) and<br />
self-impoverishing (it motivates an intense search for a lost half that absorbs time and energy that<br />
could be better spent). 21 Let us not forget that the whole situation is the result of a divine punishment<br />
according to the story.<br />
That said, what makes the Aristophanic narrative relevant here is precisely the radical<br />
incompatibility between the conception of the self implicitly contained in that story and the Socratic<br />
ideal of care for the self. Socrates himself ironically –though unambiguously– underlines that<br />
incompatibility when he later attacks the Aristophanic conception of love by making the following<br />
statement:<br />
46<br />
Now there is a certain story [...] according to which lovers are those people who seek their other<br />
halves. But according to my story, a lover does not seek the half or the whole, unless, my<br />
friend, it turns out to be good as well. I say this because people are willing to cut off their own<br />
arms and legs if they think they are diseased. I don’t think an individual takes joy in what<br />
belongs to him personally unless by ‘belonging to me’ he means ‘good’ and by ‘belonging to<br />
another’ he means ‘bad’. That’s because what everyone loves is really nothing other than the<br />
good. (205e-206a) 22<br />
Of course, despite Socrates’ edifying words, many people seem to ‘love’ and search the company of<br />
someone who is not ‘good’ to/for them. 23 Aristophanes’ fanciful narrative transposes, in striking<br />
images, the intense, painful and often self-destructive experience that love too often is – and from an<br />
empirical point of view it is probably better equipped than Socratima’s to make sense of most<br />
people’s experience of erotic attachment. 24 Whereas Socratima describes eros as it can or could be at<br />
its best, Aristophanes shows it as it usually is. Not only does he show it as it is, but the lost-half story<br />
has no power to transform that pitiful experience. It does not enrich it, it does not make use of its<br />
intensity to bring us somewhere else, and it does not aim to. This story does not make us better and is<br />
not trying to. In brief, Aristophane’s speech is unapologetically a-therapeutic and a-protreptic. (Unless<br />
we suppose that a plain description of this pathetic experience could trigger, in some people, an<br />
intense desire to avoid it!)<br />
Another way to shed light on the difference between the two, without jumping ahead, would<br />
be to say that Aristophanes’ and Socratima’s different conceptions of love find their source in a<br />
different understanding of the temporal and normative nature of the self. Whereas Aristophanes’ self<br />
is essentially a-normative and defined by its past (the self is and wishes to be what it once was –no<br />
matter what that was), Socratima’s self, as we will soon see, is a self in progress, turned toward its<br />
future, which is the temporal condition of its own improvement. That self is future-oriented and<br />
fundamentally normative, hence the central importance of self-care. It is a ‘becoming self’ whose<br />
process of becoming is based on the capacity to let go of the parts of itself that are not worth keeping<br />
and to perpetuate those that are worthy of “intra- or interpersonal propagation”. In other words, it does<br />
not confuse what it was (what it inherited from its past) with what it ‘is’ (that is: what it can become<br />
by reproducing and ‘propagating’ what is good in itself and by purging what is worthless from itself).<br />
21 191a-b.<br />
22 The only aspect of this story that is remotely linked to a protreptic motion (in the literal sense of the word: ‘to turn<br />
toward’) is its attempt to make sense of one’s sexual orientation. That said, the story helps to understand why people are<br />
sexually ‘turned’ in a specific direction and makes no attempt to change that direction determined by the past and apparently<br />
unchangeable.<br />
23 To the extent that this story depicts the situation of one half searching for another half, we must suppose that the original<br />
unity was in some way differentiated, i.e., composed of two halves at least partially identifiable in their individuality,<br />
something like the unity of conjoint twins. The story does not mention the possibility that one of these twins (or both) feels<br />
liberated after the separation and that they could have experienced their union as, say, being joined to a gangrenous limb, as<br />
Socrates’ objection supposes. All that we know is that the original spheres or ‘wheels’ felt complete while the half-wheels<br />
feel incomplete without their lost half and that the wheels originally had powers that even two reunited halves would lack.<br />
24 It is also compatible with the psychoanalytic axiom now largely accepted according to which the erotic tendencies and<br />
needs of adults are essentially determined by their past (more precisely by the infant’s primary relationship with the mother<br />
and other care-givers).
Agathon: elenchos as an erotic ‘turn-on’ and as a purge<br />
Annie Larivée<br />
For my purpose, Agathon’s eulogy is interesting mainly as an excellent illustration of someone who<br />
“commits himself or the care of his soul to words” (Cratylus, 440c) and whose soul, therefore, is in<br />
need of a purge. This probably motivates Socrates’ (however brief) attempt to submit him to an<br />
elenchic process. Agathon’s speech does however, make a significant –if only negative—<br />
contribution to the dialogue in that it helps to shape Socrates’ eulogy by providing him with ideas to<br />
criticize and beliefs to put straight (beliefs about Eros’ beauty, for example, or his divine nature). As<br />
such, it is also a good example of the Socratic art of seduction, in which the elenchus plays an<br />
important role in humbling the eromenos. In what follows, I will limit myself to Socrates’ criticism of<br />
these ideas and will not discuss Agathon’s eulogy as such, nor the beginning of elenchic purification<br />
to which Socrates submits him before evoking Diotima’s teachings. ><br />
Socratima: love as a mean of self-propagation. Memes and personal identity<br />
[Note : due to lack of time, the rest of the text is in French, but it will be presented in English at the<br />
conference ]<br />
Le mouvement protreptique initié par le discours de Socratima est si habile, les idées qui le<br />
soutiennent si séduisantes que pour bien percevoir la transition radicale qu’il tente de susciter, il faut<br />
d’abord faire l’effort spécial de résister à sa séduction et mettre l’accent sur ce qu’il y a, en lui,<br />
d’inouï. Autant l’histoire comico-bizarroïde d’Aristophane mettait en mots et en images des<br />
sentiments familiers ressentis dans l’amour, autant les idées et les images apparemment beaucoup plus<br />
communes employées par Socratima tentent d’initier un processus « amoureux » menant vers une<br />
sphère d’expérience pour le moins inhabituelle. L’idée de conversion est, me semble-t-il, adéquate<br />
pour rendre compte de ce passage d’un univers familier à une expérience hors du commun. D’ailleurs,<br />
cette puissance et cette intention de conversion sont en quelque sorte symbolisées, dès le départ, par le<br />
personnage démonique d’Eros présenté comme jouant le rôle d’intermédiaire, de passeur. Eros est<br />
cette force démonique permettant de transiter de la pauvreté à la richesse (203e), du laid et du<br />
mauvais au beau et au bon (202b), de l’ignorance au savoir (202a, 204a-b), de la mort à la vie (203e),<br />
de la sphère humaine à la sphère divine (202d-e). Autant de transitions qui peuvent être pensée<br />
comme des mouvements de conversion, eros étant la force protreptique par excellence.<br />
Pour plus de clarté, il convient de différencier deux passages protreptiques dans les<br />
enseignements que Socrate attribue à Diotima. Le premier passage, qui met en jeu une stratégie<br />
protreptique « classique », correspond à la partie où il est question des bénéfices dont eros est la<br />
source. Il s’étend de 204d à 209e et je l’appelle le « protreptique long ». Quant au second passage, « le<br />
protreptique court », il est constitué par la description condensée que Diotima offre de l’initiation<br />
qu’elle décrit comme « le plus haut mystère » à la fin du discours de Socrate entre 210a-et 212b,<br />
passage que les interprètes désignent souvent comme « l’ascension vers le Beau ». Le contraste entre<br />
les tactiques protreptiques employées dans ces deux passages est frappant.<br />
1- Premier passage protreptique : Eros as a mode of propagation of the self<br />
Je qualifie l’approche protreptique utilisée ici de « classique » car elle repose sur une méthode<br />
couramment appliquée ailleurs. 25 Cette méthode, simple, consiste à : 1) mettre en lumière, chez le<br />
lecteur ou l’auditeur, un désir, un but souhaité, et 2) présenter ensuite ce vers quoi on veut le tourner<br />
comme étant moyen de parvenir à ce but préexistant. Dans le passage qui nous intéresse, le but en<br />
question est le bonheur, présenté comme « la possession perpétuelle des choses bonnes » (205a). Le<br />
fait que Socratima précise que ce but est partagé par «tous les hommes » (205a6, 9) nous informe sur<br />
ceux qui sont (en principe) visés par cette première conversion protreptique. En un mot : tous. Tout le<br />
monde. Jusqu’ici, rien d’original. Mais ce qui distingue son approche du protreptique classique, c’est<br />
qu’elle décide de faire en quelque sorte un pas en amont de ce but universel et de nous présenter, tous,<br />
dans la position d’amoureux par rapport au désir des choses bonnes. Elle fait valoir, en effet, que<br />
l’application du terme ‘amour’ est arbitrairement limitée à une de ses formes (comme c’est également<br />
le cas du terme poiesis) et doit être élargi à la sphère entière du désir des choses bonnes (205c-d).<br />
« D’une façon générale, tout ce qui est désir des choses bonnes et du bonheur, c’est cela qu’est<br />
Amour, aussi tout puissant que rusé en toutes choses » (205d). Dans notre poursuite du bonheur,<br />
Socratima nous invite donc à nous percevoir comme des amoureux, et à voir cette quête universelle du<br />
25 In the Euthydemus for example. See Larivée [2010], 168-9.<br />
47
Annie Larrivée<br />
bonheur comme étant érotique. 26 Un autre trait distinctif par rapport au protreptique classique est<br />
qu’elle décide de mettre l’accent sur un aspect précis de cette quête (érotique) du bonheur, à savoir<br />
son aspect temporel. Nous souhaitons une possession des bonnes choses qui soit permanente,<br />
perpétuelle (206a). De manière inhabituelle, c’est sur cet aspect temporel que son levier protreptique<br />
viendra s’appuyer.<br />
Le gros de son effort sera ensuite consacré à la deuxième étape protreptique. Celle où il s’agit<br />
d’identifier un certain moyen, un certain mode de vie, comme étant la façon de parvenir au but visé.<br />
Dans le cas du premier passage protreptique, ce moyen n’est pas présenté comme étant le mode de vie<br />
philosophique (ce sera le rôle du second passage), mais plus largement comme ce que j’appellerai la<br />
« procréation spirituelle ». Cette transition vers la question du moyen d’atteindre le but visé est, dans<br />
le texte, très claire puisque Socratima pose elle-même, de manière rhétorique, la question de savoir<br />
par le biais de quelle activité (praxis) particulière impliquant zèle et effort, le but sera atteint (206b1-<br />
2). La réponse, apparemment ésotérique (« un enfantement dans la beauté selon le corps et selon<br />
l’âme », 206b) met en jeu une analogie entre l’âme et le corps, analogie qui sert souvent de tremplin à<br />
la conversion vers le souci de l’âme dans les dialogues de Platon. 27 Dépouillée de ses embellissement<br />
rhétorique, l’analogie est simple : tout comme la manière, pour le corps, de se perpétuer est la<br />
reproduction, l’âme aussi peut persister par le biais de quelque chose comme une « reproduction<br />
spirituelle ». Rappelons ici que l’aspect de notre désir ‘amoureux’ des bonnes choses (autrement dit,<br />
du bonheur) sur lequel Socratima concentre son attention est la permanence, la persistance temporelle.<br />
Ce qui se fait jour, à son avis, dans l’amour comme quête de bonheur, c’est le désir de durer, ce désir<br />
qu’a tout individu de « persister dans son être » pour parler comme Spinoza. On pourrait dire, en<br />
termes socratiques, qu’il s’agit d’un certain souci de soi, un souci qu’a le soi, heureux, de persister. Or<br />
suivant les explications de Socratima, pour des mortels, le seul moyen, la seule praxis, permettant d’y<br />
parvenir est l’activité de procréation. L’âme, comme le corps doit, afin de persister au-delà de la mort<br />
individuelle, se reproduire.<br />
On pourra s’étonner, ici, que l’âme ne soit pas présentée comme intrinsèquement immortelle.<br />
Bien qu’on puisse être tenté d’y percevoir un signe de l’évolution des positions philosophiques de<br />
Platon, j’aurais pour ma part tendance à penser qu’il s’agit là d’une indication du caractère<br />
protreptique du passage (et du dialogue en général). L’immortalité (aussi bien spirituelle que<br />
physique) n’est pas présentée comme un état de fait, quelque chose de donné, mais est plutôt utilisé<br />
par Socratima comme une « carotte » permettant de tourner vers le souci de l’âme. Vous voulez<br />
l’immortalité de l’âme comme condition d’un bonheur permanent, semble-t-elle dire? Eh bien dans ce<br />
cas vous devrez la gagner en choisissant une praxis amoureuse liée à l’âme et menant à une certaine<br />
forme de procréation spirituelle.<br />
Seule cette conception égocentrée de l’amour peut expliquer le sacrifice des animaux pour<br />
leurs petits, des héros pour leurs aimé(e)s, phénomène qui autrement serait « absurde » (208c).<br />
Admète, Achille, ont fait le sacrifice de leur vie non par renoncement à soi, mais par désir de s’assurer<br />
l’immortalité (208d). Il n’y rien là d’altruiste, semble-t-elle dire en réponse aux questions soulevées<br />
par le discours de Phèdre. Mais la reproduction, physique ou spirituelle, nous permet-elle vraiment<br />
d’atteindre l’immortalité, serait-on tenté de lui demander? Elle a prévu nos résistances et y répond<br />
dans le passage dense et déconcertant (207d-208b) où elle présente sa vision de ce que les philosophes<br />
contemporains appellent le problème de l’ « identité personnelle » (c’est-à-dire le problème qui<br />
consiste à rendre compte du maintien de l’unité de la personne malgré l’essentielle fluidité du moi,<br />
constamment en devenir, physiquement et mentalement). On pourrait formuler l’objection prévenue<br />
par Socratima comme suit : l’immortalité de l’individu ne peut vraiment être assurée par la<br />
procréation (physique ou spirituelle) dans la mesure où ce qui est créé par la re-production n’est pas le<br />
« même » que ce qui l’a créé. Ainsi, dans la re-production issue de l’amour, physique ou spirituel, il y<br />
a certainement quelque chose qui vient de soi, mais pas la persistance du soi comme tel. Et si tel est le<br />
cas, ni la reproduction, ni la création spirituelle sous le signe d’eros ne permettent au soi comme tel<br />
d’atteindre l’immortalité. Ni la procréation, ni la création de belles œuvres ne permettrait donc de<br />
satisfaire le souci de soi en ce sens-là. Le souci, qu’a le soi, heureux, de durer.<br />
Pour surmonter cette difficulté, Socratima adopte la stratégie insolite consistant à dissocier la<br />
question de l’identité personnelle de celle de la mêmeté. Faisant appel à nos croyances ordinaires<br />
concernant l’individu, elle nous force à admettre que nous admettons spontanément l’existence d’une<br />
26 Elle “traduit” aussi la hiérarchie socratique du souci en terme d’amour lorsqu’elle critique l’aspect limité de l’application<br />
du concept d’amour en disant: “… those who pursue this along any of its many other ways –through making money,or<br />
through the love or sports, or through philosophy—we don’t say that these people are in love, and we don’t call them<br />
lovers’’ (sous-entendu : alors qu’en fait, on le devrait), 205d.<br />
27 See for ex. Larivée [2007].<br />
48
Annie Larivée<br />
personne particulière et identifiable (la réponse au ‘qui est-ce?’) malgré les constants changements<br />
que cette personne subit à divers égards. Malgré le fait, donc, qu’elle n’est jamais tout à fait la même,<br />
nous n’avons néanmoins aucune hésitation à désigner une personne donnée comme étant cette<br />
personne particulière, X.<br />
La partie de ses explications qui ont les conséquences les plus importantes pour mon sujet<br />
concernent l’âme. Car Socratima fait valoir qu’au niveau de l’âme, la persistance de la personne<br />
dépend en fait du choix qu’elle fait de conserver, de renouveler par la mémoire et l’exercice, tel ou tel<br />
trait de son caractère, telle ou telle opinion, tel ou tel désir, telle ou telle connaissance (207e).<br />
Continuer d’exister en tant que personne, semble dire Socratima, repose sur un constant processus de<br />
sélection, de reproduction de soi par soi. De sorte que le processus de reproduction spirituelle ou<br />
certains éléments du soi pérennisés dans des supports extérieurs au soi qui seront ensuite assimilés par<br />
d’autres (par le biais d’œuvres poétiques, éducatives, ou législatives par exemple) ne serait pas<br />
fondamentalement différent de ce qui se produit constamment à l’intérieur de la personne.<br />
Si l’on emprunte le vocabulaire employé par Irwin, on pourrait dire que Socratima tente de<br />
nous convaincre que la persistance de la personne par le biais d’une ‘interpersonal propagation’ (sous<br />
forme spirituelle et psychique) ne diffère pas fondamentalement de l’’intrapersonal propagation’ sur<br />
laquelle repose notre identité personnelle, identité que nous ne questionnons pas. 28 Au niveau interne<br />
à l’âme, la persistance du soi prend la forme d’une self-propagation qui repose sur la décision de<br />
conserver certains traits et éléments présents de la personne, en vue de les maintenir dans le futur. Or,<br />
la procréation spirituelle repose sur la même dynamique de sélection et de préservation, elle est une<br />
propagation du soi sur un support extérieur. En fait, on pourrait même aller jusqu’à dire que ce que R.<br />
Dawkins a baptisé « meme » 29 (à savoir « an idea, behavior, or style that spreads from person to<br />
person within a culture ») 30 est aussi le support de l’identité personne telle que Socratima suggère que<br />
nous la comprenions. Si l’on cherchait à prouver, avec Ch. Gill, que le soi ou la personne, dans<br />
l’antiquité grecque classique, ne repose pas, contrairement à l’époque moderne, sur la capacité<br />
d’adopter la perspective de la première personne (ce qu’on pourrait appeler avec Ricoeur l’ipséité), on<br />
aurait trouvé de bons arguments dans ce passage du Banquet! 31 Mais quelles sont les conséquences de<br />
ce passage pour la question du soin de l’âme ?<br />
D’abord, avec ces explications sur la procréation de l’âme, Socratima ouvre la possibilité pour<br />
l’éraste d’être, lui aussi, motivé par son souci de l’âme (alors que chez Pausanias, il ne retirait<br />
apparemment rien d’autre qu’une satisfaction sensuelle). 32 Le soin qu’il prodigue à l’eromène est<br />
bénéfique non seulement à l’âme de l’éromène, qui s’en trouve améliorée, mais également à sa propre<br />
âme. Une certaine forme de souci de l’âme comme souci de soi trouve ici sa satisfaction par le bais de<br />
la procréation spirituelle. Et si l’on applique ces idées à la relation entre Socrate et Alcibiade telle que<br />
décrite par Alcibiade à la fin du Banquet par exemple, on obtient une réponse à la question de savoir<br />
ce que cherchait Socrate dans sa relation chaste avec le jeune homme politiquement ambitieux. On<br />
peut penser qu’il cherchait en quelque sorte à s’auto-propager en semant, dans l’âme d’Alcibiade, ce<br />
qui, en lui-même, lui semblait essentiel et digne d’immortalité: ses vertus, son amour de la<br />
philosophie. À plus forte raison, c’est bien entendu aussi ce qu’a fait Platon en écrivant le Banquet<br />
que l’on pourrait peut-être, tout entier, percevoir comme un « meme ».<br />
Évidemment, on pourrait reprocher à la vision de l’amour présentée par Socratima d’être, plus<br />
encore que celle d’Aristophane, ego-centrée (et intrumentale). Car dans l’amour, ce qui serait en jeu<br />
serait la capacité du soi d’assurer sa permanence par la ‘propagation’ d’éléments (du soi) qui semblent<br />
dignes d’être transmis. Ce n’est sans doute pas faux. Mais à mon avis, la meilleure manière de<br />
comprendre le caractère auto-centré de la conception de l’amour présentée par Socratima est d’en<br />
percevoir la puissance protreptique. Très habilement, Platon exploite ici le souci qu’a tout soi de<br />
persister dans son être pour amorcer une conversion de l’attention vers une sphère d’intérêt beaucoup<br />
plus générale et impersonnelle : belles créations poétiques, éducation, belles institutions politique ou<br />
législatives, par exemple.<br />
28<br />
Irwin [1995], 306-11.<br />
29<br />
Dawkins [1989], 192. "We need a name for the new replicator, a noun that conveys the idea of a unit of cultural<br />
transmission, or a unit of imitation. 'Mimeme' comes from a suitable Greek root, but I want a monosyllable that sounds a bit<br />
like 'gene'. I hope my classicist friends will forgive me if I abbreviate mimeme to meme. If it is any consolation, it could<br />
alternatively be thought of as being related to 'memory', or to the French word même.”<br />
30<br />
Merriam-Webster Dictionary.<br />
31<br />
Gill [2006] 330-34.<br />
32<br />
Rappelons que le discours de Pausanias ne permettait pas de comprendre ce qui motive l’eraste dans une perspective<br />
socratique du souci de l’âme. Car si le discours de Pausanias permet de voir comment le processus éducatif de la relation<br />
pédérastique bénéficie clairement à l’âme de l’eromène, on ne comprend pas l’avantage que l’éraste pourrait en retirer (autre<br />
que sensuel).<br />
49
Annie Larrivée<br />
Avant de clore mon analyse du protreptique long, on pourrait me reprocher d’avoir présenté le<br />
discours de Socratima comme un discours de conversion vers le souci de l’âme alors qu’en fait,<br />
« engendrer dans le beau » peut-être accompli aussi bien selon le corps que l’âme. Il est en effet<br />
déclaré que certains sont plus féconds selon le corps, d’autres selon l’âme. Il semble donc que<br />
Socratima reconnaisse l’existence de deux types de personnes différents sans tenter de convertir les<br />
premiers au mode d’accomplissement des seconds. Cela serait mal comprendre le public visé par<br />
Platon dans ses œuvres protreptiques. Ceux qu’il vise à gagner sont en fait ceux dont le désir pourrait<br />
aller aussi bien d’un côté que de l’autre, ceux qui ont un certain souci pour l’âme, mais qui sont<br />
également fortement attirés par d’autres « amours », tel Alcibiade. 33<br />
Dans le passage qui nous intéresse, plutôt que de produire un argument sophistiqué pour<br />
prouver cette valeur supérieure, Socratima s’appuie tout bonnement sur une situation empirique<br />
connue de tous : le fait que des honneurs publics sont constamment accordés aux créations issues de<br />
l’âme alors que personne n’est publiquement honoré pour avoir donné naissance à un enfant (209e).<br />
Elle joue donc ici habilement sur un jugement de valeur implicite et préexistant chez ses auditeurs<br />
pour encourager une conversion du souci. De manière crue, sa conversion repose sur la logique<br />
protreptique suivante :<br />
-l’amour a pour objet le corps ou l’âme,<br />
-l’amour du corps aspire à la reproduction physique, l’amour de l’âme à des productions<br />
spirituelles,<br />
-les créations spirituelles se voient accorder des honneurs publics, ce qui n’est pas le cas des<br />
rejetons physiques,<br />
-tous admettent donc que l’amour de l’âme a plus de valeur que l’amour du (ou des) corps.<br />
Si vous êtes minimalement cohérent, semble-t-elle ainsi suggérer, vous vous soucierez dans vos<br />
amours plus de l’âme que du corps puisque vous accordez en fait plus de valeur aux productions de<br />
l’âme qu’à celles du corps.<br />
2- Second passage protreptique (court), l’ « ascension vers le Beau »<br />
Quant au levier protreptique qui permettrait de passer à la sphère philosophique du Beau en<br />
soi, il est, de manière surprenante, beaucoup moins sophistiqué que le précédent.<br />
Avant d’aller plus loin, il faut distinguer l’effet protreptique que peut avoir ce court passage<br />
de son sujet (ou contenu) protreptique. Le passage a un contenu protreptique dans la mesure où il<br />
décrit, verbalement et de manière extérieure, un processus de conversion, le passage progressif d’une<br />
expérience commune (personnelle) de l’amour à une sorte d’érotique philosophique (impersonnelle) à<br />
première vue étrange. Ce processus décrit comme une initiation, Diotime l’a visiblement expérimenté<br />
elle-même et elle déclare que Socrate pourrait peut-être également le vivre (210a). Or, cette<br />
description d’un processus protreptique que Diotime, seule, a vécu, peut également avoir un certain<br />
effet protreptique sur le lecteur ou l’auditeur. 34 Le récit est donc protreptique non seulement par son<br />
contenu (par le fait qu’il offre le portrait d’une conversion), mais aussi par son effet possible au sens<br />
où il peut susciter le désir du lecteur ou de l’auditeur face à une telle expérience, décrite comme<br />
incroyablement satisfaisante. Les deux aspects protreptiques sont donc liés, mais ils ne doivent pas<br />
être confondus. 35 Dans un premier temps, on se tourne vers cette expérience (décrite comme pouvant<br />
« tourner » notre âme), en un second temps, notre âme est tournée par cette expérience –en admettant<br />
que nous l’accomplissions. Car rien ne garantit que celui qui est séduit par ce récit platonicien sera<br />
ensuite en mesure de passer à travers les stades de cette expérience (pas même Socrate suivant<br />
Diotime). Il faut donc soigneusement différencier ces deux mouvements de conversion, conversion<br />
vers, conversion par.<br />
Cette distinction permet d’ailleurs d’évoquer un aspect crucial de la description de<br />
l’ «ascension vers le Beau » trop souvent passé sous silence : son double caractère à la fois sublime et<br />
décevant, édifiant et creux. En effet une fois la première séduction passée, on en vient à se demander<br />
quelle forme concrète peut bien prendre une telle ‘vision’ du Beau en soi et comment elle peut créer<br />
l’intense satisfaction que Diotime lui associe. La description de cette conversion du regard ou du<br />
souci par rapport au beau est séduisante, attrayante et en cela, protreptique, mais en l’absence<br />
33 Larivée [2012], 20-24<br />
34 Qu’il s’agisse de Socrate, qui avoue avoir été « persuadé », des participants du banquet où Socrate rapporte le récit, et de<br />
l’ami d’Apollodore qui écoute la narration du discours.<br />
35 On peut être convaincu de la valeur et du caractère désirable de cette érotique philosophique à la lecture du passage (ou<br />
l’audition du récit), mais cette expérience de conversion vers la philosophie comme activité ou mode de vie est différente de<br />
la conversion du regard qui se produit lors de l’ « ascension vers le Beau » décrite par Diotime.<br />
50
Annie Larivée<br />
d’expérience réelle, elle reste purement verbale. On apprend, par le témoignage d’autrui, qu’une telle<br />
expérience a le pouvoir de faire que « la vie vaut d’être vécue » (211d), mais en quoi consiste cette<br />
expérience exactement? Comment la reproduire ?<br />
En fait, cet espace creux entre la conversion vers et la conversion par –pour le lecteur ou<br />
l’auditeur— est en quelque sorte comblé par une condition souvent négligée. À savoir qu’un guide<br />
semble nécessaire (ou du moins hautement souhaitable) pour parvenir à cette expérience. En effet,<br />
non seulement la transition érotique prend du temps, elle est graduelle et nécessite le passage à travers<br />
plusieurs étapes, mais Diotime mentionne à plusieurs reprises que cette expérience se fait à l’aide<br />
d’un accompagnateur initié. De sorte qu’entre l’enthousiasme créé par la description de l’expérience<br />
de conversion et la déception issue du caractère purement verbal du récit, il y a un espace d’action<br />
ouvert pour l’auditeur ou le lecteur. Avec l’allusion à la nécessité d’un guide, une condition est posée,<br />
une tâche concrète est proposée : se mettre à la recherche du guide compétent. Après seulement, sous<br />
la tutelle de ce guide, la vraie conversion érotique, la vraie expérience pourra avoir lieu. <br />
À être complété et révisé… This is a work in Progress.<br />
Selective bibliography<br />
BENARDETE, S. [2001] Plato's <strong>Symposium</strong>, U of Chicago Press.<br />
BRUNSCHWIG, J. [1963] *Correspondance: sur Amélès et Mélétè+, Revue philosophique de la<br />
France et de l=étranger, no2, avril-juin, 267-268.<br />
DAWKINS, R. [1989] The Selfish Gene (2 ed.), Oxford University Press,<br />
DOVER, K.J. [1978] Greek Homosexuality, Cambrige Mass., Harvard U Press, 1989.<br />
FRANKFURT, H. [1988] The Importance of What We Care About, Cambridge U Press.<br />
GERSON, L. [2003] Knowing Persons. A Study in Plato, Oxford U. Press.<br />
GILL, Ch. [2006] The Structured Self in Hellenistic and Roman Thought, Oxford U Press.<br />
HADOT, P. [1993] Exercices spirituels et philosophie antique, Albin Michel, Paris, 2002.<br />
HUNTER, R. [2004] Plato's <strong>Symposium</strong> (Oxford Approaches to Classical Literature). Oxford: Oxford<br />
U. Press, 2004<br />
IRWIN, T. [1995] Plato’s Ethics, Oxford U Press.<br />
LARIVÉE, A. [2010] “The Philebus, a Protreptic?” Plato’s Philebus. Selected Papers from the 8 th<br />
<strong>Symposium</strong> Platonicum, Akademia Verlag, 163-71.<br />
_____ [2012] “Eros Tyrannos: Alcibiades as the Model of the Tyrant in Book IX of the Republic,”<br />
IJPT 6, 1-26.<br />
LUDWIG, P.W. [2002] Eros and Polis. Desire and Community in Greek Political Theory, Cambridge,<br />
Cambridge U. Press.<br />
NUSSBAUM, M. [1986] The Fragility of Goodness, Cambridge U. Press, Updated Edition, 2001.<br />
PARFIT, D. [1984] Reasons and Persons, Clarendon Press, Oxford.<br />
PERRY, J., [1978] A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality, Indianapolis.<br />
_____, [2002] Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self, Indianapolis/Cambridge, Hackett Publ.<br />
Company.<br />
_____, [2008 ] (ed.) Personal Identity, Berkley-Los Angeles, U of California Press.<br />
36 Il est tentant, ici, de faire un rapprochement avec l’Alcibiade où Socrate se présente à Alcibiade comme étant sous la<br />
tutelle d’un dieu qui le guide, XXX.<br />
51
Annie Larrivée<br />
PLATO [1997] The <strong>Symposium</strong>. Trans. by A. Nehamas and P. Woodruff in Plato Complete Works, J.<br />
H. Cooper, D. Hutchinson (ed.) Hackett. Pub.<br />
PRICE, A.W. [2004] Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle, Oxford U Press.<br />
RICOEUR, P. [1990] Soi-même comme un autre, Paris, Seuil.<br />
TAYLOR, Ch. [1991] The Malaise of Modernity, Toronto, House of Anansi Press.<br />
VERNANT, J.-P. [1959] *Aspects mythiques de la mémoire en Grèce+, Journal de Psychologie, 1-30.<br />
_____, [1991] “Façons grecques d’être soi,” Les Grecs, les Romains et nous, R.-P. Droit (ed), Le<br />
Monde Éditions, Paris, 103-13.<br />
_____, [1998] *Le fleuve AAmélès@ et la *mélétè thanatou+, Mythe et pensée chez les Grecs, Paris,<br />
137-152.<br />
VLASTOS, G. [1973] “The Individual as an Object of Love in Plato,” Platonic Studies, Princeton U.<br />
Press.<br />
WARNER, M. [1979] “Love, Self, and Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong>,” Philosophical Quarterly 29, 329-39.<br />
WHITING, J. [1986], “Friends and Future Selves,” Philosophical Review 95, 547-80.<br />
WILLIAMS, B. [1973], Problems of the Self, Cambridge U. Press, 1999.<br />
52
Intro<br />
Diotime contre Aristote : qu’est-ce qui fait l’identité à soi du vivant?<br />
Alexis Pinchard<br />
Ainsi que le montre la fin du Cratyle, les Formes intelligibles, si toutefois il y en a, disposent<br />
évidemment d’une parfaite identité à soi sous tout rapport 1 . Il n’y a pas d’obstacle psychologique qui<br />
gêne la reconnaissance de cette évidence. C’est le sens même de la position des Formes intelligibles,<br />
le sens de leur être : elles sont censées rendre la science possible en tant que celle-ci constitue un<br />
savoir lui-même caractérisé par la stabilité et portant sur une réalité, sur un être au sens plein du<br />
terme, car du néant il n’y a qu’ignorance. S’il faut admettre l’existence réelle des Formes intelligibles,<br />
c’est parce qu’elles seules disposent, par définition, d’une identité à soi sous tout rapport et pour<br />
toujours, nécessaire à tout objet d’une science digne de ce nom. L’Identité elle-même est une Forme,<br />
un grand genre de l’être auquel participe tous les autres genres (Sophiste, 254d-e : « Chacun [des<br />
genres de l’être que sont l’Être, le Mouvement et le Repos] est autre que les deux qui restent et même<br />
que soi »). D’ailleurs les Formes intelligibles sont tellement identiques à elles-mêmes qu’elle ne<br />
peuvent être la forme de rien sinon d’elles-mêmes. Elles n’accueillent pas l’altérité de la matière en<br />
elle. Elles ne façonnent rien directement. Elles ne sont pas réllement impliquées dans ce dont, par<br />
imitation, elles sont le principe. Elles sont seulement en elles-mêmes, et donc séparées de tout le reste.<br />
La « Beau divin », en particulier, est selon Diotime « éternellement joint à l’unicité de sa forme »<br />
(monoeides, Banquet, 210e ; repris en 211e). Dans l’éternité, où tout est simultané, la question de<br />
l’identité numérique de l’essence (ousia) — c’est le même Beau que contemplent tous ceux qui ont<br />
été initiés à Eros jusqu’au bout — et la question de son l’identité à soi comme permanence se<br />
confondent 2 : faute de parties internes dans l’essence, la moindre modification supposerait un<br />
éclatement radical et une suppression de l’identité numérique. Réciproquement l’unité numérique se<br />
traduit nécessairement par une parfaite conservation de toutes les déterminations.<br />
Mais y a-t-il des Formes intelligibles ? Existent-elles comme on les décrit ? Peut-on légitimement<br />
poser le type de réalité ainsi défini ? Bref sont-elles ? Voilà qui n’est pas évident pour la doxa. C’est<br />
un songe de philosophe. Si on pense ces Formes pour en manifester les déterminations et l’entrelac<br />
mutuel, leur réalité devient une évidence, mais par définition la doxa ne pense pas. Sur ce point, il<br />
faudra donc aller contre les apparences communes. Il faudra faire un pari sur l’invisible. Le<br />
philosophe devra surmonter en lui la répugnance naturelle de la doxa pour admettre l’existence de ces<br />
Formes.<br />
Inversement, des vivants sensibles sont évidemment donnés à notre perception. Tout le monde<br />
s’accorde là-dessus. Le fait de leur existence n’est pas contesté, même par le philosophe, bien qu’il se<br />
demande en retour ce qu’exister veut dire dans ce cas. Mais qu’en est-il de leur identité individuelle ?<br />
C’est là que le doute est permis, et même requis. Contrairement à l’intelligible qui réclame une<br />
affirmation sur le plan de l’existence, le sensible, lui, réclame au vrai philosophe une retenue<br />
concernant le plan de l’identité à soi, même si l’usage de la langue commune, avec ses noms, incite à<br />
1 Cf. Platon, Cratyle, 439b-440d, trad. Catherine Dalimier modifiée : « — Socr. : Examine en effet, admirable Cratyle, ce<br />
songe que je fais souvent. Affirmons-nous, oui ou non, que le bon en soi existe, et de même pour chacun des êtres pris<br />
individuellement ? — Cratyle : À mon avis, Socrate, ils existent. — Eh bien examinons cet en soi. Il ne s’agit pas de savoir<br />
si, lorsqu’un visage ou quelque chose de ce genre est beau, tout cela semble aussi s’écouler, mais il s’agit du beau en soi :<br />
n’est-il pas toujours tel qu’il est ? — Nécessairement. — […] S’il est toujours dans le même état et toujours identique à luimême,<br />
comment pourrait-il changer ou se mouvoir, sans s’écarter en rien de sa forme (idea) ? […] En va-t-il ainsi (ce qui<br />
connaît et ce qui est connu existe toujours, autrement dit s’il existe un beau en soi et tout le reste) ou de la première façon,<br />
comme le prétendent les héraclitéens et tant d’autres ? Sujet d’étude difficile, je le crains ! […] En conclusion, Cratyle, peutêtre<br />
qu’il en est ainsi, mais peut-être pas. Il faut donc examiner la question avec vaillance et bien à fond, sans t’en laisser<br />
accroire — tu es encore jeune et c’est le bel âge pour le faire — et si tu as trouvé après cet examen, tu devras me le<br />
communiquer. » Socrate, face à Cratyle, n’affiche ici aucune certitude concernant la position d’essences séparées ; la<br />
question réclame encore un examen dialectique auquel il encourage son jeune interlocuteur. En revanche, la nécessité de<br />
l’immuabilité de ces êtres est clairement établie. Cette immuabilité, impliquant une complète identité à soi, est la condition<br />
pour qu’ils soient intelligibles, puisque de toute façon ils ne sauraient être visibles, et donc connaissables. Sans cela la<br />
position d’essence séparées pour chaque prédicat possible ne permettrait pas de sauver la possibilité de la connaissance en<br />
générale, compromise par le caractère fluant du sensible. On retrouve l’insistance sur l’identité à soi de la Forme intelligible<br />
en République V, 479a : le beau en soi, dès lors qu’on en reconnaît l’existence, garde « une forme (idéa) qui se tient toujours<br />
dans le même état sous les mêmes rapports (ἀεὶ µὲν κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἔχουσαν). » Le pluriel « sous les mêmes<br />
rapports », implicitement opposé à « sous certains rapports », indique que tous les aspects de la forme sont conservés. Il n’y<br />
a pas, au sein de l’essence, de partage entre un fond qui demeure et une surface qualititative variable.<br />
2 Cf. Plaul Ricoeur, Soi-même comme un autre, Paris, 1990, p. 140-141.
Alexis Pinchard<br />
dépasser la mesure. Il y a une chiasme. Dans le cas du sensible, le philosophe devra surmonter la<br />
tendance affirmative de la doxa, sans toutefois la renverser complètement. Accorder l’identité plénière<br />
aux vivants sensibles, ce serait encore donner trop d’exactitude au sensible. Identité et altérité n’ont<br />
pas exactement le même sens dans le sensible et dans l’intelligible. De la même manière, quand le<br />
philosophe a admis l’existence des Formes intelligibles, il savait que cette existence ne pouvait<br />
signifier exactement la même chose que pour le sensible qui l’imite imparfaitement. La différence<br />
entre le mode d’être du sensible et celui de l’intelligible se joue à la fois sur la relation de l’étant à ses<br />
propres déterminations et sur sa position nue.<br />
Enfin, qu’en est-il de l’âme ? En quel sens, et à quel degré reste-t-elle identique à elle-même,<br />
elle qui est intermédiaire entre le sensible et l’intelligible ? Pour produire des jugements d’identité à<br />
propos du sensible comme à propos de l’intelligible, ne faut-il pas que sa manière d’être identique soit<br />
ni tout à fait étrangère au sensible ni tout à fait étrangère à l’intelligible ? Mais le fait que toutes les<br />
manières d’être identiques ne soient pas identiques entre elles, n’est-ce pas contradictoire ? L’identité<br />
n’exclut-elle pas par nature les degrés et les approximations ?<br />
En tout cas, c’est vers un tel renversement de la doxa que nous oriente le texte suivant, extrait<br />
du discours de Diotime dans le Banquet :<br />
Εἰ τοίνυν, ἔφη, πιστεύεις ἐκείνου εἶναι φύσει τὸν ἔρωτα, οὗ πολλάκις ὡµολογήκαµεν, µὴ θαύµαζε.<br />
ἐνταῦθα γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν ἐκείνῳ λόγον ἡ θνητὴ φύσις ζητεῖ κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν ἀεί τε εἶναι καὶ ἀθάνατος.<br />
δύναται δὲ ταύτῃ µόνον, τῇ γενέσει, ὅτι ἀεὶ καταλείπει ἕτερον νέον ἀντὶ τοῦ παλαιοῦ, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἓν<br />
ἕκαστον τῶν ζῴων ζῆν καλεῖται καὶ εἶναι τὸ αὐτό – οἷον ἐκ παιδαρίου ὁ αὐτὸς λέγεται ἕως ἂν<br />
πρεσβύτης γένηται· οὗτος µέντοι οὐδέποτε τὰ αὐτὰ ἔχων ἐν αὑτῷ ὅµως ὁ αὐτὸς καλεῖται, ἀλλὰ νέος<br />
ἀεὶ γιγνόµενος, τὰ δὲ ἀπολλύς, καὶ κατὰ τὰς τρίχας καὶ σάρκα καὶ ὀστᾶ καὶ αἷµα καὶ σύµπαν τὸ σῶµα.<br />
καὶ µὴ ὅτι κατὰ τὸ σῶµα, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν οἱ τρόποι, τὰ ἤθη, δόξαι, ἐπιθυµίαι, ἡδοναί, λῦπαι,<br />
φόβοι, τούτων ἕκαστα οὐδέποτε τὰ αὐτὰ πάρεστιν ἑκάστῳ, ἀλλὰ τὰ µὲν γίγνεται, τὰ δὲ ἀπόλλυται.<br />
πολὺ δὲ τούτων ἀτοπώτερον ἔτι, ὅτι καὶ αἱ ἐπιστῆµαι µὴ ὅτι αἱ µὲν γίγνονται, αἱ δὲ ἀπόλλυνται ἡµῖν,<br />
καὶ οὐδέποτε οἱ αὐτοί ἐσµεν οὐδὲ κατὰ τὰς ἐπιστήµας, ἀλλὰ καὶ µία ἑκάστη τῶν ἐπιστηµῶν ταὐτὸν<br />
πάσχει. ὃ γὰρ καλεῖται µελετᾶν, ὡς ἐξιούσης ἐστὶ τῆς ἐπιστήµης· λήθη γὰρ ἐπιστήµης ἔξοδος, µελέτη<br />
δὲ πάλιν καινὴν ἐµποιοῦσα ἀντὶ τῆς ἀπιούσης µνήµην σῴζει τὴν ἐπιστήµην, ὥστε τὴν αὐτὴν δοκεῖν<br />
εἶναι. τούτῳ γὰρ τῷ τρόπῳ πᾶν τὸ θνητὸν σῴζεται, οὐ τῷ παντάπασιν τὸ αὐτὸ ἀεὶ εἶναι ὥσπερ τὸ<br />
θεῖον, ἀλλὰ τῷ τὸ ἀπιὸν καὶ παλαιούµενον ἕτερον νέον ἐγκαταλείπειν οἷον αὐτὸ ἦν. ταύτῃ τῇ µηχανῇ,<br />
ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, θνητὸν ἀθανασίας µετέχει, καὶ σῶµα καὶ τἆλλα πάντα· ἀθάνατον δὲ ἄλλῃ. µὴ οὖν<br />
θαύµαζε εἰ τὸ αὑτοῦ ἀποβλάστηµα φύσει πᾶν τιµᾷ· ἀθανασίας γὰρ χάριν παντὶ αὕτη ἡ σπουδὴ καὶ ὁ<br />
ἔρως ἕπεται.<br />
Or donc, dit-elle, si tu es bien convaincu que l’objet de l’amour est par nature celui que nous disons et<br />
sur lequel, à plusieurs reprises, nous nous sommes mis d’accord, il n’y a pas là (le zèle déployé par<br />
tous les vivants pour se reproduire et conserver leur progéniture) de quoi s’émerveiller ! Car dans le<br />
cas présent le raisonnement sera le même que dans l’autre : la nature mortelle cherche, dans la mesure<br />
de ses possibilités, à être toujours et à être immortelle ; or le seul moyen dont elle dispose pour cela,<br />
c’est le processus de naissance, en tant que perpétuellement à la place de l’ancien elle laisse quelque<br />
chose d’autre, qui est tout nouveau. À preuve cela même qu’on appelle la vie individuelle de chaque<br />
vivant et son identité à soi, c’est-à-dire le fait que depuis sa jeunesse jusqu’au temps où il sera devenu<br />
vieux, on dit qu’il est le même ; oui, en vérité, ce [vivant] qui n’a jamais en lui les mêmes choses, on<br />
l’appelle pourtant le même ! alors qu’au contraire perpétuellement, mais non sans certaines pertes, il<br />
se renouvelle dans ses cheveux, dans sa chair, dans ses os, dans son sang, bref dans son corps tout<br />
entier.<br />
En outre, ce n’est pas vrai seulement du corps, mais aussi, en ce qui concerne l’âme, de nos<br />
dispositions, de notre caractère, des opinions, penchants, des plaisirs, des peines, des craintes ; car en<br />
chaque individu rien de tout cela ne se présente identiquement : il y en a au contraire qui naissent et<br />
d’autres qui se perdent. Ce qu’il y a encore de beaucoup plus déroutant que tout cela, c’est ce qui se<br />
passe pour les connaissances. Non seulement il y en a qui naissent en nous et d’autres qui se perdent,<br />
si bien que pour ce qui est de nos connaissances nous ne sommes non plus jamais les mêmes ; mais en<br />
outre chaque connaissance individuelle a le même sort. Car ce que l’on appelle «étudier » suppose que<br />
la connaissance puisse nous quitter ; l’oubli est en effet le départ d’une connaissance, tandis qu’en<br />
revanche l’étude, créant en nous un souvenir tout neuf à la place de celui qui se retire, sauve la<br />
connaissance et fait qu’elle semble être la même.<br />
C’est, vois-tu, de cette façon que se sauvegarde tout ce qui est mortel : non pas en étant à<br />
jamais totalement identique comme l’est le divin, mais en faisant que ce qui se retire, et que son<br />
54
Alexis Pinchard<br />
ancienneté a ruiné, laisse après soi autre chose de nouveau, pareil à ce qui était. Voilà, dit-elle, par<br />
quel artifice, dans son corps comme dans tout le reste, ce qui est mortel, Socrate, participe à<br />
l’immortalité ; pour ce ce qui est immortel, c’est d’une autre manière. Par conséquent tu n’as pas à<br />
t’émerveiller de ce que tout [vivant] fasse naturellement cas de ce qui est une repousse de lui-même ;<br />
c’est en vue de l’immortalité que sont inséparables de chacun ce zèle et cet amour (Platon, Banquet,<br />
trad. Robin modifiée).<br />
Ce texte ne se contente pas d’énoncer dogmatiquement ce qu’il en est de l’identité, ou plutôt du<br />
manque d’identité, des vivants sensibles. Il pose lui-même un certain nombre de difficultés au lecteur<br />
attentif.<br />
I/ L’identité du corps vivant comme problème<br />
Diotime se démarque ici du discours entièrement mythique d’Aristophane notamment en ce que,<br />
ayant précédemment prouvé que l’amour est, par nature, désir d’immortalité, elle peut rétablir une<br />
connexion nécessaire entre amour et procréation. La sexualité génitale n’est plus un accident de<br />
l’amour. La perpétuation de toutes les espèces vivantes est l’expression et l’effet d’un même désir<br />
d’immortalité. L’amour ne vise pas à posséder autrui mais un avenir où quelque chose de soi, fût-ce le<br />
déni de soi, demeure pour que demeure aussi la possession du beau. Dans l’autre comme partenaire<br />
sexuel, c’est encore soi que l’on cherche, mais un soi qu’on n’est pas encore et qu’on ne sera peut-être<br />
jamais. Davantage, l’articulation entre Eros et procréation, loin de se limiter à une philosophie de la<br />
nature cherchant à expliquer les comportements des êtres vivants à l’égard de leur partenaire sexuel<br />
ou de leur progéniture, va prendre une véritable dimension ontologique car le désir d’immortalité va<br />
être intériorisé par Diotime au sein de chaque vivant individuel en tant qu’il est en relation avec luimême.<br />
C’est tout individu mortel, en lui-même, indépendamment du comportement qu’il peut adopter<br />
envers d’autres individus, qui se révèle durer par une perpétuelle procréation interne. Son être même<br />
doit être interprété à partir de l’hypothèse qui fait d’Eros une puissance oeuvrant à la cosmicité du<br />
cosmos. Eros constitue le fil d’Ariane qui peut nous guider dans le labyrinthe du demi-être et des<br />
imperfections énigmatiques propres au sensible 3 . Mais, du même coup, qu’en est-il de l’identité à soi<br />
du vivant ? S’il y a procréation interne, il doit aussi y avoir alterité numérique interne ne se limitant<br />
pas à une simple altération qualitative, au point que l’application même de la notion d’intériorité<br />
devient ici problématique. N’est-ce pas par un abus de langage que l’on parle d’individu à propos du<br />
vivant en général, et aussi à propos des corps et des âmes ? Et pourtant comment peut-on vivre, et<br />
donc être mortel, si l’on ne fait pas positivement un avec soi-même ? En quoi le vivant se distingue-til<br />
de la matière inerte s’il n’est pas habité par une vie ? Davantage, en quoi pourrait-on encore<br />
affirmer que l’amour pousse à s’immortaliser si ce qui naît de cet amour n’a rien à voir avec ce qui,<br />
précisément, cherchait à s’immortaliser en donnant naissance ? La seule ressemblance extérieure estelle<br />
suffisante ? Que faut-il à cette ressemblance pour que, à l’avenir, elle fasse signe vers celui qui a<br />
disparu ? Comment le nouveau vivant pourra-t-il être le sèma de l’ancien — marquant définitivement<br />
sa mort comme le fait un tombeau — à défaut de le prolonger positivement ?<br />
L’analogie qu’établit Diotime entre l’individu et l’espèce a en fait des effets contraires par rapport à<br />
notre opinion ordinaire. Au niveau de l’espèce, remarquer que les enfants sont le résultat du désir<br />
d’immortalité des parents a plutôt tendance à rétablir une continuité entre les parents et les enfants ; en<br />
revanche, au niveau de l’individu, affirmer qu’il y a une procréation interne incessante aboutit plutôt à<br />
fragmenter ce qui nous semble d’ordinaire un seul et même individu au cours du temps.<br />
En quel sens le mortel reste-t-il donc identique à soi au cours du temps ?<br />
a/ Le corps n’a plus besoin de l’âme pour vivre et mourir ?<br />
Tout d’abord, la « nature mortelle » dont les stratégies, partiellement vaines, pour se rendre<br />
immortelle sont décrites par Diotime, est analysée ici en deux composantes, le corps et l’âme.<br />
Chacune de ces composantes se révèle éprise d’immortalité mais ne pouvant accéder qu’à un<br />
simulacre de celle-ci, à l’opposé de la nature immortelle, c’est-à-dire principalement l’intelligible, qui,<br />
elle, dispose d’emblée d’une éternelle et parfaite identité à soi. Donc il semble que chacune de ces<br />
composantes soit astreinte aux limites caractéristiques de la nature mortelle — l’immortalité, pour<br />
elle, ne peut consister qu’en un « artifice » — et donc (selon la ratio cognoscendi) constitue un<br />
3 Cf. République V, 479c-d : les multiples participants sensible d’une Idée, comparés à l’objet des « énigmes » et des « jeux<br />
de mots échangés dans les banquets », sont finalement placés à un rang intermédiaire entre l’être et le non-être, et ainsi ne<br />
peuvent être objets que d’opinion.<br />
55
Alexis Pinchard<br />
exemple de nature mortelle : ce n’est que pour le mortel que la question des stratégies<br />
d’immortalisation se pose. Le tout a ici le même caractère que les parties. Bien que le composé puisse<br />
se défaire lors de la mort du vivant individuel, ce n’est pas seulement le composé âme-corps qui est<br />
sujet à l’alternative opposant mortel et immortel, comme l’envisage Socrate dans le Phèdre 4 , mais ce<br />
sont aussi le corps et l’âme, chacun pris en lui-même, car chacun connaît à tout instant de sa durée,<br />
fût-elle limitée ou illimitée, pour ainsi dire une petite mort. On ne peut pas se rassurer en disant que le<br />
composé, en tant que tel, est mortel, c’est-à-dire susceptible de se dissoudre en ses deux composantes<br />
de base, et doit donc recourir à un artifice pour s’immortaliser, tandis que les composantes seraient<br />
parfaitement immortelles. L’imperfection du composé relativement à l’immortalité de l’intelligible a<br />
sa ratio essendi aussi dans l’imperfection des composantes. Mais qu’est-ce que signifie être mortel<br />
pour un corps pris en lui-même, hors de son rapport à une unique âme ? Peut-on définir la mortalité, et<br />
donc la vie, sans référence à l’âme ? Cela semble contradictoire au sein du platonisme, et c’est<br />
pourtant ce que le texte présuppose. Car, alors que l’immortalité n’est encore étudiée qu’au niveau du<br />
corps, Diotime parle déjà de « vivant » et de « vie individuelle », tandis que, quand elle aborde l’âme,<br />
elle se cantonne au « nous » humain (ἡµῖν, 208a 1) et ne se lance plus dans des considérations<br />
biologiques générales. Le cas du vivant individuel, censé illustrer une thèse universelle, à portée<br />
ontologique, sur la participation de la nature mortelle à l’immortalité et ses modalités, semble donc<br />
commencer et s’arrêter avec la description du métabolisme corporel. Corrélativement, l’âme de ce<br />
passage du Banquet est présentée comme sujet d’émotions et de connaissances, si du moins la notion<br />
de sujet peut être maintenue, comme un principe essentiellement cognitif et non comme principe de<br />
vie. C’est un principe proprement spirituel, faisant de nous des personnes et non des choses.<br />
D’ailleurs, puisque Diotime, peu avant notre passage, oppose la fécondité selon le corps et<br />
celle selon l’âme (206b), il est évident qu’une telle âme ne saurait condescendre à aucune fonction<br />
nutritive. La multiplication des individus au sein de chaque espèce ne la concerne pas directement.<br />
L’âme ainsi conçue est plus proche de celle de Descartes que de celle d’Aristote.<br />
b/ Le soi du corps : proclamé mais introuvable<br />
L’autre au cœur du même<br />
Ensuite, en ce qui concerne le corps pris en lui-même, hors de son rapport avec l’âme, Diotime n’est<br />
pas très claire sur le degré d’altérité qui en réalité, pour ce que l’on appelle un « même » être vivant,<br />
sépare un corps vivant instantané des corps à peu près semblables qui le précèdent et le suivent<br />
immédiatement au cours du temps. Y a-t-il une discontinuité ontologique absolue, chaque corps étant<br />
numériquement distinct de tous les autres, ainsi que le terme héteron (ἕτερον, 207d 3) le laisse penser,<br />
ou bien une discontinuité ontologique relative, concernant seulement le contenu du corps mais non le<br />
contenant : au cours du temps, les éléments qui sont « dans » le corps — sang, cheveaux, os — se<br />
renouvèlent mais il semble qu’il y ait toujours une sorte d’enveloppe qui demeure tant que le corps est<br />
en vie. Après tout, les Formes intelligibles demeurent non seulement identiques à elles-mêmes, mais<br />
aussi identiques « sous tout rapport ». Le corps pourrait donc s’immortaliser en demeurant identique à<br />
lui-même sous certains rapports seulement, conservant un noyau d’être immuable au moins pour toute<br />
la durée de notre vie tandis que les propriétés qualitatives et quantitatives glisseraient en surface,, et la<br />
différence entre l’immortalité imparfaite de la nature mortelle et l’immortalité parfaite de l’intelligible<br />
serait encore sauve. L’hypothèse de la discontinuité relative pourrait alors aller jusqu’à la<br />
reconnaissance de la permanence d’une chôra toujours identique à soi au fond d’elle-même malgré ses<br />
altérations qualitatives, comme dans le Timée ; mais alors l’identité déborderait le vivant individuelle<br />
pour englober tout corps possible. Il ne s’agirait plus de l’identité de tel corps plutôt que de tel autre<br />
corps. L’hypothèse de la discontinuité ontologique relative doit donc elle-même être posée de manière<br />
relative. Diotime, apparemment, n’abandonne pas tout à fait l’idée qu’il y a un « soi » (ἐν αὑτῷ, 207d<br />
7) de ce corps, et donc une identité — à moins que cette thèse ne soit qu’une illusion nécessairement<br />
produite par tout discours au sujet du corps, illusion à laquelle Diotime elle-même n’adhère pas et<br />
contre laquelle tout lecteur philosophe devrait se défendre. Si l’on suit les paroles de Diotime étape<br />
par étape, mot à mot, à défaut d’une « mêmeté » individuelle impliquant la permanence d’un contenu<br />
chosal, il y aurait finalement au moins une « ipséité » du vivant, dont l’âme pourtant ne serait pas le<br />
4 Cf. Phèdre, 246c, trad. Robin modifiée : « Ce qu’on a appelé vivant, c’est cet ensemble d’une âme (immortelle) et d’un<br />
corps solidement ajusté, et il a reçu la dénomination de mortel. Quant à celle d’immortel, il n’est rien qui permette d’en<br />
rendre raison d’une façon raisonnée ; mais nous foregons, sans en avoir ni expérience ni suffisante intelligence, une idée du<br />
dieu : un vivant immortel qui possède une âme, qui possède aussi un corps, mais tous deux naturellement unis pour<br />
toujours. »<br />
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Alexis Pinchard<br />
principe — et nous reprenons ici la terminologie de Paul Ricoeur 5 . Il y a quand même quelque chose<br />
comme une « nature » mortelle, distincte d’autres natures, ayant sa cohérence propre et ses exigences<br />
conceptuelles permanentes. D’un côté, ce maintien discret d’un soi corporel vital va dans le sens de<br />
l’analogie entre l’âme et le corps face aux effets de l’amour puisque Diotime, dans sa description de<br />
l’effort de l’âme pour immortaliser ses connaissances, ne va pas jusqu’à remettre en question le fait<br />
qu’il s’agisse d’une seule et même âme au cours du temps, bien qu’elle ne fasse pas non plus de l’âme<br />
un substrat figé. D’un autre côté, on voit bien pourquoi ce n’est pas la relation à une seule et même<br />
âme qui, dans ce texte, pourrait venir assurer l’identité à soi du corps vivant : l’âme elle-même sera<br />
présentée d’abord sous l’angle des discontinuités qui affectent ses vécus successifs, lesquels se<br />
réduisent asymptotiquement à une simple série de phénomènes, sans qu’on ne puisse tout d’abord<br />
clairement discerner pour qui sont ses phénomènes. Comment une âme aussi profondément affectée<br />
par le changement pourrait-elle valoir comme principe d’identité pour autre chose qu’elle-même ?<br />
Que l’on considère la relation du corps à l’âme comme celle d’un tout à sa cause à la fois<br />
synthétique et organisatrice — dans une perspective plutôt aristotélicienne (« forme substantielle »)<br />
—, ou bien comme une relation de communication entre mouvements de l’un et affects de l’autre —<br />
dans une perspective plutôt cartésienne —, dans tous les cas dire qu’il s’agit du même corps parce que<br />
c’est le corps de la même âme supposerait que l’identité à soi de l’âme soit évidente pour elle-même<br />
ou, à défaut, pour le métaphysicien, ce qui n’est pas le cas ici, tant du moins que l’identité est<br />
interprétée comme mêmeté, selon la terminologie de Paul Ricœur. Davantage, si c’était l’âme qui,<br />
grâce à une puissance constitutive rayonnant au-delà d’elle-même, assurait immédiatement, à chaque<br />
instant, l’individualité du corps par rapport aux autres corps dans l’espace et, médiatement, son<br />
identité à soi à travers la durée malgré la perpétuelle nouveauté de ses éléments constitutifs, en quoi le<br />
cas du corps serait-il encore un exemple d’immortalisation du mortel par la procréation ? Car, dans<br />
cette hypothèse, c’est l’âme qui produirait le corps, non le corps instantané qui se reproduirait luimême<br />
pour s’immortaliser, et ainsi la thèse de Diotime serait ruinée.<br />
L’individu à l’image de l’espèce<br />
Mais il est difficile de trouver à quoi correspond ce soi du corps maintenu malgré tout par les mots de<br />
Diotime, car qu’est-ce qu’un corps sinon la somme de certains éléments matériels ? Peut-on, sans<br />
prendre la permanence de l’âme en considération, affirmer qu’il y a une forme dans le corps qui<br />
demeure réellement identique à elle-même au cours du temps et qui ne soit pas le simple résultat d’un<br />
effort d’abstraction toujours maintenu par l’intelligence ? Certes, il y a la Forme intelligible à laquelle<br />
le corps participe, mais cette Forme n’est pas en lui et ses éléments ne sont pas elle : elle est<br />
« séparée ». À cette difficulté théorique générale empêchant d’accorder au corps vivant une<br />
quelconque permanence substantielle s’ajoute le poids des comparaisons effectuées par Diotime ellemême.<br />
À la limite, au terme de ces comparaisons, le renouvellement de l’espèce devient en général<br />
indiscernable du renouvellement de l’individu (comme c’est manifestement le cas pour les animaux<br />
unicellulaires et certaines plantes à rhizome), si bien qu’individu et espèce constituent des points de<br />
vue plutôt que des réalités absolument distinctes. En effet, si le genre tend à l’immortalité de la même<br />
manière que le vivant individuel, c’est-à-dire avec les mêmes moyens et les mêmes limites dans la<br />
réussite du projet, il faut que le vivant individuel soit un individu seulement pour un point de vue<br />
externe, car entre le père et son rejeton, par exemple, il n’y a pas de lien réel (pas de vinculum<br />
substantiale dirait Leibniz), pas d’âme ou de forme commune immanente qui donne une raison<br />
intrinsèque de considérer l’ensemble comme un seule et même chose. Une fois passé le bref moment<br />
de l’engendrement, c’est seulement la ressemblance entre l’un et l’autre, découverte par un<br />
observateur externe, qui incite à les regrouper dans la même espèce. Le père et son rejeton n’ont pas<br />
immédiatement en eux-mêmes, positivement, le fondement de leur relation ; le père peut mourir sans<br />
que la vie du rejeton en soit affectée, et heureusement sinon l’artifice d’immortalisation ne<br />
fonctionnerait pas du tout ; la discontinuité ontologique entre l’ancien et le nouveau est ici la<br />
condition nécessaire pour que la procréation ait un sens, c’est-à-dire puisse être expliquée à partir<br />
d’Eros. La relation identifiante entre le père et son rejeton doit passer par la médiation d’une<br />
5 Cf. Paul Ricoeur, Soi-même comme un autre, Paris, 1990, « Indentité personnelle et identité narrative », p. 148 : « Il<br />
importe de tirer argument, en faveur de la distinction entre identité du soi et identité du même, de l’usage que nous faisons<br />
de la notion dans les contextes où les deux sortes d’identité cessent de se recouvrir au point de se dissocier entièrement,<br />
mettant en quelque sorte à nu l’ipseité du soi sans le support de la mêmeté. Il est en effet un autre modèle de caractère dans<br />
le temps que celui du caractère. C’est celui de la parole tenue dans la fidélité à la parole donnée […] La parole tenue dit un<br />
maintien de soi qui ne se laisse pas inscrire, comme le caractère, dans la dimension du quelque chose en général, mais<br />
uniquement dans celle du qui ?. »<br />
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Alexis Pinchard<br />
intelligence capable de remarquer leur commune participation à la Forme transcendante de l’homme<br />
ou d’un autre animal, bref leur similitude. Certes, au niveau de l’intelligible, l’espèce animale<br />
constitue bien une seule et même réalité, mais cette Forme ne peut se penser que comme l’unité d’une<br />
multiplicité.<br />
On n’aurait donc pas d’occasion de la penser si la multiplicité des individus vivants au cours<br />
des génération disparaissait, même si son être ne dépend pas d’une telle multiplicité. Or, de fait, on est<br />
capable de la penser. Le fait que multiple vaille comme condition épistémologique de la saisie de<br />
l’unité intelligible apparaît évidemment dans cas de la Beauté exposé par Diotime au terme de la<br />
fameuse dialectique ascendante : celle-ci doit passer par l’amour de tous les beaux corps avant d’en<br />
arriver à l’unique espèce de Beauté qu’est Beauté des corps, ne peut se penser que comme l’unité<br />
d’une multplicité.<br />
De même, l’immortalité du vivant individuel est comparée à l’immortalité du nom, objet<br />
d’amour pour les héros de jadis et les poètes qui les chantèrent (Banquet, 208c-d). La gloire épique se<br />
transmet certes de génération en génération, mimant la procréation sur le plan symbolique, mais elle<br />
est bien différente d’une immortalité personnelle supposant la conservation de l’identité numérique de<br />
l’âme au cours du temps. Il s’agit d’une succession du semblable au semblable, sans rien de réel qui<br />
unisse le successif à lui-même, ainsi que l’a déjà compris Héraclite :<br />
αἱρεῦνται γὰρ ἓν ἀντὶ ἁπάντων οἱ ἄριστοι, κλέος ἀέναον θνητῶν· οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ κεκόρηνται ὅκωσπερ<br />
κτήνεα<br />
Les meilleurs, en vérité, préfèrent une seule chose à toutes les autres, la renom intarissable parmi les<br />
mortels, tandis que le plus grand nombre se remplit à satiété, exactement comme du bétail (Héraclite,<br />
fr. 29 DK).<br />
Le contraste entre « intarissable » et « mortels » est ici typiquement héraclitéen : chaque homme qui<br />
porte la rumeur est pris dans le devenir, bientôt anéanti, mais cette rumeur demeure par ce<br />
renouvellement incessant lui-même. La gloire est ainsi à la fois toujours la même et toujours autre que<br />
ce qu’elle était, tel un fleuve dans lequel on ne se baigne jamais deux fois. Nous retrouvons ici<br />
l’héraclitéisme bien connu de Platon en ce qui concerne le sensible.<br />
Si nous appliquons ces analogies au corps vivant individuel, l’amant débutant qui aime un<br />
seul beau corps en aime déjà une pluralité potentiellement infinie sans le savoir. « L’océan du beau »<br />
(Banquet, 210d), en réalité, est déjà là. L’élévation dialectique à l’amour de tous les beaux corps ne<br />
fait que montrer la vérité implicite de l’étape précédente. La véritable unité ne se trouvera que dans<br />
l’Idée, unité pour la pensée et dans la pensée, et non dans l’ordre du corps, qu’on le prenne en sa<br />
pluralité manifeste ou en quelque singularité apparente.<br />
La mort en héritage ?<br />
Et pourtant, alors même que l’on cherche à nier que le corps demeure identique à lui-même, on lui<br />
attribue justement un « lui-même », un soi : il faut bien admettre qu’il n’est jamais le même justement<br />
parce qu’il se reproduit toujours. L’altérité émergente est le résultat d’une capacité à se dépasser soimême<br />
inhérente au terme antérieur, ce qui suppose donc une sorte de soi. Ce dépassement, payé au<br />
bout du compte au prix de la mort, est à la fois de soi et par soi. Au niveau de l’espèce, Diotime<br />
évoque le sacrifice des parents pour les enfants comme un cas limite et seulement possible révélant,<br />
par son caractère exceptionnel même, la vraie nature d’Eros en tant qu’il est étranger à tout principe<br />
de conservation de ce qui est déjà donné en son imperfection et son inertie :<br />
[Les bêtes] sont prêtes à batailler pour leur progéniture, les plus faibles contre les plus fortes, et à<br />
sacrifier leur vie, souffrant elles-mêmes les tortures de la faim en vue d’assurer sa subsistance et se<br />
dévouant de toutes les manières possibles (Platon, Banquet, 207b).<br />
Mais, au niveau de l’individu, il faut toujours que l’ancien disparaisse pour que le nouveau<br />
apparaisse : nos corps successifs et semblables ne peuvent pas se chevaucher dans le temps, ou alors<br />
un cancer se développe et nous mourons encore plus vite. Dans le vivant en devenir, la négation<br />
même par lequel le jeune corps chasse le vieux est un fruit de l’identité à soi du terme plus ancien.<br />
Certes, ce terme ancien était mortel et donc il aurait fini par être détruit par son environnement même<br />
s’il ne s’était pas reproduit, mais la destruction qui le frappe dans l’acte de reproduction a l’avantage<br />
de venir de lui-même, et c’est précisément cette réflexivité qui le sauve. Il est encore là dans son<br />
entrée en absence. Le fils, pour ainsi dire, hérite bien de quelque chose venant de son père glorieux,<br />
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Alexis Pinchard<br />
mais il n’y a pas de transfert d’un contenu réel positif car ce quelque chose c’est la mort du père,<br />
condition pour que le souvenir en soit transmis de génération en génération. L’immortalisation par la<br />
gloire qu’évoque Diotime pour ceux dont la fécondité est d’ordre spirituel, poètes ou législateurs,<br />
nous rappelle que, au niveau des Petits Mystères, la continuité de la vie est paradoxalement affaire<br />
deuil car elle est affaire de mémoire à défaut de réminiscence. L’immortalité se réalise alors, dans la<br />
faible mesure où elle est accessible au mortel, au détriment de la conservation : tel est le lot de ceux<br />
qui sont, dès l’origine, un mélange d’être et de non-être. Leur prolongement est aussi contradictoire<br />
que leur existence, à la limite du pensable, recélant une vérité par ce qu’il laisse deviner plutôt par ce<br />
qu’il est en lui-même. Diotime doit trouver dans l’abolition des propriétés et de l’existence du soi<br />
l’affirmation ultime de ce dernier comme facteur d’unité relative au cours du temps, car si il y avait<br />
une étrangeté et une extériorité absolue entre deux corps successifs au sein de ce qui semble un même<br />
individu vivant, en quoi cette succession de corps constituerait-elle une stratégie, fût-elle imparfaite,<br />
pour qu’il s’immortalise lui-même ? Il faut bien, pour la cohérence du discours de Diotime, que d’une<br />
certaine manière l’ancien se prolonge dans le nouveau, au moins par le fait que l’un jaillit de l’autre,<br />
même si par la suite, dans la mémoire d’un observateur lucide, ils sont numériquement distincts. Eros<br />
n’ouvre pas seulement l’âme humaine sur la transcendance de l’intelligible en tant que telle, sans la<br />
rabaisser, ainsi que le montreront les Grands Mystères finalement dévoilés par Diotime ; il pousse<br />
aussi tout étant sensible à se transcender, à se perdre pour enfin conserver de soi ce qui peut l’être, ne<br />
serait-ce justement que cet élan périlleux. La perte de soi garantit ici que, tout en suivant une<br />
impulsion interne, c’est bien au-delà de ce que l’on était et de notre finitude que l’on passe. Vouloir se<br />
conserver de manière immobile, à la manière de l’intelligible, en se renfermant sur une identité morte,<br />
un simple stock d’éléments ou de propriétés, n’aboutirait pour le vivant qu’à l’annihilation.<br />
En somme, nous retrouvons ici les problèmes « puérils » évoqués dans le Philèbe (14d).<br />
Comment une même réalité sensible peut-elle être dite à la fois une et multiple ? Faut-il faire de<br />
l’unité une simple apparence ? Mais à lui refuser toute unité véritable, c’est la multiplicité même des<br />
individus regroupés dans l’espèce que l’on ruine, car il n’y a de multiple que là où l’on peut compter<br />
des unités, et finalement on ruine aussi la réalité de la Forme intelligible qui devait faire la synthèse de<br />
cette mutiplicité. Faut-il dire qu’elle participe à l’un sous un certain rapport et au multiple sous un<br />
autre ? Mais alors on ne comprendra plus qu’elle se repoduise, c’est-à-dire se multiplie elle-même à<br />
partir d’elle-même en tant qu’elle-même. Il n’est pas certain que la solution de ces apories soit aussi<br />
facile que ce que revendiquera le Philèbe.<br />
c/ Eros comme principe d’identité ?<br />
Le vrai principe qui fait l’unité du vivant dans le temps n’est pas un substrat inerte dont on pourrait<br />
espérer donner un concept stable et clos, ce n’est pas une matière supportant ultimement des qualités<br />
sensibles ou intelligibles. Car Platon sait bien qu’un tel substrat, tel un « objet transcendantal = X »<br />
(Kant, Critique de la raison pure, passim), n’est postulé que pour faire l’unité des phénomènes et ne<br />
peut être connue en lui-même hors de sa seule fonction synthétique par rapport à notre propre<br />
perception en tant que perception objective ; autrement dit, l’étendue qui sert de matrice au devenir,<br />
contrairement aux Formes intelligibles qui sont connues en elle-mêmes et par elle-mêmes, n’est<br />
connue que par un « raisonnement bâtard » (Timée, 52b) partant du sensible et servant l’impérieux<br />
besoin d’unité de la raison. Il s’agit d’ailleurs d’une simple représentation, comme un « songe », et<br />
non d’une connaissance capable de déterminer l’être même de son objet. En fait , la notion de substrat<br />
permanent ne permet pas d’affirmer que le vivant reste identique à lui-même malgré le devenir<br />
apparent, mais au contraire suppose une telle identité. C’est en postulant une unité qu’on en vient à<br />
imaginer le substrat identitaire, car ce substrat demeure en lui-même à la fois invisible et<br />
inintelligible. Or, au nom de quoi postuler l’unité du vivant sensible ? Cette unité, en vérité, n’est pas<br />
en lui mais dans notre perception de lui. L’unité qui se traduit par la supposition d’une étendue<br />
permanente sous la diversité du devenir des qualités sensibles n’a donc pas de valeur ontologique ;<br />
c’est seulement une condition de possibilité notre expérience en tant qu’expérience d’objets stables et<br />
différentiables les uns des autres.<br />
Seul l’Amour, qui n’est pas le reflet de notre désir d’unité au sein de la perception mais sa<br />
cause, est capable de garantir, au niveau ontologique — même s’il s’agit d’une ontologie en mode<br />
mineur —, une sorte d’identité au vivant, car Eros ne se tient pas en deça de ce qu’il lie, comme s’il<br />
était un terme encore autre que les moments et les éléments à lier, mais Eros est parfaitement<br />
immanent à ce qu’il lie. Car si chaque moment du corps enfante un autre moment du corps, si chaque<br />
connaissance enfante une autre connaissance dans la même âme, c’est qu’elle se trouve suffisamment<br />
bonne et belle pour s’aimer elle-même. Ainsi, en se procréant lui-même avec lui-même, le corps<br />
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Alexis Pinchard<br />
vivant enfante encore dans le beau. La disparition de l’ancien qui laisse place au nouveau s’origine<br />
intégralement dans l’unique terme ancien. L’Eros narcissique cher à Freud n’est donc pas le garant de<br />
la conservation individuelle, mais cette conservation elle-même, avec tout ce qu’elle implique de mort<br />
sur son passage. En effet, Diotime n’a pas exclu que l’amour porte sur soi, mais y a mis comme<br />
condition un jugement de valeur :<br />
Mais ce que prétend ma théorie à moi (contre Aristophane), c’est que l’objet de l’amour n’est<br />
ni la moitié ni l’entier, à moins justement, mon camarade, que d’aventure ils ne soient en quelque<br />
manière une chose bonne (Platon, Banquet, 205e).<br />
On aura certes peut-être du mal à admettre qu’un corps, à lui seul, puisse prononcer un tel<br />
jugement de valeur. Mais rien, dans le sensible n’est tout à fait dépourvu de participations aux Formes<br />
intelligibles, à leur pureté et finalement à leur beauté. Le vivant s’aime lui-même en tant qu’il se tient<br />
sous le jour de l’intelligible. Le Phédon, alors que l’argument en faveur de l’immortalité de l’âme<br />
basé sur la réalité des expériences de réminiscence, n’admet-il pas que le sensible en tant que tel, étant<br />
pour ainsi dire conscient de son imperfection, aspire en personne à la plénitude de l’idéal 6 ?<br />
En tout cas, dans le vivant individuel, seul l’amour demeure, non pas en tant que sujet mais en<br />
tant qu’activité incessante, passant de l’ancien corps au nouveau corps sans relâche. C’est toujours de<br />
la même manière et par la même puissance qu’Eros subvertit les identités et les ouvres sur l’altérité,<br />
ne gardant d’elle que leur souvenir glorieux. Celle qui naît, dès qu’elle naît et parce qu’elle naît, est<br />
déjà tendue vers son propre dépassement. L’amour est une puissance de liaison aussi au sein de<br />
l’individu vivant : il le rattache à lui-même, assure la médiation et la continuité dialectique entre ses<br />
divers élements au cours du temps dans la mesure où il déborde chaque moment du corps à la fois du<br />
côté du passé — c’est grâce à Eros que ce moment est apparu — et du côté de l’avenir — c’est grâce<br />
à Eros qu’il cèdera la place au nouveau corps qu’il va produire. Ainsi il y a finalement bien un soi du<br />
corps vivant, sur le mode de l’ipséité et non de la mêmeté, permettant d’affirmer qu’il se reproduit et<br />
que ses éléments sont sans cesse renouvelés. Telle est l’œuvre démonique d’Eros, à l’échelle du<br />
micro-cosme comme du macro-cosme :<br />
Puisque le démonique est à mi-distance des hommes et des dieux, son rôle est de combler le<br />
vide : il est ainsi le lien qui unit le Tout à lui-même (202e).<br />
Mais on se heurte à nouveau à une difficulté : dans le Philèbe, Socrate démontre qu’il n’y a de<br />
désir que de l’âme, car tout désir suppose la mémoire. Comment donc le corps, au même titre que<br />
l’âme elle-même et en analogie avec elle, pourrait-il être possédé d’Eros ? Or c’est pourtant ce que<br />
laisse penser la première partie de notre texte du Banquet. Face à cette difficulté, il faut entrer plus<br />
avant dans la démonologie. Eros n’est pas un affect de l’âme. Il traverse l’âme sans la supposer. C’est<br />
une personne au sujet de laquelle on peut composer un discours mythique, sa réalité est autonome. Et<br />
pourtant Eros n’est rien d’autre que la somme de ses manifestations. Il s’épuise dans ses effets. Il faut<br />
qu’il se fasse sentir pour être. En fait Eros n’est pas une chose du monde parmi d’autres. C’est le sens<br />
même de l’être pour les étants sensibles, l’a priori qui donne forme à tout ce qui se manifeste à nos<br />
sens sans se manifester lui-même en personne. C’est pourquoi on peut contrer l’objection qui<br />
consisterait à dire qu’Eros ne peut pas assurer l’identité des corps vivants parce que, demeurant<br />
justement le même en chacun d’eux, il finirait par les confondre tous en une sorte de sphère<br />
homogène digne du règne de l’Amitié empédocléenne pris à son paroxysme. Comme la chôra, il<br />
sauverait l’identité au détriment de l’individualité, effacerait l’Autre à force de faire régner le Même ?<br />
Non. En effet, Eros n’est pas un étant ayant un effet sur d’autres étants. Comme Eros garantit, par sa<br />
faveur, que les étants soient précisément des étants, ou plutôt ne soient pas des non-étants absolus, et<br />
puisque le fait qu’ils ne soient pas des non-étants absolus implique qu’ils soient au moins objet<br />
d’opinion, Eros assure que les réalités sensibles restent à peu près distinctes les unes des autres. Eros<br />
donne aux demi-étants sensibles juste assez de stabilité pour pouvoir se disposer sous la lumière<br />
séparatrice de l’Idée et la recevoir.<br />
d/ Le refus de l’âme comme principe de la substantialité<br />
Aristote et l’âme comme «forme substantielle»<br />
Ayant examiné la solution positive au problème de l’identité des corps vivants qui émane des propos<br />
de Diotime, il faut à présent comprendre ce que Diotime refuse, car cela engage à la fois le sens de<br />
l’œuvre de Platon dans son ensemble et les rapports entre Aristote et Platon.<br />
Diotime, si notre interprétation est correcte refuse en quelque sorte par avance ce qui<br />
6 Platon, Phédon, 75a-b : « Quoi qu’il en soit, ce sont bien nos sensations qui doivent nous donner l’idée, à la fois que toutes<br />
les égalités sensibles aspirent (orégetai) à l’essence même de l’Egal, et qu’elles sont déficientes par rapport à elles. »<br />
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deviendra la solution aristolicienne pour penser l’identité à soi du vivant individuel, solution partant<br />
pourtant de prémisses semblables aux siennes :<br />
La plus naturel des fonctions pour un être vivant qui est achevé et qui n’est pas incomplet, ou<br />
dont la génération n’est pas spontané, c’est de créer un autre être semblable à lui, l’animal un animal,<br />
et la plante une plante, de façon à participer à l’éternel et au divin dans la mesure du possible […].<br />
Puisque donc il n’est pas possible pour l’individu de participer à l’éternel et au divin d’une façon<br />
continue, par le fait qu’aucun être corruptible ne peut demeurer le même et numériquement un, c’est<br />
dans la mesure où il peut y avoir part que chaque être y participe, l’un plus et l’autre moins ; et il<br />
demeure ainsi non pas lui-même, mais semblable à lui-même, non pas numériquement un, mais<br />
spécifiquement un.<br />
L’âme est cause et principe du corps vivant. Ces termes, « cause » et « principe », se prennent<br />
en plusieurs acceptions, mais l’âme est pareillement cause selon les trois modes que nous avons<br />
déterminés ; elle est, en effet, l’origine du mouvement, elle est la fin, et c’est aussi comme l’essence<br />
(ousia) des corps animés que l’âme est cause. Qu’elle soit cause comme essence, c’est évident, car la<br />
cause de l’êtree est, pour toutes choses, l’essence : or c’est la vie qui, chez tous les êtres, constitue leur<br />
être, et la cause et le principe de leur vie, c’est l’âme (Aristote, De anima, 415b1-15).<br />
Le refus aristotélicien les poser les universaux que constituent les espèces vivantes comme<br />
des substances (ousia) séparées a pour corrélat nécessaire la reconnaissance de l’âme comme forme<br />
réellement active et donc réellement présente dans le corps vivant tout au long de sa vie, si toutefois<br />
on veut accorder une certaine réalité à ces universaux et éviter ainsi le nominalisme. Certes l’âme, en<br />
tant que forme d’un corps pourvu d’organes, n’existe pas séparément, mais elle existe quand même,<br />
n’étant pas un simple résultat de l’abstraction, dans la mesure où elle exerce une causalité<br />
organisatrice. Elle n’est d’ailleurs que cette force organisatrice. L’espèce n’est une réalité, pour<br />
Aristote, que si elle s’actualise dans les individus sensibles, passant d’entéléchie première à entéléchie<br />
seconde, et fait d’eux, à titre de cause, précisément ce qu’ils sont pour tout le temps où ils sont. Sans<br />
les individus sensibles l’intellect, qui pense nécessairement l’universel, ne saisirait aucune vérité<br />
sinon dans ses jugements, et l’intuition ne pourrait donc venir fournir les principes de la<br />
démonstration. Certes l’âme, cause formelle du corps vivant en tant que vivant, pourra abandonner le<br />
corps, et ce sera alors la mort, y compris peut-être la sienne, mais en attendant, pour quelques temps,<br />
elle confère le rang de substance, parmi les divers sens de l’être, à certains individus sensibles. C’est<br />
véritablement, comme le dira la scolastique, une « forme substantielle », à la fois active dans la<br />
matière et soutenue par elle quoique non soumise à son flux. Un individu vivant ne demeure le même<br />
au cours du temps que parce que son âme est toujours présente dans son corps, ce qui permet<br />
justement de dire que c’est son corps. Et chaque vivant participe à l’éternel à proportion de la<br />
complexité de son âme. Au sommet, avec l’âme intellective, l’homme y participe davantage que la<br />
plante douée seulement d’âme nutritive. Mais toujours l’individu prend consistance par son âme, aussi<br />
brève que soit sa vie. Aristote ne peut donc aligner exactement la nutrition sur le statut de la<br />
reproduction, contrairement à Diotime, car la nutrition suppose une seule et même âme, alors que la<br />
reproduction en convoque au moins deux. Il n’y a pas d’âme de l’espèce, nous ne sommes pas chez<br />
Schopenhauer.<br />
L’âme platonicienne constituante?<br />
Mais cette opposition entre Aristote et Diotime exprime-t-elle, plus profondément, une opposition<br />
entre Platon et Aristote ? Rien n’est moins sûr, au moins à première vue. Car, dans le Phédon,<br />
contrairement au Banquet, Socrate semble admettre l’hypothèse d’une âme durable qui se façonne<br />
toujours à nouveau un corps quasi instantané mais parfaitement organisé, constituant ainsi la véritable<br />
unité du vivant au cours de sa durée, voire lui donnant ainsi, tout simplement, une durée. Cette âme<br />
formatrice nous ramène du côté d’Aristote et de son âme « cause et principe du corps vivant »<br />
(Aristote, De anima, 415b 5), bien qu’elle ne soit jamais assimilée à une ousia :<br />
SOCRATE : L’âme, dirait-on [si on voulait appliquer au couple âme-corps l’analogie avec le tisserand<br />
et le vêtement qu’il tisse], est chose durable, le corps de son côté chose plus fragile et de moindre<br />
durée. En réalité, cependant, ajouterait-on, mettons que chaque âme use de nombreux corps,<br />
particulièrement quand la vie dure de nombreuses années (car on peut supposer que, le corps étant un<br />
courant qui se perd tandis que l’homme continue à vivre, l’âme au contraire ne cesse de retisser ce qui<br />
est usé) ; ce n’en serait pas moins une nécessité que l’âme, le jour où elle sera détruite, ait justement<br />
sur elle le dernier vêtement qu’elle a tissé, et que ce soit le seul antérieurement auquel ait lieu cette<br />
destruction. Mais une fois l’âme anéantie, c’est alors que désormais le corps révélerait sa fragilité<br />
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foncière ; et, tombant en pourriture, il ne tarderait pas à passer définitivement (Phédon, 87d-e, trad.<br />
Robin).<br />
Il faut resituer cette théorie dans son contexte dialectique. Socrate veut montrer à Simias que l’un de<br />
ses arguments pour prouver l’immortalité de l’âme, basé sur une analogie entre l’âme est un tisserand,<br />
est invalide. La raison n’en est pas nécessairement la fausseté de l’analogie qui sert de prémisses,<br />
mais son incapacité à fonder la conclusion qu’on veut en tirer. Socrate, d’ailleurs, admet que l’âme<br />
soit quelque chose de « plus durable » que le corps ainsi que l’implique l’analogie. Néanmoins la<br />
valeur de vérité de l’analogie avec le tisserand n’est pas maintenue explicitement par Socrate, qui<br />
reste neutre. Ce dernier veut surtout montrer que, quand bien même on admettrait cette analogie, on<br />
n’aurait pas encore l’argument recherché. Il réfute ici l’âme de Simias, qui raisonne maladroitement,<br />
et non l’une de ses thèses en particulier. Il s’agit d’une manœuvre élenchtique typiquement socratique.<br />
Pourtant, de manière plus générale, il est indéniable que le Phédon admet que l’âme apporte<br />
partout et nécessairement avec elle la vie, puisque c’est même là une des prémisses pour le dernier<br />
argument en faveur de l’immortalité de l’âme 7 . Comment donc réconcilier cette conception de l’âme<br />
exposée et non démentie par Socrate, et celle exposée par Diotime dans le Banquet ? Un telle<br />
réconciliation est-elle même possible ?<br />
Cette contradiction au moins apparente ne serait pas la seule dans l’œuvre de Platon<br />
concernant l’âme. Dans le Timée, seule une partie de l’âme, l’élément rationnel, est dite<br />
« immortelle », tandis qu’est dite « mortelle » celle qui apporte la vie au corps en lui insufflant les<br />
désirs nécessaires à sa conservation 8 . Les deux contradictions sont analogues et peuvent se résoudre<br />
de manière analogue, ce qui nous amène de manière assez naturelle à des interprétations proches du<br />
néoplatonisme, en particulier Plotin. En effet, l’âme étant principe de son propre mouvement, elle ne<br />
peut non seulement se rapprocher ou s’éloigner d’autres réalités, et donc changer son rapport à elles,<br />
mais elle peut aussi — et c’est en fait la condition du premier point — changer son rapport à ellemême<br />
de par sa propre initiative. C’est ainsi qu’elle peut s’aliéner et être plus ou moins elle-même.<br />
Son soi peut se poser comme distance à soi, voire perte de soi.<br />
Or, pour Platon, la vraie vie est celle de l’esprit :<br />
S’étant alors rapproché de cet objet, s’étant confondu vraiment avec l’être, ayant engendré<br />
intelligence et vérité, il vivra (souligné par nous) se nourrira véritablement, et ainsi cesseront pour lui<br />
les douleurs de l’enfantement (République VI, 490b).<br />
L’âme n’est principe de vie pour le corps que parce qu’elle est elle-même la vie par excellence. Et sa<br />
vie atteint son maximum d’intensité lorsqu’elle pense et en tant qu’elle pense les Formes. La vie de<br />
l’âme s’amoindrit au fur et à mesure qu’elle s’éloigne de son centre intellectif. La vie que reçoit le<br />
corps et qu’il détient n’est plus la vie primordiale. C’est une âme aliénée, par sa propre initiative, qui<br />
devient capable s’assurer les fonctions vitales du corps. Mais cette âme compromise, qui se meut sur<br />
le mode du désir et de l’ardeur combattive peut disparaître comme elle est apparue, en fonction des<br />
options cognitives de l’âme, sans que l’âme elle-même soit réduite à néant. Il s’agit donc en quelque<br />
sorte d’une partie mortelle de l’âme. Elle ne dure qu’autant que l’âme veut se projeter en autre chose<br />
qu’elle-même et refuse de se connaître pleinement elle-même. De même, ce qui, de l’âme, constitue et<br />
reconstitue le corps au cours temps, n’est plus vraiment l’âme. L’âme ne peut fournir au corps qu’un<br />
simulacre d’identité car, quand elle se tourne vers le corps, elle est elle-même exilée d’elle-même.<br />
L’âme, sortie d’elle-même, ne peut se manifester dans le corps qu’en le dispersant, qu’en introduisant<br />
en lui un mouvement linéaire, dont la fin ne saurait coïncider avec le commencement. Par exemple, la<br />
vieillesse demeure inexorablement distincte de l’enfance. Le temps de notre existence, en tant que<br />
nous sommes mortels, est irréversible, comme Platon le montre dans le mythe du Politique. Ce<br />
décalage entre le commencement et la fin n’advient pas malgré l’âme mais à cause de l’âme. Donc<br />
quand bien même l’âme contribuerait à la reconstitution quotidienne du corps, elle ne saurait valoir<br />
7 Cf. Platon, Phédon, 105c : « Qu’est-ce qui, en se présentant dans un corps, fera qu’il soit vivant ? — Ce sera l’âme, dit-il.<br />
— Est-ce qu’il en est toujours ainsi ? — Le moyen, en effet, de le nier ! fir Cébès — Sur quelque objet, par conséquent, que<br />
l’âme mette sa prise, elle est venue à l’objet en question, portant avec elle la vie. »<br />
8 Cf. Platon, Timée, 69c-d : « [Les jeunes dieux nés du Démiurge], à son imitation, entreprirent, après qu’ils eurent reçu le<br />
pricipe immortel de l’âme, de façonner au tour pour lui un corps mortel et, à ce corps, ils donnèrent pour véhicule le corps<br />
tout entier cependant qu’ils établissaitent dans ce dernier une autre espèce d’âme, celle qui est mortelle et qui comporte en<br />
elle-même des passions terribles et inévitables : d’abord le plaisir, le plus important appât qui provoque au mal, ensuite les<br />
douleurs qui éloignent du bien, et encore la témérité et la peur, un couple de conseillers peu sâges, l’emportement rebelle aux<br />
exhortations, et l’espérance facile à décevoir. Ayant fait un mélange avec ses passions, la sensation irrationnelle et le désir de<br />
qui vient toute entreprise, ils ont constitué l’espèce mortelle en se soumettant à la nécessité. »<br />
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pour lui comme un principe d’identité univoque. L’âme dans pureté primordiale n’a pas d’energie<br />
formatrice à appliquer du côté du corps ; elle est tout entière tournée vers elle tout entière.<br />
II/ L’identité de l’âme comme problème<br />
A/ Penser et être soi<br />
En examinant le rôle identificatoire que l’âme aurait pu joué à l’égard du corps, que d’autres textes de<br />
Platon suggèrent et que Diotime, pourtant, refuse, on est naturellement conduit à s’intéresser à la<br />
question de l’identité de l’âme elle-même. Conformément au plan du texte, venons-en donc<br />
maintenant au niveau de l’âme, c’est-à-dire à la personne elle-même et non plus seulement ce qui lui<br />
appartient, le corps. Si le niveau de l’âme n’a pas pu apporter directement de solution aux problèmes<br />
d’identité rencontrés au niveau du corps, c’est que l’âme elle-même constitue problème. Comment<br />
concilier la variété ininterrompue des contenus de conscience décrite par Diotime et le maintien d’un<br />
soi de l’âme ? L’identité personnelle, introuvable au niveau du corps puisque le peu qui le lie à luimême<br />
est l’universel Eros, a-t-elle une meilleure chance de se réaliser, avec sa singularité essentielle,<br />
au niveau de l’âme ?<br />
En ce qui concerne l’identité aussi, l’âme est un intermédiaire entre le sensible et<br />
l’intelligible, mais un intermédiaire mobile, un intermédiaire intermédiant et non intermédiaire placé<br />
après-coup. Dans le discours de Diotime, rien n’oblige à poser l’âme comme mortelle dans sa totalité<br />
— en cela ce discours s’accorde avec le reste de l’œuvre de Platon — mais ce qui vit en elle peut être<br />
mortel et se renouveler à la manière des éléments du corps, ou bien, quand le dégré suprême de<br />
l’initiation érotique est atteint, coïncider avec l’immortalité de l’intelligible qu’elle contemple,<br />
autrement dit s’identifier à l’identité de l’intelligible. L’âme peut progresser vers l’identité absolue ou<br />
se laisser aller à une aliénation radicale, mais quoi qu’il arrive, quelque oubli de soi qui survienne,<br />
c’est toujours à elle-même que cela arrrive, en sorte que l’âme conserve toujours un minimum<br />
d’ipséité. La philosophie est un art de la reconquête de soi, mais à partir de soi. « Se soucier de soi »<br />
comme l’exige Socrate (par exemple en Cratyle 440c), c’est d’abord de soucier d’avoir vraiment un<br />
soi. Le souci est le geste même qui maintient le soi comme tel pour lui-même. L’âme dispose toujours<br />
de la faculté de s’inquiéter d’elle-même, et dès lors qu’elle en use elle se donne une nouvelle figure,<br />
ou plutôt revient à sa forme originelle. Mais cela n’implique aucun narcissisme. Si le philosophe<br />
aspire à être pleinement soi-même, c’est pour jouir pleinement du Beau qu’il aime, de même que le<br />
vivant cherche à s’immortaliser pour toujours posséder la belle chose qu’il aime. L’immortalité visée<br />
par l’amour lucide du philosophe ne soulève donc pas le problème des moyens disponibles pour<br />
réaliser une identité conçue comme permanence dans le temps ; au contraire, elle est d’emblée la<br />
solution de ce problème :<br />
N’est-ce pas, d’autre part, à celui qui enfante une réelle capacité d’exceller (aretè) et qui la<br />
nourrit, qu’il appartient de devenir cher à la divinité, et, s’il y a un homme capable de s’immortaliser,<br />
n’est-ce pas celui dont je parle qui en détiendra le privilège (Platon, Banquet, 212a) ?<br />
Ici, on peut certes se demander en qui la réelle capacité à exceller est enfantée. Est-ce dans la<br />
même âme celle qui contemple le beau, ce qui irait dans le sens de la République 9 où les rois, grâce à<br />
leur fréquentation des Formes en particulier du Bien, obtiennent une âme bien ordonnée et juste, ou<br />
bien s’agit-il de l’âme du disciple, sur le modèle de ce qui est dit dans le Phèdre, quand le maître<br />
produit dans son élève une capacité à argumenter de diverses manières, qui sera féconde à son tour.<br />
Mais, au fond, cette disjonction n’est peut-être pas pertinente. En effet, d’une part, il faut<br />
exceller soi-même pour transmettre l’excellence ; d’autre part l’excellence intellectuelle qui est<br />
transmise ne contribue pas l’immortalité du maître par sa démultiplication dans didivers sujets, mais<br />
pas le fait même qu’elle est transmise. C’est l’événement même du transmettre qui compte,<br />
événement où précisément la différence des deux excellences s’abolit. On peut donc supposer que la<br />
capacité à exceller en question est aussi celle du disciple, en sorte que immortalité du philosophe,<br />
dans un premier temps, ressemble à celle des vivants en général : il s’agit de mettre quelque chose de<br />
soi en l’autre qui nous survivra. Comme tous les amoureux, il enfante dans le beau ce qui prolongera<br />
sa possession du beau. Mais l’Idée étant parfaitement identique à elle-même sous tout rapport, les<br />
actes de contemplation, quel qu’en soit le sujet, sont en fait tous numériquement le même. Car l’Idée<br />
n’apparaît pas différemment selon le point de vue qu’on adopte pour la contempler, si bien que la<br />
notion même de point de vue, dans l’espace ou dans le temps, n’est plus pertinente. Quand le donc le<br />
disciple se met à penser effectivement, actualisant l’aretè que le maître a produit en lui par la semence<br />
9 Cf. Platon, République VII, 540b : « En contemplant le bien lui-même et en ayant recours à lui comme à un modèle, ils<br />
ordonneront la cité et les particuliers comme ils se sont ordonnés eux-mêmes. »<br />
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de sa parole vive, c’est en fait la pensée du maître qui se répète. Davantage, elle ne se répète que pour<br />
ceux qui sont les témoins extérieurs d’une telle contemplation sans contempler eux-même ; en vérité,<br />
du maître au disciple, la contemplation n’a pas cessé, étant coéternel à son objet. Le fait que le<br />
disciple contemple à son tour n’augmente pas la quantité d’immortalité qui échoit au maître car cette<br />
immortalité, par nature, est toujours déjà achevée dès qu’elle atteinte. En revanche, comme le dit<br />
l’Alcibiade, c’est en contemplant l’acte contemplatif du disciple que le maître peut prendre<br />
conscience de l’éternité qui traverse son propre intellect. C’est donc dans l’enseignement que le<br />
philosophe fait l’épreuve de l’éternité de sa propre pensée en tant qu’elle entre en contact avec<br />
l’éternité des Formes.<br />
Cette argument permet de trancher une question concernant le type de ressouvenir évoqué par<br />
Diotime en 208a : il ne s’agit pas de la réminiscence dialectique, car il est alors précisé que la<br />
nouvelle connaissance est certes semblable à l’ancienne, mais en fait numériquement autre. Il s’agit<br />
de la révision de connaissance acquise ex datis durant la vie incarnée. Il ne s’agit pas de vérités<br />
éternelles connues a priori à partir de principes innées. La connaissance de l’Idée, quant à elle, est<br />
toujours vraie et pleinement vraie dès qu’elle advient puisqu’elle est simple, et donc, comme il n’y a<br />
qu’une seule vérité de chaque chose, cette connaissance doit être toujours exactement la même quel<br />
que soit le moment où, pour le discours mondain qui la relate, adressé à d’autres hommes pris dans le<br />
monde, elle surgit. C’est autour d’une telle identité que se reconstitue l’identité supérieure du<br />
philosophe. Le soi de celui qui pense les Formes est tout entier pensant, et ce qu’il pense se tient tout<br />
entier à l’intérieur de lui, car saisissable par la seule réminiscence. Davantage, ce soi n’est-il pas le<br />
même pour toute conscience ? Ce soi n’a-t-il pas aboli la diversité de tous les moi, et donc l’identité<br />
personnelle en tant qu’elle est complémentaire d’une certaine altérité ? Comment peut-on encore être<br />
dit rester le même quand il n’y a plus rien d’autre vers quoi on pourrait aller pour trahir son identité ?<br />
Demeurer identique, n’est-ce pas d’abord continuer à être autre que les autres ? En vérité, en ce qui<br />
concerne l’âme en train d’intelliger, de l’altérité demeure, mais idéale : l’intellect pense diverses<br />
Formes, d’un seul coup. S’il faut dialectiser pour parvenir à l’intellection, il faut que l’intellection<br />
récapitule la multiplicité des Formes parmi lesquelles le dialecticien circule, à l’image de ce qui se<br />
pratique dans le Philèbe. Donc l’altérité n’est pas perdue mais elle est intériorisée par le Moi qui<br />
pense. La singularité du moi devient enfin ce qu’elle est : unique.<br />
L’immortalité du philosophe qui contemple le Beau en soi est donc différente de l’immortalité<br />
des autres âmes, sans que cela remette en cause l’immortalité de l’âme propre à tous les vivants et la<br />
différence entre l’éternité de l’intelligible et le sempiternité propre au mode d’être intermédiaire qui<br />
est échu à l’âme. Il s’agit d’une immortalité qui garantit l’identité au lieu de soulever le problème de<br />
l’identité comme permanence au cours du temps.<br />
Lorsque l’âme se met à intelliger, c’est-à-dire lorsqu’elle prend l’initiative de donner à son automouvement<br />
constitutif une orientation pour ainsi dire circulaire et parfaitement régulière, elle décide<br />
par elle-même de ne plus mettre son énergie au service d’une loi venant de l’extériorité corporelle. Le<br />
mouvement circulaire est par excellence le type de mouvement qu’elle doit choisir si enfin elle décide<br />
de choisir son mouvement au lieu d’abandonner sa direction au hasard, car il est le mouvement qui,<br />
faisant coïncider la fin et le commencement, exprime au mieux le fait que l’âme est un principe qui se<br />
meut soi-même jusque dans les différentes orientations qu’elle peut se donner. C’est ce mouvement<br />
qui signifie le mieux la nature de toute âme. Lorsqu’elle décide de penser, l’âme accède donc<br />
librement à l’autonomie quant à la nature de son mouvement et non plus seulement quant au fait de<br />
son mouvement. Ainsi l’âme respecte enfin concrètement pour tous les aspects de son activité la loi à<br />
laquelle elle a dû faire allegeance pour venir à l’être : tenir de soi-même ses propres déterminations.<br />
Plus rien d’elle n’échappe à l’auto-causalité qui la distingue dès l’origine de tous les autres êtres. Tout<br />
ce qui en elle sera désormais issu d’elle et par elle. C’est seulement ainsi que le soi qu’elle cause est<br />
son soi tout entier et donc mérite son nom de soi. Ces déterminations seront certes amenées à changer<br />
puisque l’âme est mouvement, mais toujours elles surgiront des déterminations antérieures selon un<br />
ordre qu’elle-même peut comprendre. L’âme en train de penser est donc en quelque sorte doublement<br />
elle-même. Elle ne se contente pas d’être, de fait, elle-même ; elle se pose en tant qu’elle-même, à ses<br />
propres yeux, dans l’espace de sa trajectoire et des figures générales qu’elle dessine. Elle se veut ellemême,<br />
s’elle s’aime elle-même en tant que principe agissant sur soi. Elle échappe à sa contradiction<br />
ordinaire, être cause de soi par hasard.<br />
B/ Connaissance du vrai, fidélité au serment et ipséité (thèse)<br />
Ce qui persiste, en matière de soi, au sein de ce mouvement ininterrompu de l’intellection, c’est,<br />
comme le suggère Paul Ricœur, l’intensité éthique d’un engagement, et non un substrat inerte ou un<br />
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ensemble de propriétés. L’identité personnelle du philosophe n’est donc pas un acquis mais une tâche<br />
de chaque instant, une fidélité toujours renouvelée au logos une première fois assumée. En revanche,<br />
pour le commun des mortels, l’identité de l’âme consiste seulement dans le désir — Eros — qui mène<br />
d’image en image 10 . Eros, au niveau du corps, produit d’autres corps ; au niveau de l’âme, il produit<br />
des affects successifs qui sont à eux-mêmes leurs propres sujets mais s’appellent les uns les autres à<br />
l’autres à l’infini. Cette série est liée dynamiquement par le désir, non pas un substrat statique<br />
commun se tenant en retrait. C’est l’élan érotique lui-même qui se soutient — l’âme est auto-motrice<br />
— et qui soutient continûment les diverses tonalités affectives qui peuvent le colorer. Certes, toute<br />
âme d’homme pense un tant soit peu, car toute âme d’homme a vu les Formes mais Eros produit le<br />
plus souvent une perte de soi dans l’extériorité. Seul l’amour de l’Idée reconnu comme tel peut<br />
maintenir une tension continue de soi vers soi. C’est l’attraction de l’Idée qui incurve le mouvement<br />
de l’âme pour en faire un cercle parfait, de même que, dans le système Newtonien, c’est l’attraction<br />
du soleil qui courbe le mouvement de certains corps célestes pour en faire ses satellites, les planètes.<br />
L’intellect n’est pas un sujet donné a priori qui endure une série d’expérience comme autant<br />
de modifications périphérique successives, mais il est l’attitude d’une âme qui s’efforce, au nom de<br />
son amour du Bien et du Beau, de demeurer à la hauteur de l’exigence qui lui a donné naissance.<br />
L’intellect est un geste, une danse, et il n’est un « organe », comme le dit parfois Platon dans la<br />
République, que par métaphore et commodité de langage. C’est, pour l’âme, une manière de se<br />
comporter à l’égard d’elle-même et, du même coup, c’est aussi une manière de se comporter à l’égard<br />
des Idées ; ce comportement investit finalement l’être de l’âme tout entier.<br />
Chez Platon, la reconnaissance du vrai a la valeur éthique du respect d’un serment où, à travers<br />
l’autre, c’est finalement surtout à soi-même que l’on est fidèle. Corrélativement, nier le vrai, c’est se<br />
trahir. La recherche a dialectique est ce qui va montrer cette trahison ou cette fidélité comme telles, et<br />
donc nous amener à nous amender.<br />
En effet, Platon choisit de faire de la recherche de ce que sont les choses en soi et par soi la<br />
forme première de toute piété 11 . S’abstenir de mensonge ne suffit pas à contenter les dieux ; il faut<br />
aussi investir toutes les forces humaines dans l’approfondissement de la vérité spéculative.<br />
Néanmoins, cela se traduit aussi nécessairement par une sincérité envers soi-même et une capacité à<br />
maintenir nos engagements initiaux : c’est le principe de l’ἔλεγχος socratique. Puisque mon âme<br />
possède une semence de vérité en raison de son séjour prénatal dans l’Hadès, et que toutes choses sont<br />
apparentées, je ne puis tenir une opinion erronée sans me contredire secrètement. Pour éviter l’erreur,<br />
je dois être fidèle au serment que m’impose la raison. Seul celui qui est parfaitement en accord avec<br />
soi-même peut dire en vérité ce qui est. Il y a une raison intérieure à l’adéquation de mon discours<br />
avec les objets extérieurs. Or cette semence de vérité en moi ne peut être que d’origine divine, voire<br />
une divinité en personne. Dire la vérité sur ce qui est, c’est donc ne pas négliger son âme en la laissant<br />
dans la contradiction et cela, à son tour, c’est ne pas léser le dieu qui est en nous, l’intellect. Prendre<br />
soin de la partie de notre âme capable de penser porte tous les cultes extérieurs à leur perfection, voire<br />
les remplace avantageusement pour ce qui est de la familiarité avec le divin :<br />
En ce qui concerne l’espèce d’âme [l’intellect] qui en nous domine, il faut se faire l’idée que voici. En<br />
fait, un dieu a donné à chacun de nous, comme démon, cette espèce d’âme-là dont nous disons — ce<br />
qui est parfaitement exact — qu’elle habite la partie supérieure de notre corps, et qu’elle nous élève<br />
au-dessus de la terre vers ce qui, dans le ciel, nous est apparenté. [...] L’homme qui a mis tout son zèle<br />
à acquérir la connaissance et à obtenir des pensées vraies, celui qui a exercé surtout cette partie de luimême,<br />
il est absolument nécessaire, je suppose, qu’il ait des pensées immortelles et divines, si<br />
précisément il a atteint à la vérité ; que, dans la mesure, encore une fois, où la nature humaine est<br />
capable d’avoir part à l’immortalité, il ne lui en échappe pas la moindre parcelle ; enfin que, puisqu’il<br />
ne cesse de prendre soin de son élément divin et qu’il maintient en bonne forme le démon qui en lui<br />
partage sa demeure, il soit supérieurement heureux 12 .<br />
Inversement, l’absence de vérité spéculative, cause de toute immoralité — nul n’est méchant<br />
volontairement —, détruit positivement l’âme, la privant des béatitudes parmi les dieux promises aux<br />
initiés de la philosophie :<br />
10 Cf. Leibniz, Lettre à la reine Anne-Sophie Charlotte : « Car, comme le mouvement mène la matière de figure en figure,<br />
l’appétit mène l’âme d’image en image. »<br />
11 Cf. Alexis Pinchard, Les langues de sagesse dans la Grèce et l’Inde anciennes, Genève, 2009, p. 160 et suivantes.<br />
12 Platon, Timée, 90a-c. Plus généralement, sur les devoirs sacrés de l’homme envers son âme comme envers ce qu’il y a de<br />
plus divin en lui, cf. Lois V, 726a-728c.<br />
65
Alexis Pinchard<br />
Donc, quand les morts se présentent devant leur juge, quant ceux d’Asie, par exemple, vont auprès de<br />
Rhadamante, Rhadamante les arrête et il sonde l’âme de chacun, sans savoir à qui cette âme<br />
appartient ; mais il arrive souvent qu’il tombe sur l’âme du Grand Roi ou encore sur n’importe quel<br />
autre roi ou chef, et qu’il considère qu’il n’y a rien de sain en cette âme, qu’elle est lacérée, ulcérée,<br />
pleine de tous les parjures ou injustices que chaque action de sa vie a imprimés en elle, que tous ces<br />
fragments ont été nourris de mensonges, de vanité, que rien n’est droit en cette âme, parce qu’elle ne<br />
s’est jamais nourrie de la moindre vérité. [...] Dès qu’il voit cette âme privée de toute dignité, il<br />
l’envoie aussitôt dans la prison du Tartare, où elle est destinée à endurer tous les maux qu’elle<br />
mérite 13 .<br />
Prendre soin de l’élément divin de l’âme et l’honorer, ce n’est pas flatter la vanité de l’individu. Au<br />
contraire, c’est se purifier incessamment pour dégager ce qu’il y a de vraiment immortel en nous,<br />
l’intellect. C’est une ascèse toujours à renouveler. Dans cet effort le soi authentique se constitue, et il<br />
ne se constitue qu’en reconnaissant une norme qui le précède, à savoir l’Idée. Chez Platon, la sincérité<br />
authentique mène finalement à des vérités objectives car notre âme est constituée par les linéaments<br />
de ces vérités. Le souci de soi est un chemin de connaissance vers ce qui est antérieur à soi.<br />
13 Platon, Gorgias, 525a.<br />
66
Reading the <strong>Symposium</strong>: Text and Reception<br />
Chair: Antonio Carlini
Stylistic Difference in the Speeches of the <strong>Symposium</strong><br />
Harold Tarrant (collaborating with Marguerite Johnson)<br />
It is now widely acknowledged that literary form is a crucial ingredient of the Platonic dialogue, and<br />
one that affects how the reader should be interpreting the work. Hand in hand with form goes the<br />
correspondingly important ingredient of diction. While Plato does not usually introduce obvious and<br />
significant changes in diction, he is certainly capable of changing it in accordance with specific<br />
requirements, as Tarrant, Benitez, and Roberts demonstrate in relation to the Timaeus-Critias and the<br />
language of myth (Ancient Philosophy, 31, 2011, 95-120). Their methods, borrowed in part from the<br />
University of Newcastle’s Centre for Literary and Linguistic Computing, focus on the mix of<br />
recurrent vocabulary and in particular on the words that tend to be used in any similar text regardless<br />
of the subject matter, generally 80 to 100 words in the commonest 200 in any set of texts.<br />
When Plato offers a variety of speeches within a work, especially speeches delivered by<br />
different characters or deriving (as in the Phaedrus) from different sources of inspiration, he<br />
demonstrates himself well able to switch between types of diction, probably involving what should be<br />
thought of linguistically as changes of ‘register’. Of course, the Greeks had no word equivalent to this<br />
term, though the metrical changes that occur in tragedy and comedy guarantee their sensitivity to<br />
different types of speech, types that will be employed by an individual only where the situation<br />
warrants. Furthermore, the development of rhetorical theory resulted in a technical vocabulary for<br />
types of rhetorical speech that applied to one situation rather than another. Accordingly Plato too is<br />
prepared on occasion to use the terminology of, for instance, epideixis and protreptic, and must have<br />
had a grasp of their usual stylistic requirements.<br />
The <strong>Symposium</strong>, with its rich cast and with speeches that are usually considered to contrast<br />
with one another, is a natural place to expect to see Plato distinguishing between different types of<br />
speech—not simply between short question-and-answer exchanges and long set speeches, and not<br />
simply between the types of characters being sketched, but between different types of diction that the<br />
Greek reader of c. 380 BCE would be instinctively have been aware. There are two poets, but are they<br />
actually speaking with a recognisably poetic diction? There is a medical man, but is his language<br />
noticeably scientific? And what of the language of the literary enthusiastic ‘Phaedrus’, or of<br />
‘Pausanias’ who is often thought to have sophistic connections? As for the language of Alcibiades, it<br />
does not seem to reflect his drunkenness, but is it or is it not distinctive? Finally there is the language<br />
associated with Diotima. Does she speak like a woman, and if so does she speak particularly like a<br />
prophetess? And is ALL this language especially suited to sympotic contexts, informal occasions<br />
designed to serve the reunion of friends and to smooth out any recent wounds?<br />
This paper began with an observation that resulted in a joint Johnson-and-Tarrant article,<br />
which is (hopefully) soon to appear. 1 The commentary of Olympiodorus had branded the central<br />
section of the Alcibiades I ‘protreptic’, and a test of various chosen materials was run to ascertain<br />
whether there was indeed a recognisable ‘protreptic register’ in Plato. They included the two works in<br />
which the notion of protreptic discourse appeared, the Euthydemus (with its protreptic interludes<br />
considered in isolation) and the Clitophon, where ‘Clitophon’ complains that Socrates’ discourse<br />
serves only a protreptic purpose. Chart 1 offers diagrammatically the resultant cluster analysis:<br />
1 ‘Fairytales and Make-believe, or Spinning Stories about Poros and Penia in Plato's <strong>Symposium</strong>: A Literary and<br />
Computational Analysis’, Phoenix forthcoming.
Harold Tarrant<br />
70<br />
Chart 1: Cluster analysis of selected Socratic texts<br />
Olympiodorus’ ‘protreptic’ section of the Alcibiades I (119a-124b: = Alc1Protr, far left), in which<br />
Socrates, offering concerned guidance of an almost parental character, makes excellent use of the<br />
things that queens of Persia and Sparta might say about Alcibiades, is placed closest to both blocks<br />
into which the program had split the Menexenus and to <strong>Symposium</strong> 201d-212b. The role of women in<br />
all four blocks suggests that there may be some common linguistic feature that affects how Socrates<br />
speaks when trying to think like Aspasia, Diotima, and Amestris or Lampido. The only other four<br />
blocks that are closely linked with these linguistically are the spurious Axiochus in which Socrates<br />
urges Axiochus to face death bravely, the palinode of the Phaedrus (in two parts) and the myth of<br />
Protagoras. Do they too offer some kind of quasi-parental voice, perhaps, or is there some overlap<br />
between the language of myth and female language? Diotima is of course herself a myth-teller, and as<br />
we show the tale of Poros and Penia is linguistically more extreme than most myths.<br />
This suggestion of a link between the voices of women and of story-tellers may be of wide<br />
relevance to the <strong>Symposium</strong>. To many of Socrates’ contemporaries, notably Thrasymachus (Rep.<br />
350e2-4) and Callicles (Grg. 527a5-8), little was thought as unreliable as a story coming from a<br />
mature woman. Even taken alone, neither story nor female voice is ordinarily a source of authority for<br />
an Athenian, and either could readily be dismissed. But much the same could be set of ‘sympotic<br />
literature’ altogether. No speaker at this symposium or at the one presented by Xenophon commands<br />
great authority, for that is not what is expected of a contribution towards sympotic entertainment. And<br />
further, the proem’s account of the tale’s oral history (172a1-173b8) and Aristodemus’ documented<br />
lapses of attention (180c1-2, 223b8-c1), are enough to undermine any confidence the hearer has in the<br />
accuracy of the narrative on offer. Plato is not forcing beliefs on us here; his speakers compete in<br />
offering worthy praise of the god Eros (177c2-7, 197e5-7), not in offering anything reliable (198c5e4).<br />
He invites us to relax and enjoy an entertainment, which may well conceal truth upon reflection,<br />
but seldom masquerades as literal truth.<br />
Even the comments made upon the diction are such as to reinforce our sense of incredulity,<br />
beginning with Apollodorus’ assertion that the wise teach him to use cheap jingles (185c4-5),<br />
continuing with Aristophanes’ determination to deliver a laughable speech (189b4-7), proceeding on<br />
to Socrates’ affirmation about the refined Agathon speaking like the haughty Gorgias (198c1-2), and<br />
finally to the enigmatic suggestion that Diotima, approaching the climax of her speech (208c1), spoke<br />
‘like the ultimate sophists’. One never knows what, if anything, to take seriously for it seems that<br />
Plato spends the whole dialogue being coy, and hiding his jewels well beneath the surface. 2<br />
Even so, it could be argued that the very language used in some speeches invites us to<br />
2 Cf. Alcibiades on Socrates, 216e.
Harold Tarrant<br />
contemplate the possibility of a serious message, while that used by others does not. Certainly we are<br />
unlikely to listen seriously to anything resembling the speech of Lysias in the Phaedrus, and we do in<br />
fact have a speech in the <strong>Symposium</strong> that the computer recognises as closely resembling it. That<br />
speech is of course the speech given by Lysias’ great admirer Phaedrus. We divided the <strong>Symposium</strong><br />
according to speeches, plus a file for the introduction preceding the speeches, and another for<br />
additional frame-material, while dividing the Phaedrus into:<br />
Phdr.A: what precedes the speech of Lysias<br />
Phdr.S1: the speech of Lysias<br />
Phdr.B: what follows Lysias and precedes Socrates’ first speech<br />
Phdr.S2: Socrates’ first speech<br />
Phdr.C: what follows his first speech and precedes the Palinode<br />
PalinodeA: to 247c2<br />
PalinodeB: 247c3-253c6<br />
PalinodeC: 253c7 on<br />
Phdr.D (1-3): what follows the palinode, words 1-2000, 2001-4000, 4001 on.<br />
To these materials were added the Phaedo divided into 2000-word blocks; Republic IV, VII, and X<br />
similarly divided (except that the Myth of Er was kept separate); a composite file consisting of all<br />
Gorgias’ contributions to the Gorgias of around three lines or more; the final myth in the Gorgias. The<br />
computer easily isolates and links together the files consisting of Gorgias’ speeches, Lysias’ speech,<br />
and Phaedrus’ speech in the <strong>Symposium</strong> (chart 2):<br />
Chart 2: Cluster analysis of parts of middle-period dialogues<br />
Most files that we should expect to display the features of everyday conversational language are<br />
placed in cluster 3 (centre, blue) or 4 (right, yellow), both in the right-hand arm of the chart. Here are<br />
placed all blocks of Phaedo except for the two last blocks (106b7-111e5, 111e5-end), all blocks of<br />
Republic iv, vii and x except the Myth of Er and the Cave-block (514a1-520d3), all non-speech<br />
Phaedrus; and the introduction and frame of <strong>Symposium</strong> plus Alcibiades’ speech. The three rhetorical<br />
files (cluster 1, left, red) are kept together, 3 separate from, but distantly related to files in which Plato<br />
appears to use other kinds of non-conversational language, usually myth-like or poetic: the myth of<br />
judgment in Gorgias, the Myth of Er, the account of the True Earth in Phaedo, the Cave-block of Rep.<br />
514-520, both of Socrates’ speeches in Phaedrus—the first poetic, the second poetic and sometimes<br />
myth-like, and all speeches in <strong>Symposium</strong> other than the shallow rhetorical exercise of Phaedrus and<br />
the speech of Alcibiades. This latter, though a monologue, closely resembles the narrative<br />
introduction and frame of <strong>Symposium</strong>.<br />
What do all the main speeches other than those of Phaedrus and Alcibiades share in common?<br />
3 Subsequent analysis used files reflecting the real language of Gorgias (Helen, Epitaphios), Lysias (c.Erat.), and Isocrates<br />
(c.Soph.); the speech of Lysias and Phaedrus’ speech proved closer to Lysias and Isocrates than to Gorgias.<br />
71
Harold Tarrant<br />
Neoplatonists would have regarded them all as examples of a style that is to some degree ‘rich’ or<br />
‘weighty’ (ἁδρὸς), as opposed to ‘lean’ (ἰσχνὸς). The speech of Lysias is a paradigm case of a speech<br />
in the lean style (Hermias in Phdr. 10.16, 206.22; cf. in Prm. 633.10), but Socrates’ familiar<br />
conversational style is likewise lean (in Tim. I.64.5-11, cf. anon. Proleg. 17.12-13). However,<br />
Socrates uses a weightier style in both his speeches in Phdr. (Hermias, in Phdr. 206.17-26; cf. 10.14-<br />
18; anon. at Proc. in Prm. 633.10). This style was considered suited to those experiencing divine<br />
possession (in Prm. 645.30-31), to divine addresses (in Tim. III.199.29-200.19), to myths like that of<br />
the Gorgias (anon. Proleg. 17.13-15) and other theological material (ibid. 3-4), to divinely inspired<br />
poetry (Proc. in Prm. 646.23-25), and other inspired speech such as the Nuptial Number passage and<br />
the Myth of Er in the Republic (Proc. in Tim. III.200.3-10), and to oracles (in Tim. I.64.16-17). These<br />
passages repeatedly speak of the weightier language being tailored to reflect the weightier nature of<br />
the subject matter. Hence there is a presumption that wherever Plato breaks into this richer language<br />
his characters will be trying to suggest the great weight of their subject matter. Given that all formal<br />
speeches in the <strong>Symposium</strong> are ‘encomia’, it is no surprise that Proclus tells us that a worthy<br />
encomium requires a delivery that is rich, solemn and grand (in Tim. I.62.8-9). These encomia tailor<br />
their language to subject matter concerned with a divine, or at least daemonic, being. If the speech is<br />
to praise their subject in a worthy fashion, then it must be rich, solemn and grand.<br />
But does Phaedrus’ speech not count as an encomium? Perhaps, but Lysian simplicity has got<br />
the better of him. And is Agathon’s speech really to be taken seriously? In this case Proclus (in Tim.<br />
I.6413-23) seems to have an answer. Dividing composition into ‘inspired’ and ‘technical’, he argues<br />
that the attempt to substitute artificial technique for higher inspiration produces a contrived and<br />
bombastic result. Agathon’s speech begins by offering guidelines for correct encomia (194e4-195a5),<br />
and Socrates’ response subtly mocks Agathon’s techniques (198c5-199a3). The solemnity of his<br />
speech is artificial, hence Socrates will ultimately compare its ending with the bombastic prose of<br />
Gorgias.<br />
As for Phaedrus’ speech, one needs to separate out the elements that contribute to its being<br />
attributed to the rhetorical cluster. Principal component analysis has the advantage of detecting groups<br />
of words that combine to influence the linguistic mix of several blocks. The first principal component<br />
detects the most obvious of these combinations, the second the second most obvious, and so on.<br />
Phaedrus’ speech (+6.32), the Gorgias-file (+7.07), and the speech of Lysias (+10.86) are placed<br />
together at the top of the second principal component, indicating that they share a combination of<br />
characteristics. However, the difference between speech that is weighty and that which is lean seems<br />
to be precisely what is captured by the first principal component. Here are all the scores at the lowest<br />
(negative) end of the scale:<br />
72<br />
Block name Score, PC1 Category Remark<br />
palinodeC (1) -9.35037 Myth Also poetic<br />
MythER (1) -7.13451 Myth<br />
palinodeB (1) -7.09177 Myth Also poetic<br />
palinodeA (1) -4.07255 Inspired Also poetic<br />
Phdr.S2 (1) -4.06727 Inspired Also poetic<br />
GrgMyth (1) -3.63663 Myth<br />
SympAr (1) -3.45248 Myth Also poetic<br />
SympAg (1) -3.44254 Encomium Also poetic<br />
SympEry (1) -2.94973 Encomium<br />
Phaedo (11) -2.2353 Part-myth Swansong 111e-118a<br />
Phaedo (10) -1.84489 Part-myth Swansong 106b-111e<br />
SympPhdr (1) -1.69257 Encomium Rhetorical<br />
SympPau (1) -1.24534 Encomium<br />
SympDi (1) -1.21953 ‘Encomium’ Part-conversational<br />
Rep7 (4) -0.83935 Cave explained 533a-541b<br />
Rep7 (1) -0.62754 Cave described 514a-520d<br />
Phaedo (5) -0.61465 Myth-like 79b-84d<br />
Table 1: Results of less than –0.5 on first principal component
Harold Tarrant<br />
Obviously the pervasive presence of either myth or a poetic style is important in accounting for these<br />
negative scores, and accordingly the speech of Aristophanes is the highest-scoring part of the<br />
<strong>Symposium</strong>, followed by Agathon and Eyximachus, with Phaedrus coming next. Recall that all these<br />
speeches are encomia of a kind, though the Diotima contribution is a highly unusual and somewhat<br />
conversational kind (199a6-b7).<br />
What do these results mean for an ancient reader? As encomia of a quasi-divine being that is<br />
manifested in human action, they a partly protreptic function, designed to encourage supposedly<br />
ethical behaviour. The anonymous Prolegomena takes a blended style, neither wholly weighty not<br />
wholly lean, as a characteristic of moral discussions (17.15-18), and the speeches of Phaedrus and<br />
Pausanias would perhaps have struck the listener as ‘blended’, and hence as having something serious<br />
to offer if the elevated style did not seem contrived, as that of Phaedrus would perhaps have done.<br />
Pausanias’ speech was certainly agreed by the Platonist Taurus and Aulus Gellius (NA 17.20.6) to<br />
require one to penetrate beyond the dressing of rhetoric to the weighty and majestic depths of Plato’s<br />
subject matter. Rather weightier (to judge from PC1) was the tone of Eryximachus, marginally less<br />
weighty than Aristophanes’ foundation-myth of human erotic behaviour and Agathon’s technically<br />
contrived poetic encomium. Through the admixture of features of the ἁδρὸς-style Plato ensures that<br />
his audience sits up in expectation of hearing something with substantial content, and the tendency is<br />
for this admixture to increase, from Phaedrus (who by his resemblance to ‘Lysias’ must have been<br />
seen to display features of the opposite style as well) and Pausanias, to Eryximachus, Aristophanes,<br />
and Agathon—who is quickly exposed as a fraud by Socrates. The specious beauty of Agathon’s<br />
effort is in effect replaced by the deeper beauty associated with Diotima, who will make use of the<br />
ἁδρὸς-style in certain passages, most notably the myth of Poros and Penia and the Ladder of Love<br />
passage, but remains in conversational-mode elsewhere.<br />
In the following chart, which was not atypical, we found that the Poros and Penia passage<br />
most resembled the latter part of the Palinode, 4 and the Ladder of Love the earlier part. The special<br />
diction of the Diotima passage is thus like nothing more than that of the inspired poet, whether<br />
mythical or not so mythical. The remainder of it most resembled the introductory narratives of the<br />
Euthydemus and the <strong>Symposium</strong> itself (Chart 3):<br />
Table 3: Diotima’s speech split<br />
The versatility of Diotima’s diction was thus both striking and confusing, and stands in contrast to the<br />
more homogeneous contributions of other speakers. The listeners are left perplexed (212c4-6), no<br />
doubt unwilling to share Socrates’ readiness to believe this strange lady, and happy to be diverted by<br />
4 Rather than the threefold division used earlier in this paper, earlier work had simply split the Palinode into two files, with a<br />
break after the first 2000 words (250a6).<br />
73
Harold Tarrant<br />
the arrival of Aristophanes.<br />
Some Possible Conclusions:<br />
• Varieties of diction in the <strong>Symposium</strong> are intended to be noticed by Plato’s audience; they are<br />
used partly as a means of controlling our expectations, and, where these prove false, of increasing our<br />
perplexity;<br />
• Diotima’s diction, perhaps recognizably female, varied, and ultimately weighty, creates an<br />
atmosphere designed to challenge our expectations of a female voice;<br />
• Phaedrus’ diction is modelled on that of the orators on whom he doted, and undermines any<br />
seriousness behind the speech;<br />
• Intermediate speeches are seemingly all examples of a type of speech associated by later<br />
Platonists with a serious message and elevated subject matter;<br />
• Agathon’s speech seems intended to sound technical rather than inspired, and so the<br />
audience’s confidence is ready to be undermined by Socrates’ challenge;<br />
• Aristophanes’ speech is the one that most resembles myth, and hence is the most likely of the<br />
early speeches to conceal a weightier message below the surface;<br />
• There is little in either the text or the stylistic results to discourage the idea of a general<br />
increase in depth from Phaedrus to Diotima that nevertheless bypasses Agathon.<br />
• There is little difference in level of ‘richness’ or ‘weightiness’ between the speeches of<br />
Eryximachus and Aristophanes, and combined with the hiccough device that has the two speak out of<br />
order, there is once again an ambiguity that encourages one to ponder which is the proper order of<br />
speeches.<br />
74
Lettori antichi di Platone: il caso del Simposio (POxy 843)<br />
Margherita Erbì<br />
“Contaminazione, diffusione trasversale, o orizzontale di lezioni vi fu di certo, ma essa appartiene già<br />
al periodo antico della storia del testo, non soltanto alla tradizione medievale”.<br />
In sintesi questo è, per usare le parole di Giorgio Pasquali, il contributo dato alla ricostruzione<br />
della storia del testo di Platone dai papiri. La tradizione papiracea, infatti, prova che i codici bizantini<br />
continuano, almeno in parte, vari esemplari antichi risalenti ad edizioni antiche, forse già prealessandrine<br />
1 . Dunque per Pasquali tutt’altro che marginale è stato nella ricostruzione delle fasi più<br />
antiche della storia del testo di Platone il ruolo avuto dalla tradizione papiracea, che negli anni in cui<br />
veniva alla luce la Storia della tradizione e critica del testo, consisteva in soli 23 esemplari, quelli cioè<br />
registrati nei noti elenchi di Oldfather 2 . Da allora nuove acquisizioni hanno incrementato il numero<br />
dei papiri che conservano i dialoghi: 82 sono i papiri editi nel 1999 nel Corpus dei Papiri Filosofici.<br />
96 sono i papiri che oggi compaiono nel MartensPack3 on line, il Database del Centre de<br />
Documentation de Papyrologie Littéraire aggiornato a maggio 2013. Questi i papiri secondo le<br />
tetralogie: 1 con l’Eutifrone, 1 con l’Apologia, 1 con il Critone, 10 con il Fedone, 2 con il Cratilo, 4<br />
con il Teeteto, 1 con il Sofista, 7 con il Politico, 2 con il Parmenide, 2 con il Filebo, 1 con il Simposio,<br />
7 con il Fedro, 3 con l’Alcibiade I, 2 con l’Alcibiade II, 1 con i Rivali, 1 con il Teage, 2 con il<br />
Carmide, 5 con il Lachete, 1 con il Liside, 2 con l’Eutidemo, 1 con il Protagora, 5 con il Gorgia, 2 con<br />
il Menone, 1 con l’Ippia Maggiore, 13 con la Repubblica, 1 con il Timeo, 1 con il Minosse, 9 con le<br />
Leggi, 1 con l’Epistola II, 1 con l’Epistola VII. A questi si aggiungono 5 papiri che conservano<br />
Commentari ai dialoghi: 1 al Fedone, 1 al Teeteto, 1 al Politico, 1 al Fedro e 1 all’Alcibiade I. I più<br />
antichi di questi papiri risalgono al III secolo a.C.: PPetr I 5-8 che conserva il Fedone, PPetr I 50 con<br />
il Lachete e PHib 2.228 che conserva il frammento del Sofista, ma anche PLG Carlini 29+P.Monac<br />
2.21 che restituiscono il commento filosofico al testo del Fedone. Il papiro più recente, PAnt 2.68, un<br />
papiro con il Teeteto, è datato al V-VI d.C. Il gruppo più consistente è costituito dagli 81 papiri di età<br />
imperiale, datati tra il II e III secolo d.C.: si tratta dunque della gran parte dei papiri di Platone a noi<br />
noti, il confronto dei quali con la tradizione medievale si è rivelato, come ha dimostrato Antonio<br />
Carlini 3 , assai fruttuoso. Incolmabile è almeno fino a oggi, purtroppo, il vuoto dal III secolo a.C. al II<br />
secolo d.C.<br />
È ben comprensibile come un così significativo numero di papiri che appartengono a epoche tanto<br />
diverse tra loro non potesse che indurre la critica a interrogarsi sulla storia più antica del testo e sui<br />
diversi stati attraverso i quali le opere di Platone dall’antichità sono giunte a noi. I papiri più antichi,<br />
quelli di epoca tolemaica, presentano un testo spesso divergente da quello dei codici, talvolta<br />
rivelandosi superiore ai codici, talvolta presentando corruttele e varianti inferiori. Le convergenze con<br />
la tradizione medievale confermano per lo più l’antichità di lezioni prima attestate da singoli codici o<br />
da famiglie di codici e suggeriscono che il numero delle varianti esistenti già un secolo dopo la morte<br />
di Platone doveva essere piuttosto ampio. I papiri platonici di età imperiale presentano un testo molto<br />
più uniforme con un numero di varianti ridotto rispetto alla tradizione medievale: poche sono le<br />
varianti notevoli, per lo più i papiri confermano le lezioni dei codici. Una situazione che si spiega,<br />
ricorrendo, pur con la necessaria cautela, all’ipotesi di un’edizione autorevole che abbia imposto una<br />
sua autorità sulle altre. Un’edizione alla quale risalirebbero, in ultima analisi, sia i codici, sia i papiri<br />
di età imperiale nonché i testimoni medievali. Dunque i papiri, al di là della bontà della tradizione che<br />
testimoniano, consentono, in molti casi, il recupero di correnti testuali, magari secondarie, ma pur<br />
sempre presenti nell’antichità. Per tutto ciò si rivelano assai importanti per la storia del testo di<br />
Platone, in particolare per ripercorrere i diversi stadi del testo. Ma non c’è dubbio che i papiri offrano<br />
anche indizi utili per ricostruire la fruizione del testo di Platone nell’antichità. In proposito è ben noto<br />
che per Platone i papiri provano soprattutto una fruizione alta: si tratta infatti nella stragrande<br />
maggioranza dei casi di rotoli realizzati per studiosi. Dunque, il numero dei papiri prova una buona<br />
diffusione, la tipologia dei rotoli prova la fruizione alta.<br />
Dei 96 papiri di Platone giunti a noi solo il POxy 843 conserva il testo del Simposio. Dunque<br />
un unico papiro, ma un papiro che, come vedremo, molti dati offre sul suo allestimento e sulla sua<br />
1 Pasquali G., Storia della tradizione e critica del testo, Firenze 1952 2 .<br />
2 Oldfather C.H., Greek Literary texts from Graeco-Roman Egypt, Madison 1923.<br />
3 Carlini A., Studi sulla tradizione antica e medievale del Fedone, Roma 1972.
Margherita Erbì<br />
destinazione. Si tratta del più esteso papiro che conserva un testo di Platone, uno dei rotoli letterari<br />
meglio conservati. Rinvenuto ad Ossirinco durante V la campagna di scavo nel 1905-1906 e datato su<br />
base paleografica tra il II e III secolo d.C., è edito per la prima volta nel 1908 da Grenfell e Hunt nel<br />
V volume degli Oxyrhynchus Papyri: è di Fabio Vendruscolo l’edizione del testo pubblicata nel 1999<br />
nel Corpus dei Papiri Filosofici.<br />
Le caratteristiche fisiche del volumen ne provano l’ottima qualità, la mise en page è indice<br />
della cura redazionale, gli interventi del diorthotes documentano un sistematico impegno sul testo.<br />
Il volumen alto 31,1 cm è conservato in lunghezza per 2,50 m. Le 31 colonne ricostruibili<br />
corrispondono a poco meno della seconda metà del dialogo: pertanto il rotolo con l’intera opera<br />
doveva originariamente avere una lunghezza di circa 7 m. e contenere in totale 65/70 colonne.<br />
Sostanzialmente ben leggibili sono 25 colonne di scrittura: della I colonna si leggono solo poche<br />
lettere, consistente è la lacuna che si estende per ben 5 colonne dalla XVIII alla XXIII. Dalla colonna<br />
II all’inizio della colonna XVIII è conservata la parte di testo che corrisponde a 201a1 – 213e3<br />
Stephanus. Dalla colonna XXIII fino alla fine del rotolo è conservato il testo che corrisponde a 213e4-<br />
217b1 Stephanus. Dunque il papiro restituisce, pur solo in parte, le ultime 16 pagine Stephanus del<br />
dialogo: le ultime battute dello scambio tra Socrate e Agatone e parte del discorso di Diotima riferito<br />
da Socrate, l’ingresso di Alcibiade, l’elogio di Socrate e le battute finali.<br />
Ben leggibile è il colofone con il nome dell’autore e il titolo dell’opera, Πλάτωνος Συµπόσιον<br />
vergato nella colonna finale sotto le ultime righe di scrittura.<br />
Il nostro testo soddisfa tutte le sei caratteristiche che, secondo Turner 4 , contraddistinguono i<br />
libri di Ossirinco destinati ad una fruizione dotta: una bella grafia, l’uso del solo recto, la correttezza<br />
ortografica dello scriba, la presenza di punteggiatura e segni critici, le tracce dell’intervento di un<br />
revisore, l’aggiunta di note marginali. Il testo è vergato sul recto con una grafia verticale, angolosa e<br />
regolare: il modulo è piccolo e tendenzialmente quadrato. Il tratto è caratterizzato da irregolari<br />
contrasti di spessore. Il verso è bianco. L’allineamento a destra dei righi è rispettato: realizzato sia con<br />
il restringimento delle lettere sia con l’impiego del segno di riempimento angolato (>). Il ν in fine rigo<br />
è spesso sostituito da un trattino soprascritto: si tratta dell’unica forma di abbreviazione presente nel<br />
testo. Abbastanza regolare è l’uso dei segni di interpunzione: stigmai e paragraphoi segnalano pause<br />
più o meno forti, i doppi punti sono utilizzati, anche se non esclusivamente, per indicare, come d’uso,<br />
il cambio di battuta. I passaggi più significativi della struttura del dialogo, spesso evidenziati anche<br />
dai codici medievali, sono marcati dalla diple obelismene o dalla paragraphos più grande combinata<br />
con la coronide. La diple obelismene si trova due volte: a 201d1 in corrispondenza del punto in cui<br />
Socrate introduce il discorso di Diotima, dopo ἐάσω, e a 210a5 nel punto in cui Diotima inizia Socrate<br />
agli ἐρωτικά. Le coronidi segnano invece la fine del discorso di Socrate a 212c4 la fine del discorso di<br />
Alcibiade, 222c1 e la fine dell’intero componimento. Il testo, come abbiamo ricordato, è abbastanza<br />
corretto dal punto di vista ortografico.<br />
L’apporto del papiro alla costituzione del testo è positivo: il papiro conferma per lo più il testo<br />
tradito di fronte a molti interventi non necessari. Benché alcune novità rispetto ai codici primari che<br />
sanano guasti già emendati dai bizantini o dai moderni, o comunque già rilevati, non siano da<br />
trascurare, nella grande maggioranza dei casi le varianti appaiono tendenzialmente inferiori o<br />
equivalenti al testo medievale. Pochi sono, ma comunque assi utili per la costituzione del testo sono i<br />
casi nei quali le varianti risultano autentiche e pertanto preferibili al testo della tradizione medievale.<br />
Il nostro papiro è l’unico testimone che conserva a r. 1180 la preziosa lezione εἴσω ἄντικρυς con il<br />
significato “direttamente dentro” al posto di εἰς τὸ ἄντικρυς di 223b4, presente nella maggior parte dei<br />
codici, interpretato come equivalente al semplice ἄντικρυς “direttamente” e accolto da gran parte<br />
degli editori. L’uso di ἄντικρυς con articolo e preposizione non ha paralleli né spiegazione. È invece<br />
attestato con καταντικρύ “di fronte”: forse proprio all’influsso di καταντικρύ è da ricondurre l’origine<br />
dell’errore e quindi la sequenza εἰς τὸ ἄντικρυς. εἴσω ἄντικρυς descrive certo meglio dell’inusuale<br />
sequenza εἰς τὸ ἄντικρυς l’irrompere improvviso della folla di gaudenti nel simposio, alla fine del<br />
dialogo, nel momento in cui Agatone si accinge a sdraiarsi accanto a Socrate.<br />
Molti sono gli errori presenti nel papiro ma estranei alla tradizione medievale: si tratta per lo<br />
più di banalizzazioni emendate dall’intervento del diorthotes. Poche sono invece le varianti di cui non<br />
è facile ipotizzare l’origine. Non privo di significato per la storia del testo è inoltre l’accordo, se pure<br />
occasionale, in lezioni erronee o peculiari fra il nostro papiro e altri testimoni di età imperiale contro i<br />
codici. L’assenza poi di significativi casi di convergenza in errore con i codici primari suggerisce di<br />
collocare il testo del nostro papiro prima di una fase di selezione attraverso la quale è passata la<br />
tradizione di Platone giunta a noi. Le numerose coincidenze in errore tra il papiro e le singole famiglie<br />
4 Turner E.G., Greek Papyri. An Introduction, Oxford 1980 2 .<br />
76
Margherita Erbì<br />
o parti della tradizione non sono particolarmente significative: per lo più sono spiegabili come esito di<br />
una comune tendenza alla banalizzazione. Non sfugge tuttavia che dietro i pochi sicuri errori sia<br />
possibile scorgere un’unità testuale di fondo tra il nostro testimone e i codici medievali. Un’unità che,<br />
si può forse ricondurre, se pure con cautela, alle fasi più remote della trasmissione del testo di Platone,<br />
forse addirittura all’edizione che sarebbe stata allestita all’interno dell’Accademia. Nei casi in cui i<br />
codici divergono il nostro papiro conferma di norma la lezione buona di due delle tre famiglie. Per<br />
questo il papiro si rivela decisivo per dirimere i molti casi in cui nella tradizione medievale si<br />
contrappongono due lezioni adiafore.<br />
Ma non c’è dubbio che l’importanza del papiro è accresciuta dall’accurato intervento del diorthotes.<br />
La grafia del diorthotes, con asse lievemente inclinato a destra, può essere ritenuta coeva a quella<br />
dello scriba: pertanto in relazione a interventi minimi sul testo non sempre è facile distinguere la<br />
mano del correttore dalla mano dello scriba che inter scribendum corregge il testo. Una distinzione<br />
resa non agevole anche dalla grande somiglianza dell’inchiostro usato dallo scriba con quello del<br />
correttore. Tuttavia la gran parte dei 150 interventi sul testo sono per lo più da ricondurre al lavoro del<br />
diorthotes che sana le sviste dello scriba, emenda i guasti, esiti di banalizzazioni, corregge gli errori<br />
più importanti, colma omissioni e lacune, aggiunge punti, accenti, spiriti e segni diacritici. È<br />
plausibile che proprio la mano del diorthotes abbia segnato gli spiriti e gli accenti che compaiono nel<br />
testo, una ventina in tutto con funzione distintiva. Le aggiunte testuali sono inserite supra lineam, le<br />
cancellazioni di parole iterate o di parti da espungere sono, di norma, eliminate con sopralineatura. È<br />
della mano del correttore l’unico scolio presente nel testo.<br />
L’impegno del diorthotes sul testo ne migliora in molti casi la qualità. Né pochi né irrilevanti,<br />
poi, sono gli interventi che suggeriscono una revisione condotta a partire da un esemplare diverso<br />
rispetto all’antigrafo dal quale la prima mano ha copiato il testo. Infatti, almeno in sette casi è<br />
possibile individuare lezioni o varianti riconducibili ad una tradizione diversa da quella alla quale<br />
appartiene il testo copiato dallo scriba. Si tratta per lo più di varianti inferiori, ma pur sempre di<br />
varianti che circolavano ad Ossirinco nel II secolo d.C., e che danno accesso forse ad un altro<br />
manoscritto. Osserviamo dunque alcuni esempi.<br />
In risposta a Socrate Diotima a 207d4 spiega che la natura mortale, per quanto le sia possibile,<br />
cerca di esistere perennemente attraverso la generazione. Diotima poi precisa che ciò può avvenire in<br />
quanto la natura lascia ogni volta un essere nuovo in luogo di uno vecchio: anche nel lasso di tempo in<br />
cui ciascun animale vive ed esiste di per sé, si dice che rimane lo stesso l’individuo da quando è<br />
fanciullo alla vecchiaia, anche se le sue parti costitutive si rinnovano perpetuamente. ἐν ὧν ἕν di<br />
207d4 conservato da BD T PW è sospeso sintatticamente nella frase e crea un anacoluto. ἐν ᾧ manca<br />
invece in Vind Phil Gr. 21, dove probabilmente è stato eliminato per congettura. Il papiro a r. 438<br />
conserva la sequenza ἐν ὧν ἕν con spirito e accento sopra ω e con un punto sia sopra ε sia sopra ν del<br />
secondo εν. Nel papiro il punto sopra la lettera è registrato di solito in modo incerto. Di norma, come<br />
si è visto, l’espunzione di parole e passi più lunghi è indicata mediante sopralineatura. Dunque è<br />
plausibile che il correttore qui abbia voluto segnalare con i due punti sopra εν un’omissione che<br />
registrava nel suo esemplare di collazione.<br />
A 223a4 Agatone si rivolge ad Alcibiade: dichiara di voler cambiare posizione soprattutto per<br />
ricevere l’elogio di Socrate. A r. 1167, in luogo di παντὸς µᾶλλον dei codici, il papiro ha πάντοσ`ε´<br />
µᾶλλον dove la ε è aggiunta supra lineam. Resta incerto il testo dello scriba sul quale è intervenuto il<br />
correttore. I primi editori stampano πάντοσα, con α incerta e ε supra lineam come correzione di α, ma<br />
forse non si deve escludere παντω, con ω corretto, in un primo momento in παντ〚ω〛ός. Certo è che πάντοσε<br />
µᾶλλον è con ogni probabilità una lezione inferiore come suggerisce l’assai raro πάντοσε, ma lezione<br />
dotata di senso e di efficacia: Alcibiade con πάντοσε sembrerebbe ribadire la sua ferrea intenzione di<br />
spostarsi ovunque pur ricevere la lode da Socrate.<br />
Della stessa mano del correttore è l’unico scolio presente nel papiro. In margine a r. 391 si<br />
leggono due brevi righi: nel primo rigo la sequenza αο̣εχ̣, con ν sopra α, come abbreviazione di ἀν(τὶ<br />
τοῦ), e υ sopra ο, come abbreviazione di οὕ(τωϲ), nel secondo la sequenza ρωϲ̣ ϲ̣τ̣ .[. Gli editori stampano ἀν(τὶ τοῦ)<br />
οὕ(τωϲ) ἔχει e riconoscono in questa nota una spiegazione a εἶεν di 206e 3-4, la parola più vicina. Non<br />
possiamo ricostruire l’indicazione del diorthotes che nello scolio sembra proporre una forma<br />
alternativa a εἶεν che ne chiarisca il senso. In effetti εἶεν, raramente usato come forma breve di<br />
risposta, si trova in un passaggio cruciale del dialogo tra Socrate e Diotima. Diotima afferma che eros<br />
è desiderio di generazione del bello. La risposta di Socrate, εἶεν, introduce di fatto il discorso con il<br />
quale Diotima spiega la propria tesi mostrando che la generazione è per mortali cosa immortale ed<br />
eterna. È probabile che per il correttore εἶεν il cui significato, come emerge dalla critica, sembra<br />
oscillare tra un valore asseverativo e un valore interrogativo, richiedesse una spiegazione. Pochi sono<br />
77
Margherita Erbì<br />
gli errori evidenti che restano non corretti e per lo più si tratta di sviste o dimenticanze. È plausibile<br />
che siano esito di banalizzazioni che, non compromettendo il senso, erano trascurate dal correttore.<br />
Come emerge dalle considerazioni fin qui sviluppate, non c’è dubbio che il P.Oxy. 843 vergato sul<br />
recto di un rotolo di buona qualità con una grafia ordinata e corretta, caratterizzato dalla presenza di<br />
punteggiatura, accenti, spiriti e segni critici, sottoposto alla revisione attenta e scrupolosa di un<br />
correttore, segno palese di uno spiccato interesse esegetico doveva essere destinato ad uno studioso.<br />
È plausibile che il nostro testo sia stato allestito presso uno degli scriptoria o delle biblioteche<br />
presenti ad Ossirinco, la città definita a partire dal III secolo d.C. λαµπρὰ καὶ λαµπροτάτη, illustre e<br />
celeberrima, ma senza dubbio importante anche nei secoli precedenti. Numerosi sono i documenti che<br />
per il II secolo d.C. descrivono Ossirinco come una città dotta che aveva contatti con la vita culturale<br />
di Alessandria e con le correnti culturali più vive. È proprio ad Ossirinco nel II secolo d.C. che<br />
collochiamo con certezza l’attività di Arpocrazione, l’autore del noto lessico sui dieci oratori, e<br />
l’attività di altri eruditi, dei quali è possibile in alcuni casi definire addirittura l’identità e gli interessi.<br />
All’impegno di studiosi ed eruditi sui testi della letteratura greca bisogna forse ricondurre la presenza<br />
ad Ossirinco di moltissimi rotoli con testi letterari. Certo frutto della loro esegesi sui testi sono le tante<br />
opere erudite conservateci dai papiri. Intenso ad Ossirinco era dunque anche il lavoro degli scribi, le<br />
mani di alcuni dei quali, grazie alle importanti quantità di rotoli rinvenuti, è stato possibile riconoscere<br />
in più di un manoscritto.<br />
Questo il milieu culturale nel quale il nostro papiro è stato allestito. Dunque l’attività di studio<br />
del dotto destinatario del nostro rotolo è da immaginare in relazione ai circoli di intellettuali che<br />
animavano la vita culturale della Ossirinco del II secolo d.C. E questo certo non desta stupore. Infatti<br />
la gran parte dei papiri con i testi di Platone provengono da Ossirinco e sono databili al II o al III<br />
secolo d.C. Si tratta di 53 in tutto. Tra i quali spiccano i 6 del Fedone, i 6 del Politico e i 4 delle Leggi<br />
i 4 con l’Alcibiade I, i 3 del Teeteto e i 3 del Lachete. Nella gran parte dei casi sono, proprio come il<br />
nostro testo del Simposio, ben scritti, mai gravemente scorretti, con segni di punteggiatura, segni<br />
diacritici e varianti marginali o interlineari, brevi note. Dunque manoscritti destinati a lettori dotti e<br />
allestiti con scrupolosa cura in vista di uno studio più approfondito del testo e non della sola lettura.<br />
La circolazione dei dialoghi di Platone ad Ossirinco in quei secoli è provata inoltre da un frammento<br />
proveniente da Ossirinco con un elenco di titoli e di nomi: il PSILur inv. 19662. L’elenco è scritto sul<br />
verso di una lista di terreni: si tratta di una sola colonna di scrittura priva della parte iniziale e di<br />
quella finale. Il primo titolo dell’elenco è il Simposio, nel rigo successivo si legge διάλογοι seguito<br />
dal numerale κ, 20. Di seguito nelle altre 22 righe uno dopo l’altro sono elencati titoli di dialoghi di<br />
Platone. E forse il nome di Platone compariva all’inizio di questo elenco. Alcuni di questi titoli<br />
ricorrono più volte, il Filebo, l’Alcibiade, il Protagora, alcuni sono multipli, l’Ippia deve riferirsi sia<br />
all’Ippia maggiore e all’Ippia minore, alcuni sono posti in alternativa, Alcibiade o Liside e altri non<br />
corrispondono nessuna delle opere di Platone. Separate da una paragraphos seguono prima un elenco<br />
di quattro titoli di opere di Senofonte, poi la successione dei nomi di Omero, Menandro, Euripide ed<br />
Aristofane, tutti seguiti dalla sequenza ὅσα εὑρίσκεται, letteralmente, “quanti si trovano”, forse si<br />
intendono i libri disponibili sul mercato. Il papiro è stato interpretato variamente dalla critica: ora<br />
come un inventario di titoli di opere presenti in una collezione di libri forse presenti in una biblioteca<br />
o una lista di desiderata, cioè un elenco di libri che si intendeva acquistare, o da un librario o per uno<br />
scriptorium. In ogni caso l’elenco documenta per il III secolo d.C. la presenza ad Ossirinco di questi<br />
libri o la possibilità di recuperarli. E tra questi non sfugge la presenza del Simposio, un dialogo per il<br />
quale, dunque, dobbiamo forse immaginare una diffusione più ampia di quella che l’unico papiro<br />
rinvenuto, POxy 843, sembra suggerire. Ma c’è di più.<br />
Come ho detto il POxy 843 venne rinvenuto durante la V campagna di scavo iniziata nel<br />
dicembre del 1905, insieme ad altri undici rotoli con testi letterari, in quello che Grenfell e Hunt 5 nella<br />
cronaca dello scavo hanno definito un basketful of broken literary papyrus rolls. Un ritrovamento<br />
senza alcun dubbio di portata eccezionale. Oltre al rotolo con il Simposio: POxy 841 con Pindaro,<br />
Peani II, POxy 842 con le Elleniche di Ossirinco, POxy 844 con Isocrate, Panegirico, POxy 852 con<br />
Euripide, Ipsipile, POxy 853 con un Commentario a Tucidide II, POxy 1012 con un testo di<br />
erudizione, POxy 1364 con Antifonte Sofistail Περὶ ἀληθείας, POxy 1376 con Tucidide VII, POxy<br />
1606 con Lisia, con brani in particolare da Contro Ippoterse, e Contro Teomnesto, ma soprattutto<br />
POxy 1016 e POxy 1017, i noti papiri che conservano parti del Fedro. Forse, come suggerisce parte<br />
della critica, si tratta di una vera e propria collezione di libri, presumibilmente appartenuta alla<br />
biblioteca di un erudito di Ossirinco del III secolo d.C. Una collezione certo che prova un prevalente,<br />
5 B.P. Grenfell, A. S. Hunt, Egypt Exploration Fund: Archeological Report 15 (1905-1906), 8-16.<br />
78
Margherita Erbì<br />
se non assoluto interesse di natura letteraria. E non è un caso che in questa raccolta compaiano di<br />
Platone sia il Fedro sia il Simposio, i due dialoghi al centro dei quali è eros, il cuore dell’argomentazione.<br />
Due testi nei quali, dunque, non a caso, Platone esplicita una parte consistente della<br />
sua riflessione sul rapporto tra il dialogo e gli altri generi della tradizione, raggiungendo, forse, il<br />
risultato più pieno della sua arte di scrittore.<br />
Per tutto ciò è plausibile che nella dotta Ossirinco tra il II e il III secolo d.C., chi leggeva il<br />
Simposio, leggesse anche Pindaro, Euripide, Isocrate, Tucidide, Lisia, segno palese della posizione<br />
eminente che nel corpus di Platone ricopre il Simposio quale esempio, ormai canonico, del genio<br />
letterario di Platone.<br />
79
Revisiting the <strong>Symposium</strong>:<br />
the paradoxical eroticism of Plato and Lucian<br />
Ruby Blondell - Sandra Boehringer<br />
The purpose of this paper is to provide a new perspective on Plato's <strong>Symposium</strong> by viewing it through<br />
the lens of a humorous and paradoxical reading supplied by a short dialogue by Lucian. Lucian was a<br />
prolific second century CE rhetorician and satirist whose native tongue was Syriac but who wrote in<br />
Greek. His numerous works include a set of fifteen short farces known as the Dialogues of the<br />
Courtesans, which seem to offer us a kind of survey of character-types from the world of commercial<br />
sex in the Athens of Plato's day. Lucian openly acknowledges the philosophical roots of dialogue<br />
form, thus priming his audience to detect Platonic resonances. Because of their subject-matter,<br />
however, which seems closer to comedy, scholars have not viewed these particular dialogues through<br />
the lens of Platonic influence.<br />
In this paper we shall argue that this exclusion is unwarranted. Not only was Plato himself a<br />
master of serious play, but the subject matter of the Dialogues of the Courtesans gives them an<br />
immediate point of contact with the philosopher's interest in erotic themes, his dramatization of erotic<br />
relationships, and his eroticizing of philosophical conversation. We shall focus specifically on<br />
Dialogues of the Courtesans 5, in an effort to show that Plato--and especially the <strong>Symposium</strong>--is<br />
fundamental to a proper understanding of this particular work. Conversely, we believe that Lucian's<br />
parody allows us to see aspects of Plato's erotic theory more clearly.<br />
Dialogue 5 is a short quasi-Socratic work, which opens with an inquiry about a sexual relationship. A<br />
courtesan named Clonarium addresses her friend, the courtesan Leaena. Using diction that evokes the<br />
ambiguities of philosophical eros in Plato, she says she has heard that Megilla, a wealthy woman from<br />
Lesbos, is "in love with" Leaena (eran) and they are "having intercourse" (suneinai), doing together "I<br />
don't know what". Baffled, she subjects Leaena to a series of questions, and the latter ends up<br />
describing for her a remarkably erotic evening that she spent with Megilla and another rich foreign<br />
woman, the Corinthian Demonassa.<br />
It all started with a party of a very unorthodox kind--an all-female drinking party, complete<br />
with the musical and sexual entertainment typical of a male symposion. Leaena was invited as a<br />
musician, but after she finished playing, when it had grown late and the two foreigners were drunk,<br />
Megilla proposed that she spend the night with them. We are then treated to a description of sexual<br />
activity that stands apart from all other ancient erotic texts for its detail and specificity, its enthusiastic<br />
and multifacted eroticism, the involvement of three participants instead of two, and (most strikingly)<br />
the fact that they are all women.<br />
When the erotic and narrative tension is at its height, something unexpected intervenes. In the<br />
heat of passion, Megilla removes her (previously imperceptible) wig, revealing a shaved head like that<br />
of a male athlete. She thereupon declares herself a handsome youth (kalos neaniskos), demands to be<br />
called Megillus, and announces that she "has married" Demonassa, who is her "wife". This startling<br />
announcement leads to a discussion of the paradox of Megilla's identity.<br />
Leaena, who reports the conversation to Clonarium, adopts the "Socratic" role of questioner,<br />
offering a sequence of hypothetical explanations for the mystery that confronts her. First she<br />
hypothesizes that Megilla is really a man. But to confirm this theory she wants to know two more<br />
things. One of her questions is about the body--does Megilla have the "manly thing" that men have (to<br />
andreion)?--and the other is about behavior--does she do to Demonassa what men do? Megilla<br />
responds negatively to the first question, and affirmatively to the second, leaving the confusion<br />
unresolved (how can a woman "do what men do" without "having what men have" to do it with?). For<br />
her next hypothesis Leaena suggests that Megilla has bodily attributes of both sexes, like a<br />
hermaphrodite. When the object of her inquiry replies in the negative, Leaena speculates that Megilla<br />
was transformed by a divinity, like Teiresias, who "became a man after being a woman". When<br />
Megilla denies this too, the women start debating what it is that makes a man a man. For Leaena, it is<br />
the male sexual organ, but for Megilla it is "mind" (gnomê) and "desire" (epithumia). When Leaena<br />
wonders whether this is "enough", Megilla assures her that she does not need the male organ because<br />
she has "something instead".<br />
With this exchange we leave the embedded dialogue and return to the narrative frame. Leaena<br />
describes--briefly but unambiguously--sexual intercourse between herself and Megilla. She embraced<br />
Megilla "as if she [Megilla] were a man" and Megilla went at it vigorously with evident pleasure. Her<br />
audience--Clonarium (and of course ourselves)--wants to know exactly what Megilla did, and how,
Ruby Blondell – Sandra Boehringer<br />
but Leaena declares "by the Heavenly Goddess"--that is, by Aphrodite Ourania--that she will say no<br />
more because it is shameful.<br />
Even though Dialogue 5 makes no explicit reference to philosophy or philosophers, it is<br />
highly Platonic in tone. It is pervaded with expressions of confusion and ignorance that evoke Plato's<br />
Socrates ("doing I don't know what," "I don't understand," etc.); the central question is an<br />
epistemological problem; and in the inset conversation the audience is treated to a parody of<br />
philosophical dialogue, as Leaena attempts to solve that mystery through a logical sequence of<br />
questions and answers. The ending is, moreover, aporetic. Neither Clonarium nor the reader ever finds<br />
out the exact nature of the "something" that Megilla has insted of a male sex organ.<br />
Dialogue 5's most striking Platonic antecedent and intertext is, for several reasons, the<br />
<strong>Symposium</strong>. Like Plato's dialogue, Lucian's consists of an outer conversational frame containing an<br />
inner narrative that describes a drinking party, elicited by questions from a curious friend. At both<br />
gatherings the topic of conversation is eros and the participants outdo each other in demonstrating<br />
their expertise on the subject. The inset story, like the most famous episode in Alcibiades' speech, is a<br />
tale of seduction--but this time a successful one. Both those tales are told by unreliable narrators, who<br />
present their own behavior as a shameful secret. Both are willing to undergo considerable<br />
embarrassment, by participating in transgressive sexual behavior, in order to discover the truth about<br />
an erotic mystery. But if Leaena is an Alcibiades, she is also a Socrates, who brings her audience to<br />
the very brink of revelation by ventriloquating Megilla, an expert in erotics, just as Socrates does by<br />
ventriloquating Diotima. At the end of the dialogue she teases her audience--and Lucian his--by<br />
witholding the answer, just as Plato's Socrates--in the view of his enemies and even his frustrated<br />
admirers--withholds his wisdom, as part of a larger Platonic strategy to elicit our philosophical desire.<br />
Both these drinking parties are, moreover, quite unconventional. Plato's symposion is<br />
notoriously devoid of drunkenness--at least until Alcibiades appears. It is further marked as both<br />
unusually cerebral and exclusively male by the banishment of the female musician (176e). Lucian's is<br />
extraordinary for a very different reason: the fact that it consists only of women, who are<br />
enthusiastically devoted to the very pleasures of music, drunkenness and sex that Plato's symposion<br />
eschews. Leaena is invited in the first place as a musician to entertain the other women--as if she were<br />
the Platonic flute-girl dismissed from the male symposion and sent away to play for the women of the<br />
household (Symp. 176e). Lucian thus offers the perspective of those who are excluded from male<br />
philosophical "intercourse." But the excluded women are not thwarted or downcast by the male<br />
identification of the feminine with the body and its pleasures. On the contrary, they enthusiastically<br />
embrace that identification--without, however, abandoning their right to engage in rational<br />
conversation about those very pleasures. Plato excludes women from the elite male world of<br />
philosophy; but Lucian appropriates that world for them, portraying a self-sufficient and harmonious<br />
single-sex world that mirrors the male world of philosophy.<br />
Dialogue 5 also includes a number of more specific allusions to Plato's <strong>Symposium</strong>. In the<br />
interests of time, we will focus here on two interrelated themes that connect these two dialogues: the<br />
confusion surrounding conventional sex-roles, hierarchies and practices, and the motif of sex among<br />
women.<br />
In Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong>, conventional erotic categories are disturbed in several ways, notably<br />
the role reversal between Alcibidiades, the eromenos who pursues Socrates like an erastes, and<br />
Socrates, the ugly philosophical erastes who is also an eromenos. Such confusion is also a marked<br />
feature of the myth of Aristophanes, which explains sexual desire as the consequence of chopping in<br />
half three primordial beings--the complete male, the complete female and the androgyne. The comic<br />
playwright purports to organize human sexuality into three tidy categories. In reality, however, it is<br />
impossible to map them neatly onto the roles and expectations that were in place in Plato's Athens.<br />
Aristophanes' geography of human sexualities disrupts the active-passive binary by generating three<br />
types of couple in all of which desire is equal and reciprocal, leaving no room for conventional<br />
hierarchies.<br />
Aristophanes' myth also introduces the second theme that will be important for Lucian--sex<br />
among women. Because this theme is so rare in our surviving ancient texts from all periods, scholars<br />
have seized on Dialogue 5, with its extended and detailed account of sex among women, to fill the<br />
vacuum created by the silence of our other sources. Though interpretations vary, the dialogue is<br />
typically understood in one of two ways (which may overlap). The first approach sees Lucian as<br />
providing an active-passive model of female sexual relationships based on the male erastes/eromenos<br />
model, with Megilla filling the "active", "male" role, in order to make it comprehensible to his male<br />
audience (thus, Megilla is interpreted as physically masculine, she behaves like a man, and uses a<br />
dildo). The second sees him associating sex among women with gender inversion and construction of<br />
81
Ruby Blondell – Sandra Boehringer<br />
psychological identities, the butch and the fem (models that seem easily legible to a modern<br />
audience). But in our view none of these interpretations is adequate to the complexities of the<br />
dialogue, which can be properly understood only in light of its Platonic subtext.<br />
This subtext emerges most strikingly with the use of one particular word. When Clonarium<br />
reports the rumor she has heard about women in Lesbos she calls them hetairistriai. This is only the<br />
second appearance of this word in our ancient sources. The first, of course, is in Plato's <strong>Symposium</strong>.<br />
In his myth, Aristophanes tells us that the slices of the all-female primordial creature include in their<br />
number the hetairistriai (191e). What exactly does he mean? The word hetairistriai cannot be<br />
translated "lesbians" or "homosexual women," since these categories did not exist in the ancient world<br />
(where sexual behavior was not used to construct such psychological identities). Nor does it refer to<br />
all the women resulting from the splitting of the primordial female. It refers, rather to those who are<br />
attracted strongly to other women. Aristophanes gives us no further information about these women,<br />
who take their place among the fantasies and distortions licensed by his role as a comic playwright<br />
(cf. 189b). But Lucian's Clonarium defines the word hetairistria her own way: "they say there are such<br />
women in Lesbos, masculine looking (arrenopos), not willing to have it done to them (paschein) by<br />
men, but preferring to associate (plêsiazein) with women as men do". In other words, she associates<br />
sex among women with masculine attributes and sexually active behavior, suggesting gendered role<br />
reversal among the women she calls hetairistriai. But Clonarium is reporting mere hearsay. Nor did<br />
she participate in Megilla's soirée. Leaena's eye-witness account will provide a much less clear-cut<br />
picture than Clonarium's characterization of the hetairistria might lead us to expect.<br />
Let us start with the women's appearance. According to Leaena, Megilla is "terribly manly"<br />
(andrikê). What exactly does this mean? Megilla is not masculine in her general appearance or<br />
physique. The wig, when worn, is undetectable. The only physical trait that marks her as "manly"<br />
looking is her baldness--an effect that any woman could produce by shaving. Besides, she presents<br />
herself as a neaniskos, a "youth", not a mature man. The cultural mark of a neaniskos is precisely the<br />
absence of confirmed physical signs of virility, and retention of the softness and sexual indeterminacy<br />
of childhood. Megilla is, then, sometimes androgynous and sometimes feminine, depending on the<br />
presence or absence of her wig. She does not have a "masculine" physique. Note, too, that Leaena<br />
mentions no physical signs of masculinity in Demonassa, even though she is said to have "the same<br />
skills as" Megilla and both of them behave at times "like men". It is character and behavior, rather<br />
than appearance, that are emphasized throughout the dialogue.<br />
Perhaps, then, when Leaena calls Megilla "manly" she means that Megilla will play the<br />
"active" sexual role in relation to her partners and assign them the "passive" role (like the women<br />
Clonarium has heard about in Lesbos). But the larger picture does not support this model. Demonassa,<br />
despite being designated Megilla's "wife", has "the same skills" as Megilla and, like her, behaves "just<br />
like men do" in actively kissing and embracing Leaena. Leaena too takes the initiative at times. There<br />
is thus no simple active-passive or masculine-feminine reversal. Nor does the dialogue portray just<br />
one sexual act between two people. There is sex between Leaena and Megilla, sex between Megilla<br />
and Demonassa, and sex among the three women. The confusion is further fostered by Megilla's selfproclaimed<br />
identity as as a neaniskos. By claiming this identity, Megilla subverts the passive/active<br />
binary associated with conventional representations of male homoeroticism. She is both "manly" and<br />
"active", like an erastes, but the phrase kalos neaniskos clearly codes her as one who would, in a male<br />
homoerotic relationship, play the role of an eromenos. Like Plato's Alcibiades, "Megillus" is an<br />
eromenos who asserts "himself" as an erastes. At the same time, "his" pleasure described in a way that<br />
suggests the excess associated with female sexual response. Leaena presents herself, by contrast, not<br />
as experiencing reciprocal pleasure, as a woman would be expected to do, but as merely in it for the<br />
gifts she receives in return--or perhaps, like an eromenos, for the education (!).<br />
Lucian sows even more doubt by leaving us uncertain what exactly Megilla has "instead of<br />
what men have". Most scholars assume that she is referring here to an olisbos (a dildo) to "replace"<br />
the male sex organ. If so, however, her use of it does not conform to the expectations raised by the<br />
presence of such an object. The olisbos is typically represented as bringing pleasure to the person<br />
penetrated (whether it is a matter of solo or group use). But Megilla, who uses the object in question,<br />
also experiences obvious pleasure herself. Moreover neither the word olisbos nor any equivalent<br />
appears anywhere in the text. Megilla's specific practices therefore remain veiled in mystery. Rolereversal<br />
(a woman taking the role of a man) is thus not the way to explain sex between women, as<br />
shown in this dialogue. Rather, what is culturally and socially "masculine" (gender) circulates among<br />
three women without completely or permanently characterizing any one of them. The claim that<br />
Lucian is relocating sex between women into the framework of a binary active/passive relationship<br />
modelled on conventional representations of male homoeroticism is equally untenable.<br />
82
Ruby Blondell – Sandra Boehringer<br />
In short, Lucian does not, in Dialogue 5, present a coherent picture of female-female<br />
sexuality. This work does not function with reference to reality (that is, to “real” “lesbians”) but<br />
through engagement with its Platonic subtext, which likewise does not provide a coherent picture of<br />
the classical categories governing sexual behavior. In the <strong>Symposium</strong>, Plato is not interested in<br />
providing an alternative sexuality. Rather, he employs the licence supplied by comedy and fantasy to<br />
manipulate conventional sexual roles in the service of a philosophical agenda. Lucian responds by<br />
rendering Plato's subversion of the active-passive homoerotic binary gleefully physical, and by<br />
reintroducing the drunken, female physical body eschewed by Platonic dialogue. He places at the<br />
center of his sympotic drama female characters that were confined to the margins of Plato's: the<br />
excluded female musician and the hetairistria. He completes the Platonic picture by taking the<br />
tantalizingly underspecified women of Aristophanes' myth and filling them out with a wealth of carnal<br />
detail worthy of the comic playwright himself. Like Plato, however, he is not offering us an<br />
alternative sexuality, or revealing one that has been suppressed by other authors. He is, rather,<br />
responding to Plato by appropriating philosophy in its turn for his own purposes--namely, to win<br />
applause for the ingenious manipulation of intellectual and erotic traditions. The result is at once a<br />
satire of the pretensions of philosophical eros and an homage to its absurdities.<br />
83
Un Banquet revisité :<br />
l’érotisme paradoxal de Platon et de Lucien<br />
Ruby Blondell - Sandra Boehringer<br />
Le but de cette communication est de tenter de porter un regard renouvelé sur le Banquet de Platon à<br />
partir de la lecture d’un dialogue humoristique et paradoxal composé par Lucien. Lucien est un<br />
sophiste du IIe siècle, un rhéteur et un satiriste particulièrement prolifique, de langue maternelle<br />
syriaque et écrivant en grec. Ses nombreuses productions comprennent un ensemble de 15 courtes<br />
saynètes, connues sous le nom de Dialogues des courtisanes, qui semblent déployer un catalogue des<br />
personnages-types du monde du commerce sexuel dans l’Athènes de l’époque de Platon. Dans son<br />
œuvre, Lucien reconnaît les origines philosophiques de la forme dialogique qu’il a choisie, rendant<br />
ainsi son public sensible aux influences platoniciennes. Pourtant, la critique contemporaine a<br />
généralement exclu de cette influence les Dialogues des courtisanes, en raison de leur caractère<br />
comique et de leur thème (les femmes et la sexualité).<br />
Nous montrerons aujourd’hui que cette exclusion ne se justifie pas : non seulement Platon était<br />
lui-même un maître du « jeu sérieux » mais, de plus, le thème du Dialogue des courtisanes est en lien<br />
direct avec l’intérêt du philosophe pour les questions érotiques, les mises en scènes des relations<br />
érotiques et l’érotisation des conversations philosophiques. Une étude serrée du dialogue 5 mettra en<br />
évidence le fait qu’il n’est pas possible de comprendre l’œuvre de Lucien sans prendre en compte<br />
l’œuvre de Platon (et surtout Le Banquet) ; inversement, nous pensons que la parodie de Lucien nous<br />
permet de mieux saisir certains aspects de l’érotique platonicienne.<br />
Le dialogue 5 est un court dialogue, quasi socratique : il s’ouvre sur une question (portant sur<br />
une relation sexuelle). La courtisane Klonarion s’adresse à son amie et courtisane Léaina : elle a<br />
entendu dire que Mégilla, une riche femme de Lesbos, s’est prise d’amour pour Léaina (le verbe eran<br />
a un sens érotique sans équivoque) et qu’elle « couchent ensemble » (le verbe suneinai est ambigu et a<br />
également un sens philosophique), faisant toutes deux « on ne sait quoi ». Perplexe, elle soumet<br />
Léaina à une série de questions – et la dernière suscite, en réponse, la description hautement érotique<br />
de la soirée que Léaina a passée avec Mégilla et une autre riche femme étrangère, la corinthienne<br />
Démonassa.<br />
Tout a commencé sous la forme d’une soirée particulièrement peu conventionnelle : une fête<br />
exclusivement féminine, où l’on boit et où l’on passe du bon temps grâce aux divertissements<br />
musicaux et érotiques typiques du symposion masculin. C’est en tant que musicienne que Léaina a été<br />
invitée, mais après qu’elle a joué, une fois nuit tombée, les deux étrangères sont ivres, et Mégilla<br />
propose à Léaina de passer la nuit avec elles deux. Commence alors la description de pratiques<br />
érotiques particulièrement inédites dans le corpus antique (les autres Dialogues des courtisanes<br />
inclus), en raison des détails et de leur précision, de l’érotisme débordant et multiforme, de la<br />
participation des trois partenaires (et non de deux) et, enfin, en raison du sexe des partenaires (toutes<br />
des femmes).<br />
La tension est à son comble quand intervient un élément imprévu : au beau milieu de l’étreinte,<br />
Mégilla enlève sa perruque – une perruque que personne n’avait préalablement remarquée – mettant à<br />
nu un crâne rasé comme celui des athlètes. Elle se présente alors en disant d’elle-même qu’elle est un<br />
beau jeune homme (kalos neaniskos), elle demande qu’on la nomme Mégillos et annonce que, jadis,<br />
elle a épousé Démonassa et que celle-ci est sa femme. Cette révélation pour le moins surprenante est<br />
le point de départ d’une discussion sur le paradoxe de l’identité de Mégilla.<br />
Léaina qui rapporte la conversation à Klonarion – il s’agit donc d’un dialogue enchâssé dans un<br />
dialogue – prend le « rôle socratique » de celui qui pose les questions. Ses questions prennent la forme<br />
d’une succession d’hypothèses destinées à expliquer le problème épistémologique auquel elle est<br />
confrontée. Léaina avance une première hypothèse en se référant à un épisode du mythe d’Achille où<br />
le jeune héros est travesti en fille, postulant que Mégilla est en réalité un homme. Mais pour confirmer<br />
sa théorie, il lui faut savoir deux autres choses. L’une de ses questions porte sur le corps (« Et est-ce<br />
que tu as ce qu’ont les hommes ? »), l’autre sur ses pratiques (« Est-ce que tu fais à Démonassa ce que<br />
font les hommes ? »). Puis Léaina, en se référant au personnage d’Hermaphrodite et donc à une<br />
possible bisexuation, émet l’hypothèse d’une malformation physique. La réponse de l’intéressée étant<br />
négative, Léaina poursuit et passe dans le domaine surnaturel : comme Tirésias qui fut transformé<br />
« de femme en homme », Mégilla aurait été métamorphosée par une divinité. La réponse étant<br />
négative, les deux femmes commencent à débattre sur ce qui fait qu’un homme est un homme. Pour
Ruby Blondell – Sandra Boehringer<br />
Léaina, c’est le membre viril, pour Mégilla ce sont l’esprit (gnomê) et le désir (epithumia). Léaina lui<br />
demande alors si cela lui suffit et Mégilla lui assure qu’elle n’a pas besoin du membre viril car elle a<br />
« quelque chose » à la place.<br />
Le dialogue enchâssé s’achève et l’on revient au premier niveau de la discussion. Léaina décrit,<br />
brièvement mais sans équivoque, la relation sexuelle entre elle et Mégilla. Elle embrasse Mégilla<br />
« comme si elle était un homme » et Mégilla l’étreint avec une énergie qui débouche sur une<br />
jouissance visible. Le public (Klonarion, ainsi que les spectateurs du dialogue évidemment) veut<br />
savoir ce que Mégilla a fait, et comment, mais Léaina déclare que, « par la déesse ouranienne » (à<br />
savoir par Aphrodite), elle ne dira rien de plus, car c’est honteux.<br />
Le dialogue 5 ne fait aucune référence explicite à la philosophie ou à des philosophes, mais la<br />
tonalité platonicienne n’en est pas moins forte. Le dialogue est traversé par un grand nombre<br />
d’expressions de doute ou d’ignorance qui évoquent le Socrate de Platon (« faisant je ne sais quoi »,<br />
« je ne comprends pas » etc.). La question centrale est un problème épistémologique – et le dialogue<br />
enchâssé offre au public une parodie de dialogue philosophique, avec une succession de questions et<br />
de réponses qui progressent par étapes et de façon logique. La fin, de plus, est aporétique. Jamais<br />
Klonarion ni le public ne connaîtra la nature exacte de ce « quelque chose » que Mégilla a à la place<br />
de ce qu’ont les hommes.<br />
L’intertexte le plus visible, la source la plus prégnante de ce dialogue, est sans conteste le<br />
Banquet. Comme lui, le dialogue 5 se compose d’une discussion générale incluant un dialogue qui luimême<br />
déploie la description d’une soirée – une description suscitée par les questions d’un ami trop<br />
curieux. Lors des deux soirées, le thème de la conversation est érôs et les participants rivalisent les<br />
uns avec les autres pour mettre en évidence leur maîtrise du sujet. Le récit enchâssé, comme le<br />
fameux épisode du discours d’Alcibiade, est une histoire de séduction – dans le dialogue 5, d’une<br />
séduction réussie. Ces deux récits sont assumés par des personnages peu crédibles, qui présentent leur<br />
comportement comme un secret honteux. Les deux sont consentants pour vivre une expérience<br />
compromettante, en s’engageant dans des relations sexuelles transgressives, dans l’objectif de<br />
découvrir la vérité du mystère d’érôs. Mais si Léaina est un Alcibiade, elle est aussi un Socrate qui<br />
entraîne son public au seuil même de la révélation : tel un ventriloque elle fait entendre la voix de<br />
Mégilla, une experte en matière érotique, tout comme Socrate fait entendre la voix de Diotime. À la<br />
fin du dialogue, elle joue avec son public – et Lucien avec le sien – en gardant pour elle la réponse<br />
finale, tout comme Socrate – du point de vue de ses détracteurs et de ses admirateurs frustrés – garde<br />
pour lui sa sagesse : c’est là un des aspect de la stratégie platonicienne pour susciter le désir de la<br />
philosophie.<br />
Les deux soirées (celle décrite par Platon et celle de Lucien) sont, de plus, particulièrement non<br />
conventionnelles. C’est bien connu, point d’ivresse lors du banquet décrit par Platon – du moins<br />
jusqu’à l’arrivée d’Alcibiade. Il est consacré aux seules considérations intellectuelles des hommes<br />
exclusivement, la musicienne ayant été renvoyée (176e). Le banquet décrit par Lucien est<br />
exceptionnel pour une raison fort différente : il n’y a que des femmes, qui s’adonnent avec un grand<br />
enthousiasme au plaisir de la musique, de la boisson et du sexe – des plaisirs que le banquet<br />
platonicien rejette. Léaina est invitée principalement en tant que musicienne pour divertir les autres<br />
femmes : on pourrait reconnaître la flûtiste de Platon, renvoyée du symposion masculin et qui<br />
viendrait jouer pour les femmes de la maisonnée (Symp. 176e). Lucien fait accéder au point de vue de<br />
celles et ceux qui sont exclus du « commerce » philosophique des hommes, mais cette fois, les<br />
femmes exclues ne sont pas repousées ou rabaissées par l’assimilation entre le féminin et les plaisirs<br />
du corps. Au contraire, elles assument avec enthousiasme cette identification sans toutefois<br />
abandonner leur droit à s’engager dans des conversations rationnelles sur ces plaisirs, précisément.<br />
Alors que Platon exclut les femmes du petit monde élitiste et exclusivement masculin de la<br />
philosophie, Lucien, quant à lui, leur consacre ce monde et en fait, en miroir, un lieu exclusivement<br />
féminin, autonome et harmonieux.<br />
On relève dans ce dialogue plusieurs références très précises à des éléments de discours<br />
prononcés par les participants au Banquet de Platon. Pour des raisons de temps, nous nous<br />
concentrerons sur les deux éléments les plus importants qui rapprochent ces deux dialogues : le<br />
brouillage des rôles sexuels traditionnel et le thème de la sexualité entre femmes.<br />
Dans le Banquet, en effet, les catégories traditionnelles sont brouillées d’une manière<br />
remarquable. L’inversion des rôles traditionnels en est un exemple : Alcibiade, l’eromenos, se conduit<br />
comme un erastes et cherche à séduire Socrate ; Socrate, l’erastes âgé, laid et philosophe, est<br />
poursuivi et, tel un eromenos, sait résister aux avances. Un brouillage complexe apparaît également<br />
dans le fameux discours d’Aristophane : celui-ci explique l’origine de l’attraction sexuelle comme<br />
étant la conséquence de la coupure des trois boules primitives – la boule mâle, la boule femelle et la<br />
85
Ruby Blondell – Sandra Boehringer<br />
boule androgyne. Il tente ainsi d’organiser la sexualité humaine en trois catégories bien distinctes,<br />
mais sans pouvoir y intégrer l’ensemble des aspirations et des rôles tels qu’ils se formulaient dans<br />
l’Athènes de Platon. La cartographie érotique d’Aristophane brise l’opposition binaire<br />
activité/passivité en créant trois types de couples où dans chacun d’eux le désir est égal et réciproque,<br />
ne laissant pas de place aux hiérarchies traditionnelles.<br />
Le mythe d’Aristophane nous mène au deuxième thème platonicien qui se trouve être<br />
primordial dans notre analyse du cinquième Dialogue des courtisanes : les relations sexuelles entre<br />
femmes. En raison de la rareté du thème, les chercheurs l’ont surexploité pour remplir le vide créé par<br />
le silence des sources. Les interprétations de ce passage varient, mais globalement deux lectures<br />
dominent (elles se chevauchent parfois) : selon l’une, Lucien offre à son public l’image d’une relation<br />
entre femmes sur le modèle actif-passif, où Mégilla endosserait le rôle actif et masculin, et l’objectif<br />
de Lucien serait de rendre intelligible ce type de relations pour le public masculin (c’est pour cette<br />
raison, par exemple, que l’on a considéré que Mégilla a réellement un physique viril, qu’elle se<br />
comporte comme un homme et qu’elle utilise un godemiché). La seconde lecture du dialogue consiste<br />
à voir, dans le traitement de ce thème par Lucien, la mise en scène d’une inversion de genre et la<br />
construction de nouvelles identités psychologiques : ce seraient des lesbiennes et, plus<br />
particulièrement, Mégilla serait une butch, Léaina une fem (c’est une interprétation qui permet<br />
apparemment une compréhension plus facile du passage pour un public contemporain). Nous pensons<br />
qu’aucune de ces deux lectures n’est valable et que le texte de Lucien ne peut être compris qu’à la<br />
lumière de son lien avec son sous-texte, le Banquet de Platon.<br />
Ce sous-texte est particulièrement perceptible pour le public, en particulier dans l’usage que fait<br />
Lucien d’un terme précis. Lorsque Klonarion rapporte la rumeur sur les femmes de Lesbos, elle utilise<br />
le terme d’hetairistria. Il s’agit de la deuxième occurrence de ce terme dans le corpus grec, la première<br />
apparaissant dans le Banquet de Platon. Dans son célèbre discours, Aristophane raconte que les<br />
moitiés femelles, issues de la coupure de l’être femelle, sont plutôt attirées par les femmes que par les<br />
hommes, et que dans cette catégorie figurent les hetairistriai (191e). Mais que signifie ce mot ? Dans<br />
ce contexte, le terme d’hetairistriai ne peut d’aucune manière être traduit par « lesbiennes » ou<br />
« homosexuelles » puisque ces catégories n’existent pas dans le monde antique (les comportements<br />
sexuels ne servent à construire une « identité psychologique » ou « intime » des individus). Il ne<br />
désigne pas non plus toutes les femmes issues de la scission de l’être femelle : il désigne celles qui<br />
sont attirées intensément par les femmes. Aristophane ne donne pas davantage d’information sur ces<br />
femmes, qui prennent place dans une histoire fabuleuse et imaginaire dont les distorsions par rapport à<br />
la réalité sont autorisées par le statut d’auteur comique du personnage (cf. 189b). Le personnage de<br />
Lucien, Klonarion, en fournit une définition : « des femmes à l’air viril (arrenopos) qui ne veulent pas<br />
se donner (paschein) aux hommes, mais qui ont des relations (plesiazein) avec des femmes comme<br />
des hommes ». Il y a là sans conteste une association entre l’homoérotisme féminin et le fait d’avoir<br />
des comportements ou des attributs masculins. Mais Klonarion rapporte des on-dits, elle n’a pas<br />
participé personnellement à la soirée de Mégilla, et le récit de Léaina fournit des informations bien<br />
plus précises que ce que cette définition d’hetairistria élaborée par une courtisane apporte.<br />
Qu’en est-il, en effet, de leur apparence physique ? Lorsque Léaina dit de celle-ci qu’elle est<br />
« terriblement masculine », il est certain qu’il ne s’agit pas d’un trait visible pour tous ni que Mégilla<br />
a l’air d’être un homme. La perruque, dont Léaina découvre avec étonnement l’existence un peu plus<br />
tard, est « invisible (littéralement : très ressemblante) et bien attachée ». Le seul trait physique qui<br />
renvoie à un trait masculin est la nudité de son crâne au moment où elle retire la perruque, une<br />
caractéristique que toute femme peut avoir… en se rasant la tête. Par ailleurs, Mégilla se présente<br />
comme un neaniskos, un jeune homme, et non comme un homme mûr : or la caractéristique culturelle<br />
du neaniskos est, précisément, de ne pas avoir de signes affirmés de la virilité et de conserver la<br />
douceur des traits sexuellement indéterminés de l’enfance. Par conséquent, Mégilla a une apparence<br />
parfois féminine, parfois androgyne, selon qu’elle porte ou non sa perruque. Elle n’a donc pas de<br />
“physique mâle”. Ajoutons qu’à aucun moment il n’est dit que Démonassa aurait des traits masculins,<br />
alors même qu’il est précisé qu’elle a les mêmes pratiques (homotechnos) et que les deux se<br />
conduisent “comme des hommes” . Il s’agit donc dans ce dialogue de caractère et de comportement, et<br />
non d’apparence physique.<br />
Alors, peut-être est-ce un rôle sexuel actif que Léaina caractériserait lorsqu’elle utilise le terme<br />
de « viril », impliquant ainsi que Démonassa aurait le rôle « passif » ? Pourtant, alors même que<br />
Démonassa a été désignée comme l’épouse de Mégilla, elle a les mêmes pratiques qu’elle : comme<br />
Mégilla, elle se conduit « comme le font les hommes » lorsqu’elle embrasse et enlace Léaina, avec<br />
une énergie que le texte ne manque de souligner. À d’autres moments c’est Léaina qui prend<br />
l’initiative - bref, il apparaît nettement qu’il n’y a pas là un simple renversement ou une simple<br />
86
Ruby Blondell – Sandra Boehringer<br />
inversion des rôles actifs/passifs ou féminins/masculins. Le dialogue fait état d’une relation érotique<br />
entre Léaina et Mégilla, entre Démonassa et Mégilla et entre les trois femmes. De surcroît, en<br />
revendiquant son identité de neaniskos, Mégilla subvertit la binarité actif/passif traditionnellement<br />
associée à la relation homoérotique masculine. Comme un erastes, elle est à la fois masculine et<br />
active, mais l’expression kalos neaniskos la désigne clairement comme étant celui qui, dans une<br />
relation entre hommes, joue le rôle de l’eromenos. Comme l’Alcibiade de Platon, « Mégillos » est une<br />
éromène qui s’affirme et se revendique éraste. Mais en même temps, le plaisir sexuel ressenti est<br />
décrit de façon à suggérer une démesure toute féminine. Quant à Léaina, à l’inverse, elle ne se<br />
présente pas comme engagée dans une relation où le plaisir est partagé, conformément à ce qui est<br />
traditionnellement présenté comme propre aux femmes, mais elle dit d’elle-même qu’elle a accepté<br />
des cadeaux – en échange de ses services, ou peut-être, tel un éromène, pour l’éducation qu’il a reçue<br />
(!).<br />
Lucien sème un doute encore plus grand en ne permettant pas à son public de savoir avec<br />
précision ce que Mégilla a « à la place de ce que les hommes ont ». Certains commentateurs ont<br />
supputé qu’elle faisait référence à un olisbos (un godemiché) pour faire office de sexe masculin.<br />
Pourtant, si tel était le cas, l’usage qu’en fait Mégilla ne correspond pas à ce que l’on attendrait d’un<br />
tel objet. L’olisbos est généralement représenté comme un objet censé apporter, en premier lieu, du<br />
plaisir à la personne pénétrée par cet objet (que l’on soit seul, à deux ou en groupe). Mais dans<br />
l’étreinte entre Mégilla, qui prend les initiatives, et Léaina, c’est Mégilla qui se trouve ressentir<br />
visiblement une forte jouissance. Ajoutons que nulle part le terme d’olisbos n’apparaît dans le texte.<br />
Les pratiques particulières de Mégilla conservent leur voile de mystère. L’inversion des rôles (un<br />
femme prenant le rôle d’un homme) n’est donc pas une lecture possible des relations entre femmes –<br />
c’est ce que le montre ce dialogue. Ce qui est culturellement et socialement considéré comme<br />
masculin (le genre) circule entre les trois femmes sans jamais en caractériser une de façon totale et<br />
permanente. De même, l’affirmation selon laquelle Lucien replace la sexualité entre femmes dans une<br />
grille de lecture actif/passif sur le modèle binaire de la relation conventionnel entre hommes n’est pas<br />
davantage recevable.<br />
Pour conclure, Lucien ne nous offre pas, dans ce dialogue, un tableau cohérent et réaliste des<br />
relations sexuelles entre femmes : cette œuvre ne fonctionne pas par le biais de références à la réalité<br />
et aux « vraies » pratiques des femmes, mais par le lien que Lucien établit avec le sous-texte<br />
platonicien. Dans le Banquet, Platon utilise la liberté offerte par la comédie et l’imagination pour<br />
transformer les rôles sexuels conventionnels dans le cadre d’un programme philosophique. Dans le<br />
dialogue 5, Lucien répond, en quelque sorte, à Platon en faisant de la subversion des rôles<br />
homoérotiques actifs/passifs une subversion joyeusement physique. Il réintroduit le vin et les corps de<br />
femmes que le dialogue platonicien avait évacués. Lucien met au centre de sa mise en scène du<br />
banquet les personnages de femmes qui restaient, chez Platon, à la marge : les hétairistriai, la flûtiste<br />
renvoyée. Il retouche le tableau platonicien en reprenant le motif platonico-aristophanesque de la<br />
catégorie des femmes issues de l’être primitif femelle, une catégorie laissée dans un flou<br />
particulièrement frustrant, et en le complétant par une abondance de détails physiques et érotiques<br />
concrets dignes de la comédie elle-même. Comme Platon, cependant, il ne fait pas l’éloge d’une<br />
sexualité alternative et son but n’est pas davantage de révéler, ou de dénoncer, un quelconque tabou<br />
chez les auteurs qui l’ont précédé. Au contraire, il répond à Platon en s’appropriant la philosophie et<br />
en la mettant au service de ses objectifs : obtenir l’ovation d’un public enthousiasmé par son habile<br />
détournement des conventions intellectuelles et érotiques. Le résultat en est une satire des ambitions<br />
de l’érôs philosophique – dont Lucien souligne les multiples aspects – et, tout à la fois, un hommage à<br />
sa splendide absurdité.<br />
87
1. Introduction<br />
<strong>Symposium</strong> 212a6-7: the Most Immortal of Men<br />
Gerard Boter<br />
As Kurt Sier writes in his monograph on Diotima’s speech, the concluding sentence of this speech is<br />
the most discussed sentence of the <strong>Symposium</strong>. 1 There is no unanimity on the character of the<br />
immortality which is in store for the philosopher-lover and probably there never will be. In this paper<br />
I do not intend to bring forth a new interpretation. I wish to draw attention to two hitherto neglected<br />
formal arguments in favour of the thesis that the philosopher’s immortality described by Diotima<br />
refers exclusively to immortality by means of posterity and not to some sort of personal immortality<br />
after death. Both arguments are contained in the words 212a6-7 καὶ εἴπερ τῳ ἄλλῳ ἀνθρώπων<br />
ἀθανάτῳ καὶ ἐκείνῳ.<br />
The problem concerning the philosopher’s immortality as sketched by Diotima at the end of<br />
her speech is well-known. Some scholars argue that the philosopher becomes immortal by<br />
procreation, like other living beings. 2 Others maintain that this is not enough: they claim that in<br />
addition to the immortality by procreation the philosopher also gains a higher type of<br />
immortality―one bestowed upon him as a reward for his perfect virtue. 3 Yet others argue that<br />
Diotima is talking exclusively about immortality after death. 4<br />
Let us first read the passage which interests us: the end of Diotima’s speech (Smp. 211e4-<br />
212a7).<br />
2. ἄνθρωπος<br />
ἆρ’ οἴει, ἔφη, φαῦλον βίον<br />
(212a1) γίγνεσθαι ἐκεῖσε βλέποντος ἀνθρώπου καὶ ἐκεῖνο ᾧ δεῖ<br />
θεωµένου καὶ συνόντος αὐτῷ; ἢ οὐκ ἐνθυµῇ, ἔφη, ὅτι ἐνταῦθα<br />
αὐτῷ µοναχοῦ γενήσεται, ὁρῶντι ᾧ ὁρατὸν τὸ καλόν, τίκτειν<br />
οὐκ εἴδωλα ἀρετῆς, ἅτε οὐκ εἰδώλου ἐφαπτοµένῳ, ἀλλὰ<br />
(a5) ἀληθῆ, ἅτε τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἐφαπτοµένῳ· τεκόντι δὲ ἀρετὴν<br />
ἀληθῆ καὶ θρεψαµένῳ ὑπάρχει θεοφιλεῖ γενέσθαι, καὶ εἴπερ<br />
τῳ ἄλλῳ ἀνθρώπων ἀθανάτῳ καὶ ἐκείνῳ;<br />
“Do you think it’s a worthless life,” she said, “ if a person (ἄνθρωπος) turns his gaze in that<br />
direction and contemplates that beauty with the faculty he should use, and is able to be with<br />
it? Or do you not recognize”, she said, “that it is under these conditions alone, as he sees<br />
beauty with what has the power to see it, that he will succeed in bringing to birth, not<br />
phantoms of virtue, because he is not grasping a phantom, but true virtue, because he is<br />
grasping the truth; and that when he has given birth to and nurtured true virtue, it belongs to<br />
him to be loved by the gods, and to him, if to any human being (ἄνθρωπος), to be immortal?”<br />
(Rowe)<br />
Throughout Diotima’s speech it is pointed out that man is a living being, composed of body and soul.<br />
Because one of these elements―the body―is mortal, the composite of body and soul is mortal too.<br />
With regard to the body, man is equal to any living being. See for instance Smp. 206c1-8: “All human<br />
beings (ἄνθρωποι), Socrates, are pregnant both in body (σῶµα) and in soul (ψυχή), and when we<br />
come to be of the right age, we naturally desire to give birth. (...) This matter of giving birth is<br />
something divine: living creatures (ζῴῳ), despite their mortality (θνητῷ), contain this immortal aspect<br />
(ἀθάνατον), of pregnancy and procreation.” (Rowe) In this passage, man is called a ζῷον, “a living<br />
1 Sier 1997, 184: “Dies ist der in der Forschung meistdiskutierte Satz des Symposion.”<br />
2 See for instance Wippern 1965, 142 (with note 123 on p. 158); Dyson 1986, 59-72; Stokes 1986, 180-182; Price 1989, 49-<br />
54; Rowe 1998, ad 212a6-7 (p. 201).<br />
3 See for instance Sier 1997, 184-197; Fierro 2001, 34-36; Sedley 2009, 160-161. According to Sier the philosopher’s soul<br />
continues to exist after death as an individual with an unchanged and unchangeable identity. Fierro suggests that the<br />
philosopher’s fate as sketched in the Phaedo, where the philosopher “attain[s] the best kind of existence (i.e. an existence in<br />
which the soul is by itself, lives with the gods, is in contact with the Forms and achieves an immortality which is superior to<br />
a just survival through reincarnation)”, is also what Diotima attributes to the perfect lover of beauty. Sedley states that the<br />
philosopher is “as it were, an intellectual Heracles”.<br />
4 See for instance O’Brien 1984.
Gerard Boter<br />
being”, which unites him to the animal world.<br />
It is obvious to everyone without the need for proof that the body is subject to decay and<br />
death. And for any composite which contains at least one mortal element it is impossible to be<br />
immortal: the death of one element involves the death of the composite to which this element belongs.<br />
This is stated clearly in Phaedo 70b2-4: “but to show that the soul (ψυχή) exists when the man<br />
(ἄνθρωπος) has died, and possesses some power and intelligence―well, that, I feel, needs a great deal<br />
of persuasive argument.” (Hackforth)<br />
You may wonder why I insist on something which is so obvious. This is because the word<br />
ἄνθρωπος occurs twice at the end of Diotima’s speech. The first time is at 211e4, where she speaks<br />
about the man who is contemplating Beauty itself. 5 In the Phaedo, viewing the Forms in their perfect<br />
state is reserved for the disembodied soul of the philosopher; in the <strong>Symposium</strong> it is expressly stated<br />
that this is possible for the philosopher when he is living as a man. I will return to the Phaedo later.<br />
The second occurrence of the word ἄνθρωπος at the end of Diotima’s speech is found in the<br />
very last line, καὶ εἴπερ τῳ ἄλλῳ ἀνθρώπων ἀθανάτῳ καὶ ἐκείνῳ. Once more, Diotima stresses the<br />
fact that the philosopher she is talking about is a man, that is, a composite of body and soul, living in<br />
our material world. The philosopher, that is, is explicitly put on a par with the living beings―animals<br />
and men―who were discussed in the preceding part of Diotima’s speech. In order to fully appreciate<br />
the meaning of the final phrase, however, we must first have a closer look at the phrase εἴπερ τῳ ἄλλῳ<br />
καὶ ἐκείνῳ itself.<br />
3. εἴπερ τῳ ἄλλῳ καὶ ἐκείνῳ<br />
Phrases of the type εἴπερ τις ἄλλος are treated in Kühner-Gerth, 6 who state that the phrase indicates<br />
“dass das im Hauptsatze ausgesprochene Prädikat einer Person oder Sache mehr als irgend einer<br />
anderen zukomme”; in practice, that is, the phrase means “more than anyone or anything else”.<br />
Here are some instances. Just before our passage Diotima says (Smp. 211d1-3): ἐνταῦθα τοῦ<br />
βίου, ὦ φίλε Σώκρατες, ἔφη ἡ Μαντινικὴ ξένη, εἴπερ που ἄλλοθι, βιωτὸν ἀνθρώπῳ, θεωµένῳ αὐτὸ<br />
τὸ καλόν, “In that state of life above all others, my dear Socrates,” said the Mantinean woman, “a man<br />
finds it truly worth while to live, as he contemplates essential beauty.” (Lamb) 7 In the exordium of<br />
Demosthenes’ speech Against Timocrates we read (D. 24.4): ἐγὼ δ’, εἴπερ τινὶ τοῦτο καὶ ἄλλῳ<br />
προσηκόντως εἴρηται, νοµίζω κἀµοὶ νῦν ἁρµόττειν εἰπεῖν, “But if that claim has ever been made<br />
with propriety, I think that I am entitled to make it now.” (Vince) Further on in the same speech we<br />
find (D. 24.96): ἔστιν ὑµῖν κύριος νόµος, καλῶς εἴπερ τις καὶ ἄλλος κείµενος, τοὺς ἔχοντας τά θ’<br />
ἱερὰ καὶ τὰ ὅσια χρήµατα κτἑ, “You have a law in operation, as good a law as ever was enacted, that<br />
holders of sacred or civil moneys etcetera.” (Vince) I might style this use of the phrase εἴπερ τις ἄλλος<br />
as the “inclusive superlative”. It corresponds exactly to the English idiom by which Vince translates<br />
the Demosthenes passage just mentioned: “as good a law as ever was enacted”, which in practice<br />
amounts to “the best law ever enacted”. 8<br />
Usually one or both elements of the phrase contain καί, as in the two passages from<br />
Demosthenes. It is remarkable that in translations of such passages καί usually goes untranslated, as in<br />
Vince’s translation of the first passage from Demosthenes. But it is necessary for fully appreciating<br />
the sense: “if others too have ever made that claim with propriety [as in fact they have], then I am<br />
entitled to make it now too.” Even if the phrase in practice usually means that someone deserves a<br />
5 At 211d1 too, just before the passage under discussion, the word ἄνθρωπος also figures prominently: ἐνταῦθα τοῦ βίου, ὦ<br />
φίλε Σώκρατες, ἔφη ἡ Μαντινικὴ ξένη, εἴπερ που ἄλλοθι, βιωτὸν ἀνθρώπῳ, θεωµένῳ αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, “ ‘In that state of life<br />
above all others, my dear Socrates,’ said the Mantinean woman, ‘a man finds it truly worth while to live, as he contemplates<br />
essential beauty.’” (Lamb) For further discussion of this passage see below.<br />
6 Kühner-Gerth 1898 3 , 2.573.<br />
7 Rowe translates: “It is here, my dear Socrates,” said the visitor from Mantinea, “if anywhere, that life is worth living for a<br />
human being, in contemplation of beauty itself.” That is, Rowe takes the phrase in the “exclusive sense”, for which see<br />
below.<br />
8 In fact, in passages as this one I believe that the superlative meaning is not necessarily present. Demosthenes wants to point<br />
out that the law under discussion is a very good law; we need not assume that he really thinks that all other laws are inferior<br />
to this law. Similarly, in X. Cyr. 5.1.6, the phrase ἀλλ’ ὡς ἡµεῖς γε νοµίζοµεν, εἴ τις καὶ ἄλλος ἀνήρ, καὶ Κῦρος ἄξιός<br />
ἐστι θαυµάζεσθαι may just indicate that Cyrus is to be reckoned among admirable men; but we need not assume that<br />
according to Xenophon he outdid all other famous men who ever lived. To put it in grammatical terms: the superlative may<br />
often be absolute (“very good”) rather than relative (“best of all”). ― In terms of the speech act theory one might explain<br />
matters as follows. In the passages from Demosthenes and Xenophon the illocution is equal to the perlocution, that is, “A is<br />
as good as anyone” means that there are others equal to A, but nobody superior to A. In the passage from the <strong>Symposium</strong> the<br />
perlocution goes further than the illocution, that is, “if anywhere, then here” means that “here” is superior to all other<br />
circumstances, but (and this is essential) this does not mean that there no are other circumstances in which life is worth<br />
living; it is only to state that nowhere is life worth living in the same degree as “here”.<br />
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Gerard Boter<br />
predicate more than anyone else, we should realize that καί in the apodosis indicates that besides the<br />
man or thing under discussion there are others for whom the same qualification is valid, although it be<br />
to a lesser degree (however, not stated explicitly).<br />
In Xenophon’s Hiero we read (X. Hier. 7.13): ἀλλ’ εἴπερ τῳ ἄλλῳ, ὦ Σιµωνίδη, λυσιτελεῖ<br />
ἀπάγξασθαι, ἴσθι, ἔφη, ὅτι τυράννῳ ἔγωγε εὑρίσκω µάλιστα τοῦτο λυσιτελοῦν ποιῆσαι, “Ah,<br />
Simonides,” he cried, “if it profits any man to hang himself, know what my finding is: a despot has<br />
most to gain by it, since he alone can neither keep nor lay down his troubles with profit.”<br />
(Marchant/Bowersock) Here, the superlative meaning of the phrase is stressed by µάλιστα.<br />
O’Brien 9 goes one important step further than Kühner-Gerth: he states that in some passages<br />
in Plato the phrase must mean “to the exclusion of anyone (anything, anywhere) else”, which in fact is<br />
the meaning he needs for his interpretation of the philosopher as the only one to attain immortality. I<br />
might style this as the “exclusive use”. As instances, O’Brien mentions three passages in the Phaedo. 10<br />
At Phaedo 78c we find: εἰ δέ τι τυγχάνει ὂν ἀσύνθετον, τούτῳ µόνῳ προσήκει µὴ πάσχειν ταῦτα,<br />
εἴπερ τῳ ἄλλῳ; which is translated by Hachforth as: “Isn’t it incomposite things alone that can<br />
possibly be exempt from that?” Strictly speaking, the phrase is a contamination of τούτῳ µόνῳ<br />
προσήκει µὴ πάσχειν ταῦτα and τούτῳ προσήκει µὴ πάσχειν ταῦτα, εἴπερ τῳ ἄλλῳ. But the<br />
exclusiveness here results from the addition of µόνῳ, not from εἴπερ τῳ ἄλλῳ, and therefore this<br />
passage cannot serve to prove O’Brien’s thesis. 11 In the other two instances adduced by O’Brien the<br />
exclusive interpretation appears to hold; thus at Phaedo 65c Socrates says: Ἆρ’ οὖν οὐκ ἐν τῷ<br />
λογίζεσθαι εἴπερ που ἄλλοθι κατάδηλον αὐτῇ γίγνεταί τι τῶν ὄντων; “If then any part of reality is<br />
ever revealed to it, must it not be when it reasons?” (Hackforth) Here reasoning is dichotomically<br />
opposed to physical perception; in the preceding sentence Socrates had said that the soul is deceived<br />
by the body and thus it is clear that reasoning is the only valid way of reaching the truth. 12 This use of<br />
the formula εἴπερ τις ἄλλος corresponds to the English idiom “to him, if to any human being”. In fact,<br />
O’Brien goes still further: he makes a switch from the plain exclusive use of the phrase (“he alone is<br />
immortal”) to a qualified exclusivity (“he alone is immortal in the real sense of the word”). 13 But this<br />
switch is nowhere hinted at in the text. Moreover, in O’Brien’s interpretation we would have to<br />
assume that the word ἀθανάτῳ is being used in two senses at the same time: personal immortality for<br />
the philosopher and immortality through procreation for other men.<br />
For O’Brien’s interpretation of the philosopher as the only one to attain real immortality it is<br />
essential that εἴπερ τῳ ἄλλῳ ἀνθρώπων ἀθανάτῳ καὶ ἐκείνῳ has an “exclusive” meaning. The<br />
exclusive interpretation of the phrase is also found in the majority of translations. See for instance:<br />
Rowe, “to him, if to any human being”; Susanetti, “e, se mai fu altro uomo, immortale?”; Boll-<br />
Buchwald, “und, wenn es überhaupt ein Mensch erreicht, gar unsterblich?”; Brisson, “Et si, entre tous<br />
les hommes, il en est un qui mérite de devenir immortel, n’est-ce pas lui?” 14 But is this “exclusive”<br />
interpretation acceptable in our passage? It is not.<br />
I have already noted that the presence of καί in the apodosis is an unmistakeable indication of<br />
the “inclusive superlative”; in our passage we find καὶ ἐκείνῳ in the apodosis. What is more, there is<br />
abundant explicit mention of others to whom immortality applies: in fact, the whole of Diotima’s<br />
speech from 206c on aims to demonstrate that living beings, both animals and men, successfully strive<br />
for immortality by means of procreation. And therefore, when Diotima says that if it happens to<br />
anyone else it will also befall the philosopher to become immortal, we have to take this as an inclusive<br />
superlative. 15<br />
9 O’Brien 1984, 197, n. 34.<br />
10 Phaedo 78c, 65c and 66a.<br />
11 For the illogicality of the phrase, Rowe 1993 ad loc. refers to Phaedo 62a, εἰ τοῦτο µόνον τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων ἁπλοῦν<br />
ἐστιν, “that this alone of all the other things is without exception”, which, as Verdenius 1958, 197-198 states, is “a<br />
contamination of “this alone of all things” and “this as distinct from other things”.”<br />
12 The other passage adduced by O’Brien, Phd. 66a7-8, runs as follows: ἆρ’ οὐχ οὗτός ἐστιν, ὦ Σιµµία, εἴπερ τις [καὶ] ἄλλος<br />
ὁ τευξόµενος τοῦ ὄντος; “Is not this the man, Simmias, if anyone, to attain to the knowledge of reality?” (Fowler) I agree<br />
with O’Brien that the phrase is exclusive here. There is an interesting textual problem in this passage: καί is found in the<br />
majority of the medieval mss. but it is omitted in TV and Jamblichus and probably it was absent from the papyrus as well.<br />
The word is bracketed by Burnet but accepted by Rowe and Strachan (the editor of the new OCT), as by the majority of<br />
editors. Because of the exclusive meaning of the phrase I side with Burnet: καί is inappropriate here.<br />
13 O’Brien 1984, 197, n. 34: “A clause of this kind is therefore an appropriate idiom with which to contrast the philosopher’s<br />
true immortality with the mere semblance of it achieved by other men.”<br />
14 See also, e.g., Sedley (2009, 160), “and to him it belongs, if to any human being, to become immortal”; Robin, “n’est-ce<br />
pas à celui dont je parle qu’en reviendra le privilège?”; Joyce, “if ever it is given to man to put on immortality, it shall be<br />
given to him”; Howatson-Sheffield, “it is possible for him (...) and to become, if any human can, immortal himself.”<br />
15 Here are some instances of correct renderings of the phrase: Ferrari, “e, se altri mai, immortale anch'egli?”; Reale, “e sarà,<br />
se mai un altro uomo lo fu, egli pure immortale?”; Schleiermacher, “dem gebührt (...) und, wenn irgendeinem anderen<br />
Menschen, dann gewiß ihm auch, unsterblich zu sein”; Rufener, “und dann kann, wenn überhaupt ein Mensch, auch er<br />
90
4. εἴπερ τῳ ἄλλῳ ἀνθρώπων ἀθανάτῳ καὶ ἐκείνῳ<br />
Gerard Boter<br />
Now that we have established that the phrase εἴπερ τῳ ἄλλῳ ἀνθρώπων ἀθανάτῳ καὶ ἐκείνῳ should<br />
not be taken in an exclusive sense in our passage, we should return to the word ἀνθρώπων in this<br />
phrase. We have already seen that man (ἄνθρωπος) belongs to the class of ζῷα, “living beings”, to<br />
which θηρία, “animals” also belong. The large majority of men become immortal in the same way as<br />
animals, namely by physical procreation. Some people, however, become immortal by intellectual<br />
procreation; at 209c she calls this type of offspring ἀθανατώτεροι παῖδες, “more immortal children”.<br />
Because men become immortal through their offspring, we may conclude that the parents will become<br />
all the more immortal when their offspring is more immortal. So here the scalarity of immortality is<br />
mentioned explicitly. With the philosopher’s offspring we reach the top of the scale. Like some other<br />
men, he produces spiritual offspring. But, just as the spiritual offspring of some is more immortal than<br />
the physical offspring of others, the philosopher’s offspring thus surpasses the spiritual offspring of<br />
others because the philosopher begets this offspring in real beauty, the Form of Beauty itself, and not<br />
in an image of beauty. Therefore the philosopher might rightly be called ἀθανατώτατος, “most<br />
immortal”. Thus the phrase εἴπερ τῳ ἄλλῳ ἀνθρώπων ἀθανάτῳ καὶ ἐκείνῳ fulfils the function it<br />
usually does: it indicates an inclusive superlative―the top of the scale. Like others, the philosopher,<br />
being a man, becomes immortal through the offspring he begets and raises. 16<br />
Many scholars have drawn attention to the similarity of the philosopher’s view of the Form of<br />
Beauty in the <strong>Symposium</strong> and the perfect and eternal view of the Forms by the philosopher’s soul<br />
after death in the Phaedo, when he finally escapes from the cycle of reincarnation. 17 But the<br />
differences between the two dialogues are so great that they prevent us from attributing personal<br />
immortality to the philosopher-lover in the <strong>Symposium</strong>. For one thing, I have already mentioned that<br />
Diotima speaks about him as a man (ἄνθρωπος) viewing the Form of Beauty, whereas in the Phaedo<br />
the Forms are viewed by the disembodied soul of the philosopher. For another, the relation between<br />
viewing the Forms and virtue in the <strong>Symposium</strong> is exactly the opposite of the situation in the Phaedo.<br />
In the <strong>Symposium</strong> the philosopher’s viewing the Form of Beauty enables him to produce real virtue<br />
and thus it precedes virtue; in the Phaedo the possession and practising of real virtue earns him the<br />
reward of viewing the Forms and thus it follows upon viewing the Forms.<br />
5. The immortal Socrates<br />
It is generally assumed that the picture of the philosopher as the perfect lover sketched by Diotima is<br />
put into practice in Alcibiades’ eulogy on Socrates in the next part of the <strong>Symposium</strong>. 18 I would<br />
suggest that an allusion to the person of the historical Socrates may also be present at the end of<br />
Diotima’s speech itself. What I have in mind is similar to the situation in the Simile of the Cave in the<br />
Republic. There (R. 517a4-6) it is stated about the man who returns into the Cave after having seen<br />
the real world and who tries to free the prisoners and lead them outside the cave, “And if it were<br />
possible to lay hands on and to kill the man who tried to release them and lead them up, would they<br />
not kill him?” (Shorey) It has long been recognized that this is an allusion to the fate of Socrates<br />
himself, who was killed by his fellow Athenians. Thus Socrates is made to predict his own death in<br />
the Republic. I suggest that a positive counterpart of this procedure is found in the <strong>Symposium</strong>. Just as<br />
the philosopher-king, that is Socrates, in the Republic has acquired true knowledge of the Forms, so<br />
the ideal philosopher-lover, that is Socrates, has acquired true knowledge of the Form of Beauty. And<br />
his contact with the Form of Beauty has enabled him to give birth to true virtue. The true virtue,<br />
therefore, alludes to Socrates’ perfect philosophy of virtue. This true virtue, being the most immortal<br />
offspring imaginable, will make him immortal.<br />
Both the Phaedo and the <strong>Symposium</strong> can be regarded as monuments for Socrates. They might<br />
be said to constitute a diptych. In the Phaedo the man Socrates is about to die. The dialogue<br />
unsterblich sein”; Chambry, “Or c’est à celui (...) qu’il appartient (...) et, si jamais homme devient immortel, de le devenir lui<br />
aussi.” Lamb’s translation, “he, above all men, is immortal”, makes the superlative meaning of the phrase explicit.<br />
16 What happens to the philosopher’s soul (or, for that matter, to anybody’s soul) after death is not mentioned at all in the<br />
<strong>Symposium</strong>. As to Plato’s opinion on the immortality of the soul at the time he wrote the <strong>Symposium</strong>, I concur with those<br />
scholars who claim that this doctrine is nowhere contradicted in the <strong>Symposium</strong>; it just plays no role in this dialogue. See for<br />
instance Kahn 2003, 300-301; Sedley 2009, 159. Kahn convincingly speaks about the “autonomy” of the Platonic dialogue.<br />
17 See, e.g., Sier 1997, 187: “Diotima läßt ihre Rede, mehr andeutend als ausführend und in einem gewissen mythischen<br />
Halbdunkel mit einem Motiv ausklingen, das gleichsam die Abbreviatur eines eschatologischen Mythos darstallt, wie er<br />
gegen Ende von Gorgias, Phaidon und Politeia begegnet.” See also Fierro 2001, 36-41; Sedley 2009, 160.<br />
18 See, e.g., Hunter 2004, 99 with references.<br />
91
Gerard Boter<br />
concentrates on the fate of Socrates’ soul after the death of the man Socrates: he is the perfect<br />
philosopher whose immortal soul will eventually escape from the cycle of reincarnation and live<br />
forever with the gods, in perfect contact with the Forms. The <strong>Symposium</strong> deals with the man Socrates<br />
in this world of ours: his actual life as the perfect philosopher-lover, as related in Alcibiades’ speech,<br />
and his posthumous life in which he will become immortal by his offspring, true virtue. The fact that<br />
we are talking about Socrates today proves that Plato was fully justified in putting this prediction into<br />
the mouth of his admired master.<br />
References<br />
Boll, F., Buchwald, W. 1969 6 . Platon, Symposion (München)<br />
Bury, R.G. 1932 2 . The <strong>Symposium</strong> of Plato (Cambridge)<br />
Brisson, L. 2000 2 . Platon, Le Banquet (Paris)<br />
Chambry, E. 1922. Platon, Le Banquet (Paris)<br />
Diano, C. 1992. Platone. Il Simposio (Venezia)<br />
Dover, K.J. 1980. Plato, <strong>Symposium</strong> (Cambridge)<br />
Dyson, M. 1986. Immortality and Procreation in Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong>, Antichthon 20, 59-72<br />
Ferrari, F. 1985. Platone, Simposio (Milano)<br />
Fierro, M.A. 2001. Symp. 212A2-7: Desire for the Truth and Desire for Death and a God-like<br />
Immortality, Méthexis 14, 23-43<br />
Fowler, H.N. 1914. Plato, Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo, Phaedrus (Cambridge MA/London)<br />
Gigon, O., Rufener, R. 1974. Platon, Meisterdialoge. Phaidon, Symposion, Phaidros<br />
(Zürich/München)<br />
Hackforth, R. 1955. Plato’s Phaedo (Cambridge)<br />
Howatson, M.C., Sheffield, F.C.C. 2008. Plato, The <strong>Symposium</strong> (Cambridge)<br />
Hunter, R. 2004. Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong> (Oxford)<br />
Joyce, M. 1963 2 . Plato, <strong>Symposium</strong>, in: Hamilton, E., Cairns, H. (eds.) The Collected Dialogues of<br />
Plato (Princeton)<br />
Kahn, Ch. 2003. On the Philosophical Autonomy of a Platonic Dialogue: the Case of Recollection, in:<br />
Michelini, A.N. (ed.), Plato as Author. The Rhetoric of Philosophy (Leiden/Boston)<br />
Kühner, R., Gerth, B. 1898 3 . Ausführliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache, Zweiter Teil:<br />
Satzlehre (Hannover)<br />
Lamb, W.R.M. 1925. Plato, Lysis, <strong>Symposium</strong>, Gorgias (Cambridge MA/London)<br />
Marchant, E.C., Bowersock, G.W. Xenophon, Scripta minora (Cambridge MA/London)<br />
O’Brien, M.J. 1984. “Becoming Immortal” in Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong>, in: Gerber, D.E. (ed.) Greek Poetry<br />
and Philosophy (Festschrift L. Woodbury) (Chico), 185-205<br />
Price, A.W. 1989. Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle (Oxford)<br />
Reale, G. 2001. Platone, Simposio (Milano)<br />
Robin, L. 1929. Platon, Le Banquet (Paris)<br />
Rowe, C.J. 1998. Plato, <strong>Symposium</strong> (Warminster)<br />
Schleiermacher, F., Kurz, D. 1974. Platon, Phaidon, Das Gastmahl, Kratylos (Darmstadt)<br />
Sedley, D. 2009. Three Kinds of Platonic Immortality, in: Frede, D., Reis, B. (eds.) Body and Soul in<br />
Ancient Philosophy (Berlin), 145-161<br />
Shorey, P. 1935. Plato, The Republic, vol. 2 (Cambridge MA/London)<br />
Sier, K. 1997. Die Rede der Diotima (Stuttgart/Leipzig)<br />
Stokes, M.C. 1986. Plato’s Socratic Conversations (London)<br />
Verdenius, W.J. 1958. Notes on Plato’s Phaedo, Mnemosyne 10, 193-243<br />
Vince, J.H. 1935. Demosthenes, vol. 3 (Cambridge MA/London)<br />
Wippern, J. 1965. Eros und Unsterblichkeit in der Diotima-Rede des Symposions, in: Flashar, H.,<br />
Gaiser, K. (eds.) Synusia, Festgabe fiir Wolfgang Schadewaldt zum 15. Marz 1965 (Pfullingen),<br />
12<br />
92
Plenary session<br />
Chair: Mary Margaret McCabe
Immortalità personale senza anima immortale: Diotima e Aristotele<br />
Mario Vegetti<br />
1. Diotima 1 sostiene con molta chiarezza la tesi che il desiderio di possedere “ciò che è buono”<br />
(tagathà) è motivato dall'altro e dominante desiderio di “essere felici” (εὐδαίµων ἔσται, 204e6 ss.).<br />
Eros è dunque rivolto a «possedere il bene per sempre» (206a8-9), e con esso, s'intende, la felicità che<br />
ne consegue. Questa aspirazione a un possesso perpetuo di bene e di felicità dà necessariamente luogo<br />
a un desiderio erotico di immortalità (ἀθανασίας δὲ ἀναγκαῖον ἐπιθυµεῖν, 206e9 s.). 2<br />
Diotima indica tre percorsi che possono venire seguiti in vista della soddisfazione di questo desiderio<br />
di immortalità. 3<br />
1.1 La prima via verso l'immortalità riguarda ogni vivente mortale, uomo o animale che sia<br />
(207b), e consiste nella procreazione biologica di un individuo simile al genitore, poiché «in ogni<br />
vivente che è mortale vi è qualcosa di immortale», la gravidanza e la generazione (206c6-8): «la<br />
procreazione è ciò che di eterno e immortale spetta a un mortale» (206e8). 4<br />
Infatti, conclude su questo punto Diotima, «la natura mortale cerca per quanto le è possibile (katà to<br />
dynatòn) di essere sempre e di essere immortale. Ma può farlo solo in questo modo, attraverso la<br />
procreazione» (207d1-3).<br />
Si tratta in particolare della via seguita da quegli uomini che sono «gravidi secondo il corpo»:<br />
essi si rivolgono alla riproduzione sessuale «procurandosi attraverso la procreazione di figli<br />
immortalità e ricordo e felicità (ἀθανασίαν καὶ µνήµην καὶ εὐδαιµονίαν)...per tutto il tempo a venire»<br />
(208e).<br />
1.2 Accanto alla via biologica verso l'immortalità, Diotima ne riconosce altre due, queste<br />
specificamente umane, che potremmo definire di tipo “culturale”. 5<br />
La prima di esse riguarda un tipo d'uomo il cui profilo antropologico è diverso da quello dedito alla<br />
riproduzione biologica. E' l'uomo ambizioso, motivato dalla philotimia, il cui desiderio di immortalità<br />
prende la forma dell'aspirazione – di chiara memoria omerica 6 – a un kleos athanaton (208c5 s.), che<br />
assicuri «l'immortale memoria» delle loro gesta e della loro areté: «è per una virtù immortale e una<br />
fama gloriosa che tutti fanno tutto, e tanto più quanto migliori essi siano: infatti amano l'immortale»<br />
(208d5-e2).<br />
E' nell'ambito di questo tipo antropologico che la tensione verso un'immortalità culturale si<br />
sviluppa, dopo la primitiva ricerca del kleos eroico dell'epica, in direzione di un lascito eterno di opere<br />
memorabili, tanto nell'ambito della creazione poetica quanto in quello della storia politica. La vecchia<br />
areté eroica lascia ora il passo a un nuovo quadro di virtù che si inscrivono nello spazio<br />
dell'intelligenza, la phronesis (φρόνησίν τε καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετήν, 209a4): quelle virtù, sophrosyne e<br />
dikaiosyne, che per Platone sono essenzialmente “politiche” (cfr. Resp. IV 430d1), e che Aristotele<br />
avrebbe preferito chiamare “etiche”. Gli eroi eponimi di queste nuove virtù sono ora i poeti e gli<br />
artisti “creativi”, come Omero ed Esiodo, ma ancor di più coloro che si distinguono nel garantire il<br />
buon ordine (diakosmesis) delle case e delle città, come i protolegislatori Licurgo e Solone. 7 E' grazie<br />
alle loro opere nel dominio della cultura e della politica che essi acquistano, come i vecchi eroi, fama<br />
(kleos) e memoria immortali (209d). 8<br />
1 La maggior parte dei commentatori riconosce senza incertezze in Diotima un portavoce affidabile del pensiero platonico.<br />
Dubbi in proposito, da punti di vista diversi, sono stati espressi per esempio da SEDLEY (1999) p. 130 n. 2, e da NAILS (2006)<br />
pp. 192-3. Si tratta di dubbi legittimi, se si tiene conto delle complesse strategie di distanziamento dal testo presentate nel<br />
prologo del dialogo (catena di narratori poco attendibili), e del carattere anomalo del personaggio (donna, straniera,<br />
sacerdotessa). E' vero tuttavia che Diotima usa a più riprese, come vedremo, il linguaggio tecnico della teoria delle idee che<br />
appartiene senza dubbio a uno dei nuclei teorici costanti del pensiero di Platone. Se è vero che nessun personaggio<br />
(comprese le diverse raffigurazioni di Socrate) può essere considerato senza riserve come “portavoce” autentico di Platone,<br />
non credo dunque che Diotima sia da considerare meno affidabile per esempio del Socrate del Fedone o della Repubblica, né<br />
che le sue tesi vadano corrette sulla base di quelle espresse altrove da altri personaggi autorevoli. Ma della specificità del<br />
personaggio nel contesto dialogico, in particolare per quanto riguarda la retorica erotica, bisognerà tener conto nel seguito di<br />
questa analisi.<br />
2 Per un importante passo parallelo sulla connessione tra immortalità e felicità cfr. Timeo 90c, sul quale dovremo tornare.<br />
L'accostamento è segnalato da FERRARI (2012) p. 38.<br />
3 Si veda in questo senso LEAR (2006) p. 109.<br />
4 Le traduzioni del Simposio citate sono di M. Nucci (2009), con qualche modifica.<br />
5 FUSSI (2008) segnala tuttavia che nel caso degli uomini anche la riproduzione biologica comporta un aspetto culturale,<br />
perché essa comprende le nozioni di famiglia e di memoria conservata nella discendenza (pp. 6-7).<br />
6 Sul tono epico di tutto il passo cfr. SUSANETTI (1992) p. 25.<br />
7 G. R. F. FERRARI (1992), p. 255, parla in proposito di un «pious roll of cultural heroes».<br />
8 Un interessante passo delle Leggi compatta la prima e la seconda via all'immortalità. «In qualche misura il genere umano
Mario Vegetti<br />
Fin qui, secondo Diotima, il giovane Socrate è in grado di seguire il percorso dell'iniziazione erotica.<br />
La sacerdotessa dubita però che egli sia in grado di seguirla oltre la soglia dei cosiddetti misteri<br />
maggiori, che apre la via all'iniziazione epoptica, nonostante che si dichiari disposta a dedicare al<br />
discepolo tutto il suo impegno (οὐκ οἶδ´εἰ οἷός τ´ἂν εἴης...ἐγὼ καὶ προθυµίας οὐδὲν ἀπολείψω, 210α2-<br />
4). Torneremo più avanti sul senso di questa presunta incapacità di Socrate di seguire Diotima nel<br />
percorso iniziatico. Si tratta ora invece di vedere che cosa sta oltre la soglia dei “grandi misteri”. E'<br />
certo comunque che a superarla non potrà essere il tipo antropologico dell'uomo “filotimico”, ma una<br />
figura umana diversa: evidentemente, è il caso di anticipare, quella del filosofo.<br />
1.3 La terza via verso l'immortalità è anch'essa, come la seconda, di ambito culturale e non<br />
biologico, ma sia il suo approccio sia il suo esito sono di qualità intellettuale del tutto superiore a<br />
quelli della via “filotimica”. Chi dunque procede correttamente (orthòs) per questa via passerà<br />
dall'eros rivolto alla bellezza di un corpo a quello per tutti i corpi che partecipano del tratto della<br />
bellezza, poi a quello rivolto alla superiore bellezza delle anime e dei loro prodotti: comportamenti<br />
(epitedeumata), leggi, conoscenze (epistemai) (210a-c). Questo eros riorientato lo metterà di fronte<br />
allo spettacolo del «vasto mare del bello», la cui contemplazione gli ispirerà la generazione di<br />
«discorsi (logoi) belli e magnifici», nonché di nobili pensieri (dianoemata) filosofici, il cui orizzonte è<br />
la conoscenza unitaria e per così dire intensiva (mia episteme) del bello (210d).<br />
A questo punto, giunto ormai al telos della contemplazione delle cose belle, l'iniziato perverrà<br />
alla visione istantanea (ἐξαίφνης κατόψεται) del «bello per natura» (210e4-6). Tutto ciò suscita<br />
naturalmente parecchie domande, ma importa qui in primo luogo vedere le conseguenze di questa<br />
visione del bello in sé. Chi la consegue genera non più simulacri di areté – tali vanno ormai<br />
evidentemente considerate tanto le virtù “eroiche” quanto quelle etico-politiche – ma la «virtù vera»<br />
(212a4-6), la cui natura deve essere dunque considerata soltanto contemplativa. A chi l'ha conseguita<br />
spetta di diventare theophilés, evidentemente nel doppio senso di colui che è “caro agli dèi” e che è a<br />
loro devoto. A questo tipo di uomo toccherebbe anche di diventare immortale, athanatos, se mai ciò<br />
potesse accadere a un uomo, e nella misura in cui questo per un uomo è possibile (212a7-8). Questa è<br />
la terza e più elevata forma di immortalità perseguibile dagli uomini, dopo quella biologica e quella<br />
poetica e politica.<br />
1.4 Tutto questo, si diceva, suscita molte domande. Che cosa esattamente conosce l'iniziato<br />
quando “vede” il bello? Che forma epistemica assume questa conoscenza? Perché essa dovrebbe<br />
risultare quasi inaccessibile al Socrate allievo di Diotima? C'è continuità o discontinuità fra i diversi<br />
passi verso l'immortalità, e i tipi d'uomo che ad essi corrispondono? Che cosa accade all'iniziato dopo<br />
la visione del bello? Infine quella che è per noi la domanda più importante: di che tipo è l'immortalità<br />
acquisita grazie alla conoscenza del bello?<br />
1.4.1 Il linguaggio con cui Platone descrive il “bello” oggetto della visione epoptica non<br />
lascia dubbi: si tratta dell'idea o forma del bello, cui vengono riferiti i tratti ricorrenti in quella che si<br />
può definire la teoria standard delle idee. 9 E' sufficiente leggerne due passi confrontandoli<br />
rispettivamente con quelli paralleli in Repubblica e Fedone. Il bello del Simposio «sempre è e non<br />
nasce né muore, non cresce né diminuisce, ...non è in parte bello e in parte brutto, né a volte bello e a<br />
volte no, né bello rispetto a una cosa e brutto rispetto a un'altra [...]» (211a1-4). E si veda Repubblica,<br />
dove si polemizza contro il filodosso che «non ritiene esservi il bello in sé né alcuna idea della<br />
bellezza in sé che permanga sempre invariante nella sua identità», e gli si obietta che delle molteplici<br />
cose belle «non ve n'è una che non possa apparire anche brutta [...], e che le stesse cose appaiono, da<br />
diversi punti di vista, ora belle ora brutte», a differenza dell'identità invariante dell'idea (V 479a1-8).<br />
Ancora, il bello del Simposio si trova «esso stesso (αὐτὸ καθ´αὑτό) in se stesso, con se stesso, in<br />
un'unica forma (monoeidès), eterno, mentre tutte le altre cose belle partecipano (metechonta) di esso<br />
[...]» (211b1-3). Il confronto qui è con il Fedone, dove dell' «uguale in sé, del bello in sé, e di ciascuna<br />
cosa che è in sé» si dice che «ciascuna di queste cose che sono, essendo uniformi (monoeidès) in sé e<br />
per sé (αὐτὸ καθ´αὑτό) e nella medesima condizione, in nessun momento, in nessun luogo ammette<br />
alcun mutamento» (78d3-8).<br />
Non c'è dubbio, quindi, che l'oggetto della visione iniziatica possa definirsi tecnicamente<br />
come l'idea del bello. Il fatto che il contatto con essa (designato con il verbo aptesthai) rappresenti il<br />
partecipa per sua natura dell'immortalità e di questa ognuno ha un desiderio innato: si tratta del desiderio di diventare celebri<br />
(kleinòn) senza giacere senza nome una volta morti. In effetti il genere umano è in qualche modo connato con la totalità del<br />
tempo che lo accompagna e lo accompagnerà sino al termine ed essendo appunto in questo senso immortale, col lasciare i<br />
figli dei figli restando perennemente identico a se stesso e unico, partecipa mediante la generazione all'immortalità» (IV<br />
721b7-c7). E' da notare che mentre l'immortalità attraverso la fama è strettamente individuale, quella riproduttiva si sposta<br />
chiaramente, come sarebbe accaduto in Aristotele (cfr. 2.1) dagli individui al genere.<br />
9 Si vedano in questo senso p. es. DI BENEDETTO (1985) p. 41; FRONTEROTTA (2012) p. 99.<br />
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culmine e il compimento del percorso erotico (telos, 210e4) può suggerire un'analogia, almeno di<br />
posizione, con l'idea del buono nella Repubblica, collocata anch'esso al culmine (telos) del mondo<br />
ideale, e oggetto di un'apprensione noetica (VII 532b1 s.), che può a sua volta venire indicata con il<br />
verbo aptesthai (VI 511b6). Ma si tratta di un'analogia che è appunto solo di posizione, perché mentre<br />
nella Repubblica il primato del buono rispetto alle altre idee è argomentato con forza, nel Simposio il<br />
bello appare come telos nel quadro dominante della sublimazione erotica, né è mai in questione il suo<br />
rapporto con le altre forme del dominio eidetico.<br />
1.4.2 Pochi dubbi possono esservi anche circa il modo di apprensione dell'idea del bello nel<br />
Simposio. Il linguaggio platonico rinvia inequivocabilmente all'immediatezza dell'atto intuitivo, che si<br />
configura come visione o contatto (exaiphnes, kathoràn, aptesthai: 210e5, 211b8). Si aggiunge<br />
esplicitamente che in questo atto l'apparizione del bello non prende la forma né di un logos né di una<br />
episteme (211a8), è dunque estranea rispetto all'ambito della conoscenza linguistico-proposizionale. 10<br />
E' persuasivo il confronto con l'approccio della dialettica all'idea del buono nella Repubblica. Benché<br />
anche qui non siano assenti accenni a una conoscenza di tipo intuitivo, l'accento cade sulla definizione<br />
discorsiva (διορίσασθαι τῷ λόγῳ), sull'elenchos (VII 534b8-c1), sul logos tes ousias, sul logon<br />
didonai (VII 534b3-5). Confesso di non trovare appassionante la discussione intorno al carattere<br />
irrazionale, mistico, oppure razionale e addirittura iper-razionale 11 di atti conoscitivi extralinguistici.<br />
Linguistico/proposizionale e razionale non sono evidentemente termini sovrapponibili e convertibili, e<br />
la storia dell'idea di Wesenschau nella filosofia del Novecento è lì a dimostrarlo. Più interessante è la<br />
questione, sollevata da Fronterotta, 12 se l'atto di conoscenza intuitiva individualmente sperimentato sia<br />
linguisticamente trasponibile, comunicabile e universalizzabile: a me pare che, a differenza della<br />
Repubblica, la questione non sia tematizzata nel Simposio e debba quindi essere lasciata aperta, anche<br />
se una risposta positiva potrebbe, con molta incertezza, venire suggerita dal rapporto maestrodiscepolo<br />
che regge l'intero percorso iniziatico.<br />
Va piuttosto notato che la piena visione dell'idea del bello è perfettamente accessibile in<br />
questa vita, e non richiede – a differenza che nel Fedone – alcuna separazione dell'anima dal corpo,<br />
anzi è possibile solo al termine di un processo di sublimazione nel quale l'attrazione verso la bellezza<br />
corporea è il punto di partenza imprescindibile. Ma su questo dovremo tornare da un diverso punto di<br />
vista.<br />
1.4.3 Che cosa significa dunque l'incapacità di seguirla nel viaggio iniziatico che Diotima<br />
attribuisce a Socrate? In essa si è potuto leggere il segno della insuperabile minorità del filosofo,<br />
costretto, almeno in questa vita, ad amare la sapienza senza poterla conseguire, e dunque confinato<br />
nella zona epistemica dell' “opinione vera”. Questa interpretazione sembra tuttavia smentita da un<br />
passo molto simile della Repubblica, dove è però Socrate, una volta giunto sulla soglia della piena<br />
comprensione della dialettica e del suo oggetto terminale, l'idea del buono, ad attribuire a Glaucone<br />
un'analoga incapacità di procedere oltre. 13 Socrate usa qui quasi le stesse parole che Diotima gli aveva<br />
indirizzato nel Simposio: «mio caro Glaucone, non sarai più in grado (οὐκέτι...οἶός τ´ἔσῃ) di<br />
seguirmi, per quanto io non trascurerò certo ogni sforzo (prothymia)» (VII 533a1 s.). Il cambio di<br />
posizione fra Socrate e Diotima può allora far pensare che l'incapacità di Socrate nel Simposio sia<br />
dovuta alla sua giovinezza, 14 superata nella Repubblica quando un Socrate maturo avrebbe ormai<br />
assunto l'atteggiamento del maestro. Anche questa ipotesi sembra tuttavia messa in dubbio da un<br />
confronto con il Parmenide. Qui il vecchio maestro eleata riconosce come propria del giovanissimo<br />
Socrate una procedura filosofica consistente nel riconoscere tratti comuni a diversi enti (è il primo<br />
passo nella costruzione della teoria delle idee, cioè il riconoscimento dell'unità oltre la molteplicità,<br />
dello hen epì pollois, da cui inizia anche l'ascesa del Simposio, 210b3 s.), e nel separare (chorìs)<br />
questi tratti dagli enti che ne partecipano, facendone così eide esistenti in se stessi: «questo<br />
ragionamento vale anche per realtà quali la forma in sé e per sé (εἶδος αὐτὸ καθ ´αὑτό) del giusto, del<br />
bello, del buono» (130b2-9, cfr. 130e5-131a2).<br />
Quello insomma che il giovanissimo Socrate fa secondo Parmenide è la costruzione di una<br />
forma standard della teoria delle idee mediante una semplice procedura logico-ontologica che non<br />
richiede né i paraphernalia dell'iniziazione ai misteri erotici propri del Simposio, 15 né alcuna visione<br />
10 Cfr. CENTRONE (2009) p. XXXIII; NUCCI (2009) n. 269; FRONTEROTTA (2012) pp. 106-10.<br />
11 Parla di «suprema rigorosità razionale» BEARZI (2004) p. 215. Che non si tratti di una «mystische Erlebnis», perché non<br />
c'è alcuna unio mystica fra soggetto e oggetto, è sostenuto da SIER (1997) pp. 171 sg.<br />
12 Cit., p. 109.<br />
13 Qui tuttavia può trattarsi non tanto di un'incapacità soggettiva quanto dell'intrinseca difficoltà che la dialettica possa<br />
costituirsi come un sapere epistemologicamente completo e saturo, difficoltà che dipende dalla natura ontologicamente<br />
ambigua del suo oggetto ultimo, l'idea del buono: cfr. in questo senso VEGETTI (2005) pp. 25-37.<br />
14 Interessanti considerazioni sul “Socrate giovane” nei dialoghi in DE LUISE (2012) pp. 115-38.<br />
15 Giustamente ROWE (1998) sottolinea che quella erotica è solo una delle vie possibili per la conoscenza filosofica.<br />
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oltreterrena delle idee.<br />
Non sembra dunque che la ragione della difficoltà attribuita da Diotima a Socrate consista<br />
nell'aspetto cognitivo dell'accesso all'idea del bello. Ciò che viene in questo modo enfatizzato e<br />
solennizzato è la difficoltà di una scelta di vita più che di un orientamento epistemico: la scelta di vita<br />
che condurrà a una forma di immortalizzazione individuale diversa sia da quella biologica sia da<br />
quella politica e poetica, e che dunque richiede una piena maturità morale oltre che intellettuale da<br />
parte di chi si avvia in quella direzione.<br />
1.4.4 Sembra di poter escludere che vi sia una continuità fra i diversi percorsi verso l'immortalità, e<br />
che essi possano venir disposti in una sequenza progressiva: 16 quello erotico-filosofico va intrapreso<br />
«fin da giovane» (210a6), e ad esso corrisponde un tipo d'uomo – appunto il filosofo –<br />
antropologicamente diverso sia da quello dedito alla procreazione biologica sia dal philotimos. La<br />
scelta del filosofo comporta una forma di vita che gli è peculiare: «questa è la dimensione della vita<br />
che, se mai altra, un uomo deve vivere (biôtòn): contemplando il bello in sé» (211d1-3).<br />
Il Simposio – a differenza dalla Repubblica – non sembra prevedere alcuna discesa del<br />
filosofo una volta raggiunto lo stadio contemplativo. 17 E' vero che giunto alla visione del bello, e al<br />
tipo di vita che le consegue, il filosofo ha ancora un'attività generativa, consistente nel «partorire non<br />
simulacri (eidola) di virtù, ma virtù vera, visto che afferra il vero» (212a4-6). Questa areté, proprio in<br />
quanto è “vera”, sarà perciò diversa dalle virtù poetiche e politiche: se possiamo anticipare un<br />
linguaggio aristotelico, essa sarà una virtù dianoetica e non etica, che configura una forma di vita<br />
dedicata alla verità e non alla politica o alla creazione poetica.<br />
Blondell 18 ritiene inevitabile una discesa: «poiché il filosofo non può esistere<br />
permanentemente nella contemplazione delle forme», «il Socrate temporaneamente solipsistico<br />
tornerà presto fra i suoi compagni mortali». Questo può essere certamente vero per il filosofo della<br />
Repubblica, e forse anche per il nostro senso comune. Ma è meno vero per la figura del filosofo che<br />
Platone delinea nel celebre excursus del Teeteto, con la sua esclusiva dedizione alla pura teoresi<br />
(173d-175b), per non parlare dell'ascesi del Fedone. 19 Del resto, non c'è nulla di impensabile in una<br />
vita interamente dedicata alla comprensione delle strutture del mondo noetico, se si pensa a esercizi<br />
teorici come quelli programmati nel Sofista e nel Parmenide. Che il bios theoretikòs possa costituire<br />
una forma di vita pervasiva, lo avrebbe indicato con chiarezza Aristotele – anche se certamente in lui<br />
l'oggetto della contemplazione risulta assai dilatato rispetto a quello platonico.<br />
1.4.5 Queste considerazioni rendono più agevole la risposta alla domanda per noi più<br />
importante, circa il tipo di immortalità personale che consegue alla visione dell'idea del bello (e per<br />
estensione, è lecito supporre, del mondo delle forme nel suo insieme). «Non trovi – chiede Diotima –<br />
che a chi partorisce e alleva virtù vera spetta di diventare caro agli dèi (theophilès), e se mai a un<br />
uomo toccasse di diventare immortale, dovrebbe toccare a lui?» (212a7 s.). Il senso di questo passo, in<br />
cui Platone indica la terza e più elevata via verso l'immortalità personale, viene chiarito dal confronto<br />
con un più esplicito testo parallelo del Timeo, il cui linguaggio presenta forti affinità con quello del<br />
Simposio: «colui il quale si è impegnato nella ricerca del sapere e in pensieri veri e soprattutto questa<br />
parte di sé ha esercitato, è assolutamente necessario che, quando attinge alla verità (ἀληθείας<br />
ἐφάπτηται), abbia dei pensieri immortali e divini e che, nella misura in cui alla natura umana è stato<br />
dato di partecipare all'immortalità, non ne trascuri alcuna parte e sia perciò straordinariamente felice»<br />
(90b6-c6, trad. Fronterotta leggermente modificata).<br />
Il passo del Timeo conferma ciò che risulta già con molta chiarezza nel Simposio. Per<br />
individui mortali, l'immortalità personale ottenuta mediante l'acquisizione, il consolidamento, la<br />
trasmissione educativa della conoscenza – al pari di quella perseguita mediante la prole o la memoria<br />
– non richiede e non presume l'immortalità dell'anima individuale. Come ha scritto Casertano, «ogni<br />
singolo uomo è mortale, in suo corpo e sua anima, ma ha la possibilità, nella sua vita mortale, di<br />
16 Cfr. in questo senso CENTRONE (2009) p. XXXIII e NUCCI (2009) n. 260.<br />
17 Così NAILS (2006): «the ascent in the <strong>Symposium</strong> ends at the summit with exclusive contemplation of the kalon» (pp. 193<br />
s.). Nello stesso senso BEARZI (2004), p. 234 (che tuttavia cerca di mostrare una indiretta compatibilità con la Repubblica).<br />
Scrive efficacemente FERRARI (1992) pp. 259-60: «far from there being any hint that he [l'iniziato] could transfer his concern<br />
from the Beautiful itself to the beauty of virtue, he is explicitly envisaged as spending his life in contemplation of the former.<br />
In marked contrast to the Lesser Mysteries, what virtue amounts to here is not clearly something other than the vision of the<br />
Beautiful that gives it birth».<br />
18 BLONDELL (2006) pp. 155, 176. Mi sembra abbastanza simile la posizione di GONZALEZ (2008) §17. Anche PRICE (1989)<br />
ritiene che contemplazione non possa significare inazione e indifferenza alle altre persone, ma come conferma a questa tesi<br />
cita prevalentemente passi della Repubblica! (p. 51). Se tutte le tesi sostenute da Platone in ogni dialogo fossero<br />
immediatamente trasferibili a tutti gli altri, Platone avrebbe scritto un solo libro: un compendio, o syngramma, della filosofia<br />
platonica, opera che egli stesso dichiara impossibile e il cui primo esemplare storico sembra sia stato composto dal giovane<br />
tiranno siracusano Dionisio II (Ep. VII 341b-c).<br />
19 Per questa tensione tra diversi profili della vita filosofica cfr. VEGETTI (2000) pp. 362-64.<br />
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attingere una forma di immortalità, che consiste precisamente nell'innalzarsi al mondo immortale della<br />
conoscenza». 20<br />
Il senso dell'assenza nel Simposio di una teoria dell'immortalità dell'anima individuale, in<br />
rapporto all'insieme del pensiero platonico, andrà discusso più avanti.<br />
E' ora il caso di considerare una posterità importante, e in qualche misura sorprendente, delle tesi<br />
sull'immortalità insegnate da Diotima; reciprocamente, questa posterità servirà a comprendere meglio<br />
il senso e la portata delle osservazioni che abbiamo svolto fin qui.<br />
2.1 C'è una straordinaria somiglianza fra la via riproduttiva all'immortalità indicata da<br />
Diotima e il modo in cui Aristotele spiega la finalità della riproduzione biologica tanto nel De anima<br />
quanto nel De generatione animalium. «La funzione più naturale (physikôtaton) degli esseri viventi<br />
[...] è di produrre un altro individuo simile a sé: l'animale un animale e la pianta una pianta, e ciò per<br />
partecipare (metechôsin), nella misura del possibile, dell'eterno e del divino. In effetti è a questo che<br />
tutti gli esseri tendono (oregetai) [...] Poiché dunque questi esseri non possono partecipare con<br />
continuità dell'eterno e del divino, in quanto nessun essere corruttibile è in grado di sopravvivere<br />
identico e uno di numero, ciascuno ne partecipa per quanto gli è possibile, chi più e chi meno, e<br />
sopravvive non in se stesso, ma in un individuo simile a sé, non uno di numero, ma uno nella specie<br />
(eidei)» (De an. II 4 415a25-b7, trad. Movia). Più brevemente ribadiva Aristotele nel De generatione:<br />
«poiché non è possibile che la natura del genere degli animali sia eterna, ciò che nasce è eterno nel<br />
modo che gli è dato. Individualmente gli è dunque impossibile [...] secondo la specie gli è invece<br />
possibile. Perciò vi è sempre un genere di uomini, di animali e di piante» (De gen. anim. II 1 731b31-<br />
732a1, trad. Lanza).<br />
Aristotele non fa così che generalizzare, estendendola all'intero mondo vivente, dagli uomini<br />
alle piante, la tesi di Diotima sull'immortalità riproduttiva. L'estensione comporta però due<br />
conseguenze. La prima è una certa de-psicologizzazione del discorso di Diotima, che sostituisce l'eros<br />
con una pulsione “naturalissima”; resta vero anche per Aristotele che l'aspirazione (orexis) verso<br />
l'eternità divina costituisce una sorta di programma genetico del vivente, che può però agire in modo<br />
del tutto inconsapevole. La seconda conseguenza è che la scena dell'immortalizzazione riproduttiva si<br />
sposta decisamente dagli individui alla specie, che ne è l'unico ambito possibile.<br />
2.2 Aristotele non riprende in modo esplicito la seconda via verso l'immortalità personale,<br />
quella perseguita dal tipo d'uomo “filotimico”. Non c'è dubbio però che egli delinei questa forma di<br />
vita e la sua connessione con la virtù e la felicità, anche se non direttamente con l'immortalità<br />
mediante la memoria. Si tratta dell'ambito delle virtù che Aristotele chiama etiche, distinguendolo da<br />
quelle “teoriche” definite, com'è noto, “dianoetiche”. Le virtù etiche non sono le prime anche se<br />
godono di una loro eccellenza. «L'agire politico e le azioni di guerra eccellono tra le azioni secondo<br />
virtù»; ne derivano «potere e onori (timàs), e comunque la felicità (eudaimonia) per se stesso e per i<br />
propri concittadini» (Eth. nicom. X 7, 1177b13-17, trad. Natali modificata). Tuttavia la felicità<br />
conseguente a questa forma di virtù è imperfetta e di secondo rango, perché condizionata da<br />
circostanze esterne e indipendenti dall'individuo agente, al quale viene richiesto un impegno oneroso e<br />
dall'esito incerto.<br />
2.3. Inequivocabile invece la ripresa aristotelica della terza via verso l'immortalità personale,<br />
quella filosofica: 21 essa è manifestata in un passo dell'Etica nicomachea dal forte rilievo retorico,<br />
centrato sul verbo athanatizein, un hapax nel corpo aristotelico. 22 Nel celebre capitolo 7 del libro X, 23<br />
Aristotele decreta il primato della vita teoretica, in quanto attività secondo la migliore virtù umana,<br />
quella esercitata dal nous nella conoscenza delle cose «belle e divine», da cui consegue la sua capacità<br />
di pervenire alla «felicità perfetta (teleia eudamonia)» (1177a12-17). Questa vita consiste nell'attività<br />
dell'elemento divino inerente alla vita umana, appunto il pensiero. Per questo, aggiunge Aristotele,<br />
«non si deve, essendo uomini, limitarsi a pensare a cose umane, né essendo mortali pensare solo a<br />
cose mortali, come dicono i consigli tradizionali, ma rendersi immortali fin quanto è possibile (ἐφ´<br />
ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν) e fare di tutto per vivere secondo la parte migliore che è in noi. Anche se<br />
20 Cfr. CASERTANO (2012) pp. 64-5 (anche nota 49 a p. 67). Nello stesso senso LEAR (2006) p. 115 nota 25 («nel mondo del<br />
Simposio le pratiche culturali durano più a lungo delle anime perché le anime sono mortali. E le scienze sono ancora più<br />
“immortali” perché sono associate a oggetti atemporali»); FERRARI (2012) p. 39 (l'eternazione del sapere come unica forma<br />
di immortalità umana); ROWE (1998) pp. 112-13. Per il Timeo cfr. CENTRONE (2007) p. 42. Per posizioni opposte cfr. nota<br />
25.<br />
21 La vicinanza di Aristotele a Platone su questo tema è stata segnalata e discussa da ARENDT (1991) pp. 70-129.<br />
22 Cfr. in proposito VEGETTI (2007A) pp. 165-66, 174-76. Un accenno all'influsso di Simposio e Timeo 90c su questo passo<br />
aristotelico è formulato da SIER (1997) pp. 187 sg.<br />
23 La critica ha spesso rilevato il carattere anomalo di questo e del seguente capitolo rispetto al tono generale del trattato<br />
etico: la discussione relativa in VEGETTI (2010) pp. 202-10.<br />
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è di peso (onchos) minuscolo, per potere e per onore essa supera di gran lunga tutto il resto»<br />
(1177b31-1178a1). La più alta forma di immortalità personale possibile per l'essere umano mortale, la<br />
virtù più vera, la perfetta felicità: riecheggiano con molta forza, in questo passo aristotelico, i tratti<br />
decisivi riconosciuti da Diotima alla contemplazione filosofica dell'idea del bello – certo estesa da<br />
Aristotele a tutto il campo dei possibili oggetti del pensiero speculativo.<br />
Sembra dunque certo che Aristotele abbia trovato nel Simposio elementi decisivi per pensare<br />
la questione del desiderio di immortalità individuale da parte di viventi mortali, e dei diversi livelli ai<br />
quali questo desiderio può venire soddisfatto: dall'eternazione riproduttiva fino all'assimilazione<br />
parziale con l'immortalità divina consentito dalla forma di vita teoretica.<br />
2.4 L'elaborazione e l'espansione aristotelica delle prospettive indicate da Diotima forniscono<br />
dal canto loro preziosi chiarimenti che possono venire impiegati retroattivamente per l'interpretazione<br />
dei problemi cruciali sollevati da quelle prospettive.<br />
In primo luogo. Considerata dal punto di vista aristotelico, la questione se il percorso<br />
“politico” e quello speculativo verso l'immortalizzazione personale vadano considerati come posti in<br />
sequenza o piuttosto in alternativa può venire chiaramente risolta nel secondo senso. La forma di vita<br />
politica e quella teoretica sono nettamente distinte e contrapposte da Aristotele; 24 ad esse<br />
corrispondono tipi d'uomo diversi, e diverse virtù gerarchicamente distinte (quella dianoetica e quelle<br />
etiche, anche se naturalmente l'esercizio della virtù maggiore non esclude il possesso di quelle etiche,<br />
richieste dall'interazione quotidiana fra gli uomini) 25 . Aristotele considera l'attività politica come un<br />
impedimento e un impaccio per quella speculativa, cui va dedicata per quanto è possibile la vita intera<br />
– anche se essa concerne un'esigua minoranza di uomini, come del resto presumibilmente accadeva<br />
per la perfetta iniziazione erotica del Simposio.<br />
Questa opposizione tra virtù, forme di vita e tipi umani contiene in sé anche la risposta che il<br />
punto di vista aristotelico offre al secondo quesito suscitato dal Simposio, circa l'eventuale “discesa”<br />
nelle occupazioni umane dopo l'evento della contemplazione dell'idea del bello. Come si era<br />
anticipato, questa risposta non può che essere negativa. A differenza del ritorno nella caverna dei<br />
filosofi della Repubblica, il filosofo aristotelico rifiuterà il coinvolgimento politico, decidendo di<br />
«vivere da straniero» nella città (Pol. VII 2 1324a16). La stessa permanenza perpetua nella sfera<br />
dell'attività teoretica sarà dunque da attribuire al filosofo contemplatore del Simposio.<br />
Ma veniamo alla terza e più importante questione. L'idea di un accesso biologico all'eternità<br />
della specie, e di una conquista culturale dell'immortalità personale che non comporta e non richiede<br />
alcuna concezione dell'immortalità dell'anima individuale, si accorda perfettamente con la psicologia<br />
e l'etica perfettamente “mondane” di Aristotele. Reciprocamente, il fatto che egli possa accogliere<br />
senza riserve queste prospettive sull'immortalizzazione formulate nel Simposio significa che nella<br />
lettura aristotelica esse non comportavano alcun impegno nei riguardi delle convinzioni altrove<br />
formulate da Platone circa l'immortalità dell'anima individuale, convinzioni che Aristotele non<br />
avrebbe potuto affatto condividere. Aristotele conferma dunque l'assenza nel Simposio di ogni<br />
riferimento a questo complesso di dottrine e delle loro ricadute sia morali sia gnoseologiche.<br />
3. Un'assenza, questa, che non può venire spiegata con ipotesi di tipo evolutivo, vista la<br />
prossimità del Simposio a dialoghi, come il Fedone e il Fedro, dove il pensiero dell'immortalità<br />
dell'anima gioca un ruolo centrale. Sembra anche piuttosto arbitrario pensare a uno «scetticismo<br />
temporaneo» di Platone intorno a questa convinzione, come ha fatto Hackforth. 26 Ma neppure<br />
sembrano accettabili “spiegazioni” (nel senso inglese di explain away) che implicano una petitio<br />
principii, di questo tipo: Platone ha sempre sostenuto la teoria dell'immortalità dell'anima; dunque<br />
essa non può risultare assente nel Simposio, anche se il testo sembra confermarlo. 27<br />
24 Si vedano in proposito le puntuali analisi di GASTALDI (2003) pp. 109-31.<br />
25 Cfr. in questo senso Eth. nicom. X 8 1178b2-7.<br />
26 R. HACKFORTH, Immortality in Plato's '<strong>Symposium</strong>', «Classical Review» 64 (1950) pp. 43-45.<br />
27 Mi sembra che di questo tipo sia l'argomentazione in CENTRONE (2009) pp. LIX s.: «La negazione dell'immortalità<br />
personale implicita nelle parole di Diotima a 207c-208b non può essere in contrasto con la teoria dell'immortalità dell'anima,<br />
cosmica o individuale, di cui Platone è costantemente strenuo e convinto sostenitore; il mortale di cui si parla è il corpo e<br />
probabilmente il composto di anima e corpo». Un ragionamento simile anche in FIERRO (2001), la cui interpretazione del<br />
Simposio è interamente derivata dal Fedone. Ponendosi da un punto di vista “compatibilista” (per es. tra Fedone e<br />
Simposio), PRICE (1989) si chiede: «The question becomes how best characterize an immortality within mortality whose<br />
achievement is desirable even for souls that are themselves fully immortal»; e conclude: «Plato, regrettably, leaves us to<br />
speculate about an answer» (pp. 33-4). Per un'ampia discussione problematica cfr. SIER (1997) pp. 185-197. Tra<br />
l'interpretazione secondo la quale «l'individualità della persona può perpetuarsi solo per sostituzione, attraverso la 'creazione'<br />
spirituale», e quella di una immortalità piena, non vicariante, per l'anima del filosofo, Sier proponde con molta cautela per la<br />
seconda, soprattutto sulla base dell'opinabile riferimento indicato da O'Brien a Resp. X 612e-614a. Il saggio di M. O'BRIEN<br />
(1984) costituisce probabilmente il migliore sforzo in senso “compatibilista”, perché non si nasconde le difficoltà di<br />
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In realtà, anche l'eclissi dell'immortalità dell'anima individuale deve a mio avviso venire<br />
interpretata secondo il criterio prudente e plausibile formulato da Tim Robinson: «Il rifiuto manifesto,<br />
da parte di Platone, di ridurre a una sembianza d'ordine artificiale una serie di concezioni dell'anima<br />
che, intrinsecamente, sono probabilmente inconciliabili [...] va compreso come un segno della sua<br />
potenza filosofica [...] Esso può venire attribuito a una sua ferma decisione di lasciare una pluralità di<br />
opzioni aperte in caso di dubbio, decisione di un uomo che lungo tutta la sua vita, e fino alla fine, ha<br />
scelto di esprimersi sempre, su ogni argomento, nella forma di un dialogo aperto e non in quella di un<br />
trattato dogmatico». 28<br />
E’ del resto ben noto quanto sia problematica e tormentata in Platone la questione<br />
dell'immortalità dell'anima individuale, in ragione delle stesse esigenze cui essa è chiamata a<br />
rispondere. C'è da un lato la necessità di ordine morale di incentivare la condotta giusta in questa vita<br />
mediante un dispositivo di premi e punizioni previsti per l'anima nell'al di là, che possono risarcire il<br />
giusto per le sue sofferenze mondane e sanzionare l'ingiusto per le sue prevaricazioni, dispositivo<br />
ampiamente descritto nei miti escatologici del Gorgia e del libro X della Repubblica. 29 C'è dall'altro<br />
lato l'esigenza gnoseologica di spiegare la possibilità di conoscenza di enti incorporei come le idee da<br />
parte di un'anima vincolata agli organi di senso: essa può essere più facilmente pensata come un<br />
contatto pre-natale fra le idee e un'anima non ancora incorporata, secondo la tesi del Fedone. 30<br />
Le due esigenze tuttavia confliggono su un punto decisivo, che resta irrisolto in Platone. 31 Una<br />
qualche forma di ricordo dell'esperienza conoscitiva pre-natale deve essere conservato nella vita<br />
corporea, perché su di esso si fonda la via anamnestica per il riconoscimento delle idee anche in<br />
questa vita. Al contrario, l'istanza etica esige la cancellazione di ogni ricordo delle esperienze prenatali,<br />
come indica il mito di Er, perché altrimenti non si avrebbero più in questa vita decisioni morali<br />
responsabili, bensì un semplice calcolo di costi e benefici, in base al quale la condotta giusta verrebbe<br />
presumibilmente scelta in vista dei premi decuplicati con cui essa è remunerata nell'al di là, e<br />
viceversa sarebbe evitata la condotta ingiusta per timore delle analoghe punizioni. La memoria,<br />
necessaria per la conoscenza delle idee, renderebbe dunque impossibile la scelta morale. Una<br />
contraddizione questa che Platone non risolve e neppure tematizza, lasciando che i due tipi di discorso<br />
si svolgano su piani diversi e non comunicanti.<br />
Considerazioni simili si possono svolgere intorno alla questione dell'immortalità dell'anima<br />
nella sua singolare individualità. 32 L'esigenza di ordine morale richiede che la vicenda oltreterrena<br />
dell'anima la riguardi nella sua interezza personale (si parlerà dunque dell'anima di Achille o di<br />
Socrate): premi e punizioni non possono che riguardare tutta l'anima che porta meriti e colpe della vita<br />
dell'individuo cui è appartenuta. Ma d'altro canto è difficile pensare che le parti dell'anima più<br />
strettamente legate alla corporeità, come lo thymoeidès e l'epithymetikòn – del resto esplicitamente<br />
designate come “mortali” nel Timeo – possano godere della stessa immortalità che spetta all'elemento<br />
divino che è in noi, cioè il principio razionale che è tuttavia per sua natura impersonale.<br />
Anche questi problemi non trovano in Platone soluzioni univoche, né vengono esplicitamente<br />
tematizzati.<br />
Se si tiene conto di questo quadro complesso e frastagliato, si può dunque accettare senza<br />
eccessiva sorpresa che il Simposio non prenda affatto in considerazione l'immortalità dell'anima, e<br />
proponga di pensare una via all'immortalizzazione personale che ne prescinde completamente: questi<br />
va considerato come uno dei molti esperimenti intellettuali di Platone, la cui importanza è<br />
eccezionalmente confermata dalla sua attenta rivisitazione da parte di Aristotele.<br />
E’ però il caso di mettere in rilievo una conseguenza importante di questo esperimento, alla<br />
quale non sempre si è dedicata una sufficiente attenzione: si tratta della rinuncia alla funzione<br />
interpolare nel Simposio una dottrina dell'immortalità dell'anima senza sovrapporvi altri dialoghi come il Fedone (p. 186),<br />
benché egli stesso ricorra poi ripetutamente al libro X della Repubblica. O'Brien scrive che la topica dell'immortalità è<br />
evitata, piuttosto che asserita o negata, nel discorso di Diotima (p. 192), ma vede nella sua frase finale un riferimento alla<br />
«immortalità letterale del filosofo in comunione con la Bellezza assoluta» (p. 196-7, 197 n. 34). Tuttavia O'Brien si rende<br />
conto di due anomalie di questa interpretazione: che l'immortalità è una prospettiva, un “achievement”, concessi solo al<br />
filosofo, la cui anima non è immortale per natura ma può diventarlo; ed è presentata come un dono divino al filosofo, non<br />
come un attributo necessario dell'anima (pp. 199-201). O'Brien spiega queste anomalie come l'effetto della strategia retorica<br />
(psicagogica) di Diotima, ma di fatto esse sembrano caratterizzare l'intero assetto teorico del discorso sull'immortalità, che<br />
per questo probabilmente avrebbe attratto l'interesse di Aristotele. Credo comunque di aver dimostrato (VEGETTI 2007B) che<br />
il libro X della Repubblica, o le parti di cui è composto, non possa essere considerato come “l'ultima parola” della filosofia<br />
platonica su questo e altri temi.<br />
28 TH. M. ROBINSON (1997) p. 26.<br />
29 Cfr. in proposito CENTRONE (2007) pp. 36 s.<br />
30 Cfr. in questo senso FERRARI (2007) pp. 80-83.<br />
31 Per una discussione più ampia in proposito rinvio a VEGETTI (2003) pp. 119-31.<br />
32 Il problema è discusso in CENTRONE (2007) pp. 35-50, e in MIGLIORI (2007) pp. 273-75.<br />
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Mario Vegetti<br />
gnoseologica (oltre che a quella morale) attribuita all'immortalità dell'anima.<br />
4. Fare a meno dell'immortalità dell'anima significa nel Simposio rinunciare alla reminiscenza<br />
(anamnesis) come modalità di recupero di una conoscenza del mondo eidetico ottenuta dall'anima<br />
nella sua vita extracorporea. 33 L'accesso all'idea del bello in questo dialogo avviene grazie a un<br />
percorso di sublimazione della pulsione erotica che non richiede affatto la separazione dell'anima dal<br />
corpo, anzi ha nel corpo – come soggetto e oggetto del desiderio di bellezza – il suo imprescindibile<br />
punto di partenza, e l'indispensabile riserva di energie psichiche da investire nella conversione verso<br />
l'idea. Non c'è dubbio, dunque, che secondo il Simposio una conoscenza delle idee (che qui sembra di<br />
tipo prevalentemente intuitivo) è possibile anche senza il ricorso all'immortalità dell'anima e alla<br />
relativa reminiscenza.<br />
E’ indubbiamente vero che in molti dialoghi – dal Fedone 34 al Menone, 35 per certi aspetti al<br />
Fedro – la compiuta visione del mondo eidetico è fatta dipendere da un'esperienza cognitiva possibile<br />
solo per l'anima disincarnata, che ne conserva una qualche memoria anche dopo la reincarnazione.<br />
E' altrettanto vero, però, che in altri dialoghi non meno importanti, oltre che nello stesso Simposio, la<br />
conoscenza delle idee risulta possibile anche senza reminiscenza.<br />
Nel Parmenide, il giovane Socrate sembra impiegare con una certa disinvoltura il metodo –<br />
che Aristotele avrebbe chiamato ekthesis – consistente nell'isolare un tratto predicativo comune a più<br />
realtà empiriche facendone un'entità noetica “separata” e invariante, insomma un'idea. Un metodo di<br />
trattazione delle idee, naturalmente, che non ha nulla a che fare con l'immortalità e con la<br />
reminiscenza.<br />
Ma ciò che più conta è l'assenza della reminiscenza nella Repubblica, che pure offre nel libro<br />
VII il più elaborato programma di accesso al mondo eidetico che Platone abbia mai formulato. E' ben<br />
poco plausibile il tentativo di ridurre la portata di questa assenza riconducendola a ragioni<br />
«essenzialmente letterarie e drammatiche», perché stonerebbe con la prospettiva unificante della<br />
visione del bene. 36 Al contrario, la conoscenza delle idee, e al di là di esse dell'idea del buono, è<br />
preparata – a partire dai paradossi dell'esperienza sensibile – dai processi astrattivo-idealizzanti delle<br />
matematiche, poi dal lavoro critico-costruttivo della dialettica. 37 Anche qui, e forse qui più che<br />
altrove, Platone non sembra avvertire alcuna necessità di ricorrere all'ipotesi di una conoscenza prenatale<br />
delle idee e della sua reminiscenza in questa vita.<br />
Il Simposio non è dunque l'unico testimone del fatto che Platone abbia esplorato soluzioni<br />
gnoseologiche diverse per l'accesso al mondo eidetico. 38 Ci sono alternative alla rammemorazione<br />
anamnestica, e, nel loro ambito, ci sono modalità differenziate di approccio alla conoscenza delle idee<br />
(nel Simposio l'accento è posto sull'immediatezza della visione, nella Repubblica sul lavoro dialettico,<br />
nel Parmenide sulla ekthesis dell'unità dal molteplice). Le differenze fra queste prospettive non<br />
consentono di essere spiegate mediante ipotesi evolutive, e possono probabilmente venire considerate<br />
non incompatibili nel quadro del pensiero platonico. Non è però accettabile scegliere una di queste<br />
prospettive come dominante o “strutturale”, facendone un letto di Procuste in cui annullare la<br />
ricchezza di esperimenti teorici presenti nei dialoghi. In essi Platone ha mostrato come fosse possibile<br />
mantenere un nitido profilo di pensiero, invariante nel suo assetto di fondo, sviluppando al tempo<br />
stesso in direzioni diverse le sue potenzialità di ricerca. Almeno in un caso – l'immortalizzazione<br />
personale senza immortalità dell'anima – questi sviluppi avrebbero incontrato il consenso da parte di<br />
Aristotele, che era interessato a mantenere il privilegio straordinario della forma di vita filosofica, la<br />
sua capacità di athanatizein, senza per questo modificare la sua dottrina dell'anima come forma del<br />
corpo e da esso inseparabile (De anima II 1 412b5, 413a2 ss.).<br />
33 Il punto è stato sottolineato da DI BENEDETTO (1985) p. 40. L'assenza nel Simposio dell'Anamnesis-Modell è sottolineata<br />
anche da SIER (1997) pp. 147sg., 190.<br />
34 Secondo la nota tesi di EBERT (1994) in questo dialogo la reminiscenza apparterebbe più alla dottrina pitagorica che a<br />
quella platonica. In senso opposto va la discussione di TRABATTONI (2011) pp. XXXIV-XLVIII, con ampi riferimenti alla<br />
bibliografia recente.<br />
35 Ma sulle differenze fra questi due dialoghi cfr. le interessanti osservazioni di LAFFRANCE (2007).<br />
36 E' la tesi di KAHN (2005) p. 100. Anche questo autore sembra incorrere in una sorta di petitio principii, quando riconosce<br />
una “struttura profonda” del pensiero di Platone in «ciò che è comune a Simposio, Fedone e alla Repubblica» (p. 98),<br />
attribuendo poi le varianti di questa struttura a ragioni letterarie. Ma perché allora la reminiscenza, assente in Simposio e<br />
Repubblica, non dovrebbe essere attribuita a “ragioni letterarie” nel Fedone, anziché ipotizzare che essa sia “strutturale”<br />
sulla base del solo Fedone?<br />
37 Sul ruolo delle matematiche nella Repubblica cfr. CATTANEI (2003).<br />
38 Nella stessa Repubblica del resto è presente – seppure in secondo piano – il tema della sublimazione della pulsione erotica<br />
come impulso verso la conversione teorica (cfr. VI 485d6-e1, 490a8-b8).<br />
102
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NAILS (2006): D. NAILS, Tragedy off Stage, in Lesher - Nails - Sheffield (pp. 179-207)<br />
103
Mario Vegetti<br />
NUCCI (2009): M. NUCCI, in Platone. Simposio, trad. e commento di M. Nucci, Einaudi, Torino 2009<br />
O'BRIEN (1984): M. O'BRIEN, “Becoming immortal” in Plato's '<strong>Symposium</strong>', in D.E. Gerber (ed.),<br />
Greek Poetry and Philosophy, Scholars Press, Chico CA, 1984 (pp. 185-205)<br />
PRICE (1989): A.W.PRICE, Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle, Clarendon Press, Oxford<br />
ROBINSON (1997): TH. M. ROBINSON, Caractères constitutifs du dualisme âme-corps dans le 'Corpus<br />
platonicum', «Cahiers du Centre d'études sur la pensée antique “kairos kai logos”», 11 (1997) pp. 1-28<br />
ROWE (1998): CH. ROWE, Il 'Simposio' di Platone, Academia, Sankt Augustin 1998<br />
SEDLEY (1999): D. SEDLEY, The Ideal of Godlikeness, in G. Fine (a cura di), Plato 2. Ethics, Politics,<br />
Religion and the Soul, Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford 1999 (pp. 309-28)<br />
SIER (1997): K. SIER, Die Rede der Diotima. Untersuchungen zum platonischen Symposion, Teubner,<br />
Stuttgart-Leipzig 1997<br />
SUSANETTI (1992): D. SUSANETTI, L'anima, l'amore e il grande mare del bello, introd. a Platone. Il<br />
Simposio, Marsilio, Venezia 1992 (pp. 9-46)<br />
TRABATTONI (2011): F. TRABATTONI, Introduzione a Platone. Fedone, a cura di F. T., Einaudi, Torino<br />
2011 (pp. VII-LXXXVI)<br />
VEGETTI (2000): M. VEGETTI, Il regno filosofico, in Platone. Repubblica, a cura di M.V., vol. IV,<br />
Bibliopolis, Napoli 2000 (pp. 335-364)<br />
VEGETTI (2003): M. VEGETTI, Quindici lezioni su Platone, Einaudi, Torino 2003<br />
VEGETTI (2005): M. VEGETTI, Glaucon et les mystères de la dialectique, in M. Dixsaut (a cura di),<br />
Études sur la 'République' de Platon, vol. II, Vrin, Paris 2005 (pp. 25-37)<br />
VEGETTI (2007A): M. VEGETTI, Athanatizein. Strategie di immortalità nel pensiero greco, in Dialoghi<br />
con gli antichi, Academia Verlag, Sankt Augustin 2006 (pp. 165-178)<br />
VEGETTI (2007B): M. VEGETTI, Introduzione al libro X, in Platone, Repubblica, traduzione e<br />
commento a cura di M.V., Bibliopolis, Napoli 2007, vol. VII (pp. 13-34)<br />
VEGETTI (2010): M. VEGETTI, L'etica degli antichi, Laterza, Roma (1989) 2010<br />
104
Tuesday<br />
16 th July, 2013
Plenary session<br />
Chair: Giuseppe Cambiano
ABSTRACT<br />
Wichtige Manuskripte als Meilensteine<br />
in der Textgeschichte von Platons Symposion<br />
Christian Brockmann<br />
In diesem Vortrag wird die Textgeschichte von Platons Symposion von der Spätantike und dem<br />
Ersten Byzantinischen Humanismus bis zur Renaissance und der Frühen Neuzeit zunächst<br />
überblicksartig dargestellt. Dabei werden einige grundlegende wissenschaftlich-kulturelle<br />
Bedingungen, die für die Überlieferung der griechischen Literatur insgesamt von Bedeutung sind,<br />
kurz erläutert, nämlich das Verdrängen der Papyrus-Rolle durch das Manuskript in Kodex-Form<br />
sowie der umfassende Prozess der Bearbeitung und Revision der antiken Texte im Zuge des<br />
Metacharakterismos, also der Herstellung neuer, aktualisierter Manuskripte mit Hilfe des neuartigen<br />
graphischen Systems der Minuskelschrift (9.-10 Jahrhundert).<br />
Anschließend werden einige der wichtigsten Manuskripte exemplarisch vorgestellt und genauer<br />
betrachtet. Es wird nach ihrer Entstehung und ihrer Rolle für die Überlieferung gefragt. Dabei liegt<br />
ein besonderes Augenmerk auf der gelehrten Arbeit, die die Manuskripte geformt hat und die sich in<br />
ihnen manifestiert. Selbstverständlich finden die beiden ältesten Kodizes besondere Würdigung,<br />
nämlich Ms. E. D. Clarke 39 aus der Bodleian Library und Marc. 4,1 aus Venedig (Kodizes B und T).<br />
Neue Überlegungen und Hypothesen zu ihrer Entstehung und ihren Vorlagen werden erörtert, wobei<br />
auch auf die Beziehung von T zu dem ältesten erhaltenen Platon-Manuskript, Kodex A (Parisinus<br />
graecus 1807) eingegangen wird.<br />
Der Vorgang des Abschreibens und Herstellens neuer Manuskripte ging meistens mit einer<br />
Bearbeitung der Textform, die man in der Vorlage oder auch in mehreren Vorlagen fand, einher.<br />
Denn es haben bedeutende byzantinische Gelehrte an der Überlieferung der Platonischen Werke als<br />
Schreiber, Bearbeiter und Auftraggeber mitgewirkt. Ihre philologische Leistung lässt sich in den<br />
erhaltenen Manuskripten genau studieren. Manche ihrer Textänderungen oder Konjekturen haben sich<br />
bis heute durchgesetzt oder werden als bedenkenswerte Varianten zitiert. Allerdings bleiben die<br />
Urheber dieser Lesarten meistens ungenannt, da die Varianten in den kritischen Apparaten nur der<br />
Handschrift zugewiesen werden, in der man ihren Ursprung vermutet. Um diesem Mangel abzuhelfen,<br />
sollen die Arbeiten byzantinischer Gelehrter wie Georgios Pachymeres (Parisinus graecus 1810) und<br />
Maximos Planudes (Vindobonensis phil. 21) am Text des Symposions genauer diskutiert werden. Die<br />
Manuskripte wurden durch die Arbeit der Gelehrten zum Teil erheblich verbessert. Es ist erkennbar,<br />
dass sie stets bemüht waren, andere Manuskripte mit besserem Text zu finden und dass es teilweise<br />
auch Austausch und Zirkulation von Varianten gegeben hat.<br />
In der wissenschaftlichen Kreativität, dem Engagement und den Fähigkeiten der Schreiber und<br />
Bearbeiter und der gemeinschaftlichen Arbeit intellektueller Kreise an den Kodizes werden<br />
wesentliche Kennzeichen der griechisch-byzantinischen Manuskriptkultur sichtbar. Ob es den<br />
Gelehrten zuweilen sogar gelungen ist, Fehler der Überlieferung zu heilen, werden wir diskutieren<br />
müssen. Dabei ist auch das umfangreiche Papyrusfragment (um 200 n. Chr.) zum Vergleich<br />
heranzuziehen. Ein Höhepunkt in der Arbeit am Platontext wird in der Renaissance mit Kardinal<br />
Bessarion und Marsilio Ficino erreicht. Die griechischen Manuskripte, die sie benutzt und bearbeitet<br />
haben, werden zum Abschluss behandelt. Es ist spannend zu sehen, dass es auch hier Verbindungen<br />
gegeben hat.
The Frame Dialogue:<br />
Voices and Themes<br />
Chair: Alonso Tordesillas
ABSTRACT<br />
A Rejected Version of the <strong>Symposium</strong><br />
Menahem Luz<br />
Phoenix son of Philip is said to have passed on a version of the Agathon's symposium described by<br />
Apollodorus as unclear and in the end passed over in favour of that described in the main body of<br />
Plato's <strong>Symposium</strong> (172b, 173b). Although many assume that Plato was the inventor of the<br />
symposium genre, but Apollodorus' remarks are a prima facie admission that an earlier version of the<br />
account existed only to be here dismissed. More recently a number of scholars (e.g., Holgar Thesleff<br />
(1978)), for considering Plato's account of Agathon's <strong>Symposium</strong> to have been written after<br />
Xenophon's account of Callias' <strong>Symposium</strong> that Plato rejected in his account of Apollodorus' opening.<br />
Since Xenophon's composition has been long shown to reflect salient linguistic, stylistic and<br />
philosophical passages in that of Plato, it was then suggested that Xenophon partially rewrote his<br />
material (esp. cap. viii) as a reply (Gabriel Danzig (2005)). Although it is possible that Xenophon<br />
rewrote his composition, my own contention is that we need not presuppose his chronological<br />
priority. When we recall the structure of Plato's work we see that it opens a basically two level<br />
structure suggesting, as I hope to show, the seams of rewriting. The main section of the <strong>Symposium</strong> is<br />
in oratio obliqua as many previous dialogues while the opening introduction of Apollodorus is in<br />
oratio directa. Although a handful of dialogues show this technique, the one easiest recalled is the<br />
Theaetetus itself known to have been rewritten by Plato after its initial composition. We need only<br />
assume that Plato initially composed the <strong>Symposium</strong> without Apollodorus' introduction or with<br />
another one. Shortly afterward, Xenophon produced his account of Callias' <strong>Symposium</strong> riffled from<br />
Antisthenes, Aeschines and Plato himself. Finally Plato reworked the opening of the <strong>Symposium</strong> as<br />
he was said to have done with other dialogues all of his life, but in this case included a rejection of<br />
Xenophon's account. Other scholars have given reasons for seeing Phoenix son Philip – the author of<br />
the version rejected by Apollodorus – as representing Xenophon's account, but none are convincing.<br />
My own suggestion is that Phoenix' father, Philip - both elsewhere unknown in Plato – is to be<br />
identified with Philip the comedian in Xenophon's <strong>Symposium</strong> who appears uninvited at Callias'<br />
house along with his child. This unnamed child should be identified with Phoenix. Although it has<br />
been suggested that Xenophon's rewrote cap. viii of his compostion as a reply to Phaedrus' speech in<br />
Plato's work, we find in Xenophon a much deeper misconstruction of Socratic eros emerging from his<br />
piecemeal choice of sources on this issue (Aeschines, Antisthenes and of course Plato).
Narrazioni e narratori nel Simposio di Platone<br />
Lidia Palumbo<br />
Nella prima riga del dialogo Apollodoro afferma di non essere colto alla sprovvista (ἀµελέτητος) dalla<br />
richiesta di racconto che gli è stata posta. Al contrario, egli ha avuto cura di prepararsi, perché nei<br />
giorni precedenti gli è stata rivolta una richiesta di narrazione simile a quella che gli viene rivolta<br />
nell’occasione presente. Egli dice di essersi dedicato all’allestimento del racconto e racconta di tale<br />
allestimento tornando con la narrazione indietro nel tempo.<br />
È così, allora, e cioè con la creazione di tessere di temporalità diverse disposte su piani di<br />
distanza crescente dal presente che, a partire dal dialogo tra Apollodoro e i suoi anonimi<br />
interlocutori 1 , e cioè dalla prima scena del testo, si costruisce quella profondità prospettica che sarà<br />
destinata ad ospitare la desiderata narrazione. Vi è un primo piano, dunque, che è quello del tempo<br />
rappresentato sulla scena: il presente spaziale e temporale dell’incontro di Apollodoro con i suoi<br />
anonimi interlocutori.<br />
Vi è poi un secondo piano, corrispondente ad un secondo tempo, precedente rispetto al primo<br />
di circa due giorni, – ieri l’altro (πρῴην, 172a2) dice Apollodoro – che è il tempo dell’incontro del<br />
narratore con uno gnorimos, un conoscente 2 , che ha formulato, dal suo tempo di secondo piano, una<br />
richiesta dello stesso racconto. Viene così disegnata, secondo un percorso a ritroso, la traccia ripetuta<br />
di un’aspettativa, di un desiderio di ascolto, che conduce il lettore in un movimento all’indietro, verso<br />
un tempo passato, che dà senso e direzione alla narrazione.<br />
Tutto nel testo concorre a creare questa direzione prospettica rivolta al passato: le relazioni<br />
spaziali tra ciò che è in primo piano e ciò che è in secondo piano, tra ciò che è davanti e ciò che è<br />
dietro, tra ciò che è in basso e ciò che è in alto, ciò che è vicino e ciò che è lontano alludono, secondo<br />
l’analogia tra forma e contenuto che caratterizza la scrittura platonica, alla relazione temporale tra ciò<br />
che viene prima, ed è meno importante, e ciò che viene dopo, ed è più importante, ed è meta del<br />
percorso, fine del racconto, riposo del viaggio.<br />
Apollodoro comincia a narrare nella prima riga del dialogo di un percorso in salita, εἰς ἄστυ<br />
(172α2), verso la città. Di un conoscente che lo ravvisa dall’indietro, ὄπισθεν, che lo chiama da<br />
lontano, πόρρωθεν (172a3), che gli chiede di aspettarlo. E allora Apollodoro si ferma e il racconto è<br />
alla sua prima precoce pausa, indicativa del ritmo lento della narrazione. La pausa è finalizzata ad<br />
introdurre la prima richiesta di racconto del simposio che venga menzionata nel testo. Il conoscente<br />
sta infatti cercando Apollodoro perché vuole interrogarlo sull’incontro tra Agatone, Socrate, Alcibiade<br />
e gli altri presenti al banchetto. Ciò che il conoscente vuole sapere è quali furono, τίνες ἦσαν, (172b3)<br />
gli erotikoi logoi che in quella circostanza si tennero 3 . Un altro ha già a lui raccontato e costui aveva<br />
a sua volta ascoltato il racconto da Fenice 4 .<br />
È stato Fenice a riferire che anche Apollodoro conosce il racconto (“ha detto che anche tu<br />
sai”: ἔφη δὲ καὶ σὲ εἰδέναι, 172b4). Ma è Glaucone a consacrare Apollodoro come narratore<br />
giustissimo (δικαιότατος, 172b5): è giusto che sia tu a riferire – egli dice – i discorsi del tuo amico.<br />
Fenice infatti non aveva οὐδὲν εἶχε σαφὲς λέγειν, 172b4-5, niente di chiaro da dire.<br />
Nel Simposio è possibile individuare una riflessione sulla natura del racconto e del linguaggio<br />
diegetico. Tale riflessione è a tratti implicita e a tratti esplicita, e la dialettica di questa alternanza non<br />
è estranea alla tematizzazione in questione. Di un racconto – emerge dal testo – la cosa più importante<br />
è il narratore. Nel Simposio si configurano diverse tipologie di narratori. Nella prima pagina ne<br />
distinguiamo già due: Apollodoro e Fenice. Di Apollodoro si dice che è giustissimo che sia lui a<br />
raccontare di Socrate e degli erotikoi logoi che Socrate tenne (e suscitò e raccontò e ascoltò e<br />
confutò) in un’occasione lontana dai tempi in cui tale narrazione avviene. Apollodoro è buon<br />
1 La cui identità apparirà chiara solo alla pagina seguente: si tratta di affaristi, gente dedita alla cura della ricchezza (173c),<br />
cui Apollodoro riserva il trattamento critico che i socratici amavano marcare in tali circostanze. La differenza tra filosofi e<br />
non filosofi è posta così fin dal principio, attraverso la nozione di cura, melete (la cui negazione è negata, nella prima riga<br />
del testo, con il termine ἀµελέτητος): Apollodoro trascorre – lo dirà tra poco – il tempo con Socrate, e ciò di cui ha cura ha a<br />
che vedere con i logoi: egli si prepara a raccontare di lui e dei suoi discorsi. Costoro, invece, trascorrono il tempo<br />
dissipandolo, dediti alle monete e non alle parole, letteralmente sono philochrematoi e non philosophoi (cfr. Phaed. 68c,<br />
Symp. 173c). Cito dall’edizione oxoniense di Burnet 1976 (I ed. 1901).<br />
2 Che poi si rivela essere Glaucone, forse il fratello di Platone.<br />
3 Il racconto si configura come oggetto di desiderio. Il narratore è inseguito, è oggetto di ricerca, e il suo racconto è l’oggetto<br />
cercato.<br />
4 Il nome di Fenice, che è ὁ διηγούµενος, il narratore (172c1), significa “abitante della Fenicia”, luogo della palma e della<br />
porpora, luogo di provenienza della scrittura.
Lidia Palumbo<br />
narratore di tali discorsi perché è amico di Socrate (172b7). Quando qualcuno è hetairos di qualcun<br />
altro, è giusto che si dedichi lui stesso e non altri al dialegesthai dell’hetairos. Si tratta di una<br />
riflessione importante. L’amante può narrare dell’amato meglio di chiunque altro, ed è sempre ad un<br />
amante, nel Fedone come nel Simposio, che Platone ha affidato il compito delicato della narrazione di<br />
Socrate. In 172c6-7 si dice che Apollodoro passa il suo tempo con Socrate, che si prende cura ogni<br />
giorno di sapere quel che dice e quel che fa. Questa notazione assumerà tutta la sua importanza al<br />
comparire della terza e più importante figura di narratore, e cioè Aristodemo, innamorato di Socrate e<br />
presente ai fatti narrati. Di Aristodemo e Apollodoro, narratori giusti, in un certo senso, come<br />
vedremo, immagini l’uno dell’altro e dell’oggetto del loro racconto, il Simposio presenta nella figura<br />
di Fenice l’immagine negativa di narratore privo di chiarezza 5 . La mancanza di sapheneia del racconto<br />
di Fenice riguarda essenzialmente il tempo in cui avvennero i fatti. Glaucone che ha ascoltato Fenice<br />
crede infatti che il simposio di cui desidera sapere si sia tenuto così recentemente che Apollodoro<br />
avrebbe potuto parteciparvi.<br />
La determinazione corretta del tempo in cui va collocato un evento è molto importante. Ogni<br />
tempo è qualitativamente determinato. Dalle parole di Apollodoro (173a) apprendiamo che vi può<br />
essere un tempo per errare ed uno per filosofare, che il tempo giusto è quello in cui si dà alla propria<br />
esistenza una direzione, ed allora il prima e il poi sono scanditi da una cesura a partire dalla quale la<br />
vita assume senso. Nel testo il ritmo del tempo è scandito dal racconto ed è il ritmo della<br />
determinazione del senso. Il percorso a ritroso in direzione dell’evento passato di cui si desidera il<br />
racconto è segnato, nel testo, prima da un’annotazione di Apollodoro che, dopo le prime due citate<br />
sopra, traccia i contorni di una terza temporalità: quella che stabilisce una distanza tra il tempo<br />
presente, cominciato tre anni prima, da quando egli vive insieme a Socrate (Σωκράτει συνδιατρίβω,<br />
172c5), e il tempo passato, in cui, più sventurato di chiunque altro, vagante per ogni dove, egli era<br />
teso a far qualunque cosa tranne che filosofare. Ma è solo con Glaucone, cui è affidato il compito di<br />
enunciare, con ciò stesso disegnandola 6 , dimmi invece quando avvenne l’incontro (πότε ἐγένετο ἡ<br />
συνουσία αὕτη, 173a4-5) che poi appare la scena del tempo di cui si desidera il racconto, la<br />
temporalità veramente degna di essere narrata, quella collocata alla più grande distanza dal presente<br />
scenico, tessera di quarto piano: il tempo del simposio che dà il nome al testo. Essa ha avuto bisogno<br />
di una introduzione, di una preparazione, che fosse in grado di allestire quella scena del dialogo in cui<br />
abitano gli eventi passati destinati a restare nella memoria, che è strutturata come una scena<br />
dell’anima 7 , il cui allestimento, la cui preparazione, letteralmente teatrale, è tanto più accurata quanto<br />
più degni di essere ricordati sono gli eventi narrati.<br />
Ed allora Apollodoro racconta, e la formula di introduzione del racconto è quella che subito si colora<br />
di nostalgia:<br />
Eravamo ancora ragazzi (παίδων ὄντων ἡµῶν ἔτι) quando Agatone vinse con la sua<br />
prima tragedia, fu all’indomani del giorno in cui egli e i coreuti offrirono il sacrificio per<br />
la vittoria (173a5).<br />
La distanza temporale disegnata da Apollodoro è scandita anche dal suo interlocutore come sempre<br />
nei dialoghi quando una cosa deve essere sottolineata:<br />
Allora, - disse – a quanto pare è passato molto tempo davvero. Ma chi ti ha raccontato la<br />
cosa? Forse Socrate stesso? (173a7-8).<br />
Apollodoro non ha ricevuto il racconto da Socrate stesso (autos Sokrates 173a8) e non narra fatti che<br />
abbia visto egli stesso, ma può narrarli bene, perché gli sono stati narrati da Aristodemo, che è a sua<br />
volta buon narratore: Aristodemo è infatti innamorato di Socrate (173b4). Perché un racconto sia<br />
giustamente raccontato, stando al testo del Simposio, devono essere giusti sia il narratore sia<br />
5 Fenice incarna nel testo del Simposio una tipologia di narratore diversa sia da quella cui appartiene Apollodoro, sia da<br />
quella cui appartiene Aristodemo: assente ai fatti di cui si narra, li ha appresi da Aristodemo e li ha a sua volta riferiti, ma il<br />
suo racconto non racconta niente (οὐδὲν διηγεῖσθαι, 172b8).<br />
6 “Non prenderti gioco di me”, dice Glaucone ad Apollodoro in 173 a4-5, “e dimmi invece quando avvenne l’incontro”<br />
(πότε ἐγένετο ἡ συνουσία αὕτη, 173a4-5).<br />
7 Ho presentato un’interpretazione del dialogo platonico come testo teatrale in cui prende corpo un’idea di anima intesa<br />
come scena, scena psichica, luogo di figure e di parole, testo mimetico e diegetico, dialogico per essenza, nei due seguenti<br />
saggi: «Scenografie verbali di quinto secolo. Appunti sulla natura visiva del linguaggio tragico», apparso in V secolo. Studi<br />
di filosofia antica in onore di L. Rossetti, a cura di S. Giombini e F. Marcacci, Perugia 2010, pp. 689-699 e Pensare l'anima<br />
nello spazio iconico dei dialoghi di Platone, apparso in “Chora. Revue d’études anciennes et médiévales” 9-10 (2011-2012),<br />
pp. 13-31.<br />
115
Lidia Palumbo<br />
l’ascoltatore. Giusti parrebbe significare, in questo caso, affetti dall’affezione di cui il racconto dice:<br />
l’eros socratico 8 , in tutti i sensi di questa espressione.<br />
Aristodemo è narratore diverso da Apollodoro perché era presente ai fatti che narra. Egli ha<br />
narrato non solo ad Apollodoro, ma anche a Fenice (173b1-2). A differenziare Apollodoro da Fenice,<br />
entrambi ascoltatori di Aristodemo, ed entrambi a loro volta narratori del racconto di Aristodemo,<br />
stanno le seguenti determinazioni: non si conoscono i sentimenti di Fenice per Socrate e Fenice non<br />
ha avuto cura di determinare il tempo in cui sono avvenuti i fatti narrati (172b8-c2). Apollodoro non<br />
soltanto ha cura di determinare il tempo in cui sono avvenuti i fatti che narra (172c-173a), ma, nel<br />
prepararsi al racconto, non si è limitato ad ascoltare Aristodemo e ricordare quanto lui gli ha narrato,<br />
ma ha anche interrogato Socrate su alcune delle cose ascoltate, ed ha ottenuto da questi conferma<br />
(173b5-6) 9 . Ed è come se la conferma di Socrate si fosse incastonata nel racconto di Apollodoro<br />
impreziosendolo e donandogli chiarezza e verità.<br />
Nel cominciare il suo racconto a Glaucone, il suo racconto dei fatti appresi da Aristodemo,<br />
Apollodoro presenta innanzitutto la figura di Aristodemo narratore, sul quale parrebbe aver assunto<br />
delle informazioni:<br />
116<br />
Un certo Aristodemo, del demo Cidateneo, un piccolo uomo sempre scalzo. Aveva<br />
assistito all’incontro, poiché, a quanto mi risulta, era tra i più innamorati di Socrate, a<br />
quel tempo (Σωκράτους ἐραστὴς ὢν ἐν τοῖς µάλιστα τῶν τότε, 173b1-4).<br />
Da questa presentazione di Aristodemo apprendiamo che egli, innamorato di Socrate, in un qualche<br />
modo gli somigliava, lo imitava 10 , almeno nell’abitudine di andare scalzo, e questa notazione serve a<br />
creare nel lettore l’impressione che l’erastes, l’amante, sia buon narratore dei fatti dell’amato, e a<br />
mostrare come egli stesso, rappresentando il suo racconto, diventi in un certo modo il ritratto di ciò<br />
che viene raccontato 11 . Apollodoro, a sua volta, è, per così dire, pur in un’altra temporalità,<br />
l’immagine di Aristodemo: tra i più innamorati di Socrate, nel suo tempo; è un’immagine solo un po’<br />
sbiadita, come l’hetairos lo è dell’erastes; ed infatti Aristodemo, presente al banchetto di cui narra, è<br />
di esso testimone oculare, mentre Apollodoro, assente al banchetto di cui narra, guarda ad esso come<br />
ad un’immagine in assenza, in un’altra temporalità, un’immagine un po’ sbiadita, ma della quale è<br />
anche egli, in qualche modo, un buon narratore, un buon ritratto, essendo di Socrate hetairos e “da tre<br />
anni preoccupato di sapere ogni giorno ciò che dice e ciò che fa” (172c).<br />
Glaucone non ha dubbi sulla accuratezza del racconto di Apollodoro, ed insiste per ascoltarlo.<br />
Nel porsi nella condizione di ascoltatore, egli associa il racconto ad un percorso:<br />
La strada che conduce alla città 12 è proprio adatta, per chi cammina, a parlare e ad<br />
ascoltare.<br />
Qui scompare dalla scena Glaucone, buon ascoltatore, abitatore della temporalità di secondo piano,<br />
appena più arretrata rispetto al presente scenico, e il posto di ascoltatore viene occupato, per tutta la<br />
durata del dialogo, dal gruppo anonimo di affaristi che stanno interrogando Apollodoro sul banchetto<br />
che si tenne nel passato a casa di Agatone. Come Glaucone, del quale sono indegni sostituti nel ruolo<br />
8<br />
Amanti sono i narratori, amato e desiderato è il racconto da chi lo richiede, erotico è l’argomento di cui il racconto è<br />
racconto: “dimmi degli erotikoi logoi che si tennero”, è questo il modo in cui la richiesta di racconto, come abbiamo visto, è<br />
formulata.<br />
9<br />
Analoga interrogazione di Socrate da parte di un narratore che cerca chiarimenti e conferme su fatti da narrare in Theaet.<br />
142d-143a.<br />
10<br />
In Phaed. 74d10 compare un elemento importante della semantica della mimesis: il «desiderio di essere simile a», di<br />
essere «quale è un altro». In Resp. VI 500c6-7 si dice che questo desiderio, che è quello che prova l’inferiore verso il<br />
superiore, è un desiderio che non è possibile non provare nei confronti di ciò che si ammira. È nel Fedro poi l’idea che<br />
l’amato vede nell’amante come in uno specchio (255d6).<br />
11<br />
Nei dialoghi di Platone la relazione delle caratteristiche dei personaggi con la tesi che essi assumono o difendono, ossia<br />
una sorta di concretizzazione delle teorie o dei racconti enunciati e rappresentati dai personaggi, sono procedimenti che<br />
ricordano la scrittura di Aristofane. Va nella stessa direzione la relazione dei nomi dei personaggi con le loro qualità e le loro<br />
teorie, la esposizione delle dottrine nelle loro versioni più estreme, quasi caricaturali, ed ancora lo stretto legame che è<br />
possibile individuare tra le tematiche abbordate e la maniera di abbordarle. Sull’argomento cfr. Luisa Buarque, As armas<br />
cômicas. Os interlocutores de Platão no Crátilo, Rio de Janeiro, Hexis, 2011; Rossella Saetta-Cottone, Aristofane e la<br />
Poetica dell’ingiuria, Roma, Carocci, 2005.<br />
12<br />
Il percorso è in salita (eis asty, 173b7), ma non nel senso che sia faticoso, piuttosto esso è un cammino verso l’alto, verso<br />
ciò che conta, verso ciò che è degno di essere ascoltato. L’asty è alto in contrapposizione al Pireo anche in Resp. 327.<br />
Sull’argomento cfr. E. Nuzzo, Tra acropoli e agorá. Luoghi e figure della città in Platone e Aristotele, Roma, Edizioni di<br />
Storia e Letteratura, 2011.
Lidia Palumbo<br />
di ascoltatori 13 in un’altra temporalità, costoro pregano Apollodoro di raccontare gli erotikoi logoi 14 ,<br />
e, situati come sono alla massima distanza dal tempo narrato, essi, con la loro stessa diversità dal<br />
narratore e dalle sue occupazioni, sottolineano, per differentiam, l’importanza di una vita kata<br />
philosophian.<br />
Nel cominciare a raccontare, Apollodoro ha prima, per così dire, una falsa partenza:<br />
Ebbene furono pressappoco i seguenti, quei discorsi…(173e7).<br />
Poi, correggendo il tiro, si appresta a cominciare a raccontare secondo il modo corretto di raccontare,<br />
che è quello che comincia ἐξ ἀρχῆς:<br />
Ma è meglio che, cominciando da principio, come aveva raccontato Aristodemo, così<br />
cerchi anch’io di raccontarli a voi (173e7-174a2).<br />
Apollodoro narratore assume dunque esplicitamente Aristodemo a modello di narrazione: egli<br />
racconterà hos ekeinos diegeito, “come lui raccontò”; ma soprattutto il suo discorso, il suo racconto di<br />
discorsi, seguirà il modello che ogni discorso deve seguire, e cioè comincerà dall’inizio e giungerà<br />
fino alla fine, come si dice nel Fedro 15 , e come si constata in altri dialoghi e nel Simposio stesso, ove<br />
accade che la narrazione giunge fino alla fine della serata di cui si narrano i discorsi: specchio del suo<br />
oggetto, il racconto non deve disordinarne le parti né deformarlo. Non solo. Specchio filosofico e non<br />
sofistico 16 del suo oggetto, il racconto platonico di discorsi non soltanto deve narrare i suoi oggetti<br />
senza deformarli, ma deve anche rendere ragione di ciò che dice, deve esplicitare le sue fonti, deve<br />
raccontare, cominciando ancor prima dell’inizio, da una sorta di introduzione al racconto, qual è<br />
quella che troviamo nel Protagora, ove all’anonimo amico che incontra Socrate di ritorno dalla casa di<br />
Callia e gli chiede di raccontare la συνουσία che questi ha appena avuto con il sofista, il filosofo<br />
racconta ciò che è avvenuto prima della conversazione con Protagora, cioè fa precedere l’esposizione<br />
della conversazione da una sorta di introduzione che conduce gli ascoltatori ad una specie di ascolto<br />
consapevole, critico, mimetico 17 . Troviamo una simile introduzione all’ascolto anche nel Simposio<br />
stesso, come abbiamo visto, ove vengono da Apollodoro narrati tanti dettagli prima ancora che si<br />
cominci a parlare del banchetto avvenuto a casa di Agatone; e tra questi dettagli, che sono esterni<br />
all’oggetto della narrazione, occupano un posto importante la presentazione degli ascoltatori del<br />
racconto, che sono per così dire i destinatari della narrazione, l’esplicitazione del loro desiderio di<br />
ascolto, delle motivazioni e delle condizioni che sono alla base di questo desiderio 18 ; e tutto ciò per<br />
condurre chi ascolta, ed anche in ultima analisi noi stessi lettori del dialogo, per così dire all’interno<br />
del testo, a condividere il desiderio di discorsi kata philosophian.<br />
Seguendo la narrazione di Aristodemo, Apollodoro non racconta dunque direttamente i<br />
discorsi che si tennero a casa di Agatone, ma comincia da quello che considera l’inizio dell’evento da<br />
raccontare, dall’incontro che avvenne tra Aristodemo e Socrate diretto al banchetto. I personaggi nel<br />
racconto di Apollodoro parlano dell’invito, dei festeggiamenti per la vittoria di Agatone occasione del<br />
banchetto, e di molte altre cose ancora, e poi, a marcare, come nel Protagora 19 , ma ancora più<br />
13 Indegni perché dediti agli affari invece che alla filosofia come ha modo di sottolineare Apollodoro in 173c: “Così dunque,<br />
camminando, assieme parlammo di queste cose, e di conseguenza, come appunto dissi da principio, non mi trovo<br />
impreparato. Se poi occorre fare anche a voi questo racconto, ebbene facciamolo. D’altronde per parte mia, quando tengo io<br />
stesso, o ascolto da altri, discorsi di filosofia, provo una mirabile gioia, [cfr. Phaed. 58d, ove Fedone dice ad Echecrate:<br />
“Proverò a raccontare. E poi, ricordarmi di Socrate, o che ne parli io o che ne oda parlare da altri, è sempre per me la più<br />
dolce cosa fra tutte”], senza considerare che credo di trarne giovamento. Di fronte ad altri discorsi invece, soprattutto i vostri,<br />
dei ricchi e degli uomini d’affari, io mi irrito, e vi compiango, miei compagni, perché credete di far qualcosa, mentre non<br />
fate nulla. Dal canto vostro, forse ritenete che io sia un povero diavolo, e credo che la vostra credenza sia vera; ma io, per<br />
quanto vi riguarda, non è che lo creda, bensì lo so con certezza” (173b9-d3, trad. di G. Colli).<br />
14 La preghiera degli anonimi affinché Apollodoro racconti è ripetuta in 173e5-6, ed è ancora una volta desiderio di ascolto<br />
di logoi: “ciò su cui ti abbiamo pregato non rifiutarlo e racconta quali furono i discorsi” (διήγησαι τίνες ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι).<br />
15 Cfr. Phaedr. 264c: “Ogni discorso deve essere costruito come una creatura vivente (hosper zoon); deve avere un suo corpo<br />
che non manchi né di testa, né di piedi, ma abbia le sue parti di mezzo e i suoi estremi, composti così da essere in armonia<br />
fra loro e con l’intero”.<br />
16 Il riferimento è al libro decimo della Repubblica (596d sgg.) ove si mostra come i discorsi sofistici sono specchi<br />
deformanti dei loro oggetti. Sull’argomento cfr. L. Palumbo, Mimesis. Rappresentazione, teatro e mondo nei dialoghi di<br />
Platone e nella Poetica di Aristotele, Napoli, Loffredo 2008, pp. 50-63.<br />
17 Sull’argomento cfr. L. Palumbo, Socrate, Ippocrate e il vestibolo dell’anima, in Il Protagora di Platone: struttura e<br />
problematiche, a cura di G. Casertano, Napoli 2004, pp. 87-103.<br />
18 Ed avranno un loro ruolo i luoghi della narrazione, i colori delle cose, l’ordine degli interventi, specialmente quando<br />
questo è invertito, è sbagliato, è prima pronunciato e poi corretto e così via.<br />
19 Cfr. Prot. 314c3-7: “Quando fummo davanti alla porta d’ingresso, ci fermammo a discutere di un qualche argomento che<br />
117
Lidia Palumbo<br />
marcatamente che allora, un indugio in funzione introduttiva sulla soglia del luogo dei discorsi, si<br />
colloca nel testo del Simposio l’episodio della sosta di Socrate nel vestibolo della casa di Agatone.<br />
L’intero racconto di Apollodoro, che è, come sappiamo, il racconto di un racconto, ha per questo la<br />
forma della oratio obliqua e la sua costruzione è quella di una lunghissima infinitiva 20 . Ogni racconto<br />
è un’immagine, e quella di Apollodoro è l’immagine di un’immagine, in cui sono riflessi anche i due<br />
narratori: l’uno (Apollodoro) immagine dell’altro (Aristodemo), ognuno a rappresentare nel proprio<br />
tempo l’immagine dell’amato, che è anche l’oggetto del racconto, perché il racconto è una forma di<br />
cura, e raccontare di qualcuno è prendersi cura di lui 21 .<br />
Quando, allora, appena cominciato il racconto, Apollodoro narratore cita Omero, e dice che il<br />
poeta plasma (cfr. 174b7 ποιήσας, c3 ἐποίησεν) le figure del suo racconto, dando ad esse caratteri e<br />
colori, appare chiaro che il narratore, proprio come un falegname, fa dei personaggi le sue creature, e<br />
che la narrazione, in Symp. 205a-d presentata come la forma creativa per eccellenza 22 , consacra<br />
Apollodoro, Aristodemo e, in ultima analisi, quindi, Platone, come creatori dei sokratikoi logoi di cui<br />
essi sono amanti e narratori.<br />
Aristodemo – viene di ciò avvertito il lettore in 178a – non aveva un ricordo completo dei<br />
sokratikoi logoi, né del racconto di Aristodemo aveva un ricordo completo Apollodoro, per cui dei<br />
discorsi che quel giorno si tennero non soltanto vengono raccontati solo quelli che, secondo il giudizio<br />
dei narratori, erano davvero degni di essere conservati, ma, accade anche che, trattandosi della<br />
narrazione di discorsi, sia difficile, talvolta, nel corpo della narrazione, per l’ascoltatore, discernere<br />
ciò che appartiene ai discorsi narrati e ciò che, sorta di elemento metanarrativo, è una riflessione del<br />
narratore che si introduce nel corpo della narrazione. Quando, per esempio in 190a, nel corpo della<br />
narrazione di Aristofane si narra dei primordi della natura umana e si dice che gli uomini allora erano<br />
a forma di sfera, che avevano dorso e fianchi in cerchio, quattro mani, quattro gambe e due volti sul<br />
collo cilindrico, che “la testa per entrambi i volti messi uno all’opposto dell’altro era poi una sola”,<br />
ma quattro gli orecchi e due gli organi sessuali; quando, dopo tutto ciò, il testo riporta la frase<br />
conclusiva sull’aspetto degli uomini a forma di sfera e dice che “tutte le altre cose erano come uno le<br />
immaginerebbe a partire da questi cenni”, è difficile stabilire se questa frase è di Aristofane o di<br />
Aristodemo narrato da Apollodoro, se cioè il commediografo descrisse altri particolari degli uomini a<br />
forma di sfera o li lasciò all’immaginazione del lettore, e fu invece Aristodemo a scegliere di<br />
raccontare così questo pezzo del discorso di Aristofane. La decisione su questo e su molte altre cose<br />
narrate è lasciata da Platone al lettore.<br />
ci si era presentato strada facendo: perché non rimanesse inconcluso, e per entrare solo dopo averlo condotto a termine,<br />
continuammo a discutere, fermi lì in piedi nel vestibolo, fino a quando ci trovammo d’accordo”.<br />
20 Si veda la nota che Nucci fa precedere alla sua traduzione del testo in Platone, Simposio, traduzione e commento di M.<br />
Nucci, introduzione di B. Centrone, Torino, Einaudi 2009, pp. LXIV-V.<br />
21 Apollodoro dice di prendersi cura di Socrate da tre anni, e questa cura – espressa in 172c5 con il termine ἐπιµελές – che<br />
egli gli dedica, comprende anche la preparazione a raccontare, della quale due volte, in 172a1 e in 173c1, con l’espressione<br />
οὐκ ἀµελέτητος, egli afferma di non mancare. Si è preparati a fare qualcosa quando la si è già fatta. Prepararsi è dedicarsi,<br />
avere attenzione ripetuta, osservazione, memoria. Questo è ciò che consente di raccontare. Sono tre anni che Apollodoro si<br />
dedica, allora, per così dire, al racconto di Socrate, ed è a questo racconto che ha dedicato la sua vita. Racconto dunque come<br />
cura attenta che consente di salvare, conservando; racconto come memoria, memoria come salvezza (soteria, cfr. Phil. 34a).<br />
22 Ποίησίς ἐστί τι πολύ “creazione è termine vasto” 205b8.<br />
118
The Functions of Apollodorus<br />
Matthew D. Walker<br />
In the opening frame prologue of Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong>, the enigmatic Apollodorus recounts to an<br />
unnamed companion, and to us, Aristodemus’s story of just what happened at Agathon’s drinking<br />
party. Since Apollodorus did not attend the party, however, it is unclear what relevance he could have<br />
to our understanding of the drama and speeches about erôs that follow. Apollodorus’s strangeness is<br />
accentuated by his recession into the background after only two Stephanus pages. It might seem, then,<br />
that Plato could have presented the <strong>Symposium</strong> without Apollodorus. Instead of writing what David<br />
M. Halperin calls a “mixed narrative” (Apollodorus’s third-person recounting of the events at<br />
Agathon’s party), Plato could always have written a straightforward mimetic account of Agathon’s<br />
party (set in the present tense, in direct discourse), or a first-person report (e.g., from either<br />
Aristodemus’s or Socrates’ point of view). 1 The question thus arises, what difference—if any—does<br />
Apollodorus make to the <strong>Symposium</strong>? Does his inclusion call the dramatic and philosophical unity of<br />
the work into question?<br />
I argue that, despite initial appearances, Plato has important literary and philosophical reasons<br />
for including Apollodorus as a character. Far from being an odd appendage to an otherwise complete<br />
narrative, Apollodorus plays an integral role in the <strong>Symposium</strong>. Of course, one might identify,<br />
piecemeal, any number of functions that Apollodorus could serve in the work. I find it entirely<br />
plausible, for instance, that Plato includes the frame prologue with Apollodorus to render the events<br />
that take place at Agathon’s party mysterious and distant, and to arouse our desire to learn more about<br />
them. 2 In this paper, however, I aim to provide a more systematic account of Apollodorus’s role in the<br />
<strong>Symposium</strong>. Apollodorus, I contend, plays at least four important, interconnected functions in the<br />
work, functions that touch on the <strong>Symposium</strong>’s main themes.<br />
I. Through his portrayal of Apollodorus, who reveals a passion for philosophical logoi, Plato intimates<br />
that erôs, in some way yet to be specified, will (a) somehow be philosophical, or best understood by<br />
reference to philosophizing (φιλοσοφεῖν: 173a3); and that (b) the satisfaction of erôs in philosophy<br />
will somehow be important for securing happiness (or eudaimonia). These claims are central in<br />
Socrates’ own speech concerning erôs. Through his portrayal of Apollodorus, then, Plato primes us to<br />
consider these claims as we go on to read the various speeches concerning erôs that follow. This is the<br />
first function that Apollodorus plays in the <strong>Symposium</strong>.<br />
The thought that erôs is somehow philosophical is developed throughout the speech of<br />
Socrates, which presents the views of Diotima, a Mantinean priestess, and which I take, generally, to<br />
present both Socrates’ and Plato’s own views. According to Socrates’ recounting of Diotima’s<br />
teaching about love (a teaching that personifies erôs in quasi-mythic terms), Erôs—the child of Poros<br />
(Resource) and Penia (Lack)—aims at securing what it lacks and needs (200a-b). Since Erôs aims at<br />
beauty, Erôs lacks beauty. But Erôs is not thereby ugly and bad (201e). Rather, Erôs is an<br />
intermediate spirit, a daimôn who occupies a place in between gods and mortals, beauty and ugliness<br />
(202d-e). Wisdom, however, is among the most beautiful things (204b). Hence, Erôs, lacking beauty,<br />
lacks wisdom. But since Erôs is not altogether ugly, Erôs is not altogether ignorant: Erôs is in between<br />
wisdom and ignorance (203e-204a). Lacking wisdom, but neither ignorant nor foolish, Erôs is a lover<br />
of wisdom—a philosopher (203d6; 204a).<br />
Second, Socrates portrays philosophy as the highest form of erôs, and one whose satisfaction best<br />
secures happiness. Philosophy, that is, is the form of erôs that most completely attains the end at<br />
which erôs aims as such, viz., securing immortal possession of the good through generation. In his<br />
speech, Socrates famously outlines a philosophical ascent, in which the erotic philosopher “moves up”<br />
(ἐπανιὼν: 211b6; cf. of ἐπανιέναι at 211c2) from beautiful particular bodies and souls toward Beauty<br />
itself (αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν: 211e1). In completing this ascent, and in “contemplating and being with”<br />
(θεωµένου καὶ συνόντος αὐτῷ: 212a2) Beauty itself, the philosopher gives birth to true virtue and<br />
thereby secures a stable, godlike happiness (212a).<br />
The thought that erôs might be philosophical, and might even constitute a kind of erôs, is<br />
striking. Yet such a view might seem far-fetched. The same goes for the thought that one might secure<br />
1 Halperin (1992: 93-129). Cf. Bury (1909: xv-xvi). Translations from the <strong>Symposium</strong> are generally adapted (with<br />
emendations) from Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff’s translation, in Cooper 1997.<br />
2 See Scott and Welton (2008: 28). For her part, Nussbaum (1986: 168) insists that the mixed narrative “makes us always<br />
aware of the fragility of our knowledge of love.”
Matthew D. Walker<br />
happiness in, or through, philosophical activity. Accordingly, I suggest, Plato has good reason to<br />
introduce his readers to these thoughts through his depiction of Apollodorus in the <strong>Symposium</strong>’s<br />
prologue.<br />
First, Plato portrays Apollodorus as erotically inspired, and as passionately concerned with<br />
philosophical logoi. Apollodorus shows a kind of mania (173e1-2) that reveals him as erotically<br />
inspired. 3 Further, this mania is manifest in his passion for making and listening to “speeches about<br />
philosophy” (τινας περὶ φιλοσοφίας λόγους: 173c3). 4 At the same time, Apollodorus also possesses an<br />
acute awareness of the unsatisfactoriness of the life that he used to lead (173c). 5 To this extent,<br />
Apollodorus reminds one of a Socratic philosopher who has come to attain a certain degree of selfknowledge,<br />
i.e., a certain awareness of his ignorance. Finally, just as the erotically inspired lover in<br />
Socrates’ speech “moves up” a ladder toward the contemplation of Beauty, Apollodorus describes<br />
himself as on his “way up (ἀνιὼν) to town” from his home Phalerum (172a2-3)—i.e., to the city,<br />
where Socrates elsewhere plausibly suggests that philosophical conversation might best flourish. 6<br />
Second, Plato portrays Apollodorus as believing himself to be making progress toward<br />
happiness by devoting himself to philosophical logoi. Now that he has found philosophy, Apollodorus<br />
says, joy has entered his life: “how extraordinarily I enjoy (ὑπερφυῶς ὡς χαίρω) speeches about<br />
philosophy, even if I’m only a listener” (173c). Speaking to Glaucon, Apollodorus disdains his life<br />
before encountering Socrates. “Before then,” Apollodorus says, “I ran around aimlessly. Of course, I<br />
used to think that what I was doing was important, but in fact I was the most worthless man on earth<br />
(ἀθλιώτερος ἦ ὁτουοῦν)—as bad as you are this very moment: I used to think philosophy was the last<br />
thing a man should do” (173a). Apollodorus, however, suggests that things now are different.<br />
Apollodorus now views philosophy as a paramount end worthy of regulating the shape of one’s life.<br />
Thus, Apollodorus claims to be unconcerned with merely instrumental goods, the sort with which his<br />
anonymous companion seems to be concerned (insofar as his companion leads a life organized around<br />
wealth and profit): “All other talk, especially the talk of rich businessmen (τοὺς τῶν πλουσίων καὶ<br />
χρηµατιστικῶν) like you, bores me to tears, and I’m sorry for you and your friends because you think<br />
your affairs are important when really they’re totally trivial” (173c-d). When Apollodorus dismisses<br />
such ends, and the lives that pursue them, as incapable of securing happiness, it is plausible to think<br />
that Plato agrees.<br />
II. So far, I have argued, Apollodorus introduces Plato’s audience to the thoughts, central to the<br />
<strong>Symposium</strong>, that (a) philosophy and erôs are tightly linked, such that philosophy is the highest form<br />
of erôs, and that (b) the satisfaction of such erôs best secures happiness. Yet, ultimately, I suggest,<br />
Apollodorus turns out to be neither a philosopher strictly speaking, nor really on the path to<br />
happiness. Apollodorus, then, serves a corresponding second function in the <strong>Symposium</strong>. Plato’s<br />
characterization of Apollodorus compels Plato’s readers to question what it is be a philosopher, and to<br />
consider how (and why) Apollodorus ultimately falls short. 7<br />
To support this reading, I consider Apollodorus’s innocuous opening line: Δοκῶ µοι περὶ ὧν<br />
πυνθάνεσθε οὐκ ἀµελέτητος εἶναι (172a1). A literal, if clunky, translation of this line might go<br />
something like, “I seem to myself, concerning the things about which you inquire, to be not<br />
unrehearsed.” Indeed, only two days ago, Apollodorus says, he recounted to Glaucon the story about<br />
Agathon’s party that he had heard from Aristodemus. Thus, Apollodorus reiterates to his anonymous<br />
companion in the present, he is “not unrehearsed” (οὐκ ἀµελετήτως ἔχω: 173c1).<br />
Three points about Apollodorus’s opening remarks invite comment. First, with Δοκῶ, Plato<br />
introduces Apollodorus as one who seems, and perhaps one against whom we need to be on guard.<br />
Second, the reflexive µοι suggests that Apollodorus seems a certain way to himself—and it allows<br />
that he may well be deluded. Third, Apollodorus seems to himself to be οὐκ ἀµελέτητος—not<br />
unrehearsed. One of the primary senses of meletê, evident here, is “rehearsal” or “practice,” i.e.,<br />
focused repetition and drill. But another primary sense of meletê in Plato is “care.” Thus, as Socrates<br />
suggests elsewhere, to be a philosopher is to have meletê for the right sorts of objects. For instance, in<br />
the Apology (24d-26b), Socrates puns on the name of one of his later accusers, Meletus. Despite his<br />
accuser’s claims to be concerned about the virtue and education of young Athenians, Socrates claims<br />
3 On Apollodorus’s mania as erotic, cf. Neumann (1965: 285).<br />
4 At <strong>Symposium</strong> 218b3-4, Alcibiades identifies philosophy as a kind of mania and Bacchic frenzy.<br />
5 On Apollodorus’s grasp of the unhappiness of his pre-conversion way of life, see Moore (1969: 229); Sheffield (2006: 10).<br />
6 On Apollodorus’s ascent and its relation to the ascent Socrates describes, see Osborne (1996: 88-90); Corrigan and Glazov-<br />
Corrigan (2006: 10). As Rowe (1998: 127) observes, Phalerum is on the outskirts of Athens, away from its center. As<br />
Socrates maintains at Phaedrus 230d, philosophical conversation best flourishes in the city.<br />
7 Cf. Rosen (1987: 14), who argues that Apollodorus “is both close to and far from philosophy.” Halperin (1992: 113-114)<br />
also notes Apollodorus’s ambiguity.<br />
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Matthew D. Walker<br />
that “to Meletus, these things neither much nor little ever were cares (ἐµέλησεν)” (26b; my<br />
translation). The philosopher, by constrast, shows a proper care for the soul and its best condition<br />
(29d-30b). Similarly, in the Alcibiades, Socrates chastises the young Alcibiades for failing to care for<br />
himself and his virtue. Throughout that dialogue, Socrates impresses on young Alcibiades the need to<br />
show such care (epimeleia: e.g., Alcibiades 119a9, 120c8-d4; 123d4-e1; 124b2-3; 127d-e; 132b6-c2). 8<br />
With Apollodorus’s multiple references to the ambiguous term meletê in the opening lines of<br />
the <strong>Symposium</strong>, Plato compels his readers to reflect on the meaning(s) of meletê and on the sort of<br />
meletê that Apollodorus displays. On the one hand, in Apollodorus’s opening exchange, Plato<br />
highlights the sense of meletê as rehearsal and drilled practice. On the other hand, since Apollodorus<br />
presents himself as passionate for philosophy, Plato invites us to recall the other sense of meletê that<br />
Socrates thinks is proper to the philosopher, i.e., care for the soul and its good condition. 9<br />
With these ambiguities in mind, one must consider what sort of meletê Apollodorus displays<br />
when Apollodorus expresses his passionate concern to make and listen to “speeches about<br />
philosophy” (περὶ φιλοσοφίας λόγους: 173c3). For, as Plato’s portrayal of Apollodorus indicates,<br />
philosophizing for Apollodorus consists, above all, in making and listening to speeches about<br />
Socrates. Thus, Apollodorus reveals to Glaucon that he has been consorting with Socrates for three<br />
years, and has made it his “care (ἐπιµελὲς) to know exactly what he says and does each day” (172c).<br />
Although Apollodorus presents himself on the “way up” to the city, he, and his erotic drives are<br />
ultimately focused on the Socrates who inhabits the city’s streets. 10 Apollodorus seems less—if at<br />
all—concerned for the objects at which the philosopher’s erôs, according to Socrates, properly aims.<br />
Apollodorus, that is, seems not to be especially concerned with contemplating Beauty itself, or even,<br />
more modestly, in pursuing lower kinds of beautiful knowledge. Apollodorus appears similarly<br />
fixated on Socrates as such elsewhere in Plato, viz., in the Apology and Phaedo. 11<br />
Apollodorus shows up as distinctly non-philosophical in other ways. For instance,<br />
Apollodorus appears content simply to rehearse and drill stories about the speeches and deeds of<br />
Socrates. On this basis, commentators have compared Apollodorus to a Homeric rhapode 12 or to<br />
someone repeating a mantra. 13 Apollodorus does not engage argumentatively or dialectically with<br />
Socrates’ speeches. 14 To be sure, that Apollodorus memorizes philosophical logoi does not by itself<br />
show that Apollodorus fails to be a philosopher. For Socrates himself is content in other dialogues to<br />
rehearse philosophical logoi (e.g., at Timaeus 17b-19b, which rehearses points from the Republic). 15<br />
Unlike Socrates, however, Apollodorus shows no signs of doing anything other than rehearsing<br />
philosophical logoi. In light of Plato’s other ways of characterizing Apollodorus, this point counts<br />
against Apollodorus’s philosopher status. Accordingly, when Apollodorus’s anonymous companion<br />
says, “I don’t know exactly how you came to be called ‘the soft (τὸ µαλακὸς),’” it is plausible to<br />
construe Apollodorus’s softness as consisting, in part, of a lack of nerve to question, to challenge, and<br />
to press on for the sake of a fuller understanding. 16<br />
Second, although Apollodorus, as we have seen, believes himself to be making progress<br />
toward happiness insofar as he devotes himself to philosophical logoi, Plato gives us reasons to doubt<br />
that Apollodorus adequately grasps his own situation. Despite Apollodorus’s claims that philosophy<br />
8<br />
On the authenticity of the Alcibiades, see, e.g., Annas (1985: 111-115); Denyer (2001: 14-26).<br />
9<br />
As Halperin (1992: 103) rightly notes, Apollodorus’s references to meletê also prefigure Socrates’ discussion of meletê qua<br />
rehearsal as preservative, and how meletê preserves knowledge (e.g., at 207e-208b).<br />
10<br />
Like Halperin (1992), Sheffield (2006: 11-12) identifies Apollodorus as manifesting an erotic “attraction to Socrates,” and<br />
as “drawn to” Socrates. Rowe (1998: 129), by contrast, argues that Apollodorus is only a “friend” or “companion” (hetairos:<br />
172b7) of Socrates. In reply, it bears noting that Glaucon calls Socrates the friend of Apollodorus. That is still consistent<br />
with Apollodorus’s being a lover of Socrates.<br />
11<br />
Apollodorus’s zeal for Socrates shows itself in his offering to pay Socrates’ bail (Apology 38b), and in Apollodorus’s<br />
wailing at Socrates’ death (Phaedo 117d-e). As Neumann (1965: 285) reasonably claims, grief is a natural response to the<br />
loss of a great value in one’s life. But Apollodorus’s response is excessive by the standard set by Socrates’ other<br />
companions.<br />
12<br />
Corrigan and Glazov-Corrigan (2006: 12; 15). As the Ion suggests, while rhapsodes are divinely inspired, they do not<br />
possess real knowledge.<br />
13<br />
Benardete (2001: 180).<br />
14<br />
Here, I agree with Scott and Welton (2008: 29) that Apollodorus “shows no signs of excelling as a philosopher.” See also<br />
Halperin (1992: 114) and Hunter (2004: 27-28). Even Neumann (1965: 282), who insists that Apollodorus is a philosopher,<br />
admits that Apollodorus engages in no actual philosophical dialogue. Rowe (1998: 130) acknowledges that many modern<br />
commentators deny that Apollodorus engages in philosophy; but Rowe says, “maybe they should listen to Apollodorus.”<br />
Even by Socratic lights, I contend, Apollodorus is not a philosopher.<br />
15<br />
See Sheffield (2006: 14n8).<br />
16<br />
Neumann (1965: 289) contends that Apollodorus’s softness consists in his erotic receptivity to a passion for philosophy<br />
lacking in the many. My reading, however, finds support from Plato’s other uses of malakos elsewhere. As Corrigan and<br />
Glazov-Corrigan (2006: 16n23) observe, Phaedo 85b-c suggests that the soft man (malthakos) does not investigate and<br />
question.<br />
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Matthew D. Walker<br />
has brought him joy (173c4-5), his snarling attitude toward the unenlightened (e.g., at 173a) makes us<br />
wonder. If Apollodorus were truly progressing toward happiness, we are apt to think, he would be a<br />
witty, gentle sort. Yet, as Apollodorus’s anonymous companion remarks to Apollodorus, Apollodorus<br />
seems unhappy (κακοδαίµονα: 173d1): “for you are always like this in your speeches, always furious<br />
(ἀγριαίνεις) with everyone, including yourself—but not with Socrates!” (173d). 17 Apollodorus’s<br />
response to his anonymous companion—“Of course, my dear friend, it’s perfectly obvious why I have<br />
these views about us all: it’s simply because I’m a maniac, and I’m raving!” (173e)—itself seems<br />
tinged with unhappy condescension and obsessiveness. Even if extraordinary enjoyment comes to<br />
Apollodorus from recounting the speeches and deeds of Socrates, he seems not to have made much<br />
progress. Indeed, he seems to be back where he started. Despite his philosophical conversion, that is,<br />
Apollodorus still seems to be “running around”—except that he now goes about chastising nonphilosophers<br />
and recording the speeches and deeds of Socrates.<br />
In making these claims, I am not saying that Apollodorus’s encounter with Socrates has been<br />
harmful for him. On the contrary, Socrates now provides a principle of order in Apollodorus’s life,<br />
such that Apollodorus’s life has a certain shape and unity that it presumably lacked before. Further, as<br />
Socrates does with the young Alcibiades in the dialogue of the same name, Socrates has evidently<br />
brought at least some of Apollodorus’s self-ignorance to light, and he has compelled Apollodorus to<br />
detach himself from his previous way of life, which Apollodorus has come to accept as an unhappy<br />
one. Yet, contra Catherine Osborne, for instance, I am doubtful that Apollodorus’s “journey from his<br />
home to the city matches his departure from his old, non-philosophical lifestyle to the new Socratic<br />
life.” 18 I am similarly skeptical that we should see Apollodorus as having made an “ascent from<br />
ordinary life to Socratic philosophy.” 19 For, given Plato’s depiction of Apollodorus, it seems doubtful<br />
that Apollodorus’s separation from his older way of life counts as a real step forward toward either<br />
Socratic philosophy or a happy life, any more than, say, Alcibiades’ recognition of his self-ignorance<br />
(e.g., at Alcibiades 127d and <strong>Symposium</strong> 215d-216c) marks similar progress for Alcibiades. Such<br />
separation and self-awareness serves, at best, as a precondition for such progress. 20 So, while I concur<br />
with Frisbee Sheffield that Apollodorus receives a certain educational benefit from his interactions<br />
with Socrates (viz., a certain grasp of the happiness of the philosophical life), 21 Apollodorus himself<br />
seems not to be on the path toward happiness.<br />
III. So, how, and why, then, does Apollodorus go wrong? An answer to this question, I contend,<br />
brings to light Apollodorus’s third function in the <strong>Symposium</strong>. Through his portrayal of Apollodorus,<br />
Plato dramatizes how, in general, the nature of erôs is prone to be misunderstood and,<br />
correspondingly, how erôs is apt to be misdirected. In virtue of his misdirected erôs, Apollodorus<br />
displays the basic—and commonly shared—misunderstanding of erôs’s nature that Socrates seeks to<br />
overcome in his speech, and that the <strong>Symposium</strong> as a whole aims to correct.<br />
To understand this point, consider how the attendees of Agathon’s party identify erôs. As<br />
quoted by Eryximachus, Phaedrus asks how people could “never, not even once, write a proper hymn<br />
to Love? How could anyone ignore so great a god?” (177c). Sharing this conception of Erôs as divine,<br />
Eryximachus proposes that each of the attendees spend the night offering encomia to Erôs (177d). In<br />
his own speech, Phaedrus identifies Erôs as “a great god, wonderful in many ways to gods and men,”<br />
and the “most ancient god” (178a-b). Pausanias distinguishes two kinds of Erôs —one heavenly, one<br />
common—but insists that it is necessary to praise all gods (180d-e). Eryximachus identifies a<br />
harmonizing kind of Erôs as the god through which medicine is guided (186e). Aristophanes, for his<br />
part, describes Erôs as the “most philanthropic of gods” (θεῶν φιλανθρωπότατος: 189c7-d1). The<br />
speakers’ praise of Erôs reaches its culmination in the rhetorical fireworks of Agathon’s speech<br />
(especially at 197c-e), which identifies Erôs as “the most beautiful and the best” of gods. It is no<br />
surprise, then, that the young Socrates, in conversation with Diotima, grants that Erôs “is agreed by all<br />
to be a great god” (ὁµολογεῖταί γε παρὰ πάντων µέγας θεὸς εἶναι: 202b6-7).<br />
In praising Erôs as a god, however, the various speeches, and common opinion, make the<br />
following mistake: they treat a daimôn as though he were fully divine, i.e., complete and beautiful.<br />
That is, they misconstrue Erôs not as a needy and desirous lover (τὸ ἐρῶν: 204c3), but, rather, as a<br />
fitting object of love (τὸ ἐρώµενον: 204c2). Erôs, however, is not complete in this way. On the<br />
17<br />
Bury (1909: 6) argues for the alternate reading of the nickname, “to manikos.” Rowe (1998: 130), however, plausibly<br />
defends malakos as making the most sense of the incongruity of Apollodorus’s being savage toward others.<br />
18<br />
Osborne (1996: 88).<br />
19<br />
Osborne (1996: 90).<br />
20<br />
For this point about the knowledge of ignorance, see Sheffield (2006: 61).<br />
21<br />
Sheffield (2006: 11).<br />
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contrary, as already discussed, Erôs is an intermediate figure, neither wholly without resource, nor<br />
wholly without lack. And just as one (theoretically) misconstrues Erôs’s nature when one identifies<br />
Erôs as a divine, complete, and beautiful object of desire, so too one (practically) misdirects one’s<br />
erôs when one pursues erôs as such an object. That is, one’s erôs is misdirected to the extent that one<br />
is “in love with love,” as opposed to loving the complete and beautiful objects and ends that would<br />
fulfill erôs.<br />
As we have also seen, Erôs—neither fully wise nor wholly ignorant—is desirous of wisdom,<br />
and so, a philosopher. By the same token, the philosopher qua philosopher embodies and personifies<br />
Erôs. Thus, as scores of commentators have noted, Socrates’ description of a tough, barefoot,<br />
scheming, brave Erôs (e.g., at 203c-d) seems like something of a self-portrait. Insofar as the<br />
philosopher personifies erôs, then, the philosopher himself would fail to be a fitting object of erôs, at<br />
least not without qualification. For erôs misdirected toward a philosopher would misconstrue a needy<br />
lover as a complete and beautiful object of love. It would accordingly fail to be aimed toward its<br />
proper objects, viz. wisdom, contemplation of the Beautiful, and the immortal possession of the good.<br />
To that extent, an erôs misdirected toward erôs, or toward the philosopher as personification of erôs,<br />
would fail to secure immortal happiness. 22<br />
Given Erôs’s resourcefulness in guiding one toward the good, one can understand how one<br />
might misconstrue Erôs’s nature as wholly divine and loveable: for Erôs, after all, is not wholly<br />
lacking, but has certain good-making features. Similarly, in virtue of the philosopher’s own forms of<br />
resourcefulness, one can understand how one might come to misconstrue—and to pursue—the<br />
philosopher himself as a complete object of erotic striving. Indeed, given Plato’s depiction of Socrates<br />
in the <strong>Symposium</strong>, one can understand Apollodorus’s unhealthy attraction to Socrates in particular.<br />
For in the <strong>Symposium</strong>, Plato portrays Socrates as relatively beautiful and resourceful, showing more<br />
of his paternal inheritance than his maternal. Thus, Socrates shows up to Agathon’s party in an<br />
unusual guise, bathed, prettified, wearing slippers (174a; cf. 220b). He claims, astonishingly, to<br />
understand nothing other than erotic matters (οὐδέν…ἄλλο ἐπίστασθαι ἢ τὰ ἐρωτικά: 177d8). Indeed,<br />
rather than ending on a note of aporia, Socrates reveals himself to be a skilled figure capable of<br />
trapping the beautiful and good, at least to some extent. His inventive account of erôs builds, and<br />
improves, upon the prior speeches, and presents an overview, however dim and incomplete, of the<br />
truth about erôs. But to construe a figure like Socrates as godlike and complete, and to pursue him<br />
accordingly as an ultimate aim of erotic striving, is to overlook his needy and incomplete side,<br />
apparent in Plato’s portrayal of Socrates in other dialogues. In such works, Socrates spends his days<br />
barefoot in the streets, seeking, but characteristically failing to attain, the wisdom that he is all too<br />
aware of lacking.<br />
In short, the <strong>Symposium</strong> suggests, it is problematic to construe philosophers as complete<br />
objects of erôs, as attractive without qualification. It is problematic, in other words, to idolize them.<br />
This is the error that Apollodorus reveals in his stance toward Socrates. And this error reflects a more<br />
general error—misconceiving the daimonic as divine—that Plato aims to explore and correct in the<br />
<strong>Symposium</strong>. In his portrayal of Apollodorus, Plato introduces and dramatizes this error.<br />
IV. Thus far, I have argued that Apollodorus plays three main, unified functions in the <strong>Symposium</strong>.<br />
(i) Apollodorus’s presence offers a means for Plato to introduce certain of the work’s central—if<br />
initially puzzling and possibly counterintuitive—views about erôs, philosophy, and happiness. (ii)<br />
Nevertheless, Apollodorus’s status as philosopher manqué, and his apparent unhappiness, compel us<br />
to puzzle about how Apollodorus goes wrong. (iii) Insofar as Apollodorus goes wrong by idolizing<br />
Socrates, who in turn personifies erôs, Apollodorus introduces us to central views that the <strong>Symposium</strong><br />
as a whole develops, viz., concerning erôs’s nature, how we are apt to misconstrue it, and some of the<br />
potential practical implications of so doing.<br />
On these grounds, I propose, Apollodorus plays a fourth function in the <strong>Symposium</strong>, an<br />
overarching rhetorical, or “psychagogic,” function intended to regulate how Plato’s readers orient<br />
themselves toward the <strong>Symposium</strong> and the Socrates who appears in its pages. Through his depiction<br />
of Apollodorus, I conjecture, Plato attempts to inoculate the aspiring philosophical reader of the<br />
<strong>Symposium</strong> against some of the tendencies that Apollodorus displays. More specifically, Plato’s<br />
portrayal of Apollodorus serves as a distancing device, by means of which Plato prevents his readers<br />
22 Sayre (1996: 126-127) identifies this problem as it arises for Alcibiades, who pursues Socrates as perfect and godlike, and<br />
who accordingly fails to make progress of his own. On Alcibiades’ “idolatrous attachment to Socrates,” cf. Sheffield (2006:<br />
204), who observes in passing that Apollodorus makes a similar mistake. Bury (1909: xvi) identifies Apollodorus as “a<br />
worshipper of Socrates.” Cf. Rosen (1987: 10) and Halperin (1992: 114). According to Nussbaum (1986: 168), Apollodorus<br />
(and Aristodemus) invite comparison with Alcibiades insofar as they “remain lovers of the particulars of personal history.”<br />
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from fully identifying with Apollodorus.<br />
Such distancing is important on account of the <strong>Symposium</strong>’s dramatic portrayal of Socrates in<br />
a more beautiful, more resourceful, less aporetic mode than elsewhere. Presented with Socrates’ own<br />
beautiful speech and inspiring character, Plato’s readers are always at risk of lowering their aims as<br />
aspiring philosophers. Instead of working through the <strong>Symposium</strong> and questioning Socrates’ views on<br />
erôs—i.e., instead of approaching the <strong>Symposium</strong> in a mood of engaged meletê—Plato’s audiences<br />
are at risk of being lulled into merely “rehearsing” the work by reading it passively. They are at risk<br />
of accepting Socrates as a kind of “guru” figure, rather than as a spur to further thinking and progress<br />
of their own. Through his unattractive characterization of Apollodorus, a figure who does accept<br />
Socrates in just this way, Plato reminds his readers of this danger. 23 Plato thereby aims to promote, or<br />
at least not to forestall, his audience’s philosophical progress. 24<br />
Bibliography<br />
Annas, Julia. 1985. “Self-Knowledge in Early Plato.” In Platonic Investigations, ed. Dominic<br />
O’Meara, 111-138. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press.<br />
Benardete, Seth, trans. and comm. 2001. Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong>. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.<br />
Bury, R.G., ed. and intro., 1909. The <strong>Symposium</strong> of Plato. Cambridge: W. Heffer and Sons.<br />
Cooper, John M. ed. 1997. Plato: Complete Works. Indianapolis: Hackett.<br />
Corrigan, Kevin and Elena Glazov-Corrigan. 2006. Plato’s Dialectic at Play: Argument, Structure,<br />
and Myth in the <strong>Symposium</strong>. University Park: Penn State Press.<br />
Denyer, Nicholas, ed. and comm. 2001. Plato: Alcibiades. Cambridge: Cambridge Greek and Latin<br />
Classics.<br />
Halperin, David M. 1992. “Plato and the Erotics of Narrativity,” in Methods of Interpreting Plato and<br />
His Dialogues, ed. James C. Klagge and Nicholas D. Smith (Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy<br />
supplement): 93-129.<br />
Hunter, Richard. 2004. Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong>. Oxford: Oxford University Press.<br />
Moore, J.D. 1969. “The Philosopher’s Frenzy.” Mnemosyne 22: 225-230.<br />
Neumann, Harry. 1965. “On the Madness of Plato’s Apollodorus.” Transactions and Proceedings of<br />
the American Philological Association 96: 283-289.<br />
Nussbaum, Martha C. 1986. The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and<br />
Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.<br />
Osborne, Catherine. 1996. Eros Unveiled: Plato and the God of Love. Oxford: Clarendon Press.<br />
Rowe, Christopher, ed. and trans. 1998. Plato: <strong>Symposium</strong>. Warminster: Aris and Phillips.<br />
Sayre, Kenneth. 1996. Plato’s Literary Garden: How to Read a Platonic Dialogue. South Bend:<br />
University of Notre Dame Press.<br />
Scott, Gary Alan and William A. Welton. 2008. Erotic Wisdom: Philosophy and Intermediacy in<br />
Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong>. Albany: SUNY Press.<br />
Sheffield, Frisbee C. C. 2006. Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong>: The Ethics of Desire. Oxford: Oxford University<br />
Press.<br />
23 Some commentators—e.g., Bury (1909: xvi) and Neumann (1965: 284)—plausibly see Apollodorus as a kind of mask for<br />
Plato himself. If so, I contend, that is not because (as Neumann suggests) Apollodorus is a philosopher. Rather, Apollodorus<br />
represents certain tendencies toward which aspiring philosophers are prone—tendencies toward which Plato believes that<br />
perhaps he too risks falling victim. Accordingly, the presence of Apollodorus serves not only to inoculate Plato’s audience<br />
from these tendencies, but also to provide a kind of self-inoculation for Plato. But such remarks, I allow, are speculative.<br />
24 Acknowledgments tk.<br />
124
Agatone agathos: l'eco dell'epos nell'incipit del Simposio<br />
Dino De Sanctis<br />
Per il Simposio Platone costruisce una cornice complessa. Nell'esordio improvviso, Apollodoro<br />
rivolgendosi ad un gruppo di anonimi destinatari, si dice non impreparato, οὐκ ἀµελέτητος, riguardo<br />
alle notizie che costoro chiedono sul banchetto di Agatone. Subito un'indicazione temporale, πρῴην,<br />
evoca un incontro recente: l'incontro con Glaucone. Proprio l'altro ieri, infatti, come afferma<br />
Apollodoro, anche Glaucone ha chiesto notizie relative a quella συνουσία, credendola un evento<br />
recente. Senza esitazione Apollodoro rivela l'errore di Glaucone, un errore che dipende dalla fonte:<br />
mentre Apollodoro ha ascoltato Aristodemo, presente al banchetto, e per questo sa con sicurezza che<br />
il banchetto è avvenuto molto tempo fa, un ἄλλος τις, un uomo dall'identità imprecisata, ha offerto a<br />
Glaucone un racconto non chiaro, privo di σαφήνεια, sullo stesso δεῖπνον, dopo aver ascoltato Fenice<br />
che, a sua volta, ha ricevuto a riguardo un racconto di Aristodemo. Il banchetto di Agatone, come<br />
rivela Apollodoro, è invece ben più lontano nel tempo rispetto all'incontro con Glaucone. Risale agli<br />
anni in cui Apollodoro e Glaucone erano παῖδες e per la prima volta Agatone ottenne la vittoria con<br />
una tragedia. Il πάνυ ἄρα πάλαι, ὡς ἔοικεν (173a7), che ora esclama Glaucone, è dunque l'eloquente e<br />
quasi meravigliata precisazione che, in questo sapiente gioco di incastri cronologici, restituisce di<br />
nuovo al passato il banchetto di Agatone rispetto al νῦν, il presente di Apollodoro.<br />
Tra gli elementi peculiari che rendono il Simposio un dialogo di profondo equilibrio e di<br />
armoniosa complessità, la critica ha più volte sottolineato il valore che assume questa elaborata<br />
cornice. Nella cornice ai salti cronologici che proiettano il lettore in una vertiginosa fuga nel tempo si<br />
armonizzano, a vari livelli, le voci dei narratori: la voce entusiastica di un Apollodoro µαλακός, la<br />
voce di Aristodemo σµικρός e ἀνυπόδητος ἀεί, su tutte la voce vigile e accorta di Platone, voce<br />
onnisciente che spesso evoca la poesia quale indispensabile risorsa narrativa, quale principale<br />
paradigma della realtà, quale necessario strumento ermeneutico. Nella cornice, levando le tende di un<br />
palcoscenico costruito con arte e con cura scrupolosa, Platone inizia a introdurre il lettore nella<br />
dimora di Agatone, che si popola di personaggi scelti e ben distinti dalla folla degli Ateniesi, nuovi<br />
eroi di una speciale ποίησις. Una comunità di uomini eccellenti, ἀγαθοί, riunita intorno a Socrate, per<br />
un banchetto nel quale la rinuncia sostanziale al vino è finalizzata all'encomio di eros. La casa di<br />
Agatone diventa, dunque, il maestoso teatro di un δεῖπνον che mostra caratteri di spiccata<br />
eccezionalità. Non desta meraviglia, per tutto ciò, che nel Simposio gli echi dell'epos siano intrecciati<br />
a programmatiche strategie sceniche che richiamano il dramma, la tragedia e la commedia, i generi sui<br />
quali Platone, tramite la discussione tra Socrate, Agatone e Aristofane, all'alba del nuovo giorno<br />
annunciato dal canto dei galli, chiude il sipario del dialogo (223d). Questo intreccio tra epos e<br />
dramma, a ben vedere, nel Simposio si esplicita da subito, già nel momento in cui nella cornice inizia<br />
il prologo dialogato tra Socrate e Aristodemo (174a-d3), cioè quando Aristodemo incontra Socrate per<br />
le strade di Atene prima di entrare nella casa di Agatone, alla quale Socrate, in un momento di<br />
concentrazione assoluta e distintiva, preferirà il πρόθυρος dei vicini (175a6-9), creando un'entrata in<br />
ritardo che sottolinea la superiorità dell'ospite.<br />
Mio intento, dunque, sarà oggi esaminare la funzione che riveste in questo prologo dialogato<br />
la poesia con i suoi echi suggestivi che si diffondono via via nelle pagine del Simposio.<br />
L'incontro tra Aristodemo e Socrate è veloce. Socrate spiega che si sta dirigendo presso<br />
Agatone. Il giorno precedente, allontanandosi dalla folla per paura, χθὲς γὰρ αὐτὸν διέφυγον τοῖς<br />
ἐπινικίοις, φοβηθεὶς τὸν ὄχλον (174a7-8), Socrate non ha presenziato al sacrificio di ringraziamento<br />
che Agatone offre per la vittoria: con Agatone, dunque, ha deciso di differire l'incontro per il giorno<br />
successivo. Platone presenta ora un Socrate bello, καλός. Questo κάλλος, tuttavia, desta stupore in<br />
Aristodemo perché strano, atipico per l'uomo che Aristodemo ama più di ogni altro. Subito, però, la<br />
stranezza ha una sua spiegazione: il lettore scopre che i calzari, la pulizia del corpo, il καλλωπίζεσθαι<br />
si giustificano alla luce del fatto che Socrate si sta dirigendo bello a casa di un bello, ἵνα καλὸς παρὰ<br />
καλὸν ἴω (174a9). All'inizio del dialogo, dunque, è inevitabile una corresponsione armoniosa tra la<br />
bellezza dell'ospite e quella del padrone di casa.<br />
Il motivo della bellezza di Agatone, unita nella cornice del Simposio ad un viaggio per le<br />
strade di Atene, richiama, forse intenzionalmente, le Tesmoforiazuse. Aristofane apre la commedia,<br />
come noto, mettendo in scena un grave problema che agita Euripide e destabilizza l'equilibrio della<br />
città. In occasione delle Tesmoforie, le donne stanno per condannare a morte il tragico, perché nelle<br />
sue opere le ha diffamate con i più biechi e violenti insulti. Euripide pertanto decide di chiedere aiuto<br />
ad un suo κηδεστής. Il piano di Euripide è scaltro: andare, assieme al κηδεστής, a casa di Agatone e,
Dino De Sanctis<br />
vista la sua straordinaria bellezza, che si fonda su seducenti tratti femminei, su un'eleganza senza pari,<br />
convincere Agatone a unirsi alle Ateniesi, travestito per l'appunto da donna, per evitare che lo<br />
condannino a morte. Sul piano scenico, dunque, nelle Tesmoforiazuse due uomini, Euripide e il<br />
parente, si dirigono presso la casa di Agatone, come nel Simposio presso la stessa casa si dirigono<br />
Socrate e Aristodemo. A differenza delle Tesmoforiazuse, però, nelle quali Euripide e il parente<br />
resteranno fuori dalla dimora del tragico, dinanzi alla porticina, il θύριον, nei pressi della chiostra, il<br />
θριγκός (24-38), e osserveranno l'uscita di un θεράπων che annuncia l'uscita spettacolare di Agatone<br />
(38-128), nel Simposio, seppure in momenti ben diversi, Aristodemo e Socrate entreranno nella casa<br />
di Agatone per prendere qui parte al banchetto. Non solo: nella fase iniziale della commedia, il<br />
fascino di Agatone è destinato a diventare una connotazione fisica negativa. Tutto su Agatone è<br />
comicamente affascinante e sublime tanto da suscitare il violento accanimento e il dissacrante<br />
sarcasmo del κηδεστής. Inevitabile pertanto appare il richiamo serrato del κηδεστής al κάλλος di<br />
Agatone che dalle parole armoniose di poeta delicato e καλλιεπής si riverbera sul corpo imbellettato<br />
ad arte di novella Cirene, ἀλλ' ἦ τυφλὸς µέν εἰµ'; Ἐγὼ γὰρ οὐχ ὁρῶ / ἄνδρ' οὐδέν' ἐνθάδ' ὄντα,<br />
Κυρήνην δ' ὁρῶ (97-98). La bellezza che Socrate, invece, nel Simposio scorge come un tratto fisico<br />
connotante Agatone, tanto da indurlo ad un personale e raro καλλωπίζεσθαι, traspare da subito quale<br />
componente positiva e distintiva.<br />
Ad Agatone ἀγαθός Platone dedica in fondo le prime pagine del Simposio. Si tratta di una<br />
sezione nella quale è presentato il tema dell'andare a cena ἄκλητος, un tema centrale anche nell'incipit<br />
del Simposio di Senofonte (II 2-7). Qui, infatti, a banchetto iniziato arriva Filippo, il buffone<br />
parassita, Kultperson ricorrente nella commedia a partire dall'Eracle presso Folo di Epicarmo (fr. 66<br />
K.-A.) e poi spesso centrale nella µέση e nella νέα. Filippo calcia con forza alla porta della casa di<br />
Callia, desideroso di entrare quanto prima; per giustificare la sua presenza nel segno del γελοῖον,<br />
afferma che per un buffone andare alle cene altrui ἄκλητος desta maggiore riso che presentarsi su<br />
invito, ἥκω δὲ προθύµως νοµίσας γελοιότερον εἶναι τὸ ἄκλητον ἢ τὸ κεκληµένον ἐλθεῖν ἐπὶ τὸ<br />
δεῖπνον. Callia subito ordina che Filippo entri, ritenendo un gesto volgare privare qualcuno di un tetto<br />
(I 12-13). L'arrivo del buffone parassita, descritto durante il banchetto da Senofonte, del resto,<br />
promette un salace divertimento che poi nei fatti non avrà luogo. Ben diversa, invece, è la situazione<br />
nel Simposio di Platone per non pochi motivi. Certo, qui manca la figura del buffone parassita e il<br />
γελοῖον che all'inizio del banchetto è prodotto dalla sosta di Socrate presso il portico - Aristodemo<br />
dirà infatti che proprio a questo punto gli successe una cosa davvero buffa, καὶ τι ἔφη γελοῖον παθεῖν<br />
(174e1-4) - come si capirà in breve tempo, non è altro se non un ἔθος peculiare e serissimo di Socrate<br />
quando Socrate è alla ricerca della σοφία. Ma non solo: nella cornice del Simposio Socrate invita<br />
presso Agatone Aristodemo incontrato per strada che, a questo punto, da ἄκλητος diventa a suo modo<br />
κεκληµένος, anche se non per diretto invito del padrone di casa. In tal modo Aristodemo che dice di<br />
essere un φαῦλος rispetto ad un uomo σοφός, viene integrato in una gerarchia etica superiore. L'invito<br />
di Socrate è dunque decisivo. Certo, non è finalizzato a minare l'armonia del banchetto al quale si sta<br />
recando o a suscitare ilarità. Socrate intende alterare tutt'al più una παροιµία, un proverbio, per<br />
dimostrare che sono i buoni ad andare spontaneamente al banchetto dei buoni, ἀγαθῶν ἐπὶ δαῖτας<br />
ἴασιν αὐτόµατοι ἀγαθοί. Non sfugge in questa sequenza il gioco di parole prezioso e colto che si<br />
sviluppa tra il nome di Agatone e l'epiteto ἀγαθός. Non a caso, Lachmann ipotizzò che sotto il<br />
genitivo ἀγαθῶν sul quale unanime concorda la tradizione si celasse un dativo con aferesi Ἀγάθων(ι).<br />
Senza dubbio, una congettura ingegnosa e ricca di fascino, non a caso accolta in testo da Burnet, tale<br />
da restituire il sottile gioco al quale inevitabilmente Platone - come ogni Greco – pensava al suono del<br />
nome parlante del tragico Agatone. Ma forse, a mio avviso, non è necessario spingersi alla correzione<br />
della tradizione e preferire nel testo il dativo Ἀγάθωνι. Anche il genitivo ἀγαθῶν, infatti, rende conto<br />
del verbo διαφθείρω che, assieme a µεταβάλλω, contrassegna l'azione sovversiva che ora Socrate<br />
compie nei confronti della παροιµία citata. Un'azione sovversiva che, peraltro, è di poco peso, se<br />
messa a confronto con quanto invece, secondo Socrate, avviene in Omero. Omero, infatti, non solo<br />
altera il proverbio ma addirittura commette un atto di ὕβρις nei suoi confronti. Nell'Iliade, prima che<br />
l'esercito greco marci contro Troia, Menelao spontaneamente si dirige presso la tenda di Agamennone<br />
durante un sacrificio per propiziare Zeus, αὐτόµατος δέ οἱ ἦλθε βοὴν ἀγαθὸς Μενέλαος (II 408). La<br />
scena è di per sé strana, visto che secondo Omero, come aggiunge Socrate, Menelao è un µαλθακὸς<br />
αἰχµητής rispetto a Agamennone considerato nel Simposio un ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ τὰ πολεµικά. Non sfugge<br />
in questa sezione una voluta fusione delle tessere dell'epos compiuta da Socrate. Socrate attribuisce a<br />
Menelao, nel II libro del poema definito βοὴν ἀγαθός, il profilo riservato all'eroe durante un momento<br />
decisivo del XVII libro, non a caso dedicato alla aristia di Agamennone, quando cioè Apollo per<br />
spronare alla guerra Ettore chiama molle guerriero il re di Sparta, οἷον δὴ Μενέλαον ὑπέτρεσας, ὃς τὸ<br />
πάρος γε / µαλθακὸς αἰχµητής (587-588). Ne consegue dunque che in Omero Menelao, un uomo<br />
126
Dino De Sanctis<br />
inferiore, χείρων, senza invito, va di sua iniziativa al banchetto di Agamennone, un uomo superiore,<br />
ἀµείνων.<br />
Per comprendere le implicazioni sottese dalla lettura dell'Iliade avanzata ora da Socrate è<br />
opportuno considerare l'uso del verso proverbiale ἀγαθῶν ἐπὶ δαῖτας ἴασιν αὐτόµατοι ἀγαθοί<br />
presentato a questo punto del dialogo. Di sicuro Socrate ne altera la struttura, come suggerisce il<br />
verbo διαφθείρειν, compie un mutamento di termini, come testimonia il verbo µεταβάλλειν, se<br />
consideriamo la forma iniziale alla quale Platone forse intende riferirsi. Sia uno scolio al Simposio sia<br />
Ateneo sia il paremiografo Zenobio, infatti, individuano un rapporto di diretta dipendenza tra la<br />
παροιµία citata da Socrate e un frammento che deriva dal Χρυσοῦν γένος di Eupoli (fr. 289 K.-A.):<br />
αὐτόµατοι δ' ἀγαθοὶ δειλῶν ἐπὶ δαῖτας ἴασιν.<br />
Sequenza esametrica che nella commedia di norma evoca e tradisce la parodia epica. Il titolo di questo<br />
dramma, del resto, richiama chiaramente il mito delle cinque razze delineato negli Erga di Esiodo<br />
tanto che forse non sarà azzardato credere che qui Eupoli sviluppasse il τόπος delle origini per<br />
muovere una polemica contro la società coeva. Del resto, è plausibile che in questa commedia fosse<br />
presentata una realtà anomala, un mondo alla rovescia, nel quale è ammessa un'interazione tra buoni e<br />
cattivi, tra δειλοί e ἀγαθοί per l'appunto, durante una mitica età primitiva in cui i buoni si recano di<br />
propria iniziativa alla mensa dei cattivi. Socrate, dunque, smentisce il verso di Eupoli, nel momento in<br />
cui, tramite l'invito ad Aristodemo, fa in modo che siano solo i buoni a recarsi αὐτόµατοι,<br />
spontaneamente, presso i buoni.<br />
Ma, a ben vedere, l'inserimento di ἀγαθῶν che compie Socrate nella παροιµία con δειλῶν non<br />
è solo un abile espediente con il quale Platone anticipa il profilo di chi partecipa alla mensa di<br />
Agatone: diventa una dotta ἐπανόρθωσις, una correzione, per così dire, filologica, capace di restituire<br />
al proverbio il suo côtè epico.<br />
Il verso del Χρυσοῦν γένος di Eupoli, infatti, si fonda su un verso attribuito alle Nozze di<br />
Ceice, un poema in antichità assegnato ad Esiodo (frr. 263-268 M.-W.). Qui era narrato l'arrivo di<br />
Eracle nella dimora di Ceice nel momento in cui il re offre un banchetto per le sue nozze con Alcione.<br />
Ma non solo: nel poema iniziava a delinearsi anche il doppio profilo di Eracle, cioè quello dell'Eracle<br />
mangione, molto caro alla commedia, e quello dell'Eracle virtuoso. In effetti, una volta entrato nel<br />
banchetto di Ceice, Eracle contende con Lepreo, altro commensale di Ceice, per vedere chi dei due sia<br />
il più abile e forte nel divorare il cibo. Solo dopo il banchetto invece subentrerà una gara ben più<br />
difficoltosa, relativa alla virtù, nella quale Eracle sarà il vincitore. Certo è che nel poema, arrivando<br />
senza invito e inatteso alla casa dell'amico Ceice, Eracle esclamava, come ricorda Zenobio, αὐτόµατοι<br />
δ' ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθῶν ἐπὶ δαῖτας ἵενται (fr. 264 M.-W.). L'idea per cui i buoni si possano recare<br />
spontaneamente presso i buoni risale dunque già ad un poema della tradizione arcaico-esiodea dove è<br />
collegata in maniera vistosa alle gesta di Eracle, ad un contesto simposiale, ad una disputa agonale.<br />
Non a caso, dopo le Nozze di Ceice, nel narrare la stessa vicenda, anche Bacchilide, nel IV Peana,<br />
ricorda l'entrata di Eracle nel palazzo di Ceice con parole che hanno il valore di una citazione<br />
programmatica (fr. 1, 21-25 Irigoin):<br />
στᾶ δ' ἐπὶ λάϊνον οὐδόν,<br />
τοὶ δὲ θοίνας ἔντυον, ὧδέ τ' ἔφα·<br />
"Αὐτόµατοι δ' ἀγαθῶν ἐς<br />
δαῖτας εὐόχθους ἐπέρχονται δίκαιοι<br />
φῶτες."<br />
I versi sono un chiaro esempio di memoria poetica tra epos e lirica. Fermo sulla soglia di bronzo del<br />
palazzo del re, mentre è allestito il banchetto nuziale, Eracle giustifica il suo arrivo improvviso e<br />
inatteso, ricordando di nuovo che alla mensa dei buoni gli uomini giusti vanno da soli, senza essere<br />
invitati, spontaneamente. Δίκαιοι φῶτες sono ora per l'Eracle di Bacchilide gli ἀγαθοί di Esiodo. Solo<br />
dopo Esiodo e Bacchilide, dunque, il verso arriva alla commedia: lo troviamo, come abbiamo visto, in<br />
forma alterata in Eupoli. E lo troviamo anche nella Πυλαία di Cratino, forse durante la parabasi,<br />
quando il poeta tramite il coro si rivolge al suo pubblico (fr. 182 K.-A.):<br />
οἱ δ' αὖθ' ἡµεῖς, ὡς ὁ παλαιὸς<br />
λόγος, αὐτοµάτους ἀγαθοὺς ἰέναι<br />
κοµψῶν ἐπὶ δαῖτα θεατῶν.<br />
127
Dino De Sanctis<br />
A differenza di Eupoli, Cratino volutamente ricorda la tradizione che il verso ha alle spalle: l'antico<br />
detto, il παλαιὸς λόγος al quale accenna è il verso delle Nozze di Ceice, il verso che ora serve al<br />
comico per rivelare che, come un poeta ἀγαθός, assieme al suo coro, dunque assieme alla sua opera, si<br />
sta recando presso spettatori eleganti, κοµψοὶ θεαταί, in quanto capaci di giudicare un'arte perfetta, in<br />
un banchetto che coincide con il teatro secondo una metafora simposiale non peregrina sulla scena<br />
ateniese.<br />
Il verso errante che Socrate, incontrando Aristodemo, modifica a partire dalla forma scelta da<br />
Eupoli con il riferimento agli ἀγαθοί, ha dunque una funzione decisiva all'inizio del dialogo, un<br />
funzione prolettica che non a caso ruota intorno al concetto di ἀγαθόν. Non stupisce del resto che nel<br />
Simposio la convergenza tra καλόν e ἀγαθόν diventi a poco a poco un sostanziale Leitmotiv che in<br />
fondo omaggia il padrone di casa, almeno sino a quando Socrate tramite Diotima non rivela che<br />
amore, realtà demonica intermedia tra uomini e dei, né bello né brutto, è tutt'al più tensione suprema<br />
al καλόν e all'ἀγαθόν. Ma certo, almeno sino ad Agatone, Eros è causa per l'appunto di ἀγαθά, è<br />
ποιητὴς ἀγαθός, ἵλεως ἀγαθός e ἐπιµελὴς ἀγαθῶν. Socrate, ora, nel prologo dialogato della cornice,<br />
come un nuovo Eracle che avanza per le strade di Atene, si sta dirigendo presso la dimora di un poeta<br />
ἀγαθός dove incontrerà uomini ἀγαθοί. Certo, a differenza di Eracle, Socrate è stato invitato da<br />
Agatone: il suo arrivo non è dunque inatteso né imprevisto. Inatteso e imprevisto è tutt'al più l'arrivo<br />
di Aristodemo, l'amico che Socrate incontra per strada. Ma l'invito, proposto da un ἀνήρ ἀγαθός e ad<br />
un tempo σοφός ad un amico, non altera il corretto andamento del δεῖπνον, la sua struttura armoniosa<br />
e consequenziale. Lo dimostra, ad esempio, sul finale del Simposio la serie di arrivi di altri<br />
personaggi, uomini che, in modo diverso, rappresentano per il δεῖπνον un momento critico, certo<br />
potenzialmente di difficile gestione. A casa di Agatone, infatti, la stessa sera giungono altri conoscenti<br />
di Agatone non invitati, nel momento in cui la συνουσία volge al termine: Alcibiade con il suo<br />
corteggio ebbro e festante, nonché un secondo gruppo di rumorosi comasti. Giungono entrambi<br />
inattesi, senza invito, all'improvviso, ἐξαίφνης (212c7 ε 223b2). Alcibiade addirittura troverà la porta<br />
chiusa e dovrà bussare per entrare a differenza di Socrate e di Aristodemo dinanzi ai quali le porte<br />
della casa di Agatone sono aperte e dunque accessibili, ἐπειδὴ δὲ γενέσθαι ἐπὶ τῇ οἰκίᾳ τῇ Ἀγάθωνος,<br />
ἀνεῳγµένην καταλαµβάνειν τὴν θύραν (174d8-e2). Si ha come l'impressione che per chi partecipa a<br />
questo δεῖπνον speciale, la guida di Socrate sia una garanzia irrinunciabile, necessaria, indispensabile.<br />
Una testimonianza in questa direzione è offerta, per l'appunto, dall'ultima fondamentale<br />
citazione che Socrate, nel convincere Aristodemo a seguirlo, propone nel prologo dialogato della<br />
cornice. Prima di intraprendere la strada che condurrà alla casa di Agatone, nel momento in cui i due<br />
amici decidono cosa dire al loro imminente ospite, Socrate esclama alcune parole che, nella Dolonia,<br />
Diomede rivolge a Nestore per ottenere la compagnia del saggio Odisseo, σύν τε δύ', ἔφη, ἐρχοµένω<br />
πρὸ ὁδοῦ (174d2). Si tratta anche in questo caso di un verso riadattato rispetto all'originale, σύν τε δύ'<br />
ἐρχοµένω καί τε πρὸ ὃ τοῦ ἐνόησεν (Il. X 224), nel quale palese è il cambio funzionale πρὸ ὁδοῦ<br />
rispetto al tradito πρὸ ὃ τοῦ. La tradizione di questo verso della Dolonia peraltro ha una lunga storia:<br />
del resto Platone lo utilizza, nella sua completezza, una seconda volta, nel Protagora (348d1), quando<br />
Socrate per l'appunto, nella sezione dedicata al commento del Carme a Scopas, dimostra a Protagora<br />
che entrambi dispongono di buone risorse nella discussione per quanto riguarda azione, parola e<br />
pensiero, εὐπορώτεροι γάρ πως ἅπαντές ἐσµεν οἱ ἄνθρωποι πρὸς ἅπαν ἔργον καὶ λόγον καὶ διανόηµα.<br />
Aristotele lo cita poi sia nell'Etica Nicomachea (1155a12-16) sia nella Politica (1287b13-15). Certo,<br />
nel Simposio questo verso, una volta rivisitato da Socrate, ha una spiccata valenza evocativa.<br />
Nell'Iliade Diomede sceglie Odisseo come compagno di viaggio per la sua superiore capacità<br />
intellettiva prima di un'impresa difficoltosa e piena di pericolo; nel Simposio Socrate, dopo aver<br />
integrato il suo amico nel novero degli ἀγαθοί, procede assieme a lui - o almeno così lascia credere il<br />
lettore - verso un evento decisivo e a suo modo impegnativo lungo una strada che conduce alla dimora<br />
di Agatone.<br />
Certo, colpisce a prima vista, che il proposito che Socrate rivela a Aristodemo, procedere<br />
entrambi assieme sulla stessa strada, nel Simposio sia subito disatteso. Mentre Aristodemo avanza per<br />
le strade di Atene, Socrate resta indietro, avvinto dai suoi pensieri, nella sua estatica concentrazione.<br />
Quando l'amico di viaggio si girerà per attenderlo, Socrate lo manderà avanti, presso Agatone, verso<br />
la meta dove Aristodemo entrerà da solo. Il procedere assieme, dunque, presto diventa un cammino<br />
parallelo ma solitario e si ricomporrà nell'intreccio dei λόγοι a casa di Agatone. L'atteggiamento di<br />
Socrate, tuttavia, non deve stupire. Non a caso, quando Agatone vede arrivare a casa sua Aristodemo,<br />
afferma che avrebbe voluto invitarlo ma che non è riuscito nell'intento per la folla numerosa che lo<br />
circondava e che gli ha impedito di scoprire dove fosse andato il suo amico. Al di là dell'urbanità di<br />
Agatone che deve far sentire a suo agio il conoscente giunto senza suo invito, ma come precisa di<br />
nuovo Aristodemo invitato da Socrate, è qui possibile cogliere una sottile allusione al fatto che chi<br />
128
Dino De Sanctis<br />
viaggia con Socrate e lo frequenta assiduamente è una figura opportuna e ammessa tra gli ἀγαθοί. E<br />
qui, tra gli ἀγαθοί, Socrate quale nuovo eroe della sontuosa ποίησις de Simposio ha il ruolo decisivo e<br />
di guida, paradigma, maestro, in vista della lode suprema che riceverà al termine del dialogo. Socrate<br />
ha ormai indicato ad Aristodemo - e dunque al lettore del Simposio - dove occorre andare, quale sia il<br />
vero banchetto che l'uomo deve frequentare, quale sia la strada corretta da intraprendere. Non resta<br />
che percorrere questa strada e entrare nella casa di Agatone dove Aristodemo scoprirà, come il lettore<br />
del dialogo, che nell'impulso ad eros si nasconde l'inesausta tensione dell'uomo verso il bene, verso<br />
l'eterno possesso dell'immortalità.<br />
129
No Invitation Required? A Theme in Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong><br />
Giovanni R.F. Ferrari<br />
Uninvited arrivals are a salient theme of Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong>. Why is this?<br />
The theme is broached when Socrates, coaxing Aristodemus to accompany him, uninvited, to<br />
Agathon's, twists a proverb to make it say that the good go uninvited to the feasts of the good (174b).<br />
Three distinct acts of uninvited arrival are involved here: most obviously, good going uninvited to<br />
good; implicitly, superior going uninvited to inferior, since this seems to be the version of the proverb<br />
that Socrates is treating as his original; lastly, inferior going uninvited to superior, which is how<br />
Socrates claims Homer portrayed Menelaus's visit to Agamemnon in the Iliad. Each of the three has<br />
its significance for the dialogue.<br />
Aristodemus worries that his situation would fit, not the first case, good going uninvited to<br />
good, but the third: inferior going uninvited to superior. For protection, he seeks an invitation from<br />
Socrates. This, however, is a revealing error. For to go uninvited as inferior to superior, in Plato, is<br />
emblematic of one's philosophic independence. It is to follow where nothing and no one actively<br />
beckons or responds; where what draws you on is your own desire for the wisdom that would yield<br />
complete, godlike satisfaction, if you could attain it. It is this connection with desire that makes the<br />
theme a natural one to appear when the talk in Plato's dialogues turns to love, since love may well<br />
pursue its object without regard for invitation, and may continue the pursuit — indeed, may pursue<br />
more ardently — if unrequited.<br />
Not coincidentally, therefore, the theme reappears in Plato's other dialogue on love, the<br />
Phaedrus, where it receives a full-dress mythical presentation as the relationship in which<br />
philosophers should properly stand to the divine. The Olympian gods in Socrates' great speech on<br />
love in the Phaedrus are said to wander the pathways of the heavens, enjoying blessed visions and<br />
"doing each his own" (prattôn hekastos autôn to hautou, 247a), while any human soul who is able and<br />
willing may follow them (hepetai de ho aei ethelôn te kai dynamenos), ascending after much struggle<br />
to glimpse the place where the gods are to feast and dine on the vision of true being (pros daita kai epi<br />
thoinên); for the gods begrudge nothing (phthonos gar exô theiou khorou histatai). The gods, then,<br />
issue no invitations. Nor, however, do they pose obstacles. It is up to humans to follow, in<br />
sympathetic imitation, if they wish to enjoy a similar blessedness. They must go uninvited to the feast<br />
of their superiors.<br />
The <strong>Symposium</strong> too does not lack for a mythical presentation of this theme. Whereas the<br />
divine feast of the Phaedrus, however, is high-flown in every sense of the word, that in the<br />
<strong>Symposium</strong> is narrated in the lower, comedic register of Aesopic fable, as is appropriate to the less<br />
serious, "sympotic" tone of the dialogue as whole. In the symbolic story of Eros' origins, told by<br />
Diotima to Socrates (203b-204a), it is Eros' mother, Poverty, who goes uninvited to beg at the doors<br />
where the gods are holding a celebratory feast for Aphrodite's birth. As Poverty incarnate, she is<br />
herself poor and, one assumes, hungry, while the gods' feast is sumptuous (hoion dê euôkhias ousês,<br />
203b). It is her own nature, then, that draws her on. And there she seizes on a second opportunity,<br />
again without invitation: finding the god Resource (Poros) prostrate in a drunken stupor in the garden<br />
nearby, and conscious of her own lack of resources (dia tên hautês aporian, 203b), she takes<br />
advantage of his temporary defenselessness and conceives a child from this most well-off of fathers.<br />
The child Eros, however, turns out to resemble its mother more than its father. Eros'<br />
resemblance to Poverty, expressed allegorically in terms of the external features of his life, is wellnigh<br />
perfect. Like his mother, he is poor and homeless and lives a hardscrabble life out of doors.<br />
Hence his life is excluded from resembling that of his divine father, who, unlike his mother, is a fullypaid<br />
up member of the happy company of feasting gods. And here it is important to see that Poros'<br />
name, in the context of this fable, means Resource in the sense of "Resources" rather than<br />
"Resourcefulness." When Plato writes that "in conformity with his father [or perhaps, "in the<br />
direction of his father"], he is a schemer after the beautiful and the good" (kata de au ton patera<br />
epiboulos esti tois kalois kai tois agathois, 203d), and when he follows this with a long list of<br />
attributes making Eros out to be a cunning and resource-ful provider of those resource-s, it is the<br />
resources that he inherits from his father, not the resourcefulness. The resources or goods that Eros<br />
seeks (but only occasionally and temporarily achieves) are those times in his life when he prospers<br />
and enjoys success (tote men ... thallei ... tote de apothnêiskei, 203e). 1 Resource himself, however,<br />
1 So too, when terms etymologically related to Poros are used in this passage, they refer to achieved goods rather than to the<br />
process of achieving them. This is certainly the case at 203e, just cited in the text, where Eros is described as capable in one
Giovanni R.F. Ferrari<br />
has no need to be resourceful: he is a god, who already has all that he needs.<br />
In fact, the parent who demonstrates resourcefulness in this fable is not Resource but Poverty.<br />
She is the one who is driven to scheme after resources that she lacks — driven by an awareness of her<br />
own lack of resources that seems the seed of the philosopher's awareness of his own ignorance (cf.<br />
204a). The word for her scheming is epibouleuousa (203b). When we read at 203d, then, that Eros is<br />
epiboulos, a "schemer" after the beautiful and the good, we should attribute the scheming to his<br />
mother, while to his father, who lives large, we should attribute only the broad range of "beautifuls"<br />
and "goods" (tois kalois kai tois agathois) to which Eros aspires — a larger goal than his mother could<br />
have attempted to attain for herself. Eros's philosophic nature, then, makes him a striver after the<br />
beautiful and good, and in this he resembles his mother, who goes uninvited to the feasts of her<br />
superiors. Although transposed to the genre of fable, it is essentially the same message as the one we<br />
found in the Phaedrus.<br />
Let us return now to the early scene between Socrates and Aristodemus and see how the<br />
theme plays out there. It might seem that the theme applies only to Aristodemus, not to Socrates,<br />
since with his opening words Socrates informs Aristodemus that he has accepted an invitation to<br />
attend a dinner party at Agathon's that day (174a). More precisely, the occasion would seem to be a<br />
case of the good going invited to the good: for Socrates jokingly gives as his reason for having<br />
groomed himself unusually well for the occasion his desire to go to Agathon kalos para kalon, "as one<br />
beautiful person to another."<br />
This appearance, however, turns out to be deceptive, and that in two ways. First, Socrates'<br />
beauty is only cosmetic; it is not the kind of beauty that bears a close relation to the good.<br />
Accordingly, although Socrates' physical beauty is much inferior to Agathon's, we are not surprised to<br />
find, as the dialogue progresses, that when it comes to the good, and to the beautiful that attends the<br />
good, it is Socrates, not Agathon, who is the superior. Second: despite having a bona fide invitation,<br />
Socrates manages, in a sense, to arrive uninvited after all. En route to Agathon's he becomes pensive<br />
and falls behind, putting Aristodemus in the embarrassing situation of entering Agathon's house<br />
without him. Socrates then ignores the slave sent by Agathon to summon him from the neighbor's<br />
porch, to which he has repaired. Agathon makes many further moves toward calling Socrates inside,<br />
but Aristodemus refuses to permit them even to reach Socrates' ears. Finally, when the guests are<br />
already halfway through their meal, Socrates arrives unheralded, having spent the intervening time in<br />
his accustomed way (174d-175c).<br />
When Socrates arrives, then, he arrives on his own initiative. He interrupts the meal like an<br />
uninvited parasite — somewhat in the way that the clown Philip in Xenophon's <strong>Symposium</strong> interrupts<br />
the dinner at Callias' house (1.11-13). Philip, however, as an ironist of a far cruder stamp than<br />
Socrates, makes an issue of his uninvited status, claiming that it is funnier to come to dinner without<br />
an invitation than with one. Socrates, by contrast, is simply being himself, arriving without comment<br />
and only when he is good and ready. His arrival fits the version of the proverb that Socrates seized<br />
upon in order to twist: he is a superior going uninvited to the feast of his inferior. If that version of<br />
the proverb is itself a satire on the version that has the good going uninvited to the feasts of the good<br />
— since we find it in the comic poet Eupolis (fr. 289), while the version that has good going to good<br />
is found in Hesiod (fr. 264) — its comic quality would also fit Socrates' general situation well. That<br />
is to say, among his fellow human beings, a philosopher such as Socrates is permanently in a<br />
condition analogous to that of a superior going uninvited to the feasts of the inferior. He lives among<br />
the pleasures of his fellow human beings without defining himself by their pleasures. Socrates in the<br />
<strong>Symposium</strong> drinks, but he never gets drunk (176c, 214a, 220a). He joins in, but stays sober, while<br />
and the same day as "living and flourishing" and then "dying": for it is when he is flourishing — when the desire is not just<br />
live and active, but successful — that Eros is said to euporein, find resources. And it is when he "comes back to life on<br />
account of his father's nature" that he is said once again to have a porizomenon that he can lose — a "provision," not a<br />
"means of providing." What his father represents, then, is the wealthy pole at the opposite extreme from aporia, as<br />
described in the conclusion that Eros "neither lacks resources nor is wealthy" (oute aporei Erôs oute ploutei). Poros<br />
represents achieved wealth, not the pursuit of wealth. Accordingly, the earlier reference to Eros' being phronêseôs<br />
epithymêtês kai porimos (203d) should be understood to say that he both desires to understand and is resourceful about<br />
coming to understand — not just about seeking to understand. In its general usage, the word porimos seems in any case to<br />
be used in contexts where resourcefulness is proven by success. Rowe in his commentary to 203d5-7 agrees that "we might<br />
expect porimos to mean 'resourceful in finding [wisdom]'"; in his translation, however, he writes "resourceful in looking for<br />
it," on the grounds that a philosopher, unlike a god, never does actually find wisdom, at least according to 204a. But what is<br />
said at 204a is that a wise person (sophos) does not philosophize. This does not exclude — in fact, had better not exclude —<br />
that a philosopher could on occasion achieve some better understanding than he previously had. As Rowe himself puts it in<br />
a subsequent note (to 203e2), the idea that Eros at any particular moment is neither resourceless nor rich makes sense "as a<br />
metaphorical description of the ups and downs of philosophic discussion." [C. J. Rowe, trans., comm., Plato: <strong>Symposium</strong><br />
(Warminster 1998)]<br />
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those around him make fools of themselves. It is a situation rich in comic possibilities.<br />
But although the philosopher among his fellow human beings is as a superior going uninvited<br />
to the feasts of the inferior, this is not the condition to which he aspires. In his pursuit of wisdom he<br />
resembles, as we have seen, an inferior going uninvited to the feasts of his superiors. And ultimately,<br />
he would wish to be as the gods themselves could be said to be (and in the Phaedrus, are said to be):<br />
the good going uninvited to the feasts of the good. 2<br />
Both of these latter situations, in fact, are alluded to also in this opening scene between<br />
Socrates and Aristodemus. The allusion is contained in Socrates' garbling of Homer's treatment of<br />
Menelaus. Homer, so Socrates claims, made Menelaus out to be a "soft spearman," while portraying<br />
his brother Agamemnon as a superior fighter; despite which, Homer has Menelaus arrive uninvited, as<br />
inferior to superior, when Agamemnon arranges a feast for the Greek generals at Troy (174b-c).<br />
Aristodemus, ever subservient to his idol Socrates, accepts Socrates' account of Homer without<br />
objection. But Plato's readers should not. Socrates has had to stretch to find that slighting evaluation<br />
of Menelaus' soldierly prowess: it occurs in the seventeenth book of the Iliad (17.587), separated by<br />
much incident from the feast that Agamemnon held in the second book. What is more, it is an insult<br />
put in the mouth of Apollo rather than uttered as a judgment of the narrator. Menelaus in Homer is<br />
generally quite as brave a fighter as most — indeed, Apollo's taunt here is an attempt to discount a<br />
conspicuous act of valour that Menelaus has just performed.<br />
Thus alerted, the reader who considers more closely the incident in Book 2 will recall that the<br />
reason Homer gives for Menelaus having come unbidden to Agamemnon's feast is that, as<br />
Agamemnon's younger brother, he knows the elder's mind without needing to be told: "And<br />
Menelaus of the strong war cry came to him of his own accord, for he knew in his heart the cares that<br />
troubled his brother" (2. 408-9). That is, as one brother to another, he took his invitation for granted<br />
at such a time, even if Agamemnon's worries caused him to forget to include Menelaus among the<br />
formally invited guests. (This is how Plutarch interprets the passage at Moralia 706f.) Although the<br />
brothers differ in status —Agamemnon being the elder and exercising the greater kingly authority —<br />
they belong together by nature.<br />
To the extent that the description "inferior going uninvited to superior" still fits Menelaus'<br />
situation, then, it does so in a positive sense. Although not his brother's equal, he too, like his brother,<br />
is a valiant warrior. And it is with this positive spin that his situation corresponds to the philosopher's<br />
pursuit of godlike wisdom. The philosopher is not equal to the divine; but he has within him the<br />
godlike spark of reason that allows him to aspire, by nature, to associate himself as closely with the<br />
divine as a human being can (as, for example, at the summit of Diotima's ascent, where the<br />
philosopher keeps company with the beautiful itself, 211e-212a). It is with the divine that the<br />
philosopher naturally belongs — ultimately, as the good having gone uninvited to the good.<br />
To seek out invitations, by contrast, is to look for acknowledgment from one's fellows and to<br />
find in this a source of validation. Yet the love that seeks a return of this or indeed of any sort is a less<br />
adequate love than the uninvited love felt by the philosopher for the divine. This is the philosophic<br />
point embodied in the theme of going uninvited in the <strong>Symposium</strong>. The philosopher seeks creative<br />
self-realization through belonging, to the fullest extent, with that to which the best in his nature is<br />
congenial; he seeks Diotima's "birth in the beautiful," not the quid pro quo that is the basis of the<br />
standard love-affair between Athenian males or of the everyday sacrificial transactions between the<br />
Greeks and their gods. 3 Those who seek invitations in the <strong>Symposium</strong> duly come unstuck.<br />
We have already seen one such case, when Aristodemus gets left in the lurch on the way to<br />
Agathon's house. Aristodemus, described by his kindred spirit Apollodorus as a "huge fan" or "lover"<br />
of Socrates at the time (erastês, 173b), makes the mistake of loving and seeking sponsorship from<br />
Socrates, rather than simply loving what Socrates loves. That is why he goes barefoot like his idol,<br />
and reports on his every word (173b). He imitates Socrates, rather than the divine. When Socrates<br />
2 These three possibilities for uninvited arrival (good to good; superior to inferior; inferior to superior) naturally suggest a<br />
fourth, which would complete the four-place grid: bad going uninvited to bad. It is a possibility realized at the very end of<br />
the dialogue, when the crowd of drunken revellers break in uninvited on the company at Agathon's house. ("Bad" here is a<br />
relative term, and describes the typical behavior of ordinary Athenians by contrast to the aspirational conduct of<br />
philosophers.) The incident represents and is an instance of complete disorder on a humdrum level. It implicitly<br />
acknowledges the necessity of "invitations" — of mutual acknowledgment and negotiation — to the smooth running of<br />
social life. That the philosopher has the ability to transcend such behavior makes him exceptional.<br />
3 Admittedly, in Diotima's initial description of Eros' role as daemonic intermediary between humans and the gods, the<br />
relationship mediated by "the daemonic" (to daimonion) runs both ways, in the manner of traditional religion: requests and<br />
sacrifices are conveyed from men to gods; commands and returns for sacrifice are conveyed from gods to men (202e). But<br />
her account here is preliminary. Once Diotima has left the "Lesser Mysteries" behind for the Greater (209e), the religious<br />
traffic becomes one-way, as the philosopher ascends, through Eros, to join with the divine. Such communion is its own<br />
reward.<br />
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Giovanni R.F. Ferrari<br />
abandons him along the road, then, Aristodemus is getting his symbolic come-uppance.<br />
In this behavior, Aristodemus at the dialogue's opening turns out to be a precursor of<br />
Alcibiades at its close. Like Aristodemus, Alcibiades makes Socrates, rather than the divine, the<br />
focus of his love. His aspiration is not simply, as he claims (218d), to become the best he can be, but,<br />
as his behaviour reveals, to have Socrates acknowledge him as the best. And once again, Plato<br />
deploys the theme of invitation-seeking and uninvited arrival to help make his point.<br />
We have seen how Socrates, at the beginning of the dialogue, seems to have been invited to<br />
the feast but ends up coming uninvited. Alcibiades, at the dialogue's end, seems to show up<br />
uninvited, with much drunken banging on the doors, but turns out to be responding to an invitation<br />
after all. "I couldn't come yesterday, so here I am now," are among his first words (212e). 4 Then, in<br />
the story Alcibiades tells of his pursuit of (not wisdom, but) the wise Socrates, we learn that, in his<br />
impatience to receive an invitation from Socrates, he went so far to issue his own invitation to the<br />
feast (217c), inviting Socrates to dinner at his house as if he were the older lover and Socrates the<br />
young man whose love he sought. In this role, Alcibiades could be described as the inferior inviting<br />
the superior to the feast in order that the superior may approve of him. But the description should ring<br />
a bell: it is based on Agathon's instruction to his servants at the start of the evening's dinner:<br />
"Imagining that I and these others have been invited to dinner by you, serve us, so that we may praise<br />
you" (175b). Agathon, the master, here comments wryly about being at the mercy of his slaves.<br />
Alcibiades attempts the same trick, but cannot disturb Socrates' mastery.<br />
4 It is once again Socrates who appears uninvited, startling Alcibiades when he turns around to find him sitting as third guest<br />
on the couch. "Always popping up where I least expect you," says Alcibiades (213c).<br />
133
Diotima and kuèsis in the Light of the Myths of<br />
the God’s Annexation of Pregnancy<br />
Anne Gabrièle Wersinger<br />
In Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong> (201d-212b), Diotima of Mantinea introduces herself in an hyper-masculine<br />
environment, through a complex apparatus of speech embedded relays and nested narratives of which<br />
the main effect is to blur the source of enunciation 1 . Reported by a male, Socrates, one of Diotima’s<br />
main thesis seems rather surprising at first sight: men’s desire (erôs) even the most manly of them, is<br />
to become pregnant (kuèsis) 2 .<br />
Male pregnancy and the Olympian and Orphic myths<br />
Scholars 3 have tried to edulcorate Diotima’s thesis, pretending that it does not imply any valuation of<br />
a feminine attribute. After all, does not Plato write in the Timaeus that a male’s seed, a divine part<br />
derived from the marrow which forms the brain, is sown in the “ploughland of the womb with living<br />
creatures too small to be seen (aorata … zôia) and that those are nourished until they grow large<br />
within” (91c8-d5)? Aeschylus seems to echo the same tradition in a passage of the Eumenides, when<br />
Athena says: “It is not the mother who is the begetter (tokeus) of what is called her child, beeing only<br />
the nurse of the newly-sown embryo (kumatos); the one who begets (tiktei) is the one who mounts<br />
(d’ho thrôiskôn)” (v. 658-660). The phallus is considered the key element for the birth, and if the<br />
maternal role has not completely disappeared, it is reduced to a nurturing function. Anaxagoras held<br />
that man’s ejaculation of seed produced an homunculus which reached it’s full size thanks to the<br />
nourishment supplied by the mother 4 . Accordingly, when Diotima says that the males aspire to<br />
pregnancy, one should understand (except by uttering something absurd) that she can’t of course be<br />
speaking of the mother’s pregnancy, but only of the condition whereby a man is ready to ejaculate his<br />
seed 5 .<br />
But, to postulate that kuèsis applied to males can’t have the usual meaning and must be<br />
interpreted in a metaphorical sense, since a male can not reasonably be pregnant, is a petition of<br />
principle that prohibits understanding why Diotima chooses this metaphor rather than another 6 . It<br />
should be noticed also that in the Timaeus, (where one would mostly expect the word to occur), kuèsis<br />
(and its derivatives) is not used by Plato. It seems therefore reasonable to assume that, as Diotima<br />
stresses the metaphor of kuèsis built on the verb kuèô 7 , she means something else than the male’s<br />
condition before ejaculation.<br />
It seems then that a better method would imply working on a material where male pregnancy<br />
is fully acknowledged, such as in the mythological tradition called “Olympian” going back to Hesiod,<br />
which points toward the annexation of the feminine function of giving birth, by the father. Thus, in<br />
Hesiod, while allocating privileges (timai) to the gods, Zeus marries Metis. When she is about to give<br />
birth to Athena, Hesiod says, Zeus swallows her into his nèdun 8 (v. 899) to avoid that some one else<br />
would take his privilege from him (time, v. 892) and then he begets Athena (Theogony, v. 886-890<br />
with the verb etikte, v. 922, implied v. 924). N. Loraux reminds us that Athena is Dios pais, Dios<br />
tekon, and above all, that she is motherless 9 . In Euripides’Bacchae, Zeus is accused of having<br />
deprived Semele from her child Dionysus, while still in her womb. He then hid the child in his thigh<br />
1<br />
Wersinger, 2011, p. 96-100 and 2012, p. 2-6.<br />
2 e<br />
<strong>Symposium</strong>, 206c1 (kueô), c7 (kuèsis), d4 (to kuoûn), d7 (to kuèma) d8 (tôi kuoûnti) ; 208 2 (egkumones), 209a1<br />
(kuoûsin), b1 (egkumôn), b5 (kuôn), c3 (ekuei).<br />
3<br />
Morrisson, 1964, p. 54.<br />
4<br />
Leitao, 2012, p. 15, speaks of « male pregancy as scientific fact » but it seems rather a deduction as the word kuèsis does<br />
not occur in what is left of Anaxagoras’work.<br />
5<br />
Morrisson, ibid., Pender, 1992, p. 72 ; Leitao thinks that there is a strategic turn in Diotima’s discourse, and agrees with<br />
Pender up to 210d5, where one has to acknowledge a feminine form of pregnancy (2012, p. 188).<br />
6<br />
Wersinger, 2012, p. 11. Unfortunately, Leitao who deals a lot with the word tiktein (p. 281-284) does not examine the word<br />
kuèsis.<br />
7<br />
Morrisson, (1964, p. 53), and Evans, (2006, p. 15, and n°2) have pretended that kueô may have the causal meaning of<br />
“impregnate” that applies to the male role in procreation, as attested in the aorist tense in Aeschylus, fr. 44, Nauck (ὄµβρος δ'<br />
ἀπ' εὐνάεντος οὐρανοῦ πεσὼν / ἔκυσε γαῖαν· ἡ δὲ τίκτεται βροτοῖς). But Aeschylus here does not employ the verb kueô (to<br />
be pregnant), but the verb kuô with an accusative that, in this case, means “impregnate”.<br />
8<br />
The word reinforces the analogy with the womb often designated by the belly or other parts of the digestive tract (e.g.<br />
Euripides, Bacchai, v. 527).<br />
9 Loraux, 1981, p. 142.
Anne Gabriel Wersinger<br />
(v. 96-97 and v. 523-530) 10 . Athenian vases often place one or more Ilithyies alongside Zeus, to<br />
emphasize its annexation of the mother’s priviledge.<br />
And so, it looks as if in the “Olympian” tradition, Zeus appropriates himself pregnancy, an<br />
attribute that he explicitly steals from woman.<br />
But another important tradition is noteworthy. More recent than the Olympian tradition, it is<br />
mentioned in the Papyrus Derveni whose anonymous interpreter assigns to Orpheus (Coll. VII, 4-8).<br />
In this tradition, the role of the phallus is strongly emphasized:<br />
“αἰδοῖον κατ̣έπινεν, ὃς αἰθέρα ἔκθορ̣ε πρῶτος”.<br />
(He swallowed the phallus (or the venerable) Fr. 8 (Coll. XIII, 4) 11 .<br />
The examination of the theogonic vocabulary in the Derveni Papyrus shows that in the Orphic<br />
scenario Zeus having swallowed the phallus of Heaven would beget the “cosmos”. In other words,<br />
Zeus would become pregnant, directly after having swallowed Ouranos’ phallus. This pregnancy<br />
seems to be confirmed by the Hellenistic version of an hymn to Zeus, the original dating from the 5th<br />
century BC.<br />
“A domination, a daimon, great sire, principle of all things / a royal body in which all things<br />
are moved in a circle” (“en hoî tade panta kukleîtai”,Orphica F 168, Kern, v. 6-8).<br />
One will undoubtedly agree that the image of things and beings that move circularly in the divine<br />
body strongly suggests pregnancy.<br />
According to Bernabé whose interpretation we shall follow, Zeus, having swallowed the<br />
phallus of Heaven, after having listened to the prophecies of the Night and of his father Kronos,<br />
would go back to the origin of all things and would restart the history of the universe, by becoming<br />
the “new mother” of who was the first born. If Heaven has been the first-born, Zeus, somehow, for<br />
having introduced the phallus of Heaven in his breast, becomes himself the ascendant of the first<br />
being, while having been also the new born. Indeed, we may read in fr. 14, 1 “Zeus was born first,<br />
Zeus, the last”.<br />
Such material offers us a first lesson concerning the comparison between the Olympian model<br />
and the Orphic model. In Hesiod's Olympian model, Zeus annexes pregnancy considered as a<br />
feminine attribute, while in the Orphic model of the Derveni papyrus, pregnancy is considered a result<br />
of the ingestion of the phallus, as if the mere ingestion of the phallus made Zeus a mother, capable of<br />
pregnancy, and so explicitly gaining bisexuality 12 .<br />
Such a duality of sex roles is acknowledged by all the posterity of the Derveni Papyrus. The<br />
later Orphic Hymns seem to interpret the role of Zeus as a sexual duality. Let us start with the Hymn<br />
to Zeus (v. 4) quoted in the Ps.-Aristotle’s De Mundo, 401a25:<br />
“Zeus was born a male, immortal Zeus was a nymph”<br />
Similarly, in the Orphic Hymn 6, even if it involves Phanes which is not discussed in the fragments of<br />
papyrus Derveni, we have:<br />
Πρωτόγονον καλέω διφυῆ, µέγαν, αἰθερόπλαγκτον,<br />
ὠιογενῆ, χρυσέαισιν ἀγαλλόµενον πτερύγεσσι,<br />
ταυροβόαν, γένεσιν µακάρων θνητῶν τ’ ἀνθρώπων,<br />
σπέρµα πολύµνηστον, πολυόργιον (…)<br />
“I invoke the First Born, of both natures, the great who haunts the Ether<br />
Born of the egg, glorious with his golden wings,<br />
Roaring like a bull, he, the origin<br />
Of the Blessed and mortal men<br />
Seed of many memories of many orgies”<br />
10 In the Melampodia, Metis is said hupo splagchnois, fr. 343, 13, R. Merkelbach and M.L. West, 1983.<br />
11 It is unnecessary here to recall the controversy around the term aidoîon. According to Bernabé (2002), there is no doubt<br />
that the word here means not simply the “venerable” but Ouranos’phallus which is also associated with the Sun. This is<br />
confirmed by the anonymous comment of the Papyrus, explaining that the word (aidoion) refers to men’ genitals.<br />
12 Bernabé, 2010, 78.<br />
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Anne Gabriel Wersinger<br />
This tradition continues lately, as evidenced by the following Latin authors:<br />
Tiberianus, Versus Platonis de deo (ed. S. Mattiacci, 1990), vers 21-24 :<br />
136<br />
Tu genus omne deum, tu rerum causa uigorque<br />
Tu natura omnis, deus innumerabilis unus<br />
Tu sexu plenus toto, tibi nascitur olim<br />
Hic deus, hic mundus, domus hic hominumque deumque<br />
“Thou, the first origin of the gods, thou cause and vigor of things,<br />
Thou, universal nature, countless single god,<br />
Thou, the whole sex, it is from thee that in one day are born<br />
this god, this world, this home of gods and men”<br />
R. F. Avienus, Les Phénomènes d’Aratos (ed. J. Soubiran, CUF, 1981, v. 25-28) :<br />
(…) sexuque inmixtus utroque<br />
atque aevi pariter gemini simul omnia lustrans<br />
sufficit alterno res semine. (…)<br />
“(...) mixed with both sexes<br />
with an equally twofold life, running at once through all things<br />
he provides things with seed of either sex”.<br />
In these texts, we see that the focus is on the duality of the sexes, as if Zeus was hermaphrodite, both<br />
male and female. Moreover, in column 7, we read:<br />
Ἀφροδίτη Οὐρανία<br />
καὶ Ζεὺς καὶ ἀφροδισιάζειν κ̣αὶ θόρνυσθαι καὶ Πειθὼ<br />
καὶ Ἁρµονία τῶι αὐτῶι θεῶι ὄνοµα κεῖται.<br />
“Aphrodite Ourania,<br />
Zeus, sexual intercourse, ejaculation, Persuasion<br />
and Harmony are names given to the same god”.<br />
In this excerpt where Zeus is identified with female deities, we can see evidence that Zeus acquires<br />
both sexes. And if Zeus is the noûs, one must notice also that in column 26, the noûs is explicitly<br />
called the “mother” of other things.<br />
Bernabé recalls a Hurrian myth known from a Hittite version, The Kingdom of Heaven (or<br />
Theogony). In one episode, Anu, the god of heaven, is emasculated by the bite of Kumarbi. Then he<br />
swallows the phallus of Heaven. However, precises Bernabé, he finds himself “pregnant” of many<br />
gods.<br />
The Derveni Papyrus seems to reflect a source of inspiration, perhaps Hittite, where the god<br />
creator is pregnant.<br />
The scope of Diotima’s thesis (whose name etymologically meaning, Zeus’timè, might hint at<br />
an Orphic character) makes sense, compared to these traditions.<br />
The ellipsis of ejaculation in Diotima’s speech<br />
Now, on one point at least, Diotima explicitly reverses the tradition of Olympian patriarchal myths of<br />
annexation. Indeed, she describes Erôs’ birth through rather surprising words:<br />
ἡ οὖν Πενία ἐπιβουλεύουσα διὰ τὴν αὑτῆς ἀπορίαν παιδίον ποιήσασθαι ἐκ τοῦ Πόρου,<br />
κατακλίνεταί τε παρ’ αὐτῷ καὶ ἐκύησε τὸν Ἔρωτα (203a3-203c).<br />
“Then Penia, being of herself resourceless, planned to make for her a child from Poros, and<br />
lying down by his side she became pregnant of Erôs”.
Anne Gabriel Wersinger<br />
It should be noticed here that the middle voice aorist infinitive of the verb poiô 13 , suddenly stresses<br />
the active role of some unexpected person, for gender and context reasons: Penia, whose name means<br />
Poverty, being resourceless with regard to resourceful Poros, and of course being a woman, shows her<br />
capacity of devising and initiating an intercourse with a sleeping, unconscious, and for this reason,<br />
passive male. There is an obvious hint here to the myth in which Zeus steals Métis or Semele of their<br />
power to give birth 14 . But in Diotima’s version of the myth, it is as if there was annexation by a<br />
woman of the male share of generation. At the same time, since Penia necessarily had to be<br />
inseminated by Poros, we must assume that kuèsis implies the existence of a man’s sperm.<br />
But one is left then with a question : why is Diotima so elliptical about ejaculation when<br />
redefining the purpose of love as kuèsis? According to her, it is men’s business, even for those who<br />
love and have intercourse with women (208e2-4), to "beget children" (paidogonia), but things seem to<br />
happen without any reference to ejaculation, although Plato uses, in erotic contexts such as the<br />
Phaedrus (250e5) the verbs paidosporeîn "to protrude" or bainein "to mount. Should we assume that it<br />
is so obvious that pregnancy involves ejaculation, that it is not necessary to mention it?<br />
A fortiori, some scholars 15 have pretended that, since men are at stake, it can’t be female<br />
pregnancy but ejaculation that is evidently supposed in <strong>Symposium</strong> 206d4-206e1 (“to kuoûn is<br />
released (…) from its great birth pangs (dia to megalès ôdînos apoluein”), this passage having a<br />
parallel in the Phaedrus : as he looks at his pais’ beauty (251c6), the lover feels the discomfort of<br />
sexual tension described by the metaphor of the production and growth of feathers 16 , and, when his<br />
soul receives the himeros, he is released from his birth pangs (odunès, 251 d1). The word ôdis being<br />
generally used for women 17 , one too easily believes that since Plato applies to men a word usually<br />
used for women in the Phaedrus, there is no reason to admit that it would not be the case in the<br />
<strong>Symposium</strong>, including the word kuèsis. But one may reverse the argument : why does the word kuèsis<br />
appear in the <strong>Symposium</strong> and not in the Phaedrus ?<br />
Anyway, it seems difficult to accept that the ellipsis of ejaculation is unimportant in Diotima’s<br />
speech face to a tradition that emphasizes so strongly its importance, as it is the case in the Orphic<br />
tradition (in Fr. 15, the word thornei 18 , a substantive presumably denoting ejaculation). The ellipsis<br />
makes sense with regard to this emphasis.<br />
Taking for granted these points, we may conclude that Diotima reverses the Olympian myths<br />
of annexation of the female share of generation, by rendering to the mother the initiative of gestation.<br />
Regarding the Orphic myth, she seems to conceal both ejaculation and phallus for the benefit<br />
of pregnancy.<br />
The orphic and musical background of the female genious<br />
What is then the real scope of Diotima’metaphor of kuèsis? Answering this question requires setting<br />
the background of the notion of creation in Plato’s Timaeus.<br />
In the Derveni Papyrus, and unlike what happens in Homer and Hesiod, to produce (poeîn)<br />
and to give birth to (tiktein) are no longer opposed 19 .<br />
In an Orphic poem, which dates from the second century AD, (an older version being quoted<br />
in the Derveni Papyrus), the first two lines show that the assimilation of the two concepts is indeed<br />
realized:<br />
“Zeus was born first, Zeus with the bright lightning, is the last<br />
Zeus is the head, Zeus is the middle, from Zeus all things were made (Dios tetuktai panta ek),<br />
v. 1-2<br />
Zeus alone is the prime genitor (archigenethlos)”, v. 5 (fragment 168, Kern, quoted by<br />
Apuleius, De Mundo, 37, and Porphyry, Peri Agalmatôn, 3, 7).<br />
The Orphic Zeus is the demiurge that begets and makes the cosmos. This assimilation of ideas for<br />
making and childbirth is completely Orphic. Thus the musician Timotheus of Miletus mentions<br />
Orpheus, demi-god, son of the Muse Calliope in indicative terms for our purpose:<br />
13 Wersinger, 2012, p. 9-10.<br />
14 Wersinger, ibid., Leitao, 2012, p. 221.<br />
15 Pender (1992), p. 72-75, as Morrisson (1964), p. 51-52.<br />
16 Csapo, 1993, p. 12<br />
17 Loraux (1990), p. 40, 63.<br />
18 West, 1997, p. 91-92.<br />
19 Wersinger, 2009, 2013. Leitao notices it (2012, p. 122) but without being able to tell the origin of the birth metaphor (p.<br />
127).<br />
137
Anne Gabriel Wersinger<br />
138<br />
“Orpheus, Calliope’s son, he of the intricate muse,<br />
was the first to beget (eteknôsen) the tortoise-shell lyre in Pieria” (fr. 711, Page, 221-224,<br />
trad. D.A. Campbell)<br />
The birth of a lyre, an instrument of music being a technical and unnatural object, reflects the<br />
assimilation of the two registers, the demiurgic and the procreative, and this reference is Orphic<br />
(compare with Hermes in the Homeric Hymn to Hermes, who is said to “make a singer<br />
(tektènat'aoidon)” (v. 25).<br />
But it looks too as if the assimilation of the idea of begetting and the idea of demiurgy implied<br />
the female gender.<br />
In Aristophanes' comedy The Thesmophoria, the poet-musician Agathon who, like Timothy,<br />
is a follower of the New Music which feeds with Orphism a proven relationship, is in action. He is<br />
currently composing a tragedy of the kind of the Phaedra, and needs the musical mode akin to tragedy<br />
(a Mixolydian for example, which is said to be “feminine”). For this purpose, the creator must engage<br />
in a mimèsis of a special type which is to get into the spirit (gnome) of female fashion, that is to say,<br />
he has to “think like a woman” and to “feel like a woman” in his very body. This is the theory called<br />
the Gunaikeîa Dramata, according to which a composer of dramas must impulse mimèsis so far that<br />
his own ways and attitudes must conform with the feminine character he creates. That is why Agathon<br />
has the feminine attributes of childbirth that Aristophanes caricatures. This does not mean that<br />
Agathon is an effeminate man, and Aristophanes outlines the poet’s virility (v. 95-153).<br />
The teaching of this passage is that a man, a male, who is explicitly a poet-musician, can be<br />
said to give birth like a woman. Timotheus of Miletus’ dithyramb called the Birthpangs of Semele<br />
was probably composed through this feminine mimetical device 20 . But it should immediately be added<br />
that this birth metaphor is characterized by novelty. Agathon and Timotheus of Miletus both<br />
emphasize the novelty of their music: Eros is a musician-poet that Agathon praises, and by calling<br />
him neôtaton and aei neos (<strong>Symposium</strong>, 195c), he is obviously echoing Timotheus of<br />
Miletus’Persians:<br />
“I do not sing the old songs, because mine are new (kaina) and better.<br />
A young Zeus reigns (neos) ...” (fr. 20, in Athenaeus, Deipnosophistes, 122c-d).<br />
It is also known that music is likened to the birth of a newborn. Thus, according to Athenaeus, the<br />
comic poet of the 4th century, Anaxilas has said in his Hyacinthus:<br />
“Music, like Libya, thanks to the gods gives birth (tiktei) to a new creature each year<br />
(kainon)”<br />
(Deipnosophistes 623F).<br />
The same testimony is offered about the comic poet of the fifth century, Eupolis:<br />
“The comic poet Eupolis, my friends said that" Music is a thing (pragma) deep and complex<br />
'and is constantly offering new discoveries (aiei te kainon hexeuriskei) for those who can<br />
reach them” (Athenaeus, Deipnosophistes 623F).<br />
Such material constitutes the evidence of the background of what Diotima says about production<br />
(poiesis):<br />
“(…) a single section, disparate from the whole of creation (pasès tès poièseôs), —merely the<br />
business of music and meters (to peri tèn mousikèn kai ta metra)—is entitled with the name of<br />
the whole. This and no more is called creation (poièsis); those only who possess this branch of<br />
creation (tès poièseôs) are creators (poiètas) “ <strong>Symposium</strong>, 205c4-c8).<br />
According to Diotima, one came by synecdoche to denote by the word creator what we call, still<br />
today, the poet, in fact the musician. The creator par excellence, is the musician, i.e. the melic poet.<br />
But the musician illustrated by Agathon, is also, as we have seen, not only the one who gives<br />
birth, but the one who always gives birth to something new, as a neo-musician. As Timothy or<br />
20 Hordern, 2002, p. 249 ; Leitao, 2012, p. 65, 155.
Anne Gabriel Wersinger<br />
Philoxenus, Agathon is a “passionate of novelty, a philokainos”.<br />
It is not insignificant either that Timothy expressly claims novelty by claiming the name of<br />
the “new Zeus” and by repudiating the Muses of the past:<br />
“Go away Muses of the Beginning (Apito Mousa Archon)” (fr. 20, in Athenaeus,<br />
Deipnosophists, 122c-d) 21 .<br />
Through the synecdoche operated by Diotima, one may reckognize an undeniably Orphic theme<br />
according to which creation and musical poetry considered as begetting a newborn child are<br />
identified 22 .<br />
Subversion of paiderastic intercourse: the beloved as a midwife<br />
But to grasp the very significance of Diotima’s subversive operation, another key element is worth<br />
noting. Indeed observe that Diotima subverts paiderastic relationship (one adult, the erastès is<br />
supposed to appeal to a younger, the erômenos, and to assault him sexually) 23 by giving the erômenos<br />
the posture of a midwife (206d2) and the erastès that of a mother, giving birth to beautiful<br />
discourses 24 .<br />
However, as Diotima herself gives birth to logoi face to Socrates, we must recognize that a<br />
woman, pregnant with discourses, subtitutes herself to an erastès, facing Socrates himself being<br />
invested with the character of an erômènos-midwife 25 .<br />
This is understandable only by comparing the <strong>Symposium</strong> (where the figure of the midwife<br />
remains passive, all the active part belonging fully to the one that is pregnant, 206d7), with the<br />
Theaetetus where, on the contrary, Socrates as midwife expert in deliveries, masters the art of<br />
delivering as well as aborting (151c4). Obviously, birth control involves the selection of products. It<br />
means that, conversely, in the speech of Diotima, gestation takes over the product itself. Everything<br />
happens as if, according to Diotima, the work as a result was worth less than its gestation, that is to<br />
say, if one wants to translate this into logoi, the gestation of speech outweighs the speeches<br />
themselves.<br />
Philosophical gestation<br />
Even if Diotima's speech is a pastiche composed by Plato for fun 26 , it offers a testimony on the<br />
relationship between New music and Orphism, and on the semantic and conceptual transformations of<br />
the concept of creation under the influence of Orphism. It looks as if the style of orphic religion, of<br />
which it is agreed that it was not fixed in a dogmatic code, proceeded as a kind of wreath by profusion<br />
of ingenious theories. Such could be the theory of the genious musician giving birth to a newborn<br />
work, under the auspices of Orpheus. In this perspective, the metaphor of feminine pregnancy in<br />
Diotima's speech would have the purpose of claiming that especially in thought matter such as<br />
philosophy, where intelligence and truth are concerned, and where the Ilithyie is the Form of Beauty<br />
itself (212a2), creation can’t reduce itself to the begetting of novelty and invention, but takes time 27 as<br />
does a maternal gestation.<br />
21 It is not possible to show in detail here that Agathon's speech reflects the close relationship of the new music with<br />
religious language promoting innovation of which Orpheus seems to be the effigy, Wersinger, 2009, 2013.<br />
22 Diotima emphasizes the opposition between new and ancient, through several progressive arguments (heteron neon anti<br />
toû palaioû, 207d3-4, for the desire to perpetuate one’s mortal life ; (presbutès d6 / neos aei, d8) for one’s own life ; (kainèn<br />
empoioûsa anti tês apiousès 208a6) for spiritual matters such as memory, knowledge.<br />
23 Leitao (2012, p. 131sq.) rightly says that Plato invented the Socrates-as-midwife metaphor as a counter to a teacher-asimpregnator<br />
metaphor originated by Prodicus or another Sophist. But he does not see that the metaphor of the midwife starts<br />
already in the <strong>Symposium</strong>.<br />
24 We have to remember that to kalon currently denotes the pais (Wersinger, 2012, p. 44-45). Now, Diotima explains that<br />
érôs consists in tokos en kalôi (206b6). Then she progressively explains this definition, by proceeding through substitutions:<br />
- kuoûsi gar substitutes for tokos (206 c1)<br />
- en de kalôi opposed to men aischrôi substitutes to en kalôi (206c4-5)<br />
- hè kuèsis kai hè gennèsis substitutes to tokos (206c7-8)<br />
- Diotima goes back to the opposition between aischron and kalon taken as anarmoston opposed to harmotton (notice the<br />
chiasma) (206 d1-2)<br />
-Moira et Eileithuia are related to Kallonè (substituting to kalon) (d2-3) and Kallonè (206d2) which substitutes to Eileithia,<br />
The formula “en philosophiai aphthonôi” (210d5-6) shows the same construction with en.<br />
25 Wersinger, 2012, p. 11.<br />
26 It is out of the limits of this contribution to locate Diotima’s subversion in the broader context of phallic Dionysian rituals,<br />
where cross-dressing and playing with gender riversal was common, Csapo, 1997, p. 263.<br />
27 Eight months are needed for the real philosopher’s seeds to mature in the soul (Phaedrus, 276b1-8).<br />
139
Anne Gabriel Wersinger<br />
Bibl.<br />
BERNABÉ A., Casadesús F. (ed.), Orfeo y la tradición órfica: un reencuentro. (2 vols.) Akal<br />
Universitaria. Madrid, Akal, 2008.<br />
BERNABÉ, A., « El himno a Zeus órfico. Vicisitudes literarias, ideológicas y religiosas » In Bernabé<br />
A., Casadesús F., and Santamaría F. Orfeo y el Orfismo: nuevas perspectivas Alicante, Biblioteca<br />
Virtual Cervantes, 2010, 67–97<br />
BERNABÉ, A., « La Théogonie orphique du papyrus de Derveni », Kernos 15, 2002, 91-129<br />
BROMMER F., « Die Geburt der Athena », Jahrbuch des römisch-germanischen Zentralsmuseums<br />
Mainz 8, 1961, 66-83<br />
BURKERT W. « El dios solitario. Orfeo, fr. 12 Bernabé, en contexto. » in Bernabé and Casadesús<br />
2008, 579–589<br />
CSAPO, E., « Riding the Phallus for Dionysus: Iconology, Ritual, and Gender-Role De/Construction »,<br />
Phoenix, Vol. 51, No. 3/4 (Autumn - Winter, 1997), 253-295<br />
CSAPO, E., «Deep Ambivalence : Notes on a Greek Cockfight (Part I) », Phoenix Vol. 47, n°1, Spring<br />
1993, 1-28<br />
EVANS N., « Diotima and Demeter as Mystagogues in Plato's <strong>Symposium</strong> », Hypatia, Vol. 21, No. 2<br />
(Spring, 2006), pp. 1-27<br />
HORDERN J., The Fragments of Timotheus of Miletus, Oxford, Oxford Clarendon Press, 2002.<br />
LEITAO D. D., The Pregnant Male as Myth and Metaphor in Classical Greek Literature, Cambridge,<br />
Cambridge University Press, 2012<br />
LORAUX N., Les enfants d’Athena, idées athéniennes sur la citoyenneté et la division des sexes, Paris,<br />
Maspero, 1981<br />
LORAUX N., Les Mères en deuil, Paris, Seuil, 1990.<br />
MORRISSON, J., S., « Four notes on Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong> », The Classical Quarterly, New series, Vol.<br />
14, n°1 (May), 1964, 42-55<br />
PENDER E., E., « Spiritual Pregnancy in Plato's <strong>Symposium</strong> », The Classical Quarterly, New Series,<br />
Vol. 42, No. 1 (1992), pp. 72-86<br />
WERSINGER A.G., « Aux origines de la création artistique : Le concept de Nouveauté dans la poétique<br />
musicale en Grèce ancienne et ses conséquences sur l’interprétation de la création », (paper initially<br />
read in 2009 in “la Création en questions” organized by the Centre de Philosophie de l'Art de Paris I-<br />
Sorbonne), in P. Caye, L. Boulègue, F. Malhomme eds. Les Théories de l’Art, Paris, Garnier,<br />
forthcoming, 2013<br />
WERSINGER A.G., « La voix d’une “savante“: Diotime de Mantinée dans le Banquet de Platon (201d-<br />
212b) », Cahiers Mondes anciens 2, 2012.<br />
WERSINGER A.G., « Plato and Philosophy as a figure of speech » in Oralité et Écriture chez Platon, J.-<br />
L. Périllié (ed.), Bruxelles, Ousia, Cahiers de Philosophie, 2011<br />
WERSINGER A.G., « Platon et la philosophie comme 'figure' d'énonciation » Philosophia 40, 2010.<br />
WEST M.L., « Hocus-Pocus in East and West. Theogony, Ritual and the Tradition of Esoteric<br />
Commentary » in A. Laks and G. Most (eds.), Studies on the Derveni Papyrus, Oxford, Clarendon<br />
Press, 1997, 81–90.<br />
140
Phaedrus and Pausanias<br />
Chair: Thomas M. Robinson
Phaedrus and the sophistic competition of beautiful speech<br />
Noburu Notomi<br />
In Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong>, a series of speeches in praise of Eros are introduced as customary<br />
entertainment at a symposium with reference to the sophistic activity of encomium. The five speakers<br />
before Socrates predominantly depend on experts’ or sophists’ knowledge, and respond to each other.<br />
It is against these sophistic modes of speech that Socrates forwards his own speech. I will clarify this<br />
sophistic feature of the earlier speeches in contrast with that of Socrates in contrast with that of<br />
Socrates by putting special focus on Phaedrus, the first speaker and original proposer of this theme.<br />
The dialogue is concerned with “wisdom” (σοφία), 1 and its relation to “philosophy” (φιλοσοφία) and<br />
“sophistry”.<br />
1. Speech competition over wisdom<br />
In the symposium celebrating the first victory of Agathon, the participants agree to enjoy<br />
conversation, rather than heavy drink or music. They choose “encomium to Eros” for the topic of<br />
conversation. While this topic is proposed by Eryximachus at the party, the original idea comes from<br />
Phaedrus. Eryximachus explains that Phaedrus insisted each time that Eros should be praised, for he<br />
complained that this god alone has not been bestowed proper honour differently from other gods<br />
(177a-d). He tried to prove this claim with reference to poets and sophists: whereas the past poets<br />
dedicated hymns and eulogies to the other gods, no poet has made an encomium to Eros. Then, he<br />
refers to the sophists, as follows.<br />
[Plato, <strong>Symposium</strong> 177b-c]<br />
Or again, if you like, consider the case of the sophists, I mean the respectable ones (τοὺς χρηστοὺς<br />
σοφιστάς). Isn’t it terrible that they write prose panegyrics of Heracles and others, as the excellent<br />
Prodicus did – in fact, that isn’t so amazing, but I have actually come across a book by a clever man in<br />
which salt was the subject of amazing praise for its usefulness (πρὸς ὠφελίαν), and you’ll see many<br />
other things of that sort given encomia. (trans. C. J. Rowe)<br />
His first reference is to Prodicus’ famous work, The Choice of Heracles, 2 in which he<br />
encourages young people to choose, as Heracles did, a life of virtue and labor, instead of that of vice<br />
and pleasure. Phaedrus takes this moralist story as a kind of encomium to the hero (half-god). Next,<br />
the “clever man” mentioned here and one who praises “bumble-bees and salt and the like” (Isocrates,<br />
Helen 12) are supposed to be Polycrates. 3 He is said to have produced encomia to such trifles as<br />
pebbles and mice, and to such notorious heroes as Clytemnestra and Paris. 4 Thus, it is true that the<br />
sophists produce speeches in praise of gods and heroes, but they are nothing but playfulness<br />
(παίγνιον), as Gorgias says at the end of his Encomium of Helen (21), and as Agathon emphasizes in<br />
his own speech by calling it “play” (παιδιά, 197e).<br />
On the other hand, we should remember that Prodicus advances the rationalistic view that<br />
useful things (τὰ ὠφελοῦντα) and the men who designed them were regarded as gods. 5 He is said to<br />
have related Demeter to bread, Dionysus to wine, Poseidon to water and Hephaestus to fire. For this<br />
idea of the gods, he is later regarded as an atheist. 6 In this respect, Phaedrus’ reference to the sophists<br />
implies departure from traditional religion, notwithstanding his apparently pious proposal of<br />
encomium to the god.<br />
It is also interesting to note that Gorgias is not mentioned here as the author of the famous<br />
Encomium of Helen. This work may not have been written before 416 BC (the date of Agathon’s<br />
party); 7 however, it seems possible that Phaedrus deliberately ignores it because it is too paradoxical<br />
1 For example, Bury (1932 2 ), xix, says that “one main motive of the dialogue as a whole is to exhibit the σοφία of Socrates,<br />
his intellectual as well as moral supremacy”.<br />
2 DK 84 B2 (Xenophon, Memorabilia II 1, 21-34).<br />
3 This is assumed by Sauppe, Blass, Jebb, Hug, Bury, Dover, and Rowe. For the relation between the two texts, see Bury<br />
(1932 2 ), xx-xxi; cf. Radermacher (1951), B XXI 9. Bury introduces Antisthenes as another candidate.<br />
4 He wrote The Apology of Busiris, a monstrous king of Egypt, and also published a pamphlet entitled The Accusation of<br />
Socrates, around 393BC.<br />
5 Cf. DK 84 B5 (Sextus Empiricus, Math. 9.18, cf. 9.51–52).<br />
6 Cf. Notomi (2010).<br />
7 Gorgias may have responded to Eupirides’ Trojan Women, produced in 415 BC, since there are many similarities between<br />
the two works. If Euripides responded to Gorgias, his work may have been written around 416 BC.
Noburu Notomi<br />
or scandalous (but in any case, Plato’s contemporary readers must have been aware of it).<br />
Now it is obvious that “encomium to Eros” constitutes a sophistic competition. Phaedrus<br />
becomes “father of the discourse” (πατὴρ τοῦ λόγου, 177d), and is appointed as the first speaker. 8<br />
Agathon’s welcome address to Socrates points out that “wisdom” (σοφία) is a hidden theme<br />
(175c-e). He asks Socrates to lie next to him, so that he can enjoy the wisdom that Socrates must have<br />
discovered before entering the door. He assumes that wisdom flows from the fuller to the emptier by<br />
touch. This reminds us of sophistic teaching. Agathon says that “On this, we’ll take our rival claims to<br />
wisdom to court a bit later on, with Dionysus as judge” (175e). 9<br />
2. Phaedrus’ citations of authorities 10<br />
The first speaker Phaedrus appears in the other two dialogues of Plato, namely Phaedrus and<br />
Protagoras. In the Phaedrus, he converses with Socrates over rhetoric and love. When Phaedrus comes<br />
across Socrates, he is learning by heart a short rhetorical text written by Lysias with the view of<br />
reciting it in front of the others. This initial scene vividly shows that he loves any kind of discourse<br />
(philologos). 11 In the Protagoras, he appears among those who eagerly follow Hippias of Elis at the<br />
spectacular gathering of the great sophists in Callias’ house (315c).<br />
In the <strong>Symposium</strong>, Phaedrus begins his speech with the citations of authorities. While this<br />
passage (178b2-c2) has been drastically emended since the beginning of the 18th century, I propose to<br />
retain the reading of the major manuscripts (BTW), and to reject the modern editions that print<br />
different texts. 12 Since I have already examined elsewhere how these differences emerged, so as to<br />
demonstrate that the traditional reading of the manuscript is correct, I simply assume my reading here.<br />
[ Plato, <strong>Symposium</strong> 178b2-c2 ]<br />
b2 γονῆς γὰρ Ἔρωτος οὔτ’ εἰσὶν οὔτε λέγονται ὑπ’ οὐδενὸς<br />
οὔτε ἰδιώτου οὔτε ποιητοῦ, ἀλλ’ Ἡσίοδος πρῶτον µὲν Χάος φησὶ<br />
γενέσθαι—<br />
b5 αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα<br />
Γαῖ’ εὐρύστερνος, πάντων ἕδος ἀσφαλὲς αἰεί,<br />
ἠδ’ Ἔρος<br />
b8 φησὶ µετὰ τὸ Χάος δύο τούτω γενέσθαι, Γῆν τε καὶ Ἔρωτα.<br />
Παρµενίδης δὲ τὴν γένεσιν λέγει—<br />
πρώτιστον µὲν Ἔρωτα θεῶν µητίσατο πάντων.<br />
c1 Ἡσιόδῳ δὲ καὶ Ἀκουσίλεως ὁµολογεῖ. οὕτω πολλαχόθεν<br />
ὁµολογεῖται ὁ Ἔρως ἐν τοῖς πρεσβύτατος εἶναι.<br />
For Eros neither has any parents, nor is he said by anyone, whether layman or poet, to have them.<br />
Hesiod says that first to come into being was Chaos;<br />
“and then broad-bosomed Earth, a seat for all, safe for ever, and Eros”.<br />
He says that these two, Earth and Eros, came into being after Chaos. Parmenides says of the origin of<br />
Eros<br />
“First was devised Eros, of all gods”.<br />
Acusileos agrees with Hesiod. Thus it is agreed on many sides that Eros was among the oldest. (trans.<br />
C.J. Rowe, modified)<br />
The recent studies of doxography show that Phaedrus here depends on Hippias’ Anthology for the<br />
citations. The first evidence comes from a parallel passage in Aristotle, Metaphysics A4, 984b23-31:<br />
in discussing the earlier thinkers who investigated the first principles, Aristotle cites the same<br />
Parmenides (B13) and Hesiod, Theogony (116-117 and 120). Although modern editors found this<br />
exact correspondence with the <strong>Symposium</strong> strange and often emended the transmitted text, the<br />
parallelism of the two texts is best explained by the assumption that the citations derive from the same<br />
source, i.e. Anthology, a collection of famous sayings of the authorities, edited by the sophist<br />
8 His role as chairman continues in 194d-e, 199b-c, and 212b-c.<br />
9 The issue of wisdom gets focused again in 194b-c.<br />
10 This section provides a summary of my arguments in Notomi (forthcoming).<br />
11 The character of Phaedrus as “philologue” is analyzed by Ferrari (1987).<br />
12 178b8 to c2: Burnet (1901 1 , 1910 2 ) emended the test of 178b8 to c2 on the suggestion of Schanz (1882), 7, and was<br />
followed by Dover (1980), Vicaire (1989), and Rowe (1998). It reads “Acusileos too says the same as Hesiod, that these two,<br />
Earth and Eros, came into being after Chaos” (b8-9). Among the 20th century major editions, Robin (1929 1 , 1958 6 ) is the<br />
only one that maintains the manuscripts’ reading, with one minor addition.<br />
144
Hippias. 13<br />
Noburu Notomi<br />
Since Hippias is the only author, as far as we know, who compiled an anthology up to the<br />
latter half of the 5th century BC, he most probably was the common source for Plato and Aristotle.<br />
His policy of compilation, namely to excerpt from both verse (poetry) and prose writings, 14 fits what<br />
Phaedrus says before the citations (178b1-3).<br />
If we assume that Phaedrus uses Hippias’ Anthology in citing famous sayings on Eros, we can<br />
observe the following points:<br />
(i) The citations of Hesiod, Theogony, Parmenides, and Acusileos are a part of the chapter on Eros in<br />
Hippias’ Anthology.<br />
(ii) Hippias probably introduces the sayings in chronological order, namely, “Hesiod, Parmenides,<br />
Acusileos”, 15 according to his assumed editorial policy. 16 If this is the case, the manuscript reading<br />
better fits the original source, as long as Phaedrus cites it more or less faithfully.<br />
(iii) Hippias probably omits the two lines 118-119 in quoting from Hesiod for his own purpose. Plato<br />
and Aristotle then quote from this shorter version (in slightly different ways from each other).<br />
(iv) Phaedrus adds a paraphrase of the older word “Gaia” in Hesiod for “Gē” after the citation<br />
(178b8). To modern commentators, this appears insignificant or redundant, but it may well be a<br />
customary way of commenting on citations.<br />
(v) Hippias may also have collected some words from Acusileos in the Anthology. If so, Phaedrus<br />
makes it simple by saying, “Acusileos agrees with Hesiod” (178c1), but this never means that both<br />
insist on exactly the same things, as is evident from the testimonies of Acusileos. 17<br />
When “encomium to Eros” was chosen as the theme for the symposiastic speeches, Phaedrus<br />
must have already prepared to give a speech by learning the relevant materials by heart. No doubt, the<br />
useful collection of famous sayings of poets and others, edited by Hippias, was a main source for his<br />
preparation. 18 Therefore, he starts a speech with citations from the three men of wisdom, namely<br />
Hesiod, Parmenides, and Acusileos, to appeal to authority.<br />
The style of sophistic polymathy (for which Hippias was particularly famous) is suitable for<br />
the beginning of the competition of speeches at the symposium. From the Phaedrus, we know that<br />
Phaedrus is fond of memorising many texts of poets, rhetoricians, sophists, and other intellectuals to<br />
show off his knowledge in front of others by freely citing the authorities. We know that Hippias was<br />
also an expert of such mnemonic skills (cf. DK 86A2, 5a, 16, etc.). This kind of exhibition of wisdom<br />
might look shallow to those who possess or seek true knowledge, but it must have attracted many men<br />
of culture. Phaedrus’ audience may well be aware that he depends on Hippias’ Anthology, and<br />
responded to him reflecting this awareness. It is a sort of intellectual game, more or less expected on<br />
such an occasion as a symposium. The polymathy and mnemonic skills of Hippias characterise this<br />
beginning of the competition. 19<br />
3. Sophistic responses to Phaedrus<br />
Next, we shall look at how the other speakers respond to Phaedrus, above all, to his sophistic<br />
presentation of Hippias’ style. Pausanias starts with a sort of criticism of Phaedrus’ speech.<br />
[ <strong>Symposium</strong> 180c-d ]<br />
Phaedrus, our subject seems to me not to have been put forward in the right way – I mean in that we<br />
have been instructed, as we have, simply to give an encomium to Eros. If Eros were such that there<br />
were just one of him, that would be in order; but in fact there isn’t just one of him; and if there isn’t, it<br />
is more correct (ὀρθότερον) to preface what one says by first saying what sort of Eros one should<br />
praise. So I shall try to put this right (ἐπανορθώσασθαι).<br />
13 This view was originally given by Bruno Snell on the doxography of Aristotle, Metaphysics A3 (983b21 ff.) and Plato,<br />
Cratylus 402b; cf. Snell (1944), 170 ff., von Kienle (1961), 41 ff. It was then applied to the <strong>Symposium</strong> passage by Classen<br />
(1965), 175-178; cf. Mansfeld ([1986]/1990), 35, 46, 48, 71, n.9, Patzer (1986), 43-48. While they take it for certain that<br />
<strong>Symposium</strong> 178b-c depends on Hippias, no commentary on the passage, notably Dover and Rowe, takes this aspect into<br />
consideration yet.<br />
14 DK 86B6 (Clement of Alexandria, Stromateis VI.15).<br />
15 Acusileos of Argos probably came after Parmenides (active in the beginning of the fifth century BCE) since his date of<br />
activity is assumed to be around the Persian War.<br />
16 Cf. Patzer (1986), 46.<br />
17 Cf. DK 9 B1 (Damascius, On the First Principles 124 (I.320, 10R.), Eudemus fr.117 Wehrli, Philodemus, De pietate 137,<br />
13 p.61 Gomperz) and B3 (Scholia to Theocritus 13 1/2c Wendel).<br />
18 It is also suggested that Phaedrus is influenced by Isocrates (or Lysias): cf. Rowe (1998), 137, Wardy (2004), 180-181.<br />
19 Also, Phaedrus presents, in the third part of his speech, literary criticism concerning Homer, Aeschylus and others<br />
(Euripides?). His speech is essential to understand the whole dialogue: see Wardy (2012).<br />
145
Noburu Notomi<br />
Pausanias then distinguishes two senses of Aphrodite, one heavenly (Οὐρανίον) and the other<br />
common (Πάνδηµον), and two senses of Eros accordingly (180d-181a). Making a distinction between<br />
each word is a typical method of another sophist, Prodicus of Ceos, who is much concerned about the<br />
correctness of words (ὀρθοέπεια) and criticizes others by pointing out the ambiguity of words, so as to<br />
exhibit his acute knowledge of language and various issues. Pausanias’ remarkable emphasis on<br />
“correctness” clearly represents the main concern of Prodicus. 20 Since he insists that “correctly”<br />
(ὀρθῶς) means “beautifully” (καλῶς, 181a4), his correct speech becomes a beautiful speech (cf.<br />
180c4). It seems obvious that Pausanias uses this sophist’ arsenal for criticism against Phaedrus, who<br />
assumes, as Hippias does, the traditional view that Eros is a single object.<br />
Pausanias’ long argument seems to show another feature of Prodicus. In the distinction<br />
between the two kinds – high and low – of Aphrodite and Eros, each plays some function but neither<br />
looks very “divine”. In particular, “Common” Aphrodite and Eros are not highly respected. This<br />
shows a characteristic position of Prodicus, who challenges traditional views on gods and eventually<br />
rejects them as human deification. 21 This may explain why Pausanias provides a strange excuse:<br />
[<strong>Symposium</strong> 180e]<br />
Now one should praise all gods, but for now what matters is to try to say what domain falls to the lot<br />
of each Eros.<br />
Moreover, Pausanias frequently refers to the “custom” (νόµος) of each society (181d-184c). Different<br />
societies, such as Sparta, Ionia, and Athens, have different attitudes and laws towards love. This kind<br />
of relativistic observation is typical of the sophists in the latter half of the 5th century BC. In contrast<br />
with Pausanias, Aristophanes repeatedly emphasizes the ancient “nature” (φύσις) of human beings in<br />
his original myth (189d, 191d, 192e, 193c-d). He explicitly contrasts physis with nomos as a<br />
compelling force in a society (192b). This contrast is manipulated by the sophists.<br />
Here we should also remember that Pausanias appears in the Protagoras as one of the<br />
followers of Prodicus (315d). A young beautiful boy, Agathon, was sitting next to Pausanias (315d-e).<br />
So when the sophists compete with each other at Callias’ house (the dramatic setting is around 432<br />
BC), Agathon sides with Prodicus, but 16 years later in 416 BC, he is fully influenced by Gorgias. It<br />
was in 427 BC when Gorgias made an impressive debut at Athens.<br />
Finally, the rhetorical speech of Agathon manifestly imitates Gorgias’ style: in particular, the<br />
repetition of similar words, the use of antithetic phrases, the order of encomiac argument starting from<br />
the praise of the origin, and the mocking ending claiming “playfulness” (197e). 22 Socrates mockingly<br />
points out this imitation (198c).<br />
Agathon reacts against Phaedrus in commenting on his interpretation of the oldness of Eros.<br />
This opposition corresponds to Gorgias’ antagonism against Hippias. He says:<br />
[ <strong>Symposium</strong> 195b-c ]<br />
I agree with Phaedrus on many other things, but on this I do not agree, that Eros is more ancient than<br />
Cronus and Iapetus: I declare that he is youngest of the gods, and always young, and that those old<br />
happenings that Hesiod and Parmenides report in relation to gods, if they were actually reporting the<br />
truth, happened through Necessity and not through Eros. 23<br />
Gorgias was famous for his paradoxical arguments (παραδοχολογία), notably On What Is Not<br />
and Encomium of Helen. He is good at forwarding most unexpected views against our common sense,<br />
so as to subvert it. Here, Agathon presents a similar uncommon view that Eros is the youngest god.<br />
For, as Hippias provides abundant support (Hesiod, Acusileos, et al.), Eros was regarded as one of the<br />
oldest gods in traditional mythology. Therefore, Agathon’s criticism of Phaedrus recapitulates the<br />
sophistic opposition between Hippias’ austere presentation of traditional wisdom and Gorgias’ playful<br />
demonstration of paradoxical wisdom: one authoritative and the other shocking but enchanting. They<br />
are two contrasting skills of sophistic exhibition.<br />
In criticizing Phaedrus with reference to Hesiod and Parmenides (195c), Agathon must be<br />
aware that his opponent depends on Hippias’ Anthology. Thus, the critical exchange between the two<br />
20 Cf. ὀρθότερόν, 180c7; ἐπανορθώσασθαι, d2, ὀρθῶς καλεῖσθαι, e2; ὀρθῶς λέγοντας, 183d1.<br />
21 For this aspect of Prodicus, see Notomi (2010).<br />
22 For the detailed analysis, see Dover (1980) ad hoc.<br />
23 Some commentators suggest that Agathon raises here an issue of literary criticism: while Phaedrus takes “τὴν Γένεσιν”<br />
(Generation, 178b9) for the subject of Parmenides B13, Agathon proposes “ἀνάγκη” for it.<br />
146
speakers represents sophistic antagonism.<br />
4. Socrates’ criticism and a double image of Eros<br />
Noburu Notomi<br />
We find many hints of sophists’ influence in the earlier speeches, but Socrates starts his<br />
speech with a total rejection of this kind of sophistic discourse: the latter is concerned solely with<br />
“beauty” in appearance, but not with the real “beauty” (i.e., the truth). Socrates expresses this<br />
rejection exactly when the sophistic tendency culminates in the Gorgianic extempore speech by<br />
Agathon (197c-e). His encomium is typically empty and fallacious. Thus, philosophy as seeking for<br />
the truth is sharply contrasted with rhetoric as presenting beautiful logos.<br />
Socrates cross-examines Agathon in a philosophical way (i.e., through questions and<br />
answers). However, his elenchus reveals a more radical view than that of Prodicus, since they<br />
conclude that Eros is not a god at all. He criticises the previous speakers, notably, Aristophanes in<br />
205d-e (cf. 212c); this reminds us of sophistic competition. Therefore, Socrates must seem to the<br />
others to be a far more formidable sophist who defeats all the others. This might be related to the<br />
perplexing passage where Eros is characterized as “sophist” along with “philosopher” (cf. 204a-b):<br />
[ <strong>Symposium</strong> 203d ]<br />
His father’s side, for its part, makes him a schemer after the beautiful and good, courageous,<br />
impetuous, and intense, a clever hunter (θηρευτὴς δεινός), always weaving new devices, both<br />
passionate for wisdom and resourceful in looking for it, philosophizing through all his life<br />
(φιλοσοφῶν διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου), a clever magician, sorcerer, and sophist (δεινὸς γόης καὶ<br />
φαρµακεὺς καὶ σοφιστής).<br />
Also, Socrates reports that Diotima speaks like “accomplished sophists” (οἱ τέλεοι σοφισταί, 208c).<br />
This fusion of “sophist” and “philosopher” is striking as well as perplexing, since Plato<br />
always tries to make a clear distinction between the two. The sophists, such as Protagoras, Gorgias,<br />
Prodicus and Hippias, are sharply contrasted with the philosopher, Socrates, and therefore we see few<br />
“respectable” sophists in Plato’s dialogues. 24<br />
It seems obvious that Plato deliberately fuses the philosopher and the sophist in these<br />
passages. Then, should we, or can we distinguish between the two in a clear way? These coincide in<br />
the figure of Eros as if they are an inseparable twin. How about Diotima? What is her wisdom? Again,<br />
what is the “erotic” wisdom of Socrates, which he was taught by Diotima? 25 Plato may be suggesting<br />
that the distinction is neither simple nor easy. Do we need sophists in order to do philosophy?<br />
Sophists may be within us, when we seek for truth in philosophy. I think this is a genuine challenge of<br />
the <strong>Symposium</strong>.<br />
[ Bibliography ]<br />
Burnet, J. (1901 1 , 1910 2 ), Platonis Opera, Tomus II, recognovit brevique adnotatione critica instruxit<br />
Ioannes Burnet, Clarendon Press, Oxford.<br />
Bury, R. G. (1909 1 , 1932 2 ), The <strong>Symposium</strong> of Plato, edited with introduction, critical notes, and<br />
commentary, W. Heffer, Cambridge.<br />
Classen, C. J. (1965), “Bemerkungen zu zwei griechischen ‘Philosophier-historikern’”, Philologus<br />
109, 175-178.<br />
Dover, K. (1980), Plato, <strong>Symposium</strong>, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.<br />
Ferrari, G. R. F. (1987), Listening to the cicadas: a study of Plato’s Phaedrus, Cambridge University<br />
Press, Cambridge.<br />
Kienle, W. von (1961), Die Berichte über die Sukzessionen der Philosophen in der hellenistischen und<br />
spätanktiken Literatur, Freie Universität, Berlin.<br />
Mansfeld, J. ([1986]/1990), “Aristotle, Plato, and the Preplatonic Doxography and Chronography”,<br />
G. Cambiano ed., Storiographia e dossografia nella filosofia antica, Torino, 1986, 1-59; repr. in<br />
his Studies in the Historiography of Greek Philosophy, Assen / Maastricht, 22-83.<br />
Notomi, N. (2010), “Prodicus in Aristophanes”, Stefania Giombini e Flavia Marcacci. Aguaplano ed.,<br />
Il Quinto Secolo: Studi di filosofia antica in onore di Livio Rossetti, Aguaplano, Perugia, 655-<br />
24 In only a few passages, the word “sophist” seems to be used in a neutral or a positive way: Men. 85b (“experts”), Prot.<br />
312c (“man of wisdom”), and Rep. X 596d (“man of wisdom”, but ironical). It is also used for gods in Crat. 403e and Minos<br />
319c bis.<br />
25 Socrates unusually claims his knowledge, in 177d, cf. 201d.<br />
147
Noburu Notomi<br />
663.<br />
Notomi, N. (forthcoming), “Citations in Plato, <strong>Symposium</strong> 178b-c”, SCO.<br />
Patzer, A. (1986), Der Sophist Hippias als Philosophiehistoriker. Alber, Freiburg / München.<br />
Radermacher, L. (1951), Artium Scriptores (Reste der voraristotelischen Rhetorik), Rudolf M. Rohrer,<br />
Wien.<br />
Robin, L. (1929 1 , 1958 6 ), Platon, Œuvres complètes, t. 4, pt. 2, Le Banquet, texte établi et traduit par<br />
Léon Robin, Société d’édition “Les Belles Lettres”, Paris.<br />
Rowe, C. J. (1998), Plato: <strong>Symposium</strong>, edited with an introduction, translation and commentary, Aris<br />
& Phillips, Warminster.<br />
Schanz, M. (1882), Platonis Opera quae feruntur omnia, No.5, <strong>Symposium</strong>, Phaedrus, ad codices<br />
denuo collatos, Leipzig.<br />
Snell, B. (1944), “Die Nachrichten über die Lehren des Thales und die Anfänge der griechischen<br />
Philosophie- und Literaturgeschichte”, Philologus 96, 170-182.<br />
Vicaire, P. (1989), Platon, Œuvres complètes, t. 4, pt. 2, Le Banquet, texte établi et traduit par Paul<br />
Vicaire, “Les Belles Lettres”, Paris.<br />
Wardy, R. (2012), “Father of the Discourse: Phaedrus’ Speech in the <strong>Symposium</strong>”, Revue de<br />
Philosophie Ancienne 30-2, 133-184.<br />
148
Eros sans expédient : Banquet, 179b4-180b5<br />
Annie Hourcade Sciou<br />
A la ligne 178b7 du Banquet, Phèdre cite de manière tronquée le vers 120 de la Théogonie d’Hésiode,<br />
se contentant de nommer Eros mais omettant la définition, pourtant décisive, qu’Hésiode lui-même<br />
donne du dieu (vers 120-122) :<br />
ὃς κάλλιστος ἐν ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσι,<br />
λυσιµελής, πάντων τε θεῶν πάντων τ’ ἀνθρώπων<br />
δάµναται ἐν στήθεσσι νόον καὶ ἐπίφρονα βουλήν.<br />
« Celui qui est le plus beau parmi les dieux immortels, celui qui affaiblit les membres et<br />
dompte dans la poitrine des dieux et des hommes la raison et la prudente délibération ».<br />
La lecture du discours de Phèdre révèle que les vers manquants confèrent au texte sa structure sousjacente<br />
et que l’omission constitue avant tout un procédé de nature rhétorique. De fait, si Phèdre en<br />
appelle expressément à l’autorité d’Hésiode et de Parménide afin de montrer (1) qu’Eros puise sa<br />
supériorité dans son ancienneté (178a9-178c5), il consacre la plus grande partie de son discours à<br />
démontrer (2) qu’Eros est étranger à toute forme de laideur (178c5-179b3) et (3) qu’Eros confère à<br />
tous une puissance d’action qui, méprisant tout recours aux stratagèmes issus de l’intelligence, permet<br />
d’outrepasser les limites imposées par la raison (179b4-180b5). C’est en ce sens qu’Alceste est<br />
supérieure à Orphée qui est puni des dieux pour avoir usé d’un expédient pour entrer vivant dans<br />
l’Hadès (179d6) et qu’Achille est honoré pour avoir choisi de combattre Hector en dépit du savoir<br />
prévoyant conféré par sa mère (179e2).<br />
Le but de cette communication est d’explorer plus particulièrement cette troisième<br />
caractéristique d’Eros et le traitement que Phèdre en fait, notamment par l’intermédiaire des figures<br />
exemplaires d’Alceste, d’Orphée et d’Achille. De manière plus précise, il s’agit d’interroger les<br />
conséquences, pour la conception de l’âme et des rapports à l’œuvre entre ses parties, de cette<br />
caractéristique problématique d’Eros – caractéristique d’Eros qui est d’ailleurs, au même titre que sa<br />
beauté, remise en cause, dans la suite du dialogue, par Diotime.<br />
Les développements de Phèdre conduisent en effet à envisager l’existence d’un thumos<br />
foncièrement moral en dépit – ou même en raison – de son insoumission à toute forme d’influence du<br />
nous ou plus largement de la raison ; un thumos que la puissance d’Eros autorise à ne viser que le<br />
beau, à réaliser également sa vocation première, et à proprement parler essentielle, en présidant de<br />
manière exclusive à l’action indépendamment de tout assujettissement au calcul, à l’expédient et à la<br />
délibération issus de la raison.<br />
I<br />
Les vers 120-122 de la Théogonie d’Hésiode ne sont pas présents dans le discours de Phèdre.<br />
Seul apparaît, de fait, le nom d’Eros et non sa définition, en cela, il est assimilé d’emblée à un<br />
principe cosmologique, alors que les vers d’Hésiode conduisent à voir en lui, également, et peut-être<br />
même surtout, un principe psychologique. Cette définition d’Eros, pourtant, Phèdre va y faire<br />
référence, non pas en l’énonçant au moyen d’une formule, d’un logos, comme le fait Hésiode, mais en<br />
ayant recours, dans le cadre d’un discours de nature épidictique, à des figures exemplaires et<br />
traditionnelles qui sont représentatives de l’effet produit par Eros sur le cœur des hommes et des<br />
dieux.<br />
Incontestablement, ce qui témoigne d’un tel effet, c’est la présence d’une vertu morale, de la<br />
vertu morale par excellence du cœur, à savoir, le courage. Vertu qui trouve essentiellement à s’exercer<br />
sur le champ de bataille. Excellence du cœur qui n’est pas le signe d’un bon naturel, mais d’une<br />
inspiration divine. Personne n’est mauvais au point qu’Eros, lui-même, l’inspirant, ne produise en lui<br />
la vertu, de sorte qu’il devienne semblable au meilleur par nature (179a7-8). C’est exactement le cas<br />
pour Alceste, femme pourtant – dont la principale excellence par nature par conséquent n’est pas le<br />
courage –, attestant qu’elle est inspirée par Eros lorsqu’elle consent à mourir à la place de son mari<br />
alors que les propres parents de celui-ci n’ont pas accepté de le faire. Eros peut donc inspirer un<br />
sentiment qui dépasse les liens familiaux traditionnels et la nature même de chacun. A proprement<br />
parler, ce que récompensent les dieux en Alceste, c’est le courage qu’elle a eu de sacrifier sa vie.<br />
En revanche, même si l’action accomplie par Orphée est du même ordre : il descend dans
Annie Hourcade Sciou<br />
l’Hadès pour en ramener sa femme, il ne mérite pas la renommée, à la différence d’Alceste, car il a eu<br />
recours à un stratagème : « au lieu d’avoir sous l’impulsion d’Eros, le courage de mourir comme<br />
Alceste, il avait eu recours à un artifice pour pénétrer vivant chez Hadès (καὶ οὐ τολµᾶν ἕνεκα τοῦ<br />
ἔρωτος ἀποθνῄσκειν ὥσπερ Ἄλκηστις, ἀλλὰ διαµηχανᾶσθαι ζῶν εἰσιέναι εἰς Ἅιδου) » (179d5-7).<br />
C’est précisément en soulignant cette différence entre Alceste et Orphée que Phèdre fait implicitement<br />
référence à la définition d’Eros pourtant non énoncée, à l’effet qu’il produit, non sur le corps – celui<br />
selon lequel il affaiblit les membres – mais sur le cœur, tel qu’il se manifeste dans la poitrine : « il<br />
dompte dans la poitrine des dieux et des hommes la raison et la prudente délibération ». De fait, si<br />
Alceste n’a en aucun cas réfléchi avant de consentir au sacrifice de sa vie pour son mari, si elle n’a<br />
pas délibéré afin de trouver un moyen efficace permettant d’atteindre ce qui pourtant était la fin de<br />
son action, à savoir la vie sauve pour son mari, sans pour autant sacrifier la sienne, Orphée, en<br />
revanche, a utilisé sa raison et sa sagesse pour rechercher un moyen afin de préserver sa propre vie.<br />
En cela, Orphée s’est davantage placé sous l’égide de la raison – visant l’utile – qu’il n’a écouté son<br />
cœur. C’est sans doute pour cette raison que son action n’était pas belle et c’est pour cette raison qu’il<br />
n’a pas reçu les honneurs des dieux, pour cela également que les moyens mis en œuvre, en dépit de<br />
leur caractère réfléchi et calculé, ne lui ont finalement pas permis de parvenir à sa fin ; alors que l’âme<br />
d’Alceste, sans que cela ne soit le résultat d’un stratagème de sa part, a eu accès à l’immortalité.<br />
De même Achille « a appris » (179e2) de sa mère qu’il trouverait la mort s’il tuait Hector,<br />
pourtant la préscience de son avenir ne l’a pas détourné de venger Patrocle. Là encore, comme chez<br />
Alceste, la peur de la mort, l’intérêt pour l’individu de faire prévaloir sa propre vie sur toute autre, la<br />
possibilité d’utiliser son intelligence, sa capacité de délibération et de prévision, ne le détournent pas<br />
d’accomplir un acte de sacrifice qui suscite l’admiration des dieux.<br />
C’est précisément le double critère de la beauté du geste et de son caractère désintéressé –<br />
action belle parce qu’elle est désintéressée – qui permet de hiérarchiser les actions d’Alceste,<br />
d’Orphée et d’Achille. Orphée voit son entreprise échouer et il reçoit la punition des dieux car il use<br />
d’un subterfuge pour ramener Eurydice à la vie. Le qualificatif de « lâche » (179d4) utilisé à propos<br />
d’Orphée est partiellement lié au fait qu’Orphée use de stratagème et par conséquent agit non en vue<br />
de la beauté, mais de l’utilité – pour lui comme pour celle qu’il aime. Cette intervention de l’intérêt<br />
suffit à rendre son action laide et par conséquent lâche, c’est parce que l’action n’est pas accomplie<br />
exclusivement sous l’emprise du cœur qu’elle témoigne d’une absence de virilité ou de courage, bien<br />
qu’Orphée soit un homme. Alceste agit en revanche en vue de la beauté exclusivement et de manière<br />
personnellement désintéressée, en cela, son action est courageuse, bien qu’elle soit une femme. Cette<br />
action cependant est moins belle que celle d’Achille car Achille est l’aimé et agit pour l’amant et<br />
l’amant est « chose plus divine que l’aimé » (180b3). Sans doute pourrait-on en outre souligner que<br />
l’action d’Achille est encore plus libre d’intérêt que celle d’Alceste dans la mesure où ce n’est même<br />
pas pour sauver la vie de son amant qu’il consent à mourir, puisque ce dernier a déjà été tué par<br />
Hector.<br />
II<br />
Si l’on tente à présent de réinscrire la perspective de Phèdre dans le cadre d’une conception de<br />
l’âme et des rapports entre ses parties, on note la valorisation par Phèdre de l’excellence qui ressortit<br />
au thumos, en l’occurrence le courage, mais un courage qui n’a semble-t-il rien à voir avec<br />
l’intelligence, un courage qui n’est précisément courage que parce qu’il ne fait pas intervenir la<br />
délibération. Si l’on essaie d’éclairer les exemples choisis par Phèdre à la lumière de la partie<br />
tronquée de la citation d’Hésiode, il semblerait que l’action accomplie par Alceste, ou encore par<br />
Achille, le soit exclusivement sous l’emprise du cœur et que ce soit cette exclusivité qui, à la<br />
différence précisément des développements de Platon sur la question au livre IV de la République, lui<br />
confère son caractère moral 1 . Pour Platon, en effet, l’action ne sera courageuse que parce qu’elle sera<br />
inspirée par la raison, que parce que le cœur sera à l’écoute de la voix de la raison et agira selon son<br />
conseil (442b5-c3). C’est en ce sens qu’Ulysse ne fait pas preuve de lâcheté (Odyssée, XX, 17)<br />
quand, selon la citation homérique de Platon en République, IV, 441b5-c2, « s’étant frappé la poitrine,<br />
il réprimanda son cœur en lui tenant ce discours ». Dans le discours de Phèdre, comme dans la<br />
définition cachée d’Hésiode, l’amour nous fait agir au contraire en faisant taire, en domptant, le nous<br />
et la prévoyante, la sage délibération, ce qui conduit Phèdre à une définition du courage bien<br />
particulière, celle selon laquelle le courageux agira sous l’emprise du cœur, mais sans intervention<br />
aucune de la raison, faute de quoi il sera considéré comme lâche, comme c’est le cas pour Orphée 2 .<br />
1 Sur la place implicite de la tripartition de l’âme dans le Phèdre, voir Alessandra Fussi, « The Desire for Recognition in<br />
Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong> », Arethusa, 41 (2), 2008, pp. 237-262, p. 238.<br />
2 La beauté de l’action est ce qui prévaut selon Phèdre. Kenneth Dorter, « The Significance of the Speeches in Plato’s<br />
150
Annie Hourcade Sciou<br />
L’un des intérêts du discours de Phèdre est d’exemplifier un fonctionnement exclusif du thumos 3 ,<br />
indépendamment par conséquent de toute intervention de la raison, mais aussi de l’epithumia.<br />
L’amour n’est pas considéré par Phèdre selon la dimension qui fait de lui un principe de génération,<br />
un principe de vie ; bien au contraire, il est, tout au long de son discours, associé à la mort 4 . De fait,<br />
c’est exclusivement en tant qu’il confère à chacun cette capacité d’aller jusqu’au sacrifice de sa vie<br />
pour l’autre (179b), qu’Eros est envisagé.<br />
L’autre aspect, lié, c’est l’association d’Eros et de la beauté. Eros en effet, pour Phèdre, ne<br />
peut qu’être beau et se pose ici la question de la finalité de l’action accomplie. Plus que dans les<br />
figures traditionnelles convoquées par Phèdre, c’est dans la mention, non moins traditionnelle, du<br />
bataillon sacré de Thèbes que l’association d’Eros et de la beauté est la plus présente. Phèdre en effet<br />
introduit la référence à la beauté et le sentiment qui lui correspond dans l’âme de celui qui agit de<br />
manière belle : l’honneur et, en regard, la référence à son contraire, la laideur et le sentiment qui lui<br />
est associé : la honte (178d). Alceste et Achille ont recherché l’honneur par la beauté de leur action et,<br />
de fait, ils ont l’un et l’autre provoqué l’admiration des dieux et ont obtenu une récompense<br />
proportionnelle à la beauté de leurs actions respectives. Orphée, en revanche, a agi en usant de ruse et<br />
de stratagème, il a donc agi de manière laide, provoquant le mépris des dieux et un châtiment honteux<br />
proportionnellement à la laideur de son action : le fait d’être mis à mort par des femmes.<br />
Je voudrais insister sur le fait qu’un tel schéma trouve un corrélat rhétorique et un corrélat<br />
politique 5 . Phèdre en effet s’inscrit de manière très classique dans une visée épidictique. Son discours<br />
en effet est beau, il use de l’éloge et du blâme, il vise en outre à en appeler aux sentiments que<br />
provoquent dans l’auditoire la beauté et la laideur afin d’exhorter à l’action belle et détourner de<br />
l’action laide en ayant recours essentiellement à des références traditionnelles, qu’elles soient<br />
collectives, comme l’armée de Thèbes, ou encore individuelles mais exemplaires, comme c’est le cas<br />
pour Alceste ou Achille. Comme cela apparaît aussi bien dans la référence à l’armée de Thèbes que<br />
dans l’exemple d’Alceste ou d’Achille, ce n’est pas, en dernier recours, la beauté de l’aimé que<br />
l’amant inspiré par l’amour recherche (et inversement), c’est en définitive la belle action, celle qui<br />
provoquera l’admiration des hommes et des dieux, celle qui conférera l’honneur, et c’est en ce sens<br />
qu’il semble légitime de considérer, comme cela a souvent été fait, que cette pratique rhétorique est,<br />
de manière très classique, au service d’une visée politique et éducative. Le discours de Phèdre en effet<br />
s’inscrit dans la perspective d’une éducation à la vie civique des jeunes par les anciens 6 ; et le<br />
comportement valorisé par Phèdre est conventionnellement considéré comme beau par les membres<br />
de la cité 7 .<br />
III<br />
La critique du discours de Phèdre, mise en œuvre par Diotime, a souvent été signalée 8 et tout<br />
particulièrement le fait que Diotime souligne que ce n’est pas par amour pour Admète qu’Alceste a<br />
sacrifié sa vie et qu’Achille a suivi Patrocle dans la mort, mais par amour de la renommée et de<br />
l’immortalité (208d-e). De fait, Alceste comme Achille prêts pourtant à sacrifier leur vie, ont, selon la<br />
volonté des dieux et en vertu de la beauté de leur action désintéressée, accédé l’un et l’autre à<br />
l’immortalité. Diotime, en revanche, n’évoque guère la figure d’Orphée et, de fait, ce dernier, comme<br />
on le sait, en raison même de sa conduite honteuse, parce qu’il a usé d’un subterfuge, n’a accédé ni à<br />
la renommée, ni à l’immortalité. Pourtant, ce silence de Diotime à son propos est susceptible de<br />
signifier qu’à la différence d’Alceste et d’Achille, c’est bien par amour d’Eurydice qu’il a agi comme<br />
<strong>Symposium</strong> », Philosophy & Rhetoric, 2 (4), 1969, pp. 215-234, pp. 216-217, souligne que même si, selon Phèdre, il est<br />
beau de mourir plusieurs fois plutôt que de jeter les armes (Banquet, 179a5), il peut être meilleur, sous certaines conditions,<br />
de battre en retraite, comme cela fut le cas pour Socrate (220e8), plutôt que de tenir bon contre toute raison. Il en va bien<br />
entendu de la définition du courage et de la place accordée à la raison dans la conduite courageuse.<br />
3 Sur Achille emblématique de la prévalence du thumos dans la République de Platon, voir Angela Hobbs, Plato and the<br />
Hero. Courage, Manliness and the Impersonal Good, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 199-219.<br />
4 Comme le fait remarquer Arlene W. Saxonhouse, « Classical Greek Political Thought II : I. Eros and the Female in Greek<br />
Political Thought. An Interpretation of Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong>, Political Theory, 12 (1), 1984, pp. 5-27, p. 14.<br />
5 Voir notamment les développements de Steven Berg, Eros and the Intoxications of Enlightenment. On Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong>,<br />
Albany, State University of New York, 2010, p. 15 : « [ …] Phaedrus understands the ground for his teaching regarding the<br />
divinity of Eros to be neither a cosmology nor a psychology, but a novel art of speaking that combines poetry and political<br />
rhetoric in equal measure ». Voir également Andrea Wilson Nightingale, « The Folly of Praise: Plato’s Critique of<br />
Encomiastic Discourse in the Lysis and <strong>Symposium</strong> », The Classical Quarterly, NS, 43 (1), 1993, pp. 112-130, p. 117.<br />
6 Sur ce point, Gary Alan Scott, William A. Welton, Erotic Wisdom. Philosophy and Intermediacy in Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong>,<br />
Albany, State University of New York, 2008, p. 48.<br />
7 Gabriel Richardson Lear, « Permanent Beauty and Becoming Happy in Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong> », in J. H. Lesher, Debra Nails,<br />
Frisbee C. C. Sheffield (ed.), Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong>. Issues in Interpretation and Reception, Cambridge (Mass.)-London,<br />
Harvard University Press, 2006, pp. 96-123, p. 100.<br />
8 Voir notamment, Kenneth Dorter, « The Significance of the Speeches in Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong> », op. cit., p. 231.<br />
151
Annie Hourcade Sciou<br />
il l’a fait.<br />
Je voudrais suggérer que la critique que Diotime met en œuvre de la conception de l’amour<br />
par Phèdre est également présente dans la définition même qu’elle donne d’Eros, prenant l’exact<br />
contrepied de la définition d’Eros donnée dans les vers manquants d’Hésiode. Un tel état de fait est<br />
plus particulièrement prégnant dans le passage suivant dans lequel Diotime dresse le portrait d’Eros.<br />
Comme sa mère il est pauvre, rude et malpropre ; « […] à l’exemple de son père en revanche, il agit<br />
par préméditation (ἐπίβουλός) en vue de ce qui est beau et de ce qui est bon, il est viril (ἀνδρεῖος),<br />
résolu (ἴτης) et ardent (σύντονος), c’est un chasseur redoutable (θηρευτὴς δεινός) ; il ne cesse de<br />
tramer des ruses (µηχανάς), il est passionné de savoir (φρονήσεως ἐπιθυµητὴς) et fertile en expédients<br />
(πόριµος), il passe tout son temps à philosopher, c’est un sorcier redoutable (δεινὸς γόης), un<br />
magicien (φαρµακεὺς) et un sophiste (σοφιστής) » (203d4-8).<br />
De manière assez inattendue, Diotime dresse ici le portrait d’un Eros qui serait mi-Achille,<br />
mi-Orphée. D’Achille, sans aucun doute, il aurait le courage et l’ardeur, le caractère résolu<br />
également ; comment en serait-il autrement puisque l’amour produit son effet avant tout sur le cœur<br />
des hommes et des dieux ? Mais d’Orphée, l’Eros de Diotime posséderait aussi plusieurs traits. Dans<br />
le registre irrationnel, Eros aurait, comme Orphée, un don pour la magie, la capacité de captiver et de<br />
charmer ; l’usage par Diotime de la référence au σοφιστής ressortit d’une orientation similaire : Eros<br />
est capable de charmer au même titre que le sophiste charme par son discours et Orphée par sa<br />
musique ; l’Eros de Diotime est un chasseur comme le sophiste mais aussi comme Orphée qui est<br />
capable de captiver, par son art, aussi bien les hommes que les animaux les plus sauvages. Mais<br />
comme Orphée également, l’Eros de Diotime présenterait la caractéristique d’user avec talent de sa<br />
raison pour arriver à ses fins. De fait, à son propos, elle use du terme de ruse (µηχανή), terme que<br />
précisément Phèdre utilise lui aussi par l’usage du verbe : διαµηχανᾶσθαι (179d6), mais contrairement<br />
à Diotime à des fins critiques, précisément pour suggérer que l’amour est absent du comportement<br />
d’Orphée. Une remarque similaire peut être faite concernant l’usage, par Diotime, de l’adjectif<br />
πόριµος. Plus encore, semble-t-il, c’est l’usage, par Diotime, de l’adjectif ἐπίβουλός appliqué à Eros<br />
qui est particulièrement intéressant. On en trouve peut-être un écho dans les vers tronqués d’Hésiode,<br />
tout particulièrement dans l’expression ἐπίφρονα βουλήν. Dans les deux cas, en effet, c’est moins<br />
l’idée de stratagème ou d’expédient qui est présente qu’un recours à l’anticipation et à la prudente<br />
délibération. L’Eros d’Hésiode et de Phèdre n’a rien à voir avec la ruse et avec la raison ; l’Eros de<br />
Diotime est sophiste, parce qu’il charme mais aussi parce qu’il use d’un savoir de type pratique ; il<br />
est aussi philosophe car il est passionné de sagesse φρονήσεως ἐπιθυµητὴς.<br />
Sans aucun doute, même si elle n’est pas abordée directement, la question de la constitution<br />
de l’âme et des rapports entre ses parties est présente dans le Banquet, avec un intérêt tout particulier<br />
accordé au thumos. L’approche de Phèdre est intéressante car elle permet d’envisager la possibilité,<br />
pour l’âme, d’être exclusivement dominée par son thumos, sans que pour autant cette domination ne<br />
conduise à sortir des cadres de la cité. Bien au contraire, Phèdre prend appui sur la définition de<br />
l’amour qui, en définitive, le met au service des valeurs collectives et fait de lui un auxiliaire<br />
indispensable des pratiques éducatives de la cité 9 car « sans cela, ni cité ni particulier ne peuvent<br />
réaliser de grandes et belles choses (178d2-4). L’amour dans ce cas, il est vrai – en ce sens Diotime a<br />
sans aucun doute raison –, se confond avec la passion de l’honneur et de la renommée.<br />
9 On pourra, toutes proportions gardées, se référer à Thucydide, II, 43.1. Voir sur la question Sara Monoson, « Citizen as<br />
Erastes: Erotic Imagery and the Idea of Reciprocity in the Periclean Funeral Oration », Political Theory, 22 (2), 1994,<br />
pp. 253-276.<br />
152
Eros protrepōn: philosophy and seduction in the <strong>Symposium</strong><br />
Olga Alieva<br />
The scope of this paper is to provide some literary background for Pausanias’ speech in the<br />
<strong>Symposium</strong> and, against this background, to reconsider the notion of Ἔρως προτρέπων in the<br />
dialogue. I assume that one of Plato’s purposes in this dialogue was to question the protreptic function<br />
of Eros as understood in Antisthenes. 1<br />
I’ll try to show, firstly, that Pausanias’ speech echoes Antisthenes’ views that only the wise<br />
man is worthy of love. A natural inference from this conviction would be that the sage has a sort of<br />
“monopoly” 2 on seduction: the idea most explicitly set forth by Pausanias.<br />
Secondly, I’ll turn to the Phaedrus where we also find the notion of Ἔρως προτρέπων. Certain<br />
parallels with “Lysias’ speech” enable to consider Pausanias’ praise of Eros as a sort of “sophistic”<br />
palinode.<br />
But first of all, a brief background should be given concerning λόγοι ἐρωτικοί and their<br />
relation to protreptic.<br />
Ἔρως σοφιστής<br />
In 1944 F. Lasserre suggested that prosaic λόγοι ἐρωτικοί, as we find them in the <strong>Symposium</strong> and in<br />
the Phaedrus, originated among the sophists, 3 and he even assumes that “Lysias’ speech” in the<br />
Phaedrus is indeed an unknown piece written by the famous orator. 4<br />
In his seminal Protreptik und Paränese bei Platon Gaiser adopts Lasserre’s thesis on sophistic λόγοι<br />
ἐρωτικοί and claims that “Lysias’ speech” has as a “precondition” (Voraussetzung) the existence the<br />
genre. 5 But as a matter of fact, we don’t have to go that far: the only “precondition” here is the<br />
common opinion µὴ ἐραστᾶι χαρίζεσθαι αἰσχρόν which can be used as a departure point for λόγος<br />
παράδοξος.<br />
We do actually find this opinion in the anonymous Dissoi Logoi. 6 One the chapter of this<br />
writing is entitled “Concerning seemly and disgraceful” 7 (Περὶ καλοῦ καὶ αἰσχροῦ) and contains the<br />
following statement: αὐτίκα γὰρ παιδὶ ὡραίωι ἐραστᾶι µὲν [χρηστῶι] χαρίζεσθαι καλόν, µὴ ἐραστᾶι<br />
δὲ [καλῶι] αἰσχρόν. Thereafter, a set of “comparative” examples follows, many of them concerning<br />
sexual comportment. 8 The conclusion of the section, designed as a merely rhetorical exercise, is:<br />
“disgraceful and seemly are really the same thing” (2. 21), or πάντα καιρῶι µὲν καλά ἐντι, ἐν ἀκαιρίαι<br />
δ' αἰσχρά. 9 In other words, under certain circumstances, µὴ ἐραστᾶι χαρίζεσθαι may also be καλόν.<br />
It is this “inversed” thesis that is defended by Lysisas, but we find here a feature which is not<br />
1<br />
In this paper, I can’t linger on parallels with Aeschines in the <strong>Symposium</strong>, which are also very important. On his notion of<br />
eros see: Dittmar, H., Aischines von Sphettos: Studien zur Literaturgeschichte der Sokratiker, Berlin, 1912; Gaiser, K.,<br />
Protreptik und Paränese bei Platon: Untersuchungen zur Form des Platonischen Dialogs, Stuttgart 1959; Ehlers, B., Eine<br />
vorplatonische Deutung des sokratischen Eros: der Dialog Aspasia des Sokratikers Aischines, München, 1966; Kahn, Ch.,<br />
“Aeschines on Socratic Eros”, in P. A. Vander Waerdt (ed.), The Socratic Movement, Ithaca NY, 1994, 87-106; Idem, Plato<br />
and the Socratic Dialogue: The Philosophical Use of a Literary Form, Cambridge / New York, 1996.<br />
2<br />
I owe this expression to M. Narcy whose book Le Philosophe et son double : un commentaire de l’Euthydème de Platon<br />
(Paris, 1984) helped to formulate many of the ideas expressed in this paper.<br />
3<br />
Lasserre, F., “Ἐρωτικοὶ λόγοι”, Museum Helveticum, 1 (1944), 169–178. Lasserre singles out two forms of λόγοι<br />
ἐρωτικοί: a more ‘primitive’, that is “un propos adressé à un être aimé”, and a more advanced one, that is an encomium of<br />
Eros. “Primitive” λόγοι ἐρωτικοί, according to Lasserre, date back to the elder sophists.<br />
4<br />
This guess is not supported by any evidence. For reasons set out below, I am inclined to agree with prof. Shichalin’s<br />
assumption that Lysias’ speech reproduces in a playful manner some features of Antisthenes’ teaching on eros.<br />
Unfortunately, the work I’m referring to is not translated into English. See: Shichalin, Y. (ed.), Egunov, A. (trans.), Plato,<br />
Fedr, Moskva, 1989 (in Russian).<br />
5<br />
Gaiser, op. cit., 66.<br />
6<br />
The unknown author of this writing adopted Protagoras’ methods; see: Guthrie, W.K.C., The Sophists, London; New York,<br />
1971, 316.<br />
7<br />
Hereinafter the translation is that of Sprague. See: Sprague, R. K., The older Sophists : a complete translation by several<br />
hands of the fragments in Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, edited by Diels-Kranz. With a new edition of Antiphon and<br />
Euthydemus, Columbia, SC, 1972, 279 ff.<br />
8<br />
Diss. log. 2. 16: “It strikes the Lydians as seemly that young girls should first earn money by prostituting themselves and<br />
then get married, but no one among the Greeks would be willing to marry a girl who did that”; Ibid. 2. 12: “To the<br />
Macedonians it appears to be seemly for young girls, before they are married, to fall in love and to have intercourse with a<br />
man, but when a girl is married it is a disgrace”, etc.<br />
9<br />
The author cites a fragment of an unknown tragedy: “And if you investigate in this way, you will see another law for<br />
mortals: nothing is always seemly or always disgraceful, but the right occasion takes the same things and makes them<br />
disgraceful and then alters them and makes them seemly” (2. 19).
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characteristic of the sophistic writings. Lysias mentions moral perfection among the reasons to yield<br />
to the non-lover. 10<br />
If we give a closer look to the extant specimens of sophistic oratory, we’ll note that though Eros and<br />
beauty (both physical and literary) do occupy an exceptional place here, 11 nothing is said concerning<br />
their “moral” influence whereas both in the <strong>Symposium</strong> and in the Phaedrus it is this aspect that<br />
comes to the fore. In Isocrates we even find the motif of voluntary slavery for the sake of beauty, 12 but<br />
for him, this slavery requires no justification like moral perfection. Even for Gorgias it would be farfetched<br />
to claim that Helen has become “better” due to her passion for Paris: as playful as an<br />
argument might be, it should nonetheless remain within the domain of εἰκός.<br />
But the problem is deeper than that: technical παιδεία of the sophists is absolutely unconcerned with<br />
erotic disposition of the person being converted. His χάρις is of no interest to the teacher. 13 On the<br />
contrary, in the earliest testimonies on Socrates his paideia is so to say sexually connoted. Thus, in<br />
Aristophanes’ Clouds, Socrates is presented on the one hand as the cheerleader of the sophistic<br />
movement, 14 and on the other hand as a sexually licentious person. 15 Far from being historically<br />
reliable, this image testifies to the effect that Socratic education was understood “in terms of eros” as<br />
late as in 423 BC. 16<br />
Polycrates might have developped some of the motifs present in Aristophanes. After Polycrates’<br />
accusation, 17 there were attempts to reconsider the Socratic eros (“corruption”) in a more positive<br />
way. It is at this point when eros and moral protreptic become associated: it would be pointless to look<br />
for something similar in non-Socratic literature. That is why I am inclined to think that Pausanias’<br />
speech is not a specimen of some generalized “sophistic” reasoning, 18 but a response to one particular<br />
sophist, 19 Antisthenes.<br />
10 Phaedr. 233a4−5: “And then, too, it will be better for your character (βελτίονί σοι προσήκει γενέσθαι) to yield to me than<br />
to a lover” (hereinafter Fowler’s transl.). Cfr. note 545.<br />
11 See, e.g., Gorg. Helen. 11. 110−111: “If, (being) a god, (love has) the divine power of the gods, how could a lesser being<br />
reject and refuse it?” (transl. by G. Kennedy in Sprague, op. cit., 30 ff). According to Gorias, the power of eros is that of<br />
“impression”: “the sight engraves upon the mind images of things which have been seen” (εἰκόνας τῶν ὁρωµένων<br />
πραγµάτων ἡ ὄψις ἐνέγραψεν ἐν τῶι φρονήµατι). Εros is therefore compulsory (cfr. 11. 125: ἔρωτος ἀνάγκαις), just like<br />
λόγος is, — one can hardly resist it; still, nothing is said concerning their “moral” influence. Isocrates also dealt extensively<br />
with the exceptional power (54.5: δύναµιν; 55. 6: ῥώµην) of beauty in his Helen, where he claims that “beauty is of all things<br />
the most venerated, the most precious, and the most divine.”<br />
12 Isocr. Helen. 57: “we submit more willingly to be the slaves of such than to rule all others, and we are more grateful to<br />
them when they impose many tasks upon us than to those who demand nothing at all” (ἥδιον δουλεύοµεν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἢ<br />
τῶν ἄλλων ἄρχοµεν…) Transl. by G. Norlin.<br />
13 Gaiser tries to overcome this difficulty by pointing to Ps.-Demosthenes’ Erotikos: “Der ἐραστής empfiehlt seinem<br />
Liebling eine sophistische Ausbildung, der er selbst nicht zu leisten vermag” (op. cit., 69). “Eine solche äußerliche<br />
Verquickung der sophistisch-paideutischen und der erotisch erotisch-paideutischen Werbung in der Form des protreptischen<br />
Logos Erotikos ist nun aber auch für die Zeit der Sophisten vor dem Aufkommen der sokratischen Literatur zu vermuten”,<br />
he argues. However, this is not convincing for the writing in question is a later one (presumably, 350 th BC) and is most likely<br />
influenced by the Socratic literature. On Ps.-Demosthenes, see: Blass, F., Die Attische Beredsamkeit III. 1: Demosthenes,<br />
Leipzig, 1893, 406 ff.; Wendland, P., Anaximenes von Lampsakos: Studien zur ältesten Geschichte der Rhetorik, Berlin,<br />
1905, 71 ff.<br />
14 See: Shichalin, Y., “Was the image of Socrates–Pythagorean Plato’s invention?”, in the Socrates and the Socratic<br />
Dialogue, ed. Ch. Moore et al. (in print). Shichalin observes that Aristophanes’ Socrates worshipes the Clouds as the gods of<br />
the sophists’ (Nub. 331: Σω. οὐ γὰρ µὰ Δί' οἶσθ' ὁτιὴ πλείστους αὗται βόσκουσι σοφιστάς), whereas the Clouds consider<br />
Socrates to be inferior only to Prodicus (Nub. 360-361: οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλῳ γ' ὑπακούσαιµεν τῶν νῦν µετεωροσοφιστῶν // πλὴν<br />
ἢ Προδίκῳ); the graduate of Socrates’ school is supposed to become a sophist (Nub. 1111: ἀµέλει, κοµιεῖ τοῦτον σοφιστὴν<br />
δεξιόν). Note that Aristophanes’ Socrates is engaged in typically sophistic activity: linguistic contrivances, making the just<br />
logos unjust etc.<br />
15 The Just Logos claims that Socrates’ παιδεία will fill the young boy “with the lewdness of Antimachus” (1022:<br />
καταπυγοσύνης; cfr. 909: καταπύγων εἶ κἀναίσχυντος) and eventually will make him εὐρύπρωκτος (1085). Dover maintains<br />
that these terms were associated with passive homosexualism. See: Dover, K.J., Greek Homosexuality, Cambridge, Mass.,<br />
1989, 141.<br />
16 I don’t think that what we find in Aristophanes is more than an obsentity, a rude joke which is not supposed to be taken<br />
literally (neither is contemporary abusive language!). Nevertheless, it doesn’t enable to maintain that “no one before<br />
Aeschines proposed to understand the protreptic and educational influence of Socrates in terms of eros” (Kahn, Ch.,<br />
“Aeschines on Socratic Eros”, 93). A useful survey of Aristophanes’ attitude to eros (as connected with sophistry) may be<br />
found in: Rosen, S., Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong>, New Haven, 1968, 120 ff.<br />
17 In Polycrates, Socrates’ corrupting influence was illustrated with the example of Alcibiades. Isocrates witnesses in his<br />
Busiris that this was a novelty, for before Polycrates no one heard of Alcibiades as a student of Socrates. Isocr. Bus. 5.9−13.<br />
Livingstone, N., A Commentary on Isocrates’ Busiris, Leiden; Boston, 2001, 38.<br />
18 Rosen notes that Pausanias’ “sexual inversion” is “assisted by the teaching of the Sophists” (op.cit., 86). It is agreed that<br />
Pausanias was a pupil of Prodicus; see: Nails, D., The People of Plato: a Prosopography of Plato and Other Socratics,<br />
Indianapolis, 2002, 222; cfr. Hunter, R., Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong>, Oxford, 2004, 43.<br />
19 We know that Antisthenes edorsed some key sophistic attitudes, for instance, τὴν ἀρετὴν διδακτὴν εἶναι (SSR V A 99 =<br />
DL VI 105, see note 34 below), and studied with Gorgias. He is one of the “sophists” Isocrates addresses in his In sophistas.<br />
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An accurate reading of Pausanias’ speech reveals an enormous significance attributed to the<br />
χαρίζεσθαι by the speaker. 20 He is particularly and even annoyingly insistent that a youth should yield<br />
to a lover in order to gain moral excellence. The verb χαρίζεσθαι in different forms is used 11 times<br />
by Pausanias. 21<br />
Text 1 182a2−3 …τινὰς τολµᾶν λέγειν ὡς αἰσχρὸν χαρίζεσθαι ἐρασταῖς·<br />
Text 2 182b1−3 ἐν ῎Ηλιδι µὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐν Βοιωτοῖς, καὶ οὗ µὴ σοφοὶ λέγειν, ἁπλῶς νενοµοθέτηται<br />
καλὸν τὸ χαρίζεσθαι ἐρασταῖς… τῆς δὲ ᾿Ιωνίας καὶ ἄλλοθι πολλαχοῦ<br />
αἰσχρὸν νενόµισται…<br />
Text 3 182c5-d1 ὁ γὰρ ᾿Αριστογείτονος ἔρως καὶ ἡ ῾Αρµοδίου φιλία βέβαιος γενοµένη κατέλυσεν<br />
αὐτῶν τὴν ἀρχήν. οὕτως οὗ µὲν αἰσχρὸν ἐτέθη χαρίζεσθαι ἐρασταῖς…<br />
Text 4 183d6−8 αἰσχρῶς µὲν οὖν ἐστι πονηρῷ τε καὶ πονηρῶς χαρίζεσθαι, καλῶς δὲ χρηστῷ τε<br />
καὶ καλῶς.<br />
Text 5 184b5-66 µία δὴ λείπεται τῷ ἡµετέρῳ νόµῳ ὁδός, εἰ µέλλει καλῶς χαριεῖσθαι ἐραστῇ<br />
παιδικά.<br />
Text 6 184c7-d3 δεῖ δὴ τὼ νόµω τούτω συµβαλεῖν εἰς ταὐτόν, τόν τε περὶ τὴν παιδεραστίαν καὶ<br />
τὸν περὶ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν τε καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετήν, εἰ µέλλει συµβῆναι καλὸν<br />
γενέσθαι τὸ ἐραστῇ παιδικὰ χαρίσασθαι. ὅταν γὰρ εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ ἔλθωσιν<br />
ἐραστής τε καὶ παιδικά, νόµον ἔχων ἑκάτερος, ὁ µὲν χαρισαµένοις παιδικοῖς<br />
ὑπηρετῶν ὁτιοῦν δικαίως ἂν ὑπηρετεῖν, ὁ δὲ δικαίως αὖ ὁτιοῦν ἂν ὑπουργῶν<br />
, …τότε δὴ …συµπίπτει τὸ καλὸν εἶναι παιδικὰ ἐραστῇ<br />
χαρίσασθαι, ἄλλοθι δὲ οὐδαµοῦ.<br />
Text 7 184e6−a5 εἰ γάρ τις ἐραστῇ ὡς πλουσίῳ πλούτου ἕνεκα χαρισάµενος ἐξαπατηθείη καὶ<br />
µὴ λάβοι χρήµατα, ἀναφανέντος τοῦ ἐραστοῦ πένητος, οὐδὲν ἧττον<br />
αἰσχρόν·δοκεῖ γὰρ ὁ τοιοῦτος τό γε αὑτοῦ ἐπιδεῖξαι, ὅτι ἕνεκα χρηµάτων ὁτιοῦν<br />
ἂν ὁτῳοῦν ὑπηρετοῖ, τοῦτο δὲ οὐ καλόν.<br />
Text 8 185a5−b5 κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ λόγον κἂν εἴ τις ὡς ἀγαθῷ χαρισάµενος καὶ αὐτὸς ὡς<br />
ἀµείνων ἐσόµενος διὰ τὴν φιλίαν ἐραστοῦ ἐξαπατηθείη, ἀναφανέντος ἐκείνου<br />
κακοῦ καὶ οὐ κεκτηµένου ἀρετήν, ὅµως καλὴ ἡ ἀπάτη· δοκεῖ γὰρ αὖ καὶ οὗτος<br />
τὸ καθ' αὑτὸν δεδηλωκέναι, ὅτι ἀρετῆς γ' ἕνεκα καὶ τοῦ βελτίων γενέσθαι πᾶν<br />
ἂν παντὶ προθυµηθείη, τοῦτο δὲ αὖ πάντων κάλλιστον· οὕτω πᾶν πάντως γε<br />
καλὸν ἀρετῆς γ' ἕνεκα χαρίζεσθαι.<br />
The first thing that attracts a reader’s attention is that in all cited passages χαρίζεσθαι is qualified by<br />
adverbs καλῶς or αἰσχρῶς; alternatively, a neutral adjective καλὸν (αἰσχρόν) is used. One might get<br />
the impression that Pausanias’ aim is to distinguish between two “modes” of Eros, and that this<br />
distinction proceeds from a clear idea of what the noble (καλὸν) and the base (αἰσχρόν) is. However,<br />
Pausanias remarks that “every action… as acted by itself (αὐτὴ ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς πραττοµένη) it is neither<br />
noble nor base (οὔτε καλὴ οὔτε αἰσχρά) 22 ”: “when the doing of it is noble and right, the thing itself<br />
becomes noble; when wrong, it becomes base. So also it is with loving, and Eros is not in every case<br />
noble or worthy of celebration, but only when he impels us to love in a noble manner (ὁ ῎Ερως οὐ πᾶς<br />
ἐστι καλὸς οὐδὲ ἄξιος ἐγκωµιάζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ ὁ καλῶς προτρέπων ἐρᾶν)” (180e5−a6; hereinafter<br />
Fowler’s transl.).<br />
At first glance, this text is highly reminiscent of the Dissoi logoi. In both cases, the focus is on noble<br />
and base actions; in both cases a “comparative cultural study” 23 is carried out in order to blur the<br />
See: Usacheva, A., “Socratics” as the addressees of Isocrates’ epideictic speeches (Against the sophists, Encomium to Helen,<br />
Busiris)”, in the Socratica III volume (in print).<br />
20 Pausanias’ speech has been often regarded as a specimen of “moral relativism” and poorly disguised “predilections” of the<br />
speaker. See: Cooksey, Th. L., Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong>: A Reader’s Guide. London; New York: 2010, 50; cfr.: Scott,<br />
G.A.;Welton W.A., Erotic wisdom : philosophy and intermediacy in Plato's <strong>Symposium</strong>, 2008, 56.<br />
21 And once more by Eryximachus while commenting on the previous speech; we also find here several occurences of<br />
δουλεύειν (183a7; 184b7−8; 184c2), ἁλῶναι (184a6; 184a8), ὑπηρετεῖν and ὑπουργεῖν (184d7).<br />
22 It has been observed by scholars that Pausanias’ views here are close to those of Stoics, see: Inwood, B., “Why do fools<br />
fall in love?”, Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies 41, S68 (1997), 55-69. Cfr.: Laurand, V., “L’Érôs pédagogique<br />
chez Platon et les stoïciens”, in Bonazzi, M., Helmig C., Platonic Stoicism, Stoic Platonism the dialogue between Platonism<br />
and Stoicism in antiquity, Leuven, 2007, 63-86.<br />
23 Cfr. text 2 above: “in Elis and Boeotia and where there is no skill in speech they have simply an ordinance that it is seemly<br />
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difference between the two; finally, both texts deal with χαρίζεσθαι ἐρασταῖς motif and are<br />
fallaciously reasoned. 24 But Pausanias’ speech has one important novelty as compared to the Dissoi<br />
logoi, namely the protreptic element.<br />
Pausanias is not interested in defending the paradoxical thesis that µὴ ἐραστᾶι χαρίζεσθαι καλόν; he<br />
aims at more: it is only noble to gratify a lover for the sake of wisdom and moral perfection (see<br />
above texts 6, 8) 25 . The pursuit of virtue justifies, in his opinion, δουλεία ἑκούσιος (184c2; cfr.<br />
ἐθελοδουλεία 184c2-7). In full compliance with this practice, Alcibiades wants to gratify<br />
(218d4: χαριζόµενος) Socrates in order to become better (218d2: βέλτιστον …γενέσθαι).<br />
In the Euthydemus, 26 where Socrates invents his own protrpetic, the interlocutors are driven to the<br />
conclusion that there’s no disgrace in being a slave for the sake of wisdom (282b 27 ). Narcy justly<br />
observes that in both cases the use of the verb προτρέπω recurs in a context where the case in point is<br />
the exceptional value of wisdom. Philosophical protreptic therefore involves what Narcy labels as<br />
“monopoly on seduction”. I’ll try to demonstrate that such understanding stems from Antisthenes, to<br />
whom Plato playfully alludes in the <strong>Symposium</strong>.<br />
Antisthenes: ἀξιέραστος ὁ σοφός<br />
The extant fragments of Antisthenes abound in scornful remarks concerning “worldly” love and<br />
pleasure. “I would rather go mad than enjoy pleasure”; 28 “If I could catch Aphrodite I would shoot her<br />
with my bow, because she has corrupted so many excellent and beautiful women among us” (SSR V<br />
A 122−123) 29 and so on.<br />
On the other hand, as Kahn puts it, Antisthenes “has a much more positive conception of<br />
philosophical eros in the sense of intimate friendship among intellectuals in pursuit of virtue.” 30 Thus,<br />
he says: “the wise man will be in love for he is the only one who knows whom one should love” (SSR<br />
V A 58 = DL VI 11 31 ) and “it is the sage who is worthy of love and friend to one like himself” (SSR<br />
V A 99 = DL VI 105 32 ).<br />
It is difficult to account for these inconsistencies unless we assume that Antisthenes distinguished<br />
between the two Eroses: a vulgar one and a philosophical one, just like Pausanias does. This<br />
assumption is indirectly corroborated by a passage from Xenophon’s <strong>Symposium</strong> (VIII. 10) where<br />
Socrates draws a distinction between the vulgar and the heavenly Aphrodite. 33<br />
Furthermore, it is likely that in Antisthenes eros was endowed with educational function. The above<br />
cited fragment from Diogenes Laertius (see note 32: ἀξιέραστος ὁ σοφός) is taken from the writing<br />
Heracles where Antisthenes showed τὴν ἀρετὴν διδακτὴν εἶναι. There, Heracles was depicted as one<br />
to gratify lovers”; “in Ionia and many other regions where they live under foreign sway, it is counted a disgrace”. The latter<br />
practice is then associated with the despotic rule peculiar to the barbarians (text 3).<br />
24<br />
Pausanias’ argument is circular: if there is nothing noble or base “by itself”, any “manner” under certain circumstances<br />
can be regarded as either noble or ignoble. Besides, there is a fallacious slip: what is “by itself” neither noble nor base turns<br />
out to be indispensable for attaining moral virtue.<br />
25<br />
See note 54. However, with “wisdom” he means no more than persuasiveness in speech. See: Rosen, op. cit., 89.<br />
26<br />
Michelini notes certain parallelism between the protreptic in the Euthydemus and Pausanias’ speech; see: Michelini, A.,<br />
“Socrates Plays the Buffoon: Cautionary Protreptic in Euthydemus”, American Journal of Philology 121 (2000), 509-35.<br />
Rappe argues that the Euthydemus “exhibits a number of familiar Cynic trademarks, or rather motifs that strikingly<br />
anticipate Cynicism, (apparently) associated with Socrates’ follower Antisthenes”; see: Rappe, S., “Father of the dogs?<br />
Tracking the Cynics in Plato’s Euthydemus”, Classical Philology, 95, 3 (2000), 282-303. On Antisthenes’ Protreptic see our<br />
paper in the Socratica III volume “Protreptic in the Socratics: In Search of a Genre” (in print).<br />
27<br />
Narcy, op.cit., 114. On slavery for the sake of virtue as a protreptic motif see: Slings, S.R., Plato, Clitophon, Cambridge<br />
(UK), 1999, 117-118.<br />
28<br />
Translation is cited from: Kahn, Ch., “Plato as a Socratic”, in Hommage à Henri Joly, Recherches sur la Philosophie et le<br />
Langage 12, Grenoble, 1990, 287-301, here 289.<br />
29<br />
See especially Theodoret. Graec. Aff. Cur. III. 53 (SSR V A 123): αὐτίκα τοίνυν ᾿Αντισθένης ὁ Σωκράτους ἑταῖρος καὶ<br />
Διογένους διδάσκαλος, τὴν σωφροσύνην περὶ πλείστου ποιούµενος καὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν µυσαττόµενος, τοιάδε περὶ τῆς<br />
᾿Αφροδίτης λέγεται φάναι «ἐγὼ δὲ τὴν ᾿Αφροδίτην κἂν κατατοξεύσαιµι, εἰ λάβοιµι, ὅτι πολλὰς ἡµῶν καλὰς κἀγαθὰς<br />
γυναῖκας διέφθειρεν». τὸν δέ γε ἔρωτα κακίαν ἐκάλει τῆς φύσεως, ἧς ἥττους ὄντες οἱ κακοδαίµονες θεὸν τὴν νόσον<br />
καλοῦσιν. ταύτῃ τοι µανῆναι µᾶλλον ἢ ἡσθῆναι ᾑρεῖτο.<br />
30<br />
Kahn, “Plato as a Socratic”, 289.<br />
31<br />
DL VI 11: (τὸν σοφὸν) γαµήσειν τε τεκνοποιίας χάριν, ταῖς εὐφυεστάταις συνιόντα γυναιξί. καὶ ἐρασθήσεσθαι δέ· µόνον<br />
γὰρ εἰδέναι τὸν σοφὸν τίνων χρὴ ἐρᾶν.<br />
32<br />
DL VI 105: Ἀρέσκει δ' αὐτοῖς καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν διδακτὴν εἶναι, καθά φησιν Ἀντισθένης ἐν τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ, καὶ ἀναπόβλητον<br />
ὑπάρχειν· ἀξιέραστόν τε τὸν σοφὸν καὶ ἀναµάρτητον καὶ φίλον τῷ ὁµοίῳ, τύχῃ τε µηδὲν ἐπιτρέπειν.<br />
33<br />
Kahn remarks that though this passage “has certainly been influenced by Pausanias’ speech in Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong>”,<br />
“Xenophon’s distinction between carnal and noble eros is much more simplistic than anything in Plato” and “it probably<br />
reflects Antisthenes’ distinction between the bad eros based on pleasure” and “the morally sound eros based upon virtue and<br />
wisdom in the beloved.” See: Kahn, “Plato as a Socratic”, 290.<br />
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of Chiron’s students (SSR V A 92: ἤκουεν αὐτοῦ), along with Achilles. A passage from Ps.-<br />
Eratosthenes says that Antisthenes’ Heracles came to the centaur Chiron δι' ἔρωτα 34 (SSR V A 92 =<br />
Ps.-Erat. Catast. 40).<br />
Different interpretations of this eros have been suggested. Thus, Rankin compares this passage with a<br />
fragment from Themistius’ oration On virtue 35 (SSR V A 96) and assumes that Heracles was urged<br />
“to progress towards full human development”. “A crude and brutalized Heracles”, Rankin believes,<br />
was forced to direct his “animal energy” towards philosophy. 36 “The animal is converted to virtue by<br />
the influence of Chiron — another animal itself conspicuously virtuous. Fully aware that we are<br />
speculating, may we ask whether the sophos in C fg 22 (= SSR V A 99 — O.A.) who is axioerastos, is<br />
Chiron?”<br />
The same suggestion was earlier made by Dümmler in connection with another fragment: λέγει γοῦν<br />
καὶ ὁ ᾿Αντισθένους ῾Ηρακλῆς περί τινος νεανίσκου παρὰ τῷ Χείρωνι τρεφοµένου· «µέγας γάρ, φησι,<br />
καὶ καλὸς καὶ ὡραῖος, οὐκ ἂν αὐτοῦ ἠράσθη δειλὸς ἐραστής» (SSR V A 93 = Proclus in Alcib. 98.<br />
14). “Damit wird der ἀνδρεῖος ἐραστής, als welchen man sich Cheiron oder Herakles selbst denken<br />
kann, doch nicht gemißbilligt,” he remarks 37 . A passage cited by Dümmler from Dio 38 suggests that<br />
Achilles might have also been depicted as a Chiron’s ἐρόµενος. Though the verb χαρίζεσθαι does not<br />
occur in our fragments, we know that Antisthenes praised Achilles for undergoing service to Chiron<br />
for the sake of education (SSR V A 95 39 ).<br />
Diogenes notes certain parallelism between the Kyros and the Heracles of Antisthenes: both dialogues<br />
were dedicated to the same problem and dealt with the topic ὁ πόνος ἀγαθὸν (SSR V A 97 = DL VI<br />
2). We know that Alcibiades’ παρανοµία was discussed in the Kyros and that the whole piece was<br />
probably a reported Socratic dialogue written, Dittmar believes, 40 as a response to Polycrates.<br />
Dümmler claims that “Cheiron war bei Antisthenes vielmehr echter Tugendlehrer und sein Verhältniß<br />
zu Achill analog dem des Socrates zu Alkibiades.” 41 Rankin agrees saying that Antisthenes probably<br />
saw in Alcibiades “a Heracles figure” who “met his Chiron too late for good effect” 42 . Given that, it is<br />
not that strange to find allusions to the Heracles in the <strong>Symposium</strong>, where Plato also hints at other<br />
authors who somehow touched upon the Socratic eros. 43<br />
Pausanias is critically disposed towards flatterers, but he stresses that it is “counted no flattery<br />
(κολακεία) or scandal” for the lovers “to be willingly and utterly enslaved to their favorites” (184c1-<br />
3); whatever is done by the lover to achieve his aim, he is not reproached “with adulation” (183b1:<br />
κολακείας). This might also be a playful allusion to Antisthenes. The latter compared flatterers to<br />
hetairas 44 ; this topic was touched upon also in the Heracles 45 . In a fragment preserved by Plutarchus<br />
we read that the youth should not yield (µηδενὶ χάριν ἔχειν) to the adulators. For Antisthenes, the<br />
adulators harm ἐροµένοις insofar as they keep them from νοῦς and φρόνησις; similarly, the “vulgar”<br />
34<br />
Rankin, H.D., Anthisthenes Sokratikos, Amsterdam, 1986, 104-105, notes: “Mullach, in his edition, fg6 (C fg 24) adds the<br />
conjecture paideias after eros so that the phrase explicitly says ‘desire of education’, instead of simply ‘desire’.” Rankin is<br />
inclined to think “that eros is used with an ironical layer of intention to refer to its sexual meaning in addition to its<br />
“Socratic” and metaphorical sense of spititual and intellectual frenzy for knowledge”.<br />
35<br />
Preserved only in Syriac; Giannantoni cites the Lation translation of R. Mach: “…Perfectum enim vir non eris, priusque<br />
ea, quae hominibus sublimiora sunt, didiceris. Si ista disces, tunc humana quoque disces; sin autem humana tantum didiceris,<br />
tu tamquam animal ferum errabis”, etc. For English translation and interpretation of the passage see: Luz, M., “Antisthenes’<br />
Prometheus Myth”, in Jacob Bernays : un philologue juif, ed. by John Glucker, André Laks et al., Villeneuve d'Ascq, 1996,<br />
89-104; Moles, J., “The Thirteenth Oration of Dio Chrysostom: Complexity and Simplicity, Rhetoric and Moralism,<br />
Literature and Life”, The Journal of Hellenic Studies 125 (2005), 112-38. The latter article contains also important<br />
considerations concerning the notion of “double paideia” probably coming from Antisthenes’ Heracles. One may cautiously<br />
assume that two types of paideia correlated with the two types of love.<br />
36<br />
Rankin, op.cit., 105.<br />
37<br />
Dümmler, F., “Zum Herakles des Antisthenes”, Philologus 50 (1891), 288-296, here 293.<br />
38<br />
Ibid., 294. Dio. Or. 58. 4-5: ὁ Χείρων ὀργισθεὶς …µόλις δὲ ἀπεχόµενος τοῦ µὴ παῖσαι αὐτόν, ὅτι διενοεῖτο ἐρᾶν αὐτοῦ etc.<br />
39<br />
Dümmler (op. cit., 293) also cites several passages from Xenophon’s Cynegeticus (12. 18−20) where the love for ἀρετή is<br />
mentioned along with Chiron’s name. Cfr., esp.: Xen. Cyneg. 12. 20 ὅταν µὲν γάρ τις ὁρᾶται ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐρωµένου, ἅπας<br />
ἑαυτοῦ ἐστι βελτίων. It seems to me, that the passage in question may as well be influenced by the Phaedrus, but I leave<br />
alone this question so far.<br />
40<br />
Dittmar, op.cit., 90.<br />
41<br />
Dümmler, op.cit., 291.<br />
42<br />
Rankin, op.cit., 127.<br />
43<br />
See notes 1 and 16.<br />
44<br />
Stob. Anthol. III. 14. 19 = SSR V A 132: ᾿Αντισθένης ἔλεγεν, ὥσπερ τὰς ἑταίρας τἀγαθὰ πάντα εὔχεσθαι τοῖς ἐρασταῖς<br />
παρεῖναι, πλὴν νοῦ καὶ φρονήσεως, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς κόλακας οἷς σύνεισιν.<br />
45<br />
Plutarch. De Vit. Pud. 536B = SSR V A 94: οὕτως ἄτρεπτος ἦν καὶ ἀνάλωτος ὑπὸ τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ κρατῶν ἐκείνης τῆς<br />
παραινέσεως, ἣν ὁ ᾿Αντισθένειος ῾Ηρακλῆς παρῄνει, τοῖς παισὶ διακελευόµενος µηδενὶ χάριν ἔχειν ἐπαινοῦντι αὐτούς· τοῦτο<br />
δ' ἦν οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ µὴ δυσωπεῖσθαι µηδ' ἀντικολακεύειν τοὺς ἐπαινοῦντας. Cfr. Hecaton ap. DL VI. 489 = SSR V A 131:<br />
κρεῖττον ἔλεγε, καθά φησιν ῾Εκάτων ἐν ταῖς Χρείαις, εἰς κόρακας ἢ εἰς κόλακας ἐµπεσεῖν· οἱ µὲν γὰρ νεκρούς, οἱ δὲ ζῶντας<br />
ἐσθίουσιν.<br />
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lover in Pausanias is said to love “the most witless people” (ὡς ἂν δύνωνται ἀνοητοτάτων), whereas<br />
the “noble” lovers fall for those νοῦν ἔχοντες 46 .<br />
Pausanias emphasizes that lovers “in the vulgar opinion” have “indulgence from the gods” when they<br />
forsake vows they have sworn — a motif also reminiscent of Antisthenes, who says in his Homerica<br />
that lovers often break their promises. 47<br />
In any case, it is clear that in the Heracles and, probably, in other Antisthenes’ dialogues the teaching<br />
of virtue was discussed and the erotic disposition of the characters played a significant role. That the<br />
wise man in those writings had the same “monopoly on seduction” that Pausanias defends in his<br />
speech doesn’t seem to be a bold assertion.<br />
Interestingly enough, it has already been noted on several occasions that Pausanias’ distinction<br />
between the two Eroses corresponds to the basic Stoic notion of love. As Inwood puts it, Pausanias’<br />
theory with its division between love for exceptional people and that for ordinary, or base, “is the<br />
most appropriate backdrop for an exploration of erοs in Stoic thought.” 48 If we bare in mind that<br />
Antisthenes is in the background of Pausanias’ speech this parallelism becomes more understandable,<br />
though of course it requires a closer consideration.<br />
Sophistic palinode?<br />
Ἔρως προτρέπων in Pausanias’ speech is reminiscent of Socrates’ closing words in his “palinode” in<br />
the Phaedrus. Addressing himself to Eros, Socrates says: “Pardon, I pray, my former words and accept<br />
these words with favor; be kind and gracious to me; do not in anger take from me the art of love (τὴν<br />
ἐρωτικήν …τέχνην) which thou didst give me… Make [Lysias] to cease from such speeches, and turn<br />
(τρέψον) him, as his brother Polemarchus is turned (τέτραπται), toward philosophy, that his lover<br />
Phaedrus may no longer hesitate, as he does now, between two ways, but may direct his life with all<br />
singleness of purpose toward love and philosophical discourses (πρὸς Ἔρωτα µετὰ φιλοσόφων<br />
λόγων) (257ab).<br />
To what kind of discourse is “Lysias” supposed to be directed? Socrates gives but a hint by saying: “I<br />
advise Lysias also to write as soon as he can, that …the lover should be favored rather than the nonlover<br />
(ὡς χρὴ ἐραστῇ µᾶλλον ἢ µὴ ἐρῶντι …χαρίζεσθαι)” And Phaedrus replies: “Be assured that he<br />
will do so: for when you have spoken the praise of the lover, Lysias must of course be compelled by<br />
me to write another discourse on the same subject” (243de). To an extent, I’d say that Pausanias’<br />
speech is a sort of sophistic “palinode” Phaedrus promises to Socrates, with a reservation that<br />
“sophistry” here should also include Antisthenian sophistry.<br />
A comparison of Lysias’ speech and that of Pausanias reveals certain parallelism between the two:<br />
both Lysias’ non-lover and Pausanias’ lover aim at the ὠφελία of the ἐρόµενος 49 and are going to<br />
remain faithful to him 50 even when he is older, 51 because they are attracted not to his body, but to his<br />
soul; 52 on the other hand, the ἐρόµενοι in the two speeches also have much in common: they should<br />
yield 53 — one to the non-lover, the other to the lover — in order to gain moral excellence; 54 finally,<br />
both speekers are concerned with public opinion and custom 55 and hold those possessed with<br />
46 Symp. 181b1-6: [οἱ φαῦλοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων] …ἐρῶσι …ὡς ἂν δύνωνται ἀνοητοτάτων etc.; Cfr. 181c4-6 on “noble” lovers:<br />
ὅθεν δὴ ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρρεν τρέπονται οἱ ἐκ τούτου τοῦ ἔρωτος ἔπιπνοι, τὸ φύσει ἐρρωµενέστερον καὶ νοῦν µᾶλλον ἔχον<br />
ἀγαπῶντες.<br />
47 Symp. 183b5-8: καὶ ὀµνύντι µόνῳ συγγνώµη παρὰ θεῶν ἐκβάντι τῶν ὅρκων – ἀφροδίσιον γὰρ ὅρκον οὔ φασιν εἶναι;<br />
183e1-5: πολλοὺς λόγους καὶ ὑποσχέσεις καταισχύνας.The same idea in the first Socrates’ speech in the Phaedrus (240e).<br />
Cfr. Porphyr. Schol. ad Od. VII, 257 = SSR V A 188: ᾿Αντισθένης δέ φησι ὅτι τοὺς ἐρῶντας ᾔδει ψευδοµένους τὰς<br />
ὑποσχέσεις· τοῦτο γὰρ ποιεῖν οὐκ ἐδύνατο δίχα Διός.<br />
48 See note 22 above.<br />
49 Phaedr. 230e7: συµφέρειν; 233b6-c2: οὐ τὴν παροῦσαν ἡδονὴν θεραπεύων συνέσοµαί σοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν µέλλουσαν<br />
ὠφελίαν ἔσεσθαι; 234c3-4: ὠφελίαν δὲ ἀµφοῖν γίγνεσθαι. On the moral use of love in Pausanias, see above. On pragmatic<br />
attitude to love in Antisthenes, see: Shichalin, Fedr, xvii.<br />
50 Phaedr. 233c5-6: ταῦτα γάρ ἐστι φιλίας πολὺν χρόνον ἐσοµένης τεκµήρια; 234a6-7: διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου φίλοις ἐσοµένοις.<br />
Symp. 181d4-5: ὡς τὸν βίον ἅπαντα συνεσόµενοι καὶ κοινῇ συµβιωσόµενοι; 183e5-6: ὁ δὲ τοῦ ἤθους χρηστοῦ ὄντος<br />
ἐραστὴς διὰ βίου µένει.<br />
51 Phaedr. 234a1-3: οὐδὲ ὅσοι τῆς σῆς ὥρας ἀπολαύσονται, ἀλλ' οἵτινες πρεσβυτέρῳ γενοµένῳ τῶν σφετέρων ἀγαθῶν<br />
µεταδώσουσιν; Symp. 183e1-5: πονηρὸς δ' ἐστὶν ἐκεῖνος ὁ ἐραστὴς ὁ πάνδηµος, ὁ τοῦ σώµατος µᾶλλον ἢ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐρῶν…<br />
ἅµα γὰρ τῷ τοῦ σώµατος ἄνθει λήγοντι, οὗπερ ἤρα, “οἴχεται ἀποπτάµενος” etc.<br />
52 Symp. 181b1-6: [οἱ φαῦλοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων] …ἐρῶσι τῶν σωµάτων µᾶλλον ἢ τῶν ψυχῶν. Cfr. Phaedr. 232e3-233a4: Καὶ<br />
µὲν δὴ τῶν µὲν ἐρώντων πολλοὶ πρότερον τοῦ σώµατος ἐπεθύµησαν ἢ τὸν τρόπον ἔγνωσαν etc.<br />
53 Χαρίζεσθαι in Lysias’ speech at 233d5, 233e6; on Pausanias, see table above.<br />
54 Phaedr. 233а4-5: βελτίονί σοι προσήκει γενέσθαι ἐµοὶ πειθοµένῳ; Symp. 185b2-3: ἀρετῆς γ' ἕνεκα καὶ τοῦ βελτίων<br />
γενέσθαι πᾶν ἂν παντὶ προθυµηθείη; 184c4−7: ἡγούµενος δι' ἐκεῖνον ἀµείνων ἔσεσθαι.<br />
55 Phaedr. 232a6-b3: τοὺς δὲ µὴ ἐρῶντας οὐδ' αἰτιᾶσθαι διὰ τὴν συνουσίαν ἐπιχειροῦσιν; 231e3-4: Εἰ τοίνυν τὸν νόµον τὸν<br />
καθεστηκότα δέδοικας, µὴ πυθοµένων τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὄνειδός σοι γένηται etc. Symp. 182a1-2: οὗτοι γάρ εἰσιν οἱ καὶ τὸ<br />
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“worldly” passion in contempt. 56<br />
Interestingly, Lysias’ speech bears many traits of Antisthenes’ teaching on eros 57 . Thus, Lysias thinks<br />
that those in love suffer from an illness that makes them mad; 58 he stresses that one should yield to<br />
those who would be grateful for that; 59 he doesn’t approve of pleasure (at least, he says so) 60 and aims<br />
at mutual benefits of those engaged in a relationship. The parallelism between the speeches of<br />
Pausanias and Lysias may therefore be explained by the fact that in both pieces Plato alludes to<br />
Antisthenes.<br />
Literary context seem to provide an important background for understanding the meaning of<br />
philosophical protreptic in Plato. It turns out that for Socrates it makes little difference if a sophist is<br />
praising or rebuking Eros. To take an image from the Phaedrus itself, “Lysias” and Pausanias think<br />
they are urging “to buy a horse and fight against the invaders”, but none of them has a slightest idea of<br />
what a horse is (260b). 61 Not that I wished to compare Eros to a donkey but the thing is that neither<br />
Lysias nor Pausanias have an idea of what they are praising and urging to.<br />
Socrates defends a radically different sort of rhetoric: one aimed at pleasing not the listeners, however<br />
“wise” they are, but gods themselves. At this point, the problem of χαρίζεσθαι gains a more broad<br />
meaning. As Socrates himself claims in the Phaedrus, a wise man will study rhetoric not “for the sake<br />
of speaking and acting before men, but that he may be able to speak and to do everything, so far as<br />
possible, in a manner pleasing to the gods (θεοῖς κεχαρισµένα). For those who are wiser than we,<br />
Tisias, say that a man of sense should surely practice to please not his fellow slaves (οὐ …ὁµοδούλοις<br />
δεῖ χαρίζεσθαι µελετᾶν τὸν νοῦν ἔχοντα), except as a secondary consideration, but his good and noble<br />
masters” (273e5–9).<br />
This entails that both rhetorical and erotical χάρις must be turned (“converted”) not to the “fellow<br />
slaves”, however wise they might be, but to gods alone 62 . Thus, dealing with Ἔρως προτρέπων, Plato<br />
offers his solution to the problem of δουλεία ἑκούσιος and to the combination of eros and exhortation<br />
in speeches. The protreptic power of Socrates’ speeches, described by Alcibiades at the end of the<br />
dialogue (216 ab), originates in gods themselves, is addressed to the gods and — eventually —<br />
converts his listeners to the divine 63 .<br />
P.S.: A question of chronology<br />
Though Phaedrus is now believed to be a later dialogue, 64 it has also been observed that certain motifs<br />
would be more appropriate in an earlier writing. Thus, Hackforth notes that some reminiscences of<br />
Isocrates’ speeches could hardly be detected by Plato’s readers some 15-20 years after these speeches<br />
ὄνειδος πεποιηκότες; cfr. 183a2: ὀνείδη; 183b1: τῶν µὲν ὀνειδιζόντων; 183b4: ἄνευ ὀνείδους; 183c7: ὀνειδίζωσιν; 183c8:<br />
ὀνειδίζωσιν; 184c1: µηδὲ ἐπονείδιστον etc. In both cases the common aim is to convince the youth that there is no ὄνειδος in<br />
gratifying a (non-)lover.<br />
56<br />
Phaedr. 232e3-6; 233b1−6: πολὺ µᾶλλον ἐλεεῖν τοῖς ἐρωµένοις ἢ ζηλοῦν αὐτοὺς προσήκει; 231e2-4: αὐτοὶ ὁµολογοῦσι<br />
νοσεῖν µᾶλλον ἢ σωφρονεῖν, καὶ εἰδέναι ὅτι κακῶς φρονοῦσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ δύνασθαι αὑτῶν κρατεῖν. This idea is clearly of<br />
Antisthenian provenance, see note 29: θεὸν τὴν νόσον καλοῦσιν.<br />
57<br />
This idea was expressed and elaborated by Y. Shichalin in his edition of the Phaedrus (above note 4).<br />
58<br />
See note 56.<br />
59<br />
Phaedr. 233d5-8: Ἔτι δὲ εἰ χρὴ τοῖς δεοµένοις µάλιστα χαρίζεσθαι, προσήκει καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις µὴ τοὺς βελτίστους ἀλλὰ<br />
τοὺς ἀπορωτάτους εὖ ποιεῖν· µεγίστων γὰρ ἀπαλλαγέντες κακῶν πλείστην χάριν αὐτοῖς εἴσονται; cfr. DL VI, 3 = SSR V A<br />
56: καὶ χρὴ τοιαύταις πλησιάζειν γυναιξὶν αἳ χάριν εἴσονται.<br />
60<br />
Cfr. above note 49.<br />
61<br />
Cfr. DL VI 8 = SSR V A 72: συνεβούλευεν [sc. Antisthenes ] Ἀθηναίοις τοὺς ὄνους ἵππους ψηφίσασθαι· ἄλογον δὲ<br />
ἡγουµένων, “ἀλλὰ µὴν καὶ στρατηγοί,” φησί, “γίνονται παρ' ὑµῖν µηδὲν µαθόντες, µόνον δὲ χειροτονηθέντες.” May we<br />
suggest that Antisthenes himself if subject to the reproach which he addresses to the Athenias?<br />
62<br />
This theoretical consideration is manifested at the practical level: Socrates’ speech in the Phaedrus is marked by the<br />
ostensible change of addressee, whereas in the <strong>Symposium</strong> the role of Socrates as “mediator” between the gods and the<br />
people is emphasized (202e-203a).<br />
63<br />
Alcibiades says that Socrates’ speeches are “divine” (222a3: θειοτάτους), they contain “images of virtue” inside (222a4:<br />
ἀγάλµατ' ἀρετῆς), just as their author that conceals “divine images” (216e6-7: ἀγάλµατα·θεῖα). The “wondrous power” (216с<br />
6−7: τὴν δύναµιν ὡς θαυµασίαν) of Socrates becomes more clear when we bare in mind the divine origin of his protreptics.<br />
64<br />
Erler, Hackforth and Robin take the Phaedrus to be later than the Republic, see: Erler, M., Platon / Die Philosophie der<br />
Antike, Band 2/2, Basel 2007, 216; Hackforth, R., Plato’s Phaedrus, Cambridge, 1952, 7; Platon, Oeuvres complètes IV 3:<br />
Phèdre / texte établi et trad. par León Robin, Paris, 1985, ix. Not many scholars now place the Phaedrus among earlier<br />
dialogues. See: Moore, J.D. “The Relation between Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong> and Phaedrus”, in Patterns in Plato’s thought: papers<br />
arising out of the 1971 West Coast Greek Philosophy Conference, ed. by J.M.E. Moravcsik, Dordrecht; Boston, 1973, 52-71;<br />
cfr. also J. Dillon’s “Comments on John Moore’s Paper” in the same volume. Bury also defends the prority of the Phaedrus,<br />
see: Bury, R.G., The <strong>Symposium</strong> of Plato, Cambridge, 1909, lxvii.<br />
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were published. 65 The so called “theory of revision”, suggested by H. Thesleff, enables to assume that<br />
some parts of the dialogue (“Lysias’ speech” among them) were written before the <strong>Symposium</strong>, 66<br />
which fits in with the upshot of the present paper. Of course, this question requires futher<br />
investigation, which we neither can nor intend to undertake within the limited scope of this paper.<br />
65 Hackforth, op.cit., 34.<br />
66 The theory of revision was proposed by Thesleff (Thesleff, H., Studies in Platonic Chronology, Helsinki, 1981, 172) and<br />
endorsed by Y. Shichalin in his edition of the Phaedrus (see note 15) and by A. Usacheva (“Concerning The Date Of Plato’s<br />
Phaedrus”, to be published in Hermathena, 2013). In the same volume, H. Tarrant in his “Final Reflections” singles out<br />
several “stylistic clusters” in the Phaedrus and remarks: “This may owe something to Plato’s conscious changes in linguistic<br />
register, but is better explained in terms of chronology”.<br />
160
La natura intermedia di Eros: Pausania e Aristofane a confronto con Socrate<br />
Lucia Palpacelli<br />
Il fil rouge dell’analisi che propongo è costituito dalla parola µεταξύ e, quindi, dal concetto di<br />
intermedio che a me sembra essere una chiave di volta, attraverso la quale è possibile rileggere in<br />
controluce il discorso di Pausania, che pare anticipare quello di Socrate, e il discorso di Aristofane,<br />
che lo nega, anche se in modo del tutto funzionale all’esito del dialogo stesso.<br />
1. Le occorrenze di µεταξύ all’interno del Simposio<br />
Il primo dato su cui è interessante riflettere è proprio quello delle occorrenze della parola µεταξύ:<br />
attraverso uno screening dell’intero dialogo, condotto con l’ausilio del lessico informatizzato di<br />
Radice-Bombacigno 1 , risulta che µεταξύ compare nel Simposio 8 volte e le occorrenze sono tutte<br />
concentrate nel discorso di Socrate-Diotima (202 A 2; 202 A 8; 202 D 11; 202 D 13; 204 B 1; 204 B<br />
2), ad eccezione di una (214 E 10), in cui però µεταξύ non ha valore di intermedio e non è legato ad<br />
Eros, ma all’espressione verbale µεταξύ ἐπιλαβοῦ che significa «interrompere».<br />
Alla luce di questo risultato si può quindi affermare che il concetto di intermedio è, nella<br />
finzione scenica, un guadagno esclusivo di Socrate-Diotima, perché in nessun altro discorso questo<br />
termine compare.<br />
Del resto, questo dato è in linea con il fatto che l’intervento di Socrate si apre con una<br />
precisazione metodologica che preannuncia una diversa impostazione del suo discorso rispetto a<br />
quelli che lo hanno preceduto: cogliendo uno spunto di Agatone, infatti, il filosofo, osserva:<br />
Caro Agatone, a me sembra che tu abbia aperto bene il tuo discorso, dicendo che per prima cosa<br />
bisogna mostrare quale sia (τίς ἐστιν) Eros, poi le sue opere (τὰ ἔργα) (199 C 3-5) 2 .<br />
In questo modo, Platone avverte il lettore che tutti i discorsi precedenti – tranne quello di Agatone –<br />
sono viziati da un errore a monte 3 che, quindi, pregiudica anche il loro svolgimento e consente di<br />
affermare che «ogni personaggio che è intervenuto a parlare di Eros, prima di Diotima, ha messo in<br />
luce ciò che rientrava nelle sue competenze, ha permesso al ragionamento di procedere, inverando con<br />
le sue parole un aspetto dell’amore, ma non ne ha colto l’essenza» 4 .<br />
Se poi analizziamo i passi in questione, ci accorgiamo che Platone presenta il concetto di<br />
µεταξύ come risolutivo per individuare la natura di Eros.<br />
Socrate riconosce, infatti, che, di fronte alla sacerdotessa di Mantinea, anche lui sostenne ciò<br />
che ha sostenuto Agatone e cioè che Eros è un grande dio ed è amore delle cose belle, ma Diotima lo<br />
ha confutato affermando che<br />
Proprio sulla base del mio discorso, Eros non è né bello né buono (201 E 7).<br />
Di fronte a tale affermazione, Socrate replica:<br />
Che cosa dici, Diotima? Allora Eros è forse brutto e cattivo? (201 E 8-9).<br />
E Diotima gli impone di tacere:<br />
Sta’ zitto! Pensi forse che ciò che non è bello, sia necessariamente brutto?... E che ciò che non è<br />
sapiente sia ignorante? O non ti accorgi che c’è qualcosa di intermedio (τι µεταξύ) tra sapienza e<br />
ignoranza? (201 E 10 -202 A 3).<br />
1 R. Radice - R. Bombacigno, Plato. Lexicon. Con CD-ROM, Biblia, Milano 2003.<br />
2 La traduzione di tutti i passi citati è mia.<br />
3 «I cinque discorsi che precedono quello di Socrate costituiscono esempi di stile retorico e questo fornisce il primo punto di<br />
contrasto: come lo stesso filosofo, dopo l’esibizione di Agatone, dice subito, egli è interessato solo alla verità» (Il Simposio<br />
di Platone, Lectura Platonis 1, a cura di M. Migliori, Academia Verlag, Sankt Augustin 1998, p. 25). Sottolinea questo anche<br />
L. M. Segolini, Socrate a banchetto, Il Simposio di Platone e i Banchettanti di Aristofane, GEI. Gruppo Editoriale<br />
Internazionale, Roma 1994, pp. 63-64.<br />
4 G. Cappelletti, Simposio e Fedro. Variazioni strutturali del discorso d’amore, in La struttura del dialogo platonico, a cura di<br />
G. Casertano, Loffredo Editore, Napoli 2000, pp. 253-261, p. 256.
Lucia Palpacelli<br />
Questa è la prima occorrenza del termine µεταξύ che si rivela come la chiave per uscire dalla strettoia<br />
dell’aut… aut..: Eros, infatti, non può dirsi né bello né buono, ma questo non significa che sia brutto e<br />
cattivo.<br />
Diotima conclude, affermando:<br />
Allora, non costringere ciò che non è bello ad essere brutto e ciò che non è buono ad essere cattivo.<br />
Lo stesso vale per eros: dal momento che tu concordi sul fatto che non sia né buono né bello, non<br />
pensare che debba essere brutto e cattivo, ma qualcosa di intermedio (τι µεταξύ) tra questi (202 B 1-<br />
5).<br />
La terza occorrenza del termine µεταξύ (la seconda ricorre infatti a 202 A 8, e definisce la retta<br />
opinione come intermedia tra sapienza e ignoranza) permette di vedere lo schema ternario entro cui<br />
Platone pone Eros:<br />
bello – intermedio (= Eros) – brutto; buono – intermedio (= Eros) – cattivo.<br />
Il fatto di riconoscere la natura mediana di Eros, consente anche di affermare che egli non è<br />
un dio, ma è un demone, intermedio tra mortale e immortale (quinta e sesta occorrenza):<br />
È qualcosa di intermedio tra mortale e immortale (µεταξὺ θνητοῦ καὶ ἀθανάτου)… un grande demone<br />
(δαίµων µέγας), infatti tutto ciò che è demonico è intermedio tra mortale e immortale (202 D 11- E 1);<br />
è figlio di Penia e di Poros, è filosofo, in quanto intermedio (settima occorrenza) tra sapienza e<br />
ignoranza (204 b 1-2).<br />
2. Il discorso di Pausania e di Aristofane a confronto con il discorso di Socrate<br />
Intrecciando tra loro i discorsi di Socrate, Pausania e Aristofane è possibile verificare che l’approdo<br />
costituito dal µεταξύ è preparato da Platone nei discorsi che precedono quello del filosofo, sia in<br />
positivo - tramite cioè, alcuni elementi che vengono ripresi dai discorsi del retore e del<br />
commediografo per essere corretti, posti in una più giusta prospettiva o meglio messi a fuoco – sia in<br />
negativo, attraverso vere e proprie prese di distanza.<br />
2.1. Pausania prepara il discorso di Socrate<br />
Ponendo in relazione il discorso di Socrate e quello di Pausania, si ha l’impressione che, nel discorso<br />
del retore, Platone cominci ad indicare al lettore la via di soluzione poi percorsa da Socrate, mettendo<br />
in bocca a Pausania le parole giuste in un contesto sbagliato, come il successivo discorso del filosofo<br />
chiarisce.<br />
Alla luce del discorso di Socrate, infatti, risulta che Pausania abbia sbagliato, innanzitutto, nel<br />
considerare gli erga di Eros prima della sua natura.<br />
La prima movenza del retore nel suo intervento è quella di distinguere due Eros, legati<br />
rispettivamente ad Afrodite Pandemia e ad Afrodite Urania (180 D-E), sulla base della considerazione<br />
per cui Eros non è cosa semplice e, come si è detto all’inizio, in sé e per sé (αὐτὸ αὑτό), né bella né<br />
brutta, ma è bella se viene fatta in modo bello e brutta se viene compiuta in modo brutto (183 D 4-6).<br />
Infatti, proprio all’inizio del suo discorso (181 A) Pausania aveva subito stabilito che il primo<br />
Eros, terreno, non è certo da lodare, bisogna, invece, elogiare il secondo, perché così come le azioni in<br />
se stesse non possono dirsi né belle né brutte, ma risultano tali in relazione al modo in cui vengono<br />
compiute (181 A 2-3), questo vale anche per l’Eros: non ogni Eros è bello e degno di lode, ma quello<br />
che ci spinge ad amare in modo bello (181 A 5-6).<br />
Come osserva Reale, «secondo Pausania, i valori non sono nelle cose, ma vengono dati alle<br />
cose: ogni azione in quanto tale non è né bella né brutta; ma risulta essere bella, se svolta in modo<br />
retto e armonico, mentre risulta essere brutta, se svolta in maniera opposta. In altri termini, non è<br />
l’azione in sé… ad avere un valore o un disvalore, bensì il modo in cui essa viene fatta. Dunque, è il<br />
modo in cui si fa un’azione che conferisce valore o disvalore all’azione stessa» 5 .<br />
Sicuramente quindi, l’errore metodologico porta Pausania già su una strada sbagliata, ma<br />
l’insistenza del retore sulla natura neutra dell’amore non può non richiamare la strada tracciata da<br />
Socrate per arrivare al concetto di intermedio, come definizione appropriata di Eros: come si è visto,<br />
infatti, a 201 E anche Diotima, correggendo Socrate, dichiara Eros né bello né necessariamente brutto,<br />
ma questo non implica uno sdoppiamento dell’Eros stesso in un Eros celeste e bello e in un Eros<br />
terreno e brutto, perché, così facendo, non si definisce comunque la sua natura. Infatti, Pausania è<br />
5 G. Reale, Eros demone mediatore. Il gioco delle maschere nel Simposio di Platone, Rizzoli, Milano 1997, pp. 68-69.<br />
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costretto a duplicare Eros per poter giustificare il fatto che esso appaia, sulla base degli erga, bello e<br />
brutto e, dunque, in sé né bello né brutto 6 .<br />
Alla neutralità riconosciuta a Eros, quindi, Socrate-Diotima risponde con uno schema<br />
ternario, mentre Pausania, legando l’oggetto al modo in cui viene usato, risponde con uno schema<br />
binario: se Diotima definisce Eros come intermedio tra bello e brutto e buono e cattivo, Pausania<br />
riconosce due Eros: uno bello e buono e l’altro brutto e cattivo.<br />
Al di là degli errori, però, l’elemento corretto che Platone fa preannunciare a Pausania, perché<br />
Socrate lo ponga poi nella giusta luce, è proprio il fatto che Eros non sia in sé né bello né brutto (ad<br />
indicare l’importanza di tale affermazione sta anche l’insistenza con cui Platone la sottolinea sia per<br />
bocca di Pausania sia per bocca di Socrate: 180 E; 183 D 5; 201 C). Proprio a partire da questa<br />
considerazione, infatti, Diotima può affermare che egli abbia una natura intermedia. D’altro canto,<br />
però, solo quando si arriva al µεταξύ la giusta intuizione di Pausania sembra essere collocata al livello<br />
appropriato e sfruttata appieno per definire la natura stessa di Eros.<br />
Un’ulteriore conseguenza dell’indicazione metodologica che Platone mette in bocca a Socrate<br />
all’inizio del suo discorso è quella secondo cui Pausania non avrebbe dovuto giocare il suo discorso<br />
sul piano pratico-comportamentale, ma su quello ontologico-metafisico.<br />
Del resto, che questo aspetto del discorso di Pausania sia particolarmente debole è messo in<br />
evidenza da Platone anche tramite il passaggio che prende in considerazione le diverse costituzioni<br />
politiche rispetto all’amore: egli nota, infatti, che nell’Elide e nella Beozia si stabilisce semplicemente<br />
che concedere favori agli amanti è cosa bella, mentre nella Ionia e in luoghi in cui dominano i barbari,<br />
si è stabilito per legge che è cosa brutta (182 B - C). Una tale valutazione, però, a suo parere non è<br />
corretta, ma dove è stato stabilito che è cosa brutta compiacere gli amanti, si è deciso a causa della<br />
bassezza di chi lo ha stabilito, per la prepotenza di coloro che governano e per la viltà di coloro che<br />
sono governati, invece dove fu stabilito semplicemente che è bello, questo fu a causa dell’ignavia di<br />
chi lo ha stabilito (182 C 7- D 4).<br />
Cosa diversa accade ad Atene dove vige una «legge molto più bella» (182 D 4), anche se non facile da<br />
comprendere (a 182 B Platone aveva già anticipato che ad Atene e a Sparta la legge era molto più<br />
complessa).<br />
Infatti, da un lato, qui si afferma che amare apertamente è cosa più bella che amare di<br />
nascosto ed è soprattutto considerato bello amare i più nobili e i migliori, anche se sono più brutti di<br />
altri. Inoltre a chi ama, la legge e perfino gli dei concedono ampia libertà: egli, per amore, può fare<br />
cose per le quali, sarebbe biasimato, se fosse spinto da diverse ragioni; può perfino giurare e<br />
trasgredire i giuramenti (183 A). D’altro canto, però, l’atteggiamento dei padri che istruiscono i<br />
pedagoghi perché i giovani amati non parlino con i loro amanti, può far pensare che l’amore sia<br />
considerato cosa bruttissima 7 .<br />
Pausania scioglie questa ambiguità, ribadendo la natura neutra di Eros e affermando che il<br />
fatto che sia bello o brutto dipende dal modo in cui viene compiuto (183 D 4-6) 8 .<br />
In questo passaggio si sottolinea di nuovo, quindi, che il giudizio di Pausania sul bello e sul<br />
brutto rispetto ad Eros non tocca la sua natura, ma dipende da qualcosa di esterno a lui.<br />
Infine, rivelando la vera natura di Eros come intermedio e la natura del vero amante, Socrate<br />
chiarirà che l’eros sessuale è il primo gradino della scala d’amore e che l’eros filosofico si pone al di<br />
sopra dei sensi e del sensibile (210 B-211 B). Questo gli consente di fondare ad un altro livello e,<br />
quindi, di superare la visione che Pausania tocca con l’ultimo punto del suo discorso: la connessione<br />
tra eros e virtù.<br />
Per quanto riguarda l’amore compiuto in modo bello, il retore sottolinea, infatti, come la legge<br />
6 A conferma che, comunque, anche nell’errore Platone può “nascondere” indizi utili, Allen (The dialogue of Plato, The<br />
<strong>Symposium</strong>, volume II, translated with comment by R. E. Allen, Yale University Press, New Haven and London 1991, p.<br />
20) fa notare che «se la distinzione di Pausania tra due Afrodite e due Eros è confusa, essa è anche dopotutto fertile:<br />
suggerisce che l’amore può essere più che fisico e che, nella misura in cui è diretto verso l’educazione e la virtù, può<br />
diventare un mezzo per ottenere un fine spirituale».<br />
7 «Se c’è un problema morale rispetto all’amore, non può che porsi nel caso in cui l’indecisione della regola lascia alle<br />
risorse interiori dell’agente morale la libertà di determinarsi, in un senso o nell’altro. È proprio quello che accade in un caso<br />
complesso e ambiguo, qual è quello del costume ateniese» (Platon, Le Banquet, notice de L. Robin, texte établi et traduit par<br />
P. Vicaire, Les Belles Lettres, Paris 1992, p. XLVIII).<br />
8 Rowe (Simposio…, p. 25) osserva che Pausania, nel trattare d’amore, «tratta… un argomento che lo coinvolge<br />
direttamente: è l’unica persona del dialogo identificata chiaramente come un amante, cioè amante del bell’Agatone». Dover<br />
(Plato, <strong>Symposium</strong>, University Cambridge Press, Cambridge 1980, p. 96), a questo proposito, afferma che «il rapporto di<br />
Pausania con Agatone è riflesso nel suo disdegno per le donne (181 B 3- C 6), nella sua critica di quelli che desiderano<br />
ragazzi immaturi (181 C 7 – 182 A 6) e nell’importanza che dà alla stabilità (181 D 3-7; 183 D 8 – E 6)». Allen (Dialogue…,<br />
p. 17) afferma, infatti, che «Pausania stesso sembra sia stato l’erastes, l’amante, di Agatone che era l’eromenos, l’amato e la<br />
loro relazione era durata fino all’età adulta».<br />
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Lucia Palpacelli<br />
stessa incoraggi soprattutto l’amore che conduce alla virtù:<br />
Ecco la nostra legge: come per chi ama l’assoggettarsi, accettando volontariamente qualsiasi<br />
servitù per i propri amanti, non si deve considerare né adulazione né qualcosa di vergognoso, così c’è<br />
soltanto un’altra servitù volontaria che non è vergognosa, ed è quella riguardante la virtù. Da noi,<br />
infatti, è così stabilito per legge: se qualcuno vuol servire un altro pensando che, tramite quello,<br />
diventerà migliore o per una sapienza o per qualche altra parte della virtù, questa servitù volontaria<br />
non è da considerarsi vergognosa e nemmeno un atto di adulazione (184 B 6 - C 7) 9 .<br />
Su questa connessione tra amore e virtù, egli continua ad insistere con tre sottolineature che<br />
confermano l’importanza del tema per Platone (184 C-D; 185 B; 185 B-C).<br />
Come riconosce Reale, infatti, «per Platone è vera la tesi che Eros va strettamente congiunto<br />
con la sapienza e con la virtù, ma ciò deve avvenire in maniera del tutto differente. Pausania cerca di<br />
salvare il piacere sessuale dell’eros per i giovani nobilitandolo, ossia connettendolo con la sapienza e<br />
con la virtù. Ma la sua tesi risulta essere del tutto fallace, in quanto cerca di mediare cose non<br />
mediabili in questo modo» 10 .<br />
Infatti, a 206 C, dopo aver definito Eros come desiderio del possesso del bene sempre,<br />
Diotima chiede in quale azione l’impegno e lo sforzo di chi mira al bene può chiamarsi amore. Per<br />
dirla con Aristotele, la sacerdotessa di Mantinea sta chiedendo qual è la specie in cui il genere appena<br />
definito – l’amore come desiderio del bene – si declina. La risposta è chiara: nell’amore umano, o<br />
meglio, nella tendenza, propria di tutti gli uomini, a procreare nel bello.<br />
Se, infatti, l’amore è desiderio del bene sempre, Eros è anche un desiderio di immortalità che<br />
si esplica tramite la procreazione nel corpo, ma anche tramite la procreazione nell’anima (208 E - 209<br />
A).<br />
All’anima si addicono le virtù e, in particolar modo, la temperanza e la giustizia che<br />
riguardano l’ordinamento della città e della casa.<br />
E quando qualcuno fin dalla giovinezza abbia l’anima gravida ed essendo celibe, giunta l’età,<br />
desideri partorire e generare, credo che egli, girando intorno, cerchi ciò che è bello nel quale possa<br />
generare… E qualora incontri un’anima bella e nobile e di buona natura, allora si avvicina a questa<br />
bellezza e di fronte a quest’uomo subito gli vengono discorsi intorno alla virtù e sul modo in cui<br />
l’uomo deve essere buono e delle cose di cui deve prendersi cura e comincia ad educarlo… Di<br />
conseguenza, questi uomini hanno tra loro una comunanza molto più grande di quella che hanno con i<br />
figli e un’amicizia più salda, perché condividono figli più belli e assolutamente immortali (209 A 8 –<br />
C 7).<br />
Ecco quindi il giusto modo e le corrette ragioni per le quali è cosa lodevole che Eros si<br />
accompagni a virtù.<br />
2.2 Aristofane nega il discorso di Socrate<br />
Aristofane apre il suo discorso mettendosi subito e apertamente in contrapposizione con il discorso di<br />
Pausania e con quello di Erissimaco, che del discorso di Pausania ha conservato l’elemento della<br />
duplicazione di Eros (186 A) 11 .<br />
Il commediografo afferma:<br />
Certamente, Erissimaco, ho in mente di parlare in modo diverso rispetto a come avete parlato tu e<br />
Pausania (189 3-4) 12 .<br />
Egli mostra da subito, infatti, di muoversi in modo opposto rispetto a Pausania, perché non enfatizza<br />
9 In questo senso, è confrontabile un passo dell’Eutidemo: «E se si crede che si debba certamente ereditare questo piuttosto<br />
che le ricchezze del padre, chiedendo e pregando di essere resi partecipi della sapienza, dai tutori, dagli amici, da quelli che<br />
si dicono amanti, sia stranieri sia concittadini, non è, Clinia, assolutamente vergognoso né degno di biasimo, per questo,<br />
obbedire e servire sia l’amante sia ogni uomo, volendo servire in qualsiasi modo, purché sia onesto, perché si desidera<br />
diventare saggi» (282 A 7 - B 6). A questo proposito, Allen (Dialogue…, p. 17) nota che «la franchezza con cui Platone<br />
elogia la pederastia può sembrare sorprendente al lettore moderno, anche se forse meno che in passato… si deve osservare,<br />
però, che Platone non sta elogiando l’omosessualità e neanche la pederastia in generale, ma una specifica variante di essa:<br />
l’amore del ragazzo adolescente che sta appena mettendo la barba. L’approccio è essenzialmente romantico e idealizzato».<br />
10 Reale, Eros…, pp. 76-77.<br />
11 «Dal momento che Pausania ha cominciato bene il suo discorso, ma non lo ha concluso in modo adeguato, a me sembra<br />
che sia necessario che io lo porti a compimento. A me sembra corretto, infatti, distinguere i due Eros» (185 E 6- 186 A 3).<br />
Sul discorso di Erissimaco come ampliamento, dal punto di vista fisico-biologico, del discorso di Pausania, svolto invece sul<br />
piano sociale, cfr. L. M. Napolitano Valditara, Il sé, l’altro l’intero. Rileggendo i dialoghi di Platone, Mimesis, Milano-<br />
Udine 2010, pp. 149-161.<br />
12 A riprova dell’importanza di questo dato, esso viene ricordato da Aristofane anche alla fine del suo discorso (193 D 6-7).<br />
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Lucia Palpacelli<br />
la natura duplice di Eros, ma anzi, tramite il racconto della natura umana alle origini, punta<br />
l’attenzione sull’elemento unitario e sull’interezza che caratterizzava il genere umano: inoltre, la<br />
figura di ciascun uomo era tutta intera e rotonda, aveva il dorso e i fianchi a forma di cerchio, aveva<br />
quattro mani e tante gambe quante mani e due volti assolutamente uguali su un collo arrotondato.<br />
Aveva un’unica testa per entrambi i visi rivolti in senso contrario (189 E 5 – 190 A 3).<br />
L’interezza e l’unità originaria vengono spezzate da Zeus e questo innesca negli uomini il<br />
meccanismo del desiderio della loro metà per ricostituire l’intero; infatti, come osserva la Napolitano,<br />
«gli uomini nuovi, generati dalla bisezione divina sono, a causa di questa, dimidiati e, dunque, per ciò<br />
stesso desideranti: è ora, dopo il taglio che essi hanno subito, che nasce in essi l’ἐπιθυµία, la brama<br />
di “rifondersi insieme”, prima, evidentemente, del tutto assente e ignota» 13 :<br />
ciascuna metà desiderando (ποθοῦν) l’altra metà di sé tendeva a raggiungerla (191 A 6).<br />
In questo quadro Eros viene ad essere quindi quella forza connaturata negli uomini che riporta<br />
all’antica natura:<br />
Pertanto, da tanto tempo, è connaturato negli uomini l’amore reciproco degli uni per gli altri<br />
che ci riconduce all’antica natura e cerca di fare uno da due (ἓν ἐκ δυοῖν) e di risanare la natura umana<br />
(191 C 8 – D 3).<br />
Aristofane, poi, si sofferma a descrivere i possibili incontri tra le metà di diverso genere che<br />
sono funzionali a classificare le diverse forme di amore, per ribadire, infine, che il desiderio di chi si<br />
ama per tutta la vita è proprio quello di fondersi e, da due, farsi uno (192 C-D).<br />
Di contro al modello binario proposto da Pausania e a quello ternario che descriverà Socrate,<br />
Aristofane ci pone, quindi, di fronte ad un modello unitario: Eros è ritorno all’uno, desiderio di<br />
completa fusione nell’altro. Il concetto di intermedio viene evidentemente negato.<br />
A conferma del rapporto antitetico tra la posizione del commediografo e quella esposta dal<br />
filosofo, proprio in virtù del fatto che Eros ha una natura intermedia e, quindi, desidera ciò che è bello<br />
e buono, Diotima arriva a fare un’importante precisazione:<br />
Si fa però un certo discorso, secondo cui coloro che cercano la loro metà, questi amano. Il mio<br />
discorso afferma invece che l’amore non è amore né della metà né dell’intero (οὔτε ἡµίσεός… τὸν<br />
ἔρωτα οὔτε ὅλου), a meno che, caro amico, non capiti che questo sia il bene. Infatti, gli uomini<br />
desiderano farsi tagliare piedi e mani, qualora a loro sembri che queste parti di sé siano malandate.<br />
Infatti, penso che ciascuno non sia attaccato a ciò che gli è proprio, a meno che quel qualcosa che gli è<br />
proprio non si chiami bene e male ciò che è estraneo; non c’è altro che gli uomini amano che non sia<br />
il bene (205 D 10- 206 A 1).<br />
Nel dichiarare che l’amore non è amore né della metà né dell’intero, la sacerdotessa si pone in netta<br />
contrapposizione con le parole di Aristofane a 191 A 6: non avendo riflettuto sulla natura dell’eros<br />
(errore metodologico comune a Pausania e agli altri discorsi; cfr. 199 C 3-5) 14 , il commediografo fa<br />
l’errore di credere che Eros sia desiderio dell’intero e dell’unità di se stessi, mentre ora Platone<br />
precisa che il criterio non è quello della tensione alla totalità delle parti (al contrario, gli uomini<br />
desiderano farsi tagliare piedi e mani, se sono malate), ma quello del bene. Alla luce di questo passo e<br />
dell’orizzonte che sto cercando di delineare, non credo quindi che sia corretto vedere, con Reale,<br />
nell’affermazione di Aristofane del ritorno all’uno un’allusione ai principi dell’Uno e della Diade,<br />
perché Platone prende chiaramente le distanze da questa affermazione e non indica al lettore di<br />
condividerla in alcun modo, anzi, come si è appena visto, Socrate si pone su una linea del tutto<br />
antitetica 15 .<br />
Nonostante il fatto che Socrate arrivi a un esito opposto rispetto a quello di Aristofane, però, il<br />
discorso del commediografo non è del tutto invalidato.<br />
Nei passaggi iniziali del suo discorso, infatti, Socrate sembra seguire la linea tracciata da<br />
Aristofane e “salvare” almeno un elemento posto in luce dal commediografo nel suo discorso: il fatto<br />
13 L. M. Napolititano Valditara, Platone e le ‘ragioni’ dell’immagine. Percorsi filosofici e deviazioni tra metafore e miti, Vita<br />
e pensiero, Milano 2007, p. 113. A. W. Saxonhouse, The net of Hephaestus: Aristophanes’Speech in Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong>,<br />
«Interpretation», 13 (1985), pp. 15-32, p. 21-22, osserva a questo proposito che la forma umana originaria «è una forma<br />
senza eros, perché è in sé completa. La forma sferica indica l’assenza di un inizio e di una fine. Essa non richiede nulla di più<br />
per essere completa. Non c’è interdipendenza tra i corpi sferici. Essi non hanno bisogno gli uni degli altri, neanche per il fine<br />
della procreazione».<br />
14 Allen (Dialogue…, p. 36) sottolinea il fatto che Aristofane ha sbagliato nella comprensione dell’oggetto di Eros.<br />
15 Reale, Eros…, p. 105-108; cfr. anche G. Reale, Per una nuova interpretazione di Platone, Vita e Pensiero, Milano 1991,<br />
pp. 471-477.<br />
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Lucia Palpacelli<br />
di pensare all’eros come a una tensione, a un desiderio per qualcosa che manca.<br />
Infatti, il discorso di Socrate si apre proprio stabilendo che Eros è amore di qualcosa e dunque<br />
desidera ciò di cui è amore:<br />
SOCRATE: Ma dimmi questo: Eros è amore di qualcosa, desidera (ἐπιθυµεῖ) o no questa cosa?<br />
AGATONE: Certamente! (200 A 2-4)<br />
Perché si inneschi il meccanismo del desiderio, però, è necessario che si desideri ciò che non si ha:<br />
Eros quindi deve desiderare ciò che egli non è, ciò di cui ha bisogno:<br />
SOCRATE: Dunque, questi e ogni altra persona che desideri, desidera ciò che non ha a disposizione e<br />
che non è presente, ciò che non possiede e ciò che egli non è, ciò di cui ha bisogno. Sono queste le<br />
cose di cui sente desiderio (ἐπιθυµία) e amore?<br />
AGATONE: Certo! (200 E 2-6).<br />
In particolare, Socrate conclude il suo ragionamento con Agatone affermando che Eros ama le cose<br />
belle, proprio perché manca di esse e stabilendo poi un’eguaglianza tra le cose belle e le cose buone,<br />
che gli permette di definire Eros come mancante sia di cose belle sia di cose buone (201 C).<br />
In questo senso, potremmo dire con Halperin, che Platone ha preparato il lettore alla sua teoria<br />
dell’eros fissandone le premesse nel mito di Aristofane, fornendo così «al lettore non filosofico una<br />
base di normale esperienza umana per l’iniziazione ai misteri dell’erotica platonica» 16 .<br />
Infatti, mettendo in gioco il concetto di intermedio, la posizione di Aristofane viene<br />
progressivamente corretta fino ad arrivare ad un’esplicita presa di distanza:<br />
– Eros è amore di qualcosa e dunque desidera (intuizione di Aristofane);<br />
– È necessario che si desideri ciò che non si ha;<br />
– Eros è desiderio di cose buone e belle, per cui non è né buono né bello, ma ha<br />
una natura intermedia (correzione al discorso di Aristofane: Eros non è desiderio dell’intero);<br />
– Eros è amore del bene, non dell’intero (a meno che non sia sotto il segno del<br />
bene) né della metà (presa di distanza da Aristofane) 17 .<br />
Ripercorrendo e riassumendo quanto fin qui sostenuto, quindi, potremmo affermare che<br />
Pausania comincia a focalizzare l’elemento della neutralità dell’eros che Socrate, nel discorso di<br />
Diotima, non rinnega, ma corregge e sviluppa: egli, infatti, porta il discorso dal piano più strettamente<br />
“pratico” ed “etico-comportamentale”, al piano teorico/metafisico e approda al concetto di intermedio,<br />
che in Pausania resta in nuce nella movenza della duplicazione stessa di Eros e in Aristofane viene<br />
negato, a favore di una visione unitarista dell’Eros, inteso come desiderio di totale fusione.<br />
In questo quadro, come già anticipato, il concetto di intermedio, si rivela del tutto funzionale<br />
non solo per definire correttamente l’eros, ma anche per ricollocare le giuste intuizioni che hanno<br />
preceduto il discorso di Socrate: Platone ci presenta, infatti, tre modelli diversi tra di loro (unitario<br />
quello di Aristofane, binario quello di Pausania, ternario quello di Socrate) e quella indicata dal<br />
µεταξύ sembra essere una terza via (rispetto alle due che si autoescludono), cui gli altri due modelli<br />
preludono e preparano in senso positivo (quello di Pausania) e in senso negativo (quello di<br />
Aristofane).<br />
3. Considerazioni conclusive<br />
La breve analisi condotta conferma che Platone ha costruito questo dialogo con una regia perfetta,<br />
entro la quale tutti i personaggi concorrono a costruire il discorso platonico intorno a Eros 18 che<br />
16 D. M. Halperin, Platonic Eros and what men call love, «Ancient Philosophy», 5 (1985), pp. 161-204, pp. 169-170.<br />
17 Rispetto al desiderio, Kahn (Plato and the Socratic Dialogue, Cambridge University Press, 1996; traduzione italiana,<br />
Platone e il dialogo socratico. L’uso filosofico di una forma letteraria, Vita e Pensiero, Milano 2008, pp. 259-260) osserva,<br />
dopo aver condotto un’analisi sull’uso platonico dei verbi che indicano il desiderare, che «Platone esprime il generico<br />
concetto di desiderio non con un singolo termine, ma attraverso un libero movimento attraverso una serie di espressioni<br />
diverse che includono epithumein, boulesthai, ed eran» e ascrive la decisione platonica di «fondere le parole del desiderio in<br />
un’unità concettuale» ad un’importante ragione filosofica: «l’intenzione di creare una teoria del desiderio che si focalizzerà<br />
esclusivamente sul desiderio razionale per il bene, cioè proprio quel desiderio che sta alla base del paradosso socratico.<br />
Questo è il desiderio razionale che Aristotele chiamerà boulesis. Ma nello schema platonico la boulesis ha un ruolo più<br />
importante da giocare: quell’universale desiderio umano per il bene… che diventa eros nella scala dell’amore del Simposio».<br />
18 In particolare rispetto al mito narrato da Aristofane nel Simposio, assume questa chiave di lettura anche la Napolitano,<br />
rifacendosi ad un’affermazione di Vegetti: «Assumo qui una significatività possibile del mito al livello minimo, cioè non<br />
tanto rispetto al fatto… della sua attribuzione al personaggio di Aristofane, quanto rispetto alla sua presenza nel dialogo:<br />
166
Lucia Palpacelli<br />
sembra procedere, come si è visto, per successive correzioni e puntualizzazioni.<br />
Rispetto a questo particolare modus scribendi, di cui qui si è dato appena un esempio, credo<br />
che esso sia spiegabile rintracciando un fine ultimo presente nel Simposio, come in tutti i dialoghi<br />
platonici, cioè quello di invitare il lettore a fare filosofia.<br />
Nell’intreccio di voci di Pausania, Aristofane e Socrate, è stato possibile verificare, infatti,<br />
come Platone dissemini nel testo, “affidandoli” ai diversi personaggi, elementi e motivi che egli<br />
condivide e trova utili per la ricerca che si sta compiendo, anche se li pone in uno sfondo impreciso e<br />
non sempre corretto, per poi indicare al lettore come correggere alcune affermazioni o in quale luce<br />
esse assumano una prospettiva utile.<br />
Un tale modo di procedere si giustifica, in ultima analisi, alla luce di una prospettiva educativoprotrettica:<br />
«Il dato distintivo dei dialoghi è che l’Autore, per ragioni eminentemente educative, ha<br />
“inventato” e sviluppato una particolare tecnica di scrittura… Platone è convinto che la filosofia non<br />
si apprende, ma si fa, per cui il maestro deve essere colui che aiuta il soggetto a compiere il suo<br />
percorso euristico che è insieme vitale e intellettuale. Pertanto lo scrittore, se vuole essere filosofo,<br />
deve “spingere” il lettore a “fare filosofia”, non dando “soluzioni” ma indicando i problemi e le vie<br />
che portano alla soluzione degli stessi» 19 .<br />
Ecco perché Platone dissemina “indizi” lungo il percorso che sta tracciando per arrivare a<br />
definire Eros, servendosi di tutte le voci, ma, allo stesso tempo, stando sempre attento ad indicare al<br />
lettore le posizioni deboli e gli errori.<br />
Letteratura critica citata e utilizzata<br />
Allen R. E., The dialogue of Plato, The <strong>Symposium</strong>, volume II, translated with comment by R. E.<br />
Allen, Yale University Press, New Haven and London 1991.<br />
Cappelletti G., Simposio e Fedro. Variazioni strutturali del discorso d’amore, in La struttura del<br />
dialogo platonico, a cura di G. Casertano, Loffredo Editore, Napoli 2000, pp. 253-261.<br />
Dover K. J., Plato, <strong>Symposium</strong>, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1980.<br />
Halperin D. M., Platonic Eros and what men call love, «Ancient Philosophy», 5 (1985), pp. 161-204.<br />
Kahn C. H., Plato and the Socratic Dialogue, Cambridge University Press, 1996; traduzione italiana,<br />
Platone e il dialogo socratico. L’uso filosofico di una forma letteraria, Vita e Pensiero, Milano 2008.<br />
Migliori M., Tra Polifonia e puzzle. Esempi di rilettura del “gioco” filosofico di Platone, in La<br />
struttura del dialogo platonico, a cura di G. Casertano, Loffredo Editore, Napoli 2000, pp. 171-212.<br />
Migliori M., Come scrive Platone. Esempi di una scrittura a carattere “protrettico”, «Annali della<br />
facoltà di Lettere e Filosofia dell’Università di Macerata», 37 (2004), pp. 249-277.<br />
Napolitano Valditara L. M., Platone e le ‘ragioni’ dell’immagine. Percorsi filosofici e deviazioni tra<br />
metafore e miti, Vita e pensiero, Milano 2007.<br />
Napolitano Valditara L. M., Il sé, l’altro l’intero. Rileggendo i dialoghi di Platone, Mimesis, Milano-<br />
Udine 2010.<br />
Radice R.-Bombacigno R., Plato. Lexicon. Con CD-ROM, Biblia, Milano 2003.<br />
questa può avere come tale un senso non irrilevante, ammesso… che in qualche modo tutti i personaggi dei dialoghi<br />
contribuiscano, in modo critico, cioè quantomeno perché propongono ipotesi da discutersi e superarsi alla costruzione della<br />
stessa filosofia dialettica di Platone; egli andrebbe dunque in qualche modo “riconosciuto in tutti i suoi personaggi” » (L. M. Napolititano Valditara, Platone…, p. 105).<br />
Migliori (Tra Polifonia e puzzle. Esempi di rilettura del “gioco” filosofico di Platone, in La struttura del dialogo platonico, a<br />
cura di G. Casertano, Loffredo Editore, Napoli 2000, pp. 171-212, p. 189), su questa linea, richiama l’attenzione sull’<br />
“architettura” dei dialoghi di Platone: «Il primo frutto dell’intreccio tra grande letteratura e grande filosofia, che avviene nel<br />
solo Platone, è che i suoi dialoghi hanno una struttura “architettonica” che è molto rilevante sia sul piano estetico sia per i<br />
fini argomentativi che l’Autore si propone». Rowe (Simposio…, p. 10) sottolinea che « Tutti i dialoghi sono “fictions”,<br />
anche l’Apologia lo è in larga misura, e credo che questo aspetto del corpus sia stato per troppo tempo trascurato... Ciò che<br />
dobbiamo chiederci, a mio avviso, in ciascun punto del dialogo è: perché Platone fa parlare così questo personaggio, adesso,<br />
in questa parte del dialogo? Perché questo accadimento avviene proprio qui? E come contribuisce al senso generale del<br />
dialogo? E qual è questo senso?».<br />
19 M. Migliori, Come scrive Platone. Esempi di una scrittura a carattere “protrettico”, «Annali della facoltà di Lettere e<br />
Filosofia dell’Università di Macerata», 37 (2004), pp. 249-277, p. 250.<br />
167
Lucia Palpacelli<br />
Reale G., Per una nuova interpretazione di Platone, Vita e Pensiero, Milano 1991.<br />
Reale G., Eros demone mediatore. Il gioco delle maschere nel Simposio di Platone, Rizzoli, Milano<br />
1997.<br />
Robin L., Platon, Le Banquet, notice de L. Robin, texte établi et traduit par P. Vicaire, Les Belles<br />
Lettres, Paris 1992,<br />
Rowe C. J., Il Simposio di Platone, Lectura Platonis 1, a cura di M. Migliori, Academia Verlag, Sankt<br />
Augustin 1998.<br />
Saxonhouse A. W., The net of Hephaestus: Aristophanes’ Speech in Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong>,<br />
«Interpretation», 13 (1985), pp. 15-32.<br />
Segolini L. M., Socrate a banchetto. Il Simposio di Platone e i Banchettanti di Aristofane, GEI.<br />
Gruppo Editoriale Internazionale, Roma 1994.<br />
Vegetti M., Quindici lezioni su Platone, Einaudi, Torino 2003.<br />
168
Philotimia and Philosophia in Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong><br />
Jens Kristian Larsen<br />
”So it was by main force that I stopped my ears and took off in flight, as if from the Sirens, in order<br />
that I might not sit here in idleness and grow old beside him. In regard to this human being alone have<br />
I been affected in a way that no one would suspect was in me, to feel shame before anyone at all. Only<br />
before him do I feel shame. For I know within myself that I am incapable of contradicting him or of<br />
saying that what he commands must not be done; and whenever I go away, I know within myself that<br />
I am doing so because I have succumbed to the honor I get from the many.” (Symp. 216a6-b5) 1<br />
With these words the drunken Alcibiades, who arrives at the end of Agathon’s symposium,<br />
describes his own troubled relationship both to Socrates and to the Athenian public. The speech<br />
delivered by Alcibiades, which is presumably meant to tell the truth about Socrates (214e1-6), seems<br />
to tell the truth about Alcibiades as well. Under the influence of Socrates, whose speeches Alcibiades<br />
claims affect him like charms (215c6-d6), Alcibiades has come to the opinion that it is not really<br />
worth living if he remains as he is (216a1), and therefore he feels shame before Socrates. For instead<br />
of taking care of himself, which Socrates both urges him to do and forces him to admit that he does<br />
not do, he is preoccupied with the affairs of the Athenians (216a4-6). Alcibiades, it seems, does not<br />
live the examined life that Socrates in the Apology claims is the only one worth living (38a1-7). As<br />
such we may suspect that he lacks the self-knowledge that the Delphic oracle exhorts us to seek.<br />
All the same, Alcibiades does seem to know himself, at least to the extent that he knows that<br />
it is his own love of honour which prevents him from turning from the applause of the multitude to the<br />
philosophic life envisioned by Socrates. He thus seems to have realized what Socrates points out, both<br />
when defending his life of philosophy before the men of Athens in the Apology and before his friends<br />
in the Phaedo, namely that philotimia, love of honour or ambition, may stand in the way of<br />
philosophia, the love of wisdom (Apo. 29d7-e3, Phd. 68c1-3, 82c8). 2 Although Alcibiades thus seems<br />
unable to break the spell public esteem holds over him, he has at least realized how questionable this<br />
is, since he knows that it prevents him from caring about that which really matters, his soul. He has<br />
been bitten by Socrates’ philosophic discourses, as he says (Symp. 217e6-218b2), and this has made<br />
him painfully aware of his own shortcomings, even if they have been unable to turn him to<br />
philosophy. The life of Alcibiades seems to be a troubled one.<br />
Alcibiades’ ambivalent relation to honour due to his encounter with Socratic philosophy<br />
seems to make him the exact opposite of Phaedrus, the initiator of the encomia to eros that makes up<br />
the greater part of the <strong>Symposium</strong>. For Phaedrus makes philotimia pivotal in his account of the goods<br />
bestowed on human beings by eros. He thus seems blind to the doubtful worth of philotimia and its<br />
connection with public approval that Alcibiades has come to realize. Moreover, Phaedrus, more than<br />
any of the other encomiasts, praises eros from a traditional point of view. As uncritical reliance on<br />
tradition seems to be the opposite of philosophical inquiry, it might appear that Phaedrus of all the<br />
figures in the <strong>Symposium</strong> is the one farthest removed from the life of philosophy advocated by<br />
Socrates. That the speech of Phaedrus has often been accorded little interest from scholars is thus<br />
perhaps understandable. 3<br />
All the same, a careful reading of Phaedrus’ speech reveals that it contains insights about eros<br />
that will ultimately be absorbed into Diotima’s speech and this alone should make us hesitate to<br />
condemn it as devoid of philosophical content. Furthermore, as I shall go on to argue, these insights<br />
are connected with Phaedrus’ understanding of philotimia. This should make us wonder if there<br />
might, at least according to Diotima, be a positive aspect of our ambition for honour, an aspect that<br />
has escaped Alcibiades. Let us therefore turn to Phaedrus in order to see what we can learn about eros<br />
1 Translation is taken from from the <strong>Symposium</strong> are by S. Benardete<br />
2 This potential conflict is of course also pointed out in the Republic, ???<br />
3 Thought-provoking and careful readings of the speech can be found in S. Rosen, Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong>, New Haven: Yale<br />
University Press, 1968 [2 nd ed. 1987], 39-59 and L. Strauss, On Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong>, Chicago: University of Chicago Press,<br />
2001, 46-56. Both Rosen and Strauss regard Phaedrus as preoccupied with utility or gain, more precisely, with the utility of<br />
eros from the point of view of the beloved, and hence see Phaedrus as the lowest of the speakers of the <strong>Symposium</strong>. All the<br />
same Strauss points out, to my mind correctly, that all “the motives of Phaedrus’s speech return in Socrates’ speech in a<br />
modified way”, p. 56 (see also Rosen, p. 35). In contrast to Strauss’ and Rosen’s overall negative evaluation of Phaerus, F.<br />
Sheffield Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong> – The Ethics of Desire, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, 17 points out that his speech is<br />
“a thought-provoking account of how erōs can lead to virtue”. See also K. Corrigan and E. Glazov-Corrigan, Plato’s<br />
Dialectic at Play, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2004, 51-56, who emphasize the positive aspects of<br />
Phaedrus’ speech while maintaining that Phaedrus himself is incapable of examining the philosophical importance of his<br />
claims.
Jens Kristian Larsen<br />
from his speech.<br />
Once Phaedrus has finished the first part of his speech, which praises eros by claiming that it<br />
is oldest among the gods, he delivers, from 178c2-179b3, an account of how eros serves us as a guide<br />
for acquiring virtue and happiness. The first thing to note is that Phaedrus claims that eros is the cause<br />
of the greatest goods for both lover and beloved, since the greatest good for a beloved is to have a<br />
good or useful lover and the greatest good for a lover is to have a beloved (178c3-5). More precisely,<br />
eros, according to Phaedrus, implants “that which should guide human beings who are going to live<br />
nobly throughout their lives” more beautifully than anything else (178c5-d1), and it implants this in<br />
lover and beloved alike. This means that Phaedrus, in contrast to most of the other encomiasts, regards<br />
an erotic relation as reciprocal. According to a traditional understanding of the paiderastic relation, in<br />
accordance with which most speakers at Agathon’s symposium analyse the erotic relation, the<br />
beloved, the eromenos, was – at least ideally – to acquire virtue through the educative effort of the<br />
lover, whereas the lover, the erastes, was to receive sexual gratification. As regards the acquisition of<br />
education and virtue, it was thus a one-way relation; the lover was supposedly already good, wise and<br />
virtuous. 4 According to Phaedrus, however, eros installs a guide for living nobly or beautifully – and<br />
that means in accordance with virtue (cf. 179a8) – in lover and beloved alike.<br />
This power residing in eros is due to the fact that it, at least according to Phaedrus, makes us<br />
feel shame at doing shameful things and gives us ambition – or love of honour, that is philotimia – as<br />
regards the noble things (178d2). That we should fear performing base acts and make it a point of<br />
honour to do noble deeds is of course a traditional view of what it means to live virtuously that we<br />
find in many Greek poets. 5 All the same, it is interesting that Phaedrus claims that love makes us<br />
follow this ideal because it makes us fear how we will look in the eyes of our lover or beloved,<br />
respectively, if we fail to live up to it. It is this aspect of the erotic relation that installs a drive for<br />
virtue in human beings much better than family or publically bestowed honours could do (cf. 178c6-<br />
7). 6 This implies that, even if Phaedrus’ ideals are borrowed from tradition, a fact that could seem to<br />
inscribe Phaedrus in the conventionality of the public sphere, he envisages the virtuous life as a life<br />
that – at least potentially – transcends this sphere and its values, since it is centred on how we appear<br />
to our loved ones, not to others in general.<br />
This nonconventional dimension also comes to the fore when Phaedrus, at 179a7-9, sums up<br />
the good effects of eros with the following words: “there is no one so bad that, once the god Eros had<br />
entered him, he would not be directed toward virtue – to the point where he is like one who is best by<br />
nature”, that is fysis. As is pointed out by Kevin Corrigan and Elena Glazov-Corrigan, the claim that<br />
eros installs a striving in us to become like – homoios – the one who is by nature best, is “reminiscent<br />
of the Platonic homoiôsis theô”, 7 that is, the ideal to become as like god as is humanly possible. This<br />
platonic notion, which is introduced in both the Theaetetus and the Laws as a contrast to the<br />
Protagorean doctrine that man is the measure (cf. Tht. 176a-177c in contrast to 166e-167c and Lg.<br />
716c-d, 906a-b), is – among other things – meant to point out that there is a natural standard for<br />
excellence and happiness independent of human convention or tradition, that is nomos. When<br />
Phaedrus states that eros makes us like what is by nature – physei – best, the same ideal of a nonconventional<br />
standard seems to be in play.<br />
Of course, Phaedrus does not attempt to give any conceptual clarification of virtue or nature,<br />
nor does he deliver any argumentative justification for the claim that eros makes us strive for the best.<br />
In this respect one may thus say that he is far removed from philosophy. All the same, I think that a<br />
good part of his tradition-bound understanding of eros gains a philosophical justification in the speech<br />
of Diotima. So let us now turn briefly to this speech, before we finally return to Phaedrus’ and<br />
Alcibiades’ conflicting interpretations of philotimia.<br />
Diotima’s speech can roughly be divided into three parts. 8 The first (201d1-204c) contains<br />
Diotima’s clarification of the nature of eros. A second part, running from 204c9-209e4, then focuses<br />
on the effects of eros in general and goes on to elaborate these effects from the perspective of<br />
4 For a discussion, see L. Brisson, ”Agathon, Pausanias, and Diotima in Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong>” in Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong> – Issues<br />
in Interpretation and Reception, ed. J. Lesher, D. Nails and F. Sheffield, Wahington DC: Center for Hellenic Studies, 2006,<br />
233-235.<br />
5 For a discussion of thi s, see C. Pietsch, ”Die Rede des Phaidros (178a6-180b8)” in Platon. Symposion – Klassiker<br />
Auslegen 39, hg. Christoph Horn, Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2012, 42.<br />
6 T. L. Cooksey, Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong> – A reader’s guide, Continuum, 2010, 37.<br />
7 Corrigan and Glazov-Corrigan, op. cit., 53.<br />
8 An interesting discussion of the relation between these parts and the genre of encomium can be found in K. Ågotnes, “”<br />
(2013) who in contrast to my interpretation claims that the <strong>Symposium</strong> as such “leaves us with one strong message: we shall<br />
not love honour”, p. 59.<br />
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Jens Kristian Larsen<br />
philotimia, whereas the third part, 9 running from 209e5-212c3, finally, elaborates the effects of eros<br />
from the perspective of philosophia. Here I will limit myself to say a few words about the second and<br />
third parts, in particular about the relation between philotimia and philosophia we find therein. 10<br />
In both the second and the third part of Diotima’s speech we find a hierarchy of types of eros.<br />
These hierarchies are dependent on Diotima’s claim that eros, as desire for something, must be<br />
understood as broader than the erotic relation between human beings (205b4-c10): eros is, generally<br />
speaking, our desire to possess the good in order to become happy, a desire characterizing all human<br />
beings (204e1-205a8). But although all people naturally desire to possess the good, in order to<br />
become happy, different people regard different things as what is truly good. To illustrate this point,<br />
Diotima initially lists three types of desires, three kinds of eros, in addition to what is normally called<br />
love, namely a love of money-making, a love of gymnastics and a love of wisdom (205d4-5) that<br />
roughly seem to correspond to the three kinds of desires Socrates ascribed to the three parts of the<br />
soul in the Republic, that is the epithymic, the thymoedic and the rational parts (553c, 549a, 581b). 11<br />
Diotima then delivers two hierarchies of types of desire, one at the end of the second part of her<br />
speech, that is at 208e1-209a9, the other at the beginning of the third part, running from 210a4 to<br />
210e2. Both hierarchies begin by contrasting the types of desires to be placed within them with<br />
physical erotic desire, which in the Republic is determined as one of the characteristic desires of the<br />
epithymic part. As I see it, the first hierarchy is centred entirely on philotimia, which may be said to<br />
be the kind of eros which corresponds to the desire of what is in the Republic called the thymoeidic<br />
part, whereas the second culminates in the eros which corresponds to the leading desire of that part of<br />
the soul which in the Republic is called to logistikon.<br />
Prior to the first hierarchy, Diotima explains that the real motivation behind deeds performed<br />
as an expression of philotimia is a love of immortality, since immortality can supposedly be gained –<br />
so far as this is humanly possible - through an eternal renown for one’s virtue (208c1-e1). This<br />
motivation results in different psychic products, such as speeches about virtue (209b8), poetry (209a4-<br />
5, 209c7-d4) and lawgiving (209a6-8, 209d4-e4), which are supposedly the offspring of the virtues<br />
possessed by their creators. The third hierarchy, in contrast, regards this kind of striving for<br />
immortality as just a preliminary to philosophy (210a1-2, 210e5-6), which is the true striving for<br />
immortality, and here science (epistêmê, 210c6-d6) and the vision of true beauty is added to the list as<br />
higher kinds of eros.<br />
A full discussion of how these two hierarchies relate to each other lies beyond the scope of the<br />
present paper. Here I only wish to emphasize the following. The first hierarchy explicates different<br />
ways in which people seek eternal renown through psychic products that bear witness to their virtue,<br />
and this explains how philotimia drives people towards virtue, in a manner that closely resembles<br />
Phaedrus’ initial claim that philotimia leads us to imitate what is by nature best. 12 In contrast to<br />
Phaedrus, however, Diotima indicates that such activities have a further goal than virtue, namely<br />
eternal renown. 13 To people driven by philotimia, Diotima suggests, virtue is regarded as a means to<br />
an end, honour and renown, rather than as an end in itself. 14 In contrast, the second hierarchy makes<br />
clear that, in order to gain true virtue, and not just images (eidôla) of virtues (212a3-5), one must<br />
proceed from the love of bodies, of beautiful ways of living, and of the sciences, to a single science,<br />
namely the science about the beautiful (210d6-e1). It is only when one reaches this level of<br />
knowledge that one becomes virtuous and life becomes worth living (211d1-2). The second hierarchy<br />
thus makes clear that the virtues attested to by the deeds performed through philotimia are not true<br />
virtues.<br />
It is tempting to see a parallel between this and what Socrates claims in the Phaedo and the<br />
Republic, namely that political or popular virtue, the kind of virtue pursued by most gentlemen, is in<br />
fact not true virtue, because it is not grounded in knowledge or wisdom (phrônesis) which in turn<br />
9 There is a clear shift in Diotima’s speech at 209e5 which on the dramatic level is emphasized by the fact that Diotima,<br />
through the voice of Socrates, states that Socrates may no longer be able to follow her. As many commentators have pointed<br />
out, this shift is structured around the division between the lesser and the greater mysteries known from ??<br />
10 For a more elaborate discussion of how these relate, see Sheffield, op. Cit., 137-153<br />
11 See Francisco Lisi, ”Philosophische und tyrannische Liebe” in Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong> – Proceedings of the fifth Symposim<br />
Platonicum Pragense, ed. A. Havlíček and M. Cajthaml. Prague, 2005, 182-183. See also Strauss, op. cit., 57. In contrast to<br />
Lisi I believe that the discussion of philotimia is not limited to the passage 208c1-e1 but continues till 209e4. For a similar<br />
reading, see Dorothe Frede, ”Eros als Verlangen nach Unsterblichkeit” in Platon. Symposion – Klassiker Auslegen 39, hg.<br />
Christoph Horn, Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2012, 151-154.<br />
12 The connection with Phaedrus is emphasized by the fact that Diotima, in order to exemplify the deeds performed through<br />
philotimia, uses the same examples as Phaedrus had done earlier, compare 208d2—6 with 179b4-180b5.<br />
13 I have discussed the relation between Phaedrus’ and Diotima’s speeches at greater length in ”The love of the beloved” in<br />
Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift, Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2013, 81-83.<br />
14 Cf. Frede, op. cit., 151-152.<br />
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Jens Kristian Larsen<br />
depends on a philosophical grasp of the forms (cf. Phd. 68b8-69b8, 82a11-b3, Resp. 500d4-8). If this<br />
parallel is plausible, one may wonder if Diotima, despite the fact that she seems to reiterate Phaedrus’<br />
claims about the good effects of philotimia, in the end discredits Phaedrus’ understanding of eros<br />
altogether. I think at least three things speak against this.<br />
The first point is that Diotima herself emphasizes that the psychic products resulting from<br />
philotimia should be regarded as steppingstones for the philosopher. Although Diotima ultimately<br />
points out that the production of these products – speeches about virtue and how one should live,<br />
poems, and laws – will not lead to true happiness and do not necessarily result from true virtue, she<br />
still regards the recognition of the beauty inherent in them as necessary steps for the one who is<br />
moving up her ‘ladder of love’. What distinguishes the philosopher in the making from the person<br />
driven by philotimia seems to be an awareness of how one should relate to such things (cf. 210a4-7,<br />
210e2-6, 211b7-d1). The products in themselves are thus good if one knows how one should comport<br />
oneself towards them, but presumably bad if one believes that they themselves are what should be<br />
striven for.<br />
The second, and more important, point is that Phaedrus himself does not stress the productive<br />
dimension of philotimia in quite the same way as Diotima does. To Diotima, philotimia is a striving<br />
for immortality that reaches its end in the alleged immortality consisting in eternal renown for the<br />
products one has left behind. Phaedrus’ focus is simpler. Eros is able to guide us in living the best life<br />
because it makes us shameful of the base things and ambitious as regards the noble or beautiful things<br />
(178c3-d2). Phaedrus is not too specific about what these ‘things’ are, but it seems relatively clear that<br />
what he has in mind is deeds or acts – in particular courageous acts in combat (cf. 178d2-179a6) –<br />
rather than spiritual products. The point for Phaedrus is therefore not that a lover wants to become<br />
immortal through the renown his speeches, poems, or laws will secure him, but that a lover or a<br />
beloved wishes to appear as a good man before his loved one, i.e. that he wishes, through his deeds, to<br />
display his virtue. In other words, Phaedrus is not interested in the honour we receive from others due<br />
to our creative greatness, but only in the fact that eros drives us to become more virtuous because we<br />
fear to appear bad in the eyes of the other that truly matters. 15 Phaedrus’ straightforward and rather<br />
simple emphasis on the relation between deeds and virtue is, to my mind, closer to a Socratic<br />
understanding of virtue than the rather grandiose picture we get in Diotima’s first hierarchy. For<br />
whereas we may well imagine a man able to make good laws or good poems although he is corrupted,<br />
it is less likely – although of course not impossible – that such a person will be able to stably perform<br />
virtuous actions. Phaedrus’ more restricted focus is, in my view, a result of the fact that his praise of<br />
eros is disconnected from the political sphere. 16 In contrast to Diotima, who regards philotimia as the<br />
main motivational force for the production of laws and tradition, Phaedrus connects it only with the<br />
achievement of personal virtue. In this way, Phaedrus’ sub-political notion of philotimia seems to me<br />
to foreshadow Diotima’s teaching about the highest – and in a way supra-political – form of eros,<br />
philosophy.<br />
Finally, as I pointed out initially, Phaedrus sees the erotic relation as reciprocal since eros<br />
makes both lover and beloved better. The same reciprocal dimension can be found in Diotima’s<br />
speech, albeit on a higher, and more reflected, level. In her account of the progress of the philotimic<br />
as well as the philosophic lover (209a8-c7, 210a4-e1), she emphasizes, in accordance with the<br />
traditional understanding of the paiderastic relation, that the lover will seek to educate his beloved (cf.<br />
209c1-2, 210b6-c3). However, she equally emphasizes that the lover, through his encounter with the<br />
beauty of the beloved, himself gives birth to virtue, i.e. that he becomes virtuous, and this is really the<br />
basis for the lover’s ability to educate the beloved (cf. 209c2-3, 210c1-2, 210d3-6). 17 The birth of<br />
virtue is connected with the lover’s ascent up the ‘ladder of love’ which culminates in his vision of<br />
beauty itself. On this ladder he comes to understand different levels of beauty until he learns that the<br />
vision of beauty is what makes life worth living, and it is presumably this understanding of the levels<br />
of beauty he seeks to pass on to his beloved (cf. 210c3-5)<br />
Let us finally return to Alcibiades. As I stated initially, he is presented as a man torn between<br />
his love of public honour, on the one hand, and his knowledge that there is another form of life than<br />
the political that is the one truly worth living, the philosophic life. No doubt, he is a man characterized<br />
15 It must be admitted that the bestowing of honour does play a role in Phaedrus’ account of eros. However, he does not<br />
focus on honour bestowed upon us by other men or by the public, but only by the Gods, cf. 179d2, 180a2-3, 180b5. This, I<br />
think, connects with the fact that Phaedrus’ praise of eros is a-political. We should remember that the notion of being<br />
honoured by the gods is, at a higher level, repeated by Diotima when she claims that the philosopher, when he has given<br />
birth to true virtue, becomes dear to god (212a6).<br />
16 Something about the army of lovors as a political dimension…<br />
17 That Diotima thus criticizes the traditional paiderastic ideal of paideia is rightly emphasized by L. Brisson, see Brisson,<br />
op. cit., 246-251.<br />
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Jens Kristian Larsen<br />
by philotimia, love of honour. But is it Phaedrus’ love of honour? This is not a simple question. On<br />
the one hand, what Alcibiades is primarily interested in is publically bestowed honour and, as I have<br />
argued, this is not what Phaedrus is interested in. For Phaedrus, philotimia means ambition for doing<br />
noble acts, which, as its counterpoint, has shamefulness at performing shameful acts. These two<br />
explains why eros, according to Phaedrus, is able to make us like those that are by nature best. But<br />
this points to a connection between Phaedrus’ understanding of eros and the character of Alcibiades.<br />
Alcibiades states that Socrates is the only one before whom he has felt shame. So we see that<br />
Phaedrus’ notion of eros is somehow vindicated in the character of Alcibiades. It is his love of<br />
Socrates that makes him shameful, shameful at caring more about the matters of the Athenians than<br />
about his soul. Perhaps, if he had chosen to sit by Socrates, instead of running off to the many, he<br />
could have overcome his infatuation with the honour bestowed by the public and instead made it a<br />
point of honour to strive for virtue, thereby changing his philotimia from being a hindrance to the<br />
philosophic life into a noble ally.<br />
173
La pédérastie selon Pausanias : un défi pour l’éducation platonicienne<br />
Olivier Renaut<br />
Le discours de Pausanias est majoritairement étudié comme un témoignage sur l’institution de la<br />
« pédérastie » 1 . Il est aussi d’usage de considérer qu’il est un discours auquel Platon ne souscrit pas,<br />
qu’il ridiculise, qu’il critique, par un ensemble de procédés internes au Banquet d’une part, et souvent<br />
à la pensée de ce que Platon peut affirmer ailleurs, notamment dans les Lois 2 .<br />
Il me semble qu’un autre traitement de ce discours de Pausanias peut être envisagé. La<br />
question de savoir si la « pédérastie » peut jouir d’une qualification positive chez Platon demeure une<br />
question ouverte 3 . Non seulement il faut se déprendre de l’idée qu’on puisse trouver chez Platon une<br />
quelconque affirmation non problématique sur la pédérastie, mais il faut aussi, dans la mesure du<br />
possible éviter de projeter sur ces textes une intention qui relève davantage d’engagements personnels<br />
et contemporains sur la « sexualité » 4 .<br />
Il ne s’agit pas pour autant de « réhabiliter » Pausanias pour lui-même : ce discours doit être<br />
réinséré dans l’économie générale du Banquet d’une part, et comparé à d’autres mentions de la<br />
pratique de la pédérastie dans les dialogues de Platon, notamment la République et les Lois. Le<br />
discours de Pausanias constitue bien un « défi pour l’éducation platonicienne » de deux manières :<br />
d’abord, l’institution pédérastique telle que la définit Pausanias est critiquée dans le discours de<br />
Diotime, permettant ainsi d’en proposer une pratique « correcte » s’appuyant sur une redéfinition de<br />
l’objet aimé et une reconfiguration du désir ; mais pour autant, cette critique de la pédérastie chez<br />
Diotime ne doit pas occulter la place du désir charnel dans la relation (homo-)érotique, ni non plus la<br />
dimension intrinsèquement politique du discours de Pausanias qui interroge les conditions d’une<br />
éducation à la vertu dans la cité, notamment par l’intermédiaire d’une législation sur les pratiques<br />
sexuelles.<br />
Le discours de Pausanias n’est pas seulement une singerie : il est, dans le sillage du discours<br />
de Phèdre, une réflexion sur les conséquences d’eros dans sa dimension politique et éducative. À ce<br />
titre, ce discours doit être mieux pris en compte dans sa prétention à promouvoir la philosophie.<br />
I. À la recherche d’une règle<br />
Partons tout d’abord de l’expression que Diotime utilise en 211b6, orthos paiderastein :<br />
« Toutes les fois donc, que, en partant des choses d’ici-bas, on arrive à s’élever par une pratique<br />
correcte de l’amour des jeunes garçons (διὰ τὸ ὀρθῶς παιδεραστεῖν), on commence à contempler<br />
cette beauté-là, on n’est pas loin de toucher au but. Voilà donc quelle est la droite voie qu’il faut<br />
1 Le discours de Pausanias est une pièce maîtresse chez les historiens et tous les spécialistes de lettres classiques qui se sont<br />
intéressés aux questions de genre et de sexualité dans l’Athènes classique. Pausanias est un personnage ambigu : il est<br />
l’amant d’Agathon et représente donc une figure non pas tant marginale, mais compliquée relativement à l’institution de la<br />
pédérastie dont il fait l’éloge. Un ensemble de thèses ont été tirées de ce discours : a) la pédérastie est une institution qui ne<br />
saurait être comprise si on ne la resitue pas dans un contexte précis, et qui, de l’aveu de Pausanias, est divers. Le problème<br />
de la sexualité est dérivé par rapport à la perception de la norme en vigueur dans la cité (Dover 1964). b) d’autres interprètes<br />
ont insisté en revanche sur l’importance du problème sexuel entre éraste et éromène défini comme un jeu à somme nulle à<br />
travers une relation nécessairement asymétrique (Dover 1978; Cohen 1987). Voir également la présentation de Brisson<br />
(2006).<br />
2 Ce même discours a été largement négligé par les philosophes. M. Nussbaum (1994) traite ce discours d’une manière<br />
charitable, mais se rallie en général à la position de Dover, et, symptomatiquement, souligne que des discours de Phèdre,<br />
Pausanias et d’Aristophane, c’est ce dernier qui est le plus « sérieux » (Nussbaum 1994:1541). À l’inverse certains<br />
commentateurs n’hésitent pas à traiter Pausanias de a) vicieux sophiste séducteur dont le but est de déroger à la règle<br />
naturelle qui impose la reproduction (Neumann 1964); b) de sociologue sophiste (Corrigan 2004:56–61); c) de quelqu’un qui<br />
est obsédé par les conventions, au point d’en bégayer « Il devrait y avoir une loi » (Ludwig 2002:44) ; d) de représentant une<br />
forme d’eros athénien incompatible avec l’eros philosophique platonicien, bien qu’il le singe (Corrigan 2004:51).<br />
3 Simplement à titre de rappel, sur les 7 occurrences de paiderastein chez Platon, 6 se trouvent dans le Banquet, dont 2 chez<br />
Pausanias, 2 chez Aristophane, 1 dans le discours de Diotime où il est question de orthos paiderastein, et 1 autre se trouve<br />
dans le Phèdre (250a), fait notable, où il est question des cycles de réincarnation de l’âme humaine, qui doit attendre dix<br />
mille ans avant de retrouver son point d’origine, « exception faite pour l’homme qui a aspiré loyalement au savoir ou qui a<br />
aimé les jeunes gens pour les faire aspirer au savoir » (πλὴν ἡ τοῦ φιλοσοφήσαντος ἀδόλως ἢ παιδεραστήσαντος µετὰ<br />
φιλοσοφίας).<br />
4 Voir à ce propos Davidson (2001) qui trace une généalogie très convaincante de la construction du rapport<br />
"pénétré/pénétrant" dans l'image de l'amour grec, et son influence en particulier sur les analyses de Dover entre 1964 et<br />
1978.
Olivier Renaut<br />
suivre dans le domaine des choses de l’amour ou sur laquelle il faut se laisser conduire par un autre<br />
(τὸ ὀρθῶς ἐπὶ τὰ ἐρωτικὰ ἰέναι ἢ ὑπ' ἄλλου ἄγεσθαι) (…) ». 5<br />
Il est tentant de comprendre que le orthos qui qualifie cette paiderastia très particulière décrite par<br />
Diotime renvoie à l’obsession que Pausanias a de la règle qu’il cherche désespérément à formuler. La<br />
voie « correcte » que propose Diotime s’opposerait donc à une mauvaise pédérastie, celle-là même<br />
dont Pausanias ferait l’éloge au début du Banquet. L’argument serait donc le suivant : a) Pausanias<br />
déclare, à l’envie, être le garant d’une convention sociale bien établie, et le champion de la « droite »<br />
règle 6 , d’abord en rectifiant le sujet de l’éloge, ensuite en se proposant de produire une juste<br />
interprétation des règles en vigueur dans de multiples cités, et enfin en proposant de comprendre que<br />
les relations sexuelles dans la pédérastie, si elles sont exécutées droitement, sont belles ; b) Diotime, à<br />
l’inverse de Pausanias, établit la rectitude de la pédérastie en proposant des étapes bien connues dans<br />
la voie qui mène à la science du bien.<br />
Il est cependant intéressant de résister un peu à cette interprétation qui met en concurrence<br />
deux voies qui se déclarent toutes deux « droites ».<br />
Pour Pausanias, l’institution pédérastique est multiple (182b). Il existe une multitude de règles et de<br />
conventions en effet, au sein desquelles il faut comprendre la complexité d’une institution pour en<br />
saisir l’intérêt et la fécondité, sa droiture, qu’on cherchera donc à travers les effets pédagogiques et<br />
politiques qu’elle est capable de produire.<br />
Pausanias, comme on le sait, commence par critiquer l’institution pédérastique elle-même :<br />
elle est une institution qui favorise un Eros vulgaire, insolent, abusant de la naïveté des jeunes<br />
garçons, etc. 7 Sa pratique ternit selon lui un usage correct de l’érotique masculine patiente, qui va audelà<br />
de l’âge de l’institution pédérastique 8 .<br />
Par ailleurs la complexité de la règle athénienne, selon Pausanias, réside, non pas tant comme<br />
chez Diotime dans les différentes étapes à gravir avant la contemplation du Bien, mais dans la<br />
subtilité de normes apparemment contradictoires qui règlent la société athénienne et les pratiques de<br />
la cour qui lie l’éraste à l’éromène : liberté totale de l’amant conquérant et résistance attendue de<br />
l’aimé ; constance des relations s’attachant au caractère et à la vertu, et non la poursuite de la relation<br />
uniquement corporelle ; condamnation des aspiration aux honneurs, à l’argent, au pouvoir politique 9 .<br />
Un seul et même but est donné par Pausanias à cette institution : la vertu, se déclinant ellemême<br />
pour l’amant à « contribuer à faire avancer sur le chemin de l’intelligence et de la vertu »<br />
(184d6-e1) (à supposer qu’il les possède), et pour l’aimé à « gagner en éducation et en savoir »<br />
(184e1-2). Plus encore, il s’agit, par deux fois dans le discours de Pausanias, de mettre en relation<br />
directe la philosophia et la paiderastia.<br />
S’agit-il alors vraiment de considérer que Pausanias voudrait justifier la paiderastia par la<br />
philosophia ?<br />
II. Paideraistia et philosophia<br />
À la fin de son discours, Pausanias déclare que la pédérastie est une institution qui doit favoriser<br />
l’éclosion de la vertu et la pratique de la « philosophie ».<br />
En effet, chez nous, la règle est la suivante : si l'on accepte d'être au service de quelqu'un en<br />
pensant que par son intermédiaire on deviendra meilleur dans une forme de savoir quelconque ou<br />
dans un autre domaine de l'excellence (ἢ κατὰ σοφίαν τινὰ ἢ κατὰ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν µέρος ἀρετῆς), quel<br />
que soit ce domaine, cet esclavage accepté n'a rien de honteux et ne relève même pas de la<br />
flatterie. Il faut dès lors réunir en une seule (εἰς ταὐτόν) ces deux règles, celle qui concerne l'amour<br />
des jeunes garçons (τόν τε περὶ τὴν παιδεραστίαν) et celle qui concerne l'aspiration au savoir et au<br />
reste de la vertu (καὶ τὸν περὶ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν τε καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετήν), s'il doit résulter un bien<br />
du fait que l'aimé cède à l'amant. 10<br />
5 Phèdre, 211b5-c1. Toutes les traductions, sauf mention contraire, sont de L. Brisson (1998).<br />
6 Les termes de la famille de *-ὀρθ sont répétés six fois dans le discours de Pausanias 180c7, 180d2, 180e2, 181a4 (deux<br />
fois), 183d1 (on peut ajouter l’usage de l’adverbe δικαίως à la fin du discours en 184d6); cette fréquence appuie l’abondance<br />
du vocabulaire de la loi (νόµος) : 181d7, 181e3, 182a5, 182a7, 182b2; 182d3, 182d4, 182e2, 183b4, 183c2, 184a1, 184b5,<br />
184b7, 184c7, 184d1, 184d4.<br />
7 181d7-e1 : « Il faudrait même établir une règle qui interdise d’aimer les jeunes garçons ».<br />
8 181c7-d3. Voir à ce propos Brisson (2006:235-8).<br />
9 Comme l’ont très bien analysé Dover (1964), puis Cohen (1987) et Hindley (1991).<br />
10 184c7-d3. (trad. L. Brisson légèrement modifiée).<br />
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Olivier Renaut<br />
Le programme est donc le suivant : il faut combiner deux lois : celle qui régule (ou devrait réguler)<br />
l’institution pédérastique qui associe un amant et un aimé d’une part, et une autre « règle » qui renvoie<br />
au système pédagogique où celui qui sait transmet à celui qui ne sait pas 11 . C’est la combinaison de<br />
cette institution bien réglée et de l’éducation en un sens large qui permet l’éclosion de la vertu et la<br />
philosophia.<br />
De quelle philosophia s’agit-il ? Certainement pas de la pratique de la philosophia telle que la<br />
proposent Socrate et Diotime dans leur échange. Il s’agit d’une certaine culture générale, dont le<br />
rapport à la vertu est néanmoins très accentué, dans une veine intellectualiste que Platon s’amuse à<br />
souligner ironiquement 12 . La philosophia dans ce passage de 184d1 se comprendrait donc comme un<br />
terme générique qui concerne l’ensemble des savoirs non techniques, en un mot de la vertu. Pausanias<br />
le rappelle à la fin de son discours :<br />
De toute évidence en effet, cet aimé-là lui aussi a manifesté le fond de sa nature ; à savoir que la<br />
vertu et progrès moral (ἀρετῆς γ' ἕνεκα καὶ τοῦ βελτίων γενέσθαι) sont l’objet en tout et pour tout<br />
de son effort passionné ; et rien n’est plus beau. Ainsi donc il est beau en toutes circonstances de<br />
céder pour atteindre à la vertu. 13<br />
En 182c1, philosophia apparaît, à travers la figure des tyrannicides bien connus Harmodios et<br />
Aristogiton, pour montrer que la philosophie est l’une des choses que l’amour fait éclore, aux côtés de<br />
la philogymnastia.<br />
C'est que chez les Barbares l'exercice du pouvoir tyrannique conduit à faire de cela en tout cas<br />
quelque chose de honteux, tout comme l'est la passion pour le savoir et pour l'exercice physique (ἥ<br />
γε φιλοσοφία καὶ ἡ φιλογυµναστία). En effet, ceux qui détiennent le pouvoir ne tirent aucun<br />
avantage, j'imagine, du fait que naissent chez leurs sujets de hautes pensées (φρονήµατα µεγάλα),<br />
ou même de solides amitiés et de fortes solidarités (οὐδὲ φιλίας ἰσχυρὰς καὶ κοινωνίας), ce que<br />
justement l'amour, plus que toute autre chose, se plaît à réaliser. Les tyrans de chez nous en ont<br />
aussi fait l'expérience. En effet, l'amour d'Aristogiton et l'affection d'Harmodios, sentiments<br />
solides, brisèrent le pouvoir de ces tyrans. 14<br />
Philosophia et philogymnastia sont ici, comme dans la République au livre III à propos de l’éducation<br />
préliminaire, deux pôles que la relation érotique ou plus largement communautaire doit favoriser dans<br />
le caractère des amants. Les « hautes pensées » philosophiques, remparts contre la tyrannie, sont un<br />
gage de l’efficacité du système éducatif que Pausanias détaille, en montrant que l’amour des discours<br />
est un des effets du système pédérastique 15 .<br />
Même si nous ne reconnaissons rien de comparable à la « philosophie » platonicienne dans cet<br />
usage du terme philosophia dans le discours de Pausanias, la proximité avec le vocabulaire socratique<br />
du « souci de soi » peut nous interpeller quant à la manière dont le progrès moral s’ensuit de la<br />
relation érotique pédérastique. En effet, à la fin du discours, Pausanias déclare :<br />
Cet Eros relève de l’Aphrodite céleste et lui-même il est céleste, et sa valeur est grande aussi bien<br />
pour la cité que pour les particuliers (καὶ πόλει καὶ ἰδιώταις), car il oblige l’amant en question et<br />
son aimé à prendre eux-mêmes soin d’eux-mêmes pour devenir vertueux (πολλὴν ἐπιµέλειαν<br />
ἀναγκάζων ποιεῖσθαι πρὸς ἀρετὴν τόν τε ἐρῶντα αὐτὸν αὑτοῦ καὶ τὸν ἐρώµενον). 16<br />
L’expression autos epimeleian autou doit se comprendre, dans le sillage du discours de Phèdre,<br />
comme l’impératif pour l’amant et l’aimé de produire de soi-même une image désirable et vertueuse,<br />
avec l’idée que cette émulation réciproque (τόν τε ἐρῶντα καὶ τὸν ἐρώµενον) constitue bien le moteur<br />
de la vertu 17 .<br />
11<br />
Sur ce point précis d’un modèle de transmission du savoir conçu comme transmission du liquide séminal, voir Brisson<br />
(2006 :229-230), avec lequel je m’accorde.<br />
12<br />
Pausanias aime les garçons intelligents : 181c6, 181d2· Voir également 182c2 où Pausanias mentionne les φρονήµατα<br />
µεγάλα des citoyens.<br />
13<br />
185b1-5.<br />
14<br />
182b7-c7.<br />
15<br />
L’inutilité du discours persuasif à des fins séductrices (182b4-6) chez les Béotiens et les Spartiates est comparée à de la<br />
paresse d’esprit par Pausanias (182d3-4 : τῆς ψυχῆς ἀργίαν).<br />
16<br />
185b5-c1.<br />
17<br />
Sur ce discours, voir Wersinger (2001:248-257) et Renaut (2012).<br />
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Olivier Renaut<br />
La philosophia et plus généralement la vertu, constitue donc bien, pour Pausanias, la fin de la relation<br />
pédérastique correcte. Si Dover a raison de souligner à propos de ce discours que Pausanias n’a pas<br />
montré que la pédérastie était en elle-même une entreprise pédagogique, ce n’est pourtant pas une<br />
raison suffisante pour faire du plaisir sexuel de l’éraste 18 . Il n’y a, selon Pausanias, nulle contradiction<br />
qui puisse exclure, d’emblée, un croisement possible entre pratique sexuelle et pédagogie. Il est donc<br />
nécessaire de clarifier le rôle des relations sexuelles dans la forme droite de la pédérastie selon<br />
Pausanias 19 .<br />
III. Le rôle des relations sexuelles<br />
L’Aphrodite Pandémos ne concerne littéralement « pas moins les femmes que les garçons, et<br />
davantage le corps que l’âme (οὐχ ἧττον γυναικῶν ἢ παίδων, ἔπειτα ὧν καὶ ἐρῶσι τῶν σωµάτων<br />
µᾶλλον ἢ τῶν ψυχῶν) » (181b3-4). Cette indistinction d’objet entre homme et femme, et la prévalence<br />
du corps sur l’âme permet de poser que la « fin » que poursuit l’amant « pandémien » est le plaisir<br />
sexuel, plutôt que la reproduction, qui se satisfait de l’une ou de l’autre indifféremment.<br />
L’Aphrodite Céleste introduit une dimension sexuée et genrée nette, brisant une symétrie<br />
attendue qui aurait fait de l’amour céleste un amour exclusivement tourné vers l’âme. Cet amour ne<br />
concerne que le « mâle » (οὐ µετεχούσης θήλεος ἀλλ' ἄρρενος µόνον) (181c2-3), et n’est attentif qu’à<br />
l’intelligence et à la vigueur du garçon (τὸ φύσει ἐρρωµενέστερον καὶ νοῦν µᾶλλον ἔχον) (181c6).<br />
L’amour ouranien, s’il favorise l’intelligence, ne discrédite pas le corps (181e2-3 : l’amant serait<br />
attentif au développement du garçon, aussi bien quant à son âme qu’à son corps : ψυχῆς τε πέρι καὶ<br />
σώµατος). Pausanias, en dépit du dualisme âme-corps qui semble structurer son discours, ne pose en<br />
réalité qu’une différence de degré entre ces deux pôles, raison pour laquelle la philosophia, dans le<br />
passage précité d’Harmodios et Aristogiton, est flanquée de la philogymnastia.<br />
Comme l’a parfaitement remarqué L. Brisson, l’amour ouranien n’a pas pour objet l’âme<br />
exclusivement, mais le caractère (ἦθος) 20 . Dans la comparaison entre l’amant pandémien et l’amant<br />
ouranien, on remarquera encore l’absence de symétrie entre l’amour ouranien et l’amour pandémien :<br />
Et celui qui n’en vaut pas la peine, c’est l’amant « vulgaire », celui qui aime le corps plutôt que<br />
l’âme (ὁ τοῦ σώµατος µᾶλλον ἢ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐρῶν). (…) En revanche, celui qui aime un caractère<br />
qui en vaut la peine (ὁ δὲ τοῦ ἤθους χρηστοῦ ὄντος ἐραστὴς) reste un amant toute sa vie, car il<br />
s’est fondu avec quelque chose de constant. 21<br />
La relation sexuelle pédérastique et entre deux hommes plus murs (dans la perspective d’une amitié<br />
sexuelle continuée) n’est donc en aucun cas discréditée. Elle est même très fortement suggérée, à<br />
peine euphémisée, à partir de 184d (notamment à travers les connotations sexuelles des verbes<br />
χαρίζεσθαι et ὑπηρετεῖν).<br />
La relation sexuelle accompagne donc la relation érotique comme son ombre, nécessairement<br />
certes mais secondairement, comme s’il fallait s’acquitter du fait que nous sommes, aussi, un corps 22 .<br />
Que l’amour platonicien soit exclusif ou non de relations sexuelles effectives est évidemment<br />
un problème contesté, puisqu’il engage une certaine interprétation du rôle de l’amour « personnel » 23 .<br />
Il est indubitable que dans le Banquet, la relation sexuelle n’est pas valorisée pour définir la puissance<br />
d’Eros. Il est également hors de doute que Platon entend transformer radicalement le sens et la valeur<br />
de la paiderastia en lui conférant un telos différent de celui que Pausanias lui prête, en la rendant<br />
exclusive de la relation sexuelle. Cependant, le discours de Pausanias constitue bien un défi pour le<br />
18<br />
(Dover, 1978:91).<br />
19<br />
Sheffield (2006:25) parvient à une position nuancée sur ce discours qui me semble plus propice à faire du discours de<br />
Diotime un exercice de clarification de l’entreprise pédérastique.<br />
20<br />
(Brisson, 2006 :244).<br />
21<br />
183d8-e6.<br />
22<br />
Marsile Ficin est particulièrement sagace à propos de Pausanias, et c’est cette interprétation qu’il choisit de donner, en en<br />
faisant, comme tous les autres discours, une expression de la pensée platonicienne : « Qu’est-ce donc que Pausanias critique<br />
dans l’Amour ? Je vais vous le dire. Supposons que trop porté à l’acte d’engendrer l’on néglige la contemplation, ou que l’on<br />
cherche cette génération par les femmes avec excès ou par les garçons contre nature, ou que l’on préfère la beauté du corps à<br />
la beauté de l’âme : c’est là abuser de la dignité de l’Amour. Et tel est l’abus que blâme Pausanias. Mais celui qui en use<br />
correctement, loue, certes, la beauté corporelle, mais à travers elle il conçoit la beauté supérieure de l’âme, de l’intelligence<br />
et de Dieu et l’admire et l’aime encore plus ardemment. Quant au devoir de génération et d’union charnelle, il s’en acquitte<br />
dans les limites prescrites par l’ordre naturel et par les lois civiles édictées par les sages. Pausanias s’est étendu longuement<br />
là-dessus. » De Amore, II, 7.<br />
23<br />
Sur ce sujet, voir Renaut (2012).<br />
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Olivier Renaut<br />
discours de Diotime, dans la mesure où le premier entrelace l’institution pédérastique et les relations<br />
sexuelles afférentes à un problème social et politique, que le discours de Diotime prend soin de mettre<br />
à l’écart.<br />
Je ne ferai ici que deux remarques pour accréditer l’idée que Platon choisit de laisser dans<br />
l’ombre la question des relations sexuelles en particulier homoérotiques.<br />
a) Dans son discours, Diotime emploie des exemples désexualisés concernant les effets<br />
« politiques » de l’amour. Discréditant le couple Achille-Patrocle présent dans le discours de Phèdre<br />
(208d), et remplaçant les tyrannicides Harmodios et Aristogiton du discours de Pausanias par les<br />
exemples de Codros (208d), Lycurgue et Solon (209d), passant sous silence l’exemple populaire du<br />
bataillon de Thèbes (178e), Diotime récuse une justification possible de la relation sexuelles entre<br />
hommes par ses effets politiques. En d’autres termes, Diotime entend faire des mœurs sexuelles dans<br />
la cité un problème différent de celui de l’érotisation de l’action politique.<br />
b) Ce qui est laissé dans l’ombre dans le Banquet fait au contraire l’objet d’un intérêt<br />
particulier dans la République à propos de la sexualité des gardiens et des gardiennes, que je ne<br />
détaille pas ici 24 . La régulation des pratiques sexuelles des jeunes gardiens, la licence des gardiens<br />
plus vieux qui ne sont plus en âge de procréer, ainsi que les règles de convenance qui obligent les uns<br />
et les autres à la plus grande discrétion font de la sexualité un enjeu politique important, que le<br />
discours de Diotime tend à occulter. Je terminerai donc par ce que je considère comme l’enjeu le plus<br />
important dans le discours de Pausanias : les implications politiques et sociales de la paiderastia chez<br />
Pausanias.<br />
IV. Les implications politiques de la paiderastia<br />
Reprenons la question de savoir quelle est la nature du lien entre philosophia et paiderastia dans le<br />
discours de Pausanias. S’agit-il seulement d’une heureuse coïncidence ? Si la réponse était positive,<br />
alors on aurait raison de considérer que Pausanias masque sous la promesse d’un savoir l’ambition<br />
d’un amant peu scrupuleux pour assouvir son désir charnel. Rien ne permettrait en somme de lier ces<br />
deux termes sinon la combinaison fortuite et toute sociale du désir pédérastique et du désir de<br />
philosophie. Ce n’est pourtant pas le cas, et Pausanias, à la suite de Phèdre, affirme qu’il y a bien un<br />
lien plus intime entre la pédérastie et l’éclosion de la vertu plus que toute autre forme de savoir.<br />
En effet, en 182c, à propos des tyrannicides, Pausanias souligne que philosophia et<br />
philogymnastia favorisent des « liens forts de communauté » à travers les relations érotiques. De<br />
même, à la fin du discours, Pausanias souligne bien que l’effet de la pédérastie bien comprise est<br />
bénéfique aussi bien pour les particuliers que pour la cité :<br />
Cet Eros relève de l’Aphrodite céleste et lui-même il est céleste, et sa valeur est grande aussi bien<br />
pour la cité que pour les particuliers (καὶ πόλει καὶ ἰδιώταις), car il oblige l’amant en question et<br />
son aimé à prendre eux-mêmes soin d’eux-mêmes pour devenir vertueux (πολλὴν ἐπιµέλειαν<br />
ἀναγκάζων ποιεῖσθαι πρὸς ἀρετὴν τόν τε ἐρῶντα αὐτὸν αὑτοῦ καὶ τὸν ἐρώµενον). 25<br />
Plus qu’un trope rhétorique, il s’agit bien pour Pausanias d’intégrer l’institution pédérastique dans un<br />
système normatif global et d’en expliciter la fonction politique, reprenant ainsi l’expression que<br />
Phèdre utilisait dans son précédent discours 26 . En un mot, l’institution pédérastique permet de valider<br />
une idéologie compétitive et coopérative, dans un contexte public d’émulation réciproque à la vertu.<br />
L’Eros pédérastique est en effet éminemment « public » : la cour de l’amant auprès de l’aimé<br />
se déclare en public, devant l’assistance des amis, des parents, et s’offre au jugement du qu’en-dira-ton.<br />
La publicité de l’institution pédérastique est en outre assurée par un contrôle familial et une<br />
véritable « mise à l’épreuve » du caractère des amants :<br />
La règle chez nous entend soumettre les amants à une épreuve sérieuse et honnête (εὖ καὶ καλῶς<br />
βασανίζειν) pour que l’aimé sache à qui céder et qui fuir. Pour cette raison, la règle qui est la nôtre<br />
encourage les uns à poursuivre et les autres à fuir en instaurant une compétition qui permette de<br />
reconnaître à quelle espèce appartiennent et l’amant et l’aimé (ἀγωνοθετῶν καὶ βασανίζων<br />
ποτέρων ποτέ ἐστιν ὁ ἐρῶν καὶ ποτέρων ὁ ἐρώµενος) 27 .<br />
24<br />
Voir sur ce sujet l’analyse de Ludgwig (2007).<br />
25<br />
185b5-c1.<br />
26<br />
« Sans cela, en effet, ni cité ni individu ne peuvent réaliser de grandes et belles choses » (178d2-4).<br />
27 183e6-184a5.<br />
178
Olivier Renaut<br />
Il s’agit ni plus ni moins d’une compétition, un agôn, qui se charge ainsi de tester la qualité de<br />
l’amant. En ce sens, le discours de Pausanias est parfaitement congruent avec le discours de Phèdre<br />
qui fait du champ de bataille homérique le lieu où s’éprouvent la qualité des amants grâce à la<br />
philotimia (178e-179a).<br />
Je voudrais pour conclure revenir aux intuitions fondamentales de Dover (Dover 1964) qui insistait<br />
sur le contexte public de l’analyse de la pédérastie chez Pausanias, sur l’appareil complexe du<br />
dispositif social qui entendait donner de la valeur à certains types d’actions. Ce qui est honteux, ce<br />
n’est pas l’acte lui-même, c’est la manière dont il est accompli. En un mot, il ne s’agit pas de l’acte<br />
sexuel, mais bien d’une manière d’accomplir la norme. Ce qui est honteux, ce n’est pas<br />
corrélativement le fait d’être vaincu (pour l’éromène), ou de vaincre de quelque manière que ce soit<br />
(pour l’éraste), mais, en vertu du croisement des deux règles énoncées par Pausanias à la fin de son<br />
discours, conjoindre pédérastie et relation pédagogique fondée sur la bonté du caractère (τοῦ ἤθους<br />
χρηστοῦ). Ainsi, ce qui est honteux représente une certaine application de la règle, et renvoie à une<br />
certaine « finesse » dans l’interprétation des normes.<br />
La pédérastie chez Pausanias a) n’est pas une légitimation superficielle de la conquête<br />
sexuelle ; b) n’est pas un jeu à somme nulle mais implique un mutuel bénéfice pour les partenaires<br />
bien qu’ils jouent avec des normes qui sont celles de la conquête virile ; c) repose sur une intrication<br />
des mœurs sexuelles et de la sphère publique et politique, permettant ainsi de faire de la relation<br />
érotique le vecteur de l’éducation à la vertu. Le discours de Pausanias représente donc un défi pour<br />
l’éducation platonicienne, dans la mesure où il pose le problème spécifiquement politique de la<br />
régulation des mœurs sexuelles, de leur comptabilité avec la loi, mais surtout de l’usage par le<br />
législateur des relations (homo-)érotiques pour l’éclosion de la vertu, non pas chez les philosophes,<br />
mais pour la cité tout entière.<br />
Bibliographie<br />
Brisson, L. 1998. Platon, Le Banquet. Paris, Flammarion.<br />
———. « Agathon, Pausanias, and Diotima in Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong>. Paiderastia and Philosophia », in<br />
J. Lesher, D. Nails, F. Sheffield (eds.), Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong>. Issues in Interpretation and Reception,<br />
Washington, Center for Hellenic Studies : 229-251.<br />
Cohen, D. 1987. « Law, Society and Homosexuality in Classical Athens ». Past & Present (117): 3-<br />
21.<br />
———. 1991. « Law, Society and Homosexuality in Classical Athens: Reply ». Past & Present (133):<br />
184-194.<br />
Corrigan, K. 2004. Plato’s Dialectic at Play: Argument, Structure, and Myth in the <strong>Symposium</strong>.<br />
University Park, Pennsylvania State University Press.<br />
Davidson, J. 2001. « Dover, Foucault and Greek Homosexuality: Penetration and the Truth of Sex ».<br />
Past & Present (170): 3-51.<br />
Dover, K. J. 1964. « Eros and Nomos (Plato, <strong>Symposium</strong> 182a–185c) ». Bulletin of the Institute of<br />
Classical Studies 11: 31-42.<br />
———. 1978. Greek homosexuality. Harvard Univ Press.<br />
Hindley, C. 1991. « Law, Society and Homosexuality in Classical Athens ». Past & Present (133):<br />
167-183.<br />
Ludwig, P.W. 2002. Eros and polis : desire and community in Greek political theory. Cambridge:<br />
Cambridge University press.<br />
———.2007. « Eros in the Republic », in G.R.F. Ferrari (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Plato’s<br />
Republic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 202-231.<br />
Neumann, H. 1964. « On the Sophistry of Plato’s Pausanias ». Transactions and Proceedings of the<br />
American Philological Association 95: 261-267.<br />
179
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Nussbaum, M. C. 1994. « Platonic Love and Colorado Law: The Relevance of Ancient Greek Norms<br />
to Modern Sexual Controversies ». Virginia Law Review 80 (7): 1515-1651.<br />
Renaut, O. 2013. « Challenging Platonic Erôs: The Role of Thumos and Philotimia in Love », in E.<br />
Sanders, C. Thumiger, N.J. Lowe (eds.), Erôs in Ancient Greece, Oxford, Oxford University Press:<br />
95-110.<br />
Sheffield, F. "The Role of the Earlier Speeches in the <strong>Symposium</strong>: Plato's Endoxic Method?", in J.<br />
Lesher, D. Nails, F. Sheffield (eds.), Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong>. Issues in Interpretation and Reception :23-<br />
46.<br />
Wersinger, A.-G. 2001. Platon et la dysharmonie : recherches sur la forme musicale. Paris: J. Vrin.<br />
180
Eryximachus<br />
Chair: David T. Runia
Eryximachus’ Medicine in the <strong>Symposium</strong> and Plato’s Love<br />
Hua-kuei Ho<br />
The main body of Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong> consists of seven speeches on ἔρως (love/desire) which are<br />
made by seven distinguished figures. Eryximachus is one of them. In the context, Eryximachus is a<br />
representative of his τέχνη (expertise), that is, medicine. Medicine is an exemplar of the genuine<br />
τέχνη. It meets Plato’s requirement of knowledge in the earlier dialogues, that is, to require the<br />
possessor of knowledge (as a practitioner of the τέχνη) to give a rational account. The emphasis on<br />
rational explanation seems to be a common feature of medicine of that time and Plato’s philosophy.<br />
Another common feature can be found in their aim. Medicine aims at health by harmonizing different<br />
elements in the body, the soul, and everything. So does Plato’s philosophy.<br />
In spite of these similarities, Plato’s accent on ἔρως shows one important characteristic of his<br />
philosophy. Ἔρως is in a sense a kind of νόσος (disease). This may be the most striking difference<br />
between the roles of love in the medical discourse and in Plato. The connection of Plato’s love to<br />
disease marks the divergence of Plato’s treatment of desire from the medical view. It leads to a<br />
different idea of harmony too, especially when the issue comes to the harmony of the elements in the<br />
soul. This calls more attention to Plato’s complex attitude toward irrationality. Philosophy cannot be<br />
deprived of irrationality and thus is distinguished from the balanced calculation or rational science<br />
like medicine, since philosophy in Plato is the ἔρως for wisdom.<br />
In the first part of my paper, I shall justify the role of Eryximachus in the dialogue as the<br />
representative of medicine of that time, and show the similarities between medicine and Plato’s<br />
philosophy; in the second part I shall compare Plato’s connection of ἔρως to disease on the one hand,<br />
and the insufficiency of Eryximachus’ speech and the treatment of mental disease in the Hippocratic<br />
writings on the other hand, to highlight the dissimilarity of the doctor’s medicine and Plato’s love.<br />
I.<br />
Eryximachus’ speech runs from 186a to 188e in the <strong>Symposium</strong>. In the context of the dialogue, the<br />
speech is sandwiched between Pausanias’ and Aristophanes’. He continues Pausanias’ distinction<br />
between good and bad desires and tries to expand the thesis to the whole universe. The distinction<br />
between good and bad desires in Pausanias’ speech is delivered in the language of myth. There the<br />
division of double Ἔρως (the god), along with double Aphrodite, represents the double face of ἔρως<br />
(love/desire). (180c-e) Eryximachus translates the distinction into a more scientific language which<br />
contains more of rational explanation from the view of a practitioner of medicine. Here the distinction<br />
between good and bad desires is understood in the same way as the distinction between health and<br />
disease (τὸ ὑγιὲς… καὶ τὸ νοσοῦς). (186b5 ff.) The main principle is to gratify the good and healthy<br />
desires in each body. (186b-c) He defines medicine as knowledge (ἐπιστήµη) of the love-matters in<br />
respect of “filling and emptying (πλησµονὴν καὶ κένωσιν).” In practice, the medical method is to<br />
distinguish the good love from the bad ugly one, and to produce love where it ought to be, to remove<br />
love from where it ought not to be. (186d) In this way it achieves a balance of the opposites like cold<br />
and hot, bitter and sweet, dry and wet. (186d-e) This is “our expertise (τὴν ἡµετέραν τέχνην),” the<br />
doctor says. (186e3)<br />
Traditionally, the role of Eryximachus in the <strong>Symposium</strong> has been dismissed as a pompous<br />
caricature of doctor. The unfriendly reading has once been widely, almost unquestionably, accepted in<br />
the first half of the twentieth century, before Edelstein challenges the reading. 1 As Edelstein<br />
complains, this piece of text had been reduced to a mere caricature of doctor. He defends that the<br />
“ironical portrait of the pedantic expert and scientist” is “hardly justified.” (1945: 85) Throughout the<br />
dialogue, Eryximachus’ medical knowledge does work. He proves to be a genuine expert. “By making<br />
Eryximachus act as physician whenever the occasion calls for medical opinion, Plato can hardly have<br />
intended to satirize him.” (86) Moreover, at the end of his speech in the <strong>Symposium</strong>, the doctor says<br />
he might omit many things and expects Aristophanes to fill up. (188e) These modest words “betray<br />
belief in his own wisdom and superiority.” (91)<br />
To a certain extent, I follow Edelstein’s suggestion: Eryximachus does have his importance.<br />
However, to the eye of readers after a half century, still, Eryximachus looks “pompous, over-emphatic<br />
about his expertise” and “imposing ‘orderliness’ on the conduct of the symposium.” 2 But two points<br />
1 A brief history of the hostile reading and relevant debate, see Craik 2001: 110, n.7.<br />
2 In words of Gill (1999: xxiii). Italics mine.
Hua-kuei Ho<br />
are noteworthy here. Firstly, Eryximachus is a representative of his expertise, medicine, and medicine<br />
is regarded as an exemplar of the genuine τέχνη in Plato. Secondly, even if Plato’s representation<br />
appears satirical, features in the speech here properly match the principal ideas of medical discourse<br />
of Plato’s days.<br />
In the <strong>Symposium</strong>, Eryximachus contrasts medicine with cookery which aims at pleasing our<br />
appetites and is not a genuine τέχνη. (187e4-6) The contrast is simply the same one drawn by Socrates<br />
at Gorgias 464d, where Plato is making a sharp distinction between τέχνη and ἐµπειρία (sheer<br />
experience, 464b-466a). Plato sometimes uses a more offensive term τριβή (knack). The most crucial<br />
point is that ἐµπειρία or τριβή does not give any rational account (λόγον, 465a3) and thus is with-noaccount/irrational<br />
(ἄλογον, 465a6).<br />
Readers of Plato might be very familiar with the epistemic significance of τέχνη in the early<br />
dialogues. Τέχνη requires rational explanations. So does knowledge. In the earlier dialogues, starting<br />
from the Apology, Ion, to Protagoras, Gorgias, Plato submits the same requirement for people who<br />
appear to possess knowledge (ἐπιστήµη). It is no surprising that Plato chooses medicine to be a model<br />
of τέχνη (and thus to be a typical model of knowledge). The Hippocratic physicians of that time<br />
differentiate themselves from other healers by giving rational explanations. It is the way in which they<br />
display their superiority in knowledge and τέχνη, probably with a certain degree of selfconsciousness.<br />
One author of the Hippocratic corpus defends his own standpoint on the ground that he<br />
can give a better account than others. (Nature of Man 1) To display their knowledge, they are debating<br />
(ἀντιλέγουσιν, 1.22). The true possessor of knowledge must be able to “provide his own explanation<br />
always victorious (παρέχειν αἰεὶ ἐπικρτέοντα τὸν λόγον τὸν ἑωυτοῦ).” (1.29-30) As for the need of<br />
accuracy, the author of On Ancient Medicine says, although it is impossible for human being to attain<br />
the perfect accuracy, 3 they can reach the greatest accuracy by reasoning (λογισµῷ). (On Ancient<br />
Medicine 12.9-16) The requirement of giving an account and the emphasis on rationality make<br />
medicine the best candidate to show what knowledge is like in Plato.<br />
As a true professional practitioner of medicine, Eryximachus’ advice is decisive when the<br />
participants in the drinking party are making the regulation not to indulge their desires, but to<br />
entertain themselves with speeches on desire/ἔρως. (176b-e) In deeds, he exhibits his expertise by<br />
stopping Aristophanes’ hiccups. (185c-e) In words, his eulogy of ἔρως expresses the typical view of<br />
Greek medicine which emphasizes the harmony among different elements and aims to achieve the<br />
health of body and soul. (185e-188e)<br />
The harmony in Eryximachus’ speech is defined by a balance of the opposites like cold and<br />
hot, bitter and sweet, dry and wet. (186d-e) Eryximachus’ thesis of balancing elements can be found<br />
in the Hippocratic writings. (On Nature of Man 4.1-9; On Ancient Medicine 12, etc.) The balance and<br />
continuous interaction of these opposites play an important role in Greek medicine and early nature<br />
philosophy. 4 Now the doctor in the <strong>Symposium</strong> applies the medical thesis of balance into µουσική<br />
(music/arts). He values harmony and emphasizes that it is impossible to achieve harmony as long as<br />
the elements stay at variance as Heraclitus insists. (187a-b) Then the medical idea of balance expands<br />
into divination further. It becomes the guarding (φυλακήν) and healing (ἴασίν) about Love. (188c)<br />
The pursuit of health and harmony is by no means unfamiliar to the readers of Plato’s<br />
Republic. 5 In the Republic, the inner state of the just person resembles the musical harmony<br />
(σύµφωνα at 441e-422a; συναρµόσαντα, ἁρµονίας and ἡρµοσµένον at 443d-e). Plato describes it as<br />
the “health” of the soul. (444c-e) Eryximachus’ “guarding and healing” about Love also reminds us of<br />
the guardian in the Republic. Plato’s guardian in the strict sense is the philosopher who really<br />
possesses the true knowledge. As pointed out above, medicine is the model of τέχνη and thus is also a<br />
typical model of knowledge. So is medicine in the Republic I. Medicine plays the role of the typical<br />
3 A brief discussion on the exactness in medicine, see Lloyd 1991: 257. The practitioners of the Hippocratic medicine are<br />
clearly aware of their limitation. This is consistent with Eryximachus’ modest attitude in the <strong>Symposium</strong> and can support<br />
Edelstein’s reading.<br />
4 For Eryximachus’ connection to the theory of filling and emptying in the Hippocratic treatises, see Hunter 2004: 55-6. For<br />
the forming of this medical idea, see Lloyd 1964. The first extant text in medicine on the balance of the hot and the cold, the<br />
dry and the wet, is the Hippocratic treatise On the Nature of Man. (Llyod 1964: 92) The underlying thoughts can be traced to<br />
Anaximander’ cosmological theory. (100) Eryximachus’ speech exhibits some important features of Greek medicine and<br />
natural philosophy. The early Greek thinkers tend “to divide opposites into a positive and a negative pole.” (104) This helps<br />
to explain Eryximachus’ acceptance of the division of double love.<br />
5 The problem of connection between different dialogues is complex. The <strong>Symposium</strong> is composed, broadly speaking, in the<br />
same period as Republic. (Cf. Dover 1965; Brandwood 1992: 91 and 110.) One year earlier than Dover’s paper, Morrison<br />
analyses the development of Plato’s thoughts on immortality, and argues that <strong>Symposium</strong> should be composed earlier (even<br />
earlier than Meno). (Morrison 1964: 42-46) But, take more recent examples of Howatson and Sheffield 2008: vii, Hunter<br />
2004:3, Gill 1999: xvi etc., <strong>Symposium</strong> and Republic are usually supposed to be in the same group. Plato’s thoughts in the<br />
two dialogues should maintain a certain degree of consistency.<br />
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Hua-kuei Ho<br />
example of τέχνη by which Plato expounds the features of knowledge. (Republic 350a-b) Plato’s<br />
guardian is the one who truly has knowledge concerning the soul just as the physician is the one who<br />
truly has knowledge concerning the body. 6 In the Republic, Plato submits the doctrine of the tripartite<br />
soul. (436a-441c) “Since there are three elements,” there are also “three kinds of desire (ἐπιθυµίαι).”<br />
(580d) The doctor knows how to achieve the health of the body by harmonizing the opposites.<br />
Similarly, Plato’s philosopher knows how to achieve the health of the soul by harmonizing the<br />
opposite desires of different elements in the soul.<br />
II<br />
But surely philosophy is not medicine.<br />
Plato’s ἔρως is in a sense a kind of disease. This is a significant difference between the roles<br />
of love in the medical discourse and in Plato. In the doctor’s speech, the distinction between good and<br />
bad loves/desires is understood in terms of the distinction between health and disease. Medicine is to<br />
gratify the good and healthy elements and not to gratify the bad and diseased elements. (186b-c) But<br />
later in the <strong>Symposium</strong>, in Diotima’s teaching, people in the intensive ἔρως are described as diseased<br />
(νοσοῦντά, 207a9-b1). In the Phaedrus, the companion dialogue of the <strong>Symposium</strong>, ἔρως is labelled<br />
as the fourth kind of madness. (Phaedrus 249d) Madness is counted as disease in Greek medicine. (Cf.<br />
On the Sacred Disease) So is in Plato. (Timaeus 86b) Furthermore, when Plato explains the work of<br />
love that “the stream of beauty flowing through the eyes,” he uses the metaphor of infecting “the<br />
disease of the eyes.” (Phaedrus 255d)<br />
Plato’s philosophy is the ἔρως for wisdom. The connection of Plato’s love to disease marks<br />
the divergence of Plato’s philosophy from medicine. Medicine as a genuine τέχνη contains some true<br />
knowledge. But now the model of knowledge is not sufficient any longer.<br />
The model of medicine becomes insufficient not simply because that it deals with the body<br />
rather than the soul. The limited scope of the doctor’s speech may be counted as a weakness. Dover<br />
suggests that the doctor fails to give a fair account of the concepts like health and harmony, because<br />
of “its narrow materialism.”(Dover 1969: 220) But Plato is not totally anti-materialist. The dialogue<br />
tells us, some gaps in Eryximachus’ speech will be filled up by the next speaker Aristophanes. (188e)<br />
Aristophanes delivers a story about how human beings were split into two halves and how ἔρως leads<br />
us to embrace our “another-halves.” (189c-191d) It is heavily concerning the body and physical<br />
needs. According to the literary arrangement, dealing with the body is not the main insufficiency of<br />
Eryximachus’ speech.<br />
However, there is a side effect when the scope is limited in the physical material world.<br />
“Harmony” explained by physical causes, is a result of adding or removing some material elements<br />
from certain physical places. It is to even out variance. Another weakness pointed out by Dover lies in<br />
Eryximachus’ concept of harmony: Harmony in the doctor’s speech is in the sense of mediation.<br />
According to Dover’s analysis, “[m]ediation is possible in two ways, depending on whether or not one<br />
preserves the natures of the things mediated.” (226) Eryximachus only focuses on one kind of<br />
mediation, but fails to notice the other kind. (226-7) The other kind of mediation can be presented by<br />
Heraclitus’ description of harmony: it is agreement of things at variance, like of the bow and of the<br />
lyre. 7 Eryximachus criticizes Heraclitus. He thinks it is impossible to achieve harmony when the<br />
elements still preserve their differences. (<strong>Symposium</strong> 187b) In the context, the next speaker<br />
Aristophanes mocks Eryximachus’ prescription of healing hiccups by sneezing and mocks the<br />
doctor’s concept of harmony in this way. (189a) This makes Plato’s representation appear satirical.<br />
But the doctor’s suggestion does work. And it is true that if the superfluous air in different parts of<br />
body remains there, the hiccups will not stop. The concept of harmony in medicine mainly means to<br />
even out differences. Based on the concept, Eryximachus’ treatment of desire is a kind of calculation.<br />
It measures desires and their effects, namely pleasures. With the correct measurement, the doctor<br />
helps people to maintain the good desires but remove the bad desires. Then the elements in the body<br />
are balanced.<br />
Mental disease may be also healed in this way. As said above, Plato’s ἔρως is a kind of<br />
madness. Madness is counted as disease in the Hippocratic medicine, and can be explained by<br />
physical causes. It can be given an account by the condition of the brain. The brain is where our<br />
6 Hunter appeals to Republic 403d ff. to read that Plato “the exaggerated claims of medicine, which had little in common<br />
with what he saw as the true pursuit of understanding (philosophy).” (Hunter 2004: 54) But the reading seems inconsistent<br />
with Plato’s positive evaluation of medicine as a genuine τέχνη in Republic I. Though book 1 might be dated much earlier<br />
than the rest of the Republic, it is unreasonable to suppose that Plato compiles inconsistent pieces into one work.<br />
7 Fr. 51, Kirk and Raven 1957: 193.<br />
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Hua-kuei Ho<br />
emotions, perceptions and knowledge come from. (On the Sacred Disease 14) It is the interpreter of<br />
understanding. (15, 16, 17) When the brain is too hot, too cold, too wet or too dry, it becomes<br />
unhealthy. Madness is caused by too much moisture inside the head. Then the brain needs to be put<br />
into motion (to remove the superfluous humidity) and thus the sight and hearing cannot be at rest, and<br />
the person cannot reason properly. (14) When the brain is damaged by phlegm and bile, people<br />
become mad. Being heated or being cooled may change the condition of the brain. (15)<br />
Actually Plato shares the medical view that the “sacred disease” (epilepsy) is caused by<br />
phlegm and bile in the brain. 8 For the brain is the sacred part of our body, the disease is called sacred.<br />
(Timaeus 85a-b) The author of On the Sacred Disease emphasizes that the “sacred disease” is “no<br />
more divine nor sacred than other diseases” but can be explained by natural causes. People call it<br />
divine because they are unable to comprehend it. This is the way in which the author distinguishes<br />
himself from ignorant people. (On the Sacred Disease 1) Plato adopts the medical explanation to<br />
regard the diseases of the soul as resulted from the condition of the body. Madness is one of the two<br />
kinds of disease (the other kind is ignorance). (Timaeus 86b) Considering these, once again we find<br />
that Plato’s position could not be too anti-materialist. However, he seems not as eager to discharge the<br />
divine matters by physical causes as the Hippocratic physicians. 9<br />
In the <strong>Symposium</strong>, philosophy is colored with a divine hue. The divine hue brings a new<br />
reflection on irrationality. In Plato’s early dialogue Ion, the requirement of giving a rational account<br />
distinguishes the genuine τέχνη from the divine inspiration. In the Ion, the rhapsody inspired by<br />
divinity—as the author of On the Sacred Disease says, one thing is called divine when people cannot<br />
comprehend it—is not a genuine τέχνη and thus not knowledge. Ion chooses to be thought divine,<br />
when he fails to provide rational explanations for his irrational performance. (Ion 542a-b) But in the<br />
<strong>Symposium</strong>, the need to go beyond τέχνη is pointed out by Diotima. The communication between god<br />
and human being takes place through ἔρως. This kind of wisdom is something different from wisdom<br />
περὶ τέχνας (about expertise). (203a) The role of Diotima as a priestess from Mantinea (punning on<br />
µαντική (divination)) strengthens the divine tone of her teaching. But now it is not irrationality which<br />
fails to give an account as in the Ion. The ἔρως for wisdom is the rational desire which combines both<br />
rationality (toward the rational aim, wisdom) and irrationality (urged by irrational ἔρως). In Diotima’s<br />
teaching for the initiates, when one ascends from the physical level to the end of the education in love,<br />
and catches the sight of the beauty of its wonderful nature, the beauty will appear “nor as any rational<br />
explanation nor as any knowledge (οὐδέ τις λόγος οὐδέ τις ἐπιστήµη).” (211a7) It does not come short<br />
of rationality, but go beyond.<br />
Philosophy as the ἔρως for wisdom refers to a special state in the soul. Plato does not<br />
emphasize the harmony and health less than any true practitioner of medicine, especially when it is<br />
involved with the soul. But to characterize philosophy, Plato needs to go beyond the model of τέχνη.<br />
Though the corresponding condition of the body can be explained by physical causes, the harmony of<br />
elements in the soul cannot be reduced to a rational balance of the opposite desires. Medicine<br />
produces the balance of different elements by evening out variance. But the harmonious soul of<br />
Plato’s philosopher contains not only rational, but also irrational elements.<br />
[Reference]<br />
Brandwood, L., “Stylometry and chronology,” in R. Kraut ed., The Cambridge Companion to Plato,<br />
Cambridge, 1992: 90-120.<br />
Burnet, J., ed., Platonis Opera Tom. II, Oxford: 1901.<br />
Craik, E. M., “Plato and Medical Texts: <strong>Symposium</strong> 185c-193d,” Classical Quarterly 51.1 (2001):<br />
109-114.<br />
Dover, K., “The date of Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong>,” Phronesis 10, 1965: 2-20.<br />
----, “The Significance of the Speeches in Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong>,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 2, 1969:<br />
215-34.<br />
Edelstein, L., “The Role of Eryximachus in Plato's <strong>Symposium</strong>,” Transactions and Proceedings of the<br />
American Philological Association 76, 1945: 85-103.<br />
Gill, C., Plato: the <strong>Symposium</strong>, Penguin, 1999.<br />
Howatson, M. C. and Sheffield, F. C. C., eds., Howaston tr., Plato, the <strong>Symposium</strong>, Cambridge, 2008.<br />
Hunter, R., Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong>, Oxford, 2004.<br />
8 On this, “Plato agrees with the Hippocratic author of On the Sacred Disease that epilepsy is to be explained by a physical,<br />
not a religious, account.” (McPherran 2006: 77) “Plato even goes so far as to implicitly deny the popular view that epilepsy<br />
is caused by a divinity.” (77 n.18)<br />
9 Even for the Hippocratics, the influence of divinity might still remain. (McPherran 2006: 81)<br />
186
Hua-kuei Ho<br />
Jones, W. H. S., ed., Hippocrates Collected Works I, Harvard, 1868. (www.perseus.tufts.edu)<br />
Kirk, G. S., and Raven, J. E., The Presocratic Philosophers, Cambridge, 1957.<br />
Lamb, W. R. M., Plato: Lysis, <strong>Symposium</strong>, Gorgias, Harvard, 1925.<br />
Littre, A., ed., Oeuvres Completes D’Hippocrate, Hippocrates, Adolf M. Hakkert. (Hippocrates, De<br />
Morbo Sacro on www.perseus.tufts.edu)<br />
Lloyd, G. E. R., “The Hot and the Cold, the Dry and the Wet in Greek Philosophy,” Journal of<br />
Hellenic Studies 84, 1964: 92-106.<br />
----, “The Medical Τέχνη in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries,” Science and Philosophy in Classical<br />
Greece, ed. A. C. Bowen, Garland, 1991: 249-260; reprinted in Principles and Practices in Ancient<br />
Greek and Chinese Science, ed. G. E. R. Lloyd, Ashgate, 2006 (same pagination).<br />
McPherran, M. L., “Medicine, Magic, and Religion in Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong>,” in Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong>:<br />
Issues in Interpretation and Reception, eds. J. H. Lesher, D. Nails, F. Sheffield, Harvard, 2006: 71-95.<br />
Morrison, J. S., “Four Notes on Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong>,” Classical Quarterly, 14: 1, 1964: 42-55.<br />
Page, T. E., Capps, E., Rouse, W. H. D., Post, A., Warmington, E. H., eds., with an tr. by W. H. S.<br />
Jones, Hippocrates IV, Heracleitus, On the Universe, Loeb library, Harvard, 1931.<br />
Slings, S. R., ed., Platonis Rempvblicam, Oxford, 2003<br />
.<br />
187
La medicina di Erissimaco: appunti per una cosmologia dialogica<br />
Silvio Marino<br />
Il discorso di Erissimaco nel Simposio è stato definito un pastiche, ed effettivamente risulta un<br />
insieme di spunti medici e filosofici che hanno come obiettivo l’elogio sia di Eros sia della medicina.<br />
Questo pastiche colpisce per il tentativo di tenere uniti il tema della discussione, l’amore, e il sapere<br />
medico di cui Erissimaco è esperto. Non si può del resto non considerare anche la particolare corrente<br />
medica che questo discorso sembra abbracciare, ovvero la scelta di una medicina di stampo<br />
physiologico, apertamente criticata in Antica medicina.<br />
Pur non potendo toccare molti degli innumerevoli spunti che questo brano offre al lettore,<br />
quanto vorrei qui sottolineare è la sua vicinanza con il trattato pseudo-ippocratico del Regime,<br />
soprattutto per quanto riguarda il primo libro. Cercherò di mostrare, seppur brevemente, quali sono i<br />
portati dell’incrocio tra questi due scritti e cosa possiamo supporre Platone stia proponendo qui<br />
attraverso il personaggio di Erissimaco.<br />
Il discorso in onore di Eros fatto dal medico presenta vari aspetti ed è una sorta di cosmologia<br />
erotica, in cui i due amori sono a fondamento di ogni realtà, da quelle complesse come l’uomo a<br />
quelle meno complesse come le piante e tutti gli enti, tutte le realtà esistenti 1 . Non solo; lo schema<br />
generale qui tracciato da Erissimaco contempla anche gli dèi e i rapporti tra gli dèi e gli uomini,<br />
ovvero tratta dell’armonia e della concordia che devono esistere tra uomini e dèi. Non si potrebbe<br />
avere una teoria più generale di questa.<br />
Ma il duplice amore, che funziona a livello macrocosmico, si ritrova anche all’interno stesso<br />
degli enti e ne determina la costituzione e i mutamenti. Ed è in questo ambito che viene enunciato il<br />
principio di funzionamento che regola le varie realtà, ovvero il principio di inclusione del simile e di<br />
esclusione del dissimile:<br />
La natura dei corpi, infatti, possiede questo duplice amore, in quanto la sanità del corpo e la malattia<br />
sono, per riconoscimento comune, diverse e dissimili, ma il dissimile desidera ed ama cose dissimili.<br />
Altro è, dunque, l’amore in ciò che è sano e altro in ciò che è malato. (tr. Cambiano) 2<br />
Il passo indica che ciò che è diverso è dissimile e pertanto due enti dissimili non possono amare le<br />
medesime cose o essere attratti da enti simili. Ciò che è sano desidera ciò che a lui è simile e ciò che è<br />
malato ciò che è malato, per una legge universale che è quella per la quale al simile si accompagna<br />
sempre il simile.<br />
La strutturazione del corpo umano, così come quella di tutte le realtà, non è neutra, ma opera<br />
uno slittamento di senso, a mio avviso, dal concetto di simile al concetto di opposto. Tale slittamento<br />
è determinato dalla divisione della realtà in due campi differenti e opposti, ovvero nei due campi del<br />
sano e del malato. Nel Gorgia si afferma esplicitamente questo principio:<br />
chi sta bene si trova nella condizione opposta di chi sta male, non ti pare?<br />
[…]<br />
Perciò, se sono due condizioni opposte, deve valere per esse ciò che vale per la salute e la malattia:<br />
ossia un uomo non può essere sano e malato contemporaneamente, e neppure può liberarsi<br />
contemporaneamente della salute e della malattia. (Gorg. 495e2-9; tr. Zanetto, lievemente<br />
modificata). 3<br />
Non si può essere sani e malati allo stesso tempo e non si può non essere contemporaneamente né in<br />
una condizione di salute né in una condizione di malattia: tertium non datur.<br />
1 Cfr. Symp. 186a3-b2: «ὅτι δὲ οὐ µόνον ἐστὶν ἐπὶ ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων πρὸς τοὺς καλοὺς ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλα πολλὰ<br />
καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, τοῖς τε σώµασι τῶν πάντων ζῴων καὶ τοῖς ἐν τῇ γῇ φυοµένοις καὶ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς οὖσι,<br />
καθεωρακέναι µοι δοκῶ ἐκ τῆς ἰατρικῆς, τῆς ἡµετέρας τέχνης, ὡς µέγας καὶ θαυµαστὸς καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶν ὁ θεὸς τείνει καὶ κατ'<br />
ἀνθρώπινα καὶ κατὰ θεῖα πράγµατα».<br />
2 Symp. 186b4-8: « ἡ γὰρ φύσις τῶν σωµάτων τὸν διπλοῦν Ἔρωτα τοῦτον ἔχει· τὸ γὰρ ὑγιὲς τοῦ σώµατος καὶ τὸ νοσοῦν<br />
ὁµολογουµένως ἕτερόν τε καὶ ἀνόµοιόν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ἀνόµοιον ἀνοµοίων ἐπιθυµεῖ καὶ ἐρᾷ. ἄλλος µὲν οὖν ὁ ἐπὶ τῷ ὑγιεινῷ<br />
ἔρως, ἄλλος δὲ ὁ ἐπὶ τῷ νοσώδει.»<br />
3 Gorg. 495e2-9: « τοὺς εὖ πράττοντας τοῖς κακῶς πράττουσιν οὐ τοὐναντίον ἡγῇ πάθος πεπονθέναι; […] Ἆρ' οὖν, εἴπερ<br />
ἐναντία ἐστὶν ταῦτα ἀλλήλοις, ἀνάγκη περὶ αὐτῶν ἔχειν ὥσπερ περὶ ὑγιείας ἔχει καὶ νόσου; οὐ γὰρ ἅµα δήπου ὑγιαίνει τε καὶ<br />
νοσεῖ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, οὐδὲ ἅµα ἀπαλλάττεται ὑγιείας τε καὶ νόσου».
Silvio Marino<br />
Se all’interno del corpo umano si introduce la distinzione tra ciò che è sano e ciò che è malato, allora<br />
non può non instaurarsi una dialettica oppositiva all’interno stesso del corpo. Tale dialettica, però,<br />
inserita all’interno della costituzione degli enti, opera non solo a livello propriamente medico, ovvero<br />
non concerne soltanto le terapie atte a ripristinare uno stato di salute nel corpo, ma opera a livello più<br />
generale sul piano della strutturazione stessa degli enti, sia dal punto di vista cosmico (le relazioni tra<br />
i vari enti) sia dal punto di vista delle parti costitutive di ogni singolo ente. Infatti Erissimaco esplicita<br />
in che modo il medico debba operare:<br />
bisogna appunto essere in grado di rendere amiche e far innamorare reciprocamente nel corpo le<br />
proprietà più ostili. E le più ostili sono le più contrarie, il freddo al caldo, l’amaro al dolce, il secco<br />
all’umido e così via: per aver saputo produrre tra queste amore e concordia (ὁµόνοιαν) il nostro<br />
progenitore Asclepio, come dicono questi poeti ed io ne sono convinto, istituì la nostra tecnica (tr.<br />
Cambiano) 4<br />
Il principio per il quale il simile si unisce al simile si può rintracciare nel Regime pseudo-ippocratico,<br />
che mostra avere una particolare affinità anche con il discorso che si affronta nel Timeo (cfr. 57c2-7) 5 .<br />
Nel testo del Regime le relazioni di somiglianza si declinano secondo il concetto di “appropriato”,<br />
espresso con i termini σύµφερον e ὁµότροπον, e queste relazioni determinano l’aggregazione e la<br />
disgregazione dei composti e la posizione delle particelle all’interno degli enti:<br />
non è possibile infatti che ciò che non ha una struttura simile (ὁµότροπον) rimanga in luoghi<br />
inappropriati; (tali elementi) pertanto errano senza ragione. Ma una volta mescolati (questi elementi)<br />
sanno ciò a cui si uniscono: l’appropriato si unisce all’appropriato, mentre l’inappropriato entra in<br />
guerra, combatte e si separa. (De vict. I, 6, Joly 2003 p. 130, 11-15).<br />
La relazione di somiglianza viene espressa, in questo passo, attraverso il concetto di ὁµοτροπία e<br />
determina le condizioni di mutamento di luogo. Ma troviamo in questo passo qualcosa in più, perché<br />
gli elementi dissimili non sono neutri quanto alle reazioni che generano: essi iniziano a guerreggiare<br />
(πολεµεῖ), a farsi battaglia (µάχεται) e quindi si separano (διαλλάσσει). Possiamo ritrovare questa<br />
concezione dei mutamenti degli elementi anche nel Timeo: in questo dialogo platonico, infatti, gli<br />
elementi dissimili e non uniformi ingaggiano una lotta che porta o all’assimilazione dell’elemento<br />
debole all’elemento forte oppure comporta uno spostamento dell’elemento debole in un luogo a lui<br />
“adatto”, “appropriato” 6 .<br />
È importante sottolineare questo aspetto comune alla concezione platonica e a quella del<br />
Regime, in quanto questa strutturazione della materia si rivela non soltanto all’interno del corpo<br />
umano, oggetto proprio della medicina, ma anche all’interno del corpo politico, nelle relazioni tra gli<br />
uomini. Il processo di differenziazione cui gli enti sensibili sono soggetti, in quanto mutevoli, produce<br />
di fatto una situazione di conflitto tra i vari elementi (siano essi particelle, parti del corpo o uomini),<br />
una situazione che all’interno del corpo genera la patologia.<br />
Del resto, il principio per cui enti dissimili producono guerra e conflitto si ritrova in un passo<br />
molto interessante del De flatibus (altro trattato in cui molti studiosi hanno messo in evidenza le<br />
affinità con il discorso di Erissimaco per il tema del megas dynastes):<br />
[un regime di questo tipo è cattivo]: quando si ingeriscono cibi variati e tra di loro dissimili: le cose<br />
dissimili infatti entrano in conflitto (στασιάζει) e alcune sono digerite più rapidamente, altre più<br />
lentamente (Des vents VII, 1, Jouanna p. 111, 5-7) 7 .<br />
Il compito del medico, sia per Erissimaco sia per l’autore di Venti, è quello di equilibrare i cibi e gli<br />
elementi presenti nel corpo. È questo il senso dell’operazione che rende amiche le proprietà più<br />
4 Symp. 186d5-e1: «δεῖ γὰρ δὴ τὰ ἔχθιστα ὄντα ἐν τῷ σώµατι φίλα οἷόν τ' εἶναι ποιεῖν καὶ ἐρᾶν ἀλλήλων. ἔστι δὲ ἔχθιστα τὰ<br />
ἐναντιώτατα, ψυχρὸν θερµῷ, πικρὸν γλυκεῖ, ξηρὸν ὑγρῷ, πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα· τούτοις ἐπιστηθεὶς ἔρωτα ἐµποιῆσαι καὶ<br />
ὁµόνοιαν ὁ ἡµέτερος πρόγονος Ἀσκληπιός, ὥς φασιν οἵδε οἱ ποιηταὶ καὶ ἐγὼ πείθοµαι, συνέστησεν τὴν ἡµετέραν τέχνην.»<br />
5 Tim. 57c2-7: «le masse di ciascun elemento si distribuiscono in base al luogo che è loro proprio in virtù del movimento del<br />
ricettacolo che li accoglie, ma quelle parti di esse che di volta in volta divengono da sé dissimili e simili ad altre sono<br />
trascinate via, per il grande sommovimento, verso il luogo che è proprio di quelle cui sono divenute simili (διέστηκεν µὲν<br />
γὰρ τοῦ γένους ἑκάστου τὰ πλήθη κατὰ τόπον ἴδιον διὰ τὴν τῆς δεχοµένης κίνησιν, τὰ δὲ ἀνοµοιούµενα ἑκάστοτε ἑαυτοῖς,<br />
ἄλλοις δὲ ὁµοιούµενα, φέ-ρεται διὰ τὸν σεισµὸν πρὸς τὸν ἐκείνων οἷς ἂν ὁµοιωθῇ τόπον)» (tr. Fronterotta).<br />
6 Tim. 57a7b7; tr. Fronterotta leggermente modificata.<br />
7 Des vents VII, 1, Jouanna p. 111, 5-7: «ὅταν ποικίλας καὶ ἀνοµοίους ἀλλήλῃσιν ἐσπέµπῃ τροφὰς· τὰ γὰρ ἀνόµοια στασιάζει<br />
καὶ τὰ µὲν θᾶσσον, τὰ δὲ σχολαίτερον πέσσεται».<br />
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nemiche tra di loro.<br />
Per quanto riguarda questa operazione di accordo, il discorso di Erissimaco e il testo del<br />
Regime presentano una particolare affinità sia terminologica sia concettuale. Nel discorso del<br />
Simposio, infatti, Erissimaco introduce i termini symphonia e harmonia ed entrambi i testi utilizzano<br />
la tecnica musicale per spiegare i processi che avvengono nel corpo. Il termine symphonia occorre<br />
soltanto in questo trattato pseudo-ippocratico e il termine harmonia ha sette occorrenze nel Corpus<br />
hippocraticum, di cui ben quattro nel Regime. A partire da queste convergenze possiamo proporre un<br />
parallelo tra questi due testi e ipotizzare il senso del discorso di Erissimaco.<br />
Nel Simposio, dopo aver citato liberamente Eraclito (B 51), commentandone l’assurdità<br />
dell’affermazione, Erissimaco interpreta in questo modo il senso del pensiero del filosofo di Efeso:<br />
Ma forse voleva dire questo, cioè che da elementi prima discordi (διαφεροµένων), l’acuto e il grave,<br />
dopo che questi si sono accordati (ὁµολογησάντων) per opera della tecnica musicale, nasce in seguito<br />
l’armonia, perché certamente dal grave e dall’acuto ancora discordi non potrebbe nascere armonia,<br />
dato che l’armonia è consonanza (συµφωνία) e la consonanza è un certo tipo di accordo (ὁµολογία<br />
τις) – e che un accordo (ὁµολογία) risulti da elementi discordi, finché discordano, è impossibile, come<br />
è impossibile, d’altra parte, armonizzare ciò che è discorde e non si accorda (διαφερόµενον δὲ αὖ καὶ<br />
µὴ ὁµολογοῦν ἀδύνατον ἁρµόσαι) (Symp. 187a8-b7; tr. Cambiano) 8 .<br />
L’interpretazione del pensiero eracliteo, chiaramente piegata da Platone ai fini del discorso di<br />
Erissimaco, serve a far passare una serie di assimilazioni le quali tendono a mostrare che in realtà ogni<br />
operazione che la medicina e il medico possono realizzare si risolve nell’accordo, nella homologia,<br />
termine, quest’ultimo, non neutro per la dialettica platonica. È indicativo, inoltre, il fatto che si accosti<br />
il concetto di homologia a quello di harmonia (con l’uso del verbo corradicale harmosai). Se il<br />
dialegesthai individua nella homologia un concetto molto preciso, ovvero l’accordo che arriva alla<br />
fine di un dialogo condotto correttamente, in cui si giunge a una posizione condivisa dagli<br />
interlocutori, il concetto di harmonia indica qualcosa di più ampio e che può essere utilizzato in<br />
diversi contesti. Questo concetto può infatti indicare un patto stipulato tra uomini, i legamenti della<br />
zattera di Odisseo, un accordo musicale, o anche un legame costitutivo di un holon. Con<br />
l’accostamento dei due concetti di homologia e di harmonia Platone allarga il campo semantico del<br />
concetto di homologia e lo rende estendibile a quelle realtà che non si pongono primariamente in un<br />
orizzonte dialogico.<br />
Nel Regime il ricorso alla musica viene usato nel medesimo spirito: la musica serve a<br />
mostrare e a spiegare i processi di mutamento, di agglomerazione e di disgregazione delle particelle<br />
che non possono essere colti dall’esperienza sensibile:<br />
Una volta che [queste particelle] hanno cambiato luogo e che hanno trovato una corretta armonia che<br />
ha rapporti musicali secondo le tre consonanze, la quarta, la quinta e l’ottava, esse vivono e<br />
aumentano grazie agli stessi alimenti di cui fruivano precedentemente; ma se esse non trovano<br />
l’armonia, se cioè i suoni gravi non sono consonanti con quelli acuti nel primo intervallo o nel<br />
secondo o nell’ottava, mancando uno solo di essi, tutto l’accordo è senza effetto. 9<br />
Il passo appena citato si riferisce ai processi che investono il corpo umano, oggetto di trattazione<br />
specifica a partire dal capitolo VII del primo libro del Regime. Non penso possa essere casuale il<br />
richiamo alla musica e ai concetti di harmonia e di symphonia nel discorso di Erissimaco, sia se<br />
pensiamo a un’influenza diretta dell’uno sull’altro sia se pensiamo a una matrice comune, a un<br />
immaginario comune della riflessione medica e fisica del cosmo e dell’uomo.<br />
Del resto, quanto occorre sottolineare dell’ampiezza della spiegazione fornita da Erissimaco è<br />
il fatto che essa riesce a mettere in connessione il microcosmo col macrocosmo, anche in relazione<br />
alle realtà fisiche esterne all’uomo: è il caso dell’alternarsi delle stagioni dell’anno e della costituzione<br />
di ognuna di esse (ἡ τῶν ὡρῶν τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ σύστασις). Infatti anche qui compare il lessico della<br />
tecnica musicale:<br />
8 Symp. 187a8-b7«ἀλλὰ ἴσως τόδε ἐβούλετο λέγειν, ὅτι ἐκ διαφεροµένων πρότερον τοῦ ὀξέος καὶ βαρέος, ἔπειτα ὕστερον<br />
ὁµολογησάντων γέγονεν ὑπὸ τῆς µουσικῆς τέχνης. οὐ γὰρ δήπου ἐκ διαφεροµένων γε ἔτι τοῦ ὀξέος καὶ βαρέος ἁρµονία ἂν<br />
εἴη· ἡ γὰρ ἁρµονία συµφωνία ἐστίν, συµφωνία δὲ ὁµολογία τις – ὁµολογίαν δὲ ἐκ διαφεροµένων, ἕως ἂν διαφέρωνται,<br />
ἀδύνατον εἶναι· διαφερόµενον δὲ αὖ καὶ µὴ ὁµολογοῦν ἀδύνατον ἁρµόσαι».<br />
9 De vict. I, VIII, Joly, CMG, p. 132, 6-10: « χώρην δὲ ἀµείψαντα καὶ τυχόντα ἁρµονίης ὀρθῆς ἐχούσης συµφωνίας τρεῖς,<br />
συλλαβήν, διʼ ὀξέων, διὰ πασέων, ζώει καὶ αὔξεται τοῖσιν αὐτοῖσιν, οἵσί περ καὶ πρόσθεν· ἢν δὲ µὴ τύχῃ τῆς ἁρµονίης, µηδὲ<br />
σύµφωνα τὰ βαρέα τοῖσιν ὀξέσι γένηται ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ συµφωνίῃ ἢ τῇ δευτέρῃ ἢ τῇ διὰ παντὸς, ἑνὸς ἀπογενοµένου πᾶς ὁ<br />
τόνος µάταιος»<br />
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Il fatto è che anche la costituzione delle stagioni dell’anno è piena di entrambi questi amori e quando<br />
quei contrari che dicevo poco fa, il caldo e il freddo, il secco e l’umido, abbiano raggiunto<br />
reciprocamente l’amore ordinato e abbiano assunto una saggia armonia e mescolanza (καὶ ἁρµονίαν<br />
καὶ κρᾶσιν λάβῃ σώφρονα), allora il loro arrivo apporta buona annata e salute agli uomini, agli altri<br />
animali e alle piante e nulla compie ingiustizia (καὶ οὐδὲν ἠδίκησεν). (Symp. 188a1-6; tr. Cambiano<br />
leggermente modificata) 10 .<br />
Il principio della harmonia si declina, come per le proprietà costituenti l’uomo, così anche per quelle<br />
che costituiscono le stagioni. Innanzitutto possiamo notare che le proprietà che vengono citate, che<br />
possono dirsi “classiche” nei trattati medici o nella speculazione peri physeos, sono le coppie<br />
caldo/freddo e secco/umido. Queste due coppie sono anche le istanze prime della costituzione<br />
dell’universo per l’autore del Regime, in quanto tutto si genera attraverso i due elementi del fuoco e<br />
dell’acqua, che hanno come proprietà rispettivamente il caldo e il secco e il freddo e l’umido (cfr. il<br />
capitolo IV del primo libro). Ma Erissimaco procede nell’esposizione dell’azione di eros facendo<br />
slittare il senso da un piano fisiologico a un piano prettamente morale: spia di ciò è il verbo ἠδίκησεν<br />
che compare alla fine del passo citato. Il riferimento alla tecnica musicale, presa come paradigma<br />
esplicativo di tutte le realtà (corporali e ambientali), viene arricchito da un cortocircuito semantico per<br />
il quale la harmonia e la symphonia fanno sì che nulla “compia ingiustizia”, il che equivale a dire che<br />
harmonia e symphonia producono e ingenerano in qualsiasi essere giustizia.<br />
Il quadro tratteggiato da Erissimaco riesce a raggruppare assieme piani di discorso differenti<br />
presi da vari settori del sapere e a ricostruire un senso profondo. Ed è a questo livello, che<br />
sbaglieremmo a definire “astratto” tout court, che possiamo leggere il lessico proprio del dialegesthai<br />
platonico in un’altra prospettiva da quella che concerne prettamente lo scambio dialogico tra gli<br />
interlocutori di un dialogo.<br />
Se vogliamo tirare le somme di quanto esposto precedentemente, possiamo intravvedere in<br />
che modo Platone si appropri di tutto un armamentario concettuale proprio della medicina di stampo<br />
physiologico e riesca a fonderla con dinamiche e concetti propri della discussione dialogica e politica.<br />
Se poniamo attenzione ai passi e traiamo le conclusioni per quanto riguarda le assimilazioni operate<br />
da Platone ci troviamo di fronte a questa catena di termini: eros-homonoia-armonia-symphoniahomologia-sophron-dikaion.<br />
Gli slittamenti di piano dei termini impiegati da Erissimaco mostrano il passaggio da un piano<br />
biologico a un piano “erotico” (eros), un piano politico (homonoia), un piano biologico e musicale<br />
fino ad arrivare a un piano etico. Se prendiamo questa prospettiva per inquadrare il senso del discorso<br />
del medico, possiamo immaginare che qui Platone stia suggerendo, attraverso la bocca di Erissimaco,<br />
una sorta di cosmologia dialogica, in cui tutto il cosmo, nei suoi diversi piani strutturali, è legato da<br />
una logica biologica, il cui dispositivo funziona per esclusione del dissimile (che genera adikia) e<br />
inclusione del simile (che genera harmonia, symphonia, homologia e homonoia) e che viene non a<br />
caso a investire il piano dialogico e il piano prettamente politico: il termine homonoia infatti in<br />
Platone si trova in contesti esclusivamente politici e indica il corretto sistema di relazioni tra gli<br />
uomini, che non è altro poi che la giustizia.<br />
Il discorso di Erissimaco è, da questa prospettiva, una sorta di appunti non sistematizzati di<br />
una cosmologia dialogica, che trova la propria sponda ancora una volta nel primo libro del Regime,<br />
nel capitolo undicesimo:<br />
Tutte le cose, infatti, sono simili, pur essendo dissimili; tutte sono compatibili, pur essendo<br />
incompatibili; tutte dialogano, pur non dialogando; tutte hanno intelligenza pur essendone prive; il<br />
modo di ciascuna cosa è contrario pur accordandosi (ὁµολογεόµενος). Il nomos e la physis, attraverso<br />
i quali facciamo tutto, non si accordano pur accordandosi. 11<br />
Anche nel Regime occorrono termini molto prossimi all’elaborazione concettuale del dialegesthai così<br />
com’è pensato da Platone, e anche qui questi concetti non servono semplicemente a spiegare soltanto<br />
10 Symp. 188a1-6: «ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡ τῶν ὡρῶν τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ σύστασις µεστή ἐστιν ἀµφοτέρων τούτων, καὶ ἐπειδὰν µὲν πρὸς<br />
ἄλληλα τοῦ κοσµίου τύχῃ ἔρωτος ἃ νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, τά τε θερµὰ καὶ τὰ ψυχρὰ καὶ ξηρὰ καὶ ὑγρά, καὶ ἁρµονίαν καὶ<br />
κρᾶσιν λάβῃ σώφρονα, ἥκει φέροντα εὐετηρίαν τε καὶ ὑγίειαν ἀνθρώποις καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις τε καὶ φυτοῖς, καὶ οὐδὲν<br />
ἠδίκησεν».<br />
11 Regime I, XI,πάντα γὰρ ὅµοια, ἀνόµοια ἐόντα· καὶ σύµφονα πάντα, διάφορα ἐόντα· διαλεγόµενα, οὐ διαλεγόµενα· γνώµην<br />
ἔχοντα, ἀγνώµονα. ὑπεναντίος ὁ τρόπος ἐκάστων ὁµολογεόµενος. Νόµος γὰρ καὶ φύσις, οἷσι πάντα διαπρησσόµεθα, οὐχ<br />
ὁµολογεῖται ὁµολογεόµενα. (Joly 2003 CMG pp. 134, 24-136, 1).<br />
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dei fenomeni fisici; essi servono a ricostruire i diversi piani di realtà attraverso una struttura<br />
relazionale improntata a rapporti oppositivo-polari.<br />
Il discorso di Erissimaco, da questo particolare angolo visuale, introduce quindi concetti<br />
biologici all’interno stesso della pratica dialogica (e politica) e viceversa. L’uso da parte di Erissimaco<br />
di termini come homologia e homonoia apre a una prospettiva dialogica e politica per quanto<br />
concerne tutte le realtà esistenti. In questo modo il medico del Simposio produce un doppio<br />
movimento concettuale (presente anche nel I libro del Regime) per cui dal dialogico si passa al<br />
biologico e dal biologico al dialogico, ovvero instaura una comunicazione tra due piani: quello della<br />
physis e quello della techne.<br />
Il risultato degli slittamenti di senso risulta essere doppio. Da un lato, infatti, si introduce nel<br />
campo del dialogico una dinamica necessaria (di derivazione biologica) in cui i rapporti tra gli<br />
elementi seguono il principio del “simile”; dall’altro, all’interno del campo cosmologicoantropologico,<br />
servendosi di principi dialogici applicati al piano fisico, si propone una sorta di<br />
cosmologia dialogica che riesce a legare i diversi piani di realtà in cui l’uomo si trova a essere.<br />
BIBLIOGRAFIA MINIMA<br />
E.M. Craik, Plato and medical texts: <strong>Symposium</strong>: 185c–193d, in «Classical Quarterly» LI, 2001,<br />
pp.109-114.<br />
L. Edelstein, The Role of Eryximachus in Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong>, in «Transactions and Proceedings of<br />
the American Philological Association Vol. 76, (1945), pp. 85-103».<br />
S.B. Levin, Eryximachus's tale: The <strong>Symposium</strong>'s role in Plato's Critique of medicine, in «Apeiron»<br />
2009, XLII, pp. 275-308.<br />
R. Joly, Recherches sur le traité pseudo-hippocratique du Régime, Paris 1960.<br />
P. Laspia, L’articolazione linguistica. Origini biologiche di una metafora, NIS, Roma 1997.<br />
A. Thivel, Eryximaque et le principe des contraires, in «Cuadernos de filologia clàsica» (G) XIV,<br />
2004, pp. 35-44.<br />
R. Wardy, The unity of opposites in Plato's <strong>Symposium</strong>, in «Oxford studies in ancient philosophy»,<br />
XXIII, 2002, pp. 1-61.<br />
192
ABSTRACT<br />
Eryximachus’ Physical Theory in Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong><br />
Richard D. Parry<br />
In line with recent attempts to defend the coherence of Eryximachus’ speech, this paper will explore<br />
the similarity between his account of double eros and Empedocles’ account of Love and Strife. I<br />
assume that, in basing Eryximachus’ account on Empedocles’, Plato is offering a variation of the<br />
latter that deserves serious consideration. Empedocles posits four roots: fire, air, water, and earth<br />
(B6). These are not the mutually aggressive opposites, found in Anaximander and Heracleitus, that<br />
devour one another. Rather, they either cohere with or flee one another, depending on whether Love<br />
or Strife rules (B17, 23). Eryximachus’ theory is similar—but only to a point. His speech begins with<br />
a medical theory in which appetites are subject either to noble eros (which is orderly and healthful) or<br />
to base eros (which is hubristic, causing disease). Medicine, which institutes noble eros in place of the<br />
base, is knowledge about bodily desires’ (tôn erôtikôn) filling and emptying. This medical theory<br />
finds some important parallels in the account of medicine in the Gorgias, especially in the relation of<br />
health to orderly appetites and of disease to undisciplined ones (493e-494a; 500e-501c; 503e-505b;<br />
517d-518d). For Eryximachus, whether the appetites are healthy or not depends on whether noble eros<br />
rules the opposites that compose the body, instituting not only desire (eros) but also accord (homoia)<br />
among cold and hot, bitter and sweet, dry and moist (186a-e). In Eryximachus’ account of the system<br />
of the seasons, we can see how noble eros institutes accord among opposites. When noble eros unites<br />
hot, cold, dry, and moist in harmony and temperate mixture (harmonian kai krasin…sôphrona),<br />
fertility and health result for humans, animals, and plants. When base eros rules, the opposites destroy<br />
one another and commit injustice, resulting in pestilence and disease (188a-b). First, then, unlike<br />
Empedocles, Eryximachus keeps the opposites, as found in, e.g., Anaximander (B1). Second, noble<br />
eros affects both bodily appetites and the opposites. Thus, we need not suppose that eros in bodily<br />
desires is different from eros among the opposites—as some hold. If we suppose that, in Anaximander<br />
and Heracleitus, the opposites consume one another because of desire, the desire would be like hunger<br />
or thirst. A variation on this kind of opposition would have them sexually desire one another, like<br />
lovers. Then the hot would have a desire for its opposite, the cold, to fill some lack it has. If noble<br />
eros rules, the hot is filled without completely destroying the cold and committing injustice. Since the<br />
same can be said for the desire of the cold for the hot, they achieve harmony with respect to their<br />
desires; thus, noble eros causes friendship and accord. This type of integration of elements into a<br />
larger whole makes their coherence into a regulated mutual dependence. It is what we would call<br />
chemical—and, as we shall see, has advantages over Empedocles’ combination of elements. Still,<br />
Eryximachus’ account has other deficiencies, given its position in the series of speeches.
The concept of harmony (187 a-e) and its cosmological role in Eryximachus’<br />
discourse<br />
Introduction<br />
Laura Candiotto<br />
This article aims to analyze the role of harmony specifically in the <strong>Symposium</strong> 187a-e and, more<br />
generally, in Eryximachus’ discourse. In opposition to those who consider Eryximachus a pedant 1 ,<br />
whose discourse is refuted by Diotima’s discourse 2 , the paper proposes an interpretation emphasizing<br />
literary and philosophical aspects which enable us to grasp the positive significance carried by<br />
Eryximachus’ discourse within the <strong>Symposium</strong> 3 .<br />
After having analyzed Eryximachus’ character and its role in the dialogue, the concept of<br />
“harmony” will be explored in relation to pre-Socratic physics and Hippocratic medicine. The aim of<br />
this article is to evaluate the philosophical import of a “cosmological medicine”, emphasizing how<br />
this concept recurs also in other dialogues, and to present reasons for considering it as an expression<br />
of platonic philosophy.<br />
Eryximachus and the medicine of IV Century<br />
Eryximachus 4 is a physikos belonging to a family of doctors 5 (his father is Acumenus) whose<br />
members trace their origin back to Asclepius. As a platonic character, we find him – in addition to the<br />
<strong>Symposium</strong> – in Protagoras 315c, where he questions Hippias about nature, astronomy and<br />
meteorology. Moreover, he is cited in Phaedrus 268a as Phaedrus’s friend 6 . In these three occasions<br />
he is presented as a friend of Phaedrus, so his relationship with him developed at least from 433/432<br />
BC, dramatic dating of Protagoras, to 416 BC, dramatic dating of the <strong>Symposium</strong>. One Eryximachus<br />
is cited among those who desecrate the Herms in 415, but it is not clear whether or not he is the<br />
Eryximachus we are referring to.<br />
Eryximachus represents temperance or – we could say on the basis of what will be<br />
demonstrated below – the concept of harmony: as a symposiarch he decides a correct balance to the<br />
proportions of water and wine 7 , as a doctor he proposes a therapy for Aristophanes’ hiccups 8 , as a<br />
good musician he establishes the order of discourses and restores it after the disorder generated by<br />
Alcibiades’ arrival 9 . The characterization of Eryximachus reflects thus the content conveyed by his<br />
encomium of Eros and by his prominent position in the dialogue 10 . Arguably, grasping these aspects<br />
enables us to question, at least partially, the assumption that Eryximachus’ discourse is pedantic and<br />
sophistic.<br />
Plato intervened with a discourse of this type in the debate 11 concerning the relation between<br />
philosophy and medicine, which develops in the fifth Century due to the establishment of Hippocratic<br />
medicine 12 . In the discourse of Eryximachus, Plato places himself between Empedocles and the Ionics<br />
on the one hand and Hippocrates on the other 13 . The discourse is thought also as a response to<br />
Eleatism and Heraclitism in relation to the nature of the compounds.<br />
The Cosmological role of harmony<br />
We are going to highlight now the aspects of closeness and distance between Eryximachus’ discourse<br />
and each of these positions, in particular in relation to the cosmological role of harmony, to the<br />
1<br />
Bury 1909, Robin 1929, Dover 1980, Rosen 1987, Nehamas 1989.<br />
2<br />
For example Corrigan 2004.<br />
3<br />
In line with Edlestein 1945, Konstan, Young-Bruehl 1982, Rowe 1999, Hunter 2004, McPerrhan 2006, Cooksey 2010.<br />
4<br />
Nails 2002.<br />
5<br />
Plat., Symp. 214b.<br />
6<br />
Cf. also Plat., Symp. 177a.<br />
7<br />
Plat., Symp.176b, 214b.<br />
8<br />
Plat., Symp. 185c7-8.<br />
9<br />
Plat. Symp. 223b.<br />
10<br />
In agreement with what has been demonstrated by Edelstein 1945, in particular cf. p. 99.<br />
11<br />
Cambiano 1991, Longrigg 1993, Vegetti 1995.<br />
12 Edelstein 1945.<br />
13 Jouanna 1961.
Laura Candiotto<br />
observation of nature and in general to the relationship between philosophy and physics 14 . By<br />
focusing on these themes it is possible to individuate more clearly the platonic position present in<br />
Eryximachus’s discourse.<br />
Eryximachus’s discourse can be subdivided into six sections 15<br />
Prologue: Eryximachus refers to the discourse of Pausanias saying that it is right to retain a double<br />
nature for Eros but such double nature needs to be extended to the whole cosmos.<br />
Section 1: Eros and medicine. The body manifests Eros’ double nature in the coexistence of healthy<br />
desires and unhealthy desires. Medicine is the science of the erotic tendencies of the body to fill and<br />
empty itself. It enables the distinction between healthy and unhealthy desires. The task of the doctor is<br />
to transform the fight between the two Eros in friendship by operating on opposites: cold/hot,<br />
bitter/sweet, dry/humid.<br />
Section 2: Eros and music. Eryximachus comments Eraclitus’ fragment DK 22 b51, interpreting it<br />
from a temporal perspective: the doctor musician is able to create harmony from an initial discord. He<br />
operates thus through a technique which is able to transform the discordant into concordant. Music is<br />
then the science of love of harmony and rhythm. It is important to take care of both forms of Eros,<br />
using cautiously that of the muse Polyhymnia, enjoying its pleasure without falling sick.<br />
Section 3: Eros and meteorology and astronomy. Prosperity and Health happen when the opposites<br />
find themselves reciprocally united in an ordered love and support each other in harmony and<br />
temperate mixture. When excessive Eros prevails (hybreos Eros), which leads to imbalance, we<br />
witness epidemics, disease and destruction.<br />
Section 4: Eros and religion. Friendship between men and Gods happens by seconding ordered Eros.<br />
Epilogue: Eryximachus concludes by saying that Eros possesses a universal power and that happiness<br />
comes from that Eros which aims to the good with justness and moderation. He passes then the baton<br />
to Aristophanes inviting him to fill the gaps in his speech.<br />
This article focuses on Section two, but it is immediately evident that this section is<br />
intertwined with the other sections, thus it is fundamental to interpret it through an analysis of the<br />
comprehensive significance of Eryximachus’ discourse and of the role that he plays in the dialogue.<br />
Already in section one the text clearly reveals the relevance Eryximachus attributes to the<br />
praxis which establishes friendship between previously contrasting forces. Nature is composed of<br />
opposite forces whose dynamics create movement and transformation. The doctor qua good physicist<br />
and knower of the cosmos must know the Erotic tendencies of elements in order to help them to come<br />
together in relations of mutual friendship. In Eryximachus’ discourse, Empedocle’s two cosmic forces<br />
– philia and neikos – assume an immanent character as forces that compose nature in ordered and<br />
disordered forms. Equilibrium is dynamic 16 : in Empedoclean terms, it is possible to maintain that the<br />
predominance of philia on neikos does not cancel neikos but shapes it in the right proportion.<br />
Eryximachus transforms thus the Empedoclean perspective which defines the starting point of his<br />
discourse by emphasizing the necessary coexistence of the two forces 17 . Such coexistence will not be<br />
conflictual as in Eraclitus, but it will unfold in harmonic proportion. In the second section<br />
Eryximachus transforms in fact Eraclitus’ own maxim to his own advantage. Harmony is not realized<br />
by discordant things but by transforming discordant things into concordant ones. For Eryximachus,<br />
Eraclitus intended to say that harmony is realized by things that before were discordant and that,<br />
thanks to medical praxis, become concordant. Harmony is in fact both consonance (symphonia), and<br />
agreement (omologhia). The physics described by Eryximachus is not an ordered and harmonic whole<br />
but a world in movement and transformation that must be ordered by a doctor-demiurge following the<br />
principle of harmony 18 . In this way, E. emphasizes the role of technique 19 and of human action in the<br />
universe. Such a role consists of creating a dynamic equilibrium by transforming discordant forces<br />
into concordant ones, without falling into the error of eliminating one of the two poles but finding the<br />
right rhythm to enjoy the pleasure that the negative force offers whence a relation is established with<br />
the positive one. Moderation or temperance is not thus the dictatorship of the positive, but the right<br />
proportion between the different constituents of the universe, like the right proportion between water<br />
14 The study of Jouanna (1998) is crucial on this issue.<br />
15 In this division, I am following Bury 1976.<br />
16 Interestingly, this concept will be taken up in Roman times by the Pneumatics, whilst in the nineties of the last century<br />
research on physiology of stress led to the revision of the traditional concept of homeostasis (restoration of the same<br />
equilibrium) and its substitution with the concept of allostasis (different equilibrium). Cf. Bottaccioli 2010, p. 25.<br />
17 It is important to notice that in section two Eryximachus says that he is taking care also of the Eros of the muse<br />
Polyhymnia.<br />
18 According to McPherran the interpretation of Heraclitus’ maxim demonstrates the fact that Eryximachus is not a “slave to<br />
pre-Socratic science”. Mc Pherran 2006, p. 80, n27.<br />
19 For a detailed analysis of the concept in comparison to that present in Gorgias, cf. Levin 2009.<br />
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Laura Candiotto<br />
and wine to prevent intoxication, as explained by Eryximachus in 176c1-e3.<br />
Rhythm, which transforms the fast and the slow from discordant to concordant, is realized<br />
thanks to numeric harmony. In this perspective Eryximachus refers explicitly to the Pythagorean<br />
doctrine 20 and establishes a relation between the harmony which manifests itself in the cosmos and an<br />
“invisible” harmony. In fact it is the number 21 , a being that is invisible yet present in the visible,<br />
which creates harmony within the proportional relation. Musical harmony, which can be perceived<br />
through ears but which is realized through the numerical proportion between high-pitched and low<br />
pitched sounds is thus the bond holding together body and soul 22 , the sensible and ideas. Conversely,<br />
celestial harmony does not possess the double nature of Eros: Eryximachus argues in fact that in<br />
harmony itself (thus in the idea of harmony) there is no duality 23 . Duality is rather the model<br />
according to which the musician-demiurges must order the opposite forces which are present in the<br />
physis. The medical-demiurgical-musical art thus implies the restoration of a hidden proportion. 24<br />
Eryximachus’ discourse distinguishes thus two harmonizing actions: one creates harmony in<br />
the sensible universe on the model of the intelligible; the other creates harmony between the sensible<br />
and the intelligible.<br />
The topic of the cosmological function of celestial harmony obviously recalls the Timaeus.<br />
This dialogue clearly explains that the harmony of the microcosm should be related to that of the<br />
macrocosm. Accordingly, the health of the body will be properly defined as the right equilibrium<br />
among elements 25 , the health of the soul as the absence of excesses in the constitution of its nature,<br />
good education and mode of life. Music 26 absolves the task of healing the soul by restoring the<br />
balance lost 27 through incarnation. The right proportion amongst elements is intended by Timaeus as<br />
conformity to nature, imbalance as a disorder that creates illness in the body and the soul. In fact,<br />
nature has been created by the demiurge in the best possible way, yet it presents imbalances due to the<br />
disorder of elements in the chora. This explains the necessity of the ordering role of a magistratedemiurge<br />
who legislates, as well as the healing practice of a doctor who heals the soul and the body 28<br />
taking as a model the constitution of the Universe 29 . In the Philebus 30 , the Good performs the function<br />
of a good mixture so that the elements are well blended, insofar as, once again, an incorrect relation<br />
between elements causes the ruin of the whole within which they are contained.<br />
The composition of elements<br />
How are elements composed? 31<br />
Eryximachus’ discourse presents the theory of the composition of contraries, based on the law<br />
that “the similar loves the similar” 32 . Eryximachus therefore endorses the concept of harmony as unity<br />
of opposites, yet in a way different from Heraclitus: the unity in question is possible only if the<br />
opposites become friends, transforming their nature from that of discordant opposites to a<br />
composition of similar elements (i.e. to that of concordant ones). A qualitative change takes place.<br />
Friendship does not imply a shift from opposition to identity, but from opposition to the proportion<br />
20 For Pitagoras cosmic harmony depends on the unity produced by the tension between opposites and its essence is in<br />
numbers in the opposition between the even and the odd. Cf. for example Philolaus, 44 a1 DK.<br />
21 It is the number that enables a Harmonic combination intended as limit between high and low pitched sounds Cf. Phl.<br />
26a3-5<br />
22 Pelosi 2010.<br />
23 Symp. 187 c5-7.<br />
24 Jaeger 1936, Reale 1999.<br />
25 The illnesses of the body caused by a disequilibrium of elements are described in Tim. 81e6-86a8.<br />
26 Also the word, if it is that of true rhetoric, absolves the task of pharmakon. On this topic I refer to the second chapter of<br />
my monography, Candiotto 2012, with the intention to explore further the theme of the analogy between music and true<br />
rhetoric – especially in Phaedrus and Gorgias – in the near future. To emphasize the centrality of this theme it suffices to<br />
mention – focusing on the symposium – the definition of Socrates as a flautist in Symp. 215b8.<br />
27 Tim. 47 c-e. Cf. Barker 2000, Barker 2005, pp. 125-126.<br />
28 Tim.88b5-c1<br />
29 Tim. c7-d1<br />
30 Phil. 64d9-65a5.<br />
31 The Timaeus, again, is of fundamental importance in addressing this question. In particular, the theory of the composition<br />
of elements through the mélange of Same and Different is presented in the passage 35a-b. For our study it is important to<br />
emphasize the role played by harmony in inducing the Different, refractory to composition, to mix with the Identical.<br />
Compositions in fact will be born from the union and subsequent subdivision in parts (through particular numerical<br />
proportions) of Identical, Different and intermediate substance. Compositions are thus born from three elements, thanks to<br />
the primary harmonizing work of the demiurge, who operates on the two opposite principles of the Same and the Different.<br />
For further reading, Cf. Brisson 1998.<br />
32 Thivel (2004) questions whether Eryximachus’ theory is to be considered mainly as a theory of the opposites, arguing for<br />
the preeminence of the theory of the similar in his discourse.<br />
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Laura Candiotto<br />
between similar elements. Proportion pertains in fact to the correct measure, the reciprocal relation<br />
between different elements. Through a quantitative transformation (in other words, by creating the<br />
right proportion) the contrasting relation between elements becomes harmonic. Elements change their<br />
oppositional qualities thanks to a quantitative change. For this reason Eryximachus maintains that<br />
Polyhymnian Eros must be retained but that its presence must be well proportioned in relation to that<br />
of Uranian Eros. The duality of Eros is functional therefore to the medical concept of harmonic<br />
proportion between elements.<br />
Eryximachus is able to elaborate this perspective not only thanks to Pythagorean,<br />
Empedoclean and Eraclitean contributes, but also thanks to his medical formation.<br />
Medicine and philosophy emerge in fact from the same cultural and professional substratum,<br />
with ample and persistent reciprocal influences 33 . For example, the combination between Crotoniate<br />
medicine and Pythagoreanism can be traced back to the first historically known philosopher-doctor,<br />
Alcmaeon. We owe him the first definition of health and illness based on the concepts of harmony<br />
and equilibrium. Even if Empedocles’ medical praxis is quite different from that of Hippocrates, the<br />
former’s work was to inspire the latter’s theory of four elements.<br />
Hippocrates, albeit younger, is Plato’s contemporary. It is therefore easy to think that Plato,<br />
through Eryximachus, presents a medical theory which entertained a dialogical relation with the<br />
Hippocratic one 34 .<br />
Eryximachus between Plato and Hippocrates<br />
An important point to be established is whether Eryximachus’ discourse is characterized more by a<br />
Hippocratic conception, a platonic one or by a combination of the two.<br />
The cosmological significance of medicine is ascribed to Hippocrates by Plato himself in Phaedrus<br />
270 c-d, when Phaedrus tells Socrates that not only the nature of the soul, but also that of the body<br />
cannot be known without knowing the nature of the Whole.<br />
Greek medicine focuses from the beginning on the natural context in which life manifests<br />
itself. Knowing the physical environment in a broad sense, from stars to waters to air, is crucial in<br />
order to know the human being and the conditions of health and disease 35 . In Airs, Waters and Places<br />
the healthy city is characterized by equilibrate seasons: such equilibrium is the equivalent of<br />
moderation (metriotes), a state where there are not sudden changes (metabolè). Such changes are the<br />
ecological equivalent of hybris; excess in its moral dimension.<br />
These elements are present in Eryximachus’ discourse (it is possible to mention here hybreos<br />
eros, cited specifically in relation to seasons, 36 and its continuous emphasis on caution and<br />
temperance) and recur also in other platonic passages: in the already mentioned Timaeus but also in<br />
Charmides 37 , in relation to the cure for the headache of Charmides, and in the final of Phaedrus 38 .<br />
In the second section, Eryximachus talks about meteorology 39 . This is a clear reference to<br />
those texts of Hippocratic medicine 40 which refer to cosmological medicine. This medicine is also<br />
recalled in the usage of the Hippocratic word for equilibrium, eukrasia, literally “good mixture” which<br />
is used in Timaeus 41 in relation to the right combination of seasons, but not in Eryximachus’<br />
discourse, where the term used is harmonia. Plato uses in Eryximachus’ discourse the word harmonia<br />
in the second and third section as, in my opinion, he aims to emphasize how this relation of proportion<br />
between different elements, typical of musical harmony, is present from a cosmological perspective in<br />
the combination of seasons. Moreover, in the passage 188 a4, which concerns the seasons, Plato uses<br />
next to the word harmonia the term krasis, mixture, to recall not only Empedocles but also<br />
Hippocrates and to emphasize how Hippocratic eukrasia assumes a philosophical meaning whether<br />
conceived together with harmonia. In the Philebus musical harmony is realized through the<br />
combination of the Limited and the Limitless and – an aspect particularly relevant for our study – in<br />
33 Regarding the complex primal intertwining between philosophy and medicine, classical literature establishes the<br />
supremacy of philosophy over medicine (Edestein 1987, Cambiano 1991), whilst a reading which emphasizes the<br />
foundational contribution of medicine towards philosophy has been advanced in more recent years.<br />
34 Hippocrates has been cited in Prt. 311b-c, Phdr. 270 c-d, Chrm. 156 e.<br />
35 Edelstein individuates the general atmosphere of Eryximachus’ encomium in the Hippocratic text On the Art, cf. Edelstein<br />
1945, p.90. Konstan, Young-Bruehl in the Hippocratic text On Regimen, cf. Konstan, Young-Bruehl 1982, p.42.<br />
36 Symp.188a7.<br />
37 Charm. 155e.5-157c6.<br />
38 Phaedr. 279 b9-c5.<br />
39 Cf. Gaudin 1970 for the meaning of meteorology in Plato's philosophy.<br />
40 Cf. Hyppocrates, Airs, Waters, Places.<br />
41 Tim. 24 c6.<br />
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Laura Candiotto<br />
26b1-3 Socrates applies this concept to seasons.<br />
The harmony of opposites is connected by Eryximachus, however briefly, to divination and religious<br />
practice. Again in the Timaeus 42 we find a reference consistent with this topic, concerning the mixture<br />
of opposites within the liver that enables the operation of divination during sleep 43 . This passage<br />
enables us to grasp how the law of harmony acts not only between congener elements but, like in this<br />
case, also between images and physical elements – sweet and bitter – that constitute the liver.<br />
These passages – it would be possible to mention and analyze many others – are in my opinion the<br />
sign of a general 44 thematic concordance between Plato and Hippocrates in relation to a “cosmological<br />
medicine” and, more specifically, the sign of a conformity between Eryximachus discourse and<br />
platonic philosophy 45 . In the meanwhile, however, Plato’s effort in detecting and incrementing the<br />
philosophical meaning of Hippocratic medicine testifies his will to guarantee the epistemic primacy of<br />
philosophy and therefore to create a certain dependency of medicine on philosophy 46 . The predilection<br />
for the theory of the similar over the theory of contraries is a clue to Plato’s predilection for<br />
Empedocles rather than Heraclitus and for the theory of contraries presented by the Corpus<br />
Hippocraticum 47 .<br />
Harmonic education and cosmological medicine<br />
Corporeal illness, unhappiness, folly and the ignorance of the soul 48 , disorder at a meteorological<br />
level, religious impiety, hybris from an ethical and political perspective are expression of an infraction<br />
of the harmonic law which regulates the universe.<br />
These aspects emphasize the necessity of a technique which is able to re-create harmony<br />
taking celestial harmony as a model. The musical image of harmony is considered in this article<br />
mainly from the perspective of cosmological medicine, in other words, as a medical-demiurgical<br />
technique inserted in a cosmological contest 49 . The ethical and educative role of harmony (the<br />
references to the Laws 50 and the Republic 51 are central in relation to this theme) becomes thus<br />
meaningful in a holistic vision, where the praxis oriented towards the construction of the right<br />
harmony of the physical universe – but also of institutions and laws – takes celestial harmony as a<br />
model.<br />
In Plato, cosmological medicine – typical of an important part of the Hippocratic Corpus –<br />
takes up a philosophical meaning which pervades all fields of human activity, including ethics and<br />
politics. Arguably, Eryximachus’ discourse is thus expression of the platonic tendency to translate on<br />
the philosophical plane the implications of a model peri physeos.<br />
However, the harmonic technique cannot order everything once and for all. In the same way<br />
in which the demiurge’s act is a continuous series of exhortations to the chora 52 , so in the narrative<br />
framework the doctor Eryximachus advises against excessive drinking (in other words, he gives the<br />
prescription and provides the motivations), but he needs to obtain the consent of the patient, who will<br />
subsequently decide freely. The text in fact emphasizes that everyone will drink as he pleases 53<br />
without getting drunk. Eryximachus presents himself thus as a free doctor, using the terminology of<br />
the well-known passage of the Laws 54 in relation to the difference between doctors who are free and<br />
doctors who are slaves.<br />
Harmonic praxis is thus always linked to the theme of moral responsibility: the philosopher is<br />
also doctor, musician and demiurges in his harmonizing activity. Accordingly, there is no primacy of<br />
the physical plane over the ethical one, or of the ethical over the physical, but – we could say inspired<br />
by our theme – a reciprocal and harmonic relation.<br />
42<br />
Tim. 71 c3-d4.<br />
43<br />
Barker 2000.<br />
44<br />
This perspective is in contrast with that of Levin (2009), who maintains that in the <strong>Symposium</strong> Plato firmly criticizes the<br />
medical technique and seeks to limit the philosophical pretenses of medicine.<br />
45<br />
Accordingly, he does not represent the model of doctor which Plato seeks to oppose. Leven (2009) and others does not<br />
agree with this perspective.<br />
46<br />
According to Cambiano this was precisely what Hippocrates sought to avoid. Cf. Cambiano 1991, p. 41.<br />
47<br />
Cf. Thivel 2004, p. 42.<br />
48<br />
Cf. Tim. 86b1-4.<br />
49<br />
Brès 1973, pp. 287-319.<br />
50<br />
Leg. VII 790.<br />
51<br />
Third book.<br />
52<br />
For an ethical and political significance cf. Casertano 2003.<br />
53<br />
Symp. 176 e1-3.<br />
54<br />
Leg. IV 720 c-e.<br />
198
Conclusion: the philosophical import of a medicine connected to cosmology<br />
Laura Candiotto<br />
The perspective presented in Eryximachus’ discourse plays an important role among the passages of<br />
the Corpus Platonicum in relation to harmony, enabling to grasp its cosmological and holistic<br />
character. In his encomium cosmological medicine assumes the character of philosophy. Therefore it<br />
comes to partake in the general framework of a platonic philosophy of relations 55 , which aims to<br />
institute and recreate harmonies among parts whether operating at cosmological, ontological, ethical<br />
or political levels. Re-evaluating Eryximachus’ discourse in this light enables us also to verify the<br />
positive role of his character and his discourse in the interpretation of the <strong>Symposium</strong>. Although for<br />
reasons of space it is not possible to develop further this subject of enquiry in this paper, I would like<br />
to conclude with three questions which trace a possible trajectory of research: to what extent does the<br />
metaxy of Socrate-Diotima’s discourse depend on the concept of harmony developed by<br />
Eryximachus? Is it possible to intend the metaxy not as something which stands in the middle of a<br />
division but as a proportional equilibrium which does not transform the ugly in beautiful but in<br />
something qualitatively and quantitatively different? To what extent the ascent from the corporeal<br />
plane to divination present in Eryximachus’ encomium is connected to the erotic ascent expressed by<br />
Diotima? 56<br />
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Lombard, J., Platon et la médicine, le corps affaibli et l'âme attristé, L'Harmattan, Paris 1999.<br />
Longrigg, J., Greek rational medicine. Philosophy and medicine from Alcmeon to the Alexandrians,<br />
Routledge, London and New York 1993.<br />
Nails, D., The people of Plato. A prosopography of Plato and Other Socratics, Hackett Publishing<br />
Company, Indianapolis 2002.<br />
Natali, C., Maso, S. (eds.)(2003), Plato physicus. Cosmologia e antropologia nel Timeo, Adolf<br />
Kakkert Editore, Amsterdam.<br />
Nehamas, A., Woodruff, P., Plato: <strong>Symposium</strong>, Hackett, Indianapolis 1989.<br />
O'Brien, D., "Aristophanes' speech in Plato's <strong>Symposium</strong>: the empedoclean background and its<br />
philosophical significance", in A. Havlíček, M. Cajthaml, Plato's <strong>Symposium</strong>. Proceedings of the<br />
Fifth <strong>Symposium</strong> Platonicum Pragense, OYKOYMENH, Prague 2007.<br />
Pelosi, F., Plato: on Music, Soul and Body, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2010.<br />
Reale, G., Corpo, anima e salute. Il concetto di uomo da Omero a Platone, Raffaello Cortina Editore,<br />
Milano 1999.<br />
Robin, L., Le Banquet, Les Belles Lettres, Paris 1929<br />
Rosen, S., Plato's <strong>Symposium</strong>, Yale University Press, New Heaven 1987.<br />
Rowe, C. J., Plato: <strong>Symposium</strong>, Aris & Phillips, Oxford 1998.<br />
- "The Speech of Eryximachus in Plato's <strong>Symposium</strong>", in J. J. Cleary (ed.), Traditions of Platonism:<br />
Essays in Honour of John Dillon, Ashgate, Asleshot 1999, pp. 53-64.<br />
Temkin, C. L., Temkin, O., (eds.), Ancient Medicine: Selected Papers of Ludwig Edelstein, John<br />
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London 1987.<br />
Thivel, A., "Eryximaque et le principe des contraires", Estudios griegos e indoeuropeos 35<br />
2004, 14, pp. 35-44.<br />
Van der Eijk, P., (ed.), Greek Medicine by Jacques Jouanna, Brill, Leiden-Boston 2012.<br />
- Medicine and Philosophy in Classical Antiquity. Doctors and Philosophers on Nature, Soul, Health<br />
and Disease, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2005.<br />
Vegetti, M., La medicina in Platone, Il Cardo, Venezia 1995.<br />
Voltaggio, F., La medicina come scienza filosofica, Laterza, Roma 1998.<br />
Wardy, R., "The unity of opposites in Plato's <strong>Symposium</strong>", Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 23<br />
(2002), pp. 1-61.<br />
Wunenburger, J. J., "La dynamique Éraclitéenne des contraires et la naissance du mobilisme universel<br />
selon Platon", Les Études philosophiques, No. 1, Philosophie grecque — II: Platon — Aristote —<br />
Epicure (Janvier-Mars 1976), pp. 29-47.<br />
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Sophrosyne in the <strong>Symposium</strong><br />
Richard Stalley<br />
Most accounts of the <strong>Symposium</strong> rightly focus on its treatment of love. But, since the dialogue<br />
describes a drinking party, it also draws our attention to the pleasures and dangers of alcohol. Most of<br />
the participants are already suffering the effects of some serious drinking and the initial expectation is<br />
that this will continue (175e). But it is soon agreed that each should drink merely as much as suits his<br />
pleasure. The flute girl, a symbol of dissipation, is sent away and party-goers set about entertaining<br />
one another with speeches. They are eventually interrupted by the arrival of Alcibiades and a<br />
disorderly crowd of revellers. Alcibiades is so drunk that he needs the support of, among others,<br />
another flute girl (212d). He insists that much more wine should be consumed (213e-214a) and gives<br />
a speech about Socrates in which it is clear that alcohol has seriously loosened his tongue. When he<br />
has finished, the party is interrupted by a further irruption of drunken revellers. Some of the guests<br />
leave but most of the others drink themselves to oblivion. Only Socrates remains awake and sober to<br />
the end.<br />
By introducing us to a drinking party Plato inevitably directs our attention to the virtue which<br />
the Greeks called ‘sōphrosunē ’. This, of course, refers to the capacity to handle temptations,<br />
particularly those arising from bodily appetites. It is, thus, commonly translated. as ‘temperance’,<br />
‘self-control’ or ‘sobriety’. It is opposed to akolasia and to akrasia. As we know from the Charmides<br />
(159b), it is also used to describe moderate, orderly, and unobtrusive behaviour. It is associated with<br />
the Delphic maxims ‘Know thyself’ and ‘Nothing to much’. In these contexts ‘moderation or<br />
‘modesty’ may be preferred translations. Our sōphrosunē, or the lack of it, is particularly apparent in<br />
our use of alcohol. In moderate quantities this promotes conviviality and encourages free expression.<br />
But it can be a source of desires that are notoriously difficult to resist, and excessive consumption<br />
may cause us to do things which would horrify us if we were sober. For this reason Plato, in the Laws<br />
(645d-650a) recommends carefully managed drinking parties as a means of testing and developing<br />
young men’s powers of self-control. Sex is another source of desires which seem almost irresistible.<br />
It, too, can lead to behaviour which we would regard as shameful in other contexts. It can be<br />
destructive for the individual, for the family and for the wider community. So here, too, the virtue we<br />
need is sōphrosunē.<br />
Throughout the <strong>Symposium</strong> Socrates is represented as a model of sobriety. As Alcibiades puts<br />
it, externally he looks like Silenus but internally he is incredibly full of sōphrosunē (216d) So far as<br />
sex is concerned, he is presented as the lover of Alcibiades and as strongly attracted to any beautiful<br />
young man. But we also learn that Alcibiades could not seduce him into physically consummating his<br />
love. Socrates actually spent the whole night in the arms of his loved one without being physically<br />
aroused (217a-218c). So far as alcohol is concerned he does not care whether he drinks or not (176c),<br />
but he can consume as much as anyone and remain none the worse for it. By the end of the dialogue<br />
he is the only one to have survived the night awake, sober and ready for the new day. According to<br />
Alcibiades, he also showed extraordinary endurance during his military service. He withstood<br />
hardship and hunger better than anyone but he could enjoy a feast to the full. On such occasions he<br />
outlasted his companions in drinking but was never seen drunk (220a). He is contrasted, in these<br />
respects, with the notoriously dissolute Alcibiades. The latter not only arrives drunk but insists on<br />
further heavy drinking. He describes at length his elaborate, though unsuccessful attempts to seduce<br />
Socrates. He also admits to a kind of akrasia, for, although he is convinced by Socrates’ advice, he is<br />
unable to follow it. As soon as he leaves Socrates’ presence he is overcome by his desire for political<br />
glory (216b). He is, therefore, is utterly ashamed when he meets Socrates, but still does not change his<br />
behaviour.<br />
Given these points there can be little doubt that the <strong>Symposium</strong> draws attention to the virtue<br />
of sōphrosunē. But the question to consider now is whether the content of the speeches contributes to<br />
the philosophical understanding of this virtue<br />
Phaedrus’ uncritical praise of love shows no recognition that erotic desires may need restraint,<br />
but there is a change of direction when Pausanias introduces his distinction between the Heavenly<br />
Love, which should be encouraged, and the Common Love, which should not. This, no doubt, reflects<br />
the attitudes of Plato’s circle. They, too, would presumably disapprove of a love which is directed to<br />
women and young boys, which values the body rather than the soul and which aims to achieve<br />
gratification without caring whether it does so honourably or not. Likewise they might be expected to<br />
approve of the more enduring love that is directed to young men, whose power of understanding has<br />
already developed. Pausanias supports his claim that only the Heavenly Love merits gratification with
Richard Stalley<br />
an appeal to what he claims are Athenian customs. These forbid the pursuit of young boys, but<br />
encourage lovers to go to great lengths in the pursuit of those who are somewhat older. At the same<br />
time the objects of these attentions are expected to resist. The point of this, Pausanias claims, is to<br />
distinguish the common lovers, whose desire is purely physical, from those whose love is directed to<br />
the soul and who seek to benefit the loved ones by making them wise and virtuous. Only this latter<br />
group should be gratified (181b-182a).<br />
Although Socrates has already pointed out that mere physical contact cannot transfer wisdom<br />
from one person to another (175d-e), Pausanias assumes, without argument, that gratifying a lover’s<br />
desires can advance a young man in wisdom and virtue. His frequent references to nomos suggest that<br />
he is relying on the prejudices of his social milieu rather than on a clear conception of what makes life<br />
worth living. Even more striking is his account of Athenian customs. These, he claims, encourage<br />
lovers to engage in extraordinary kinds of behaviour — beseeching and begging their loved ones,<br />
swearing oaths and camping out on their doorsteps.They are even forgiven for breaking vows made<br />
under love’s influence. By Pausanias’ own admission, such behaviour would not be tolerated in any<br />
other circumstances (83c-d). He even claims that a lover should place himself in a kind of voluntary<br />
slavery to his beloved. So he clearly does not expect lovers to exercise moderation and self-control.<br />
All this is in marked contrast to the views Plato expresses elsewhere. In the Republic he argues that<br />
the correct kind of love is a sober (sōphrōn) love of order and beauty and has nothing mad or<br />
licentious about it. A lover may, therefore kiss and touch his beloved, as a father would, but no more<br />
(403a-b). In the Laws he again outlaws homosexual intercourse and, tellingly, points out that it could<br />
not be expected to promote virtue. It would not foster courage in the one who is seduced, nor<br />
sōphrosunē in the seducer (836d).<br />
Eryximachus presents himself as a man of sobriety. Early in the dialogue he portentously<br />
claims medical authority for the utterly obvious point that drinking can be harmful. His own speech<br />
starts with the claim that love is a force at work throughout nature. Medical science supports<br />
Pausanias’ view that it is twofold. In particular the love a body displays in so far as it is healthy is<br />
quite unlike the love it displays in so far as it is sick. Pausanias claimed that it is a fine thing to gratify<br />
the love of good men, but not that of the bad. Similarly one should gratify the healthy elements in the<br />
body and refuse gratification to the sick ones. Medicine is thus the science concerned with bodily<br />
loves. The skilled practitioner replaces sick forms with healthy ones.<br />
Some features of this passage recall the Gorgias. There Socrates relies heavily on an analogy between<br />
bodily health and sickness, on the one hand, and virtue and vice on the other. The skilled doctor<br />
allows healthy patients to satisfy their bodily desires, but restrains sick patients from doing so.<br />
Similarly the wise statesman restrains the desires of licentious people and so creates order and<br />
harmony in their souls. But important elements in the Gorgias are missing from Eryximachus’ speech<br />
In the Gorgias medicine stands to the body as statesmanship does to the soul. These are<br />
genuine crafts because they seek the good of their respective subjects and rely on reason. They must<br />
therefore be distinguished from their bogus counterparts, oratory and cookery, which seek pleasure<br />
and rely merely on experience. Thus the Gorgias insists that the happy and virtuous life requires a<br />
knowledge of the good which only philosophy can provide. Eryximachus, on the other hand, blurs the<br />
distinction between soul and body. The same power of love operates in both. So it looks as though<br />
any account Eryximachus could give of sōphrosunē would be based, like his original warning against<br />
over-drinking, on physiological grounds. We must not indulge desires when that would cause pain or<br />
discomfort or would hinder our enjoyment of other pleasures.<br />
Eryximachus goes on to argue that pretty well everything can be explained in terms of the<br />
interaction of opposites, such as cold and dry, sweet and sour, dry and moist. The art of medicine<br />
creates love and agreement between elements which would otherwise be hostile to one another.<br />
Similarly music creates love and agreement between high and low in pitch and between fast and slow<br />
in rhythm. This confirms that we should gratify and preserve the ‘heavenly love’ which takes orderly<br />
people as its object and tends to improve those who are not yet orderly. We should however exercise<br />
caution in tasting the pleasures afforded by the common kind of love so that we do not thereby<br />
become involved in debauchery (186d-188d).<br />
Here Eryximachus introduces the key idea that the goodness of the soul consists in order and<br />
harmony. But there are important differences between the way in which he deploys this idea and its<br />
use by Plato in dialogues such as the Republic. There the fact that we can experience opposite desires<br />
is used as an argument for the tripartite division of the soul (435a-441c). But there is no suggestion<br />
that the parts of the soul, as such, are opposed or that virtue consists simply in a balance between<br />
them. In an unjust soul the desires of the three parts will conflict, but in a just soul there will be no<br />
conflict because each part does its own work. Reason will govern, with the aid of spirit, and appetite<br />
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will obey (441e-442b). Sōphrosunē will consist in an agreement and harmony among the parts,<br />
whereby appetite and spirit willingly accept the rule of reason (442c-d). There is an important link<br />
between the order and harmony of the soul and that of music, but it is not to be understood, in<br />
Eryximachus’s way, as a balance between opposites. The key point is that reason must be in control.<br />
Only then can the soul as a whole and its individual parts achieve their good.<br />
Eryximachus concludes his speech by commenting that, while love in general is all powerful,<br />
the love that is concerned with the things that are good and is ‘completed with justice and temperance<br />
(sōphrosunē )’ has the greatest power and creates happiness community and friendship among men<br />
and gods (188d). But he has done very little to explain what makes things good, nor why the love of<br />
them creates friendship rather than competition, envy and greed. Nor has he explained how justice and<br />
sōphrosunē enter into the picture.<br />
On the surface, at least, neither Aristophanes nor Agathon recognise the need for restraint in<br />
love matters. But both their speeches remind the reader that love can be a source of moral danger.<br />
According to Aristophanes, lovers are seeking their missing ‘halves’. But Zeus split human beings in<br />
two because of their hubristic behaviour. So it looks as though the reunion of the halves might make<br />
them disruptive once again. Agathon sees love as spreading peace and happiness wherever it goes.<br />
But Plato has given him a speech which reminds readers why sexual desires can pose a particular<br />
threat to sōphrosunē. Love insinuates itself unnoticed into our souls, preferring those which are soft<br />
and malleable to those that are hard and tough. But Agathon claims that, since it does not use force, it<br />
is just and temperate. As evidence of Love’s bravery he refers to Ares’ scandalous love affair with<br />
Aphrodite. This is supposed to show that even the god of war can be overcome by love but it might<br />
equally serve as proof that love undermines sōphrosunē. So Agathon turns features that reveal the<br />
moral danger of Love into arguments for its virtue. His speech is Gorgianic, not only in its language,<br />
as Socrates suggests (198b-199b), but also in its paradoxical arguments. We may recall that in the<br />
Gorgias Plato depicts oratory, which aims at pleasure rather than the good, as the enemy of<br />
sōphrosunē.<br />
It is tempting to assume that Socrates is Plato’s philosophical mouthpiece and that his speech<br />
must therefore contain the solution to the problems raised in the dialogue. In some respects that<br />
approach looks promising. The lack of an adequate conception of the good prevented Pausanias and<br />
Eryximachus from giving satisfactory accounts of sōphrosunē. In Socrates’ speech, on the other hand,<br />
Diotima makes it clear that the ascent of love involves a gradual development in one’s understanding<br />
of the good. Those who make significant progress on that ascent will, doubtless, display the attributes<br />
associated with sōphrosunē. They will, for example, be above the temptation to over-indulge in drink<br />
or sex. This is possible, not because they have suppressed their desires but, rather, because they have<br />
reshaped them and redirected them towards the beautiful and the good. They have achieved selfknowledge<br />
because they understand the nature of their desires and their proper place in the economy<br />
of the soul. Socrates himself has evidently achieved at least part of this ascent. So we can see the<br />
Diotima section as describing an ideal sōphrosunē which is, in part at least, exemplified in the<br />
dialogue by the figure of Socrates.<br />
There is some truth in this picture but it cannot be the whole truth. The ascent to the beautiful<br />
apparently requires powers that are almost divine. Socrates learns about it from an imaginary priestess<br />
who has demonstrated divine power by postponing the Athenian plague (201d). She argues that Love<br />
is himself a semi-divine daemon who mediates between gods and men. In order to embark on the<br />
ascent one needs guidance which, presumably can be provided only by someone like Diotima herself.<br />
No doubt this explains Socrates’ lack of success in improving Alcibiades’ character. More<br />
prosaically we may notice that Diotima says nothing about inner conflict or about the need to restrain<br />
unruly desires. Nor does she say anything about the way in which ordinary men and women might<br />
achieve some kind of virtue. So while the <strong>Symposium</strong>, as a whole, emphasises that we are embodied<br />
beings with desires that may need restraint, Diotima seems to envisage a ‘heavenly’ virtue which has<br />
little to do with the lives of ordinary mortals. By allowing Alcibiades to have the last word, Plato<br />
warns us that Socrates has not provided a definitive answer to the problems raised in the dialogue.<br />
To find a more rounded answer we must look back at the speeches of Pausanias and,<br />
particularly, Eryximachus. The latter is well aware that we have desires which should not be satisfied.<br />
Virtue consists in replacing the discord in our souls with order and harmony. In this respect virtue is<br />
to the soul what health is to the body. Eryximachus is unable to weld these ideas into a coherent<br />
account, but they are all to be found elsewhere in Plato, most notably in the Republic. There the good<br />
and healthy condition of the soul is one in which the appetites and the desire for honour follow the<br />
direction of reason. This can come about only if children need are brought up in the right kind of<br />
environment and receive the right kind of education in music and gymnastics. But that alone is not<br />
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enough: the city must be ruled by philosopher kings. So the Republic attempts to integrate the ideal of<br />
order in the embodied soul with that of a philosopher who has turned away from the world of the<br />
senses in order to commune with the good and the beautiful. We may therefore see the that dialogue<br />
as an attempt to solve problems which are displayed but not resolved in the <strong>Symposium</strong>.<br />
204
ABSTRACT<br />
El dilema “Erixímaco”<br />
Ivana Costa<br />
El discurso de Erixímaco, sobre el cual la tradición interpretativa pronunció una condena casi<br />
generalizada, con la notable excepción de Edelstein (1945), ha sido reivindicado en las últimas<br />
décadas al menos en dos sentidos. Konstan y Young-Bruehl (1982: 44-46) defendieron el “rigor<br />
intelectual” de su “exposición sistemática” y sobre todo la sutileza de su análisis, que al distinguir la<br />
doble valencia de Eros (como epithymía y, a partir de Smp. 186d6, como philía) revela la necesidad<br />
“de una nueva definición”. Por su parte, McPherran (2006: 74- 80) encontró en la reivindicación que<br />
hace Erixímaco de la mántica (análoga en un plano cósmico a la tarea del médico practicante sobre el<br />
paciente) un aporte puntual al más vasto proyecto platónico de incluir determinados aspectos de la<br />
religiosidad entre las tareas propias de la filosofía. Así, según McPherran, el discurso de Erixímaco<br />
anticipa en parte la concepción de la piedad que esbozarán Sócrates-Diotima, entendida como<br />
asimilación a lo divino. No obstante estos avances hacia una comprensión más cabal de la inserción<br />
de Erixímaco entre los oradores del Simposio, el valor de su discurso sigue siendo en gran medida<br />
oscuro. Erixímaco, de hecho, no hace el encomio de Eros sino el de la medicina: capaz de identificar<br />
la doble naturalez de Eros y su doble tendencia: hacia lo enfermo o, si se trata del Eros benéfico, hacia<br />
lo sano. La medicina también es capaz de lograr que los elementos más hostiles entre sí “se hagan<br />
amigos y se deseen unos a otros” (186d5-6) generando homónoia (186e2). La astronomía y la mántica<br />
son análogas a la medicina, pues permiten establecer –teórica y prácticamente— una comunicación<br />
con la esfera divina capaz de dar paso a las transformaciones necesarias para alcanzar armonía y<br />
prosperidad. El énfasis de Erixímaco en la estructura radicalmente dualista de las tendencias humanas<br />
y cósmicas resulta difícil de compatibilizar con la contemplación de la unitaria “belleza maravillosa”<br />
en la que culmina el discurso de Sócrates-Diotima. Como señaló Dover (1980: 105), la “positiva<br />
atribución de un Eros malo al orden de la naturaleza es completamente ajena a la metafísica de<br />
Diotima”. Pero por otra parte, resulta igualmente difícil soslayar la relevancia de Erixímaco, dada la<br />
insistencia con la que regresan, a lo largo del corpus, los esquemas dualistas que explican aspectos de<br />
la vida humana o del devenir cósmico a través de las leyes de atracción de lo semejante por lo<br />
semejante. La crítica contemporánea ha visto huellas de Erixímaco en la teoría cósmica de la philía de<br />
Ly. 215c3–216a4 (Penner y Rowe, 2005: 95), en el análisis de la enfermedad psicosomática de Ti.<br />
88e4-89a1 (Zamora y Brisson, 2010: 423), en la pintura del universo que brinda el Ateniense hacia el<br />
final de Lg. X, 906a2-b3 (Scott y Wellton, 2008: 241). La falta de una explicación coherente para<br />
cada una de estas apariciones fantasmagóricas de Erixímaco no ha mitigado la pertinencia de su<br />
aporte. Entonces, he aquí el dilema: la posición dualista de Erixímaco no puede ser asimilada lisa y<br />
llanamente a la cima conceptual de Smp., pero a la luz de sus trazos, esparcidos por el corpus,<br />
tampoco podemos reducirla a mera pedantería (Bury, 1909: xxviii; Hamilton, 1951: 15) o al<br />
tecnicismo obcecado de un “aficionado anodino” (Wardy, 2002: 5). Intentaré una interpretación del<br />
sentido del discurso de Erixímaco para la economía del Smp. procurando hallar en ella también un<br />
marco para la comprensión de sus “huellas” en el corpus. Argumentaré que el discurso de Erixímaco<br />
efectivamente provee un elemento crucial para la edificación de la vida filosófica que van a proponer<br />
Sócrates-Diotima. El dualismo –buscaré mostrar—no es irrelevante ni prescindente en esa<br />
arquitectura, tal como revela la formulación e interpretación que se ofrece en Smp. 187a4-6 del<br />
fragmento 51 de Heráclito. (Tomaré como prueba para mi razonamiento la formulación ligeramente<br />
diversa del mismo 22B51 DK que se ofrece en Sph 242e2-3.) El punto decisivo está dado en Smp., a<br />
mi juicio, por la situación de intermediación que, según Erixímaco (según Platón), Heráclito no ha<br />
visto claramente, pero es la que se debe adoptar frente a un escenario dualista. El médico, como el<br />
músico (como el filósofo) disponen de una doble competencia: la teórica, que diagnostica, y la<br />
práctica o demiúrgica, capaz de torcer la espontaneidad de una tendencia perjudicial hacia lo mejor.<br />
La medicina brinda aquí –al igual que en otros contextos platónicos—un modelo para la conducta<br />
pero también un mapa que identifica la posición del ser humano en el mundo y lo orienta en la misma<br />
dirección del filosofar.
The Realm of the Metaxy<br />
Chair: Beatriz Bossi
Le Banquet de Platon : une philosophie de la relation ?<br />
Michel Fattal<br />
À la différence de l'approche matérialiste des philosophes présocratiques qui faisaient intervenir des<br />
principes physiques comme l'air, l'eau le feu et la terre dans leur explication de l'univers et de sa<br />
genèse, Platon inaugure une ère radicalement nouvelle dans sa façon d'expliquer la naissance de tout<br />
ce qui existe dans le monde visible. Désormais, les réalités de la nature, du monde physique et visible,<br />
ne s'expliquent plus par un élément matériel, mais trouvent leur origine ou leur cause dans ce qu'il<br />
appelle les Idées (eidê) ou les Formes intelligibles 1 . Ces Idées caractérisées par leur stabilité, leur<br />
éternité et leur être, constituent les modèles ou les paradigmes des choses sensibles et visibles sujettes<br />
au devenir, au temps et à l'instabilité. Ce monde sensible et visible qui est celui du devenir instable est<br />
donc conçu comme copie (eikôn) ou comme imitation (mimêsis) de cette cause intelligible et invisible<br />
qu’est l’Idée. Dans le Phédon, 79 a, Socrate affirme « qu’il existe deux espèces d’être, d’une part<br />
l’espèce visible, de l’autre l’espèce invisible » représentée par l’intelligible situé au niveau le plus<br />
élevé. En exhaussant l’Idée au-dessus du monde physique, Platon faisait de la forme (aspect) un<br />
principe séparé du sensible. L'Athénien ira jusqu'à parler, dans la République (VI, 509 d ; VII, 517 b ;<br />
508 c) de « lieu intelligible » et dans le Phèdre de « lieu qui se trouve au-dessus du ciel » (247c). On<br />
voit ainsi apparaître l’existence de deux ordres hiérarchiquement séparés ou de deux sphères distinctes<br />
de réalité : celle du « lieu intelligible » et celle du « lieu sensible ». C’est la réalité qui est censée être<br />
une et continue qui se trouve en quelque sorte coupée en deux par la « séparation » (chôrismos) de ces<br />
deux sphères qui sont bien distinctes. C’est la raison pour laquelle certains commentateurs parlent de<br />
« dualisme » ou même de « l’infranchissable fossé entre le sensible et l’intelligible » 2 à propos de la<br />
philosophie de Platon. Ce dualisme ontologique ou cosmologique qui vise à « dissocier d’elle-même<br />
une réalité qu’il convient précisément d’expliquer dans son unité » 3 va également s’appliquer à la<br />
représentation que Platon se fait de l’homme. Ainsi, l’homme se trouve lui aussi constitué d’une âme<br />
immatérielle, éternelle et invisible qui est « séparée » ou même opposée au corps matériel, visible et<br />
sujet à la corruption et à la mort. On connaît les développements du Phédon sur le corps comme<br />
tombeau 4 ou prison de l’âme. Le corps apparenté au devenir et sujet à la mort constitue un obstacle à<br />
l’élévation de l’âme ou à son accès au « lieu intelligible ». L’âme qui s’apparente à ce qui est divin et<br />
intelligible se trouve en quelque sorte entravée par l’action des désirs infinis et insatiables du corps<br />
qui retiennent celle-ci dans le monde matériel et temporel, et l’empêchent de rejoindre la sphère<br />
intelligible.<br />
Pour résumer les choses, on peut dire que Platon inaugure, après la vision unitaire et<br />
holistique ou même moniste des Présocratiques, une vision dualiste de la réalité et de l’homme. C’est<br />
le fameux chôrismos (séparation) ontologique et cosmologique du sensible et de l’intelligible, et la<br />
célèbre « séparation » anthropologique de l’âme et du corps 5 . Ce dualisme ontologique et<br />
anthropologique soulève une véritable difficulté ou une véritable aporie qui a été relevée par les<br />
commentateurs et par l’élève de Platon lui-même, Aristote. Le Stagirite ne manquera pas en effet de<br />
critiquer la théorie platonicienne des Idées qui, selon lui, redouble inutilement la réalité. Platon luimême,<br />
conscient de cette difficulté pose, dans le Parménide, le problème de la « participation » ou du<br />
« rapport » du sensible à l’intelligible, et envisage la causalité que l’intelligible exerce sur le sensible.<br />
C’est dans la cosmologie du Timée que Platon trouvera une solution au problème épineux de la<br />
participation en mettant en œuvre d’autres types de causalités comme par exemple la causalité<br />
efficiente du démiurge et la causalité matérielle de la chôra à partir de laquelle le monde sera formé<br />
ou engendré 6 .<br />
1 Voir à ce sujet, J.-F. Pradeau (éd.), Platon, les formes intelligibles, Paris, PUF, « Débats », 2001.<br />
2 Voir récemment l’ouvrage de Ch. Rogue, Comprendre Platon, Paris, Armand Colin, « Cursus », 2004, chapitre V :<br />
« L’infranchissable fossé entre sensible et intelligible », pp. 87-108.<br />
3 Op. cit., p. 94.<br />
4 Voir le jeu de mots sôma sêma (corps tombeau).<br />
5 Sur les occurrences de chôrismos, chôrizein, chôris dans l’œuvre de Platon, voir Platon, Lexique (M-Omega), par A. Diès,<br />
Les Belles Lettres, Collection des Universités de France, année, Tome 2, 1964, p. 570-571 ; R. Radice (ed.), Plato Lexicon,<br />
Electronic edition by R. Bombacigno, Milano, Biblia, 2003, p. 993-994. Voir par exemple, le Phédon 64 c 5-6 ; 67 a ; 67 d<br />
3 ; L. Brisson, « Comment rendre compte de la participation du sensible à l’intelligible chez Platon ? », in J.-F. Pradeau<br />
(éd.), Platon, les formes intelligibles, op. cit., p. 55 sq.<br />
6 Là-dessus, voir L. Brisson, art. cit., p. 57. Il ne faut certes pas oublier la causalité des Formes. Les Formes, caractérisées<br />
par la stabilité et contemplées par le démiurge, jouent également un rôle déterminant, car elles lui permettent de mettre en<br />
ordre la chôra traversée par des mouvements désordonnés.
Michel Fattal<br />
Dans la seconde partie du Parménide, Platon n’hésitera pas à poser le problème de la<br />
participation des formes intelligibles entre elles 7 , et à remanier de fond en comble, dans le Sophiste, sa<br />
doctrine des Idées en envisageant leurs mutuelles et effectives participations en vue de rendre compte<br />
de la complexité du réel et du langage. C’est en introduisant du non-être dans l’être, de l’altérité dans<br />
l’identité, et c’est en faisant éclater en quelque sorte le caractère monoeidétique de la forme<br />
intelligible et de l’être que le Sophiste réalisera une profonde révolution du platonisme classique 8 .<br />
C’est en envisageant « l’entrelacement » (sumplokê) ou la « communication » (koinônia) des Idées ou<br />
des genres entre eux que sont le « même » et « l’autre », « l’un » et le « multiple », « l’être » et le<br />
« non-être », le « repos » et le « mouvement » que cette révolution de la doctrine classique des Idées<br />
se réalise pleinement. C’est en d’autres termes, dans la « relation » ou le « lien » (desmos) qui est<br />
établi entre les genres différents que certaines difficultés suscitées par la doctrine des Idées se trouvent<br />
en quelque sorte résolues ou dépassées. Platon est ainsi confronté, dans le Parménide et dans le<br />
Sophiste, au problème de la « séparation » et de « la participation » du sensible à l’intelligible, et à<br />
celui de la « participation » des idées entre elles.<br />
La thèse que je me propose de défendre, dans cet exposé consacré au Banquet, est que Platon<br />
n’a pas attendu le Parménide, le Sophiste ou même le Timée pour résoudre le problème épineux de la<br />
séparation et de la participation du sensible à l’intelligible, ou de la séparation et de la participation<br />
des idées entre elles, mais qu’il a pris conscience assez tôt, dans sa carrière d’écrivain, et notamment<br />
dans le Banquet, de la nécessité de mettre en œuvre une philosophie de la relation. C’est, dès le<br />
Banquet, et après le Ménon et le dialogues socratiques, qu’on verrait apparaître cette philosophie de la<br />
relation que Platon énonce aussitôt qu’il envisage ce qu’on pourrait appeler sa philosophie de la<br />
séparation du sensible et de l’intelligible. Platon, ayant ainsi pris conscience très rapidement des<br />
difficultés soulevées par sa théorie des Idées séparées tenterait de les résoudre aussitôt à travers cette<br />
philosophie de la relation en vue de sauvegarder l’unité et la cohésion du réel qui lui sont chers. Le<br />
Banquet représenterait la cohabitation de deux philosophies différentes et complémentaires, ou<br />
mettrait en œuvre une philosophie qui en appelle une autre. La philosophie de la séparation en<br />
appellerait ainsi à mettre nécessairement en place une philosophie de la relation.<br />
Parti avec Socrate et les dialogues socratiques d’une recherche sur l’essence ou la nature de<br />
concepts éthiques que sont le bien, le beau, la vertu, le courage, Platon va considérer d’une manière<br />
explicite, à partir du Phédon, du Banquet, de la République et du Phèdre que ces Essences constituent<br />
désormais la vraie réalité des choses. Les Idées universelles, éternelles et stables qui sont des Etres<br />
véritables se trouvent séparées et exhaussées au-dessus du sensible. Afin de sauvegarder l’unité du<br />
réel, Platon se servira d’un certain nombre de notions pour dire le « lien » ou la « relation » qui unit<br />
malgré tout le sensible à l’intelligible. Ce sont les notions de participation (methexis), de<br />
communication (koinônia), d’image (eikôn), d’imitation (mimêsis) qui établissent désormais ces<br />
relations entre ces deux ordres séparés. La participation établit, on l’a vu, un « rapport » entre le<br />
sensible et l’intelligible : le sensible « prend part » (metechei) à l’intelligible et dépend de lui. Le lien<br />
avec l’intelligible dont il est séparé n’est donc pas rompu. Ainsi, l’homme physique, visible et<br />
sensible « participe » à l’homme intelligible, c’est-à-dire trouve son origine dans cette cause<br />
supérieure qu’est l’Idée d’Homme. Pour dire les choses autrement, l’homme corporel et sensible serait<br />
une « image », une « copie », une « imitation » ou un « reflet » du modèle d’Homme qui est la vraie<br />
réalité de l’homme. La notion d’image est une notion paradoxale qui permet de dire à la fois l’identité<br />
et l’altérité. Plus exactement, elle permet de dire le lien, la relation dans la différence 9 . Ainsi, la<br />
beauté physique et sensible d’un corps, bien que différente de l’Idée de beauté ou du Beau en soi,<br />
conserve malgré tout un lien ou une relation avec la Forme du Beau dont elle est l’image et à laquelle<br />
elle « prend part », c’est-à-dire « participe » et dépend causalement.<br />
Le point de vue défendu dans la présente conférence vise à montrer que Platon énonce sa<br />
philosophie de la relation dès qu’il met en œuvre sa philosophie de la séparation. Philosophie de la<br />
séparation et philosophie de la relation sont donc indissociables. On pourrait dire que Platon est dans<br />
l’obligation de sauvegarder l’unité et la cohésion du réel à partir de moment où il élabore une forme<br />
de dualisme ontologique, cosmologique et anthropologique. L’étude du Banquet est tout à fait<br />
7 Cf. V. Brochard, « La théorie platonicienne de la participation d’après le Parménide et le Sophiste », in Etudes de<br />
philosophie ancienne et de philosophie moderne, Paris, Vrin, 1926, pp. 113-150.<br />
8 Voir à ce sujet l’Introduction de N.-L. Cordero, Platon, Le Sophiste, Paris, GF Flammarion, 1993, pp. 11-65 ; M. Fattal, Le<br />
Langage chez Platon. Autour du Sophiste, Paris, L’Harmattan, « Ouverture Philosophique », 2009, pp. 39-83.<br />
9 Sur le caractère paradoxal de cette notion intéressante d’image, voir M. Fattal, Image, Mythe, Logos et Raison, Paris,<br />
L’Harmattan, « Ouverture Philosophique », 2009 ; trad. allemande in J. Grave und A. Schubbach (dir.), Denken mit dem<br />
Bild, München, Fink Verlag, « Eikones », 2009. Voir également du même auteur, Logos et image chez Plotin, Paris,<br />
L’Harmattan, 1998 ; trad. italienne Ricerche sul logos. Da Omero a Plotino, a cura di R. Radice, Milano, Vita e Pensiero,<br />
« Temi metafisici e problemi del pensiero antico. Studi e testi 99 », 2005.<br />
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intéressante à cet égard, car elle permet de révéler l’existence de cette philosophie de la relation qui<br />
s’exerce et s’affirme à tous les niveaux du dialogue : dans le thème et la forme littéraire choisis, dans<br />
la relation pédagogique unissant le maître au disciple, dans la représentation que Platon se fait de la<br />
philosophie et du philosophe, dans sa conception du savoir et de l’ignorance, dans sa représentation de<br />
l’être et du cosmos, et surtout dans le discours (logos) de Diotime sur l’amour.<br />
Si le dialogue socratique du Ménon n’évoque pas d’une manière explicite la doctrine des<br />
Idées, le Phédon et le Banquet, quant à eux, ne manquent pas d’affirmer, avant la République et le<br />
Phèdre, une conception des Essences séparées. L’exemple du beau corps et de la Beauté en soi,<br />
évoqué précédemment et qui marque cette différence entre le sensible et l’intelligible, est justement<br />
donné par Platon, dans le Banquet, dans le célèbre passage consacré à ce que les commentateurs<br />
appellent habituellement la « dialectique ascendante » conduisant à la vision du Beau (210 a sq.). La<br />
doctrine des Idées est explicitement mise en place dans le Phédon et cette mise en place d’un<br />
intelligible distingué et séparé d’un sensible, qui apparaît également dans le Banquet, appelle<br />
automatiquement et nécessairement la mise en place d’une philosophie de la relation qui se déploie et<br />
se développe merveilleusement bien à travers les notions de « banquet » ou de « beuverie commune »<br />
(sumposion), de discours (logos), d’amour (erôs), de passage (poros), d’intermédiaire (metaxu), de<br />
milieu (meson), de philosophie (philosophia), de philosophe (philosophos), etc. Cette philosophie de<br />
la relation qui est mise en œuvre à tous les niveaux du dialogue permettrait de résoudre les difficultés<br />
soulevées par une philosophie qui instaure une forme de verticalité et de transcendance induisant une<br />
séparation entre des niveaux différents de réalités. Essayons de voir comment Platon est amené à<br />
déployer, dans le Banquet, une telle philosophie de la relation et du lien.<br />
I. Le titre, le thème et la forme littéraire du dialogue<br />
En Grèce ancienne, le sumposion, qui désigne la « beuverie commune », suit habituellement le<br />
deipnon, c’est-à-dire qu’il suit le « repas ». Le sumposion constitue donc le second moment d’un<br />
banquet au cours duquel les convives boivent du vin, parlent sur un thème, chantent et font des<br />
libations aux dieux (176 a). Tous les convives sont ainsi réunis, reliés les uns aux autres, au cours de<br />
la « beuverie commune » qu’ils partagent. Tous les convives se rassemblent également autour d’un<br />
logos commun (discours) qu’ils vont tenir et autour d’un thème commun qu’ils vont aborder et dont<br />
ils vont faire l’éloge. Le sumposion est manifestement « ce qui met en relation » les convives à travers<br />
« la mise en commun » (sun : avec, ensemble) de plusieurs choses : le vin, le logos (discours) et<br />
l’amour (thème). C’est à Phèdre qu’incombe de présider le sumposion et de fixer l’ordre du jour (177<br />
c-e). C’est à Phèdre, qui occupe la première place (prôton) et qui est qualifié de « père du discours »<br />
(patêr tou logou) 10 , que revient la prérogative de prononcer le premier discours qui sera « un éloge de<br />
l’amour » (177 d). Le thème du sumposion est donc l’amour (eros), et la forme du discours (logos) qui<br />
porte sur l’amour, et dont Phèdre est le « père », est celle de l’éloge.<br />
Mais pourquoi pratiquer la forme de l’éloge (epainos, enkômion) ? L’éloge vise à honorer un<br />
dieu (177 c). Or, comme pour la majorité des convives, l’amour est un dieu, il était nécessaire de se<br />
rassembler pour que chacun prononce à tour de rôle un « discours » (logos) qui serait une louange de<br />
ce dieu qu’est l’Amour. La louange ou l’hommage rendu, qui constitue la forme littéraire adoptée par<br />
la majorité des orateurs, est par conséquent un logos qui porte sur le thème Eros. Le lecteur peut<br />
constater que le discours de Diotime sur l’amour (sixième discours) tranche par rapport aux cinq<br />
premiers discours de Phèdre, de Pausanias, d’Eryximaque, d’Aristophane et d’Agathon qui célèbrent<br />
tous l’amour en tant que divinité. L’amour est non seulement un dieu pour les auteurs des cinq<br />
premiers discours, mais il est également beau. Le discours de Diotime, la prêtresse de Mantinée, vise<br />
à montrer que l’amour n’est ni un dieu, ni beau. Son objectif est de montrer les liens étroits qui<br />
unissent l’amour à la philosophie. Mais avant d’approfondir la conception que Diotime se fait de<br />
l’amour-philosophe, essayons de voir en quoi le titre du dialogue, le thème choisi et la forme littéraire<br />
adoptée relèvent de ce qu’on pourrait appeler une pensée de la relation.<br />
On a vu que le sumposion, le logos envisagé sous le registre littéraire de l’éloge (epainos,<br />
enkômion) et le thème de l’amour (eros) « rassemblent » tous les convives autour de la table du<br />
banquet. Tous les convives partagent une même boisson, le vin, et un même discours qui est une<br />
louange de l’amour. Le vin, le discours et l’amour permettent aux convives d’entrer en relation les uns<br />
avec les autres et d’avoir un objectif commun qui les unit et les réunit. Or, il faut voir que le thème<br />
fédérateur choisi comme objet central du logos est lui-même marqué du sceau de la relation. L’amour<br />
10 Il est le « père du discours » (patêr tou logou), car il sera à l’origine d’autres discours sur l’amour (cf. Platon, Le Banquet,<br />
Traduction inédite, introduction et notes par L. Brisson, p. 188, n. 91).<br />
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est relation. L’amour établit manifestement une relation entre les hommes. Cette relation est d’ordre<br />
sexuelle et pédagogique. La relation sexuelle (sunousia) unissant deux êtres l’un à l’autre, et l’amour<br />
masculin ou plus exactement la paiderastia, dont il est souvent question dans les premiers discours du<br />
Banquet, rendent compte de la relation pédagogique unissant le maître à son disciple, et unissant<br />
l’amant (erastês) qui est âgé à l’aimé (erômenos) qui est plus jeune 11 . « Agathon, (qui est) assez<br />
représentatif des convictions de son époque, considère l’éducation comme la transmission du savoir<br />
ou de la vertu qui passe d’un récipient plein, le maître, vers un récipient vide ou moins rempli, le<br />
disciple, par l’intermédiaire d’un contact physique…dans l’union sexuelle. A cette représentation<br />
masculine de l’éducation, Diotime, une étrangère dont Socrate prétend rapporter les paroles, oppose,<br />
vers la fin du dialogue, une autre représentation, féminine celle-là, qui fait intervenir la<br />
procréation » 12 . Ce qu’on peut noter ici, c’est que Diotime propose, en contrepoint du lien classique<br />
unissant pédagogie et pédérastie, une représentation nouvelle de la relation pédagogique qui s’appuie<br />
sur la relation sexuelle de type féminin et qui a partie liée à la procréation, c’est-à-dire à la recherche<br />
de l’immortalité. Une telle recherche de l’immortalité n’avait nullement été envisagée par les cinq<br />
discours qui précèdent. N’est-ce pas dans la recherche du Beau en soi, du beau dans les âmes et dans<br />
les corps qu’il est possible d’accéder à une forme d’immortalité ? Mais qu’est-ce qui permet de<br />
rechercher le Beau en vue de s’immortaliser sinon la philosophie ? Platon ne dira-t-il pas dans le<br />
Phèdre, 248 d, que le philosophe est un philokalos, un « amoureux du beau » ?<br />
Rappelons pour l’instant que le titre, le thème et la forme littéraire du Banquet sont tous<br />
placés sous le signe de la relation : relation des convives autour du vin, relation des orateurs autour<br />
d’un logos qui est un éloge de l’amour, relation pédagogique entre un maître et un disciple induisant<br />
une relation sexuelle entre un homme âgé et un homme jeune. La forme littéraire de l’éloge est ellemême<br />
fédératrice, car elle suppose l’accord de tous les convives et orateurs sur le fait que l’amour est<br />
un dieu, qu’il est beau, et qu’il faut nécessairement l’honorer et le louer par un discours. Ce discours<br />
(logos) est donc le « lien » qui unit et réunit par excellence les convives. N’oublions pas que le<br />
substantif logos provient du verbe legein, dérivé de la racine leg- qui renvoie au fait de lier et de<br />
relier. Ainsi, avant de signifier « parler », le verbe legein signifie avant tout le fait de « rassembler,<br />
ramasser, recueillir » 13 . Platon lui-même ne définira-t-il pas, dans le Théétète et dans le Sophiste, le<br />
logos comme « combinaison » (sunthesis) ou comme « entrelacement » (sumplokê) de noms et de<br />
verbes, ou d’idées entre elles. On notera ici l’importance qui est à nouveau accordée au sun- de<br />
sunthesis (de noms et de verbes) et de sumplokê (d’idée). Un sun- dont l’importance a été<br />
précédemment relevée au sujet des termes de sumposion (beuverie commune) et de sunousia (relation<br />
sexuelle). Le logos discursif en tant que lien (desmos) ou synthèse de noms et de verbes et, en tant que<br />
relation d’idées (ou de genres), porte sur un objet, l’amour qui est lui-même relation. Le logos dit<br />
donc « quelque chose » au sujet de « quelque chose » (l’amour) qui est lui-même en relation avec<br />
« quelque chose », le beau.<br />
En effet, dans la discussion de Socrate avec Agathon (Banquet, 199 b - 201 c), il s’agit de voir<br />
si l’amour est amour de « quelque chose » (tinos) ou amour de « rien » (oudenos).<br />
La question est posée par Socrate à Agathon à deux reprises en 199d-e. La réponse donnée est<br />
la suivante : l’amour est amour de la beauté dont on est dépourvu. En faisant ainsi de l’amour un<br />
relatif ou un corrélatif du beau qui nous manque, Socrate bat en brèche l’idée classique défendue par<br />
Agathon selon laquelle l’amour est beau. L’amour n’est pas identifié au beau, mais il est amour du<br />
beau. Dans la relation masculine et pédagogique unissant le maître à son disciple, l’amour est<br />
principalement amour du beau (physique et moral) qu’on ne possède pas. L’éloge de Socrate qui sera<br />
prononcé par Alcibiade à la fin du Banquet en est la preuve la plus éloquente. Alcibiade, en aimant<br />
Socrate, va finir par aimer en Socrate ce dont il est dépourvu, à savoir sa beauté morale, intellectuelle<br />
et spirituelle 14 . Au même titre que le logos qui est relation puisqu’il « dit quelque chose au sujet de<br />
quelque chose » (legei ti kata tinos) 15 , l’amour est relation, car il est l’amour « de quelque chose »<br />
11 Sur la relation qui unit la sexualité à l’éducation en Grèce archaïque et classique, et dans le Banquet de Platon, voir<br />
notamment, C. Calame, L’Eros dans la Grèce antique, Paris, Belin, « L’Antiquité au présent », 1996 ; L. Brisson, op. cit.,<br />
Introduction, pp. 55-65.<br />
12 Op. cit., p. 11, et notamment p. 61 sq.<br />
13 Voir à ce sujet, Fournier, Les verbes « dire » en Grec ancien, Paris, 1946 ; M. Heidegger, Introduction à la métaphysique,<br />
Paris, Gallimard, « Tel », 1967, p. 132 ; et surtout M. Fattal, Logos, pensée et vérité dans la philosophie grecque, Paris-<br />
Montréal-Turin-Budapest, L’Harmattan, « Ouverture Philosophique », 2001, pp. 28-48 ; pp. 52-57 ; trad. it. Ricerche sul<br />
logos, op. cit., pp. 24-40 ; pp. 42-46.<br />
14 Voir à ce sujet, P. Hadot, « La figure de Socrate », in Exercices spirituels et philosophie antique, Paris, Albin Michel, 2002<br />
(1993, 1 ère éd.), pp. 100-141 ; repris dans Eloge de Socrate, Paris, Editions Allia, 1998.<br />
15 Platon, Le Sophiste, 237 e : « Qui ne dit quelque chose (…) ne dit rien ». Le logos est donc discours de quelque chose ou<br />
sur quelque chose (tinos). Il « dit quelque chose au sujet de quelque chose » (legei ti kata tinos). Cette réflexion sur<br />
l’attribution et la prédication qui apparaît chez Platon se trouvera thématisée et systématisée par Aristote. Voir à ce sujet, M.<br />
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(tinos) qu’on ne possède pas (la beauté morale et intellectuelle) et qu’on recherche à travers l’amour<br />
« de quelqu’un » (Socrate). Logos et eros sont donc en consonance parfaite dans la mesure où l’un et<br />
l’autre sont « en rapport » avec quelque chose et avec quelqu’un. La relation discursive ou dialogique<br />
unissant les interlocuteurs se fait sur la base d’un thème fédérateur ou d’un objet qui se définit luimême<br />
par la relation et la synthèse 16 .<br />
Essayons de voir maintenant comment le discours de Diotime sur l’amour, qui tranche par<br />
rapport aux discours précédents qui faisaient d’eros un dieu beau et délicat et qui faisaient de l’amour<br />
masculin un modèle pédagogique, illustre merveilleusement bien cette philosophie de la relation.<br />
Cette philosophie de la relation où l’amour est amour du beau et du bien dont on est dépourvu, et qui<br />
fait intervenir une représentation féminine de l’amour induisant la procréation et le désir<br />
d’immortalité, apparaît à différents niveaux du discours de Diotime qui s’étend de 201 d à 212 c.<br />
Cette philosophie de la relation trouve concrètement son illustration dans les développements que<br />
Diotime consacre à la figure de l’eros-démon, au mythe de la naissance d’Eros, et à travers ce qu’on<br />
pourrait appeler l’initiation aux mystères de l’amour.<br />
II. Eros-démon, un intermédiaire entre les dieux et les hommes, le savoir et<br />
l’ignorance<br />
Sur la fin de son discours sur l'amour, Diotime s'adressant à Socrate, affirme que c'est dans la<br />
contemplation de la beauté en elle-même (211 d) que la vie humaine vaut la peine d'être vécue. C'est<br />
donc dans la contemplation des Formes que réside la valeur d'une vie de philosophe. La puissance de<br />
l'amour, symbolisant le philosophe, constitue le moyen d'accès idéal au monde des Formes. Plus<br />
exactement, l’eros (amour)-philosophe, qui est lui-même identifié à la figure mythique du démon,<br />
représente l’intermédiaire incontournable reliant le monde d’en haut au monde d’en bas. Mais qu'estce<br />
que le démon ? Dans la représentation populaire, le démon désigne une « puissance divine », une «<br />
puissance distributive » ou « une divinité du destin » 17 . Ici, dans le Banquet, le démon n'est pas une<br />
divinité, mais un intermédiaire (metaxu) entre les dieux et les hommes. Il est le médiateur, le moyen<br />
terme de la relation qui permet de combler le vide résultant de sa théorie de la séparation (chôrismos).<br />
Cette conception de l'eros-démon qui n'est pas un dieu, mais à un intermédiaire ou une médiation, et<br />
plus exactement une puissance de relation, symbolise le philosophe et la philosophie qui se charge de<br />
colmater les brèches du chôrismos séparant le sensible de l'intelligible, le corps de l’âme. L'amourdémon,<br />
qui relie et unit les êtres, est une puissance dynamique qui, en tant qu'intermédiaire et moyen<br />
terme, établit une relation entre le monde d'ici-bas et le monde d'en-haut, entre le la terre et le ciel.<br />
Notons au passage que dans le Phèdre, c'est l'âme humaine qui possède cette fonction médiatrice<br />
dynamique, cette puissance de relation. Le Timée envisage l’âme humaine à l'image de l'Ame du<br />
monde comme un mélange de divisible et d’indivisible, de l'autre et du même, du multiple et de l’un.<br />
Cette représentation dynamique et synthétique de l'âme comme intermédiaire et médiatrice sera<br />
reprise et développée par Plotin jusqu'à Damascius. L'amour dans le Banquet et l’âme dans le Phèdre<br />
possèdent donc l'un et l'autre cette fonction médiatrice et relationnelle, ou représentent ce moyen<br />
d'accès dynamique vers les Formes, l'indivisible, le beau et le bien. L'amour est donc l'auxiliaire (sunergon)<br />
dynamique de l’âme du philosophe désireuse d'accéder au Beau et au Bien qu'elle ne possède<br />
pas. L'âme, située à mi-chemin entre le haut et le bas, est susceptible de s'élever vers les Formes<br />
comme elle peut être capable de chuter dans le sensible. La figure mythique de l'eros-démon permet<br />
donc à Platon de « lier » des domaines, des ordres ou des sphères séparés : les hommes et les dieux, le<br />
corps et l'âme, le bas et le haut, la terre et le ciel, l'ignorance et le savoir, l'anthropologique et le<br />
théologique. Elle offre plus exactement à Platon une solution au problème du dualisme induit par sa<br />
philosophie de la séparation puisqu'elle se propose d'assurer le « passage » (poros) d'un domaine à<br />
l'autre.<br />
Fattal, Logos, pensée et vérité dans la philosophie grecque, op. cit. ; trad. it. Ricerche sul logos, op. cit.<br />
16 Sur l’amour en tant que synthèse, voir L. Robin, La Théorie platonicienne de l’amour, Paris, PUF, 1964 (1909 1 ère éd.).<br />
17 Daimôn est un dérivé de la racine da(i)- qui a donné en grec daiomai (partager, diviser, distribuer), d’où le sens de<br />
« puissance distributive » ou de « divinité du destin », sachant que l’heimarmenê (destin) elle-même provient du verbe<br />
meiromai (obtenir en partage, diviser, séparer). Voir à ce sujet, A. Timotin, La Démonologie platonicienne. Histoire de la<br />
notion de daimôn de Platon aux derniers néoplatoniciens, Leiden-Boston, Brill, « Philosophia Antiqua 128 », 2012, p. 13 sq.<br />
Sur les démons et la notion d’intermédiaire en Grèce et chez Platon, voir J. Ries et H. Limet (éds), Anges et démons, Actes<br />
du colloque de Liège et de Louvain-la-Neuve, 25-26 novembre 1987, Homo religiosus 14, Louvain-la-Neuve, 1989 ; C.<br />
Calame (éd.), Figures grecques de l’intermédiaire, Etudes de Lettres, Lausanne, 1992 ; M. Détienne, La Notion de Daimôn<br />
dans le pythagorisme ancien, Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 1963 ; Ph. Hoffmann, « Le sage et son démon. La figure de Socrate<br />
dans la tradition philosophique et littéraire », Annuaire de l’EPHE, 94 (1985-1986), pp. 417-436 ; 95 (1986-1987), pp. 295-<br />
305 ; 96 (1987-1988), pp. 272-281 ; J. Souilhé, La Notion platonicienne d’intermédiaire dans la philosophie des dialogues,<br />
Paris, Librairie Félix Alcan, 1919.<br />
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Michel Fattal<br />
Moyen terme dynamique de la relation, médiation et intermédiaire atypique et atopique,<br />
puissance relationnelle par excellence, figure paradoxale susceptible d'orienter l'œil de l’âme vers les<br />
Formes intelligibles, telles sont les qualités du philosophe Socrate. La figure du démon, symbolisant<br />
le philosophe médiateur, est là pour combler l'intervalle et le vide entre les dieux et les hommes, et en<br />
vue d'assurer la cohésion de l'univers ou l'unité du Tout avec lui même. Sa fonction est déterminante :<br />
elle est tout autant cosmologique et physique que théologique et anthropologique. La figure de l'erosdémon<br />
médiateur ou intermédiaire se charge de mettre en relation, d'établir un contact entre les<br />
hommes et les dieux puisque « le dieu, dit Diotime, n'entre pas en contact direct avec l'homme ». «<br />
C'est par l'intermédiaire de ce démon, que de toutes manières possibles les dieux entrent en rapport<br />
avec les hommes et communiquent avec eux, à l'état de veille ou dans le sommeil. Celui qui est expert<br />
(sophos) en ce genre de choses est un homme démonique (daimonios anêr) » (203 a, trad. Brisson).<br />
Ce passage, identifiant clairement le philosophe à l’homme démonique susceptible de mettre<br />
en contact et en relation les dieux avec les hommes, s’inscrit dans la continuité de ce que Diotime dit<br />
quelques lignes plus haut en 202 d – 203 a en vue de justifier l’intervention de sa conception de<br />
l’eros-démon. Etant donné qu’eros n’est pas beau et qu’il n’est pas un dieu, l’amour ne peut qu’être<br />
« désir » des choses qui lui manquent. Il est « désir » du Beau et du Bien qu’il ne possède pas, et en<br />
tant qu’epithumia (désir) et epithumein (désirer) il incarne cet élan dynamique et passionné. N’étant<br />
pas un dieu, il est, dit-elle, un grand-démon :<br />
« Eros est un intermédiaire (metaxu) entre le mortel et l’immortel. – Socrate : Que veux-tu dire,<br />
Diotime ? – Diotime : C’est un grand-démon (daimôn megas), Socrate. En effet tout ce qui présente la<br />
nature d’un démon est intermédiaire (metaxu) entre le divin et le mortel. – Socrate : Quel pouvoir est<br />
le sien ?, demandai-je – Diotime : il interprète et il communique (hermêneuon kai diaporthmeuon) aux<br />
dieux ce qui vient des hommes, et aux hommes ce qui vient des dieux : d’un côté les prières et les<br />
sacrifices, et de l’autre les prescriptions et les faveurs que les sacrifices permettent d’obtenir en<br />
échange. Et, comme il se trouve à mi-chemin (en mesô) entre les dieux et les hommes, il contribue à<br />
remplir l’intervalle, pour faire en sorte que chaque partie soit liée aux autres dans l’univers (to pan<br />
auto hautô xundedesthai)…Le dieu n’entre pas en contact direct avec l’homme ; mais c’est par<br />
l’intermédiaire de ce démon, que de toutes les manières possibles les dieux entrent en rapport avec les<br />
hommes et communiquent avec eux, à l’état de veille ou dans le sommeil. Celui qui est expert<br />
(sophos) en ce genre de choses est un homme démonique… » (202 d – 203 a, trad. Brisson).<br />
Ce passage rend compte de la mise en relation verticale, de haut en bas, des dieux avec les hommes,<br />
grâce à l’homme démonique et expert qu’est le philosophe, et de la mise en relation verticale, unissant<br />
de bas en haut, les hommes aux dieux, grâce à la fonction herméneutique et communicationnelle du<br />
philosophe. Diotime dira en effet de l’eros-démon qu’« il interprète et (qu’) il communique<br />
(hermêneuon kai diaporthmeuon) aux dieux ce qui vient des hommes, et aux hommes ce qui vient des<br />
dieux ». L’herméneute est un traducteur, un passeur, un transmetteur. L’âme démonique et inspirée du<br />
philosophe qui est médiatrice occupe une position privilégiée pour traduire, interpréter et mettre en<br />
relation ou tout simplement communiquer ce qui provient des hommes à destination des dieux<br />
(prières, sacrifices) et ce qui provient des dieux à destination des hommes (prescriptions et faveurs des<br />
sacrifices). Je dirais que la position centrale du philosophe qui se trouve à mi-chemin ou au milieu (en<br />
mesô) entre les dieux et les hommes, et que le statut médian de son âme démonique qui est à la fois<br />
rationnelle et inspirée, dotée d’un intellect et mue par le désir irrationnel, lui confèrent le don<br />
(inspiration) d’assurer non seulement la relation des hommes entre eux, des hommes et des dieux, du<br />
mais de sauvegarder également la cohésion du cosmos en suturant le Tout avec lui-même 18 , c’est-àdire<br />
en reliant le sensible à l’intelligible.<br />
A partir de sa théorie de l’eros-démon, Platon offre une merveilleuse solution au problème du<br />
chôrismos et évite à son système de sombrer dans le dualisme. Voilà que se trouve vérifiée notre thèse<br />
selon laquelle la mise en place de la théorie des Formes intelligibles, induisant une « séparation »<br />
entre le sensible et l’intelligible, appelle nécessairement et simultanément la mise en place d’une<br />
philosophie de la « relation » illustrée par la figure mythique de l’eros-démon qui suggère à Platon un<br />
développement tout aussi poétique et mythique au sujet de la naissance d’Eros.<br />
III.La naissance d’Eros<br />
Si le philosophe, identifié à la figure mythique de l’amour-démon, est en mesure d’établir le « lien »<br />
18 Les différentes parties de l’univers se trouvent désormais liées les unes aux autres au sein du Tout qu’on ne peut<br />
fragmenter.<br />
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Michel Fattal<br />
entre des domaines séparés, c’est parce qu’il est un « mixte » ou le résultat d’une « synthèse » de ses<br />
parents qui l’ont engendrés. En d’autres termes, il est une « synthèse » de Poros (chemin, expédient)<br />
et de Pénia (pauvreté, indigence). C’est à partir des pages 203 a – 204 c que Diotime, la prêtresse de<br />
Mantinée, relate à Socrate le mythe de la naissance d’Eros que les commentateurs ont longuement<br />
commenté 19 .<br />
« Le jour de la naissance d’Aphrodite, raconte Diotime, il y eut banquet chez les dieux. A la fin du<br />
repas, Pénia, c’est-à-dire ‘Pauvreté’, ‘Privation’, vint pour mendier. Elle vit Poros, c’est-à-dire<br />
‘Moyen’, ‘Expédient’, ‘Richesse’, enivré par le nectar et endormi dans le jardin de Zeus. Pour<br />
remédier à son dénuement, Pénia décida d’avoir un enfant de Poros. Elle s’étendit près de Poros<br />
endormi et conçut ainsi l’Amour » 20 . Après avoir rappelé la généalogie d’Eros, P. Hadot souligne à<br />
juste titre que « l’Amour n’est pas beau, comme l’avait voulu le poète tragique Agathon. Sans cela il<br />
ne serait plus l’Amour. Car Eros est essentiellement désir et on ne peut désirer que ce dont on est<br />
privé. Eros ne peut être beau : fils de Pénia, il est privé de la beauté ; mais fils de Poros, il sait<br />
remédier à cette privation » 21 . Fruit d’une synthèse de Pénia et de Poros, de Pauvreté et de Richesse,<br />
d’Indigence et d’Expédient, l’eros-philosophe est paradoxal et atopique. Il est à la fois riche et pauvre,<br />
beau et laid, homme et dieu, ou plus exactement, il n’est ni homme ni dieu, ni beau ni laid, ni sage ni<br />
insensé. Il est pur « désir », désir du beau qu’il n’a pas, désir du « savoir » dont il est dépourvu.<br />
L’eros-philosophe qui met en relation des domaines séparés est celui qui est capable de « passer » et<br />
de « faire passer » (poros désigne le « passage », l’« issue », le « chemin » qui permet de sortir de l’aporie,<br />
d’une situation sans issue, d’une difficulté) du dénuement à la richesse, du manque à la<br />
satisfaction du manque. Il est le « moyen » dynamique qui « fait passer » de l’indigence esthétique et<br />
éthique (le beau et le bien dont il est privé) à la perfection morale et intellectuelle (contemplation du<br />
beau et du bien), de l’ignorance au savoir, de l’absence de connaissance à la connaissance. C’est là<br />
qu’apparaît le rôle incontournable du philosophe sur le plan gnoséologique et épistémologique.<br />
Etant donné que les dieux possèdent le savoir et que les hommes sont ignorants, et<br />
compte tenu du fait que le philosophe est un intermédiaire entre les dieux et les hommes, la<br />
philosophie est nécessairement un intermédiaire entre le savoir des dieux et l’ignorance des hommes.<br />
En effet, Eros, en tant que fils de Pénia, est pur « désir » (epithumia) du savoir qu’il n’a pas. Dans son<br />
« élan » vers le beau et le bien, il tend à « connaître » le beau et le bien. « L’epithumia, dira M.<br />
Dixsaut, fait partie du genre de la relation », pourtant, ajoute-t-elle « ce n’est pas l’objet qui est la fin<br />
du désir, mais bien le mouvement de se procurer, de ramener à soi ; on désire la génération d’un<br />
rapport, le devenir d’une mise en relation (Rép. IV, 437 c et Phil. 53 c-55 a) » 22 . C’est le verbe<br />
ephiêmi qui utilisé dans ces deux passages de la République et du Philèbe pour dire le désir, c’est-àdire<br />
le mouvement, la tension vers, la recherche de ce qu’on ne possède pas. C’est par ce désir et par<br />
cette « tension vers » quelque chose d’autre que l’epithumia met en relation. Elle est relation<br />
dynamique en direction de quelqu’un d’autre ou de quelque chose d’autre. De même qu’eros-démon<br />
est un intermédiaire entre le laid et le beau, le mauvais et le bon, il est également intermédiaire entre<br />
l’ignorance et le savoir. Diotime s’adressant à Socrate l’interroge de la manière suivante :<br />
« T’imagines-tu de même que celui qui n’est pas expert (sophos : savant) est stupide ? N’as-tu pas le<br />
sentiment que, entre science et ignorance, il y a un intermédiare (metaxu) ? – Socrate : Lequel ? –<br />
Diotime : Avoir une opinion droite (ortha doxazein), sans être à même d’en rendre raison (logon<br />
dounai). Ne sais-tu pas, poursuivit-elle, que ce n’est là ni savoir – car comment une activité, dont on<br />
arrive pas à rendre raison, saurait-elle être une connaissance sûre ? – ni ignorance – car ce qui atteint<br />
la réalité ne saurait être ignorance. L’opinion droite (orthê doxa) est bien quelque chose de ce genre,<br />
quelque chose d’intermédiaire (metaxu) entre le savoir et l’ignorance » (202 a , trad. Brisson).<br />
Un peu plus loin, Diotime ajoute :<br />
« Par ailleurs, il se trouve à mi-chemin (en mesô) entre le savoir et l’ignorance. Voici, en effet ce qui<br />
en est. Aucun dieu ne tend vers le savoir ni ne désire devenir savant, car il l’est ; or, si l’on est savant,<br />
on n’a pas besoin de tendre vers le savoir. Les ignorants ne tendent pas davantage vers le savoir ni ne<br />
19<br />
Je me permets de renvoyer au développement que P. Hadot, « La figure de Socrate », in Exercices spirituels et philosophie<br />
antique, op. cit., Eloge de Socrate, op. cit., pp. 45-53, consacre à ce mythe. J’insisterai plus loin sur le caractère<br />
épistémologique ou gnoséologique du philosophe situé à mi-chemin entre le savoir des dieux et l’ignorance des hommes.<br />
20<br />
P. Hadot, « La figure de Socrate », in Exercices…, op. cit. ; Eloge de Socrate, op. cit., p. 45-46.<br />
21<br />
Op. cit., p. 46.<br />
22<br />
M. Dixsaut, Le Naturel philosophe. Essais sur les Dialogues de Platon, Paris, Les Belles Lettres-Vrin, 1985, p. 131.<br />
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Michel Fattal<br />
désirent devenir savants. Mais c’est justement ce qu’il y a de fâcheux dans l’ignorance : alors que l’on<br />
est ni beau, ni bon, ni savant, on croit l’être suffisamment. Non, celui qui ne s’imagine pas en être<br />
dépourvu ne désire pas ce dont il ne croit pas devoir être pourvu » (203 e – 204 a, trad. Brisson).<br />
Dans ce texte, la distinction est nettement établie entre le philosophe et le dieu, entre celui qui est<br />
philo-sophos et celui qui est sophos. Seul dieu semble être un sophos, car il possède le savoir. Ici,<br />
Platon, utilise le verbe epithumein pour signifier l’acte de désirer le savoir. Or, ce désir (epithumia)<br />
semble dénié au dieu. Le dieu n’en n’a nullement besoin puisqu’il possède déjà le savoir. Possédant le<br />
savoir et la sagesse, le dieu ne philosophe pas, c’est-à-dire ne désire pas et ne recherche pas le savoir.<br />
Le philo-sophe, à la différence du sophos, est en quête, à la recherche de quelque chose. Il est mu par<br />
la dynamique du désir. Il incarne donc la figure de l’epithumein (désirer) et du philein (aimer).<br />
Désirer et aimer sont non seulement absents du dieu, mais également absent de l’homme ignorant. A<br />
l’opposé de la figure du savant qui ne désire pas le savoir puisqu’il le possède, il y la figure de<br />
l’ignorant qui ne désire pas non plus le savoir. Croyant savoir, l’ignorant ne cherche même pas à<br />
savoir. L’ignorant ignore qu’il est ignorant, il ne sait pas qu’il ne sait rien ; alors que Socrate, situé à<br />
mi-chemin entre le savant et l’ignorant, sait qu’il ne sait pas, sait qu’il ne sait rien. Il a cet avantage<br />
sur l’ignorant, c’est d’avoir un savoir de son non-savoir. L’ignorant ignore son non-savoir. Comme<br />
l’ignorant ne pense pas être dépourvu de savoir, il n’a pas d’epithumia, et ne croit pas avoir besoin de<br />
savoir. En revanche, le philo-sophe Socrate, mu par son epithumia, désire savoir parce qu’il sait qu’il<br />
ne sait rien, et c’est par ce savoir du non-savoir (inscience) qu’il vérifie l’Oracle de Delphes qui faisait<br />
de lui le « plus sage » des hommes. Ce savoir du non-savoir ne fait pourtant pas de lui un savant au<br />
sens absolu du terme, c’est-à-dire que cette conscience du non savoir ne peut faire de lui un dieu.<br />
Ainsi, l’eros-philosophe n’a pas le savoir absolu de dieu et l’ignorance des hommes, car il est situé<br />
dans l’entre-deux, à mi-chemin ou au milieu des deux (en mesô) du fait qu’il est un intermédiaire<br />
(metaxu) reliant la sophia à l’amathia. Relativement au dieu, il n’est pas savant ou sage, mais<br />
relativement aux autres hommes son savoir et sa sagesse résideraient justement dans son inscience.<br />
Or, il est dit en 202 a que l’opinion droite (orthê doxa) est un intermédiaire. Compte tenu du fait que<br />
l’opinion droite est un metaxu et qu’eros est également un intermédiaire, on peut se demander s’il est<br />
légitime d’identifier le caractère intermédiaire de l’opinion droite au caractère intermédiaire d’eros ?<br />
Jusqu’à quel point une telle identification est-elle tenable ?<br />
En commentant cette page 202 a dans laquelle Diotime évoque le statut intermédiaire de<br />
l’opinion droite, on ne peut que renvoyer au passage célèbre du Ménon, 97 a – 99 a, souvent<br />
commenté par les exégètes dans lequel l’expression d’opinion vraie (alêthês doxa) 23 apparaît.<br />
« L’opinion vraie (alêthês doxa), dira Brisson à propos de ce passage du Ménon, se distingue de la<br />
science par son manque de stabilité, stabilité que seul peut conférer un ‘raisonnement qui donne<br />
l’explication (aitias logismos)’ de la chose considérée. Seul celui qui est en mesure de rendre raison<br />
(logon didonai) d’une chose peut prétendre en avoir une connaissance sûre, la connaître vraiment » 24 .<br />
« Rendre raison » (logon didonai) 25 , c’est donner une explication ou une justification (aitia), à travers<br />
un raisonnement (logismos) ou une proposition (logos) 26 . Rendre raison revient en fait à établir des<br />
« liens ». Parlant des opinions, Socrate dira en effet dans le Ménon, 98 a qu’« elles ne valent donc pas<br />
grand-chose, tant qu’on ne les a reliées par un raisonnement qui en donne l’explication (aitias<br />
logismô)…Dès que les opinions ont été ainsi reliées…elles deviennent connaissances ». Ainsi, pour<br />
Platon, les opinions vraies 27 ne deviennent sciences que si elles sont attachées par un « lien » 28 qui en<br />
donne l’explication. Or, c’est au philosophe qu’incombe la tâche de relier les opinions entre elles et<br />
d’en donner l’explication par son logos et par son logismos. On peut ainsi apercevoir le rôle<br />
incontournable du philosophe-intermédiaire sur le plan gnoséologique et épistémologique. « Le<br />
processus de transformation des opinions vraies en connaissance s’achève, sous l’effet de<br />
l’interrogation dialectique, en une connaissance globale où l’opinion, une fois liée, perd sa valeur<br />
23<br />
L’opinion droite (orthê doxa) correspond à l’opinion vraie (alêthês doxa). Ce qui est droit est vrai chez Platon. La vérité<br />
est donc caractérisée par la rectitude. Sur l’orthotês platonicienne, voir le sous-titre du Cratyle. Sur la rectitude des noms<br />
(peri onomatôn orthotêtos) ; et M. Fattal, « Vérité et fausseté de l’onoma et du logos dans le Cratyle de Platon », in M. Fattal<br />
(éd.), La Philosophie de Platon, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2001, Tome 1, pp. 207-231.<br />
24<br />
Op. cit., p. 209, n. 377.<br />
25<br />
C’est le titre évocateur donné à l’ouvrage publié en hommage à G. Casertano, Logon didonai. La filosofia come esercizio<br />
del render ragione. Studi in onore di Giovanni Casertano, a cura di L. Palumbo, Napoli, Loffredo Editore, 2001.<br />
26<br />
Voir à ce sujet, Y. Lafrance, La Théorie platonicienne de la Doxa, Paris-Montréal, Les Belles Lettres-Bellarmin, 1981, p.<br />
295.<br />
27<br />
Voir à ce sujet, Platon, Ménon, Traduction, introduction et notes par M. Canto, Paris, GF Flammarion, 1991, pp. 84-94.<br />
28 Op. cit., p. 89, n. 151.<br />
216
Michel Fattal<br />
d’opinion » 29 .<br />
Après avoir montré le rôle joué par l’opinion vraie au sein de l’interrogation dialectique du<br />
philosophe en vue de sa transformation en connaissance et en science, on peut se demander<br />
maintenant si le statut intermédiaire de l’opinion droite est identifiable au statut intermédiaire de<br />
l’eros. L. Robin soutient que « si l’Amour est quelque chose d’intermédiaire, ce n’est pas du moins au<br />
même sens que l’opinion, et, par conséquent, si l’exemple de l’opinion est allégué dans le Banquet<br />
pour faire comprendre ce qu’est l’Amour, il faut ne voir là qu’une comparaison très générale » 30 .<br />
« Jamais, ajoute Robin, l’opinion droite n’atteint le réel véritable ; si elle arrivait jusque-là, elle<br />
cesserait d’être elle-même, elle deviendrait autre chose, elle serait science ; elle reste donc<br />
essentiellement incapable de s’élever jusqu’à ce qui pourrait rendre raison d’elle-même. L’Amour, au<br />
contraire, n’est pas un tel intermédiaire, et, si la theia moira qui lui donne naissance n’est pas une<br />
grâce imparfaite et précaire, il doit nous conduire jusqu’à son terme naturel, qui est la contemplation<br />
même du Beau absolu…s’il nous conduit jusque-là, c’est qu’il est un intermédiaire bien différent de<br />
l’opinion vraie…l’Amour…est de telle nature qu’il tend à unir véritablement les extrêmes, à les<br />
concilier l’un avec l’autre. De plus, il est ce que n’est pas l’opinion, car il constitue par lui-même une<br />
méthode, c’est-à-dire une transition au sens propre du mot, un passage, un mouvement vers un but,<br />
auquel il atteint sans cesser d’être ce qu’il est » 31 , alors que l’opinion droite cesse d’être ce qu’elle est<br />
en devenant science.<br />
L’Amour-philosophe qui ne cesse d’être lui-même établit d’une manière dynamique et<br />
rationnelle, grâce à l’élan qui le caractérise en propre et qui est absent de l’opinion droite, un « lien »<br />
ou une « liaison » entre l’ignorance et la science, le sensible et l’intelligible, le corps et l’âme. Il est ce<br />
« chemin » ou ce « moyen » qui fait passer d’un domaine à l’autre, de la beauté corporelle à la beauté<br />
psychique, de la beauté psychique à la beauté épistémologique, et de la beauté épistémologique à la<br />
beauté intelligible. Ce moyen terme qui est « tension vers » et relation dynamique du fait qu’il est<br />
animé par un désir passionné fait passer l’initié de la beauté esthétique (aisthêsis : sensible), à la<br />
beauté morale, et de la beauté morale et intellectuelle à la beauté spirituelle 32 . Ce passage ou cette<br />
méthode qui conduit à la contemplation du Beau en soi est très bien décrit pas Platon lorsque Diotime<br />
se propose d’initier Socrate aux mystères de l’amour (209 e – 212 c).<br />
IV. L’initiation aux mystères de l’amour : un passage du sensible à l’intelligible, une transition du<br />
beau corps au Beau en soi (209 e – 212 c)<br />
Je ne rentrerai pas dans le détail de ce passage du Banquet qui a été maintes fois commenté par les<br />
exégètes. Je rappellerai ici que si la philosophie est conçue comme aspiration/élan vers le savoir et la<br />
sagesse visant la contemplation des Formes intelligibles, il est nécessaire que l’individu, qui se<br />
propose de contempler ces Formes, soit aidé par un guide (Diotime). Il doit être éduqué en vue de<br />
tourner le regard/l’œil de son âme du sensible vers l’intelligible, de l’image vers le modèle. Il devra<br />
donc être guidé et initié par un maître ou un éducateur. Or la « voie droite » (orthos) ou les<br />
« échelons » (epanabasmois) (211 c) qu’il faut suivre pour atteindre le but est comparable à<br />
l’initiation aux mystères 33 .<br />
L’initiation parfaite aux mystères représente une méthode ou un chemin constitué d’échelons<br />
et d’étapes permettant de progresser vers la contemplation du Beau en soi. Platon résume cet itinéraire<br />
conduisant au terme du cheminement en 211 b – d :<br />
« Voilà donc quelle est la droite voie qu’il faut suivre dans le domaine des choses de l’amour ou sur<br />
laquelle il faut se laisser conduire par un autre ; c’est en prenant son point de départ dans les beautés<br />
d’ici-bas pour aller vers cette beauté-là, de s’élever toujours, comme au moyen d’échelons, en passant<br />
d’un seul beau corps à deux, de deux beaux corps à tous les beaux corps, et des beaux corps aux belles<br />
occupations, et des occupations vers les belles connaissances qui sont certaines, puis des belles<br />
connaissances qui sont certaines vers cette connaissance qui constitue le terme, celle qui n’est autre<br />
que la science du beau lui-même, dans le but de connaître finalement la beauté en soi. C’est ce point<br />
29 Op. cit., p. 93.<br />
30 L. Robin, La Théorie platonicienne de l’amour, op. cit., p. 169.<br />
31 Op. cit., p. 169-170.<br />
32 « Aussi, dira P. Hadot,. op cit., p. 52, lorsque les autres hommes aiment Socrate-Eros, lorsqu’ils aiment l’Amour, révélé<br />
par Socrate, ce qu’ils aiment en Socrate, c’est cette aspiration, c’est cet amour de Socrate pour la Beauté et la perfection de<br />
l’être. Ils trouvent donc en Socrate le chemin vers leur propre perfection ».<br />
33 Voir à ce sujet, L. Brisson, op. cit., Introduction, pp. 65-71 ; J.-F. Mattéi, « Le symbole de l’amour dans le Banquet de<br />
Platon », in R. Brague et J.-F. Courtine (éds), Herméneutique et ontologie. Mélanges en hommage à Pierre Aubenque, Paris,<br />
PUF, « Epiméthée », 1990, pp. 55-77.<br />
217
Michel Fattal<br />
de la vie, mon cher Socrate, reprit l’étrangère de Mantinée, plus qu’à n’importe quel autre, que se<br />
situe le moment où, pour l’être humain, la vie vaut d’être vécue, parce qu’il contemple la beauté en<br />
elle-même » (trad. Brisson).<br />
Ce qu’il y a d’intéressant pour mon propos, dans ce passage, c’est que ce dernier met à nouveau en<br />
œuvre ce que j’ai appelé une philosophie de la relation qui vient contrebalancer la philosophie de la<br />
séparation ou le dualisme du corps et de l’âme, du sensible et de l’intelligible clairement posé et<br />
affirmé dans le Phédon. Si en effet, dans le Phédon, le corps est une prison/tombeau pour l’âme, s’il<br />
faut pratiquer la purification, c’est-à-dire « séparer le plus possible l’âme du corps » pour être<br />
notamment en mesure de penser l’être et la vérité ; ici, dans le Banquet, bien que l’âme soit distinguée<br />
du corps, la rupture ou la scission du corps et de l’âme n’apparaît pas puisqu’il s’agit justement de<br />
ménager des étapes, des échelons, des transitions et des progressions de l’amour des beaux corps à<br />
l’amour des belles âmes en vue d’accéder au Beau en soi. L’amour des beaux corps constitue donc un<br />
« tremplin » vers l’amour des belles âmes et par delà l’amour des belles âmes vers la Beauté<br />
intelligible. On peut même dire que la philosophie du Banquet est une philosophie du passage, une<br />
philosophie méthodique, permettant l’ascension progressive conduisant à la saisie immédiate du Beau<br />
en soi. Il s’agit manifestement de ne pas exclure, de cette représentation progressive de l’ascension<br />
vers le Beau en soi, la première étape de l’initiation qui est celle de la prise en considération de<br />
l’amour du beau corps. L’amour du beau corps n’est en aucune manière opposé à l’amour d’une belle<br />
âme et à l’amour du Beau en soi (le dualisme suppose justement l’opposition et l’exclusion). Bien au<br />
contraire, l’amour du beau corps ou des beaux corps est la condition sine qua non de toute conversion,<br />
de toute élévation, de toute vision, c’est-à-dire de toute saisie du Beau en soi. L’amour du beau corps<br />
et des beaux corps est en d’autres termes la condition nécessaire de toute contemplation. Cette<br />
condition nécessaire, mais non suffisante, de l’amour du beau corps caractérise en propre cette<br />
philosophie du passage. C’est donc à partir du premier stade incontournable de l’ascension que la<br />
philosophie de la relation est mise en œuvre. Le premier échelon représente en fait le point de départ<br />
sans lequel l’ascension ne peut être possible ou ne peut se réaliser. Ainsi, le corps, loin de constituer<br />
un obstacle, représente un passage nécessaire et obligé vers l’âme, la science, et le Beau en soi. Il est<br />
le « lieu initial » à partir duquel il est possible de « relier » le sensible à l’intelligible, l’extérieur à<br />
l’intérieur, le bas au haut. Et c’est l’amour, en tant qu’élan, aspiration et désir passionné, qui est le<br />
moteur ou le ciment fédérateur et dynamique de ces différents niveaux.<br />
Si le corps représente un passage nécessaire et obligé, et si l’amour du beau corps permet cette<br />
dynamique ascensionnelle vers le Beau en soi à travers les médiations de l’amour des belles âmes et<br />
des belles sciences ; si, en d’autres termes, le corps, au lieu d’être rejeté et séparé de l’âme, constitue<br />
en revanche un élément incontournable de ce que j’ai appelé une philosophie de la relation, c’est<br />
parce que la vision sensible d’un beau corps permet le souvenir (réminiscence) de la Beauté en soi<br />
contemplée par l’âme antérieurement avant qu’elle ne rentre dans un corps. Si la philosophie de la<br />
réminiscence qui est clairement formulée dans le Ménon et dans le Phédon 34 n’apparaît pas<br />
explicitement dans le Banquet, on peut tout de même dire qu’elle sous-tend cette philosophie de la<br />
relation qui au lieu de séparer comme par une coupure le sensible de l’intelligible, le corps de l’âme<br />
permet plutôt d’assurer leur unité et leur cohésion.<br />
Conclusion<br />
Ainsi, partis d’une philosophie de la séparation dans le Phédon dont on trouve les traces dans le<br />
Banquet, on se trouve aussitôt installé, avec le Sum-posion, dans le cadre d’une philosophie de la<br />
relation qui assure désormais la cohésion du Tout avec lui-même, et l’unité de l’homme avec luimême.<br />
Ce monisme cosmologique et anthropologique permet à Platon de sauvegarder l’unité de son<br />
système et l’empêche de sombrer dans le dualisme opposant le sensible à l’intelligible, le corps à<br />
l’âme. Platon répondrait à la critique que lui adressera par la suite Aristote. Contrairement à ce que<br />
soutiendrait Aristote, Platon ne redoublerait pas la réalité puisque celle-ci se trouverait malgré tout<br />
caractérisée par l’unité. J’ajouterai que cette philosophie de la relation, développée par Platon dans le<br />
Banquet, est conforme à l’optimisme grec en général et à l’optimisme platonicien en particulier qui<br />
considèrent que le monde est beau (cf. le Timée) et que l’homme est en mesure d’harmoniser, en lui,<br />
34 Sur la réminscence dans le Ménon et le Phédon, cf. l’Introduction de M. Canto, Platon, Ménon, op. cit., p. 74 sq., ainsi que<br />
l’Introduction de M. Dixsaut, Platon, Phédon, Traduction nouvelle, introduction et notes, Paris, GF Flammarion, 1991, p. 97<br />
sq. Sur le rôle joué par l’anmanèse dans d’autres dialogues, voir l’étude de S. Scolnicov, « Anamnèse et structure des idées<br />
dans le Théétète et dans le Parménide », in M. Fattal (éd.), La Philosophie de Platon, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2005, Tome 2, pp.<br />
139-158.<br />
218
Michel Fattal<br />
le corps et l’âme, le physique et le psychique. C’est à travers la figure mythique et dynamique de<br />
l’eros-démon-intermédiaire et médiateur, figure par excellence du « lien » (desmos) incarnée par le<br />
philo-sophe qui occupe une position médiane (en mesô) et centrale entre le haut et le bas, que cette<br />
unité du Tout avec lui-même et que cette harmonie de l’homme avec lui-même sont rendues<br />
possibles.<br />
219
Perché tanta morte in un dialogo sull’amore e sulla vita?<br />
Riflessioni sulla dialettica amore-morte-immortalità nel Simposio di Platone<br />
I. Riflessioni introduttive<br />
Arianna Fermani<br />
«Fratelli, a un tempo stesso, Amore e Morte,<br />
ingenerò la sorte»<br />
(G. Leopardi, Amore e Morte, 1832)<br />
Il primo dato su cui vorrei cercare di riflettere e su cui, stranamente, non si è adeguatamente<br />
soffermata la critica, è la cospicua presenza di riferimenti alla morte e al morire all'interno del<br />
Simposio 1 .<br />
L'individuazione delle occorrenze del lemma θάνατος, del verbo θνήσκω e dei suoi composti,<br />
costituisce il punto di avvio di questo contributo. Sulla scorta del lessico informatizzato di Radice-<br />
Bombacigno 2 è possibile individuare una serie di occorrenze piuttosto significative legate ai termini di<br />
quest’area semantica. Infatti, a fronte di un’unica occorrenza del lemma θάνατος 3 , si riscontrano del<br />
testo numerose occorrenze relative ai lemmi θνήσκω 4 , θνητός 5 , ai composti ἀποθνήσκω 6 e<br />
ὑπεραποθνῄσκω 7 , e ai verbi τελευτάω 8 e ἀπόλλυµι 9 .<br />
All'assunzione di questa presenza, tanto significativa quanto anomala, se si tiene conto che ci<br />
troviamo all'interno di un dialogo consacrato all'amore e dunque tradizionalmente considerato un inno<br />
alla procreazione e alla vita 10 , va però affiancata la riflessione sulla particolare curvatura che la<br />
nozione di θάνατος riceve all'interno del Simposio. Quello che, infatti, vorrei cercare di mostrare<br />
attraverso questo percorso è come, contrariamente alla nota contrapposizione tra ἔρως e θάνατος -<br />
intesi rispettivamente come istinto vitale e come pulsione distruttiva, ovvero come la Todestriebe<br />
(pulsione di morte) di freudiana memoria 11 - la morte rappresenti in questo contesto non solo il<br />
fondamento della vita, ma la condizione di possibilità dell’insorgenza dell'eros stesso.<br />
II. Le articolazioni del rapporto tra amore e morte<br />
Il riferimento alla morte e al morire attraversa tutta l’opera, a partire dal primo discorso. Fedro ricorda<br />
infatti come<br />
«solo gli amanti accettano di morire (ὑπεραποθνῄσκειν) per gli altri; non solo gli uomini, ma anche le<br />
donne. E di questa mia affermazione offre agli Elleni una bella testimonianza la figlia di Pelia,<br />
Alcesti, che volle, ella sola, morire (ἀποθανεῖν) per il suo sposo, pur avendo egli padre e madre…<br />
Invece Orfeo, figlio di Eagro, gli dèi lo mandarono via dall’Ade senza alcun risultato… perché<br />
1 Gli studi tema della morte nell’opera platonica, infatti, si concentrano principalmente su dialoghi quali Apologia, Fedone e<br />
Repubblica. Si vedano, tra gli altri, Van Harten, Socrates on Life and Death; Austin, Fear and Death in Plato; Armleder,<br />
Death in Plato’s Apologia. Per ovvie ragioni di spazio i riferimenti alla letteratura secondaria e la discussione con essa<br />
saranno limitati al minimo. Per una rassegna bibliografica, di carattere generale e specifico, si rinvia all’aggiornamento<br />
bibliografico di M. Tulli, in Platone, Simposio, 2011 24 , pp. 80 ss.<br />
2 Radice-Bombacigno, Plato, Lexicon, 2003.<br />
3 θάνατον: 179 D 8.<br />
4 τεθνάναι: 179 A 5; τεθνεῶτε: 192 E 4.<br />
5 θνητή: 207 D 1; θνητῆς: 211 E 3; θνητόν: 208 A 7, 208 B 3; θνητός: 202 D 8; 203 E 1; θνητοῦ: 202 D 11; 202 E 1; θνητῷ:<br />
206 C 7; 206 E 8.<br />
6 ἀπέθνῃσκον: 191 A 8; ἀποθανεῖν: 178 B 8; 208 D 3; ἀποθάνητε: 192 E 3; ἀποθάνοι: 191 B 2; ἀποθανοῖτο: 179 E 3;<br />
ἀποθνῄσκειν: 179 D 6.<br />
7 ὑπεραποθανεῖν: 180 A 1; ὑπεραποθνῄσκειν: 179 B 4; 207 B 4; 208 D 2.<br />
8 τελευτᾷ: 181 E 2; τελευτῆσαι: 211 C 7; τελευτήσασι: 180 b 8; τελευτήσοι: 179 E 4; τελευτῶν: 198 C 3; 211 C 8;<br />
τελευτῶντες: 220 C 8; τετελευτηκότι: 180 A 2.<br />
9 ἀπολλύµενον: 211 a 1; ἀπολλυµένων: 211 b 3; ἀπόλλυνται: 208 a 1; ἀπόλλυται: 207 E 4; ἀπώλλυντο: 191 B 5.<br />
10 «Ciò che emerge chiaramente nel Simposio è che i concetti che caratterizzano l’eros… sono il desiderio, la bellezza, la<br />
creatività, l’immortalità» (Santas, Platone e Freud, p. 70).<br />
11 Si tratta della teoria, elaborata da Sigmund Freud a partire dal 1920 (cfr. Freud, Jenseits des Lustprinzips), fondata sulla<br />
contrapposizione delle due pulsioni, quella di vita (Eros) e quella di morte (Thanatos), che scandirebbero la dimensione<br />
psichica di ogni essere vivente. «Contrapponendo amore e morte, Eros e Thanatos… Freud vede in Amore il tentativo di<br />
contrastare le forse disgregatrici, le pulsioni di morte, che altro non sono se non le cadenze con cui la natura gioca il suo<br />
rinnovamento a spese degli individui, ingannati dalla cieca pulsione (blinder Trieb) che Shopenhauer, il filosofo di Freud,<br />
aveva così lucidamente indicato» (Galimberti, Idee, p. 19).
Arianna Fermani<br />
sembrò loro essere un debole… e non avere il coraggio di morire per amore» (ἕνεκα τοῦ ἔρωτος<br />
ἀποθνῄσκειν) come ebbe Alcesti… Per questo motivo gli diedero un castigo e lo fecero morire<br />
(ἐποίησαν τὸν θάνατον) per mano di donne… E non lo trattennero certo come Achille, figlio di Teti, a<br />
cui attribuirono onori e lo mandarono alle Isole dei Beati. Infatti Achille, pur avendo saputo dalla<br />
madre che, se avesse ucciso Ettore, sarebbe morto (ἀποθανοῖτο) e che, se non avesse fatto questo,<br />
sarebbe tornato a casa e sarebbe morto (τελευτήσοι) vecchio, ebbe il coraggio di scegliere, porgendo<br />
soccorso al suo amante Patroclo e vendicandolo, non solo di morire per lui (ὑπεραποθανεῖν) ma di<br />
morire per lui già morto (ἐπαποθανεῖν τετελευτηκότι)» 12 .<br />
Il discorso di Fedro contiene, dunque, una cospicua serie di riferimenti alla morte e al morire. Il vero<br />
amante, dice Fedro, è colui che è disposto a morire per il proprio amato, come fece Alcesti, sebbene<br />
fosse una donna, o come fece Achille, che addirittura fu disposto a morire per un amato già morto.<br />
Egli, infatti, «non solo morì per Patroclo ma anche dopo Patroclo» 13 . Sul fronte opposto c’è chi, come<br />
Orfeo, non ha la forza di dare la propria vita per la propria amata. Egli non ha abbastanza coraggio 14 e<br />
quindi non riesce a dominare la paura e, nello specifico, la paura della morte. In questo senso, come<br />
viene detto esplicitamente, egli, pur essendo un uomo, è più debole di Alcesti. Ma a chi non è disposto<br />
a morire per amore non resta che o essere ucciso per mano altrui (o addirittura, come si legge, per<br />
«mano di donne», 179 D 8, come capitò, appunto, ad Orfeo), o terminare i propri giorni arrivando al<br />
termine della propria esistenza 15 morendo da vecchio ma in modo ignobile (prospettiva che Achille<br />
non fu disposto ad accettare).<br />
Tale discorso, dunque, che apre la serie di riferimenti al tema del θάνατος all’interno del dialogo,<br />
oltre ad avere una serie di limiti evidenziati dalla critica 16 , è dichiarato sbagliato dallo stesso Platone.<br />
In 208 D 7-8, infatti, Diotima, riprendendo le figure ricordate nel discorso di Fedro, puntualizza che la<br />
vera ragione per cui Alcesti e Achille sono morti per il proprio amato è quella di ottenere «la virtù<br />
immortale» e «la fama gloriosa». D’altra parte l’erroneità del discorso di Fedro non toglie, come ha<br />
giustamente osservato Reale 17 , l’importanza di questo, come di tutti gli altri personaggi, all’interno<br />
dell’economia complessiva del dialogo. «Il giudizio negativo che molti hanno dato del contenuto del<br />
discorso è dovuto al fatto che non hanno compreso il personaggio che lo pronuncia… e hanno<br />
frainteso il preciso ruolo della maschera con cui inizia il complesso gioco drammaturgico» 18 .<br />
Resta comunque il fatto che ci troviamo di fronte a vari scenari di “amore” e di “morte”, che nel<br />
discorso di Fedro vengono presentati in modo certamente inadeguato, ma che testimoniano la forza e<br />
il valore dell’eros, visto che gli dèi arrivano a punire chi non è disposto a morire per amore 19 . Un<br />
morire per amore che, in realtà, non ha nulla a che fare con l’ideale cristiano del sacrificio e<br />
dell’amore supremo che consiste nel morire gratuitamente per l’altro 20 , ma che è finalizzato<br />
all’acquisizione di una forma di immortalità: quella che deriva dalla fama e dalla gloria 21 . Come ha<br />
giustamente sottolineato Reale 22 , infatti, «costoro… non avrebbero fatto ciò che hanno fatto “se essi<br />
non fossero stati convinti che della loro virtù sarebbe rimasta immortale la memoria” [Simposio 208<br />
D]. Essi hanno accettato di sacrificare la vita “per la virtù immortale e per la fama gloriosa”, e dunque<br />
per amore dell’immortalità».<br />
12 Platone, Simposio 179 B 4-180 A 2. La traduzione di riferimento è quella di G. Reale, in Platone, Simposio, 1993.<br />
13 Rowe, Il Simposio di Platone, p. 25, n. 24.<br />
14 Sul fatto che l’amore implichi coraggio cfr. Simposio 196 C 8-D4: «E per coraggio, poi, neppure Ares gli si può opporre.<br />
Infatti non è Ares che possiede Eros, ma Eros che possiede Ares… E chi possiede è più forte di chi è posseduto; e chi<br />
domina colui che ha il maggior coraggio rispetto agli altri, risulta essere il più coraggioso di tutti».<br />
15 Il verbo usato in questo caso è, significativamente, τελευτάω che significa sì “morire” ma nel senso di “portare a termine<br />
la vita”, “compiere”, “finire”.<br />
16 «Fedro sta applicando la sua regola generale che “solo coloro che amano sono pronti a morire per altri”, ma con risultati<br />
particolarmente strani» (Rowe, Il Simposio di Platone, p. 25). La stranezza starebbe, in questo caso, nel fatto che, come<br />
sottolinea sempre Rowe, «solo gli amanti muoiono per altri; Alcesti muore per suo marito; pertanto deve necessariamente<br />
essere un’amante» (Ivi, n. 23).<br />
17 Eros. Demone mediatore, pp. 54 ss.<br />
18 Reale, Demone mediatore, p. 55.<br />
19 In questo senso l’eros risulta essere più forte della philia: «l’esempio di Alcesti, che per amore dello sposo fu pronta a<br />
morire al suo posto, a differenza del padre e della madre, dimostra che l’eros è più forte dell’amore familiare (filia). Gli dei<br />
la rispettarono, mentre punirono invece Orfeo che non fu ugualmente disposto a morire per Euridice» (Santas, Platone e<br />
Freud, p. 31).<br />
20 «L’Agape cristiana costituisce un vertice di amore donativo in senso assoluto, mentre l’Eros della morte per l’altro di cui<br />
parla Platone è un amore acquisitivo e non donativo» (Reale, Eros demone mediatore, p. 195).<br />
21 Non a caso, come sottolinea Jaeger, Paideia, p. 997 a proposito del discorso di Fedro: «motivo fondamentale del suo<br />
discorso è l’aspetto che si può dire politico di Eros. È lui che desta negli uomini il desiderio di onore, lui che genera l’areté,<br />
senza di che, non può esistere né amicizia, né società né stato».<br />
22 Reale, Eros. Demone mediatore, p. 195.<br />
221
Arianna Fermani<br />
I due poli “morte”-“immortalità”, legati dal comune trait d’union rappresentato dall’ “amore”- in una<br />
triade dialettica che, come cercherò di mostrare nella parte che segue, rappresenta una delle strutture<br />
concettuali fondanti dell’opera- emergono, dunque, già all’inizio del dialogo, anche se in forma per<br />
così dire embrionale.<br />
Il tema della morte e del morire affiora, poi, anche se ad un altro livello, anche nel discorso di<br />
Aristofane. Qui la questione della morte viene associata all’aspirazione a diventare “una cosa sola”,<br />
ovvero a quell’insaziabile desiderio di fusione (ἐπιθυµοῦντες συµφῦναι: 191 A 8) che caratterizza gli<br />
amanti. Infatti è proprio a causa di questa ἐπιθυµία insopprimibile che, si racconta, gli amanti<br />
«morivano di fame e di inattività (ἀπέθνῃσκον ὑπὸ λιµοῦ καὶ τῆς... ἀργίας)» 23 .<br />
Il discorso di Aristofane 24 , presenta dunque una articolazione del rapporto fra amore e morte diversa<br />
rispetto al discorso di Fedro: nel racconto aristofanesco, infatti, gli amanti non scelgono di morire per<br />
il proprio amato, e la morte non si configura come l’esito di un atto eroico, non è l’espressione di<br />
forza o di coraggio (finalizzato in realtà, come spiegherà Diotima alla fine dell’opera, all’acquisizione<br />
di una gloria immortale 25 ), ma, esattamente al contrario, sopraggiunge per una forma di debolezza,<br />
cioè per l’incapacità di controllare l’impulso amoroso e di amministrare il desiderio.<br />
Ora, per un verso, come è ovvio e come emerge chiarissimamente anche dal mito, la morte<br />
rappresenta il contraltare della vita, ovvero ciò che le si oppone e che la nega. Quando, infatti, delle<br />
due metà dell’intero, una muore e una vive, quella che rimane in vita proietta il proprio desiderio<br />
verso un’altra metà, sia essa di sesso maschile sia di sesso femminile:<br />
«quando una metà moriva (ἀποθάνοι) e l’altra rimaneva in vita, questa rimasta cercava un’altra metà e<br />
si intrecciava con questa, sia che si imbattesse nella metà di una donna… sia che si imbattesse nella<br />
metà di un uomo. E in questo modo morivano (ἀπώλλυντο)» 26 .<br />
Ancora una volta, dunque, l’esito della fusione di due metà è rappresentato dalla morte e dalla<br />
distruzione: c’è infatti una “prima” morte al momento della separazione della metà originaria e una<br />
“seconda morte” al momento della formazione di un altro intero.<br />
Ma, se da un lato è vero che vita e morte si contrappongono, delineando due esiti irrimediabilmente<br />
opposti (come l’esperienza comune e le parole pronunciate da Socrate alla fine dell’Apologia<br />
attestano con una straordinaria icasticità: «è ormai venuta l’ora di andare: io a morire, e voi, invece, a<br />
vivere» 27 ), è però anche vero che nella potente immagine aristofanesca vita e morte si trovano a<br />
convivere. Dire, infatti, che l’intero è contemporaneamente costituito di due metà, di cui una è viva e<br />
l’altra è morta («una metà moriva e l’altra rimaneva in vita» 191 B 2), significa, fuori dal linguaggio<br />
mitico, che gli opposti sono chiamati a convivere e ad armonizzarsi proprio in virtù della loro<br />
contrapposizione. E significa anche che i due termini vita e morte danno reciprocamente senso l’uno<br />
all’altro: la morte esiste in quanto esiste la vita e viceversa, e i due termini si danno e si completano<br />
proprio in forza della loro opposizione. Ci troviamo insomma di fronte alla analoga movenza<br />
dialettica introdotta già nel discorso di Erissimaco 28 in cui, non a caso, viene esplicitamente citato il<br />
celebre frammento eracliteo: «l’Uno in sé discorde, con se medesimo s’accorda, come l’armonia<br />
dell’arco e della lira». In questa “opposizione armoniosa”, dunque, che costituisce il vero cuore del<br />
pensiero dialettico, risiede (così come -seppur a diverso titolo- mostrano i discorsi di Fedro e di<br />
Aristofane) uno degli snodi fondamentali del rapporto tra amore e morte.<br />
Inoltre, sempre nel mito narrato da Aristofane, emerge, a mio avviso, un’altra questione estremamente<br />
rilevante: la metà viva è spinta dall’amore e in virtù della morte della parte che precedentemente la<br />
completava, a dirigersi altrove, ovvero a cercare un’altra metà, segno che l’amore, da un certo punto<br />
di vista, trae origine dalla morte. Se dunque «con la morte di una metà, l’altra cercava e abbracciava<br />
qualunque metà potesse ricomporre la coppia originaria» 29 , questo significa che vita e morte si<br />
trovano, seppure in un modo del tutto particolare, a convivere.<br />
Ma in realtà vita e morte vengono ad intrecciarsi, nel medesimo discorso, anche ad un altro livello.<br />
L’amore, infatti, letto secondo il paradigma della “fusione degli amanti”, viene anche visto come ciò<br />
23 191 A 8-191 B 1.<br />
24 Sebbene anche questo discorso, al pari di quello di Fedro, sia considerato falso da Platone (cfr. 208 C-E; 205 D-E; su tutta<br />
la questione cfr. Migliori, Il Disordine ordinato, pp. 115 ss.), risultano a mio avviso interessanti le movenze teoriche che in<br />
essi vengono proposte e che troveranno conferma nel discorso di Diotima.<br />
25 «Credo proprio -soggiunse- che tutti facciano quello che fanno per la virtù immortale e per questa fama gloriosa, tanto più,<br />
quanto più valgono: infatti, essi amano l’immortalità (ἀθανάτου ἐρῶσιν)» (208 D 7-E 1).<br />
26 191 B 2-5.<br />
27 Apologia di Socrate, 42 A 2-3.<br />
28 «Egli fonda il suo concetto della concordia armoniosa sulla teoria eraclitea dei contrari… che, del resto, ha una notevole<br />
parte anche in altri elementi del pensiero medico del tempo» (Jaeger, Paideia, p. 1003).<br />
29 Santas, Platone e Freud, p. 35.<br />
222
Arianna Fermani<br />
che supera i confini della vita prolungandosi nella morte. Efesto, infatti, offre agli amanti la possibilità<br />
che essi si fondino l’uno con l’altro, perché, dice il dio parlando direttamente ad essi<br />
«viviate insieme la vita, e quando morirete (ἀποθάνητε), anche laggiù, nell’Ade, invece di due siate<br />
ancora uno, uniti insieme anche nella morte (τεθνεῶτε) 30 .<br />
Dunque se l’amore costituisce il fondamento di una fusione, di una reductio ad unum che supera il<br />
limite della vita trapassando anche nella morte 31 , allora si può dire che, anche da questo di vista, vita e<br />
morte si trovano a convivere, nel comune anello di congiunzione rappresentato da Eros.<br />
Queste diverse riflessioni sulla morte, sul suo nesso con la vita e con l’amore da un lato e con<br />
l’immortalità dall’altro, trovano delle interessanti conferme nel discorso di Socrate. Il discorso di<br />
Diotima riportato dal Filosofo, infatti, che ruota tutto intorno all’eros definito come «un parto nella<br />
bellezza, sia secondo il corpo, sia secondo l’anima» (206 B 7-8), e come amore di «generare e<br />
partorire nel bello» (206 E 5), si impernia proprio sulla tensione dialettica tra mortale e immortale:<br />
«la generazione è ciò che ci può essere di sempre nascente e di immortale in un mortale (ἀθάνατον ὡς<br />
θνητῷ)» (206 E 8).<br />
L’amore, dunque, definito esplicitamente «desiderio di immortalità (τῆς ἀθανασίας τὸν ἔρωτα)» (207<br />
A 3-4), viene definitivamente connesso al duplice polo della morte da un lato e dell’immortalità<br />
dall’altro.<br />
Questo significa che, come accade per il demone Eros, che «per mancanza delle cose buone e belle,<br />
ha desiderio di queste cose di cui è mancante (ἐνδεής)» (202 D 1-3), così l’uomo, costitutivamente<br />
ancorato alla sua originaria mancanza, inchiodato alla sua condizione mortale e chiuso nel perimetro<br />
delimitato sin dall’inizio alla sua esistenza, non può trovare se non nell’amore il fondamento della<br />
propria immortalità, per quanto è possibile all’essere umano:<br />
«infatti lo stesso discorso di prima vale anche ora, ossia che la natura mortale (ἡ θνητὴ φύσις) cerca,<br />
nella misura del possibile (κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν), di essere sempre e di essere immortale (ἀεί τε εἶναι καὶ<br />
ἀθάνατος)» (207 D 1-2).<br />
E l’unica condizione di accesso all’immortalità per l’essere umano, ricorda il Filosofo, risiede nella<br />
possibilità di “generare figli”, siano essi figli del corpo o figli dell’anima 32 . In realtà, nell’ottica<br />
platonica, sono “i figli dell’anima” a detenere il primato, ovvero quei figli spirituali che sono frutto di<br />
un processo comunicativo-educativo e di una fecondità interiore ben più importante della prima. Da<br />
questa seconda forma di generazione derivano, non a caso, figli definiti esplicitamente «più immortali<br />
(ἀθανατωτέρων) e più belli» (209 C 7).<br />
«E appunto in questa maniera ogni cosa mortale si mette in salvo, ossia non già con l’essere sempre in<br />
tutto il medesimo, come ciò che è divino, ma con il lasciare in luogo di quello che se ne va o che<br />
invecchia, qualcos’altro che è giovane e simile a lui»,<br />
si legge in 208 A 7-B 2.<br />
In questo senso si può dire che ad una forma di immortalità per così dire “leggera”, in quanto<br />
posseduta sin da sempre e per altra via dalle realtà eterne 33 , si contrappone l’“immortalità faticosa”<br />
dell’essere umano, raggiungibile solo passando attraverso un vero e proprio “stratagemma” (µηχανῇ:<br />
208 B 2), cioè solo attraversando le impervie vie e le dolorose strettoie della cura (σπουδὴ: 208 B 6) e<br />
dell’amore (ἔρως: 208 B 6):<br />
«con questo stratagemma 34 , o Socrate-soggiunse-, ciò che è mortale partecipa dell’immortalità<br />
(θνητὸν ἀθανασίας µετέχει), sia il corpo, sia ogni altra cosa… Non ti stupire, dunque, se ogni essere<br />
tenga in onore il proprio rampollo, perché è in funzione di immortalità che questa cura e l’amore<br />
s’accompagnano ad ognuno» (208 B 2-6).<br />
III. Riflessioni conclusive<br />
Da questo attraversamento -seppur rapido e incompleto- della nozione di thanatos all’interno del<br />
Simposio, emerge come il tema della morte e del morire, che intesse intimamente molte trame<br />
dell’opera, non si configuri nel dialogo come contraltare dell’amore e come negazione della vita, ma<br />
come ciò che:<br />
1) è inseparabile dalla vita stessa, nel senso che non può esserci la vita senza la morte e senza il<br />
limite da essa delineato;<br />
30<br />
192 E 3-4.<br />
31<br />
In realtà va osservato come, in tale fusione, i soggetti si perdono, dato che sopravvive l’unione e non le due metà che si<br />
cercavano.<br />
32<br />
Per un approfondimento di questa nozione di «mental procreation» cfr. Price, Love and Friendship, pp. 35 ss.<br />
33<br />
«Ciò che è immortale, invece, vi partecipa in altro modo» (208 B 4).<br />
34<br />
Ho apportato qui una variazione rispetto alla traduzione del termine µηχανή (“sistema”) proposta da Reale.<br />
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Arianna Fermani<br />
2) rappresenta la conditio sine qua non dell'insorgenza stessa dell'amore come desiderio<br />
inestinguibile, come desiderio di immortalarsi, «per quanto è possibile ai mortali» (206 E 8).<br />
In questo senso, forse, si può comprendere come il Filosofo, proprio nel dialogo dedicato alla<br />
«pulsante vitalità della vita» 35 , ritenga necessario parlare, più volte e in molti modi, di morte.<br />
La presenza ineludibile della morte, infatti, costituisce la sorgente inesauribile dell’amore e, con esso,<br />
la ricerca dell’immortalità, visto che «Platone è chiaro nel sostenere che l’immortalità costituisce la<br />
meta ultima dell’eros vero e proprio» 36 . Le due forme di immortalità del Simposio, infatti, ovvero<br />
«l'immortalità riproduttiva, che riguarda la stirpe e la specie, e l'immortalità del pensiero, quella che<br />
spetta ai poeti, agli uomini di scienza, ai legislatori, grazie alla fama imperitura delle loro opere, che<br />
sopravvivono nella posteriorità» 37 , si fondano proprio sulla consapevolezza di quel πέρας (limite)<br />
intrinseco alla vita rappresentato dalla morte stessa. «Perciò la generazione di un essere identico nella<br />
specie… è l’unica via, per il mortale e finito, di conservarsi immortale» 38 .<br />
In questo senso, amore e morte, lungi dal contrapporsi irriducibilmente, finiscono per costituire due<br />
facce della stessa medaglia, e non solo in base al fatto che, come si ricorda nel primo discorso, «solo<br />
gli amanti sono disposti a morire per gli amati» (179 B 4-5), ma per una ragione più profonda,<br />
rappresentata dalla tensione dialettica (che a mio avviso rappresenta uno dei cuori teorici della<br />
riflessione etico-antropologica platonica) tra la consapevole accettazione della morte e<br />
l'insopprimibile aspirazione al suo superamento.<br />
«Ogni… persona che abbia desiderio, desidera ciò che non ha a sua disposizione e che non è presente,<br />
ciò che non possiede, ciò che egli non è (ὃ µὴ ἔστιν αὐτὸς), ciò di cui ha bisogno»,<br />
si legge in 200 E 2-5.<br />
Sull’assunzione di quel limite invalicabile che è la morte, dunque, risiede la radice di un desiderio<br />
senza limite, dato che, se l’essere umano non fosse consapevole della sua mancanza, non potrebbe<br />
neppure desiderare:<br />
«quando non si crede di essere privi di una cosa, non la si desidera (ὁ µὴ οἰόµενος ἐνδεὴς εἶναι οὗ ἂν<br />
µὴ οἴηται ἐπιδεῖσθαι)» (204 A 6-7).<br />
La mancanza e la consapevolezza di questa mancanza si danno dunque come elementi indisgiungibili,<br />
esattamente come la natura di Eros è costituita dalla “tensione armonica” e dalla combinazione delle<br />
nature opposte dei suoi genitori Poros e Penia. Perché Eros è sì costitutivamente manchevole, in<br />
quanto «ha la natura della madre, sempre accompagnato con povertà (ἀεὶ ἐνδείᾳ σύνοικος)» (203 D<br />
3), ma ha anche la ricchezza enorme, conferitagli dalla natura paterna, di essere sempre alla ricerca,<br />
sempre “affamato”: «è coraggioso, audace, impetuoso, straordinario, cacciatore… pieno di risorse,<br />
ricercatore di sapienza per tutta la vita» (203 D 4-7).<br />
Ma se Eros può desiderare in quanto, appunto, «privo di bellezza e bontà, ma consapevole di questa<br />
mancanza e pieno di risorse nel cercare di ottenerle» 39 , in virtù del suo collocarsi in una posizione<br />
intermedia fra mortale e immortale (µεταξὺ θνητοῦ καὶ ἀθανάτου) (202 D 11), questo significa anche<br />
che ciò che è immortale, in virtù della sua perfezione e compiutezza, non ha accesso al desiderio. Non<br />
a caso gli dèi, come ricorda esplicitamente Platone, non desiderano (204 A 1).<br />
Senza l’assunzione della finitezza originaria del θάνατος, pertanto, non si darebbero né la vita né eros,<br />
vero anello di congiunzione tra divino e mortale (θνητοῦ) (202 E 1), e fondamentale condizione di<br />
possibilità che, come si è visto, «ciò che è mortale partecipi dell’immortalità» (208 B 3) 40 .<br />
«Con un sapiente discorso Diotima rivela la verità sulla natura e l’opera di Eros, demone potente, che<br />
muove alla fecondità del corpo e dello spirito e che mediante i bei corpi e le anime belle consente<br />
all’uomo di godere dell’immortalità della specie e del pensiero immortale. È dunque l’amore che<br />
innalza l’uomo oltre la propria condizione mortale e suscita il desiderio di oltrepassare la propria<br />
natura finita portandone a compimento le proprie potenzialità» 41 .<br />
L’amore è indisgiungibile dalla morte, dunque, e da essa trae origine, esattamente come la filosofia<br />
che, proprio per questa ragione, è sorretta da un’inquietudine costante 42 . Ecco perché il filosofo, come<br />
Eros, è sempre alla ricerca, non ha mai pace. Egli, infatti, non solo non rimuove e non dimentica la<br />
35 Bury, The <strong>Symposium</strong> of Plato, p. III.<br />
36 Santas, Platone e Freud, p. 63.<br />
37 Vegetti, Quindici lezioni su Platone, p. 129 (corsivi miei).<br />
38 Jaeger, Paideia, p. 1015.<br />
39 Santas, Platone e Freud, p. 50.<br />
40 «Diotima has been describing an immortality open to what is mortal» (Price, Love and Friendship, p. 30).<br />
41 Zanatta, in Platone, Simposio o Sull’amore, p. 178.<br />
42 «La filosofia, come indica lo stesso termine, possiede una dimensione affettiva che la costituisce e insieme la caratterizza.<br />
Il filosofo non solo agisce guidato dall’intelligenza, ma ama questa attività, conosce il valore delle sue risorse, apprezza il<br />
suo linguaggio, cioè desidera il sapere di cui va alla ricerca. La filosofia è desiderio di conoscere. Intelligenza e desiderio<br />
sembrano convergere, stringendosi in un nodo inestricabile» (corsivo mio)» (Borges, Eros: direzione e effetti, p. 15).<br />
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Arianna Fermani<br />
morte, ma ne fa la chiave di volta della sua vita, il punto di partenza della sua inestinguibile sete di<br />
conoscenza, di amore e, dunque, di immortalità. Perché se è vero che «la filosofia nasce come<br />
tentativo di controllare il dolore che il divenire porta con sé» 43 , è proprio in questo fondamentale<br />
crocevia che può sprigionarsi la meraviglia, ovvero quell’apertura incessante alla domanda e alla vita<br />
che può generarsi solo in presenza di un atteggiamento di persistente e profonda anticipazione della<br />
morte:<br />
«la domanda che nasce nella prospettiva della fine resta comunque inevitabile e finisce col costituire<br />
l’inizio stesso della filosofia. Platone e Aristotele hanno insegnato che la filosofia nasce con la<br />
meraviglia sull’essere. Si può però ben dire che la meraviglia non è che il risvolto positivo<br />
dell’angoscia di fronte al nulla, in qualche modo già la prefigurazione della sua salvezza» 44 .<br />
IV. Bibliografia citata e utilizzata<br />
1. Strumenti e lessici<br />
Radice R.-Bombacigno R., Plato. Lexicon. Con CD-ROM, Biblia, Milano 2003.<br />
2. Fonti<br />
Bury R.G., The <strong>Symposium</strong> of Plato, Heffer, Cambridge 1932.<br />
Ferrari F.: Platone, Simposio, introduzione di F. Di Benedetto, traduzione e note di F. Ferrari,<br />
aggiornamento bibliografico di M. Tulli, Bur, Milano 1986, 2011 24 .<br />
Freud S., Jenseits des Lustprinzips 1920, trad. it. Al di là del principio del piacere, in Opere di<br />
Sigmund Freud (OSF) vol. 9. L'Io e l'Es e altri scritti 1917-1923, Bollati Boringhieri, Torino 1986.<br />
Reale G.: Platone, Simposio, introduzione, traduzione, note e apparati di G. Reale, appendice<br />
bibliografica di E. Peroli, Rusconi, Milano 1993.<br />
Zanatta F: Platone, Simposio o Sull’Amore, introduzione di U. Galimberti, traduzione a cura di F.<br />
Zanatta, Feltrinelli, Milano 1995, 2010 9 .<br />
3. Studi critici<br />
Armleder P.J., Death in Plato’s Apologia, «Classical Bulletin», 42 (1966), p. 46.<br />
Austin E., Fear and Death in Plato, Washington University 2009.<br />
Borges De Araújo Jr. A., Eros: direzione e effetti, in Anastácio Borges De Araújo Jr.-Gabriele<br />
Cornelli (eds.), Il Simposio di Platone: un banchetto di interpretazioni, Loffredo Editore, Napoli 2012.<br />
Galimberti U., Idee: il catalogo è questo, Feltrinelli, Milano 2001.<br />
Jaeger W., Paideia. Die Formung des griechischen Menshen, 3 voll., Berlin 1936-1947; trad. it. L.<br />
Emery-A. Setti: Paideia. La formazione dell‘uomo greco, introduzione di G. Reale, indici di A.<br />
Bellanti, Bompiani “Il pensiero Occidentale”, Milano 2003.<br />
Melchiorre V., Al di là dell’ultimo. Filosofie della morte e della vita, Vita e Pensiero, Milano 1998.<br />
Migliori M, Il Disordine ordinato. La filosofia dialettica di Platone. Volume I. Dialettica, metafisica e<br />
cosmologia. Volume II. Dall’anima alla prassi etica e politica, Morcelliana, Brescia 2013.<br />
Price A.W., Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1989, 1997 3 .<br />
Reale G., Eros demone mediatore e il gioco delle maschere nel Simposio di Platone, Rizzoli, Milano<br />
1997.<br />
Rowe C. J., Il Simposio di Platone. Cinque lezioni sul dialogo con un ulteriore contributo sul Fedone<br />
e una breve discussione di Maurizio Migliori e Arianna Fermani, a cura di M. Migliori, Academia<br />
Verlag, Sankt Augustin 1998.<br />
Santas G., Plato and Freud. Two Theories of Love, Basis Blakwell, Oxford 1988; trad. it. L.<br />
Casalboni: Platone e Freud: due teorie dell'eros, Il Mulino, Bologna 1990.<br />
Van Harten A., Socrates on Life and Death (Plato, Apology 40 C 5-41 C7), «The Cambridge Classical<br />
Journal», 57 (2011), pp. 165-183.<br />
Vegetti M., Quindici lezioni su Platone, Einaudi, Torino 2003.<br />
43 Galimberti, Idee, p. 61.<br />
44 Melchiorre, Al di là dell’ultimo, p. 10.<br />
225
La nozione di intermedio nel <strong>Symposium</strong> di Platone<br />
Cristina Rossitto<br />
Nel <strong>Symposium</strong> Platone utilizza ripetutamente la nozione di "intermedio" (µεταξύ), in quanto essa è<br />
fondamentale per stabilire quale sia la vera natura di Eros. Questi infatti viene riconosciuto come né<br />
bello né brutto, ma come intermedio fra i due; come né buono né cattivo, ma come intermedio fra i<br />
due; ma soprattutto come né immortale né mortale, né un dio né un uomo, ma come qualcosa di<br />
intermedio fra ciò che è immortale e ciò che è mortale, fra ciò che è divino e ciò che è umano. In<br />
quanto tale, Eros è un "dèmone", e anzi, proprio per il fatto di avere una natura intermedia fra gli dèi e<br />
gli uomini, egli assume la funzione di vero e proprio collegamento tra gli uni e gli altri: Eros è<br />
appunto un "dèmone mediatore". 1 E ancora, figlio di Poros e Penia, genitori aventi per molti aspetti<br />
natura opposta l'uno rispetto all'altra, Eros si trova in una situazione di intermedietà anche fra sapienza<br />
e ignoranza, ed è perciò filosofo.<br />
Tale uso della nozione di intermedio come ciò che possiede una natura che sta "in mezzo" fra<br />
una superiore ed una inferiore ad esso, queste ultime "opposte" o senz'altro "contrarie" (ἐναντίον) fra<br />
loro 2 , è sicuramente il più noto ed è riscontrabile anche in altri luoghi platonici, e non solo nei<br />
dialoghi, 3 ma anche nelle testimonianze sulle "cosiddette dottrine non scritte" 4 . In questa sede,<br />
tuttavia, si preferisce svolgere alcune considerazioni di carattere più specifico sulla nozione di<br />
intermedio utilizzata da Platone, proprio grazie al fatto che nel <strong>Symposium</strong> egli offre una varietà di<br />
coppie di opposti "con intermedio" assai ricca ed articolata. Ciò lascia intendere, già ad una prima<br />
lettura, che la nozione di intermedio possieda più di un significato e che essa si colleghi ad altre<br />
prospettive e ad ambiti ulteriori rispetto a quanto espresso nel <strong>Symposium</strong> stesso.<br />
Proprio per tale motivo si cercherà di concentrare l'attenzione solo sulle argomentazioni<br />
contenute in questa parte del dialogo, limitando il confronto, a titolo esmplificativo, con un altro breve<br />
testo platonico, forse meno tematizzato in questa prospettiva, ma meritevole di considerazione, quale<br />
quello che si può individuare nel Gorgia. 5 In tal senso, la nozione tecnica di intermedio e la figura di<br />
Eros potrebbero trovare un qualche reciproco giovamento dal punto di vista filosofico, in riferimento<br />
non solo alle dottrine platoniche ma anche alle dottrine di altri pensatori del medesimo periodo o<br />
ambito culturale, le quali, pur nella loro diversità rispetto alle prime, rivelano per altri aspetti una linea<br />
comune di sviluppo.<br />
1. L'uso "tecnico" del concetto di µεταξύ si trova nella parte finale del dialogo, quella che<br />
viene di consuetudine considerata come la più strettamente filosofica, dal momento che la sua<br />
conduzione è affidata, diversamente da quanto avvenuto in precedenza, alla figura di Socrate.<br />
Più precisamente, il primo riferimento importante alla nozione di µεταξύ compare, nel<br />
<strong>Symposium</strong>, nel momento in cui Socrate espone il discorso su Eros udito da Diotima, nella stessa<br />
forma in cui questa lo spiegò a lui, ossia interrogando:<br />
Σχεδὸν γάρ τι καὶ ἐγὼ πρὸς αὐτὴν ἕτερα τοιαῦτα ἔλεγον οἷάπερ νῦν πρὸς ἐµὲ Ἀγάθων,<br />
ὡς εἴη ὁ Ἔρως µέγας θεός, εἴη δὲ τῶν καλῶν· ἤλεγχε δή µε τούτοις τοῖς λόγοις οἷσπερ<br />
ἐγὼ τοῦτον, ὡς οὔτε καλὸς εἴη κατὰ τὸν ἐµὸν λόγ οὔτε ἀγαθός. Καὶ ἐγώ, Πῶς λέγεις,<br />
ἔφην, ὦ Διοτίµα; αἰσχρὸς ἄρα ὁ Ἔρως ἐστὶ καὶ κακός; Καὶ ἥ, Οὐκ εὐφηµήσεις; ἔφη· ἢ<br />
1 Cf. G. Reale, Eros dèmone mediatore. Il gioco delle maschere nel <strong>Symposium</strong> di Platone, Milano 1997.<br />
2 E' noto che la distinzione dei tipi di termini opposti (ἀντικείµενα) in contraddittori, privazione e possesso, contrari<br />
(ἐναντία) e relativi risale ad Aristotele, il quale però a volte, esattamente come è in Platone, utilizza ancora il termine<br />
ἐναντίον per indicare tanto gli opposti in generale quanto quel particolare tipo di opposti che sono i "contrari" (cf. per<br />
esempio Aristot. Cat. 10). D'altra parte, è proprio Aristotele ad ammettere la possibilità che vi siano intermedi fra termini<br />
opposti solo per i contrari, e anzi, nemmeno per tutti (cf. anche Aristot. Metaph. X 7).<br />
3 Per una considerazione complessiva ma articolata dei luogi dei dialoghi n cui Platone utilizza il termine µεταξύ si rinvia<br />
all'intramontabile J. Souilhé, La notion platonicienne d'intermediaire dans la philosophie des dialogues, Paris 1919, anche se<br />
qui spesso prevale una visione della tematica che forse tiene troppo conto della tradizione filosofica successiva a Platone,<br />
quale quelle aristotelica e stoica.<br />
4 Cf . H.J. Kraemer, Platone e i fondamenti della metafisica, Milano 1982.<br />
5 Non potranno perciò essere qui tematizzati i collegamenti con dialoghi quali la Repubblica, il Teeteto e il Timeo, essendo<br />
di carattere troppo ampio, mentre l'utilizzazione della nozione di intermedio nell'ambito delle "dottrine non scritte" è ricerca<br />
condotta in altra sede. Per un esempio di apprezzamento del concetto di intermedio nel <strong>Symposium</strong> in generale, si veda,<br />
recentemente, Ch. Rowe, Il Simposio di Platone, Sankt Augustin 1998; R. Fabbrichesi, La freccia di Apollo. Semiotica ed<br />
erotica nel pensiero antico, Pisa 2006.
Cristina Rossitto<br />
οἴει, ὅτι ἂν µὴ καλὸν ᾖ, ἀναγκαῖον αὐτὸ εἶναι αἰσχρόν; Μάλιστά γε. Ἦ καὶ ἂν µὴ σοφόν,<br />
ἀµαθές; ἢ οὐκ ᾔσθησαι ὅτι ἔστιν τι µεταξὺ σοφίας καὶ ἀµαθίας; Τί τοῦτο; Τὸ ὀρθὰ<br />
δοξάζειν καὶ ἄνευ τοῦ ἔχειν λόγον δοῦναι οὐκ οἶσθ’, ἔφη, ὅτι οὔτε ἐπίστασθαί ἐστιν -<br />
ἄλογον γὰρ πρᾶγµα πῶς ἂν εἴη ἐπιστήµη; - οὔτε ἀµαθία - τὸ γὰρ τοῦ ὄντος τυγχάνον πῶς<br />
ἂν εἴη ἀµαθία; - ἔστι δὲ δήπου τοιοῦτον ἡ ὀρθὴ δόξα, µεταξὺ φρονήσεως καὶ<br />
ἀµαθίας. Ἀληθῆ, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, λέγεις. Μὴ τοίνυν ἀνάγκαζε ὃ µὴ καλόν ἐστιν αἰσχρὸν εἶναι,<br />
µηδὲ ὃ µὴ ἀγαθόν, κακόν. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸν Ἔρωτα ἐπειδὴ αὐτὸς ὁµολογεῖς µὴ εἶναι<br />
ἀγαθὸν µηδὲ καλόν, µηδέν τι µᾶλλον οἴου δεῖν αὐτὸν αἰσχρὸν καὶ κακὸν εἶναι, ἀλλά τι<br />
µεταξύ, ἔφη, τούτοιν.<br />
Infatti, anch’io dissi a lei all’incirca quelle stesse cose che Agatone ha detto a me, ossia<br />
che Eros è un gran dio, e che è amore delle cose belle. E lei mi confutò con quegli stessi<br />
argomenti con cui io ho confutato lui, ossia dicendo che, in base al suo stesso discorso,<br />
Eros non risulta essere né bello né buono. Ed io allora risposi: "Che cosa dici, o Diotima?<br />
Allora Eros è brutto e cattivo?". E lei: "Sta' zitto! Credi forse che ciò che non sia bello, di<br />
necessità debba essere brutto?". (S.)"Sicuramente!". (D.) "E che ciò che non sia sapiente,<br />
debba essere ignorante? O non ti accorgi che c'è un intermedio fra sapienza e<br />
ignoranza?". (S.) "Qual è questo?". "L'opinare rettamente, però, senza essere in grado di<br />
fornire spiegazioni - precisò Diotima -, non sai che non è un sapere? Infatti, come<br />
potrebbe essere scienza una cosa senza spiegazioni? E non è neppure ignoranza. Infatti,<br />
come potrebbe essere ignoranza, se coglie l'essere? Pertanto, l'opinione retta è<br />
indubbiamente di questo tipo: un intermedio fra saggezza e ignoranza". "Dici il vero",<br />
risposi. "Allora non forzare ciò che non è bello ad essere brutto e ciò che non è buono ad<br />
essere cattivo! E così anche Eros, dal momento che anche tu sei d'accordo che non è né<br />
buono né bello, non credere che debba essere brutto e cattivo: è qualcosa di intermedio<br />
fra questi due", disse. 6<br />
Eros dunque, pur non essendo bello non è nemmeno brutto, e in tal senso, non essendo né bello<br />
né brutto, è un intermedio fra i due; così anche, pur non essendo buono non è nemmeno cattivo, e in<br />
tal senso, non essendo né buono né cattivo, è un intermedio fra i due. Questa è del resto una situazione<br />
che si riscontra anche a proposito di sapienza e ignoranza, per cui qualcuno, pur non essendo sapiente,<br />
non è nemmeno ignorante, e in tal senso, non essendo né sapiente né ignorante, è un intermedio fra i<br />
due, e precisamente possiede opinione retta.<br />
Per quanto riguarda la nozione di intermedio, essa dunque sta ad indicare ciò che non è né l’uno<br />
né l’altro di due termini opposti, cioè contrari, fra loro, come appunto è la retta opinione rispetto a<br />
sapienza e a ignoranza, ciò che non è né bello né brutto rispetto a ciò che è bello e a ciò che è brutto,<br />
ciò che non è né buono né cattivo rispetto a ciò che è buono e a ciò che è cattivo. Si tratta in questo<br />
caso di tre coppie di contrari - sapienza-ignoranza, bello-brutto, buono-cattivo - che presentano,<br />
ciascuna al proprio interno, un terzo termine - retta opinione, né bello né brutto, né buono né cattivo -,<br />
che è appunto il rispettivo intermedio.<br />
Benché Platone introduca la coppia sapienza-ignoranza con intermedio retta opinione per<br />
mostrare come essa sia il modello da assumere per comprendere le coppie bello-brutto e buonocattivo,<br />
di cui Eros costituisce l'intermedio, essendo né bello né brutto e né buono né cattivo, solo per<br />
quel caso indica esplicitamente l'intermedio, ossia appunto la retta opinione - che è comunque ciò che<br />
non è né sapienza né ignoranza -, mentre negli altri due casi si limita a mantenere la doppia negazione<br />
- né l'uno né l'altro dei due -. Si tratta dunque dell'indicazione dell'intermedio mediante la negazione<br />
dei due contrari di cui è intermedio.<br />
Anche altrove Platone mostra di adottare una simile terminologia, ed anzi, nel Gorgia, proprio<br />
in riferimento alle nozioni di bene e di male:<br />
- ΣΩ. Ἆρ’ οὖν ἔστιν τι τῶν ὄντων ὃ οὐχὶ ἤτοι ἀγαθόν γ’ ἐστὶν ἢ κακὸν ἢ µεταξὺ τούτων,<br />
οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακόν; -ΠΩΛ. Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες. -ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν λέγεις εἶναι<br />
ἀγαθὸν µὲν σοφίαν τε καὶ ὑγίειαν καὶ πλοῦτον καὶ τἆλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα, κακὰ δὲ τἀναντία<br />
τούτων; -ΠΩΛ. Ἔγωγε. -ΣΩ. Τὰ δὲ µήτε ἀγαθὰ µήτε κακὰ ἆρα τοιάδε λέγεις, ἃ ἐνίοτε<br />
µὲν µετέχει τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἐνίοτε δὲ τοῦ κακοῦ, ἐνίοτε δὲ οὐδετέρου, οἷον καθῆσθαι καὶ<br />
βαδίζειν καὶ τρέχειν καὶ πλεῖν, καὶ οἷον αὖ λίθους καὶ ξύλα καὶ τἆλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα; οὐ<br />
ταῦτα λέγεις; ἢ ἄλλ’ ἄττα καλεῖς τὰ µήτε ἀγαθὰ µήτε κακά;<br />
6 Plat. Symp. 201E3-202B5 (trad. it. di G. Reale, in Platone, Simposio, Milano 2011, pp. 175-177).<br />
227
Cristina Rossitto<br />
228<br />
Esiste una sola cosa che non sia o buona, o cattiva, o intermedia tra l'una e l'altra, cioè né<br />
buona né cattiva? ... Tu dirai, senza dubio, che sapienza, salute, ricchezza e altre simili<br />
doti sono un bene, male le qualità contrarie? ... Né buone né cattive dirai, invece, quelle<br />
cose che partecipano ora del bene ora del male, talvolta ancora né del bene né del male,<br />
come, per esempio, lo stare a sedere, camminare, corrre, navigare, oppure le pietre, il<br />
legno, e gli altri oggetti di questo genere? 7<br />
Anche nel Gorgia, dunque, Platone, a proposito della coppia di contrari costituita da bene e<br />
male, indica l'intermedio come ciò che non è nessuno dei due, ossia come ciò che non è né bene né<br />
male. Egli anzi distingue un duplice significato di ciò che viene indicato con la negazione dei due<br />
contrari (ciò che non è né bene né male), per cui ciò che non è né l’uno né l’altro dei due può essere<br />
inteso o come ciò che partecipa ora del bene ora del male, o come ciò che non partecipa né del bene<br />
né del male. Sembra dunque di poter intendere che, in base al primo significato, la negazione dei due<br />
contrari è da intendersi come un vero e proprio intermedio, nel senso che ciò che non è né bene né<br />
male a volte è collegato al bene e a volte al male, mentre, in base al secondo significato, essa rimane<br />
una semplice negazione, nel senso che ciò che non è né bene né male non ha nulla a che fare né con il<br />
bene né con il male.<br />
Gli esempi riportati, in questo testo veramente abbondanti, sembrano del resto confermare tale<br />
prospettiva. Che non siano né bene né male si dice tanto della passeggiata quanto del legno; ma<br />
mentre nel primo caso ciò significa che la passeggiata a volte può far bene, se compiuta con<br />
equilibrio, a volte può far male, se comporta uno sforzo eccessivo, nel secondo caso ciò significa che<br />
il legno non fa né bene né male.<br />
In realtà, come si evince dall'esordio del passo, qui Platone non pare riferirsi direttamente al<br />
bene e al male, ma agli "enti" che possono essere buoni e cattivi. In base a questa considerazione, per<br />
cui potrebbe trattarsi di una classificazione degli enti, nel senso che questi o sono beni o sono mali o<br />
sono nessuno dei due, nel duplice significato visto, il passo del Gorgia ritorna esattamente nello stesso<br />
modo nelle Divisiones Aristoteleae, uno scritto attribuito ad Aristotele che è costituito da una raccolta<br />
di classificazioni dei sensi di vari termini e i cui contenuti sono riconducibili all'ambiente<br />
dell'Accademia platonica antica. In tale opera, infatti, una delle divisioni degli enti suona così:<br />
Διαιρεῖται ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων εἰς τρία. ἔστι γὰρ ἢ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ἢ οὐδέτερον. τὸ µὲν<br />
οὖν ἀγαθόν ἐστιν, ὅταν ὠφελήσῃ τινὰ καὶ οὐ βλάψῃ, τὸ δὲ κακόν, ὅταν βλάπτῃ ἀεί, τὸ δὲ<br />
οὐδέτερον, ὅπερ ποτὲ µὲν βλάψει ποτὲ δὲ ὠφελήσει, οἷον οἱ περίπατοι καὶ οἱ ὕπνοι καὶ οἱ<br />
ἑλλέβοροι καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἢ οὔτε βλάψει ὅλως οὔτε ὠφελήσει.<br />
Ciascuno degli enti si divide in tre: infatti o è un bene, o un male, o nessuno dei due.<br />
L’uno, dunque, è un bene, qualora procuri vantaggio a qualcuno e non faccia danno;<br />
l’altro è un male, qualora faccia sempre danno; quello invece che non è nessuno dei due,<br />
è ciò che a volte fa danno e a volte procura vantaggio, per esempio le passeggiate, il<br />
sonno, l’elleboro e simili, oppure ciò che non fa danno né procura vantaggio affatto. 8<br />
Se le cose stanno così, allora il passo del Gorgia starebbe proprio alle origini di questa divisione, che<br />
anzi sarebbe diventata patrimonio comune dell'Accademia antica. 9 In effetti, secondo una<br />
testimonianza di Sesto Empirico, sarebbe stato proprio l'Accademico Senocrate ad occuparsi<br />
specificamente di questa tematica, tanto da mettere in atto una vera e propria dimostrazione:<br />
Πάντες µὲν οἱ κατὰ τρόπον στοιχειοῦν δοκοῦντες τῶν φιλοσόφων, καὶ ἐπιφανέστατα<br />
παρὰ πάντας οἵ τε ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχαίας Ἀκαδηµίας καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ Περιπάτου, ἔτι δὲ τῆς<br />
Στοᾶς, εἰώθασι διαιρούµενοι λέγειν τῶν ὄντων τὰ µὲν εἶναι ἀγαθά, τὰ δὲ κακά, τὰ δὲ<br />
µεταξὺ τούτων, ἅπερ καὶ ἀδιάφορα λέγουσιν· ἰδιαίτερον δὲ παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους ὁ<br />
Ξενοκράτης καὶ ταῖς ἑνικαῖς πτώσεσι χρώµενος ἔφασκε· "πᾶν τὸ ὂν ἢ ἀγαθόν ἐστιν ἢ<br />
7 Plat. Gorg. 467E1-468A4 (trad. it. di F. Adorno, in Platone, Gorgia, Bari 1971, p. 193)<br />
8 Divisiones Aristoteleae 55 (cod. Marciano) Mutschmann (trad. it. di C. Rossitto, in Aristotele e altri Autori, Divisioni,<br />
nuova ed. riveduta Milano 2005, p. 197).Xenocr. fr. 231 Isnardi1 = Sext. Emp. Adv. Eth. 3-6 (trad. it. di M. Isnardi Parente,<br />
in Senocrate-Ermodoro, Frammenti, Napoli 1982, pp. 243-244).<br />
9 Sulla ricchezza delle posizioni accademiche al proposito e sulla loro fortuna, sono costretta a rinviare ai miei Studi sulla<br />
dialettica in Aristotele, Napoli 2000, nonché a Contrarietà e relazione nello scritto sugli opposti di pseudo-Archita, in C.<br />
Rossitto (a cura), Studies on Aristotle and the Aristotelian Tradition, Lecce 2011, pp. 207-224.
Cristina Rossitto<br />
κακόν ἐστιν ἢ οὔτε ἀγαθόν ἐστιν οὔτε κακόν ἐστιν." καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν φιλοσόφων χωρὶς<br />
ἀποδείξεως τὴν τοιαύτην διαίρεσιν προσιεµένων αὐτὸς ἐδόκει καὶ ἀπόδειξιν<br />
συµπαραλαµβάνειν. "εἰ γὰρ ἔστι τι κεχωρισµένον πρᾶγµα τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ<br />
τῶν µήτε ἀγαθῶν µήτε κακῶν, ἐκεῖνο ἤτοι ἀγαθόν ἐστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθόν. καὶ εἰ µὲν<br />
ἤτοι ἀγαθόν ἐστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθόν. καὶ εἰ µὲν ἀγαθόν ἐστιν, ἓν τῶν τριῶν γενήσεται·<br />
εἰ δ’ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθόν, ἤτοι κακόν ἐστιν ἢ οὔτε κακόν ἐστιν οὔτε ἀγαθόν ἐστιν· εἰ δὲ<br />
κακόν ἐστιν, ἓν τῶν τριῶν ὑπάρξει, εἰ δὲ οὔτε ἀγαθόν ἐστιν οὔτε κακόν ἐστι, πάλιν ἓν<br />
τῶν τριῶν καταστήσεται. πᾶν ἄρα τὸ ὂν ἤτοι ἀγαθόν ἐστιν ἢ κακόν ἐστιν ἢ οὔτε ἀγαθόν<br />
ἐστιν οὔτε κακόν ἐστιν".<br />
Tutti quei filosofi che sembra abbiano compiuto trattazioni metodiche e piú chiaramente<br />
fra tutti gli Accademici antichi, i Peripatetici e inoltre gli Stoici, sogliono dividere la<br />
materia dicendo che delle cose che sono alcune sono buone, altre cattive, altre intermedie<br />
fra queste, e queste ultime le chiamano indifferenti. Ma Senocrate, in forma piú tipica di<br />
tutti gli altri e valendosi della forma singolare, diceva: "Tutto cio che è, è buono, oppure<br />
è cattivo oppure non è né buono né cattivo". E mentre tutti gli altri filosofi adottavano<br />
questa suddivisione senza addurre alcuna dimostrazione, sembra che egli si sia adoperato<br />
a darne anche una dimostrazione: "se vi è qualcosa che sia diverso da ciò ch’è buono, sia<br />
da ciò ch’è cattivo, sia da ciò che non è né l’uno né l’altro, questo è però sempre o buono<br />
o non buono; e se è buono ricade in uno dei tre casi considerati; se non è buono, o è<br />
cattivo o è fra quelle cose che non sono né l’uno né l’altro; ma se è cattivo ricade in uno<br />
dei tre casi, e lo stesso se non è né buono né cattivo. Dunque ogni cosa non può non<br />
essere o buona, o cattiva, o né buona né cattiva". 10<br />
Comunque stiano le cose, si può procedere ora al confronto tra le informazioni ottenute a proposito<br />
dell'intermedio, anzi, di ciò che non è nessuno dei due contrari, dal passo del Gorgia e la<br />
caratterizazione di Eros come intermedio nel <strong>Symposium</strong>. Sembra chiaro che nessuna delle tre coppie<br />
di contrari addotte nel <strong>Symposium</strong> ha un intermedio (né sapienza né ignoranza, cioè retta opinione, né<br />
bello né brutto, né buono né cattivo) nel secondo significato distinto nel Gorgia, ossia come ciò che<br />
non avrebbe nulla a che fare con entrambi i contrari di cui è intermedio. Ché anzi lo scopo di Platone<br />
è proprio quello di mostrare come Eros "sia" un vero e proprio intermedio tra i contrari.<br />
Né il fatto che Platone mantenga, proprio per Eros, la negazione dei contrari per indicare la sua<br />
intermedietà, deve indurre in sospetto. Evidentemente era questa una consuetudine nell'Accademia<br />
antica, che ancora Aristotele, nelle Categorie, sembra quasi ritenere bisognosa di giustificazione:<br />
ἐπ’ ἐνίων µὲν οὖν ὀνόµατα κεῖται τοῖς ἀνὰ µέσον, οἷον λευκοῦ καὶ µέλανος τὸ φαιὸν καὶ<br />
ὠχρόν· ἐπ’ ἐνίων δὲ ὀνόµατι µὲν οὐκ εὔπορον τὸ ἀνὰ µέσον ἀποδοῦναι, τῇ δὲ ἑκατέρου<br />
τῶν ἄκρων ἀποφάσει τὸ ἀνὰ µέσον ὁρίζεται, οἷον τὸ οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακὸν καὶ οὔτε<br />
δίκαιον οὔτε ἄδικον.<br />
In alcuni casi questi termini intermedi hanno un nome, come tra il bianco e il nero il<br />
grigio e il giallo, ma in altri casi non è facile contrassegnare i termini intermedi con un<br />
nome, ma questi vengono definiti mediante la negazione di ciascuno degli estremi, come<br />
il né buono né cattivo e il né giusto né ingiusto. 11<br />
A tale proposito valga altresì notare che uno degli esempi di intermedio "senza nome" qui addotti da<br />
Aristotele è proprio quello interno alla coppia buono-cattivo.<br />
Non rimane che mettere a confronto l'altro significato di ciò che non è né l'uno né l'altro dei due<br />
contrari, ossia quello indicante l'intermedio in senso positivo. In effetti, tra quanto affermato nel<br />
Gorgia - e nella divisione - e quanto risulta dal <strong>Symposium</strong> sembra esserci una differenza. Nel primo<br />
caso, infatti, l'intermedio è ciò che è nessuno dei due contrari nel senso che ha a che fare a volte con<br />
l'uno e a volte con l'altro; nel secondo, invece, l'intermedio è ciò che è nessuno dei due contrari nel<br />
senso che è in qualche modo entrambi i contrari. Se infatti consideriamo gli esempi, la passeggiata è<br />
intermedio fra bene e male perché a volte fa bene e a volte fa male, mentre non è così per la retta<br />
opinione, in quanto di questa non si può dire che è intermedia fra sapienza e ignoranza perché a volte<br />
è sapienza e a volte è ignoranza. Anzi, la retta opinione è intermedia fra sapienza e ignoranza proprio<br />
10<br />
Xenocr. fr. 231 Isnardi1 = Sext. Emp. Adv. Eth. 3-6 (trad. it. di M. Isnardi Parente, in Senocrate-Ermodoro, Frammenti,<br />
Napoli 1982, pp. 243-244).<br />
11<br />
Aristot. Cat. 10, 12 a 20-25 (trad. it. di D. Pesce, in Aristotele, Le categorie, Padova 1967, p. 95).<br />
229
Cristina Rossitto<br />
perché non è né totale sapienza né pura ignoranza, bensì è, per così dire, un po' sapienza e un po'<br />
ignoranza.<br />
L'intermedietà di Eros in questo primo passo del <strong>Symposium</strong>, per cui egli è insieme bello e<br />
brutto, buono e cattivo, cioè è insieme, ma in parte, entrambi i contrari, sembra avvicinarsi<br />
maggiormente a quanto Aristotele spiegherà in modo molto tecnico, nella Metafisica, circa la natura<br />
dell'intermedio. Quivi infatti egli offre un'articolata dimostrazione di quale sia effettivamente tale<br />
natura, concludendo che "è chiaro dunque che gli intermedi appartengono al medesimo genere, che<br />
sono intermedi fra contrari e che tutti quanti sono composti di contrari" (ὅτι µὲν οὖν τὰ µεταξὺ ἔν τε<br />
ταὐτῷ γένει πάντα καὶ µεταξὺ ἐναντίων καὶ σύγκειται ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων πάντα, δῆλον). 12<br />
Di particolare interesse è anzi, per quanto riguarda la natura degli intermedi come necessari<br />
composti di contrari, la fase finale della dimostrazione aristotelica, che immediatamente precede la<br />
conclusione appena citata. Pur argomentando da un punto di vista che implica la sua stessa dottrina<br />
del mutamento, cioè la dottrina dei tre princìpi elementi del divenire (sostrato e due contrari), egli ha<br />
modo di osservare:<br />
230<br />
Τὰ µὲν οὖν ἐναντία ἀσύνθετα ἐξ ἀλλήλων, ὥστε ἀρχαί· τὰ δὲ µεταξὺ ἢ πάντα ἢ οὐθέν. ἐκ<br />
δὲ τῶν ἐναντίων γίγνεταί τι, ὥστ’ ἔσται µεταβολὴ εἰς τοῦτο πρὶν ἢ εἰς αὐτά· ἑκατέρου<br />
γὰρ καὶ ἧττον ἔσται καὶ µᾶλλον. µεταξὺ ἄρα ἔσται καὶ τοῦτο τῶν ἐναντίων. καὶ τἆλλα<br />
ἄρα πάντα σύνθετα τὰ µεταξύ· τὸ γὰρ τοῦ µὲν µᾶλλον τοῦ δ’ἧττον σύνθετόν πως ἐξ<br />
ἐκείνων ὧν λέγεται εἶναι τοῦ µὲν µᾶλλον τοῦ δ’ ἧττον. ἐπεὶ δ’ οὐκ ἔστιν ἕτερα πρότερα<br />
ὁµογενῆ τῶν ἐναντίων, ἅπαντ’ ἂν ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων εἴη τὰ µεταξύ, ὥστε καὶ τὰ κάτω<br />
πάντα, καὶ τἀναντία καὶ τὰ µεταξύ, ἐκ τῶν πρώτων ἐναντίων ἔσονται. ὅτι µὲν οὖν τὰ<br />
µεταξὺ ἔν τε ταὐτῷ γένει πάντα καὶ µεταξὺ ἐναντίων καὶ σύγκειται ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων<br />
πάντα, δῆλον.<br />
I contrari non sono composti gli uni degli altri e pertanto sono princìpi; invece gli<br />
intermedi o sono tutti composti dei loro contrari o non lo è nessuno. Ora certamente<br />
esiste qualcosa composto di contrari e tale che il mutamento da un contrario all'altro<br />
dovrà prima passare attraverso esso; infatti esso dovrà essere più di uno dei contrari e<br />
meno dell'altro: e, questo, sarà intermedio fra i contrari. Allora anche tutti gli altri<br />
intermedi saranno composti di contrari, perché ciò che è meno dell'uno e più dell'altro è<br />
in qualche modo composto di ambedue quei termini, nel confronto di ciascuno dei quali è<br />
detto più oppure meno. E poiché non esistono altre cose dello stesso genere che siano<br />
anteriori ai contrari, tutti gli intermedi dovranno essere composti di contrari. 13<br />
2. Subito dopo aver mostrato la natura intermedia di Eros rispetto a buono e cattivo e a bello e brutto,<br />
nel senso appunto che egli non è né l'uno né l'altro dei due, essendo un po' l'uno e un po' l'altro,<br />
Platone affronta l'esame di un'altra sua peculiarità, che riguarda più precisamente il rapporto con il<br />
divino. Socrate infatti riprende una tesi già avanzata nel dialogo, per cui ad un certo punto si era<br />
ammesso che Eros era un grande dio, ma Diotima lo confuta ancora una volta, mostrando che Eros è<br />
un dèmone. In realtà, l'argomentazione di Diotima, che fa leva tutta e proprio sulla nozione di<br />
intermedio, si articola in tre momenti successivi, tesi a dimostrare (a) che Eros è un dèmone, in quanto<br />
intermedio fra mortale e immortale, fra uomo e dio; (b) che ha natura duplice, in quanto intermedio<br />
fra Poros e Penia, i suoi genitori di natura opposta; (c) che è filosofo, in quanto intermedio fra il<br />
sapiente e l'ignorante.<br />
Di tale argomentazione riportiamo i passaggi fondamentali, mantenendone l'articolazione.<br />
(a) Lέγε γάρ µοι, οὐ πάντας θεοὺς φῂς εὐδαίµονας εἶναι καὶ καλούς; ... Ἀλλὰ µὴν Ἔρωτά<br />
γε ὡµολόγηκας δι’ ἔνδειαν τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ καλῶν ἐπιθυµεῖν αὐτῶν τούτων ὧν<br />
ἐνδεήςἐστιν ... Πῶς ἂν οὖν θεὸς εἴη ὅ γε τῶν καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν ἄµοιρος; ... Τί οὖν ἄν,<br />
ἔφην, εἴη ὁ Ἔρως; θνητός; Ἥκιστά γε. Ἀλλὰ τί µήν; Ὥσπερ τὰ πρότερα, ἔφη, µεταξὺ<br />
θνητοῦ καὶ ἀθανάτου. Τί οὖν, ὦ Διοτίµα; Δαίµων µέγας, ὦ Σώκρατες· καὶ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ<br />
δαιµόνιον µεταξύ ἐστι θεοῦ τε καὶ θνητοῦ. Τίνα, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, δύναµιν ἔχον; Ἑρµηνεῦον<br />
καὶ διαπορθµεῦον θεοῖς τὰ παρ’ ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἀνθρώποις τὰ παρὰ θεῶν, τῶν µὲν τὰς<br />
δεήσεις καὶ θυσίας, τῶν δὲ τὰς ἐπιτάξεις τε καὶ ἀµοιβὰς τῶν θυσιῶν, ἐν µέσῳ δὲ ὂν<br />
ἀµφοτέρων συµπληροῖ, ὥστε τὸ πᾶν αὐτὸ αὑτῷ συνδεδέσθαι.<br />
12 Aristot. Metaph. X 7, 1057 b 32-34.<br />
13 Aristot. Metaph. X 7, 1057 b 22-30 (trad. it. di G. Reale, in Aristotele, La metafisica, Napoli 1968, vol. II, pp. 116-117).
Cristina Rossitto<br />
"Dimmi: non affermi tu che tutti gli dèi sono beati e belli?" ... "Ma tu hai ammesso che<br />
Eros, per mancanza delle cose buone e belle, ha desiderio di queste cose di cui è<br />
mancante" ... "E allora come potrebbe essere un dio chi non è partecipe delle cose belle e<br />
delle cose buone?" ...(S.)"Allora - dissi - che cosè Eros? E' un mortale?". "Come si è<br />
detto prima - disse -. E' qualcosa di intermedio fra mortale e immortale". "Allora che<br />
cos'è, o Diotima?". "Un grande dèmone, Socrate: infatti, tutto ciò che è demonico è<br />
intermedio fra dio e mortale". "E quale potere ha?" domandai. "Ha il potere di<br />
interpretare e di portare agli dèi le cose che vengono dagli uomini e agli uomini le cose<br />
che vengono dagli dèi: degli uomini le preghiere e i sacrifici, degli dèi, invece, i comandi<br />
e le ricompense dei sacrifici. E, stando in mezzo fra gli uni e gli altri, opera un<br />
completamento, in modo che il tutto sia ben collegato con sé medesimo". 14<br />
(b) ἅτε οὖν Πόρου καὶ Πενίας ὑὸς ὢν ὁ Ἔρως ἐν τοιαύτῃ τύχῃ καθέστηκεν. πρῶτον µὲν<br />
πένης ἀεί ἐστι, καὶ πολλοῦ δεῖ ἁπαλός τε καὶ καλός, οἷον οἱ πολλοὶ οἴονται, ἀλλὰ<br />
σκληρὸς καὶ αὐχµηρὸς καὶ ἀνυπόδητος καὶ ἄοικος, χαµαιπετὴς ἀεὶ ὢν καὶ ἄστρωτος, ἐπὶ<br />
θύραις καὶ ἐν ὁδοῖς ὑπαίθριος κοιµώµενος, τὴν τῆς µητρὸς φύσιν ἔχων, ἀεὶ ἐνδείᾳ<br />
σύνοικος. κατὰ δὲ αὖ τὸν πατέρα ἐπίβουλός ἐστι τοῖς καλοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, ἀνδρεῖος<br />
ὢν καὶ ἴτης καὶ σύντονος, θηρευτὴς δεινός, ἀεί τινας πλέκων µηχανάς, καὶ φρονήσεως<br />
ἐπιθυµητὴς καὶ πόριµος, φιλοσοφῶν διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου θυµητὴς καὶ πόριµος,<br />
φιλοσοφῶν διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου, δεινὸς γόης καὶ φαρµακεὺς καὶ σοφιστής· καὶ οὔτε ὡς<br />
ἀθάνατος πέφυκεν οὔτε ὡς θνητός, ἀλλὰ τοτὲ µὲν τῆς αὐτῆς ἡµέρας θάλλει τε καὶ ζῇ,<br />
ὅταν εὐπορήσῃ, τοτὲ δὲ ἀποθνῄσκει, πάλιν δὲ ἀναβιώσκεται διὰ τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς φύσιν,<br />
τὸ δὲ ποριζόµενον ἀεὶ ὑπεκρεῖ, ὥστε οὔτε ἀπορεῖ Ἔρως ποτὲ οὔτε πλουτεῖ, σοφίας τε αὖ<br />
καὶ ἀµαθίας ἐν µέσῳ ἐστίν.<br />
"Dunque, in quanto Eros è figlio di Penia e di Poros, gli è toccato un destino di questo<br />
tipo. Prima di tutto è povero sempre, ed è tutt'altro che bello e delicato, come ritengono i<br />
più. Invece, è duro e ispido, scalzo e senza casa, si sdraia sempre per terra senza coperte,<br />
e dorme all'aperto davanti alle porte o in mezzo alla strada, e, perché ha la natura della<br />
madre, è sempre accompagnato con povertà. Per ciò che riceve dal padre, invece, egli è<br />
insidiatore dei belli e dei buoni, è coraggioso, audace, impetuoso, straordinario<br />
cacciatore, intento sempre a tramare intrighi, appassionato di saggezza, pieno di risorse,<br />
filosofo per tutta la vita, straordinario incantatore, preparatore di filtri, sofista. E per sua<br />
natura non è né mortale né immortale, ma, in uno stesso giorno, talora fiorisce e vive,<br />
quando riesce nei suoi espedienti, talora, invece, muore, ma poi torna in vita, a causa<br />
della natura del padre. E ciò che si procura gli sfugge sempre di mano, sicché Eros non è<br />
mai povero di risorse, né ricco". 15<br />
(c) Σοφίας τε αὖ καὶ ἀµαθίας ἐν µέσῳ ἐστίν. ἔχει γὰρ ὧδε. θεῶν οὐδεὶς φιλοσοφεῖ οὐδ’<br />
ἐπιθυµεῖ σοφὸς γενέσθαι - ἔστι γάρ - οὐδ’ εἴ τις ἄλλος σοφός, οὐ φιλοσοφεῖ. οὐδ’ αὖ οἱ<br />
ἀµαθεῖς φιλοσοφοῦσιν οὐδ’ ἐπιθυµοῦσι σοφοὶ γενέσθαι· ... Τίνες οὖν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὦ<br />
Διοτίµα, οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες, εἰ µήτε οἱ σοφοὶ µήτε οἱ ἀµαθεῖς; Δῆλον δή, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε<br />
ἤδη καὶ παιδί, ὅτι οἱ µεταξὺ τούτων ἀµφοτέρων, ὧν ἂν εἴη καὶ ὁ Ἔρως. ἔστιν γὰρ δὴ τῶν<br />
καλλίστων ἡ σοφία, Ἔρως δ’ ἐστὶν ἔρως περὶ τὸ καλόν, ὥστε ἀναγκαῖον Ἔρωτα<br />
φιλόσοφον εἶναι, φιλόσοφον δὲὄντα µεταξὺ εἶναι σοφοῦ καὶ ἀµαθοῦς. αἰτία δὲ αὐτῷ<br />
καὶ τούτων ἡ γένεσις· πατρὸς µὲν γὰρ σοφοῦ ἐστι καὶ εὐπόρου, µητρὸς δὲ οὐ σοφῆς καὶ<br />
ἀπόρου. ἡ µὲν οὖν φύσις τοῦ δαίµονος, ὦ φίλε Σώκρατες, αὕτη.<br />
"Inoltre, sta in mezzo fra sapienza e ignoranza. Ed ecco come avviene questo. Nessuno<br />
degli dèi fa filosofia, né desidera diventare sapiente, dal momento che lo è già. E<br />
chiunque altro sia sapiente, non filosofa. Ma neppure gli ignoranti fanno filosofia, né<br />
desiderano diventare sapienti"... "Chi sono allora, o Diotima - io dissi -, coloro che<br />
filosofano, se non lo sono i sapienti e neppure gli ignoranti?". "E' ormai chiaro - rispose -<br />
anche ad un bambino che sono quelli che stanno a mezzo fra gli uni e gli altri, e uno di<br />
questi è appunto anche Eros. Infatti, la sapienza è una delle cose più belle, ed Eros è<br />
amore per il bello. Perciò è necssario che Eros sia filosofo, e, in quanto è filosofo, che sia<br />
intermedio fra il sapiente e l'ignorante. E causa di questo è la sua nascita: infatti, ha il<br />
padre sapiente pieno di risorse, e la madre non sapiente priva di risorse. La natura del<br />
14 Plat. Symp. 202 C6-E7 (trad. it. cit. pp. 177-179).<br />
15 Plat. Symp. 203C5-E5 (trad. it. cit. p. 181).<br />
231
Cristina Rossitto<br />
232<br />
dèmone, caro Socrate, è dunque questa". 16<br />
Ecco dunque la vera natura del dèmone mediatore. Eros è intermedio fra uomo e dio, quindi è<br />
intermedio fra l'essere mortale e l'essere immortale, non essendo completamente né l'uno né l'altro. E'<br />
intermedio fra la natura del padre e quella della madre, perché, non potendo accogliere<br />
completamente ciascuna delle due, le ha entrambe in sé, e quindi è ad un tempo ricco di risorse (per<br />
esempio ha molta inventiva) e povero di risorse (dorme ovunque gli capiti). Infine è intermedio fra<br />
l'essere sapiente e l'essere ignorante, perché, non essendo totalmente né l'uno né l'altro, possiede<br />
comunque un po' dell'uno e un po' dell'altro, ossia è filosofo.<br />
Di queste tre coppie di contrari, di cui Eros è l'intermedio, le ultime due, ossia ricco di risorse -<br />
povero di risorse e sapiente-ignorante, sembrano potersi ricondurre più (la seconda) o meno (la prima)<br />
a quelle che consentono un vero e proprio intermedio al loro interno, come abbiamo riscontrato<br />
essere, nel passo precedente del <strong>Symposium</strong>, le coppie costituite da bello-brutto e buono-cattivo. In<br />
tale prospettiva Eros è intermedio fra l'essere ricco di risorse e l'essere privo di risorse nel senso che,<br />
non essendo né l'uno né l'altro, si trova in una terza situazione, per cui è un po' ricco e un po' povero<br />
insieme; analogamente egli è intermedio fra l'essere sapiente e l'essere ignorante nel senso che, non<br />
essendo né l'uno né l'altro, si trova in una terza situazione, per cui è un po' sapiente e un po' ignorante<br />
insieme, il che corrisponde alla situazione del filosofo, che è ulteriore rispetto a quella del sapiente e a<br />
quella dell'ignorante. Insomma, quasi rivelando una dottrina che a suo modo Aristotele, come<br />
abbiamo visto, potrebbe aver ripreso, in entrambi i casi Eros si manifesta essere un "composto" di<br />
entrambi i contrari. Ma se l'intermedio è l'essere insieme l'uno e l'altro dei due contrari (come lo è il<br />
filosofo rispetto al sapiente e all'ignorante), allora ne deriva che esso costituisce un vero e proprio<br />
status ontologico: ma per essere tale deve esserci appunto la compresenza simultanea delle<br />
caratteristiche, pur in misura differente, di entrambi i contrari.<br />
Ma è proprio per questo motivo che una situazione diversa sembra invece essere quella che<br />
vede Eros come intermedio fra uomo e dio, cioè fra l'essere mortale e l'essere immortale. A tale<br />
proposito, nel passo considerato, di Eros si dice che "stando in mezzo fra gli uni (uomini) e gli altri<br />
(dèi), opera un completamento, in modo che il tutto sia ben collegato con sé medesimo" (a); e che "per<br />
sua natura non è né mortale né immortale, ma, in uno stesso giorno, talora fiorisce e vive, quando<br />
riesce nei suoi espedienti, talora, invece, muore, ma poi torna in vita, a causa della natura del padre"<br />
(b).<br />
In base a tali spiegazioni di Platone, sembra difficile che si possa intendere la situazione di Eros<br />
come intermedio rispetto alla mortalità e all'immortalità esattamente nello stesso senso in cui si era<br />
intesa quella precedente come intermedio, in quanto filosofo, rispetto alla sapienza e all'ignoranza,<br />
ossia come un vero e proprio status ontologico che per essere tale deve essere costituito dalla<br />
compresenza simultanea delle caratteristiche, pur in misura diversa, di entrambi i contrari. Infatti si<br />
dovrebbe poter riscontrare in Eros la compresenza simultanea di mortalità e di immortalità: ma ciò<br />
pare andare in direzione esattamente opposta alle parole di Platone.<br />
Si potrebbe piuttosto pensare a una qualche affinità con il significato di intermedio presente nel<br />
Gorgia, dove si era riscontrata, per l'intermedio, l'alternanza fra i due contrari. Da questo punto di<br />
vista, allora, come la passeggiata a volte fa bene e a volte fa male, ma mai contmporaneamente, così<br />
Eros a volte è mortale (quando muore) e a volte è immortale (quando rinasce), ma mai<br />
contemporaneamente. Ma se le cose stessero così, allora nemmeno Eros sarebbe "ad un tempo"<br />
mortale ed immortale, il che potrebbe anche costituire un pericolo per la sua stessa caratteristica di<br />
dèmone mediatore.<br />
La particolarità che indubbiamente caratterizza l'intermedio rispetto alla coppia di contrari<br />
mortale-immortale non sembra possa dipendere da una concezione simile a quella aristotelica del<br />
divenire (dottrina dei tre princìpi elementi), come se di Eros si potesse dire che da mortale diviene<br />
immortale e viceversa, alternativamente, giacché "sempre", nel caso del divenire di tipo aristotelico, i<br />
due contrari appartengono ora l'uno ora l'altro al soggetto. Né può dipendere dalla nozione di<br />
intermedio in quanto tale, perché "sempre" un intermedio fra i due contrari, essendo costituito dai due<br />
contrari, è i due contrari insieme. Insomma, nel caso di mortale e immortale, se Eros è in alcuni<br />
momenti mortale ed in altri immortale, è in divenire, ma non è propriamente un intermedio; se è un<br />
intermedio, dovrebbe essere mortale e immortale contemporaneamente, ma così non è.<br />
Per tali motivi sembra dunque di poter ritenere che la differenza fra il caso della coppia mortaleimmortale<br />
e quelli delle altre coppie, non potendo dipendere né da una nozione di divenire di tipo<br />
aristotelico (peraltro non appartenente comunque a Platone), né dalla nozione di intermedio in senso<br />
16 Plat. Symp. 203E5-204B8 (trad. it. cit. pp.181-183).
Cristina Rossitto<br />
stretto come composto di contrari (che invece Platone possedeva, e molto chiaramente), non possa che<br />
dipendere dalla natura particolare che caratterizza quella coppia di contrari, cioè dalle nozioni stesse<br />
di mortale e immmortale, particolarità di cui Platone pare essere consapevole e che si manifesta come<br />
impossibilità di compresenza simultanea in un medesimo soggetto.<br />
In conclusione, per quanto riguarda la nozione di intermedio che Platone utilizza nel<br />
<strong>Symposium</strong>, si può riconoscere che essa è molto più complessa di quanto potrebbe sembrare a prima<br />
vista. E ciò non per il modo in cui Platone la esamina, ma per la difficoltà intrinseca della nozione<br />
stessa. Tanto più se, come pare, essa è stata discussa e sviluppata ultriormente nell'ambito<br />
dell'Accademia platonica e anche successivamente, come mostrano alcune riflessioni al proposito<br />
svolte da pensatori quali Senocrate e Aristotele.<br />
233
Reproduction, Immortality, and the Greater Mysteries in Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong><br />
Thomas M. Tuozzo<br />
What is the philosophical import of Socrates’ contribution to the encomia to Love offered at<br />
Agathon’s dinner party in Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong>? In this paper I shall offer an answer to this question<br />
which is intended to respond to a trend in recent interpretations of Socrates’ speech in this dialogue.<br />
Scholars have noticed that while what are commonly called “the lesser mysteries” in Diotima’s<br />
teaching put a strong emphasis on immortality through reproduction, the “greater mysteries” make<br />
only one brief mention of immortality. They have accordingly proposed a new interpretation of the<br />
speech: the true culmination of the ascent to the vision of the Beautiful Itself is not, as traditional<br />
readings of the <strong>Symposium</strong> would have it, 1 a self-reproduction that in some sense comes closest to<br />
true immortality, but is rather simply the beatific experience of that vision itself. The concern with<br />
reproduction and immortality, on this view, is an egoistic distortion of the erotic characteristic of the<br />
lesser mysteries; in the greater mysteries the goal is rightly understood as the selfless contemplation of<br />
the Form itself. 2<br />
The question of whether experience of the Beautiful leads one to engage in some activity of<br />
self-reproduction, or is rather a self-contained experience of contemplation, is a manifestation of a<br />
tension in Plato’s philosophy that also shows up in the question of why the philosopher returns to the<br />
cave in the Republic. The tension lives on in Aristotle’s ethics, as the question of the respective roles<br />
of practical and theoretical activity in the highest form of eudaimonia. In my view, speaking very<br />
broadly, for Plato there is always a connection between the soul’s contemplating the eternal principles<br />
of order, the Forms, and its acting in accordance with those principles in shaping the sensible world.<br />
The soul is not a Form, and never can be; its essential temporality is, in fact, one of the central lessons<br />
of the <strong>Symposium</strong>. Plato maintains the connection between the contemplative and the active<br />
dimensions of the grasp of the Forms, even as he emphasizes one or the other in different dialogues.<br />
Indeed, traditionally the Phaedo and the <strong>Symposium</strong> have been seen precisely as complementary<br />
dialogues, stressing, respectively, the other-worldly and this-worldly aspects of knowledge of the<br />
Forms. Recent scholarship has tended to assimilate the <strong>Symposium</strong> to the one-sided view of the<br />
Phaedo; I hope to contest that tendency here.<br />
It is sound move on the part of recent scholars to avoid conflating what Diotima says about<br />
the lesser and the greater mysteries. Socrates’ account of love is in fact clearly articulated into four<br />
sections; ignoring these articulations and indiscriminately mixing together propositions from<br />
throughout his speech is, I think, a recipe for confusion. The first division in Socrates’ account is that<br />
between Socrates’ dialectical exchange with Agathon (199c3-201c9) and his account of the teachings<br />
of Diotima (201d1-212a7). The latter is itself divided into the teachings she gave him on a number of<br />
occasions (201d1-207a4) and the additional teachings she gave on him on one particular occasion<br />
(whether it was ever repeated or not we are not told) (207a5-212a7). This last, finally, is itself divided<br />
into the account of the lesser (207a5-209a4) and the greater mysteries (209a5-212a7). I shall develop<br />
my interpretation by addressing these sections in turn.<br />
Discussion with Agathon<br />
Socrates’ preliminary discussion with Agathon accomplishes more than it appears to at first glance: it<br />
lays the foundation for the extended discussion of the temporality of the soul in the lesser mysteries.<br />
Love, Socrates argues, has an object; Love in fact desires that object; and since desire is for what one<br />
lacks, Love must lack its object. Before specifying what Love’s object is, Socrates considers a<br />
possible objection to the claim that the desirer lacks what he desires: cannot someone who is strong,<br />
or swift, or healthy, or rich, desire to be so, even while possessing the things that make them strong,<br />
swift, etc.? Indeed they can; so Socrates re-interprets what it means to desire what one lacks: it is to<br />
desire to possess something in the future, which, simply in virtue of being in the future, is not yet<br />
available to one. Socrates explicitly extends this analysis to all cases of desire: even in cases where<br />
one desires what one does not presently have, what one desires is not that one presently have it – as<br />
Socrates might say, whether you desire to have it or not, you simply do not have it, and no desire can<br />
change that – but rather that one have it in the future (200e2-5).<br />
1 For a relatively recent, sophisticated version of the traditional interpretation, see Price.<br />
2 Those offering variants of this interpretation include: Ferrarri (1992, 1994), Rowe (1998), Sheffield (2006), and, most<br />
recently, Obdrzalek (2010).
Thomas M. Tuozzo<br />
Socrates’ reanalysis of desire here as essentially future-related anticipates Diotima’s analysis<br />
of the temporality of the soul in the lesser mysteries. The desire of the rich to be rich is a desire for the<br />
future possession of wealth; it presumably prompts continued business activity, to replace the<br />
necessary outflow caused by the expenditures of a lavish lifestyle. So too the desire of the strong to be<br />
strong is a desire to maintain physical strength; it prompts continued physical exercise, to counteract<br />
the deconditioning effects of time. Oddly, however, when Socrates returns to the question of Love’s<br />
relation to its object, he neglects the possibility he has just sketched for these two cases. He argues<br />
that since Love is desire of beauty, it must lack beauty, and similarly with the good. But his examples<br />
suggest a different possibility: that love is beautiful, but its hold on beauty, like the rich man’s hold on<br />
wealth, is precarious, and requires work. And this is the view that Diotima develops in the lesser<br />
mysteries.<br />
Diotima’s Teachings, First Round<br />
In the first round of Diotimian lectures Socrates reports, Diotima elaborates the notion that Love is a<br />
daimon, midway between gods and mortals, and so occupies a middle position between beauty and<br />
ugliness, goodness and badness, wisdom and ignorance. 3 Diotima then turns to the question of what<br />
the lover gets out of the possession of beautiful things. Construed along the model of the rich person’s<br />
desiring wealth in order to be rich, the answer would be: the lover becomes beautiful. The<br />
unsatisfactoriness of that answer perhaps explains why Socrates does not give it. In fact, he is unable<br />
to come up with any answer at all. At this point Diotima broadens the discussion by making the love<br />
that is concerned with beauty into one species of the general desire for good things, whose goal is<br />
happiness, and which all humans share. She gives other species of this generic love for happiness:<br />
people pursue it “through money-making (chrêmatismon), or athletics (philogumnasian), or<br />
philosophy (philosophian)” (205d3-5). The examples of money-making and athletics recall Socrates’<br />
earlier examples of the rich person and the strong person, whose happiness would consist in being<br />
wealthy and being strong. Diotima does not here explain how philosophy counts as way of pursuing<br />
happiness, but instead turns back to the specific version of love concerned with beautiful things.<br />
Given the philosophical version of this specific love that Diotima develops in the greater<br />
mysteries, we are probably meant to identify the two.<br />
After explaining the general desire for happiness of which specific love concerned with<br />
beauty is one version, Diotima turns back to an analysis of this latter. 4 She first relates a possible<br />
account of specific love that she thinks is wrong: namely, what we know to be the Aristophanic<br />
account of love as a search for one’s other half. This view of specific love is rejected because it<br />
violates the condition that generic love sets for all its different species: they must be ways of pursuing<br />
the good. Diotima then offers her own account: the characteristic activity of specific love is “giving<br />
birth in the beautiful, in both body and soul” (206b7-8). When Diotima introduces this account, she<br />
does not explain how giving birth in the beautiful constitutes possession of the good (which, as a form<br />
of generic love, it must do). Rather she concentrates on the role of the beautiful, vividly describing<br />
how it fosters reproduction (and how ugliness impedes it). She then draws a lesson for generic love<br />
from her account of specific love: it is for immortality as well as for the good. 5 Now since generation<br />
is the only way mortal things have of pursuing immortality, and generation is always in the beautiful,<br />
it might seem that “giving birth in the beautiful” is the definition of the generic love of happiness. I do<br />
not think this can be right. Diotima nowhere indicates that acquiring wealth or physical strength is a<br />
form of self-reproduction or of giving birth, or that it is a response to beauty. While all desire for<br />
happiness is desire for immortal happiness, only specific love actually involves reproduction. This<br />
explains why reason specific love is singled out with the name “love,” which (according to Diotima)<br />
3 She first offers a static conception of this midway condition (e.g., offering “right opinion” as midway between wisdom and<br />
ignorance), and the replaces it with a dynamic one (philosophy as the midway position, consisting in the continual working<br />
at acquiring wisdom).<br />
4 Surprisingly, some commentators deny that this is so; see, for example, Rowe (1998) and Sheffield (2006). The parallels<br />
between 205d and 206b seem to me to tell heavily in favor of the view that the latter passage is concerned with specific love.<br />
See allêi trepomenai ~ tina tropon; eran kalountai ~ erôs kaloito; espoudakotes ~ spoudê. Rowe’s objection, that the activity<br />
of specific love is obviously sex, neglects the rejection of that answer already in Aristophanes’ speech (192d), implicitly<br />
endorsed by Diotima’s rejection of Aristophanes’ own answer at 205d.<br />
5 Diotima’s reasoning here has generally raised eyebrows, but it is a rather natural way of developing the point, earlier made,<br />
that all desire is for possessing something in the future. In order to possess something in the future, one must exist then. One<br />
natural way of dealing with this fact is to include one’s future existence in the content of the wish: one does not only wish to<br />
eat a good meal tonight, one also wishes to be there to eat it. The alternate possibility is to make every desire a conditional<br />
one: “I wish, in case I am alive tonight, to have a good meal.” While both alternatives are possible, it strikes me that the one<br />
Diotima chooses is a reasonably intuitive one (although it is true she does not explicitly argue for it against the alternative).<br />
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applies more widely to the desire for happiness. The reproduction characteristic of specific love<br />
enables it to more fully express the desire for happiness than other ways of pursuing it.<br />
Diotima’s Teachings, Second Round: Lesser Mysteries<br />
At 202a5 Socrates turns from a summary of the teachings Diotima gave him on repeated occasions to<br />
the report of one particular lesson. Here Diotima focuses entirely on specific love; there is no reason<br />
to suppose that she discusses the general desire for happiness at all. On this occasion Diotima pursues<br />
the investigation of specific love at a more fundamental level than her usual lectures: she asks for the<br />
cause (aition, aitia) of the “awful lovesick state” (hôs deinôs diatithetai … nosounta te … kai erôtikôs<br />
diatithemena) animals are in when they want to reproduce (grouping together both sexual intercourse<br />
and care for offspring as manifestations of specific love). The aitia of this behavior, she reveals, is<br />
rooted in the very nature of mortal beings:<br />
mortal nature seeks so far as it can to exist forever and to be immortal. And it can achieve it only in<br />
this way, through becoming (genesei), because it always leaves behind something else that is new in<br />
place of the old…(207d1-3). 6<br />
Diotima goes on to explain that the very continued existence of mortal things is due to ceaseless<br />
becoming, with parts of the body passing away and replaced by new ones, and psychic states<br />
behaving likewise. It should be noted that Diotima never calls the becoming that is the fundamental<br />
aspect of mortal being reproduction, nor does she intimate that the beautiful has anything to do with<br />
it. 7 Rather, the reproduction characteristic of specific love is a specific manifestation of mortal<br />
becoming, one that enables the individual to survive, in a fashion, beyond the limits of his own life.<br />
After rooting specific love, with its concern for reproduction, in the general nature of mortal<br />
things, Diotima turns to a specifically human form of that love: the “awful state” human beings get in<br />
“through love of becoming famous and of storing up immortal renown for all time” (hôs deinôs<br />
diakeintai erôti tou onomastoi genesthai kai kleos es ton aei chronon athanaton katathesthai.) Human<br />
beings who pursue specific love in this way are pregnant in soul, and what they give birth to is virtue.<br />
Diotima makes it clear that giving birth to virtue must be understood in a broad sense, to include<br />
becoming virtuous, performing virtuous activities, and producing educational discourses, poems, and<br />
laws that enable one’s virtues to live on after the death of those who produced them. And this ‘living<br />
on” itself has several dimensions – not only does a person live on in others’ memory of what he has<br />
done and been, but he also lives on in the virtues and virtuous actions of those who are inspired by his<br />
example or more directly educated by his poems or laws. While the focus in Diotima’s account of the<br />
lesser mysteries is on the variety of virtuous offspring produced by those pregnant in soul, she does<br />
not neglect the role of beauty as catalyst: those pregnant in soul are stirred to give birth to virtue by<br />
their dealings with a beautiful beloved, one whose bodily beauty in the best case is, but need not be,<br />
accompanied by beauty in soul (cf. 209b).<br />
Diotima’s Teaching, Second Round: Greater Mysteries<br />
At 210a Diotima turns to her “final revelation” about love, even as she expresses doubt as to Socrates’<br />
ability to understand what she is about to say. In these greater mysteries Diotima is not introducing<br />
yet a new class of lovers, distinct from and superior to those pregnant in soul discussed in the lesser<br />
mysteries. 8 Rather, she reveals the proper method to be followed in matters of love by those pregnant<br />
in soul in order to reach the highest results of which they are capable. 9 In the lesser mysteries Diotima<br />
explained what sort of offspring is produced by those pregnant in soul: virtue and logoi about virtue.<br />
In the greater mysteries, Diotima does not reject this aspect of the highest use of love; 10 rather,<br />
she takes it for granted, and focuses on the different grades of beauty in response to which the<br />
properly-led lover gives birth. Whereas in the lesser mysteries the only beauty mentioned was that of<br />
the beloved, the proper method of the greater mysteries requires that the human beloved be left behind<br />
6 Extended translations are based on Rowe (1998b).<br />
7 Indeed, throughout this whole passage (207c8-208b6) Diotima never uses any of the words she has used earlier for<br />
generation and reproduction (tiktein, gennan, etc.); when she has cause to talk about reproduction as it relates to the constant<br />
becoming of mortal things, she uses a different word: “offshoot” (apoblastêma, 208b5).<br />
8 Those whose views tend in this direction include Obdrzalek (2010) and Sheffield (2006).<br />
9 Note the repetitions of orthôs: 210a2,4,6, e3; 211b5,7.<br />
10 logoi: 210a8, c1, d5; virtue: 212a3-5.<br />
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as the lover pregnant in soul learns to appreciate first the beauty of bodily form as a whole, and then<br />
the beauty of soul and its sources in beautiful customs and laws, and then the source of their beauty in<br />
the sciences and, ultimately, the Beautiful Itself. 11 The focus is on the change in the beauty<br />
contemplated, not (until the very end) in the change in offspring that results from it. Indeed, there is<br />
no reason to doubt that Diotima’s account, in the lesser mysteries, of the persistence of knowledge<br />
through study is applicable also to the lover’s dealings with the sciences in the greater mysteries. 12<br />
Even when the soul has seen the Form of the Beautiful, such knowledge as it acquires will<br />
still be subject to the conditions of temporality that characterize the being of the soul. It will still need<br />
to practice (meletan) to retain its knowledge. But in Diotima’s account of the greater mysteries we<br />
learn something important about that practice: it involves contemplating the Form of the Beautiful.<br />
Diotima gives two descriptions of the experience of the Beautiful Itself. The first emphasizes the<br />
value of the experience, and does not mention any resulting product: “Here in life, said the visitor<br />
from Mantinea, if anywhere, is it worth living for a human being, contemplating the beautiful itself”<br />
(211d1-3). The second description, however, which serves as the finale of Diotima’s teaching as a<br />
whole, emphasizes the birth and rearing of true virtue:<br />
Do you think it’s a base life, she said, if a person turns his gaze in that direction and contemplates that<br />
[beauty] with the appropriate faculty, and is able to be with it? Or do you not realize, she said, that it<br />
is there alone that it will belong to him to bring to birth not phantoms of virtue, since he is not<br />
grasping a phantom, but true virtue, since he is grasping what is true? And that when he has given<br />
birth to true virtue and has raised it, it belongs to him to be a friend of the gods, and, to him, if to any<br />
human being, to be immortal? (211e4-212a7)<br />
It has been suggested that we should read this second description in terms of the first: the only<br />
“virtue” produced is knowledge of the Beautiful Itself, which is nothing other than the activity of<br />
contemplation. 13 I think it much more likely that we are to assume that Diotima has in mind a<br />
production of virtue much like that in the lesser mysteries: virtuous state of character, virtuous<br />
actions, and educative talk and/or writings directed towards producing virtue in others. However, the<br />
change in the character of the beautiful which conduces to this reproduction, we may reasonably<br />
speculate, makes some difference in the nature of the virtue produced. Certainly, as Diotima explicitly<br />
indicates, the virtue produced in virtue of communion with the Form of the Beautiful is “true virtue,”<br />
as that produced merely in response to the beauty of the beloved is not. But further, we may suppose<br />
that the very process of generalization – starting from the move from one beautiful body to bodily<br />
beauty in general, and moving to ever greater levels of generality – also conditions how the lover<br />
conceives of his product. In the lesser mysteries, just as the beauty which fostered the production of<br />
virtue was that of a particular individual, so too the virtue produced was valued, in part, because of its<br />
connection with the lover himself. It was a living memorial to the lover’s excellence in its<br />
particularity, making not only his goodness, but also his name live on. The lover initiated into the<br />
greater mysteries knows that the particularity of any instance of beauty (including virtue) is not part of<br />
what makes it valuable. What he identifies with as valuable in himself, and what he wishes to<br />
propagate, is nothing particular, but only virtue as such. His encounters with others are geared<br />
towards moving them to virtue, and not at all towards making sure that that virtue bears his own<br />
stamp. And the model of such a lover is surely the character Socrates himself.<br />
Works Cited<br />
Ferrari, Giovanni. 1992. "Platonic Love." In The Cambridge Companion to Plato, edited by Richard<br />
Kraut, 248-276. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.<br />
Ferrari, G. R. F. 1994. "Moral Fecundity. A Discussion of A. W. Price, Love and Friendship in Plato<br />
and Aristotle." Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy no. 9:169-184.<br />
Ionescu, Cristina. 2007. "The Transition from the Lower to the Higher Mysteries of Love in Plato's<br />
11 On this cf. Patterson (1991).<br />
12 It is not uncommon for interpreters to suppose that the account of the persistence of knowledge at 208a3-7 applies only to<br />
right opinion or something else short of true knowledge. Cf. Obdrzalek (2010), Ionescu (2007).<br />
13 See Sheffield (2006).<br />
237
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Syposium." Dialogue no. 46:27-42.<br />
Obdrzalek, Suzanne. 2010. "Moral Transformation and the Love of Beauty in Plato's <strong>Symposium</strong>."<br />
Journal for the History of Philosophy no. 48:415-44.<br />
Patterson, Richard. 1991. "The Ascent in Plato's <strong>Symposium</strong>." Proceedings of BACAP no. 7:193-214.<br />
Rowe, C. J. 1998. "Socrates and Diotima: Eros, Immortality, and Creativity." Proceedings of BACAP<br />
no. 14:239-259.<br />
———. 1998b. Plato. <strong>Symposium</strong>. Warminster: Aris & Phillips.<br />
Sheffield, Frisbee C. C. 2006. Plato's <strong>Symposium</strong>: The Ethics of Desire. Oxford: Oxford University<br />
Press.<br />
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Gli eroi e la natura demonica di Amore:<br />
Proclo interprete di Symp. 201e-204b<br />
Piera De Piano<br />
Riempire la distanza in maniera tale che il tutto risulti collegato con se stesso: questo uno dei poteri<br />
riconosciuto da Diotima a ciò che sta ἐν µέσῳ, ad Eros demone di Symp. 202e6-7. È a partire da<br />
questa annotazione che vorrei guardare, in questo breve contributo, a chi, all’interno della scuola<br />
platonica, fa dell’elemento intermedio un criterio ontologico ed ermeneutico di capitale importanza<br />
nella descrizione e comprensione del reale, tanto da fissare nei demoni «τὰ κέντρα τῆς τοῦ παντὸς<br />
διακοσµήσεως», i cardini dell’ordinamento cosmico 1 .<br />
È la Teologia Platonica il luogo in cui Proclo fornisce, dichiarando di apprenderla<br />
direttamente dai dialoghi platonici 2 , questa esposizione della struttura del reale, una struttura che si<br />
organizza in numerosi e diversificati livelli ontologici 3 . Ciascuno di questi livelli nei quali si viene<br />
progressivamente ad individuare l’assoluta semplicità principiale è presidiato da un dio e così la<br />
struttura metafisica diventa una struttura teologica: questo il senso dell’opera somma del filosofo<br />
tardo neoplatonico. Siamo nel sesto libro del capolavoro procliano. Dopo aver presentato le<br />
primissime enadi, poi le divinità di livello intelligibile e, quindi nell’ordine, quelle intelligibiliintellettive,<br />
quelle intellettive e demiurgiche, infine quelle introduttive alla dimensione psichica,<br />
ovvero le divinità ipercosmiche e quelle, ancora una volta intermedie, ipercosmiche-encosmiche,<br />
Proclo avrebbe dovuto parlare del genere ἐγκόσµιον degli dèi, celebrato solo in maniera cursoria<br />
(σποράδην) da Platone 4 , genere caratterizzato a sua volta da un’ulteriore suddivisione che vede<br />
animare di angeli, demoni ed eroi la processione dell’universo sensibile da quello intelligibile 5 . In<br />
realtà non lo farà, se non, anche lui, in maniera sporadica, forse perché non riesce a completare la sua<br />
trattazione o forse perché nel suo progetto di delineare gli ordinamenti divini che governano a livello<br />
originario e universale il tutto non rientra in maniera specifica la descrizione di quelle entità semidivine<br />
ormai già fuori dall’intelligibile. Del Simposio, dialogo dove figura un demone celebre, non è<br />
sopravvissuto, come si sa, alcun commento neoplatonico 6 . Il mio interesse si concentra pertanto, in<br />
questa occasione, sulla presenza demonica, e in particolare di Eros δαίµων µέγας, nell’In Cratylum, su<br />
quelle pagine degli scoli procliani in cui il discorso sul linguaggio s’intreccia con il discorso sulla<br />
poesia e sull’amore.<br />
Il punto d’inizio dell’esegesi procliana è l’indagine etimologica dei termini δαίµων ed ἥρως<br />
(demone ed eroe) proposta da Socrate nel suo dialogo con Ermogene (Crat. 397e-398d).<br />
Ricorrendo alla fonte esiodea che faceva dei demoni una stirpe aurea, ctonia e custode<br />
dell’umanità 7 , Socrate suggerisce di trovare la giustificazione razionale di tale immagine poetica nella<br />
1 Procl. In Alc. 69, 12-13 ed. Segonds.<br />
2 Il dialogo da cui è possibile dedurre la dottrina teologica, dal principio fino agli ultimi enti, è il Parmenide, in cui vengono<br />
presentati, secondo la lettura procliana, i generi divini a partire dalla primissima causa e nella loro reciproca connessione:<br />
Theol. Plat. I, 7, p. 31, 14-16 ed. Saffrey - Westerink. È da questa prospettiva che la filosofia platonica diventa una<br />
mistagogia, così come ci viene presentata anche da Marino nella Vita Procli (cap. 13 ed. Saffrey - Segonds), una iniziazione<br />
ai grandi misteri cui si accede attraverso lo studio di alcune opere propedeutiche (i pitagorici Versi d’oro, il Manuale di<br />
Epitteto, gli scritti di Aristotele introdotti dall’Isagoge porfiriana) come se fossero dei sacrifici preparatori ad una vita<br />
filosofica che è esercizio spirituale. In Theol. Plat. I, 1, pp. 5, 16 – 6, 15 e I, 5 pp. 24, 12 – 25, 2, Proclo presenta Platone<br />
come un sacerdote attraverso il quale si è rivelata la somma verità divina ad anime iniziate e la sua è detta essere una mistica<br />
dottrina di contenuto divino (περὶ θεῶν µυσταγωγία).<br />
3 Sulla divinizzazione e la gerarchizzazione dell’intelligibile nella Teologia Platonica, cfr. Abbate 2008, pp. 11-16, 107-11.<br />
Sulla struttura gerarchica dell’intero sistema metafisico procliano ancora fondamentale è lo studio di Beierwaltes 1965.<br />
4 Sulla nozione di ‘intermediario’ nei dialoghi platonici è imprescindibile la monografia di Souilhé 1919. Più recentemente si<br />
vedano Friedländer 1954, I, pp. 34-62; Robin 1964, per un approfondimento più specifico sulla natura demonica di amore;<br />
Motte 1989 e Alt 2000, pp. 223-230. Sulla demonologia in ambito neoplatonico ricchissimo è il recente volume di Timotin<br />
2012, che indaga sugli sviluppi che tutte le figure demoniche dei dialoghi platonici subiscono dall’Accademia antica fino al<br />
tardo neoplatonismo.<br />
5 «Tutti quanti gli dèi, in effetti, sono sovrani e governanti nell’universo, e a danzare intorno a loro ci sono molti ordini di<br />
angeli, molte serie di demoni, molte schiere di eroi, gran masse di anime particolari, multiformi generi di viventi mortali, ed<br />
infine variegate tipologie di piante»: Procl. Theol. Plat. VI, 4, p. 24, 2-7. La traduzione è di Abbate 2005.<br />
6 Il Simposio è certamente un dialogo inserito nel curriculum neoplatonico e, nell’ordine di lettura stabilitosi con Giamblico,<br />
è posto insieme col Fedro quasi alla fine del cursus, preparando l’allievo, con la descrizione della risalita dell’anima al bello<br />
intelligibile e da questo al Principio Primo, su questioni teologiche poi affrontate nel Timeo e nel Parmenide: cfr. An. Prol.<br />
26, 31-32 ed. Westerink. Secondo Ermia nel Simposio Platone avrebbe definito l’essenza e la potenza di Eros, nel Fedro,<br />
invece, la sua attività: In Phaedr. 12, 15-25 ed. Couvreur. Sul canone dei dialoghi e l’ordine con cui essi vengono proposti<br />
nella scuola platonica fondamentale è lo studio di Festugière 1969, in particolare, sul Simposio e il Fedro, pp. 284 e 290-292.<br />
7 Hes. Op. 121-123.
Piera De Piano<br />
loro intelligenza: i demoni sono aurei non perché realmente fatti d’oro, ma perché luminosi nella loro<br />
bellezza e bontà; ora chi è buono è anche saggio, dunque i δαίµονες ricevono la loro denominazione<br />
dal loro essere δαήµονες, sapienti. Diversa è l’origine del termine greco ricostruita da Proclo ed anche<br />
dalla moderna scienza etimologica: piuttosto che da una radice in comune col verbo διδάσκω, che<br />
collegherebbe la figura del demone alla conoscenza, gli studiosi moderni rimandano la natura<br />
semidivina all’elemento della divisione, riconducendo il termine greco al verbo δαίοµαι e alla radice<br />
indoeuropea *da(i) 8 . Il demone sarebbe dunque colui che assegna le parti, le distribuisce. Così spiega<br />
Proclo:<br />
[Dei generi posteriori agli dèi alcuni] sono chiamati demonici (τὰ δαιµόνια) in quanto legano insieme<br />
la parte centrale dell’universo (ὡς τὴν µεσότητα συνδέοντα) e distribuiscono la potenza divina (τὴν<br />
θείαν δύναµιν µερίζοντα) e la portano avanti fino alle ultime cose: suddividere (τὸ µερίσαι) è infatti<br />
dividere (δαῖσαι) 9 .<br />
È proprio la distribuzione, la condivisione che sembra connotare il posto centrale di Eros nel dialogo<br />
platonico, quel posto che è µεταξύ tra sapienza e ignoranza, tra il divino e il mortale, e che racconta in<br />
maniera pervasiva la gerarchica successione degli ordinamenti divini nel platonismo procliano 10 .<br />
Prima di soffermarci più specificamente sul ruolo destinato ai demoni e agli eroi dal filosofo licio, è<br />
opportuno fissare alcuni punti essenziali del contesto esegetico in cui le riflessioni sull’ordinamento<br />
demonico degli dèi si inseriscono.<br />
Dalla prospettiva procliana, il rapporto che lega il nome al suo referente è un rapporto<br />
iconico e l’onomaturgia, in quanto tecnica di assimilazione di una copia ad un modello, è un’attività<br />
umana condivisa per analogia con la dimensione divina 11 . Se, però, l’uomo nomina in maniera<br />
inevitabilmente fallibile, poiché opera con oggetti inseriti in una temporalità e in una spazialità di cui<br />
può avere solo una conoscenza altrettanto mutevole e corruttibile, l’onomaturgia divina si pone al<br />
principio stesso delle cose nominate, per cui il nome divino delle cose coincide con la cosa stessa. Il<br />
contenuto veridico del nome divino può però essere trasferito ai filosofi da una figura che, pur non<br />
essendo un dio, è a questo più vicino di quanto non lo sia il filosofo stesso, e cioè dal poeta. Coloro<br />
che sono ispirati (oi̔ ἐνθουσιάζοντες) hanno il compito di mostrare ai filosofi il reale oggetto di ricerca<br />
di cui sono a conoscenza per insegnamento divino 12 . Il principio dell’ἐνθουσιασµός, che Platone nello<br />
Ione evoca a dimostrazione dell’ignoranza del poeta, della sua mancata scienza di ciò che racconta, e<br />
di conseguenza della sua profonda distanza dal filosofo 13 , diventa, invece, nell’esegeta neoplatonico,<br />
proprio per il filosofo, uno strumento epistemico e perciò l’elemento di salvezza del linguaggio<br />
poetico. Il poeta arcaico, proprio perché ἔνθεος, è più prossimo al linguaggio corretto di produzione<br />
divina e al tempo stesso si pone al centro tra gli dèi e gli uomini che da lui apprendono il vero<br />
linguaggio. Coerentemente con il principio fondamentale del neoplatonismo, per cui tanto maggiore è<br />
il grado di originarietà, quindi di indeterminatezza, del reale, tanto minore è la possibilità che esso sia<br />
dicibile, nel suo Commento al Cratilo Proclo individua diversi gradi di nominabilità del divino, che<br />
vanno dalla assoluta indicibilità dei συνθήµατα, a noi visibili solo attraverso figure luminose 14 (τοῦ<br />
φωτὸς χαρακτῆρες), alla forma intermedia dei σύµβολα, i suoni inarticolati delle pratiche teurgiche,<br />
fino ad arrivare ai veri e propri ὀνόµατα, nomi con cui gli dèi vengono nominati e celebrati nelle<br />
8 Dalla stessa radice derivano le forme verbali attive δαΐζω «dividere» e δαίνυµι «distribuire» e, detto di cibo, «banchettare»,<br />
da cui il termine δαίς, «pasto» o «banchetto» in cui ciascuno ha la sua parte. Cfr. Chantraine 1968, sub voces δαίµων e<br />
δαίοµαι, pp. 246-247 e Lévêque 1993.<br />
9 Procl. In Crat. CXXVIII, 75, 19-21 ed. Pasquali. La traduzione è di Romano 1989, lievemente modificata. Cfr. anche<br />
Herm. In Phaedr. 39, 20-22 in cui si piega che Eros è un grande demone perché partecipa del bello in maniera divisa e non<br />
unitaria: «δαίσασθαι γὰρ τὸ µερίσασθαι».<br />
10 Sul ruolo ontologico dei demoni, sulla funzione di mediazione tra le realtà divine e quelle umane, traducendo la<br />
provvidenza trascendente, universale e unitaria in una provvidenza prossima, particolare e plurale cfr. anche Procl. In Tim. I,<br />
39, 30 – 40, 10 ed. Diehl. Tralascerò in questa sede questioni relative alla dimensione demonica delle anime particolari.<br />
Sull’argomento cfr. Steel 1978, Di Pasquale Barbanti 2001 e, in particolare sul demone di Socrate, De Vita 2011.<br />
11 Cfr. Procl. In Crat. LI, 18, 9 – LIII, 23, 25. Sull’argomento cfr. Abbate 2001, pp. 39-45, 55-61 e De Piano 2013. Sulla<br />
natura iconica, dunque mimetica, del linguaggio già in Platone cfr. Palumbo 2008, pp. 334-364.<br />
12 Procl. In Crat. LXVIII, 29, 11-12.<br />
13 Il poeta divinamente ispirato è assolutamente inconsapevole (ἔκφρων) e l’intelletto (νοῦς) non è più in lui; egli, «κοῦφον<br />
γὰρ χρῆµα ... καὶ πτηνὸν καὶ ἱερόν, Ion. 534b3-4», non è capace di comporre alcunché se prima non è colmo di divino<br />
(ἔνθεος, 534b5). Sull’ispirazione poetica nella tradizione arcaica e in Platone mi limito a rimandare in questa sede a<br />
Tigerstedt 1969 e Murray 1981 (da Omero a Pindaro) e, più specificamente per Platone, a Velardi 1989 e Giuliano 2005, pp.<br />
137-218.<br />
14 Cfr. Or. Ch. fr. 145 Des Places e si veda, per un interessante commento su tale immagine di ascendenza caldaica, Pépin<br />
1981, pp. 50-53.<br />
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diverse lingue degli uomini 15 . Ebbene, gli dèi superiori al livello intellettivo dell’essere sono immersi<br />
nel silenzio; in realtà essi comunicano tra di loro, ma l’atto del comunicare, essendo in loro unito a<br />
quello del pensare, si risolve in un elemento luminoso, pura luce che procede da un ordine all’altro.<br />
Ma questi nomi, che pure esistono in maniera nascosta (κρυφίως) presso gli dèi, «sono rivelati a chi<br />
tra gli uomini ha una certa affinità con gli dèi (τῶν ἀνθρώπων τοῖς συγγενέσι πρὸς τοὺς θεούς)» 16 . Τra<br />
questo particolare genere di uomini sono da considerare i teurghi, i sacerdoti, così come intermediari<br />
tra il divino e l’umano, ancor prima degli uomini, sono i demoni 17 . Gli dèi a volte comunicano<br />
direttamente con gli uomini, ad esempio nei riti e nei misteri, altre volte si servono di intermediari,<br />
come accadde – ricorda Proclo – ad Eleno nell’episodio iliadico 18 , che «sentì il volere di Apollo e di<br />
Atena non già per mezzo degli enti più elevati, bensì di quelli a lui immediatamente vicini e che sono<br />
di natura demonica 19 ». Ma che i poeti condividano con queste misteriose figure la natura di congeneri,<br />
veri parenti degli dèi è altrettanto esplicito.<br />
Nel capitolo CXVIII dell’In Cratylum l’esegeta neoplatonico spiega il nome poetico<br />
come un velamento della realtà divina: «i miti ricoprono le cose per mezzo dell’omonimia, οἱ µῦθοι<br />
οὖν διὰ τῆς ὁµωνυµίας 20 τὰ πράγµατα συγκαλύπτουσι, 69, 11-12». In questo passo Proclo utilizza il<br />
concetto aristotelico dell’omonimia per tradurre in termini linguistico-semantici la distanza ontologica<br />
tra una divinità principiale ed una derivata. È la stessa processione dell’essere, la derivazione dei<br />
molti dall’Uno, della realtà intelligibile nella sua struttura triadica di essere intelligibile, intelligibileintellettivo<br />
e intellettivo ad essere coperta, velata in un sistema perfetto di omonimie poetiche.<br />
Ciascun dio, preso in se stesso, trascende gli dèi che vengono dopo di lui, ma al tempo stesso, ha con<br />
questi un elemento in comune, qualcosa che permette la processione degli dèi di rango inferiore da<br />
quelli di rango superiore. Ciascun dio presiede una catena (σειρά), una serie dalla quale l’essere<br />
divino procede dal trascendente al sensibile senza creare alcun vuoto nella gerarchia ontologica del<br />
reale 21 . Ebbene il linguaggio poetico rappresenta tale struttura gerarchica servendosi di omonimi,<br />
ovvero denominazioni che sono le stesse per gli dèi, cause principiali della loro propria catena (τῆς<br />
ἑαυτῶν σειρᾶς ἀρχικοῖς αἰτίοις) e per gli enti intermedi che da questi dèi derivano fino alle ultime<br />
entità (πνεύµατα 22 ), inferiori persino ai demoni e agli eroi. È così spiegato il motivo per cui i poeti<br />
parlano di dèi che si uniscono a donne mortali o di uomini che si uniscono a dee; in realtà essi non<br />
fanno altro che velare un principio metafisico più complesso:<br />
Se avessero voluto parlare in termini chiari e precisi (διαρρήδην καὶ σαφῶς), avrebbero detto che<br />
Afrodite e Ares e Teti e gli altri dèi producono, ciascuno cominciando da quello che sta più in alto<br />
fino agli ultimi enti (ἕκαστος ἄνωθεν ἀρχόµενος µέχρι τῶν τελευταίων), la sua propria catena<br />
comprendente tutte le molteplici cause (προάγει τὴν οἰκείαν σειρὰν περιέχουσαν πολλὰς αἰτίας), che<br />
sono diverse l’una dall’altra, pur nella medesima essenza (διαφερούσας ἀλλήλων τῇ οὐσίᾳ αὐτῇ),<br />
quali, ad esempio, le cause che sono angeli, demoni, eroi, ninfe e simili 23 .<br />
Dopo questa spiegazione di ordine generale, Proclo si sofferma sull’origine e sulla natura di<br />
queste cause seconde che derivano dagli dèi e che pure manifestano delle caratteristiche comuni con<br />
gli uomini. Esse infatti si trovano al limite tra il superiore (gli enti primari, ovvero gli dèi) e la<br />
generazione degli enti secondari, ovvero eroi, uomini, ma anche ninfe, piante, sorgenti e specie<br />
15 Su tale classificazione triadica della processione e produzione linguistica degli dèi si vedano Trouillard 1975, pp. 243-248<br />
e Van den Berg 2008, pp. 162-172.<br />
16 Procl. In Crat. LXXI, 33, 19-20.<br />
17 Che la comunicazione tra i demoni avvenga per irradiazioni, senza uso di voce e suoni, è un fatto già noto ai<br />
medioplatonici: cfr. per esempio Plut. De gen. Socr. 20, 589b dove si trova utilizzato lo stesso verbo procliano (ἐλλάµψειν).<br />
18 Hom. Il. VII, 44.<br />
19 Procl. In Crat. LXXIX, 37, 19-21; cfr. anche il capitolo CXXII, 72, 10-15 dove si fa un esplicito riferimento ai «Teurghi<br />
nati sotto Marco Aurelio» ai quali gli dèi hanno tramandato i nomi «che ci informano sulle proprietà degli ordinamenti<br />
divini».<br />
20 Sull’omonimia in Arist. Cat. 1a1 ss. ed il fecondo dibattito sorto in ambito neoplatonico cfr. Narcy 1981, Chiaradonna<br />
2002, pp. 227-305 e Chiaradonna 2004.<br />
21 Cfr. Procl. In Remp. I, 78,1-6 ed. Kroll.<br />
22 Con questo termine Proclo si riferisce proprio a quegli enti intermedi che sono a contatto con le anime; si possono perciò<br />
associare a figure come spiriti ed eroi: essi sono inferiori ai demoni che si collocano ancora al di là della relazione con le<br />
cose e vivono intorno alla terra e sono particolari e «aiutano a generare alcune cose, ma non certo mescolandosi fisicamente<br />
con le cose mortali, ma stimolando la natura e portando a compimento la potenza generatrice»: In Crat. CXVIII, 69, 6-9.<br />
23 Procl. ibi, CXVIII, 69, 14-20. Lo stesso principio è chiarito in El. Theol. 125 ed. Dodds. Cfr. anche In Tim. I, 361, 1 ss.;<br />
III, 166, 12 ss.; In Remp. I, 91, 15 ss.; 147, 6 ss. dove le ingiurie di Achille nei confronti di Apollo si spiegano col fatto che<br />
non è ad Apollo che l’eroe omerico si rivolge, ma al suo demone che da lui deriva e che porta il suo stesso nome. Che<br />
esistano dei demoni che portano lo stesso nome degli dèi è già detto chiaramente da Plutarco in De def. orac. 21, 421e. Cfr.<br />
anche Iambl. De myst. IX, 9, p. 284, 3-7 ed. Des Places.<br />
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Piera De Piano<br />
animali. Esistono tre generi intermedi: gli angeli, i demoni e gli eroi; i primi sono i più vicini agli dèi<br />
e ne condividono l’essenza unitaria e indivisa, rendendo proporzionato alle cose posteriori il carattere<br />
non ancora molteplice della natura divina; i secondi, come abbiamo già visto sopra, distribuiscono la<br />
potenza divina in tutti gli enti secondari; i terzi, invece, riconducono la molteplicità degli enti derivati<br />
all’intelletto divino, hanno cioè il compito di elevare e convertire le anime umane attraverso<br />
l’amore 24 . Da qui la spiegazione etimologica del termine ἥρως, «eroe». Tutti gli eroi, infatti, spiega<br />
Platone nel Cratilo (398d1-e3), sono nati da un innamorato (ἐρασθείς): o da un dio innamorato di una<br />
mortale, o da un mortale innamorato di una dea. Ecco perché la radice del termine ἥρωες è<br />
strettamente collegata al termine ἔρως, al nome dell’amore, da cui appunto sono nati gli eroi. Nello<br />
scolio CXIX, di commento proprio a questo passo platonico, Proclo inquadra tale spiegazione nella<br />
gerarchia metafisico-teologica del reale: gli eroi ricevono la loro denominazione (ἐπωνυµίαν) da Eros,<br />
dio dell’amore. Questi è a metà tra il mortale e il dio, spiega Diotima 25 , ed è per questo che gli eroi<br />
non solo nascono dai demoni, ma ne ricevono anche, per analogia (ἀναλόγως), le proprietà: poiché<br />
Eros è generato da Poros, che è migliore, e da Penia, che è peggiore, anche gli eroi contengono in sé<br />
questi generi differenti, l’uno divino, l’altro mortale 26 .<br />
La genitorialità di Eros serve a Proclo per spiegare la genitura divina in generale nel primo<br />
libro della Teologia Platonica. Gli dèi sono posti al di sopra della γένεσις e della realtà condizionata<br />
dalla temporalità, e allora il racconto di Diotima che presenta Eros figlio di una causa paterna e una<br />
materna diventa il luogo adatto alla spiegazione di qualunque nascita di ordine divino. La processione<br />
degli dèi è conforme all’unità, essa non prevede divisioni e distinzioni dell’essenza, che invece<br />
procede senza che ciò che è superiore subisca diminuzione né alterazione 27 .<br />
Quando allora Platone dice in forma di racconto mitico (ἐν µυθικοῖς πλάσµασιν) della nascita<br />
di Eros, generato durante la festa per la nascita di Afrodite, dobbiamo ricordare – spiega Proclo – che<br />
egli si sta servendo di una dimostrazione simbolica: i miti chiamano γένεσις l’indicibile<br />
manifestazione che ha origine dai principi causali. Quando invece Platone si esprime in maniera<br />
dialettica e intellettiva, e non in modo mistico come fanno i teologi, ovvero i poeti ispirati, egli non fa<br />
che celebrare il carattere di ingenerato proprio degli dèi 28 . L’ordine divino più prossimo all’Uno<br />
contiene in se stesso le processioni degli enti inferiori, intermedi e di ultimo livello: in esso, come in<br />
ciascuno degli ordinamenti divini di livello inferiore, sono contenuti principi causali uniformi ma<br />
anche multiformi enti causati. Ciascuno di questi contenuti sussiste però in maniera differente: «i<br />
primi, in quanto completanti preesistono ai secondi; i secondi, in quanto completati, bramano quelli<br />
più compiuti, e a loro volta, partecipando della potenza dei primi, si rendono principi di generazione<br />
di quelli successivi» 29 .<br />
È tenendo presente queste nozioni che va interpretata la genitorialità divina dei racconti<br />
mitici: s’intenderà perciò la causa paterna come il principio causale uniforme della natura superiore, e<br />
quella materna come il principio causale di natura inferiore e più particolare che viene a preesistere<br />
nel ruolo di madre (ἐν µητρὸς τάξει). Se però la causa paterna è sempre superiore all’ente da essa<br />
derivato, la causa materna a volte può anche essere ad esso inferiore: è questo il caso di Πενία, causa<br />
materna di Eros nel Simposio. Ciò è vero non solo nei racconti mitici, ma anche quando Platone parla<br />
‘in maniera filosofica’ degli enti, come nel Timeo, quando chiama «padre» l’essere, ovvero i modelli<br />
intelligibili delle cose sensibili, chiama «madre» e «nutrice del divenire» la materia, ricettacolo delle<br />
immagini dell’essere, e «figlio» la natura di ciò che è ad essi intermedio (τὴν δὲ µεταξὺ τούτων<br />
φύσιν) 30 . Ebbene le potenze causatrici che perfezionano le realtà seconde, che sono promotrici di vita<br />
24<br />
Cfr. Procl. ibi, CXXVIII, 75, 80 – 76, 4. La stessa distinzione dell’ordinamento intermedio di natura demonica in angeli,<br />
demoni ed eroi si trova anche in In Tim. III, 165, 15-22. La distribuzione gerarchica degli esseri intermedi tra gli dèi e gli<br />
uomini si trova già nell’Epinomide in cui ad ognuna delle specie viventi e dei quattro elementi di Tim. 39e10-40a2 si fanno<br />
corrispondere, rispettivamente, gli dèi, i demoni, di cui si individua anche un particolare ἀέριον γένος, i semidei e infine gli<br />
uomini (Ep. 984d-985b). Stessa disposizione gerarchica si ritrova in Alc. Didask. p. 171, 15-29 ed. Whittaker - Louis e in<br />
Calc. In Tim. §§ 127-136 ed. Waszink. Ad introdurre l’elemento angelico accanto a quello demonico è la tradizione<br />
neopitagorica (cfr. Iambl. Theol. aritm. p. 24, 20 ed. De Falco). L’ordine angeli – demoni – eroi è già di Celso (in Orig.<br />
Contr. Cels. VII, 68) e di Ierocle di Alessandria (In carm. aur. 19, 17-22 ed. Köhler). Sull’argomento cfr. Rodríguez Moreno<br />
1998, pp. 177-192 e Timotin 2012, pp. 85-161.<br />
25<br />
Plat. Symp. 202d11-e1; 203b1-e5. Cito i testi platonici dall’edizione oxoniense di Burnet, tt. I-V, 1900-1907.<br />
26<br />
Cfr. Procl. In Crat. CXIX, 71, 8-13.<br />
27<br />
Cfr. Procl. El. Theol. 25.<br />
28<br />
Cfr. Procl. Theol. Plat. I, 28, pp. 120, 22 – 121, 14.<br />
29<br />
Procl. ibi, I, 28, pp. 121, 21 – 122, 2. La traduzione è di Abbate 2005, lievemente modificata.<br />
30<br />
Cfr. Plat. Tim. 50d2-4 e 52d5. L’identificazione dell’essere con la causa paterna dell’universo è dedotta da Proclo<br />
direttamente da Tim. 50d2 in cui l’appellativo di ‘padre’ riferito da Platone al modello intelligibile, uno dei tre principi della<br />
generazione del cosmo, risulta significativo per l’interpretazione del ruolo del demiurgo a cui tradizionalmente si<br />
attribuiscono, senza un reale riscontro del testo, gli appellativi di ποιητής e πατήρ di Tim. 28c3. Sull’argomento rimando al<br />
fondamentale studio di Ferrari 2003, teso a dimostrare come il mondo delle idee rappresenti contemporaneamente la causa<br />
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e generano divisione, sono cause materne al di sopra degli enti derivati; le potenze che invece<br />
accolgono le realtà seconde e moltiplicano le loro attività e ne estendono la condizione inferiore sono<br />
anch’esse dette madri, ma sono al di sotto degli enti da essi generati. Allo stesso modo, tra i prodotti<br />
generati da tali principi causali, alcuni procedono da entrambi i principi in maniera unitaria e si<br />
completano presso entrambi i tipi di causa, altri sono posti in mezzo, al centro (ἐν µέσῳ) e conservano<br />
il legame con entrambi, trasferendo «i doni dei padri nei grembi materni e facendo rivolgere i<br />
ricettacoli di questi verso le cause primigenie perché le ricolmino» 31 . È così spiegata la nascita di<br />
Eros, generato da Poros e Penia, principio superiore il primo, principio inferiore il secondo: rispetto<br />
ad entrambi Eros demone si pone al centro perché nel suo essere legato ad entrambi i genitori esso è<br />
sintesi dell’uno nell’altro, è l’assenza di risorse che trova la risorsa, è la mancanza di espedienti che<br />
trova l’espediente, è il non essere che si fa essere nel riempire di sé di ciò che è mancante.<br />
La dialettica triadica della processione dell’essere racconta anche il genere di sapienza divina<br />
di cui parla Diotima in Simp. 204a1-3; Proclo lo spiega nel capitolo 23 del primo libro della Teologia<br />
Platonica a proposito dei tre attributi divini, la bellezza, la sapienza e la bontà desunti da Phaedr.<br />
246d8-e1:<br />
Io dico che secondo la Diotima del Simposio la natura del sapiente è colma del conoscibile, e non<br />
ricerca né insegue, bensì possiede l’intelligibile. […] La natura del sapiente è ricolma e non è<br />
bisognosa di nulla, e tutto ciò che vuole ha lì presente, e non è bramosa di nulla, ma è preposta al<br />
filosofo come desiderabile e appetibile 32 .<br />
È proprio dalla palinodia socratica che Proclo ricava la triade di ἀγαθόν, σοφὀν, καλόν, da lui posta al<br />
livello intelligibile dell’essere 33 . Nell’assetto teologico-metafisico del νοητόν, derivano da queste tre<br />
cause tre monadi: πίστις, ἀλήθεια ed ἔρως, Fede, Verità e Amore 34 che rappresentano di ciascuna<br />
causa l’elemento intermedio attraverso il quale le realtà inferiori da esse derivate possono<br />
ricongiungersi al loro principio: è necessario, infatti, che ci sia una determinata medietà (µεσότης)<br />
congenere a ciascun ente perché attraverso di essa quell’ente possa raggiungere la propria causa.<br />
L’elemento intermedio della Bellezza è l’amore. Infatti non sarebbe possibile porre l’amore né tra i<br />
primi esseri perché l’oggetto d’amore è al di sopra dell’amore, né tra gli ultimi enti perché l’amante<br />
partecipa dell’amore 35 .<br />
Dall’eros come principio causale, dunque dalla monade che ha sede nell’intelligibile, ha inizio<br />
la serie erotica degli dèi, che procede dal livello ineffabile dell’intelligibile a quello unificante,<br />
perfettivo e paterno dell’ordinamento intelligibile-intellettivo 36 , a quello poietico e assimilatore degli<br />
dèi ipercosmici 37 , fino a mostrarsi in maniera molteplice e divisa negli dèi encosmici 38 . Se al livello<br />
del νοητόν eros esiste solo κατ᾽ αἰτίαν, come principio causale, è lì dove intervengono l’unità e la<br />
divisione tra gli esseri che l’amore manifesta pienamente la sua natura di essere intermedio 39 . Nel<br />
Commento all’Alcibiade Primo, in cui si descrive il ritorno dell’anima a sé per mezzo della forza<br />
anagogica di eros 40 , Proclo stabilisce il modello della classe demonica proprio nella εἰροτικὴ σειρά,<br />
nella catena erotica degli dèi, quella che da una parte ha il compito di elevare le realtà inferiori fino<br />
alla divina Bellezza e dall’altra irradia su queste stesse realtà la luce divina che dalla Bellezza<br />
procede. «È necessario allora che questo dio sia posto al centro (ἐν µέσῳ) tra l’oggetto d’amore e gli<br />
amanti, e che sia inferiore al bello, ma superiore a tutto il resto», scrive Proclo 41 . La direzione<br />
epistrofica delle realtà seconde verso quelle di ordine primario si realizza pertanto intorno alla<br />
centralità dell’ordinamento erotico degli esseri divini, che trovano così in Eros, demone potentissimo,<br />
paradigmatica e quella efficiente della generazione del mondo.<br />
31 Procl. Theol. Plat. I, 28, p. 123, 4-6. La traduzione è di Abbate, lievemente modificata.<br />
32 Procl. ibi, I, 23, p. 105, 5-12.<br />
33 Una sua dettagliata presentazione si trova in Procl. Theol. Plat. I, 22-24, pp. 100, 17 – 109, 12 e III, 22, pp. 78, 15 – 81,<br />
20. Cfr. anche Dam. In Phaed. I, 41 ed. Westerink.<br />
34 Cfr. Procl. Theol. Plat. I, 2, p. 11, 13-21 e I, 25, pp. 109, 4 –113, 10. Proclo attinge tale triade dagli Oracoli caldaici, fr. 46<br />
Des Places.<br />
35 Cfr. Procl. In Alc. 51, 3-6.<br />
36 Sugli attributi degli dèi intelligibili-intellettivi cfr. Procl. El. Theol. 151, 57; 154; In Crat. XCVIII, 48, 1-4; CX, 63, 7-16;<br />
65, 3-7.<br />
37 Cfr. Procl. In Tim. II, 236, 27; 273, 16-19.<br />
38 Cfr. Procl. In Crat. CXXVIII, 75, 9-14; 19-21.<br />
39 «Poiché esso [scil. l’amore] è il legame (συνδετικός) degli esseri separati e l’unione (συναγωγός) di quelli che vengono<br />
dopo di lui con quegli enti che lo precedono, è colui che converte (ἐπιστρεπτικός) gli esseri di secondo rango verso quelli<br />
primari, che eleva (ἀναγωγός) e perfeziona (τελεσιουργός) gli esseri più imperfetti»: Procl. In Alc. 53, 5-8.<br />
40 Sull’interpretazione tardo neoplatonica del potere anagogico di eros cfr. Motta 2012.<br />
41 Procl. ibi, 51, 6-8.<br />
243
Piera De Piano<br />
l’immagine più perspicua della loro medietà 42 .<br />
Per aver sottoposto ad una capillare teologizzazione gli scritti del divino maestro, la tarda<br />
scuola platonica si trovava di fronte alla necessità di colmare quel vuoto di cui persino ciò che è<br />
perfetto ha bisogno per conservare la sua natura assolutamente separata e trascendente. Allo scopo di<br />
colmare questo vuoto era stata elaborata una inusitata e labirintica proliferazione dei livelli ontologici,<br />
che avrebbero potuto gradualmente salvaguardare la trascendenza della causa originaria e<br />
l’appartenenza degli enti secondari alla causa primissima. Per dare dinamismo ad un sistema che<br />
altrimenti sarebbe imploso nella sua eccessiva articolazione, Proclo ricorre con una prudenza,<br />
potremmo dire, genialmente maniacale all’elemento intermedio, sia esso un dio, un demone, un eroe o<br />
persino un poeta, ogni volta che è chiamato a descrivere la continuità di ciò che è separato, il legame<br />
del tutto con se stesso.<br />
Abbreviazioni bibliografiche<br />
Abbate 2001 = M. Abbate, Dall’etimologia alla teologia: Proclo interprete del Cratilo, Casale<br />
Monferrato 2001.<br />
Abbate 2005 = Proclo, Teologia platonica, presentazione di W. Beierwaltes, introd. di G. Reale, trad.,<br />
note e apparati di M. Abbate, Milano 2005.<br />
Abbate 2008 = M. Abbate, Il divino tra unità e molteplicità. Saggio sulla Teologia Platonica di Proclo,<br />
Alessandria 2008.<br />
Alt 2000 = K. Alt, Der Daimon als Seelenführer: zur Vorstellung des persönlichen Schutzgeistes bei<br />
den Griechen, «Hyperboreus», 6 (2000), pp. 219-252.<br />
Beierwaltes 1965 = W. Beierwaltes, Proklos: Grundzüge seiner Metaphysik, Frankfurt am Main 1965.<br />
Chantraine 1968 = P. Chantraine, Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque, Paris 1968.<br />
Chiaradonna 2002 = R. Chiaradonna, Sostanza movimento analogia. Plotino critico di Aristotele,<br />
Napoli 2002.<br />
Chiaradonna 2004 = R. Chiaradonna, Plotino e la teoria degli universali. Enn. VI, 3 [44], 9, in<br />
Aristotele e i suoi esegeti neoplatonici. Logica e ontologia nelle interpretazioni greche e arabe,<br />
Atti del Convegno internazionale, Roma 19-20 ottobre 2001, a cura di V. Celluprica - C.<br />
D’Ancona, Napoli 2004, pp. 1-35.<br />
De Piano 2013 = P. De Piano, Il Demiurgo, l’onomaturgo e l’artista nei capitoli LI-LIII dell’In<br />
Cratylum di Proclo, «Logos. Rivista annuale del Dipartimento di filosofia A. Aliotta», 8<br />
(2013), pp. 9-22 (in fase di elaborazione presso l’editore).<br />
De Vita 2011 = M. C. De Vita, Sul demone di Socrate: l’esegesi neoplatonica, in Λόγον διδόναι. La<br />
filosofia come esercizio del render ragione. Studi in onore di G. Casertano, a cura di L.<br />
Palumbo, Loffredo 2011, pp. 841-863.<br />
Di Pasquale Barbanti = M. Di Pasquale Barbanti, Il concetto di mediazione nella psicologia e nella<br />
gnoseologia di Proclo, «Invigilata Lucernis», 23 (2001), pp. 55-81.<br />
Ferrari 2003 = F. Ferrari, Causa paradigmatica e causa efficiente: il ruolo delle Idee nel Timeo,<br />
in Plato Physicus, a cura di S. Maso e C. Natali, Amsterdam 2003, pp. 81-94.<br />
Festugière 1969 = A. J. Festugière, L’ordre de lecture des dialogues de Platon aux Ve/VIe siècle,<br />
«Museum Helveticum», 26 (1969), pp. 281-296.<br />
Friedländer 1954 =P. Friedländer, Platon. Seinswahrheit und Lebenswirklichkeit, I-III, Berlin 1954 (I<br />
ed. 1928-1930)<br />
Giuliano 2005 = F. M. Giuliano, Platone e la poesia. Teoria della composizione e prassi della<br />
ricezione, Sankt Augustin 2005.<br />
Lévêque 1993 = Répartition et démocratie. A propos de la racine *da-, «Esprit», décembre 1993, pp.<br />
34-39.<br />
Motta 2012 = A. Motta, Eros ἀναγωγός e filosofia nell’esegesi tardo neoplatonica, in Eros e<br />
Pulchritudo. Tra Antico e Moderno, a cura di L. Palumbo – V. Sorge, Napoli 2012, pp. 71-82.<br />
Motte 1989 = A. Motte, La catégorie platonicienne du démonique, in Anges et démons. Actes du<br />
colloque de Liège et de Louvain-la-Neuve, 25-26 novembre 1987, éd. par J. Ries, Louvain<br />
1989, pp. 205-221.<br />
Murray 1981 = P. Murray, Poetic inspiration in early Greece, «The Journal of Hellenic Studies», 101<br />
(1981), pp. 87-100.<br />
42 Cfr. Procl. ibi, 30, 15 – 31, 9. La serie erotica trova il suo παράδειγµα nei demoni poiché essa detiene tra gli dèi la<br />
medesima medietà che ai demoni viene riconosciuta tra le realtà divine e quelle umane: «καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τῆς ὅλης τῶν<br />
δαιµόνων τάξεως ἐν ἑαυτῇ τὸ παράδειγµα προεστήσατο, ταύτην ἐν τοῖς θεοῖς ἔχουσα τὴν µεσότητα ἣν οἱ δαίµονες τῶν τε<br />
θείων µεταξὺ καὶ τῶν θνητῶν ἐκληρώσαντο πραγµάτων»: ibi, 31, 5-8.<br />
244
Piera De Piano<br />
Narcy 1981 = M. Narcy, L’homonymie entre Aristote et ses commentateurs néo-platoniciens, «Les<br />
études philosophiques», janvier-mars 1981, pp. 35-52.<br />
Palumbo 2008 = L. Palumbo, Μίµησις. Rappresentazione, teatro e mondo nei dialoghi di Platone e<br />
nella Poetica di Aristotele, Napoli 2008.<br />
Pépin 1981 = J. Pépin, Linguistique et théologie dans la tradition platonicienne, in AA. VV.,<br />
Linguaggio. Scienza-Filosofia-Teologia, Atti del XXV convegno di assistenti universitari di<br />
filosofia, Padova 1981, pp. 23-53.<br />
Robin 1964 = L. Robin, La théorie platonicienne de l’amour, nouvelle édition, préface de P.-M.<br />
Schuhl, Paris, 1964 (I ed. 1908).<br />
Rodríguez Moreno 1998 = I. Rodríguez Moreno, Ángeles, démones y héroes en el neoplatonismo<br />
griego, Amsterdam 1998.<br />
Romano 1989 = Proclo, Lezioni sul “Cratilo” di Platone, introd. trad. e comm. di F. Romano, Catania<br />
1989.<br />
Souilhé 1919 = J. Souilhé, La notion platonicienne d’intermédiaire dans la philosophie des dialogues,<br />
Paris 1919 (rist. New York – London 1987)<br />
Steel 1976 = C. G. Steel, The Changing Self. A study on the Soul in Later Neoplatonism: Iamblichus,<br />
Damascius, Priscianus, Bruxelles 1976.<br />
Tigerstedt 1969 = E. N. Tigerstedt, Plato’s Idea of Poetical Inspiration, Helsinki 1969.<br />
Timotin 2012 = A. Timotin, La démonologie platonicienne: histoire de la notion de daimôn de Platon<br />
aux derniers néoplatoniciens, Leiden – Boston 2012.<br />
Trouillard 1975 = J. Trouillard, L’activité onomastique selon Proclos, in De Jamblique à Proclus,<br />
Neuf exposes suivis de discussions par B. D. Larsen et al., avec la participation de F. Brunner,<br />
entretiens préparés et présidés par H. Dörrie, Vandoeuvres-Geneve, 26-31 août 1974, Genève<br />
1975, pp. 239-251.<br />
Van den Berg 2008 = R. M. Van den Berg, Proclus’ Commentary on the Cratylus in Context. Ancient<br />
theories of Language and Naming, Leiden – Boston 2008.<br />
Velardi 1989 = R. Velardi, Enthousiasmos. Possessione rituale e teoria della comunicazione poetica in<br />
Platone, Roma 1989.<br />
245
ABSTRACT<br />
Socrates as a divine intermediary in the Apology and <strong>Symposium</strong><br />
Gerard Naddaf<br />
The best and most complete portraits that Plato provides of the figure of Socrates as a philosopher<br />
appear in the Apology and the <strong>Symposium</strong>. In both dialogues, Socrates comes across as a deeply<br />
religious or spiritual figure. Yet there are both similarities and differences between the two dialogues<br />
which make it difficult to determine which portrait is the more faithful.<br />
In this paper I focus on the figure of Socrates as a “daimonic man” (daimonios anêr, Sym.<br />
203a5) and leader (hêgoumenos, Sym. 210a7). I argue that Socrates is acutely self-conscious (sunoida<br />
emautôi, Ap. 21b4-5, 22c8) of the belief that he is not only divinely inspired but also god’s<br />
representative on earth and that god has given him the means to perform his task, which he knows, as<br />
well as his disciples, is exceedingly difficult (sunoida emautôi, Sym. 216a3, b3). The ultimate aim for<br />
us, as Socrates understands it, is to become as godlike as possible, for this will lead to happiness in<br />
this life and the next, a glimpse of which is conveyed in the form of a final revelation during an<br />
exaiphnês or sudden moment in the <strong>Symposium</strong> (210e4). I also explain where Socrates’ exaiphnês<br />
moments of insight and revelation appear in the Apology.<br />
In conjunction, I show that there is no difference between the god of the Apology (to<br />
daimonion, 40a5 or ho theos, 40b1) communicating directly with Socrates via a voice (phônê, 31d2)<br />
or sign (sêmeion, 40b1) and the Socrates of the <strong>Symposium</strong>, portrayed as a spiritual entity (to<br />
daimonion, Sym. 202e1, or daimonios anêr, 203a5) standing between god and mortals, or, more<br />
precisely, the incarnation of the greatest of all daimons: Eros himself (202d). Socrates is indeed the<br />
ultimate messenger and leader, the one through whom, like the Delphic oracle, divination now passes<br />
(202e).<br />
Finally, since in the Apology Socrates states that the divine voice communicated with him<br />
from childhood (ex paidos, 31d3), he appears to be god’s chosen messenger from an early age. I<br />
understand this as an instance of the awakening of self-consciousness, a relatively new phenomenon<br />
in ancient Greece and elsewhere.
Agathon<br />
Chair: Debra Nails
Why Agathon’s Beauty Matters<br />
Francisco J. Gonzalez<br />
When I kiss Agathon my soul is on my lips,<br />
whither it comes, poor thing, hoping to cross over 1<br />
There is a tendency to treat Agathon’s as the most superficial and philosophically vacuous speech in<br />
the dialogue. 2 This impression is of course encouraged by Socrates who characterizes the speech as a<br />
piece of Gorgianic rhetoric concerned only with impressing through its choice of words and phrases<br />
and not at all with telling the truth about its subject. In other words, Socrates suggests that the speech<br />
is an attractive or beautiful one (καλὸν οὕτω καὶ παντοδαπὸν λόγον ῥηθέντα198b3), but not a good<br />
one. Indeed the speech makes love itself something merely attractive but not good, like the author in<br />
whose image it is conceived: despite his name, Agathon is more pretty boy than good.<br />
But careful consideration of Agathon’s speech and its place in the dialogue shows that this<br />
assessment cannot stand. Considering first its place in the dialogue, Agathon’s speech immediately<br />
precedes Socrates’ and is thus given a prominent, central place in the dialogue. If we see the series of<br />
speeches as an ascent of some sort, Agathon’s is near the top. One could of course in response reject<br />
the view that the speeches represent an ascent, as many scholars have precisely in order to avoid<br />
giving Agathon’s speech too much honor 3 But we do not need to assume such an ascent in order to<br />
see in the position of Agathon’s speech a sign of its importance. The reason is that the <strong>Symposium</strong><br />
explicitly justifies this position by making it clear that Socrates’ contest is with Agathon more than<br />
with any other participant. Right near the start we have Socrates’ ironic comparison of his wisdom<br />
with that of Agathon’s and then Agathon’s suggestion that Dionysus will soon decide their claims to<br />
wisdom (175e7-9). We are reminded of this towards the dialogue’s end when Alcibiades in the guise<br />
of Dionysus first crowns Agathon and then, upon seeing Socrates, crowns him as well (note that both<br />
are crowned). 4 Furthermore, if Socrates claims expertise in love (177d7-8), Eryximachus suggests that<br />
Socrates and Agathon are the two experts in love among the party (193e4-5). Now why would Plato<br />
set up this contest and this rivalry if he thought that Agathon was a mere airhead with nothing but<br />
1 “τὴν ψυχὴν ᾽Αγάθωνα φιλῶν ἐπὶ χείλεσιν ἔσχον. ἦλθε γὰρ ἡ τλήµων ὡς διαβησοµένη” This verse is attributed to Plato by<br />
Diogenes Laertius (3, 23, 32), among others. See final note of paper.<br />
2 Though acknowledging that “some valuable points are made”, Waterfield characterizes Agathon’s speech as “little more<br />
than a tour de force” (Plato: <strong>Symposium</strong> [Oxford University Press, 2009], xxiv) and concludes: “Underneath the pretty<br />
exterior lies a conventional encomium and a conventional view of Love, which reflects the god’s portraits we can find in<br />
paintings and in literature. It is therefore a perfect speech for Agathon the artist” (xxv). Note this damning last sentence on<br />
the ‘artist’. Such a judgment can be found already in Bury who judges the content of the speech purely conventional and<br />
suggests that nothing better describes it than the Pauline phrase: “Though he speaks with the tongues of men and of angels, ,<br />
he is become as sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal.” (R. G. Bury, The <strong>Symposium</strong> of Plato [Cambridge: W. Heffer and<br />
Sons, 1909]). Though one could multiply the examples of such a judgment ad nauseam, let us just add Luc Brisson’s<br />
description of the speech as “empty but magnificently constructed” (“Agathon, Pausanias, and Diotima in Plato’s<br />
<strong>Symposium</strong>; Paiderastia and Philosophia,” in Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong>: Issues in Interpretation and Reception, eds. Lesher, Nails,<br />
Sheffield [Harvard University Press, 2006], 245).<br />
3 Kenneth Dorter has argued that the speeches cannot form an ascent, but must instead be interpreted dialectically, on the<br />
basis of his unquestioned assumption that the speech of Agathon “even allowing for its humorous intent, can hardly be<br />
placed above (or even alongside of) the inspired myth of his predecessor Aristophanes” (“A Dual Dialectic in the<br />
<strong>Symposium</strong>,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 25, no. 3 [1992]: 253-254). Bury already made the same point in arguing that the<br />
thesis of an ascending order is made untenable by “the obvious fact that Agathon’s speech is in no real sense the best or most<br />
important of the series; rather, from the point of view of Socrates, it is the worst.” One exception to this tendency is David<br />
Sedley, “The Speech of Agathon in Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong>,” in The Virtuous Life in Greek Ethics, eds. Stella Haffmans &<br />
Burkhard Reis (Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 47-69. Defending what he calls the ‘crescendo’ interpretation of the<br />
speeches, Sedley interprets Agathon’s speech as being the one closest to Socrates’ own, even calling it ‘sub-Socratic’. As<br />
will be noted below, some of the observations Sedley makes in support of this reading coincide with the points made here,<br />
though some exception will be taken to his overall account of Agathon’s role in the dialogue and of his relation to Socrates.<br />
4 A point rightly emphasized by Steven Robinson, “The Contest of Wisdom between Socrates and Agathon in Plato’s<br />
<strong>Symposium</strong>,” Ancient Philosophy 24 (2004): 93. Robinson interprets this double-crowning as an indication of two sides of<br />
the worship of Dionysos: the public polis-cult, represented by Agathon with his dramatic victory at a Dionysian festival, and<br />
the private mystery-cult, represented by Socrates through his account of eros in the voice of Diotima and in the language of<br />
the mystery religions: see especially p. 87. Agathon and Socrates on this interpretation are both legitimated, the first as<br />
representing discourse that “is exoteric and public, and extends to all citizens, who all partake of it” and the second as<br />
representing discourse that “is esoteric and private, and extends only to those few citizens who are capable of meeting its<br />
very high demands, and who also participate in the public discourse” (98). But this interpretation, apart from its Straussian<br />
tendency of reducing all issues (in this case eros!) to the political one of exoteric versus esoteric discourse, appears to<br />
eliminate any real contest between Agathon and Socrates: if each has his own domain, what is the contest for?
Francisco J. Gonzalez<br />
pretty words to offer on the subject of love? Agathon and Socrates are the last to speak on the topic of<br />
eros because both are recognized to have the most to say on the topic and therefore to be the real<br />
contenders in the contest of praising eros.<br />
It might seem that Agathon, far from being any kind of expert, as a poet only panders to<br />
public opinion and therefore is not worthy of having anything he says taken seriously by Socrates.<br />
This is why the short conversation in which Socrates engages Agathon prior to Agathon’s speech is of<br />
much importance. Here, in response to Socrates’ suggestion that he cannot possibly be worried about<br />
the opinions of the few present at the party after having addressed a vast multitude in the theater,<br />
Agathon protests that he is not so ‘full of the theater’ (θεάτρου µεστόν, 194b7) as to ignore that we<br />
should esteem only the opinions of the wise and not those of the many (194b6-8). His plays may be<br />
‘crowd-pleasers’, but Agathon no less than Socrates values wisdom and expertise above popular<br />
opinion. Indeed, two surviving fragments of the work of the historical Agathon appear to express well<br />
Agathon’s view here and thus his kinship with Socrates: “No envy would there be in the life of men /<br />
If we were all constituted equal by nature” (fr. 24); “To envy wisdom more than wealth is noble” (fr.<br />
25).<br />
If we turn to Agathon’s speech itself, we see that far from being empty rhetoric and saying<br />
nothing true, it is a conceptually coherent and sophisticated speech that makes a number of important<br />
points for the first time with which Socrates will himself agree. Within the present time constraints I<br />
can only outline these contributions as follows.<br />
1) Agathon claims that we must distinguish between the nature of Love and what it effects or<br />
produces, criticizing previous speakers for neglecting the former (194e5-195a5). 5 Socrates<br />
will explicitly praise the soundness of this methodology and embrace it as his own.<br />
2) This methodological shift brings with it a shift in how the causality of love is understood.<br />
While previous speakers treated love as a verb only rather than as a subject, so that it is a<br />
property of people or things that ‘do’ the loving, Agathon makes love itself the subject and<br />
cause of loving. This shift in perspective is not only adopted by Socrates, but is essential to<br />
his entire argument. As David Sedley has shown (56-57), the argument by which Socrates<br />
tries to prove that love lacks beauty and goodness works at all only if the subject is<br />
understood to be not people who love but the love itself that causes them to love. Lovers can<br />
of course posses good and beautiful things and still be lovers, but the love itself that causes<br />
them to love must as desire for what is good and beautiful be utterly lacking in these<br />
properties. In other words, in loving I can myself possess good and beautiful things, but the<br />
love that causes me to desire good and beautiful things cannot itself in any way be good or<br />
beautiful. In this way, the very starting point of Socrates’ account of love would be<br />
impossible without the shift towards treating love as itself the cause and subject of loving<br />
brought about by Agathon.<br />
3) In addressing the nature of love, Agathon argues it to be happy because both beautiful and<br />
good. This identification of happiness with the possession of goodness and beauty will of<br />
course play a central role in Socrates’ speech (204e1-7). But Agathon is as conceptually<br />
careful here as he is in his opening distinction between the nature and the works of love:<br />
rather than simply conflating the properties of ‘beautiful’ and ‘good’, he argues for love’s<br />
possession of each in turn by further analyzing each property into a set of characteristics Love<br />
can be shown to possess.<br />
4) Love is shown to be beautiful by being shown to be young, delicate, supple and always in<br />
bloom. Though these may at first appear to be trivial characteristics that tell us nothing<br />
important about the nature of Love, Agathon’s argument in fact has him defending some<br />
important claims that imply a critical distance from the poetic tradition. Love must be young<br />
because the violent deeds the poets attribute to the gods at the beginning could not have been<br />
caused by love, but only by necessity. In Agathon’s view, poets like Homer and Parmenides<br />
have at the very least failed to make the important distinction between love and necessity, a<br />
distinction that Agathon will make again later in the speech to connect beauty and the good in<br />
their opposition to necessity. But here he suggests that the poets may not even be telling the<br />
truth in their attribution of violent deeds to the gods, since after citing their views, he adds: “If<br />
they spoke the truth” (195c2-3). 6<br />
5 This is presumably why Socrates engages only Agathon in discussion: the latter, unlike the others, has something to say<br />
about the nature of love. As Frisbee C. C. Sheffield observes, “If one must begin an investigation, as Socrates suggests, with<br />
an identification of the subject matter, then examining Agathon’s speech will be the best place to start” (Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong>:<br />
The Ethics of Desire [Oxford University Press, 2006], 35).<br />
6 Sedley has another reading of this passage that would make Agathon’s questioning of poetic authority even more direct.<br />
250
Francisco J. Gonzalez<br />
5) In defending the claim that Love is delicate, Agathon cites Homer, but in a strikingly clever<br />
and subversive way. Citing a passage in which Homer describes Delusion (Atê) as having<br />
delicate feet because she walks on the heads of men (195d4-5), Agathon first substitutes Love<br />
for Delusion, as if he were correcting the poet for confusing the two just as he confused love<br />
with necessity. In another important correction, he then claims that Love has delicate feet not<br />
because it walks on men’s heads: after all, heads are not really soft! Instead, love makes its<br />
home in what is truly soft: the souls and characters of men and gods (195e4-7). Agathon thus<br />
uses a rather trivial anthropomorphism in a rather subversive way in order to locate love in<br />
the soul, as Socrates himself will do.<br />
6) Turning to the argument that Love is not only beautiful but good, he analyzes the latter into<br />
the virtues of justice, moderation, bravery and wisdom (196b5-197b3), an analysis that can be<br />
claimed to be distinctly Platonic. 7 Agathon then discusses each virtue one by one, defending<br />
in each case its attribution to Love. 8 There has been much indignation at the weakness of<br />
Agathon’s arguments. Is love really temperate because it is a desire stronger than, and thus<br />
able to control, other desires? Is it courageous because the god of love is stronger than the god<br />
of war? But not sufficient importance has been given to the fact that, weak as they are,<br />
Agathon still gives arguments. Can that be said of any of the preceding speeches? Even<br />
Socrates’ speech, put into the mouth of a priestess, has been judged, in its more positive part,<br />
as rather lacking in the argument department. Furthermore, Agathon acknowledges, as we<br />
will see, that there is some playfulness mixed in with seriousness in his speech. Can a<br />
Platonist condemn that? Most importantly, Agathon’s arguments, however playfully<br />
presented, are not as absurd as they are often taken to be. When scholars, for example, find<br />
ridiculous the argument that eros is temperate because it is a desire stronger than, and<br />
therefore capable of controlling, other desires, one must ask why they don’t find the same<br />
view ridiculous when defended by Socrates. Have they forgotten that the opposition between<br />
temperance and erotic desire in Lysias’ speech and Socrates’ first speech in the Phaedrus is<br />
explicitly rejected in Socrates’ second speech where true temperance (256b1-2, as distinct<br />
from the contemptible purely ‘mortal’ temperance, 256e5) is achieved through erotic desire?<br />
Have they forgotten that in the <strong>Symposium</strong> itself Socrates describes true virtue as being the<br />
product of the erotic desire for beauty? In arguing that temperance, rather than involving an<br />
opposition to all desire, is rather the ruling of lower desires by a higher desire for a higher<br />
object, Agathon is defending a sophisticated and distinctly Platonic conception of temperance.<br />
7) Among the virtues, Agathon significantly devotes the greatest amount of space to the wisdom<br />
of love (196d5-197b9). 9 Though Agathon here characterizes love as being a poet like himself,<br />
Sedley suggests that we understand 195c1-3 as follows: “and the ancient goings-on concerning the gods, of which Homer<br />
and Parmenides speak, were due to Necessity, not to Love, if they were speaking the truth”<br />
(67-68). On this reading, Agathon is agreeing with Phaedrus that Homer and Parmenides made Love rather than Necessity<br />
rule during the time of castrations, etc., and is claiming that the poets were wrong. Agathon is in this case, as Sedley notes,<br />
simply “rejecting their authority” (69). Yet Sedley thereby makes Agathon in another respect more conservative as he has<br />
him not question that the immortal happenings concerning the gods did occur (only their attribution to Love), whereas on the<br />
other reading (“if they spoke the truth,” i.e., about the ancient goings-on) Agathon at least doubts this. The traditional<br />
reading is in my view better in that it has Agathon implicitly rejecting one view of the poets (that Love existed at the time of<br />
the ancient immoral happenings) and explicitly bringing into question another (that such immoral happenings concerning the<br />
gods ever even took place).<br />
7 See the interpretation of this part of Agathon’s speech in Ficino, In Convivium V.8. Citing Adam’s observation that the<br />
identification of good character with just these four virtues appears to be new with Plato, Bury rather absurdly counters that<br />
“a peculiarly Platonic tenet would hardly be put into the mouth of Agathon”! See also C. J. Rowe, Plato: <strong>Symposium</strong><br />
(Oxford: Aris & Phillips, 1998), p. 164, who insists that there is nothing Platonic about the virtues Agathon describes. On the<br />
other end of the interpretative spectrum we have Sedley who judges that here “Agathon . . . is speaking with a sufficiently<br />
Socratic (or Platonic) voice for it to be worth tracking his ideas and seeing what will become of them in the hands of<br />
Socrates himself” (59). Specifically, Sedley sees the serious content running through Agathon’s account of the virtues as<br />
lying in the notion that virtue is a matter of non-coercive control, a notion that “has obvious enough resonances with the<br />
theory of virtue, in both city and soul, developed . . . in Republic 4” (59).<br />
8 Agathon’s claim that love is just because it commits no violence is described by Dover as “a somewhat reckless statement,<br />
considering the importance of eros as a motive of violence and fraud in myth, history and everyday life” (127). But then<br />
would not Socrates’ account of love also need to be judged ‘reckless’ for the same reason? One surviving fragment (though<br />
of uncertain attribution) might show that Agathon was well aware of the darker side of love: “Should I judge you hubris or<br />
Cypris? Desire or distress of the heart?“ (fr. 31). The important point is that all the speakers are engaged in the explicit<br />
project of defending love against its more negative depiction in earlier literature.<br />
9 Surviving fragments show Agathon to have been, as he is here, especially concerned with the notion of technê (see frs. 6, 8,<br />
& 20). Socrates’ own tendency to compare with technê the kind of wisdom that constitutes virtue is notorious. Sedley, noting<br />
the importance of Agathon’s emphasis on wisdom, comments that nevertheless “Agathon’s view of wisdom (sophia, the goal<br />
of philosophy) is a deeply unphilosophical one, and the same may be said of his treatment of virtue in general” (62).<br />
Agathon of course does not include philosophy in his treatment of wisdom, but to consider this a defect is to assume that<br />
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he does so in the context of describing love as a ‘poet’ in the broadest sense possible that<br />
includes not only all artistic production, but also all natural and technical production. Love’s<br />
wisdom is an ability to produce or create in general. This is another idea that will be taken up<br />
by Socrates with his characterization of love as giving birth and with the suggestion that<br />
poetry like love has both a broader and a narrower meaning (205b8-c10). 10<br />
8) In the context of claiming that the gods associated with different arts discovered these arts<br />
through the power of love, Agathon returns to the idea that what reigned at the beginning, if<br />
the stories of the poets are to be believed, was not love, but necessity (197b7). 11 But this idea<br />
now enables him to connect the notions of beauty and goodness that have until now been<br />
distinct. Agathon first claims that the love that ended the disputes between the gods and<br />
inspired the different arts was the love of beauty (197b5). In thus treating beauty as the object<br />
of love, Agathon is of course introducing the idea that will prove absolutely central to<br />
Socrates’ own account; in later critiquing the ambiguity in Agathon’s formulation, Socrates is<br />
also acknowledging a debt. But Agathon goes even further: he proceeds to conclude that it is<br />
the love of beauty that brings what is good to both men and gods (ἐκ τοῦ ἐρᾶν τῶν καλῶν<br />
πάντ᾽ἀγαθὰ γέγονεν καὶ θεοῖς καὶ ἀνθρώποις, 197b8-9). Beauty, if distinct from the good, is<br />
still a cause for good. Again, the anticipation of Socrates is impossible to ignore, especially<br />
since for Agathon too it is apparently through providing wisdom that the love of beauty is a<br />
cause of good.<br />
9) Finally, the speech concludes with a poetic peroration that is clearly distinguished from the<br />
rest of the speech in form, as it exhibits the rhythms and alliteration of verse, 12 and adds<br />
nothing to its content, as it only recaps the main conclusions. Poet he may be, but Agathon<br />
still knows the difference between argument, however playfully expressed, and poetic<br />
flourish.<br />
Agathon’s speech is thus rigorously organized according to important conceptual distinctions:<br />
between the nature of Love and its effects, between beauty and goodness as the two components of<br />
Love’s happiness, between the different characteristics that comprise beauty and the good<br />
respectively, between the analysis itself and a poetic peroration that only recaps the conclusions of the<br />
analysis in verse. Furthermore, if we consider all of the anticipations of key points in Socrates’ own<br />
speech outlined here, it seems impossible to deny that the contributions of Agathon’s speech far outdo<br />
in importance the contributions of all the other speeches. 13<br />
But why, then, does Socrates dismiss the speech as mere pretty rhetoric with no truth content?<br />
One puzzle in Socrates’ reaction to the speech is indeed just how unfair it is. While Agathon’s speech<br />
does contain some pretty Gorgianic rhetoric, especially in its last part, it also contains, as we have<br />
seen, much more than that. Most importantly, Agathon is quite aware of the distinction between this<br />
kind of rhetoric and the attempt to say the truth about love since he concludes with these words: “Let<br />
this, Phaedrus, be my account dedicated to the gods, partly partaking of play, partly of measured<br />
seriousness, to the extent of my ability ” (τὰ µὲν παιδιᾶς, τὰ δὲ σπουδῆς µετρίας . . . µετέχων, 197e).<br />
Here Agathon acknowledges the playfulness of his speech, playfulness that would presumably include<br />
Socrates has already won the contest as well as to assume that the nature of philosophy and its relation to other forms of<br />
knowledge is something perfectly clear.<br />
10 See Michael C. Stokes, Plato’s Socratic Conversations: Drama and Dialectic in Three Dialogues (The Johns Hopkins<br />
University Press, 1986), pp. 156-157. Sedley also stresses the way in which Agathon’s connection of love with poeisis and<br />
his broadening of the sense of both terms anticipates Diotima (60-61), even suggesting that “Diotima is formally theorizing<br />
what Agathon has already done de facto” (61).<br />
11 Much is made of this distinction by Ficino, In Convivium V.11. In a surviving fragment of Agathon we find technê, here<br />
associated with love; explicitly opposed to both necessity and chance (fr. 8).<br />
12 Kenneth Dover notes that “In the peroration (197d1-e5) nearly all the thirty-one members (or ‘cola’) into which the<br />
passage can be articulated by attention to the phrasing indicated by the sense are recognisable, once normal rules of Attic<br />
prosody, elision, crasis, etc., have been applied, as metrical units familiar in Greek lyric poetry” (Plato: <strong>Symposium</strong><br />
[Cambridge University Press, 1980], 124).<br />
13 After outlining Socrates’ refutation of Agathon, Sheffield rightly notes: “But this is not the say that Agathon’s speech is<br />
nonsense. Socrates goes on to show that Agathon is right that Eros has some relationship both to beauty and to divinity; he is<br />
muddled about the precise nature of those relationships. This is a muddle to which Socrates himself, apparently, was subject,<br />
before he met the mysterious Diotima (201e3-7)” (36). Dover, despite expressing ‘our’ annoyance at Agathon’s “verbal<br />
sophistries or his apparent inability to draw distinctions which, if drawn, would profoundly affect his generalizations’ and<br />
claiming that the speech “is appropriate to a man whose business in life is the manipulation of language”, must nevertheless<br />
concede: “In so far as it subsumes under eros all kinds of desire for τὰ καλά (197b8) and seems to attribute to this desire all<br />
good in the life of gods and men, it may be regarded as expressing, although in ways which make it immediately vulnerable<br />
to systematic criticism, some degree of ‘right opinion’ . . . on the role of Eros as Diotima sees it” (123). Given that Diotima<br />
assigns ‘right opinion’ to that same intermediate position occupied by Eros and by the philosopher, this is actually high<br />
praise.<br />
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the play with words and sounds, the mischievously subversive use of the poets, the more blatantly<br />
sophistical argumentation (e.g., Love is courageous because Aphrodite is stronger than Ares!), and the<br />
flights of poetic fancy, especially in the entire concluding section: precisely the kind of playfulness, in<br />
other words, that readers of Plato find in his own dialogues! Yet Agathon also claims a measure of<br />
seriousness and with ample justification, as we have seen. 14 What, then, is Socrates’ reaction?<br />
Unbelievably he says: “I didn’t find the rest quite so wonderful, but who would not be enchanted in<br />
hearing the ending with its beauty of language?” (τὰ µὲν ἄλλα οὐχ όµοίως µὲν θαυµαστἀ, τὸ δὲ ἐπὶ<br />
τελευτῆς τοῦ κὰλλους τῶν ὀνοµάτων καὶ ῥηµάτων τις οὐκ ἂν ἐξεπλάγη ἀκούων, 198b). Socrates thus<br />
chooses to ignore the serious content of the speech and focus only on the beautiful language<br />
concentrated in its conclusion! This unfair focus should give us some pause before simply accepting<br />
the critique that follows. 15 Indeed, we should remember that Socrates is in a contest with Agathon,<br />
which means that he naturally seeks to belittle the contribution of his rival.<br />
The upshot of Socrates’ critique is that Agathon’s is a beautiful speech, but lacks truth (see<br />
198e2, 199a7, b3). This is indeed a puzzling critique in a number of ways. First, as we have seen,<br />
there is much in Agathon’s speech that Socrates himself will acknowledge as ‘true’ in his own speech.<br />
Therefore, as we have seen, Socrates can make this critique only by initially ignoring the serious<br />
content of Agathon’s speech and focusing on the poetic peroration. Secondly, Socrates targets with<br />
his critique not Agathon in particular, but all of the preceding speeches. 16 He claims that none of them<br />
understood an encomium as required to tell the truth, but thought it sufficient to say anything to<br />
magnify the subject, whether true or false (198d7-e2) Thirdly, when after this general condemnation<br />
he turns to Agathon’s speech in particular, the first thing he does is praise as correct the organizing<br />
principle of Agathon’s speech: i.e., that we need to exhibit the nature of Eros before exhibiting its<br />
effects (199c3-5), a principle reiterated at the start of Socrates’ own speech (201d8-e2). 17 Fourthly,<br />
the question to Agathon with which Socrates begins his elenchus is formulated thus: “Come, since<br />
you have so beautifully and magnificently (καλῶς καὶ µεγαλοπρεπῶς) expounded in other respects<br />
what Love is, tell me this about it: is Love such as to be the love of something or of nothing?” (199c6d2).<br />
Finally, while Socrates indeed goes on to refute a central contention of Agathon’s speech, i.e.,<br />
that Love is itself beautiful and good, he claims at the start of his own speech that he once believed<br />
exactly what Agathon believes (201e3-5). 18 There is no reason to dismiss this as mere politeness;<br />
Socrates has not shown himself elsewhere in the dialogue to be very concerned with politeness!<br />
Rather, if he engages Agathon in discussion, this is because he recognizes in Agathon a serious<br />
position that he himself once held. It is hard to avoid the conclusion: if all of the speeches failed to<br />
speak the truth about Love, Agathon’s speech in Socrates’ view came the closest and is most<br />
deserving of serious discussion. 19 Of course, this means that Socrates’s judgment disagrees with the<br />
14 Elizabeth S. Belfiore finds in this statement “a self-awareness shared by none of the other five speakers” (Socrates’<br />
Daimonic Art: Love for Wisdom in Four Platonic Dialogues [Cambridge University Press, 2012], 137) and therefore an<br />
indication that Agathon’s amathia “is less serious than that of the other speakers” (136). Bruno Centrone notes that this<br />
mixture of seriousness and play is what characterizes the true art of writing in the Phaedrus 276bff. (Platone: Simposio,<br />
trans. Matteo Nucci [Turin,: Einaudi, 2009], xxv), a connection also made by Heidegger in a seminar on the Phaedrus he<br />
gave in the summer of 1932 (Seminare: Platon – Aristoteles – Augustinus, Gesamtausgabe 83 [Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio<br />
Klostermann, 2012], p. 143). Rowe rightly observes that with this comment Agathon distinguishes himself from Gorgias (in<br />
a way, I would add, that Socrates deliberately ignores!): while Gorgias characterized his Encomium of Helen as mere play<br />
(paignion, fr. 11. 21), Agathon insists on the at least partial or moderate seriousness of his own speech (p. 166). Rowe<br />
nevertheless is himself unable to find any seriousness in Agathon’s speech: “It is not clear where exactly the seriousness of<br />
Agathon’s speech is supposed to lie; but then P. clearly wishes to leave us with a picture of someone who has a distinctly<br />
uncertain relationship with anything resembling the truth” (166).<br />
15 Matteo Nucci appears to consider Socrates’ response justified here, seeing him as highlighting the peroration “come se<br />
fosse l’unica cosa di cui è veramente capace il poeta, visto anche che invece le argumentazioni sono deboli, capziose,<br />
inconsistenti” (Platone: Simposio [Turin: Einaudi, 2009], p. 115, n. 189). But this is why it is important to show, as I attempt<br />
to do here, that the ‘serious’ part of Agathon’s speech is not so weak, empty and therefore ignorable as Nucci and others take<br />
it to be.<br />
16 Though Rowe insists that Agathon is the main target: p. 167.<br />
17 This is not to deny that the principle undergoes some modification in Socrates’ adoption of it. As Sedley has argued (52-<br />
54), Agathon’s starting point is an account of what love is like (οἷός ἐστιν, 195a4) that takes the form of a description of the<br />
qualities that make love good and beautiful, rather than an account of what love is, i.e., its essential nature, which is<br />
Socrates’ own starting point. Sedley accordingly concludes that “Agathon’s method is not yet fully Socratic” (54).<br />
18 And Agathon’s view, after all, is not so obviously ridiculous or false. As Allen notes, “Agathon, if he is mistaken in<br />
describing Eros as beautiful, is surely not making a linguistic mistake: not only the object of desire, but the person desiring<br />
could be characterized as καλός, as Phaedrus and Pausanias make clear. Indeed, desire itself, and specifically erotic desire,<br />
could be so characterized” (p. 44, n. 69).<br />
19 As Bruno Centrone suggests, “il suo discorso sembra contenere molti spunti accettabili nell’ottica di Platone; ma forse<br />
proprio per questo sarà anche quello attaccato piú direttamente nei suoi fondamenti” (p. xxii). Stokes has sought to show<br />
how Socrates’ critique of Agathon genuinely engages with the content of Agathon’s speech, so that “Agathon sheds the<br />
foolish weakness he is often saddled with, just as Socrates sheds his overbearing rhetoric. This passage, at least, can now be<br />
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prevailing view in scholarship on the dialogue that tends to consider Agathon’s speech the most<br />
vacuous and least worthy of serious discussion among all the speeches.<br />
Yet presumably one reason why Agathon’s speech has not been taken more seriously is<br />
Socrates’ repeated description of the speech as ‘beautiful’, reflecting Agathon’s own extraordinary<br />
beauty, 20 and the assumption that beauty is something superficial having little to do with truth. One of<br />
the central points of similarity, however, between Socrates and Agathon is to be found in their<br />
understandings of the relation between beauty and goodness. Both neither completely identify the two<br />
terms nor see them as separable. Central to Socrates’ own speech is Diotima’s substitution of ‘good’<br />
for ‘beautiful’ in order to arrive at the conclusion that what we seek from the possession of beautiful<br />
things is happiness (204d-e). At the same time, this substitution does not appear to presuppose a<br />
simple identity given the different roles assigned to the beautiful and the good in the higher mysteries:<br />
what the lover pursues, both in its different manifestations and in itself, is beauty and not the good,<br />
while the good, in the form of true virtue, is what the lover gives birth to through intercourse with<br />
beauty. 21 The relation is thus neither a simple identity nor a sharp distinction. Socrates therefore would<br />
hardly be justified in dismissing the beauty of Agathon’s speech, and indeed Agathon’s own beauty<br />
and the beauty of love on his account, as mere beauty, as something superficial having no necessary<br />
connection to goodness. At the very least, this beauty of Agathon’s is something that could lead us to<br />
the good.<br />
It is significant that immediately after calling Agathon’s speech beautiful (καλῶς γε εἶπες),<br />
Socrates’ asks him if anything good is not also beautiful (τἀγαθὰ οὐκ καὶ καλὰ δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι, 201c).<br />
Some, such as Waterfield (p.84), have taken this to imply that the contrary is not true, i.e., that not<br />
everything beautiful is good, and have seen here an implicit critique of Agathon. But since what<br />
Socrates seeks to establish here is that to be deprived of beautiful things is to be deprived of good<br />
things, an opposition of the beautiful to the good (i.e., the suggestion that some beautiful things are<br />
bad) is not even implied. Even in his critique of Agathon’s rhetoric, Socrates does not oppose beauty<br />
and truth, but rather suggests that they go together: a good encomium is one that chooses the most<br />
beautiful truths (198d3-6). 22 Thus there is nothing to suggest that Socrates sees the relation between<br />
beauty and goodness or truth as a discordant one, not even in the sense of the ‘felicitous discordance’<br />
described by Heidegger in his Nietzsche lectures. It is hard to see, then, how Socrates could join so<br />
many modern commentators in dismissing Agathon and his speech as ‘merely’ beautiful.<br />
As for Agathon himself, he surely is not guilty of simply reducing goodness to beauty. As we<br />
have seen, his speech clearly distinguishes between the two: he first sets out to show how Eros is<br />
κάλλιστος (195a8-196b5) and then how it is ἄριστος (196b5-197b10). 23 As we have also seen,<br />
however, Agathon relates the two characteristics, seeing the love of beauty as a means to acquiring<br />
what is good, as it is in the highest mysteries of Diotima’s account. 24 Thus Agathon’s understanding<br />
of the relation between the good and the beautiful appears no different from Socrates’ own.<br />
Furthermore, far from sacrificing truth to beauty, Agathon questions the veracity of the poets 25 and<br />
carefully distinguishes between the more serious and the more playful aspects of his own speech.<br />
One must therefore suspect that the reason for the contest between Agathon and Socrates and<br />
for Socrates’ unfair critique of Agathon’s speech is that the beauty cultivated and promoted by the<br />
poet is not so easy to separate from the goodness pursued by the philosopher. The beautiful Agathon<br />
is not so indifferent to goodness and truth as Socrates pretends and Socrates is not so indifferent to<br />
beauty as he sometimes pretends. In the words of the Philebus, after all, in the nature of beauty lies<br />
read as a dialogue” (145).<br />
20 Considering all the surviving testimony, Pierre Lèvêque concludes: “Éclatante beauté, telle est donc l’impression<br />
qu’Agathon produisit sur tous ses contemporains” (Agathon [Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1955], 36).<br />
21 See Stokes, pp. 154-155 and 181. As he notes with regard to Diotima’s ‘higher mysteries’, the desire for immortality “is<br />
not a desire directly to possess the beautiful so much as to procreate offspring in the beautiful. It is, however, the desire for<br />
what is good. The functions of the good and of the beautiful in the argument and its exposition are quite different” (181). See<br />
also Sedley who denies that the good and the beautiful are ever identical in Plato’s dialogues (p. 49, n. 4).<br />
22 As Nucci notes, commenting on this passage: “La bellezza seque la verità ma le dà anche luce” (117, n. 194).<br />
23 This is a point noted by Steven Berg: “Agathon is thus the first speaker since Phaedrus to distinguish the beautiful and the<br />
good and he makes explicit what Phaedrus left implicit” (Eros and the Intoxications of Enlightenment: on Plato’s<br />
<strong>Symposium</strong> [SUNY 2010], 77). Yet Berg claims that Agathon goes on to conflate the two in attributing the power to effect<br />
good to eros as a poet, i.e., as a maker of images: “What Agathon shows, then, is that the beautiful is an image in speech of<br />
the good that speciously appropriates to itself the being of the good. Agathon’s entire speech is just such an image. His<br />
claim, then, that wisdom is the good is the beautiful masquerading as the good. His god Eros in the wisdom of his making is<br />
the unreal unity of the beautiful and the good” (88). This critique I address below.<br />
24 See Stokes, pp. 125-126, who claims that Agathon is trying to have things both ways. But isn’t Socrates as well?<br />
25 Rowe, instead of seeing here evidence of a concern for truth on Agathon’s part, cannot restrain himself from the slander:<br />
“whether Agathon has any interest at all in ‘truth’ must be at best an open question (cf. S. at 198d—e)” (163).<br />
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the power of the good (νῦν δὴ καταπέφευγεν ἡµῖν ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ δύναµις εἰς τὴν τοῦ καλλοῦ φύσιν,<br />
64e5-6). 26<br />
One might of course be tempted to identify Agathon with the mere appearance of the good<br />
while identifying Socrates with its reality, 27 just as one might be tempted to identify poetry with mere<br />
imitation and philosophy with an unmediated grasp of the truth. 28 There can be no doubt that<br />
Agathon’s speech shows him to be an imitator par excellence, as it literally depicts love in his own<br />
image. Furthermore, this is the characteristic of Agathon that is emphasized in his portrayal by<br />
Aristophanes in the Themsmophorizusae. There, in the context of explaining why he is dressed as a<br />
woman, Agathon argues that the poet must himself be beautiful in order to compose beautiful plays,<br />
since “one necessarily composes things like one’s nature [ὄµοια γὰρ ποιεῖν ὰνὰγκη τῂ φύσει]” (167).<br />
This is a principle both explicitly articulated in Agathon’s speech in the <strong>Symposium</strong> when he cites<br />
with approval the old saying that like is drawn to like (ὅµοιον ὁµοίῳ ἀεὶ πελάζει, 195b5) and put to<br />
work there, since both the beauty of the speech itself and the beauty it attributes to love are only<br />
reflections of Agathon’s own beauty. But if we return to Aristophanes’ play, Agathon there is made to<br />
express the view that imitation is not simply the result of being good or beautiful, but can itself be that<br />
by which we become good and beautiful. In claiming that the poet must become like his characters,<br />
Agathon explains that “mimêsis can provide us with the things we do not possess [ἃ δ᾽οὐ κεκτήµεθα,<br />
µίµησις ἤδη ταῦτα συνθηρεὐεται], 155-156). 29 It is thus possible that in imitating the beauty and<br />
goodness of love Agathon seeks not only to reflect what he takes to be his own nature, but also further<br />
to become himself good and beautiful. Here it is worth noting that Socrates describes the young<br />
Agathon in the Protagoras as being not only beautiful in appearance, but as having a beautiful and<br />
good nature (καλόν τε κἀγαθον τήν φύσιν, τῆν δ᾽οὖν ἰδέαν πάνυ καλός, 315d). Furthermore, it would<br />
be wrong to identify Agathon with the poetic tradition Plato otherwise criticizes. For one thing, as we<br />
have already noted, Agathon, unlike the other speakers, treats his poetic sources critically. 30 This<br />
should not surprise us since Agathon’s distinction as a tragedian was to invent his own plots rather<br />
than imitate the traditional stories told by the poets. 31 And Agathon’s theatre, from what we know of<br />
it, could be judged to be especially philosophical in character. 32<br />
26 Commenting on the distinction between beauty and the good in Agathon’s speech, Ficino concludes: “bonitatis florem<br />
quemdam esse pulchritudinem volumus” (V.1.40). But for Ficino there are two senses to this analogy: beauty is the flower of<br />
the good not only in the sense that it is the outward manifestation of inner goodness, but also in the sense that, as the flower<br />
carries the seed from which other flowers will grow, beauty leads us to the good: “ut flores arborum seminibus orti semina<br />
ipsi quoque producunt, its spetiem hanc bonitatis florem, ut ex bono pululat, eic et ad bonum amantes producere” (V.1.40).<br />
27 Thus Allen, though showing the many ways in which Agathon’s speech anticipates Socrates’, concludes: “Both speeches<br />
are rhetorical. But Agathon’s rhetoric deals with appearance, as Socrates’ examination of it will show, and Diotima’s with<br />
reality” (R. E. Allen, translation and commentary, The Dialogues of Plato, Volume II: The <strong>Symposium</strong> [New Haven: Yale<br />
University Press, 1991], p. 40). Likewise, Sedley, while emphasizing the Socratic content of Agathon’s speech, in the end<br />
sees in Agathon nothing but “a pale ghost of the Platonic truth” and “mere ‘images’ of the philosophical understanding in<br />
which real virtue resides” (65). If Sedley acknowledges that of the speeches Agathon’s comes closest to the Platonic<br />
position, this ‘closest’ is still in his view immeasurably far. There can be no doubt that what Agathon provides is in some<br />
sense an image, but to assume that such an image is to be disparaged and rejected by the philosopher is to assume that the<br />
philosopher is capable of an unmediated access to the truth. Diotima of course describes such an ideal, but to believe that<br />
Socrates or any other philosopher could fully attain it, as Sedley apparently does (see p. 65), is to ignore the context of<br />
Diotima’s teaching and thus to misread the dialogue as a whole. For my own reading of the dialogue on this point, see “Il<br />
bello nel Simposio: sogno o visione?”, Méthexis XXV (2012): 51-70.<br />
28 “Agathon as sophist is an image of Socrates the philosopher and his imitation of mind as wisdom finds its original in<br />
Socrates’ knowledge of ignorance. Agathon, however, is a sophist who makes the unique claim that Eros is the core of his<br />
wisdom and its power. He is a peculiarly Socratic false image of Socrates whose sole expertise is erotics” (Berg, 89).<br />
29 Lèvêque sees here “une évolution dans la conception de l’artiste: il n’est plus le créateur d’une oeuvre qui exprime avec<br />
une nécessité intime sa nature profonde; il devient un acteur qui veut produire une impression et se prête, pour atteindre son<br />
but, à toutes les transformations de son être. A la place de la φύσις nait la τέχνη, ‘à la place de l’inspiration qui contraint, la<br />
rhétorique préméditée” (125).<br />
30 See Belfiore, 136.<br />
31 “Nevertheless even in tragedy there are some plays with but one or two known names in them, the rest being inventions;<br />
and there are some without a single known name, e. g. Agathon’s Antheus, in which both incidents and names are of the<br />
poet’s invention, and it is no less delightful on that account” (Aristotle, Poetics 6, 1451b19-24). Lèvêque argues that this was<br />
the play with which Agathon achieved the victory being celebrated in the <strong>Symposium</strong> (55). One piece of evidence he offers<br />
is the use of forms of the word for ‘flower’ (ἄνθος) at 196a8-b2, which can be plausibly taken as an allusion to the title of the<br />
tragedy (56; see also 111). Apart from its having an original plot, nothing is known about what this plot was; even the title<br />
Flower has been disputed (see Lèvêque, pp. 105-114). From the other titles that have been preserved, it is clear that Agathon<br />
most often was faithful to the old classical subjects. But he was also an innovator with regard to the musical dimension of<br />
tragedy and this in two respects: he reduced the choruses to mere intermezzi with no necessary connection to the plot and he<br />
introduced chromaticism, where “le chromatique permettait au poète d’exprimer toutes les nuances des sentiments et des<br />
passions” (151). As Lèvêque concludes, “C’est donc avant tout comme un novateur que se présente Agathon . . .” (153).<br />
32 As Lèvêque notes, “nous retrouvons dans la tragédie d’Agathon cette même attitude réflexive, ce même besoin de<br />
connaître l’homme et le monde, cette même curiosité inlassable de l’esprit, ce même effort d’analyse s’appliquant à la<br />
255
Francisco J. Gonzalez<br />
If we are tempted to think that Socrates has nothing to do with the imitation practiced by<br />
Agathon, we should first recall that Socrates goes to Agathon’s party all dressed up because, he<br />
explains, Agathon is beautiful and he must go to him looking beautiful (οὕτω καλὸς γεγενηµένος,<br />
174a5). But then just a few lines later he alters a proverb to describe himself and Aristodemus as good<br />
men going unbidden to the feast of the good (174b4-5). So it is Socrates himself who is here not<br />
distinguishing between beauty and goodness, is ascribing both to Agathon, and is understanding our<br />
relation to both as one of imitation. Furthermore, if we are inclined to criticize Agathon for describing<br />
love in his own image, asserting that he thereby misses the truth about love, we should recall that<br />
Socrates does the same thing in describing love as ugly, barefoot and poor! (Not to mention that fact<br />
that, like Agathon in the Thesmophorizusae, Socrates gives his speech in the guise of a woman!)<br />
Finally, Agathon’s claim in Aristophanes’ play could be made Socrates’ own: we become what we<br />
imitate and therefore the solution to not possessing goodness and beauty is to imitate them.<br />
It is here, however, that we can begin to perceive where the real difference between Socrates<br />
and Agathon lies. If Agathon tends to think that he is what he imitates, that he possesses what he<br />
loves, Socrates interprets all imitation as desire and all desire as lack. Agathon the poet is satisfied<br />
with images because he fails to see the great gulf that separates the image from the original. This is<br />
why Agathon’s wisdom is manifest and bright (λαµπρά), while Socrates’ is “ambiguous like a dream”<br />
(ἀµφισβητήσιµος ὡς ὄναρ, 175e3-4). Because he in contrast recognizes this gulf, Socrates can at least<br />
envisage, through the eyes of the priestess Diotima, a beauty that is no longer an image and the<br />
contact with which will give birth to goodness that is no longer an image (212a4-6). But if Socratic<br />
eros recognizes the deficiency of images and is directed beyond them, that need not make it any less<br />
enamored of images. On Socrates’ account, it is only through beautiful images—and this includes<br />
beautiful bodies—that we can access, if at all, the good. That Socrates critiques Agathon and the<br />
beautiful images he represents, that he wishes to go beyond him, in no way shows that he does not<br />
remain attracted to him.<br />
Agathon, we must note, is indeed attractive for more than his physical beauty. Not only does<br />
the serious content of his speech show him to possess at least an approximation of the wisdom<br />
Socrates himself seeks, but he also recognizes that he can at best offer a ‘measure’ of the truth<br />
according to the limits of his abilities. This is reflected in the perfect graciousness with which he<br />
meets what can only be described as extremely rude behavior on the part of Socrates and in his<br />
acceptance of his refutation with an open acknowledgement of his ignorance rather than with anger or<br />
evasion. 33 Agathon is indeed one of the very few good interlocutors in Plato’s dialogues and we<br />
should not forget that he is in the current dialogue the only person Socrates chooses to engage in<br />
conversation. If in comparison to Alcibiades he lacks a sufficiently passionate nature and does not<br />
experience fully the pain of shame regarding his deficiencies, this makes him less of a lover but not<br />
less of a beloved. 34<br />
This is made clear at the dialogue’s end when Socrates expresses his desire that Agathon sit<br />
next to him so that he can praise him as Alcibiades praised Socrates: Socrates even claims that “I’m<br />
really desirous of praising him” (πάνυ ἐπιθυµῶ αὐτὸν ἐγκωµιάσαι, 223a2). While on the usual<br />
assessment of Agathon and his speech, Socrates’ desire here must come as a surprise (though not for<br />
long, as commentators always have ready to hand the convenient device of dismissing surprising<br />
claims as being only ‘ironic’), there is nothing surprising about it on the current reading. After having<br />
critiqued Agathon and his earlier self for not conceiving of love as a lover (204c1-3), Socrates is eager<br />
to praise Agathon as the embodiment of the good and beautiful qualities that belong to the beloved.<br />
Socrates indeed twice in the dialogue addresses Agathon as ‘beloved’ (201c9, 222d5). After<br />
Alcibiades’ speech praising Socrates the lover as if he were the beloved and as if he possessed a<br />
wisdom he disavows, Socrates is eager to counter by assuming the role of lover again in praising<br />
someone who, having misunderstood what it means to be a lover, can still be an object of love.<br />
The dramatic action is significant here. At first Alcibiades tries to come between Socrates and<br />
Agathon, but only to witness what he describes as Socrates’ resourcefulness in getting Agathon to sit<br />
totalité du réel,. Son théâtre est un théâtre raisonneur, et même philosophique et, comme tel, rapelle de près celui d’Euripide”<br />
(116-117).<br />
33 Lèvêque does not neglect to emphasize the goodness of Agathon: his graciousness, hospitality, solicitude towards his<br />
many friends, but also his courage in publically defending the politician Antiphon at a very sensitive and dangerous time (for<br />
details, see 46-47).<br />
34 “On the other hand, the fact that Agathon responds so mildly, without expressing passion or conflict, suggests that he<br />
shares less than does Alcibiades in the ‘philosophical madness and Bacchic frenzy’ that, according to Alcibiades,<br />
characterizes a philosopher (218b3-4) who is a passionate lover of wisdom. Agathon is portrayed throughout not as a lover,<br />
but as a beloved” (184). Lèvêque in stressing the similarities between Agathon and Alcibiades (78-79), ignores the important<br />
differences in character.<br />
256
Francisco J. Gonzalez<br />
next to him (223a8-9): a description that clearly echoes Diotima’s description of love’s<br />
resourcefulness as explained by its mother Poverty lying down with its father Resource (203b7-c1).<br />
But in the end it is the sudden arrival of drunken revelers that comes between Socrates and Agathon<br />
(223b2-6). Is it too much to hear the suggestion here that Alcibiades and the drunken revelers come<br />
between Socrates and the good he desires, or at least its beautiful image?35 We can assume, of<br />
course, that Socrates’ praise of Agathon, like Alcibiades’ praise of Socrates, would have been mixed<br />
with critique, and this for the simple reason that it would have been a praise of the good and therefore<br />
implicitly a critique of the eponymous person who is only a deficient if beautiful appearance of the<br />
good. Yet Socrates knows perfectly well that the pursuit of the good cannot dispense with beautiful<br />
images, however deficient.<br />
Even the disorder that puts an end to the speeches and prevents Socrates from praising<br />
Agathon cannot stand in the way of Socrates’s passion for dialogue. And who is the last one to stay<br />
awake in discussion with Socrates but Agathon? Even if Socrates is trying to persuade both Agathon<br />
and Aristophanes that their respective arts should form one expertise, Aristophanes nods off well<br />
before Agathon, the latter not falling asleep until it was already daylight (223d8), leaving us to<br />
wonder if in the end it is not only Agathon who can follow Socrates’ point and perhaps even be<br />
persuaded by it. There is indeed evidence of the historical Agathon bringing the forms of tragedy and<br />
comedy closer together in key respects and even, if one scholion is to be believed, writing comedies<br />
himself. 36 In this case Agathon would have much in common with that tragedian-turned-writer-oftragicomic-dialogues<br />
named Plato. But at the very least the concluding conversation between Socrates<br />
and Agathon as all others have fallen asleep or passed out confirms the kinship between the two<br />
suggested by the nature and central importance of their rivalry in the dialogue. 37 While most<br />
commentators do not consider Agathon worthy even of speaking before Socrates, Dionysus crowns<br />
both. And Socrates, far from begrudging the poet his laurels, does not allow the destructive<br />
infatuation of Alcibiades or the indiscriminate noise of the multitude to keep him from giving<br />
Agathon what is surely the highest possible praise: engaging him in serious conversation. It is for this<br />
purpose, after all, that Socrates made himself beautiful. 38<br />
35 Belfiore finds this play already in Socrates’ refutation of Agathon: “ . . . when Socrates says that Eros is deficient in (or<br />
needs) good things (tôn agathôn endeês; 201c5), he is simultaneously refuting Agathon and paying him a compliment, by<br />
stating that Eros is in need of Agathon. This pun also helps explain why Socrates addresses Agathon as ‘beloved’. In<br />
identifying him with the things Eros needs, Socrates casts Agathon in the role of beloved, a role that Agathon’s speech<br />
already gave to his soft and delicate Eros (see 204c1-5)” (176).<br />
36 Even Rowe must grudgingly admit that “Agathon has shown at least some ability to follow an argument, and certainly<br />
more than Aristophanes (see 212c4-6n.) (But perhaps this is to press the text too hard?)” (215). Rowe sees a critique of<br />
Agathon in the final argument, but only by assuming that Agathon “was exclusively a tragic poet” (214). Strikingly, one<br />
scholiast of Aristophanes’ Frogs describes Agathon as κωµῳδοποιὸς (84). Lèvêque dismisses this as an error perhaps having<br />
its origin in Socrates’ argument at the end of the <strong>Symposium</strong> that the tragic poet should also be able to write comedies (87).<br />
But why not instead take this as some evidence that Agathon was persuaded by Socrates to the extent of going on to write<br />
comedies? Lèvêque himself sees an anticipation of the New Comedy in Agathon’s innovation of an original plot (113) as<br />
well as his innovative reduction of the choruses to simple intermezzi (141).<br />
37 At the very least, there is between Socrates and Agathon, as Lévêque has concluded, “une solide amitié” (44). I hope the<br />
present paper has shown to be completely groundless Rowe’s claim that “Certainly, by the end of the dialogue it will have<br />
become perfectly clear that S. has no high opinion of Agathon’s qualities, either as intellectual or as poet” (p. 161).<br />
38 Indeed, in the context of the dialogue’s final pages one can well imagine that Plato wrote the verses cited at the beginning<br />
of this paper in the persona of Socrates, as suggested by Edmonds: “As A. was born 20 years before Plato, this poem, like<br />
the next but one, seems to have been written, like the Dialogues , by Plato personating Socrates: cf. Gell. 19. 11. 1, Macr.<br />
Sat. 2. 2. 15, A.P. 5. 77, Cram. A.P. 4. 384. 1” (2.1.2., note 10, Elegy and Iambus. with an English Translation by. J. M.<br />
Edmonds. Cambridge, MA. Harvard University Press. London. William Heinemann Ltd. 1931.) Lèvêque, not considering<br />
the possibility suggested by Edmonds, just dismisses the verse as a fabrication by someone who forgot the respective ages of<br />
Agathon and Plato (53).<br />
257
La mimesis di sé nel discorso di Agatone:<br />
l'agone fra poesia e filosofia nel Simposio<br />
Mario Regali<br />
Da sempre il discorso di Agatone gode di diversa fortuna. Di norma, ad Agatone è stata riconosciuta<br />
solo la cura formale per una sequenza elegante di frasi levigate, che celano però un pensiero vacuo, se<br />
non del tutto fallace. Scopo di Platone sarebbe quindi la parodia, rivolta in polemica contro la poesia e<br />
contro l'epideixis sofistica.<br />
Con una rinnovata attenzione al testo dei dialoghi, nella critica recente non poche voci si sono<br />
levate a contrasto, in difesa del ritratto di Agatone offerto da Platone 1 . Tali voci hanno mostrato come<br />
il discorso di Agatone su Eros sia degno della posizione che occupa nella struttura del Simposio:<br />
subito prima di Socrate, prima della climax che con Diotima conduce alla visione del bello in sé. Non<br />
pochi elementi del discorso di Agatone infatti anticipano i concetti espressi, pur su un piano più alto,<br />
da Diotima. E non a caso, nell'azione del dialogo, ad Agatone, fra i personaggi del Simposio, Socrate<br />
dedica l'attenzione maggiore. Socrate sceglie infatti Agatone quale suo interlocutore nell'elenchos che<br />
precede il racconto su Diotima, confessando poi che anch'egli, da giovane, prima dell'incontro con<br />
Diotima, pensava di Eros ciò che ora il giovane Agatone ha espresso nel suo discorso (199c-201e).<br />
Nella sezione finale del dialogo, Agatone diviene poi persino il possibile eromenos di Socrate (222c-<br />
223a).<br />
Mio scopo oggi è osservare il ruolo del concetto di mimesis nel discorso di Agatone e più in<br />
generale nella seconda parte del dialogo. In particolare, nel discorso di Agatone sembra avere un ruolo<br />
centrale la mimesis di sé, intesa quale proiezione sul personaggio Eros di caratteristiche personali<br />
dell'autore Agatone. Un processo che Platone sembra sviluppare anche nel discorso di Socrate: con la<br />
mimesis di sé Socrate, pur dietro la maschera di Diotima, rappresenta Eros quale φιλόσοφος, come<br />
con la mimesis di sé Agatone rappresenta Eros quale ποιητής. Intorno alla mimesis di sè si articola<br />
uno snodo cruciale del Simposio: il progressivo mutare del tema al centro del dialogo, dalla lode di<br />
Eros alla lode di Socrate. Dopo l'unione tra Eros e φιλοσοφία proposta da Diotima, Alcibiade infatti<br />
varia in modo radicale il tema del Simposio sostituendo la lode di Eros φιλόσοφος con la lode di<br />
Socrate.<br />
Nel discorso di Agatone, Eros è bello, giovane, delicato e poeta; nel discorso di Socrate, Eros<br />
non possiede bellezza, è scalzo ed è φιλόσοφος. In entrambi i casi, il profilo di Eros riflette il profilo<br />
di chi pronuncia il discorso. Nei rispettivi logoi, tramite la lode di Eros Agatone e Socrate<br />
promuovono quindi il proprio sapere: il sapere del poeta e il sapere del filosofo. Ciò non sorprende: la<br />
critica ha spesso messo in luce come nei logoi del Simposio, a margine dell'encomio di Eros, ognuno<br />
dei simposiasti tenda all'elogio della propria techne 2 . Come ha mostrato Tilman Krischer, tra i<br />
personaggi del Simposio è infatti in palio la qualifica di sophos, secondo la tradizione letteraria del<br />
banchetto dei Sette Saggi e la Gesetz der Reihe 3 .<br />
Ma quale sapere promuove Agatone nel suo discorso? Anche sulla base del commento di<br />
Socrate (198c1-5), la critica ha individuato il sapere di Agatone nella techne epidittica di Gorgia.<br />
Tuttavia nell'impegno teorico che Platone svilupperà tra la Repubblica e le Leggi è la mimesis il tratto<br />
distintivo dei poeti. Nel ritratto che Platone offre di un poeta nel momento della sua prima vittoria,<br />
l'occasione del Simposio, il lettore della Repubblica e delle Leggi si attenderebbe quindi che ad<br />
emergere con forza dal personaggio di Agatone fosse la mimesis. Certo, nella plausibile cronologia<br />
dei dialoghi, il Simposio con ogni probabilità precede la Repubblica, ma la distanza che la critica<br />
immagina non è ampia. Se la mimesis ha un ruolo decisivo nell'indagine sulla poesia della<br />
Repubblica, nel Simposio è dunque legittimo attendersi la presenza di essa nel profilo di un poeta.<br />
Alla luce di ciò, è plausibile osservare sotto una diversa luce l’influenza di Gorgia che la critica, sulla<br />
scia di Socrate, tende a scorgere nel discorso di Agatone. Proprio a Gorgia, infatti, è da attribuire uno<br />
dei contributi decisivi nella riflessione teorica dei Greci sul concetto di mimesis letteraria, in<br />
particolare nella descrizione degli effetti mimetici del λόγος sulla ψυχή nell’Encomio di Elena (82 B<br />
11, 9 D.-K.). In questa direzione è utile tenere presente che, nelleTesmoforiazuse di Aristofane,<br />
1 Cfr., fra gli altri, D. SEDLEY, The Speech of Agathon in Plato's <strong>Symposium</strong>, in S. HAFFMANNS, B. REIS (edd.), The Virtous<br />
Life in Greek Ethics, Cambridge 2006, 47-69, e S. STERN-GILLET, Poets and Other Makers: Agathon's Speech in Context, in<br />
A. HAVLÍČEK, M. CAJTHAML (edd.), Plato's <strong>Symposium</strong>, Prague 2007, 86-107, J. MÜLLER, Der Wettstreit über die Weisheit<br />
zwischen Poesie und Philosophie: Agathons Rede und ihre Prüfung durch Sokrates (193-201c), in C. HORN (ed.), Platon.<br />
Symposion, Berlin 2012, 105-123..<br />
2 Cfr. F. SHEFFIELD, Plato's <strong>Symposium</strong>. The Ethics of Eros, Oxford 2006, 15-16.<br />
3 T. KRISCHER, Diotima und Alkibiades. Zur Struktur des platonischen Symposion, «Grazer Beiträge» (1984), 51-65.
Mario Regali<br />
rappresentate nel 411, dove prima del Simposio Agatone diviene personaggio sulla scena della<br />
commedia, il poeta è già un µιµητής, il suo sapere ruota già attorno alla mimesis. Di fronte ad<br />
Euripide, che chiede aiuto in vista della condanna a morte che l'assemblea delle Tesmoforie<br />
pronuncerà contro di lui, Agatone appare sulla scena in abiti femminili perché intento a comporre una<br />
tragedia di argomento femminile (95-265). Spiega poi il suo abbigliamento esponendo un principio di<br />
poetica: il poeta deve uniformare i propri τρόποι ai δράµατα che compone (146-152). Agatone, perché<br />
uomo, per produrre un dramma “femminile” deve quindi indossare abiti femminili. Agatone lega in<br />
modo saldo la produzione letteraria alla φύσις dell'autore: ciò che è estraneo alla φύσις può invece<br />
essere rappresentato tramite la mimesis (154-156). Il termine µίµησις compare quindi quando<br />
Aristofane descrive il bisogno dell'autore di rappresentare l'altro da sé, come nel caso di Agatone<br />
intento alla composizione di drammi femminili, di per sé estranei alla sua φύσις maschile. Ma nella<br />
scena delle Tesmoforiazuse è senza dubbio mimetico anche il rapporto fra il poeta e la produzione che<br />
non è estranea alla sua φύσις. La produzione letteraria riflette sempre la natura del suo autore: ὅµοια<br />
γὰρ ποιεῖν ἀνάγκη τῇ φύσει (159-167).<br />
Come noto, il nucleo di pensiero attorno al quale Aristofane costruisce la scena comica su<br />
Agatone nelle Tesmoforiazuse è poi sviluppato da Platone nella Repubblica. Tra il III e il X libro<br />
traspare il giudizio di Platone: da un lato il rifiuto per la mimesis dell'altro da sé, che distrae il φύλαξ<br />
dall'unico compito specifico che gli spetta, dall'altro l'assenso per la mimesis di sé da parte dell'uomo<br />
virtuoso, dell'ἐπιεικὴς ἀνήρ. Nel VI libro della Repubblica, quando soggetto della mimesis è il<br />
filosofo, il consenso di Platone diviene non a caso esplicito: svela infatti il profilo dell'autore della<br />
Repubblica la metafora del “buon pittore” che da un lato, quale φιλόσοφος, rende simile se stesso alle<br />
“realtà ordinate e sempre invariate nella loro identità”, dall'altro costruisce un modello di πόλις che<br />
riproduce “ciò che per natura è giusto, bello, moderato” (500c-501b). Dietro la maschera del “buon<br />
pittore”, parte della critica scorge la poetica di Platone autore della Repubblica: il dialogo imita la<br />
ricerca del filosofo sulla δικαιοσύνη. La selezione che Platone attua nei confronti della tradizione<br />
rappresentata da Aristofane favorisce dunque la mimesis del sé, quando il sé cela il profilo del<br />
filosofo.<br />
E il passaggio dalla tradizione poetica, rappresentata in commedia da Aristofane, alla nuova<br />
mimesis del filosofo che imita se stesso è messo in scena già nella sezione finale del Simposio. Come<br />
vedremo, Agatone rappresenta il punto più alto possibile raggiunto dalla tradizione poetica: una<br />
tradizione corretta e riveduta, che pone al centro l'imitazione del sé e non la indiscriminata mimesis di<br />
ogni oggetto possibile. Ma la mimesis di Agatone non è ancora diretta verso la ricerca del filosofo e il<br />
carattere stabile delle idee al quale il φιλόσοφος aspira. Questo passo ulteriore è compiuto da Socrate<br />
che, con la maschera di Diotima, rappresenta Eros quale φιλόσοφος.<br />
Osserviamo ora, dunque, come Agatone tenda nel λόγος a rappresentare se stesso quale poeta<br />
ed Eros quale riflesso del sé. Pur senza menzionare il concetto di mimesis, Agatone disegna un ritratto<br />
di Eros che appare modellato sull'immagine di se stesso, l'immagine di Agatone offerta dalla<br />
tradizione che Platone recepisce nel Simposio. Eros è καλός, νέος, ἁπαλός, (195a-b; 195d-e; 196a-b),<br />
come Agatone è καλός, νεανίσκος, ἁπαλός (174a, 198a; Aristoph. Thesm. 192). Il rispecchiamento di<br />
Agatone nell'immagine di Eros giunge al culmine con la qualifica di poeta che ad Eros è attribuita<br />
nella sezione finale del discorso: Eros e gli uomini che ad Eros inneggiano condividono il medesimo<br />
canto (196e-197a). Vediamo nel dettaglio. La prima definizione che Agatone offre di Eros è nel segno<br />
della massima lode: Eros è il più felice tra gli dei, è κάλλιστος e ἄριστος (195a5-8). Tra le qualità che<br />
compongono la bellezza di Eros, Agatone illustra per prima la giovinezza. Eros è il più giovane tra gli<br />
dei: Eros sempre rifugge infatti la vecchiaia e sempre accompagna i giovani, a lui simili (195a8-b7).<br />
Nella fase più antica della storia del mondo, infatti, le lotte e le violenze tra gli dei delle quali<br />
raccontano Esiodo e Parmenide scaturirono da Ananke, quando Eros, il più giovane tra gli dei, ancora<br />
non era in vita; da Eros deriva invece la φιλία e la pace che ora dominano il mondo degli dei. La<br />
correzione etica che Agatone opera sui racconti di Esiodo e Parmenide recepiti da Fedro richiama da<br />
vicino i τύποι per la rappresentazione degli dei che Socrate stabilisce nella Kallipolis della Repubblica<br />
tra il II e il III libro: tra gli dei non esistono contese e violenza.<br />
Sin da questo primo tratto di Eros emerge il rapporto mimetico con Agatone: come Eros è<br />
bello perché giovane, così la caratterizzazione di Agatone, sia nel Simposio sia nelle Tesmoforiazuse,<br />
è focalizzata sulla bellezza e sulla gioventù del poeta. Nella cornice, quando Aristodemo incontra<br />
Socrate che contro le sue abitudini si è fatto bello, Socrate spiega che si è reso bello “per andare da un<br />
bello”, il suo imminente ospite Agatone: ταῦτα δὴ ἐκαλλωπισάµην, ἵνα καλὸς παρὰ καλὸν ἴω (174a2-<br />
8). Nel primo scambio fra Agatone e Socrate, in merito alla trasmissione della σοφία, Socrate descrive<br />
la σοφία di Agatone, che a differenza della sua, debole e vaga come un sogno, splende chiara a tutti i<br />
Greci dopo la vittoria del giorno precedente, una σοφία che per la giovane età di Agatone, definito<br />
259
Mario Regali<br />
νέος da Socrate, promette molto per il futuro (175e3-7). Al termine del discorso di Agatone,<br />
Aristodemo ricorda il clamore destato tra i simposiasti, il θόρυβος che si solleva per l'appropriatezza<br />
del λόγος del giovane, del νεανίσκος come qui Aristodemo definisce Agatone (198a1-3). Anche nelle<br />
Tesmoforiazuse, la caratterizzazione di Agatone ruota attorno alla giovane età: subito dopo il canto di<br />
Agatone, come nel Simposio subito dopo il λόγος, il Parente apostrofa Agatone con ὦ νεανίσκε (134).<br />
Non solo: la gioventù di Agatone è un tratto che Platone sottolinea con intenzioni diverse dalla fedeltà<br />
storica. È importante notare che Agatone infatti è già trentenne nel 416, nel momento della sua prima<br />
vittoria nell'agone tragico, la data fittizia del Simposio. L'insistenza sulla gioventù del poeta da parte<br />
di Platone deriva quindi dalla focalizzazione sui tratti tipici del personaggio Agatone che Aristofane<br />
aveva posto sulla scena delle Tesmoforiazuse.<br />
Tutto ciò che sappiamo dal Simposio e dalle Tesmoforiazuse sul ritratto di Agatone ruota<br />
dunque attorno alla gioventù e alla bellezza del poeta. I soli tratti dell'aspetto di Agatone ai quali sia<br />
Platone sia Aristofane accennano sono la sua giovane età e la bellezza del corpo o dei vestiti che<br />
indossa. E non a caso, nel pieno rispetto della teoria esposta da Agatone nelle Tesmoforiazuse, nel<br />
Simposio Agatone compone un encomio per Eros attribuendo al dio tratti fisici identici ai propri.<br />
Nella stessa direzione conduce il tratto della delicatezza, la ἁπαλότης. Quale prova della<br />
ἁπαλότης di Eros Agatone propone la delicatezza di ciò con cui Eros entra in contatto privilegiato: la<br />
ψυχή e l'ἦθος (195e1-9). Come per la gioventù, anche per la delicatezza sussiste una corrispondenza<br />
fra Eros e il ritratto di Agatone. Ancora nella scena di Agatone nelle Tesmoforiazuse, infatti, Euripide<br />
descrive l'aspetto femmineo di Agatone, l'aspetto che lo rende adatto a confondersi fra le donne delle<br />
Tesmoforie: una sequenza di attributi nella quale, in chiusura, compare la ἁπαλότης (192).<br />
Sin qui le caratteristiche fisiche di Eros, che riflettono le caratteristiche fisiche di Agatone.<br />
Ma il vertice della mimesis di sé nel ritrarre Eros è raggiunto da Agatone nella seconda parte del<br />
λόγος, quando dal κάλλος il poeta passa a descrivere l’ἀρετή del dio. Nella sequenza canonica<br />
δικαιοσύνη, σωφροσύνη, ἀνδρεία e σοφία, la σοφία di Eros identifica in modo palese l'oggetto della<br />
lode, Eros, con l'autore della lode, Agatone: la σοφία di Eros è infatti la σοφία di un poeta (196d4-e6).<br />
Anche per onorare la propria τέχνη, come in precedenza Erissimaco, Agatone afferma che Eros è un<br />
ποιητής così sapiente da riuscire a rendere chiunque poeta: chi è toccato da Eros diviene infatti poeta<br />
anche se estraneo alle Muse. La descrizione di Eros quale poeta raggiunge poi il suo culmine nella<br />
sezione conclusiva, nella quale, non a caso, anche lo stile di Agatone vira dalla prosa di stampo<br />
gorgiano verso la dizione poetica (197c3-35). L'immagine conclusiva di Eros poeta “accompagnato da<br />
ogni uomo” nel canto che affascina è preparata in vario modo nella serrata sequenza asidentica che<br />
chiude l'encomio. Eros appare quale guida, ἡγεµών, degli incontri, σύνοδοι, dove di norma ha luogo<br />
la rappresentazione poetica: le feste, i cori, i sacrifici (197d2-3). Ancora quale guida, κυβερνήτης,<br />
Eros è descritto in relazione alla fatica, alla paura, al desiderio, alla parola, il λόγος (197d8-e1). Una<br />
sequenza nella quale la critica scorge la situazione di Agatone nel momento presente, l'encomio che è<br />
chiamato a esporre, e i momenti legati alla sua attività di poeta: la fatica della composizione, la paura<br />
dell'insuccesso, il desiderio di gloria, il λόγος 4 . Il quadro conclusivo del ritratto di Eros offerto da<br />
Agatone coincide poi con il vertice dell'identificazione fra Eros e il poeta. Eros è ora l'ἡγεµών<br />
κάλλιστος e ἄριστος, che ogni uomo deve seguire mentre inneggia secondo bellezza e partecipa<br />
all'ode che il dio canta affascinando la mente di tutti gli dei e degli uomini. Ogni uomo deve quindi<br />
seguire Eros con un inno: non a caso, Platone sceglie qui un composto di ὑµνεῖν che indica in senso<br />
tecnico il canto poetico per il dio, ossia il canto di lode che Agatone sta tessendo per il dio Eros.<br />
Agatone esorta quindi gli uomini a divenire poeti, a lodare Eros seguendo il suo esempio: Agatone<br />
diviene così maestro di poesia, proprio come Eros. La partecipazione di Agatone all'attività poetica di<br />
Eros è ora esplicita, come esplicito è l'effetto del canto di Eros che chiude il λόγος: il piacere per gli<br />
dei e per gli uomini. Anche in questo caso la scelta lessicale di Platone è significativa: il θέλγειν,<br />
come il τέρπειν, è la funzione principale che nella poetica arcaica è attribuita alla poesia. Nonostante<br />
il carattere di novità che contraddistingue Agatone nel Simposio, poeta giovane, di successo recente,<br />
che corregge i racconti antichi di Esiodo e Parmenide, il cardine della sua poetica resta immutato<br />
rispetto alla tradizione: scopo principale della poesia è il piacere che affascina.<br />
La mimesis quale rappresentazione di sé percorre dunque, come abbiamo visto, l'encomio per<br />
Eros di Agatone nella sua interezza. Non è estraneo al concetto di mimesis anche il discorso che<br />
Socrate apprende da Diotima. Come la critica non ha mancato di notare, i contatti tra il discorso di<br />
Diotima e il discorso di Agatone sono numerosi: in particolare è approvato da Socrate il principio di<br />
metodo espresso da Agatone in apertura del suo discorso. Prima bisogna descrivere “quale sia Eros,<br />
poi le sue opere” (199c3-6; 201d8-e2). Nel rispetto di tale principio, tramite l'elenchos di Agatone,<br />
4 C.J. ROWE, Plato. <strong>Symposium</strong>, Oxford 1998, 166.<br />
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Socrate giunge a mostrare “quale sia Eros” invertendo di segno il ritratto offerto in precedenza da<br />
Agatone: Eros non è né καλός né ἀγαθός, bensì è privo sia di καλά sia di ἀγαθά (201b1-c9).<br />
L'insegnamento seguente di Diotima conduce poi a identificare nella sfera del µεταξύ l'ambito che<br />
appartiene ad Eros (201e8-b5). Ma il profilo reale di Eros è offerto da Diotima con il racconto sulla<br />
nascita da Poros e Penia: un ritratto che sconvolge l'immagine di Eros offerta da Agatone (203b1-<br />
204a7). Eros è sempre povero e soprattutto è molto lontano dall'essere delicato e bello, ἀπαλός τε καὶ<br />
καλός. Alla delicatezza di Agatone, si oppone l'Eros duro e squallido di Diotima, l'Eros σκληρὸς καὶ<br />
αὐχµηρός (203c6-d3). Ora, negando la delicatezza e la bellezza di Eros, Diotima inverte di segno il<br />
ritratto di Eros che Agatone aveva delineato tramite la mimesis di sé. Quindi un profilo nuovo per<br />
Eros, un profilo che presenta i tratti che appartengono a Socrate. Oltre all'essere scalzo, il tratto<br />
peculiare di Socrate segnalato già nella cornice con gli inusuali sandali che stupiscono Aristodemo, a<br />
Socrate, come all'Eros nuovo di Diotima, non appartiene certo la bellezza. L'immagine del Sileno al<br />
quale Alcibiade paragonerà Socrate ne offre conferma (215a-e). Come nel discorso di Agatone, poi, la<br />
mimesis del sé coinvolge l'attività di Eros: come Socrate, Eros è “filosofo attraverso l'intera vita”,<br />
φιλοσοφῶν διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου (203d7). La posizione intermedia tra mortalità e immortalità conduce<br />
Eros al passaggio continuo, nello stesso giorno, dalla morte alla rinascita, alla continua alternanza tra<br />
sapere e ignoranza (203d8-e5). Non a caso, tale tratto del carattere di Eros torna più oltre nel discorso<br />
di Diotima, quando Eros conduce i mortali a partecipare dell'immortalità tramite il continuo rinnovarsi<br />
della ἐπιστήµη per mezzo di una µελέτη che richiama senza dubbio la ricerca continua di Socrate, con<br />
il suo διαλέγεσθαι (207c-208b). Solo Eros, poi, tra gli dei pratica la filosofia e desidera divenire<br />
σοφός, perché gli altri dei già possiedono il sapere. Il danno maggiore provocato dalla ἀµαθία è per<br />
Diotima l'illusione di essere valenti e saggi quando in realtà non si è tali: emerge qui un ritratto di<br />
Eros molto vicino al profilo di Socrate nell'Apologia, il più sapiente tra gli uomini, secondo l’oracolo,<br />
perché unico a sapere di non sapere (21a-23c). Diotima conclude ora il ritratto di Eros affermando in<br />
modo definitivo la sua natura filosofica: è necessario che Eros sia φιλόσοφος poiché il φιλόσοφος è in<br />
una condizione intermedia tra il sapiente e l'ignorante, una condizione che Eros deve alla nascita da<br />
Poros e da Penia, la condizione alla quale di frequente nei dialoghi, dalla Apologia al Fedro, Socrate<br />
aspira (204a1-c1). E ancora, nei Grandi Misteri, l'ergon di Eros corrisponde di nuovo alla φιλοσοφία:<br />
dopo gli ἐπιτηδεύµατα, il νέος deve essere guidato verso la bellezza delle ἐπιστῆµαι, dove il καλόν<br />
non risplende solo nei particolari ma è libero, senza vincoli, nel “grande mare del bello”. Di fronte al<br />
mare del bello, nella sua contemplazione, il giovane produrrà λόγοι “belli e magnifici” e genererà<br />
pensieri nella φιλοσοφία priva di φθόνος (210c6-e1). Il praticare senza φθόνος la ricerca del sapere,<br />
qui attribuito al νέος che segue Eros, è un tratto che nei dialoghi è sempre associato al personaggio di<br />
Socrate o all'ideale di φιλόσοφος che Socrate propugna, dal Protagora (320c1-2) alla Repubblica (VI.<br />
499d10-501b8) 5 . Eros diviene quindi nel ritratto di Diotima un maestro di φιλοσοφία; Eros tende alla<br />
conoscenza del καλόν e trascina chi partecipa di esso, così come Eros, per Agatone, tende alla poesia<br />
e trascina al canto chi di lui partecipa. Come per Agatone, dunque anche per il discorso di Socrate la<br />
mimesis di sé ha un ruolo fondamentale.<br />
Indicare la presenza della mimesis di sé nel discorso di Agatone e poi nel discorso di Socrate,<br />
con il passaggio cruciale dalla mimesis del poeta alla mimesis del filosofo, permette di comprendere<br />
l'intenzione preminente di Platone nella elaborazione drammaturgica del Simposio: costruire una<br />
climax che tenda alla lode per Socrate. Agatone, prossimo al vertice della scala, è emblema della<br />
produzione poetica nella sua espressione più alta: corregge i racconti sugli dei di Esiodo e di<br />
Parmenide, offre una mimesis non indiscriminata, rivolta al καλόν e all’ἀγαθόν, priva solo del sapere<br />
fondato sulla dialettica. Al culmine della climax Socrate mostra la propria superiorità nel segno della<br />
aletheia; il vero volto di Eros cela il volto del φιλόσοφος, in armonia, come abbiamo osservato, con la<br />
mimesis del sé da parte dell' ἐπιεικὴς ἀνήρ della Repubblica. Il discorso di Alcibiade, che irrompe<br />
nella casa di Agatone sancisce poi il definitivo mutamento del tema dalla lode di Eros, il tema<br />
convenzionale scelto da Fedro, alla lode di Socrate, all'encomio del filosofo che nell'agone simposiale<br />
conquista la corona che spetta a chi possiede in misura maggiore la σοφία.<br />
E alla vittoria di Socrate corrisponde la vittoria dei suoi logoi, dell'intreccio fra domande e<br />
risposte che sviluppa l'elenchos: la corona che Alcibiade dona a Socrate sancisce la vittoria del<br />
dialogo, del logos sokratikos sulla tragedia, anche sulla tragedia nuova e fortunata di Agatone, autore<br />
di un discorso che pur fondato sul modello corretto della mimesis del sé, non è rivolto alla mimesis<br />
del filosofo. La celebre scena finale del Simposio, pur nel fievole ricordo di Aristodemo assonnato,<br />
racconta poi di Socrate che confuta sia Agatone sia Aristofane, segnando così il telos del cammino di<br />
5 Cfr. F.G. HERRMANN, φθόνος in the world of Plato's Timaeus, in D. KONSTAN, K. REUTER (edd.), Envy, Spite and Jealousy.<br />
The Rivalrous Emotions in Ancient Greece, Edinburgh 2003, 53-83.<br />
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Platone: il dialogo, unione di spoudaion e geloion, supera la tradizione letteraria nel segno della<br />
mimesis di Socrate, φιλόσοφος e maestro di φιλοσοφία.<br />
262
I. Einleitung<br />
Die Poetik des Philosophen: Sokrates und die Rede des Agathon<br />
Irmgard Männlein-Robert<br />
Die Rede des Tragödiendichters Agathon ist die fünfte der Eros-Reden, die im Rahmen des<br />
Symposions gehalten wird, und hat in methodischer, inhaltlicher und struktureller Hinsicht eine<br />
Sonderstellung inne: 1 Zum einen ist Agathons erster Sieg im tragischen Agon der Lenäen (Februar<br />
416 v. Chr.) Anlass der Feier, zu der er einlädt. Die Rede des Gastgebers und gefeierten<br />
Tragödiensiegers erhält in der Runde also besondere Aufmerksamkeit, zudem wird sie spät, als letzte<br />
vor dem Beitrag des Sokrates, gehalten. Zum anderen werden Agathon und Sokrates, deren Beiträge<br />
die Sequenz der Eros-Reden abschließen, von Eryximachos als Eros-Experten, als Meister in<br />
Liebesangelegenheiten beschrieben (Smp. 193e). Damit wird beiden, die auch zusammen auf der<br />
letzten Kline in der Symposionsrunde liegen, eine besondere erotische Affinität attestiert, beide<br />
werden somit als besonders kompetentes Team herausgestellt, die Erwartung der anderen<br />
Symposiasten (und der Rezipienten), zunächst auf die Rede des gefeierten Agathon, steigt. Dessen<br />
Eros-Rede ist durch zwei kleine dialogische Gespräche gerahmt, in die Sokrates ihn verwickelt. Es<br />
handelt sich dabei nicht, wie bei den vorherigen kurzen Gesprächen in der Runde (jeweils nach den<br />
Reden des Pausanias, des Eryximachos und des Aristophanes), um Zwischengespräche, die sich aus<br />
dem situativen Wechsel des vorherigen zum folgenden Redner ergeben (vgl. den berühmten<br />
Schluckauf des Aristophanes 185c-e). Vielmehr handelt es sich bei den beiden, die Agathon-Rede<br />
rahmenden Partien um dialogische Intermezzi, an denen sich nun erstmals Sokrates – relativ plötzlich<br />
und dominant – beteiligt, der im Anschluss an Agathon sein Eros-Lob vortragen soll. Überdies<br />
markiert vor allem das zweite, an die Agathon-Rede anschließende von Sokrates dominierte<br />
Intermezzo einen Moduswechsel, und zwar inhaltlich wie methodisch. Denn die Agathon-Rede ist die<br />
einzige in der Runde, die in Aspekten ihrer Form und ihres Inhalts resp. Argumentationsganges von<br />
Sokrates ins Visier genommen und näher diskutiert wird. Der Modus eben dieser kritischen<br />
Diskussion ist ein sokratischer Elenchos, in dem Sokrates den gerade noch bejubelten Dichter<br />
Agathon zur Rücknahme seiner Argumente zwingt. Bereits vor der Eros-Rede Agathons hatte sich ein<br />
kleiner Dialog zwischen diesem und Sokrates entsponnen, der von Phaidros unterbrochen wurde. Im<br />
Anschluss an Agathons Rede erwirkt Sokrates von Eryximachos nun jedoch die Erlaubnis, Agathon<br />
nur ein einige kleine Fragen stellen zu dürfen, da es eine Irritation auszuräumen gelte, die sich nach<br />
dessen Eros-Rede ergeben habe. Daraus folgt dann der kleine elenktische Dialog, in dem Sokrates den<br />
Dichter Agathon zum Selbstwiderspruch nötigt. Meine These ist nun, dass es sich bei den beiden<br />
Intermezzi, welche die Agathon-Rede rahmen, um wichtige Textpassagen des Platonischen<br />
Symposions handelt, in denen methodische und inhaltliche Richtlinien einer philosophischen Poetik<br />
angedeutet werden, wie sie später Sokrates für Diotima referieren wird. Diese Richtlinien werden<br />
bereits im Vorfeld der Agathon-Rede in dem kleinen Gespräch zwischen Sokrates und Agathon<br />
motiviert (Intermezzo I), unmittelbar nach Agathons Rede im Elenchos (anhand der Wiederlegung der<br />
nur formal überzeugenden Darstellung des Dichters) gleichsam ex negativo skizziert (Intermezzo II)<br />
und finden im anschließenden Diotima-Referat des Sokrates konkrete Anwendung und positive<br />
Bestätigung.<br />
II. Präludium<br />
Um die Rahmung der Agathon-Rede und insbesondere den dialogischen Elenchos des Sokrates besser<br />
verstehen und einordnen zu können, müssen wir einen Blick auch auf eine frühere Szene werfen, die<br />
ihn vorab motiviert. Die von Eryximachos formulierte Affinität des Sokrates und des Agathon zu Eros<br />
zeigt sich gleich am Anfang des Symposions in der kleinen Szene, in der Sokrates verspätet in der<br />
Symposionsrunde eintrifft (Smp. 175c-d): Als er nach einiger Zeit des Nachdenkens im Vorhof (ebd.<br />
175a8: ἐν τῷ τῶν γειτόνων προθύρῳ) in der Mitte des Mahles hereinkommt, fordert Agathon, der<br />
allein auf der letzten Kline Platz genommen hat, ihn auf, sich zum ihm zu legen – was Sokrates auch<br />
tut. Bereits hier in der Rahmenerzählung des Symposion vor dem Referat der gehaltenen Eros-Reden<br />
findet sich ein Vorverweis auf das später tatsächlich folgende (Streit-) Gespräch zwischen Sokrates<br />
1 Einen Überblick über die Forschungspositionen dazu bietet Müller, J., Der Wettstreit über die Weisheit zwischen Poesie<br />
und Philosophie: Agathons Rede und ihre Prüfung durch Sokrates (193e-201c), in: Platon, Symposion (hg. v. C. Horn),<br />
Berlin 2012, 105-123, hier: 105-107.
Irmgard Männlein-Robert<br />
und Agathon (ebd. 175e7-9). Der Umstand, dass Sokrates direkt neben Agathon auf dessen Kline<br />
Platz nimmt, ist zum einen der Situation seines Zuspätkommens geschuldet, hat aber zum anderen<br />
auch eine symbolhafte Signalwirkung darüber hinaus und bringt über die räumliche Affinität eine<br />
gewisse Nähe dieser beiden so unterschiedlichen Symposiasten zum Ausdruck. Beide bieten im<br />
Austausch ihrer Höflichkeiten eine jeweils indirekte Schilderung von Charakteristika der Sophia des<br />
anderen: Sokrates beschreibt die Sophia des Agathon als jugendliche, wirkmächtige, eindrückliche,<br />
vom großem Publikum gefeierte (πολλὴ καὶ καλὴ σοφία, vgl. ebd. 175e1f.) – Agathon die des<br />
Sokrates als eine, die in der Einsamkeit, im einsamen Nachdenken und Durchdenken gründet. 2 In der<br />
ironischem Umkehr (ebd. 175d3-7) von Agathons Witz, er wolle neben Sokrates liege, da er dann<br />
durch Körperkontakt von dessen Weisheit profizieren könne (ebd. 175c8-d1: ἵνα καὶ τοῦ σοφοῦ<br />
ἁπτόµενός σου ἀπολαύσω, ὅ σοι προσέστη ἐν τοῖς προθύροις), deutet Sokrates an, dass seine Sophia<br />
keine stabile sei (ebd. 175e3f.: ἀµφιβητήσιµος ὥσπερ ὄναρ οὖσα), dass Weisheit und Wissen nicht<br />
einfach übertragbar sei. Auch wenn der ganze Ton dieser kleinen Szene heiter und humorig und<br />
situativ bedingt zu sein scheint, so lassen sich doch Signale für das spätere dialogische Intermezzo<br />
zwischen Sokrates und Agathon identifizieren. Agathon verweist mit urbanem Humor auf die später<br />
anstehende Entscheidung darüber, wer nun von wessen Sophia profitiere (ebd. 175e8f.). 3<br />
III. Agathon und Sokrates<br />
1. Vor der Rede des Agathon: Intermezzo I<br />
Im Anschluss an die Rede des Aristophanes macht Eryximachos deutlich, dass jetzt nur noch Agathon<br />
und Sokrates in der Reihe der Eros-Redner fehlen (Smp. 193e1f.). Erneut werden beide als ‚Team‘<br />
deutlich. Eryximachos lenkt somit den Blick der Runde (und der Rezipienten) auf die beiden auf der<br />
letzten Kline Platzierten und verstärkt den visuellen Eindruck eines ‚Teams‘ noch dadurch, dass er<br />
diese beiden als besonders kompetent in Eros-Angelegenheiten bezeichnet (ebd. 193e5: δεινοῖς οὖσι<br />
περὶ τὰ ἐρωτικά), obgleich nun doch schon so vieles darüber gesagt worden sei. Daraufhin entspinnt<br />
sich ein kleines dialogisches Intermezzo (ebd. 193e3-194c10) zwischen Sokrates und Agathon, das<br />
von Phaidros unterbrochen wird. Worum geht es aber in diesem Intermezzo? Sokrates lenkt die<br />
Aufmerksamkeit und Spannung auf die als nächste anstehende Rede des Agathon, die ihn selbst als<br />
letzten Redner in Bedrängnis bringen wird. Agathon meint, Sokrates wolle ihn aus der Fassung<br />
bringen. Der betont, Agathon habe vor riesigem Publikum im Theater Mut und Selbstvertrauen<br />
bewiesen (epideíxasthai), daher könne ihm das kleine Publikum hier nichts anhaben. Doch Agathon<br />
verweist auf den Unterschied zwischen einem großen unverständigen Publikum und einem kleinen<br />
verständigen (émphrones – áphrones). Daraufhin mutmaßt Sokrates, dass Agathon verständigen<br />
Männern, nicht den Vielen, Aufmerksamkeit entgegenbringen würde und sich vor diesen für etwas<br />
Hässliches schämen würde. Sokrates rechnet sich hier (in vorsichtiger Formulierung!) nicht zu den<br />
Verständigen, sondern zur Menge. Als er Agathon fragt, ob dieser sich für etwas Unschönes auch vor<br />
der Menge schämen würde, er also die Fragestellung auf einen Fall anwendet, unterbricht ihn<br />
Phaidros, der die ausschließliche Fixierung des Sokrates auf diese Art von dialogischem Gespräch<br />
(194d3f.), noch dazu mit einem schönen jungen Mann, explizit macht, ein solches hier aber verhindert<br />
und auf andere künftige Gelegenheiten verweist. Von da an steht aber der Gegensatz zwischen den<br />
(wenigen) Verständigen resp. Weisen und den Vielen im Raum. Erneut kommt hier also, situativ<br />
motiviert, das Duo Sokrates-Agathon in den Blick des referierenden Erzählers. Im Komplimenten-<br />
Geplänkel darüber, wer nun den schwierigeren Part habe, entspinnt sich unmittelbar vor Agathons<br />
Rede ein kleiner Dialog zwischen beiden, der maßgeblich von Sokrates‘ stimuliert und dominiert<br />
wird. Agathon gesteht Sokrates hier zu, dass für ihn die Weisen, nicht die Vielen, das<br />
ausschlaggebende Publikum darstellen. Indem Sokrates sich hier listig in einer nur scheinbar<br />
logischen Schlussfolgerung zur Gruppe der Vielen rechnet, da er ja gestern in der Menschenmenge<br />
Agathons Sieg im Theater miterlebt habe, signalisiert er dem jungen Dichter, dass er vor ihm,<br />
Sokrates, keine Angst haben müsse, was die Beurteilung seiner Eros-Rede angehe. Damit aber wiegt<br />
er den schönen Agathon, wie sich nach dessen Rede im Elenchos zeigen wird, in falscher Sicherheit.<br />
2 Dazu Szlezák, T.A., Platon und die Schriftlichkeit der Philosophie, Berlin/New York 1985, hier: 254f., dagegen siehe<br />
Rehn, R., Der entzauberte Platon. Symposion, in: Kobusch, T./Mojsisch, B. (Hg.), Platon. Seine Dialoge in der Sicht neuer<br />
Forschungen, Darmstadt 1996, 81-95, hier: 90f.<br />
3 Dazu und zum Symbolwert des hier als Richter genannten Dionysos siehe Robinson, S.R., The Contest of Wisdom<br />
between Socrates and Agathon in Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong>, in: Ancient Philosophy 24, 2004, 81-100.<br />
264
2. Agathons Rede<br />
Irmgard Männlein-Robert<br />
Es folgt die Rede des Agathon (ebd. 194e4-197e8), die nach allen formalen Regeln der sophistischen<br />
Rhetorik komponiert ist. Agathon betont dabei nachdrücklich einen Ansatz, den die bisherigen Redner<br />
nicht verfolgt hatten: Er will sich zunächst auf die Qualität resp. die Charakteristik des Eros<br />
konzentrieren, daraus seine Urheberschaft für entsprechende Dinge ableiten und dann erst seine<br />
Gaben und Wirkungen auf die Menschen loben (ebd. 194e7: ὁποῖος; 195a2: οἷος οἵων αἴτιος ὥν,<br />
195a4: οἷός ἐστιν). Es ist diese Systematik, die von allen vorherigen Rednern methodisch abweicht,<br />
die aber in Fragestellung und Untersuchungsmethodik mit der des Sokrates in den aporetischen<br />
Dialogen Platons übereinstimmt. 4 Es sind aber auch weitere inhaltliche Argumente seiner Rede, etwa<br />
die von ihm fokussierten Aspekte der Schönheit und der Gerechtigkeit, Besonnenheit, Tapferkeit und<br />
Weisheit, kurz: die Tugenden des Eros (ebd. 196b-d), die zuvor nicht in dieser Weise dargestellt<br />
worden waren, vielmehr dem platonischen Sokrates in den aporetischen Dialogen als Gegenstand<br />
dialektischer Untersuchung dienen. Vor allem aber Agathons Bemerkungen, dass Eros mit Blick auf<br />
die gesamte Musenkunst ein guter Dichter resp. ein wirksames Stimulans für Dichtung (poiesis), er<br />
selbst ein von Eros angetriebener Dichter (poietes) sei (ebd. 196ef.), 5 und dass alles Gute für<br />
Menschen und Götter aus dem Eros nach Schönem resultiere (ebd. 197b7-9), heben seine Rede von<br />
allen früheren Eros-Reden in der Runde ab und machen sie – ganz offensichtlich – für den<br />
platonischen Sokrates interessant und einer prüfenden Diskussion würdig.<br />
3. Nach Agathons Rede: Intermezzo II<br />
Die eigentliche Eros-Rede des Agathon wird mit großem Beifall und Tumult der Anwesenden<br />
quittiert, da er ‚geziemend für sich selbst sowie für den Gott [sc. Eros]‘ geredet habe. Agathon hat<br />
sich also zumindest vor dem anwesenden Symposions-Publikum nicht blamiert. Und wie reagiert<br />
Sokrates nun auf diesen erneuten Erfolg des Gastgebers Agathon? Er differenziert zwischen dem<br />
Anspruch einer ‚schönen‘ und dem Anspruch einer ‚wahren‘ Rede. Scherzhaft verweist er auf seine<br />
‚seherischen‘ Fähigkeiten (Smp. 198a5: µαντικῶς), denn er habe ja vorhergesagt, dass Agathon eine<br />
glänzende Rede halten werde. Eryximachos bestätigt ihm explizit diese mantische Gabe (ebd.<br />
198a8f.), macht ihm aber Mut für seine ja immer noch ausstehende Rede (ebd. 198a9). Doch Sokrates<br />
ist noch nicht bereit, diese zu halten, vielmehr beschreibt er ein Missverständnis: Eine so ‚schöne‘<br />
Rede wie Agathon könne er niemals halten, habe er doch immer gedacht, es käme darauf an, die<br />
Wahrheit über Eros zu sagen (ebd. 198d3f.: ᾤµην δεῖν τἀληθῆ λέγειν περὶ ἑκάστου τοῦ<br />
ἐγκωµιαζοµένου; 198d7f.: ὡς εἰδὼς τὴν ἀλήθειαν; 199a7: τά γε ἀληθῆ). Er kann nur auf seine Weise<br />
loben, was man ihm auch zugesteht. Kurz: Wir sehen, wie Sokrates hier einen Moduswechsel, einen<br />
anderen ‚trópos‘ des Eros-Lobes motiviert, bei dem es nicht auf die (letztlich ungesicherte)<br />
Zuschreibung von Superlativen an Eros oder auf suggestive rhetorische Form oder Schönheit in der<br />
Form ankommt, sondern auf das Kriterium der Wahrheit (ebd. 198b1-199b7): Das ist nun ein<br />
Parameter, der mit Blick auf die Eros-Thematik erstmals in die Runde kommt. Damit entlarvt<br />
Sokrates nicht nur alle anderen vorherigen Reden, inkl. der des Agathon, der Rhetorizität, sondern<br />
motiviert für seine Rede einen andere, ganz eigenen Modus des Eros-Lobes, den ihm die anderen<br />
Symposiasten als nunmehr letztem Redner auch zugestehen. Im Anschluss wendet sich Sokrates an<br />
Phaidros mit der Bitte, Agathon noch eine Kleinigkeit fragen zu dürfen, was man ihm zugesteht. Von<br />
diesem Punkt des Symposions an hat sich Sokrates die Lizenz erwirkt, so zu sprechen, wie er will.<br />
Das impliziert den ihm eigenen Tropos resp. Modus des Sprechens: also in Frage- und Antwortmodus<br />
und impliziert auch die dialektische Suche nach der Wahrheit. Seinen dialogischen Tropos wendet er<br />
vor seinem Eros-Beitrag nun zuerst auf Agathon an, da er ja sein Missverständnis noch ausräumen<br />
müsse. Raffiniert hat er sich so nun den Dialog ermöglicht, den ihm unmittelbar vor der Agathon-<br />
Rede (im Intermezzo II) Phaidros noch verwehrt hatte.<br />
IV. Agathon im Elenchos des Sokrates<br />
Sokrates lobt die Disposition der Rede Agathons, zuerst nach der Qualität des Eros, dann nach seinen<br />
Taten zu fragen. Er lenkt das kleinteilige dialogische Gespräch auf das wichtige Ergebnis, dass Eros<br />
ein Mangelzustand von etwas resp. ein Begehren nach etwas, das man noch nicht hat, beschreibt. Am<br />
Beispiel der Schönheit, die Agathon in seiner Rede für Eros in allerhöchstem Maße proklamiert hatte,<br />
44 Ausführlich siehe Erler, M., Vom Sinn der Aporien in den Dialogen Platons, Berlin/New York 1987.<br />
5 Zur Ambiguität von Poiesis siehe Stern-Gillet, S., Poets and Other Makers, in: Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong>. Proc. of the Fifth<br />
<strong>Symposium</strong> Platonicum Pragense (hg. v. A. Havlíček/M. Cajthaml), Prague 2007, 86-107, hier: 86-91.<br />
265
Irmgard Männlein-Robert<br />
demonstriert nun Sokrates den logischen Schluss, dass Eros nach Schönheit strebe, diese also nicht<br />
habe (ebd. 201b4). 6 Eros ist somit Agathon zufolge ein Mängelwesen. Am Ende erweitert er noch<br />
gleichsam en passant die Fragestellung, indem er die Behauptung, das Schöne sei auch gut, von<br />
Agathon bestätigen lässt. Die Identität des Schönen mit dem Guten verfolgt Sokrates hier jedoch nicht<br />
weiter, lenkt nur am Ende des dialogischen Intermezzos erneut zurück auf das Kriterium der<br />
‚Wahrheit‘, der Agathon nicht widersprechen könne (ebd. 201c1-9). Agathons Eros-Rede ist somit<br />
entwertet und als nur der Form und dem Klang nach schön kenntlich geworden, der gefeierte<br />
Tragödiensieger und Gastgeber der Runde vor allen seinen Gästen von Sokrates widerlegt. 7 Während<br />
am Vortag die Masse ihn durch den Sieg im tragischen Agon in seinem poetischen Tun, seiner<br />
‚poíesis‘, ausgezeichnet und bestätigt hatte, bringt ihn Sokrates in einem dialogischen Elenchos zu<br />
Fall. Die poietische Sophia des Dichters Agathon erweist sich spätestens hier, gleichsam ex negativo,<br />
als eine ganz andere als die des Sokrates, sie entspricht zwar publikumswirksam dem modischen<br />
Geschmack der Menge und erweist sich im Gestus der Disposition (Frage nach der Qualität von Eros)<br />
und der Präsentation seiner Tugenden als quasi-philosophisch. Seine Sophia brilliert nur im Modus<br />
der ihr genuinen Kommunikationsform, der enkomiastischen Rede (oder aber der tragischen<br />
Dichtung). Schlussendlich kann Agathon aber einer Prüfung des Philosophen Sokrates im Medium<br />
des Prosa-Dialogs weder methodisch noch argumentativ standhalten, seine poietische Sophia vermag<br />
eine Transponierung in eine andere Kommunikationsform nicht mit zu vollziehen und erweist sich<br />
damit als zu eng, zu spezifisch, zu wenig objektiv und als nicht transferierbar. Und doch ist es so, dass<br />
Sokrates allein den schönen und jungen Dichter mit einem Elenchos würdigt, da er nicht zuletzt<br />
aufgrund seiner Zuschreibung von Tugenden und kreativer Potenz an Eros, aber auch mit seiner<br />
Bemerkung, Eros sei ein Poietes (ebd. 196e1), für Sokrates richtige, aber noch zu überprüfende<br />
Behauptungen formuliert. Damit weist dieser dem in Erotika versierten, philosophisch prinzipiell<br />
nicht untauglichen Agathon zumindest methodisch einen ersten Schritt auf dem Weg in Richtung<br />
‚Wahrheit‘ oder echter Weisheit (Sophia).<br />
V. Sokrates im Elenchos der Diotima<br />
Sokrates referiert dann seine Widerlegung durch die weise Diotima aus Mantikleia, die seine<br />
Meinung, Eros sei gut und schön, widerlegt habe. Dafür übernimmt er – explizit – die bereits für gut<br />
befundene Disposition des Agathon (Qualität, Taten des Eros). Die anfängliche Belehrung des jungen<br />
Sokrates durch die weise Diotima erfolgte dabei zunächst im Modus des elenktischen Dialogs, bevor<br />
sie den Weg zur Schau des Schönen beschreibt. 8 Diese Szene hat, wie das gesamte Diotima-Gespräch,<br />
eine komplexe Bedeutungsstruktur, aus Zeitgründen sei nur auf einige wenige Aspekte verwiesen: Die<br />
Widerlegung des Sokrates durch Diotima erweist sich als ‚klärende‘ oder ‚reinigende‘ Belehrung, 9 die<br />
dialogisch erfolgt. Der junge Sokrates lernt also auf diese Weise von der weisen Diotima über Eros.<br />
Erinnern wir uns an das humorvolle Gespräch zwischen Sokrates und dem jungen Agathon bei der<br />
verspäteten Ankunft des Sokrates, als dieser eine gleichsam physische Vermittlung von Sophia durch<br />
körperliche Nähe zu Agathon ausgeschlossen hatte, wird nun anhand des Diotima-Referates des<br />
Sokrates deutlich, wie Sophia allein vermittelt werden kann: im aktiven geistigen Eigenerwerb, im<br />
aktiven Nachvollzug, 10 einer von einer ‚weisen‘ Person geleiteten Argumentation durch ein<br />
dialogisches Gespräch, den Elenchos, in den Sokrates zuvor Agathon verwickelt hatte. Dieser erweist<br />
sich somit als Anfangsgrund einer auf Wahrheit basierenden (philosophischen) Poetik, die<br />
rückwirkend durch Diotima autorisiert wird. Der Modus des dialogischen Elenchos erweist sich<br />
einmal mehr als geeignete Form der Überprüfung von Wissen eines philosophischen ‚Anfängers‘,<br />
dessen Tauglichkeit sich relativ schnell zeigt – im Falle des jungen Agathon ebenso wie im Fall des<br />
damals noch jungen Sokrates. In unserem Kontext ist nicht zuletzt Diotimas Hinweis auf die<br />
produktive Potenz des Eros von besonderer Bedeutung, als sie allgemein den Übergang vom<br />
Nichtsein zum Sein auf die in ihm gründende Poíesis zurückführt (ebd. 205b-c). 11 ‚Erotik‘ wird somit<br />
zur (universell zu verstehenden) Poetik und umgekehrt, die Sokratische Erotik erweist sich als eine<br />
6 Zur logischen Inkonzinnität dieses Elenchos siehe Payne, A., The Refutation of Agathon: Symposion 199c-201c, in:<br />
Ancient Philosophy 19, 1999, 235-253 und Castagnoli, L., L’ eälegxow di Agatone. Una rilettura di Platone, Simposio,<br />
199c3-201c9, in: Dianoia 6 (2001), 39-84.<br />
7 Zur Passivität Agathons im Elenchos siehe z.B. Müller 2012, 117.<br />
8 Dazu mehr bei Sier, K., Die Rede der Diotima, Stuttgart/Leipzig 1997.<br />
9 Siehe Riedweg, C., Mysterienterminologie bei Platon, Philon und Klemens von Alexandrien, Berlin 1987. hier: 17-29.<br />
10 Vgl. das von Alkibiades gebrauchte Bild der nötigen Mühe um den Zugang zum Wissen (Smp. 215a-222b); dazu Gaiser,<br />
K., Platone come scrittore filosofico, Neapel 1984, 55-76.<br />
11 Vgl. Plat. Soph. 265b.<br />
266
Irmgard Männlein-Robert<br />
‚Poetik der Wahrheit‘ (ebd. 199a-b), die bereits auf objektive Wahrheit verweist. 12 Mit Blick auf die<br />
zu Sokrates‘ Zeiten längst etablierte poetische Tradition, in der das Kriterium der Wahrheit seit<br />
Hesiods (lügenden) Musen (Hes. Th. 26-28) variabel geworden und poetologisch ausdifferenziert<br />
worden war, ist der Rekurs des Sokrates auf ‚Wahrheit‘ als grundsätzlichen Maßstab des Philosophen<br />
für eine universal verstandene Poetik resp. Erotik bemerkenswert und hebt ihn, wie demonstrativ am<br />
Beispiels des umjubelten Dichters Agathon, von einer populären, zu kurz greifenden Poetikauffassung<br />
ab. 13<br />
VI. Fazit<br />
Der durch Sokrates in der Rahmung der Agathon-Rede markierte, szenisch elegant vollzogene<br />
Methodenwechsel innerhalb der Eros-Enkomiastik hat philosophisch-poietische Relevanz und<br />
Signalwirkung. Die Eros-Rede des Agathon, ein rhetorisches Glanzstück des tragischen Dichters, hält<br />
dem sokratischen Elenchos nicht stand. Und dennoch fungiert sie, wie vor allem an der Rahmung<br />
durch die Sokrates-Intermezzi deutlich wird, als ‚Aufhänger‘ für eine korrigierte, eine philosophische<br />
Darstellung des Phänomens Eros – so wie Sokrates das in seinem Diotima-Referat beschreibt.<br />
Zugleich erweist sich der in diesem Vortrag fokussierte Passus als bedeutsames Gelenkstück im<br />
Übergang von populärer, modisch-technischer Poíesis, verkörpert durch Agathon, zu einer durch Eros<br />
inspirierten philosophischen Poíesis, wie sie der Autor Platon seinen Protagonisten, den Erotiker<br />
Sokrates (re-)präsentieren lässt.<br />
12 Zum Anklang an Platonisches Ideenwissen siehe Erler, M., Platon, Basel 2007, 197; 488f.<br />
13 Siehe auch Smp. 223d, als Sokrates Agathon und Aristophanes im Ausgang des Gelages zum Eingeständnis nötigt, dass<br />
derselbe Dichter Komödien wie Tragödien verfassen könne, dazu Stern-Gillet (2007), 104-107.<br />
267
Introduction<br />
EROS SOTER: How Can Love Save Us?<br />
Aikaterini Lefka<br />
In the <strong>Symposium</strong>, Agathon calls Eros, among other attributes, soter (197 e 1). Some commentators of<br />
the dialogue accorded to this term a short note. However, the qualification soter was largely neglected<br />
and, in my opinion, unjustly underestimated. To my knowledge, up to now there has been no study<br />
dedicated to its entirely original link with Love. In my paper, I shall try to defend the idea that soter is<br />
an attribute that can offer us considerable help for a better understanding of Eros as presented in the<br />
<strong>Symposium</strong>.<br />
In fact, soter / soteira is an epithet given by Plato’s contemporaries to some particular<br />
divinities, to heroes and to men who, under certain circumstances, offered crucial help to someone or<br />
to a group of persons. I shall first expose which were the divinities who usually received such an<br />
epithet and for which particular reasons, in order to make evident the most interesting elements<br />
attached to the divine “saviours”’ action.<br />
Then, I shall give a short account of Plato’s use of this attribute. In the dialogues we may see<br />
that Plato follows slightly the religious tradition and innovates most of the times.<br />
In the third part of my paper, I shall try to point out that every speech of the <strong>Symposium</strong>,<br />
where figures the hapax “Eros soter”, offers a different aspect of the multiple functions of Love<br />
saving humanity in a complex structure that progressively leads to the most radical Platonic positions.<br />
I. Divinities currently qualified by the epithet soter<br />
Soter (masculine form) or soteira (feminine form) is “from the Homeric hymns (Hom. H. 22,5; 33, 6)<br />
onwards the epithet of very diverse Greek deities in the role of helper in time of need”. The general<br />
terms “god” or “the gods” could receive this qualification. Finally, it is “also an epithet for humans<br />
based on crucial actions (of help)” 1 .<br />
We may make more or less evident suppositions concerning the reasons for which some<br />
particular divinities were currently considered as “saviours”.<br />
Zeus 2 receives the epithet soter first as a just king of the universe, contributing to its harmonious<br />
function by the application of the divine law. The divinities Themis and Eunomia, who also supervise<br />
the respect of the divine justice are called soteirai 3 .<br />
In Athens, where Zeus is one of the official protectors of the city (polieus; poliouchos), like<br />
Athena 4 , they both may be considered as “saviours” of the polis and its inhabitants from any danger,<br />
during times of peace or at war 5 .<br />
Zeus tritos soter is also invoked during the three ritual libations, where the first is dedicated to<br />
Zeus Olympios, the second to a hero and the third to Zeus soter, in order to obtain his protection.<br />
Apollo 6 and his son Asclepius 7 were divinities attached to the exercise of medicine; they “saved”<br />
people from illness and death. Apollo was supposed to send also diseases that were in fact divine<br />
punishments for some hybris committed by humans and to stop them when the tribute was considered<br />
satisfactory.<br />
Artemis 8 was one of the divinities supervising births, a perilous experience for mothers and<br />
children, whom she was asked to preserve. Rhea 9 soteira should also be included, I think, to the same<br />
domain of mothers’ and children’s protection, as she is the mother of Zeus and saved him when he<br />
1 K. Zimmermann, 2008, p. 666.<br />
2 For the various aspects of Zeus, see for example A. B. Cook, 1925 ; H. Schwabl et al., 1972, pp. 253-376 and 1978, pp.<br />
993-1481.<br />
3 For Themis, the first wife of Zeus, see, for example, J. Jank, 2000, pp. 5-31 ; L. Käppel, 2002, pp. 301-302 ; E. Stafford,<br />
2007, pp. 71-85. For Eunomia, one of the three Horai, daughters of Zeus and Themis (the other two being Dike and Eirene),<br />
see P. Stengel, 1913, pp. 2300-2313 ; Th. Heinze, 1998, pp. 716-717 ; O. Waser, 1907, pp. 1130-1131 ; R. Bloch, 1998, p.<br />
255.<br />
4 See, for exemple, S. Deacy and A. Villing (eds.), 2001 ; F. Dümmler, 1896, pp. 1942- 2020 ; R. Ganszyniec, 1959, pp. 199-<br />
204 ; F. Graf, 1997, pp. 160-166 ; C. J. Herington,1955; I. Kasper-Butz, 1990 ; K. Kérenyi, 1952 ; R. Parker, 2000, p. 198.<br />
5 For the gods poliouchoi of Athens, see, for example, S. Deacy, 2007, pp. 219-235 and R. Parker, 2005.<br />
6 See, for exemple, K. Wernicke, 1896, pp. 1-111 ; F. Graf, 1996, pp. 863-868.<br />
7 See, for example, E. J. and L. Edelstein, 1945 ; F. Graf, 1997, pp. 94-99 ; E. Thraemer, 1896, pp.1642-1697 .<br />
8 See, for example, K. Wernicke, 1896, pp. 1336-1440 ; F. Graf, 1997, pp. 53-58 . .<br />
9 See, for example, J. Heckenbach, « Ῥέα » (1914), pp. 339-341 ; L. Käppel, « Rheia » (2001), p. 950.
Aikaterini Lefka<br />
was just a new-born from the cruelty of his father, Cronos.<br />
The Dioscuri 10 , experienced warriors and horsemen, were the protectors of men in battle but<br />
also of navigators and were often invoked in case of bad sailing conditions that could put into danger<br />
the ships, the persons and the goods they carried. For a people of seamen as the Greeks, these<br />
“saviours” were highly appreciated. On the other hand, Hermes 11 , as the god protecting the travellers,<br />
the messengers and the merchands, is a soter asked to assure the safe journeys by land.<br />
He is also the guide of the souls in their way to Hades, and this eschatological dimension may add a<br />
second aspect to his role as a “saviour”. The soul is also expected to be “saved”, thanks to the eternal<br />
beatitude offered by the initiation to Mysteries, like the Eleusinian ones, which explains sufficiently, I<br />
think, the attribution of the epithet soteira to Demeter 12 and to Kore 13 .<br />
Hecate 14 is a particular divinity, attached to the crossroads (and therefore protecting also travellers),<br />
including the ones between the three levels of existence: the heavens, the earth and the underworld, a<br />
fact that makes her also responsible of the safe souls’ transition. She is the obscure goddess of the<br />
moon, occult practices and fortune, too. Her help was asked to assure protection from evil and<br />
acquisition of good luck.<br />
Tyche 15 , the goddess of Fortune herself is considered as a soteira for the same reason. We<br />
may therefore conclude that, besides the invocation to the gods in general, in various cases of great<br />
need, the particular divinities who most currently receive the epithet soter or soteira are the ones who<br />
supervise domains where the human life, liberty, safety, health, procreation, justice, wealth, success,<br />
and even the soul’s eternal well-being may be seriously threatened.<br />
It is noteworthy for our study that Eros never figures among the traditional divine “saviours”.<br />
II. Who is a soter for Plato?<br />
Among these divinities who currently received the epithet soter, Plato chooses only Zeus, to whom he<br />
refers four times in his whole work.<br />
When we give a close look to these passages, we may observe that the philosopher offers<br />
new, original interpretations of the epithet, the ritual attached to it and the salutary action of the<br />
supreme god of the Greek pantheon, adapted and integrated to his own theories. For example, in the<br />
Laws, III, 692 a 3, Zeus is referred to as tritos soter. Instead of the usual third libation, the context<br />
here is a metaphore concerning the “salvation” of the city, thanks to the third of the institutions that<br />
the god accorded for the government of Sparta, that is the ephors (after the two kings and the senate),<br />
elected among the people in order to control the just exercise of the government.<br />
In the Charmides, 167 a 7, Socrates uses this epithet when he is trying for the third time to<br />
give a definition of wisdom (sophrosyne), which he identifies with “knowing one’s self”. In the same<br />
way, in the Philebus, 66 d 4, he mentions tritos soter while he gives his third version of defining the<br />
relation between wisdom and pleasure.<br />
Finally, in the Republic, IX, 583 b 3, Socrates combines this epithet of Zeus with the sport of<br />
wrestling, where the athlete who would throw his opponent three times on the ground was the winner.<br />
The third victory of the just man against the unjust within the frame of the arguments of the<br />
philosophical dialogue (compared to an Olympic victory) is dedicated to Zeus soter and Olympios.<br />
In the Timaeus, 48 d 5, there is a more general reference to “the god” who is asked to operate as the<br />
“saviour” of the interlocutors while they undertake an extraordinary, but true narration of the<br />
cosmogony, the theogony and the anthropogony.<br />
Other entities, non-divine but characteristic of Platonic philosophy receive also the<br />
qualification “soter”, like the intellect (nous: Laws, XII, 961 d 1), the reason (logos: Republic, VIII,<br />
549 b 7) and the laws (<strong>Symposium</strong>, 209 d 5).<br />
Concerning more concrete operations of rescue, an Egyptian priest calls the river Nile the<br />
saviour of Egypt (Timaeus, 22 d 5) from all extreme and dangerous climate conditions, among others.<br />
The hero Hector (Cratylus, 392 e 2) is also called “saviour”, as it was the case in the Homeric Iliad,<br />
because he defended efficiently his city against the Greek army till his death. But the human beings<br />
10<br />
For the twin sons of Zeus and Leda, who saved also their sister Helen from Theseus’ kidnapping, see, for exemple E.<br />
Bethe, 1903, pp. 1087-1123 and T. Scheer, 1997, pp. 673-677.<br />
11<br />
See, for exemple, G. Baudy, 1998, pp. 426-431 ; S. Eitrem, 1912, pp. 738-792 ; D. Jaillard, 2007 ; L. Kahn, 1978.<br />
12<br />
See, for exemple, F. Graf, 1997, pp. 420-425 ; S. Guettel Cole, 2000, pp. 133-154 ; O. Kern, 1901, pp. 2713-2764 ; N. J.<br />
Richardson, 1974.<br />
13<br />
See, for exemple, F. Bräuninger, 1937, pp. 944-972 ; L. Bruit, 2007, pp. 37-52 ; K. Clinton, 2007, pp. 342-356 ; S. Rosen,<br />
1943, pp. 247-259 ; Chr. Sourvinou Inwood, 2000, pp. 600-603 ; G. Zuntz, 1971.<br />
14<br />
See, for exemple, J. Heckenbach, 1912, pp. 2769-2782 ; S. I. Johnston, 1990 and 1998, pp. 267-270.<br />
15<br />
See also G. Herzog-Hauser, 1948, pp. 1643-1689 and N. Johannsen, 2002, pp. 936-937.<br />
269
Aikaterini Lefka<br />
who replace the heroes in this role in the platonic dialogues are the wise legislators and governors of a<br />
city (Theaetetus, 170 a 12; Republic, V, 463 b 1; VI, 502 d 1; Lois, IV, 704 d 6) as well as the<br />
excellent and the wise men in general (Laws, III, 689 d 9; XI, 922 a 1).<br />
We may therefore consider that Plato keeps here the traditional domain of the life and the<br />
good government of a city, but insists on the salutary role of intelligence, justice, wisdom and moral<br />
excellence in the public sphere 16 . He also refers to “saviours” quite originally, on the occasion of a<br />
philosophical debate and argumentation or of a narration that reveals the truth, against all false<br />
opinions 17 . The philosopher attributes rarely any epithets to the particular gods he refers to, and soter<br />
isn’t an exception. It is accorded only to Zeus, the wise governor of the world, in the passages cited<br />
above, and to Eros, just once, on an occasion that merits a closer look.<br />
III. The Platonic Eros as a soter<br />
Eros is a divinity usually presented as terrible by the poets, who put more eagerly into evidence the<br />
torments of his victims 18 . In the <strong>Symposium</strong>, the orators decide to adopt a new, positive way to depict<br />
him: for the first time, they undertake to praise “the great god” Eros as a benefactor.<br />
Agathon, the host of the banquet, exclaims in the end of his speech, among other<br />
qualifications, that Eros is “in trouble, in fear, in longing, in speaking, a steersman, defender, fellowsoldier<br />
and saviour without peer (παραστάτης τε καὶ σωτὴρ ἄριστος), ornament at once of all gods<br />
and men, most beautiful and best guide, whom everyone must follow” (197 d 8-e 3) 19 .<br />
Only a few commentators paid some attention to the use of the term soter here. For exemple,<br />
L. Brisson just notes that “the preceeding parastates (the hoplites who stood beside his fellow soldier<br />
and was supposed to protect him, as well as be protected by him) accords a military sense to soter” 20 .<br />
R. G. Bury makes a parallel with the protector daimon of each person, as well as with Socrates as a<br />
soter, putting forward that this term is usually attributed to heroes. Taking under consideration the<br />
military and the naval context, he concludes that “the general sense of the passage is this: ‘in the<br />
contests both of war and peace the best guide and warden, comrade and rescuer is Eros’” 21 .<br />
I believe that the salutary action of Eros is nevertheless present in all speeches of the<br />
<strong>Symposium</strong>. In fact, every speaker offers a different aspect of the multiple functions of Love as a<br />
“saviour” for humans, in a complex structure that progressively leads to the most innovating Platonic<br />
positions on the subject.<br />
Phaedrus 22 and Pausanias 23 support that love will push a person to defend his lover’s life (as it<br />
was the case when couples of warriors were fighting together, for example), to pursue and to<br />
accomplish virtue (especially courage) and to enjoy the eternal honour (time) that could come out of<br />
these heroic deeds – this was the only access to eternity that the heroes of the Homeric poems could<br />
pretend to.<br />
Pausanias, by his distinction between Eros Ouranios and Eros Pandemos, introduced the<br />
element of a rational and selective approach to Love, if one wants to receive his salutary effects. The<br />
more traditional, disastrous characteristics of the divinity are found in the second Eros.<br />
Euriximachus 24 goes even further, by developing a true “erotic science” that permits us to know how<br />
to approach and to conduct this universal force, innate to all beings, so that we might benefit of the<br />
health, the harmony and the well-being that the “good” Eros can install to our body and mind and to<br />
avoid as much as possible the nuisance of the “bad” one, the desire for inappropriate things. Eros<br />
guarantees the unity and the concord among the different parts of the world, including the friendly<br />
relations between the members of a community and even between gods and men.<br />
Aristophanes 25 , with his peculiar myth of the “three original genders” of humankind, takes up<br />
the healing power of Eros, who alone offers us the possibility to recover from the division imposed to<br />
us by Zeus because of our ancestral hybris, by finding our “other half”, restoring our initial nature and<br />
living happily ever after in a perfect union.<br />
16<br />
For the notion of “salvation” in Plato’s political theories, see A. Kelessidou, 2009.<br />
17<br />
Plato can use also other expressions related etymologically to soter, like soteria, sozein etc., but we chose here to examine<br />
only the cases where he mentions the divine epithet.<br />
18<br />
See for example, Sappho, fr. 2 ; fr. 44 and fr. 46.<br />
19<br />
Translation of C. J. Rowe, 1998.<br />
20<br />
L. Brisson, 1998, p. 206, n. 331.<br />
21<br />
R. G Bury, 1973, p. 83.<br />
22<br />
Plato, <strong>Symposium</strong>, 178 a 6- 180 b 8.<br />
23<br />
Idem, op. cit., 180 c 3-185 c 3.<br />
24<br />
Idem, op. cit.,185 e 6-188 e 4.<br />
25<br />
Idem, op. cit.,189 a 1-193 e 2.<br />
270
Aikaterini Lefka<br />
Agathon 26 follows all the rhetoric rules to elaborate a praise of Eros where he is depicted as<br />
absolutely excellent, concerning his form, his ethics and his intelligence. The benefits that god and<br />
men enjoy from his creative action are also of supreme importance: everybody has learnt the science,<br />
the art or the activity he likes best because of his love for this particular knowledge and therefore<br />
because of Eros, who becomes thus the wisest of teachers. Let us remind here that the extraordinary<br />
artistic or scientific creations open another way for humans to obtain an “immortal fame”. Eros<br />
always seeks harmony and beauty; he installs peace and concord in the whole world, against the hard<br />
struggles imposed by Necessity. In times of war or peace, on land or at sea, this god is the best guide,<br />
supporter and “saviour” for us.<br />
Socrates 27 insists also on the knowledge of the truth concerning Love and transmits to his<br />
interlocutors the “initiation to the mysteries of Eros” that he received when he was still a young man<br />
from the wise priestess Diotima, who was invited to Athens in order to “save” the city from the<br />
menace of a plague 28 . Eros is presented here as a philosopher, a constant lover and seeker of beauty<br />
and wisdom, like Socrates himself. This daimon guarantees the survival of the human race by the<br />
desire of beautiful bodies and of procreation of physical children. He also helps us to realise the most<br />
excellent and happy life thanks to intellectual creations due to the progressive attraction to the<br />
knowledge of higher kinds of beauty, up to the contemplation of the Idea of the Fine itself; creations<br />
that bring immortal glory, by making their author a better person and inciting others to start the<br />
practice of philosophy. The eternal and absolute felicity of the soul, promised by all doctrines of<br />
mysteries, is offered here by the salutary action of Eros.<br />
Alcibiades 29 enters uninvited and in great fuss to the banquet, after the end of Socrates’<br />
speech. He shall crown the philosopher, however, as the winner of the competition for the best praise<br />
to Eros, and shall give a touching personal testimony of the philosopher’s way to behave in amorous<br />
relations, where indeed he seems to apply the model of the “initiated” lover depicted previously: he is<br />
virtuous (courageous at wartime, capable of saving his fellow-soldiers, moderate and just at peaceful<br />
moments), wise and perfectly detached from any material charms. He creates enchanting speeches<br />
that have the power to turn the listeners towards the practice of philosophy and the pursuit of virtue<br />
and therefore eternal felicity.<br />
Conclusions<br />
After the close examination of the <strong>Symposium</strong>’s speeches, under the light of the salutary<br />
characteristics of Eros, I think we may conclude that Plato accorded much more importance to this<br />
aspect of the divinity than currently believed. The interlocutors pronounce more than praises to the<br />
benefits of Love; they present in fact Eros soter in an original combination of traditional and new,<br />
philosophical dimensions. If we possess the right knowledge concerning Eros, this daimon helps us to<br />
survive (at wartime and at peace) and to lead a terrestrial existence as good and as harmonious as<br />
possible internally and externally, in unity with our companions and with our fellow citizens, as well<br />
as with the gods and all the other parts of the universe. Thanks to his benevolence, we may even<br />
overcome the limits of our human condition and achieve immortality (understood in various ways:<br />
physical childbirth or intellectual creations of eternal glory) and eternal felicity – the components of<br />
the homoiosis theoi –. Socrates, through Diotima’s “initiation in the mysteries of Eros” offers the<br />
summit of the philosophical interpretation of Love as our “saviour”, while Alcibiades gives evidence<br />
of its concrete realisation.<br />
But I think that the most important innovation of the Platonic vision of Eros is that he doesn’t<br />
operate in the usual way of the other divine rescuers. Possessing the human soul with a “divine<br />
madness”, as Socrates says in the Phaedrus 30 , he incites us in fact to become wise, virtuous, happy and<br />
finally the “saviours” of ourselves and of our beloved ones. Eros offers us the possibility of becoming<br />
responsible for our own “salvation”, but also of the help provided to other humans and thus to<br />
“resemble the divine” in an original way: as soteres.<br />
26 Idem, op. cit.,194 e 4-197 e 8.<br />
27 Idem, op. cit.,198 b 1-212 c 3.<br />
28 In the text (idem, op. cit., 201 d 3-5) Socrates supports that Diotima with her sacrifices succeeded only in delaying this<br />
“divne punishment” (of Apollo), imposed to the city ten years later (431-430 B.C.).<br />
29 Idem, op. cit., 215 a 4-222 b 7.<br />
30 See idem, Phaedrus, 244 a 3-245 c 4 and 265 a 9-b 5.<br />
271
Aikaterini Lefka<br />
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pp. 33-68.<br />
T. Scheer, Der Neue Pauly, Enzyklopädie der Antike, Herausgegeben von H. Cancik – H. Schneider,<br />
Verlag J. B. Metzler, Stuttgart – Weimar, 3, 1997, pp. 673-677.<br />
D. C. Schindler, «Plato and the Problem of Love. On the Nature of Eros in the <strong>Symposium</strong>», Apeiron,<br />
40, 2007, pp. 199-220.<br />
H. Schwabl et al., « Zeus », Paulys Real-encyclopädie der Classischen Altertumswissenschaft,<br />
herausgegebe, NeueNearbeitung begonnen von G. Wissowa, Alfred DruckenmüllerVerlag, Stuttgart,<br />
X, A, 1972, pp. 253-376 ; suppl.. XV, 1978, pp. 993-1481.<br />
G. A. Scott – W. A. Welton, «Eros as a Messenger in Diotima’s Teaching», G. A. Press (ed.), Who<br />
Speaks for Plato ? Studies on Platonic Anonymity, Rowman & Littlefield Pub., Lanham/Boulder/N.<br />
York/Oxford, 2000, pp. 147-159.<br />
D. Sedley, «The Ideal of Godlikeness», G. Fine (ed.), Plato, 2. Ethics, Politics, Religion and the Soul,<br />
Oxford University Press, Oxford 1999, pp. 309-328.<br />
F. C. C. Sheffield, Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong>. The Ethic of Desire, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006.<br />
Chr. Sourvinou Inwood, « Kore », Der Neue Pauly, Enzyklopädie der Antike, Herausgegeben von H.<br />
Cancik – H. Schneider, Verlag J. B. Metzler, Stuttgart – Weimar, IX, 2000, pp. 600-603.<br />
E. Stafford, « Personifications in Greek Religious Thought and Practice », A Companion to Greek<br />
Religion, D. Ogden (ed.), Oxford, Blackwell, 2007, pp. 71-85.<br />
P. Stengel, « Horai », Paulys Real-encyclopädie der Classischen Altertumswissenschaft,<br />
herausgegebe, von G. Wissowa, J.B. Metzlerscher Verlag, Stuttgart, VIII, 2, 1913, pp. 2300-2313.<br />
274
Aikaterini Lefka<br />
O. Thomson, «Socrates and Love», C & M, 52, 2001, pp. 117-178.<br />
E. Thraemer, « Asklepios », Paulys Real-encyclopädie der Classischen Altertumswissenschaft,<br />
herausgegebe, von G. Wissowa, J.B. Metzlerscher Verlag, Stuttgart, II, 1896, pp.1642-1697.<br />
J. P. Vernant, «Un, deux, trois, Éros», M. M. Mactoux et E. Geny (éds.), Mélanges Pierre Levêque,<br />
vol. I, Presses Universitaires Franche-Compté, Besançon, 1988, pp. 293-302.<br />
G. Vlastos, «The Individual as an Object of Love in Plato», G. Vlastos (ed.), Platonic Studies,<br />
Princeton University Press, Princeton, N. J., 1973, pp. 3-42, reprinted in G. Fine (ed.), Plato, 2. Ethics,<br />
Politics, Religion and the Soul, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1999, pp. 137-163.<br />
O. Waser, « Eunomia », Paulys Real-encyclopädie der Classischen Altertumswissenschaft,<br />
herausgegebe, von G. Wissowa, J.B. Metzlerscher Verlag, Stuttgart, VI 1, 1907, pp. 1130-1131.<br />
K. Wernicke, « Apollon », Paulys Real-encyclopädie der Classischen Altertumswissenschaft,<br />
herausgegebe, von G. Wissowa, J.B. Metzlerscher Verlag, Stuttgart, II 2, 1896, pp. 1-111.<br />
—, « Artemis », Paulys Real-encyclopädie der Classischen Altertumswissenschaft, herausgegebe, von<br />
G. Wissowa, J.B. Metzlerscher Verlag, Stuttgart, II 2, 1896, pp. 1336-1440.<br />
J. Wippern, «Eros und Unsterblichkeit in der Diotima-Rede des Symposions», H. Flashar und K.<br />
Gaiser (hrsg.), Synusia, Festgabe für W. Schadewaldt zum 15. Märtz 1965, Neske, Pfullingen, 1965,<br />
pp. 123-129.<br />
K. Zimmermann, lemm. «Soter», Brill’s New Pauly, vol. 13, Brill, Leiden-Boston, 2008, 666-668 and<br />
«Soteria», ibid., 668.<br />
G. Zuntz, Persephone, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1971.<br />
275
ABSTRACT<br />
Agathon’s Gorgianic Logic<br />
Richard Patterson<br />
In responding to Agathon’s speech, Socrates notes the influence of Gorgias. Commentators have<br />
pointed to Agathon’s free use of the verbal “anthitheses” for which Gorgias was famous, especially in<br />
the concluding section of his speech, which Socrates professes to find particularly impressive. Indeed<br />
Agathon surpasses Gorgias in this respect, although at the cost of any semblance of seriousness of<br />
purpose.<br />
Equally characteristic of Gorgias’ style, however, is the self-conscious highlighting of a<br />
speech’s logical structure. This consists partly in displaying an ability to produce arguments for any<br />
thesis, however outrageous. That much seems to be part of what any clever sophist is supposed to be<br />
able to do. But Gorgias likes to make explicit every significant point relevant to a thesis, then argue<br />
for each point systematically and exhaustively—as opposed to persuading the hearer, at least on some<br />
points, by other means (e.g., projecting an air of authority, manipulating emotion). This careful and<br />
conspicuous logical structuring typifies Georgias’ best known and most clearly authentic works—the<br />
Defense of Helen and On What Is Not. Gorgias stands out among the sophists in this respect (which is<br />
not to say that the rest do not use deductive argument). His performance in On What Is Not is<br />
surpassed only by Plato in the Parmenides--and perhaps Zeno, in a work attested by Proclus and<br />
alluded to in the Parmenides.<br />
Agathon takes things to the extreme, arguing for every statement that pops out of his mouth,<br />
whether trivial or seemingly important, and whether the argument provided is any good or not. In fact<br />
Agathon’s argumentation (encompassing about two dozen short, densely ordered deductions<br />
“proving” the attributes of Eros) amounts itself to a kind of verbal pyrotechnics, one in deductive<br />
mode.<br />
All three marks of Gorgianic rhetoric (virtuosic use of verbal antitheses, formulation of an<br />
argument for every relevant point, and making evident, for all to admire, the systematic and<br />
exhaustive nature of the overall logic of a speech) characterize Agathon’s contribution to the<br />
<strong>Symposium</strong>.<br />
What is Plato’s point in composing such a speech for Agathon? Aside from showing that<br />
Plato can (as usual) beat his rivals at their own game, even while exposing the shallowness of their<br />
efforts, it serves important dramatic purposes (as described in “The Platonic conception of Tragedy<br />
and Comedy”, Philosophy and Literature, 1982). It also contains thoughts about the creative--and<br />
inspirational-- force of eros that are developed more deeply in Diotima’s speech. But comparison of<br />
the two speeches—and the intermediate section showing that Agathon did not know what he was<br />
talking about—reveals that eros must be educated through philosophical logos if it is to bring us into<br />
contact with, and then give birth to, what is genuinely beautiful (by a process described in “The<br />
Ascent in Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong>”, Proceedings, Boston Area Colloquium, 1991). Pace the Beatles, it is<br />
false that “Love Is All You Need”.
I. INTRODUCTION<br />
Tragedy and Comedy at Agathon’s Party:<br />
Two Tetralogies in Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong><br />
Nicholas Riegel<br />
The purpose of this paper is to answer two questions. The first is: Why does the <strong>Symposium</strong> end as it<br />
does? What is the connection between the ending and the rest of the dialogue? At the end of the<br />
dialogue, when all of Agathon’s guests have either left or drifted off to sleep, we are told that the last<br />
thing Aristodemus remembers seeing is Socrates explaining to Agathon and Aristophanes – a tragic<br />
and a comic poet, respectively – that it belongs to the same person to know how to write both<br />
comedies and tragedies. One might be excused for thinking that the <strong>Symposium</strong> wasn’t really about<br />
tragedy and comedy, but about love. But it is precisely this apparent lack of connection that raises the<br />
question of what the subject of tragedy and comedy has to do with the rest of the dialogue. The<br />
second major question is: What is the meaning of the argument that it belongs to the same person to<br />
know how to write good tragedies and comedies?<br />
Regarding the first major question, two things strongly suggest that in fact the dialogue does<br />
have quite a bit to do with tragedy and comedy. First there is the number of characters. And second,<br />
there is the dialogue’s many allusions to tragedy and comedy. Anyone who reads the <strong>Symposium</strong><br />
must be struck by the sheer number of significant characters. Nowhere else in Plato’s works do so<br />
many characters have significant speaking roles. Usually, it is just Socrates speaking to one or two<br />
other people. In <strong>Symposium</strong>, no less than seven (I will argue there are eight) characters have<br />
significant speaking roles. And Socrates does not dominate discussion, as he usually does.<br />
The number of significant characters in the dialogue raises the question of the dialogue’s<br />
structure. Scholars have divided the speeches up differently. R. G. Bury divides the speeches into<br />
three acts: The first act consists of the first five speeches, the second consists of Socrates’ speech, and<br />
the third of Alcibiades’. 1 Both G. R. F. Ferrari and Alexander Nehamas would divide “the praises of<br />
eros” into two groups, the first comprising the speeches of Phaedrus, Pausanias, and Eryximachus,<br />
and the second, the speeches of Aristophanes, Agathon, and Socrates. 2 But if we take Diotima’s as<br />
separate speech, and appreciate dialogue’s intimate connection to Greek drama, its structure becomes<br />
immediately clear: there are eight speeches, divided into two tetralogies. And this mirrors the<br />
structure of the festivals of the Great Dionysia in 5 th and 4 th century Athens. At these festivals, tragic<br />
poets competed by presenting three tragedies followed by a satyr play. And here in the <strong>Symposium</strong><br />
we have two sets of three serious speeches followed by a humorous speech. In the first tetralogy,<br />
Phaedrus, Pausanias, and Eryximachus present serious or tragic Speeches, and Aristophanes presents<br />
a humorous speech or satyr play. In the second tetralogy, Agathon, Socrates and Diotima present<br />
serious or tragic speeches and Alcibiades presents the humorous speech or satyr play. There can be no<br />
doubt that Plato intends us to take Alcibiades’ speech as a satyr play, because Socrates calls it a satyr<br />
play. At <strong>Symposium</strong> 222d, Socrates says to Alcibiades: “You think that I should be in love with you<br />
and no one else, while you and no one else, should be in love with Agathon – well, we were not<br />
deceived; we’ve seen through your little satyr play.” 3 But if Alcibiades’ speech constitutes a satyr<br />
play, then it would make sense to take Aristophanes’ speech as a satyr play as well. Thus the<br />
1 Robert Gregg Bury, The <strong>Symposium</strong> of Plato, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Heffer, 1932). lii.<br />
2 Alcibiades’ speech is apparently a separate issue. Alexander Nehamas, "The <strong>Symposium</strong>," in Virtues of Authenticity:<br />
Essays on Plato and Socrates (Princeton: Princeton University, 1999), 306; G. R. F. Ferrari, "Platonic Love," in The<br />
Cambridge Companion to Plato, ed. Richard Kraut (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 250. For a review of the<br />
literature on this topic dating from 1932 see Bury, The <strong>Symposium</strong>. For a more recent review, see Kevin Corrigan and Elena<br />
Glazov-Corrigan, Plato's Dialectic at Play: Argument, Structure, and Myth in the <strong>Symposium</strong> (University Park:<br />
Pennsylvania State University Press, 2004). Chpt 3. Corrigan and Glazov-Corrigan attempt to show how the first five<br />
speeches (Phaedrus, Pausinaus, Eryximachus, Aristophanes, and Agathon) are reflected in the ascent to the Form of the<br />
Beautiful in Diotima’s speech. Cf. also Meyer William Isenberg, "The Order of the Discourses in Plato's <strong>Symposium</strong>" (The<br />
University of Chicago, 1940); John A. Brentlinger, "The Cycle of Becoming in the <strong>Symposium</strong>," in The <strong>Symposium</strong> of<br />
Plato, ed. Leonard Baskin (Amherst: 1970).<br />
3 Except where otherwise noted, translations of Plato’s works will be taken from John M. Cooper, ed. Plato: Complete<br />
Works (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997).
Nicholas Riegel<br />
dialogue’s structure is as follows: 4<br />
278<br />
Tetralogy 1 Tetralogy 2<br />
Phaedrus Agathon Tragedy<br />
Pausanias Socrates Tragedy<br />
Eryximachus Diotima Tragedy<br />
Aristophanes Alcibiades Satyr Play<br />
This analysis becomes even more persuasive when we attend to what I think is the dialogue’s second<br />
most salient feature: namely its many allusions to tragedy and comedy. First, there is the fact that the<br />
symposium takes place at Agathon’s house. Agathon is a tragic poet. And the symposium is held in<br />
honor of his victory at the Lenaia in 416 BCE. Second, the famous comic poet Aristophanes is there.<br />
Third, a symposium is literally a drinking party. And so it must take place under the auspices of<br />
Dionysus: god of wine and drama. And Alcibiades is depicted as Dionysus, and Socrates is compared<br />
to Silenus (215b ff.), companion of Dionysus, and leader of satyr chorus. And finally there is the<br />
ending of the dialogue itself, as we have already mentioned. Thus it seems that contrary to what we<br />
might have thought at first, the <strong>Symposium</strong> has quite a lot to do with tragedy and comedy.<br />
Regarding the second major question - namely, what is the meaning of arguing that it belongs<br />
to the same person to write good tragedies and comedies - I want to argue that all three: Philosophy,<br />
Tragedy, and Comedy claim to address life’s problems. Two of life’s central problems are love and<br />
death. The questions concerning love are: What is the good? What is happiness? And what should we<br />
desire? And the question concerning death is: Why is there badness especially in the forms of<br />
suffering and death? I think Plato’s point is that comedy and tragedy have no answer to these<br />
questions. We can never be sure whether what they say about love is true. And we are left with the<br />
feeling that they both say that suffering and death are meaningless. Tragedy emphasizes the horror of<br />
this, and comedy emphasizes the ridiculousness of it. So, insofar as all the speeches in the <strong>Symposium</strong><br />
are like tragedies or comedies, they all fail in some way – even the speeches of Socrates and Diotima<br />
– although they fail perhaps least of all. The first tetralogy fails because it does not follow a correct<br />
methodology. And this leads to the content being wrong. But even if the methodology and hence the<br />
content were correct – as they are in the second tetralogy – tragedy and comedy still fail because the<br />
medium is wrong. Tragedy and comedy are essentially mimetic, and so they cannot lead us to the true<br />
object of love – the good itself – nor can they solve the question of death and suffering. Plato’s point<br />
is that only philosophy can do this.<br />
II. PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS<br />
Before we begin, however, I would like to address a number of questions or objections which may<br />
have already occurred to the reader. The first major objection may be that there is a difference<br />
between satyr plays and comedies. Satyr play was one of the four types of performances at the City<br />
Dionysia, the other three being dithyramb, tragedy and comedy. 5 Satyr plays consist of a chorus of<br />
satyrs led by their father, Silenus. According to Bernd Seidensticker there are four major differences<br />
between satyr play and comedy. 6 The first is that Satyr Plays are more light-hearted than comedies.<br />
Comedies tend to engage more in satire and parody, and often have a biting, caustic side to them,<br />
whereas satyr plays are aimed at pure relaxation and enjoyment. Second, satyr plays do not take<br />
contemporary issues as their theme. They resemble tragedies in being about the stories from wellknown<br />
myths. Comedy, on the other hand, often takes contemporary issues, like the Peloponnesian<br />
War, as its theme, and it often addresses contemporary figures and ridicules them by name. Third, in<br />
4<br />
In his article The Cycle of Becoming in the <strong>Symposium</strong> John Brentlinger also divides the <strong>Symposium</strong> into two sets of four<br />
speeches. However, he does not consider Diotima’s to constitute a separate speech; rather, he divides the second set of<br />
speeches as follows: 1. Agathon, 2. Agathon and Socrates, 3. Socrates, 4. Alcibiades. In addition, he does not make the<br />
connection between the series of four speeches and the dramatic tetralogies of Antiquity. And, though he goes on to make<br />
many excellent points, I believe his analysis of the order of the speeches ignores an important critique of Socrates, which my<br />
analysis reveals. Brentlinger, "The Cycle of Becoming in the <strong>Symposium</strong>," 7.<br />
5<br />
The dithyramb is a cult song in honor of Dionysus. It was sung to the accompaniment of the aulos by a chorus at the<br />
beginning of the festivals.<br />
6<br />
For this and much of what follows my source is Bernd Seidensticker, "Dithyramb, Comedy, and Satyr-Play," in A<br />
Companion to Greek Tragedy, ed. Justina Gregory (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005).
Nicholas Riegel<br />
contrast to both tragedy and comedy, the chorus of satyrs in a satyr play takes an active part in the<br />
action of the drama; whereas, the chorus of tragedies and comedies is usually relegated to observation<br />
and commentary. And finally, the scene of satyr plays is generally “trees, caves, and mountains,”<br />
whereas the scene of tragedies is usually a palace, while the scene of comedies is usually the common<br />
spaces of a city.<br />
Though satyr plays are a distinct genre from comedy proper, it does not seem to me to follow<br />
necessarily that some of the things said about comedy cannot also be said about satyr play and vice<br />
versa. Even Seidensticker, who is adamant about the difference between satyr play and comedy, 7<br />
admits that they both have essentially the same function, namely “to get the audience to laugh.” 8 Thus<br />
just as Tragedy may be categorized as “that which is performed for the sake of fear and pity,” so<br />
perhaps we may group satyr play and comedy together under the heading “that which is performed for<br />
the sake of laughter.” And it is in this sense that what Socrates speaks about at the end of the<br />
<strong>Symposium</strong> as comedy, may also refer back to the speeches I have categorized as satyr plays in the<br />
two tetralogies.<br />
The second major objection may be that it is not at all clear that Plato believed there was a<br />
science of tragedy and comedy. At Republic 395A Socrates evinces clear awareness that as a matter<br />
of fact the same person does not write tragedies and comedies. This might be explained, as James<br />
Adam does, by saying that in Republic he is talking about what in fact is the case, whereas in<br />
<strong>Symposium</strong> he is talking about what should be the case. 9 The case of the Ion is more complex. For at<br />
Ion 534c Socrates seems to say that good poetry cannot be produced by a scientific method. But even<br />
if Plato believes that as a matter of fact, good poetry is not produced by scientific means, it seems to<br />
me, we may still ask why Plato seems to think in the <strong>Symposium</strong> that if it were produced<br />
scientifically, the same person would be able to write tragedies and comedies? It is true that, as Adam<br />
points out, 10 it is a Socratic principle that there should be one science for every pair of opposites, but<br />
we can still ask, what is it about tragedy and comedy in particular that makes Socrates think, at least<br />
in the <strong>Symposium</strong> that there could be a single science or craft of both?<br />
Having hopefully addressed these objections, let us turn now to the comparison of the two<br />
tetralogies: the first, we might call the ‘demotic tetralogy,’ and the second is the ‘philosophic<br />
tetralogy.’ In the first tetralogy we will see that each speech fails to adequately address the problems<br />
of love and life in their content. In the second, the methodology and content are correct – or so it<br />
would appear Plato thinks – but still, the speeches fail to bring the reader to the knowledge of the<br />
good and the solution to our mortality. After showing this, we will consider why Plato thinks neither<br />
tragedy nor comedy offers a solution to life, and why he thinks only philosophy can.<br />
III. THE FIRST, OR DEMOTIC TETRALOGY<br />
If we accept the bi-tetralogical structure of the <strong>Symposium</strong>, we can further analyze each tetralogy as<br />
follows: thesis, antithesis, development, and critique. Thus Phaedrus presents the thesis that love is<br />
good because his effects are good. Pausanias disagrees with Phaedrus that love’s effects are always<br />
good and thus feels the need to posit two kinds of love. Eryximachus agrees with Pausanias, but he<br />
goes further than any of the other speakers in explaining the essence of the good effects of love. At<br />
the basis, however, of all the first three speeches lies the assumption that love consists in two beings<br />
coming together and that the correct object of love is always another human being. Aristophanes<br />
makes this assumption explicit and perhaps also gently ridicules it.<br />
Phaedrus presents the thesis of the first tetralogy: the effects of love are good. Love, he<br />
argues, leads to virtuous activity. One would least of all like to be seen doing something shameful in<br />
the eyes of one’s lover. As proof he adduces the myths of Alcestis, Orpheus and Achilles. It was said<br />
that the all the speeches of the first tetralogy fail because they do not address the central problems of<br />
love, among which are the problems of suffering and death. But here, in the first speech of the first<br />
tetralogy Phaedrus explicitly refers and relies on myths surrounding the deaths of three persons. Even<br />
though Phaedrus does bring up the subject of death, it is clear that he does not do so in order to<br />
emphasize death as a central problem for the question of love and life; rather, he does so only in order<br />
to further his program of demonstrating the good effects of love. For a serious discussion of the<br />
7 “Even if (as is probable) the three dramatic genres arose from the same or closely related cultural contexts, in their fully<br />
developed literary forms each as its separate identity.” Ibid., 49.<br />
8 Ibid., 47.<br />
9 James Adam, The Republic of Plato: Edited with Critical Notes, Commentary and Appendices, 2 vols. (Cambridge:<br />
Cambridge University, 1902). ad loc.<br />
10 Ibid.<br />
279
Nicholas Riegel<br />
problem death poses for love, we shall have to wait for Diotima’s speech in the second tetralogy.<br />
Pausanias presents the antithesis that the effects of love are not always good. Since the effects<br />
of love are not always good, he concludes that there must be two gods of love, or two kinds of love.<br />
But the problem is that we begin to have doubts even about what Pausanias calls the good kind of<br />
love. He argues that in the good kind of love the beloved will be motivated by the desire for virtue<br />
which the older lover can presumably confer. But we are not told what the lover gets from this<br />
relationship. Presumably sexual gratification, but no investigation is made into whether this indeed is<br />
good. Despite this apparent difficulty with his account, Pausanias has provided a definite advance in<br />
the dialectic. The effects of love are not always good. But, again, by concentrating on the effects of<br />
love, Pausanias neglects love’s nature, and thus he misses the central questions of love.<br />
Eryximachus presents the development of Pausanias’ contribution. He deepens our<br />
understanding of the effects of love. Like Diotima in the second tetralogy, Eryximachus focuses on<br />
natures and essences. But unlike Diotima, he focuses on the nature of the effects of love, rather than<br />
on the nature of love itself. The good effect of love consists in agreement (homonoia: 186e;<br />
homologia: 187b) and harmony (harmonia: 187a; sumphonia: 187b). 11 The main thrust of his<br />
argument is to try to connect the good sort of love with the principle of harmony and concord. He<br />
speaks as though love conquers all the discord in the universe, but we are led to wonder whether this<br />
is true. As a doctor Eryximachus must know that at best the good kind of love has a temporary victory<br />
in the universe. Even the healthiest body, where all the opposing elements are maximally harmonized<br />
for the longest time, will eventually succumb to the forces of decay and discord. And we are still left<br />
with no answer to the question: what was it all for? Nevertheless, Eryximachus has provided an<br />
advance over Pausanias. While Pausanias argued that there must be different kinds of love, since love<br />
has bad effects as well as good, he did not investigate the nature of those effects. Eryximachus gives<br />
an answer to the question about the nature of love’s good effects. But as with all the previous<br />
speakers, the ultimate questions concerning love are not answered. And this is because the nature of<br />
love itself has neither been explored nor settled.<br />
Like Alcibiades will in the second tetralogy, Aristophanes does not so much continue the<br />
progression of the dialectic of the first three speeches, as criticize the basic picture of love which lies<br />
beneath the previous speeches in their respective tetralogies. The basic picture of love in the first<br />
tetralogy is that it consists in two people coming together. This is obviously the case with Phaedrus<br />
and Pausanias, but even with Eryximachus, there is no indication that human love has any other<br />
proper object than another person. But, one might well argue, Aristophanes does not paint the picture<br />
of the double-people in order to criticize it; rather, he seems to celebrate it. Here I would say that<br />
Aristophanes’ own humor works against him, and that we need to remember Plato/Socrates’ own<br />
injunction against taking poets as the ultimate authorities on the correct interpretation of their own<br />
works at Apology 22a-c. The way in which Aristophanes’ own comedy works against the conclusion<br />
he draws from it, is precisely the ridiculousness of the imagery of the double-people. Aristophanes<br />
counts heavily on this imagery to raise a laugh, but he does not see that the reason it raises a laugh is<br />
precisely because it takes to the extreme the idea that one person should couple with another. But<br />
Plato may here be highlighting how absurd it looks from a philosophical point of view.<br />
In the end each speech in the First Tetralogy fails because it does not follow a proper<br />
methodology. The speeches describe the effects of before defining love itself. They raise problems<br />
without adequately answering them. We can either worry about these problems, as in the first three<br />
speeches. Or we can laugh about them, as in the last one. But none of the speeches solves the<br />
problems.<br />
IV. THE SECOND, OR PHILOSOPHIC TETRALOGY<br />
The structure of the second tetralogy is like the first. Agathon presents the thesis that love is good;<br />
Socrates presents the antithesis that love is not good; Diotima then develops Socrates’ theme; and<br />
Alcibiades provides a criticism of the picture of love which emerges from the dialectic. The second<br />
tetralogy is “philosophic” because it follows the correct methodology. It begins by investigating<br />
love’s nature rather than its effects. But as we shall see in Acibiades’ speech there is a veiled criticism<br />
11 It should be noted that it is not clear whether the words harmonia or sumphonia mean exactly the same thing as our word<br />
‘harmony’. Some translators have favored ‘attunement’ for the former and ‘concord’ for the latter, e.g. Nehamas and<br />
Woodruff. But I think Eryximachus’ point is clear, both harmonia and sumphonia are kinds of agreement (homologia) and as<br />
such ‘harmony’ is not out of place as a translation in this context. Cf. 187b: ἡ γὰρ ἁρµονία συµφωνία ἐστίν, συµφωνία δὲ<br />
ὁµολογία τις. Cf. also Kenneth James Dover, Plato: <strong>Symposium</strong> (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1980). 108; Bury, The<br />
<strong>Symposium</strong>: ad loc.<br />
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Nicholas Riegel<br />
even of the second tetralogy. It necessarily fails to bring us to the vision of the beautiful itself because<br />
it is a mimetic representation.<br />
Turning to the speeches, we might well ask why Agathon belongs in the philosophic<br />
tetralogy? The answer is because he begins almost in the right way. He begins by considering love<br />
itself rather than its effects, and he criticizes all the previous speakers for failing to do so at 194e-5a.<br />
Socrates acknowledges that Agathon gets this right at 199c where he states, “Indeed, Agathon, my<br />
friend, I thought you led the way beautifully in your speech when you said that one should first show<br />
the qualities of Love himself, and only then those of his deeds. I much admire that beginning.” The<br />
problem is that it is still not precisely right to begin as Agathon does by attributing all good and<br />
virtuous qualities to love. Even though this is not made explicit until Diotima’s speech, the proper<br />
procedure is to begin by considering an object’s nature or essence. Only then should one move to<br />
consider its qualities and then its effects.<br />
Socrates presents the antithesis that love is not good. He argues 1. That love is “of” something<br />
(199d-e); 2. That it is the desire for its object (200a); and 3. That a desire implies a lack or deficiency<br />
of the object desired (200a-b). From this he argues that it follows that love can be neither good nor<br />
beautiful, as Agathon had claimed. Whether Socrates’ arguments are valid or not would be the subject<br />
of another paper. But his conclusion seems insightful and plausible. His overall conclusion is that<br />
insofar as love implies some sort of desire, it also seems to imply some sort of lack, deficiency, and<br />
imperfection. And thus one who is in a state of love/desire is experiencing an awareness of a lack of<br />
goodness. Socrates is the first to begin by considering love’s nature, and thus he advances the<br />
dialectic.<br />
But even Socrates fails to give a definition of love. Only with Diotima do we finally get a<br />
proper definition of love. Progress toward the definition begins at 204d when she changes the proper<br />
object of love from beauty to goodness. The next step was already prepared for us by Socrates when<br />
he realized that persons who possessed a quality could still be said to desire that quality in a way.<br />
What those persons desire is the continued possession of that property. Diotima reminds Socrates of<br />
this when she points out that lovers don’t just want the good, they want the good to be theirs eternally.<br />
The full definition of love is at 206a: “In a word, then, love is wanting to possess the good forever.”<br />
And this shows the problem with the other speeches. Even if one is lucky enough to attain the good in<br />
this life, we still remain mortal beings. So if anything is going to solve the problem of life and love it<br />
must tell us two things: first, what is the good, and second how can we possess it forever. Anything<br />
which fails to answer these two questions, fails to solve the problem of love, which has become the<br />
problem of life. And Diotima does both, even if a bit cryptically. The good turns out to be the eternal<br />
possession of the ultimate object of knowledge in the increasingly abstract ascent of the higher<br />
mysteries (210a-212a). This is the apex of the ascent of philosophy, where one achieves a vision of<br />
the beautiful and eternal life at the same time. But, though we seem to have an answer finally to the<br />
question of love and life, the dialogue does not end here, and it is worth considering why.<br />
I would like to focus only on two main points with respect to Alcibiades. The first is that he is<br />
or represents Dionysus in the <strong>Symposium</strong>. He crowns the victors of the contest between two<br />
tetralogies: Agathon, Socrates and himself, just as Dionysus decides the contest between Aeschylus<br />
and Eurpides in Aristophanes’ Frogs. This eventuality was prepared for us at the beginning of the<br />
<strong>Symposium</strong>, at 175e, where Agathon tells Socrates that Dionysus will soon be the judge of their<br />
wisdom. The second point is that Alcibiades shows the problem with the second tetralogy. Alcibiades<br />
can and does describe Socrates intimately, but it is clear that he doesn’t understand him, for if he truly<br />
did understand Socrates he wouldn’t have run away and lived the life that he did. What I think this is<br />
meant to show is that even if a poet had the right method, still the problem with poetry is that at best it<br />
can only represent, and therefore it cannot get you to the transcendent solution to love and life.<br />
V. CONCLUSION<br />
Thus, in conclusion, the essay began with two questions: What is the connection between the<br />
argument about tragedy and comedy, and the rest of the dialogue? What is the meaning of Socrates’<br />
argument that it belongs to the same person to write tragedy and comedy? Regarding the first<br />
question, it turns out there were many connections: First, the <strong>Symposium</strong> takes place at Agathon’s<br />
house. Second, Aristophanes is there. Third, Alcibiades is depicted as Dionysus and Socrates as<br />
Silenus. And finally there is the Structure of the Dialogue itself, which seems very similar to the<br />
dramatic contests performed at the festivals of Dionysus. Regarding the second question, it belongs to<br />
the same person to know how to write tragedies and comedies because they are about the subject<br />
matter. All three: tragedy, comedy, and philosophy attempt to deal with the problems of life. Two of<br />
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Nicholas Riegel<br />
the main problems are: What is the good and how do we get it? What is the meaning of it all<br />
considering our mortality?<br />
Tragedy and comedy can and do address these problems, but they cannot solve them. They<br />
cannot solve the problems because they do not have the right methodology. This was the problem<br />
with the first tetralogy. But even if they did have the right methodology, qua mimetic representations<br />
they can only give an external description of the good and how to get there. They cannot bring us to<br />
the good itself. This was the problem with the second tetralogy. Art and poetry, according to Socrates<br />
in the Republic, can only hold up a mirror to nature. But the problem for Plato is that he thinks the<br />
solution to the problems of life ultimately require transcending the concrete world of the senses. The<br />
<strong>Symposium</strong> teaches that only through philosophy can we transcend the concrete world of the senses<br />
and find a solution to life’s problems. Whether Plato was right about that is another question.<br />
BIBLIOGRAPHY<br />
Adam, James. The Republic of Plato: Edited with Critical Notes, Commentary and Appendices. 2 vols<br />
Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1902.<br />
Brentlinger, John A. "The Cycle of Becoming in the <strong>Symposium</strong>." In The <strong>Symposium</strong> of Plato, edited<br />
by Leonard Baskin. Amherst, 1970.<br />
Bury, Robert Gregg. The <strong>Symposium</strong> of Plato. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Heffer, 1932.<br />
Cooper, John M., ed. Plato: Complete Works. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997.<br />
Corrigan, Kevin, and Elena Glazov-Corrigan. Plato's Dialectic at Play: Argument, Structure, and<br />
Myth in the <strong>Symposium</strong>. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2004.<br />
Dover, Kenneth James. Plato: <strong>Symposium</strong>. Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1980.<br />
Ferrari, G. R. F. "Platonic Love." In The Cambridge Companion to Plato, edited by Richard Kraut.<br />
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.<br />
Isenberg, Meyer William. "The Order of the Discourses in Plato's <strong>Symposium</strong>." The University of<br />
Chicago, 1940.<br />
Nehamas, Alexander. "The <strong>Symposium</strong>." In Virtues of Authenticity: Essays on Plato and Socrates.<br />
Princeton: Princeton University, 1999.<br />
Seidensticker, Bernd. "Dithyramb, Comedy, and Satyr-Play." Chap. 3 In A Companion to Greek<br />
Tragedy, edited by Justina Gregory. Oxford: Blackwell, 2005.<br />
282
Literary Form and Thought in Aristophanes’ Speech<br />
Chair: Arnaud Macé
ABSTRACT<br />
Platonic Fables as Philosophical Poiesis<br />
Rick Benitez<br />
Scholars have sometimes noted the importance of fables to Plato by pointing to the passage of Phaedo<br />
in which Cebes speaks of Socrates embellishing Aesop's fables (ἐντείνας τοὺς τοῦ Αἰσώπου λόγους,<br />
60d1). Some have suggested that Plato's fables play an important structural role in the philosophical<br />
lessons of particular dialogues (e.g. Betegh, 2009). 1 None, however, have gone so far as to describe<br />
the Platonic fables as making an important contribution to Plato's critique of poetry generally. In this<br />
paper I propose that Platonic fables—short myths, typically incorporating comic elements and<br />
embedding a philosophical lesson rather than a caution—have a cognitive function that conventional<br />
fables do not: they reflect a rationally ordered picture of how things are. Mimesis of a rational order<br />
of things is an aesthetic criterion; we see it at work in Plato's fables, where it provides a model for<br />
what Plato believes good poems and myths should do.<br />
A unique context for examining my hypothesis is the <strong>Symposium</strong>, because it presents both a<br />
Platonic fable—the fable of Poros and Penia—and a fable in conventional form—Aristophanes' fable<br />
of the circle-men. In the <strong>Symposium</strong> it is possible to observe both Plato's objections to conventional<br />
fables and his recommendations for what fables (and by extension poems and myths) should do.<br />
Scholars have generally treated the fable of Poros and Penia as part of Socrates' response to Agathon,<br />
but there are many similarities to Aristophanes' fable (such as the union of complementary beings, the<br />
neediness of incomplete beings, the relationship of desire to lack, etc.). Despite the structural<br />
similarities linking the two fables, however, they function in entirely different ways. While<br />
Aristophanes' fable emphasises the irrationality of the human condition, the hubris of human beings,<br />
and the need to fear the gods because of their power to destroy, the fable of Poros and Penia<br />
emphasises cognitive capacities, approves of unrestrained desire to understand, and establishes<br />
intercourse between humans and gods through an intermediate.<br />
Hunter (2004:85) 2 recognised that the fable of Poros and Penia provides part of the<br />
philosophical education of the acolyte of beauty (though according to him only the lowest part). My<br />
aim in this paper is to show that the Poros and Penia fable does more than that. Since it incorporates<br />
an understanding of the nature, object and function of desire, it is the sort of story that only a teacher<br />
who had received the highest vision could tell. It is thus a creation that is born in the presence of the<br />
beautiful—the sort of creation that reflects how things really are. The fable of Poros and Penia, then,<br />
is not only an inducement to the attainment of rational vision, it is the accomplishment of such a<br />
vision.<br />
Sheffield (2006:45) 3 has noted that through the fable of Poros and Penia "Socrates envisages<br />
stories with the right (philosophical) content." This is correct, but does not go far enough. The fable<br />
also allows us to envisage stories with the right form and aim of composition.<br />
1 Gabor Betegh, 2009, "Tale, theology and teleology in the Phaedo" in Catalin Partenie, ed., Plato's Myths. Cambridge.<br />
2 Richard Hunter, 2004, Plato's <strong>Symposium</strong>, Oxford.<br />
3 Frisbee Sheffield, 2006, Plato's <strong>Symposium</strong>: The Ethics of Desire, Oxford.
Premessa<br />
Tra Henologia ed Agathologia.<br />
Aristofane e Diotima a confronto sulla concezione del Bene<br />
e sulla Dialettica (Symp. 189a1-193e2 e 201d1-212c3)<br />
Claudia Luchetti<br />
θεραπεία δὲ δὴ παντὶ παντὸς µία, τὰς οἰκείας<br />
ἑκάστῳ τροφὰς καὶ κινήσεις ἀποδιδόναι. τῷ δ' ἐν<br />
ἡµῖν θείῳ συγγενεῖς εἰσιν κινήσεις αἱ τοῦ παντὸς<br />
διανοήσεις καὶ περιφοραί· ταύταις δὴ<br />
συνεπόµενον ἕκαστον δεῖ, τὰς περὶ τὴν γένεσιν ἐν<br />
τῇ κεφαλῇ διεφθαρµένας ἡµῶν περιόδους<br />
ἐξορθοῦντα διὰ τὸ καταµανθάνειν τὰς τοῦ παντὸς<br />
ἁρµονίας τε καὶ περιφοράς, τῷ κατανοουµένῳ τὸ<br />
κατανοοῦν ἐξοµοιῶσαι κατὰ τὴν ἀρχαίαν φύσιν,<br />
ὁµοιώσαντα δὲ τέλος ἔχειν τοῦ προτεθέντος<br />
ἀνθρώποις ὑπὸ θεῶν ἀρίστου βίου πρός τε τὸν<br />
παρόντα καὶ τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον.<br />
Timaios, 90c6-d7<br />
τεθεάµεθα µέντοι διακείµενον αὐτό, ὥσπερ οἱ τὸν<br />
θαλάττιον Γλαῦκον ὁρῶντες οὐκ ἂν ἔτι ῥᾳδίως<br />
αὐτοῦ ἴδοιεν τὴν ἀρχαίαν φύσιν, ὑπὸ τοῦ τά τε<br />
παλαιὰ τοῦ σώµατος µέρη τὰ µὲν ἐκκεκλάσθαι, τὰ<br />
δὲ συντετρῖφθαι καὶ πάντως λελωβῆσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν<br />
κυµάτων, ἄλλα δὲ προσπεφυκέναι, ὄστρεά τε καὶ<br />
φυκία καὶ πέτρας, ὥστε παντὶ µᾶλλον θηρίῳ<br />
ἐοικέναι ἢ οἷος ἦν φύσει, οὕτω καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν<br />
ἡµεῖς θεώµεθα διακειµένην ὑπὸ µυρίων κακῶν.<br />
ἀλλὰ δεῖ, ὦ Γλαύκων, ἐκεῖσε βλέπειν. - Ποῖ; ἦ δ'<br />
ὅς. - Εἰς τὴν φιλοσοφίαν αὐτῆς, καὶ ἐννοεῖν ὧν<br />
ἅπτεται καὶ οἵων ἐφίεται ὁµιλιῶν, ὡς συγγενὴς<br />
οὖσα τῷ τε θείῳ καὶ ἀθανάτῳ καὶ τῷ ἀεὶ ὄντι, καὶ<br />
οἵα ἂν γένοιτο τῷ τοιούτῳ πᾶσα ἐπισποµένη καὶ<br />
ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς ὁρµῆς ἐκκοµισθεῖσα ἐκ τοῦ<br />
πόντου ἐν ᾧ νῦν ἐστίν<br />
Politeia X, 611d1-e5<br />
Il presente contributo si propone come tentativo di fornire un’interpretazione prevalentemente<br />
filosofica di alcuni aspetti del legame presente fra i discorsi di Aristofane e Socrate-Diotima sulla<br />
natura di Eros.<br />
Che nel Simposio vi sia un filo d’Arianna, teso sapientemente da Platone con il probabile<br />
intento, sottolineerei, didattico e protreptico insieme, di mantenere viva l’attenzione del lettore<br />
sull’esistenza di connessioni più profonde fra i due ‘encomi’ di Amore, è stato già osservato 1 : si va<br />
dall’inversione dell’ordine dei discorsi di Aristofane ed Erissimaco (185c4-e5), al richiamo esplicito<br />
di Diotima, decisivo per la comprensione dell’analogia e della distanza fra le due posizioni (205d10e3),<br />
alla segnalazione da parte di entrambi di voler parlare in modo alquanto diverso da quanto ha<br />
fatto chi li ha preceduti (si veda rispettivamente 189c2-3 ed in particolare 199a6-b5), fino al tentativo<br />
di Aristofane di riprendere la parola dopo Socrate (212c4-d5), interrotto “improvvisamente”<br />
(ἐξαίφνης, 212c6) dall’irrompere di Alcibiade sulla scena, ed infine alla conversazione a tre che<br />
culmina, fattosi oramai giorno, nell’autentico enigma della teoria socratica dell’Unità di tragedia e<br />
commedia (223d3-6). È chiaro che, con quest’ultima allusione, Platone ha voluto porre la parola fine<br />
ad uno dei suoi capolavori omettendo i dettagli indispensabili a comprendere il senso ultimo di un<br />
διαλέγεσθαι (c6) che si è sviluppato nel corso di buona parte della notte (cfr. 223b1 sgg.).<br />
*Desidero esprimere subito la mia riconoscenza a Platone per averci lasciato, oltre al compito di coglierne le connessioni<br />
certo non elementari, un dialogo, l’unico, in cui si parla, separatamente ed insieme, sia dell’Uno che del Bene.<br />
1 Per non appesantire questa presentazione, mi limito ad indicare alla fine una breve lista solo di alcuni fra i testi che ritengo<br />
essenziali, per approfondire il tipo tematiche affrontate qui. La mia tendenza innata a privilegiare sempre innanzitutto il<br />
lavoro sui testi, sistematico e senza troppe mediazioni, mi ha comunque portata ad imboccare un percorso per certi versi<br />
atipico, come del resto non può non accadere, quando ci si affidi interamente a Platone.
Aristofane e Platone. Sulla “Natura Originaria”, e sul Bene come Uno.<br />
Claudia Luchetti<br />
Se questo gioco di rimandi interni al Simposio è già un segnale piuttosto esplicito dell’esortazione, da<br />
parte di Platone, a prendere seriamente il contenuto del discorso di Aristofane, sulla sua profonda<br />
consistenza teoretica non ci sono più dubbi se ci si concentra sulla predominanza del concetto di<br />
ἀρχαία φύσις (191d1-2, 192e9, 193c5, 193d4), intorno a cui ruota l’intero argomento. L’insistenza su<br />
questa nozione svela l’intento platonico di porre al centro dell’attenzione, servendosi della maschera<br />
di Aristofane, sia il tema della natura primigenia dell’Anima, sia della relazione della ψυχή con il<br />
Bene, l’oggetto supremo che guida il desiderio psichico di ritorno al proprio stato originario, senza<br />
distinzioni, ad un livello iniziale, sulle inclinazioni più o meno filosofiche del soggetto in questione<br />
(cfr. Resp. VI 505d5-e3 con Symp. 191c2-d2, passaggi su cui tornerò a breve).<br />
Per stabilire le innegabili affinità fra questa natura pristina e la concezione platonica<br />
dell’Anima considerata nella sua forma pura, è necessaria una breve ricostruzione. Oltre ai due brani<br />
che ho citato all’inizio, Timeo 90c6-d7, e Repubblica X 611d1-e5, possiamo rifarci a quanto descritto<br />
nella celebre analogia con il Sole di Repubblica VI (508d4-509a5): quando la Psiche è ormai<br />
interamente orientata alla visione delle realtà illuminate dalla Verità e dall’Essere (ἀλήθειά τε καὶ τὸ<br />
ὄν, 508d5), essa si rivela nel suo aspetto agatoide (ἀγαθοειδής, 509a3), ovvero come Intelligenza e<br />
Scienza (νοῦς, 508d6 ed ἐπιστήµη, 508e6).<br />
Che questo Essere dell’Anima non si riduca semplicemente ad una condizione statica, ma<br />
corrisponda ad una costante aspirazione e tensione, ce lo dimostra proprio il brano di Repubblica X<br />
(611d1-e5): per poterne contemplare l’antica natura è alla sua filosofia che bisogna guardare. In<br />
questa formulazione confluiscono, da un lato, la concezione dell’attività filosofica come µελέτη<br />
θανάτου (61b7-84b8) e la teoria della συγγένεια dell’Anima al divino mondo degli εἴδη provenienti<br />
dal Fedone, e dall’altro, la natura prevalentemente erotica dello slancio psichico verso l’Intelligibile<br />
proveniente dal discorso di Socrate e Diotima nel Simposio, segnalata dal ricorso alla metafora del<br />
contatto fisico-spirituale (Resp. X 611e1, Symp. 192b5, ed in Diotima 208e5, 209c7, 211b5-7, 212a2-<br />
5). La filosofia dunque, l’Eros rivolto all’εἰδέναι ed alla φρόνησις (cfr. Phaed., 62c9 sgg.), non<br />
rappresenta solo il desiderio, certamente realizzabile, anche se con delle limitazioni di ordine<br />
‘temporale’ (Phaed. 66b1-67a2), di un soggetto ancora incarnato, ma costituisce l’autentica Essenza<br />
dell’Anima, quando la si osservi in ciò che essa è “al di là” (cfr. la perfetta coincidenza nell’uso<br />
dell’ἐκεῖσε di Resp. X 611b10-d8 e Symp. 211e4-212a2) dei vincoli corporei, e per mezzo dell’unico<br />
strumento che rende possibile questa contemplazione: la sua stessa Intelligenza. Nel concetto<br />
platonico di ἀρχαία φύσις si concretizza infatti quella simmetria quasi onnipresente nei dialoghi fra<br />
conoscenza dell’Anima e conoscenza delle Idee (cfr. la ἴση ἀνάγκη di Phaed. 76e5), che culmina<br />
nell’Autoconoscenza.<br />
L’espressione massima di questa bellissima sintesi di ontologia, gnoseologia e psicologia<br />
platoniche, la ritroviamo proprio nel passo del Timeo (90c6-d7), che descrive la dinamica della<br />
ὁµοίωσις θεῷ: l’ἀρχαία φύσις qui si svela, in maniera evidentissima, non nella considerazione del<br />
soggetto conoscente, nella sua forma incontaminata, e dell’oggetto del conoscere, presi a sé,<br />
scollegati, bensì nella fusione di questa polarità nell’Unità dell’atto noetico. E l’identità che Platone ci<br />
esorta a meditare in Repubblica X fra ἀρχαία φύσις e φιλοσοφία, intesa con Diotima come<br />
conseguimento del Bene mediato dall’unione intellettuale col Bello (cfr. 201d1 sgg.), ci intima a non<br />
perdere di vista l’elemento fondamentale di questo ‘eterno processo’ e di questa ‘eterna aspirazione’:<br />
nell’analogia con il Sole il Bene non è ‘solo’ causa dell’Essere e dell’Esistenza degli Intelligibili (τὸ<br />
εἶναί τε καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν, 509b7-8), è anche causa del ‘passaggio’ dalla loro conoscibilità al loro essere<br />
conosciuti (τὸ γιγνώσκεσθαι, 509b6). Il Bene investe di sé, simultaneamente, e ‘servendosi’ di quel<br />
legame potente che è la Luce, definita come un “terzo” (τρίτον, 507d1, e1), la ψυχή e gli εἴδη,<br />
determinandone, nell’atto stesso dell’irradiazione, sia la consistenza ontologica che la connessione<br />
reciproca.<br />
In sintesi: l’ ἀρχαία φύσις è per Platone l’Unità del conoscente e del conosciuto, in termini<br />
erotico-filosofici, dell’Amante e dell’Amato, causata dall’ ἀγαθόν.<br />
Senza approfondire ulteriormente, bisogna domandarsi se, nel discorso di Aristofane, si celi o<br />
meno tutta questa densità gnoseologica, ontologica e metafisico-protologica. Fatte tutte le dovute<br />
precisazioni, che proverranno anche dal successivo confronto con il discorso di Diotima, risponderò<br />
con un sì a questa domanda.<br />
Se analizziamo la condizione dell’androgino, o della natura umana in generale, anteriore<br />
all’intervento dicotomico operato da Zeus (189c5-190c1), ci troviamo infatti di fronte ad un essere<br />
completamente inconsapevole del proprio legame con l’ἀγαθόν in quanto il suo possesso -ammesso e<br />
287
Claudia Luchetti<br />
non concesso che inizialmente lo fosse davvero- connaturato alla sua struttura originaria, non viene<br />
riconosciuto come tale.<br />
Questo ci porta ad ipotizzare sin dall’inizio la necessità distinguere almeno due livelli di<br />
questa φύσις: platonicamente infatti la non divisione non conduce alla vera unificazione –διαίρεσις e<br />
συναγωγή si implicano reciprocamente, e lo vedremo- in quanto quest’ultima è inizialmente presente<br />
in forma indifferenziata ed irriflessa. Parafrasando le parole che userà Socrate nel suo discorso, ‘non<br />
si desidera ciò di cui non si crede di aver bisogno’ (200a1 sgg.), mentre Eros, erede della natura<br />
indigente della madre Penia, è sempre ‘bisognoso e desideroso’ (203c5 sgg.). Con tutta evidenza<br />
quindi, la natura che non vive, ma ‘vegeta’, nell’era anteriore a quella di Zeus, è completamente priva<br />
di qualsiasi tipo di tensione erotica orientata verso il Bello ed il Bene, il che esclude a priori che<br />
questa tipologia rispecchi con le sue caratteristiche la confluenza platonica fra ἀρχαία φύσις e<br />
φιλοσοφία, con tutte le δυνάµεις conoscitive che ne conseguono.<br />
Indicazioni chiare di una considerazione negativa da parte platonica delle attitudini degli<br />
umani indivisi, provengono dalla loro descrizione come esseri “terribili” (190b5), e dal paragonarli ai<br />
Titani (190c4). Anche i loro “grandi/smisurati pensieri” (τὰ φρονήµατα µεγάλα, 189b6), non sono<br />
rivolti ad altro che a tentare la ἀνάβασις al cielo per aggredire gli Dei (190b8-c1). La punizione divina<br />
che ne consegue, è il segno più evidente dell’assoluta mancanza di quell’ordine interiore (κόσµιοι,<br />
193a4, da cfr. con 190e4-5), della Giustizia (cfr. τὴν ἀδικίαν, 193a2) e di quella devozione (εὐσεβεῖν,<br />
193a8) ed amicizia verso gli Dei (φίλοι τῷ θεῷ, 193b3-4), che in Platone costituiscono, insieme, il<br />
presupposto ed il fine della ὁµοίωσις θεῷ, trasformare la Psiche individuale quanto più possibile nello<br />
‘specchio’ dell’ordinamento giusto ed invariante degli εἴδη (cfr. Resp. VI, 500b8-d2, Theaet. 176a5b3).<br />
Inoltre, non è una coincidenza che il concetto di ἀρχαία φύσις compaia solamente nella<br />
‘seconda’ parte del racconto di Aristofane (appunto in 191d1-2, 192e9, 193c5, 193d4), mentre ‘prima’<br />
che Zeus intervenga, la formula utilizzata è la assai meno allusiva ἡ γὰρ πάλαι ἡµῶν φύσις οὐχ αὑτὴ<br />
ἦν ἥπερ νῦν (189d6-7). Viene anche evitato il ricorso alla possibile alternativa ἡ παλαιὰ φύσις, che<br />
avrebbe potuto farci pensare immediatamente a Repubblica X (cfr. 611d2).<br />
Il discorso invece, di un’intensità straordinaria, che il Dio Efesto rivolge alle due metà<br />
dell’umano diviso, si innesta su uno sfondo che corrisponde fedelmente alla visione platonica del<br />
legame fra ψυχή ed ἀγαθόν: le Anime di ciascuna delle due metà non sono “capaci di dire” (192c3,<br />
d1) il perché del rapimento -avendo già escluso che sia di tipo puramente sessuale (192c5)- che le<br />
domina quando riescono a ritrovarsi e ad “Essere insieme” (συνών, 192c6); le due metà possono solo<br />
indovinare questo desiderio irresistibile e manifestarlo in forma enigmatica (µαντεύεται ὅ βούλεται,<br />
καὶ αἰνίττεται, 192d1-2), e, se interrogate ancora al riguardo, continuano a rimanere nell’incertezza e<br />
nell’imbarazzo (ἀποροῦντας, 192d5). Ci troviamo qui esattamente nella stessa costellazione teorica<br />
del libro VI di Repubblica, 505d5-e3: l’Anima, che nel caso del Bene non si accontenta mai<br />
dell’apparenza, ma lo cerca nella sua realtà, agisce sempre in vista di esso (cfr. il τούτου ἕνεκα di<br />
505d11 con Symp. 192c6), anche quando indovini soltanto che cosa esso sia (ἀποµαντεθοµένη τι<br />
εἶναι, 505e1), essendo incerta ed incapace di coglierne a sufficienza l’Essenza (ἀποροῦσα δὲ καὶ οὐκ<br />
ἔχουσα λαβεῖν ἱκανῶς τί ποτ' ἐστὶν, 505e1-2).<br />
Questo parallelismo marcatissimo ci permette anche di individuare una differenza prospettica,<br />
ovviamente consapevolmente ricercata da Platone in qualità di scrittore del Simposio, ma sostanziale,<br />
su cui mi concentrerò in tutto quanto segue. L’ἀγαθόν non è affatto assente dal λόγος di Aristofane: vi<br />
si fa esplicito riferimento, alla fine, nei termini della felicità e della beatitudine (εὔδαιµον, 193c3,<br />
µακαρίους καὶ εὐδαίµονας, 193d5), e del conseguimento di quell’ottimo (ἄριστον, 193c6, c7) che<br />
derivano appunto dalla ricostituzione dell’ἀρχαία φύσις (193c2-5).<br />
Il Bene però, non è il fine primario delle Anime che anelano alla ricostituzione della loro<br />
natura originaria: inconsapevoli di ciò che auspicano dalla loro metà perduta (191c2-4), non<br />
desiderano altro che “ridiventare, da due, uno” (ἐκ δυοῖν εἶς γενέσθαι, 192e8-9); perciò perseguono la<br />
“totalità” (τοῦ ὅλου), perché la loro condizione era quella di ‘interi’ (ὅλοι, 192e10), intendendo con<br />
ciò che erano assolutamente Uno (ἕν ἦµεν, 193a1-2).<br />
Emblematico in Aristofane è quindi il primato dello ἕν sull’ἀγαθόν: diversamente da quanto<br />
lascia intendere una considerazione sinottica del concetto di ἀρχαία φύσις nei dialoghi, il Bene è una<br />
conseguenza dell’essere Uno, e non la sua causa.<br />
288
Diotima, o dell’Uno come Bene.<br />
Claudia Luchetti<br />
καὶ λέγεται µέν γέ τις, ἔφη, λόγος, ὡς οἳ ἂν τὸ ἥµισυ ἑαυτῶν ζητῶσιν, οὗτοι ἐρῶσιν· ὁ δ' ἐµὸς λόγος<br />
οὔτε ἡµίσεός φησιν εἶναι τὸν ἔρωτα οὔτε ὅλου, ἐὰν µὴ τυγχάνῃ γέ που, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ἀγαθὸν ὄν…<br />
Symposion, 205d10-e3<br />
Nel discorso di Socrate, Diotima, alla proposta di definizione di Eros data da Aristofane, τοῦ ὅλου οὖν<br />
τῇ ἐπιθυµία καὶ διώξει ἔρως ὄνοµα (192e10-193a1), risponde con un’alternativa chiarissima: Amore<br />
non è in primo luogo Amore dell’Uno, concetto che nella sua polisemia può esprimere sia l’unità della<br />
parte che del tutto, ma del Bene in quanto tale. La tensione verso l’Uno, dominante nel discorso di<br />
Aristofane, va dunque corretta e riletta come conseguenza del suo essere Bene, e non viceversa.<br />
Una prova straordinaria della priorità dell’ἀγαθόν sullo ἕν si evince dal percorso erotico che<br />
conduce al Bene, partendo da una più adeguata definizione di Eros come Amore del Bene e del suo<br />
eterno possesso, ovvero dell’Immortalità (204d1 sgg.), e culminante nell’epifania della Bellezza.<br />
La metodologia dialettica adottata nella descrizione dell’ascesi psichica che procede per i<br />
diversi gradi dei misteri erotici, presenta delle particolarità a cui è indispensabile almeno accennare:<br />
Platone ci ha abituati, dall’Eutifrone (6c-e), attraverso la Repubblica (libro V 476b-d, 479c-e) ed il<br />
Fedro (249b-c, 266b-c), sino al Filebo (12b-15c), solo per fare pochi esempi, a considerare come<br />
prima operazione della Dialettica (cfr. Soph. 253c-e) il passaggio, parafrasando il Fedro, ‘da una<br />
molteplicità sensibile ad un’Unità articolata con, ed apprensibile dal ragionamento’. Nel Simposio<br />
siamo di fronte ad un impiego della συναγωγή e delle sue varianti estremamente più complesso, e<br />
questo sotto un duplice aspetto:<br />
1) Innanzitutto abbiamo un’interazione palese e strutturale fra Unità e Molteplicità: senza<br />
mettere in discussione la chiara organizzazione piramidale e gerarchica dei vari gradi di<br />
manifestazione del Bello, osserviamo che il punto di partenza di questa elevazione non sono τὰ πολλὰ<br />
καλὰ, come ci si potrebbe aspettare, bensì un singolo sensibile ritenuto bello (210a4-8). Per evitare il<br />
possibile errore di identificazione di questo tipo di unità puramente apparente, con il vero ‘Uno’ che è<br />
il τέλος di tutto il percorso, la συναγωγή sembra venire applicata, per così dire, al contrario,<br />
introducendo solo in un secondo momento una molteplicità sensibile che permetta, per contrasto, di<br />
individuarvi un’Unità ontologicamente superiore in quanto di tipo non più fenomenico. L’effetto più<br />
immediato dell’utilizzo ripetuto di questo metodo, è la produzione di quelle combinazioni possibili di<br />
Unità e Molteplicità, che anticipano in modo puntuale la descrizione, esplicitata nel Sofista, di tutte le<br />
operazioni della διαλεκτικὴ ἐπιστήµη (cfr. 253d1-253e2). Ne consegue anche che, giunti al livello<br />
della Bellezza della singola ψυχή e delle molte ψυχαί, la dinamica erotico-dialettica continuerà a<br />
svolgersi in ambito esclusivamente intelligibile (210b6 sgg.).<br />
2) In secondo luogo, possiamo apprezzare la presenza, quasi nascosta, del ben noto contraltare<br />
dialettico di questo procedere per livelli di Unificazione sempre più articolati e profondi: la via della<br />
διαίρεσις. Quella riconduzione ad unità svolta in apparenza all’inverso, che fa da mediatore fra<br />
un’unità di ordine inferiore e l’infinita molteplicità che potrebbe seguirle immediatamente, rendendo,<br />
come nel caso della fissazione erotica sull’unità apparente di partenza, anche qui, impossibile il<br />
riconoscimento di quel tratto Identico ed Uno (ἕν τε καὶ ταὐτόν, 210b3), necessario al raggiungimento<br />
del livello ontologico successivo, è in realtà il metodo dicotomico: ἀπὸ ἑνὸς ἐπὶ δύο καὶ ἀπὸ δυοῖν ἐπὶ<br />
πάντα τὰ καλὰ σώµατα, 211c3-4. Se ne può concludere che συναγωγή e διαίρεσις, pur non ricorrendo<br />
come termini tecnici, agiscono sullo sfondo dell’elevazione erotica in modo sinergico ed<br />
indissolubile.<br />
Perché, anche solo partendo da queste poche premesse, è possibile sia sostenere che la<br />
prospettiva di Diotima è agatologica, che stabilirne la supremazia su quella henologica avanzata da<br />
Aristofane nel suo discorso? Perché il sentiero iniziatico che conduce alla contemplazione del Bello<br />
passa attraverso un processo espansivo dall’Uno ai Molti, che colloca esplicitamente alcune<br />
Molteplicità (quella di tutti i corpi o quella delle Anime), ad un livello superiore a quello di alcune<br />
Unità (rispettivamente del singolo corpo o della singola Anima). Procedendo nella generalizzazione<br />
evidentemente queste Molteplicità vengono ulteriormente sintetizzate in Unità ancora superiori fino<br />
ad arrivare al τέλος. Le Unità sintetiche che di volta in volta vengono contemplate, si presentano<br />
perciò come Esseri Uni-molteplici, ovvero come delle Totalità o Interi, ὅλοι.<br />
Da un punto di vista ontologico dunque, l’Idea del Bello-Bene, pur essendo µονοειδές (211b1,<br />
e4), si presenta come l’antitesi più radicale di quel presunto atomismo monolitico ed a-dialettico sul<br />
quale Platone, secondo molte interpretazioni moderne, avrebbe impostato la sua teoria delle Idee, e<br />
che poi avrebbe abbandonato, del tutto o in parte, nei dialoghi tardi.<br />
In un’ottica metafisico-protologica, tornando al richiamo ad Aristofane di Diotima in 205d10-<br />
289
Claudia Luchetti<br />
e3, le parole della Sacerdotessa si potrebbero riformulare come segue: se è vero che Amore del Bene è<br />
Amore dell’Uno -ricordiamo che si parte dal grado infimo dello slancio erotico verso l’Uno, quello<br />
rivolto al singolo corpo- non necessariamente vale l’inverso, ovvero che Amore di un’unità<br />
qualsivoglia sia Amore del Bene. Amore dell’Uno, per essere Amore del Bene, deve essere Amore di<br />
un’Unità sintetica che sappia fondere insieme, ed in maniera ultimativa, Uno e Non Uno, ovvero<br />
capace di assorbire in sé anche il lungo cammino di negazioni (cfr. 210e2-211b5) e distinzioni in cui<br />
il carattere omnipervasivo del καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν trova la sua espressione più consona.<br />
Come si può facilmente constatare, una ricostruzione di questo tipo non entra in contrasto con<br />
quelle testimonianze indirette sugli ἄγραφα δόγµατα, che fanno esplicito riferimento all’identità<br />
sostanziale fra il Bene e l’Uno 2 : la Metà, o più genericamente, la Parte, ed il Tutto, di cui parla<br />
Diotima, sono pur sempre forme specifiche di Unità, dipendenti però da un’Unità originaria<br />
intimamente dialettica, e non indifferenziata e disarticolata. Detto in maniera ancora più prosaica,<br />
permettendomi di richiamarmi al dialogo Parmenide, l’Uno-Bene platonico trova corrispondenze<br />
decisamente più numerose nello ἕν-ὅλον della seconda ipotesi (cfr. 142b1 sgg.), certo non nello<br />
ἕν indifferenziato ed inconoscibile della prima (cfr. 137c4 sgg.) 3 .<br />
Gli stimoli che provengono dal Simposio però, spingono anche a problematizzare molto<br />
seriamente la questione del rapporto non solo dell’Uno, ma di entrambi i Principi all’ἀγαθόν, e questo<br />
perlomeno in due sensi:<br />
a) In primo luogo perché la divisione e la negazione, rivelandosi per elementi che non si<br />
limitano a permetterci di discriminare ‘verticalmente’ i livelli dell’epifania del Bello sulla base della<br />
loro maggiore o minore consistenza ontologica, determinando bensì, diciamo ‘orizzontalmente’, la<br />
costituzione stessa dell’αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, sono proprio quelle componenti che rendono possibile<br />
parlarne come di un vasto mare (τὸ πολὺ πέλαγος, 210d4). Coerenza con questa interpretazione<br />
agatologica, cioè dialettica, vuole che, se stando alla tradizione indiretta, la διαίρεσις e la ἑτερότης,<br />
rispettivamente, dipendono metodologicamente e derivano ontologicamente entrambe dalla ἀόριστος<br />
δυάς, ci si svincoli da quella visione della Diade presente in alcune interpretazioni della teoria dei<br />
Principi non solo come radicalmente opposta all’Uno, ma soprattutto impregnata di connotazioni<br />
etiche negative.<br />
L’utilità dell’applicazione del metodo dicotomico è evidentissima: per suo tramite viene<br />
divisa, spezzata concettualmente, l’unità apparente di partenza, svelandone l’illusorietà, nel produrne<br />
due da una, di modo che la Psiche dell’iniziando possa volgersi alla considerazione della Totalità<br />
delle Unità appartenenti alla medesima specie (cfr. ancora 211c3-4). Nelle loro manifestazioni<br />
metodologico-dialettiche lo ἕν e la δυάς concorrono non solamente a liberare la via alla visione<br />
ultimativa del Bello-Bene, ma convergono nella determinazione della sua stessa natura: questo θεῖον<br />
θαῦµα (211e3, 210e4-5) è sia trascendente che immanente, assoluto nella sua inconcussa Unità e<br />
simultaneamente diffusivo ed omnipervasivo.<br />
b) Secondariamente, ma non in ordine di importanza, va tenuto conto del carattere iconico di<br />
Eros, che induce, nel riflettere sulla relazione fra l’ ἀγαθόν e lo ἕν, a spostare il baricentro di questo<br />
rapporto in maniera ancora più decisa nella direzione agatologica: nel brano centrale (202d8-203a8),<br />
in cui Diotima descrive la potenza (δύναµις) di questo grande δαίµων, Eros è quella forza ermetica<br />
(ἑρµηνεῦον) di scambio e di comunicazione (ἡ ὁµιλία καὶ ἡ διάλεκτος) fra il Divino e l’umano,<br />
capace di colmare le ‘lacune’ (συµπληροῖ) affinché tutto risulti, in se stesso -intrinsecamente-<br />
interconnesso (ὥστε τὸ πᾶν αὐτὸ αὑτῷ συνδεδέσθαι).<br />
A mio parere non c’è motivo per non vedere in questa straordinaria illustrazione, anche la<br />
descrizione, sottoforma di immagine, di una dinamica il cui svolgimento coinvolge, oltre al rapporto<br />
‘verticale’ fra un’Anima ancora incarnata che anela all’Idea, con questa, innanzitutto la dimensione<br />
intelligibile in quanto tale, e questo per due ragioni: la prima è che nel mito immediatamente<br />
successivo sulla genealogia di Amore, è possibile intravedere, come è notoriamente già stato<br />
suggerito, nelle vesti di Poros e Penia, lo ἕν e la ἀόριστος δυάς dell’insegnamento orale. La seconda,<br />
per me ancora più importante, è che forse nell’unica vera definizione del Bene che abbiamo nei<br />
2 Qui è sufficiente richiamarsi, per la ἀναγωγή del metodo generalizzante che riduce i µέγιστα γένη allo ἕν, alla relazione<br />
sullo scritto περὶ τῶν ἐναντίων (Alessandro di Afrodisia, Commento alla Metafisica di Aristotele, 250, 20, sgg. Hayduck), e<br />
per la riduzione della serie positiva ad Aristotele, Metafisica Δ 15, 1021a9 sgg. Per la specifica dipendenza della ταὐτότης<br />
dalla ἑνότης, cfr. Metaph. Δ 1018a7, e per la fondamentale identificazione fra ἀγαθόν e ἕν cfr., a titolo esemplificativo,<br />
Metaph. Ν 4, 1091b14.<br />
3 Per esigenze di sintesi ho dovuto rinunciare ad una disamina, entro la concezione plotiniana della henosis, della recezione,<br />
più o meno esplicita, del mito dell’androgino. Alcuni aspetti del discorso di Aristofane (cfr. Enn. IV,3,12) diventano centrali,<br />
accanto ad una lettura radicalmente monista della teoria platonica dei Principi (cfr. Enn. V, 3, 15 and V, 4, 2), sia per<br />
distinguere il νοῦς ἔµφρονος dal νοῦς ἐρῶν (cfr. Enn. III,5, 4-7 and VI 7 31-35.), che per pervenire alla propria visione<br />
dell’Uno superessenziale.<br />
290
Claudia Luchetti<br />
dialoghi platonici, precisamente nel Fedone (99c1-6), l’ἀγαθόν è quell’autentico potere immortale che<br />
tutto tiene insieme e tutto collega:…ὡς ἀληθῶς τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ δέον συνδεῖν καὶ συνέχειν.<br />
Seguendo questa suggestione, Eros sarebbe icona del Bene, proprio in quanto frutto della<br />
mescolanza fra i due Principi, dominati da un’Unica ἀρχή che è loro immanente, in quanto è identica<br />
al misto, al prodotto della fusione, ed insieme li trascende, in quanto, essendo la causa dell’unione, ne<br />
costituisce il fondamento ontologico.<br />
Non solo Eros è immagine fededegna del Bene, lo è anche il φιλόσοφος per eccellenza:<br />
Socrate. Unico uomo realmente demonico (cfr. 203a4-5, 219b7-c2), unico vero esperto di cose<br />
d’Amore (cfr. 177d6-8, 198c5 sgg.), Socrate è, come l’Istante in cui il Bello-Bene irrompe nell’Anima<br />
(ἐξαίφνης, 210e4, 213c1), stando nel mezzo fra sapienza ed ignoranza (cfr. 201e10-202a10), una<br />
ἄτοπος φύσις µεταξύ (cfr. Symp. 175a10-b3, 221d2, e Parm. 156d1-e3). Ma questa sua ἀτοπία è la<br />
stessa θαυµασιότης del Bello (cfr. 210e4-5 e 213e2, 215b8, 216c7, 219c1, 220a4, a7, 221c3, c6).<br />
Proprio in questa meraviglia si svela il tratto più profondo della personalità di Socrate, il suo essere<br />
ἄφθονος (cfr. Symp. 210d6 e ad esempio Euthyphr. 3b5-d9, Phaed. 61d9-e4), e cioè ἀγαθός (cfr. Tim.<br />
29e1-3).<br />
Naturalmente, la ragione ultimativa della supremazia dell’agatologia di Diotima sulla<br />
henologia di Aristofane, si radica nella sorgente di quella antinomia originaria che, per via analogica,<br />
dice l’ἀγαθόν in quanto massimo datore di Forma, come ἰδέα ed οὐσία, ed insieme come “al di là”<br />
della Forma (ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας, 509b9-10), quindi, letteralmente, come οὐκ ἰδέα ed οὐκ οὐσία<br />
(509b8-9).<br />
Il λόγος di Diotima ci mostra che non c’è bisogno di imboccare una sola fra le due vie a<br />
discapito dell’altra, perché è proprio nell’Unione con ciò che è massimamente Idea, il Bello (210e6-<br />
211b5), che si schiudono tutta la πρεσβεία e la δύναµις generatrici del Bene.<br />
Solo da una συνουσία (Symp. 211d8, 212a2) con questo tipo di ‘Unità’, per meglio dire, di causa<br />
unificante, o di non Dualità, e né con un’unità primaria ma indifferenziata, né semplicemente con un<br />
uno di secondo grado (cfr. Aristofane, rispettivamente 191c7, 192c5, c6), è possibile la procreazione<br />
nel Bello (τόκος ἐν καλῷ, 206b7-8): come nella Repubblica dalla µείξις erotica del filosofo con<br />
l’οὐσία sgorgano νοῦς, ἀλήθεια ed ἐπιστήµη (libro VI 490a 8-b8), così, nel Simposio, dalla<br />
coesistenza con il Bello, l’Anima genera la ‘restante’ prole (Resp. VI 507a1-5) dell’ἀγαθόν, la vera<br />
ἀρετή (212a2-7).<br />
La “Natura Originaria” e l’Uno di Aristofane rivisti in prospettiva agatologica.<br />
La concezione di un Bene che include in sé dialetticamente l’Uno, permette, per concludere, di gettare<br />
un breve sguardo retrospettivo alla ‘seconda’ parte del discorso di Aristofane e di mettervi meglio a<br />
fuoco alcuni ulteriori elementi genuinamente platonici nella relazione fra l’ἀγαθόν, la ψυχή e lo ἕν.<br />
Ovviamente si potrebbe dubitare dell’opportunità di riconoscere nella descrizione dell’umano<br />
diviso degli espliciti richiami ai due metodi fondamentali della dialettica platonica.<br />
Sta di fatto però, che il dividere per due compiuto da Zeus, sottolineato con una certa<br />
insistenza (διατεµῶ δίχα, Symp. 190d1, τεµῶ δίχα, d5, ἔτεµε τοὺς ἀνθρώπους δίχα, d7, ἡ φύσις δίχα<br />
ἐτµήθη, 191a5-6), compare come terminus technicus perfettamente interscambiabile con il noto δίχα<br />
διαιρεῖν dei dialoghi ritenuti espressamente dialettici (cfr. Soph. 221e2, 265a11, 265e8, Polit. da<br />
261b4 a 302c8, Phil. 49a9, ed in Leg. V 745c5, d2), ma ricorre anche all’inizio della celebre analogia<br />
della Linea in Resp. VI 509d6.<br />
Per quanto concerne il ricondurre ad unità, anche se a quest’altezza del racconto, Aristofane<br />
intende il desiderio di commistione e congiungimento delle due metà in un’accezione<br />
prevalentemente sessuale, la scelta cade sulle espressioni συµπλεκόµενοι di 191a7, συνεπλέκετο,<br />
191b3, e ἐν τῇ συµπλοκῇ, 191c4, συµπεπλεγµένοι, 191e8-192a1, tipiche della συµπλοκὴ τῶν εἰδῶν<br />
(Soph. 259e6, cfr. 240c1, 262c6, Theaet. 202b5, Polit. 278b2 fino a 309e10, ed in particolare la<br />
significativa connessione fra συµπλέκειν e l’agatologico συνδεῖn in 309a8 sgg.). Di συναγωγή invece,<br />
come strumento amoroso messo a disposizione dall’azione congiunta di Zeus e di Apollo per risanare<br />
la natura umana, si parla esplicitamente anche in 191d3 (συναγωγεύς).<br />
È interessante inoltre osservare, che col procedimento di individualizzazione o di<br />
individuazione eseguito da Apollo su ciascuna metà, per sanare le ferite prodotte dalla scissione<br />
(190e2-191a5), vengono ricreate quelle condizioni di ordine interno (cfr. κοσµιώτερος, 190e4),<br />
necessarie a generare un giusto rapporto con il Divino: nel rivolgersi (µετέστρεφε, 190e6 e cfr. Resp.<br />
VII 518c4-519a1) col volto al proprio ὀµφαλός (190e9), vedendo così simultaneamente sia il taglio<br />
che la sua guarigione, l’Anima di ciascuna metà prende coscienza, in un modo che ricorda fortemente<br />
l’anamnesi (µνηµεῖον εἶναι τοῦ παλαιοῦ πάθους, 191a4-5, e cfr. Phaed. 73c1 sgg.), sia della propria<br />
291
Claudia Luchetti<br />
somiglianza che della dissomiglianza dall’origine, ovvero della convivenza in essa di Uno e Non Uno.<br />
Zeus ed Apollo concorrono dunque per primi, nel loro dividere e ri-unificare, a favorire la<br />
ricostituzione dell’Unità originaria, prerequisito per riconquistare la µεγίστη εὐδαιµονία perduta, in<br />
quanto questo Principio e Sorgente, è appunto sia Uno che Dualità (ποιῆσαι ἕν ἐκ δυοῖν, 191d2,<br />
τετµηµένος…ἐξ ἑνὸς δύο, 191d5, ὥστε δύ’ ὄντας ἕνα γεγονέναι, 192e1, ὡς ἕνα ὄντα, e2, ἀντὶ δυοῖν<br />
ἕνα εἶναι, e3-4, ἐκ δυοῖν εἷς γενέσθαι, 192e8-9).<br />
Dalla proposta, spiccatamente demiurgica, fatta da Efesto alle ψυχαί dell’umano diviso, di rifondere<br />
e concreare insieme in un Identico ed Uno (συντῆξαι καὶ συµφυσῆσαι εἰς τὸ αὐτό, 192d8-e1)<br />
le due metà, è chiaro che l’ἀρχαία φύσις così ricomposta non può più coincidere con l’unità<br />
disarticolata di partenza. Per pervenirvi infatti, è nuovamente indispensabile l’intervento di un Dio, ed<br />
inoltre questo ricongiungimento potrebbe non essere una grazia riservata a tutti, ma solo a coloro che<br />
abbiano raggiunto definitivamente almeno il livello dell’Amore fra le Anime (da 192b5 in poi).<br />
Risiede dunque nella sapienza demiurgica del Divino, il solo sufficientemente capace di<br />
sciogliere l’Uno nei Molti e di riportare il Molteplice ad Unità (cfr. Tim. 68d2-d7), la vera causa dei<br />
fondamenti di una dialettica erotica fra soggetto e oggetto -al livello più alto auspicato da Platone, fra<br />
Anima e Idee (cfr. anche Phaedr. 250c7 sgg.)- che sfoci nella loro autentica Unificazione nell’atto<br />
intellettuale.<br />
Se l’uomo non è nient’altro che Anima (cfr. Alc. I 130c1-3, Leg. XII 959a4-b7), servendosi di<br />
Aristofane Platone precisa, ulteriormente, la sua mancanza di Autosufficienza nella sua singolarità:<br />
l’unità psichica individuale è infatti solo un σύµβολον ἀνθρώπου (191d4). La vera Psiche risulta<br />
invece dall’assimilazione con il massimo oggetto d’Amore, in cui la φιλοσοφία può essere vista come<br />
la connessione reciproca, ‘verticale’ ed ‘orizzontale’ insieme, che lega indissolubilmente (per il<br />
δεσµός più bello e più potente, cfr. Tim. 31b8-c4, e Crat. 403a3 sgg.) il conoscente ed il conosciuto<br />
nella comune tensione verso l’ἀγαθόν.<br />
È dunque più che plausibile che nell’ἀρχαία φύσις di Aristofane, rivista con lo sguardo di<br />
Socrate e di Diotima, si nascondano davvero quella sintesi primigenia del Timeo fra ψυχή ed εἴδη,<br />
congiunte nell’Unità della Noesi, e quella realtà agatoide della Repubblica, Principiato immediato del<br />
Bene, che con il soccorso degli Dei possiamo ‘ricreare’, realizzando il nostro fine: con le parole del<br />
Timeo, dialogo con cui alcune parti del λόγος di Aristofane andrebbero confrontate sistematicamente,<br />
“la migliore delle realtà generate, dal migliore degli esseri intelligibili ed eterni” (τῶν νοητῶν ἀεί τε<br />
ὄντων ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀρίστη γενοµένη τῶν γεννεθέντων, 37a1-2).<br />
Indicazioni bibliografiche<br />
Edizioni del Simposio<br />
Platone, Simposio, introduz. di V. Di Benedetto, traduz. e note di F. Ferrari, 2008 22 , Milano, Rizzoli.<br />
Platone, Simposio, traduz. e commento di M. Nucci, introduz. di B. Centrone, Torino, Einaudi, 2009.<br />
Platone, Simposio, traduz. di G. Calogero, introduz. di A. Taglia, Bari, Laterza, 1996.<br />
The <strong>Symposium</strong> of Plato. Edited with Introduction, Critical Notes and Commentary by R.G. Bury,<br />
Cambridge, W. Heffer & Sons Ltd, 1932 2 .<br />
292<br />
*<br />
K. Albert, Mystik und Philosophie, Sankt Augustin, Verlag Hans Richarz, 1986.<br />
W. Beierwaltes, Denken des Einen. Studien zur neuplatonischen Philosophie und ihrer<br />
Wirkungsgeschichte, Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann, 1985.<br />
W. Beierwaltes, Lux Intelligibilis. Untersuchungen zur Lichtmetaphysik der Griechen, München,<br />
1957.<br />
S. Delcomminette, Le Philèbe de Platon: introduction à l'agathologie platonicienne, Leiden, Brill,<br />
2006.<br />
N. Dimon, L’infelicità di essere Greci, Castelvecchi-Lit Edizioni, Roma 2012.<br />
M. Ficino, Über die Liebe oder Platons Gastmahl, Lateinisch-Deutsch, Hamburg, Felix Meiner<br />
Verlag, 2004.<br />
J.N. Findlay, Plato. The Written and Unwritten Doctrines, New York, 1974.
Claudia Luchetti<br />
H.G. Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik, Tübingen,<br />
J.C.B. Mohr, 1965 2 .<br />
K. Gaiser, Platons Zusammenschau der mathematischen Wissenschaften, in Antike und Abendland.<br />
Beiträge zum Verständnis der Griechen und Römer und ihres Nachlebens, Band XXXII, 1986, pp. 89-<br />
124.<br />
K. Gaiser, La dottrina non scritta di Platone [Platons ungeschriebene Lehre, 1968 2 ], traduz. di V.<br />
Cicero, Milano, Vita e Pensiero, 1994.<br />
K. Gaiser, Testimonia Platonica. Le antiche testimonianze sulle dottrine non scritte di Platone, [in<br />
Platons ungeschriebene Lehre, 1963], ediz. it. a c. di G. Reale e V. Cicero, Milano, Vita e Pensiero,<br />
1998.<br />
K. Gaiser, Platonische Dialektik – damals und heute, in Gesammelte Schriften, hrsg. von T.A. Szlezák<br />
und K.-H. Stanzel, Sankt Augustin, Academia Verlag, pp. 177-203.<br />
G. Giannantoni, Dialogo socratico e nascita della dialettica nella filosofia di Platone, Edizione<br />
postuma a c. di B. Centrone, Napoli, Bibliopolis, 2005.<br />
J. Halfwassen, Monismus und Dualismus in Platons Prinzipienlehre, in Platonisches Philosophieren.<br />
Zehn Beiträge zum Ehre von H.J. Krämer, Spudasmata, 82, 2001, pp. 67-85.<br />
N. Hartmann, Platos Logik des Seins, Berlin, Walter De Gruyter & Co., 1965 2 .G.W.F. Hegel,<br />
Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, in Sämtliche Werke. Jubiläumausgabe in zwanzig<br />
Bänden, mit einem Vorwort von K.L. Michelet, hrsg. von H. Glockner, Stuttgart, Frommanns-<br />
Holzboog, 1959 Band XVIII.<br />
G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über Platon (1825-1826), herausgegeben, eingeleitet und mit<br />
Anmerkungen versehen von J.L. Vieillard-Baron, Frankfurt am Main-Berlin-Wien, Ullstein Verlag,<br />
1979.<br />
V. Hösle, Wahrheit und Geschichte. Studien zur Struktur der Philosophiegeschichte unter<br />
paradigmatischer Analyse der Entwicklung von Parmenides bis Platon, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt,<br />
frommann-holzboog, 1984.<br />
M. Isnardi Parente, Studi sull’Accademia Platonica Antica, Firenze, Olschkij, 1979.<br />
H.J. Krämer, Aretē bei Platon und Aristoteles. Zum Wesen und zur Geschichte der platonischen<br />
Ontologie, Heidelberg, Carl Winter Universitätsverlag, 1959.<br />
G. Krüger, Einsicht und Leidenschaft. Das Wesen des platonischen Denkens, Frankfurt am Main,<br />
Vittorio Klostermann, 1948.<br />
S. Lavecchia, Oltre l’Uno ed i Molti. Bene ed Essere nella filosofia di Platone, Milano-Udine,<br />
Mimesis Edizioni, 2010.<br />
P. Merlan, From Platonism to Neoplatonism, The Hague, Nijhoff, 1960.<br />
Plotino, Enneadi, a c. di G. Faggin, Milano, Rusconi, 1992<br />
Raphael, Iniziazione alla Filosofia di Platone, Fano, Edizioni Āśram Vidyā, 1996 2<br />
Giovanni Reale, Eros dèmone mediatore. Il gioco delle maschere nel Simposio di Platone, Milano,<br />
Bompiani, 2005.<br />
Giovanni Reale, «Tutto ciò che è profondo ama la maschera». Aristofane nel Simposio come<br />
maschera emblematica delle dottrine non scritte di Platone, in Studia Classica Iohanni Traditi oblata,<br />
vol. II, pp. 899-1015.<br />
L. Robin, La teoria platonica dell’amore [La théorie platonicenne de l’amour, 1964], traduz. di D.<br />
Gavazzi Porta, prefaz. di G. Reale, Milano, Celuc, 1964.<br />
L. Robin, La Théorie Platonicienne des Idées et des Nombres d’apres Aristote, Paris, Felix Alcan<br />
Éditeur, 1908.<br />
W. Schwabe, Der Geistcharakter des »Überhimmlischen Raumes«. Zur Korrektur der herrschenden<br />
Auffassung von Phaidros 247C-E, in Platonisches Philosophieren. Zehn Vorträge zu Ehren von Hans<br />
Joachim Krämer, Spudasmata Band 82, hrsg. von T.A. Szlezák und K.-H. Stanzel, 2001, pp. 181-331.<br />
J. Stenzel, Zahl und Gestalt bei Platon und Aristoteles, Leipzig-Berlin, B.G. Teubner Verlag, 1924.<br />
T.A. Szlezák, Platone e la scrittura della filosofia. Analisi di struttura dei dialoghi della giovinezza e<br />
della maturità alla luce di un nuovo paradigma ermeneutico, [Platon und die Schriftlichkeit der<br />
Philosophie. Interpretationen zu den frühen und mittleren Dialogen, Berlin, 1985], introduz. e traduz.<br />
di G. Reale, Milano, Vita e Pensiero, 1988.<br />
T.A. Szlezák, Unsterblichkeit und Trichotomie der Seele im zehnten Buch der Politeia, Phronesis, 21,<br />
1976, pp. 31-58.<br />
E. Zeller-R. Mondolfo, La filosofia dei Greci nel suo sviluppo storico [Die Philosophie der Griechen<br />
in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung, 1892]:<br />
Parte II. Platone e l’Accademia antica. Voll. III\1 e III\2, a c. di M. Isnardi Parente, Firenze, la Nuova<br />
Italia, 1974.<br />
293
Premise<br />
Between Henology and Agathology.<br />
Aristophanes and Diotima Compared<br />
on the Conception of the Good and on Dialectics<br />
(Symp. 189a1-193e2 e 201d1-212c3)*<br />
Claudia Luchetti<br />
θεραπεία δὲ δὴ παντὶ παντὸς µία, τὰς οἰκείας<br />
ἑκάστῳ τροφὰς καὶ κινήσεις ἀποδιδόναι. τῷ δ' ἐν<br />
ἡµῖν θείῳ συγγενεῖς εἰσιν κινήσεις αἱ τοῦ παντὸς<br />
διανοήσεις καὶ περιφοραί· ταύταις δὴ<br />
συνεπόµενον ἕκαστον δεῖ, τὰς περὶ τὴν γένεσιν ἐν<br />
τῇ κεφαλῇ διεφθαρµένας ἡµῶν περιόδους<br />
ἐξορθοῦντα διὰ τὸ καταµανθάνειν τὰς τοῦ παντὸς<br />
ἁρµονίας τε καὶ περιφοράς, τῷ κατανοουµένῳ τὸ<br />
κατανοοῦν ἐξοµοιῶσαι κατὰ τὴν ἀρχαίαν φύσιν,<br />
ὁµοιώσαντα δὲ τέλος ἔχειν τοῦ προτεθέντος<br />
ἀνθρώποις ὑπὸ θεῶν ἀρίστου βίου πρός τε τὸν<br />
παρόντα καὶ τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον.<br />
Timaios, 90c6-d7<br />
τεθεάµεθα µέντοι διακείµενον αὐτό, ὥσπερ οἱ τὸν<br />
θαλάττιον Γλαῦκον ὁρῶντες οὐκ ἂν ἔτι ῥᾳδίως<br />
αὐτοῦ ἴδοιεν τὴν ἀρχαίαν φύσιν, ὑπὸ τοῦ τά τε<br />
παλαιὰ τοῦ σώµατος µέρη τὰ µὲν ἐκκεκλάσθαι, τὰ<br />
δὲ συντετρῖφθαι καὶ πάντως λελωβῆσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν<br />
κυµάτων, ἄλλα δὲ προσπεφυκέναι, ὄστρεά τε καὶ<br />
φυκία καὶ πέτρας, ὥστε παντὶ µᾶλλον θηρίῳ<br />
ἐοικέναι ἢ οἷος ἦν φύσει, οὕτω καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν<br />
ἡµεῖς θεώµεθα διακειµένην ὑπὸ µυρίων κακῶν.<br />
ἀλλὰ δεῖ, ὦ Γλαύκων, ἐκεῖσε βλέπειν. - Ποῖ; ἦ δ'<br />
ὅς. - Εἰς τὴν φιλοσοφίαν αὐτῆς, καὶ ἐννοεῖν ὧν<br />
ἅπτεται καὶ οἵων ἐφίεται ὁµιλιῶν, ὡς συγγενὴς<br />
οὖσα τῷ τε θείῳ καὶ ἀθανάτῳ καὶ τῷ ἀεὶ ὄντι, καὶ<br />
οἵα ἂν γένοιτο τῷ τοιούτῳ πᾶσα ἐπισποµένη καὶ<br />
ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς ὁρµῆς ἐκκοµισθεῖσα ἐκ τοῦ<br />
πόντου ἐν ᾧ νῦν ἐστίν<br />
Politeia X, 611d1-e5<br />
In this Paper I aim at giving above all a philosophical interpretation of some of the facets and the clear<br />
connections between the speeches of Aristophanes and Socrates-Diotima about the nature of Eros.<br />
The subtle Ariadnes thread, pull by Plato all through the Symposion, with the probable intention,<br />
didactic and protreptic at once, to keep the attention of the reader concentrated on the existence of<br />
deeper conceptual connections between the two ‘encomia’ of Love, has already been highlighted 1 : we<br />
start from the inversion of the order of the speeches of Aristophanes and Eryximachus (185c4-e5),<br />
through the explicit recall of Diotima, which is essential to comprehend both analogies and distances<br />
between the two positions (205d10-e3), to the declaration, of Aristophanes and Socrates as well, of<br />
their will to talk in a radically different way from that of those who preceded them (see respectively<br />
189c2-3 and in particular 199a6-b5), until Aristophanes failed attempt to take the floor after Socrates<br />
(212c4-d5), being “suddenly” interrupted (ἐξαίφνης, 212c6) from the arrival of Alcibiades on the<br />
scene, and finally to the conversation among three which culminates, as the day has already begun, in<br />
the authentic enigma of Socrates’ theory of the Unity of tragedy an comedy (223d3-6). It is quite clear<br />
*I wish to express explicitly my gratitude to Plato, for having left us, apart from the challenge of grasping the bond between<br />
them, which is certainly no easy challenge, a dialogue, the only one, in which he speaks, separately and together, about the<br />
One and the Good.<br />
1 To avoid an excessive heaviness of this presentation, I limited myself to indicate in the Bibliography a list of few texts<br />
which I consider to be essential to deepen the topics discussed here. However, my tendency to privilege a direct and<br />
systematic confrontation with the dialogues, led me to follow, in some respects, an atypical path.
Claudia Luchetti<br />
that, with this last allusion, Plato decided to write the word end to one of his masterpieces, omitting<br />
those details that would have been indispensable to comprehend the ultimate meaning of a<br />
διαλέγεσθαι (c6) carried out through the greater part of the night (223b1 ff.).<br />
Aristophanes and Plato. On the “Primordial Nature”, and on the Good as One.<br />
If this pattern of internal cross-references in the Symposion, is already an evident sign that Plato<br />
exhorts us to take the content of Aristophanes’ speech seriously, there should be no doubts as regards<br />
its theoretical consistency, if one focuses on the predominance of the notion of ἀρχαία φύσις (191d1-<br />
2, 192e9, 193c5, 193d4), around which the whole argument is constructed. The insistence on this<br />
notion reveals the platonic intention, wearing the mask of Aristophanes, to draw the attention on the<br />
topic of the pristine nature of the Soul, as well as on the relationship of the ψυχή with the Good, the<br />
highest object that guides the psychical desire to return to her ancient condition. Within certain limits,<br />
it is not necessary to establish distinctions among the more or less accentuated philosophical<br />
inclinations of the Souls involved in this myth, from the point of view of their aspiration (see Resp. VI<br />
505d5-e3 and Symp. 191c2-d2.<br />
To establish the undeniable affinities between this primigenial nature and Plato’s conception<br />
of the Soul regarded in her pure form, a brief reconstruction might be useful.<br />
Apart from the two passages, quoted in the previous page, from the Timaeus 90c6-d7, and the<br />
Republic X 611d1-e5, we can refer to a couple of lines of the Sun’s Simile in Republic VI (508d4-<br />
509a5): when the Soul is definitively oriented to the vision of the realities enlightened by Truth and<br />
Being (ἀλήθειά τε καὶ τὸ ὄν, 508d5), she discloses her agathoid features (ἀγαθοειδής, 509a3), that is<br />
to say, she shows herself as Intelligence and Science (νοῦς, 508d6 ed ἐπιστήµη, 508e6).<br />
The passus of Republic X (611d1-e5), proves that the Soul’s Being does not exhaust itself in a<br />
static condition, consisting instead in a constant aspiration and propensity: in order to contemplate her<br />
primeval nature, one has to gaze at her philosophy. In this formulation are flowing into each other on<br />
the one hand, the conception of the philosophical activity as µελέτη θανάτου (61b7-84b8) and the<br />
theory of the συγγένεια of the Soul with the divine reality of εἴδη deriving from the Phaedo, and on<br />
the other hand, the predominantly erotic character of the psychical élan towards the Intelligible<br />
deriving from the speech of Socrates and Diotima in Symposion, signalled from the use of the<br />
metaphor of physical and spiritual contact (Resp. X 611e1, Symp. 192b5, and in Diotima 208e5,<br />
209c7, 211b5-7, 212a2-5). Philosophy therefore, the Eros aiming at εἰδέναι and φρόνησις (see Phaed.,<br />
62c9 ff.), doesn’t only represent the wish, certainly possible to fulfill, though with some ‘temporal’<br />
limitations (Phaed. 66b1-67a2) of a still embodied subject, but constitutes the authentic Essence of the<br />
Soul, when one observes her in what she is “beyond” the bodily constraints (see the perfect<br />
coincidence in the use of ἐκεῖσε in Resp. X 611b10-d8 and Symp. 211e4-212a2), and by virtue of the<br />
only instrument which makes this contemplation possible: her own Intelligence.<br />
In the platonic concept of ἀρχαία φύσις converges the almost omnipresent symmetry in the<br />
dialogues between knowledge of the Soul and knowledge of the Ideas (see the ἴση ἀνάγκη of Phaed.<br />
76e5), which culminates in Self-knowledge (see Phaed. 79d1-7).<br />
We encounter the highest expression of this beautiful synthesis of platonic ontology, gnoseology, and<br />
psychology, precisely in the passus of the Timaeus (90c6-d7), describing the dynamic of the ὁµοίωσις<br />
θεῷ: the ἀρχαία φύσις reveals herself here, most evidently, neither in the consideration of the subject<br />
of knowledge, also in its uncontaminated form, nor in the object of knowledge, taken as such,<br />
disconnected, but rather in the fusion of this polarity within the Unity of the noetic act. The Identity,<br />
that Plato exhorts us to meditate in Republic X between ἀρχαία φύσις and φιλοσοφία, understood with<br />
Diotima as the attainment of the Good mediated by the intellectual Union with Beauty (see 201d1 ff.),<br />
urges us not to lose sight of the core of this ‘eternal process’ and this ‘eternal aspiration’: in the Sun’s<br />
Simile the Good is not ‘only’ the cause both of Being and Existence of the Intelligible (τὸ εἶναί τε καὶ<br />
τὴν οὐσίαν, 509b7-8); it is the cause of the ‘passage’ from their knowability to their being known as<br />
well (τὸ γιγνώσκεσθαι, 509b6). The Good infuses, simultaneously, ψυχή and εἴδη with itself, ‘by<br />
mean of’ that mighty bond called Light, defined as a “third” (τρίτον, 507d1, e1), determining, ‘during’<br />
the act of irradiation itself, both their ontological consistence and their reciprocal connection.<br />
To synthesize: ἀρχαία φύσις is for Plato the Unity of knowing subject and object of<br />
knowledge, in erotic-philosophic words, of Lover and Beloved, caused by the ἀγαθόν.<br />
Without further deepening, one should ask oneself whether Aristophanes’ speech hides all this<br />
gnoseological, ontological and metaphysical or protological density, or not. Once all the necessary<br />
clarifications will be made, with the support of a comparison with Diotima’s speech, I will answer yes<br />
to this question.<br />
295
Claudia Luchetti<br />
If we analyze the condition of the androgyn, or of the human nature in general, prior to the<br />
dichotomic intervention of Zeus, (189c5-190c1), we can observe a kind of being which is completely<br />
unaware of its bond with the ἀγαθόν, for its possession, -just assuming that at the very beginning it<br />
was really a possession- connaturated to the original structure of the prime humans, is not recognized<br />
as such.<br />
This leads us to hypothize from the beginning the existence of at least two levels of this<br />
φύσις: from a platonic perspective in fact, a non division does not lead to a true unification -διαίρεσις<br />
and συναγωγή imply each other, as we will see- for this unification is initially displayed in an<br />
undifferentiated and unreflected way. Paraphrasing the words that Socrates will use in his speech,<br />
‘one does not desire, what he does not believe to need’ (200a1 ff.), while Eros, which inherited the<br />
indigent nature from the mother Penia, is always ‘needing and desiring’ (203c5 ff.). In a most evident<br />
way therefore, the nature that does not live, but ‘vegetates’ instead, ‘before’ the age of Zeus, lacks<br />
entirely of any kind of erotic tension oriented towards Beauty and the Good, which excludes a priori<br />
the hypothesis of a correspondence between this first typology of androgyn and human, and the<br />
conceptual confluence of ἀρχαία φύσις and φιλοσοφία, with all their consequent epistemic δυνάµεις.<br />
Some clear signals of the negative evaluation of the attitudes of the undivided humans, come<br />
from their description as “tremendous” beings (190b5), and from their comparison with the Titans<br />
(190c4). Even their “huge/unmeasured thoughts” (τὰ φρονήµατα µεγάλα, 189b6), are aimed at<br />
nothing else but the ἀνάβασις to the sky to attack the Gods (190b8-c1). The outcome, a divine<br />
punishment, is the most evident sign of their absolute lack of that inner order (κόσµιοι, 193a4, to<br />
compare with 190e4-5), of Justice (see τὴν ἀδικίαν, 193a2) and of the devotion (εὐσεβεῖν, 193a8) and<br />
friendship towards the Gods (φίλοι τῷ θεῷ, 193b3-4), that in Plato’s view represent, at once, the<br />
premise and aim of the ὁµοίωσις θεῷ, to transform the individual Psyche, as much as possible, in the<br />
‘mirror’ of the invariant and just order of εἴδη (see Resp. VI, 500b8-d2, Theater. 176a5-b3).<br />
Furthermore, it is no coincidence that the notion of ἀρχαία φύσις only occurs in the ‘second’<br />
part of Aristophanes mythical reconstruction (precisely in 191d1-2, 192e9, 193c5, 193d4), while<br />
‘before’ the intervention of Zeus the formulation utilized is the less allusive ἡ γὰρ πάλαι ἡµῶν φύσις<br />
οὐχ αὑτὴ ἦν ἥπερ νῦν, ἀλλ' ἀλλοία (189d6-7). Plato also avoids the use of the possible alternative ἡ<br />
παλαία φύσις, which could have let us thought immediately about Republic X (see 611d2).<br />
The speech instead, of extraordinary intensity, directed from the God Hephaestus to both<br />
halves of the divided humans, takes root in a background that corresponds faithfully to the platonic<br />
vision of the connection between the Soul and the Good: the Souls of each of the two halves are not<br />
“able to say” (192c3, d1) the reason for the thrill that dominates them -having already excluded the<br />
merely sexual meaning of such an excitement (192c5)- when they manage to find each other again<br />
and to “Be together” (συνῶν, 192c6). The two halves can only guess the nature of such an irresistible<br />
desire and express it in an enigmatic way (µαντεύεται ὅ βούλεται, καὶ αἰνίττεται, 192d1-2), and if they<br />
would be asked once more, about their condition, they would still remain in a state of uncertainty and<br />
embarrassment (ἀποροῦντας, 192d5). We are here exactly in the same theoretical constellation of the<br />
book VI of the Republic, 505d5-e3: the Soul, which in the case of the achievement of the Good is<br />
never content with an appearance of it, and searches for it constantly in its reality, always acts in view<br />
of it (see the τούτου ἕνεκα of 505d11 and Symp. 192c6), even when she can only guess what it is<br />
(ἀποµαντευοµένη τι εἶναι, 505e1), being uncertain and unable to grasp its Essence sufficiently -or<br />
satisfactorily- (ἀποροῦσα δὲ καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσα λαβεῖν ἱκανῶς τί ποτἐστίν, 505e1-2).<br />
This accentuated parallelism, also helps us to detect a substantial difference of perspective,<br />
which Plato, as writer of the <strong>Symposium</strong>, is consciously willing to highlight, on which I will focus in<br />
what follows. The ἀγαθόν is not absent at all in the λόγος of Aristophanes: there are explicit<br />
references to it, right at the end of the speech, in terms of happiness and bliss (εὔδαιµον, 193c3,<br />
µακαρίους καὶ εὐδαίµονας, 193d5), and of the attainment of that best (ἄριστον, 193c6, c7) descending<br />
indeed from the reconstruction of the ἀρχαία φύσις (193c2-5).<br />
Despite this, the Good is not the primary goal of the Souls yearning to piece together their<br />
ancient nature: unconscious of what they really wish to obtain from their lost half (191c2-4), they do<br />
not desire anything else but “becoming again, from two, one” (ἐκ δυοῖν εἷς γενέσθαι, 192e8-9);<br />
therefore they pursue the “totality” (τοῦ ὅλου), because their previous condition was to be as<br />
“wholes” (ὅλοι, 192e10), meaning by this that they were absolutely One (ἕν ἦµεν, 193a1-2).<br />
Emblematic by Aristophanes is the priority of ἔν on ἀγαθόν: contrary to what emerges from a<br />
synoptic consideration of the concept of ἀρχαία φύσις in the dialogues, the Good is said here to be a<br />
consequence of being One, and not its αἰτία.<br />
Diotima, or on the One as Good.<br />
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καὶ λέγεται µέν γέ τις, ἔφη, λόγος, ὡς οἳ ἂν τὸ ἥµισυ ἑαυτῶν ζητῶσιν, οὗτοι ἐρῶσιν· ὁ δ' ἐµὸς λόγος<br />
οὔτε ἡµίσεός φησιν εἶναι τὸν ἔρωτα οὔτε ὅλου, ἐὰν µὴ τυγχάνῃ γέ που, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ἀγαθὸν ὄν…<br />
Symposion, 205d10-e3<br />
In Socrates speech, Diotima answers to the proposal of a definition of Eros given by Aristophanes,<br />
τοῦ ὅλου οὖν τῇ ἐπιθυµίᾳ καὶ διώξει ἔρως ὄνοµα (192e10-193a1), with an extremely clear alternative:<br />
Love is not primarily Love of the One, a notion that in its polisemy can express both the unity of the<br />
part and the unity of the whole, but Love of the Good as such. Therefore, the longing for the One,<br />
dominant in Aristophanes' speech, has to be corrected and reread as a consequence of its being Good,<br />
and not vice versa.<br />
An extraordinary evidence of the supremacy of ἀγαθόν on ἕν can be deduced from the<br />
characteristics of the erotic path, whose departing point is the more adequate definition of Eros as<br />
Love of the Good and of its eternal possession, that is to say, of Immortality (204d1 ff.), culminating<br />
in the epiphany of Beauty itself.<br />
The dialectical methodology employed within the description of the psychic ascent that<br />
proceeds through the diverse degrees of the erotic mysteries, shows some particularities that require to<br />
be at least mentioned: Plato accustomed us, from the Euthyphron (6c-e), through the Republic (book<br />
V 476b-d, 479c-e) and the Phaedrus (249b-c, 266b-c), until the Philebus (12b-15c), just to mention<br />
few examples, to behold as the first operation of Dialectics (see Soph. 253c-e) the passage,<br />
paraphrasing the Phaedrus, ‘from a multiplicity approached through the senses to a Unity articulated<br />
with/and apprehensible through reasonment’.<br />
In the <strong>Symposium</strong> Plato challenges us to grasp a much more complex use of συναγωγή and its<br />
variations, from a double point of view:<br />
1) First of all, we have an evident and structural interaction between Unity and Multiplicity:<br />
without needing to arise any doubt about the clear pyramidal and hierarchic organization of the<br />
various degrees of manifestation of Beauty, one can observe that the starting point of this elevation<br />
are not τὰ πολλὰ καλὰ, how one may expect, but a single perceivable object regarded as beautiful<br />
(210a4-8). To avoid the possible mistake of identifying a merely apparent unity of this kind with the<br />
true ‘One’, which is the τέλος of the whole path, the συναγωγή seems to be applied, so to say, upside<br />
down, introducing only in a second phase a phenomenal multiplicity, and this in order to allow the<br />
initiate to recognize, by contrast, an ontologically higher level Unity which no longer belongs to the<br />
bodily sphere. The most immediate consequence of the reiterated use of this method, is the production<br />
of those possible combinations of Unity and Multiplicity, which punctually anticipate the description,<br />
made explicit in the Sophist, of all the operations of the διαλεκτικὴ ἐπιστήµη (see 253d1-253e2). It<br />
follows further, that once the level of Beauty of a single ψυχή and of the many ψυχαί has been<br />
reached, the erotic-dialectical dynamic will keep taking place only within the intelligible realm<br />
(210b6 ff.).<br />
2) Secondly, one can notice the presence, nearly completely hidden, of the well known<br />
dialectical counterpart of this way of forthcoming through more and more articulated and deep levels<br />
of Unification: the way of διαίρεσις. That reduction to Unity, which seemed to be developed upside<br />
down, working as a mediator between a lower range unity and the infinite multiplicity that could<br />
follow it immediately, preventing, exactly as in the former case of the erotic fixation on the apparent<br />
unity of departure, from recognizing traces of Identity and Unity (ἕν τε καὶ ταὐτόν, 210b3), which are<br />
indispensable to reach the following ontological layer, is in reality the dichotomic method: ἀπὸ ἑνὸς<br />
ἐπὶ δύο καὶ ἐπὶ δυοῖν ἐπὶ πάντα τὰ καλὰ σώµατα, 211c3-4. It is therefore legitimate to conclude that<br />
συναγωγή and διαίρεσις, even if they do not occur as technical terms, are constantly acting on the<br />
background of the erotic ascent in a synergic and indissoluble way.<br />
Why is it possible, even moving from these few premises, to claim both that Diotima’s<br />
perspective is agathological, and to establish its supremacy on Aristophanes henological position,<br />
carried out in his speech?<br />
Because the path of mysteric initiation that leads to the contemplation of Beauty, goes through<br />
a process of expansion from the One to the Many, that evidently places some Multiplicities (like the<br />
one of all bodies or the one of the Souls) on a higher level than that of some Unities (respectively, of<br />
the single body or of the single Soul). By proceeding with this generalization, these Multiplicities are<br />
further synthesized in higher Unities, until the arrival at the τέλος. Therefore, the synthetic Unities<br />
contemplated ‘from time to time’, reveal themselves as complex Beings, that is, as Totalities or<br />
Wholes, ὅλοι.<br />
From an ontological point of view then, the Idea of Beauty-Good, even though it is µονοειδές<br />
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(211b1, e4), presents itself as the most radical antithesis of the presumed monolithic and a-dialectical<br />
atomism on which Plato, in the opinion of many interpreters, would have based his theory of Ideas, to<br />
abandon it partially or completely only in the later dialogues.<br />
In metaphysical-protological perspective, going back to Diotima recalling the content of<br />
Aristophanes speech, the words of the Priestess could be rephrased as follows: if it is true that Love of<br />
the Good is Love for the One -remembering that the starting point is the lowest degree of the erotic<br />
élan towards the One, the attraction directed to a single body- the opposite statement is not necessarily<br />
true, i.e. that Love of just any unity coincides with the Love for the Good. The Love of the One, to be<br />
Love of the Good, must be Love of a synthetic Unity able to fuse together, and permanently, One and<br />
Not One. It signifies: an ultimate Unity capable of including in itself also the long path of negations<br />
(see 210e2-211b5) and distinctions, in which the pervasive and permeating features of the καλὸν καὶ<br />
ἀγαθόν find their highest expression.<br />
It is easy to see, that such a reconstruction does not collide with those indirect testimonies on<br />
the ἄγραφα δὀγµατα, which explicitly claim the substantial Identity of the Good with the One 2 : the<br />
Half, more generically, the Part, or the Whole, about which Diotima is talking, are always specific<br />
forms of Unity, though they depend on a archetypal dialectical Unity, not on an undifferentiated and<br />
disarticulated One. To say it in an even more prosaic way, allowing myself to recall the Parmenides,<br />
the platonic One-Good finds much more correspondences in the ἕν-ὅλον of the second hypothesis (see<br />
142b1 ff.), certainly not in the non dialectical and unknowable ἕν of the first (see 137c4 ff.) 3 .<br />
The suggestions coming from the <strong>Symposium</strong>, though, encourage us to reflect very seriously<br />
not only on the relationship of the One, but of both Principles with the ἀγαθόν, at least in two<br />
directions:<br />
a) First, because division and negation, having revealed themselves as elements, that are not<br />
only allowing us to distinguish ‘vertically’ the levels of the epiphany of Beauty, on the base of their<br />
more or less ontological consistence, determining indeed, so to say, ‘horizontally’, the constitution<br />
itself of αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν, are precisely those components by virtue of which it is possible to describe<br />
Beauty as a wide sea (τὸ πολὺ πέλαγος, 210d4). Being coherent with this agathological and dialectical<br />
perspective implies, that if in the indirect tradition διαίρεσις and ἑτερότης, are said to be both,<br />
respectively, methodologically dependent on and ontologically deriving from, the ἀόριστος δυάς, one<br />
should free oneself from a view of the Dyad, occurring in some interpretations of Plato’s theory of<br />
Principles, not only as radically opposed to the One, but above all filled with negative ethical<br />
connotations.<br />
The utility of applying the dichotomic method could not be more evident: by means of it the<br />
apparent unity of departure is conceptually ‘broken’, divided, generating two from one, so that the<br />
Soul of the initiate can comprehend its illusory character and start beholding the Totality of Unities<br />
belonging to the same kind (see again 211c3-4). Therefore, in their methodological and dialectical<br />
manifestations ἕν and δυάς are contributing both not only to free the path to the ultimate vision of the<br />
Beauty-Good, but they converge in the determination of its own nature as well: this θεῖον θαῦµα<br />
(211e3, 210e4-5) is both transcendent and immanent, absolute in its unshaken Unity, and<br />
simultaneously diffusivum and omnipervasivum.<br />
b) Second, but no less important, one should take into consideration the iconic character of<br />
Eros, which leads, reflecting on the relationship between ἀγαθόν and ἕν, to move the center of gravity<br />
of this bond even more decidedly in the agathological direction: in the crucial passus (202d8-203a8),<br />
where Diotima describes the mighty (δύναµις) of this great δαίµων, Eros is that hermetic power<br />
(ἑρµηνεῦον) of intercourse and communication (ἡ ὁµιλία καὶ ἡ διάλεκτος) between the human and the<br />
Divine, able to fill the ‘gap and lapse’ (συµπληροῖ), so that everything can result in itself -<br />
intrinsically- interconnected (ὥστε τὸ πᾶν αὐτὸ αὑτῷ συνδεδέσθαι).<br />
In my opinion, there is no evidence not to see in this marvelous illustration, under the form of<br />
an image, also the description of a dynamic involving, apart from the ‘vertical’ relation of a Soul still<br />
embodied yearning for the Idea, above all the intelligible dimension as such, and this for two reasons:<br />
2 It should be enough here to refer, for the ἀναγωγή of the generalizing method, reducing the µέγιστα γένη to the ἕν, to the<br />
report on the writing περί τῶν ἐναντίων of Alexander of Aphrodisias, in his Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics, 250,<br />
20, ff. (Hayduck), and for the reduction of the positive series to Aristotle, Metaphysics Δ 15, 1021a9 ff. For the specific<br />
dependence of ταὐτότης and ἑνότης on the One, see Metaph. Δ 1018a7. For the fundamental identification of ἀγαθόν and<br />
ἕν see, for example, Metaph. Ν 4, 1091b14.<br />
3 In such a brief account I had to give up the plan to discuss Plotinus' more or less explicit reception of the myth of the<br />
divided humans, within his conception of ἕνωσις. Some facets of Aristophanes’ speech (see Enn. IV,3,12), together with a<br />
radically monistic understanding of Plato’s theory of Principles (see Enn. V, 3, 15 and V, 4, 2), become crucial for Plotinus,<br />
both to distinguish νοῦς ἔµφρονος and νοῦς ἐρῶν (see Enn. III,5, 4-7 and VI 7 31-35), and to acquire his own vision of the<br />
superessential One.<br />
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the first, is that in the following myth about the genealogy of Love it is possible to recognize, as it has<br />
already been noticed, under the guise of Poros and Penia, the ἕν and ἀόριστος δυάς of the oral<br />
teaching. The second, much more important from my point of view, is that maybe in the only true<br />
definition of the Good contained in the platonic dialogues, precisely in the Phaedo (99c1-6), the<br />
ἀγαθόν is the authentic immortal power that truly keeps and connects (everything) together… ὡς<br />
ἀληθῶς τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ δέον συνδεῖν καὶ συνέχειν.<br />
Following this suggestion, Eros would be an icon of the Good, by virtue of its being fruit of<br />
the mixture between the two Principles, both dominated from a Unique ἀρχή which, being identical<br />
with the mixture, the product of this fusion, is immanent to them, while being the cause of the Union,<br />
constituting therefore their ontological foundation, transcends them both.<br />
Not only Eros, also the φιλόσοφος par excellence is a faithful image of the Good: Socrates.<br />
The only man that can be regarded as demonic (see 203a4-5, 219b7-c2), the only true expert in<br />
matters of Love (see 177d6-8, 198c5 ff.), Socrates is, like the Instant in which the Beauty-Good<br />
irrupts in the Soul (ἐξαίφνης, 210e4, 213c1), being in the middle between wisdom and ignorance (see<br />
201e10-202a10), an ἄτοπος φύσις µεταξύ (see Symp. 175a10-b3, 221d2, and Parm. 156d1-e3). But<br />
his ἀτόπια is the same θαυµασιότης of Beauty itself (see 210e4-5 e 213e2, 215b8, 216c7, 219c1,<br />
220a4, a7, 221c3, c6). Precisely this wonder discloses the deepest feature of Socrates’ personality, his<br />
being ἄφθονος (see Symp. 210d6 and, for example, Euthyphr. 3b5-d9, Phaed. 61d9-e4), that is,<br />
ἀγαθός (see Tim. 29e1-3).<br />
Obviously, the ultimate reason for the supremacy of Diotima’s agathological perspective on<br />
Aristophanes’ henology, takes root in the source of that primordial antinomy which, by means of an<br />
analogy, tells the ἀγαθόν as ἰδέα and οὐσία, being the highest giver of Form, and as “beyond” Form,<br />
at once (ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας, 509b9-10), so, literally, as οὐκ ἰδέα and οὐκ οὐσία (509b8-9).<br />
The λόγος of Diotima shows us that it is not necessary to follow only one among these two<br />
ways, excluding the other, for it is exactly in the Union with that what is pre-eminently Idea, Beauty<br />
itself (210e6-211b5), that the whole generative πρεσβεία and δύναµις of the Good become manifest.<br />
Only from a συνουσία (Symp. 211d8, 212a2) with this kind of ‘Unity’, better to say, of<br />
unifying cause, or Non Duality, and neither with a primary but undifferentiated unity, nor with a<br />
derived or second degree unity (see Aristophanes, respectively 191c7, 192c5, c6), the procreation in<br />
the Beauty (τόκος ἐν καλῷ, 206b7-8) becomes possible: as in the Republic from the erotic µείξις of<br />
the philosopher with the οὐσία gush out νοῦς, ἀλήθεια and ἐπιστήµη (book VI 490a 8-b8), so in the<br />
<strong>Symposium</strong>, from the coexistence with Beauty the Soul generates the ‘remaining’ offspring (Resp. VI<br />
507a1-5) of ἀγαθόν, true ἀρετή (212a2-7).<br />
The “Primordial Nature” and Aristophanes’ One reviewed in an agathological perspective.<br />
To conclude, the conception of a Good including in itself dialectically the One, allows us to take a<br />
retrospective look at Aristophanes’ speech, in order to focus in it on some further platonic facets of<br />
the relationship between ἀγαθόν, ψυχή and ἕν.<br />
Naturally, one could doubt about the correctness of an attempt aimed at finding in the<br />
description of the divided humans strict correspondences with the two fundamental methods of<br />
platonic Dialectics.<br />
It is a state of fact though, that the dividing by two completed by Zeus, and underlined with a<br />
certain insistence (διατεµῶ δίχα, Symp. 190d1, τεµῶ δίχα, d5, ἔτεµε τοὺς ἀνθρώπους δίχα, d7, ἡ<br />
φύσις δίχα ἐτµήθη, 191a5-6), occurs as terminus technicus and is perfectly interchangeable with the<br />
well known δίχα διαιρεῖν of the dialogues commonly regarded as dialectical (see Soph. 221e2,<br />
265a11, 265e8, Polit. from 261b4 to 302c8, Phil. 49a9, and Leg. V 745c5, d2), but it is used also at<br />
the beginning of the famous Simile with the Line in Republic VI 509d6.<br />
As far as the reduction to unity is concerned, even if at this point of the account, Aristophanes<br />
seems to understand the desire of interrelation and conjunction of the two halves in a mainly sexual<br />
sense, the choice falls on formulations like συµπλεκόµενοι in 191a7, συνεπλέκετο, 191b3, ἐν τῇ<br />
συµπλοκῇ, 191c4, and συµπεπλεγµένοι, 191e8-192a1, typical for the συµπλοκὴ τῶν εἰδῶν (see Soph.<br />
259e6, 240c1, 262c6, Theaet. 202b5, and Polit. 278b2 till 309e10, and particularly the meaningful<br />
connection between συµπλέκειν and the agathological συνδεῖν in 309a8 ff.). The συναγωγή instead,<br />
considered as erotic instrument put at our disposal from the conjunct action of Zeus and Apollo to<br />
cure the human nature, is explicitly mentioned also in 191d3 (συναγωγεύς).<br />
Furthermore, it is very interesting to observe that through the process of individualization or<br />
individuation carried out by Apollo on each half, to heal the wounds produced by the scission (190e2-<br />
191a5), it is possible to restore the conditions of that inner order (see κοσµιώτερος, 190e4), necessary<br />
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to establish a just relation to the Divine: by turning (µετέστρεφε, 190e6 and see Resp. VII 518c4-<br />
519a1) herself towards her ὀµφαλός (190e9), seeing simultaneously the cut and its healing, the Soul<br />
of each half becomes aware, in a way that strongly recalls the anamnesis (µνηµεῖον εἶναι τοῦ παλαιοῦ<br />
πάθους, 191a4-5, and see Phaed. 73c1 ff.), both of her resemblance and of the dissimilarity from the<br />
origin, in other words, of the coexistence within herself of One and Not One.<br />
Zeus and Apollo are therefore the first to cooperate, with their dividing and re-unifying, to reform<br />
the pristine Unity, prerequisite to attain the lost µεγίστη εὐδαιµονία, for this Principle and<br />
Source is both One and Duality (ποιῆσαι ἕν ἐκ δυοῖν, 191d2, τετµηµένος…ἐξ ἑνὸς δύο, 191d5, ὥστε<br />
δύο ὄντας ἕνα γεγονέναι, 192e1, ὡς ἕνα ὄντα, e2, ἀντὶ δυοῖν ἕνα εἴναι, e3-4, ἐκ δυοίν εἷς γενέσθαι,<br />
192e8-9).<br />
Seeing the typically demiurgic proposal, directed by Hephaestus to the ψυχαί of the divided<br />
humans, to merge again and to concreate together into a One and Identical (συντῆξαι καὶ συµφυσῆσαι<br />
εἰς τὸ αὐτό, 192d8-e1) the two halves, it is clear that the ἀρχαία φύσις, so recomposed, cannot<br />
coincide anymore with the undefined Unity of the beginning. To achieve it indeed, the intervention of<br />
a God is, once again, unavoidable, and further, this reconjunction could be a sort of grace that not<br />
everyone deserves, but only those who have reached, permanently, at least the degree of Love<br />
between two Souls (from 192b5 on).<br />
It takes root, then, in the demiurgic wisdom of the Divine, the only one sufficiently able to<br />
solve the One in the Many and to take the Multiplicity back to Unity (see Tim. 68d2-d7), the true<br />
cause of the foundations of an erotic Dialectics between subject and object -on the highest level hoped<br />
by Plato, between Soul and Ideas (see also Phaedr. 250c7 ff.)- that flows into their authentic<br />
Unification in the intellectual act.<br />
If the man is nothing but Soul (see Alc. I 130c1-3, Leg. XII 959a4-b7), Plato takes the chance,<br />
through Aristophanes’ mythical tale, to further precise its lack of Self-sufficiency, regarded in its<br />
singularity: the individual psychic unity is just a σύµπβολον ἀνθρώπου (191d4). The true Psyche<br />
results, instead, from the assimilation with the highest object of Love, in which the φιλοσοφία can be<br />
seen as the reciprocal connection, ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ at once, that binds indissolubly (for the<br />
most beautiful and mighty δεσµός, see Tim. 31b8-c4, and Crat. 403a3 ff.) the knowing subject and the<br />
object of knowledge in the common aspiration to the ἀγαθόν.<br />
Everything considered, it is more than just plausible that in Aristophanes’ concept of ἀρχαία<br />
φύσις, reread with the eyes of Socrates and Diotima, are really hiding that primordial synthesis of the<br />
Timaeus between ψυχή and εἴδη, joined together in the Unity of Noesis, and that agathoid reality of<br />
the Republic, immediate creation of the Good, that we can ‘restore’ with the help of the Gods,<br />
achieving our aim: with the words of the Timaeus, a dialogue with which some sections of<br />
Aristophanes’ λόγος should be compared systematically, “the best among the generated beings, from<br />
the best among the intelligible and eternal beings” (τῶν νοητῶν ἀεί τε ὄντων ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀρίστη<br />
γενοµένη τῶν γεννηθέντων, 37a1-2).<br />
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302
ABSTRACT<br />
The Comic and the Tragic:<br />
a Reading of Aristophanes’ Speech in Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong><br />
Suzanne Obdrzalek<br />
At the close of the <strong>Symposium</strong>, we are left with a striking image: Aristophanes, Agathon and Socrates<br />
drink wine from a common cup, as Socrates argues that the skillful tragedian should also be a comic<br />
and vice versa. Readers of the <strong>Symposium</strong> might wonder whether this stricture can be applied to<br />
Aristophanes’ speech. With its grotesque depiction of the cutting of human bodies and the contortions<br />
of sex, Aristophanes’ speech appears pure comedy. In this paper, I argue that it is in fact<br />
fundamentally tragic: it presents humans as both incomplete and incapable of completion.<br />
Though Plato deliberately draws attention to the significance of Aristophanes’ speech in<br />
relation to Diotima’s—she twice makes seemingly anachronistic objections to it (205d-e, 211d)—it<br />
has received relatively little philosophical attention. Critics who discuss it typically treat it as a comic<br />
fable, of little philosophical significance (e.g. Dover 1966, Rowe 1998), or uncover in it an account of<br />
love which recognizes the value of human individuals as love-objects (e.g. Dover 1966, Nussbaum<br />
1986). Against the first set of interpreters, I maintain that Aristophanes’ speech is of the utmost<br />
philosophical significance; in it, Plato sets forth a view of eros as the desire for completion, which is<br />
the starting-point for Diotima’s analysis. I argue against the second set that Aristophanes’ speech<br />
contains a profoundly pessimistic account of eros. Far from being a response to the individuality of<br />
the beloved, eros, for Aristophanes, is an irrational urge.<br />
In the first part of my paper, I offer an analysis of human nature as presented in Aristophanes’<br />
speech. According to Aristophanes, humans are created both incomplete and aware of this<br />
incompleteness. In the second part of my paper, I offer a close reading of the physical transformations<br />
undergone by Aristophanes’ humans. I argue that Plato subtly indicates that while we may attempt to<br />
overcome our incompleteness through finding our other halves, this project is doomed to failure. It is<br />
not obvious how we might recognize our other halves; indeed, there is reason to doubt that they even<br />
exist. Furthermore, Aristophanes’ humans do not appear to seek their other halves, but rather to forget<br />
their state of primordial incompleteness by embracing any available partner. In the final part of my<br />
paper, I ask what goes wrong with Aristophanes’ lovers. Diotima, too, sees man as incomplete, but is<br />
hopeful that we can achieve completion through our relationship to the forms. I argue against Dover<br />
that what Plato rejects is not Aristophanes’ focus on love of particular individuals. Instead, the<br />
difficulty with Aristophanes’ lovers is their irrationality. Aristophanes’ lovers are not depicted as<br />
attracted to any qualities in their other halves beyond their ability to complete them. It is only when<br />
Aristophanes’ analysis of eros as originating in lack is wedded to Agathon’s emphasis on beauty that<br />
eros becomes rational and capable of resolution: in the ascent it is the initiate’s responsiveness to the<br />
beauty of a particular beloved that enables him to eventually love beauty itself (see, e.g., my 2010).
Aristofane e l’ombra di Protagora:<br />
origini dell’umanità e orthoepeia nel mito degli uomini-palla<br />
Michele Corradi<br />
Gli interpreti moderni, da Robin a Strauss, da Rosen a Corrigan e Glazov-Corrigan, hanno spesso<br />
colto un rapporto dei discorsi pronunciati dagli interlocutori di Socrate nel Simposio con dottrine,<br />
particolarità stilistiche ed argomentative riconducibili a varie figure di sofisti. 1 Del resto, alla fine del<br />
discorso di Agatone (198c), lo stesso Socrate sottolinea l’ispirazione gorgiana delle parole del poeta,<br />
καὶ γάρ µε Γοργίου ὁ λόγος ἀνεµίµνῃσκεν. Rivela di aver avuto paura, in modo analogo ad Odisseo<br />
alla fine della νέκυια, che Agatone gli gettasse contro la testa di Gorgia, oratore δεινός, per<br />
pietrificarlo e privarlo della parola. A Prodico fa poi allusione esplicita Erissimaco, proponendo il<br />
tema del simposio, quale autorità nella produzione di ἔπαινοι in prosa (177b). E una possibile per<br />
quanto non sicura influenza di Prodico coglieva Brochard nella distinzione fra i due tipi di amore<br />
proposta nel discorso di Pausania. 2 Nel discorso di Fedro, più in particolare nella maniera in cui sono<br />
citati i testi dei poeti e filosofi, è invece plausibile individuare una forte traccia del metodo<br />
dossografico di Ippia (178a-b): lo ha recentemente evidenziato Notomi. 3<br />
Certo, com’è stato segnalato da molti critici, è significativo il fatto che tutti gli interlocutori di<br />
Socrate nel Simposio siano presenti sulla scena del Protagora, quale pubblico attento delle<br />
performances dei sofisti nella casa di Callia (315a-316b): Platone descrive Fedro ed Erissimaco intenti<br />
a porre domande a Ippia di argomento naturalistico, περὶ φύσεώς τε καὶ τῶν µετεώρων ἀστρονοµικὰ<br />
ἄττα διερωτᾶν, Pausania e Agatone seduti accanto al letto di Prodico coinvolti in una discussione di<br />
cui Socrate non riesce a ricostruire il contenuto a causa del tono baritonale della voce di Prodico.<br />
Come nel Simposio (212d), Alcibiade giunge solo in un secondo momento, in tempo però per<br />
intervenire nella discussione fra Socrate e Protagora in difesa di Socrate.<br />
Troviamo dunque una sola pesante eccezione: Aristofane non compare sulla scena del<br />
Protagora. A mio avviso, però, proprio nel discorso di Aristofane del Simposio (189c-193d), grazie al<br />
sottile gioco di maschere sapientemente costruito da Platone, nella trama fitta di riferimenti al dialogo<br />
giovanile, può essere scorta l’ombra di Protagora. All’analisi della presenza di Protagora quale<br />
“convitato di pietra” seduto a fianco di Aristofane al banchetto di Agatone saranno dedicate le<br />
considerazioni che proporrò qui oggi.<br />
Innanzitutto è possibile evidenziare, come è stato almeno in parte proposto da Manuwald, una<br />
serie di affinità specifiche, pur nel quadro di una più generale appartenenza all’ambito dei cosiddetti<br />
miti platonici, tra il discorso di Aristofane e il mito di Prometeo che lo stesso Protagora narra<br />
nell’omonimo dialogo (320c-322d = 80 C 1 DK). 4<br />
Entrambi i discorsi hanno un carattere eziologico, si soffermano sull’umanità delle origini per<br />
spiegare alcuni caratteri essenziali della natura dell’essere umano e in particolare le cause del loro<br />
vivere associati: nel caso del discorso di Aristofane, il vincolo d’amore, συναγωγεύς dell’antica natura<br />
dell’uomo, tale da rendere una sola cosa due individui separati, ποιῆσαι ἓν ἐκ δυοῖν (191c-d), nel caso<br />
del mito di Prometeo, i legami di amicizia reciproca, che sono causa della formazione e della<br />
sopravvivenza della città, πόλεων κόσµοι τε καὶ δεσµοὶ φιλίας συναγωγοί (322c).<br />
Se certo per l’interesse per l’umanità primitiva si può richiamare l’archaia (si pensi ad<br />
esempio all’antologia di frammenti di comici dell’archaia sull’età dell’oro salvata da Ateneo nel VI<br />
libro dei Deipnosofisti, 267e-270a) e se, più in generale, possono essere individuati precisi paralleli<br />
tra il racconto sugli uomini-palla e la produzione di Aristofane (ad esempio la Pace o gli Uccelli) 5 , per<br />
il discorso del Simposio sono stati messi in evidenza stretti rapporti proprio con tipologie di<br />
1 L. Robin, Platon. Oeuvres complètes - Tome IV, 2e partie. Le Banquet, Paris 1958 6 , XXXVI; L. Strauss, On Plato’s<br />
<strong>Symposium</strong>, edited and with a foreword by S. Benardete, Chicago 2001; 25-27 e 39-40; S. Rosen, Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong>, New<br />
Haven-London 1968, 24-25; K. Corrigan, E. Glazov-Corrigan, Plato’s Dialectic at Play. Argument, Structure, and Myth in<br />
the <strong>Symposium</strong>, University Park 2004, 33-34.<br />
2 V. Brochard, Études de philosophie ancienne et de philosophie moderne, Paris 1912, 68-71. Alla presenza nel discorso di<br />
Pausania di modalità argomentative protagoree, simili a quelle che si ritrovano nei Dissoi logoi pensa G.F. Nieddu, Pausania:<br />
un sofista ‘sociologo’ nel Simposio di Platone, in G. Bastianini, W. Lapini, M. Tulli (ed.), Harmonia. Scritti di filologia<br />
classica in onore di Angelo Casanova, Firenze 2012, II, 651-668.<br />
3 N. Notomi, Citations in Plato, <strong>Symposium</strong> 178B-C, «Studi Classici e Orientali», LIX, 2012 (in stampa).<br />
4 Cfr. in ultimo B. Manuwald: Die Rede des Aristophanes (189a1-193e2), in Ch. Horn (ed.), Platon. Symposion, Berlin<br />
2012, 89-104. Sull’uso del mito in Platone recenti contributi offrono C. Collobert, P. Destrée, F.J. Gonzalez (ed.), Plato and<br />
Myth. Studies on the Use and Status of Platonic Myths, Leiden-Boston 2012.<br />
5 Cfr. ad es. R. Hunter, Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong>, Oxford-New York 2004, 64-65.
Michele Corradi<br />
esposizione tipiche dei sofisti 6 . Ben documentata per i sofisti è la composizione di ἐπιδείξεις che<br />
rielaborano temi mitologici per sviluppare riflessioni di carattere antropologico, etico e politico: basti<br />
pensare a Prodico, e più in particolare all’apologo di Eracle al bivio delle Ὧραι (84 B 2 DK), e<br />
proprio a Protagora, se dal Περὶ τῆς ἐν ἀρχῇ καταστάσεως (80 B 8b DK) o da un’altra opera del<br />
sofista dipende il mito di Prometeo del Protagora (320c8-322d5 = 80 C 1 DK).<br />
Certo con buona plausibilità sono stati indicati, soprattutto grazie alle approfondite ricerche di<br />
O’Brien, 7 rapporti tra il racconto di Aristofane e altri filoni della riflessione presocratica, nello<br />
specifico l’antropogonia di Empedocle (31 B 61-63 DK), in cui erano presenti creature simili agli<br />
uomini-palla di cui ci parla Aristofane. Non si deve però dimenticare che anche la speculazione dei<br />
cosiddetti sofisti non era impermeabile ai risultati delle ricerche della fisica presocratica. Probabili<br />
riferimenti alle dottrine empedoclee sono presenti nello stesso mito del Protagora: si pensi in<br />
particolare al riferimento all’origine degli esseri viventi dalla terra, τυποῦσιν αὐτὰ θεοί γῆς ἔνδον<br />
(320d; cfr. 31 B 62, 4 DK: οὐλοφυεῖς µὲν πρῶτα τύποι χθονὸς ἐξανέτελλον).<br />
Tornando ad una prospettiva più letteraria, si deve rilevare che, dal punto di vista dello<br />
sviluppo narrativo, i parallelismi fra il mito del Protagora e il racconto di Aristofane sono evidenti.<br />
Entrambi i discorsi prendono le mosse da un originario stato di eccezionalità dell’uomo primitivo: nel<br />
discorso di Aristofane gli esseri umani sono dotati di forza straordinaria e di pensieri superbi,<br />
caratteristiche che li spingono a muovere guerra agli dei (190b); nel mito del Protagora un deficit di<br />
doti naturali rispetto agli animali rende gli uomini privi di ogni difesa contro i pericoli naturali (321bc).<br />
Segue in entrambi i testi un intervento divino che mira al superamento della situazione aporetica<br />
(Prt. 321c: ἀπορίᾳ, Smp. 190c: ἠπόρουν) per stabilire una condizione di equilibrio: nel Simposio Zeus<br />
in collaborazione con Apollo divide gli uomini-palla in due metà affinché pongano fine alla loro<br />
intemperanza divenendo più deboli (190c-e), nel Protagora Prometeo ruba il fuoco ad Atena ed Efesto<br />
perché gli uomini possano trovare nelle τέχναι un sapere utile per la sopravvivenza (321c-e). Tale<br />
intervento non risolve efficacemente la situazione e anzi minaccia l’esistenza stessa del genere umano<br />
(Smp. 191b ἀπώλλυντο, Prt. 322c ἀπόλοιτο): gli uomini-palla ormai divisi in due, desiderosi di<br />
riunirsi, restano avvinti in un abbraccio perpetuo che non permette loro di fare nulla, causando così la<br />
loro morte per fame e inattività (Smp. 191a-b); nel caso degli uomini primitivi del mito di Prometeo,<br />
le τέχναι artigianali, che pure si erano rivelate sufficienti per la ricerca del cibo, non sono in grado di<br />
contribuire alla lotta contro gli animali feroci. Gli uomini primitivi sono infatti privi della πολιτικὴ<br />
τέχνη, di cui fa parte l’arte bellica. Per questo stesso motivo, quando tentano per salvarsi di riunirsi in<br />
città, sono costretti a separarsi nuovamente a causa delle reciproche ingiustizie (Prt. 322b-c).<br />
Segue per questo un intervento di Zeus che ha carattere risolutivo ed è causa della condizione<br />
attuale degli esseri umani: nel Simposio (191b-c), Zeus, impietosito, trasferisce sul davanti i genitali<br />
degli esseri umani e crea così la sessualità, che permette di conciliare l’eros con le altre esigenze della<br />
vita: per mezzo della generazione nel caso di coppie eterosessuali, per mezzo della sazietà nel caso di<br />
coppie omosessuali – si chiarirà in seguito (192a) che proprio chi fa parte di coppie omosessuali<br />
maschili sarà per natura portato all’attività politica; nel Protagora (322c-d), Zeus, temendo la<br />
scomparsa del genere umano, ordina a Ermes di distribuire a tutti gli uomini αἰδώς e δίκη: in questo<br />
modo potranno sviluppare la πολιτικὴ τέχνη e dunque la vita associata nella πόλις. Zeus stabilisce<br />
però una norma: chi non è in grado di partecipare di αἰδώς e δίκη dovrà essere eliminato come una<br />
malattia per la città. Alla norma stabilita da Zeus risponde in una qualche misura il timore espresso da<br />
Aristofane alla fine del proprio discorso: se gli uomini non saranno ben disposti nei confronti degli<br />
dei, potrebbero essere ancora una volta scissi in due metà come le figure scolpite nelle steli.<br />
Al di là delle evidenti somiglianze dal punto di vista dello sviluppo narrativo, è da sottolineare<br />
la presenza nei due discorsi di un’analoga articolazione bipartita: al racconto sugli eventi dell’umanità<br />
primitiva fa seguito un’analisi delle conseguenze che tali eventi hanno sull’uomo contemporaneo. Nel<br />
Protagora, tale articolazione, tematizzata dallo stesso Protagora nell’opposizione tra µῦθος e λόγος<br />
(320c e 324d), si ritrova anche nella prima parte del discorso, esplicitamente definita dal sofista<br />
µῦθος, in cui è possibile distinguere una sezione narrativa (320c-322a) da una chiaramente<br />
argomentativa (322a-324c). Nel discorso di Aristofane, dopo il racconto sull’umanità primitiva (189c-<br />
191d), si offre un’ampia analisi dei possibili tipi di relazioni amorose fra esseri umani che proprio in<br />
base alle vicende dell’umanità primitiva sono spiegate (191d-193d).<br />
A margine, può valer la pena infine ricordare che la sezione finale del discorso di Aristofane e<br />
6<br />
Cfr. ad es. P.W. Ludwig, Eros and Polis. Desire and Community in Greek Political Theory, Cambridge-New York 2002, 34<br />
n. 17.<br />
7<br />
Cfr. in ultimo D. O’Brien, Aristophanes’ Speech in Plato’s Sympoxium: the Empedoclean Background and Its<br />
Philosophical Significance, in A. Havlícek, M. Cajthaml (ed.), Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong>. Proceedings of the Fifth <strong>Symposium</strong><br />
Platonicum Pragense, Prague 2007, 59-85.<br />
305
Michele Corradi<br />
quella del grande discorso di Protagora presentano un chiaro ritorno al contesto drammatico del<br />
dialogo attraverso l’evocazione di vicende relative a personaggi presenti sulla scena: Pausania e<br />
Agatone nel Simposio (193b-c), i figli di Pericle Paralo e Santippo nel Protagora (328c-d).<br />
Come emerge da questa serie di analogie, Platone fa pronunciare ad Aristofane un discorso<br />
sotto molti aspetti simile a quello che presta a Protagora nell’omonimo dialogo. Un discorso dunque<br />
che, almeno nella particolare prospettiva dei dialoghi di Platone, ha una forte connotazione<br />
protagorea.<br />
Tale connotazione può apparire in qualche modo una risposta di Platone al poeta comico che<br />
nelle Nuvole aveva caratterizzato in senso protagoreo la παιδεία di Socrate: basti pensare<br />
all’insegnamento del discorso più forte e del discorso più debole impartito nel φροντιστήριον (94-99,<br />
112-113, 898-1104 = 80 C 2 DK), che riecheggia il celebre ἐπάγγελµα di Protagora τὸν ἥττω δὲ λόγον<br />
κρείττω ποιεῖν (80 B 6 DK), o alla lezione di grammatica offerta a Strepsiade da Socrate (658–693 =<br />
80 C 3 DK), che attinge chiaramente alle ricerche del sofista sull’ὀρθοέπεια (80 A 26-30 DK). 8<br />
Del resto riferimenti alle Nuvole non mancano nel Simposio: alla commedia di Aristofane<br />
(362: ὅτι βρενθύει τ΄ ἐν ταῖσιν ὁδοῖς καὶ τὠφθαλµὼ παραβάλλεις) allude ad esempio in modo esplicito<br />
Alcibiade per caratterizzare il coraggio di Socrate che nella ritirata di Delio incedeva βρενθυόµενος<br />
καὶ τὠφθαλµὼ παραβάλλων (221b3).<br />
In ogni caso nella connotazione protagorea del discorso di Aristofane non deve essere colta a<br />
mio avviso la volontà di una sarcastica vendetta – il desiderio da parte di Platone di vendicarsi delle<br />
Nuvole è stata ad esempio letto da più di uno studioso nell’episodio del singhiozzo di Aristofane<br />
(185c-e) 9 – ma quella di creare un sottile gioco di maschere. Tale è il peso dell’insegnamento di<br />
Protagora sulla cultura ateniese della seconda metà del V secolo che, se Aristofane aveva potuto in<br />
modo plausibile costruire la maschera di un Socrate dai tratti protagorei, con altrettanta plausibilità<br />
Platone riesce a costruire una maschera protagorea per Aristofane. Del resto, dalle pagine di Platone,<br />
che pure non risparmiano critiche nei confronti del sofista, emerge un ritratto di Protagora quale<br />
figura di primo piano nella storia del pensiero. La stessa opposizione dialettica fra Socrate e Protagora<br />
sull’ἀρετή si risolve nel finale del Protagora in uno scambio di posizioni che Protagora approva<br />
vaticinando per Socrate un futuro fra gli uomini ἐλλόγιµοι per σοφία (359e-362a).<br />
La connotazione protagorea del racconto di Aristofane e il suo rapporto con le Nuvole ci<br />
permettono forse di meglio apprezzare un passo sul quale gli interpreti non si sono soffermati con la<br />
necessaria attenzione: si tratta della spiegazione del nome ἀνδρόγυνος che Aristofane propone<br />
all’inizio del suo discorso (189e). Osserviamo più da vicino il passo. Secondo Aristofane la natura<br />
degli esseri umani in origine era diversa. Non esistevano soltanto il genere maschile e quello<br />
femminile, ἄρρεν καὶ θῆλυ. Ma ne esisteva un terzo. Tale genere aveva caratteristiche comuni agli<br />
altri due, κοινὸν ὂν ἀµφοτέρων τούτων. Ora è sparito ma ne rimane il nome, οὗ νῦν ὄνοµα λοιπόν͵<br />
αὐτὸ δὲ ἠφάνισται. Si trattava del genere androgino, dotato di caratteri comuni al genere maschile e a<br />
quello femminile sia dal punto di vista dell’aspetto sia dal punto di vista del nome, ἀνδρόγυνον γὰρ ἓν<br />
τότε µὲν ἦν καὶ εἶδος καὶ ὄνοµα ἐξ ἀµφοτέρων κοινὸν τοῦ τε ἄρρενος καὶ θήλεος. Questo genere non<br />
è più presente ma il nome continua a essere utilizzato con un significato dispregiativo, νῦν δὲ οὐκ<br />
ἔστιν ἀλλ΄ ἢ ἐν ὀνείδει ὄνοµα κείµενον. Aristofane con una struttura particolarmente elaborata fonda<br />
la sua riflessione relativa alla natura originaria dell’uomo su un argomento di tipo linguisticoetimologico:<br />
il nome ἀνδρόγυνος avrebbe assunto nel greco della sua epoca il significato volgare di<br />
“uomo effeminato”, “cinedo”, che non aveva all’inizio. Nella sua accezione originaria indicava<br />
invece, come rivela l’etimologia, un essere che presentava un aspetto, un εἶδος ad un tempo maschile<br />
e femminile: Aristofane offre una spiegazione del nome identificandone le due componenti, ἀνήρ e<br />
γυνή, e parafrasandole con i sinonimi ἄρρεν καὶ θῆλυ. Il nome ἀνδρόγυνος rivela dunque una perfetta<br />
corrispondenza fra nome e cosa, tra ὄνοµα ed εἶδος. Una perfetta corrispondenza che si è persa a<br />
causa della scomparsa del genere androgino, del suo εἶδος – dei motivi di tale scomparsa ci informerà<br />
il racconto di Aristofane – e della sopravvivenza dell’ὄνοµα con un altro significato, per giunta<br />
dispregiativo, ἐν ὀνείδει (si noti il raffinato gioco retorico fondato su omeoarcto e paronomasia che fa<br />
risuonare in ὀνείδει ad un tempo ὄνοµα ed εἶδος). Se certo la riflessione sul rapporto tra ὄνοµα ed<br />
εἶδος suggerisce in modo sorprendente un legame con le pagine del Cratilo, credo che non debba<br />
essere dimenticato il rapporto con il contributo di Protagora, più in particolare proprio con quanto da<br />
Protagora riprende Aristofane nelle Nuvole. Com’è noto, Protagora ha dato un impulso fondamentale<br />
8 Cfr. O. Imperio, La figura dell’intellettuale nella commedia greca, in A.M. Belardinelli, O. Imperio, G. Mastromarco, M.<br />
Pellegrino, P. Totaro, Tessere. Frammenti della commedia greca: studi e commenti, Bari 1998, 43-130, e M. Corradi,<br />
Protagora tra filologia e filosofia. Le testimonianze di Aristotele, Pisa-Roma 2012, 133-175.<br />
9 Cfr. ad es. M.G. Bonanno, Aristofane in Platone (Pax 412 et Symp. 190c), «Museum Criticum», X-XII, 1975-1977, 103-<br />
112: 108-113.<br />
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Michele Corradi<br />
allo sviluppo della riflessione grammaticale antica con le sue ricerche sull’ὀρθοέπεια. In particolare<br />
dalle testimonianze antiche ricaviamo la presenza di un importante contributo sul verbo, che<br />
anticipava probabilmente la riflessione della successiva τέχνη γραµµατική su modi e tempi, e<br />
soprattutto sul nome (80 A 25-30 DK). Lo stesso Aristotele nella Retorica si riferisce a Protagora<br />
come ad un’autorità nell’ambito della distinzione fra i generi del nome (1407b6-8 = 80 A 27 DK):<br />
Πρωταγόρας τὰ γένη τῶν ὀνοµάτων διήιρει͵ ἄρρενα καὶ θήλεα καὶ σκεύη. Come emerge dalle<br />
Confutazioni sofistiche, sembra che Protagora giungesse a criticare lo stesso Omero per l’uso di µῆνις<br />
al genere femminile a suo avviso scorretto (80 A 28 DK). Nella lezione di grammatica che Socrate<br />
impartisce a Strepsiade nelle Nuvole (658-691 = 80 C 3 DK) la critica ha da tempo colto una ripresa<br />
per quanto parodica abbastanza precisa delle ricerche di Protagora sui generi grammaticali. 10 Nella<br />
commedia Socrate cerca di persuadere Strepsiade ad utilizzare nomi diversi per distinguere entità di<br />
genere maschile e femminile (è il caso della coppia ἀλέκτωρ/ἀλεκτρύαινα), a correggere i nomi<br />
femminili appartenenti alla seconda declinazione per ricondurli alla prima (è il caso di ἡ κάρδοπος<br />
che viene modificato in ἡ καρδόπη), a considerare femminili anche i nomi maschili appartenenti alla<br />
prima (è il caso di Ἀµεινίας). In buona sostanza dalla scena delle Nuvole possiamo ricavare che il<br />
contributo di Protagora sui γένη dei nomi andasse nella direzione della ricerca di una corrispondenza<br />
tra generi grammaticali e generi naturali. Anche l’ὀρθοέπεια di Protagora si inserisce pertanto in quel<br />
filone del pensiero arcaico e tardo-arcaico che s’interrogava profondamente sul rapporto fra ὀνόµατα<br />
e cose alla ricerca di corrispondenze che fornissero la chiave di un metodo sicuro per la comprensione<br />
della realtà. Una tradizione che trovava le sue radici nell’epos, in Omero ed Esiodo, autori non a caso<br />
studiati e approfonditi da Protagora: si pensi al nome di Odisseo la cui spiegazione nell’Odissea svela<br />
il destino del personaggio (XIX 403-409) o ai nomi delle Muse nel proemio della Teogonia che<br />
nell’etimologia rivelano le funzioni stesse del canto (77-79). Lo hanno insegnato a generazioni di<br />
studiosi le pagine di Friedländer o di Stanford. 11<br />
Nella spiegazione che Aristofane offre del nome ἀνδρόγυνος, interpretato nella sua duplice<br />
componente maschile e femminile proprio con i termini che a partire da Protagora assumeranno<br />
carattere tecnico per l’indicazione dei generi grammaticali, ἄρρεν e θῆλυ, può forse essere vista una<br />
trasposizione fantastica se non parodica degli studi che il sofista aveva svolto sul genere dei nomi: la<br />
ricerca di una corrispondenza fra generi grammaticali e generi naturali prende vita nella figura di un<br />
essere androgino che proprio nella sua commistione di maschile e femminile realizza una perfetta ma<br />
difficilmente recuperabile corrispondenza di ὄνοµα e εἶδος.<br />
L’Aristofane di Platone intreccia dunque con sapienza racconto sulle origini dell’uomo e<br />
riflessione sul linguaggio. In una qualche misura l’interpretazione stessa che del nome ἀνδρόγυνος e<br />
della sua evoluzione semantica Aristofane offre nel Simposio è motore dello sviluppo narrativo<br />
sull’umanità delle origini. In questo Platone sembra chiaramente inserire il suo personaggio nel solco<br />
di lunga tradizione letteraria. Come hanno mostrato Risch e, più recentemente, Arrighetti, già<br />
nell’epica arcaica l’interpretazione del nome, la spiegazione etimologica è spesso alla base del µῦθος:<br />
nella Teogonia Afrodite nasce dalla spuma del mare perché alla spuma del mare rinvia l’etimologia<br />
del suo nome (188-200). 12 Α tale tradizione non sono del resto sorde la commedia arcaica e la<br />
produzione di Aristofane in particolare: si pensi al ruolo dei nomi parlanti dei protagonisti delle sue<br />
commedie, ad esempio Strepsiade e Diceopoli, o alla capacità insuperata di dare esistenza concreta<br />
sulla scena alle metafore di cui il poeta dà ripetuta prova. Nello studio e nella rielaborazione della<br />
tradizione letteraria del passato anche Protagora fondava quel ben connesso intreccio di riflessione<br />
linguistica, politica e pedagogica che emerge da quanto su Protagora ci offrono il poderoso ritratto<br />
sbozzato da Platone e i pochi frammenti conservati da altri autori: sul testo di Omero Protagora<br />
esercitava la propria riflessione linguistica, con le tessere dei poemi di Esiodo, stando alla<br />
testimonianza del Protagora, costruiva il suo racconto sull’origine della πόλις.<br />
Nei discorsi del Simposio Platone ci offre uno specimen straordinario dei risultati a cui la<br />
cultura greca della fine del V secolo era giunta nella rielaborazione della grande tradizione del<br />
passato. A tali risultati avevano contribuito in maniera rilevante anche i cosiddetti sofisti, in una certa<br />
misura maestri di tutti i protagonisti della scena e “convitati di pietra” del banchetto a casa di<br />
Agatone. Fra questi un ruolo di primo attore era certo rivestito da Protagora che, come abbiamo visto,<br />
10 Cfr. M. Corradi, op. cit., 154-158.<br />
11 P. Friedländer, Rec. Hesiodi Carmina recensuit Felix Jacoby. Pars I: Theogonia, «Göttingische Gelehrte Anzeigen», XCIII,<br />
1931, 241-266, trad. it. in G. Arrighetti, Esiodo. Opere, Torino 1998, 495-510, e W.B. Stanford, The Homeric Etymology of<br />
the Name Odysseus, «Classical Philology», XLVII, 1952, 209-213.<br />
12 E. Risch, Namensdeutungen und Worterklärungen bei den ältesten griechischen Dichtern, in Eumusia. Festgabe für Ernst<br />
Howald zum sechzigsten Geburtstag am 20. April 1947, Erlenbach-Zürich 1947, 72-91, ora in Kleine Schriften, Berlin-New<br />
York 1981, 294-313, e G. Arrighetti, Poeti, eruditi e biografi. Momenti della riflessione dei Greci sulla letteratura, Pisa 1987,<br />
16-36.<br />
307
Michele Corradi<br />
Platone vuol celare fra le pieghe del discorso di Aristofane. Di quel poeta cioè che nelle Nuvole aveva<br />
invece intagliato una maschera con i tratti di Protagora per Socrate, il maestro di Platone. Solo dopo<br />
averla riconsegnata – almeno per un po’ – ad Aristofane, Platone potrà accompagnare, anche grazie<br />
alla riflessione di Aristofane e di Protagora sulla tradizione letteraria greca, il suo Socrate a<br />
trascenderne i risultati lungo la scala che li condurrà alla scoperta dell’ideale.<br />
308
What Socrates learned from Aristophanes<br />
(and what he left behind)<br />
Samuel Scolnicov<br />
All the speakers who preceded Aristophanes – Phaedrus, Pausanias, Eryximachus – characterized<br />
Eros by what he is or does. So will Agathon do. Aristophanes, on the other hand, characterizes Eros<br />
not positively but negatively, by what he lacks, 1 by what he seeks.<br />
This lack is not simple privation. Immanent in it is a drive for the completion of what lacks.<br />
Yet, this immanent drive should not be understood as something of an aristotelean potentiality. It is<br />
not a drive towards an essence already immanent. It is a drive towards a completion of what man does<br />
not have, not for what he already has, albeit in a somewhat different form. What he lacks is outside of<br />
him, yet it is his in an important sense to be characterized by Aristophanes mythically.<br />
The change of order Aristophanes/Eryxmachus is, in most cases, passed over or swiftly<br />
explained away by the commentators. 2 However, this exchange of places bears an important structural<br />
significance. Aristophanes too, like the first speakers, speaks of the individual; Eryximachus broadens<br />
the scope to cosmic proportions. From this point of view, considering the content of his speech,<br />
Eryximachus should come last in that series, after Aristophanes. Yet, Aristophanes introduces (or,<br />
rather, prefigurates) a change of direction as well as a change of tone, stressed by his new place in the<br />
order of the speeches, anticipating, as he does, some salient features of Socrates/Diotima’s 3 speech. 4<br />
Of course, Aristophanes’ myth is not to be taken literally. For example, it has nothing to say<br />
about other animals and cannot explain why man is no longer born globular (although, of course, in<br />
illo tempore, in those mythical times, things happened, as it were, not as they happen today). On this<br />
count, Eryximachus’ all-inclusive cosmological and anthropological speech is to be considered<br />
superior. On the other hand, Aristophanes’ myth – like many a platonic myth, if not indeed all of<br />
them – expresses in temporal, anthropogonic terms a non-temporal truth, viz., in this case, what<br />
Aristophanes sees as man’s fundamental nature. In this too, in transferring the discourse to this other<br />
plane, his speech is of another order than all the previous speeches.<br />
However, Aristophanes conceives of eros only as a yearning for completion within the same<br />
order of being. According to him, man lacks a part of his own body, which was mythically taken away<br />
from him. Unlike the previous speakers’ views of man, Aristophanes’ man is not self-sufficient. In his<br />
speech, man as empirically given lacks half of himself. For the platonic Socrates too, man is not<br />
sufficient to himself. Not as Thrasymachus and Glaucon assume in the Republic. The shift from the<br />
previous speakers in the <strong>Symposium</strong> to Aristophanes is the same as the shift from the political<br />
theories of Thrasymachus and Glaucon to Socrates’ founding of human society. For Thrasymachus<br />
and Glaucon, the individual single man is sufficient to himself and is not in need of others. The others<br />
just stand in his way. The function of their states is to manage the conflicts between basically selfcontained<br />
units of power, by subjugation and submission or by mutual contract. Socrates’ state, on the<br />
contrary, arises from the basic insufficiency of man, hence his need to collaborate in order to survive.<br />
Socrates’ man in the Republic is not a unit unto himself but only a part of the larger unit of the state.<br />
However, man’s privation in itself can suscitate neither the aristophanic longing for his other half nor<br />
the socratic need of collaboration or the powerful attraction towards the Beautiful and the Good. For<br />
that, it is necessary that man be conscient of his lack. This is why, in the terms of Aristophanes’<br />
anthropogonic myth, man has his face turned round: so that he can see his deficiency and be vaguely<br />
reminded of his mythical pristine state. The conscience of the cut makes man kosmioteros (190e). The<br />
drive to kosmos is a consequence of man’s conscience of his deficiency and the desire to overcome it.<br />
Eryximachus put much store on harmony and balance, the aim of medicine on a cosmic scale.<br />
Aristophanes’ hiccups undermine Eryximachus’ theory. The latter is quick to restore that harmony by<br />
his art, although, against his own theoretical principles of the good and bad erotes, he can only cure<br />
that disorder by means of yet more disorder. The inordinate state of the body is to be appeased only<br />
1 I am indebted for this insight to my student Noa Lahav.<br />
2 Hoffmann 1947 attempts to explain the change on the basis of the ternary and quaternary structures of the relevant<br />
speeches. But I cannot see why the final order could not have been established ab initio, without highlighting the still<br />
unnecessary change.<br />
3 That Diotima is a stand-in for Plato’s Socrates, who cannot yet in character propound positive doctrines, is by now well<br />
accepted. Her love lesson follows smoothly from Socrates’ elenchus of Agathon.<br />
4 But I cannot see in this change of order a pointer to the dottrine non scritte (Reale 2001, ad 185c5-d and li-liii, 196-204,<br />
esp. 200). Aristophanes’ half-men are not aoristoi duades. For a thorough ‘arithmological’ interpretation of the <strong>Symposium</strong><br />
without appeal to any supposed esoteric doctrines, see, e.g., Hoffmann 1947.
Samuel Scolnicov<br />
by more noise and irritation in the form of sneezes. 5 Eryximachus can restore the body to its ordered<br />
state, even if he cannot explain why he does what he does. But he cannot go beyond natural science as<br />
such.<br />
But Aristophanes’ own analysis of man’s deficiency as the lack of a part is pointedly shown<br />
not to be quite adequate either. Hiccups and sneezes are not the sort of defect that Aristophanes will<br />
address in his speech. They are not a form of bodily incompleteness. Although he exhibits this<br />
shortcoming of his own body, Aristophanes cannot account for it in his speech. Even by resorting to<br />
the mythical mode, Aristophanes too cannot transcend empirical phusis. 6 The poet’s man is conscious<br />
only of his longing for some sort of physical completeness. Like his own half-men, who experience<br />
ho adunatoi eipein (192d), what they cannot say, also Aristophanes exhibits what he cannot formulate.<br />
Aristophanes’ original men ta phronema megala eikhon (190a), were high minded and had proud<br />
looks. 7 They not only conspired against the gods. 8 Perhaps there is in this phrase some ambiguity,<br />
certainly not intended by Aristophanes but possibly played on by Plato, as he is wont to do: they had<br />
high thoughts, proud designs, were presumptuous and arrogant, in good and bad sense. 9 Aristophanes’<br />
original men attempted to be like the gods by escalating their place. Diotima will transform those<br />
proud thoughts into a drive for homoiosis theoi. High thoughts indeed. Aristophanes’ man becomes<br />
kosmioteros by being reminded of the unwelcome consequence of his hubris towards the gods.<br />
Diotima’s man becomes kosmioteros as a most fortunate consequence of his attempt at trying to<br />
transcend his given state.<br />
Socrates learned from Aristophanes, first of all and most importantly, that man, as empirically<br />
given, is defined by what he lacks rather than by what he is or does. Moreover, Aristophanes makes<br />
quite clear that what man lacks both belongs to him and is outside him, natural to, but not immanent<br />
in him, not what he already has. 10 What we have is not simply inside us. We do not have it, not in our<br />
present state, although it is natural to us.<br />
Socrates also takes from Aristophanes the need for conscience of this lack. Only man is<br />
conscious, in fact only semi-conscious, of his deficiency. Socrates, through Diotima’s speech, again<br />
corrects Aristophanes, even while following his clue. True, man longs for wholeness. Eros is the name<br />
given to epithumia holou (192e), desire for the whole. But eros is not just an epithumia, not as such.<br />
Aristophanes cannot go beyond epithumiai as bodily desires. But eros is not only of the corporeal and<br />
not of the same order of being as the epithumiai. In Aristophanes’ myth, man longs for himself, for<br />
completion of what he lacks. But for Socrates/Diotima this ‘himself’ is his ideal nature. It is his<br />
oikeion, but it is not homoion to him. 11 It is akin to him, natural to him, even in this empirical life of<br />
his, but it is not like him. Aristophanes has an inkling of this at 193d2-3, in saying that, if we behave<br />
ourselves, we can hope that the gods will lead us to our oikeion. But he still misunderstands this<br />
oikeion as what we lack materially.<br />
In all the previous speeches, eros was a desire for some form of immortality. Any immortality<br />
referred to, however, was only by descendants or else by fame of deeds and works. Animals can reach<br />
only physical transcendence in the form of descendants. This transcendence will be interpreted by<br />
Diotima as ultimately dependent on another order of being, of which other animals cannot ever be<br />
conscious. For Aristophanes, only man is conscious of his incompleteness. Sex organs are turned to<br />
the front to allow a certain transcendence, not different from that of the other animals. In any case,<br />
these do not interest Aristophanes.<br />
Thus, procreation is not totally incidental to the true motive of eros. 12 It is a way of attaining<br />
some sort of immortality in the form of progeny or of something else man cannot put a name to.<br />
Aristophanes’ men long for something they do not know what it is and cannot achieve it. Man wants<br />
to be whole ekei au en Haidou (192e), also there in Hades’. ‘What is erotic is unconsciously animated<br />
by a vision of the “immortal”.’ 13 Man wants to transcend this life but he can hardly think beyond<br />
some sort of extension of his empirical life. 14 That much Socrates learned from Aristophanes.<br />
Man and even, more obscurely, all animals are driven by their real nature, which is not<br />
immanent in them. Aristophanes’ man longs for something else he takes for everlasting wholeness:<br />
5 On Aristophanes’ implicit critique of Eryximachus, see Hofmann 1947, 14.<br />
6 Pace Salman 1990.<br />
7 Bury, ad loc.<br />
8 Megala phronemata dicuntur habere qui contra dominis conspirant (Hommel, quoted by Bury, ad loc.).<br />
9 Cf. LSJ, ad voc. II.<br />
10 Contra Hunter 71.<br />
11 Pohlenz 1916.<br />
12 Contra Salman 1990.<br />
13 Salman 1990.<br />
14 As pointed out by Rowe 1998.<br />
310
Samuel Scolnicov<br />
the temporal expression of a metaphysical perfection he cannot fathom. In this, he goes wrong twice:<br />
he thinks in terms of physical completeness and of temporal everlastingness.<br />
But Plato’s soul cannot be immortal in this sense. For Plato, the incarnate soul is the principle<br />
of ordered movement, and, as such, it has a supra-sensible dimension. This dimension is expressed as<br />
immortality only mythically understood as everlastingness. The incarnate soul, as ordered movement,<br />
introduces in the world a duplicity of sensible (insofar as it is movement) and of non-sensible reality<br />
(insofar as it is order). 15 But if Plato’s soul is the principle of ordered movement, it is necessarily<br />
prior to time as the number of that movement (Timaeus). Thus, the soul cannot be immortal in the<br />
sense of indefinite continuation in time. Indefinite continuation in time is the sensible, mythical<br />
expression of a non-temporal, non-empirical dimension of the incarnate soul. The soul in its pure<br />
form as nous (Republic x) is not temporal.<br />
Plato is not concerned in the <strong>Symposium</strong> with immortality after death. Diotima does not speak<br />
of an after-life, 16 as Aristophanes does not do either. (His Hefaistos’ proposal is merely hypothetical.)<br />
She is not concerned with reward after death. 17 Soul comes to its own perfection by attaining its true,<br />
non-empirical nature, not by securing its own everlastingness.<br />
Man is not in need of completion; he needs perfectioning. He lacks Vervollkomnung, not<br />
Ergänzung, as Pohlenz put it in a slightly different context. 18 What he lacks is not more of the same<br />
ontological order. Praxiteles’ Doruphoros lacks his spear and is, therefore, in need of completion. A<br />
Roman copy of it may have all its parts and still fall short of the original. Any first-year conservatory<br />
student can play Bach’s first Two-Part Invention without missing a single note, but not as Glen Gould<br />
or Wanda Landowska played it.<br />
Compare, in the Republic, the passage from the ‘city of pigs’ to the ‘swollen city’. In the first,<br />
man has all he needs for his survival and even enjoys a modicum of happiness. But what Glaucon<br />
misses of is not of the order of physical survival. What he needs is something of a different order:<br />
luxury, poetry, art, eventually philosophy. Glaucon can begin to name what Aristophanes’ half-men<br />
could not.<br />
Diotima is indeed concerned with the highest amount of perfection achievable in this life, 19<br />
but not just with some kind of self-perfection by creative work. As Dover justly notes, ‘Aristophanes’<br />
notion that in sexual eros we are groping in ignorance after something beyond temporary union<br />
(192c4-d3) might itself be regarded as an uninformed but not totally misdirected groping after the<br />
metaphysical world perceived and expounded by Diotima (210a-212a)’. 20 Although he is prepared to<br />
say that, in his view, there is here a faint apprehension of recollection, yet he further claims explicitly<br />
that ‘recollection and the existence of the soul before union with the body are nowhere mentioned by<br />
Diotima, and we cannot be sure what view Plato took of the recollection theory when he wrote<br />
Smp.’. 21 Aristophanes’ myth stresses man’s half-conscience of what he lacks and his drive towards<br />
completion and procreation, and presents man as fundamentally pregnant. This is as far as<br />
Aristophanes can go: not only conscience of the lack but also a vague memory of it (cf. mnemeion<br />
191a4). But this memory is too vague, it has no inkling of a positive content.<br />
The myth does not quite amount to an ‘intimation of the “hyperouranian” place’. 22 It only<br />
posits a drive for physical completion, knowingly marking man’s painful shortcoming, without being<br />
able to see, not even through a glass darkly, what this shortcoming implies or where to look for its<br />
remedy. Socrates/Diotima will clarify this as a most powerful drive towards man’s non-immanent<br />
perfection, to which he can approximate by careful recollection of his mythical pre-natal state.<br />
Works cited<br />
Bury, R.G. 1969. The <strong>Symposium</strong> of Plato. Cambridge: W. Heffer. Second edition.<br />
Dover, Kenneth J. 1980. <strong>Symposium</strong>. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.<br />
Frede, Dorothea 1993. ‘Out of the cave: What Socrates leaned from Diotima’. Nomodeiktes: Greek<br />
studies in honor of Martin Ostwald. Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press, 397-422.<br />
15 I cannot go here into a discussion of this vexed question. In a forthcoming article, I argue that Plato’s teleology, the<br />
principle of order, is not temporal and is, in this sense, external to the pure, absolutely non-directional motility of the khora.<br />
Cf. Scolnicov (forthcoming).<br />
16 Frede 1993, O’Brien 1984.<br />
17 Contra O’Brien 1984.<br />
18 Pohlenz 1916.<br />
19 Frede 1993.<br />
20 Dover 1990.<br />
21 Dover 1990.<br />
22 Salman 1990.<br />
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Samuel Scolnicov<br />
Hoffman, Ernst 1947. Über Platons <strong>Symposium</strong>. Heidelberg: Kerle.<br />
Hunter, Richard 2004. Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong>. Oxford: Oxford University Press.<br />
O’Brien, Michael 1984. ‘ “Becoming immortal” in Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong>’. Greek poetry and<br />
philosophy. Chico, CA: Scholar Press, 185-205<br />
Pohlenz, Max 1916. Review of Hans v. Arnim, Platos Jugenddialoge und die Enstehungszeit des<br />
Phaidros. Gottingsche gelehrte Anzeigen 178:5 (1916).<br />
Reale, Giovanni 2001. ‘Introduzione’, ‘Commento’. Platone: Simposio. [Milano]: Mondadori.<br />
Rowe, Christopher 1998. Il Simposio di Platone. Sankt Augustin: Academia.<br />
Salman, Charles 1990. ‘The wisdom of Plato’s Aristophanes’. Interpretation 18:2 (1990), 233-249.<br />
Scolnicov, Samuel (forthcoming). ‘Plato’s atemporal teleology’, Teleology. Cambridge: Cambridge<br />
University Press.<br />
312
Split Personalities in the <strong>Symposium</strong> and the Bible:<br />
Aristophanes’ Speech and the Myth of Adam and Eve<br />
Roslyn Weiss<br />
Of the many points of comparison between the Aristophanes myth in Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong> and the<br />
myth of Adam and Eve in Genesis 2-3—both are tales of how human beings came to yearn for one<br />
another; both are ultimately tales of disobedience on the part of human beings and retribution by the<br />
god(s)—I will be focusing my attention on their accounts of (1) why there is attraction between<br />
people and (2) how the gods figure in the matter of human attraction. The two myths offer radically<br />
different perspectives on the first of these questions, and hence suggest divergent visions of the<br />
relationship between the human and divine realms.<br />
I. Why There Is Love between People<br />
Both these myths presuppose that there is something special about the connection between human<br />
beings that requires an account, some element in the human longing for one another that cannot be<br />
reduced to a reproductive instinct or even to the biologically based love of parent for child. In neither<br />
of these myths do the peculiar beginnings to which the relations between human beings are traced<br />
apply to other animals. 1<br />
In fulfilling his charge as a speaker in the <strong>Symposium</strong> to compose an encomium to Eros,<br />
Aristophanes provides an account of human beings’ yearning for one another. In the myth he presents,<br />
human beings begin as composites, but are subsequently split apart from one another, so that forever<br />
after they seek to recover their lost completion. Once they find their missing half, they do not wish to<br />
separate from their complement; promiscuity results only from the unsatisfied search for wholeness.<br />
In the biblical myth of man and woman, man begins alone. The initial condition of the man,<br />
of Adam, is not one of self-sufficiency but one of lack or need. Something is missing, but not<br />
something he has already had. The only way he can be made whole is via union with a being who is<br />
separate from him from the start.<br />
Separate from him, but not entirely so. Woman is made from Adam, from part of him. (There<br />
is a debate among biblical scholars as to whether tzel´a means side or rib, but I am inclined to believe<br />
it means rib, insofar as the textual expression is: ahat mitzal´otav, one of his tzel´aot, suggesting that<br />
there are several, and it seems odd to suppose that Adam had several sides.) A part of Adam is<br />
removed from him, flesh is added to it to complete the new being, and breath is breathed into that new<br />
being, woman.<br />
Let us draw out some of the implications for the nature of human attraction from just these<br />
bare outlines of the two myths. In both, a person is missing a part of himself. But the nature of what is<br />
missing is significantly different in the two cases. In the <strong>Symposium</strong> myth as recounted by<br />
Aristophanes, the original human being was composed of two wholes. Although the human being’s<br />
power is diminished by being divided in two, nevertheless, each half is on its own complete. The<br />
situation is comparable, perhaps, to that of conjoined twins, who, when separated, can each, at least in<br />
some instances, have all the organs and limbs necessary for independent existence. Nevertheless each<br />
twin profoundly misses the connection with his or her twin. These siblings are indeed often, though<br />
paradoxically, described as “inseparable.”<br />
In the Genesis myth, unlike in the Aristophanes myth, Adam and the woman do not start out<br />
as two complete human beings conjoined with one another. At first there is only Adam, only a man.<br />
The sole being who can complete Adam is not even envisioned. Adam’s situation is bleak, perhaps<br />
even dire. He has power and intelligence—he is smart enough to be entrusted with naming all the<br />
animals—and he is placed in charge of the Garden, “to work it and to protect it” (Gen. 2:15). But he<br />
has no human connection, no one who is his mate. None of the animals that God fashions will do. In<br />
Genesis 1 we are told that God created man—male and female. But, at least according to Genesis 2,<br />
the creation of male and female proceeds in stages.<br />
In the Genesis myth, Adam cannot have a mate without sacrifice on his part—the sacrifice, in<br />
fact, of a part of his body. His body must be rendered less than whole in order for him to become<br />
whole; he welcomes as his mate someone for whom he has yielded his bodily integrity.<br />
One important consequence of the creation of woman out of the rib of man is that male and<br />
female are not equals; the relationship is not symmetrical. Unlike in the Aristophanes myth in which<br />
1 Animals as well as plants experience love according to Eryximachus (186a).
Roslyn Weiss<br />
two conjoined wholes are separated into two independent wholes, in the Genesis myth, one whole<br />
becomes less than whole in order for there to be a second whole which contains a part of the original<br />
whole which is no longer whole. We ought not, then, to think of Adam, who is the first human<br />
creation, as the perfect specimen of a human being; it is in fact the woman who is most perfect. It is<br />
she who not only lacks nothing, but even contains a part of Adam. Moreover, the woman never<br />
experiences aloneness or lack. She never has to sacrifice a part of her body for her mate. She is born<br />
into the world to satisfy the neediness of another; she herself is not needy.<br />
Adam is delighted at the sight of the woman when they are first introduced to one another.<br />
Finally, after having surveyed a host of unsuitable animals, he meets the mate who is just right. When<br />
the woman is brought to him, he exclaims: “This one this time is bone of my bones and flesh of my<br />
flesh; she will be called ‘woman’ because she was taken from ‘man’” (2:23). 2 There is no comparable<br />
reaction on the part of the woman. It is not she who lacks something and is now acquiring what is<br />
missing. She comes to man as whole, as independent, as complete—not as alone, dependent, and<br />
missing a rib. It is perhaps not farfetched to infer from the Genesis myth that prelapsarian woman has<br />
the upper hand. Whereas in Aristophanes’ myth there is no reason that both partners would not<br />
equally desire their missing half, in the biblical narrative, the desire is initially decidedly one-way.<br />
In order to appreciate the relationship between the biblical first man and first woman it may<br />
perhaps be useful to think of the relation between a first-born child and a second, though the<br />
comparison is not entirely apt. The first-born child is perfect, the apple of his or her parents’ eye. But<br />
the child is alone. The parents produce a playmate for their child—a brother or sister. But all is not<br />
rosy. Yes, the older child now has a sibling, born of the same parents, and so, automatically, someone<br />
with whom the older child has much in common. But the older child also experiences significant loss:<br />
no longer enjoying undivided parental affection, the child must adjust to not being the only child.<br />
Since the younger child has never enjoyed undivided parental affection and has never been without a<br />
sibling, he or she has significantly less adjusting to do.<br />
One way in which a dependent and needy person might seek to ensure the survival of the<br />
being on whom his own completion depends is by becoming over-protective. We have good reason to<br />
think that this is precisely what Adam does. The prohibition of eating from the fruit of the tree of<br />
knowledge of good and evil was issued to Adam alone 3 —before the creation of the woman. The<br />
prohibition forbade eating from the tree of knowledge of good and evil, for “on the day you eat from<br />
it you will surely die” (Gen. 2:17). Although there were two trees planted in the center of the Garden<br />
(2:9), both the tree of knowledge and the tree of life (2:9), the prohibition extended no farther than the<br />
tree of knowledge. Moreover, the prohibition concerned only eating. When the woman reports the<br />
prohibition to the Serpent in 3:3, she is able to correct the Serpent’s version of the prohibition: “You<br />
may not eat from all the trees of the Garden” (3:1), but she herself has it wrong as well. Whereas she<br />
believes correctly that the prohibition does not apply to all the trees of the Garden, she thinks<br />
incorrectly that it applies to the fruit of the tree in the center of the Garden (rather than to the fruit of<br />
just one of those trees) and that it includes a prohibition on touching it (3:3). Where could the woman<br />
have gotten these ideas but from Adam? The woman is surely reporting what she has heard from the<br />
man, who has apparently sought, by inflating the prohibition, to make doubly or triply sure that she<br />
will not sin, thereby safeguarding her life on which he is dependent.<br />
It is perhaps significant, in addition, that the woman is attracted to the fruit—not to the man.<br />
The fruit fulfills all her yearnings: for physical pleasure, for aesthetic enjoyment, and for intellectual<br />
fulfillment. “And the woman saw that the tree was good for eating and was a delight to the eyes and<br />
that the tree was desirable for the purpose of becoming wise, and she took of its fruit and ate” (3:6).<br />
One might say that the serpent cunningly directs the woman’s lust toward the fruit. 4<br />
The difference between the equality of the two halves seeking completion in the Aristophanes<br />
myth, stemming as it does from the wholeness in itself of each of the halves, with neither suffering a<br />
loss of its wholeness in the separation from it of its other half, 5 and the asymmetry in the Genesis<br />
myth between man and woman, creates a disparity in the complexity of the relationship between the<br />
parties in the two cases. The Aristophanes myth seeks to account for why any two people are attracted<br />
to one another, but not for why one might be more attracted than the other. The Genesis myth, by<br />
contrast, sets for itself the task of explaining why the attraction is not even—and not simple. Chapter<br />
2 We don’t know how Adam determined which names to assign to the animals.<br />
3 Gen. 2:16-17. Note that after the sin, God says to Adam: “Hast thou eaten of the tree of which I commanded thee<br />
(masculine sing.) that thou shouldst not eat ?”(2:11).<br />
4 Certainly not to himself.<br />
5 The equality in the Aristophanes myth appears to represent a deliberate departure from Pausanius’s speech where lover and<br />
beloved are essentially unequal.<br />
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2 in Genesis thus ends with an asymmetrical statement by the narrator: “Therefore does a man leave<br />
his father and his mother and cleave to his woman, and they become one flesh” (2:24).<br />
A second remarkable difference between the Aristophanes and Genesis myths is that,<br />
although in both cases attraction follows—and requires—separation, in the former attraction arises<br />
only after an “unnatural” separation of one half from the other occurs, as a result of the undoing of the<br />
original human state, while attraction in the latter is the natural state for man once woman is created.<br />
Adam is incomplete and requires a mate before he has one, and his attachment to his mate follows<br />
immediately upon her creation. In both cases, attraction requires separation, but for Aristophanes love<br />
mends an unnatural and imposed separation, whereas biblically, attraction is in the nature of things.<br />
A third feature of interest is, of course, that the Aristophanes myth explains homosexual as<br />
well as heterosexual attraction; it explains why some men pursue women, some men pursue men, and<br />
some women pursue women: each is seeking his or her lost half. What this myth fails to account for,<br />
however—and it is a glaring omission—is why love is not always reciprocated. If a person finds<br />
his/her genuine other half, why does not this other half always return the affection? Also, the truest<br />
and best matches, according to Aristophanes, are those of an older lover and a younger beloved: is it<br />
likely that these very different human specimens could be the two halves of a former whole?<br />
The biblical myth does not account for homosexual attraction, but it does offer an astonishing<br />
account of how (heterosexual) attraction can misfire. The man who is dependent on his perfect<br />
companion acknowledges his dependence on her as he blames her for his disobedient act: “The<br />
woman whom Thou didst give to be with me, she gave me of the tree and I did eat” (3:12). 6 This man<br />
so cleaves to this woman that he prefers to disobey God rather than risk creating a rift between<br />
himself and her. Adam, we note, obeys the divine command until the woman gives him the forbidden<br />
fruit. Unlike the woman, he is not said to be attracted to the fruit. He eats it, as he says, because the<br />
woman gave it to him. Adam’s only alternative would have been to rebuke her; this is something he<br />
was not—or not yet—prepared to do. 7<br />
Once the man’s and the woman’s eyes are opened and they see their nakedness, Adam is at<br />
last the one to take the initiative: “Adam and the woman hid (the verb is masculine singular) from the<br />
Lord God amid the trees of the Garden” (3:8). This is the first real act on Adam’s part: he did not<br />
think to request a companion; the animals were brought before him to be named; he ate what he was<br />
given. But he is no longer protective of the woman. He blames her for his disobedience to God.<br />
The punishment that God metes out to the woman is that she now desires the man and he rules<br />
her. This is, then, in the biblical narrative, a post-lapsarian reversal of the natural order of things,<br />
comparable to that in the Aristophanes myth. The change in the <strong>Symposium</strong> is from two wholes<br />
joined as one to two separate beings yearning for one another; the change in Genesis is from man<br />
completed by the woman upon whom he is dependent to man who, as the object of the woman’s<br />
desire, rules her. The flaw Adam now sees in the woman with his newly opened eyes results in<br />
disillusionment and disappointment—he now sees not only his own nakedness but hers: “they knew<br />
that they were naked” (3:7)—causing the power in the relationship to revert to him. And she, by<br />
seeing her own nakedness, becomes aware of her own imperfection and can finally be dependent on<br />
another. Whereas God’s initial intent must surely have been for two equal companions to complete<br />
one another, the dependency of the one on the other without a reciprocal dependency of the other on<br />
the one set the stage for a power shift, ultimately with sexual overtones, in the relations between male<br />
and female. If the serpent turned Eve’s lust on the fruit, God turned it (by way of punishment) toward<br />
Adam. One might say that the biblical story is one that explains how man came to desire woman and<br />
how woman came to desire man, with the respective desires having very different origins. Had God<br />
created the woman ab initio as a separate being without using a part of Adam, Adam could not have<br />
said “bone of my bone and flesh of my flesh”; he might never have eaten the fruit the woman gave<br />
him; and the woman’s desire might well then never have come to be centered on him.<br />
II. Gods and Human Beings<br />
A central feature of both myths is human disobedience or rebellion. In the <strong>Symposium</strong>, powerful<br />
human beings clamber up to heaven and try to topple the gods. In Genesis, Adam is given an explicit<br />
6 Adam was with her when she took the fruit and ate and gave some to him: “…she took of its fruit and did eat, and gave<br />
also to her husband (who was) with her, and he ate” (3:6). The same term is used for “with me” and “with her”: the man<br />
who was “with her” complains to God about the woman who God gave him to be “with him.” The woman who was<br />
presumably meant to help him came to dominate him—he followed her as she took the lead—and now he has sinned.<br />
7 It is possible that Adam preferred that he and the woman die together than that she die and he once again be alone. Perhaps<br />
once he sees that neither of them died, he is less hesitant about placing the blame on the woman.<br />
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prohibition, and he and the woman defy it. Neither the biblical author nor Aristophanes approves of<br />
human defiance. Aristophanes calls it adikia, injustice (193a); in Genesis, the author expresses no<br />
reservation concerning God’s right to punish; nor do any of those punished lodge a protest. As a<br />
consequence of their improper acts, human beings in the <strong>Symposium</strong> and in Genesis probably deserve<br />
what they get. In both cases God/s keep human beings in their place: although the human beings in<br />
Genesis attain knowledge of good and evil and in this way become like God, they also become subject<br />
to death and in this way become unlike God; in the Aristophanes myth, mortals are further weakened,<br />
though their numbers initially increase.<br />
The first striking difference between the two myths with respect to relations between gods and<br />
men is the number of gods involved. In Aristophanes’ myth, three gods are prominent: Zeus, Apollo,<br />
and, finally, Eros. There are also the gods who are the parents of the original double-people: Sun of<br />
the double-males; Earth of the double-females; Moon of the mixed double. In Genesis there is but a<br />
single God. In the Aristophanes myth, Zeus hatches the plan to weaken human beings by cutting them<br />
in two, halving their strength and doubling their number, so that the gods would at once have less to<br />
fear and more sacrificial smoke to savor. If this is not enough to reduce them to lives of peace and<br />
quiet, Zeus reckons, the cut can be made again. Once the first cut is made, the heads of the new beings<br />
are turned around by Apollo—as per Zeus’s instructions—so that they face the gash where they were<br />
cut and learn greater restraint as they contemplate their wounds. Apollo then sews them up and<br />
smoothes them out, leaving a few creases around the center (190d). The role Eros plays is to draw<br />
together the severed halves, to make one out of two, to heal the human condition. Eros loves the<br />
human race more than any of the other gods do, supporting us and healing the wounds that prevent<br />
our greatest happiness (189d). He is the god who will help us find the boys who are our true matching<br />
halves. The Aristophanes myth retains the hope that we might return to our original state—if we treat<br />
Love right. Love might heal our wounds and render us blessed, whole, and happy. One wonders,<br />
however, whether Eros doesn’t break at least as many hearts as he mends.<br />
Remarkably in the Genesis myth, by contrast, the God who creates Adam and creates the<br />
woman for his sake, and also endows them with wisdom and power and provides for them by<br />
permitting them the fruit of all the Garden’s trees but one, is the very God who punishes them. The<br />
same God who lovingly gives man life is the one who, perhaps also lovingly, punishes. (Note that the<br />
text does not say that God is angry.) This God is one who is not prepared to pronounce all of Creation<br />
“very good” (1:31) until He fixes the one thing that He acknowledges is “not good.” As he says: “It is<br />
not good for man to be alone; I will make him a helper alongside him” (2:18). It is only once the<br />
woman is created that the creation of the human as summarized in Genesis 1, “male and female He<br />
created them” (1:27), can contribute to God’s assessment of His creation as “very good” (1:31). Of<br />
course, this is not a God who thrives on the gifts of human beings in the form of sacrifices and<br />
worship. He might well have destroyed the human race now as He will soon consider doing in the<br />
days of Noah when human corruption exceeds all bounds. He can go on without them. According to<br />
Aristophanes’ myth, however, the gods do not have the luxury of being able to destroy human beings<br />
whose hand feeds them, so their only viable option is to weaken them. Nevertheless, both the God of<br />
the Bible and Zeus take pity on people. God sews for the man and the woman coats of skin and<br />
clothes them (3:21). Zeus helps to preserve the human race by changing the placement of the sexual<br />
organs; this change not only has the potential to result in conception and birth (in the case of males<br />
and females locked in embrace), but in the temporary satisfaction that enables men to turn their<br />
attention to their basic needs (191c). Since, however, Zeus needs to have human beings exist, one<br />
suspects that something more than pure compassion may be motivating him.<br />
III. Conclusion<br />
In Aristophanes’ myth, Zeus had no hand in creating the bond between the two halves of the original<br />
human beings; yet it is he who breaks it: the broken bond constitutes the human beings’ punishment.<br />
In Genesis, God creates the bond, but the relations between man and woman are complicated; they<br />
even reverse direction as a result of her sin. In the Aristophanes myth, equals search for equals; in<br />
Genesis, unequals yearn unequally for one another: first man for woman, later woman for man. Thus<br />
in Aristophanes, there is no shift in the dependence relation, but in Genesis there is. In Aristophanes,<br />
man was never destined for immortality; in Genesis man could not both be immortal and know good<br />
and evil: one or the other, however, could be tolerated. And this is because man is no threat to God in<br />
the Bible; God does not need men to survive.<br />
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Wednesday<br />
17 th July, 2013
Plenary session<br />
Chair: Verity Harte
Sokrates’ Rollen im Symposion:<br />
sein Wissen und sein Nichtwissen<br />
Thomas Alexander Szlezák<br />
Von sich selbst sagt Sokrates, er behaupte sich auf nichts anderes zu verstehen als auf die Dinge der<br />
Liebe (ouden phēmi allo epistasthai ē ta erōtika, Symp. 177 d7-8). In der Situation, in der das gesagt<br />
wird zu Beginn des Symposions, klingt das ziemlich harmlos, stellt sich doch Sokrates in eine Reihe<br />
mit den anderen Teilnehmern des Gastmahls, denen er offenbar einen je eigenen Zugang zum Thema<br />
‚Liebe‘ zubilligt. Er ist weit davon entfernt, in seiner Erotik ein mathēma zu sehen, in dem er alle<br />
Früheren und Heutigen übertreffe – so läßt ihn nur der Autor des unechten Theages reden (128 b2-6)<br />
– er nennt auch seine Kennerschaft (sein epistasthai) in Liebesdingen nicht eine technē, wie im<br />
Phaidros (257 a7-8) und weist nicht darauf hin, daß er sie von Gott hat (wie im Phaidros und im Lysis<br />
204 c1-2). Man könnte eher geneigt sein, Sokrates‘ oben wiedergegebene Selbsteinschätzung in Symp.<br />
177 d7-8 mit einem außerplatonischen Zeugnis für die sokratische Erotik zusammenzustellen: mit<br />
dem Ende von Aischines‘ Dialog Alkibiades. Dort läßt der Autor seinen Sokrates vehement verneinen,<br />
daß er Alkibiades genützt habe kraft einer technē, er habe auch kein mathēma, das er lehren könnte<br />
um einem anderen Menschen von Nutzen zu sein, vielmehr glaubt er, im Umgang mit Alkibiades<br />
diesen durch seine Liebe (dia to erān) besser zu machen (Aischines, SSR VI A 53. 4-6, 26-27). Doch<br />
auch dieses Zeugnis geht über den wie es scheint absichtlich bescheiden gehaltenen Anspruch von<br />
Symp. 177d hinaus, hat doch Sokrates seine Gabe des Bessermachens kraft ‚göttlicher Fügung‘ (theiāi<br />
moirāi), was wiederum ganz in die Richtung des ek theou (moi) dedotai im Lysis weist. Die Art, wie<br />
Sokrates sich beim Gastmahl des Agathon als Erotiker einstuft, entspricht ganz der Rolle, in der er an<br />
diesem Abend zunächst auftritt: es ist die Rolle eines geselligen Menschen, der gar nichts Besonderes<br />
sein will, sondern sich gutwillig in einen Freundeskreis von Gebildeten eingliedert, wie die anderen<br />
frisch gebadet und mit Schuhen versehen zum Gelage kommt, in ganz konventioneller Weise die<br />
Libation und das Absingen eines Hymnos mitmacht und freundschaftlich-scherzhaft Bemerkungen<br />
mit den anderen austauscht, sei es über deren ‚Weisheit‘, sei es über deren erotische Eifersucht (174<br />
a3-4, 176 a2-3, 175 c-e, 213 c2 – d6, 221 c1 – 223a9).<br />
Und doch ist festzuhalten: Sokrates charakterisiert sich hier nicht negativ über sein<br />
Nichtwissen, sondern positiv: er ist einer, der sich auf etwas versteht, einer, der etwas epistatai. Kann<br />
das wirklich ganz harmlos gemeint sein?<br />
Nun hat Sokrates in diesem Dialog noch andere Rollen. Bevor er ins Haus des Agathon<br />
eintritt und sich zu den Symposiasten gesellt, wird seine Rolle als der einsam Nachdenkende<br />
geschildert (174d – 175c). Kann sie etwas mit seinem erotischen Wissen und Können zu tun haben?<br />
Es scheint doch nichts Unerotischeres zu geben als die Einsamkeit des Denkens. Und von einem<br />
Wissen oder einer Einsicht, die er soeben gewonnen habe, sagt Sokrates nichts.<br />
Nun kam Sokrates nicht allein, sondern in Begleitung des Aristodemos, den er unterwegs<br />
getroffen und zum Gelage mitgenommen hatte (174 a-d). Wie dieser Freund zu Sokrates steht, wird in<br />
der Schilderung des Gelages nicht zum Thema gemacht. Doch im Vorgespräch hatte Apollodoros ihn<br />
als einen der eifrigsten Verehrer (oder Liebhaber, erastēs, 173 b3) des Sokrates bezeichnet. Von<br />
diesem erastēs also stammt der Bericht über die Gespräche über den Eros, den Apollodoros<br />
wiedergibt – Apollodoros, der seinerseits dem Sokrates folgt als dem, der seinem Leben erst Sinn<br />
gegeben hat. Apollodoros und Aristodemos stehen stellvertretend für eine ganze Gruppe von<br />
Anhängern des Sokrates, deren Existenz (als Gruppe) erst in der Rede des Alkibiades am Ende des<br />
Dialogs sichtbar wird. Ihre Mitglieder sind ihm zwar in unterschiedlichem Grad verbunden – man<br />
könnte sagen: ihre Bindung an Sokrates reicht von ‚ihm zugetan‘ bis ‚ihm verfallen‘ – sie haben<br />
jedoch eines gemeinsam: sie alle haben den ‚Biß der Schlange‘ erfahren, wie Alkibiades es ausdrückt<br />
(217e – 218a), d.h. sie wurden in ihrem Innersten getroffen und verwundet vom Anspruch des<br />
sokratischen Fragens, das sie nicht mehr losließ, so daß sie nunmehr ‚teilhaben am Wahnsinn der<br />
Philosophie (kekoinōnēkate tēs philosophou manias, 218 b3). Nach der Darstellung des Alkibiades ist<br />
die Bindung der Mitglieder des Freundeskreises an die zentrale Gestalt Sokrates für jeden einzelnen<br />
eine ‚erotische‘: Sokrates gibt sich zunächst als Verehrer und Liebhaber, erastēs, zieht den jeweils<br />
‚erwählten‘ jungen Mann in seinen Bann und wird in einem überraschenden Rollentausch schließlich<br />
zum Verehrten und Umworbenen (paidika mallon autos kathistatai ant´ erastou, 222 b3-4). Sokrates<br />
selbst sieht seine jungen Freunde als durch starken Liebeszauber an ihn Gefesselte – allerdings nicht<br />
bei Platon (der indes denselben Sachverhalt dezenter ausdrückt: Sokrates bittet Eros, daß er bei den<br />
Schönen künftig noch mehr als jetzt schon geschätzt werde (Phdr. 257 a9)), sondern in dem Gespräch<br />
mit Theodote, in dem der xenophontische Sokrates der Hetäre erklärt, sein Gefolge sei bei ihm nur
Thomas Alexander Slezák<br />
weil er es mit Liebeszauber, Besprechungen und Zauberrädern ? (mit philtra, epōdai, und iynges) an<br />
sich binde (Xen.mem. 3.11.17). Ziehen wir die allzu krasse Selbstironie ab – die Iynx in der Hand des<br />
Sokrates müssen wir ja nicht wörtlich nehmen –, so bleibt die Information, daß<br />
Sokrates‘ erotisierende Wirkung wie bei Aischines und Platon so auch bei Xenophon fest zum Bild<br />
dieses Mannes gehörte.<br />
Daß Sokrates seine erastai nicht nur durch sein persönliches Charisma, sondern ebenso sehr<br />
durch philosophische Inhalte und Einsichten fesselte, ist bei allen Sokratikern als selbstverständlich<br />
vorausgesetzt. Doch welche inhaltlichen Positionen waren das, wenn es um den Eros ging? Es gab<br />
dazu keine technē, versichert uns Aischines, und kein mathēma (s.o.) Bei Xenophon gibt Sokrates vor<br />
seinem Bekenntnis zu seinem Liebeszauber der Theodote Ratschläge, wie sie bewirken könne, daß<br />
ihre Kunden sie noch mehr begehren und dann bei ihr bleiben – Ratschläge, die einer sehr simplen<br />
Psychologie entspringen und eigentlich von jedem, der auch nur einen bescheidenen Grad von<br />
‚common sense‘ besitzt, hätten gegeben werden können. An solchen Gedanken kann sich der<br />
platonische Sokrates mit seinem Anspruch auf epistasthai ta erōtika nicht gut orientiert haben. Platon<br />
läßt seinen Alkibiades danach verlangen, „alles zu hören, was Sokrates wußte“ (panta akousai hosaper<br />
houtos ēidei, 217 a4-5). In Dingen der Liebe wurde ihm bedeutet – und dies nicht nur in Worten<br />
(218d6 – 219a1), sondern auch durch die Tat (219b3 – d2) – daß sich sittliche Schönheit nicht gegen<br />
körperliche Schönheit eintauschen läßt. Die bloße Tatsache, daß er einen Versuch dazu machte, zeigt<br />
zur Genüge, daß er das Wesentliche an Sokrates‘ Denken nicht hinreichend verstanden hat. Dennoch<br />
ist er sich sicher, an den Logoi des Sokrates – er kennt nur Unterhaltungen vom Typ der aporetischen<br />
Frühdialoge (221 e1-6) – alles zu finden, was man brauche, um ein Mann von Charakter und Anstand<br />
zu werden (222a 5-6). Alkibiades‘ Streben, dem gängigen Ideal des kalos kagathos zu genügen zeigt,<br />
daß er – in platonische Terminologie übersetzt – an jener bürgerlichen oder populären Tugend, jener<br />
politikē oder dēmotikē aretē orientiert ist, die Platon anderswo so deutlich von der aretē, die die<br />
Philosophie verleiht, absetzt (Phdn. 82ab, Politeia 500d). Mag dieser leidenschaftliche erastēs die<br />
Einzigartigkeit des Sokrates als Charakter auch richtig erkannt haben (221d), über das philosophische<br />
‚Wissen‘, das seinen Anspruch auf ein seiner würdiges epistasthai ta erōtika rechtfertigen könnte,<br />
erfahren wir aus seinen Worten nichts Spezifisches. Die Rolle des Sokrates als paidika (222 b3)<br />
seiner zahlreichen erastai ist überdeutlich; welche Art von Wissen oder Nichtwissen zu dieser Rolle<br />
gehört, bleibt vorerst noch rätselhaft.<br />
In einer ganz anderen Rolle erscheint Sokrates nach der Rede des Agathon. Es ist seine<br />
Standardrolle, an die wohl auch Alkibiades gedacht haben mag, als er vom ‚Öffnen‘ der sokratischen<br />
Logoi sprach (221d7 – 222a6): die Rolle des schonungslosen Prüfers fremder Weisheit. In aller<br />
Freundschaft weist er dem jungen Tragödiendichter nach, daß alles, was er über den Eros gesagt hat,<br />
verkehrt war und daß er folglich ohne Wissen von seinem Gegenstand gesprochen hatte (201b 11-12).<br />
Der Eros ist weder schön noch gut, wie Agathon geglaubt hatte, denn er begehrt das Schöne, zu dem<br />
auch das Gute gehört, hat also beides nicht (199c – 201c). Agathon hatte offenbar den Eros als<br />
Streben verwechselt mit dem Objekt des Strebens. Die Weisheit des Agathon ist also aus überlegener<br />
Warte widerlegt, und die Widerlegung besteht lediglich in einem Aufweis der Unverträglichkeit von<br />
Agathons eigenen Annahmen. Der sokratische Elenchos braucht ja nichts als eine These des Gegners<br />
und die Zugeständnisse, die er auf einfache Fragen macht. Sein Ergebnis ist rein negativ und verweist<br />
als solches nicht auf eine eigene Weisheit, ein eigenes ‚Wissen‘ des Sokrates. In keiner der bisher<br />
untersuchten Rollen des Sokrates ist ein Können oder Wissen greifbar geworden, das den Anspruch<br />
des epistasthai ta erotika mit spezifischem Inhalt füllen könnte, denn selbst Sokrates‘ Überordnung<br />
der Arete über körperliche Schönheit ist etwas, das auch der konventionellen sophrosyne erreichbar<br />
wäre.<br />
Im Anschluß an das Gespräch mit Agathon enthüllt Sokrates nun aber, daß seine Widerlegung<br />
fremden Wissens ihrerseits auf fremdem Wissen beruhte. Er hatte nur den Elenchos wiederholt, dem<br />
Diotima seine eigenen früheren Ansichten unterzogen hatte. Mit der unerwarteten Berufung auf diese<br />
Figur kommt nunmehr konkretes Wissen über den Eros in den Dialog.<br />
Die Einführung Diotimas ist die radikalste Wendung im ganzen Dialog. Was die<br />
dramaturgische Gestaltung betrifft, so scheint zwar der Auftritt des Alkibiades nach der Diotima-Rede<br />
den stärkeren Einschnitt darzustellen, kommt doch der neue Mann in der Runde mit Musik und viel<br />
Lärm, mit reichem Bänderschmuck auf dem Kopf und in Begleitung anderer Zecher, darunter einer<br />
Flötenspielerin. Auch was er dann zu sagen hat ist extravagant genug – und doch betrifft es nichts<br />
unerhört Neues, sondern den allen bekannten Sokrates und bestätigt nur dessen bewährte sophrosyne.<br />
Diotima hingegen ist eine radikal andere Figur. Sie ist nicht Athenerin, sie kommt aus der Fremde (1).<br />
Sie ist Frau (2) und klärt Sokrates, einen Mann, über den Eros auf. Während die anderen als idiōtai<br />
sprechen, die von sich aus keinen ausgewiesenen Bezug zum Göttlichen haben, spricht sie als<br />
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Priesterin (3) zur Frage, ob Eros ein Gott sei. Sie äußert sich nicht in ungeplanten, zufälligen<br />
Gelegenheitsunterhaltungen, sie unterrichtet vielmehr ihren athenischen Schüler in immer wieder<br />
stattfindenden Lehrgesprächen (4) (206 b6, 207 a5-6). Und sie bleibt nicht beim bloßen Elenchos<br />
stehen, sondern schreitet fort zu positiven Aussagen (5) von großer Kühnheit. Dies aber tut sie nicht<br />
in protreptischer Dialogform (wie noch beim anfänglichen Elenchos), sondern in autoritativer<br />
Belehrung (6) (ab 207a).<br />
Die kühne, radikal andersartige Konzeption Diotimas als Dialogfigur ist der geeignete<br />
Rahmen für die Inhalte ihrer Rede, deren philosophische Neuartigkeit weit schockierender ist als die<br />
verstörende persönliche Erfahrung des Alkibiades. In dichter Folge erteilt die Priesterin aus Mantinea<br />
Belehrungen, von denen jede einzelne Thema und Ergebnis eines kürzeren oder auch mittleren<br />
Dialogs sein könnte. Diotima erklärt, daß der Eros (1) des Schönen nicht teilhaftig ist, und, da alles<br />
Gute auch schön ist, (2) auch des Guten nicht teilhaftig ist. Diesen doppelt negativen Einstieg in die<br />
Erörterung hatte Sokrates bereits an Agathon bei dessen Befragung weitergegeben. Und dennoch ist<br />
die zwingende Schlußfolgerung, die in dieser Aussage schon beschlossen liegt, wie ein weiterer harter<br />
Schlag gegen das gängige Eros-Bild: in Ermangelung des Schönen und des Guten kann Eros (3) auch<br />
kein Gott sein. Hier endet der elenktische Durchgang durch die Durchschnittsphilosophie des Eros,<br />
die auch Sokrates – wie er glauben machen will – anfangs vertrat. Es folgen positive Festlegungen<br />
von großer Tragweite. Der Eros ist (4) ein großer Daimon, dessen Seinsstatus nicht im Dunklen<br />
gelassen wird: er steht zwischen dem Sterblichen und Unsterblichen. Überhaupt steht (5) alles<br />
Daimonische zwischen diesen beiden Bereichen, wobei es den Verkehr zwischen ihnen vermittelt,<br />
auch den Verkehr zwischen Göttern und Menschen durch Mantik, Opfer, Mysterien und<br />
Besprechungen, denn (6) ein Gott verkehrt nicht mit einem Menschen. Durch seine Mittelstellung<br />
füllt das Daimonion die Kluft zwischen beiden auf, so daß das All (7) mit sich selbst verbunden ist.<br />
Ein Mensch, der bezüglich dieser Dinge weise (sophos) ist, ist (8) ein ‚daimonischer<br />
Mann‘ (daimonios anēr), im Gegensatz zum Banausen, der über andere Dinge, etwa Künste und<br />
Handwerk, Bescheid weiß. (10) Die Eltern des Eros sind Poros und Penia, und er hat von beiden ihre<br />
charakteristischen Eigenschaften geerbt, die Mittellosigkeit von der Mutter, die Fähigkeit, sich das<br />
Erstrebte zu verschaffen, vom Vater. Daraus folgt, (11) daß Eros weder dauerhaft mittellos noch<br />
jemals dauerhaft reich ist an Einsicht, vielmehr steht er zwischen Weisheit und Unwissenheit in der<br />
Mitte, weil ihm das, was er gewonnen hat, wieder zerrinnt. (12) Kein Gott philosophiert und will<br />
weise werden, denn er ist es schon, und auch sonst philosophiert niemand, der weise ist. (13) Die<br />
Menschen verlangen nach nichts anderem als nach dem Guten, genauer nach dessen dauerhaftem<br />
Besitz, mithin (14) nach der Unsterblichkeit. Der Sinn des Zeugens im Schönen ist das (15)<br />
Anteilgewinnen an der Unsterblichkeit, sei es durch Fortpflanzung, sei es durch ewigen Ruhm, sei es<br />
durch geistige und moralische Hinterlassenschaft: auch die Dichter und Gesetzgeber ‚zeugen‘ in ihren<br />
Werken aretē für die Ewigkeit.<br />
Alles bisher Gesagte (201e – 209e) war nur Vorbereitung für das Eigentliche. Über die<br />
‚epoptische‘ Schau des Schönen selbst faßt sich Diotima vergleichsweise kurz (210a – 212a).<br />
Voraussetzung ist (16) ein Aufstieg über die verschiedenen Erscheinungsformen des Schönen bis hin<br />
zum (17) Ziel und Ende (télos) des erotischen Strebens (telos tōn erōtikōn), zum (18) plötzlich<br />
(exaiphnēs) erscheinenden Schönen selbst (auto to kalon). Der Weg dorthin ist klar festgelegt, und<br />
wer (19) ihn ‚richtig‘ (orthōs) beschreitet oder auf ihm ‚richtig‘ geführt wird (eān orthōs hēgētai ho<br />
hēgoumenos), kann das telos berühren. (20) Dieses schauende Zusammensein mit dem reinen und<br />
unvermischten Schönen selbst ist ein Zeugen wahrer aretē und bedeutet für den Schauenden<br />
vollkommenes Glück, Unsterblichkeit und Geliebtsein von Gott.<br />
Nach dieser Darbietung geballten Wissens über den Eros weiß der Leser: wenn irgend jemand<br />
in diesem Dialog dem Anspruch des epistasthai ta erōtika genügen kann, dann ist es die Fremde aus<br />
Mantinea. Sie ist Priesterin und spricht nicht dialogisch-protreptisch, sondern autoritativ als Lehrerin<br />
(vgl. 207 c6 didaskalōn deomai). Ihre Mitteilungen bietet sie als eine Analogie zur Einweihung in<br />
Mysterien (209e5 – 201a2), mithin zu einer religiösen Handlung. Die Riten der Mysterien aber<br />
müssen exakt den Vorschriften entsprechen. Daher ihr mehrfaches Betonen des ‚richtigen‘ (orthōs)<br />
Beschreitens des Weges und des ‚richtigen‘ Führens auf dem Weg (210 a2, 6, 211 b5, 7). Es kann<br />
keinem Zweifel unterliegen, daß sie ihrerseits ihren Initianden Sokrates richtig führt: Diotima ist die<br />
kompetente Mystagogin, unter ihrer Führung könnte Sokrates das télos erreichen. Das setzt voraus,<br />
daß sie selbst die Mysterien durchlaufen hat – eine Mystagogin, die nicht selbst eingeweiht wäre,<br />
wäre ein kompletter Widersinn. Diotima hat das Schöne selbst gesehen, sie weiß, wovon sie redet.<br />
Ungeachtet der Neuartigkeit der Enthüllungen Diotimas haben viele ihrer Aussagen Parallelen,<br />
zum Teil sogar sehr enge Parallelen, in anderen Dialogen. Das All ist in sich verbunden, sagt Diotima<br />
(202 e6-7) – das ist auch die Auffassung der ‚Weisen‘ (sophoi), auf die sich Sokrates im Gorgias<br />
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(507e6 – 508a4) beruft, und der Priester und Priesterinnen, deren Meinung er Menon 81c9 – d1<br />
wiedergibt. Ebenso denkt der Sokrates der Politeia, daß der Dialektiker zu einer Zusammenschau der<br />
‚Verwandtschaft‘ (oikeiotēs) der mathematischen Wissenschaften untereinander und mit der Natur<br />
des Seienden gelangen muß (Pol. 537 c2-3), was auch der ‚Athener‘ der Nomoi (unter Verwendung<br />
des Wortes Gemeinschaft, koinōnia) vertritt (967 e2-3). Wer ‚weise‘ ist in Dingen der Liebe, den hält<br />
Diotima für einen daimonios anēr und unterscheidet ihn vom Banausen (203 a4-6), ganz wie Sokrates<br />
im Exkurs des Theaitetos die für den Menschen entscheidende ‚Weisheit‘ vom banausischen Wissen<br />
absetzt (176 c4-d1). Kein Gott philosophiert nach Ansicht der mantineischen Priesterin, und auch<br />
sonst keiner, der weise ist (204 a1-2) – ganz ähnlich hatte Sokrates im Lysis das Philosophieren denen<br />
abgesprochen, die schon weise sind, „ob diese nun Götter sind oder Menschen“ (218 a2-4). Was die<br />
Menschen letztlich erstreben, ist das Gute, erklärt Diotima (205e7 – 206a12), durchaus in<br />
Übereinstimmung mit dem Sokrates der Politeia, der vom Guten sagt, es sei das „was jede Seele<br />
verfolgt und worumwillen sie alles macht“ (505 d11-e1). Und wenn Diotima einen gestuften Aufstieg<br />
zum Ziel der Erkenntnis skizziert (201a-e), so ist sie offenbar in unmittelbarer philosophischer Nähe<br />
zum methodisch geregelten Weg über die Stufen der Hypothesen hinauf zum voraussetzungslosen<br />
Prinzip von allem (Politeia 511 b3-7) bzw. zum ‚Hinreichenden‘ (hikanon) schlechthin (Phdn. 101 d3e1).<br />
Bei richtigem Beschreiten des Weges oder bei richtigem Geführtwerden ist das Erreichen des<br />
télos möglich – mit dieser Überzeugung (210 e2-6, 211 b5-7, c8, 212 a1-7) trifft sie sich abermals mit<br />
dem Sokrates der Politeia, der die Dialektik – das ist das per definitionem richtige geistige<br />
Voranschreiten – als den einzigen Weg zur archē und zum télos sieht (533 c7-d1, 504 d3, vgl. 532 e3).<br />
Und was Diotimas Schilderung der abschließenden Glückserfahrung (211e4 – 212b7) betrifft, so hat<br />
sie eine im Werk Platons einmalige Punkt- für Punkt- Entsprechung in Sokrates‘ analoger Schilderung<br />
des Aufhörens des Eros und der Geburtswehen (apolēgoi erōtos, lēgoi ōdinos) beim Erreichen des<br />
Erkenntnisziels durch den wahren philomathēs (Politeia 490 a8-b7): an beiden Stellen ist vom<br />
‚Berühren‘ des Erkenntnisobjekts die Rede, von dem Teil der Seele, dem das zukommt und von seiner<br />
Verwandtschaft mit ihm, von ‚Zusammensein‘ und ‚Vermischung‘ mit ihm und vom Zeugen wahrer<br />
aretē bzw. Einsicht und Wahrheit, und schließlich vom wahrhaften Leben, das auf diese Weise<br />
erreicht wird.<br />
Man sieht: so fremdartig Diotima auch erscheinen mag nach ihrer Herkunft, ihrem Beruf und<br />
ihrem Lehrhabitus, intellektuell erweist sie sich doch als Zwillingsschwester des unpriesterlichen,<br />
urbanen, dialogisch vorgehenden Atheners Sokrates. So daß die Frage nunmehr unvermeidlich wird:<br />
wer ist diese Diotima wirklich? Daß es in Mantineia einmal eine Priesterin dieses Namens gegeben<br />
hat, ist gut möglich (wenn auch durch keine außerplatonische Quelle belegt). Daß aber diese<br />
Priesterin Sokrates regelmäßigen Philosophieunterricht erteilt hat, ist durchsichtige poetische Fiktion.<br />
Platon hätte leicht einen quasi-historischen Rahmen für Diotimas Unterweisungen angeben können.<br />
Wir finden nichts davon im Text, und es fragt auch keiner der Teilnehmer des Gastmahls: „wann und<br />
wo pflegtest du, Sokrates, die Priesterin zu treffen, und warum hast du uns nicht früher schon von ihr<br />
berichtet?“ Die in sich gänzlich unglaubwürdigen Begegnungen werden erzählerisch völlig von der<br />
athenischen Alltagsrealität isoliert. Der Leser soll sie dadurch als reine Fiktion erkennen. Wir haben<br />
Diotima als Maske des Sokrates zu verstehen. Somit liegt vom Ende der Widerlegung des Agathon<br />
(201 d1) bis zum Auftreten des Alkibiades ein geschlossener Monolog des Sokrates vor (201d – 212c),<br />
der in seiner ersten Hälfte (bis 207a) dialogisiert wird, aber nur formal.<br />
Das Wissen der Diotima ist also Wissen des Sokrates. Wo und wann kann er dieses Wissen<br />
gewonnen haben? Etwa im Gespräch mit Partnern wie Agathon, Pausanias und den anderen? Oder<br />
beim vertrauten Umgang mit Alkibiades (der sich ihm effektiv entzog)? Man muß diese Frage nur<br />
stellen, um zu sehen, daß kein Weg führt von den stadtbekannten Alltagsbeschäftigungen des Sokrates,<br />
die ihm auch die Ankläger vorwarfen, nämlich strenge Befragung von Spezialisten (hier des<br />
Spezialisten für die Tragödie Agathon) und Verkehr mit blidlungswilligen Jünglingen (hier vertreten<br />
durch den schönsten von ihnen, Alkibiades) zur geistigen Welt der Diotima. Die Kluft zwischen der<br />
´Mysterien´-Auffassung des Eros und der gängigen – die trotz der interessanten Variationen bei<br />
Phaidros, Pausanias, Eryximachos, Aristophanes, Agathon und Alkibiades durch ein gemeinsames<br />
intellektuelles und ethisches Niveau zusammengehalten wird – ist so groß, daß es der erwähnten<br />
dramaturgischen Isolierung und der Einführung einer neuen, gänzlich unwahrscheinlichen dramatis<br />
persona bedurfte, um das Nebeneinander der zwei inkommensurablen geistigen Welten erträglich zu<br />
machen.<br />
Die Frage nach dem Zugang zu dieser anderen Sicht des Eros kann in zweifacher Weise<br />
gestellt werden: (a) sachlich-philosophisch und (b) biographisch. (a) Die philosophische Antwort<br />
kann nur lauten: beim Anblick des diesseitigen Schönen kommt jenen Seelen, die über hinreichende<br />
Erinnerung (mnēmē, Phdr. 250 a5) an das jenseits Geschaute verfügen, die Wiedererinnerung,<br />
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Thomas Alexander Slezák<br />
anamnesis, an das vollendet Schöne (Phdr. 249d4 – 250c6). Sokrates – d.h. Platons Sokrates – war<br />
solch eine Seele. (b) Zeitlich-innerweltlich betrachtet muß es dann aber einen bestimmten Zeitpunkt<br />
gegeben haben, an dem ihm die entscheidende Einsicht über das Wesen des Schönen selbst, dieser<br />
Ausblick auf das Außer- und Überzeitliche plötzlich (exaiphnēs, Symp. 210 c4) aufging. Darüber vor<br />
anderen zu reden, wäre ihm unangemessen erschienen. Lieber versteckte er sich ironisch hinter der<br />
Maske ‚Diotima‘.<br />
Doch Platon der Dialogdichter schuf einen ‚biographischen‘ Kontext, in dem man sich das<br />
Erlangen einer exzeptionellen Einsicht durch den exzeptionellen Mann gut vorstellen kann. Das<br />
waren die Momente, in denen Sokrates unvermittelt stehen blieb, das Gespräch mit anderen beendete<br />
und alleine konzentriert nachdachte. Auf diese Weise den Kontakt zu den Gesprächspartnern zu<br />
suspendieren und ganz allein für sich seinem Denken zu folgen, war eine Gewohnheit (ethos, hōs<br />
eiōthei 175 b1, c5) des Sokrates, den wir Heutige uns nur in Gemeinschaft mit anderen<br />
philosophierend vorzustellen pflegen. So wichtig ist Platon dieser einsam nachdenkende Sokrates, daß<br />
er ihn gleich zweimal inszeniert, vor Beginn des Gastmahls (174 d4 – 175 d2) und gegen Ende der<br />
letzten Rede (220 c3-d5). Das partnerlose Selbstdenken rahmt so in auffälliger Weise die in der<br />
Gemeinschaft (koinōnia) vorgetragenen Porträts des Eros. Deren Höhepunkt aber ist der lange<br />
Monolog des Denkers, der sonst für sein ‚gemeinsames Suchen‘ (koinēi zētein) bekannt ist. Sollen wir<br />
das als reinen Zufall betrachten? Oder will Platon auf unaufdringliche Weise nahelegen, daß<br />
tatsächlich – wie von Agathon vermutet (175 c7-d2) – ein Zusammenhang besteht zwischen<br />
Sokrates‘ Gewohnheit des einsamen Nachsinnens und seinem ‚Finden‘ und ‚Haben‘ von Einsichten,<br />
die die anderen an ihm bewundern?<br />
Wenn aber wirklich das einsame gesprächslose und nicht einmal verbalisierte Denken – von<br />
Verbalisation sagt weder Aristodemos etwas noch Alkibiades – die eigentliche Quelle der Einsichten<br />
des Sokrates ist, müssen wir da nicht die seit der Romantik liebgewonnene Vorstellung aufgeben, der<br />
dialogisch-dialektische Austausch zweier gleichgestellter Partner sei die Seele des sokratischplatonischen<br />
Philosophierens und existentiell wichtig für jeden, der sich als philosophos verstehen<br />
möchte? Nun, über die ‚Gemeinsamkeit‘ der Suche kursieren seit Schleiermachers berühmter<br />
‚Einleitung‘ (1804) allerhand Märchen und Mythen, die der Überprüfung am Text nicht standhalten.<br />
In Wirklichkeit ist die jeweilige Dialektikerfigur (heiße sie nun Sokrates, Diotima, Parmenides, Eleat,<br />
Athener) dem intellektuell weit schwächeren Partner stets meilenweit voraus und lenkt das Gespräch<br />
souverän nach eigenem Gutdünken. 1 Grundsätzlich sind ‚Sokrates‘, ‚der Eleat‘, ‚der Athener‘ usw.<br />
ihren Partnern so weit überlegen wie Diotima ihrem angeblichen Schüler Sokrates, und sie müssen es<br />
sein, wenn Einsicht bei den Partnern aufkommen soll.<br />
Die wesenhafte Dialogizität des platonischen Philosophierens müssen wird anderswo suchen:<br />
in der dianoia als dem innerhalb der Seele mit sich selbst geführten Zwiegespräch ohne ´Stimme´, d.h.<br />
ohne Verbalisation (ho entos tēs psychēs pros hautēn dialogos aneu phōnēs, Sop. 263 e3-5, vgl. Tht.<br />
184 e6-7). Diese innere Dialogizität braucht keinen Partner. Kein Wunder also, daß Sokrates sagen<br />
kann, es wäre besser für ihn, wenn die Menschen nicht mit ihm übereinstimmten als wenn er als der<br />
Einzelne, der er ist, mit sich selbst nicht im Einklang wäre (Gorg. 482 c1-3): die Homologie muß im<br />
eigenen Inneren gefunden werden, dann erst im Umgang mit anderen. Das ist auch der Sinn der<br />
Stellen, an denen gesagt wird, man verfolge das Argument primär um der eigenen Person willen,<br />
sekundär auch im Blick auf andere (Politeia 528 a1-5, Cha. 166 d3, Phdn. 91 a7-b1). Das Dialogische<br />
ist dem Erzielen der Übereinstimmung mit sich selbst unterzuordnen. Über diese Übereinstimmung,<br />
homologia, kann nur das eigene Denken, das innere Gespräch der Seele mit sich selbst, befinden.<br />
Die Notwendigkeit der didachē meta synousias pollēs, der Lehre mit vielen<br />
Zusammenkünften (Nom. 968 c6), oder des phoitān para tēn didaskalon (vgl. Symp. 206 b6, 207 c6)<br />
wird damit nicht bestritten. Die Frage ist vielmehr, wo der philosophisch entscheidende Schritt erfolgt.<br />
Wenn er im ‚plötzlichen‘ (exaiphnes) Erblicken des Schönen selbst besteht, so kann sein Ort nur die<br />
Seele des einsam Denkenden sein. Die Schau und die ‚Berührung‘ des auto to kalon ist kein<br />
Gemeinschafts- und kein Paarerlebnis.<br />
1 Dies an allen Dialogen (mit Ausnahme von Ion und Menexenos) auch im Detail zu zeigen war die Aufgabe, die ich mir in<br />
„Platon und die Schriftlichkeit der Philosophie“ (1985) und „Das Bild des Dialektikers in Platons späten Dialogen“ (2004)<br />
gestellt hatte.<br />
325
ABSTRACT<br />
Chi è il Socrate del Simposio?<br />
Giuseppe Cambiano<br />
The <strong>Symposium</strong> consists to a large extent of long continuous speeches. That fits the habitual practice<br />
of the symposia, where people attending them used to speak in turn. However in some dialogues, such<br />
as Protagoras and Gorgias, long speeches are opposed to katà brachy dialegesthai, i.e. the method of<br />
speaking by questions and answers, preferred by Socrates, while, as has been rightly remarked, in the<br />
<strong>Symposium</strong> Socrates too, although refractory to participate to the symposium, delivers a long speech.<br />
The dialogue, however, contains a section in which Socrates dialectically refutes Agathon, but<br />
immediately afterwards he confesses that he is not the true author of the refutation. He has been able<br />
to refute Agathon, because he himself was refuted by Diotima nearly in the same way. But Diotima’s<br />
refutation of Socrates extends beyond the conclusion reached in the discussion with Agathon and is<br />
followed by a long discourse, inclusive also of a myth, delivered by Diotima, who is repeatedly<br />
presented as a sophé woman and a teacher of Socrates. In this context Socrates’ questions aim at<br />
learning, not at refuting. The conversation with Diotima shows that Socrates’ refutation comes from a<br />
woman who knows what is Eros, whereas in Plato habitually Socrates refutes without any knowledge<br />
of the themes about which he puts the questions. As it is delivered by a person who has knowledge<br />
and can therefore claim to be capable to teach, Diotima’s long speech is presented as a discourse<br />
completely different from the speeches pronounced by the other characters of the dialogue. As it has<br />
been rightly remarked by Thomas Szlezak, at the beginning of the dialogue Socrates is able to present<br />
himself as knowing tà erotikà (177 d 6-8), because he received in past times Diotima’s teaching.<br />
But if Socrates does not display his usual dialectical techne, what is his leading rôle in the<br />
<strong>Symposium</strong>? Socrates’ long speech is neither an epideixis in the sophists’ way, nor a rhetorical<br />
encomium. In the dialogue Socrates is represented as reporting his repeated meetings with Diotima<br />
and the speeches which were delivered in those occasions. There are other dialogues in which<br />
Socrates displays this same function, but his reports concern recent events and conversations<br />
(sometimes yesterday or the day before, as in Charmides, Protagoras and Euthydemus, and perhaps<br />
also in Lysis). On the contrary, in the <strong>Symposium</strong> Socrates’ report concerns events occurred many<br />
years before. In Parmenides too we have a report of a meeting occurred many years before, but in that<br />
case it is not Socrates who reports, but Antiphon, as well as in the Theaetetus it is Eucleides the writer<br />
who reports the meeting. An interesting parallel to the <strong>Symposium</strong>, which would be worthwhile to<br />
analyse, could be the Menexenos, where Socrates reports the epitaphs pronounced by another woman,<br />
Aspasia, teacher of rhetoric to Socrates himself (235e), but the epitaph was delivered ‘yesterday’ (236<br />
b). Then, the <strong>Symposium</strong> seems to be a unicum, in that it presents Socrates reporting an old story. If<br />
the plague alluded to 201 d is the plague in Athens in 430, Diotima’s stay in Athens should be dated<br />
about 440, whereas – according to Bury, p. lxvi – the date of the banquet should be the year 416 and<br />
the date of the dramatic setting circ. 400. Socrates declares that he will report Diotima’s speech, as he<br />
will be able (201 d), alluding perhaps to the difficult contents of the speech, but also to his ability in<br />
remembering them. In order to report old events and speeches, to memorize is an essential condition.<br />
The <strong>Symposium</strong> as a whole appears to be an oral report of a past event, that contains within it<br />
Socrates’ report of a much older event. The author of the entire report, Apollodorus, says that Socrates<br />
himself confirmed the reliability of Aristodemus’ first oral account. We may think that Apollodorus<br />
asked Socrates’ confirmation above all about the things said by Socrates himself, particularly about<br />
Diotima’s speech. So the <strong>Symposium</strong>, as a written product, appears to be a written hypomnema of an<br />
oral report, within which Socrates’ oral report fits as its deepest core. In the Phaedrus, as is known,<br />
there is at least a case in which the paidià of writing seems to be justified, that is in order to store up a<br />
treasure of records (hypomnemata thesaurizomenos) both for himself, when the forgetful old age will<br />
arrive, and for those who will follow the same track (276 d). As a matter of fact the <strong>Symposium</strong><br />
presents Socrates orally performing what Plato frequently performs by writing, that is reporting past<br />
events and speeches. I think that perhaps we could interpret this circumstance as a sort of justification<br />
of Plato’s practice of writing. Socrates’ hypomnema contains refutation, arguments with positive<br />
conclusions and also a myth, that is to say precisely the ingredients, in variable ratio, of a Platonic<br />
written dialogue. Furthermore it shows that also a long speech can have philosophical relevance;<br />
indeed, as is pointed out in the Theaetetus’ remark on the philosopher’s portrait, both length or
Giuseppe Cambiano<br />
shortness are unimportant, provided the speech seizes tò on (172 d 8-9). But significantly in the<br />
<strong>Symposium</strong> the author of the content of the long speech, reported by Socrates, is Diotima, not<br />
Socrates himself, as it occurs also in the Timaeus.<br />
However in the <strong>Symposium</strong> there is another person who delivers a long speech, whose<br />
content is for the most part a report of past events: it is Alcibiades’ speech, that constitutes the<br />
pendant of Socrates’ report. It is the well-known story of his relations with Socrates, having its climax<br />
in the closed space of Socrates and Alcibiades in the same bed and in the open spaces of the military<br />
expeditions, at Potidaea and Delion, between 432 and 424 b.C (217 a-221 c). Alcibiades is conscious<br />
of Socrates’ atopia, but he does not understand the peculiar character of the Socratic dialectic. He<br />
interprets the effects of Socrates’ speeches on his audience in terms of fascination, as a sort of passive<br />
condition and paralysis, which reminds us Gorgias’ views, that is a rhetorical horizon. It is not by any<br />
chance that Alcibiades refers to a competitive context, where the most important thing is to win and<br />
to overpower the opponents. Therefore he appeals to the physical contact as a mean to dominate<br />
Socrates. But the emphasis on the physical contact shows that Alcibiades is very far from the<br />
ascending process described by Diotima recurring to a terminology taken from the mysteries<br />
(Riedweg). The apex is constituted by the contemplation of the beautiful itself, described also<br />
metaphorically as ephaptesthai the truth (212 a 3-5), that obviously is not a physical contact. On the<br />
contrary, Socrates proves that he has learned from Diotima, when he arrives at the banquet and<br />
Agathon makes him sitting beside himself in order to benefit from Socrates’ wise discovery by the<br />
help of this physical contact (haptomenos) (175 c 7-d 2). But Socrates replies that it would be very<br />
useful if sophia could flow from the fuller to the emptier individual simply by a physical reciprocal<br />
contact (haptometha) (175 d 3-e 6). This is the aspect that is not understood by Alcibiades, who<br />
however is reporting the story of his relations with Socrates. This confirms, in my opinion, that an<br />
oral hypomnema can express also a philosophical misunderstanding and represent persons who<br />
remain temporarily or always far away or on the threshold of philosophy. And the Platonic dialogues<br />
too, as written products, display the same circumstances, in the interrelations of common beliefs,<br />
reports, myths, refutation and philosophical arguments.<br />
327
Diotima and the Ocean of Beauty<br />
Chair: Maurizio Migliori
1. Introducción<br />
Symposion 210d4: τὸ πολὺ πέλαγος τοῦ καλοῦ<br />
Francisco L. Lisi<br />
La revelación que Diotima hace a Sócrates (201d1-212a7) tiene su culminación en la contemplación<br />
del “gran océano de lo bello”(τὸ πολὺ πέλαγος ... τοῦ καλοῦ; 210d4), una frase que ha dado lugar a<br />
numerosas interpretaciones a lo largo de la historia del platonismo, muchas de ellas contradictorias.<br />
Basten dos ejemplos, uno tomado de la Antigüedad y otro proveniente de interpretaciones<br />
contemporáneas. Plotino interpreta la frase como una referencia a la multiplicidad de las Ideas<br />
(Enneades I 6 9, 34-36). Una interpretación que ha tenido una amplia recepción últimamente (Chen<br />
1983, 68 nn. 17 y 18 = 1993, 41 nn. 19 y 20) sostiene que este término sólo puede referirse a la gran<br />
cantidad de instancias en las que la belleza se realiza en los distintos niveles de la realidad. Platón<br />
utiliza aquí metafóricamente un término, πέλαγος, que no es habitual en su obra. A pesar de la<br />
posición central que tiene este giro en el discurso de Diotima, no se le ha prestado la atención que<br />
merece. En general, los intérpretes se limitan a repetir el texto sin proceder a una auténtica<br />
interpretación (cf., p. ej., Leisegang 1950, col. 2449).<br />
En la presente exposición, me propongo responder a tres preguntas que hacen a la sustancia<br />
de la versión que ofrece Diotima. (a) ¿A qué se refiere τὸ πολὺ πέλαγος τοῦ καλοῦ?, (b) ¿Qué tipo de<br />
proceso se describe? (c) ¿cuál es la relación de la Idea de lo Bello con la Idea del Bien.<br />
2. El significado de πέλαγος<br />
La palabra πέλαγος designa en general el alta mar, el piélago, que en general suele traducirse en<br />
lengua castellana por océano con la intención de otorgarle el significado que aparentemente tiene en<br />
griego de inmensidad marítima, dado que en muchas ocasiones va acompañada de términos que<br />
designan específicamente el mar como θάλασσα o πόντος. En el amplio corpus Platonicum aparece<br />
sólo dieciocho veces, de las cuales dos se encuentran en un diálogo considerado espurio desde la<br />
Antigüedad, el Axíoco (368c1 y 370b4). En esas dos apariciones, el término tiene su sentido habitual.<br />
De las dieciséis apariciones restantes, ocho se dan en el Timeo y el Critias relacionadas con las<br />
descripciones geográficas de la Atlántida. En algunas ocasiones, la voz es utilizada como sinónimo de<br />
πόντος o θάλασσα (Tim. 24e5, 25a4, d4,) o, simplemente, con un significado similar a nuestro océano<br />
(Tim 24e4; Cts. 109a1, 114a6, c6). En el Político la palabra es utilizada como sinónimo de θάλασσα<br />
(298b5). Estos pasajes no permiten establecer ningún significado específico, dado que la palabra<br />
parece utilizarse con gran libertad para indicar o bien la acepción de ‘mar’ u ‘océano’, pero no,<br />
precisamente, la idea de piélago o alta mar. Parecería más bien referirse a una superficie<br />
espacialmente grande, aunque no profunda. El significado de ‘piélago’, ‘alta mar’ puede encontrarse<br />
en el Segundo Alcibíades (147b1) y, probablemente, en el Fedón (109c5). Algo semejante sucede con<br />
un pasaje de la República (V 473d6) y en el dístico que pronuncia Agatón en el Banquete (197c5).<br />
Hay una utilización metafórica de πέλαγος en los dos pasajes restantes que son coincidentes en cuanto<br />
al significado. Tanto en el Parménides (137a6) como en el Protágoras (338a6) se menciona un<br />
πέλαγος τῶν λόγων para designar la inmensidad y la diversidad de la argumentación.<br />
El pasaje antes mencionado del mito final de Fedón (109c5), puede ayudar a esclarecer el<br />
significado del término en el Simposio. En él se sostiene que los seres humanos vivimos en cuevas,<br />
creyendo habitar en la superficie de la tierra, como si alguien acostumbrado a habitar en el medio de<br />
las profundidades del océano creyera vivir en la superficie del mar y al ver el sol y el resto de los<br />
astros pensara que el mar es el cielo y por su lentitud y debilidad nunca pudiera llegar a la superficie<br />
ni verla, pero si saliera y levantara su cabeza fuera del mar, alcanzaría una realidad mucho más pura y<br />
bella que la que existe donde vive él.<br />
Este primer acercamiento a los significados del término en el resto de la obra platónica parece indicar<br />
que la palabra significa todo lo contrario a lo que se pretende: no sólo multiplicidad sino incluso<br />
desorden, y indefinición e infinitud.<br />
3. Breve esbozo de la estructura del discurso<br />
Volvamos ahora la mirada hacia el contexto en el que el término aparece. Los diferentes estudios<br />
realizados sobre el discurso de Diotima han indicado ya sus relación con el resto del diálogo y, en
Francisco L. Lisi<br />
especial, con la irrupción de Alcibíades y el discurso de Agatón, de manera que es innecesario insistir<br />
aquí sobre ese punto. El relato de Sócrates puede dividirse en dos partes, siguiendo las pautas dadas a<br />
los encomios al Amor. En la primera (201d1-206a13) se revela la naturaleza de Eros, su carácter<br />
demoníaco como intermediador entre el mundo de los dioses y el de los hombres, pero<br />
fundamentalmente el hecho de que sea el que garantiza la unidad del universo (ὥστε τὸ πᾶν αὐτὸ<br />
αὑτῷ συνδεδέσθαι; 202e6-7). El amor se muestra como un deseo que impulsa a los seres vivientes a<br />
buscar la unidad con la realidad trascendente que da el ser al mundo, como una búsqueda del ser por<br />
parte del devenir. 1 De esta forma realiza el Eros la unidad del universo consigo mismo y el filósofo se<br />
convierte en un factor de unidad cósmica. Diotima logra esto a través de una serie de pasos. En primer<br />
lugar, redefine lo bello (cf. 205d10-206a1), uniéndolo al bien (204e1-2) y a la felicidad como<br />
finalidad humana (e5-6): el amor más importante y engañador es el deseo de bienes y de ser feliz<br />
(πᾶσα ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπιθυµία καὶ τοῦ εὐδαιµονεῖν ὁ µέγιστός τε καὶ δολερὸ ς ἔ ρως παντί;<br />
205d2-3). El amor se convierte así en un deseo, un impulso hacia el Bien (cf. τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ en 206a1),<br />
a la obtención y posesión del Bien para sí eternamente (ὁ ἔρως τοῦ τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὑτῷ εἶναι ἀεί; a11-12).<br />
De esta manera se da la identificación del Bien y de lo Bello.<br />
La segunda parte (206b1- 212a7) describe la obra del amor, que antes había sido definida al<br />
pasar como lograr que, por su intermediación, el universo se mantenga unido consigo mismo (202e6-<br />
7). Esta parte muestra también la importancia que tenía la comparación anterior con la<br />
producción/creación (ποίησις; 205b8-c9), ya que el amor es el impulso a la creación, el esfuerzo y<br />
tensión en la gestación en lo bello, tanto en el cuerpo cuanto en el alma. Los seres humanos quedan<br />
preñados en el cuerpo y en el alma y cuando llegan a una cierta edad quieren engendrar, pero esto<br />
puede hacerse sólo en lo bello. Engendrar y parir son formas de la inmortalidad en lo mortal, algo<br />
divino. La belleza es el medio en el que se produce la creación. Es imposible generar en lo<br />
inarmónico, pero lo bello es armónico. En realidad, no se busca lo bello por lo bello, sino porque sólo<br />
en él puede darse la creación (b1-e6). La identificación de lo bello con lo armónico, proporcionado<br />
(ἁρµόττον; 206d2) apunta a la identificación de lo Bello con el Bien, anteriormente apuntada. La<br />
descripción que se realiza a continuación se corresponde con los tres géneros de alma. El amor<br />
corporal, que es la expresión de esta necesidad de inmortalidad que tienen los seres vivos,<br />
corresponde al ἐπιθυµητικόν. La naturaleza mortal busca en lo posible existir siempre y ser inmortal.<br />
El mortal sufre el cambio, la destrucción y el nacimiento en los asuntos del cuerpo y del alma (206e7-<br />
208b9). Lo mismo sucede con el amor por ser renombrados y alcanzar una fama inmortal. Más fuerte<br />
que el amor a los hijos (c1-e1). El amor en el alma engendra inteligencia (φρόνησιν) y el resto de la<br />
virtud. El joven busca a alguien bello que le haga engendrar esa virtud a través de la amistad (c1-<br />
209e4). Este estadio, que se corresponde con la personalidad de los héroes, los poetas y los<br />
legisladores, es el propio del θυµικόν, ya que se subraya una de sus características esenciales, la<br />
búsqueda de la inmortalidad a través de la fama.<br />
Estos dos momentos están unidos y formalmente separados del penúltimo estadio<br />
correspondiente al νοῦς (cf. 209e5-210a4). Esta sección está dividida en dos momentos<br />
cualitativamente diferentes: (a) El que quiere llegar a él correctamente, debe comenzar desde joven,<br />
llevado por un guía. En el primer escalón debe dirigirse a los cuerpos jóvenes, concentrándose en<br />
primer lugar amar un solo cuerpo y engendrar en él discursos bellos. Luego debe buscar la belleza<br />
corporal como género (τὸ ἐπ᾽εἴδει καλόν; 210b2), dado que es una y la misma en todo. A continuación<br />
debe indagar lo bello en las prácticas y las costumbres/leyes, contemplarlo y verlo. Más tarde ha de<br />
pasar a lo bello en las ciencias y mirar la multiplicidad de la belleza (πολὺ ἤδη τὸ καλόν; 210d1). Éste<br />
es un estadio que indica la inmensidad de lo bello común a todos, pero identificable con la<br />
multiplicidad: es una abstracción de lo bello particular que lleva a crear razonamientos bellos y<br />
magnificentes en abundante filosofía. El πολὺ πέλαγος τοῦ καλοῦ hace referencia a esa abstracción de<br />
la multiplicidad en la unidad del género. Este estadio prevé una intensa práctica filosófica que<br />
fortalece el intelecto del iniciando y lo hace crecer hasta hacerlo ver una única ciencia de esa belleza<br />
(τινὰ ἐπιστήµην µίαν τοιαύτην, ἥ ἐστι καλοῦ τοιοῦδε; d7-e1).<br />
Una nueva indicación formal (e1-2) anuncia que pasamos a un estadio cualitativamente<br />
superior (210e1-211b4). El término ἐξαίφνης marca una fenómeno diferente al de la abstracción que<br />
hasta ahora había sido el preponderante. El que llega a este punto del proceso “ve súbitamente algo<br />
maravillosamente bello en su naturaleza”(ἐξαίφνης κατόψεται τι θαυµαστὸν τὴν φύσιν καλόν; 210 e4-<br />
5). Este ser posee todas las cualidades que corresponden a las Ideas. Es absolutamente bello en todo<br />
11 “Der Entwurf der Transzendenz ist bei Platon in sich immer schon durch den Eros geführt und geleitet. Das heißt zugleich:<br />
Die Seiendheit des Seienden ist selbst Eros; das im Genitiv genannte Gründungsverhältnis selbst geschieht immer schon als<br />
Eros” (Büchner 1965,150). Eros no es, como reclama Büchner la entidad del ente, sino, más bien, el impulso que lleva a<br />
buscar el fin último de esta realidad, e. d. no es el ser, sino la aspiración al ser.<br />
332
Francisco L. Lisi<br />
los sentidos. No es corporal, ni intelectual, ni científico. No está en otro. Es en sí, consigo, único,<br />
eterno. Todo lo bello participa de él.<br />
La última parte del discurso de Diotima (211b7-212a7) es un resumen de lo expresado<br />
anteriormente, pero añade varias determinaciones de importancia: el proceso no finaliza con la visión<br />
súbita, sino que requiere además una permanencia que es deseada por el filósofo iniciado. La<br />
permanencia en contacto con lo Bello en sí, despreciando la belleza corporal, hace devenir al filósofo<br />
querido de los dioses e inmortal.<br />
Chen (1983, 68 s.) sostiene que la transición de conocimiento que se da a la contemplación de<br />
las Ideas es de una cualidad diferente a los estadios anteriores y sólo aquí se produce el ascenso.<br />
Según su interpretación el ascenso tiene un solo paso y no más. Sólo hay dos niveles metafísicos:<br />
realidad e ideas y no una gradación. El proceso no sería un proceso de abstracción ni de<br />
generalización, e. d. no es la producción de un concepto. La Idea de lo Bello no es un concepto, es un<br />
ser, una entidad. Si bien es cierto que la captación de lo Bello es claramente un estadio<br />
cualitativamente superior al resto del proceso, no es menos verdadero que el texto contradice la<br />
interpretación de Chen de manera palmaria. Diotima habla expresamente de un ascenso (cf. ἐπανιών,<br />
211b6; ἐπανιέναι, c2) y de estadios o escalones ascendentes (ἐπαναβασµοῖς; c3). El mito del Fedón<br />
citado anteriormente permite comprender la metáfora utilizada en el Banquete. Se trata del momento<br />
en el que el alma se levanta por encima de la realidad sensible y percibe la multiplicidad anterior a la<br />
formación del concepto. En ese momento, a través de la intensa actividad dialéctica (ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ<br />
ἀφθόνῳ; 210d6), alcanza el conocimiento de la unidad de esa multiplicidad de lo bello (κατίδῃ τινὰ<br />
ἐπιστήµην µίαν τοιαύτην, ἥ ἐστι καλοῦ τοιοῦδε; d7-e1). Ése es el momento previo que da lugar al<br />
salto cualitativo que se produce de súbito con la captación de la Idea de lo Bello.<br />
Por otra parte, contrariamente a lo que sostiene Chen, se menciona la creación de conceptos y<br />
pensamientos en el proceso de ascenso. Hay una ciencia que está referida a esa visión de lo bello que<br />
se logra por la contemplación y frecuentación del concepto que se obtiene a través de la<br />
contemplación del amplio océano de lo bello. Kahn (1987, 101) ha caracterizado este ascenso como<br />
un proceso dialéctico similar al de la República. Sin embargo, no aparece aquí delineada ninguna<br />
búsqueda de una definición de lo Bello, sino que se trata más bien de visiones y de contemplación.<br />
Sobre todo en el estadio final se menciona una captación que trasciende la ciencia y, aunque se habla<br />
del αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ µάθηµα (211c7-8), no se trata de un conocimiento discursivo, sino de<br />
una captación intuitiva de la naturaleza de lo bello.<br />
4. Lo Bello y el Bien<br />
Uno de los problemas centrales que presenta este pasaje es el de la relación existente entre lo Bello y<br />
el Bien. Ya Plotino en la Enéada anteriormente mencionada identificaba lo Bello con el Bien. Esta<br />
identificación se ha impuesto en la mayoría de los intérpretes contemporáneos que suelen darla por<br />
supuesta. 2 Kahn (1987, 91), p. ej., atribuye a ambas Ideas el mismo papel en el proceso de<br />
iluminación filosófica 3 Aunque no se define explícitamente acerca de su identificación, su<br />
interpretación se basa en ella, ya que ambas son el fin del proceso. Otros como White (2004) se<br />
definen por la distinción del Bien y lo Bello (cf. quoque Strauss 2001, 234). Según Chang (2002,<br />
433s.), la Idea del Bien no se encuentra en el Simposio, donde el Eros es la causa de todo lo bello y<br />
bueno (436), aunque la única referencia es a los pasajes de 197c3 y 198e6-199a1 que corresponden al<br />
discurso de Agatón. De todas maneras, Chang considera a lo Bello el principio último que produce<br />
todo, lo que implica o bien la identificación de lo Bello con el Bien o bien, más probable, la<br />
suplantación de la Idea del Bien por la Idea de lo Bello. Como último ejemplo, Krämer (1959, 494)<br />
sostiene la diferencia entre ambas Ideas y entiende el Bien como fin y lo Bello como medio, aunque<br />
afirma que Platón deja aquí sin respuesta el problema de la relación entre ambas ideas.<br />
El discurso de Diotima se mueve ocultando la relación existente entre lo Bello y el Bien. El<br />
Bien aparece en la redefinición de la finalidad del amor, como el deseo de obtener y poseer de manera<br />
permanente el Bien (τὸ ἀγαθόν; 206a11-12). La definición que da Diotima del Amor se dirige<br />
directamente contra el mito puesto en boca de Aristófanes, pero la insistencia en diferenciar en lo<br />
Bello y lo Bueno se opone también al discurso de Agatón que considera a Eros el principio de lo Bello<br />
2 Markus (1955, 137), p. ej., considera esta identificación “axiomatic for Plato”, pero no ofrece ninguna prueba de su<br />
afirmación, salvo la identificación que Agatón que hace de ambos términos y del pasaje del diálogo entre Diotima y Sócrates<br />
(204d1-e7) que ya he analizado antes y que no indica esa identificación. Cf. quoque, Taylor (1926,231 s.); Bury (1932 xliv);<br />
Patterson (1991, 197-200). Para más ejemplos, cf. White (1989, 479, n. 3; 2008, 372 n. 28).<br />
3 Algo similar sucede con Brisson (1998, 71-74), que tampoco se pronuncia de manera clara, pero parecería dar por supuesta<br />
la identificación.<br />
333
Francisco L. Lisi<br />
y Bueno. El diálogo entre Agatón y Sócrates que sirve de vínculo a la exposición de este último<br />
(199c3-201c9) pone de manifiesto una diferencia entre lo bello y lo bueno que es también una<br />
indicación de importancia, entre otras razones porque muestra que Eros es un deseo de aquello que se<br />
carece y porque anuncia la posición de Diotima: el carácter final de la aspiración amorosa, la posesión<br />
del Bien. 4 Que el bien del que se habla es el principio último de la realidad queda claro por la expresa<br />
relación con la felicidad. Quien lo posee es feliz y ése es el final de la búsqueda (205a3). Si bien<br />
Diotima utiliza el plural en esta primera aproximación, su definición final del amor deja en claro que<br />
apunta al Bien, principio último de la realidad, dado que sólo en unión con él puede darse el estado de<br />
felicidad.<br />
El hecho de que Eros sea insistentemente unido a la creación (ποίησις), como ha puesto de<br />
manifiesto el análisis de la estructura del discurso, parecería también apuntar a la presencia creadora<br />
del Bien, tal como se manifiesta en la República. Es, además, indicativo que lo bello sea el medio en<br />
el que se produce la búsqueda de eternidad o inmortalidad que caracteriza al amor. Asimismo, La<br />
caracterización de Eros como filósofo (204b4) indica el valor cósmico del filósofo, que a la manera de<br />
Eros media entre los dioses y los hombres y une de esa forma el universo.<br />
De todas formas, estos aspectos no indican la identificación de lo Bello y el Bien. En<br />
repetidas ocasiones en la obra de Platón, la característica de la belleza implica el predicado de bondad,<br />
para explicarlo en términos lógicos, la especie de τὸ καλόν está incluida en el género de τὸ ἀγαθόν<br />
(Prot. 360b3, Symp. 201c1-5). La relación entre el Bien y la Belleza también es considerada en el<br />
Filebo (64e5-65a5), donde tres Ideas (belleza [κἀλλει], proporción [συµµετρίᾳ] y verdad [ἀληθείᾳ])<br />
aparecen para describir el poder/capacidad del Bien (ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ δύναµις; 64e5). Estas<br />
predicaciones son comprensibles a partir de la alegoría del sol en el sexto libro de la República (cf.<br />
Lisi 2007). La Idea del Bien es el fundamento que otorga estas tres características. Por último, la<br />
misma Diotima indica al pasar que ésa no es la meta final del impulso o deseo que es el amor:<br />
334<br />
ὅταν δή τις ἀπὸ τῶνδε διὰ τὸ ὀρθῶς παιδεραστεῖν ἐπανιὼν ἐκεῖνο τὸ καλὸν ἄρχηται καθορᾶν,<br />
σχεδὸν ἄν τι ἅπτοιτο τοῦ τέλους (“Cuando, uno, elevándose desde las cosas bellas de este<br />
mundo por el correcto amor a los jóvenes, comienza a ver aquello bello, casi tocaría el final”,<br />
211b5-7).<br />
El sintagma σχεδόν τι indica con claridad que la Idea de lo Bello no es idéntica a la Idea del Bien y<br />
que el impulso amoroso necesita aún recorrer un camino más largo para llegar a la contemplación de<br />
la Idea del Bien. El camino que lleva de la contemplación de la Idea individual a la Idea del Bien no<br />
es explicado en este pasaje. Una aproximación puede encontrarse en la descripción de la dialéctica en<br />
la República.<br />
Bibliografía mencionada<br />
Brisson, L. (1998), Platon. Le Banquet. Traduction inédite, introduction et notes par L. B. Paris.<br />
Büchner, H. (1965), Eros und Sein. Erörterungen zu Platons Symposion. Bonn.<br />
Bury, R. G. (1932), The <strong>Symposium</strong> of Plato. Edited with introduction, critical notes and commentary<br />
by R. G. B.. Cambridge 1932 (2nd. ed.).<br />
Chang, K-Ch. (2002), “Plato's Form of the Beautiful in the <strong>Symposium</strong> versus Aristotle's Unmoved<br />
Mover in the Metaphysics (Λ)”, The Classical Quarterly , NS 52, 2, 431-446.<br />
Chen, L. C. H. (1983), “Knowledge and Beauty in Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong>”, The Classical Quarterly NS<br />
33, 1, 6-74.<br />
------------------ (1992), Acquiring knowledge of the Ideas. A study of Plato’s Methods in the Phaedo,<br />
the <strong>Symposium</strong> and the central books of the Republic. Stuttgart. Palingenesia 35.<br />
Kahn, Ch. (1987), “Plato’s theory of desire”, Review of Metaphysics 41, 1, 77-103.<br />
Krämer, H.-J. (1959), Arete bei Platon und Aristoteles. Zum Wesen und zur Geschichte der<br />
platonischen Ontologie. Abhandlungen der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften<br />
Philosophisch-historische Klasse 1959,6.<br />
Leisegang, H. (1950) “Platon” REPW XX, col. 2342-2537.<br />
Markus, R. E. (1955), “The dialectic of Eros in Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong>’, Downside Review 73, 219-230.<br />
Ahora en: G. Vlastos (ed.), Plato. II: Ethics, Politics, and Philosophy of Art and Religion. A colection<br />
of critical essays, s. l. 1971, 132-143 (citado por esta edición).<br />
Patterson, R. (1991), “The Ascent in Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong>”. J. Cleary, Proceedings of the Boston Area<br />
Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 7,Boston-London, 193-214.<br />
4 Es doctrina permanente en Platón que el que desea desea el bien para sí (cf. Men. 77b6-e4)
Francisco L. Lisi<br />
Strauss, L. (2001), On Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong>. Ed. with a foreword by S. Benardete. Chicago.<br />
Taylor, A. E. (1926), Plato. The man and his work. London 1955.<br />
White, F. C. (1989), “Love and Beauty in Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong>”. The Journal of Hellenic Studies 109,<br />
149-157.<br />
-------- (2004), “Virtue in Plato's "<strong>Symposium</strong>"” The Classical Quarterly NS, 54, 2, 366-378.<br />
335
L'océan du beau :<br />
les Formes platoniciennes et leur extension (210a-212a)<br />
Arnaud Macé<br />
Je souhaite explorer les implication du fait que l'ensemble des objets participant à la Forme de la<br />
beauté, dont Diotime accomplit le parcours, soit décrit (τὸ πολὺ πέλαγος τοῦ καλοῦ Banquet 210d4)<br />
comme une pleine mer, une haute mer, un πέλαγος, cette étendue sur laquelle on peut voir, à perte de<br />
vue, se lever la houle :<br />
ὡς δ' ὅτε πορφύρῃ πέλαγος µέγα κύµατι κωφῷ 1<br />
Comme lorsque la vaste mer se gonfle d'une vague muette<br />
Le terme décrit la mer moins comme une entité, différenciée par exemple de la Terre ou du<br />
ciel, comme πόντος – l'infranchissable 2 –, qu'une mer en particulier, la mer Égée ou Ionienne, et<br />
surtout, cette mer que l'on est en train de traverser, plutôt que de tranquillement suivre une côte 3 . Cette<br />
expérience, dans la poésie homérique, est aussi bien celle d'une épreuve (ce que les héros doivent en<br />
effet traverser, cf. Od. III 179) qu'une source d'analogie, comme dans le présent passage où il s'agit<br />
d'évoquer l'état d'esprit de Nestor. Les poètes l'utilise comme métaphore pour dire une quantité qui<br />
paraît si grande qu'on en voit pas le bout – en imaginant par exemple un océan sans fond de ruine 4 .<br />
Platon prolonge cet usage métaphorique, en nous nous invitant à considérer que le « beau » est une<br />
telle étendue. La première chose qu'il faut observer c'est tout simplement qu'en lui donnant un nom,<br />
même métaphorique, Platon circonscrit une chose qui n'en a pas toujours dans les dialogues, car<br />
l'océan du beau n'est pas la Forme du beau, mais plutôt ce que l'on pourrait appeler son « champ de<br />
participation », à savoir l'ensemble des items qui, à un moment donné, en viennent à participer à cette<br />
Forme. Il me semble que c'est une donnée importante de la façon dont les Formes sont présentées<br />
dans les dialogues, à savoir que l'on puisse aussi le saisir à partir de leur champ et penser leurs<br />
rapports à partir de ceux qui s'établissent entre leurs champs respectifs 5 . Le passage du Banquet que<br />
nous allons considérer fait apparaître, au gré d'une métaphore bien choisie, le caractère à la fois<br />
mouvant, sans contours fixes et fondamentalement hétérogène du champ de participation propre à la<br />
Forme du Beau. Nous verrons même que cette hétérogénéité menace la possibilité de trouver dans<br />
l'ensemble des manifestations du Beau un trait descriptif commun : la Forme du Beau unifie son<br />
champ de participation sans donner aux choses qui le compose un style identique, et en lui laissant<br />
plutôt arborer un fascinant miroitement.<br />
1/ Ouvrir l'extension : la totalisation des belles choses<br />
Étendre la classe des choses dont on parle : c'est déjà le souci d'Eryximaque après l'intervention de<br />
Pausanias : si ce dernier a péché, c'est en restreignant sa distinction des deux amours aux âmes des<br />
hommes, alors qu'elle s'applique à quantité d'autres choses, dans le corps des animaux, dans ce qui<br />
pousse sur la terre, et, pour ainsi dire, dans tout ce qui existe (186a). Diotime prolonge cette appel<br />
vers le large, en invitant chacun à étendre le champ des belles choses qu'il fréquente.<br />
a) Il y a les beaux corps (τὰ καλὰ σώµατα 210a6 et 211c4).<br />
L'initiation proposée par Diotime commence au niveau qui est aussi celui de l'Hippias Majeur.<br />
Hippias a proposé, en réponse à la question “τί ἐστι τοῦτο τὸ καλόν;” (287d3), la réponse suivante :<br />
une belle jeune femme. Le spécialiste d'Homère qu'est Hippias aurait pu donner un exemple :<br />
pourquoi pas Hermione, fille d'Hélène et de Ménélas, dont l'εἶδος, la beauté, est celle d'Aphrodite<br />
même 6 . C'est à ce niveau que commence aussi l'initiation proposée par Diotime. Il faut même qu'elle<br />
1<br />
Homère, Il. XIV 16 Allen.<br />
2<br />
ἐπ' ἀπείρονα πόντον Il. VII 350. Pour Hésiode, voir par exemple πόντος ἀπείριτος 109.<br />
3<br />
Voir Thucydide VI 13 1, 10-11 : on oppose διὰ πελάγους, en traversant directement la mer, au fait de suivre la côte, παρὰ<br />
γῆν.<br />
4<br />
Voir Eschyle Perses 433 κακῶν πέλαγος µέγα et Suppliantes 470 ἄτης δ' ἄβυσσον πέλαγος.<br />
5<br />
Nous avons proposé de lire la construction de la dialectique platonicienne en termes de rapports entre ensembles de choses<br />
participant aux Formes, voir A. Macé, L’Atelier de l’invisible, apprendre à philosopher avec Platon, Paris, Ere, 2010,<br />
particulier les chapitres II et III. Il s'agit en particulier de repérer les relations qui existent entre de tels ensembles, telles que<br />
celles que nous nommons aujourd'hui en mathématiques l'inclusion ou l'intersection.<br />
6<br />
Hermione, qui a la beauté de l'Aphrodite d'or, Ἑρµιόνην, ἣ εἶδος ἔχε χρυσῆς Ἀφροδίτης, Od. IV 14. Ce sens de beauté, en<br />
particulier de beauté du visage, est manifeste dans la plupart des occurrences archaïques, mais a laissé place, au IV e siècle, à
commence par l'amour d'un seul corps.<br />
Arnaud Macé<br />
δεῖ γάρ, ἔφη, τὸν ὀρθῶς ἰόντα ἐπὶ τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγµα ἄρχεσθαι µὲν νέον ὄντα ἰέναι ἐπὶ τὰ καλὰ σώµατα,<br />
καὶ πρῶτον µέν, ἐὰν ὀρθῶς ἡγῆται ὁ ἡγούµενος, ἑνὸς αὐτὸν σώµατος ἐρᾶν καὶ ἐνταῦθα γεννᾶν<br />
λόγους καλούς, 7<br />
Il faut en effet, dit-elle, que celui qui prend la bonne voie pour aller à ce but commence dès sa<br />
jeunesse à rechercher les beaux corps. Dans un premier temps, s'il est bien dirigé par celui qui le<br />
dirige, il n'aimera qu'un seul corps et alors il enfantera de beaux discours... 8<br />
Il est possible que la « bonne voie » dont il s'agit renvoie à la « pratique correcte de l'amour des jeunes<br />
garçons (τὸ ὀρθῶς παιδεραστεῖν) » 9 , l'amour pour les femmes (de la part des hommes) ayant été réduit<br />
au désir de l'immortalité à travers la progéniture (208e), tandis que l'amour des jeunes hommes semble<br />
propice au fait de laisser l'âme s'inspirer du spectacle de la beauté (209b-c). Cette bonne voie<br />
commence en outre par la singularité : s'enticher d'un corps unique. C'est que l'on est précisément au<br />
niveau de l'εἶδος, de ce trait de beauté sensible qui n'est jamais aussi bien saisi que dans son<br />
incarnation individuelle. Il y a donc déjà une incroyable abstraction dans le fait de passer, pour<br />
l'amoureux d'Hermione, ou disons plutôt pour l'amoureux de Pâris, à passer de son amour exclusif<br />
pour Pâris à la considération que Pâris et un autre jeune homme aurait finalement, à travers leur<br />
beauté, des propriétés qui sont au fond du même type.<br />
ἔπειτα δὲ αὐτὸν κατανοῆσαι ὅτι τὸ κάλλος τὸ ἐπὶ ὁτῳοῦν σώµατι τῷ ἐπὶ ἑτέρῳ σώµατι ἀδελφόν ἐστι,<br />
καὶ εἰ δεῖ διώκειν τὸ ἐπ' εἴδει καλόν, πολλὴ ἄνοια µὴ οὐχ ἕν τε καὶ ταὐτὸν ἡγεῖσθαι τὸ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν τοῖς<br />
σώµασι κάλλος· 10<br />
puis il constatera que la beauté qui réside en un corps quelconque est sœur de la beauté qui se trouve<br />
dans un autre corps, et que, si on s'en tient à la beauté qui réside dans l'apparence, il serait insensé de<br />
ne pas tenir pour une et identique la beauté qui réside dans tous les corps. 11<br />
Notez l'emploi sensible du terme εἶδος ici : il s'agit bien, comme les poèmes homériques, de la<br />
beauté du corps – cet εἶδος encore de la femme de Candaule que ce dernier rêve de faire admirer à son<br />
fidèle Gygès 12 . On s'élève à une caractérisation de la beauté des corps en général. Les comparaisons<br />
homériques, mesurant ainsi qui est premier « quant à l' εἶδος », c'est-à-dire en termes de beauté,<br />
offraient déjà cette possibilité d'abstraction de la qualité générale 13 . Il y a une beauté des corps, une<br />
dimension unique dans tous les beaux corps, que l'on pourra décrire avec des propriétés similaires,<br />
taille, formes, etc. On peut peut-être encore entendre cette abstraction du beau qu'il y a dans tous les<br />
corps, dans la formule qui sera utilisée à propos de la Forme du beau dans la page qui suit, pour nier<br />
quelle paraisse à ce niveau. Nous reviendrons à cette négation, commençons par simplement relever la<br />
celui d'apparence physique, de silhouette, devenu plus courant, comme en témoigne un commentaire d'Aristote dans la<br />
Poétique 1461a12-14 : καὶ τὸν Δόλωνα, “ὅς ῥ' ἦ τοι εἶδος µὲν ἔην κακός”, οὐ τὸ σῶµα ἀσύµµετρον ἀλλὰ τὸ πρόσωπον<br />
αἰσχρόν, τὸ γὰρ εὐειδὲς οἱ Κρῆτες τὸ εὐπρόσωπον καλοῦσι. Taylor déduit de cette remarque d'Aristote le fait qu'en<br />
revanche, dans la langue attique quotidienne, le terme en est venu à vouloir dire le « corps » ou le « physique », ce dont la<br />
forme ou les proportions peuvent être commentées, voir A. E. Taylor, « The Words eidos, idea in pre-Platonic Literature »,<br />
in Varia Socratica: first series, Oxford, J. Parker, 1911, p. 178-267, p. 182. On peut néanmoins douter de la réduction stricte<br />
de la beauté signifiée par l'adjectif εὐειδής à celle du visage, en considérant par exemple la fable d'Esope intitulée<br />
« Aphrodite et la Belette » (50 Hausrath = 76 Chambry), qui semble ne pas s'interdire de désigner par là l'ensemble des<br />
charmes physiques de la jeune mariée. Il s'agit de la beauté du corps en général, dont les visages peuvent être un moment<br />
plus intense. Voir aussi l'usage d'Hérodote mentionné ci-après.<br />
7<br />
Banquet 210a4-8 Burnet.<br />
8<br />
Traduction Luc Brisson.<br />
9<br />
Banquet 211b5-6, traduction Brisson.<br />
10<br />
Banquet 210a8-b3 Burnet.<br />
11<br />
Traduction de Luc Brisson modifiée en un seul point, mais un point essentiel : Luc Brisson traduit τὸ ἐπ' εἴδει καλόν par<br />
« la beauté qui réside dans une Forme ». Nous comprenons le terme εἶδος dans son sens courant et non platonicien.<br />
L'ensemble de notre propos montrera pourquoi nous ne pouvons considérer qu'il s'agisse là déjà de la Forme, qui n'est pas<br />
encore apparue à l'initié, lequel n'en poursuit pour l'instant que des imitations.<br />
12<br />
Hérodote I, 8. Certains y lisent le sens de « silhouette », voir A. E. Taylor, « The Words eidos, idea in pre-Platonic<br />
Literature », op. cit., p. 184-186. Nous préférons celui de beauté (beauté physique), qui est le sens homérique.<br />
13<br />
C'est en effet un argument pour ceux qui pensent que le corps homérique n'est saisi qu'à travers des traits hétérogènes qui<br />
en classent les différents aspects sans les réunir en un corps organique. Ainsi B. Snell fait la remarque que δέµας, qu'Homère<br />
emploie de la même façon qu' εἶδος, à l'accusatif de spécification, qui était pourtant le mieux placé pour désigner chez<br />
Homère le corps lui-même, puisque σῶµα ne jouait pas encore ce rôle, n'y parvenait pas et restait une simple façon de<br />
préciser l'attribution d'une qualité relative (il est grand ou petit « du point de vue du δέµας », plus grand qu'un tel « du point<br />
de vue du δέµας », de la même façon qu'on est premier « quant à l'εἶδος »), B. Snell, Die Entdeckung des Geistes: Studien<br />
zur Entstehung des europäischen Denkens bei den Griechen, Hamburg, Allemagne, Claassen & Goverts, 1948, p. 19.<br />
337
Arnaud Macé<br />
caractérisation de ce niveau corporel :<br />
οὐδ' αὖ φαντασθήσεται αὐτῷ τὸ καλὸν οἷον πρόσωπόν τι οὐδὲ χεῖρες οὐδὲ ἄλλο οὐδὲν ὧν σῶµα<br />
µετέχει, 14<br />
Le Beau ne se manifestera pas non plus à lui comme un visage, ni non plus comme des mains ou quoi<br />
que ce soit d'autre parmi les choses qui ont part au corps, 15<br />
Imaginons le « τὸ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν τοῖς σώµασι κάλλος· », celui dont on vient de parler, il faut bien<br />
assurément qu'il soit cette beauté que l'on peut saisir dans les visages, sur le mains et sur tout ce qui a<br />
part à la corporéité – on note l'importance de l'expérience du visage et des mains dans l'expérience de<br />
la beauté. L'éclat de cette beauté qui rayonne sur les corps, et notamment sur les visages, est aussi<br />
évoqué dans le Phèdre.<br />
ἀρτιτελής, ὁ τῶν τότε πολυθεάµων, ὅταν θεοειδὲς πρόσωπον ἴδῃ κάλλος εὖ µεµιµηµένον ἤ τινα<br />
σώµατος ἰδέαν, πρῶτον µὲν ἔφριξε... 16<br />
Celui au contraire qui vient d'être initié, celui qui des réalités de jadis a eu une vision pleine, quand il<br />
lui arrive de voir un visage, ou la forme d'un corps, qui soit d'un aspect divin, qui imite à merveille la<br />
beauté, celui-là, alors, commence par frissonner... 17<br />
Nous tenterons plus tard de réconcilier ce qui semble incompatible entre ce passage du Phèdre et celui<br />
du Banquet que nous venions de citer : comment les mêmes corps peuvent-ils être l'imitation de la<br />
beauté même et ce en quoi le beau se refuse à se manifester ? Pour l'instant, nous en restons à la mise<br />
au jour de cette couche spécifique du corporel en général dans l'expérience des belles choses. On peut<br />
noter à ce propos que l'extension proposée par Diotime, qui peut sembler violente à tous ceux qui sont<br />
attachés à la singularité des attachements exclusifs, est pourtant limitée. Que l'on pense à l'initiation<br />
que Socrate fait connaître à Hippias, en lui faisant apparaître la beauté qu'il y a dans les juments, les<br />
lyres et dans les marmites. Une belle jument est aussi quelque chose de beau ; car comment admettre<br />
que « ce qui est beau ne soit pas beau » (Hippias Majeur 288c2-3) ? Hippias, qui se souvient des<br />
magnifiques juments dont on fait l'élevage dans son pays, à Elis, approuve. Et Socrate lui fait accepter<br />
qu'une belle lyre est aussi quelque chose de beau, et aussi une belle marmite : « si la marmite a été<br />
fabriquée par un bon potier, qu'elle est bien lisse, bien arrondie et bien cuite, comme sont, parmi les<br />
belles marmites, celles qui ont deux anses, et qui peuvent contenir six conges – de si belles<br />
marmites » (288d6-9). Or Diotime ne semble pas requérir que l'on approfondisse l'initiation<br />
amoureuse en reconnaissant aussi la beauté qu'il y a dans les marmites, les juments, en s'adonnant à<br />
l'amour de ces corps là aussi, au même titre qu'on désire la beauté de Pâris ou de Patrocle. Nous<br />
verrons qu'il y a une étape de l'initiation où nous rangerons pourtant Pâris à côté des marmites et des<br />
juments. Mais pour l'instant, une logique de l'éminence semble présider à l'initiation, un point de vue<br />
qu'Hippias déjà avait très bien exprimé, en affirmant qu'une marmite, même très belle, « ne mérite pas<br />
qu'on la place parmi les belles choses, au même titre que le cheval ou la jeune femme et que toutes les<br />
autres belles choses » (Hippias Majeur 288e7-9). Grâce à Hippias, nous savons déjà quoi répondre à<br />
celui qui nous a fait reconnaître la beauté des marmites, en lui apprenant qu'il ignore la vérité qu'il y a<br />
dans ces mots d'Héraclite : « le plus beau des singes est laid en comparaison de l'espèce humaine »<br />
(289a3-4), et la vérité qu'il y a dans cet aphorisme du savant Hippias : « la plus belle des marmites est<br />
laide, en comparaison de l'espèce des jeunes femmes » (289a4-6) ! Voilà une bonne raison de préférer<br />
commencer l'initiation par les corps humains, sans s'embarrasser des marmites : ils manifestent la<br />
beauté à un degré supérieur à celui de la même propriété présente dans les marmites et les jugements :<br />
ils la possèdent « éminemment (kuriôs) »18, comme dirait Aristote. Mais, comme Hippias l'a aussi<br />
appris à ces dépends, une telle logique est prompte à évincer ses élus d'un jour. On trouve toujours un<br />
porteur plus éminent de la qualité recherchée. Les âmes s'apprêtent à éclipser les corps selon la même<br />
logique.<br />
b) ce qu'il y a dans les âmes : actes<br />
Après avoir élu la beauté des corps, on se trouverait étonnamment, comme par la grâce d'une première<br />
14 Banquet 211a5-7 Burnet.<br />
15 Nous traduisons.<br />
16 Phèdre 251a1-4 Burnet.<br />
17 Nous traduisons.<br />
18 Sur les formes, cité par Alexandre d'Aphrodise, Commentaire à la Métaphysique d'Aristote, 82.13.<br />
338
Arnaud Macé<br />
synthèse du corporel en général, à voir apparaître un nouveau type de choses qui sont susceptibles de<br />
beauté : les âmes. La beauté qui se trouve dans les âmes lui semblera plus digne d'éloge que celle qui<br />
est dans les corps, de telle sorte qu'il sera enclin à chérir et prendre soin d'une personne possédant une<br />
âme admirable, quand bien même son physique serait ingrat (210b6-c3). Or si l'on s'arrête sur la<br />
nature des discours qu'une âme admirable inspire, on s'aperçoit, poursuit la prêtresse, qu'il s'agit de<br />
discours qui ont pour but de « rendre la jeunesse meilleure ». Cela implique que la beauté qui est dans<br />
les âmes (τὸ ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς κάλλος 210b6-7), est aussi la beauté qui est dans les conduites et dans les<br />
lois qui les inspirent (τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιτηδεύµασι καὶ τοῖς νόµοις καλὸν 210c2-3/τὰ καλὰ ἐπιτηδεύµατα<br />
211c5). Les actes, comme les discours, sont ce en quoi se manifeste la beauté des âmes.<br />
Cette façon qu'à la beauté des discours et celle des esprits qu'ils révèlent justement, comme les<br />
actes le font aussi, d'évincer la beauté des corps est là aussi comme une réminiscence homérique : on<br />
pense à l'apparition d'Ulysse devant les Troyens, tel que Priam se la remémore tandis que du haut des<br />
remparts en compagnie d'Hélène il reconnaît le roi d'Ithaque affairé à ranger ses hommes, au livre III.<br />
Ulysse apparaît au vers 194-198, moins grand qu'Agamemnon mais paraît plus large, de la poitrine et<br />
des épaules (194), et Priam se souvient de la façon du jour où Ulysse et Ménélas se présentèrent<br />
devant l'assemblée troyenne. Le roi de Sparte parle le premier, homme de peu de mots, mais qui<br />
sonnent bien. Ulysse lui, lorsqu'il se lève pour parler a d'abord l'air d'un idiot : il se tient là, les yeux<br />
au sol, le sceptre immobile – il a l'air de quelqu'un qui a perdu l'esprit (ἄφρονά 220). Pourtant, dès que<br />
sa voix sort de sa poitrine, « avec des mots tombant pareils aux flocons de neige en hiver » 19 , alors,<br />
aucune mortel ne peut rivaliser, et, dès lors, avoue Priam, « nous songions moins désormais à admirer<br />
sa beauté » 20 . La description homérique a le grand mérite de nous donner une idée, même<br />
métaphorique, des traits que l'on peut expliciter pour décrire la beauté d'une âme, ou la beauté de ses<br />
mots, de sa manière de se révéler à travers son discours. On pense à la façon dont Socrate décrit<br />
Théétète, aussi laid que lui-même, mais révélant une âme d'une grande beauté, lorsqu'il manifeste ce<br />
mélange de courage et de douceur qui lui permet de progresser à travers les problèmes sans effort,<br />
comme une nappe d'huile s'épand silencieusement (144a1-b7) 21 .<br />
Avec les corps et les actes qui révèlent les âmes, les deux premiers niveaux de l'initiation,<br />
nous tenons du reste les deux types de choses dans lesquelles les Formes de vertu peuvent se<br />
manifester – c'est encore le verbe φαντάζω qui est utilisé à ce propos dans un autre texte de Platon :<br />
Καὶ περὶ δὴ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου καὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ καὶ πάντων τῶν εἰδῶν πέρι ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, αὐτὸ<br />
µὲν ἓν ἕκαστον εἶναι, τῇ δὲ τῶν πράξεων καὶ σωµάτων καὶ ἀλλήλων κοινωνίᾳ πανταχοῦ φανταζόµενα<br />
πολλὰ φαίνεσθαι ἕκαστον. 22<br />
Et le raisonnement est le même en ce qui concerne le juste et l'injuste, le bien et le mal et toutes les<br />
autres Formes : chacune elle-même est une, mais paraît multiple en se manifestant partout en<br />
communauté les unes avec les autres et avec les actes et les corps. 23<br />
Ce qui est troublant, peut-être, c'est qu'il faille penser que la même chose se « manifeste » dans des<br />
corps et dans des actes, comme si c'est deux niveaux étaient susceptible de nous procurer des<br />
descriptions homogènes de propriétés. Or, si l'on se transporte du côté de la beauté, comment<br />
imaginerions-nous unir l'arrondi et le lisse qui font la belle marmite, la grâce du visage et des mains<br />
qui font le beau jeune homme, et la douceur audacieuse qui fait la belle âme ? Nous allons revenir sur<br />
sur ce point. Il y a encore une étape dans l'ascension.<br />
c) La beauté qui est dans les sciences.<br />
Après les occupations, on parvient au beau qui est dans les sciences (ἐπιστηµῶν κάλλος 210c7, τὰ<br />
καλὰ µαθήµατα 211c6). On pourrait dire que les sciences sont dans les âmes – et donc que ces beautés<br />
feraient partie de celles que l'on a déjà pu envisager. Mais s'il s'agit toujours d'une logique d'éminence,<br />
il est plus probable qu'il s'agisse d'un nouveau genre de beauté, non pas celle des sciences en tant que<br />
dispositions psychiques, mais celle des objets de science, par exemple la beauté de l'ordre<br />
mathématique que révèle l'étude de l'univers. Il s'agirait par exemple éventuellement de cette beauté<br />
qui se trouve dans le cosmos, en tant que la science y trouve des régularités, comme lorsque dans le<br />
19 καὶ ἔπεα νιφάδεσσιν ἐοικότα χειµερίῃσιν, 222. C'est l'élégante la traduction de Paul Mazon.<br />
20 οὐ τότε γ' ὧδ' Ὀδυσῆος ἀγασσάµεθ' εἶδος ἰδόντες, 224. C'est là encore la traduction de Paul Mazon.<br />
21 Voir A. Macé, « L’institution platonicienne de la question des vertus intellectuelles », Les Cahiers philosophiques de<br />
Strasbourg, n o 20, éd. par T. Bénatouïl et M. Le Du, 2006, p. 11-48, p. 26-27.<br />
22 République 476a4-7 Burnet.<br />
23 Nous traduisons.<br />
339
Arnaud Macé<br />
Timée (47b5-c4) on explore la façon dont les mathématiques nous permettent, ayant observé le ciel,<br />
ayant étudié à fond (ἐκµαθόντες) les mouvements qui s'y trouvent et ayant pris part à la justesse du<br />
calcul (λογισµῶν… ὀρθότητος), de découvrir l'harmonie qui est dans le ciel, découverte qui aura pour<br />
effet de mettre de l'ordre dans les mouvements de notre âme. Or une telle indication de localisation de<br />
cette beauté semble confirmée lorsqu'à la page suivante on en vient à éliminer toutes les choses<br />
précédemment évoquées dans lesquelles la Forme elle-même n'est pas :<br />
οὐδέ τις λόγος οὐδέ τις ἐπιστήµη, οὐδέ που ὂν ἐν ἑτέρῳ τινι, οἷον ἐν ζώῳ ἢ ἐν γῇ ἢ ἐν οὐρανῷ ἢ ἔν τῳ<br />
ἄλλῳ, 24<br />
(Ce Beau ne se manifestera) pas non plus comme un discours ni comme une science donnée, il ne sera<br />
pas non plus en quelque façon dans une autre chose, comme dans un animal, dans la Terre, dans le<br />
ciel ou dans quoi que ce soit d'autre.<br />
La beauté du ciel ou de la terre semblent bien être de celles que les sciences peuvent révéler. En quoi<br />
ces beautés sont-elles plus grandes que celles des hommes et des femmes ? Ce sont les beautés de<br />
divinités. Or, comme Hippias l'a appris à ses dépends, la plus belle des femmes, comparée à une<br />
déesse, ne sera plus très belle, comme le dit Héraclite : « le plus savant des hommes paraît un singe<br />
auprès d'un dieu ; il en est de même pour le savoir, comme pour la beauté, comme pour toute chose »<br />
(Hippias 289b4-5). Surtout, il semble s'agir désormais d'une beauté qui ne se révèle qu'à l'intellect, par<br />
l'intermédiaire de l'étude des sciences, celle de l'ordre mathématique que l'étude révèle aux futurs<br />
gouvernants de la République comme des Lois (XII 966d-968c).<br />
340<br />
2/ les propriétés des choses composant l'ensemble total des belles choses<br />
Une chose étonnante se produit alors. Pourquoi, si l'on se tenait dans une logique d'éminence, de<br />
recherche d'une beauté de plus en plus éclatante, se retourner pour regarder en arrière ? Diotime invite<br />
l'initié à contempler l'ensemble parcouru : « en considérant la vaste étendue qui est déjà celle du beau<br />
(βλέπων πρὸς πολὺ ἤδη τὸ καλὸν) » 25 . Alors, l'initié aux mystères d'Eros, se trouve « tourné vers<br />
l'océan du beau et le contemplant (ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ πέλαγος τετραµµένος τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ θεωρῶν) »<br />
(210d3-4). L'océan du beau n'est pas la Forme du beau : c'est l'ensemble des choses belles qui ont été<br />
parcourues. Ce que nous appelons son champ de participation. Or c'est le moment où Diotime, en<br />
décrivant une nouvelle chose qui ne fait pas nombre avec l'ensemble des choses belles, en décrivant la<br />
Forme du Beau, propose, en creux, une description de certains attributs communs à toutes les choses<br />
belles qui ne sont pas le Beau lui-même. Lorsque Diotime entreprend de nous présenter « ce beau<br />
dont la nature est merveilleuse » (τι θαυµαστὸν τὴν φύσιν καλόν 210.e4-5), elle se contente d'exclure<br />
un certains nombre d'attributs (210e6-211b5). Or l'ensemble de ces propriétés aurait permis pourtant<br />
de circonscrire des ensembles d'objets que l'on vient de traverser. Il y a deux types de propriétés.<br />
a) Les formes du mouvement :<br />
ὃς γὰρ ἂν µέχρι ἐνταῦθα πρὸς τὰ ἐρωτικὰ παιδαγωγηθῇ, θεώµενος ἐφεξῆς τε καὶ ὀρθῶς τὰ καλά, πρὸς<br />
τέλος ἤδη ἰὼν τῶν ἐρωτικῶν ἐξαίφνης κατόψεταί τι θαυµαστὸν τὴν φύσιν καλόν, τοῦτο ἐκεῖνο, ὦ<br />
Σώκρατες, οὗ δὴ ἕνεκεν καὶ οἱ ἔµπροσθεν πάντες πόνοι ἦσαν, πρῶτον µὲν ἀεὶ ὂν καὶ οὔτε γιγνόµενον<br />
οὔτε ἀπολλύµενον, οὔτε αὐξανόµενον οὔτε φθίνον...26<br />
Celui qui en effet aura suivi jusque là l'initiation menant vers les objets de l'amour, contemplant les<br />
belles choses, de manière successive et correcte, parvient alors au terme des choses de l'amour : il<br />
verra soudain quelque chose d'incroyablement beau quant à sa nature, cette chose même, Socrate, qui<br />
était le but de toutes les peines antérieures, une chose, qui, tout d'abord, est toujours, ne vient jamais à<br />
l'existence ni ne périt, ne s'accroît ni ne diminue... 27<br />
Rien qui ne vienne à l'existence ni n'en sorte, n'augmente ni de diminue. Cette exclusion de la<br />
génération et de la destruction est complétée par celle de l'augmentation et de la diminution, peut-être<br />
de manière générale celle de toute forme de devenir. Voyons en effet la reprise de ce thème :<br />
ἀλλ' αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ µεθ' αὑτοῦ µονοειδὲς ἀεὶ ὄν, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα καλὰ ἐκείνου µετέχοντα τρόπον<br />
24 Banquet 211a7-b1 Burnet.<br />
25 Banquet 210c3-d1.<br />
26 Banquet 210e2-211a2.<br />
27 Nous traduisons.
Arnaud Macé<br />
τινὰ τοιοῦτον, οἷον γιγνοµένων τε τῶν ἄλλων καὶ ἀπολλυµένων µηδὲν ἐκεῖνο µήτε τι πλέον µήτε<br />
ἔλαττον γίγνεσθαι µηδὲ πάσχειν µηδέν. 28<br />
mais il est lui-même par lui-même, d'une forme unique, existant toujours, et toutes les autres choses<br />
belles participent à celui-ci sur un certain mode tel que tandis que les autres choses viennent à<br />
l'existence et périssent, jamais celui-ci ne devient ni plus grand ni plus petit et ne subit rien.<br />
On pourrait imaginer ici que toute forme de devenir, grand ou petit, mais aussi de bien toute autre<br />
sorte est aussi bien exclut – l'altération en général. C'est ce que confirme une expression<br />
précédemment utilisée : οὐδὲ τοτὲ µέν, τοτὲ δὲ οὔ29, il n'est pas beau à un moment, et laid à un autre.<br />
Il ne s'altère pas. On trouve peut-être là les différents types de mouvements qui affectent toute<br />
les choses qu'il y a dans l'univers, qu'il s'agisse de corps (corps individuels, corps du monde), d'âmes<br />
(âmes individuelles ou âme du monde) ou de dispositions de ces corps et de ces âmes, comme le<br />
décrit la physique du livre X des Lois (893c-896e 30 ). Il y a bien là un ensemble de propriétés qui<br />
qualifient bien l'ensemble des choses parcourues par Diotime jusqu'ici : même le corps et l'âme du<br />
monde sont des choses soumises au mouvement, et leur ordre, objet des mathématiques, l'est aussi.<br />
L'ordre du ciel peut-être décrit comme le résultat d'une mise en ordre, comme c'est aussi le cas dans le<br />
Timée.<br />
b) La relativité des perceptions.<br />
ἔπειτα οὐ τῇ µὲν καλόν, τῇ δ' αἰσχρόν, οὐδὲ τοτὲ µέν, τοτὲ δὲ οὔ, οὐδὲ πρὸς µὲν τὸ καλόν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ<br />
αἰσχρόν, οὐδ' ἔνθα µὲν καλόν, ἔνθα δὲ αἰσχρόν, ὡς τισὶ µὲν ὂν καλόν, τισὶ δὲ αἰσχρόν· 31<br />
en outre il n'est pas beau d'un côté, laid de l'autre, ni beau à un moment, laid à un autre, ni beau par<br />
rapport à tel autre, laid par rapport à tel autre, beau ici, laid ailleurs, beau pour certains, pour d'autres<br />
laid.<br />
On a là cinq formes de relativité qu'il faut distinguer et que l'on peut réduire à quatre modes, comme<br />
l'a fait Vlastos 32 : selon les parties, le temps, la relation, le lieu et le point de vue. Le tableau résume<br />
ces quatre possibilités.<br />
Parties et aspects : comparaison interne Beau du visage, laid des pieds ; beau habillé, laid nu<br />
Temps Beau jeune, laid vieux<br />
Relation Beau par rapport à une marmite, laid par rapport à<br />
une jument 33 .<br />
Lieu Beau à Athènes, Laid à Sparte<br />
Point de vue Beau pour les vieux, laid pour les jeunes<br />
Ces variations affectent assurément les objets sensibles, comme en témoignent de nombreux autres<br />
passages platoniciens. Qu'en est-il des âmes ? Sont-elles elles aussi soumises à l'ensemble de ces<br />
variations ? Il semble en effet qu'une âme puisse être seulement partiellement belle, cesser de l'être,<br />
l'être relativement seulement, et être soumise à des évaluations diverses selon les lieux et selon les<br />
interlocuteurs – même auprès de la même âme, si on en croît le type de distorsions qui peuvent exister<br />
au sein du même sujet sur le moindre spectacle 34 . La beauté qui est dans les sciences est-elle soumise<br />
à la même variation ? Il n'y a pas moyen d'y échapper. Un triangle pourrait-il être beau et laid ? Il peut<br />
bien être à la fois grand et petit. Bref, il n'y aurait aucune attribution absolument stable de propriétés<br />
contraires. Peut-être pourrait-on néanmoins accepter des degrés : que les corps soit davantage soumis<br />
28<br />
Banquet 211b1-5.<br />
29<br />
Banquet 211a3 Burnet.<br />
30<br />
Voir A. Macé, Platon, philosophie de l’agir et du pâtir, Sankt Augustin, Academia, 2006, 147-150.<br />
31<br />
Banquet 211a2-5.<br />
32<br />
Voir G. Vlastos, « Degress of Reality », in R. Bambrough (éd.), New essays on Plato and Aristotle, London, pays<br />
multiples, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965, p. 219-234, et voyez notre comparaison avec de multiples passages platoniciens,<br />
A. Macé, Platon, philosophie de l’agir et du pâtir, op. cit., p. 185-189.<br />
33<br />
On pense aussi au cas des bouts de bois égaux (deux à deux) qui peuvent en même temps être inégaux (par rapport à<br />
d'autres) (Phédon 74d-e), le cas des hommes ou des doigts que nous voyons grands par rapport à certains se trouver petits par<br />
rapport à d'autres (Ibid.102b-e pour les hommes, République VII 523c-d pour les doigts).<br />
34<br />
Voir notre étude A. Macé, « Que l’art ne peut pas tout pour la cité : la dissonance de l’art, du spectateur et de l’acteur selon<br />
Platon », Cahiers du Centre G. Glotz, n o 18, 2007, p. 303-322.<br />
341
Arnaud Macé<br />
à cette évaluation contraire que les âmes et les actes, et les objets des sciences moins que les âmes et<br />
les actes : ce serait la raison de la logique d'éminence que nous avons suivi : plus de stabilité peut-être<br />
dans les propriété présentées par les âmes, et plus encore dans celles des objets mathématiques. Ce<br />
n'est qu'une hypothèse.<br />
342<br />
3/ La forme du Beau n'a aucune des caractéristiques portées par l'ensemble des choses belles<br />
Il faut donc conclure que le beau lui-même n'a aucun de traits des choses belles. La négation du<br />
premier groupe de propriétés le rend simplement inaccessible au changement. La négation du second<br />
groupe le libère de toute forme de conflit des apparences. Mais Diotime ne procède pas seulement à<br />
une négation des deux types de propriétés qui caractérisent l'ensemble des choses belles, elle procède<br />
aussi à la négation des groupes de propriétés qui caractérisent aussi chacun des domaines de choses<br />
belles, comme nous l'avons vu : le domaine corporel, le domaine psychique et celui des sciences. La<br />
beauté ne se manifeste pas sous les traits d'un visage ou d'un raisonnement, elle n'est pas la beauté que<br />
l'on peut lire dans le ciel. Elle n'a aucun des traits que l'un de ces types de chose pourraient manifester.<br />
Or c'est bien sa seule possibilité d'échapper à la relativité des perceptions que manifestent tout traits<br />
descriptifs. On comprend ces passages des dialogues qui affirment que nous n'avons jamais vu la<br />
beauté. Pensons au Phédon :<br />
Τί δὲ δὴ τὰ τοιάδε, ὦ Σιµµία; φαµέν τι εἶναι δίκαιον αὐτὸ ἢ οὐδέν;<br />
Φαµὲν µέντοι νὴ Δία.<br />
Καὶ αὖ καλόν γέ τι καὶ ἀγαθόν;<br />
Πῶς δ' οὔ;<br />
Ἤδη οὖν πώποτέ τι τῶν τοιούτων τοῖς ὀφθαλµοῖς εἶδες;<br />
Οὐδαµῶς, ἦ δ' ὅς. 35<br />
Affirmons-nous qu'il existe quelque chose qui est la justice même, ou qu'il n'y a rien de tel ? - Par<br />
Zeus oui, nous l'affirmons ! - Et ne disons-nous pas encore qu'il y a quelque chose de beau et quelque<br />
chose de bon ? - Comment ne le dirions-nous pas ? - Et alors, as-tu déjà vu, de tes yeux vu, l'une de<br />
ces choses ? - Jamais, dit-il.<br />
Or il n'y a pas que le bon et le juste que nous n'ayons jamais vus, de nos yeux vus :<br />
Ἀλλ' ἄλλῃ τινὶ αἰσθήσει τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώµατος ἐφήψω αὐτῶν; λέγω δὲ περὶ πάντων, οἷον µεγέθους<br />
πέρι, ὑγιείας, ἰσχύος, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἑνὶ λόγῳ ἁπάντων τῆς οὐσίας ὃ τυγχάνει ἕκαστον ὄν· 36<br />
Mais n'est-ce pas par une autre sensation que celle qui se fait par le corps que tu as touché ces<br />
choses ? Je veux parler de toutes ces choses comme la grandeur, la santé, la force, en un mot de ce qui<br />
relève de la réalité que chacune de ces formes se trouve être.<br />
Différencions donc deux choses : personne n'a jamais vu la grandeur, la beauté, la santé ou la force,<br />
mais l'on pourrait avoir vu la beauté d'une fleur, senti la force d'un taureau, etc. La Forme en tant que<br />
telle ne se manifeste pas. En réalité, ce que l'on a vu, ce sont d'autres propriétés – celles qui imitent la<br />
Forme. Est-ce que la fleur est belle « parce qu'elle a une charmante couleur ou à cause de ses formes<br />
(ἢ χρῶµα εὐανθὲς ἔχον ἢ σχῆµα) » 37 ? Non, ces choses ne sont que des produits de la participation à la<br />
Forme du Beau qui, elle, est au-delà de toutes ces déterminations. La Forme de la beauté recule<br />
derrière la diversité des caractéristiques que présentent les choses belles : elle est seulement traduite<br />
dans d'autres propriétés qui en assurent l'imitation, propriétés éminemment variables selon les<br />
supports – rondeur des marmites, grâce des visages humains, douceur des mots et des âmes, élégance<br />
des âmes, ordre du ciel. Dès lors, un champ de participation doit être considéré comme une classe<br />
d'une nature tout à fait particulière. Si on peut la définir comme une classe, c'est-à-dire un ensemble<br />
de valeurs de x vérifiant la description « x est Beau », il faut admettre que c'est une classe étonnante,<br />
dans la mesure où il n'y a rien dans le contenu descriptif en question que l'on puisse trouver<br />
d'homogène. L'ensemble qui fait le champ de participation d'une telle Forme est un ensemble mouvant<br />
et hétérogène. Un véritable océan.<br />
On pourrait prolonger la réflexion en considérant que c'est là une manière très vigoureuse de<br />
répondre à l'objection qu'énoncera un jour Aristote à propos du Bien platonicien (Ethique à<br />
Nicomaque I 4) : à chercher une unité qui enveloppe des choses qui se trouvent dans de multiples<br />
35 Phédon, 65d4-10 Burnet.<br />
36 Ibid., 65d11-e1.<br />
37 Ibid. 100d1.
Arnaud Macé<br />
genres, on ne peut produire de définition, car il faudrait qu'il existe un trait essentiel commun à des<br />
choses de genre si différents, or cela n'existe pas, sinon par analogie. La nature du Beau, dans laquelle<br />
la puissance du Bien s'est réfugiée 38 , traverse elle aussi de nombreux « genres » de choses, au sens où<br />
Aristote emploierait ce terme. Elle est donc moins facile semble-t-il à définir qu'une vertu qui pourrait<br />
se situer dans un genre de chose donné. La justice par exemple, nous savons qu'elle est dans l'âme ou<br />
dans la cité. Or ce qui est le plus étonnant, c'est que ces Formes qui sont le plus étendues, et donc les<br />
plus difficiles à définir, semble être celles qui ont le plus d'éclat parmi les choses sensibles. C'est une<br />
autre leçon du Phèdre. La beauté rayonne sur ces choses avec une intensité particulière – plus que<br />
toute autre forme, plus que la justice, la tempérance et les autres choses que l'âme estime, et dont les<br />
imitations sont perçues de manière très affaiblies 39 . Au contraire, la beauté jouit du privilège d'être,<br />
parmi toutes les formes, la plus éclatante dans ses propres images, et la plus désirée 40 . Il est donc plus<br />
facile d'être ému par la beauté d'un visage que par le courage qui peut aussi pourtant s'y lire, comme<br />
nous le rappelle Plotin 41 , mais plus difficilement. Il faut croire que le fait, pour une Forme, de n'être<br />
liée, dans ses imitations, à aucun contenu descriptif particulier, laissant celles-ci se disperser dans la<br />
plus grande hétérogénéité, lui offre aussi la capacité de se manifester avec le plus grand éclat.<br />
38<br />
Philèbe 64.e.5-6 Νῦν δὴ καταπέφευγεν ἡµῖν ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ δύναµις εἰς τὴν τοῦ καλοῦ φύσιν.<br />
39<br />
Phèdre 250b.<br />
40<br />
Phèdre 250c8.<br />
41<br />
Enneades 1, 6, 5,14 andrian blosuron ekhousan prosôpon.<br />
343
ABSTRACT<br />
Socrates’ Thea:<br />
The Description of Beauty in <strong>Symposium</strong> 211a<br />
and the Parmenidean Predicates of Being<br />
Manfred Kraus<br />
Some 40 years ago, Friedrich Solmsen and Rosamond Kent Sprague have simultaneously and<br />
independently pointed to the striking similarity of the terms in which Diotima describes the Form of<br />
Beauty in <strong>Symposium</strong> 211a and the predicates of Parmenidean Being revealed by the goddess in<br />
fragment B 8. Yet in subsequent scholarly literature this groundbreaking discovery has left<br />
astonishingly few traces other than short remarks or footnotes. Scholars have mostly confined<br />
themselves to pointing out the negative or privative character of the employed predicates or to<br />
emphasize parallels with other Platonic descriptions of the Ideal such as Phaedo 78b-79b, Cratylus<br />
439d-440b, Timaeus 52a-c, Philebus 15b, and several others.<br />
Yet in effect, while Platonic descriptions of ideas are often reminiscent of Eleatic concepts<br />
and vocabulary, in the <strong>Symposium</strong> passage this correlation appears to be even more close-knit than in<br />
any other. It provides not only a description of the Beautiful itself, but also of the nature of knowledge<br />
and wisdom, and the imagery of ascent, descent, revelation, sudden vision and light is particularly<br />
prominent and concentrated.<br />
For this reason this true centrepiece of the whole dialogue would seem to deserve a more<br />
detailed comparative appraisal than it has hitherto been granted. Such an endeavour is both strongly<br />
suggested and facilitated also by the fact that scholarship on the Parmenidean predicates of Being has<br />
made substantial progress in recent years, and the role of space, time, eternity, homogeneity,<br />
indivisibility, changelessness, perfection etc. in Parmenides has been reassessed in many ways, not to<br />
speak of erotic undertones that have recently been perceived.<br />
The paper will attempt to analyse the <strong>Symposium</strong> passage by comparing it in a first step with<br />
other similar Platonic passages relevant to the description of ideas, in order to highlight its particular<br />
differences and peculiarities. It will then meticulously examine the relationship of the individual<br />
predicates and combinations of predicates to their respective parallels in Parmenides’ fragment B 8.<br />
Ideally, the result will be not only a more profound understanding of the Platonic passage and its<br />
Eleatic background, but also some new insights about the sometimes contested wordings and<br />
meanings of the difficult Parmenidean sequence. As a result it will emerge that the Platonic passage is<br />
in various respects more closely modelled on its Parmenidean archetype than mostly assumed, and<br />
how Socrates takes on the role of a new kouros to listen to the revelations of his personal guiding<br />
goddess, the mysterious Mantinean woman Diotima, eventually to become an eidōs phōs in all things<br />
erōs, beauty, and wisdom.
ABSTRACT<br />
L’interpretazione plotiniana (Enneade III 5)<br />
della nascita di Eros (Symp. 203b-c)<br />
Angela Longo<br />
Il confronto con il “Simposio” di Platone rappresenta un elemento costante nella ricerca filosofica e<br />
nella produzione letteraria di Plotino (205-270 d. C.). Esso “feconda” il pensiero e lo stile di scrittura<br />
plotiniani sia nei trattati del primo periodo, tra cui spicca il primo scritto stesso composto da Plotino<br />
“Sul bello” (Enn. I 6 [1]), sia nei trattati del periodo di mezzo, tra cui spicca l’opuscolo “Sul bello<br />
intelligibile” (Enn. V 8 [31]), sia infine nei trattati dell’ultimo periodo, tra cui merita una particolare<br />
menzione l’opera “Sull’amore” (Enn. III 5 [50]). Plotino si rivela un lettore selettivo del “Simposio”<br />
platonico poiché sono soprattutto due temi e un’immagine che lo accompagnano nella sua lunga<br />
riflessione sull’anima che risale al bello tramite amore e che trascende persino il Bello nell’unione con<br />
il Bene. I due temi sono:<br />
a) quello della risalita graduale dell’anima dai vari gradi di bellezza (dei corpi, dell’anima,<br />
delle azioni, delle scienze) fino alla visione del Bello in sé (Platone, Symp. 210-12);<br />
b) quello della nascita di Amore (Plat., Symp. 203-204);<br />
mentre l’immagine letteraria è quella delle statuette preziose che si trovano nell’anima di Socrate<br />
(Symp. 216e5-217a).<br />
All’interno del “Simposio” platonico, i due temi sono contenuti nel discorso che Socrate<br />
riferisce come proprio di Diotima, mentre l’immagine delle statuette è espressa nel discorso di<br />
Alcibiade su Socrate. Plotino, quale interprete fedele e, al tempo stesso, personale di Platone,<br />
rielabora il tema dei vari gradini che portano l’anima amante dal bello sensibile o artistico al Bello<br />
intelligibile sia nell’opuscolo “Sul bello” sia in quello successivo e più complesso “Sul bello<br />
intelligibile”, inserendo tale ascesa nella sua propria speculazione sulla conversione e purificazione<br />
dell’anima umana che ritrova la sua origine e natura intelligibile grazie alla forza propulsiva del bello<br />
cui essa costantemente tende. Nondimeno nel sistema gerarchico della realtà secondo Plotino (in<br />
ordine ascendente Anima, Intelletto, Bene), il percorso non si esaurisce mai nella contemplazione del<br />
Bello in sé, ma a partire da essa si verificano le condizioni perché l’anima umana possa fare un salto<br />
finale e attingere il Bene stesso, causa prima e finale di tutto quello che esiste.<br />
Ma è soprattutto nel tardo trattato “Sull’amore” che Plotino sembra dare un’interpretazione<br />
specialmente personale del discorso di Diotima in realzione al secondo tema da noi individuato, ossia<br />
la nascita di Amore. In tale trattato infatti (capitoli 5-9) Plotino fornisce un’interpretazione allegorica<br />
dei vari personaggi del mito della nascita di Eros, per cui l’Afrodite “celeste” è l’Anima che, figlia<br />
dell’Intelletto, è sempre volta alla contemplazione di questi e, nel far ciò, genera il dio Amore;<br />
l’Afrodite di secondo livello è l’anima cosmica che volta al mondo sensibile genera il demone Amore;<br />
Penia indica la materia, Poros sta per le forme razionali, Zeus personifica l’Intelletto e il giardino di<br />
Zeus (in cui nasce Amore) è lo splendore che emana dall’Intelletto. Nel compiere questa operazione<br />
di allegoresi Plotino si rifà alla tradizione ormai consolidata, soprattutto in ambito stoico, di<br />
reinterpretazione della lettera di testi poetici al fine di ricavarne dati “accettabili” alla speculazione<br />
filosofica, e teologica in particolare. Egli menziona anche delle allegoresi concorrenti che rifiuta,<br />
come per esempio quella per cui Amore indicherebbe il mondo sensibile (cfr. in proposito la<br />
testimonianza di Plutarco di Cheronea (“Su Iside e Osiride”). Inoltre nel capitolo finale (9) del<br />
trattato, Plotino, in rapporto all’interpretazione allegorica da lui fornita, offre una riflessione sul mito<br />
in generale e come esso vada correttamente interpretato, visto che il mito, per ragioni didattiche,<br />
separa nel tempo e in vari personaggi delle realtà che sono invece fuori dal tempo e unitarie.<br />
Infine l’immagine platonica delle statuette preziose nell’anima di Socrate viene in Plotino<br />
elaborata e sviluppata in modo importante sia a livello letterario sia nel suo significato filosofico,<br />
poiché essa traccia il panorama dell’interiorità del saggio in generale (Socrate non è più direttamente<br />
menzionato). Infatti il messaggio sarebbe che la vera contemplazione del Bello e del Bene si risolva in<br />
una contemplazione del “sancta sanctorum” della propria anima, sviluppando quel discorso<br />
sull’interiorità che avrà largo seguito non solo nella filosofia pagana post-plotiniana ma anche in<br />
quella cristiana, in primis in Agostino.<br />
345
Eros, Poiesis and Philosophical Writing<br />
Chair: Marcelo D. Boeri
I: INTRODUCTION<br />
On the Early Speeches’ Developement of a Methodology<br />
Philip Krinks<br />
The objective of this short paper is to re-examine the early speakers’ reflections on method. I argue<br />
that each early speaker adopts an explicit methodological focus for his speech, which responds to his<br />
predecessors’ focuses. The early speakers thereby collectively and progressively generate a<br />
methodology for praising erōs. This connection and progression between the early speeches gives<br />
them a tighter relation to one another, and the dialogue a greater degree of unity, than might otherwise<br />
appear.<br />
For Phaedrus, the method for praising erōs is to focus on what it causes (Section II); for<br />
Pausanias, on erōs as a praxis (Section III); for Eryximachus, the praise should be complete, reach the<br />
telos (Section IV); for Aristophanes, a praise should do justice to the power of erōs (Section V); for<br />
Agathon, to the intrinsic character of erōs.<br />
I also make the observation, as a corollary (Section VII), that it is these five methodological<br />
focuses which then structure Socrates’ speech.<br />
II: PHAEDRUS AND CAUSALITY<br />
II.1 Phaedrus and his predecessors<br />
Although Phaedrus is the first speaker in the dialogue, he has a long tradition of praise discourse to<br />
draw on. Phaedrus sees that the conventions of prose encomium, which would be used if one were<br />
praising a legendary hero, or heroically depicted aristocrat, can be adapted for the praise of erōs. The<br />
conventional pattern for praising a hero would be in outline:<br />
- This hero is of distinguished genesis<br />
- His genesis is responsible for him being virtuous<br />
- So he is responsible for great erga<br />
II.2 Phaedrus’ focus: what erōs causes<br />
Phaedrus evolves this pattern. erōs lacks noble lineage, but does have great antiquity. 1 Therefore:<br />
‘Since erōs is very old, he is cause (aitios) of very great goods for us human beings’ (178c2-3) 2<br />
Phaedrus relies on a methodological principle, drawn from conventional encomiastic practice, that<br />
someone should be praised if he is cause of benefits for other human beings. Phaedrus has to evolve<br />
the standard pattern, however: it is implausible to state, given what had been said about erōs in poetry<br />
and prose in the preceding decades, that erōs is virtuous. Phaedrus removes the direct reference to<br />
virtue in the middle step of the conventional structure. 3 He maintains the ideas that shame and love of<br />
honour play an important and positive ethical role 4 , and the idea that outstanding human lives are<br />
marked by great works 5 . This gives him the structure of his praise:<br />
- erōs has no known parentage<br />
- so it must be old<br />
- it instils (better than other things) shame and pride (at the right things)<br />
- which is what is needed to do great and fine works (and lead a fine life)<br />
1 Rowe (op. cit. p.137, ad 178a5ff) rightly notes the superlatives. Socrates comments on the superlatives below, 199a2<br />
2 Translations from the <strong>Symposium</strong> are partly from the excellent edition and translation of Rowe 1998, and partly my own<br />
doing<br />
3 This creates an interesting parallel with Gorgias’ Encomium of Helen, which begins its praise and defence of Helen by<br />
discussing Helen’s pre-eminence in nature (phusei) and descent (genei)<br />
4 Cf. Williams 1993 pp.78ff on shame. The idea that the role played by shame and love of honour is positive was, by the late<br />
5th and early 4th century, controversial. Some worried that ‘... philotimia could slide into aggression, pride and<br />
boastfulness’. Dover 1974, p.232 cites examples of concern about philotimia from Aristophanes and Demosthenes<br />
5 That is true from Homer onwards: famously Penelope requests Phemius to sing of ‘the works (erga) of gods and heroes’ at<br />
Odyssey 1.338
Philip Krinks<br />
III: PAUSANIAS AND PRAXIS<br />
III.1 Pausanias and his predecessors<br />
Pausanias criticises the method so far:<br />
‘Far from fine is the manner, Phaedrus, it seems to me, that the topic (logos) has been imposed<br />
(probeblēsthai) on us - I mean, that we have been instructed to praise erōs too simply (haplōs).’<br />
(180c4-5)<br />
Pausanias finds a single, but important fault: the logos has been ‘imposed’ 6 , qua topic and qua<br />
method, ‘too simply’ (haplōs). 7 In terms of the famous exchange in Euripides’ Phoenician Women 8 ,<br />
Pausanias casts Phaedrus as Polyneices, who thought nostalgically that simplicity was the mark of<br />
truth, and that complexity was inappropriately sophistical (as opposed to appropriately subtle and<br />
nuanced 9 ). Pausanias casts himself, on the other hand, as Eteocles, to whom what is simple (haplous)<br />
may be unhelpful, because it can constrain appropriately two-sided debate.<br />
Pausanias’ account of erōs is as multiple:<br />
‘If erōs were one, then that [sc. imposing a haplōs method] would be fine, but in fact he is not one’<br />
(180c5-6)<br />
A simple method is literally too one-fold, in assuming that erōs is one. Perhaps Pausanias assumes<br />
that it will not work to praise in a simple way a thing which is not simple: after all, poetry referred to<br />
erōtes plural. Perhaps Pausanias is more subtle: a method which is not simple reveals an erōs which is<br />
not one.<br />
III.2 Pausanias’ focus: the praxis of erōs<br />
For Pausanias, as 180c7-d3 shows, not only is erōs multiple, but one of the erōtes is not in fact<br />
praiseworthy. Phaedrus assumed he had to praise all erōs. If in fact one or more kinds of erōs can be<br />
left unpraised, how is one to identify the kind of erōs which is praiseworthy? Methodologically,<br />
Pausanias’ frame is that each erōs is a practical activity (praxis). His principle is that any praxis can be<br />
praiseworthy or not:<br />
‘The following holds true of every practical activity (praxis): being done, itself by itself, it is neither<br />
fine nor shameful. But within the doing of it (en tēi praxei), depending on the manner in which it is<br />
done (hōs an prachtei), so it turns out.’ (181a1-4)<br />
Whereas on Phaedrus’ heroic view, every activity was either fine or shameful, Pausanias implies no<br />
6 I would bring out the notion of imposition a little more than the translators. (E.g.: Jowett 1970: ‘The argument has not been<br />
set before us quite in the right form.’ Rowe 1998: ‘Our subject seems not to have been put forward in the right way.’ Gill<br />
2003: ‘Our project has [not] been specified properly’.) The expression prosballein ti tini literally means ‘to throw something<br />
against someone’. Cf. Aeschylus Prometheus Bound 950f., where Hermes asks ‘do not impose (prosbalēis) upon me a<br />
double (diplas) journey’ –Pausanias’ concern at the imposition of a single method may recall Hermes’ concern at the<br />
possible imposition of a double journey<br />
7 The adjective ‘haplous’ from which the adverb ‘haplōs’ word comes, means, literally, ‘in a single way’ ‘one-fold’, ‘single’.<br />
It is contrasted with double or two-fold (diplous). Since it is a complaint, it must in the context have the connotation of ‘too<br />
simple’, ‘simplistic’, or ‘simple-minded’. But it can also have a positive connotation: simple, clear, decisive, plain, open,<br />
straightforward, frank<br />
8 Produced 409 B.C.<br />
Polyneices: ‘Simple (haplous) is the word of truth<br />
And of complex (poikilōn) interpretations justice has no need<br />
Since it of itself has the advantage. But the unjust word<br />
Diseased in itself needs drugs which are clever (sophōn)…’ (Lines 469-72)<br />
Eteocles: ‘…But if the same thing seemed to all fine (kalon) and wise (sophon)<br />
There wouldn’t be the two-sided strife of debate among humans<br />
But nothing is like nor equal (ison) among mortals<br />
Except names (onomosai); and names are not deeds (ergon)…’ (lines 499-502)<br />
(I owe my understanding of the importance of these lines to Meltzer 2006, pp.1ff, whose translation (p.2 ibid.) I adapt here)<br />
9 The word for this might be poikilon cf. Medea line 300, ‘those with a reputation for subtlety’ and cp. Apology 20d-23c,<br />
esp. 21b-22; cp. Williamson 1990 p.30 n.12<br />
350
Philip Krinks<br />
activity is in itself either defensible or indefensible. Pausanias can then distinguish bad erōs, which is<br />
not controllable, from good erōs which can be channelled through a social transmission mechanism.<br />
Thus Pausanias steps away from Phaedrus’ simple absolutes, to a subtle account of virtue. 10 Human<br />
values are viewed in a more relativistic way. Ethical principles, matters of right and wrong, are polisspecific<br />
conventions, determined by political and social factors.<br />
IV: ERYIMACHUS AND COMPLETENESS<br />
IV.1 Eryximachus and his predecessors<br />
Pausanias came to a pause (pausamenou, 185c5). Eryximachus thinks he can do better than a pause<br />
and bring completion (telos). 11<br />
‘It seems to me to be necessary, since Pausanias set out well in his speech, but failed sufficiently to<br />
complete it (apetelese), that I must bring completeness (telos) to his argument’ (185e6-186a3)<br />
Eryximachus compliments Pausanias on making a distinction 12 :<br />
‘To say that erōs is double (diploun) seems to me to make a good distinction (kalōs dielesthai)’<br />
(186a3-4)<br />
The compliment is a self-serving one, however: Pausanias did not say that. Pausanias’ notion was not<br />
one erōs with a double nature. It was multiple erōtes with evident differences. Eryximachus sees<br />
things differently. Pausanias wanted specificity of praise (or not), according to each erōs and its<br />
praxis; Eryximachus sees erōs as one thing with multiple aspects.<br />
IV.2 Eryximachus’ focus: a complete praise<br />
Eryximachus significantly broadens the discussion at 186a4-7. He recalls Empedocles: both in the<br />
breadth of his cosmic view, for example fragments B21 and B26; and in the statement that a single<br />
force of love plays a role throughout the whole cosmos (for Eryximachus, erōs; for Empedocles<br />
philotēs, for example at B17). A praise of love must be teleion in the sense of applying to the whole<br />
role of erōs: it must be complete, in the sense of exhaustive. erōs can best be praised as a broad<br />
phenomenon, through the frames of medical practice and Empedoclean philosophy: it is a cosmic<br />
force which has utility (katakrēsthai, 187d1).<br />
V: ARISTOPHANES AND POWER<br />
V.1 Aristophanes and his predecessors<br />
Aristophanes’ opening remark is addressed to Eryximachus:<br />
‘Indeed I do have in mind to speak in a different (allēi) way from you and Pausanias.’ (189c3-4) 13<br />
They have made the same mistake as all or most other people:<br />
‘…For it seems to me that human beings have completely failed to perceive the power (dunamis) of<br />
erōs…’ (189c5-6)<br />
To say that one should do justice to the power of erōs seems reasonable. But it is a sharp criticism of<br />
Eryximachus. Contemporary scientists and philosophers believed that to understand the nature<br />
(physis) of x, one must understand the power (dunamis) of x, both what x does (poiein) to other things<br />
and what x undergoes (pathein) at the hands of y. By seeing what y does (poein) to x, one sees the<br />
power of y. 14 If Empedocles should have yielded anything to Eryximachus, it was an understanding of<br />
10 Cf. Sheffield 2006a p.36: perhaps, as Phaedrus said, erōs does manifest itself in a love of honour but one needs to ask<br />
whether that ‘is … the only (or the best) [manifestation]’<br />
11 What it is to be complete (teleion) is a topic in many Platonic dialogues, e.g. Philebus 20d, Sophist 253d<br />
12 Examples of discussions elsewhere in Plato include Phaedrus 265e, Sophist from 218c<br />
13 So Pausanias’ earlier suggestion was right: Aristophanes does ‘have in mind to praise the god in a different way’ (188e4)<br />
14 For this view elsewhere in Plato, v. e.g. Phaedrus 270c8-d5<br />
351
Philip Krinks<br />
the nature, including the power, of the thing under discussion.<br />
V.2 Aristophanes and the power of erōs<br />
Aristophanes gradually reveals what he means by doing justice to the power of erōs. It is not the<br />
doctor or other technician who must find the utility in erōs: it is erōs which:<br />
‘is the most human-loving of gods, being the helper of human beings, and doctor (iatros) of those<br />
things, which if they were cured (iathentōn) it would be the greatest happiness for the human race<br />
(genei)…’ (189c9-d3)<br />
This is double-edged: ultimately, erōs does not cure the illness. It treats our ills, without<br />
necessarily curing them: a note of dismal realism<br />
Eryximachus was right, Aristophanes implies, to focus on nature (physis). But it is human nature<br />
(anthropinēn phusin) which matters.<br />
‘… It is necessary for you to learn (mathein) what human nature (anthropinēn phusin) is and what its<br />
sufferings (pathēmata) have been…’ (189d3-6)<br />
Only if one understands human nature, Aristophanes implies, can one understand the power of erōs<br />
and so defend it. That is another criticism of Eryximachus: the account of nature which focuses on a<br />
cosmic account of erōs (relating to the elements and their combination through Love and Strife) is not,<br />
says Aristophanes, the type of nature on which the defender of erōs needs to focus. Aristophanes’ own<br />
praise of erōs consists in an exposition of human nature: the power of erōs is that it contributes to<br />
defining, in a rather literal way, with the various slicings, the human condition. erōs defines the<br />
human condition in its incompleteness, offering also a remedy for incompleteness, albeit a tragically<br />
partial one.<br />
VI: AGATHON AND INTRINSIC CHARACTERISATION<br />
V.1 Agathon and his predecessors<br />
Agathon’s criticism of his predecessors 15 is apparently devastating:<br />
‘Those who have spoken before me seem not to be offering an encomium to (egkōmiazein) the god,<br />
but congratulating (eudaimonizein) human beings on the benefits of which the god is cause (aitios) for<br />
them.’ (194e5-7)<br />
He has a point. The previous speakers did seem to proceed as if the right way to defend erōs was to<br />
point out the benefits erōs brought to human beings, based on certain characteristics which they said<br />
that erōs had: oldest of gods, twofold, widely present in the cosmos, definitive of the human<br />
condition, respectively.<br />
Agathon’s own focus will be elsewhere:<br />
‘But what the characteristic of (hopoios tis) erōs is (ōn), such that he makes gift of (edōrēsato) these<br />
things, noone has said’ (194e7-195a1)<br />
An initial impression may be that this makes an incorrect criticism about the previous praises. It might<br />
seem to say that the previous speakers failed to say what they thought the characteristics of erōs were.<br />
And that would be incorrect: for they each described one or more characteristics: oldest of gods,<br />
twofold, widely present in all creatures, and so on.<br />
It is a valid criticism if the test for an appropriate characterisation is that it should in itself provide an<br />
adequate explanation of how erōs can give such gifts. That is what Agathon means. A literal<br />
translation of the text would be:<br />
‘of what kind (hopoios tis) himself (autos) being (ōn) he gives these things (tauta edōrēsato), no one<br />
has said (oudeis eirēken)’<br />
15 Bury 1932/1973, ad 194e, rightly points out this is ‘the favourite rhetorical device of criticising the manner or thought of<br />
previous speakers’, but on my reading it is also something more than that<br />
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By using the participle of the verb to be (ōn), translated ‘is’ above, and literally meaning ‘being’, he<br />
means that one must describe what erōs is like, and that that same description must also show how<br />
erōs can make those gifts to human beings.<br />
The next sentence confirms this:<br />
‘There is one correct way for any praise of anything: to go through in one’s speech what kind of thing<br />
(hoios) it happens to be (ōn), such that it is cause (aitios) for the things (hoiōn), concerning which the<br />
speech (logos) is made’ (195a1-3)<br />
The verb ‘to be’ and its participle ōn appears again, but this time with the notion of ‘cause’ (aitios)<br />
being explicit. Agathon’s principle is that there must be an explanatory or causal link between the<br />
characteristics of erōs and what the gifts are. One must say what kind of thing erōs is, such that it is<br />
thereby shown how erōs is responsible for the gifts.<br />
The reader might think that seems a fair enough principle for the praise of erōs. But it is not<br />
clear that Agathon is correct to say the others failed to honour it. It seemed that each symposiast had<br />
his reasons to say that his description of erōs explained it being beneficial. For example, Phaedrus had<br />
his reasons to say that the great age of erōs explained it being beneficial.<br />
Agathon’s complaint is aimed, however, specifically at the structure of their praises:<br />
‘It is just for us also to praise erōs first himself for the kind of thing he is, and then his gifts’ (195a3-<br />
4)<br />
The problem, then, is, in the first place, with the descriptions. If erōs is to be praised ‘for the kind of<br />
thing he is’, then he must be described as something which is in itself praiseworthy. But the others’<br />
descriptions of erōs (as old, co-working with Aphrodite, pervasive in the cosmos, and so on) are not in<br />
themselves praiseworthy. When Phaedrus made his modifications to encomium convention, having in<br />
mind, I suggested, previous attacks on erōs, the result was a strategy to defend erōs which was<br />
indirect. This indirect strategy characterised erōs in a neutral way (as opposed to the negative<br />
characterisations offered by the attackers), and then showed how on some neutral characterisation<br />
erōs provided benefits to humans and was therefore defensible. Until now, noone has questioned this<br />
indirect strategy. Agathon does, and requires instead that the description of erōs should itself show<br />
how erōs can cause benefits. 16<br />
One reason Agathon might doubt the indirect strategy, is that he might hold, as some pre-<br />
Socratic philosophers seem to have done, that what causes something to be F must itself be F: that Fness<br />
must be somehow transmitted between the two. 17 This then suggests a more direct strategy,<br />
where the description of erōs would be as in itself praiseworthy. erōs can be defended as literally<br />
putting its own beauty and goodness into human beings, being in that sense directly the cause of<br />
human beings becoming beautiful and good. The accounts of beautiful and good given by Agathon<br />
then reflect that: a subjectivist account of beauty, where erōs pours beauty into y, in the sense that it<br />
makes y see z as beautiful; and a reductive account of goodness, where erōs is a strong psychological<br />
compulsion which determines right conduct, defined as acting according to the strongest compulsion.<br />
VII: CONCLUSION AND COROLLARY OBSERVATION<br />
The early speakers’ explicitly reflect on method. Phaedrus’ methodological focus is to demonstrate<br />
causality, with erōs is praised as cause (aitios, 178c2) of benefits for humans. Pausanias’ focus is<br />
human praxis (181a1) in all its specificity and context. Eryximachus’ focus is a complete (telos,<br />
186a2) praise. Aristophanes’ focus is acknowledging power (dunamis, 189c6). Agathon’s focus is<br />
intrinsic characterisation: to show ‘what the characteristic of erōs is’ (hopoios tis, 194e7), such that he<br />
gives us these things: else, it is not explained how he does.<br />
Their reflections structure and unify the early part of the dialogue. Their speeches respond to<br />
those preceding. The stated methodological focus of each speaker shapes his speech. Methodological<br />
questions raised by the desire to praise erōs are explored.<br />
A corollary observation, which can only be stated here, concerns the structure of Socrates’<br />
speech. It is the others’ principles which structure Socrates’ speech. After Socrates introduces his own<br />
16 Sedley (2006 p.55f.) is right to highlight this: my interpretation has several points of contact with his<br />
17 On the pre-Socratics, v. Barnes 1979 e.g. vol.1 p.88f. On Plato’s consideration of this question in the Phaedo and<br />
elsewhere, v. Sedley 1998 e.g. p.119<br />
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methodological focus, on truth (alēthē legein, 198d4), it is then the principles of the early speakers<br />
which structure his speech. The principles appear in reverse order. Firstly, there is a discussion of<br />
intrinsic characterisation (poios tis, 201e1). Secondly, there is an enquiry as to the power of erōs<br />
(dunamin, 202e2). Thirdly, there is a search for a complete account (telos echein, 205a3). Fourthly<br />
erōs is examined as praxis (praxei, 206b2). The final focus is on erōs as cause (aition, 207a6).<br />
Corollary conclusions are that Socrates’ speech has a greater degree of methodological<br />
dependency on the earlier speeches than might otherwise appear; and that the early speakers’<br />
methodological focuses serve to unify the dialogue, not only in its early part, but up to at least the<br />
latter part of Socrates’ speech.<br />
WORKS CITED<br />
Barnes, J., 1979, The Presocratic Philosophers (2 vols.) (London: Routledge)<br />
Bury, R.G., 1932/1973 (2 nd ed.), The <strong>Symposium</strong> of Plato (Cambridge: Heffer)<br />
Dover, K.J., 1974, Greek Popular Morality In The Time Of Plato And Aristotle (Oxford: Blackwell)<br />
Gill, C.J., 2003, The <strong>Symposium</strong> (London: Penguin)<br />
Jowett, Benjamin, 1970, The Dialogues of Plato, (London: Sphere)<br />
Meltzer, G. S., 2006, Euripides And The Poetics Of Nostalgia (Cambridge: CUP)<br />
Rowe, C.J., 1998, Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong> (Warminster: Aris and Phillips)<br />
Sedley, D., 1998, Platonic Causes, Phronesis 43.2, pp.114-132<br />
Sedley, D., 2006, The Speech Of Agathon In Plato's <strong>Symposium</strong>, pp.49-67, in The Virtuous Life in<br />
Greek Ethics, ed. Reis (Cambridge: CUP)<br />
Sheffield, F.C.C., 2006, Plato's <strong>Symposium</strong>: the Ethics of Desire (Oxford: OUP)<br />
Williams, B.A.O, 1993, Shame and Necessity, Sather Classical Lectures, Vol. 57 (University of<br />
California Press)<br />
Williamson, M, 1990, A Woman's Place in Euripides' Medea, pp.16-31 in Euripides, Women, And<br />
Sexuality, ed. Powell (London: Routledge)<br />
354
Boasting and self-promotion in Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong><br />
Gabriel Danzig<br />
Speakers at a Greek symposium regularly engage in competition, seeking to outdo each other in<br />
making clever and impressive speeches, criticizing, capping and outmaneuvering their rivals. 1 In<br />
addition to this, the speeches generally exhibit a reflexive, self-promoting or boastful character. Not<br />
merely competing in producing good speeches or in trying to show themselves good as speakers or<br />
thinkers, the speakers also compete in praising themselves for their personal qualities and possessions<br />
and in showing that the lives they lead are worthwhile and enviable. Plato puts this feature of the<br />
symposium to a specifically Platonic purpose, transforming the sympotic contest into a kind of<br />
Platonic dialogue. The contest is not merely to describe eros in the most compelling terms, but by<br />
praising eros in terms that are implicitly self-flattering to show who is the better man or woman. This<br />
is also an important characteristic of the early dialogues. Although they are often seen as devoted<br />
primarily to investigations of philosophical questions, they are no less devoted to the same kind of<br />
personal rivalry.<br />
Xenophon’s <strong>Symposium</strong><br />
The reflexive character of the sympotic speech is most clearly evident in Xenophon’s <strong>Symposium</strong>,<br />
where, instead of speaking in praise of a god or devoting themselves to any other single topic, the<br />
speakers take turns openly praising their own good qualities. 2 Considerable leeway is allowed in<br />
defining the aim of the speeches: one may display the best knowledge one has (3.3) or more generally<br />
describe the thing of which one is most proud (3.4). In practice, the guests boast about diverse<br />
subjects: the ability to make others better, knowledge of the Homeric poems, beauty, wealth, poverty,<br />
knowledge of procuring, the ability to make other laugh, a son who has won athletic contests, one’s<br />
father, the goodness and power of one’s friends. After these claims are made, explanations, which are<br />
never straightforward, are offered in a second round. Callias, who boasts about his ability to make<br />
others better, really wishes to remind the guests of his great wealth, claiming that his wealth enables<br />
him to make others just. 3 Niceratos demonstrates the value of his knowledge of Homer by outlining<br />
the racing strategies and condiment recipes he has acquired from his knowledge of Homer. Critobulus<br />
boasts about the practical advantages that beauty confers on him, especially that fact that everyone<br />
else in the room will serve his needs gladly. Charmides describes the advantages of poverty by<br />
contrasting the burdens placed on the wealthy in democratic Athens. 4 Antisthenes boasts of his ability<br />
to enjoy very little as proof of his great wealth. Hermogenes, who was lined up to speak last, takes<br />
Socrates’ place in the order, and takes his inspiration from Socrates’ well-known communication with<br />
the daimon. Apparently having no friends to boast of, he explains that the gods are his friends. Phillip,<br />
who was supposed to speak after Socrates, speaks next, boasting that his ability to make others laugh<br />
means that he is invited only to happy, opulent events, and not to the reverse. The Syracusan<br />
entertainment provider, who was not scheduled to speak at all, is asked if he is most proud of the<br />
beautiful young male entertainer he has brought. But he complains that he is worried about pederasts<br />
taking advantage of him, and says that in fact he is most proud of the stupid people who pay to see his<br />
performances. Tactfully enough, no one asks Lykon to explain his pride in his son, nor Autolykos to<br />
explain his pride in his father: given the humorous and paradoxical character of the explanations, they<br />
would have had to explain themselves by insulting one another.<br />
Socrates, who is left for last, explains his boast about his ability as a procurer by arguing that<br />
a procurer teaches the art of self-presentation. His presentation is remarkable in several ways. The<br />
previous speakers made impressive boasts, and then explained them in ludicrous and unimpressive<br />
ways. The explanations are let-downs from the high boasts that were originally made. Callias’ ability<br />
to make others better is nothing other than his ability to pay their debts and thereby make them “just.”<br />
Nicaratos’ great mastery of Homer culminates in the suggestion that the company eat onions. And so<br />
1 This aspect of the symposium has been studied in detail recently by Fiona Hobden (The Symposion in Ancient Greek<br />
Thought, Cambridge, 2013, see esp. 201-213.<br />
2 See also Wasps (1186-1207).<br />
3 Compare Cephalus’ words in Republic (330d-331b).<br />
4 The speech of Charmides was supposed to have been given after that of Antisthenes, but the order is reversed. This may<br />
indicate that the two speeches, in praise of poverty and in praise of wealth, are interchangeable. Indeed, no one will really<br />
praise wealth directly although all prefer it.
Gabriel Danzig<br />
forth. The only partial exception to this pattern is Charmides, who boasts about his poverty. But here,<br />
too, the explanation is a let-down: his claim that poverty enables him to evade costly levies shows the<br />
high value he places on money and hence makes his original boast that poverty is a good thing look<br />
absurd. He admits freely that he would rather be wealthy. The good-humored speakers in Xenophon<br />
act as if they are engaged in simple boasting, but then reveal themselves to be engaged in self-ridicule.<br />
This self-ridicule is a strategy of self-defense: if I have not really boasted, I am not really<br />
open to attack. Socrates reverses this strategy: he opens with a ludicrous claim – expertise in the art of<br />
procuring – and then explains that it is really a valuable skill. 5 By doing this, Socrates actually makes<br />
and defends a serious boast, thereby exposing himself in principle to attack. But he proves his<br />
possession of the claimed ability by showing himself a master of self-presentation throughout the<br />
composition, even taking the upper hand when losing a beauty contest (5.10). No one attacks<br />
Socrates’ claim, in fear, one may suppose, of his reputation for verbal self-defense, thereby implicitly<br />
recognizing the validity of his claim. 6 In any case, taking no chances, Socrates concludes his<br />
presentation with another unique accomplishment: foisting his disreputable skill onto Antisthenes<br />
(4.61-64). He is the only one who uses his own boast as an opportunity to attack or insult someone<br />
else. Socrates is also unique in the doubly-reflexive manner he speaks. Not only is he, like all<br />
speakers, praising himself, but the skill for which he praises himself is the skill of self-presentation,<br />
which is the very skill which all the speakers, himself included, are attempting to use. 7 By openly<br />
claiming to be doing what everyone is doing surreptitiously he shows himself more honest than they<br />
and at the same time lends his speech a meta-theatrical air. This self-conscious focus on selfpresentation<br />
shows just how central it is to Xenophon’s conception of the speeches at a symposium.<br />
To summarize, it is taken for granted that a speaker at a symposium will boast, and the art of speaking<br />
involves fulfilling this expectation without exposing oneself to the possibility of attack and insult. The<br />
clever self-deprecating humor that is displayed by the speakers serves a self-defensive purpose in<br />
preventing serious attacks. Xenophon highlights the centrality of self-presentation by making<br />
Socrates’ self-presentation focus on his ability at self-presentation. All this goes to show that the<br />
competition at this symposium is not merely over cleverness in rhetorical display or philosophic<br />
insight. Rather the competition concerns the value of the personal qualities one claims to possess.<br />
Participants speaks of the value of wealth, Homeric poetry, beauty, or the power of laughter as a<br />
means of praising themselves. This is self-evident to any participant in a symposium and any reader of<br />
sympotic literature, and is only slightly less obvious in Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong>.<br />
Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong><br />
As the comparison with Xenophon suggests, the speakers here do not merely compete in<br />
producing clever, insightful speeches, they also compete in praising themselves for qualities they<br />
possess and in showing implicitly that the lives they lead are enviable. Plato is much heavier in tone<br />
than Xenophon, even in a relatively humorous work like <strong>Symposium</strong>. There is little of the selfdeprecatory<br />
humor, the self-defensive effort to keep things light, that we find in Xenophon, and<br />
nothing that substantially offsets the serious effort of self-promotion in which the speakers are<br />
engaged. As in Xenophon, the speakers praise themselves by praising the qualities they possess, but<br />
there is an additional layer of indirection: since the nominal topic is eros, everyone must attribute his<br />
own good qualities to the god in order to praise herself. If attributing my qualities to the god is a form<br />
of praise of the god, my qualities must be very good ones indeed.<br />
Commentators have long noted some obvious ways in which some of the speakers craft their<br />
speeches on eros to give praise to themselves. Most obvious are the cases of Eryximachos, Agathon<br />
and Socrates, each of whom creates eros in his own image and in the image of his own art or practice.<br />
But this reflexive, boastful or self-promoting characteristic is common to all the speakers.<br />
Phaedrus<br />
Phaedrus is not usually one of the characters taken to task for self-promotion. Rutherford,<br />
who shows more interest than most in the self-promoting aspect of the speeches, says about Phaedrus<br />
that he has “rather little to say about himself or his native Athens or the company’s emotional lives.”<br />
5 In fact he combined the serious and the ridiculous in his initial comment, where he made a serious face while announcing<br />
his ridiculous profession (3.10). Thus his initial comment already contains the serious-ludicrous combination. Whereas the<br />
other speakers use a simple serious-ridiculous formula, Socrates uses a more complex serious-ridiculous-serious formula.<br />
6 Incidentally, this ability supports Xenophon’s claim that Socrates could have won his trial had he wanted to (Ap. 1-9).<br />
7 This reflexivity seems to be a special Socratic characteristic in Plato as well as Xenophon.<br />
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(185) Following Bury, he sees the speech as illustrating an interest in mythical allusions and<br />
quotations. 8 But in fact Phaedrus’ speech appears to be highly self-referential.<br />
We know about Phaedrus from several dialogues. Born about 444, he is a very young man in<br />
Protagoras, which is set in 433-2. 9 Evidently interested in intellectual pursuits, he is already<br />
associating with Eryximachos. In Phaedrus he seems to be a slightly older young man (the dramatic<br />
date is uncertain), fascinated by erotikoi logoi. He enjoys hearing speeches in which lovers attempt to<br />
persuade beautiful young men to accept their advances for paradoxical reasons. He appears to be a<br />
popular young man, for we find Socrates following him around and competing jealously with other<br />
offstage intellectuals for his admiration. Although he is not explicitly said to be beautiful, he must<br />
have at least some of the bloom of youth that is necessary for service as an attraction for Socrates<br />
(Symp. 210c1). In one way, the arguments in Phaedrus seem to imply that he is indeed good looking:<br />
Socrates’ explanation of the attractive power of beauty (249e-252c) provides a reflexive explanation<br />
of his pursuit of Phaedrus only on this assumption (see also Diogenes Laertius 3.29).<br />
In <strong>Symposium</strong>, set in 416 when he would be almost thirty years old, Phaedrus shows a similar<br />
interest in the things that lovers do for their beloveds, especially suicides. In more than one way he is<br />
comparable to Critobulus in Xenophon’s <strong>Symposium</strong> who describes at length the services he receives<br />
by virtue of his beauty and the desire this inspires in others (4.10-18). Like Critobulus, Phaedrus<br />
believes that love can contribute to military victory, but in arguing for this case, he goes beyond<br />
Critobulus’ relatively mild comments to suggest sexual relations between the soldiers. 10<br />
How acceptable was Phaedrus’ fascination with eroticism in ancient Athens? Despite the<br />
relative openness of the Greeks concerning erotic subjects, it was not at all common to speak in praise<br />
of eros. Phaedrus has complained to Eryximachos that no one, neither poets nor sophists, has ever<br />
done it before, or rather that no one has dared to do it before (177c: tetolmekenai). 11 This language,<br />
which he also uses in describing the heroism of Achilles (179e) and in contrasting it with the less<br />
impressive behavior of Orpheus (179d), suggests that praising eros requires daring or courage, and<br />
hence that eros was not generally thought to be worthy of praise. Aristophanes also testifies to the<br />
general neglect of this deity (189c). The speakers seem embarrassed to even raise the topic: Phaedrus<br />
does not suggest it openly himself, but turns the task over to Eryximachos, and Eryximachos in turn<br />
makes it clear that the idea is not his own. Hostile attitudes towards pederastic couples are reflected<br />
throughout Pausanias’ speech, and the fact that Socrates merits praise for abstaining from sexual<br />
relations with Alcibiades also shows the low esteem in which they were held. 12<br />
This attitude is not difficult to understand: the Greeks before Plato viewed love as a kind of<br />
mental disease that causes personal and communal disaster. 13 It was responsible in Homer and<br />
Herodotus for catastrophic wars, and in Sophocles and Euripides for suicides and murders. Although a<br />
symposium was a natural place for words of love, there is a difference between giving expression to<br />
the effects of a disease by expressing one’s desire, as in much Greek erotic poetry, and actually<br />
praising the disease while sober. In requesting speeches in praise of eros, Phaedrus is demanding<br />
legitimacy for a subject of great personal interest to him. He wishes his obsession with love to brand<br />
him not as a victim of a mental disease, but as an admirable servant of an important god.<br />
There is a further motive here. Phaedrus is not only a partisan of a disreputable god, he is also<br />
himself an attractive eromenos. 14 As is well known, the passive member of a homosexual relationship<br />
8 R. G. Bury, The <strong>Symposium</strong> of Plato (Cambridge, 1932) xxiv-xxvi); R. Rutherford, The Art of Plato (London, 1995) 190;<br />
R. Hunter, Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong> (Oxford, 2004) 38-42.<br />
9 See D. Nails, People of Plato (Indianapolis, 1992) 233-4.<br />
10 This is one of the chief arguments for the priority of at least this section of Xenophon’s <strong>Symposium</strong>: it is hard to imagine<br />
Xenophon copying from Plato and attributing to Critobulus a mild version of a suggestion that he evidently finds so<br />
objectionable (see 8.33-4).<br />
11 Phaedrus himself seems embarrassed to raise his suggestion in public and has apparently asked Eryximachos to do so on<br />
his behalf; and Eryximachos, while willing to raise the suggestion, does not take responsibility for it, but mentions its real<br />
author. The fact that this subject was somewhat off-limits by the fourth century may also explain the many-layered literary<br />
frame and the intense curiosity that is evoked in the opening conversation.<br />
12 The off-bounds character of erotic matters is also reflected in the secretive way that Phaedrus treats the speech of Lysias<br />
in Phaedrus (228d-e). This may also explain the great curiosity that the subject evidently arouses at the time of the telling of<br />
<strong>Symposium</strong> (172a-173d). T. K. Hubbard has suggested that attitudes towards homosexuality underwent a change in the<br />
middle and late fifth century (“Pederasty and Democracy: The Marginalization of a Social Practice,” in T. K. Hubbard, ed.,<br />
Greek Love Reconsidered, New York, 2000, 1-11. If so, the elaborate chain of transmission of the contents of <strong>Symposium</strong><br />
may be designed to reflect a memory of a time when pederasty was more widely favored.<br />
13 Although it needs to be used with caution, the most comprehensive treatment of this point is Bruce S. Thornton, Eros: The<br />
Myth of Ancient Greek Sexuality (Boulder, Colorado, 1997). This attitude did not change quickly: despite Plato’s efforts to<br />
make eros into a respectable subject, Aristotle barely mentions it in his own vast ethical writings.<br />
14 Although typically the eromenos was a young man without a beard, in Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong> this role is played by men who<br />
would have been about the age of thirty, such as Agathon and Alcibiades. It is not clear to me how much we are meant to<br />
357
Gabriel Danzig<br />
was a special target of ridicule throughout antiquity. 15 Alcibiades mentions this clearly in his own<br />
speech (218d). Phaedrus therefore has a special reason to redeem eros and the eromenos: by<br />
redeeming them he also redeems himself from social disgrace.<br />
Phaedrus’ personal interests and status in Athens explain why he not only speaks in praise of<br />
eros, but also instigates the entire series of speeches in praise of eros. It explains why he emphasizes<br />
the respectable qualities of eros: the greatness (megas), the impressiveness (thaumastos), the dignity<br />
(timion) and honored age (presbutatos: 178a-c; 180b). His central claim is that far from being a<br />
corrupting influence on human beings, as was usually thought, eros actually benefits them. It is the<br />
best guide to a good life for the most paradoxical reason: it inspires moral improvement, not<br />
corruption, and it does this by inspiring feelings of shame, not shamelessness. 16 Eros does not merely<br />
offer practical benefits by encouraging an emotion that Aristotle would characterize merely as a semivirtue<br />
(NE 4.9: 1128b9-36), it also provides an incentive to acts of greater nobility and self-sacrifice<br />
than those performed by parents for children, as the example of Alcestis shows. Erotic relations create<br />
greater bonds than the most sacred bonds of family, inspiring even women, such as Alcestis, to<br />
overcome the fear of death. Here Phaedrus transforms the harmful effect of delirious passion into a<br />
mark of great nobility. Given its connection with suicide and military disaster, when Phaedrus argues<br />
that eros is responsible for virtuous behavior and military prowess, and suggests that it should be<br />
encouraged among soldiers, he is defending a thesis no less paradoxical than that of Gorgias when<br />
defending Helen or those he enjoys in Phaedrus.<br />
The speech is self-referential not only in its general praise of eros, but also in giving the best<br />
role to the eromenos. This explains the peculiar conclusion in which he praises the beloved above the<br />
lover on the ground that they are not possessed by divinity (180a-b). Commentators have wondered<br />
why Phaedrus closes his speech by criticizing Aeschylus for making Achilles the lover and Patroclos<br />
the beloved. As Rutherford (189) points out, criticism of great poets and thinkers is part and parcel of<br />
the openly rivalrous self-promoting atmosphere of <strong>Symposium</strong>. The speakers regularly criticize<br />
famous poets and previous speaker, Aristophanes even responding afterwards to Socratic criticism of<br />
his own speech. So there is nothing strange about criticizing Aeschylus. But why this particular<br />
criticism?<br />
The criticism of Aeschylus is part of a general claim that the gods reserve more wonder,<br />
admiration and even benefits for the beloved who is devoted to his lover than for the lover himself<br />
(180a). 17 This argument stands in tension with the praise that Phaedrus heaped on the lover earlier<br />
(178d-179d). Phaedrus had argued that eros inspires lovers to deeds of supreme courage (179a6-b2)<br />
but here he argues that the presence of the divine in the lover is a reason to discount his noble actions.<br />
He could just as easily have argued for the opposite conclusion, that the lover is more worthy<br />
precisely because he is possessed by the divinity. Why does he choose to make the argument in favor<br />
of the beloved? Why does he even feel compelled to enter into this comparison between the two?<br />
This can be explained by the self-referential character of the speech. While Phaedrus has<br />
some interest in redeeming the honor of inflamed lovers and encouraging their attentions, he primarily<br />
wishes to defend his own honor as a sexual object and this means praising the eromenos. 18 Why then<br />
has he praised lovers in the earlier part of his speech? This may of course be attributed to a genuine<br />
admiration for the men who love him, a desire to please them and perhaps even to the hope of<br />
attracting more. But it also serves a rhetorical purpose: by praising lovers for being possessed by the<br />
divine, he flatters them into accepting this description of their state. This in turn leaves them open to<br />
the later claim that for this very reason their acts of courage rank lower than those of eromenoi.<br />
In sum, Phaedrus’ speech aims to remove the stain that is associated with his erotic interests<br />
and passive sexual role. He builds a paradoxical speech which praises eros and especially eromenoi<br />
for reasons diametrically opposed to their common reputation.<br />
reflect on these ages and whether or not Plato is being careful about them. Despite the evident value of D. Nail’s<br />
prosopographical volume, we do not know to what extent Plato aimed at historical verisimilitude in portraying the persons<br />
and settings of his dialogues or that he was accurate in portraying events that occurred when he was a young boy.<br />
15 See K. Dover, Greek Homosexuality (Cambridge MA, 1978) 100-109.<br />
16 Xenophon roundly ridicules this idea in his <strong>Symposium</strong> (8.32-34) and Aristophanes provides evidence for the prevalence<br />
of Xenophon’s attitude (192a: possibly a reference to Xenophon).<br />
17 While supportable on the basis of some passages in the Iliad, the idea that Achilles acted primarily out of love for<br />
Patroclos is questionable. As Socrates will argue, such acts stem more from a love of glory than from the love of a particular<br />
person (208c-d). This point is made by Xenophon’s Socrates in an apparent allusion to Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong>: he denies that<br />
Patroclos was Achilles beloved, and also denies that Achilles was motivated by erotic love in avenging him (8.31).<br />
18 This may also explain also why, unlike Pausanias, Eryximachos and Aristophanes, he praises a woman, Alcestis: like the<br />
eromenos, women always play the passive sexual role, so their honor and the honor of the eromenos are naturally tied<br />
together.<br />
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Pausanias<br />
As a devoted lover of Agathon (Protagoras 315d-e; see also X. Mem. 8.32), Pausanias shares<br />
with Phaedrus the general aim of dispelling the stigma that attaches to eros. 19 He is the first speaker to<br />
claim that homosexual love is superior to heterosexual love, an opinion that must not have been<br />
universally accepted if he has to argue for it (see 181c). Like Phaedrus, Pausanias is concerned with<br />
popular attitudes and he uses some form of the word nomos not less than 21 times between 181d and<br />
184e. As an erastes, Pausanias suffered from a different kind of hostility than that to which an<br />
eromenos was exposed. While the eromenos suffered from the humiliation of being used like a<br />
woman, the erastes was considered an enemy by the friends and family of his supposed victims (see<br />
183c-d).<br />
Pausanias defends himself by accepting the views of his opponents to a large degree. There<br />
are men who should be kept away from boys, especially very young ones, but he is not among them.<br />
He hopes to redeem the reputations of virtuous pederasts such as himself and to encourage potential<br />
young eromenoi to choose the right sort of lovers. The better sort love boys for their souls or intellects,<br />
and hence have no interest in girls or very young boys, neither of whom have much intellect to love<br />
(181c). 20 They love slightly older boys whose intellects are starting to bloom and they tend to stick<br />
with them for a long time. He thinks it is wrong to castigate those who engage in pederastic relations<br />
in the right way, arguing that it is only the inferior lovers who give pederasty a bad name (182a). He<br />
takes the high moral ground by proclaiming that there should be a law against those who take<br />
advantage of young boys (paidōn: 181d-e), but it is surprising to see who this law is meant to protect.<br />
Pausanias argues that the pederasts are the ones who are harmed by the young boys they pursue, since<br />
young boys are apt to turn out disappointing (181e). His parallel, the sanctions against sexual relations<br />
with unmarried free women (181e-182a), would not support this explanation. But it fits well his effort<br />
to gain sympathy for the older lover.<br />
As Pausanias notes, parents are deeply concerned about the effects pederasty may have on<br />
their young children and take serious efforts to prevent its occurrence (183c-d). Understandably,<br />
Pausanias spends much less time on this than he does describing the encouragement that is given to<br />
those who pursue beautiful young men (182d-183c). These conflicting attitudes need reflect nothing<br />
other than the fact that plenty of men in Athens, including the very fathers who objected to the<br />
pederastic use of their sons, would have been quite happy to form a sexual relationship with a nice<br />
young boy from another family: what is good for me may not be good for you. But Pausanias, finding<br />
a deeper logic in them, argues that Athenians take a moderate stance towards pederasty, neither<br />
outlawing it, as is done in barbaric (ie., non-Greek but also uncivilized) and tyrannous regimes, nor<br />
enforcing it, as is done in societies whose members, according to him, lack the wit to properly seduce<br />
a boy. Its complex and seemingly contradictory attitudes – encouraging the lover while discouraging<br />
the boy – are actually designed to insure that the young people will form sexual relations with<br />
excellent men like himself.<br />
The speech seems like an advertisement for these better lovers, and hence for Pausanias<br />
himself. He argues that the better lovers contribute to the acquisition of virtue and wisdom by the<br />
boys (184c-185c), and he also puts great emphasis on the fact that the better lovers are willing to<br />
devote themselves to their beloveds for the long-term (183e-184b) 21 as he apparently did with<br />
Agathon. 22 But although Pausanias devotes much of his effort to praising those who love boys for<br />
their souls rather than their bodies, he does not encourage what we call “platonic” relationships. It is<br />
important to him that the boys he seduces reciprocate his affection by offering their bodies for his<br />
gratification, and he insists that young men give their bodies only to those who, like himself, love<br />
them for their souls (tois men charizesthai, tous de phugein: 184a). Nor does Pausanias place any limit<br />
on the kind of sexual activities that may legitimately take place. As he says, there is no act that is<br />
inherently prohibited; it all depends on how it is done (181a). The analogies he offers, of drinking,<br />
singing and talking, suggest that he is referring to specific acts that lovers engage in with their<br />
beloveds. The better lover does not refrain from any of these acts, but rather performs them in a fine<br />
19 Many theories have been proposed to explain the order of the speeches in <strong>Symposium</strong> (see Bury, lii-lvii). I believe that<br />
each speech is paired both with the one before it, if there is one, and with the one after it, if there is one.<br />
20 While boys are more attractive intellectually than girls, there is no claim that they are more beautiful physically. In<br />
Xenophon’s Cyropaedia (5.1.7) and Memorabilia (3.11) women are presented as the most beautiful temptations.<br />
21 Pausanias’ and Agathon’s long-term love affair played an important role in the introduction of this principle which was to<br />
play a fundamental role in Aristotle’s thinking on friendship and in the thinking of the entire philosophic tradition in the west<br />
and its associated cultures during the thousands of years that followed.<br />
22 There may be something defensive in this latter claim, since his long-term relationship with Agathon was made into a<br />
subject of ridicule in Athens. See L. Brisson, “Agathon, Pausanias, and Diotima in Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong>: Paiderastia and<br />
Philosophia,” in Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong>, ed. J. Lesher et al., Washington, 2006, 229-251.<br />
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way. While there may be certain acts that are prohibited to those who are incapable of performing<br />
them in a fine way, to the better kind of lover, like himself, everything is permitted.<br />
Because of his virtue the good lover receives numerous leniencies. Since the only good<br />
motive for forming a relationship with an older lover is educational improvement, he is freed from the<br />
obligation to provide material benefits – and is even forbidden to do so (184a5-b7). Such virtuous<br />
couples are, by Athenian custom as interpreted by Pausanias, freed from any ordinary moral<br />
conventions and are free to act as slavishly as they wish one to the other. 23 There is even a convenient<br />
escape hatch involved: if anyone gives sexual favors to a Pausanias, and then finds that he lacks any<br />
educational value, he has nothing to be ashamed of, as long as he was careful to accept no gifts<br />
(185a5-b5).<br />
Given his desire to trade virtue for sex, the best possible theory for him to espouse would<br />
be one that holds that wisdom and virtue may be transmitted sexually via the semen. 24 Although<br />
Pausanias does not mention this theory explicitly, there is some evidence to suggest that he and<br />
other men said things like that to their eromenoi. His beloved Agathon seems to believe this<br />
theory, since he asks Socrates sit next to him, so that “touching you I may benefit from the<br />
wisdom that came to you in the porch” (175c-d). 25 In light of Socrates’ response, this appears to<br />
be a playful offer to play a passive sexual role for Socrates. Socrates understands this as a<br />
reference to the transmission of wisdom through the seminal fluid, but he rejects the offer<br />
commenting that wisdom is not a liquid (and hence a fortiori not a bodily fluid) that can be<br />
transferred from one person to another (175d) thus demonstrating his disinterest in sexual<br />
relations by publicly foreclosing the possibility of using this claim in the future.<br />
To whom does Pausanias address his advertisement? Because he is the long-term lover of<br />
Agathon, who is now thirty years old, many commentators have assumed that he cannot be making a<br />
play for a new paidika, however suitable for that his speech may seem. Rutherford assumes that his<br />
aim is to impress Agathon. 26 But Agathon has had enough time to get to know Pausanias already, and<br />
hearing about it again would not make much difference. But is it right to assume that Pausanias is<br />
faithful to Agathon? Although Pausanias has spoken at length about long-term devotion, it is<br />
interesting to note that, in contrast to Aristophanes, he said nothing to imply exclusivity in his<br />
description of the better lover. Just as Agathon seems free to make advances to Socrates on this<br />
occasion (222d-223b), Pausanias must also be free to make a play for other young men, either those in<br />
the room, or those who may hear about his views at second hand. Given Agathon’s success in the<br />
recent tragic competition, Pausanias may even be using the occasion to toot his own horn by showing<br />
how successfully his paidika turned out.<br />
Even if he has no practical aims, it seems obvious that, like Phaedrus before him, Pausanias has<br />
concocted a speech designed to make himself look good in the eyes of others. Such speeches are<br />
useful both for assuring one’s position in society and for providing a kind of psychological<br />
reassurance. The very fact that they aim at self-promotion, however, means that their refutations will<br />
have serious personal consequences.<br />
The Value of Boasting<br />
A similar phenomenon can be found in virtually all of Plato’s dramatic dialogues. Plato is a<br />
dramatic artist precisely because he always bears in mind the connection between the persons who are<br />
speaking and the philosophical arguments they support. One of the clearest examples is the<br />
conversation between Socrates and Cephalus in book one of Republic. While often seen as a<br />
preliminary effort to define justice, this conversation can also be described as an effort by Cephalus to<br />
defend himself and his status as a wealthy householder. His own personal interest compels him to<br />
consider justice satisfied when one has conducted one’s business honestly, and he is not concerned<br />
23<br />
184b7-c7; see 182e-183c; compare Xenophon’s Socrates who, like Pausanias, praises friendship for enabling otherwise<br />
shameful behavior (Mem. 2.7-9).<br />
24<br />
Erich Bethe, “Die dorische Knabenliebe, ihre Ethik und ihre Idee,” Rheinisches Museum für Philologie 62 (1907) 438-75.<br />
See also Harald Patzer, Die griechische Knabenliebe (Wiesbaden, 1982).<br />
25<br />
L. Brisson (1998, 11-12). C. J. Rowe misreads the Greek, in which haptomenos must be construed with sou (as Bury<br />
recognized), and translates: So that I can also have benefit from contact with that bit of wisdom of yours.” (21) Alcibiades<br />
also seems to think he has something to gain by sexual relations with a virtuous man such as Socrates, although he does not<br />
suggest that the semen will convey wisdom or virtue (217a).<br />
26<br />
“The map he draws of Athenian practice is well-observed, but the deductions he draws seem self-interested, for he is<br />
himself the pursuer of Agathon.” (186) “He is trying to advance his relationship with Agathon” (190) “Pausanias argues that<br />
it is acceptable to yield to a lover ‘in order to improve one’s moral state’ (184ab, 185b); this suits his own interest, as he<br />
himself is a lover of Agathon.” (201) Hunter shares this view (45).<br />
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about the possibility that wealth acquired by legitimate means may nevertheless wind up in the hands<br />
of those who have no real need or good use for it and no intelligent ability to reapportion it, since this<br />
would raise doubts about his own right to the wealth he possesses. By demonstrating that this<br />
understanding of justice is wrong, Socrates not only advances the understanding of justice, he also<br />
undermines Cephalus’ personal claim by right to the resources on which his status depends and<br />
advances the claims of those who, like himself, may possess the virtues that merit the wealth they do<br />
not possess. 27<br />
While this kind of self-interested speech may seem out of place in a serious philosophical<br />
investigation, it is actually a necessity of Socratic philosophy, because Socrates’ aim in his<br />
conversations is not so much to discover the truth about a question as to investigate his interlocutor<br />
and raise question that impel him or her to change his or her character, mentality and behavior. This<br />
goal is announced in many of the dialogues, but nowhere more clearly than in <strong>Symposium</strong>, where<br />
Apollodoros berates his anonymous listeners, who represent the audience assembled at a reading of<br />
the composition, for leading worthless lives, spending their time in pursuit of money rather than<br />
devoting their time to Socrates (172c-173e). Sincere boasting, praising oneself for the things one is<br />
and does, is an essential pre-requisite for this process.<br />
The boastful speeches we find in <strong>Symposium</strong> and elsewhere take the form of implicitly selfflattering<br />
claims about the nature of things. Because they are claims about the world, they have an<br />
objective quality and can be brought into conflict with other contrary claims. When this occurs the<br />
result is not merely the refutation of a theory, and the embarrassment generated is not merely the<br />
embarrassment of being shown not to know. If the principles refuted are genuine reflections of the<br />
character, mentality and behavior of the speaker, the result is the refutation also of the person who<br />
espouses it. This is why Socrates is so happy when his interlocutors speak the truth as they see it<br />
(Gorgias 486d-487d; see Republic 367e-368b): this not only gives him an opportunity to investigate<br />
the proposition being proposed – which would be possible even if the person were not sincere about it<br />
– but also to examine the principles that motivate the speaker personally. When these principles are<br />
refuted, the speaker must either turn hostile or suffer a breakdown. For this reason, the level of<br />
personal competition is much higher in the Socratic dialogues than it would be in a disinterested<br />
conversation about philosophical issues, however eager the parties are to prove themselves right. The<br />
aggressive, personal flavor of the Socratic conversation is better captured when we recognize that the<br />
subject is not merely what is the best way of life, but rather whose life is better, mine or yours.<br />
Refutation<br />
<strong>Symposium</strong> resembles a Socratic dialogue because it contains a refutation of the selfinterested<br />
arguments of the previous speakers. Criticism is not a uniquely Socratic privilege in a<br />
symposium, of course. All the speakers criticize the others. For example, Pausanias offers mild<br />
criticism of Phaedrus, saying that he has not distinguished between the heavenly and the common<br />
forms of love (180c-d). This is a criticism of his speech, and does not carry major implications for<br />
Phaedrus as a person -- unless we are to suppose him an especially promiscuous young man who fails<br />
to discriminate among lovers, for which there is no evidence at all. 28 Socrates however offers criticism<br />
that applies more directly to Phaedrus when he argues that no one dies for the eromenos but for<br />
immortal fame (208c-d). This argument denies Phaedrus’ effort to redeem the eromenos and himself<br />
by claiming that he inspires acts of virtue. Phaedrus may provide the occasion for noble sacrifice, but<br />
he is not its object, and therefore does not deserve the honor he appropriates to himself by the<br />
description of love he offered in his speech. This is not a devastating critique, but it is of a piece with<br />
Socrates’ general reduction of potential eromenoi to the role of useful implement for higher<br />
achievement (compare the role of the beautiful in facilitating giving birth).<br />
More serious is Socrates’ critique of Pausanias. He is a different kind of target: as a lover of<br />
Agathon, he is a potential rival to Socrates, who has set out this evening to enjoy Agathon’s company<br />
(174a). This means that the attack will aim not to reduce him to the status of a useful eromenos, but<br />
merely to push him off. The attack on Pausanias is carried out in two waves: first in the speech of<br />
Socrates himself and then in the speech of Alcibiades.<br />
One indirect, but undoubtedly distressing, criticism is found in Socrates’ critique of Agathon. By<br />
forcing Agathon to acknowledge that he does not know what he was talking about (201c), Socrates<br />
27 Similarly, Charmides defines sophrosune as quietness or slowness, characteristics that would, if true, make him a paragon<br />
of virtue. Euthyphro attempts to define piety in a manner that will justify his own actions against his father. Lysis defines<br />
friendship in a manner that would validate his own friendship with Menexenus.<br />
28 In fact, his behavior in Phaedrus shows him to be quite snobbish in his choice of lovers.<br />
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not only shows Agathon himself to be lacking in sense, he also shows that Pausanias’ claims to<br />
transfer wisdom and excellence are not very well founded. 29 In general, Socrates’ speech raises doubts<br />
about the wisdom that Pausanias displayed and which he offers as a return for his paidika’s<br />
investment. Socrates’ use of the birthing model of education offers an even more fundamental critique,<br />
since it implies that wisdom is found within oneself and is not acquired by the transmission of semen,<br />
or by any other external input. 30<br />
In addition to raising doubts about the value of Pausanias’ merchandise, Socrates expends<br />
considerable effort belittling Pausanias’ desire for physical contact with young men. Pausanias’<br />
speech rests heavily not only on the assumption that he has something worthwhile to offer, but also<br />
that his enjoyment of sexual relations with young men is worthwhile. But if it is really a waste of time,<br />
then how do his supposed virtues really serve Pausanias’ interests?<br />
Pausanias does not of course say that engaging in sexual relations with a young man is a valuable way<br />
to spend one’s time. He actually offers very little explanation for what he, the older lover, stands to<br />
gain from a relationship with a paidika. Although he says that he loves the young man for his soul, he<br />
does not explain what benefit he gains from indulging this spiritual affection, saying instead that the<br />
paidika should satisfy (charizesthai) a virtuous lover physically. Throughout his speech he minimizes<br />
the value of this benefit while magnifying the benefit he offers. If one didn’t know any better one<br />
might think that Pausanias offers his services to young boys for purely altruistic purposes or for a<br />
trifle, something of no real worth, certainly not worth much in comparison with what he has to offer.<br />
And yet, the opportunity for relations with a young boy is of such value to him that he is willing to do<br />
the most slavish things (184d).<br />
Socrates’ erotic impulses are both lower and higher than those reported by Pausanias. By<br />
insisting that love of a beautiful body is indeed an important step in the so-called ladder of love,<br />
Socrates tarnishes the credibility of Pausanias’ high minded denigration of love of the body. If we are<br />
right to discount Pausanias’ claim to love the soul of Agathon and to acknowledge the very important<br />
role of the body in his relationship to Pausanias, Socrates’ speech consigns Pausanias to the very<br />
lowest level of the ladder. Socrates puts the principle of promiscuity at a higher rung than the<br />
principle of loyalty, and, as the action of <strong>Symposium</strong> illustrates, he lives by that rule himself. He<br />
further undermines Pausanias by describing forms of eros more heavenly than any he has conceived,<br />
providing an explanation for how one could actually love the soul of a young boy as Pausanias claims<br />
to do.<br />
Alcibiades’ speech also plays an important role in refuting Pausanias. This speech is<br />
especially effective because as an external witness to Socrates’ behavior it is not subject to the<br />
suspicions of a conflict between word and deed which undermine Pausanias’ own speech. Alcibiades’<br />
testimony concerning Socrates show that Socrates actually does what Pausanias boasts to do. He takes<br />
Pausanias at his word, sincerely believing that there is little or nothing to be gained from the favors of<br />
a paidika. Pausanias never explains why he accepts a trade he describes as so imbalanced. Possibly,<br />
the trade is not so imbalanced after all, since he has no genuine virtue to offer. Indeed, he has said<br />
precious little about the nature of the virtue he teaches, and unless he is much superior to most of<br />
Socrates’ eminent interlocutors he probably has no idea what virtue is in the first place. His lack of<br />
wisdom can be seen not only on the basis of his own speech and behavior, but also from the poor<br />
contents of the speech his well-trained paidika, Agathon, makes and the speed with which he<br />
succumbs to Socrates’ criticism. Alternatively, Pausanias may not know how to distinguish gold from<br />
bronze. In contrast with this, Socrates actually refuses the trade (218e). He either possesses some<br />
virtue that is worth more than anything an adult can get from a young man or he sees that there is<br />
really no value in the sensual pleasures, as he says over and over again in the middle dialogues (ie.<br />
Phaedo, Phaedrus, Republic, and Gorgias).<br />
Conclusion<br />
The speeches in <strong>Symposium</strong>, and in the dialogues more generally, are self-referential and designed to<br />
enhance the reputation and confidence of the speaker. 31 Although not an acceptable trait today, this<br />
mode of discourse was accepted and expected in ancient Greece. It was also of great value for<br />
philosophical disputation of the Socratic sort. Self-referential speech exposes the speaker to criticism<br />
and refutation not merely of disinterested opinions, but of principles that are central to his or her<br />
29 See Charmides’ remark on the credit due to a teacher in Xenophon’s <strong>Symposium</strong> (2.15). Perhaps it is not superfluous to<br />
add that there is something erotic in the beautiful Agathon’s humble words to Socrates.<br />
30 See L. Brisson, above note 22.<br />
31 The exception, of course, is Alcibiades who insults himself and praises Socrates, thus inverting sympotic expectations.<br />
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character, mentality and behavior. The refutation of these principles therefore leads not merely to the<br />
need for a more adequate theory, it also leads to the humiliation and breakdown of the speaker. In<br />
some cases, as apparently in the case of Agathon, there is an erotic motive to this process.<br />
The cases of Phaedrus and Pausanias are rather mild, since neither of them is a direct object of<br />
Socrates’ interest. But the speech of Alcibiades shows what kind of experience is in wait for Agathon.<br />
The Socratic refutation creates a profound disturbance in the soul of the speaker, instigating a collapse<br />
of personality which leads to the slavish adulation of Socrates that is reported not only by Alcibiades<br />
but also by Apollodoros and evidenced by the behavior of Aristodemos. Agathon is well on the way<br />
to a similar experience.<br />
Appendix on Aristophanes:<br />
Aristophanes’ speech is at first sight difficult to fit into the pattern of boasting. Plato does not provide<br />
us with enough information concerning Aristophanes’ personal life to enable us to evaluate the role<br />
his speech plays in forwarding his personal interests. Unlike other characters in <strong>Symposium</strong>, we are<br />
not told of any romantic interests he may have had. He seems to be the one speaker who does not<br />
attempt to sell himself to potential sexual partners, and indeed, his speech, with its insistence on<br />
natural partnership, contradicts any such intention. Possibly, he is the only speaker who does not<br />
attempt to advance himself in any way. But selling oneself is not the only form of self-promotion that<br />
occurs in <strong>Symposium</strong>, and I am not aware of any good reason to think that Aristophanes is an<br />
exception to the general rule. Given the prominence of self-promotion elsewhere in the composition,<br />
and in Athenian social life in general, we should expect the general pattern to hold here as well. If so,<br />
some of the elements of his speech, at least, should serve his personal interests. By taking this as an<br />
hypothesis, and considering what information we do have about Aristophanes we can derive a<br />
tolerably plausible portrait of the relationship between the man and the speech. Here I apply my<br />
reasoning in reverse and ask, What kind of a person must he have been if this speech is self-serving?<br />
1) Aristophanes must have been strongly partial to homosexuality. The story of our original<br />
unity grants a natural status to those who possess the tendency to homosexuality. Two of the three<br />
human prototypes he mentions are prototypes for homosexuals, while only one out of three is a<br />
prototype for the heterosexual. He refers to the prototype of the heterosexual as androgynous,<br />
reminding the company that this word is used nowadays as a term of reproach (189e). He insults the<br />
descendents of these androgynous creatures, claiming that they are adulterers and adulteresses (191de).<br />
He praises men who are naturally homosexual, claiming that they possess manly virtues and tend<br />
to perform well in political activity (192a-b: this passage may have been added later in response to<br />
Xenophon; 193c). Interestingly, his mythological account of the origins of love allows no possibility<br />
of bisexuality, and in 192a he suggests that homosexuals who marry women (there was no same-sex<br />
marriage in ancient Greece) do so only because of social pressure (192b). This may reflect an<br />
exclusive predilection on Aristophanes’ part for men. Although he praises male homosexuality, he has<br />
almost nothing to say about female homosexuality.<br />
2) Beauty is not mentioned in Aristophanes’ speech, and neither are other traits by which<br />
quality or excellence are judged. The fact that belongingness is the chief attraction in erotic love, and<br />
that traits of quality such as good-looks, wealth, intelligence, virtue, play no role at all, suggests that<br />
Aristophanes was not blessed with such things. Born around 446, Aristophanes would have been<br />
thirty years old in 416, the dramatic date of the party, about the same age as Agathon, but he is not<br />
said to be good-looking.<br />
3) In contrast to Eryximachos, although Aristophanes provides a coarse materialistic<br />
explanation for the power of love, his explanation is not primarily sexual in nature. The inclination to<br />
unite with one’s mate is a desire for an original wholeness or unity, not for the pleasures of sexual<br />
intercourse. The purpose of sexual intercourse is to produce children in the case of androgynous pairs<br />
and to provide satisfaction (plesmone) for homosexual men. (Homosexual women are not mentioned<br />
in this connection.) This satisfaction enables them to cease their embracing and turn to productive<br />
activities (191c). So, although he does attribute sexual obsession to heterosexuals, as we have seen, he<br />
says clearly that sexual pleasure is not the main attraction for homosexual couples (192c-e). This<br />
attitude too may reflect Aristophanes’ own personal habits.32<br />
4) As we have noted, Aristophanes was not known for his good looks. Some parts of<br />
<strong>Symposium</strong> seem to suggest that Aristophanes was also of a rotund appearance. As I have argued, the<br />
speeches tend to describe eros in the image of the speaker himself, so the fact that Aristophanes<br />
32 Socrates says that Aristophanes spends his whole time with Dionysius and Aphrodite (177e), but this is presumably a<br />
reference to his comic productions.<br />
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describes the original human creatures as round may suggest that he was too (but this may<br />
alternatively merely reflect on his bald head: Peace, 762-773). The idea that he was a fat man would<br />
give extra force to the fact that his hiccups are attributed to overeating (185c), and perhaps also fit his<br />
reputation as a big drinker (176b-c). Alcibiades says of Aristophanes that he is geloios and wants to be<br />
so (213c). This can be taken merely as a reference to his comic manner of speaking, but Alcibiades<br />
says this to explain why Socrates did not sit next to Aristophanes, but rather next to the beautiful<br />
Agathon. This comment therefore seems to imply that Aristophanes has an ungainly appearance.<br />
5) The story of our original unity implies that the best matches are long-lasting and inviolable<br />
(although he admits that people do sometimes mate with the wrong partners: 191a-b). This suggests<br />
that he was a devoted partner, and not one who played the field.<br />
In sum: Aristophanes’ speech suggests that its author cut a roundish, ungainly figure, and was<br />
not popular as a lover. He was a confirmed homosexual who was deeply involved with a single<br />
partner, or hoped to be, but who aspired to spending his time not in love-making but in productive<br />
activities. The comic art is often cultivated by the outsider, and in Aristophanes’ description of love as<br />
a pursuit of primal wholeness we may glimpse, together with a mockery of lovers, the deep longing of<br />
an unpopular man for some taste of true love.<br />
364
I.<br />
La difficile analogia tra poesia e amore<br />
Giovanni Casertano<br />
Alle pagine 205a-206a, nel suo dialogo con Socrate, Diotima stabilisce un’analogia tra la poesia e<br />
l’amore che ha un importante rilievo nella sua argomentazione. Come è noto, il dialogo avvenuto tra<br />
Diotima e Socrate, o meglio i dialoghi avvenuti in una serie di incontri tra i due personaggi (cfr.<br />
207a), riportati dal personaggio Socrate agli amici riuniti nel Simposio, costituiscono il contributo di<br />
Socrate agli encomi di Eros che in quell’occasione si era convenuto di fare. In un articolo del 1997 1<br />
mi sono occupato di questo “dialogo nel dialogo” e della sua importanza per la concezione platonica<br />
dell’amore, della morte e dell’immortalità 2 . Qui mi occuperò di questa pagina del Simposio, cercando<br />
di mettere in luce il significato dell’analogia. Ma, per chiarirlo, sarà bene inquadrare la pagina<br />
all’interno del dialogo tra Socrate e Diotima.<br />
Il problema che ci interessa viene introdotto da Diotima dopo la conclusione cui si è giunti in<br />
205a: essere felici significa possedere (205a1: κτήσει) cose buone, e tutti gli uomini hanno la volontà<br />
(205a5: βούλησιν) e il desiderio (205a5: ἔρωτα) di possedere sempre le cose buone. Notiamo che qui<br />
eros è il desiderare, e cioè l’amare, ma l’amare le cose buone. A sua volta, questa conclusione è<br />
raggiunta, secondo il più classico metodo socratico, nel corso di un dialogo in cui uno dei personaggi<br />
interroga e l’altro risponde, solo che qui è Diotima che assume il ruolo che Socrate ha in altri dialoghi,<br />
e Socrate quello che in genere assumono i suoi interlocutori 3 . Sintetizzerò qui brevemente le tappe che<br />
hanno portato a questa conclusione, accennando ai risvolti metodologici che emergono chiaramente<br />
nell’andamento di questo dialogo.<br />
Si comincia con una serie di qualificazioni di Eros:<br />
1) Eros non è né bello né buono (201e).<br />
2) È qualcosa di intermedio tra sapiente e ignorante (202a), e quindi tra bello e brutto, buono e cattivo<br />
(202b).<br />
3) Non è un dio, perché questi è felice e bello, possiede già le cose buone e belle (202b-c), mentre<br />
Socrate già ha convenuto (202d1: ὡµολόγηκας) che è per la mancanza (δι’ ἔνδειαν) di cose buone e<br />
belle che Eros le desidera.<br />
4) È qualcosa di intermedio tra mortale e immortale, è un grande demone (202d).<br />
Si continua con:<br />
5) Il mito della sua nascita e la deduzione del suo carattere (203a-204a).<br />
Segue un dialogo fatto di domande e risposte:<br />
6) Una nuova domanda di Socrate: chi sono allora coloro che filosofano (204a8: οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες)?<br />
Qui c’è da notare innanzi tutto la conferma del ruolo di Socrate nel dialogo con Diotima al quale<br />
accennavo prima: in genere, nei dialoghi platonici, ci sono due tipi di domande, quelle di chi sa e<br />
confuta chi non sa, svolgendo così la sua opera maieutica, e quelle di chi non sa e vuole apprendere da<br />
chi sa; il primo tipo è del Socrate abituale, il secondo del Socrate che qui discute con Diotima 4 . Ed è<br />
sintomatico, per quel che andremo argomentando, che Socrate non dica qui “i filosofi”, ma: coloro<br />
che esercitano questo tipo di attività che è il filosofare.<br />
7) È chiaro anche ad un ragazzino, è la risposta di Diotima: è necessario (204b4: ἀναγκαῖον) che Eros<br />
1 Il (in) nome di Eros. Una lettura del discorso di Diotima nel Simposio platonico; in «Elenchos» XVIII (1997), pp. 277-310.<br />
2 Sono poi ritornato su questi argomenti in altri studi: Dal logo al mito al logo: la struttura del Fedone; in G. Casertano (a<br />
cura di), La struttura del dialogo platonico, Loffredo, Napoli 2000, pp. 86-107; Morte (dai Presocratici a Platone: ovvero dal<br />
concetto all’incantesimo), Guida, Napoli 2003, pp. 49-119; O homem combatido: terapia do medo em Platão, in «Cadernos<br />
de Filosofia. Publicação Semestral do Instituto de Filosofia da Linguagem» da Universidade Nova de Lisboa, n° 18/2005,<br />
Lisboa 2006, pp. 105-125.<br />
3 Comprese le connotazioni psicologiche a questi ultimi riservate. E infatti Socrate si meraviglia di un’affermazione (201e8-<br />
9); riconosce la verità di una conseguenza apparentemente strana (202a10); insiste in una sua affermazione (202b6-7); deve<br />
ammettere di aver sostenuto una cosa contro le sue stesse convinzioni (202c-d); è frastornato dall’andamento del discorso,<br />
tanto da non avere ad un certo suo snodo una risposta da dare (204d10-11; anche 207c2); si meraviglia di certe conseguenze<br />
che necessariamente discendono dall’andamento del discorso (205b3); riconosce la verità di queste conseguenze (205c3,<br />
c10), pur mostrando qualche resistenza a riconoscerla (205d9), finché non può non accettarla in pieno (206a13); non capisce<br />
alcuni passaggi del discorso, inducendo Diotima ad una spiegazione chiarificante (206b9-10sgg.); si stupisce per l’apparente<br />
paradossalità di certe conclusioni, delle quali non riesce ancora a percepire la verità (208b7-9).<br />
4 L’ha ben notato B. Centrone, Introduzione a Platone, Simposio, tr. e commento di M. Nucci, Einaudi, Torino 2009, p.<br />
XXVIII.
Giovanni Casertano<br />
sia φιλόσοφος, perché si trova in una posizione intermedia tra il sapiente e l’ignorante, e quindi è<br />
l’amante e non l’amato: infatti τὸ ἐραστόν è ciò che è veramente/realmente bello (204c4: τὸ τῷ ὄντι<br />
καλόν), mentre τὸ ἐρῶν ha tutt’altro aspetto (ἰδέαν), quello che ha già illustrato. Qui appunto si<br />
chiarisce che il nome “filosofo” può ora essere attribuito ad Eros, proprio perché è stata specificata<br />
l’attività sua propria.<br />
8) Ora Socrate chiede qual è l’utilità di Eros per gli uomini (204c). Il termine utilizzato è χρεία<br />
(204c8), un termine che indica allo stesso tempo il vantaggio, l’utilità, ma anche il bisogno, la<br />
necessità, e quindi la mancanza, e quindi la richiesta: come a sottolineare che la condizione di filosofo<br />
di Eros indica sempre un’attività che è l’espressione di un bisogno necessario, un bisogno che richiede<br />
sempre e rinnovatamente di essere soddisfatto, ma allo stesso tempo è appagante, perché apportatore<br />
di un vantaggio che è proprio solo di chi filosofa. Ma la risposta di Diotima non è immediata; come<br />
spesso accade nella metodologia del discorrere e dell’indagare platonico, per rispondere a questa<br />
domanda bisogna trasformarla in un’altra, e quindi chiedersi: perché Eros è rivolto verso le cose<br />
belle? O, ancora più chiaramente (204d5: σαφέστερον): chi ama le cose belle, ama; che cosa ama<br />
(204d5-6: ἐρᾷ ὁ ἐρῶν τῶν καλῶν . τί ἐρᾷ;)? Che diventino sue (204d7). In altre parole, non basta<br />
chiarire che un certo nome appartiene a colui che esercita una certa attività, ma bisogna chiarire anche<br />
qual è l’oggetto, il fine di quell’attività.<br />
9) Ma anche questa risposta desidera (204d8: ποθεῖ), ha bisogno di un’altra domanda, in questo<br />
procedere del discorso che allarga sempre più i suoi confini e ridefinisce i termini che usa per<br />
giungere ad una migliore comprensione dell’oggetto della sua ricerca. La nuova domanda è: cosa<br />
accade a chi possiede le cose belle (204d10-11)? Socrate non sa rispondere.<br />
10) Diotima allora trasforma ancora la domanda, cambiando (204e1: µεταβαλών) i termini e usando<br />
‘bene’ al posto di ‘bello’ 5 , ma mantenendo inalterata la struttura della domanda: chi ama le cose<br />
buone, ama; che cosa ama (204e2-3: ἐρᾷ ὁ ἐρῶν τῶν καλῶν . τί ἐρᾷ;)? Che diventino sue; e cosa<br />
accade a chi possiede le cose buone? che sarà felice (204e7: ἐὐδαίµων), e non occorre domandare<br />
oltre, perché qui la risposta ha raggiunto un termine (205a3: τέλος), dal momento che non ha senso<br />
chiedere ancora “perché un uomo vuole essere felice?”.<br />
È a questo punto che viene stabilita la conclusione di 205a5-8 che ho riportato all’inizio. Ed è<br />
da sottolineare il fatto che questo fine perseguito da tutti appartenga alla sfera della vita nel suo intero,<br />
e non solo alla sfera della ricerca teoretica; il che era stato chiaramente espresso già nella relazione tra<br />
bello e bene. Ma su questo ritornerò.<br />
II.<br />
La nuova domanda di Diotima, che lascia sconcertato Socrate, è a questo punto: allora perché non<br />
diciamo (205a9: φάµεν) che tutti amano (205a9: ἐρᾶν), dal momento che tutti amano sempre le stesse<br />
cose, ma diciamo che alcuni amano ed altri no? Socrate si meraviglia di questo fatto (205b3). Ma<br />
Diotima gli dice che non deve meravigliarsi, perché in effetti noi, isolata (205b4-5: ἀφελόντες) una<br />
certa specie di amore (205b4-5: τοῦ ἔρωτός τι εἶδος), la denominiamo (205b5: ὀνοµάζοµεν) amore,<br />
imponendogli il nome dell’intero (205b5: τὸ τοῦ ὅλου ἐπιθέντες ὄνοµα), mentre per le altre specie<br />
usiamo altri nomi (205b6: ἄλλοις καταχρώµεθα ὀνόµασιν). La questione posta qui da Diotima, e la<br />
spiegazione che ne dà, sono significative del fatto che, se c’è un problema che non ha mai cessato di<br />
interessare Platone, questo è il problema del linguaggio, cioè di quella peculiare attività dell’uomo che<br />
consiste nel cercare di rendere chiari a se stessi i rapporti reali tra le cose nel momento in cui vengono<br />
tradotti in nomi, cioè in parole. In altri termini, c’è un’attività che consiste nello stabilire nomi, che<br />
vengono imposti (ὀνοµάζοµεν, ἐπιθέντες) alle cose; questi nomi sono legati in modo stretto alle idee –<br />
qui non c’interessa stabilire il senso e il valore di questo legame. Queste relazioni sono problematiche,<br />
perché non sono fisse e stabilite una volta per sempre, ma variano a seconda degli usi che ne<br />
facciamo, delle finalità che ci proponiamo nella nostra indagine, del campo di riferimenti che volta a<br />
volta utilizziamo. Ma le spiegazioni di Diotima sono anche un esempio di come quel metodo<br />
diairetico “scoperto”, applicato e difeso nei cosiddetti dialoghi dialettici, sia stato in realtà una<br />
costante nella metodologia e nella dialettica platoniche.<br />
Cerchiamo allora di schematizzare il ragionamento di Diotima: c’è un intero – un genere –<br />
5 L’equivalenza di bello e bene è abbastanza comune nella cultura greca classica, e Platone la approfondisce in senso<br />
specificamente filosofico. Il che non significa che l'equivalenza non resti abbastanza problematica. Per il bello come la<br />
capacità di suscitare un desiderio intenso che spinge l'anima verso il mondo delle idee, cfr. Centrone, cit., pp. LI-LIII.<br />
366
Giovanni Casertano<br />
che si divide in molte specie 6 ; il nome di quest’intero è “amore”; noi isoliamo una specie di<br />
quell’intero e le attribuiamo lo stesso nome dell’intero, cioè appunto “amore”. Notiamo che non si<br />
dice qui quali siano le altre specie dell’intero “amore”, né quali siano i loro nomi. Ora, l’amare è<br />
un’attività, e, come abbiamo visto prima a proposito del filosofare e del filosofo, chi esercita<br />
quell’attività ne deriva anche il nome, per cui si chiama “amante”. Ad una sola specie dell’intero noi<br />
attribuiamo il nome che è lo stesso dell’intero, cioè amore, e quindi attribuiamo il nome “amante”<br />
solo ad alcuni uomini che esercitano quell’attività specifica e non a tutti, cioè a tutti gli uomini che<br />
esercitano le altre attività specifiche dell’amore. Verosimilmente – anche se non viene detto – non<br />
attribuiamo il nome di “amanti” nemmeno a tutti gli uomini che esercitano l’attività che corrisponde<br />
all’intero, che cioè amano e vogliono le cose belle e buone.<br />
Socrate chiede spiegazioni, e Diotima fa un esempio, quello appunto della produzione e della<br />
poesia, cioè della ποίησις. Ora, è da notare che Platone, per esemplificare appunto quanto ha appena<br />
dichiarato sull’amore e sui nomi ad esso collegato, usa esplicitamente il termine ποίησις nel suo<br />
duplice significato di attività produttiva in generale, e di attività produttiva di poesia: queste due<br />
attività hanno lo stesso nome, appunto ποίησις. La ποίησις è infatti qualcosa di ampio (205b8: τι<br />
πολύ), un genere che comprende molte specie. Essa è caratterizzata dal fatto, qualunque sia la sua<br />
specificazione, di produrre qualcosa che prima non c’era: ogni causa (αἰτία) per cui qualsiasi cosa<br />
passa dal non essere all’essere (205b9: ἐκ τοῦ µὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ ὂν ἰόντι) è dunque ποίησις, sicché anche<br />
le operazioni (205c1: ἐργασίαι) di tutte le tecniche sono ποιήσεις, e i loro artefici (δηµιουργοῖ) sono<br />
ποιηταί (205c2). Ma attenzione: sono ποιηταί, ma non si chiamano ποιηταί (205c4), bensì hanno altri<br />
nomi (205c3-4: ἄλλα ἔχουσιν ὀνόµατα). Invece una sola parte (205c5-6: ἓν µόριον) della ποίησις<br />
intera – quella concernente musica e metri – è designata col nome dell’intero (205c6-7: τῷ τοῦ ὅλου<br />
ὀνόµατι προσαγορεύεται). Solo questa parte quindi è ποίησις, e si chiamano ποιηταί quelli che la<br />
posseggono (205c7-9).<br />
Mi pare chiaro che qui il gioco è appunto quello di assumere una sola parola in due significati<br />
diversi: ποίησις è l’intero, è il nome che designa tutte le attività che producono qualcosa; e ποίησις è<br />
anche il nome di una sola parte di quell’intero, quella che concerne la musica e le composizioni<br />
metriche. Il fatto che chi esercita l’attività in generale di produrre qualcosa, e quindi, in base alla<br />
“regola” già ricordata, dovrebbe assumere il nome proprio di quell’attività, non viene invece chiamato<br />
col nome proprio dell’attività, si spiega solo col fatto che il termine usato, ποίησις, ed il nome ad esso<br />
collegato, ποιηταί, viene usato ambiguamente, in maniera cosciente. Insomma, ποίησις è l’attività<br />
produttiva in generale, e ποιηταί, cioè produttori, sono coloro che la esercitano, ma non si possono<br />
chiamare ποιηταί, cioè poeti, perché questo nome di “poeti” è riservato a coloro che esercitano una<br />
sola specie di quell’attività generale, e cioè coloro che compongono musica e versi. Nell’esempio<br />
compare anche un altro nome, in 205c1, e cioè δηµιουργοῖ. Questo nome appartiene a tutti coloro che<br />
esercitino una qualunque attività compresa nel genere ποίησις, inteso come attività produttiva, quindi<br />
appartiene anche a coloro che esercitano l’attività particolare del comporre musica e versi, e che si<br />
chiamano col nome dell’intero. E allora questi ultimi si chiamano non solo in base al nome della<br />
specie – “poeti”, come produttori di opere di musica e in versi –, ma anche, ovviamente, in base al<br />
nome dell’intero – “artefici”, “demiurghi”. Non è detto esplicitamente, ma possiamo anche<br />
completare lo schema dicendo che anche gli altri “artefici”, i demiurghi che esercitano altre specie<br />
dell’attività produttiva, hanno un doppio nome: essi infatti si chiamano demiurghi, e poi pittori,<br />
scultori, architetti, e così via.<br />
L’esempio della ποίησις è chiaro; è chiaro cioè il meccanismo in base al quale un certo nome<br />
da noi usato viene inteso in un senso più ristretto rispetto allo stesso nome, quando usato in senso più<br />
generale. A questo punto (205d1) viene introdotta l’analogia con eros, esplicitamente dichiarata tale<br />
(οὕτω τοίνυν). Solo che lo schema della dimostrazione applicato all’esempio di ποίησις non è<br />
altrettanto chiaro quando viene applicato ad eros. Vediamo.<br />
Anche qui ci troviamo di fronte ad un genere, o ad un’attività intesa in senso generale, che<br />
chiamiamo eros. Ricordiamo che questo genere aveva ricevuto già due nomi, eros, appunto, e<br />
βούλησις, la volontà di possedere sempre le cose buone, che è comune a tutti gli uomini (205a5-7).<br />
Chi esercita quest’attività, quella cioè di ricercare e di amare sempre le cose buone, dovrebbe ricevere<br />
lo stesso nome, cioè “amante”, solo che noi, era stato detto, non diciamo che tutti “amano”, cioè sono<br />
“amanti”, anche se tutti amano queste stesse cose (205a9-b2). E questo perché, abbiamo visto, noi<br />
isoliamo una certa specie di eros, e la chiamiamo appunto eros, col nome dell’intero, mentre per le<br />
6 Uso qui i termini di genere e specie, anche se nel testo Platone usa i termini “intero” e “parti”, poiché mi sembra che il<br />
senso sia lo stesso. Del resto, anche se conosceranno in Aristotele un loro uso sistematico, i termini di genere e specie erano<br />
già comunque ben presenti, nello stesso senso “aristotelico”, nel testo platonico: si veda in particolare Soph. 267d5-6, dove<br />
si parla appunto della divisione τῶν γενῶν κατ’ εἴδη.<br />
367
Giovanni Casertano<br />
altre specie di quell’intero ci serviamo di altri nomi (205b4-6). Seguiva poi l’esempio della poiēsis<br />
(205b-c), dopo il quale inizia la dimostrazione per quanto riguarda eros.<br />
C’è un’attività, in generale (205d1: τὸ κεφάλαιον), cui diamo il nome di eros; in realtà, non le<br />
diamo un solo nome: si tratta infatti di un desiderio (205d2: ἐπιθυµία) di cose belle e buone e di<br />
felicità che noi chiamiamo “il potentissimo e ingannevole eros” (205d2-3: ὁ µέγιστός τε καὶ δολερὸς<br />
ἔρως) 7 . Quindi ci sono due nomi a designare questo genere, eros, appunto (che riceve a sua volta altre<br />
due qualificazioni), e desiderio, ἐπιθυµία; ma questa assimilazione di amore a desiderio era stata<br />
“preparata” in effetti da molto tempo, almeno da 204a, da quando cioè la natura “media” di amore tra<br />
divinità e umanità, tra sapienza e ignoranza, lo aveva legato al livello della tensione, del desiderio<br />
appunto, e quindi della filosofia. Ora, questo genere può essere distinto in una molteplicità di specie<br />
che indicano direzioni e fini particolari in diversi campi; gli esempi di questa tensione (cfr. il<br />
τρεπόµενοι di 205d4) sono il guadagno, la passione per la ginnastica (205d4: φιλογυµναστία) e la<br />
passione per la sapienza (205d4: φιλοσοφία). Tutti coloro che sono presi da questi desideri/amori non<br />
si dice che “amano” e quindi non possono essere chiamati “amanti”. Dall’altra parte c’è una certa<br />
forma/specie (205d6: ἕν τι εἶδος) di eros che prende il nome dell’intero, e quindi si chiama “amore”, il<br />
nome di quest’attività si chiama “amare” e coloro che esercitano questo tipo di attività si chiamano<br />
“amanti” (205d7-8: ἔρωτά τε καὶ ἐρᾶν καὶ ἐρασταί). A differenza di quanto accadeva nell’esempio<br />
della produzione e della poesia, dove coloro che esercitavano l’attività particolare del produrre e si<br />
chiamavano perciò “poeti”, col nome dell’intero, venivano individuati come gli artefici di<br />
composizioni musicali e in versi, qui non si dice chi siano e come si chiamino gli uomini che<br />
esercitano quest’attività specifica di eros e quindi ricevono il nome dell’intero, “amanti”. Può stupire<br />
innanzi tutto che non siano i filosofi, che qui costituiscono una delle molte specie che appartengono al<br />
genere eros, mentre in 204a-b erano stati indicati come coloro che più di tutti gli altri incarnano la<br />
posizione intermedia tra sapienza e ignoranza caratteristica di eros come amante di sapienza e<br />
filosofo, e quindi “amante” (204c3: τὸ ἐρῶν). Qui invece i filosofi non possono ricevere il nome di<br />
“amanti”, perché appartengono ad una delle molte specie di eros che non ricevono il nome dell’intero.<br />
Chi sono dunque gli “amanti”?<br />
Mi pare che nel testo platonico non ci sia una risposta esplicita a questa domanda. Potremmo<br />
quindi tentare di trovarla solo nel prosieguo del discorso. Innanzi tutto, in chiara polemica con il<br />
discorso di Aristofane, si dice che amore non è né della metà né dell’intero, a meno che questo non sia<br />
in qualche modo un bene (205e2-3: ἐὰν µὴ τυγχάνῃ γέ που… ἀγαθὸν ὄν). Questa specificazione è<br />
indicativa, mi pare, che qui si sta parlando ancora dell’eros come genere, dal momento che questo era<br />
stato indicato come amore/desiderio delle cose buone (205d1-2), e quindi non può riferirsi alla specie<br />
particolare di amore che acquista il nome dell’intero. In effetti si può dire semplicemente (206a3:<br />
ἁπλοῦν) che gli uomini amano il bene (206a3-4). Ma bisogna aggiungere che amano anche<br />
possederlo, e possederlo per sempre (206a6-9); in generale (206a11: συλλήβδην), allora, si può dire<br />
che eros è rivolto al bene e a possederlo per sempre. Non possiamo, mi pare, intendere queste righe<br />
come esplicative della specie particolare di eros, dal momento che si sta parlando sempre di eros come<br />
amore per le cose buone; anche stilisticamente le tre specificazioni di 205d1, τὸ κεφάλαιον, di 206a3,<br />
ἁπλοῦν, di 206a11, συλλήβδην, stanno ad indicare sempre che si tratta dell’eros come intero. Socrate<br />
concorda con tutto quanto detto da Diotima, ma a questo punto il discorso della sacerdotessa cambia<br />
registro.<br />
III.<br />
La nuova domanda che ora viene introdotta è: qual è il modo (206b1: τρόπον) e in quale attività<br />
(206b2: ἐν τίνι πράξει) si possono riconoscere lo sforzo e la tensione (206b2: σπουδὴ καὶ σύντασις)<br />
che possono essere chiamati eros? Noto che ancora non si dice esplicitamente se si tratterà di eros<br />
come intero o di quella sua specie particolare che prende il nome dell’intero. Ci troviamo di fronte,<br />
comunque, a quelle bellissime pagine finali del discorso di Diotima sulla causa e sul fine di eros che<br />
costituiscono una delle caratterizzazioni più alte dell’“amore platonico”. Non è il caso qui di<br />
esaminarle in particolare, ma solo di ripercorrerle per sommi capi, con l’intenzione di vedere se e in<br />
che modo esse ci consentano di rispondere alla domanda che ci siamo posta. La risposta alla nuova<br />
domanda è: partorire nel bello sia secondo il corpo sia secondo l’anima (206b7-8): eros infatti non è<br />
7 Gli studiosi affermano che si tratta probabilmente della citazione di un verso; in realtà, mentre è spiegabile la<br />
qualificazione di eros come una grande potenza, non è chiaro perché qui esso venga qualificato anche come δολερός, che<br />
significa ingannevole, infido, ed è un aggettivo che conosce solo una qualificazione negativa.<br />
368
Giovanni Casertano<br />
amore del bello, ma desiderio di procreazione nel bello, perché la procreazione è ciò che di eterno e<br />
immortale spetta a un mortale, dal momento che l’immortalità si desidera necessariamente insieme al<br />
bene (206e-207a). E qual è la causa di questo eros e di questo desiderio (ancora associati, come si<br />
vede), di questo stato terribile (207b1: δεινῶς διατιθέµενα) in cui si trovano tutti gli esseri viventi? Per<br />
gli uomini si potrebbe pensare anche che si tratti di una disposizione derivante da un ragionamento<br />
(207b7-8: ἐκ λογισµοῦ), ma per gli altri animali? La risposta è che la natura mortale cerca per quanto<br />
è possibile di essere sempre e di essere immortale (207d1-2: ἡ θνητὴ φύσις ζετεῖ κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν ἀεί<br />
τε καὶ ἀθάναθος). Si tratta di un vero e proprio artificio (208b2: µηχανῆ) col quale tutti, uomini e<br />
animali, partecipano dell’immortalità. In effetti gli uomini si trovano in uno stato di terribile eros<br />
(208c4: δεινῶς διάκεινται ἔρωτι) 8 per acquistarsi gloria eterna e immortale: essi quindi “amano” ciò<br />
che è immortale (208e1: τοῦ ἀθανάτου ἐρῶσιν). Gli ἐρωτικοί (208e3) secondo il corpo procreano figli<br />
e, così credono (208e4: ὡς οἴονται), si procurano ricordo e immortalità e felicità; gli ἐρωτικοί secondo<br />
l’anima procreano saggezza e ogni altra virtù, e la più bella saggezza è quella che riguarda le città<br />
(208e-209a).<br />
Le due bellissime pagine che seguono, 208e-210e, disegnano il percorso dell’uomo erotico<br />
che tocca il bello (209c2), che è il primo grado degli erōtiká, quello fino al quale anche Socrate può<br />
essere iniziato, mentre al grado perfetto e contemplativo (210a1: τὰ τέλεα καὶ ἐποπτικά) Diotima non<br />
sa se Socrate sarà capace di giungere. Questo non le impedisce però di tracciare anche questo percorso<br />
più impegnativo; non converrà perciò insistere troppo sul carattere di “iniziazione misterica” del<br />
discorso di Diotima: il linguaggio è certamente, e volutamente, quello dei misteri, ma il percorso che<br />
traccia Diotima è percorribile da ogni uomo “gravido nell’anima”, dotato cioè di buone qualità e<br />
disposto a seguirlo. Ed anche Socrate, evidentemente, l’ha seguito, se ne è convinto, ed ora cerca di<br />
convincere anche gli amici, segno appunto che si tratta di una “iniziazione”, se si vuole continuare ad<br />
usare questo termine, chiaramente pedagogica, anche se strettamente legata ad eros (212b1-3). Si<br />
tratta della famosissima ascesa – non ascesi – all’idea del bello, inseguendo la bellezza nella sua<br />
forma/idea nei corpi, nelle anime, nei comportamenti, nelle leggi, nelle conoscenze, fino a giungere al<br />
πολὺ καλόν (210d1), al τὸ πολὺ πέλαγος… τοῦ καλοῦ (210d4), dove non ci si acquieta estaticamente,<br />
ma si procreano discorsi belli e magnifici (210d5) in un amore per la sapienza privo di invidia (210d6:<br />
ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ἀφθόνῳ). E questo è appunto il τέλος τῶν ἐρωτικῶν (210e4), un’acquisizione istantanea<br />
(210e4: ἐξαίφνης), ma da un lato preparata da un percorso educativo lungo e difficile, e dall’altro<br />
foriera di un nuovo atteggiamento nel mondo.<br />
Concludendo: possiamo dire che abbiamo individuata la specie particolare di eros che prende<br />
in nome dell’intero, ed alla quale noi applichiamo il nome dell’intero? Possiamo indicare chi siano<br />
quegli uomini ai quali soltanto possiamo applicare il nome di “amanti”, che, in analogia con l’esempio<br />
della ποίησις, non possiamo applicare invece a chi partecipa del genere più ampio di eros? Non mi<br />
pare che nel testo platonico ci sia una risposta esplicita a queste domande; mi pare invece che il testo<br />
apra a varie soluzioni, e che comunque l’analogia eros-poiēsis presenti delle difficoltà. Tentando di<br />
rispondere, potremmo dire che in effetti tutto il testo che segue la domanda di Diotima si riferisca<br />
all’eros come genere: in tal caso, la domanda rimarrebbe senza risposta, non solo, ma ne risulterebbe<br />
anche che i nomi di “amore” e di “amante” in questo caso sarebbero attribuiti a coloro che esercitano<br />
l’attività corrispondente al genere/intero, e quindi l’analogia con la poiēsis verrebbe meno, perché<br />
quei nomi apparterrebbero a chi partecipa dell’eros come intero e non come specie. Oppure potemmo<br />
dire che tutto il testo si riferisca invece all’eros come specie: in tal caso i nomi di “amore” e “amante”<br />
sarebbero attribuiti a chi percorre tutto il viaggio verso l’idea del bello e riesce a coglierla. Ma, se<br />
fosse così, ne risulterebbe una grande stranezza, e cioè che i filosofi non potrebbero essere chiamati<br />
“amanti” del bello e del bene, dal momento che in 205d si dice chiaramente che essi percorrono una<br />
delle molte altre vie attraverso le quali si ricercano le cose buone e la felicità, via ben distinta da<br />
quell’unica specie/idea di eros che sola può far sì che si usino i nomi di “amore”, “amare” e “amanti”;<br />
e questo in contrasto con 204b, dove si era detto che i filosofi sono appunto gli “amanti” della<br />
sapienza, e quindi ricevono comunque il nome di “amanti”. Oppure potremmo trovarci di fronte ad<br />
una di quelle situazioni, non infrequenti in Platone, in cui la “retorica argomentativa”, comunque di<br />
altissimo livello, anche emozionale, prende il sopravvento sul rigore razionale delle dimostrazioni<br />
preannunciate. Quello che invece vorrei sottolineare è l’aspetto più tipico di questa concezione<br />
dell’amore, che, genere o specie che sia, si dimostra sempre come una forza che coinvolge l’essere<br />
8 Il “disporsi amorevolmente” viene qualificato due volte (207b1, 208c4) con il termine δεινῶς, usato avverbialmente. Il<br />
termine in effetti ha una duplice valenza, potremmo dire una negativa (temibile, terribile, pericoloso), ed una positiva<br />
(straordinario, forte, potente, mirabile): qui credo che indichi appunto una forza straordinaria che non dipende da un<br />
ragionamento, ma coinvolge tutto l’essere dell’uomo, indipendentemente dalla sua volontà. L’altra qualificazione di questa<br />
forza, δολερός, che abbiamo trovato in 205d3, aveva invece una connotazione solo negativa.<br />
369
Giovanni Casertano<br />
umano nella sua totalità. L’eros insomma è quella forza che consente all’uomo “amante” di<br />
raggiungere un fine che appartiene alla sfera della vita, e non solo a quello della pura ricerca<br />
razionale: l’essere felici, che è il fine di ogni uomo, comporta certamente una capacità<br />
“contemplativa” che ha a che fare col mondo delle conoscenze, ed appartiene quindi alla sfera<br />
teoretica, ma è anche e inseparabilmente la traduzione in pratica di questa dimensione, che consiste<br />
nel “partorire” belli ed eccellenti discorsi sulla vera virtù, ha a che fare cioè con la sfera della vita in<br />
comune degli uomini: consiste insomma in un rinnovato atteggiamento di vita che esclude ogni<br />
malevolenza e gelosia tra gli uomini: ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ἀφθόνῳ.<br />
370
Onoma e holon in Symp. 204e-206a: che cosa nomina il nome “eros”<br />
ABSTRACT<br />
Francesco Aronadio<br />
Sarà preso in esame il passo 204e-206a, tematizzando la funzione argomentativa e il valore<br />
concettuale attribuiti alla riflessione sul nome eros.<br />
La pagina platonica appare di primo acchito caratterizzata, sotto diversi profili, da una certa<br />
ambivalenza. In primo luogo, si noterà come, da un lato, il nome appaia fuorviante, mentre, dall’altro,<br />
sia proprio la considerazione del nome a instradare verso l’esito dell’argomentazione (e cioè che<br />
l’oggetto dell’eros è il permanente possesso del bene).<br />
Diotima, infatti, afferma che si dà una discrepanza fra il vero significato del nome eros e il<br />
suo uso corrente: eros designa in realtà uno holon (il desiderio di possedere ta agatha), benché sia<br />
solitamente riferito solo a una sua parte (il desiderio a sfondo sessuale). Le modalità del rapido<br />
argomentare di Diotima (che peraltro si radicano nella concezione referenzialistica del nome quale<br />
emerge dal Cratilo) riservano allo holon, come oggetto intenzionato dal nome indipendentemente<br />
dalle restrizioni nell’uso, un ruolo guida ai fini della comprensione dell’eros.<br />
Ci si potrà, allora, chiedere quale rapporto sussista fra questo holon e le sue parti, sia sul piano<br />
del nome (la complessiva area semantica di eros vs le sue accezioni ristrette) sia sul piano del<br />
nominato (to agathon vs altri specifici oggetti di eros). Ne emerge un altro fattore di ambivalenza:<br />
l’interpretazione dominante, facendo leva sull’uso di koinon in 205a (l’eros nella sua accezione ampia<br />
è koinon a tutti gli uomini), propende per configurare tale rapporto come una relazione fra universale<br />
e particolari, fra un genere e le sue specie. Ma il prosieguo dell’argomentazione sembra andare in una<br />
direzione diversa, come traspare dall’affermazione di Diotima, la quale, benché abbia appena<br />
richiamato l’attenzione sullo holon che il nome eros nomina, nega che eros aspiri a uno holon tranne<br />
che non si trovi a essere agathon: il che induce a ripensare i rapporti concettuali fra le nozioni di<br />
holon, koinon e agathon.<br />
Alla luce di ciò si mirerà a mostrare come la riflessione sul nome eros presentata da Diotima<br />
non costituisca solo un espediente retorico, ma assolva anche una funzione argomentativa essenziale<br />
ai fini del rinvenimento di: 1) due differenti accezioni dello holon, l’una accolta da Platone (valenza<br />
strutturale e identitaria), l’altra respinta proprio perché imperniata sulla relazione genere-specie<br />
(carattere compositivo e connotati finanche fisicistici dello holon); 2) un’accezione del koinon per cui<br />
esso designa non una generalità, ma la determinazione essenziale di una realtà ontologicamente<br />
individua; 3) una analogia, se non un isomorfismo, fra la dinamica linguistica del nome eros, nel suo<br />
essere intenzionato al suo referente, e della natura propria dell’eros, nel suo essere aspirazione verso<br />
un suo oggetto intenzionale; 4) un’anticipazione implicita della successiva caratterizzazione dell’eros<br />
come tensione al bello in sé.<br />
La riflessione sul nome eros assolve pertanto non solo la funzione di estendere ad un’area più<br />
ampia la valenza dell’eros, ma anche quella di prospettare un’articolazione interna di tale area nella<br />
quale si delinei una dinamica verticale da un’accezione corrente e fuorviante a un’accezione autentica<br />
e paradigmatica, corrispondente alla dinamica verticale dal bello empirico al bello in sé.
The Picture of Socrates<br />
Chair: Christopher J. Rowe
Alcibiades’ Refutation of Socrates<br />
Edward C. Halper<br />
Close examinations of individual arguments in Plato’s dialogues usually ignore the dramatic elements,<br />
and studies of the characters and the drama of the dialogues often pass over the arguments. This<br />
paper argues, first, that Plato includes the speech of the Alcibiades in the <strong>Symposium</strong> as a kind of<br />
dramatic refutation of Socrates’ (or rather Diotima’s) argument that love is rooted in a universal desire<br />
to possess the good and necessarily results in an ascent of the ladder of loves (to the level of which<br />
one is capable) and in a “giving birth in beauty.” Alciabias serves as a counter-example. More than<br />
that, though, the paper argues that the extraordinary insight into Socrates that Alcibiades displays<br />
helps the reader grasp Diotima’s mistake—indeed, the contradiction—that is inherent in her account<br />
and that that must be Plato’s intention. Third, I suggest that Plato provides an anticipatory refutation<br />
of Gregory Vlastos’s famous paper: he included Alcibiades in the <strong>Symposium</strong> in order to illustrate the<br />
disastrous consequences of taking an individual as the object of love. Finally, although Alcibiades<br />
undermines Socrates’ speech, there is an important sense in which he also affirms it. If this analysis<br />
or something like it is correct, the <strong>Symposium</strong> uses its dramatic action and descriptive passages to<br />
further its argument.<br />
I<br />
Although it has been little discussed in the literature, one striking and pervasive detail of Socrates’<br />
long encomium to love is the necessity it ascribes to the actions of the lover. 1 He must (δεῖ) begin by<br />
pursuing beautiful bodies, love one body and, then, come to see that the beauty in any one is akin to<br />
that of another body; and he must (δεῖ) thereafter pursue the beautiful form in all bodies and despise<br />
any one body (210a-b). Then, he must grasp that the beauty of the soul is more honorable<br />
(τιµιώτερον) than that of bodies, and, in consequence, the lover must care for the soul of the beloved.<br />
Inasmuch as all souls can be beautiful, the lover will seek to make other souls better and so “be forced<br />
to consider beauty in customs and laws” (ἀναγκασθῇ αὖ θεάσασθαι τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιτηδεύµασι καὶ τοῖς<br />
νόµοις καλόν—210c3-4) and from there to ascend to love of knowledge. Most of the verbs in this<br />
passage are infinitives governed by δεῖ. According to this account the lover is forced to ascend to the<br />
pursuit of higher objects.<br />
There is a qualification here. The ascent must occur only if love “leads rightly” (210a4-7).<br />
We can surmise that love does not lead rightly if the lover is unable to grasp that the higher levels are<br />
more beautiful or if he does not pursue them for some other reason. If the right conditions are not<br />
present, the lover’s ascent can be frustrated; but if those conditions are present, it is necessary. What<br />
accounts for this necessity?<br />
Socrates’ speech in the <strong>Symposium</strong> does not have the logical tightness of his arguments<br />
elsewhere, but I think we can answer the question. Indeed, I think the parts of this speech fit nicely<br />
together if we understand the speech to be aiming to show this very necessity. In its fanciful<br />
beginning, Socrates declares that love is not a god, but the offspring of Resource and Need. Just what<br />
is it that the lover needs? The lover needs the Good, but so does everyone else. To distinguish the<br />
lover from the non-lover, Diotima claims that the lover generates in the beautiful. 2 She reasons that<br />
because the lover wants to possess the Good forever (206a), he creates, insofar as he can, something<br />
that persists. (Wanting to possess what is beautiful [204d, 211c-d], the lover makes beautiful things<br />
or himself becomes beautiful.) Thus, animal life is sustained indefinitely by the creation of offspring,<br />
whereas acts of virtue and noble speeches bring a person immortal fame.<br />
We can appreciate the significance of this reasoning by recognizing how implausible it is on<br />
the surface. The Good is eternal, of course, and it is human to want to possess it forever. Why,<br />
though, would one suppose that possessing eternity or some semblance of it would bring one closer to<br />
possessing the Good? Diotima’s account recalls the Demiurge of the Timaeus, and it is equally<br />
problematic. Seeking to imitate the forms, the Demiurge fashions a cosmos that is, so far as possible,<br />
1 Martha Craven Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy, 2nd ed.<br />
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 179, notices “all these ‘must’s,” and proposes that they represent a felt<br />
need to diminish unbearable sexual tension. There is no textual evidence for this claim, nor is there any textual ground to<br />
think that the ascent has a “negative motivation,” namely, to escape from physical contact. Rather, the lover’s positive<br />
desire for Beauty draws him upwards. Desire and “tension” must continue inasmuch as they motivate the climb.<br />
2 This account reverses the metaphor of the Theaetetus where it is the beloved who gives birth (150a-151d, esp. 151a).
Edward C. Halper<br />
eternal (cf. 29d-30a with 37c-d). 3 In my view, the reasoning in both dialogues is cogent because both<br />
are making the same implicit assumption: what is good persists, whereas what is bad does not. As<br />
Plato has Socrates explain in the Gorgias, the craftsman brings about order and organization in a<br />
matter and, doing so, he makes it good (503e-504e; cf. Tim. 30a). That is to say, the craftsman<br />
creates a being by ordering and organizing a matter. What enables this object to be is also what<br />
allows it to persist in being, and the order that allows it to persist fits the artifact to do its job and,<br />
thereby makes it beneficial. So, in creating offspring, acts, or speeches that persist, the lover not only<br />
has a share of eternity, but necessarily has a share in the goodness, that is, a share in the principle of<br />
order and organization, that allows there to be things that are, to a greater or lesser degree, eternal.<br />
A sign that this reasoning, or something like it, is implicit in the <strong>Symposium</strong> is that we can<br />
now understand how the lover differs from those who pursue the good in other ways and also how one<br />
lover differs from another. The lover strives to possess the good by creating something that will be<br />
organized in such a way that it could persist forever. Thus, the lover’s need for the Good is met by<br />
creating an imitation of the Good, and he can be called a lover because he has resourcefulness to make<br />
such an imitation. These imitations differ in how long they persist and, thus, how well they imitate<br />
the Good. A beautiful speech is assumed to be more long lasting than a child and the beauty “in”<br />
which the creator of the former creates is closer to Beauty itself than the beautiful body in which the<br />
latter creates. Hence, lovers who produce the former come closer to possessing the Good forever than<br />
the latter. Perhaps a parent comes as close to eternity with successive generations of offspring as the<br />
author of a beautiful poem, but the latter has a more immediate and direct role in creating an object<br />
that could itself persist eternally and his creation is intrinsically better because it occurs “in” the soul,<br />
something closer to Beauty itself. Inasmuch as nothing generated by the lover could ever be truly<br />
eternal, his desire to possess the Good must motivate him to be ever generating anew. Finally, since<br />
all lovers strive to possess the Good forever by generating objects (in the presence of Beauty), since<br />
some objects, those that are more long-lasting, allow their generator to come closer to their goal,<br />
lovers must constantly seek to generate objects that are more long-lasting. That is to say, the lover is<br />
forced by his need to possess the Good forever to exercise his resourcefulness and continually seek to<br />
generate those objects that, being closer to eternity themselves, will bring him closer to his goal. To<br />
be sure, not everyone is capable of climbing this ladder. Indeed, most people remain on its bottom<br />
rung. Nonetheless, for those who are capable, the necessity of climbing the ladder is the result of the<br />
nature of love.<br />
This explanation of the logical necessity of the climb involves three components, the beloved,<br />
the lover (who is resourceful and needy), and what he generates. However, the goal of the climb is to<br />
gaze on Beauty itself, and one who does so (a) knows what it is to be beautiful (211c8-d1) and (b)<br />
gives birth to true virtue (212a2-7). This latter must be the virtue that is simply knowledge, the goal<br />
of all Socratic dialogues. But there is an ambiguity here, for (a) and (b) both belong to the lover.<br />
Does the ascent end when the lover himself comes as close as humanly possible to being Beauty itself<br />
or when, because of this encounter, he somehow generates true virtue in another? Indeed, a parallel<br />
issue pervades the account the beauty of a beautiful body inspires generation in that beautiful body,<br />
and the result is another individual; but the beauty of a young soul inspires beautiful speeches that<br />
make that soul better (210c). How can the beloved benefit from these speeches if he is already<br />
beautiful, for insofar as something is beautiful it needs nothing? Presumably, he becomes still more<br />
beautiful in soul. Presumably, it is part of climbing the ladder to generate, first, something wholly<br />
external to beauty, a child, then, some increase in the beloved’s beauty, and, finally, one’s own self as<br />
beautiful. The first of these offspring do not truly belong to the lover. Only at the ultimate level is his<br />
product himself. At that stage, the lover becomes more like Beauty itself, self-sufficient and able to<br />
inspire virtue in others. Surprisingly, though, there is no real mutual interaction. The lover creates;<br />
the beloved does not. There is nothing here about the mutual love of lovers, both centerpieces of the<br />
accounts of love in the Lysis (212b-213c) and the Phaedrus (253d-257a) 4 and both essential for<br />
human relationships to endures. On Diotima’s ladder, only the lover’s relation with Beauty itself is<br />
legitimate. Human love falls by the way.<br />
3 David Keyt, “The Mad Craftsman of the Timaeus,” The Philosophical Review 80 (1971): 230–35, claims that the<br />
Demiurge mistakenly imitates the nicks and scratches of his model, rather than its substantial character.<br />
4 This lengthy passage could be read as Socrates’ reply to Alicbiades’ speech were it not apparent that the mutual benefit it<br />
describes did not occur. Note that 256a-b illustrates the proverb Socrates mentions at Symp. 174b.<br />
376
II<br />
Edward C. Halper<br />
With this understanding of Socrates’ argument, we can turn to Alcibiades’ speech. It is obvious that<br />
he has not climbed the ladder of loves. Had he done so, he would likely have been at the symposium<br />
with Socrates and the others. If Alcibiades lacked the intellectual capacity to climb the ladder or if he<br />
were not a lover, he would not pose a problem for Socrates’ account. If, however, neither of these nor<br />
any other exception to the account applies to Alcibiades, he is a counterexample to that account. In<br />
this case, just as Socrates’ speech undermines those that come before, the speech of Alcibiades would<br />
undermine Socrates’ argument that climbing the ladder is necessary.<br />
Whereas the other speakers deliver encomia to love, Alcibiades gives an encomium to<br />
Socrates, even though he came to the banquet intending to crown Agathon (212e). One repeated<br />
theme is that Socrates runs after all attractive boys (213c-d, 216d, 222b), but that he not really love<br />
with any of them. Others, perhaps other speakers at the banquet, may feign an interest in philosophy<br />
to secure physical intimacy, but Alcibiades suggests that Socrates feigns an interest in beautiful boys<br />
to engage them in philosophy (218a-b). Without having heard Socrates’ speech, Alcibiades comically<br />
describes how it feels to be the beloved of someone who climbs the ladder of loves from the love of a<br />
particular boy to the universal love of all beautiful bodies.<br />
A second theme of Alcibiades is Socrates’ moral character. This is what he refers to when he<br />
compares Socrates to a statue of Silenus, ugly on the outside but filled with “gods” (215b). The<br />
“gods” are the virtues. That no one is more moderate in his sexual appetites is illustrated by Socrates’<br />
firm resistance to Alcibiades’ most explicit enticements (217a-219d). His moderation in respect of<br />
food, drink, and physical comfort is evidenced by his imperturbability to hardships, including the<br />
cold, on military campaign (219e-220c). His courage is manifest at Potidea where Alcibiades claims<br />
he outshone the notably courageous Laches and not only rescued Alcibiades but insisted that the latter<br />
receive an award for courage (220d-221b). It is clear from this description that Socrates has attained<br />
the beauty of the soul that he describes as the next rung on the ladder of loves (210b-c). In<br />
consequence of this beauty he “gives birth to such discourses as make young men better” and comes<br />
“to gaze on the beauty of activities and laws” which he sees as akin to his own soul. Alcibiades fully<br />
recognizes the aim of these discourses and their power, he acknowledges his shame in resisting them<br />
(215e-216c).<br />
The next rung of Socrates’ ladder is the love of knowledge, an object that he must come to<br />
after the love of laws (210c-d). As we saw, Socrates claims that the lover of knowledge creates many<br />
beautiful speeches and eventually comes to the knowledge of Beauty itself (210d). Gazing on Beauty<br />
itself, his soul becomes truly virtuous and immortal (212a-b). This step of the ladder receives cursory<br />
treatment in Alcibiades’ account. He ascribes knowledge (φρόνησις) to Socrates (219d), he speaks of<br />
the Socrates and his companions, including himself, as smitten with the madness and Bacchic frenzy<br />
of philosophy (218b), and he mentions Socrates’ arguments about blacksmiths, cobblers and other<br />
ordinary activities that, nonetheless have deep inner meaning and are important for becoming truly<br />
good (221d-222a)—arguments that could as well stem from the preceding rung, the love of the<br />
beautiful soul. 5 But what probably best describes Socrates’ love of knowledge, the practice of<br />
philosophy, Alcibiades can only describe externally, as his standing fixed to a place contemplating a<br />
philosophical problem all night (220c-d). 6<br />
My aim here is not to summarize Alcibiades’ speech, but to rearrange it to understand its<br />
import. Alcibiades warns us that his speech will be disordered—he ascribes this to his own<br />
drunkenness and Socrates’ bizarreness (214e-215a). When we unscramble his speech, we see that<br />
Alcibiades covers precisely the same ground as Socrates. He, too, describes the ladder but, of course,<br />
from his own perspective. He makes clear what Socrates cannot say without arrogance, that Socrates<br />
has climbed the ladder himself. (By putting the speech in the mouth of Diotima, Socrates can<br />
describe the ladder without implying that he himself has stood at the summit.) Alciabiades’ account<br />
of Socrates’ love of knowledge is brief and external, likely reflecting his lack of direct personal<br />
engagement with philosophical issues, as I said. It contrasts sharply with his description of Socrates’<br />
love of all physical beauty and of beautiful souls: here Alcibiades’ understanding and appreciation are<br />
profound. Of all Socrates’ interlocutors, Alcibiades is the only one who gives a description that<br />
comes close to grasping who he is. Meletus, Meno, Gorgias, and Protagoras appreciate the power of<br />
Socrates’ intellect, but they cannot grasp his ideas. Alcibiades understands Socrates’ virtues, he<br />
5 C. D. C. Reeve, “A Study in Violets: Alcibiades in the <strong>Symposium</strong>,” in Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong>: Issues in Interpretation and<br />
Reception, ed. James Lesher, Debra Nails, Frisbee Sheffield (Washington, D.C.: Center for Hellenic Studies, 2006), 129,<br />
141: “Alcibiades’ portrait [of Socrates] unwittingly mimics Diotima’s.”<br />
6 Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness, 184, recognizes this last as sign of Socrates’ ascent.<br />
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Edward C. Halper<br />
understands that the homey arguments Socrates is always making aim to produce virtuous souls, he<br />
sees Socrates’ actions as a manifestation of his virtue, and he loves Socrates because of his virtue<br />
(219d). 7<br />
Why, then, does Alcibiades remain unaffected by those arguments? Why does he not himself<br />
become virtuous? Why does he not come to appreciate law or to be a philosopher? This cannot be<br />
because he is not led rightly or intellectually deficient; for Socrates is his teacher, and Alcibiades<br />
understands Socrates—far better, it seems, than Apollodorus or Aristodemus, both of whom we know<br />
from the dialogue’s beginning did try to emulate Socrates. Alcibiades understands Socrates so well<br />
that he must “stop [his] ears and tear [him]self away from [Socrates], for, like the Sirens, he could<br />
make [Alcibiades] stay by his side till [Alcibiades dies]” (216a-c). 8 Indeed, there is some reason to<br />
think that Alcibiades truly desires philosophy, for he wants to seduce Socrates in order that the latter<br />
might teach him all he knows (217a). He may suppose that a fallen Socrates could not refuse to teach<br />
him how to win arguments (cf. 213e; Prot. 336b-d), 9 but, again, he sees that the arguments Socrates<br />
constantly uses are “of the greatest importance to anyone who wants to become a truly good man”<br />
(222a). Alcibiades understands the ladder of loves, but he does not climb the ladder. No one is more<br />
disappointed in himself than Alcibiades, yet he says nothing by way of self-defense or explanation.<br />
(Instead, he speaks to his audience as the “jury . . . that is to sit in judgment of Socrates’ amazing<br />
arrogance and pride” [219c]—as if Socrates is on trial rather than himself.) The depth of appreciation<br />
that Alcibidades displays for Socrates makes his own failure to pursue philosophy unintelligible and<br />
that, I suggest, is Plato’s point: Alcibiades serves to undermine the universality that Socrates claims<br />
for his account. Alcibiades recognizes his need for the good, and he has the resourcefulness to pursue<br />
it—as evidenced here by his resourcefulness in contriving circumstances in which to seduce Socrates.<br />
Apart from Socrates’ soul, he loves Agathon for his beauty; but he does not climb the ladder. 10<br />
Evidently, Socrates is wrong about love.<br />
There is another dramatic detail here that raises questions about Socrates’ speech. Alcibiades<br />
compares Socrates to Pericles and other orators (215e4-7); Socrates clearly gets the prize. Although<br />
he breifly refers to his arguments (λόγοι at 221d7-e1 cannot be “speeches”), there is nearly no<br />
mention of dialectic. The only place Alcibiades does mention it points up how ineffecutal it is:<br />
Socrates ignored Alcibiades’ attempts to seduce him and continued his usual dialogue (διαλεχθεὶς)<br />
(217b2-7). Phaedrus and Agathon realize that Socrates would prefer dialogue to giving a speech<br />
(194d-e), but Alcibiades appears not to notice. For him, Socrates always gives speeches, and<br />
Socrates’ earlier speech is not at all a departure. Surprisingly, Socrates also omits dialogue from his<br />
speech; he claims to be persuaded (πέπεισµαι δ’ ἐγώ) by Diotima (212b); 11 and his lover gives birth to<br />
speeches (210d4-6). But a speech addresses an entire audience and cannot be questioned: it must be<br />
defective. Socrates’ omission of dialogue from his speech would seem, then, to reflect the defective<br />
form of any speech, but Alcibiades’ omission of dialogue appears to reflect his own inability to<br />
interact with Socrates. He faults Socrates’ actions, but not what Socrates says. His comparison of<br />
Socrates’ arguments to the Silenus statues (222a)—ridiculous on the outside, containing a god<br />
within—suggests the problem: one cannot question a god as one must question a philosophical<br />
argument. He cannot engage Socrates because he is convinced that Socrates is right.<br />
Alcibiades’ entry into the dialogue belongs to what is commonly regarded as the dramatic<br />
action of the dialogue, in contrast with its arguments. We have seen, though that this dramatic action<br />
cannot be divorced from the dialogue’s philosophical content. The drama here refutes Socrates’<br />
7 Socrates’ assertion that Alcibiades is sober after all (222c) returns the compliment Alcibiades had paid to him (220a) and<br />
signifies, perhaps, Socrates’ appreciation (misplaced, it turned out) of his moral character.<br />
8 Alcibiades’ own inability to pursue philosophy undermines Michael Gargarin, “Socrates’ Hybris and Alcibiades’ Failure,”<br />
Phoenix 31 (1977): 35–37, argument that Socrates’ hybris is to blame. Gargarin thinks that, through dramatic clues, the<br />
dialogue presents Socrates as having achieved a knowledge of beauty that separates him from his interlocutors/lovers and<br />
frustrates their attempts to pursue knowledge with him.<br />
9 Or does he suppose, like Agathon at 175c-d, that proximity to Socrates will make knowledge will flow into him? Of<br />
course, neither is a way to acquire knowledge, but they point to a central theme in the dialogue.<br />
10. Elizabeth S. Belfiore, Socrates’ Daimonic Art: Love for Wisdom in Four Platonic Dialogues (Cambridge: Cambridge<br />
University Press, 2012), compares Agathon to Alcibiades. Both are beloved by Socrates and both accuse him of hubris. She<br />
argues that Agathon does not pursue philosophy because he lacks a passionate nature (p. 184). In my view, it is more in<br />
keeping with the dialogue to say, rather, that Agathon lacks the need of the lover, a point that emerges not only in his speech<br />
on Eros, but also in Socrates’ pun on his name (174b). As Belfiore notes here, scholars are divided on whether Socrates or<br />
Alcibiades is to blame for his failure. I think both sides are mistake. The dialogue blames neither. The Alcibiades I, if<br />
authentic, confirms the brilliance of Alicibiades’ understanding of Socrates.<br />
11 This persuasion is a mere belief that is not produced by arguments (cf. Crito 46b); Belfiore, Socrates’ Daimonic Art, 155.<br />
She explains how Socrates’ speech is persuasive (pp. 159-60), but does not mention how uncharacteristic of Socrates this is.<br />
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argument or, as we will see, refines that argument. If this is right, then Socrates cannot be Plato’s<br />
“mouthpiece” in the <strong>Symposium</strong>.<br />
III<br />
The case of Alcibiades is unintelligible. Socrates’ account would make love intelligible. In<br />
presenting this account, albeit in the Diotima’s name, Socrates is contradicting himself. On one hand,<br />
he declares that love is not a god but an intermediary between the gods and the physical world (202e).<br />
As such, love stands between knowledge and ignorance as somehow akin to true belief (202a). On<br />
the other hand, the speech he presents purports to expound knowledge of love. The necessity of<br />
climbing the latter is a mark of this assumed intelligibility. As we saw, it is because the lover needs<br />
the Good and has the resourcefulness to pursue it, he must ever seek ways of coming closer to<br />
possessing the Good. Alcibiades’ example refutes this tacit claim of intelligibility. If, though, love is<br />
not fully intelligible nor entirely unintelligible, it must be an intermediate, as Socrates had said. So it<br />
is that what is presented as a counter example serves ironically to support Socrates’ account. As the<br />
Timaeus might have put it, the account is a likely story. That there is a notable exception confirms its<br />
being merely a likely story.<br />
Alcibiades, however, would seem to think that ladder story is true in only one case, that of<br />
Socrates. Throughout the speech, he refers to Socrates as a kind of god, and at the end he insists that<br />
Socrates is truly unique (221c). Evidently, he means to say that it is only Socrates who pursues virtue<br />
and philosophy as a lover. Again, I think that the opening of the <strong>Symposium</strong> is meant to refute this<br />
claim by showing Socrates had a profound effect on turning his companions to the pursuit of<br />
philosophy. Indeed, Alcibiades declares that his “whole life has become one constant effort to escape<br />
from him and keep away” (216b). Sadly, Alcibiades succeeded too well. 12<br />
Socrates’ speech describes a movement toward philosophy that must transform all lovers and,<br />
perhaps, all people; Alcibiades describes the movement that is unique to Socrates. Whereas Socrates<br />
sees the lover as coming to love the universal, Alcibiades himself loves Socrates as a uniquely divine<br />
individual. Because he sees Socrates as unique, he supposes he cannot emulate him. We can<br />
speculate that his supposed defacing of the Herms is somehow connected to the thought that they,<br />
with their prominent genitals, were impersonating the divinity that the self-controlled Socrates more<br />
truly manifested and that Alcibiades’ supposed profaning of the Eleusinian mysteries was an<br />
affirmation that not they but the mysteries into which Diotima initiated Socrates are the legitimate<br />
Eleusinian mysteries (210a). 13<br />
In a famous paper, “The Individual as Object of Love in Plato,” Gregory Vlastos argues that<br />
Plato was mistaken in supposing that a universal, rather than a particular person is the legitimate<br />
object of love. 14 He reasons that one who loves Beauty cannot do what is essential to love: wish for<br />
another’s good for that person’s own sake by having “imaginative sympathy and concern for what<br />
[our fellows] themselves think, feel, and want.” Alcibiades does not agree. He is convinced that<br />
Socrates cares deeply about what he wants—so deeply that Socrates convinces him that politics and<br />
crowd-pleasing cannot possibly bring him closer to it (216a-c; cf. 220d-e). Vlastos is mistaken about<br />
what a lover desires: for Plato, as for most of us, someone who truly desires good for another does<br />
not exhibit “sympathy” for or acceptance of (wrong-headed) goals the other has set for himself, but<br />
works with him to rectify those goals. Martha Nussbaum agrees with Vlastos that love for the<br />
universal is misguided. 15 That is why she thinks Socrates represents a threat to Alcibiades. Since, she<br />
reasons, Alcibiades sees Socrates as a unique individual and loves him for himself, Alcibiades’ love<br />
12 On the tragi-comic dimension of Alcibiades, and Socrates as well, see Edward C. Halper, “Humor, Dialectic, and Human<br />
Nature in Plato,” Epoché: A Journal of the History of Philosophy 15 (2011): 319–30.<br />
13 Gary Alan Scott and William A Welton., Erotic Wisdom: Philosophy and Intermediacy in Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong> (Albany,<br />
NY: State University of New York Press, 2008), 182–83, arrive at the opposite conclusion: they think Alcibiades’ crimes<br />
were attacks on Socrates. They ascribe his failure to excessive pride.<br />
14 Gregory Vlastos, “The Individual as Object of Love in Plato,” in Platonic Studies (Princeton: Princeton University Press,<br />
1981), 26, 32–33. Vlastos begins his paper by discussing Aristotle’s remarks on friendship in the Rhetoric and Plato’s Lysis,<br />
and what follows depends heavily on his interpretation of them. (Later, Gregory Vlastos, Socrates, Ironist and Moral<br />
Philosopher [Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1991], 41–44, claims that Socrates’ harm to Alcibiades was an<br />
unintended consequence of his pursuit of the universal; he does not exonerate Socrates.) Vlastos’s article spurred a great<br />
deal of discussion on whether ancient Greek accounts of friendship are egoistic or altruistic. In my view this is a false<br />
dichotomy. Ideal relationships are both; see Edward C. Halper, “Plato and Aristotle on Friendship,” in Form and Reason:<br />
Essays in Metaphysics (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1993), 35–55.<br />
15 Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness, 181, imagines valuing the universal to require regarding everything beautiful, all<br />
bodies and souls, as interchangeable. On the contrary, one who grasps the beauty of all beautiful bodies sets aside the<br />
physical possession of any one (210b4-6).<br />
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would be undermined by his climbing the ladder. 16 She would explain Alcibiades’ not climbing the<br />
ladder as a heroic stand to preserve his love of Socrates as an individual. This is not the character<br />
Plato presents to us in this dialogue. Instead, the <strong>Symposium</strong> shows Alcibiades evaluating Socrates<br />
by the same criterion Socrates uses to evaluate him, moral virtue: he is stunned by the degree of<br />
Socrates’ courage and self-control. He is in love with a moral virtue that exceeds anything he has<br />
encountered. What makes Alcibiades so puzzling is not his commitment to unintelligible experience,<br />
as Nussbaum imagines, but his appreciation of Socrates because Socrates has climbed the ladder.<br />
Moreover, he knows that philosophy is at the core of Socrates’ virtue. He may believe Socrates’ mad<br />
devotion to philosophy is an individual quirk (218b), but he knows that philosophy is not a hobby and<br />
that it is responsible for the moral virtue that makes Socrates so attractive. Alicibiades’ dilemma is<br />
that he cannot recognize the value of philosophy without himself pursuing it, but he cannot give up<br />
his political aspirations. His soul is divided. It is, I propose, as if Plato had anticipated Vlastos and<br />
Nussbaum and included a character designed to illustrate the disastrous consequences of taking an<br />
individual as the object of love.<br />
To be sure, Alcibiades and Socrates could simply agree that the pursuits of the other, though<br />
legitimate, are not for them. But, then, they would not engage in activities together. It is this latter,<br />
rather than wishing another well, that Plato (and Aristotle) take as central to a love relationship. For<br />
the same reason, if each of them takes the other as his end, their activities will not share the same end.<br />
Nor is the individual as an object of love any more attainable than the Good as an object of love.<br />
What makes the Good the more suitable object of a sustainable relationship is its universality: both<br />
lovers can pursue it as an end. The <strong>Symposium</strong> shows Socrates presenting a beautiful speech about<br />
love, a speech that nicely incorporates the insights of the previous speeches, but there is little of the<br />
direct engagement with interlocutors that is so prominent in other dialogues. The end of all the<br />
symposiasts is a universal, Beauty or Good, but they pursue it as individuals. Alcibiades helps the<br />
reader to see what is missing, for the reader recognizes that Alcibiades could engage Socrates in<br />
philosophical discourse but mysteriously chooses not to do so. And Alcibiabes wants to have<br />
Socrates’ knowledge for his own individual (political) ends, something that Socrates cannot pursue<br />
and share with him. Whereas Socrates speaks of a lover’s necessary ascent up the ladder of loves and<br />
sees its culmination is his individual communion with the Good, Alcibiades’ speech inadvertently<br />
makes clear the essential correctives, namely, that this ascent is not an individual endeavor but one<br />
best undertaken with another and that the other may, for no reason at all, be unable to undertake or<br />
complete it. The <strong>Symposium</strong> does not discuss whether it is better to pursue the Good jointly as lovers<br />
by creating discourses and speeches or to pursue one’s more private interests, but the contrast between<br />
Socrates’ joyous begetting of speeches with others and Alcibiades’ drunken debauchery and, despite<br />
the other revelers, his isolation is a dramatic endorsement of a suitably corrected version of Socrates’<br />
account.<br />
Bibliography<br />
Belfiore, Elizabeth S. Socrates’ Daimonic Art: Love for Wisdom in Four Platonic Dialogues.<br />
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.<br />
Gagarin, Michael. “Socrates’ Hybris and Alcibiades’ Failure.” Phoenix 31 (1977): 22–37.<br />
Halper, Edward C. “Humor, Dialectic, and Human Nature in Plato” Epoché: A Journal of the<br />
History of Philosophy 15 (2011): 319–30.<br />
------. “Plato and Aristotle on Friendship.” In Form and Reason: Essays in Metaphysics, 35–55.<br />
Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1993.<br />
Keyt, David. “The Mad Craftsman of the Timaeus.” The Philosophical Review 80 (1971): 230–<br />
35.<br />
Nussbaum, Martha Craven. The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and<br />
Philosophy. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.<br />
Reeve, C. D. C. “A Study in Violets: Alcibiades in the <strong>Symposium</strong>.” In Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong>:<br />
Issues in Interpretation and Reception, edited by James Lesher, Debra Nails, and Frisbee<br />
Sheffield, 124-46. Washington, D.C.: Center for Hellenic Studies, 2006.<br />
16 Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness, 198, thinks Alcibiades and Socrates represent two irreconcilable ways of knowing.<br />
She argues that Alicbiades’ seeing Socrates as an individual entails not only seeing his virtue but also seeing Socrates as a<br />
whole (p. 190). Her argument relies on Alcibiades’ using an image to describe Socrates (signaling that Socrates is not a fully<br />
intelligible universal) and declaring that he is going to speak the truth (214e-215b). My objection is that in the Apology<br />
Socrates claims to speak the truth (17b-c) and also uses an image to describe himself (30e). Further, she says nothing about<br />
the begetting in beauty that is the center of Socrates’ account of love.<br />
380
Edward C. Halper<br />
Scott, Gary Alan, and William A Welton. Erotic Wisdom: Philosophy and Intermediacy in<br />
Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong>. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2008.<br />
Vlastos, Gregory. “The Individual as Object of Love in Plato.” In Platonic Studies, 3–42.<br />
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981.<br />
------. Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press,<br />
1991.<br />
381
ABSTRACT<br />
Platon als Lehrer des Sokrates<br />
Rafael Ferber<br />
Dass Sokrates Lehrer Platons war, ist ein unbestrittenes historisches Faktum. Eine umstrittene Frage<br />
ist es dagegen, wo wir die Grenze zwischen dem historischen (bzw. frühen platonischen) und dem<br />
platonischen Sokrates anzusetzen haben. Der Vortrag soll die These vertreten, dass Platon diese<br />
Grenze durch Einführung der „weisesten Diotima“ (Smp.208b8) markiert hat. Da – unabhängig von<br />
der Frage, ob Diotima eine historische Figur war – aus dem Munde Diotimas Platon spricht, kann in<br />
gewissem Sinne auch Platon als Lehrer des Sokrates bezeichnet werden.<br />
Der Vortrag hat drei Teile:<br />
In einem ersten Teil soll (I) ein kurzer Überblick ueber die sogenannte „sokratische Frage“ gegeben<br />
werden, wie sie sich insbesondere in der Diskussion zwischen Unitariern (Ch. Kahn) einerseits und<br />
Vertretern einer philosophischen Entwicklung (G. Vlastos, T. Penner, Ch. Rowe, T. Brickhouse/ N.<br />
Smith et al.) andererseits zeigt. In einem zweiten Teil (II) soll gezeigt werden, dass die dividing line<br />
zwischen dem historischen und dem platonischen Sokrates nicht in der unterschiedlichen<br />
Moralpsychologie liegt. Weder markiert die dreigeteilte Seele (vgl.R.440a-b) den entscheidenden<br />
Unterschied (Penner/Rowe) noch liegt sie in der These: "In the Socratic account, appetites make<br />
presentations of goodness; in the platonic account, appetites make actual judgments of goodness."<br />
(Brickhouse/Smith) 1 . Im dritten Teil (III) soll nachgewiesen werden, dass die Unterscheidung durch<br />
Platon selber durch die Einführung von Diotima bezeichnet wurde. Dabei soll insbesondere folgender<br />
Satz genau interpretiert werden: „Soweit nun, o Sokrates, vermagst wohl auch du in die Geheimnisse<br />
der Liebe eingeweiht zu werden; ob aber, wenn jemand die höchsten und heiligsten, auf welche sich<br />
auch jene beziehen, recht vortrüge, du es auch vermöchtest, weiß ich nicht.“ (Smp.209e5-210a2, uebs.<br />
F. D. Schleiermacher). F. M. Cornford schreibt dazu: „I incline to agree with those scholars who have<br />
seen in this sentence Plato’s intention to mark the limit reached by the philosophy of his master“ 2 . F.<br />
M. Cornford könnte sich damit auf Otto Apelts Anmerkung zur Stelle beziehen: „Die Figur der<br />
Diotima verdankt ihr Dasein wohl der Phantasie des Platon. Sie dient ihm dazu, Sokratisches und<br />
Platonisches Erkenntnisgut scharf voneinander zu unterscheiden.“ 3 Diese alte These, dass Platon mit<br />
Diotima Sokratisches und Platonisches Erkenntnisgut scharf zu unterscheiden versuchte, soll neu<br />
begründet und in ihren Konsequenzen entfaltet werden.<br />
1 Th. Brickhouse/N. Smith, Socratic Moral Psychology, Oxford 2010, p. 205.<br />
2 F. M. Cornford „The doctrine of Eros in Plato’s <strong>Symposium</strong>” in; The unwritten philosophy and other essays,<br />
Cambridge 1950, 68-80, quotation p.75<br />
3 Platon, Gastmahl, neu übersetzt und erläutert v. O. Apelt, Leipzig 1926, p. 82, n. 54.
Sócrates aprendiz y maestro de Eros:<br />
conocimiento erótico y profesión de ignorancia en Platón, <strong>Symposium</strong><br />
Graciela E. Marcos de Pinotti<br />
La imagen de Sócrates que brindan los diálogos platónicos responde a una concepción de la actividad<br />
filosófica que hace hincapié en la aspiración de saber antes que en su posesión efectiva. La<br />
consciencia de carencia, la problematización, el reconocimiento de no saber y la permanente<br />
disposición a examinar las propias opiniones en aras de la liberación de la falsa presunción de saber<br />
son rasgos que el Sócrates platónico encarna y valora más que todo porque ponen en marcha el<br />
proceso de indagación en que consiste la filosofía. Esta concepción, reflejada tanto en los primeros<br />
diálogos como en la célebre imagen de Sócrates como "mayéutico" o partero espiritual en Tht. 157c2d2,<br />
está presente también en Symp., cuya caracterización de Eros desplegada en 203c6-e5 evoca a<br />
Sócrates en cuerpo y alma. Ciertos rasgos asociados tradicionalmente a la práctica socrática de la<br />
filosofía aparecen en Symp., sin embargo, bajo una luz nueva, que deja ver aristas hasta entonces<br />
inexploradas, a veces paradójicas, de una imagen de Sócrates que contrasta, en cierto modo, con la<br />
ofrecida en otros diálogos. Me refiero a su profesión de ignorancia (i), a su negativa a ser considerado<br />
maestro (ii) y a su particular concepción acerca de la naturaleza del saber y del modo de transmisión<br />
de la verdad (iii). Al menos tres pasajes del diálogo no condicen, en principio, con estos rasgos. En<br />
Symp. 177d7-8 Sócrates admite tener conocimiento acerca de las cosas del amor (tà erotiká), lo cual<br />
aparentemente contradice su habitual profesión de ignorancia. Luego en Symp. 199a8-b5, anuncia que<br />
dirá la verdad sobre eros, lo que está en tensión con su usual negativa a transmitir una verdad con<br />
pretensión enseñante. 1 El conocimiento de tà erotiká que Sócrates reivindica, por otra parte, procede<br />
de Diotima, algo que a simple vista choca con sus habituales reservas acerca de la posibilidad de<br />
transmisión directa de saber desde un individuo a otro.<br />
Mi propósito es examinar el conocimiento erótico que Sócrates admite poseer y, sobre esta<br />
base, despejar las tensiones apuntadas. La habitual maestría de Platón para adaptar sus ideas a un<br />
diálogo particular le permitiría en Symp. hablarnos de Sócrates/filósofo indirectamente, hablándonos<br />
de Eros, 2 y describir positivamente, como conocimiento erótico, la conciencia de carencia y la<br />
habitual profesión de ignorancia que dan sentido a su práctica refutativa. El conocimiento erótico,<br />
sostendré, no es saber que se pueda encontrar y capturar, sino disposición a buscar nacida de la<br />
apetencia de conocimiento que anida en el alma del filósofo. En tanto envuelve el reconocimiento de<br />
los límites del propio saber, supone estar en posesión de verdades acerca de éros pero no ya la<br />
seguridad de estar en lo cierto, asumiendo la forma de un saber provisorio que impulsa a Sócrates al<br />
examen permanente. Tampoco en este punto, entonces, habría excepciones a su profesión de<br />
ignorancia. Por otra parte, de acuerdo con la descripción de la instrucción recibida de Diotima, el<br />
punto de partida de este conocimiento sería una opinión recta (orthè dóxa), a mitad de camino entre el<br />
conocimiento y la ignorancia, un tipo de saber que puede ser transmitido de un individuo a otro y cuya<br />
eficacia en el plano práctico ha sido siempre reconocida por Platón. Al reivindicar este tipo de<br />
conocimiento, Sócrates se mantendría fiel, otra vez, a su profesión de ignorancia, aplicado a una<br />
búsqueda infatigable que redunda en el mejoramiento de sí mismo.<br />
***<br />
¿Cómo compatibilizar la ignorancia que Sócrates profesa habitualmente con su reconocimiento de<br />
saber de las cosas del amor?<br />
Por empezar, la de Sócrates no es la mayor ignorancia, propia de quien cree saber lo que no<br />
sabe y se cierra a toda búsqueda (Rep. II 382b6-7, Symp. 204a2-6), sino la de quien reconoce no saber<br />
y se dispone a indagar. Envuelve un saber del no saber, o de los límites del propio saber, distintivo de<br />
quien tiene un persistente anhelo de conocimiento. Si bien su formulación más célebre la<br />
proporcionan los pasajes de Apol. donde Sócrates declara que no sabe pero tampoco cree saber (21d5-<br />
6, 22e3-4, etc.), puede considerarse paralela la ofrecida en Men. 98b2-5, donde al igual que en Symp.,<br />
1 Más aún, su rol en Symp. ha sido interpretado como el de activo progenitor y productor de ideas, lejos de la imagen de<br />
mayéutico que niega su propia fertilidad, que no produce él mismo conocimientos sino que ayuda a otros a que den a luz sus<br />
propias ideas. Cf. Dover (1980), n. ad loc. Symp. 208b7-209e4, 151: "a midwife's role is not a progenitor's".<br />
2 Sobre la "asimilación" Eros/Socrates en la descripción de Diotima, especialmente en su explicación del nacimiento de Eros<br />
en Symp. 203b-d, cf. Osborne (1994), 94s. Hornsby (1956), 38, hace hincapié en que "Alcibiades employs the same terms in<br />
the panegyric on Socrates as Socrates used when he described Love". En esta dirección cf. también Dorter (1969), 232;<br />
Gagarin (1977), 29, etc.
Graciela E. Marcos de Pinotti<br />
Sócrates pone énfasis en que su saber lo es de una sola cosa. En ese caso se trata del reconocimiento<br />
de que la recta opinión y el conocimiento son cosas distintas. "si alguna cosa puedo afirmar que sé –y<br />
pocas serían las que afirme–, dice allí Sócrates, esta es precisamente una de las que pondría entre<br />
ellas". La distinción entre orthè dóxa y epistéme reaparece en Symp. 202a5, pasaje al que volveré<br />
luego.<br />
Reconocer que la opinión recta no constituye conocimiento, o que la sabiduría humana reside<br />
en no creer saber lo que no se sabe, son formulaciones negativas que apuntan a la precariedad de<br />
nuestro saber y dan sentido a la práctica refutativa de Sócrates, consistente en someter a prueba las<br />
opiniones y socavar la ilusoria confianza en que ya se conoce. Y bien, en Symp. hay indicios de que el<br />
conocimiento erótico que Sócrates declara poseer es un saber esencialmente negativo que funda ese<br />
tipo de práctica.<br />
Así p.e. cuando en Symp. 177d7-8, Sócrates dice no saber nada excepto las cosas del amor<br />
(oudén phemi állo epístasthai è tà erotiká), queda claro que se trata de un conocimiento singular,<br />
único, que contrasta con la vastedad de lo que ignora. La posesión de tal conocimiento no solo no<br />
contradice su habitual profesión de ignorancia, sino que se presenta como inseparable del<br />
reconocimiento de los límites del propio saber. A lo mismo apunta Sócrates al anunciar el relato<br />
acerca de Eros que oyó un día de labios de una mujer de Mantinea, Diotima, "sabia en esta y otras<br />
muchas cosas (taûtá te sophè ên kaì álla pollá, Symp. 201d3)". El contraste es claro entre las pocas<br />
cosas que Sócrates admite saber y la vastedad del conocimiento de la sabia que lo instruyó en las<br />
cosas del amor. Notemos que lejos de estar reñida con su conciencia de no saber, la declaración<br />
socrática de que posee conocimiento erótico hace hincapié en el carácter limitado de cuanto se sabe.<br />
Luego en Symp. 202d1-2, al subrayar que "Eros, por carecer de cosas buenas y bellas, desea<br />
precisamente eso mismo de que está falto", se hace explícito que el conocimiento erótico lo es de un<br />
cierto bien del que se carece y que se instituye en objeto de deseo. 3 En tanto conciencia de carencia, se<br />
trata de un conocimiento atravesado por una radical negatividad. La posterior afirmación de que Eros<br />
es necesariamente un filósofo, i.e. un amante de la sabiduría, en medio del sabio y del ignorante<br />
(anankaiôn Érota philósophon eînai, philósophon dè ónta metaxù eînai sophoû kaì amathoûs, 204b4-<br />
5), muestra que el bien que constituye su objeto no es otro que la sabiduría. Eros designa así el<br />
impulso a filosofar de quienes, como Sócrates, se aplican a la búsqueda del conocimiento que no<br />
tienen pero cuya posesión anhelan.<br />
Platón expresa en términos positivos, como conocimiento de las cosas del amor, un tipo<br />
especial de saber muy cercano al que adjudica habitualmente a su maestro. Es significativo el juego de<br />
palabras, en Symp. 199b8-c2 y e7, entre el verbo erotáo, interrogar a alguien, y el sustantivo éros,<br />
mediante el cual se expresaría que tà erotiká es tanto el arte de interrogar como el arte erótico, 4<br />
vínculo apuntado también en Cra. 398c5-e5. Si a ello añadimos que el progreso erótico es, al mismo<br />
tiempo, un progreso en la filosofía, 5 no sorprende que en Symp. Platón presente a Sócrates como<br />
alguien que domina ambos artes. Cuando éste declara honrar las cosas del amor y practicarlas<br />
sobremanera, "recomendándolas a los demás y elogiando, ahora y siempre, el poder y la valentía 6 de<br />
eros, en la medida en que soy capaz" (Symp. 212b5-8), entiendo que está refiriéndose a su práctica<br />
habitual de la filosofía. 7 En todo caso, si hasta el momento Platón supo poner el acento en el costado<br />
negativo, refutativo, del interrogatorio socrático dirigido a la liberación de la falsa presunción de<br />
saber, ahora se centra más bien en su aspecto constructivo, productivo, cristalizado en una práctica de<br />
la filosofía que redunda en el perfeccionamiento de sí. Desde la ignorancia socrática, condición de<br />
toda búsqueda, en Symp. la atención se concentra en la búsqueda misma en que consiste la filosofía y<br />
en el papel activo que asume quien la emprende. Es en este contexto donde Platón describe la práctica<br />
socrática en términos de técnica erótica.<br />
En consonancia con su profesión de ignorancia, Sócrates rehúsa habitualmente describirse a sí<br />
mismo como maestro capaz de transmitir saber alguno, insistiendo en que nada enseña. Aquí, en<br />
cambio, anuncia que dirá la verdad (Symp. 199a8, b3) sobre ello y si bien lo hará a su manera –sin<br />
3<br />
Sobre la estrecha conexión entre eros y deseo cf. Warner (1979), 330-331. Sobre la negatividad inherente a eros y su<br />
"naturaleza esencialmente temporal", cf. Roochnik (1987), 117-120.<br />
4<br />
Reeve (1992), 92-93, para quien "when Socrates claims to know tà erotiká, we ought I think to understand Plato to be<br />
doing something rather complex. He is presenting Socrates as claiming to know the art of questioning ... and at the same<br />
time that art is being identified with, or at least importantly related to, the art of love".<br />
5<br />
Cf. Osborne (1994), 93: "...the progress in love is progress in philosophy, and hence the guide will be not only an expert in<br />
love, but also a philosophy teacher".<br />
6<br />
La referencia a la valentía de Eros apunta seguramente, explica Rowe (1998), n. ad loc. Symp. 212b7-8, 202, a lo esforzado<br />
(ponoi, 210e6) del ascenso.<br />
7<br />
Sócrates habría incursionado en la filosofía, por ende habría tenido experiencia en tà erotiká, antes de su encuentro con<br />
Diotima, práctica que a la luz de la instrucción recibida posteriormente, puede ser descripta en términos de un elogio a Eros.<br />
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Graciela E. Marcos de Pinotti<br />
intentar competir con los discursos dados hasta ese momento y sirviéndose de las palabras y giros que<br />
le surjan–, hay de su parte una clara voluntad de exponer ante sus interlocutores un discurso<br />
verdadero. Presentarse como portavoz de una verdad, unido a su previa admisión de saber acerca de<br />
las cosas del amor, choca, otra vez, con sus habituales reservas para transmitir un saber positivo.<br />
La dificultad puede en parte despejarse si asumimos que ni el usual reconocimiento de<br />
ignorancia por parte de Sócrates ni su rechazo de toda pretensión enseñante son incompatibles con la<br />
posesión de opiniones verdaderas, sino únicamente con la seguridad de estar en lo cierto. Ni Sócrates<br />
ni sus interlocutores suelen estar privados de opiniones, al contrario, de hecho la práctica refutativa<br />
ilustrada en los primeros diálogos platónicos parte de las dóxai de los interlocutores y las pone a<br />
prueba. 8 Lo que singulariza la búsqueda socrática no es, en fin, la falta de opiniones sino la<br />
permanente disposición a someterlas a examen, de modo que si el conocimiento de tà erotiká<br />
envuelve la posesión de verdades acerca de eros, Sócrates puede reivindicar este saber sin por eso<br />
traicionar su profesión de ignorancia. Ahora bien, que el conocimiento erótico tiene carácter de dóxa<br />
es claro a partir de la explicación que ofrece Sócrates de su procedencia: es un saber que le ha sido<br />
transmitido por otra persona, Diotima. Mediante el recurso de desplazar la conversación a un pasado<br />
remoto, Platón hace que Sócrates pase de interrogador molesto y temido a ingenuo examinado, que<br />
dice lo que dice no como fruto de su sabiduría superior al resto de los hombres, sino como una<br />
revelación de la vidente. 9 Sócrates, receptor privilegiado de la verdad acerca de eros, es capaz a su vez<br />
de transmitirla a sus pares sin abandonar en ningún momento su posición de indagador ni su profesión<br />
de ignorancia. Acude a Diotima consciente de que necesita maestros (207c: gnoùs hóti didaskálon<br />
déomai) y se beneficia de su sabiduría, pero con inocultables dificultades para seguir su explicación<br />
(cf. p.e. 209e5-210a4). De este modo puede presentarse como experto (deinós, 207c3) y como<br />
portavoz de verdades acerca de las cosas del amor sin cejar en su búsqueda infatigable. Sócrates es<br />
maestro sin dejar de ser aprendiz de las cosas del amor.<br />
Si el conocimiento erótico, en tanto conciencia de carencia, envuelve el reconocimiento de la<br />
precariedad de lo que se sabe y llega a Sócrates en la forma de un saber de oídas, a título de dóxa,<br />
buena parte de las dificultades que fueron apuntadas al comienzo se despejan. Cabe preguntarnos, sin<br />
embargo, dónde han quedado las reservas de Platón sobre la posibilidad de que el conocimiento pueda<br />
transmitirse de un individuo a otro ¿Por qué el saber erótico habría de ser inmune a las críticas de que<br />
suele ser objeto la dóxa, a mitad de camino entre la ignorancia y la sabiduría? En lo que sigue<br />
ensayaré una respuesta a la cuestión.<br />
Lejos de concebir el saber como algo pasible de ser capturado, o como algo que uno encuentra<br />
y de lo que se apropia, Platón lo presenta a menudo como un bien alumbrado con mucho esfuerzo tras<br />
una ejercitación constante. Ello es "principio básico de la educación socrática" 10 , pero también el<br />
núcleo de su tesis de que conocer es recordar. Esta concepción contrasta con la de Agatón, quien al<br />
menos en dos ocasiones se sirve de una concepción de la enseñanza como transmisión directa, aun<br />
automática, de saber.<br />
Una es en Symp. 175c8-d3, cuando invita a Sócrates a echarse a su lado para, a través de este<br />
contacto (haptómenós), poder él beneficiarse con la sabia idea (sophón) que se le presentó a aquél en<br />
el portal y retrasó su entrada, dando por supuesto que la ha encontrado y la posee. La sabiduría está<br />
entendida por el poeta como un objeto físico 11 y como un bien de cambio pasible de atesoramiento y<br />
cesión a otro. Dado que el discurso de Agatón está inspirado en Gorgias (Symp. 198c2-6), en este<br />
pasaje ha podido verse una referencia al modelo de enseñanza pregonado por los sofistas, 12 en que el<br />
saber es una suerte de mercancía objeto de intercambio entre maestro y discípulo antes que el<br />
producto de un arduo proceso de búsqueda y conquista personales. La réplica de Sócrates es irónica<br />
tanto en su propósito como en la inversión del beneficio que ha de esperarse: 13 bueno sería que la<br />
8 El diálogo Symp. constituye, claro, un caso especial, pues en lugar de una discusión acerca de eros al modo de los primeros<br />
diálogos, como una sucesión ininterrumpida de intentos de definición más o menos afortunados, presenta una estructura<br />
compleja donde se suceden distintos lógoi, cada uno de los cuales expone sobre las cosas del amor desde su singular<br />
perspectiva.<br />
9 Jaeger (1944), 578.<br />
10 Friedländer (1960), citado infra n. 13.<br />
11 El uso de los verbos heurísko y écho reforzaría esta idea, al igual que el giro tò sophón (175d1) empleado por Agatón, que<br />
alude a la sabiduría como objeto antes que como estado del alma.<br />
12 Cf. Reale (1997), 60.<br />
13 Cf. Tarrant (1958), 95. Como afirma Friedländer (1960), 8-9, la analogía "that wisdom does not flow from the fuller into<br />
the emptier man as water runs from the fuller into the emptier vessel, suggests a bassic principle of Socratic education.<br />
***<br />
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Graciela E. Marcos de Pinotti<br />
sabiduría fuera de tal naturaleza que al ponernos en contacto unos con otros, fluyera de lo más lleno a<br />
lo más vacío de nosotros, en cuyo caso es él quien valora estar sentado junto a Agatón, que lo llenaría<br />
de su "mucha y hermosa sabiduría". La suya propia, acota Sócrates, "es insignificante, incluso<br />
discutible 14 como un sueño (...phaúle tis àn eíe, è kaì amphisbetésimos hósper ónar oûsa)", mientras<br />
que la de Agatón es brillante y prometedora (Symp. 175d5-e5).<br />
Ironías aparte, la caracterización que hace Sócrates de su saber evoca la afirmación de Men.<br />
85c de que las opiniones –i.e. las opiniones verdaderas alcanzadas por el esclavo de Menón gracias al<br />
interrogatorio socrático–, "son como un sueño (hósper ónar)", queriendo expresar con ello que no<br />
estamos aún en posición de dar razón de ellas y que son efímeras, inestables, hasta tanto alcancemos<br />
la comprensión del porqué. Por otra parte, sobre la base de lo dicho por Agatón, Sócrates se sirve de<br />
la imagen del conocimiento como líquido, fluído, 15 metáfora retomada y reformulada en Symp.<br />
210d3-4, donde "el vasto mar de lo bello" (tò polù pélagos toû kaloû) expresaría, en contraste con la<br />
posición de Agatón, la vastedad e inconmensurabilidad del "líquido" de la idea de belleza, océano<br />
inagotable que estrictamente ningún recipiente o contenedor podría atesorar. En la perspectiva de<br />
Agatón, en cambio, quien aprende es una suerte de recipiente o contenedor que se "llena" de<br />
conocimiento procedente de otro, convirtiéndose de ese modo de ignorante en sabio. 16<br />
Luego en 196e4-197a1, Agatón funda su afirmación de que Eros ha de ser un poeta sabio en<br />
su capacidad de hacer poeta a otro, unido al supuesto de que lo que uno no tiene o no conoce, ni puede<br />
dárselo ni enseñárselo a otro. 17 Este supuesto, sin embargo, es falso a la luz de la figura de Sócrates<br />
como el verdadero maestro, que enseña sin dejar de profesar ignorancia e incentivando a otros a que<br />
busquen y encuentren por sí mismos. La existencia de Sócrates como maestro constituiría la prueba de<br />
que no solamente es posible dar o enseñar lo que no se posee o no se conoce, sino que únicamente<br />
aquello que no se tiene pero se anhela poseer se convierte en objeto de una búsqueda conjunta en la<br />
cual, únicamente, acontece la enseñanza.<br />
A la hora de explicar por qué la transmisión de conocimiento erótico por parte de Diotima,<br />
aun cuando las verdades que lo constituyen tengan el rango de dóxai, es inmune a las críticas que<br />
Platón suele dirigir a este tipo de saber, debemos circunscribirnos a la opinión recta (orthè dóxa), a<br />
mitad de camino entre sabiduría e ignorancia. Es la noción que Diotima trae a colación en Symp.<br />
202a5 y cuya diferencia con el conocimiento, significativamente, es una de las pocas cosas que<br />
Sócrates admitía conocer en el pasaje de Men. 98b2-5 antes mencionado. A la luz de la concepción de<br />
orthè dóxa, un tipo de saber cuya eficacia práctica Platón siempre ha reconocido, tiene sentido que<br />
Sócrates presente como verdad un discurso del que no es capaz de dar razón, pero que así y todo le<br />
merece plena credibilidad por las consecuencias provechosas que depara darlo por verdadero.<br />
Un ejemplo que quisiera traer a colación, pues lo considero paralelo en cierto sentido al que<br />
nos ocupa, lo brinda Men. 81b4-d6. Allí, en respuesta a la paradoja que pone en tela de juicio la<br />
búsqueda de conocimiento, Sócrates se remonta al relato de origen órfico-pitagórico que afirma la<br />
inmortalidad del alma. Dice haberlo oído de hombres y mujeres sabios en asuntos divinos (81a5-6:<br />
akékoa gàr andrôn te kaì gunaikôn sophôn perì tà theîa prágmata) y declara que confía en su verdad<br />
porque “nos hace laboriosos e indagadores” (81e), vale decir, porque darlo por verdadero mueve a<br />
adoptar un curso de acción preferible al que se seguiría de tener por verdad el argumento de Menón.<br />
Lo que otorga credibilidad a ese relato es su valor práctico, su influjo sobre nuestra conducta: si le<br />
damos crédito y actuamos conforme a esa creencia, nos volvemos mejores. 18<br />
Agathon, full of knowledge, and Socrates as the ignorant man are poised in ironic counterpoint".<br />
14 Rowe (1998, n. ad loc. Symp. 175e3-4, 133) remite a Apol. 23a-b, donde esa sabiduría de tipo inferior solo tiene de tal el<br />
nombre, dado que, según interpreta Sócrates la respuesta del oráculo, solo los dioses son sabios. Si bien la presente<br />
afirmación de Symp. tiene sentido en el contexto sin necesidad de apelar a Apol., ambas obras comparten un sentido<br />
predominante de Sócrates como indagador de la verdad.<br />
15 Como fluída será la forma de Eros mismo (hugròs tò eîdos, 196a2), lo que lo hace capaz de envolvernos por todas partes,<br />
de entrar y salir de las almas con facilidad. Cf. Dover (1980), n. ad. loc., 126.<br />
16 Sabemos, sin embargo, sobre la base de Prt. 314a-b, que a diferencia del alimento del cuerpo, que es posible adquirir y<br />
transportar en un recipiente, los conocimientos, alimento espiritual, no puede uno menos que llevarlos consigo, "en la propia<br />
alma". Y también sabemos que para Platón hay en el alma verdades que son punto de partida de la búsqueda de saber y que<br />
gracias a una práctica esforzada pueden devenir conocimiento.<br />
17 Brisson (2005), n. ad loc. 196e1-2, 204, destaca el singular juego entre poietès y poieîn: "Eros est un poète qui peut<br />
produire non pas une oeuvre, mais celui-là qui produit cette oeuvre, c'est-à-dire un poète". En cuanto a que no es posible dar<br />
o enseñar excepto lo que se posee o conoce, observa con razón (n. ad loc. 196e5-197a1, 205) que tal concepción, "qui mène<br />
tout droit au paradoxe de Ménon, s'accord avec l'image des vases communicants evoquée par Socrate au début du Banquet<br />
(175d-3)".<br />
18 Cf. espec. Men. 86b8-c1. En similar dirección se desarrolla el mito del final de Rep. Una vez expuesto el destino del alma<br />
tras la muerte, Platón afirma su valor curativo. El relato, así como ha quedado a salvo gracias al soldado Er, “nos puede<br />
salvar a nosotros, si le damos crédito” (Rep. X, 621c1). En esta dirección apunta el comentario de Dover (1980) ad loc.<br />
212b1-c3, 159, quien remite a Phd. 114d. A propósito de la la expresión kalòs kíndunos en 114d6, varios estudiosos<br />
386
Graciela E. Marcos de Pinotti<br />
Y bien, el relato sobre Eros que Sócrates expone, que oyó una vez de labios de la sabia<br />
sacerdotisa de Mantinea, tiene un estatuto similar. Es un relato que también se inscribe en el pasado,<br />
que procede de alguien cuya sabiduría excede el punto de vista mortal y que enlaza filosofía e<br />
inmortalidad. La sabiduría que ostenta Diotima es la de una experta religiosa cuya palabra persuade<br />
antes de que su sentido último se haga comprensible, como la palabra del oráculo délfico en Apol. 20e<br />
ss., o la que da apoyo a la tesis de que conocer es recordar en el pasaje recién mencionado de Men. En<br />
ambos casos se pone de manifiesto la confianza de Platón en una tradición religiosa que es fuente de<br />
verdad para la filosofía, 19 que encuentra en ella fundamento y sentido. En ambos, también, se la<br />
expresa a través de un relato cuya verdad está fuera de toda duda y que merece crédito porque siembra<br />
en nosotros la virtud. 20<br />
La dimensión fundamentalmente práctica del conocimiento erótico es indudable. En primer<br />
lugar, no olvidemos que los discursos sobre Eros que integran el diálogo no son meramente sobre<br />
Eros, sino en alabanza a Eros (177a ss.), de modo que deben no solo presentar una concepción de él,<br />
sino también un concepto de bien conforme al cual Eros es elogiado. 21 Y así como la sabiduría de<br />
Diotima se traduce en un beneficio en el plano práctico –aun siendo extranjera, la mujer habría<br />
prestado un servicio inapreciable a la ciudad, ilustra Sócrates, salvando a Atenas de una peste (Symp.<br />
201d3-5)–, así también disponer de verdades sobre eros conduce a una práctica de la filosofía que<br />
deriva en el perfeccionamiento de sí mismo. La dimensión práctica del conocimiento erótico subyace<br />
a la pregunta que hace Sócrates, una vez que Diotima ha expuesto cuál es la naturaleza de Eros, por su<br />
utilidad (chreían, 204c8) para los hombres, así como se pone de manifiesto en la respuesta a esta<br />
pregunta, cuando tras describir el último paso de la scala amoris, Diotima detalla la suerte del filósofo<br />
que ha logrado elevarse a la contemplación de la belleza. A quien contempla la belleza le será dado<br />
"engendrar, no ya imágenes de virtud, al no estar en contacto con una imagen, sino virtudes<br />
verdaderas", ya que está en contacto con la verdad. De amante del saber pasará, por haber<br />
engendrado y alimentado una virtud verdadera, a ser amado por los dioses (theophileî) y, si es que<br />
algún hombre puede serlo, llegará a ser inmortal también él (Symp. 212a4-7).<br />
Sócrates, persuadido de la verdad de lo dicho por Diotima, intenta a su vez persuadir a los<br />
demás de que en esta empresa de volverse virtuoso, no hay mejor colaborador que Eros. Es entonces<br />
cuando afirma honrar las cosas del amor y practicarlas sobremanera, "ahora y siempre", en alusión,<br />
podemos suponer, a su actividad filosófica. No podemos saber a ciencia cierta si por esta vía le es<br />
dado o no a Sócrates completar el ascenso y engendrar la verdadera virtud, lo que en alguna medida lo<br />
colocaría por encima de lo humano, o si su práctica de la filosofía lo confina a una búsqueda<br />
infatigable, impulsada por un anhelo que nunca se colma. 22 Este es uno de los tantos enigmas que<br />
Platón deja abiertos.<br />
Ediciones, traducciones, comentarios:<br />
Dover, K. Plato, <strong>Symposium</strong>, Cambridge, Cambridge U.P., 1980 = Dover (1980)<br />
Rowe, C. J. Plato <strong>Symposium</strong>, Warminster, Aris & Philips, 1998 = Rowe (1998)<br />
Brisson, L. Platon, Le Banquet, Paris, GF-Flammarion, 2005 = Brisson (2005)<br />
Bibliografía citada:<br />
Brickhouse, Th. & Smith, N., "The Paradox of Socratic Ignorance in Plato's Apology", History of<br />
PhilosophicalQuarterly 1 (1984) 2, 125-131 = Brickhouse-Smith (1984)<br />
Dorter, K., "The Significance of the Speeches in Plato's <strong>Symposium</strong>", Philosophy and Rhetoric 2<br />
(Brisson, Vicaire, Dixsaut, etc.) coinciden en que kalós significa en este caso ‘útil’, o ‘ventajoso’.<br />
19 Cf. Brisson (2005), 63-64. Brickhouse - Smith (1984), 127, destacan como uno de los rasgos más singulares de la filosofía<br />
de Sócrates su confianza en diversas formas de adivinación como fuentes de verdad.<br />
20 En Rep. II, 382c ss., Platón justifica la construcción de relatos que "asemejen lo más posible la mentira a la verdad"<br />
(382d2-3) y mantiene que los buenos relatos, sean verdaderos o falsos desde el punto de vista fáctico, tienen consecuencias<br />
provechosas para el alma, beneficio debido a que no están reñidos con la verdad, sino diseñados en conformidad con ella.<br />
21 Cf. Dorter (1969), 216.<br />
22 Según Gagarin (1977), 28, podemos inferir "that Socrates has reached the end of the lover/philosopher's journey, has had<br />
his own vision of true Beauty, and now possesses knowledge and virtud. This conclusion is nowhere explicitly stated, but it<br />
is confirmed by the physical appearance of Socrates at the banquet (...) the beautiful and wise Socrates is no<br />
longer/philosopher, but must be a wise man and consequently an object of love. Reeve (1992), 112-113, en cambio, con<br />
apoyo en la expresión "agálmat'aretês" (Symp. 222a4) en el discurso de Alcibíades –imágenes o estatuas de virtud que<br />
Sócrates, como las estatuas de los silenos, atesora en su interior– y en Rep. 517d9, donde ágalma designa las estatuas vistas<br />
por los prisioneros en la caverna, considera que "Socrates is being presented as someone who has not seen the beautiful<br />
itself" y que "has nothing better than images of the virtues to offer to Alcibiades".<br />
387
Graciela E. Marcos de Pinotti<br />
(1969) 4, 215-234 = Dorter (1969)<br />
Edmonds, R., "Socrates the Beautiful. Role Reversal and Midwery in Plato's <strong>Symposium</strong>", T.A:P.A.<br />
130 (2000), 261-285<br />
Friedländer, P., Plato III, trad. H. Meyerhoff, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969 (1960) =<br />
Friedländer (1960)<br />
Gagarin, M., "Socrates' Hybris and Alcibiades' Failure", Phoenix 31 (1977), 22-37 = Gagarin (1977)<br />
Hornsby, R., "Action in the <strong>Symposium</strong>", The Classical Journal 32 (1956) 1, 37-40 = Hornsby (1956)<br />
Jaeger, W., Paideia. los ideales de la cultura griega, trad. W. Roces, México, Fondo de Cultura<br />
Económica, 1967 (1944) = Jaeger (1944)<br />
Osborne, C., Eros Unveiled. Plato and the God of Love, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1994 = Osborne<br />
(1994)<br />
Reale, G., Eros, demonio mediador. El juego de las máscaras en el Banquete de Platón, trad. R. Rius y<br />
P. Salvat, Barcelona, Herder, 2004 (1997) = Reale (1997)<br />
Reeve, C., "Telling the Truth about Love: Plato's <strong>Symposium</strong>", Cleary, J. & W. Wians, Proceedings<br />
of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy III (1992), 89-133 = Reeve (1992)<br />
Roochnik, D., "The Erotics of Philosophical Discourse", History of Philosophy Quarterly 4 (1987) 2,<br />
117-129 = Roochnik (1987)<br />
Tarrant, D., "The Touch of Socrates", The Classical Quarterly 8 (1958) 1/2, 95-98 = Tarrant (1958)<br />
Warner, M., "Self, and Plato's <strong>Symposium</strong>", The Philosophical Quarterly 29 (1979) 117, 329-333 =<br />
Warner (1979)<br />
388
Platone, la virtù e un gioco di specchi:<br />
guardare il filosofo con gli occhi del φιλότιµος<br />
Federico M. Petrucci<br />
Alcibiade ubriaco irrompe nel Simposio, e una svolta scuote il dialogo: il suo discorso, ibrido di lode<br />
e biasimo, impone una riflessione sulla figura di Socrate. Alcibiade potrebbe cogliere alcune carenze<br />
delle posizioni espresse da Socrate o, al contrario, causare un netto abbassamento del discorso per la<br />
propria pochezza; in ogni caso, quando egli, uomo timocratico - quale è secondo recenti studi 1 -,<br />
prende la parola la forza teoretica del Simposio sembrerebbe ormai indebolirsi. E tuttavia, un'analisi<br />
dialettica del rapporto tra le dottrine espresse da Socrate e quelle introdotte da Alcibiade<br />
(apparentemente meno impegnative) può ricomporre tale apparente frattura 2 . In questo breve<br />
intervento vorrei concentrarmi sulle possibili interazioni tra questi due piani, tentando di indicare:<br />
• che nella descrizione delle virtù di Socrate prodotta da Alcibiade, il φιλότιµος proietta sul<br />
filosofo il proprio modello di virtù;<br />
• che tra questa descrizione "orientata" e l'autentica virtù del filosofo sussiste comunque una<br />
dialettica organica;<br />
• che proprio grazie a questo "gioco di specchi" Platone può descrivere il filosofo come capace<br />
anche di agire in modo virtuoso all'interno del contesto della πόλις.<br />
Il discorso di Diotima si apre con un riferimento netto all'esigenza conoscitiva propria del filosofo, per<br />
poi chiarire, nell'approssimarsi verso la scala amoris, la distanza tra l'eros del filosofo e quello, ben<br />
più tradizionale, proprio dei φιλότιµοι (208c-d). Questi ultimi, al fine di acquisire gloria eterna, sono<br />
pronti a correre pericolosamente pericoli di ogni genere ancora più che per i figli, e a spendere<br />
ricchezze e a faticare fatiche d'ogni tipo e a morire al posto di altri 3 (καὶ ὑπὲρ τούτου κινδύνους τε<br />
κινδυνεύειν ἕτοιµοί εἰσι πάντας ἔτι µᾶλλον ἢ ὑπὲρ τῶν παίδων, καὶ χρήµατα ἀναλίσκειν καὶ πόνους<br />
πονεῖν οὑστινασοῦν καὶ ὑπεραποθνῄσκειν). [trad. it. di Matteo Nucci]. Così si aspira a una ἀθάνατος<br />
ἀρετή (208d5-6). Il termine ἀρετή è qui da intendere in termini tradizionali, quelli dell'agire in modo<br />
coraggioso e valoroso per procurarsi gli onori pubblici. Diverso è invece il fine di chi è gravido<br />
nell'anima, il quale aspira ad acquisire φρόνησίν τε καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετήν (209a4). Questi, se svolge<br />
in modo corretto la propria formazione, se vive in modo compiuto la vicinanza intellettuale con un<br />
altro come lui, vede nei λόγοι περὶ ἀρετῆς (209b8) un frutto - con un chiaro parallelismo rispetto al<br />
tipo umano precedente - più importante anche dei figli (209c2-6). Ancora più significativo è che<br />
costui, il filosofo, giunga, apprendendo i grandi misteri della contemplazione del bello ideale, a una<br />
vera virtù piuttosto che a εἴδωλα ἀρετῆς (212a2-7). Nel volgere di poche pagine, dunque,<br />
all'avvicendarsi dei tipi umani considerati corrisponde l'implicito sviluppo semantico di una nozione<br />
chiave, ἀρετή, che da presidio tradizionale diviene la complessa base dell'identità morale del filosofo.<br />
Un simile quadro sembrerebbe condurre verso una prospettiva fortemente caratterizzata in<br />
senso intellettualistico: la realizzazione compiuta dell'intera virtù passa per il momento più alto a cui<br />
può accedere la conoscenza umana, la contemplazione dell'idea. Pare così riprodotto un modello<br />
classico, ben rintracciabile, ad esempio, in un noto passo del Fedone (68b8-69c3): a forme non<br />
intellettualisticamente fondate di virtù - εὐήθης σωφροσύνη e ἀνδρεία δειλίᾳ -, proprie di chi non è<br />
filosofo, Platone oppone l'unica vera moneta per la virtù compiuta, la φρόνησις. In entrambi i passi, in<br />
effetti, sembra essere elevata al rango di unica virtù quella fondata sulla conoscenza e svalutata quella,<br />
tradizionale, propria dell'uomo timocratico, che consente nella società l'accesso agli onori politici e<br />
militari. Quest'ultima, definita anche πολιτική e δηµοτική (Phaed. 82a11), è dunque una virtù di<br />
secondo livello che anche nel Simposio Platone sembrerebbe svalutare, relegandola nell'ambito della<br />
φιλοτιµία, molto lontana dalla vera virtù filosofica 4 . In effetti, se il dialogo non comprendesse il colpo<br />
1 Ai quali si rimanda per argomentazioni più dettagliate circa questo punto; cfr.. M.C. Howatson, F.C.C. Sheffield (eds.),<br />
Plato. The <strong>Symposium</strong>, Cambridge 2008, XXVI-XXVIII e partic. B. Centrone, M. Nucci, Platone. Simposio, Torino 2009,<br />
XXXVII-XXXVIII.<br />
2 La critica ha ormai ampiamente riconosciuto una correlazione stretta tra il discorso di Socrate e quello di Alcibiade, benché<br />
circa i caratteri di tale rapporto non ci sia una convergenza; per uno status quaestionis aggiornato cfr. P. Destrée, The Speech<br />
of Alcibiades (212c4-222b7), in C. Horn (ed.), Platon, Symposion, Berlin 2012, 191-205.<br />
3 Questa e le seguenti traduzioni sono di M. Nucci, in Centrone, Nucci, op. cit.<br />
4 L'associazione, implicitamente raccolta già nella tradizione platonica (cfr. ad es. Plot. I 2, con L. Gerson, A Platonic<br />
Reading of Plato's <strong>Symposium</strong>, in J. Lesher, D. Nails, F.C.C. Sheffield (eds.), Plato's <strong>Symposium</strong>. Issues in Interpretation<br />
and Reception, Washington 2006, 56-57), è stata sostenuta da B. Centrone, M. Nucci, op. cit., XXX. Una dimostrazione
Federico M. Petrucci<br />
di scena dell'ingresso di Alcibiade, uno dei suoi contributi all'etica platonica sarebbe di questo tipo.<br />
Ma alcuni segnali nascosti tra le parole del φιλότιµος per eccellenza possono indurre a disegnare un<br />
quadro più complesso e forse meglio integrato in una lettura dialettica della teoria morale di Platone.<br />
Non è difficile notare che molti degli elementi salienti del ritratto del filosofo prodotto da<br />
Diotima sono presenti nella descrizione dell'ἀτοπία di Socrate delineata dallo sguardo - forse<br />
appannato, ma comunque profondo - di Alcibiade. La potenza degli ψιλοὶ λόγοι di Socrate sconvolge<br />
l'anima dell'uomo timocratico, la rende in qualche modo consapevole della sua schiavitù, delle sue<br />
carenze interiori che si manifestano nel momento stesso in cui si fa strada nella politica Ateniese<br />
(215c-216a). Ancora più importante è che Socrate disprezzi l'attaccamento alla bellezza fisica, la<br />
ricchezza, quella τιµὴ "τῶν ὑπὸ πλήθους µακαριζοµένων" che invece perseguono Alcibiade e i<br />
φιλότιµοι il cui eros era stato criticato da Diotima nei passi richiamati precedentemente (216e):<br />
Socrate pensa "che questi possessi non abbiano alcun valore e che non siano nulla". E in effetti le<br />
aspirazioni di Alcibiade rimangono ignorate da Socrate, che continua invece a infondere i suoi λόγοι<br />
ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ. La prospettiva etica già chiara nelle parole di Diotima si concretizza così nel rifiuto di<br />
Socrate dello scambio della bellezza vera, interiore, per una solo apparente (218e).<br />
È di fronte a questo atteggiamento che Alcibiade introduce la lode delle virtù di Socrate,<br />
passo su cui verterà il resto dell'analisi e che sarà osservato come uno dei nuclei in cui Platone,<br />
scegliendo con cura uno dei suoi personaggi, può offrire una possibile riflessione "dall'interno",<br />
prospettica, sulla virtù (219d-222a).<br />
In primo luogo, il rifiuto di Socrate segnala, agli occhi di Alcibiade, le sue σωφροσύνη e<br />
ἀνδρεία, virtù che si sovrappongono subito dopo a φρόνησις e καρτερία (219d3-7). Dice Alcibiade:<br />
Poi, dopo questo, sapete in che stato d'animo mi trovavo? Io che ritenevo di essere stato disprezzato e<br />
che però ammiravo la sua natura e la temperanza e il coraggio, poiché avevo trovato un uomo come<br />
non avrei mai creduto di poterne incontrare per saggezza e fermezza 5 . [trad. it. M. Nucci]<br />
Ma a quale tipo di virtù fa riferimento Alcibiade? Il testo non offre indicazioni circa la comprensione<br />
da parte di Alcibiade delle ragioni per cui Socrate lo rifiuta: sembra cioè sfuggirgli la relazione<br />
essenziale tra il superamento dei valori fisici o sociali e la riflessione filosofica. Anzi, la lode compare<br />
nel momento stesso in cui Alcibiade attacca ancora l'ἀτοπία di Socrate, la sua totale devozione ai<br />
discorsi, raccontando il rifiuto subìto. Ciò conferma quanto è già ipotizzabile in linea generale, cioè<br />
che Alcibiade non faccia riferimento alle virtù "filosofiche" - ad esempio, al possesso compiuto di<br />
tutte le virtù per come tematizzate nel quarto libro della Repubblica -, bensì a dimensioni generiche,<br />
tradizionali, di σωφροσύνη e ἀνδρεία. In caso contrario si dovrebbe attribuire ad Alcibiade una<br />
consapevolezza teoretica non riscontrabile in questo testo né in altri: occorrerebbe attribuire ad<br />
Alcibiade una "deduzione" che invece, probabilmente, Platone vuole lasciare al lettore. E in effetti la<br />
temperanza mostrata da Socrate è, agli occhi di Alcibiade, la moderazione di fronte alle provocazioni<br />
di un bellissimo innamorato: una simile nozione potrebbe facilmente essere definita, in termini<br />
tradizionali, come αἰδώς - direbbe così Carmide - o come continenza - la intenderebbe in questo<br />
modo, e con grande disprezzo, Callicle -. Ancora, l'ἀνδρεία qui menzionata non è che un'articolazione<br />
di questa virtù tradizionale, ovvero la forza di resistere. A conferma giunge la menzione della<br />
φρόνησις, che in questo passaggio sembra appiattirsi sul tono non filosofico delle tematizzazioni<br />
implicite precedenti e sulla successiva καρτερία, che allude ancora, evidentemente, alla forza<br />
dell'azione, del rifiuto, di Socrate. Le nozioni evocate da Alcibiade sembrano fare riferimento, almeno<br />
negli aspetti di "rivalutazione positiva" del rifiuto, a un retroterra tradizionale: le nozioni di saggezza e<br />
temperanza attribuite a Socrate sono riconducibili a un severo profilo di aristocrazia antica, che ad<br />
esempio rifiuta la ricchezza come valore in sé e per sé valido, che assume come modello di<br />
comportamento la moderazione 6 . Dunque, il riconoscimento del possesso di σωφροσύνη e ἀνδρεία<br />
della peculiare semantica di "virtù" nel contesto della prima parte del discorso di Socrate è inoltre proposta da C.J. Rowe, Il<br />
Simposio di Platone. Cinque lezioni sul dialogo con una breve discussione con Maurizio Migliori e Arianna Fermani (a cura<br />
di Maurizio Migliori), Sankt Augustin 1998, 45-52. Dal discorso di Diotima emerge invece una vera virtù filosofica, con<br />
connotazioni proprie, del tutto legata alla conoscenza; cfr. anche F.C.C. Sheffield, Plato's <strong>Symposium</strong>. The Ethics of Desire,<br />
Oxford 2006, 133-153 (che evidenzia soprattutto la differenza nelle finalità e, parallelamente, nei caratteri dei rispettivi fini).<br />
5 Τὸ δὴ µετὰ τοῦτο τίνα οἴεσθέ µε διάνοιαν ἔχειν, ἡγούµενον µὲν ἠτιµάσθαι, ἀγάµενον δὲ τὴν τούτου φύσιν τε καὶ<br />
σωφροσύνην καὶ ἀνδρείαν, ἐντετυχηκότα ἀνθρώπῳ τοιούτῳ οἵῳ ἐγὼ οὐκ ἂν ᾤµην ποτ' ἐντυχεῖν εἰς φρόνησιν καὶ εἰς<br />
καρτερίαν;<br />
6 Non si tratta, ovviamente, di una prospettiva pauperista, estranea all'etica greca canonica: ma la ricchezza non conferisce di<br />
per sé una statura "morale" - ad esempio se si tratta della condizione degli "arricchiti", cfr. ad es. Theogn. I vv. 39-60 o 145-<br />
158 -, né può essere acquisita senza valore, in assenza del quale, anzi, ogni possesso si distrugge (si pensi, ad esempio, ai<br />
termini entro i quali Esiodo loda la ricchezza). In altri termini, il rifiuto di Socrate deve essere ricondotto comunque nel<br />
quadro tradizionale del valore della moderazione.<br />
390
Federico M. Petrucci<br />
sembra fondato su un retroterra etico almeno in parte tradizionale e - elemento forse più importante - è<br />
garantito a Socrate dalla semplice azione del rifiuto: Alcibiade non coglie le basi filosofiche<br />
dell'atteggiamento di Socrate 7 , ma le azioni del filosofo sono evidentemente temperanti.<br />
La descrizione di un Socrate "virtuoso" prosegue e pare finalizzata a inquadrare ancora aspetti<br />
dell'ἀτοπία del filosofo in un contesto di forza d'animo straordinaria, benché sempre legata alla<br />
capacità di agire con forza e resistenza. Ecco dunque Socrate degno di lode perché resiste al freddo e<br />
alla fame (220a-b) o che, "rapito" dal proprio pensare, rimane immobile, in piedi, da alba ad alba<br />
(220c-d). Non sembra però esservi, agli occhi di Alcibiade, uno scarto tra simili manifestazioni:<br />
mentre sfuggono le motivazioni dell'ἀτοπία, i suoi tratti più tipicamente filosofici (il rapimento<br />
intellettuale di Socrate) si mescolano con atteggiamenti ammirevoli perché degni di lode secondo una<br />
prospettiva tradizionale, come la capacità di resistere in situazioni avverse.<br />
Ma le più chiare indicazioni circa le basi dell'ammirazione da parte di Alcibiade per Socrate<br />
sono fornite dal passo successivo, in cui viene esaltato il suo coraggio in guerra (220d5-221c1):<br />
Se poi volete, nelle battaglie - e infatti è giusto riconoscergli anche questo - quando ci fu la battaglia<br />
in cui gli strateghi mi diedero il riconoscimento al valore, nessun uomo mi salvò se non lui, che non<br />
volle abbandonare un ferito e riuscì a mettere in salvo sia me che le armi. E io, Socrate, anche allora<br />
insistei con gli strateghi perché dessero a te il riconoscimento al valore, e di questo almeno non mi<br />
rimprovererai né dirai che mento. Ma mentre gli strateghi guardavano alla mia posizione sociale e<br />
volevano dare a me il riconoscimento al valore, tu stesso fosti ancora più premuroso degli strateghi<br />
perché lo ricevessi io e non te. E ancora, uomini, vale la pena contemplare Socrate, quando il nostro<br />
esercito si ritirava in fuga da Delio; mi capitò infatti di trovarmi accanto a lui, io a cavallo, lui con le<br />
armature da oplita. Si ritirava, quando ormai i nostri uomini erano dispersi, insieme a Lachete; e io per<br />
caso mi trovo lì e appena li vedo li esorto ad aver coraggio e dicevo che non li avrei abbandonati. E in<br />
quel caso potei contemplare Socrate meglio che a Potidea - io infatti avevo meno paura per il fatto di<br />
essere a cavallo - innanzitutto per quanto superava Lachete in fermezza; eppoi mi sembrava,<br />
Aristofane, come dici tu, che lui camminasse laggiù, come anche qui, "a testa alta, lanciando occhiate<br />
di sbieco", guardando tranquillamente amici e nemici e mostrando chiaramente a chiunque, anche da<br />
molto lontano, che se qualcuno avesse toccato un uomo simile, si sarebbe difeso con enorme vigore.<br />
Perciò si ritirava con sicurezza, lui e il suo compagno; infatti, in guerra, quelli che si comportano così,<br />
i nemici neppure li toccano, mentre inseguono chi fugge disordinatamente 8 .<br />
Dunque, Socrate si mise a rischio per salvare Alcibiade e le sue armi, e a Delio apparì più ἔµφρων di<br />
Lachete, muovendosi con tranquillità, fermezza e vigore negli scontri: senza cavallo, nella ritirata, non<br />
mostra paura. Il ritratto che ne esce incute, come spesso ripete Alcibiade nel suo discorso,<br />
"meraviglia", in quanto Socrate eccelle per coraggio e fermezza, perché rispetta i valori tradizionali<br />
7 Si tratta, dunque, di un "errore" prospettico di Alcibiade, che pur tenta di comprendere le scelte di Socrate; questo errore,<br />
peraltro, non è necessariamente alternativo rispetto a quelli già segnalati dalla critica; cfr. partic. Th.A. Szlezák, Platon und<br />
die Schriftlichkeit der Philosophie, trad. it. Milano 1988, 345-350, o M. Nucci, La visibilità della virtù, «Bollettino della<br />
Società Filosofica Italiana» 169 (2000), 13-18. Parallelamente c'è una relativa convergenza tra gli studiosi nell'affermare che<br />
Socrate ha a questo punto raggiunto almeno un livello dell'ascesa (cfr. ad es. Rowe, Il Simposio, cit., 53-54). Più<br />
problematica e discussa è invece la possibilità di attribuire a Socrate (cioè, al Socrate come immagine del filosofo in questo<br />
contesto del dialogo platonico) la realizzazione dell'ascesa all'idea. Si tratta di una vexata quaestio, non certo limitata a<br />
quest'opera, su cui è impossibile soffermarsi. Si può tuttavia escludere che la possibilità non si dia per ragioni drammatiche -<br />
cioè perché Socrate deve apprendere i contenuti della scala amoris da Diotima: in effetti, il dialogo con Diotima è confinato<br />
al passato -. Ci si potrebbe anche chiedere che tipo di conoscenza abbia Socrate delle idee di cui parla nel suo discorso, se sia<br />
possibile attribuirgli una descrizione superficiale, della quale non sarebbe in grado di rendere ragione, o ancora se vi siano<br />
gradi intermedi tra la virtù filosofica compiuta legata alla φρόνησις (e non, evidentemente, alla σοφία) e alla conoscenza<br />
delle idee e la virtù incompleta a cui si fa riferimento nella prima parte del discorso di Socrate. Sul problema cfr. Centrone,<br />
Nucci, op. cit., XXVII-XXVIII.<br />
8 εἰ δὲ βούλεσθε ἐν ταῖς µάχαις – τοῦτο γὰρ δὴ δίκαιόν γε αὐτῷ ἀποδοῦναι – ὅτε γὰρ ἡ µάχη ἦν ἐξ ἧς ἐµοὶ καὶ τἀριστεῖα<br />
ἔδοσαν οἱ στρατηγοί, οὐδεὶς ἄλλος ἐµὲ ἔσωσεν ἀνθρώπων ἢ οὗτος, τετρωµένον οὐκ ἐθέλων ἀπολιπεῖν, ἀλλὰ συνδιέσωσε καὶ<br />
τὰ ὅπλα καὶ αὐτὸν ἐµέ. καὶ ἐγὼ µέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ τότε ἐκέλευον σοὶ διδόναι τἀριστεῖα τοὺς στρατηγούς, καὶ τοῦτό γέ<br />
µοι οὔτε µέµψῃ οὔτε ἐρεῖς ὅτι ψεύδοµαι· ἀλλὰ γὰρ τῶν στρατηγῶν πρὸς τὸ ἐµὸν ἀξίωµα ἀποβλεπόντων καὶ βουλοµένων<br />
ἐµοὶ διδόναι τἀριστεῖα, αὐτὸς προθυµότερος ἐγένου τῶν στρατηγῶν ἐµὲ λαβεῖν ἢ σαυτόν. ἔτι τοίνυν, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἄξιον ἦν<br />
θεάσασθαι Σωκράτη, ὅτε ἀπὸ Δηλίου φυγῇ ἀνεχώρει τὸ στρατόπεδον· ἔτυχον γὰρ παραγενόµενος ἵππον ἔχων, οὗτος δὲ<br />
ὅπλα. ἀνεχώρει οὖν ἐσκεδασµένων ἤδη τῶν ἀνθρώπων οὗτός τε ἅµα καὶ Λάχης· καὶ ἐγὼ περιτυγχάνω, καὶ ἰδὼν εὐθὺς<br />
παρακελεύοµαί τε αὐτοῖν θαρρεῖν, καὶ ἔλεγον ὅτι οὐκ ἀπολείψω αὐτώ. ἐνταῦθα δὴ καὶ κάλλιον ἐθεασάµην Σωκράτη ἢ ἐν<br />
Ποτειδαίᾳ – αὐτὸς γὰρ ἧττον ἐν φόβῳ ἦ διὰ τὸ ἐφ' ἵππου εἶναι – πρῶτον µὲν ὅσον περιῆν Λάχητος τῷ ἔµφρων εἶναι· ἔπειτα<br />
ἔµοιγ' ἐδόκει, ὦ Ἀριστόφανες, τὸ σὸν δὴ τοῦτο, καὶ ἐκεῖ διαπορεύεσθαι ὥσπερ καὶ ἐνθάδε, , ἠρέµα παρασκοπῶν καὶ τοὺς φιλίους καὶ τοὺς πολεµίους, δῆλος ὢν παντὶ καὶ πάνυ πόρρωθεν ὅτι εἴ τις<br />
ἅψεται τούτου τοῦ ἀνδρός, µάλα ἐρρωµένως ἀµυνεῖται. διὸ καὶ ἀσφαλῶς ἀπῄει καὶ οὗτος καὶ ὁ ἑταῖρος· σχεδὸν γάρ τι τῶν<br />
οὕτω διακειµένων ἐν τῷ πολέµῳ οὐδὲ ἅπτονται, ἀλλὰ τοὺς προτροπάδην φεύγοντας διώκουσιν.<br />
391
Federico M. Petrucci<br />
dell'oplita e le regole sociali che lo vincolano, quale quella di riportare le armi. Ma anche in questo<br />
caso la descrizione appassionata di Alcibiade evidenzia una forte distanza rispetto a una lettura<br />
filosofica del coraggio. La prova maggiore di questo è fornita dall'inciso relativo al "riconoscimento al<br />
valore": Socrate non lo vuole, mentre Alcibiade aspira proprio ad esso, e ringrazia implicitamente<br />
Socrate per una rinuncia che suppone in qualche modo generosa e sofferta 9 . Agli occhi di Alcibiade la<br />
virtù di Socrate è ancora tradizionale, una fermezza che ricorda immagini di battaglie cantate dai<br />
lirici, che riprende terminologia e contenuti delle virtù spartane rappresentate da Tucidide: si tratta di<br />
una virtù dell'azione, del tutto immersa nei valori della πόλις.<br />
Ciò non impedisce, tuttavia, che l'azione di Socrate possa essere considerata come virtuosa al<br />
di là dell'inadeguatezza dell'"analisi" del comportamento implicita nelle parole di Alcibiade; al<br />
contrario, il comportamento di Socrate, proprio perché di Socrate e in base all'ascesa descritta da<br />
Diotima, deve essere dettato da una base filosofica, cioè dal possesso di una virtù compiuta a monte<br />
delle azioni virtuose.<br />
Osservando la lode dal punto di vista di Alcibiade si ottiene dunque un quadro coerente,<br />
l'immagine di un Socrate ἄτοπος per la sua attività filosofica ma al contempo in grado di agire in<br />
modo straordinariamente virtuoso. E tuttavia, la stessa descrizione difficilmente potrebbe risultare<br />
lusinghiera in una prospettiva propriamente platonica, o anche, restringendo la prospettiva, in base al<br />
discorso di Diotima 10 . In effetti, se da un lato le azioni descritte da Alcibiade sono in ogni caso<br />
virtuose, le motivazioni individuate non evidenziano alcuna matrice filosofica, anzi si appiattiscono su<br />
una morale tradizionale, del tutto simile a quella di chi aspira al riconoscimento sociale (come<br />
conferma lo stupore per il rifiuto di Socrate degli onori pubblici, considerato atto di generosità). In<br />
questo senso la virtù di Socrate sembrerebbe - paradossalmente - porsi al livello dell'uomo<br />
timocratico, tanto distante dal filosofo nella prospettiva indicata da Diotima.<br />
Da questa - troppo breve - analisi delle sezioni considerate è possibile trarre tre conclusioni<br />
interrelate.<br />
In primo luogo, Alcibiade si conferma immagine del φιλότιµος, distante da qualsiasi<br />
consapevolezza di tipo filosofico: egli coglie la virtù nell'agire di Socrate, ma proietta sul filosofo le<br />
proprie categorie, le motivazioni tradizionali che lo spingerebbero alla virtù 11 .<br />
In secondo luogo, il fatto che il filosofo compia azioni virtuose e che sia riconosciuto come<br />
virtuoso da Alcibiade spinge a rimodulare in generale lo scarto tra l'agire del φιλόσοφος e quello del<br />
φιλότιµος. Il φιλότιµος non può essere realmente e completamente virtuoso poiché non conosce il<br />
vero (come insegna Diotima), ma può agire in modo virtuoso ed essere educato a farlo. Il filosofo,<br />
invece, per la contemplazione raggiunta e la φρόνησις filosofica acquisita, conosce il vero ed è<br />
completamente virtuoso (come testimonia Diotima), ma al contempo agisce in modo virtuoso (come<br />
chiarisce un osservatore d'eccezione, Alcibiade). Il fatto che per Alcibiade questa dialettica si ponga<br />
nei termini di una discrasia tra l'ἀτοπία di Socrate e le sue gesta straordinariamente virtuose 12 dipende<br />
proprio dall'incapacità del φιλότιµος di cogliere la relazione essenziale tra conoscenza, possesso della<br />
virtù e agire virtuoso, una relazione che si concretizza solo nel filosofo. Parallelamente, descrizioni<br />
nette come quelle presenti nel Fedone o nel discorso di Diotima sono tali perché tendono a una<br />
distinzione analitica e mirata tra le figure dal punto di vista "della filosofia", cioè sulla base dell'essere<br />
9 Ciò non implica che ogni pubblico riconoscimento al valore sia da rifiutare (al contrario, anche lo stato platonico della<br />
Repubblica prevede onori). E tuttavia il fatto che Socrate agisca in modo virtuoso non implica che Platone accetti i<br />
presupposti della morale tradizionale, che anzi vuole riformare: in questo senso il rifiuto degli onori e le relative osservazioni<br />
di Alcibiade rimarcano ancora il polo "dell'atopia" del filosofo nella πόλις storica (controbilanciato dal valore riscontrabile<br />
nel suo agire).<br />
10 In questo senso ci si allontana dalla prospettiva di integrazione netta tra i discorsi di Socrate e Alcibiade tentata, ad<br />
esempio, da D. Scott, Socrates and Alcibiades in the <strong>Symposium</strong>, «Hermathena» 168 (2000), 25-37: pur evidenziando il<br />
cambiamento di prospettiva nei due discorsi, Scott non sottolinea la distorsione nella descrizione della virtù prodotta da<br />
Alcibiade.<br />
11 Un altro caso evidente di proiezione su Socrate di un punto di vista proprio di Alcibiade, e tipico del φιλότιµος, si ha a 214<br />
d2-4, quando a Socrate viene attribuito il desiderio di encomi e implicitamente l'invidia per encomi attribuiti ad altri: è<br />
evidente dai passi citati in precedenza, invece, che è proprio Alcibiade ad aspirare a onori personali nell'ambito pubblico (ma<br />
anche a un'attenzione esclusiva da parte di Socrate); cfr. B. Centrone, M. Nucci, op. cit., XXXIX. Questa conclusione,<br />
inoltre, oppone argomenti contro la tesi (argomentata, ad es., da E.Belfiore, Dialectic with the Reader in Plato's <strong>Symposium</strong>,<br />
«Maia» 36 (1984), 47-48) per cui Alcibiade avrebbe raggiunto un certo livello dell'iniziazione ai misteri, in particolare<br />
quello del riconoscimento di τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιτηδεύµασι καὶ τοῖς νόµοις καλὸν (210 c4). In effetti, la prospettiva timocratica<br />
evidenziata da Alcibiade si riflette nella valutazione delle attività, delle loro motivazioni e delle loro finalità: Alcibiade<br />
riconosce attività che, se considerate unitamente alle loro motivazioni, sono il frutto di immagini di virtù, il che conduce<br />
nuovamente al di fuori dei grandi misteri.<br />
12 Discrasia che è stata oggetto diffuso di interpretazioni, spesso volte a ricomporre i tratti di contrasto tra la condanna e la<br />
lode.<br />
392
Federico M. Petrucci<br />
virtuoso, del possesso dell'autentica virtù. Ma se si aggiunge a quel punto di vista quello, tradizionale<br />
e politico, di Alcibiade, si ottiene un quadro completo e plastico.<br />
Infine si può rintracciare una delle ragioni per cui Platone affida ad Alcibiade quest'ultimo<br />
discorso 13 . Far pronunciare al campione della timocrazia, che non coglie le basi filosofiche delle gesta<br />
di Socrate, una simile lode delle azioni virtuose consente a Platone di evidenziare come le azioni del<br />
maestro siano non solo compatibili con ciò che la città richiede ai suoi cittadini, ma addirittura<br />
compiute con livelli di eccellenza. Così, se Diotima ha elevato il filosofo ai grandi misteri, alla<br />
contemplazione delle idee, sottraendogli l'attenzione per gli onori, Alcibiade - perché proprio questi<br />
può farlo in modo immediato - gli restituisce la dignità del cittadino virtuoso secondo uno sguardo<br />
tradizionale. Ora, la dialettica tra queste due polarità rappresenta un argomento implicito a sostegno<br />
del fatto che il filosofo, asceso all'idea, può ridiscendere nel mondo in modo compiuto, essere<br />
accettato e anzi lodato per il suo agire virtuoso 14 .<br />
Così Socrate è lontano dal pensatoio in cui vorrebbero relegarlo i suoi detrattori, lontano dal<br />
ruolo di corruttore, e paradossalmente lontano anche dall'immagine denigratoria del filosofo che<br />
potrebbe essere delineata da un Callicle. Il filosofo, anzi, è in grado anche di manifestarsi come<br />
campione dell'azione virtuosa. E questo è ciò che Alcibiade, benché senza cogliere le basi morali di<br />
tali capacità, è probabilmente il più qualificato a mostrare.<br />
13 Ragioni, queste, che approfondiscono - a causa del carattere specifico del personaggio - quelle più generali di una<br />
possibile immedesimazione del lettore con Alcibiade (cfr. partic. E.Belfiore, Dialectic with the Reader cit., 44-45); anzi, in<br />
tal caso il lettore è chiamato a valutare le parole di Alcibiade ed eventualmente a rintracciare l'errore che esse contengono.<br />
14 Questo elemento apologetico si può aggiungere agli altri presenti nel dialogo, e in particolare impliciti nel discorso di<br />
Alcibiade, spesso evidenziati dalla critica.<br />
393
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