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THE ROYAL AIR FORCE 

AIR POWER 

Review 

Volume Three 

Number One 

Spring 2000

Editor RAF IMTTP* 

Brian Finch 0171 305 7140 

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Royal Air Force 

AIR POWER 

Review 

Contents 

Foreword from CAS 

Introduction by Director of Defence 

Studies (RAF) 

Contributions to Royal Air Force 

Air Power Review 

1 Sir Frederick Tymms Memorial Lecture 

The Chief of the Air Staff 

Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Johns 

16 Air Operations for Strategic Effect 

Group Captain Peter W Gray 

32 Doctrine Not Dogma: Lessons from the 

Past 

Professor Richard Overy 

At any time throughout the document, you can 

click this arrow to return to this contents screen 

48 The Future of Airpower – 

Observations from the Past Decade 

Philip S Meilinger 

70 The Future of Airpower? 

Group Captain John Thomas 

82 To Sea or Not To Sea: That is the 

Question 

Wing Commander Neil Meadows 

108 Target Berlin 

Dr Alfred Price FRHistS 

124 Book Reviews 

142 Notices 

Tel: 01554 822 399 

Fax: 01554 822 515 

The views expressed are those of the authors concerned, not 

necessarily the MOD. 

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be 

reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any 

form without prior permission in writing from the Editor. 

Unless by prior arrangement, articles and photographs will 

not normally be returned. 

Editorial Board: 

Gp Capt P W Gray D Def S (RAF) (Chairman) 

B Finch, Editor, RAF Information Media Training and Technical Publications* 

Gp Capt J H S Thomas, MOD; Gp Capt H Rondle, Gp Capt CST; 

Wg Cdr P J Greville, SO1 Def S (RAF); Mr S Cox, Head AHB; 

Mr C Hobson, Head Librarian JSCSC; Dr C J M Goulter, Defence Studies 

Dept, JSCSC; 

Sqn Ldr A W Riches, Secretary.

Foreword from CAS 

Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Johns, 

GCB CBE LVO ADC FRAeS RAF 

I continue to be impressed by the excellent standard of the 

articles that are appearing in the Air Power Review. Not 

surprisingly, the high quality of debate and the broad range of 

topics covered in the Review are attracting well-deserved plaudits 

from our readers around the World. Indeed, in the last issue, the 

then Commander Allied Air Forces Central Europe, General John 

Jumper USAF, provided his personal viewpoint on the Allied 

victory in Kosovo. If you have not yet read his article, I strongly 

recommend you do so as it provides a fascinating overview of the 

operation with a forceful and most pertinent conclusion. 

For my part, and without wishing to have an adverse impact on 

the very high quality of articles in this latest issue of the Review, 

I have included in this edition my script from the Sir Frederick 

Tymms Memorial Lecture which I presented at the Royal 

Aeronautical Society last year. The lecture was my first 

opportunity to speak openly on Air Power in the aftermath of 

Allied operations in the Balkans, and you will note that as well as 

addressing many of the fallacies disseminated by the media at 

the time, I also cover in more general terms my thoughts on the 

enduring nature of Air Power. 

This will be my last foreword to the Royal Air Force Air Power 

Review, as I retire from my post as Chief of the Air Staff in April. 

I do so in the knowledge that the Review has established itself 

throughout the world as a high quality and respected journal. 

This success reflects not only the hard work of the editorial team 

but also the high quality of the articles submitted for publication. 

So thank you to everyone who has taken the time and trouble to 

contribute. To the many others who have enjoyed the Review but 

have not yet been tempted to commit their thoughts to paper, 

I simply offer my encouragement. No-one has a monopoly of 

good ideas or military wisdom so the more that contribute to the 

Air Power debate the better.

INTRODUCTION BY 

DIRECTOR OF DEFENCE STUDIES (RAF) 

In his Chesney Gold Memorial Lecture to the Royal United Services Institute in 1973, Professor Michael Howard stated that he was 

‘tempted indeed to declare dogmatically that whatever doctrine the Armed Forces are working on now, they have got it wrong. I am 

also tempted to declare that it does not matter that they have got it wrong. What does matter is their capacity to get it right quickly 

when the moment arrives.’ 1 Arguably, military doctrine has come a long way in the intervening quarter of a century. We now have a 

recognisable hierarchy of doctrine, the vast bulk of which is consistent with key allies and with NATO at both the strategic and 

operational levels. Single Service doctrine is increasingly joint in tone, content and delivery – as was evident to all of those who were 

privileged to hear the panel comments at the launch of AP 3000 (third edition) British Air Power Doctrine. But strategic and operational 

level doctrine documents do not tell the whole story. Active debate within the covers of journals such as the Air Power Review 

contributes considerably to ensuring that our doctrine continues to develop in step with changes in technology and in concert with 

world events. This issue is no exception. 

The first article is the text of a speech given by the Chief of the Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Johns, to the Guild of Air Pilots 

and Navigators at the Royal Aeronautical Society in September 1999; this was delivered as the annual Sir Frederick Tymms Memorial 

Lecture. Given the importance of the debate on the use of air power within the Service, among the public and in academia, it is 

extremely important to be able to publish (and therefore record) the entire text – rather than just the sound bites that have become the 

norm in the media. The speech not only outlines CAS’s views on the Kosovo air operation, it also presents an invaluable critique on the 

contemporary utility of air power. This text, along with CAS’s valedictory foreword, makes an auspicious start for the Air Power Review 

in the new millennium. 

In the second article, I have sought to evaluate the use of air power for strategic effect in the light of the strictest test of all – actual 

combat in the conflict against Serbia. Effects-based warfare is very much the flavour of the moment in discussions of air power. At its 

most basic, this form of warfare aims to achieve a given objective in as precise a manner as possible. If one wishes to close down a 

power station, a weapon delivered into the control room would have the same effect as demolishing the entire plant, but with less 

collateral damage (and less to repair when conflict moves into a peacekeeping situation). To do this at any level requires accurate 

intelligence and analysis; this is even more vital if we are to do so on the strategic plane. 

Early analysis of our doctrine in this way is part of what Professor Richard Overy, in our third article, terms ‘constant and critical 

interrogation’. Professor Overy examines the development of air power doctrine in the UK and identifies five factors that have to be 

1 Michael Howard MC FBA, ‘Military Science in an age of Peace’, Chesney Gold Medal Lecture given on 3 October 1973, Journal of the Royal 

United Services Institute, March 1974, Volume 119, No 1, page 7.

taken into account in its formulation. These include the impact of politics, the role of technological change, the lessons of experience, 

conditions for review and coping with the ‘eccentricity factor’. It is incumbent on all involved in thinking about air power, at whatever 

level, to contribute to the debate if we are to prevent doctrine becoming dogma. This article, coming as it does from one of the United 

Kingdom’s most eminent historians, provides an excellent stimulant for the debate. 

The general theme of generating debate is maintained in the next two articles. Colonel Philip Meilinger USAF is a well known exponent 

of air power whose Ten Propositions Regarding Air Power have been widely read and discussed. His article takes forward US thinking 

on the use of air power in the next decade. Meilinger succinctly analyses the impact of the use of air power in the Gulf and the 

Balkans. He points out that many of the apparent disadvantages faced by the coalitions involved in these conflicts were largely offset 

by air power – even though few airmen would claim that it had won on its own. Colonel Meilinger’s views on the future prospects for 

air power are written on the basis of developments in technology which only the United States can afford across the spectrum. Group 

Captain John Thomas’s article puts forward the UK perspective, inevitably highlighting the disparity in scale and resources. Thomas 

concludes, however, by stating that whatever the differences between respective air forces, air power will always be, to use John 

Terraine’s words, To the Right of the Line 2 . 

Wing Commander Neil Meadows has provided our next article on how the considerable air power potential of Joint Force 2000 could 

be used in future emergencies. He points out that not all contingencies lend themselves to the deployment of this force and its efficacy 

will depend on the scale and intensity of the conflict. His view that it should not be used for political whim or due to historical 

precedent is very much consistent with our theme of avoiding the descent from living doctrine into dogma. 

The final article has been written for us by another extremely prominent military historian – Dr Alfred Price. ‘Target Berlin’ provides a 

graphic description of a maximum effort strike on the German Capital carried out by the US 8th Air Force from their bases in England. 

The article is based on numerous interviews and other primary source material. Almost as a postscript, Dr Price points out that the 

value of these raids extended far beyond the material (and psychological) damage they caused; the war of attrition against Luftwaffe 

fighters went a long way towards the acquisition and maintenance of air superiority over Normandy later in the year. 

In the last edition of this journal, I promised that we would publish a list of the Top Ten Air Power Readers and this is included in this 

edition. Although I confess to cheating by including alternatives to the ten books recommended, the titles covered do offer a strategic 

overview of the first century of air power. The book section of the journal has also been expanded to include more detailed reviews of a 

wide range of appropriate titles – rather than just the notices of publication that we had published hitherto. We hope that these reviews 

will stimulate interest and debate and we would welcome submissions for further editions. 

D Def S (RAF) 

2 Taken from the title of the history of the Second World War: John Terraine, The Right of the Line: The RAF in the European War 1939 – 1945, 

Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1985.

CONTRIBUTIONS TO ROYAL AIR FORCE 

AIR POWER REVIEW 

The Royal Air Force Air Power Review is published under the auspices of Director of Defence Studies (RAF) and has the sponsorship 

of Assistant Chief of the Air Staff. It is intended to provide an open forum for study which stimulates discussion and thought on air 

power in its broadest context. This publication is also intended to support the British armed forces in general and the Royal Air Force in 

particular with respect to the development and application of air power. 

Quality contributions from both service and civilian authors are sought which will contribute to the existing knowledge and 

understanding of the subject. Any topic relevant to the study of contemporary or historical air power will be considered by the Air 

Power Review Management Board. 

Articles should be original and preferably not previously published, although this will not exclude publication in the Air Power Review if 

the material is considered to be of sufficient merit. The length of articles may vary from as little as 2,000 to an absolute maximum of 

10,000 words. Each author will receive a payment of £200 when the article is published. Assistance and research for photographic, 

illustrative and diagrammatic information can be provided, but design format and graphic presentation of material on page will be at the 

discretion of the Editor. Lengthy articles so considered may be published in multiple parts. Bibliographic and other references should 

be included as end notes to articles. Contributions from serving military personnel should be in accordance with DCI GEN 313 dated 

26 November 1999 (Clearance Procedures for Dealing with the Media and Other Public Speaking and Writing). Contributions from 

serving Royal Air Force personnel must be approved by Publications Clearance Branch (Air), Ministry of Defence, 3-5 Great Scotland 

Yard, London, SW1A 2HW. 

Submissions can be accepted as typed copy or in a variety of electronic IBM or Apple Macintosh based formats on 3.5 inch floppy 

disk. A numbered page print out of all text should be accompanied by illustrative, diagrammatic, photographic or other graphic 

material intended to illuminate the article. Please send your material to: 

Editor, Air Power Review, Room 5/128, St Christopher House, Southwark Street, 

London, SE1 0TD. 

or 

Director of Defence Studies (RAF), Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre, Shrivenham, 

Swindon, Wiltshire, SN6 8RF. e-mail: defs-raf@netcomuk.co.uk

Sir Frederick Tymms 

Memorial Lecture 

to the Guild of Air Pilots 

and Air Navigators at 

The Royal Aeronautical Society 

on 21 September 1999

presented by 

The Chief of the Air Staff 

Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Johns 

GCB CBE LVO ADC FRAeS RAF 

1 

I 

was most grateful and indeed honoured to receive 

GAPAN’s invitation to give the Guild’s autumn lecture in 

memory of Sir Frederick Tymms, a founder member of the 

Guild of Air Pilots in 1929 and himself a Master of the 

Guild in 1957/8. Sir Frederick is also well remembered as a 

driving force in obtaining livery status for the Guild, which was 

achieved in 1956. All this was a culmination of a most 

distinguished career in aviation, which started when Sir Frederick 

joined the RFC in 1917. Thereafter he played a most important 

role in opening up international air routes in Africa and India 

before he was appointed as the UK representative on the 

Council of ICAO in 1947. 

Sir Frederick was an airman in the truest and broadest sense of 

that distinguished designation and in his memory it is my 

privilege to give you an airman’s appraisal of where air power 

stands today as we approach the end of the century. A century 

much scarred by war and within which air forces have grown 

from an almost insignificant auxiliary to the land and sea services 

into a decisive factor in the conduct of all contemporary joint 

operations throughout the spectrum of conflict.

2 

I also do welcome this public opportunity to offer my own professional comments on some of the major criticisms levelled at air 

forces – and in some instances my own Service – involved in recent operation in the Balkans. I have to say that much of what 

was written and said by commentators and military analysts gave me a sad feeling of déjà vu, as a predictable litany of 

prejudices and fixed ideas received a ritual airing. 

In giving my response, subjective perhaps in places but at least with the merit of being professionally well informed, I do hope 

that together we can make a more balanced judgement on the contemporary utility of air power and in the process identify one 

or two signposts which point the way forward to the next millennium. 

Perhaps the most predictable of all recent outpourings during Op Allied Force was that the Royal Air Force should be split 

asunder and returned to its parent services. So before I consider the contemporary and future employment of air power in our 

much troubled world let me reflect briefly on why the Royal Air Force was born of a merger of the RFC and RNAS each with its 

own brief but dazzling history. A merger, as I never tire of reminding people, decided by statesmen, industrialists, generals and 

admirals, with no Air Marshal yet available to assist their deliberations. 

It came about because the Germans were the first to twig that aircraft had a military utility beyond control of the airspace over 

and near the battlefield – that it could be used to strike directly at the heartland of an enemy. With attacks on British mainland 

targets, principally London, in the summer of 1917 by Zeppelin airships and fixed wing bombers, the Germans were the first to 

exploit this new concept of air warfare. These attacks provoked a public outcry that gave much of the impetus to the formation 

of an independent air force. This outcry was the primary consequence of the inability of the RFC and RNAS to co-ordinate their 

operations in order to provide effective air defence of London. But there were other reasons too, particularly the need to resolve 

disputes between the army and the navy over the supply of aircraft and engines for two competing air arms. In 1917 the two 

services had placed orders for 76 new types of airplane and 57 new types of aero-engine much to the delight of their French 

manufacturers who were the principal suppliers. 

The creation of the RAF was the right thing to do but it was MRAF Sir John Slessor’s opinion that it would probably have never 

happened had it not been done when it was. Sir John Slessor was of course an early apostle of what we today call jointery and 

it was he who first made the very pertinent point that had the RAF not been created in 1918, it is at least a fair bet that the RFC 

in the years between the wars would have suffered the fate of the tank corps – and then what would have happened to Britain 

in 1940?

Largely due to the quite extraordinary 

foresight, vision and determination of such 

men as Trenchard, the RAF was adequately 

prepared to fight and win the battle that 

saved us in the heroic summer of 1940 

3 

Largely due to the quite extraordinary foresight, vision and determination of 

such men as Trenchard, the RAF was adequately prepared to fight and win 

the battle that saved us in the heroic summer of 1940. And in the years that 

followed that great victory the men and women of the RAF truly swung into 

their stride. In conjunction principally with the air arms of the United States, 

they eventually secured that extraordinary degree of air supremacy in the new 

age of joint warfare that enabled the allied armies and fleets to win their great 

victories on land and sea. 

Even the most cursory examination of the early history of The RAF reveals 

three themes of contemporary relevance. First and foremost, the RAF must 

never be distracted from the raison d’être of its existence. Our Service was 

conceived in war at a time of great national peril as a fighting service. That is 

what we still are and must remain because no warfighting operation on land or 

at sea anywhere within the spectrum of conflict can be satisfactorily concluded 

without control of the air. We need to be quite clear that air power in 

warfighting concerns in the first instance the achievement of air superiority to 

permit the conduct of surface operations. To proceed at a given time and 

place without prohibitive enemy interference. 

We need to be quite clear that air power in 

warfighting concerns in the first instance the 

achievement of air superiority to permit the 

conduct of surface operations

4 

Control of the air is achieved by defeating an enemy’s 

air power, which requires a dedicated campaign to 

suppress his air force. In this context, the relationship 

between offensive and defensive air operations is 

dynamic. They are complementary not alternative 

elements and the balance between them will depend 

on a range of factors. This is not straightforward, as 

the fight for air superiority is a highly complex operation 

with no absolute finality in it as long as enemy aircraft 

are operating. The tragedy of Sir Galahad in the 

Falklands war only six days before the Argentine 

surrender serves to underline my point. 

The second theme to emerge concerns the 

importance of technology. In the 1920s and 1930s 

men of vision within many national air forces had 

concluded that air power is essentially dependent 

upon scientific and technological superiority. But for 

various reasons we in this country underinvested in 

R&D and for this omission we paid dearly in the early years of 

World War II. Moreover this act of omission undermined the 

judgement of the early air power theorists which put in train a 

tradition of over-expectations and inflated claims that mark 

almost every development on air power technology or capability 

up to end of World War II. 

To illustrate my point, in World War II, to hit a target as 

big as a standard football pitch from medium level 

took over 9000 bombs and almost 3000 aircraft 

At that stage, air power, once perceived by many theorists as a military scalpel, was, in truth, a cudgel and a ruthless one at that as 

epitomised by the emergence of the air delivered nuclear bomb. That said, we must recognise that our Second World War 

commanders had the foresight to appreciate what air power could achieve for them. But what they lacked was the technological 

capability to apply air power with precision and certainty. To illustrate my point, in World War II, to hit a target as big as a standard 

football pitch from medium level took over 9,000 bombs and almost 3,000 aircraft. Today with precision guided munitions we can

achieve the same certainty of effect with just one aircraft. So with increased precision, the cudgel is redundant albeit I think we still need 

to be careful in using the analogy of the scalpel. While the arrival of a 1,000lb bomb spot on target may represent precision, the 

consequences for the target are normally dire. 

But rapid advances in technology have done much more besides improve our weapons aiming capabilities. With parallel improvements 

to range, reliability and endurance and advances in air-to-air refuelling, aircraft can be quickly brought to readiness at their home bases 

or deployed to an operational theatre. Alternatively where a high level of responsiveness is required, they can be held in the air close to 

the area of political or operational interest and with maximum visibility, under tight political control and in cadence with other measures of 

inducement or coercion. Air power thus provides a wide spread of options to governments wishing to exert military pressure short of the 

risks and costs of committing ground forces in circumstances where a ground presence can sensibly be avoided. 

But perhaps the most important area of technology – both now and in the near future – is that of information. This should come as no 

surprise. It has become the critical issue in many fields of endeavour, not just the military. We have the ability to reach distant targets and 

to hit them precisely and decisively. But we need to locate and identify them first. And crucially, we have to get the relevant information 

to the attacking forces before the target can move out of the weapon footprint. Precision and timely, accurate information go very much 

hand-in-hand. We have of course recognised this for some time, and are making great strides in the fields of information, surveillance, 

targeting and reconnaissance – or ISTAR, as we call it. The recent announcement on the future ASTOR system is one example of the 

progress we are making in this area. But we recognise that there is much still to do, and information superiority will be a key priority for 

us in the years ahead. 

The third theme is the importance of our people. They must of course have the right equipment and 

logistic support. But so often in the past, it has been the quality of our people that has made the 

difference. Their bravery, foresight, imagination, and their powers of objective analysis have been 

fundamental in ensuring that we are prepared for crises and that, once committed to operations, we 

win. We need all those qualities and more in our people both now and in the future. 

We are therefore determined to put people at the heart of our forward planning, and one of the key 

strategic objectives for the RAF is to recruit, train and maintain the commitment of all of its people. 

This is more challenging than ever before. First of all we are not talking about just regular RAF 

personnel; we must include our reservists, our civilian employees and, in some cases, contract staff. 

Secondly, they are not all employed in a direct RAF chain of command; many are in joint 

organisations and defence agencies. We therefore have to work all the harder at maintaining their 

5 

…it has been the quality of 

our people that has made the 

difference. Their bravery, 

foresight, imagination, and 

their powers of objective 

analysis have been 

fundamental in ensuring that 

we are prepared for crises 

and that, once committed to 

operations, we win

6 

sense of identity and looking after then in the round. For while we welcome enthusiastically the introduction of joint 

organisations, we have to remember one overriding imperative. We are in the business of winning battles, and to do that you 

need people to do difficult and dangerous things; things that test not only the quality of their inner steel but also their loyalty 

and commitment to their fighting unit whether it be ship, regiment or squadron. The motivational and other reasons that 

persuade people to put their lives on the line are complex, but ethos and ‘tribal’ identity are certainly vital factors. And because 

of our history and the way we are organised, our ethos and identities in the British military are based on the single services. 

We therefore have to operate jointly where it makes operational sense in terms of military effectiveness and efficiency, while 

maintaining a clear sense of belonging and loyalty to the parent service. 

At the same time, of course, we have to satisfy the demands of our people. Striking a balance between operations and 

training, between time deployed and time at home, is becoming increasingly difficult in this new era of expeditionary 

operations. If we are to retain our people for the time we need them – to develop and exploit their expertise and experience – 

we have to understand and be sympathetic to the aspirations of not only the men and women of the service, but also their 

families. Moreover, it remains a fact of life that a force that is continually being employed – even on relatively small scale 

operations – will need far more people than one which is only used occasionally for large scale conflicts. This was of course a 

key strand of the Strategic Defence Review, and it is increasingly conditioning our thinking on the balance of regulars, 

reservists and contract personnel. And we must get this right, because the need for us to respond rapidly and effectively to 

crises is as great as ever. 

Turning from themes may I 

touch briefly on the enduring 

characteristics of air power? If 

you believe as I do that the 

world will continue to witness 

clashes of group interests that 

will from time to time erupt into 

collective violence, then the 

ability rapidly to constrain the 

ambitions of an enemy will 

remain an invaluable option to 

the resolution of crises. And if 

If you believe as I do that 

the world will continue to 

witness clashes of group 

interests that will from 

time to time erupt into 

collective violence, then 

the ability rapidly to 

constrain the ambitions 

of an enemy will remain 

an invaluable option to 

the resolution of crises

diplomacy and deterrence should fail, resulting in conflict at whatever level of intensity, we airmen must be prepared first to 

shape the ring for our ground forces and secondly to provide direct support to their activities within it. We must be ready to 

respond to their requirements by removing an enemy’s operational options and by reducing his capacity to fight – in effect 

denying him the initiative and dictating the conditions of confrontation. 

In practical terms this means first achieving and sustaining control of the air space – remember the first and vital responsibility 

of the air force – before then denying the enemy the capacity to concentrate, manoeuvre, deploy or prepare an ambush without 

fear of detection and, if appropriate, attack. In doing so we must continue to expand our ability to exploit the fundamental and 

long established characteristics at the decisive time and place. 

So much for theory. Let me now turn to experience and practicalities. A moment ago I mentioned shaping the ring for our 

ground forces and of course there is nothing new in air power moulding the environment for the benefit of surface units. This is 

exactly what the allied air forces did before the Normandy landing in 1944 and incidentally what the Luftwaffe failed to do for 

the German army in the face of our air defences in 1940. And it is also what the coalition air forces did in the Gulf War at least 

to my airman’s eye. The other side of the Gulf War story is given by General Kroesen, US army retired who wrote in 1994 and I 

quote: “The recent air campaign against the Iraqi forces gained not a single one of the US or UN objectives in the Persian Gulf 

War. Four days of land combat aided immeasurably by the air campaign achieved every goal and victory”. 

For my money however, it was the coalition air forces that denied Saddam Hussein the strategy of his choice. This was 

achieved through the immediate establishment of control of the air, which allowed General Schwarzkopf to authorise attacks on 

both strategic and tactical objectives. Saddam’s army was thus cut off and progressively cut down. Battlefield surveillance by 

Joint Stars and other systems took place with impunity and total information dominance was achieved. Coalition ground forces 

could thus re-deploy for the key flanking attack without detection or disruption. With powerful land forces exploiting the impact 

of air power, the coalition imposed its strategy on Saddam Hussein. And happily 18,000 hospital beds proved largely 

superfluous to requirements while in the land fighting the US Army 7th corps used only 10 to 15% of the 70,000 tons of 

ammunition allocated to it. 

Almost inevitably, the end of the war lessons learned exercise immediately provoked an endless debate as to how the war was 

won. In my view, this was a sterile exercise, some of it certainly provoked by defence contractors with their own commercial 

interests to satisfy, and all of which cloaked more serious issues and assessments from public scrutiny and debate. We should 

be quite clear that the evident success of air power was dependent on the use of Saudi air fields, the early achievement of air 

superiority following a gutless performance by the Iraqi air force and of course terrain and climatic conditions which were 

7

8 

…it was the coalition air forces that denied 

Saddam Hussein the strategy of his 

choice. This was achieved through the 

immediate establishment of control of the 

air, which allowed General Schwarzkopf to 

authorise attacks on both strategic and 

tactical objectives 

generally conducive to the conduct of air operations. On the 

debit side, inherent limitations in aircraft sensors needed to 

guide PGMs placed some inhibitions on the total effectiveness of air power. Pilots found that infra-red electrical optical and 

laser systems were seriously affected by cloud, rain, smoke and high humidity. 

The point I want to make at this stage is that within all levels of warfare, whether on land at sea or in the air, there are few if any 

absolutes. Balanced judgements within the joint arena of warfare can only be made through the abandonment of prejudice and 

by dispassionate consideration of first, military facts and second, political sensitivities which condition the use of military force. 

Perhaps the experience of Bosnia-Herzegovina will help serve to underline my point because the shaping of the operational 

environment in the Balkans provides a most illuminating contrast to that of the Gulf War. You will recall that for many months in 

a very complex operational environment, air power was not brought fully to bear. It was applied irregularly and in small doses as

timing, in relation to the diplomatic initiatives and operational and humanitarian constraints, was critical. Moreover, given the 

widespread dispersal of small and often isolated detachments of multi-national ground forces caution had to be exercised. 

In retrospect, we can identify problems with confused political objectives, the often contradictory requirements of peace 

enforcement and humanitarian relief, and difficulties ensuing from extended and duplicated chains of command. But procedures 

were improved and the perceptions which may have been created in 1993 and 1994 as to the relative impotence of air power 

were abruptly shattered as UN land forces were re-deployed for self-protection and the weight of NATO air power was 

unleashed in Operation Deliberate Force. 

You may recall that the air campaign was specifically authorised by the London Conference which allowed both the UN and 

NATO command keys to be turned. Under the leadership of General Rupert Smith and with a carefully orchestrated planning of 

NATO air chiefs, the precise application of air power made its decisive contribution to the totality of pressures which forced the 

Serbs to accept the demands of the international community. 

…perceptions in 1993 

and 1994 as to the 

relative impotence of air 

power were abruptly 

shattered as UN land 

forces were re-deployed 

for self-protection and 

the weight of NATO air 

power was unleashed in 

Operation Deliberate 

Force 

9 

Of course this success was not due to 

air power alone. Over a long period 

ground forces had held the ring while 

international leaders and aid agencies 

played out their hands. The Croat 

offensive in the Serb Krajina was 

important in weakening Serb resolve as 

was the presence and support of 

UNPROFOR’s rapid reaction force 

artillery. But I share the view of Admiral 

Leighton-Smith, the NATO theatre 

commander at the time, that it was the 

relentless pressure and precision of up to

10 

7 NATO air attack packages a day that finally persuaded the Serbs that the international community really meant business. 

Some 48 target complexes within which there were 338 individual aiming points were attacked with 1,026 munitions of which 

some 708 were precision guided. More than 80% of the targets were destroyed or suffered serious damage. 

Despite many differences 

between the environment 

of the Gulf and Bosnia- 

Herzegovina the 

contribution of air power 

towards the achievement 

of the respective 

strategic objectives had 

some commonalities 

Despite many differences between the environment of the Gulf and Bosnia-Herzegovina the 

contribution of air power towards the achievement of the respective strategic objectives had 

some commonalities. In both instances air power responded flexibly to the needs of the 

moment and it was employed within an overall strategic plan. Air power was both available to 

support the tactical activities of lower level commanders and free to pursue higher level 

strategic objectives. But most importantly, while the limitations of some aspects of air power 

technology were demonstrated, both operations provided a proving ground for advanced 

weapons systems that our air forces had been incorporating into their inventories over the 

previous decade. The consequence was that air power’s offensive potential began fully to 

match its earlier promise and hopefully all the critics of air power will come to understand that 

imposing the characteristics of past bombing campaigns – notably the bomber offensive 

against Germany in World War II and North Vietnam 25 years later-on to present day air strike 

capabilities represents a classic case of trying to compare apples and oranges. 

This brings me to Kosovo. Let me kick off with some incontrovertible statistics. Over 78 days of the air campaign NATO air 

forces flew some 38,000 missions of which about 1/3rd were strike sorties that delivered some 10,000 tons of ordnance. From 

a purely national perspective, 100 air defence sorties were flown by RN Sea Harriers and over 1,000 bombing sorties by RAF 

Harrier GR7 and Tornado GR1s. RAF VC-10 and Tristar tankers and our E3D Sentry AWACS aircraft flew a further 500 combat 

support missions while hundreds of sorties were flown by air transport aircraft in support of our deployed forces. 

And while all this was going on in the Balkans do not forget that we flew a further 700 missions over the Iraqi no-fly zones 

where Saddam continued to mount a sustained campaign against coalition aircraft in his attempts to shoot one down. Since 

the end of Operation Desert Fox in December 1998, our aircraft have faced 325 direct threats from Iraqi ground-based forces, 

including SAMs and anti-aircraft artillery. In response, coalition aircraft have been forced to take defensive action on 104 days 

during the past 39 weeks, and for their part, RAF Tornado GR1s have dropped laser-guided bombs on 32 occasions, hitting 41 

separate targets.

From a purely national perspective, 100 air 

defence sorties were flown by RN Sea 

Harriers and over 1,000 bombing sorties by 

RAF Harrier GR7 and Tornado GR1s 

But to return to Kosovo, throughout the course of 

operation Allied Force, NATO air operations were 

subject to continual critical analysis from a 

number of media and military ‘experts’, whose 

reports gave the impression that NATO aircraft 

had operated from a safe haven above 15,000 

feet raining down bombs on a largely defenceless 

Serbia. Furthermore, they suggested that many of 

these bombs missed their targets and no real 

damage was done to the Serbian military 

machine, apart from the destruction of dummy 

tanks, because NATO air crew would not come 

down to low level to close with the enemy. Then, 

when the cease-fire was secured and offensive 

operations at an end, these critics implied that the 

78 days of the air campaign was largely nugatory 

effort, and that it was the growing threat of a land 

invasion which had caused Milosevic to bend to 

NATO’s will. 

Let me give you an airman’s view on these points. First it is absolutely true that the NATO chain of command placed a high 

premium on the safety of its aircraft and aircrew – and as the professional head of my service I say a good thing too because I 

would not want the men and women entrusted to my care ever to feel that I or my senior commanders would be tempted to be 

profligate with their lives. That said, had we given the Serbs greater opportunity to shoot down our aircraft by consistently flying 

within the range of their man portable SAM systems and light AAA, and had they succeeded in knocking down some NATO 

aircraft every time they flew over, I can think of nothing which would have given a greater boost to their morale. 

11

12 I should also point out that the 

airspace above 15,000 feet was not 

a safe haven. While the Serb air 

force quickly threw in the towel – and 

incidentally lost 115 combat aircraft, 

including helicopters, in the course of 

the war – their GBAD fired over 700 

SAMs at coalition aircraft… 

Moreover we have to ask whether the cohesion of NATO, the centre of gravity 

of the alliance, would have been sufficiently strong to accommodate a steady 

flow of aircraft losses. I think a lot of otherwise well informed and intelligent 

people, albeit totally lacking in military experience, cannot get to grips with the 

fact that war is not an exercise in chivalry in which honour demands an even 

handed and fair contest. War is and will remain a nasty and brutal business in 

which the aim is to achieve political objectives with the least possible loss to 

one’s own side. This requires you to concentrate your strengths and advantages 

on the enemy’s weaknesses and no prizes are awarded for manufacturing an 

evenly balanced fight let alone for sustaining unnecessary casualties. 

I should also point out that the airspace above 

15,000 feet was not a safe haven. While the 

Serb air force quickly threw in the towel – and 

incidentally lost 115 combat aircraft, including 

helicopters, in the course of the war – their 

GBAD fired over 700 SAMs at coalition aircraft 

and engaged with heavy AAA on numerous 

occasions. We did not lose aircraft because we 

first won the battle for control of the airspace. 

Thereafter, the effectiveness of our counter 

measures, the skills of our aircrew and a large 

slice of luck brought home all but 2 of the 829 

airplanes from 14 countries that were chopped 

to NATO control. 

RAF aircrew flew 10% of the offensive missions 

and on numerous occasions when the weather 

was against us, they penetrated Serb air 

defences to get to their targets. But because 

they were unable to identify positively their 

aiming point or because conditions would not 

Serb SA3 GOA missile battery

permit a consistent aiming solution they brought their weapons all the way 

home. It takes guts to do that because an airplane without its weapon load 

is far more manoeuvrable when under threat. But apart from guts it also 

represents a discipline within the ranks of our operational aircrew of which I 

am deeply proud. 

It is also no secret that NATO placed strict limitations on targeting in order 

to avoid collateral damage, which meant it was much easier to strike 

effectively at fixed installations than at fielded forces in Kosovo. And with 

that in mind may I make one further practical point on the issue of altitude. 

Given reasonable weather it is much easier to attack a target from medium 

level than at low level. You have more time to acquire a target, to identify it 

positively, and then to achieve the best weapons aiming solution – all of 

Destruction of radar facility in Pristina, Kosovo which is vital if you are to minimise the risk of collateral damage. On the 

other hand the lower you go the smaller your field of vision and the less time you 

have to acquire, identify and aim at a target, all of which increases the risk of collateral damage. 

Low level operational flying is the most difficult and demanding of military flying disciplines and that is why we train so hard at it. 

Moreover to persecute a successful low level attack requires one of two pre-conditions. Targets must either be sufficiently large 

to permit acquisition in time to permit an attack or the aircrew must have very accurate co-ordinates of the target’s position. As 

the Serb army had the time to disperse and camouflage all their significant fielded equipment, low flying operations in Kosovo 

were not a realistic option. That said, had NATO land forces been committed to an opposed invasion, close air support from 

low level would have been provided around the clock with our aircraft benefiting from ground-based laser designation of their 

targets. 

As to the effectiveness of the campaign 467 static targets were attacked and less than 20 of these missions involved incidents 

of significant collateral damage. More that three-quarters of these targets suffered moderate to severe damage. Against fielded 

targets, you will have seen what SACEUR, Gen Milosevic’s security forces and restricting their operations in Kosovo. The figures 

which he quoted were not materially different from those issued at the end of the campaign. But war is not a matter of pure statistics. 

No figures can show the extent to which the Yugoslav military had to keep tanks and other assets hidden and inoperative to avoid them 

being hit. And as Gen Clark said: 

“The conflict ended on NATO’s terms. The Serb forces are out. The refugees are home. Peace is in place”. 

13

14 

The real issue, then, is not what was destroyed – although Serb propaganda claims are very wide of the mark – but why did Milosevic 

capitulate? Only Milosevic himself knows for certain but given the opportunity to ask him the question we have to face the probability 

that on past form his reply would not be the whole truth and nothing but the truth. In my opinion his decision was certainly prompted by 

a number of factors. 

The indictment of Milosevic and four other senior FRY figures by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia exercised a 

most unsettling effect on his personal morale. His increasing international isolation, culminating in Russian involvement in the diplomatic 

process of pursuing the G8 principles of 6 May was a further pressure point, and an important parallel activity to the military campaign. 

Also of importance was the build-up of forces for KFOR after the Washington Summit, and the announcement that NATO would be 

updating its planning for ground options. This must have played a part in convincing Milosevic that waiting for NATO’s will to break was 

not an option. 

But I do believe that these three factors either individually or collectively would not have exercised sufficient pressure to explain why 

Milosevic, a master of unscrupulous brinkmanship, should so suddenly accept NATO conditions in early June. So that leaves us with the 

coercive effect of the air campaign within which I think we can make three informed judgements. 

First, even if we destroyed less fighting equipment in Kosovo than first estimated, it is clear that 

when the Serbs came out of hiding to counter UCK activity they suffered serious losses to air 

attack. It would therefore have been apparent to the Serbs that their operations against the UCK 

were being rendered largely non-effective by NATO air power. Second, perhaps more critical, is 

the effect of the attacks on Serbia itself. Apart from the damage to military infrastructure, there is 

considerable evidence that NATO’s air attacks were seriously damaging the wealth of the 

industrialists and fat cats who underpin Milosevic’s hold on power. Third, what is undeniable other 

than by distorting facts beyond recognition is that had we not bombed we would not be in the 

position today where the majority of refugees have been able to return home. 

Although the air campaign was the decisive element in Allied Force this is not to say that success 

was achieved by air power, let alone by air forces, acting in isolation. Operation Allied Force was a joint operation within which alliance 

navies and armies as well as air forces made their own contributions. The navies provided launch platforms for aircraft and cruise 

missiles while land forces contributed recce drones in support of the air campaign and made an invaluable contribution to humanitarian 

relief. And by their very presence on the ground land forces undoubtedly helped prevent further regional destabilisation and conflict 

spillover. 

Taking an overview of Kosovo, Bosnia and Gulf operations, I think we can safely conclude that when joint operations are considered air 

power will usually be the primary instrument of initial reaction. Air power is attractive because it can be quickly deployed and returned 

First, even if we destroyed less 

fighting equipment in Kosovo 

than first estimated, it is clear 

that when the Serbs came out 

of hiding to counter UCK 

activity they suffered serious 

losses to air attack

…I think we can safely conclude 

that when joint operations are 

considered air power will usually 

be the primary instrument of 

initial reaction 

and it demands less human and material commitment to achieve political objectives while involving 

fewer political risks. But every conflict is unique and air power will not always provide the best 

solution and is unlikely ever to be a panacea. 

Looking to the future, I think one can be certain in restating the fundamental military truth that control of the air will remain a fundamental 

pre-requisite for the successful conduct of any surface campaign. Air power will continue to shape the battlespace to allow naval and 

land forces to exploit the impact of air operations. And while sometimes, as in Kosovo, it may be possible to achieve strategic objectives 

without the committal to action of surface forces, we must continue to aim to achieve the most efficient application of military effort 

through the harmonisation of both surface and air operations. This will only be achieved across the whole spectrum of defence if the 

effectiveness of our armed forces is based on an appropriate balance of mobility, fire power, and manoeuvre capabilities. 

So before I conclude, let me attempt briefly to draw together the main arguments I have advanced on the role and status of air power in 

the course of what I acknowledge to be a fairly discursive scene-setter for our subsequent discussion this evening. I believe I have 

advanced 4 main propositions. 

•1. First, that since its inception, the primary role of the RAF – indeed of any air force – is to win and sustain control of the air. •2. 

Second, that such control is and will remain essential to the success of military operations in the joint environment of today and 

tomorrow. •3. Third, that air power, with its inherent characteristics of height, speed and reach enhanced by technological advances in 

weapon precision and target acquisition, have made it the capability of first choice in the containment of crises or, in the event of conflict, 

as the primary tool for shaping the battlespace to permit the effective and battle winning employment of surface forces. •4. Fourth, and 

last but by no means least, the fundamental importance to the continuing success of the Royal Air Force of recruiting and retaining 

highly trained and motivated men and women all trained to operate in a joint environment, but imbued with the ethos, history and pride 

of their parent service. 

If in the process of demonstrating these propositions, I have also succeeded in answering many of the unjustified criticisms of air power 

in recent operations, then I shall regard my time as well spent! 

In offering an airman’s appraisal on the contemporary state of air power and its strategic and operational significance, I have done so in 

the spirit of that great airman Sir Frederick Tymms whose life this lecture commemorates. I have covered a broad canvas in variable 

detail but hopefully with a style and some sense of balance that will have provoked your interest as well as your comments and 

questions. I also hope you will have got some feeling of the fierce pride I have taken in the courage and discipline of RAF aircrew who 

continue their operations as I speak over Iraq, in their helicopters supporting KFOR, and in other places besides. So as we face the 

future let me conclude by saying that I am very much aware of the challenges that face the RAF and that I fully recognise that it is my 

task as CAS to ensure by personal example the service responds to these challenges, with determination, resourcefulness and, dare I 

say, good humour and confidence. 

15

Air Operations 

for 

Strategic Effect – 

theory and practice in Kosovo 

Milosevic.

By Group Captain Peter W Gray, Director of Defence Studies RAF 17 

People have preferred to feel rather than to know about strategic bombing. 

Dr Noble Frankland 1 

A 

s befitting an operational aviator, as well as being the co-author of 

the official history of the World War II Strategic Air Offensive against 

Germany 2 , Frankland was an air power enthusiast from the classic 

mould. He considered strategic bombing to be at the heart of air 

power 3 – the vital characteristic that set air power apart from land and naval 

warfare. His sentiments in the opening quotation remain as relevant now as 

they were in the aftermath of the Second World War. Much of the public 

debate 4 during the Kosovo campaign tended, in volume if nothing else, 

towards the emotional end of the spectrum rather than the analytical. A 

considerable quantity of material was published over the crisis with the more 

serious arguments ranging from the moral and legal issues through to 

technical matters. One of the most common themes, however, was the debate 

that centred on whether air power could win the day on its own. The ‘armchair 

generals’ 5 and some academics on the one hand suggested that only an 

overwhelming ground force could secure the province of Kosovo. Others 

(arguably the more enlightened) kept faith in the efficacy of air power, but 

without necessarily advocating its utility in isolation. One of the more striking results from the debate was the ‘conversion’ of 

military historian John Keegan 6 whose implacable opposition to the ‘air power alone’ theory was overturned by Milosevic’s 

eventual capitulation. 

This apparent victory for air power will continue to generate debate for years to come – not least because the real reasons for 

Milosevic’s actions will remain, at best, highly classified and may well be interred with his bones. As stated by General Jumper 

in the last issue of this Review, 7 we must be wary of drawing generic lessons from such an idiosyncratic operation. This does 

not, however, suggest that the debate is sterile: indeed analysis is highly relevant at all levels, from the implications for the 

assumptions that underpinned the United Kingdom’s Strategic Defence Review, through the technical merits of specific 

weaponry, to the robustness of national and NATO doctrine.

18 

It would be neither practical nor appropriate for this article to attempt to cover all of this ground. But with the ink barely dry on 

the third edition of AP 3000 – British Air Power Doctrine, it is timely to examine the use of air power for strategic effect in the 

light of the Kosovo air operation. 8 This article will therefore cover the – often competing – theories of strategic air power and 

coercion; the legacy of air power operations in the Balkans; the political build up to Operation ALLIED FORCE; the air war itself; 

and finally the robustness of British air power doctrine in the wake of NATO’s first offensive operation. 

THE THEORY 

The various theories and counter-theories of the strategic use of air power have already filled innumerable pages. Authors have 

invariably felt that they are bound to cover the story of the birth of the Royal Air Force and its subsequent fight for survival. 

Some versions of the story have been the result of scholarly research; 9 others, however, have been rather superficial with 

selective analysis chosen to complement the theme of the host book. The essence of the plot is that Trenchard inherited (from 

his rival, and fellow CAS, General Sir Frederick Sykes) a plan for a bombing strategy aimed at dislocating the enemy’s key 

industries. Trenchard’s position gradually switched from implacable opposition (based on the impracticalities of the scheme) to 

fulsome support. Trenchard heavily emphasized the damage that air attack could wreak on enemy morale. He believed 

wholeheartedly that air power must be used as an offensive weapon and that the defence of the United Kingdom could best be 

achieved by hitting the enemy so hard that he had to reallocate valuable offensive resources 

to the defence of the home land. Trenchard was well aware of the practical difficulties of 

intercepting bombers, particularly as the performance of the fighters was often worse than 

that of their targets. His emphasis on the importance of offensive action has remained a 

constant theme in the history of air power thinking. Developments in radar technology and 

aircraft such as the Spitfire, however, radically changed the Trenchard concept of air 

superiority, albeit with considerable reluctance from those air force staff who had been 

brought up on a diet of strategic bombing. 10 The benefit of forcing the enemy to increase 

his investment in defence was also seen during the bomber offensives in both World Wars. 11 

The very survival of the fledgling Air Force was also understandably high on Trenchard’s agenda. As post-Great War budgets 

Trenchard heavily emphasized 

the damage that air attack 

could wreak on enemy morale. 

He believed wholeheartedly 

that air power must be used 

as an offensive weapon… 

were slashed, the RAF needed its own, distinct role. If air power was primarily in support of land and naval forces, assets could 

be redistributed with an appropriate saving in organisation costs – and then the junior service would probably be allowed to 

wither on the vine. The strategic bombing role offered both a lifeline for the RAF and a cudgel with which to beat sister services 

in the scrimmage for funding. As this was a continuing process, the concept of strategic bombing became embedded in the 

RAF psyche, particularly under the charismatic leadership of ‘Boom’ Trenchard. The vision of strategic bombing in which fleets

Developments in 

radar technology 

and aircraft such as 

the Spitfire radically 

changed the 

Trenchard concept 

of air superiority… 

of invincible aircraft would strike terror into the hearts of the enemy populace 

causing their total collapse was not, however, born out by the technological 

realities of the inter war years – or even until the advent of nuclear weapons. 

In practical terms, however, the RAF needed a role in which air power could 

be utilised and developed in parallel with the mantra of strategic bombing. 

The use of aircraft for imperial policing provided this outlet. 12 Notwithstanding 

some of the more bellicose sentiments expressed over the strategic 

bombing concept, it was evident in the execution of the policing duties that 

causing widespread casualties was not the aim. In fact Sir John Slessor 

makes it plain in his description of operations that efforts were made to 

avoid such an outcome. 13 Briefings to the RAF Staff College over the interwar 

years highlight the pragmatic approach to real operations. Colonel Philip 

Meilinger 14 quotes a presentation by Tedder in 1934 to describe the doctrine 

as being an air strategy for paralysis – not obliteration. This description is 

particularly apposite in the light of the relevant chapter in the newly issued 

third edition of AP 3000. 15 

British Air Power Doctrine recognizes a single centre of gravity at the 

strategic and operational levels, but not in the tactical arena (unlike other 

forces that accept a number of centres at each of the higher levels). This 

article will concentrate primarily on air operations for strategic effect. This 

effect could theoretically be created by independent and distinct use of air 

power alone, or, more likely, it will be part of joint or multi-national activity. Air 

operations for strategic effect are aimed to destroy or disrupt the defined 

strategic centre of gravity of an opponent. 16 It is worth emphasising at this 

point that the effect sought by the use of air power may not necessarily be 

the physical destruction of the chosen target set. Indeed, the centre of 

gravity may not be the enemy’s army (which Clausewitz saw as being the 

natural choice); it may be as ephemeral as a despot’s ability to further his 

family’s fortunes and influence. Warden 17 has suggested that attacking the 

19

20 

leadership of a foe could lead to strategic paralysis, thereby possibly obviating the need for attacks on fielded forces. Air assets 

other than attack aircraft may, however, be involved in strategic air operations. Activities such as supervision of a no-fly zone or 

the provision of relief supplies may have strategic effect, depending on the circumstances prevailing at the time. 

The objective of strategic 

air operations, consistent 

with the tenets of 

manoeuvre warfare, is to 

shatter the enemy’s 

cohesion and will – not just 

to destroy men and materiel 

The objective of strategic air operations, consistent with the tenets of manoeuvre warfare, is to 

shatter the enemy’s cohesion and will – not just to destroy men and materiel. Target sets will 

have been selected, as part of the estimate process, for their strategic relevance and may 

include the machinery of government, military forces, infrastructure and so forth. Given the 

flexibility of air power, other targets at the operational and tactical levels may be attacked in 

parallel with, or subsequent to, strategic operations. The target sets at this high level of 

operations, and the weapons proposed, will inevitably excite considerable political, legal and 

humanitarian interest in the highest spheres of governmental machinery. Whilst the military 

preference is for the espousal of a clear political aim followed by centralised planning and then 

decentralised execution, it is entirely proper in a democratically accountable structure that 

political oversight is maintained. This is bound to be most appropriate, and most contentious, at the strategic level. The possible 

necessity of maintaining coalition solidarity may make this aspect of an operation or campaign particularly fraught. 

A study of the historical uses of air power at the strategic level suggests a number of possible lessons that may influence 

coalition planning. The actual shock of aerial bombardment may be sufficient on its own to influence the target government – 

particularly if the intended victim has been sceptical as to the will of his foe. 

The psychology of this type of operations is at best hugely difficult and, more 

probably, such that each case is sui generis. The actual effect of the attack, 

rather than just the damage assessment, is extremely difficult to assess, 

particularly if it has been accompanied by information operations. The US 

operation against the Gaddafi regime in 1986 is held by some to have been 

successful in its shock effect; but it is by no means certain that ELDORADO 

CANYON did little more than force Libya to be more covert in its support for 

terrorism. 18 

A concerted bombing offensive can have a profound effect on a target 

population. In a democratic state with open media, this may result in increased 

pressure on the ruling elite. In any event it may well force the target government

…measuring ‘public morale’ is 

hardly a scientific art in any 

country let alone one that is 

subject to police control, 

censorship and propaganda 

to reallocate scarce assets to defence of the 

homeland. 19 The less accountable the 

leadership of the target state, however, or 

the more ‘total’ the war, the less likely they 

are to bow to public opinion. Furthermore, 

measuring ‘public morale’ is hardly a 

scientific art in any country let alone one that 

is subject to police control, censorship and 

propaganda. 

Any dealings with a state such as Milosevic’s Serbia must make these options at 

best questionable. The majority of the press is firmly under state control and the 

Interior Ministry Police would ensure that serious unrest did not become a threat. 

Hoping for the populace to pressurise a dictator may be overly optimistic. 

Furthermore an external threat would tend more to unite the people behind 

Milosevic, particularly if the potential aggressor had taken up cudgels on behalf of 

the loathed Albanian neighbours. Nor are the Serbs slow to exhibit a marked 

tendency towards national martyrdom – particularly over Kosovo with its historic 

connections to the infamous Battle on the Field of Blackbirds in 1389. Drawing too many examples from the historical use of 

strategic bombing may be counter-productive. An analysis of more recent usage of air power in the Balkans could therefore be 

more useful. 

THE LEGACY OF AIR POWER IN THE BALKANS – DELIBERATE FORCE 

The break up of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia shortly after the successful end to the Gulf War has occasioned 

veritable rain forests of literature, both in the open press and in academic research papers. It is well outside the scope of this 

article even to review a sample of the works, let alone describe the dissolution of Tito’s legacy. Suffice it to say that the 

Yugoslav Peoples’ Army (JNA) had failed to prevent the secession of Slovenia in the Summer of 1991 and the world was 

subsequently reminded of the potential brutality of violence in the region as Serbs and Croats fought out their bitter struggle in 

the border areas of Croatia. As the first peacekeeping troops entered that country in early 1992, the few Balkan specialists 

watched the area with mounting trepidation, anticipating an upsurge of violence in the multi-ethnic state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 

21

22 

Bosnian Serb paramilitary units had formed in anticipation of Muslim-led calls for secession, greatly aided by the JNA who 

released war stocks of weaponry to their Serbian brethren. Bosnia withdrew from Yugoslavia in March 1992, resulting in 

immediate conflagration as the Bosnian Serbs sought to use their military potential for maximum territorial gain. 

The first air power on the scene, almost inevitably, were AWACS aircraft in support of the NATO/WEU operation to enforce the 

arms embargo (SHARP GUARD). (In addition, the Sarajevo airlift began on 2 July 1992.) United Nations Security Council 

Resolution (UNSCR) 781 prohibited all military 

flight operations over Bosnia and Operation SKY 

WATCH soon reported that the ban was being 

observed only in the breach. This was followed 

on 31 March 1993 by the issue of 

UNSCR 816 which banned all flights not 

authorised by the UN; SKY WATCH was replaced 

by DENY FLIGHT and policing of the No-Fly Zone 

began in earnest. Further air power missions 

were added to the DENY FLIGHT folder including 

the option to use Close Air Support for relief of 

UN peacekeepers under attack. The whole 

operation was fraught with problems. HQ 5 ATAF, 

under whose command the operation fell, was illequipped 

to handle an operation of the 

complexity of DENY FLIGHT, let alone undertake 

an extensive offensive campaign. 20 The practical 

situation was exacerbated by the often delicate 

relationship between the UN and NATO. There 

was considerable concern that a rash NATO air 

attack, possibly fuelled by high level political 

frustration, could seriously endanger the lives of 

the peacekeepers on the ground. 21 This resulted 

in the so-called dual-key approach under which a 

given target had to be approved at high level in 

As the first peacekeeping troops entered that country in 

early 1992, the few Balkan specialists watched the area with 

mounting trepidation…

oth organisations. 22 Air power was used on occasions such as the attack on Ubdina airfield in late 1994; NATO proudly 

announced that this had been the largest air raid in Europe since World War II – Richard Holbrooke described it in horror as 

being closer to ‘pinpricks’. 23 General Sir Michael Rose defended similar actions as being ‘textbook examples of the precise use 

of force in a peacekeeping mission’. 24 From these two viewpoints, it is evident that perceptions are all-important. 

As the months went by, the situation in Bosnia continued to deteriorate. The UN’s worst fears were realised in May 1995 when 

the Bosnian Serbs took 370 (largely French) peacekeepers hostage following NATO bombing of ammunition depots at Pale. 

Srebrenica fell to a brutal assault in mid-July and the clamour within the international community for ‘something to be done’ 

rose to yet another peak. NATO planning within AFSOUTH had by this time improved to the point whereby suitable Bosnian 

Serb targets had been identified throughout the theatre – including ‘indirect’ targets such as bridges and command facilities. 25 

These indirect targets were specifically chosen to increase the level of coercive pain levered on the Bosnian Serbs. 

On 28 August 1995, a mortar bomb exploded in a Sarajevo marketplace killing 68 people. The Bosnian government blamed 

the Serbs. The Bosnian Serbs blamed the Muslims for firing on their own people in an attempt to provoke a NATO response. 26 

There then followed a short delay while plans were finalised and, more importantly, UN forces were allowed to take up positions 

that they could defend. DELIBERATE FORCE started in the early hours of 30 August 1995. Some 220 fighter aircraft and 70 

support aircraft from the US, UK, Italy, Germany, Netherlands, Greece, Turkey, Spain and France took part, generally flying four 

or five ‘packages’ of aircraft on each day that weather allowed operations. Some 3515 sorties were flown delivering 1026 

weapons against 48 targets. 27 For presentational purposes, the NATO attacks were carried out as part of the campaign to 

protect the safe areas – directly and indirectly. It is obvious, however, from Holbrooke that any coercion of the Bosnian Serbs 

towards a peace settlement would be beneficial. 28 Furthermore, the air campaign was materially assisting an ongoing Croatian 

Army 29 /Muslim ground offensive – much to the discomfort of the Bosnian Serb Army who found that the concentrations of tanks 

and artillery necessary to counter this assault made excellent targets for air power. Holbrooke suggested to Milosevic that the 

air campaign was not coordinated with the ground offensive, but later in his account admits to having advised President 

Tudjman of Croatia as to which towns his troops should occupy to facilitate later negotiations. 30 The marked escalation in 

external military involvement resulted in a new momentum for the talks’ process. 

Wright-Paterson Air Force Base in Dayton Ohio was chosen as the venue for substantive talks between the erstwhile warring 

factions. The delegates arriving from the Balkans by air had to walk past ramps laden with operational aircraft, leaving the Serbs 

in no doubt as to the scale of air resources available to an American led coalition. For many commentators and participants the 

use of air power was decisive. Carl Bildt, however, correctly brings the enthusiasts back to earth with the reminder that the key 

events were political rather than military – not least because the US administration was at last prepared actually to recognise 

23

24 

DELIBERATE FORCE started in the early hours of 30 

August 1995. Some 220 fighter aircraft and 70 support 

aircraft from the US, UK, Italy, Germany, Netherlands, 

Greece, Turkey, Spain and France took part… 

politically the Bosnian Serb entity 31 (this had stymied 

earlier attempts at a settlement). 

Beyond the implication that DELIBERATE FORCE had 

galvanised both sides into negotiating a settlement at 

Dayton, it is always difficult to penetrate the Stygian 

gloom of Belgrade politics. Milosevic had already been 

seen to have sold out the Krajina Serbs; he then 

confounded the ‘Greater Serbia’ theorists by supporting 

Dayton. Some key factors can, however, be identified. 

There was a marked improvement in the terms on offer at 

Dayton with the recognition of the Bosnian Serb entity. 

What is more, Russia was fully integrated into the political 

process 32 and would certainly not have supported 

Belgrade militarily. After months of dithering, which 

Milosevic would have perceived as endemic weakness, 

the international community had sanctioned the use of air 

power on a significant scale and showed no signs of 

relenting in its use. Again from the Serbian perspective 

(both in Belgrade and Pale), Western resources must 

have appeared unlimited. Finally there was the risk, from 

Milosevic’s perspective, that coalition air power would 

increasingly be coordinated with Croat/Muslim ground 

forces and that more Bosnian Serb territory would be lost 

in action than at the conference table. Even though 

Milosevic has consistently shown himself to be a master 

tactician (rather than a strategist), his evil genius almost 

certainly appreciated the prospect of the ‘keener’ 

elements of the international community becoming 

bogged down in policing the settlement for years 

knowing that the alternative would leave him or his 

successors a clear field.

THE KOSOVO AIR OPERATION 

The background to the most recent crisis in Kosovo has excited considerable and understandable interest. The literature on the 

Balkans has increased exponentially over the last decade; it will, however, be many years before a neutral and authoritative account 

is available. In the meantime the would-be student needs to retain the mental health warning that many authors have prepared their 

works with the sound of axes being sharpened in the background. A visit to the region in search of first hand research would almost 

inevitably result in a series of contradictory history lessons, usually accompanied by the selective use of maps and washed down 

with Slivovitz. For the purposes of this article, it is sufficient to go back to 1987 when the Serbian Communist Party apparatchik 

Slobodan Milosevic latched onto the plight of the Kosovo Serbs as a vehicle for his own rise to power. 33 He stripped Kosovo, and 

the Hungarian majority area of Vojvodina, of their status as Autonomous Provinces and vainly attempted in the former to redress the 

population balance by importing Serbs who had been displaced from other regions. The ethnic Albanian population still 

outnumbered the Serbs by a huge margin. Their ‘shadow’ economy and political system functioned well; while Sarajevo was under 

siege and Belgrade was in the grip of economic sanctions, Pristina appeared almost prosperous 34 in comparison with other parts of 

the Balkans – not least because the Kosovo Albanian economy was supported by hard currency remittances from the diaspora. 

This stability was maintained under the benign rule of Ibrahim Rugova whose pacifist stance 35 tended to reduce the possibility of 

strife. But no one was naïve enough to doubt that Milosevic would not hesitate to inflame the situation if domestic politics required a 

diversion, or if the Albanians openly espoused independence. 

The aftermath of the Dayton agreement traumatised the ethnic Albanians – particularly as Lord 

Owen’s consistent calls for the plight of Kosovo to be included in the settlement were ignored. Their 

policy of non-violence had not worked. The subsequent (but unconnected) collapse into anarchy of 

Albania in 1997 resulted in an almost unlimited supply of weapons becoming available, and the 

scope for armed insurrection suddenly opened. This mounting frustration, along with a massive 

influx of light weaponry, resulted in the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) growing from a minor bunch of 

disillusioned ex-patriates into a serious threat to the Serbian authorities. The cycle of violence 

expanded with the inevitable counter-offensives through 1998. The spectre of massacres, ethnic 

cleansing and other atrocities prompted the international community into the Rambouillet talks 

process. 36 Milosevic could not accept the terms on offer. Having come to, and maintained, power on 

the basis of rabid nationalism, he could not back down without some semblance of a fight. There 

was a clear risk of secession, and the detail of the agreement contained, from Belgrade’s 

perspective, serious erosions of Serbia’s sovereignty. 37 Acceptance would have been political suicide 

for Milosevic – not a trait for which he is renowned. 

25 

The aftermath of the 

Dayton agreement 

traumatised the ethnic 

Albanians – particularly 

as Lord Owen’s 

consistent calls for the 

plight of Kosovo to be 

included in the 

settlement were ignored

26 Milosevic may have doubted the 

will of the international community 

and almost certainly bargained on 

NATO not being able to maintain 

its cohesion. He must also have 

hoped that Russia would not 

tolerate an open attack on a fellow 

Slav sovereign state… 

Milosevic may have doubted the will of the international community and almost certainly 

bargained on NATO not being able to maintain its cohesion. He must also have hoped 

that Russia would not tolerate an open attack on a fellow Slav sovereign state and would 

have anticipated a veto on Chapter VII action in the UN Security Council. Although 

Serbia’s own respect for international law is less than comprehensive, Milosevic may also 

have reckoned on the international community taking a conservative approach based on 

the absolute sovereignty of nation states. In the event, Milosevic miscalculated. The West 

was quite clear that military action was justified as an exceptional measure to prevent an 

overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe. 38 

It could be argued that an analysis of NATO strategy in the lead-up to the campaign would be as doomed to confusion as an 

attempt to rationalise Balkan history. It is evident that many hoped that the mere exercise of military force would be sufficient to 

make Milosevic realise his ultimate destiny. This apparent optimism may have been based on realisation of coalition fragility, rather 

than cold military appreciation. NATO options varied from a limited conventional attack against fixed military targets across Serbia 

through to a 2-phase operation against specific Kosovo related military targets. 39 At first sight, it would appear that these options 

would have given NATO the flexibility to apply air power to a wide range of targets. Therein lies the probable rub. Too extensive a 

range would undoubtedly have been politically unacceptable to the less committed members of the alliance. And a hesitant 

campaign would have allowed Milosevic’s small paramilitary units to get inside the Alliance decision making loop. The subsequent 

disconnect in NATO aims may have become evident in the publicly stated war aims of its leaders. SACEUR, General Wesley Clark, 

stated in a NATO briefing on 25 March 1999 that: 

“We’re going to systematically and progressively attack, disrupt, degrade, devastate, and ultimately – unless President 

Milosevic complies with the demand of the international community – we’re going to destroy these forces and their facilities 

and support.” 

On the other hand, Lieutenant General Michael Short, who was the air commander in theatre at the time, subsequently gave 

evidence to the Senate (and in TV interviews) that there had been severe national differences over the targeting of Serbian 

centre(s) of gravity. Short stated somewhat graphically that he would have preferred to have 

“gone for the head of the snake on the first night”. 40 

It is possible that Clark may have been reflecting NATO appreciation of an operational centre of gravity while his air commander 

had identified the strategic Centre. This argument would have been consistent with the Service background of the officers 

concerned – particularly in the classic Clausewitzian desire to destroy the enemy army. The tone of Short’s evidence suggests, 

however, that there was considerable frustration over the high level of (perfectly proper) political control.

Notwithstanding the internal debate, the air 

operation commenced at 1900 GMT on 24 

March 1999 and continued for 78 days. Some 

38,004 sorties were flown of which 10,484 

were strike missions. The UK flew 1,618 sorties 

of which 1,008 were strike. 41 The air campaign 

began with a series of strikes on air defences 

across Serbia and Montenegro and against a 

limited number of military targets in Kosovo 

and elsewhere in Southern Serbia. Targeting 

policy was under political control in NATO and 

nationally. Any Western assessments 42 that 

Milosevic would collapse immediately were 

quickly shown to be wrong as his special 

forces and para-military units set about an 

ethnic cleansing operation of unprecedented 

brutality. The refugee situation alone threatened 

the stability of neighbouring Macedonia and 

Albania. Disquiet in Greece and Italy also made 

NATO cohesion look questionable. 43 In the 

event, the combination of Serbian intransigence 

and extreme brutality only served to confirm the 

NATO coalition in its determination. 

The US deployed Apache to Albania, AC130U Spectre Gunships 

began operations from Italy and the sortie rate overall increased, 

peaking at close on 800 per day by the end of May 

NATO progressively increased the pace and tempo of the operation, extending the spectrum of targets open for attack. 44 After 

early objectives had been achieved, including the consolidation of air superiority, NATO was able to shift its focus to the 

Yugoslav Army’s fielded forces. 45 The rate of attrition increased, not least because the weather had started to improve allowing 

more formations of aircraft to deliver their ordinance without fear of causing collateral damage. The US deployed Apache to 

Albania, AC130U Spectre Gunships began operations from Italy and the sortie rate overall increased, peaking at close on 800 

per day by the end of May. 46 At the same time, ground troops were continuing to form in Macedonia and speculation was 

mounting in the press that land operations could be attempted in a ‘semi-permissive’ environment: the hitherto comforting (for 

Belgrade) mantra that ground troops would not be used in Kosovo had gradually reduced. Milosevic could be in no doubt that 

NATO cohesion had been maintained and that there was no evidence of diminution of allied appetite for the conflict. 

Furthermore no real help was forthcoming from Moscow. 

27

28 

Peace talks started to produce results, culminating in the signing, on 9 June, of the Technical Military Agreement which set out 

how the Serbs would leave Kosovo. NATO peacekeeping troops entered Kosovo on 12 June (a day after a small contingent of 

Russian troops unexpectedly drove into Pristina). The Serbs evacuated large numbers of troops and military vehicles, claiming 

that NATO had been duped by simple deception techniques. 47 The inevitable post mortems, ‘bean-counts’ and so forth will 

doubtless continue to be bandied around for years to come. Lessons will undoubtedly be learned – provided we remember 

General Jumper’s advice about drawing generic lessons from such an idiosyncratic operation. The mistakes, such as the 

bombing of the Chinese Embassy and attacks on refugees, will be mulled over. And the sterile debate as to whether air power 

‘did it alone’ will drone on. The bottom line remains, however, that Serbian forces evacuated Kosovo without the loss of ‘the 

bones of a single Pomeranian Grenadier’; NATO-led forces are in control, supervising the return of refugees. 

What brought about Milosevic’s change of heart may never be known. But there are similarities 

between the end of this conflict and the end of DELIBERATE FORCE. As with Dayton, the 

peace settlement was an improvement on what was on offer at Rambouillet, not least over 

specific recognition of Serbian sovereignty. Again Russia had given little more than popular 

support – the forces of international economics proving stronger than pan-Slav nationalism. 

The international community had been seen to dither up to the banks of the Rubicon, but 

having decided to go forward did so with increasing strength and determination. Air power 

was used on a significant scale against a wide range of targets – not just the military assets. 

Furthermore, from the Serbian perspective, Western resources must have appeared unlimited 

(despite articles in the specialist press suggesting otherwise 48 ). As with the situation leading up 

to Dayton, Milosevic must have been concerned that NATO air power was at least being taken 

What brought about 

Milosevic’s change of heart 

may never be known. But 

there are similarities 

between the end of this 

conflict and the end of 

DELIBERATE FORCE 

advantage of by the KLA. 49 Serbian military responses to KLA action brought troops and equipment out into the open for long 

enough for the NATO targeting cycle to respond. Finally, Milosevic could again see that the West had become committed to 

another long sojourn in another area of the Balkans. He may have calculated that coalition capacity to provide ground troops 

was more limited than the provision of air power, which could have significant ramifications for the next flash point (possibly 

Montenegro?). 

So how does the doctrine on the use of air power for strategic effect hold up in the light of Operation ALLIED FORCE? 

Notwithstanding the debate within NATO, this author has been unable to locate an official definition of the enemy strategic 

centre of gravity. But Milosevic’s personal hold on power must have been a reasonable possibility (provided, as always, that 

success would not have resulted in him being replaced by someone more radical – a very likely contingency in Serbia).

In the past, Milosevic has adeptly 

manipulated sanctions regimes and 

hyperinflation by allowing his 

cronies to profit from the 

constrictions in supply and demand 

It is probably too early to say what the long-term effects of the Operation were on 

Milosevic. He was probably unsettled by his indictment as a war criminal, not least 

because it left neither him, nor his cronies, with an escape route to comfortable exile. 

In the past, Milosevic has adeptly manipulated sanctions regimes and hyperinflation by allowing his cronies to profit from the 

constrictions in supply and demand. These have almost invariably worked in hard currencies with black marketeers making 

huge profits on both the transaction and the rate of exchange. Ironically, in previous ‘hard times’, Kosovo with its remunerations 

from the diaspora has been a fertile source of Deutchmarks and Swiss francs. The continuing air campaign almost certainly 

was squeezing the Serbian economy to the point at which there were few profits to be made. Support from corrupt 

businessmen could only be taken for granted when they had something to gain; if Milosevic could not maintain the momentum 

of the gravy train, his erstwhile cronies could easily turn against him. This is even more likely if he needs hard currency to be 

repatriated for the rebuilding of Serbia. 

Milosevic has always been an adept politician; he has demonstrated considerable prowess in manipulating the fractured 

opposition and, at the time of writing, little change is evident on this front. Serbian paramilitary units have been consistent in 

their support for Milosevic and this is almost bound to continue – mutual support is vital with war crimes indictments on the 

horizon. 50 Support within the army is probably more fragile. Milosevic has consistently removed potential opposition, but even 

his hand picked general staff must have become increasingly frustrated with the plight of their troops who had to hide in 

underground car parks. The ability of air power intelligence assets to identify concentrations of troops can only have added to 

this trend. 

The use of air power for strategic effect is based primarily on the identification of the weak spot in the make up of the enemy, 

attack on which will lead to his acceptance of diplomatic imperatives: accurate assessment of the enemy’s perceptions is vital. 

The strategy maker then works around the loop to analyse how to attack this weak spot – it may be a centre of gravity, a 

centre of influence or, indeed, a seam between elements of his decision-making fabric. The next step is to draw up the target 

list and attack using the best weapons available, or politically acceptable. The consequences of the action are then analysed 

prior to the cycle repeating. This is not carried out automatically; the battle damage assessment must include an analysis of 

enemy perceptions and responses to the progress thus far. If necessary, the target set is amended to reflect say a hardening of 

attitudes. Given the flexibility of air power, other targets at the operational and tactical levels may be attacked in parallel with, or 

subsequent to, strategic operations. 

29

30 

The full range of strategic targets appears to have been attacked in 

the Kosovo air operation. Sceptics who insist on counting the men 

and materiel that have been ‘plinked’ miss the point that the aim is 

strategic effect – not the large-scale destruction of physical assets, 

nor the wholesale lowering of morale. Frankland’s quotation is as 

relevant after Kosovo as it was when he wrote his history of the 

World War II bombing campaign. That Kosovo is now in NATO 

hands proves the point. 

The full range of strategic targets appears to have been attacked in the Kosovo air operation. Sceptics 

who insist on counting the men and materiel that have been ‘plinked’ miss the point… 

NOTES 

1 This quotation was also used to start Chapter 6 (entitled Strategic Effect of Air 

Power) of AP3000 British Air Power Doctrine, Third Edition, (HMSO), 1999’ page 

2.6.1. The original is from Noble Frankland, The Bombing Offensive against 

Germany, Outlines and Perspectives, (London: Faber and Faber), 1965, page 18. 

This book was based on his delivery of the University of Cambridge Lees Knowles 

Lectures in 1963. 

2 Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive against 

Germany, (London: HMSO), 1961; 4 volumes. 

3 Outlines and Perspectives, page 16. 

4 For a useful review of the theory of the relationship between the public debate 

and the inevitably classified reflections of officialdom see Jonathan Mermin, 

Debating War and Peace – Media coverage of US Intervention in post-Vietnam 

era, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1999. 

5 This rather derogatory term was used by the Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, on 

the Radio 4 Today programme on the morning of 25 March – after the first night’s 

bombing. For better or worse, the term stuck irrespective of the operational 

pedigree of those concerned. 

6 John Keegan, ‘So the bomber got through to Milosevic after all’, Daily Telegraph, 

4 June 1999, page 28. See also John Keegan, ‘Yes, we won this war; let’s be 

proud of it.’ Daily Telegraph, 24 June 1999, page 26. Contrast this with General 

Sir Michael Rose, ‘Peacekeepers fight a better war than bombers’, Sunday Times, 

20 June 1999, page 26. 

7 General John Jumper (Commander of US Air Forces in Europe and of Allied Air 

Forces Central Europe), Kosovo Victory – A Commander’s Perspective, RAF Air 

Power Review Vol 2 No 4, December 1999, page 1. 

8 Note that, doctrinally, the air operation was part of the overall campaign – not a 

campaign in its own right. 

9 See for example, Air Vice Marshal Tony Mason, Air Power – a Centennial 

Appraisal, (London: Brasseys), 1994, Chapters 1 and 2. 

10 R J Overy, The Air War 1939 –1945, (New York: Stein and Day), 1980, page 15. 

11 Ibid, page 121. See also Tami Davis Biddle, ‘British and American Approaches to 

Strategic Bombing: Their origins and Implementation in the World War II 

Combined Bomber Offensive’, in Air Power Theory and Practice ed by John 

Gooch, (London: Cass), 1995, page 98. 

12 See David Omissi, Air Power and Colonial Control: the Royal Air Force 1919 – 

1939, (New York: St Martins). 

13 John C. Slessor, The Central Blue, (London: Cassell), 1956 page 62. 

14 Philip S Meilinger, ‘Trenchard and ‘Morale Bombing’ the Evolution of Royal Air 

Force Doctrine Before World War II’, The Journal of Military History, Vol 60, No 2. 

April 1996, page 264. 

15 British Air Power Doctrine, AP 3000, third edition, (London: HMSO), 1999, 

Chapter 6. 

16 Ibid, page 2.6.1.

31 

17 John A Warden III, The Air Campaign, (New York: to Excel), 1998; the original 

version was first published in 1989 and was highly influential in the Gulf War air 

campaign. 

18 See, for example, Joseph Lepgold, ‘Hypotheses on Vulnerability: Are Terrorists 

and Drug Traffickers Coerceable?’ in Strategic Coercion, Concepts and Cases, 

ed by Lawrence Freedman (Oxford: OUP), 1998, pages144-147. 

19 Overy, The Air War 1939 –1945, page 121. 

20 For an authoritative account see Colonel Robert C Owen USAF, ‘The Balkans Air 

Campaign Study’, published in two parts in the Airpower Journal, Summer and 

Fall 1997. 

21 Richard Holbrooke, To End a War, (New York: The Modern Library), 1998, page 

63. 

22 General Sir Michael Rose, Fighting for Peace, (London: Harvill), 1998, page 160 

(for example). 

23 Holbrooke, To End a War, page 61. 

24 Rose, Fighting for Peace, page 161. 

25 Owen, ‘The Balkans Air Campaign Study’, page 20. 

26 Rose, Fighting for Peace, page 43. 

27 Owen, ‘The Balkans Air Campaign Study’, Fall 1997, page 8. 

28 Holbrooke, To End a War, pages 145 – 150. 

29 Thomas Quiggin, Do airstrikes amount to an effective policy?, RUSI Journal, 

April/May 1999 page 17 is quite specific over the involvement of regular Croatian 

Army troops. 

30 Holbrooke, To End a War, pages 147 and 160. 

31 Carl Bildt, Holbrooke’s History, Review Essay, Survival, Autumn 1998, page 187. 

32 Pauline Neville-Jones, Bosnia after IFOR, Survival, Winter 1996-97, pages 45 – 

65. This essay gives a UK perspective on the process to balance Holbrooke’s 

somewhat Washington centric view. 

33 See for example, Tim Judah, The Serbs:History, Myth, and the Destruction of 

Yugoslavia, (Yale: Yale University Press) 1997. 

34 But only by prevailing Balkan standards. The author, in his capacity as a Balkans 

analyst in the Cabinet Office, visited Kosovo in 1993. Two Albanian youths were 

shot dead in the street outside the author’s hotel at about 5.00 AM. 

35 Rugova was, and still is, a quietly spoken academic who shunned all question of 

militant action against the Serbs. He would expound at great length how a softlysoftly 

approach was the only way to challenge the Serbs – even over lunch he 

was never without his scarf around his neck. 

36 For a detailed discussion on the international legal aspects of these talks see 

Marc Weller, ‘The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo’, International Affairs 75, 2 

1999, pages 211 –251. Weller has acted as counsel to the Bosnian Muslims and 

the Kosovo Albanians. 

37 See John Pilger, ‘Revealed: the amazing NATO plan, tabled at Rambouillet, to 

occupy Yugoslavia’, New Statesman, 17 May 1999. Pilger contended that a full 

copy of the plan had been published in France but had been suppressed in the 

UK. His objection was that it allowed NATO unbridled access to any part of 

Yugoslavia and was therefore an excessive infringement of sovereignty. 

38 See the MoD justification on www.mod.uk/dicmt/kosovo/legal.htm. See also 

Catherine Guicherd, ‘International Law and the War in Kosovo’, Survival, vol 41, 

no 2, Summer 1999, pages 19-34. AP3000 states correctly on page 1.1.10 that 

legal opinion is divided over this issue. In a less extreme case than Kosovo, 

intervention may be more hotly debated. 

39 See for example, Rebecca Grant, The Kosovo Campaign: Aerospace Power 

Made It Work, Air Force Association Special Report, Arlington, September 1999, 

pages 4 – 7. 

40 Reported in Greg Seigle, ‘USA claims France hindered raids’, Janes Defence 

Weekly, 27 October 1999, page 3. 

41 Details taken from www.mod.uk/news/kosovo/account/nato.htm on 11 Oct 99. 

42 See for example, Sue Cameron, ‘Top Brass Brassed Off’, The Spectator 17 April 

1999, page 14. 

43 CAS has described NATO cohesion as being its ‘Centre of Gravity’. Air Chief 

Marshal Sir Richard Johns, Presentation to the Guild of Air Pilots and Air 

Navigators on 21 September 1999. 

44 Nick Cook, ‘Serb air war changes gear’, Janes Defence Weekly, 7 April 1999, 

page 24. 

45 Air Cdre Andrew Vallance, ‘Kosovo exclusive – a planner’s perspective’, Aircraft 

Illustrated, September 1999, pages 20 – 23. 

46 Kosovo War Diary, AIR International, July 1999, pages 14 – 15. 

47 ‘Air Power over Kosovo. A historic victory?, IISS Strategic Comments, Vol 5, 

Issue 7, September 1999. 

48 Greg Sample, ‘US Cruise missile stocks dwindling’, JDW, 7 April 1999, page 3. 

49 Bryan Bender, ‘KLA action fuelled NATO victory’, JDW, 16 June 1999, page 5. 

50 ‘Foul Play: Serbia’s opposition’, The Economist, 9 October 1999, page 60.

DOCTRINE NOT DOGMA: 

Lessons from the Past

By Professor Richard Overy, King’s College, 

London 

33 

Military doctrine is by definition historical. It changes 

through time, as circumstances and experience dictate. It 

is, in this sense, an intensely unstable or evolutionary 

phenomenon. This has always been a difficult situation for 

the military establishment of any country to cope with. 

The temptation is to take doctrine at a fixed point and to keep it that 

way to maintain some semblance of intellectual certainty. Doctrine can 

then turn into dogma. It no longer encourages creative thinking about 

the function and nature of military activity, but forces that activity into 

a particular mould, which may be more or less suitable for the current 

situation. More commonly history has shown that a dogmatic 

attachment to strategy inhibits the creativity and responsiveness 

essential to military thought; it generates a cast of mind that is 

conservative, uncritical, or, at times, ideologically inspired. Doctrine 

becomes not a means to an end, but an end in itself. 

There are no shortages of examples in twentieth century military 

history to support the contention that doctrine tends to solidify like a 

slowly moving lava flow. The very idea of doctrine – as a set of formal, 

written, guidelines on the organization and function of an armed 

service in pursuit of certain stated strategic objectives – is to a large 

extent a twentieth century development, it owed a good deal to the 

emergence of military aviation, because air forces, more than armies 

and navies, were forced to justify their independent existence by 

adopting a doctrine distinct from the more senior services. The 

formulation of air doctrine had the effect of encouraging the rest of 

the military machine to think harder about its own strategic outlook.

34 …the RAF established in 

1918 a so-called 

Independent Force, under 

the command of General 

Hugh Trenchard, whose 

purpose was to mount a 

bombing campaign 

against German cities and 

military installations 

‘independent’ of the 

conduct of the group war 

This was the situation that faced the infant 

Royal Air Force (RAF) when it found itself 

in the early 1920s under strong pressure 

from both the army and the Royal Navy to 

abandon an independent organization in 

favour of the close support of surface 

forces. The raison d’être of the RAF as an 

independent force lay in the 

circumstances of the final years of the 

Great War. Aircraft were organized 

independently as a defence force against 

German bombing of London and the 

coastal towns. More significantly, the RAF 

established in 1918 a so-called 

Independent Force, under the command 

of General Hugh Trenchard, whose purpose was to mount a bombing 

campaign against German cities and military installations ‘independent’ of 

the conduct of the group war. Trenchard emerged in the 1920s, despite his 

initial scepticism, as the foremost champion of an independent air force, 

and of a strategy of aerial bombardment against targets other than those in 

the immediate battle zone. 

In Trenchard’s view the impact of bombing owed more to its moral effects 

than its power of physical destruction. He suggested the untested, and 

untestable, hypothesis that the enemy could be defeated by destroying the 

will to fight, rather than the means to fight, became a central tenet of British 

air power strategy. In 1928 the British Chiefs of Staff began a searching 

inquiry into the nature of air doctrine. It gave Trenchard the opportunity to 

define his terms more clearly. He took as his starting point the view that 

unlike the other two services, the air force could not very easily pursue the 

classic counter-force objective. The RAF took the view – which was 

maintained right through to the Second World War – that an enemy air

force presented a target that was too dispersed and fleeting to be defeated by other aircraft. Unlike a conventional force, 

Trenchard argued that air power ought to be directed at the enemy’s willingness or capacity to make war at all. Of air attack he 

wrote that ‘the moral effect is very great’, even incalculable. He continued: 

‘it is clear that such attack, owing to the crushing moral effect on a Nation, may impress the public opinion to a point of 

disarming the Government and thus become decisive’. 1 

The argument could be supported by the experience of the RAF in what was called ‘Empire policing’, where political results 

were cheaply obtained by attacking rebel tribesmen with a handful of aircraft and low-calibre bombs. 

The Chief of the Naval Staff took a different view. In the naval response to Trenchard it was forcefully suggested that the RAF 

ignored the traditional principles of concentration of effort for the direct attack of the enemy armed forces, whose defeat alone 

would produce the desired political effect. 2 Trenchard won the day. The Chiefs agreed that the RAF could specify the strategy 

which made best use of air resources and promised the best strategic results. An independent assault on the war-willingness of 

the enemy became the centre piece of British air doctrine. It is what British airmen – and much of the British public – expected 

the enemy to do. The RAF War manual opened with the words: ‘The bomb is the chief weapon of an air force and the principal 

means by which it may attain its aim in war’. 3 The pursuit of independent bombing was done at the cost of a serious counterforce 

strategy, or even an effective strategy of defence, until the radar chain was built in the late 1930s. Cooperation with the 

navy and army was not regarded as a significant strategic objectives by the RAF, and very little was done to prepare for such an 

eventuality. 

The Trenchard doctrine was modified in the late 1930s when the RAF began, on the instructions of the Chiefs-of-Staff, to 

prepare a plan for the long-range bombing of German industry. When the economic strategy failed in 1940-1, largely for 

technical reasons, the Trenchard view was resurrected, despite the fact that it remained unproven. British morale had not 

cracked in the Blitz in the decisive sense implied by Trenchard, and there was little to suggest that it would do so in Germany. 

In the summer of 1941 Trenchard wrote a strong letter to the Air Ministry, which was widely circulated. He urged the RAF to 

concentrate on the morale of the German people by attacking it by night and day continuously. On the specious grounds that 

the German people ‘remain passive and easy prey to hysteria and panic’, while ‘History has proved that we have always been 

able to stand our casualties better than other nations’, Trenchard suggested that the German population would simply stand no 

more and end the war. 4 It was a view strongly supported by the Chief of the Air Staff, Sir Charles Portal, and by Churchill’s 

scientific adviser, Lord Cherwell. The Trenchard doctrine triumphed again as dogma. 

35

36 In the summer of 1941 

Trenchard wrote a 

strong letter to the Air 

Ministry, which was 

widely circulated. He 

urged the RAF to 

concentrate on the 

morale of the German 

people by attacking it 

by night and day 

continuously 

This time the response of the other service 

chiefs was more forthright. Admiral Sir 

Dudley Pound condemned Trenchard’s 

paper as ‘a complete overstatement’. He 

continued: ‘The danger of hard and fast 

priorities unintelligently interpreted has often 

been exemplified’. 5 He knew dogma when 

he saw it. None the less the Chiefs-of-Staff 

endorsed a new strategy for Bomber 

Command in July 1941 in which the assault 

on German morale was given pride of place. 

This was the strategy inherited by Air 

Marshal Arthur Harris when he was 

Stirling bombers en route to target 

appointed commander of Bomber Command in February 1942. Although he has been popularly viewed from a quite different 

perspective, it is to Harris’ credit that he recognised dogma too. When he assumed command the force was drifting, politically 

vulnerable because of its poor performance, quite unequal to the task of breaking the German will to resist. He regarded morale 

as such as an absurd objective in a state ‘with the concentration camp around the corner’. 6 He believed, as he had done as 

Deputy Director of Plans in the mid-1930s, that air power had one purpose, given the current state of technology, and that was 

to destroy the physical base of German war production by hammering the most important centres of production heavily and 

repeatedly. Whatever the drawbacks of such a campaign, which are well-known, Harris did set up a clear strategic objective, 

created the force structure and technology necessary to achieve it, and rejected the dogmatic assertion that morale was the 

key. The US 8th Air Force broadly followed the Harris line. US practice differed only in the belief that specific target systems 

could be hit with accuracy, rather than entire industrial cities. 

The Trenchard view is hard to justify. It was accepted dogmatically and in the face of circumstances which should have 

encouraged a doctrinal revolution in the RAF. There were strong political constraints on a bombing strategy. When the RAF 

entered war in 1939 the prevailing instruction was to avoid any bomb attack in which there was the slightest chance of injury to 

a civilian. The British government, like the American, was among those exploring throughout the 1930s some means of 

outlawing the use of aircraft against anything but military targets in the strict meaning of the term. There were self-evident 

practical constraints. The prevailing technology might well have been equal to the tasks of subduing poorly armed colonial

When the RAF entered war in 1939 

the prevailing instruction was to avoid 

any bomb attack in which there was 

the slightest chance of injury to a 

civilian. The British government, like 

the American, was among those 

exploring throughout the 1930s some 

means of outlawing the use of aircraft 

against anything but military targets… 

rebels; it was inadequate for the kind of operations needed to subdue an enemy 

population on almost every count. Nor was there any conclusive evidence that 

bombing had the moral effects claimed for it. The bombing of Ethiopian villages in 

the Italian-Ethiopian war, or later the bombing of Guernica in the Spanish Civil War, 

were evidently demoralising but politically indecisive. The belief in the power of the 

bomb to affect the outcome of war remained, in the words of Marshal of the RAF, 

Sir John Slessor, a ‘matter of faith’. 

Why did British air doctrine develop in this way? The answers to that question, and 

there are many, provide important indicators to the factors that influence the 

development of doctrine more generally. Political factors played their part, quite aside from the military issues involved. In the 

first place the RAF did need to justify its existence as a separate force, not only in 1919 when post-war retrenchment made the 

RAF a prime target for cutting, but throughout the inter-war years. An independent and unique doctrine, one which stressed the 

modernity and originality of air strategy, was regarded as essential to the political survival of the force. In addition, air doctrine 

was inseparable from the conditions of inter-service rivalry in the inter-war years. That rivalry was based on competition for 

scarce resources of money and industrial capacity for defence purposes. The senior services developed strong intellectual 

grounds for dismissing the idea of an independent air arm, but much of the rivalry between the services was based on material 

issues, or relative status. The RAF required a strong sense of what it was there for, in order to convince successive Chancellors 

of the Exchequer that the force was worth funding. As a result, the force was perhaps over-reliant on the strength of 

Trenchard’s personality. The development of doctrine was difficulty to separate from the political will and capability of the 

individuals involved in its formulation. 

In the second place, doctrine suffered from a relatively poor level of evaluation and review. Of course, the military services 

between the wars lacked the kind of management skills and apparatus which forces in the late twentieth century take for 

granted. None the less, there was strikingly little serious discussion about air doctrine. The commitment to bombing was based 

on only the slenderest foundation of military experience. The post-1918 survey of the effects of bombing Germany in the last 

year of the war was pessimistic and inconclusive. 7 It was not a sufficient basis on which to erect a strategy of independent air 

power. The experience of Empire policing, in which many senior officers in the 1930s had been engaged at some time or other, 

supported the idea of independent bombing in a context unlikely to be replicated in a European war. Consider a case published 

in the Journal of the Royal United Services Institution in 1938, ‘Air Control in Ovamboland’. The author described the 

suppression of a rebel headman in southern Africa, who was brought to heel with the use of three aircraft bombing his kraal 

37

38 

and his cattle. 8 The lesson to be drawn from the experience was that the moral pressure exerted by air attack was sufficient to 

achieve a political outcome. It was an assumption which could be, and was, extrapolated by the RAF to explain the offensive 

posture of the force and the central role assigned to bombing. 

Clearly, from this example, the formulation of doctrine cannot be regarded as autonomous. 

Personalities, politics, technology, and experience combined in an intricate web of influence 

whose effects on doctrine were diverse but often profound. In this case doctrine ran ahead 

of what experience had taught, or the technical threshold would permit, or political 

circumstances make possible. The result was an attitude to air warfare that left the RAF 

after the outbreak of war in 1939 with a wide gap between ambition and capability. It might 

well be argued that some combination of these factors will usually influence the choice and 

development of doctrine under any circumstances, particularly in peacetime. Where a 

service has a powerful political interest to protect, as did the RAF between the wars, the 

prospects of doctrinal distortion, even of dogmatism, are likely to be more pronounced. 

Doctrinal rigidity is more likely to occur, as with air power, at points where there appears a radical shift in military technology. The 

change from cavalry to tanks, or from conventional to nuclear bombs, are obvious examples. In the case of sea power, the 

transition from the age of battleships to the age of aircraft carriers, radar and air-sea collaboration was exceptionally rapid, and 

led in some cases, to a temporary gap between doctrine and military capability which was the reverse of the experience of the 

RAF. For naval staffs the aircraft threatened two things: the end of the battle fleet and the big gun engagement at the core of 

naval doctrine, and, more dangerously, the rapid eclipse of navies as a factor in war. The advent of air power made conventional 

naval doctrine unstable, even redundant in the eyes of aviation radicals, and invited a response that bordered on the dogmatic. 

The Royal Navy did not ignore 

aircraft. The Royal Naval Air Service 

under Churchill’s leadership 

pioneered independent air activity in 

the early stages of the Great War. Yet 

in the inter-war years aircraft were 

given a largely subsidiary tactical role 

…the formulation of doctrine 

cannot be regarded as 

autonomous. Personalities, 

politics, technology, and 

experience combined in an 

intricate web of influence whose 

effects on doctrine were diverse 

but often profound 

The Royal Navy did not ignore aircraft. The Royal Naval Air Service under 

Churchill’s leadership pioneered independent air activity in the early stages of the 

Great War. Yet in the inter-war years aircraft were given a largely subsidiary 

tactical role. Until 1931 British naval doctrine assigned to aircraft a role in fleet 

reconnaissance. They were not expected to play a role in the big gun 

engagement; it was expected that the traditional maritime duel would decide the 

outcome of the naval war. From 1931 with the creation of command for aircraft 

carriers the situation began to change. But in 1935, when naval air doctrine was 

more clearly defined, aircraft were still regarded as auxiliary. The functions aircraft

were to perform reflected this subordination. They 

were to conduct fleet reconnaissance; during the 

big gun actions they were to act as artillery 

spotters. They were to protect the fleet form 

enemy air and submarine attack, and attack 

enemy capital ships to reduce their speed and 

make it possible for a big gun engagement to 

finish the job. Little thought was put into the role 

of air power in trade protection, and less into the 

effects of air attack on shipping. Naval vessels 

were expected to be able to defend themselves 

from air attack by concentrated shipboard anti-aircraft fire. The 

development of a separate RAF Coastal Command in 1936 did not 

produce an effective air-sea cooperation. Coastal Command was 

regarded as a sophisticated reconnaissance organization, spotting the 

enemy’s ships so that the navy could destroy them. 

All of this was some six years before Pearl Harbour and before the sinking 

of the Prince of Wales and Repulse in the South China Sea. Only seven 

HMS Achilles with aircraft-catapult 

facility and RAF personnel. 

years separated this evaluation from the Battle of the Coral Sea and Midway which were decided by aircraft without a single 

ship-to-ship salvo. To be fair, the Royal Navy was not alone in this assessment of the transforming effects of maritime air power. 

When the German Navy began in the late 1930s its plans for major expansion, the force was divided between those who 

wanted a slim offensive force, composed of submarines and supported by aircraft, and those who wanted a large battle fleet 

based around a core of major battleships. In 1939 Hitler opted for the latter to meet what he perceived to be Germany’s long 

term strategic interests as a global power, but also because he associated naval power, as did so many of his contemporaries, 

with its symbolic expression: the big-gun battleship. 9 The battleship school within the German Navy had its own position to 

consider within the service hierarchy. To have embraced the ‘slim navy’ would have required close collaboration, even perhaps 

a dependence, on the new German Air Force which neither service found congenial. 

In Japan a paradoxical situation developed. The Japanese navy was at the forefront in the development of aircraft carriers and 

of offensive naval aviation. Naval aircraft equipped with good quality armament were developed to sink fleet units, and to 

prevent the enemy from doing the same to the Japanese fleet. Yet Japanese admirals remained wedded to the idea of the large 

battle fleet and the super-battleship. The Battle of Midway was planned as a major fleet engagement, in which the main task 

39

40 

force would pursue and destroy the outgunned remnants of the US Pacific Fleet. The big guns were never fired in anger. Nor 

were they for most of the Pacific War. The Yamato, the world’s largest battleship, was sunk by a hail of aerial bombs in 1945 

when it sailed out for a final defiant flourish, a swansong for the battleship age. 

It could be argued that the failure to react more effectively or more rapidly to the advent of maritime air power, for offensive or 

defensive purposes, was not an expression of self-interest or dogmatism, but was the product of a rational assessment of the 

relative future development of naval and air technology, and of the immature state of naval aviation in the 1930s. From this 

In 1935 the Royal Navy 

exercises in the Mediterranean 

produced the conclusion (from 

an airman) that ‘aeroplanes 

are certain to find and locate a 

hostile fleet … and would 

probably inflict heavy losses’ 

perspective, the plans to build a large German battle fleet, or Royal Naval plans to build and 

update its capital ships during the 1940s – the Naval Race that never was – were rational 

medium-term ambitions. On the other hand, the argument that aircraft could inflict serious 

damage on shipping, in the absence of the array of anti-aircraft defences that developed 

after 1945, was not lacking by the 1930s. In 1935 the Royal Navy exercises in the 

Mediterranean produced the conclusion (from an airman) that ‘aeroplanes are certain to find 

and locate a hostile fleet … and would probably inflict heavy losses’. The technology was 

immature but not lacking. The United States Navy made much more progress in the interwar 

years in this direction than did European navies. Naval air armament was in many cases 

not much more effective than the low-calibre bombs with which Trenchard’s strike force was 

furnished, but effective aerial torpedoes were developed, and deck-piercing bombs. The best naval 

aircraft by the outbreak of war were capable of inflicting fatal damage on ships. It is difficult to 

escape the conclusion that European naval commanders were slow to adapt doctrine to match new 

technical capabilities. Aircraft did not make navies redundant after 1945, but they forced a major 

reorientation. The process of adaptation might well have been less costly in men and ships if the 

navy (and, it should be added, the air force too) had demonstrated greater doctrinal openness. 

Aircraft did not make 

navies redundant after 

1945, but they forced 

a major reorientation 

There are more general lessons to be learned from these examples. In any organization there is a persistent tension between 

convention and innovation. The presumption is that innovation will always be progressive, and that existing structures, 

procedures and practices are in the nature of things a barrier to progress. Innovation for its own sake, however, has little more 

to commend it than a reactionary commitment to established behaviour. The critical issue in military institutions is the 

achievement of balance: a weighing of existing organization and ideas against the pressures for change, in order to achieve at 

any given time something close to the optimum. History demonstrates that the greatest pressure to change is generated under 

conditions of actual combat. Dogmatic thinking has usually failed the test of war.

In prolonged periods of peace the tendency to consolidate or to conserve is magnified. This is not to argue that military 

innovation is dependent on war alone; it is to suggest that to prevent doctrine from becoming dogma is a singularly challenging 

task under all conditions short of major war. 

At the risk of appearing too categorical, there are at least five (there may well be more) elements to be taken into account in the 

formation and development of doctrine which can be regarded as decisive. They operated to a greater or lesser extent in the 

examples already examined. Briefly summarised these elements are: the impact of politics, broadly conceived; the role of 

technological change; the ability to absorb the lessons of experience; effective conditions for review; and finally, what might be 

called the ‘eccentricity factor’. Each of these elements will be elaborated in turn. 

1. The impact of politics 

The history of the inter-war 

RAF shows that self-interest 

can also be self-defeating. 

The isolation of the RAF 

from the navy and army 

and its pursuit of an 

independent strategy left it 

able to do very little in 1939 

Political factors affect the formulation of doctrine in a number of ways, and are more likely, on 

the evidence already looked at, to distort doctrine and its application than any other factor. The 

political context cannot be ignored in the formulation of doctrine, particularly where a regime is 

committed to particular long-term strategic goals, or is intent on expanding or contracting the 

arms base to a significant degree. The wider political context can be mediated to an extent – if, 

for example, the military themselves play a substantial part in determining that context – but it 

cannot be ignored, least of all by retreating into dogmatic positions. A recognition of political 

realities may well make it easier to adapt doctrine in creative ways, as the German military did in 

the 1920s under the exceptional conditions of enforced disarmament. 

The second political element is more tractable. It is possible, and evidently desirable, to reduce political conflict between the 

services to a minimum. Self-interest is hard to resist, given the competition for scarce resources, and the understandable desire 

to maintain the prestige and capability of the force. The history of the inter-war RAF shows that self-interest can also be selfdefeating. 

The isolation of the RAF from the navy and army and its pursuit of an independent strategy left it able to do very little 

in 1939. Active collaboration between the forces in the formation of doctrine, or simply the absence of a clear antagonism, is 

preferable to continuous rivalry. The kind of lateral thinking that this promotes may lead to the situation where a service is 

arguing away its raison d’être, as the RAF was forced to do when manned bombers gave way to Polaris submarines. At the 

least, doctrine should be examined with the following questions in mind: to what extent has the formulation of doctrine been 

governed by self-interest of the force, and does it matter? 

41

42 

The new generation of 

German weapons – jets, 

long-range rockets, 

ground-to-air missiles – 

provided the weapons 

for the Cold War 

confrontation of the 

1950s, but they were not 

strategically significant 

for World War II 

2. The role of technological change 

There is no simple answer to the issue of whether doctrine should 

be driven by technological change or vice versa. Technical 

innovation can profoundly influence the development of doctrine. 

Historically, technological change has produced occasional abrupt 

breakthroughs which lead to a short period of doctrinal instability – 

for example, the introduction of combat aircraft in the First World 

War, or atomic weapons at the end of the Second – and interrupt 

a more gradual process of development. The impact of a sudden 

change can be either overestimated, as it was with strategic 

bombing, or underestimated, as it was with maritime air power. In 

general, doctrine should match the current level of technology 

which is capable of effective deployment. The contrast between 

Soviet practice in the Second World War, where a small group of 

robust, technically advanced weapons was mass-produced for the 

kind of battles being fought on the eastern Front, and the German 

preference for smaller numbers of optimum-quality weapons at the 

forefront of development, which were over-complex and expensive, 

demonstrates the danger of being technology-led. The new 

generation of German weapons – jets, long-range rockets, groundto-air 

missiles – provided the weapons for the Cold War 

confrontation of the 1950s, but they were not strategically 

significant for World War II. Optimum technology is not always, in 

this sense, usable and effective – an observation that might be 

applied to the nuclear weapons programmes generated by the 

super-powers since 1945. On the other hand, the optimum 

doctrine, as the RAF found in the 1930s, is not attainable if the 

technological base is not yet sophisticated enough to support it. 

Doctrine has to be steered between these two extremes.

3. The lessons of experience 

Doctrine does not emerge in a vacuum. It is 

profoundly affected by historical experience. The 

evaluation of the experience is critical to the 

formulation of effective doctrine. The process of 

evaluation is common to all armed forces, but it 

carries within it a number of dangers. It is difficult 

to examine past experience without bringing to 

that process a particular cast of mind, a 

predisposition to interpret the material in 

particular ways. Professional historians are no 

more exempt from these tendencies than military 

staffs. Evaluation is a matter of sound judgement; 

it requires real candour, a genuine detachment, 

and, above all, a scientific approach. Slessor’s 

description of air strategy in the 1930s as ‘a 

matter of faith’ may well reflect the historical reality, but it was not a sound basis for doctrine. The 

Paradoxically, the 43 

RAF did not draw 

lessons from the 

German bombing of 

Britain during the Blitz, 

which confirmed that 

economic targets were 

difficult to destroy 

permanently, and that 

civilian morale could 

survive over 40,000 

deaths 

tendency for evaluation to reflect the eye of the beholder was evident in the different responses to the air battles of the 1930s. 

The bombing of Guernica during the Spanish Civil War drew entirely different responses from those who observed its effects. 

The German Air Force, whose planes attacked Guernica, were unimpressed by the effects of urban bombing and stuck to a 

tactical air doctrine until the technology might permit something different. Soviet observation of the bombing in Spain ended the 

experimental development of heavy bombers and long-range aviation, and pushed the Red Air Force towards a rather narrow 

conception of tactical air power. The RAF on the other hand saw Guernica, together with Italian experience in Ethiopia, or 

Japanese bombing of Chinese cities, as confirmation that bombing was effective against civilian morale. Paradoxically, the RAF 

did not draw lessons from the German bombing of Britain during the Blitz, which confirmed that economic targets were difficult 

to destroy permanently, and that civilian morale could survive over 40,000 deaths. Instead they launched their own bombing 

offensive with poorer resources against a well-defended enemy state, with the object of smashing German industry and 

undermining German war-willingness to the point of collapse. In this case, of course, much more was at stake. If the RAF had 

admitted the drawbacks of bombing doctrine the bombing offensive would never have been attempted. The improved 

performance of Bomber Command over the war was entirely a product of tactical and technological improvements learned in 

the hardest of all schools, combat itself.

44 

This example illustrates the importance of applying the principle of ‘appropriateness’ in making evaluations from experience. 

There are evident dangers in extrapolating from small wars to large wars, or vice versa. Bombing in Spain was not like a 

bombing war between major states. Bombing Vietnam or Korea was not the same as bombing Germany or even Japan. 

Doctrine should, and usually does, reflect a variety of different contexts and environments for the likely conduct of operations. 

4. The conditions for review 

Since doctrine is from its nature impermanent, it must be the subject of almost perpetual review. Here 

once again there are problems of balance between what should be conserved and what should be 

revised. The existence of some kind of effective review body with the right to treat doctrine irreverently 

must in itself promote the desire to demonstrate change. Review bodies have their own interests to 

promote, not least of which is a justification of their existence and their budget. Change is not for its 

own sake. It may be desirable under certain circumstances for a review body to conclude that current 

doctrine stays as it is, and it justifies its existence no less by doing so. 

The exact nature of the process of review cannot be prescribed in every case. But some process of 

Review bodies have 

their own interests to 

promote, not least of 

which is a justification 

of their existence and 

their budget 

regular scrutiny, when doctrine is re-assessed in the light of fresh ideas or new experience, or a political sea-change, is a 

significant step towards identifying the elements of dogma. It might well be objected that regular monitoring on this scale would 

render doctrine unusable, because it would exist in a permanent state of uncertainty; this would make it difficult to plan the 

long-term development of technology or force structures if doctrine were subject to unpredictable and possibly radical alteration 

on a regular short-term basis. The evidence from the Second World War suggests that, if anything, the opposite is the case. 

Under conditions of extreme instability the Red Army tore up its manuals in 1942 and initiated at the highest level a thorough 

review of everything from the mission of the armed forces down to battlefield tactics. 10 The results produced a remarkable 

revival in Soviet fighting power. Over the rest of the war period the Soviet General Staff were open to change. The flexibility of 

the Soviet military machine was the opposite of the popular image of the Soviet regime – totalitarian, ideologically driven, 

dogmatic – and its responsiveness surprised the German forces who had taken advantage of the many Soviet weaknesses in 

1941. The pressure of war produced in this case a willingness to adapt doctrine to circumstances with remarkable effect. Both 

the Soviet and British forces in general performed better during the war when they were forced to make their doctrine up as 

they went along. The history of British tactical air power is probably the most obvious example. The RAF’s dogmatic rejection of 

counter-force strategy and hostility to air-army cooperation meant that tactical air doctrine had to be formulated and practised 

under wartime pressure.

Under conditions of 

extreme instability the 

Red Army tore up its 

manuals in 1942 and 

initiated at the highest 

level a thorough review 

of everything from the 

mission of the armed 

forces down to 

battlefield tactics 

Review raises the issue of reviewers. Should they be independent? How independent should 

they be? There has been historically an obvious reluctance to import outside expertise into 

areas properly regarded as military. During the Second World War relations between the 

British military authorities and the Operational Research teams, which had a large complement of external academic expertise, 

were strained. The German armed forces made significantly less use of independent expertise than other armed forces, and 

resented civilian intervention. Yet civilian evaluation, however hard to swallow, could have a serious effect on the conduct of 

operations. The Butt Report on the performance of Bomber Command produced in 1941 almost led to the eclipse of bombing 

strategy, and forced a hard rethinking of bombing doctrine. The ideal lies perhaps somewhere in between, in the development 

of an intellectual community part military, part civilian, capable of generating an effective exchange of ideas and competence. 

Academic disciplines operate in a perpetual state of self-critical but constructive review. These are transferable practices. 

Doctrine is not inscribed in stone; it calls for constant and critical interrogation. 

The Fairey Battle light 

day-bomber is the story 

of a promising aircraft 

that tragically failed to 

perform its task in war. 

The Butt Report on the performance 

of Bomber Command produced in 

1941 almost led to the eclipse of 

bombing strategy, and forced a 

hard rethinking of bombing doctrine 

45

46 

5. The ‘eccentricity factor’ 

Coping with eccentric interventions in the formulation or practice of doctrine might seem on the surface no more difficult than 

Air Marshal Harris found it to be. He had the habit of showing every amateur expert the door. Yet eccentricity, quite literally the 

property of deviating from the norm, plays its part in military affairs. The revolutionary insight, like the transforming invention, is 

rare. More common is the ability of a particular individual from sheer strength of character, or quality of leadership, to distort or 

ignore existing doctrine and to impose his own solution. Winston Churchill is almost certainly the most obvious example. Time 

and again his interventions were talked down by the Chiefs of Staff; occasionally he prevailed. The effect was at times 

damaging. What Churchill did do was to sharpen the military minds around him by forcing them to think differently, to deviate 

occasionally from the norm. 

A cynic might suggest at this point that wars are not won by doctrine at all, but through qualities of political leadership or 

generalship and the effect of both upon the state of morale, none of which can be easily incorporated, if at all, into written 

doctrine. There is no formula for coping with the eccentric, beyond a willingness to remain open to the unorthodox idea or the 

military firebrand. Harris was no doubt wrong to show everyone the door, but right to be sceptical. But in his own way he too 

was an eccentric; he put his own stamp on Bomber Command and turned it into a much more effective force than it had been 

for the first two and half years of war, but he did so in regular defiance of colleagues in the RAF, and senior commanders and 

politicians outside it. There is a long and distinguished list of others who, like Harris, imposed their personality on the rule-book. 

The random factor does not render doctrine redundant. The long-term development of military thought and military organization 

has continuities which transcend the impact of the eccentric. Doctrine is not simply about winning battles; it is about the 

construction and development of peace-time forces. It helps them to define their function and shape and to make both clear to 

their paymasters and the wider public. The five factors explored here, in the harsh light of historical experience, illustrate the 

many ways in which military doctrine can avoid the pitfalls of dogmatism, while remaining receptive to innovation and capable of 

absorbing sudden shocks or arbitrary intervention. Military doctrine is neither ideal nor universal; it is historically specific and in 

flux, and the best doctrine reflects that reality.

47 

NOTES 

1 Public Record Office, Kew, London, AIR 9/8, memorandum by the Chief of the Air 

Staff, ‘The War Object of an Air Force’, 2nd May 1928. 

2 PRO AIR 9/8, Note by the First Sea Lord, 21st May 1928. 

3 PRO AIR 9/8, ‘Air Policy and Strategy’, lecture at the Royal Naval Staff College, 

Greenwich, 23rd March 1936, p.1. 

4 Memorandum by Lord Trenchard on ‘The Present War Situation’, 19th May 1941, in 

C. Webster & N. Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany, London, 

1961, volume 4, pp. 195-6. 

5 Note by Sir Dudley Pound on Lord Trenchard’s memorandum. 2nd June 1941, 

Webster & Frankland, iv, p. 198. 

6 A.T. Harris, Bomber Offensive, London, 1947, p. 97. 

7 Air Ministry, Synopsis of British Air Effort During the War, HMSO, Cmnd 100, April 

1919. 

8 H. G. Wilmot, ‘Air Control in Ovamboland’, Journal of the Royal United Services 

Institution ’83, 1938, pp. 823-9. 

9 See C. Thomas. The German Navy in the Nazi Era, London, 1990, pp. 177-9. 

10 For example L. Rotundo (ed), Battle of Stalingrad: The 1943 Soviet General Staff 

Study, Washington, 1989. 

RAF Harrier GR7 with LGB 

Photo Sgt Jack Prichard

THE FUTURE OF AIR POWER 

Observations from the Past Decade

By Philip S Meilinger, USAF 49 

It is an axiom that sound military doctrine – the formalized concept 

of how we intend to fight – must be based on both experience 

and theory. A doctrine that relies exclusively on the past quite 

literally will fight the last war. On the other hand, doctrine that only 

looks forward, in disregard of the past, is built on a foundation of 

quicksand with no empirical evidence to support it. It is my intention to 

look at the future of warfare, specifically the role of airpower in future 

war, by first looking at the recent past. These events and their 

implications for American foreign policy, plus a discussion of some 

emerging technologies and new ideas on how to employ them, will 

point towards the future of airpower. At the same time, the use of force 

must be placed in the context – the economic, political and social 

environment – in which it is likely to be employed. A beginning note: 

airpower is an inclusive term that incorporates the air assets, fixed and 

rotary wing, manned and unmanned, of all the services. It also includes 

space assets. 

It has become common to talk of new challenges facing NATO: the 

clash of civilizations, the rise (or re-rise) of nationalism, terrorism, 

nuclear proliferation, religious radicals, and the awakening of China, to 

name a few. When discussing such challenges, military analysts too 

often face the future as if there was little or no past to provide 

guidance. There is some merit with this approach; after all, every crisis 

is unique and therefore requires a unique solution. Nonetheless, there 

is a distressing tendency to ignore the war in the Persian Gulf, to brand 

it as such an aberration, to so denigrate the Iraqi military and its 

leadership, as to contend there is nothing to gain from its study. 

Similarly, events in the Balkans are passed off as irrelevant to the future 

because of their peculiar and unique nature. This would be dangerous.

50 Nonetheless, there is a 

distressing tendency to 

ignore the war in the 

Persian Gulf, to brand it 

as such an aberration, 

to so denigrate the Iraqi 

military and its 

leadership, as to 

contend there is nothing 

to gain from its study 

We are often reminded, for 

example, that the coalitions 

against Iraq and Serbia were 

so powerful and had so many 

advantages that their success 

was inevitable. It is hard to 

argue with these great 

advantages: alliances that 

largely isolated Iraq and 

Serbia, prepared bases and 

pre-positioned stocks intheater, 

months of calm to 

train and prepare for battle, 

great economic strength, the moral high ground that coalesced world public opinion, superior technology, and, in the case of 

the Gulf War, terrain that seemed to favor air operations. Such an assessment, however, owes much to hindsight. In the 

summer and fall of 1990 there were many voices, including noted military professionals, who publicly spoke out against the use 

of military force. They pointed to Iraqi strengths that augured ill for the coalition. The same was true in the Balkans. Pundits and 

analysts evoked memories of World War II when it took dozens of Axis divisions to subdue Yugoslavia. 

As for the terrain, 

Colin Powell’s alleged 

comment summed 

the issue: “We don’t 

do mountains.” 

As for the terrain, Colin Powell’s alleged comment summed the issue: “We don’t do mountains.” We 

must remember these coalition disadvantages in the Persian Gulf and the Balkans in order to dispel 

the aura of inevitability that came to surround these operations. Nothing seemed inevitable at the time. 

To what extent these obstacles were overcome will shed light on future military operations. 

The disadvantages the coalitions faced in these two theaters were real, even if they proved less 

troublesome than first imagined. In the Balkans, for example, attempting to fight a war by committee 

with nineteen nations having veto power was enormously cumbersome, to say nothing of Russian and 

Chinese outrage at the air campaigns over Bosnia and Kosovo. Military experts warned that the conditions in the Yugoslavian 

region were not at all like those in the desert, that air strikes against Serbian positions and equipment would have little effect 

because the terrain and weather were a severe handicap to air operations. Others argued that attempting to put pressure on 

the Serb populace would only harden their resolve. It is the thesis of this paper that it was the unusual and unique strengths of

…the Iraqi government has placed the 

number of deaths during the war at less 

than three thousand – a remarkable 

figure given the weight of the air effort 

airpower that helped ameliorate coalition disadvantages. 

Furthermore, it is these same strengths will make 

airpower an effective policy tool in the future. 

The results of the military action in the Persian Gulf War 

of 1991 were dramatic: it was the most lopsided victory 

of modern times. Coalition casualties were exceptionally 

low: 240 dead and 776 wounded. Over 86,000 Iraqi 

soldiers surrendered, virtually without a fight, while a like 

number deserted. Although there are a plethora of 

statistics extant regarding the number of Iraqi tanks, 

armored personnel carriers, and artillery pieces 

destroyed, by all accounts Saddam lost a substantial portion of his arsenal – 

well over 50 percent. Iraqi casualties, both military and civilian, were, 

however, surprisingly light. In a reflection of the extreme precautions taken to 

minimize such casualties, the Iraqi government has placed the number of 

deaths during the war at less than three thousand – a remarkable figure given 

the weight of the air effort. 1 

In another area of the world, Yugoslavia had been disintegrating since 1991, under the anxious eyes of NATO. Attention soon 

focused on Bosnia where bitter fighting went on between Serbs and Bosnian Muslims. On 28 August 1995 two mortar shells 

exploded in a market place in Sarajevo, killing thirty-seven civilians; it was assumed the Serbs had fired them. The world was 

outraged, leading to an air campaign against Serbia, termed Deliberate Force. Over a twenty-two day period, 220 coalition 

aircraft flew 3515 sorties against 48 targets, mostly air defense sites, ammunition/supply depots, or fielded forces. Stating that 

“every bomb is a political bomb,” General Mike Ryan, the air commander, personally scrutinized each targeting decision so as 

to minimize errors that could result in civilian casualties or collateral damage. The Dayton Peace Accords that followed in 

November resulted in a negotiated settlement granting Bosnia independence with UN peacekeeping forces in place. Milosevic 

yielded due to the air campaign, a Croatian ground offensive that had succeeded in pushing his troops back, and increasing 

unrest among his population. US Secretary of Defense William Perry stated: “Deliberate Force was the absolutely crucial step in 

bringing the warring parties to the negotiating table at Dayton, leading to the peace agreement.” 2 That appraisal was echoed by 

Richard Holbrooke who brokered the deal at Dayton. Serbian civilian casualties were estimated at less than thirty dead; there 

was only one allied aircraft lost in the strikes, and both its crewmembers were later recovered. 3 

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Events in Kosovo were similarly dramatic. Milosevic had been oppressing the Albanian Kosovars for years, and the UN 

estimated that 250,000 Kosovars had been driven from their homes by March 1999. NATO’s negotiations to end the violence, 

followed by threats of using force, proved fruitless. Assuming it would replicate the quick and successful bombing campaign 

that saved Bosnia, NATO began with a surprisingly tepid air campaign on 24 March that slowly accelerated over the 

succeeding weeks. The daily sortie rate was fairly low, bomb sizes were sometimes reduced to minimize damage, restrictive 

rules of engagement resulted in many aircraft returning with their ordnance, and higher level guidance from both Washington 

and NATO headquarters was pervasive. Yet, NATO achieved its goals after continued bombing for seventy-eight days and 

14,006 strike sorties that dropped 23,614 weapons. When Milosevic conceded on 3 June, NATO claimed it was because he 

had lost over one-third of his heavy equipment, over one hundred aircraft, and dozens of other military and industrial facilities 

and structures. Serbia’s electrical grid was down, its oil refineries shut, and its economy in shambles. Moreover, this was 

accomplished at an astonishingly low cost in human life: NATO lost but two aircraft – the pilots were recovered – and Serbian 

civilian casualties were approximately six hundred dead. 4 

In general terms, military operations in the Persian Gulf and the Balkans indicate several trends and characteristics relevant to 

future NATO involvement: 

● NATO vital interests will not ordinarily be at stake, but the mantel of world leadership is taken very seriously by our 

leaders and by our public. We will therefore continue to intervene in situations where we believe such involvement is 

“the right thing to do” and where it is believed this will result in innocent lives being saved. “Vital interests” have given 

way to “key values.” 

● NATO intervention will generally not be predictable either by location or scale. Very few predicted as little as one month in 

advance that there would be major wars fought in Korea, the Falklands, or the Persian Gulf. Similarly, very few foresaw the 

duration and expense of military operations short of major war, such as Northern and Southern Watch (the air patrols over 

Iraq now in their eighth year). What begins as a limited involvement with a specific “exit strategy” often is quickly overcome 

by events. 

● Overseas basing will continue to be limited. As a result, NATO, and especially the US, must be able to project and 

sustain its military power and influence over great distances. Nonetheless, it is also true that overseas basing is 

essential for extended operations. It is not conceivable that military operations could be sustained in the Middle East, 

for example, solely from bases in the US. 

● Casualties and damage are of increasing importance to NATO and indeed world public opinion. Our interventions must 

therefore be discriminate, measured, restrained and appropriate. Our adversaries will be able to get away with far more

53 

violence and lawlessness than we can. Precision weapons are essential for such situations. Moreover, we must be able to 

deliver these precise weapons so as to minimize our own casualties. In this regard, the high cost of such weapons is deemed 

less important than the lives they may save. 

● Just as nuclear weapons drove war down to the conventional level in the aftermath of World War II, so too have the events 

of the past decade driven it down to the asymmetric level whenever NATO is likely to be involved. The relatively effortless 

destruction of large and well equipped Iraqi and Serbian armies and air forces sent a powerful message to would-be 

aggressors: the only possibility of success against NATO lies in not fighting it on even terms or in a conventional fashion. 

● Adversaries will be intelligent, clever and dedicated to their cause. They will devise ways to avoid or limit our technological, 

qualitative and quantitative superiority. Asymmetrical strategies and tactics will include an emphasis on mobility, 

concealment, hardening, and the commingling of civilian and military targets. Weapons of mass destruction will proliferate 

as will their means of delivery. Indeed, it will not be necessary for countries – or terrorist groups – to develop nuclear 

weapons in order to be a serious threat. Chemical and biological weapons are also frightening and difficult to defend 

against. 

The combination of these factors points towards a NATO military response that is flexible and that employs discreet, precise, longdistance 

power projection. 

More specifically, the past decade has given us many other lessons to consider. Lessons can be tricky things, however. There are 

countless examples when serious military professionals from different countries or services looked dispassionately, logically, and 

rigorously at past events and deduced totally different “lessons” based on those events. After World War I German officers examined 

the experience of trench warfare and concluded the only solution was to restore mobility to the battlefield via a combination of 

armored vehicles and airpower. French officers examined that same 

experience and determined just as conclusively that the response to the 

trench stalemate was a series of highly elaborate and defensible static 

fortifications – the Maginot Line. Learned lessons are not always correct 

lessons. We proceed with that monition in mind. 

French officers determined just as conclusively that the 

response to the trench stalemate was a series of highly 

elaborate and defensible static fortifications – the Maginot 

Line. Learned lessons are not always correct lessons

54 

● It is imperative that future strategists, planners and commanders remember the axiom that military strategy must match 

government policy. Once the civilian leaders have determined the policy objectives, planners must then devise a military strategy 

to fulfill those objectives. It is surprising how often this simple principle has been violated in war. The Japanese wanted raw 

materials and resources in a Southeast Asian empire. In order to achieve that goal, however, they selected a military strategy of 

attacking the United States – an enemy they could never defeat. Other less extreme examples are the unhappy American 

experiences in Somalia and Haiti. Defeating the dominant warlords and restoring democracy and peace were noble goals, but 

they were simply not achievable given the military resources committed and the strategies employed. 

Specifically regarding the use of airpower, planners will begin looking at targets to strike or neutralize. They must ensure those 

targets do in fact lead them closer to achieving their policy goals. I am told that following the Gulf War a writer was interviewing 

a senior airman regarding the targeting strategy of the air campaign. The officer was asked why a certain bridge, seemingly 

unconnected with any major military or industrial target and situated in an isolated location, had been struck by coalition aircraft. 

The officer was surprised by the question, and answered, half seriously, that “it was hit because it was bridge; we do bridges; 

we’re good at bridges.” Targets should not be hit simply because they are hittable, or because they were struck in the last war, 

or because there are lots of them, or because they are politically “safe,” or because they are less risky to attack than are other 

targets. Rather, targets should be attacked because doing so will help lead to the policy objectives. If a planner cannot draw a 

clear connection between the target struck and one of the stated objectives, the targeting strategy needs to be reconsidered. 

At a higher level, a more compelling example of this problem was in Kosovo. NATO intervened for humanitarian reasons: the 

ethnic cleansing of Albanian Kosovars by the Serbs. Yet, NATO leaders, civilian and military, state repeatedly that the goal of the 

air campaign was merely to degrade the military capability of the Serbian forces so as to reduce their ability to conduct that 

cleansing. This of course begs the question of how does one define “degrade” – the destruction of a dozen Serbian tanks 

could fit the literal meaning of that term. But more importantly, how would such degradation, however defined, meet the political 

objectives of saving Kosovar lives? There seemed to be a gap between NATO’s political goals and the military strategy adopted 

to achieve them. Fortunately, and almost serendipitously, the air campaign was successful anyway. To reiterate: the military 

strategy must fulfill the political objectives desired; if they do not, then those military operations, regardless of how efficient, 

accurate, bloodless, and discriminate, are useless. 

● The issue of “casualty intolerance” has been discussed during the past decade because coalition casualties have been 

astonishingly light. Despite the scale of victory, the Coalition suffered only 240 killed in the Gulf War. This extraordinary 

performance has led to the expectation that all wars and military engagements will be similarly bloodless. Hence, the loss of an 

American F-16 over Bosnia dominated news coverage for a week in June 1995. The rescue of the pilot, who was then 

accorded hero status, illustrates the seriousness with which casualties are now seen by the American public. This experience

was repeated in the Balkans with the return of the three hapless American soldiers who had fallen into Serbian hands. An 

exclamation point can be added to the casualty intolerance issue by the unhappy experience of US forces in Somalia. The 

death of eighteen Army rangers in October 1993 was enough to break the will of American leaders, and we withdrew from 

Somalia. It may be argued that the American people are less queasy about casualties than is generally thought. 5 What is 

important to realize, however, is that NATO political and military leaders assume their populations are casualty intolerant; they 

then plan their actions based on that assumption. Heavy casualties are viewed as unacceptable, especially in a limited conflict 

where vital interests are not at stake. 

The drive to limit casualties extends to our adversaries; indeed, it even includes their military personnel. This has resulted in an 

extraordinary degree of political control over the planning, targeting, and execution processes of an air campaign. It has also 

spurred the development of smaller but more accurate bombs. These mini-bombs would weigh only 250-300 lbs, but because 

of their extreme accuracy, would have the effect of a much larger warhead. Moreover, they would at the same time generate 

less collateral damage. In addition, it appears the USAF has even been using bombs with concrete warheads against sensitive 

targets in Iraq to further limit casualties and collateral damage. 6 

The goal of limiting enemy casualties has also led to research into what are termed nonlethal weapons. These new weapons 

employ kinetic, mechanical, chemical, biological, acoustic, or electromagnetic properties to incapacitate or neutralize personnel 

or equipment. Typical applications of such technologies include beanbag projectiles, tear gas, oil-eating bacteria, laser guns, 

corrosive agents, and sticky foam. In Desert Storm and Allied Force, air-delivered munitions draped carbon-graphite filaments 

across power lines, causing the electricity to short out and temporarily shut down. Nonlethals are a growth industry, but there 

remain formidable technical problems. There are also military, ethical and legal complications that have yet to be thoroughly 

worked out. For example, will their use in combat send a signal of weakness or lack of resolve to an enemy? Will the use of a 

biological agent that turns enemy fuel into jelly be in violation of international laws regarding biological warfare? Nonetheless, 

given the nature of many military operations that are highly politicized and thus require an extremely discriminate use of force, 

nonlethal weapons have an obvious utility. 7 

A consequence of an increasingly discriminate use of force is the high expectations it produces. Since accuracy has been 

demonstrated, it is the new standard by which future operations will be measured. Casualties and collateral damage of any 

degree will generate scrutiny. This is a major constraint facing airmen in their operational planning. When the Al Firdos 

command and control bunker in Baghdad was struck on 13 February 1991, killing over two hundred Iraqis, the outcry was 

immediate. Although a military target, the bunker would not have been attacked had planners known it was also being used as 

an air raid shelter. As a result, targets in Baghdad were avoided thereafter, lest more civilian casualties inadvertently occur. 8 This 

concern had a similar impact over Serbia. Air strikes on bridges and factories, as well as errant bombs that hit hospitals, trains, 

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and residential areas, were immediately shown on television stations worldwide. This prompted NATO air planners at times to 

use 500 lb bombs instead of the normal 2000 lb bombs so as to minimize damage, to halt the use of “area weapons” such as 

cluster bomb units, and to instruct pilots to return with their ordnance unless they were certain they would hit their targets 

exactly. Fear of collateral damage dominated the targeting process. It may be that “media spin” has become a new principle of 

war. Military leaders must be ever cognizant of the effects their actions will have and how those actions will be depicted on the 

six o’clock news. 

● Jointness is an effective way to ensure unity of effort and a focused application of power. Service parochialism is not dead 

– and perhaps a little bit of it is good to foster healthy competition – but it seems to have faded as a disruptive force in NATO 

military operations. 9 This is partly because the line between the services and their capabilities has blurred over the past two 

decades. For example, all of the US services have air arms; the Navy has a large ground contingent (the Marines); the Army has 

a significant fleet of supply ships; and all the services rely on space assets. This multi-faceted and increasingly integrated 

capability has produced senior officers far more familiar with the full range of military operations, thereby reducing tensions, misunderstandings 

and disagreements. Familiarity breeds consent. 

It could also be argued that this emphasis on jointness is in fact another manifestation of an aspect of the American way of 

war: redundancy. Attempting to decide between the efficacy of land-based airpower versus aircraft carriers, marines or soldiers, 

or the utility of missiles versus aircraft, is resolved by simply choosing all of the above. Although some may see this as wasteful 

and inefficient, there may be a method to such madness. This redundancy greatly multiplies the problems confronting a 

potential adversary. If the US had “merely” a large and capable army, or air force, or navy, or amphibious force, then an enemy 

could focus on that single threat and devise an effective counter. But how does one fight a US that has all of these capabilities? 

There are simply too many arrows in that quiver for any adversary to negate all of them. Thus, seeming indecision in American 

defense policy can also be seen as a great strength. 

● Air supremacy is essential for the effective conduct of NATO military operations. If air supremacy is lost, the cost in 

casualties to our forces on the ground, at sea, and in the air will rise dramatically. It has become joint doctrine that the first 

priority at the beginning of a military operation is to take down an enemy’s air defense network and neutralize his air force. After 

that is accomplished, all else becomes far easier and safer. Two photographs should come to mind to illustrate this point. First, 

recall the picture of the coalition supply depot at Ad-Dammam in Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War: hundreds of vehicles lined 

up bumper to bumper in serried ranks stretching almost to the horizon. It is what a bomber pilot would term “a target rich 

environment.” That is what can be done with air supremacy. Second, visualize the photo of the “highway of death” leading 

northwest out of Kuwait City. On 26 February 1991 the Iraqis attempted to retreat northward, but they were detected, trapped, 

and attacked from the air. In thirty minutes, aircraft destroyed fourteen hundred vehicles. That is what happens to the side that

loses air supremacy. It also must be understood that achieving air supremacy is usually not an end in itself; this achievement 

must then be exploited. It is the follow-on actions of military force that will take us towards our overall political objectives. 

There is a danger, however, that policy makers, the public and even military planners, may begin to take air supremacy for 

granted, to assume that it will be an automatic feature of any future military involvement. 10 This would be a dangerous 

misconception. NATO has the finest air forces in the world, more than a match for any potential adversary. But this dominance 

is not a God-given right; it was earned over a period of decades, at great effort, and at 

a cost of billions of dollars. It will take continued effort to guarantee such air dominance 

in the future, because air defenses, especially ground based, are becoming 

increasingly dangerous. 

● Technology can dominate war. The question of technology versus the individual 

has always been at heart a cultural one. Airmen tend to place more efficacy in 

technology than do surface officers. This is perhaps due to the fact that airpower, by 

its very nature, is dependent on advanced technology. Man has fought wars on land 

for millennia, but it is only during this century that he has been able to fight in the air 

and space. This dependency on technology is deeply ingrained in the airman’s 

culture, but we must be wary of accepting the arguments of either the technologists 

or the humanists and rely instead on empirical data and evidence. 

Technology has dominated the conflicts of the past decade for the eminently 

practical reason that it has worked. Coalition aircraft have had an overwhelming 

superiority in air to air combat: 38:1 in the Gulf War and 10:0 over the Balkans. 

American-built M-1 tanks destroyed Iraqi tanks often with a single shot before the 

latter were even close enough to bring their own guns to bear. US and European 

space assets assured near “information dominance” over Iraq and Serbia. Ironically, 

this success story was almost prevented. During the 1980s a group of US 

politicians and defense analysts decried the emphasis on technology. They said the 

military “gold plated” its weapon systems, which not only drove up costs, but also 

made them overly delicate and thus likely to fail in combat. The weapons they 

deplored included the F-15, F-18, C-17, stealth technology, radar-guided air to air 

missiles, large deck aircraft carrier, M-1 tank, Bradley fighting vehicle, and the 

Patriot missile. All were expected to be failures in combat, but all have proven to be 

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…weapons deplored included the 

F-15, F-18, C-17, stealth 

technology, radar-guided air to air 

missiles, large deck aircraft carrier, 

M-1 tank, Bradley fighting vehicle, 

and the Patriot missile. All were 

expected to be failures in combat…

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successful. 11 Spending money on overly complex or unnecessary weapons is to be strongly condemned, but no airman, sailor 

or soldier wants to be holding the second best gun, even if – or perhaps especially if – it is cheap. As long as Americans place 

life over machines, they will continue to support the idea of military technology second to none – even if that costs a great deal. 

Another method to lower cost, limit casualties and enhance chances of success is through the use of unmanned air vehicles 

(UAV). They are cheaper than manned aircraft, require no design compromises to accommodate a crew, and put no lives at 

risk. To date, UAV have been limited largely to reconnaissance and communications duties, and their performance has been 

mixed. Although less costly, they are still expensive (the Predator costs $3 million, and the new Global Hawk is projected to 

cost $10 million), have limited payload and endurance, and are more vulnerable than anticipated: thirty were reportedly shot 

down over the Balkans. Nonetheless, a new generation of these aircraft appearing in the next decade promises to be more 

capable and reliable than its predecessors, while also being able to deliver ordnance in hostile environments. 12 

● Stealth technology generated great skepticism when first revealed. Many doubted its usefulness, but even if it was initially 

successful, the skeptics argued, effective counters would soon be developed. The naysayers were proven wrong. The record of 

the F-117 in Desert Storm was sterling. Beginning on opening night, F-117s penetrated through the heart of Iraqi defenses to 

bomb targets in downtown Baghdad. They then continued to return to this high threat area, while also striking targets 

throughout Iraq, over the next six weeks. In over seventeen hundred combat missions not a single F-117 was damaged by 

enemy fire, much less shot down. The “Nighthawk” was unable to sustain this perfect record in Operation Allied Force: on 27 

March an F-117 went down near Belgrade. 13 Nevertheless, its combat record remains amazing. The B-2 stealth bomber, not yet 

operational during Desert Storm, was unveiled in combat operations over Kosovo. It also performed extremely well, flying fortyfive 

sorties from a base in Missouri and dropping 652 precision-guided munitions (PGM) with excellent accuracy. Although flying 

only 1 percent of the total sorties, it accounted for 11 percent of the tonnage dropped. 14 It is probable that all future US aircraft 

will have stealth characteristics, but there are still drawbacks to this technology. 

Stealth technology is expensive. It is not only difficult to design and manufacture, it can also troublesome and costly to 

maintain. As a result, the use of the F-117 and B-2 is often seen as cost-ineffective. In one sense, this is true. Ordnance can be 

delivered by aircraft such as the F-16 or F-18 that are less expensive. It must therefore be remembered why stealth was 

developed and why it is so important: deadly air defense systems. There are some targets that are simply too dangerous for 

non-stealthy aircraft to tackle. Cruise missiles are an added option, but they generally have a smaller warhead, are less 

accurate, and are expensive – over $1million per round. The accuracy and survivability of stealth aircraft allows them to strike 

targets effectively that otherwise would require larger force packages of not only multiple strike aircraft, but also additional 

escorts, jammers, SEAD aircraft and tankers. 15 The difference involved in numbers of aircraft committed, ordnance, fuel, aircrew, 

training, and lives at risk between stealthy and non-stealthy aircraft is great.

A host of new air-deliverable 

weapons are now being 

developed that offer the hope 

of severely attriting an enemy 

before he can get close enough 

to hurt friendly ground troops 

No new weapon can dominate war indefinitely, so there will eventually be a defense 

against stealth. The question is how long it will take for that counter to be 

developed. Submarines can also be considered a form of stealth technology, and 

although scientists have attempted for decades to penetrate that protective cloak, 

they have been largely unsuccessful. Stealth aircraft technology could prove equally 

durable. 16 

● Precision weapons have revolutionized air warfare. It is not unlikely that NATO will 

again face an enemy who, like Iraq, possesses a sizable army complete with heavy 

artillery, armor and mechanized forces. That does not mean, however, that we must 

confront such an enemy with symmetrical forces. Instead, it would be wiser to fight 

him at arm’s length. Although this may not always be possible, there is a difference 

between being prepared to fight a vicious and probably bloody land action as a last 

resort, and assuming that such an action will occur and thus planning for it as the 

first resort. A host of new air-deliverable weapons are now being developed that offer 

the hope of severely attriting an enemy before he can get close enough to hurt 

friendly ground troops. The alphabet soup of such weapons is typically numbing – 

JDAM, JSOW, JASSM, WCMD, SFW, etc. – but the capabilities they offer are eye 

opening. Most of these weapons, and note that most have already been successfully 

used in combat, are similar in that they magnify the ability of an aircraft to destroy 

enemy facilities, vehicles, and conventional ground forces. 17 

During the Gulf War the Iraqis attempted their only offensive ground operation on 29 January 1991. They occupied the Saudi 

border town of Khafji and began moving three heavy divisions south to counter the coalition ground attack they believed would 

soon follow. Rather than step into that trap and precipitate a bloody ground war, however, the coalition reacted with airpower. 

Over the next two nights aircraft pummeled the Iraqis, destroying hundreds of tanks and other vehicles and stopping the 

offensive cold. One of the more authoritative commentaries on the war termed it “the war’s defining moment.” 18 The Iraqis never 

attempted another assault. 

PGM are relatively cheap compared to the targets they can hit – a 2000 lb laser-guided bomb costs approximately $25 

thousand and the new JDAM costs $18 thousand; whereas, the tanks they destroy cost over $1 million each. Although more 

sophisticated weapons like cruise missiles cost over $1 million per weapon, that is still seen as acceptable given the accuracy 

and low risk they provide. 

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Precision weapons, especially standoff precision 

weapons, have arrived in force. In the Gulf War, only 

9 percent of the bombs dropped by coalition aircraft 

were precision guided. In the Balkans the 

percentage of PGM employed was 69 percent in 

Bosnia and 35 percent in Kosovo. 19 Virtually all 

American strike aircraft and attack helicopters now 

have the capability to deliver PGM, and they have 

…one aircraft carrying 

PGM today is 

comparable in its 

effects to one thousand 

aircraft carrying dumb 

bombs in World War II 

become the weapon of choice in our military operations. There are several reasons for this. First, increased accuracy allows a 

target to be neutralized with far fewer weapons. PGM have increased accuracy by two orders of magnitude: one aircraft 

carrying PGM today is comparable in its effects to one thousand aircraft carrying dumb bombs in World War II. 20 This has 

implications for the number of aircraft required to deliver such munitions, the trained personnel to maintain and fly those aircraft, 

the logistics to deliver and support the planes, weapons and personnel, and perhaps most importantly, the number of lives put 

at risk in delivering those weapons. For example, a common measure of combat efficiency is the “tooth to tail” ratio: the 

number of fighters versus the number of support personnel. A military force with a low tooth to tail ratio, few fighters relative to 

the number of supporters, is seen as inefficient and wasteful. In the age of the PGM, this is an outmoded concept because it 

assumes that a large number of attack assets is both necessary and desirable. It is not. If the same amount of damage can be 

performed by a far smaller number of personnel, then the size of the support structure backing them up – out of harm’s way – 

is of minor import. As noted, the NATO public seems less concerned with losing money than they are with losing lives. 

PGM allow parallel operations: the ability to strike multiple targets at different levels of war simultaneously. This is a significant 

development. Because of the inaccuracy and thus inefficiency of previous bombing efforts using dumb bombs, neutralizing 

targets was a slow process. Previously, the issue was “how many aircraft will it take to destroy a single target,” but now the 

question more appropriately is “how many targets can one aircraft destroy on a single mission.” For example, five hundred 

bombers of the Eighth Air Force during World War II might attack an oil refinery in Germany and cause moderate damage. They 

would fly again two days later against a different target; two to three days later there would be a different target, and so on. 

Perhaps after a month they would return to the original oil refinery, which had been largely repaired during the interim, and the 

process began anew. This was attrition writ large. In 1943 the Eighth Air Force attacked 124 discrete targets. Five decades 

later, in the first twenty-four hours of Desert Storm coalition aircraft using PGM and missiles struck 148 separate targets – fifty in 

the first two hours. 21 In Operation Allied Force over Kosovo, which was a much smaller effort than Desert Storm, NATO aircraft 

and missiles still struck forty different targets during the first few nights of operations. Parallel operations can seriously 

unbalance an enemy, and make it difficult for him to plan and coordinate a coherent response. Nonetheless, as noted above,

simply hitting many targets quickly should not be mistaken for a sound military strategy. The value of those targets and whether 

their destruction brings us closer to our political objectives are what matters. 

Such an impressive capability has its challenges. Precision weapons need precision intelligence. If it is now possible to put a 

weapon through a specific window of a specific building, then it is necessary to know if that is the correct window – the blunder 

of hitting the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade is a particularly telling illustration. This greatly elevates the level of detail required 

from the intelligence gathering agencies. These difficulties are magnified further by the proliferation of mobile military targets. 

The most difficult tactical task facing airmen today is the ability to detect, track, and destroy mobile targets, especially in bad 

weather, beneath a cloud deck, or when they are hidden under trees. Although a major effort was mounted in the Gulf War to 

eradicate the Iraqi Scud menace – over fifteen hundred sorties flown – analysts were forced to conclude after the war that it is 

possible no Scud mobile missiles were destroyed by air attack. 22 This problem reappeared in the Balkans. Despite a far more 

capable reconnaissance effort that included advanced JSTARS aircraft, as well as an 

increased use of UAV and space assets, airmen still had difficulty in finding and 

destroying Serbian tanks, artillery pieces, and other vehicles. Moreover, Iraqi Scud 

technology was rudimentary in many respects. More capable missiles and guidance 

systems are now being developed by China, Iran, India, and North Korea that promise 

greater range, payload and accuracy. 23 Cruise missiles, an equally dangerous threat, are 

also expected to proliferate. There has been much talk since the Gulf War that the US 

has acquired what the Soviets would have called a “reconnaissance-strike-complex” 

(RSC). This would allow the ability to locate, identify, attack, assess damage, and reattack 

(if necessary) a target in near real time. Although many of the surveillance and 

command and control assets are in place to produce such an RSC, Kosovo illustrates 

the difficulties still faced. 24 Until the mobile target problem is resolved, no such complete 

or effective system as an RSC exists. 

Although a major effort was 

mounted in the Gulf War to 

eradicate the Iraqi Scud menace 

– over fifteen hundred sorties 

flown – analysts were forced to 

conclude after the war that it is 

possible no Scud mobile missiles 

were destroyed by air attack 

● One of the great failures of the Gulf War was the coalition’s inability to find and destroy Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction 

(WMD) research and production facilities, and weapon stockpiles. Although this was a stated goal of the coalition, accurate 

intelligence was lacking to achieve it. It was disconcerting to discover that there were many nuclear research facilities in Iraq 

that had not been identified either before or during the war. It was United Nations inspectors roaming Iraq afterwards that 

discovered and then disabled such sites. 25 How many more exist that have not been discovered? Given that our technological 

ability to monitor Iraq from the air, space, and on the ground has been far greater than is normally the case, such a poor track 

record is not comforting when one thinks of other countries where our surveillance capability is far less. 

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Air and space platforms like JSTARS, Rivet Joint and Cobra Ball (special electronic surveillance versions of the RC-135), U-2, 

P-3, unmanned air vehicles, and various imaging satellites, will increasingly be used to locate WMD and their delivery systems. 

These assets can be tied together into a tool called the Counterproliferation Analysis and Planning System (CAPS), which 

employs extensive computer modeling and analysis to locate, track, and predict development in WMD activities. 26 Another 

concept under development would rely primarily on multiple passive sensors to detect and monitor nuclear weapon materials. 

Since all nuclear materials emit distinctive signatures, certain types of spectrometers can detect these emissions over facilities in 

a wide area, even from unknown nuclear sites in that area. This system, the Wide-Area Nuclear Detector (WAND) concept, 

would aid in detecting the movement of such nuclear materials, thus aiding in the counterproliferation process. 27 Once detection 

is made, targeting and destruction are probable, but detection remains a difficult nut to crack. 28 It remains to be seen whether 

or not the systems described above will work, and so the detection of WMD persists as one of the foremost technical 

challenges facing airmen today. 

● Space assets have shrunk the globe and our militaries now rely on satellites for communications, command and control, 

surveillance, intelligence gathering, weather forecasting, mapping, and location finding. In addition, some of the new precision 

munitions, specifically the JDAM and JSOW, use GPS signals for guidance. Space now permeates military operations. Of the 

two hundred American satellites circling the earth, approximately half are used for military purposes – fifty US and European 

satellites directly supported military operations over Serbia. 29 As always, however, such new opportunities carry with them a new 

set of problems. 

Many countries and private companies are jumping into space, diluting NATO dominance. During the Gulf War, the space 

powers were either part of the coalition or at least were not affiliated with Iraq. As a result of that dominance, the “left hook” 

ground offensive enjoyed tactical surprise. What if Saddam had had access to surveillance satellites or their products? The 

concern raised when Russia deployed electronic surveillance vessels to the Adriatic during the Kosovo conflict highlights this 

potential problem. It is estimated that by 2010 at least ten countries will have orbited imaging satellite systems with a resolution 

capability of one meter or less. 30 The ability to blind and isolate an enemy from outside information as we did Iraq will seldom be 

possible in the future. 

Given this general framework, how will military force be used in the future? It is usually stated that the object of war is to impose 

your will on the enemy by destroying his will or his capability to resist. At the risk of over-simplification, military strategists are 

often put into two categories. The first includes those who focus on seeking methods of confusing, deceiving, frightening, or 

otherwise influencing the mind of the enemy in the hope of shattering his will and thus causing surrender. The other school is 

more direct; it believes that if one attacks the enemy’s military forces or industrial infrastructure, thus removing his capability to

esist, then surrender must follow. Some, especially those trained in the social 

sciences, have put new terms on these old concepts, and now refer to coercion 

and denial strategies. There has been a vigorous debate over the past decade 

between the proponents of these two camps. In truth, it is virtually impossible to 

separate these two types of strategies in practice. If the point of attacking, say, an 

enemy’s forces is to deny him the ability to fight, then it is likely such an inability will 

have a strong coercive effect on the enemy’s will. Conversely, if an attack on the 

enemy’s oil refineries is intended to break an enemy’s will because it destroys 

something he values, then at the same time the value of the oil revenue lost will 

decrease his ability to fight. The issue therefore becomes one of emphasis. 

To a great extent, the choice of strategy is driven by objectives and by the nature of 

the war. In a total war, with surrender and subjugation of the enemy as the goal, it is 

likely the destruction of the enemy’s will and his capability will be necessary. Thus, in 

World War II the Allies attacked both Germany’s will and her capability – coercion 

and denial. In the case of Iraq, it was similarly a question of both strategies being 

employed, albeit for different reasons: the coalition wanted to coerce Saddam to 

leave Kuwait; but it also wanted to deny him the capability of remaining an offensive 

threat in the region thereafter. Other conflicts, such as that in Kosovo, are more 

problematic. It was NATO’s goal to coerce Serbia into stopping ethnic cleansing in 

Kosovo. Coercion would ordinarily entail the attack of high value targets in Serbia 

itself, but planners also employed a strategy of denial: they targeted Serbian military 

forces and infrastructure actually engaged in Kosovo. Milosevic surrendered, but it is impossible at this stage to know why. Was 

it because of the losses his military forces suffered in Kosovo – which accelerated greatly during the last two weeks of the war; 

or was it due to the severe damage done to the Serbian infrastructure, estimated at over $30 billion? Perhaps it was both 

strategies working together, along with the realization that the bombing would continue indefinitely and with no respite, that 

broke Milosevic. On the other hand, reports increasingly indicate that the damage actually sustained by the Serbian army, 

though high, was less than initially thought. This would tend to indicate that the coercive aspect of NATO’s air campaign was 

the dominant cause of Serbian surrender. It may therefore be useful to re-examine the coercive strategy known as gradual 

escalation, so deplored in Vietnam and seen as anathema by airmen ever since. 

…if an attack on the enemy’s oil 

refineries is intended to break an 

enemy’s will because it destroys 

something he values, then at the 

same time the value of the oil 

revenue lost will decrease his ability 

to fight. The issue therefore becomes 

one of emphasis… 

63

64 

In contrast to the unhappy experience in Vietnam, air planners in the Persian Gulf War chose a violent, massive air assault 

against Saddam’s regime and military forces, which began the first night of the war and continued unabated for the next six 

weeks. However, that experience seems to have been quickly forgotten. The air campaign against Serbia resembled more the 

failure of Vietnam than it did the success of the Persian Gulf. On average, less that fifty strike sorties were flown each day over 

Serbia during the first two weeks of the air campaign, compared to the 1200 strike sorties flown on the opening night of Desert 

Storm. The number and types of targets struck were restricted and subject to rigid rules regarding weapon size, type, and 

tactics employed. Although the intensity of the air strikes built steadily to over five hundred sorties per day, airmen remained 

frustrated. And yet, the air campaign proved to be successful. 

As a consequence, it is likely that when the political and tactical constraints imposed on air leaders are extensive and pervasive 

– and that trend seems more rather than less likely – then gradual escalation will be more appealing. A measured and steadily 

increasing use of airpower against an enemy, which gives him ample opportunity to assess his situation and come to terms, 

combined with a remarkably low casualty rate for both ourselves and the enemy’s civilian populace, may be the future of war. 

The crucial thing, however, is to understand the policy goals and the nature of the war so that the most effective air strategy 

can be employed. Regardless of the strategy chosen, it remains essential to monitor and measure its progress so as to 

determine if the stated goals are being achieved. 

One of the greatest challenges facing airmen remains that of assessment: how do we know if we are achieving our objectives? 

The problem has haunted airmen for decades, but seems little closer to solution than it was in World War II. Bomb damage 

assessment has certainly improved, but this is largely a tactical concept and although important, it can give little insight into the 

overall progress of the campaign. In other words, although we may have the ability to determine whether or not a bomb or 

missile struck its target, that does not necessarily tell us what effect, if any, that destruction will have on the overall war effort. 

Common sense tells us, for example, that if a capital city loses its electrical power, telephones and public transportation 

systems, then the ability to coordinate and direct a war effort will be greatly impaired. But how impaired? Assigning a number to 

such a degradation of performance is extremely difficult. Yet, until such measurements are possible, the importance of strategic 

attacks will be speculative and driven more by preconceptions than by proof. 

Despite these limitations, airpower has increasingly come to dominate modern war. There is an old saying that if one wants to 

know what is considered important, they should follow the money. Although a precise number is difficult to acquire, perhaps 60 

to 65 percent of the US Department of Defense budget each year is spent on air and space forces. This is not surprising when 

one realizes that the Air Force takes approximately one-third of the DoD budget, an aircraft carrier costs around $6.5 billion, an 

Apache Longbow helicopter is over $25 million, and the Navy/Marine F-18 “Super Hornet” program is expected to run in

excess of $70 billion. 31 In truth, the US is an airpower nation. The largest air arm in the world belongs to the US Army – it has 

nearly five thousand helicopters. Second place goes to the Chinese air force, while the USAF ranks third. The US Navy ranks 

fifth behind Russia. 32 The money trail has a clear destination. 

In addition, the main doctrinal arguments that occur between the services today tend to center on issues of airpower: the role 

and responsibilities of the Joint Force Air Component Commander (the JFACC: the individual, an airman, in charge of air assets 

within a theater); the purpose and authority of the joint targeting board and its relation to the JFACC; the need for a joint fires 

coordinator to serve as a balance (along with the joint targeting board) on the power of the JFACC; whether helicopters are 

better suited for close air support or interdiction; the ownership of the “deep battle” (the area generally designated between 

twenty to one hundred miles in front of friendly ground forces); theater air defense, especially missile defense; and the 

ownership and tasking authority of space assets. In short, all of these arguments occur over the questions of who controls the 

dominant air assets and for what purpose will they be used. 

The greatest debate remains the most fundamental. Although few airmen have ever made the claim that airpower can win wars 

alone, they are often accused of believing it, and such an idea is seen as foolish and dangerous. The day Allied Force began, 

retired soldiers and George Patton wannabes began to write of airpower’s inability to “win the war alone” in Kosovo; their cry 

was to “send in the ground troops.” In truth, airmen had no preconceived notion of winning the war “alone” and would have 

welcomed the presence of ground troops, if they had been able to deploy and if NATO had had the political will to employ 

them. A joint air-land campaign would certainly have been preferable. But these conditions were not present, so airpower was 

left to play the decisive role, as it had in Iraq and Bosnia. 

Paradoxically, what is often seen as one of airpower’s greatest weaknesses – its inability to hold ground – is in some 

circumstances precisely what makes it a useful tool of diplomacy. It is less provocative and less risky than ground forces, while 

at the same time it lessens the danger of mission creep. In some circumstances, another term for ground troops is hostages, 

as was the case in Bosnia when Serbian forces arrested and/or threatened to kill UN peacekeeping troops in Goradze and 

Bihac if NATO attempted to use force to stop the violence there. It is thus more advisable for aircraft to patrol the skies over 

Iraq than it would be to deploy tens of thousands of ground troops there. Similarly, it was more politically acceptable for NATO 

to bomb Serbia than it would have been to invade it, as the Russians warned us repeatedly. 

Francis Bacon, the Elizabethan scientist and philosopher, once wrote, “he that commands the sea is at great liberty and may 

take as much or as little of the war as he will, whereas those that be strongest by land are many times nevertheless in great 

straits.” 34 By that Bacon meant that armies, once committed, are difficult to extricate. They send powerful signals implying long 

term involvement and great capital investment of personnel, weapons and logistics. Bacon was implying, however, that some 

65

66 

objectives do not need such commitment; indeed, such commitment may even be inadvisable and provocative. Sea power 

gives its wielder the option of determining the degree of involvement. Full scale war would still be possible, but not automatic. 

This situation is even truer today regarding airpower. Our leaders have been loath to commit combat troops to Rwanda, the 

Sudan, and the Balkans, or to reintroduce them into the Iraqi situation. In a sense, ground operations are self-deterring; we will 

not seriously contemplate their use if there is a risk involved. Somalia crystallized the issue. We are in an era where NATO 

interventions may be seen as important, but they are not seen as vital. In such instances NATO leaders, supported by public 

opinion, may be willing to use military force to save lives, right wrongs, or enforce the peace. But when doing so, this force 

must be used sparingly; it should not kill civilians or even seriously impact their daily lives; it must not incur significant casualties; 

it must not irritate our friends, and thus, it should probably not involve a large presence in the region; and, frankly, it should be 

done “on the cheap.” The public does not want their reservists mobilized or their civilian airliners commandeered; they do not 

want taxes raised or their economies and social programs disrupted. A return to the draft is unthinkable. If any of those actions 

were to occur, it would signal a move away from a limited involvement with limited objectives. 

This is a fine line to walk – to commit military forces but to do so partially armed, in “cold blood,” and with one hand tied behind 

your back. Airpower employed from land or sea bases near the crisis area, used discreetly against military targets, with a high 

assurance that casualties will be extremely light, offers the best chance of achieving our political objectives. Will it always work? 

No. However, it stands a better chance of success – success as constrained by the factors noted above – than do other types 

of military forces. Moreover, and this is a crucial if not openly stated consideration, even if airpower is not successful, the cost of 

failure will be low. Several divisions of ground troops could perhaps have been sent to the Balkans to engage and defeat the 

Serbian army, followed by occupation of the contested areas. This would, however, have taken a very long time and been an 

enormously expensive and bloody proposition. And it too might have failed, but the cost would have been spectacularly high. 

The Gulf War, in effect, was a condemnation of our success, and the sentence was Kosovo. The Serbs, who had close military 

contacts with the Iraqis for many years, knew better than to fight us on our terms. They therefore resorted to an asymmetrical 

strategy that relied, first, on rope-a-dope tactics: they endured air punishment stoically, believing their heads would last longer 

than our fists. Secondly, they used small, mobile, and lightly armed forces to terrorize and drive out the Kosovars. These small 

unit tactics reduced their exposure to air attack, but did not diminish their ability to rout unarmed civilians. Potential aggressors 

will undoubtedly see the cleverness Milosevic showed in playing a weak hand. Some of NATO’s biggest aces were trumped, 

because we were unwilling to pay the price in political capital, blood, or world censure to use the military force necessary to 

achieve our objectives quickly.

The application of airpower is not immune from the vicissitudes of strategy, and airmen must beware of the tendency to oversell 

airpower’s capabilities – a common problem in the past. Airpower does, however, address an increasing share of the problems 

facing NATO in the post Cold War world. The increasing airpower components of surface forces only serve to demonstrate this 

fact. As new and different crises emerge that require the threat or use of force, air forces teamed with the latest technology and 

employed in a precise, effective fashion will not only continue to be the symbol of NATO military power, but will expand in 

importance. 

In summary, NATO political and military leaders, and the public, must realize that not all problems are amenable to the use of 

military force, and those that are may not be suitable for airpower. Yet, given the trends of the past decade in technology and 

NATO political activism around the globe, airpower will increasingly be viewed as the weapon of first resort. As long as this 

remains the case, we must ensure our military strategy supports and complements our diplomatic policies, and vice versa. 

Anything less is a recipe for disaster. 

NOTES 

1 William M. Arkin, Damian Durrant and Marianne Cherni. On Impact: 

Modern Warfare and the Environment (London: Greenpeace, 1991), 

p 42; John G. Heidenrich, “The Gulf War: How Many Iraqis Died?” 

Foreign Policy, 90 (Spring 1993), p 124. 

2 Quoted in Michael O. Beale, Bombs Over Bosnia: The Role of 

Airpower in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Maxwell AFB: Air University Press, 

1997), p 32. 

3 Robert C. Owen, “The Balkans Air Campaign Study,” Airpower 

Journal, in two issues, Summer 1997, pp 4-24 and Fall 1997, pp 6- 

26. The one aircraft lost was a French Mirage 2000. Prior to the air 

campaign, UN peacekeeping ground forces had suffered eighty 

killed and 628 wounded. 

4 Correspondence with William M Arkin, 22 November 1999. Arkin is 

a noted defense analyst who visited Serbia immediately following 

the airwar. His estimate is based on touring the country and 

conversations with numerous Serbian government and medical 

officials. 

5 Mark J. Conversino, “Sawdust Superpower: Perceptions of U.S. 

Casualty Tolerance in the Post-Gulf War Era,” Strategic Review, 25 

(Winter 1997), pp 15-23; and Peter D. Feaver and Christopher 

Gelpi, “How Many Deaths are Acceptable? A Surprising Answer,” 

Washington Post, 7 November 1999, p B3. 

6 Possible new weapons are the laser radar-guided Low-Cost 

Autonomous Attack System (LOCAAS), and a 500 lb JDAM. Robert 

Ware, “New Munitions Needs Spark Funding Uncertainty,” Aviation 

Week & Space Technology (AWST), 8 November 1999, p 60; 

Steven Lee Myers, “Something New in the Iraqi Conflict: Concrete 

Bombs,” New York Times, 7 October 1999, p 1. 

7 For overviews see Nick Lewer and Steven Schofield, Non-Lethal 

Weapons: A Fatal Attraction? (London: Zed Books, 1997); and 

Steven Aftergood, “The Soft-Kill Fallacy,” Bulletin of the Atomic 

Scientists, Sep/Oct 1994, pp 40-45. For a fairly frightening account 

see Timothy L. Thomas, “The Mind Has No Firewall,” Parameters, 

28 (Spring 1998), pp 84-92. 

8 Similar concerns were raised during Desert Storm over attacks on 

the “baby milk” factory, the fiber optics cables routed through bridge 

structures, the entombment of Iraqi soldiers during coalition 

breaching operations, and the so-called “highway of death” incident 

near Kuwait City. 

67

68 

9 The unseemly spat between the Army and the Air Force over 

tasking of Apache helicopters in Kosovo was a regrettable 

exception. The fear of risking the Apaches in combat finessed this 

potential problem. “Shelton: Risk was the Key in Decision Not to 

Use Apaches,” Defense Daily, 10 September 1999, p 2. 

10 This was clearly illustrated in the summer of 1999 when the US 

Congress seemed poised to cancel funding of the F-22, the USAF’s 

new air superiority fighter. The USAF had simply not made a 

compelling case to Congress as to why the new plane was 

required. 

11 Gary Hart and William S. Lind, America Can Win: The Case for 

Military Reform (NY: Adler & Adler, 1986), passim. Other members 

of this group were Norman Polmar, Steve Canby, and John Boyd. 

12 Daniel G. Dupont, “Despite Losses, Backers Say Unmanned 

Systems Excelling over Kosovo,” Inside the Pentagon, 10 June 

1999, p 1; Jeff Cole, “Unmanned Jets May Someday Fly as 

Bombers,” Wall Street Journal, 10 May 1999, p B1; Mark Hewish, 

“Coming Soon: Attack of the Killer UAVs,” Jane’s International 

Defense Review, September 1999, pp 30-38. 

13 The Pentagon has not revealed what happened to the F-117. One 

report states that a surface to air missile (SAM) hit the aircraft due 

to luck, repetitive flight patterns, the movement of SAM sites that 

had not been reported by intelligence, and lack of effective jamming 

aircraft. David A. Fulghum, “Pentagon Gets Lock on F-117 

Shootdown,” AWST, 19 April 1999, p 28. 

14 John A. Tirpak, “With Stealth in the Balkans,” Air Force Magazine, 

October 1999, pp 22-28. 

15 Even stealth aircraft benefit from electronic jamming and SEAD 

aircraft armed with anti-radiation missiles, so these air assets will 

continue to be essential for the foreseeable future. 

16 Of interest, the USN is also working on stealthy surface ships, while 

the USA is experimenting with stealthy tanks. Jane’s Defence 

Weekly (JDW), 10 February 1999, p 3; W.R. Snedberg, “The Naked 

Fleet,” US Naval Institute Proceedings, April 1999, pp 89-91. 

17 David A. Ochmanek, et. al., “Find, Hit, Win,” Air Force Magazine, 

April 1999, pp 50-59. One study concludes that ten fighter wings 

equipped with sensor fuzed weapons could stop a force of ten 

armored/mechanized divisions in approximately one week. Chris 

Bowie, et. al., The New Calculus: Analyzing Airpower’s Changing 

Role in Joint Theater Campaigns (Santa Monica: RAND, 1993), p 

61. Note: JDAM = Joint Direct Attack Munition; JSOW = Joint 

Standoff Weapon; JASSM = Joint Air to Surface Standoff Missile; 

WCMD = Wind-Corrected Munitions Dispenser; and SFW = Sensor 

Fuzed Weapon. 

18 Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals’ 

War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf (Boston: Little, 

Brown, 1995), p 268. 

19 A large percentage of the tonnage dropped in Kosovo was by B- 

52s against area targets using un-guided bombs. The vast majority 

of targets struck in Serbia, however, were with PGM. 

20 Jeffrey R. Barnett, Future War: An Assessment of Aerospace 

Campaigns in 2010 (Maxwell AFB: Air University Press, 1996), p 

11. 

21 Ibid., p 9. 

22 Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen. The Gulf War Air Power 

Survey, Summary Volume (Washington: Government Printing Office, 

1993), pp 83, 90. For continuing difficulties on this problem, see 

Bryan Bender, “Allies Still Lack Real-Time Targeting,” JDW, 7 April 

1999, p 4. 

23 “Ballistic Missiles: Shifting Balance,” JDW, 10 March 1999, pp 59- 

73; “Missile Controversies,” Air Force Magazine, January 1999, pp 

49-51. 

24 “Pentagon Group Considering Precision Strike Improvements to 

JSTARS,” Inside the Air Force, 30 July 1999, p 1; Bryan Bender, 

“USA Unveils New Target Data System,” JDW, 14 July 1999, p 3; 

“DoD Accelerates Work on Foliage-Penetrating Radar,” JDW, 8 

September 1999, p 13. 

25 David Albright and Mark Hibbs wrote a series of articles discussing

these discoveries in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists during 

1991 and 1992. 

26 Robert W. Chandler, “Counterforce: Locating and Destroying 

Weapons of Mass Destruction,” INSS Occasional Paper 21, 

August 1998, pp 24-25; Steve Fetter, et. al., “Detecting 

Nuclear Warheads,” Science and Global Security, 1 (1990), pp 

225-302. 

27 Zachary M. Koenig, et. al., “Wide-Area Nuclear Detection for 

Monitoring and Tracking Nuclear-Weapon Material,” Arms 

Control and Nonproliferation Technologies, Third Quarter, 

1994, pp 27-28. 

28 One study calls for “thermoflux” weapons that generate 

intense heat for a long duration to destroy WMD, while also 

limiting the danger of releasing deadly elements. US Air Force, 

New World Vistas: Air and Space in the 21st Century. 

Munitions Volume (Washington: Department of the Air Force, 

1996), p 31, and “USA Planning Warhead to Hit CB 

Weapons,” JDW, 24 March 1999, p 6. 

29 Daniel Gouré and Christopher Szara, Air and Space Power in 

the New Millennium (Washington: CSIS, 1997), p 101; Craig 

Covault, “Military Space Dominates Air Strikes,” AWST, 29 

March 1999, pp 31-33. 

30 Thomas G. Behling and Kenneth McGruther, “Satellite 

Reconnaissance of the Future,” Joint Force Quarterly, 18 

(Spring 1999), p 24. 

31 These statistics are from Ted Nicholas and Rita Rossi, U.S. 

Weapon Systems Costs, 1998. Eighteenth Edition (Fountain 

Valley, CA: Data Search Associates, 1998). 

32 IISS, The Military Balance, 1998/99 (London: Oxford University 

Press, 1998). Because the Chinese and Russian air arms are 

aging, US air dominance is even more pronounced than the 

numbers would indicate. 

33 Beale, pp 25, 29 and 32. 

34 Quoted in Julian Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime 

Strategy (London: Longmans, Green, 1911), p 55. 

69 

RAF Chinook HC2

THE FUTURE OF 

AIRPOWER?

By Group Captain John Thomas RAF 

71 

P 

hil Meilinger’s excellent article on The Future of Air Power highlights many of the current factors which influence both 

the strategic analysis of how air power might develop in the foreseeable future and its possible place in the hierarchy 

of forces. However, as the article itself makes clear from the outset, it is essentially a US view of the issues. Not 

surprisingly, therefore, it is based on an analysis of likely future US military capabilities and an analysis of likely US 

political and individual reactions to future conflicts. As close allies within NATO and for a host of historical, cultural and 

political reasons, much of what Phil Meilinger puts forward as a US view finds an echo in the UK. For example, the trends and 

characteristics he gives as relevant to future US involvement in military operations (such as ‘[national] vital interests will not 

normally be at stake, or that ‘future intervention will generally not be predictable either by location or scale’) are no less relevant 

to the UK.

72 

…powerful 

though it is, a 

US view on 

the future of 

air power 

cannot 

necessarily be 

practically 

accepted as 

the definitive 

view of the all 

our futures… 

I recognise that it is possible to 

consider the future of ‘pure air 

power’ in a non-national and 

theoretical way. However, most 

mature air power nations will need to 

take account primarily of ‘applied air 

power’, applying their own unique 

perspective. This is because there 

are important differences of scale, 

doctrine, capability and national 

character which mean that, powerful 

though it is, a US view on the future 

of air power cannot necessarily be 

practically accepted as the definitive 

view of the all our futures, except 

perhaps in a ‘pure’ sense, which 

assumes that all force elements are 

available in sufficient quality and 

quantity to align theory and practice. 

For the UK and all other nations, the 

divergence between theoretical and 

actual capability will be significant. 

Therefore, when considering the 

future of air power for the UK, we 

must from the outset be alive to the 

constraints which our more limited 

resources will place on the way in 

which we will use air power, 

including being realistic as to 

whether air power will indeed be the 

military option of first resort for the 

UK. This is not to say that

73 

Phil Meilinger is wrong in any of the conclusions he reaches, but the 

purpose of this short commentary on his views is to point out some 

of the areas in which a different perspective might be more relevant 

to the UK. For the purposes of this commentary, I shall concentrate 

on 3 broad areas; scale, technology and national character. 

In addition to the hardware itself, organizational 

and doctrinal improvements such as the 

creation of JF2000 and the arrival of Apache will 

provide opportunities to exploit new air power 

SCALE 

The UK retains a highly professional and balanced air power 

capability. The next few years will see the introduction into service of 

several new platforms and weapons, which in many cases will 

represent a substantial increase in capability; there are also a 

number of upgrade programmes which will enhance the capability 

of existing assets. In addition to the hardware itself, organizational 

and doctrinal improvements such as the creation of JF2000 and the 

arrival of Apache will provide opportunities to exploit new air power. 

No less importantly, the strength of our air power capability is built 

on a firm foundation of rigorous training, which not only teaches the 

hard skills necessary for the optimum use of aircraft and ground 

systems, but also provides a breadth and depth of education which 

places a high value on ingenuity, analysis and leadership. As a 

result, (and I know we can all think of exceptions) we buy good kit 

and we get the most out of it. 

However, none of us are under any illusions about the limits 

imposed on the UK’s application of air power imposed by the size 

of our forces and the lack of capability in certain areas; ingenuity 

can only take us so far, but it will not get a Challenger tank into the 

back of a C-130 or make a Tornado GR4 stealthy. For the US, the 

situation is markedly different; by virtue of the size of their 

investment, industrial base and population, the gap between the

74 

theoretical possibilities which air power offers and their capabilities is small. Put simply, assuming political will and no concurrent 

major conflicts, a US JFACC is in a position to formulate a plan, effectively unhindered by equipment constraints, and able to 

match roles and missions closely to the theoretical ideal. His UK counterpart will seldom have that luxury and will have to scale 

his plan to match the available capabilities, which might well be some way removed from the theoretical ideal. 

In terms of air power delivery, this difference of scale could well make itself felt in a number of areas, all of which could pose 

challenges for a UK JFC. In comparison with the US in particular, these challenges are likely to include intelligence gathering, 

analysis and transmission, seizing and retaining air superiority, lack of airlift capability and CSAR. These challenges certainly do 

not mean that the UK does not have an effective and broad spectrum autonomous air power capability. However, what they do 

mean is that UK commanders and their staffs will be more exercised by capability gaps, roulement issues during protracted 

operations and hard decisions over the apportionment of forces. 

In the 2 theatres on which Phil Meilinger concentrates (the Gulf and FRY) the UK gaps have been filled by (principally) the US 

and have therefore not affected the outcome. On the positive side, the UK has been able to provide niche expertise which the 

US, for all its assets, did not possess. The issue for the UK is therefore not to be seduced by the theoretical capabilities of air 

(and space) power to such an extent that, when formulating our doctrine, we begin to forget the practical limits which our own 

more modest capabilities will impose on us, for national or coalition operations not involving the US. Just as we would be 

foolish to predict our enemies, so we would be unwise to assume that UK and US interests will always coincide so closely to 

guarantee that the US will always be our ally in the field, even if it were to remain a benign observer. 

The Prime Minister has made clear one way in which the issue of scale could be addressed for European nations, by 

strengthening the European Defence Identity (EDI) within NATO. Whilst this would not improve national capabilities, it would 

…if OPS SOUTHERN 

WATCH and NORTHERN 

WATCH were EDI operations, 

the political differences 

between France and the UK 

would make unity of purpose 

and selection of the aim 

extremely difficult 

allow eradication of some European capability gaps, assuming that more cost-effective 

expenditure in the military aerospace arena was not simply translated into a reduction in 

national defence budgets, or the pursuit of nationalistic procurement agendas. In addition to 

the hard procurement decisions that would have to be overcome, it is still unclear how a EDI 

would, in practical terms, either detach itself from, or gain access to, US C3I capabilities 

embedded in NATO. Furthermore, even if we assume unity of command could be achieved, 

unity of purpose to embark on warlike action is not a given. For example, if OPS SOUTHERN 

WATCH and NORTHERN WATCH were EDI operations, the political differences between 

France and the UK would make unity of purpose and selection of the aim extremely difficult. 

All these difficulties were brought into sharp relief during the Kosovo air campaign where US

capabilities dominated. The campaign vividly illustrated that Europe needs to do more, but we should not delude ourselves that 

the EDI option, however desirable, will be easy or cheap. There is a long and hard road between ‘Something must be done’ 

and practical capability. 

There is one further significant result of the difference between the US and UK’s relative sizes which deserves to be highlighted 

and that is our different approaches to jointery. Phil Meilinger points out the difficulty a potential enemy will face because of the 

redundancy of US forces, a redundancy that encompasses not only substantial air arms of all 4 Services, but also redundancy 

Much of the UK’s air power capability will in future be 

controlled in peace and war by joint formations; for example, 

battlefield helicopters by JHC, Harrier and Nimrod MR by 

JF2000, and 38 Gp assets are already tasked by MOD 

75 

of capabilities within them. At this scale, true 

jointness is seen as a drawback, because it reduces 

options by reducing redundancy. The focus is 

therefore an effective collaboration and advantages 

accrue from cumulative effect, rather than true 

synergy. 

Thinking in the UK could hardly be more different. 

Much of the UK’s air power capability will in future be 

controlled in peace and war by joint formations; for 

example, battlefield helicopters by JHC, Harrier and 

Nimrod MR by JF2000, and 38 Gp assets are 

already tasked by MOD. This creates an absolute 

requirement for a depth of joint understanding, which 

we are making good progress towards, but have yet 

to fully achieve. It also creates the possibility for 

substantial disagreement at Joint Targeting Board 

(JTB) level and below over how limited assets should 

be used to best effect. Air staffs will therefore have to 

be extremely well educated in the effective 

application of air power doctrine, if they are to 

contribute effectively to the JTB process. Type 

knowledge, however deep, will no longer be enough. 

For today’s airman, the superstructure of joint 

knowledge cannot be heavier than can be supported

76 …whilst redundancy is a positive benefit for the 

US, lack of redundancy is an issue for the UK 

and brings with it a greater training burden, if 

joint synergies are to be identified and exploited 

by the foundation of air power knowledge on which it rests, a 

fact which has been recognised and acted upon. Therefore, 

whilst redundancy is a positive benefit for the US, lack of 

redundancy is an issue for the UK 

and brings with it a greater training 

burden, if joint synergies are to be 

identified and exploited. 

TECHNOLOGY 

In many ways, improved technology 

is also an issue of scale and the 

resources that a nation or 

organization is prepared to (or simply 

has available to) devote to 

development. As Phil Meilinger 

correctly states, it is the huge 

increase in computing power which 

has allowed such rapid advances in 

capability, allowing, for example, not 

only the design of aerodynamically 

unstable aircraft but the on-board 

computing resources to actually keep 

them in the air. However, nowhere is 

the technology gap between the US 

and UK more evident than in the 

…nowhere is the 

technology gap 

between the US 

and UK more 

evident than in the 

exploitation of 

space. Even if we 

consider space 

only in respect of 

reconnaissance, 

intelligence and 

communications, 

the range of assets 

deployed by the US 

dwarfs that 

available to any 

other nation

exploitation of space. Even if we consider space only in respect of reconnaissance, intelligence and communications, the range 

of assets deployed by the US dwarfs that available to any other nation. Once again the capability difference is mitigated if we 

(the UK) are able to share in the benefits of this capability as a preferred coalition partner, but for the reasons given above we 

would be unwise to rely on this in all circumstances. 

The technology gap is also beginning to impose real constraints on the interoperability of US air forces with those of other 

nations. Understandably, the US seeks to exploit its technological advantage by producing equipment which will give its forces 

the greatest chance of success, at minimum risk to themselves. Such technological advances, such as secure communications 

and JTIDS/Link16 bring with them not only a hardware gap but, more significantly, a doctrinal and operating procedures gap. 

Technology allows forces to fight smarter and, frankly, the US does not want less advanced allied nations degrading its 

technological advantage in combat. This is a significant difference between the issue of scale and the issue of technology; a 

difference in scale means we can only contribute to part of the campaign, a difference in technology might mean we are not 

even invited to the fight. 

One technological factor which is common to both the US and the UK is that most cutting edge technological development is 

now undertaken to meet civilian commercial needs, unlike the Cold War period when military requirements often forced the 

pace of technological change. Whilst this removes a large R&D burden from the military defence budgets, it often means that 

the technology we procure is not unique to us and is available to others. An example of the consequences of this change, 

which does not relate to a weapons system, is that commercial news gathering companies have equipped themselves with real 

time satellite transmission equipment which can and does beam the war into our homes. This real time imagery and instant 

reaction, which often prefers immediacy of comment to analysis, does not of itself cause casualties, but it does accelerate the 

pace of decision making to a degree which risks allowing the news agenda to drive military and political decision making. The 

reluctance or inability to match such resources means that we become, in turn, dependent on them, with all the attendant risks 

of inaccuracy, bias and speculative comment which they bring. The image of casualties around a still smoking hole in the 

ground, accompanied by the statement ‘NATO did this’ is a powerful message to have to counter, whether or not the 

statement later proves to be accurate. 

The image of casualties around a still smoking hole in the ground, accompanied by the statement ‘NATO 

did this’ is a powerful message to have to counter, whether or not the statement later proves to be accurate 

77

78 

…superior technology is 

not always synonymous 

with superior battlefield 

performance, and as 

support for this I would 

refer readers to Dr 

Kenneth Freeman’s 

article in the June 1999 

edition of the RUSI 

journal, in which he 

compares the relative 

combat effectiveness of 

the low-tech A-10 and 

the high-tech Apache in 

the Gulf war 

However, before UK readers despair, superior technology is not always synonymous with superior battlefield performance, and 

as support for this I would refer readers to Dr Kenneth Freeman’s article in the June 1999 edition of the RUSI journal, in which 

he compares the relative combat effectiveness of the low-tech A-10 and the high-tech Apache in the Gulf war. We must also 

match the technological means to the desired combat outcome. For example, the US dominated the electromagnetic spectrum 

in Mogadishu, but the investment was futile as the ‘enemy’ were not using electromagnetic means to pass their messages. 

Also, the successful policing of the Iraq no fly zones does not mean that they have become no persecution zones, so there are 

limits to what airborne technology can achieve. Therefore, although I would not wish to be accused of making a virtue of a 

necessity, a lack of access to technology can lead to greater ingenuity and success in some circumstances.

NATIONAL CHARACTER 

The combined effect of scale, technology and national character is that the US and the UK approach the use of force from very 

different standpoints. For example, the way in which the police forces of both countries are equipped and operate is a clear, 

non-military, indication of that difference. Therefore, Phil Meilinger’s image of a ‘cop on the beat’ will conjure up a different image 

for a US citizen than that of a ‘bobby on the beat’ would do for a Brit. Whilst both nations operate strictly within the law of 

armed conflict, the US approach, particularly following Weinberger/Powell, is essentially one of overwhelming force, compared 

with the British approach of minimum force. Again, issues of scale and availability of forces are a 

factor, but national character plays an important part here. The US’s ability to muster and deploy 

overwhelming force has also contributed to the intolerance of casualties which Meilinger 

describes. In the UK, whilst everything is done to minimize unavoidable casualties, there is 

perhaps a difference between the 2 nations in what ‘unavoidable’ means, in that there is a greater 

acceptance of casualties by the UK population, provided they are convinced that the plan is 

sound and the cause is just. Although the circumstances were different, the smaller UK population 

was more tolerant of the 252 UK Service fatalities during the Falklands war than the US was of its 

18 fatalities in Somalia. 

Both the US and UK will apply similar criteria of legality, political risk and ‘national interest’ when assessing a situation. However, 

on the use of force, the UK, particularly in the case of a national operation, might well apply the same criteria as the US, but be 

forced to reach rather different conclusions. This might be due not only to a greater military risk, or non availability of forces, but 

also to perceived greater adverse diplomatic or commercial consequences. We can punch above our weight, but only up to a 

point. 

The US’s ability to muster 

and deploy overwhelming 

force has also 

contributed to the 

intolerance of casualties 

which Meilinger describes 

THE FUTURE FOR UK AIR POWER 

Given the differences between the US and the UK, is the future for UK air power that it ‘will be increasingly viewed as the 

weapon of first resort’, at least when all but the military options have been tried and failed? 

For many of the reasons cited by Meilinger, the answer must be yes. Air power can make a rapid and powerful statement of 

intent almost anywhere on the globe (and this definition of air power includes, for example, the carrier borne elements of 

JF2000). It also offers a degree of commitment which can be increased or decreased with greater speed and less logistic 

implications than a ground force of consequence and avoids at least some of the complex legal and practical difficulties of 

79

80 

committing ground forces into a hostile third country. Furthermore, air power does not mean uniquely combat power, but 

embraces reconnaissance, intelligence gathering and airlift for humanitarian or evacuation tasks, all roles which can provide 

leverage to de-escalate a situation without resort to combat power. Ships, Royal Marines and soldiers can also undertake some 

of these roles and it would be nonsense to claim them all as the unique prerogative of air power. However, there is no doubt 

that the rapid deployment of air power in adequate strength will remain as attractive an option to domestic political leaders as it 

is unattractive to potential adversaries. 

We must also remember that the inherent characteristics of air power, such as speed, reach and flexibility, remain equally 

applicable to the smallest and the largest air forces. These are the very characteristics which make air power such a responsive 

and valuable tool in a complex world of inter and intra state conflict. Air power will often be the best mechanism to display the 

iron fist of resolve, without removing the velvet glove of diplomacy. Whether employed as the sole response or as part of a joint 

force, in a benign or hostile environment, air power in at least one of its guises will certainly be in the vanguard of our future 

operations. 

…air power does not mean uniquely combat 

power, but embraces reconnaissance, 

intelligence gathering and airlift for 

humanitarian or evacuation tasks, all roles 

which can provide leverage to de-escalate a 

situation without resort to combat power

Royal Air Force Nimrod MR2 

81

TO SEA 

OR NOT 

TO SEA: That is the 

Question

How Should Joint Force 2000 be Deployed to Maximise its Air Power Utility in the Likely 

Limited Conflicts of the Future? 

83 

By Wing Commander Neil Meadows RAF 

T 

he 1998 Strategic Defence Review proposed 

Joint Force 2000 as a joint RAF/RN force to 

provide a deployable and effective offensive air 

capability to meet the likely expeditionary roles of 

the post-Cold War era. Since its inception, 

however, there has been much debate on the composition 

of the Force, its ownership and its Command & Control, but 

little discussion of how its air power potential might best be 

deployed in modern, complex emergencies. This essay 

uses articles in books, journals, magazines and on the 

Internet, as well as information obtained in interviews with 

key players in the Joint Force 2000 implementation 

process, to analyse the various strengths and weaknesses 

of both sea and land basing (including the likely effects of 

the procurement of the proposed Future Aircraft Carrier and 

the Future Carrier-Borne Aircraft). The essay concludes 

that, in terms of the efficient and effective use of Joint Force 

2000’s air assets, there is a direct relationship between the 

most appropriate deployment option and the intensity of 

the conflict in which the Force is likely to be involved. 

Therefore, to maximise Joint Force 2000’s air power utility 

in the likely limited conflicts of the future, it should be 

deployed strictly according to the combat scenario, and not 

according to the historical (single-service) precedents or 

political whims which have prevailed in the past.

84 

INTRODUCTION 

In recognition of the ‘new strategic realities’ of the post-Cold War era, the 1998 Strategic Defence Review (SDR) structured 

Britain’s armed forces on an ‘expeditionary’ basis to meet the demands of modern, complex emergencies instead of the 

traditional NATO European role. 1 Expounded within this expeditionary theme was the key issue of ‘Jointery’ 2 and the recognition 

in a ‘Joint Vision Statement’ 3 that ‘the traditional distinction between ground, sea and air theatres of operations is rapidly being 

replaced by a single battlespace, embracing all 3 environments’. The SDR introduced some 7 new joint ventures, 4 including 

Joint Force 2000 (JF 2000), which was proposed as ‘a concept for a joint RAF/RN force to be established from around the 

middle of the next decade’, 5 to provide a deployable and effective offensive air capability to meet the likely expeditionary roles of 

the post-Cold War era. It is planned that the Force will eventually operate a common aircraft type and will ‘build on the success 

of current joint Harrier operations and gradually merge RN and RAF cultures and practices towards a properly joint force, 

capable of land attack and air defence operations’. 6 

Although heralded as ‘a historic proposal from the First Sea Lord and the Chief of the Air Staff’, 7 the JF 2000 idea is not new. In 

1961, the Minister of Defence tasked the Admiralty to ‘consider the shape of Britain’s future naval policy for the 1970s’. 8 The 

Admiralty was ‘careful to emphasise the complementary nature of carriers and land-based air power’ and suggested a ‘worldwide 

maritime strategy’ and a ‘truly inter-Service force’. 9 The First Sea Lord presented the proposed aircraft carriers as ‘National 

assets; as mobile, self-contained airfields…not in competition with shore-based air power’. 10 He concluded that ‘if British 

military power is to continue to be deployed around the world, then mobile airfields in the form of aircraft carriers ought 

positively to be part of this country’s armoury [and] we should welcome as much flexibility between seaborne and land-based 

aircraft squadrons as the Admiralty and the Air Ministry together could devise’. 11 

The Admiralty’s proposals were given further weight by the independent Festing Study, 12 which recommended ‘a common light 

bomber/strike fighter for RAF/RN use’ that could be ‘used in operations either from shore bases or from carriers according to 

the requirements of a particular operation’. 13 Unfortunately, the vision was not realised, partly because of inter-Service rivalries, 14 

partly because the British attack carrier was seen in the 1960s as an instrument of power projection for only ‘limited’ 

operations, 15 but mainly because of the crippling budgetary cuts associated with the 1966 Healey Defence Review. 16 It is 

perhaps ironic, therefore, that the SDR propounded a similar joint air capability as the most cost-effective way of meeting the 

requirements of the ‘limited’ operational scenarios of the post-Cold War era whilst, at the same time, increasing the operational 

effectiveness of both services. 

Since the announcement of the SDR, the development of the ‘JF 2000 Initiative’ has proceeded apace. The JF 2000 Study 

Team recommended in October 1998 17 that the Force should form within RAF Strike Command, under command of a RN Rear 

Admiral (2-Star) and a RAF Air Commodore (1-Star). The JF 2000 Implementation Team formed on 1st February 1999 and

85 

Strike Command has developed infrastructure and organisational plans for the collocation of the current RAF and RN Harrier 

forces at RAF Cottesmore and RAF Wittering in 2003. 18 For the longer term, the Staff Requirements for the Future Carrier Borne 

Aircraft (FCBA) and the Future Aircraft Carrier (FAC) are being prepared. The Combined Operational Effectiveness and 

Investment Appraisal (COEIA) for the FCBA is due to report in 2000; both the FAC and the FCBA are expected into service in 

2012. 19 However, whilst the studies so far have concentrated on the composition of the Force, its ownership and its Command 

& Control, there has been little discussion of how its air power potential might best be employed in modern, complex 

emergencies. In the words of Air Commodore Probert, there has been ‘too much dispute over ownership, too little about 

planning for roles.’ 20 

So, will ‘Harriers on Carriers’ be the panacea for Britain’s future air power requirements, will JF 2000 operate equally effectively 

from aircraft carriers and land bases (as the SDR suggests), and exactly how should it be deployed to maximise its air power 

utility in the likely limited conflicts of the future? To answer these questions, this essay will define the composition and 

capabilities of JF 2000 and will discuss, in detail, the likely advantages and disadvantages (in terms of air power projection) of 

basing it at sea and on land. In doing so, the essay will assume (for the purposes of analysis) that a land basing option is 

available, but recognises that this may not always be the case. 21 The essay will not reopen the debate about whether sea or 

land-based air power would best serve the National interest, nor will it revisit old arguments which challenged the procurement 

of the FAC. Instead, by comparing the various strengths and weaknesses of both sea and land basing (including the likely 

effects of the procurement of the proposed FAC and FCBA), this essay will show that both options are vital to the effective and 

efficient use of JF 2000’s air power potential, and that there is a direct relationship between the most appropriate deployment 

option and the intensity of the conflict in which the Force is likely to be involved. The essay will conclude, therefore, that to 

maximise Joint Force 2000’s air power utility in the likely limited conflicts of the future, it should be deployed strictly according to 

the combat scenario, and not according to the historical (single-service) precedents or political whims which have prevailed in 

the past. 

FORCE COMPOSITION 

Before considering its various strengths and weaknesses, it is important to define exactly what JF 2000 will be. There is a 

popular misconception that the Force will comprise aircraft carriers, escorts, amphibious assault ships, mine countermeasure 

vessels and fleet auxiliaries operating with Nimrod Maritime Patrol Aircraft in a similar configuration to an American Carrier Battle 

Group. However, this sort of ‘hard-hitting, flexible and genuinely deployable force, able to undertake the full spectrum of shortnotice 

missions in today’s international environment.’ 22 describes not JF 2000, but the new Joint Rapid Reaction Force 23 (JRRF), 

which was also proposed by the SDR. The JF 2000 Initiative is ‘simply’ the amalgamation of the RAF and RN Harrier fleets and 

operations involving the resultant joint air wings. 24 Therefore, although the sea power capabilities of JF 2000’s likely escorts 25

and its carrier are not inconsiderable, this essay will concentrate on the air power utility of JF 2000’s aircraft (whether they 

86 

be land or sea based). 

At present, JF 2000 comprises 2 aircraft types. The RAF Harrier GR7 is a versatile surface attack and reconnaissance aircraft 

with a Short Take-Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) capability. It has a sophisticated, integrated cockpit, and is capable of 

medium and low level attack sorties, by day and by night, and in poor weather, using Night Vision Goggles or Forward-Looking 

Infra-Red equipment or a combination of both. Its armaments include 2 cannons, and combinations of up to 4 Sidewinder airto-air 

missiles, 7 Cluster Bombs, 2 Laser Guided Bombs (LGB) and 2 rocket pods. In addition, the aircraft carries a 

comprehensive self-defence Electronic Countermeasures (ECM) suite and may carry an external reconnaissance camera pod or 

a Thermal Imaging and Laser Designation (TIALD) pod. 26 

The RN Sea Harrier FA2 is a capable air defence fighter with a similar STOVL capability to its RAF counterpart. The aircraft is 

fitted with the Blue Vixen multi-mode pulse doppler air intercept radar which, in concert with the Advanced Medium Range Air-to- 

Air Missile (AMRAAM), gives it an all-weather, multi-target, Beyond Visual Range look-down / shoot-down capability. The aircraft 

may also be fitted with Sidewinder air-to-air missiles and twin cannons in the air-to-air role, and either free-fall or LGBs in a limited 

air-to-ground role (although the Sea Harrier cannot self-designate its targets). 27 

ADVANTAGES OF DEPLOYMENTS AT SEA 

A fundamental consequence of the collapse of the Soviet Union 

(and the effective demise of the Soviet Navy) is that there is no 

longer any nation which can challenge Western maritime 

supremacy and therefore no likelihood of a sustained conflict at 

sea. 28 Whilst it would be foolish to conclude that control of the 

sea will never be contested, the focus of maritime operations in 

the post-Cold War era has inevitably shifted from ‘power at sea’ 

to ‘power from the sea’, 29 away from traditional ‘blue water’ 

operations towards what have become known as ‘littoral’ 30 (or 

‘brown-water’) operations. Traditional ‘naval’ strategy has 

therefore become increasingly ‘joint’ as the capabilities of all 3 

Services have been integrated to project power ashore in these 

littoral regions. In 1992, the US Navy and Marine Corps defined 

A fundamental 

consequence of the 

collapse of the 

Soviet Union (and 

the effective demise 

of the Soviet Navy) 

is that there is no 

longer any nation 

which can challenge 

Western maritime 

supremacy… 

a new strategic focus, 31 which established the ‘Naval Expeditionary Force’ as the basic building block for US naval operations. 32 

The creation of JF 2000 reflects the British Government’s recognition of this need to ‘focus a higher proportion of naval effort on 

the projection of power ashore’. 33

Embarked at sea, JF 2000 offers a potent power-projection capability throughout the spectrum of naval roles. 34 In high 

87 

intensity ‘war fighting’, the Harrier FA2 and organic (Sea King) Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft would form an 

indivisible part of an aircraft carrier’s combat power in the conduct of air defence operations and Anti-Surface Unit Warfare 

(ASUW) tasks. Under this air defence umbrella, the Harrier GR7 could be used in a variety of land attack roles, from interdiction 

and offensive counter-air missions, to the close air support of amphibious landings. The Falklands campaign of 1982 provides 

good examples of the utility of a multi-role seaborne air capability 35 (and the efficacy of a joint approach). Whilst Sea Harriers 

destroyed some 25 Argentinean aircraft in air-to-air combat, some 500 ground attack missions were flown. 36 These included 

close air support, offensive counter air, suppression of enemy air defences and ASUW operations. 

Notwithstanding these historical successes, it is in the field of ‘naval diplomacy’ 37 that JF 2000 is likely to have its greatest utility 

in the post-Cold War era. The Harrier GR7’s ability to deliver Precision Guided Munitions will add considerable substance to 

coercive operations, 38 particularly in view of modern Western political sensitivities about the avoidance of collateral damage and 

civilian casualties. This coercive capability was exemplified during Operation BOLTON 39 in 1998 when HMS Invincible (and 

subsequently HMS Illustrious) joined US carriers in the Gulf to induce Saddam Hussein to accede to UN inspection demands. 

Despite the modest nature of the British contribution, ‘the embarkation of RAF Harrier GR7s, alongside Sea Harriers allowed the 

carrier to show its joint credentials.’ 40 Operations DENY FLIGHT and DELIBERATE FORCE in the former Yugoslavia between 

1993 and 1995 exemplified JF 2000’s likely utility in peace inducement and peace enforcement operations of the future. Whilst 

the Harrier FA2s could provide control of the air, the Harrier GR7s could strike at pin-point targets using TIALD-designated 

LGBs, or with their highly-accurate, high-velocity rockets. The same aircraft could also be used in the reconnaissance role in 

The Harrier 

GR7’s ability to 

deliver Precision 

Guided 

Munitions will 

add considerable 

substance to 

coercive 

operations…

88 

…Harrier FA2s could be used to patrol UN no-fly zones or 

to escort unarmed transport aircraft through hostile airspace 

subsequent Bomb Damage Assessment missions. In 

benign Peace Support Operations, 41 the Harrier FA2s 

could be used to patrol UN no-fly zones or to escort 

unarmed transport aircraft through hostile airspace. 

Harrier GR7s could be used in a variety of 

surveillance roles as well as in close air support of 

ground forces, if required. Even in the early days of a 

crisis (where specific policy objectives may be 

unclear), JF 2000 could have a significant effect. 

Whilst the presence of an aircraft carrier already 

conveys a ‘tangible commitment’ 42 in terms of 

diplomatic signalling, JF 2000’s all-round striking 

power would add greater credibility to the Navy’s 

customary ‘poise’ in operations of preventative 

diplomacy and would provide an early and highprofile 

message of the British Government’s political 

and military intent. Lastly, by demonstrating the 

British Government’s commitment to a credible 

expeditionary air capability, JF 2000 could assist 

greatly in the process of alliance building through 

bilateral or multilateral exercises with nations around 

the world, as the US Navy’s UNITAS and RIMPAC 

exercises have ably demonstrated. 43 

However, JF 2000 offers much more than just the combined capabilities of 2 aircraft types. Embarked on its ‘floating air power 

platforms’, 44 it will harness the 2 key maritime attributes of ‘mobility’ and ‘sustained reach’ 45 to its own environmental characteristics 

to provide ‘the presence, flexibility and utility required for most foreseeable incidents’. 46 Because the sea covers some 

70% of the Earth’s surface, aircraft carriers are able to deploy (or redeploy between theatres) almost unrestricted through 

international waters (at some 400 miles per day) to provide mobile, self-contained airfields in areas which would otherwise be 

inaccessible to land-based aircraft, either because Host Nation Support (HNS) or overflight rights cannot be secured, or 

because of a lack of suitable airfields (the number of US overseas bases, for example, has reduced from 127 to just 25 47 ). Once 

in theatre, an aircraft carrier is constrained only by the littoral boundary and can reposition to suit the tactical situation (for 

example, to maximise a favourable force gradient 48 ) or to find more suitable operating conditions for its embarked aircraft. 49

In addition to this strategic and tactical 

mobility, aircraft carriers can also ‘loiter off 

an enemy coast for weeks or even months 

before being brought into action if and 

when the Government feels this is 

necessary’ 50 without the need to ask for 

basing rights which may mean ‘offering 

political or economic concessions or 

revealing a government’s intentions in a 

politically embarrassing fashion’. 51 Thus, in 

its maritime role, JF 2000 will offer the 

ability to ‘exploit the access the sea can 

provide’ 52 to provide a fully manoeuvrist 53 

and joint maritime force capable both of 

autonomous operations and flanking 

support to land-based assets. In the words 

of Rear Admiral Cobbold, it will meet the ‘6 

jargon-coated criteria for operations in the 

new millennium: flexibility, versatility, 

availability, deployability, sustainability and 

interoperability’. 54 

Once in theatre, an aircraft carrier is constrained only by the littoral 

boundary and can reposition to suit the tactical situation… 

89 

LIMITATIONS OF SEABORNE OPERATIONS 

This exciting picture must be viewed, however, in the light of some significant shortfalls in JF 2000’s current capability to project 

air power ashore due, in the main, to the limitations of the existing aircraft and their carriers. Although both variants of the 

Harrier are capable aircraft, they are limited in their endurance, range and load-carrying capacity. 55 The FA2 in its air defence 

configuration, for example, can loiter for just 90 minutes on station at a radius of only 100nm; in its anti-shipping role, it has a 

combat radius of only 200nm. 56 Notwithstanding the famous ‘ski-jump’, the take-off run available on current British aircraft 

carriers appears insufficient to launch the GR7 with more than one LGB, which must be dropped (or jettisoned) before recovery

90 

to bring the aircraft’s weight below the maximum permitted for a vertical landing, particularly in warmer climates (although 

engine upgrades are planned). 57 Lastly, whilst the Harrier GR7 is a good medium-altitude bomber, it has no ‘stealth’ capability 

and cannot therefore be used on the ‘first night’ of major operations against an enemy’s air defence systems. As regards the 

carriers, the RN’s INVINCIBLE Class (CVSGs) were originally designed to operate as Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) helicopter 

platforms and were only subsequently provided with a limited fixed-wing air defence capability. 58 By virtue of their limited size, 

therefore, they cannot mount Air-to-Air Refuelling (AAR), Electronic Warfare (EW) or Suppression of Enemy Air Defence (SEAD) 

missions. However, without AAR, JF 2000’s short-range Harrier aircraft will lack the reach for deployment and deep missions, 

will be unable to be held airborne for survival or short-notice tasking, will be unable to escort other combat aircraft over long 

ranges and will be limited in mission endurance. Without comprehensive EW and SEAD support (including Electronic Support, 

Counter and Protection Measures), JF 2000’s aircraft will be critically vulnerable to modern Surface to Air Missile systems and 

Anti-Aircraft Artillery. With only the relatively limited AEW capability provided by the Sea King W, JF 2000’s commanders will lack 

the comprehensive air picture required to fully evaluate an enemy’s air activity or to interface with friendly air, land or sea 

operations. As the Falklands campaign demonstrated: 

‘The British fleet suffered severely from its lack of AEW or AWACS capability to defend the carriers… [which] meant that 

warning time was restricted to the ship’s radar range. The Harriers did a marvellous job in reacting rapidly, with pilots 

stationed in cockpits and being airborne in minutes after notice; but even this could not adequately compensate for the 

lack of an early warning system. Thus, the Navy operated as it did in World War II.’ 59 

Maintaining logistical support for a carrier-borne air offensive could also be problematical. Assuming just 4 sorties per day per 

aircraft (and with a single bomb load for the Harrier GR7), JF 2000 would consume some 240 tonnes of aviation fuel and 32 

LGBs per day. 60 Notwithstanding planned modifications to remove the Sea Dart missile system to increase the weapons 

magazine capacity, 61 this is likely to be beyond the capability of current British aircraft carriers to sustain without daily 

replenishment at sea, thus further limiting the ship’s tactical flexibility and the tempo of its air operations. The size of current 

aircraft carriers also limits the number of aircraft embarked and the conditions in which those aircraft can be recovered. Without 

an arrestor capability, it is impossible to recover any aircraft which have been damaged sufficiently to preclude a vertical 

landing 62 and, ‘with only 18 aircraft of whatever mix, the [British] Carrier Air Group is pitifully small’. 63 With a likely mix of 8 FA2s, 

8 GR7s and a couple of helicopters, 64 JF 2000’s current air power projection capability is extremely limited. Therefore, whilst 

British aircraft carriers might be big ships, JF 2000 will never be part of the ‘Big League’, 65 unless as a coalition partner with the 

USA. 66

To maintain her global interests 

America requires a total of 14 

deployable aircraft carriers 

The likely size of the fleet will also 

restrict JF 2000’s potential, particularly 

in response to immediate, high intensity 

crises. American experience has shown 

that a total of 3 carriers are needed to 

sustain one forward in an area of 

interest (allowing for time spent 

preparing for and returning from 

deployments, and for refitting 

programmes in between). 67 To maintain 

her global interests, 68 therefore, America 

requires a total of 14 deployable aircraft 

carriers. 69 Whilst British interests are 

certainly not this broad, they have been 

quoted as ‘abnormally vigorous for a small country lurking off the north-west coast of Europe’. 70 A ‘fleet’ of just 2 CVSGs, 

therefore, will inevitably be insufficient to meet all of the demands likely to be placed upon it. Effective interpretation of political 

signals might allow prior positioning of JF 2000 to excellent advantage (The USS Eisenhower and Independence, for example, 

were the only air power assets on hand to deter Iraqi incursions into Saudi Arabia following the invasion of Kuwait in August 

1990). However, notwithstanding its ability to deploy almost unrestricted through international waters, with only 2 aircraft carriers 

at its disposal, it seems highly likely that JF 2000 will find itself poorly placed to respond to immediate events (the combat phase 

of the Yom Kippur War, for example, was over before the first US ship arrived in the area). 71 

Lastly, it cannot be ignored that aircraft carriers are extremely high value assets, which offer almost irresistible premiums to an 

opponent. 72 The inherent vulnerability of the aircraft carrier is therefore also likely to limit JF 2000’s power projection capability. 

The collapse of the Soviet Union has sparked the proliferation of small, conventionally-armed, diesel-powered submarines 73 

(SSKs or ‘Kilos’), which are extremely quiet and difficult to detect in the shallow waters of the littoral, and which pose a 

91

92 …one of the most feared modern threats 

is the fast attack boat, which is cheap, 

expendable, difficult to counter and 

potentially lethal to the largest of ships 

significant threat to carrier operations and thus to JF 2000 

in its maritime role. Another worrying modern development 

is the ‘horizontal proliferation’ of highly-accurate, seaskimming, 

smart, anti-shipping missiles which can be easily 

acquired and operated by third-world countries. 74 These 

missiles may be launched from mobile sites in a ‘fire and 

forget’ mode and may give little or no warning of their 

approach (as the US frigate Stark discovered when she was 

hit by 2 Exocet missiles in the Persian Gulf in May 1987). In 

littoral areas, therefore (which, by their very definition, are 

within effective reach of land-based systems), anti-shipping missiles pose a considerable threat to carrier operations. Modern, 

plastic, anti-shipping mines are also cheap, easy to acquire, almost impossible to detect and lethal to shipping if scattered in 

large numbers in shallow (littoral) waters. Thus, they present an ideal weapon for relatively primitive navies to deny considerable 

areas to even the most sophisticated of forces. 75 However, one of the most feared modern threats is the fast attack boat, 76 

which is cheap, expendable, difficult to counter and potentially lethal to the largest of ships. These small craft may be used to 

launch anti-shipping missiles (such as the Egyptian Komar-class vessel which sank the Israeli destroyer Eilat with a 

SS-N-2 ‘Styx’ missile in 1967), may carry infra-red or laser-guided anti-aircraft missiles for use against a carrier’s aircraft as they 

launch or recover, and may be packed with explosives and rammed against the hulls of surface vessels by fanatical suicide 

bombers. 

Whilst the protagonists of aircraft carriers have argued that such vessels are unsinkable, 77 their opponents have argued that 

they are hopelessly vulnerable (particularly to modern sea-skimming weapon systems) and are useful, therefore, only in the 

most benign environments. In reality, the truth lies somewhere between these 2 extremes. However, even the Americans (who 

view their aircraft carriers as invulnerable floating citadels 78 ) recognise the seriousness of the threat in the littoral environment, 79 

which is frequently characterised by confined and congested waters and airspace, occupied by friends, potential adversaries 

and neutrals alike, making identification (and protection of the carrier) profoundly difficult. In these conditions, a ship on station

cannot lightly engage incoming ‘contacts’, even in a war zone, and it is impossible to differentiate a civilian motor yacht from a 

‘fast attack boat’ until the vessel is well within launch range. Unfortunately, however, ‘only the big [American] carriers can carry 

aircraft capable enough to support the fleet against all plausible threats.’ 80 Thus, as the intensity of a conflict increases, the risk 

to JF 2000’s aircraft carriers from submarines, land-based missiles, mines and fast-attack craft is likely to become increasingly 

unacceptable. In modern ‘conflicts of choice’, therefore, given the real penalties involved in the 

sinking of an aircraft carrier, it is difficult to envisage Britain choosing to put one of its vessels as 

far ‘into harm’s way’ as war games and operational analysis might suggest. Thus, the basic 

premise of British carrier operations is likely to remain as it was in the Falklands War 81 that ‘no 

greater disaster could occur than the loss of an aircraft carrier’. 82 Therefore, as the threat to its 

sea platform increases, JF 2000 is most likely to be deployed in a position to ensure maximum 

protection of its carrier, rather than to maximise the effectiveness of its aircraft. Furthermore, if 

the carrier were to be threatened such that the FA2s were required to concentrate on air defence 

or defensive sea control, the Force’s land attack capability would be degraded even more. ‘In 

these situations, a small carrier may – just about – be able to control the water in which it 

operates with its accompanying group, but be unable to extend its influence any further.’ 83 

…as the intensity of a 

conflict increases, the risk 

to JF 2000’s aircraft 

carriers from submarines, 

land-based missiles, mines 

and fast-attack craft is 

likely to become 

increasingly unacceptable 

ADVANTAGES OF LAND BASING 

By deploying to a land base (if available), JF 2000 could arrive rapidly in theatre in numbers limited only by aircraft availability, 

with its initial weapon outload and logistical support provided by Air Transport aircraft. Prepared runways would allow the 

Harrier GR7 to launch with its maximum weapon complement, and undertake deep incursions into enemy territory with the full 

panoply of combat support (including AAR, EW, SEAD and AWACS). In these scenarios, JF 2000’s Harrier FA2s could also 

provide an inherent fighter sweep and escort within the overall Force package. In terms of air power alone, therefore, deploying 

JF 2000 to a land base would appear to offer the maximum advantage, as even the most ardent proponents of aircraft carriers 

agree. ‘Land bases, where available, correctly sited and adequately supplied, will almost certainly permit air operations on a 

greater scale.’ 84 

DISADVANTAGES OF LAND BASING 

So, in the light of the prospective disadvantages of carrier-borne operations, and the scale of air operations that are possible 

only from a land base, it might appear that JF 2000 should be based almost exclusively on land in order to maximise its air 

power utility. However, to enable an airfield to ‘generate and recover air power missions’, 85 a considerable number of functions 

93

94 

are required. These comprise operations support (including Air Traffic Control, command and control, intelligence exploitation 

facilities, firefighting and rescue services), logistics (including flight line, air movements, fuel, storage and motor transport 

facilities) and administration (including personnel, resource and financial management, medical infrastructure, accommodation, 

catering and training facilities). In addition, static airfields are vulnerable to enemy attack and, although it seems highly unlikely 

that a single (conventional) weapon could close an airfield for a protracted period, there remains a significant threat to deployed 

forces, particularly from ‘asymmetric’ attack. The threat could be passive in the form of covert observation and reporting, or it 

could be active in the form of air, ground, information or Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) attack. There is a fundamental 

requirement, therefore, to provide physical protection at deployed operating bases for aircraft, airfield surfaces, people, 

equipment and information. Protection measures would include Ground-Based Air Defences, Battle Damage Repair teams and 

the use of organic ground combat units to provide enhanced perimeter security. Therefore, land-based operations (even from a 

well-found operating base) are likely to involve the deployment of several hundreds of people (in addition to the aircrew and 

engineers directly involved with the generation of Harrier sorties) at considerable economic, human and political expense. 

Conversely, an aircraft carrier’s crew complement are trained to provide all of these support functions within the ship’s 

operational role at no additional cost per deployment. 

…land-based operations (even from a well-found operating base) are likely to involve the deployment of 

several hundreds of people (in addition to the aircrew and engineers directly involved with the generation 

of Harrier sorties) at considerable economic, human and political expense 

APPROPRIATE DEPLOYMENT 

Analysis of the aforementioned advantages and disadvantages of both sea and land-based operations suggests that JF 2000’s 

air power utility depends both on its deployment platform and the intensity of the conflict in which it is likely to be involved. To 

determine JF 2000’s optimum deployment, therefore, it would be useful to compare its sea and land-based attributes against 

an appropriate model of conflict which reflects the Defence Missions outlined in the SDR. Current Air Power Doctrine shows 

that ‘the linear, graduated model of conflict used during the Cold War.....is of limited relevance in the current environment’. 86 

Therefore, to cater for the multi-faceted nature of complex emergencies 87 ‘in the turbulent inter and intra-state relations of the 

new millennium,’ 88 a new circular spectrum has been proposed: 89

Ser 

(a) 

(b) 

(c) 

(d) 

(e) 

(f) 

(g) 

(h) 

Patrol 

Intrusive 

Surveillance 

PEACE 

INDUCE- 

MENT 

POST 

CONFLICT 

ACTIVITY 

Withdrawal/Handover 

PEACE 

BUILDING 

Denial 

PEACE 

KEEPING 

Compliance 

PEACE 

Deterrence 

INFORMATION 

Compellance 

WARFIGHTING 

PEACE 

ENFORCEMENT 

Combined/Joint Campaign 

Preparation 

PREVENTATIVE 

DIPLOMACY 

Consent 

Coertion 

PEACEKEEPING 

Deployment 

Patrol 

Local/Precise Attack 

Mission 

Peacetime Security 

Security of the Overseas Territories 

Defence Diplomacy 

Support to Wider British Interests 

Peace Support and Humanitarian Operations 

Regional Conflict Outside the NATO Area 

Regional Conflict Inside the NATO Area 

Strategic Attack on NATO 

Table 1 – SDR Defence Missions 

Figure 1 – The Circular 

Spectrum of Conflict 

In the likely peacetime operations envisaged by the SDR, there will 

95 

be an increased requirement for cooperation with other nations (for 

example, in the evacuation of British and other citizens caught up in 

overseas crises 90 ), and for participation in multi-national exercises with 

the aim of fostering international good will and deterring conflict. This 

‘preventative diplomacy’ will form part of the wider Mission of ‘Defence 

Diplomacy’ and will include various activities ‘undertaken to dispel 

hostility, build and maintain trust and assist in the development of 

democratically accountable armed forces, thereby making a significant 

contribution to conflict prevention and resolution’. 91 The aircraft carrier 

seems the ideal platform on which to base JF 2000 in support of these 

activities. Not only could the Force’s aircraft partake in exercises in 

most parts of the world without first securing basing or overflight rights, 

but the arrival of a British aircraft carrier bedecked with JF 2000’s 

aircraft would send considerable political signals in terms of Britain’s ‘presence’ in the world. 

‘Impressible countries will find JF 2000 very impressive!’. 92 Carrier-borne operations could also be 

maintained, almost indefinitely, without the prohibitive human, economical and political costs of an 

open-ended, land-based deployment. 

In benign peace support or peacekeeping operations (especially in regions where suitable airfields 

are not readily available or HNS is neither offered nor desirable), the aircraft carrier would also be 

the ideal platform for JF 2000, combining the key naval attributes of strategic and tactical mobility, 

poise and sustained reach, synergistically, with the key air power characteristics 

of reach, flexibility, ubiquity and responsiveness. In these 

situations, JF 2000 would maintain Britain’s standing as a ‘serious 

player’ in any coalition force, with the perceived ability to ‘punch above 

its weight’ if necessary. However, as the likely intensity of the conflict 

(and the likely belligerence of the opposition) increases, so the suitability 

of JF 2000’s sea platform decreases. Although Harriers have taken a 

credible part in peace enforcement operations, their current range and weapon loads are significantly 

curtailed by the aircraft carrier’s inherent limitations. Furthermore, if the threat to the carrier were to 

increase (from stronger opponents, or those willing to engage in ‘asymmetric’ activities) then an 

increasing amount of JF 2000’s capabilities would be absorbed in protecting the ship, which would 

Although Harriers have 

taken a credible part in 

peace enforcement 

operations, their 

current range and 

weapon loads are 

significantly curtailed 

by the aircraft carrier’s 

inherent limitations

96 

have to withdraw to a safe operating area, thus degrading its operational independence and denying its aircraft much of the 

‘reach’ that naval operations are meant to provide. In high intensity conflict, therefore, JF 2000’s ability to project air power 

ashore from current British aircraft carriers is likely to be minimal at best. 

Conversely, the utility of land bases in providing an appropriate air power response 

increases with the scale of the response required. In benign peacekeeping operations, 

the cost of a permanent land-based deployment is unlikely to be justified (or even 

necessary). However, where large-scale, intensive or rapid responses are required, 

then no sea-based force can match the air power projection capability of a properly 

constituted airfield. In these situations, not only could JF 2000’s aircraft operate with 

…the utility of land bases in 

providing an appropriate air 

power response increases with 

the scale of the response required 

their full fuel and weapon loads, but they could also take advantage of the full panoply of air support to maximise their range, 

effectiveness and survivability. Thus, for war fighting, it would seem that JF 2000 should be deployed without its carriers, to a 

properly-prepared, coalition land base. In accordance with the ‘circular’ spectrum of conflict for modern, complex emergencies, 

therefore, there appears to be a distinct relationship between the most appropriate deployment option for JF 2000, and the 

intensity of the conflict in which it is likely to be involved: 

Suitability of Deployment 

Aircraft Carrier 

Land Base 

Peace Peacekeeping Warfighting Peacebuilding Peace 

Preventative Diplomacy Peace Enforcement Peace Inducement Peacekeeping 

Spectrum of Conflict 

Figure 2 – Deployment of JF 2000 

This paradigm has 3 obvious exceptions: firstly, 

in peacetime exercises where JF 2000 may be 

deployed to either sea or land bases with 

equal effectiveness (and must practice both 

eventualities to maintain its proficiency); 

secondly, in full-scale war (such as the 

‘Strategic Attack on NATO’ envisaged in the 

SDR Defence Missions) where the otherwise 

disproportionate risk to the aircraft carrier 

becomes very much less significant in the 

overall scenario; and, thirdly, when HNS (and 

therefore a land base) is not available, as was 

the case in the Falklands campaign. 93 In the 

latter case, the carrier provides the only option 

for a British air power response. However, in

high intensity conflict, the likely restrictions on JF 2000’s air power projection capability inherent in current carrier-borne operations 

suggest strongly that, if land basing is either non-existent or marginal, then the Force should not be deployed at all. 

However, where the choice of a land base exists, the analysis suggests that JF 2000 should be deployed at sea for peace 

support and peace keeping operations, and to land bases for peace enforcement and warfighting scenarios. In conflicts where the 

most appropriate solution is not clear, some radical thinking will be required. In certain circumstances (as the US Marine Corps’ 

Concept of Operations suggests, 94 it might be appropriate for JF 2000 to deploy initially by sea, to provide air support for 

amphibious and follow-on forces to establish a bridgehead and prepare a Deployed Operating Base (DOB) to which JF 2000 

would then deploy to conduct high-intensity air operations (leaving the carrier to retire out of harm’s way). Alternatively, JF 2000 

could deploy rapidly (as part of the JRRF, for example) to a land DOB, to be followed later by the aircraft carrier which could then 

act as a second basing option to maximise the Force’s manoeuvrist potential with its tactical mobility (and could provide other 

functions, such as that of a floating joint headquarters or as a base for diplomatic discussions between protagonists). The recent 

Operation DESERT FOX exemplifies the flexibility of this approach. Whilst medium-intensity bombing raids on Iraqi targets were 

mounted from well-found land bases (albeit by Tornado aircraft in this case), an aircraft carrier and its Harrier complement were 

deployed to undertake the subsequent (low intensity) monitoring task. However, no 2 situations will be the same, and many 

variations on the overall theme are possible (given JF 2000’s inherent flexibility) provided that current operating procedures, 

traditions and political expectations do not preclude the necessary innovation. However, to ensure the most efficient use of JF 

2000’s air power attributes, RAF personnel will have to become accustomed to lengthy deployments at sea on aircraft carriers 

and, similarly, naval personnel will have to accept protracted periods of operations from land bases. More significantly, the Naval 

Staff might have to entertain the deployment of historically organic air assets, whilst leaving their host carriers in port. Some 

‘sacred cows’ may therefore be at risk. 

THE FUTURE 

The current INVINCIBLE Class of aircraft carriers is due for replacement in 2012, at which time the FCBA is also due into 

service. Operational analysis suggests that it would be more cost-effective to replace the current fleet of 3 CVSGs with 2 larger, 

more versatile ships capable of operating the largest possible range of aircraft in the widest possible range of roles. However, a 

primary driver for the FAC will be the number and type of FCBA, and the sortie generation rate required. 95 There are 3 generic 

combinations of FAC and FCBA: 96 STOVL (as per the current fleet); Short Take-Off But Arrested Recovery (STOBAR); and 

Conventional Take-Off and Landing (CTOL). Whilst studies are still ongoing, it would seem that the winning design is most likely 

to be either a STOVL or CTOL variant, 97 the choice of which will have significant implications for JF 2000’s likely air power utility. 

97

98 

In economic terms, the STOVL combination presents the most cost effective option. A STOVL ship requires only one runway, 

has a faster turnround capability and does not need to provide as stable a platform as its CTOL counterpart for aircraft 

recoveries. 98 It would therefore be smaller (and cheaper) than a CTOL equivalent. Similarly, a STOVL FCBA would need to be 

small and light (some 30,000 lbs instead of 70,000 lbs for a conventional aircraft) and would therefore be cheaper than a CTOL 

variant. Although the COEIA for the procurement of the FCBA is not due until 2000, a primary contender is the STOVL version 

of the US Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), 99 currently under development by 2 competing contractors: Boeing and Lockheed Martin. 

Although technical specifications will undoubtedly change, the companies’ proposals suggest that the JSF will be a formidable 

fighting machine. 100 Both the Boeing and Lockheed Martin variants will be single-seat, single-engined, supersonic, all-weather, 

multi-role aircraft with aerodynamic performance in excess of the F-16, enhanced lethality, greater survivability and considerable 

interoperability with their land-based counterparts. Designed with the proven stealth technology of the F-117 and the F-22, they 

will be extremely capable ‘Day-One strike aircraft’, able to handle the ‘deep target sets’ (such as Integrated Air Defence 

Systems) in any modern conflict. 101 To enhance its stealth capability, the JSF’s ECM and laser designator will be fitted internally, 

and the aircraft may also utilise the ‘off-board sensor’ concept. 102 The JSF will have a likely range of some 600nm, and its 

internal (stealth) bomb bay will likely house 2 advanced 900 kg stand-off munitions or LGBs and 2 AMRAAMs. For land-based 

operations, additional fuel tanks and weapon stores may be carried externally, with an associated reduction in the aircraft’s 

stealth capability. A retractable AAR probe will also be fitted. 

Whilst a CTOL FAC/FCBA combination would be larger (and therefore more expensive), it would, however, offer considerably 

more in terms of air power projection capability than its STOVL equivalent. An electromagnetic catapult 103 could launch aircraft 

of all-up weights in excess of 70,000 lbs, thus permitting combat operations by modified versions of most land-based fighter 

aircraft at their full operational loads. 104 It would also enable the use of more capable, fixed-wing AEW aircraft (such as the E-2 

Hawkeye) and small AAR tankers. The CTOL carrier’s arrestor capability would also permit the recovery of its aircraft in most 

configurations and with significant battle damage. 

So, how do the proposed FAC and FCBA affect the analysis of how JF 2000 should be deployed? As regards the FAC, future 

technological advances will undoubtedly improve the ship’s on-board defence capabilities. However, similar advances in ASUW 

weaponry (in the so-called ‘dynamic of technology’ 105 ) are likely to balance the equation. 106 In both CTOL and STOVL variants, 

therefore, the inherent vulnerability of the aircraft carrier is likely to remain a limiting factor. Whilst the FCBA (in whatever its final 

form) would considerably enhance JF 2000’s air power projection potential, any technological advances would be equally 

applicable to land and sea-based operations. Therefore, neither factor (on its own) will change significantly the relative 

advantages and disadvantages previously described.

In the STOVL configuration, a complement of 50 aircraft would allow the conduct of defensive counter air and defensive sea 

control operations without absorbing all of JF 2000’s power projection capability. Furthermore, the procurement of the FCBA 

would eliminate many of the Harrier GR7’s current operating limitations and would increase JF 2000’s effective range, 

particularly if the carrier was forced to withdraw out of harm’s way. However, notwithstanding the JSF’s likely ability to carry 

twice the Harrier’s current bomb load, the procurement of a STOVL FAC/FCBA combination would perpetuate the inherent air 

power limitations previously described, which would continue to restrict ship-borne air operations to a far smaller scale than 

would be possible from a land base. Therefore, whilst a STOVL FAC/FCBA combination would increase the utility of seaborne 

operations at the lower end of the intensity scale, it would not significantly affect the overall paradigm, which would therefore 

remain substantially as proposed: 

In medium to high intensity conflict, one of the most significant limitations to JF 2000’s carrier-borne air power potential is the 

inability of current British aircraft carriers to provide combat support for the Force’s core air power missions, without assistance 

from the very land bases which the carriers are meant to obviate. In its CTOL form, however, a FAC/FCBA combination could 

radically alter JF 2000’s air power utility in favour of sea-based operations. The ability to launch and recover combat aircraft of 

similar operating weights to their land-based counterparts would allow the aircraft carrier to mount comprehensive packages of 

heavily-armed attack aircraft, with SEAD and fighter escort, on missions appropriate to even the most intense of conflicts. The 

ship’s complement of 50 aircraft would also permit simultaneous air defence operations if circumstances dictated, supported by 

99 



Land Base 



Land Base 





Figure 3 – Deployment of STOVL FAC/FCBA 

Figure 4 – Deployment of CTOL FAC/FCBA

100 

the enhanced AEW capability of a fixed-wing aircraft, if also procured. 107 In terms of air power projection, therefore, a land base 

would offer few significant advantages over the CTOL FAC/FCBA combination, except in the most intense of conflicts, where the 

increased availability of AAR and greater logistical support would still permit operations on a greater scale and over increased 

ranges. The procurement of a CTOL FAC/FCBA combination would therefore make seaborne operations for JF 2000 much more 

appropriate throughout the circular spectrum of conflict: 

CONCLUSION 

The formation of JF 2000 represents a bold move away from the historic extremes of both the RAF and the RN and formalises 

a previously ad-hoc arrangement for the operation of a truly joint capability. In a gradual, pragmatic bringing together of the 

ways in which each service does business, it will provide (as the SDR suggests) a potent offensive air capability to meet the 

likely expeditionary roles of the post-Cold War era. 

Embarked at sea, JF 2000 will be particularly suited to operations traditionally associated with ‘naval diplomacy’ such as 

peacekeeping, peace building and preventative diplomacy. In these circumstances, the Force will combine, synergistically, the 

speed, reach, ubiquity, flexibility and responsiveness of its air assets with the poise, mobility and sustained reach of its floating 

air platforms to provide an air power projection capability fully in keeping with Britain’s tradition of ‘punching above its weight’. 

The deployment of JF 2000 on its aircraft carrier will be an impressive demonstration of Britain’s role as a ‘serious player’ on the 

modern, international stage (particularly in coalition operations as part of an overall force package) and will allow the 

Government to keep its options open in confusing and uncertain modern crises. 

However, the limitations of current British aircraft carriers significantly restrict JF 2000’s air power projection capability. Thus, as 

the likely intensity of a conflict increases away from the benign, the suitability of deploying JF 2000 by sea diminishes. 

Furthermore, as the intensity of the likely conflict increases, the inherent vulnerability of aircraft carrier (and the need to protect 

such a high-value asset from the likely threats in the littoral environment) further limits the Force’s air power utility. Not only must 

the carrier be withdrawn substantially ‘out of harm’s way’ (thus reducing the effective range of its aircraft), but the aircraft 

themselves must play an ever-increasing role in defending their ship. Ultimately, in very high threat scenarios, it is likely that JF 

2000’s entire air capability could be absorbed in protecting the aircraft carrier on which it is based. Thus, from an air power 

perspective, JF 2000 should not be deployed at sea for high intensity conflict, irrespective of other basing options. 

Deployed operations from land bases also have their own, particular disadvantages. To provide operations and logistical 

support, administration and force protection for even a small detachment of aircraft requires the deployment of many hundreds 

of people at potentially enormous human, economic and diplomatic cost. To deploy JF 2000 to a land base to conduct benign

‘Defence Diplomacy’ missions (which may be of indeterminate length) is therefore highly inappropriate, especially when the 

enhanced air power capability afforded by the land base is unlikely to be used. However, as the likely intensity of the conflict 

increases, the cost of deployed, land-based operations becomes less significant in the light of the scale of air operations which 

the land base can support. Furthermore, there can be little argument that land bases (where available) will permit air operations 

on a far greater scale than are possible from aircraft carriers. For high intensity conflicts, therefore, a land base is the only 

deployment platform from which JF 2000 will be able to operate at its maximum air power potential. 

The current aircraft carriers and their Harrier aircraft are due to be replaced in 2012, by either a STOVL or CTOL combination of 

FAC and FCBA, each of which offers considerable technological advances to JF 2000’s air power projection capability. However, 

whilst a STOVL combination is likely to be smaller and cheaper than its CTOL counterpart, in terms of air power it would 

perpetuate many of JF 2000’s current carrier-borne limitations. Thus, whilst the likely technological advances would confer an 

increase in capability, the relative advantages and disadvantages of sea and land bases would not differ, significantly, from those 

of today. Conversely, the procurement of a CTOL FAC/FCBA combination would allow the aircraft carrier to mount all but the 

most intensive of air combat operations and would thus radically alter JF 2000’s deployment considerations in favour of seaborne 

operations. Only in its prospective CTOL form, therefore, would JF 2000 become the ‘deployable and effective offensive air 

capability’ which the SDR envisaged, fully able to fulfil the expeditionary roles of the post-Cold War era as a true instrument of 

political choice, and able to operate equally effectively from aircraft carriers and land bases in all but the most intense of conflicts. 

In all cases, however, analysis of the various strengths and weaknesses of land and sea deployments shows a direct 

relationship between the most appropriate deployment option and the intensity of the conflict in which JF 2000 is likely to be 

involved. For benign peace building and peacekeeping operations, preventative diplomacy, and operations in immature, austere 

theatres, JF 2000 should be deployed only on its aircraft carrier. For warfighting operations, it should be deployed only to a land 

base and (from an air power perspective) if a land base is not available then it should not be deployed at all. For mediumintensity 

operations where the situation is unclear, careful consideration should be given to the most appropriate deployment 

option. JF 2000 might best be deployed by carrier at the outset, but then on to a forward operating (land) base, leaving the 

carrier to withdraw to relative safety. Conversely, the Force might deploy on its own to a land base, to be followed later by the 

carrier, which could then provide a second, manoeuvrist basing option. Many variations on this theme will be possible (given JF 

2000’s inherent flexibility), provided that the Force is always deployed in a manner most appropriate to the likely combat 

scenario. In sum, both land and sea basing options will be vital to the efficient and effective use of JF 2000’s air assets. 

However, to maximise its air power utility in the likely limited conflicts of the future, JF 2000 should be deployed either on an 

aircraft carrier or to a land base (‘to sea, or not to sea’), not according to the historical (single-service) precedents or political 

whims which have prevailed in the past, but strictly according to the intensity of the conflict in which it is likely to be involved. 

101

102 

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Still the Best’. RUSI Journal, April 1997, pp. 39-44. 

Office of Naval Intelligence. ‘Worldwide Submarine Challenges’. 1997, pp. 6-7. 

Pay, John. ‘Full Circle: The US Navy and its Carriers, 1974-1993’. The Journal of 

Strategic Studies, Vol 17 No 1, pp. 124-147. 

Ripley, Tim. ‘Invincible Ideas?’ Flight International, 26 March – 1 April 1997, pp. 32-33. 

Scott, R. ‘A Navy for the New Millennium’. Janes Defence Weekly, 28th October 1998, 

pp. 20-21. 

Scott, Richard and Starr, Barbara. ‘Carrier Aviation at the Crossroads’. Jane’s Navy 

International, March/April 1995, pp. 19-24. 

Statement for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. ‘Global Threats and 

Challenges: the Decade Ahead’. January 1998, p. 11. 

Stocker, Lt Cdr Jeremy. ‘Carrier Decisions’. RUSI Journal, October 1997, pp. 46-50. 

Till, Geoffrey. ‘Maritime Strategy and the Twenty-First Century’. The Journal of 

Strategic Studies, Vol 17 No 1, pp. 176-199. 

Tirpak, John A. ‘Strike fighter’. Air Force Magazine, October 1996, pp. 22-29. 

Warwick, Graham. ‘Joint endeavour’. Flight International, 3 – 9 July 1996, pp. 25-28. 

Encyclopaedia 

Jane’s All The World’s Aircraft 1997-98. Edited by P Jackson. Jane’s Information 

Group Ltd, 1997. 

Jane’s All The World’s Aircraft 1998-99. Edited by P Jackson. Jane’s Information 

Group Ltd, 1998. 

Articles in Newspapers 

Butcher, Tim. ‘Navy and RAF Harriers to become a joint force’. The Daily Telegraph, 

News, 24th October 1999, p. 8. 

Evans, M. ‘Navy takes Harriers under its wing’. The Times, Home News, 19th October 

1998, p. 6. 

Lorenz, A. ‘BAe sets sights on developing Eurofighter for Royal Navy’. The Times, 

Business Supplement, 31st January 1999, p. 3. 

Material on the Internet 

Boeing Military Airplanes. ‘Joint Strike Fighter’.http://www.boeing.com/defensespace/military/jsf/jsf.htm. 

‘Interview with Frank Capuccio, Vice President of Lockheed Martin’s Joint Strike 

Fighter Program’. Defense Daily, undated. http://www.Imtas.com/jsf/jsf.html. 

Ministry of Defence. ‘Future Aircraft Carriers’. Strategic Defence Review. 

http://www.mod.uk/policy/sdr/futureac.htm. 

Ministry of Defence. ‘Joint Force 2000’. Strategic Defence Review. 

http://www.mod.uk/policy/sdr/jf2000.htm. 

United States Air Force. ‘Joint Strike Fighter’. 

http://www.af.mil/lib/afissues/1997/app_b_4.html. 

Interviews 

Harry, Captain N J, RN. Assistant Director Future Aircraft Carrier, MOD(PE) Abbey 

Wood. 2 Feb 99. 

Meyer, Commodore S R, RN. Team Leader Joint Force 2000 Study Team. 25 Nov 98. 

Mitchell, Squadron Leader A G, RAF. Plans 3b, Headquarters Strike Command. 17 

Dec 98. 

Lectures 

Goulter, Dr C J M. Lecture on Air Power Theorists, given to the Air Component of 

Advanced Command and Staff Course No 2 at the Joint Services Command and Staff 

College Bracknell, 17th November 1998. 

Probert, Air Commodore, RAF (Ret’d). Lecture on Air Power History, given to the Air 

Component of Advanced Command and Staff Course No 2 at the Royal Air Force 

Museum Hendon, 19th November 1998.

104 

Sabin, Dr Philip. Lecture on Air Superiority, given to the Air Component of Advanced 

Command and Staff Course No 2 at the Joint Services Command and Staff College 

Bracknell, 17th November 1998. 

Unpublished Material 

Best, Sqn Ldr D. The British Aircraft Carrier – A Joint Asset for the Twenty-First 

Century? Unpublished Defence Research Paper, Joint Services Command and Staff 

College Bracknell, 1997. 

Kessel, Sqn Ldr J B. A Discussion of the Relevant Factors With Regard to the Royal 

Navy’s Requirement for New Aircraft Carriers in the Next Century. Unpublished Defence 

Research Paper, Joint Services Command and Staff College Bracknell, 1997. 

NOTES 

1 Michael Codner, ‘The Strategic Defence Review – A Good Job’, RUSI Newsbrief, Vol. 18 

No. 8, Aug 1998, p. 58. 

2 In ‘Joint’ operations, the forces provided by 2 or more Services are integrated to 

maximise their effectiveness. 

3 Ministry of Defence, The Strategic Defence Review: Supporting Essays (London: The 

Stationery Office, 1998), Essay 8. 

4 Details of the 7 joint ventures are contained in Supporting Essay 8 to the SDR. 

5 Ministry of Defence, ‘Joint Force 2000’, Strategic Defence Review, 

http://www.mod.uk/policy/sdr/jf2000.htm. 

6 Idem. 

7 Ministry of Defence, The Strategic Defence Review (London: The Stationery Office, 1998), 

p. 2. 

8 Eric Grove, ‘Partnership Spurned: The Royal Navy’s Search for a Joint Maritime-Air 

Strategy East of Suez, 1961-63’ in Naval Power in the Twentieth Century, edited by N 

Rodger (Basingstoke, England: MacMillan Press Ltd, 1996), p. 227. 

9 Ibid., p. 228. 

10 Idem. 

11 PRO:ADM 205/192, folio 43 cited in Idem. 

12 Paper entitled ‘Future Air Strike Policy In Limited War Outside Europe’, cited in Ibid., p. 

229. 

13 Idem. 

14 Including the ‘infamous mis-plot’ of Australia by 300nm to increase the credibility of the 

RAF’s argument for land bases. Paul Beaver, The British Aircraft Carrier (Wellingborough: 

Patrick Stephens, 1981), p. 191. 

15 Michael Codner, ‘Aircraft Carriers: The Next Generation?’, International Security 

Information Service Briefing No. 70, June 1998. 

16 J R Hill, ‘British Naval Planning Post-1945’ in Naval Power in the Twentieth Century, Op. 

Cit., p. 219. 

17 M Evans, ‘Navy takes Harriers under its wing’ in The Times, 19 Oct 98, p. 6. 

18 Interview with Squadron Leader A Mitchell, RAF: Plans 3b, Headquarters Strike 

Command, 17th December 1998. 

19 Interview with Captain N Harry, RN: Assistant Director Future Aircraft Carrier, MOD(PE) 

Abbey Wood, 2nd February 1999. 

20 Air Commodore Probert, RAF (Ret’d) in Lecture on Air Power History at the RAF Museum 

Hendon, 19th November 1998. 

21 The likely absence of Host Nation Support formed a major part of the argument to justify 

the procurement of the FAC. Harry, Op. Cit. 

22 The Strategic Defence Review: Supporting Essays, Op. Cit., Supporting Essay 8. 

23 Idem. 

24 The Harrier Force currently comprises 58 GR7s and 28 FA2s. Interview with Commodore 

S R Meyer, Team Leader Joint Force 2000 Study Team, 25th November 1998. 

25 Although JF 2000 might occasionally form part of a Task Group in support of the JRRF, 

its most likely sea deployment configuration will be similar to that which took part in 

Operation BOLTON in early 1998: the aircraft carrier plus one or 2 escorts, attended by 

one or 2 Royal Fleet Auxiliaries. Meyer, Op. Cit. 

26 Jane’s All The World’s Aircraft, 1997-98, Edited by P Jackson, Jane’s Information Group 

Ltd, 1997, pp. 210-215. 

27 Jane’s All The World’s Aircraft, 1996-97, pp. 505-507. 

28 Professor Geoffrey Till, ‘Maritime Strategy and the Twenty-First Century’, in The Journal of 

Strategic Studies, Vol 17 No 1, p. 186. 

29 Idem. 

30 The ‘littoral’ is defined as the interface between the land and the sea where the proximity 

of one influences operations on the other. Approximately two-thirds of the world’s 

population and capital cities lie within littoral regions; some 122 countries have coastlines. 

Lt Cdr Jeremy Stocker, ‘Carrier Decisions’ in RUSI Journal, October 1997, p. 47. 

31 United States Navy, …From The Sea – Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century 

(Washington DC: Department of the Navy, 1992). 

32 Admiral F B Kelso III, US Navy, ‘Aircraft Carriers – Power Projection from the Sea’ in 

NATO’s Sixteen Nations, No. 1/1994, p. 80. 

33 Till, Op. Cit., p. 186. 

34 Ibid., p. 180. 

35 Military Lessons of the Falkland Islands War: Views from the United States, edited by 

Bruce W Watson and Peter M Dunn 

(Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984), p. 129. 

36 Anthony H Cordesman and Abraham R Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War Volume III: 

The Afghan and Falklands Conflicts 

(Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1990), pp. 300-323. 

37 Till, Op. Cit., p. 190. 

38 Coercive operations aim to deter a possible aggressor, or to compel him to comply with 

a particular course of action through the use (or the threat of the use) of force.

105 

39 The lessons learned from Operation BOLTON and the 1997 Operational Audit of aircraft 

carriers heavily influenced the SDR decision to form JF 2000. Meyer, Op. Cit. 

40 Codner, ‘Aircraft Carriers’ Op. Cit., p. 2. 

41 Ministry of Defence, Peace Support Operations: Joint Warfare Publication 3-50 

(Northwood, England: The Permanent Joint Headquarters, J7 Division, Undated), Chapter 

5, Section VI. 

42 Kelso, Op. Cit., p. 81. 

43 Till, Op. Cit., p. 191. 

44 Dr Philip Towle, ‘The Distinctive Characteristics of Air Power’ in The Dynamics of Air 

Power, Edited by Group Captain Andrew Lambert and Arthur C Williamson (London: Her 

Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1996), p. 11. 

45 Ministry of Defence, The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine (BR 1806) (London: 

Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1995), pp. 57-58. 

46 James L George, The US Navy in the 1990s – Alternatives for Action (Annapolis, 

Maryland: United States Naval Institute, 1992), p. 103. 

47 Dr C J M Goulter in Lecture on Air Power Theorists at the JSCSC Bracknell, 17th 

November 1998. 

48 Dr Philip Sabin’s article on ‘Force Gradients and the Offence-Defence Balance’ may be 

found in The Dynamics of Air Power, Op. Cit., p. 23. 

49 At one time during Operation DENY FLIGHT, HMS Ark Royal’s Harriers were the only 

British aircraft able to undertake offensive counter air patrols because fog had grounded 

all land-based aircraft. Conversely, carrier operations are susceptible to high sea states 

and wind strengths that are usually more severe than on land. Eric Grove, ‘Navies in 

Peacekeeping and Enforcement: The British Experience in the Adriatic Sea’ in 

International Peacekeeping, Vol. 1, No 4, Winter 1994, p. 464. 

50 Towle, Op. Cit., p. 11. 

51 Idem. 


53 Manoeuvre warfare seeks to defeat an enemy by shattering his cohesion and will to fight 

through a series of rapid, violent, simultaneous and unexpected actions that create a 

turbulent and rapidly-deteriorating situation with which he cannot cope. Ministry of 

Defence, British Defence Doctrine (Joint Warfare Publication 0-01) (London: Her Majesty’s 

Stationery Office, 1997), pp. 4.8-4.9. 

54 Rear Admiral Richard Cobbold, RN, cited by The Honourable John H Dalton in ‘Navies 

and World Events in the 21st Century’ in RUSI Journal, October 1998, p. 9. 


56 Jane’s All The World’s Aircraft 1997-98, Op. Cit., p. 507. 

57 Figures extracted from Jane’s All The World’s Aircraft show that (at 32°C), there is just 

2408 lbs difference between the Harrier GR7’s empty weight (15,542 lbs) and its 

maximum vertical landing weight (17,950 lbs). This must cater for fuel, stores, 

ammunition and water injection for the engine, as well as weapons. 

58 Malcolm Bird, ‘Learning from Experience’ in Defence Review, Autumn 1997, p. 32. 

59 Cordesman and Wagner, Op. Cit., p. 341. 

60 Figures extracted from Jane’s All The World’s Aircraft. 

61 Harry, Op. Cit. 

62 The value of an arrestor capability was demonstrated during Operation BALBUZARD (the 

French contribution to Operation SHARP GUARD in the former Yugoslavia), when 2 

Etendard IVPMs were hit by Surface-to-Air Missiles, the most severely damaged of which 

landed safely on the carrier despite a badly damaged tail and the loss of its flaps. Gert 

Kromhout, ‘A Bright Future for French Carrier Aviation’ in Air International, March 1997, p. 

159. 


64 Meyer, Op. Cit. 

65 Idem. 

66 Even so, British aircraft carriers were not used in the Gulf War when, compared with the 

vast US effort, they would have contributed very little to the strategic bombing and 

interdiction campaigns. Codner, ‘Aircraft Carriers’ Op. Cit., p. 2. 

67 N Friedman, The US Maritime Strategy (London: Jane’s Publishing Company Limited, 

1988), p. 80. 

68 The key areas where the US feels its interests threatened are the Mediterranean, the Gulf, 

the Indian Ocean and the North-east Pacific region. Idem. 

69 John Pay, ‘Full Circle: The US Navy and its Carriers, 1974-1993’ in The Journal of 

Strategic Studies, Vol 17 No 1, p. 135. 

70 Rear Admiral Richard Cobbold, RN, ‘A Joint Maritime-Based Expeditionary Capability’ in 

RUSI Journal, August 1997, p. 24. 

71 Wing Commander Andrew Brooks, RAF, ‘Above and Beyond? – Capabilities of Out-of- 

Area Air Power’ in RUSI Journal, October 1993, p. 30. 

72 Dr Philip Sabin in Lecture on Air Superiority at the JSCSC Bracknell, 17th November 

1998. 

73 The Russian submarine force still presents a formidable threat. However, some 20 Third- 

World countries now operate SSKs, a third of which are designated ‘countries of 

concern’. During 1996-97, nine SSKs were delivered to these countries (including Iran, 

China and Pakistan); North Korea and China also launched their own indigenous SSKs. 

Office of Naval Intelligence, Worldwide Submarine Challenges (1997), 

pp. 6-7 and Statement for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Global Threats 

and Challenges: the Decade Ahead, January 1998, p. 11. 

74 More than 60 non-NATO countries now possess cruise missiles. ‘Carrier Questions’ in 

The Economist, May 31st 1997, p. 25. 

75 During the Korean War, sampans and junks laid some 3000 mines which delayed a US 

amphibious operation by several weeks. More recently, a small field laid by a Libyan 

cargo ship closed the Red Sea for about 6 weeks). Friedman, Op. Cit., p. 77. 

76 Meyer, Op. Cit.

106 

77 John Lehman, a former US Secretary of the Navy, argued that ‘The carrier is the least 

vulnerable ship to destruction or sinking because of its large size in relation to the 

warheads constituting the threat, greater relative compartmentalisation, massive 

protection of propulsion and ordnance, and its structural strength necessary to handle 

the stress loads of catapulting and arresting 35 ton aircraft.’ Eric Grove, 

The Future of Sea Power (London: Routledge, 1990) p. 124. 

78 The Americans protect their aircraft carriers with a multi-layered defence comprising longrange 

fighters, air-to-air refuellers, electronic reconnaissance and countermeasures 

aircraft, ASW patrol aircraft, missile engagement zones, close-in weapon systems and 

built-in survivability measures (such as compartmentalisation and armour plating). Even 

then, they will operate with 2 carriers per group to ensure that at least one is capable of 

launching and recovering aircraft. Friedman, Op. Cit., p. 104. 

79 During recent operations in the Gulf (and despite the Americans’ considerable ASW and 

ASUW capability), US naval commanders demanded minute-by-minute updates on the 

whereabouts of 3 (neutral) Iranian ‘Kilos’. When the position of just one submarine was 

lost, the Americans withdrew their Carrier Air Group to the south, out of any possible 

danger. The carriers were withdrawn in a similar manner on the approach of any small, 

unidentified, fast-moving surface contacts. Meyer, Op. Cit. 

80 Friedman, Op. Cit., p. 77. 

81 Most analysts agree that if a carrier had been sunk, the war would have ended 

immediately. 

82 Cordesman and Wagner, Op. Cit., p. 341. 


84 Stocker, Op. Cit., p. 47. 

85 Ministry of Defence, British Air Power Doctrine (AP 3000 – 3rd Edition Final Study Draft) 

(JSCSC Bracknell: Department of Defence Studies (RAF)), 1998, Chapter 9. 

86 Ibid., p. 1.2. 

87 The UN definition of a complex emergency is ‘a humanitarian crisis in a country, region or 

society where there is a total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from 

internal conflict and which requires an international response that goes beyond the 

mandate or capacity of any single agency and/or the ongoing UN country aid 

programme’. John Mackinlay and Randolph Kent, ‘Complex Emergencies Doctrine: The 

British are Still the Best’ in RUSI Journal, April 1997, p. 39. 

88 Group Captain A Lambert, RAF, ‘Air Power and Coercion’ in Perspectives on Air Power – 

Air Power in its Wider Context, Edited by S Peach (London: The Stationery Office, 1998), 

p. 266. 

89 Group Captain Stuart Peach, RAF, ‘Coalition Air Operations’ in Ibid., p. 50. 

90 The Strategic Defence Review, Op. Cit., p. 14. 

91 The Strategic Defence Review: Supporting Essays, Op. Cit., Essay Four: ‘Defence 

Diplomacy’, p. 4-1. 


93 However, the intense air operations of the Gulf War could not have been sustained from 

aircraft carriers alone: without HNS, therefore, the war could not have been fought. 

94 United States Navy, Forward...From The Sea (Washington DC: Department of the Navy, 

1994), pp 6-7. 

95 Operational analysis also suggests that 50 aircraft will be required to ensure campaign 

success in medium-intensity scenarios. This requires a ship of some 30,000 to 40,000 

tons displacement, operating 50 aircraft in overload capacity. Harry, Op. Cit. 


97 CTOL and STOBAR hulls require 2 runways to enable simultaneous launch and recovery. 

They are therefore larger than STOVL ships. The STOBAR design, however, requires a 

longer runway for launch than the CTOL variant does for catapult operations and is 

therefore larger (and more expensive). STOBAR therefore combines the take-off 

limitations of STOVL with the cost disadvantages of CTOL and is unlikely to be chosen. 

Harry, Op. Cit. 

98 Idem. 


100 Further details of the Boeing and Lockheed Martin contenders may be found in Jane’s All 

The World’s Aircraft 1998-99 (pp. 559-560 and 671-672) and the companies’ Internet 

web-sites (see Bibliography). 

101 Graham Warwick, ‘Joint endeavour’ in Flight International, 3 – 9 July 1996, p. 26. 

102 The ‘off-board’ sensor concept envisages the use of remote sensor aircraft (such as 

AWACS) connected to individual fighters by datalink. Because the fighter has no onboard 

equipment, its electromagnetic emissions and its weight are minimised. The fighter 

cannot, however, be used autonomously except for visual engagements. 

103 The electromagnetic catapult is emerging technology which promises to provide smooth, 

controlled and continuous acceleration for carrier-launched aircraft, instead of the current 

‘explosive’ force of the steam catapult. The aircraft therefore do not need extensive 

strengthening to withstand the launch shock and can thus carry greater payloads. Harry, 

Op. Cit. 

104 Current contenders include the Rafale, the F-18E/F, a marinised EFA and the CTOL 

version of the JSF (which offers the technological advantages described above, but at 

much greater operational weights than its STOVL counterpart). A CTOL carrier would 

also accommodate the RAF’s proposed Future Offensive Air System, and could therefore 

generate considerable ‘economies of commonality’. Harry, Op. Cit. 

105 Goulter, Op. Cit. 

106 Likely future ASUW weapon developments include longer range, stealthy anti-ship 

missiles with dual seeker (IR and active/passive radar) heads, which will use mid-course 

way points and evasive manoeuvres during the terminal phase. They will fly at seaskimming 

heights or will use semi-ballistic trajectories with supersonic, near-vertical 

impact profiles. Future torpedoes will feature wake homing and stealth technology. Harry, 

Op. Cit. 

107 Tim Ripley, ‘Invincible Ideas?’ in Flight International, 26 March – 1 April 1997, p. 32.

Lockheed Raptor F-22 over Edwards AFB 

Photo: Lockheed 

107

TARGET 

BERLIN 

USAAF B-17 breaks up in 

flames over German target

TBy Dr Alfred Price FRHistS 

109 

he US bomber offensive against Germany sparked off some of the hardest-fought air actions in history. On 6 March 

1944 the 8th Air Force launched its first maximum effort daylight attack on Berlin. That action would prove to be the 

hardest-fought of them all, with heavy losses on both sides. 

By March 1944 the US 8th Air Force based in England considered itself sufficiently strong to take on the ultimate 

challenge, a daylight maximum-effort strike on the most heavily defended target in Germany – Berlin. After a couple of false 

starts, the first large scale daylight attack on the enemy capital took place on 6 March. 

A total of 563 B-17 Flying Fortresses and 249 B-24 Liberators were assigned to the Berlin mission. The 1st Bomb Division, with 

301 B-17s in five Wing formations, was to attack the V.K.F. ball-bearing factory at Erkner, the third-largest plant of its kind in 

Germany. The 2nd Bomb Division, with 249 B-24 Liberators in three Wing formations, was to bomb the Daimler-Benz works at 

Genshagen turning out more than a thousand aero engines per month. The 3rd Bomb Division, with 262 B-17s in six Wing 

formations, was to strike at the Bosch factory at Klein Machnow manufacturing electrical equipment for aircraft and military 

vehicles. 1 

For such a lengthy penetration into enemy 

airspace, 600 miles from the Dutch coast 

to Berlin and back, much would depend on 

the ability of the escorting fighters to ward 

off the inevitable attacks by German 

fighters. Fifteen Groups of P-38 Lightnings, 

P-47 Thunderbolts and P-51 Mustangs of 

the US 8th Air Force, four Groups of 

Thunderbolts and Mustangs of the US 9th 

Air Force and three squadrons of R.A.F. 

Mustangs – a total of 691 fighters – were 

to support the operation. After they had 

covered the bombers’ initial penetration, 

the plan called for 130 Thunderbolts to 

return to the base, refuel and re-arm, then 

return to eastern Holland to cover the final 

part of the bombers’ withdrawal. 2 

The B-17 Flying 

Fortress made up 

the bulk of the 

raiding force 

during the attack 

on Berlin, and 

units operating the 

type suffered the 

heaviest losses.

110 

The Escort Plan 

The plan for escorting the bombers on 6 March, using a total of nearly 700 P-38s, P-47s 

and P-51s. The 94-mile long bomber stream, to be flown during the route to the target, is 

drawn to scale and shows the order of the three bomb divisions. During the return flight the 

bomb divisions were to fly in line abreast. In each case the fighters flew with the bombers 

approximately 100 miles along the route. 

1. Two groups of P-47s were to join the bombers at this point and escort the 1st and 3rd 

Divisions. 

2. Two groups of P-47s were to join the bombers at this point and escort the 1st and 2nd 

Bomb Divisions. 

3. Two and a half groups of P-47s were to join the bombers at this point, one group 

escorting the 1st Bomb Division, one escorting the 3rd and a half group escorting the 

2nd Bomb Division. 

4. Three groups of P-51s were to join the bombers at this point, one escorting each bomb 

division. 

5. Three groups of P-38s were to join the bombers in this area, one escorting each bomb 

division. 

6. Three squadrons of Royal Air Force P-51 Mustangs were to join the bombers at this 

point. 

7. Two and a half groups of P-47s were to join the bombers at this point. 

8. Three groups of P-47s, one flying its second mission of the day, were to join the 

bombers at this point. 

9. Two groups of P-47s, both flying their second mission of the day, were to join the 

bombers at this point. 

ESCORT DIFFICULTIES 

Numerically the escorting force was formidable, but 

various factors conspired to limit the number of 

escorts in position to protect the bombers at any 

given place or time. The first constraint was the 

limited radius of action of the escorts: with drop 

tanks the fighters could penetrate deep into 

Germany, but only if they flew in a straight line. When 

they accompanied bombers the escorts had to 

maintain fighting speed while matching their rate of 

advance with that of their slower charges. That 

meant flying a zig-zag path, which added greatly to 

the distance flown. Also, the escorting fighters had to 

retain a reserve of fuel in case they needed to go into 

combat. Those factors limited the time a fighter 

Group could spend with bombers over Germany to 

about half an hour, or 100 miles of the bombers’ 

penetration. Then, hopefully, another Group of 

fighters would relieve it. Thus the escort of a deep 

penetration attack resembled a relay race, with some 

fighter units moving out to join the bombers, some 

with the bombers and others heading for home after 

completing their time with the bombers. At any one 

time only about 140 Allied fighters would be flying 

with the bombers, less than one-sixth of the number 

of sorties flown that day. 3 

At any one time only about 140 Allied 

fighters would be flying with the bombers, 

less than one-sixth of the number of sorties 

flown that day

111 

The Planned Route, 6 March 1944, Showing the Flak Zones 

As was usually the case, the bombers were routed to avoid flak zones wherever possible, 

without having to make too many turns on the way to the target. Apart from the target 

area, the planned route crossed only one flak zone, the moderately defended area round 

Vechta. The raiding force was to cross the Dutch coast at Egmond and fly due east to 

Celle, then east southeast to the Initial Points each 18 miles down-wind of the targets at 

Erkner, Klein Machnow and Genshagen. At the Initial Points the bombers were to turn into 

wind for their bomb runs. After attacking, the bombers were to leave the Berlin flak zone 

as quickly as possible, then reassemble with the other bomb divisions northwest of the 

city for the return flight. 

The second major constraint on the escorts was the 

huge length of the bomber stream: 94 miles during 

this attack. Had the 140 available escorts been 

spread out evenly throughout that distance, there 

would have been just three fighters to cover every 

two miles of the bomber stream. Tactically that would 

have been a useless distribution. The solution was to 

concentrate about half of the escorts around the one 

or two Combat Bomb Wings at the head of the 

bomber stream, the part most likely to come under 

attack from German fighters. The remaining escorts 

were split into eight-plane flights that patrolled the 

flanks of the rest of the bomber stream. 4 This 

arrangement meant that at any one time most 

bomber Wing formations had no escorts in a position 

to respond immediately, if they came under attack 

from German fighters. Until help arrived, the bombers 

had to rely on their own defensive fire power to hold 

off their attackers. 

THE RAIDERS ASSEMBLE 

Starting at 0750 hours 5 the bombers of the 8th Air Force began taking off from their bases in eastern England. Once airborne 

they assembled into Group formations then the Groups joined up to form Combat Bomb Wings. As the Bomb Wings crossed 

the coast of England at designated places and times, they slotted into position to form Divisions. At 1053 hours the vanguard of 

leading Bomb Division, the 1st, crossed the Dutch coast a little over three hours after the first plane had taken off. 6 

As they assembled into formation, the bombers came under the attentive gaze of Mammut and Wassermann long range early 

warning radar stations in Holland and Belgium. Their reports were passed to the fighter control bunkers from which the air 

defence of the German homeland was managed. The action about to open would be controlled from headquarters 3rd Fighter 

Division near Arnhem in Holland, that of 2nd Fighter Division at Stade near Hamburg and the headquarters 1st Fighter Division 

at Döberitz near Berlin. 7

112 

With the three Bomb Divisions in line astern, the 1st and the 3rd with B-17 Flying Fortresses then the 2nd with B-24 Liberators, 

the bombers thundered eastward over Holland at three miles per minute at altitudes around 20,000 feet. The aerial armada 

took more than half an hour to pass a given point on the ground. To those watching from the ground, it presenting an 

awesomely impres-sive spectacle of military might. 

Some commentators have likened the US heavy bomber actions over Germany to those fought over England during the Battle of 

Britain in the summer of 1940. Both led to large scale daylight actions, in which a numerically inferior defender strove to protect 

their homeland against attacks by enemy bombers with strong fighter escorts. However, the far greater distances to the targets in 

Germany meant that the later campaign was quite different in character. The defenders had far more time to assemble their 

forces, and they could deliver a more measured response than had been possible for the RAF in 1940. During the Battle of 

Britain the German raiding forces took half an hour to reach London, one of their more distant targets, from the south coast. In 

1944, the US bombers had often to spend four times as long over hostile territory to reach their targets in Germany. In contrast 

to the hectic British fighter scrambles of 1940, the German fighter controllers had ample time to prepare their riposte and direct 

their fighters into position. Certainly that would be the case on March 6, 1944. 

At airfields throughout Germany, Holland, Belgium and northern France, fighter units were brought through the different stages 

of alert, until the pilots were at cockpit readiness awaiting the order to take off. As the raiding force headed due east across 

Holland, the German fighter controllers could see that it was probably heading for a target in northern Germany. 

Messerschmitt 110G was the main type of bomber 

destroyer operated by the Luftwaffe. This example 

carried two 30-mm cannon, four 20-mm cannon and 

four launchers for 21-cm unguided rockets under the 

outer wings. 

…the Luftwaffe had 

just over nine hundred 

serviceable fighters 

available for the 

defence of the Reich. 

The heavyweights 

were the eighty twinengined 

Messerschmitt 

110s and Me 410s… 

On this day the Luftwaffe had just over nine 

hundred serviceable fighters available for the 

defence of the Reich. The heavyweights were 

the eighty twin-engined Messerschmitt 110s 

and Me 410s, specialized bomber destroyers 

armed with batteries of heavy cannon and 

launchers for 21-cm unguided rockets. In 

addition there were nearly six hundred 

Messerschmitt 109 and Focke Wulf 190 

single-engined fighters. Also there were more 

than two hundred night fighters, 

Messerschmitt 110s and Junkers 88s, that 

could be sent up to assist with daylight air defence operations. 8

Just as there were operational constraints limiting the proportion of the 

escorting fighters available to protect U.S bombers at any one time, so 

other constraints limited the proportion of the defending fighter force 

that could be put into action against them. The tyranny of distance 

imposed its will on attacker and defender alike. The defending fighters 

had to be disposed to protect a huge area of France, Holland and 

Belgium as well as almost the whole Germany. To bring into action 

those units based far from the bombers’ route, for example in eastern 

France or southern Germany, called for a degree of prescience on the 

part of the fighter controllers. Moreover, although the twin-engined 

bomber-destroyers had the range to reach any part of Germany, these 

large and unwieldy machines were liable to suffer heavy losses if they 

were caught by the escorts. Because of this, the twin-engined fighters 

were limited to engagements east of the line Bremen – Kassel – 

Frankfurt. The night-fighters, slowed by the weight of their radar 

equipment and the drag from its complex aerial arrays, were to be used only to pick off wounded 

stragglers. 

The fact that the bombers were accompanied by escorts presented a severe problem for the 

German fighter pilots. The answer was for the defenders to deliver their attack en mass, to 

overwhelm the escort at a chosen time and place. Also, to reduce effectiveness of the bombers’ 

return fire, the defending fighters were to deliver their initial attack from head-on. That required 

careful direction from the ground controllers, and skilful tactical handling from the formation 

leader. 

At 1100 hours, seven minutes after the leading bombers crossed the Dutch coast, the first 

German fighter units began taking off: one hundred and seven Messerschmitt 109s and Focke 

Wulf 190s drawn from Ist and IInd Gruppen of Jagdgeschwader 1, Ist, IInd and IIIrd Gruppen of 

Jagdgeschwader 11 and IIIrd of Jagdgeschwader 54. 9 Once airborne, the fighters assembled 

into Gruppe (25-30 plane) formations then commenced their climb to altitude. As they did so they 

headed for Lake Steinhuder near Hannover, the designated assembly point for the battle 

formation. Although this German ‘Big Wing’ was twice as large as any that Douglas Bader had 

led during the Battle of Britain in 1940, it would not suffer the same shortcomings of the earlier 

tactic. For one thing the American bomber formations occupied a much larger volume of 

The Messerschmitt 109G formed the bulk of the 

defending figher force on 6 March 1944. This example 

was armed with three 20 mm cannon and two 13 mm 

machine guns. 

113 

…the first German 

fighter units began 

taking off: one hundred 

and seven 

Messerschmitt 109s 

and Focke Wulf 190s 

drawn from Ist and IInd 

Gruppen of 

Jagdgeschwader 1, Ist, 

IInd and IIIrd Gruppen 

of Jagdgeschwader 11 

and IIIrd of 

Jagdgeschwader 54

114 

airspace than their Luftwaffe counterparts in 1940. Also, the fighters would make their initial attack from head-on. These factors 

would ensure that defending fighters would rarely get into each others’ way during the actual attack. 

Escorting the bombers during the initial part of their penetration into Germany were one hundred and forty Thunderbolts from 

the 56th, 78th, and 353rd Fighter Groups. 10 Although the escorts outnumbered the German fighters now preparing to engage 

the bombers, the arithmetic of the ensuing engagement was not on their side. The German fighter pilots would focus their 

attack on one Combat Bomb Wing formation, but until the last minute the escorts would be ignorant of where the blow would 

fall. As was pointed out earlier, about half the escorts were concentrated at the leading Bomb Wing formations, with the 

remainder divided along the rest of the force. 

Soon after the vanguard of the attacking force crossed the Dutch coast, the pathfinder B-17 at the head of the attack force 

suffered a radar failure (at this time only a few pathfinder bombers carried groundmapping 

radar). As a result the leading formation flew a heading that took it a 

slightly south of the planned route. 11 The rest of the bombers in the 1st Bomb 

Division followed it, as did those at the head of the 3rd Division. Before the leader 

had deviated 20 miles from the planned track the error was discovered, and the 

The unlucky 13th Wing would soon 

pay a terrible price for this 

accumulation of relatively minor errors 

pathfinder edged on to a more northerly heading to regain the planned route. 12 But by then the damage had been done. The 

13th Wing, situated mid-way along the bomber stream, was a couple of minutes late at the Dutch Coast and it had lost visual 

contact with the 4th Wing ahead of it. Ignorant of the deviation from the briefed route by the bombers ahead of it, the 13th 

adhered to the flight plan. The unlucky 13th Wing would soon pay a terrible price for this accumulation of relatively minor errors. 

Vectored by controllers at the Luftwaffe 3rd Fighter Division at Stade, the leader of the German battle formation caught sight of 

the incoming enemy formation at 1155 hours. The ground controllers had done their work well: the raiders were almost exactly 

in front of the defenders, and far enough away to allow a few small corrections as the defending fighters ligned up for the 

attack. 

It was sheer bad luck for the American bomber crews involved that the formation now under threat was not that leading the 

bomber stream, where more than half of the escorting Thunderbolts were concentrated. It was the 13th Wing, that was 

heading the detached second half of the bomber stream and which was almost devoid of such protection. Lieutenant Robert 

Johnson of the 56th Fighter Group, flying a P-47, was to one side of the Wing when he suddenly noticed the enemy formation 

closing in fast: 

“I was on the left side of the bombers and going 180 degrees to them when I noticed a large box of planes coming at us at 

the same level. There were about forty or fifty to a box, and I saw two boxes at our level and one box at 27,000 or 28,000 

feet. I called in to watch them, and then that they were FW 190s. There were only eight of us…’ 13

The Thunderbolts attempted to disrupt the attack but the German pilots simply ignored them as they streaked for the 

115 

bombers. The opposing forces met at noon, 21,000 feet above the small German town of Haselünne close to the Dutch 

border. 

A head-on attack on an bomber required a high degree of skill from the fighter pilot if it was to succeed. Closing at a rate of 

200 yards per second, there was time only a brief half-second burst from 500 yards before he had to ease up on the stick to 

avoid colliding with his target. For experienced pilots like Hauptmann Anton Hackl, the fighter ace leading the Focke Wulfs of 

IIIrd Gruppe of Jagdgeschwader 11 that day, that was quite sufficient. As he later commented: 

“One accurate half-second burst from head-on [on a four-engined bomber] and a kill was guaranteed. Guaranteed!” 14 

Feldwebel (Sergeant) Friedrich Ungar of Jagdgeschwader 54, flying an Me 109, saw his rounds exploding against the engine of 

one of the bombers and pieces fly off: 

“There was no time for jubilation. The next thing I was inside the enemy formation trying to get through without ramming 

anyone. Nobody fired at me then, they were too concerned about hitting each other. When we emerged from the formation 

things got really hot; we had the tail gunners of some thirty bombers letting fly at us with everything they had. Together with 

part of our Gruppe I pulled sharply to the left and high, out to one side. Glancing back I saw the Fortress I had hit tip up 

and go down to the right, smoking strongly.” 15 

Sergeant Van Pinner, a top turret gunner in a B-17 of the 100th Bomb Group, recalled that he had far more targets than he 

could possibly engage: 

“There were fighters everywhere. They seemed to come past in fours. I would engage the first three but then the fourth 

would be on to me before I could get my guns on him. I knew our aircraft was being hit real bad – we lost the ball turret 

gunner early in the fight…” 16 

The initial head-on attack was over in much less than a minute. Then, almost in slow motion, a succession of mortally wounded 

heavy bombers began sliding out of formation. The 13th Wing comprised A and B formations flying almost in line abreast with a 

mile between them. The B formation comprised thirty-eight Flying Fortresses from the 100th and 390th Bomb Groups and its 

Low Box, with sixteen B-17s at the start of the action, suffered the worst. All six bombers of its High Squadron were shot 

down, as were two of the six in its Lead Squadron and two of the four in its Low Squadron. 17 

Lieutenant John Harrison of the 100th Bomb Group, captain of one of the bombers, gazed in disbelief as planes began to go 

down around him: 

“The engine of one Fort burst into flames and soon the entire ship was afire. Another was burning from waist to tail. It 

seemed both the pilot and copilot of another ship had been killed. It started towards us out of control. I moved the 

squadron over. Still it came. Again we moved. This time the stricken Fortress stalled, went up on its tail, then slid down.” 18

116 

Following the initial firing pass, the German fighters split into twos and fours and curved around to deliver re-attacks on the 

same formation. Some overtook the bombers and sped ahead of them preparatory to moving into position for a further headon 

attack. Other German fighters attacked the bomber formation from behind, yet others dived after damaged B-17s that had 

been forced to leave the formation and were trying to escape to the west. 

Lieutenant Lowell Watts, captain of a bomber in the next formation in the stream, was an unwilling spectator to the unequal 

battle: 

“About two or three miles ahead of us was the 13th Combat Wing. Their 

formation had tightened up since I last looked at it. Little dots that were 

German fighters were diving into those formation, circling, and attacking again. 

Out of one high squadron a B-17 slowly climbed away from its formation, the 

entire right wing a mass of flames. I looked again a second later. There was a 

flash – then nothing but little specks drifting, tumbling down. Seconds later 

another bomber tipped up on a wing, rolled over and dove straight for the 

ground. Little white puffs of parachutes began to float beneath us, then fall 

behind as we flew toward our target.” 19 

From the moment the German fighters had first been sighted, the 13th Wing put out desperate radio calls to summon the 

escorts. Colonel Hub Zemke, commander of the 56th Fighter Group and heading an eight-plane flight of Thunderbolts, arrived 

at the beleaguered unit just as Oberleutnant Wolfgang Kretschmer of Jagdgeschwader 1 was lining up for another firing pass 

on the bombers. Zemke spotted the lone Focke Wulf below him and ordered one section of four aircraft to remain at high 

altitude to cover him, while he led his section down to attack. 20 

Kretschmer hauled the Focke 

Wulf into a tight turn to the left 

get out of the way but it was too 

late. By then Zemke was in a 

firing position and .5-in rounds 

from his accurate burst thudded 

into the wings and fuselage of 

the German fighter 

“Out of one high squadron a B-17 

slowly climbed away from its 

formation, the entire right wing a mass 

of flames. I looked again a second 

later. There was a flash – then nothing 

but little specks drifting…” 

Before opening fire at the bomber he had selected as a target, Kretschmer glanced over his 

own tail to check that the sky was clear. It was not. The German pilot was horrified to see 

Zemke’s Thunderbolt closing in rapidly on him followed by three others. Kretschmer hauled 

the Focke Wulf into a tight turn to the left get out of the way but it was too late. By then 

Zemke was in a firing position and .5-in rounds from his accurate burst thudded into the 

wings and fuselage of the German fighter. As the Zemke pulled up to regain altitude he 

glanced back and saw the enemy fighter falling out of the sky enveloped in flames. 21 

Kretschmer extricated himself from the cockpit of his blazing aircraft, and jumped clear. 

He landed by parachute with moderate burns to his hands and face and splinters 

embedded in his thigh.

The main part of the initial action lasted about ten minutes. Then, as the German fighters exhausted their ammunition, they 

dived away from the fight to avoid the escorts. 

Even as the initial action petered to its close, a second German battle formation was already moving into position to engage the 

raiders. From their bunker at Döberitz near Berlin, the controllers of the 1st Fighter Division had assembled every available fighter in 

that part of Germany. The core of the battle formation comprised the bomber destroyers, forty-two Messerschmitt 110s and 410s 

from IInd and IIIrd Gruppen of Zerstörergeschwader 26 and Ist and IInd Gruppen of ZG 76. Providing cover for these, though they 

were also expected to engage the bombers, were seventy Me 109s and FW 190s from 

Ist, IInd and IVth Gruppen of Jagdgeschwader 3, Ist of JG 302 and Sturmstaffel 1. 22 

Again a large force of German fighters charged almost head-on into a couple of 

formations of Flying Fortresses flying in line abreast. The 1st Combat Wing 

comprised fifty-one B-17s drawn from the 91st and 381st Bomb Groups. The 94th 

Combat Wing, with sixty-one Flying Fortresses from the 401st and 457th Bomb 

Groups, flew a couple of miles to the right of it. But these two Wings were in the 

vanguard of the bomber stream and were protected by a large proportion of the 

available escorts: eighty Mustangs from the 4th and 354th Fighter Groups. 23 

This time the escorts were in the right place, at the right time and in sufficient 

numbers to blunt the German attack. Watching from his P-51, Lieutenant Nicholas 

Megura of the 4th Fighter Group described the approach of the German formation: 

“Twelve-plus smoke-trails were seen coming from twelve 

…Mustangs’ spoiling 

action forced several 

bomber destroyers to 

abandon their attacks, 

but others continued 

doggedly on to launch 

their hefty 21 cm 

calibre rockets into the 

bomber formations 

o’clock and high, thirty miles ahead. ‘Upper’ [the Group 

leader] positioned the Group up sun, below condensation 

height, and waited. Trails finally positioned themselves at 

nine o’clock to bombers and started to close. Six 

thousand feet below the trails were twenty-plus singleengine 

fighters line abreast, sweeping the area for 

twenty-plus twin-engine rocket-carrying aircraft. ‘Upper’ 

led Group head-on into front wave of enemy aircraft.” 24 

The Mustangs’ spoiling action forced several bomber 

destroyers to abandon their attacks, but others continued 

doggedly on to launch their hefty 21 cm calibre rockets 

into the bomber formations. 

The superlative P-51B Mustang had the 

range to escort US bombers as far east 

as Berlin, and the performance to outfly 

the defending fighter types. 

117

118 

Either accidentally or deliberately, an Me 410 collided with or rammed head-on into a Flying Fortress of the 457th Bomb Group 

and tore away a large section of the bomber’s tail. The stricken bomber, which had been flying on the right side of the High 

Squadron, went out of control and entered a steep diving turn to the left. After narrowly missing several bombers in the 

formation, it smashed into the aircraft on the far left of the Low Squadron. Only one man survived from the three crews involved 

in the incident, the tail gunner from the last aircraft to be struck. 25 

As the bomber-destroyers emerged from the rear of the bomber formation, other 

Mustangs pounced on them. The nimble single-seaters did great execution, shooting 

down fourteen of the twin-engined fighters in quick succession. 

Hard on the heels of the heavy fighters came the main body of the attack formation, 

seventy single-seat Messerschmitts and Focke Wulfs. Leutnant Hans Iffland of 

Jagdgeschwader 3, flying a Messerschmitt Bf 109, recalled: 

Hard on the heels of the heavy 

fighters came the main body of the 

attack formation, seventy single-seat 

Messerschmitts and Focke Wulfs 

“During the firing run everything happened very quickly, with the closing speed of about 800 kilometres per hour [500 mph]. 

After firing my short burst at one of the B-17s I pulled up over it; I had attacked from slightly above, allowing a slight 

deflection angle and aiming at the nose. I saw my rounds exploding around the wing root and tracers rounds from the 

bombers flashing past me. As I pulled up over the bomber I dropped my left wing, to see the results of my attack and also 

to give the smallest possible target at which their gunners could aim. Pieces broke off the bomber and it began to slide out 

of the formation.” 26 

The action around the leading formations lasted little over ten minutes and, thanks to the efforts of the Mustangs, the 

bombers’s losses were much lighter than during the earlier attack: seven bombers destroyed immediately, or forced to leave the 

formation to be finished off as stragglers. 

Now, shortly after 1300 hours, the raiding units were moving into position to 

begin their bomb runs. Defending Berlin was the 1st Flak Division comprising the 

22nd, 53rd, 126th and 172nd Flak Regiments with more than four hundred 8.8 

cm, 10.5 cm, and 12.8 cm guns. As the bomber formations closed on the 

capital and entered the inferno of flak, the German fighters broke off the action. 27 

As they approached their targets the bombers split into their three divisions and lined up for their bombing runs. The first to feel 

the gunners’ wrath were the Flying Fortresses of the 1st Bomb Division. Captain Ed Curry, a bombardier with the 401st Bomb 

Group, never forgot that cannonade: 

As the bomber formations closed on the 

capital and entered the inferno of flak, 

the German fighters broke off the action

“I’d been to Oschersleben and the Ruhr, but I’d never seen flak as heavy as that they had over Berlin. It wasn’t just the 

119 

odd black puff, it was completely dense; not just at one altitude, but high and low. There was a saying that you see the 

smoke only after the explosion; but that day we actually saw the red of the explosions. One shell burst near us, and we 

had chunks of shell tear through the radio room and the bomb bay.” 28 

Now, however, the weather intervened to protect the primary targets more effectively than the defences ever could. At first it had 

seemed the lead bombardiers at the head of each Wing formation could make visual bomb runs on the targets through breaks in 

the clouds. But, at the critical moment, the aiming points were obscured and by then it was too late to revert to radar-controlled 

bomb runs. No planes hit the 1st Division’s primary target at Erkner, and the attackers released their bombs on the Köpenick and 

Weissensee districts of the city which were clear of cloud. 29 

It was a similar story for the 3rd Bomb Division, whose Flying Fortresses missed the primary target at Klein Machnow and 

bombed the Steglitz and Zehlendorf districts instead. Lowell Watts was established on his bomb run when the gunners zeroed 

in on his formation. 

“They didn’t start out with wild shots and work in closer. The first salvo they sent up was right on us. We could hear the 

metal of our plane rend and tear as each volley exploded. The hits weren’t direct. They were just far enough away so they 

didn’t take off a wing, the tail or blow the plane up; they would just tear a ship half apart without completely knocking it 

out. Big ragged holes appeared in the wings and the fuselage. Kennedy, the co-pilot, was watching nothing but the 

instruments, waiting for the tell-tale indication of a damaged or ruined engine. But they kept up their steady roar, even as 

the ship rocked from the nearness of the flak bursts… The flak was coming up as close as ever, increasing in intensity. 

Above and to the right of us a string of bombs trailed out from our lead ship. Simultaneously our ship jumped upwards, 

relieved of its explosive load as the call ‘Bombs away!’ came over the interphone. Our left wing ship, one engine feathered, 

dropped behind the formation. That left only four of us in the low squadron. A few minutes later the flak stopped. We had 

come through it and all four engines were still purring away.” 30 

Only a few Liberators of the 2nd Bomb Division, the last to attack, put their bombs 

on their primary target, the Daimler-Benz aero-engine works at Genshagen; the rest 

of the attack also fell on secondary targets in and around the capital. 

The vicious bombardment from the flak batteries knocked down only four bombers, 

but damaged several others sufficiently to force them to leave formation. Nearly half 

of all bombers that reached Berlin collected flak damage of some sort. 

As the bombers emerged from the flak zones, a few German single-seat fighters 

tried to a press home attacks. Also, fourteen Messerschmitt 110 night fighters from 

Nachtjagdgeschwader 5 closed in bent on finishing off stragglers. The American 

The vicious bombardment from the 

flak batteries knocked down only four 

bombers, but damaged several others 

sufficiently to force them to leave 

formation. Nearly half of all bombers 

that reached Berlin collected flak 

damage of some sort

120 

escorts quickly took charge of the situation, however. They pounced on the night fighters and the latter, too slow to escape 

from their pursuers, lost ten of their number within the space of a few minutes. 31 

For the time being the German fighters had spent their force, and during the next half there was a lull in the fighting. 

Relieved by fresh squadrons of Thunderbolts, the Mustangs peeled away from the bombers headed for home. As they were 

running out past Bremen, a section of Mustangs of the 357th Fighter Group came upon a lone Messerschmitt 109 and 

Lieutenants Howell and Carder shot it down. The German pilot, Oberleutnant Gerhard Loos of Jagdgeschwader 54, a leading 

ace credited with ninety-two victories, was killed. 32 

The air action around the bombers resumed at 1440 hours, with attacks by Me 109s and FW 190s that had landed, refueled 

and re-armed after taking part in the noon action near Haselünne. Other fighters came from units based in France and Belgium, 

that had missed the raiders on their way in. 

The formation hardest hit during this engagement was the 45th Combat Bomb Wing. Once again Lowell Watts of the 388th 

Bomb Group takes up the story: 

“The interphone snapped to life: ‘Focke Wulfs at 3 o’clock level!’ Yes, there they were. What seemed at a hurried count to 

be about 30 fighters flying along just out of range beside us. They pulled ahead of us, turned across our flight path and 

attacked from ahead and slightly below us. Turrets swung forward throughout the formation and began spitting out their.50 

calibre challenge. Some Focke Wulfs pulled above us and hit us from behind while most dived in from the front, coming in 

from 11 to 1 o’clock to level, so close that only every second or third plane could be sighted on by the gunners. Still them 

came, rolling, firing and diving away, then attacking again.” 33 

He watched two bombers fall out of the formation, then his own aircraft came under attack: 

“Brassfield called from the tail position ‘I’ve got one, I’ve got one!’ Then, almost with the same breath ‘I’ve been hit!’ No 

sooner had the interphone cleared from that message when an even more ominous one cracked into the headsets: ‘We’re 

on fire!’ Looking forwards I saw a Focke Wulf coming at us from dead level at 12 o’clock. The fire from our top and chin 

turrets shook the B-17. At the same instant his wings lit up with fire from his guns. The 20 mm rounds crashed through our 

nose and exploded beneath my feet amongst the oxygen tanks. At the same time they slashed through some of the 

gasoline cross-feed lines. The flames which started here, fed by the pure oxygen and the gasoline, almost exploded 

through the front of the ship. The companionway to the nose, the cockpit and the bomb bays was a solid mass of flame.” 34 

Watts struggled to hold the bomber level while his crew abandoned the machine. The flames prevented him from seeing ahead 

and he could not know that his aircraft was edging towards another in the formation. With a crash of tortured metal the

121 

bombers smashed together, then broke apart. Shedding pieces, the two planes began their long fall to earth. 

Unaware that there had been a collision, Watts knew that his bomber was no longer under his control. Also, seemingly for no 

good reason, almost the whole of the cabin roof above his head had suddenly vanished. He struggled clear of the plunging 

bomber and parachuted to safety. 35 

During this sharp engagement the 388th Bomb Group lost a total of seven aircraft. The losses were not all on one side, 

however. Hauptmann Hugo Frey of Jagdgeschwader 11, a fighter ace credited with the destruction of twenty-six US heavy 

bombers, was killed when his FW 190 was shot down by return fire from the bombers. 36 

THE RECKONING 

On 6 March a total of 814 Flying Fortresses and Liberators set out from England, of which 672 attacked primary or secondary 

targets in the Berlin area. Sixty-nine B-17s and B-24s failed to return, including four planes with serious damage that put down in 

Sweden. A further sixty bombers landed at airfields in England with severe damage, and 336 more returned with lesser damage. 37 

Of the bombers that failed to return 42 were certainly or probably lost to fighter attack, 13 to flak, five to fighters and flak, and five in 

collisions with friendly or enemy planes. The causes of the remaining four losses cannot be ascertained. 38 A total of 691 escorts 

took part in the operation, of which eleven were destroyed and eight returned with severe damage. Ten escorts fell to fighter attack 

and one to flak. 39 Of those US aircraft that penetrated into enemy territory, one bomber in ten and one fighter in 75 were lost. 

The hardest hit unit, the 100th Bomb Group, lost fifteen of the thirty-six aircraft that crossed the Dutch coast; 

most of those during the initial clash near Haselünne 

In a concentrated fighter-versus-bomber action of this type, it was usual for the heaviest losses to be confined to a few 

unfortunate units. As luck would have it on this occasion, all of them flew B-17 Flying Fortresses. The hardest hit unit, the 100th 

Bomb Group, lost fifteen of the thirty-six aircraft that crossed the Dutch coast; most of those during the initial clash near 

Haselünne. The 95th Bomb Group, which with the 100th made up the 13B Wing formation, lost eight bombers. The 388th 

Bomb Group lost seven planes and the 91st lost six planes. 40 Those four unlucky Groups lost more than half of the heavy 

bombers that failed to return. 

By its nature, an account such as this focuses on the areas of heaviest fighting and the units that took the heaviest losses. To 

put things into perspective, it should be noted that the remaining thirty-three bomber losses were spread evenly across 

nineteen Bomb Groups. Six Bomb Groups flew the mission without suffering a single loss. 41

122 

Of the US personnel engaged in the raid, 701 men failed to return immediately or at all. 

Of these, 229 were killed or missing and 411 were taken prisoner. Thirteen men came 

down in Holland, made contact with the resistance and evaded capture. Eight men were 

picked up from the North Sea by the RAF rescue service. Finally, the forty men aboard 

the four planes that landed in Sweden were all repatriated during the next few months. 42 

…the Luftwaffe lost fortyfour 

aircrew killed, 

including two leading aces. 

A further twenty-three 

aircrewmen were wounded 

Of the US personnel engaged in 

the raid, 701 men failed to return 

immediately or at all. Of these, 

229 were killed or missing and 

411 were taken prisoner 

That day the Luftwaffe flew 528 fighter sorties, of which 69 probably made contact with the 

raiders. 43 Sixty-two German fighters, 16 per cent of those that made contact, were destroyed and 

thirteen damaged. The twin-engined fighter units took the heaviest losses. Nachtjagdgeschwader 5 

lost ten of the fourteen Messerschmitt 110 night fighters it sent up. Zerstörergeschwader 26 lost 

eleven of its eighteen Messerschmitt 110 and Me 410 bomber-destroyers. Altogether the Luftwaffe 

lost forty-four aircrew killed, including two leading aces. A further twenty-three aircrewmen were 

wounded. 44 

As an attempt to curtail production at the three primary targets in Berlin, the 6 March attack was a failure. None of those 

objectives was hit effectively. Only the Genshagen aero engine plant came under attack at all, from a quarter of the force 

assigned to it, and there the bombing was scattered and ineffectual. 45 

From other viewpoints the attack on Berlin was a resounding success, however. It demonstrated that from now on there was 

no target in Germany, no matter how far it lay from England or how strong its defences, immune from daylight bomber attack 

accompanied by a powerful fighter escort. 

The 8th Air Force was quick to drive home that lesson. Two days later, on 8 March, it sent 539 bombers to Berlin. It did so yet 

again on the 9th (490 bombers) and the 22nd (657 bombers). And on those occasions the weather did not shield the German 

capital. Altogether, during March 1944, the US 8th and 9th Air Forces in England, and the 15th Air Force in Italy, mounted 

eighteen large scale incursions to attack targets in German-held territory at a cost of just over four hundred bombers and 

fighters. 46 Yet, thanks to the well-resourced US supply and aircrew training organisations, these losses were immediately made 

good. 

During the same period Luftwaffe units defending the homeland lost 356 fighters destroyed and 163 damaged. 47 With difficulty, 

those could be replaced also. The loss of 219 aircrew killed and missing, and 103 wounded, 48 almost all of them pilots, was a 

quite different matter. The Luftwaffe flying training organisation was short of aircraft, flying instructors and fuel. Even by 

sacrificing quality for quantity, it was quite unable to replace losses on that scale. 49

Early in May Generalmajor Adolf Galland, the Inspector of Fighters, was forced to write, in a grim report to the Reich Air 

Ministry: 

“Between [the beginning of ] January and [the end of] April 1944 our day fighter units lost over 1,000 pilots. They included 

our best Staffel, Gruppe and Geschwader commanders. Each incursion of the enemy is costing us some fifty aircrew. The 

time has come when our [force] is in sight to collapse.” 50 

When Allied troops stormed ashore in Normandy on D-Day, 6 June 1944, the Luftwaffe fighter arm was a spent force that was 

quite unable to intervene effectively. The air supremacy over France, necessary to secure the invasion, had been won during the 

hard-fought campaign of attrition over Germany itself during the preceding five months. 

Taken from “Target Berlin, Mission 250, 6 March 1944”, by Jeffrey Ethell and Alfred Price, published by Arms and Armour Press, 

London, 1981. 

NOTES 

1. Headquarters 8th Air Force, Field Order Operation No 250, 6 March 1944. 

2. VIIIth Fighter Command Narrative of Operations, 6 March 1944. 

3. Ibid. 

4. Ibid. 

5. Times are given in British Summer Time, in use by the USAAF in Britain. This coincided 

with the Middle European Time in use in Germany and in the Luftwaffe. 

6. 8th Air Force Narrative of Operations, 6 March 1944. 

7. Air Ministry ACAS(I) “The Rise and Fall of the German Air Force”, London, 1948, p 295. 

8. Einsatzbereitschaft der deutschen Jagdverbaende, 5. 3.44, Freiburg document RL2/1704; 

also Genst.Gen.Qu.6 Abt, Stand der Einzatsberitschaft am 29.2.44, Freiburg document 

RLIII/729. 

9. Freiburg document Kart 44/1632-1633 gives the times of take-off, number and type of 

planes and airfields of each air defence units taking part in the action on 6 March 1944. 

10. VIIIth Fighter Command Narrative, op cit. 

11. 1st Bombardment Division, Report of Operations, 6 March 1944. 

12. Ibid. 

13. Personal Combat Report Lt Johnson, 56th Fighter Group, 6 March 1944. 

14. Interview Anton Hackle. 

15. Interview Friedrich Ungar. 

16. Interview Van Pinner. 

17. 100th Bombardment Group, Narrative of Operations, 6 March 1944. 

18. Interview John Harrison. 

19. Transcript of day’s events written by Lowell Watts, made available to writer. 

20. Interviews Hub Zemke and Wolfgang Kretchmer. 

21. Ibid. 

22. Freiburg document Kart 44/1632- 1633, op cit. 


24. Personal Combat Report, Lieutenant Nicholas Megura, 4th Fighter Group, 6 March 1944. 

25. Narrative of Operations 457th Bomb Group, 6 March 1944. 

26. Interview Hans Iffland. 

27. Correspondence Goetz Bergander. 

28. Correspondence, Ed Curry. 

29. 8th Air Force Narrative, op cit. 

30. Watts transcript. 

31. Kriegstagebuch NJG 5, 6 March 1944. 

32. Obermaier, Ernst, “Die Ritterkreuztraeger der Luftwaffe”, Verlag Dieter Hoffmann, Mainz, 

1966, p 165. 

33. Watts Transcript. 

34. Ibid. 

35. Ibid. 

36. Obermaier, p 121. 

37. VIIIth Bomber Command Narrative, op cit. 

38. Missing Aircrew Reports. 


40. Missing Air Crew Reports. 

41. Operational Research Section, Headquarters Eighth Air Force, Combat Damage Report, 6 

March 1944. 

42. Missing Air Crew Reports. 

43. Freiburg document Kart 44/1632- 1633, op cit. 

44. Luftwaffe casualty figures supplied by the Deutsche Dienstelle, Berlin. 

45. VIIIth Bomber Command Narrative, op cit. 

46. Freeman, Roger “Mighty Eighth War Diary”, Jane’s, London, 1981, p 189 et seq; also 

Rust, Kenn, “The 9th Air Force in World War II”, Aero Publishers, Fallbrook, 1967, p 60 et 

seq; also Rust, Kenn, “Fifteenth Air Force Story”, Sunshine House, Terre Haute, 1976, p 

16). 

47. Gruppe I (IC) General der Jagdflieger “Grosseinfluege in das Reichgebiet (Tag) Januar 

1944 – Juni 1944”, copy of report in possession of the author. 

48. Ibid. 

49. “Rise and Fall”, op cit, p 314 et seq. 

50. Quoted in Bekker, Cajus, “The Luftwaffe War Diaries”, Macdonald, London, 1967, p 351. 

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BOOK REVIEWS 

BY AIR MARSHAL 

SIR TIMOTHY GARDEN 

b o o k r e v i e w s 

These book reviews first appeared in the Times Higher Education 

Supplement. 

WAR & LAW SINCE 1945 

By Geoffrey Best 

Clarendon Press, Oxford, 434pp, £25 

ISBN 0-19-821991-1 

published October 1994 

GENOCIDE: CONCEPTUAL AND HISTORICAL 

DIMENSIONS 

By George J. Andreopoulos (Editor) 

University of Philadelphia Press, 

265pp, £32.95 

ISBN 0-8122-3249-6 

published August 1994 

CHILD SOLDIERS 

By Ilene Cohn and Guy S. Goodwin-Gill 

Clarendon Press, Oxford, 228pp, 

£25 and £10.95 

ISBN 0-19-825935-2 and 825932-8 

published September 1994 

There are those who question the very logic of a concept of the laws 

of war. War is such a violent and terrible undertaking, that it seems 

beyond the calm rational structure of a legal code. In the minds of 

others, such a regime suggests the complex customs of ancient 

knights with their code of chivalry. The cynics claim that prosecutions 

for war crimes are always of the vanquished by the victor and that this 

makes for an unjust form of legislation. 

The laws of war are different in nature from domestic laws, and also 

from the normal range of international law. There is no single legislature 

to agree the rules of war and no standing police force to catch the law 

breakers. Yet no state can afford to ignore the international consensus 

on the laws of war, whether as the aggressor nation or the defending 

power. Nor is it possible to cobble together a suitable set of rules as 

each war breaks out. The soldiers need guidance as to the legality of 

their actions, and they need long training so that the implications of the 

rules of war become second nature. The planners need to procure 

military equipment many years before it is delivered into service. It could 

be less than sensible to invest both time and money in the 

development of a weapon system, if its use would be a criminal act in 

the eyes of the world community. Political leaders need also to be 

aware of the constraints of the international laws of war. 

Again, the sceptic may laugh. A statesman intent on war is unlikely 

to be constrained by the customs of the world community on the 

laws of war. A military scientist, who discovers a more effective way 

of incapacitating the opposition, will be able to persuade the arms 

manufacturers to invest in his new weapon. The military man will not 

wish to fight with one hand tied behind his back. Taking these three 

books together provides some of the answers to these doubts. The 

first explains the development and current compass of the laws of 

war, and highlights the failures as well as the successes. The other 

two give graphic examples of the inhumanity and needless 

catastrophe that flow from lack of observance of even the most 

basic humanitarian laws. 

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Professor Best is not a lawyer by training but a historian, and his book 

War & Law since 1945 is a description of the development of the 

thinking, practice and effectiveness of laws about conflict. Indeed, he 

makes it clear that lawyers should read the book for pleasure, but not as 

the preparation for academic examinations on International Law. The 

spread of international agreement on humanitarian law has been mainly 

a twentieth century phenomenon. Reflecting this (and his title) only one 

chapter is allocated to events from the dawn of time to 1945. 

He dates the codification of the laws and customs of war from the 

regulation of maritime commerce in wartime, which was dealt with in 

1856. Land warfare codes followed in quick succession, and by the 

turn of the century a set of such regulations was annexed to the 

Hague Conventions. In parallel, work was developed on codification 

of practices for the sick and wounded. International agreement on 

simple humanitarian arrangements was agreed in the Geneva 

Convention of 1864. 

The third pillar of such laws was to be the question of the involvement 

of non-combatants in war. Here Best describes why the development 

of a legal framework seems to have been rather less tidy. While the 

St. Petersburg declaration of 1868 indicated that the only legitimate 

object in war was the weakening of the military forces of the enemy, 

there was no explicit ban on attacking civilians. 

The test of these new humanitarian laws was to come with World War 

1. While many of the rules were broken, or bent beyond recognition, it 

was a war in which the belligerents all presumed the validity of the laws 

of war, and could thus accuse each other of contraventions. Yet, 

largely, the humanitarian rules for care of the injured and prisoner of war 

procedures worked well. The Red Cross gained greater influence 

through its work, and was able to take on an agreed role in later 

conventions. The horrors of that war however meant that the thrust of 

the interwar period was the prevention of war rather than the patching 

up of the laws of war. Best makes the point that if the League of 

Nations is to be criticised for not having done more to reaffirm and 

reinforce the law of war, one must remember that it had the higher aim 

of making such laws redundant. 

Despite such hopes, wars continued and the next major test of the 

laws of war came with World War 2. In this, Best judges, perhaps overgenerously, 

that the core principles of restraint and discrimination for the 

sake of humanity were observed not badly when men had the will and 

space to observe them. He deduces two lessons from this period: 

firstly, the willingness to risk extra losses for humanitarian principle is 

rare; and second, the prospect of war trials has little effect on the 

actions of belligerents. 

The second part of the book turns to the reconstruction of the laws of 

war between 1945 and 1950. The birth of the United Nations 

Organisation was the key event. Best makes the point that the laws of 

war would have continued to operate without the UN, but the UN 

Charter was the hub of the post-war reconstruction of the international 

legal apparatus. He paints a fascinating picture of the development of 

humanitarian law. The difficulties of negotiation over a large range of 

Conventions are well documented in the book. A good example is the 

push to define the distinction between combatant and non-combatant 

in a war: a problem that continues in modern warfare. 

More successful was the development in 1949 of a comprehensive 

prisoner of war Convention. The 143 articles and five annexes 

provided a complete code of conduct for the handling of POWs. This 

has been a useful and important agreement. While there have been 

transgressions against the code in recent times, world opinion is 

quick to condemn them as we saw in the Gulf War. 

In the final part, covering the period from 1950, his examples are 

comprehensive. He sketches the increasing concern over the use of 

Napalm as a legitimate weapon from Korea, through Algeria, Angola, 

Mozambique and of course in Vietnam. This is one illustration of the 

difficulties of agreeing humanitarian law. Similarly, limitations on the 


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126 


use of mines have become an issue as more civilian casualties occur 

long after wars have ceased. 

In the Epilogue to the book, Professor Best gives a personal and 

subjective assessment of the place of international humanitarian law in 

the scheme of inter-State relationships today. He describes how, over 

twenty years of study, he has moved from being impressed by the 

moral and religious seriousness of the underlying ideas to a much more 

critical position. He now has a much more limited expectation of the 

efficacy of international humanitarian law. 

In his wide ranging treatise, Best makes only a passing mention of the 

UN Genocide Convention of 1948. He faults it, as with other aspects of 

humanitarian law because of difficulty of enforcement. George 

Andreopoulous, in his edited collection of papers on all aspects of 

genocide, reprints the Convention in full, and his contributors examine 

the strengths and weaknesses. The case studies include the use of 

chemical weapons by the Iraqis against the Kurds, East Timor after the 

Indonesian invasion, and Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge. These are 

useful examples to explore both the definition of genocide and the utility 

of international law. As is often the case with such conference 

collections, the conclusion is provided in the editor’s introduction. 

Andreopoulous does not disagree with Best’s views on the limited 

effectiveness of such legislation. He does however offer the hope that 

the international community is now showing a willingness to rethink its 

approach towards a people-centred security regime rather than a statecentred 

system. This carries with it a need to be prepared to carry out 

UN-sponsored intervention to police humanitarian illegal acts. 

For the reader, who has by now become thoroughly depressed over 

the inadequacies of international humanitarian law, the third volume 

Child Soldiers offers little comfort. Again, an area which is mentioned 

briefly by Professor Best is expanded into a detailed appraisal of the 

international law relevant to children in armed conflict, and the impact 

of such law. What makes this volume different is that the analytical 

prose is interspersed with photographs that would move the hardest 

heart. Each young child, weighed down with the trappings of modern 

weapons, makes a convincing argument for the need for a more 

effective international humanitarian law regime. 

Professor Goodwin-Gill and Ilene Cohn are perhaps less forceful in 

their conclusions. They argue for more research and upgrading of the 

law. They see the wider understanding of the laws about children in 

armed conflict, coupled with more monitoring and reporting, as being 

the way forward. I doubt that Professor Best would feel that this was 

enough. 

These are three books that show clearly the need for laws of war, and 

also the difficulties in both agreeing those laws and enforcing them. 

Each highlights the lack of adherence when times get difficult, as they 

always do in war. That said, as Professor Best admits, international 

humanitarian law makes war less terrible than it would be without it. I 

would go further. For regular military men, it provides an important 

template for conduct in war. Increasingly, it provides a basis for 

judgement by the world’s media. When an atrocity occurs, it is judged 

as such against the customs of humanitarian law. With sufficient 

international outrage, an ad hoc intervention may be mounted by the 

United Nations to restore the area to a tolerable state. This surely is the 

current development in the path to a more effective rule of international 

humanitarian law. 








WHY WARS HAPPEN 

BY JEREMY BLACK 

Reaktion Books, 271pp, £19.95 

ISBN 1 86189 017 6 

Published 10 April 1998 

STRATEGIC COERCION 

EDITED BY LAWRENCE FREEDMAN 

Oxford University Press, 400pp, £48 

ISBN 0 19 829349 6 

Published 9 April 1998 

Why do we still need the capacity to fight wars, now that the dangers of 

the Cold War are over? Is mankind naturally predisposed to settling 

problems by state authorised violence? Is military power a necessary part 

of diplomacy? These two books give some insights into these questions. 

Professor Black takes a historian’s approach to the question of why 

wars happen. It is a long perspective looking back to the 15th 

Century as his start point, and as such may, at times, seem to have 

little relevance to the strategist of the late 20th Century. He seeks to 

establish whether wars primarily reflect bellicosity in society and 

states, or whether they are accidental and should be blamed on poor 

diplomacy. If generalisation at this level were not difficult enough, he 

also seeks a picture that covers the whole world, and not just 

Europeanized nations. 

The canvas is enormous both in space and time, and the task is 

further complicated by the difficulty of defining what is meant by war. 

Fighting can range from local tribal disputes to the carnage of the 

Somme or the atomic destruction of Hiroshima. Much of the lower 

level conflicts in distant parts go unrecorded even today, and 

certainly in past centuries. The author draws on his encyclopaedic 

knowledge of wars of the past 500 years, but at times the sheer 

number of examples leaves the reader unsure of the common 

lessons to be drawn. He seeks to use diplomatic archives as a 

primary source for his analysis. He claims that diplomats are 

reflective and understand the source, use and purpose of power. 

Less helpfully, they may write from a very particular viewpoint. 

The period of two hundred years from 1450 (“An age of expansion”) 

was a rough time to be an ordinary citizen. Force was an accepted 

method of dispute settlement. The author parodies Clausewitz by 

asserting that: “War was the continuation of litigation by other 

means”. States became defined by wars, but no generally applicable 

rationale for war emerges from his review of conflicts. The period 

from 1650 to 1775, which he subtitles “An age of Limited War?” is 

no clearer. Examples range from attacks on tax gatherers to the 

European fighting at sea and on land. Some were wars of 

opportunity, some of fear and some of conquest. Rebellions could be 

far more bloody than declared wars. 85,000 Hungarians were killed 

in the Rakoczi rising. 

Wars of revolution and nationalism characterise the period from 1775 

to the start of the First World War. The American War of 

Independence, the French Revolutionary Wars, the American Civil 

War and Napoleon’s campaigns were all motivated by different 

factors. As Professor Black notes, these are wars which have much 

more in common with modern conflicts. However he believes that 

“the bellicist culture of the period ensured a greater willingness to kill 

and be killed than in Western society in the 1990s”. There could be 

other reasons for a willingness to accept casualties, and it is not 

clear that the soldier of the 1990s is any more fearful than his great 

grandfather was. The wars of imperialism that overlap this period had 

yet other causes. 

Total War arrives in 1914, and for the purposes of this book extends 

to 1945. This is a somewhat arbitrary period. In earlier days, the 


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128 


American Civil War used industrial capacity to support war effort, and 

any war after 1945 had the potential for even greater destruction 

than those that had gone before. The causes of both world wars 

have been analysed extensively, and Black covers familiar ground. 

He reflects on the question of whether democracies are less prone to 

start wars than dictatorships, and concludes there is little evidence to 

support this view. Indeed, he might have concluded that 

democracies are more likely to start wars; but only against nondemocratic 

states. 

The Cold War chapter covers not just the superpower confrontation, 

but also the problems of decolonisation. This is a period which 

generated a massive industry in the arcane field of nuclear strategy, 

and its application in the prevention of war. Yet the role of atomic 

weapons in this period is hardly mentioned by Professor Black, who 

puts no entry against “nuclear” in his index. This is particularly 

strange as the book has promised to reveal how far are the causes 

of war related to the changes in the nature of warfare. The final 

period examined is from 1990 to the present day, and this is a rather 

less academic review of the flash points of today. He suggests that 

we may be experiencing a decline in bellicosity in the West. The 

evidence on this is hardly conclusive after the experiences of the 

Falklands, the Gulf, and operations in the former Yugoslavia. 

A book which covers such a long period of the history of conflict 

over the whole globe is bound to be restricted to brief analysis of 

each campaign. The reader is asked to conclude that wars happen 

because of cultural contexts. That bellicose nations and bellicose 

leaders initiate wars is scarcely a surprise. However, for the modern 

strategist, the requirement is to find how to prevent wars. 

Nuclear deterrence was important in preventing a superpower war, 

but we still need effective mechanisms for preventing conflict below 

the level of world war. Coercion offers one approach, and Professor 

Freedman has assembled an impressive collection of views on 

concepts and cases of strategic coercion. The essence of strategic 

coercion is to persuade the target to change his behaviour to the 

desired mode through a threat of punishment for failing to comply 

with the demand. Deterrence seeks only to prevent a hostile act by 

an enemy; coercion seeks to change the situation. This book also 

looks at different times and places to avoid a purely western view. 

However, by taking a limited number of concrete examples and 

analysing them in depth, a more convincing picture is built up. 

Coercion is not just an instrument of the state. It can be, and is, 

used by sub state actors as well as multilateral organisations. 

In recent years we have seen the United States, with the support of 

some allies, deploying a naval force to the Gulf in order to coerce 

Sadam Hussein into accepting the United Nations inspection teams. 

Although many had severe doubts about the outcome if an air attack 

had to be launched against Iraq, the strategy of coercive deployment 

of military force had the desired diplomatic outcome. Again, NATO 

has attempted to modify the behaviour of the Serbs in Kosovo by the 

deployment of allied air power. In this case the effect has been less 

clear cut, but seems to have accelerated the diplomatic process. 

There are no lack of opportunities for applying coercion around the 

world, and Professor Freedman has timed his book well. As he 

notes, the Cold War literature was dominated by the special case of 

deterrence theory, in which states were coerced into not doing 

anything hostile to one another. The use of threats to pressure others 

into doing things that they did not wish to received less attention. 

The dozen contributors range broadly. The Balkans, as a target for 

coercion by great powers, in the last century and in 1914 are covered 

in one chapter. Later in the book, the use of coercion in recent days in 

the region is examined. The break up of Yugoslavia is rich in examples 

of coercive behaviour by both internal and external parties. Asia is also 

a source of many contemporary cases studies. The interaction 

between India and Pakistan is well covered, and has a topical 








relevance given their recent nuclear tests. Cambodia and North Korea 

provide interesting examples of prolonged exposure to external 

coercion by the United Nations and the United States. Latin America 

has been the target for a number of strategic coercion measures by 

the United States in recent times. Three cases are outlined: Haiti, Cuba 

and Brazil. While the first two events will be well known to the security 

specialist, the use of coercive diplomacy for economic bargaining over 

intellectual property rights in Brazil reminds us that not all cases will be 

security related. Indeed there seems to be a trend for the United 

States to use its powers for coercion in the economic field more and 

more. 

The role of coercion in dealing with terrorism and drug traffickers is 

addressed briefly and inconclusively. We are asked to take comfort in 

the fact that both are easier to deal with if state sponsored. Coercion 

and non-state actors are covered in an interesting chapter on the 

Palestinian Liberation Organization in Lebanon from 1969-1976. Oil is 

a key economic issue for Russia, and another section examines recent 

Russian actions towards its neighbours in the new oil regions. Control 

of pipeline routes becomes a powerful coercive weapon. 

Africa remains an area of great concern to the international 

community. The methods of resolving recent conflicts and crises in 

Liberia, Somalia and the Great Lakes are reviewed. Here the 

solutions are less easy to find. The difficulties are well illustrated by 

the attempts of the international community to influence events in 

Rwanda, Burundi and Zaire over the past 7 years. Clement Adibe 

concludes that the intervention in Africa by the international 

community has probably made things worse. He advocates the use 

of preventive diplomacy in preference to strategic coercion. 

In an age where human rights abuses are graphically shown in every 

home as they happen around the world, the clamour for the 

international community to do something is ever present. The 

permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, and 

many other states, continue to maintain significant military forces in 

being despite there being no direct threats to their territories. The 

deployment of these forces offer one way that governments can be 

seen to be doing something about the world’s problems. Strategic 

coercion can only work if the implicit threat of the ultimate use of 

force is real. This means that from time to time fighting will happen 

because coercion has failed. 

The policy framework for Britain’s defence strategy was published as 

part of the government’s strategic defence review in early July 1998. 

“The new challenges we face will call for the combined application of 

all the tools at our disposal – diplomatic, economic, trade, 

developmental, as well as the Armed Forces. In the changed world 

there is a new and growing role for preventive diplomacy which 

brings all these tools to bear to avert conflict before military 

intervention is required.” Both of these books reinforce that message 

from the Defence White Paper. 

Strategic coercion can lead to military involvement that fails to solve 

the underlying problems. Yet armed forces provide an easy answer 

for politicians who wish to be seen as doing something. Economic 

aid, diplomacy, training and working through non-governmental 

organisations may produce better results in many troubled areas at 

lower cost. Military forces will be needed for the intractable cases 

where national interests are at risk; or where all forms of preventive 

diplomacy have failed and instability is likely to spread. While both 

volumes will be of interest to the strategic specialist, the case studies 

in Professor Freedman’s excellent collection should be required 

reading in the corridors of power of the United Nations, NATO and 

those nations who claim a special responsibility for peace in the 

wider world. 

Air Marshal Sir Timothy Garden is a former Director of the Royal 

Institute of International Affairs and Commandant of the Royal 

College of Defence Studies. 


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AIR POWER READERS – THE TOP TEN 

Group Captain Peter W Gray Director of Defence 

Studies RAF 

In the introduction to the last edition of the Air Power Review, I 

promised to provide an air power reading list that was somewhat 

more attuned to the strategic level in the United Kingdom than the 

titles offered by Davis Mets in his article ‘To Kill a Stalking Bird’. 1 The 

all-time ‘top ten’ would inevitably include books that are now out of 

print and I have deliberately tried to avoid this – not because the 

books are not worth reading, but for ease of obtaining personal 

copies. To that end, I have also included current US titles as they are 

easily obtainable through Internet bookshops. In compiling this list, I 

have obviously consulted with colleagues on the Air Power Review 

Management Board; whilst consensus on the main entries was not 

too difficult to achieve, an order of merit would be impossible. The 

books are therefore arranged in rough reverse chronological order in 

an attempt to cover the complete spectrum of air power activity. 

Most of the titles are taken from the recommended reading list in the 

latest edition of AP 3000. 

AP 3000 BRITISH AIR POWER DOCTRINE, THIRD 

EDITION, HMSO, LONDON 1999 

No collection would be complete without this! 

CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF’S AIR POWER 

WORKSHOP SERIES 

This series of collections of essays (Dynamics of Air Power, ed A P N 

Lambert and Perspectives on Air Power, ed S W Peach) provide an 

ideal vehicle for the development of air power thinking in the UK. A 

further book is due to be published in Summer 2000. Similar 

collections, but with higher proportions of American (and others!) 

authors include: 

R P Hallion, Air Power Confronts an Unstable World, Brassey’s 

London, 1997 and 

John Gooch, Air Power Theory and Practice, Cass, London, 1995. 

ROBERT A PAPE, BOMBING TO WIN; AIR POWER 

AND COERCION IN WAR, CORNELL UNIVERSITY 

PRESS, ITHACA, 1996 

In this book, Pape covers the theory and practice of attempting to 

coerce an enemy with the use of air power. Although some readers 

may find the theory slightly dense, the case studies make the effort 

well worth while. Pape’s work is the subject of considerable 

controversy; a collection of essays challenging some of his 

conclusions is published by Benjamin Frankel (Ed), Precision and 

Purpose: Debating Robert 

A Pape’s Bombing to Win, Cass, London. 

AIR VICE-MARSHAL TONY MASON, AIR POWER – 

A CENTENNIAL APPRAISAL, BRASSEYS, 

LONDON, 1994 

Professor Mason covers 100 years of air power thinking and writing 

starting from Major J D Fullerton’s discourse on the impact of 

aeronautics in 1893. This book is an excellent source of material on 

many aspects of air power. It is not, however, mere regurgitation of 

old material, but has snippets of original source research such as the 

confirmation by Air Marshals Harris and Slessor that they had never 

heard of nor read [the Italian air power theorist] Douhet’s ideas before 

World War II (page 45). 

NOTE 

1 David R Mets, ‘To kill a Stalking Bird: Fodder for your professional Reading 

on Air and Space Superiority’, RAF Air Power Review, Vol 2, Nos 3 & 4. 








RICHARD P HALLION, STORM OVER IRAQ, 

SMITHSONIAN, WASHINGTON, 1992 

Dr Hallion is the official USAF Historian. His coverage of the air 

aspects of the Gulf War is extremely comprehensive. Furthermore, 

his analytical treatment of the strategic and doctrinal issues is 

excellent. Although Dr Hallion introduces the work of Colonel John 

Warden, his book, The Air Campaign, was so influential that it has 

become a classic in its own right. 

MAX HASTINGS AND SIMON JENKINS, THE 

BATTLE FOR THE FALKLANDS, MICHAEL JOSEPH, 

LONDON, 1983 

Although this book deals with the whole of the Falklands campaign, 

it was so inherently joint that it is hard to treat air power in isolation. 

The nearest book to do so is Jeffrey Ethel and Alfred Price, Air War 

South Atlantic, Sidgwick and Jackson, London, 1983. 

MARK CLODFELTER, THE LIMITS OF AIR POWER: 

THE AMERICAN BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM, 

FREE PRESS, NEW YORK, 1989 

Clodfelter provides an excellent, comprehensive study of the use of 

air power in Vietnam. His background work on the US experiences in 

World War II and Korea makes interesting reading in isolation, but his 

treatment of the political-military interface is outstanding. An 

alternative is Earl H Tilford, Setup – What the Air Force did in 

Vietnam and Why, Air University Press, Maxwell AFB, 1991. 

JOHN TERRAINE, THE RIGHT OF THE LINE, 

HODDER AND STOUGHTON, LONDON, 1985 

This book is still the authoritative history of the Royal Air Force in the 

Second World War. It is comprehensive, easy to read and the 

paperback version is a snip at £7.95. For those readers who are then 

tempted to delve further into specific campaigns, or into oral history, 

Max Hastings, Bomber Command, Michael Joseph, London, 1979 

provides an excellent starting point. Martin Middlebrook has 

published an excellent series of titles covering individual Bomber 

Command raids (or series thereof); The Schweinfurt-Regensburg 

Mission is but one example. For those interested in Fighter 

Command, Len Deighton’s Fighter, remains an excellent choice along 

with Alfred Price, The Hardest Day; this gives an extremely readable 

account of events on 18 August 1940 from many view points. Two 

recent books on the Luftwaffe are also worthy of mention: James S 

Corum, The Luftwaffe: creating the operational air war 1918 – 1940, 

University Press, Kansas, 1997 and Hooton, The rise and rise of the 

Luftwaffe. Coastal Command is admirably dealt with in Christina J M 

Goulter, A Forgotten Offensive: RAF Coastal Command’s antishipping 

campaign, 1940 –1945, Cass, London, 1995. 

COLONEL PHILIP S MEILINGER, 

THE PATHS OF HEAVEN: THE EVOLUTION OF 

AIRPOWER THEORY, THE SCHOOL OF 

ADVANCED AIR POWER STUDIES, AIR 

UNIVERSITY PRESS, MAXWELL AFB, 1997 

This book has been produced by a veritable galaxy of US academic 

writers. It covers the spectrum of air power thinking from the very 

early air power theorists such as Douhet, Mitchell, Trenchard and 

Slessor through to their modern equivalents of Boyd and Warden. 

For the reader to whom these names mean little, this book will 

provide ready access to their thinking. A possible alternative would 

be the chapter in Peter Paret (Ed), Makers of Modern Strategy, PUP, 

New Jersey, 1986. This book also offers excellent chapters on 

Clausewitz, Machiavelli and the like. 


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132 


ERIC ASH, SIR FREDERICK SYKES AND THE AIR 

REVOLUTION, 1912 – 1918, CASS, LONDON 

1999 

Inevitably, having said that most of the books listed were 

recommended in AP 3000, this last recommendation was published 

after the AP went to press. It has been included for several reasons. 

It provides an excellent review of the development of air power 

strategy as it evolved – not in the context of later developments or 

wars as has all too often been the case. Ash also provides the first 

proper assessment of Sykes’s contribution to military aviation; many 

works on this period appear to have air-brushed him from history. As 

Seb Cox (Head of the Air Historical Branch and Editor to this Frank 

Cass series) points out in his preface, the existing works on some of 

the officers in competition with Sykes were written largely on the 

basis of the individual’s memoirs (Andrew Boyle’s Trenchard being a 

classic example) rather than on official papers that had not then been 

released. 

BOOK REVIEWS 

BY GROUP CAPTAIN PETER W GRAY, 

DIRECTOR OF DEFENCE STUDIES RAF 

MISHA GLENNY, THE BALKANS 1804 – 1999, 

NATIONALISM, WAR AND THE GREAT POWERS, 

GRANTA, LONDON, 1999. ISBN 1 86207 050 4 

TIM RIPLEY, OPERATION DELIBERATE FORCE: THE 

UN AND NATO IN BOSNIA 1995, CENTRE FOR 

DEFENCE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 

STUDIES, BAILRIGG STUDY 3, 1999. 

ISBN 0 9536650 0 3 

Events in the Balkans over the last decade have generated a veritable 

rain forest of books, articles and theses from the full spectrum of 

society. When this reviewer first started work as an analyst attempting 

to specialise on this fractious part of the world, background material 

was very thin on the ground. Fred Singleton’s A Short History of the 

Yugoslav Peoples, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985) 

provided a much needed historical backdrop and James Gow’s 

Legitimacy and the Military: the Yugoslav Crisis (Pinter, London, 1992) 

gave a useful overview of the military aspects. Care then had to be 

taken with the flood of material that inevitably followed as much of it 

had been written with the highly audible sound of axes being 

sharpened in the background. This was typified by the horror 

experienced when a young diplomat recommended, as an excellent 

foundation reader, an extremely partisan academic paper that had 

been prepared by a formal adviser to the Bosnian Serb leadership! 

Fortunately, neither of the two books that are the subject of this review 

fall into this category. Both provide valuable additions to the literature, 

albeit from opposite ends of the spectrum. 

One of the first reliable studies to hit the streets, that was worthy of 

positive recommendation, was Misha Glenny’s Fall of Yugoslavia 

(Penguin, first published in 1992) which was updated several times 

as events unfolded in the Balkans. Glenny has now gone on to 

produce a masterly history of the region from 1804 to present day. 

Although his earlier work retained some element of the journalistic 

tone, this latest offering very much falls into the category of genuine 

narrative history. Glenny’s theme throughout his book centres on the 

balance between nationalism and great power intervention – with the 

inevitable outbursts of violence. It is essential reading for anyone 

wishing to get beyond the banal generalisations of ‘religious divides’ 

and ‘ethnic conflict’. Visitors who have conducted formal talks in the 

region will be aware of the propensity for all discussions to be 

preceded by selective renderings of history accompanied by dubious 








maps of the region. A liberal dose of Glenny is recommended as an 

antidote. For the casual reader looking for a brief introduction to the 

current conflict, the Epilogue – the Balkan Vortex – makes excellent 

reading. 

The second subject of this review article is a detailed study of 

Operation DELIBERATE FORCE written by Tim Ripley. This work is 

published as a Lancaster University Bailrigg Study where Ripley is a 

research associate; he is also a journalist who has covered events in 

the region for Jane’s Intelligence Review and Flight International. The 

book is written very much in a journalistic, rather than academic, style 

with some less than choice phrases such as ‘The grim reality was far 

from rosy for General Ratko Mladic and his army’. Similarly, the 

outstanding range of interviews that Mr Ripley conducted do not 

appear to have warranted detailed footnotes outlining times and 

places; a full list of interlocutors has, however, been included. These 

are minor criticisms and do not detract from the overall utility of the 

book. It will prove to be an invaluable source of reference for 

subsequent writers who will benefit considerably from the first hand 

interviews. That these have been woven into the narrative adds to the 

value. (Some of Ripley’s interlocutors may squirm slightly at the extent 

to which they have been quoted directly). The rather dense nature of 

the narrative tends somewhat to mask some of the more valuable 

aspects of this Balkan saga that are well worthy of deeper analysis. 

An example of this is highlighted by Nik Gowing (Diplomatic Editor of 

Channel Four News) who notes in his foreword that the US had been 

waging a covert war in support of the Bosnian Muslims involving 

weapons drops, training and so forth. Ripley brings out further 

evidence of this (page 61), along with some analysis of the degree to 

which US negotiator Richard Holbrooke co-ordinated NATO bombing, 

Croatian Army advances and diplomatic efforts. Holbrooke’s own 

book, To End a War (Modern Library, New York, 1999) makes an 

excellent companion volume for students of Balkan conspiracy 

theories! 

Both of the books reviewed make welcome additions to the rapidly 

growing literature on the conflict in the Balkans. Both authors have 

extensive experience of the region and add significantly to the 

debate. For students of air power, Tim Ripley’s volume fills a major 

gap on the shelves. For any reader interested in taking his or her 

knowledge beyond general awareness, Misha Glenny’s work cannot 

be recommended too highly. 

BOOK REVIEWS BY 

DR CHRISTINA GOULTER, SENIOR 

LECTURER, JOINT SERVICES 

COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE, 

BRACKNELL 

MCFARLAND, STEPHEN, AMERICA’S PURSUIT OF 

PRECISION BOMBING, 1910 – 1945. 

WASHINGTON, D.C., SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTE 

PRESS, 1995. ISBN 1-56098-407-4. 

ILLUSTRATIONS. FIGURES. TABLES. APPENDICES. 

NOTES. BIBLIOGRAPHY. INDEX. PP.XVIII, 312. 

£23.25 (CLOTH) 

This work is of considerable value to air power and Second World War 

scholars, and those who have read Stephen McFarland’s earlier 

excellent study of the air superiority battle over Germany, To Command 

the Sky, will be interested to see how he deals with this subject. This 

the first large study of the U.S.’s pursuit of precision bombing, although 

other scholars should be acknowledged for having made important 

contributions to the historiography also within the last few years, 

particularly Tami Davis-Biddle and Hays Parks (Journal of Strategic 

Studies, Vol.18, No.1, March 1995). 


133






134 


Stephen McFarland concludes, like Davis-Biddle and Parks, that 

‘precision’ was relative, and demonstrates how the available 

bombsighting technology failed to meet the expectations of U.S. 

strategic bombing doctrine. McFarland’s book begins with an 

examination of the bombing experiments done in the U.S. prior to 

1918. This is reminiscent of Neville Jones’s book, The Origins of 

Strategic Bombing, which focuses on British air thought and practice 

up to the end of the First World War. However, the comparison leads 

the reviewer to wish that McFarland had devoted more attention to 

the doctrinal thought processes in the U.S. The author spends too 

much time detailing the various bombsighting developments, without 

significant mention of the doctrinal debates and wider influences on 

U.S. strategic bombing theory which shaped the doctrine with which 

the U.S. Army Forces went to war in 1941. Although McFarland 

acknowledges some British influence on early American 

bombsighting technology, one would have expected a discussion of 

the U.S.’s observations of British bombing during the First World War, 

as the British were, after all, the chief bombing practitioners. 

The reviewer would also have liked more discussion of the type seen 

in Chapter Four, where McFarland raises the fundamental question of 

why the U.S. opted for precision attack of industrial targets, while the 

Royal Air Force believed attacks on enemy morale were more 

efficacious. McFarland states (p.82) that ‘Americans had a traditional 

reverence for marksmanship and a deep rooted opposition to 

making civilians targets in war’. Leaving aside the fact that Britain, 

too, had a tradition of marksmanship (as exemplified by the ‘Old 

Contemptibles’ who helped to stall the Schlieffen Plan), where did 

this ‘deep rooted opposition to making civilians targets in war’ come 

from? Was it, as some have suggested, because of the 

comparatively recent experience of the American Civil War? Did this 

differ substantially from Britain’s own recent experience of civilians 

being bombed by the Germans? McFarland’s treatment of these 

fundamental wider issues is disappointingly brief. One of the principal 

reasons the British emphasised the morale effect of bombing and the 

Americans did not was the RAF’s empire policing experience during 

the interwar period. Success in this role reinforced Trenchard’s view, 

expressed as early as 1919, that the morale effect of bombing stood 

‘to the material effect in a proportion of twenty to one’. This remained 

gospel for as long as Trenchard was Chief of Air Staff (until 1930), 

and remained a feature of British bombing doctrine thereafter. 

Having said all this, McFarland makes a significant contribution to our 

understanding of American bombsight development during the 

interwar period, particularly the work done by Carl Norden. The 

author shows how, in spite of the advanced bombing technology 

offered by Norden’s bombsight, the Americans were unable to 

achieve the desired precision, in either the European or Pacific 

theatres during the Second World War. McFarland does an excellent 

job of digesting the wartime and post-war bombing analyses, and 

shows how for most of the war the USAAF achieved bombing 

accuracy comparable to the results of the British night bombing 

campaign. Until the end of 1944, an average of no more than onethird 

of bombs dropped hit within 1,000 feet of their intended 

targets. 

While some scholars may find the above mentioned deficiencies, and 

occasional lax referencing (Chapter Three’s endnote 47, for example), 

distracting, this is still an important book. McFarland helps us to start 

thinking about the reasons why the need for precision has become so 

ingrained in U.S. military culture, and why it is dangerous to seek ‘silver 

bullet’ solutions. McFarland demonstrates that this is the period when 

the U.S. started to believe that technological excellence would 

overcome most operational problems. Although this philosophy was 

dented by the Vietnam war, it continues to underpin U.S. military 

doctrine. 








GOODERSON, IAN, AIR POWER AT THE 

BATTLEFRONT: ALLIED CLOSE AIR SUPPORT IN 

EUROPE, 1943 – 45. LONDON, FRANK CASS, 1998. 

ISBN 0-7146-4211-8 (PAPER). ILLUSTRATIONS. 

TABLES. DIAGRAMS. APPENDICES. NOTES. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. INDEX. PP.XVIII, 282. £18.50 

The subject of close air support has received very little attention from 

scholars, and Dr Gooderson’s book is the first in-depth study of 

battlefield air support in the European theatre between 1943 and 

1945. By this point in the war, the Allies had learned most of the 

important air support lessons from the battles in France and North 

Africa, and applied them with devastating effect from D-Day 

onwards. Gooderson investigates one of the key debates of the 

invasion period: whether battlefield support was best provided by the 

interdiction of German lines of communication, the bombing of 

enemy positions at the front, both of which diverted resources away 

from the bomber offensive over Germany, or the close air support 

offered by the fighter-bombers. He concludes, correctly, that all three 

approaches were required. Gooderson also brings to light a 

conclusion reached during the war that close air support operations 

had an important impact on the morale of the German land forces, 

particularly rocket attacks on armour. 

The work begins with a useful account of the development of 

Operational Research, again, a neglected area of the RAF’s history. 

Without Operational Research, any of the air campaigns during the 

Second World War would have wasted valuable resources, not to 

mention lives, and this was particularly true of Bomber and Coastal 

Command’s campaigns. Gooderson then goes on to discuss the 

doctrine and hardware available for Allied air support by 1943. One 

of the few flaws of this work is the minimal discussion of the all 

important developments up to that point, particularly the Allied 

experience in North Africa, where the RAF’s lack of coherent air 

support doctrine and tactics was exposed in a large way first in 

1941. Insufficient credit is given to Coningham’s work, in particular. 

The reviewer would also have liked to see more discussion of the 

interwar doctrinal legacy. There are a number of reasons why the 

RAF was bereft of a coherent army support doctrine by 1939, and at 

least a few pages on interwar doctrinal debates would have added 

weight to this work. Having said this, Gooderson does discuss in 

detail the development of the hardware used in close air support. He 

challenges some of the accepted views of the Allied air campaign in 

north-west Europe, particularly the idea that fighter-bombers inflicted 

massive losses on German armour and that this was the only 

important impact on the German fighting capability. He points out 

that the psychological impact of fighter-bomber attacks was also of 

great importance, as German tank crews abandoned their tanks, 

often never to return. Unfortunately, some of Gooderson’s interesting 

findings have been left in their raw form, in tables, which are left to 

‘speak for themselves’, while, on other occasions, tables add very 

little to his argument. Having said this, he has distilled many facts 

which would have otherwise remained buried, and must be 

applauded for his diligent research. 

This book is an essential read for air power and Second World War 

scholars, and also to anyone interested in today’s joint service 

environment. Many of the issues Gooderson raises have been 

doctrinal and organisational stumbling blocks again since the Second 

World War, and, as with so many other air power facets, the lessons 

learned by an earlier generation remain relevant. 


135






136 


ROAD TO BERLIN 

THE ALLIED DRIVE FROM NORMANDY 

George Forty 

This book tells by photographs the story of the Allied campaign in 

North West Europe, in the twelve months, June 1944 to May 1945. 

Beautifully illustrated with over 275 action-packed photographs. 

A remarkable pictorial record of all the campaigns of twelve months of 

almost non-stop fighting. The photographs, each extensively 

captioned, are accompanied by a concise history of events, moveby-move, 

of the Allies’ progress towards the heart of the German war 

machine. 

George Forty covers all the important actions and turning points, the 

cities liberated, the enemy strongholds defeated. Experience the thrill 

of breakthrough as the Allies push back the German defence. 

The photographic approach vividly chronicles the tortuous progress 

the Allies made across Europe to reach their final objective – Berlin, 

the crumbling headquarters of the broken German war machine. 

Lt. Col. George Forty CBE FMA is a leading authority on land warfare 

in the twentieth century. A former tank officer – he had command of 

a tank in the Korean War, and was wounded in battle – he 

established his reputation as Curator of the Tank Museum at 

Bovington, which he brought to be one of the world’s leading military 

museums. 

Details: Cassell Publishing, £25.00 

Publication: October 1999 

ISBN: 0-304-35306-X 








FLIGHTS INTO THE NIGHT 

L. Anthony Leicester 

137 

Flights into the Night is a fascinating collection of World War II 

adventure stories. As a young RAF pilot Anthony Leicester’s wartime 

service took him to Canada, the Middle East, India and Burma as well 

as Europe. As an eighteen-year-old student pilot he survived a midair 

collision in Canada. Then, at nineteen, as the Captain of a Wellington II, 

he lost an engine over the Atlas mountains during the African campaign 

and was faced with the agonising choice of crash landing, bailing out 

or finding a safe airfield hundreds of miles away in the Sahara Desert. 

Anthony Leicester’s responsibilities were typical of those faced by 

young airmen every day throughout the 2nd World War. But Flights into 

the Night is not without its lighter side. Where some stories are 

informative and dramatic, others are humorous. For example, the 

author recalls the occasion when he and his crew are arrested in a 

Cairo hotel by an army Colonel with a dislike of aircrew! Collectively 

Flights into the Night provide an illuminating insight into the experiences 

and emotions of wartime RAF service. 

The Author: Anthony Leicester was born in Weybridge, Surrey and as a 

pilot in the RAF received his wings at the age of eighteen. In 1942, at 

nineteen, he flew a Wellington bomber from England to India. He 

completed a tour of operations flying over Burma before returning to 

England. After VE Day he flew Dakotas in and out of Europe for RAF 

Transport Command. 

After leaving the RAF Anthony Leicester emigrated to Canada where he 

served for twenty years in the RCAF as an instrument flying instructor 

and transport pilot. 

Details: Crécy Publishing Ltd, 256pp, £7.99 

Publication: March 2000 

ISBN: 0-947554-84-X 







138 


FIGHTER COMMAND WAR DIARIES 

John Foreman 

This 3rd volume of John Foreman’s acclaimed series covers the period 

January 1942 to June 1943. It includes the air cover for the Dieppe 

landings, escort missions over Europe, the entry of the USAAF into the 

war and the defence of Britain against Luftwaffe raiders. 

Drawing on his many years of research into the subject the author has 

been able to assemble a unique database of aircraft and crew losses 

and claims for aircraft shot down. Combined with a wealth of 

knowledge and Foreman’s ability to analyse the air battles of long ago, 

these diverse scraps of information form a new and more complete 

picture of events than has previously been possible. 

The Author: John Foreman has established himself as one of the leading 

experts in the air war fought over Europe in World War II. His researches 

began in the early 1970s and his archives now form a huge database of 

material covering every day of the war from 1939 to 1945. As well as 

two volumes in the Fighter Command War Diaries series, his books 

include The Battle of Britain – The Forgotten Months, 1941 – The 

Turning Point (two volumes) and 1944 – Over the Beaches. He is coauthor 

of The Fledgling Eagle and the Messerschmitt Me262 Combat 

Diary. 

Details: Crécy Publishing Ltd, 

366pp, £24.95 

Publication: Winter 1999 

ISBN: 1-871187-39-7 








MILITARY MAVERICKS 

Extraordinary Men 

of Battle 

David Rooney 

139 

What makes a maverick? Is it simply an orthodox mind, a dislike of rule 

and tradition? Or is it more than that, a flagrant disregard for convention? 

Can there ever be a place for the maverick in a disciplined military 

hierarchy? A maverick on the battlefield is much more than just a loose 

cannon; it’s the maverick who seizes the unlikely chance to win the day. 

In his absorbing new study of heroes who broke the rules, historian 

David Rooney shows how often the day is won by sheer determination 

to succeed, despite the odds, despite the criticism of peers and elders. 

It is invariably the maverick that turns every challenge to an opportunity, 

leads from the front, and wins the unwinnable. The contrary chaos of 

war can be so intimidating to the traditional mind that – perhaps – 

victory can only belong to the military maverick. 

Here are the stories of twelve mavericks: Alexander the Great, Shaka 

Zulu, Stonewall Jackson, Giuseppe Garibaldi, Lawrence of Arabia, Paul 

von Lettow-Vorbeck, Heinz Guderian, George S. Patton, Vinegar Joe 

Stilwell, Orde Wingate, Otto Skorzeny, and Vo Nguyen Giap. 

Each had flaws that would have brought down a lesser man. Each faced 

strong opposition from their own side, but they all proved their bravery 

and leadership in battle. Full of insight into the nature of the military mind, 

this book reveals by how much, and how often, success in battle 

depends on the irreplaceable presence of just one man. 

Details: Cassell Publishing, £19.99 

Publication: October 1999 

ISBN: 0-304-35316-7 







140 


BEAUFIGHTER – IN FOCUS 

Photographic History of the Bristol Beaufighter 

Simon W Parry 

The Bristol Beaufighter fulfilled many roles in the RAF during World War II, but was always 

overshadowed by the more famous Mosquito. Whether it be in night fighting, ground 

attack or shipping strikes, the Beau’ served its crews well. Using photographs from 

several private collections, this book charts the missions flown by the Beaufighter and its 

crews in Europe, the Middle East and Far East. 


112pp, £19.95 


ISBN: 1-871187-41-9 

SHOOTING STAR – IN FOCUS 

Photographic History of the 

Lockheed F-80/T33 Series 

Chris Ellis 

The F-80 Shooting Star was the first American jet fighter to see large scale service. 

Designed in the closing stages of World War II, it became one of the principal jet fighters 

in the early days of the Korean War and was responsible for shooting down a MiG 15 in 

the first jet versus jet combat. Amazingly the design is still in service as a training aircraft 

designated the T-33 and some air forces intend to keep it flying well into the next century. 

Details: Crécy Publishing Ltd, 64pp, £11.95 


ISBN: 1-871187-42-7 








141 

KAMPFGESCHWADER 55 – IN FOCUS 

Photographic History of a Luftwaffe 

Bomber Unit 

Steve Hall and Lionel Quinlan 

KG 55 was the only Luftwaffe bomber unit to fly the Heinkel He111 

throughout World War II. The twin-engine Heinkel bombers of KG 55 

carried the red Grief (Griffon) badge of the Geschwader through 

Poland, the Battle of France, the Battle of Britain and the Blitz and 

finally to defeat in Russia. 


112pp, £19.95 


ISBN: 1-871187-40-0 


UNIONS NOTICES/REUNIONS NOTICES/REUNIONS NOTICES/REUNIONS NOTICES/REUNIONS NOTICES/REUNIONS NOTICES/REUNIONS NOTICES/REUNIONS NOTICES/REUNIONS NOTICES/REUNIONS NOTICES/REUNIONS NOTICES/REUNIONS NOT 

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142 

n o t i c e s / r e u n i o n s 

THE AIR LEAGUE EDUCATIONAL TRUST 

encouraging air-mindedness in Britain’s youth 

ANNOUNCEMENT OF WINNERS AND COMPETITIONS 

Once again, the Trust is launching its annual competitions for flying scholarships and bursaries, engineering scholarships and – new for 2000 – 

a competition for a Private Pilot’s Licence (Balloon & Airship). Some 85 awards are on offer, details follow: 

2000 FLYING SCHOLARSHIP WINNERS 

The Trustees are pleased to announce the award of 45 flying scholarships to be flown during 2000. There are several new awards including the 

Joe Wheater Scholarship for a full Private Pilot’s Licence (PPL) and the Scarman 20-hour awards supported by funds from HQ Air Cadets. All 

other awards are for 15 flying hours. 

Flying Scholarship/Sponsor Recipient 

617 Squadron Aircrew Association Mr A M Lock from Clevedon, North 

Somerset (ATC) 

Aircrew Association 

Ms R M Lloyd from Bromyard, 

Herefordshire (CCF(RAF)) 

Aircrew Association 

Mr M D Wight-Boycott from Burntisland, 

Fife (CCF(Army)) 

Andrew Humphrey 

Miss S Price from Withington, Manchester 

(ATC) 

Barnett & Piercey (Flight International) 

Mr P J Amstutz from Tonbridge, Kent 

(CCF(RAF)) 

British Aerospace 

Mr R A J Wells from Dorchester, Dorset 

(ATC) 

British Airways 

Miss K L Ballantyne from Bedlington, 

Northumberland 

British Airways 

Mr P M Roulston from Castlederg, Co 

Tyrone (ATC) 

British Telecom 

Mr U H J Malik from Leicester (ATC) 

Captain C A Barnes 

Mr G D Haydon from Englefield Green, 

Surrey (CCF(RAF)) 

Commander Sam Macdonald-Hall 

D G Marshall (Marshall Aerospace) 

GE Aircraft Engines 

GEC 

GEC 

Hugh Pope 

Joan Angus 

Joe Wheater PPL 

Lucas Aerospace 

Messier-Dowty 

Nigel Blood/BWPA 

Mr A J Harman from Bracknell, Berkshire 

(CCF(RAF)) (AIM Group) 

Mr R W Titshall from Ipswich, Suffolk (ATC) 

Mr R M Packman from Banbury, 

Oxfordshire 

Mr J P Pateman from Hailsham, East 

Sussex (ATC) 

Miss F B C Walravens from Boars Hill, 

Oxfordshire (ATC) 

Mr P J Hunter from Moneymore, Co 

Londonderry 

Miss S Pollock from Fallowfield, 

Manchester 

Mr G A Lockwood from Woodhall Spa, 

Lincolnshire (CCF(RAF)) 

Mr A E Barr from Bridlington, East 

Yorkshire (CCF(RAF)) 

Mr M A G Lee from Ettington, Warwickshire 


Miss E J Telfer from Halfway, Sheffield (ATC) 

n o t i c e s / r e u n i o n s

ICES/REUNIONS NOTICES/REUNIONS NOTICES/REUNIONS NOTICES/REUNIONS NOTICES/REUNIONS NOTICES/REUNIONS NOTICES/REUNIONS NOTICES/REUNIONS NOTICES/REUNIONS NOTICES/REUNIONS NOTICES/REUNIONS NOTICES/REUNIO 

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REUNIONS NOTICES/REUNIONS NOTICES/REUNIONS NOTICES/REUNIONS NOTICES/REUNIONS NOTICES/REUNIONS NOTICES/REUNIONS NOTICES/REUNIONS NOTICES/REUNIONS NOTICES/REUNIONS NOTICES/REUNIONS NOTICES/REUNIONS NO 

UNIONS NOTICES/REUNIONS NOTICES/REUNIONS NOTICES/REUNIONS NOTICES/REUNIONS NOTICES/REUNIONS NOTICES/REUNIONS NOTICES/REUNIONS NOTICES/REUNIONS NOTICES/REUNIONS NOTICES/REUNIONS NOTICES/REUNIONS NOTI 

IONS NOTICES/REUNIONS NOTICES/REUNIONS NOTICES/REUNIONS NOTICES/REUNIONS NOTICES/REUNIONS NOTICES/REUNIONS NOTICES/REUNIONS NOTICES/REUNIONS NOTICES/REUNIONS NOTICES/REUNIONS NOTICES/REUNIONS NOTICE 

Flying Scholarship/Sponsor 

Page Aerospace 

Royal Aeronautical Society 

Scarman 

Scarman 

Scarman 

Serco Aerospace 

Shell Aircraft 

Sir Alan Cobham (Flight Refuelling) 

Nottingham 

Sir George Dowty (Dowty Group) 

Sir James Martin (Martin Baker) 

Swire Charitable Trust 


2000 FLYING BURSARY 

COMPETITION 

Applications are invited for flying bursaries to be 

flown in 2000. The awards comprise a fixed sum of 

money, sufficient to cover between 5 to 8 hours 

flying, to assist members to gain additional flying 

qualifications or to renew a rating in their licences. 

Applicants must hold either a current Private Pilot’s 

Licence or a Basic Commercial Pilot’s Licence 

(Aeroplanes) and be a member of The Air League (or 

be applying to be a member at the time of 

application for the bursary). 

Closing date for completed application forms is 31 

March 2000. 


Recipient 

Mr L M Dunn from Leighton Buzzard, 

Bedfordshire (ATC) 

Mr T E Holgate from Havant, Hampshire 

(ATC) 

Mr M S Hibbs from Surbiton, Surrey (ATC) 

Miss O A Stannard from Birmingham (ATC) 

Mr P R A Winn from Birkenhead, 

Merseyside (ATC) 

Mr M J Bayer from Chipping Norton, Oxon 

(ACF) 

Mr B Kings from Brighton, Sussex (ATC) 

Mr D F Bromley from Sandiacre, 

(ATC) 

Mr T A Watson from Cheltenham, 

Gloucestershire (ATC) 

Mr S Etheridge from Glasgow 

Miss R J Angel from Warminster, Wiltshire 

Mr L E Craig from Inveresk, East Lothian 

(ATC) 









The Altair 

The MacRobert Trust 

Unipart 

Wycombe Air Centre 

2000 ENGINEERING 

SCHOLARSHIP 

COMPETITION 

Applications are invited for engineering scholarships 

in 2000. The scholarships, offered in conjunction 

with the Engineering and Marine Training Authority, 

will provide a placement in the UK aerospace 

industry for one or two weeks in the summer for 

young men and women considering careers as 

aircraft technicians. The scholarship will also provide 

bed and breakfast accommodation (if necessary), 

and meet any expenses necessarily incurred for 

travel and meals. Applicants must be aged at least 

143 

Mr J E Fordham from Hertford (ATC & 

CCF(RAF)) 

Mr M S Harris from Teignmouth, Devon 

(ATC) 

Mr A R Houghton from Aberystwyth (ATC) 

Mr A J Kinmond from Coupar Angus, 

Perthshire 

Mr R D Middleton from Macclesfield, 

Cheshire (ATC) 

Miss K L Muldoon from Edinburgh 

(ATC & Lord Lieutenant’s Cadet for 

Edinburgh) 

Miss K L Owen from Leeds 

Mr P G Scott from Penkridge, Staffordshire 

(ATC) 

Mr J D Ewence from Banbury, Oxon 

Miss C Day from Fraserburgh, 

Aberdeenshire (ATC) 

Mr M J Payne from Tadley, Hampshire 


Miss P H Fanning from High Wycombe, 

Bucks (ATC) 

17 but under 21 on 31 March 2000; have gained at 

least four GCSE/SCE passes at grade C or higher, 

including passes in English Language and 

Mathematics; and be undertaking an appropriate 

engineering course of further education or advanced 

GNVQ or are taking A-levels with a view to following 

an aviation career. 


March 2000. 







144 

BREITLING BALLOON 

SCHOLARSHIP 

Applications are invited for a newly established 

balloon scholarship sponsored by Breitling. The 

award is for a PPL (Balloons and Airships) with 

training being co-ordinated by Brian Jones who 

recently circumnavigated the earth with Bertrand 

Piccard in the Breitling Orbiter 3, and is the UK 

Chief Balloon Flying Instructor. The award may be 

flown at any recognised centre in the UK and ideally 

in the summer months starting in May. Applicants 

must be a member of The Air League (or be 

applying to be a member at the time of application 

for the scholarship). 


April 2000. 

2001 FLYING 

SCHOLARSHIP 

COMPETITION 

Applications are invited for the 2001 flying 

scholarship competition from young men and 

women who are British citizens resident in the UK 

and who will be over the age of 17 and under the 

age of 22 on 30 June 2000. Scholarship winners will 

be awarded 15 hours flying instruction to be flown 

during 2001. Air Cadets will be eligible for the award 

of the Joe Wheater PPL scholarship and the 

Scarman 20-hour scholarships. Selection will be 

based on a formal application and, after shortlisting, 

either an interview at the Trust’s office in 


London or on aptitude tests, medical tests and an 

interview to be conducted at the Officers’ and 

Aircrew Selection Centre, RAF Cranwell, during 

September 2000. 


June 2000. 

ROYAL AIR FORCE 

HISTORICAL SOCIETY 

● Formed in July 1986 

● Studies the history of Air Power 

● Examines the creation of Military Air Power and 

studies various topics including: 

● The strategic bomber offensive 

● Berlin Air Lift 

● The V Force 

● The RAF in the Far Eastern War 

● Falklands 

● Contemporary Air Power 

● Lectures, Seminars, Discussions and Journal 

● Self Financing, £15 membership per annum 

● Information and Application Form from: 

Dr Jack Dunham 

Silverhill House 

Coombe 

Wotton-u-Edge 

Glos GL12 7ND 

Tel: 01453 843362 

● The central objective of the Society is to bring 

together those involved in Royal Air Force 

activities in the past and those concerned today 

so that we can learn more about its history. 

TATTOO MOVE TO TOP 

RAF HARRIER BASE 

The Royal International Air Tattoo, the airborne 

supershow appearing at RAF Fairford since 1985, 

will this year be held over the weekend of 22/23 July 

at RAF Cottesmore in Rutland in partnership with 

BAE SYSTEMS (formerly British Aerospace). The 

station is home to two squadrons of Harrier GR7s. 

With extensive resurfacing work at Fairford due to 

start in May, Tattoo organisers had to find a new 

temporary venue. 

RAF Cottesmore’s Station Commander, Group 

Captain David Walker, says “Everyone at RAF 

Cottesmore is delighted that this Unit has been 

chosen to host RIAT 2000. The Tattoo is one of the 

most prestigious events in the world’s aviation 

calendar, and it is a great honour.” 

RIAT 2000 will pay tribute to the 60th Anniversary of 

the Battle of Britain, featuring the Spitfires and 

Hurricanes that flew to glory 

six decades ago, and celebrate with the young 

aircrew of today as they look back at 75 years of 

University Air Squadrons. The giants of the aviation 

world will create a dramatic skyline at RAF 

Cottesmore as transport aircraft from across the 

world line up for Airlift 2000. 

Director Paul Bowen says “We are extremely 

grateful to the Royal Air Force and RAF Cottesmore 

for allowing us to mount the airshow at such an 


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excellent airfield. RIAT 2000 will see an exciting array 

of aircraft, including the UK debut of the futuristic 

Boeing V22 Osprey. Despite being held at a slightly 

smaller airbase, this will be a “vintage” Tattoo to 

launch a second century of aviation.” 

The Tattoo is staged in aid of the RAF Benevolent 

Fund, and this will have particular relevance in a 

year when the nation remembers the gallantry of 

“The Few”. 

The Legend Lives On 

RAF HONOURS BATTLE OF 

BRITAIN HEROES 

The Central Band of the 

Royal Air Force in 

Concert 

In the presence of HRH The Duke of Kent, the 

Central Band of the Royal Air Force will stage a 

powerful tribute to the 60th Anniversary of the Battle 

of Britain at the Barbican Centre on Friday 31 March 

2000. Churchill’s ‘Few’ will be remembered along 

with ground crews, fire fighters, radar plotters and 

many more unsung heroes who stood firm in the 

face of peril. The evening will be compered by BBC 

radio personality, John Dunn. 

The spirit of those fateful few months in the Summer 

of 1940 will be captured through the music of the 

time. The Central Band will perform Spitfire Prelude 

and Fugue and The Battle of Britain Suite by Sir 

William Walton, and the programme also includes 

classics such as A Nightingale Sang in Berkeley 


Square and On a Little Street in Singapore. Two 

actors will play wartime sweethearts, telling the story 

of ordinary people living through bombing raids, the 

loss of friends and family, and uncertainty about the 

future. 

Re-working the new dance sensation that swept 

across the country in the 1940s, The Squadronaires 

will swing into the Tuxedo Junction, Pennsylvania 

65000 and In the Mood. Dancers will join the show 

band on stage to perform a sensational jitterbug 

routine. 

Sponsored by Lockheed Martin, this Royal Air Force 

anniversary concert is in support of the RAF 

Benevolent Fund – the military charity taking care of 

veterans who served in World War II, together with 

all other personnel who have served, or are serving, 

in the RAF. 

Tickets, ranging from £8 to £26, are available from 

the Barbican Centre Box Office on 0171 638 8891. 

DUXFORD CALLS UP NEW 

RECRUITS FOR ESSENTIAL 

CONSERVATION WORK 

145 

The Imperial War Museum Duxford is appealing for 

new recruits to join the skilled volunteers already 

helping to conserve and restore Duxford’s 

outstanding collection of vintage aircraft, tanks and 

military vehicles. 

“Volunteers are at the heart of Duxford’s restoration 

and conservation programme” says Chris 

Chippington, Head of Conservation. “Restoring such 

a large number of exhibits to top condition is an 

enormous challenge that we couldn’t meet without 

the help of the volunteers.” 

Volunteering provides the unique and exciting 

opportunity to get to work with valuable machines 

you might only expect to see at a distance or on the 

television. Under the direction of permanent staff 

volunteers are already working on a wartime Hawker 

Hurricane fighter and a B-24 Liberator bomber as 

well as a Wessex helicopter. Duxford is of course 

much more than just an aircraft museum and 

volunteers are also working on Cromwell and 

Crusader tanks plus other military vehicles. 

The museum welcomes volunteers with a whole 

range of skills but the key ingredients are 

enthusiasm, flexibility, an interest in the subject and 

a degree of commitment. Previous engineering 

experience is not essential. Volunteers come from all 

walks of life; a bus driver, a gardener, a retired 

policeman and a manager of a building society all 

find volunteering at Duxford a rewarding experience. 







146 

Some volunteers are retired but others fit time at 

Duxford around busy working lives so restoration 

work continues on Sundays as well as during the 

week. 

Duxford, Europe’s premier aviation museum, 

receives over 400,000 visitors every year, most of 

whom are fascinated to see conservation work 

taking place right there in front of them. If you would 

like to become part of the team and help preserve 

our heritage contact Jack Livesey on 01223 

499327. 

Duxford is just south of Cambridge on the M11 and 

is open daily from 10am. For general enquiries call 

01223 835000. 

THE ROYAL AIR FORCE AIR 

POWER CD-ROM 

To support the Air Power Training Strategy for the 

Royal Air Force, an interactive CD-ROM entitled 

‘Royal Air Force Air Power’ has been produced by 

the Air Warfare Centre, in consultation with the 

Ministry of Defence Air Historical Branch (Royal Air 

Force) and Director of Defence Studies (Royal Air 

Force). Produced commercially by OP&S Ltd, the 

‘RAF Air Power’ CD-ROMs will be ready for 

distribution in April and May 2000 and published 

under Crown Copyright. All material within the CD- 

ROM has been scrutinised and approved by 

relevant specialist authorities. The CD-ROM 

package will contain two disks, both containing a 

large number of video clips. 


The first disk contains: 

● A historical section charting the development of 

RAF air power. 

● A detailed timeline highlighting key events within 

the historical section. 

● 85 pen pictures of key contributors to the 

development of RAF air power. 

● A section on equipment, 

containing all current and 

future aircraft and weapons 

systems. 

● A section on air power 

doctrine based on ‘British Air 

Power Doctrine’ and the RAF 

Air Operations Manual. 

The second disk concentrates on 

RAF units and contains 

information on the role of each 

RAF station both at home and 

overseas. 

Starting in April 2000, copies of 

the ‘RAF Air Power’ CD-ROM will 

be distributed free of charge to all 

serving RAF officers and airmen. 

It will also be distributed to future 

officer cadets, airmen recruits and 

to all current and future reservists.

THE RAF AIR POWER REVIEW - Royal Air Force Centre for Air ...

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