Volume 4 No 4 - Air Power Studies

THE ROYAL AIR FORCE 

AIR POWER 

Review 

Volume Four 

Number Four 

Winter 2001

Editor RAF IMTTP* 

Brian Finch 0171 305 7140 

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Contents 

Foreword 

Royal Air Force 

AIR POWER 

Review 

1 Review Essay: Bomber Harris, 

His Life and Times 

Group Captain Peter W Gray RAF 

8 The Russian Air Force in Chechnya – 

have lessons been learnt and what are 

the future perspectives? 

Major J Takacs Slovak Air and 

Air-Defence Force 

28 Sun Tzu, Strategic Paralysis 

and Small Nations 

Wing Commander Saridporn 

Soonthornkit, Royal Thai Air Force 

At any time throughout the document, you can 

click this arrow to return to this contents screen 

64 Air Power Versus a Fielded Army: 

A Construct for Air Operations in the 

21st Century 

Lieutenant Colonel ‘Goldie’ Haun, USAF 

92 What was the impact of the Luftwaffe’s 

‘Tip and Run’ Bombing Attacks? 

Squadron Leader Chris Goss RAF 

118 Air Power Taken to its Limits and Beyond. 

The Battle of Amiens 

Dr Alfred Price FRHistS 

136 New Zealand’s Fast Jets 

Nick Lee-Frampton 

150 Book Reviews 

The views expressed are those of the authors 

concerned, not necessarily the MOD. 

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163 Notices 

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Foreword 

Air Chief Marshal Sir Peter Squire GCB DFC AFC ADC DSc FRAeS RAF 

This Foreword marks the fourth complete volume of the Royal Air Force Air Power Review. 

In his foreword to the inaugural edition, my predecessor highlighted the importance of 

debate on the exploitation of air power in the unpredictable and uncertain strategic 

environment. The tragic events of 11 September, and the tensions that have followed, have 

emphasised the need for debate, the need for doctrine and the vital conceptual thinking 

that we must have if we are to avoid a mesmeric descent into dogma and unthinking 

reaction. Nor must we forget that, horrific though the events in America were, the vast 

majority of our strategic posture and doctrine remains absolutely valid. 

As we contemplate how air power can be employed in future conflicts, we must remember 

that little in warfare is new. The scale may change and the lengths to which belligerents are 

prepared to go may also vary. A wary eye on history will help us to keep some things in 

proportion and the pages of this Journal have helped in this part of the process. Clausewitz 

is well known for his utterances on war being an extension of politics by other means. The 

same is true across the complete spectrum of conflict. War, conflict and terrorism are all 

forms of human activity. We may talk all too glibly about people coming first and so forth; 

when we actually need to fight, this apparent truism becomes of vital importance. 

As this Journal continues to explore wider issues and new areas of the air power spectrum, I would strongly urge you all to 

continue to engage in debate and to participate in the underlying conceptual thinking that will enable us to meet future 

challenges.

Keen students of military history, strategic studies and international relations do not need to be reminded of the range of 

written material that confronts them on each and every visit to the bookstore or the internet. The history of the Second World 

War is always popular with students and casual readers alike. Interest may be thematic, casual or obsessive. Whatever the 

motivation for interest, the Combined Bomber Offensive is almost invariably of interest to most. The efficacy of the campaign, 

its legality, the ethical dimension and the progress in technology have all been debated across the intervening years. In all 

areas of warfare, the human dimension is the most critical – after all it is mankind that goes to war, not machinery or 

technology. Out of all of the senior leaders in the Second World War the acerbic personality of ‘Bomber’ Harris, combined 

with the controversial nature of his Command’s role, have ensured that he has been at the centre of the debate since its 

inception in the dying days of the War. The absence of an authoritative biography on Harris has meant that misperceptions, 

bias and even bigotry have been able to flourish relatively unchecked. The publication of Air Commodore Henry Probert’s 

book on Harris has hopefully filled this gap. The book has taken six years to research and is well-balanced, thoroughly 

informative and essential air power reading. This edition of the Air Power Review opens with a review essay on Harris 

highlighting some of the areas where balance has been provided. 

The second article has been provided by Major J Takacs whose Staff College paper provides an invaluable insight into the 

Russian air operations over Chechnya. Major Takacs is a member of the Slovak Armed Forces and, among the many benefits 

that publication of his piece brings, one of the more important is confirmation that perceptions and perspectives are bound to 

be different depending on background, culture, national interests and domestic pressures. We cannot afford to confront the 

prospect of the air power across a global battlespace if we only see things from a parochial western-centric perspective. 

This theme is continued with the article on Sun Tzu submitted by Wing Commander Soonthornkit of the Royal Thai Air Force. 

This work was completed while he was a student at the Australian Defence Force Academy. 

The fourth article has been submitted by Lieutenant Colonel ‘Goldie’ Haun and is based on his thesis for the USAF School of 

Advanced Air Power Studies at Maxwell. While some of the arguments in this thesis will be familiar to regular readers, there 

are some interesting and completely new insights there as well. 

The Air Power Review has a long tradition in publishing historical pieces and the fifth article, by Squadron Leader Chris Goss, 

maintains the trend. This was again based on an academic thesis, in this case for the MA degree in War Studies at King’s 

College London, which Squadron Leader Goss attended as part of the Royal Air Force High Level Defence Studies 

Programme.

We then go further back in time for an excellent review of the role of the Royal Flying Corps in the Battle of Amiens. Dr Alfred 

Price has become a regular contributor to the Air Power Review and this article is a further example of his historical prowess. 

The final article per se is by Nick Lee-Frampton and chronicles the demise of New Zealand’s fast jet force. The deliberate 

move towards making one potential component commander the permanently supported commander is an interesting one. It 

is not consistent with our normal understanding of command and control doctrine in which circumstances will dictate which is 

the supported component. Trenchard probably shuddered in his grave at such a move and his distinguished Kiwi successors in 

the pantheon of Royal Air Force senior officers would have recoiled in horror at the removal of the offensive element of a 

nation’s air power. 

D Def S (RAF)

REVIEW ESSAY BY GROUP CAPTAIN PETER W GRAY RAF 

Bomber Harris, His Life and Times 

Air Commodore Henry Probert MBE MA 

Greenhill Books 

London, 2001 

ISBN 1-85367-473-7 

Sir Arthur Harris had many nicknames and epithets over his Service career and during his 

subsequent years of fame, or infamy depending on one’s viewpoint. He was totally indifferent 

to many of these sobriquets, only objecting to ‘Ginger’. Air Commodore Probert uses 

‘Bomber’ as it coincides most closely with public perceptions and common usage. Yet in his 

own day, Harris was almost uniformly known as ‘Bert’ – by his crews, colleagues and by the 

likes of USAAF Generals Hap Arnold and Ira Eaker. 

On the face of it, one could be forgiven for thinking that the exploits of Bomber Command, 

and its irascible leader, have been more than adequately covered with a surfeit of books, 

television programmes, journal articles, theses and the like. Indeed Probert makes this point 

at the very beginning of his book in the opening sentence of the Preface. Arguably, however, 

the very proliferation of material is good cause for the administration of an occasional douche 

of common sense to bring the debate back to serious levels. This authoritative biography on Harris certainly meets this 

objective. It also serves to highlight the previous lacuna in the field and should make many academics, commentators and 

authors review their earlier material for balance, content and the risk of preconceptions. Harris did not write a full autobiography, 

understandably preferring to chronicle his views on wartime matters in his formal missive – Despatch on War Operations 23rd 

February 1942 to 8th May 1945, (published with a preface and introduction by Sebastian Cox, Cass, 1995). This represents 

Harris’s own testament to his tenure at the head of Bomber Command; it was not published at the time because of what 

Tedder, who was CAS when it was completed, called ‘insurmountable security objections’. Harris acquiesced in this decision, 

but drew heavily on the work to produce Bomber Offensive (Collins, 1947). There was then a considerable gap until the only 

hitherto authorised biography on Harris was completed by Dudley Saward in 1984 (Bomber Harris, Buchan and Enright). 

Saward had been the Chief Radar Officer at Bomber Command and had proven his literary skills in writing The Bomber’s Eye 

(Cassell, 1959) describing the use of radar by bombers in World War II. Probert suggests that he would also be highly likely to 

complete the work under his master’s supervision and be amenable to direction (page 403). Harris forbade publication until after

his death thereby exacerbating the fallow period in which liberal consciences, and other axe-grinders, had full rein to 

1 

lambast Bomber Command and its erstwhile Chief. 

The absence of comprehensive coverage has also allowed some historians to make causal links between events in Harris’s life 

and his performance as Commander-in-Chief. Probert covers many of these areas in commendable detail. Aspects of Harris’s 

childhood and school days risk misinterpretation and must seen in the light of existing practice – not in a modern context. The 

boarding out of children from colonial outposts, unnatural as it now seems, was as commonplace as using a four-by-four for 

the half-mile school run of today. The resulting difference in self-reliance should not be surprising. 

Harris joined the army at the outbreak of the Great War and his experiences of route marches in Africa certainly resulted in him, 

in later life, never walking if he could drive! It also confirmed that, at least for him, the soldier was perhaps not the best offensive 

weapons system. Equally his earliest flying experiences attempting to shoot down Zeppelins at night must have influenced later 

thinking, both in terms of the air defence of the United Kingdom and the relative safety of attempting to bomb by night. Skill at 

night flying does not come easily, or by accident – Harris was a staunch believer in making people practise. His later penchant 

for showing aerial photographs that he had taken of Passchendaele provides eloquent testament to the impact on him of this 

battle and his ensuing wish never to repeat the horrors of Trench warfare. Arguably, the legacy of Harris’s experiences in 

Mesopotamia had more to do with the need for rigorous training and decent equipment than over the efficacy of bombing to 

destroy enemy morale. 

Many myths and misunderstandings have grown up over the years concerning Harris and his stewardship of what for a 

significant portion of the war was Britain’s only means of striking Nazi Germany directly. These myths have inevitably been 

exacerbated by lack of understanding and a willingness to accept elements of lore at face value. The commonly held view that 

the US 8th Air Force only engaged in precision bombing in contrast to the RAF policy of area bombing is a classic example. 

Academic research clearly shows that the Mighty 8th was certainly capable of accurate bombing (thanks to the Norden 

bombsight which Harris desperately tried to get the Americans to sell to us as early as 1938), but like Bomber Command, had 

to default to less precise means when the weather was anything other than perfect. There is also a tendency to focus on the 

later years of the war, rather than applying balance across the whole. Bombing policy in 1945 when, with benefit of hindsight, 

the war in Europe was all but won, overshadows the grim realities of operations in 1939 through to 1942. Similarly, it is all too 

easy to focus on Harris’s debate over bombing policy with Portal in the last months of the war, allowing this spat to eclipse 

years of genuine respect, friendship and loyal service. 

The beginning of the end of the War also saw something of an unseemly scramble for the moral high ground with senior 

politicians – such as Churchill – manoeuvring with indecent haste to distance themselves from the less politically correct warwinning 

tools, their exponents and sadly their practitioners. That the same politicians had been vocal advocates for their 

employment, and responsible for the accompanying directives and policy, could only serve to disillusion straightforward officers

2 

and men who formed the vast majority of Bomber Command. The relative lack of recognition for Bomber Command 

personnel added greatly to the bitterness and Probert’s treatment of this aspect is both sensitive and comprehensive. 

HARRIS AS A WAR CRIMINAL 

To some commentators, Bomber Command and its leadership should have been more in line for an appearance at the 

Nuremburg War Crimes Tribunal than for honours and awards. At a more rational level, however, Harris has been widely 

criticised on a range of counts. The first of these is that he was indeed a war criminal, particularly for his role as the prime 

architect of area bombing. This essay is neither the time nor the place for a detailed review of RAF inter-war strategic bombing 

doctrine, or for a discussion on the relative merits of air power theories. Suffice it to say that, from the perceptions of those 

responsible for the direction of higher level policy, strategic bombing was a valid and inevitable means of waging war. Stanley 

Baldwin summed up the widespread belief in the House of Commons in 1932 stating that ‘the bomber would always get 

through’ – he went on to add, with evident regret, that ‘The only defence is offence, which means that you have to kill more 

women and children more quickly than the enemy,’ (House of Commons, 10 November 1932. 270 Parliamentary Debates 

(House of Commons), Official report 5th Series, c632). The ethical issues, however, were not consigned to the dustbin as is 

commonly thought. In a paper that started as a presentation to the Imperial Defence College in 1928, and was then circulated 

to fellow Chiefs, Trenchard dealt at length with the need to target military objectives and avoiding ‘indiscriminate bombing of a 

city for the sole purpose of terrorising the civilian population’; this address has subsequently been termed his ‘last will and 

testament’. A decade later, Chamberlain cited international law in his formal guidelines to Bomber Command. He stated 

unequivocally that: 

1. It is against international law to bomb civilians as such and to make deliberate attacks on the civilian population. 

2. Targets which are aimed at from the air must be legitimate military objectives and must be capable of identification. 

3. Reasonable care must be taken in attacking those military objectives so that by carelessness a civilian population in the 

neighbourhood is not bombed. 

Chamberlain went on to state in the House of Commons that not only was bombing civilian populations contrary to international 

law, but that in his opinion such action would not be a successful war winning tool. His ethical and legal approach was heavily 

influenced by the practicalities of the matter. These concerns over practical capabilities were equally evident to the air staff. 

Slessor points out that our capabilities were such that decisive results could not then be achieved. Chamberlain’s directives 

were translated, after much debate, into operations orders that could be issued to the Command; considerable doubt remained 

as to what could be reasonably described as military objectives. Slessor concluded, however, that, without doubt, ‘sooner or 

later, the gloves would have to come off’.

The early days of the War saw a natural reluctance to remove the ‘gloves’ – partly over concerns of retaliation, but also 

3 

acknowledging the limited capabilities possessed by Bomber Command. The ensuing constraints were gradually removed 

over time and industrial areas were attacked through 1940, as well as obvious targets such as concentrations of invasion 

barges in channel ports. Writing in July 1940, Churchill was unequivocal in his determination that the only way to get through to 

the enemy was through ‘an absolutely devastating, exterminating attack by heavy bombers from this country upon the Nazi 

homeland’. The move to area bombing was consolidated by the Air Ministry in a directive to Sir Richard Peirse (Harris’s 

predecessor as C-in-C) dated 9 July 1941. This missive accepted the difficulties of finding and hitting precise targets in 

Germany by night; it proposed that, in reality, concentration on large towns and cities would mean that the military installations 

and economic facilities contained therein would be suitably attacked. The move to ‘area’ targets also allowed morale of civilian 

workers, and of the population as a whole, to be attacked. 

Discussions between Churchill and Stalin in August 1942 confirmed the Grand Strategic level direction for Bomber Command. 

The leaders agreed that not only should German industry be bombed, but also the population and its morale. Stalin stressed 

the importance of attacking Berlin and this cascaded down to Harris later that month. Stalin’s appreciation of the efforts of 

Bomber Command was reinforced by Harris sending the Russian leader a book of aerial photographs of the damage wrought. 

The air of mutual satisfaction continued through to the Casablanca conference in February 1943. Strategic bombing policy was 

discussed, but it was not the top item on the agenda – a key strategic area for discussion was confirmation of ‘Germany first’ 

and the ensuing argument over the desirability of an early land offensive in Northern Europe versus a Mediterranean policy. The 

resulting bombing directive read: 

‘The primary objective will be the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic 

system, and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is 

fatally weakened’. 

As Professor Biddle has pointed out, this contained something for everyone and gave the commanders a deal of latitude, both 

in target sets and methodology. As far as Harris was concerned, this constituted ideal mission command guidance (to use the 

language of current doctrine) – what had to be achieved, but not how to do it. 

Some unity of purpose was imposed on the scene in the lead-up to the Normandy landings with the attacks on the German 

transportation system. Once the land offensive was established, however, differences of opinion again surfaced over priorities. 

Tedder (as Deputy to Eisenhower) advocated that priority continue to be given to transportation and communications targets. 

Spaatz (Commander of the USAAF Eighth Air Force) favoured attacks on oil, while Harris continued to insist on the 

maintenance of area bombing. Throughout this debate, Harris fervently believed that the carnage that he had witnessed in the 

Great War could be avoided through the application of undiluted air power – with no diversions to panacea targets.

Nevertheless, when he had had his say, and was overruled, he applied Bomber Command to the given task with 

4 

appropriate dedication. 

The Nuremburg War Crimes Tribunals established that following orders did not constitute a legal defence. Had Harris been 

indicted formally, it is unlikely that he would even have attempted such an argument. In total war, he considered that the 

resolute application of air power – i.e. Bomber Command – could shorten the conflict and prevent needless slaughter. Even the 

brief scope for overview provided by this review essay suggests that had Harris been summoned to the dock, he would not 

have been short of company. 

AN UNRECONSTRUCTED BOMBER ZEALOT? 

From the doctrinal perspective, and from the more serious matter of allocation of resources, Harris is perceived as being an 

entrenched member of the heavy bomber mafia. The theory was that the Royal Air Force of the inter-war years was largely 

populated by short-sighted exponents of the Douhetian theory that bombers would win wars without the need for armies and 

navies. This thesis falls at the first hurdle in that few, if any, senior British airmen had heard of, let alone read, Douhet – even 

though his work had some influence in America. Similarly, the citation of Trenchard as coming from the same school of thought 

is flawed. Appropriate quotations are widely available from speeches, lectures, notes and files; these can be taken to prove 

almost any thesis. But allowance must be made for the fact that, on the vast majority of occasions, Trenchard was speaking 

politically in the defence of his Service, and indeed for its very survival. His broader perspective, that air power was an 

essentially offensive weapon, was a matter of faith with which few air power advocates would disagree today. The Trenchard 

suggestion that a football team comprised of eleven goalkeepers would win no matches did not mean that he was selecting 

only centre forwards to play ‘up front’. The key was in the balance. Arguably the same is true in the ‘war against terrorism’ with 

a hard balance to be struck between force/home protection and the need to strike at the roots of evil. 

In the lean inter-war years, there was considerable debate over the ratio of fighter squadrons to bombers. There was no 

question of the nation being left undefended; the key question was again one of balance. Denis Richards describes a young 

Squadron Leader Portal being summoned by Trenchard to take part in meetings on this balance (Portal of Hungerford, 

Heineman, 1978). The junior staff officer was anything but a bomber zealot in arguing for far more fighters than his Chief would 

countenance. The unbroken line of fighter operational requirements, and the development of radar make questionable the 

premise that the Royal Air Force only focused on bombers. 

From Harris’s perspective it should also be remembered that he started his flying career flying night fighters in defence of the 

homeland. Although he went on to other roles – and they were not so specifically delimited as they are today – there is bound 

to have been some impact on his experience base. Likewise, Harris must have been influenced to some degree by his 

attendance at Army Staff College at Camberley (rather than the RAF equivalent at Andover). Little of his staff work has survived,

ut from the little that Probert has unearthed, it is evident that Harris saw aerial bombardment as a natural extension of 

5 

the development of projectiles from apes throwing rocks, through archery to firearms. He described ‘the exploitation of 

range’ as being a principle of war. This type of thinking almost certainly owes more to the doctrinal heritage of Fuller and 

Liddell-Hart than to Douhet and Mitchell. Harris also spent a most enjoyable interlude as CO of 210 Squadron, a flying boat unit 

where he first met Donald Bennett; hardly the normal stamping ground for the bomber zealots! Rising tension saw Harris 

promoted and destined for the Air Ministry. As Deputy Director of Plans, Harris was a staunch advocate of the replacement of 

light and medium bombers with a credible heavy bomber force; this again must be seen in the light of Navy and Army 

scepticism. The debate over the ratio of fighters to bombers continued. His other work included a formal appreciation of the 

likely situation in the event of war with Germany. Again bombers feature heavily in the work, but in balance with other forms and 

means of warfare. Baldwin’s dictum on the bomber getting through set the mood – not the other way round. 

In June 1938, Harris’s planned posting to Palestine was replaced with a surprise move to Fighter Command as Senior Air Staff 

Officer (SASO) to Dowding. Neither posting was a likely stamping ground for bomber zealots. Harris objected to the switch 

primarily because he did not see himself getting on with ‘Stuffy’ Dowding, but it was only his new wife’s entirely sub-tropical 

trousseau that persuaded the CAS to relent. Keith Park went to Fighter Command in his place. 

Harris was less than sympathetic to demands on his assets from other Commands. He has been criticised for considering 

sending aircraft to Army Co-operation Command as a ‘gross misuse of the RAF’. Likewise he has been quoted as calling 

Coastal Command an ‘obstacle to victory’. Strong stuff indeed. Yet actions speak louder than words and it must be recorded 

that Harris did not begrudge his Command’s employment on mining duties. These continued throughout the war, were not 

glamorous, but had undoubted effect. It was the lack of effect that so frustrated him in having to bomb U-boat pens against 

which his crews were endangered for little result. Likewise, when told to support the army in Normandy, he did so with full 

resources. 

As AOC 5 Group and then C-in-C Bomber Command, it was very much part of Harris’s primary duties to extol the virtues, 

capabilities and potential of his Commands. Equally, it would be surprising if he had not protected his assets (and in particular 

his crews) and deplored their utilisation elsewhere. Historians would be more entitled to look askance at his performance as a 

leader had he done otherwise. 

HARRIS AS A LEADER AND SUBORDINATE 

Many of the critics of Harris’s style of leadership run the risk of confusing leadership with command and management. They 

also fail to take proper account of any one individual’s capacity and the number of hours in a day. During the Franco-Prussian 

War, Marshal Bazaine led cavalry skirmishes and fired cannon at his Prussian foes: this was fine theatre, but poor use of a 

commander’s time. Harris was altogether more focused. As AOC 5 Group he frequently visited his squadrons and was strongly

proactive in seeking to improve the lot of his people – as he had consistently been as a squadron commander. As a 

6 

Commander-in-Chief he had relatively little time to visit and furthermore saw this as the AOC’s prerogative rather than his. 

Unit commanders were almost certainly relieved not to have Bert turning up on their patch on a regular basis! 

It must also be remembered that he was sending his crews in harm’s way on a daily basis and, as Probert makes very clear, 

Harris saw the responsibility as being his alone. He was not prepared to shirk this awesome task, or to delegate. What is more 

he was at pains to ensure that his boys were not put at risk unnecessarily. In no way can Harris be seen through the 

Blackadder cameo of sweeping men and machines off the table like a latter day Haig. Harris did not shrink from the 

responsibility, but nor did he wear his heart on his sleeve. The personal pressure on him must have been enormous; he was 

under considerable personal financial stress (partly because of the stringencies of having to entertain on wartime rationing and 

part on the high alimony bills he was paying to his first wife). These pressures were exacerbated by an untreated duodenal ulcer 

– like many aircrew, Harris was a reluctant visitor of the medical centre! It may be a difference in the biographers’ art, but 

Probert does not recount Harris as enjoying the fishing, shooting and bird watching interludes that Portal and Alanbrooke had 

the odd occasion to enjoy. Harris did not socialise in the Mess at High Wycombe, but was keen on the feedback provided by 

those who did so. He was, however, a convivial host at home and canvassed unceasingly for Bomber Command in the 

process. 

Much has been made of individual instances such as Operation Millennium (the attack on Cologne with 1,000 bombers on the 

night of 30/31 May 1942). His efforts in accumulating the necessary numbers of aircraft have been revisited frequently. As with 

many individual raids the extent of the damage was not as great as originally thought. But, to use modern parlance, the effect 

achieved in Germany, in the United Kingdom and amongst our allies was immense. Rather than cover the debate in detail, the 

comments of John Terraine (The Right of the Line, Hodder & Stoughton, 1985), one of this nation’s most outstanding historians 

should suffice: ‘Harris’s calm and deliberate decision to stake his whole force and its future on that night showed the true 

quality of command’. 

Notwithstanding the subtleties of command styles and leadership, one cannot doubt that working for Harris as a staff officer 

was probably not the most pleasant of tasks. In such a position, one can conclude that one was doing all right – or you would 

have been sacked! There is little doubt, however, to his crews Harris was a hero to be followed to the ends of the earth. 

Having Harris as a subordinate cannot have been an easy task either. He had a reputation for being prickly and did not suffer 

fools gladly – irrespective of their seniority. One area where Harris was particularly difficult was when officers junior to him wrote 

to him, ‘trying to do his job for him’, but with the authority of a higher formation; he objected vehemently to the use of Air 

Ministry ‘directed letters’ in which the phrasing ‘Sir, I am directed by the Air Council to instruct you to..’ prefaced yet another 

interference that was seen as unwarranted. Harris’s dealings with the Air Ministry in general and Bufton (Director of Bomber

Operations) and Bottomley (DCAS) were often acerbic. Portal tried on a number of occasions to calm the waters, but was 

7 

not always able to produce lasting peace. Harris had seen Dowding win what he described as one of the Nation’s 

greatest victories only to be sacked for his pains and be replaced by Judas like plotters from the Ministry. As the War 

approached its climax, the correspondence between Portal and Harris became increasingly tense. Commentators since have 

questioned whether or not Harris should have been replaced at this point. One must add, however, that the areas of agreement 

between the two men were, even at that stage, greater than the rifts. Furthermore, they had been very good friends for many 

years and had huge respect for each other’s talents. From Portal’s viewpoint one must consider first of all whether or not 

Churchill would have sanctioned such a move. Harris had been very close to the Prime Minister early in his tenure, dining 

regularly at Chequers (but always back-briefing Portal on the discussions). Churchill and Harris had drifted apart as the war 

progressed and the PM had other priorities, but it is far from certain that the removal would have been allowed. Portal was also 

well aware of the high esteem in which Harris was held throughout his Command and the detrimental effect that his sacking 

would have. He also had to consider what benefit would have been achieved in replacing Harris with someone new. He was 

after all still an outstanding Commander and Portal was too great a leader himself to move someone just to get a quiet life in 

the corridors of the Air Ministry. 

There can be little doubt that the histiography of the Bomber offensive will continue to grow and that its prime architects – 

Churchill, Portal, Harris, Spaatz and Arnold – will continue to attract attention. Hopefully as the debate continues, the extremes 

of oscillation will even out as discussion becomes more rational. Balanced biographies that bring new and interesting material 

are vital to this process and Air Commodore Probert has certainly succeeded in fulfilling both of these fields. The book adds 

considerably to the sum of knowledge with excellent coverage of Harris’s early life and of his post-war activities. There are areas 

still worthy of research and Probert highlights these. An example of this is on the issue of Harris’s peerage and other awards 

although many of the issues are covered very clearly. 

Probert does not pretend that his book represents a comprehensive survey of the bomber war; that has been covered many 

times. Noble Frankland (co-author of the Official History of the Strategic Bomber Offensive) wrote that people preferred to feel 

rather than know about strategic bombing. The same has been true over ‘Bert’ Harris. This excellent biography should help to 

shift the balance.

The aim of this paper is to 

examine and analyse the RuAF’s 

present and future doctrinal and 

operational situation and 

perspectives, using as a basis its 

involvement in the Chechen Wars 

(1994 – 96 and 1999 – present) and 

the forgotten Afghanistan War 

(1979 – 89), and looking ahead to 

2010 – 15 

THE 

Russian Air Force in Chechnya – 

have lessons been learnt and what are the future perspectives?

By Major J Takacs Slovak Air and Air-Defence Force 

9 

More than fifteen years ago Mikhail Gorbachov, the new, relatively young and energetic General Secretary of the 

mighty Communist Party began his attempt to extensively reform the whole structure of the politically and 

economically rapidly declining Soviet Union. Without a clearly defined end state, goals, identified ways or available 

means this attempt completely failed as many similarly constructed reform efforts had also done in the past. He 

paradoxically became the first and the last President of the Soviet Union. The unsuccessful coup against Gorbachov in August 

1991 could not save the old regime; on the contrary it expedited the collapse of the USSR. Fifteen new, differently 

‘independent’ countries have since emerged from the ruins of the biggest state formation of the world. The main successor 

state, Russia, was literally thrown back hundreds of years, whereupon she started her long lasting struggle to re-create and 

safeguard an imperium based on fear, and where inner cohesion was maintained mainly by force, manipulation, division, and by 

adapting various levels of religious and ideological pressure. 

Boris Yeltzin, the first Russian President (1992-1999), inherited a widespread crisis situation that was poorly managed by his 

administration. Extensive reforms, not only of the political and economical sphere, but also the whole society, turned out to be 

inevitable. The new Russia, with her fragile democracy, could not rely any more on the old-style power approach towards its 

allies, neighbours and other partners on the international scene to retain at best a fraction of her previous influence. There were 

no longer such ‘useful’ institutions like the Warsaw Pact, COMECON, 1 former Soviet buffer states in western and southern 

regions of Russia and ‘special relations’ with many Third World countries. The once mighty and feared Soviet Armed Forces in 

their current Russian ‘format’ were no longer the solid pillar of the political system and the whole society as they used to be. 

Moreover, Russia had to cope with a huge number of international commitments, treaties and obligations, most of which 

transferred from the former USSR. These commitments created very tight and legally binding boundaries that Russia could 

move within.

Russia had been trying hard to form a defence policy and an appropriate military doctrine consistent with its foreign and 

10 

domestic policy, economic resources and the aforementioned commitments to the international community. Russia had 

remained a major player on the international scene, but was no longer a real superpower. The first Military Doctrine from 

1993 (MD1993) failed to recognize this reality. It was based on false perceptions and unrealistic expectations. Moreover, the 

long and painful period of transition and reform of the armed forces was re-defining an appropriate military doctrine with an 

‘open architecture’ more closely reflecting this period. The MD1993 did not become a system of views on the prevention of 

wars and armed conflicts, nor on the development of the Russian armed forces, nor the country’s preparation to defend itself. It 

did not examine threats to the military security of the state or the use of armed forces to defend the state’s ‘vital interests’. This 

doctrine did not answer questions emerging from the difficult situation of the Russian Federation (RF) as a state, its armed 

forces and the most negatively affected military branch, the Russian Air Force (RuAF). The MD1993 also failed to provide the 

necessary rudder to control the armed forces, proving to be anachronistic and unrealistic. 

THE RUAF PRIOR TO THE FIRST CHECHEN WAR 

Within quite a short period of time (1992-93), the former Soviet Air Force was transformed into the RuAF, which was 

significantly smaller in terms of numbers, size and more importantly, in operational resources. The first ‘earthquake-like’ changes 

after the disappearance of the USSR brought about a huge decrease in numbers of pilots, from about 20,000 to 13,000, and 

aircraft from 13,000 to 5,000. Russia lost many of these assets to the Ukraine and Belarus; approximately 37 percent of all 

former Soviet Air Force MiG-29s, 

The Ukranian Air Force operates 

approximately 60 Sukhoi Su-27 

FLANKER aircraft. 

23 percent of Su-27s, half of Il-78 

…the disappearance of the 

USSR brought about a huge 

decrease in numbers of 

pilots, from about 20,000 to 

13,000 and aircraft from 

13,000 to 5,000. Russia lost 

many of these assets to the 

Ukraine and Belarus

flight refuelling tankers, almost half of Il-76 transport aircraft, most of the Tu-95s, and all but three of its flight-worthy 

11 

Tu-160 strategic bombers went to these countries. 2 These assets were the best and most modern combat equipment in 

the RuAF inventory. However, another very sensitive loss was the dismantling of the massive integrated air defence and air 

force structure built up during a long period of time and spread throughout the former USSR and in many Warsaw Pact allied 

countries. 

The most important commitment inherited from the Soviet Union was the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE), which 

came into force in July 1992. It had an immediate effect on the composition of the newly emerging RuAF. In order to retain as 

many aircraft as possible, Russia joined the Tashkent Treaty (May 1993), which divided the former USSR’s quotas among the 

former Soviet States. These treaties together meant the reduction of aircraft to 3,450 by the year 1995. 

Russia’s aviation manpower also underwent an unprecedented decline from 

its former Soviet level. From a total of about one million personnel in the 

Soviet Air Force, Air Defence Forces and naval aviation, the overall number for 

the three Russian Air Arms by 1998 was down to 335,000. 3 

From a total of about one million 

personnel in the Soviet Air Force, Air 

Defence Forces and naval aviation, the 

overall number for the three Russian Air 

Arms by 1998 was down to 335,000 

While numbers of aircraft, personnel and equipment were dramatically falling 

during huge defence budget cutbacks, the organizational structure of the new 

RuAF remained practically the same as it was under the previous Soviet era. 

General Pyotr Deynekin, the CinC of the RuAF (1992-1997) made some 

attempts in 1993 to gain greater coherence and efficiency in the RuAF organization by rearranging the Frontal Aviation 

Command and creating a new Reserve and Training Command. At the same time, he left untouched the Long Range Aviation 

and Military Transport Aviation Commands. The Air Defence Forces also retained their separate service status until 1998. These 

changes, however, were aimed to consolidate the evolving crisis situation rather than lay down a firm base for future deep and 

systematic reforms. 

Traditional Soviet military doctrine provided air power with only a supporting role in a combined-arms type of war fought mainly 

by infantry and armoured forces. However, the 1993 doctrine outlined a shift in the operational focus for Russian armed forces 

from theatre offensive warfare to regional power projection, where air power could naturally play a very important role. The 

success of Coalition air operations against Iraq in the Gulf War clearly helped, at least to a group of progressive thinking 

Russian military experts, who recognized and acknowledged the capabilities of air power, when it was properly used, in 

determining outcomes of joint operations. Unfortunately, this recognition and acknowledgment had not materialised in the 

RuAF’s structures, equipment, training and operational and tactical approaches before the first Chechen War, and there still 

remains a long way to go (as we will see later).

In 1994, the RuAF Central Research Institute published an unprecedented analysis describing the RuAF’s roles, missions, 

12 

organizational status and force development plans up to the year 2015. This analysis openly concluded that the RuAF’s 

current structure, aircraft, weapon platforms, its industrial support, its deployment, basing and maintenance infrastructure, 

its command, control, communications, intelligence and its redeployment capabilities were completely inadequate to respond to 

the requirements outlined by the MD1993. 4 

Few months after publication of the analysis, the RuAF took part in a conflict in Chechnya (known as the first Chechen War in 

1994-96), which fully bore out all the problems and shortcomings described in this document. 

AIR CAMPAIGNS 

The origins of the Chechen ‘problems’ were very complex and dated back to the period of Russian expansion in the Caucasus 

in the 18th and 19th Centuries. Since the forced annexation to the Russian Empire, the Chechens never willingly accepted 

Russian rule. They utilized, in more or less organized forms, every possible opportunity to get rid of Russian control; 

unsurprisingly, this happened again in 1991 in the wake of the USSR demise. Although 

Chechnya was legally a part of the Russian Federation, it remained a ‘foreign body’ inside 

Russia. The tragedy results from the inability of both sides to recognize each other’s 

interests and establish conditions for long-term, mutually acceptable political solutions. 

Since the forced 

annexation to the 

Russian Empire, the 

Chechens never willingly 

accepted Russian rule. 

They utilized, in more or 

less organized forms, 

every possible 

opportunity to get rid off 

the Russian control… 

Chechnya declared itself independent from the Russian 

Federation in September 1991 under the leadership of 

Dzhokhar Dudayev, a former Soviet bomber pilot. When 

several Russian-backed attempts to overthrow Dudayev’s 

government and reinstall a pro-Russian one had failed 

during 1993-94, a wide-scale conventional military 

operation became the only ‘available’ solution to this 

problem. Whilst making preparations for this operation, 

Russian political and military leaders had the opportunity 

to take full advantage of the lessons which could be learnt 

from a number of recent conflicts, with or without Russian 

involvement. Knowledge and ramifications of wars, 

campaigns and conflicts, like those between Arabic states 

and Israel (1967, 1973, 1982), the Afghanistan War 

(1979-89) and the Gulf War (1991) offered an excellent

Closer examination of the air operations in 

support of the land forces engaged in 

destroying rebel resistance throughout the 

Chechen conflict, indicated a repeat of all the 

old problems and mistakes so apparent 

during the Soviet era… 

starting point for creating a modern and firm doctrine with both a 

theoretical and operational basis for a RuAF emerging from the 

ruins of the former Soviet system. All of the aforementioned campaigns 

were analysed to ‘death’ by the most important and influential military 

academies such as the Frunze Military Academy, the Gagarin Military 

Air Academy and the Military Academy of the General Staff. It was not 

surprising given the Russian preoccupation with military theory. What 

was, however, less understandable was the fact that lessons learned 

from previous operations could only slowly and cautiously find their 

way towards practical military applications. Closer examination of the air operations in support of the land forces engaged in 

destroying rebel resistance throughout the Chechen conflict, indicated a repeat of all the old problems and mistakes so 

apparent during the Soviet era multiplied by turbulences caused by the ongoing military reforms of the RuAF. 

Analysis of the ‘Afghan experience’ demonstrated many of the fundamental problems associated with air force operations, such 

as the inherent inflexibility of air and ground crew training blinded with formalism and stereotypic approaches. Many of the 

lessons learned in Afghanistan were ignored, highlighted problems remained unresolved or no solutions were found. The Air 

Force Command failed to capitalise on the enormous potential gained through the combat experience of thousands of pilots, 

ground support and maintenance personnel. To minimize the possible ‘bad impact’ of the Afghan veterans on the moral and 

tactical training programs of combat units, they were spread all over the Soviet Air Force structure. Therefore, changes in 

standard and rigid operating procedures were 

…although the first Chechen 

conflict was clearly a failed 

attempt by Russian ground 

forces to suppress the Chechen 

rebels with overwhelming 

power, the RuAF played an 

important role supporting the 

ground contingent… 

insignificant, remained restricted to the Afghan combat 

theatre itself, and not implemented in Air Force training 

schemes. 

Although the first Chechen conflict was clearly a failed 

attempt by Russian ground forces to suppress the 

Chechen rebels with overwhelming power, the RuAF 

played an important role either supporting the ground 

contingent or conducting independent offensive air 

operations. This conflict offered a test of the RuAF’s 

primary role expressed in the MD1993, which required 

sufficient air power projection into areas of interest 

alongside the periphery of the former Soviet Union. 

13

Air operations were conducted mainly by units from the 4th Air Army deployed on a number of air bases of the North 

14 

Caucasus Military District (NCMD) reinforced with frontal, transport and long-range aviation assets. Assets of the separate 

Air Defence Aviation (ADA) and helicopters of the Army Aviation (AA) took part as well. Problems of co-ordination among 

these different units were further complicated by the involvement of helicopters used by troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs 

(MIA). By the end of November 1994, almost 140 combat aircraft, 5 55 Army Aviation helicopters, 6 up to 30 transport aircraft 7 

and 12 Mi-8 helicopters of the MIA were dedicated for air operations against Chechen rebels. Numbers of sorties carried out by 

specialized reconnaissance version of the Su-24 (limited to carry out only visual and photographic recce) were flown to build up 

a current picture of Chechen forces’ deployment, their movements, status of their air and air defence assets. As it later became 

obvious, information obtained by this way was neither precise nor flexibly distributed to fighting units; therefore it added very 

little value. This was even more evident during operations in urban areas, mainly in Groznyy, where ‘old fashioned’ airborne 

reconnaissance methods were completely ineffective and were only partially useful for battle damage assessment (BDA). 

Chechnya inherited about 250 aircraft 8 from the Armavir flight school. The vast majority of them were in poor flying condition, 

with very limited combat value. 9 They were deployed on three airfields: Kalinovskaya, Khankala and Groznyy-Severnyy. 

Moreover, Dudayev’s ‘Air Force’ could only rely on less than 40 inadequately trained pilots. However, the RuAF’s first step was 

to eliminate this threat of possible Chechen air attacks on Russian territory. In a three-day airfield attack operation, the RuAF 

managed to destroy or neutralize all of the Chechen air assets on the ground, mindful of the need to keep damage to runways, 

taxiways and airfield installations to a minimum for follow-on redeployment of RuAF units closer to areas of operations. This task 

was a relatively easy one, bearing in mind that Dudayev’s forces were not able to pose any substantial counter-air challenge 

with their limited, antiquated air defence weapons. 10 

Rough and tough; the virtually indestructable 

Su-25 ‘FROGFOOT’. 

Chechen rebels 

did not manage to 

cause any losses 

or substantial 

damage to the 

attacking aircraft 

with their small 

arms and 

sporadic antiaircraft 

gunfire 

Typically flights of four Su-25 Frogfoots in standard 

tactical formations were used in this operation 

delivering free-fall, high explosive (HE) 

fragmentation bombs with a combination of 57mm, 

80mm and 240mm unguided rockets. These 

aircraft, thanks to their massive armour protection, 

duplication of vital systems and relatively good 

manoeuvrability close to the ground, were well 

suited for the mission. In this phase of operations, 

Chechen rebels did not manage to cause any 

losses or substantial damage to the attacking 

aircraft with their small arms and sporadic antiaircraft 

gunfire.

Aircraft from the Russian Air Defence Aviation from the end of December 1994 were constantly monitoring Chechen 

15 

airspace supported by the A-50 Mainstay AWACS platform. To prevent any transport of military assets by air to the rebels, 

one to three pairs of MiG-31 Foxhound or Su-27 Flanker interceptors were kept on round-the-clock combat air patrol 

missions (CAP) over Chechnya. Air Defence radar companies and platoons were also covering low and very low level gaps in 

the overall radar picture. There was no real recorded attempt to provide any support for Chechen fighters from any country by 

air throughout the conflict. These preliminary measures taken by the RuAF and Air Defence Aviation allowed Russian troops to 

conduct ground operations without any Chechen interference from the air. Despite Russian air superiority, and the expectations 

of RuAF and army aviation high command, Chechen forces were still able to cause high losses to the enemy’s air supporting 

Russian air campaign planners once again underestimated the 

‘power’ of the weather. Winter months in this part of the North 

Caucasus were extremely severe with long lasting ground 

fogs, blowing snow, strong icing, heavy cloud build-up, low 

cloud ceilings and high top levels 

elements, as the follow-on stages of the conflict 

revealed. 

The next phase of the air war began in the middle 

of December with the advance of Russian ground 

troops towards main Chechen strongholds around 

and in the capital city Groznyy and nearby 

important towns of Argun and Gudermes. Russian 

air campaign planners once again underestimated 

the ‘power’ of the weather. Winter months 

(December, January and February) in this part of 

the North Caucasus were extremely severe with 

long lasting ground fogs, blowing snow, strong 

icing, heavy cloud build-up, low cloud ceilings and 

high top levels. Slowly advancing ground troops 

were struggling with small rebel units, which 

flexibly changed their positions and fighting 

tactics, 11 without much-needed close air support 

(CAS). The weather made it impossible to use Su- 

25s and Mi-24s for their primary role of CAS (with 

no all-weather, precision weapon delivery capability 

and not least without adequately trained crews). 

Under these conditions, the RuAF could employ 

only its Su-24s in day and night medium altitude

adar or inertial bombing through clouds. The inaccuracy of these weapon delivery modes resulted in many casualties and 

16 

collateral damage to their own troops and was indiscriminate against the Chechen civilian population as well. In these 

early stages of the Chechen war, forgotten lessons from Afghanistan, well-known and widely published experiences of 

other modern air forces in recent conflicts elsewhere, were frequently recalled through the painful failures of Russian air power. 

Four years of rapid decline in pilot proficiency, under-funded aircrew training, 12 a small percentage of pilots with night, allweather, 

precision weapons delivery preparedness could only end in poor performance. A partial solution was found in the 

creation of small combat units from the most experienced weapon instructors and test pilots from different RuAF regiments, 

weapon and flying training centres. This ‘concentration’ of force and experience helped to substantially increase the 

effectiveness of air strikes against high-value targets of Chechen infrastructure, communications and transportation network and 

some of the militarily and politically important buildings. 13 

Short or longer periods of improved weather were utilised to provide CAS to ground forces struggling to set up the tempo of 

operations regardless of the overwhelming superiority in numbers of fighting personnel (about 8:1), equipment and firepower. 

CAS operations in Chechenya once again revealed the problems in co-ordination between ground and supporting air 

operations. Many of the difficulties experienced in Chechenya were not at all new. Ten years of the Afghan War clearly showed 

how important well-trained, equipped and able to cope with the demands of the combat environment, forward air controllers 

(FAC) were for effective and efficient CAS. The RuAF and Army Aviation allocated some forty FACs to ground units to provide 

the crucial link for co-ordination between ground and air operations. With no previous combined training and operational 

procedures, the effectiveness of FAC-controlled CAS missions remained low throughout the Chechen conflict and produced 

numerous ‘blue-on-blue’ incidents with many friendly casualties. 14 To make things even worse, poor communications, navigation 

and transportation equipment further undermined the conduct of CAS operations. Chechen rebels operating the same military 

‘hardware’ as their Russian counterparts were able to intercept and monitor most of the radio frequencies used by Russian 

forces. They also made special efforts to find out the FACs’ positions and eliminate this important link in the chain of air-ground 

co-operation. Moreover, information about ground force concentrations, weapons and enemy positions were exploited by 

Chechen commanders either to quickly change their positions to avoid CAS attacks, or engage Russian positions with artillery 

and mortar fire. The lack of secure communications and data exchanging lines made many Russian ground force unit 

commanders unwilling to transfer information through radio links. For the same reason, they were also reluctant to call for CAS, 

thus severely reducing flexible and joint combat capabilities to deal with Chechen fighting tactics. 

The next phase of the campaign can be characterized by the shift towards air interdiction operations. The small number of 

politically or militarily significant targets that were destroyed or damaged by the RuAF throughout Chechenya had no visible 

impact on the rebels. They were operating in small groups, exploiting every opportunity and advantage offered by the terrain, 

weather, and weapons in their possession along with utilizing urban areas to wear down Russian troops. The RuAF lacked the

conceptual and doctrinal framework determining air power utility to contribute to urban warfare. 15 This was clearly visible 

17 

throughout the Chechen air campaign. Army Aviation commander in chief, General Pavlov, expressed this problem stating 

that “urban combat is not suited to helicopters”. The same applied to fixed wing assets of the RuAF. Some ‘solutions’ were, 

however, found in the form of massive, indiscriminate bombing of Chechen cities, infrastructure and transportation lines to 

support ground troops overcoming the rebels’ resistance. Thousands of casualties and widespread suffering of the civilian 

population resulted in adverse reactions from the international community, and surprisingly even on the changing domestic 

Russian political and military scene, against this method of air power ‘application’. Precision weapons played a limited role in 

the RuAF’s campaign in Chechenya despite their well-known effectiveness and the possibility of minimizing collateral 

damage. 16 This was mainly due to their high cost, limited number and small percentage of frontline pilots with the appropriate 

proficiency to use them effectively. Nonetheless, lives and properties of Chechen civilians were valued as little as those of the 

rebels and there were no special measures taken to avoid unnecessary suffering of the civil population. 17 

Despite the well-known shortcomings and trade-offs 

revealed by air campaigns waged in these conflicts, 

the overall positive contribution of air power has 

proved undisputable 

The first Chechen War was in many ways a repetition of the 

same failures in employing air power in a limited, low intensity 

conflict, as in Afghanistan during the previous decade. Despite 

the well-known shortcomings and trade-offs revealed by air 

campaigns waged in these conflicts, the overall positive 

contribution of air power has proved undisputable. The most 

important lessons learned and re-learned in the first Chechen War included the need for complex measures to maintain air 

superiority and minimize high-value air asset losses in a combat environment with no opposing air force, no integrated air 

defence systems, but substantial numbers and range of different mobile anti-aircraft weapons. 18 In the absence of ISTAR 19 

coverage, it required much flexibility to obtain timely and accurate information along with tactics matching those of the 

adversary. This war revealed yet another important finding. Although the RuAF was able to maintain its superiority throughout 

the war, it was much less successful in preventing the rebels from exploiting commercially available communication assets such 

as cellular phones and radio transceivers to carry out command and control (C2). The RuAF made only a few isolated attempts 

to employ hi-tech precision weapons against key targets, interrupting the rebels’ C2 system and providing air support

integrated with the advance of ground forces. Vague doctrinal fundamentals and ambiguous operational guidance, without 

18 

tactical solutions, backed by low-level training, inevitably led to poor performance and extensive losses even when a 

reasonable number of adequate air assets and weapons were available from the RuAF’s inventory to cope with the 

challenges of the war. The first Chechen War showed that the RuAF was still far from able to effectively and efficiently undertake 

complex and comprehensive tasks and missions in low intensity conflicts. 

At a cost of huge military and civilian losses, Russian ground units managed to occupy Groznyy and the other major towns in 

Chechenya in the first half of 1996. Due to massive and intensive counter attacks launched by the rebels, Russian troops were 

forced to withdraw from Chechenya in August 1996. The peace agreement gave the Chechen Republic an undefined 

independence within the Russian Federation. Both sides were completely dissatisfied with this situation and the next attempt to 

find a long-term solution was just a question of time. Based on the antagonistic Russian and Chechen positions, the only open 

option was through military force. Tension reached a dangerous level in August 1999 after numerous Chechen incursions into 

the neighbouring Dagestan and a series of terrorist bomb attacks in Russian cities. The follow-on, large-scale campaign 

carefully orchestrated by a more jointly thinking and working task force command, achieved most of the planned objectives by 

the beginning of March 2000. 20 Chechen guerrillas were pushed back into the southern mountainous area, losing all their 

important military and support bases. 

Although this war is far from over, some important changes can 

be identified in the employment of RuAF in this current conflict. 

First of all, although the task force was again set up of units and 

formations controlled by the Ministry of Defence (MOD), the 

Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA), Federal Security Service, Ministry 

for Emergencies and so on, through the new concept of 

“Temporary Operational Groupings” and under one unified C2 

structure, the MOD managed to maintain a more effective and 

Air power had been employed to minimize contact 

battles generating massive firepower creating 

favourable conditions for ground troops’ advance. 

Almost 80% of all fire missions had been carried out 

by fixed or rotary wing aviation and only about 15% by 

ground-based artillery…

streamlined chain of command throughout the period of intensive military operations. The main result of this was a more 

19 

manoeuvrist approach of Russian forces along with the ability to dictate the tempo of operations, which was in sharp 

contrast with the first Chechen War. 

Secondly, since 1997, the reform of Russian armed forces moved on a strategic level as well. Old Military Districts (MD) with 

their huge administrative and bureaucratic structures had been re-configured into “Operational-Strategic Commands”, which 

were intended to command all the armed forces on their territory. Although this concept is still evolving, the North Caucasus 

MD has been able to more flexibly meet the challenges of the second Chechen War waged inside its territorial responsibility. 

Thirdly, down to the tactical level, this latest conflict was a confirmation of substantial changes in regiments, battalions and subunits 

with much evidence of greater tactical sophistication. Nethertheless, the quality of conscripts (on which Russian ground 

forces are mainly based) had not improved since the first Chechen War and their ability to match Chechen guerrillas, especially 

in close combat, was still unsatisfactory. 21 Air power had been employed to minimize contact battles, generating massive 

firepower and creating favourable conditions for ground troops’ advance. Almost 80% of all fire missions had been carried out 

by fixed or rotary wing aviation and only about 15% by ground based artillery .22 Air support of troops in the demanding form of 

CAS proved not to be any better in this conflict. The lack of adequately trained and equipped forward air controllers (FAC) 

remained a serious problem. However, more FACs have since allocated to battalions and companies, thus increasing the 

responsiveness of CAS to tactical commanders. 

It is also worth mentioning that during this conflict the RuAF and the Army Aviation conducted some experimental trials of new 

weaponry in a limited combat environment using the modernised and improved version of the Su-25TM ‘Frogfoot’ attack 

aircraft and the Ka-50/52 and Mi-24N attack helicopters. However, except for some very vague information regarding the actual 

combat effectiveness of these aircraft expressed in terms like “they performed 5 or even 10 times better than their 

predecessors”, no authentic evaluation results were revealed. Given the well-known Russian defence budget misery, there are 

no plans to procure any of the aforementioned aircraft or helicopters in significant numbers, at least in the next few years. 

Finally, while in the first Chechen War, the Russian military authorities completely lost the information war as well; however, in 

this recent conflict they have been performing arguably better. Russian public opinion was not prepared for the first war; the 

MOD’s press centre totally underestimated the possible impact of the domestic media on the Russian population. Russian 

military leaders treated the press with little respect; on the other hand, the Chechens enabled the media to cover most of the 

evolving situation, with mainly scenes of destroyed Russian equipment and dead soldiers. They also fully utilized the power of 

the images showing bombed cities and masses of refugees. The result of this was a ‘public relations disaster’. 

In the early stages of the second Chechen conflict, having properly analysed the previous ‘disaster’, the Russians won the 

information war. However, as the conflict went on, it became more and more difficult to maintain an intensive information 

campaign and the Chechens are ruthlessly exploiting every gap and shortcoming in it.

20 

KOSOVO, CHECHNYA AND THE NEW MILITARY DOCTRINE 

NATO’s 78 days’ intensive military campaign “Allied Force” against Yugoslavia in 1999 deeply and seriously affected the 

political and military establishment of Russia. It was seen as a humiliation and a ‘spit in the face’ for Russia. 23 The period of 

stagnation and rehabilitation after the first Chechen War was replaced by a new wave of reforms and further downsizing in 

Russian armed forces. 

As mentioned before, the 1993 Military Doctrine was not a coherent guide for the Russian armed forces to deal with possible 

future military challenges. Neither did the 1997 National Security Concept shed any light on the way to approach current and 

future security issues. The tension between the old Soviet legacy and new circumstances and realities remained. Desperate 

attempts to maintain a great power status with global reach have been seriously under-funded. These problems, multiplied by 

the ongoing economic and social reforms and underpinned by the very fragile nature of Russia’s emerging democracy, 

inevitably led to the need to rethink security and military ramifications. Revised versions of Russia’s National Security Concept 

(approved by a Presidential Decree in January 2000) and the Russian Federation Military Doctrine (approved by a Presidential 

Decree in April 2000) were aimed to more closely match and tackle possible external and internal threats during a period of 

transition of Russia into a politically and economically stable, democratic statehood. While still regarding itself as a major 

power with global influence (seen primarily through its massive strategic nuclear arsenal), the main emphasis in these 

documents was placed on the identification of internal and regional threats (mainly in areas inside or close to the borders of 

the former Soviet Union). This theoretical and conceptual appreciation of probable future military challenges, though painfully 

slow, is finding its way into strategic and operational outcomes, as the recent Chechen conflict has revealed. Air power is seen 

as not merely a support element of ground troops but as a force, which can be decisive when utilized in an effective and 

efficient manner. 

The RuAF performed arguably better during the opening phase of the second Chechen War. Partially based on previous 

experiences from Afghanistan, from the first Chechen War and partially on lessons learned by the Allied Air Forces in the Gulf 

and in Kosovo, the RuAF’s operations were more focused, coherent and integrated into the overall campaign plan. Except for 

the occasional employment of precision-guided munitions (PGM), the bulk of firepower was projected through non-precision 

bombs and rockets, thus confirming the existence of a substantial technological gap between the RuAF and its most developed 

NATO or Western counterparts. This gap is likely to remain or even to widen in the foreseeable future. Despite these well-known 

shortcomings, the RuAF’s role in low intensity conflicts, and local or regional wars, will certainly rise, bearing in mind the 

framework given by the 2000 Security Concept and Military Doctrine. 

FUTURE PERSPECTIVES 

At the end of Yeltzin’s presidency (1998-99), military reforms were both inconsistent and lacked any systematic, conceptual

approach. Continuing economic problems, miserable financial funding and budgeting further reduced the effectiveness of 

21 

this process. The new President of Russia, Vladimir Putin (elected in March 2000), promised in his political programme to 

enhance and boost the reforms of Russia’s armed forces. He seemed to clearly understand the importance of desperately 

needed complex and radical changes in the whole defence structure of the Russian Federation. Two key principles were 

recognized by Putin’s administration as a basic requirement for any feasible and successful military reform. First of all, that any 

measures taken during a comprehensive process of reforms must be backed by a realistic and balanced economic assessment 

aimed to use available funds much more efficiently. Secondly, that the whole structure of the armed forces should correspond 

to current and foreseeable future threats. Nothing revolutionary new, rather a less politicised, more pragmatic and realistic 

approach. 

The earlier-mentioned National Security Concept along with the Military Doctrine, still contain elements of Cold War style 

perception of some of the external threats (like NATO’s capability to project out-of-area operations and its enlargement 

especially towards Russia’s western borders), and are a ‘product’ of Russia’s changing vision of its own vital national interests. 

We need to refer here to visions rather than exact and precise definitions because Russia has still a long way to go down the 

‘doctrinal road’. The Military Doctrine provides the means and basic guidance on the use of military forces, answering the when, 

where and how questions. It describes the goals of the use of Russian armed forces as follows: 

– in a large scale (regional) war in the event that it is unleashed by a state (group or coalition of states): to protect the 

independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation (RF) and its allies, to repulse aggression, to 

effectively engage the enemy and to force it to end its military operations on terms according with the interests of RF and 

its allies; 

– in local wars and international armed conflicts: to localize the seat of tension, to create the prerequisites for ending the 

war or armed conflict or for bringing it to an end at an early stage; to neutralize the aggressor and achieve a settlement 

on terms according with the interests of RF and its allies; 

– in internal armed conflicts: to rout and liquidate illegal armed formations, to create the conditions for a full settlement of 

the conflict on the basis of RF Constitution and federal legislation; 

– in peacekeeping and peace restoration operations: to disengage the warring factions, to stabilize the situation and to 

ensure the conditions for a just peace settlement. 

The main ways of utilizing RF armed forces are: 

– strategic operations, operations and combat operations; in large scale and regional wars; 

– operations and combat operations; in local wars and international armed conflicts; 

– joint special operations: in internal armed conflicts;

– counter terrorist operations; in fight against terrorism in accordance with federal legislation; 

22 

– peacekeeping operations. 24 

Air power is recognized as an indisputably key contributor to the success of the aforementioned operations and missions. The 

RuAF’s real current and future capabilities however need to be seen and assessed in the light of Russia’s overall situation and 

position at the beginning of the 21st Century. 

Russia’s conventional forces were especially weakened by ill-planned reform attempts during the 1990s. The first Chechen War 

was a confirmation of this. With no time for recovery, evaluation and at least identification of lessons, a new round of 

downsizing was launched in 1997. The amalgamation of the former Air Defence Troops and Frontal Aviation under one Air 

Force Command was completed in 2000. A joint, reorganized air defence system now covers Russia and some of the 

At the end of 2000 the number of 

operational combat aircraft went down to 

2,300. This was hardly one fourth of the 

level maintained ten years ago. However, 

only about 50-80% of the aircraft in the 

current inventory are serviceable… 

members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) like 

Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. At the end of 

2000, the overall strength of the RuAF’s personnel was down to 190,000 

and the number of operational combat aircraft went down to 2,300. 25 

This was hardly one fourth of the level maintained ten years ago. 

However, only about 50-80% of the aircraft in the current inventory are 

serviceable, thus severely degrading the projection of combat capabilities 

(the worst situation is in the transport aviation, improving through the 

long-range aviation and reaching the highest level in the tactical aviation). 

The RuAF now consists of two Air Armies (the Long Range Aviation and 

Military Transport Aviation), seven operational tactical air and air defence 

formations along with 70 air regiments. Air formations deployed within 

Military Districts (MD) are subordinate to commanders of MDs, but 

overall control is the central RuAF command responsibility. In 2001, all of 

Russia’s air force assets, including 37 surface-to-air missile regiments, 

anti-missile and space defence units were merged into an automatic 

command and control system based on the former Air Defence 

Command’s enhanced C2 system. However, the current C2 structure 

desperately needs to be thoroughly modernized to maintain its 

effectiveness across the whole spectrum of conflict described in the 

latest Military Doctrine. Further changes, ‘rearrangements’ and 

‘streamlining’ are likely to follow according to requirements dictated by

not only the evolving operational environment, but also by the available resources for defence expenditure. 

23 

Since 1994, only a dozen new combat aircraft have been introduced into frontline service. They were from the family of 

Su-27 Flankers, modernized into a capable tactical strike (Su-30) and fighter (Su-35) version. The current fleet of aircraft is 

relatively young (from 10 to 17 years) since the majority of older aircraft was phased out or scrapped. Nevertheless, the 

situation will become very serious around 2005, when a large number of aircraft reach the end of their service lives. 26 There are 

plans for substantial procurement of new generation combat aircraft from 2005 onwards, but the assumptions, which these 

plans are based on, lack a great deal of realism. Even the most optimistically constructed economic recovery with a sustained 

annual growth of GDP around 3-5% allows for only a modest increase in defence spending. Research, development and 

procurement programs for the RuAF are not at the top of a long list of ‘burning’ priorities. What is, however, feasible in the 

coming years is to overhaul, upgrade and modernise at least the core of the current inventory, thus meeting possible internal 

and external challenges over the next 10-15 years. This solution certainly leads to an increasing technological gap between the 

RuAF and its advanced counterparts, but this decade is more about realistic survival for the RuAF, rather than keeping pace or 

competing with the USA, as at the peak of the Cold War. Therefore, a whole range of optimistic and ambitious combat aircraft 

development programs were either cancelled entirely or indefinitely postponed. 27 The only recognized solution currently available 

and affordable was to keep the present fleet flying as long as possible with targeted upgrade. Platforms like the MiG-29 and 

Su-27 were perfectly suitable to fulfil the whole range of combat missions after increasing their capabilities by cost effective 

modernisation. In small numbers, the RuAF already possesses a potent and capable renewed ‘family’ of aircraft like the truly 

multirole MiG-29SMT, Su-30 long-range interceptor, Su-34 tactical strike and Su-35/37 fighter aircraft. The ageing Su-25 

ground attack aircraft is being replaced by the completely rebuilt version designated as the Su-39. The fleet of Tu-160, Tu-95 

and Tu-22 long-range bombers is also gradually being modernised. This trend is most likely to continue in the foreseeable 

future as the only available solution to provide the RuAF with appropriate ‘tools’ to fulfil tasks and missions derived from the 

Military Doctrine. 

Russia’s defence industry, which comprises around one-fifth of the country’s total industrial capacity, remains a huge complex of 

ineffective and inflexible design bureaux and production facilities. Reforming this area has been the least successful so far. It 

was, however, more than clear for the present administration that maintaining its status quo seriously undermined upgrading 

and modernising programs for the RuAF. Moreover, a future capability to produce new generation aircraft was jeopardized by 

spreading among them the already low level of state funding for research and development. Only a third of the most ‘healthy’ 

defence companies from the current number of 1,500 were expected to survive the planned drastic ‘cure prescribed’ by the 

new Russian government. To protect and sustain the necessary defence industrial base, the Military Doctrine identified the need 

for state purchases from a selected group of enterprises with guaranteed fixed prices for equipment. Moreover, it emphasised 

the importance to retain an independent research and development capability across the range of weapon systems and

platforms, including nuclear and conventional ones. As domestic demand for new weapons was on a historically low level 

24 

(due to budget constraints), Russia’s arms exports will remain a major source of revenue for the defence industry. 28 

Putin’s administration is determined to keep Russia’s defence budget on the present level of 4-5% of GDP in the next few 

years. This seems to be a relatively high number, 29 but in real purchasing terms on the domestic market it is still just around 

$50 bn. After a long period of decline, Russia’s economy in 2000 achieved a remarkable growth of 5% of GDP and in 2001 a 

similar trend is seen. This growth is, however, very fragile bearing in mind that is mainly based on high oil, natural gas and raw 

materials market prices. Nevertheless, it allows carrying on with some of the outlined modernization programs for the RuAF. 

Except for the last 2-3 years, when reforms in Russian armed forces took a more coherent and planned form, the steps taken 

by political and military decision makers throughout the 1990s can be characterized as ‘management of chaos’. It should be 

acknowledged that management was rather poor, lacking any cohesion and vision. The transition from an authoritarian state 

and communist party controlled system into a democratic country is still going on after ten years. This process in its complexity 

is comparable to the creation of Soviet Russia after the communist revolution in 1917. It is an extraordinarily complicated task 

to build up a democratic statehood with solid institutional pillars especially after seventy years of rigid central control. Economic, 

political and societal problems are magnified by the painful realization of the loss of superpower status. The RuAF has been one 

of the most adversely affected branches of the transforming Russian Armed Forces. At the end of a decade characterized by 

constant cuts in numbers and resources, the RuAF emerged with little respect as a service. In spite of many changes, the RuAF 

is still seen (by military analysts inside and outside Russia) as a force unable to project full-scale air power. 

The first Chechen War revealed many problems and shortcomings from doctrinal down to operational and tactical levels. The 

1993 Military Doctrine, still deeply influenced by perceptions from the previous Soviet era, saw air power merely as a support 

element of massive ground forces. Many useful lessons learned in Afghanistan were either forgotten or ignored by political and 

military decision-makers and planners. Pilot training schemes were rigid and unimaginative coupled with a low number of flying 

hours (about one fifth of the amount for NATO operational, combat ready pilots). In addition to poor equipment, lack of 

appropriate type and sufficient stockpiles of all weather, precision-guided munitions, caused the RuAF to suffer substantial 

losses in a rather benign combat environment with little challenging Chechen air defence. The second Chechen conflict (still 

unresolved because the Kremlin’s decision makers failed to address themselves to the political end state of this war), though 

heavily influenced by the need to quickly ‘produce’ satisfying results before the oncoming presidential elections in March 2000, 

can be assessed from an air power perspective as a turning point in the right direction. Unified command and control, changes 

to force structures, pooling well-trained personnel and forming the most modern air assets into a responsive task force helped 

to achieve, in a short time, most of the goals and objectives of the air campaign. Better coordination was achieved between 

various elements of the joint task force grouping comprising units and formations from three ministries, and from numbers of 

state institutions all of them carrying their differing doctrines, rules of engagements etc. On the other hand, it again highlighted

how limited the RuAF’s current operational capabilities were. Starting with aircrew training, continuing through aircraft 

25 

inventory modernization and ending with a full range of high-accuracy weapons and their delivery capabilities – these were 

the key areas where substantial improvements and upgrading were essential. The leadership of the RuAF was fully aware 

of these challenges and its main effort was focused into these directions. It also remains to be seen, what impact ongoing 

structural changes, reforms, further decreasing of manpower numbers and defence budget constraints will have on the RuAF’s 

operational capabilities. 

The latest Military Doctrine is a fundamental document, which tries to reflect (as much as possible) Russia’s changed security 

position after ten years of evolution since the end of the Cold War. New tasks and missions are emerging from it for the RuAF. 

Air power projection in this decade is most probable in regions of interests along the rim surrounding Russia, rather than 

beyond it. We are certainly not going to witness Gulf or Kosovo-type ‘high-tech’ air operations in the next few years 

orchestrated by the RuAF. There was no lack of scientific and human invention devoted to aircraft and weapon projects, which 

can give similarly new dimensions to the utility of air power as it is in countries with highly developed airspace research and 

manufacturing industries. In the next 10-15 years, the RuAF will mainly rely on current frontline aircraft and weapon platforms 30 

partially modernized through cost-effective, affordable projects. Cuts in numbers will continue along with improvements in force 

structures making them leaner and more responsive. The central motive of this decade for the RuAF will be a struggle to retain 

limited air power projection capabilities and the justification of its own existence. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

BOOKS 

Lambeth, B. S. Russia’s Air Power in Crisis. Washington: Smithsonian Institution 

Press, 1999. 

Urban, M. War in Afghanistan. 2nd edition, London: MacMillan, 1990. 

McMichael, S. Stumbling Bear – Soviet Military Performance in Afghanistan. 

London: Brassey’s, 1991. 

Cordesman, A. and Wagner, A. Lessons of Modern Warfare – The Afghan and 

Falklands Conflict. Vol. III, London: Mansell Publishing, 1990. 

Grau, L. W. The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in 

Afghanistan. London: Frank Cass Publisher, 1998. 

Strategic and Combat Studies Institute. The Second Chechen War. No.40, 

Edited by A. Aldis, JDCC, 2000. 

Arbatov, A. G. The Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine: Lessons Learned 

from Kosovo and Chechnya. The Marshall Center Papers, No.2, Garmish- 

Partenkirchen, 2000. 

Nikunen, H. The Current State of the Russian Air Force. Stockholm: J Lindberg, 

2000. 

ARTICLES IN JOURNALS AND MAGAZINES 

Lewis, Ronald W. ‘Chechnya – Third Battle of the Russian Civil War’. AFM, May 

1995, p. 16-21. 

Marshall-Hasdell, D. J. ‘Recent Employment of Russian Air Power: The Case of 

Chechnya’. Air Clues, August 1996, p. 284-292. 

Taylor, J. W. ‘Gallery of Russian Aerospace Weapons’. Air Force Magazine, 

March 1997, p. 65-78. 

Tereenkov, K. ‘Whirlwind Over the Caucasus’. Air Forces Monthly, December 

1999, p. 24-27.

26 

Cook, N. ‘Russian Air Force is down but not out’. Jane’s Defence Weekly, 

19 March 1997, p. 21-25. 

Fulghum, D. A. ‘Air War in Chechnya Reveals Mix of Tactics’. AW&ST, 14 

February 2000, p. 76-78. 

Komarov, A. ‘Chechen Conflict Drives Call for Air Force Modernization’. AW&ST, 

14 February 2000, p. 80-81. 

Butowski, P. ‘Russia’s new air force enters a tight manoeuvre’. Jane’s 

Intelligence Review, May 1999, p. 14-19. 

Butowski, P. ‘CIS military aircraft plants’. Air Forces Monthly, February 2001, 

p. 68-73. 

Mann, P. ‘Russian Air Force Besieged, Broke’. AW&ST, 14 October 1996, 

p. 28-32. 

Lambeth, B. S. ‘Hard Times for the Russian Air Force’. Air Force Magazine, July 

1995, p. 58-62. 

Lambeth, B. S. ‘Profiles in Russian Airpower’. Air Force Magazine, March 1997, 

p. 42-44. 

Velovich, A. ‘Preparing for combat’. Flight International, 8-14 February 1995, 

p. 26-27. 

Barrie, D. ‘Coming down to earth’. Flight International, 6-12 August 1997, 

p. 35-37. 

Marshall-Hasdell, D. J. ‘The Russian Air Force: Prospects for the Future?’. 

Air Clues, July 1994, p. 244-299. 

Kondratyev, V. ‘The Terrible Sky above Chechnya’. Krylya Rodiny, No 1,2, 

January/February 1996, p. 1-5/1-4. 

Hills, A. ‘The Airpower Taboo: Dialogue Across Perspectives? Airpower and 

Urban Operations’. Airman-Scholar, Spring 2000, p. 62-72. 

Deynekin, P. ‘The War in Chechnya’. Aviatsiya I kosmonavtika, November 1995, 

p. 15-20. 

INTERNET SOURCES 

The Military Balance 2000-2001, Published for IISS, 19 October 2000 

(http://www.iiss.org/pub/tx00009.asp), downloaded 02/11/2000. 

Military Expenditure 1999, SIPRI Yearbook 2000, 

(http://www.projects.sipri.se/milex/mex.html), downloaded 30/10/2000. 

Military Reform and the Russian Air Force, CSRC, Dick, C.J., 2000 

(http://www.ppc.pims.org/projects.html), downloaded 06/09/2000. 

Security Council Reconsiders Military Reform, 10 November 2000 MSK, 

(http://www.gazeta.ru/scrmr.html), downloaded 10/11/2000. 

Russian Military Thinking from Kosovo to Chechnya, Baev, P., FOA 15 

December 1999 

(http://www.ppc.pims.org/Projects/csrc/new/ob74.html), downloaded 

06/09/2000.

NOTES 

1 Council for Mutual Economic Support; institution promoting economic 

cooperation among socialist countries under the former Soviet Union 

‘protection’ (1949-91). 

2 Benjamin S. Lambeth, Russia’s Air Power in Crisis, Smithsonian Institution, 

1999, pp.15. 

3 Ibid, pp. 39. 

4 Ibid, pp. 34-43. 

5 Su-25 (Frogfoot) ground attack, Su-22 (Fitter), fighter-bomber and Su-24 

(Fencer) tactical bomber aircraft. 

6 Mi-24 (Hind) attack, Mi-8/17 (Hip) transport/utility and Mi-6 (Hook) heavy 

transport helicopters. 

7 An-12 (Cub), An-22 (Cock), An-26 (Curl), An-124 (Condor) and Il-76 

(Candid) transport aircraft. 

8 152 L-39 and 94 L-29 jet trainers and several MiG-15/17 old, first 

generation jet fighters. 

9 Some of the L-39s were configured to carry two 250-pound bombs or two 

rocket pods each for 16 unguided 57mm rockets 

10 Alltogether 4 mobile ZSU-23/4 radar and optically tracked anti-aircraft guns, 

6 ZU-23 and DShK optically sighted machine guns and some SA-7/14 

Strela and SA-16 Igla man-portable SAMs. 

11 Many of the Chechen commanders and fighters were graduates of Soviet 

military schools and academies, skilfully adopting their knowledge of 

Russian tactics, using the same weapons (left behind Russian units 

withdrawn from Chechenya in 1991). 

12 The average amount of flying time per year for frontline ‘combat’ pilots for 

four years prior to the Chechen conflict was well below 30 hours. 

13 Bridges over the Argun River, presidential palace in Groznyy, former Soviet 

ICBM silos used as ammunition stores, etc. 

14 N.N. Novichkov: The Russian Armed Forces in the Chechen Conflict 

(Moscow 1995), pp.10. 

15 See also A. Hills: The Airpower Taboo: Dialouge Across Perspectives? 

Airpower and Urban Operations (Airman Scholar, Spring 2000). 

16 Precision guided missiles and bombs (mainly the AS 12/14 laser or TV 

guided missiles and KAB 500L, 1500L, 500KR laser and TV guided bombs) 

were used in some cases against bridges over the Argun River, industrial 

infrastructure, defensive positions of the rebels and their military leadership. 

17 According to Russian sources 6,000 Chechen civilians died in the 

conflict; Western sources indicate the loss of 20,000civilian lives. 27 

18 The RuAF lost two Su-25s, one Su-24; 26 aircraft sustained battle 

damage and the Army Aviation lost ten helicopters and every forth of them 

were damaged. 

19 ISTAR – Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance. 

20 Driven by the enormous political pressure from the Kremlin under the 

leadership of Prime Minister Putin, the major candidate for the presidential 

elections held in March 2000. 

21 The majority of Russian casualties were due to forcing unprepared soldiers 

to fight the guerrillas in Chechen urban areas. 

22 Michael Orr: Second Time Lucky? Evaluating Russian Performance in the 

Second Chechen War; www.ppc.pims.org/Projects/csrc/JIRArticle.htm 

23 G. Arbatov: The Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine: Lessons 

Learned from Kosovo and Chechnya; (The Marshall Center Papers, No.2; 

2000). 

24 See also: G. Arbatov: The Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine: 

Lessons Learned from Kosovo and Chechnya; (The Marshall Center papers, 

No.2; 2000). 

25 Military Balance 2000, Russia ,pp.124. 

26 It is almost 30% of the fleet, namely the Su-24 Fencer tactical bombers; Su- 

25 Frogfoot close air support aircraft and the first batch of the MiG-29 

Fulcrum, Su-27 Flanker and MiG-31 Foxhound fighters, further reducing the 

number of effectively available air assets below 2000. 

27 Like the MiG-MAPO aircraft manufacturer’s future multirole frontal fighter 

known as ‘Article 1.42’ (MiG-35); or the Sukhoi Design Bureau’s forward 

swept wing interceptor S-37, which in the lack of funding are remaining only 

in a form of ‘technological demonstrators’. 

28 In 2000 weapons’ export achieved the level of $4bn and is steadily rising. 

29 For example US defence budget is about 3.5% of GDP in FY2001 

($305.4 bn). 

30 Little prospect for small-scale introduction of new generation combat 

aircraft.

SUN TZU 

STRATEGIC PARALYSIS 

and SMALL NATIONS

By Wing Commander Saridporn Soonthornkit, Royal Thai Air Force 29 

The 1991 Gulf War appeared to mark a significant turning point for modern warfare. For the first time, precision attacks 

could be conducted successfully against virtually any strategic or tactical targets. Waging total war seemed no longer 

necessary because the enemy could be quickly paralyzed and forced to make concessions by a strategic paralysis 

campaign. Strategic paralysis could not only minimize casualties and collateral damage but also avoid protracted war. 

Advocates of airpower even argued that the air campaign by itself could be decisive without any follow-up ground offensives or 

territorial occupations despite the fact that airpower cannot seize or hold any territories. 1 It was hoped that future wars would 

be comparatively shorter, less costly, and more humane. 

However, time has revealed that the strategic paralysis campaign was not completely successful since it failed to achieve some 

of the objectives set by the coalition forces. Dr Grant T. Hammond argues that ‘Iraq did not win militarily, but it did not lose 

politically.’ 2 It is still debatable whether stability really exists in the Persian Gulf after the war and whether American citizens are 

now safer abroad. Moreover, neither Iraq’s WMD capability nor the Republican Guard was completely destroyed. Similarly, 

William M. Arkin points out that while Saddam Hussein might have had great difficulty in directing his war efforts, the attacks 

against his leadership did not cause his regime to collapse as previously expected. 3 After a decade, the remaining fundamental 

conflicts and psychological hostilities still have a considerable potential to trigger subsequent wars. 

While modern theories fail to explain why an overwhelming military success did not lead to the desired end-state, The Art of 

War written by Sun Tzu over two thousand years ago surprisingly accounts for the shortcoming. 4 Though ‘friction’ such as 

uncertainties, errors, accidents, technical difficulties, and unforeseen circumstances can adversely affect the outcome of war, 

Sun Tzu’s strategic concept can approximate to a science on the nature of war because it is an accumulative experience of the 

Chinese people over thousands of years. 5 Friction can certainly make the outcome of war unpredictable. Nevertheless, a set of 

general principles governing various aspects of war can be empirically derived from history, given a sufficient number of 

historical cases. Even though Sun Tzu’s work has been widely translated into many languages for centuries, not many people 

profoundly understand his concept.

The term ‘paralysis’ was used by Sir Basil H. Liddell Hart when he wrote, ‘It is thus more potent, as well as more 

30 

economical, to disarm the enemy than to attempt his destruction by hard fighting. … A strategist should think in terms of 

paralyzing, not killing.’ 6 In modern practice, the concept of strategic paralysis was derived from the combined ideas of Col. 

John R. Boyd’s ‘psychological’ paralysis and Col. John A. Warden III’s ‘physical’ paralysis. The practical concept is probably 

best defined by the US Joint Vision 2010 as follows: 

Airpower will simultaneously deliver precision weapons against strategic targets in a minimum time frame to inflict strategic 

paralysis on the enemy. Such parallel attacks will synergistically create both physical and psychological effects. The 

enemy’s war fighting capability will be quickly reduced to a level that subsequent military operations can be accomplished 

easily. 7 

According to the definition, strategic paralysis seems to be feasible only for superpowers with sufficient assets to conduct 

parallel attacks. The objective of this paper is to demonstrate that strategic paralysis pursued in conjunction with Sun Tzu’s 

concept could prevent failures similar to those of the 1991 Gulf War and might also be feasible for small nations with limited 

airpower. 

The paper consists of seven parts. The first section will indicate the relevancy of Sun Tzu’s concept of war to modern warfare. 

The second section will briefly discuss Boyd’s psychological paralysis and Warden’s physical paralysis. The third section will 

identify some possible theoretical flaws in the strategic paralysis concept. The fourth section will examine the practical 

limitations of military means and strategic paralysis at each level of strategy. The fifth section will discuss the most likely 

scenarios for small nations with limited airpower. The sixth section will discuss how to apply a prewar strategy prior to the state 

of war. The seventh section will discuss how to apply strategic paralysis in conjunction with Sun Tzu’s concept. In addition to 

the thinking of Western scholars, the paper incorporates the practical experiences of some senior officers of the Royal Thai Air 

Force (RTAF). 8 Lastly, the conclusion will summarize the alternative approach to strategic thinking, military campaign planning, 

targeting strategy, and the exploitation of military success. 

SUN TZU’S CONCEPT OF WAR 

It is quite difficult to interpret Sun Tzu’s The Art of War accurately because of two major factors. Firstly, there are a number of 

ambiguities in any single translation because the Chinese ideograms may have several valid contextual meanings. For example, 

the ideogram ‘bing’ in a particular context could be translated as ‘war’, ‘conflict’, ‘military’, ‘strategy’, ‘tactic’, ‘combat’, ‘battle’, 

‘manoeuvre’, or ‘weapon’. 9 Word-by-word translation sometimes does not make much sense while contextual translation is 

sometimes inaccurate due to the East-West cultural differences. It is also possible that Sun Tzu might have intentionally chosen 

these terms so that his work would always remain universally applicable. Secondly, a comprehensive understanding of Chinese

history and culture is essential for a precise translation. The Chinese perception of war in the past might have been 

31 

different from modern beliefs. In an attempt to avoid misinterpretation, the quotations from The Art of War in this paper are 

based on the comparison of several available sources. 

Sun Tzu’s concept of war in general still remains relevant to modern warfare. At the grand strategic and military strategic levels, 

The Art of War discusses not only military strategy but also the political and economic aspects of war. At the operational and 

tactical levels, some of the operational doctrines and tactics are still applicable to modern warfare. For example, some of the 

principles of war discussed in The Art of War remain central to modern military doctrines. Modern guerrilla warfare illustrates a 

complete application of Sun Tzu’s concept at all levels of strategy. 10 The nature of war may have changed significantly in terms 

of military hardware and the environment; nevertheless, the pattern of conflict and typical human deficiencies remain 

unchanged. 11 Hence, most of Sun Tzu’s strategic and tactical concepts are still applicable or adaptable to modern warfare. 

Some wars continue for a 

long period of time as long 

as the fundamental conflicts 

remain, although the 

continuity of armed 

hostilities may be interrupted 

by forcible suppressions or 

domestic problems 

Sun Tzu looked at war from a very broad perspective. ‘War’ not only means the actual 

state of war but also includes prewar efforts to avoid armed hostilities and postwar efforts 

to achieve the desired end-state. 12 Some wars continue for a long period of time as long as 

the fundamental conflicts remain, although the continuity of armed hostilities may be 

interrupted by forcible suppressions or domestic problems. The apparent peace achieved 

under these conditions is unlikely to endure. In other words, war may be a series of armed 

hostilities and other forms of struggle such as political propaganda or isolation, economic 

sanctions, or cultural/religious rivalries, as well as violence and terrorism. Thus, war in a 

normal sense may be just a single event of war in the broad sense. The Chinese unification 

wars (453-221 BC), the Crusades, the Arab-Israeli wars, and the Cold War are good 

examples of war under this definition. 

Sun Tzu believed that the overall strategy to achieve the 

objectives of war should be comprehensive and consist 

of three elements: the prewar, war, and postwar 

strategies. 13 The overall strategy should utilize all available 

means to end the conflicts and hostilities as quickly as 

possible, thus minimizing losses and the residual effects. 

Non-military means are preferable to the use of force. 

Examples of non-military means that can be exploited to 

implement the overall strategy are political, economic, 

cultural, psychological, and diplomatic measures.

32 The operational 

effectiveness of 

armed forces 

largely depends 

on rules that 

govern the 

conduct of 

military 

operations 

Even though Sun Tzu was an expert in warfare, he 

believed that war should be avoided by all means. 

The very first lines of The Art of War state that war is 

a vital affair of state because it determines life or 

death, and survival or ruin; therefore, it should be 

thoroughly considered. 14 A state should not go to war 

unless it is absolutely necessary to do so. Whether a 

state wins or loses, the population and economy will 

suffer to some degree. The success of a state should 

be measured by the well being of people, not the 

predominance over other states. 

Sun Tzu placed the greatest emphasis on the grand 

strategic calculation of war. He believed that the 

outcome of war could be predetermined by evaluating the five essential criteria: tao (way), heaven, earth, leadership, and 

rules. 15 We must ensure that our objectives of war, strategy, and conduct of war conform to these principles. 

Tao is the most important factor at the grand strategic level. Tao means that a sovereign or political leader must be meritorious 

and his political rationale for war must be legitimate, justified, and convincing to his people. In other words, tao is the way to 

justify the political rationale for war in order to gain public consent and support. Tao also serves as a political motivation for the 

people and troops towards the desired end. Tao must remain credible throughout the war. 

Apart from tao, heaven and earth are also important factors at the lower levels of strategy. The conduct of war must conform to 

the accepted rules or ethics of war. If the rules are deliberately violated, a just war may become unjust because tao no longer 

exists. Heaven means natural phenomena such as climate and weather. A flawless military strategy must take these 

uncontrollable factors into account. Earth means the environment such as geography and terrain that one must adapt to and 

take advantage of. The alteration of environment, if not impossible, is time consuming and requires great effort. The most 

efficient military strategy is the one that maximizes the exploitation of the existing environment. 

Leadership and rules are more relevant to the operational and tactical levels. A military commander should be intelligent and 

competent. His success depends on careful thoughts rather than intuition (immediate apprehension by the mind without 

reasoning, or by a sense). 16 The operational effectiveness of armed forces largely depends on rules that govern the conduct of 

military operations. Examples of rules are laws, orders, doctrines, organizational structures, disciplinary codes, and incentive 

schemes.

Sun Tzu also placed great emphasis on knowing the enemy physically and mentally. 17 By ‘physically’, he means one must 

33 

know what the enemy has on hand. This type of information includes the enemy’s assets, strength, capabilities, training, 

doctrine, logistics, and disposition. By ‘mentally’ he means one must be able to read the enemy’s mind correctly. This 

requires in-depth knowledge of the enemy’s leadership such as the competency and personal character of the enemy’s leader 

as well as his objectives and strategy. In addition, one needs to know about the discipline and morale of the enemy’s troops. 

Knowing the enemy allows us to direct our war efforts precisely at the enemy’s vulnerabilities or weaknesses, and predict 

accurately how the enemy will react in particular situations. In order to win, we may need to know the enemy even better than 

he knows himself. 

Knowing the enemy might allow us to achieve our objectives of war without engaging in combat, or with minimum effort. Sun 

Tzu believed that winning a war without fighting at all is better than winning the war by defeating the enemy in one hundred 

battles. 18 Although there is disagreement whether he suggested that one should just keep ‘his own state and army’ intact or 

should also keep ‘the enemy state and its army’ intact, both interpretations make sense. 19 While the former obviously makes 

sense, the latter also does because we might be able to utilize the enemy’s remaining assets or turn him into an ally in future. 

Sun Tzu believed that the most efficient way to win a war, which he regarded as ‘strategy’, is to foil the enemy’s strategy; the 

next is to break his alliances; the next is to defeat his armies; and the last is to seize his fortified cities. 20 The first two most 

desirable options are unfeasible if we do not know the enemy mentally. Pursuing these options may not appear as decisive as 

using brute force but human lives and resources are preserved. In addition, knowing the enemy is also very important at the 

operational and tactical levels. Sun Tzu believed that the art of war lies in reading the enemy’s intentions. 21 For example, he 

suggested that we should attack the enemy at undefended positions, and defend the positions where the enemy would not 

dare to attack. 22 

Sun Tzu believed that 

winning a war without 

fighting at all is better 

than winning the war by 

defeating the enemy in 

one hundred battles 

Sun Tzu pointed out a significant difference between ‘winning’ and ‘not losing’. The superior 

side normally aims at ‘winning’ whereas the inferior side may just aim at ‘not losing’. In other 

words, a stalemate may be regarded as a failure for the former and a success for the latter. Sun 

Tzu suggested that one should not engage a superior enemy in combat unless certain of 

victory. 23 ‘Not losing’ depends on whether we make mistakes whereas ‘winning’ depends on 

whether the enemy exposes his vulnerabilities or weaknesses. 24 A winner develops a strategy 

before engaging in combat while a loser does the opposite. 25 That is to say we must be smart 

not to lose but we need a foolish enemy to win. 

Although protracted war should be avoided in general, the inferior side may need to preserve itself and wait for an opportunity. 26 

One can always choose not to fight by making concessions for the time being. 27 Any losses, with the exception of human lives, 

could be regained or rebuilt. There are no good reasons to engage in combat and be defeated because the enemy will

eventually get what he wants anyway. If time is not a limiting factor and the strategic intentions remain, the objectives of 

34 war may be achieved in the long term by continuing to build up the means and seek strategic advantages before 

engaging the enemy decisively under favorable conditions. 28 

Apart from military expertise, military commanders in the past also needed other knowledge. The role of a sovereign or political 

leader in wartime was to ensure that the five essential criteria were met. Once his army was on the march, the total 

responsibility for the conduct of war rested with his supreme field commander. It was customary that the commander might 

disregard the commands of his sovereign that did not fit. 29 Although the practice might have been largely due to the inadequacy 

of communications, it offered some practical advantages. It allowed the commander not only to take his own initiative but also 

to respond to situations in the battlefield more effectively. Sun Tzu believed that political leaders should not interfere with military 

affairs. 30 Since a war strategy could also be implemented by non-military means, military commanders needed political, 

economic, cultural, and diplomatic knowledge to deal with, or take advantage of, the situations in the theatre. 

According to Sun Tzu, war and battles can be won decisively, quickly, and efficiently if we seek strategic advantage and choose 

correct timing. 31 Practically, we should adhere to the principles of war such as objective, morale, deception, intelligence, 

initiative, secrecy, surprise, timing, offensive, defensive, mass, flexibility, and fluidity. For example, Sun Tzu emphasized that the 

objectives of war must be set and maintained in compliance with the five essential criteria. 32 If war is prolonged, troops will be 

demoralized. 33 He believed that warfare is based on the art of deceit and regarded espionage and intelligence as the essence of 

warfare. 34 We should take the initiative, keep our plans secret, make use of deceptions, and surprise the enemy. 35 

Straightforward manoeuvres are generally used to engage the enemy while surprise should be used to defeat him decisively. 36 

‘Strategic advantages’ are just a potential for victory but it is ‘correct timing’ that makes a battle decisive. 37 Whether to take the 

offensive or the defensive depends on the situation and relative strengths. 38 Local superiority can be achieved by concealing 

one’s own dispositions and concentrating troops at a pre-selected decisive location. 39 Tactics should be flexible and fluid so that 

the momentum of force can be directed at the enemy’s weakest point. 40 

STRATEGIC PARALYSIS 

‘Strategic paralysis’ defined earlier by the US Joint Vision 2010 is based on Boyd’s concept of ‘psychological’ paralysis and 

Warden’s concept of ‘physical’ paralysis. 41 It is necessary to understand the theoretical concepts comprehensively in order to 

analyze the practical concept. 

Boyd’s concept of ‘psychological’ paralysis appeared in ‘A Discourse on Winning and Losing’ produced during 1976-87, and 

consisted of four slide presentations and one essay: ‘Pattern of Conflict’; ‘Organic Design for Command and Control’; ‘The 

Strategic Game of ‘Destruction and Creation’; and ‘Revelation’. 42 Unfortunately, his work has never been published. Boyd

Boyd’s strategic thinking was comprehensive because 

it covered all levels of strategy. The idea that made him 

best known was the Observation-Orientation-Decision- 

Action (OODA) time cycle or loop 

35 

Boyd served as a 

fighter pilot during the 

Korean War operating 

F-86 aircraft 

served as a fighter pilot in the Korean War in which he was first inspired 

by the success of the F-86 against the Mig-15 because of its fast 

transient characteristics. Based on his extensive research in the history 

of warfare and his engineering background, he analyzed military 

successes and failures in the past in a scientific way. Boyd’s concept in 

general is largely a modern reinterpretation of The Art of War. He was 

also highly influenced by the successes of the Mongols, Napoleon, 

Blitzkrieg, and guerrilla warfare. Boyd’s strategic thinking was 

comprehensive because it covered all levels of strategy. The idea that 

made him best known was the Observation-Orientation-Decision- 

Action (OODA) time cycle or loop. 

At the grand strategic level, Boyd suggested that first of all, political leaders should inspire their followers to take action 

enthusiastically towards confronting and conquering all obstacles that stand in the way. 43 Protracted war, high attrition, and 

collateral damage should be avoided. While undermining and isolating the enemy, the state should not only increase its own 

spirit and strength but also influence uncommitted and potential adversaries. The state should make the enemy regime appear 

corrupt, incompetent, and unfit to govern. That is to say while maintaining its own tao, a state should also try to destroy the 

enemy’s tao at both the national and international levels. Having defeated the enemy, the state should ensure that the remaining 

conflicts or the conditions of peace will not lead to future conflicts. In brief, Boyd effectively suggested that the state should 

pursue a long-term strategy and aim for sustainable peace. 

At the operational level, Boyd suggested that the OODA loop could be thought of as being the command and control loop. 44 

The loop can be best explained by using its own origin. In air combat, a pilot continuously executes a cycle of physical/mental 

tasks. Firstly, he observes the enemy’s initial action. Secondly, he orients himself by recognizing the relative energymanoeuvrability 

between his aircraft and the opponent. Thirdly, he decides what manoeuvre is most appropriate for that 

situation. And fourthly, he acts by executing the selected manoeuvre. He then begins his next OODA loop by observing the 

enemy’s reaction to his initial maneuver and continues onto the next phase and cycle, and so on. Naturally, the OODA loop is 

always executed automatically, repeatedly, and continuously. The process occurs at all levels where strategic or tactical

decisions are made by commanders and passed on to subordinate units or troops to be executed, namely, where there is 

36 

command and control. Boyd believed that orientation is the most critical phase of the four since it shapes the way one 

observes, decides, and acts. Orientation itself is shaped by generic heritage, cultural tradition, on previous experiences, 

and unfolding circumstances. 

IMPLICIT CONTROL 

NEW 

INFO 

GENETICS 

ORIENTATION 

DESTRUCTION 

CREATION 

EXPERIENCE 

MENTAL 

IMAGE 

CULTURE 

IMPLICIT CONTROL 

OBSERVATION DECISION ACTION 

FEEDBACK 

FEEDBACK 

Figure 1: Boyd’s OODA Loop 45 

UNFOLDING 

ENVIRONMENT 

INTERACTION 

Boyd discussed his strategic thinking in terms of tactics, 

grand tactics, strategy, and strategic aim. 46 Boyd 

suggested that while we continue to improve our own 

freedom of action, we should try to diminish the enemy’s 

freedom of action to cope with unfolding events 

(strategic aim). We should paralyze the enemy and 

collapse his will to resist by targeting his moral-mentalphysical 

being (strategy). The enemy should be morallymentally-physically 

isolated from his allies and any 

outside support. Similarly, his elements should be 

isolated from one another. Boyd suggested how to 

isolate the enemy in practice. 47 We ‘physically’ isolate 

the enemy from the supply of matter-energy-information 

by cutting both his internal and external links. We 

‘mentally’ isolate the enemy from what is going on 

around him by presenting him with ambiguous, 

deceptive, or unusual situations. And we ‘morally’ isolate 

the enemy from his allies and the uncommitted by exploiting his violation of the generally accepted codes of conduct or 

standards of behaviour that he professes or is expected to uphold. 

To achieve the goal, Boyd suggested that we should operate inside the enemy’s OODA loop, or get inside the enemy’s mindtime-space 

(grand tactics). 48 We should OODA more inconspicuously, more quickly, and with more irregularity to maintain our 

initiative (tactics). As the enemy cannot generate mental images that are consistent with the threatening or non-threatening 

events/efforts and mismatches among those events/efforts, he will face uncertainty, doubt, mistrust, confusion, disorder, fear, 

panic, chaos, and so on. Thus, the enemy will over-react or under-react to such ambiguous and unpredictable activities. In 

other words, we should accelerate our own OODA loop and simultaneously disrupt, decelerate, or interfere with the enemy’s 

OODA loop until it reaches the point that the disoriented enemy is unable to adapt or endure. As the enemy is driven beyond 

his moral-mental-physical capacity – or is ‘psychologically’ paralyzed – he will be unable to continue his war efforts.

In regard to Sun Tzu’s concept of war, Boyd expressed the essence of The Art of War by the theme ‘harmony, deception, 

37 

swiftness of action, fluidity of action, dispersion/concentration, surprise, and shock.’ 49 He agreed with Sun Tzu that the art 

of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting and to avoid protracted war. This could be achieved by probing the enemy 

to reveal his organization, disposition, patterns of movement, intentions, strengths, and weaknesses; manipulating the enemy 

by shaping his perceptions; foiling the enemy’s plan or strategy as the best option; and employing cheng (regular, expected, 

straightforward, conventional) manoeuvre to expose the enemy’s vulnerabilities or weaknesses, and ch’i (irregular, unexpected, 

surprising, unconventional) manoeuvre to defeat him decisively. 

Boyd made an interesting 

observation that modern 

Western commanders just 

concentrate on defeating the 

enemy in battle rather than 

attempting to foil the enemy’s 

plan or strategy prior to battle 

Boyd also made an interesting observation that modern Western commanders just 

concentrate on defeating the enemy in battle rather than attempting to foil the enemy’s 

plan or strategy prior to battle. 50 Boyd criticized Clausewitz for his concept of centre of 

gravity (COG) that had led to ‘bloodbath’ attrition wars. 51 While Clausewitz believed that 

the COG is always found where the mass is concentrated most densely, Boyd argued 

that many non-cooperative COGs could be generated by attacking the enemy’s 

vulnerabilities. From a different perspective, the enemy’s perception can also be thought 

of as the COG. 52 Moreover, Boyd also criticized the modern principles of war. Boyd 

argued that the principles are not really principles unless variety, rapidity, harmony, and 

initiative are emphasized and fully exploited. 53 

Warden’s concept of ‘physical’ paralysis was first originated in 1988 when he wrote a book titled The Air Campaign: Planning 

for Combat under the influence of the Cold War and from his experience in Vietnam. 54 To some extent, his concept of the air 

campaign was successfully applied during the 1991 Gulf War. He has written a few articles since then. ‘Employing Air Power in 

the Twenty-first Century’ explained his concept of centre of gravity (COG) by the five concentric rings of COG components: the 

command structure, essential production, transportation network, population, and military field forces. 55 The analysis of the 

enemy as a system and the equation ‘Physical x Morale = Outcome’ first appeared in ‘The Enemy as a System’ in which the 

rings also became known as ‘the Basic Five-Ring Model’. 56 And in ‘Planning to Win’, Warden suggests the whole planning 

process for an air campaign. 57 In contrast to Boyd, Warden is highly influenced by what Clausewitz called the ideal form of war 

– simultaneous attacks or parallel warfare. 58 His focus is on the military strategic and operational levels of strategy. Despite their 

clarity, his works have been criticized for their redefined concept of COG, the simplicity of his model, the selectivity of 

supporting evidence, and the universality of application. 59 

In The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat, Warden uses ‘centre of gravity’ or COG to describe the ‘point where the enemy is 

most vulnerable and the point where an attack will have the best chance of being decisive.’ 60 He believes that air superiority 

should be the first priority in any military campaign because it is crucial to the success of subsequent military operations. He

38 

In ‘Employing Air Power in the Twenty-first 

Century’, Warden points out the major 

advantages of airpower, such as its 

responsiveness, decisiveness, mobility, firepower, 

accuracy, and ability to circumvent the enemy’s 

field forces to attack his COG… 

believes that offensive airpower is the strongest form of air 

warfare. He suggests that offensive operations should be 

planned ‘without concern for defence.’ Defensive 

operations, if unavoidable, should aim to inflict sufficient 

casualties on the enemy so that he cannot continue his 

offensive operations. This could be achieved by 

concentrating airpower locally to achieve numerical 

superiority over the enemy. 

In addition, Warden recognizes that military objectives should serve political objectives that ‘…can range from demanding 

unconditional surrender to asking the opponent to grant favourable terms for an armistice.’ 61 Military objectives can be the 

destruction of the enemy’s armed forces, economy, or will to resist. He emphasizes that the enemy’s COG must be correctly 

identified and attacked. He points out that airpower can bypass the enemy’s surface forces. In a joint campaign, the key force 

must be identified and all efforts must be orchestrated for synergy. Unnecessary seizure of the enemy’s territory and protracted 

war should be avoided. Airpower must be the key force when surface forces have insufficient strength or cannot reach the 

enemy’s COG. Airpower may be the key force if the enemy’s field forces can be isolated, or until ground and/or naval offensives 

take place. 

In ‘Employing Air Power in the Twenty-first Century’, Warden points out the major advantages of airpower, such as its 

responsiveness, decisiveness, mobility, firepower, accuracy, and ability to circumvent the enemy’s field forces to attack his COG 

directly. 62 Airpower can also minimize war casualties and collateral damage. As a political instrument, airpower can be used to 

threaten the enemy or actually attack his COG to achieve the objectives of war. 

Warden believes that all states and military organizations have unique sets of COGs or ‘vulnerabilities’. 64 Nonetheless, it is 

possible to create a general model of COGs that consists of five concentric circles as mentioned earlier. He believes that the 

most critical ring is the command structure. All war efforts should aim to affect, whether directly or indirectly, the innermost ring

Figure 2: Warden’s Basic 

Five-Ring Model 63 

LEADERSHIP 

ORGANIC ESSENCE 

INFRASTRUCTURE 

POPULATION 

FIELD MILITARY 

because that is where concessions are made. In most cases, all 

39 

the rings exist in that order and the outer rings can be bypassed. 

He points out that the COGs also exist at the operational level. 

Warden claims that the Gulf War was the first true ‘inside to outside’ 

war in which attacks were conducted against the innermost ring 

outward to the outermost ring. Iraq was both ‘strategically’ and 

‘operationally’ paralyzed so it could do nothing to resist the coalition 

forces. Manoeuvre, mass, and concentration could be effectively 

achieved by the use of precision weapons in conjunction with stealth 

technology. Warden believes that it is almost impossible to defend 

against offensive airpower that has become dominant in ‘hyperwarfare’. 

In ‘The Enemy as a System’, Warden argues that airpower and 

precision weapons have made it possible to separate the physical side 

and the morale side of the enemy into distinct categories. 65 The 

outcome of the enemy’s war efforts can be represented by the 

following equation: 

Physical x Morale = Outcome 

If the physical side can be reduced close to zero, even high morale cannot produce an effective outcome. Warden believes that 

human behaviour is complex and unpredictable while the physical effects of military action are more predictable. Since it is 

more difficult to deal with the enemy’s morale, war efforts should be primarily directed at his physical side. In brief, Warden 

believes that we may achieve our objectives in war by causing changes to one or more parts of the enemy’s physical system so 

that the enemy decides to adopt our objectives. In other words, we make it physically impossible for the enemy to oppose us. 

This is how Warden defines ‘physical’ paralysis. 

Warden suggests that we should look at the enemy as ‘a system composed of numerous subsystems.’ 66 He defines a ‘strategic 

entity’ as anything that can ‘function on its own and is free and able to make decisions as to where it will go and what it will do’ 

or ‘any organization that can operate autonomously; that is, it is self-directing and self-sustaining.’ An enemy system is a 

strategic entity that consists of central leadership or direction, organic essentials, infrastructure, population, and fighting 

mechanisms (or field military). Although Warden renames the five concentric rings as ‘the Basic Five-Ring Model’, his 

description of the COG components and their relationships is almost the same.

To paralyze the enemy system, Warden suggests that parallel attacks, as opposed to serial attacks, are more effective 

40 

because they prevent the enemy from responding effectively, or reacting at all. 67 Ideally, all of the enemy’s vulnerabilities 

should be attacked simultaneously and modern technology has made this concept possible. Nonetheless, he realizes that 

the model may be inapplicable in some circumstances such as a struggle against brutal invaders. If people believe that 

surrendering would not make any difference to their fate, every person will become a strategic entity and fight to death. In 

Warden’s view, strategic paralysis provides the most positive resolution of conflicts. 

In ‘Planning to Win’, Warden defines winning as ‘… when the opponent … is in the state we want it to be in and when it can 

only do what we want it to, or will only do what we want it to.’ 68 In regard to the information revolution, he believes that it is 

counter-productive trying to keep secrets. Instead, we should try to exploit information faster than our opponent. That is, he 

disregards the principle of surprise in the traditional way. He believes that parallel warfare will dominate future wars. He 

suggests that planning to win must be a top-down process starting from the highest level of strategy. Warden favours parallel 

attacks in a compressed timeframe since he believes that as the time to attack the enemy’s key strategic and operational 

targets increases, the number of incidents that might adversely affect the outcome of war will increase. 

Warden favours parallel attacks in 

a compressed timeframe since 

he believes that as the time to 

attack the enemy’s key strategic 

and operational targets increases, 

the number of incidents that 

might adversely affect the 

outcome of war will increase 

Boyd focuses on the enemy’s decision-making process whereas Warden looks at the 

enemy system from a physical perspective. Despite their differences, there are many 

common and/or consistent ideas that could be merged into a practical concept. 

Nonetheless, the practical concept appears to have been dominated by Warden’s 

thinking, and the rest of Boyd’s thinking, apart from the OODA loop, seems to have 

been disregarded. Warden’s concept of parallel warfare fits nicely with Boyd’s 

suggestion to accelerate the OODA time cycle because physical and psychological 

paralysis can be concurrently achieved. However, Boyd’s emphasis on the grand 

strategic level is absent from the practical concept. This is probably one of the 

reasons why the application of strategic paralysis did not lead to a complete political 

success and the desired end-state in the 1991 Gulf War. 

POSSIBLE THEORETICAL FLAWS IN THE STRATEGIC PARALYSIS CONCEPT 

While scientific theories can be both proven theoretically and verified experimentally in a controlled environment, the same 

approach cannot be applied to military theories because there are many uncontrollable factors in war. Hence, theoretical flaws 

or weaknesses in a military theory may not be revealed until its application has resulted in failure. Strategic paralysis, like all 

other military strategies, is not perfect. The Art of War implies that the smarter side, not necessarily the superior side, will 

succeed. If Sun Tzu were correct, strategic paralysis would be ineffective against a smart enemy who did not expose his

vulnerabilities or weaknesses, and might fail if the assailant made his own mistakes. This approach will be used to access the 

concept theoretically. 

Firstly, the enemy’s decentralization of command and control may render strategic paralysis ineffective. One can paralyze highly 

developed living organisms such as human beings but cannot paralyze microorganisms such as germs. This is because human 

beings have a vulnerable nervous system but germs do not. Similarly, decentralized or independent field forces are less 

vulnerable to strategic paralysis than highly centralized ones. The enemy could decentralize his war efforts at the tactical level 

while still centralizing his strategic directions that seldom change. For example, China is interested in the concept of ‘guerrilla air 

war’ after having studied the lessons learned in recent wars. 69 If a well-prepared enemy restructures and operates his field 

forces in such a way, a strategic paralysis campaign may be unable to degrade his capabilities in a short timeframe. Thus, a 

quick victory is unlikely. 

Secondly, the enemy may not engage in direct combat or compete at a fast pace. The enemy may choose to engage only 

under favourable conditions such as using hit-and-run tactics. Numerical superiority could also be used to offset the 

advantages of technological superiority. Though the assailant may have a strategic paralysis capability, there may not be 

suitable targets to attack. The absence of such targets does not necessarily mean that the enemy’s field forces have been 

rendered ineffective. A smart enemy would fight at his comfortable pace and only engage when he is certain of victory. If he 

becomes disoriented, he should avoid reacting in a risky way that might lead to disaster. If the enemy pursues this strategy and 

time is on his side, the assailant may have to abandon his war efforts. 

Thirdly, the acceleration of the OODA loop may also create problems for the assailant himself. Most importantly, more mistakes 

will be made in a given period of time if his strategy is inappropriate. Although future technology might allow near real time 

corrections to be made in the subsequent loops, the incorrect course of action might be irreversible after the initial action has 

been taken. For instance, attacking certain targets may inadvertently escalate and prolong the war. Once escalated, the scale of 

war cannot be brought back to the initial level. Moreover, the outcome of previous attacks may be unavailable or inaccurate 

when new decisions have to be made. As a result, subsequent attacks may be wasteful and result in a shortage of weapons 

and other supplies, or create undesired impacts that may lead to additional political implications. 

Furthermore, there are likely to be more mistakes in both the planning process and the execution of strategic paralysis. It is a 

fact that human mental capacity has some limitations. That capacity decreases significantly when human beings have to 

perform concurrent mental tasks under stress. Military planners may have difficulties in working continuously for several days. 

There is also a possibility of information overload. 70 Consequently, there are likely to be more mistakes in the planning process 

of parallel attacks as compared to sequential attacks simply because parallel operations are more intensive and more complex. 

Field coordination also becomes a crucial factor to operational success. Since parallel attacks are conducted simultaneously by 

several branches of effort in a compressed timeframe, the difficulties of coordination will increase as the number of branches 

41

increases, and as the timeframe is compressed. Similarly, there are likely to be more mistakes in the execution of parallel 

42 

attacks as compared to sequential attacks. 

Fourthly, the enemy may try to interfere with the assailant’s OODA loop. 71 Since war is interactive, both sides will try every 

possible way to win. Relying on a highly automated system means that there are fewer personnel and less human time to 

screen the large amount of incoming information before decisions are made. This might become the assailant’s vulnerability. For 

instance, key staff could be directly targeted and the assailant might be unable to find suitable replacements in time. Even if 

replacements were readily available, their orientation with the current situation would take some time. The enemy could also 

indirectly target their loved ones so that the psychological impact would degrade their mental capacity. 

In addition, information technology has not only created a superhighway of information for the assailant’s decision makers but 

also provided the enemy with an expressway to reach and deceive them. Although the assailant may know exactly what the 

enemy is doing by using advanced sensors, he might still be unable to read the enemy’s mind correctly and deduce what the 

enemy is thinking. Hence, strategic deceptions that have been almost impossible may once again become possible. 

Fifthly, the Basic Five-Ring Model may be too simplified since it does not take into account some internal relationships between 

the COG components, and it also disregards any external relationships between the COG components and the outside world. 

The model represents an orderly strategic entity such as a democracy or an industrialized economy in which the relationships 

between the COG components are quite predictable. 72 According to Warden, all war efforts should aim to have either direct or 

indirect impacts on the enemy’s leadership in order to compel the desired concessions. While such attacks may create the 

desired impacts on the leadership, they may also create undesired impacts on other COG components as well as many 

strategic entities outside. Other COG components may become significant factors in determining the outcome of war. The 

affected strategic entities from the outside world may also change their stances in the enemy’s favour. These unpredictable 

impacts may adversely affect the campaign and the outcome of war. 

Lastly, the morale side may be a significant factor in the long term. Warden’s equation ‘Physical x Morale = Outcome’ implies 

that the enemy’s morale is an insignificant factor to the outcome of war if the assailant can reduce the enemy’s physical effort 

close to zero. 73 While this may be true for a brief event of war, it might not be applicable to war in the broad sense. In fact, 

physical and psychological wars are always fought simultaneously. Morale determines the output of war efforts that consists of 

tangible and intangible outcomes. The equation should be more precisely rewritten as follows: 

(Physical + Psychological) x Morale = Tangible Outcome + Intangible Outcome 

Even if the physical effort is driven close to zero and there is no significant tangible outcome, the psychological effort may still 

produce a significant intangible outcome provided that morale is still high. An intangible outcome has the potential to turn into a 

tangible outcome and vice versa. For example, while devastating damage could turn into fear, hatred may also turn into some

other forms of struggle such as terrorism. The assailant’s postwar casualties due to terrorist attacks might be even higher 

than his field casualties in war. In brief, the enemy’s psychological effort and morale should also be dealt with to prevent 

such after-effects. 74 

43 

THE PRACTICAL LIMITATIONS OF MILITARY MEANS AND STRATEGIC PARALYSIS 

When it comes to practice, strategic paralysis has many limitations. At the grand strategic level, military means may be 

unsuitable for some types of war, especially wars of belief such as religious, ethnic, and ideological conflicts. It is a fact that 

human beings may continue to fight from generation to generation for their beliefs. Strategic paralysis is not an exception to this 

According to Sun Tzu, a 

true victory is one that can 

change the enemy’s longterm 

strategic intentions. 

Defeating the enemy in 

war may not be an 

absolute victory if there is 

still a potential for 

subsequent war 

limitation because it is a military means. According to Sun Tzu, a true victory is one that can 

change the enemy’s long-term strategic intentions. Defeating the enemy in war may not be an 

absolute victory if there is still a potential for subsequent war. The grand strategic calculation 

implies that without tao, one may be unable to win a war even against an inferior enemy. In 

other words, there are wars that may not be won by a particular side. In such situations, 

states capable of conducting strategic paralysis may be unable to exploit such a capability to 

achieve their objectives. The fact that strategic paralysis is not always applicable despite its 

potential should be regarded as its greatest practical limitation. 

At the military strategic level, there may be some political, economic, legal, and/or other 

constraints that prevent the full application of the strategic paralysis concept. According to 

Sun Tzu, all available means should be used to achieve the objectives of war. It is a fact that 

some wars may not be won solely by military means, or may be won more quickly if the war 

efforts are enhanced by other means. To apply non-military means successfully, some 

constraints may have to be imposed on the application of military means. Consequently, 

military planners may be unable to apply the entire theoretical concept of strategic paralysis in 

practice. For instance, the assailant may be unable to isolate the enemy by blockade, or may 

have to exclude some sensitive targets. The partial application of the strategic paralysis 

concept may reduce the campaign effectiveness or could lead to a failure. 

In addition, there is the argument that strategic paralysis may not be feasible without an 

effective nuclear deterrence. 75 The argument is based on the assumption that the enemy would 

be deterred from using WMD to counter strategic paralysis because of the fear of nuclear 

retaliation. Even small states may have a capability to employ WMD. 76 Without a nuclear 

capability, the assailant might be unable to deter such counter-attacks. On the other hand, the

strategic paralysis capability itself may have raised the credibility of conventional deterrence to a degree that it could 

44 

effectively deter the use of WMD. 

At the operational level, there are many complicating factors. First, the availability of forward bases may be a factor. A strategic 

paralysis campaign may require some suitable forward bases in third countries. The bases may be unavailable to the assailant, 

or the hosts may impose restrictions due to political reasons. Though long-range operations may be possible, there are many 

disadvantages such as higher operational costs, fewer available sorties, and aircrew fatigue. 77 

Second, the deployment phase that normally takes quite some time may create difficulties. The enemy could use this 

opportunity to strengthen his defence and prepare counter-attacks. 78 The enemy may also seize the opportunity to launch a 

pre-emptive strike against the assembling forces. The assailant might have to delay or abandon the campaign if the enemy 

succeeds in destroying his key assets. 

Third, there may be no suitable targets for strategic paralysis. If the enemy is a non-industrialized economy, his basic 

infrastructure and industry may not be as critical to him as compared to an industrialized economy. Striking such targets may 

have little effect on his war efforts. The enemy may also disperse his assets so that they become inaccessible, or are no longer 

high-value targets. The use of smart weapons may be unfeasible, or become excessive and less cost-effective against such 

targets. 

Fourth, the campaign may be ineffective if the 

enemy’s vulnerabilities or weaknesses are 

incorrectly identified. 79 The COG may be 

different from state to state. The assets that the 

assailant regards as vital may not be that 

important to the enemy. Targeting can be very 

difficult unless the assailant knows the enemy 

inside out. Attacking a wrong COG may lead to 

protracted war and excessive losses for both 

sides. 

Fifth, the environment may not be ideal for 

strategic paralysis. The assailant may be unable 

to isolate the enemy physically due to 

unfavourable geography or other reasons. It is 

also a fact that airpower, the primary instrument 

…there may be no 

suitable targets for 

strategic paralysis. 

If the enemy is a 

non-industrialized 

economy, his basic 

infrastructure and 

industry may not 

be as critical to 

him as compared 

to an industrialized 

economy

of strategic paralysis, is not fully effective in bad weather. In addition, certain types of terrain such as forests, mountains, 

45 

or urban areas may be unsuitable for some types of smart weapons. 80 

Sixth, there may be some operational constraints that reduce operational effectiveness. For example, the conduct of the 

campaign will have to comply with the Law of Armed Conflict that restricts certain actions. 81 There might also be a problem in a 

joint or combined campaign. The available assets may not be fully exploited due to the allocation of responsibilities among the 

services or nations that make up the joint or combined force. 

Seventh, the zero casualties and minimum collateral damage concepts may lead to unproductive efforts. 82 The operational 

directions may be influenced by the media and public (the so-called ‘CNN effect’). The assailant may have to allocate 

considerable assets to counter relatively insignificant threats instead of attacking more lucrative targets. He may also have to 

attack insignificant targets while omitting key targets in the vicinity of populated areas. 

Eighth, logistics may become a bottleneck for strategic paralysis. Massive airlift may be required in a short timeframe for both 

the deployment and the campaign itself. The assailant’s airlift capacity may be insufficient to support such a requirement, or 

could be affected by the enemy’s initiative. Moreover, the high consumption of smart weapons that have become the weapon 

of choice may deplete the limited stockpile quickly. 83 This could cause serious operational problems if the acquisition process 

cannot keep up with the demands. 

Ninth, some combat and supporting components may become the assailant’s vulnerabilities as strategic paralysis makes them 

critical to operational success. 84 In a compressed timeframe with several branches of effort, some critical components such as 

high-demand assets that are limited in number, air operations centres, key communication nodes, or special supporting facilities 

would become lucrative targets for the enemy. If the enemy successfully attacked these key components, the assailant might 

have to suspend his war efforts even though his remaining forces were still at full strength. 

Last, the assailant may have to allocate substantial assets to guard against asymmetric threats posed by the enemy. 85 Since the 

strategic paralysis capability has become dominant in modern warfare, weaker states are effectively forced to develop 

asymmetric means as a countermeasure. For example, China has developed the concept of ‘unrestricted warfare’ that utilizes 

every possible means to offset the technological advantages enjoyed by the West. Even though asymmetric attacks are unlikely 

to cause high casualties on the battlefield or have a significant direct impact on operational effectiveness, the indirect impacts 

due to public sensitivities could considerably affect the campaign. Moreover, the enemy may have a capability to conduct 

asymmetric attacks against the assailant’s homeland. 86 Such attacks may even have greater indirect impact on the campaign. 

At the tactical level, the execution of strategic paralysis may be ineffective due to many factors. For example, it may be difficult 

to locate and destroy moving targets. 87 Tactical targets are unlikely to be static in highly mechanized warfare. Though the 

assailant may be able to locate moving targets quickly by advanced sensors, the targets may have moved by the time the

attackers arrive. Employing airborne alerts may not be a cost-effective solution because it withholds valuable assets from 

46 

other purposes. 

In addition, the enemy’s deception combined with self-imposed constraints may reduce the effectiveness of attacks. The 

assailant may have to impose his own constraints such as minimum altitude restrictions for safety or other reasons. The enemy 

may also use camouflage to conceal his field forces or decoys to attract the attackers’ attention. Moreover, the enemy could 

enhance the effectiveness of his deception by selecting favorable terrains such as urban areas. 88 Consequently, intelligence, 

which is a crucial factor to the success of an air operation, could be inaccurate at the time of planning or execution. In such 

situations, it may be very difficult for aircrews to identify targets, or to make precise assessments of their attacks. 89 These 

limitations may also reduce the overall effectiveness of the campaign. 

STRATEGIC PARALYSIS FOR SMALL NATIONS WITH LIMITED AIRPOWER 

From the strategic perspective, ‘small nations’ should be defined in terms of state power that is derived from the means states 

could use to achieve their national objectives, such as political, economic, and military power. According to Sun Tzu, a great 

military power without comparative economic and political strengths cannot expect to prevail in the long run. ‘Small nations’ 

can be any states of which political, economic, and military strengths are between those of superpowers and poor countries. 

Similarly, ‘limited airpower’ should be defined in terms of capability that is derived from air assets that small nations possess. In 

general, small nations have many constraints on employing their airpower. 90 For example, they cannot do everything that 

superpowers can because they lack certain air assets. They cannot replace attrition losses quickly. They have limited stockpiles 

of weapons and other supplies. They cannot sustain protracted war. Nonetheless, they may have a capability to gain control of 

the air and strike any targets in the theatre of war and the enemy’s homeland. Such a capability is a potential for strategic 

paralysis and will be regarded as ‘limited airpower’. Although some concepts in the following discussion are universally 

applicable, the use of airpower by superpowers will not be discussed because they are unconstrained by these limiting factors. 

For poor countries, it is obvious that this military option is unviable. 

Strategic paralysis is a relative capability. The assailant must be far superior to the enemy in terms of overall military capability 

and airpower in particular. A superpower may have a strategic paralysis capability in relation to a small nation. Similarly, a small 

nation with relatively far superior airpower may have a strategic paralysis capability in relation to a weaker nation. For example, 

the US had a strategic paralysis capability against Iraq but may not have such a capability against a near-peer competitor such 

as Russia. Israel, with its relatively larger and far more effective airpower, may have a strategic paralysis capability against some 

of its weaker hostile neighbours. 

Limited armed conflicts over territorial disputes are the most likely scenarios for small nations. Since economic development is 

normally their primary concern, they would only go to war for non-negotiable issues such as sovereignty. Territorial disputes are

the most common source of conflict although there might be political, economic, religious, or cultural factors. Even in civil 

47 

wars, each party fights for territorial control more than anything else. Nevertheless, contested territories are not always 

critical to strategic needs, or vital to economies. 91 In many cases, states engage in armed conflict for the purpose of 

maintaining their status quo and/or the legitimacy of their claims. If the disputes are not a matter of national survival, small 

nations should be able to force their adversaries to make concessions provided that the conditions of war are favorable. Military 

means are usually feasible for state-versus-state conflicts although they should be used only as the last resort. 

Small nations may not have to paralyze their enemies in the same way superpowers do. Generally, patients have to be 

completely paralyzed in major surgical operations. However, complete anaesthesia may be unnecessary for minor operations. A 

patient may only have to be paralyzed locally on the part of his body where the operation is going to take place. Local 

anaesthesia is less costly and takes shorter time for patients to recover. While superpowers may choose to paralyze their 

enemies completely to prevent them from responding at all, small nations may have to paralyze their enemies locally and briefly, 

precisely where and when the paralysis is required. ‘Tactical paralysis’ could be as effective as strategic paralysis if small nations 

paralyze the right part of the enemy at the right time. This approach would suit their operational limitations because it minimizes 

the demand for air assets. Moreover, tactical paralysis would be less costly in terms of operational and postwar reconstruction 

costs. 

Whether decisive air campaigns are feasible depends on the strategic environment. If the theatre of war is isolated, such as a 

remote island, ground offensives may be unnecessary. If airpower alone can isolate the enemy’s field forces in the theatre of 

war, decisive air campaigns should be feasible. However, it should be noted that airpower only has a potential to destroy 

physical targets. It cannot seize and hold any contested territories. It does not have the same degree of presence in terms of 

psychological effects as occupying forces. If more tasks need to be done in order to secure the victory, the assailant may still 

have to employ his ground forces. 

THE APPLICATION OF SUN TZU’S CONCEPT PRIOR TO THE STATE OF WAR 

Sun Tzu recommended an active approach to war; namely, one should predetermine 

the outcome of war and take the initiative prior to the state of war. 92 The grand strategic 

calculation should be performed in peacetime for a few reasons. Firstly, the decision 

whether to go to war should be based on the predicted outcome. If we are caught by 

surprise and forced to go to war unprepared, it is because we have been passive. 

Secondly, the calculation would give an opportunity to foil the enemy’s strategy prior to 

the state of war. War could be successfully avoided if the available time were sufficient 

to implement the prewar strategy. Thirdly, the decision would allow an early preparation 

Sun Tzu recommended an 

active approach to war; namely, 

one should predetermine the 

outcome of war and take the 

initiative prior to the state of war

for war. The accomplishment of the preparation might change the outcome of war in our favour. 

48 

Although Sun Tzu might have been too optimistic about ‘not losing’, some of his suggestions are still very useful. First of all, 

we should not enter a war we are unlikely to win. Such a war should be avoided by all means because it is a waste of effort. A 

war that may not be won solely by military means should be carefully considered. We should have the necessary means to 

implement our strategy before committing ourselves in such a war. A war against a superior enemy or a war that may not be won 

quickly should be avoided or delayed until we have gained sufficient strategic advantages and strength to defeat the enemy 

decisively. 

In addition, we must meet all the essential criteria discussed earlier and should be reasonable in setting our objectives of war. 

Most importantly, our political rationale for war must be justified and accepted by our people. The political objectives should be 

based on a feasible end-state in which peace is sustainable. The military objectives should be realistically achievable under the 

existing conditions. Generally, the overall political objective is always ‘winning’ but the overall military objective may be either 

‘winning’ or ‘not losing’ depending on the relative strengths. 

Although ‘winning’ depends on whether the enemy exposes his vulnerabilities or weaknesses, we might be able to win a war 

without engaging in combat if we successfully foil the enemy’s strategy prior to the state of war. From the enemy’s perspective, his 

strategy is based on ‘the strategic trinity’ of will, means, and opportunities. More accurately, ‘will’ is the enemy’s strategic 

intentions rather than his will to fight. ‘Means’ includes both non-military and military means that could be exploited to achieve 

objectives. And ‘opportunities’ arise when the conditions are favourable to achieve his objectives. An elimination of one or more 

components would be sufficient to foil the enemy’s strategy and cause him to abolish his war option. Sun Tzu regarded the 

avoidance of war by this method as the best strategy. 93 

If we have not succeeded and war breaks out, we should continue our effort to foil the enemy’s strategy along with other war 

efforts. However, it should be noted that while the elimination of means and/or opportunities might terminate an event of war, it will 

not necessarily change the enemy’s long-term strategic intentions. This is because the means could be rebuilt and opportunities 

might arise again in future. Hence, one needs an effective postwar strategy to change the enemy’s long-term strategic intentions. 

The enemy’s strategic intentions could be changed by destroying his political rationale for war or by providing him with alternatives 

to war. The first possibility is that the enemy’s strategic intentions are sometimes based on parochial interests or the personal 

aspirations of the enemy’s leader rather than the people’s will. If the people are convinced by psychological warfare that the 

reasons to go to war are unjustified, the leader might have to change his intentions because he is unlikely to win without public 

support. 

The second possibility is that the enemy may have no choice but to go to war. The enemy could be persuaded not to go war if 

provided with alternatives. War can always be avoided if both parties are willing to compromise. Not only the apparent costs but

also the hidden or incalculable costs should be taken into account in the cost-benefit calculation. War is mutually destructive 

49 

so both parties would benefit from settling the dispute peacefully. To persuade the enemy to choose an alternative, both 

positive and negative incentives should be used. Namely, one should not only make the enemy realize the negative 

consequences but also offer him some advantages if he is willing to cooperate. The enemy should also be provided with a 

comfortable way out otherwise he might have no choice but to pursue his war option. 

Some of the enemy’s means could be neutralized prior to the state of war. In addition to the armed forces (fighting organs) which 

is the primary means, traditionally recognized means also include the mechanisms that drive (a nervous system) and feed (blood) 

the armed forces, such as the administration, basic infrastructure, industry, agriculture, energy supplies, military infrastructure, and 

field logistics. These normal means can only be neutralized in wartime. Furthermore, Sun Tzu recognized non-military means such 

as political power, economic influence, cultural ties, diplomacy, alliances, proxies, and the people as means to achieve the 

objectives of war. These additional means could, and should, be neutralized before war breaks out. 

In some cases, the enemy’s key means to achieve his objectives are of the latter types. If we successfully neutralize these key 

means prior to the state of war, the enemy might have to drop his plan. To accomplish the task, we have to identify the enemy’s 

key means correctly. We should develop a strategy and implement its prewar element to neutralize them. It should be noted that 

the key means are not always the same, and the same enemy may use different means in different wars. This is probably why 

Sun Tzu never specified the enemy’s COG but only recommended foiling the enemy’s strategy. 94 Nevertheless, the enemy’s COG 

in any war is always part of the strategic trinity. 

We can deny the enemy’s opportunities by creating a credible deterrence and removing the conditions of 

war. We can effectively deter the enemy by eliminating or minimizing our vulnerabilities, improving our overall 

military capability, and seeking additional allies. Opportunity is a function of the vulnerabilities. Since it is 

impossible to deal with all vulnerabilities, we need to identify and eliminate the vulnerabilities that really 

interest the enemy. We must analyze our vulnerabilities from the enemy’s perspective. The way that we 

improve our overall military capability should not appear too threatening to the enemy otherwise it might 

encourage a pre-emptive strike, thus accelerating the war. In an anarchic world, there are neither permanent 

friends nor permanent foes. We should not fixate or rely solely on particular allies. Besides potential 

adversaries, we should also pre-identify potential allies in each particular context so that we could seek 

additional allies when necessary. 

In addition, we should try to remove the conditions of war because they are the enemy’s incentives or 

motives to go to war. For example, some conditions provide the enemy with strategic advantages. Some 

conditions serve the enemy as his political rationale for war. And some conditions could be used by a 

superior enemy to initiate a war in his favour. 

In an anarchic 

world, there are 

neither 

permanent 

friends nor 

permanent 

foes. We should 

not fixate or rely 

solely on 

particular allies

50 

THE APPLICATION OF STRATEGIC PARALYSIS IN CONJUNCTION WITH 

SUN TZU’S CONCEPT 

If the attempt to avoid war fails, the assailant should prepare the battlefield before engaging the enemy in combat. Since strategic 

paralysis is most effective against a closed system, the assailant should try to isolate the enemy not only physically and 

economically but also politically and culturally as much as possible prior to the campaign. This is consistent with Sun Tzu’s 

recommendation that the second best strategy is to break the enemy’s alliances. 95 By doing so, the assailant effectively eliminates 

the external factors that may adversely affect the campaign and also prevents the escalation of conflict. For example, Dr David R. 

Mets points out that Iraq’s inaccessibility to Russian space resources was a factor that contributed to the success of Operation 

Desert Storm. 96 

The assailant should also think defensively and prepare for the worst cases. It is a fact that vulnerabilities at home and in the 

theatre of war can never be completely eliminated. Sun Tzu noted that a wise military commander considers both favourable and 

unfavourable conditions to make his plan both feasible and flawless. 97 The assailant should never bet on a desperate enemy and 

always be prepared to defend. Although the enemy’s counterattacks are unlikely to affect the overall conduct of war, one of the 

The objectives of Operation 

Desert Storm are an 

example. The objective to 

destroy the Iraqi WMD 

capability was set without 

an objective to occupy 

Iraq. By the nature of 

WMD, it was unlikely that 

the task could have been 

accomplished without an 

occupation. Consequently, 

the objective was not fully 

achieved 

assailant’s real vulnerabilities might be the public sensitiveness on war casualties. 98 If the political 

rationale for war is truly justified, the best way to eliminate this vulnerability is to educate the 

people to understand the risks and accept the consequences of war. 

According to Sun Tzu, the success of a military campaign should be measured by the 

achievement of military objectives with the initial allocation of assets and within the timeframe. 99 If 

that is not the case, the achievement may be arguable and could also be regarded as a partial 

failure. Military objectives must be effective to attain political objectives. Many failures are due to 

the fact that people may do things right but may not do the right things. Setting the right military 

objectives seems straightforward but there are many problems in practice. 

Firstly, political objectives are sometimes ill-defined because war may not really be a matter of 

national survival but something else less important to the state and the people. Consequently, 

political leaders may be reluctant to make a full commitment to the war effort and may fail to 

define political objectives clearly. 100 

Secondly, political objectives are sometimes dictated by military solutions. In many cases, political 

objectives are set according to the option most preferred by the military that may not necessarily 

be the best course of action. 101 As a result, such political objectives may not accurately represent 

the national goal and what should be done to attain the national goal may not be done.

Thirdly, military objectives may be inadequate or irrelevant to attain the desired political objectives or end-state. Effective 

51 

military objectives and realistic timeframes cannot be set if the assailant does not know under what conditions the enemy 

would concede defeat. The shortcoming usually leads to political interference and ineffective conduct of the military 

campaign. 

Fourthly, military objectives and political objectives are often intermixed or are inconsistent with one another. For instance, military 

objectives such as defeating the enemy’s field forces and seizing his territories are often intermixed with political objectives such 

as changing the enemy’s strategic intentions and restoring sustainable peace. As a result, the military may be unable to attain a 

military objective that is supposed to be a political objective. Moreover, military objectives are sometimes set without their 

essential prerequisites. The objectives of Operation Desert Storm are an example. The objective to destroy the Iraqi WMD 

capability was set without an objective to occupy Iraq. 102 By the nature of WMD, it was unlikely that the task could have been 

accomplished without an occupation. Consequently, the objective was not fully achieved. 

Fifthly, it may be a fallacy to establish a direct relationship between military actions and political objectives while the strategic 

linkage between military objectives and political objectives is bypassed or missing. For instance, a military option may attain the 

desired political objectives in a particular war while resulting in an unfavourable political outcome in another war. In fact, each war 

is unique. Without any military objectives, one can easily make a mistake by incorrectly assuming that a particular military option 

will always result in a certain political outcome. On the other hand, many military options may attain the same military objectives. 

With the military objectives designed to attain the desired political objectives, we should never make the same mistake no matter 

which military option we choose. 

The assailant must not make these mistakes. Effective military objectives are based on what is most likely to cause the enemy to 

concede defeat, not necessarily the most desirable military option. When the enemy decides to go to war, he should be prepared 

to lose part of certain assets such as his infrastructure, industry, and population in return for the stake. It would take small nations 

with limited airpower a long time and great effort to achieve military objectives that target such assets. In addition, such assets 

are unlikely to be critical to the enemy’s war efforts in the short term. This shortcoming is evident by the fact that the conventional 

strategic bombing during World War II was not as decisive as previously expected. 103 Traditionally, military planners aim directly at 

the contested territory. Achieving such military objectives does not necessarily cause the enemy to concede defeat because he 

might choose to retreat strategically and wait for future opportunities. 

The assailant needs to know the enemy’s core interests as well as how he values his assets and the stake. He needs to identify 

and target exactly what the enemy cannot afford to lose so that the enemy will have to make the desired concessions. Military 

objectives set accordingly will have the best chance of being decisive and preventing protracted war. The assailant may indirectly 

target the assets that are most highly valued by the enemy instead of directly targeting the contested territory. The alternative 

approach is consistent with Sun Tzu’s suggestions to seize what the enemy values most, and to attack undefended positions. 104

For example, states contesting a territorial dispute are normally prepared for holding the contested territory. 105 Seizing or 

52 

retaking the territory would be very difficult, and the territory itself may not be the real source of conflict or highly valued by 

the enemy. Alternatively, the assailant could seize or target key strategic areas, highly industrialized zones, or major ports 

that the enemy does not expect to be attacked. If the enemy does not know exactly where to defend, the tasks could be 

accomplished with comparatively less effort. Such military objectives are more likely to be effective because the bargaining chip is 

more critical to the enemy. 

Clear military objectives allow military planners to utilize all available assets most efficiently. As discussed earlier, some military 

objectives may require parallel attacks to be conducted in a compressed timeframe while others may just require independent 

attacks only when necessary. What, where, when, and how to attack should be primarily determined by the desired effects on 

the enemy system. In other words, the extra effects besides the operational requirements should not be a dominant factor in 

targeting. The effects-based approach would not only minimize the operational requirement for air assets but also free them for 

other purposes. Since all bombs are expense and could potentially create collateral damage, they should not be wasted on 

irrelevant targets or used unnecessarily. It does not make sense for small nations to increase the tempo of war unless doing so 

will significantly minimize losses and/or maximize the effects. According to Sun Tzu, it is correct timing that makes attacks most 

effective. 106 

Traditionally, air campaigners prefer to target strategic targets in the enemy’s homeland first, and then work outward to the 

battlefield. After gaining control of the air, the typical priorities are strategic attacks, air interdiction, and close air support. 

Although strategic paralysis is based on parallel attacks, such targeting priorities still exist in practice. 

Tactical paralysis may require a new targeting strategy to suit small nations’ operational limitations and requirements, although the 

core ideas of strategic paralysis remain unchanged. Control of the air will remain the first priority in a campaign dominated by 

manned aircraft because substantial casualties inflicted by the enemy’s 

airpower could adversely affect the campaign both operationally and 

politically. Long-range precision attack capabilities such as attack UAVs 

and cruise missiles will remain unfeasible and unaffordable for most small 

nations for quite some time. The air superiority campaign may still require 

…a study of the strategic air campaign in the 1991 Gulf War 

by Olsen reveals that ‘decapitation’, another coercive 

strategy that targets the enemy’s leadership as well as his 

command and control, did not work

parallel attacks to be conducted in a compressed timeframe in order to minimize the effectiveness of the enemy’s 

53 

resistance. However, strategic attacks may be unnecessary for short military campaigns since such attacks are unlikely to 

have significant impacts on the effectiveness of the enemy’s field forces during the campaign. 107 The assailant should focus 

primarily on the field forces because they are most likely to be the key means for limited conventional war. This is why Pape finds 

that ‘denial’, a coercive strategy that targets the enemy’s military means, works best in territorial disputes. 108 In addition, a study 

of the strategic air campaign in the 1991 Gulf War by Olsen reveals that ‘decapitation’, another coercive strategy that targets the 

enemy’s leadership as well as his command and control, did not work. 109 

Nevertheless, the assailant should not attack the combat elements directly in the early stage because they would be highly 

prepared. First, the assailant should focus on the enemy’s vulnerabilities or weaknesses such as his rear areas. He should 

indirectly target the logistic lines and some less-protected elements to create an immediate physical and moral effect on the 

enemy, and then work inward to his homeland as deeply as required in order to prevent further supplies and attrition 

replacements from reaching the battlefield. The depth of attacks should depend on how long it will take to defeat the enemy’s 

combat elements. For example, if a decisive ground offensive is expected to last only a few days, there is no need to strike 

logistic depots from which supplies will reach the front in a few weeks. Targets should be neutralized or destroyed only if they 

really contribute to the enemy’s war efforts. By this method, the enemy would start suffering from the very first days of the war 

instead of just before the beginning of the ground offensive. More importantly, the preparation phase for any ground offensive 

could be significantly shortened. This step is analogous to preventing oxygen and nutrients from reaching the enemy’s fighting 

organs through blood vessels. The shortage of oxygen and nutrients will incrementally affect the organs. 

Once the enemy’s field forces have been sufficiently weakened, the assailant should start an air offensive against the remaining 

combat elements. Having lost the key means, the enemy might decide to surrender and make the desired concessions at this 

stage. If the enemy does not give up, a ground offensive would be necessary and close air support would be required. It is 

important to note that attacks against the remaining command and control targets should be withheld until the start of a decisive 

air offensive or ground offensive to maximize shock effects. Tactical paralysis is fully achieved at this stage by further blocking the 

enemy’s nervous system temporarily so that his fighting organs cannot function during the decisive operation. Such attacks 

should not be conducted too soon otherwise the enemy might have sufficient time to adapt to the situations and overcome the 

problems. In brief, the effectiveness of tactical paralysis depends largely on targeting strategy and correct timing. 

It should be noted that while strategic paralysis aims at paralyzing the whole enemy system during the entire campaign, tactical 

paralysis only aims at paralyzing the enemy’s fighting organs temporarily during the decisive phase. It is a ‘just enough’ and ‘just 

in time’ strategy. Although the execution of tactical paralysis seems very similar to that of a traditional air campaign, the two 

actions are largely different in concept. The aim of tactical paralysis is not attrition or ‘cutting off’ the enemy’s fighting organs. 110 

The assailant only needs to paralyze the enemy’s field forces on the battlefield briefly to achieve his military objectives with

minimum resistance. The goal is to minimize casualties for both sides. For tactical paralysis, timing is as crucial as targeting, 

54 

whereas it may be less important in traditional air campaigns. Tactical paralysis is consistent with Sun Tzu’s concept 

because the assailant could not only preserve his assets but also keep the enemy’s field forces intact. 111 

According to Sun Tzu, strategy should be flexible and fluid in order to take situational advantages and exploit the enemy’s 

vulnerabilities. 112 Hence, the targeting strategy should be responsive to situational development. 113 The versatility and flexibility of 

airpower makes it an ideal means to implement such an adaptive strategy. The main effort should be directed at the enemy’s 

weaknesses or targets of opportunity to produce maximum effects at minimum costs. In other words, military objectives may 

have to be revised from time to time to suit the changing situations. 114 

The assailant should always prepare for a ground offensive although it might be unnecessary if there is a shortcut to victory. The 

shortcut is possible only if the assailant is able to read the enemy’s mind correctly, and willing to accommodate him out of 

deteriorating situations. By human nature, nobody wants to be defeated, lose power, and become a war criminal. In many cases, 

political leaders do not give up even though their field forces are about to be defeated because they cannot accept the 

consequences. According to Sun Tzu, one should leave a way out for a desperate enemy otherwise he might decide to fight to 

the death. 115 When there is an indication that the enemy might give up, the assailant should seize the opportunity by providing 

him with a comfortable way out. If the enemy decides to take the offer, the assailant would benefit from a quick victory. 

Once the military objectives have been achieved, the war may have not yet come to an end although armed hostilities may no 

longer exist. The postwar strategy must be implemented in order to turn the short-term military success into the desired endstate. 

In terms of mind-time-space, we also have to change the enemy’s mind after having prevented him from exploiting time 

and space. One of the lessons learned from the 1991 Gulf War was that there was no postwar strategy to terminate the 

conflict. 116 While the use of force may bring the enemy to negotiation, the long-term political objectives can only be achieved by 

conflict resolution. The victorious assailant may have a bargaining power to 

coerce the loser to accept the terms of peace but it would be meaningless 

unless the loser is also satisfied with the resolution. Conflict resolution is 

largely based on compromise. The fundamental conflicts must be correctly 

identified and the most suitable solution or course of action to remove the 

One of the lessons learned from the 1991 Gulf War was that 

there was no postwar strategy to terminate the conflict. While the 

use of force may bring the enemy to negotiation, the long-term 

political objectives can only be achieved by conflict resolution

conflicts must be agreed upon by both sides. The victorious assailant may have to make some concessions himself in 

return for sustainable peace otherwise he might have to wage subsequent wars. 

INITIAL STAGE INTERMEDIATE STAGE FINAL STAGE 

BASIC SECURITY 

OBJECTIVES 

WAR STRATEGY 

WAR EFFORTS (ALL MEANS) 

MILITARY 

OBJECTIVES 

POSTWAR STRATEGY 

PREWAR STRATEGY (WAR AVOIDANCE) 

ALL EFFORTS EXCEPT THE ACTUAL USE OF FORCE 

POLITICAL 

OBJECTIVES 

Figure 3: The three stages of war according to Sun Tzu’s concept 

Since the advent of airpower, there have been many 

unsatisfactory attempts to explain the relationship between a 

targeting strategy and its strategic consequences. Dr 

Hammond points out that the connection between the 

application of military force on a particular target set and its 

strategic effects is wrongly assumed to be automatic. 117 Only 

‘knowing the enemy’, specifically what he values and his 

cultural mind-time-space, will tell us how a military action may 

achieve a moral, mental, and emotional strategic effect. 

Recently, scholars have begun to focus on what the enemy 

values. For example, ‘axiological targeting’ is a strategy that 

targets what the enemy leaders at every level value. 118 

‘Countervalue military targeting’ is another strategy that 

targets military assets most valued by the enemy. 119 

According to Sun Tzu, the connection between a military action and the desired end-state is by design. A right military strategy 

may bring a military victory but does not guarantee a favorable political outcome unless military objectives are set correctly and 

postwar political efforts are successful. This can be visualized by breaking down war into progressive stages as illustrated by 

figure 3. Military actions can only bring us to the intermediate stage. A military success is just a stepping-stone toward the end, 

not an end in itself, and does not necessarily lead to a strategic success. It is an effective postwar strategy that will allow us to 

proceed further to the final stage. While it may not be easy to change the enemy’s mind, it may even be more difficult to change 

our own minds. To achieve sustainable peace, we need to have the right attitude toward the coexistence of nations. 

In summary, Sun Tzu’s concept of war is still relevant to modern warfare. Although the strategic paralysis concept is based on 

the combined concepts of Boyd’s psychological paralysis and Warden’s physical paralysis, it is largely dominated by Warden’s 

emphasis on the physical side while Boyd’s emphasis on the grand strategic level is missing. There are a number of possible 

theoretical flaws in the strategic paralysis concept. There are also many practical limitations at all levels of strategy. Although 

some of these limitations could be overcome by advanced technology and/or new tactics, new limitations would certainly arise as 

a result of the enemy’s adaptations. 120 

55

Sun Tzu’s concept may make it possible for small nations with limited airpower to adopt the strategic paralysis concept 

56 

with some modifications. Since strategic paralysis is a relative capability, small nations may have such a capability in relation 

to a weaker state. The most likely scenarios for them are limited armed conflicts due to territorial disputes. Small nations 

may not have to use their airpower in the same way superpowers do because their enemies may only have to be paralyzed 

locally by tactical paralysis campaigns. 

Sun Tzu’s concept of war offers an alternative approach that suits small nations. In regard to strategic thinking, war should be 

perceived from a broad perspective. The overall strategy to achieve the objectives of war should be comprehensive and exploit all 

available means. States should avoid war by all means and non-military means should take precedence before the use of force. 

States should base their strategy on the grand strategic calculation of war. States should always comply with the five essential 

criteria. Most importantly, tao should always be maintained even in peacetime. Knowing the enemy both physically and mentally 

is very important because it allows states to avoid war by foiling the enemy’s strategy. A strategy can be foiled by eliminating one 

or more components of the strategic trinity: will, means, and opportunities. 

Pursuing a right strategy is crucial to small nations. If war breaks out, small nations should aim for a short military campaign 

because of their limitations. Protracted war, high attrition, and collateral damage should be avoided to minimize losses and the 

residual effects. They have to aim at both ‘not losing’ and ‘winning’. In order not to lose, they must not make any mistakes 

themselves. In order to win, they must expose and target their enemy’s vulnerabilities and weaknesses. The key to military 

success is to seek strategic advantages and choose correct timing, not necessarily superior military strength or the rapidity of 

attacks. Small nations should also continue their efforts to foil the enemy’s strategy during the state of war along with other war 

efforts. 

The conduct of war should also comply with Sun Tzu’s concept. Small nations should prepare the battlefield by isolating their 

enemies as much as possible. They should think defensively and prepare for the worst cases. They should aim at achieving their 

military objectives with the initial allocation of assets and within the timeframe. This could be achieved by setting military 

objectives correctly. They should target what their enemies cannot afford to lose, which may not necessarily be the contested 

territories or the stakes. The application of tactical paralysis may require a new targeting strategy that better suits their operational 

limitations and requirements. Since military objectives may have to be revised from time to time, the targeting strategy should be 

flexible. Small nations should take a shortcut to quick victory whenever possible by providing their enemies with a comfortable 

way out. They may also have to compromise with their enemies in return for sustainable peace. That is to say, the postwar 

strategy must be implemented to turn the short-term military success into the desired end-state. 

This paper has demonstrated that strategic paralysis applied in conjunction with Sun Tzu’s concept of war could prevent similar 

failures to those of the 1991 Gulf war and might also be feasible for small nations with limited airpower. One should always bear 

in mind that war is always fought simultaneously in both the physical and psychological dimensions, and that time is not a limiting

factor for war in the broad sense. While the strategic paralysis concept emphasizes the overwhelming superiority on the 

physical side, one should never ignore the psychological side because it is potentially as important and may be the factor 

that determines the outcome of war in the long term. 

57 

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NOTES 

1 Mets, David R., The Air Campaign: John Warden and the Classical 

Airpower Theorists (Revised Edition), Air University Press, Maxwell AFB, 

Alabama, 1999, p. 78 

2 Hammond, Grant T., ‘Myths of the Gulf War’: Some “Lessons” Not to 

Learn’, Airpower Journal, Vol. 12, No. 3, Fall 1998, pp. 8-10 

3 Arkin, William M., ‘Baghdad: The Urban Sanctuary in Desert Storm?’, 

Airpower Journal, Vol. 11, No. 1, Spring 1997, pp. 16-17 

4 Ames, Roger T., Sun Tzu: The Art of Warfare, Ballantine Books, New York, 

1993, pp. 3-5, Note: It is believed that the original thirteen chapters of The 

Art of War (Sun-tzu ping-fa) were written during the Chinese Warring States 

Period (403-221 BC). 

5 Paret, Peter, ‘Clausewitz’, in Paret, Peter (ed.), Makers of Modern Strategy: 

From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 

1986, pp. 201-203, Note: According to Clausewitz, ‘friction’ is what 

distinguishes real war from war on paper. It can make apparently easy 

tasks so difficult and cause military operations to fail. 

6 Liddell Hart, B.H., Strategy: The Indirect Approach (Revised Edition), Faber 

and Faber Limited, London, 1967 (first published in 1954), p. 228 

7 Warner, Christopher G., Implementing Joint Vision 2010: A Revolution in 

Military Affairs for Strategic Air Campaigns, Air University Press, Maxwell 

AFB, Alabama, 1999, p. 9 

8 Group Interview (through Internet), Mar 2001, Note: The writer would like to 

thank AM Thares Punsri, AM Narongsak Sangapong, AVM M.L. Suprija 

Kamalasana, and Gp.Capt. Kanit Suwannate for their contribution. In 

general, they believe that Sun Tzu’s concept of war can fill the gaps in 

modern military theories by explaining why tactical (or military) victories do 

not always lead to a strategic (or political) success. 

9 Wing, R. L., The Art of Strategy, Thorsons, London, 1997, p. 10 

10 Mao, Tse-tung, Guerrilla Warfare (translated by Griffith, Samuel B.), Cassell, 

London, 1965, pp. 31-82 

11 Group Interview, Note: For example, a senior RTAF officer points out that 

Thailand currently faces many territorial disputes that are not much different 

from the conflicts of the past in terms of the source, pattern, and resolution 

of conflict. 

12 Handel, Michael I., Masters of War: Sun Tzu, Clausewitz and Jomini, Frank 

Cass, London, 1992, pp. 32-33 and 48 

13 ibid 

59 

14 Tao, Hanzhang, Sun Tzu’s Art of War: The Modern Chinese 

Interpretation (translated by Yuan, Shibing), Sterling Publishing, New 

York, 1987, p. 94 (The Art of War Chapter 1) 

15 Sangrawee, Bunsak, Sun Tzu in Practice (Second Edition), Kor Kai Press, 

Bangkok, 1990, pp. 19-22 (The Art of War Chapter 1), Note: This book is a 

translation of The Art of War in Thai Language. It is probably better than 

English translations in regard to abstract meanings such as tao, heaven, 

and earth because Thai people largely adopt these abstract ideas from the 

Chinese culture. 

16 ibid, pp. 201-202 and 250-254 (The Art of War Chapters 8 and 11) 


18 Wing, p. 45 (The Art of War Chapter 3) 

19 Ames, pp. 111-112 (The Art of War Chapter 3), interprets that one should 

keep himself intact while Tao, p. 99 (The Art of War Chapter 3), interprets 

that one should take all under heaven intact (i.e. everything including the 

enemy state and its army). 

20 Huang, J. H., Sun Tzu: The New Translation, Quill William, New York, 1993, 

p. 49 (The Art of War Chapter 3) 

21 Ames, p. 161(The Art of War Chapter 11) 

22 Tao, p. 105 (The Art of War Chapter 6) 

23 ibid, p. 101 (The Art of War Chapter 4) 

24 Ames, p. 115 (The Art of War Chapter 4) 

25 Sawyer, Ralph D., Sun Tzu: Art of War, Westview Press, Oxford, 1994, 

p. 184 (The Art of War Chapter 4) 

26 ibid, pp. 173 and 183 (The Art of War Chapters 2 and 4) 

27 Group Interview, Note: For example, a senior RTAF officer believes that it 

was a ‘compromising’ strategy that enabled Thailand to maintain its 

sovereignty during the Colonization Period. Thailand achieved its political 

objectives although it had to give away some of its territories to the 

Western powers in order to avoid military confrontations. Had Thailand 

fought against the superior powers, its inferior military would have been 

easily defeated and the country would have been colonized. 

28 Ames, pp. 119-121 (The Art of War Chapter 5) 


30 Sawyer, pp. 178-179 (The Art of War Chapter 3)


60 




35 ibid, pp. 119-121, 153-162, and 169-171 (The Art of War Chapters 5, 11, 

and 13) 

36 ibid, pp. 119-121 (The Art of War Chapter 5) 

37 ibid 


39 Tao, pp. 105-107 (The Art of War Chapter 6) 

40 ibid 

41 See the introduction for the definition of ‘Strategic Paralysis’. 

42 Boyd, John R., ‘A Discourse on Winning and Losing’, Unpublished Work, 

1976-1987, Available from Dr Alan Stephens, University College, ADFA, 

Note: The work consists of ‘Pattern of Conflict’, a 193 pages slide 

presentation dated Dec 1986; ‘Organic Design for Command and Control’, 

a 37 pages slide presentation dated May 1987; ‘The Strategic Game of ? 

and ?’, a 59 pages slide presentation dated Jun 1987; ‘Destruction and 

Creation’, a 16 pages unpublished essay dated 3 Sep 1976; and 

‘Revelation’, a 38 pages slide presentation undated. 

43 Boyd, ‘Pattern of Conflict’, pp. 139-143 

44 Boyd, ‘Organic Design for Command and Control’, pp. 13 and 26 

45 Fadok, David S., ‘John Boyd and John Warden: Airpower’s Quest for 

Strategic Paralysis’, in Meilinger, Phillip (ed.), The Paths of Heaven: The 

Evolution of Airpower Theory, Air University Press, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 

1997, p. 366 

46 Boyd, ‘Pattern of Conflict’, pp. 134-137 

47 Boyd, ‘The Strategic Game of ? and ?’, pp. 35-36 and 47 

48 Boyd, ‘Pattern of Conflict’, pp. 133-134, Note: By the phrase ‘getting inside 

the enemy’s mind-time-space’, Boyd probably suggested that one should 

shape the enemy’s perception as well as prevent him from using time and 

space. 

49 ibid, pp. 13-14 

50 ibid 

51 ibid, pp. 41-42 

52 Hammond, Grant T., ‘The Essential Boyd’, Unpublished Essay, 1997, 

Available from Dr Alan Stephens, University College, ADFA, p. 10, Note: 

According to Dr Hammond, Boyd believed that the real target is always the 

enemy’s perception. 

53 Boyd, ‘Pattern of Conflict’, p. 182 

54 Warden, John A. III, The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat, Pergamon- 

Brassey’s International Defense Publishers, Washington, 1989 

55 Warden, John A. III, ‘Employing Air Power in the Twenty-first Century’, in 

Shultz, Richard H., Jr. and Pfaltzgraff, Robert L., Jr. (eds.), The Future of Air 

Power in the Aftermath of the Gulf War, Air University Press, Maxwell AFB, 

Alabama, 1992, pp. 57-82 

56 Warden, John A. III, ‘The Enemy as a System’, Airpower Journal, Vol. 9, 

No. 1, Spring 1995, pp. 40-55 

57 Warden, John A. III, ‘Planning to Win’, in Clarke, Shaun (ed.), Testing the 

Limits, Air Power Studies Centre, RAAF Base Fairbairn, Canberra, 1998, 

pp. 77-98 

58 Warden, ‘The Enemy as a System’, p. 54 

59 Belote, Howard D., ‘Warden and the Air Corps Tactical School’, Airpower 

Journal, Vol. 13, No. 3, Fall 1999, pp. 44-45; and Murphy, Timothy G., ‘A 

Critique of the Air Campaign’, Airpower Journal, Vol. 8, No. 1, Spring 1994, 

p. 70 

60 Warden, The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat, pp. 7, 13, 22-23, 33, 

and 59-60 

61 ibid, pp. 109-126 

62 Warden, ‘Employing Air Power in the Twenty-first Century’, pp. 61-62 

63 Warden, ‘The Enemy as a System’, p. 47 

64 Warden, ‘Employing Air Power in the Twenty-first Century’, pp. 64-82 

65 Warden, ‘The Enemy as a System’, pp. 42-43 

66 ibid, pp. 42-48 and 55 

67 ibid, pp. 53-55 

68 Warden, ‘Planning to Win’, pp. 78-90 

69 Perry, James D., ‘Operation Allied Force’, Aerospace Power Journal, Vol. 

14, No. 2, Summer 2000, pp. 3 and 8-9 of 13 (through internet), Note: One 

of the key ideas is to disperse airpower by operating small air units from 

many concealed locations. Hence, future fighter aircraft should have short 

takeoff and landing capability to be able to operate from these dispersed

primitive strips. In addition, future ground forces will have to be small and 

well-trained to survive in high-tech wars. 

70 Thomas, Timothy L., ‘Kosovo and the Current Myth of Information 

Superiority’, Parameters, Vol. 30, No. 1, Spring 2000, pp. 1-14 (through 

internet), Note: Thomas interviewed Admiral James Ellis, C-in-C of NATO’s 

Allied Forces Southern Europe in 1999. Thomas finds that excessive 

information has a potential to reduce a military leader’s awareness of an 

unfolding situation and excessive data also leads to sensory overload. He 

quotes Admiral Ellis that, ‘Information saturation is additive to the fog of war 

… uncontrolled, it will control you and your staffs and lengthen your 

decision-cycle times.’ 

71 ibid, Note: Thomas points out that despite NATO having almost total 

information superiority, its situation awareness during Operation Allied Force 

was manipulated by the Serbs more often than expected. Although NATO 

knew almost everything that happened in the battlespace, it did not 

understand everything. NATO also experienced delays in its integrated 

information operations as a result of the lack of key personnel. 

72 Warden, ‘Employing Air Power in the Twenty-first Century’, pp. 64-68; and 

Warden, ‘The Enemy as a System’, pp. 49-53 

73 Warden, “The Enemy as a System, pp. 42-43 

74 Hosmer, Stephen T., Psychological Effects of U.S. Air Operations in Four 

Wars 1941-1991: Lessons for U.S. Commanders, RAND, Santa Monica, 

CA, 1996, p. 189, Note: Hosmer concludes from the study of psychological 

effects of air operations in WWII, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the 

Gulf War that the psychological dimension of war should be emphasized in 

military education, training, planning, and the conduct of military operations. 

75 Stephens, Alan, Private Discussion, Oct 2000 

76 Linn, Thomas C., ‘Adversarial Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction’, Joint 

Force Quarterly, No. 23, Autumn/Winter 1999-2000, pp. 58-64, Note: Linn 

points out that WMD are cheap, available, potent, and very difficult to 

detect. Therefore, it is possible that nation states or terrorists could use 

WMD to attack their adversaries’ population centers. 

77 Correll, John T., ‘Visions’, Air Force, Vol. 83, No. 9, Sep 2000, pp. 36-37, 

Note: According to the US Joint Vision 2020, the effects of mass could be 

achieved regardless of where platforms reside, fly, or orbit. Nevertheless, 

these limitations will still exist to some extent. 

78 Stillion, John and Orletskey, David T., Airbase Vulnerability to Conventional 

Cruise-Missile and Ballistic-Missile Attacks, RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 

1999, pp. 59-60, Note: Stillion and Orletskey conclude that by 

combining several well-known and widely available technologies 61 

such as UAVs, GPS, submunition warheads, and ballistic missiles, 

an enemy could severely disrupt the USAF’s ability to conduct air 

operations from airbases in the theater. 

79 Meilinger, Phillip S., ‘Air Strategy: Targeting for Effect’, Aerospace Power 

Journal, Vol. 13, No. 4, pp. 1-13 (through internet), Note: Meilinger believes 

that selecting the correct targets is the essence of air strategy. He also 

points out that COGs of one country are not necessarily those of another 

and may change over time within the same country. 

80 Vick, Alan, et al., Aerospace Operation in Urban Environments: Exploring 

New Concepts, RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 2000, pp. 264-265, Note: Vick 

and his colleagues find that one of the major factors that significantly 

degrades the effectiveness of airpower is concern about friendly and noncombatant 

casualties. 

81 RAAF, DI(AF) AAP 1003 Operations Law for RAAF Commanders, Air Power 

Studies Centre, RAAF Base Fairbairn, Canberra, 1994, the introduction and 

pp. 7-1 to 7-6 

82 Arkin, William M., ‘Smart Bombs, Dumb Targeting?’, The Bulletin of the 

Atomic Scientists, Vol. 56, No. 3, May/Jun 2000, pp. 46-53, Note: Arkin 

effectively argues that the effectiveness of Operation Allied Force was 

compromised by the need to minimize civilian casualties. 

83 Thomas, p. 6 of 14 (through internet), Note: This problem actually occurred 

in the early stage of Operation Allied Force. 

84 Haffa, Robert P. and Watts Barry D., ‘Brittle Swords: Low-Density, High- 

Demand Assets’, Strategic Review, Vol. 28, No. 4, Fall 2000, pp. 43-48, 

Note: The US admitted that it could not meet the operational demands for 

some low-density, high-demand assets which were critical to its advanced 

war fighting capabilities during Operation Allied Force even though those 

assets were not affected by the enemy’s actions. 

85 O’Brien, Kevin A., ‘Intelligence Gathering on Asymmetric Threats – Part 

One’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vol. 12, No. 10, 2000, p. 52; and Perry, 

pp. 1-13 through internet, Note: Some PLA officers believe that in future, 

dedicated computer viruses could paralyze the adversary’s electric power 

plants, financial institutions, stock markets, telecommunication 

infrastructure, and integrated defence networks, thus creating national 

chaos and reducing the effectiveness of armed forces. 

86 Larsen, Randall J. and David, Ruth A., ‘Homeland Defense: Assumptions

First, Strategy Second’, Strategic Review, Vol. 28, No. 4, Fall 2000, pp. 

62 4-10, Note: Larsen and David believe that the threat of asymmetric 

attacks against the US homeland, either by nation states or terrorist 

organizations, is real and increasing. They recommend that homeland 

defence should be seriously addressed. 

87 Thomas, p. 3 of 14 (through internet), Note: Despite the lesson learned 

from hunting Scuds in the Gulf War, a similar problem was experienced 

again in Operation Allied Force. 

88 Gerwehr, Scott and Glenn, Russell W., The Art of Darkness: Deception and 

Urban Operations, RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 2000, pp. 57-59 

89 Tilford, Earl H., ‘Operation Allied Force and the Role of Air Power’, 

Parameters, Vol. 29, No. 4, Winter 1999/2000, p. 5 of 11(through internet), 

Note: This problem was experienced in Operation Allied Force. The Serbs 

made use of deception effectively while NATO itself imposed a minimum 

altitude of 15,000 feet to avoid casualties. 

90 Clarke, Shaun, Strategy, Air Strike and Small Nations, Air Power Studies 

Centre, RAAF Base Fairbairn, Canberra, 1999, pp. 67-70, Note: Clarke 

summarizes that small nations’ main limitations are largely economic based. 

These constraints include inability to mass platform and weapons, inability 

to sustain protracted war, limited access to advanced technology, low 

tolerance to casualties, and low capacity to replace attrition. 

91 Group Interview, Note: A senior RTAF officer notes that unlike in the Middle 

East, many of the contested territories in Southeast Asia are neither 

economically valuable nor strategically vital to the disputing parties because 

gaining or losing the territories is unlikely to have significant economic or 

security impacts on the parties in the short term. 

92 Ames, pp.103-105 and 119-121 (The Art of War Chapters 1 and 5) 


94 ibid 

95 Huang, p. 49 (The Art of War Chapter 3) 

96 Mets, David R., ‘To Kill a Stalking Bird’, Airpower Journal, Vol. 12, No. 3, 

Fall 1998, pp. 91-92 


98 Edwards, Sean J.A., MARS Unmasked: The Changing Face of Urban 

Operations, RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 2000, pp. xiv-xv and 95-98 

99 Tao, pp. 97-98 (Sun Tzu, The Art of War Chapter 2) 

100 Handel, Michael I., Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought (Third, 

Revised and Expanded Edition), Frank Cass, London, 2001, pp. 307-326, 

Note: This problem gave birth to the 1984 Weinberger Doctrine. Whether 

vital US interests are involved and whether political and military objectives 

are clearly defined are two of the six major tests to be applied before 

committing US combat forces overseas. 

101 Bryan, Ian, ‘Military Success Requires Political Direction’, Strategic Review, 

Vol. 27, No. 4, Fall 1999, pp. 3-11, Note: Brian argues that the military may 

fail to recommend the best course of action because of many reasons. For 

example, it may pursue bureaucratic objectives, misinterpret national 

political objectives, misjudge the political impact of its actions, or fail to 

support foreign policy. 

102 USGAO, Operation Desert Storm: Evaluation of the Air Campaign, USGAO, 

Washington, D.C., 1997, pp. 194-195 

103 Pape, Robert A. Jr., Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War, 

Cornell University Press, New York, 1996, pp. 10-11 

104 Ames, pp. 123 and 162 (The Art of War Chapters 6 and 11) 

105 Group Interview, Note: From his experience in many territorial disputes, a 

senior RTAF officer observes that the adversaries usually strengthen their 

positions before engaging in limited armed conflicts. The application of 

airpower is often ineffective when the adversaries conceal themselves in 

modified natural shelters especially in mountainous terrain. 


107 Pape, p. 75 

108 ibid, p. 20 

109 Olsen, John Andreas, ‘Operation Desert Storm: An Examination of the 

Strategic Air Campaign’, Dissertation submitted to De Montfort University 

for PhD, UK, Mar 2000, pp. 317-321 

110 Barlow Jason B., ‘Strategic Paralysis: An Air Power Strategy for the 

Present’, Air Power, Vol. 7, No. 4, Winter 1993, p. 6, Note: According to 

Barlow, the ‘attrition’ strategy seeks victory by exhausting the enemy in 

time, space, energy, and supplies. 



113 Meilinger, p. 12 of 13 (through internet), Note: Meilinger similarly suggests 

that ‘flexibility is the key to airpower.’ 

114 Bryan, p. 11, Note: Bryan argues that the exclusion of political input would 

degrade military effectiveness. However, this should not be confused with

political interference. He suggests that political leaders should monitor 

military policy and action; nonetheless, they should not micromanage 

military operations or flippantly disregard military advice. 


116 Horner, Charles A., ‘New Era Warfare’, in Stephens, Alan (ed.), The War in 

the Air, Air Power Studies Centre, RAAF Base Fairbairn, Canberra, 1994, p. 

324, Note: General Horner who was in charge of the coalition’s air assets 

during Operation Desert Storm, admits that he did not know what to 

negotiate with the Iraqis when he was directed by the US Government to 

do so. 

117 Hammond, Grant T., Private Correspondence, Feb 2001 

118 Wijninga, Peter W.W. and Szafranski, Richard, ‘Beyond Utility Targeting: 

Toward Axiological Air Operations’, Aerospace Power Journal, Vol. 14, No. 

4, Winter 2000, pp. 47-48 

119 Mueller, Karl, ‘Countermilitary Strategies for Coercion: Threatening What the 

Enemy Values’, Presentation at the International Studies Association 42nd 

Annual Convention, Chicago, Feb 2001, pp. 4-5 

120 Scales, Robert H., Jr., ‘Adaptive Enemies: Dealing with the Strategic Threat 

after 2010’, Strategic Review, Vol. 27, No. 1, Winter, 1999, p. 13, Note: 

Scales believes that ‘Every successful technical or tactical innovation that 

provides a dominant military advantage eventually yields to a countervailing 

response that shifts the advantage to the opposing force.’ 

63

Air Power Versus a 

Fielded Army: 

A Construct for Air 

Operations in the 21st 

Century

By Lieutenant Colonel ‘Goldie’ Haun USAF 

65 

Operation Desert Storm, the 1991 Gulf War, and Operation Allied force, the 1999 Air War over Serbia, saw US and 

coalition Air Forces attacking enemy field forces at unprecedented levels. Given the real change in the nature, 

strategy, and conduct of air operations in the last decade, this study examines how to most efficiently employ 

airpower to achieve its objectives in the asymmetric attack against a fielded army. 

During Desert Storm, US Air Forces developed medium altitude tactics increasing servivability by over-flying the range of Iraqi 

AAA and MANPADS. Difficulties in attacking from medium altitude were countered with massed formations of specialised 

armor-killing A-10s, the development of F-16 “Killer Scouts,” and the F-111 and F-15E tactic of “Tank Plinking”with laser guided 

bombs. During Allied Force, the challenge lay not in attacking the enemy, but in locating and identifying an army interspersed 

with a large number of civilian refugees. 

A systems approach is required to most efficiently attack a fielded army by air. The key is the integration of ISR assets through 

an intelligence “flex targeting” cell and the use of terminal air controllers such as Forward Air Controllers Airborne (FACAs), 

along with trained strikers capable of precision attack. This approach requires a change in Joint and Air Force doctrine 

acknowledging the supported role that US Air Forces have performed against enemy fielded forces over the last decade. It calls 

for the adaptation of the tactics, techniques, and procedures necessary to ensure the USAF prepares for these kinds of 

operations in the future. 

THE AIRPOWER DEBATE 

Though this paper focuses predominantly on operational and tactical concerns, it is firmly rooted in the larger issues of 

airpower and warfare. Even as the one hundredth anniversary of powered flight approaches, debate over the military 

effectiveness of airpower continues. Both theorists and practitioners have addressed this most important question and, more 

often than not, their answers have stressed the strategic dimensions of aerial warfare. The critical component of strategic 

airpower theory and doctrine has been the need to strike directly at the enemy’s heartland in order to destroy the enemy’s 

willingness or capability to wage war. Theorists and practitioners of air warfare from Douhet to Warden have equated airpower 

effectiveness with attacks on strategic targets: the enemy’s population, war-making industries or industrial web, or the enemy’s 

leadership. Whether command of the air, high-altitude daylight precision bombardment, or strategic paralysis, the focus has 

been on attacking targets characterized as strategic in nature.

However, in the wake of the Gulf War, some theorists and practitioners are suggesting that a more effective (and politically 

66 

palatable) use of airpower lies not only in attacking strategic targets, but also in directly attacking an opponent’s fielded 

forces. This new emphasis does not suggest targeting fielded forces in support of planned or actual ground operations, 

but rather targeting fielded forces independently with a goal of destroying or degrading them to the point of enemy accession to 

demands. In his book Bombing to Win, Robert Pape suggests such an approach. Pape divides coercive air strategies into four 

categories. Punishment strategy attempts to increase the pain to enemy civilians to the point where the cost of continued 

resistance by the state exceeds the benefits of their territorial interests 1 . The bombing of cities to create homeless citizens and 

severe shortages of key supplies is an example of this strategy. Risk strategy slowly raises the costs of continued resistance 

over time, forcing the enemy to weigh future risks with continued resistance. 2 Vietnam’s Rolling Thunder air campaign, based on 

the logic of Schelling’s gradualism, provides this classic example of this strategy put into practice. A decapitation strategy 

strikes key leadership and command and control facilities. This was applied in the initial air strikes of the Gulf War. 3 Finally, denial 

strategy targets the enemy’s ability to achieve its military objectives. 4 In his analysis of thirty-three airpower case studies, Pape 

concludes that only denial strategy has been decisive in aerial warfare. 5 Though Pape’s analysis and conclusions are subject to 

challenge, his conclusions have ignited a serious debate within America’s security community on the effective use of airpower. 6 

Not only theorists, but also Air Force practitioners, have recently debated the effectiveness of direct aerial attack against an 

advancing enemy army. Major General Charles Link championed the use of airpower asymmetrically against enemy ground 

forces during the “Halt” phase. 7 This halt strategy is designed to stop 

the enemy short of their objective. Once stopped, the enemy must 

resolve either to survive in friendly territory under aerial bombardment 

or to withdraw to a position where they are no longer threatened. 8 

In his analysis of 

thirty-three airpower 

case studies, Pape 

concludes that only 

denial strategy has 

been decisive in 

aerial warfare 

A B-57 drops 750lb bombs 

over Vietnam, 1967. 

A 

halt strategy is not just a defensive 

posture, but an application of airpower to 

directly defeat an enemy by 

defeating/destroying its fielded forces. 

The debate on how to best coerce an 

opponent through application of airpower 

now involves more than just strategic 

attack. 

The purpose of sketching these 

distinctions between theories is not one 

of semantics. Rather, it is background to

the real change in the nature, strategy and conduct of air operations in the last decade. If there is any validity in the 

67 

theories put forward by thinkers like Pape and Link, then practitioners must develop the systems to most efficiently strike 

fielded forces with the appropriate lethality, flexibility, and controllability. Reinforcing this requirement are the recent policy 

and strategy shifts towards the use of airpower to attack not only traditional strategic targets, but also fielded forces 

independent of friendly ground operations. As both the earlier operations in Bosnia and the latest in Kosovo illustrate, political 

leaders are looking to coerce opponents with attacks directed at fielded forces accomplished primarily, if not solely, through 

airpower. This paper draws on the experiences of attacking Iraqi and Serbian fielded forces during Desert Storm and Allied 

Force. It then lays out the operational and tactical framework, emphasizing a systems approach, for efficiently conducting air 

operations against fielded forces. 

DESERT STORM: ATTACKING THE REPUBLICAN GUARD 

On 17 January, 1991 United States and coalition forces launched the Gulf War air offensive. Waves of aircraft flooded into 

Kuwait and Iraq, attacking key integrated air defense system nodes, airfields, command and control systems, 

nuclear/biological/chemical sites, and electric plants. 9 Daybreak of day one witnessed the start of attacks against Iraqi ground 

forces in Kuwait. Among the centers of gravity identified by General Schwarzkopf, the US Joint Forces Commander, were the 

seven elite Republican Guard divisions held in reserve along the Iraq-Kuwait border. 10 While aerial attack continued against key 

“strategic” targets in Iraq, 75% of the coalition strike missions focused on the Iraqi forces in Kuwait. 11 

Operation Desert Storm provided a catalyst for airpower thinkers like Pape and Link. The Gulf War demonstrated the ability of 

air forces to effectively attack fielded forces, fundamentally changing the perspective of many senior military leaders and policy 

makers on how warfare should be conducted. Never before had airpower been called upon to produce the level of destruction 

upon fielded forces that coalition air forces were expected to achieve prior to a ground invasion of Kuwait. Because US casualty 

estimates were predicted to be as high as fifteen thousand, US concern over these possible losses led the national command 

authority and General Schwarzkopf to develop a strategy emphasizing the use of airpower to significantly reduce the Iraqi 

army’s size, maneuver capability, and will to fight. 12 The same capabilities Colonel Warden and his planners capitalized upon to 

enable their strategic attacks, improvements in target acquisition and precision weapons delivery, provided a quantum leap in 

airpower’s lethality against an army. 

This air-first strategy proved immensely successful, with friendly casualty rates far below even the most optimistic estimates and 

with friendly ground forces achieving objectives well ahead of schedule, with limited Iraqi resistance. The exact relationship 

between the destruction of Iraqi ground forces by air attack and the ultimate decision by Iraq to abandon Kuwait and agree to 

negotiations is still debated. Still, the fact remains that airpower played a deliberate, leading roll in the defeat of the Iraqi Army. 

However, this aerial achievement was not accomplished without major modification to existing tactics, techniques and procedures.

68 

The exact relationship between the destruction of 

Iraqi ground forces by air attack and the ultimate 

decision by Iraq to abandon Kuwait and agree to 

negotiations is still debated 

Desert Storm educated the USAF on how to organize and 

train airpower to accurately attack a fielded army and the 

Gulf War has reshaped how the United States employs its 

airpower. 

The Gulf War air offensive consisted of three phases, 

conducted nearly simultaneously. Phases I and II were 

directed against strategic target sets to include leadership, 

Iraqi Hardened Air Shelters (HAS) 

command and control facilities, nuclear, biological and 

chemical (NBC) facilities, airfields, aircraft, and the integrated 

air defense system. Phase III was the air attack against Iraq’s fielded forces. It called for the 50% attrition of Iraqi’s 5,000 pieces 

of dug in armor and artillery prior to any ground offensive. 13 In this phase, Schwarzkopf was most concerned with the three 

heavy divisions of the seven Republican Guard divisions along the Kuwait-Iraq border. 14 The units were widely dispersed and 

dug in, with thousands of U-shaped earthen berms protecting their T-72 tanks. 15 Their defenses included anti-aircraft artillery 

(AAA), infrared SA-13 surface-to-air-missiles (SAMs) and radar-guided SA-6 SAMs. 

Phase III required the unprecedented success of airpower against a fielded army. 16 Air planning boss Brigadier General Buster 

Glosson’s briefing to Schwarzkopf in December 1990 indicated the Republican Guard could be attrited to 50% in five days, 

assuming 600 sorties a day. 17 Air planners divided Kuwait and Iraq into a grid pattern with the smallest division being a 30 

nautical mile x 30 nautical mile square known as a “kill box”. Aircraft were then assigned kill boxes and ordered to locate and 

destroy Iraqi forces within that area. 18 The job of attacking the elite Republican Guard fell to F-16s and B-52s, while A-10s were 

used against the regular Iraqi divisions dug in along the Kuwait-Saudi border. 19 

By the fifth day of phase III, coalition air attacks against the Republican Guard had not achieved anywhere near the 50% 

attrition levels expected by Schwarzkopf. 20 Post war analysis indicated that between 24-34% of Republican Guard heavy 

division armor was actually attrited during the entire 38 days of the air campaign. 21 Glosson’s 5-day estimate proved overly 

optimistic for two reasons. First, air attacks were not as effective as war-gaming analysis predicted. 22 US Air Forces used 

medium altitude tactics to reduce the threat from Iraqi air defenses. While this greatly improved survivability, US pilots were

elatively unfamiliar with medium altitude tactics. Unforeseen difficulties with target identification, poor weather, and 

69 

inaccuracies in delivering medium altitude munitions reduced effectiveness. Second, the number of sorties flown against 

the Republican Guard fell well short of 600 sorties a day. A combination of initial emphasis on phase I operations, a 

reluctance to employ A-10s that deep in the battlespace, and unanticipated Scud hunting missions reduced the number of 

sorties available to attack the Republican Guard. For the first 5 days, total strikes against Republican Guard units were constant 

at around 100 missions per day. By the end of day 10, a cumulative count of sorties against the Republican guard totaled 728 

missions, an average of only 72.8 sorties a day. 23 

In addition to the lower than estimated sortie rates, intelligence and targeting support against the Iraqi fielded forces proved 

extremely difficult. The Joint Air Operations Center (JAOC) intelligence cell at Riyadh was overwhelmed with concurrent requests 

The job of attacking the elite Republican Guard fell 

to F-16s and B-52s, while A-10s were used 

against the regular Iraqi divisions dug in along the 

Kuwait-Saudi border 

The ubiquitous A-10 ‘Tankbuster’ 

to support strategic, counterair, counterland, and Scud hunting 

operations. 24 The task of destroying the Iraqi army, with 

thousands of vehicles spread out over thousands of square 

miles of desert was enormous. This, coupled with an underlying 

assumption that imagery of a potentially mobile unit had limited 

viability, restricted the precision imagery available to help plan 

and direct attacks on the Iraqi Army. 25 The intelligence system 

was neither designed nor prepared to provide the quantity of 

imagery required by the flying units. 26 Some flying unit intelligence 

shops provided comprehensive information on the Iraqi’s Ground 

Order of Battle, based on the Joint Forces Air Component 

Commander’s priorities. This included available imagery, GPSbased 

coordinates, and unit derived target areas of interest 

products. 27 However, no one at the JAOC was responsible for 

producing these materials and, consequently, many aircrews 

launched on missions with little more than the approximate 

location of enemy divisions within an assigned kill box. 28 

Even when intelligence products were available, the usefulness 

of the material was suspect. Aircrew had difficulty in locating the 

exact coordinates of potential targets dispersed throughout the 

desert. The flat, featureless terrain made detailed maps (such as 

1-50,000) unusable for target location criteria. Limited GPS

70 

…many aircrews launched on missions with 

little more than the approximate location of 

enemy divisions within an assigned kill box 

navigation capability of tactical aircraft left aircrews 

reliant on inertial navigation systems (INS) that 

were sufficient for basic navigation, but inadequate 

for precise coordinate location. 29 Aircrews flew to 

known or suspected target areas and then 

commenced visual searches for any viable targets. 

The intelligence deficit was not insurmountable. 

More accurate information including photos and 

graphics was available. The Army Intelligence 

Agency had studied the Kuwait Theater of 

Operations (KTO) continuously and produced 

highly accurate and detailed templates with 

individual tanks plotted, which were then supplied 

to US Army units in theater. 30 But this information 

was never made available to the air units and 

crews responsible for attacking the Iraqi army. This 

disconnect between the US Army and Air Force 

was just one indication of a chasm between the 

two services’ intelligence and targeting systems. 

As problematic as the intelligence support was the lack of coordination 

between Army and Air Force over the rules governing Battle Damage 

Assessment (BDA). The objective of 50% attrition of Iraqi armor and 

artillery meant that BDA had to accurately track the damage being done 

by air attack. This proved difficult for a variety of reasons. First, from 

medium altitude it was difficult to identify what was being attacked. While differentiating tank, artillery, and soft skin vehicles was 

possible, assessing bombing damage proved difficult. 31 From medium altitude it was nearly impossible for pilots to know exactly 

what they had destroyed. Also the HUD (Heads-Up-Display) video footage provided by most fighter aircraft from medium 

altitude weapon delivery attacks was unusable for BDA purposes. 32 

Second, Central Command Air Force (CENTAF) intelligence was overwhelmed and had no overall framework to integrate the 

reports from the numerous wings into an overall picture of the effectiveness of the air attacks. 33 Compounding this problem was 

Schwarzkopf’s decision to allow the Army and Marines to separately determine the attrition rates of enemy ground forces. The

lack of pre-coordinated Joint BDA guidelines led to vast disagreements over the state of the Republican Guard. The 

71 

Army’s lack of confidence in medium altitude attack led them to only accept BDA from laser guided bombs (with 

accompanying targeting pod film) and A-10 attacks. 34 The friction between services and the BDA calculating formulas and 

permutations floating around Riyadh ultimately led Schwarzkopf to abandon the percentages game. 35 He instead relied on 

reports from the coalition ground commanders, to evaluate whether the air attacks had achieved adequate levels of battlefield 

preparation. 

A-10s mounted 

three days of wingsized 

attacks 

against the division, 

with powerful 

results despite Iraqi 

efforts to dig their 

forces deeper under 

the desert sand… 

At the tactical level, the problem was one of how best to destroy the dug in Republican Guard. While 

the JAOC never solved the intelligence challenges of locating and identifying enemy army forces, they 

incorporated three tactical changes to increase the efficiency of the operational air forces. The first 

tactic involved directing the unique firepower of A-10s against exposed and vulnerable Republican 

Guard forces. A-10s employed initially against front line forces near the Kuwaiti-Saudi Arabian border. 

On 27 February, Glosson instructed A-10 commanders to prepare to attack the Republican Guard 

Tawakalna armored division. 36 In attacking such a heavily defended area, A-10s flew in mass 

formations, in lieu of their usual two-ship formations. A-10s mounted three days of wing-sized 

attacks against the division, with powerful results despite Iraqi efforts to dig their forces deeper under 

the desert sand and stepped up efforts at deception. The combination of massed attack and a 

unique airframe designed and manned by pilots trained in the art of destroying armor proved a major 

step forward for coalition air strikes against Iraq’s Republican Guard. 37 

The second tactical innovation used against the Republican Guard was the introduction of the F-16 “Killer Scout.” 38 Killer 

Scouts would take off early and reconnoiter the target area. Once identifying targets, they would then bring in additional fighters 

to attack these locations. The Killer Scouts were allocated air-refueling tankers and could thus remain on station for much 

longer periods of time, becoming familiar with the area and increasing their situational awareness. Along with identifying viable 

target areas for attack, Killer Scouts also aided in the collection of BDA. However, they did not completely solve the problem of 

target discrimination. Although they used binoculars, they still could not accurately tell the number of vehicles destroyed during 

their attacks. While the Killer Scout role had its limitations, this innovation allowed for the F-16s to more efficiently use their 

resources against the Iraqi fielded forces. 

The third innovation was the introduction of “tank plinking,” locating targets from medium altitude with infrared targeting pods 

and then attacking them with precision laser guided bombs. 39 One of the most pervasive arguments for tank plinking was the 

targeting pod video, which could clearly indicate the infrared contrast of Iraqi armor against the cold desert background. 40 This 

added to the ability to verify BDA and boosted Army Central Command (ARCENT) BDA estimates.

These tactical innovations by the USAF against the Republican Guard significantly increased the efficiency of airpower in 

72 

directly attacking ground forces. The massed formations of A-10s, the introduction of Killer Scouts, and tank plinking 

combined to produce a quantum improvement in medium altitude tactics. While these tactics were effective at 

prosecuting attacks, the lag in the integration of intelligence and Imagery, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets 

hindered further gains. Even if intelligence products were available, the lack of GPS equipped strikers operating over a 

featureless desert would have limited the effectiveness of the information. 

OPERATION ALLIED FORCE: ATTACKING THE SERBIAN 3RD ARMY 

Despite the primacy of strategic attack in Air Force thinking and doctrine, the preponderance of coalition airpower in the Gulf 

War was directed against Iraqi fielded forces. Some commentators have dismissed the importance of these attacks or viewed 

them as an anomaly based on the unique contextual elements of the Gulf War. 41 For those who believed attacking fielded forces 

was reserved for the arena of a flat open desert, Operation Allied Force, the air operations against Serbia, proved otherwise. 42 

Once again, a combination of context, policy, and overall military strategy compelled airmen to apply airpower in direct attack of 

a fielded army. The situation was further complicated by the much-publicized caveat that the Serbian army would face no threat 

from NATO ground forces. 

Planning for possible air operations against Serbia began in earnest May of 1998. By July, General Wesley Clark, Supreme 

Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), was focusing NATO’s military actions around a phased air operation, with an incremental 

approach to hold military escalation firmly under political control. 43 Until mid-February 1999, planning focused on punitive strikes 

against fixed command and control and military facilities in Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia. However, while negotiations were 

being conducted at Rambouillet, France, General Clark ordered his Combined Forces Air Component Commander (CFACC), Air 

Force Lieutenant General Mike Short, to increase the scope of planned strikes to include attacks on the Serbian fielded forces 

in Kosovo. General Short was not convinced that direct attacks would be the best use of airpower, believing the key to meeting 

NATO’s objectives lay in attacking the political leadership in Belgrade. 44 However, NATO’s stated military objectives included two 

dealing directly with the Serbian fielded forces: deterring further Serbian action against the Kosovar Albanians, and reducing the 

ability of the Serbian military to continue offensive operations against them. 45 Prodded by General Clark, General Short tasked 

air planners to formulate a plan for attacking the Serbian 3rd Army. However, unlike Desert Storm, where the somewhat 

quantifiable objective of 50% attrition of Iraqi armor had been set, no such measurable goals were set before or during Allied 

Force. 

Attacking the Serbian Army in Kosovo was a much different venture than going after the Republican Guard. The terrain in 

Kosovo differed greatly from the desert of Kuwait. The entire region of Kosovo lies within a valley measuring a mere 60 by 

60 miles. Small cities and villages are well dispersed throughout the region. The valley sits at approximately 2,000 ft. mean sea

Attacking the Serbian Army in Kosovo was a 

much different venture than going after the 

Republican Guard. The terrain in Kosovo differed 

greatly from the desert of Kuwait 

level (MSL), but the surrounding mountains rise as high as 

10,000 ft. MSL. The valley is a patchwork of wheat fields and 

forests, a terrain well suited for concealing an armored army. The 

weather in Kosovo is some of the worst weather in all of Europe 

for conducting air operations. Further, Kosovo was overflowing 

with nearly a million refugees. Kosovar Albanians were being 

forced from their homes and either fleeing as refugees to 

Macedonia or Albania, or retreating to the foothills and living in 

makeshift tents and shelters as internally displaced persons. With 

the Serbian Army operating in close proximity to these civilians, 

the potential for collateral damage and casualties was great. 

Concealed within this verdant, cloud-covered valley roamed 

40,000 soldiers of the Serbian 3rd Army, protected by a wall of 

mobile radar guided SA-6 SAMS and a squadron of MiG 21 

fighter aircraft. 46 Additional air defenses included large numbers 

of man portable air defense systems (MANPADS) and medium 

caliber towed AAA. 47 Though outdated by western standards, 

the armor and artillery they deployed numbered in the 

hundreds and included M-84 and T-54/55 tanks, M-80 

Armored Personnel Carriers (APC) and self-propelled and 

towed artillery. 48 

Though outdated by western standards, the armor 

and artillery deployed numbered in the hundreds 

and included M-84 and T-54/55 tanks… 

73

In developing the air plan against the Serbian 3rd Army, air planners focused on 

74 

adapting a combination of known techniques to the situation. Air superiority 

would be achieved by NATO Airborne Early Warning (NAEW) and a continuous 

fighter presence. 49 To counter the SA-6 threat, USAF F-16CJ (Block 50) and 

German ECR Tornados provided reactive cover with High-speed Anti-Radiation 

Missiles (HARMs). Also, US Navy and Marine EA-6Bs jammers and “Compass 

Call” USAF EC-130s would confuse and degrade the Serbian Integrated Air 

Defense System (IADS). 

Once air superiority was achieved over Kosovo, strikes would be directed 

against the Serbian army. Two tactical problems remained: how to locate and 

identify the targets and how to successfully attack them while limiting collateral 

damage. A squadron of A-10s and two squadrons of F-16CG (Block 40) 

Forward Air Controllers Airborne (FACAs) were available to perform this critical 

task. These pilots were trained in visual reconnaissance and air strike control. 50 

They would search out targets either identified from ISR assets during premission 

planning, or real time from the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar 

System (JSTARS). Once targets were identified, the FACAs would control 

strikes using available NATO aircraft. A-10 pilots, trained with space-stabilized 

Figure 1: Map of Kosovo 

binoculars, would be the primary day FACA, while F-16CGs with targeting 

pods would be the primary night FACA. 51 

General Short approved the plan to attack the Serbian 3rd Army on 15 March, 1999. Meanwhile at Rambouillet, negotiations 

were at a standstill and NATO began preparations for punitive air strikes on Serbia to begin the night of 24 March. Short had 

approval for enough fixed targets spread throughout Serbia proper, Kosovo, and the Montenegro province for two or three 

nights of limited strikes. The Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) had developed a two-day air tasking order (ATO) for the 

strikes. 52 However, as NATO bombs began to rain down, the Serbian 3rd Army responded by accelerating the mass ethnic 

cleansing operation against the Kosovar Albanians. Responding to this situation, General Clark ordered Short to begin attacks 

on Serbian fielded forces commencing 30 March. 53 

Air attacks against targets in Serbia and Kosovo were conducted under rules of engagement (ROE) approved by General Short. 

Part of the ROE included a 15,000’ AGL altitude restriction aimed primarily as a means to protect NATO aircraft against hostile 

fire. The resulting tradeoff was added difficulty in locating and identifying targets. To compensate for this, the ROE allowed 

FACAs to fly as low as 10,000 ft. AGL to identify targets. 54 As Allied Force progressed, the ROE was continually adjusted to

estrict the types of targets to be attacked. Initially, FACAs could attack any Serbian Army vehicles, wherever located. By 

75 

early June, FACAs were required to receive permission from the CAOC for any targets attacked. Likewise, certain areas 

within Kosovo were off limits to attack including a ten-mile wide strip along the Kosovo-Macedonia border. 55 

30 March saw the first air missions against the Serbian fielded forces. 56 SA-6 operators were reluctant to switch on their radars 

with HARM equipped fighters overhead and, after having previously lost several fighters, the Serbian Air Force refused to meet 

the NATO attackers in the air. But NATO’s Air Force did not have the element of surprise and the 3rd Army units limited their 

movement when FACAs circled overhead. Now facing a static enemy, two problems quickly surfaced. First, just as in Desert 

Storm, the intelligence support and imagery provided to aircrews was not adequate to accomplish the mission. Second, with 

the Serbs sitting on the sides of the roads during strike windows, the usefulness of JSTARs and its moving target indicator was 

limited. 

Monitoring of the Serbian 3rd Army was the responsibility of NATO’s in-theater intelligence organizations consisting primarily of 

intelligence assets based at the Joint Analysis Center (JAC) in Molesworth, England and at the CAOC’s C2 intelligence cell in 

Vicenza, Italy. With NATO’s initial plans having focused on attacking fixed target sets, neither facility was fully prepared for the 

enormous demand for tactical imagery required to efficiently attack fielded forces. The lack of a strong Army intelligence 

presence at the CAOC further exacerbated the problem. 57 This resulted in an incomplete picture of the Serbian Order of Battle 

in Kosovo during March and April. This overall weakness in intelligence capability existed throughout the operation, but the 

arrival of the US Army’s Task Force Hawk to Tirana, Albania and the construction of a flexible targeting cell within the CAOC 

improved matters. 

Compounding the limited tactical intelligence support, tactical imagery of the Serbian 3rd Army was inadequate, both in the 

quantity produced and timeliness of dissemination. The poor weather over Kosovo during late March and early April prevented 

US reconnaissance assets from producing imagery and those products that were received were outdated. Similar to Desert 

Storm, aircrews stepped to jets with inadequate imagery and only a general idea of Serbian locations. Even with good weather, 

requests for tactical imagery had to compete at the National Command Authority (NCA) level for priority. Often there were timely 

photographs of the refugees hiding in the hills, but no imagery of the Serbian armor that had driven them there. 58 In-theater 

tactical reconnaissance assets were available, albeit to a limited degree. However, dissemination of the information proved 

ineffective. A process was never developed for timely distribution of the tactical imagery produced by Navy Tactical Air 

Reconnaissance Pods (TARPs) equipped F-14s, French Mirage or British GR-7 tactical reconnaissance pods. 

Viable intelligence and imagery was critical for locating and destroying Serbian fielded forces, but other systems were also 

available to try and fill in the gap. One such system, JSTARS, had the unique capability of tracking hundreds of vehicles 

throughout Kosovo with its Moving Target Indicator. 59 JSTARS data was used on several occasions locating targets. However,

76 

A Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) 

controller located at the CAOC, 

monitored Predator video and 

performed real time target talk-ons 

via a radio link through the Airborne 

Command and Control Center (ABCCC) 

to FACAs overflying the target area 

the successes were few and far between. The real 

limitation of JSTARS was the lack of a viable 

onboard target identification capability. JSTARS 

could see all the vehicles moving around Kosovo, 

but could not distinguish a T-72 tank from a tractor 

pulling a trailer loaded with refugees. Collateral 

damage concerns, the necessity for positive target 

identification, and a rugged terrain were all 

contextual elements which had not existed in the 

Kuwaiti desert. JSTARS did develop tactics in an 

attempt to overcome the challenge of target ID 

and, on occasion, was able to correlate vehicle 

identification from unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) 

to provide real time targeting information to 

airborne FACs. But, for the most part the lack of 

target identification capability severely limited 

JSTARS’ impact on the battlefield. 

While JSTARS’ lack of onboard target ID capability 

limited its usefulness, UAVs such as USAF 

Predator and USA Hunter could identify targets 

through their real time video output. Limits on the 

efficient use of UAVs during Allied Force were due 

mostly to the lack of integration with the conventional operational forces. 

UAVs had never been integrated into the air tasking order (ATO) with strike 

packages and the lack of training between UAVs and FACAs made tasks 

such as altitude deconfliction and target talk-ons difficult. Even so, the ability 

of UAVs to locate and identify Serbian forces was a much sought-after 

capability and operational techniques were quickly patched together. One 

example was the effort to connect Predator with the FACA. A Tactical Air 

Control Party (TACP) controller, located at the CAOC, monitored Predator 

video and performed real time target talk-ons via a radio link through the 

Airborne Command and Control Center (ABCCC) to FACAs overflying the

target area. The occasions when these missions were successful provided a glimpse into the potential of fully integrated 

77 

UAV platforms with conventional strike aircraft. But UAV-FACA employment techniques were in their infancy at the end of 

Allied Force and did not produce a significant number of target engagements. 

With limited intelligence, imagery, JSTAR, and UAV support, the FACA was forced to independently locate and identify the 

Serbian army. FACAs were required to positively identify all targets prior to attack. Visual target identification was difficult during 

the day and virtually impossible at night, even with the use of Night Vision Goggles (NVGs) and targeting pods. But, whereas 

locating and identifying targets proved difficult, once identified the destruction of those targets was relatively easy. Precision 

guided munitions proved effective against Serbian armor, as did cluster bomb units and general purpose bombs dropped by 

strikers with computed delivery systems. For the most part, once a target was identified, it would be killed. 

Despite this ability, the results against the 3rd Army were mixed and bear some explanation. The first week of attacks in Kosovo 

from 30 March through 5 April were severely hampered by bad weather. Attacks against the 3rd Army began in earnest on 

7 April with A-10 FACAs destroying moving armor. Within a week the Serbian military had responded by severely limiting its 

movement of vehicles during good weather and had begun to hide its armor. Although late April to mid-May was characterized 

by better weather, the Serbs increased their efforts at camouflage and deception tactics. Late May ushered in the emergence of 

improved intelligence with the introduction of the CAOC’s flexible targeting cell. This, coupled with a KLA offensive, which forced 

the 3rd Army out of hiding, increased Serbian vulnerability to attack from the air. 

Measuring the effectiveness of air strikes proved as problematic as locating and identifying Serbian armor. Unlike Desert Storm 

where mission objectives called for a 50% attrition of the Republican Guard’s armor, no such quantitative objective was ever set 

for Allied Force. Furthermore, total numbers of Serbian armor in Kosovo were never well tracked, leaving no way for NATO 

intelligence to adequately assess attrition rates, even if that had been an objective. While the conflict between Army and Air 

Force BDA had been a major source of friction during Desert Storm, the BDA count was not an issue until after Allied Force. 

The measure of effectiveness of the air attacks was then reduced to the question of how much armor was destroyed. In a 

September, 1999 NATO news conference, General Clark, when asked how much of the 3rd Army was destroyed, replied, 

“Enough.” 60 This alludes to the fact that NATO’s air strikes against the Serbs in Kosovo were designed to coerce, rather than 

destroy. The objectives of deterring Serbian action against the Kosovar Albanians and of reducing the ability of the Serbian 

military to continue offensive operations was not measured in number of vehicles destroyed, but by the Serbs’ actions. 

Nonetheless, the fact remains that the primary target of NATO warplanes in Kosovo was the 3rd Army’s armor and artillery. It 

seems reasonable that accurate BDA would shed light upon the effectiveness of attacking fielded forces at the tactical level. 

Unfortunately, Allied Force BDA has been clouded by controversy since the final air strikes in Kosovo. Table 1 reflects the BDA 

reported from several sources. Regardless of which set of numbers are closest to being accurate, having an accurate 

number/percentage of vehicles destroyed would still be meaningless without a yardstick to measure overall effectiveness.

78 BDA Source Tanks 

APCs 

Artillery 

Shelton, 10 June 99 

120 

220 

450 

Serbian Army 

13 

6 

27 

Newsweek 15 May 00 

14 

18 

20 

NATO, 16 Sep 99 

93 

153 

389 

Table 1: Allied Force Tactical BDA estimates 61 

Unlike Desert Storm, for which attacking fielded forces was a prelude to land warfare, Allied Force was an air-only campaign. 

Since airpower’s goal was not the preparation of the battlefield for a US Army attack, conventional attrition ranging from 30- 

50% made little sense. In Allied Force, the only measure of the effectiveness of attacking fielded forces was in achieving NATO’s 

stated military objectives of deterring further Serbian action against Kosovar Albanians and reducing the ability of the Serbian 

military to continue offensive operations. Since no quantifiable numbers or percentages can be readily drawn from these 

objectives, the goal became to attack fielded forces in the most efficient manner. The operational measurement of success was 

not determined by destroying a preset quantity of targets, but rather the destruction of as much armor as could be positively 

identified. 

The challenge of attacking the Serbian 3rd Army in Kosovo lay in such contextual factors as conducting an air operation in poor 

weather, over a rugged, well-vegetated terrain, amidst a million refugees. In addition, other critical areas identified as airpower 

weaknesses during the Gulf War were amplified over Kosovo. As in Desert Storm, Air Force intelligence and reconnaissance 

communities were ill prepared to provide a detailed enemy ground order of battle and time sensitive tactical imagery 

requirements for attacking mobile armor. Medium altitude tactics by conventional strike assets were limited by onboard and offboard 

sensors for target location and identification. Likewise, accurate BDA assessments and synthesis with the overall 

intelligence picture proved elusive, with BDA unable to provide an accurate measure for air strike effectiveness. For both Desert 

Storm and Allied Force, target identification and post strike assessment proved the most challenging aspects of attacking a 

fielded force. Both conflicts demonstrate that while technology shows great potential, there is no single silver bullet to solve the 

target identification problem. Improvements in airpower efficiency against a fielded army only begin to accumulate once the Air

The challenge of attacking the Serbian 3rd Army in Kosovo lay in such contextual factors as conducting 

an air operation in poor weather, over a rugged, well-vegetated terrain, amidst a million refugees 

Force recognizes that it will again be required to attack fielded forces in future conflicts. Regardless of how strongly strategic 

airpower theorists argue, an enemy’s fielded force will continue to be a viable target for aerial attack. Only when the Air Force 

views this mission from a systems perspective, integrating existing capabilities and techniques with developing technologies will 

real increases in efficiency materialize. 

ARCHITECTURE FOR ATTACKING FIELDED FORCES 

“In essence, Air Power is targeting, targeting is intelligence, and intelligence is analyzing the effects of air operations.” 

…given the 

realities of the 

joint/combined 

command 

structure, key 

airpower 

decisions may 

not be made 

by an airman 

Meilinger 4th Proposition Regarding Air Power 

Allied Force, like Desert Storm, demonstrated that target location and identification are two of the most 

important and challenging aspects of applying airpower. During Allied Force, NATO quickly achieved air 

superiority and was able to overfly Serbia and Kosovo at will. Having achieved control of the high ground, 

NATO’s air commanders discovered that the fixed target sets they could easily locate and identify were 

politically sensitive. Unfortunately, the targets most politically acceptable for attack, namely the Serbian 3rd 

Army in Kosovo, were much more difficult to locate and identify. To properly understand the lessons of 

Allied Force one must first recognize this irony: an air force trained, prepared and organized to attack a set 

of predominantly off-limit, fixed targets was relatively untrained and ill-prepared to attack a mobile army in 

the field. However, the challenge of attacking fielded forces from the air is not limited to the Air Force, but 

requires a joint/combined approach. The USAF has no monopoly on the requisite ISR assets and 

intelligence expertise. Also, given the realities of the joint/combined command structure, key airpower 

decisions may not be made by an airman. 

The argument presented here does not call for the USAF to abandon its capabilities for strategic attack based on the politically 

sensitive nature of its target set. Rather, it is to acknowledge and accept that enemy fielded forces will not only continue to be 

viable target arrays, but that the Air Force will continue to be required to engage these forces prior to or in lieu of friendly 

ground force activity. In addition, both Desert Storm and Allied Force provide insight into the unique intelligence, target 

identification and BDA requirements of an air campaign versus a fielded army. Attacking an army from the air without the 

clarifying presence of friendly ground forces is a unique mission with special requirements. Fighting an organized mobile and 

reactive enemy condenses the time available from target identification to destruction. Without a friendly ground force to locate, 

79

identify, and fix enemy forces as well as organize and prioritize air attacks, these heavy responsibilities fall back to the 

80 

Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC). 

This focused discussion on the targeting of an enemy’s army does not imply that an enemy’s air-to-air or surface-to-air 

capabilities are inconsequential. On the contrary, air superiority is prerequisite for any successful air operation. In the case of 

attacking fielded forces, an air force must be free to occupy the battlespace above the enemy in order to successfully monitor 

enemy movement, locate and identify specific enemy positions, attack valid targets and verify BDA. This freedom involves 

removing or diminishing the threat from enemy aircraft and SAMs. Air supremacy will probably remain elusive and the 

adaptation of medium altitude tactics and integrated SEAD and air-to-air assets will significantly reduce the threat, leaving air 

operations relatively immune from enemy air defenses. 

…when attacking fielded 

forces, a unique set of 

capabilities must be 

integrated into a system 

designed for the rigorous, 

fast-paced nature of war 

against a reactive and 

mobile enemy 

Air superiority and SEAD assets remain high on the JFACC’s list of essential capabilities. These 

air assets are required no matter what targets the JFACC plans to attack. However, when 

attacking fielded forces, a unique set of capabilities must be integrated into a system designed 

for the rigorous, fast-paced nature of war against a reactive and mobile enemy. At the 

operational level, the JFACC must have a JAOC with a J2 intelligence shop capable of 

maintaining an up-to-date ground order of battle while simultaneously processing applicable 

ISR products for real or near real time use by combat operations; a monumental task. Once 

strikes have begun, intelligence must also be able to receive and integrate accurate BDA to 

continuously update the overall battlespace picture for the JFACC. Likewise, J3 combat 

operations must be able to control its tactical assets overhead the enemy to translate 

intelligence products into quickly and efficiently prosecuted attacks within the bounds of ROE. 

At the tactical level, the right mixture of ISR assets must be able to locate, identify and track fielded forces in real or near real 

time. Joint assets such as US Navy tactical reconnaissance (TAC RECCE) pods or US Army counter battery radar may be 

required to provide capabilities not available with Air Force assets. Terminal attack control assets capable of final target 

identification and collateral damage assessment will remain critical as will strikers trained to attack mobile targets and able to 

accurately deliver a variety of munitions. 

Intelligence at the JAOC is the logical point of departure to begin this discussion on the tailored requirements for successfully 

targeting an enemy’s fielded forces. The two key areas to be addressed by intelligence are manning and organization. 

Intelligence manning requirements increase significantly when the JAOC assumes responsibility for maintaining the ground order 

of battle. Under joint doctrine the Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL) is not only the chief mechanism for determining who 

controls strikes, but also indirectly divides targeting responsibility. 62 While a bit simplistic, this line drawn on a map and in the 

sand has long been the method for the division of labor, with Army intelligence assets being primarily responsible for the

detailed targeting associated with the close fight and Air Force intelligence focusing on deeper target sets. Air assets 

allocated to attack targets short of the FSCL receive their targeting information within the construct of the Theater Air- 

Ground System (TAGS). 63 However, when a FSCL does not exist, the responsibility for all enemy targeting by air reverts 

defacto to the JAOC. In this case, the JAOC must have additional manning to assume the tactical targeting responsibilities 

against enemy fielded forces normally conducted by the Army. 

USAF intelligence personnel are 

trained primarily within a targeting 

process focused on fixed targets. 

Intelligence expertise against enemy 

armies resides within the US Army 

Besides having additional manning, the JAOC’s J2 intelligence requires an 

injection of Army intelligence expertise. USAF intelligence personnel are trained 

primarily within a targeting process focused on fixed targets. Intelligence expertise 

against enemy armies resides within the US Army. Army intel is not only trained at 

templating enemy ground activity, but is also intimately familiar with the various 

ISR assets with specialized capabilities against fielded forces. 64 

Once properly manned in numbers and expertise, the J2 must be organized to handle the additional responsibility of targeting 

fielded forces. A “flex targeting” cell, as developed during Allied Force, should be the theater’s clearing house for intelligence 

information on the enemy’s army. The flex targeting cell has four main tasks. First, it takes inputs from all available intelligence 

sources to build the most complete picture of the enemy force structure and movements. Flex targeting should have the 

theater’s best and most up-to-date assessment of the ground order of battle. Second, it provides current operations (J3) the 

latest changes to the battlefield. This is an important consideration. Knowledge of the enemy’s precise location and intentions 

are of no use unless they can be translated into successful attacks. In particular, this requires the production of time sensitive 

targeting material, including processed imagery. Third, flex targeting maintains responsibility for the central filtering and 

processing of national and TAC RECCE products and distributing them within theater. The goal is to make up-to-the-minute 

processed imagery available on secure networks with joint and combined access down to the squadron level. The two critical 

attributes of good tactical imagery are quality and timeliness; can an aircrew actually find the target based on the picture 

provided and will the target still be there once the aircrew reaches the target area? The fourth task of flex targeting is the 

processing and validation of BDA. Without the ability to observe what is transpiring on the battlefield, the necessary 

adjustments cannot be made to counter the moves of the thinking and reacting enemy. 

While the flex targeting cell is the brain of air intelligence activity, its eyes and ears are its ISR assets. Although all sources of 

intelligence are important in providing an overall assessment of an enemy’s activities, some sources are more important than 

others when translating an intelligence assessment into armor destroyed on the battlefield. The importance of tactical imagery 

was underscored by an A-10 FACA during Allied Force who recoined a familiar phrase: “a picture is worth a thousand 

coordinates.” Imagery must not only be able to identify targets, but also provide enough terrain features to make it usable for 

terminal attack control assets to easily locate the position. 65 Coordinates must also be accurate and the aspect of the image 

81

82 

clearly defined. This quality of imagery is available from a wide variety of sources including both national assets and TAC 

RECCE. 66 

While national assets provide excellent tactical imagery, these assets are not under the direct control of the Joint Force 

Commander (JFC). Other non-DOD agencies such as the State Department and the CIA compete for priority over the use of 

national level intelligence. Currently the time cycle for collection and distribution of national products is too lengthy for theaterwide 

real and near real time target engagement. Recent exercises such as Joint Expeditionary Forces exercise (JEFX) 1999 and 

2000 have focused on reducing this time from 

sensor to shooter. 67 Such exercises have 

demonstrated the potential integration of existing ISR 

and data-link technologies to decrease the time 

required for getting the right information to the right 

cockpit. While such technologies are important in 

reducing the time from target ID to target destroyed, 

they are not a replacement for, but an enhancement 

to an integrated intelligence-operations system, 

designed to push imagery to terminal control assets 

as quickly and efficiently as possible. 

While the JFC and JFACC must compete for national 

assets, TAC RECCE assets are under the JFC’s 

control and can be more flexibly employed. A 

disadvantage of the majority of current TAC RECCE 

assets is the difficulty in quickly transmitting the 

information. Current systems, including the US Navy 

TARPS and NATO TAC RECCE pods, are wet film 

systems. Developed prior to the digital age, these 

systems require processing the imagery and then 

translating it to a digital medium in order to be 

transported on the same networks as other imagery 

products. Although this processing takes time, it is 

somewhat offset by the fact that these assets reside 

in theater. 68 

Airborne Command and Control platforms such as Airborne 

Warning and Control system (AWACS) and ABCCC are 

responsible for the flow of assets in and out of the AOR and 

act as the conduit to the JAOC 

Boeing E3D AWACS

Along with imagery, intelligence should continue to use other sources such as human intelligence (HUMINT) and signals 

83 

intelligence (SIGINT) to develop the best all source picture of the battlespace. As ISR assets have matured over the last 

decade, they have begun to bridge the gap between the ISR and operational worlds. While no single asset provides the 

silver bullet for attacking fielded forces, these systems do provide additional capability that, when integrated into an overall 

system, increase efficiency. For example, JSTARS has all weather capability to locate and track mobile vehicles. 69 Other assets, 

such as UAVs, provide real time overhead target identification capability. Being unmanned, UAVs can typically accept higher 

levels of risk, allowing for longer duration and lower altitude operations over enemy positions. 70 Joint assets may also be 

available. The Army has a full suite of ISR assets capable of identifying enemy positions, but their limitation lies in the 

coordination and integration of US Army assets into the JAOC during operations. 71 

Once ISR assets have located and identified mobile targets, intelligence through the flex targeting process, distributes this 

information in a timely fashion. Operations must now prosecute swift attacks on these targets. The Battle Staff Director is the 

JAOC’s agent responsible for the daily operational conduct of the area of responsibility (AOR). Airborne Command and Control 

platforms such as Airborne Warning and Control system (AWACS) and ABCCC are responsible for the flow of assets in and out 

of the AOR and act as the conduit to the JAOC. 

However, a well functioning command and control system still does not insure that the correct target is attacked. It is at the 

tactical level that the targets are physically destroyed and the JFACC influences these attacks by his designation of terminal 

control authority. 72 This delegation of terminal control authority is dependent on the nature of the conflict and the type of mission 

being conducted. During CAS missions, when air attacks on fielded forces are in close proximity and in coordination with 

friendly ground forces, terminal control authority resides with a terminal attack controller. 73 Likewise, when attacking fielded 

forces without friendly ground forces, the JFACC may assign terminal control authority to an airborne terminal attack controller. 

The combination of a high potential for collateral damage and the difficulty of locating and identifying the Serbian 3rd Army was 

the primary reason FACAs were used for terminal control over Kosovo in Allied Force. There are three characteristics required 

for a terminal attack controller. First, the controller must be able to develop and maintain situational awareness in order to 

orchestrate successful attacks. Controllers must be survivable within the battlespace in order to observe and maneuver to 

identify not only targets, but also threats and collateral damage potential. Second, the controller must have on board target 

identification capability. Third, the controller must be trained in attacking fielded forces. The tactical controller must be familiar 

with enemy armor recognition and understand how to control strikers onto targets. Controllers must also be familiar with 

striker’s capabilities and limitations as well as tactics used. The controller is the key tactician who determines what and how 

targets will be attacked. 

Terminal air controllers are responsible for final identification and prioritization of targets, but it is the striker that delivers the 

firepower. 74 There are three critical characteristics that require consideration when determining the suitability of a striker: the

training of the aircrews, the platform, and the munitions available. During Vietnam, the 

entire USAF fighter community was well-versed in CAS procedures. With the introduction 

of the A-10 in the late 1970s, however, the CAS role became the specialty of one 

airframe, while the remainder of the USAF fighter force gravitated toward interdiction, strategic 

attack, and air superiority missions. Today the majority of fighter aircrew is no longer trained in 

CAS. Although attacking fielded forces without the presence of friendly ground troops is, by 

definition, not CAS, the fundamental skills remain the same. 75 These skills include an 

understanding of terminology and coordination procedures, target marking and talk-on 

procedures, restrictions, and final control procedures. Aircrew performing the striker mission 

must also be proficient at weapons delivery. Direct hits are required to kill armor, particularly 

armor that is dug in or on the move. Collateral damage potential may further restrict attack 

headings or delivery options, increasing the challenge of successful attack. 

84 During Vietnam, the entire 

USAF fighter community 

was well-versed in CAS 

procedures. With the 

introduction of the A-10 

in the late 1970s, 

however, the CAS role 

became the specialty of 

one airframe… 

Along with the proficiency of the aircrew, the platform employed is also critical. The platform 

must be survivable. The JFACC needs to weigh the survivability of the striker’s platform against 

the risk of shootdown. The platform must also have a comparable communications suite able to 

conduct secure communications. Otherwise, strikers may degrade communication security, 

allowing the enemy an opportunity to gain insight into operational procedures and increase the 

speed at which they can react to attack. Further, the platform should be able to accurately 

delivery a variety of munitions. This may mean precision-guided munitions or free fall munitions 

accurately delivered from medium altitude if the ROE or threat so dictate. It does not matter 

how proficient the aircrew is if the platform cannot deliver the munition with the requisite 

accuracy. 76 

Finally, strikers must not only be able to accurately deliver munitions, but also have munitions 

that destroy the target to an acceptable degree without causing undue collateral damage. Large 

warheads may provide the killing power desired, but at the expense of excessive collateral 

damage. There is no perfect solution for the type of munition to use since it is situational 

dependent. A combination of precision and non-precision munitions provides the flexibility for 

A-10 Thunderbolt 

the striker to prosecute the attack. 77 

This architecture for attacking fielded forces is a systems approach. Relying on the existing Joint Air Operations Center (JAOC) 

structure, modifications at the operational and tactical level allow for the time critical targeting required to successfully attack 

mobile targets. The flex targeting cell is the central location for processing ISR inputs and for developing and distributing

targeting products, as well as maintaining the enemy order of battle. J3 operations is then responsible for the command 

85 

and control of assets, ensuring the commander’s intent is translated into appropriate action. At the tactical level, terminal 

air controllers are responsible for target identification and prioritization, as well as determining attack restrictions based on 

such criteria as collateral damage potential or ROE. Finally, with inputs and guidance from the terminal air controller, the striker 

completes the attack. 

Debate over the effective use of airpower will continue. Advocates for attacking leadership and infrastructure draw from Desert 

Storm and Allied Force to demonstrate how airpower can best be used to produce decisive results. Ironically, those who believe 

attacking an enemy’s fielded military strength as the key to achieving military objectives also use Desert Storm and Allied Force 

to fortify their case. The purpose of this paper has not been to settle this argument, but rather to focus on the reality of how US 

airpower has been used over the last decade. In both Desert Storm and Allied Force, airpower was called upon to directly 

attack an enemy’s army without the benefit of friendly ground forces to locate, identify, and fix the enemy’s position. Given the 

propensity for US policy makers to use airpower first in crisis situations, the United States military should prepare to support 

such an air first strategy, and its services need to organize, train, and equip for such operations. 

Airpower can now destroy what it finds, however an enemy under air attack quickly adapts, using dispersal and deception to 

conceal its location. Based on the experience of Desert Storm and Allied Force, a systems approach is required to efficiently 

locate and attack such an enemy. At the operational level the JAOC’s J2 requires a flex targeting cell, manned by Air Force and 

Army intelligence personnel to build and maintain situational awareness on enemy ground forces, as well as process ISR 

products for near real time targeting and BDA. Intelligence must have immediate access to a variety of ISR assets and be able 

to process the information quickly. This not only includes USAF and national assets, but joint and combined assets such as 

Army and coalition UAVs, counter-battery radar, and Navy and coalition tactical reconnaissance platforms. 

This systems approach will only be effective if the targeting information provided can be prosecuted at the tactical level. 

Terminal air controllers, such as FACAs, must have the capability to locate and identify targets on the battlefield. Advances in 

optics and infrared targeting systems continue to increase the capability of medium altitude target identification during day and 

night operations. Likewise, more fully integrating UAVs into operations by developing tactics, techniques and procedures during 

peacetime, will improve their ability for target marking or talk-ons. Finally, strikers must train with FACAs to attack mobile targets 

and become familiar with the unique and flexible nature of attacking fielded forces. 

Historically, air strikes against fielded forces have been in support of the land battle. The air attack against the Republican 

Guard during Desert Storm had the objective of preparing the battlefield for land operations. In contrast, the direct attack of the 

Serbian 3rd Army in Allied Force was neither in preparation for nor in support of ground forces. Instead, Army assets performed 

supporting roles, providing UAV, counter-battery radar, and intelligence assets to assist in air strikes. 78 Currently, the Army does 

not train and equip for such a supporting role as in providing specific ISR and intelligence assets from its force structure to

support Air Force operations. Though this may seem a simple change, particularly for airmen used to providing specific 

86 

capabilities to support ongoing operations, it requires a shift in Army doctrine. 

Likewise, Joint and Air Force doctrine needs to adapt to the realities of how air forces are being employed. Current doctrine 

acknowledges only two Counterland missions: Air Interdiction and Close Air Support, both of which are defined by their 

relationship to friendly forces. 79 This leaves the mission of attacking fielded forces in the absence of friendly forces undefined. 80 

Joint and Air Force doctrine must acknowledge attacking fielded forces as a separate mission before it can organize, equip, and 

train for it. Along with this acknowledgement, Air Force Doctrine needs to redefine two key functions: Terminal Attack Controllers 

(TAC) and Forward Air Controllers Airborne (FACA). Currently, both are defined only within the close air support construct. Their 

definitions should expand beyond the confines of CAS as they were used during Desert Storm and Allied Force. 81 

Along with doctrinal change, the Air Force needs to adjust its training and tactics. The adage of “fight the way you train” is true 

from two perspectives. First, it makes sense to take those time-tested tactics and techniques honed during peacetime training 

into combat. A more subtle implication is that military forces have no other option but to fight the way they train. It is training 

that develops the tactical skills and mindset that defines a combat force’s capabilities. Major exercises such as Red Flag and Air 

Warrior should incorporate the attack of fielded forces without friendly ground forces as a primary mission. The Conventional Air 

Forces (CAF) need to be exposed to the mission and be familiar with the challenges of attacking a mobile army. An Air Force 

that does not train or develop such tactics will not have the requisite skills when confronted with combat. The Air Force should 

address the shortfall in tactics by adjusting its Air Force Tactics Techniques and Procedures (AFTTP) 3-1 series publications to 

better address the systems approach to attacking fielded forces, as opposed to how the tactical publications are now divided 

among platforms. A separate volume on attacking fielded forces should focus on the system approach, addressing ISR, 

intelligence, command and control, Terminal Air Controller, striker capabilities, and integration requirements. 

This adjustment of doctrine, training, and tactics is critical to maintaining a military capable of successfully accomplishing all the 

objectives that it is given. Desert Storm and Allied Force demonstrated that an air force could be given the mission of attacking 

a fielded army from the air. The lessons generated from this conflict are the basis for an architecture that should be developed 

in times of peace, for use in future conflict.

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NOTES 

1 Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War, Faber, (Ithaca, 

New York: Cornell University Press, 1996), 58. 

2 Ibid., 66. 

3 Ibid., 79. 

4 Ibid., 69. 

5 Ibid., 10. 

6 Colonel John A. Warden, USAF (ret),“A Response to Robert Pape’s Bombing to 

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7 Major General Charles Link, USAF (retired) was the special assistant to the USAF 

chief of staff during the 1996 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). 

8 Major General Charles Link, “The New View of Airpower,” Air Force Magazine, 

August 1997, Vol. 80, No. 8. 

9 Gulf War Air Power Survey Summary Report, (Washington, D.C.: Government 

Printing Office [GPO], 1993), 12. 

10 General Norman Schwarzkopf and Peter Petre, It Doesn’t Take a Hero, (New York: 

Bantom, 1992), 371. 

11 GWAPS Summary Report, 65. 

12 Colin L. Powell with Joseph E. Persico, My American Journey, (New York: 

Random House, 1995), 498. 

13 GWAPS Summary Report, 48-51. 

14 Lieutenant Colonel William F. Andrews, Airpower Against an Army: Challenge and 

Response in CENTAF’s Duel with the Republican Army, (Maxwell Air Force Base, 

Alabama: Air University Press, 1998), 14. 

15 National Training Center Handbook 100-91, The Iraqi Army: Organization and 

Tactics, (Fort Irwin, Calif., 1991), 25-31. 


17 Ibid., 49.

18 Gulf War Air Power Survey, Vol. 5, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office 

[GPO], 1993), pt. 1: 463-539. 

19 Andrews, 29. Air Force assets were not the only air assets attacking fielded forces. 

Carrier-based strikers including F-18s also attacked fielded forces, however they 

did not begin to attack the Republican Guard in earnest until a week after the air 

war had started. 

20 Lieutenant Colonel Christopher P. Weggeman, F-16 pilot with 388th TFW flying the 

Killer Scout mission against the Republican guard, e-mail interview with author, 28 

November 2000. The Army was concerned not only with armor but support 

assets such as artillery, mechanized infantry vehicles, support vehicles, 

ammunition supplies and POL storage. 


22 Weggeman. 

23 Gulf War Air Power Survey, Vol. 5, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office 

[GPO], 1993), pt. 1: 463-539. The majority of these missions, 569, were delivered 

by F-16’s employing non-precision, free falling general purpose bombs as well as 

older generation cluster bomb units, MK-20 Rockeye, CBU-52, and CBU-58. 

Battlefield effectiveness was below expectations, which led to concern over the 

high consumption rates of the more modern, armor piercing CBU-87 during the 

first two weeks. “CENTAF TACC/NCO Log, January-February 1991” (U), 30 

January 1991, 21. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified. 

24 Ibid., 30. 

25 Ibid., 37. 

26 Major Laura Berry, F-15E squadron intelligence officer, interviewed by author, 

Maxwell AFB, Ala., 27 November 2000. 

27 Weggeman. 

28 Andrews, 30. 

29 Major Robert Givens, A-10 pilot with Myrtle Beach Wing, interview with author, 

Maxwell Air Base, Ala., 2 March 2001. And Lt Col Christopher P Weggeman, F-16 

pilot with 388th TFW flying the Killer Scout mission against the Republican guard, 

e-mail interview with author, 6 March 2001. The F-16 (Block 40) aircraft from Hill 

AFB were the only strikers with GPS navigation. 


31 Weggeman. 


33 Ibid. 38. 

34 Andrews, 60. Due to using the precision guided Maverick missiles and the 

perception by the Army that the A-10s were better at attacking armor due 89 

to close air support training. 

35 General Norman Schwarzkopf and Peter Petre, It Doesn’t Take a Hero, (New York: 

Bantom, 1992), 500. 

36 William L. Smallwood, Warthog: Flying the A-10 in the Gulf War, (Washington, 

D.C.: Brassey’s, 1993), 123-24. 


38 Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1.3, Counterland, (August 27, 1999), 102. 

Counterland doctrine now incorporates the Killer Scout mission. 

39 GWAPS Summary Report, 21, and Andrews, 54. F-111Fs developed the tactic 

using their Pave Tack laser designator. Lessons learned during a Desert Shield 

exercise had shown the potential for identifying and targeting armor from medium 

altitude. On 5 February, 2 F-111Fs successfully dropped two GBU-12s on revetted 

positions. Within 3 days 50 sorties a night were devoted to tank plinking. Navy A- 

6Es began dropping a limited number of LGBs as did F-15E crews. The F-15Es 

were limited by the number of LANTIRN pods and quickly developed buddy lasing 

techniques. Fred L. Frostic, Air Campaign against the Iraqi Army in the Kuwaiti 

Theater of Operations, Project Air Force (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1994). 


41 Col John Warden, USAF (retired), lecture, Air Command and Staff College, 

Maxwell Air Base, Ala. 12 December 2000. 

42 For purposes of this discussion Serbia and Serbian will be used to refer to those 

forces from the Federal Republic of Yugoslav. Likewise Macedonia will be used to 

refer to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. 

43 Air War Over Serbia Initial Report, (United States Air Forces In Europe Studies and 

Analysis Directorate, April 2000), 8. 

44 Lieutenant General Mike Short, USAF (retired), lecture, School for Advanced 

Airpower Studies, Maxwell Air Base, Ala., 21 November 2000. 

45 AWOS Initial Report, 9. 

46 Ibid., 11. 

47 R. Jeffrey Smith and William Drozdiak, Anatomy of a Purge, Washington Post, 

April 11, 1999, A1. 

48 The Yugoslavian built M-84 is a version of the Soviet T-72 and theM-80 is a 

version of the Soviet BRDM. 

49 NAEW looks similar to a US AWACS, however NAEW does not have the manning, 

communications suite, or train to control mass strike packages as does AWACS.

50 Major Phil M. Haun, A-10 unpublished war diary. FACAs would eventually 

90 expand to include US Navy F-14s and Marine F/A-18D Hornets. 

51 Commercial purchased space-stabilized binoculars were used for visual 

identification. Made by Canon these 12x and 15x binoculars remove much 

of the jitter associated with using binoculars in the cockpit and were a 

monumental improvement over using regular binoculars. 

52 Short. 

53 General Wesley Clark as SACEUR was not technically the Combined Forces 

Commander (CFC), as Admiral Ellis held this position in charge of NATO forces in 

the southern region. However for practical purposes General Clark performed the 

functions of the CFC. 

54 Major Phil M. Haun, A-10 unpublished war diary. Later the ROE was further 

modified to allow strike aircraft to fly as low as 8,000 ft. AGL during diving 

weapons deliveries. This altitude restriction was further reduced to 5,000’ AGL 

after the bombing of a Kosovar refugee column by F-16CGs FACAs on 14 April, 

1999. 

55 This safe haven was implemented by Admiral Ellis as a precaution to prevent 

Serbs thinking NATO ground troops in Macedonia were actually attacking their 

positions. 

56 Due to poor weather over Kosovo, the first strikes against mobile targets did not 

take place until 6 April. 

57 Unlike Air Force intelligence, Army intelligence spends its effort in assessing enemy 

army capabilities. Army intelligence is therefore more familiar with the ISR assets 

best suited for observing enemy ground forces and adds a wealth of expertise to 

the CAOC in this area. 

58 Discussions with author and Lt Steven Smith, Intelligence officer 81st Fighter 

Squadron, April 1999. 

59 JSTARS is a long range, air to ground surveillance system aboard the E-8C, a 

modified Boeing 707, consisting of a Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) capable of 

producing an image of a selected area and a Moving Target Indicator (MTI) 

designed to locate slow-moving ground targets. 

60 Wesley Clark, General (USA) and John Corley, Brig General (USAF) at NATO press 

conference, Brussels, 16 Sep 1999. 

www.eucom.mil/operations/af/nato/1999/meabriefing.html 

61 Secretary of Defense William Cohen and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

General Henry Shelton provided an initial BDA assessment in a 10 June 1999 

briefing. Henry H. Shelton, Chairman Joint Chief of Staff briefing, Washington, DC: 

10 June, 1999. www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun1999/t06101999_t0610asd.html. 

These numbers were refuted by a much lower total given on 16 June 1999 by 

Serb Army Lieutenant General Nebojsa Pavkovic. Rebecca Grant, “True Blue: The 

Real Story Behind the Kosovo Numbers Game,” AFA Issue Brief, 1 June 2000. 

www.afa.org/library/issues/trueblue.html. . By mid-July General Clark ordered an 

Air Force Mission Effectiveness Analysis (MEA) team to go see what was on the 

ground. General Clark then gave NATO’s BDA assessment on 16 Sep, which was 

similar to Cohen and Shelton’s assessment with slightly lower numbers based on 

multiple strikes, which had previously been double counted. Wesley Clark, General 

(USA) and John Corley, Brig General (USAF) at NATO press conference, Brussels 

Belgium, 16 Sep 1999. 

www.eucom.mil/operations/af/nato/1999/meabriefing.html. Nearly a year after the 

air operations on May 15, 2000, a Newsweek article entitled “Kosovo Cover-up” 

claimed that the Air Force had inflated the MEA teams findings. Newsweek 

numbers included only those vehicles located at the sites searched by the MEA 

team and did not account for other sources of BDA or that the Serbs removed 

vehicles from the battlefield. 

62 Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, 1 February 1995, GL-7. The FSCL is 

a line established by the appropriate land or amphibious force commander to 

ensure coordination of fire not under the commander’s control but which may 

affect current tactical operations. While the FSCL does not directly discuss 

targeting, it is the targeting process that determines fires. Historically fielded forces 

are those forces inside of the FSCL and therefore the responsibility of land or 

amphibious forces for intelligence and targeting. 

63 Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1.3, Counterland, (August 27, 1999), 49. 

64 Examples of such systems include RC-12s, Hunter UAVs, and counter-battery 

radars. 

65 Unpublished lessons learned from the 81 Expeditionary Fighter Squadron at the 

15 June 1999 A-10 Hot Wash at Gioia Del Colle Air Base, Italy. Fielded forces 

under attack by air will remain static only as long as they are under direct attack. 

Once the threat has departed, whether due to poor weather, darkness, or simply 

the departure of strike forces the enemy will reposition their forces. During Allied 

Force imagery over 12 hours old resulted in very few successful attacks. Inside 6- 

8 hours resulted in an improved chance of successful attack. 

66 During Allied Force national systems were available, as were TAC RECCE forces 

from the US Navy with its Tactical Air Reconnaissance Pod (TARPs), and coalition 

assets of the French, British, and Germans. 

67 Lt Col Richard P. Stafford, intelligence officer who helped set up the flex targeting

cell during Allied Force, and A-2 for Time Critical Targeting (TCT) for JEFX 2000, e- 

mail interview with author, 5 March 2001. 

68 Unpublished lessons learned from the 81 Expeditionary Fighter Squadron at the 

15 June 1999 A-10 Hot Wash at Gioia Del Colle Air Base, Italy. A successful 

example of sensor to shooter processing of TAC RECCE imagery during Allied 

Force occurred when British GR-7 Harriers carrying TAC RECCE pods were 

collocated with A-10 FACAs. The GR-7s were able to process morning 

reconnaissance runs for afternoon missions. This imagery was made available to 

FACAs in some cases less than 3 hours and proved incredibly valuable. 

69 JSTARS limitations include a lack of on board target identification capability, 

restrictions to use in mountainous terrain, and the limited number of platforms 

available. 

70 Current limitations being worked include limited communication and Identification 

Friend or Foe (IFF) capability as well as a limited operational training with target 

marking or talk-on procedures when working with either FACAs or directly with 

strikers. 

71 An example of how US Army ISR assets can be successfully integrated was in the 

final days of Allied Force when US Army counter-battery radars successfully 

located active Serbian artillery positions and passed those coordinates to FACAs 

overhead. 

72 Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1.3, Counterland, (August 27, 1999), 98. Terminal 

control is the authority to direct the maneuver of aircraft, which are delivering 

ordnance to a specific target. Terminal control is a type of air control. Air Force 

Doctrine Document 2-1.3, Counterland, (August 27, 1999), 98. 

73 Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1.3, Counterland, (August 27, 1999), 98. A 

qualified officer or enlisted member who, from a forward ground or airborne 

position, provides terminal control to aircraft performing close air support to 

ground forces. 

74 This does not mean that controllers with inherent kill capability may not perform 

both controller and striker functions. 

75 Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1.3, Counterland, (August 27, 1999), 92. CAS is 

air action by fixed and rotary wing aircraft against hostile targets which are in close 

proximity to friendly forces and which require detailed integration of each air 

mission with the fire and movement of those forces. Air Force Doctrine Document 

2-1.3, Counterland, (August 27, 1999), 92. 

76 An excellent example is the British GR-7 during Allied Force. The RAF pilots were 

some of the most professional and well-trained pilots available. However, at 

medium altitude the GR-7 was extremely inaccurate delivering the BL-755 cluster 

bomb unit. This was due to a lack of a computed delivery solution for the 

BL-755, requiring a modified manual delivery from medium altitude with 

the aid of an Electro-Optic targeting pod. First canister impacts were 

recorded as far as 1-2 km from target. Major Phil M. Haun, A-10 unpublished war 

diary. 

77 A common misunderstanding is that precision munitions results in lower collateral 

damage potential. While precision munitions such as laser guided bombs or 

maverick missiles are more accurate than free-fall munitions, when a precision 

munition does not guide the resulting miss distance may be measured in miles. 

Compare this with a free-fall general purpose bomb delivered from a diving 

delivery. While this bomb may miss by meters, it is physically impossible for it to 

be miles off target. 

78 The availability of Army intelligence and ISR assets were for the most part not 

planned, but due to Task Force Able Sentry and Task Force Hawk operating in 

Macedonia and Albania respectively. 

79 Air Interdiction are operations conducted to destroy, neutralize, or delay enemy’s 

military potential before it can be brought to bear against friendly forces. Close Air 

Support are actions by aircraft against hostile targets in close proximity to friendly 

forces requiring detailed integration. Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint 

Operations, (February 1, 1995), GL 3-4. 

80 This has not gone unnoticed in the latest issue of Air Force Doctrine Document 2- 

1.3. This document makes a reference to such attacks. “In those unusual 

circumstance in which aerospace forces conduct AI in the absence of friendly 

surface forces, enemy forces are able to disperse and seek cover in a way that 

complicates the problem for the airman.” This statement misses the mark in two 

ways. First is that attack of field forces in the absence of friendly surface forces is 

unusual. Desert Storm and Allied Force demonstrate that this form of attack is 

now the norm and not simply an unusual occurrence. Second is the mistaken 

assumption that AI can be conducted in the absence of friendly forces. By 

definition AI cannot occur unless there are friendly forces. Air Force Doctrine 

Document 2-1.3, Counterland, (August 27, 1999), 8. 

81 A benefit of the expansion of the role of TAC and FACA would be the removal of 

the Killer Scout from Air Force doctrine. The Killer Scout role has two key 

weaknesses, which limit its effectiveness. Killer Scouts do not limit the potential of 

collateral damage, being untrained in positive control strikes. Killer Scouts also 

become ineffective once friendly forces become involved, since they are untrained 

in Close Air Support. By expanding the role of the FACA to that of how it was 

used in Allied Force removes the requirement of the Killer Scout role. 

91

What was the Impact of the Luftwaffe’s 

‘Tip & Run’ 

Bombing Attacks 

March 1942 – June 1943?

By Squadron Leader Chris Goss RAF 

93 

In March 1942, the Luftwaffe formed two dedicated units whose task was to carry out a bombing campaign against shipping 

and coastal military and industrial installations on the southern coast of England. By fitting bombs to Messerchmitt 109 

single-seat fighters, these fighter-bombers, or in German Jagdbomber nearly always shortened to Jabo, began attacking 

targets as far east as Kent 1 and as far west as the Lizard in Cornwall. Known to the British as ‘tip and run’ attacks, they 

continued until the 6th of June 1943 2 prior to which the Luftwaffe had increased its strength of fighter-bombers on the western 

front from in the region of 28 to 118, 3 which had prompted the following phlegmatic British comment: 

“…for the first three months of the year [1943], the position with regard to enemy fighter-bomber activity was not 

satisfactory…the problem was to get adequate warning of these low flying raids as, though enemy casualties were high, 

these casualties mostly took place after the bombs had been dropped…” 4 

Without warning, ‘tip and run’ attacks stopped following the attack on Eastbourne on the 6th of June 1943. The majority of 

German fighter-bombers were then transferred to the Mediterranean, leaving just 42 fighter-bombers 5 which were used solely 

for attacks at night. 

This paper will analyse the development of the German tactic of using fighter-bombers prior to March 1942. It will then discuss 

the impact from the viewpoints of both the Luftwaffe, the British military and the civilian population of the ‘tip and run’ campaign 

between March 1942 and the 6th of June 1943. It will conclude by questioning the German decision to stop such attacks, 

whether ‘tip and run’ attacks had been effective or not and the lessons that had been learned as a result.

94 

…Germany was keen to prove the superiority of its 

Zeppelin airships and its specially designed ‘battle 

planes’ such as the Gotha… 

The origin of the term ‘tip and run’ is not known but it was first applied to 

the infrequent small-scale bombing attacks carried out on south-east 

England by aircraft of the German Imperial Navy in the First World War. 6 

Kaiser Wilhelm II had been begged to authorise limited air attacks against 

British coastal targets of a military nature and when in January 1915 he 

acquiesced, military facilities on the shores of the Thames Estuary 

became legitimate ‘tip and run’ targets. However, a lack of suitable aircraft, the distance from bases in Belgium and the greater 

importance of air operations on the Western Front limited the scale of such attacks and by the end of 1916, approximately 25 

people had been killed but the military and civilian impact of such attacks is believed to have been minimal. 7 By then, Germany 

was keen to prove the superiority of its Zeppelin airships and its specially designed ‘battle planes’ such as the Gotha and 

targets switched from ‘nuisance raids’ to aerial assaults on London and other major cities, something that was to be repeated 

in 1940. It appeared as if the memory of ‘tip and run’ attacks would fade into obscurity. 

The single-seat 

Heinkel 51 

biplane fighter 

was, until the 

arrival of the 

Messerschmitt 

109 monoplane, 

the Legion 

Condor’s 

principal fighter 

It was in Spain in 1937 that the idea of ‘fighterbombers’ 

was resurrected, a few German 

fighters in the First World War having been 

fitted with bombs as a crude way of stemming 

the Allied advance in the Summer of 1918, 

these aircraft being termed ‘fighter-bombers’. 

In August 1936, Nazi Germany, concerned 

that Communists would get a foothold in 

Western Europe when civil war erupted in 

Spain, began supporting General Franco’s 

Nationalist army. The Legion Condor, a semiautonomous 

German air component, would 

play an important part during the civil war, 

allowing its aircrew to gain combat experience 

for the coming Second World War and for

…Henschel 123 dive bombers were quickly brought to Spain 

and used with great success 

Luftwaffe senior officers to devise and prove 

95 

a concept of air operations. However, it was 

in Spain in March 1937 that ‘fighter-bombers’ 

proved to be an effective weapon. 

The single-seat Heinkel 51 biplane fighter was, until 

the arrival of the Messerschmitt 109 monoplane, 

the Legion Condor’s principal fighter. However, it 

was becoming increasingly obvious that by 

February 1937, the Heinkel 51 was inferior to the 

Soviet fighters being used by the Republican 

forces. Faced with the inferiority of its principal 

fighter, the Legion Condor decided to enhance its 

offensive capability, particularly for the battle for 

Bilbao, by fitting its Heinkel 51s with fragmentation 

bombs and on the 31st of March 1937, these 

aircraft were used to bomb and strafe Republican 

front positions with considerable success. In the 

days that followed, the fighter-bombers proved 

ideal at neutralising those targets that medium to 

high-level bombers found harder to destroy. 

Paradoxically, it was the success of the fighter-bomber that ultimately spelt its demise. Impressed by the concept of close air 

support and pinpoint bombing accuracy, the Junkers 87 Stuka and Henschel 123 dive bombers were quickly brought to Spain 

and used with great success. It was this concept of operations that, following refinement in Spain, was used with great effect 

from the 1st of September 1939 when Germany invaded Poland and again on the 10th of May 1940 when Germany invaded 

France and the Low Countries. The Stuka suited the Blitzkrieg concept and with the air superiority achieved by the Luftwaffe in 

the first nine months of the Second World War, there was no need for a fighter-bomber. This was to change dramatically during 

the Battle of Britain. 

On the 10th of July 1940, the Luftwaffe began attacking shipping in the English Channel and coastal targets, hoping to entice 

the RAF into battle and, by means of attrition, to weaken the RAF’s ability to interfere with the planned German invasion of 

Great Britain. With the Germans anticipating the same air superiority they enjoyed in previous campaigns, it was thought that 

the Stuka would enjoy the same success. However, when the Stuka was at last committed en masse on the 8th of August

96 …when the Stuka was at last committed 

en masse on the 8th of August 1940, it 

was clear that against far more superior 

fighters such as the Spitfire and Hurricane, 

the Stuka was vulnerable… 

1940, it was clear that against far more superior 

fighters such as the Spitfire and Hurricane, the Stuka 

was vulnerable unless it had a substantial fighter 

escort. 8 Nevertheless, limited Stuka successes on the 

days that followed appeared to lull the German 

commanders into using them against inland targets. 

The results were catastrophic with 25 aircraft shot 

down and five seriously damaged in the space of two 

days. The Stuka was immediately withdrawn from front 

line operations and the Luftwaffe now had no aircraft 

that could fulfil the close-support role. 

Nevertheless, the Luftwaffe had been looking ahead. It 

was believed that the proposed twin-engined 

Messerschmitt 210 would be an ideal aircraft to be the 

Stuka’s successor as it was anticipated that it could be utilised in the close-support role and then be able to defend itself, a true 

fighter-bomber like the Heinkel 51. However, the Messerschmitt 210 was plagued by technical problems and as its entry into 

service slipped, the experimental unit formed to develop its use as a fighter-bomber pressed ahead with developing the fighterbomber 

concept by using the Messerschmitt 110 twin-engined fighter and to a lesser degree the Messerschmitt 109. 

It quickly became obvious that the Messerschmitt 110 was slow and vulnerable after dropping its bombs, any successes being 

achieved purely through the skill of the unit’s experienced pilots. However, the Messerschmitt 109 was found to be a much 

better fighter-bomber and was able to defend itself so it was decided to develop this aircraft as a jabo. 

A British intelligence report dated 21 Oct 1940 9 condensed all that had been gleaned on bombing with the Messerschmitt 109 

and appears to be the date that the RAF first acknowledged the existence of fighter- bombers, even though a Messerschmitt 

109 captured on the 7th of September 1940 was found to be fitted with a bomb rack and bomb release mechanism. 10

Furthermore, an attack against railway lines by a formation of Messerschmitt 109 jabos on the15th of September 1940 

had provoked an outcry by the British Press as to fighter-bombers being ‘unfair’. 11 The report acknowledged that one 

German unit had had been practising by bombing with 250 and 500 kg bombs from as early July 1940 and that a third of 

all German fighter groups were now being retrained as ‘Me 109 bombers’. However, by the time that this report had been 

written, the fighter-bomber phase of the Battle of Britain was almost over. 

Following the major attack on London on the 15th of September 1940 and the failure of the conventional bombers in daylight, 

the Luftwaffe switched nearly all of its bombers to nocturnal operations. From the 5th of September 1940 onwards, German 

fighter pilots had started receiving rudimentary training in using their fighters as bombers, using the gunsight as a bombsight. 

From the start of October 1940, these jabos were then used to bomb at medium and high altitudes. At high level, they were 

particularly hard to intercept but with a normal bomb load of one 250 kg bomb being dropped by pilots unused to bombing 

and using a rudimentary aiming system, the accuracy achieved was generally poor and attacks soon began to decrease. 

Additionally, Winter brought with it poor weather which restricted fighter-bomber missions and with 

Adolf Galland who 

commanded a fighter 

group during the Battle of 

Britain had previously 

been a ground attack pilot 

the majority of German fighter units being withdrawn to Germany for rest and refit, jabo attacks 

decreased further. Finally, the RAF started offensive fighter sweeps over the Continent on the 9th of 

January 1941 and this forced the Luftwaffe to commit more of its fighters to combat the increasing 

RAF incursions. 

It is interesting to read what the German fighter pilots of 1940 thought about fighter-bomber missions. 

General Adolf Galland, who had been a ground attack pilot flying Henschel 123s prior to the Battle of 

France, commanded a fighter group during the Battle of Britain. Of fighter-bombers, he said: 

“…we fighter pilots looked upon this violation of our aircraft with great bitterness. We had done 

everything possible to increase our performance in order to keep up with a progressive enemy. We 

had discarded everything dispensable in an attempt to squeeze another ounce of speed out of 

them. We had always demanded ejectable spare tanks in order to increase our range. Instead of 

that they now gave us bomb-release gadgets and we were forced to see a third of our aircraft drop 

out of air combat…” 12 

Galland was clearly not an exponent of the jabo and I believe that his view was shared by the 

majority of German fighter pilots. Galland further acknowledges that fighter bomber attacks "apart 

Galland was clearly not an exponent of the jabo and I believe that his view was 

shared by the majority of German fighter pilots 

97

from their nuisance value, [they] achieved very little of any military value" 13 and that such missions had an adverse affect on 

98 

the fighter pilot’s morale: 

“…it is disconcerting for a fighter pilot to have to fight without being able to take the initiative. The morale of fighter pilots 

was affected; they had to carry bombs, release them at great altitude on an enormous target without being able to 

observe the effect and then had to adopt a passive attitude towards enemy fighters…” 14 

With Generalfeldmarschall Göring highly critical of the failure of his fighter pilots and the ineffectiveness of fighter-bomber 

missions, it is surprising that just over a year later, the decision was made to recommence jabo attacks against British targets. 

This was the start of the Luftwaffe’s ‘tip and run’ bombing campaign. 

The origins of the Second World War ‘tip and run’ attacks came in March 1941. One fighter group, Jagdgeschwader 2 (JG 2), 

had continued to carry out fighter-bomber attacks but just against shipping. One squadron from JG 2 was given specific lowlevel 

bombing training by the Messerschmitt 210 operation evaluation unit whilst a further two squadrons carried out sporadic 

fighter-bomber attacks when pure fighter duties permitted. By June 1941, these latter two units had accounted for two 

freighters between 5,000 and 3,000 BRT and a 

tanker of 2,500 BRT as well as damaging a 

submarine, a cruiser of 10,000 BRT and a 

freighter of 3,000 BRT. 15 

Nevertheless, jabo missions were still secondary 

until one officer, wounded in July 1941, returned to 

operational flying duties. Frank Liesendahl 

commanded one of JG 2’s squadrons which still 

carried out jabo missions. However, he had been 

replaced after being wounded and it is believed 

…jabo missions were still secondary 

until one officer, wounded in July 

1941, returned to operational flying 

duties. Frank Liesendahl commanded 

one of JG 2’s squadrons which still 

carried out jabo missions

that as well as recuperating from his wounds, he worked on formulating tactics for low-level fighter-bomber missions. 

99 

He convinced his senior officers of the value of what a low-level fighter-bomber could achieve against shipping and in 

November 1941 was given permission to form a dedicated jabo squadron. 

From the 10th of November 1941 to the 18th of February 1942, Liesendahl’s squadron trained and perfected the tactics they 

would employ against British shipping. Liesendahl devised what was called the ‘Liesendahl Process’ which was quickly 

adopted as the preferred method of attack. Approaching the target at 450 kph and at an altitude of five metres, 1,800 metres 

from the target the fighter-bomber would climb to a maximum height of 500 metres before levelling off, diving at 550 kph and a 

dive angle of 3° before pulling up and lobbing the bomb at the target. 16 

The first recorded ‘tip and run’ attack was made 

against an unspecified target at Fairlight in Sussex 

on Christmas Day 1941 and in January 1941, the 

first ‘tip and run incidents’ were reported in Kent… 

The first recorded ‘tip and run’ attack was made against an 

unspecified target at Fairlight in Sussex on Christmas Day 

1941 17 and in January 1941, the first ‘tip and run incidents’ were 

reported in Kent (three), Sussex (nine), Dorset (two), Hampshire 

(one), Cornwall (28) and the Isle of Wight (one). However, it 

would appear that Liesendahl was still trying to convince senior 

officers of the value of jabo attacks and this proof came on the 10th of February 1942 when the 3,000 BRT steamship Lieutenant 

Robert Mory was badly damaged in an attack off the Cornish Coast. On the 4th of March 1942, Luftflotte 3’s 18 Fighter 

Headquarters authorised jabo missions as well as ordering another fighter group, JG 26, to form its own jabo squadron with 

effect from the 10th of March 1942. 

JG 26 was an a distinct disadvantage, having not been involved in JG 2’s three month work up. Pilots who had limited jabo 

experience from 1940 and early 1941 were transferred from other squadrons in JG 26 and a number who came to the jabo 

squadron were either unsuitable as fighter pilots, undisciplined or had incurred the wrath of their squadron commander. 19 With 

the unsuitability or unwillingness of some of its pilots for ‘tip and run’ missions and with a lack of training, the effectiveness of 

10/JG 26 (as the jabo squadron was designated) was questionable. British analysis of ‘tip and run’ attacks supported the 

imbalance of missions between JG 2 and JG 26 in March 1942, the first month of authorised operations. 17 ‘tip and run’ 

attacks were carried out in JG 26’s area of operations (Sussex and Kent) whilst JG 2’s area of operations (Hampshire 

westwards) reported 49 such attacks. Admittedly JG 26 was operating in an area heavily defended by anti-aircraft guns and the 

fighter aircraft of the RAF’s Number 11 Group but the successes of 10/JG 2 were impressive and a concern to the British. For 

example, on the 7th of March 1942, four Messerschmitt 109s roamed unmolested in the Exmouth-Teignmouth area, attacking 

numerous targets and even shooting down one of the RAF fighters trying to take off to intercept them whilst during the month, 

10/JG 2 had attacked at least two convoys, claiming to have sunk three ships of varying tonnages and at damaging at least 

two more.

In April 1942, ‘tip and run’ attacks increased dramatically, with British intelligence reporting 156 such attacks. April also 

100 

saw a shift to land targets, particularly gas holders as these were such prominent targets. The Luftwaffe’s intelligence 

during the last war has been criticised as being inaccurate or misguided. However, ‘tip and run’ targets attacked in April 

and May 1942 did show a high degree of good planning (or possibly luck). For example, the Germans were aware of an 

underground explosives store inland from Poole and unsuccessfully tried to attack it five times in April and May 1942 whilst two 

fighter-bombers attacked the Betteshanger Colliery in Kent precisely at shift-change causing damage and civilian casualties. Of 

greater concern were two attacks carried out by 10/JG 2 against the Telecommunications and Research Establishment (TRE) at 

Worth Matravers in Dorset. Described as ‘…one of the country’s single most important defence research related establishments 

during the whole of the Second World War…’, 20 much of Britain’s radar and radar-related research and development was being 

carried out at Worth Matravers. In April 1942, the TRE was studying the effect of the ionosphere on ‘Gee’ transmissions, ‘Gee’ 

enabling RAF bomber crews to fix their position by using pulse signals from three widely separated transmitters. ‘Gee’ could 

also be used to find targets when they were obscured by cloud. In the early evening of the 6th of April 1942, three aircraft from 

10/JG 2 attacked the site causing unrecorded damage; at lunchtime two days later, another attack killed two and injured six, 

whilst a bomb passed through the 350 foot tall ‘Gee’ tower, causing slight damage. The site was unoperational for four days 

and because of the risk of a further more devastating attack and German reprisals for the Bruneval Raid, 21 the TRE was moved 

to Malvern in Worcestershire in May 1942. 

It should be emphasised that during 1942, the combined strength of 10/JG 2 and 10/JG 26 was rarely more than a maximum 

of 28 aircraft 22 but their effectiveness was keenly felt by the British who quickly voiced concern as to means of combating ‘tip 

and run’ attacks. The official narrative produced after the war by the Observer Corps was quite specific as to the threat and the 

difficulties posed, saying: 

“…In view of the persistent attacks made by the enemy using very low flying aircraft on coastal targets along the south 

coast of England, various methods were tried to facilitate interception. The difficulties were great as, in view of the low 

altitude, RDF [Radio Direction Finding or radar] information was seriously limited with the result that anti-aircraft defences 

were frequently unable to come into action until the attack had been delivered…” 23 

Furthermore, the only anti-aircraft weapons that could counter these low and fast attacks were predominantly the 40mm light 

anti-aircraft guns. When the ‘tip and run’ attacks commenced, Anti-Aircraft Command only had 43 40mm calibre guns in 

position on the south coast and these were assigned to protect military installations, the sort of targets that the fighter-bombers 

were not attacking. 24 Even then, these guns had their failings as an attack on the airfield at Bolt Head in Devon on the 1st of 

May 1942 showed. Five Spitfires were damaged, a pilot badly wounded and many building damaged and the following report 

was submitted in respect of the anti-aircraft guns failing to engage the attackers:

“…the RAF 4 AA Flight twin Lewis gun posts and one Bren gun 25 were in action firing 304 rounds. Hits were claimed 

101 

on all aircraft but no damage was observed. The Bofors guns 26 made a rather poor showing. Number Four gun fired 

only two rounds before the traverse gear jammed and Number Two gun fired one round, the case of which could not 

be ejected….” 27 

By the end of April 1942, it must have been increasingly clear to the Luftwaffe of the value of such ‘tip and run’ attacks, 

specifically against shipping. Post-war analysis shows that between July 1941 and February 1942, German aircraft had sunk or 

damaged just 32.35% of the ships they attacked in daylight but in the period March-October 1942, this increased to 64.4%. 28 

Still, the Luftwaffe did not expand the two units but at the end of May 1942, co-located both units and subordinated them to 

the Luftflotte 3’s Fighter Headquarters for operational, and later administrative, command and control. This was a clear 

indication that greater direction in fighter-bomber operations was at last being realised. Then, in mid-June 1942, both units 

were withdrawn piecemeal to near Paris where they began re-equipping with the Focke Wulf 190. Accordingly, ‘tip and run’ 

attacks decreased, dropping from 105 in May, to 77 in June and 37 in July 1942. 29 

This was a worrying development for the British. The Focke Wulf 190 was superior in all flight parameters, except turning 

radius, to the best Allied fighter at that time, the Spitfire Mark Vb. It was 25 to 30 mph faster at all altitudes up to 25,000 feet 

and had the highest rate of roll of any fighter of the last war. As a fighter-bomber, it could carry a single 500 kg bomb under the 

fuselage and four 50 kg bombs under the 

wings, more than doubling the bomb load of 

the Messerschmitt 109. Furthermore, if the 

Messerschmitt 109 had been hard to shoot 

down (10/JG 2 had so far lost four to antiaircraft 

fire and two to RAF fighters whilst 

10/JG 26 had lost three to anti-aircraft fire 

and one to a fighter), the Focke Wulf 190 was 

faster, more suited, because of its air cooled 

engine and robust construction, to fighterbomber 

operations and far more capable of 

taking care of itself when confronted by 

RAF fighters. 

10/JG 2 flew its first attack with the Focke 

Wulf 190 on the 7th of July 1942, claiming to 

have sunk and damaged three ships, two 

The Focke 

Wulf 190 

was superior 

in all flight 

parameters, 

except 

turning 

radius, to 

the best 

Allied 

fighter…

102 

days later doing the same again, claiming to have sunk two and damaged one. From now on, at least one ‘tip and run’ 

attack a day was planned or flown and as yet, the British had no means of countering them. 

Because radar was rarely unable to detect such attacks, the first line of defence had to be the Observer Corps. Selected posts 

were ordered to fire a rocket (known as ‘Totter’) as soon as low-flying aircraft were seen and to continue to fire them whilst they 

remained in their vicinity. Furthermore, in order to speed up the reporting of low-flying fighter-bombers, the Observer Corps post 

would immediately pass the code word ‘Rats’ to the Observer Centre before passing any plot. This was then passed 

immediately to the Sector Controller, such messages having full priority to then scramble, or if airborne direct, RAF fighters to 

intercept. 30 The ‘Totter’ and ‘Rats’ systems were still inadequate. It took until November 1942 

…an attack on Salisbury in 

Wiltshire at the start of August 

1942 was so sudden and fast 

that no RAF fighters were 

scrambled to intercept … 

before standing patrols of two fighters (with another two on standby on the ground) 

were introduced at anticipated vulnerable points and even then, successful 

interceptions were infrequent. Furthermore, the existing spacing of the Observer Corps 

posts still made it possible for enemy aircraft to fly for appreciable distances overland at 

very low altitude without their tracks being maintained sufficiently to enable fighters to 

intercept and air raid warnings given. For example, an attack on Salisbury in Wiltshire at 

the start of August 1942 was so sudden and fast that no RAF fighters were scrambled to intercept and the air raid sirens not 

sounded until the two Focke Wulf 190s were well south of the Isle of Wight on their way home. It was therefore decided to form 

approximately 150 satellite reporting posts, connected to the nearest Observer Corps ‘parent’ post which would increase low 

coverage in a belt 30 miles width from the coast. These satellite posts were simply to report during the hours of daylight low 

flying ‘doubtful’ aircraft. 31 Nevertheless, with both German unit’s fully operational with the Focke Wulf 190 by mid-July 1942, ‘tip 

and run’ attacks still continued with virtual impunity even though by the end of the month, each unit had lost one Focke Wulf 

190 to anti-aircraft fire from the ships they were attacking. These losses had resulted in the deaths of each unit’s experienced 

commanding officers, one of which was the ‘tip and run’ exponent Frank Liesendahl. However, their replacements were equally 

experienced and even though the deaths of the two were keenly felt, there was still no respite in the attacks. 

It was at the start of August 1942 that changes to the pattern of attacks occurred. 10/JG 26 moved back under the control of 

Luftflotte 2’s Fighter Leader and again started carrying out more attacks on Britain’s south-eastern coast, stretching British 

defences to their limit. In addition to shipping and coastal targets, the pattern of targets attacked by 10/JG 2 now showed a 

shift towards specific inland targets such as Helston and Bodmin in Cornwall, Salisbury and on the 5th of August, Yeovil in 

Somerset. The reason for this change in targets was hinted by a German war reporter who wrote about the Yeovil attack: 

“…until now, every mission flown by the Red Foxes 32 has only been aimed at the south coast of England. They have not 

yet made an attempt to attack the English hinterland. So they prepare Operation Ypsilon all the better because this attack

shall hit industrial works on the other side of the range of hills which stretch behind the south coast. Only two planes 

103 

are going to carry out this difficult mission. First of all they have to wait for appropriate weather. Up to now, those 

designated for this attack had to turn back twice because they had not been able to break through the line of English 

fighter patrols…” 33 

The full report, much of which should be regarded at German propaganda, is interesting for three reasons. Firstly, it gives the 

rationale for attacking targets other than coastal ones. Secondly, it acknowledges that ‘tip and run’ attacks relied on good 

weather and thirdly, the British defences, even though they might not be aware of it, did manage to cause some ‘tip and run’ 

attacks to be aborted. Nevertheless, this attack was a success. Just two 500 kg bombs destroyed 15 buildings with a further 972 

suffering varying damage whilst three civilians were killed and 26 injured. It was thought at the time the target was the Westland 

aircraft factory but in fact the railway line and station and the 

centre of the town were the intended targets. The effect it had 

on the civilian population was not recorded but the audacity and 

the success of the attack did result in much analysis afterwards, 

particularly by the Ministry of Home Security. 34 

…the Royal Navy did lose the destroyer HMS 

Berkeley which was a considerable embarrassment, 

especially as the destroyer was also being used as 

a forward air controller for the Allied fighters… 

For the following weeks, the occasional coastal target was 

attacked but an increase in Allied air and sea activity was 

noted and the reason for this became obvious on the 19th of 

August 1942 when a predominantly Canadian force carried out 

a raid on the French port of Dieppe. German twin-engined 

bombers were quickly committed but did not arrive over the 

beachhead until just before midday and then had to contend 

with smoke, anti-aircraft fire and a massive Allied fighter 

umbrella and so Dieppe became an ideal battlefield for fighterbombers 

to utilise their speed and skill to attack Allied 

shipping. 10/JG 26 was based close to Dieppe and was 

committed throughout the day against purely naval targets, but 

both 10/JG 2 and 10/JG 26 attacked warships, transports, 

torpedo boats and landing craft throughout the day, 10/JG 26 

losing just one aircraft and its pilot. The more experienced 

10/JG 2 proved the value of ‘tip and run’ tactics being 

employed against ships off Dieppe, claiming to have sunk two

destroyers, two large landing craft and two other ships, damaging a further destroyer, transport ship, landing ship, two 

104 

other ships and shooting down a Spitfire for no loss. The validity of these claims are hard to ascertain but the Royal Navy 

did lose the destroyer HMS Berkeley which was a considerable embarrassment, especially as the destroyer was also 

being used as a forward air controller for the Allied fighters and those fighters had been helpless to prevent bombs from just 

two 10/JG 2 fighter-bombers from breaking the destroyer’s back. 

It would appear that the German successes on the 19th of August 1942 in respect of employing ‘tip and run’ tactics against 

shipping were not developed further as from now on, land targets were concentrated on and by that Autumn, no further Allied 

ships would be attacked by German fighter-bombers, prompting the German Navy to state that it “…regrets every bomb that is 

not dropped on shipyards, ships etc”. 35 ‘Tip and run’ attacks would continue to be a constant source of irritation and threat but 

now the Allied defences were forced to try and in counter them more effectively. 

September and October 1942 saw a reduction in the number of ‘tip and run’ attacks with Kent and Sussex receiving the brunt 

of the attacks. In order to ensure the success of attacks in this region, the fighter-bombers now had their own escorts but the 

majority of fighter-bombers lost during these months were still due to anti-aircraft fire. 36 The Luftwaffe also employed fighters on 

what was termed by both sides as nuisance or disturbance attacks in Kent and Sussex, the effects of which were minimal. 

It was about now that the RAF assigned a new weapon to counter the ‘tip and run’ raiders. The Hawker Typhoon had been 

introduced into service in early Summer 1942 and so far had proved to be a disappointment. In August 1942, the commanders 

of the three Typhoon squadrons complained that the Spitfire, 

not the Typhoon, was better used on offensive sweeps whilst 

the Typhoon’s superior speed and fire power would be better 

used countering ‘tip and run’ Focke Wulf 190s and by basing 

the three squadrons near the eastern, south-eastern and southwestern 

coasts. 37 This was accepted and by the end of 

September 1942, a total of five Typhoon squadrons were 

employed in this manner. 

…commanders of the three Typhoon squadrons 

complained that the Spitfire, not the Typhoon, was 

better used on offensive sweeps whilst the 

Typhoon’s superior speed and fire power would be 

better used countering ‘tip and run’ Focke Wulf

The tactics adopted by the Typhoon squadrons was another matter. It would appear that those developed by one 

105 

squadron of 15 patrols a day by two aircraft flying at low or even lower altitudes with a further two on ‘cockpit readiness’, 

were soon adopted by other squadrons. Standing patrols then positioned themselves two to six miles from the coast and 

waited. 38 There was an additional hazard in that the Typhoon at some angles could look like its German opponent but this was 

partially solved by painting both the Typhoon noses white and black and white stripes under the wings. Still, success was hard 

to come by as a squadron records: 

“…what with having to keep one eye on engine temperature, scan the air for enemy raiders, watch each gun position and 

Spitfire with suspicion and guard against crashing into cliffs or balloons, the whole enterprise seemed unprofitable. By the 

end of November [1942], with nothing to show for it, anti-aircraft fire had claimed one Typhoon, the weather two Typhoons 

and their pilots…” 39 

There was another reason for this lack of success. On the 8th of November 1942, American forces landed in north-western 

Africa and the Germans immediately moved fighter units, including both fighter-bomber squadrons, to southern France as a 

precaution against any Allied invasion. Both fighter-bomber squadrons remained there for just over a month and between the 

1st of November and 16th of December 1942, only one ‘tip and run’ attack was made. The unit responsible for this sole attack 

had been withdrawn temporarily from North Africa to exchange its Messerschmitt 110 fighters for Focke Wulf 190 fighterbombers 

and cost the German squadron two fighter-bombers, intercepted by a standing patrol of two Typhoons thus validating 

the RAF’s new aircraft and tactic. 

However, prior to the southern France detachment and the inactivity of the last two months of the year, it should be stressed 

that the new British aircraft and tactics were unable to prevent what was the Luftwaffe’s largest daylight attack on Britain since 

1940. Hitler, increasingly annoyed by Bomber Command’s offensive, ordered a full strength vengeance attack against 

Canterbury on the evening on the 31st of October 1942. The attack was carried out purely by fighter-bombers, 19 coming from 

the two recognised fighter-bomber squadrons and which were reinforced by an unknown number of temporary fighter-bombers 

drawn from fighter units and the unit which had been temporarily withdrawn from North Africa. The total force, including 

escorts, numbered 62 Focke Wulf 190s. 40 

The attack was an embarrassment to the British defences. The German formation approached the Kent coast at wave-top 

height in three waves, hedgehopped approaching the outskirts of Canterbury, then climbed, dropped 31 bombs which killed 

32 people and damaged countless buildings, and streaked back for France. British defences claimed to have shot down 

10 fighter-bombers and suspected a further aircraft had been destroyed hitting a balloon cable. The true cost was one fighterbomber 

lost to anti-aircraft fire after it had dropped its bomb, one fighter- bomber lost part of its wing to a balloon cable but 

returned safely and one of the escorts was shot down by an RAF fighter. To add further embarrassment, German fighters shot 

down two RAF fighters. As a vengeance attack, the attack on Canterbury was an unmitigated success with the British

acknowledging that 70% of the total weight of bombs fell in the target area 

106 

but failing to acknowledge their failure to intercept the raid. 41 

The attack of 31st of October 1942 was effectively the last ‘tip and run’ attack 

of any substance for 1942. The Home Office, amongst other political and military 

organisations, was quick to analyse the successes and failures of the ‘tip and 

run’ attacks over the preceding nine months. In an end of year report produced 

by the Key Points Intelligence Directorate, it said of ‘tip and run’ attacks: 

“It is clear that attacks were directed against gas and electricity 

undertakings, railways, trains and in some cases a terror raid was made on 

residential and shopping areas. Gas works and electricity undertakings in 

exposed coastal sites provide in themselves a good target and it may well 

be that the enemy were encouraged to develop these attacks in view of the 

repeated warnings of the Government for the necessity of limiting both 

industrial and domestic fuel. The undertakings at Brighton suffered severely 

in the several attacks made on them and as a result of the attack on the St 

Ives undertaking in August, domestic supplies were held up for about two 

months….” 42 

From a British viewpoint, the small 

number of German fighter-bombers 

was creating far more work for the 

Observer Corps, RAF and anti-aircraft 

defences than they should have 

An analysis carried out by the War Office on ‘tip and run’ attacks up to the end 

of 1942 was even more blunt. 43 Bearing in mind that the maximum number of fighter- bombers available to the Luftwaffe at this 

time was 28, 40% of all daylight attacks in 1942 were carried out by jabos, with low-level attacks being preponderant in the 

latter half of the year. Four out of every five fighter-bombers attacked recognisable military targets, average efficiency on each 

attack was 71% and German losses had been light. 

From a British viewpoint, the small number of German fighter-bombers was creating far more work for the Observer Corps, RAF 

and anti-aircraft defences than they should have. In addition to an expansion of the Observer Corps satellite posts and 

increased fighter defences using new (and untried) tactics, the increase in anti-aircraft defences was dramatic. The numbers of 

light anti-aircraft guns assigned to combat ‘tip and run’ attacks rose from 43 in March 1942 to 543 in November 1942. 

Searchlight battery personnel were withdrawn from their primary duties and trained to man twin machine guns whilst the RAF 

Regiment anti-aircraft guns and personnel and 400 Royal Navy rocket projectors which fired wire obstacles into the paths of 

enemy aircraft were also assigned to the battle. 44 Despite all of this: 

“…the increase in gun strength was not accompanied by any corresponding rise in the success rate…The first big 

weakness lay in the early warning arrangements which failed to record raid approach or did so too late. Out of 44 attacks

A reminder of the ineffectiveness of British defences was cruelly 

reinforced early in the New Year by another German ‘vengeance’ attack 

in August 1942, only eight were 

preceded by radar warning…” 45 

107 

A reminder of the ineffectiveness of 

British defences was cruelly reinforced early in the New Year by another German ‘vengeance’ attack. As a reprisal for Bomber 

Command’s attacks on Berlin on the 16th and 17th of January 1943, 28 fighter-bombers attacked the London Docks area at 

lunchtime on the 20th of January 1943 whilst a further 12 fighter-bombers carried out a diversionary attack on the Isle of Wight 

and Tunbridge Wells. Another 16 Focke Wulf 190s were used as escort whilst 39 German fighters carried out a diversionary 

fighter sweep off the Kent coast. 

The attack achieved total surprise. The balloon barrage in that area of London had been brought down for maintenance during 

that lunch hour and the fighter-bombers attacked as that part of London’s inhabitants were going to or at lunch; they were 

unaware of an attack until the first bombs exploded and only then the sirens sounded, by which time they were too late. With 

impunity, the fighter-bombers dropped their bombs and strafed buildings before heading south, their only loss being suffered on 

the return flight. A gasholder was set alight, the Royal Naval College at Greenwich was hit as was the Deptford West Power 

Station and Surrey Commercial Docks. To add insult to injury, the Germans also shot down ten barrage balloons, the barrage 

being hurriedly winched back up during the attack. 

The loss of life was high and the effect on morale considerable. A school was hit, killing 38 children and six teachers, countless 

others were injured and many buildings and vehicles destroyed and damaged. So serious were the after effects of the attack 

that, for the first time, the problem of ‘tip and run’ attacks was debated in the House of Commons. A petition was signed by 

local residents complaining about the inability to prevent this attack and questions were asked why the defences were down 

and what was being done to combat ‘tip and run’ attacks. In a particularly evasive reply, the Secretary of State for Air, Sir 

Archibald Sinclair, said that the balloons were down for maintenance and that “…the best deterrence to such attacks as that on 

the 20th of January is the infliction of heavy casualties on the attackers…” 46 which was precisely what did not happen – all but 

one of losses suffered by the Germans were from the diversionary sweeps whilst the only fighter-bomber was lost after it had 

dropped its bomb. A further question, asking whether the Secretary of State for Air was satisfied that everything was being 

done to combat ‘tip and run’ raids, resulted in a similar response: “…the tactical measures best suited for defending this and 

other areas which are subject to varying forms of attack are under constant review…” 47 

The attack received unprecedented publicity in the days that followed which was not helped by the captured German fighterbomber 

pilot who, whilst being interrogated, stated that jabo pilots: 

“…have been told to attack anything and everything liable to terrorise the British public. Trains, motor buses, gatherings of 

people, herds of cattle and sheep etc have been mentioned specifically at the briefing as likely targets…” 48

All of this still did not alter the fact that Britain’s capital city had been bombed in 

108 

broad daylight by a force which penetrated nearly 100 miles at high speed and 

low-level into enemy territory and still managed to drop its bombs onto 

recognised targets with good effect and then returned virtually unscathed. 

When the weather permitted, for much of January and February 1943 more traditional 

‘tip and run’ attacks were carried out from as far west as Torquay to as far east as 

Margate with the usual results – destroyed gasholders, hotels where trainee aircrew 

were being billeted, railway junctions and lines and, more often, town centres. It also 

appeared that the British defences were at last exacting a toll against the attackers – 

Typhoons accounted for five fighter-bombers in these two months, light anti-aircraft fire a further three. However, again all eight 

aircraft were shot down after dropping their bombs on the designated target and these losses did not deter the Luftwaffe or 

affect the potency of the attacks. In fact, a greater number of attacks were now flown when the weather improved in March and 

a number of these were by much larger formations of 20 or so fighter – bombers. As the Observer Corps narrative noted: 

“…many minor attacks were made by aircraft in small formations with occasional more ambitious attacks by formations of 

between 12 and 30 fighter-bombers with or without an escort or rear cover. In January [20th], 12 [sic] fighter-bombers 

bombed the crowded areas round Poplar and Bermondsey from low altitude with considerable moral effect. This was 

followed by several other similar attacks on Eastbourne, Hastings, London and Ashford…” 49 

If the attack on London on 

the 20th of January had 

“considerable moral effect”, 

similar attacks in March 1943 

had an even greater adverse 

moral effect for British civilians 

…Britain’s capital city had been 

bombed in broad daylight by a 

force which penetrated nearly 

100 miles at high speed and 

low-level into enemy territory and 

still managed to drop its bombs 

onto recognised targets… 

If the attack on London on the 20th of January had “considerable moral effect”, similar 

attacks in March 1943 had an even greater adverse moral effect for British civilians. The 

attack against Eastbourne on the 7th of March by 18 fighter-bombers was undetected 

until the first bombs exploded; no RAF fighters were able to intercept and 14 civilians and 

seven servicemen were killed and countless buildings destroyed or damaged. Then again 

on the 11th of March, 27 fighter-bombers attacked Hastings, killing six civilians, 

destroying 40 houses and blocking the railway line. No German aircraft were lost even 

though anti-aircraft defences claimed to have shot down three but as Headquarters 

Number 11 Group noted: 

“…standing patrols were immediately detailed to the raid but the attack was so sharp that the enemy were passing out to 

sea six minutes after they were sighted…” 50 

The following day saw another reprisal for Bomber Command’s continued attacks against Berlin with 24 fighter-bombers, this 

time with a massive escort, dropping bombs on Ilford and Barking in Essex and the eastern outskirts of London. Only minor

damage was inflicted but the residents of Ilford were vociferous in the failure of the defences preventing the attack and 

109 

sirens again being sounded only after the attack had started. The RAF did manage to intercept the formation but not until 

it approached the Belgian coast on the return flight where two fighter-bombers were eventually shot down. 

The final massed attack took place against Ashford in Kent on the 24th of March and was the most successful by far. The 

official report is graphic as to the attack’s effectiveness: 

“…this attack was heavier and more successful than the enemy’s previous efforts. The enemy aircraft flew across Ashford 

at low level from south-east to north-west. Two of the five bombs aimed at the railway works did considerable damage 

whilst three bombs which fell to the north of the works damaged rolling stock. The remaining enemy aircraft appear to 

have made an indiscriminate attack on the town. One enemy aircraft made a cannon attack from roof top height on a 

petrol lorry standing in the yard of an agricultural works and the lorry exploded. The bomb carried by this aircraft was hit by 

light anti-aircraft fire and the enemy aircraft blew up. Extensive damage was caused to the works as a result of the double 

explosion…” 51 

All this increased activity, with ‘tip and run’ attacks now spreading further north-east as far as Walton-on–the-Naze in Essex, 

coincided with a massive expansion and reorganisation of the German fighter-bomber force in France. In addition to the two 

established fighter-bomber squadrons, a dedicated jabo group had begun to form in December 1942. 

Schnellkampfgeschwader 10 (SKG 10) 52 flew its first operational sortie on the 7th of March 1943 and by the 31st of the month, 

had 90 aircraft available to attack Britain, an additional 28 being assigned to it when the two original fighter-bomber units came 

under its aegis early in April 1943. 53 

…the Luftwaffe High Command, probably due to incomplete 

intelligence, believed that daylight jabo missions had not 

achieved the desired effect… 

The British were unaware of this massive force of 

fighter-bombers and if the Luftwaffe had utilised it 

in a similar tactical manner to the ‘tip and run’ 

attacks of the previous 13 months, would have 

been a formidable weapon which the British 

defences would have had considerable difficulty in countering. Crucially, the Luftwaffe High Command, probably due to 

incomplete intelligence, believed that daylight jabo missions had not achieved the desired effect and therefore the vast majority 

of SKG 10 was to be trained for nocturnal attacks, to the incredulity of many of its pilots: 

“…they got the idea that attacks would be practicable at night…such an absurd idea. The…pilots of SKG 10 had no 

qualifications for night missions. There was no experience in night and instrument flying and no [night] navigation system 

was available…” 54 

April 1943 saw daylight ‘tip and run’ attacks continue but on a much reduced scale, as much of SKG 10 trained for nocturnal

operations, and only five separate attacks were carried out. Only one of these was a mass attack and took place on the 

110 

3rd of April when 16 fighter-bombers, yet again, completely surprised the defences, caused considerable damage and all 

aircraft returned safely. A minor attack on the 8th of April by a smaller formation caused considerable damage to military 

and industrial targets on the Isle of Wight but two fighter-bombers were lost, one to a Typhoon on a standing patrol, the other 

to light anti-aircraft fire. 

This reduction in ‘tip and run’ activity did not go unnoticed and although no obvious reason could be given for it, the British still 

saw ‘tip and run’ attacks such as the one on the 3rd of April as wholly successful and that “…it is clear from the results 

achieved in the ‘tip and run’ raids on coastal targets that our defences can be improved…”. 55 Furthermore, a similar report 

analysing nocturnal bombing did not connect the reduction in daylight attacks with a commencement of fighter-bombers 

attacking by night, stating: 

“The fighter-bomber appeared for the first time as a night 

bomber on the 16th/17th of April and it is presumably the new 

fast bomber 56 which has been mentioned recently in German 

broadcast claims…They have operated mostly in the London 

and Home counties…” 57 

May 1943 saw a sharp increase in massed ‘tip and run’ attacks with 

12 specific attacks on seven days. On two days, two attacks were 

made simultaneously in an attempt to split the fighter defences, all 

the attacks occurring either early in the morning, lunchtime or late in 

the evening, maximising their irritation to the civilian population. The 

fact that Great Yarmouth and a nearby radar station was under 

attack by 20 fighter-bombers on the 7th of May was not evident 

until the first bomb exploded whilst a similar attack four days later 

was equally successful. Only two aircraft were lost in these attacks, 

one of them to British defences again after the bombs had been 

dropped. The following day, Lowestoft was attacked by 25 fighterbombers 

just before sunset; the results were predictable: 

“…the first warning received by anti-aircraft sites was the noise 

of falling bombs; the official warning was given two minutes 

after the first bomb had dropped. In addition to 21 bombs on 

…‘tip and run’ losses for the first 20 days of 

May 1943 numbered two whilst nocturnal 

losses for the same period were higher despite 

such attacks only being flown on four nights

land, several bombs were dropped in the sea near the harbour. Nine anti-aircraft sites were attacked with cannon 

111 

and machine gun fire and the gas works, electricity mains and a hospital were damaged…” 58 

Yet again, no German aircraft were lost. 

It would appear incredible that the Luftwaffe was not aware of the successes it was achieving in May 1943 and even German 

radio broadcasts, usually boastful of such attacks, preferred to play down the successes of the ‘fast bombers’ 59 . The frequency 

of nocturnal missions now began to increase as daylight attacks decreased but even then, ‘tip and run’ losses for the first 20 

days of May 1943 numbered two whilst nocturnal losses for the same period were higher despite such attacks only being flown 

on four nights. 

‘Tip and run’ attacks would occur only on three more days in May 1943 and all attacks but one were devastating. On the 23rd 

of May, simultaneous lunchtime attacks were launched against Hastings and Bournemouth. At Hastings, anti-aircraft sites 

appeared to be the chosen targets but, for a change, these sites and the fighter standing patrol had received ample warning. 

The town was still bombed and the two German losses, one to a Typhoon, the other to anti-aircraft fire, occurred after the 

bombs had been dropped. Despite a six-minute warning, the attack on Bournemouth was a total success. Considerable 

damage was caused to the town centre with five buildings destroyed and a further 3,000 damaged whilst civilian casualties 

were 77 killed, 45 seriously wounded and 150 slightly wounded. Far more serious was a direct hit on a hotel being used by 

trainee RAF aircrew; 31 service personnel were killed, three missing and 38 wounded. Two days later, Brighton suffered 

another mass attack. Again, there was five minutes warning of the attack but the fighter-bombers still succeeded in damaging 

the railway and locomotive works and appeared to be targeting, with considerable success, Brighton’s larger buildings. 

The only failure that month was on the evening of the 25th of May when adequate warning enabled Spitfires to break up an 

intended attack on Folkestone. Slowed down by their bombs, the fighter-bombers jettisoned them into the sea and turned for 

home. Spitfires claimed to have shot down six fighter-bombers but only one was lost. 

The final attacks of the month took place on the 30th of May. Torquay, another location where RAF trainee aircrew were billeted, 

had always been a popular target for ‘tip and run’ attackers; this time five servicemen were killed and 11 wounded. However, 

one of the five fighter-bombers lost in the attack did so because it collided with a church steeple; its bomb was thrown clear to 

explode on a Sunday school, killing 21 children and three of their teachers; the morale of the town’s inhabitants was, obviously, 

badly shaken and the fact that five enemy aircraft had been lost during the attack was of little recompense. An attack on 

Walton-on-the-Naze that same evening also caused much damage but no casualties. 

It could have been safe to assume that ‘tip and run’ raids in June 1943 would continue in the same vein. Indeed, this was the 

case for the five mass attacks that took place on the first six days of the month. Each attack was analysed by the British as 

being a total success, particularly the attack against Eastbourne in the early afternoon of the 6th of June 1943. However, ‘tip

112 

and run’ attacks expected on the days that followed did not materialise; no further such attacks would occur against the 

British mainland for the remainder of the war. 

The reason for the sudden cessation 

of ‘tip and run’ attacks has never 

been satisfactorily explained 

The reason for the sudden cessation of ‘tip and run’ attacks has never been 

satisfactorily explained. The Observer Corps Narrative tries to explain it by saying: 

“…at the end of the first week in June [1943], these ‘tip and run’ raids ceased. 

Undoubtedly, the enemy had found it increasingly dangerous to make daylight 

sorties over this country…” 60 

Another source supports this explanation by saying “…Göring decided that the losses were too great and in June [1943] 

the…attacks petered out…” 61 

However, I have tried to show that contrary to the above, ‘tip and run’ attacks had met with considerable success, especially 

for much of 1943, by normally hitting the designated target whilst keeping fighter-bomber losses to a minimum. There were a 

very few exceptions to this and in particular, the attacks carried out in June 1943 were seen by the British as being 100% 

successful. 

I believe that there are three simple reasons why ‘tip and run’ attacks stopped. Firstly, German post-attack intelligence, normally 

quite poor throughout the war, underestimated what the attacks had achieved; even the German radio broadcasts were 

unusually non-committal about the achievements. 62 Secondly, the Luftwaffe mistakenly believed that by using the fighter-bomber 

at night, similar results could be achieved whilst the darkness would help protect the aircraft. However, advances in British air-toair 

radar technology and the superiority of British night fighters proved that darkness was no protection, German losses were 

high and effectiveness very poor. As one German commander, who had flown such missions in 1943 and 1944, made clear 

after the war: 

“…the night action of the Focke Wulf 190 against London was not very successful. It was a real makeshift. This type of 

aircraft was neither designated for this kind of mission nor was it suitable for this task…” 63 

However, the final reason why tip and run attacks stopped was far simpler in that there were no fighter-bombers available for 

‘tip and run’ missions left in north-west Europe by the middle of June 1943. On the 12th of May 1943, German forces had 

surrendered in North Africa and it was clear that the Allies would soon invade southern Europe. The Germans thought that the 

greater threat was now in the Mediterranean, the ‘soft underbelly of Europe’, so in order to reinforce one wing of SKG 10, a 

second was rushed from France to southern Italy in the second week of June 1943 whilst a third wing was withdrawn from 

France and operational from Italy by the end of June 1943. By then, the only fighter-bomber unit still in northern France was the 

nocturnal wing of SKG 10.

So to conclude, what was the impact of the German ‘tip and run’ campaign? The Germans had discovered a unique use 

113 

for its fighter aircraft and after much trial and error and even opposition, the fighter-bomber proved to be a very effective 

weapon against shipping. Extending its usage to coastal targets was also a success and the British defences had great 

difficulty in preventing many devastating attacks on numerous coastal towns and latterly inland targets. 

For much of the 15 months that ‘tip and run’ attacks occurred, the Germans could only muster a maximum of 28 64 aircraft to 

attack targets on a coastline which stretched from Great Yarmouth to the Lizard, a distance in excess of 1300 kilometres. 

However, this length of coastline and uncertainty of what would be attacked also played into the German’s hands. There were 

insufficient anti-aircraft guns of the correct calibre to counter a low-flying high-speed threat, whilst: 

“…the RAF could offer no positive defence against these fast, low-flying fighter-bombers which achieved an effect out of all 

proportion to the effort they represented. The Chain-Home and Chain-Home Low radar stations…were unable to plot the 

movements of the jabos on account of their low altitude and Fighter Command was forced to mount standing patrols in 

order to counter the threat…” 65 

It is interesting to note that wartime analysis stated anti-aircraft guns accounted for 55 ‘tip and run’ attackers during the period 

March 1942 to the 6th of June 1943; fighters were said to have accounted for a further 51. 66 Analysis carried out by myself 

tells a different story – anti-aircraft fire actually accounted for 28 fighter-bombers, fighters a further 28, one aircraft was shared 

whilst a further five either collided with buildings, high-tension wires or other aircraft. 67 It is clear that to lose 62 aircraft and 62 

pilots over a 15 month period was high but at this stage of the war, this was sustainable. Furthermore, these losses should be 

compared against a comparable German twin-engined bomber group which, for the same period, lost 122 aircraft in attacks on 

Britain, costing in the region of 480 aircrew killed, missing or prisoners of war. 68 

From a military viewpoint, ‘tip and run’ attacks did result in many more anti-aircraft guns and associated personnel being 

dedicated to defend potential targets. Furthermore, Fighter Command was forced to dedicate many aircraft to try and prevent 

the fighter-bombers from dropping their bombs, something normally met with little success. These assets could have been 

better used. 

What of the impact on the civilian population and the Government? The inability to prevent such attacks was a great worry to 

those living on the south coast. For example, Torquay was attack eight times over the 15 months, two of the attacks being 

severe and resulting in considerable loss of life. Two other attacks in 1943 so incensed civilians living in the towns affected that 

petitions were written and questions asked in the House of Commons. However, it would appear from the non-committal 

responses that ‘tip and run’ problems were left purely to the military and ‘tip and run’ attacks remained a constant irritation to 

civilians living on or near the south coast.

114 

What then of the value of the ‘fighter-bomber’ as a weapon? The Germans did indeed develop the idea but the Allies copied 

and perfected it. Every Allied fighter introduced during the war had to have, with minimum modification, the capability of 

carrying a bomb and the best example of this was the Hawker Typhoon. In the second half of 1943, the Typhoon found a new 

role as an all-weather intruder and then close-support aircraft, armed with bombs and rockets. In the battle for Normandy in the 

Summer of 1944, the Typhoon made a name for itself as a first-class anti-tank, anti-vehicle, anti-building and anti-strongpoint 

weapons platform, something the Germans never managed to achieve after the early success of the war. 

It is therefore my conclusion that ‘tip and run’ attacks did have an impact on both the British military and, to a lesser extent, the 

civilian population living on Britain’s southern coast but there is scant evidence that the Government was overly concerned, 

unless a Member of Parliament’s constituency was a regular target. From the German viewpoint, they underestimated what they 

were achieving with what was a very small force of fighter-bombers, a force which was too small to cause massive damage. 

The decision made in 1943 to use the fighter-bomber at night was misguided and even when the Luftwaffe had a massive 

fighter-bomber force at its disposal, it failed to utilise it in a way that would have swamped British defences and allowed the 

fighter-bombers to attack more targets, further inland, with virtual impunity.

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Published Sources 

Balke, Ulf (1997) Der Luftkrieg in Europa 1941-1945 (Bechtermünz Verlag, 

Augsburg). 

Bigge, Jupp (unknown) Jagdgeschwader Richthofen Nr 2 (Privately published). 

Caldwell, Don (1996) The JG 26 War Diary Volume One (Grubb Street, London). 

Frappe, Jean-Bernard (1977) Jabo Sur La Manche (Le Fanatique de L’Aviation, 

Paris). 

Dahlman, Kurt (unknown) Die Nachtschlacht-Gruppe 20 (BA-MA RL 10-510, 

held by Bundesarchiv, Freiburg). 

Galland, Adolf (1953) The Battle of Britain (Air Ministry, London). 

Galland, Adolf (1975) The First and the Last (Fontana/Collins, London). 

Goss, Christopher (2000) The Luftwaffe’s Battle of Britain: The Fighter’s Battle 

(Crecy, Manchester). 

Krebs, Karl Klaus (1942) Der Kanalschreck greift an (W Conrad & Co, Leipzig). 

Neitzel, Sonke (1995) Der Einsatz der deutschen Luftwaffe über dem Atlantik 

und Nordsee 1939-1945 (Bernhard Graefe Verlag, Bonn). 

Pomeroy, Sqn Ldr C A (1995) Military Dorset Today (Privately published). 

Routledge, Brigadier N W (1994) History of the Royal Regiment of Artillery: Anti- 

Aircraft Artillery 1914-55 (Brasseys, London). 

Steel, Nigel & Hart, Peter (1997) Tumult in the Clouds (Hodder & Stoughton, 

London). 

Wood, Tony & Gunston, Bill (1977) Hitler’s Luftwaffe (Salamander, London). 

Ziegler, Frank (1993) Under the White Rose: The Story of 609 Squadron (Crecy, 

Bristol). 

Documentary Sources 

AI 1 (K) Report No 781/1940 Bombing with Me 109 (held by Air 

Historical Branch, London). 

AI (K) Report February 1943 Further Report on Three Aircraft of JG 26 Brought 

down on January 20th 1943 (held by Air Historical Branch, London). 

Analysis of South Coast Tip and Run Incidents (held by Air Historical Branch, 

London). 

AWA Report Numbers BC/G/11, BC/18, BC/19, BC/20 (held by Air Historical 

Branch, London). 

Diary of Day Raiding-April and May 1943 (held by Air Historical Branch, London) 

HQ No.11 Group Operations Record Book (Air 25/205) (held by Public Records 

Office, London). 

Kriegstagebuch der Seekriegsleitung (held by Bundesarchiv, Freiburg) 

Parliamentary Debates Commons 1942-43 Vol 386 (held by Public Records 

Office, London). 

Report WT.16628 83/6/43 (held by Air Historical Branch, London). 

Royal Air Force Bolt Head, Operations Record Book (Air 28) (held by Public 

Records Office, Kew). 

Royal Observer Corps Narrative 1942 (held by Air Historical Branch, London). 

Royal Observer Corps Narrative 1943 (held by Air Historical Branch, London). 

Setzer, Fritz (Private letter dated 1989). 

Shelter Damage Special Report Yeovil M.B 5/8/42 (HO192/875) (held by Public 

Records Office, Kew). 

115

116 

NOTES 

1 In 1943, this extended as far east as Great Yarmouth. 

2 Reaching a peak in the Summer of 1942. 

3 Balke, U (1997) p.389. 

4 Royal Observer Corps Narrative 1943 p.101. 

5 Balke, U (1997), p.391. 

6 Steel, N & Hart, P (1997) p.262. 

7 Ibid. 

8 Even though the convoy was nearly annihilated, eight Stukas were shot 

down and a further seven damaged. 

9 AI 1 (K) Report No 781/1940. 

10 Caldwell, D (1996) p.71. 

11 Goss, C H (2000) p.145. 

12 Galland, A (1975) p.50. 

13 Galland, A (1953) p.28. 

14 Ibid. 

15 Bigge, J p.19. 

16 Frappe, J-B (1977) p.12. 


18 Occupied Europe was divided up by Air Fleets by the Luftwaffe, Air Fleet 3 

covering much of France. 

19 Caldwell, D (1996) p.214. 

20 Pomeroy, C A (1995) p.115. 

21 This took place on the 28th of February 1942 when British commandos 

captured German radar equipment. 

22 Balke, U (1997) p.389. 

23 Royal Observer Corps Narrative 1942, p.86. 

24 Routledge, N W (1994) p.402. 

25 Both. 303 calibre machine-guns. 

26 40mm calibre. 

27 RAF Bolt Head Operations Record Book, 1 May 42. 

28 Neitzel, S (1995) p. 127. 

29 Analysis of South Coast Tip & Run Incidents (7/43). 


31 Ibid. 

32 A reference to the unit badge, a red fox carrying a ship in its mouth. 

33 Krebs, K K (1942) p.58. 

34 HO192/875. 

35 KTB Skl p.675. 

36 Five were lost of which only two were shot down by fighter aircraft. 

37 Ziegler, F (1993) p.248. 

38 Ibid pp.253-254. 

39 Ibid p.254. 

40 Caldwell, D (1996) p.300. 

41 AWA Report Number BC/G/11 p.2. 

42 WT.16628 83/6/43 p.35. 

43 BC/G/11 p.3. 

44 Routledge, N W (1994) p.403. 

45 Ibid. 

46 Parliamentary Debates Commons 1942-43 Vol. 386 p.477. 

47 Ibid. 

48 AI (K) Report Feb 43 p.5; there is no evidence that this was the norm but 

that it was a tactic reserved for ‘vengeance’ attacks. 


50 HQ No 11 Group Operations Record Book, March 1943, p.7. 

51 AWA Report No BC/18 May 1943 p.7.

52 Fast Bomber Group 10. 

53 Balke, U (1997) p.389. 

54 Setzer, F (1989). 

55 AWA Report No BC/20 p.2. 

56 Reference to the new unit, SKG 10, which was thought to be using a 

newer and faster FW 190 which was in fact not the case. 

57 AWA Report No BC/19 p.1. 

58 AWA Report BC/20 p.4. 

59 Diary of Day Raiding - April and May 1943 p.2. 

60 Royal Observer Corps Narrative 1943 pp.101-102. 

61 Routledge, N W (1994) p.404. 

62 Diary of Day Raiding – April and May 1943. 

63 Dahlmann, K p.81. 

64 Assuming 100% serviceability which was never achieved. 

65 Wood, T & Gunston, B (1977) p.62. 

66 Routledge, N W (1994) p.404. 

67 Sources for the German losses are the Luftwaffe Quartermaster General’s 

Returns and Deutche Dienststelle. Sources for how these aircraft were 

shot down came from the Command, Group and Squadron Records books 

held either at the Air Historical Branch or Public Records Office. 

68 Balke, U (1997) pp.428-457. 

117

Air Power Taken to its Limits, and Beyond 

The 

Battle of Amiens 

(8-11 Aug 1918)

By Dr Alfred Price FRHistS 

119 

In July 1918 the British Fourth Army and the neighbouring French First Army prepared an offensive along the 28-mile section 

of the line in front of Amiens. In the previous April the German offensive in that area had come to a halt just in front of the 

city. An important communications centre, Amiens was now within range of German long-range artillery and suffered from 

frequent shelling. One aim of the new offensive was to push the front line back far enough to remove that threat. 

The German Army regarded this part of the front was as a jumping off point for a future advance, rather than as a barrier to 

repel an Allied offensive. Consequently the defences there were relatively weak, with no bunkers or concrete fortifications to 

protect troops against an artillery bombardment. 1 

The Allies took pains with camouflage to conceal the preparations for the new offensive. There was plenty to hide. The British 

Fourth Army was reinforced by five infantry divisions, two cavalry divisions, nine armoured battalions with 462 heavy and 72 

light tanks, and one thousand additional artillery pieces. Nearly 300 extra trains ran into the Fourth Army area, in addition to its 

normal traffic. 2 Generally poor weather during the first week in August assisted in keeping these moves secret. On 7 August the 

skies cleared, and RAF fighters flew a vigorous programme of barrier patrols to prevent enemy planes photographing or 

otherwise observing the rear areas.

AIR ORDERS OF BATTLE 

The RAF’s 5th Brigade was the formation normally attached to the British Fourth Army. During the two days preceding the 

offensive its strength was much increased with the arrival of units from 9th Brigade, the General Headquarters reserve held for 

that purpose. Also 3rd Brigade, assigned to the neighbouring sector, sent its units into action over the battle area. 

120 

When the offensive opened the RAF units supporting it possessed about eight hundred aircraft, divided as follows: 3 

Single-seat fighters (Sopwith Camel, Sopwith Dolphin, SE 5A) 376 

Fighter-reconnaissance (Bristol Fighter F2B) 75 

Day bombers (DH 4, DH 9) 147 

Night bombers (Handley Page 0/400, Fe 2D) 92 

Corps (army co-operation) aircraft (RE 8, Armstrong Whitworth FK 8) 110 

In addition there were eight Sections of tethered observation balloons in the battle area, each operating one balloon. 

The French air units supporting the French First Army possessed 1,104 aircraft, divided as follows: 4 

Single-seat fighters (Nieuport 28, SPAD XIII) 612 

Day bombers (Breguet 14, Salmson A.2) 195 

Night bombers (Farman F. 50) 52 

Corps (army co-operation) aircraft (Breguet 14, Salmson A.2, SPAD XVI) 245 

The number of observation balloons in position in that 

sector is not known, but was probably about ten. 

Thus the total Allied air strength positioned along the 25- 

mile wide front to support the offensive amounted to about 

1,900 combat aircraft and about eighteen observation 

balloons. There was no shortage of landing grounds within 

easy reach of the battle area. 

…the total Allied air strength positioned along 

the 25-mile wide front to support the offensive 

amounted to about 1,900 combat aircraft…

The German Air Service units supporting the Second Army facing the offensive possessed 365 aircraft of all types, divided 

as follows: 5 

Single-seat fighters (Fokker D VII, Pfalz XIII, Albatross D III) 140 

Bombers (AEG G4) 36 

Ground attack aircraft (Halberstadt CV, Junkers J.1, AEG J1) 18 

Corps (army co-operation) aircraft (Halberstadt CV, Junkers J.1, AEG J1, 

LVG C.VI, DFW CV) 171 

The number of observation balloons in position in that sector when the offensive opened is not known, but it was probably 

about four. It is likely that more arrived in the battle area after the offensive opened. 

121 

RELATIVE EQUIPMENT OF THE OPPOSING AIR FORCES 

The latest BMW-engined version of the German Fokker D. VII fighter was now in service with several front-line units. As fast as the 

fastest Allied fighter types at altitude, its rate of climb was superior to any of them making it a formidable opponent in close 

combat. 6 The availability of the D. VII would be a major factor in enabling the outnumbered German flying units to continue 

effective resistance during the final months of the war. The Allied fighter type that came closest to matching the performance of the 

D.VII was the newly-introduced Sopwith Dolphin, 7 but only two squadrons of these fighters were in place to support the offensive. 

The German Air Service also had the advantage of possessing armoured aircraft for low altitude operations over the battle area. 

The AEG J-1 and Junkers J-1 aircraft carried sheets of armour plate 5 mm thick to protect their two-man crews and, in the case 

of the latter, the engine. Neither the Allied front-line troops nor their covering fighter units possessed automatic weapons larger 

than rifle calibre, so the armoured aircraft were able to operate at low altitude over the battle area with a high degree of impunity. 8 

As well as being heavily outnumbered, the German Air Service had to contend with the cumulative effects of an Allied naval 

blockade that had lasted four years. The German fighter ace Ernst Udet later wrote: 

“The strain of the war increased from day to day. For every one of our machines which took-off, five enemy machines 

started. And should one of them happen to be brought down on our side of the line we pounced upon it, and eagerly 

seized all instruments and articles of nickel and brass – metals which had long since ceased to exist in Germany. Against 

the abundant supplies at the disposal of the enemy, we had nothing to stake save our sense of duty and four years’ 

fighting experience. Now each start [take off] meant a fight, and we started often.” 9 

Against the abundant supplies at the disposal of the enemy, we had nothing to stake save our sense of 

duty and four years’ fighting experience

122 

Among other items in very short supply were copper, rubber and leather, as well as a whole range of foodstuffs. 

THE RAF PLAN 

During the battle the French Air Force units in the south flew a similar pattern of operations to those of the RAF. The account 

that follows will concentrate on the RAF plan and its execution, however. 

The RAF plan to support for the Amiens offensive was more detailed and ambitious than any previously attempted. In addition 

to the normal air superiority, reconnaissance, contact patrol and artillery direction tasks, the following were ordered: 10 

(i) Soon after dawn on the first day, day bomber squadrons were to attack the main German airfields. 

(ii) Eight RAF fighter squadrons, with about 150 aircraft, were to deliver low-flying bombing and strafing attacks on enemy 

troops moving towards or away from the battle area. 

(iii) On the evening of the first day, when enemy reinforcements were expected to arrive in the battle area, day-bomber 

squadrons with fighter support were to hit the rail stations at Peronne, Chaulnes, Marchelepot, Villers Carbonnel, and 

Etricourt. 

During this operation, for the first time, a squadron of Armstrong Whitworth FK 8 army co-operation planes was to work with the 

tank units, with an allocation of one flight of six aircraft to each of the three tank brigades. Before the battle these aircraft flew 

photographic sorties over the ground over which tanks were to pass, so tank commanders could pick suitable lanes through the 

defences. Once the offensive began, the aircraft were to fly contact patrols and deliver reports on the vehicles’ progress to the 

various headquarters. These planes also were to scout the ground ahead of the advancing tanks, searching for enemy anti-tank 

gun positions which were to be put out of action by direct air attack or by air-directed artillery fire. Although there had been several 

experiments with systems to provide direct communication between tanks and aircraft, none had proved successful. 11 

On the first morning, two squadrons of RE 8s were to drop lines of phosphorous bombs to produce smoke screens ahead of 

the advancing troops, to screen them from view. Later, one of these squadrons would be employed in parachuting boxes 

containing 1,000 belted rounds of machine gun ammunition, to units near the head of the attack that had run short. 12 

COURSE OF THE BATTLE 

On the nights of August 6/7 and 7/8, a pair of twin-engined Handley Page 0/400 bombers flew up and down the front line for 

several hours dropping bombs and strafing any source of light seen in enemy territory. Any damage caused was incidental; the 

primary purpose of these flights was to conceal the noise from the British tanks as they moved into position for the attack. 13

More than 1,380 field guns and howitzers, 

123 

and 826 heavy guns, supported the 

offensive. At 0420 hours on 8 August these 

commenced a hurricane artillery barrage on the 

German forward positions, designated artillery 

batteries and other important targets. The torrent 

of high explosive and shrapnel shells arrived as a 

fortuitously thick blanket of mist covered much of 

the area. Three minutes after the barrage began, 

the gunners began a creeping barrage that 

advanced in 100-yard steps every three minutes. 

Following the barrage, British, Australian and 

Canadian infantry and tanks began their 

methodical advance. Their advance concealed by 

the mist, these troops quickly overran the German 

Any damage caused was incidental; the primary purpose of forward positions and moved on. 14 

these flights was to conceal the noise from the British tanks Lieutenant Paul Winslow US Air Corps, flying an 

as they moved into position for the attack 

SE 5A with No 56 Squadron RAF, took part in a 

dawn patrol over the battle area that morning. 

Later he noted in his diary: 

“We took off while it was still dark and got to 12,000 feet. All that could be seen were hundreds of our machines and 

thousands of gun flashes, denoting the top of the barrage. It was a wonderful sight to watch, and we were not bothered 

by Archie [anti-aircraft fire] so we could enjoy it. Landed at 7:00 am.” 15 

Lower down, the mist greatly hindered the work of those units assigned to the army co-operation and ground strafing tasks. 

Writing of the RE 8 operations that morning by No 3 Squadron Australian Flying Corps, the Official Australian Historian noted: 

“In the event the airmen saw little of the opening of the attack. From the moment of `zero’ (4.20 am) till nearly 10 o’ clock in 

the forenoon fog assisted the artifice of the smoke-screens on the Somme in hiding all the conflict in the valleys and copses 

between Cerisy and Warfusee…The infantry attack, however, met with little or no difficulty. A lifting of the fog enabled 

contact patrols to locate the line at 10 am and 11.30. So swift and complete was the advance that the artillery and counterattack 

machines had very little of their contemplated work to do. The German batteries were smashed or overrun. The 

German infantry delivered no counter-attack, for the simple reason that its reserves were rounded up and captured.” 16

A few words are necessary at this point, to explain the various roles undertaken by the two-seat army co-operation planes 

124 

operating over the battle area. Each Royal Air Force plane engaged in this work carried a Sterling spark transmitter 

operating in the 2-Megahertz band, with a maximum range of about 10 miles. These planes did not carry wireless 

receivers, however. The crews transmitted reports in Morse code, but messages from the ground to the aircraft were passed by 

signal lamp or by means of large signal panels laid out on the ground. 17 

The purpose of the contact patrols was to establish the location of the forward elements of the attacking infantry and tank 

units. Flown at altitudes below 1,000 feet, the mission required the aircraft to fly a series of tracks parallel to the start line and 

advancing methodically forwards. In those pre-R/T days, communications had to be improvised. At intervals the contact patrol 

aircraft sounded a Klaxon horn with the Morse letter “A” (dot dash) to ask “Where are you?” On hearing that signal, infantrymen 

responded by lighting flares and displaying reflective metal discs carried for the purpose. Once the forward edge of the battle 

line had been determined, the observer marked this on maps. These were placed in weighted message bags and delivered to 

the appropriate division, the corps and the army headquarters. 18 Typical contact patrol reports from RE 8s of No 3 Squadron 

Australian Flying Corps that day ran: 

“Lt R Armstrong pilot, Lt F. Hart observer. Contact patrol, airborne 10.30 landed at 11.30. Flares called for at 10.50 am 

and 11.30. Our line apparently runs [series of map references given]. Message and map dropped at 5th Australian Division, 

Australian Corps and 4th Army report centre. Height 1,000 feet. Tanks and infantry moving forward without opposition.” 

“Lt Foale and Lt F. Sewell. Contact patrol, take off 11 am landed at 1220. Right division sector. Flares called for at 11.30. 

Line appears to run, [map references given]. Message and map dropped to 5th Australian Division, Australian Corps and 

Fourth Army Report Centre. Our troops and tanks well forward. Enemy shelling at [map reference]. Also scattered shelling 

all over the front. Our cavalry behind Harbonniers, also small body of cavalry along road in [map reference]. Discs were very 

easily distinguished, flares were difficult to see.” 19 

If a contact patrol ventured too far forward in the crew’s efforts to determine the extent of the troops’ advance, enemy tracer 

rounds heading in their direction would announce the fact. These planes were also in danger from the hundreds of “friendly” 

and enemy artillery shells passing over the battle area on their way to targets. Last, and certainly not least, there was the risk of 

attack from enemy planes engaged in the same task. 20 It was dangerous work, but it was vitally important to the success of the 

army’s operation. Ground commanders required regular reports on the progress of their forces, if they were to exert any degree 

of effective control over their forces. 

Another important role carried out by army co-operation planes was that of mounting artillery-spotting patrols up to 10 miles 

beyond the front line, usually at altitudes above 7,000 feet. These planes had the task of calling down artillery fire on enemy 

batteries in action and not being engaged, and other worthwhile targets. Usually the pilot controlled the shoot by wireless, while 

the observer kept a wary eye for approaching German fighters.

A further role of the army co-operation planes during an offensive was that of maintaining patrols to warn of imminent 

125 

counter-attack. These planes operated in the same area as the artillery spotters but at altitudes around 2,000 feet, as they 

searched for enemy infantry concentrations. On seeing such a concentration, the crew would call down artillery fire on it. 

Then the plane was to descend to low altitude and fly over the threatened friendly troops, heading for the centre of the enemy 

concentration and discharging a series of red flares to warn of the danger. 21 The report from one such patrol on that day, again 

from No 3 Squadron AFC, ran: 

“Lt Roberts, Lt Wilson. Took off 4.30 [pm], down at 6.15. Area as far east as Chuignolles through Foucaucourt – 

Vermandoville [7 miles east of the start line] under observation. No sign of impending counter attack.” 22 

Throughout the day eight RAF fighter squadrons delivered low-altitude bombing and strafing attacks on retiring enemy troops. 

These Sopwith Camels, Sopwith Dolphins and SE 5As were armed with two .303-in machine guns and four 25-pound bombs. 

Each squadron sent out pairs of fighters at 20-minute intervals, to comb the battle area looking for targets of opportunity. On that 

first morning these attacks, made on enemy troops forced out into the open as they pulled back, hastened the collapse of the 

German defences at some points. 23 Major Raymond Collishaw, commanding No 203 Squadron with Sopwith Camels, later wrote: 

“As in the case of the big German pushes earlier in the year 

Each squadron sent out pairs of 

there was a heavy ground mist but this time it favoured us 

and not the enemy. Despite this fog we were able to get off fighters at 20-minute intervals, 

the ground about 5 o’clock and throughout the day flew a to comb the battle area looking 

series of low-level bombing and strafing attacks on the 

for targets of opportunity 

Fourth army front against infantry, vehicles and other targets 

on the Roye road that leads to the south-east out of Amiens. 

I led four patrols during the day and although this low-level 

work was no more popular than it had been during the 

German advances in March and April, it was comforting to 

know that this time it was in support of an offensive of our own 

and that it was the enemy who was on the defensive. My 

logbook shows that I put in 11 hours 20 minutes in the air 

during the day, all at heights of 100 feet or less.” 24 

Lacking armour protection, the fighters were ill equipped for this 

hazardous task. Collishaw’s unit escaped loss on 8 August, but 

others were not so fortunate. Hardest hit was No 201 Squadron, 

also with Camels, which lost seven aircraft that day with one pilot 

killed and five taken prisoner. 25

Six squadrons of RAF fighters, with about 110 aircraft, flew offensive patrols over the battle area to drive away enemy 

126 

aircraft. Throughout the day, these fighters were involved in several skirmishes. One of the largest of these involved six 

Camels of No 65 Squadron, two SE 5As of No 41 Squadron and a Bristol Fighter of No 48 Squadron. Captain James 

White, leading the Camels, later reported: 

“About 12.25 p.m. I was attacked by 8 E.A. and climbed west and met Capt Brookes [and his flight]. I led the combined 

formation to attack the EA. During the fight which ensued I got on the tail of one EA and after firing a short burst it turned 

on its back and fell out of control. I got on the tail of another EA and chased it west. The remaining Camels all gathered 

behind this EA and it was forced to land behind our lines.” 26 

A further important task assigned to both sides’ fighters was the destruction of enemy observation balloons. Each balloon 

carried a couple of observers linked to the ground by a telephone cable, and would call down accurate artillery fire on enemy 

troops and other targets. Filled with potentially explosive hydrogen gas, lacking onboard defensive weapons and sitting 

stationary in space at altitudes between 3,000 and 4,000 feet, the balloons might seem an easy prey. Yet as many a fighter 

pilot discovered, this was not the case. 

Hydrogen in an enclosed container – such as a balloon envelope – is not inflammable. Like petrol, it becomes explosive only if 

mixed with air in the correct ratio. To set a balloon ablaze a fighter pilot had first to puncture the envelope to allow the hydrogen 

to escape and mix with the surrounding air. To ignite the mixture the attacking pilot had to concentrate his fire on the same part 

of the balloon, often closing to within 50 yards before breaking off the attack. If the balloon was wet or the air was damp, 

getting the hydrogen-air mixture to ignite often proved frustratingly difficult. 

Light machine guns and anti-aircraft guns were positioned beside the balloon winch to deter attacking fighters. Lookouts were 

continually on watch for approaching hostile planes. If an enemy aircraft closed on the balloon, on a warning from the ground 

the observers jumped from their basket and descended by parachute. Meanwhile the ground crew winched down the balloon 

as rapidly as possible, presenting the attacker with a difficult descending target. 

Once the Allied offensive began, German balloon units in front of the advance had to pull back to avoid capture. During these 

moves the balloons, flying close hauled just above the ground, made enticing if not easy targets. At 10 am Lieutenant Norman 

Mawle of No 84 Squadron, flying an SE 5A, came upon a pair of observation balloons in the process of moving back. The 

report of the action stated: 

“While on a ground strafing expedition Lt Mawle sighted two enemy balloons, each being towed by a team of horses, east 

of Harbonniers… He dived on the first, but did not succeed in shooting it down. Heedless of machine guns being fired 

from the ground, he turned and dived on the second, which was approximately at a height of 25 feet. He fired into it 

causing it to burst into flames. He immediately made a climbing turn and dived on the first balloon but, however, was 

unsuccessful.” 27

Mawle was hit in one wrist and his stomach but succeeded in regaining his base. In the course of the day, SE 5A pilots 

127 

claimed the destruction of five more German balloons. 28 A German pilot attacked one RAF balloon, but although his rounds 

punctured the envelope they failed to ignite the gas. 29 

THE BOMBERS STRIKE 

The RAF plan called for the day-bomber units operating de Havilland 4s and DH 9s to attack the German airfields at Moislains, 

St Christ and Bouvincourt to disrupt air operations on the first day of the offensive. In each case cloud hindered and in some 

cases prevented the attackers from finding their targets. 

Ten DH 4s of No 57 Squadron, flying in to two “V” formations each of five aircraft, attacked the airfield at Moislains at 8.10 am. 

Five of the planes carried two 112-pound bombs each; the other five carried twelve 25-pounders each. The two formations 

crossed the front line at 7,000 feet and on reaching the target area they separated. Each DH 4 descended individually to 

between 1,000 and 2,000 feet to deliver their bombs. 30 Lieutenant Andrew MacGregor, piloting one of the bombers, later wrote: 

“To achieve success, surprise is vital. On this occasion we had arrived over the German aerodrome and, coming down 

through the light clouds, had carried out the attack before the people on the ground understood what was happening. The 

attack was very successful, two sheds being destroyed with the aircraft inside them, as well as two fighters on the tarmac 

outside. Re-organising the formations at a distance from the objective, all aeroplanes flew to the lines at a low height.” 31 

As the attackers withdraw, several Fokker D.VIIs engaged the bombers and shot down one. MacGregor’s observer fired at a 

Fokker and was credited with sending it down out of control. Another DH 4 crew also claimed the destruction of an enemy fighter. 32 

No 205 Squadron’s DH 4s set out to attack the airfield at Bouvincourt: one flight attacked the target but the results were not 

observed. The other flight failed to locate the target and instead bombed the railway station at Chaulnes. 33 

The force sent to deliver the initial attack on St Christ airfield, comprising fourteen DH 9s of No 27 Squadron, failed to find the 

airfield and instead bombed targets of opportunity near Peronne. Later in the day eight DH 9s of No 98 Squadron found the 

airfield and bombed it, causing some damage. 34 

THE AIR ATTACK SHIFTS TO THE BRIDGES 

During the late morning, RAF crews returning from operations spoke of severe congestion on roads leading to the bridges over 

the River Somme as German troops began to pull back. For example Lieutenants Hellet and Blair, each flying an SE 5A of No 

48 Squadron, returned from a reconnaissance patrol over enemy territory at 11 am to report: 

“General line of our tanks Guillaucourt – Caix. General enemy movement Eastward. EKB [enemy kite balloon] being towed 

E towards Harbonnieres. Caix being evacuated. Train going east from Rosieres. Artillery retiring at [map ref].” 35

At 1.pm the crew of a Bristol Fighter of No 48 Squadron returned from a reconnaissance patrol over another part of the 

128 

front at 2,000 feet, and filed a report similar in tone: 

“Corbie – Bray Road, from [map ref] to Bray congested with mixed traffic moving East. From [map ref] to Proyart road full 

of horsed transport moving East. Amiens – St Quentin Road between Proyart and Estrees seen to be congested with 

mixed traffic, general trend easterly…” 36 

If the Somme bridges could be broken, the German troops’ escape would be problematical. Accordingly Major General John 

Salmond, the RAF commander, cancelled his planned programme of attacks by the day bombers and ordered that the Somme 

bridges were to be bombed “as long as weather and light permits”. Fighters were to join in the attacks, each carrying their 

usual load of four 25-pound bombs. 37 

The bridge at Brie, an essential artery, was allocated to the DH 4s of 205 Squadron and the DH 9s of No 107 Squadron; each 

plane carried two 112-pound bombs. The Sopwith Camels of No 54 Squadron, each carrying four 25-pound bombs, 

supported the attack. Descending below 1,000 feet so pilots could deliver their bombs “by eye”, the bombers aimed fifty-six 

112-pounders at the bridge without inflicting any serious damage. The Camels’ 25-pounders caused some casualties against 

German troops on their way to the bridge. The same units repeated their attack on the bridge during the afternoon, again 

without success. One DH 9 and one Camel were lost. 38 

The bridge at Bethencourt twice came under attack from DH 9s of No 49 Squadron assisted by SE 5As of No 32 Squadron, 

but emerged unscathed. In these actions three DH 9s were lost and two more suffered severe damage. 39 

The DH 9s of No 27 Squadron delivered unsuccessful attacks on the bridges at Voyennes, Pithon and Offoy, supported by Camels 

of No 73 Squadron. There the raiders came under attack from enemy fighters, which shot down two DH 9s and two Camels. 40 

The bridges at Peronne came under attack from the DH 9s of No 98 Squadron, the SE 5A’s of No 1 Squadron and the Camels 

of No 43 Squadron, but without success. One DH 9 and three Camels were lost during the engagement. 41 

OTHER TARGETS 

No 22 Squadron sent fifteen Bristol F2B Fighters to escort the DH 4s of No 18 Squadron attacking the important Somain rail 

junction, through which German reinforcements would need to pass in order to reach the battle area from points to the north. 

German fighters attempted to engage these bombers, but on each occasion the escorting Bristol Fighters drove them away 

and the force suffered no losses. 42

From the afternoon of the first day, German air 

reinforcements began arriving in the area. The most 

significant of these was Jagdgeschwader 1 

equipped with the newest version of the Fokker D.VII 

THE DEFENCE STIFFENS 

From the afternoon of the first day, German air 

reinforcements began arriving in the area. The most significant 

of these was Jagdgeschwader 1 equipped with the newest 

version of the Fokker D.VII. Oberleutnant Hermann Goering 

commanded the unit, but he was on leave at the time and 

played no part in the battle. Leutnant Lothar von Richthofen, 

(brother to Manfred, the top scoring German pilot of the 

conflict, who had been killed a few months earlier) held 

temporary charge of the unit. 43 A skilful air fighter himself, 

Lothar von Richthofen had been credited with 32 aerial 

victories to date. 

Jagdgeschwader 1 moved to its new base at Ennemain close 

to the new battle area from Laon, some 60 miles to the 

southeast, bringing only 21 fighters out of its established 

strength of 52. Knowing that a hard fight was in the offing, von 

Richthofen had decided to leave his novice pilots behind even 

though this greatly reduced the effective strength of his Staffel. 

Later he wrote on the unit’s state that day: 

“I was flying with Lowenhardt and the best men from our two Staffeln. In my Staffel, things were very shaky. There was 

actually only one [other] pilot who was any good. It was the same with Lowenhardt’s Staffel. The best had fallen; the new 

pilots were good for very little.” 44 

Leutnant Erich Lowenhardt, top scorer in the Geschwader at that time, was credited with 49 victories. 

Lieutenant Ernst Udet, credited with 44 victories up to that morning, led other fighters of JG 1 to the new base. He later wrote: 

“The further we went the more evidence we saw of the desperate character of the fighting that was taking place below. Near 

Fontaine le Cappy, I discovered an enemy infantry co-operation machine, flying low over our trenches. Detaching myself from 

the flight, I dived at him, and opened fire. After about twenty rounds, the ‘plane was struck in a vital part, and crashed near the 

trenches. The time was in the afternoon, and our petrol would not last much beyond [half an hour]. Our supplies were getting 

low, [because] we took-off with half-filled tanks. Of late it had been very difficult to get sufficient petrol for ordinary pur-poses, let 

alone for a longish cross-country flight, such as we were now engaged upon. It was imperative that we should land and refuel.” 

129

130 

“Below us lay a small aerodrome, and we dropped on to it like starlings on to a field of corn. Machine stood by machine, 

until the whole ‘drome was covered. The flight commanders reported to the com-mandant of the aerodrome, a charming 

man, who would have been delighted to help us, had he not required the petrol for his own machines …Eventually we 

managed to persuade the commandant to provide the necessary ‘schnapps’ for our machines. There would be just 

enough to last us for ten minutes’ flying, just enough to take us to our destination.” 45 

LOSSES 

During the first day of the offensive the RAF suffered relatively heavy losses – 42 aircraft destroyed and 52 damaged beyond 

During the first day of the offensive the RAF suffered relatively 

heavy losses – 42 aircraft destroyed and 52 damaged 

beyond repair – about 13 per cent of the sorties flown 

repair – about 13 per cent of the sorties flown. The 

heaviest losses were suffered by the fighter and 

bomber units making low altitude attacks on ground 

targets, amounting to 23 per cent of their sorties. 46 

Many of these planes fell to ground fire. Of the 

77 aircrew aboard these planes 31 were killed, 13 were 

wounded and 33 were taken prisoner. 

German losses during these actions were far less, 

around ten aircraft. Yet, while the RAF could easily 

replace the pilots and planes it lost, by this stage of the 

war any gaps in the German ranks were difficult to fill. 

By nightfall on the first day, the leading tank and 

infantry units had advanced seven miles. By the 

standards of that conflict, British and Commonwealth 

troop losses had been light at around 9,000 killed, 

wounded, missing and taken prisoner. German records 

give their losses during the day at 28,000 of all ranks, 

including 15,000 taken prisoner. 47 

During the night of 8th/9th, RAF night bomber units 

maintained the attack on bridges over the River Somme, 

still without success. Up to dawn on the 9th a total of 

162 sorties had been flown against eleven bridges.

THE FOLLOWING DAYS 

On the second day of the offensive, 9 August, German resistance in the air stiffened further with the arrival of more units 

from other parts of the front. The pattern of operations by the RAF continued much as on the previous day, though two fighter 

squadrons switched from ground strafing to flying offensive patrols over the battle area. The Somme bridges remained the main 

target for the day bombers, with 173 sorties flown against these and 33 flown against other (mainly rail) targets. One bomb hit 

the bridge at Brie, but the damage was not serious and the structure continued in use. 48 

No 8 Squadron, the unit assigned to assist the tank units, successfully reported the positions of the leading tanks, as well as 

those that had broken down and needed recovery. The attempt to use aircraft to locate and knock out enemy anti-tank guns 

ahead of the tank advance was a failure, however. During the first two days of the offensive, the squadron found and attacked 

only one such position. 

Total RAF losses on the second day were 45 aircraft shot down or damaged beyond repair. 49 

On the third day (10 August) the RAF continued with this general pattern of operations, having received a reinforcement of five 

squadrons with about ninety fighters to replace aircraft lost. 50 

By this time small numbers of German assault planes, some fitted with protective armour, were operating at low altitude over 

the battle area. On the evening of the 10th German low flying ground attack planes, assisted by ground artillery, halted an 

Australian advance along the Amiens – Brie road. To protect British ground forces from these low flying planes, further RAF 

fighters were switched from ground staffing to low altitude counter-air patrols. 51 

On the 10th the Somme bridges remained the main targets for the day bombers, though there was some reduction in 

emphasis: 105 sorties were flown against the bridges, compared with 93 against all other targets. Following the losses incurred 

during the previous two days the bombers now delivered their attacks from higher altitudes, around 10,000 feet, to remain 

beyond the reach of effective ground fire. 52 This further reduced their chances of hitting those small targets, however. 

On the final day of the offensive (the 11 th ), the entire RAF fighter force was employed on counter-air patrols and these planes 

delivered no attacks on ground targets. The bombers moved their attack away from the Somme bridges (25 sorties) and 

concentrated on other targets, mainly rail facilities (93 sorties). 53 

On the afternoon of the 11th, the Allied ground offensive ended. The troops had broken into the German defensive line and 

advanced up to 12 miles in places, but there had been no breakthrough. With the arrival of large German troop reinforcements, 

the law of diminishing returns took effect. In contrast to the long battles of attrition that had proved so costly in the past, the 

Allied commanders had decided this would be a “bite and hold” operation. 

131

Throughout the battle there had been considerable air activity. The outnumbered German fighter units gave a good 

132 

account of themselves, but suffered heavy casualties in proportion to their numbers. The Jagdgeschwader 1, for example, 

was reduced to 11 fighters and had to withdraw from the battle to reform. 

On the evening of the 11 August, German night bombers achieved a rare success for this type of mission. Ten twin-engined 

bombers attacked two mechanical transport depots near Calais and set both ablaze. About a hundred vehicles, and huge 

quantities of spare parts, were lost. 

During the Amiens offensive in 1918 the RAF employed a greater concentration of aircraft than ever before, in its efforts to 

support the ground forces. In this section we shall consider which aspects of air power proved effective, and which did not. 

First, let us look at those aspects of air power that provided major assistance to the ground forces. Prior to the offensive, the 

RAF and the French Air Force successfully prevented German reconnaissance planes from photographing or otherwise 

observing the preparations. During the two nights leading up to the attack, aircraft flying up and down the front line successfully 

masked the sounds of tanks moving to their attack positions. Taken together, these moves prevented the defenders gaining an 

inkling of what was afoot. Only when the bombardment opened was there a clear indication that the Allies were attacking at 

that point on the front. Surprise is the most important single ingredient for a successful land attack, and it is impossible to 

exaggerate its importance on this occasion. 

Also prior to the offensive, the systematic Allied photography of the German defences allowed the gunners to pre-register 

targets for engagement once the preparatory bombardment started. Those targets were hit even though the mist on the first 

morning prevented visual observation. 

When the mist cleared on the first day, artillery fire designated from the air inflicted considerable damage and helped to unhinge 

the defences. Reports from aircraft on contact patrols and counter-attack patrols were invaluable in providing commanders with 

information on the course of the battle and the locations of the leading troops. That made possible the effective deployment of 

reserves, the effective use of artillery, etc. 

The vigorous patrolling by the Allied fighters over the battle area made life difficult for German aircraft flying contact or artillery 

patrols. During their forays over the battle area German two-seaters flew in units of three or five planes for mutual protection, 

often with single-seat fighters providing top cover. 

Once German troops were forced to leave their trenches and began to withdraw, the strafing and bombing attacks by low flying 

fighters added greatly to the confusion. Apart from the casualties caused, these operations delayed the re-establishment of an 

effective defensive line. The squadrons involved in these attacks suffered serious losses from ground fire, however. 

Now let us look at those aspects of air power which failed to make any major contribution to the land battle. Despite the large 

number of sorties flown, the RAF day bombers inflicted little physical damage of any importance. Initially the day bombers

attacked airfield and rail targets. One airfield attack inflicted moderate damage, the rest were failures. There is no evidence 

133 

that any bomber attack on a rail target caused any serious delay in the inflow of German reinforcements. From the first 

afternoon, the day bombers switched their attacks to the Somme bridges. They scored hits on one or maybe two of the 

structures, but no bridge was rendered unusable. 

The main reasons for the RAF bombers’ failure to inflict significant damage were the inaccuracy of the bombing and the use of 

light bombs with feeble explosive power. The de Havilland 4 and DH 9 bombers involved in the attacks each carried two 112- 

pound bombs or twelve 25-pounders. The sights used for high altitude bombing were rudimentary, while during low level 

attacks the bombs were usually released “by eye”. Given the limited weight and accuracy of the attacks, bridges and railway 

installations were not suitable as targets since the chances of success were minimal. Several decades would pass before there 

was a full appreciation of the limited destructive power of high explosive bombs, when these failed to score direct hits. 

As mentioned above, the attempt to use aircraft to locate and knock out enemy anti-tank guns ahead of the tank advance was 

also a failure. During the first two days of the offensive, only one such position was attacked. In the course of its low flying 

operations over the battle area to assist the tanks, No 8 Squadron lost half of its eighteen planes for the most part to ground fire. 

From the early afternoon of the first day, once the panic withdrawal by German troops ended, the 

effectiveness of the low altitude bombing and strafing attacks by RAF fighters rapidly diminished. 

After the war Wing Commander (later Marshal of the RAF Sir) John Slessor conducted a detailed 

study of air operations during the Amiens battle. His candid and perceptive comments on the use 

of air power during the battle appeared in the 1936 book “Air Power and Armies”. They are 

appropriate to round off this study: 

“In the event, the RAF made two contributions of great importance to the success of the 

initial attack on August 8th. First, the complete surprise achieved was largely due to the high 

degree of air superiority prevailing… Secondly the action of the low-flying fighters on the 8th 

was a factor of first-class importance in the overwhelming success of the initial break-in. But 

apart from those two factors it is impossible to assert with any confidence that the result of 

the battle after about 1400 hours on the 8th [the first day of the offensive] would have been 

materially different, or that the ultimate line reached and held by our forward troops on the 

11th [the last day] would have been materially short of where in fact it was, if not a bomb 

had been dropped or a round fired by aircraft against ground objectives.” 

“If this is so it is a damaging admission, in view of the fact that this battle saw the greatest 

concentration of air strength in any battle of the War…” 54 

…it is impossible to assert 

with any confidence that 

the result of the battle on 

the first day of the offensive 

would have been materially 

different, or that the 

ultimate line reached and 

held by our forward troops 

on the last day would have 

been materially short of 

where in fact it was, if not a 

bomb had been dropped 

or a round fired by aircraft 

against ground objectives

134 

NOTES 

1. Johnson, J., “1918 The Unexpected Victory”, Cassell, London 1999, 

p 90. 

2. Slessor, J.C. “Air Power and Armies”, Oxford University Press, London, 

1936, p 154. 

3. Ibid p 218, 219. 

4. Jones, H.A., “The War in the Air”, Vol VI, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1937, 

p 435. 

5. Slessor p 220. 

6. Gray, Peter and Thetford, Owen, “German Aircraft of the First World War”, 

Putnam. London, 1962, p 105-108. 

7. ‘Thetford, O.G. and Riding, E.J, “Aircraft of the 1914-1918 War”, 

Harleyford, Marlow, 1954, p 36. 

8. Gray, Ibid. 

9. Udet, Ernst “Ace of the Black Cross”, Newnes, London, undated, 

p 144–148. 

10. Jones p 433, 434. 

11. Leigh-Mallory war experiences, PRO Ref Air 1 2388/228/11/80. 


13. Henshaw, Trevor “The Sky Their Battlefield”, Grub Street, London, 1995, 

p 372. 

14. Griffith p 146. 

15. Revell, Alex, “High in the Empty Blue”, Flying Machines Press, Mountain 

View, California, 1995. p 339. 

16. Cutlack, F.M., Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918, Volume 

VIII, p 309-313. 

17. Ibid. 

18. Ibid. 

19. PRO Ref Air 1/2256/209/59/3 

20. Sheldon, Bob, “Infantry Contact Patrols during World War I”, Cross and 

Cockade (US) magazine, Autumn 1975. 

21. Cutlack, op cit. 

22. PRO Ref Air 1/2256/209/59/3. 


24. Collishaw, Raymond, “Air Command”, Kimber, London, 1973, p 164-5. 

25. Henshaw, p 372. 

26. PRO Ref Air 1 2218/209/40/1. 

27. Ibid. 

28. Franks, Norman, “Drachens Destroyed”, Cross and Cockade UK, Spring 

1974. 

29. PRO Ref AIR 1/2218/209/40/1. 

30. Ibid. 

31. Personal account in “The Hawk”, magazine of the RAF Staff College, 

December 1928. 

32. Henshaw, p 371. 


34 Ibid. 


36. Ibid. 

37. Jones, p 441-442. 

38. Ibid. 

39. Ibid. 

40. Ibid. 

41 Henshaw p 372. 

42. Bowyer, Chaz, “Bristol Fighter”, Ian Allan, Shepperton 1985, p 38. 

43. Herlin, Hans, “Udet”, Macdonald and Co, London, 1960, p 66-67. 

44. von Richthofen, Lothar, “Das Letzte Mal an der Front” published in the 

anthology “Im Felde Unbesiegt”, Munich 1921. 

45. Udet Ibid. 

46. Jones Ibid. 

47. Johnson, p 102. 

48. Slessor, Ibid. 

49. Jones Ibid. 

50 Ibid. 

51 Ibid. 

52 Slessor p 172-173. 

53. Ibid. 

54. Ibid p 163-164.

Royal Air Force VC-10 Tanker 

refuelling Tornado F3 

135

New Zealand’s 

Fast Jet

This article is something of a departure from the normal run of the material submitted for publication in the Air Power Review. 

137 

It chronicles the demise of the Skyhawk from the Royal New Zealand Air Force inventory leaving them with no offensive air 

capability. This opens up considerable scope for wider debate – one of the key aims of this journal. Defence budgets are 

always under pressure and scrutiny – even in times of total war. When either cash is short, or physical resources limited, the key 

question must be one of force definition. In the inter-war years, the Royal Air Force struggled year in and year out to decide on the 

balance between fighters and bombers. Other roles were often squeezed almost to extinction: but never quite to the point where 

a complete capability was lost. In current times, the debate on a European defence identity brings with it the enticing prospect of 

role specialisation, and by implication, role elimination. The New Zealand government have now set the precedent. 

New Zealand’s Fast Jet 

By Nick Lee-Frampton 

Retirement is not unusual for a combat aircraft type but rarely does it mean eliminating the air combat element of an air 

force. However, when the surviving Skyhawks of the Royal New Zealand Air Force are shut down at base Ohakea in 

December 2001 the ability of the RNZAF to conduct air combat effectively will cease too. 1 An ambitious plan to lease 

surplus F-16A/Bs from the US as Skyhawk replacements was cancelled by the incoming New Zealand government 

which, last May 2001, announced that the Skyhawks will be withdrawn ‘before Christmas.’ 2 Following the end of flight 

operations both no’s 2 and 75 Squadrons RNZAF will be disbanded, as will 14 Sqn with its Aermacchi MB-339CB trainers for 

whom the Skyhawks were its raison d’etre. The only jets remaining in operational RNZAF service will be the two Boeing 727s 

purchased, second-hand, in 1981. This is a brief account of the 31 years the A-4K Skyhawk has served with the RNZAF. 

In June 1962 when Air Vice-Marshal Ian Morrison was appointed its Chief of Air Staff, the RNZAF was in dire straits with 

obsolescent Sunderlands, vintage Vampires and relatively sophisticated Canberras. 

‘The Air Force was waning at that time. It was urgent that we get some new equipment into service and get morale up.’ 3 

AVM Morrison applied himself to re-equipping the RNZAF with ‘first class’ aircraft and in 1964 Air Staff Requirement No.5/Air 

set out the service’s requirement for a Canberra replacement. It was to be a long range aircraft with the primary role of counterair/interdiction 

and secondary roles of close air support and air defence. Some £23 million was set aside for the new combat 

aircraft to enter service by 1970.

138 

…the NZ media reported that Morrison wanted the F-111, a claim which drew a sharp response 

from the Government. Mr Marshall, acting Prime Minister, said ‘I don’t think such things should be 

discussed in public’ 

During 1964 the NZ media reported that Morrison wanted the F-111, a claim which drew a sharp response from the 

Government. Mr Marshall, acting Prime Minister, said ‘I don’t think such things should be discussed in public.’ 4 Ironically, 

Morrison says he was misquoted: 

‘The newspaper said I wanted F-111s and I chose not to correct them.’ 5 

By December 1965 the requirements for the Canberra replacement included the ability to provide effective air support for 

ground forces, high reliability and robustness, long range and the ability to operate closely with both American and Australian 

forces. Among the types considered for the role at the time were the McDonnell Phantom F-4, Northrop F-5, Dassault Mirage 

III, Douglas A-4 Skyhawk, LTV A-7 Corsair II and Lockheed’s F-104G Starfighter. Unofficially, however, the RNZAF’s Canberra 

pilots favoured the Buccaneer. 

‘We all thought they were marvellous. Two-place, twin-engined, a classic strike aeroplane …’ 6 

Officially, however, the F-4 Phantom was the preferred option. In comparison with its perceived rivals, the F-5 and the Mirage III, 

the F-4 offered greater range, versatility and all-round performance. However, the F-4’s flyaway price was approximately $2.1 

million compared with $1.6 million for the Australian-built Mirage III and a relatively paltry $900,000 for the F-5. Nevertheless, in 

August 1966 the RNZAF formally asked the NZ Government for 16 F-4s. When the Cabinet’s Defence Committee considered 

the matter in early December it became clear that cost was not the only obstacle confronting the RNZAF’s plans. Echoing 

today’s political environment some Cabinet members doubted whether combat aircraft per se were even necessary! 

By early 1968 the political spotlight had focused on the Skyhawk which had been rejected by the RNZAF two years earlier because 

it was subsonic, single-engined and had only limited self-defence capabilities. Moreover, the A-4 had first flown in June 1954, only 

five years after the prototype Canberra and there was concern at the time that it might shortly be withdrawn from front-line service 

in the United States. However, the Skyhawk had continuously been improved and, crucially, at a flyaway price of $935,000, it was 

affordable. Thus, in April 1968 an RNZAF evaluation team flew to the US, effectively to negotiate a Skyhawk purchase. 

Fred Kinvig was just finishing an exchange tour with the USAF, flying F-4 Phantoms, when he was ordered to join the evaluation 

team in Los Angeles. 7 Kinvig had been very disappointed with the Phantom’s range performance and was ‘a little bit sceptical’ 

of the A-4’s combat radius. He arranged to carry out a maximum weight take-off in an A-4F and after flying for almost three 

hours was ordered to land because the evaluation team was tired of waiting for him!

…after flying for almost three hours was ordered to land because the evaluation team was tired of 

waiting for him. ‘I still had fuel left and I could have kept going for some time. …I was most impressed 

with the [Skyhawk’s] range figures’ 

‘I still had fuel left and I could have kept going for some time. … I was 

most impressed with the [Skyhawk’s] range figures.’ 8 

The NZ Government was accordingly advised that the A-4 would make a 

very satisfactory Canberra replacement in the ground attack role and the 

evaluation team recommended the purchase of 18 Skyhawks, including 

four attrition aircraft. The US Department of Defence offered New 

Zealand two purchase options: either 14 aircraft (10 single-seat A-4Ks 

and four two-seat TA-4Ks) or 18 aircraft (12 A-4Ks and six TA-4Ks). Both 

options were valid only until 1st July 1968. After some four years of 

argument and inconclusive debate, the New Zealand Government 

suddenly had only a few weeks in which to decide whether or not to buy 

the A-4. 

On 10th June 1968, the government approved the purchase of 10 A- 

4Ks and four TA-4Ks for the RNZAF. The entire package, including 

spares, support and training equipment, air and ground crew training in 

the US and new infrastructure in NZ, was estimated to cost less than 

$25 million. RNZAF personnel had mixed feelings about the order. 

AVM Morrison: ‘Once the F-4s were turned down for being too expensive, an evaluation team was formed to go to the 

States and see what was left.’ 

‘I’d been saying I would rather have six [F-4s] than 20 of the others, but in the event they came back and said these 1954 

vintage aircraft could do the job with certain modifications … and, by the grace of God, they’ve turned out remarkably well.’ 9 

Squadron Leader John Scrimshaw: ‘I remember thinking it would be better having a flight line full of A-4s than three or four 

F-4’s with only one of them serviceable.’ 10 

Wing Commander John Lanham: The RNZAF’s Canberra pilots still wanted Buccaneers, or F-4s or F-111s or even TSR-2! 

There was gloom, despondency and horror [regarding the A-4]. 11 

139

140 

‘…I would rather have six [F-4s] than 20 of the others, but in the event they came back and said 

these 1954 vintage aircraft could do the job with certain modifications … and, by the grace of God, 

they’ve turned out remarkably well’ 

CAS John Hosie: ‘The expectation of the Air Force was that we’d probably buy F-4s … I mean we expected the F-4. 

Anyway, out of the blue comes the A-4. We didn’t know what it was, we hadn’t even heard of it. I guess the reaction was 

that we’d got this wrong.’ 12 

Replacing the two-seat, two-engined Canberra with the single-seat, single engined Skyhawk that, moreover, lacked the former’s 

range and self-starting capability didn’t make sense to the young pilot. 

‘It seemed to us we were going backwards … somehow we felt we’d been sold down the river. I think that was the 

general feeling.’ 13 

John Scrimshaw was the first RNZAF pilot to go solo in a (US Navy) Skyhawk in Florida in February 1970. 

‘The training was quite a challenge for us, a big jump from the Vampires.’ 

The Skyhawks were equipped with Tacan which was new to the Kiwis and the pilots also were unfamiliar with flying in the US. 

The RNZAF almost lost its first Skyhawk before it had even seen it: USN pilots flew the first three RNZAF Skyhawks from 

California to Florida and the pilot of NZ6201 had a problem. 

‘There was a slight murmur in the engine and he radioed that he was thinking about [ejecting]. I said, “Look there’d be a 

bloody national emergency, a national disaster if you do that!”’ 14 

Thereafter, RNZAF pilots flew the delivery flights. 

For their trans-Pacific passage to New Zealand the Skyhawks were chained to the deck of the helicopter carrier USS Okinawa. 15 

Following a safe landfall in the port of Auckland the Skyhawks were towed to the nearby RNZAF base at Whenuapai from where 

they would be flown to their operational base at Ohakea. At this point none of 75 Sqn’s pilots had flown a Skyhawk for more than 

a month. Sqn Ldr Scrimshaw’s log book shows his previous Skyhawk flight was to San Diego on 15th April, six weeks earlier. 

“We had minimum hours on the things, we didn’t have Tacan in place at Ohakea and we still had jagged hexagonal 

concrete blocks on the runways. The risk of blowing a tyre was quite high.” 16 

Moreover, there was no ability at the time for making arrested landings in the event of a burst tyre. 

‘We were actually at our most vulnerable right at the beginning and I’m quite proud of the fact that we didn’t have any 

accidents.’ 17

At least paperwork wasn’t a problem! 

141 

‘There were all these nice new aeroplanes but not a stick of furniture! Not a desk, not even a book in the hangar. We 

were so busy we didn’t have the time to set up offices.’ 18 

On 10th June 1970 the NZ Government formally handed over the Skyhawks to the RNZAF’s Strike Wing and the first A-4K 

conversion course began (on schedule) two weeks later. Initially there was a chronic demand for formation fly-pasts, though 

they were not prominent on John Scrimshaw’s agenda. 19 

‘My feeling was we’d bought the Skyhawks as weapons, as close-support platforms. So we were totally concerned at 

finding targets and hitting them. To me, success was being within two seconds of time-on-target and getting a direct hit. 

That’s what it was all about.’ 20 

Exercise Flashover, the RNZAF Skyhawk’s first overseas deployment began on 1st March 1971. Led by Sqn Ldr Scrimshaw, 

four Skyhawks flew to RAAF base Williamtown, near Sydney, in just over three hours. A RNZAF P-3 Orion provided search & 

rescue, navigation and communication support for the deployment. The day after arriving at Williamtown the Skyhawks took 

advantage of the RAAF Mirage’s 420kt low-level corridors which compared favourably with the 360kts limit in New Zealand. The 

Skyhawks’ camouflage proved effective in Australia except for the white drop tanks which proved conspicuous until they too 

were camouflaged. In July 1971 the Skyhawks used live weapons, including 500lb bombs, 5-in Zuni rockets and 20mm 

cannon shells, for the first time. 21 

Exercise Vanguard 14, the annual deployment to Singapore, took place in late October that year with the Skyhawks departing 

Ohakea for Richmond, Townsville and Darwin in Australia thence, via Bali, to Tengah air base in Singapore, some 5,800 miles 

(9,400km) from Ohakea. 22 Interestingly, the Skyhawks arrived at Tengah on the day the Five Power defence pact ‘ANZUK’ came 

into operation. Over the next three weeks, the Squadron flew from Malaysian bases at Butterworth, Kuantan and Kuala Lumpur. 

The first of the new ‘bent’ refuelling probes was fitted during May 1973. 23 The modification had became a priority because the 

straight refuelling probes originally fitted occasionally leaked, allowing raw fuel to enter the starboard engine air intake. The new 

probes allowed the overseas deployment of a two-seat TA-4K for the first time. 24 This had not happened earlier because air-toair 

refuelling was prohibited with the original probes. The Skyhawk’s deployment procedure was much admired overseas. 

‘The Australians, for example, are amazed to see an RNZAF C-130 arrive half-an-hour before the eight Skyhawks, and in 

that time [get] out and ready all the equipment needed to service them.’ 25 

John Hosie recalls that in those days the Skyhawks didn’t have a park brake. 

‘You had to hold the aircraft on the brakes all the time, or have a chock. So when you shut down you needed someone to 

put chocks in and you needed a ladder to get down. That’s basically all you needed, but to get started you needed power

and you needed air. And probably someone to take the chocks away, so you weren’t in a 

142 

position to go on your own.’ 

In those days the A-4K had a doppler navigation system. If you’re flying at high altitude there can be 

slippage. Over a flat sea it would often go to memory mode, because it’s not getting a good return. 

‘It gave you a continuous readout of latitude & longitude and, I think, distance to go, but still we’d 

have to navigate with the map spread out … That’s why we devised strip maps.’ 26 

To ensure continuous communications en route, the P-3K used to take off an hour ahead of the 

Skyhawks. 

‘[We] would pass it about midpoint. We worked all this out before hand. … That way we would 

be in continuous UHF contact.’ 

‘Incidentally, we devised a fall-back position where we could do this with a C-130, but it wasn’t 

so good …’ 

‘So the [P-3K] Orion [kept] track of where we were … they had inertial navigation, so they kept 

an eye on us over long ocean legs and told us if we were wandering off track too much. Because 

really we were working blind. Sometimes you would get airborne and the doppler would stay in 

memory for the whole trip.’ 

‘It was surprising how good we got at navigating ourselves across.’ 

‘…the [P-3K] Orion 

[kept] track of 

where we were 

…and told us if we 

were wandering off 

track too much. 

Because really we 

were working blind. 

Sometimes you 

would get airborne 

and the doppler 

would stay in 

memory for the 

whole trip’ 

1975, a process not completed until October. 29 

In October 1974 the Skyhawks were tasked to perform foreign fishing vessel 

(FFV) patrols of NZ territorial waters. On the first such sortie a Skyhawk flew 

around the coast line without identifying a single foreign fishing vessel. 27 That 

month too the RNZAF lost its first Skyhawk when 6207 crashed after its engine 

failed due to an oil pump problem. The pilot, Wg Cdr Fred Kinvig, then CO 

operations wing at Ohakea, ejected but broke his right leg on landing. 28 

In January 1975 all of the RNZAF Skyhawks’ ejection seats were modified and 

four aircraft were grounded because of cracks beneath their starboard air 

intakes. Ironically, 11 Skyhawks were grounded for three days in early February 

when it was found that their ejection seats had been incorrectly assembled! The 

first AIM-9G Sidewinders were quietly introduced to operational service in July

On the 30th March 1976 came a unique 

143 

opportunity for the Skyhawks to fire their 

guns in anger! HMNZS Taupo, on fishery 

protection duties, had detected a Taiwanese squid 

boat, the Kim Nan, fishing illegally within the 

12-mile limit. As the Taupo approached her, the 

fishing boat headed for international waters, 

ignoring radio calls and warning shots. The order 

was given to scramble a pair of Skyhawks armed 

with 20mm cannon shells and rockets. After 

repeated low passes across the bows of the 

fishing boat had no effect, the pilot of ‘01 was 

The New Zealanders’ high bomb scores led to enquiries ordered to fire a burst of 20mm cannon 

100 metres in front of the Kim Nan, which he did, 

regarding the Kiwis’ recipe for success, although the answer, 

causing the squid boat to stop immediately, 

the TLAR ‘That Looks About Right weapon aiming system’ approximately 100km off shore. The Taupo was 

usually came as a surprise 

then able to come alongside and put a boarding 

party aboard, so ending a seven-hour pursuit. 30 

June that year saw the Skyhawk’s fifth Australian deployment, this time for Exercise Spanish Dollar at RAAF Williamtown. The 

exercise included ACM with RAAF Mirages and the A-4G Skyhawks of the RAN’s VF805 Sqn. On the last night of the exercise, 

a Skyhawk had problems with its undercarriage and then both its hydraulic systems failed, causing the aircraft to be 

intermittently uncontrollable. Although more than justified in ejecting, US exchange pilot Capt Carter managed to land the 

aircraft, a feat which earned him the Air Force Cross. 31 

In April 1976 Sqn Ldr Ching Fuller and Flt Lt Al Curtis, both British, began their Skyhawk conversion in what was swiftly dubbed 

the Pom Pom Conversion Course. (Alan Curtiss was later killed flying a Sea Harrier in the Falklands). The two men finished their 

conversion course on the 25th June becoming fully fledged members of the ‘Colonial Strike Force.’ 32 The world’s media took no 

notice of that event, but New Zealands’ air space attracted international attention in January 1977 with reported sightings, in 

the Kaikoura region, of unidentified flying objects! 33 

Participation in the Hawaii-based Cope Thunder exercise in 1981 helped raise 75 Sqn’s reputation. 34 The New Zealanders’ high 

bomb scores led to enquiries regarding the Kiwis’ recipe for success, although the answer, the TLAR ‘That Looks About Right 

weapon aiming system’ usually came as a surprise. 35 That month saw the 40,000th RNZAF Skyhawk hour, representing an 

average of more than 3,600 hours/year since May 1970. 36

In the early 1980s the Skyhawk force was increased with the purchase of A-4G models from the Royal Australian Navy. 

144 

On the 9th July 1984 a nine-man team set off for Nowra to familiarise themselves with the RAN A-4G’s that were shortly 

to become RNZAF property. Compared with the A-4K the -G models had no avionics hump on the upper fuselage, no 

drag chute, different radios and a slightly different cockpit layout. The absence of a drag chute was arguably the most 

significant difference for on 3rd June 1985 one of the A-4Gs blew both main tyres when landing at Townsville and overturned. 

The pilot was uninjured, although doubtless upset to find himself inverted at such a low altitude. The incident served to highlight 

the value of having a braking chute available and prompted renewed efforts to have all the ex-RAN A-4’s fitted with ‘chutes as 

soon as possible. 37 

Twenty seven years after being disbanded, No.2 Squadron RNZAF was reformed in December 1984 at Ohakea and equipped 

with Skyhawks. In 1991 the squadron moved to Nowra in New South Wales to begin a decade of flying mainly in Australian skies. 

…it had become clear that upgraded Skyhawks 

could emulate much of the F-16’s capabilities, 

especially in the maritime and close air support roles, 

for less than a fifth of the cost of a new aircraft! 

KAHU 

Project Kahu, updating both A-4G and A-4K Skyhawks with 

new radar and avionics, originated in the late 1970’s when 

the RNZAF began wondering whether to replace the 

Skyhawks or update them. New Zealand’s 1978 Defence 

Review mentioned a requirement to upgrade the aircraft’s 

navigation and weapons delivery systems and the loss of a 

second Skyhawk, early in 1981, also raised the matter of 

adequate aircraft numbers. With only twelve Skyhawks 

remaining of the original 14, the credibility of the RNZAF’s 

combat force was becoming suspect. Moreover, the 

increasing sophistication of new combat aircraft threatened to 

render the A-4K obsolescent. 

‘It had no computing power, a fixed gun-sight even more 

primitive than the one we’d had in Vampires and very simple, 

rudimentary avionics,’ recalls Stu White, Kahu project 

manager. 38 

In 1981, after defining its operational requirements, the 

RNZAF began evaluating the acquisition of new aircraft while

also considering options for modernising the Skyhawks. By 1983 it was concluded that F-16s were the answer. However, 

145 

it had also become clear that upgraded Skyhawks could emulate much of the F-16’s capabilities, especially in the 

maritime and close air support roles, for less than a fifth of the cost of a new aircraft! There still remained the matter of 

replacing aircraft lost through attrition. Then in May 1983, with exquisite timing, the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) announced that 

its ten remaining A-4G & TA-4G Skyhawks were for sale. The decision to purchase the Australian Skyhawks was announced on 

29th June 1984. 

Also authorised was their conversion to ‘K’ specification, structural repairs to extend their fatigue life and, in principle, an 

upgrade programme to improve the Skyhawk’s operational capabilities. The RFP elicited seven proposals from British, French, 

Israeli and US companies. All were carefully evaluated before Lear Siegler’s bid was selected. 39 When the RNZAF first 

considered improving the Skyhawk’s effectiveness, emphasis was placed on the close air support role. This, after all, was the 

focus the Government had adopted when seeking a Canberra successor. However, as mentioned in the 1983 Defence Review, 

maritime strike was now prominent in the Skyhawk’s repertoire and this was emphasised in a new RFP, this time covering not 

12 but 22 Skyhawks. Because of this change in focus, a multi-mode radar was substituted for the earlier requirement of a laser 

range finder and target seeker. Consideration was also given to replacing the 9,300lb thrust J-52 turbojet with a more powerful 

engine, but it was rejected as not being a cost-effective option. Six companies submitted tenders for the second RFP and once 

again Lear Siegler’s bid was considered the best, both on technical and on financial grounds. 

The NZ Government approved the $148 million modernisation plan in May 1985 and eight months later the prime contract was 

awarded to Lear Siegler, now known as SLI Avionics Systems Corp, following a take-over by the British avionics firm Smiths 

Industries. RNZAF Flight Lieutenant Steve Moore was chosen to test-fly the Kahu prototypes and accordingly attended the 

Empire Test Pilots’ School (ETPS) at Boscombe Down in 1985. Implementing Kahu fell behind schedule and installation work 

on the prototype only started in July 1987. Positioning the HUD was a major problem, says Moore: 

‘We had to have a second go at that in the single-seaters. When first installed it was far too low, … even motoring the seat 

right down I couldn’t get my eye low enough to see the HUD properly, so we had to get it higher.’ 40 

The RNZAF’s Skyhawks were equipped with the Ferranti model 4513 HUD which was unique in displaying both analogue and 

digital data. This combination of symbology resulted from having the benefit of test flying on the F-18, F-16, F-20, updated RAF 

Jaguars and the Mirage 2000, says Stu White. 

‘We were able to take best HUD features out of those aircraft and combine them into the A-4 to fully meet our 

requirements.’ 41

146 MISSILES 

When the customary eight Skyhawks deployed to Williamtown for Willoh 86-3 in October 1986 the squadron had its first 

encounter with the RAAF’s new F-18 Hornets of 3 Sqn. Within days 75 was claiming gun kills on the Australian’s latest fighter. 42 

In the closing months of 1986 the RNZAF purchased 100 AIM-9L missiles at a cost of $11.6 million as well as second-hand 

AGM-65B Maverick TV-guided missiles from the Jordanian Air Force as an interim measure until IR -65G missiles became 

available. Celebrations in 1987 for the RNZAF’s 50th anniversary included a remarkable formation of 30 aircraft, comprising 

RNZAF Skyhawks and Strikemasters and RAAF F-18s and Mirages. About this time too a visiting RAF VC-10 tanker allegedly 

plugged into a Skyhawk’s buddy store but with commendable restraint took no fuel. Six RAAF F-18‘s (including a two-seater) of 

77 Sqn arrived at Ohakea for a Willoh exercise in mid-November 1987. The F-18’s technical advantages couldn’t overcome the 

problem of its camouflage, which proved unsuitable for lo-level overland strike missions. Almost the opposite case applied to 

the Skyhawks, with excellent grey/green camouflage but minimal sophistication. During Vanguard 88 over the Malaysian jungle 

the pilots found their aircraft’s new camouflage scheme, so effective by day, was disconcertingly effective at night when trying to 

maintain formation. Reflective tape was applied to make the Skyhawks suitably visible! 43 

April 1989 saw the first live firings of AGM-65B (TV guided) Maverick missiles. Overseas, the (pre-Kahu) Skyhawks on Vanguard 

had redeployed to Williamtown for a Willoh and used the opportunity to test their skill at getting within Sidewinder or guns 

range of the AIM-7 Sparrow armed Hornets. The last pre-Kahu Skyhawk flight was on the 28th June 1989 when 11 was flown 

from Ohakea to RNZAF Woodbourne for conversion. On 18th February, 1991 2 Sqn made its ‘final’ flight at Ohakea with a flypast 

led by the squadron’s new CO, Steve Moore. The squadron was redeployed to the RAN base at Nowra where the 

Skyhawks have assisted RAN warships’ crews practise air defence as well as cooperating with RAAF exercises and providing 

new pilots with type conversion. 

In the past 18 months many of 

the most experienced members, 

both aircrew and groundcrew, of 

the two Skyhawk squadrons have 

resigned, leaving 2 Sqn with only 

four pilots for its five aircraft and 

75 Sqn with just six pilots, one of 

them on exchange from the RAF 

‘In the nearly three and a half years I was at Nowra there we carried out 22 

deployments in total, a lot of those were to Williamtown, flying with the Hornet 

squadrons. Most of our flying was for the Navy.’ 44 

Australian authorities naturally are dismayed that this valuable contribution to their 

military training will cease when the Skyhawks are phased out. In January 1991 

Skyhawk pilots’ monthly flying hours were officially reduced from 23.5 hours/month 

to 13.2 hours/month when the Gulf War caused the price of aviation fuel to almost 

double. However, over the previous six months actual flying hours for line pilots on 

75 Sqn had averaged only 15 hours/month. 45 In the past 18 months many of the 

most experienced members, both aircrew and groundcrew, of the two Skyhawk

squadrons have resigned, leaving 2 Sqn with only four pilots for its five aircraft and 75 Sqn with just six pilots, one of them 

on exchange from the RAF. 

147 

NOTES 

1 RNZAF base Ohakea is 22km west of Palmerston North in the lower North 

Island. 

2 Officially the Skyhawks cease operating on 1 December 2001 but as this is 

a Saturday, flying will cease on 30 November 2001. 

3 Interview, 1995. 

4 The Dominion newspaper, Wellington, 29th June 1964. 

5 Interview, 1995. 

6 Interview 1996 with Wing Commander John Lanham, RNZAF (retd) 

erstwhile C0 75 Sqn. 

7 Interview 1995, erstwhile CO of 75 Sqn. 

8 Ibid. 

9 Interview, op.cit. 

10 Interview1995, John Scrimshaw was CO of 75 Sqn until 1971 

11 Op.cit. 

12 John Hosie, Interview 1995 when he was CAS. 

13 Ibid. 

14 Op.cit. 

15 Then technical NCO Barry Brinsdon, interviewed, says the carrier 

encountered a severe storm when close to its destination, Auckland. ‘We 

didn’t get any hot food – and very little sleep – for three days. Over half the 

Okinawa’s crew were sea-sick … The Skyhawks often disappeared in spray 

and foam.’ 

“One night the Captain [of the Okinawa] said if we didn’t get out of the 

storm in the next 18 hours he was going to have to lighten the ship …” 

16 Op. cit. 

17 Op. cit. 

18 Op. cit. 

19 For example The Dominion newspaper, Wellington, NZ, 16 February 1973, 

reported that the RNZAF had staged three Skyhawk fly-pasts in the past 

week, one for a US Marine pilgrimage party, another for Dutch Prince 

Bernhard’s departure from Auckland and a third for the opening of 

Parliament. 

20 Op. cit. 

21 75 Sqn official diary entry. 

22 Ian Uffindell, interview, says that on that first transit through Bali the support 

Hercules he was on was surrounded by armed guards upon landing and 

none of the occupants were allowed off. ‘The RNZAF were charged $10 for 

each Skyhawk drag chute collected off Bali’s runway and had to pay 

hundreds of dollars to get passports processed.’ 

23 75 Sqn official diary entry. 

24 Exercise Vanguard 17 October/ November 1973. 

Interview Des Ashton. 

A lot of things that were wrong with the A-4 when they entered RNZAF 

service were gradually put right, he says. 

‘I’m sure, for instance, in the old pilots’ manual there was a note that … 

during takeoff, the oil low light might come on. … But that should never 

have happened. That warning got in [the manual] through the US Navy and 

I could never figure out [why].’ 

Then one day the oil warning light illuminated on a Skyhawk during take-off. 

‘We couldn’t fault the system and when we took the sensor out of the oil 

tank, we found [it] had been wired back to front at manufacture! It was a 

closed, sealed-up unit and there were a whole [batch] like that.’ 

25 Wg Cdr Boys RNZAF, reported in NZ Wings magazine, January 1974. 

26 Op. cit. 

27 John Lanham, op. cit ‘It was really nonsense because if we saw anything 

we didn’t recognise it, there was nothing we could do about it and there 

was no way we could check its distance offshore!’ 

28 The following year the Labour Party Conference debated a motion that the 

Government should not replace the lost Skyhawk. Defence Minister Bill 

Fraser said that the original purchase decision may not have been the right 

decision at the time, but that now the country was ‘stuck with it.’, research 

by author.

Seven RNZAF Skyhawks have been lost: 

A-4K NZ6207 crashed 18 October 1974 

TA-4K NZ6253 crashed 25 March 1981 

A-4K NZ6210 crashed 24 October 1989 

A-4K NZ6208 crashed 23 July 1992 

A-4K NZ6203 crashed 20 June 1996 

A-4K NZ6211 crashed 16 February 2001 

TA-4K NZ6256 crashed 20 March 2001 

29 75 Sqn op. cit. 

30 John Hosie recalls hearing about the incident from an unexpected quarter. 

‘I remember being up at Hawaii on a seminar some three or four years after 

that [incident] and this US Coastguard Captain said: “You go down to New 

Zealand and … mess about down there with fishing and don’t have the 

right licences, they’ll just blow you out of the water, no questions asked.” I 

said to him afterwards, “Where did you get that from?” 

“Well it’s true isn’t it?,” he said “A Taiwanese boat was down there and you 

sent some of your aircraft to attack it with rockets and guns.” 

We never had any trouble for years after that [incident]; not a problem. It 

doesn’t hurt to be able to do something a little nasty.’ 

31 75 Sqn op. cit. 

32 Ibid. 

33 Two Skyhawks were put on alert on the night of 2nd January 1979 but the 

call to scramble never came. 

34 The squadron first exercised its Skyhawks at Hawaii in 1978. 

35 ‘It is considered to be a credit to the RNZAF that 14 pilots could take eight 

aircraft with relatively unsophisticated nav/attack systems some 4,000 miles 

and compete credibly against some of the most expensive and advanced 

aircraft in the world. The flexibility displayed by our pilots in changing 

between roles in a forever changing environment proved the value of 

RNZAF training. Then to achieve the highest serviceability rate and equal, if 

not better, the results of the Americans in the air is truly something to be 

proud of,’ signalled CAS, Sept 1984. 

Interview 1995 with 75 Sqn Warrant Officer, Evan Wright. ‘They’re just a big 

lump of aluminium and bits of metal and wire, but maybe I don’t have such 

an intimate relationship with them as other tradesmen do…’ 

148 

‘… The exercise scenario isn’t a lot different to what we do in NZ in that we 

attempt to get as many aircraft available at any one time as possible.’ 

‘Very seldom will we be able to deploy with the same people on 

consecutive exercises. It’s a bit of a juggling act; you must keep the 

experienced people to look after the young guys, but you’ve got to take the 

young guys to give them the experience …’ 

‘Since Kahu the pack-up has actually got bigger, but they’re giving us fewer 

Hercules to use …’ 

36 75 Sqn op.cit. 

37 Although badly damaged, 6218 was eventually repaired and returned to 

operational service five years later. 

38 Interview. 

39 The May 1982 RFP stipulated that …. 

● Most of the work be conducted in New Zealand 

● Both the A-4K and the TA-4K were to be modified 

● There should be minimal structural change 

Other major requirements included the provision of a head-up display 

(HUD), a weapons delivery computer, a radar warning system, an attitude 

reference system, a sophisticated navigation system, a laser ranging/target 

seeking system – and the elimination, so far as possible, of the cockpit’s 

many deficiencies. 

40 Steve Moore, interview. 

Another problem involved the aircraft’s centre of gravity. With all the new 

equipment in the nose, the centre of gravity had moved forwards. Although 

still within limits, it affected the aircraft’s handling characteristics. 

‘You couldn’t stall the two-seaters. So we ended up having to throw 106lb 

of lead into the tail of all the aircraft to compensate for it.’- Interview, Stu 

White. 

41 ‘The entire system was developed and flown artificially to our satisfaction 

before it was installed on the prototype aircraft, all within 20 months of 

signing the contract,’ says Stu White. 

42 75 Sqn op.cit. 

43 Ibid. 

44 Interview op.cit. 

45 75 Sqn op.cit.

Eurofighter 2000 equipped 

with AIM-9 Sidewinder and 

AIM-120 AMRAAM missiles 

149

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150 

b o o k r e v i e w s 

THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN 

AIR POWER 

Benjamin S. Lambeth 

Review essay by John 

Andreas Olsen 

RAND-analyst Benjamin S. 

Lambeth argues that the United 

States has witnessed, over the 

last two or three decades, a nonlinear 

growth in air power’s ability 

to contribute to the outcome of 

joint operations. Although many 

factors have played their part in 

this development, the author 

emphasises that air power’s 

increased leverage is a result of 

“stealth”, precision and “standoff” 

capabilities combined with 

the expanded battlespace 

awareness made possible by 

recent developments in C4ISR. 1 

Lambeth advances his thesis by 

taking us on an excursion from the failures of “Rolling Thunder” to the 

mixed performances of “Deliberate Force” and “Allied Force”, via the 

epitome of “Desert Storm”. He does not, however, argue that air 

power can win wars single-handedly, or that air power is universally 

applicable, but that recent developments have increased the relative 

combat potential of air power considerably in comparison to that of 

other force elements. The work is as such a timely and 

comprehensive survey that merits attention by those interested in the 

utility of contemporary aerospace power and the larger debate on 

defence investments. 

From Rolling Thunder to Desert Storm 

Rather than perceive air power as synonymous with bombs, 

Lambeth stresses that “in its totality, air power is a complex amalgam 

of hardware and less tangible but equally important ingredients 

bearing on its effectiveness, such as employment doctrine, concepts 

of operations, training, tactics, proficiency, leadership, adaptability, 

and practical experience”. 2 With this definition in mind, the author’s 

point of departure is that air power failed miserably in Vietnam, but 

that it is insufficient to accept the classic air power advocate 

argument that the misuse should be attributed to the limits on air 

power rather than limits of air power. Although the micromanagement 

of Lyndon B. Johnson and Robert McNamara had a 

degrading effect on the application of air power, the author argues 

that there were organisational problems within the military force that 

did not allow it to be effective, and that there were considerable 

shortcomings in equipment, training, doctrine and operational 

proficiency that have to be accounted for in the overall assessment. 

The air weapon was largely ill-suited in the proxy-fed war of 

insurgency in South Vietnam and the “Rolling Thunder” campaign 

was ineffective partly as a result of self-deceiving measures of 

effectiveness and needlessly self-imposed operational restrictions that 

hampered aerial combat and exposed aircraft to the North 

Vietnamese surface-to-air missile threat. Lambeth argues that the 

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military commanders have to share the responsibility for the outcome 

as there was an unhealthy inter-service rivalry that among other 

things resulted in fragmented command and control arrangements. 

Moreover, through “mirror-imaging” the politicians, generals and 

admirals misinterpreted not only the determination of the enemy, but 

also the whole nature of the war at hand. 3 Lambeth provides an 

interesting account of the Vietnam experience, and most importantly 

he demonstrates its influence on the 1991 campaign: “It put all four 

services on a vector to perfect their air assets during the two 

decades that spanned Vietnam and Desert Storm”. 4 Indeed, several 

improvements that were to be the hallmark in 1991 originated with 

the Linebacker campaigns: laser-guided precision bombs (LGB) were 

tested, the “tank-plinking” idea was conceived, improvements in 

electronic warfare were found, the Vietnamese air defence system 

was largely suppressed, and finally, an integrated air offensive based 

on a plausible strategy and reasonable rules of engagements (ROE) 

was largely executed with an acceptable operational outcome. 

The Vietnam experience, combined with the results of the Yom 

Kippur War of 1973, where Israel lost one-third of its air force in the 

combined Arab attack, and the increased mobilisation of Soviet 

forces during the “Second Cold War”, led to a period of reform in the 

American military. Lambeth discusses how the United States 

improved its air posture over the subsequent years by describing the 

changes in USAF training and education, the modernisation of aircraft 

and equipment inventory, and the refining of American doctrine and 

concepts of operations. All these three elements played an important 

role in forming the air power capabilities witnessed in the 1990s and 

according to Lambeth the incorporation of leading-edge technology 

made for a quantum leap in operational efficiency. The author 

discusses the introduction of new aircraft, pays attention to the 

partnership between the USAF Tactical Air Command (TAC) and the 

US Army Training and Doctrine (TRADOC) centre, and assesses the 

utility of the Air-Land Forces Application (ALFA), AirLand Battle 

Doctrine and the Follow-On Force Attack (FOFA) plan. Although these 

concepts in theory gave the Army and the Air Force a common basis 

for planning through the “31 Initiatives”, 5 the author identifies a 

substantial lack of understanding between the two parties. 

Lambeth discusses how the USAF improved its inventory and 

concepts of operations throughout the 1970s and 1980s, but the 

author does not deal with the “Fighter Mafia” and the “Military Reform 

Movement” explicitly. The development of the technologically 

sophisticated F-15 and the more manoeuvrable F-16, combined with 

Colonel John R. Boyd’s role therein, deserves consideration. One 

side argues that the Movement was critical of the very technology 

that makes air power and thus largely irrelevant in the wider defence 

debate, while the other side argues that John Boyd, William S. Lind, 

Norman Polmar, Pierre Sprey and others strongly influenced the 

military thinking that eventually prevailed during “Desert Storm”. 6 

According to Colin Gray, “John Boyd deserves at least an honourable 

mention for his discovery of the ‘OODA [Observation-Orientation- 

Decision-Action] loop’ .... The OODA loop may appear too humble to 

merit categorisation as grand theory, but that is what it is. It has an 

elegant simplicity, an extensive domain of applicability, and contains a 

high quality of insight about strategic essentials”. 7 In discussing John 

Boyd one is reminded of Martin van Creveld’s comment on 

Machiavelli in his survey of military theorists: “The reason for including 

him in these pages is principally because he is there and because in 

other respects he is a commanding intellectual figure. Like a major 

general standing in the middle of the road, one must salute him 

whether one wants or not”. 8 







152 









153 

parts of the security and intelligence network for the moment 

focused on their own survival rather than the protection of the 

regime. The concurrent operations against leadership targets 

provided a factor of uncertainty and element of resolve that is difficult 

to account for, but the confusion and disorder certainly undermined 

the effectiveness of the Iraqi leadership. Although the 850 strikes 

against leadership and C 3 targets were not comprehensive enough 

to ultimately change the Iraqi leadership, it is fair to argue that 

bombing of strategic targets made a worthwhile contribution to 

“Desert Storm’s” ultimate outcome. It was of course, in the end, the 

combination of attacks on the Iraqi war-making and war-fighting 

capabilities that gave the Coalition its unique leverage in arms. 

Nonetheless, Lambeth provides a comprehensive explanation of the 

importance of Suppression of Enemy Air Defence (SEAD) operations 

on the one hand and the significance of combining JSTARS with 

precision engagements on the other. 11 That combination enabled an 

impressive “tank plinking” operation, and together with Push CAS 

and other tactical and operational procedures the Iraqi defeat was 

inevitable prior to the one hundred hour ground battle. 12 

Although Desert Storm was a watershed in modern American 

military history, the author argues that there were several important 

problems in terms of air tasking, air-ground co-ordination specifically 

and joint operations generally. Although all the US services accepted 

in principle the need for a single air commander there was 

continuous strife over allocations. The corps commanders preferred 

assets for their own area of responsibility rather than the second and 

third echelons of Iraqi forces that General Schwarzkopf considered 

most important. An extension of such disagreements resulted in 

“arm-wrestling” over the proper placement of the Forward Support 

Control Line (FSCL), and consequently the argument is put forward 

that the Army’s obsession with extending the line prohibited the 

USAF from conducting strikes that would possibly have prevented 

the Republican Guard’s escape. The author provides different sides 

of that story and other disputes, and concludes the chapter with 

emphasising how air power came of age in 1991 although there are 

many caveats and qualifications that have to be considered carefully 

before one generalises about the overall utility of air power. One 

possible caveat for the future would be to believe that Saddam 

Hussein’s actions and reactions represent future adversaries. The 

Iraqis were for example not able to take advantage of the fact that 

the large ground organisation of a modern air force is its Achilles’ 

heel, and arguably Saddam Hussein made several military/strategic 

decisions during the battles that favoured the Coalition. 

While technological progress was vindicated in 1991 the author next 

discusses the operational impact of stealth throughout the decade, 

including the advent of B-2. Lambeth explores a new generation of 

munitions, allowing for accurate through-the-weather ground-attack 

capabilities, and discusses the formal shift from a nuclear to a 

conventional bomber force that took place with the disestablishment 

of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) and the Tactical Air Command 

(TAC) in June 1992. The author demonstrates the improvements 

found in technology, which have been part of shaping the operational 

concepts for the Post-Cold War era, and as American bases worldwide 

are being severely reduced he speculates that the future might 

bring more attention to an Air Expeditionary Force (AEF). In 

evaluating operations in Bosnia, the author states that “Deny Flight” 

was a near disaster and “little more than a costly exercise in 

converting jet fuel into noise”, 13 “while Deliberate Force” was a clear 

success and a good example of coercive diplomacy working with air 

power. As with the Israeli surprise attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor 







154 


in June 1981, it provided a clear case where air power was used not 

to win a war, but rather to achieve limited objectives. The 

combination of increased artillery fire, the credible threat of a ground 

attack and the diplomatic pressure played important parts in driving 

the Bosnian Serb leadership to the negotiation table, but as Richard 

Holbrooke stated in his book, the air campaign made a “huge 

difference” in helping bring about the Dayton accord. The interaction 

between diplomacy and bombing is still under-researched, but one 

might speculate that it was in fact Milosevic’s concessions in 1995 

that persuaded large parts of the US political leadership in 1999 into 

believing that Milosevic would give up Kosovo after only three days 

of bombing. 

Operation Allied Force and Beyond 

Lambeth discusses the three phases of Operation “Allied Force” by 

looking into what worked and what caused problems. The first phase 

intended to soften the Yugoslav integrated air defence system, but 

although the B-2 and other aircraft performed superbly, the 

Yugoslavs were highly professional as far as surface-to-air missiles 

and anti-aircraft-artillery operations were concerned. They did not 

disclose their positions easily and although NATO managed to gain 

air superiority there remained a certain threat to the pilots throughout 

the campaign. The Serbs were extremely good at imitating tanks and 

artillery with milk carton material and wood-burning stoves, and to 

this day the Serbs’ ability to disperse and hide equipment is not 

known. The author presents theories on how the 

F-117 was shot down and he makes the pertinent point that when 

no friendly casualties becomes accepted as a goal of strategy, then 

one is judged by unreachable standards in this human endeavour of 

fog and friction called war. One becomes a victim of one’s own 

success and at best it makes for an inefficient air campaign, as one 

operates in an environment where civilians and soldiers are mixed. 14 

The second phase envisaged attacks against military targets below 

the 44th parallel. Despite the escalation the intensity of effort 

averaged merely fifty strike-sorties a night throughout the first week. 

Without a ground threat, however, the Serbs could disperse their 

ground forces in Kosovo, and with shortcomings in the intelligence 

cycle time combined with escalation on ethnic cleansing the Alliance 

came under severe criticism. The Apache fiasco is discussed, as are 

the collateral damage incidents that dominated the news, and thus 

influenced the choice of strategy. 

The third phase included attacks directly on Belgrade. This was kept 

as a last resort for political reasons, and when it finally found 

acceptance it was halted by the unfortunate destruction of the 

Chinese Embassy. As with the al-Firdos incident in 1991, which was 

also an intelligence error, the strategic air campaign was halted for a 

period of time and the much-needed momentum was lost. The larger 

point which the author makes is that “tactical mistakes” may have 

“strategic implications”, and with war being a continuation of politics 

by other means the larger geopolitical issues will and should always 

prevail. The author adheres to the view of Philip Meilinger and Tony 

Mason that airmen have to accept that air campaigns originate in a 

political situation, and thus the political considerations will always 

govern the choice of strategy. Lambeth furthermore discusses why 

Milosevic chose to give up in the end, the problems of 

interoperability, the problems of decision-making in such a diverse 

alliance and the dispute over strategy that occurred between 

Lieutenant General Michael C. Short and General Wesley Clark. 15 In 

essence Short argues that because of all the compromises that had 

to be made in both planning and executing the air campaign it was 








155 

in the end a “victory by happenstance rather than a victory by 

design”. 16 

The debate on “centres of gravity” has to a large extent focused on 

whether it is the political leadership commanding war, or the military 

forces occupying territory. In 1991 Colonel Warden was the 

strongest advocate of the former, and in 1999 Lieutenant General 

Short continued that line of argument. In an attempt to “untangle” 

the air power debate Lambeth argues that those who focus on 

whether strategic bombing works, or whether air power can win 

wars single-handedly, are in reality approaching straw-men that will 

not provide useful answers in providing a vector for the future. 

Moreover, the battle over resources and doctrine is so linked to 

parochialism that no service is really capable of moving beyond their 

own concepts of operations and terms of reference. The author is 

certainly right in arguing that “the most enlightening view is the 

eclectic one that argues for avoiding formulaic, single-recipe 

solutions to the exclusion of all others”. 17 

Air Power Transformed and the Future 

Lambeth provides an informative discussion on the possible synergy 

of air and space power in the near future. He argues that they are 

still considered as two separate professions with different cultures 

and that there is a lack of understanding between the two parties, 

but integration between the two has proved ever more successful 

after 1991. The spectrum of space missions includes space support, 

force enhancement, space control and force application, but the 

doctrinal work in the sphere is often seen as unrealistically visionary 

within the air power environment. There were, nevertheless, several 

space contributions to the Gulf War that are often forgotten or taken 

for granted. The Navstar global positioning system (GPS) came of 

age in Desert Storm, satellites were crucial in enabling the 

command, control and communication network that was used, and 

the space surveillance system proved important in dealing with the 

Scuds. 

In the last chapter Lambeth concludes that improved battlespace 

awareness, heightened aircraft survivability, increased weapons 

accuracy and improved understanding of concepts of operation 

witnessed today have made it possible for air power to achieve 

strategic effects without having to mass numbers. If, however, the 

promise of air and space power outlined in this book is to be 

realised in the future force posture, the author suggests several 

recommendations that must be adhered to. First, air power 

proponents must candidly acknowledge what air power cannot do, 

and moreover, “to argue for an aerospace-centric U.S. defense 

strategy for all occasions is possibly the single most self-destructive 

error that air power proponents can make”. 18 Second, airmen must 

accept that achieving and maintaining air superiority is a means to 

an end and that it does not amount to achieving a military victory. 

Third, airmen must unburden themselves with the belief that urbanindustrial 

bombing can undermine the enemy’s will to fight to the 

degree that bombing alone can win the war. Fourth, air power 

theories must be developed for attacking ground forces, rather than 

relying on a reductionist attrition approach of destroying as many 

tanks and artillery pieces as can be seen. Fifth, airmen should 

convince their military colleagues what air power can do for them. 

Sixth, one has to redefine or specify what the terms “winning” and 

“victory” actually mean: “This canonical image of victory entails 

defeating an enemy’s ground forces in detail, occupying his territory, 

and controlling his population on an open-ended basis. Yet the latter 







156 


two of these objectives are rarely likely to be goals of any U.S. joint 

operation”. 19 Finally, in order to maintain the leverage of the air 

weapons one must continue to explore the mixture of advancing 

equipment, operational acumen and theoretical foundations for 

operations. One might also add that doctrine consists of theory, 

history, technology and culture, and that the latter has essentially 

been neglected in the design of air power strategies throughout the 

century. 20 

Overall Assessment 

Lambeth’s thesis is that the exploration of stealth, precision and the 

increased use of space, such as global positioning system, amounts 

to a “transformation” in US air power. There is no doubt that there 

has been a transformation in combat effectiveness, and that air 

power has become the first choice for policy makers. One should, 

however, take note of the fact that precise targeting does not equal 

precise military or political effects, and the author does well in 

stressing that air power is ultimately but one part of an overall jointoperation 

package. There are interestingly two sides of the coin, as 

observed by Mark Clodfelter: The implication might well be that the 

changes in American air power have altered the way a future 

adversary will fight, so that air power’s capabilities are minimised. 21 

Lambeth’s main argument nevertheless stands scrutiny: American air 

power has been transformed over the past two-three decades to a 

point where it has become strategically realisable outside the Cold 

War paradigm. Air power has a relative advantage in its relationship 

to the other elements of military force in the sense that it can 

influence the outcome in part because of stealth, precision and 

information dominance on the one hand and speed, range and 

flexibility on the other. Still, Lambeth does well in not arguing that the 

technological changes have amounted to a revolution in military 

affairs (RMA). Indeed, the author does not use that term RMA, or 

“information warfare”, but he brilliantly illustrates how technological 

improvements have altered the conduct of war and improved the 

effectiveness of air operations on the tactical, operational and 

strategic levels of command. Lambeth’s work is a highly 

recommended survey for better understanding of how air power can 

provide other elements of force with cost-effective leverage that 

subsequently increases the chance for successful outcomes in 

contemporary conventional conflicts. 

One could of course criticise the author for not having accounted for 

the technological improvements of the other services, but it may well 

be that technology has not increased the real preponderance of land 

power and sea power. Armies in the future will have flanks, but 

whether they will be able to add depth is quite another matter, and 

navies seem often to be subordinate to armies in waging and winning 

wars. In conclusion it seems as though the traditional combined-arms 

ground offensive has witnessed a paradigm shift, where the organic 

army assets of tanks and attack helicopters play a more subordinate 

part to fixed-wing aircraft and unmanned vehicles than previously. The 

Pentagon’s research on futuristic “space bombers” that could destroy 

targets on the other side of the world in thirty minutes strengthens 

Lambeth’s conclusion. 22 

“The Transformation of American Air Power” is primarily written for 

policy-makers who require a greater appreciation of the technical and 

doctrinal issues involved in the application of air power, and secondly 

for the general audience who is interested in air power and defence 

matters. It is based on secondary sources rather than archival 

documentation and provides in summary a comprehensive, well- 








157 

articulated and perceptive survey. The case studies and cogent 

explanations are of high scholarly quality with substantial footnotes 

and interesting anecdotes, and the author’s ability to use history, 

technological data and conceptual insight when drawing the big 

picture is nothing less than praiseworthy. 

NOTES 

1 C4ISR is short for Command, Control, Communications and Computers - 

combined with Information, Surveillance and Reconnaissance. 

2 Benjamin S. Lambeth, The Transformation of American Air Power, (Ithaca: 

Cornell University Press, 2000), p. 9. 

3 See particularly Mark A. Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power: The American 

Bombing of North Vietnam, (New York: Free Press, 1989). 

4 Benjamin S. Lambeth, The Transformation of American Air Power, p. 53. 

5 Richard G. Davis, The 31 Initiatives: A Study of Air Force-Army 

Cooperation, (Washington D.C.: Office of USAF History, 1987). 

6 See for example Grant T. Hammond, The Mind of War: John Boyd and 

American Security, (Washington D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 

2001). 

7 Colin Gray, Modern Strategy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 

pp. 90-91. 

8 Martin van Creveld, The Art of War: War and Military Thought, (London: 

Cassell & Co, 2000), p. 73. 

9 See H.P. Willmott, “When Men Lost Faith in Reason”, draft, 1999, chapter 

V, pp. 14-15. 


11 JSTARS is short for Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System. It 

identifies tanks, artillery and movement on the battlefield. It does for the 

ground picture what AWACS does for the air picture. 

12 Push CAS is, according to General Charles A. Horner, “that aircraft would 

be designated for [Close Air Support] CAS , but where, how, and when 

they would be used would be determined “on the run” by events in the 

field”. See Tom Clancy with General Chuck Horner (Ret.), Every Man a 

Tiger, (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1999), p. 22. 


14 According to General Short there was no defined Fire Support Coordination 

Line (FSCL) in the war over Kosovo. See Lieutenant General 

Michael C. Short, “An Airman’s Lessons from Kosovo”, in John Andreas 

Olsen (ed.), From Manoeuvre Warfare to Kosovo?, (Trondheim: The Royal 

Norwegian Air Force Academy, 2001), p. 264. 

15 Dana Priest, “Air Chief Faults Kosovo Strategy”, The Washington Post, 22 

October 1999. See also John A. Tirpak, “Washington Watch: Short’s View 

of the Air Campaign”, The Air Force Magazine, 82, vol. 9, September 

1999, pp. 43-49. 

16 Lieutenant General Michael C. Short, “An Airman’s Lessons from 

Kosovo”, p. 258. 




20 Ian MacFarling, Air Power Terminology, second edition, (Canberra: 

Aerospace Centre, 2001), p. 34. 

21 Mark Clodfelter, Book Review: “The Transformation of American Air 

Power”, Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ), forthcoming 22 March 2001. 

22 See for example “U.S. Looking At Spacecraft As Bomber”, Los Angeles 

Times, 28 July, 2001, p. 1. For a different perspective, see for example 

Barry R. McCaffrey, “Cutting Ground Forces is Dangerous”, Commentary, 

1 August 2001. 







158 


BAO NINH, THE SORROW OF WAR: 

A NOVEL OF NORTH VIETNAM 

Reviewer: John Andreas Olsen 

There are many impressive studies on different aspects of the 

Vietnam War, but there are comparatively few that account for the 

North Vietnamese perception. There are stories of Vo Nguyen Giap, 

the legendary general, strategist and statesman who led the 

Vietcong army to several victories, biographies of Ho Chi Minh and 

details about the Tet Offensive, but it is nonetheless difficult to 

imagine events from “the other side of the hill”. Bao Ninh’s The 

Sorrow of War is a book that helps contemplate the psychological 

experience of war from a soldier’s perspective: it is an emotional 

debrief of immense proportions about individual and collective 

sacrifice, compromised youth and lost love. 

The book is not about politics, ideology, strategy, tactics or even 

combat, but about the true face of war, courage, the mental struggle 

of purpose and how the momentum of events leads from one 

situation to another without rational explanations. The protagonist is 

Kien, an infantryman of the Glorious 27th Youth Brigade who has to 

go back to the battlefield after Victory Day to collect and count the 

dead. He is one of the few survivors, and as he is sitting in his 

humble apartment in Hanoi, writing his memoirs after eleven years of 

war, the mystical journey floats in time and place. One is witness to 

an innocent youngster who becomes coldly indifferent to killing, 

where fear and anger is substituted with depression. Kien 

experiences fellow officers raping his girlfriend Phoung, South 

Vietnamese soldiers raping young girls near their camp, and 

American soldiers raping his college Hao. Kien suffers a personal 

trauma where illusions and reality are blurred, as these humiliations 

are combined with the reality of warfare in the “Jungle of Screaming 

Souls”. According to the author justice was never served in the war, 

only cruelty and inhuman violence, and as such fighting would result 

in nothing but inevitable defeat despite success in battle. Within the 

reality of napalm, malaria and desertion, the only escape at times 

was drugs, and by the late 1970s he had become an alcoholic with 

sporadic violent outbursts. Kien sees writing this book as his last 

duty as a solider, and paradoxically, he can only find relief by 

recollecting the reminiscences of the sad past. 

Bao Ninh has been heavily criticised by fellow countrymen for this 

book, and the publication was banned for several years, since it did 

not acknowledge the heroism of defending North Vietnam. It could 

be nothing but controversial as it discloses the illusion of the high 

morale so often associated with the people’s war. The author does 

not see any glory in killing the South Vietnamese brothers or even 

Americans: “In all my time as a soldier I’ve yet to see anything 

honourable”. Bao Ninh humanises and dehumanises war at the 

same time in what is essentially a lyrical, bleak, intense, gruesome, 

sarcastically humorous emotional report on the psychological scares 

of military realities. The book is both a bewildering and sobering 

account of the true horrors of war, and for those reasons highly 

recommendable reading. 

Dr. John Andreas Olsen is a lecturer at the Royal Norwegian Air 

Force Academy. 








FORGOTTEN VICTORY: THE FIRST 

WORLD WAR, MYTHS AND REALITIES 

Gary Sheffield 

Reviewer: Group Captain Peter Gray 

159 

Headline, London, 2001 

ISBN 0 7472 7157 7 

The popular history of the First World War has become dominated, 

in the United Kingdom at least, by images from the television series 

Blackadder goes forth. The underlying theme is of squalor, wanton 

slaughter, the total absence of a plan and generals living the life of 

luxury in chateaux miles behind the front line. Haig is portrayed as a 

donkey, callously sweeping model – and real-soldiers off the table. 

The spread of this perception has infiltrated the National Curriculum 

and a generation of history teachers. 

Gary Sheffield deliberately takes on this image with specific 

references to the series, and to the Great War in Anglo American 

history, and some of the myths that have been generated. In 

particular, he attacks the mythology surrounding the Battle of the 

Somme highlighting the pressures on Haig to support the French 

Army, which was enduring huge losses at Verdun. The emphasis 

was that if Haig delayed his action, there would no longer be an 

allied Army to help – they would be wiped out. In these days of 

casualty-free warfare, it is almost considered obscene to suggest 

that there must be an attritional phase in a major war so that the 

national store of men, materiel, will, and money can be eroded and 

tested. Manoeuvre warfare, let alone a manoeuvrist approach, 

cannot be attempted when the battlespace is fully occupied. This 

can certainly apply at the operational and strategic levels of warfare 

– even if the concept is alien to modern thinking. Sheffield 

postulates that the parallel battles of 1916 fulfilled just such a 

function and that the eventual victories of 1918 would not have been 

possible without the attrition. 

Much of the recent historiography of the Great War concentrates on 

the major battles. Sheffield redresses this with excellent coverage of 

the origins of the War and Allied strategy. He also covers the final 

phase emphasising that the Allies were genuinely victorious – a fact 

often forgotten. 

This book is easy to read, yet conveys a number of serious 

messages. It goes far beyond the normal run of ‘potboilers’ and 

should be considered as essential reading – especially for those 

seeking a properly balanced view of an often misunderstood conflict. 







160 


THE MIND OF WAR: JOHN BOYD AND 

AMERICAN SECURITY 

Grant T Hammond 

Reviewer: Group Captain Peter Gray 

Smithsonian, Washington, 2001 

ISBN 1-56098-941-6 

Staff College students, at all levels of study, instinctively associate John 

Boyd with the OODA loop in which the war fighter – again at every 

level – is invited to Observe, Orientate, Decide and then Act. After a 

moment’s self-congratulatory pause for remembering the mnemonic, 

there follows a major scratch of the cranium while attempts are made 

to recall what else John Boyd did, said and wrote. To start with the last 

aspect, Boyd committed very little of his work to paper. Like most 

aviators he preferred to do, or to teach in the air and, as a fallback, to 

brief on the ground. His briefing material gradually coalesced into a 

multi-hour presentation entitled ‘Patterns of Conflict’; as Hammond 

points out this briefing was some 193 vu-graphs long. Boyd’s central 

thesis was that neither machines nor weapons fought wars – only 

people did that. Boyd used his huge experience of air-to-air combat 

(including Korea) as a basis for explaining the need to outwit your 

opponent by thinking and acting faster. This appears obvious in 

dogfight terms, but Boyd extended the theory into a generic warfighting 

ethos that became enshrined in the OODA loop. 

From his extensive study of the history of warfare, Boyd believed that 

the enemy system could be forced to collapse into confusion and 

disorder through the rapid and flexible application of force, and the 

judicious threat of force. Boyd’s conceptual approach hit a chord with 

both the US Army and more particularly the US Marine Corps. His 

theories utilised the core concepts of precision, speed and manoeuvre 

– key characteristics of air power but applicable across the piece. 

Boyd’s theorising, along with the thinking of a group of reformist 

colleagues, became the underlying premise behind manoeuvre warfare. 

Boyd’s briefing process then expanded to encapsulate ‘A Discourse on 

Winning and Losing’ with 327 slides! 

In addition to his theoretical work on the nature of warfare, Boyd was a 

hugely talented fighter pilot who invariably won bets on his ability to get 

into guns solution on any adversary. He also worked on a theoretical 

air-to-air combat construct based on energy manoeuvrability theory. 

Boyd’s theories and early computer simulation work were some of the 

most influential factors behind the design criteria of the F-15 and F-16. 

He also authored the first real USAF tactics manual. Modern-day 

fighter pilots talk about aircraft energy states, tactics and procedures 

with no realisation that John Boyd was the major thinker behind the 

codification of basic fighter lore into the jet age. There was no scope 

for intellectual copyright or elaborate footnoting in air combat training 

and manuals and therefore little recognition for Boyd personally. 

Hammond, who is at his best in challenging orthodoxy (as is evident to 

regular readers of Air Power Review), evidently believes that there 

should be more like Boyd in the air power game. That Boyd won more 

recognition, and was accorded greater status, by the Marines clearly 

rankles with his biographer – and so it should. Boyd was an intellectual 

maverick operating in an environment that values neither trait. He was 

either loved or hated with equal extremes of sentiment. There is, 

however, little doubt that as personal memories fade, and the angst 

lessens, Boyd will be considered by history to have been one of the 

20th Century’s greatest strategic thinkers. There is no doubt at all that 

this biography will be a significant factor in aiding Boyd’s eventual 

rehabilitation. Furthermore, it is a significant work on strategic thinking 

in its own right and should be widely read. 







MOONLESS NIGHT 

BY B A ‘JIMMY ’JAMES 

The Second World War Escape Epic 

Published: 8th September 2001, 

£19.95 Hardback, Illustrated 


Any prisoner-of-war deep inside the Nazi Third Reich who attempted 

to escape deserves the highest praise for courage and 

determination. Remarkably Jimmy James took part in no less than 

twelve attempts including the Great Escape, which so angered Hitler 

that fifty of the seventy-six POWs involved were callously murdered. 

In Moonless Night he describes in the most graphic and gripping 

terms not only his own experiences and emotions, both in captivity 

and on-the-run, but also the achievements of his fellow prisoners-ofwar. 

The author is so disarmingly modest that readers may find 

themselves almost taking for granted the extreme risks involved. 

After capture, following the Great Escape, he and a small group of 

colleagues experienced appalling conditions at the notorious 

Sachsenhausen Concentration Camp. Yet utterly refused to accept 

captivity even when recapture carried the real prospect of execution. 

Indeed they were sentenced to death by Himmler after a further 

unsuccessful escape but this was commuted to five months solitary 

confinement in the Death Cells. 

In the front rank of World War Two escape stories, Moonless Night 

is an inspiring, exciting and utterly compelling book which demands 

reading. 

161 







162 

BOMBER BARONS 

By Chaz Bowyer 


Published 2nd August 2001, £19.95 Hardback, 

ISBN 0 85052 802 X 

By the end of the Second World War, a grim total of 55,000 air crew 

of Bomber Command had lost their lives. This figure comprised no 

less than seventy per cent of RAF fatalities. Yet, unlike their more 

glamorous fighter pilot colleagues, very few bomber pilots or 

crewmen were familiar household names to the general public. 

However, within the ranks of the RAF itself, some individuals stood 

out gaining high reputations for their courage and leadership, a 

respect achieved regardless of the decorations they had won or the 

number of sorties flown. These were the Bomber Barons. 

In this authoritative book, Chaz Bowyer chooses a selection of 

these men, Leonard Cheshire, Guy Gibson, Hughie Edwards, Nick 

Knilans, Syd Clayton and Jo Lancaster to name but a few. For 

each, the author gives details of their careers and relates episodes 

that reflect the qualities that made them outstanding. 

At the same time, the reader learns of the unfolding dramatic 

development of Bomber Command from the comparatively 

uncoordinated, non-cohesive raids of the early part of the war to 

the highly-trained and deadly offensive weapon it became under Sir 

Arthur Harris, from 1942 AOC-in-C of Bomber Command, and the 

Greatest Baron of them all. 

Chaz Bowyer 

joined the RAF 

aged 16 as a 

Halton Aircraft 

Apprentice and 

went on to 

complete twentysix 

years’ regular 

service. After 

retiring voluntarily 

he became a fulltime 

professional 

aviation history 

author, researcher 

and consultant. He 

has published 

some forty 

hardcover titles and 

hundreds of feature 

articles. 


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n o t i c e s / r e u n i o n s 

163 

Patron: The Chief of the Air Staff President: Air Chief Marshal Sir Patrick Hine GCE GBE 

The Air Power Association (APrA), which was founded in 1947, 

aims to foster awareness of the Royal Air Force, its role, people 

and equipment and to bring together people and organisations 

with an interest in air power. 

The Association’s role has grown since it was founded in 1947 as the 

Air Public Relations Association. C P Robertson, who served in the 

Royal Flying Corps and was then Director of Public Relations (RAF), 

was the moving spirit behind its formation and foresaw a largely social 

Association comprising former Air Ministry Information Division people. 

Few people today have first hand experience of the armed forces and 

defence is rarely at the top of the political agenda. 

In a move to foster greater public awareness, recommendations to 

make the Association a more effective and attractive networking 

organisation were accepted by the 2000 AGM – the most major 

change being the new name – “The Air Power Association”. The 

original mission statement and articles of association were revised to 

reflect APrA’s new role. 

Since then, the Association has been revitalised to provide a forum 

that is attractive to the RAF, the aerospace and defence industries, the 

media, opinion formers and all those with an interest in air power. 

The Association’s Patron is, by tradition, the current Chief of Air Staff. 

The President is Air Chief Marshal Sir Patrick Hine GCB GBE. 

Chairmanship of the Association’s Executive Committee devolves 

upon the serving officer currently holding the post of Director of 

Corporate Communications (RAF). 

The Association has three categories of the membership: Official 

Sponsor (currently BAE Systems, Boeing, GKN Westland, and 

Rolls-Royce); Corporate (which include Flight International, Raytheon, 

and Thales); and individual membership. 

What membership offers you 

● The opportunity to make new RAF, industry and media contacts 

and renew acquaintances. 

● The Association’s “The Bulletin” to keep you up-to-date with 

developments in air power. 

● The chance to hear top level speakers from industry and the RAF at 

Association lunches at the RAF Club. 

● The opportunity to attend the Association’s annual Industry Dinner, 

where the speaker is a government Minister. 

● Attend special events, such as presentations and visits to RAF 

stations, organised by the Association. 

n o t i c e s / r e u n i o n s

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164 


Forthcoming Services 2001 

Date Time Event 

Monday, 10th December 6pm Carol Service The Savage Club 

Thursday 13th December 12.15pm Carol Service Exxon Mobil 

Thursday 13th December 7.30pm The London Welsh Male Voice Choir will give a concert produced by 

1475 Squadron A.T.C. 

Friday 14th December 5pm Carol Service Lawrence Graham 

Advent 3 11am Carol Service in aid of St. Christopher’s Fellowship. 

Sunday 16th December 

Lessons and Readers to be advised. 

(Following this Service there will be the usual Christmas Lunch in the Crypt 

for all Guild members and their friends) 

Thursday 20th December 12 noon Carol Service Shell 

Thursday 20th December 6pm Carol Service Taylor Joynson Garrett 

Advent 4 Choral Matins Old Testament: Micah 5 2-5 Anna Siraut 

Sunday 23rd December New Testament: Luke 1 26-38 John Siraut 

Christmas Eve 11.30pm 1st Reading: Isaiah 9 2-7 Ivan Packman 

Monday 24th December 2nd Reading: Titus 2 11-14 Keith Grout 

Midnight Choral Eucharist Gospel: Luke 2 1-14 Resident Chaplain 

Christmas Day 11am 1st Reading: Isaiah 52 7-10 Brian Poag 

Tuesday 25th December 2nd Reading: Hebrews 1 1-12 Keith Grout 

Choral Eucharist Gospel: John 1 1-14 Resident Chaplain 

Sunday 30th December 1st Reading: Isaiah 63 7-9 Ken Allen 

Choral Eucharist 2nd Reading: Hebrews 2 10-18 Ivan Packman 

Gospel: Matthew 2 13-23 

Resident Chaplain 


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165 

ST. CLEMENT DANES, STRAND, LONDON 

CENTRAL CHURCH OF THE ROYAL AIR FORCE 

This beautiful Wren church, which is also the Royal Air Force Central Church, 

has a world-wide following and is open daily from 08.30 am – 4.30 pm. There 

is Choral Eucharist or Matins every Sunday at 11.00 am, sung by the famous 

choir. Civilians and all members of the Armed Forces are welcome to visit the 

church and attend the Services.

Volume 4 No 4 - Air Power Studies

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