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TIMMAS21 93-04.DOC - East Timor Action Network/U.S.

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Documents on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> from<br />

PeaceNet and Connected Computer <strong>Network</strong>s<br />

Volume 21: February 15 – April 10, 19<strong>93</strong><br />

Published by:<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> <strong>Action</strong> <strong>Network</strong> / U.S.<br />

P.O. Box 1182, White Plains, NY 10602 USA<br />

Tel: 914-428-7299 Fax: 914-428-7383 E-mail PeaceNet:CSCHEINER or CSCHEINER@IGC.APC.ORG<br />

For additional copies, please enclose US$10. per volume to cover costs; add an extra $3.00 for international<br />

air mail. Activist rate: $6. domestic, $7.50 international.<br />

These documents are usually produced monthly, and mailed to subscribers.<br />

If you would like to subscribe, send $60 for the next six issues (US), or $69 for international air mail.<br />

Reduced rate for activists: $36 in the US, $45 international. Lower, subsidized prices are available for<br />

groups in Third World countries working on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. Checks should be made out to “Foreign Bases<br />

Project/ETAN.” Tax-deductible contributions can be made out to “WESPAC Foundation/ETAN.”<br />

The material is grouped by subject, with articles under each category in approximately chronological<br />

order. It is also available on IBM-compatible diskette, in either WinWord 2 or ASCII format.<br />

Reprinting and distribution without permission is welcomed.<br />

Much of this information is translated and supplied by TAPOL (London), Task Force Indonesia (USA),<br />

CDPM (Lisbon), CNRM, Free <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Japan Coalition, Mate-Bian News (Sydney) and solidarity<br />

groups, but they are not responsible for edi torial comment or selection.<br />

TABLE OF CONTENTS<br />

XANANA GUSMÃO’S TRIAL CONTINUES ...................................................................................................... 6<br />

PORTUGUESE PARLIAMEN T: TRIAL IS ILLEGAL..............................................................................................6<br />

XANANA LAWYER COURT STATEMENT...........................................................................................................6<br />

XANANA REKINDLES EXPECTATION OVER HIS TRIAL IN DILI .......................................................................7<br />

XANANA’S LAWYER USES ALATAS’S ARGUMENT............................................................................................8<br />

RAMOS HORTA AGREES TO TESTIFY .............................................................................................................9<br />

INDONESIAN UN MISSION CHIEF MEETS XANANA .....................................................................................10<br />

FOUR WITNESSES HEARD AT XANANA TRIAL ON FEB. 15 ............................................................................10<br />

XANANA’S LAWYER UNDER PRESSURE........................................................................................................10<br />

GUSMÃO ADMITS ‘DEATH’ EVIDENCE..........................................................................................................11<br />

XANANA CONFOUNDS HIS LAWYER ............................................................................................................11<br />

AUSTRALIAN CASH SENT TO FRETILIN: WITNESS........................................................................................12<br />

FORMER REBEL NOW “INDONESIAN CITIZEN”............................................................................................12<br />

XANANA: A LEADER WHO DOES NOT APPEAR BEATEN ................................................................................12<br />

FRETILIN ‘GOT AID FROM AUSTRALIA’ ........................................................................................................14<br />

MATE-BIAN NEWS COMMENTS ON COVERAGE OF XANANA TRIAL ..............................................................14<br />

XANANA: THE TRIAL OF JUSTICE.................................................................................................................15<br />

RETICENT WITNESSES.................................................................................................................................16<br />

TRIAL RESUMES TODAY...............................................................................................................................16


Page 2 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

SATURNINO DA COSTA BELO BRAVELY CRIES OUT .....................................................................................17<br />

SOS RE: SATURNINO’S CONDITION ............................................................................................................18<br />

BACKGROUND ON SATURNINO...................................................................................................................18<br />

SATURNINO’S ‘TESTIMONY’ USED IN COURT...............................................................................................20<br />

NOTHING DELIBERATE ABOUT DELAY IN TRIAL ..........................................................................................20<br />

XANANA TRIAL DRAGS ON ..........................................................................................................................20<br />

DEFENCE WITNESSES HEARD .....................................................................................................................21<br />

EVENTS INSIDE EAST TIMOR.................................................................................................................... 21<br />

WHO’S WHO IN THE RESISTANCE...............................................................................................................21<br />

CNRM CHRISTMAS MESSAGE......................................................................................................................21<br />

STATE OF WAR: A DIARY..............................................................................................................................22<br />

FIGHTING AND ARRESTS IN FIVE MUNICIPALITIES.....................................................................................26<br />

ALIAS CORTHE.............................................................................................................................................26<br />

VIDEO OF XANANA CIRCULATES AROUND TIMORESE SCHOOLS ................................................................27<br />

THE OLD MISSIONARY’S MONOLOGUE .......................................................................................................27<br />

BELO: TIMOR LIKE THE AZORES, MADEIRA, PUERTO RICO .........................................................................27<br />

EAST TIMOR PADDY FIELDS NEGLECTED ....................................................................................................29<br />

AROUND THE TRIAL.....................................................................................................................................30<br />

SIX TIMORESE REBELS SURRENDER WITH BOWS AND ARROWS................................................................30<br />

RESISTANCE LEADERS ANSWER QUESTIONS..............................................................................................30<br />

MA’HUNU VOWS TO CONTINUE THE STRUGGLE..........................................................................................32<br />

NEW BAR ON EAST TIMORESE GOING OVERSEAS? .....................................................................................33<br />

LIKE IT OR QUIT TIMOR, GOVERNOR TELLS PRIESTS..................................................................................33<br />

AUSTRALIAN INVESTS IN DILI GARMENT BUSINESS ...................................................................................34<br />

EAST TIMOR’S CATHOLIC PRIEST AGAIN DENOUNCES ABUSES ..................................................................34<br />

RESISTANCE GROUP DEN OUNCES INDONESIAN ATROCITIES ....................................................................34<br />

PROPAGATION OF ISLAM IN DILI ...............................................................................................................35<br />

INDONESIA TO CHANGE MILITARY ROLE IN EAST TIMOR...........................................................................35<br />

MILITARY REDUCTION IN EAST TIMOR?......................................................................................................35<br />

TIMORESE REBEL SURRENDERS TO INDONESIAN MILITARY ......................................................................35<br />

FOUR INDONESIAN SOLDIERS KILLED BY “FRETILIN” (BBC) .......................................................................36<br />

EDI: TROOPS KILLED WON’T DELAY WITHDRAWAL.....................................................................................36<br />

CNRM COMMUNIQUÉ ON XANANA, OSORIO...............................................................................................37<br />

MORE INDONESIAN DEATHS IN TIMOR ......................................................................................................37<br />

NEW TORTURE CHARGED AGAINST INDONESIA .........................................................................................37<br />

SYAFEI BECOMES UDAYANA COMMANDER..................................................................................................38<br />

DEMONSTRATION PLANNED IN DILI? .........................................................................................................38<br />

YOUNG PEOPLE DEMONSTRATE IN DILI .....................................................................................................38<br />

ARMY CHANGES IN TIMOR..........................................................................................................................38<br />

MA’HUNU CAPTURED................................................................................................................................. 39<br />

QUESTIONS SURROUND MA’HUNU CAPTURE..............................................................................................39<br />

ACTION ALERT TO PREVENT MA HUNU TORTURE........................................................................................39<br />

STATEMENT BY JOSE RAMOS-HORTA ..........................................................................................................40<br />

FURTHER EXCERPTS FROM WIRES ON EAST TIMOR DEVELOPMENTS:........................................................40<br />

REACTIONS TO MA HUNU CAPTURE ............................................................................................................40<br />

HARSH BLOW TO THE RESISTANCE.............................................................................................................41<br />

MA’HUNU CAPTURED IN BATTLE..................................................................................................................41<br />

MORE WEAPONS FLOW TO INDONESIA.................................................................................................... 42<br />

PORTUGAL PROTESTS LONDON-JAKARTA MILITARY PLANES DEAL.............................................................42


<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 3<br />

SOUTHEAST ASIAN NAVIES GROWING BIGGER...........................................................................................42<br />

INDONESIA NO THREAT TO ITS NEIGHBORS ..............................................................................................42<br />

PORTUGAL PROTESTS AT GERMAN ARMS SALE ...........................................................................................43<br />

GERMANY SELLS WAR SHIPS TO INDONESIA..............................................................................................43<br />

KOHL IN TOKYO CHASTISED FOR ARMS SALE.............................................................................................43<br />

NGOS PROTEST WARSHIP DEAL TO KOHL...................................................................................................44<br />

PERPETRATORS OF VIOLENCE ARE UNLIKELY CHAMPIONS OF PEACE .......................................................44<br />

DEMONSTRATION AT BRITISH AEROSPACE................................................................................................45<br />

GERMAN EMBASSY REPLIES TO CANADA ....................................................................................................45<br />

PROSPECTS FOR MORE HAWK SALES FROM BAE ........................................................................................45<br />

SUHARTO “RE-ELECTED”, TRY IS NEW V.P............................................................................................. 46<br />

PETITION SUPPORT SWELLS FOR SUHARTO ................................................................................................46<br />

ENVOY AT UN TOLD TO CAMPAIGN FOR TIMOR ACCEPTANCE ....................................................................46<br />

GEN. TRY KEEPS MUM ABOUT ACCEPTING V-P NOMINATION .....................................................................46<br />

SUDRADJAT LOCALLY TRAINED...................................................................................................................47<br />

NEW ABRI CHIEF A TIMOR VETERAN ...........................................................................................................47<br />

STUDENTS DETAINED FOR DEMO ..............................................................................................................47<br />

STUDENTS ARRESTED AS SUHARTO ACCEPTS TRY......................................................................................47<br />

SUHARTO STILL SILENT ON VICE-PRESIDENT.............................................................................................48<br />

TRY SUTRISNO IS TRUSTED SUHARTO MAN, DEVOUT MUSLIM ..................................................................48<br />

THE END GAME FOR INDONESIA’S SUHARTO .............................................................................................48<br />

SUHARTO ANNOUNCES NEW CABINET.......................................................................................................50<br />

PROFILES OF KEY MEN IN NEW SUHARTO CABI NET ...................................................................................51<br />

ABRI REASSERTS SELF.................................................................................................................................51<br />

SUHARTO EXCLUDES ARMY FROM CABINET................................................................................................52<br />

SUHARTO TO ATTEND G7 SUMMIT? ............................................................................................................52<br />

INDONESIA’S NEW AMBASSADOR TO INDIA ...............................................................................................53<br />

HUMAN RIGHTS: BACKGROUND PAPERS.................................................................................................. 54<br />

INDONESIA/EAST TIMOR A NEW ORDER? HUMAN RIGHTS IN 1992 (AI)......................................................54<br />

THE HUMAN RIGHTS CRISIS IN EAST TIMOR: REGIONAL AND GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES..............................56<br />

BACKGROUND TO THE CURRENT HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION (FROM CANADA) .........................................59<br />

INDONESIA’S JUSTICE SYSTEM VIOLATES BASIC RIGHTS ...........................................................................62<br />

PRISONERS FACE TORTURE, SAYS HUMAN RIGHTS GROUP........................................................................62<br />

HUMAN RIGHTS LAW BODY RECEIVES AWARD ...........................................................................................63<br />

UN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION PASSES STRONG RESOLUTION .......................................................... 64<br />

THE JAKARTA REGIME AND ITS GENEVA COMMITMENTS............................................................................64<br />

EAST TIMOR REBEL LEADER PLEADS FOR U.N. SUPPORT............................................................................64<br />

URGE YOUR GOVERNMENT TO SUPPORT EAST TIMOR AT THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION .............64<br />

CLOSED EYES ON EAST TIMOR...................................................................................................................65<br />

UNHRC STATEMENT OF CONSTANCIO PINTO ..............................................................................................66<br />

UNHRC STATEMENT BY ABE BARRETO SOARES ...........................................................................................67<br />

CNRM UPDATE.............................................................................................................................................67<br />

INDONESIA SUFFERS HUMILIATING DEFEAT AT UN ....................................................................................68<br />

AUSTRALIA’S UN VOTE ‘A SURPRISE’ ..........................................................................................................69<br />

UN SLAMS DILI KILLERS’ JAIL TERMS ........................................................................................................69<br />

U.N. CRITICIZES INDONESIA ABOUT EAST TIMOR.......................................................................................69<br />

INDONESIA REJECTS UNHRC RESOLUTION ON ET .....................................................................................70<br />

INDONESIA, DESERVEDLY REBUKED ..........................................................................................................71<br />

ACTION ALERT ON INDONESIAN RESPONSE TO UNHRC RESOLUTION .......................................................71


Page 4 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

INDONESIA LOSES GEN EVA VOTE..............................................................................................................73<br />

SELECTIVE FOCUS ON HUMAN RIGHTS CRITICISED ...................................................................................73<br />

UN ROUND-UP OF UNHRC SESSION ..........................................................................................................76<br />

EUROPEAN POSITIONS AT UNHRC .............................................................................................................76<br />

U.S. CONCERN OVER EAST TIMOR MAY SIGNAL ASIAN POLICY CHANGE ...................................................76<br />

SOME TIMORESE BEING GROOMED FOR INDONESIA.................................................................................77<br />

INDONESIA ASKS NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES TO SUPPORT REPRESSION .................................................77<br />

CHAIRMAN OF COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS ANNOUNCES SEVEN SPECIAL RAPPORTEURS..............78<br />

TIMOR CONTROVERSY AT BANGKOK HUMAN RIGHTS MEETING ............................................................ 78<br />

ROW OVER NGO ACCREDITATION...............................................................................................................78<br />

GROUPS PLEDGE TO BOOST EAST TIMOR FIGHT.........................................................................................78<br />

HUMAN RIGHTS MEETING IN BANGKOK - IS IT A SHAM?............................................................................79<br />

HUMAN RIGHTS VALUES – EASTERN, WESTERN OR UNIVERSAL?................................................................79<br />

NGOS BANNED FROM ASIAN MEETING......................................................................................................80<br />

NEED FOR REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS MECHANISM STRESSED ................................................................81<br />

HUMAN RIGHTS: INDONESIA HITS BACK AT CRITICS .................................................................................81<br />

ASSISTANT S-G FOR HUMAN RIGHTS STRESSES ASIAN CONTRIBUTION TO WORLD CONFERENCE ...........82<br />

BANGKOK DECLARATION ............................................................................................................................82<br />

ASIA-PACIFIC STATES SET STRONG AGENDA ..............................................................................................84<br />

BBC ON BANGKOK DECLARATION AND TIMOR ...........................................................................................85<br />

JOSÉ RAMOS HORTA SAYS HE PLANS TO RETURN TO EAST TIMOR.............................................................86<br />

CONTINUING TALKS BETW EEN INDONESIA AND PORTUGAL................................................................... 87<br />

JAPANESE GROUPS URGE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REDOUBLE EFFORTS ...........................................87<br />

CHURCH TO MEDIATE TIMOR TALKS?.........................................................................................................88<br />

ROME AWAITS THE TIMORESE.....................................................................................................................89<br />

VATICAN MEDIATION NOT CONFIRMED BY FOREI GN OFFICE.....................................................................89<br />

ALATAS STEPS “BACKWARD” TOWARDS ROME ?..........................................................................................90<br />

INDONESIA SAYS PORTUGAL UNHELPFUL OVER TIMOR .............................................................................90<br />

DIPLOMACY VERSUS LOGIC OF WAR..........................................................................................................90<br />

AMOS WAKO RETURNS TO EAST TIMOR .................................................................................................. 91<br />

SECRETARY-GENERAL TO SEND PERSONAL ENVOY TO INDONESIA AND EAST TIMOR...............................91<br />

JAKARTA ASKED TO REVEAL ALL FROM PROBE OF 1991 DILI INCIDENT.....................................................91<br />

JAKARTA’S HANDLING OF THE AMOS WAKO VISIT......................................................................................92<br />

AMOS WAKO’S RETURN VISIT TO INDONESIA.............................................................................................92<br />

WAKO: “MY DOOR IS OPEN”........................................................................................................................<strong>93</strong><br />

AMOS WAKO MEETS XANANA AND MAU HUNU............................................................................................<strong>93</strong><br />

RADIO AUSTRALIA ON WAKO VISIT............................................................................................................<strong>93</strong><br />

UN ENVOY IN TALKS WITH XANANA...........................................................................................................<strong>93</strong><br />

EVENTS IN CANADA................................................................................................................................... 94<br />

FIVE DAYS IN EAST TIMOR ..........................................................................................................................94<br />

EAST TIMOR UPDATE FROM ETAN/TORONTO ..............................................................................................94<br />

CANADIAN GOVERNMENT ON XANANA......................................................................................................95<br />

EAST TIMOR ALERT NETWORK / CANADA NEWSLETTER, FEB. 19<strong>93</strong>.............................................................96<br />

UPDATE FROM EAST TIMOR ALERT NETWORK/CANADA..............................................................................98<br />

EVENTS IN EUROPE; EUROPEAN LEADERS VISIT INDONESIA ................................................................. 99<br />

SWITZERLAND’S POSITION ON EAST TIMOR ...............................................................................................99<br />

LACK OF UNEQUIVOCAL SUPPORT FROM EC ............................................................................................. 100<br />

MOREIRA INTERVIEW: PORTUGUESE GOV’T VIEWS................................................................................... 100


<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 5<br />

KOHL TO RAISE TIMOR ISSUE WITH SUHARTO ......................................................................................... 102<br />

LETTER TO FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTRY .................................................................................................. 102<br />

POSSIBLE VOTE IN EP ............................................................................................................................... 102<br />

NEW PAPAL AMBASSADOR TO LISBON ...................................................................................................... 102<br />

EP: XANANA TRIAL ILLEGAL....................................................................................................................... 102<br />

EAST TIMOR MOTION WINS UK COMMONS SUPPORT ............................................................................... 103<br />

FRETILIN SATISFIED WITH PORTUGAL ...................................................................................................... 103<br />

DENMARK WANTS EC OBSERVER FOR EAST TIMOR .................................................................................. 103<br />

EURO-MPS’ VISIT AWAITS GREEN LIGHT................................................................................................... 103<br />

BRITISH FM DOUGLAS HURD TO VISIT JAKARTA....................................................................................... 103<br />

WITH THE TIMORESE BUT WITHOUT FRETILIN AT EC HEARING................................................................ 104<br />

REPORT FROM FRENCH SOLIDARITY MOVEMENT..................................................................................... 104<br />

EVENTS IN THE UNITED STATES............................................................................................................ 105<br />

REPORT FROM EAST TIMOR ACTION NETWORK / U.S. TO THE SOLIDARITY MEETING.............................. 105<br />

SILENT GENOCIDE: EAST TIMOR STRUGGLES FOR GLOBAL ATTENTION – AND FOR ITS LIFE ................... 105<br />

SENATOR PELL STATEMENT ON EAST TIMOR............................................................................................. 106<br />

US STATE DEPARTMENT’S ANNUAL REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES IN INDONESIA................... 107<br />

TIME TO END AN ATROCITY....................................................................................................................... 115<br />

EAST TIMORESE WANT THEIR CONQUERORS OUT .................................................................................... 116<br />

ACTION ALERT: THE LAST CHANCE FOR THE HOUSE HUNGER COMMITTEE !............................................ 116<br />

SPEAKING TOUR: EAST TIMOR – A NEW GENERATION OF RESISTANCE.................................................... 117<br />

TIMOR’S UNTELEVISED TERROR................................................................................................................ 117<br />

ETAN/US NEWSLETTER # 5......................................................................................................................... 119<br />

INÍCIO DA DIGRESSÃO TIMORENSE PELOS EUA....................................................................................... 120<br />

EAST TIMOR: SOARES WRITES TO CLINTON .............................................................................................. 121<br />

TIMORESE EXILE ACTIVITIES................................................................................................................. 121<br />

THE “FREEDOM FOR XANANA, FREEDOM FOR TIMOR” COMMISSION ....................................................... 121<br />

SOME EXILES: HORTA HAS NEVER BEEN MANDATED................................................................................ 121<br />

FRETILIN/AUSTRALIA WANTS MOVEMENT RESTRUCTURED ...................................................................... 122<br />

FRETILIN WITHOUT MAU HUNU................................................................................................................ 122<br />

TIMORESE RESISTANCE TRIES TO AVOID DIVISIONS ............................................................................... 123<br />

MISCELLANEOUS ARTICLES ................................................................................................................... 123<br />

SYAFEI ON MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EAST TIMOR FROM 1975................................................................ 123<br />

INFORMATION WANTED ON ENVIRONMENTAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE INDONESIAN OCCUPATION ........ 123<br />

EAST TIMOR COMPUTER WAR GAME ......................................................................................................... 124<br />

AUSTRALIAN TV STARTS BROADCASTING TO SOUTHEAST ASIA................................................................. 124<br />

PRESS COMMUNIQUÉ FROM THE INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY MOVEMENT............................................ 124<br />

YEAR OF THE SANDALWOOD EXHIBITION, LISBON................................................................................... 125<br />

EVANS FACES PROTEST OVER TIMOR........................................................................................................ 125<br />

DEBATE: PORTUGUESE TEACHERS RESOLUTION ON EAST TIMOR ............................................................ 125<br />

ASIA BOLDLY TAKING ON THE WEST......................................................................................................... 131<br />

RELIGIOUS CONFLICT DISINFORMATION QUERY ..................................................................................... 132<br />

LOBBYING FOR EAST TIMOR IN BRAZIL.................................................................................................... 132<br />

RESOURCES............................................................................................................................................. 132<br />

TAPOL BULLETIN CONTENTS, APRIL 19<strong>93</strong> .................................................................................................. 132<br />

FIRST PLAY BY TIMORESE CULTURAL GROUP ............................................................................................ 133<br />

AUSTRALIAN BID TO SAVE THE TETUM LANGUAGE.................................................................................... 133<br />

ANNOUNCEMENT OF NEW PRIVATE ‘INDONESIA’ AND ‘EASTTIMOR’ LISTS............................................... 133


Page 6 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

XANANA GUSMÃO’S<br />

TRIAL CONTINUES<br />

PORTUGUESE PARLIAMENT:<br />

TRIAL IS ILLEGAL<br />

Publico 3 February 19<strong>93</strong>. By Angela Silva.<br />

Original Portuguese. abridged<br />

(Lisbon) The Assembly of the Republic<br />

yesterday unanimously passed a vote of<br />

“vehement repudiation of the pursuance of<br />

Xanana Gusmão’s trial,” considering it to be<br />

“unjust, unlawful, biased, and gravely<br />

offensive to human dignity and to the internationally<br />

recognised rights of the people of<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.” The vote, proposed by all the<br />

members of the parliamentary Commission<br />

on the Situation in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, alerts the<br />

UN Human Rights Commission to the<br />

“urgency of the Presidency’s statement on<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> being respected.” Furthermore,<br />

it asks non- governmental organisations and<br />

the Portuguese Lawyers’ Council “that they<br />

collaborate in the restoration of the violated<br />

international juridical order.”<br />

In the preamble to the vote, Xanana’s<br />

trial is considered “an abusive attempt to<br />

impose, upon the international community,<br />

the qualification of the resistance as a<br />

question of domestic jurisdiction, thereby<br />

passively bringing about acceptance of the<br />

subjugation and integration” of the territory<br />

of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. In this regard, the Assembly<br />

of the Republic requests Parliaments and<br />

Governments, “especially those of the<br />

United States and Australia, that they urgently<br />

proceed to an evaluation of the disparities<br />

between the policies imposed on the<br />

people of <strong>Timor</strong> and the Universal<br />

Declaration of Human Rights and principles<br />

of self-determination and independence of<br />

peoples, embodied in the UN Charter.”<br />

This vote came from the Parliamentary<br />

Commission on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> which is now<br />

chaired, since just a few days ago, by the<br />

Christian-Democrat deputy Adriano Moreira,<br />

substituting the Social-Democrat Vitor<br />

Crespo.<br />

XANANA LAWYER COURT<br />

STATEMENT<br />

Delivered 3 February, 19<strong>93</strong><br />

DOCUMENT: EKSEPSI DELIVERED BY<br />

XANANA’S LAWYER, SUDJONO AT DILI<br />

TRIAL.<br />

Law Office Sudjono and Partners<br />

Counselor: Prof. Sahetbi, SH, Dr. Lubby<br />

Loqman, SH, MH<br />

No. 500/SP/I/<strong>93</strong><br />

E K S E P S I in response to LIST OF<br />

THE PROSECUTION’S CHARGES<br />

No.: PDM - 90/DILI/01/19<strong>93</strong>25 January<br />

19<strong>93</strong><br />

A. IDENTITY OF THE ACCUSED<br />

Name in Full: JOSE ALEXANDRE<br />

GUSMÃO alias KAY RALA GUSMÃO<br />

Al XANANA<br />

Place and Date of Birth: Manatuto, <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>, 20 June 1946<br />

Age: 46 years<br />

Sex: Male<br />

Nationality/Citizenship: Indonesian<br />

Place of Residence: West Lahane, RT. 2<br />

RK. 1, West Dili sub-district, District of<br />

Dili<br />

Religion: Catholic<br />

Employment: GPK (Gerombolan Pengacau<br />

Keamanan: rebel/secessionist/ disturber<br />

of common safety)<br />

Education: Liceu (Senior High School)<br />

B. HELD BY THE INVESTIGATING<br />

OFFICER<br />

Since November 20 1992 Extended Detention<br />

by General Prosecutor/ Indonesian<br />

Attorneys Office, Dili from 10 December<br />

1992 to 18 January 19<strong>93</strong>. Detention extended<br />

by Dili District Court as of 19 January<br />

19<strong>93</strong><br />

C. TYPE OF DETENTION<br />

Detained in Prison<br />

Respected Judge, Beloved Prosecution:<br />

INTRODUCTION:<br />

Before the trial begins, allow us to present<br />

an eksepsi in response to the charges<br />

laid by the Public Prosecutor as included in<br />

the List of Charges No. -90/PDM/<br />

DILI/01/19<strong>93</strong>, 25 January, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

The charges laid against the accused are<br />

inextricably linked to administrative law, in<br />

particular from the concept of the emergence<br />

of a state. The contract theory is one of the<br />

theories concerning the emergence of states,<br />

a theory which has been illustrated in the<br />

emergence of ex-Soviet or ex-<br />

Czechoslovakian states. Likewise, states<br />

formerly colonized by Portugal.<br />

The emergence of a state is not only<br />

based on contract but also relates to the<br />

history of a particular group of people. The<br />

emergence of the Indonesian state, for example,<br />

is not based on contract between<br />

states but on the common history of a people<br />

from a certain location/geographic area.<br />

States also emerge out of radical change<br />

often referred to as revolution. Thus, states<br />

may emerge from either peaceful or violent<br />

processes.<br />

A GLANCE AT THE TIMOR PROBLEM<br />

Since the departure of the Portuguese<br />

colonial government, there has been no <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese state. The conditions for establishing<br />

a state are that it must constitute<br />

a people, a geographic area and a government.<br />

Other conditions include other countries’<br />

recognition (of the new state). <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> only has a geographic area and a<br />

people, but no government.<br />

Nevertheless, recognition by other<br />

countries has been present in the form of<br />

United Nations recognition. Recognition by<br />

other states tends to be the dominant factor<br />

in determining the formation of new states.<br />

At present (the validity/legality of) the integration<br />

of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> remains in question.<br />

Following the departure of the Portuguese<br />

colonial government, several groups of<br />

people formed parties which had varying<br />

aspirations regarding the nature of the administration<br />

of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. These aspirations<br />

included the desire to integrate with<br />

Indonesia, and the desire to form a separate<br />

state. Presently, these groups maintain their<br />

respective followings, and are in possession<br />

of weapons formerly belonging to the ex-<br />

Portuguese colonial administration. The<br />

group aspiring to integration received assistance<br />

from the Republic of Indonesia. The<br />

group desiring a separate state received assistance<br />

from overseas. The group desiring a<br />

separate state was known as Fretilin, led by<br />

the accused. A leadership body was formed,<br />

thus fulfilling the conditions necessary for<br />

establishing a state.<br />

Another group refused to accept the establishing<br />

of an independent <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />

state. This group wanted to integrate with<br />

Indonesia. Armed conflict broke out between<br />

these two groups.<br />

The leadership of several groups then<br />

approached the Indonesian government to<br />

request integration as soon as possible.<br />

Attempts were made to hold a referendum.<br />

Whether this referendum was selfinitiated<br />

or carried out by other people remains<br />

a question. Was not a neutral third<br />

party not required to oversee such a referendum?<br />

The ‘non-integration’ group continued to<br />

question the validity of the referendum.<br />

Moreover, according to the referendum results,<br />

the majority of people chose to integrate<br />

with the Republic of Indonesia.<br />

At this stage, the United Nations continued<br />

to question the validity of the general<br />

election (referendum). Was the decision<br />

taken by the four parties excluding Fretilin a<br />

pure manifestation of the will of the people<br />

of the ex-Portuguese colony? This may<br />

relate to the fact that, due to the poor level<br />

of education of the (majority of ) people left


<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 7<br />

by the Portuguese colonial government,<br />

decision making power rested with their<br />

leaders.<br />

The group which opposed integration<br />

(‘non-integration group’) considered the result<br />

of the referendum invalid. Thus, this<br />

group, of which the accused was leader, did<br />

not recognise the Indonesian rule.<br />

We may compare this situation with Indonesia’s<br />

annexation of West Irian. Although<br />

this discredited Indonesia internationally,<br />

West Irian was formerly a Dutch<br />

colony. Juridically, therefore, Indonesia’s<br />

annexation was recognised internationally,<br />

and was not really questioned by anyone<br />

but the Dutch government.<br />

THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT<br />

These events occurred long before the<br />

declaration of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>’s integration into<br />

Indonesia (i.e.: before 1976).<br />

Basic to the accused’s beliefs are his refusal<br />

to recognise the act o integration, and<br />

thus the jurisdiction of this court to try him<br />

is questionable.<br />

Additionally, the list of charges notes<br />

that the accused carried out (illegal) activities<br />

between July 17 1976 and November 20<br />

1992. This is beyond the existing facts.<br />

The existing facts are presented as follows:<br />

1. 1942-5 Dutch <strong>East</strong> Indies occupied by<br />

the Japanese military regime. <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

included in the area of occupation.<br />

2. 17 August 1945 Indonesian people proclaim<br />

independence. Area encompassed<br />

by Indonesia as yet unclear.<br />

3. August 1945 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese people began<br />

to revolt against Portuguese colonialism<br />

but were crushed by the Portuguese.<br />

4. 27 December 1949 Surrender of Dutch<br />

sovereignty of Indonesia. Indonesia accompanies<br />

all that was former Dutch<br />

<strong>East</strong> Indies, not including <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

which was still under Portuguese colonial<br />

rule.<br />

5. April-May 1974 Portuguese government<br />

planed to grant democratic rights to its<br />

colonies, including <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

6. September-October 1974 Discussion<br />

concerning the decolonisation of <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> held for the first time between the<br />

Portuguese and Indonesian governments.<br />

7. May-November 1974 Five <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />

political parties organise themselves for<br />

self-government.<br />

8. March 1975 Plans to hold a referendum<br />

are thwarted by the Portuguese military.<br />

Fretilin begins its activities. UDT also<br />

begins to stage demonstrations demanding<br />

integration with Indonesia.<br />

9. 20 August 1975 Fretilin controls a large<br />

area of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

10. 26 August 1975 The Portuguese colonial<br />

government leaves <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. Various<br />

groups claim to control the ex-Portuguese<br />

territory.<br />

11. 28 November 1975 Fretilin declares <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese independence.<br />

12. 29 November 1975 Portuguese government<br />

announces that in three months<br />

<strong>East</strong> TImor will gain administrative independence.<br />

13. 30 November 1975 Four other parties<br />

also proclaim their independence and<br />

approach Indonesia to integrate.<br />

14. 15 January 1976 A United Nations<br />

delegate (Vittorio Winspeare Gucciardi)<br />

visits Indonesia and meets with Adam<br />

Malik to enquire about the situation in<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

15. 20-22 January 1976 UN delegate visits<br />

Dili to meet with leaders, including<br />

Fretilin leaders, in various parts of <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>. Following this the UN delegate<br />

visited Australia to meet with Fretilin<br />

members.<br />

16. April-May 1976 A letter sent to the UN<br />

requests that the imminent election be<br />

observed.<br />

17. May 1976 Election held and the result is<br />

the choice to integrate with Indonesia.<br />

18. 5 June 1976 <strong>Timor</strong>ese delegation visits<br />

Jakarta to present a petition requesting<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>’s integration with Indonesia.<br />

19. 23 June 1976 Fact-finding team led by<br />

Indonesian Internal Affairs Minister<br />

(Amir Machmud) visits <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> to<br />

inspect the situation there.<br />

20. 17 July 1976 President Suharto announces<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> as the 27th Province<br />

of Indonesia.<br />

21. End 1978 Discussion about the integration<br />

of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> held in the UN.<br />

As evident in the above chronology,<br />

Fretilin did not agree to integration from the<br />

beginning, and that they wanted to establish<br />

a separate state. The will to establish<br />

independent states emerged at the end of<br />

World War II, when even the <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />

people had begun to oppose the Portuguese<br />

colonial government.<br />

The group of which the accused was<br />

leader existed within the ex-Portuguese<br />

colonial territory. This group maintained<br />

their desire for free state, independent of all<br />

other countries.<br />

The proclamation of self-governance by<br />

groups led by the accused was based on<br />

their conviction to maintain/uphold their<br />

power. According to the existing facts, the<br />

actions of the accused and his followers<br />

show a desire for self-governance and , according<br />

to administrative law, did not recognise<br />

the new legal system.<br />

Because the Indonesian government’s<br />

presence in the ex-Portuguese colonial<br />

territory was not recognised (by Fretilin), all<br />

existing institutions were considered nonexistent,<br />

including the court currently trying<br />

the accused. The present court only came<br />

into existence long after the void of<br />

governance in the ex-Portuguese colony. The<br />

group opposed to integration and led by the<br />

accused already existed (before Indonesian<br />

annexation).<br />

The activities carried out by the accused<br />

began in 1975 and were carried out on a<br />

continual basis. Claims in the list of charges<br />

as to the accused’s actions beginning in 1976<br />

are false.<br />

Thus we conclude that this court has no<br />

authority to try the accused. We request<br />

that the Dili District Court declare itself<br />

without the authority to try the accused in<br />

the trial proposed by the Dili State Public<br />

Prosecutor No. PDM/90 /DILI/01/19<strong>93</strong><br />

based on fact and according to the current<br />

constitution.<br />

I thank you for your attention and<br />

wisdom.<br />

Sudjono<br />

3 February 19<strong>93</strong><br />

Translated by Bibi and Emma for MANIC<br />

(Marrickville Activists <strong>Network</strong> for International<br />

Social Change).<br />

XANANA REKINDLES<br />

EXPECTATION OVER HIS<br />

TRIAL IN DILI<br />

BRILLIANT & EDUCATED<br />

Diario de Noticias 4 February 19<strong>93</strong> By<br />

Oscar Mascarenhas. Translated from<br />

Portuguese. unabridged<br />

(Dili) Xanana Gusmão is not unprovided<br />

for with regards his defence. His lawyer,<br />

Sudjono, made it clear yesterday in the Dili<br />

courtroom that he will fight every legal inch<br />

of the way throughout the proceedings.<br />

The defence strategy is being overseen by<br />

Loebby Loqman, a respected university<br />

professor from Jakarta, specialist in matters<br />

related to the Anti-Subversion Law. Perhaps<br />

for this reason Xanana, in a mood different<br />

from that of the first day, asked that the<br />

journalists “wait until the end of the<br />

proceedings.”<br />

In black, white and grey checkered shirt<br />

with rolled up sleeves, Xanana left the cell<br />

yesterday under a smaller escort. He looked<br />

spiritedly, with head slightly inclined, to the<br />

right and behind, towards the journalists. He<br />

didn’t look right and then left until he<br />

reached the courtroom, to which he had been<br />

summoned by the judge.<br />

With determination he crossed the tiny<br />

lawn, clouds of minute grasshoppers rising


Page 8 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

with each step. It was Xanana who led his<br />

escort.<br />

“You must attend this process until the<br />

end,” he said in English in a good loud voice,<br />

head lowered and left arm raised as if to<br />

wave good-bye. Was he addressing the<br />

international press? Or, not knowing Indonesian<br />

Bahasa, was he sending a message to<br />

the local journalists? The defence lawyer<br />

later told the journalists that the prisoner’s<br />

gesture had not been prearranged.<br />

Xanana entered the courtroom and was<br />

before the judge for 22 minutes. 17 of those<br />

he spent listening to his lawyer’s response<br />

to the public prosecutor’s indictment, which<br />

had been read on Monday. He returned to<br />

his cell, waving his hand when a Portuguese<br />

reporter asked how he was feeling, to await<br />

his reappearance in court the following day.<br />

The judge had ordered two days<br />

adjournment for the prosecutor to reply to<br />

the procedural matter raised by the defence.<br />

Contrary to what we had officially been<br />

informed, there will be a session on Friday.<br />

A little more than a quarter of an hour<br />

was enough for Sudjono to say that the Indonesian<br />

court lacks legitimacy to try<br />

Xanana. It was what could be called an<br />

historic intervention, because Sudjono recalled<br />

the various steps of <strong>Timor</strong>’s international<br />

situation from 1974 onwards, and the<br />

word referendum was included several times<br />

in his speech. Sudjono explained to the<br />

journalists that the stage of having to answer<br />

the prosecutor’s accusations had not yet<br />

been reached. At this time, he opted for<br />

counter-attack, aimed at the court itself. But<br />

Xanana declared himself to be Indonesian at<br />

the outset of the trial when he identified<br />

himself to the judge. Sudjono smiled: “Even<br />

if he says he is Indonesian, this does not<br />

mean that the court has the competence to<br />

try him.” Amused, he revealed a trump card<br />

in his hand - “At the right moment I’ll ask<br />

the prosecutor to prove that Xanana is<br />

Indonesian. I want to see just how he proposes<br />

to do that.”<br />

Might not the lawyer be bringing personal<br />

problems down upon himself by employing<br />

a defence based upon questioning<br />

the legitimacy of Indonesia’s presence in<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>? “Only God knows that,” he replies<br />

jokingly: “I am a fanatical Moslem, I can but<br />

believe in God...” He did not, however,<br />

reveal his own view on the problem of <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>: “I am a professional lawyer and that<br />

question is a political one. It goes beyond<br />

my profession.”<br />

Sudjono receives no remuneration for his<br />

work and even pays the costs of the trial.<br />

And what costs! As well as his own hotel<br />

expenses in Dili for at least two months, he<br />

has to foot the bill for Prof. Loebby<br />

Loqman’s attendance as well as that of the<br />

young lawyers Bhismoko and Iwan Pradana,<br />

his assistants. Pointing to Pradana, Sudjono<br />

laughs and says: “And this one certainly<br />

needs to earn his living because he has a sixmonth-old<br />

son....”<br />

Why did he take on this case? “For humanitarian<br />

reasons,” he replied, striking his<br />

breast. And, as if to say “that’s just the<br />

way I am,” he added “Just lately I had the<br />

joy of saving someone from the hangman’s<br />

noose, in Malaysia.”<br />

For him the primary objective is not to<br />

win or lose the case: “My main motivation<br />

is to fight with the law, as best I can. Success<br />

or failure is of secondary importance.”<br />

He speaks to Xanana in English, and has<br />

already met with him in prison seven times.<br />

He offered him this line of defence and the<br />

prisoner had no objections. But Xanana<br />

speaks poor English. “So do I,” Sudjono<br />

laughs. Someone expressed surprise that<br />

Xanana speaks to quietly, in court. “But he<br />

always speaks quietly!,” retorted Sudjono.<br />

“It is his politeness. He is a brilliant and<br />

well mannered man.” The defence lawyer<br />

appears to be fascinated by Xanana’s personality:<br />

“He’s like an artist. He is particularly<br />

brilliant in the way he thinks and the<br />

way he understands. He seems more an intellectual<br />

than a rebel.”<br />

When they told him that the news had<br />

said that Xanana’s cell had an Indian carpet<br />

and marble washbasin, the lawyer burst into<br />

laughter: “All I said was that he is being well<br />

treated...”<br />

Sudjono’s intervention surprised the international<br />

observers, but was considered<br />

“very good,” by both the presiding judge,<br />

Christian Javanese Hyeronimus Godang,<br />

and the leader of the public prosecutor’s<br />

bench, Moslem Ketut Swara from Bali. An<br />

Australian reporter met with bafflement on<br />

the other end of the line when sending<br />

through his report for editing: “We understand<br />

what you are saying,” they said, “We<br />

just don’t see what it is that the lawyer’s<br />

aiming at.” It is, after all, quite simple: the<br />

Indonesian Moslem lawyer, who has never<br />

seen <strong>Timor</strong>, working with an essentially<br />

Dutch penal code, outlined a strategy just in<br />

the same way a good Portuguese lawyer,<br />

expert in international law, would do.<br />

XANANA’S LAWYER USES<br />

ALATAS’S ARGUMENT<br />

Publico 4 February 19<strong>93</strong> Byline : Adelino<br />

Gomes Translated from Portuguese unabridged<br />

(Dili) A reversal of position, or simply a<br />

procedural incident? Xanana’s lawyer insists<br />

he is just a professional, but his strategy,<br />

yesterday, could have been the first<br />

sign that Jakarta is going to have difficulty<br />

in trying the <strong>Timor</strong>ese ex- leader as a<br />

common criminal.<br />

Only tomorrow will the public prosecutor<br />

reply to the procedural incident raised<br />

by Xanana Gusmão’s defence counsel, lawyer<br />

Sudjono, in his 9-page intervention<br />

which, by questioning the Dili Tribunal’s<br />

competence to try the defendant, represents<br />

the first attempt to shake the logic of the<br />

Indonesian authorities’ juridical construction<br />

of the entire proceedings. The judges will<br />

then spend almost a week studying the<br />

arguments presented by both sides, before<br />

announcing their decision on 11 February.<br />

The defence lawyer upholds his argument<br />

on two main grounds: Fretilin’s fight for<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>’s independence had already started<br />

when Suharto proclaimed the territory<br />

Indonesia’s 17th province, and the guerrillas<br />

never having recognised the Dili Tribunal’s<br />

jurisdiction.<br />

“He must have read the book on the <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> question, distributed a few months<br />

ago by the Indonesian Foreign Ministry,”<br />

commented foreign observers at the end of<br />

the trial’s second hearing. It had lasted just<br />

22 minutes and comprised of Sudjono’s<br />

intervention, the prosecutor’s request for<br />

the hearing to be again suspended, and the<br />

judges’ concession of just one day.<br />

The document on which Sudjono based<br />

his arguments for his first public appearance<br />

in Xanana’s defence, had been specially<br />

prepared for the Non-Aligned Countries’<br />

Summit held in September in Jakarta. It<br />

constituted “the best legal justification for<br />

the occupation, produced by the Indonesians<br />

until now,” thought one press correspondent<br />

based in the Indonesian capital,<br />

impressed by the defence lawyer’s astuteness<br />

in employing the arguments of Ali<br />

Alatas himself against the basis of the<br />

prosecutor’s position.<br />

It should be emphasized here that Sudjono<br />

did not contest the competence of the<br />

Dili Tribunal to try this case. He asked the<br />

court to accept that it does not have the<br />

authority. Or, to repeat the comments made<br />

by an observer to Publico, “He gave the Indonesian<br />

legal system a chance to decide for<br />

itself.”<br />

Xanana’s defence counsel chose, therefore,<br />

“cooperation” rather than<br />

“confrontation,” in contrast to, for example,<br />

the <strong>Timor</strong>ese Fernando Araujo and Francisco<br />

Miranda Branco, when they declared<br />

themselves Portuguese and rejected Indonesia’s<br />

laws and courts, during their trial last<br />

year in Jakarta. They were given heavy<br />

sentences for allegedly encouraging activities<br />

in opposition to the regime, while members<br />

of the resistance. To this end, the lawyer<br />

minimized the effects of Xanana’s<br />

statement, during the first hearing, in which<br />

he identified himself as Indonesian.


<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 9<br />

Although a source linked to the proceedings<br />

admitted that “that is an obstacle which the<br />

defence is going to have to remove,” it<br />

would seem that Sudjono is relying on legal<br />

rather than political logic prevailing.<br />

“The crimes of which Xanana is accused<br />

were committed while he was leader of an<br />

organisation which never accepted integration.<br />

The fact that he identified himself as<br />

Indonesian cannot go against him, when it is<br />

his responsibility in acts committed over the<br />

past 17 years, and not today, that is being<br />

investigated,” argues a diplomat who is<br />

following the proceedings in Dili. And, in<br />

this respect, he could be referring to the<br />

lawyer when, yesterday, he said to foreign<br />

reporters here that “there is a right time for<br />

each legal question to be raised.”<br />

Sudjono, who revealed to Publico that he<br />

accepted the case purely for humanitarian<br />

reasons and without any kind of remuneration,<br />

insists that he sees his whole performance<br />

in this trial as being within the<br />

strict limits of a professional relationship.<br />

He says he studied <strong>Timor</strong>’s recent history<br />

only when he became defence lawyer for<br />

Agapito Cardoso last year, and insists on<br />

not revealing any political view on the<br />

subject.<br />

However, this is not stopping him from<br />

scrutinizing every legal hypothesis possible,<br />

even when it would have sensitive political<br />

implications for the Suharto regime. “De<br />

facto, <strong>Timor</strong> belongs to Indonesia. But, de<br />

jure, the international community refuses to<br />

accept integration,” he said during a long<br />

meeting with the foreign press, during which<br />

he agreed to make some small revelations<br />

about his visits to Xanana.<br />

Hope, until we die<br />

Sudjono’s team consists of the university<br />

professor of law, Prof. Loqman, a known<br />

and respected Indonesian critic of the Anti-<br />

Subversion Law. It is practically impossible<br />

for western observers to this trial to imagine<br />

that the Dili Tribunal would recognise its<br />

incompetence to try Xanana. It will,<br />

therefore, be impossible for the defence to<br />

invoke the political nature of the “crimes” of<br />

which his client is accused by the Indonesian<br />

state. But Sudjono suggests he may<br />

have new surprises in store, when he says<br />

that he will bring out Xanana’s testimony<br />

“at the right time.”<br />

By asking the reporters in English yesterdays<br />

to “wait until the end of the trial,”<br />

Xanana must have wanted to indicate that<br />

he has confidence in the lawyers and that<br />

everyone, starting with the <strong>Timor</strong>ese, was<br />

wrong when, seeing Xanana apathetic,<br />

“Indonesian,” and “disturber of the peace,”<br />

at the first hearing, they regarded him as a<br />

warrior who had given up the fight. Good<br />

news for the <strong>Timor</strong>ese, about 200 of whom<br />

gathered again yesterday in the street in<br />

front of the court, in spite of the dissuasive<br />

presence of, this time, groups of Indonesians<br />

in civilian clothing, armed with sticks<br />

measuring about one and a half metres long<br />

and 3 centimetres in diameter.<br />

Indifferent to the danger, some awaited<br />

the reporters to transmit a message of resistance.<br />

“They drugged the old man. We are<br />

very sad because he declared himself Indonesian,”<br />

said two demonstrators quietly, as<br />

the Publico’s correspondent passed by.<br />

“Don’t abandon us. We want independence,<br />

we don’t want integration.”<br />

In the middle of the road, towards the<br />

cathedral, under the violent blaze of the<br />

morning sun, the voice of a middle- aged<br />

woman sounds like a cry of anger: “We will<br />

hope until we die.” Only she knows<br />

whether it was meant for the world, or for<br />

the ears of her own compatriots.<br />

Calendar of the Trial<br />

Day 5 - Prosecutor’s reply to the<br />

procedural incident raised yesterday by<br />

the defence.<br />

Day 11 - Court’s decision on the incident<br />

Days 15 to 25 - Listening to testimonies.<br />

Possible start of Xanana’s testimony.<br />

Days 26 & 27 - Xanana to be questioned.<br />

Days 4 to 10 March - Proceedings continue,<br />

and final statements.<br />

Day 20 or 21 - Sentencing.<br />

RAMOS HORTA<br />

AGREES TO TESTIFY<br />

The following is the text of a letter faxed by<br />

José Ramos Horta in Geneva to Sudjono,<br />

the Indonesian defence lawyer of Xanana<br />

Gusmão, on 11 February 19<strong>93</strong>, in response<br />

to a request that he testify at Xanana’s trial<br />

as a defence witness:<br />

Dear Mr. Sudjono,<br />

I acknowledge receipt of your fax of 9<br />

February 19<strong>93</strong> and thank you for your efforts<br />

in trying to obtain clearance from the<br />

competent authorities to enable me to testify<br />

in Dili as a defence witness.<br />

While I wish to reiterate my interest in<br />

attending the proceedings, let me make the<br />

following points clear from the outset:<br />

1. Indonesia does not have any jurisdiction<br />

in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and therefore the trial of<br />

Xanana Gusmão is illegal under international<br />

law. Xanana has neither<br />

committed a crime under international<br />

law nor under Indonesian law, since <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> is NOT a territory of Indonesia.<br />

2. Indonesia has occupied <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> illegally<br />

since 1975 in breach of provisions<br />

of the United Nations Charter on the<br />

non-use of force in international relations.<br />

This has also been in defiance of two<br />

Security Council and eight General<br />

Assembly resolutions which reaffirm the<br />

right of the people of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> to selfdetermination<br />

and independence, and call<br />

on the government of Indonesia to<br />

withdraw from <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

3. As a direst consequence of the invasion<br />

and occupation of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> by Indonesian<br />

armed forces in 1975, the people<br />

of the territory have not been able to exercise<br />

their inalienable right to self-determination.<br />

Having stated these points, which I<br />

would ask you to read to the court, I remain<br />

ready to travel to my homeland, <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>,<br />

at short notice. There, together with Xanana<br />

Gusmão and my... [one line left out in the<br />

copy we have]... help, you will prove<br />

beyond doubt that Xanana Gusmão and all<br />

our compatriots, who have been fighting for<br />

self-determination, independence and freedom,<br />

have not violated any laws of any<br />

country. We will prove that they should<br />

therefore be set free and Indonesia should<br />

begin its disengagement from <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

and work for a true resolution of this conflict<br />

for the future of peace and prosperity<br />

of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and the Indonesian people.<br />

This would be in line with the true spirit of<br />

understanding which should prevail amongst<br />

our regional family and which we ardently<br />

desire.<br />

I remain in Geneva until 14 March, attending<br />

the UN Commission on Human<br />

Rights where, for your information, <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> has been the most talked about issue.<br />

Yours sincerely,<br />

José RAMOS HORTA<br />

XANANA INDIFFERENT TO RAMOS<br />

HORTA OFFER<br />

Publico, From the Portuguese unabridged<br />

(Lisbon) The announcement that the<br />

representative abroad of the Maubere Resistance<br />

National Council (CNRM), Mr.<br />

Ramos Horta, could be a witness in Xanana<br />

Gusmão’s trial was received yesterday with<br />

indifference by the latter. According to the<br />

defence lawyer, S.H. Sudjono, who passed<br />

the information on, Xanana just said “I myself<br />

am my best witness.”<br />

The reaction of the <strong>Timor</strong>ese armed resistance’s<br />

former leader surprised Sudjono<br />

who, in a letter to which Lusa’s special envoy<br />

to Dili had access, thanked Ramos<br />

Horta’s offer to travel to <strong>Timor</strong>’s capital in<br />

order to testify at the trial.<br />

The CNRM’s representative, currently<br />

in Geneva for the UN Human Rights<br />

Commission, offered to testify as “enemy<br />

number one abroad” of the Jakarta regime,


Page 10 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

and was prepared to go to Dili with a group<br />

of celebrities and reporters, in order to<br />

“transform the court into an international<br />

forum for the defence of the Maubere people.”<br />

As well as expressing appreciation for<br />

the offer to stand as witness, Mr. Sudjono<br />

pointed out in his reply to Ramos Horta<br />

that entering the territory would be<br />

“difficult” for him, but promised to make<br />

every effort to ensure his presence in the<br />

Dili court.<br />

Forced to Testify<br />

Those giving evidence for the prosecution<br />

against Xanana Gusmão will probably start<br />

being called next Monday. This information<br />

was given to Lusa by an unidentified<br />

“<strong>Timor</strong>ese source,” according to which most<br />

of the witnesses were arrested after<br />

Xanana’s capture and, under torture, forced<br />

to agree to give evidence.<br />

According to the same source, the deponents<br />

for the prosecution were even made to<br />

swear loyalty to Suharto and given instructions<br />

by the Indonesian authorities<br />

with regards the content of their testimony<br />

before the court trying the <strong>Timor</strong>ese former<br />

leader.<br />

INDONESIAN UN MISSION<br />

CHIEF MEETS XANANA<br />

Jawa Pos, 13 February 19<strong>93</strong>.Abridged.<br />

Comment: This is an important item about a<br />

visit to Dili of Nugroho Wisnumurti, head of<br />

Indonesia’s mission to the UN in New York.<br />

Much of what happened in Nugroho’s<br />

discussions in Dili is left unsaid but the<br />

impression is that the visit was part of the<br />

preparation for Indonesia’s strategy being<br />

planned for the meeting in Rome on 20 April<br />

between Indonesia and Portugal.<br />

There are reports circulating in Jakarta that<br />

Indonesia intends to take Xanana to Rome,<br />

although how they think they can pull this off<br />

is difficult to imagine.<br />

Also, we have seen reports in the Portuguese<br />

press that Bishop Belo is likely to be in Rome<br />

at the time of the talks in order to play a<br />

part. Several newspapers have given<br />

credence to this story while others like<br />

Publico, usually up front with reporting<br />

about <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, have treated the report<br />

with a considerable amount of skepticism.<br />

– TAPOL<br />

Although he did not carry out his plan to<br />

attend a session of the Xanana Gusmão trial<br />

now under way in Dili, Indonesia ‘s head of<br />

UN mission in New York, Nugroho<br />

Wisnumurti had the opportunity of having a<br />

private meeting with the Fretilin leader at<br />

the police detention centre.<br />

Nugroho told Jawa Pos that he had held a<br />

frank discussion with Xanana who had made<br />

it clear that he is ready to help the<br />

Indonesian government on the question of<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> at the UN.<br />

During a 90-minute meeting with Xanana<br />

- which Nugroho admitted was somewhat<br />

hampered by language because Xanana does<br />

not speak English well - Xanana had spoken<br />

very frankly and openly. Nugroho hoped<br />

that this was a sign of goodwill on Xanana’s<br />

part and was not a manoeuvre to promote<br />

his own interests.<br />

Asked what he discussed with Xanana,<br />

Nugroho said that they had discussed a<br />

number of things but “my main purpose<br />

was to get to know him in connection with<br />

my work at the UN, so as to provide information<br />

to the international community, via<br />

the UN, about <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.”<br />

Asked how Xanana had responded,<br />

Nugroho said: “Very well indeed. He spoke<br />

very openly and said he would like to help<br />

the Indonesian government reach a solution<br />

to the question of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> at the UN. I<br />

am sorry I cannot say more than this because<br />

many of the things we discussed were<br />

matters of substance.”<br />

Nugroho also said that the conversation<br />

with Xanana had convinced him that what<br />

Xanana had said on Indonesian TV was indeed<br />

true. “Portugal’s assessment that the<br />

various statements made recently by<br />

Xanana were made under duress from the<br />

Indonesian government is quite wrong.”<br />

Asked whether he had discussed the trial<br />

with Xanana, Nugroho said that Xanana told<br />

him he would speak in court about his<br />

position.<br />

During the visit to Dili, Nugroho also<br />

held a lengthy discussion with the military<br />

commander, Brig.Gen. Theo Syafei [who, as<br />

reg.easttimor readers will recall, recently<br />

called for the talks between Indonesia and<br />

Portugal to be halted] as well as having a<br />

meeting Bishop Belo.<br />

FOUR WITNESSES HEARD AT<br />

XANANA TRIAL ON FEB. 15<br />

According to an AFP report filed from<br />

Dili, four witnesses were heard today, 15<br />

February, at the Xanana Gusmão trial which<br />

opened on 1 February. Three were members<br />

of the armed forces and the fourth was an<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese member of the police, Agusto<br />

Pereira, in whose house Xanana Gusmão<br />

was taking refuge when he was captured on<br />

20 November last.<br />

First to testify was Private João Jesus<br />

Costa, member of the special force which<br />

captured Xanana, who told the court he<br />

found a Minimi rifle and an FN-45 pistol in<br />

Xanana’s room. He said the weapons belong<br />

to the armed forces; this was corroborated<br />

by a statement from ABRI’s Support Arms<br />

department.<br />

Agusto Pereira confirmed that the two<br />

weapons were Xanana’s.<br />

According to a written statement, army<br />

commander Brig.Gen. Theo Syafei, told the<br />

court the army lost several [sic] weapons<br />

from 1975 to 1989 during engagements with<br />

Fretilin units.<br />

Two other witnesses, Captain Kadio and<br />

police chief Sergeant Made Maja, told the<br />

court they were guarding the Dili TV station<br />

in 1980 when it was attacked by about 100<br />

Fretilin members, killing two policemen and<br />

wounding several others. The attackers were<br />

driven back with the help of security forces<br />

from nearby posts and 15 people were<br />

arrested.<br />

The trial was adjourned till tomorrow,<br />

Tuesday.<br />

XANANA’S LAWYER UNDER<br />

PRESSURE<br />

Publico, Lisbon 16 February 19<strong>93</strong><br />

Remark: Portuguese journalists who were in<br />

Dili last week for Xanana’s trial reported<br />

that his lawyer, Sudjono, was having greater<br />

difficulty communicating with his client who<br />

had become far less talkative than before.<br />

This change seems to have occurred after<br />

Xanana called out to journalists on the<br />

second day of his trial, asking them to follow<br />

the proceedings to the end.<br />

Sudjono last week contacted José Ramos-<br />

Horta inviting him to testify as a defence<br />

witness at the trial of Xanana. We hope to<br />

publish more details about this shortly.<br />

SUDJONO NOT CONTACTABLE<br />

– CDPM<br />

XANANA’S LAWYER MOVES TO A<br />

HOTEL WITH NO TELEPHONE<br />

The Indonesian defence lawyer of<br />

Xanana Gusmão cannot be contacted. Sudjono<br />

suddenly moved from the hotel where<br />

he was staying in Dili and transferred to a<br />

tiny hotel without a telephone, in Liquica,<br />

outside the capital, Dili.<br />

Contacted by the agency LUSA, the<br />

Hotel Mahkota receptionist in Dili said that<br />

Sudjono checked out of the hotel last<br />

Thursday, the day the Portuguese journalists<br />

left Dili.<br />

According to sources close to the trial,<br />

Sudjono’s move to a hotel in Liquica, which<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese refugees in Lisbon say is nothing<br />

more than a restaurant with a couple of<br />

rooms, coincides with an intensification of<br />

pressure from Jakarta on Xanana’s lawyer.<br />

After last Thursday’s court hearing just<br />

before leaving Dili, the Portuguese journal-


<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 11<br />

ists made arrangements with Sudjono to<br />

stay in contact with him. He expressed a<br />

willingness to do so, as he has done up to<br />

now, saying nothing about any intention to<br />

move to a hotel without a telephone.<br />

GUSMÃO ADMITS ‘DEATH’<br />

EVIDENCE<br />

The Melbourne Age, 16 February <strong>93</strong> By<br />

Lindsay Murdoch, Southeast Asia Correspondent,<br />

Full text<br />

The <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> guerrilla leader, Mr. José<br />

“Xanana” Gusmão, today admitted evidence<br />

that could make him liable to a death<br />

sentence under Indonesian law.<br />

Indonesian prosecutors said Mr. Gusmão<br />

was in possession of a high-powered automatic<br />

rifle and pistol when he was arrested<br />

in Dili, the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese capital, on<br />

20November last year.<br />

When asked in court whether evidence<br />

about the weapons was correct, Mr.<br />

Gusmão replied in Portuguese: “Right.”<br />

Under a 1951 Indonesian law the offence<br />

carries a maximum penalty of death.<br />

The evidence by an arresting soldier, Indonesian<br />

special forces Private João Jesus<br />

Costa, was the first for the prosecution at<br />

the trial which opened today after preliminary<br />

hearings.<br />

Mr. Gusmão has pleaded not guilty to<br />

rebellion, conspiracy and the weapons<br />

charges.<br />

Diplomats observing the trial had<br />

speculated that Indonesia did not intend to<br />

execute Mr. Gusmão, since the rebellion<br />

charges he faces come under the country’s<br />

criminal law and not harsher subversion<br />

laws.<br />

The policeman owner of a house in which<br />

Mr. Gusmão was arrested, Mr. Agusto<br />

Pereira, told the court that Mr. Gusmão<br />

confided in him that he felt “responsible”<br />

for the violence in Dili in November 1991<br />

when Indonesian soldiers opened fire on<br />

pro-independence demonstrators, killing and<br />

wounding scores of people.<br />

When Mr. Pereira finished giving his<br />

evidence Mr. Gusmão said through an interpreter<br />

that he knew the witness well and<br />

agreed with what he had said.<br />

Mr. Gusmão, 45, the leader of the<br />

Fretilin guerrilla group fighting to end<br />

Indonesian rule of the former Portuguese<br />

territory, complained to his counsel during<br />

today’s three-hour hearing about what he<br />

described as aggressive questioning of witnesses<br />

by one of three judges hearing the<br />

case.<br />

His chief counsel, Mr. Sudjono, said Mr.<br />

Gusmão was in good health. He was being<br />

treated well at a jail in Dili where he spent<br />

much of his time playing dominoes with a<br />

guard.<br />

Mr. Sudjono said after the hearing he<br />

would appeal against a decision of the court<br />

last week to refuse his application challenging<br />

its right to hear the case as Fretilin had<br />

been fighting against Indonesian rule since<br />

1975.<br />

The appeal will be heard by the<br />

Indonesian High Court sitting in West<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

Mr. Gusmão’s lawyers appeared to be<br />

basing their case on the jurisdiction issue,<br />

challenging a prosecution claim that <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese were willing to integrate with<br />

Indonesia in 1975.<br />

Asked about Mr. Gusmão’s admission<br />

on the weapons Mr. Sudjono said: “I have<br />

an idea Xanana had the guns long before<br />

1975.”<br />

In dismissing the jurisdiction issue last<br />

week the judges noted that Mr. Gusmão had<br />

admitted in court that he was an Indonesian<br />

national and his profession was the leader of<br />

the “security disturbance movement.”<br />

Mr. Pereira, a <strong>Timor</strong>ese, told the court he<br />

was a distant relative by marriage to Mr.<br />

Gusmão whom he had known since 1981.<br />

He said he first “picked up” Mr. Gusmão<br />

in 1981 after receiving a message from Mr.<br />

Constâncio Pinto, the main organiser of the<br />

demonstration in 1991 that turned into the<br />

Dili massacre.<br />

Mr. Pinto, a central and controversial<br />

figure in the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> resistance movement,<br />

is now believed to be in Lisbon,<br />

Portugal. Mr. Pereira said Mr. Gusmão<br />

asked him last year to build a secret bunker<br />

behind a cupboard in his house.<br />

He said Mr. Gusmão paid for the bunker<br />

and had lived there for some time before his<br />

arrest.<br />

Private Costa said he went to the house<br />

with 21 other soldiers at 6am on 20<br />

November, 1992, after earlier arresting an<br />

informant. He said he found Mr. Gusmão<br />

hiding in the bunker and confronted him<br />

with a gun.<br />

Mr. Gusmão put his hands in the air and<br />

surrendered without a struggle.<br />

The weapons in Mr. Gusmão’s possession<br />

had been issued by the Indonesian<br />

military, the court was told.<br />

A prosecutor read to the court a statement<br />

from the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> military command<br />

detailing the loss of weapons from<br />

military compounds between 1979 and<br />

1984.<br />

Two Dili policemen testified that Fretilin<br />

guerrillas attacked the television station in<br />

Dili in 1980. Two officers were killed and<br />

several other people wounded in the attack.<br />

Asked about the evidence Mr. Gusmão<br />

said he was not there at the time.<br />

XANANA CONFOUNDS HIS<br />

LAWYER<br />

The Age 17 Feb. 19<strong>93</strong>.By Lindsay Murdoch,<br />

Southeast Asia Correspondent. Slightly<br />

abridged. Some well known facts omitted.<br />

(Dili, Monday) <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese resistance<br />

leader Mr. José “Xanana” Gusmão today<br />

accepted responsibility for the killing of<br />

Indonesians by his guerrillas as his lawyer<br />

said his case was virtually lost.<br />

The lawyer, Mr. Sudjono, told diplomats<br />

he would consider his representation a success<br />

if Mr. Gusmão escaped execution and<br />

received life imprisonment on the charges he<br />

faces [...]<br />

During the second day of prosecution<br />

evidence, Mr. Sudjono pleaded with Mr.<br />

Gusmão not to admit responsibility for<br />

[the] alleged attacks, but he refused.<br />

“I shook him and said, ‘Do you understand<br />

the process... do you understand?”<br />

Mr. Sudjono said later. “But Xanana said<br />

yes he understood.”<br />

Mr. Sudjono said he was certain Mr.<br />

Gusmão had a strategy. “But I don’t know<br />

what it is,” he said.<br />

“This is a big question for me... why he<br />

is confessing. I think he is very clever.<br />

Maybe when the moment is right he will<br />

take action.”<br />

Mr. Sudjono said he considered an appeal<br />

he intended to make to the High Court<br />

challenging the right of the Dili court to hear<br />

the charges had little, if any, chance of<br />

success. Appeals to Indonesia’s High Court<br />

[sic - should be High Courts] are rarely<br />

successful.<br />

[...]Speaking outside the court, Mr.<br />

Sudjono shrugged his shoulders and said:<br />

“What can I do? I will try to talk with my<br />

client tomorrow. Maybe we can talk about a<br />

global strategy and a narrow strategy.”<br />

Mr. Gusmão’s frank and solemn admissions<br />

today surprised court observers.<br />

Asked about evidence that Fretilin had<br />

carried out attacks including the burning of<br />

houses and the killing of soldiers in 1982,<br />

Mr. Gusmão told the court: “I don’t want<br />

to tell the story in detail but I admit that I<br />

have responsibility for these incidents.”<br />

Since three Indonesian judges started to<br />

hear evidence yesterday, Mr. Gusmão has<br />

spent much of the time in his cell writing<br />

notes.<br />

Mr. Sudjono said Mr. Gusmão asked him<br />

to get the trial over with as soon as possible.<br />

He has refused to see members of his<br />

family, who are watching the proceedings at<br />

the back of the court.<br />

Mr. Gusmão, 45, told Mr. Sudjono:<br />

“Please don’t involve my family in the case.<br />

I do not want to see them.”


Page 12 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

Although Mr. Gusmão has pleaded not<br />

guilty to the charges he appears unwilling to<br />

challenge the prosecution case.[...]<br />

Witnesses today told the court of numerous<br />

Fretilin attacks between 1979 and last<br />

year.<br />

A provincial civil servant, Mr. Martinho<br />

Fernandez, 46, told the court Fretilin<br />

guerrillas attacked and killed 14 Indonesian<br />

soldiers in Viqueque district in 1982. The<br />

soldiers were tortured and had their penises<br />

cut off, he said.<br />

Mr. Fernandez, who went to a<br />

Portuguese school in Dili with Mr. Gusmão<br />

but split with him in 1975, testified that<br />

Fretilin burnt 300 houses in Viqueque between<br />

1982 and 1983, forcing 1000 villagers<br />

to live in the jungle.<br />

Witnesses told the court about an attack<br />

on an Indonesian soldier who was drinking<br />

in a cafe on in the coastal town of Baucau in<br />

October last year. The man died after being<br />

shot nine times.<br />

Asked about the attack, Mr. Gusmão<br />

said: “I agree with the witnesses’ statement.<br />

It was done by my men.”<br />

A teacher, Mr. Islamat Widodo, 46, told<br />

the court Fretilin killed his 12 year old<br />

daughter at Baucau in 1990. He said he was<br />

later told by the military his daughter’s<br />

killer was a Fretilin member, David Alex.<br />

Asked about the attack, Mr. Gusmão<br />

said he neither denied nor agreed with the<br />

evidence. But he said: “It is true David Alex<br />

is one of my men.”<br />

During the court’s sitting hours Mr.<br />

Gusmão appears disinterested in Mr.<br />

Sudjono’s handling of the case.<br />

AUSTRALIAN CASH SENT TO<br />

FRETILIN: WITNESS<br />

Age (Melbourne, Australia) February 18,<br />

19<strong>93</strong>. By Lindsay Murdoch, SE Asian<br />

correspondent, Dili, Wednesday<br />

[unabridged]<br />

A prosecution witness in the trial of <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> resistance leader, Mr. José ‘Xanana’<br />

Gusmão has alleged that his Fretilin fighters<br />

received money from supporters in<br />

Australia. Mr. Oscar Lima, an <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

businessman, has told Indonesian prosecutors<br />

that money was regularly passed to<br />

Fretilin representatives by Australians<br />

posing as tourists in Kupang, West <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

Mr. Lima is listed to give evidence at the<br />

trial of Mr. Gusmão on charges of rebellion,<br />

conspiracy and possession of illegal<br />

weapons. Mr. Gusmão, who has pleaded<br />

not guilty, faces a possible death sentence.<br />

Court sources say that prosecutors had evidence<br />

from Mr. Lima and other witnesses<br />

that money from sources in Australia was<br />

used in part to buy weapons and ammunition<br />

for Fretilin, which has been waging a<br />

guerrilla campaign against Indonesia’s rule<br />

since 1975. Some weapons were supplied<br />

by arms dealers in Java, according to evidence<br />

said to have been gathered by prosecutors.<br />

Mr. Gusmão admitted in court on<br />

Monday that he had an automatic rifle and<br />

pistol when arrested in a Dili policeman’s<br />

house last November. The weapons had<br />

been originally issued to the Indonesian<br />

army, the court heard. It will be up to<br />

prosecutors to decide whether to introduce<br />

evidence about Fretilin funding into Mr.<br />

Gusmão’s trial.<br />

Mr. Gusmão’s chief counsel, Mr.<br />

Sudjono, was expected to meet Mr. Gusmão<br />

in his cell in Dili tonight in an attempt to<br />

stop him confessing to allegations being<br />

presented during the trial which began<br />

hearing evidence on Monday. Mr. Sudjono<br />

said today that Mr. Gusmão felt that as<br />

Fretilin’s supreme commander he accepted<br />

responsibility for the actions of his men.<br />

The trial allegations include claims that<br />

Fretilin attacked & killed Indonesian soldiers<br />

and burnt villagers to force people into the<br />

jungle. Mr. Sudjono said he had asked<br />

prosecutors at a meeting this morning to<br />

help him find defence witnesses but had<br />

been told that this was not possible. Mr.<br />

Sudjono said Mr. Gusmão became angry<br />

earlier this week when one of the three trial<br />

judges pressed a <strong>Timor</strong>ese witness for<br />

answers. “Xanana said he was on trial, not<br />

anybody else,” Mr. Sudjono said.<br />

Mr. Sudjono said that he had refused a<br />

request by Fretilin’s international representative,<br />

Mr. José Ramos Horta, who lives in<br />

Australia, to appear as a witness. The trial<br />

will resume tomorrow.<br />

FORMER REBEL NOW<br />

“INDONESIAN CITIZEN”<br />

The Age (Melbourne), February 19, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

By Lindsay Murdoch<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> guerrilla leader, Mr. José<br />

“Xanana” Gusmão, today nodded in agreement<br />

when one of his former platoon commanders<br />

described himself as an Indonesian<br />

citizen.<br />

Mr. Antonio Sadres Da Silva, 33, alias<br />

Maukalo, told Mr. Gusmão’s trial in Dili<br />

that until 1991, when he was captured by<br />

Indonesian forces, he considered his nationality<br />

to be Portuguese.<br />

“I am now Indonesian,” he said as Mr.<br />

Gusmão nodded and smiled.<br />

Later, when the court adjourned, Mr.<br />

Gusmão said he was “sorry” when asked by<br />

reporters if he had a message for the world.<br />

Mr. Gusmão, leader of the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

resistance group, Fretilin, has pleaded not<br />

guilty to charges of rebellion, conspiracy<br />

and possessing illegal weapons. He faces<br />

possible execution. Fretilin has been fighting<br />

Indonesia’s rule of the former Portuguese<br />

territory since 1975.<br />

In an earlier hearing, Mr. Gusmão, 45,<br />

described himself as “Indonesian,” something<br />

Fretilin supporters overseas used to<br />

claim he had been tortured.<br />

Mr. Da Silva testified that between 1975<br />

and 1991 he was involved in 17 attacks<br />

against the Indonesian military and villages,<br />

including the massacre in 1988 of 14 soldiers<br />

who were found with their penises cut off.<br />

He said he was following the orders of<br />

his superiors.<br />

Mr. Da Silva, who is not under arrest,<br />

said he attacked some villages “to show<br />

people in the cities that FALINTIL<br />

(Fretilin’s armed wing) is still active.”<br />

Mr. Da Silva testified that he had never<br />

received a direct order from Mr. Gusmão<br />

although he had heard him outline the aims<br />

of the group’s armed struggle.<br />

An <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> businessman, Mr. Oscar<br />

Lima, 40, told the court that several years<br />

ago, he passed a message to Mr. Gusmão<br />

that a Catholic priest in Dili, Father Mario<br />

Belo, wanted to give $500 to the Fretilin<br />

leader.<br />

An earlier hearing was told that another<br />

Catholic priest had sent a message to a<br />

Fretilin supporter to pick up Mr. Gusmão<br />

on one occasion.<br />

Mr. Lima said he was a former Fretilin<br />

commander but left the group because it was<br />

dissatisfied with his service. Mr. Lima is not<br />

under arrest.<br />

Prosecutors did not introduce into evidence<br />

claims made by Mr. Lima in statements<br />

to police that Australian tourists in<br />

West <strong>Timor</strong> regularly passed money to<br />

Fretilin representatives.<br />

The trial will resume next Monday.<br />

XANANA: A LEADER WHO<br />

DOES NOT APPEAR BEAT EN<br />

Sydney Morning Herald 20th February 19<strong>93</strong><br />

Byline: Lindsay Murdoch Dateline: Dili.<br />

Unabridged<br />

(In Dili the population clings to a faint<br />

hope of independence for <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, as<br />

Herald correspondent Lindsay Murdoch reports.)<br />

Xanana Gusmão is remarkably co-operative<br />

for somebody facing the possibility<br />

of execution.<br />

No crime, it seems, is too grave for him<br />

to admit responsibility, including mass<br />

murder.<br />

But the leader of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>’s resistance<br />

movement does not appear beaten.


<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 13<br />

He looks his accusers dead straight in the<br />

eye, as if unrepentant, perhaps even a touch<br />

arrogant. The paradox of Xanana’s trial on<br />

rebellion and other charges, which began in<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> this week, is that a massive legal<br />

case prepared against him by Indonesia<br />

serves to prove him by Indonesia serves to<br />

prove what Xanana himself apparently<br />

want the world to know: he, and nobody<br />

else, has led the guerilla campaign against<br />

Indonesia’s rule since 1979.<br />

José Alexandre Gusmão, better known as<br />

Xanana, is tall and lean with a wispy,<br />

greying beard. When the court heard witnesses<br />

tell this week of gruesome acts<br />

committed by his men, Xanana showed no<br />

emotion and sat staring nonchalantly at the<br />

ceiling.<br />

Xanana, 45, is an enigma. Wily and resourceful,<br />

as he has shown to Indonesia’s<br />

cost in the past, he will remain a key player<br />

in the future of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> no matte what<br />

the trial’s outcome.<br />

Maybe he has a surprise up his sleeve.<br />

It is easy to be seduced by the charm of<br />

Dili, capital of the 18,900 square-kilometer<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> at the south-eastern extremity of<br />

the sprawling Indonesian archipelago.<br />

Young children splash gaily on white,<br />

sandy beaches, Hawkers walk the eucalyptus-lined<br />

streets selling fresh fish tied to a<br />

pole. Give him a day or two and old John,<br />

the waiter at the beachfront Turismo Hotel,<br />

will arrange a delightful Portuguese meal,<br />

complete with chilled rose.<br />

But sullen faces of the dark-skinned and<br />

lightly-built <strong>Timor</strong>ese reveal a population in<br />

deep mourning, clinging to the faint hope of<br />

some sort of independence.<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> has been a dirty little war. It<br />

still is in some ways, although the number<br />

of Xanana’s guerrillas in the jungle has<br />

dwindled and the nature of the struggle has<br />

changed.<br />

A large number of <strong>Timor</strong>ese do not accept<br />

Indonesia’s 1976 annexation of the<br />

former Portuguese colony, according to<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese quoted this week by Catholic<br />

priests.<br />

The head of the Roman Catholic church<br />

in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, Bishop Carlos Ximenes Belo,<br />

says history shows <strong>Timor</strong>ese people to be<br />

brave. “But now they are closed in their<br />

hearts. There is this pressure. Yeah, the<br />

word is sad. They are sad because of the<br />

situation... there is no change in the history<br />

of the repression,” he says.<br />

According to the <strong>Timor</strong>ese, military and<br />

police agents are everywhere, listening to<br />

conversations, watching people and creating<br />

an environment in which people perceive it<br />

dangerous to be seen talking to foreigners or<br />

to gather in small groups.<br />

“People are afraid to walk freely,”<br />

Bishop Belo said. “Everywhere there are<br />

military from the territorial operation. They<br />

are building houses and going to live in<br />

villages. The people do not feel free.”<br />

Dark, wet-season clouds hide peaks of<br />

mountains where in 1942 the <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />

helped Australian commandos resist advancing<br />

Japanese forces; and Xanana’s<br />

Frente Revolutionaria de <strong>Timor</strong>-Leste<br />

Independente (Fretilin) still plays cat-andmouse<br />

with up to 12 Indonesian military<br />

battalions.<br />

Dili’s Santa Cruz Cemetery is cluttered<br />

with graves up to a century old. People<br />

come silently and often to mourn dozens of<br />

independence supporters killed when<br />

Indonesian soldiers opened fire there in<br />

November 1991. They light candles and<br />

spread flower petals on an unmarked grave<br />

with a large iron cross.<br />

The Catholic Motael Church facing the<br />

sea, has been a haven for student activists<br />

wanted by the police or the military. Its<br />

mass is always packed to overflowing. Some<br />

of the people wear black armbands or black<br />

cloth pinned to their chests. A young man,<br />

about 20, wants to talk. Shaking with<br />

nerves, he says to call him “Materuin.”<br />

“I am not Fretilin. I represent many<br />

young people of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>,” he says. “Our<br />

fight is not with the Indonesian constitution.<br />

We have no quarrel with it. Our fight is for<br />

some independence.”<br />

Materuin has rehearsed his speech well.<br />

Xanana, the freedom fighter, has a strategy.<br />

Wait and see. The <strong>Timor</strong>ese know Xanana is<br />

under pressure. The struggle goes on.<br />

I find Bishop Belo pacing the balcony of<br />

his re-roofed colonial house, engrossed in<br />

the Bible. He is deeply disturbed about reports<br />

he has received from villages about<br />

bizarre ceremonies during which <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />

are forced by Indonesian soldiers to drink<br />

animal blood.<br />

People named on military lists as Fretilin<br />

sympathisers are gathered together,<br />

sometimes as many as 200 at a time. The<br />

blood of a chicken, cow or goat is mixed<br />

with wine or whisky. People are forced to<br />

drink it and make a note declaring their acceptance<br />

of Indonesia’s integration.<br />

Bishop Belo says the oath is an untrue<br />

version of a traditional pact taken by<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese leaders to end tribal wars. Rival<br />

leaders would mix their blood with palm<br />

wine and drink it in an oath to mark the end<br />

of hostilities.<br />

Since the 1991 Santa Crux massacre,<br />

Indonesia’s <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> military commander,<br />

Brigadier General Theo Syafei, has<br />

implemented a hardline campaign designed<br />

to break the will of the resistance while<br />

pushing ahead with the development of<br />

roads, bridges and other infrastructure.<br />

The military claims in propaganda that<br />

the crackdown has worked. It says virtually<br />

all of Fretilin’s able fighters have surrendered.<br />

The United Nations does not recognise<br />

Indonesia’s sovereignty of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. A<br />

vote on the question has been postponed<br />

each year since 1982 to give Indonesia and<br />

Portugal the chance to solve the issue under<br />

the auspices of the UN Secretary-General.<br />

Talks between the two countries are due to<br />

resume in April.<br />

The overriding consideration for Jakarta<br />

in any change of policy on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, according<br />

to diplomats, would be not to create<br />

an impression that the Government would<br />

tolerate disintegration of any part of<br />

Indonesia.<br />

Renewed international pressure would be<br />

put on Jakarta if Xanana were sentenced to<br />

death. Australia, which recognises<br />

Indonesia’s annexation of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>,<br />

would be among the countries forced by<br />

popular opinion at home to protest against<br />

an execution.<br />

Remark: This is a report filed from Dili - ET<br />

by RM, who is now in Dili to file report for<br />

The Age and Sydney Morning Herald about<br />

the progress of Indonesian illegal trial of<br />

Xanana Gusmão. The interesting points to<br />

note here are 1. that the Bishop of ET, Don<br />

Carlos Ximenes Belo, is becoming<br />

outspoken on the political situation inside the<br />

country; 2. that Xanana Gusmão shows no<br />

sign of being beaten; 3. that the young<br />

people are trying to let the journalists know<br />

what is going on beyond the farce of peace<br />

and development; and, the feeling of the ET<br />

people about this of the Indonesian military<br />

manipulation of this fake trial.<br />

COMMENT FROM AGIO PEREIRA<br />

Since the capture of Xanana Gusmão, the<br />

Catholic Church of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> has been<br />

forced to fill the gap of speaking against the<br />

Indonesian occupation of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. The<br />

Bishop of ET, Carlos Ximenes Belo, is<br />

trying his best to do that. Bishop Belo, too,<br />

must watch his back, because he is only<br />

Bishop of Lorium and the Pope is not necessarily<br />

his best supporter when it comes to<br />

open criticism of the abuse of Human Rights<br />

and the illegal occupation of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

This seems to be the reason why Bishop<br />

Belo adopted a pragmatic approach when he<br />

needs to tackle the political angle of the<br />

issue of the Indonesian illegal occupation of<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. His suggestion made two weeks<br />

ago to a journalist that an ‘autonomy’ would<br />

be a good way out, must be seen in this<br />

context. Bishop Belo said that after<br />

reiterating that the situation has indeed<br />

deteriorated since the capture of Xanana<br />

Gusmão. He said that arrests, imprisonments<br />

and torture of the <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />

people by the Indonesian military have de-


Page 14 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

teriorated. The Indonesian generals are<br />

trying to ‘hook’ him into the political debate<br />

so that he can be forced to leave <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

like they succeeded with Belo’s<br />

predecessor, the late courageous Mgr.<br />

Lopes.<br />

The territorial operation: weakness or<br />

strength?<br />

Bishop Belo talks about the ‘territorial<br />

operation’ now being carried out in ET by<br />

the Indonesian military. This is aimed at<br />

what brig. gen. Theo Syafei also refers to as<br />

the operation to turn all villages of ET into<br />

‘merdeka’ - the red and white flag or<br />

Indonesianisation of ET. And, this is to be<br />

accomplish with the ‘help’ of 12 battalions<br />

of Indonesian troops.<br />

Over the 17 years of occupation, the<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese have been forced to endure the<br />

consequences of about a dozen operations<br />

beginning with ‘Operasi Komodo’ of 1974.<br />

So, this is just another one. If anything, the<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese are already more than prepared to<br />

deal with this situation.<br />

One new element introduced by Theo<br />

Syafei is the infamous manipulation of the<br />

‘blood oath’ also refers to in this article of<br />

Lindsay Murdoch. LM quotes Bishop Belo<br />

as saying that “the oath is an UNTRUE<br />

version of a traditional pact taken by<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese leaders to end tribal wars. Rival<br />

leaders would mix their blood with palm<br />

wine and drink it in an oath to mark the end<br />

of hostilities.” The Bishop is quite right.<br />

What he does not say though, is that, the<br />

reason why it is “an untrue version of a<br />

traditional pact” is precisely because these<br />

‘blood oath’ which have been reported, are<br />

celebrated between the <strong>Timor</strong>ese themselves,<br />

NOT between the <strong>Timor</strong>ese and the<br />

Indonesian generals! I should let you use<br />

your own imagination...<br />

FRETILIN ‘GOT AID<br />

FROM AUSTRALIA’<br />

The Age 23 Feb. 19<strong>93</strong> Byline: Lindsay<br />

Murdoch Dateline: Dili Unabridged<br />

The <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> resistance group,<br />

Fretilin, sent secret requests for arms to<br />

supporters in Australia, a court in Dili was<br />

told today.<br />

Mr. Antonio Campos, a former Fretilin<br />

radio operator, said Mr. José “Xanana”<br />

Gusmão, that before he was arrested in<br />

1987, he was frequently in contact with<br />

Australia via radio, passing information such<br />

as Fretilin operations and the “beating of<br />

people by Indonesian troops.”<br />

One of three judges hearing charges<br />

against Mr. Gusmão interrupted and asked a<br />

non-related question when Mr. Campos<br />

mentioned the beatings.<br />

Later, Mr. Campos was asked by another<br />

judge if he had seen Fretilin guerrillas kill<br />

villagers in a “cruel and sadistic way.”<br />

“Yes,” he replied. “Who would those<br />

people have been?” - “Spies.”<br />

Mr. Campos said he knew of orders from<br />

Mr. Gusmão to burn the houses of certain<br />

villagers who were “unsympathetic” to the<br />

Fretilin cause. Mr. Campos said Mr.<br />

Gusmão had ordered the death penalty for<br />

any Fretilin member who raped villagers. He<br />

had never heard of the sentence being carried<br />

out.<br />

Mr. Gusmão, 45, has pleaded not guilty<br />

to charges of rebellion, conspiracy and possessing<br />

illegal weapons. He faces possible<br />

execution.<br />

Indonesian prosecutors have alleged that<br />

Mr. Gusmão set up a secret communication<br />

network between Dili and groups overseas,<br />

including some in Australia.<br />

Among people named as having been in<br />

contact with Mr. Gusmão through the network<br />

are Fretilin’s Australian-based representative,<br />

Mr. José Ramos-Horta, and two<br />

other people in Australia, João Carrascalao<br />

and “Vasco” in Darwin.<br />

Prosecutors have claimed that Fretilin<br />

supporters in Australian regularly sent<br />

money to the group via couriers posing as<br />

tourists in Kupang, West <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

Fretilin’s deputy leader, Mr. José Da<br />

Costa, testified today that Mr. Gusmão ordered<br />

Fretilin sympathisers to organise the<br />

demonstration in Dili in November 1991<br />

during which Indonesian troops opened fire<br />

and killed and wounded scores of people.<br />

Mr. Da Costa said Mr. Gusmão’s intention<br />

was to promote Fretilin’s cause internationally.<br />

Mr. Da Costa testified that Fretilin’s<br />

attacks on the Indonesian military during the<br />

1980s were carried out on Mr. Gusmão’s<br />

orders.<br />

He said Mr. Gusmão directed and led one<br />

attack during which 16 Indonesian soldiers<br />

were killed.<br />

Asked about Mr. Da Costa’s evidence,<br />

Mr. Gusmão said he had known the witness<br />

for a long time and verified his evidence.<br />

Mr. Gusmão also agreed with the evidence<br />

of Mr. Campos.<br />

SHADOWS OVER THE TIMOR<br />

SIDESHOW<br />

The following is an Editorial Opinion by the<br />

same newspaper on the same day.<br />

No one, except José “Xanana” Gusmão<br />

himself, knows what ploy, if any, he is using<br />

at his trial in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. Is the captured<br />

Fretilin leader’s apparent indifference to the<br />

prosecution case unfolding against him a<br />

sign of a behind-the-scenes deal? Does it<br />

reflect mistreatment and threats, or a wish<br />

for martyrdom? “Xanana” Gusmão is telling<br />

nobody.<br />

The best that can be hoped for, as some<br />

diplomats suspect, is that Mr. Gusmão is<br />

controlling at least some of the sticks of a<br />

wayang shadow puppet show that sees him<br />

face trial (Jakarta insists on that) but then<br />

able, openly, to play a role in high-level<br />

negotiations. It seems almost much to hope<br />

for after the years of killings, not least the<br />

1991 Dili massacre, and continuing tension<br />

and alleged persecution. But it would not be<br />

a bad result for the Indonesian Government,<br />

either.<br />

The worst outcome for President Suharto<br />

would be for Mr. Gusmão to be sentenced<br />

to death. He would become a renewed focus<br />

of dissent and support for Fretilin, which is<br />

showing continued resilience under new<br />

leadership.<br />

Official claims of flagging support are<br />

weakened by the remaining strong<br />

Indonesian military presence on <strong>Timor</strong>,<br />

continuing arrests and reports of soldiers’<br />

deaths.<br />

International clamor would force even<br />

Canberra - maintaining a close relationship<br />

with Indonesia since the Gusmão hearing -<br />

to reconsider Australia’s official position.<br />

Talks between Portugal and Indonesia under<br />

the United Nations, due to resume in April,<br />

would be lucky to survive.<br />

The Suharto Government cannot wish to<br />

return to ostracism. Whatever the trial’s<br />

outcome, the <strong>Timor</strong>ese will remain dissatisfied<br />

(Mr. Ali Alatas’ “sharp stone” in the<br />

national shoe) unless an accommodation can<br />

be reached.<br />

The resistance movement’s offer last<br />

year, with limited autonomy and before a<br />

referendum, was starting point. It recognised<br />

that neither armed revolt nor official<br />

repression can win the day.<br />

MATE-BIAN NEWS<br />

COMMENTS ON COVERAGE<br />

OF XANANA TRIAL<br />

23 February 19<strong>93</strong><br />

1. This farce called “Xanana’s trial” is<br />

now closed to a conclusion. It will be, of<br />

course, a guilty verdict!<br />

2. As this ‘trial’ progresses, one can see<br />

that the news coverage from Australia has<br />

been good. Lindsay Murdoch, writing for<br />

The Age and Sydney Morning Herald, has<br />

been able to send regular articles covering<br />

the ‘trials’ and the environment surrounding<br />

it. His interviews of Bishop Belo has, once<br />

again, put Bishop Belo at odds with the<br />

generals, including ‘general’ Abilio Osorio<br />

who seems to be very upset with Bishop<br />

Belo’s statements.


<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 15<br />

3. Osorio has been active puppet used by<br />

the Indonesian generals to state what they<br />

want so that the outside world can perceive<br />

that pro-Indonesian things in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> are<br />

“under the control of <strong>Timor</strong>ese.” However,<br />

being a ‘handicapped’ puppet often he is<br />

out of tune and signals messages that are not<br />

necessarily shiny for the Indonesians!<br />

4. Malcolm Booker, Canberra Times (16<br />

Feb. 19<strong>93</strong>) wrote that “any departure from<br />

fair judicial trial would be difficult to hide"-<br />

referring to this so-called trial of Xanana.<br />

Although I do not share Malcom’s<br />

confidence in this Indonesian general’s<br />

“trial” because it is, from the outset, illegal<br />

and an insult to any legal system which<br />

claims to be based on fairness and justice, I<br />

must add that Malcolm was right. In spite<br />

of a very well orchestrated farce, as the days<br />

pass, what Malcolm call’s “departure from<br />

fairness” are (inevitably) emerging. One<br />

example was the report filed by Lindsay<br />

Murdoch, The Age, 23 Feb. 19<strong>93</strong>. He<br />

recalled that “one of the three judges hearing<br />

charges against Mr. Gusmão interrupted and<br />

asked a non-related question when Mr.<br />

Campos (supposedly witness for the<br />

prosecutor) mentioned the (Indonesian)<br />

beatings. Later, Mr. Campos was asked by<br />

another judge if he had seen Fretilin guerrillas<br />

kill villagers in a “cruel and sadistic<br />

way.” “Yes” he replied. “Who would those<br />

people have been?” - “Spies.”<br />

Mr. Campos later said things that certainly<br />

made the prosecutors unhappy. He<br />

said that “Mr. Gusmão had ordered death<br />

penalty for any Fretilin member who raped<br />

villagers.”<br />

5. Lindsay Murdoch made a point in his<br />

weekend coverage (SMH, 20 Feb., 19<strong>93</strong>)<br />

that the legal case prepared by Indonesia<br />

against Xanana serves to prove that<br />

“Xanana and nobody else, has led the<br />

guerilla campaign against Indonesia’s rule<br />

since 1979.” This has emerged in the last<br />

five days of this ‘trial.’ And, I believe, it<br />

helps to keep the Australian government<br />

very worried about the “sentence” for<br />

Xanana because the Australian government<br />

seems to argue that Xanana is the vehicle for<br />

“reconciliation” and the generals of Jakarta<br />

should not waste this opportunity. As<br />

Xanana, through the eyes of prosecutors’<br />

witnesses, emerges more and more as the<br />

real moving force and “The Real Leader,”<br />

this kind of argument equally gains weight.<br />

6. The “trial” of Xanana has also allowing<br />

the Australian journalists to comment much<br />

more on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> in the light of<br />

international law. This has never happened<br />

in the past and, I believe, it has become a<br />

good vehicle to educate the Aussie journos<br />

on the illegality of the Indonesian occupation<br />

as opposed to the official line of “real<br />

politiks.”<br />

7. The involvement of priests in the<br />

struggle, although NOT in a military sense<br />

but in a nationalistic sense, is nothing new.<br />

The Indonesian generals do not it well. In<br />

the early days of Bishop Belo’s reign, the<br />

Catholic Church of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> issue a very<br />

strong statement appealing to the world to<br />

stop the cultural, social and religious<br />

genocide of the <strong>Timor</strong>ese people, perpetrated<br />

by Indonesia. Until now, the Church<br />

of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> refuses to be integrated into<br />

KAWI (the Indonesian Conference of<br />

Churches) as a political statement to preserve<br />

the dignity and unity of the <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />

people. All these are obvious political<br />

statement. The Indonesian generals,<br />

knowing this, are trying to build up a dossier<br />

to destroy the power of the <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />

priests in controlling the <strong>Timor</strong>ese Church.<br />

They already sent to <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Fr.<br />

Wanandy, the brother of Yusuf Wanandy,<br />

director of CSIS (Central of Strategic<br />

International Studies) of Indonesian government,<br />

just to infiltrate the inside power<br />

of the <strong>Timor</strong>ese priests and spy on them.<br />

The more they accuse the priests, the more<br />

the world will know through the reports<br />

from Australian and other foreign journalists<br />

that the Resistance against the occupation<br />

is, indeed, well embedded in the <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />

society.<br />

8. Stay with us, IN THE QUI VIVE!!!<br />

XANANA: THE TRIAL OF<br />

JUSTICE<br />

Article by Agio Pereira, Fretilin/Australia,<br />

February 23, 19<strong>93</strong><br />

Xanana Gusmão is not a myth. Xanana is<br />

a man of rare courage and determination,<br />

intellect and vision. Even his enemies are<br />

compelled to recognise that.<br />

If one says that about Xanana Gusmão<br />

today, the people of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and the<br />

Indonesian armed forces do fully agree with<br />

it.<br />

The problem is, it is also not easy, for<br />

those abroad, to understand Xanana’s kind<br />

of Human dimension. This is made particularly<br />

more difficult at a time when he is<br />

going through a test which is, after all,, an<br />

extremely difficult experience, not only for<br />

him, but for many others whom, in one way<br />

or another, have been part of this unique<br />

dynamic in the <strong>Timor</strong>ese politics which one<br />

can simply call: XANANISM.<br />

What is that that makes Xanana what he<br />

is?<br />

Since Xanana’s capture by the occupationists<br />

of the Homeland of the <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />

people, incredible things, worse than<br />

Xanana’s capture itself, have taken place,<br />

almost simultaneously.<br />

Leaders have come out and accused<br />

Xanana of involvement in absurd plans;<br />

Journalists have written about “the end of<br />

the myth"; and opportunists have given interviews<br />

and written articles which by all<br />

means, can either help the Indonesian generals<br />

‘bury’ Xanana and/or bury the facts<br />

that made him a national figure of <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> and a prestigious guerilla leader of the<br />

world.<br />

And... all this is done in the name of the<br />

struggle of the suffering people of <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

It is, therefore, vital for all the <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />

to help sustain the dignity of a struggle<br />

which Xanana and thousands of <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />

man, women and children help sustain in<br />

almost 18 years, against all odds.<br />

The statement sent by the courageous<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese Women in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and the<br />

students organisations for non-violent actions<br />

to the outside world was precisely<br />

aimed at safeguarding this dignity. They<br />

took risks, exposing their own lives to the<br />

guns of the occupationist, but they did because<br />

they believe the dignity of the<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese suffering people must be safeguarded<br />

in this difficult times.<br />

The youth in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, defying the<br />

now highly sophisticated repressive machine<br />

of the Indonesian generals, continue to<br />

approach foreigners to let them know the<br />

truth that lies beyond Turismo Hotel and<br />

Portuguese wines in Dili.<br />

In a message sent from <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> to<br />

Mate-Bian News, a young <strong>Timor</strong>ese said<br />

this about Xanana’s current situation:<br />

“we, in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, don’t believe a word<br />

of what the Indonesian military are trying to<br />

force Xanana to say. You, out there, all you<br />

can do to help is to fight for Xanana to<br />

regain a breeding space; and, when he is free<br />

like you out there, you then can criticize<br />

what he does or says...”<br />

These are words of people who know<br />

exactly what is “Indonesian torture and<br />

systematic repression.” They did not read it<br />

in newspapers or studied it in the universities.<br />

They live it day and night.<br />

As Prof. Kooijmans, the special rapporteur<br />

of the United Nations (now the<br />

foreign Affairs Minister of Netherlands)<br />

that went to <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> in November 1991<br />

said in his report, in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> torture is “a<br />

matter of routine.”<br />

What Xanana has managed to successfully<br />

personified is precisely the best way<br />

to deal with this systematic torture and long<br />

term environment of degradation of human<br />

dignity. Xanana urges the <strong>Timor</strong>ese to use<br />

their available resources to resist the occupation<br />

in a sustainable way, and, at the same<br />

time, to try to find ways to build and<br />

accumulate new resources to crack the occupation<br />

when time is due.


Page 16 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

When Xanana articulates the strategy of<br />

the Resistance, he shows tremendous maturity<br />

and vision. He does not show any<br />

sign of hatred against Indonesia. If anything,<br />

he shows in depth understanding of the<br />

geographical and geopolitical problems<br />

which <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> faces by virtue of its<br />

natural existence.<br />

When Xanana articulates his vision, he<br />

shows a rare understanding of the Human<br />

nature of his struggle for the liberation of<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese people; he shows it in such a<br />

way that he extends it also to the Indonesian<br />

soldiers, the Portuguese people and the rest<br />

of the world.<br />

When Xanana articulates the pros and<br />

cons of the organisational structure of the<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese Resistance, he does not diminish<br />

the role of all leaders by avoiding harsh<br />

criticism, when criticism is due. This in turn,<br />

have made him unpopular amongst some<br />

leaders and extremely admired by the people<br />

of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

Xanana believes in democracy. As a result<br />

of his seventeen years of schooling in<br />

his University which he often calls “The<br />

Mountains of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>,” Xanana have<br />

learnt to love the form of democracy which<br />

he proudly terms: MAUBERE.<br />

This is the strength of Xananism which<br />

many find it heard to grasp. After all, one<br />

may ask, how can one understands it, if one<br />

does not live Maubere’s reality like Xanana<br />

does?<br />

This so-called ‘trial’ of Xanana is shaking<br />

the blood pressure of many people. Many<br />

wish that Xanana walks into the Indonesian<br />

courtroom and start to behave like a “Steve<br />

Biko” in Cry Freedom, challenging the<br />

Indonesian generals from day one to the end.<br />

Others have said that Xanana would have<br />

been a hero if he was killed.<br />

But Xananism, it seems, sees the reality<br />

of the Mauberes inside ET. It may see the<br />

same problem as those outside, but the focus<br />

of its telescope is directed to the<br />

Maubere people suffering under the<br />

Indonesian in this already 18 years of barbarous<br />

military occupation. Xanananism<br />

will never forget that there are already<br />

200,000 <strong>Timor</strong>ese heroes. There is no need<br />

for an extra one!<br />

One of the peculiar aspect of Xananism<br />

is the clear understanding of the strength and<br />

weaknesses of the enemy’s strategy of<br />

occupation, both within the enemy’s camp<br />

itself, and the implementation of this strategy<br />

amongst the <strong>Timor</strong>ese people. It is this<br />

in depth understanding of the dynamics of<br />

the enemy’s camp that allows Xanana to sit<br />

in the Indonesian courtroom and, as Lindsay<br />

Murdoch reported to the Sydney Morning<br />

Herald (Saturday, 20 Feb. <strong>93</strong>), “he looks his<br />

accusers dead straight in the eye, as if<br />

unrepentant, perhaps even a touch<br />

arrogant.”<br />

That is, very briefly, what makes Xanana<br />

what he is today: a national figure with a<br />

strength that blew out the Indonesian<br />

barriers and brought the struggle of the<br />

Maubere into the main stream politics of the<br />

outside world. It has been Xananism that<br />

inspired all activists for <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> in the<br />

last decade in this outside world. It will<br />

continue to do so, until the end of occupation,<br />

even though, some politicians are trying<br />

to score cheap political mileage at the<br />

expense of Xanana’s silence. The cheap<br />

political points are no points at all:<br />

Xanana’s behaviour and statements seen<br />

and made since his capture, often are conveniently<br />

ignored by the opportunists that<br />

try to use the ‘gap’ left by Xanana’s capture<br />

to score cheap political points. Apart<br />

from other things,<br />

- when a journalist asked him if he would<br />

make an appeal to his guerilla fighters to<br />

surrender, Xanana simply said that “they<br />

never fought for myself";<br />

- asked whether those still in the mountains<br />

can continue the struggle Xanana said<br />

that “he (Ma’hunu) can continue the<br />

struggle if he wants to; he has the conditions<br />

to do so";<br />

- at the end of a forced interview given to<br />

a Portuguese journalist in which Xanana<br />

made some ambiguous pro-Indonesian remarks<br />

in the presence of almost three dozens<br />

Indonesian military security officers,<br />

Xanana confided to the journalist that “if I<br />

was free, the answers would be different";<br />

- Xanana, for the first time since his fake<br />

trial started in the first day of February,<br />

asked the journalists, in English, to stay<br />

until the end of the trial. That obviously<br />

cost him another session of psychological<br />

torture by the Indonesian generals. The<br />

following session, Xanana came into the<br />

‘trial’ with his faced covered, for the first<br />

time too;<br />

These are some points which are necessary<br />

to make an objective assessment of<br />

Xanana in the mouth of the ‘lion.’<br />

Xanana has been put on trial, not only by<br />

the Indonesian generals against all suffering<br />

and determination he endures for about 18<br />

years now to fight for justice for his people<br />

and the world; but, worse then that, he has<br />

been put on trial by people who often call<br />

themselves “a freedom fighter.”<br />

The trial of Xanana is, indeed, a trial of<br />

justice!<br />

RETICENT WITNESSES<br />

The Nation (Thailand), Feb. 25 <strong>93</strong><br />

Unabridged<br />

(AFP, Jakarta) - <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> pro-independence<br />

leader Xanana Gusmão’s defence<br />

lawyer has said people are afraid to testify<br />

on behalf of his client, according to press<br />

reports yesterday.<br />

“Most of those who could become witnesses<br />

are afraid to do so,” the Rupublika<br />

daily quoted Defence Lawyer Sudjono as<br />

saying in Dili, <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

“In line with the prevailing regulations, I<br />

will keep on trying to get a defence witness,”<br />

Sudjono added.<br />

The lawyer said Gusmão did not want<br />

any family members used as character witnesses.<br />

TRIAL RESUMES TODAY<br />

The following is a transcript of ABC TV -<br />

The World at Noon, 4 Mar. 19<strong>93</strong><br />

NEWSREADER: In Indonesia (sic) the<br />

trial of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> independence leader<br />

Xanana Gusmão resumes today. Into its<br />

second month it shows no sign of winding<br />

up. The prosecution is scheduled to produce<br />

more witnesses is support of numerous<br />

charges against the 46-year-old rebel leader.<br />

Xanana Gusmão hasn’t contested any of the<br />

testimony which is our Indonesian<br />

correspondent Ian MacIntosh reports is<br />

making the job of defending increasingly him<br />

difficult.<br />

IAN MACINTOSH: When the Dili district<br />

court began hearing Indonesia’s case<br />

against Xanana Gusmão more than a month<br />

ago the court house the street outside were<br />

packed. But the panel of three judges currently<br />

examining prosecution witnesses has<br />

conducted few sittings in the past fortnight<br />

and the crowds have dwindled. Xanana<br />

Gusmão has heard a string of witnesses<br />

testified against him, among them followers<br />

such as his captured former deputy José da<br />

Costa. He described Mr. Gusmão long<br />

leadership of the armed struggle against<br />

Indonesian rule in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, of their attacks<br />

against military and civilian targets and<br />

Fretilin’s alleged links with backers in<br />

Australia and elsewhere overseas.<br />

Predictably most of the evidence has been<br />

damaging to the defendant and more so because<br />

Mr. Gusmão has agreed with the testimony<br />

of each witness. His counsel<br />

Sudjono concedes the defence is facing a<br />

new impossible task even before his client<br />

takes the witness stand. And those in the<br />

public gallery among them western diplomats,<br />

Xanana Gusmão’s parents are left to<br />

speculate on the eventual sentence. The man<br />

who acquired legendary status during his


<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 17<br />

years in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>’s mountains and jungles<br />

faces prison term of between 20 years and<br />

life. For the firearms possession charge<br />

carries a maximum death penalty. Whilst the<br />

trial of Xanana Gusmão drags on the future<br />

of the independence movement in <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> remains in question, There is no<br />

doubt his capture dealt a serious blow to<br />

Fretilin but local sources say the movement<br />

has not been broken. Independent<br />

information on those still holding out in the<br />

province’s (sic) rugged interior is virtually<br />

impossible to obtain. despite some recent<br />

clashes there is general agreement the small<br />

groups of armed rebels no longer represent a<br />

serious security threat to the Indonesian<br />

administration. The authorities claim to have<br />

greatly reduced Fretilin influence following<br />

Xanana Gusmão November capture. But<br />

reliable evidence indicates some opposition<br />

to Jakarta’s 17 year rule is continuing with<br />

negotiation and diplomatic pressure likely to<br />

be its future focus.<br />

Video: Xanana shows signs of stress looking<br />

up to ceiling. Pictures of his parents in court<br />

were also shown. A Falintil flag and a pistol<br />

gun was also shown. Later they led him to a<br />

green car with tinted windows.<br />

SATURNINO DA COSTA<br />

BELO BRAVELY CRIES OUT<br />

The following fax was received by the <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> <strong>Action</strong> <strong>Network</strong>/US from an <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese nationalist in Jakarta on the<br />

morning of Friday, March 5. It is repeated<br />

here in its entirety, except for the deletion of<br />

the name of the sender:<br />

Urgently I want to inform you that my<br />

friend Saturnino da Costa Belo, a witness in<br />

the Xanana Trial yesterday in Dili (4 March<br />

19<strong>93</strong>), took the opportunity to act and<br />

showed to the world the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

people’s aspirations. He stood up, held up<br />

his arms in a victory symbol, and said<br />

loudly “Live <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>! Live the Maubere<br />

People! Indonesia must respect human<br />

rights in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.” There was a little<br />

confusion yesterday in the Dili court. The<br />

police doctor said Saturnino was ill. But he<br />

wasn’t ill. He wanted to do that in front of<br />

some diplomats, representatives of the<br />

British Embassy, and members of the<br />

International Jurists who are attending the<br />

trial.<br />

The judges decided to interrupt the trial<br />

for 45 minutes.<br />

The police took my friend Saturnino, and<br />

in the prison’s car, the police beat him,<br />

according to the information I received soon<br />

afterwards. I believe it because it is habitual<br />

experience. Saturnino was punished by 15<br />

years, his trial without advocate or lawyers,<br />

carried out in Baucau city. In need your<br />

attention about his situation now.<br />

Warm embraces to all<br />

the solidarity friends,<br />

(name removed)<br />

Radio Australia News, Thursday March 4,<br />

11.00 pm (AEST)<br />

The trial of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese independence<br />

leader, Xanana Gusmão, in Dili has been<br />

disrupted by a witness for the prosecution.<br />

He shouted pro-Fretilin slogans and greeted<br />

Mr. Gusmão causing the hearing to be adjourned.<br />

Mr. Gusmão faces charges of rebellion,<br />

conspiracy, separatist activity and<br />

possession of firearms.<br />

When the hearing resumed, an army<br />

doctor testified that the witness, Saturnino<br />

da Costa Belo was not fit to continue. He<br />

has been in gaol in Baucau, west of Dili,<br />

after receiving a 9 year sentence for involvement<br />

in the demonstration that preceded<br />

the November 1991 Dili massacre.<br />

Mr. Gusmão’s trial resumes next<br />

Thursday. (March 12)<br />

‘VIVA INDEPENDENCE’ RINGS OUT<br />

IN DILI COURT<br />

TAPOL issued the following Press Release<br />

today, 4 March 19<strong>93</strong>:<br />

An <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese, Saturnino da Costa<br />

Belo, who was present in the Dili court<br />

today to attend the trial of the resistance<br />

leader Xanana Gusmão stunned the court<br />

when he suddenly stood up and shouted:<br />

Viva <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, Viva Xanana, Viva independence!.’<br />

He had been summoned to testify<br />

as a prosecution witness. His action<br />

caused uproar; proceedings were suspended<br />

as he was hustled out of court. An hour<br />

later, a doctor came to inform the court that<br />

the witness was ‘unfit to appear.’<br />

It is highly likely that Saturnino will be<br />

subjected to maltreatment and torture for his<br />

act of defiance so pressure is needed to<br />

protect him.<br />

Saturnino da Costa Belo is himself<br />

serving a nine-year sentence, having been<br />

tried in Baucau, <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, in June last<br />

year under the anti-subversion law for involvement<br />

in the demonstration in Dili on<br />

12 November 1991. At the commencement<br />

of his own trial, he told the court that he did<br />

not want to be defended by an Indonesian<br />

lawyer and would only agree to being<br />

defended by a Fretilin lawyer. The court<br />

appointed a duty solicitor to handle his<br />

case.<br />

At an earlier hearing of the trial, Xanana<br />

Gusmão was severely reprimanded by the<br />

presiding judge for waving to his parents<br />

and his sister who were present in court.<br />

After waving, he placed two fingers on his<br />

lips, as a signal for keeping silent. The judge<br />

warned him that it was “very impolite<br />

indeed” to wave to anyone in court and<br />

ordered him to apologise. Xanana said<br />

nothing in response. According to Kompas<br />

which reported the incident [26.II.19<strong>93</strong>], his<br />

parents were very upset over what had<br />

happened. His younger sister, Felomena<br />

Gusmão, burst into tears, and shouted:<br />

“Fancy telling him off for waving to his<br />

parents!”<br />

XANANA GUSMÃO SHOW TRIAL:<br />

WITNESS’ FINAL(?) CRY FOR<br />

FREEDOM<br />

José Gusmão, CNRM/Darwin, on 5 March,<br />

adds:<br />

* At the continuing show trial of Xanana<br />

Gusmão in Dili, <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, ABC Radio<br />

reported last night that a witness for the<br />

Indonesian military shouted pro-<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

slogans.<br />

* After the court reconvened an hour<br />

later, an army doctor said that the brave<br />

witness, Saturnino da Costa Belo, was not<br />

fit to continue.<br />

* We demand to know what happened to<br />

Mr. Belo during that hour to make him unable<br />

to continue. What kind of tortures were<br />

inflicted.<br />

* We call on all international human<br />

rights bodies and governments of good will<br />

to urgently make intense representatives for<br />

the welfare of Mr. Belo.<br />

* Indonesia’s appalling and increasingly<br />

well-known record of torture and massive<br />

human rights violations in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> indicates<br />

that the Xanana Gusmão show trial<br />

will continue to be a farce until all witnesses<br />

are in 24-hour care of the International Red<br />

Cross and free to leave for a third country.<br />

We call on Australia to offer help and<br />

SANCTUARY!<br />

LONG LIVE EAST TIMOR IN DILI<br />

COURT<br />

Written by FRETILIN Committee in NSW<br />

(peg:nswfretilin) on reg.easttimor on 6<br />

March 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

The following is a transcript of ATVI ( a new<br />

satellite TV for the Asian region) run by<br />

ABC.<br />

NEWSREADER:....(missing bits). The<br />

anti-Indonesian protest took place in the<br />

court in Dili after Ian MacIntosh filed that<br />

report. He joined us by telephone with details.<br />

IAN MACINTOSH: According to<br />

sources the second prosecution witness<br />

called Saturnino Da Costa Belo walked in<br />

saluted put his FIST IN THE AIR and<br />

yelled LONG LIVE EAST TIMOR, LONG<br />

LIVE INDEPENDENCE. The sources said<br />

he then attempted to shake Xanana<br />

Gusmão’s hand but the defendant declined


Page 18 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

to do. Asked his name Saturnino responded<br />

by saying that he was present to defend<br />

EAST TIMORESE INDEPENDENCE and<br />

HUMAN RIGHTS.<br />

The hearing was then adjourned for 15<br />

minutes and an hour later when it was resumed<br />

AN ARMY DOCTOR stated that<br />

the witness was not FIT TO CONTINUE.<br />

SATURNINO has been in jail as we understand<br />

at Baucau, west of Dili after he<br />

received last year, a 9-year sentence for<br />

involvement in the demonstration which<br />

preceded the November 1991 Dili massacre.<br />

Earlier in today’s hearing Luis Cardoso, 46,<br />

testified that he had supplied Fretilin with<br />

food and medicine and last year transported<br />

and sheltered the defendant. Xanana<br />

Gusmão told the court the evidence given<br />

was true. His trial will resume next<br />

Thursday.<br />

WITNESS FOR XANANA FORCES<br />

COURT TO ADJOURN<br />

Jakarta Post, 5 March 19<strong>93</strong><br />

Only the section dealing with Saturnino’s act<br />

of defiance. Saturnino was actually<br />

summoned by the prosecution, not by the<br />

defence.<br />

(Dili, <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>) A witness in the trial<br />

of Fretilin separatist (sic) movement leader<br />

José Alexandre “Xanana” Gusmão refused<br />

yesterday to answer the presiding judge’s<br />

questions and accused the government of<br />

ignoring human rights in the province (sic).<br />

The trial was then suspended.<br />

Saturnino da Costa Belo, 32, the second<br />

witness to testify in yesterday’s session,<br />

yelled Viva <strong>Timor</strong> Leste (Portuguese for<br />

‘Long live <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>’) while looking at<br />

Xanana with his eyes glistening with tears.<br />

The witness then approached Xanana in<br />

his effort to shake hands with the Fretilin<br />

leader, but Xanana refused to shake hands<br />

with him and gestured ordering him to calm<br />

down.<br />

Saturnino ignored Xanana’s gesture,<br />

leading Presiding Judge Hieronymus Godang<br />

to pound his gavel and order him to sit<br />

down.<br />

“I want you to sit down,” the judge said.<br />

The witness however continued to stand<br />

until the court officials led him to his seat.<br />

Saturnino then kept silent when the<br />

presiding judge repeatedly asked him his<br />

identity. Suddenly the witness stood up and<br />

yelled, “I ask the government of Indonesia<br />

to respect human rights in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.”<br />

Hieronymus later suspended the session<br />

for 45 minutes and ordered the prosecutor<br />

to call a doctor to examine the witness.<br />

After examining the witness, Dr. Musadek<br />

Ishac from the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> police said that<br />

Saturnino had a mental disorder. The judge<br />

then adjourned the session till next<br />

Thursday.<br />

SOS RE: SATURNINO’S<br />

CONDITION<br />

From Ines at Fretilin/NSW, 6 March 19<strong>93</strong><br />

It is highly likely that Saturnino was<br />

mistreated after his courageous statement in<br />

court. There are reports that he was dragged<br />

out of the court. We appeal to anyone who<br />

is able to find more information on<br />

Saturnino after yesterday’s events so that<br />

we can once again start some action internationally.<br />

We will keep you posted if further<br />

news comes to hand. Stay in touch for<br />

further action.<br />

TO RESIST IS TO WIN.<br />

BACKGROUND ON<br />

SATURNINO<br />

From Peace is Possible in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, 5<br />

March 19<strong>93</strong> Dateline: Lisbon Translated<br />

from Portuguese unabridged<br />

The case of Saturnino da Costa Belo, the<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese who shouted out in favour of <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>’s independence in the court where he<br />

was supposed to testify against Xanana,<br />

reveals the methods used by the Indonesians<br />

in order to come up with such witnesses.<br />

Even though foreign journalists have been<br />

stopped from attending the trial, and<br />

therefore rendering such acts of courage<br />

practically useless, Saturnino da Costa Belo<br />

refused to play the part he had been given.<br />

Saturnino da Costa Belo had been held in<br />

Indonesian prisons from 1986 to 1990,<br />

serving a total of four years. He was re-arrested<br />

on 30 November 1991 in Baucau, at<br />

the same time as his younger brothers,<br />

Alcino Vital Freitas and Custodio Freitas,<br />

on charges of having links with the guerrilla.<br />

At the time of his arrest the Indonesian<br />

soldiers looted his home, stealing everything<br />

from a gold moon and macassar swords<br />

(objects of traditional <strong>Timor</strong>ese value) to<br />

clothes.<br />

Saturnino and his brothers were subjected<br />

to ill- treatment, especially beatings. After a<br />

few weeks, Alcino and Custodio were<br />

released. Saturnino remained in detention<br />

awaiting trial.<br />

He was taken before the Baucau court in<br />

1992, but rejected the 9- year prison sentence<br />

which the court passed. So he was<br />

taken for torture: “beatings, and his mouth<br />

squeezed with a pliers until it bled.” A new<br />

trial was set for 19 November, this time in<br />

Kupang (Indonesian <strong>Timor</strong>).<br />

Meanwhile, during guerrilla activity on 5<br />

October in Baucau, an Indonesian officer<br />

was killed for his weapon inside a hotel. The<br />

hotel is situated between the market and the<br />

police post, there being about 20 metres<br />

between them. General Syafei, Military<br />

Commander of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, in a statement to<br />

the newspaper Kompas, said there had been<br />

a guerrilla attack in Baucau, that there had<br />

been no Indonesian casualties, but that an<br />

AR16 weapon had been captured, and two<br />

terrorists had been killed.<br />

It is known from a <strong>Timor</strong>ese source that,<br />

in unclear circumstances, a young man was<br />

received a bullet wound and a child was<br />

killed. It would appear that the child was<br />

crushed in the general confusion caused by<br />

the shooting. The young man wounded was<br />

Alcino Vital Freitas, Saturnino’s brother. He<br />

was first taken by car to the military<br />

hospital but, once identified, he was taken<br />

from the hospital by soldiers and killed<br />

three days later, on 8 October, in Liamari:<br />

“he was nailed, like Jesus Christ, and cut to<br />

death little by little,” a <strong>Timor</strong>ese wrote.<br />

Another young man, Domingos, was<br />

wounded in the leg by a bullet about 500<br />

metres from the hotel in Uma Lima. He was<br />

shot and killed the following day, next to the<br />

Indonesian flag pole (merah putih) by 315<br />

Battalion soldiers.<br />

Numerous arrests (over 200 by 10<br />

October, according to one witness) followed,<br />

including that of Sebastião Fraga<br />

Freitas, son of Mateus and Madalena<br />

Freitas. He was captured on 6 October at<br />

around 5 pm by Battalion 315 soldiers, in<br />

Ossaluga (Samalari), as he returned home<br />

from work (opening an irrigation canal for<br />

Father Locatelli). Sebastião subsequently<br />

disappeared and it is feared he has been<br />

killed.<br />

On 17 October, Alcino’s 60-year-old<br />

father, Afonso Freitas, his daughter, and his<br />

daughter-in-law were all arrested in<br />

Ossaluga.<br />

In Samalari, between 70 and 80 people -<br />

men, women, young and old,- were arrested.<br />

Among them was the former Liurai<br />

(traditional leader) and ex-DPR (deputy,<br />

appointed by the Indonesians) Manuel<br />

Marcal Sequeira, with his wife and their<br />

children, later given conditional release.<br />

Some of those said to have been<br />

“released,” were actually transferred to<br />

Battalion 315 military posts in Uailili,<br />

Gariwai, Uatona and Buibau, and forced to<br />

act as scouts for the military in their search<br />

for others who had fled. The majority of<br />

detainees was tortured.<br />

After these events, Saturnino da Costa<br />

Belo disappeared from Baucau prison, only<br />

to reappear now in Dili to testify against<br />

Xanana. It is not known whether his trial,<br />

set for November in Kupang, ever took<br />

place.<br />

Apart from Saturnino himself, among<br />

those believed to be most in danger of re-


<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 19<br />

prisals following Saturnino’s statements at<br />

Xanana’s trial, are:<br />

Custodio Freitas, his brother, living in<br />

Baucau<br />

Afonso Freitas, his father, and other<br />

relatives, living in Ossaluga (Samalari,<br />

Baucau).<br />

LETTERS FROM SATURNINO<br />

10 September 1992 Dateline: prison in<br />

Baucau. Translated from Portuguese.<br />

unabridged<br />

Letter to IPJET Secretary General, Pedro<br />

Pinto Leite<br />

“My respectful and best wishes. In spite<br />

of being imprisoned in the infernal<br />

Indonesian cell in which, not on rare occasions,<br />

I am beaten up and subjected to other<br />

kinds of punishment, I felt greatly relieved<br />

from pain when, at the end of August, I received<br />

the letter sent to us. However, the<br />

copies of the letters to the UN Secretary<br />

General and the Indonesian Minister of<br />

Justice have still not arrived - I believe my<br />

seven compatriots must have them.<br />

I should also tell you that it is the second<br />

time that I am in prison. The first was from<br />

1986 to 1990, when I was sentenced to four<br />

years imprisonment. But it is the first time I<br />

have received a letter from an organisation<br />

sympathizing with our martyrised and<br />

defenceless people’s struggle.<br />

In spite of being in this painful situation,<br />

I feel more and more encouraged and<br />

stimulated by the warmth of solidarity from<br />

the IPJET in general, and from you in particular,<br />

since this gesture of solidarity<br />

constitutes moral support not only for me<br />

but also for my people.<br />

My most sincere thanks go to all the<br />

IPJET members, and especially to the organization’s<br />

Secretary General, for the<br />

solidarity shown and the efforts made to<br />

defend my People’s cause, and protect<br />

me/us from the unjust sentences of<br />

Indonesia’s laws. I hope, and I am fully<br />

confident, that the IPJET, of which you are<br />

Secretary General, will continue to make<br />

untiring efforts, through the means available<br />

to you, to secure my/our protection and to<br />

fight for my/our release from Indonesian<br />

prison. I am sure you will do everything<br />

possible to defend my People’s right, and to<br />

free it from Indonesian captivity, since my<br />

People rejects, with the annexation of its<br />

Motherland to the Republic of Indonesia.<br />

I enclose a copy of the letter addressed to<br />

the Prime Minister. I hope you will intercede<br />

with him and the Government so<br />

they might heed my cry.<br />

With sincere consideration and respect,<br />

Saturnino da Costa Belo<br />

Letter to Portuguese Prime Minister:<br />

His Excellency, the Portuguese Prime<br />

Minister Mr. Anibal Cavaco Silva.<br />

Excellency,<br />

May I first offer you my respectful and<br />

best wishes. I have the honour of writing<br />

this insignificant letter in order to inform<br />

your excellency of my situation: I was captured<br />

by Indonesian forces on 30 November<br />

1991, together with my two younger brothers,<br />

Alcino Freitas Vital and Custodio<br />

Freitas. We were accused of being in contact<br />

with the guerrilla and of subversion. Some<br />

weeks later, my two brothers were released,<br />

while I continue to be held, now in the<br />

Baucau Prison.<br />

I would also like to inform your excellency<br />

that, at the time of our capture, our<br />

personal belongings, ranging from an ordinary<br />

pair of sports shorts to a gold moon<br />

and macassar swords, of traditional value,<br />

were stolen by the Indonesian soldiers and<br />

their collaborators. All we have left are the<br />

clothes on our backs, and not even the<br />

slightest article has been returned to us.<br />

I have been taken before the Indonesian<br />

Court in Baucau eight times already, where I<br />

was given a 9-year sentence. However, I did<br />

not accept their sentence, not only because<br />

the trials are nothing but a farce, but above<br />

all because I am not an Indonesian citizen<br />

and have never acknowledged to one, to be<br />

now sentenced by Indonesian law. Within<br />

international legality, I am still legally a<br />

Portuguese citizen and identify myself as<br />

such. Since I would not accept the sentence<br />

passed, the proceedings have been<br />

transferred to the Kupang Court, Indonesian<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>, and the trial is set for 19 November<br />

next.<br />

At the time of my previous trials I was<br />

tortured with beatings and with pliers,<br />

applied to my mouth and squeezed until it<br />

bled. I was also ordered to undress, and<br />

wearing only underpants, forced to lie on<br />

the ground.<br />

Assistance from international and humanitarian<br />

organisations was non-existent,<br />

given that they were not allowed to give it.<br />

In this regard, I request your excellency,<br />

the Prime Minister and the Government to<br />

afford me the most active, maximum diplomatic<br />

protection, within international law<br />

which still supports Portugal and its responsibility.<br />

Furthermore, I ask that<br />

through the Dutch Government, which represents<br />

Portugal’s interests in Indonesia, I<br />

am given real assistance, given that because<br />

of the break in diplomatic relations between<br />

the two countries, Portugal is unable to give<br />

me any direct help.<br />

With sincere respect and gratitude,<br />

Saturnino da Costa Belo<br />

PORTUGUESE PM CAVACO<br />

RESPONDS<br />

Publico 24 March 19<strong>93</strong> Dateline : Lisbon<br />

Byline : A.G. Translated from Portuguese<br />

unabridged<br />

Yesterday, Prime Minister Cavaco Silva<br />

promised to intercede with the International<br />

Red Cross to investigate the whereabouts of<br />

Saturnino Belo, a <strong>Timor</strong>ese prisoner sentenced<br />

to 12 years’ imprisonment. Since, on<br />

5 March, he shouted out in favour of independence<br />

for <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> in front of the<br />

judges hearing the case in Dili against former<br />

Resistance leader Xanana Gusmão,<br />

Saturnino’s whereabouts are unknown.<br />

Cavaco Silva also agreed to speak to his<br />

Dutch counterpart about the situation of<br />

Saturnino Belo, whose letter reached the<br />

PM via a delegation of the “Freedom for<br />

Xanana, Freedom for <strong>Timor</strong>” Commission,<br />

founded in January this year, and the<br />

Honorary Chairman of which is the<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese poet Fernando Sylvan.<br />

In the letter, dated 10 September, Belo<br />

says he had been subjected to torture, says<br />

that he is legally still a Portuguese citizen,<br />

asks Portugal for “maximum diplomatic<br />

protection,” and that he be given “real help”<br />

through Holland, which represents<br />

Portuguese interests following the break in<br />

relations with Indonesia in the wake of the<br />

invasion of <strong>Timor</strong> on 7 December 1975.<br />

The delegation, consisting of Fernando<br />

Sylvan, Ana Nunes (from the “Peace is<br />

Possible in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>” organisation), and<br />

Luisa Teotonio Pereira (from the CDPM -<br />

the Maubere People’s Rights Commission)<br />

emphasized to the PM the need for the<br />

European Presidency’s representation in<br />

Jakarta to visit Xanana Gusmão and other<br />

political prisoners.<br />

Meanwhile, Indonesian sources established<br />

for the first time a link between the<br />

fate of Xanana Gusmão - whose sentence<br />

(originally expected to be passed at the end<br />

of last week) has been successively delayed<br />

- and the outcome of the talks between<br />

Portugal and Indonesia. Yesterday, a member<br />

of the Indonesian diplomatic corps in<br />

Holland told the Lusa agency that the sentence<br />

will only be passed after the next<br />

round of talks, scheduled for 20 April in<br />

Rome. He was, in this way, indirectly supporting<br />

the criticisms levelled by Portugal<br />

and other countries about the unjust nature<br />

of the trial.<br />

On Monday, 22 March, during an audience<br />

held at the request of the solidarity organisation<br />

CDPM, Foreign Minister Durão<br />

Barroso said there had been no contact<br />

whatsoever with the St. Egidio community,<br />

which has been mentioned in the last few<br />

weeks as possible mediator on the <strong>Timor</strong><br />

question. It was at this religious commu-


Page 20 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

nity’s facilities in Rome that the<br />

Mozambique peace talks were held, between<br />

the Frelimo government and Renamo.<br />

“The CDPM is not against the initiative<br />

in principle,” said Luisa Teotonio Pereira to<br />

Publico, “but the differences existing<br />

between the internal characteristics of the<br />

Mozambique conflict and the <strong>Timor</strong> question,<br />

whose main and irreplaceable focal<br />

point for solution is at the UN, must be<br />

made clear.”<br />

At the conclusion of the one and a half<br />

hour audience, the CDPM left convinced<br />

that Portuguese diplomacy did have<br />

“finally, a consistent strategy” for <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

“Only putting it into practice will show<br />

whether it is good or bad,” said a spokesperson<br />

for the solidarity organisation.<br />

SATURNINO’S ‘TESTIMONY’<br />

USED IN COURT<br />

TAPOL REPORT, 21 MARCH 19<strong>93</strong><br />

At a hearing of the Xanana Gusmão trial<br />

in Dili on 11 March, the presiding-judge<br />

announced that one of the witnesses,<br />

Saturnino da Costa Belo, who was to have<br />

appeared on that day, was ‘too mentally<br />

disturbed’ to appear. The prosecution was<br />

therefore given permission to read out the<br />

‘verbatim report’ of his interrogation.<br />

[Kompas, 12 March 19<strong>93</strong>]<br />

This is an outrageous abuse of<br />

Saturnino’s basic rights. When Saturnino<br />

appeared in court on 4 March, he used the<br />

opportunity to shout pro-independence slogans,<br />

clearly signalling that he was refusing<br />

to testify.<br />

The document read out in court has him<br />

‘testifying’ about alleged attacks by guerrilla<br />

units in Baucau in 1984 when villagers were<br />

allegedly killed, their possessions looted and<br />

their houses burned to the ground. Saturnino<br />

allegedly also ‘confessed’ that he acted as a<br />

courier between the guerrillas and the<br />

clandestine movement.<br />

The press report of Saturnino’s<br />

“testimony” used in his absence does not<br />

say whether it was challenged by the defence<br />

lawyer, Sudjono, as a gross infringement<br />

of court proceedings. He may well<br />

have done so and the press was ‘advised’<br />

not to report it. Testimony ‘in absentia’ can<br />

only be used in very exceptional circumstances.<br />

It is evident from what has happened<br />

that Saturnino’s act of defiance<br />

spiked a hole in the prosecution’s case, as<br />

evidence he was expected to give was lost.<br />

Having declared him “mad” and therefore<br />

“unfit to appear” a week earlier, the court<br />

knew very well that he would not be allowed<br />

to appear yet summoned him nevertheless<br />

then went through the farce of being<br />

told that he could not appear, so as to be<br />

able to use his highly suspect interrogation<br />

report.<br />

This incident again highlights the fact that<br />

Saturnino’s life is in grave danger. TAPOL<br />

has been informed that a request by an<br />

International Red Cross delegate to meet<br />

Saturnino following his appearance in court<br />

on 4 March has been turned down.<br />

TAPOL has today written to the British<br />

government asking that the Indonesian authorities<br />

be pressed to allow the International<br />

Red Cross immediate access to Saturnino.<br />

NOTHING DELIBERATE<br />

ABOUT DELAY IN TRIAL<br />

Kompas 17 March 19<strong>93</strong> Dateline: Dili<br />

Abridged<br />

Comment: No doubt this denial is made to<br />

hide an embarrassing truth. I would link the<br />

timing rather to the forthcoming talks in<br />

Rome on 20 April. It may be that the regime<br />

does not want Xanana to speak in open<br />

court before the talks commence. – TAPOL<br />

The Public Relations chief of the Dili<br />

district court, Amir Pane, said that the court<br />

was not purposely dragging out the Xanana<br />

Gusmão trial. If things have slowed down, it<br />

is purely for technical reasons.<br />

At first the court fixed a rapid timetable<br />

with four or five hearings a week but this<br />

happened only in the first weeks. Since<br />

then, hearings have been less frequent, first<br />

three times a week, then twice a week and<br />

now only once a week.<br />

Defence lawyer Sudjono has told the<br />

presiding-judge that things are becoming<br />

slower and slower. Judge Godang says the<br />

court has other things to do and he himself<br />

who is chairman of the court has various<br />

duties that he cannot desert.<br />

The timetable was only a plan and can<br />

change at any time and anyway the court<br />

wants to give the prosecution more time to<br />

summon witnesses. “They don’t all live in<br />

Dili. Some live in Baucau, Lospalos, Same,<br />

Aileu and even Bali,” said Pane<br />

The court also needs to keep fresh. Haste<br />

will not give the court the chance to try<br />

Xanana properly.<br />

But Pane is certain that the trial will end<br />

before the 120 days from Xanana’s arrest<br />

runs out.*) All that is left is to hear a few<br />

remaining witnesses and then some a-decharge<br />

witnesses (for the defence). Then the<br />

defendant will be cross-examined, the<br />

prosecutor will read his summing-up and<br />

demand for sentence, then the defence will<br />

speak, after which will come the verdict.<br />

“The court has cut down the number of<br />

witnesses to be heard from the original<br />

thirty as some are not relevant to the case.”<br />

The defence lawyer said he has no<br />

problem with the slower programme. “This<br />

is a test of resilience and stamina. I am ready<br />

to deal with it. I am not asking the court to<br />

speed things up.” His client, Xanana, whom<br />

he regularly meets, is also of the same<br />

opinion.<br />

Sudjono confirmed that two a-de-charge<br />

witnesses will testify in court. The two men<br />

knew Xanana when he was a young boy.<br />

But Sudjono would not reveal their names.<br />

“I want everything to proceed smoothly,”<br />

he said.<br />

*There must be something wrong here. 120<br />

days from 20 November ends on 18 March.<br />

XANANA TRIAL DRAGS ON<br />

Kompas 19 March 19<strong>93</strong> Dateline: Dili<br />

Abridged<br />

Comment: The list of prosecution witnesses<br />

revised from thirty down to ‘about twenty’<br />

still listed Gregorio da Cunha Saldanha and<br />

Francisco Miranda Branco, both serving<br />

long sentences, as being due to testify.<br />

However, they will not after all appear in<br />

court as it was announced on 18 March that<br />

no further witnesses summoned by the<br />

prosecution would appear. The change of<br />

plan is likely to be because of Saturnino’s<br />

act of defiance in court on 4 March, to avoid<br />

giving the chance to any other <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese to use the court in the same way.<br />

Regarding the appearance of defence<br />

witnesses, Sudjono, the defence lawyer has<br />

spoken repeatedly of the reluctance of<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese to appear for the defence. He has<br />

refused so far to divulge the identities of the<br />

two who are scheduled to appear. – TAPOL<br />

Witness Armando da Silva (23 years old)<br />

told the court hearing the case of Xanana<br />

Gusmão in Dili that the accused was sent an<br />

appeal by the Indonesian government,<br />

signed by governor Mario Carrascalao and<br />

military commander, Brig.Gen Warouw, to<br />

come down from the hills in 1990. This was<br />

discussed with his followers but his reply<br />

was that he could not surrender as he totally<br />

rejected integration. Xanana had also told<br />

him he could accept some other form such<br />

as autonomy.<br />

Armando da Silva is described as a government<br />

employee and former head of<br />

FITUN, the clandestine organisation which<br />

maintained contact with Xanana in the hills.<br />

FITUN had 170 young members helping<br />

Xanana in the towns and providing a<br />

‘bridge’ between the urban centres and the<br />

bush.<br />

The witness told the court that every<br />

time he met Xanana he had been given instructions<br />

about organising a large-scale<br />

demonstration to welcome the visiting<br />

Portuguese MPs. But I didn’t do this, he<br />

said, as by this time FITUN had broken up


<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 21<br />

and disbanded. He said he had asked Xanana<br />

what the purpose of the demonstration was<br />

and had been told that it was to show to the<br />

outside world that “we still exist.” Xanana<br />

had always said the clandestine organisation<br />

should maintain discipline, not indulge in<br />

violence, maintain mutual respect and never<br />

act without permission.<br />

The witness told the court he never implemented<br />

anything Xanana had asked him<br />

to do as he believed that none of this could<br />

be achieved and in any case, he dissolved<br />

FITUN in August 1991.<br />

Xanana told the court he knew the witness<br />

and confirmed his testimony.<br />

The court announced that it has completed<br />

the hearing of (prosecution) witnesses.<br />

The hearings will resume on<br />

Thursday 1 April to hear witnesses presented<br />

by the defence (a de charge).<br />

DEFENCE WITNESSES<br />

HEARD<br />

wire services, 1 April 19<strong>93</strong><br />

Note that the court will convene on a<br />

Monday for the first time in weeks to hear<br />

the second defence witness. That will make it<br />

possible for Amos Wako to be present. Nice<br />

management! They could of course have<br />

heard the two defence witnesses on<br />

Thursday as originally planned but it is neat<br />

to have a hearing to convince the UN Sec-<br />

Gen’s envoy just how ‘fair’ Xanana’s trial<br />

is. – TAPOL<br />

The Dili district court hearing the trial of<br />

Xanana Gusmão, heard testimony from the<br />

first defence witness (a-de-charge). He was a<br />

38-year old farmer, José da Conceicão who<br />

told the court he was a member of Fretilin in<br />

the late seventies.<br />

The witness told the court that Xanana<br />

Gusmão had always treated prisoners well,<br />

including members of the Indonesian army.<br />

He mentioned one occasion when Xanana<br />

Gusmão overruled other guerrillas who<br />

wanted to execute a captured army sergeant<br />

and how he had treated the sergeant’s<br />

wounds.<br />

The next court hearing will be on<br />

Monday, 5 April, to hear another defence<br />

witness.<br />

EVENTS INSIDE EAST<br />

TIMOR<br />

WHO’S WHO IN THE<br />

RESISTANCE<br />

Publico, Translated from Portuguese unabridged<br />

(Lisbon) In a document dated 28<br />

November 1992, but which is entitled “20th<br />

November Statement” (date on which<br />

Xanana Gusmão was captured), the new<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese leader, Ma’Hunu Bulerek<br />

Karathayano- Bukar (Antonio João Gomes<br />

da Costa, as he is named on his Portuguese<br />

birth certificate) made public the highest<br />

ranks in the Resistance and Fretilin. The text<br />

was received in Portugal via a recording<br />

transmitted by Radio Nova, but its written<br />

version arrived only now. It had been<br />

included in a package of documents<br />

delivered in Dili to the Independente and<br />

Publico reporters by “Corthe,” spokesman<br />

for the interior’s Clandestine Front.<br />

In spite of the unclear formulation of<br />

some of the decisions taken, especially regarding<br />

the role of the Maubere Resistance<br />

National Council (CNRM), it would appear<br />

that “prisoner of war” Xanana Gusmão’s<br />

functions as Resistance leader have been<br />

“frozen,” and power within the territory has<br />

passed to a so-called Politico-Military<br />

Commission of the Resistance (CPM-R).<br />

This was described as a “tactical/operational<br />

mechanism” which takes action, while being<br />

the “arm of the Falintil commander concept<br />

on the ground.” Its motto, just as it appears<br />

in the document, is “talks without preconditions,<br />

sponsored by the UN,” in order<br />

to achieve “an internationally acceptable<br />

solution to the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> problem.”<br />

The other decisions point to the reappearance<br />

of Fretilin as directing structure of<br />

the struggle, (in contrast to Xanana, who in<br />

1989 gave up the duties he was fulfilling in<br />

this party, Ma’Hunu has taken on its leadership)<br />

and to a strengthening of the position<br />

of José Ramos Horta, with whom<br />

Ma’Hunu now “coordinates” the struggle on<br />

the internal level. The non-partisan nature of<br />

the Falintil (armed wing of the Resistance) is<br />

maintained.<br />

Leader of the Resistance & Falintil<br />

Commander: Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão<br />

(functions “frozen”).<br />

Maubere Resistance National Council<br />

(CNRM): Ma’Hunu.<br />

CNRM Special Representative Abroad:<br />

José Ramos Horta<br />

Politico-Military Commission of the<br />

Resistance (CPM-R): Ma’Hunu*<br />

Fretilin Directive Commission (CDF):<br />

Ma’Hunu (Secretary); Lu-Olo and Konis<br />

Santana (Vice- Secretaries).<br />

Falintil General Staff: Taur Matan Ruak<br />

(subordinate to Ma’Hunu)<br />

*Responsible “for the struggle on an internal<br />

level,” “in coordination with the<br />

CNRM Special Representative abroad.<br />

CNRM CHRISTMAS<br />

MESSAGE<br />

Maubere Resistance National Council -<br />

CNRM<br />

Fretilin Directive Commission - CDF<br />

20 December, 1992<br />

Dear fellow <strong>Timor</strong>ese and companions in<br />

the struggle of the armed front in the bush,<br />

in the clandestine front in the towns and<br />

cities of our violated country’s soil, in the<br />

diplomatic front abroad, and friends of the<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese people all over the world:<br />

Following the imprisonment of our<br />

Commander Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão on<br />

20 November 1992, I am addressing you,<br />

this Christmas time, to send you all our<br />

warm wishes for a Holy Christmas and<br />

Happy New Year 19<strong>93</strong>, and to ask that you<br />

continue to fight for the Christmas feast of<br />

the <strong>Timor</strong>ese, for life, and the right to live as<br />

human beings, as a People and as a Nation.<br />

For many, and above all for Indonesia,<br />

our fight for the Maubere People’s rights<br />

suffered a considerable defeat on 20<br />

November 1992, but for the true children of<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> it was a day of great victory for<br />

our struggle, for the following reasons:<br />

l. With the arrest of our companion<br />

Xanana Gusmão, the Maubere People’s<br />

Resistance acquired a concrete symbol, in<br />

accordance with the 20th November<br />

Declaration, i.e. KAY RALA XANANA<br />

GUSMÃO, Symbol of <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />

Resistance.<br />

2. The arrest of our companion Xanana<br />

Gusmão, and that of the many other companions<br />

of the Clandestine Resistance, as<br />

well as the publication by the invading<br />

authority itself of the names of thousands of<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese in the clandestine front, including<br />

important public officials such as the current<br />

governor, Abilio Osorio, municipal and<br />

administrative post officials, soldiers, police,<br />

and the occupiers’ own spies, demonstrates<br />

to the world and to the Indonesians<br />

themselves, the strength of the clandestine<br />

front, which truly represents the intimate<br />

will of a people.<br />

3. The “surrender,” or the reporting to<br />

the Indonesians of thousands of clandestine<br />

members, does not signify to us a defeat,<br />

but rather heroism, since the flame of love<br />

for one’s country is not put out by a couple<br />

of songs, and their struggle will intensify, in


Page 22 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

one way or another, to an ever greater<br />

extent.<br />

4. The heathen form of taking an oath,<br />

drinking a mixture containing blood, is an<br />

attitude against the Catholic Church.<br />

Consequently, by forcing the Catholic<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese to practice these heathen acts, the<br />

Javanese are forcing the faithful to violate<br />

their own Faith, weakening the “good relationship”<br />

(according to them) between<br />

Indonesia and the Catholic Church.<br />

5. This all means condemnation of<br />

Indonesian policy itself, forcing itself to let<br />

go of <strong>Timor</strong>ese soil, leaving this poor people<br />

to live according to its right.<br />

So that we continue united, so that Jesus<br />

is born for the <strong>Timor</strong>ese people, its right as<br />

a people and nation recognised soon, we<br />

would like to send the following messages to<br />

you:<br />

l. A sincere thank you to all, without exception,<br />

big and small, rich and poor, for all<br />

the collaboration with regards our companion<br />

Xanana Gusmão, Symbol of<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese Resistance, with a request that<br />

this collaboration continue and grow.<br />

2. Everyone should bear in mind that our<br />

companion Xanana Gusmão’s functions<br />

have been frozen, in accordance with the<br />

20th November Declaration. For this reason,<br />

any statement which he makes must not be<br />

considered as coming from the CNRM.<br />

3. To the prisoners and their families, as<br />

well as to those persecuted, especially to<br />

the young people, we extend to you our<br />

moral and spiritual unity, and urge you to<br />

muster up COURAGE, according to each<br />

individual’s faith.<br />

4. We wish to remind everyone that the<br />

Indonesians are Moslems, and they want to<br />

destroy the Catholic Church. Do not, therefore,<br />

give in easily to their proposals with<br />

regards the heathen practices or any other<br />

kind of collaboration.<br />

I end with a big festive season embrace<br />

for all! The fight continues! To fight is to<br />

win! Victory is ours!<br />

The mountain of our occupied motherland<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, 20 December 1992.<br />

The CNRM<br />

(signature) Ma’Hunu Bulerek<br />

Karathavano (Bukar) Secretary of the CDF<br />

STATE OF WAR: A DIARY<br />

Independente, 19 February 19<strong>93</strong><br />

By Ines Serra Lopes. Translated from<br />

Portuguese. unabridged<br />

Wednesday, 3 February<br />

The beauty of the island is unforgettable,<br />

and the approach by air exceeded all<br />

expectations. <strong>Timor</strong> is the loveliest of<br />

places.<br />

I arrived in <strong>Timor</strong> today. I came with Rui<br />

Moreira (Lusa, Brussels) from Jakarta. I<br />

landed at Dili airport inside the cockpit of<br />

the place, beside an Indonesian pilot who,<br />

after spending 2 years in Luanda, working<br />

for Taag, had acquired a considerable<br />

Portuguese vocabulary. The only subject<br />

which the pilots (there were two) would not<br />

talk about was politics. “I not like,” said the<br />

one who spoke no Portuguese.<br />

We were met at the airport by colleagues<br />

and authorities. We came straight to the<br />

Hotel Turismo. After a lunch of grilled fish,<br />

a long day began. They asked us to go to the<br />

Indonesian hotel, the Makhota, to be<br />

“introduced” (to report, in the original version)<br />

to the Indonesian who was to be responsible<br />

for us in Dili: Kosky Zakaria.<br />

Zakaria, was insistent: if you want to<br />

return for the end of Xanana’s trial, then<br />

you must not write anything against<br />

Indonesia. You have to stick to the “facts.”<br />

And be quite objective. At the end of the<br />

conversation, on that Wednesday afternoon,<br />

Kosky announced that perhaps we would<br />

have to leave the following Saturday, just<br />

three days away. Basically, what he was<br />

saying was that it all depended on our behaviour.<br />

We would have the chance to realise<br />

that he meant what he said.<br />

On my return from the interview,<br />

Adelino Gomes was waiting for me. We<br />

went to the cathedral, to the anniversary<br />

mass for Msgr. Ximenes Belo, Bishop of<br />

Dili. The cathedral was impressively full. Of<br />

sorrowful and poor faces. Then came the<br />

endless line of people wanting to greet the<br />

Bishop. Humble and barefooted, they kissed<br />

his hand and shyly congratulated him.<br />

Outside I heard the first cry for help: “..<br />

The people of <strong>Timor</strong> are suffering. We are<br />

just waiting for Portugal. Only Portugal can<br />

help us.. All the <strong>Timor</strong>ese people are going<br />

to die. When is Portugal coming?” The tone<br />

and content (to which there was no answer)<br />

was to be repeated from the mouths of old<br />

and young, throughout the coming days in<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>. The key words, repeated again and<br />

again were: The Portuguese man (the<br />

“malae”) will be coming soon).<br />

The “malae” did not come at the time of<br />

the “Lusitania Express.” The “malae” did<br />

not come on a parliamentary delegation<br />

visit. But the <strong>Timor</strong>ese wait and trust: the<br />

“malae” has to come. He’ll be here soon...I<br />

felt a knot in my throat, a shiver, when I<br />

heard the question and the insistence: the<br />

Portuguese man is coming. Isn’t he?<br />

Teresinha believes that the Portuguese<br />

are not coming. She emigrated to Australia,<br />

and only came back to Dili to visit her<br />

family. She speaks perfect Portuguese, as<br />

did many people between the ages of 20 and<br />

30 with whom we spoke. Teresinha does<br />

not want to talk about politics. She says<br />

that in <strong>Timor</strong> there are both good and bad<br />

things. She admits she would prefer to keep<br />

quiet about the bad things. Of the good<br />

things, she laughs and can only remember<br />

her family that she left behind.<br />

Back at the hotel, we scarcely have time<br />

enough to go to our rooms. Xanana<br />

Gusmão’s lawyer is waiting for us to have<br />

dinner. We go to the restaurant. Sudjono<br />

takes along his two assistants. It is a long<br />

conversation. Sudjono confirms that he was<br />

indicated to Xanana by the police, but that<br />

Xanana could have chosen any other lawyer<br />

from among the seven that the police proposed<br />

to him. I don’t know if I believe this.<br />

The man seems to be sincere. But faces, in<br />

these parts, are almost impenetrable.<br />

There are two certainties: Sudjono knows<br />

very little about <strong>Timor</strong> and about the<br />

guerrilla. And we know nothing about the<br />

strategy of Xanana Gusmão’s defence, except<br />

that, obviously, Sudjono knows that<br />

the Indonesian court is going to reject his<br />

objection on grounds of incompetence.<br />

Sudjono is maintaining that, firstly, the<br />

anti- integrationist group to which Xanana<br />

belonged and in which he was accepted as<br />

leader, never recognised Indonesian sovereignty<br />

over the territory, formerly colonized<br />

by Portugal; secondly, until the present<br />

time, the international community, especially<br />

via the UN, has not recognised integration<br />

of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>; thirdly, that Xanana<br />

Gusmão’s “activities” had begun before the<br />

facts described in the indictment, i.e., before<br />

17 July 1976, the aim being not to attack<br />

Indonesia, but to achieve <strong>Timor</strong>’s independence.<br />

The lawyer assures me he will appeal<br />

against the decision which will be given the<br />

following week. He also says he believes it<br />

very important for us to stay and hear the<br />

testimonies, above all that of Xanana himself.<br />

I think so too.<br />

Thursday, 4 February<br />

There is no trial session today. I am<br />

staying in Dili, even though a group of<br />

Portuguese journalists are going to visit<br />

Baucau. I want to try to make some contacts,<br />

and to make up for the loss of time -<br />

two precious days - caused by the visa delay<br />

in Amsterdam.<br />

Straight after breakfast Petrus Suryadi<br />

appears. He is an Indonesian journalist,<br />

“Europe correspondent,” for the Jakarta<br />

daily “Suara Pembaruan.” He lives in<br />

Holland and used his considerable influence<br />

to get many of us over here, through his<br />

friend in Lisbon, Nuno Rocha, who untiringly<br />

helped us to get entry permits.<br />

As well as being a journalist, Petrus<br />

Suryadi is a strong man of the Indonesian<br />

regime. His sister is married to one of<br />

Jakarta’s most powerful generals. With even


<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 23<br />

more power, and one more star on his<br />

shoulder, than the well-known Armed<br />

Forces’ spokesman, Brig. Gen. Nurhadi<br />

Purwosaputro, the famous General Nurhadi<br />

to whom we all turned when the visas<br />

threatened not to be forthcoming.<br />

I could not have felt worse seeing Suryadi<br />

this morning, just when I thought I could<br />

have walk around on my own, to see and to<br />

hear. Worse was to come, however: Petrus<br />

announced that I had to report to Zakaria,<br />

my inquisitor of the previous evening.<br />

Suryadi asked me what I would like to<br />

see. Off the top of my head, I said what<br />

seemed the most innocent - the Dili market<br />

place. When we arrived, I told Suryadi that<br />

it would be best to leave the car and driver<br />

and go in on foot. Petrus Suryadi did not<br />

agree. He ordered the driver to drive on into<br />

the market. Desperately sounding the horn,<br />

through narrow pedestrian paths. And I was<br />

feeling so bad, from on high, behind the<br />

smoked colored windows of the jeep. I<br />

forced him to stop, and said I would continue<br />

on foot. Petrus followed me and tried<br />

to make me go back to the jeep. I refused.<br />

To the relief of both of us, we left there for<br />

the Hotel Makhota, to meet up with Kosky.<br />

Even Kosky was preferable to visiting the<br />

market in a jeep. The Makhota is the<br />

Indonesian hotel par excellence, made by the<br />

Indonesians for the Indonesians. All prior<br />

advice we had received recommended us not<br />

to stay there. Even with the 50 per cent<br />

discount the hotel had offered us. At the<br />

Makhota, nobody is there just by chance: in<br />

the lobby there are at least half a dozen<br />

informers and Intel (Indonesian intelligence)<br />

agents. In the front garden, hidden among<br />

the trees and foliage, live the spies who, day<br />

and night, watch the comings and goings of<br />

the road to the hotel and the Dili diocese,<br />

just right next to it.<br />

I went up to the first floor, with Suryadi,<br />

to Kosky Zakaria’s room/office, where I had<br />

been yesterday with Rui Moreira. The<br />

Ministry of Information’s representative -<br />

who had been introduced to me the day before<br />

as the person responsible for security<br />

in <strong>Timor</strong> during the trial of Xanana Gusmão<br />

- unreeled his threats: no journalist would be<br />

allowed to return for the final week of the<br />

trial if s/he had been writing anything against<br />

Indonesia. Just as I had done the day before,<br />

I stuck to my ground: I repeated that I<br />

wanted facts and figures. The indictment,<br />

the objection, and the translations of the<br />

penal code and penal procedures code. I said<br />

I was going to the court, to speak to one of<br />

the judges. Kosky Zakaria said I could and,<br />

without realizing my surprise, wrote a<br />

letter, on government-headed paper,<br />

“ordering” the court through his spokesman,<br />

Judge Hitzbullah, to grant me trial<br />

documents. We parted and I went off to the<br />

Dili court, escorted by Petrus Suryadi.<br />

Hitzbullah is an Indonesian judge, of<br />

medium height, with mustache, and friendly<br />

appearance. He received us, listened to<br />

Suryadi attentively and smiled effusively.<br />

Then, more serious, he read the letter, and<br />

said no. A determined no, not very Moslem.<br />

A convinced no, which an hour of arguing<br />

and a bit of shouting did not manage to<br />

reverse. In the middle of the conversation,<br />

Hitzbullah left the office to talk to the<br />

presiding judge, and Petrus Suryadi went<br />

straight to the desk to look for the<br />

documents which the judge had refused me.<br />

A little later, Judge Hitzbullah, in almost<br />

non-existent English, offered his apology. It<br />

was nothing personal. I asked him how long<br />

he had been at the Dili court and, without<br />

waiting for the translation, he replied: 1986.<br />

“And how long do you expect to stay for<br />

now?,” I kidded. He laughed and shrugged<br />

his shoulders. God, or the Indonesian<br />

Minister of Justice would have to decide.<br />

But he would not hand over the trial<br />

documents. “I’m sorry,” he repeated.<br />

With a copy of the indictment under<br />

Suryadi’s arm, we went to the Resende<br />

Hotel to look for Espedito, the supposed<br />

translator of the indictment, to whom<br />

Suryadi was doing me the favour of introducing.<br />

I refused his services, in spite of<br />

Espedito’s excellent arguments in his own<br />

favour. He had little more than primary<br />

school. But, to compensate, he has got a<br />

brother with a Law degree! The osmosis of<br />

family knowledge did not convince me and I<br />

rejected Espedito and his translations.<br />

Suryadi, visibly annoyed, left me at the<br />

hotel. He had to go to Jakarta. I breathed a<br />

sigh of relief and left on foot. I passed by<br />

the Bishop’s house, but D. Ximenes was<br />

not in and the reception was, to say the<br />

least, cold. I left a message saying that I<br />

would be back.<br />

After a very long walk around the bay, I<br />

finally arrived at the Motael church. I was<br />

received by an employee, whose welcome<br />

made the previous one at the Bishop’s<br />

house seem like it had been warm and intimate!<br />

None of the priests was in, and he<br />

did not know where they were. I went back<br />

to the diocese, the Ecclesiastic Tribunal. I<br />

crossed through the muddy side entrance,<br />

by the low wall (which encircles the whole<br />

block) looking right on to the spies in the<br />

next street - where the Makhota Hotel is.<br />

No priest was in there either. Through the<br />

kitchen window, two old employees, who<br />

only spoke the local dialect Tetun, discouraged<br />

me from waiting.<br />

I left the diocese and saw the taxi driver,<br />

who had been following me since I had left<br />

the hotel on foot over an hour before. I gave<br />

in to tiredness and to the young driver’s<br />

persistence and, indicating that I surrendered,<br />

got into the car. I asked him where we<br />

were going. He didn’t understand - he didn’t<br />

speak Portuguese. I repeated in English. He,<br />

who had been following me, ought to know<br />

where it was that I wanted to and could go.<br />

The driver thought he understood: I was a<br />

tourist and wanted him to show me the<br />

sights of the city. He took me inside Dili,<br />

showed me the police headquarters, where<br />

Xanana was supposedly being held. He<br />

showed me the market, open 24 hours a<br />

day. It was a far more wild market than the<br />

one Suryadi had taken me to hours before.<br />

He took me to the house of the Osorio<br />

family, where the former leader was<br />

captured. Afterwards, inevitably, to the<br />

Santa Cruz cemetery. When he finally understood<br />

that I was a “wartawan”<br />

(journalist), he refused to stop at the<br />

cemetery so I could take photos, and we<br />

suddenly started back for the hotel. On the<br />

way he explained that, if the “others” were<br />

to see him, he would be arrested. With his<br />

hand hidden from the view from the street,<br />

he made the international sign for fear.<br />

Once again I left the hotel on foot. I met a<br />

young boy scout, carrying books. He spoke<br />

to me in Portuguese and accompanied me as<br />

far as the Ecclesiastic Tribunal. Father José<br />

Antonio Costa wasn’t in. Neither,<br />

apparently, was Father Leão. I could feel<br />

the stares of the informers on my back as I<br />

left. My companion apologised. I could not<br />

be walking around the streets of Dili as a<br />

foreigner, especially a journalist, and more<br />

especially being Portuguese. One of the<br />

spies followed behind the boy scout.<br />

Another overtook me, half turning around.<br />

He said “boa tarde” (good afternoon) to<br />

confirm that I was Portuguese, then disappeared<br />

around the next corner, only to appear<br />

again later.<br />

I decided to go back and try one more<br />

time: the priest was having a nap. I sat<br />

down on the veranda that joins the two diocesan<br />

buildings. Three old and honest tables,<br />

each with four chairs, all in the shade. I<br />

decided not to move from there before<br />

speaking to the Vicar-General, Father José<br />

Antonio.<br />

While I waited, I thought about a talk I’d<br />

had a few hours earlier, in another place<br />

enveloped by the stares paid by Indonesia.<br />

Amid a lion’s mane of hair and a somewhat<br />

frightening face, a gentle smile appeared<br />

when I said who I was. “We knew you were<br />

coming,” said the dark little lion, hidden<br />

behind a column of an old Dili building.<br />

He told me how life was in the bush,<br />

where he had been until the month before.<br />

Far from the adventures one imagines, life in<br />

the mountains is spent in holes, very near<br />

the villages, sometimes inside the villages<br />

themselves, too near the Indonesians. In


Page 24 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

holes dug in the ground, inside and outside<br />

houses, watched by the people who, in turn,<br />

are watched by Indonesia.<br />

I showed him news from the previous<br />

day’s Diario de Noticias. The headline read<br />

that Ma’Hunu, Xanana Gusmão’s substitute<br />

in the leadership of the guerrilla, would<br />

give himself up within the next two months.<br />

The article had been based on statements<br />

made by the governor, Abilio Osorio. That<br />

was clear in the article, but the <strong>Timor</strong>ese did<br />

not want to read more. With eyes filled with<br />

tears, he replied: “Lies! Lies! Lies!” I tried<br />

to explain that they were just the governor’s<br />

statements. He was deaf to my words and<br />

repeated: “Lies!” He did not read on. He<br />

told me about his brother who had been<br />

“caught,” and about whom there was now<br />

no news. He told me that in his village,<br />

when the soldiers hear that a certain Manuel<br />

is working for the resistance, they arrest, interrogate<br />

and torture all the Manuels, until<br />

they find the Manuel they are looking for.<br />

Many confess to deeds they know nothing<br />

of. Many die. “It’s better to die for <strong>Timor</strong>,”<br />

said the young man, like one who is explaining<br />

the inexplicable.<br />

Father José Antonio awoke and received<br />

me in the same cane chairs. Cautious, he<br />

confirmed only what he could. He spoke a<br />

lot about the <strong>Timor</strong>ese Church and teaching<br />

in <strong>Timor</strong>. Portuguese, which until a few<br />

years ago had been the language in which the<br />

young <strong>Timor</strong>ese were taught, right from<br />

their first year at primary school, had been<br />

banned by Indonesia. Portuguese became the<br />

language of the Resistance, and of the antiintegrationists.<br />

José Antonio Costa is just<br />

another <strong>Timor</strong>ese priest who knows the<br />

regime and prefers not to talk about it.<br />

Later on, I would be told the story of a<br />

seminarist in Baucau, who started to teach<br />

his classes in Portuguese. When leaving after<br />

the first lesson, the seminarist was called by<br />

the Indonesian police. “He was left with a<br />

disfigured face,” they told me. The lessons<br />

in Portuguese ended that very same day...<br />

When I interviewed the governor, Abilio<br />

Osorio, I told him the story. He did not<br />

even try to deny it, and insinuated with<br />

malice: “It couldn’t only have been on<br />

account of the Portuguese...” Why such<br />

words, when the Bishop of Dili publicly<br />

affirms that torture is routinely used in<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>?<br />

When <strong>Timor</strong>ese start speaking to us in<br />

English so as to pretend they do not know<br />

how to speak the language detested by the<br />

Suharto regime...; when the Governor insinuates<br />

that torture is justified...; when all<br />

this happens, we are left with no doubts<br />

whatsoever: we are not in the 27th province<br />

of Indonesia. We are in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, the<br />

territory occupied 17 years ago by<br />

Indonesia’s force and violence.<br />

Friday, 5 February<br />

In court in the morning, Xanana enters<br />

covering his face with his hand. He remains<br />

like this almost throughout the hearing.<br />

A walk through Dili, with a carefully<br />

chosen itinerary, led to contact with someone<br />

who says he is in the resistance. He<br />

brought messages, communiqués from the<br />

Maubere Resistance National Council<br />

(CNRM), introducing himself as the new<br />

spokesman for the CNRM and for his<br />

leader, Ma’Hunu. He goes by the name of<br />

Corthe (taken from the initial letters in a<br />

phrase which, in English, means Reasoning<br />

elevates all men), and we talked for hours.<br />

We asked many intense questions. The<br />

replies were plausible. We had to be sure.<br />

A further meeting was arranged for the<br />

next day, in a conveniently public place.<br />

Then we would see. The greatest risk was<br />

falling into an Indonesian ambush. You can’t<br />

play games with these people.<br />

On our way back to the hotel, over a<br />

dozen taxis refused to stop. Finally, one<br />

does. He speaks Portuguese, as usual, and<br />

says his name is Martinho. He asks if we<br />

are reporters. Whether we already know<br />

about the situation in <strong>Timor</strong>. On arrival at<br />

the hotel he looks through his wallet, saying<br />

that he has something for us. He doesn’t<br />

find what he wants and suggests he delivers<br />

it the following day. At what time? As we<br />

had planned to go to the 6 am mass at the<br />

Cathedral, we tell him he could come and<br />

pick us up before six and take us to the<br />

Cathedral.<br />

It has been quite a day, and the weariness<br />

is beginning to tell. But the day is not over<br />

yet. Henri Sobroto, yet another “journalist”<br />

which the Indonesian government sends to<br />

us as a “guide,” calls a meeting with all of us<br />

Portuguese. The evening before, we had<br />

asked our “colleague” Sobroto to request the<br />

government to allow us to extend our stay.<br />

This would be the only way we could get to<br />

be present at a little of Xanana Gusmão’s<br />

real trial. Until today, the sessions had only<br />

been procedural formalities. We insisted on<br />

the need to hear the witnesses and Xanana<br />

Gusmão himself. On orders from above, the<br />

visas, originally for 28 days, had all been<br />

transformed into 10-day permits. The first<br />

of us to arrive could now only stay until the<br />

Monday.<br />

With a formal tone, Sobroto called the<br />

meeting, and announced that our stay could<br />

not be extended. In fact, all to the contrary -<br />

the Portuguese journalists would have to<br />

leave Dili and Indonesia in a few hours time,<br />

the following morning. Only one or two of<br />

us, as yet not named, would be allowed to<br />

stay on.<br />

We asked what the reason for the expulsion<br />

was. The answer was immediate:<br />

bad behaviour, both written and spoken,<br />

against Indonesia. We quickly came to the<br />

conclusion that the ones chosen to stay<br />

ought to accept that choice, and there should<br />

be no question of solidarity with the others<br />

leaving. It was more important that at least<br />

someone was staying in Dili. We calculated<br />

that the choice would be one of the<br />

televisions, one of the radios, or the Lusa<br />

news agency.<br />

The hotel bill was paid. Some packed<br />

their suitcases. Around 3 am, General<br />

Nurhadi, Armed Forces’ spokesman, called<br />

the hotel from Jakarta, stating that there had<br />

been some mistake, that no one would be<br />

expelled. Five minutes later, my old acquaintance<br />

Kosky Zakaria appeared, giving<br />

apologies, explaining that it had been<br />

nothing more than a “crossed wires,” and<br />

that we could all stay in Dili for the agreed<br />

10 days. Good night.<br />

Saturday, 6 February<br />

I leave for the 6 o’clock mass alone and<br />

late. The taxi driver Martinho was waiting<br />

for me, as we had agreed, with engine<br />

running. He stops in front of the hotel the<br />

moment I come down the stairs. I get in and<br />

ask him to go quickly to the Cathedral.<br />

Martinho seems to be making a point of<br />

driving at a snail’s pace. He asks about my<br />

colleague Adelino Gomes, with me the<br />

previous day. He wants to know whether<br />

we now have information, whether we have<br />

already been contacted. I do not like the<br />

conversation. I ask him to hurry up, and say<br />

that I have neither contacts nor information,<br />

and do not know what he is talking about. I<br />

remind him that the yesterday he had said<br />

he had something to hand over to us.<br />

The driver becomes silent. I don’t know<br />

exactly what I’m sorry about. Could it be<br />

that, yesterday, one of us said too much? I<br />

don’t want to be afraid. I realise that we are<br />

traveling in the opposite direction to the<br />

cathedral. Irritatingly insistent, he once again<br />

asks about our contacts. I order him to stop<br />

the car. He carries on. He ignores me and<br />

then comes out with: “the clandestine<br />

network wants a meeting with you tonight.”<br />

I tell him that I want no part of any meeting<br />

or clandestine network. I want him to stop<br />

the car. I want to go to the cathedral. I want<br />

to hit him. My insults have no effect. I am<br />

taken through streets in Dili which I don’t<br />

recognise, far from the cathedral. I get the<br />

impression that we are almost on the<br />

outskirts of the city. I see two soldiers on<br />

the next corner and, at that moment, the<br />

sight of them is actually a relief to me. I<br />

open the door and say I’m getting out of the<br />

moving car. The soldiers look at us, and the<br />

driver stops near them. I leave the car,<br />

slamming the door behind me. I had spent<br />

40 minutes being driven around Dili.


<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 25<br />

I get another taxi. He turns left in order to<br />

turn back. At the end of the street I see my<br />

taxi driver. He is talking through the window<br />

with a face I recognise: one of the diocese<br />

spies, with his lettuce- green T-shirt. I<br />

breathe a sigh of relief. The cathedral is<br />

empty and mass finished long ago. I return<br />

to the hotel. I’ve missed my meeting. I get a<br />

phone call; another meeting is set. Once<br />

again, I cannot go with the group. I need<br />

antibiotics as I have a sore throat - just as<br />

well, I’ll tell less lies. I have a rest. The<br />

phone calls start at breakfast time: reporters<br />

from Associated Press and other agencies,<br />

and some newspapers, are looking for<br />

confirmation - were we expelled or not? A<br />

dispatch from Antara (Indonesian news<br />

agency) says that, not only were we not<br />

expelled, but that some of us had wanted to<br />

bring forward our departure date. The lie<br />

exceeds the limits, even in a hypocritical<br />

diplomatic perspective. The worst thing<br />

though, is that all past experience<br />

discourages making any statement to<br />

Indonesian journalists. In fact the headlines<br />

in today’s “Voice of <strong>Timor</strong>” are about our<br />

expulsion, and we did not give them the<br />

story. I just make a short statement to AP.<br />

Once again, the meeting fails to happen.<br />

But I am told about Maria. She is <strong>Timor</strong>ese.<br />

She needs money. She has to have various<br />

surgical operations. She had been with the<br />

resistance and was arrested. She had sewn<br />

up her trousers, as she had been advised,<br />

only unsewing them once a day when she<br />

was alone. She went around unnoticed for a<br />

while, but her day arrived. She was<br />

repeatedly raped, in different ways.<br />

However, the final, merciless blow came<br />

when she was raped with a branch of a tree.<br />

Only God knows why he didn’t let her die<br />

then. She is alive, and trying to reconstruct,<br />

through different surgery, what is left after<br />

the violence, the rest of her body, torn in<br />

pieces. Her belly has been cut and stitched<br />

together, and is to be re-cut and re-stitched,<br />

in an attempt to repair what the insane and<br />

unstoppable violence tried to destroy.<br />

Maria says it was God who spared her.<br />

I try to find Corthe, the CNRM spokesman<br />

we met yesterday. It’s impossible, and<br />

I cannot carry on now. I will just have to<br />

wait for a while.<br />

Sunday, 7 February<br />

D. Ximenes Belo said mass at 6 am, in<br />

the gardens of his residence. Hundreds<br />

(maybe thousands?) have squashed themselves<br />

into the rooms, down the stairs, into<br />

the gardens. It is a sung mass. There is still<br />

the sensation that, just as all the other<br />

masses in <strong>Timor</strong>, this is also a mass for the<br />

souls of the dead. The only difference is that<br />

here, at the end, their names remain a secret.<br />

Suddenly, during the mass, dozens of<br />

bicycle bells are heard. I don’t know<br />

whether it is on purpose but, at the same<br />

time, the governor of <strong>Timor</strong> and his staff of<br />

several dozen people pass happily in front<br />

of the garden where the prayers are being<br />

said. They noisily ring the bells of their bicycles<br />

as they go. The praying <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />

don’t even look around. No one seems to<br />

hear. They are used to being provoked.<br />

A visit to the Motael Church at the time<br />

of the mass, said in Indonesian Bahasa,<br />

puzzles us somewhat. The Indonesian<br />

Catholics there appear, after all, as devote as<br />

the <strong>Timor</strong>ese. It is true, however, that there<br />

are far fewer spies around when this mass is<br />

over and people are leaving. It is also true<br />

that here the faithful are well dressed, and<br />

come and go in jeeps of the latest model.<br />

But it is also here that a family persuades a<br />

little child of three or four years old to come<br />

over and give me a picture of Jesus Christ in<br />

the countryside, without any message at all.<br />

After a visit to the Santa Cruz cemetery,<br />

at which police and troops stopped us from<br />

taking any photographs, we went to yet<br />

another mass at the cathedral. In between<br />

the church visits, we had time enough for a<br />

short and illuminating talk with a young<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese on the Areia Branca beach. He<br />

introduced himself as a teacher, and spoke<br />

very quietly. Regarding the situation of the<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese, he said “Our silence says it all.”<br />

He asked us to pretend we had been<br />

speaking in English to him and, as he left us,<br />

said in a good loud voice “Bye Bye” (in<br />

English).<br />

Monday, 8 February<br />

We went up to Ermera, the old city, on<br />

the top of the mountain. There we met<br />

Domingos Soares, a 4l- year-old priest, who<br />

does not hide the fact that the Indonesians<br />

do not like him. He explains that the occupiers<br />

tried to kill the people of Ermera,<br />

moving the town from the mountain top<br />

down to the valley, where the still rain<br />

waters, the heat and paludism would exterminate<br />

the population. He suggests that<br />

this particular battle was won by the people<br />

who, in spite of being forced on several occasions<br />

to go down to the new city, would<br />

return up the mountain to their old houses<br />

to sleep. Now, it seems that little more than<br />

some businesses are working down in the<br />

torrid valley of pre-fabricated houses. The<br />

mountain, in the Ermera zone, is beautiful.<br />

The magnificent view and the coffee trees<br />

that line the road under the mountain are<br />

really breathtaking. There is cassava, and<br />

incredible vegetation framing the way up the<br />

mountainside. Sometimes I have to try hard<br />

so as not to forget we are in <strong>Timor</strong>. On our<br />

way down, back to Dili, we stop briefly in a<br />

village of just a few houses called Rai Lako.<br />

To my surprise, the first person I approach<br />

to speak to asks me in good Portuguese<br />

whether we are Portuguese. He shies away<br />

at the sight of our guide - a <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />

working for the Indonesians, which is<br />

obvious a mile away.<br />

A woman comes forward with her son in<br />

her arms for a photograph. I took her to be<br />

the man’s wife. Only later, through someone<br />

in the local resistance, I would find out that<br />

her husband has been missing since the 12<br />

November massacre. The man in the village<br />

with her was her father, who for security<br />

reasons won’t be identified. He has already<br />

been arrested, interrogated and tortured<br />

many times. So many times that now he<br />

says no more than “good afternoon” to me.<br />

Two tall, good-looking <strong>Timor</strong>ese men<br />

approach from across the road. They speak<br />

very good Portuguese and, in contrast to the<br />

old embittered man, they want to talk. I ask<br />

one of them his name. The conversation is<br />

quick, and always under the watchful eye of<br />

our esteemed guide, Mr. Soares who has to<br />

submit a daily report on our comings and<br />

goings and contacts. I take note of the name<br />

the <strong>Timor</strong>ese, but only later, once back in<br />

the car, do I realise that he said his name<br />

was Domingos da Silva Soares - the name of<br />

the priest with whom we had just spoken<br />

up in Ermera. <strong>Timor</strong> is like that!<br />

Tuesday, 9 February<br />

I am thinking about Francisco, my most<br />

recent <strong>Timor</strong>ese friend. I would like to be<br />

with him now, in the cemetery, to attend the<br />

funeral of his 6-year- old son. But my friend<br />

almost cried yesterday when I told him of<br />

my intention. “Please, don’t go to the<br />

funeral!.” This is because being Portuguese<br />

in <strong>Timor</strong>, and being seen next to a <strong>Timor</strong>ese,<br />

could easily be reason enough to lead to<br />

interrogations, and to put someone’s life at<br />

risk.<br />

Later on, I have the good fortune to meet<br />

two remarkable people, about whom I can<br />

only say just that - that they are remarkable.<br />

For about an hour we spoke together very<br />

quietly - someone is always on guard at the<br />

window, watching outside. They are<br />

witnesses to the Santa Cruz massacre.<br />

Speaking softly, one of them described how<br />

the bodies of the young people were dragged<br />

along to uncovered trucks, some dead, and<br />

others only God knows if they were still<br />

alive. She confides that it is true, the bodies<br />

are in Tibar, a valley on the other side of the<br />

mountains, in front of which the Pope, John<br />

Paul II, prayed with the <strong>Timor</strong>ese. It is not<br />

possible to go there. There is a detour in the<br />

road leading to Ermera, but the troops do<br />

not allow anyone to go that way. And,<br />

above the mounds that are common graves,<br />

next to a stream, five military posts,<br />

situated up on the neighbouring mountains,


Page 26 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

are watching day and night for anything that<br />

moves.<br />

Later that same day, I heard the most<br />

complete version of the massacre. After<br />

taking the bodies away from the cemetery,<br />

battalions of soldiers took away the young<br />

people who had been in the demonstration.<br />

Using the same system of uncovered trucks,<br />

they transported hundreds of <strong>Timor</strong>ese to<br />

Tibar, on the night of 12/13 November.<br />

There they shot them in cold blood. The<br />

young people were seen in Comoro, sitting<br />

in the trucks escorted by the army troops.<br />

They numbered around 300, in addition to<br />

those who had already lost their lives in the<br />

cemetery itself, at least 180.<br />

I was told about what was said in confidence<br />

by a remorseful Indonesian official,<br />

who was unable to sleep, had lost his peace<br />

of mind and conscience, and who had still<br />

not managed to get transferred away from<br />

Dili, away from the nightmare that pursued<br />

him.<br />

Another witness recalls that, the evening<br />

before, and during the 12th November itself,<br />

the <strong>Timor</strong> radio station Loro Sae, controlled<br />

by the Javanese military, invited the young<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese to join in the walk to place<br />

flowers in the cemetery. The Suharto regime<br />

seems to have been preparing to catch the<br />

resisters all in one go.<br />

Wednesday, 10 February<br />

It was by chance that we met once more<br />

with the CNRM spokesman, Corthe, in the<br />

presence of a sponsor to vouch for him. The<br />

sponsor was a reliable one, worthy of credit.<br />

Corthe was genuine. For hours Corthe and<br />

his companions told us about the days in<br />

Dili, stories about the mountain, the state of<br />

the resistance. They spoke about Xanana<br />

Gusmão, the plan to get him to New York<br />

last December to take part in the talks<br />

between Durão Barroso and Ali Alatas.<br />

They assured us that Boutros Ghali was not<br />

only aware of this intention but was<br />

sponsoring it. They said that Xanana let<br />

himself to be taken, precisely because he<br />

expected the UN Secretary General to<br />

intervene.<br />

They told how it had all happened, and<br />

who had given the information which led to<br />

Xanana’s capture: a girl by the name of<br />

Moniz, the girlfriend of Jorge Araujo, Abilio<br />

Araujo’s nephew. After Xanana’s arrest,<br />

she went on to Jakarta and never came back.<br />

It had been her van that had been used so<br />

many times by the guerrilla to carry<br />

guerrillas, provisions and messages back and<br />

forth. One of those present explained and<br />

dissected the various phases through which<br />

the resistance has gone: the armed stage, the<br />

period of strength of clandestine movement,<br />

the current phase of the diplomatic struggle<br />

abroad, in which associations, support<br />

groups, etc. need to be encouraged to put<br />

pressure on the powerful countries. And he<br />

concluded, while Corthe lowered his eyes,:<br />

“Here, now, we are just trying to survive.<br />

Just that.” After tense hours of murmured<br />

talk, Corthe and the others asked on behalf<br />

of <strong>Timor</strong>. They transmitted to us just one<br />

certainty: that without the international<br />

community and without Portugal, the days<br />

of <strong>Timor</strong> and the <strong>Timor</strong>ese are numbered.<br />

FIGHTING AND ARRESTS IN<br />

FIVE MUNICIPALITIES<br />

Publico, 8 February 19<strong>93</strong> Translated from<br />

Portuguese. unabridged<br />

The <strong>Timor</strong>ese resistance unleashed a<br />

series of armed attacks on Thursday, 4th, in<br />

the Baucau and Los Palos (east), Viqueque<br />

(south east) and Same (central) municipalities,<br />

which resulted in at least two killed<br />

and an unspecified number of wounded<br />

among the passengers of a bus, belonging to<br />

the Indonesian company Nusantara, Publico<br />

learned. At around the same time,<br />

Indonesian security forces arrested three<br />

seminarists in Ermera.<br />

Fundraising<br />

The confrontation in Viqueque took place<br />

among the Kabo, Baso and Lugaca villages,<br />

and is said to have been aimed at the<br />

collection of money and provisions. A<br />

religious source assured Publico that no<br />

Indonesian soldiers were killed, so contradicting<br />

information previously supplied by<br />

other sources. “No guerrilla has come down<br />

from the forest,” says a well placed source,<br />

who wished to remain anonymous. He went<br />

on to explain that, in the repentance ceremonies,<br />

which take place in various parts of<br />

the territory, the military authorities use<br />

“town people.”<br />

The confrontations last week coincided<br />

with the third day of the trial of Xanana<br />

Gusmão, former resistance leader, who will<br />

only return to the courtroom next Thursday,<br />

11 February, the date on which the judges<br />

will reply to the judicial incident introduced<br />

by the defence. He argues that the Dili<br />

Court and, by extension, all Indonesian<br />

courts, do not have the competence to try<br />

him.<br />

In addition to Xanana’s arrest, the resistance<br />

is said to have been weakened by the<br />

capture of hundreds of people, also on 20<br />

November 1992, according to a <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />

who supports integration but is critical of<br />

the methods used by Suharto’s armed<br />

forces. According to the same source, who<br />

was allegedly quoting an Indonesian official,<br />

the real number of those killed in the Santa<br />

Cruz cemetery in November 1991 was 500 -<br />

ten times more than the figure quoted in the<br />

official enquiry.<br />

ALIAS CORTHE<br />

Publico, 12 February 19<strong>93</strong> By Adelino<br />

Gomes Original lang.: Portuguese. unabridged<br />

(Dili) A man with no face, no name and<br />

no age, Corthe comes down to the capital in<br />

search of the “four Portuguese journalists.”<br />

News of their arrival had been passed<br />

through the resistance’s grapevine to the<br />

mountain. He treads without leaving a track;<br />

he speaks without raising his voice; he<br />

passes in the street without any feature<br />

being evident, to linger in the memory.<br />

These characteristics are appropriate for the<br />

job he has done since l2 September last as<br />

the CNRM (Maubere Resistance National<br />

Council) spokesman in the interior, and link<br />

to the outside.<br />

Corthe is the first figure that emerges<br />

from the resistance structure, reorganized<br />

following Xanana Gusmão’s capture. He<br />

comes from the side of Ma’Hunu, the new<br />

guerrilla leader, pursued, surrounded, with<br />

neither clothing nor money, or enough<br />

weapons for the five Indonesian battalions<br />

hurled into an intensive search of the region<br />

in which he is believed to be.<br />

Alatas wants his head before meeting<br />

with Durão Barroso on 20 April, just as he<br />

had Xanana’s, before the 17 December talks.<br />

The troops had been within a hairbreadth of<br />

capturing him on the 5th - two weeks before<br />

the first meeting between the two ministers<br />

in New York - in a battle in which one of his<br />

most loyal men, Commander Ma’Luli, was<br />

killed.<br />

Ma’Hunu lost communication equipment,<br />

weapon, left behind documents, but<br />

managed to escape. “The people are in his<br />

care,” says Corthe, although it is not possible<br />

to know for sure whether it is the<br />

hunted leader’s presence which gives the<br />

population confidence, or if it is the latter<br />

which protects and comes to the aid of the<br />

leader.<br />

“You can tell the whole world that<br />

Ma’Hunu is not surrendering,” says Corthe<br />

to the Publico, in response to <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />

Governor Abilio Osorio’s recent statements<br />

in Dili, guaranteeing that surrender was<br />

imminent. He admits that the resistance<br />

never before went through such a period of<br />

weakness on the organisational level. But he<br />

rapidly resorts to complicated, worn out<br />

phrases to make his point, saying that “it is<br />

not only the CNRM which Jakarta will have<br />

to defeat in order to consolidate its presence<br />

here, but the entire population.”<br />

Just as the writers of the ‘50s, Corthe<br />

has chosen a principle of the Greeks for his<br />

life’s maxim or guiding motto: “Reasoning<br />

elevates all men.” And it is in these words<br />

that the mystery of his alias is unveiled:


<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 27<br />

“Corthe” consists of the first letter of each<br />

word of that sentence (in Portuguese). He<br />

faithfully repeats for the exterior the speech<br />

approved in September by the CNRM. It<br />

seems very far from the catastrophic vision<br />

which many, both in and outside the territory,<br />

continue provide of Xanana’s arrest.<br />

He repeats: Xanana was arrested as he prepared<br />

to flee from Dili on his way to New<br />

York. It was decided that his appearance at<br />

the headquarters of the UN, during the<br />

Alatas/Barroso talks, could constitute a<br />

psychological whiplash, capable of bringing<br />

a breath of fresh air to the international<br />

community.<br />

Did Xanana betray? “If (Commander-in-<br />

Chief of the Armed Forces) Try Sutrisno,<br />

(General) Murdani, or even Suharto got into<br />

the hands of the CNRM, they would be<br />

making the same statements as Xanana.”<br />

Carried away by the propaganda speech, he<br />

even admits that victory will be theirs<br />

“soon.” But what prevail are formulae used<br />

by <strong>Timor</strong>ese common sense when the resistance<br />

is being spoken of. Sprinkled with a<br />

certain fatal note like those of a people<br />

destined for great deeds: “Even if only one<br />

woman is left, she will not get lost half way<br />

along the road.”<br />

The main question for the resistance today<br />

is how to wake up the international<br />

community. For Ma’Hunu’s adviser,<br />

Portugal has only to persevere to the very<br />

end with its statute of administering power.<br />

Why not share it with its ally the USA?<br />

Hunu wrote to Bill Clinton, says his<br />

spokesman, impressed by the fact that the<br />

US allowed “one people to invade another<br />

people.”<br />

Corthe leaves us, as discreetly as when<br />

he arrived, but not without first taking an<br />

address book and odd bits and pieces, and<br />

dictating for the world four of the most<br />

immediate priorities: a tape recorder,<br />

medicines for the stomach and headaches,<br />

two dictionaries - English/Portuguese, the<br />

other just Portuguese. Somewhere in the<br />

Centre or <strong>East</strong> of the territory - the places in<br />

which the guerrilla leaders are to be found -<br />

Ma’Hunu will carry on hiding. “60 metres<br />

away from the enemy,” Corthe assures us.<br />

He did not delay in leaving for the interior.<br />

Silent and discreet.<br />

VIDEO OF XANANA<br />

CIRCULATES AROUND<br />

TIMORESE SCHOOLS<br />

Publico 11 February 19<strong>93</strong> Dateline: Lisbon<br />

Translated from Portuguese unabridged<br />

Yesterday, a Church source in Dili,<br />

quoted by the Lusa agency’s Rui Moreira,<br />

revealed that a video film containing pictures<br />

of and statements by Xanana Gusmão,<br />

which was made after his capture, is being<br />

shown in schools in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. The video,<br />

which started being shown on 11 January in<br />

schools and villages in the territory’s interior,<br />

was made by the Indonesian Armed<br />

Forces. It shows pictures of Xanana’s arrest,<br />

and different conversations between<br />

the former resistance leader and local<br />

authority officials, namely, Governor Abilio<br />

Osorio. The film also includes Xanana<br />

Gusmão’s appeal to the guerrillas, and another<br />

addressed to youngsters for them not<br />

to follow his example but to concentrate on<br />

their studies.<br />

THE OLD MISSIONARY’S<br />

MONOLOGUE<br />

Publico 11 February 19<strong>93</strong> Dateline : Dili<br />

Byline : Adelino Gomes Translated from<br />

Portuguese unabridged<br />

For nearly an hour, his voice breathy, he<br />

spoke of the <strong>Timor</strong>ese, the Church he belongs<br />

to, the Pope, Indonesia. And of<br />

Portugal, from which, he says, the <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />

expect so much. Above all, that Portugal<br />

“does not ever recognise integration.” Like<br />

all the sources in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, he will remain<br />

nameless and faceless. He will just be “a<br />

man in the heart of the <strong>Timor</strong>ese,” as he<br />

says.<br />

It’s like a spider on an insect. These<br />

people cannot do anything else. He fought<br />

20 years, waiting for help to arrive. No one<br />

ever sent a bazooka, a missile, a mine here.<br />

The condemnation was timid, of a genocide<br />

in direct line with that of Pol Pot in<br />

Cambodia, and Hitler in Germany. I wish to<br />

say to Mario Soares, Durão Barroso, and<br />

the other ministers: How can we abandon<br />

thousands of <strong>Timor</strong>ese? Are those 200,000<br />

dead <strong>Timor</strong>ese not 200,000 dead Portuguese<br />

- <strong>Timor</strong>ese/Portuguese? In Portugal they say<br />

that they abandoned these poor things, and<br />

that Indonesia took the right action,<br />

otherwise communism would have installed<br />

itself here. The communist forces in Angola<br />

and Mozambique never carried out such<br />

butchery in those enormous countries.<br />

Portugal should be stronger. The<br />

Government seems to ask for permission to<br />

speak each time it mentions the case.<br />

Portugal never officially left <strong>Timor</strong>. The<br />

departure of Lemos Pires (governor) was a<br />

wise move. Had he stayed, he would have<br />

been humiliated, like Vassalo e Silva<br />

(governor of Goa at the time of the Indian<br />

invasion). All the <strong>Timor</strong>ese stood up for<br />

him, even today. Do we say that Portugal<br />

was delivered into Napoleon’s hands because<br />

João VI abandoned Lisbon and sought<br />

refuge in Brazil? It was our bad luck.<br />

Portuguese sovereignty was maintained<br />

there.<br />

The government must never recognise it<br />

(integration with Indonesia). If it were to do<br />

so, it would be the greatest shameful act<br />

since the time Afonso Henriques proclaimed<br />

independence. It would be as mad as<br />

handing over a growing child to a savage<br />

beast. Let it never recognise integration. The<br />

idea of an autonomy along the lines of the<br />

Azores is being spoken of. That would be a<br />

contemptuous solution which would result<br />

in the people hating Portugal even more than<br />

Indonesia. Is it with betrayal that the<br />

Portuguese intend to preserve their culture<br />

and inheritance? It is true that (after<br />

Xanana’s arrest) a man with a name is<br />

lacking. But the people knows what it<br />

wants. Indonesia was condemned (by the<br />

UN Security Council) in 1975. Can we allow<br />

the criminal to be rewarded? We would<br />

not have done as much as this people has<br />

done, if we had been invaded by the Spanish<br />

or French. Neither would we have lived this<br />

historical experience with such faith.<br />

BELO: TIMOR LIKE THE<br />

AZORES, MADEIRA, PUERTO<br />

RICO<br />

Publico, 12 February 19<strong>93</strong>. By Adelino<br />

Gomes. Translated from Portuguese. unabridged<br />

(Dili) He acknowledges that “in a way”<br />

he is a resister. The repentance ceremonies<br />

are fabrications, he accuses. He confesses<br />

that he still has not understood Xanana’s<br />

radical change in prison. He complains of<br />

the silence from Soares, Cavaco, the<br />

Assembly, fellow dioceses in Portugal. He<br />

has abandoned the idea of a referendum and<br />

today supports a certain kind of autonomy.<br />

He is 45-year-old Carlos Filipe Ximenes<br />

Belo.<br />

Publico: During an interview by the<br />

SIC/TSF, Xanana Gusmão admitted he<br />

gave your name as being linked to the<br />

resistance. Have the Indonesian authorities<br />

reacted to that? In what way?<br />

Ximenes Belo: Xanana has the right to say<br />

that I belong to the resistance. Personally, I<br />

do not consider myself as belonging to the<br />

resistance, if we are referring to a political,<br />

armed, military resistance.<br />

Q.: What kind of resistance then?<br />

A.: It is more a statement of values.<br />

Spiritual values and a certain resistance,<br />

defending the religious, cultural, ethnic<br />

identity of the people. That, yes. As far as<br />

the Government’s reaction is concerned,<br />

they have not said anything to me until<br />

now.


Page 28 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

Q.: Has the human rights situation in <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> improved or worsened since<br />

Xanana’s arrest? How many have been<br />

arrested?<br />

A.: There are arrests in all the municipalities.<br />

I have no information as to how many;<br />

some. I cannot say that the human rights<br />

situation has worsened. It was always<br />

something continuous. Lately, what it more<br />

noticeable is the violation of people’s consciences<br />

- forcing them to confess to being<br />

part of the clandestine network when they<br />

are not, never were, nor formally took any<br />

part in it. They forced people to sign their<br />

names, drinking goat’s or dog’s blood, like<br />

what happened in Baucau. This is authentic<br />

abuse.<br />

Q.: Have you visited Xanana since he was<br />

transferred to Dili?<br />

A.: Never.<br />

Q.: Why not?<br />

A.: I made attempts, asked for information.<br />

I was given to understand that it was out of<br />

the question.<br />

Q.: What about the other prisoners, among<br />

whom are Xanana’s mother and one of<br />

his sisters, as well as the mother and<br />

nephews of Abilio Araujo?<br />

A.: Regarding the first ones, I have not visited<br />

them yet, but the vicar-general has. I<br />

visited the other group (Abilio Araujo’s<br />

family) on 17 January, and even celebrated<br />

mass. They are awaiting trial, but are in<br />

good spirits. I have also visited Abilio<br />

Araujo’s mother. She was on her own with<br />

eight grandchildren, plus all the nephews.<br />

One could see she is a morally resistant<br />

women.<br />

Q.: What is your interpretation of Xanana’s<br />

declaring himself Indonesian, and a<br />

“disturber of the peace” (the name the<br />

Indonesian military give to the<br />

guerrillas)?<br />

A.: I don’t know what to say. It is a<br />

mystery to me. I try to ask and find out just<br />

to what extent he did, in fact, do an aboutturn.<br />

All this is a game. We do not know, it<br />

is still a mystery.<br />

Q.: We have heard, in the street, some<br />

people saying that he is a traitor. Do you<br />

think this is so?<br />

A.: The simple fact that he left documents<br />

behind with people’s names on, makes one<br />

think. A leader should not do that. All over<br />

the world, in Tamil, in Afghanistan, the<br />

leaders kill themselves or run, they react. He<br />

didn’t even react. He allowed himself to be<br />

caught just like that, with documents.<br />

Concessions on both sides<br />

Q.: Xanana’s capture meant a great victory<br />

for Indonesia. Governor Abilio Osorio<br />

has said he is convinced that within 2<br />

months the same will happen to<br />

Ma’Hunu. If that were to happen, would<br />

it mean the end of the resistance?<br />

A.: I do not think so. Xanana is just a man.<br />

Maybe the armed resistance could finish.<br />

But this psychological, cultural resistance,<br />

as a people, takes time.<br />

Q.: Do you mean to say that, even if the<br />

guerrilla were to end, you could not say<br />

that the resistance in the territory had<br />

come to an end?<br />

A.: For as long as the people exist, no. The<br />

people will maintain its identity, with its<br />

legends, traditions, and its way of being.<br />

Q.: Ali Alatas and Durão Barroso are going<br />

to meet in April in Rome, under UN<br />

auspices. What advice would you give to<br />

each one if you were given the<br />

opportunity?<br />

A.: That they arrive at a solution. There<br />

have to be concessions, both on the<br />

Indonesian and on the Portuguese side. That<br />

they give some ground. I always say:<br />

Portugal and Indonesia should be on good<br />

terms and, then, that <strong>Timor</strong> should have<br />

peace and tranquillity. For this to happen,<br />

an effort must be made by both sides.<br />

Q.: What solution do you see, today, for <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>?<br />

A.: An autonomous region. I have asked for<br />

information about the Azores and Madeira.<br />

I have already read what there is on Macau.<br />

It would be something of this nature. Or like<br />

Puerto Rico within the US.<br />

Q.: An autonomy which evolves towards<br />

independence, like what happened to<br />

Singapore?<br />

A.: Let’s first get a certain autonomy. We<br />

have not got that far yet...<br />

Q.: In Indonesia’s current situation, would<br />

the regime or the generals be in a position<br />

to make a concession of this kind<br />

without creating dangerous precedents?<br />

A.: There was an article in the Integration<br />

Law which gave <strong>Timor</strong> a special place for<br />

development later. If Indonesia wants to get<br />

rid of this stone in its shoe, it will have to<br />

reach this conclusion. It would also do the<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese good to feel a little free, masters or<br />

their own land.<br />

Q.: Do you think that, if Portugal, Indonesia<br />

and the UN reached a solution of this<br />

kind, the <strong>Timor</strong>ese would accept it?<br />

A.: You ought to ask the <strong>Timor</strong>ese that<br />

question. The first step would be: a certain<br />

amount of autonomy, and then we could see<br />

about other things - the establishment of<br />

Portuguese culture, Indonesian culture. So<br />

we would be like a bridge linking Portugal<br />

and Indonesia.<br />

Q.: Why did you drop the “pure and hard”<br />

idea of the referendum? Was it not the<br />

theoretically most correct and fair solution?<br />

A.: In theory it is the most correct and fair.<br />

But I ask you this: How did Portugal view<br />

this referendum? President Mario Soares did<br />

not even dare to answer my letter. He did<br />

not reply at all. Therefore, it means that not<br />

even Portugal considered it.<br />

Q.: President Mario Soares never spoke to<br />

you?<br />

A.: He spoke to me when he was Prime<br />

Minister.<br />

Q.: In 1985.<br />

A.: In 1985, in the Nuncio’s offices in<br />

Lisbon. But when I was there the last time,<br />

in 1990, he only sent an adviser to say that<br />

he had received my letter and thanked me.<br />

But I never received a written reply on the<br />

referendum.<br />

Q.: Did you have any contact on this issue<br />

with the present government of Prof.<br />

Cavaco Silva?<br />

A.: No, not up to now. Only in 1990, someone,<br />

what was his name, Queiroz... And he<br />

said that they were continuing to take the<br />

<strong>Timor</strong> problem to the UN. Nothing else.<br />

Q.: And did the Assembly of the Republic<br />

never contact you?<br />

A.: Not until now. When I was there, I was<br />

also in touch with a Mr. Sousa Lara in<br />

Estoril. He also wanted information about<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

Q.: There are indications that Indonesia is<br />

preparing to put the case of <strong>Timor</strong> to the<br />

vote of the UN General Assembly next<br />

summer. If this were so, it is admissible<br />

that Portugal could lose the vote. What<br />

would you do in that case? Would you<br />

advise the <strong>Timor</strong>ese to conform, if that<br />

were the wish of the international community,<br />

expressed by that vote?<br />

A.: Before saying that they ought to conform,<br />

we too want some advantage points:<br />

an autonomous region. With regards con-


<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 29<br />

forming, history is in motion, and the people<br />

who might conform today might not<br />

conform in say 100 years time.<br />

Q.: Where did Indonesia go wrong in winning<br />

over the hearts of the <strong>Timor</strong>ese?<br />

A.: Its basis was violence. And then, it did<br />

not consult the people. No matter how<br />

backward a people might be, it does have its<br />

dignity. Saying “Now you are all<br />

Indonesians” - people will not accept in this<br />

way.<br />

Q.: But, as you know, one of Indonesia’s<br />

main arguments is that, in 1976, firstly,<br />

the majority of the population asked for<br />

the intervention, through the Balibo<br />

Declaration. Then, through its representatives,<br />

it accepted <strong>Timor</strong> as the 27th<br />

province. Was this a puppet show?<br />

A.: In 1976 I was in Macau. But in 1975 I<br />

went to Atamboa with the UDT and<br />

Apodeti refugees. I was a seminarist. They<br />

always say majority. But what majority?<br />

They have no facts to back this up. Who<br />

had elected that assembly which made the<br />

request for integration? If there were deputies,<br />

there ought to have been elections.<br />

Now I ask: were there election? And these<br />

deputies - who were they representing? As<br />

far as the 4 parties are concerned, I think<br />

that (the Balibo Declaration) was written<br />

out of fear. They were being ousted by<br />

Fretilin. They had no way out except to<br />

turn to Indonesia, who took them in.<br />

Q.: The masses said in Bahasa are well<br />

attended. Have you noticed an increase in<br />

the Indonesian faithful?<br />

A.: In <strong>Timor</strong> there are many Indonesians<br />

from the various provinces, like civil servants,<br />

teachers, soldiers, police.<br />

Q.: Is there real religious freedom in<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>?<br />

A.: There is freedom. However, what we see<br />

is that, as the military and the government<br />

recognise the strength of the Catholic<br />

Church’s influence, they look for ways, and<br />

above all the military, of persecuting the<br />

Church in a veiled way: arresting catechists,<br />

brothers, the priests’ intimate helpers in the<br />

parishes; stopping the young people from<br />

attending liturgical meetings and acts. In<br />

Bobonaro, a military commander even said:<br />

“And what are you going to do at mass? In<br />

the church they don’t give you a sack of<br />

rice, as we do every Sunday.”<br />

Q.: Are there indications that a transmigration<br />

policy is getting underway to<br />

solve the problem of <strong>Timor</strong>?<br />

A.: A transmigration program does, in fact,<br />

exist. Not only here in <strong>Timor</strong>. It is all over<br />

Indonesia. I do not think it is necessary to<br />

send people here to occupy vacant lands.<br />

The government should, in the first place,<br />

promote the <strong>Timor</strong>ese here.<br />

Q.: Have any Church properties been<br />

confiscated?<br />

A.: Not up to now.<br />

Q.: The San José School has been closed,<br />

and Portuguese is practically no longer<br />

taught in <strong>Timor</strong>. Were you forced to take<br />

that decision?<br />

A.: I was not forced. The educational services<br />

published a closure decree. But I must<br />

confess that I have not originated any official<br />

document saying that it closed. There<br />

was a problem of the teachers,’ students’<br />

and parents’ physical safety. There was a<br />

shortage of teachers for the schools. And<br />

finally, what was the diocese on its own<br />

doing here, organising the teaching, when it<br />

should be the Portuguese Government’s responsibility?<br />

If it had wanted to defend<br />

Portugal’s cultural and historic interests,<br />

then Portugal’s presence here in <strong>Timor</strong><br />

ought to have taken a few steps in that direction.<br />

Seventeen years have gone by, and<br />

nothing’s been done in this respect. What<br />

we teach is still with books from 1972-73.<br />

Q.: What concrete initiative could Portugal<br />

take in order to spread its language and<br />

culture?<br />

A.: Perhaps the Foreign Ministry entering in<br />

contact with Indonesia, so as to maintain<br />

this official teaching, just as they maintain<br />

here the teaching of German and English, in<br />

the last years of high school.<br />

Q.: As you know, that was part of a package<br />

in negotiations 10 years ago at the UN.<br />

Nothing can advance on its own, without<br />

everything else going ahead too. With<br />

regards the Portuguese Catholic Church,<br />

what can it do specifically to help the<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese?<br />

A.: It could organise a “twin” for the diocese<br />

of Dili, in order to with help the financial<br />

aspect, maintenance of schools, seminaries,<br />

health clinics, and, at the same time, with<br />

the recycling of our priests. Some have been<br />

here since 1972 and have never left. They<br />

could go for 3 or 6-month courses in<br />

Portugal, and return with more incentive for<br />

work.<br />

Q.: At the moment, the Vatican is taking<br />

some initiative on <strong>Timor</strong>. What suggestions<br />

would you give?<br />

A.: I do not know. I am no diplomat, and I<br />

do not know what the diplomatic corridors<br />

are cooking up for <strong>Timor</strong>. I always suggest<br />

that the Vatican bears in mind this aspiration<br />

of the people of <strong>Timor</strong> to be as it is.<br />

But, the world is so complicated that,<br />

sometimes, the Vatican cannot resolve<br />

bearing in mind aspects of the Indonesian<br />

Church as well as diplomatic aspects.<br />

Q.: Were you ever physically afraid?<br />

A.: No, not physically. I know that this is a<br />

place in which any day I could be found<br />

with a bullet in me. To die and stop<br />

speaking, and stop walking, I am not afraid<br />

of.<br />

EAST TIMOR PADDY FIELDS<br />

NEGLECTED<br />

February 12 19<strong>93</strong> Jakarta Post news brief<br />

Dateline: Dili<br />

Remark: It is virtually certain that former<br />

tillers of this unused land are the tens of<br />

thousands of people driven into armycontrolled<br />

settlements in the late 1970s. This<br />

report gives the lie to Jakarta’s claims that<br />

Indonesian control has served the <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese better than Portuguese control. –<br />

TAPOL<br />

Some 48,000 hectares of rice fields built<br />

during the Portuguese colonial era in <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> have been left uncultivated since<br />

Portugal left the region 16 years ago.<br />

Chief of the provincial office of the<br />

Ministry of Agriculture Naek Haloman<br />

Nababan told the Jakarta Post here yesterday<br />

that the large number of idle paddy<br />

fields has contributed to the failure of the<br />

province to be self-sufficient in food. “<strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> still has to import 25,000 tons of rice<br />

from outside the province every year,” he<br />

said.<br />

Nababan confirmed that only 15,000<br />

hectares of the 63,000 ha. of rice fields<br />

established by the Portuguese were cultivated<br />

by farmers.<br />

The uncultivated rice fields have turned<br />

into unproductive land overgrown by coarse<br />

grass and shrubbery. Irrigation facilities built<br />

during the colonial era have also been<br />

overgrown.


Page 30 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

AROUND THE TRIAL<br />

Publico 12 February 19<strong>93</strong> Dateline: Lisbon<br />

Translated from Portuguese abridged<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>’s Robinson Crusoes<br />

They number 51 all told: 47 boys and 4<br />

girls. They found refuge in the mountain<br />

after fleeing the 12 November 1991 massacre.<br />

With neither clothing nor medicines,<br />

they roam through <strong>Timor</strong>’s green countryside<br />

like zombies, waiting for a time which<br />

never comes. Maria died in the fighting of 5<br />

December, when the troops almost captured<br />

the new resistance leader, Ma’Hunu.<br />

Irmenegilde, Carla and Sandra are still left,<br />

living a fascinating experience for the past<br />

year, like oriental Robinson Crusoes, for<br />

whom the enemy’s savagery makes surrender<br />

more feared than the thousand sacrifices<br />

they have to make as guerrillas.<br />

In the Line of Fire<br />

Another group of youngsters are paying<br />

the price, a year later, of having been heroes<br />

in Santa Cruz on 12 November. There are 24<br />

of them. The military have sent them to<br />

serve in the very front lines of the battalions<br />

which, in the territory’s interior, have for<br />

some time been surrounding the weakened<br />

guerrilla. They have to go in first - right into<br />

the firing line. Greater cruelty could not be<br />

invented, claims an angry Church source. It<br />

is not known into which battalions they<br />

were enlisted.<br />

SIX TIMORESE REBELS<br />

SURRENDER WITH BOWS<br />

AND ARROWS<br />

Reuter, Jakarta, Feb. 16<br />

Six rebels armed with a gun, a grenade and<br />

bows and arrows surrendered to Indonesian<br />

troops in the former Portuguese colony of<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, a military spokesman said on<br />

Tuesday.<br />

“They came to us and gave themselves<br />

up with their weapons,” the spokesman told<br />

Reuters by telephone from Dili, capital of<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

He said the six surrendered on Monday<br />

in Malisaga village, west of Dili.<br />

The military spokesman said all were<br />

members of the Fretilin separatist group and<br />

had laid down arms in response to an appeal<br />

from their captured leader Xanana Gusmão.<br />

Xanana, who was seized on November<br />

20, is being tried for leading the campaign to<br />

win <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>’s independence from<br />

Indonesia. The charge carries a maximum<br />

penalty of life imprisonment.<br />

Xanana issued a hand-written appeal to<br />

his followers shortly after his capture, asking<br />

them to give themselves up to the government<br />

which has declared an amnesty.<br />

Human rights groups have expressed<br />

concern that the appeal might have been<br />

wrung from Xanana under pressure.<br />

Fretilin was blamed by Jakarta for masterminding<br />

events which led to troops firing<br />

into a crowd of mourners in Dili in 1991.<br />

Witnesses said up to 180 people were killed<br />

in the firing, but Jakarta puts the toll at 50<br />

dead and 66 missing.<br />

Indonesia invaded <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> in 1975<br />

and annexed it the following year in a move<br />

which is still not recognised by the United<br />

Nations.<br />

RESISTANCE LEADERS<br />

ANSWER QUESTIONS<br />

The following document was produced by<br />

the National Council for Maubere Resistance<br />

in February 19<strong>93</strong>:<br />

The Resistance leaders of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

here answer some important questions often<br />

asked by journalists, academics, politicians,<br />

diplomats, students and many interested<br />

individuals. The responses of these three<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese leaders represent the official<br />

stand of the National Council of Maubere<br />

Resistance (CNRM).<br />

They are:<br />

• Mr. Xanana GUSMÃO, Resistance<br />

Leader of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>,<br />

• Mr. Ma’hunu Bulerek KARATHAYNO<br />

(also known as BUKAR), deputy Leader<br />

of the Resistance (now Leader “ad interim”<br />

since the capture of Mr. Xanana<br />

Gusmão) and Commander of the National<br />

Liberation Armed Forces of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

(FALINTIL), and<br />

• Mr. José RAMOS-HORTA, Sp ecial<br />

Representative of the National Council of<br />

Maubere Resistance.<br />

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS<br />

I. The National Council of Maubere<br />

Resistance - CNRM<br />

Question: What is the National Council of<br />

Maubere Resistance?<br />

Answer: The National Council of<br />

Maubere Resistance (CNRM) is based<br />

within <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and is the supreme organisation<br />

representing all <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />

people. It comprises the Commander of<br />

FALINTIL, the Secretary of the Directive<br />

Commission of FRETILIN and the<br />

Executive Secretary of the CNRM for the<br />

Clandestine Front which encompasses a<br />

large number of underground groups that<br />

operate in the occupied cities and towns.<br />

FRETILIN (Frente Revolucionaria de<br />

<strong>Timor</strong> Leste Independente) is the largest<br />

political force in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> today and is<br />

based on social democracy. The next largest<br />

force is the UDT, the União Democràtica<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ense (<strong>Timor</strong> Democratic Union) and<br />

this also opposes integration with<br />

Indonesia. There is no party in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

which supports integration.<br />

The CNRM is a non-partisan, non-ideological<br />

body. It is equivalent to a coalition<br />

government, encompassing all <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese nationalist political parties and<br />

organisations struggling for self-determination<br />

and independence.<br />

FALINTIL is a non-partisan army owing<br />

loyalty only to the CNRM and to no political<br />

group. This non-partisanship helps to<br />

consolidate national unity and guarantees<br />

that, as in all democratic states, the army<br />

swears loyalty only to the Constitution, the<br />

elected Parliament and the Government. It<br />

will not allow itself to be the tool of one<br />

group or another as happens in Indonesia<br />

today.<br />

Question: What is the role of the Special<br />

Representative?<br />

Answer: The Special Representative is<br />

the international spokesperson for the<br />

Resistance. He is vested with full powers to<br />

represent the CNRM internationally and<br />

appoints Resistance representatives for<br />

other countries. He also chooses personal<br />

aides to assist him in discharging his responsibilities.<br />

Within the strategic consensus of the<br />

Resistance, the Special Representative undertakes<br />

diplomatic initiatives. In view of<br />

the special circumstances of the Resistance<br />

in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, the Special Representative<br />

has exceptional powers to initiate policies<br />

without prior consultation and approval by<br />

the leadership within the country.<br />

II. The struggle for self-determination:<br />

historical, diplomatic and legal foundations<br />

Question: What is the basis of your claims to<br />

Independence?<br />

Answer: <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> has never been a<br />

part of what is today called the Republic of<br />

Indonesia: neither in the period of the Dutch<br />

and Portuguese colonisations of the region<br />

nor before the arrival of European powers.<br />

On independence, the Republic of Indonesia<br />

based itself on the area colonized by the<br />

Dutch, claiming the same political<br />

boundaries. But the Republic of Indonesia is<br />

in reality only a geographical term which<br />

encompasses over 250 distinct nationalities,<br />

thrown together by the Dutch for simple<br />

administrative expediency.<br />

For 500 years, the people of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

were colonized by the Portuguese. With<br />

them they brought the Catholic faith together<br />

with their Latin culture and values,<br />

which combined with <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese animist


<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 31<br />

beliefs and rituals which had existed for over<br />

a thousand years. Throughout that period,<br />

there was little or no contact between the<br />

people of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and the peoples and<br />

rulers in the remote islands of Java or<br />

Sumatra.<br />

We are a different country and a different<br />

people: we have our own history and<br />

culture; our own languages and values; and<br />

our own religion and perception of material<br />

values.<br />

Indonesia claimed to be the successor<br />

State to only the Dutch <strong>East</strong> Indies. This<br />

was the basis of Indonesia’s claims to exist.<br />

However, through its invasion and annexation<br />

of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> which was never a part<br />

of the Dutch <strong>East</strong> Indies, Indonesia substantially<br />

weakened its own legal arguments.<br />

It laid itself open to the challenge by the<br />

West Papuans, who rightly consider that the<br />

Javanese colonialists have no more right to<br />

colonize them than did the Dutch, and by<br />

the people of Aceh (North Sumatra) who<br />

have absolutely nothing in common with the<br />

Javanese.<br />

Last, but not least, our right to self-determination<br />

is well established in international<br />

law and in ten United Nations’<br />

resolutions. We refer only to the two binding<br />

Security Council Resolutions, Res. 384<br />

(1975) and Res. 389 (1976), which reaffirmed<br />

our right to self-determination and<br />

independence.<br />

Question: Indonesia claims to have built<br />

roads, schools, hospitals etc. Aren’t you<br />

satisfied?<br />

Answer: First of all, this is not a competition<br />

between the colonial rule of the<br />

Portuguese and that of the Indonesians. We<br />

are not here to choose one from the other,<br />

but to seek our own rule, as is our right.<br />

Second, the Indonesian government, in<br />

building all these schools and roads and<br />

hospitals seeks merely to fool the outside<br />

world that <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> is happily integrated<br />

with Indonesia. Ironically these are the very<br />

arguments that the colonial powers used in<br />

the past against their subjects who yearned<br />

for freedom. Indonesia seems to have learnt<br />

all the colonial tricks and are now practicing<br />

them on us.<br />

Give us a thousand miles of freedom,<br />

rather than a thousand miles of roads, which<br />

our people cannot use anyway: to travel<br />

from one village to another we need a special<br />

permit. Allow us to build our own schools<br />

of thought and to care for our sick and<br />

elderly in hospitals that we build ourselves,<br />

as poor as they may be.<br />

But above all leave us alone: we are not<br />

fighting for the Portuguese colonisers or for<br />

a better Indonesian neo-colonialist.<br />

III. The Resistance Peace Proposals<br />

Question: What is your negotiating stand for<br />

resolving the conflict?<br />

Answer: We again reaffirm our readiness<br />

to enter into a process of dialogue with<br />

Indonesia and Portugal under UN auspices<br />

and without pre-conditions. The aim of such<br />

a dialogue would be to explore all possible<br />

avenues conducive to an internationally<br />

acceptable solution to the problem of <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

The CNRM Special Representative presented<br />

a comprehensive peace proposal to<br />

the European Parliament in Brussels in<br />

April 1992, to the Council on Foreign<br />

Relations in New York in May 1992 and<br />

later to the UN .<br />

The Peace Proposal is in three phases:<br />

* Phase One, which would last for about<br />

two years, would involve all three parties<br />

working with the UN to implement a wide<br />

range of “confidence building measures.”<br />

These measures will necessarily include a<br />

drastic scaling down of the presence of<br />

Indonesian troops and weaponry in <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>, together with the introduction of a<br />

significant UN presence in the territory .<br />

* Phase Two, lasting between five and<br />

ten years, would be a period of genuine<br />

political autonomy based on ample powers<br />

vested in a local, democratically elected<br />

People’s Assembly.<br />

* Phase Three, the final phase, would see<br />

a referendum to determine the final status of<br />

the territory.<br />

This is our policy and remains valid. We<br />

believe that this represents the best possible<br />

prescription for a resolution of the conflict.<br />

It allows time for a cooling-off period in<br />

which all sides should try to prove their<br />

good-faith; it will also allow Indonesia to<br />

save face.<br />

Indonesia should seize the olive branch<br />

we are now offering. It has only to gain. It is<br />

obvious now that the invasion of <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> was a colossal mistake: the occupation<br />

has sapped so much of Indonesia’s energy<br />

and resources. If Indonesia withdraws<br />

from <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, it would be able to regain<br />

its international reputation as a peace-loving<br />

country and not be threatening to its smaller<br />

neighbours such as Malaysia and Singapore.<br />

Moreover, an independent <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> will<br />

be an asset for Indonesia, for ASEAN and<br />

the whole region in many ways.<br />

IV. Foreign Relations of an independent<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

Question: Can you outline the foreign<br />

relations policy of an independent <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>?<br />

Answer: We can assure everyone that the<br />

government of an independent <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

will apply for membership in ASEAN and<br />

the South Pacific Forum within days of our<br />

independence. This will be a top priority.<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> will maintain close ties with<br />

Portugal and the rest of Europe. We are a<br />

crossroads of three cultures and religions:<br />

Melanesian which binds us to our brothers<br />

and sisters of the South Pacific region;<br />

Malay-Polynesian which reminds us that<br />

many of our peoples trace their origins to<br />

South <strong>East</strong> Asia; and after five hundred<br />

years of Portuguese-catholic influence, we<br />

are a distinct nation-state in the region since<br />

we have a special understanding and<br />

relationship with the European Community.<br />

indeed an independent <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> will be a<br />

valuable advocate of the region’s interests in<br />

that forum.<br />

The majority of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese resident<br />

outside the country, are based in Australia.<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese have a special understanding<br />

of white Australians and this will serve as a<br />

bridge between Australia and the South<br />

Pacific island states as well as between<br />

Australia and South <strong>East</strong> Asia.<br />

We will not have a standing army. For<br />

our external security, we will rely on a<br />

Treaty of Neutrality to be guaranteed by the<br />

permanent members of the Security Council.<br />

We will endeavor with the UN and our<br />

neighbours to declare the seas surrounding<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> a Zone of Peace and work<br />

towards total demilitarization of the entire<br />

South <strong>East</strong> Asia and South Pacific regions.<br />

V. Domestic policies<br />

Question: What is your vision of an independent<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> on a domestic level?<br />

Can <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> survive economically?<br />

Answer: These two questions beg a long<br />

answer. We have divided up the responses<br />

according to the subject matter.<br />

a. Rule of law First and foremost, we will<br />

endeavor to build a strong democratic state<br />

based on the rule of law which must<br />

emanate from the will of the people expressed<br />

through free and democratic elections.<br />

b. Freedom of Expression We will encourage<br />

a free, independent, aggressive and<br />

responsible media as the voice of the people:<br />

a media that informs and educates. We<br />

believe that there can be no foreign interests<br />

controlling the local media. However, we are<br />

conscious that there will not be much<br />

private wealth to support an independent<br />

media. In order to avoid monopolies, we<br />

would try incorporate an obligation on the<br />

State to allocate funds in support of the<br />

media written into the Constitution.<br />

In order to ensure the independence of<br />

the media, the Constitution and the laws of<br />

the country should state that government<br />

interference in the editorial policies of the<br />

press and their day to day operations is inadmissible.<br />

In final analysis, we believe the


Page 32 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

media should be as independent as the judiciary.<br />

c. Human Rights From day one of independence,<br />

all international human rights<br />

treaties which would open up <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

for international scrutiny will be submitted<br />

to the Parliament for ratification. We believe<br />

that human rights transcend boundaries and<br />

prevail over state sovereignty. No<br />

government can hide under the cover of<br />

“domestic jurisdiction” when it comes to<br />

human rights. We will actively work with<br />

like-minded countries, NGOs and the media<br />

to strengthen the UN human rights machinery.<br />

We will actively support the creation<br />

of an international human rights court.<br />

We will seek the cooperation of UN human<br />

rights agencies as well as of NGOs such<br />

as Amnesty International, the International<br />

Commission of Jurists and Asia Watch to<br />

advise and assist us in our own efforts to<br />

promote respect for human rights and the<br />

rule of law in our country.<br />

From the first, we will proclaim a general<br />

amnesty and national reconciliation. To be<br />

true to ourselves, we will forgive our worst<br />

enemies. For a society to be healthy, sane<br />

and happy, it cannot be based on hatred and<br />

revenge.<br />

d. Economic policies and priorities <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> is a relatively small country. But<br />

with an area of 18,889 km2 and a total<br />

population of 700,000 (1974 figures), it is at<br />

least equal, if not larger, in size and<br />

population than at least 30 independent<br />

states members of the UN. For instance, it<br />

is almost ten times the size of Luxembourg<br />

and has twice the population. It is sixty<br />

times larger than the Seychelles.<br />

In terms of natural resources, <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

is potentially self-sufficient in most agricultural<br />

goods, meat and fish. It also has large<br />

oil reserves and other minerals.<br />

On the economic front, we will channel<br />

our resources into food production in order<br />

to feed our people. We will seek the cooperation<br />

of the UN Specialized Agencies such<br />

as the FAO, World Food Program, UNDP.<br />

However, all our policies will be a result of<br />

close consultation with the people in each<br />

region, town and village in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

In addition, in cooperation with the FAO<br />

and other international bodies, we will initiate<br />

a massive reforestation program to<br />

replant our forests and save our environment.<br />

Regarding the “<strong>Timor</strong> Gap Treaty” we<br />

will look at its terms, seek clarification and<br />

renegotiate if necessary. The sea boundary<br />

dispute will have to be settled through an<br />

international tribunal. We will seek international<br />

partnership in mineral explorations<br />

such as oil, but we will not sacrifice our own<br />

environment for short term gains.<br />

The civil war in 1975, and the subsequent<br />

invasion, up-rooted thousands of peoples.<br />

Properties were abandoned, destroyed or<br />

sold at unfair prices. This situation will have<br />

to be redressed.<br />

e. Education and health We believe in free<br />

education and health care for our people.<br />

The money saved from not having a<br />

standing army will be well used in these<br />

areas. At least 40% of our resources will be<br />

allocated to our best resource - our people -<br />

through massive investment in health and<br />

education.<br />

With the cooperation of WHO we will<br />

seek to eradicate malaria, tuberculosis and<br />

other preventable diseases within a decade.<br />

f. Indonesian settlers It is estimated that<br />

over 100,000 Indonesians are now living in<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. Most are poor Indonesians who<br />

came to our country looking for a better life.<br />

We would not be true to ourselves if we<br />

were to turn our backs on our poor<br />

neighbours.<br />

Indonesian migrants in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> will be<br />

welcome to stay and, with us, build a better<br />

home for us all. They have brought with<br />

them the wealth of their culture which can<br />

enrich the whole community.<br />

CNRM, February 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

MA’HUNU VOWS TO<br />

CONTINUE THE STRUGGLE<br />

Lisbon, Feb. 19 (IPS) – The guerrillas of<br />

the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese resistance movement will<br />

continue the armed struggle against the<br />

Indonesian authorities, despite the capture<br />

and trial of their former leader, Xanana<br />

Gusmão, according to a rebel communiqué<br />

released here Friday.<br />

In a letter addressed to “Portuguese<br />

journalists,” the new leader of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>’s<br />

rebels, Antonio João Gomes da Costa, or<br />

commander “Ma’hunu,” denied recent<br />

claims by the governor of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>,<br />

Abilio Soares, that his group had abandoned<br />

the armed struggle.<br />

The former leader of the <strong>Timor</strong>ese resistance,<br />

Xanana Gusmão, who launched the<br />

armed struggle for independence from<br />

Indonesia in 1976, was arrested in the <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese capital, Dili, last November.<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, a former Portuguese colony,<br />

was invaded by Indonesian troops in 1975.<br />

In a statement filmed by the Indonesian<br />

army a week after his capture, Gusmão expressed<br />

regret for his actions, declared<br />

himself an Indonesian, and recognised<br />

Jakarta’s claims on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, despite the<br />

fact that these have not been recognized by<br />

the United Nations.<br />

Gusmão’s trial began in Dili towards the<br />

end of January, in the presence of foreign<br />

journalists.<br />

In his letter to the press, the new rebel<br />

leader, Antonio Gomes, says he addressed<br />

his statement to journalists because “we’re<br />

in the same trench defending <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />

rights” and fighting against a “barbarous<br />

occupation by the ASEAN hawks,” a reference<br />

to the organisation of south east Asian<br />

countries.<br />

The letter describes <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese governor<br />

Abilio Soares, a former sergeant in the<br />

Portuguese colonial army, as “an accomplice<br />

to genocide” (estimated at 210,000 people<br />

by amnesty international) and a staunch<br />

defender of Indonesian expansionism.<br />

“Surrender, no. dialogue, yes. Because<br />

we’re fighting for peace in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>,”<br />

Gomes stressed.<br />

The letter recalls that the <strong>Timor</strong>ese resistance<br />

movement exists because Indonesia<br />

still refuses to abide by a 1975 U.N.<br />

security council resolution.<br />

The resolution calls for Jakarta’s withdrawal<br />

from <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and appoints<br />

Portugal as “administrative power in the<br />

territory until a referendum on autonomy is<br />

held.”<br />

The <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese resistance “reaffirms<br />

its support for the position of the administrative<br />

power and for the cause of peace and<br />

the right to self-determination” of the<br />

people of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, concludes the rebel<br />

leader’s letter.<br />

TEXT OF COMMUNIQUÉ<br />

Diario de Noticias 19 February 19<strong>93</strong><br />

Original lang. Portuguese. abridged<br />

...<br />

“Dear Portuguese Journalists,<br />

You are going away from this bloodstained<br />

land, where the language of Camoes<br />

is still maintained. Our best wishes go with<br />

you. We are sure that, in the case of you<br />

four journalists, we are addressing people<br />

who speak on the same pitch as ourselves,<br />

that is, in defence of the legitimate <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />

cause. In fact, to remember the solidarity<br />

with <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> of the Lusitanian soil and<br />

hearts is something which fills the<br />

humiliated but heroic Maubere People with<br />

pride, in their battle for the independence of<br />

this land, which cradled Xanana Gusmão.<br />

I believe that the presence here of you<br />

four journalists constituted another facet of<br />

what was expressed last year by the<br />

Lusitania Express - a gesture of solidarity<br />

against the barbarous occupation of the<br />

ASEAN hawks and its disgraceful consequences.<br />

Following this line of thinking, I<br />

proposed to go ahead, address you four<br />

journalists, and request that you make public<br />

the attached document. On account of the<br />

time limitations and conditions surrounding<br />

my duties, I have been unable to approach<br />

at any length questions in which the


<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 33<br />

Resistance are engaged in the interior.<br />

However, it is my duty to let it be known<br />

about the developments, which are summed<br />

up by what Mr. Mario Carrascalao inferred,<br />

and I quote: “Annihilation of the Resistance<br />

is a complex matter.” This puts paid to Mr.<br />

Abilio Osorio’s view, in his contact with<br />

you, that: “Only two months are needed.”<br />

The very presence in the territory of 15 operational<br />

battalions, and the rigorously carried<br />

out control by the military are, in<br />

themselves, a reflection of the evolution of<br />

the conflict. Osorio was merely playing the<br />

role of accomplice to the genocide, while a<br />

persistent defender of annexation and, above<br />

all, an acolyte of the hard line. We do admit<br />

our weakness in the military operations<br />

theatre. But the popular support behind<br />

independence, sets the dominant tone in the<br />

political situation of this occupied <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>. Proof of this is the very location of<br />

Xanana’s capture, i.e. Dili itself. Further<br />

evidence is the vast array of <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />

names contained in a list that surfaced<br />

following the arrest of Xanana. Another fact<br />

is the arrest in Dili in January 1992 of Mau-<br />

Hodu (José da Costa). This situation affirms<br />

that, if the occupiers violence is at its most,<br />

then <strong>Timor</strong>ese nationalism is invincible. In<br />

other words, the tree of Our Country’s<br />

Liberation continues to push out its roots<br />

through to succeeding generations. On the<br />

other hand, the no-boundary solidarity with<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>, for peace, is noticeable. I remind<br />

Paul Moore, lobby Bill Clinton. Other<br />

personalities have appeared on the scene<br />

from, e.g. the Anglican Church, South Africa<br />

and Northern Ireland. Portugal has,<br />

therefore, widened its support base for the<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese cause. So peace is possible,<br />

because the annihilation of the Resistance is<br />

a complex matter.<br />

I will finish here. I am sure that you four<br />

will understand the need to make public our<br />

(the CNRM’s) thinking, contained in the 20<br />

November Declaration and in the attached<br />

communiqué. In the name of the fighters for<br />

the Maubere People’s Country, I take your<br />

stay here as a clear gesture of solidarity with<br />

Xanana, of which we are proud. Our best<br />

wishes accompany this letter.<br />

With the greatest respect,<br />

Ma’hunu Bulerek Karathayano (Bukar).<br />

In the CNRM and CDF communiqué,<br />

Ma’hunu analyses Xanana’s trial and the<br />

statement made by the “eloquent Abilio<br />

Osorio Soares before foreign journalists, e.g.<br />

Portuguese.” Abilio promised Ma’Hunu’s<br />

surrender within two months, and his reply<br />

was not long in coming: “No surrender! We<br />

reject surrender because it is the language of<br />

the hard, militarist line, which Abilio Osorio<br />

upholds by maintaining the presence of the<br />

occupying troops in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. Talks, yes!<br />

This we do support because we fight for<br />

peace for <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and its people.” The<br />

communiqué adds that the referendum for<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> “should result from the<br />

indispensable involvement of <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />

representatives in the talks without preconditions,<br />

sponsored by the UN.”<br />

Regarding the trial of Xanana Gusmão, the<br />

Resistance “demands Jakarta to immediately<br />

and unconditionally release the prisoner of<br />

war,” appeals for Boutros Ghali’s<br />

intervention in order to secure protection for<br />

Xanana by “legal, diplomatic and moral<br />

means,” and “again reaffirms its recognition<br />

of Ray Kala Xanana Gusmão as the symbol<br />

of <strong>Timor</strong>ese Resistance, his functions as<br />

Resistance Leader and Falintil Commander<br />

being frozen.” The Resistance “reaffirms its<br />

wholehearted support for the administrating<br />

power’s position in favour of peace and the<br />

heroic Maubere People’s right to selfdetermination.”<br />

NEW BAR ON EAST<br />

TIMORESE GOING<br />

OVERSEAS?<br />

UPI, Jakarta, Feb. 23 - Young people in<br />

the troubled province of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> will not<br />

be sent overseas for study or sporting<br />

events because of earlier defections by<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese youths, a newspaper reported<br />

Tuesday.<br />

The Media Indonesia newspaper said Tri<br />

Swartana, chief youth and sports official in<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, told reporters there were no<br />

plans to allow <strong>Timor</strong>ese youths to go<br />

abroad.<br />

Swartana was quoted as saying the move<br />

was made to avoid defections by <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese youths because it would “bring a<br />

bad image to the country.”<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, 1,500 miles east of Jakarta,<br />

is a former Portuguese colony annexed by<br />

Indonesia soon after Lisbon ended its colonial<br />

rule in 1975. The United Nations still<br />

does not recognize Indonesia’s sovereignty<br />

over the territory of 750,000 people.<br />

Indonesia suffered a major diplomatic<br />

setback when government troops opened<br />

fire on unarmed demonstrators in <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> Nov. 12, 1991, killing at least 50<br />

people by official count. Another 66 people<br />

remain unaccounted for following the incident,<br />

which brought widespread international<br />

criticism of the Jakarta government.<br />

In 1991, four <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese soccer players<br />

defected from an Indonesian-sponsored<br />

soccer team visiting Darwin, Australia and<br />

sought political asylum through the<br />

Portuguese embassy in Canberra.<br />

Two more <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese youths defected<br />

to Canada in 1992 during a student<br />

exchange program, Swartanta said.<br />

The defecting <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese soccer<br />

players said at the time they faced retribution<br />

by Indonesia’s security forces if they<br />

returned to <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> due to their political<br />

involvement.<br />

LIKE IT OR QUIT TIMOR,<br />

GOVERNOR TELLS PRIESTS<br />

The Age (Melbourne) 23 Feb. <strong>93</strong> Dateline:<br />

Dili, <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Byline: Lindsay Murdoch<br />

unabridged<br />

The <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Governor, Mr. Abilio<br />

Soares, has bluntly told Roman Catholic<br />

priests in the former Portuguese colony to<br />

leave if they opposed Indonesian policies.<br />

Speaking in Dili, the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> capital,<br />

Mr. Soares said he would not resign or listen<br />

to complaints from church leaders such as<br />

Bishop Carlos Belo, who claimed in an<br />

interview last week that <strong>Timor</strong>ese were been<br />

tortured and force succumb to the<br />

Indonesia’s integration of the territory.<br />

“If Bishop Belo thinks integration is<br />

being forced on the people, it is his opinion<br />

but not my opinion. If somebody does not<br />

agree with us they should go,” said Mr.<br />

Soares, who was appointed Governor by<br />

Jakarta last year.<br />

Bishop Belo, head of the Church in <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>, said last week that Indonesian<br />

military was using “psychological torture”<br />

to force people to abandon support for the<br />

Resistance group Fretilin and agree with<br />

Indonesia’s integration.<br />

The methods used included forcing<br />

people to drink animals’ blood, a version of<br />

a traditional <strong>Timor</strong>ese peace pact among<br />

tribal leaders, he said.<br />

More than 90% of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>’s 100,000<br />

people are Catholic.<br />

In an interview this weekend, Mr. Soares<br />

denied that there was disharmony between<br />

the Church and the other two pillars of <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>, the military and the provincial<br />

government.<br />

“If the are some persons in the church<br />

who what they like we cannot categorize<br />

them as the Church as a whole,” Mr. Soares<br />

said.<br />

“You cannot say the Church is against or<br />

protesting because of the statements of the<br />

priests. The Church is made of both the<br />

congregation and priests.”<br />

Mr. Soares is a long time supporter of<br />

Indonesia’s 1976 annexation of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

One of his brothers was killed by Fretilin in<br />

the late 1970s.<br />

Mr. Soares said Fretilin was now a spent<br />

force with only 60 armed men left in the<br />

jungle. He strongly defended the presence in<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> of 10 Indonesian military<br />

battalions, saying they were necessary for<br />

the province’s development (sic).


Page 34 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

Mr. Soares said the military had informed<br />

him it intended to reduce its troop strength<br />

in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> beginning in March. But he<br />

said he would prefer that the troops remain<br />

to assist in projects such as irrigation and<br />

housing, particularly in remote areas.<br />

“I don’t know how many troops will<br />

leave,” he said.<br />

Bishop Belo said last week that troop<br />

withdrawals should be the first confidencebuilding<br />

measure to allow <strong>Timor</strong>ese to feel<br />

free of repression.<br />

Mr. Soares, asked if he would like to see<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> get some sort of autonomy, said<br />

“I have no problem with the present conditions...<br />

(but) if we think we would like to<br />

ask for further autonomy I don’t have to let<br />

anybody know. It is our right to discuss<br />

autonomy with the Indonesian<br />

Government.”<br />

Some western diplomats have speculated<br />

that Jakarta is considering limited autonomy<br />

for <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> as part of a settlement that<br />

would remove the question from the United<br />

Nations agenda. The UN does not recognise<br />

Indonesia’s sovereignty of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

Mr. Soares said that if arrested the<br />

Fretilin leader, Mr. José “Xanana” Gusmão<br />

now on trial in Dili, was sentenced to death,<br />

the penalty should carried out. But he said<br />

he did not think the court would impose the<br />

sentenced as Mr. Gusmão was charged with<br />

rebellion not subversion.<br />

Mr. Gusmão’s trial is scheduled to resume<br />

tomorrow.<br />

The Sydney Morning Herald also carried a<br />

shorter version of the story.<br />

AUSTRALIAN INVESTS IN DILI<br />

GARMENT BUSINESS<br />

Jakarta Post 23 February 19<strong>93</strong> unabridged<br />

An Australian investor, attracted by <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>’s cheap labour costs, has agreed to<br />

establish a business cooperation with a<br />

garment company in Dili.<br />

Between 1,000 and 1,500 local people<br />

will be recruited for the project which is<br />

scheduled to start next month, director of<br />

CV Tira Octora, Fatmawati Sultan told<br />

journalists.<br />

This will be the first Australian investment<br />

in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

She said her Australian business partner<br />

had stopped his business in Australia because<br />

he could not afford the high labour<br />

costs. He had to pay each worker the<br />

equivalent of Rp10,000 (US$4.80) per hour<br />

in his country she said<br />

She refused to say how much the <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese workers to be deployed would<br />

receive but she said the average minimum<br />

daily labour cost in Indonesia is about<br />

Rp2,500 (US$1.2).<br />

Fatmawati said that she was arranging her<br />

visa to enter Australia . She said a visit to<br />

the site could allow her to see her partner’s<br />

machines which would later be sent to Dili<br />

after the cooperation accord was signed.<br />

More than 50 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese had been<br />

trained to operate the sewing machines but<br />

the project needs more skilled workers who<br />

cannot be found in the province, she said.<br />

Consequently she would have to bring<br />

skilled workers from outside <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

she said her partner would send designs.<br />

Fatmawati said that the economic cooperation<br />

was sponsored by a minister of the<br />

Northern territory who had visited her stand<br />

in an exhibition in the south Sulawesi capital<br />

of Ujung Pandang recently. The minister<br />

was interested in her work and had invited<br />

her to visit Darwin she said .<br />

Manuel Carrascalao head of the provincial<br />

chamber of industry and commerce, said<br />

on a separate occasion that the government<br />

encouraged local business men to cultivate<br />

economic cooperation with ones from<br />

Australia.<br />

“If the government does not support<br />

such cooperation, the businessmen will<br />

never be able to invest in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

EAST TIMOR’S CATHOLIC<br />

PRIEST AGAIN DENOUNCES<br />

ABUSES<br />

Press release from CNRM at the<br />

Commission on Human Rights in Geneva, 1<br />

March 19<strong>93</strong><br />

Bishop Carlos Ximenes Belo, head of the<br />

Catholic church of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, told Radio<br />

Australia on 28 February 19<strong>93</strong> of his anger<br />

over public ceremonies where <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />

are forced to renounce past links with the<br />

Independence movement. He repeated<br />

earlier charges that human rights continue to<br />

be abused in the former Portuguese colony.<br />

Radio Australia’s Ian MacIntosh in Dili<br />

quoted the Bishop as saying it was the<br />

church’s moral and spiritual duty to speak<br />

out against human rights abuse and injustice.<br />

At the ceremonies to which Bishop Belo<br />

was referring, <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese are required to<br />

drink chicken or animal blood mixed with<br />

wine, then sign an oath of allegiance. The<br />

Indonesian authorities say it is a traditional<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese oath of peace. The Bishop said<br />

such ceremonies have taken place in all the<br />

districts of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

“For me and for us from the church, this<br />

is a form of pressure on the people, forcing<br />

them to say what they don’t want to say.”<br />

He also told Radio Australia that beatings<br />

and torture were continuing. The church has<br />

collected data and he would soon write to<br />

the UN if the abuses continue.<br />

The Bishop offered his own solution to<br />

break out of the pattern of violence that has<br />

plagued the territory for so long. “Give the<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese some kind of autonomy. In<br />

Indonesia they don’t like to talk about this<br />

but we must try to find a solution,” he said.<br />

Asked whether political events in Jakarta<br />

this month - when Suharto will be<br />

appointed president for a sixth term on 10<br />

March -would provide impetus for change,<br />

the Bishop sounded pessimistic. He said<br />

that he held his present post for ten years<br />

during which time nothing had changed.<br />

RESISTANCE GROUP<br />

DENOUNCES INDONESIAN<br />

ATROCITIES<br />

by victor ego ducrot<br />

Geneva, Mar. 4 (IPS) – Indonesian occupation<br />

forces have been forcing people in<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> to drink human blood in a pledge<br />

of allegiance to the Jakarta regime, a<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese resistance group told the United<br />

Nations Thursday.<br />

The blood pledge is an ancient religious<br />

rite which had long fallen into disuse in the<br />

region. the vast majority of the Maubere<br />

(<strong>Timor</strong>ese) are Catholics.<br />

The charge made by the Maubere<br />

National Resistance Council (CNRM) was<br />

substantiated by a video cassette shown<br />

here by the Portuguese delegation at the UN<br />

Human Rights Commission.<br />

The video, produced by the Indonesians<br />

themselves, showed people being forced to<br />

have their blood extracted.<br />

The blood was blessed by the leader of<br />

an ancient religious cult before being emptied<br />

into a recipient where it was mixed with<br />

that of other persons and alcohol.<br />

The <strong>Timor</strong>ese were then forced to drink<br />

the mixture while an Indonesian official<br />

dressed in civilian clothing read a document<br />

stating that the act signified a pledge of<br />

loyalty to the Jakarta regime.<br />

José Ramos-Horta, the CNRM’s international<br />

representative, said that it was “a<br />

barbarous act through which the Indonesians<br />

are exposing the <strong>Timor</strong>ese to contagion by<br />

aids (acquired immune deficiency syndrome)<br />

and other infections.”<br />

“After seeing this, the international<br />

community can no longer have doubts about<br />

doing something against the systematic<br />

human rights violations which the<br />

Indonesian authorities are committing,”<br />

Ramos-Horta said Thursday.<br />

The CNRM is a political and military<br />

organization which groups all the forces<br />

fighting for the self-determination and independence<br />

for <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

Ramos-Horta said that the umbrella<br />

group was trying to get the international


<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 35<br />

community to condemn the “inhuman repression”<br />

perpetrated by the Indonesian<br />

regime against the Mauberes.<br />

The CNRM spokesman is participating<br />

in the 49th session of the UN Human Rights<br />

Commission, which ends on Mar. 12.<br />

He said the Council was trying to get the<br />

Commission to appoint a special rapporteur<br />

to investigate the human rights situation in<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

On Feb. 25, a former inmate of<br />

Indonesian jails, Domingos Seixas, explained<br />

to the commission the mechanisms used by<br />

Jakarta to repress the Maubere population.<br />

Seixas, who now lives in Portugal, revealed<br />

the cruelty to which political prisoners<br />

are subjected in Indonesian prisons and<br />

said that he and many others, who also testified<br />

before the United Nations, suffered<br />

reprisals and persecution.<br />

Ramos-Horta recalled that the international<br />

human rights organization, Amnesty<br />

International, had reported that the<br />

Indonesian forces killed 200,000 people in<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> between 1975, when they invaded<br />

the territory, and 1981.<br />

This represents “almost a third of the<br />

population of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>,” he said.<br />

According to a document distributed here<br />

by the CNRM, Indonesia has subjected the<br />

territory to a colonial and repressive regime<br />

since the 1975 invasion. Jakarta annexed it<br />

in 1976.<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> was colonized by the<br />

Portuguese 500 years ago and there is no<br />

historical element linking it to what is now<br />

the republic of Indonesia, the document<br />

stated.<br />

Portugal has expressed its support, at the<br />

United Nations, for the Mauberes’ call for<br />

self-determination and has repeatedly asked<br />

the international community to take steps to<br />

end the repression.<br />

PROPAGATION OF<br />

ISLAM IN DILI<br />

Jakarta Post, 13 March 19<strong>93</strong>. Brief news<br />

item, unabridged. Dateline: Dili<br />

For the first time in history, an exhibition<br />

of Islamic books is being held in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>,<br />

a predominantly Christian province (sic).<br />

The three-day exhibition, organised by<br />

the Agency for the Development of Library<br />

of Indonesian Mosques, in cooperation with<br />

the An-Nur mosque in Kampung Alor, Dili,<br />

was opened Thursday by the chairman of<br />

the An-Nur Foundation, Umar Balafif.<br />

He said that the exhibition which also<br />

features books on technology, was a new<br />

step in the propagation of Islam in <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>, especially in Dili, Antara news<br />

agency reported.<br />

INDONESIA TO CHANGE<br />

MILITARY ROLE IN EAST<br />

TIMOR<br />

(Reuters, DILI, <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, March 15)<br />

Indonesia is preparing to end its special<br />

military command in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and cut the<br />

number of troops in the Portuguese colony<br />

it invaded 17 years ago.<br />

<strong>East</strong> Indonesian military commander<br />

Major General Suwardi said on Monday<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> would soon change over to the<br />

ordinary military command used in the rest<br />

of the 16,000-island archipelago.<br />

“If things are okay we can soon break it<br />

(the special military command) up,” he told<br />

reporters after installing a new army commander<br />

in the local capital Dili.<br />

There will only be eight battalions by<br />

next month and six by October, from 10 at<br />

the end of last year, military sources in Dili<br />

said.<br />

A battalion has about 600 soldiers.<br />

Since the invasion of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and its<br />

subsequent annexation in 1976, Jakarta has<br />

faced constant international criticism of its<br />

human rights policy there.<br />

It has tried to win international approval<br />

of its rule, still unrecognized by the United<br />

Nations. But world opinion turned further<br />

against it after Indonesian troops killed up<br />

to 180 people in Dili by firing into a crowd<br />

of mourners on November 12, 1991.<br />

Jakarta says it is trying to develop the<br />

territory after centuries of Portuguese neglect<br />

and most <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese want to remain<br />

part of Indonesia.<br />

With the arrest late last year of the leader<br />

of the Fretilin rebel movement, diplomats<br />

said the military could no longer justify the<br />

large numbers of troops in the impoverished<br />

territory.<br />

Military commander Suwardi said a team<br />

of high ranking officers from Jakarta military<br />

headquarters were in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> to assess<br />

the situation.<br />

“None of the remaining soldiers will<br />

belong to combat battalions. They will be<br />

from territorial units,” an army officer said.<br />

The territorial troops are meant to help<br />

with civilian projects and efforts to develop<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>’s economy.<br />

MILITARY REDUCTION IN<br />

EAST TIMOR?<br />

Radio Australia, 2am news 17th March<br />

19<strong>93</strong> Dateline: Jakarta Unabridged<br />

The following is a partial transcript of news<br />

broadcast. Material dealing with the<br />

UNHRC resolution is elsewhere.<br />

READER: Indonesia has rejected United<br />

Nations criticism of its human rights record<br />

in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>... At the same time the military<br />

authorities in for former Portuguese<br />

colony has taken what they say is a step<br />

towards winding up the Special Operation<br />

Command responsible for armed forces activities<br />

there since 1989.<br />

IAN MacINTOSH:<br />

But the Indonesian press has all but ignored<br />

the Geneva vote and the authorities<br />

appeared to be pressing ahead with steps<br />

they believe offer proof that the situation in<br />

the trouble province in improving. Whilst<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>’s Roman Catholic Bishop<br />

Monsignor Carlos Belo and other sources<br />

have recently accused Jakarta of continuing<br />

human rights abuses, the Indonesian military<br />

says its began the process of reducing its<br />

command presence and the troops strength<br />

in the former Portuguese colony.<br />

I what might otherwise have been a routine<br />

event the local army commander just<br />

been rotated, with the officer-in-charge of<br />

the military region which includes <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>, major general Suwardi who attended<br />

the hand over ceremony saying preparations<br />

had began to wind up the special command<br />

in charge forces of operations in the<br />

province for the past 4 years.<br />

Officials says if things go smoothly and<br />

the security situation permits, that command,<br />

currently headed by Brigadier Theo<br />

Syafei should cease to function in coming<br />

weeks. And they say troop numbers are to<br />

be further reduced with 8 territorial and 2<br />

local battalions remaining by next month.<br />

That would amount to just over 6000<br />

troops. But western military analysts estimate<br />

that support personnel and other detachments<br />

still leave the total armed forces<br />

presence at closer to 12,000. Despite official<br />

claims that armed opposition to Indonesian<br />

rule in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> no longer represent a<br />

significant threat.<br />

TIMORESE REBEL<br />

SURRENDERS TO<br />

INDONESIAN MILITARY<br />

(Reuter, DILI, <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, March 18)<br />

Another <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese rebel has surrendered<br />

to Indonesian armed forces in the<br />

territory, military sources said on Thursday.<br />

Sebastião Mariano, 37, a member of the<br />

Fretilin guerrilla movement, gave himself up<br />

to the army in the village of Same on<br />

Wednesday.<br />

“He came to us with his rifle after<br />

roaming across hilly areas outside the capital<br />

Dili for some time,” an army officer said.<br />

The dwindling Fretilin group, which<br />

wants independence for the former<br />

Portuguese colony, has fought against<br />

Jakarta’s rule for the past 17 years.


Page 36 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

Indonesian troops invaded the territory<br />

in 1975 and annexed it the following year, a<br />

move not recognised by the United Nations.<br />

Fretilin’s top man Xanana Gusmão is<br />

currently on trial on charges of promoting<br />

separatism, which carries a maximum<br />

penalty of life imprisonment. Several other<br />

rebels surrendered following his capture last<br />

November.<br />

The government says Xanana’s movement<br />

masterminded events which led to an<br />

army massacre in Dili in November 1991.<br />

Witnesses said up to 180 people were<br />

killed when troops fired into a crowd<br />

mourning the earlier death of an independence<br />

sympathizer. Jakarta put the death toll<br />

at 50 and listed 66 as missing.<br />

FOUR INDONESIAN<br />

SOLDIERS KILLED BY<br />

“FRETILIN” (BBC)<br />

BBC 19 March 19<strong>93</strong> Language : Indonesian<br />

(abridged)<br />

The Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI)<br />

issued an statement saying that 4 Indonesian<br />

soldiers have been killed recently by Fretilin<br />

guerrillas in the area of Lospalos (eastern<br />

part of ET). General Edi Sudradjat, the<br />

Commander in Chief of the Armed<br />

Forces/Defence Minister reiterated that,<br />

despite this event, ABRI will proceed with<br />

the withdrawal of the special forces from<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> as planned.<br />

This seems to me a new move as opposed to<br />

the usually reserved attitude from the<br />

military regarding issuing information to the<br />

public about their casualties. Is this just a<br />

tactic in response to the recent UNHRC<br />

resolution? On the other hand, this might be<br />

just another pretext/tactic to justify the delay<br />

of the ‘planned withdrawal’ of their special<br />

forces. I still recall that they’ve been talking<br />

about this plan since last year.<br />

– John MacD.<br />

REUTERS REPORT<br />

(Reuters, Jakarta, March 19) <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese rebels killed four people including<br />

two soldiers in an attack in the former<br />

Portuguese colony, Indonesia’s Antara news<br />

agency reported on Friday.<br />

It quoted the military as saying the other<br />

two victims of Wednesday’s attack were<br />

students doing field work in Los Palos,<br />

about 200 km (120 miles) east of the<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese capital of Dili.<br />

The rebels of Fretilin, which wants to set<br />

up an independent <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, have fought<br />

Jakarta’s rule for the past 17 years.<br />

Indonesian troops invaded the territory<br />

in 1975 after the departure of its colonial<br />

rulers and annexed it the following year, a<br />

move not recognised by the United Nations.<br />

AFP: TROOPS KILLED IN<br />

GUERRILLA AMBUSH<br />

Comment: Note that the Xanana Gusmão<br />

trial originally scheduled to end on 20<br />

March is now likely to drag for at least<br />

another month. Hearings are now taking<br />

place only once a week, making it obvious<br />

that the authorities do not want it to end<br />

before the next round of talks between<br />

Indonesia and Portugal scheduled to take<br />

place in Rome on 20 April.<br />

It is very likely that Indonesian casualties<br />

were higher than acknowledged in this<br />

report. – TAPOL<br />

According to an AFP report from Jakarta<br />

on 19 March 19<strong>93</strong>, two Indonesian soldiers<br />

and two students were killed in an ambush<br />

by <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese guerrillas in Los Palos on<br />

Wednesday. An army spokesman, Lt.<br />

Colonel Panggih, described the two students<br />

as being from a group carrying out field<br />

work but AFP said that according to sources<br />

in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, the students, both from Java,<br />

were members of a student regiment. The<br />

army did not disclose the size of the group<br />

that mounted the ambush.<br />

Armed forces commander-in-chief<br />

General Edi Sudradjat said that the ambush<br />

would not alter plans to disband the special<br />

military command, Kolakops, in <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>. He declined to say when this would<br />

happen but said it would not be before the<br />

trial of Xanana Gusmão has ended. The trial<br />

is expected to end in late April at the<br />

earliest.<br />

CNRM: NINE SOLDIERS KILLED IN<br />

LOS PALOS<br />

News from protected sources inside <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>, April 3.<br />

On March 29, 19<strong>93</strong>, guerrillas killed nine<br />

Indonesian soldiers in Los Palos, cutting<br />

their throats with knives in a nighttime<br />

ambush. No guerrillas were killed. The<br />

soldiers’ weapons were taken to the jungle<br />

by the guerrillas.<br />

The administrator in Los Palos, José<br />

Valente, mentioned the incident in the<br />

Indonesian newspaper, but he denied that<br />

people were killed.<br />

EDI: TROOPS KILLED WON’T<br />

DELAY WITHDRAWAL<br />

By Ian MacIntosh, International Report,<br />

Radio Australia, Monday 22 March 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

ANNOUNCER: The head of Indonesia’s<br />

armed forces believes last week’s attack on<br />

troops stationed in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> will not affect<br />

the government’s plans to disband its<br />

Special Command in the province.<br />

General Edi Sudradjat was speaking after<br />

being sworn-in to serve concurrently as<br />

Defence Minister in Indonesia’s new<br />

Cabinet.<br />

Ian MacIntosh reports from Jakarta ...<br />

MACINTOSH: Talking to reporters<br />

after his swearing-in by President Suharto,<br />

General Edi said the attack near the town of<br />

Los Palos in the eastern part of the Province<br />

on Wednesday night, would not change<br />

Jakarta’s plan to reduce <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>’s<br />

special operational command. He said the<br />

incident was not a serious one.<br />

He reiterated recent military claims that<br />

the pro- independence movement - Fretilin -<br />

no longer pose a serious threat and that the<br />

security situation in the former Portuguese<br />

colony was stable.<br />

But it is known that small groups of<br />

armed rebels are still operating from <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>’s forest and mountains. The Los<br />

Palos attack appears to confirm this belief.<br />

Earlier, a military spokesman reported<br />

that two soldiers and two university students<br />

were shot dead. They appeared to<br />

have been attacked, near the town, by what<br />

was described as elements of the pro-independence<br />

rebel movement.<br />

A spokesman said the students who were<br />

named were from Java and had been<br />

involved in field work in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. The<br />

dead soldiers were not identified.<br />

According to reliable local sources, the<br />

four were killed when a van in which they<br />

were travelling was ambushed soon after<br />

they left evening prayers at a local mosque.<br />

And the sources had a different description<br />

of the dead students, some claiming they<br />

were members of a university military<br />

training corp.<br />

The release of the armed forces statement<br />

just 24 hours after the attack contrasted<br />

with the time it normally takes for the<br />

Indonesian military to confirm such incidents.<br />

That prompted some speculation that the<br />

latest bloodshed might affect the proposed<br />

downgrading of the military command to the<br />

size of a normal provincial military<br />

administration.<br />

But General Edi’s subsequent remarks<br />

prove otherwise.<br />

The Armed forces commander and<br />

Defence Minister did not say when the<br />

command which begun in 1989, was to be<br />

disbanded. However, he indicated it would<br />

happen after the current trial of the <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese independent leader, Xanana<br />

Gusmão.<br />

For many months now, Indonesian officials<br />

have also been foreshadowing a reduction<br />

in troop numbers as part of the<br />

plan. However, General Edi made no mention<br />

of the pullout when he made his comments.


<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 37<br />

Earlier last week, some officials had said<br />

the number of battalion stationed in <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> would be reduced to eight with two<br />

local battalions, next month. That would<br />

amount to just over 6,000 troops.<br />

However, military analysts estimate that<br />

with support personnel and other security<br />

detachments in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, the total armed<br />

forces present would still be in the order of<br />

10 to 12,000.<br />

CNRM COMMUNIQUÉ ON<br />

XANANA, OSORIO<br />

March 21, 19<strong>93</strong>. Translated from<br />

Portuguese; unabridged<br />

Communiqué from the Maubere Resistance<br />

National Council (CNRM), Fretilin Directive<br />

Commission (CDF):<br />

“The CNRM, based in the mountains of<br />

occupied <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, wishes to make public<br />

its position vis-a-vis the most recent developments<br />

concerning two questions:<br />

firstly, the trial of our companion Kay Rala<br />

Xanana Gusmão at the hands of Indonesian<br />

justice; secondly, the statement made by the<br />

eloquent Abilio Osorio Soares to foreign<br />

journalists, including, e.g., Portuguese.<br />

With regards the Xanana Gusmão case,<br />

the CNRM rejects any kind of proceedings<br />

by the judiciary of our Motherland’s occupier<br />

against prisoner of war Xanana<br />

Gusmão. Furthermore, it considers the argumentation,<br />

on which it intends to base the<br />

accusations against Xanana Gusmão, to be<br />

totally lacking in legal substance.<br />

The basis of the CNRM’s position is<br />

derived from the fact that the subject of <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>, in which Xanana Gusmão’s case is<br />

interwoven, is an international question,<br />

because of:<br />

l. the UN’s recognition of the <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />

People’s right to self-determination and<br />

independence;<br />

2. From Portugal’s internationally recognised<br />

legal/political position, as administrating<br />

power, it should be reiterated<br />

that:<br />

a) it maintains the <strong>Timor</strong>ese question<br />

under the protection of the UN Charter,<br />

b) it reaffirms its position on the decolonisation<br />

process of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, so<br />

brutally interrupted by the 1975<br />

Indonesian invasion, while endeavoring in<br />

every way to achieve for the <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />

People the free exercise of their right to<br />

self-determination and independence, in<br />

accordance with the Constitution of the<br />

Portuguese Republic.<br />

3. Xanana Gusmão’s trial is implicated in<br />

the legitimate <strong>Timor</strong>ese cause, to which<br />

the positions taken by certain wellknown<br />

people with responsibilities connected<br />

to the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> problem bear<br />

witness:<br />

a) Portugal’s Head of State, Dr. Mario<br />

Soares, demanding that Jakarta immediately<br />

and unconditionally release the <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />

Resistance leader Kay Rala Xanana<br />

Gusmão;<br />

b) UN Secretary General Dr. Boutros<br />

Boutros Ghali advocating the involvement<br />

of the man, now a prisoner, incommunicado,<br />

in the hands of the Indonesian military, in<br />

the talks aimed at finding an internationally<br />

acceptable solution to the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

problem.<br />

We have, therefore, strong evidence<br />

which questions the legitimacy of the<br />

Xanana Gusmão case, and makes both the<br />

prisoner’s trial and Indonesia’s argumentation<br />

void of any juridical value, as for example,<br />

the charge of “rebellion,” as one of<br />

the pillars supporting the accusations<br />

against Xanana Gusmão.<br />

It is from within this framework, therefore,<br />

that the CNRM drew its position:<br />

1. It demands the immediate and unconditional<br />

release of the prisoner of war,<br />

symbol of <strong>Timor</strong>ese Resistance, our companion<br />

and dear brother Kay Rala Xanana<br />

Gusmão.<br />

2. It appeals to the UN Secretary General<br />

to use his good offices to secure the<br />

protection of Xanana Gusmão by legal,<br />

diplomatic and moral means.<br />

3. It reaffirms its recognition of Kay Rala<br />

Xanana Gusmão as the symbol of the<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese Resistance, his functions as Head<br />

of the Resistance and Commander of the<br />

Falintil being frozen.<br />

4. It reaffirms that it fully supports the<br />

administrative power’s positions in favour<br />

of peace and the right to self-determination<br />

for the Heroic Maubere People.<br />

So, in answer to Abilio Osorio:<br />

1. No surrender! We reject surrender because<br />

that is the language of the hard-line,<br />

the militarist line, which Abilio Osorio corroborates<br />

by maintaining the presence of the<br />

occupier’s troops in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

2. Talks, yes! This we do affirm, because<br />

we are fighting for peace for <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and<br />

its People.<br />

We reaffirm, therefore, our backing for<br />

the demands of the administrating power’s<br />

government (Portugal):<br />

A REFERENDUM for <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>,<br />

which should result from the involvement of<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese representatives in the UN<br />

sponsored talks without pre-conditions. In<br />

this way, a fair and lasting peace can be<br />

achieved, in the Motherland of all <strong>Timor</strong>ese.<br />

Motherland or Death! The fight continues<br />

on all fronts!<br />

Headquarters of the Maubere Resistance<br />

National Council, in this 18th year of<br />

struggle against Indonesian occupation for a<br />

free and independent <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

CNRM<br />

(Ma’Hunu’s signature)<br />

Ma’hunu Bulerek Karathayano (Bukar)<br />

Secretary-CDF”<br />

MORE INDONESIAN DEAT HS<br />

IN TIMOR<br />

BBC, March 29<br />

Comment: It marks a new phase when<br />

reports of Indonesian casualties are coming<br />

from Indonesian sources, not the guerrillas.<br />

For reasons not unrelated presumably to<br />

their case for a continued presence in <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>, the army has reversed its tactics<br />

about admission of casualties in the war.<br />

According to the BBC’s Adam Brooks<br />

filing from Jakarta, military sources in<br />

Jakarta say that six soldiers serving in <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> are missing, feared dead, after an<br />

ambush by pro- independence guerrillas last<br />

week. The attack took place near Iliomar<br />

and indicates that armed resistance is<br />

continuing despite army statements that the<br />

guerrillas no longer pose a threat to security.<br />

While there has been no official confirmation<br />

of the report, senior military sources<br />

in Jakarta are quoted as saying the attack<br />

occurred early on 22 March, when a squad<br />

of nine soldiers was ambushed outside<br />

Iliomar. [Iliomar is on the south coast, some<br />

fifty kms south-west by road from<br />

Lospalos.] Three survived the attack while<br />

the other six are missing, feared dead.<br />

Another report of the same incident<br />

claims that the nine soldiers were all stabbed<br />

to death while they were sleeping and that<br />

eight weapons were seized by the guerrillas<br />

during the attack. A local district chief,<br />

named Maukoni, was mentioned as the<br />

source of the report.<br />

This comes little more than a week after<br />

the Indonesian army confirmed that four of<br />

their men were killed when their truck was<br />

ambushed near Lospalos.<br />

NEW TORTURE CHARGED<br />

AGAINST INDONESIA<br />

Letter to New York Times; March 31, 19<strong>93</strong><br />

To the Editor:<br />

“Indonesia, Deservedly Rebuked”<br />

(Topics of The Times, March 17) commends<br />

the Clinton Administration’s policy<br />

change on the situation in the former<br />

Portuguese colony <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. The<br />

Administration, unlike its predecessor,<br />

supported a resolution at the United<br />

Nations Human Rights Commission in<br />

Geneva expressing “deep concern” over<br />

human rights abuses in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.


Page 38 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

You note that the resolution “asks<br />

Indonesia to cooperate (which Jakarta says<br />

it will) with a U.N. inquiry into charges of<br />

torture and secret executions on the island,”<br />

which is occupied by Indonesia. Such<br />

cooperation could not be more timely, but<br />

much more is needed. I have received<br />

information from authoritative sources with<br />

whom I made acquaintance when I visited<br />

the region in late 1989 that indicate severe<br />

abuse of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>’s resistance leader<br />

Xanana Gusmão, who was captured by<br />

Indonesian forces last November and is on<br />

trial for political offenses.<br />

There had been charges of torture and<br />

coercion of Mr. Gusmão, with the<br />

Indonesians having members of his family at<br />

their mercy. Now, my source say, “the<br />

Indonesians are trying to break down<br />

Gusmão, to the point of his losing his<br />

mind.” Last month, the Roman Catholic<br />

Bishop of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, Carlos Ximenes<br />

Belo, stated that people arrested in the wake<br />

of Mr. Gusmão’s capture were being<br />

subjected to “all types of torture.” This, and<br />

the situation of Mr. Gusmão, should be high<br />

on the agenda of the Clinton Administration<br />

and the United Nations as they pursue the<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> matter with Indonesia.<br />

(Rev.) Paul Moore Jr. New York,<br />

March 24, l9<strong>93</strong><br />

The writer was Episcopal Bishop of<br />

New York, 1972-89.<br />

SYAFEI BECOMES UDAYANA<br />

COMMANDER<br />

Sources: UPI, Jakarta, 31 March 19<strong>93</strong> and<br />

Suara Pembaruan, Dili, 16 March 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

Summarised only.<br />

Brig. General Theo Syafei was today<br />

installed as commander of the Udayana regional<br />

military command based in Bali. This<br />

command covers <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

Syafei has been commander of Kolakops<br />

in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> since the month after the Dili<br />

massacre of 12 November 1991. Shortly<br />

before Syafei’s promotion to become regional<br />

military commander, the commandership<br />

of the Wira Dharma sub-regional<br />

command, 164/Korem in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>,<br />

changed hands from Colonel Dunija to<br />

Colonel Suntoro. This is reportedly in<br />

preparation for the dissolution of Kolakops,<br />

the special army command in control of <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

At the installation ceremony in Dili of<br />

the new Korem commander, Theo Syafei’s<br />

predecessor as commander in Bali, Major-<br />

General Suwardi, said that Kolakops is<br />

likely to be disbanded after the end of the<br />

Xanana Gusmão trial.<br />

General Edi Sudradjat who was is Bali to<br />

install Syafei in his new post also said that<br />

Lieut. General Wismoyo Arismundar,<br />

brother-in-law of President Suharto, will<br />

shortly be appointed chief-of-staff of the<br />

army, currently still being held by General<br />

Edi himself.<br />

DEMONSTRATION PLANNED<br />

IN DILI?<br />

Portugal’s independent TV station, SIC-<br />

TV, announced last night (April 6) that<br />

young <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese were planning to hold<br />

a demonstration outside the Bishop’s residence<br />

this morning, Wednesday, when UN<br />

envoy Amos Wako was scheduled to visit<br />

the Bishop. We have been informed that SIC<br />

broadcast the voice of someone in Dili<br />

expressing their determination to hold the<br />

demonstration.<br />

It is disturbing to see that such an event,<br />

if indeed it was planned, should have been<br />

made public in such a way unless those in<br />

charge felt that giving it publicity might<br />

provide protection for the demonstrators.<br />

No news has yet been received that any<br />

demonstration actually took place.<br />

Other reports about the Wako visit say<br />

that he met Xanana Gusmão and Mau Hunu<br />

in Dili. We have also heard that he asked to<br />

meet Saturnino da Costa Belo (who shouted<br />

slogans of defiance in the Xanana trial courtroom<br />

on 4 March) but there is no news that<br />

Wako did actually meet him.<br />

TAPOL<br />

YOUNG PEOPLE<br />

DEMONSTRATE IN DILI<br />

Publico 7 April 19<strong>93</strong> Dateline : Lisbon<br />

Translated from Portuguese unabridged<br />

According to a (Portuguese) independent<br />

TV channel (SIC) evening news program,<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese Resistance sources reported yesterday<br />

that young people held a demonstration<br />

that morning in the area around residence<br />

of Msgr. Ximenes Belo, Bishop of<br />

Dili. The protest was reportedly connected<br />

with the capture on Saturday by the<br />

Indonesian authorities of Ma’hunu, Xanana<br />

Gusmão’s successor as leader of the armed<br />

Resistance. The same sources added that the<br />

young people are prepared for anything,<br />

even to die.<br />

ARMY CHANGES IN TIMOR<br />

TAPOL report, 7 April 19<strong>93</strong><br />

The following is based on several media<br />

reports, mainly Tempo April 3 19<strong>93</strong> and<br />

Jakarta Post April 1 19<strong>93</strong>. In the past few<br />

days a number of new army commanders<br />

have been appointed around the country,<br />

with special attention going to the changes in<br />

and around <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>:<br />

Particular attention is given to two<br />

changes in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. First is the appointment<br />

of Colonel Soentoro to replace<br />

Colonel Dunidja as commander of the <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> sub-regional command, Korem<br />

164/Wira Dharma. Prior to this appointment,<br />

Colonel Soentoro was intelligence<br />

assistant to the commander of the<br />

Udayana/IX regional military command<br />

based in Bali.<br />

The appointment of Col. Soentoro is<br />

consistently reported as being a step in the<br />

direction of the disbandment of Kolakops,<br />

the special military command in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

of which Brig-Gen. Theo Syafei has been<br />

commander since December 1991.<br />

In Bali, Brig. General Theo Syafei has<br />

meanwhile been appointed commander of<br />

the Udayana/IX regional military command,<br />

putting him in overall control of military<br />

operations in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> as this regional<br />

command covers <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. He has not<br />

handed over the commandership of<br />

Kolakops to anyone, meaning presumably<br />

that he will hang on to that post until its<br />

formal dissolution, when Colonel Soentoro<br />

will take full control in what some senior<br />

officers have referred to as a ‘Korem-plus’<br />

or beefed-up Korem as compared with korems<br />

elsewhere.<br />

Reporting these changes, Tempo of 3<br />

April 19<strong>93</strong> says of Theo Syafei that he has<br />

spent “most of his military career in <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>.”<br />

Jakarta Post of 1 April 19<strong>93</strong> quotes Theo<br />

Syafei, after his installation as Udayana<br />

chief, as saying the army will go ahead with<br />

its plan to dismantle its special operation<br />

[i.e. Kolakops] in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> despite the<br />

continued present of armed resistance there.<br />

He said that both “territorial and organic”<br />

forces would be pulled out of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

gradually.<br />

“By 1995 (sic) at the latest, all the affairs<br />

currently being handled by the military<br />

should already be transferred to the local<br />

government,” he said, after the installation<br />

ceremony.<br />

JP reports also that Theo retains his post<br />

as chief of the special operational command<br />

in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> to oversee the withdrawal of<br />

the combat troops which have been stationed<br />

there since 1976 (sic).


<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 39<br />

He said that there are 13 to 14 pockets of<br />

“security disturbing groups,” possessing<br />

104 weapons and spread out in five regencies<br />

but “militarily they are insignificant.”<br />

For more information about the precise<br />

nature of the army’s territorial operations in<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, as spelt out by Brig.Gen Theo<br />

Syafei himself, see “The true aim of<br />

territorial operations” in the latest issue of<br />

TAPOL Bulletin, No 116, April 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

MA’HUNU CAPTURED<br />

First reports, April 5<br />

According to ABC Radio National,<br />

broadcast just after 4PM Australian EST<br />

April 5, Indonesian forces captured Mau<br />

Hunu on Sunday.<br />

According to an AFP report from Jakarta<br />

which we have not yet seen ourselves, Mau<br />

Hunu was captured somewhere in the interior<br />

on Saturday evening 3 April. Portuguese<br />

radio this morning broadcast an interview<br />

with José Ramos-Horta in Sydney who<br />

confirmed the report, saying that Mau Hunu<br />

had been betrayed.<br />

(UPI, Jakarta, April 5) Veteran <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> resistance fighter Ma Hunu has been<br />

captured and is undergoing interrogation, a<br />

military spokesman in the troubled province<br />

said Monday.<br />

Hunu had taken over the leadership of<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>’s Fretilin guerrilla following the<br />

arrest late last year of the group’s leader,<br />

Xanana Gusmão.<br />

The 43-year-old Hunu was captured<br />

Saturday without resistance by Indonesian<br />

forces in a rural house with the help of local<br />

villagers, Maj. L. Simbolon said. The troops<br />

also seized a number of rifles and<br />

ammunition, he said.<br />

Hunu was being interrogated in <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> capital of Dili, Simbolon said.<br />

With the capture of Hunu - who is the<br />

son of a Portuguese and originally was<br />

named Antonio Gomes Da Costa -<br />

Indonesia marked a major success in its bid<br />

to quell the last remnants of the Fretilin<br />

guerrillas.<br />

Hunu reportedly was the last major<br />

Fretilin leader at large following the capture<br />

of top guerrilla leader Xanana in November.<br />

(Reuter, Sydney, April 5) <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />

rebels exiled in Australia, shocked by the<br />

capture of their second leader in five months<br />

by Indonesian forces, said on Monday the<br />

guerrillas had moved swiftly to find a<br />

replacement.<br />

Indonesian officials said on Monday that<br />

rebel Fretilin leader Antonio Gomes da<br />

Costa had been caught in a weekend raid of a<br />

safe house in Ainaro village, about 50 km<br />

(31 miles) south of Dili, <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>’s<br />

capital.<br />

Rebel sources said that after the capture<br />

of da Costa, known by his nom de guerre<br />

Ma’hunu, the top post had been taken over<br />

by second-ranking Konis Santana, a former<br />

student in his 30s who had joined Fretilin in<br />

1981.<br />

“While it may be terrible news, the imprisonment<br />

of another of our leaders is not<br />

going to see the resistance collapse,” said<br />

high-ranking Australian-based rebel official<br />

José Ramos Horta.<br />

Da Costa, 44, intensified the war after<br />

Gusmão’s capture. Rebels in January said<br />

they had killed at least 78 Indonesian soldiers<br />

and officers in six clashes between<br />

November 27 and December 23 last year.<br />

Da Costa’s capture was announced as<br />

Amos Wako, personal envoy of U.N.<br />

Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali,<br />

began a visit to Indonesia for a fact-finding<br />

mission on the shooting.<br />

The human rights group Amnesty<br />

International, expressing fears that Da Costa<br />

would be tortured, called on Jakarta to allow<br />

him immediate access to lawyers, his family<br />

and the International Committee of the Red<br />

Cross.<br />

“There are grave concerns given the past<br />

ill treatment of Fretilin prisoners,” said<br />

Amnesty’s Australian director Andre<br />

Frankovits.<br />

“It is our experience that the first 72<br />

hours of incommunicado detention are the<br />

most dangerous.”<br />

QUESTIONS SURROUND<br />

MA’HUNU CAPTURE<br />

‘PM’ ABC Radio (Australia) 5 April 19<strong>93</strong><br />

6pm. Jakarta correspondent Ian<br />

MacIntosh, Full transcript<br />

Ian MacIntosh:<br />

Ever since the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese independence<br />

leader XG was captured last<br />

November, Indonesian military officials<br />

have been insisting the network supporting<br />

Fretilin and other opponents of Jakarta’s<br />

rule in the province were severely weakened.<br />

In early February <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>’s civilian<br />

governor, Abilio Soares, boasted to<br />

Portuguese journalists that the authorities<br />

knew the whereabouts of Antonio Gomes<br />

da Costa, XG’s successor as Fretilin commander<br />

and predicted he’d surrender within<br />

two months. Last Saturday night, just two<br />

months later, the military says da Costa was<br />

captured alone in a hideout 55 km south of<br />

Dili after a tip-off from a local villager.<br />

Whilst the arrest of the man generally<br />

known by his nom de guerre, Ma’hunu, is<br />

yet to be independently confirmed, it<br />

appears to represent another serious blow<br />

to <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>’s independence movement.<br />

According to sources close to Fretilin,<br />

Ma’hunu had served with the group’s armed<br />

wing for much of the time since Indonesia<br />

annexed the territory 17 years ago. More<br />

recently he’d been XG’s deputy, and as<br />

such was fully versed in the rebels’<br />

strategies and policies. The sources indicate<br />

that when Mr. Gusmão shifted his attention<br />

to seeking support in the towns in recent<br />

years, Ma’hunu was effectively in charge of<br />

Fretilin’s armed operations in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>’s<br />

forests and mountains.<br />

But his reported capture has raised many<br />

questions, to which few answers have yet<br />

been provided. Colonel Suntoro, the military’s<br />

deputy commander in Dili, has<br />

claimed that Ma’hunu had been holed up in<br />

his hideout since January and was separated<br />

from his men. If that is the case it raises the<br />

question of whether XG’s successor was in<br />

effective command during a period when<br />

guerrillas carried out attacks on Indonesian<br />

troops which claimed the lives of at least<br />

eight soldiers. His reported arrest also<br />

comes at a time when <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> is back in<br />

the international spotlight. A personal<br />

envoy of UN Secretary General Dr. Boutros<br />

Ghali, on a return mission to Indonesia to<br />

further examine the human rights situation in<br />

the province, travelled to Dili to today for<br />

two days of talks there. The envoy, Amos<br />

Wako, is to report back to the secretary<br />

general before Dr. Boutros Ghali holds talks<br />

on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> later this month in Rome<br />

with the foreign ministers of Portugal and<br />

Indonesia. And as the interrogation was<br />

beginning in Dili of the man local officials<br />

say is Antonio Gomes da Costa, alias<br />

Ma’hunu, his predecessor, XG, was back in<br />

court for the 14th session of his trial on<br />

rebellion, conspiracy, separatist and<br />

firearms charges.<br />

ACTION ALERT TO PREVENT<br />

MA HUNU TORTURE<br />

April 5 19<strong>93</strong>. Case IDN/TIM 0504<strong>93</strong><br />

The International Secretariat of<br />

OMCT/SOS-Torture calls upon you to intervene<br />

on behalf of the following situation<br />

in Indonesia/<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

Brief description of the situation:<br />

According to information received from<br />

TAPOL, a member of our network, during<br />

the weekend the Indonesian Military arrested<br />

Mr. Antonio GOMES DA COSTA,<br />

44, (also known as Ma’hunu), the leader of<br />

the FRETILIN movement in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

Mr. DA COSTA, who assumed leadership<br />

of FRETILIN following the arrest of<br />

its leader Xanana GUSMÃO in November


Page 40 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

1992, was reportedly arrested in Ainaro<br />

Village, some 50km south of Dili, the capital<br />

of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, following a weekend raid on<br />

a safe house.<br />

Given that torture is regularly used<br />

against detainees, and particularly against<br />

members and suspected members of opposition<br />

groups, this arrest gives rise to<br />

genuine fears for the physical and psychological<br />

integrity of Mr. DA COSTA. In this<br />

context, it should be remembered that<br />

Xanana Gusmão, the jailed leader of<br />

FRETILIN, appeared on television shortly<br />

after his arrest bearing what some witnesses<br />

claimed to be signs of torture and illtreatment.<br />

The Indonesian authorities have accused<br />

FRETILIN of being behind the peaceful<br />

demonstration in November 1991, which<br />

ended in bloodshed when the Indonesian<br />

authorities opened fire on the demonstrators,<br />

killing some 180 and wounding many<br />

others. Following this massacre, the government<br />

jailed some civilians for up to 15<br />

years while those actually involved in the<br />

shooting received very lenient sentences.<br />

<strong>Action</strong> requested:<br />

Please write to the Indonesian authorities<br />

immediately demanding that they ensure the<br />

personal safety of Mr. Antonio GOMES<br />

DA COSTA at all times and guarantee his<br />

physical and psychological integrity and<br />

urge that his family and international<br />

observers have access to him.<br />

Insist that he be brought before a fair and<br />

impartial tribunal and that his procedural<br />

rights, including his right to legal counsel of<br />

his own choice, be guaranteed at all times in<br />

accordance with international standards.<br />

Demand that they ensure the respect for<br />

human rights and fundamental freedoms in<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> at all times in accordance with<br />

international standards.<br />

Please inform the authorities in your respective<br />

countries, the UN, the European<br />

Community and other inter-governmental<br />

and non- governmental organisations urging<br />

them to intervene both at the national and<br />

international levels so that appropriate<br />

measures are adopted to put an end to human<br />

rights violations in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and to<br />

ensure the respect for human rights and<br />

fundamental freedoms in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and<br />

Indonesia at all times. Urge them also to<br />

intervene in order to ensure that Mr.<br />

Antonio GOMES DA COSTA be brought<br />

before a fair and impartial tribunal and that<br />

his legal rights be guaranteed at all times.<br />

Addresses:<br />

President Suharto, Bina Graha, Jalan<br />

Veteran 17, Jakarta, Indonesia. Tlx 44469<br />

Attn. pres. Suharto and Tlx : 44283<br />

Let. Ismail Saleh, Minister of Justice,<br />

Jalan Rasuna Said, Kav 6-7, Kuningan,<br />

Kuningen, Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia. Tlx :<br />

44404 DITJENIM IA - Fax : 62 21 32 1625<br />

General Kunarto, Chief of the National<br />

Police, Kepala Kepolisian RI, Markas Besar<br />

Kepolisian RI JI, Trunojoyo 13, Kebayoran<br />

Baru, Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia.<br />

General Try Sutrisno, Commander of the<br />

Armed Forces, Markas Besar Abri,<br />

Cilangkap, <strong>East</strong> Jakarta, Indonesia. Fax : 62<br />

21 36 1471 / 62 21 37 8144 / 62 21 35 6404<br />

Ali Alatas, Minister of Foreign Affairs,<br />

Kementerian Luar Negeri, Jalan Tamam<br />

Pejambon 6, Jakarta, Indonesia. Tlx 44205<br />

His Excellency, The Ambassador of the<br />

Republic of Indonesia, 8 Darwin Ave.,<br />

Yarralumla (Ambassador to Australia)<br />

EAST TIMOR<br />

Abilio Osorio Soares, Governor of <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>, Gubernur KDH Tk.1 <strong>Timor</strong> Timur,<br />

Jalan Inpantal D. Hendrikue, Dili, <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong><br />

Brig. Gen. Theo Syafei, Military<br />

Commander for <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, Markas Besar<br />

Korem 164, Dili, <strong>Timor</strong> Timur, <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

Geneva, 5 April 19<strong>93</strong><br />

Please inform us of any action undertaken,<br />

(kindly quote the code number of our<br />

appeal in any related correspondence).<br />

STATEMENT BY JOSE<br />

RAMOS-HORTA<br />

From the Special Representative of the <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese Resistance abroad, in Sydney.<br />

Original document, 5 April 19<strong>93</strong><br />

News of the capture of Ma’hunu, the<br />

resistance leader of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> is now<br />

confirmed. As in the case of his predecessor,<br />

Xanana Gusmão, there are well-grounded<br />

fears that he will be tortured to extract<br />

confessions.<br />

“I call upon the Indonesian government<br />

to provide immediate, unrestricted access to<br />

Ma’hunu by independent international<br />

organisations,” Mr. Ramos-Horta said today.<br />

“Jakarta must abandon the show-trial<br />

methods they have been using to try to deal<br />

with the legitimate resistance of the <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese people.”<br />

As with the capture of Xanana,<br />

Ma’Hunu’s capture in no way diminishes<br />

the strength and determination of the<br />

Resistance. With serenity and determination<br />

the leadership of the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />

resistance, both inside and outside the<br />

country, will continue the struggle.<br />

On the diplomatic front, substantial gains<br />

have been made in spite of the capture of<br />

Xanana. The new arrest of another leader, if<br />

anything, will once again highlight the<br />

occupation and the need for a negotiated<br />

settlement of the conflict in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

Australia media inquiries for José Ramos-<br />

Horta: Margherita Tracanelli<br />

(02) 369 2676 (phone) (02) 389 2488<br />

(fax)<br />

FURTHER EXCERPTS FROM<br />

WIRES ON EAST TIMOR<br />

DEVELOPMENTS:<br />

UPI, Jakarta, April 5<br />

In Lisbon, Portuguese authorities and<br />

supporters of Hunu said his detention by<br />

Indonesian troops would not end unrest in<br />

the area.<br />

“The cause of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> is on-going,”<br />

said Portuguese President Mario Soares.<br />

“When a people is sacrificed and is brutally<br />

treated by a cruel dictatorship, the people<br />

always win out in the end.”<br />

Portuguese Foreign Minister José Durão<br />

Barroso said in Luxembourg Monday that<br />

Hunu’s arrest would not make negotiations<br />

any easier.<br />

“Things were already difficult, so obviously<br />

this arrest will not help. Certainly it<br />

will create a less favourable climate for<br />

talks,” he said.<br />

REACTIONS TO MA HUNU<br />

CAPTURE<br />

Publico 6 April 19<strong>93</strong> Dateline : Lisbon<br />

Translated from Portuguese unabridged<br />

Mario Soares (Portuguese President):<br />

“This is not the end of the Resistance<br />

and, essentially, it changes nothing, i.e. the<br />

fact that Indonesia is a dictatorship and does<br />

not respect human rights in the territory of<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. (...) Portugal should continue to<br />

defend the application of international<br />

resolutions with regards the condemnation<br />

of Indonesia’s behaviour.”<br />

Cavaco Silva (Prime Minister):<br />

“I hope this is not one more of<br />

Indonesia’s schemes, saying that on one side<br />

there are the politicians and diplomats and<br />

on the other there are the military.<br />

Something similar happened before the<br />

meeting in New York, with Xanana<br />

Gusmão’s arrest (...) That would not be<br />

good for the negotiations between Portugal<br />

and Indonesia.”<br />

Durão Barroso (Foreign Minister):<br />

“The news gives us no satisfaction, and<br />

just confirms that the situation in the territory<br />

gives rise to concern. (...) Any settlement<br />

for the question will be reached<br />

through diplomatic means and, therefore, the<br />

facts of the situation are unaltered by this<br />

arrest, just as it was by the arrest of Xanana<br />

Gusmão.”<br />

Adriano Moreira (Pres. Parliamentary<br />

Commission on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>):


<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 41<br />

“The arrest of Ma’hunu demonstrates<br />

that Indonesia is extremely active in eliminating<br />

the external signs of Resistance, because<br />

it links this outward show of reducing<br />

the Resistance to the international campaign<br />

to show that the population adheres to the<br />

invader, when there is no relationship<br />

between the two circumstances at all.”<br />

Ramos Horta (spokesman for Maubere<br />

Resistance National Council):<br />

“On the international front, the<br />

Resistance was unaffected by Xanana<br />

Gusmão’s arrest. Also, our diplomatic position<br />

was not affected. Therefore, neither<br />

will Ma’Hunu’s capture have a negative<br />

effect on our strategy. (...) Time, as well as<br />

international circumstances, are in our favour.”<br />

Mari Alkatiri (member of Fretilin’s exterior<br />

delegation):<br />

“The Indonesians were clearly in hot<br />

pursuit of Ma’hunu, especially bearing in<br />

mind the Amos Wako visit, but also on account<br />

of the forthcoming Rome negotiations.<br />

Nothing surprises me. The situation in <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> is quite difficult, and when there is a<br />

17-year long guerrilla war in such a small a<br />

territory, any commander is at risk of being<br />

captured.”<br />

Vicente Guterres (Political Commission<br />

President of the <strong>Timor</strong>ese Democratic<br />

Union - UDT):<br />

“What has happened highlights an<br />

enormous military pressure of the<br />

Indonesian Government, namely on the UN,<br />

Portugal, the Resistance, and the <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />

people.”<br />

Abilio Osorio (Governor of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>):<br />

“You can almost say that he surrendered,<br />

because he came and hid in a house among<br />

the people, right in the town, and then they<br />

sent for the troops to come. They went<br />

there and he surrendered.”<br />

Francisco Lopes da Cruz (Pres. Suharto’s<br />

special adviser on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>):<br />

“Going on information from the people,<br />

and with the cooperation of that same civilian<br />

population, the armed forces easily located<br />

the place where (Ma’hunu) was and,<br />

naturally, arrested him.”<br />

HARSH BLOW TO THE<br />

RESISTANCE<br />

Diario de Noticias 6 April 19<strong>93</strong> Dateline :<br />

Lisbon Byline : Antonio Sampaio and João<br />

Pedro Henriques Translated from<br />

Portuguese abridged<br />

The <strong>Timor</strong>ese Resistance suffered a<br />

further blow with the arrest of Xanana’s<br />

successor, Ma’hunu. <strong>Timor</strong>ese leaders<br />

abroad are pointing at the almost unheard of<br />

Konis Santana as the new leader. Again,<br />

Jakarta chose the eve of an Alatas-Barroso<br />

meeting to arrest the Resistance leader.<br />

Ma’hunu, Xanana’s successor in the<br />

leadership of <strong>Timor</strong>ese Resistance, was arrested<br />

on Saturday night in a house in<br />

Manufasi, Ainaro, 55 kilometres from Dili.<br />

He reportedly did not resist arrest, in spite<br />

of allegedly being in possession of a (USmade)<br />

M-16 machine gun and 60 rounds of<br />

ammunition. On Sunday he was taken to<br />

Dili.<br />

Yesterday, Mario Carrascalao, former<br />

Governor of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> (appointed by<br />

Jakarta), told the Diario de Noticias (DN)<br />

that Ma’hunu was informed on by a<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese, whose initials are said to be F.A.<br />

However, the betrayal scenario - similar<br />

to that of Xanana’s capture less than 5<br />

months ago - was denied by analysts of the<br />

situation in <strong>Timor</strong>, living in Australia.<br />

These same analysts, contacted by the<br />

DN, stated that Jakarta could be “selling”<br />

this version of events in order to refute any<br />

claim that information which led to<br />

Ma’Hunu’s detention was obtained through<br />

torture of <strong>Timor</strong>ese prisoners, while at the<br />

same time claiming to the world that the<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese people are behind Indonesia, and<br />

not behind self- determination or independence,<br />

- just 15 days before a new meeting<br />

between Lisbon’s and Jakarta’s diplomatic<br />

chiefs.<br />

According to Mario Carrascalao, it is<br />

unlikely that Ma’hunu (<strong>Timor</strong>ese name of<br />

Antonio João Gomes da Costa) would take<br />

part in the same kind of repentance ceremonies<br />

as Xanana. The newly arrested<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese leader “is a true man of arms,”<br />

contrary to Xanana, who is “much more sophisticated”<br />

and has “greater mental<br />

flexibility,” said the former Governor, who<br />

knows both men personally. “I do not believe<br />

that he will publicly show any repentance,”<br />

he pointed out.<br />

The news of Xanana’s successor’s arrest<br />

hit Australia’s <strong>Timor</strong>ese community like a<br />

bombshell, and there were some immediate<br />

reactions, especially since some of the main<br />

leaders of the Resistance abroad are living in<br />

Darwin and Sydney: Alfredo Borges<br />

Ferreira and Mari Alkatiri (both Fretilin), as<br />

well as José Ramos Horta (special representative<br />

of the CNRM).<br />

In the wake of the news, and after time<br />

for confirming the reports, emergency<br />

meetings were organised, and it was then<br />

that the name of Konis Santana was indicated<br />

as Ma’Hunu’s successor. Mario<br />

Carrascalao told the DN he did not know<br />

the new leader: “That must be his nom de<br />

guerre. The only Santana I met in <strong>Timor</strong> was<br />

a priest of Indian origin,” he added.<br />

Dead and Resisters:<br />

Among the over 60 founding members of<br />

Fretilin, the following are still alive: abroad -<br />

José Ramos Horta, Mari Alkatiri, José Luis<br />

Guterres, Antonio Araujo, Antonio<br />

Barbosa, Francisco Joaquim Babo; inside<br />

<strong>Timor</strong> there are still - Filomena Paixao de<br />

Jesus, Alarico Fernandes, Abel Ximenes,<br />

Mariano Bonapartes Soares and Octavio<br />

Araujo.<br />

Regarding those who have died, were<br />

imprisoned, or chose to go over to the<br />

Indonesian side: Xavier do Amaral, Alarico<br />

Fernandes, and Leopoldo, “betrayed” the<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese and embraced pro- integrationist<br />

ideas; Borja da Costa, shot on Dili’s quayside<br />

on 7 December 1975; Justino da Costa<br />

Mota, arrested in 1975, died later in Lisbon;<br />

Mariano Bonaparte Soares, arrested in 1975,<br />

released, later re-arrested, and still in prison;<br />

Joaquim Urbano Saldanha, Maria do Ceu<br />

Pereira and Afonso de Araujo, killed in<br />

1979; José Sirilo Nunes, killed in Viqueque<br />

during a surround- annihilate operation in<br />

1979; Afonso Redentor de Araujo, killed in<br />

1979 after being arrested earlier that same<br />

year; Nicolau Lobato, killed on 31 December<br />

1978; Eduardo dos Anjos, killed in action in<br />

1980; Juvenal Inacio, disappeared in 1988;<br />

Ma’hunu, arrested on 3 April 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

MA’HUNU CAPTURED IN<br />

BATTLE<br />

Seminario 8 April 19<strong>93</strong> Original language:<br />

Portuguese Storytype: abridged translation<br />

According to a report in Seminario, 8<br />

April 19<strong>93</strong>, Ma’hunu was captured after a<br />

violent clash between guerrillas and the<br />

army. The information comes from José<br />

Ramos Horta who was contacted in Sydney<br />

by Seminario. He explained that he had received<br />

information from the interior which<br />

spoke of confrontation between guerrillas<br />

and a military platoon. The capture occurred<br />

last Saturday in Manufahi in the region of<br />

Ainaro, 56 km to the south of Dili,<br />

following a betrayal by a local inhabitant<br />

named Fernando Araujo (a well-known<br />

collaborator with the Indonesians).<br />

According to Ramos Horta, Ma’hunu<br />

was together with 20 guerrillas. Following<br />

the betrayal, a platoon of 30-40 Indonesian<br />

soldiers surrounded the area and started<br />

firing. As a result, 7 guerrillas and 4 Indo<br />

soldiers were killed and Ma’hunu was<br />

captured.<br />

Two months ago Abilio Osorio Soares<br />

told Portuguese journalists visiting the<br />

territory that Ma’hunu would be captured<br />

in 2 months time: he said he would surrender.<br />

No successor to Ma’hunu has yet been<br />

designated. Mari Alkatiri, a Fretilin leader,<br />

told Seminario that there were 3 candidates,


Page 42 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

Konis Santana, Lu-Ulo, acting Secretary<br />

General of the Fretilin Committee, and Ru<br />

Materuak.<br />

MORE WEAPONS FLOW<br />

TO INDONESIA<br />

PORTUGAL PROTESTS<br />

LONDON-JAKARTA MILITARY<br />

PLANES DEAL<br />

Diario de Noticias 5 February 19<strong>93</strong><br />

Dateline : Lisbon Original Lang.:<br />

Portuguese abridged<br />

The Diario de Noticias learned that last<br />

week the Foreign Ministry sent a letter of<br />

protest to the British Government over the<br />

sale of 44 Hawk military aircraft to<br />

Indonesia. The protest was sent as soon as<br />

Portuguese diplomatic channels confirmed<br />

the completion of the contract. With regards<br />

the offer to Indonesia of 39 warships by<br />

Germany, a source contacted by the DN<br />

recalled that the Portuguese Government<br />

had made known its concerns to Bonn when<br />

the contract was first being negotiated in<br />

1992. It was given guarantees that one of the<br />

contract’s clauses would be that the ships<br />

would not be employed in military actions<br />

against <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

SOUTHEAST ASIAN NAVIES<br />

GROWING BIGGER<br />

By Moses Manoharan<br />

(Reuter, Jakarta, Feb. 9) Southeast Asian<br />

navies are beefing-up in a strategic region<br />

made jittery by a power vacuum and a<br />

number of festering territorial disputes,<br />

analysts said.<br />

Indonesia’s purchase of 39 aging German<br />

naval vessels highlighted the trend in the<br />

region, where some of the world’s busiest<br />

sealanes are located and a dispute over the<br />

Spratly islands is on the boil, defence<br />

analysts said.<br />

Last month, Philippine President Fidel<br />

Ramos said the islands, in the South China<br />

Sea, were a possible flashpoint which had<br />

provoked “a mini-arms race of sorts.”<br />

A Japanese Defence Ministry official<br />

said there had been a vacuum in the area<br />

since the balance of power maintained by<br />

the United States and the former Soviet<br />

Union broke down.<br />

“Border disputes that remained quiet<br />

under the presence of the two superpowers<br />

have now surfaced as sensitive issues. The<br />

buildup in naval power can be seen as a result<br />

of this,” said the official, who declined<br />

to be named.<br />

Kensuke Ebata, a prominent Japanese<br />

defence analyst, said Indonesia’s acquisition<br />

was the latest move by countries in and near<br />

the Southeast Asian region to modernize the<br />

military.<br />

“The purchase can also be explained in<br />

terms of the power vacuum left in the area,”<br />

Ebata added.<br />

The potentially oil-rich Spratlys, claimed<br />

by China, Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia, the<br />

Philippines and Brunei are the most likely<br />

trouble-spot in the region.<br />

Chinese and Vietnamese naval forces had<br />

a brief clash over the islands in 1988. There<br />

was further tension last year when China<br />

announced plans to search for oil off<br />

Vietnam’s shores, set up a presence on a<br />

small island in the Spratlys and seized<br />

Vietnamese cargo ships sailing near southern<br />

China.<br />

Indonesia, which has no claim on the<br />

Spratlys, fears any military clash there<br />

could spill over to its Natuna island gas<br />

fields.<br />

It says its recent acquisitions are aging<br />

vessels from the former <strong>East</strong> Germany,<br />

without any blue water capability, which<br />

will be used for pacific purposes like transporting<br />

food to the nation’s far-flung islands.<br />

Armed forces commander, General Try<br />

Sutrisno, told Reuters the 39 ships would<br />

operate only within territorial waters.<br />

Jane’s Defence Weekly said the 39<br />

comprised 16 corvettes, nine minesweepers<br />

and 14 landing craft. Indonesia is also<br />

planning to buy two submarines to add to<br />

the two it has at present.<br />

The purchases, the biggest by Indonesia<br />

in recent years, are matched by other countries<br />

in the region.<br />

Singapore, whose 50-ship navy includes<br />

missile corvettes, landing ships and patrol<br />

planes, has four minehunters on order for<br />

1994. The first of 12 new large patrol craft<br />

is also due for delivery next year, analysts<br />

said.<br />

Singapore wants the United States to<br />

keep a strong presence in the region and<br />

provided the Seventh Fleet with a logistical<br />

headquarters after Manila closed the U.S.<br />

naval base at Subic Bay last year.<br />

In the Philippines, analyst Julius Caesar<br />

Parrenas of Manila’s Centre for Research<br />

and Communication said of the Indonesian<br />

purchases: “It might lead to an arms race,<br />

not because other countries could see<br />

Indonesia as a threat but because they<br />

would like to keep up with her.”<br />

Mak Joon Nam, a senior defence analyst<br />

at Malaysia’s state-backed institute of<br />

strategic and international studies, said: “It<br />

is a quantitative purchase rather than a<br />

qualitative one... if Indonesia’s intention<br />

was to match the defence capabilities of<br />

either China or Japan, it would have bought<br />

five new frigates instead of the second-hand<br />

units.”<br />

Malaysia is buying two frigates from<br />

Britain and also considering purchasing 27<br />

Russian-made MiG 29 fighters.<br />

In Taiwan, arch-foe of Beijing, defence<br />

analyst Richard Yang said Indonesia’s<br />

hardware purchases were aimed at resisting<br />

any threat from China and would increase<br />

pressure for a military buildup among Asian<br />

countries.<br />

“Indonesia has its own fears about<br />

Beijing’s military expansion. China is determined<br />

to be number one in Asia... The<br />

dispute over the Spratlys could lead to<br />

conflict,” said Yang, of the Sun Yat-sen<br />

Centre for Policy Studies.<br />

Taiwan has also been building up its<br />

navy in recent years to maintain a military<br />

balance with China, which claims sovereignty<br />

over the island and has refused to rule<br />

out the use of military force against it.<br />

In Beijing, a spokesman at the state-run<br />

China Institute of Contemporary<br />

International Relations said: “Some describe<br />

China as a tiger, claiming that Beijing dreams<br />

of setting up a greater China which may turn<br />

into the biggest tiger.<br />

“It seems that these people cannot go<br />

without an enemy.”<br />

INDONESIA NO THREAT TO<br />

ITS NEIGHBORS<br />

By Muklis Ali<br />

(Reuter, Jakarta, Feb. 11) Southeast<br />

Asian giant Indonesia, which is strengthening<br />

its military hardware, told its neighbours<br />

on Thursday it posed no threat to them.<br />

“President Suharto stressed that neighbouring<br />

countries do not need to worry<br />

about our military development,” State<br />

Secretary Murdiono told reporters.<br />

He was quoting Suharto’s comments<br />

during talks with Papua New Guinea Prime<br />

Minister Paias Wingti who is on a five-day<br />

visit to Indonesia with an entourage of<br />

nearly 200 businessmen, officials and politicians<br />

to promote economic cooperation.<br />

The two countries have long had border<br />

problems in the huge island of New Guinea,<br />

which they share. The problems are now all<br />

but settled but a small rebel movement<br />

continues to fight Indonesian rule.<br />

Suharto said Indonesia’s security and<br />

defence doctrine was based on a state ideology<br />

and constitution which guaranteed<br />

that Jakarta would not pose a threat to its<br />

neighbours.<br />

With a population of 180 million in over<br />

16,000 islands, Indonesia is by far the largest<br />

country in Southeast Asia.


<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 43<br />

It recently bought 39 second-hand<br />

German naval ships and is negotiating to<br />

buy 24 Hawk trainer planes from British<br />

Aerospace. It also wants to add to its fleet<br />

of American F-16 warplanes.<br />

From 1963-66, Indonesia crossed swords<br />

with Malaysia on Borneo island, which they<br />

share. British troops helped Malaysia defeat<br />

what was known as a policy of<br />

“Confrontation.”<br />

In 1975 Indonesian forces invaded the<br />

eastern half of <strong>Timor</strong> island, then a<br />

Portuguese colony recently abandoned by<br />

Lisbon. Jakarta integrated <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> into<br />

Indonesia the following year, a move not<br />

recognised by the United Nations.<br />

Political analysts say that while<br />

Indonesia is not now seen as a belligerent,<br />

some countries in the region consider it a<br />

latent threat because of its sheer size, if<br />

nothing else.<br />

Suharto’s government says it does not<br />

feel threatened by other countries but must<br />

remain on guard for dissent at home. There<br />

are at least three small armed separatist<br />

movements in the archipelago which is home<br />

to a wide variety of ethnic groups.<br />

“But if Indonesia is disturbed certainly it<br />

will defend its honour,” Murdiono said.<br />

PORTUGAL PROTESTS AT<br />

GERMAN ARMS SALE<br />

AFP in Bonn reported on 16 February<br />

that Portugal has formally protested to<br />

Germany over the sale to Indonesia of 39<br />

second-hand surface warships and three new<br />

submarines, citing Indonesia’s ‘extremely<br />

regrettable’ human rights record in <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

The protest was made last Thursday but<br />

released Tuesday.<br />

German officials justify the sale by saying<br />

Indonesia was entitled to receive military<br />

equipment from Germany and that the ships<br />

would be partially disarmed and could only<br />

be used for coastal patrols, minesweeping<br />

and fighting pirates.<br />

GERMANY SELLS WAR SHIPS<br />

TO INDONESIA<br />

Brussels, Feb. 24 (IPS/Bob Mantiri) –<br />

reports in the German press that Bonn will<br />

sell 39 war ships and three submarines to<br />

Indonesia raised a strong protest<br />

Wednesday from Portugal.<br />

An official of the Portuguese foreign<br />

ministry in Lisbon said that Portugal will<br />

condemn Germany during the forthcoming<br />

EC foreign ministers meeting, scheduled for<br />

March 7 in Brussels.<br />

“Indonesia will use the war ships to<br />

suppress the people of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>,” the official<br />

said. <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> is a former<br />

Portuguese colony, which has been annexed<br />

by Indonesia since 1975. According to him<br />

the ships could also be used against people<br />

in Aceh and in Irian Jaya, who are also<br />

fighting for their independence from Jakarta.<br />

The German embassy in Jakarta would<br />

not confirm nor deny the reports in the<br />

German daily ‘die woche,’ which revealed<br />

last week that the deal will be signed during<br />

the visit of chancellor Helmut Kohl to<br />

Indonesia, next week. Kohl is visiting<br />

Singapore at this moment.<br />

A spokesman of the Indonesian ministry<br />

for security and political affairs in Jakarta,<br />

however, said that “negotiations on the delivery<br />

of German war ships had already<br />

started last year.”<br />

The talks with the Bonn government<br />

have been conducted by the Indonesian<br />

minister for science and research, professor<br />

Rudy Habibie, who is a member of the<br />

board of directors of German aircraft company<br />

messcherschmitt. Habibie, who studied<br />

aviation technology in Germany, is often<br />

mentioned in the Indonesian press as the<br />

serious choice of president Suharto for the<br />

post of his country’s vice-president.<br />

The spokesman of the security and political<br />

affairs ministry, headed by Admiral<br />

Sudomo, denied that the Indonesian navy<br />

would use the ships against the <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese people.<br />

There is still resistance against Indonesia<br />

in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. Indonesian troops recently<br />

caught resistance leader Xanana Gusmão,<br />

who, according to Amnesty International<br />

has been tortured while in prison. In Nov.<br />

1991 Indonesian soldiers killed, according to<br />

Amnesty International, more than 100 <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese students during an anti-Indonesian<br />

demonstration in the capital of Dili.<br />

Portugal has effectively blocked a new<br />

economic cooperation agreement with the<br />

six countries of the association of south-east<br />

Asian nations (ASEAN), of which Indonesia<br />

is a prominent member.<br />

It would only approve such an agreement<br />

if Indonesia promised not to violate human<br />

rights and allow a referendum, in which the<br />

people on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> could say whether<br />

they want independence or to remain an<br />

Indonesian province.<br />

KOHL IN TOKYO CHASTISED<br />

FOR ARMS SALE<br />

“Would You Sell Weapons to Iraq?” asks<br />

Japanese <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Support Group<br />

From FETJC, Feb. 28, 19<strong>93</strong><br />

The Free <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Japan Coalition<br />

protested Germany’s recent sale of frigates,<br />

submarines and other naval vessels to<br />

Indonesia in a letter to Chancellor Helmut<br />

Kohl, currently on a 4-day visit to Japan.<br />

Referring to the deaths of “at least<br />

100,000 to 200,000 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese since<br />

Indonesia’s 1975 invasion of the former<br />

Portuguese colony, and the fact that<br />

“Indonesia continues its military occupation<br />

of the territory in defiance of eight United<br />

Nations General Assembly and two<br />

Security Council resolutions,” the Japanese<br />

group compared the arms deal to “selling<br />

submarines and the like to Iraq,” which has<br />

been subject to international sanctions since<br />

its short-lived invasion of Kuwait.<br />

The deal involves 39 frigates, landing<br />

ships, and minesweepers, nearly a third of<br />

the former <strong>East</strong> German Navy, as well as<br />

three new submarines that Germany is<br />

building on order. The weapons transaction<br />

drew sharp criticism in Bonn earlier in the<br />

month. Norbert Gansel, Social Democratic<br />

Party spokesperson said: “Indonesia should<br />

not get any military support because of its<br />

involvement in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>,”<br />

Akira Matsubara, secretary of the Tokyo<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Association, one of eleven<br />

grassroots organizations grouped in the<br />

Japanese coalition, conveyed the letter to<br />

the German Chancellor on February 27<br />

through an official of the Germany Embassy<br />

in Tokyo. The letter cited a resolution<br />

passed by the Council of<br />

Europe banning the export of weapons to<br />

Indonesia in view of the human rights<br />

situation in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. It also recalled<br />

Germany’s own legal restrictions on supplying<br />

weapons to non-NATO regions involved<br />

in conflicts. The recent sale, it<br />

stressed, “not only ignores these rulings, but<br />

also goes against the post-Cold War<br />

aspirations of the world to affirm human<br />

rights and disarmament.”<br />

While Bonn has sought to allay criticism<br />

with assurances that the ships would be<br />

“partially disarmed” and could only be used<br />

for coastal patrols, the Japanese group<br />

challenged this: “One wonders if Germany<br />

would have agreed to weapons sales to Iraq<br />

by a country that defended the sales with<br />

the same reasoning.”<br />

Free <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Japan Coalition c/o<br />

Tokyo <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Association Tel: 0422-<br />

55-7<strong>93</strong>7 Fax: 0422-55-7768


Page 44 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

NGOS PROTEST WARSHIP<br />

DEAL TO KOHL<br />

1 March 19<strong>93</strong> Source: IMBAS<br />

The following letter was sent on the 24<br />

February to the German Chancellor, Kohl,<br />

protesting the sale of German war vessels to<br />

Indonesia at bargain prices.<br />

Please direct send such a protest to the<br />

German embassy in your home country.<br />

Dear Mr. Chancellor<br />

We are writing to express our concern<br />

about reports we have received regarding the<br />

intended sale of 39 most modern NVA<br />

warships (from <strong>East</strong> German Navy) to<br />

Indonesia.<br />

We wish to remind you that Indonesia<br />

has illegally occupied <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> in defiance<br />

of numerous UN resolutions since 1975 and<br />

has waged a continuing war against the local<br />

population.<br />

During this time up to 200,000 people<br />

have lost their lives and human rights abuses<br />

cause continuing and serious concern.<br />

The deal was reported postponed after<br />

the Santa Cruz massacre when at least 273<br />

people were murdered by the Indonesian<br />

military.<br />

Since then the situation of human rights<br />

has not been improved and the repression<br />

inside <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> is said to be as bad as in<br />

the late 1970s.<br />

The Federal Republic of Germany, like<br />

the UN, has never recognised the Indonesian<br />

annexation, and claims that it does not sell<br />

weapons to countries at war. Because of the<br />

aforesaid, Germany is in breach of its<br />

undertaking.<br />

We strongly condemn this deal.<br />

Furthermore we note that the vessels<br />

under negotiation may be sold at prices<br />

significantly below their actual value.<br />

According to the press, all 39 vessels are<br />

said to be sold for an amount of US$ 150<br />

million only, whereas only one corvette<br />

values US$200 million actually. This can<br />

only be regarded as covert military aid to a<br />

repressive regime.<br />

We call on you to investigate this matter<br />

and look forward to your early reply.<br />

Yours faithfully,<br />

A Paz es possivel em <strong>Timor</strong> Leste, Portugal<br />

Agir pour <strong>Timor</strong>, France<br />

Aksi Setiakawan<br />

Association <strong>Timor</strong> Oriental, France<br />

British Coalition for <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, UK<br />

CDPM<br />

Coordinamento Italiano dei gruppi di<br />

Solidarieta con il Populi <strong>Timor</strong>ese, Italy<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> <strong>Action</strong> <strong>Network</strong>, USA<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Alert <strong>Network</strong>, Canada<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Group Holland<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Solidarity Campaign, Ireland<br />

Free <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Japan Coalition, Japan<br />

Free Papua Movement<br />

Front Demokrasi Indonesia<br />

IMBAS, Germany<br />

Indonesian Resources Information Project,<br />

Holland<br />

International Platform of Jurists for <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong><br />

Japanese Supporting Committee for Darwin<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> School<br />

Komitee Indonesie, Holland<br />

Oporto University, Portugal<br />

Osttimor Kommitten, Sweden<br />

Paz e justicia para <strong>Timor</strong> Leste, Portugal<br />

SOS <strong>Timor</strong>, Belgium<br />

Tapol, UK<br />

<strong>Timor</strong> Oriental a.s.b.l. Luxembourg<br />

XminY Founding Agency, Holland<br />

PERPETRATORS OF<br />

VIOLENCE ARE UNLIKELY<br />

CHAMPIONS OF PEACE<br />

Vancouver Sun, 1 March 19<strong>93</strong>. From<br />

Stephen Hume’s At Large column.<br />

A proposed United Nations tribunal on<br />

war crimes in response to the vicious civil<br />

war in the Balkans simply offers yet more<br />

proof that we’re all prisoners of our own<br />

delusions.<br />

There are as many white-collar war<br />

criminals among the righteous nations that<br />

now talk pompously about a New World<br />

order as there are blood-soaked rapists in<br />

Bosnia.<br />

The atrocities in the Balkans are horrific,<br />

but are they more horrific than the<br />

butchering of one-third of the indigenous<br />

civilian population of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> by our<br />

Indonesian trading pals? There is one obvious<br />

difference that is not mentioned in polite<br />

society. The 10,000 victims in the<br />

Balkans were white Europeans, while the<br />

200,000 killed in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> were not.<br />

Indonesia’s invasion of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

parallels Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Iraq was<br />

bombed back to a pre-industrial state to<br />

enforce UN resolutions, yet since 1975<br />

Indonesia has openly defied UN security<br />

council resolutions ordering it to withdraw.<br />

At the time of the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> invasion,<br />

the U.S. supplied Indonesia with 90 per<br />

cent of its weapons while sitting on the<br />

same security council that condemned the<br />

aggression.<br />

Since 1980, 33 per cent of the world’s<br />

nations have indulged in state-sanctioned<br />

torture. One of those cited by Amnesty<br />

International is another security council<br />

member that enjoys delivering lofty sermons<br />

on human rights.<br />

Britain’s record of torture, tainted and<br />

miscarried justice and human rights abuses<br />

in Northern Ireland leaves it in no position<br />

to instruct anyone else in proper conduct.<br />

And what legitimate moral indignation<br />

over war crimes may we expect from China,<br />

where fractious students can be crushed<br />

under the treads of tanks and forgotten<br />

overnight?<br />

In 1992, there were 24 wars going on<br />

around the world. They cost more than $50<br />

billion. Virtually all have been supported<br />

with weapons, military and economic aid<br />

from the sanctimonious members of the<br />

UN’s security council.<br />

In fact, while the value of development<br />

aid to the Third World from industrial nations<br />

between 1985 and 1989 was $166<br />

billion, the value of weapons sold there was<br />

$195 billion. In other words, the rich nations<br />

made $29 billion in the exchange.<br />

So far, those killed in the continuing wars<br />

with the weapons and expertise provided by<br />

the people who say they want to punish<br />

war criminals – I’ll only count the dead, not<br />

the maimed, mutilated and mentally<br />

impaired – amount to about 250,000, most<br />

of them civilian non-combatants, many of<br />

them children.<br />

Since 1980, close to six million people<br />

have been killed in wars financed by the<br />

industrial giants of the First World.<br />

Seventy-five per cent have been non-combatants.<br />

All this violence diverts money from<br />

education, health care and economic infrastructure<br />

at a rate of $2 million a minute. In<br />

1991, the world spent $1 trillion to equip<br />

and maintain 66 million soldiers in preparation<br />

for war. In developing countries, soldiers<br />

now outnumber physicians by eight<br />

to one.<br />

One of the biggest supporters of the<br />

butchers, villains and lunatics responsible<br />

for this carnage has been that loudest and<br />

most officious upholder of human rights, the<br />

United States.<br />

I note that of the 14 high-ranking officers<br />

whose troops have committed “brutal<br />

human rights abuses” in El Salvador, 12<br />

were trained by the U.S. military.<br />

The Centre for Defence Information in<br />

Washington, D.C. estimates that the U.S.<br />

has supplied $300 billion in weapons,<br />

military assistance and economic aid in the<br />

Third World since 1962. In all but two of<br />

the countries now racked by war, factions<br />

were armed, trained and given economic<br />

support by the U.S.<br />

Uncle Sam is in Somalia milking our<br />

brain-dead media for every available ounce<br />

of high-mindedness about the noble purpose<br />

of its mission. But U.S. policy is responsible<br />

for much of the bloody chaos that<br />

convulses that sorry country.<br />

It was the U.S. that provided dictator<br />

Siad Barre with $700 million in military and


<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 45<br />

economic aid so that he could wage an<br />

unbelievably cruel campaign of state terror<br />

against his people.<br />

Propped up by the U.S., this fool destroyed<br />

vital water supplies, slaughtered the<br />

herds of nomadic tribes and tortured and<br />

killed civilians on a grand scale. By the time<br />

he was finished, one in seven civilians had<br />

become a refugee.<br />

Rank of the U.S. among all countries in<br />

arms sales to Somalia since 1985? Number<br />

one.<br />

Today Somalia. Tomorrow Sudan.<br />

Between 1975 and 1985, despite incredible<br />

economic mismanagement and a campaign of<br />

state terror against non-Muslims that totally<br />

traumatized the country, fully two-thirds of<br />

U.S. military aid in sub-Saharan Africa went<br />

to the military dictatorship in Sudan.<br />

The real crime is war and the most dangerous<br />

war criminals are those who subvert<br />

peaceful development by selling weapons<br />

and feeding the conflicts that create their<br />

markets.<br />

DEMONSTRATION AT<br />

BRITISH AEROSPACE<br />

From Peace News 2365 (April 19<strong>93</strong>).<br />

Cherry trees for BAe<br />

On Saturday 6 March, more than 30<br />

demonstrators gathered at the British<br />

Aerospace (BAe) plant in Stevenage, Herts,<br />

in solidarity with Chris Cole (PN March<br />

19<strong>93</strong>) and to protest against BAe arms sales<br />

to Indonesia. BAe is currently finalizing a<br />

deal to sell up to 144 Hawk strike attack<br />

aircraft to Indonesia, which has occupied<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> since 1975 in defiance of more<br />

than 10 UN resolutions. Hundreds of<br />

thousands of <strong>Timor</strong>ese have died as a result.<br />

Protesters walked onto BAe property<br />

and at first met with no resistance, even<br />

when planting bulbs and a flowering<br />

Japanese cherry tree in the lawn in front of<br />

the main gate. A child-sized grave was dug<br />

in the lawn, with a paper headstone saying<br />

“Remember the dead of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.”<br />

There were eventually seven arrests, and<br />

six were taken to the police station. Three<br />

trespassers crawled under a fence in front of<br />

a police officer and were chased through the<br />

site. Three other activists were pulled off a<br />

pillar inside a neighbouring BAe site as they<br />

were holding a banner saying “Hammer BAe<br />

swords into ploughshares.”<br />

One ARROW member was arrested near<br />

the main gate and driven out of town by the<br />

police. He refused to be dumped in the<br />

middle of nowhere and was driven back to<br />

the police station, where he was simply left<br />

by the side of the road. No charges were laid<br />

against any of the protesters who had been<br />

detained, though there was some rough<br />

handling.<br />

The mass trespass was organised by<br />

ARROW at the request of the BAe<br />

Ploughshares Support Group, with legal<br />

support by the Peace Movement Legal<br />

Support Unit. Our action was featured on<br />

Anglia and Carlton regional television news.<br />

Emily Johns, BAe Ploughshares, c/o<br />

NVRN, 162 Holloway Rd, London N7 8DQ<br />

GERMAN EMBASSY REPLIES<br />

TO CANADA<br />

March 18, 19<strong>93</strong><br />

I think the letter speaks for itself and require<br />

no interpretation, ETAN/Ottawa<br />

Dear Madam, dear Sir,<br />

with reference to your letter dated March<br />

3, 19<strong>93</strong> I would like to state the following.<br />

It is true that the Federal Republic of<br />

Germany sold 39 ex-National People’s<br />

Navy vessels to Indonesia. Although the<br />

term “warship” is technically correct, it<br />

might convey the wrong impression. The<br />

vessels in question are predominantly vintage-1960s<br />

coast patrol boats. Furthermore,<br />

the price you stated (US-$150 million) is<br />

incorrect. Unfortunately I am in no position<br />

to inform you about the correct amount.<br />

Under the terms of the contract, the 39<br />

vessels will be de-militarized at the expense<br />

of the Indonesian government, i.e. all armory<br />

fixed to the vessels will be dismounted.<br />

The vessels will be used by Indonesia to<br />

counter the threat posed by an increasing<br />

number of acts of piracy and drug-trafficking<br />

within its territorial waters. Because of<br />

the aforesaid, the contract for sale of those<br />

vessels does by no means constitute a covert<br />

military aid to Indonesia.<br />

I would like to emphasize the fact that in<br />

the past the Federal Republic of Germany<br />

has repeatedly protested against the human<br />

rights infractions committed by the<br />

Indonesian government and has never recognized<br />

the annexation of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. The<br />

Federal Republic of Germany is unequivocally<br />

in line with the numerous UN resolutions<br />

on that matter.<br />

Furthermore, the contract for sale of the<br />

39 coast patrol vessels was completed only<br />

after the European Community had explicitly<br />

stated that the human rights situation<br />

had significantly improved. If the<br />

Federal Republic of Germany had had any<br />

legitimate concerns, it would not have<br />

concluded that deal.<br />

Yours sincerely,<br />

(Rainer Sulzer), First Secretary<br />

This letter is dated March 18, 19<strong>93</strong>; with<br />

regards to the last paragraph, I guess<br />

Germany didn’t inform its embassies of the<br />

vote at the UN on March 12, 19<strong>93</strong>!!<br />

I am curious though, of the other countries<br />

that wrote to their German embassies, did<br />

you receive a reply?<br />

PROSPECTS FOR MORE<br />

HAWK SALES FROM BAE<br />

From TAPOL, April 8, 19<strong>93</strong>, Storytype:<br />

combined<br />

The Indonesian airforce needs nearly 100<br />

more warplanes and could buy them from<br />

Britain if Jakarta’s conditions are met,<br />

Research and Technology Minister<br />

Bacharuddin Habibie said on Wednesday [7<br />

April].<br />

The deal depends on British Aerospace<br />

giving 35 per cent of the manufacture of its<br />

Hawk aircraft to Indonesia’s state-run<br />

Industry Pesawat Terbang Nusantara<br />

(IPTN) and helping Jakarta acquire Britain’s<br />

Civil Aviation Authority airworthiness<br />

certificate for IPTN’s 35-seat CN-235<br />

transport aircraft, said Habibie. “These are<br />

our conditions,” he said, adding that British<br />

Aerospace and the British government were<br />

showing a willingness to cooperate.<br />

Talking only a day after British Foreign<br />

Minister Douglas Hurd visited Jakarta,<br />

Habibie said “It is normal that we need more<br />

fighter planes for our airforce. According to<br />

the planning . . . our airforce in the future<br />

could use six squadrons of Hawks. This<br />

means at least 96 planes,” Habibie said.<br />

Indonesia is currently negotiating with<br />

British Aerospace for 24 Hawks, worth<br />

about 500 million.<br />

A British embassy spokesperson said<br />

that the planes were being sold as trainers<br />

and the company is adamant that the aircraft<br />

under discussion cannot be armed. Habibie,<br />

however, said “The planes will be used not<br />

only to train pilots but also for ground<br />

attack.”<br />

Any sale of military equipment to<br />

Indonesia is politically sensitive because of<br />

concerns over the country’s human rights<br />

record. Two years ago Indonesian troops<br />

slaughtered more than 50 mourners at a funeral<br />

in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

Analysts predict a possible arms race<br />

since Indonesia, with 180 million people and<br />

an air force with five squadrons of combat<br />

aircraft, is now matched in its defence<br />

purchases by several countries in the region.<br />

Air Chief Marshall Siboen, head of the<br />

airforce, who has made a number of proud<br />

announcements about the Hawk deal in the<br />

last six months, was recently replaced in the<br />

new cabinet. Habibie seems to be back in<br />

control, driving a hard bargain for the<br />

benefit of both sides of Indonesia’s aerospace<br />

industry - military and civilian.


Page 46 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

SUHARTO<br />

“RE-ELECTED”,<br />

TRY IS NEW V.P.<br />

PETITION SUPPORT SWELLS<br />

FOR SUHARTO<br />

The Straits Times, February 10, 19<strong>93</strong><br />

SUPPORT for the re-election of<br />

President Suharto continues to swell as<br />

more groups filed petitions of support with<br />

the People’s Consultative Assembly<br />

(MPR), according to a report in The Jakarta<br />

Post yesterday.<br />

The All-Java Association of Youth and<br />

Student <strong>Action</strong> and a dozen organisation<br />

leaders from Irian Jaya were quoted as<br />

saying in Jakarta that they needed President<br />

Suharto to stay at the helm “to ensure the<br />

continuity of development.”<br />

They also supported the role of the<br />

armed forces in both defence and politics<br />

which, they said, had maintained national<br />

unity and safeguarded development successfully.<br />

According to the newspaper, the petitions<br />

filed with MPR deputy speaker<br />

Achmad Amiruddin added to the long list of<br />

support for President Suharto’s renomination<br />

in next month’s presidential polls.<br />

The five political organisations making<br />

up the MPR, the United Development<br />

Party (PPP), the Golkar political grouping,<br />

the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI), the<br />

armed forces and the Regional<br />

Representatives, have endorsed the reelection<br />

of Mr. Suharto, who has been in<br />

power for 25 years.<br />

The association’s 10-member delegation,<br />

led by Mr. Aly Saleh, also backed armed<br />

forces chief Try Sutrisno for the vicepresidential<br />

post.<br />

Mr. Saleh was quoted as saying that the<br />

decision to renominate Mr. Suharto and<br />

back General Try was taken at a recent<br />

congress in Linggajati, West Java.<br />

The association requested that its members<br />

be given a more political role, claiming<br />

that the organisation had been an ardent<br />

supporter of the New Order regime under<br />

Mr. Suharto.<br />

The group from Irian Jaya did not make<br />

any mention of the vice-presidential candidate.<br />

But the group sought support for Mr.<br />

Jannes Johan Karubaba to replace Governor<br />

Barnabas Suebu, whose term of office would<br />

end in the near future.<br />

MPR deputy speaker Amiruddin said<br />

that he could not endorse Mr. Karubaba’s<br />

candidacy for governor as only the Home<br />

Minister, Mr. Rudini, had the authority to<br />

do so.<br />

ENVOY AT UN TOLD TO<br />

CAMPAIGN FOR TIMOR<br />

ACCEPTANCE<br />

Jakarta Post, 16 February 19<strong>93</strong>. slightly<br />

abridged<br />

(Jakarta) President Suharto said yesterday<br />

Indonesia must continue with its campaign<br />

in the UN to gain international acceptance<br />

of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>’s integration into the<br />

republic.<br />

Suharto told the Indonesian Ambassador<br />

to the UN, Nugroho Wisnumurti, that as far<br />

as Indonesia is concerned the question of<br />

integration has been settled and that the<br />

people of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> have already exercised<br />

their right to self-determination.<br />

“It is then our task to inform the world<br />

of all the events that have taken place and of<br />

the real situation in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>,” Nugroho<br />

said after meeting with the President at the<br />

Merdeka Palace.<br />

The world body has yet to give its recognition<br />

of the 1976 integration of <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> and instead continues to regard<br />

Portugal, the province’s colonial master for<br />

four centuries until 1975, as the territory’s<br />

administering power.<br />

Nugroho said <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> has remained in<br />

the UN agenda since the issue was raised in<br />

1982 by Portugal which questioned the<br />

legitimacy of Indonesia’s rule over the<br />

territory.<br />

“But the issue no longer reverberates in<br />

the United Nations and does not attract too<br />

much attention,” the diplomat said, noting<br />

that the world body was preoccupied with<br />

the problems in Bosnia, Somalia, Palestine<br />

and Cambodia.<br />

He said Indonesia’s explanation of the<br />

tragic incident in Dili in November in 1991<br />

and the subsequent steps taken by the government<br />

were strongly appreciated by many<br />

UN members.<br />

The tragedy, in which the government<br />

reported that 50 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> demonstrators<br />

were killed in clashes with troops, caused an<br />

international uproar, prompting Indonesia to<br />

take drastic steps to remedy the situation<br />

including the removal of two army generals<br />

from their posts.<br />

Vote<br />

Nugroho said if the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> question<br />

was put to a vote this year, “there is a very<br />

slim chance for Portugal to win.”<br />

Many of countries that had supported<br />

Portugal in the past have altered their view.<br />

Mozambique, which had been very vocal,<br />

no longer raises the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> question, he<br />

said citing an example.<br />

Although still in the UN agenda, the <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> question has been repeatedly<br />

postponed each year since 1982 to give<br />

Indonesia and Portugal a chance to resolve<br />

the issue under the auspices of the UN<br />

Secretary General.<br />

The foreign ministers of the two countries<br />

last met in the United Nations in<br />

December. The two agreed to meet again on<br />

April 20 in Rome.<br />

Several UN members, including some<br />

European Community states and Balkan<br />

countries have questioned Indonesia about<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> but it was on the human rights<br />

situation in the territory and on the steps<br />

taken in connection with the Dili tragedy,<br />

Nugroho said.<br />

The diplomat said he had just visited<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and met with local leaders including<br />

Bishop Carlos Ximenes Felipe Belo.<br />

He also held talks with José Alexandre<br />

“Xanana” Gusmão, the former leader of the<br />

Fretilin separatist rebel movement currently<br />

on trial on charges of armed rebellion.<br />

Non-Aligned<br />

Nugroho yesterday reported to the<br />

President about he recent UN General<br />

Assembly, specifically on the efforts of the<br />

Non- Aligned Movement (NAM), currently<br />

chaired by Indonesia, in fighting for its interests<br />

in the world body.<br />

Nugroho said NAM’s Coordinating<br />

Bureau, which includes all NAM members<br />

working through their representatives at the<br />

UN, is following up on the decisions taken<br />

at the NAM Summit in September.<br />

NAM had also formed a working group,<br />

in compliance with the Summit’s mandate,<br />

to specifically look into the current efforts<br />

to restructure the United Nations.<br />

GEN. TRY KEEPS MUM<br />

ABOUT ACCEPTING V-P<br />

NOMINATION<br />

The Straits Times, February 18, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

BYLINE: Paul Jacob, Jakarta<br />

Correspondent<br />

Jakarta -Indonesia’s highly-respected<br />

army chief Edi Sudradjat will be appointed<br />

commander-in-chief of the country’s nearly<br />

500,000-strong armed forces (ABRI) tomorrow.<br />

Outgoing ABRI chief General Try<br />

Sutrisno, who appears headed for unanimous<br />

nomination as Indonesia’s next vicepresident,<br />

made the announcement at the<br />

military’s headquarters yesterday.<br />

He said Gen. Sudradjat, who at 54 is the<br />

oldest man appointed by President Suharto<br />

to the powerful position, would hold the<br />

post of army chief until further notice.


<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 47<br />

Gen. Try said he had no immediate announcement<br />

to make on impending changes<br />

to the chiefs of the air force, navy and police.<br />

He said that Gen. Sudradjat was chosen<br />

because he was the most senior of the<br />

service chiefs -all of whom hold four-star<br />

general rank -and because the army was the<br />

senior-most military service.<br />

Gen. Sudradjat, a trim, tall figure, succeeded<br />

Gen. Try as army chief in February<br />

1988 and was promoted to four-star rank<br />

the same day he took up the appointment.<br />

Analysts said his elevation to commander-in-chief<br />

reflects not only the trust<br />

he enjoys from the President, the military<br />

and political leadership, but also demonstrates<br />

his political astuteness.<br />

He will preside over an armed forces<br />

which exerts considerable influence over the<br />

country because of its historical dualfunction<br />

as a security force and a sociopolitical<br />

organisation.<br />

Analysts have long pointed out that one<br />

of the most, if not the most important factor<br />

Mr. Suharto uses to decide on the appointment,<br />

is the degree of “political confidence”<br />

he has in a nominee.<br />

Some analysts said, however, that a<br />

possible recurrence of Gen. Sudradjat’s<br />

throat cancer, which he appears to have<br />

overcome, could affect his tenure as ABRI<br />

chief.<br />

One analyst said Gen. Sudradjat might be<br />

shifted to “a less strenuous ministerial<br />

position” once the new Cabinet is appointed<br />

towards the end of March.<br />

Gen. Try said yesterday that a change at<br />

the helm of ABRI was long overdue. He<br />

himself should have stepped down in 1990<br />

on reaching the retirement age of 55 but his<br />

term had been extended on a yearly basis<br />

since then. He said that he was now<br />

“preparing to enter pensionable service.”<br />

Though asked repeatedly by journalists,<br />

Gen. Try declined to give a firm response to<br />

whether he would accept the vice-presidential<br />

nomination.<br />

The question has dogged him since the<br />

Indonesian Democratic Party, ABRI and the<br />

Muslim-based United Development Party<br />

announced that they were backing him for<br />

the position.<br />

SUDRADJAT LOCALLY<br />

TRAINED<br />

The Straits Times, February 18, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

BYLINE: Paul Jacob, Jakarta<br />

Correspondent<br />

Jakarta -General Edi Sudradjat, the<br />

Indonesian army chief who becomes armed<br />

forces commander-in-chief tomorrow, is<br />

most proud of one important fact.<br />

“I’m a local army man,” he once told<br />

journalists, referring to the fact that his entire<br />

military training had been done within<br />

Indonesia.<br />

Gen. Sudradjat was among the first batch<br />

of officers to graduate from Indonesia’s elite<br />

National Military Academy in 1960 and his<br />

appointment to the military’s senior-most<br />

post comes just nine weeks short of his<br />

55th birthday.<br />

He also appears to have overcome a difficult<br />

obstacle which could have put paid to<br />

any advancement beyond his position as<br />

army chief.<br />

It was only in 1990 that news first surfaced<br />

publicly that he had throat cancer.<br />

Now, however, he is said to have overcome<br />

the problem.<br />

Journalists who covered his activities in<br />

those intervening years said that he never let<br />

it get in the way of his job.<br />

He has also remained active in sports,<br />

and still plays golf and tennis once a week.<br />

Last year, at a shooting meet attended by<br />

several senior ASEAN military officers, he<br />

walked away the champion in the rifle<br />

category.<br />

His varied experience in command-andfield<br />

appointments was not unrecognized.<br />

At a time when brigadier-general was the<br />

highest rank given to a regional military<br />

commander serving outside Java, he was one<br />

of the very few to attain the two-star rank<br />

of major-general.<br />

He has served and commanded units of<br />

the elite Special Forces and Strategic<br />

Reserve Command, and also served in<br />

peacekeeping operations in Vietnam in<br />

1973.<br />

His most difficult task in recent years<br />

came when he appointed a panel to probe<br />

the military’s conduct in the 1991 <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> killings -and then meted out punishment<br />

to senior officers and servicemen<br />

found guilty of misconduct.<br />

Gen. Sudradjat, a Muslim and married<br />

with four children, has been consistently<br />

described as a true professional. He is highly<br />

regarded for his integrity and reportedly has<br />

outstanding ties with subordinates.<br />

“I do not think there is anyone who will<br />

argue that he is the right man for the job as<br />

ABRI commander. He is a true soldier, an<br />

outstanding commander and a respected<br />

leader,” said a military attaché here.<br />

NEW ABRI CHIEF A TIMOR<br />

VETERAN<br />

TAPOL report, 17 February 19<strong>93</strong><br />

General Edi Sudradjat was today appointed<br />

commander-in-chief of the<br />

Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI), in place<br />

of General Try Sutrisno who is the ABRI<br />

candidate for vice-president. General Try<br />

reached the age of retirement a year ago and<br />

was due to be replaced anyway.<br />

General Edi Sudradjat is from the elite<br />

red-beret Kopassus, which makes him a<br />

much tougher soldier than his predecessor<br />

who is from the corps of engineers. The new<br />

C-in-C is a <strong>Timor</strong> war veteran, having<br />

served in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> during the period of<br />

Operasi Seroja, from 1978. This is when the<br />

war to crush the armed resistance was at its<br />

height.<br />

STUDENTS DETAINED<br />

FOR DEMO<br />

(Jakarta, March 9 Kyodo) Indonesia’s<br />

military and police detained several students<br />

who demonstrated Tuesday against<br />

President Suharto’s unopposed nomination<br />

for a sixth five-year term, witnesses said.<br />

Students from several big cities, carrying<br />

banners, marched to the front gate of the<br />

People’s Consultative Assembly one day<br />

ahead of the legislature’s reelection of<br />

Suharto.<br />

The assembly was convened on March 1<br />

and will end Thursday with the swearing in<br />

of the president. Retired Gen. Try Sutrisno<br />

is certain to be elected vice president.<br />

The military has deployed 11,000 personnel<br />

to guard the assembly session.<br />

‘The assembly sessions are only a play<br />

act of democracy,’ one banner read. ‘For the<br />

future of the nation, we refuse Suharto,’ said<br />

another.<br />

Police and military personnel forced the<br />

students away from the assembly area and<br />

after some scuffles five were detained and<br />

taken away in two cars, witnesses said.<br />

STUDENTS ARRESTED AS<br />

SUHARTO ACCEPTS TRY<br />

Green Left #92, March 17, 19<strong>93</strong><br />

Forty students demonstrated outside the<br />

Indonesian parliament on March 10 to protest<br />

against the nomination and election of<br />

ex- general Suharto as president.<br />

The demonstrators, carrying placards<br />

attacking recent price rises and rises in<br />

MPs’ salaries, were arrested as soon as they<br />

unfurled their banners and raised their<br />

placards. The parliament had been surrounded<br />

by army and police units for over a<br />

week.<br />

According to Green Left’s sources in<br />

Jakarta, the students were released the next<br />

morning. Among those arrested was Yenny<br />

Damianto, who visited Australia in 1991 to<br />

participate in the Beyond Borders environmental<br />

tour of Victorian high schools.<br />

Inside the parliament, the show proceeded<br />

as planned. This time, however, the


Page 48 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

scenario was determined by the armed<br />

forces leadership rather than Suharto. The<br />

president was unable to get any of the parliamentary<br />

fractions to nominate an additional<br />

candidate for vice-president. The<br />

military’s candidate, former armed forces<br />

chief Try Sutrisno, was therefore elected<br />

unopposed (as was Suharto).<br />

The ongoing struggle between Suharto<br />

and the armed forces is now likely to focus<br />

on the appointment of the defence minister<br />

in the next Cabinet. The current minister is<br />

the main plotter against Suharto, ex-general<br />

Benny Murdani.<br />

The other key position to be decided is<br />

chief of staff of the army, the second most<br />

powerful position after commander in chief<br />

of the armed forces. Sources in Jakarta say<br />

that the main candidates are Suharto’s<br />

cousin-in-law, General Wismoyo, and<br />

General Feisal Tanjung, reputedly favoured<br />

by the anti-Suharto establishment.<br />

SUHARTO STILL SILENT ON<br />

VICE-PRESIDENT<br />

Green Left #91, March 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. By Max<br />

Lane<br />

The Indonesian People’s Deliberative<br />

Assembly (MPR) began meeting on March<br />

1. It is expected to re-elect Suharto as<br />

president and to choose a new vice-president<br />

sometime between March 9 and 11.<br />

The armed forces (ABRI) has now secured<br />

public statements of support for its<br />

candidate - outgoing ABRI commander in<br />

chief Try Sutrisno - from the four major<br />

groupings in parliament. At the same time,<br />

Suharto - who is more identified with monopoly<br />

business interests than with the<br />

army - has made no public statement on the<br />

question, continuing to fuel rumours that he<br />

may make a surprise announcement seeking<br />

support for an alternative candidate.<br />

Dissension continues on this issue, especially<br />

inside Golkar, the government<br />

party. Several newspaper editors were<br />

summoned this week by politics and security<br />

minister Sudomo, who reprimanded<br />

them for reporting on the dissension and<br />

disruptions that occurred during a meeting<br />

of the Golkar fraction in the MPR.<br />

According to journalistic sources in<br />

Jakarta, the Golkar caucus divided into a<br />

number of factions, and some speakers were<br />

heckled off the podium. In particular, the<br />

newspapers gave prominence to the charge<br />

by Mrs. Sudharmono, the wife of the<br />

current vice- president, that the caucus was<br />

no longer functioning democratically. There<br />

was no public airing, however, of what the<br />

internal disputes were about. Sudharmono is<br />

thought to be Suharto’s first choice for vicepresident.<br />

Meanwhile, observers are wondering<br />

whether a statement of support for Try by<br />

Suharto’s businessman son, Tommy<br />

Suharto, is a sign that Suharto is willing to<br />

do a deal with the army. According to Green<br />

Left’s sources in Jakarta, Tommy also said<br />

that Suharto was getting tired of ruling. This<br />

was immediately rejected by Suharto’s big<br />

businessman brother, Probosutejo.<br />

It is now unlikely that Suharto will make<br />

his position on the vice-president clear until<br />

he has been confirmed as president for the<br />

next term. Announcing surprise candidates<br />

at the last minute is not a new tactic for<br />

Suharto, and there are reports that one of<br />

the country’s most influential and wellconnected<br />

Muslim figures is saying that<br />

Suharto wants to nominate the new ABRI<br />

commander in chief, Edi Sudradjat - a move<br />

that theoretically might split the leadership.<br />

TRY SUTRISNO IS<br />

TRUSTED SUHARTO MAN,<br />

DEVOUT MUSLIM<br />

(Jakarta, March 11 Kyodo) His defense<br />

in parliament of the Indonesian troops who<br />

shot dozens of demonstrators in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

in November 1991 did no harm within the<br />

Indonesian hierarchy to the reputation of<br />

former armed forces commander Try<br />

Sutrisno.<br />

On Thursday, Try was officially<br />

‘elected’ by acclamation by the 1,000-<br />

member People’s Consultative Assembly,<br />

the country’s highest authority, as the sixth<br />

vice president, and the fifth during the 27-<br />

year regime of President Suharto.<br />

Prior to his election, all five factions in<br />

the assembly had already endorsed him as<br />

the sole vice presidential candidate.<br />

Try, who retired last month as armed<br />

forces chief, is known as a close supporter<br />

of Suharto, as well as a devout Muslim.<br />

Born in Surabaya, the capital of <strong>East</strong><br />

Java, on November 15 1<strong>93</strong>5, Try was<br />

brought up by Javanese parents close to the<br />

schools of Koranic studies, known as<br />

‘pesantren.’<br />

Many leading Indonesian Islamic clergymen<br />

gave their backing for Try’s election<br />

as vice president.<br />

During the past few years, when still<br />

armed forces commander, Try was known<br />

to have visited various rural ‘pesantren’ and<br />

preached in mosques.<br />

In the past two years, Suharto has undertaken<br />

some pro-Muslim measures, among<br />

his own first pilgrimage to Mecca in late<br />

1991, bills to grant more time for Islamic<br />

teaching in the national curriculum, allowing<br />

Muslim girls to wear veils in class, and in<br />

late 1990 approving the creation of the<br />

Indonesian Association of Muslim<br />

Intellectuals, known as ICMI.<br />

In the military, Try’s career to the top<br />

began when he became a leading light at an<br />

army seminar in Bandung, West Java, in the<br />

late 1960s, the early years of Suharto’s New<br />

Order administration.<br />

From 1974 to 1978, he was military adjutant<br />

to Suharto before being promoted to<br />

chief of staff of the Udayana military command<br />

and commander of the Sriwijaya<br />

military command, which oversees several<br />

provinces in Sumatra, in 1982.<br />

He was later appointed commander of<br />

the Jaya military command which oversees<br />

Jakarta.<br />

After being army chief, Try became<br />

commander of the armed forces prior to the<br />

convening of the People’s Consultative<br />

Assembly in March 1988 to reelect Suharto<br />

for a fifth five-year term.<br />

The weekly Tempo magazine described<br />

him as someone who is ‘not so skillful’ at<br />

giving statements to the press.<br />

The English-language daily Jakarta Post<br />

said in its editorial on Wednesday that Try<br />

‘appears to be a rather shy, unassertive<br />

man.’<br />

Try does not seem to have much tolerance<br />

of critics. He said in November that<br />

Indonesian advocates of human rights, democracy<br />

and the environment are the ‘fourth<br />

generation of communists.’<br />

He is married with seven children.<br />

THE END GAME FOR<br />

INDONESIA’S SUHARTO<br />

By Jeffrey A. Winters, Ph.D., University of<br />

Michigan. 17 March 19<strong>93</strong><br />

“The older a coconut gets, the more juice<br />

it has.” Mrs. Tien (“ten percent”) Suharto<br />

recalled this Javanese adage on the occasion<br />

of her husband’s 71st birthday, just one day<br />

before Indonesia’s carefully-staged<br />

plebiscite gave President Suharto’s Golkar<br />

Party its most recent solid victory.<br />

After Kim Il Sung of South Korea,<br />

General Suharto is the longest-reigning head<br />

of state in Asia today. The MPR, the<br />

combined houses of the Indonesian parliament,<br />

convened this month to hand him his<br />

sixth five-year term. The outcome was certain<br />

because Suharto directly appoints fully<br />

60 percent of the 1,000 seats in the MPR.<br />

The remaining 400 were contested in the<br />

June 1992 general election, with Golkar<br />

winning just over two-thirds.<br />

If Suharto has enough juice to hold on<br />

until 1996, he will round out three full decades<br />

at the helm of this island nation of<br />

more than 190 million people.


<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 49<br />

The Price of Stability<br />

One would think that the long and remarkable<br />

political stability under Suharto<br />

(purchased, in part, with the blood of upwards<br />

of a million people following a failed<br />

putsch in the mid 1960s) would be reason<br />

for calm. And yet, there is palpable unease<br />

among interested parties both in Indonesia<br />

and abroad.<br />

The reasons for this are fairly straightforward.<br />

Since independence at the end of<br />

W.W.II, the country has had only two<br />

presidents, with the transfer of power between<br />

them going rather badly. Suharto has<br />

played a shrewd game of elite politics, while<br />

doing everything he could to de-politicize<br />

and de-mobilize the rest of the population.<br />

This allowed investors, both foreign and<br />

domestic, to feel safe and made the<br />

country’s high real growth rates possible.<br />

But the cost has been a striking absence<br />

of basic political development. Suharto,<br />

with his allies in the military, has managed<br />

the country’s “politics of exclusion” personally,<br />

rather than through building strong<br />

political institutions which function no<br />

matter who is in power. This is what makes<br />

the prospect of the portly general’s departure<br />

so disquieting. The legacy of Suharto’s<br />

long and stable rule, ironically, is the real<br />

possibility of instability both as he leaves<br />

and when he is gone.<br />

It is this realization which explains the<br />

tension. And the more one hears diplomats<br />

and business leaders proclaiming their<br />

confidence in Indonesia’s ability to handle<br />

the coming succession, the less convinced<br />

and convincing they sound.<br />

Politics without Political Development<br />

Indonesians are eager to demonstrate that<br />

they have matured politically since the<br />

tumultuous years under Sukarno. There has<br />

not, for instance, been even a hint that the<br />

armed forces might replace Suharto in a<br />

coup. The generals stress that this transition<br />

must proceed according to the constitution -<br />

at least on the face of it.<br />

But no one quite knows what an election<br />

in Indonesia would be like if there were<br />

more than one viable candidate for president.<br />

Only the military and the government’s<br />

Golkar party are permitted to operate<br />

at the village level. The Muslim party (PPP)<br />

and the Democratic party (PDI) would<br />

surely challenge this arrangement if they<br />

suddenly could back their own candidates<br />

for president. That said, most elites in<br />

Indonesia shudder at the thought of a return<br />

to contested politics involving the masses in<br />

anything beyond symbolism.<br />

The election last June was instructive.<br />

The campaign among the three recognized<br />

parties lasted for the specified period of<br />

twenty-five days, followed by a week of<br />

“cool down” (which was hardly needed). No<br />

policy issues were discussed or debated.<br />

The biggest draw at political rallies were not<br />

politicians and candidates, but rather<br />

performers offering the Indonesian equivalent<br />

of country-western music. Even Vice-<br />

Admiral Soedibyo Rahardjo, who stepped<br />

down in July of 1992 as head of the general<br />

staff of the armed forces, lamented the poor<br />

quality of the election campaign. “It was a<br />

lot of dancing and parading, with no political<br />

sophistication,” he said in a private interview.<br />

But should such behavior be surprising<br />

given that ordinary Indonesians only get to<br />

practice their political skills for one month<br />

in every five-year election cycle?<br />

In the past, Suharto has always chosen a<br />

vice president who could not threaten him<br />

politically. Because most Indonesians cannot<br />

imagine a contested presidential election<br />

using the existing political institutions and<br />

practices, there has been much speculation,<br />

and hope, that Suharto will solve the<br />

immediate dilemma by breaking with the<br />

past and designating a clear successor when<br />

he chooses his next vice president. With a<br />

truly viable candidate in the number-two<br />

spot, Suharto could then step aside well before<br />

the 1997-98 election. This way the next<br />

president could assume power constitutionally<br />

and also have time to consolidate<br />

his position politically before having to face<br />

an election. With any luck, goes the thinking<br />

in elite circles, he might also block the<br />

emergence of opposing candidates. In short,<br />

if Suharto plays it the way powerful social<br />

groups hope he will, the vacuum problem<br />

could conceivably be pushed into the next<br />

century.<br />

While this scenario allows for the<br />

Indonesian political system to escape being<br />

tested fully, it shifts the political heat from<br />

the late 1990s to the present.<br />

It remains to be seen how the choice of<br />

former armed forces chief General Try<br />

Sutrisno as the country’s vice- president<br />

will be played out. Some immediate observations<br />

are possible. First, because Sutrisno<br />

is a Muslim, a military man, and Javanese,<br />

he is clearly a viable candidate for the<br />

presidency. Indeed, of all Suharto’s vicepresidents,<br />

this one has the greatest potential<br />

not only for ruling the country, but also<br />

for pushing Suharto out in the event the<br />

transition gets messy. Second, although<br />

Sutrisno is close to Suharto and enjoys the<br />

president’s trust, there are indications that<br />

he may have preferred once again to have a<br />

weaker vice-president – perhaps the former<br />

VP, Sudharmono (who is hated by much of<br />

the military brass) or even the energetic<br />

Minister for Research and Technology ,<br />

Habibie.<br />

Key Considerations<br />

Three issues stand out most prominently<br />

in the dynamics surrounding succession.<br />

The first concerns important political divisions<br />

within Indonesia involving the military,<br />

the bureaucracy, the have and havenots,<br />

and Islam. None of these can be separated<br />

cleanly from the others. Second is<br />

Suharto’s own concerns about the security<br />

of his family once he is out of power. They<br />

have amassed a huge fortune, and their<br />

propensity for grabbing every business opportunity<br />

in sight is trying the patience of<br />

the country’s middle and upper classes.<br />

And third, close attention must be paid to<br />

the role of international economic linkages.<br />

Indonesia’s capital regime is one of the most<br />

open in the Third World, and signs of<br />

political instability would trigger a reaction<br />

from mobile capital which would destabilize<br />

the situation still further.<br />

Political Divisions<br />

The single greatest threat to Suharto to<br />

emerge since the anti-Japanese riots of 1974<br />

is General Benny Murdani, the recently<br />

retired Minister of Defense, the officer<br />

responsible for Indonesia’s brutal invasion<br />

of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> in 1976, and the man behind<br />

the “mysterious killings” in the early 1980s.<br />

Murdani’s strong influence within the armed<br />

forces has set up a divide between Suharto<br />

and the military that complicates the<br />

president’s ability to manage the country’s<br />

politics. To counter Murdani’s power base,<br />

Suharto adopted a two-pronged strategy.<br />

The first was to depend more on Golkar and<br />

one of its leading figures, Sudharmono. But<br />

Golkar, although strongly supported by the<br />

civilian bureaucracy, has proven unable to<br />

draw mass support with its sterile,<br />

technocratic policy agenda.<br />

Suharto has sought to compensate for<br />

this weakness by making overtures to longexcluded<br />

Muslim organizations, which have<br />

a far more substantial and dedicated popular<br />

base than Golkar. This second element of<br />

Suharto’s strategy is significant for two<br />

reasons. First, it means the country’s demobilized<br />

population might be re-mobilized,<br />

and second, it means the political role of<br />

Islam is being augmented considerably.<br />

Suharto, who is not known for his religious<br />

orthodoxy, made a showy pilgrimage to<br />

Mecca, supported the formation of ICMI, a<br />

Muslim intellectuals’ organization (making<br />

Habibie its general chairman), and<br />

encouraged the formation of an Islamic bank<br />

in Jakarta. President “Haji Mohammad”<br />

Suharto also established personal links with<br />

Mohammad Natsir, an Islamic<br />

fundamentalist thought to have direct ties to<br />

the Middle <strong>East</strong>. Opening up to the<br />

Muslims has necessarily signalled a<br />

relaxation of political controls in general,


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with the results that the dominant political<br />

role of the military has been challenged<br />

publicly.<br />

The military do not like these developments.<br />

They displayed their lukewarm support<br />

for Sudharmono’s Golkar machine by<br />

suggesting repeatedly during the June 1992<br />

general election that people can vote for<br />

whomever they prefer. This was a first.<br />

Although Golkar’s victory was secure, ten<br />

seats were lost in <strong>East</strong> Java and eight in<br />

Central Java. Suharto had instructed his<br />

Golkar point man in Jakarta that he wanted<br />

at least 60 percent of the vote in the capital.<br />

Golkar got a disappointing 50 percent. In<br />

response to calls that the military should<br />

properly be in the barracks, the armed<br />

forces made it clear last October that its<br />

social-political role is constitutional and a<br />

reduction in the number of seats in the parliament<br />

reserved for officers is not necessary.<br />

The generals also reiterated their<br />

conviction that the wider Indonesian population<br />

should not be re-politicized at the<br />

village level.<br />

Meanwhile, Suharto’s Muslim card has<br />

begun to backfire– in large part because<br />

religious tensions in the country are inseparable<br />

from economic and racial jealousies.<br />

Ethnic- Chinese Indonesians comprise just<br />

three percent of the population, but control<br />

more than 75 percent of the wealth. They<br />

also happen to be mostly Christian. Last<br />

November a series of attacks on churches<br />

began in <strong>East</strong> Java and North Sumatra,<br />

spreading most recently to Jakarta. The reaction<br />

by the military to these events, which<br />

moderate Muslim leaders claim were<br />

provoked in part by fundamentalist elements<br />

in ICMI, has been swift. Army<br />

troops were deployed when churches were<br />

set ablaze in Jakarta. If this violence<br />

spreads, it will enhance the position of<br />

Benny Murdani in his struggle against the<br />

president and Sudharmono.<br />

The Suharto Family<br />

The greed of the president and his family<br />

emerged in the 1980s as a serious political<br />

liability, particularly as Suharto’s six<br />

children dug themselves ever more deeply<br />

into the country’s economy. Intelligence<br />

sources at the US embassy in Jakarta estimated<br />

in 1989 that Suharto himself was<br />

worth about $15 billion. With his wife and<br />

children the total came to about $30 billion.<br />

And if the president’s circle of civilian and<br />

military cronies was thrown in, the total<br />

came to $60 billion, which was roughly<br />

equivalent to the country’s sovereign foreign<br />

debt. A good portion of this private wealth<br />

is, to be sure, held abroad in accounts in<br />

Singapore and Switzerland.<br />

Indonesians do not get terribly ruffled<br />

about patronage. But they do object to blatant<br />

nepotism when the family members involved<br />

are as insatiable as Suharto’s children<br />

have proven to be. A little skimming is one<br />

thing. But entrepreneurs complain that it is<br />

practically impossible to do business in<br />

Indonesia without giving “the kids” a hefty<br />

cut.<br />

Suharto can endure the criticism and defend<br />

his family’s wealth as long as he is<br />

president. The constraint lies in what might<br />

happen if he steps down. He will certainly<br />

seek a commitment of protection from his<br />

chosen successor. But, as one retired general<br />

explained in a private interview, Suharto<br />

knows from his own experience trying to<br />

protect Sukarno and his family in the late<br />

1960s that such guarantees tend to fall apart<br />

after a year or two.<br />

An additional factor rarely noted when<br />

possible attacks on Suharto’s children are<br />

discussed is that their business interests are<br />

not a strictly domestic matter. Joint-ventures<br />

with powerful international players<br />

have been forged. This means that any post-<br />

Suharto campaign to undermine the<br />

children’s business conglomerates will necessarily<br />

involve confronting their highly<br />

influential global partners. An inexhaustive<br />

list of the companies with which Suharto’s<br />

children have invested jointly would include:<br />

from the U.S., AT&T, General Motors, and<br />

Waste Management International; from<br />

Japan, Marubeni, Mitsui, Showa Denko,<br />

Toyo Engineering, and NEC; from France,<br />

Alcatel; and from South Korea, KIA<br />

Motors.<br />

These arrangements raise the political and<br />

economic stakes of dismantling the First<br />

Family’s conglomerates and represent a set<br />

of circumstances that had no parallel when<br />

Sukarno and his associates fell from power<br />

in the mid 1960s.<br />

International Linkages<br />

The outside world constrains the political<br />

options in Indonesia in more ways than<br />

merely increasing the costs of seizing the<br />

assets of the president’s overstuffed children.<br />

The country’s deep involvement in<br />

international flows of goods and capital, and<br />

the ever-wider relocation options of those<br />

controlling crucial investment resources,<br />

mean that powerful political actors in<br />

Indonesia must weigh their moves carefully.<br />

If capital is spooked – and this applies to<br />

all players, both foreign and domestic, who<br />

are mobile transnationally – Indonesia’s<br />

political leaders must be prepared to endure<br />

the cascading destabilization that could<br />

result from capital flight, severe pressure on<br />

the rupiah, declining investment rates,<br />

slowed production, layoffs in industrial and<br />

service sectors, and a contracting tax base.<br />

This is the tremendous, though often<br />

unwitting, structural power that mobile investors<br />

exert in today’s international political<br />

economy. It is obvious that Suharto possesses<br />

a subtle understanding of these<br />

forces. It remains to be seen in the months<br />

and years ahead if those eager to replace him<br />

do as well.<br />

SUHARTO ANNOUNCES<br />

NEW CABINET<br />

BBC, March 20, 19<strong>93</strong>, Saturday<br />

Radio Republic of Indonesia in Indonesian<br />

Excerpts from 17th March announcement by<br />

President Suharto on new cabinet; live<br />

In the name of Allah the Merciful and the<br />

Compassionate, honourable journalists, my<br />

fellow countrymen: Peace be upon you.<br />

Tonight [17th March], I will announce<br />

my first step after my election by the<br />

People’s Consultative Assembly [MPR] as<br />

president of the Republic of Indonesia on<br />

11th March 19<strong>93</strong>. This pertains to the<br />

composition of a cabinet that I will lead...<br />

The cabinet under my leadership will<br />

strictly adhere to Pancasila as the ideological<br />

foundation, the 1945 Constitution as the<br />

constitutional foundation and the 19<strong>93</strong><br />

Broad Outline of State Policies to be implemented<br />

during the Sixth Five-Year<br />

Development Plan and other MPR resolutions<br />

in force from 19<strong>93</strong> to 1998, including<br />

MPR Resolution No 2/MPR/1978 on<br />

Guidelines on the Perception and<br />

Implementation of Pancasila or Eka<br />

Prasetya Pancakarsa [Sanskrit for “one<br />

loyalty and five aims”] as the operational<br />

foundation.<br />

By understanding these foundations, seriously<br />

attending to the people’s hopes and<br />

wishes and perceiving the spirit of the recent<br />

MPR General Session, I define the<br />

main duties and target of the cabinet in the<br />

next five years as follows:<br />

1. To continue, enhance, deepen and<br />

broaden national development as a means to<br />

implement Pancasila on the basis of the<br />

trilogy of development and the archipelagic<br />

concept to enhance national resilience and<br />

self-reliance.<br />

2. To enhance national discipline to be<br />

pioneered by the state apparatus with a<br />

view to establishing a clean and authoritative<br />

government that will render services to the<br />

Indonesian people.<br />

3. To institutionalize the mechanism of<br />

national leadership on the basis of the 1945<br />

Constitution, the Pancasila ideology,<br />

Pancasila Democracy and the Eka Prasetya<br />

Pancakarsa in state, national and social life.<br />

4. To implement a free and active foreign<br />

policy based on the principles of peaceful<br />

coexistence in bilateral, regional and global


<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 51<br />

relations for the sake of national<br />

development.<br />

5. To hold a direct, general, free and secret<br />

general election in 1997.<br />

These duties are known as Panca Krida<br />

Kabinet Pembangunan [Five Duties of the<br />

Development Cabinet] and I name the<br />

cabinet the Sixth Development Cabinet...<br />

In accordance with the constitutional<br />

provisions, the vice-president is an assistant<br />

to the President. In this regard, I assign the<br />

vice-president to plan and conduct supervision.<br />

Both internal and external supervision<br />

must be continuously enhanced<br />

until it is institutionalized. The internal supervision<br />

to be conducted by the Vice-<br />

President is to reach the first echelon of<br />

departments, offices of state ministers and<br />

non-departmental government agencies. In<br />

addition, the Vice-President is assigned to<br />

supervise large projects. Serious attention<br />

must be paid to ensure that external supervision<br />

proceeds in addition to internal supervision.<br />

For this purpose, the Vice-<br />

President’s office will accommodate all<br />

kinds of information from the general public<br />

and subsequently process and use this as a<br />

resource for necessary measures.<br />

Supervision is necessary to improve government<br />

control and the implementation of<br />

development programmes in general, and to<br />

prevent and suppress abuse of power, wastage<br />

and misappropriations. The full composition<br />

of the Sixth Development Cabinet<br />

is as follows: Minister of Home Affairs<br />

Yogi S. Memet Minister of Foreign Affairs<br />

Ali Alatas S.H. [Master of Law] Minister of<br />

Defence and Security Gen. Edi Sudradjat<br />

Minister of Justice Haji [Islamic title]<br />

Utoyo Usman S.H. Minister of Information<br />

Haji Harmoko Minister of Finance Drs<br />

[Master of Arts] Mari’e Muhammad<br />

Minister of Trade Prof Dr Satrio Budiarjo<br />

Yudono Minister of Industry Ir [Master in<br />

Engineering] T. Aribowo Minister of<br />

Agriculture Dr Ir Syarifudin Baharsyah<br />

Minister of Mining and Energy I.G. Sujana<br />

Minister of Forestry Ir Jamaludin<br />

Suryohadikusumo Minister of Public Works<br />

Ir Radinal Mochtar Minister of<br />

Communications Dr Haryanto Danudirto<br />

Minister of Tourism, Posts and<br />

Telecommunications Joop Ave<br />

Minister of Cooperatives and the<br />

Upbringing of Small Businessmen Drs<br />

Subiyakto (?Cakrawerdaya) Minister of<br />

Manpower Drs Abdul Latief<br />

Minister of Transmigration and Forest<br />

Settlements Ir Siswono Yudohusodo<br />

Minister of Education and Culture Dr Ir<br />

Wargiman Joyonegoro Minister of Health<br />

Prof Dr Suyudi Minister of Religious<br />

Affairs Dr Tarmizi Taher<br />

Minister of Social Affairs Mrs Dra<br />

[Master of Arts] Endang Kusuma Intan<br />

Suweno Minister/State Secretary Drs<br />

Murdiono<br />

Minister of State and Cabinet Secretary<br />

Drs Sayadilah Mursid MPH [Master of<br />

Public Health] Minister of State for<br />

National Development Ir Drs Ginandjar<br />

Planning and Chairman of the National<br />

Planning Development Board Kartasasmita<br />

Minister of State for Research and<br />

Technology, Chairman of the Board for<br />

Technological Application and Research,<br />

and Head of the Strategic Industrial Board<br />

Prof Dr Ir B.T. Habibie<br />

Minister of State for Food Affairs and<br />

Head of the Logistics Board Prof Dr Ibrahim<br />

Hassan<br />

Minister of State for Population and<br />

Head of the National Family Planning Board<br />

Dr Haji Haryono Suyono<br />

Minister of State for Investment and<br />

Chairman of the Investment Coordinating<br />

Board Ir Sanyoto Sastrowardoyo<br />

Minister of State for Agrarian Affairs and<br />

Chairman of the National Land Agency Ir<br />

Sonny Harsono Minister of State for<br />

People’s Housing Ir Akbar Tanjung<br />

Minister of State for Environment Ir<br />

Sarwono Kusumaatmaja Minister of State<br />

for Women’s Affairs Mrs Mien Sugandhi<br />

Minister of State for Youth and Sports<br />

Haryono Isman Minister of State for<br />

Administrative Reform T.B. Silalahi<br />

Coordinating Minister for Economics,<br />

Finance, and Industry and Development<br />

Supervision Prof Dr Saleh Afiff<br />

Coordinating Minister for Industrial and<br />

Trade Affairs Ir Hartarto Coordinating<br />

Minister for Politics and Security Susilo<br />

Sudarman Coordinating Minister for<br />

People’s Welfare Ir Azwar Anas<br />

In addition, there are state officials accorded<br />

ministerial ranks. They are:<br />

Governor of Bank Indonesia [Central Bank]<br />

Dr J. Sudrajat Jiwandono<br />

Commander of the Armed Forces of the<br />

Republic of Indonesia Gen Edi Sudrajat<br />

Attorney General Singgih S.H.<br />

I will swear in the ministers of the Sixth<br />

Development Cabinet, the Attorney General<br />

and the Governor of Bank Indonesia on 19th<br />

March 19<strong>93</strong>. Thank you and peace be upon<br />

you again.<br />

PROFILES OF KEY MEN IN<br />

NEW SUHARTO CABINET<br />

The Straits Times, March 18, 19<strong>93</strong><br />

BYLINE: Paul Jacob, Jakarta<br />

Correspondent<br />

Excerpts<br />

The new Indonesian Cabinet line-up,<br />

named by President Suharto last night, is<br />

aimed at pushing forward his sixth-term goal<br />

of maintaining tried and trusted policies for<br />

economic growth and political stability. The<br />

following are brief sketches of some of the<br />

key men in the line-up:<br />

Co-ordinating Minister for Political<br />

and Security Affairs: General Soesilo<br />

Sudarman, 64.<br />

A long-time Suharto ally and senior<br />

former military man, he was Ambassador to<br />

the United States from 1985 until his recall<br />

in 1988, when he was appointed Minister<br />

for Tourism, Post and Telecommunications.<br />

A retired three-star general, he has served<br />

in key command positions throughout the<br />

country.<br />

Defence and Security Minister: Gen.<br />

Edi Sudradjat, 54.<br />

In appointing the Indonesian armed<br />

forces chief to the concurrent position of<br />

Defence and Security Minister, Mr. Suharto<br />

has reverted to the previous practice of<br />

having one man hold two jobs to ensure<br />

greater efficiency and effectiveness.<br />

He is expected to eventually relinquish<br />

his post of army chief to deputy Wismoyo<br />

Arismundar.<br />

ABRI REASSERTS SELF<br />

By Leah Makabenta<br />

(IPS, Jakarta, March 29) The Indonesian<br />

military is moving ahead to secure its stake<br />

on the national leadership as the country<br />

approaches the end of the Suharto era.<br />

Diplomats and analysts say the armed<br />

forces, known by the acronym ABRI, have<br />

succeeded in strengthening their position in<br />

the complicated maneuvering for the succession<br />

to aging President Suharto, who was<br />

re-elected to a probable last five-year term<br />

this month.<br />

“The way ABRI pulled the vice-presidential<br />

nomination of (former ABRI commander)<br />

Try Sutrisno was masterful. Now it<br />

is in a position to take over when Suharto<br />

goes,” said a Jakarta-based diplomat.<br />

Suharto is only the second president in<br />

Indonesia’s 48-year post-independence<br />

history, taking over from President Sukarno<br />

after crushing a alleged Communist-led coup<br />

attempt in 1965. Thousands of Indonesians<br />

were killed in the anti-Communist purge<br />

that followed, and Suharto has since ruled<br />

the world’s fourth most populous country<br />

with an iron hand, with strong backing from<br />

ABRI. That partnership began to cool<br />

through Suharto’s 27-year rule, however, as<br />

the president built up his own power base<br />

to secure his successive re-elections. Suharto<br />

had been the only candidate in each of the<br />

past six presidential elections.<br />

The 72-year-old former general has won<br />

much credit for bringing political stability<br />

and economic prosperity to his country


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after the turbulent rule of his charismatic<br />

predecessor. But Suharto’s patronage of big<br />

business interests – mostly Chinese – and<br />

Muslim political forces worried ABRI,<br />

which has a strong belief in its role as<br />

guardian of a unified and non- sectarian<br />

state. Analysts say that around the time of<br />

the 1988 presidential election, ABRI had<br />

become concerned that Suharto’s apparent<br />

disinclination to secure the succession<br />

would bring instability, growing unease over<br />

economic inequalities and agitation from the<br />

indigenous Muslim majority. Having failed<br />

to get Suharto to accept their vicepresidential<br />

choice in 1988, ABRI wanted to<br />

see its own man in place to ensure military<br />

dominance.<br />

Their choice fell on Try, who was once<br />

Suharto’s adjutant, but it is by no means<br />

sure that he will be the anointed successor.<br />

“Try is in the best position to succeed, but<br />

Suharto and even ABRI may have other<br />

ideas by then,” said a politician from the<br />

Christian-backed Indonesian Democratic<br />

Party (PDI). The drive to reassert its<br />

authority comes at a particularly crucial<br />

time for ABRI. Since 1990, internal debates<br />

have been going on in ABRI over its dual<br />

role as a civilian and military organization.<br />

The military’s role in politics is fiercely<br />

debated amid the dramatic social changes<br />

that Indonesia is undergoing. The country’s<br />

increasing wealth has brought rising<br />

expectations, clamor for democracy and a<br />

more open political system. Many analysts<br />

who foresee a period of instability in the<br />

post- Suharto era say a military successor is<br />

not necessarily bad. Unlike in other<br />

Southeast Asian countries, the military is<br />

not the most conservative institution here,<br />

said one diplomat. “The level of education<br />

in ABRI is quite high. They think about the<br />

future; they could be a more progressive<br />

force than the politicians in the ruling<br />

Golkar party,” he added.<br />

Even those in anti-government and progressive<br />

circles agree that ABRI’s success in<br />

putting its own vice-presidential candidate<br />

in place is a new, positive factor. “There is a<br />

faction in the army which is for social<br />

change, young generals of the post-Suharto<br />

generation,” said a former political detainee.<br />

“They would like to keep the establishment<br />

intact, but want more democratic freedoms,<br />

less corruption.”<br />

Human-rights lawyer Adnan Buyong<br />

Nasution said that, “Suharto now has to<br />

reckon with another factor. Between the<br />

two forces, the people watch, they don’t<br />

take sides, they see if there are any loopholes<br />

for change.” ABRI has been known to<br />

support the Christian-backed PDI, one of<br />

two officially sanctioned opposition parties.<br />

The other is the Muslim-led United<br />

Development Party (PPP). Ben Mardun, a<br />

PDI representative in the People’s<br />

Consultative Assembly (MPR) says that<br />

from his discussions with the military, he<br />

believes ABRI would be more open to democratization.<br />

“They want to anticipate the<br />

democratization process. They know that<br />

too much power would be very dangerous<br />

for them, they have to democratize,” he<br />

said. But analysts say ABRI has its own<br />

internal problems, including that of discipline.<br />

Many members are said to be engaged in<br />

business, though only on an incidental scale,<br />

and there are many more who reportedly<br />

misuse their power. When it wants to do<br />

something, however, ABRI can do it, said<br />

the diplomat. If it wants to promote<br />

democracy, it can do so, he added. The organization<br />

is also deeply divided, although<br />

Adnan believes it is very well united at<br />

present. Said Adnan: “The fact that ABRI<br />

was able to influence all the other factions in<br />

the MPR (behind Try) – the Muslims, the<br />

PDI, the Golkar and the regional representatives<br />

– showed that the army is a very<br />

united force now.”<br />

SUHARTO EXCLUDES ARMY<br />

FROM CABINET<br />

By Max Lane, Green Left News, March 30<br />

After having being forced to accept the<br />

armed forces (ABRI) vice-presidential<br />

candidate, Try Sutrisno, President Suharto<br />

has chosen a new cabinet which deliberately<br />

excludes figures close to ABRI. It comprises<br />

a select few older political cronies who have<br />

neither a political base nor any political<br />

authority in the eyes of the political elite<br />

and the mass of the population.<br />

The two key political positions went to<br />

retired generals of Suharto’s generation who<br />

owe their long and unspectacular careers to<br />

Suharto. The former transmigration minister,<br />

retired General Soesilo Sudarman, replaces<br />

aged retired Admiral Sudomo as minister for<br />

political and security affairs. The former<br />

governor of West Java, retired General<br />

Yoggie Memet, has been appointed minister<br />

for home affairs.<br />

Green Left Weekly’s Jakarta sources say<br />

that ABRI lobbied unsuccessfully for a<br />

senior political appointment for General<br />

Harsudiyono Hartas, ABRI’s chief spokesperson<br />

on political and social affairs.<br />

By excluding people with ABRI connections,<br />

Suharto is prolonging the conflict with<br />

military headquarters. This guarantees that<br />

ABRI will continue its oppositional role and<br />

will most likely use its representation in<br />

parliament to raise issues that embarrass<br />

Suharto. Thus the military will continue its<br />

contradictory role of being vocal in support<br />

of modest democratic reform in parliament<br />

and in Jakarta while implementing<br />

repressive measures against grassroots<br />

activism and against the movement for selfdetermination<br />

in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

Most of the senior cabinet appointments<br />

in the economic and technocratic ministries<br />

have gone to close associates and collaborators<br />

of Suharto’s initial choice as vicepresident,<br />

industry and technology minister<br />

Habibie. These appointments serve Suharto<br />

in two ways.<br />

First, they keep power away from ABRI<br />

by concentrating control over government<br />

departments in the hands of those most personally<br />

loyal to Suharto. Second, they remove<br />

from the cabinet those economic<br />

ministers closest to the World Bank and<br />

IMF and who have operated as a brake on<br />

the extravagant commercial activities of<br />

Suharto’s children and cronies.<br />

In particular the former senior economic<br />

ministers, such as Ali Wardhana, fought to<br />

postpone or even cancel many mega-projects<br />

initiated by the Suharto children or<br />

cronies and which relied on massive commercial<br />

loans from private foreign banks.<br />

The IMF- World Bank-oriented ministers<br />

always tried to keep foreign borrowing<br />

within the limits set by the consortium of<br />

imperialist governments that decides annually<br />

upon new credits for Indonesia.<br />

The new ministers have a record of supporting<br />

state-guaranteed business megaprojects.<br />

So far ABRI has remained silent on the<br />

cabinet. Economists supporting deregulation<br />

and privatization (excluding privatization<br />

into the hands of the children and cronies)<br />

have stated their concerns about the cabinet.<br />

At the grassroots level, most concern and<br />

contempt has been expressed towards the<br />

new minister for labour, Abdul Latief.<br />

Latief, 53, was the founder and first chairman<br />

of the Young Businessmen’s<br />

Association in 1972-3. He is now the millionaire<br />

managing director of a major Jakarta<br />

department store business. This is the first<br />

time a prominent Jakarta capitalist has been<br />

appointed labour minister.<br />

Comment from John MacDougall: The<br />

headline is misleading. There are nine<br />

Armed Forces members in the Cabinet, 7<br />

Army, 1 Navy, 1 Air Force.<br />

SUHARTO TO ATTEND<br />

G7 SUMMIT?<br />

[Radio Japan/NHK 12 Mar <strong>93</strong>]<br />

The Japanese government has decided to<br />

propose to the Group of Seven industrial<br />

countries that Indonesian President Suharto<br />

be invited to Japan just before the Tokyo<br />

summit in July. The government will make<br />

the proposal on Friday in the Group of


<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 53<br />

Seven three-day working-level meeting in<br />

Hong Kong. Japan will propose to invite<br />

President Suharto to Tokyo prior to the<br />

summit to consider the views of the Non-<br />

Aligned Movement, of which the President<br />

is chairman, but some industrialised nations<br />

are reluctant in invite Mr. Suharto to Tokyo<br />

as a formal participant in the summit.<br />

FROM BRUNO KAHN, MARCH 20:<br />

According to a source, G7 members have<br />

no intention to invite Suharto to attend the<br />

G7. The (non-) move is directed against the<br />

NAM, which is not supposed to “play in<br />

the big ones’ courtyard.” Inviting Suharto in<br />

Tokyo a few days before the summit is<br />

merely a face-saving gesture.<br />

CANADA’S BARBARA<br />

MCDOUGALL: INDONESIA WILL<br />

NOT BE AT G7<br />

Letter from Barbara McDougall, Secretary<br />

of State for External Affairs of Canada, to<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Alert <strong>Network</strong>/Toronto. Full text<br />

Comment: McDougall has decided not to<br />

seek the leadership of the Conservative<br />

party, now up for grabs, and will be retiring<br />

from politics this year. However, she seems<br />

to still be toeing party line on Indonesia.<br />

March 9, 19<strong>93</strong><br />

Thank you for your letter of December 9,<br />

1992, regarding Indonesia.<br />

Indonesia has not been invited to the G-7<br />

summit in July. In its capacity as current<br />

leader of the Non-Aligned Movement,<br />

Indonesia has requested attendance, but to<br />

date this has not been accepted by this<br />

year’s host, Japan.<br />

At the 1992 meeting of the United<br />

Nations Commission on Human Rights<br />

(UNCHR), Canada was instrumental in<br />

achieving a strongly- worded consensus text<br />

condemning Indonesian actions in <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> and demanding an appropriate response.<br />

Canada intends to take a similar<br />

approach in concert with other like-minded<br />

countries during the current UNCHR in<br />

Geneva. This was clearly expressed to<br />

Foreign Minister Alatas in the context of the<br />

Association of Southeast Asian Nations<br />

Post Ministerial Conference in Manila last<br />

July.<br />

Indonesia has announced that in the<br />

spring of 19<strong>93</strong> it will establish a National<br />

commission on Human Rights. Canada<br />

views this as a positive step, but is awaiting<br />

further information about the financing of<br />

this commission and the extent of its independence<br />

from the government.<br />

Thank you once again for writing to express<br />

your concerns.<br />

Yours sincerely,<br />

Barbara McDougall<br />

SUHARTO INTENDS TO ATTEND<br />

SUMMIT<br />

Japan Times April 8, 19<strong>93</strong>, Unabridged<br />

Indonesian President Suharto is determined<br />

to visit Tokyo to address leaders of<br />

the Group of seven nations in July, despite<br />

Japanese pressure to stay away,<br />

government sources said Tuesday.<br />

Japan sent Deputy Foreign Minister<br />

Koichiro Matsuura to Jakarta last weekend<br />

for secret talks, and proposed Suharto meet<br />

Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa as soon as<br />

possible.<br />

But Suharto, who wants to attend the<br />

summit as leader of the Nonaligned<br />

Movement and present its views, did not<br />

accept the offer.<br />

INDONESIA’S NEW<br />

AMBASSADOR TO INDIA<br />

Bio-data on Lieutenant-General Adolf<br />

Sahala Radjagukguk, Indonesian ambassador<br />

to India<br />

From TAPOL, March 26.<br />

In February 19<strong>93</strong>, Lieutenant-General<br />

Sahala Radjagukguk, was appointed<br />

Indonesia’s ambassador to India. It is important<br />

for the international community to<br />

know that this general’s hands are stained<br />

with the blood of the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese people.<br />

An <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese refugee who was held as a<br />

captive at Radjagukguk’s headquarters for<br />

several years described him as “one of the<br />

most murderous Indonesian officers to do<br />

service in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.”<br />

Adolf Sahala Radjagukguk graduated from<br />

the National Military Academy in 1961 and<br />

rose through the ranks as an infantry soldier<br />

and company commander. He served as<br />

commander of the sub-regional military<br />

command, Korem 164/Wira Dharma,<br />

covering the territory of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, from<br />

March 1979 until late 1982. From 1986<br />

until August 1987, he again held<br />

responsibility for <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, this time as<br />

commander of the regional military<br />

command, Kodam IX/Udayana, based in<br />

Bali, whose territory includes <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

Thereafter he became commander of<br />

Kostrad, the Army’s Strategic Command<br />

which controls special, rapid-deployment<br />

infantry battalions for use in ‘troublespots,’<br />

including <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. His last army post<br />

before becoming ambassador to Indonesia<br />

was as deputy chief-of-staff of the army.<br />

He is widely recognised to be a close associate<br />

of General Benny Murdani who<br />

commanded the invasion of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and<br />

has been deeply involved in the military<br />

campaign against <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> ever since.<br />

Radjagukguk’s tour of duty as 164/Wira<br />

Dharma military commander from March<br />

1979 until late 1982<br />

During the period when Lt. General, then<br />

Colonel, Radjagukguk commanded the <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> military command, Indonesia’s war<br />

against the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese resistance<br />

underwent significant change. When he took<br />

over, the leadership of Fretilin’s armed<br />

resistance had just been all but destroyed,<br />

culminating in the murder of Nicolau<br />

Lobato, chairman of Fretilin on 31<br />

December 1978.<br />

However, Fretilin forces quickly regrouped<br />

under their new leader, Xanana<br />

Gusmão and by early 1981 were again<br />

posing a serious challenge to the army of<br />

occupation, now commanded by<br />

Radjagukguk. The armed resistance was<br />

fighting under very different circumstances<br />

however; by now, after some 200,000 <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese had been killed during the army’s<br />

ground and aerial ‘encirclement and annihilation<br />

campaign’ of the late 1970s, most of<br />

the surviving population had been driven<br />

into encampments (pemukiman) under army<br />

control. Fretilin forces, now fighting a<br />

classic guerrilla war with highly mobile units<br />

against the army of occupation, were able to<br />

establish a network of contacts with the<br />

encampments where the population was<br />

forced to live.<br />

By early 1981, Fretilin forces had again<br />

become such a threat that Radjagukguk<br />

launched a huge fence-of-legs [pagar-betis]<br />

campaign against the guerrilla forces. During<br />

this campaign, tens of thousands of <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese men over 14 years old were forced<br />

to participate in a mass encirclement. A<br />

huge circle was created, covering much of<br />

the countryside, using <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese who<br />

moved forward in order to drive the<br />

guerrillas back and eventually corner them.<br />

As a military operation, Radjagukguk’s<br />

fence-of-legs was a failure, largely because<br />

the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese required to take part did<br />

what they could to help guerrillas escape,<br />

rather than handing them over to the army.<br />

However, pagar betis caused serious<br />

hardship and more casualties for those<br />

forced to take part, many of whom returned<br />

home ill and exhausted through lack of food.<br />

The absence of men from their homes also<br />

had a devastating impact on food production<br />

in and around the pemukiman.<br />

It was this campaign that caused the then<br />

Apostolic Administrator of Dili, Msgr.<br />

Martinho da Costa Lopes, to start speaking<br />

out against the forces of occupation, leading<br />

to his eventual enforced retirement in 1983.<br />

Later, after leaving <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, Msgr. da<br />

Costa Lopes told TAPOL: “During the<br />

three months of July, August and<br />

September (1981), all the people, all the<br />

males from young boys to men in their fif-


Page 54 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

ties, were away on these operations. They<br />

returned home weak and exhausted. As a<br />

result, the fields were not prepared for<br />

planting new crops... Indeed there was a<br />

serious shortage of food during those years,<br />

1981 and 1982.” [TAPOL Bulletin, No. 59,<br />

September 1983]<br />

The <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese refugee quoted above,<br />

Cristiano Costa, who is now living in<br />

Australia, had been captured by the army in<br />

1979 and was one of those forced to take<br />

part in the pagar betis campaign.<br />

After the failure of this campaign, the<br />

army under Radjagukguk’s command developed<br />

a new strategy to isolate the guerrillas<br />

in the bush from the centres of population<br />

under Indonesian control. The details<br />

of this strategy became known through the<br />

capture of nine secret military documents<br />

which were smuggled to the outside world.<br />

Some of the documents were signed by then<br />

colonel Radjagukguk and some by his chief<br />

of intelligence, Major Williem da Costa.<br />

They explained how the population must be<br />

monitored at all times, prevented from<br />

travelling out of the pemukiman, and forced<br />

to reveal the whereabouts of relatives<br />

fighting with the resistance. One document<br />

instructed troops on the conduct of interrogation<br />

teams towards captured guerrillas and<br />

the use of torture. This document<br />

[PROTAP/B-1/VII/1982], which was signed<br />

by Colonel Radjagukguk himself, became the<br />

basis for a major campaign by Amnesty<br />

International, exposing the officiallyendorsed<br />

use of torture by the Indonesian<br />

army of occupation in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

All nine documents were reproduced in<br />

English translation, in The War Against <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>, by Carmel Budiardjo and Liem Soei<br />

Liong, Zed Books, 1984.<br />

Hence, Lt.-General Radjagukguk’s two<br />

major contributions to Indonesia’s campaign<br />

to crush the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese resistance were<br />

the 1981 pagar betis campaign and the<br />

campaign to control centres of population.<br />

The latter campaign continued to be the<br />

backbone of Indonesian strategy in <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> for many years after Lt. General<br />

Radjagukguk ended his tour of duty as<br />

164/Wira Dharma Korem commander.<br />

London, 26 March 19<strong>93</strong><br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese wherever they are who have<br />

personal experience or recollections of Adolf<br />

Sahala Radjagukguk are kindly requested to<br />

write this down and send it as a response to<br />

this topic or, if they wish to maintain their<br />

anonymity, to send it in confidence to<br />

TAPOL, 111 Northwood Rd, Thornton<br />

Heath, Surrey CR7 8HW, UK<br />

HUMAN RIGHTS:<br />

BACKGROUND PAPERS<br />

INDONESIA/EAST TIMOR<br />

A NEW ORDER?<br />

HUMAN RIGHTS IN 1992 (AI)<br />

Due to space limitations, we cannot reprint<br />

the 20-plus page report, dated February<br />

19<strong>93</strong>. It is designed as AI Index: ASA<br />

21/03/<strong>93</strong>, and is available from Amnesty<br />

International offices around the world. A few<br />

sections follow.<br />

INTRODUCTION<br />

In the past year the Indonesian<br />

Government has taken a number of unprecedented<br />

initiatives which appear to<br />

signal a positive shift in its attitude toward<br />

human rights. Yet the grim factual record of<br />

human rights practice in 1992 tells a different<br />

story. Political killing,<br />

“disappearance,” torture, arbitrary detention,<br />

political imprisonment and the use of<br />

the death penalty have continued without<br />

significant interruption, despite intermittent<br />

changes in the level and nature of violations<br />

reported in particular regions. The violations<br />

have not been confined to <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> but<br />

have occurred throughout the territory under<br />

Indonesian rule.<br />

Government forces extrajudicially executed<br />

and “disappeared” scores of alleged<br />

supporters of independence in Aceh and<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> in 1992, as well as criminal<br />

suspects in Jakarta and other cities. Torture<br />

and ill-treatment of political detainees,<br />

peaceful demonstrators and criminal suspects<br />

continued to be common and resulted<br />

in some deaths. Hundreds of people were<br />

arrested and held without trial for up to two<br />

years as suspected opponents of the government.<br />

More than 180 suspected government<br />

opponents were prisoners of conscience,<br />

including some 30 sentenced during<br />

the year. At least 300 political prisoners,<br />

and possibly many more, continued to serve<br />

lengthy sentences imposed after unfair<br />

trials. Twenty-two political prisoners were<br />

judicially executed between 1985 and 1992,<br />

most after serving more than twenty years<br />

in jail, and seven political prisoners<br />

remained on death row.<br />

This report examines the record of human<br />

rights practice in Indonesia and <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

since the Santa Cruz massacre of November<br />

1991. It finds that there has been no<br />

fundamental change in the government’s<br />

repressive posture toward political dissent,<br />

and that basic human rights continue to be<br />

violated in the name of national security,<br />

stability and order. It also finds that the<br />

government’s human rights initiatives, while<br />

certainly a step in the right direction, have<br />

not addressed the root causes of human<br />

rights abuse. The report concludes that<br />

human rights abuse has become institutionalized<br />

in Indonesia and <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, and<br />

that concrete measures are urgently needed<br />

to remedy the problem. To this end,<br />

Amnesty International offers a number of<br />

practical recommendations to the Indonesian<br />

Government and to the United Nations<br />

Commission on Human Rights which, if<br />

implemented, it believes would contribute to<br />

the future protection and promotion of<br />

human rights.<br />

1. AN OVERVIEW OF HUMAN RIGHTS<br />

IN 1992<br />

The gravest violations of human rights<br />

reported to Amnesty International in the<br />

past year have occurred in the context of<br />

counter-insurgency operations in <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> and Aceh, where the government has<br />

continued to face both peaceful and armed<br />

opposition to its rule. In these areas, military<br />

authorities have been free to employ<br />

virtually any means - including unlawful<br />

execution, “disappearance,” arbitrary detention<br />

and torture - in the interest of<br />

maintaining national security, and destroying<br />

what the government calls Gerakan<br />

Pengacau Keamanan (Security Disruptors<br />

Movements). Yet, as the evidence in this<br />

report demonstrates, the human rights<br />

problem is not confined to areas of rebel<br />

activity. Serious violations occur throughout<br />

the country, including on the most populous<br />

island of Java and in the major cities. Here,<br />

too, it is the logic of national security which<br />

is frequently used to justify violations by<br />

government security forces.<br />

The most widely reported human rights<br />

abuses have occurred in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, the<br />

former Portuguese colony invaded by<br />

Indonesia in 1975, and still occupied in defiance<br />

of United Nations General Assembly<br />

and Security Council resolutions. In<br />

Amnesty International’s view, the human<br />

rights situation there has not improved since<br />

the Santa Cruz massacre of 12 November<br />

1991, in which at least 100 peaceful<br />

demonstrators, and possibly many more,<br />

were killed by Indonesian forces. While<br />

there has been no single incident on a<br />

comparable scale in the past year, the<br />

overall pattern of human rights violations -<br />

encompassing short term detention, torture<br />

and ill-treatment of suspected political opponents,<br />

intermittent political killings and<br />

“disappearances,” long-term political imprisonment<br />

after unfair trials, and the intimidation<br />

of relatives and human rights<br />

workers - has continued unabated.<br />

Far less well known, and certainly less<br />

widely reported, has been the pattern of


<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 55<br />

grave violations in Aceh, where an armed<br />

secessionist movement, Aceh Merdeka, has<br />

been active since early 1989. Aceh Merdeka<br />

is reported to have committed some abuses<br />

against the civilian population; Amnesty<br />

International condemns these unreservedly.<br />

However, human rights violations by government<br />

forces in Aceh have been both more<br />

systematic and more widespread. An<br />

estimated 2,000 civilians, including children<br />

and the very elderly, have been unlawfully<br />

killed, sometimes in public executions;<br />

hundreds, possibly thousands of villagers<br />

have been arbitrarily arrested on the merest<br />

suspicion of supporting Aceh Merdeka;<br />

many of those detained have been held<br />

incommunicado for long periods, and<br />

subjected to ill-treatment and torture to extract<br />

confessions or political intelligence;<br />

and more than 50 have been sentenced to<br />

lengthy prison sentences after unfair trials,<br />

including some who neither used nor advocated<br />

violence.<br />

The absolute level of political killings and<br />

other violations reported from Aceh has<br />

subsided somewhat in the past year.<br />

However, in Amnesty International’s view,<br />

it would be wrong to conclude from this<br />

evidence that there is no longer a serious<br />

human rights problem in the area, or that the<br />

situation does not warrant urgent international<br />

concern. There are at least three<br />

reasons why.<br />

First, as the evidence in this report suggests,<br />

grave violations do continue, even if<br />

on a reduced scale. That the cases of political<br />

killing, “disappearance” and arbitrary<br />

arrest reported in 1992 were in the scores<br />

rather than the hundreds or thousands is<br />

small consolation to the victims, or to the<br />

relatives of those killed or still missing.<br />

Second, the relative “peace and order” which<br />

now prevails in Aceh does not appear to<br />

reflect any significant change in the policies<br />

or practices of the Indonesian security<br />

forces. It reflects, rather, a significant decline<br />

in open opposition to the government and a<br />

pervasive fear of government retribution on<br />

the part of ordinary people living in areas of<br />

suspected rebel activity. Under the<br />

circumstances, a pattern of grave and<br />

widespread violations may quickly reemerge<br />

in the event of renewed opposition<br />

to Indonesian rule. Third, thorough, independent<br />

and impartial investigations of the<br />

violations committed over the past four<br />

years have not yet been carried out, nor<br />

have the suspected perpetrators been<br />

brought to justice. Not only does this leave<br />

unresolved the fate of thousands of victims,<br />

it sends a clear message to the perpetrators<br />

that such violations can be committed with<br />

impunity, thereby making future violations<br />

even more likely to occur.<br />

The same combination of factors which<br />

has given rise to serious violations in Aceh<br />

and <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> has also been evident outside<br />

the areas of rebel activity. Taken together,<br />

the pervasive rationale of national<br />

security, the preponderant influence of the<br />

military, and the failure to investigate abuses<br />

and bring the suspected perpetrators to<br />

justice, has contributed to the institutionalization<br />

of a pattern of grave human<br />

rights abuse throughout the country.<br />

...<br />

9. CONCLUSIONS AND<br />

RECOMMENDATIONS<br />

The Indonesian authorities have stated<br />

that the November 1991 Santa Cruz massacre<br />

in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> was an isolated incident,<br />

an unfortunate aberration in an otherwise<br />

acceptable pattern of behaviour by government<br />

security forces. However, the information<br />

available to Amnesty International<br />

indicates that this is far from the truth. In<br />

the quarter of a century since the current<br />

regime came to power, the Government of<br />

Indonesia has been responsible for a staggering<br />

range of violations of human rights, of<br />

which the November 1991 massacre was<br />

only one of the most widely publicized examples.<br />

Extrajudicial execution,<br />

“disappearance,” political imprisonment,<br />

torture and the death penalty have become<br />

part of an institutional repertoire for dealing<br />

with political dissent and other perceived<br />

threats to national security, stability and<br />

order throughout the country. Amnesty<br />

International believes that, unless concrete<br />

measures are taken promptly, there is every<br />

likelihood that this pattern of abuse will<br />

continue.<br />

Amnesty International offers the following<br />

recommendations which, if implemented,<br />

it believes would contribute toward the<br />

future protection of basic human rights in<br />

Indonesia and <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. Most of the<br />

recommendations are based on the<br />

principles and standards enshrined in international<br />

human rights law, particularly the<br />

International Covenant on Civil and Political<br />

Rights (ICCPR) and the Convention against<br />

Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or<br />

Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT).<br />

Some of the recommendations are also based<br />

on standards set out in the following United<br />

Nations (UN) instruments: The Body of<br />

Principles for the Protection of All Persons<br />

under Any Form of Detention or<br />

Imprisonment, adopted by the UN General<br />

Assembly in December 1988; and The<br />

Principles on the Effective Prevention and<br />

Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and<br />

Summary Executions, adopted by the UN<br />

Economic and Social Council in May 1989.<br />

Recommendations to the Government of<br />

Indonesia<br />

To prevent the occurrence of extra-judicial<br />

execution, Amnesty International urges<br />

the government to:<br />

1. prohibit by law all extra-legal, arbitrary<br />

and summary executions and ensure that<br />

any such executions are recognized as<br />

criminal offenses and are punishable by<br />

penalties which take into account the<br />

seriousness of such offenses;<br />

2. invite the UN Special Rapporteur on<br />

summary or arbitrary executions to visit<br />

Indonesia and <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> in order to<br />

conduct a full investigation of the human<br />

rights situation there;<br />

To protect detainees against torture,<br />

other ill-treatment or “disappearance,”<br />

Amnesty International urges the government<br />

to:<br />

3. ensure that all detainees, including those<br />

held for suspected national security offenses,<br />

are permitted prompt and regular<br />

access to legal counsel of their choice and<br />

to doctors and relatives;<br />

4. establish and maintain centralized public<br />

registers of all people detained in all parts<br />

of the country, to be updated on a regular<br />

basis and made available to detainees,<br />

family and lawyers;<br />

5. prohibit explicitly by law, all forms of<br />

torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading<br />

treatment or punishment; and<br />

ensure that all such acts are recognized as<br />

criminal offenses and are punishable by<br />

appropriate penalties which take into<br />

account the seriousness of such offenses;<br />

6. take all necessary steps, including the<br />

effective enforcement of existing legislation<br />

and the introduction of further<br />

legislation, to ensure that statements<br />

extracted under torture cannot be admitted<br />

as evidence during legal proceedings,<br />

except against a person accused of torture<br />

as evidence that the statement was made.<br />

7. invite the UN Special Rapporteur on<br />

Torture to conduct a follow-up visit to<br />

Indonesia and <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, to assess implementation<br />

of the recommendations set<br />

out in the report of his November 1991<br />

visit.<br />

To ensure that national security interests<br />

are not and cannot be invoked to imprison,<br />

or justify execution of, people for the<br />

peaceful exercise of their right to freedom of<br />

expression, Amnesty International urges the<br />

government to:<br />

8. conduct a thorough review of all legislation<br />

pertaining to national security and<br />

public order, and promptly repeal the<br />

Anti-Subversion Law;


Page 56 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

9. release immediately and unconditionally<br />

all those held solely for the non-violent<br />

expression of their political or religious<br />

views;<br />

10 take immediate steps toward the abolition<br />

of the death penalty, including the<br />

suspension of its application and commutation<br />

of all sentences currently imposed.<br />

To ensure that members of the security<br />

forces cannot commit human rights violations<br />

with impunity, Amnesty International<br />

urges the government to:<br />

11 bring to justice before a civilian court all<br />

members of the security forces suspected<br />

of committing human rights violations;<br />

12 ensure that all those suspected of<br />

committing human rights violations are<br />

immediately disarmed and removed from<br />

active service;<br />

13 establish an independent and impartial<br />

body whose duty is to initiate prompt<br />

and thorough investigations into all reports<br />

of human rights violations.<br />

To demonstrate commitment to international<br />

human rights standards, and to encourage<br />

their full and effective implementation,<br />

Amnesty International urges the<br />

government to:<br />

14 ratify or accede to the International<br />

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights<br />

(ICCPR), as well as the (first) Optional<br />

Protocol of the ICCPR, which permits<br />

the Human Rights Committee to receive<br />

individual complaints;<br />

15 ratify or accede to the Convention against<br />

Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or<br />

Degrading Treatment or Punishment<br />

(CAT) and recognize the competence of<br />

the UN Committee against Torture to<br />

receive individual complaints (article 22),<br />

and to hear inter-state complaints (article<br />

21);<br />

16 permit the regular and unhindered<br />

monitoring of human rights in Indonesia<br />

and <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> by national and international<br />

humanitarian and human rights<br />

organizations, including Amnesty<br />

International;<br />

17 Welcome international observers at political<br />

trials.<br />

Recommendations to the UN<br />

Commission on Human Rights<br />

In view of the grave concern about human<br />

rights in Indonesia and <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> expressed<br />

in a consensus statement at the 48th<br />

Session of the UN Commission on Human<br />

Rights, and in Resolution 1992/20 of the<br />

44th Session of the UN Sub-Commission,<br />

Amnesty International urges the UN<br />

Commission on Human Rights to:<br />

1. seek a systematic follow up, through the<br />

UN Commission on Human Rights, to<br />

the January 1992 report of the Special<br />

Rapporteur on Torture on his visit to<br />

Indonesia and <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>;<br />

2. seek a full report to the UN Commission<br />

on Human Rights by the UN Secretary-<br />

General regarding the results of the visit<br />

to <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> in February 1992 by his<br />

emissary Mr. Amos Wako;<br />

3. encourage the Government of Indonesia<br />

to invite the UN Special Rapporteur on<br />

summary or arbitrary executions, and the<br />

Working Group on Arbitrary Detention,<br />

to visit Indonesia and <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> in order<br />

to conduct full investigations of the<br />

human rights situation there;<br />

4. seek effective means whereby the regular<br />

monitoring of the human rights situation<br />

in Indonesia and <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> under UN<br />

auspices can be assured.<br />

5. urge the Indonesian Government to<br />

permit the regular and unhindered<br />

monitoring of human rights in Indonesia<br />

and <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> by national and international<br />

humanitarian and human rights<br />

organizations, including Amnesty<br />

International;<br />

6. encourage the Government of Indonesia<br />

to ratify or accede to the International<br />

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights<br />

(ICCPR), as well as the (first) Optional<br />

Protocol of the ICCPR, which permits<br />

the Human Rights Committee to receive<br />

individual complaints;<br />

7. encourage the Government of Indonesia<br />

ratify or accede to the Convention against<br />

Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or<br />

Degrading Treatment or Punishment<br />

(CAT) and recognize the competence of<br />

the UN Committee against Torture to<br />

receive individual complaints (article 22),<br />

and to hear inter-state complaints (article<br />

21).<br />

THE HUMAN RIGHTS CRISIS<br />

IN EAST TIMOR: REGIONAL<br />

AND GLOBAL<br />

PERSPECTIVES<br />

From Newsletter, February 19<strong>93</strong>, published<br />

by the Student Union of Hannover<br />

University, Germany<br />

by Shambhu Chopra, Jurist, member of the<br />

International Council of the International<br />

Platform of Jurist for <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

Introduction<br />

In this paper, I have thought to focus<br />

upon some of the regional and global perspectives<br />

of the human rights crisis in <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> and to offer some suggestions for<br />

finding a peaceful solution to this highly<br />

vexatious issue. The array of highly distinguished<br />

jurist, professors and intellectuals<br />

assembled here at this august gathering have,<br />

studied the various dimensions of the<br />

Indonesian occupation of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and<br />

would be placing their analyses, deductions<br />

as well as their suggestions for ending the<br />

occupation within the scope and ambit of<br />

international law and the applicable international<br />

instruments concerning this subject.<br />

In my humble view, apart from the other<br />

legal perspectives, the human rights perspective<br />

is perhaps the most vital significance<br />

as it would also encompass the relevant<br />

legal questions and issues concerning us<br />

today, which may be brought up for discussion<br />

by other learned speakers.<br />

I have attempted to briefly focus first<br />

upon the human rights dimension, and then<br />

on the regional and global dimensions, and,<br />

finally, have tried to put forward for consideration<br />

some suggestions which could<br />

form the basis for deciding about a possible<br />

course of action for finding a permanent,<br />

peaceful and negotiated settlement of the<br />

human rights crisis in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

At the very outset, I wish to be pardoned<br />

for my rather simplistic approach to this<br />

subject, which has indeed drawn the attention<br />

of very eminent jurists and scholars and<br />

has been studied in-depth from almost all<br />

angels and perspectives. As a public interest<br />

lawyer and as a human rights activist, it is<br />

rather difficult not to get emotionally<br />

affected whenever one thinks of the terrible<br />

sufferings of the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese people and<br />

of their sad plight especially at a time when<br />

we are fast approaching the 21st Century.<br />

The Human Rights Approach<br />

It is a self-evident truism that almost all<br />

the international instruments on human<br />

rights existing today including the Universal<br />

Declaration of Human Rights, the two<br />

Covenants, the U.N. Charter, as well as the<br />

various U.N. Security Council and General<br />

Assembly Resolutions and Declarations<br />

have been violated by Indonesian<br />

Occupation Forces, blatantly and with<br />

impunity in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

Thousands of men, women and children<br />

have been killed, injured or tortured ever<br />

since the occupation began and despite<br />

worldwide condemnation, the atrocities<br />

being committed upon the innocent people<br />

there continue unabated. The recent farcical<br />

trials of the youth arrested in November<br />

1991, agitations and demonstrations resulting<br />

in the Santa Cruz Massacre, have shown<br />

without any shadow of a doubt that the<br />

Indonesian Authorities have no desire to<br />

give up their hold over, and control of <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>.


<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 57<br />

In my perception and to the best of my<br />

knowledge, the current situation in <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> represents a human rights tragedy<br />

with few parallels in human history. The<br />

denial of the Right to self-determination and<br />

the denial of the Right to development has<br />

reduced the people of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> since the<br />

past four centuries, first under Portuguese<br />

rule and later under Indonesian rule, to a<br />

state of virtual slavery. Apart from the legal,<br />

political, economic and other considerations,<br />

the human rights crisis in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

remains a matter of the gravest concern and<br />

the world community should focus its<br />

attention upon it as well as to make efforts<br />

to stop forthwith the violations of the<br />

human rights of the people of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. It<br />

is indeed a very sad commentary that<br />

despite the several international instruments<br />

of human rights in existence today, there are<br />

still certain peoples on this earth who are<br />

still suffering under colonial yoke. Any<br />

discussion on the legal questions of<br />

Indonesia’s occupation of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> must<br />

necessarily, therefore, embrace and<br />

encompass the human rights perspective<br />

since any strategy for its liberation from<br />

colonial rule, must take into account the full<br />

restoration of all the human rights of its<br />

native population.<br />

Colonization by former colonies<br />

To a keen observer of history and of international<br />

affairs, it would be apparent that<br />

almost all post world war II attempts at<br />

colonization have been made by countries<br />

which were former colonies themselves. We<br />

have the example of Tibet occupied by<br />

China, a former colony of Japan and<br />

England, and, of Western Sahara by<br />

Morocco, a former colony of France. <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> is a colony of Indonesia and so is<br />

West Papua and West Irian, which was itself<br />

a colony of Holland. Colonization by<br />

Western Powers ended in the aftermath of<br />

World War II, following the independence of<br />

India in 1947. Soon thereafter, as if by cue,<br />

one after another almost all former colonies<br />

became independent. However, China’s<br />

occupation of Tibet is a little different from<br />

Indonesia’s occupation of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. Tibet<br />

was an independent sovereign country with<br />

the Dalai Lama as its Head of State, before<br />

China forcibly occupied it. <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, as<br />

we all very well know, was under<br />

Portuguese control and the election process<br />

was underway before Indonesia occupied it.<br />

We also have the example of some former<br />

European colonies which after<br />

independence, got absorbed into, or merged<br />

with larger or bigger former colonies. For<br />

example, Goa’s merger with India, the cessation<br />

of certain French enclaves with India<br />

like the enclave of Pondicherry and<br />

Dahomey’s incorporation of the Portuguese<br />

enclave of Sao João Batista de Ajuda.<br />

However, it must be noted here that absorption<br />

appeared to be the only logical result<br />

for these enclaves, although, a small size<br />

or lack of economic viability cannot detract<br />

from the right of a former colony to achieve<br />

independence. And <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> by no<br />

stretch of imagination, could be said to be an<br />

“enclave” of Portugal, just as the assumption<br />

of control over Hong Kong and<br />

Macao by China cannot be said, by the<br />

same yardstick, to be a part of Chinese<br />

territory, and their peoples cannot be<br />

viewed as not having any rights to self-determination.<br />

As Judge Nagendra Singh noted<br />

in the Western Sahara Case:<br />

“Thus even if integration of territory<br />

was demanded by an interested<br />

state, as in this case, it could not be<br />

had without ascertaining the freely<br />

expressed will of the people - the very<br />

sine qua non of all decolonisation.”<br />

(Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion,<br />

I.C.J. Reports 1975, Page 12 at 81).<br />

The Declaration on the Granting of<br />

Independence to Colonial Countries and<br />

Peoples in 1960 adopted by the General<br />

Assembly vide G.A. Resolution No. 1514,<br />

15 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 16), UN DOC<br />

A/4684 (1960) first evolved this principle<br />

which was premised on the “necessity of<br />

bring to a speedy and unconditional end<br />

colonialism in all its forms and manifestations”<br />

(See preamble, para 2 Resn. No.<br />

1514).<br />

Ten years later in 1970, the legal questions<br />

arising in the Declaration on Colonial<br />

Countries were further clarified in the<br />

Declaration on Principles of International<br />

Law concerning Friendly relations and Cooperation<br />

among States in accordance with<br />

the Charter of the United Nations (G.A.<br />

Resn. 2625, UN. Doc. A/5217 (1970) at<br />

121. Here, too, it was clearly premised that<br />

the future status of the territory should be<br />

determined by the free and genuine expression<br />

of the will of its contemporary inhabitants.<br />

Based on all these considerations,<br />

it is my firm view that international law is<br />

hospitable to, and sanctions, claims of selfdetermination<br />

and independence by an<br />

ethnic community like <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> which<br />

fulfills all the requirements for “self-governance,”<br />

as envisaged by general Assembly<br />

Resolution No. 1541 (XV) and General<br />

Assembly resolution No. 1514 of the<br />

United Nations.<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> - A Regional Perspective<br />

The world is witnessing today very fast<br />

moving changes. The break up of the Soviet<br />

Union and the fall of the communist regimes<br />

in <strong>East</strong>ern Europe on the one hand and the<br />

emergence of Namibia as an independent<br />

sovereign state, are harbingers of a new era<br />

in international affairs. The dismantling of<br />

the remaining bastions of apartheid in South<br />

Africa is another positive development in<br />

this direction. The firm U.N. reaction to<br />

Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait and the<br />

Security Council’s resolutions permitting<br />

military action to drive out Iraq’s<br />

occupation forces is an example of swift<br />

reaction to attempts or re-colonization.<br />

Like Iraq’s false and baseless claims of<br />

historical bonds with Kuwait, Indonesia too<br />

has tried to mask its occupation of <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> on similar false and unjustifiable<br />

grounds. In all fairness, it should be noted<br />

that the U.N. General Assembly called for<br />

the withdrawal of Indonesian troops from<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and reaffirmed <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>’s<br />

right to self-determination (See G.A. Resn.<br />

3485, 30 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 34) 118,<br />

UN Doc. A /10034 (1975); SC Resn. 384,<br />

30 UN SCOR, Resolutions and Decisions<br />

10, UN Doc. S/Resn./384 (1975). Yet <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> continues to remain firmly in control<br />

over it with no signs of any let up despite<br />

world-wide pressure and condemnation.<br />

While governments, scholars and diplomats<br />

may debate the legal questions arising<br />

from Indonesia’s occupation of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>,<br />

and whether or not it is limited to colonial<br />

situations, the ground reality is that <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> continues to reel under foreign yoke.<br />

The sad tragedy of the situation is the <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> is nobody’s baby. It holds no special<br />

economic or strategic interest for Western<br />

Powers, like Kuwait does so as to precipitate<br />

military retaliation to them. It also bears<br />

no security or humanitarian risks for any<br />

neighbouring country like Bangladesh which<br />

eventually gave birth to a new nation in<br />

Asia. Moreover, <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> cannot also be<br />

said to be part of any larger territory of<br />

some sovereign state in order to bring about<br />

a merger or absorption into it as was the<br />

case with Goa, Daman and Diu, which being<br />

an integral part-and-parcel of India since<br />

ancient times, finally merged into India after<br />

liberation from almost four centuries of<br />

Portuguese occupation.<br />

Perhaps the nearest comparison to the<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> situation could be made with<br />

that of the forcible occupation of Tibet by<br />

China. International law experts could well<br />

find several legal or other parallels in the<br />

two fact-situations, although prior to the<br />

Chinese occupation, Tibet was an independent<br />

country. China’s long occupation<br />

of Tibet since 1949-50 and its ethnic<br />

cleansing of Tibetan culture and religion has<br />

provoked consistent world reaction. Yet,<br />

there has been no tangible outcome of the<br />

outcry against human rights violations in<br />

Tibet. The Government of India, unfortunately,<br />

and for reasons perhaps known<br />

best to it, has termed China’s political<br />

domination and subjugation of Tibet as


Page 58 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

China’s own internal matter although it has<br />

provided political asylum to the Dalai Lama<br />

and thousands of Tibetan refugees in India.<br />

Hence, it would be significant to note here<br />

that, given its special responsibility of<br />

monitoring peace and liberty world-wide,<br />

unless the United nations takes upon itself<br />

the onerous task of freeing all occupied<br />

territories on this Earth, fortified as it is<br />

with several General Assembly resolutions,<br />

declarations and mandates under its own<br />

charter, countries like <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, Tibet,<br />

Western Sahara, West Papua and all other<br />

colonized territories would continue to suffer<br />

the same fate which scores of newly<br />

independent countries once had to suffer in<br />

the colonial era.<br />

The Role of the United Nations<br />

While it is not my desire or intention to<br />

comment upon the functioning of the United<br />

Nations at this forum or even to offer a<br />

critique of its many successes and failures, I<br />

perceive that there is undoubtedly an urgent<br />

need today to review and to reconsider the<br />

question whether the World Body has<br />

adequately subserved the fundamental<br />

interests of the entire world community<br />

instead of only those few select nations<br />

which are in a strong position either to<br />

dominate or to influence the decision-making<br />

processes inside the UNO. Perhaps the<br />

question of enlarging the membership of the<br />

Security Council to make it more<br />

representative of the world community, as<br />

is being raised in many quarters, and in<br />

particular, by India, Germany and Japan,<br />

does not seem to be without sound reasoning<br />

or proper purpose. It might well provide<br />

some food for thought for the distinguished<br />

gathering here to seriously consider as to<br />

how can the Security Council be made, not<br />

only be more representative of peoples from<br />

all the continents on this globe, but also as<br />

to how could it be made more reflective of<br />

fulfilling the needs and aspirations of the<br />

millions of poverty-stricken, impoverished<br />

and subjugated peoples in many parts of the<br />

world. It should not, in this age and time,<br />

become the handmaiden of a few powerful<br />

western colonial power-brokers.<br />

A Global Perspective of the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

Crisis<br />

Against this backdrop, it would perhaps<br />

be more appropriate to view the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

issue not in isolation, but from a global<br />

perspective, as part of any international effort<br />

to bring about the liberation of men and<br />

women kept in bondage anywhere in this<br />

world. In this era of globalization, it is<br />

virtually impossible to keep silent anymore.<br />

The farcical trials of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese youth in<br />

Jakarta following the Santa Cruz Massacre<br />

is no more the internal matter of Indonesia<br />

and <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> alone, just as the ethnic<br />

cleansing of Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina<br />

is no longer the internal matter of the Serbs,<br />

Croats and Bosnians. Law and social justice,<br />

cannot be allowed to remain distant<br />

neighbours anywhere and at any time. It is<br />

for us, international lawyers and jurists and<br />

informed intellectuals to provide the healing<br />

touch to the victims of human rights<br />

violations, wherever it might occur, as true<br />

citizens of the world. And it is for this<br />

reasons, perhaps more than anything else,<br />

that an internationally acceptable, effective,<br />

permanent solution must be found to free all<br />

occupied territories in the world. This can<br />

be brought about, in my view, by adopting a<br />

global perspective towards this whole<br />

question of liberation of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> rather<br />

than viewing it as an isolated issue alone. A<br />

global approach as opposed to a narrow or<br />

parochialistic approach is the need of the<br />

hour, in this age of globalization.<br />

Suggestions and Conclusions<br />

In my presentation, I have sought to<br />

highlight the human rights dimension of<br />

Indonesia’s occupation of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. It is<br />

my perception that the humanitarian and<br />

human rights concerns of the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

issue also broadly encompass the various<br />

legal questions and aspects relating thereto.<br />

No matter how much we debate and discuss<br />

the legal and juridical issues or questions<br />

from the perspective of international law,<br />

the quintessential question that continues to<br />

stare us in the face is that the battle of<br />

freedom that these poor people have been<br />

relentlessly waging against a much stronger<br />

adversary must be won for it is a battle for<br />

freedom and truth. As Lord Byron has said<br />

in one of his immortal poems:<br />

“For Freedom’s battle once begun,<br />

Bequeathed by bleeding syre to son,<br />

Though baffled oft is ever won.”<br />

It maybe perhaps be easy for the participants<br />

in this seminar to talk about the right<br />

to self-determination, about decolonisation,<br />

about human rights and freedoms available<br />

under the many covenants and conventions,<br />

declarations and resolutions of the United<br />

Nations General Assembly and the Security<br />

Council, but for the man who suffers under<br />

foreign and an alien regime, all such talk of<br />

human rights, liberty and dignity is but like<br />

a teasing illusion, like water is to a thirsty<br />

man in a desert. To me, it seems no real fun<br />

for us men of law to go on holding seminars<br />

and conferences on legal issues while ought<br />

remains to be done. The time to act in<br />

realistic and concrete terms has now come.<br />

Mahatma Gandhi once told someone that if<br />

you want to do something, do it. If you<br />

don’t want to do it, go to a lawyer and he<br />

will tell you one hundred ways of how not<br />

to do it. So let us now put on our thinktanks<br />

and do some brain-storming as to how<br />

we could evoke and raise world public<br />

opinion against the many atrocities being<br />

committed upon the innocent people of <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>. Perhaps the most unfortunate reality<br />

in the present-day civilized world of ours,<br />

is, that despite having so many rights and<br />

freedoms guaranteed to us in as many<br />

international covenants, instruments and<br />

conventions, there is a total lack of<br />

international fora where these fundamental<br />

rights and freedoms could be enforced. They<br />

remain rights only on paper without any<br />

forum, court or tribunal where they could be<br />

enforced or implemented. For rights,<br />

undoubtedly, raise the whole question of<br />

remedies, and human rights, of whatever<br />

nature they may be, keep getting further<br />

enlarged under more and more international<br />

instruments; yet, sadly enough, no forum<br />

exists at the international level, leave alone<br />

the choice of choosing one’s forum, for<br />

enforcement of these rights, the most basic<br />

of which remains the right to exercise selfdetermination.<br />

I am convinced in my mind,<br />

after having considered all the approaches<br />

and dimensions relating to the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

issue, that our collective efforts should be<br />

aimed at devising mechanisms and lobbying<br />

strategies to bring about a peaceful, negotiated<br />

and bloodless transfer of power in<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. By influencing world public<br />

opinion on the one hand and by highlighting<br />

the emancipation cause of the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />

people and on the other, at all international<br />

and regional forums, a situation for isolation<br />

of Indonesia could be created. An updated<br />

status report on the effects of Indonesia’s<br />

encroachment upon <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>’s<br />

sovereignty should be prepared highlighting<br />

the continued human rights violations there.<br />

An emergency meeting of the Security<br />

Council should be summoned for the<br />

immediate and unconditional withdrawal of<br />

Indonesian occupation forces and for<br />

initiating a United Nations sponsored peace<br />

talks for installing an interim government in<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

The independence of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> is not<br />

only an idea whose time has come, it is now<br />

a race against time. Let us be guided in this<br />

battle for truth by the noble motto of<br />

“Satyamev Jayate,” which when translated<br />

from Sanskrit, means, “Truth alone shall<br />

triumph,” for, in the eternal battle of good<br />

with evil, sometimes good wins over evil<br />

and vice-versa, but, in the ultimate analysis,<br />

it is truth and truth alone, that always<br />

triumphs.


<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 59<br />

BACKGROUND TO THE<br />

CURRENT HUMAN RIGHTS<br />

SITUATION (FROM CANADA)<br />

Canada Asia Working Group to UN Human<br />

Rights Commission.<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> achieved international<br />

prominence for the first time since the 1975<br />

Indonesian invasion on 12 November 1991,<br />

when soldiers opened fire on a crowd of<br />

unarmed civilians at the Santa Cruz cemetery<br />

in Dili, the capital of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. At<br />

least 100 people, and possibly as many as<br />

273, were killed in the Santa Cruz massacre.<br />

[1] However, the Santa Cruz massacre was<br />

just one instance of a series of similar<br />

violations.<br />

Since Indonesian troops invaded the<br />

territory in December 1975, and illegally<br />

annexed it in July 1976, a third of the<br />

population has died as a result of killings,<br />

bombings and famine brought on by the war.<br />

According to Amnesty International, the<br />

death toll is 200,000; sources in <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>’s Roman Catholic Church put the<br />

number at as many as 300,000 killed. [2]<br />

Figures compiled by the Canadian Institute<br />

for International Peace and Security peg the<br />

death rate at more than twice that of<br />

Cambodia under Pol Pot. [3]<br />

Armed resistance to Indonesian occupation<br />

continues, although the focus has<br />

shifted to non-violent clandestine actions in<br />

cities and villages under Indonesian rule. At<br />

midyear, there were around 10,000<br />

Indonesian soldiers in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> – half of<br />

them in territorial battalions, where their job<br />

is to keep control of <strong>Timor</strong>ese civilians. [4]<br />

Brig.-Gen. Theo SYAFEI, new armed forces<br />

commander in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, stationed<br />

between 40 and 60 soldiers in every village<br />

in the territory. [5] Repeated United<br />

Nations (UN) resolutions in the General<br />

Assembly have affirmed the right of the<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese to a free and fair act of selfdetermination,<br />

and have called for Indonesia<br />

to withdraw its troops from the territory.<br />

[6] In February 1991, the UN Commission<br />

on Human Rights made a consensus<br />

declaration calling on Indonesia to improve<br />

the human rights situation in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and<br />

allow free access to the territory for<br />

humanitarian organizations and international<br />

human rights groups.<br />

Despite this call, access to <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

was increasingly limited in 1992. There have<br />

been no official delegations allowed in since<br />

a brief February mission by UN envoy<br />

Amos Wako. [7] In 1992, requests from<br />

American, Australian and European<br />

parliamentarians to go to <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> were<br />

turned down, while Amnesty International<br />

and Asia Watch was banned from the territory.<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> was closed to the media<br />

throughout the year, with the exception of a<br />

BBC team during Indonesian elections in<br />

June and a Reuter correspondent in<br />

November. [8] Several journalists and ordinary<br />

tourists were expelled from <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

during the year.<br />

The “opening” of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> declared by<br />

President Suharto in 1989 seems to have<br />

finally come to an end. Despite the media<br />

blackout, however, information continued to<br />

reach the outside through tourist accounts,<br />

and sources in the Catholic church, and the<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese resistance. Reports signalled<br />

an increase in repression in the year since<br />

the Santa Cruz massacre, despite promises<br />

to the international community.<br />

“Far from putting an end to the violations,<br />

the official reaction to the incident has<br />

been accompanied by commission of further<br />

serious violations, including arrest for<br />

political reasons, torture, ill-treatment and<br />

extra-judicial executions,” Amnesty<br />

International has noted. [9] The appointment<br />

of a new governor for <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, José<br />

Abilio Osorio SOARES, signalled a harder<br />

stance. Soares, a leader of the prointegrationist<br />

Apodeti party before 1975, is<br />

much more closely associated with the<br />

Indonesian military than was his predecessor,<br />

Mario Viegas CARRASCALAO. He<br />

began his rule by telling reporters that “In<br />

my opinion, there should have been more<br />

people killed (at Santa Cruz). Why did only<br />

that number die? Why not all the one thousand?”<br />

[10]<br />

On 2 October, the United States ended<br />

its $2.3 million International Military<br />

Education and Training (IMET) aid to<br />

Indonesia to protest against continuing denial<br />

of human rights in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. [11] On<br />

the other hand, aid to Indonesia funneled<br />

through the Consultative Group on<br />

Indonesia (CGI) increased to $4.94 billion.<br />

[12] Canada’s suspension of $30 million in<br />

aid remained in place.<br />

Violations of Individual and Collective<br />

Rights<br />

Amnesty International reports that “In<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> a pattern of short term detention,<br />

torture and ill treatment of alleged<br />

political opponents continues to be reported.”<br />

[13] Widespread arrests were reported<br />

before major events to prevent proindependence<br />

demonstrations. The last<br />

week of October, for instance, saw the arrest<br />

for short periods of 1,000 people, a<br />

staggering figure in a territory Indonesia<br />

says is pacified. [14] The arrests, announced<br />

by Governor Soares, were just part of a<br />

campaign to prevent demonstrations on the<br />

first anniversary of the Santa Cruz massacre,<br />

which also included the expulsion from<br />

Dili of anyone without proper identification<br />

cards, house-to-house searches, and a pervasive<br />

military presence in the streets. [15]<br />

Short term detentions of suspected dissidents<br />

invariably include intensive interrogation.<br />

“Forms of torture and ill-treatment<br />

include: electrocution; slashing with razor<br />

blades and knives, including inside the<br />

mouth; beating on the head, shins and torso<br />

with fists, batons, iron bars, bottles, rocks<br />

and lengths of electric cable; sexual molestation<br />

and rape; kicking with heavy military<br />

boots; burning with lighted cigarettes;<br />

threats and deliberate wounding with firearms;<br />

immersion for long periods in fetid<br />

water, isolation and sleep deprivation.” [16]<br />

One recent detainee was beaten with a<br />

wooden club, after which a soldier thrust a<br />

ballpoint pen into his penis. He was then<br />

kicked and beaten during interrogation, along<br />

with a group of 30 others. His experience is<br />

by no means untypical. [17]<br />

Intensified repression was also reported<br />

around other significant dates. “Scores”<br />

were arrested in February as the Indonesian<br />

military went on full alert to prevent the<br />

landing of a Portuguese ship carrying 100<br />

students and journalists who planned to lay<br />

flowers at Santa Cruz cemetery. [18]<br />

Hundreds of fully-armed riot troops patrolled<br />

Dili during the Wako visit and arrested<br />

several people who had been planning<br />

to demonstrate, including village chief Jacob<br />

FERNANDES. [19]<br />

Security also tightened during the Non<br />

Aligned Movement summit in Jakarta.<br />

Thirty-three people (mostly high school<br />

students) were arrested in Dili during the<br />

summit [20], with a further 17 arrested in<br />

Viqueque. [21] Twenty-five were arrested in<br />

Maliana and underwent 120 hours of indoctrination.<br />

[22] Sunday mass was cancelled<br />

to prevent a march on 6 September,<br />

when 1,000 people gathered at Dili cathedral.<br />

[23]<br />

News of earlier atrocities continued to<br />

come to light in 1992. In one example from<br />

1990, Eurosia DA SILVA ALVES, a 15-<br />

year old student, was killed after her genitals<br />

were cut off and placed in her mouth and her<br />

breasts cut off and placed one in each hand.<br />

[24] Another report tells of 20 human hearts<br />

being found in a box by villagers outside Dili<br />

in November 1991. [25]<br />

In October 1992, soldiers in Belo summarily<br />

executed Dominggus AIKARAK and<br />

his relative Alcino Freitas BELO. At the<br />

same time, several dozen others were arrested.<br />

Five more people were killed the<br />

following day. [26] Another family member,<br />

Saturnino da Costa BELO, was arrested<br />

earlier with two of his brothers and an uncle<br />

near Baucau earlier. He was tortured daily<br />

until his ears, mouth and nose bled. [27]<br />

Seven young men in Viqueque were<br />

reportedly beaten until “their faces were


Page 60 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

black” during a two-week period in<br />

detention. [28]<br />

On 20 November, Indonesian troops<br />

captured Xanana GUSMÃO, leader of the<br />

armed resistance. Human rights organizations<br />

have expressed concern that he may<br />

have been tortured and drugged while in<br />

captivity. Access was not granted for the<br />

International Committee of the Red Cross<br />

until 7 December. [29] At least 60 of his<br />

family and associates were arrested over the<br />

following month in Manatuto, Dili and<br />

Same. [30] At least one of those detained,<br />

Jorge Manuel ARAUJO SERRANO, has<br />

reportedly been tortured to death. [31]<br />

Indonesia holds at least 122 <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese political prisoners (tahanan politik),<br />

and probably far more. [32] According<br />

to resistance sources, more than 500 young<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese are being held in camps and the<br />

homes of military officers “which are in fact<br />

slave houses and torture centres.” [33]<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese continue to face jail simply<br />

for asking questions about government<br />

policy. Lucas Wilson BAUMAU was arrested<br />

for writing a letter to the Indonesian<br />

press that disagreed with local government<br />

development priorities. [34] Yoanita de<br />

Yesus VIEGAS GALOCHU was charged<br />

with slander when she wrote a letter to the<br />

governor asking him to protect the life of her<br />

imprisoned husband. [35]<br />

Freedom of association has also become<br />

more restrictive as authorities moved to<br />

crack down on independent youth groups<br />

that have sprung up in the last two years, a<br />

period when government policy officially<br />

aimed at winning the “love” of the<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese. In November, the Young <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese Catholic Students Organization<br />

and Fitun (Tetun for “star”) officially dissolved<br />

themselves – almost certainly a result<br />

of government threats. [36] Both groups had<br />

been part of a youth federation that<br />

organized the 12 November 1991 demonstration.<br />

Thematic Concerns<br />

1. Right to development<br />

Indonesia has used “development” as the<br />

chief argument justifying its rule over <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>. However, the “development” under<br />

way in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> seems aimed more at the<br />

development of infrastructure to reinforce<br />

Indonesian rule than at “the constant improvement<br />

of the well-being of the entire<br />

population” described in the UN’s declaration<br />

on the right to development. Further, it<br />

ignores “the right of peoples to self-determination<br />

... [and] sovereignty over their<br />

natural wealth and resources.”<br />

Indonesian-built schools teach in Bahasa<br />

Indonesian rather than Tetun; roads facilitate<br />

the movement of Indonesian troops<br />

more than they do the movement of a traditional<br />

mountain-based society; hospitals and<br />

administrative systems benefit Indonesian<br />

settlers while doing little to help most <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese. Indonesia’s highly coercive<br />

population control program in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

has been criticized as “tantamount to<br />

genocide” by the (US) National Conference<br />

of Catholic Bishops.<br />

All these things are considered<br />

“instruments of subjugation by the<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese,” according to Peace is Possible in<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. “Economic development is, for<br />

the most part, dominated by monopolies<br />

which are in the hands of a few generals who<br />

practice an outdated colonialism.” [37]<br />

The right to control of resources is violated<br />

by the <strong>Timor</strong> Gap treaty between<br />

Indonesia and Australia, which divides the<br />

oil reserves (estimated at one billion barrels)<br />

under the <strong>Timor</strong> Sea. Drilling in the gap was<br />

expected to begin in December 1992. [38]<br />

2. Impunity<br />

In an unprecedented move after the Santa<br />

Cruz massacre last year, President Suharto<br />

promised that “no matter who they are,<br />

those found responsible for the shooting<br />

will be dealt with by the courts.” [39]<br />

However, no criminal charges have been laid<br />

against any of the soldiers who opened fire<br />

on an unarmed crowd or their commanding<br />

officers. Twelve soldiers were courtmartialled,<br />

but the charges were disciplinary<br />

rather than criminal and, as Asia Watch<br />

noted, the sentences meted out were<br />

“ludicrous.” [40]<br />

One corporal, Marthin ALAU, received a<br />

17-month sentence. An eyewitness reports<br />

seeing him kill two wounded men at Santa<br />

Cruz by repeatedly stabbing them. [41] He<br />

is also accused of cutting off the ear of one<br />

protester. Nine other soldiers were also<br />

court- martialled, and received jail terms that<br />

ranged from 8 months to 18 months.<br />

In contrast, <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese survivors of<br />

the massacre received long jail terms under<br />

Indonesia’s anti-subversion law. Gregorio da<br />

Cunha SALDANHA received a life sentence<br />

for subversion, while Francisco Miranda<br />

BRANCO was jailed for 15 years. Carlos<br />

dos Santos LEMOS was sentenced to 8<br />

years for taking photographs of the<br />

demonstration. Filomeno da Silva<br />

FERREIRA was sentenced to 5 years, 8<br />

months for translating Portuguese newspaper<br />

articles about <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. Ten more<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese in Dili have been jailed for up to<br />

10 years. In a related case, two men and a<br />

woman were jailed for three to five years for<br />

sending “secret” military papers (an<br />

interview with Governor Carrascalao)<br />

abroad. [42]<br />

Five <strong>Timor</strong>ese students studying in<br />

Indonesia were also jailed under the antisubversion<br />

law for organizing a demonstration<br />

in Jakarta on 19 November 1991, including<br />

Fernando de ARAUJO, chair of the<br />

National Resistance of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Students<br />

(RENETIL). Araujo received a 9 year sentence;<br />

he has been awarded the Reebok<br />

Human Rights award. Four other RENETIL<br />

members in Jakarta were also sentenced to<br />

as much as 10 years imprisonment. [43]<br />

3. Internally displaced persons<br />

Almost the entire population of <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> has been uprooted since the 1975 invasion.<br />

Thousands fled to the mountains in<br />

the late 1970s. When they surrendered to<br />

Indonesian troops they were often prevented<br />

from returning to their ancestral<br />

villages or moving freely about the countryside.<br />

Many were forced to take part in<br />

Indonesian military operations against<br />

guerrillas. Virtually all rural <strong>Timor</strong>ese are<br />

now living in resettlement villages, which<br />

they describe as “concentration camps.”<br />

[44]<br />

4. Minority and religious rights<br />

Annexation reduced the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese to<br />

a tiny minority within Indonesia. The<br />

displacement of traditional villages has made<br />

room for as many as 100,000 Indonesian<br />

settlers and transmigrants, who threaten to<br />

swamp the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese demographically.<br />

[45] “It is the new Indonesian civilization<br />

we are bringing. And it is not easy to civilize<br />

a backward people,” said one former army<br />

commander. [46] Bishop Belo has said that<br />

“we continue to die as a people and as a<br />

nation.” The sheer numbers killed in <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> since the Indonesian invasion qualify<br />

as genocide against the <strong>Timor</strong>ese, but the<br />

people are also subjected to cultural genocide:<br />

deliberate attempts to destroy their<br />

indigenous culture and their future as a<br />

distinct people in their own land. A full<br />

generation has now grown up cut off from<br />

their rich cultural heritage. <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>’s 12<br />

separate languages now stand on the brink<br />

of extinction. Traditional languages, religions<br />

and ceremonies are now banned. Sacred lulik<br />

sites and objects have been destroyed.<br />

For many years, the Catholic church<br />

stood as the one tenuous source of protection<br />

from Indonesian repression, despite<br />

restrictions on its operations. An estimated<br />

90 per cent of the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese are now<br />

Catholics. Since Bishop Belo’s 1989 letter<br />

to the UN to ask for a referendum on selfdetermination<br />

in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, however,<br />

Catholic priests and churches have increasingly<br />

come under attack. A raid on the San<br />

Antonio de Motael parish church on 28<br />

October 1991 (in which two men were<br />

killed) was the precursor to the Santa Cruz<br />

massacre.<br />

“Priests and nuns have been pressured,<br />

closely monitored and threatened by military<br />

personnel as they carry out their pas-


<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 61<br />

toral duties,” according to the Indonesian<br />

Front for the Defence of Human Rights<br />

(Infight). [47] The intimidation starts with<br />

Bishop Belo himself, who this year was<br />

publicly warned by the armed forces to stay<br />

out of politics. [48] Belo has said that he<br />

fears meeting the fate of murdered El<br />

Salvador Archbishop Oscar Romero.<br />

The vicar-general of the diocese, Father<br />

Alberto RICARDO, spent the early days of<br />

1992 under intensive interrogation. By the<br />

end of the year, he had been sent back to<br />

Rome. [49] Father Hilario MADEIRA and a<br />

travelling companion were arrested while<br />

returning to <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> from a trip to Java.<br />

They were threatened with guns and have<br />

been harassed ever since as suspected dissidents.<br />

[50] In Ermera, armed soldiers interrupted<br />

mass to arrest worshippers, and<br />

later arrested one of the parish’s priests at<br />

his home at 3 a.m. [51] Foreign missionaries<br />

invited by Bishop Belo have been forced to<br />

choose between leaving <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and<br />

becoming Indonesian citizens. In October,<br />

Fathers LOCATELLI, BALTAZAR AND<br />

João DE DEUS were accused of “being<br />

behind” dissent in Baucau and given this<br />

choice. Ever since, they have been required<br />

to report daily to local military<br />

headquarters. [52]<br />

Conclusions and recommendations<br />

In February, the government of Indonesia<br />

undertook to the UN Commission on<br />

Human Rights to improve the human rights<br />

situation in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. Instead, it has<br />

intensified human rights violation in a bid to<br />

crush dissent. At the same time, however,<br />

the support for <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> from within<br />

Indonesia’s democracy movement has never<br />

been higher than today. A statement by<br />

student senates throughout Java following<br />

the Santa Cruz massacre called on the<br />

government of Indonesia to withdraw its<br />

troops from <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and allow a free and<br />

fair act of self-determination, and called on<br />

foreign governments to impose “an arms<br />

embargo and possible economic sanctions”<br />

on Indonesia. [53]<br />

The leadership of the <strong>Timor</strong>ese resistance<br />

movement has effectively passed to a new<br />

generation of activists, most of whom grew<br />

up under Indonesian rule. It should be clear<br />

that Indonesia will not win their loyalty.<br />

Instead, it is time to accept the calls for<br />

peace talks that include the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />

people. Bishop Belo’s proposal for a<br />

referendum on independence, or a new peace<br />

plan offered by the resistance this year that<br />

would delay independence for 7 to 12 years,<br />

are both ideas worth a hearing from<br />

Indonesia. [54] The capture of resistance<br />

leader Xanana Gusmão offers an<br />

opportunity for dialogue. If released to a<br />

third country, he could make a valuable<br />

contribution to talks on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> taking<br />

place between Indonesia and Portugal under<br />

UN auspices as a representative of the <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese themselves.<br />

The government of Canada, along with<br />

most western countries, has not recognized<br />

the de jure incorporation of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> into<br />

Indonesia. Accordingly, we recommend that<br />

the Canadian government:<br />

1. pursue initiatives towards the implementation<br />

of UN Resolution GA 37/30<br />

(1982);<br />

2. call for a withdrawal of Indonesian occupation<br />

forces from <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and demonstrate<br />

support for the right of the<br />

people of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> to a free and fair<br />

act of self-determination, as affirmed by<br />

repeated UN resolutions;<br />

3. call for the release of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese political<br />

prisoners imprisoned solely for<br />

their opposition to Indonesian occupation<br />

of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>; At the United<br />

Nations, Canada should:<br />

4. encourage the Secretary-General of the<br />

UN to include representatives of the <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese people, including the National<br />

Council of Maubere Resistance, in talks<br />

held under his auspices, in accordance<br />

with UN resolution GA 37/30 (1982); At<br />

the 49th session of the UN Commission<br />

on Human Rights, Canada should:<br />

5. call for the publication of Amos Wako’s<br />

report on his February 1992 visit to <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> and Indonesia ;<br />

6. under agenda items 10 and 11, raise the<br />

serious concerns of Canadians about the<br />

human rights situation in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>;<br />

7. under agenda item 12, support a resolution<br />

calling for full respect for human<br />

rights in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>; With regard to<br />

humanitarian concerns, Canada should:<br />

8. help apply international pressure on the<br />

Indonesian government to give free and<br />

unrestricted access to international relief<br />

and independent human rights agencies to<br />

work in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, particularly<br />

Amnesty International.<br />

Notes<br />

[1] Amnesty International, <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>: After<br />

the Massacre, 21 November 1991. The<br />

figure of 273 killed (with another 376<br />

wounded) is from a study by <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />

activists released by the Lisbon-based<br />

ecumenical coalition Peace is Possible in<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> (cited in Tapol Bulletin,<br />

October 1992).<br />

[2] Amnesty International, <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>:<br />

Violations of Human Rights 1975-1984;<br />

Peace is Possible in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>: The Santa Cruz Massacre (Lisbon,<br />

1992).<br />

[3] Dave Todd, “Canada mum on massacres<br />

of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> civilians” in Kitchener-<br />

Waterloo Record, 28 November 1991.<br />

[4] Reuter, June 5.<br />

[5] Tempo, Jakarta, 22 February 1992.<br />

[6] General Assembly Resolution 3485XXX<br />

has been reaffirmed seven times. Security<br />

Council Resolution 384 has been<br />

reaffirmed twice.<br />

[7] Asia Watch, Asia Watch Overview,<br />

December 1992. Wako’s report has still<br />

not been made public, despite a request by<br />

the Human Rights Sub-commission on 1<br />

September 1992.<br />

[8] ibid.<br />

[9] Amnesty International, Santa Cruz: the<br />

Government Response, 6 February 1992.<br />

[10] Linda Hossie, “Massacre merits more<br />

than a slap on the wrist” in The Globe and<br />

Mail, Toronto, 13 November 1992.<br />

[11] <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> <strong>Action</strong> <strong>Network</strong>/US, news<br />

release, 3 October 1992.<br />

[12] Tapol Bulletin, August 1992.<br />

[13] Amnesty International, Indonesia/<strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>: The Suppression of Dissent, July<br />

1992.<br />

[14] David Webster, “Canada puts profits<br />

before rights” in Toronto Star, 12<br />

November 1992.<br />

[15] Reuter, 26 October 1992.<br />

[16] Amnesty International, The Suppression<br />

of Dissent.<br />

[17] ibid.<br />

[18] Jakarta Post, 21 February 1992.<br />

[19] Editor, Jakarta, 22 February.<br />

[20] “The poll that Indonesia dares not hold,”<br />

in The Economist, London, 19 September<br />

1992.<br />

[21] Tapol report, 23 September 1992.<br />

[22] Jawa Pos, 15 September 1992.<br />

[23] Tapol report, 7 September.<br />

[24] Pascoela Barreto testimony to Subcommission<br />

on Human Rights, Geneva, 14<br />

August 1992.<br />

[25] National Council of Maubere Resistance,<br />

news release, 19 February 1992.<br />

[26] Tapol report, 27 October.<br />

[27] Diario de Noticias, Lisbon, 25 April<br />

1992.<br />

[28] Tapol Bulletin, October 1992.<br />

[29] Amnesty International Urgent <strong>Action</strong>,<br />

10 December 1992.<br />

[30] Amnesty International Urgent <strong>Action</strong>,<br />

18 December 1992.<br />

[31] Amnesty International Urgent <strong>Action</strong>, 4<br />

December 1992.<br />

[32] Tapol Bulletin, October 1992.<br />

[33] Interview with José Ramos Horta,<br />

“Hidden terror in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>” in<br />

Newsweek, international edition, 1 June<br />

1992.<br />

[34] Jakarta Post, 3 April 1992.<br />

[35] Jakarta Post, 15 June 1992.<br />

[36] Suara Karya, 24 November 1991; Jawa<br />

Pos, 19 November 1992.


Page 62 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

[37] <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>: the Santa Cruz Massacre.<br />

[38] Reuter, 5 November 1992.<br />

[39] AFP, 7 February 1992.<br />

[40] Asia Watch Overview.<br />

[41] Tapol report, 7 June 1992.<br />

[42] War Resisters International, 1992<br />

Prisoners for Peace Honour Roll,<br />

November 1992.<br />

[43] Amnesty International, Fernando de<br />

Araujo: Prisoner of Conscience, May<br />

1992.<br />

[44] Mark Seddon, “Long-forgotten victims<br />

of an Asian invader” in The Times,<br />

London, 20 April 1991.<br />

[45] Hugh O’Shaughnessy, Irish Times,<br />

Dublin, 27 April 1991.<br />

[46] Colonel Kalangi, quoted in Camel<br />

Budiardjo and Liem Soei Liong, The War<br />

Against <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> (London: Zed Books,<br />

1984).<br />

[47] Infight report, 26 June 1992.<br />

[48] Reuter, 29 June.<br />

[49] Reuter, 13 November 1992.<br />

[50] Amnesty International, The Suppression<br />

of Dissent..<br />

[51] Tapol Bulletin, December 1992.<br />

[52] Tapol report, 27 October 1992.<br />

[53] Communications Forum of Student<br />

Senates, Bandung, 23 November 1991.<br />

[54] José Ramos Horta, speech to European<br />

Parliament, 27 April 1992.<br />

INDONESIA’S JUSTICE<br />

SYSTEM VIOLATES BASIC<br />

RIGHTS<br />

NEWS RELEASE from the Lawyers<br />

Committee for Human Rights, Feb. 25<br />

For Further Information Contact: James<br />

Ross, (212) 629-6170, ext. 140<br />

Today, the New York-based Lawyers<br />

Committee for Human Rights issued Broken<br />

Laws, Broken Bodies: Torture and the Right<br />

to Redress in Indonesia, a 90-page report<br />

that details serious failings of the Indonesian<br />

criminal justice system. The Lawyers<br />

Committee found that torture of detainees is<br />

“pervasive” in Indonesia and that<br />

procedures for redress are “ineffectual.”<br />

According to Michael Posner, Lawyers<br />

Committee Executive Director:<br />

“Rights violations apparent in the<br />

prosecution of Fretilin leader Xanana<br />

Gusmão and others in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>,<br />

such as incommunicado detention, are<br />

by no means exceptional in political<br />

cases. While the details of Gusmão’s<br />

treatment are still not known, the<br />

routine mistreatment of political<br />

detainees in Indonesia and <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

has raised international concern.<br />

Victims of torture find that the<br />

protections set out under Indonesian<br />

law mean very little in practice.”<br />

Broken Laws, Broken Bodies details the<br />

enormous hurdles victims of torture and illegal<br />

detention face in seeking redress for the<br />

violations of their basic rights. Detainees,<br />

particularly those accused of political<br />

offenses, often find their right to legal<br />

counsel denied, effectively preventing them<br />

from raising claims of ill- treatment.<br />

Lawyers will be blocked by the police and<br />

military from meeting with clients. The<br />

authorities have also threatened and harassed<br />

lawyers, as well as lawyers’ groups,<br />

involved in human rights work.<br />

In 1981 the Indonesian government<br />

promulgated a new criminal procedure code<br />

that included greater protections for the<br />

rights of criminal suspects and detainees.<br />

Innovative provisions sought to reduce the<br />

likelihood of torture in Indonesian detention<br />

centers. “More than a decade later,” the<br />

Lawyers Committee’s report finds, “the<br />

aims of the criminal procedure law have yet<br />

to be fulfilled: torture and mistreatment of<br />

criminal and especially political detainees<br />

remain endemic; the likelihood for meaningful<br />

redress for such abuses remains slim.”<br />

The main avenue of redress under<br />

Indonesian law is the pra-peradilan (“pretrial”),<br />

a form of habeas corpus hearing.<br />

Except in rare instances, the pra-peradilan<br />

has been unsuccessful in upholding the<br />

rights of those illegally arrested, detained or<br />

mistreated. Moreover, as evidenced by last<br />

year’s trials of military personnel implicated<br />

in the November 1991 Dili massacre, the<br />

government is unwilling to seriously<br />

prosecute members of the military and<br />

police responsible for human rights violations.<br />

Indonesian authorities commonly take<br />

actions amounting to the obstruction of<br />

justice in order to prevent detainees from<br />

bringing claims of torture before the courts.<br />

Prosecutors knowingly fail to stop torture<br />

during police interrogations. They also hinder<br />

access of non-government physicians to<br />

detainees, making torture difficult to prove<br />

in court. Particularly in political cases, they<br />

have threatened detainees and their families<br />

who file petitions for a pra-peradilan<br />

hearing.<br />

The absence of an independent judiciary<br />

in Indonesia is perhaps the greatest hurdle<br />

to effective redress for ill-treatment. As civil<br />

servants functioning under the Justice<br />

Ministry, judges lack any real independence.<br />

In practice, judges see themselves as another<br />

arm of the government, rather than as<br />

impartial adjudicators of fact and law. As a<br />

result, except in a few non-political cases,<br />

Indonesian judges have gone to great lengths<br />

to decide in favor of the government in praperadilan<br />

hearings.<br />

The Lawyers Committee makes a number<br />

of recommendations to the Indonesian<br />

government, including urging the ratification<br />

of international human rights treaties, the<br />

repeal of the much-abused Anti-Subversion<br />

Law and specific changes to the criminal<br />

procedure code. The report notes, however,<br />

that:<br />

“The political structure of the state is the<br />

fundamental obstacle to the prevention of<br />

torture and the right to redress in Indonesia.<br />

Until there is a recognition of the<br />

importance of constitutionalism, the<br />

realization of separation of powers and, at<br />

the most basic level, government respect for<br />

the rule of law, there is little chance that the<br />

problems addressed in this report can be<br />

substantially met.”<br />

Broken Laws, Broken Bodies is based on<br />

a month-long Lawyers Committee factfinding<br />

mission to Indonesia in June and<br />

July 1992 and research conducted since that<br />

time. The Lawyers Committee delegation<br />

travelled to Jakarta, Bandung, Yogyakarta<br />

and Surabaya and met with lawyers, human<br />

rights activists, legal scholars, former and<br />

current political prisoners, journalists and<br />

embassy officials. In October 1992 the<br />

Lawyers Committee made a written request<br />

to the Indonesian government to send a<br />

delegation to Jakarta to meet with<br />

Indonesian officials, but to date has not received<br />

a reply.<br />

Copies of Broken Laws, Broken Bodies:<br />

Torture and the Right to Redress in<br />

Indonesia are available for $10 from LCHR,<br />

330 Seventh Ave., New York, NY 10001.<br />

Since 1978, the Lawyers Committee for<br />

Human Rights has worked to promote international<br />

human rights and refugee law and<br />

legal procedures in the United States and<br />

abroad. Its work is impartial, holding each<br />

government to the standard affirmed in the<br />

International Bill of Human Rights.<br />

PRISONERS FACE<br />

TORTURE, SAYS HUMAN<br />

RIGHTS GROUP<br />

Washington, Feb. 25 (IPS) – the<br />

Indonesian police and army continue to<br />

torture and mistreat prisoners, the New<br />

York-based Lawyers Committee for Human<br />

Rights (LCHR) charges in a report.<br />

“Torture pervades the criminal justice<br />

system of Indonesia,” says the report released<br />

here Thursday.<br />

The LCHR bases its report, ‘Broken<br />

Laws, Broken Bodies,’ on its month-long<br />

mission to the southeast Asian nation last<br />

year and research conducted since then.<br />

Yhe group says the prosecution of the<br />

alleged <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese guerrilla leader who


<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 63<br />

was captured in November and put on trial<br />

has been flawed by rights abuses.<br />

LCHR director Michael Posner charges<br />

that Xanana Gusmão, a founder of the<br />

revolutionary front for an independent <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> (Fretilin), was held incommunicado<br />

for more than a month after his arrest in<br />

Dili.<br />

His treatment and televised repentance in<br />

December prompted charges by some<br />

human rights groups and Portuguese president<br />

Mario Soares that his captors had tortured<br />

him.<br />

Posner said that “while the details of<br />

Gusmão’s treatment are still not known, the<br />

routine mistreatment of political detainees in<br />

Indonesia and <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> has raised<br />

international concern.”<br />

More than 60 of Gusmão’s relatives and<br />

alleged associates have been detained and<br />

held incommunicado since his arrest, says<br />

Posner, who stressed that Gusmão’s treatment<br />

was “by no means exceptional in political<br />

cases.”<br />

The government of Indonesian president<br />

Suharto denies that Gusmão was tortured.<br />

The administration recently took steps to<br />

improve its human rights image which was<br />

tarnished in Nov. 1991 when army troops<br />

machine-gunned pro-Fretilin demonstrators<br />

at Dili’s main cemetery.<br />

Suharto last month announced plans to<br />

form a national human rights body and<br />

hosted a U.N.-sponsored workshop on human<br />

rights in Jakarta.<br />

He, however, denounced western countries<br />

for using Indonesia’s human rights<br />

performance as a criterion for aid.<br />

Several countries cut assistance to Jakarta<br />

after the <strong>Timor</strong> massacre, and the U.S.<br />

congress last year cut its military training<br />

programme for Indonesia to protest the Dili<br />

killings.<br />

The new LCHR report deals primarily<br />

with the hurdles which the victims of torture<br />

face.<br />

It found that detainees, particularly those<br />

accused of political crimes, are often barred<br />

from contact with their lawyers who themselves<br />

are often threatened and harassed by<br />

the police and military authorities.<br />

The report notes that in 1981, Jakarta<br />

adopted a new criminal code which included<br />

greater protections for the rights of criminal<br />

suspects and detainees.<br />

The study found that more than a decade<br />

later, “the aims of the criminal procedure<br />

law have yet to be fulfilled: torture and<br />

mistreatment of criminals, and especially<br />

political detainees, remain endemic.”<br />

Moreover, the government has shown itself<br />

unwilling to seriously prosecute members<br />

of the police and military responsible<br />

for rights violations, according to the report.<br />

In addition, the authorities often take<br />

steps to prevent detainees from bringing<br />

torture claims before the courts, the report<br />

charged.<br />

“The greatest hurdle to effective redress<br />

for ill-treatment,” however, is the “absence<br />

of an independent judiciary in Indonesia,”<br />

the report says.<br />

“In practice, judges see themselves as<br />

another arm of the government, rather than<br />

as impartial adjudicators of fact and law,” it<br />

adds.<br />

“Until there is a recognition of the importance<br />

of constitutionalism, the realization<br />

of separation of powers and, at the<br />

most basic level, government respect for the<br />

rule of law, there is little chance that the<br />

problems addressed in this report can be<br />

substantially met,” the report says.<br />

HUMAN RIGHTS LAW BODY<br />

RECEIVES AWARD<br />

New York, Mar. 18 (IPS) - a Jakartabased<br />

human rights law organisation<br />

Thursday received the International Roger<br />

Baldwin Medal of Liberty Award here.<br />

The New York-based Lawyers<br />

Committee for Human Rights (LCHR) presented<br />

the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation<br />

with the award which recognises<br />

outstanding commitments to the causes of<br />

civil liberties and human rights.<br />

The foundation provides legal aid in<br />

criminal and civil matters for persons unable<br />

to obtain a private lawyer. Most recently, it<br />

represented persons arrested in connection<br />

with the Nov. 12, 1991 massacre <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

Sukardjo Adidjojo, chair of the foundation’s<br />

board of trustees, and executive director<br />

Abdul Hakim Nusantara accepted the<br />

award for the foundation.<br />

The LCHR noted that both are lawyers<br />

who have worked to promote respect for<br />

human rights in Indonesia and for standing<br />

up for the rights of political detainees. And<br />

the LCHR charged that the foundation,<br />

known locally as Lembaga Bantuan Hukum<br />

(LBH), has been the target of government<br />

harassment.<br />

The lawyers’ committee noted that because<br />

the LBH receives foreign funds as a<br />

registered non-governmental organisation<br />

(NGO), the Indonesian government has accused<br />

it of serving foreign interests and of<br />

damaging Indonesia’s name abroad.<br />

“This year, the government has sought to<br />

put pressure on LBH by banning all Dutch<br />

assistance to Indonesian non-governmental<br />

organisations and tightening the laws on<br />

non-governmental institutions,” said the<br />

LCHR.<br />

The foundation was founded in 1971 and<br />

has 13 branches nationwide. Together with<br />

the Indonesian bar association, its lawyers<br />

have defended persons who have been arrested<br />

in connection with demonstrations<br />

against the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese massacre.<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, a former Portuguese colony<br />

was invaded by Indonesian troops in Dec.<br />

1975, and annexed the following year.<br />

International human rights groups such as<br />

Amnesty International charge that in<br />

subduing <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, the Indonesian army<br />

killed as much as one-third of the <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />

population, or 200,000 people.<br />

The United Nations has sought to negotiate<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>’s status in talks with<br />

Indonesia and Portugal. in Nov. 1991,<br />

Indonesian troops fired on hundreds of<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese demonstrators in the capital, Dili,<br />

killing more than 100 people, according to<br />

the catholic church.<br />

Indonesian president Suharto dismissed<br />

several high-ranking officers implicated in<br />

the massacre, following a government<br />

commission’s findings.<br />

But the recently concluded session of the<br />

human rights commission in Geneva said it<br />

regretted that the Indonesian investigation<br />

had failed to identify clearly the people involved<br />

in ordering the massacre.<br />

The commission called on the Indonesian<br />

government to honour fully its human rights<br />

commitments and to ensure that the <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese in custody are treated humanely.<br />

According to the Lawyers’ Committee,<br />

the LBH has been widely involved in promoting<br />

human rights through education. the<br />

LBH has sponsored community legal education<br />

programmes to teach people about<br />

land, labour and civil rights, and to spread<br />

awareness about human rights.<br />

Asked to comment on the award, U.N.<br />

ambassador Wisnumurti of Indonesia said<br />

the recognition was testimony to the<br />

strength of the legal system in Indonesia.<br />

“Although we don’t agree with everything<br />

they (LBH) say, the existence of this<br />

organisation is important to the development<br />

of our society as a whole,”<br />

Wisnumurti said.<br />

The Indonesian government funded the<br />

Foundation for the first eight years of its<br />

existence.<br />

Actress Sigourney Weaver presented the<br />

award at a reception Thursday evening.<br />

The award is presented in alternating<br />

years by the American Civil Liberties Inion<br />

(ACLU) for civil liberties advocacy in the<br />

United States, and by the LCHR for work in<br />

advancing human rights worldwide.<br />

The tribute is named after Roger<br />

Baldwin, the founder of the ACLU who<br />

died in 1981, and who was a major figure in<br />

the civil liberties and human rights<br />

movements.


Page 64 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

UN HUMAN RIGHTS<br />

COMMISSION PASSES<br />

STRONG RESOLUTION<br />

THE JAKARTA REGIME AND<br />

ITS GENEVA COMMITMENTS<br />

Publico 8 February 19<strong>93</strong> Dateline : Lisbon<br />

Byline : A.M. Original lang.: Portuguese<br />

unabridged<br />

“Jakarta had the opportunity of demonstrating<br />

its willingness to cooperate with the<br />

UN. A year later, it is worth analyzing the<br />

results.” This was said on 4 March last year<br />

by the Chairman of the UN Human Rights<br />

Commission (HRC) in his statement,<br />

according to which Indonesia guaranteed it<br />

would comply with a set of demands made<br />

by the HRC on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. A year later,<br />

the ecumenical association Peace is Possible<br />

in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> examined those commitments<br />

made in Geneva.<br />

In a publication presented yesterday, the<br />

association reveals the contrast between the<br />

various measures agreed to by Jakarta, and<br />

the real situation in the territory.<br />

The “clarification of the final outcome of<br />

the massacre” in Santa Cruz on 12<br />

November 1991 confirmed 18 dead, admitting<br />

later that there were 50 victims.<br />

However, lists of names drawn up by humanitarian<br />

organisations - already published<br />

by Publico (see 12 November 1992 edition)<br />

- confirm 271 dead, 250 missing, and 382<br />

wounded.<br />

The commitment to ensure the “fair<br />

treatment of <strong>Timor</strong>ese prisoners” and the<br />

“general improvement in human rights in<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>” has been met with the contrast between<br />

the “severe sentences” passed on the<br />

Dili demonstrators, and the vague references<br />

to “punishments” given to those responsible<br />

for the massacre.<br />

Also, Indonesia’s guarantee to facilitate<br />

access to <strong>Timor</strong> by humanitarian and human<br />

rights organisations was contradicted by the<br />

“tightening up of the blockade.”<br />

In addition to the final figures, the document<br />

publicly divulged yesterday gives a<br />

complete list of those killed, missing and<br />

wounded following the Santa Cruz massacre.<br />

The aim of the publication is to enable<br />

the Human Rights Commission - the 49th<br />

session of which is meeting in Geneva - and<br />

the UN to use “other means” of achieving<br />

the objectives proposed in last year’s<br />

statement.<br />

The document “<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> after Santa<br />

Cruz - Indonesia and the International<br />

Order,” edited in a bilingual brochure<br />

(French and English), was presented during<br />

a seminar held in Lisbon to study possible<br />

lines of action in relation to the <strong>Timor</strong><br />

problem. The seminar, attended by about<br />

two dozen <strong>Timor</strong>ese and people connected<br />

with solidarity groups, took place in the For<br />

<strong>Timor</strong> forum, which has been granted by<br />

Lisbon’s Town Hall to the Maubere<br />

People’s Rights Commission (CDPM),<br />

which also helped to organise the weekend.<br />

EAST TIMOR REBEL LEADER<br />

PLEADS FOR U.N. SUPPORT<br />

Geneva, Feb. 25 (IPS/Victor Ego Ducret)<br />

– Rebels fighting for the right to selfdetermination<br />

in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> issued a<br />

statement here Thursday calling on the<br />

Indonesian government to stop its military<br />

and political repression against the <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />

population.<br />

A spokesperson for the resistance<br />

movement in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> José Ramos-Horta<br />

said: “the Maubere national council for resistance<br />

(CNRM) in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> calls on the<br />

international community to support the<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese fight for independence and selfdetermination<br />

and to condemn the inhumane<br />

repression of Jakarta.”<br />

Ramos-Horta, who is the international<br />

representative of the CNRM, is in Geneva<br />

to participate in the 49th ordinary meeting<br />

of the United Nations (UN) Human Rights<br />

Commission.<br />

He has issued a statement requesting the<br />

Commission to appoint a special rapporteur<br />

to investigate the situation in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>,<br />

which has been under Indonesian occupation<br />

since December 1975.<br />

Dominique Seixas, a former Indonesian<br />

prisoner, testified before the commission<br />

Thursday and described the repressive<br />

measures used by Jakarta against the<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese population.<br />

He spoke of the cruel treatment and persecution<br />

that political prisoners such as<br />

himself had been subjected to. Seixas, who is<br />

now living in Portugal, offered his testimony<br />

to the commission through the auspices of<br />

the international federation of Christians for<br />

action to abolish torture (IFCAAT), a nongovernmental<br />

organisation based in Geneva.<br />

Ramos-Horta reminded the commission<br />

Thursday that the humanitarian organisation<br />

Amnesty International (AI) stated that<br />

between 1975 (the beginning of the<br />

CNRM’s struggle) and 1991, 200,000<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese were killed through the repression.<br />

He said that this amounted to almost a<br />

third of the population of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. He<br />

added that it would be a great boost for the<br />

CNRM if the international community<br />

would take effective measures, even if only<br />

to stop Indonesia from torturing more of the<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese population.<br />

However, he said, countries like<br />

Germany and France continue to give economic<br />

support to the Jakarta government.<br />

He said: “recently, Germany sold them 30<br />

battle ships and France is Indonesia’s third<br />

most important source of aid, after japan<br />

and the United States.”<br />

Portugal, Ireland, Luxembourg, Greece<br />

and the former Portuguese colonies in Africa<br />

– like Angola and Mozambique – support<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>’s demand for self-determination<br />

and independence. In September the United<br />

States Congress pronounced it was against<br />

giving economic aid to Indonesia. according<br />

to a document that was distributed in<br />

Geneva by the CNRM, Indonesia dominates<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> through a colonial and repressive<br />

regime.<br />

“<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> was colonized by the<br />

Portuguese 500 years ago and there is not a<br />

single historic element to tie it to the present<br />

Indonesian republic,” the document states.<br />

The government in Lisbon has backed the<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese demands for independence and<br />

self-determination in various letters and<br />

statements directed at the United Nations<br />

secretary general Boutros Boutros-Ghali.<br />

The letters have been included in a report<br />

on the situation in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> that was<br />

presented to the U.N. human rights commission<br />

by Boutros Boutros-Ghali this<br />

month.<br />

This document also contains the reports<br />

from a Human Rights Commission work<br />

group on disappearances, executions and<br />

torture in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. Reports from AI and<br />

the International Lawyers Commission<br />

(ICJ) have also been included.<br />

Boutros-Ghali’s document also contains<br />

letters and statements from the government<br />

of Indonesia in which it denies the reports<br />

on the violation of human rights in <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

In one of these letters, dated Jan. 4, the<br />

authorities in Jakarta confirm the arrest of<br />

CNRM leader Xanana Gusmão, on Nov. 20<br />

last year. It also states that the request by<br />

the International Red Cross to be allowed to<br />

see him will be answered at a later date.<br />

URGE YOUR GOVERNMENT<br />

TO SUPPORT EAST TIMOR<br />

AT THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS<br />

COMMISSION<br />

ACTION ALERT FROM THE EAST<br />

TIMOR ACTION NETWORK / U.S.<br />

March 2, 19<strong>93</strong><br />

A resolution on the “Situation in <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>” is being introduced today at the UN<br />

Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) annual<br />

meeting in Geneva. The resolution,<br />

whose text is appended, was initiated by the


<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 65<br />

12 European Community countries. The<br />

United States, Australia, and many Third<br />

World countries are being asked to sponsor<br />

it.<br />

This is a strong resolution, and would be<br />

a tremendous improvement over the<br />

“consensus declaration” from last year.<br />

There will be a vote early next week. At this<br />

point, the US delegation in Geneva has not<br />

determined its position, with different<br />

members having different views. Urge them<br />

to sponsor, advocate and vote for the<br />

resolution. Last year, the US opposed<br />

strong action on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, and was instrumental<br />

in sabotaging a meaningful<br />

resolution by the UNHRC.<br />

Indonesia is now the head of the Non-<br />

Aligned Movement and was elected a regional<br />

vice-chair of the UNHRC. They have<br />

a large delegation in Geneva which will<br />

strongly oppose this resolution. We must<br />

urge our governments, both in the US and<br />

other countries, to support the passage of<br />

this moderately-worded resolution to show<br />

Indonesia that the world community does<br />

not accept their ongoing genocide, occupation<br />

and repression in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, and to<br />

encourage them to participate seriously in<br />

negotiations with Portugal which resume<br />

next month in Rome.<br />

In the United States, please contact the<br />

following: Your Congressperson and<br />

Senators, who should call the State Dept.<br />

202/224-3121 Peter Tarnoff,<br />

Undersecretary of State for Policy.<br />

(202)647-2417 Sandy Berger, Deputy Asst.<br />

to the Pres. for Nat’l Security Affairs.<br />

202/456-2883<br />

TEXT OF THE PROPOSED<br />

RESOLUTION<br />

SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR<br />

The Commission on Human Rights<br />

Guided by the Universal Declaration of<br />

Human Rights, the International Covenant<br />

on Human Rights and the universally accepted<br />

rule of international law;<br />

Bearing in mind the statement on the<br />

Situation in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> agreed by consensus<br />

by the Commission on Human Rights at its<br />

forty-eighth session (Doc.E/CN. 4/1992/84,<br />

par a. 457) following the violent incident of<br />

the 12 November 1991 in Dili;<br />

Recalling resolution 1992/20 of the Sub-<br />

Commission on Prevention of<br />

Discrimination and Protection of Minorities<br />

of 27 August 1992;<br />

Gravely concerned at continuing allegation<br />

on serious human rights violations and<br />

noting with concern in this context the reports<br />

Or the Special Rapporteur on Torture<br />

(Doc.E/CN.4/19<strong>93</strong>/26); of the Special<br />

Rapporteur on Extra-judicial, Summary or<br />

Arbitrary Executions<br />

(Doc.E/CN.4/19<strong>93</strong>/46), of the Working<br />

Group on Enforced or Involuntary<br />

Disappearances (Doc.E/CN.4/19<strong>93</strong>/25);<br />

Bearing in mind the Body of Principles<br />

on the Protection of all Persons subject to<br />

any form of detention or imprisonment endorsed<br />

by the General Assembly in its<br />

resolution 43/173 and the Principles on the<br />

Effective Prevention and Investigation of<br />

Extra-legal, Arbitrary and Summary<br />

Executions, endorsed by the General<br />

Assembly in its resolution 44/162;<br />

Concerned at the fact that the Indonesian<br />

authorities aid not respond to the provisions<br />

of the statement on the situation of <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> agreed by consensus by the<br />

Commission on Human Rights at its fortyeighth<br />

session;<br />

Disappointed by the frequent denial of<br />

access to the territory of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> to human<br />

rights organizations as well as to some<br />

other relevant international observers;<br />

Having examined the report of the<br />

Secretary-General on the situation in <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> (Doc.E/CN.4/19<strong>93</strong>/49);<br />

Recalling the relevant United Nations<br />

resolutions concerning <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

1. Expresses its deep concern at the reports<br />

of continuing human rights violations in<br />

the territory of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>;<br />

2. Recalls that the Commission has commenced<br />

the decision of the Indonesian<br />

government to set up an enquiry<br />

Commission but regrets that the<br />

Indonesian investigation into the actions<br />

of the members of its security personnel<br />

on 12 November 1991, from which resulted<br />

loss of life, injuries and disappearances,<br />

failed to clearly identify all<br />

those responsible for those actions<br />

3. Expresses its concern over the lack of<br />

clear information about the number of<br />

people killed on 12 November 1991 and<br />

over the persons still unaccounted for;<br />

4. Regrets the disparity in the severity of<br />

sentences handed to those civilians not<br />

indicted for violent activities - who<br />

should have been released without delay -<br />

on the one hand, and to the military involved<br />

in the violent incident, on the<br />

other;<br />

5. Calls upon the government of Indonesia<br />

to honor its commitments undertaken in<br />

the consensus Statement adopted on 4<br />

March 1992 by the Commission on<br />

Human Rights at its 48th session;<br />

6. Calls upon the Indonesian Government to<br />

ensure that all the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese in<br />

custody, including main opposition figures,<br />

be treated humanely and with their<br />

rights fully respected, that all trials be<br />

fair, just, public and recognise the right to<br />

proper legal representation, in accordance<br />

with international humanitarian law, and<br />

that those not involved in violent<br />

activities will be released without delay;<br />

7. Renews its call on the Indonesian<br />

authorities to allow access to <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

for human rights organisations and additional<br />

humanitarian organisations;<br />

8. Encourages once again the Indonesian<br />

authorities to take the necessary steps to<br />

implement the recommendations presented<br />

by the Special Rapporteur on<br />

torture in its report (Doc. E/C.<br />

4/1992/17/Add.1) following his visit to<br />

Indonesia and <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and to keep the<br />

Special Rapporteur informed of the<br />

progress made towards their implementation;<br />

9. Urges the Government of Indonesia to<br />

invite the Special Rapporteur on Torture,<br />

the Special Rapporteur on Extra-judicial,<br />

Summary or Arbitrary Executions, the<br />

Working Group on Arbitrary Detention<br />

and the Working Group on Involuntary<br />

Disappearances to visit <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and<br />

to facilitate the discharge of their<br />

mandates;<br />

10. Invites the Secretary-General to transmit<br />

the full report of his Personal Envoy,<br />

Mr. Amos Wako, to the Commission on<br />

Human Rights;<br />

11. Welcomes the resumption of talks about<br />

the question of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and<br />

encourages the Secretary-General to<br />

continue his good offices for achieving a<br />

just, comprehensive and internationally<br />

acceptable settlement of the question of<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>;<br />

12. Decides to consider the situation in <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> at its fiftieth session on the basis<br />

of the reports of the Special rapporteurs<br />

and Working Groups and that of the<br />

Secretary General, which would include<br />

an analytical compilation of all<br />

information received from, among others,<br />

Governments, intergovernmental and<br />

non-governmental organisations.<br />

CLOSED EYES<br />

ON EAST TIMOR<br />

Editorial, The Boston Globe, Friday, March<br />

5, 19<strong>93</strong><br />

During the presidential campaign, Bill<br />

Clinton lamented the “unconscionable” indifference<br />

previous administrations displayed<br />

toward Indonesian violations of human<br />

rights in the occupied territory of <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>. He promised a change in American<br />

policy if he were elected.<br />

Whether because of inertia, the confusion<br />

of a transition or a change of heart, US<br />

policy under Clinton seems to be no different<br />

from what it has been since the


Page 66 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

Indonesians first invaded and occupied <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> in 1975.<br />

Since then, as many as 200,000<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese, out of a population of 700,000,<br />

have perished, victims of Indonesia’s<br />

genocidal repression. Though the United<br />

Nations never recognized Indonesia’s annexation<br />

of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, successive US<br />

presidents bestowed arms, military training<br />

and diplomatic support on the Indonesian<br />

executioners.<br />

Sad to say, US delegates to a meeting of<br />

the UN Human Rights Commission in<br />

Geneva reportedly lobbied this week against<br />

a resolution on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> prepared for the<br />

European Community by the Portuguese<br />

delegation. The EC resolution calls on<br />

Indonesia to cease its abuse of human rights<br />

in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, to honor its previous<br />

commitments, to allow access to human<br />

rights organizations and “to invite the<br />

special rapporteur on torture, the special<br />

rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or<br />

arbitrary executions, the working groups on<br />

arbitrary detention and the working group<br />

on involuntary disappearances to visit <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>.”<br />

Following policy guidelines established<br />

last fall by the Bush administration, the<br />

American delegates in Geneva left other<br />

nations’ delegates in no doubt that they<br />

found the Portuguese resolution too strong<br />

and instead wanted a mild “consensus<br />

statement” like the one produced last year.<br />

Indonesia’s crimes against humanity are<br />

no less repugnant than those committed in<br />

Bosnia or Iraq. If Clinton truly wants<br />

America to become a protector of human<br />

rights, he must change the Bush policy on<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

UNHRC STATEMENT OF<br />

CONSTANCIO PINTO<br />

FOR ANTI-SLAVERY INTERNATIONAL<br />

Forty-Ninth Session, UN Human Rights<br />

Commission, Item 12 Geneva, 5 March<br />

19<strong>93</strong><br />

Mr. Chairman Distinguished members of<br />

the United Nations Commission on Human<br />

Rights<br />

First, I would like to introduce myself.<br />

My name is Constancio Pinto and I am<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese. I am one of the people who organised<br />

the peaceful demonstration on 12<br />

November 1991 in Dili, the capital of <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>, where the massacre took place.<br />

Fortunately I escaped from Dili on 16 May<br />

1992 to Indonesia and then to Lisbon in<br />

Portugal on 11 November 1992.<br />

Today I am here as an eye-witness of the<br />

abuses of the human rights of my people<br />

which continued after the 12th of November<br />

massacre 1991. But while I am reading this<br />

statement I am concerned about the life of<br />

my wife and my son who is only one year<br />

old as well as the lives of my parents. To<br />

guarantee their safety I would like to hand<br />

over to this commission the list of their<br />

names.<br />

Mr. Chairman,<br />

Since I left them on 2 November 1991, I<br />

have not seen or communicated with my<br />

family. I do not even know if they are alive<br />

or not.<br />

I wish the United Nations Commission<br />

on Human Rights to take this into consideration.<br />

If not, I am sure my wife, my child<br />

and my parents will be subjected to repression<br />

by the Indonesian army.<br />

Repression is a tradition of Indonesia which<br />

is practiced in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

I was one of the young people who suffered<br />

ill-treatment in Indonesian custody.<br />

When I was arrested on 25th January 1991<br />

at 9.30am, I was beaten by many policeman<br />

at the station. I was beaten for over 14<br />

hours until blood came from my mouth, my<br />

nose, my eyes and my ears. After that, I<br />

was taken into the “Senopati II” prison<br />

where I was interrogated by Captain Edy<br />

Suprianto and Let Colonel Gatot, the head<br />

of Intelligence in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. In Senopati II<br />

I was interrogated and threatened for 4 days.<br />

Unfortunately I met with 13 other prisoners<br />

that had been detained three months before.<br />

David Aleong (20), Talofo Moniz (23), José<br />

Antonio Galucho (40), Abilio Sarmento (25)<br />

and Francisco Dias (55). most of them were<br />

young people. David, Talofo, and José<br />

Galucho are now in prison together with<br />

Alexio Gama, Grigorio Saldanha, Francisco<br />

Miranda, Filomena Ferreira, Juvencio<br />

Martins, Jacinto Alves, Carlos Lemos and<br />

many others. These people were subjected<br />

to all kinds of torture: punched and slapped,<br />

electric shock, burnt with cigarettes, cut<br />

with blades. As a consequence Abilio<br />

Sarmento had his jaw broken and Talofo<br />

suffered mental trauma.<br />

One week later I was released but on the<br />

condition that I present myself to Captain<br />

Edy and Colonel Gatot three times a week.<br />

Even then, I was continuously monitored by<br />

their intelligence police. That was my life<br />

from January to October 1991.<br />

At the times I had to present myself, I<br />

was threatened to make me denounce the<br />

position of Xanana Gusmão and the activities<br />

of the underground organisations. In the<br />

beginning of October 1991, one of the<br />

soldiers of Captain Edy Suprianto said to<br />

me “Let’s see who will be the hero: you or<br />

me?” In this case he failed. This intimidation<br />

happen to all <strong>Timor</strong>ese people, especially<br />

the young.<br />

On 29 October, when the Indonesian<br />

army ambushed Motael church and killed<br />

Sebastião Gomes, many young people were<br />

detained, among them Alfonso Rangel who<br />

was then sentenced to 5 years in prison.<br />

As a result of the torture some of the<br />

detainees were forced to say that I was their<br />

leader. That is why on 1 November 1991 at<br />

5pm Martino Alau, an intelligence policeman,<br />

held a meeting in his house with other<br />

intelligence officials. The purpose of the<br />

meeting was to arrest me again and possibly<br />

to execute me. Fortunately I was informed<br />

about the meeting.<br />

Then, on 2 November at 3am I left my<br />

wife, who was 5 months pregnant and my<br />

parents to go into hiding around Dili,<br />

moving from house to house during the night<br />

and sometimes sleeping in the jungle,<br />

without knowing the situation of my family.<br />

After the November massacre, my picture<br />

was distributed to all the intelligence<br />

police and army, my name was published in<br />

the newspaper and announced over the<br />

television. Fortunately I had the<br />

opportunity to escape to Portugal.<br />

Mr. Chairman,<br />

In the massacre of 12 November 1991,<br />

the Indonesian army killed more than 200<br />

people, most of them young people, and<br />

wounded at least 382.<br />

Indonesia, after killing 200,000 <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />

people over the past 17 years are still not<br />

satisfied. From 1989 until the present day,<br />

the presence of a strategy to exterminate the<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese people has clearly emerged,<br />

starting with the extermination of the youth.<br />

From 12 November massacre to the present<br />

day, many young people have been<br />

persecuted: some of them have been arrested<br />

and imprisoned; some o them are still<br />

persecuted. Because of that, they have had<br />

to leave their family, their jobs and their<br />

schools.<br />

Now with the isolation of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

from the eyes of the international community,<br />

the <strong>Timor</strong>ese are being forced to bend<br />

to the will of the Indonesian army, our persecutors<br />

and executers. As an example are<br />

the trials of Mr. Xanana Gusmão’s trial and<br />

of the many others. Xanana Gusmão, who<br />

before his capture always proposed to negotiate<br />

with Indonesia under UN auspices<br />

without pre-conditions, is now the victim.<br />

Mr. Chairman,<br />

The military Commander of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>,<br />

Theo Syafei, continues to use “Operasi<br />

Tuntas” (operation thoroughness or operation<br />

once and for all). The victims of this<br />

operation are and will continue to be the<br />

young <strong>Timor</strong>ese people. Hence, the extermination<br />

of the <strong>Timor</strong>ese youth will be the<br />

extermination of the next generation of<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese people.<br />

To conclude, I would like to say that,<br />

this time, my people are following the<br />

Commission of Human Rights with great<br />

expectation and hope for its success in re-


<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 67<br />

gard to the continuing human rights violations<br />

in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. On the other hand, my<br />

people would like to hear the response of<br />

the Commission in the light of the<br />

Consensus statement made by this<br />

Commission on Human Rights in March<br />

1992, dealing with human rights violations<br />

in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. Does this Commission think<br />

that Indonesian government has had any<br />

respect for that decision?<br />

Thank you Mr. Chairman.<br />

UNHRC STATEMENT BY ABE<br />

BARRETO SOARES<br />

Geneva, 8 March 19<strong>93</strong><br />

I am grateful for the opportunity I have<br />

to address this Commission on behalf of the<br />

International Peace Bureau.<br />

My name is Barnabé Barreto Soares, a<br />

fourth-year English student from the wellknown<br />

Gadjah Mada University in<br />

Yogyakarta, Central Java, Indonesia.<br />

Talking about human rights abuse in <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> is like “pulling a scab off an old<br />

wound.” For any <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese like me<br />

who experienced the brutal invasion and<br />

occupation of their country by the<br />

Indonesian military, it is hard to make a<br />

decision to choose between speaking out or<br />

not speaking out about human rights abuse<br />

in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. I chose the latter and so I am<br />

here free to talk about my experience.<br />

Even though I am free to speak out about<br />

conditions in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> since the invasion<br />

in 1975, I feel rather scared as it might cause<br />

trouble to my family back home: my family<br />

could be harassed by the Indonesian military<br />

because of my being out-spoken. But that is<br />

a risk that I have to face. I was nine years<br />

old when <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> was invaded by the<br />

Indonesian military on December 7, 1975. I<br />

had to flee to the countryside with my<br />

family to avoid the Indonesian military<br />

onslaught. I started a new life under<br />

Indonesian occupation in my father’s<br />

hometown after 1975 and I went to primary<br />

school under the Indonesian education<br />

system.<br />

Already while still a small boy living in<br />

my father’s hometown I began asking: “If<br />

the Indonesian military say that we are<br />

brothers and sisters, why do they kill people<br />

in the jungle, kill people who surrender,<br />

kill innocent people who know nothing<br />

about politics?” Let me tell you what I personally<br />

experienced about human rights<br />

violations during my childhood and while I<br />

was a teenager:<br />

* people who I knew in my father’s<br />

hometown ‘disappeared’ after surrendering<br />

to the Indonesian military;<br />

* relatives of mine lost their livestock; a<br />

close relative of my father’s discovered that<br />

his buffaloes had been killed by Indonesian<br />

soldiers. Because he protested he was accused<br />

of being a Fretilin member. This<br />

frightened him so much that he decided to<br />

remain silent about anything else that happened<br />

to him;<br />

* the troops often steal our people’s<br />

livestock to feed themselves, saying that<br />

this ‘helps them carry out their duties in<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>; such a thing often happened to<br />

the inhabitants of the town where I spent<br />

my childhood;<br />

* our people had to carry a travel document<br />

whenever and wherever they go;<br />

* people were not allowed to listen to<br />

foreign broadcasts. If they did, they were<br />

punished;<br />

* people’s houses were raided in the<br />

early morning or late at night;<br />

* people suspected as members of<br />

Fretilin were arrested and put in prison.<br />

But one incident stands out vividly in my<br />

memory. One afternoon as I was playing<br />

football with my friends in the street, I saw<br />

an army truck drive past full of Hansip<br />

soldiers (army-trained militia). The men<br />

were shouting and singing and holding high<br />

so that everyone could see, the severed<br />

heads of several guerrillas. This was meant<br />

as a warning to all of us not to support the<br />

resistance. I can tell you, I felt very scared<br />

when I saw this terrible scene.<br />

When I moved to Dili in 1981 and went<br />

to high school, I continued to hear more and<br />

more stories about the atrocities committed<br />

by the Indonesian army.<br />

In 1985, before leaving for Java to continue<br />

my studies at university, I had to take<br />

a screening test, to indicate whether I was<br />

part of Fretilin or not.<br />

In 1989 I went back to <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> for a<br />

holiday. I attended the Mass celebrated by<br />

the Pope John Paul II in Tacitolu, on the<br />

outskirts of Dili. Right after the Mass, there<br />

was a pro- independence demonstration. I<br />

saw the demonstrators being beaten up by<br />

Indonesian security forces. Later I heard<br />

that the demonstrators were put in jail for<br />

interrogation.<br />

I returned to <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> again in 1991.<br />

My movements were closely monitored by<br />

the Indonesian secret police. I felt very uneasy<br />

in Dili. I asked myself: “If the<br />

Indonesian military claim that everything is<br />

fine in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, why is there always all<br />

this surveillance? ”<br />

I left for Canada to participate in a cultural<br />

exchange program for three months in<br />

September 1991. The massacre of<br />

November 12 1991 in Santa Cruz, Dili, <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> took place just as I was about to<br />

finish my program. A week after the massacre,<br />

I realized that the situation in <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> was becoming worse and worse. I<br />

also realized that my friends who joined the<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese students’ organisation<br />

(Renetil), the group which I was associated<br />

with, had been arrested for conducting a<br />

peaceful demonstration in Jakarta, the<br />

Indonesian capital. They had been protesting<br />

about the massacre and human rights<br />

abuses since the invasion in 1975.<br />

I began to feel afraid about going back to<br />

Indonesia. Finally, I made up my mind to<br />

stay in Canada. That was the hardest decision<br />

I have ever made in my life.<br />

In my view, human rights abuses in <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> cannot be separated from the <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese struggle for self- determination<br />

and independence. There will be more human<br />

rights abuses in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> as long as<br />

there is no peaceful solution for the <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> problem. I really hope that the this<br />

UN Commission will take meaningful initiatives<br />

to put an end to the human rights<br />

violations in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

The people of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> feel helpless in<br />

their own homeland. They look to you to do<br />

everything in your power to help them.<br />

Thank you.<br />

March 8, 19<strong>93</strong><br />

CNRM UPDATE<br />

As we launch into Week 6, the tactics,<br />

moves and strategising are poised to come<br />

into play again. I hardly need to say how<br />

important these next few days are... From<br />

our last Memo, you saw clearly the double<br />

faces of both the US and Australian delegates,<br />

and how the Indonesians are always<br />

ready to capitalize. Wheeling and dealing<br />

will continue to be the order of the day this<br />

week.<br />

We have had great press activity from<br />

friends in the US, with pressure on the<br />

government there. But we need a continuous<br />

intensive attack this week. The vote for the<br />

Resolution is due Wednesday. Please lobby<br />

your home governments.<br />

Now I will let the governments and<br />

NGOs speak for themselves... So far, <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> has been raised over 22 times under<br />

item 12...and the item is still not closed.<br />

The permanent representative for<br />

Denmark, Jacob Esper Larsen, spoke for the<br />

European Community expressing the<br />

concern over “the lack of clear information<br />

about the number of people killed and over<br />

the persons still not accounted for, about<br />

the disparity of the sentences given to civilians<br />

on the one hand and the military on the<br />

other, and by the denial of access to the<br />

territory by human rights organizations.”<br />

The European Community went on to “urge<br />

the Indonesian authorities to honour their<br />

commitments and to respond fully to the<br />

consensus statement on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.”


Page 68 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

The Community also “trust” that all<br />

those in custody, such as Xanana Gusmão,<br />

will be treated humanely with their rights<br />

fully respected, that they will have fair trials<br />

and that the ICRC will have full access. It is<br />

extremely important that an EC policy<br />

statement mentions individual cases: the<br />

personal mention of Xanana is therefore<br />

very significant. The Community also reiterated<br />

its support for the talks under UN<br />

auspices “with full respect for the legitimate<br />

interests and aspirations of the <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese.”<br />

The head of the Canadian delegation,<br />

Anne Park, concurred, adding that access for<br />

international human rights activists and<br />

journalists to the territory should be expanded.<br />

Switzerland considered <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> “an<br />

occupied territory” which is in fact the very<br />

first time a western country has used such<br />

blunt diplomatic and legal language. They<br />

also stressed the importance of the input of<br />

both NGOs and UN special rapporteurs in<br />

exposing the desperate human rights situation<br />

in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. Sri Lanka, Bangladesh<br />

and the new Czech Republic expressed deep<br />

concern over the situation in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> in<br />

their submissions.<br />

The Australian delegation, remaining true<br />

to its allegiance to all things Asian, dwelt on<br />

the positive steps made by Indonesia in<br />

regard to <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. After praising<br />

President Suharto, the national commission<br />

of inquiry, the troop reductions, the access<br />

to the territory, Australia recognised that<br />

the “human rights situation in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

remains of concern.” After their actions last<br />

week we would not really have expected<br />

much more.<br />

As is to be expected, Ambassador Shunji<br />

Maruyama, heading the Japanese delegation,<br />

declared the measures taken by the<br />

Indonesian government since the massacre<br />

as “positive.” The Islamic Republic of Iran,<br />

in a swinging attack on western imperialism<br />

generally and in particular in the field of<br />

human rights, said that Portugal’s interest in<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> was purely because it “has lost<br />

residuals of colonial interests there.”<br />

Our <strong>Timor</strong>ese friends spoke passionately.<br />

Speaking for Anti-Slavery<br />

International, Constancio Pinto described<br />

the brutal torture to which he was subjected<br />

by Indonesian intelligence police and he<br />

spoke of his fears for his family because of<br />

his presence here. Abé Barreto Soares<br />

(International Peace Bureau) described the<br />

day to day violations of basic rights endured<br />

by the <strong>Timor</strong>ese people. “In my view,<br />

human rights abuses in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> cannot<br />

be separated from the <strong>Timor</strong>ese struggle for<br />

self-determination and independence.”<br />

José Ramos Horta (National Aboriginal<br />

and Islander Legal Services Secretariat)<br />

dwelt on “certain half truths, distortions and<br />

outright lies” made by the Indonesian<br />

delegation: “the return to ‘normalcy’ in <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> ... is the on-going practice of torture,<br />

arbitrary arrest and detention.” Mr. Horta<br />

asked “Is this the progress since the<br />

Consensus Statement of last year’s<br />

Commission?”<br />

Siswa Santoso, an Indonesian (MRAP),<br />

spoke of “the culture of violence” which<br />

dominates society in his country, concern<br />

over the human rights situation in the occupied<br />

territories of Aceh and <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>,<br />

while Alexandra Reis spoke on behalf of her<br />

fellow <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese women. She ca1led on<br />

the Commission to “pay special attention to<br />

the sufferings of our womenfolk, especially<br />

the atrocity of rape.”<br />

Support for the <strong>Timor</strong>ese came from<br />

NGOs, both South and North. Dr. William<br />

Wipfler of the Anglican Consultative<br />

Council, spoke solely on the question of<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, describing how “the world has<br />

observed in virtual silence, the incredible,<br />

massive and barbaric genocide of that tiny<br />

nation.” The human rights violations in <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> were also raised by Amnesty<br />

International, the International Indian<br />

Treaty Council, the International League for<br />

the Rights and Liberation of Peoples, the<br />

Commission of the Churches on<br />

International Affairs and the International<br />

Commission of Jurists.<br />

Keep up the struggle!<br />

INDONESIA SUFFERS<br />

HUMILIATING DEFEAT AT UN<br />

The following press communiqué was issued<br />

in Geneva on Thursday, 11 March 19<strong>93</strong> by<br />

the National Council for Maubere Resistance<br />

(CNRM):<br />

Indonesia was dealt a humiliating defeat<br />

at the United Nations today, the penultimate<br />

day of the Commission on Human<br />

Rights, as 22 member states voted in favour<br />

of a resolution on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

The Indonesians, who this year claimed<br />

to have been “licking their wounds” after the<br />

massacre of hundreds of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese in<br />

Dili in November 1991, will be doing so<br />

again this afternoon.<br />

They seriously miscalculated the strength<br />

of support behind the people of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>,<br />

where the violations of human rights by the<br />

Indonesian forces of occupation are wellknown.<br />

The Commission room was packed as<br />

governments and NGOs alike awaited the<br />

outcome. The resolution, which had been<br />

postponed since Wednesday in order to try<br />

and reach an expected consensus, created the<br />

biggest stir yet in the Commission.<br />

No action vote defeated<br />

Last minute attempts to negotiate failed<br />

as Indonesia, a vice chair of the Commission<br />

and head of the Non-Aligned Movement,<br />

remained intractable to the last. Finally the<br />

resolution, sponsored by 24 governments<br />

from the European Community, the United<br />

States of America, the Nordic states,<br />

Angola, Guinea- Bissau, Mozambique,<br />

Costa Rica and Canada, was put to the vote.<br />

The Asian and Islamic countries tried to<br />

avoid any action by the Commission, but<br />

the motion present by Malaysia met with<br />

defeat. This is the first time a motion of<br />

non-action has been defeated at the<br />

Commission for four years.<br />

In the voting on the resolution, the victory<br />

for <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> was resounding with 23<br />

votes to 12 in favour with 15 abstentions.<br />

Angola, Guinea-Bissau, USA, Canada,<br />

Russia, Costa Rica, Austria, Poland and<br />

Denmark all spoke out in support of <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>. This spread of support was the key<br />

to success of the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> strategy. It<br />

successfully challenged the block vote of the<br />

South which has been used in the<br />

Commission to defeat resolutions on human<br />

rights in China and Tibet.<br />

“Stone in the shoe”<br />

Despite all the Indonesian delegation’s<br />

attempt to get rid of the “stone in their<br />

shoe,” the stone remains firmly entrenched.<br />

This will be much to the chagrin of<br />

President Suharto, who has been elected to a<br />

sixth term this week. It is clear that the<br />

leaders of the armed forces in Indonesia<br />

(ABRI) forced the delegation to adopt a<br />

hard position in the negotiations. ABRI ensured<br />

the appointment of Try Sutrisno,<br />

former commander-in-chief of the Armed<br />

Forces, as vice- president.<br />

“In the end only dictatorships like Iran,<br />

Sudan and China stood with Indonesia. All<br />

the democracies of the world supported us.<br />

Equally important, and indeed it sets a<br />

precedent for other issues, <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> destroyed<br />

the myth of the Asian block. There<br />

were Latin Americans and Africans voting<br />

with us and important Asian and Muslim<br />

states that abstained,” said José Ramos<br />

Horta after the voting.<br />

The strongly-worded resolution on <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> comes close on the heels of the consensus<br />

statement on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> at last<br />

year’s Commission. In it, the Commission<br />

expresses its “deep concern” at the reports<br />

of continuing human rights abuses in <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> and calls on Indonesia to honour the<br />

commitments it made under the consensus<br />

statement of the Commission last year.<br />

The resolution was adopted word-for-word<br />

as introduced by the EC Twelve (see above).


<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 69<br />

Country voting breakdown on 11 March<br />

Human Rights Commission resolution<br />

on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>:<br />

23 In favour: Angola, Australia, Austria,<br />

Barbados, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile,<br />

Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Finland,<br />

France, Germany, Guinea-Bissau,<br />

Mauritius, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal,<br />

Russian Federation, United Kingdom, USA,<br />

Uruguay, Zambia.<br />

(Uruguay added its vote on the next day,<br />

having been out of the hall during the vote.)<br />

12 Against: Bangladesh, China, Cuba,<br />

Gambia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia,<br />

Nigeria, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria.<br />

15 Abstentions: Argentina, Burundi,<br />

Colombia, Cyprus, Gabon, Japan, Kenya,<br />

Lesotho, Mauritania, Mexico, Pakistan,<br />

Peru, Republic of Korea, Tunisia,<br />

Venezuela.<br />

AUSTRALIA’S UN VOTE<br />

‘A SURPRISE’<br />

13 March. Canberra Times. Unabridged<br />

Melbourne: In an unexpected move,<br />

Australia has backed a strongly worded<br />

United Nations Rights Commission resolution<br />

questioning Indonesia’s human-rights<br />

record in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

Despite its vote on Thursday, the<br />

Department of Foreign Affairs said yesterday<br />

that Australia planned to make statement<br />

to the commission saying would have<br />

preferred if there had not been any vote on<br />

the issue.<br />

In a resolution applauded by humanrights<br />

groups and the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese independence<br />

movement, the UNHRC in<br />

Geneva said it was “gravely concerned” at<br />

reports of continuing violations by<br />

Indonesian forces in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and criticised<br />

light sentences on soldiers involved in<br />

the 1991 Dili massacre.<br />

Australia - which initially had lobbied<br />

against any resolution at the commission -<br />

voted with 22 other countries in favour of<br />

the resolution, which was backed by the<br />

European Community, the United States<br />

and a number of Third World countries.<br />

Twelve voted against and 15 abstained.<br />

Earlier this week, a spokesman for the<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese independence movement,<br />

José Ramos Horta, accused Australia of<br />

trying to soften a resolution critical of<br />

Indonesia.<br />

“It’s pathetic that this little country can<br />

be so servile to Indonesia,” Mr. Ramos<br />

Horta said.<br />

On Monday, a spokesman for the<br />

Department of Foreign Affairs denied the<br />

allegation, but said Australia preferred that a<br />

consensus statement on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> be made<br />

by the commission chairman, rather than the<br />

issue’s going to a vote.<br />

He said yesterday that Australia, after<br />

following the arguments, had decided to vote<br />

with the resolution, even though this was<br />

not its preferred option.<br />

He said Australia intended to explain its<br />

decision in a statement at the UNHRC last<br />

night.<br />

Australia had supported the resolution<br />

because it was consistent with support for<br />

fundamental standards.<br />

It would have preferred a consensus outcome<br />

“which more adequately acknowledge<br />

the positive steps” taken by Indonesia since<br />

the commission met a year ago, the<br />

spokesman said.<br />

In a statement issued yesterday in<br />

Geneva, Mr. Ramos Horta described the<br />

resolution as a humiliating defeat for<br />

Indonesia. The Australia Council for<br />

Overseas Aid, often a critic of Australia’s<br />

stance on human rights in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>,<br />

“warmly endorsed” the vote.<br />

“This vote will do much to restore public<br />

confidence that Australia is even-handed and<br />

non-selective when it comes to grave<br />

violations of universally accepted human<br />

rights,” the executive director of ACFOA,<br />

Russell Rollason, said.<br />

Thursday’s vote followed intense behind-the-scenes<br />

lobbying.<br />

The Associated Press newsagency, in a<br />

report from Geneva , said it was a blow for<br />

Jakarta, which had managed to avoid criticism<br />

by the commission last year and had<br />

campaigned hard for support form developing<br />

countries during this year’s six-week<br />

session.<br />

Human-rights activists in the meeting<br />

chamber greeted the result with jubilation.<br />

Indonesia’s representative described the<br />

charges of violations as “unwarranted<br />

sweeping allegations.”<br />

NB: The Melbourne Age and The Weekend<br />

Australia had similar stories.<br />

UN SLAMS DILI KILLERS’<br />

JAIL TERMS<br />

Sydney Morning Herald 13th March 19<strong>93</strong><br />

Unabridged<br />

GENEVA, Friday, AP: The UN Human<br />

Rights Commission today voiced concern at<br />

reports of continuing violations by<br />

Indonesian forces in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and criticised<br />

light sentences against soldiers involved<br />

in 1991 massacre of pro-independence<br />

demonstrators.<br />

The commission urged Indonesia to allow<br />

UN experts on torture, executions and<br />

disappearances to enter <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and to<br />

increase access for other human rights<br />

monitors.<br />

The resolution was passed by 22 votes<br />

to 12. There were 15 abstentions. Western<br />

governments on the 53-member commission,<br />

including Australia, voted in favour. Most<br />

of Indonesia’s neighbours, including Japan,<br />

either voted against or abstained.<br />

The vote was a blow for Jakarta, which<br />

last year managed to avoid criticism by the<br />

commission and had campaigned hard for<br />

support from developing countries during<br />

this year’s six-week session.<br />

Indonesia described the charges of violations<br />

as “unwarranted sweeping allegations.”<br />

Human rights groups estimate that up to<br />

200 people were killed when Indonesian<br />

troops fired on mourners at a funeral in the<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese capital in Dili in November<br />

1991. Officially, the toll was 50.<br />

Ten soldiers were sentenced to up to 18<br />

months in jail for their role in the shootings.<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese involved in the demonstration,<br />

in contrast, received sentences<br />

from five years to life.<br />

U.N. CRITICIZES INDONESIA<br />

ABOUT EAST TIMOR<br />

By Paul Lewis. New York Times, Sunday<br />

March 14, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

UNITED NATIONS March 13 -<br />

Reflecting a shift in United States policy,<br />

the United Nations Human Rights<br />

Commission has adopted a resolution expressing<br />

“deep concern” at human rights<br />

violations in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> for the first time<br />

since Indonesia annexed the former<br />

Portuguese colony in 1975.<br />

With 22 nations voting in favor, 12 voting<br />

against and 15 abstaining, the Human<br />

Rights Commission also agreed on Thursday<br />

in Geneva to ask Indonesia to allow United<br />

Nations officials to visit the island to<br />

investigate allegations of torture, secret<br />

executions, religious persecution and<br />

continuing detention of citizens by the<br />

Indonesian authorities.<br />

<strong>East</strong> Timer was seized by Indonesia 18<br />

years ago, just as Portugal was preparing to<br />

grant the colony independence. Reports<br />

have persisted ever since of mistreatment of<br />

the territory’s mainly Roman Catholic<br />

inhabitants by the predominantly Muslim<br />

Indonesian police and armed forces.<br />

The issue drew international attention in<br />

November 1991, when the Indonesian security<br />

forces opened fire on a crowd of<br />

mourners at the funeral of a supporter of<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese independence. The government<br />

estimated that 50 died, but witnesses<br />

and local officials said troops killed at least<br />

180 and possibly dozens more.<br />

While the European Community has repeatedly<br />

tried to bring the matter before the


Page 70 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

Human Rights Commission, it is the first<br />

time a resolution criticizing Indonesia for its<br />

conduct in the territory has succeeded in<br />

passing.<br />

Diplomats and human rights campaigners<br />

said a crucial difference this time was a<br />

change in policy introduced by the Clinton<br />

Administration which threw Washington’s<br />

weight behind the European drive last week.<br />

Under the Bush Administration, the United<br />

States joined Australia and Japan last year<br />

in blocking a resolution criticizing Indonesia.<br />

This time Australia also voted in favor of<br />

the measure criticizing Indonesia while<br />

Japan abstained.<br />

“This vote was long overdue,” said Reed<br />

Brody of the Washington-based<br />

International Human Rights Law Group<br />

who attended the meeting. “Despite<br />

Indonesia’s power and the heavy diplomatic<br />

pressure it exerted, the international community<br />

has finally gathered the courage to<br />

speak out.”<br />

The commission’s stance on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

seemed to signal a more aggressive attitude<br />

in denouncing human rights violations<br />

around the world at the annual meeting,<br />

which ended Friday. The commission,<br />

which can only bring diplomatic pressure on<br />

offenders by drawing attention to abuses,<br />

commented unfavorably on the human rights<br />

performance of a record 29 countries,<br />

compared with 21 last year.<br />

It also dealt with human rights abuses for<br />

the first time in Papua New Guinea,<br />

Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Rwanda, Tajikistan<br />

and Togo.<br />

The commission broke new ground in its<br />

efforts to protect individuals by voting to<br />

station human rights monitors on the ground<br />

in Iraq to monitor any abuses as well as in<br />

former Yugoslavia. It also voted to keep<br />

human rights monitors in Cambodia after<br />

elections are held there late this spring and<br />

the United Nations peacekeeping force<br />

withdraws.<br />

But the United States suffered a setback<br />

when a resolution criticizing China for political<br />

repression and other rights abuses was<br />

blocked by China’s allies. The outgoing<br />

Bush Administration had sought to shield<br />

Beijing from such criticism, but the Clinton<br />

Administration took a more aggressive<br />

position in partnership with the 12<br />

European Community countries.<br />

The commission deplored the human<br />

rights situation in Myanmar, formerly<br />

Burma, after its investigator was denied access<br />

to Aung San Suu Kyi, a Nobel Peace<br />

laureate who has been under house arrest<br />

since 1991.<br />

It also criticized Cuba for refusing to<br />

admit its special investigator and adopted<br />

resolutions criticizing the human rights record<br />

of Togo, Zaire, Sudan, Afghanistan,<br />

Equatorial Guinea, Iran, and the truncated<br />

Yugoslav federation, as well as Israel’s<br />

military activities in southern Lebanon.<br />

The Commission also voted to offer aid<br />

to El Salvador, Guatemala, Georgia and<br />

Somalia to improve their justice and police<br />

systems.<br />

INDONESIA REJECTS<br />

UNHRC RESOLUTION ON ET<br />

Radio Australia News (abridged), 15 March<br />

19<strong>93</strong><br />

The leader of the Indonesian delegation to<br />

Geneva, Mr. Wiryono, has stated that<br />

Indonesia rejects the resolution of the<br />

UNHR Commission on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> adopted<br />

last week against Indonesia. He expressed<br />

his view about the resolution saying that<br />

Indonesia has been ‘unfairly treated.’ He<br />

also said that Indonesia was disappointed<br />

with Australia who chose to vote this time<br />

against Indonesia.<br />

Indonesia is obviously upset with the overwhelming<br />

support of the big powers in<br />

favour of ET, including Australia, which has<br />

always lobbied in its favour. My question is:<br />

what is the main reason which pushed<br />

Australia this time to support the resolution?<br />

Was it a genuine move? Or more likely, like<br />

Canada, it was also ‘forced’ to back the<br />

resolution because of Indonesia’s<br />

intransigence to negotiate? I understand that<br />

France, and lately the USA, has been in<br />

favour of a strong resolution, but not<br />

Australia. Moreover, with the reelection of<br />

Keating, I don’t see any good prospects for<br />

a fundamental change in Australia’s position<br />

regarding ET. I might be wrong, but,<br />

assessing from his previous policy to push<br />

Australia towards Asia, it doesn’t seem too<br />

encouraging.<br />

JAKARTA ‘REJECTS UN RESO-<br />

LUTION’ (BBC)<br />

Comment: It is significant that it took four<br />

days for Jakarta to come up with an official<br />

response to the UN resolution condemning<br />

Indonesia for human rights abuses in <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> and calling for investigations by UN<br />

special rapporteurs. We have not yet seen<br />

Indonesian press reports there about the<br />

resolution though sources say the resolution<br />

was widely reported in the Indonesian press<br />

last Friday.<br />

From the unfolding of events surrounding<br />

negotiations in Geneva in an attempt to<br />

adopt a chairman’s statement this year<br />

instead of adopting a resolution, the impression<br />

is that a hardline position adopted<br />

by the military back home made it impossible<br />

for diplomats in Geneva to offer any<br />

concessions at all. It is likely that there are<br />

mutual recriminations in Jakarta between<br />

the foreign ministry and the military over<br />

who should be held responsible for this<br />

serious setback to Indonesia’s diplomacy<br />

over <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

– John MacD.<br />

According to a BBC World Service report<br />

from Jakarta on 15 March, a senior foreign<br />

ministry official has called the UN Human<br />

Rights Commission resolution on <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> “unfair and unacceptable.”<br />

The official, Wiryono Sastrohandoyo,<br />

told journalists on Monday that Indonesia<br />

has been unfairly treated. He said the move<br />

was against the spirit of cooperation<br />

achieved last year when the commission<br />

issued a milder document - a chairman’s<br />

statement.<br />

This year, Mr. Wiryono said, Indonesia<br />

had been working for a similar outcome but<br />

could not accept the wording of a draft<br />

chairman’s statement and the Commission<br />

instead voted through a harsher resolution.<br />

But he added that the resolution was not<br />

binding and that Indonesia rejected it. In a<br />

clear reference to Portugal, Mr. Wiryono<br />

said he felt that some European countries<br />

were openly engaged in scoring points off<br />

Indonesia and wanted to perpetuate the issue<br />

of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. Among those who voted<br />

for the resolution were Portugal, the UK,<br />

France, the US and Australia.<br />

INDONESIA REJECTS UN<br />

CONDEMNATION (AUSTRALIAN<br />

TV)<br />

ABN TV (ATVI), 12.30am 16th March 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

Transcript of news item.<br />

READER: Indonesia has rejected last<br />

week’s United Nations condemnation of its<br />

human rights record in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. A senior<br />

Indonesian offical has described the


<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 71<br />

resolution of the Human Rights<br />

Commmission in Geneva as “unfair and<br />

unacceptable.”<br />

IAN MACINTOSH REPORTS FROM<br />

Jakarta: The leader of Indonesia’s delegation<br />

of the Geneva meeting B. Sastro Handoyo<br />

(his real name is Mr. Wiryono<br />

Sastrohandoyo), said his government had<br />

been “unfairly treated.” According to Mr.<br />

Handoyo Jakarta had been working for a<br />

statement by the commission chairman<br />

similar to one adopted last year, which he<br />

said his government had acted upon.<br />

However, Mr. Handoyo said Jakarta would<br />

respond favorably to a further visit to<br />

Indonesia and <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> by the UN official<br />

and he expressed disappointment over<br />

Australia’s support for the strongly worded<br />

European community-sponsored resolution<br />

finally adopted. He said Indonesia had expected<br />

Australia to vote differently.<br />

INDONESIA SLAMS UN REPORT,<br />

WILL CLOSE SPECIAL EAST TIMOR<br />

COMMAND<br />

Jakarta, March 15 (AFP) - A high-ranking<br />

Indonesian official said Monday his<br />

country had been treated unfairly in a U.N.<br />

Human Rights Commission (UNHRC)<br />

resolution condemning Indonesia’s record in<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, as the military announced plans<br />

to close a special military command there.<br />

“We have been treated unfairly by the<br />

commission,” said Wiryono Sastrohandoyo,<br />

policy director at Indonesia’s foreign affairs<br />

ministry, adding that Indonesia found the<br />

resolution “unfair in its content and harsh in<br />

its language.”<br />

In Geneva last Thursday, the U.N. body<br />

adopted a resolution condemning Indonesia<br />

for human rights abuses in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>,<br />

saying it was deeply troubled about continuing<br />

violations.<br />

In a related development, the Indonesian<br />

military said it was taking steps toward<br />

disbanding its special command in <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

Major General Suwardi, who heads the<br />

Bali-based Udayana Military Command that<br />

oversees security in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, said<br />

preparations were under way to wind up<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>’s Military Operational<br />

Command, set up in 1989.<br />

He did not say, however, when the<br />

command would stop operating in the former<br />

Portuguese colony, whose control by<br />

Indonesia is still not recognized by the<br />

United Nations.<br />

If carried out the move would leave security<br />

arrangements in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> on par<br />

with those in the country’s other provinces.<br />

The Indonesian military has said the operational<br />

command will be disbanded when<br />

the fighting troops in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> have all<br />

been replaced by territorial units.<br />

The UNHCR resolution, supported by<br />

22 countries with only 12 opposed, also expressed<br />

“concern at the lack of information<br />

about the number of people killed” when the<br />

Indonesian army opened fire on a crowd of<br />

pro-independence demonstrators in Dili, the<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> capital, in November 1991.<br />

HUMAN RIGHTS CRITICISM<br />

DRIVING INDONESIA INTO A<br />

CORNER, SAYS GENERAL<br />

DPA (official German news agency) 16<br />

March 19<strong>93</strong> Dateline: Jakarta Abridged<br />

Comment: This could be a taking a swipe at<br />

Suharto for “having done so much” (after<br />

Santa Cruz) to no avail. Edi chaired the<br />

Military Tribunal that meted out some<br />

‘punishment’ to his close buddies, causing<br />

quite some humiliation in army circles. It is<br />

more evidently a swipe at the Indonesian<br />

diplomatic corps for failing to “tell the<br />

outside world about our efforts.” – TAPOL<br />

Criticism of Indonesia’s human rights<br />

record is driving the country into a corner,<br />

armed forces commander, General Edi<br />

Sudradjat said Tuesday.<br />

Indonesia had done its best to uphold<br />

democracy, human rights and environmental<br />

protection but international criticism of its<br />

rights policies was still pouring in, he noted.<br />

“The criticism has driven Indonesia into a<br />

corner,” Edi said and added that the country<br />

had done its best “which is better than<br />

many other countries. The problem is, we<br />

haven’t told the outside world enough about<br />

our efforts.”<br />

The general said many countries had only<br />

limited knowledge of Indonesia. The UN<br />

last Thursday adopted a resolution<br />

condemning Indonesia for human rights<br />

abuses in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. Political observers<br />

said the resolution was a blow for Jakarta<br />

after the country held an international conference<br />

on human rights last month.<br />

INDONESIA, DESERVEDLY<br />

REBUKED<br />

The New York Times, Editorial Page, March<br />

17, 19<strong>93</strong> Full text. “Topics of the Times”<br />

An old injustice was redressed at the<br />

United Nations last week, thanks to a<br />

timely policy shift by the Clinton<br />

Administration. The U.N. Human Rights<br />

Commission voted to express “deep concern”<br />

over human rights abuses in <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>, the former Portuguese colony that<br />

Indonesia invaded in 1975 and then annexed.<br />

That’s the first such rebuff administered to<br />

powerful and populous Indonesia by the<br />

commission.<br />

Last year the Bush Administration joined<br />

Australia and Japan in derailing a similar<br />

resolution to avoid offending an influential<br />

third-world state. But with a different signal<br />

from Washington, Australia voted in favor,<br />

Japan abstained and others found their<br />

courage. The result: 22 nations favored, 12<br />

opposed and 15 abstained on a resolution<br />

that asks Indonesia to cooperate (which<br />

Jakarta says it will) with a U.N. inquiry into<br />

charges of torture and secret executions on<br />

the island.<br />

Few paid much attention to <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

until November 1991, when Indonesian<br />

soldiers killed as many as 180 mourners at<br />

the funeral of a <strong>Timor</strong>ese opponent of<br />

Jakarta’s tough military rule. When<br />

President Suharto, just elected unopposed<br />

to a sixth term, subsequently spoke at the<br />

United Nations he volubly condemned Israel<br />

for its occupation of Arab lands – but said<br />

not a word about <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. Thanks to the<br />

Clinton Administration, it will be harder<br />

now for him to pretend that no problems<br />

exist in his own backyard.<br />

ACTION ALERT ON<br />

INDONESIAN RESPONSE TO<br />

UNHRC RESOLUTION<br />

Dear Friends:<br />

Tapol has prepared this statement about<br />

Indonesia’s avowed rejection of the resolution<br />

passed by the UN Commission on<br />

Human Rights. We have today sent a copy<br />

to Douglas Hurd, the UK Foreign Minister,<br />

and we ask readers to press their own governments<br />

along the same lines.<br />

Thanks...<br />

TAPOL, 17 March 19<strong>93</strong><br />

EAST TIMOR: COMMISSION ON<br />

HUMAN RIGHTS RESOLUTION: NO<br />

E/CN.4/19<strong>93</strong>/97<br />

Since the resolution on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> was<br />

passed by the 49th Session of the UN<br />

Commission on Human Rights, the<br />

Indonesian authorities have been claiming<br />

that the resolution is not binding and that<br />

Indonesia therefore rejects it.<br />

Mr. Wiryono Sastrohandoyo, Director-<br />

General for Political Affairs at the Foreign<br />

Ministry, headed the Indonesian delegation<br />

to the United Nations in Geneva. He told<br />

members of the press that the move was<br />

against the spirit of cooperation achieved in<br />

last year’s Commission through the milder<br />

Chairman’s statement and that, this year,<br />

Indonesia had been working for a similar<br />

agreement but could not accept the wording<br />

of the draft presented by the resolutions’<br />

co-sponsors.


Page 72 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

While this is not the first time a State has<br />

taken this stance, the United Nations needs<br />

to take a positive stand in order to confirm<br />

its central role in, and its terms for,<br />

maintaining world harmony and peace in the<br />

“new world order.” In the light of this, the<br />

remarks of the Indonesian authorities are<br />

extremely disquieting. We take this opportunity<br />

to outline our concerns.<br />

1 Challenge to the United Nations<br />

System: Statements to the domestic and<br />

international press, claiming that the resolution<br />

is not binding, present a serious<br />

challenge to the whole foundation of the<br />

United Nations human rights mechanism. If<br />

such arguments are allowed to persist uncontested,<br />

resulting in a fundamental undermining<br />

of international law, the whole<br />

role of the United Nations and, in particular<br />

here, the Commission on Human Rights,<br />

will be threatened. The United Nations is of<br />

course founded in principles of international<br />

law and therefore must treat resolutions of<br />

the Commission as binding on the parties<br />

involved.<br />

2 Membership: Indonesia is a member of<br />

the Commission. In becoming a member, and<br />

embracing the Universal Declaration of<br />

Human Rights, a state explicitly and implicitly<br />

becomes a promoter of human rights<br />

principles through the international<br />

mechanisms. Therefore, as a member<br />

Indonesia is obliged morally, to respect and<br />

honour the decisions taken by the<br />

Commission, even when those decisions are<br />

against its own interests. Without the<br />

acceptance of this basic principle by members<br />

states, the Commission cannot function<br />

in any true sense.<br />

3 Moral obligation: Whether or not this is<br />

accepted, at the very least, the reaction of<br />

the Indonesian authorities should cause<br />

grave concern to those 23 governments who<br />

voted in favour of the resolution as well as<br />

the 15 who abstained. Even if the legal obligation<br />

remains open to discussion, the<br />

moral obligation cannot be disputed.<br />

4 50th Session: Indonesia is under an<br />

obligation to carry out the terms of the<br />

resolution E/CN.4/19<strong>93</strong>/97. In particularly<br />

its obligations appear under operative paragraphs<br />

5, 6, 7, 8 and 9. Since in operative<br />

paragraph 12, the Commission decides to<br />

consider the situation in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> on the<br />

basis, inter alia, of the reports of the two<br />

special rapporteurs and two working<br />

groups, the Indonesian authorities are<br />

obliged to allow the UN officials free access<br />

in order to be able to furnish such reports.<br />

President Suharto explained recently to<br />

Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany that<br />

“Indonesia was committed to meeting the<br />

requirements imposed by the United<br />

Nations” (Jakarta Post, 25.II.19<strong>93</strong>). By rejecting<br />

the resolution of the Commission as<br />

unfair, unacceptable and not binding, the<br />

Indonesian authorities are intimating that<br />

they do not consider international law to be<br />

binding and that the Commission, that is the<br />

53 member governments, has no authority.<br />

Contrary to the statements of President<br />

Suharto, the Indonesian authorities’ have<br />

repeatedly threatened the authority of the<br />

Commission: they have not honored the<br />

terms of the Chairman’s Consensus<br />

Statement of the 48th Session with which<br />

they did agree, they have stated that they<br />

will not implement proposals contained in<br />

the report by the United Nations Special<br />

Rapporteur on Torture, Mr. Peter<br />

Kooijmans, and now they reject the resolution.<br />

If this is their position, we have to ask<br />

the reasons for Indonesia’s membership of<br />

the Commission and whether, if they do not<br />

ever intend to honour decisions of the<br />

Commission and do not regard international<br />

law as binding on them, they should remain<br />

as such?<br />

Indonesia defends its right to reject the<br />

resolution on the grounds that it tried to<br />

negotiate a second consensus statement on<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and that co-sponsors of the<br />

resolution acted unfairly and were “merely<br />

trying to score points off Indonesia” by perpetuating<br />

the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> issue. The member<br />

states of the Commission will have their<br />

own views on the attempted negotiations.<br />

But clearly attempts to claim that the<br />

resolution is not binding because negotiations<br />

failed, cannot be entertained.<br />

When countries only use the<br />

Commission, and concern for human rights,<br />

as a political tool, the future of all peoples<br />

throughout the world becomes more and<br />

more precarious. Stances like that of<br />

Indonesia, if they go unquestioned, threaten<br />

to make a mockery of the Commission. In<br />

addition, member states who are genuinely<br />

committed to the protection and upholding<br />

of human rights and international law become<br />

incapacitated.<br />

The reality of the “new world order” is<br />

that membership of the Commission is increasingly<br />

important, especially politically:<br />

A serious consideration for the Commission.<br />

For the Commission to strengthen the vital<br />

role it has in the world, member states must<br />

be expected and required to honour the<br />

Commission and its decisions and not<br />

merely reap the undoubted benefits of<br />

membership.<br />

COMMENT FROM BRUNO KAHN,<br />

AGIR POUR TIMOR<br />

Mar 18, 19<strong>93</strong><br />

Although I fully agree we should react<br />

along the broad lines of TAPOL’s statement,<br />

I am uncomfortable with a few details<br />

in this proposal:<br />

The United Nations is of course founded<br />

in principles of international law and<br />

therefore must treat resolutions of the<br />

Commission as binding on the parties involved.<br />

I am not sure if this is true. “Binding” is a<br />

legal term and I don’t know if it applies in<br />

this case. Remember the Security Council<br />

resolutions on Kuwait, which were binding<br />

because they were under chapter 4 of the<br />

UN Charter (or something like that), while<br />

the media pointedly recalled that those<br />

concerning the Occupied Territories were<br />

not. Similarly, I bet the two SC resolutions<br />

on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> are not “binding,” and that is<br />

an excuse why no action is taken. I would be<br />

very surprised if this HRC resolution were<br />

legally binding for Indonesia. Last year’s<br />

Consensus Statement looks much more<br />

binding, because Indonesia agreed to it. So I<br />

feel it is a safer ground to demand that<br />

Indonesia at least respects its own<br />

commitments.<br />

Indonesia is under an obligation to carry<br />

out the terms of the resolution<br />

E/CN.4/19<strong>93</strong>/97. In particular its obligations<br />

appear under operative paragraphs 5, 6, 7,<br />

8 and 9. Since in operative paragraph 12,<br />

the Commission decides to consider the<br />

situation in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> on the basis, inter<br />

alia, of the reports of the two special rapporteurs<br />

and two working groups, the<br />

Indonesian authorities are obliged to allow<br />

the UN officials free access in order to be<br />

able to furnish such reports.<br />

Same remark. I am not sure of the value<br />

of the term “operative.” It seems to me that<br />

the only “operative” paragraph is #12,<br />

where the word ‘decides’ appear. Just as in<br />

a trial, a ruling of the court may not be sufficient<br />

to force the loser to do something. A<br />

further ‘executive’ order may be necessary<br />

to implement the ruling if the loser is recalcitrant.<br />

On the contrary:<br />

Therefore, as a member Indonesia is<br />

obliged morally, to respect and honour the<br />

decisions taken by the Commission, even<br />

when those decisions are against its own<br />

interests.<br />

This moral side is a quite safe ground,<br />

because it doesn’t touch legal points that<br />

can be challenged by experts. Just as the<br />

‘grave concern’ of those governments who<br />

voted for the resolution.<br />

I may be wrong in my reservations, but<br />

I’d rather have some advice from an international<br />

jurist.


<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 73<br />

INDONESIA LOSES<br />

GENEVA VOTE<br />

Southam News Service (Canada), 19 March<br />

19<strong>93</strong>. By DAVE TODD<br />

Comment: Southam News feeds most major<br />

Canadian dailies. Todd wrote several hardhitting<br />

pieces on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> following the<br />

Santa Cruz massacre, accusing the government<br />

of complicity in genocide; his<br />

criticisms of Canadian “quiet diplomacy”<br />

are toned down substantially in this piece.<br />

OTTAWA Indonesia suffered a humiliating<br />

political defeat Thursday at the<br />

United Nations when it rejected Canada’s<br />

advice and tried to legitimize its control of<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

Authority over the island of <strong>Timor</strong>, north<br />

of Australia, has been disputed since the<br />

mid-1970s when Indonesia invaded the<br />

eastern half of the former Portuguese colony<br />

it inherited through post-colonial force.<br />

A series of bloodbaths over many years<br />

followed Indonesia’s invasion of the tropical<br />

enclave.<br />

Ultimately these led to a confrontation in<br />

the capital, Dili, two years ago in which<br />

government troops killed more than a hundred<br />

protesters and innocent bystanders and<br />

provoked an international incident by<br />

drawing international attention to what<br />

happened.<br />

On Thursday, the UN Human Rights<br />

Commission in Geneva was asked to vote<br />

on what the world body should do about<br />

such concerns. One choice was to censure<br />

Indonesia by placing the country under a<br />

UN human rights watch.<br />

Instead, the government of Indonesia,<br />

part of the 53-member UN Human Rights<br />

Commission at present, chose to raise the<br />

stakes by pushing a proposition that no action<br />

be taken.<br />

Canada, which tried hard to prevent<br />

matters coming to a head and feels itself<br />

under particular pressure because of a strong<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> lobby in its own backyard had<br />

no choice.<br />

It was forced to help vote down the<br />

Indonesian initiative.<br />

A second vote chastized Indonesia’s actions<br />

in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, but fell far short of<br />

calling for a UN human rights monitor to go<br />

in.<br />

The Canadian government has worked<br />

hard to achieve a balance between human<br />

rights concerns in its dealings with Indonesia<br />

and the reality that the country represents<br />

one of the brightest prospects in Asia, in<br />

terms of Canadian commercial interests.<br />

But diplomatic sources say that has<br />

nothing to do with this decision, which in<br />

any case was inevitable.<br />

Indonesian President Suharto was<br />

“elected” to yet another term in office this<br />

week. That, as much as anything, accounts<br />

for the sudden, intransigent stance in<br />

Geneva.<br />

SELECTIVE FOCUS ON<br />

HUMAN RIGHTS CRITICISED<br />

From Third World <strong>Network</strong>, Mar 16, 19<strong>93</strong><br />

Geneva 13 March (Chakravarthi<br />

Raghavan) – The United Nations Human<br />

Rights Commission ended Friday its sixweek<br />

session marked by old <strong>East</strong>-West focus<br />

being replaced by an emerging North-<br />

South one.<br />

This was evident in the debates and<br />

resolutions, both on issues of general focus<br />

and those relating to individual country<br />

situations and how they were handled.<br />

Some Third World delegations noted a<br />

tendency for the industrialized countries,<br />

without any specific overt coordination, by<br />

and large acting or voting together, though an<br />

individual country or group of them might<br />

be taking the lead in tabling resolutions or<br />

negotiating on them.<br />

The discussions and debates at the UN<br />

body which oversees and monitors implementation<br />

of the Universal Declaration of<br />

Human Rights and various international<br />

covenants has long been marked by the<br />

<strong>East</strong>-West ideological battles during the<br />

Cold war and even the détente, with each<br />

side picking on the other as well as the<br />

other’s key supporters in the South.<br />

These went on side by side with the efforts<br />

within the UN system to focus on<br />

various aspects of the human rights – civil,<br />

political, economic, social and cultural – and<br />

seeking to expand international cooperation<br />

to make the rights and their enjoyment<br />

meaningful.<br />

But with the end of the cold war, new<br />

battle lines appear to be forming.<br />

In the just concluded 49th regular session,<br />

the North-South divisions came to the<br />

fore not only over questions like ‘right to<br />

development,’ external debt and structural<br />

adjustment issues, the global macroeconomic<br />

environment and its impact on enjoyment of<br />

human rights but also over some individual<br />

country situations as well as the future<br />

orientations and procedures of the<br />

Commission’s work and of the way several<br />

of its activities are conducted.<br />

On the latter, the developing countries<br />

pushed through two resolutions one asking<br />

for a report on the original mandates of<br />

various treaty and non-treaty mechanisms<br />

for supervision and monitoring of the implementation<br />

of the instruments as well as<br />

international legal standards and norms of<br />

existing non-treaty mechanisms, the norms<br />

and criteria used by them in their procedures,<br />

as well as the criteria used by the<br />

Centre for Human Rights (the secretariat) on<br />

how in practice it channels communications<br />

on these subjects to existing public bodies or<br />

confidential procedure mechanisms.<br />

They also got adopted another resolution<br />

underscoring the need for non-selectivity,<br />

objectivity and impartiality in the promotion,<br />

protection and full protection of human<br />

rights and fundamental freedoms and to<br />

ensure that the UN and international cooperation<br />

efforts in this area are not used for<br />

political ends.<br />

The first was adopted by a roll call vote<br />

of 33 against 16 (mainly the western countries,<br />

while the second was adopted without<br />

a vote.<br />

The countries of the South also got a<br />

resolution adopted on the right of development<br />

and for setting up a thematic working<br />

group on this issue, and two others on poverty<br />

and debt and human rights.<br />

The attempts of some of the major western<br />

countries to pressure individual Third<br />

World countries to fall in line and ‘vote’ or<br />

‘speak’ according to their desires which,<br />

with the end of the Cold war appears to<br />

have become more blatant in some capitals,<br />

figured at the final plenary when Malaysia<br />

spoke up on this.<br />

The Malaysian delegate told the<br />

Commission that while Malaysia welcomed<br />

“friendly and constructive consultations” on<br />

the work of the delegation at this and future<br />

sessions, “we take strong exceptions to approaches<br />

made by representatives of certain<br />

Western countries to our authorities in<br />

Kuala Lumpur that in any way question the<br />

integrity of our national positions on issues<br />

before this Commission or the underlying<br />

purpose of our membership in the<br />

Commission.<br />

” The Malaysian delegate declined later<br />

to elaborate on this or name any names.<br />

In this speech, he made a reference to<br />

Malaysia having moved a ‘no action’ resolution<br />

on the Portuguese-EC sponsored<br />

resolution against Indonesia over <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

(which failed), and voting for another noaction<br />

motion (which was adopted) against a<br />

US sponsored one against China.<br />

Earlier, the Malaysian delegate, in explaining<br />

the Malaysian votes on a number of<br />

decisions and actions had underlined the<br />

delegation’s “serious concern over the increasing<br />

tendency at politicization of human<br />

rights issues where certain Western<br />

countries use double standards and selectiveness”<br />

in the Commission’s work.<br />

“We believe,” the Malaysian delegate<br />

said, “that confrontational and adversarial<br />

approach, accompanied by various forms of<br />

pressure tactics by certain Western countries,<br />

is not conducive towards enhancing


Page 74 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

the work of the Commission in protecting<br />

and promoting human rights.<br />

We are also against politically motivated<br />

moves to bypass well tested procedures<br />

within the Commission such as the<br />

Confidential procedure (under which complaints<br />

against individual countries are<br />

handled in closed sessions and meetings).”<br />

“We are also concerned,” the Malaysian<br />

said, “over the tendency on their part to<br />

push through resolutions that could well go<br />

beyond the competence and mandate of the<br />

Commission, while also contravening the<br />

UN Charter, particularly Art 2 (7) on noninterference<br />

in the domestic affairs of sovereign<br />

states.<br />

We fear that whole credibility of this<br />

Commission could be affected.<br />

” Malaysia also regretted that in initiating<br />

a number of resolutions on country<br />

situations, the same group of countries did<br />

not “deem it fit to conduct serious and adequate<br />

consultations” on the substance of<br />

their resolutions with developing countries,<br />

regional groups and members of the Non-<br />

Aligned Movement.<br />

“It is on the basis of a combination of all<br />

the factors that the Malaysian delegation did<br />

not go along with their resolutions on a<br />

number of country situations,” he said referring<br />

to the Malaysian sponsoring of a noaction<br />

resolution on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and voting<br />

for a no-action resolution on China.<br />

In the case of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, where last year<br />

the Indonesians had agreed to a Chairman’s<br />

statement and had been cooperating with<br />

UN Secretary-General, the Portuguese<br />

pushed through a resolution against<br />

Indonesia.<br />

the no-action motion was turned down<br />

by a 15- 22 vote and the resolution itself<br />

carried by 22 to 12.<br />

Most of the western countries, except for<br />

Japan which abstained, voted with the<br />

Portuguese sponsored resolution against<br />

Indonesia which, among others asked that<br />

country to receive as many as three thematic<br />

special rapporteurs.<br />

Several of the Third World countries who<br />

voted with Indonesia had complained at the<br />

way the attempts to have a compromise<br />

Chairman’s statement, which would have<br />

adequately reflected the cooperation of the<br />

Indonesian authorities and the actions they<br />

had taken, had been thwarted.<br />

Even Australia which voted against<br />

Indonesia, in explaining its vote clearly<br />

recognized the positive steps that Indonesia<br />

had taken and its regret that it had not been<br />

possible to agree upon a Chairman’s statement.<br />

On the effective functioning of the various<br />

human rights mechanisms, the<br />

Commission in a resolution asked the UN<br />

Secretary-General to submit to its next<br />

session, as also to this year’s World<br />

Conference on Human Rights, a report on:<br />

* the original mandates assigned to various<br />

treaty and non- treaty mechanisms for<br />

supervision, investigation and monitoring of<br />

implementation of the provisions of the<br />

international legal instruments and standards,<br />

* the international legal norms and standards<br />

on which existing non-treaty mechanisms<br />

now base their activities, as well as<br />

the conceptual framework, methods of work<br />

and procedural rules that each have deemed<br />

it advisable to apply in the discharge of their<br />

mandate,<br />

* the norms, criteria and practices established<br />

by each of the various existing<br />

mechanisms on the admissibility of communications<br />

as well as their preliminary<br />

consideration and evaluation, their referral to<br />

interest parties and the subsequent course<br />

followed, and<br />

* the criteria used in practice by the<br />

Centre for Human Rights to channel communications<br />

received on these issues either<br />

to existing public machinery or to bodies<br />

provided in the confidential procedure established<br />

under the ECOSOC, together with<br />

the legal foundations for such criteria.<br />

Several of the cosponsors said that over a<br />

period of time the varying standards and<br />

criteria adopted, both by the mechanisms as<br />

well as by the secretariat itself, have become<br />

glaring and appears to be weighted against<br />

the countries of the South depending on<br />

their relationships with the leading Western<br />

powers.<br />

In another resolution on strengthening of<br />

UN action in field of human rights through<br />

international cooperation, the Commission,<br />

among other things,<br />

* reiterated that by virtue of equal rights<br />

and self- determination of peoples, “all<br />

peoples have the right to determine freely,<br />

without external interference, their political<br />

systems and to pursue their economic, social<br />

and cultural development” and every<br />

State has the duty to respect that right<br />

within the provisions of the UN Charter,<br />

including respect for territorial integrity,<br />

* reaffirmed that promotion, protection<br />

and full realization of all human rights and<br />

fundamental freedoms should be guided by<br />

the principles of “non-selectivity, impartiality<br />

and objectivity and should not be used<br />

for political ends,”<br />

* called upon all Member States to have<br />

their activities for promotion and protection<br />

and full realization of human rights and<br />

fundamental freedoms, including development<br />

of further international cooperation in<br />

this area, on the UN Charter, the international<br />

covenants on Human rights and other<br />

relevant instruments and “refrain from activities<br />

inconsistent with this international<br />

legal framework,”<br />

* underlined the “continuing need for<br />

accurate, impartial and objective information<br />

on the political, economic and social<br />

situation and events in all countries,”<br />

* requested all human rights bodies<br />

within the UN system, as well as special<br />

rapporteurs, special representatives, independent<br />

experts and working groups appointed<br />

or set up as special procedures<br />

“duly to take into account the contents of<br />

the present resolution in carrying out their<br />

mandates.”<br />

The resolution also called upon the UN<br />

Secretary-General, on the basis of comments<br />

made by governments, to prepare and<br />

submit to the Commission at its next<br />

session, a comprehensive report on various<br />

ways and means of promoting international<br />

cooperation and strengthening UN action in<br />

the field of human rights “in accordance<br />

with the principles of non-selectivity, impartiality<br />

and objectivity.”<br />

The developing countries also turned<br />

back an Austrian attempt to get the<br />

Commission approval for a resolution calling<br />

for the June World Conference in Vienna<br />

to discuss “an emergency mechanism” to<br />

address serious cases that arise in between<br />

the Commission’s ordinary annual<br />

sessions.”<br />

The near unanimous opposition of the<br />

developing countries to what was seen as a<br />

move to bypass the normal procedures and<br />

set a Northern agenda, resulted in the<br />

adoption of a resolution in effect remitting<br />

the issue to the ECOSOC for its consideration.<br />

Asian diplomats explained that Third<br />

World nations had rejected the proposal<br />

because they sensed that the underlying<br />

intention was to weaken the Commission as<br />

a deliberative body.<br />

Comment: While I don’t agree with the<br />

interpretation, and the description of the vote<br />

on the ET resolution ignores the fact that<br />

several countries of the South voted against<br />

Indonesia, and key Asian countries (Japan,<br />

Pakistan, South Korea) abstained, this<br />

article still raises some issues that need<br />

consideration. – Charlie Scheiner, ETAN/US<br />

RESPONSE FROM BRUNO KAHN,<br />

CHARLIE SCHEINER, OTHERS<br />

This is a draft being circulated among<br />

Malaysian and other Asian activists<br />

We were interested to read Chakravarti<br />

Raghavan’s account of new North-South<br />

antagonisms appearing in the 49th session<br />

of the UN Human Rights Commission.<br />

Without commenting on the substance of<br />

his report as a whole, we would like, as<br />

supporters of the struggle of the <strong>East</strong>


<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 75<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese people for self-determination, to<br />

address the part of this report which refers<br />

to the vote of a resolution condemning<br />

Indonesia for its repression in occupied <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>. We feel this part amounts to<br />

disinformation and would like to kindly ask<br />

you to post the following clarification.<br />

Sincerely yours,<br />

(signatures)<br />

1. <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> was militarily invaded by<br />

Indonesia at the end of 1975. This invasion,<br />

which blatantly violates the UN Charter,<br />

was condemned by two Security Council<br />

resolutions and eight General Assembly<br />

resolutions. The annexation that followed is<br />

not recognised by the United Nations, nor<br />

by most countries in the world. <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

has been, and still is, on the list of non selfgoverning<br />

territories since 1961, and is discussed<br />

every summer at the UN<br />

Decolonisation Committee.<br />

2. Continuing reports of grave human<br />

rights violations in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> by the<br />

Indonesian armed forces, including the death<br />

of at least one third of the population since<br />

the invasion, testimonies of large scale<br />

massacres, disappearances, atrocities,<br />

tortures, rapes and other ill-treatments have<br />

been available for several years from <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese refugees and the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />

Catholic church. They have been publicized<br />

by respected human rights organisations,<br />

such as Amnesty International and Asia<br />

Watch.<br />

3. On 12 November, 1991, Indonesian<br />

troops opened fire on a peaceful demonstration<br />

in Dili, killing at least 271 unarmed<br />

civilians, according to exact lists of names<br />

covertly compiled by the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />

resistance. This massacre was witnessed by<br />

foreign journalists, who all stress its<br />

peaceful character and were beaten up by<br />

Indonesian troops. A video of the massacre<br />

was smuggled out of the territory and was<br />

widely shown under the title ‘Cold Blood,’<br />

including by the Malaysian television.<br />

4. Now regarding Mr. Raghavan’s report:<br />

“In the case of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, where last year<br />

the Indonesians had agreed to a Chairman’s<br />

statement and had been cooperating with<br />

UN Secretary-General, the Portuguese<br />

pushed through a resolution against<br />

Indonesia.”<br />

Disinformation #1: the draft resolution<br />

was sponsored not just by Portugal but by<br />

24 governments, including governments<br />

from Europe and North America, but also<br />

Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and<br />

Costa Rica. (For the uninformed reader,<br />

Portugal is the UN recognised administering<br />

power in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, as former colonial<br />

power which has to carry through its process<br />

of decolonisation, interrupted by the invasion).<br />

“Most of the western countries, except for<br />

Japan which abstained, voted with the<br />

Portuguese sponsored resolution against<br />

Indonesia which, among others asked that<br />

country to receive as many as three thematic<br />

special rapporteurs.<br />

Several of the Third World countries who<br />

voted with Indonesia had complained at the<br />

way the attempts to have a compromise<br />

Chairman’s statement, which would have<br />

adequately reflected the cooperation of the<br />

Indonesian authorities and the actions they<br />

had taken, had been thwarted.”<br />

Disinformation #2: Mr. Raghavan conveniently<br />

fails to mention that 9 countries of<br />

the South voted in favour of the resolution<br />

(see country breakdown below).<br />

Disinformation #3: the resolution requests<br />

the Indonesian government to let the<br />

mentioned special rapporteurs visit, not<br />

Indonesia, but illegally occupied <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

Disinformation #4: according to our<br />

sources, the reason why the move towards a<br />

consensus statement failed was not intransigence<br />

of the Western countries, but<br />

Indonesia’s own intransigence, which hampered<br />

attempts of its allies to water down<br />

the resolution into such a consensus statement.<br />

Disinformation #5 (the most serious): the<br />

‘cooperation’ of the Indonesian authorities.<br />

Last year’s consensus statement, agreed on<br />

by Indonesia, asked inter alia:<br />

a) “further investigation into the action of<br />

the security personnel on November 12,<br />

1991, and into the fate of those unaccounted<br />

for (to) clarify the remaining discrepancies,<br />

namely on the number of people killed and<br />

those missing,”<br />

b) “that those brought to trial are assured<br />

of proper legal representation and those not<br />

involved in violent activities are released<br />

without delay,”<br />

c) (that the Indonesian government)<br />

“facilitates access to <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> (to) additional<br />

humanitarian organisations and human<br />

rights organisations,” and<br />

d) (that Indonesia) “improves the human<br />

rights situation in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.”<br />

Relatively to these points, we would like<br />

to observe that:<br />

a) The Indonesian government still uses<br />

an official number of 50 victims and about<br />

90 ‘missing’; the families of the victims have<br />

yet to know were the latter were buried. A<br />

house-to-house survey, necessarily carried<br />

out in secret, found 271 names of people<br />

killed at Santa Cruz, 382 wounded, 250<br />

‘disappeared’ and 364 arrested.<br />

The reader may be interested by the<br />

following quotes of prominent Indonesians,<br />

showing their remorse:<br />

General Try Sutrisno, then Commander<br />

in Chief of the Armed Forces, now Vice-<br />

President: “Delinquents like these agitators<br />

must be shot, and they will be, whenever<br />

that is necessary.”<br />

General Theo Syafei, new Commander<br />

for <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> after the massacre: “Under<br />

my command, the number of victims would<br />

probably have been greater.”<br />

General Herman Mantiri, new<br />

Commander for Udayana (<strong>East</strong>ern<br />

Indonesia) after the massacre: the shooting<br />

was “appropriate.”<br />

Abilio Osorio Soares, the new<br />

“Governor” of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, a civilian: “In<br />

my view, in fact many more should have<br />

died. Why only that much? Why did not all<br />

the thousand die?”<br />

b) Demonstrators from November 12<br />

were convicted and given sentences as harsh<br />

as life imprisonment for merely participating<br />

to or organising a peaceful demonstration,<br />

while the few low-ranking soldiers<br />

convicted in court martials got sentences<br />

of two years or less under typical<br />

charges of “firing into the crowd without<br />

orders to do so.”<br />

c) Amnesty International was refused<br />

access to <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> twice since the consensus<br />

statement: once in November 1992<br />

and once in January 19<strong>93</strong>. Asia Watch has<br />

also been refused.<br />

d) The human rights situation has seriously<br />

worsened since the massacre, the<br />

territory being closed officially to foreign<br />

journalists and de facto to foreign visitors;<br />

according to reports from inside, repression<br />

and violations reached an unprecedented<br />

level last November/December, at the time<br />

of the capture of Xanana Gusmão, the head<br />

of the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese resistance. The latter is<br />

currently enjoying a show trial in Dili,<br />

where he could be sentenced to death.<br />

Portuguese journalists admitted to observe<br />

the trial were ordered to leave after less than<br />

a week.<br />

It is a mockery to talk about the cooperation<br />

of the Indonesian authorities when,<br />

instead of respecting their own commitments,<br />

they do exactly the opposite.<br />

“Even Australia which voted against<br />

Indonesia, in explaining its vote clearly<br />

recognized the positive steps that Indonesia<br />

had taken and its regret that it had not been<br />

possible to agree upon a Chairman’s<br />

statement.”<br />

Disinformation #6: Mr. Raghavan fails to<br />

mention that Australia is a faithful ally of<br />

Indonesia, the only country in the world<br />

that recognises the annexation of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

de jure. It is currently preparing to exploit<br />

the oil reserves of the <strong>Timor</strong> Sea in concert<br />

with Indonesia, effectively robbing the<br />

people of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> of their natural<br />

resources, although a case pending in the<br />

International Court of Justice would invalidate<br />

the Australia-Indonesia <strong>Timor</strong> Gap<br />

treaty. It is not surprising that such an ally


Page 76 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

should defend Indonesia; on the other hand,<br />

the fact that Australia felt compelled to vote<br />

for the resolution shows the dilemma that<br />

the Indonesia government’s conduct in <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> creates for Jakarta’s supporters.<br />

Appendix 1: text of the UNHRC resolution<br />

adopted 11 March 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

Appendix 2: country voting breakdown.<br />

UN ROUND-UP OF<br />

UNHRC SESSION<br />

HR/CN/453, Official UN Press Release<br />

(Excerpts) 17 March 19<strong>93</strong><br />

FORTY-NINTH SESSION OF HUMAN<br />

RIGHTS COMMISSION<br />

GENEVA, 1 FEBRUARY-12 MARCH<br />

Appoints Special Rapporteurs on<br />

Occupied Territories, Sudan, Equatorial<br />

Guinea, Racism and Freedom of Opinion;<br />

Expert on Somalia<br />

GENEVA, 12 March (UN Information<br />

Service) – Following six weeks of intensive<br />

debate on the situation of human rights in<br />

the world, and the adoption of 98 resolutions<br />

and 16 decisions on a wide spectrum<br />

of human rights issues, the Commission on<br />

Human Rights concluded its forty-ninth<br />

session at Geneva this afternoon.<br />

...<br />

The Commission also expressed deep<br />

concern over the situation in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and<br />

called on Indonesia to step up efforts to<br />

identify those killed and unaccounted for in<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, to find and punish those responsible,<br />

and to solicit visits to the island<br />

by the Commission’s Special Rapporteurs.<br />

Further, the Commission expressed its deep<br />

concern at the serious human rights violations<br />

in the Sudan, including summary executions,<br />

detention without due process,<br />

forced displacement of persons and torture.<br />

It also exp ressed its deep concern at continuing<br />

reports of violations of human rights<br />

in Iran, including the high number of<br />

executions, torture, the lack of guarantees of<br />

due process of law, and discriminatory<br />

treatment of certain groups of citizens for<br />

their religious beliefs, notably the Baha’is.<br />

...<br />

Resolutions Adopted<br />

With regard to the situation in <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>, the Commission expressed its deep<br />

concern at the reports of continuing human<br />

rights violations, regretted that the<br />

Indonesian investigation into the actions of<br />

the members of its security personnel on 12<br />

November 1991 had failed to clearly identify<br />

all those responsible for those actions,<br />

and expressed its concern at the lack of information<br />

about the number of people killed<br />

on that day and those still unaccounted for.<br />

It called upon the Government of<br />

Indonesia to honour fully its human rights<br />

commitments, and called upon it to ensure<br />

that all the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese in custody be<br />

treated humanely and with their rights fully<br />

respected. It urged the Government to invite<br />

the Special Rapporteur on the question of<br />

torture, the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial,<br />

summary or arbitrary executions,<br />

the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention<br />

and the Working Group on Enforced or<br />

Involuntary Disappearances to visit <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> and to facilitate the discharge of their<br />

mandates; and welcomed the agreement<br />

given by the Government to the proposal of<br />

the Secretary-General for a new visit to<br />

Indonesia and <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> by his Personal<br />

Envoy in the coming months.<br />

EUROPEAN POSITIONS<br />

AT UNHRC<br />

From Bruno Kahn, Mar 27, 19<strong>93</strong><br />

According to a diplomatic source, the EC<br />

countries which tried most to obstruct the<br />

drafting of a resolution on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> at the<br />

UN Human Rights Commission were The<br />

Netherlands, Great Britain and France.<br />

Denmark was the most supportive.<br />

U.S. CONCERN OVER EAST<br />

TIMOR MAY SIGNAL ASIAN<br />

POLICY CHANGE<br />

Los Angeles Times, April 2, 19<strong>93</strong>, By<br />

Charles P. Wallace, Times Staff Writer<br />

[Most of this article was also published in<br />

the London Guardian April 3, under the<br />

headline CLINTON SHIFT ON EAST<br />

TIMOR SENDS RIPPLES AROUND ASIA.]<br />

(DENPASAR, Indonesia) The remote<br />

territory of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> has been a thorn in<br />

the Indonesian government’s side for years.<br />

Now a Clinton Administration decision to<br />

adopt a tougher stance on human rights<br />

violations there is being seen as a possible<br />

precursor to a fundamental change in U.S.<br />

human rights policy in Asia.<br />

The departure came late last month in a<br />

little-noticed action when the United States<br />

joined in supporting a resolution of the U.N.<br />

Human Rights Commission expressing<br />

“deep concern” over rights violations in <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>, a former Portuguese colony annexed<br />

by Indonesia in 1976. Under former<br />

Presidents Ronald Reagan and George Bush,<br />

the United States helped block similar<br />

resolutions condemning Indonesia’s behavior<br />

in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

Indonesian government officials were<br />

reported by Asian diplomats to be stunned<br />

by the Clinton Administration shift.<br />

Further, other countries, such as China and<br />

Malaysia, have flatly warned the United<br />

States that adopting tougher human rights<br />

positions could cost America jobs at home<br />

because of probable retaliation by Asian<br />

countries.<br />

As a result, the decision on <strong>Timor</strong> is<br />

being studied widely around the region.<br />

The U.N. action called on Indonesia to<br />

allow international experts on torture, executions<br />

and disappearances to visit the island<br />

to investigate allegations against<br />

Indonesia’s military. Indonesia condemned<br />

the charges as “unwarranted sweeping allegations.”<br />

The Indonesian government has permitted<br />

selected diplomats and observers to visit<br />

the island recently to attend the carefully<br />

stage-managed trial of José Gusmão, 45, the<br />

leader of Fretilin, <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>’s tiny<br />

independence movement.<br />

Gusmão, known by his nom de guerre,<br />

Xanana, is charged with fomenting revolution<br />

and weapons offenses. A televised confession<br />

that he gave before the start of the<br />

trial prompted diplomats to wonder<br />

whether he had been tortured or threatened<br />

by the military.<br />

Diplomats who have visited <strong>Timor</strong> – access<br />

to the island is controlled by the government<br />

– say Fretilin probably has fewer<br />

than 100 fighters after nearly two decades of<br />

Indonesian military rule.<br />

Indonesia’s annexation of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> has<br />

never won the acceptance of the United<br />

Nations, which has repeatedly called for the<br />

people to decide their own future. West<br />

<strong>Timor</strong> has been part of Indonesia since<br />

Indonesian independence after World War<br />

II.<br />

Tensions between the military and the<br />

local population reached a high in<br />

November, 1991, when troops opened fire<br />

on a crowd at a funeral in Dili, killing 60 to<br />

100 people. Four officers and six enlisted<br />

men were court-martialed for the killings.<br />

But the longest sentence handed out was 18<br />

months. The military has never admitted<br />

that more than 19 people were killed. But a<br />

government-appointed investigating commission<br />

said at least 50 people had died.<br />

Most diplomats expect that Gusmão will<br />

be given a severe sentence, which will be<br />

commuted by the government as a sign of its<br />

leniency and flexibility.<br />

But diplomats cautioned that, with restive<br />

populations elsewhere in the archipelago,<br />

it is unlikely that the government in<br />

Jakarta will go beyond that cosmetic gesture<br />

and grant the <strong>Timor</strong>ese any degree of<br />

autonomy.<br />

GRAPHIC: Map, Indonesia, VICTOR<br />

KOTOWITZ / Los Angeles Times


<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 77<br />

SOME TIMORESE BEING<br />

GROOMED FOR INDONESIA<br />

From John A. MacDougall, April 2, 19<strong>93</strong><br />

It’s no secret that Indonesian officialdom<br />

has been grooming an increasing contingent<br />

of educated <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese for its own<br />

‘development’ purposes inside <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

and ‘diplomatic’ purposes abroad. Perhaps<br />

sometimes the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese involved have<br />

indeed become ‘convinced,’ as in the expression<br />

‘a convinced Friend.’ But more<br />

often than might be thought, the <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese involved might just have been<br />

caught up in survival dilemmas from which<br />

they see no easy way to extricate themselves.<br />

I was reminded of this latter possibility<br />

when seeing an Indonesian Observer article<br />

dealing mainly with the recent U.N. Human<br />

Rights Commission proceedings.<br />

Salvador Ximenes, a Golkar DPR member<br />

from <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, is quoted as saying<br />

Indonesia fulfilled the EC’s demand to allow<br />

foreign journalists and international<br />

organizations to come to <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

The same article quotes then Interior<br />

Minister Rudini as saying “the first young<br />

Indonesian diplomat, also hailing from <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>, Leonardo Gutteres, now Third<br />

Secretary at the Indonesian Embassy in<br />

Geneva” spoke at the UNHCR session. He<br />

is reported to have said charges by Portugal<br />

and NGOs re human rights in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

were out-of-date.<br />

Two other <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese representatives,<br />

Rui Gomes and Florentino da Cruz,<br />

also reportedly took the floor to respond to<br />

NGOs. Both gave explanations “similar to<br />

those given by the Indonesian delegation<br />

that there had been no violation of human<br />

rights in the province.”<br />

What are we to make of these various<br />

remarks by <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese? Have they become<br />

‘convinced Indonesians,’ or are they<br />

consciously engaging in yet another<br />

‘sandiwara’ not unlike those in the Dili<br />

trials?<br />

COMMENT FROM AN ANONYMOUS<br />

AUSTRALIAN FRIEND<br />

If “Rui Gomes” is the Ruis Gomes I<br />

know he is a strange character. His father is<br />

a Pentecostal minister in Dili who says he is<br />

completely apolitical. Rui has been a<br />

student of psychology and theology in<br />

Semarang and Salatiga. He was always<br />

distrusted by other ET students, spent a lot<br />

of time learning self-defence. Works at the<br />

National Planning Board office in Dili, but<br />

confesses his job description is “something<br />

like spying.” Always has plenty of money,<br />

and travels overseas fairly frequently on<br />

unexplained missions. Yet he has a brother<br />

in Sydney who has had to undergo major<br />

surgery on his head for torture inflicted on<br />

him by the Indonesian military - he was apparently<br />

a Fretilin supporter there till his<br />

escape 2 years ago.<br />

This story indicates not only the opportunism<br />

of many individuals, it also illustrates<br />

the lonely life that these opportunists<br />

have to lead among their own people.<br />

Secondly it indicates the phenomenon of<br />

families that stretch across strongly divergent<br />

political loyalties - as in the Carrascalao<br />

family and many others. I think also of<br />

prominent Irianese families like Kaisiepo.<br />

My feeling is that the balance of advantage<br />

is still to the resistance in such cases,<br />

because of the access they have to “the<br />

system” through these opportunistic<br />

individuals, whose betrayal must be limited<br />

by blood loyalties. Of course ABRI intel are<br />

aware of these risks, and that is what makes<br />

the life of an opportunist so much more<br />

miserable.<br />

INDONESIA ASKS NON-<br />

ALIGNED COUNTRIES TO<br />

SUPPORT REPRESSION<br />

From ETAN/US April 5, 19<strong>93</strong><br />

Indonesia is trying to portray the struggle<br />

for human rights in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> as an effort<br />

by Western countries to undercut the<br />

sovereignty of the Third World.<br />

At a meeting of Non-Aligned countries<br />

this morning (April 5) at the UN in New<br />

York, Indonesia distributed a letter dated 15<br />

March from the UN Representative of<br />

Malaysia to the UN Representative of<br />

Indonesia. Attached to the letter was a<br />

statement delivered by Mr. M. Redzuan<br />

Kushairi (Alternate Leader of the Malaysian<br />

Delegation) at the conclusion of the UN<br />

Human Rights Commission Session in<br />

Geneva on March 12, as well as the “No-<br />

<strong>Action</strong>” motions made by Malaysia in that<br />

Commission regarding <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and<br />

China. (The eight pages of attachments are<br />

too long for me to type, but I will fax them<br />

to anyone who can type or scan them for<br />

broader circulation.)<br />

Some Non-Aligned countries are reluctant<br />

to go along with Indonesia, and there is no<br />

consensus within the Non-Aligned<br />

Movement. Please do what you can to convince<br />

Third World governments that human<br />

rights – such as freedom from murder,<br />

genocide, and colonial domination – are just<br />

as valid for people in the Non-Aligned<br />

world as they are for anyone else, regardless<br />

of the political, economic and ethnic<br />

composition of the oppressing nation.<br />

Certainly, human rights include economic<br />

rights for the people of the developing<br />

countries, and there must be major changes<br />

in the international economic order. But as<br />

we work for global economic justice, we<br />

must also work for the rights, indeed the<br />

survival, of people in territories unfortunate<br />

enough still to be dominated by military or<br />

totalitarian regimes.<br />

The letter reads as follows:<br />

Permanent Representative of Malaysia to<br />

the UN<br />

New York, 15 March 19<strong>93</strong><br />

H.E. Mr. Nugroho Wisnumurti,<br />

Permanent Representative of Indonesia<br />

Your Excellency,<br />

Malaysia participated for the first time<br />

as a member of the Commission on Human<br />

Rights at its 49th Session in Geneva which<br />

concluded on Friday, 12 March 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

As a developing country and member of<br />

the Non-Aligned Movement, the Malaysian<br />

delegation witnessed with serious concern<br />

the politicization of the Commission by<br />

certain Western countries. Practice of political<br />

selectivity and double standards was<br />

often accompanied by various forms of<br />

pressure tactics including those at the<br />

capital. All this prompted the Malaysian<br />

delegation to make a general statement of<br />

explanation at the conclusion of the 49th<br />

Session of the Commission on Human<br />

Rights which I am attaching herewith for<br />

your attention.<br />

As the statement raised issues that are of<br />

concern not only to Malaysia, but to other<br />

developing countries and members of the<br />

Non-Aligned Movement, I shall be most<br />

grateful if you could circulate the statement<br />

to members of the Non-Aligned Movement<br />

for their information.<br />

In addition, in the light of the challenges<br />

faced by developing countries and members<br />

of the Non-Aligned Movement at the<br />

Commission on Human Rights, I thought it<br />

would be useful if a meeting of the<br />

Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned<br />

Movement could be convened at an earliest<br />

convenient date to exchange views on the<br />

49th Session of the Commission on Human<br />

Rights, which amongst others also touched<br />

on the World Conference on Human Rights<br />

to be held in Vienna later in June. I hope our<br />

suggestion will receive a favourable response<br />

from you, in your capacity as Chairman of<br />

the Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned<br />

Movement.<br />

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances<br />

of my highest consideration.<br />

Razali Ismail<br />

Ambassador<br />

Excerpts from Malaysia’s statement at<br />

the close of the Human Rights<br />

Commission:<br />

We believe that with the end of the Cold<br />

War and <strong>East</strong>-West ideological rivalry the


Page 78 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

time is opportune for the international<br />

community to approach the question of<br />

protecting and promoting human rights in<br />

the spirit of constructive dialogue and cooperation<br />

on the basis of objectivity, nonselectivity,<br />

and non politicization of issues.<br />

We also believe that the time has come for<br />

the Commission to take a more holistic approach<br />

to human rights and not to be too<br />

preoccupied with questions of individual<br />

rights and freedoms under the International<br />

Covenant on Political and Civil Rights. This<br />

would require the Commission to give<br />

serious and focused attention on efforts towards<br />

implementing the Declaration on the<br />

Right to Development, whose realization<br />

would facilitate the fulfillment of the goals<br />

of both the International Covenant on<br />

Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights as<br />

well as the International Covenant on<br />

Political and Civil Rights.<br />

...<br />

While we welcome the spirit of constructive<br />

dialogue and cooperation to enhance<br />

the work of the Human Rights<br />

Commission, the Malaysian delegation<br />

would like to take this opportunity to underline<br />

our serious concern over the increasing<br />

tendency at politicization of human<br />

rights issues where certain Western<br />

countries use double standards and selectivities<br />

in the work of the Commission. We<br />

believe that confrontational and adversarial<br />

approach, accompanied by various forms of<br />

pressure tactics by certain Western countries,<br />

is not conducive towards enhancing<br />

the work of the Commission in protecting<br />

and promoting human rights. We are also<br />

against politically motivated moves to bypass<br />

well tested procedures within the<br />

Commission such as the Confidential<br />

Procedure 1503. We are also concerned over<br />

the tendency on the part of certain Western<br />

countries to push through resolutions that<br />

could well go beyond the competence and<br />

mandate of the Commission, while also<br />

contravening the UN Charter particularly on<br />

Article 2 paragraph 7 on non interference in<br />

the domestic affairs of sovereign states.<br />

CHAIRMAN OF COMMISSION<br />

ON HUMAN RIGHTS<br />

ANNOUNCES SEVEN<br />

SPECIAL RAPPORTEURS<br />

UN Press Release, 2 April 19<strong>93</strong>, Abridged.<br />

Biographical Note BIO/2763<br />

GENEVA, 2 April (UN Information<br />

Service) – The Chairman of the Commission<br />

on Human Rights, Mohamed Ennaceur<br />

(Tunisia), this morning announced the<br />

designation of seven country or thematic<br />

Special Rapporteurs, as decided by the<br />

Commission at its recently concluded fortyninth<br />

session.<br />

They are as follows:<br />

– Robert Dossou (Benin), as Special<br />

Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism,<br />

racial discrimination, xenophobia and<br />

related intolerance<br />

– Nigel S. Rodley (United Kingdom), as<br />

Special Rapporteur on torture (resolution<br />

19<strong>93</strong>/40 of 5 March). Mr. Rodley is the<br />

doyen of the Faculty of Law of Essex<br />

University, former legal counsellor for<br />

Amnesty International and author of numerous<br />

publications relating to human<br />

rights.<br />

TIMOR CONTROVERSY<br />

AT BANGKOK HUMAN<br />

RIGHTS MEETING<br />

ROW OVER NGO<br />

ACCREDITATION<br />

From Jean Inglis, International Federation<br />

for <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. March 30, 19<strong>93</strong><br />

The issue of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> has been aired<br />

prominently in the two Thai English dailies,<br />

The Nation and The Bangkok Post, for a<br />

week, thanks to a row over NGO accreditation<br />

for the Asian Regional Meeting of the<br />

UN World Conference on Human Rights<br />

which opened in Bangkok on March 29 and<br />

to hitting remarks by <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese José<br />

Ramos Horta at an Asia-Pacific NGOs<br />

conference that preceded the UN meeting<br />

and at the Regional Meeting itself. The<br />

NGO in question, the International<br />

Federation for <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, was unable to be<br />

accredited for the UN meeting due to the<br />

strong objection of the Indonesian government.<br />

I have just returned from Bangkok and<br />

will try to post a sampling of the press that<br />

this issue got. Most encouraging has been<br />

the overwhelming support of other NGOs<br />

in Bangkok for the conference. As pressing<br />

as the various issues of the other NGOs<br />

obviously are, the spirit at Bangkok was one<br />

of insisting on the urgency of lobbying on<br />

the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> issue. The UN conference<br />

winds up Friday, and I will post you on the<br />

outcome when my IFET colleague, Kiyoko<br />

Furusawa, returns. The NGOs in Bangkok<br />

are very strong, very united, and very<br />

determined to win every bit of ground<br />

possible in Bangkok with a view to<br />

maximizing the possibilities for the Vienna<br />

meeting.<br />

GROUPS PLEDGE TO<br />

BOOST EAST TIMOR FIGHT<br />

Sydney Morning Herald, Monday March 31,<br />

19<strong>93</strong>. By Lindsay Murdoch, Herald SE Asia<br />

correspondent. Unabridged. Similar article<br />

in Melbourne Age, 29 March.<br />

(Bangkok, Sunday) <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese independence<br />

activists have won support from<br />

more than 100 non-government organizations<br />

for a public campaign in Asia against<br />

Indonesia’s rule of the former Portuguese<br />

colony.<br />

A <strong>Timor</strong>ese leader, Mr. José Ramos<br />

Horta, said today the campaign would turn<br />

the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> conflict into a regional issue<br />

for the first time.<br />

“Previously we have had support in<br />

Australia and Europe but not in Asia. This<br />

is a breakthrough,” he said. The campaign<br />

will culminate with a three-day seminar on<br />

the human rights situation in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> in<br />

Manila in November.<br />

The E. <strong>Timor</strong> independence lobby was<br />

buoyed early this month when the UN<br />

Human Rights Commission in Geneva condemned<br />

Indonesia for its inaction on human<br />

rights in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. The strength of the<br />

criticism surprised Jakarta, which in January<br />

agreed to the setting up of national<br />

commissions to protect human rights.<br />

The organizations meeting in Bangkok<br />

this weekend before a UN-organized<br />

meeting of the 49 Asian governments on<br />

human rights said in a statement that <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> “must be made into an Asian issue.”<br />

The campaign would be geared towards<br />

negotiations to end the conflict under the<br />

auspices of the UN and on the basis of a<br />

genuine act of self-determination.<br />

However, strong Indonesian objection<br />

has prevent a major lobby group, the<br />

Tokyo-based International Federation of<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, being accredited at the governments<br />

meeting which is to prepare Asia’s<br />

position ahead of a world human rights<br />

conference in Vienna in June.<br />

The forum, one of the largest of its kind<br />

held in Asia, issued a declaration urging<br />

governments to agree to strengthen UN action<br />

on human rights, including the creation<br />

of a UN human rights commissioner with<br />

wide powers.<br />

It said that UN attempts over 10 years<br />

had made little progress in eradicating gross<br />

violations of human rights around the world,<br />

many of them perpetrated by Asian<br />

governments.<br />

The meeting of Asian governments is<br />

expected to close ranks against the critical<br />

West on human rights. Australia will attend<br />

this week’s meeting only as an observer,<br />

without voting rights, because several Asian<br />

governments objected to its participation on


<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 79<br />

the basis that Canberra would bring a critical<br />

Western perspective to the meeting.<br />

HUMAN RIGHTS MEETING IN<br />

BANGKOK - IS IT A SHAM?<br />

From the South <strong>East</strong> Asian Information<br />

<strong>Network</strong>, Chaingmai- Thailand, 29 March<br />

The Asian agenda for the upcoming<br />

World Human Rights Conference to be held<br />

in Vienna from June 14-25, is being set at an<br />

inter-governmental meeting which begins in<br />

Bangkok today.<br />

The meeting has been organised by the<br />

Economic and Social Commission for Asia<br />

and Pacific (ESCAP). There are 49 governmental<br />

delegates representing the Asia<br />

Pacific region and will for the first time<br />

attempt to formulate an agreed agenda for<br />

the conference in Vienna.<br />

On the discussion table are proposals to<br />

set up a regional mechanism to monitor,<br />

protect and promote human rights. The<br />

proposal surprisingly came from Indonesia,<br />

who recently hosted a pre-meeting to discuss<br />

human rights in the Asian region.<br />

Given that the Indonesian Government<br />

describes those of us that aim to raise issues<br />

such as democracy, openness, the environment<br />

and human rights as “fourth<br />

generation communists” it is vital that the<br />

voice of the international communities representing<br />

the people are heard.<br />

Prior to the meeting being opened today<br />

by Thailand’s Prime Minister Chuan<br />

Leekpai, there was a 4 day Asia-Pacific Non<br />

Government Organisation (NGO), conference<br />

on human rights held in order to assert<br />

the people’s position which will be<br />

presented to the inter-governmental meeting.<br />

240 representatives of more than 110<br />

NGOs from 26 countries in the region have<br />

put forward a detailed human rights agenda<br />

for the 1990’s and beyond.<br />

Yesterday afternoon 30, NGOs which<br />

have applied to participate in the intergovernmental<br />

meeting including the South <strong>East</strong><br />

Asian Information <strong>Network</strong> were still rejected<br />

as negotiations between the United<br />

Nations organizers continued into today.<br />

There were 234 NGOs from the region that<br />

applied for participation by the March 4th<br />

deadline.<br />

The 4 day conference ended with a declaration<br />

from all participating delegates<br />

which also included challenges and recommendations.<br />

“We affirm our commitment to the<br />

principle of indivisibility and interdependence<br />

of human rights, be they civil, political,<br />

economic, social or cultural.<br />

The Protection of human rights concerns<br />

both individuals and groups. The enjoyment<br />

of human rights implies a degree of<br />

responsibility to the community.<br />

There must be a holistic and integrated<br />

approach to human rights. One set of rights<br />

cannot be used to bargain for another.<br />

Major Recommendations:<br />

Governments of the region must accede<br />

without further delay to the principal<br />

United Nations conventions and human<br />

rights instruments:<br />

These governments must without further<br />

delay remove reservations on those agreements<br />

to which they are a party, particularly<br />

the Convention on the Elimination of<br />

Discrimination Against Women; and:<br />

These international agreements must be<br />

given force not only in domestic law but in<br />

practice.<br />

For an establishment of a UN Special<br />

Commissioner for Human Rights as a new<br />

high-level political authority to bring a more<br />

effective and rapid response, coherence and<br />

co-ordination to the UN’s human rights<br />

effort.<br />

Improvement of current treaty monitoring<br />

bodies and mechanisms; and<br />

Support of a regional human rights<br />

mechanism subject to explicit guarantee of<br />

independence, effectiveness and public access,<br />

including NGOS.<br />

There is great concern of the blatant<br />

blocking of NGO participation by certain<br />

governments of the Asian meeting. The<br />

governments concerned have made it known<br />

that certain NGOS which have been overly<br />

critical of their human rights policies be<br />

excluded.<br />

Some NGOS have been given accreditation<br />

to attend sessions, however a majority<br />

of the meetings will be held in camera. As<br />

for the access to delegates, the main tactic<br />

will have to be approaching a delegate in the<br />

corridors of the ESCAP building, the venue<br />

for the session.<br />

If the United Nations and ESCAP, do not<br />

allow the voices of their constituents to be<br />

heard then the whole human rights<br />

commission will be nothing than a waste of<br />

tax payers money and bureaucratic nonsense.<br />

And what of the people who every day<br />

suffer from the brutality of oppressive regimes.<br />

The people of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> who were<br />

invaded by Indonesia in December 1975 are<br />

not only having to deal with their loss of<br />

sovereignty, but in this process of a human<br />

rights venue have to deal with Indonesia<br />

being the Chair of the Non-Aligned<br />

Movement . A government who has not<br />

been made accountable for its crimes and<br />

massive human rights abuse, will ensure to<br />

block any move for such process to take<br />

place.<br />

And what of the people in Burma?<br />

Whilst the State Law and Order Restoration<br />

Council (SLORC) continues its brutal hold<br />

on the country, with mass relocations of<br />

ethnic nationalities, rape, military<br />

offensives, and mass tortures within their<br />

cities and rural areas? Will the ESCAP<br />

meeting hear their voices?<br />

The NGO community in Asia has made<br />

massive moves forward to ensure their governments<br />

start taking the issue of human<br />

rights seriously. At times with great risk,<br />

having to face their own military and forcing<br />

regimes to resign. It is crucial we keep the<br />

pressure up and ensure that the governments<br />

of the region understand that human<br />

rights are universal.<br />

The South <strong>East</strong> Asian Information<br />

<strong>Network</strong> (SAIN) is an NGO based in<br />

Chiangmai-Thailand. Its mandate is to expose<br />

the human rights and environmental<br />

abuses in the region.<br />

HUMAN RIGHTS VALUES –<br />

EASTERN, WESTERN OR<br />

UNIVERSAL?<br />

by Kunda Dixit<br />

Bangkok, Mar. 26 (IPS) - Differing<br />

definitions of human rights threaten to polarize<br />

an Asia-Pacific regional meeting on<br />

human rights that begins here Monday.<br />

At the heart of the dispute is the argument<br />

that western definitions of human<br />

rights emphasize individual choice and civil<br />

liberties, while oriental cultures attach more<br />

value to community welfare and respect for<br />

elders.<br />

Irritated by what they say is neo-colonial<br />

western attitudes about democracy, Asia’s<br />

newly-affluent nations look set to use the<br />

Bangkok meeting to push for new yardsticks<br />

for human rights that are more rooted<br />

in their own culture and values.<br />

But the region’s activist groups, who are<br />

holding their own parallel meeting here this<br />

week, say concepts of democracy and human<br />

rights should be universal.<br />

Although the two views need not be<br />

mutually exclusive, it is expected to be divisive<br />

for the 49 countries and more than<br />

250 groups attending as observers. The<br />

Bangkok meeting will prepare for the world<br />

conference on human rights in Vienna in<br />

June.<br />

Leading the debate are South-<strong>East</strong> Asia’s<br />

newly-affluent authoritarian capitalist states<br />

like Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia, and<br />

nations that espouse market socialism like<br />

China.<br />

They bristle when human rights and democracy<br />

are measured by what they say are<br />

standards set in Europe and the United<br />

States. They say a community’s right to


Page 80 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

food, shelter and basic health care is more<br />

fundamental than its right to vote.<br />

A society must first be able to achieve a<br />

decent standard of living for all its people –<br />

something, they say, is not possible in<br />

Asia’s rambunctious and chaotic westernstyle<br />

democracies.<br />

But activist groups maintain that a distinction<br />

between individual and community<br />

rights is absurd. They say the suppression<br />

of opposition parties in Burma or the absence<br />

of basic freedoms in North Korea<br />

must be condemned by any yardstick.<br />

“The argument that the people can have<br />

bread now and ballot later is a false dichotomy,”<br />

argues Clarence Dias of the<br />

International Centre for Law in<br />

Development. “There is a danger that the<br />

people will end up having neither bread not<br />

ballot.”<br />

Dias says vigorous calls by third world<br />

governments at international fora in defence<br />

of economic and cultural safeguards for the<br />

underprivileged is not reflected in their<br />

domestic record.<br />

Ross Daniels of Amnesty International<br />

agrees. He told a forum in Bangkok last<br />

month it made little difference to the victim<br />

to be tortured in a western way or an Asian<br />

way.<br />

“Rape is not something that is done In<br />

Asian. Rape is rape, torture is torture, and<br />

human rights are human rights,” he said.<br />

Other activists feel that although several<br />

Asian countries have emerged from totalitarianism<br />

to elect their own leaders, multiparty<br />

democracy has in many cases legitimized<br />

the interests of the ruling classes.<br />

“Multi-party systems have simply<br />

camouflaged democratic dictatorships and<br />

legitimized new forms of authoritarianism,”<br />

says Gopal Sivakoti of the Katmandu-based<br />

International Institute for Human Rights,<br />

environment and development. “Free election<br />

is not the only apparatus to protect<br />

human rights.”<br />

Dazzled by the glittering economic success<br />

of their neighbours, people in some<br />

poorer Asian countries seem to yearn for<br />

strongman rule and agree with Singapore’s<br />

Lee Kuan Yew who has repeatedly told<br />

them too much democracy is keeping them<br />

poor.<br />

Conference host Thailand restored civilian<br />

democracy after a student-led uprising<br />

last year and is caught between joining<br />

fellow members of the Association of<br />

South-<strong>East</strong> Asian Nations (ASEAN) to oppose<br />

the west and to shore up its own<br />

commitment to democratic values.<br />

“Braving batons and bullets, Thais fought<br />

for a government free from the domination<br />

of the military. Against this backdrop ... the<br />

human rights conference is a time endeavor,”<br />

said Bangkok’s the Nation newspaper on<br />

Friday.<br />

Nut human rights activist groups say<br />

inter-governmental meetings like the world<br />

conference in Vienna will be little more than<br />

a rubber stamping exercise since nation<br />

states will not allow discussion of rights<br />

violations of another member country.<br />

“There is no room for discussing specific<br />

national issues at these meetings, that is<br />

why the activities of non-governmental organisations<br />

is so important,” says Dias.<br />

“They are the only ones who can raise<br />

abuses like <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, Bhutan or Burma.”<br />

Asian non-governmental groups are<br />

holding their own forum at Bangkok’s<br />

Chulalongkorn university this week to prepare<br />

a common strategy for the Vienna conference<br />

and are coming up with a conference<br />

statement highlighting their concerns.<br />

Vitit Muntarbhorn of Chulalongkorn’s<br />

law faculty says the theory that economic<br />

development should precede democracy is<br />

flawed, and so is the argument that human<br />

rights is a western concept or that it is a<br />

country’s own business.<br />

Sums up Vitit: “no, economic development<br />

and democracy have to go together.<br />

We say no, human rights is universal. And<br />

no, human rights is not a nation’s internal<br />

affair: it joins hands across borders, it is a<br />

human solidarity issue.”<br />

NGOS BANNED FROM<br />

ASIAN MEETING<br />

The Nation (Bangkok), March 30, 19<strong>93</strong><br />

Slightly Abridged by Jean Inglis<br />

Organizers side with Indonesia in <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> row<br />

Comment: Only one of the two NGOs mentioned,<br />

IFET, actually applied. The<br />

“rejection” of the other NGO, Free <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> Coalition (sic), is, I would guess, a<br />

rejection from a list of NGOs in the area<br />

which the UN Centre drew up on its own<br />

initiative and presented to the governments.<br />

Evidently 30 NGOs in all were rejected, and<br />

efforts are being made to find out who they<br />

are. – Jean Inglis, FET-JC<br />

Two Japan-based non governmental organizations<br />

(NGOs) campaigning for <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> have been barred from participating<br />

in the Asia Regional Meeting for the Second<br />

World Conference on Human Rights that<br />

started in Bangkok yesterday.<br />

John Pace, the World Conference’s coordinator,<br />

without naming any countries,<br />

admitted that “one government” had opposed<br />

their participation while another<br />

supported their presence at the conference.<br />

It was, however, understood that the opposing<br />

party was Indonesia and the proponent<br />

was Japan.<br />

“It may not be an amicable solution to<br />

ban their participation but the organizing<br />

committees felt it was a necessary thing.”<br />

said Pace without elaborating.<br />

One of the NGOs barred is the<br />

International Federation for <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>,<br />

which is associated with the United Nations<br />

Department of Public Information. The<br />

NGO consists of 17 organizations from 12<br />

countries with an interest in the decolonization<br />

process in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. The<br />

other organization is the Free <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

Coalition.<br />

Both NGOs had initially obtained accreditation<br />

from the United Nations to attend<br />

the Asian Meeting.<br />

Informed sources at the conference said<br />

Indonesia threatened to walk out of the conference<br />

if representatives from these NGOs<br />

were allowed to join the meeting.<br />

The sources added that the organizers<br />

bowed to the requests of the Indonesian<br />

government because they did not want to<br />

jeopardize the chances of UN Special<br />

Representative Amos Wako, assigned by<br />

UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros<br />

Ghali to investigate human rights abuses in<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

A <strong>Timor</strong>ese delegate attending the conference<br />

as an adviser to the International<br />

Services for Human Rights called the<br />

Indonesian government’s opposition to the<br />

presence of the two NGOs a tactical mistake.<br />

“Why are they so afraid of little girls<br />

from Japan who are innocent and can do no<br />

harm?” asked José Ramos Horta, referring to<br />

the representatives of the two human rights<br />

groups.<br />

At the conference, Malaysia rallied together<br />

with Indonesia and warned Western<br />

countries against imposing their standard of<br />

human rights on Asian countries.<br />

In response, Horta said if other government<br />

representatives were stronger in their<br />

commitment to protect human rights, such<br />

an “embarrassment” on the part of<br />

Indonesia would not have occurred.<br />

The five-day regional meeting with representatives<br />

from 49 countries will seek to<br />

formulate an Asian agenda for the forthcoming<br />

World Conference on Human Rights<br />

in Vienna between June 1425.<br />

The meeting will also try to form an intergovernmental<br />

Asian Human Rights<br />

Commission. The Asia-Pacific region currently<br />

stands out for not having a mechanism<br />

to address and protect human rights.<br />

The head of the Indonesian delegation,<br />

Wiryono, yesterday called on Asian countries<br />

gathered at the Asia Regional Meeting


<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 81<br />

to adopt a balanced approach to human<br />

rights issues.<br />

Wiryono, director-general of the<br />

Indonesian Foreign Ministry’s political department,<br />

urged the Asian group to promote<br />

and protect human rights as suggested at the<br />

last Human Rights commission, meeting by<br />

taking fully into account the level of<br />

political, economic, social and cultural development<br />

of each country in the region.<br />

He emphasized that NGO activities<br />

should be confined to human rights concerns<br />

and not those involving political motives.<br />

Addressing the plenary session yesterday,<br />

Wiryono said the balanced approach,<br />

which he claimed to be in accordance with<br />

the principles embodied in the Universal<br />

Declaration on Human Rights, should express<br />

a symmetry between respect for the<br />

fundamental freedom of individuals on one<br />

hand and respect for the individual’s duties<br />

and responsibilities to society and the State<br />

on the other.<br />

“Without the balance, the right of society<br />

as a whole is rendered moot and this could<br />

lead to social upheaval and even anarchy,”<br />

he said.<br />

“The view that is prevalent in Asia is<br />

that the human being is both an individual<br />

and a member of society. His existence<br />

therefore can only become meaningful when<br />

he functions in a social environment,” he<br />

said.<br />

He stressed that Jakarta subscribed to<br />

social responsibility as well as to human<br />

rights.<br />

Wiryono also rapped the international<br />

community for its lack of sensitivity to political,<br />

economic, social and cultural diversity<br />

in the world.<br />

“When this diversity is disregarded, as it<br />

often is, then we are confronted by imbalances<br />

in the expression of human rights<br />

concerns which are characterized by politicization,<br />

selectivity, double standards and<br />

discrimination,” he said.<br />

He attacked the West for using human<br />

rights as a condition for economic cooperation.<br />

“The full realization of civil and political<br />

rights without the enjoyment of economic,<br />

social and cultural right is impossible,” he<br />

argued.<br />

He said human rights questions were essentially<br />

ethical and moral in nature and any<br />

approach to these questions which was not<br />

motivated by a sincere desire to protect the<br />

fundamental rights, but by disguised<br />

political purposes, could not be justified.<br />

José Ramos Horta of the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> resistance,<br />

referring to Wiryono’s statement<br />

that human rights must take into account<br />

cultural diversity, said it was an old argument<br />

that had been used time after time by<br />

Jakarta to freely arrest, kill, imprison and to<br />

rob their own people with impunity.<br />

José said he agreed with Jakarta’s argument<br />

that human rights issues should not be<br />

misused to protect a country’s economic<br />

interests, but he suggested that Indonesia<br />

could retaliate against those countries by<br />

halting oil and gas sales to other countries<br />

that violated human rights.<br />

The <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> resistance leader stressed<br />

that claims made by Third World leaders<br />

that food was needed before freedom was<br />

just and excuse for dictators to remain in<br />

power.<br />

“In many cases, and in many countries of<br />

Asia, the governments mortgage the wellbeing<br />

and the future of their countries to<br />

multilateral lending agencies, ” he said.<br />

NEED FOR REGIONAL<br />

HUMAN RIGHTS MECHANISM<br />

STRESSED<br />

Bangkok, Mar. 30 (IPS) - Amid the sharp<br />

exchanges between Asia-Pacific governments<br />

and human rights groups meeting<br />

here this week, there seems to be much<br />

agreement, for contrasting reasons, on the<br />

need to set up a regional mechanism to<br />

promote human rights.<br />

The Philippine delegation to the Asia-<br />

Pacific regional conference on human rights,<br />

now on its second day in Bangkok, argued<br />

this was a matter of enlightened selfinterest.<br />

Because Asia does not have a regional<br />

mechanism to redress human rights violations<br />

when national institutions fail, such<br />

complaints are brought to the notice of the<br />

world at large, said ambassador Hector<br />

Villaroel.<br />

“We may not like it ... but we cannot see<br />

how we can prevent this situation when we<br />

do not have a regional arrangement, like the<br />

Latin American and African groups, to<br />

interpose between us and the world at<br />

large,” he said.<br />

The Indonesians, who have taken a tough<br />

stance on the human rights issue, favour the<br />

idea of setting up such “regional<br />

arrangements.”<br />

Delegation head Ambassador S. Wiryono<br />

underscored in his speech Monday the<br />

resolutions of the U.N. Commission on<br />

Human Rights encouraging Asia-Pacific<br />

countries to establish a mechanism to promote<br />

and protect human rights in the region.<br />

This enthusiasm for a regional human<br />

rights formula comes in part from the realization<br />

that the Asia-Pacific is the only region<br />

in the world without such an international<br />

arrangement.<br />

This also highlights the region’s<br />

“disappointingly poor” rate of adherence to<br />

international human rights conventions.<br />

According to Amnesty International,<br />

more than half of Asia-Pacific countries<br />

have not ratified the two international human<br />

rights covenants or the convention<br />

against torture. Only eight countries in the<br />

region have ratified all three.<br />

In their ‘Bangkok declaration,’ non-governmental<br />

groups which held their own regional<br />

meeting here last week urged Asia-<br />

Pacific governments to accede to the main<br />

U.N. human rights agreements without<br />

further delay.<br />

The declaration added these international<br />

instruments must be given force not only in<br />

domestic law, “but more importantly in<br />

practice.”<br />

There was also widespread support for<br />

the view that national mechanisms are crucial<br />

to effective implementation of international<br />

human rights pacts.<br />

“The first line of defiance for human<br />

rights is on the national level and i believe<br />

we should focus significant attention on<br />

how to strengthen national human rights<br />

protection,” said Ibrahima Fall, U.N. assistant<br />

secretary-general for human rights.<br />

“It is essential to remain clear that the<br />

effective promotion and protection of human<br />

rights depends on the commitment of<br />

governments to pursue them,” said Villaroel.<br />

But the matter of national responsibility<br />

has two sides and continues to provoke<br />

much debate.<br />

On the one hand, this underscores the<br />

principle of national sovereignty which<br />

Asian governments prefer to stress.<br />

This means, as Indonesia puts it, that<br />

regional human rights mechanisms must take<br />

fully into account “the geographical<br />

complexity, diversity and vastness of the<br />

region, as well as their stability, economic<br />

development and social progress.”<br />

Non-governmental groups prefer to emphasize<br />

the accountability of governments<br />

to the international community.<br />

“Human rights is a matter of international<br />

concern, an international responsibility,”<br />

said Amnesty International’s Ed Garcia.<br />

National sovereignty is not an adequate<br />

defence when gross human rights violations<br />

and abuses are taking place, he added.<br />

HUMAN RIGHTS: INDONESIA<br />

HITS BACK AT CRITICS<br />

by Yuli Ismartono<br />

Bangkok, Mar. 30 (IPS) - Indonesia,<br />

often targeted as one of south-east Asia’s<br />

worst human rights offenders, is hitting back<br />

at its critics saying freedom from hunger and<br />

illiteracy should precede political freedoms.


Page 82 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

“The full realization of civil and political<br />

rights without the enjoyment of economic,<br />

social and cultural rights is impossible,” said<br />

S. Wiryono, head of the Indonesian<br />

delegation to this week’s Asia-Pacific<br />

meeting on human rights in Bangkok.<br />

“How can one express one’s opinions<br />

freely if one is illiterate? How can one enjoy<br />

the right to property if one languishes below<br />

the poverty line? And how can one exercise<br />

his right to free association in a labour union<br />

if one is unemployed?” he asked.<br />

Wiryono said concern over human rights<br />

should go beyond simple condemnation and<br />

should address the root causes of such<br />

violations, hence the importance attached by<br />

Asian countries to the right to development.<br />

International forums, in his view, mostly<br />

emphasize the civil and political aspects of<br />

human rights at the expense of economic,<br />

social and cultural aspects.<br />

Wiryono decried the misuse of human<br />

rights conditionalities for economic cooperation<br />

and assistance.<br />

“This practice does not only mitigate<br />

against the right to development, it also<br />

presupposes that human rights violations<br />

happen only in the recipient countries and<br />

never in the donor countries,” he said.<br />

Last year, the Suharto government ceased<br />

all aid programmes from the Netherlands<br />

because of Dutch criticism of its policy on<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

Jakarta also disbanded the Netherlandsled<br />

international governmental group on<br />

Indonesia (IGGI) which had been crucial in<br />

mobilizing economic aid to Indonesia following<br />

the 1965 event which left the country<br />

close to bankruptcy.<br />

A new consultative group led by the<br />

World Bank and the Manila-based Asian<br />

Development Bank (ADB) now coordinates<br />

development aid to Indonesia.<br />

Along with other member states of the<br />

Association of South-<strong>East</strong> Asian Nations<br />

(ASEAN), Indonesia recorded an impressive<br />

economic growth in the past two decades.<br />

Wiryono said international concerns on<br />

human rights are often expressed without<br />

taking into account political, economic, social<br />

and cultural diversity, causing imbalances<br />

marked by “politicization, selectivity,<br />

double standards and discrimination.”<br />

“Too often, Asian countries have been<br />

the target of unfair censure,” the Indonesian<br />

delegate said.<br />

He said there is a need for a balanced<br />

approach in accordance with the universal<br />

declaration on human rights, but there<br />

should be a symmetry between respect for<br />

the fundamental freedom of individuals on<br />

one hand and respect for the individual’s<br />

duties and responsibilities to society and the<br />

state on the other.<br />

The prevalent view in Asia, according to<br />

Wiryono, is that the human being is both an<br />

individual and a member of society.<br />

“Therefore it is imperative that the Asian<br />

group urge the world human rights<br />

conference (to be held in Vienna in June) to<br />

effectively ensure once and for all the indivisibility<br />

and interdependence of all aspects<br />

of human rights,” said Wiryono.<br />

ASSISTANT S-G FOR HUMAN<br />

RIGHTS STRESSES ASIAN<br />

CONTRIBUTION TO WORLD<br />

CONFERENCE<br />

UN Press Release, 1 April 19<strong>93</strong><br />

BANGKOK, 1 April (UN Information<br />

Service) – Ibrahima Fall, Assistant<br />

Secretary-General for Human Rights and<br />

Secretary-General of the World Conference<br />

on Human Rights, today addressed a number<br />

of issues linked to the World Conference<br />

on Human Rights and its preparatory<br />

process, at a press conference held at the<br />

new United Nations Conference Centre.<br />

The World Conference, preceded by<br />

three regional meetings (the first held in<br />

Tunis in November 1992, the second in San<br />

José in January, and the third taking place<br />

this week in Bangkok) and four sessions of<br />

the Preparatory Committee, will be held in<br />

Vienna from 14 to 25 June.<br />

Mr. Fall outlined the main objectives of<br />

the Conference, which are as follows:<br />

• To review and assess the progress made<br />

in the field of human rights since the<br />

adoption of the Universal Declaration of<br />

Human Rights in 1948;<br />

• To identify obstacles which have hindered<br />

this progress;<br />

• To examine the link between development<br />

and the enjoyment of human rights;<br />

and<br />

• To make proposals for the improvement<br />

of human rights standards and instruments,<br />

for an increased effectiveness of<br />

United Nations methods and mechanisms<br />

and to ensure adequate resources for<br />

United Nations human rights activities.<br />

Mr. Fall emphasized the important impact<br />

that the result of the Asian meeting<br />

would have on the final outcome of the<br />

World Conference. The significance of that<br />

contribution was due in part to the timing of<br />

the Asian meeting, which followed the two<br />

other regional meetings and could, therefore,<br />

benefit from their experience, and preceded<br />

the last session of the Preparatory<br />

Committee, scheduled for April in Geneva.<br />

It was also linked to the diversity of the<br />

Asian continent and to the different levels of<br />

development reached by the countries<br />

participating in the meeting.<br />

That diversity would enrich, in particular,<br />

the debate on the relation between development,<br />

democracy and human rights.<br />

Mr. Fall stated that while controversy in<br />

the field of human rights could not be<br />

avoided, the present argument opposing<br />

proponents of civil and political rights on<br />

one side and advocates of economic, social<br />

and cultural rights on the other was unfounded<br />

since neither set of rights could<br />

exist without the other. Stressing the indivisibility<br />

of human rights, he pointed out<br />

that, originally, there was to be only one<br />

International Covenant on Human Rights.<br />

Political considerations had led to the<br />

adoption of two separate Covenants, one on<br />

Political and Civil Rights, and the other on<br />

Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. A<br />

legitimate point for discussion, however,<br />

was the lack of optional protocols to the<br />

second Covenant.<br />

Mechanisms had been proposed to enhance<br />

the implementation of existing human<br />

rights instruments, he said, among them, the<br />

creation of an international penal court and<br />

the appointment of a United Nations special<br />

commissioner for human rights. Referring to<br />

the Secretary-General’s “An Agenda for<br />

Peace” report and its recommendations for<br />

the application of preventive diplomacy,<br />

Mr. Fall also mentioned the possibility of<br />

setting up a rapid and flexible system by<br />

which the United Nations would respond to<br />

cases of massive human rights violations.<br />

Such a system could include a roster of<br />

independent experts whom the Secretary-<br />

General could use at short notice.<br />

BANGKOK DECLARATION<br />

Adopted 2 April 19<strong>93</strong><br />

This is the full text of the Declaration<br />

adopted by the Ministers and representatives<br />

of Asian States, who met at Bangkok from<br />

29 March to 2 April 19<strong>93</strong>, pursuant to<br />

General Assembly resolution 46/116 of 17<br />

December 1991 in the context of preparations<br />

for the World Conference on Human<br />

rights.<br />

Emphasizing the significance of the<br />

World Conference on Human Rights, which<br />

provides an invaluable opportunity to review<br />

all aspects of human rights and ensure<br />

a just and balanced approach thereto,<br />

Recognizing the contribution that can be<br />

made to the World Conference by Asian<br />

countries with their diverse and rich cultures<br />

and traditions,<br />

Welcoming the increased attention being<br />

paid to human rights in the international<br />

community,<br />

Reaffirming their commitment to principles<br />

contained in the Charter of the United


<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 83<br />

Nations and the Universal Declaration on<br />

Human Rights,<br />

Recalling that in the Charter of the<br />

United Nations the question of universal<br />

observance and promotion of human rights<br />

and fundamental freedoms has been rightly<br />

placed within the context of international<br />

cooperation,<br />

Noting the progress made in the codification<br />

of human rights instruments, and in<br />

the establishment of international human<br />

rights mechanisms, while expressing concern<br />

that these mechanisms relate mainly to one<br />

category of rights,<br />

Emphasizing that ratification of international<br />

human rights instruments, particularly<br />

the International Covenant on Civil and<br />

Political Rights and the International<br />

Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural<br />

Rights, by all States should be further encouraged,<br />

Reaffirming the principles of respect for<br />

national sovereignty, territorial integrity and<br />

non-interference in the internal affairs of<br />

States,<br />

Stressing the universality, objectivity and<br />

non- selectivity of all human rights and the<br />

need to avoid the application of double<br />

standards in the implementation of human<br />

rights and its politicization,<br />

Recognizing that the promotion of human<br />

rights should be encouraged by cooperation<br />

and consensus, and not through confrontation<br />

and the imposition of incompatible<br />

values,<br />

Reiterating the interdependence and indivisibility<br />

of economic, social, cultural, civil<br />

and political rights, and the inherent<br />

interrelationship between development,<br />

democracy, universal enjoyment of all human<br />

rights, and social justice which must be<br />

addressed in an integrated and balanced<br />

manner,<br />

Recalling that the Declaration on the<br />

Right to Development has recognized the<br />

right to development as a universal and<br />

inalienable right and an integral part of<br />

fundamental human rights,<br />

Emphasizing that endeavours to move<br />

towards the creation of uniform international<br />

human rights norms must go hand in<br />

hand with endeavours to work towards a<br />

just and fair world economic order,<br />

Convinced that economic and social progress<br />

facilitates the growing trend towards<br />

democracy and the promotion and protection<br />

of human rights,<br />

Stressing the importance of education and<br />

training in human rights at the national,<br />

regional and international levels and the need<br />

for international cooperation aimed at<br />

overcoming the lack of public awareness of<br />

human rights,<br />

1. Reaffirm their commitment to the<br />

principles contained in the Charter of the<br />

United Nations and the Universal<br />

Declaration on Human Rights as well as the<br />

full realization of all human rights<br />

throughout the world;<br />

2. Underline the essential need to create<br />

favourable conditions for effective enjoyment<br />

of human rights at both the national<br />

and international levels;<br />

3. Stress the urgent need to democratize<br />

the United Nations system, eliminate selectivity<br />

and improve procedures and<br />

mechanisms in order to strengthen international<br />

cooperation, based on principles of<br />

equality and mutual respect, and ensure a<br />

positive, balanced and non-confrontational<br />

approach in addressing and realizing all aspects<br />

of human rights;<br />

4. Discourage any attempt to use human<br />

rights as a conditionality for extending development<br />

assistance;<br />

5. Emphasize the principles of respect<br />

for national sovereignty and territorial integrity<br />

as well as non-interference in the<br />

internal affairs of States, and the non-use of<br />

human rights as an instrument of political<br />

pressure;<br />

6. Reiterate that all countries, large and<br />

small, have the right to determine their<br />

political systems, control and freely utilize<br />

their resources, and freely pursue their economic,<br />

social and cultural development;<br />

7. Stress the universality, objectivity and<br />

non-selectivity of all human rights and the<br />

need to avoid the application of double<br />

standards in the implementation of human<br />

rights and its politicization, and that no<br />

violation of human rights can be justified;<br />

8. Recognize that while human rights are<br />

universal in nature, they must be considered<br />

in the context of a dynamic and evolving<br />

process of international norm-setting,<br />

bearing in mind the significance of national<br />

and regional particularities and various<br />

historical, cultural and religious<br />

backgrounds;<br />

9. Recognize further that States have the<br />

primary responsibility for the promotion<br />

and protection of human rights through appropriate<br />

infrastructure and mechanisms,<br />

and also recognize that remedies must be<br />

sought and provided primarily through such<br />

mechanisms and procedures;<br />

10. Reaffirm the interdependence and<br />

indivisibility of economic, social, cultural,<br />

civil and political rights, and the need to give<br />

equal emphasis to all categories of human<br />

rights;<br />

11. Emphasize the importance of guaranteeing<br />

the human rights and fundamental<br />

freedoms of vulnerable groups such as<br />

ethnic, national, racial, religious and linguistic<br />

minorities, migrant workers, disabled<br />

persons, indigenous peoples, refugees and<br />

displaced persons;<br />

12. Reiterate that self-determination is a<br />

principle of international law and a universal<br />

right recognized by the United Nations for<br />

peoples under alien or colonial domination<br />

or foreign occupation, by virtue of which<br />

they can freely determine their political<br />

status and freely pursue their economic,<br />

social and cultural development, and that its<br />

denial constitutes a grave violation of human<br />

rights;<br />

13. Stress that the right to self-determination<br />

is applicable to peoples under alien<br />

or colonial domination or foreign occupation,<br />

and should not be used to undermine<br />

the territorial integrity, national sovereignty<br />

and political independence of States;<br />

14. Express concern over all forms of<br />

violation of human rights, including manifestations<br />

of racial discrimination, racism,<br />

apartheid, colonialism, foreign aggression<br />

and occupation, and the establishment of<br />

illegal settlements in occupied territories, as<br />

well as the recent resurgence of neo- nazism,<br />

xenophobia and ethnic cleansing;<br />

15. Underline the need for taking effective<br />

international measures in order to<br />

guarantee and monitor the implementation<br />

of human rights standards and effective and<br />

legal protection of people under foreign occupation;<br />

16. Strongly affirm their support for the<br />

legitimate struggle of the Palestinian people<br />

to restore their national and inalienable<br />

rights to self-determination and independence,<br />

and demand an immediate end to the<br />

grave violations of human rights in the<br />

Palestinian, Syrian Golan and other occupied<br />

Arab territories including Jerusalem;<br />

17. Reaffirm the right to development, as<br />

established in the Declaration on the Right<br />

to Development, as a universal and<br />

inalienable right and an integral part of<br />

fundamental human rights, which must be<br />

realized through international cooperation,<br />

respect for fundamental human rights, the<br />

establishment of a monitoring mechanism<br />

and the creation of essential international<br />

conditions for the realization of such right;<br />

18. Recognize that the main obstacle to<br />

the realization of the right to development<br />

lie at the international macroeconomic level,<br />

as reflected in the widening gap between the<br />

North and the South, the rich and the poor;<br />

19. Affirm that poverty is one of the<br />

major obstacles hindering the full enjoyment<br />

of human rights;<br />

20. Affirm also the need to develop the<br />

right of humankind regarding a clean, safe<br />

and healthy environment;<br />

21. Note that terrorism, in all its forms<br />

and manifestations, as distinguished from<br />

the legitimate struggle of peoples under<br />

colonial or alien domination or foreign occupation,<br />

has emerged as one of the most<br />

dangerous threats to the enjoyment of hu-


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man rights and democracy, threatening the<br />

territorial integrity and security of States<br />

and destabilizing legitimately constituted<br />

governments, and that it must be unequivocally<br />

condemned by the international community;<br />

22. Reaffirm their strong commitment to<br />

the promotion and protection of the rights<br />

of women through the guarantee of equal<br />

participation in the political, social, economic<br />

and cultural concerns of society, and<br />

the eradication of all forms of discrimination<br />

and of gender-based violence against women;<br />

23. Recognize the rights of the child to<br />

enjoy special protection and to be afforded<br />

the opportunities and facilities to develop<br />

physically, mentally, morally, spiritually<br />

and socially in a healthy and normal manner<br />

and in conditions of freedom and dignity;<br />

24. Welcome the important role played<br />

by national institutions in the genuine and<br />

constructive promotion of human rights, and<br />

believe that the conceptualization and<br />

eventual establishment of such institutions<br />

are best left for the States to decide;<br />

25. Acknowledge the importance of cooperation<br />

and dialogue between governments<br />

and non-governmental organizations<br />

on the basis of shared values as well as<br />

mutual respect and understanding in the<br />

promotion of human rights, and encourage<br />

the non-governmental organizations in consultative<br />

status with the Economic and<br />

Social Council to contribute positively to<br />

this process in accordance with Council<br />

resolution 1296 (XLIV);<br />

26. Reiterate the need to explore the<br />

possibilities of establishing regional arrangements<br />

for the promotion and protection<br />

of human rights in Asia;<br />

27. Reiterate further the need to explore<br />

ways to generate international cooperation<br />

and financial support for education and<br />

training in the field of human rights at the<br />

national level and for the establishment of<br />

national infrastructures to promote and<br />

protect human rights if requested by States;<br />

28. Emphasize the necessity to rationalize<br />

the United Nations human rights<br />

mechanism in order to enhance its effectiveness<br />

and efficiency and the need to ensure<br />

avoidance of the duplication of work<br />

that exists between the treaty bodies, the<br />

Sub-Commission on Prevention of<br />

Discrimination and Protection of Minorities<br />

and the Commission on Human Rights, as<br />

well as the need to avoid the multiplicity of<br />

parallel mechanisms;<br />

29. Stress the importance of strengthening<br />

the United Nations Centre for Human<br />

Rights with the necessary resources to enable<br />

it to provide a wide range of advisory<br />

services and technical assistance programmes<br />

in the promotion of human rights<br />

to requesting States in a timely and effective<br />

manner, as well as to enable it to finance<br />

adequately other activities in the field of<br />

human rights authorized by competent<br />

bodies;<br />

30. Call for increased representation of<br />

the developing countries in the Centre for<br />

Human Rights.<br />

ASIAN GOVERNMENTS ADOPT<br />

BANGKOK DECLARATION ON<br />

HUMAN RIGHTS<br />

UN Press Release, 2 April 19<strong>93</strong>. Excerpts<br />

BANGKOK (United Nations<br />

Information Service) – Concluding an unprecedented<br />

regional meeting on human<br />

rights, Asian Governments here have produced<br />

the “Declaration of Bangkok,” a consensus<br />

document reflecting their positions<br />

on a range of human rights issues. The 30-<br />

point Declaration, which will be submitted<br />

to the Preparatory Committee for the World<br />

Conference on Human Rights (Vienna, 14-<br />

25 June), emphasizes the primary responsibility<br />

of states in protecting and promoting<br />

human rights, while recognizing the<br />

crucial role of international cooperation in<br />

achieving these goals.<br />

The Declaration, which was drafted by<br />

representatives of 40 Governments from<br />

West Asia to the Pacific under the chairmanship<br />

of Mr. Mohammad Javad Zarif<br />

(Islamic Republic of Iran), was adopted at<br />

the plenary session of the regional meeting<br />

which was chaired by Mr. Pracha Guna-<br />

Kasem of Thailand. Mr. Pracha Guna-<br />

Kasem said that the Declaration was prepared<br />

in record time, reflecting the spirit of<br />

cooperation among the delegations. “We are<br />

pleased to make this Asian contribution to<br />

the World Conference on Human Rights,” he<br />

said, noting that the document would be<br />

considered together with the African and<br />

Latin American and the Caribbean<br />

Declarations at the fourth and final<br />

Preparatory Committee meeting in Geneva,<br />

19-30 April.<br />

Speaking after the final plenary, Mr.<br />

Ibrahima Fall, Secretary General of the upcoming<br />

World Conference, said that the<br />

Declaration of Bangkok, reflecting the<br />

enormous social, political and cultural diversity<br />

of the Asia and Pacific region, has<br />

particular significance as it completes the<br />

overview of the concerns and proposals of<br />

the three developing regions. “There are<br />

many similarities in the three Declarations,”<br />

he pointed out. “But their differences will<br />

prove to be complementary within the<br />

framework of the World Conference.”<br />

NGO Response<br />

For their part, the NGOs attending the<br />

regional meeting as observers, said they had<br />

demonstrated their unity and that their<br />

voices had been heard. “The meeting has<br />

allowed us to come together for the first<br />

time ever around human rights issues,” said<br />

Cecilia Jimenez, spokesperson for the more<br />

than 170 NGOs represented. “We did not<br />

come here to confront governments but to<br />

encourage dialogue at the local, national and<br />

regional levels.” The Declaration represented<br />

a step forward, she said at a press<br />

conference, in that governments had recognized<br />

a number of issues such as the<br />

rights of women and children. She regretted<br />

however, that the Declaration had failed to<br />

“give proper recognition to the most fundamental<br />

rights of indigenous peoples.”<br />

A positive point, Ms. Jimenez said, was<br />

that the Declaration had acknowledged the<br />

importance of the contribution of NGOs.<br />

“The governments of the Asia/Pacific region<br />

can no longer belittle or deny our right to be<br />

part of the protection and promotion of<br />

human rights.”<br />

Ms. Jimenez expressed concern at the<br />

emphasis placed in the Declaration on<br />

“regional specificities” and what she perceived<br />

as the absence of an unequivocal<br />

statement regarding the universality and<br />

indivisibility of human rights.<br />

ASIA-PACIFIC STATES SET<br />

STRONG AGENDA<br />

by Kunda Dixit<br />

Bangkok, Apr. 2 (IPS) - The first-ever<br />

gathering of Asia-Pacific countries on human<br />

rights that ended here Friday approved a<br />

declaration that counters western pressures<br />

and blunts the concerns of the region’s<br />

activist groups.<br />

The three-cornered tussle at the conference<br />

between Asia- Pacific governments,<br />

human rights NGOs (non-governmental organisations)<br />

and the west, has ended with<br />

some of the more powerful Asian states<br />

seeming to gain the upper hand.<br />

These countries have come under growing<br />

pressure lately from industrialised countries<br />

to adhere to what they see as western<br />

commandments on human rights, democracy<br />

and the environment.<br />

The Bangkok declaration is a document<br />

that prepares a common Asian stand for the<br />

U.N. world conference on human rights to<br />

be held in Vienna in June.<br />

It was crucial for some Asian countries to<br />

draw up a paper that deleted or diluted<br />

references to civil liberties, political pluralism<br />

or NGO participation.<br />

And they seem to have got what they<br />

wanted. the final document considerably<br />

enhances their negotiating power for Vienna.<br />

Even though some south-east Asian<br />

nations have been the most vocal lately<br />

about western pressures on human rights<br />

and democracy, they showed more sophisti-


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cation. Singapore wanted the toughlyworded<br />

first draft toned down because it<br />

could have given the impression that Asia<br />

condoned human rights violations.<br />

Conference sources said China and<br />

Vietnam were most adamant in deleting all<br />

direct references to torture and NGO participation.<br />

South-east Asian countries tried<br />

to strike off phraseology on self-determination<br />

as a principle of international law and<br />

wanted to insert the right of all nations to<br />

“control and freely utilize their natural resources.”<br />

In the end, the final document reflected<br />

the growing clout of Asia’s newly-affluent<br />

nations. the few voices speaking out for civil<br />

liberties and pluralism belonged to the<br />

region’s ailing economies like India, the<br />

Philippines and Nepal.<br />

The notable exceptions were South<br />

Korea, which recently elected its first civilian<br />

president in three decades, and Japan,<br />

the only developed country that attended<br />

the meeting.<br />

Japan strongly objected to an item in the<br />

declaration that discourages attempts to use<br />

human rights conditionalities to development<br />

aid, saying it was not compatible with<br />

japan’s overseas development assistance<br />

(ODA) charter.<br />

Japan also echoed the western emphasis<br />

on civil and political rights. “Human rights<br />

are universal ... these are values common to<br />

all mankind and they are a matter of legitimate<br />

international concern,” said japan’s<br />

Seiichiro Otsuka.<br />

The final declaration drew mixed reactions<br />

from activists who were here to lobby<br />

for a stronger government commitment to<br />

civil and political liberties and the protection<br />

of minorities.<br />

Said Evelyn Serrano of the Philippine<br />

Alliance of Human Rights Advocates: “we<br />

are a bit disappointed that the states have<br />

eroded the NGO recommendations.”<br />

“It was one step forward and one step<br />

back,” said Cecilia Jimenez, spokesperson<br />

of a regional conference of human rights<br />

groups held here last week.<br />

Asia-Pacific NGOs felt the five-day<br />

Bangkok meeting was a historic occasion<br />

that united them for the first time as a<br />

region. many of them are now looking forward<br />

to Vienna, and linking up with other<br />

rights groups in Latin America and Africa.<br />

But they also lost out when some key<br />

concerns were ignored, such as indigenous<br />

people’s rights. Said Jimenez: “we achieved<br />

some points, like reference to women’s and<br />

children’s rights but the resolution’s<br />

weakness and drawbacks far outweigh the<br />

gains.”<br />

Governments were for the most part<br />

happy with the final version. “the resolution<br />

was a balanced one. it reaffirms our<br />

commitment to the Asian point of view,”<br />

said Singapore’s Bilahari Kausikan. “This is<br />

an important achievement. we will go to<br />

Vienna with a coherent voice.”<br />

The five-day Asia-Pacific human rights<br />

meeting had several glaring blind spots.<br />

some parts of the region got over-exposed<br />

while others got left out in the dark.<br />

High-profile crises like those in <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> and Burma were spotlighted by aggressive<br />

activist groups who knew their way<br />

around with the media. Proximity to the<br />

venue of the meeting meant Burmese exile<br />

groups had a strong contingent.<br />

Other human rights hot spots that did<br />

not even register a blip on the conference<br />

radar screens in the past week were north<br />

Korea, Tibet and Kashmir. The middle east<br />

was represented only by groups from<br />

Palestine and Kuwait.<br />

China, home to one-fifth of the world’s<br />

population, had a lone activist who created<br />

ripples by addressing the plenary in<br />

Chinese. Central Asian states, still suffering<br />

an identity crisis, did not even show up.<br />

“China and Tibet were both off screen.<br />

there was no major group pressing attention<br />

on human rights violations in China,” says<br />

Sidney Jones of the U.S.-based Asia Watch.<br />

“And Tibetan groups should have been here.<br />

It was an unfortunate lapse.”<br />

Given the concerns about safeguards to<br />

democracy and human rights in Hong Kong<br />

in the run-up to the 1997 handover of the<br />

British colony to China, it was surprising<br />

that only one Hong Kong NGO came to<br />

Bangkok.<br />

“Hong Kong groups are very concerned<br />

about 1997 and want a venue for discussion,<br />

but they are not so sure about their level of<br />

participation in Vienna. Intervention-wise it<br />

is problematic,” says Tan Meng-Kiat of the<br />

Hong Kong-based Asian Centre for the<br />

Progress of Peoples.<br />

But the question of Hong Kong’s absence<br />

in the Bangkok meeting was raised at this<br />

week’s legislative council meeting in Hong<br />

Kong, and the government’s answer was<br />

that Hong Kong will be present at the<br />

Vienna conference.<br />

Pro-democracy activists in Hong Kong<br />

are concerned that governor Chris Patten’s<br />

battle with Beijing over reforms in the<br />

composition of the legislature does not go<br />

far enough.<br />

Said one activist: “Hong Kong NGOs are<br />

for a totally elected legislative council. but<br />

(Patten) knows this would be too radical for<br />

China.”<br />

Human rights groups from the South<br />

Pacific island states were also under-represented.<br />

A Bougainville group tried hard to<br />

get the media interested in the Papua New<br />

Guinea military’s ongoing suppression of a<br />

separatist struggle in the copper-rich island.<br />

Also striving hard for attention were<br />

other marginalised groups like India’s untouchables.<br />

The little-known abuse of some<br />

200 million victims of south Asia’s caste<br />

system probably makes this numerically the<br />

world’s most widespread rights violation,<br />

“yet you hardly hear of untouchables in international<br />

fora,” said one activist.<br />

BBC ON BANGKOK<br />

DECLARATION AND TIMOR<br />

The BBC World Service’s Newshour at 1pm<br />

GMT on Friday, 2 April 19<strong>93</strong> carried the<br />

following report on the Bangkok meeting of<br />

Asian governments held in preparation of<br />

the UN World Conference on Human Rights<br />

in June this year. It also interviewed<br />

Indonesia’s chief delegate, Wiryono<br />

Sastrohandoyo in Bangkok, and José<br />

Ramos-Horta in Sydney:<br />

The following is an unabridged transcript of<br />

the programme which came in two sections:<br />

The Bangkok meeting was called to agree<br />

a common Asian position ahead of the<br />

World Conference on Human Rights due to<br />

be held in Austria in June. From Bangkok,<br />

here’s our Southeast Asia correspondent,<br />

Jonathan Burcher:<br />

“The Bangkok Declaration describes itself<br />

as setting out the human rights aspirations<br />

and commitments of Asia. Its contents<br />

reflect the reservations of many Asian governments<br />

over what they see as the increasing<br />

dominance of western concerns with<br />

individual, civil and political liberties. The<br />

Declaration opposes in particular attempts<br />

to tie aid to a country’s human rights record.<br />

It says rights should not be promoted<br />

through the imposition of what the<br />

Declaration calls ‘incompatible values.’ And<br />

at a time when the United Nations is<br />

growing increasingly interventionist, the<br />

Declaration stresses the importance of national<br />

sovereignty and the principle of noninterference<br />

in internal affairs.<br />

“Asian non-government human rights<br />

groups represented at the Bangkok meeting<br />

welcomed some parts of the Declaration, in<br />

particular sections on women’s and children’s<br />

rights which had been absent from<br />

the initial draft.<br />

“In a statement, the NGOs accused the<br />

Asian governments of seeking ultimately to<br />

protect themselves from a too critical examination<br />

of their own human rights record.”<br />

The second report drew attention to the<br />

forthcoming talks between Portugal and<br />

Indonesia on the question of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>:<br />

The dispute between Indonesia and<br />

Portugal which is the former colonial power<br />

in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> has exploded into open con-


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frontation. Portugal has led the European<br />

Community in getting the UN Sub-commission<br />

(sic) in Geneva to condemn<br />

Indonesia for its treatment of the <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese. While for his part, the Indonesian<br />

Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas, says such<br />

comments could ruin talks scheduled to<br />

resume in Rome on April 20.<br />

In the meantime Indonesia and 46 other<br />

Asian nations have been attending a conference<br />

on human rights in Bangkok where<br />

delegates were sharply critical of western<br />

intervention on the subject. But the head of<br />

the NGO delegation to the conference<br />

Cecilia Ximenes of the Philippines was not<br />

happy at the outcome:<br />

“They are still continuing to try to limit<br />

the scope of international monitoring of the<br />

violations of human rights in the region. And<br />

this can be seen by the emphasis on the<br />

principle of national sovereignty, the<br />

principle of non- interference in internal affairs,<br />

etc. This has been interpreted by these<br />

Asian-Pacific states as the need not be<br />

accountable for the human rights violations<br />

occurring.”<br />

So, with <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> in mind, what position<br />

has Indonesia been taking at the conference?<br />

Bill Barnes asked the government<br />

representative there, Mr. Wiryono, whether<br />

Asian countries were firmly rejecting western<br />

notions of human rights:<br />

“Of course, human rights are universal.<br />

We accept that. But we also have to accept<br />

the fact that the world is very diverse. And<br />

Indonesia, for a country I must stress, our<br />

motto is Unity in Diversity. We are a nation<br />

of 350 ethnic groups. In the United Nations<br />

we have now about 179 nations and I think<br />

they are all different but we are all committed<br />

to the universality of human rights. But<br />

I think we must not try to contradict each<br />

other but to find common ground. I think<br />

this is the voice of reason and I think we<br />

must be seriously considered by the western<br />

countries in particular because, many times,<br />

Asian countries have been the target of<br />

censure and criticism and often attack.”<br />

Bill Barnes: “Your critics in the West<br />

would presumably argue that you can have<br />

economic development, you can have progress<br />

with the sort of western rights that<br />

they would like you to adopt. And you’re<br />

are saying that you can’t have this.”<br />

Wiryono: “I am not saying that we cant<br />

have both. We must strike a balance between<br />

individual rights and the obligations<br />

of the individual to society. And in<br />

Indonesia as well as in many other Asian<br />

countries, communal rights are sometimes<br />

considered to be superior, to be given more<br />

importance. I think both economic, social<br />

and cultural rights as well as civil and political<br />

rights are important and are to be seen<br />

in an integral way. That is, I think, our<br />

views.”<br />

BB: “You say that human rights have to<br />

be ....[compatible?] in the country in which<br />

they are being applied, but couldn’t people<br />

argue that some of the people at least,<br />

calling for human rights within Asia are<br />

people living in those countries?”<br />

Wiryono: “I think that the NGOs are our<br />

partners and they can express their views<br />

but I think sometimes, I hate to say it, they<br />

reflect more the western views rather than<br />

the their own countries’ cultural heritage. If<br />

they simply make blunt voices and take for<br />

themselves the role of both judge and jury, I<br />

don’t think that it’s very useful. And governments<br />

I think represent the people. They<br />

represent their organisation and their organisations<br />

are given a certain status within<br />

the UN and they play their roles but they<br />

must also observe the same principles<br />

dealing with human rights as I have explained,<br />

in the spirit of the UN Charter and<br />

in the spirit of cooperation.”<br />

–––––––<br />

Bill Barnes: “So how do such comments<br />

go down with Fretilin? This is the rebel<br />

group campaigning for independence in <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> where tens of thousands of people<br />

are thought to have died fighting since<br />

Indonesia annexed the territory in 1975.<br />

Fretilin spokesman is José Ramos-Horta<br />

who spoke to me from Sydney, Australia,<br />

and I asked him whether he accepted the<br />

view that developing countries should have<br />

their own human rights values:<br />

Horta: “I come from a third world country,<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, which in fact is fourth<br />

world. So I have legitimacy to talk about the<br />

problems of the South. When I hear Mr.<br />

Wiryono criticizing, or saying that NGOs in<br />

the South are detached from the reality or<br />

that they reflect more the western views, I<br />

find it perplexing, because the NGOs of the<br />

South are deep-rooted in the villages, in the<br />

small towns, in the countryside. They in<br />

fact reflect the true aspirations, the true<br />

desires of the people of the South, not the<br />

elite that play golf and mortgage the future<br />

of their own countries with the West.”<br />

Barnes: “But it has to be said that the<br />

South does have different values from the<br />

West and Wiryono did make the point for<br />

example that in Indonesia you do have 350<br />

different ethnic groups. How can you possibly<br />

put individual rights ahead of the<br />

communal good?”<br />

Horta: “First let me say that there are<br />

universal standards in terms of the right to<br />

life, the right to education, the right not to<br />

be afraid of being arrested. In Indonesia<br />

student protests against lack of education,<br />

lack of health care or low wages and so on,<br />

are arrested, so what kind of economic rights<br />

is the Indonesian government talking<br />

about?”<br />

Barnes: “So on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, are you putting<br />

your faith in the second visit of Amos<br />

Wako to <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>?”<br />

Horta: “Not entirely. First we hope that<br />

his first report is made public. The UN<br />

Human Rights Commission in Geneva called<br />

on the UN Secretary-General to publish his<br />

first report which I believe is very damaging<br />

on Indonesia and calls for the respect for<br />

self-determination in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. Now let<br />

us see, what will be his second report. And<br />

we hope that he will stay there longer than<br />

in the previous visit. His visit was only one<br />

day. What kind of investigation is that when<br />

you go to a country to stay only one day in<br />

the country? So we hope that he will stay<br />

longer and publish his two reports as has<br />

been requested by the Commission.”<br />

Barnes: “What prospects are there for a<br />

political settlement? Talks are to resume on<br />

April 20; meanwhile Indonesia and Portugal<br />

are criticizing each other’s stand over <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>. The prospects don’t look too good,<br />

do they?”<br />

Horta: “It is not Portugal that invaded<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. Portugal left <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> in the<br />

hope that <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> would achieve selfdetermination<br />

and independence. It is<br />

Indonesia that has to make the gestures.<br />

What kind of gesture can they expect from<br />

Portugal? On our side, the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese, I<br />

have stated repeatedly that we are prepared<br />

to bend backwards to accommodate<br />

Indonesia’s concerns, its legitimate security<br />

interests. We are prepared to work out a<br />

formula that would help Indonesia extricate<br />

itself from <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> with honour, with<br />

dignity, without losing face. All we want is<br />

for the UN, working with Portugal and<br />

Indonesia, to organise a referendum in <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> through which the people of <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> will decide whether they want independence,<br />

whether they want to be a free<br />

associated territory with Portugal or to be<br />

integrated with Indonesia. That’s all we are<br />

asking.”<br />

JOSÉ RAMOS HORTA SAYS<br />

HE PLANS TO RETURN TO<br />

EAST TIMOR<br />

Report on SBS TV program Dateline, Friday<br />

April 2, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

Interview with José Ramos Horta.<br />

Interviewer Paul Murphy. (slightly edited).<br />

PM: <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> wasn’t on the agenda at<br />

the Bangkok Asia-Pacific Human Rights<br />

Conference this week but it scored a victory<br />

in early March at the UNCHR when a motion<br />

highly critical of Indonesia was carried<br />

overwhelmingly. One of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>’s best


<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 87<br />

known activists, José Ramos Horta, is back<br />

in Australia after attending the Conference<br />

in Thailand.<br />

José Ramos Horta, <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> wasn’t on<br />

the agenda at Bangkok but was it talked<br />

about in the corridors of the conference ?<br />

JRH: ET was not on the agenda like<br />

many other issues because it was a conference<br />

dealing with diplomatic procedures,<br />

standard setting and so on. I must say that<br />

ET dominated the whole conference, particularly<br />

the NGO conference which preceded<br />

the official conference.<br />

M: Right, but the official conference was<br />

dominated by countries like China, Iran,<br />

Indonesia. Countries not known for their<br />

progressive attitude on human rights.<br />

JRH: Yes the conference was dominated<br />

by Iran, China, Indonesia, Iraq and so many<br />

other dictatorships that I said to one of the<br />

Asian delegates that the only thing missing<br />

was having Pol Pot as one of the rapporteurs.<br />

PM: So you didn’t achieve anything in<br />

Bangkok ?<br />

JRH: Not in terms of standard setting,<br />

adoption of forward looking instruments to<br />

protect human rights, that would go beyond<br />

existing instruments such as the Covenant<br />

on Civil and Political Rights. But in terms of<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> we succeeded in obtaining from<br />

the NGOs, more than 100 NGOs, from all<br />

over the region the adoption of ET as a<br />

country situation to campaign on this year.<br />

PM: Now in Geneva in early March the<br />

UNCHR adopted a very strong motion<br />

against Indonesia. No doubt you would<br />

claim that as a victory but what really<br />

would even that achieve ? What effect<br />

would that have on Indonesia ?<br />

JRH: Well first of all let me say again<br />

that Indonesia went to Geneva as President<br />

of NAM, leader of the North-South dialogue,<br />

member of the Islamic Conference and<br />

it was also a Vice-President of the<br />

Commission itself. So all the odds were<br />

against us but as it turned out Indonesia got<br />

only one fifth of the membership of the<br />

Commission. In terms of practical achievements<br />

I must say yes because right now the<br />

special envoy of the UN Secretary General<br />

is flying to <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

PM: But he’s the Kenyan Attorney<br />

General. They’re not known for their performance<br />

in human rights are they ?<br />

JRH: That’s true but on the other hand<br />

we know of the first report he wrote. This<br />

report has been locked up at the office of<br />

the UN Secretary General because as we<br />

understand it is very damaging to Indonesia<br />

and it is also recommending that the UN<br />

must look at the root causes of the problem<br />

in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

PM: Its been 18 years since Indonesia<br />

annexed <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. What have you<br />

achieved really ? The struggle has gone on<br />

but being pragmatic what have you achieved<br />

?<br />

JRH: Well the fact we have kept the issue<br />

alive, on the agenda, that was a major<br />

success. The fact that we persuaded the US<br />

Congress to cut military training to<br />

Indonesia. The fact that now we have ET<br />

high on the agenda of the UN and of the US<br />

Congress and the Clinton administration.<br />

These, I believe, portend good news for <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> in the next few months, 2 years, 3<br />

years for ET.<br />

PM: Would you risk going to ET yourself<br />

? Would you want to ? Do you think<br />

that it would be worth the risk ?<br />

JRH: Yes, I have all intentions to go<br />

there, sooner rather than later. The<br />

Indonesian military commander, Theo<br />

Sy afei, in a sarcastic manner said that my<br />

boss Xanana Gusmão was there already so I<br />

am most welcome to come. The puppet<br />

governor of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> also said that he<br />

would pick me up at the airport himself.<br />

These are threatening remarks but I still<br />

intend to go.<br />

PM: Even though there is danger.<br />

JRH: Yes there is danger, I just remember<br />

what they did to Ninoy Aquino in the<br />

Philippines. Much more easier to shoot me<br />

but I still intend to go.<br />

PM: When will you go ?<br />

JRH: I don’t know. I have to look into<br />

the logistics.<br />

PM: This year ?<br />

JRH: Yes, I hope so. This year, within a<br />

few weeks, a few months, we are making<br />

arrangements with some international personalities<br />

to travel along with me.<br />

PM: Final question, do you think Xanana<br />

Gusmão was tortured when Indonesian<br />

troops grabbed him ?<br />

JRH: Absolutely, he was tortured. I<br />

showed the footage of the first interview<br />

which Indonesia displayed on national TV<br />

to a specialist group of the UN, the Working<br />

Group on detention and torture and<br />

everyone, 5 specialists from 5 parts of the<br />

world, they all confirmed yes, Xanana<br />

Gusmão was physically and<br />

psychologically tortured.<br />

Before the interview SBS showed extracts<br />

from a play , ‘The Voices of Souls,’ based on<br />

Michelle Turner’s book “Telling <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>” which is due to open in Melbourne<br />

in 2 weeks. (Theatre Works, St Kilda).<br />

Extracts from the play included interviews<br />

with the <strong>Timor</strong>ese ‘actors,’ traditional<br />

dances & songs and a dramatization of part<br />

of the story of Fatima Gusmão in the book.<br />

CONTINUING TALKS<br />

BETWEEN INDONESIA<br />

AND PORTUGAL<br />

JAPANESE GROUPS URGE<br />

UN SECRETARY-GENERAL<br />

TO REDOUBLE EFFORTS<br />

From Free <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Japan Coalition,<br />

Feb. 18.<br />

Letters calling on UN Secretary-General<br />

to take new initiatives to solve the <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> issue were delivered to Dr. Boutros<br />

Boutros-Ghali, who is currently on an official<br />

visit to Tokyo. Eda Satsuki, member of<br />

the Lower House, conveyed the letters at a<br />

reception for the UN chief on Feb. 17.<br />

A letter from the suprapartisan Diet<br />

Members’ Forum on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> expresses<br />

Japanese lawmakers’ concern that representatives<br />

of the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese be included<br />

in negotiations on the issue being conducted<br />

under the Secretary General’s auspices. The<br />

missive also calls on the UN to “put forth a<br />

strategy ...including as one possibility the<br />

holding of a popular referendum” in order to<br />

carry out the two Security Council and eight<br />

General Assembly resolutions on <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>. Such a strategy, the legislators say,<br />

is “absolutely consistent with goals which<br />

the United Nations is most energetically<br />

pursuing at the moment, namely,<br />

peacekeeping in regional disputes and<br />

support for democratic elections.”<br />

After the Indonesian invasion of the<br />

former Portuguese colony of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> in<br />

1975, the UN passed resolutions calling on<br />

Indonesia to withdraw its troops and affirming<br />

the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese’ right of selfdetermination.<br />

The U.S., Japan and other<br />

Western Powers closed their eyes to<br />

Indonesia’s illegal takeover of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

until Nov. 1991 when journalists witnessed<br />

Indonesian troops shoot down hundreds of<br />

mourners at a cemetery in Dili. In spite of<br />

heightened international concern, the UN<br />

has failed to take any new initiative to break<br />

the 17-year deadlock over the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

issue.<br />

The Diet Members’ letter concludes by<br />

urging Dr. Boutros-Ghali “to request the allout<br />

cooperation of Japan and the Japanese<br />

Government in achieving a solution of the<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> issue. Japan, which is the largest<br />

donor of economic aid to Indonesia, has<br />

deep economic ties with that country, so<br />

that it can be said that the issue of <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> represents a veritable test of Japan’s<br />

human rights diplomacy.”<br />

A second letter, from the Free <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> Japan Coalition, representing eleven


Page 88 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

local organizations, urges the UN chief to<br />

“redouble efforts to ensure that opportunities<br />

for a solution are not lost.” The<br />

“favorable international climate” that has<br />

prevailed since the demise of the Cold War<br />

and the “greatly enhanced awareness” of the<br />

issue are sited as opportunities.<br />

“The gravely deteriorating situation” in<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> itself is also given as a “pressing<br />

reason for a new concerted initiative.”<br />

Referring to a recent letter from the Catholic<br />

Bishop of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Ximenes Belo, the<br />

Coalition says that many people have been<br />

arrested and tortured in the wake of the<br />

arrest of resistance leader Xanana Gusmão<br />

in November of last year. Quoting Mr.<br />

Gusmão’s words after his arrest, the letter<br />

says that the only ray of hope lies in “a<br />

global solution for <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.” The<br />

scenario for such a solution would center on<br />

the Secretary-General and, the Coalition<br />

opines, should involve the cooperation of<br />

the Japanese Government.<br />

Further Information: Jean Inglis<br />

Fax:0823222684 Tel:0823220962<br />

CHURCH TO MEDIATE<br />

TIMOR TALKS?<br />

Diario de Noticias 11 March 19<strong>93</strong> Dateline:<br />

Lisbon Byline: Carlos Albino Translated<br />

from Portuguese unabridged<br />

Jakarta and Lisbon may accept intervention<br />

of the St. Egidio Community:<br />

After the Catholic Church offered three<br />

times to serve as mediator between Portugal<br />

and Indonesia, through the St. Egidio<br />

Community, it is now believed that Jakarta<br />

and Lisbon will accept a formula for a first<br />

round of formal negotiations in September<br />

on the future of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

The acceptance of the Church’s mediation<br />

could be the only concrete result of the<br />

talks scheduled for 17 April in Rome between<br />

Durão Barroso and Ali Alatas, a<br />

Community diplomatic source assured us,<br />

stressing the fact that Portugal is not going<br />

to desist from its veto on the third generation<br />

agreement between the EC and<br />

Indonesia.<br />

The same source added that Community<br />

officials were expecting Portugal to withdraw<br />

from or moderate its position, especially<br />

after Germany turned a deaf ear to the<br />

UN resolutions and to the process developed<br />

by SG Boutros-Ghali, in its sale of<br />

war materials to Jakarta.<br />

The response, however, was quick in<br />

coming and Durão Barroso ended up going<br />

to Strasbourg to personally counter the<br />

spreading news of an impending softening in<br />

Lisbon’s negotiating attitude towards<br />

Jakarta.<br />

We are assured from Brussels, besides,<br />

that Indonesia was aware of the possible<br />

moderation in Lisbon’s stance. So Minister<br />

Durão Barroso’s statements in Strasbourg,<br />

namely containing a “first step” criticism of<br />

Germany, took by surprise the Europeans,<br />

who put business dealings with Jakarta before<br />

everything else, even though the latter<br />

are no more than “diplomatic old iron,” as<br />

was the case in which Bonn involved itself,<br />

encouraging Indonesia.<br />

Yesterday, high up Portuguese diplomatic<br />

officials who, in the Foreign Office,<br />

are following the case of <strong>Timor</strong>, drew a<br />

curtain of total silence over the dossiers<br />

being prepared for Rome, and refused to<br />

speak about the case. Nevertheless, it is<br />

known that the scheduling of the Rome<br />

meeting between Durão Barroso and Ali<br />

Alatas was, from the beginning, linked to the<br />

admissibility that the St. Egidio Community<br />

could have a mediating role. Also, the 20<br />

April date was set on account of the ending<br />

of the discussion on <strong>Timor</strong> at the UN<br />

Human Rights Commission in Geneva.<br />

Jakarta always expected a neutral result.<br />

Yesterday, however, the US made a 360<br />

degree alteration to its traditional stance,<br />

when it subscribed to the draft resolution<br />

sponsored by the EC, Angola, Switzerland,<br />

Liechtenstein, Sweden, Norway, Iceland,<br />

Finland, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and<br />

Brazil. Diplomatic observers believe that, in<br />

spite of this being a first sign from<br />

Washington, it has signified a serious setback<br />

for Jakarta, but goes no further than<br />

being a warning.<br />

It is in this context that the Catholic<br />

Church’s mediation, through the St. Egidio<br />

Community, already seen as Vatican diplomacy’s<br />

“worldly goal,” arises as a viable<br />

option.<br />

To the already well-known formula of<br />

“an internationally acceptable solution” for<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>, Portugal now adds the hope of<br />

solving the problem when the Jakarta dictatorship<br />

falls once and for all, giving way to a<br />

democratic regime, for which Lisbon appears<br />

to be definitely prepared to wait for<br />

as long as it takes.<br />

It should be said that the Rome negotiations<br />

scenario will not be influenced by the<br />

forthcoming episodes of the Xanana case, in<br />

which there should be new developments on<br />

19 or 20 March, with the reading of the<br />

sentence of the Indonesian court, set up in<br />

Dili.<br />

ST. EGIDIO CONFIRMS MEDIATION<br />

Diario de Noticias 12 March 19<strong>93</strong> Dateline:<br />

Lisbon original lang.: Portuguese<br />

unabridged<br />

Father Matteo Zuppi, Director of the St.<br />

Egidio Community, confirmed there have<br />

been contacts with regards mediation between<br />

Portugal and Indonesia on the question<br />

of <strong>Timor</strong>, according to news carried<br />

yesterday by the Diario de Noticias. Father<br />

Zupi told our Rome correspondent,<br />

Manuela Paixao, that “the St. Egidio<br />

Community expressed its total willingness,<br />

when contacted in connection with possible<br />

mediation in the future peace process in<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>, to take place some time, somewhere.”<br />

Father Zuppi added that “No official<br />

request has yet been made by the two<br />

parties. This is very likely to happen when<br />

the Indonesian and Portuguese ministers<br />

meet in April.”<br />

TIMOR: VATICAN WANTS TO<br />

MEDIATE<br />

Expresso 13 February 19<strong>93</strong> Dateline:<br />

Lisbon Byline: Mario Robalo Translated<br />

from Portuguese unabridged<br />

A Church source in Rome yesterday assured<br />

the Expresso that the St. Egidio<br />

Community, in Rome, is going to appear as<br />

mediator in the search for a solution to the<br />

problem of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. As from next week,<br />

this Catholic movement, which led the<br />

mediation process between Renamo and the<br />

Mozambique Government, will initiate a<br />

series of contacts with the <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />

Resistance and the Jakarta Government,<br />

with “the committed consent of Vatican<br />

diplomacy,” with a view to finding a political<br />

model to resolve the differences which<br />

have dragged on since December 1975.<br />

According to the same source, the St.<br />

Egidio Community will not as yet be contacting<br />

Portuguese diplomacy, “given the<br />

urgency of Indonesia’s acceptance of<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese presence at the talks.” The<br />

Portuguese and Indonesian Foreign<br />

Ministers’ decision, at the end of the inconclusive<br />

December meeting, to schedule a<br />

new round of talks for Rome on 20 April<br />

next, is probably connected to this attitude<br />

taken by the Church. However, Minister<br />

Durão Barroso’s office does not confirm<br />

this version: “The meeting was set to be<br />

held in Rome because of the agenda problems<br />

faced by the three parties involved.”<br />

Meanwhile, statements made by the<br />

Bishop of Dili, Msgr. Ximenes Belo, referring<br />

to <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> becoming an<br />

“autonomous territory” of Indonesia, confirm<br />

reports that the Holy See is making<br />

diplomatic efforts to get the Suharto<br />

Government to agree to concede autonomy<br />

to the former Portuguese colony.<br />

Having until now supported a referendum<br />

through which the <strong>Timor</strong>ese could express<br />

their wishes regarding their political<br />

future, on Thursday the prelate unexpectedly<br />

admitted to Portuguese reporters, covering<br />

the Xanana Gusmão trial, that “the


<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 89<br />

most realistic solution” for the territory<br />

would be to achieve autonomous region<br />

status. This statement connects with what<br />

the Expresso published in its 30 January<br />

edition, regarding the Vatican’s efforts in the<br />

search for a solution which “does not lessen<br />

the Indonesian nation’s prestige but which,<br />

at the same time, satisfies the <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />

population.” Msgr. Ximenes Belo must<br />

have received the same message that the<br />

Apostolic Nuncio in Jakarta, Msgr. Pietro<br />

Sambi, delivered to General Suharto.<br />

In spite of the Indonesian President<br />

having stated to the Catholic Church’s<br />

diplomatic representative that the proposed<br />

model could mean the disintegration of the<br />

nation, Msgr. Belo becomes, now, the<br />

Vatican’s spokesman. It may be recalled<br />

that, last year, the Holy See admitted officially<br />

that it would agree to the Msgr.<br />

Belo’s presence at the meetings between<br />

Portugal and Indonesia, as mediator.<br />

ST. EGIDIO WITH TIMOR<br />

Expresso 13 March 19<strong>93</strong> Dateline: Lisbon<br />

Translated from Portuguese unabridged<br />

The St. Egidio Community has established<br />

contacts with the <strong>Timor</strong>ese Resistance<br />

abroad, with regards becoming mediator in<br />

the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> conflict.<br />

An ecclesiastical source in Rome assured<br />

the Expresso yesterday that in the past two<br />

weeks Father Matteo Zuppi, the Catholic<br />

movement’s leader, has met with members<br />

“with responsibilities for representing<br />

abroad the command of the Maubere<br />

struggle,” so that the Community’s<br />

willingness to make efforts to establish<br />

contacts between the Resistance and the<br />

Jakarta Government could be transmitted to<br />

the new <strong>Timor</strong>ese guerrilla leader, Mau<br />

Hunu.<br />

As the Expresso reported in its 13<br />

February edition, the St. Egidio Community,<br />

“with the committed consent of Vatican<br />

diplomacy,” is interested in leading the<br />

reconciliation process between <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />

and Indonesians, just as it did the process of<br />

mediation between Renamo and the<br />

Mozambique Government. This attitude on<br />

the Church’s part is certainly not unconnected<br />

with the fact that the next round of<br />

talks between Portugal and Indonesia will be<br />

taking place in Rome next month, at which<br />

time Msgr. Ximenes Belo, Bishop of Dili,<br />

will be travelling there.<br />

Meanwhile, Indonesia unexpectedly suffered<br />

an unprecedented defeat on Thursday<br />

at the Human Rights Commission in<br />

Geneva, when the draft resolution proposed<br />

by the EC Twelve was passed. 22 votes<br />

were cast in favour (EC, US, Australia and<br />

PALOP - Portuguese-speaking African<br />

nations - among others), against the 12<br />

countries that sided with Jakarta, which<br />

always rejected a consensus solution. Now<br />

Suharto has to agree to four UN rapporteurs<br />

visiting <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, to investigate issues<br />

connected with torture, disappearances and<br />

summary executions. The resolution further<br />

demands clarification by the Indonesian<br />

authorities of the 12 November massacre.<br />

ROME AWAITS THE<br />

TIMORESE<br />

Diario de Noticias, March 22 Dateline :<br />

Lisbon Translated from Portuguese unabridged<br />

Before Durão Barroso and Ali Alatas<br />

meet in the Italian capital, <strong>Timor</strong>ese representatives,<br />

both in favour of and against<br />

Indonesia, will be meeting in Rome under<br />

the mediation of the Catholic Church. This<br />

objective led to contacts in Lisbon between<br />

informal representatives of Indonesia’s interests<br />

and <strong>Timor</strong>ese resistance leaders. The<br />

holding in Rome of the meeting, however, is<br />

a certainty.<br />

Yesterday, observers assured the Diario<br />

de Noticias that the St. Egidio Community<br />

was not involved in the attempted convergence<br />

which should, however, be taking<br />

place under the mediation of the Church.<br />

The presence of the Bishop of Dili, reportedly<br />

as moderator, is almost certain.<br />

The same sources reported that the mediation<br />

is going to be a fundamental instrument<br />

for the political debate between<br />

Lisbon and Jakarta, in which Indonesia is<br />

said to have already given signs of being less<br />

intransigent, especially after the setback it<br />

suffered in Geneva. In this way, Durão<br />

Barroso and Ali Alatas will be able to<br />

discuss formulas for mediation at the highest<br />

level, since they will be in possession of<br />

elements which, until now, were not<br />

available and which could only be filtered<br />

from discussions between the <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />

themselves. Furthermore, the definitive alternative<br />

profile of the most appropriate<br />

Catholic institution (and this role may not<br />

fall to the St. Egidio Community, as a diplomatic<br />

source assured some days ago, and<br />

which was later confirmed by Father<br />

Matteo Zuppi himself) will depend, eventually,<br />

on the success or failure of the<br />

meeting of <strong>Timor</strong>ese and whether the<br />

Church’s mediation is formally accepted by<br />

the ministers. Specifically, it is now known<br />

that Father Mario Marisi of the St. Egidio<br />

Community was given the task of examining<br />

the mediation process in more depth.<br />

There are reportedly four points on the<br />

agenda for the meeting of the <strong>Timor</strong>ese, said<br />

to be scheduled for the second week of<br />

April: the pacification of <strong>Timor</strong>; demilitarization;<br />

reconciliation; consultation on selfdetermination<br />

or not. The postponement of<br />

Xanana Gusmão’s trial to 1 April could be<br />

linked to the subjects to be discussed by the<br />

<strong>Timor</strong> integrationists and pro-independence<br />

groups, since the pacification process would<br />

imply the release of all political prisoners.<br />

VATICAN MEDIATION NOT<br />

CONFIRMED BY FOREIGN<br />

OFFICE<br />

Publico, 24 March 19<strong>93</strong>. By Joaquim Trigo<br />

de Negreiros, Translated from Portuguese,<br />

unabridged<br />

(Lisbon)Yesterday, the (Portuguese)<br />

Foreign Office (FO) broke its silence on the<br />

alleged Vatican mediation in the talks on<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>. The FO does not endorse the statements<br />

and continues to stake everything on<br />

Boutros Ghali’s role.<br />

The Portuguese FO continues to back the<br />

current negotiating format of the talks on<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> - under the auspices of the UN<br />

Secretary General, with the personal<br />

involvement of Jakarta’s and Lisbon’s diplomatic<br />

heads - and does not confirm any<br />

change regarding the Vatican taking on the<br />

role of “mediator,” - a role played today by<br />

the UN.<br />

The official FO position on the matter<br />

was made public for the first time yesterday<br />

by way of a<br />

“clarification” released hours after a Lusa<br />

agency dispatch reached the newspapers,<br />

containing statements by a non-identified<br />

“Portuguese diplomatic source,” according<br />

to which the Portuguese Government would<br />

look favorably upon the mediation of the<br />

Vatican, “the world’s best diplomacy.”<br />

Dismissing the possibility of the St.<br />

Egidio Community eventually assuming the<br />

role - and thereby contradicting the view<br />

which had been insistently put forward on<br />

other occasions - the same source argued the<br />

advantages of the entrance on scene of the<br />

Vatican, “which would carefully ponder<br />

each step to be taken.”<br />

It was the military commander of <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>, Theo Syafei, who first floated the<br />

idea of Vatican mediation. Members of the<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese Church, linked to the Resistance,<br />

expressed their opposition to the idea to the<br />

Publico’s envoy, at the start of the Xanana<br />

Gusmão trial. They argued that the Vatican<br />

favours an autonomy solution for the territory.<br />

The rumours about the Holy See being<br />

given a more active role started straight after<br />

last December’s meeting between Ghali,<br />

Barroso and Alatas in New York, when it<br />

was announced that the next meeting would<br />

be held in April in Rome, in order to suit the<br />

Secretary General’s agenda commitments.


Page 90 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

Since then, the FO has kept silent about<br />

the reported “news” of the Vatican’s greater<br />

involvement, a silence only broken<br />

yesterday by the “clarification,” stating that<br />

“no authorised Portuguese diplomatic<br />

source made the comments” contained in the<br />

Lusa agency’s dispatch, and that “no<br />

comments whatsoever were made by this<br />

Ministry’s officials regarding the news<br />

carried by the Portuguese media concerning<br />

the alleged offers by the Holy See and the<br />

St. Egidio Community to mediate on the<br />

matter of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.” The “clarification”<br />

goes on to refer to Lisbon’s “full and constructive<br />

collaboration” with “the efforts<br />

being made by the UN Secretary General in<br />

the process of dialogue between Portugal<br />

and Indonesia.”<br />

In this way, in the usual cautious diplomatic<br />

style, Portugal rejects any attempt to<br />

substitute the UN, today at the vertex of the<br />

negotiations triangle. The presence of Dr.<br />

Boutros Ghali at the negotiating table guarantees<br />

the internationalization - and an international<br />

visibility - of the <strong>Timor</strong> problem,<br />

fitting into Lisbon’s way of seeing the<br />

matter. Minister Durão Barroso himself<br />

does not miss an opportunity of saying that<br />

the so-called “<strong>Timor</strong> question” is not a difference<br />

between Portugal and Indonesia, but<br />

a contentious issue between Jakarta and the<br />

international community. In this perspective,<br />

it would not make sense to give up<br />

the UN’s role through its Secretary<br />

General’s good offices and the most discreet<br />

contacts maintained by high-ranking UN<br />

officials.<br />

ALATAS STEPS<br />

“BACKWARD” TOWARDS<br />

ROME ?<br />

From an <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese, posted anonymously.<br />

March 26.<br />

This only a brief insight in the perspective<br />

of Rome bilateral meeting - Portugal and<br />

Indonesia - on the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> problem.<br />

Although Indonesia has given its green<br />

light to hold a bilateral talk with Portugal in<br />

Rome concerning ET question under UNO<br />

auspices, there still remain some questions<br />

on its position.<br />

Whether Indonesia will “soften” its hard<br />

line towards the ET question? Several<br />

months ago (soon after their first meeting)<br />

Alatas stated, “......Please go fishing if<br />

Portugal wants a referendum in ET......”<br />

That shows an impossible solution will<br />

be taken from their talks. On the other hand<br />

ET people will continue to be oppressed<br />

under Theo Syafei’s crucial actions.<br />

However, I personally wouldn’t believe<br />

that such statement was Alatas original<br />

thinking. As a Diplomat with a high international<br />

reputation, he wouldn’t have hardly<br />

issued such statement, then who was behind<br />

the scene ? It is not difficult to figure out...<br />

Overall, Indonesia’s willingness to attend<br />

that meeting and the deliberate delay of<br />

“Xanana Kay Rala Gusmão” trial implies<br />

Indonesia’s seriousness to face the meeting..<br />

Or is it simply a lure to handle the concerns<br />

of human rights abuses and the Geneva<br />

conference last couple of weeks ago?<br />

Hopefully, Suharto will take such matters<br />

(and his status as NAM’s leader) into<br />

his consideration to achieve a proper acceptable<br />

solution for all parties involved.<br />

The outcome of the Rome meeting, I<br />

think, will depend on Indonesia’s good will<br />

and its consciousness concerning the question,<br />

whether it is favourable to Indonesia to<br />

keep on occupying that territory which<br />

refuse to be integrated ?<br />

Otherwise, Alatas will step “backward”<br />

towards Rome.<br />

Comments welcome.!!!!!!!!!!!!!<br />

With all the best.<br />

We will fight them under their own<br />

shadows.(Xanana)<br />

INDONESIA SAYS PORTUGAL<br />

UNHELPFUL OVER TIMOR<br />

(Reuters, Jakarta, April 2) Indonesia has<br />

accused Portugal of damaging the atmosphere<br />

ahead of talks this month to try to<br />

settle the troubled issue of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

“We have to say the atmosphere of the<br />

second meeting has not been helped much<br />

by what Portugal has been doing in Geneva<br />

lately and in other forums,” Indonesian<br />

Foreign Minister Ali Alatas told reporters<br />

on Thursday.<br />

“The real intention (of Portugal) was not<br />

the betterment of human rights in <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> but to score political points,” he said<br />

of Portugal’s procedural maneuvering during<br />

the U.N. human rights conference in Geneva<br />

last month.<br />

Portugal praised the 12 European<br />

Community member states for sponsoring a<br />

resolution approved by the U.N. Human<br />

Rights Commission that condemned<br />

Indonesia for violations of human rights in<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

“The adoption of this resolution represents<br />

a very significant victory in the fight<br />

which has been taken in defence of the rights<br />

of the <strong>Timor</strong>ese people, which have been<br />

systematically and brutally violated by the<br />

illegal and forced occupation of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

by Indonesia, ” the Portuguese foreign<br />

ministry said in a statement.<br />

Alatas and his Portuguese counterpart<br />

Durão Barroso are due to meet on April 21<br />

in Rome to discuss <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, which was<br />

invaded by Indonesia in 1975 shortly after<br />

the Portuguese colonial rulers of three<br />

centuries had left.<br />

In an interview this week with the<br />

Indonesian daily, Suara Pembaruan, Barroso<br />

said Portugal considered its former colony a<br />

non-autonomous territory with the right to<br />

self-determination.<br />

Indonesia says the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese have<br />

already chosen to come under Jakarta rule.<br />

The head of the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> guerrilla<br />

movement which has been battling Jakarta<br />

for 17 years is currently on trial in the local<br />

capital Dili on charges including being involved<br />

in inciting an army massacre in late<br />

1991 when witnesses say up to 180 people<br />

were killed.<br />

Jakarta puts the toll at 50 people dead<br />

and 66 missing.<br />

Alatas said he was hopeful that there<br />

would be some move forward in finding a<br />

solution to the issue.<br />

“But you need two hands to clap. When<br />

you start negotiating means that both sides<br />

understand that there should be give and<br />

take on both sides,” he said.<br />

The United Nations does not recognise<br />

Jakarta’s rule over the territory but<br />

Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali is<br />

sending his personal envoy to Indonesia this<br />

weekend to report on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

“(The visit) will be a good opportunity<br />

for us to explain what is actually going on<br />

there because sometimes there is still misinformation<br />

and exaggerated reports on <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>,” Alatas said.<br />

DIPLOMACY VERSUS<br />

LOGIC OF WAR<br />

Publico 6 April 19<strong>93</strong> Dateline : Lisbon<br />

Byline : Joaquim Trigo de Negreiros<br />

Translated from Portuguese unabridged<br />

Alatas, who arrived in New York with<br />

Xanana’s capture in his pocket, will get to<br />

Rome with Ma’hunu in prison. It is “fait<br />

accompli” logic, which Portugal strikes out<br />

against with international condemnation of<br />

Jakarta. The reality reveals other ambiguities,<br />

under the clear argumentation of both<br />

parties.<br />

The arrest of Ma’Hunu, which occurred<br />

just over two weeks away from another<br />

round of talks between Lisbon and Jakarta<br />

on the so-called “<strong>Timor</strong> question,” and<br />

which will take place in Rome under the<br />

auspices of the UN Secretary General, has<br />

made even clearer the content of Indonesian<br />

Minister Ali Alatas’s argument, in preparation<br />

for voicing before Durão Barroso and<br />

Boutros Ghali at the negotiating table: the<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese Resistance is becoming extinct, the<br />

few guerrillas still in the mountains have<br />

their days numbered, life in the territory is<br />

getting back to normal.


<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 91<br />

To counter this argument, Portugal will<br />

have at its disposal a different kind of<br />

weaponry to that used by Ma’Hunu’s captors:<br />

when Ali Alatas presents a picture of<br />

“normality” - exemplified by the recent imprisonment<br />

of Xanana Gusmão’s successor<br />

- Durão Barroso will counter with the international<br />

condemnation of Jakarta - exemplified<br />

by the equally recent resolution<br />

on <strong>Timor</strong> passed by the UN Human Rights<br />

Commission, with the active “complicity”<br />

of the always decisive US diplomacy.<br />

It will, therefore, be a clash between<br />

Indonesia’s bet on the “fait accompli,” and<br />

Portugal’s efforts to make international<br />

pressure on Jakarta prevail,<br />

mainly on the basis of human rights arguments.<br />

The first “round” is set for today,<br />

at a meeting (scheduled before Ma’Hunu’s<br />

capture) between representatives of<br />

Portugal and Indonesia at the UN.<br />

In Rome, the two ministers, under the<br />

watchful eye of Boutros Ghali, will probably<br />

try to get across a clear picture of their<br />

respective positions. That is to say, Ali<br />

Alatas will tend to overrate the arrests of<br />

Xanana and Ma’Hunu in order to demonstrate<br />

the relinquishment of the opponents<br />

to integration, while Barroso will probably<br />

press more insistently on the international<br />

condemnation button.<br />

The reality - or the “realities” - behind<br />

the arguments of the two ministers is not,<br />

however, quite so clear.<br />

Although it is difficult to evaluate with<br />

any accuracy the current state of the<br />

Resistance in <strong>Timor</strong>, the guerrilla actions<br />

carried out after Xanana’s arrest, as well as<br />

the size of the Indonesian military presence<br />

in the territory, show that the “mountain<br />

men” are still a cause for concern for Jakarta.<br />

On the other hand, there is no indication<br />

that Indonesia’s repression has managed to<br />

destroy the so-called “clandestine network,”<br />

especially in Dili. It is, therefore, an<br />

exaggeration to say that the Resistance is<br />

finished.<br />

With regards the international community’s<br />

position on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, ambiguity<br />

reigns. Indonesia is condemned in Geneva<br />

for violating human rights in <strong>Timor</strong>; a month<br />

later, Indonesia is a candidate for<br />

representative of the developing countries at<br />

the next G7 summit meeting - Germany,<br />

which had voted in favour of the condemnatory<br />

resolution at the UN Human Rights<br />

Commission, immediately supported<br />

Indonesia’s candidature, as did Japan. So, to<br />

say that the world condemns Indonesia is,<br />

therefore, an exaggeration.<br />

The statements of British Foreign<br />

Minister, Douglas Hurd, (who, since yesterday,<br />

is in Jakarta) are symptomatic.<br />

Hurd, who is expected to clarify the British<br />

position vis-a-vis Jakarta’s participation in<br />

the G7 summit, told journalists that there is<br />

“still” concern about Indonesia’s behaviour<br />

in <strong>Timor</strong>, and chose to emphasize the disproportion<br />

between the sentences passed on<br />

the military involved in the Santa Cruz<br />

massacre and sentences received by the<br />

civilians on that occasion - a point which<br />

can hardly be considered crucial in the<br />

framework of the situation as it is today in<br />

the territory.<br />

While Douglas Hurd had talks with the<br />

Indonesian authorities in Jakarta, Kenyan<br />

Amos Wako (Boutros Ghali’s Special<br />

Envoy to <strong>Timor</strong>) arrived in Dili. “Please,<br />

don’t be afraid of me,” Wako said, on arrival.<br />

“my door is open to all those who wish<br />

to speak to me.” But it is surely not Amos<br />

Wako who the <strong>Timor</strong>ese fear.<br />

AMOS WAKO RETURNS<br />

TO EAST TIMOR<br />

SECRETARY-GENERAL TO<br />

SEND PERSONAL ENVOY TO<br />

INDONESIA AND EAST TIMOR<br />

TO ASSESS IMPLEMENTATION OF<br />

RECOMMENDATIONS<br />

UN Press Release, 31 March 19<strong>93</strong><br />

Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali<br />

has decided to send Amos Wako, Attorney-<br />

General of Kenya and an international<br />

authority on human rights, to Indonesia and<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> as his Personal Envoy. This will<br />

be a follow-up to a similar visit which he<br />

undertook on behalf of the Secretary-<br />

General in February 1992.<br />

Mr. Wako’s mission will begin on 2<br />

April and will last for approximately one<br />

week. Mr. Wako will examine the implementation<br />

of the recommendations which he<br />

had following his first visit, and will apprise<br />

the Secretary-General of his impression of<br />

the overall human rights situation in <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>. Upon completion of his mission, he<br />

will report to the Secretary-General.<br />

Mr. Wako will be accompanied by two<br />

officials of the United Nations Secretariat.<br />

AMOS WAKO TO VISIT<br />

TIMOR AGAIN<br />

Wire services, 1 April 19<strong>93</strong><br />

UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali has<br />

announced that he is to send his special<br />

envoy, Mr. Amos Wako, the attorney-general<br />

of Kenya, to Indonesia and <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

on a second visit this week. Mr. Wako is<br />

due to arrive in Jakarta Saturday 2 April for<br />

a week’s visit. He is expected to spend at<br />

least two days in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> early next<br />

week. where he will have meetings with the<br />

governor and Indonesian military commanders<br />

in the territory.<br />

Mr. Wako visited <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> in<br />

February last year but his report to the<br />

Secretary-General has remained confidential.<br />

He will be accompanied by two UN<br />

officials. The follow-up visit is intended to<br />

apprise the Secretary-General of the human<br />

rights situation in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and to review<br />

implementation of the recommendations<br />

which he made following his first visit. The<br />

forthcoming visit is also in preparation for<br />

the next round of talks between the<br />

Indonesian and Portuguese foreign ministers<br />

in Rome on 20 April, under the auspices of<br />

the UN Secretary-General.<br />

JAKARTA ASKED TO REVEAL<br />

ALL FROM PROBE OF 1991<br />

DILI INCIDENT<br />

Jakarta Post 3 April 19<strong>93</strong>. Abridged<br />

This call for the facts about the Dili massacre<br />

was well-timed to appear on the day<br />

Amos Wako, UN Secretary- General’s<br />

special envoy to investigation the Dili<br />

massacre, arrived in Jakarta for his second<br />

visit to <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. Franz Hendra Winarta<br />

was one of the lawyers who defended the<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese on trial in Dili last year.<br />

– TAPOL<br />

(Jakarta) Human rights activists called on<br />

the government yesterday to divulge all the<br />

findings from its investigation of people<br />

reported missing following the clash (sic)<br />

between military and protesters in Dili in<br />

1991.<br />

“The government has promised to investigate<br />

the case and we, the people, want<br />

to know the results of the investigation,”<br />

lawyer Franz Hendra Winarta told Jakarta<br />

Post.<br />

He said the government should reveal the<br />

entire findings of the investigation even if<br />

these could be used by developed countries<br />

to criticize Indonesia. He said it should be<br />

remembered that human rights abuses<br />

occurred throughout the world, in both<br />

developed and developing nations.<br />

Human rights lawyer Mulya Lubis said<br />

that openness was required for the improvement<br />

of the human rights situation in<br />

the country. “If mistakes were made in the<br />

past, let’s correct them,” Lubis said.


Page 92 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

JAKARTA’S HANDLING OF<br />

THE AMOS WAKO VISIT<br />

Antara news agency reports date 6 April<br />

datelined Jakarta and Dili, and Jakarta Post<br />

report of 2 April, datelined Jakarta. All<br />

abridged to leave out background<br />

information.<br />

As compared with a visit of inspection by the<br />

International Red Cross (ICRC), a visit by<br />

the UN Sec-Gen’s envoy seems to offer the<br />

worst of both worlds. With an ICRC<br />

inspection visit, the Indonesian government<br />

would not dare to publish its own version of<br />

what the ICRC was told. The rules of<br />

operation for ICRC inspections mean that<br />

the ICRC would likewise publish its version.<br />

Strict confidentiality on both sides is<br />

therefore assured. With Wako, it seems, he<br />

and Boutros-Ghali are pledged to make<br />

nothing public whilst the Indonesian side can<br />

present their side with impunity and without<br />

fear of being contradicted.<br />

Note that although Brig.Gen. Theo Syafei<br />

has been appointed commander of the<br />

Udayana Military Command based in Dili,<br />

he still continues to hold the position of<br />

commander of Kolakops, the special military<br />

command in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

– TAPOL<br />

The Jakarta Post reported Foreign<br />

Minister Ali Alatas as saying: “The visit<br />

will be useful for us to explain what was<br />

actually going on, what is continuing to go<br />

on in this welter of sometimes misinformation,<br />

sometimes deliberate misinformation<br />

and sometimes exaggeration of the developments<br />

occurring in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.”<br />

JP continues by reporting that in his second<br />

visit, Amos Wako will study the implementation<br />

of his recommendations he made<br />

in 1992. Wako recommended that the<br />

government try to ascertain the whereabouts<br />

of people reported missing following the<br />

Dili incident. He also called for greater<br />

access of non-government organisations in<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

“We are continuing the search for the<br />

missing people,” Alatas said in his first<br />

press conference since being reappointed to<br />

the post of Foreign Minister.<br />

Wako is scheduled to arrive in Jakarta<br />

Saturday and will have an informal dinner<br />

with Alatas that day. Formal talks will take<br />

place on Sunday and on Monday he will<br />

depart for Dili where he will meet with the<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> special military operation<br />

commander [this presumably means Brig-<br />

Gen. Theo Syafei], the chief of the Dili<br />

district court which is trying Xanana<br />

Gusmão and possibly Bishop Belo. He will<br />

later return to Jakarta to meet top officials<br />

including Defence Minister and armed forces<br />

commander General Edi Sudradjat and<br />

Minister of Justice Oetoyo Oesman.<br />

According to Antara on 6 April, Foreign<br />

Minister Alatas has contacted chief of the<br />

supreme court Purwoto Gandasubrata to get<br />

permission for Amos Wako to meet former<br />

resistance leader Xanana who is now on trial<br />

in Dili. “As Xanana is still in the examination<br />

process, a special permit from the<br />

chief of the supreme court will be required,”<br />

Alatas told the press.<br />

“The time for the meeting between Wako<br />

and Xanana can be arranged later,” Alatas<br />

said, denying allegations that the<br />

government will try to give ‘directives’ to<br />

Xanana in answering questions from Wako.<br />

Wako arrived in Dili Monday for a threeday<br />

visit to collect inputs and data on<br />

developments in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> which he will<br />

submit to the UN Secretary-General after<br />

his second visit to <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. Alatas said<br />

he is certain Wako fully understands that<br />

the examination process over Xanana has<br />

been going on properly.<br />

Chief of the armed forces General Edi<br />

Sudradjat also said that the government will<br />

give all opportunities to Wako to meet<br />

Xanana or any other persons he wants to<br />

see. He further said there will not be any<br />

efforts on the part of the government to<br />

‘guide’ Xanana in replying to Wako’s<br />

questions.<br />

Meanwhile from Dili, Antara reported<br />

that the results of Wako’s current visit to<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> are not meant for publication<br />

despite requests by certain members of the<br />

European Community. Wako told the press<br />

here Tuesday that his three-day visit to <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> is aimed at collecting inputs and updating<br />

data to smoothen the task of the UN<br />

Sec-Gen to settle the so-called <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

issue.<br />

“I know there are requests by certain EC<br />

members to publish the results of my visit<br />

but I will not do so because everything I<br />

have will be for the Secretary-General only,”<br />

he said. He also said he would not make any<br />

recommendations to the Indonesian<br />

government because such things will solely<br />

depend on the UN chief.<br />

Wako and delegation includes Director<br />

for International Organisations, Hadi<br />

Wayarabi of Indonesia’s Foreign Ministry<br />

[he was a member of the government’s team<br />

of inquiry into the Dili massacre set up in<br />

November 1991], and five UN officials. His<br />

first day in Dili was marked by a meeting<br />

with governor Osorio Soares and the<br />

younger sister of Xanana Gusmão,<br />

Armandina.<br />

Wako described his meeting with Soares<br />

as “satisfactory,” saying that his meeting<br />

with Armandina and her husband Gilman do<br />

Santos was also “beneficial.” He said he was<br />

assigned by Boutros-Ghali to check reports<br />

that the Indonesian government had<br />

maltreated those involved in the Nov., 12<br />

1991 Dili incident as well as Xanana who<br />

was captured last year.<br />

Wako said that in carrying out his assignment<br />

he will also meet several <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> administration officials, Bishop Belo,<br />

Xanana, Mau Hodu (arrested in January last<br />

year) and Mau Hunu (arrested last week).<br />

Armandina Maria Gusmão, after meeting<br />

Wako, dismissed as baseless allegations that<br />

she was maltreated by the Indonesian<br />

government.<br />

“There is no truth whatsoever in it as my<br />

husband Gilman dos Santos and I have<br />

always been treated well ever since Xanana<br />

was captured,” she told newsmen. She<br />

further said however, that four days after<br />

Xanana’s arrest she was approached by<br />

local security officials for information on her<br />

brother’s activities as well as her involvement<br />

in them. “But now everything is<br />

OK and we enjoy our freedom like any<br />

other Indonesian citizens. She confirmed<br />

that she once tried to assist Xanana but now<br />

regrets it very much. Armandina during the<br />

meeting with Wako also expressed the hope<br />

that the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> issue can be settled<br />

immediately at the UN. She said she told<br />

Wako that <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> has now gained a<br />

much better progress and prosperity compared<br />

to the days under Portuguese colonialism.<br />

AMOS WAKO’S RETURN<br />

VISIT TO INDONESIA<br />

ABC Radio report - Sunday, April 4, 19<strong>93</strong>.-<br />

12 noon.<br />

Reporter: Ian Mackintosh in Jakarta.<br />

IM: In February 1991, 3 months after<br />

Indonesian troops killed scores of civilian<br />

demonstrators in Dili, Amos Wako was<br />

despatched to Indonesia by the UN<br />

Secretary General. The Kenyan lawyer<br />

spent 5 days in the country, including 24<br />

hrs in Dili and declared himself satisfied<br />

with the contents of his discussions and the<br />

range of people he met. Mr. Wako’s subsequent<br />

report to the Secretary General was<br />

never made public although last week<br />

Indonesia’s Foreign Minister Mr. Ali Alatas<br />

told reporters that its conclusions and<br />

recommendations had been sent to Jakarta<br />

for comment. Mr. Alatas also noted that<br />

both sides had agreed that the envoy would<br />

be able to follow up his first visit saying<br />

that Mr. Wako was expected to make<br />

comparisons, to see what had happened<br />

since and in the Foreign Minister’s words<br />

see to what extent some of the recommendations<br />

had been implemented or not<br />

implemented and why.


<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page <strong>93</strong><br />

When the UN envoy arrived in Jakarta he<br />

said that he had returned with an open mind<br />

to take a first hand look at developments in<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

AW: I will be looking at the issue of the<br />

trial that’s going on, looking at the issue of<br />

the detainees that are there. I’ll be looking<br />

into the issue of the disappeared persons,<br />

those who cannot be identified up to date,<br />

looking at the issue of allegations of torture,<br />

if they are there, and so on. I’ll also be<br />

looking at the fundamental issue as to why<br />

all these moral concerns are there.<br />

IM: Mr. Wako told reporters he would<br />

be making a report to Dr. Boutros-Ghali before<br />

he hosted talks between the Indonesian<br />

and Portuguese Foreign Ministers in Rome<br />

this month. While the details of the envoy’s<br />

original report have not been released it is<br />

understood to have been highly critical of<br />

the behaviour of Indonesian troops and their<br />

civilian counterparts during & after the Nov.<br />

1991 killings in Dili. It is also believed to<br />

have questioned the level of human rights<br />

and personal freedoms in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and<br />

the number of troops stationed in the<br />

province.<br />

WAKO: “MY DOOR IS OPEN”<br />

AP, Dili, April 5<br />

“Please do not be afraid of me. My door<br />

is open to all who wish to talk with me,”<br />

U.N. envoy Amos Wako said in a statement<br />

upon his arrival for three days of discussions.<br />

Wako was to meet Xanana Gusmão, <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> military commander Brig. Gen. Theo<br />

Syafei and other officials and detainees. He<br />

will report his findings to U.N. Secretary-<br />

General Boutros Boutros-Ghali.<br />

In Jakarta, British Foreign Minister<br />

Douglas Hurd met with Indonesian officials<br />

and expressed his concern over the killings<br />

by Indonesian troops of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese proindependence<br />

protesters in 1991.<br />

In his talks with Indonesian Foreign<br />

Minister Ali Alatas, Hurd said Britain still<br />

has “some continuing concerns over the<br />

disparity in sentencing between military and<br />

civilians” regarding the 1991 demonstrations.<br />

A spokesman for the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

Military Command said Antonio Gomes Da<br />

Costa was captured Saturday in a cave in<br />

Manufasi, a village 30 miles south of Dili,<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>’s capital.<br />

Da Costa was transferred to Dili on<br />

Sunday, officials said.<br />

AMOS WAKO MEETS XANANA<br />

AND MAU HUNU<br />

BBC World Service and Portuguese radio 7<br />

April 19<strong>93</strong>. Summarised by TAPOL<br />

The BBC World Service reported<br />

Wednesday that the UN Secretary-<br />

General’s special envoy, Amos Wako, met<br />

Xanana Gusmão, <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese resistance<br />

leader who is now on trial in Dili, and Mau<br />

Hunu, the resistance leader arrested last<br />

week, who took over the leadership after<br />

Xanana’s arrest.<br />

The circumstances of Wako’s meetings<br />

with the two captives are not known.<br />

Wako also had a private meeting with<br />

Bishop Belo in Dili.<br />

On Portuguese radio TSF Monday,<br />

Wako said in an interview that he was<br />

anxious to meet a number of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />

now in captivity and mentioned specifically<br />

Xanana Gusmão, Mau Hunu and Saturnino<br />

da Costa Belo. There is no report of his<br />

having been able to meet Saturnino however.<br />

Amos Wako left Dili Wednesday and<br />

returned to Jakarta for more talks with<br />

senior Indonesian officials.<br />

RADIO AUSTRALIA<br />

ON WAKO VISIT<br />

Thursday April 8, 19<strong>93</strong> 11pm AEST.<br />

Reporter Ian Mackintosh (slightly abridged)<br />

Amos Wako, ending a 6 day mission to<br />

Indonesia today, told reporters that during<br />

his visit he had received different figures<br />

from the Indonesian authorities and an<br />

NGO. 17 months after the killed the UN<br />

envoy said he didn’t think anyone could say<br />

with any finality how many people were<br />

still missing. Mr. Wako told reporters that<br />

the government put the number at 61 but<br />

that an NGO had given him a list of 112<br />

names. Mr. Wako said details were still<br />

being cross-checked and he declined to say<br />

how long it would take to finish what he<br />

said was a difficult exercise - one that would<br />

also require the people of ET to come<br />

forward with information.<br />

Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas<br />

told reporters that the process needed to<br />

continue until the matter was resolved.<br />

Jakarta now says that of the 115 people it<br />

earlier listed as missing, 31 had been found,<br />

23 were confirmed dead and 61 were<br />

unaccounted for. Some human rights groups<br />

and eye witnesses put the death toll much<br />

higher.<br />

UN ENVOY IN TALKS<br />

WITH XANANA<br />

Sydney Morning Herald Date:8th April 19<strong>93</strong><br />

Dateline: Jakarta Agence France-Presse<br />

Unabridged<br />

The personal envoy of the United<br />

Nations Secretary-General, Dr. Boutros<br />

Boutros-Ghali, has met the detained <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese pro-independence leader Xanana<br />

Gusmão, an Indonesian official said today.<br />

“[Envoy]” Amos Wako was allowed to<br />

meet [Xanana] in his detention place [on]<br />

Tuesday after we received a call from the<br />

Foreign Minister,” Dili court spokesman<br />

Mr. Joseph Phenu said by telephone form<br />

Dili, <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

He said the Foreign Minister, Mr. Ali<br />

Alatas, had given the go-ahead for the visit<br />

after Mr. Wako, who arrived in Dili on<br />

Monday, had failed in his first attempt<br />

yesterday to see Xanana, who has been on<br />

trial since February 1.<br />

Mr. Alatas had called to say that following<br />

consultations with the Chief Justice and<br />

the Attorney-General, it was agreed that<br />

Mr. Wako be allowed to meet Xanana.<br />

The UN envoy had earlier yesterday<br />

failed to meet Xanana because Dili court<br />

officials refused permission, saying that the<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Justice Chief, Mr. Hironymus<br />

Godang, was absent and they had no<br />

authority.<br />

Mr. Wako, who is also Kenya’s<br />

Attorney-General, met Xanana alone and<br />

later met alone Xanana’s successor Antonio<br />

Gomes da Costa, alias Ma’hunu, who was<br />

captured on Saturday, a reliable Dili source<br />

said.<br />

The source said Mr. Wako also met<br />

Xanana’s former deputy José da Costa, alias<br />

Ma’Hodu, and two other former Fretilin<br />

members at his hotel in Dili. Da Costa was<br />

captured in Dili in February last year.<br />

The Media Indonesia daily today quoted<br />

Mr. Wako saying that Xanana had appeared<br />

to be in good health and was playing cards<br />

with other people when he arrived.


Page 94 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

EVENTS IN CANADA<br />

FIVE DAYS IN EAST TIMOR<br />

NOW Magazine, Toronto, Feb. 18-24.<br />

The Feb. 18-24 issue of NOW Magazine,<br />

Toronto’s weekly news and entertainment<br />

paper, carries three articles on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

The lead article in the News Front section is<br />

entitled “Five days in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.” The<br />

other articles are “Independence leader<br />

goes on trial” by Nantha Kumar and<br />

“Tough Talks on <strong>Timor</strong>” (about Portugal-<br />

Indonesia “peace talks”) by Glenn Wheeler.<br />

The articles are too long to post here, but<br />

are reprinted in the ETAN/Canada<br />

newsletter – email etanott@web.apc.org if<br />

you need a copy.<br />

The third article also contains the first (non-<br />

) statement from Canada’s External Affairs<br />

ministry we’ve seen on the peace talks<br />

process: “We think both sides should show<br />

more flexibility.”<br />

Excerpts follow:<br />

Five days in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Fear fuels paranoia<br />

in a land of military saturation, political<br />

surveillance and bitter young men<br />

By Glenn Wheeler<br />

....<br />

A man wearing a straw hat, white cotton<br />

shirt, shorts and sandals approaches, smiling<br />

tentatively.<br />

“Is it all right for us to walk here?” we<br />

ask. “Yes,” but then he adds nervously,<br />

“Tentera” (military). He speaks softly,<br />

looking over his shoulder. “You can walk,”<br />

he says, “but we’ll be hassled after you<br />

leave.” Then someone calls from somewhere,<br />

he puts up his hand as if to say,<br />

“Please, no more,” then he’s gone.<br />

....<br />

It’s teenage boys who are most anxious<br />

to talk, first checking to see if there are “any<br />

eyes” around.... One afternoon, we sit on<br />

the steps of the Dili stadium, waiting for the<br />

souvenir shop across the street to open, and<br />

someone invites us inside.<br />

Soon, we’re surrounded by a dozen or so<br />

football players aged 14 to 23. They don’t<br />

go to school because they can’t afford the<br />

5,000 rupiah a month in fees. It’s hard to get<br />

jobs, they say, because people from Java<br />

with better education are usually chosen<br />

over the <strong>Timor</strong>ese.<br />

After they’ve talked as long as they think<br />

they should, they ask us to come back<br />

another time.<br />

The next afternoon, we sit on the steps<br />

again. Promptly at 3, a lanky player from<br />

yesterday approaches. But there’s a soldier<br />

coming down the street, so he whispers that<br />

we should walk in the opposite direction,<br />

and then back, to the rear.<br />

Five minutes later, someone older, in his<br />

early 20s, crosses the field to where we sit<br />

in the stands. He has heard about us from<br />

his friends.<br />

Shooing away the younger boys, he tells<br />

us he’s been imprisoned five times. Once,<br />

after the massacre, he was in jail for a week.<br />

They were thirsty, and when they were<br />

given water, it was mixed with blood. He’s<br />

been hit with pieces of wood and iron bars,<br />

had his fingernails pulled out. Had a gun put<br />

to his head and heard the trigger click.<br />

Pulling up his jersey, he shows us the scars<br />

on his back.<br />

Many <strong>Timor</strong>ese have fled. Four soccer<br />

players who went to Darwin, Australia, for<br />

an exhibition game absconded, never came<br />

back.<br />

He, however, sounds defiant. “We love<br />

our land. We will stay and fight.” Abruptly,<br />

he stands and says, “Eyes are watching.”<br />

He stands and runs out on the field<br />

laughing, stopping the ball with his head.<br />

....<br />

Ian makes contact with two members of<br />

Fretilin, the underground independence<br />

movement. They don’t want to come to the<br />

hotel. Too risky. They want to meet on the<br />

beach after dark. And they want to meet at<br />

7, not 8, because it’s too dangerous walking<br />

home after that. Ian will meet them first, and<br />

then come get me.<br />

It’s still pouring at 7. But they show up<br />

anyway. “They want to honour their promise,”<br />

Ian says, as I shake their hands, wondering<br />

if the melodramatic language is the<br />

result of the translation, or the fact that<br />

they’re still teens. One of them has brought<br />

a picture of his brother, who died in his<br />

arms on November 12, 1991. Print it in your<br />

newspaper, he says.<br />

It’s men between 18 and 25 who have the<br />

hardest time with the police, because it was<br />

mostly young people who were in the<br />

funeral procession on November 12, 1991,<br />

and that’s where resistance to integration is<br />

strongest.<br />

They don’t feel safe walking alone, but if<br />

they’re in a group of three or more, they’re<br />

harassed, accused of planning another<br />

demonstration. And the army can tell<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese from settlers, because of the color<br />

of their skin and the way they speak.<br />

The wind whips the rain off the harbour,<br />

and we move to a picnic table closer to the<br />

road. Cars making right-hand turns send<br />

beams are way. They glance in the direction<br />

of the light, but keep talking.<br />

“I’d rather die than integrate,” one of<br />

them says. And then there are those words<br />

again, “We love our land.”<br />

But what are your chances, I ask. Do you<br />

have support in other countries? No, they<br />

say, “but if other countries want to give us<br />

arms, we will accept.” Sitting in the rain,<br />

watching them punctuate their remarks with<br />

the palms of their hands, I’m Skeptical,<br />

knowing they stand little chance against the<br />

Indonesian army, that their freedom is more<br />

likely to come from the halls of the United<br />

Nations than the barrel of a gun.<br />

Back, in the hindsight of home, I wonder<br />

if I missed the point. Whether their words<br />

are teen dreams or political logistics, they’re<br />

still criminals under the laws of Indonesia,<br />

which make it an offence to engage in<br />

“public expression of feelings of hostility,<br />

hatred or contempt towards the government<br />

of Indonesia,” and “the spreading or<br />

exhibiting of letters or pictures which<br />

express hatred of the government of<br />

Indonesia.”<br />

I have such a letter here on my desk, one<br />

they handed us on the beach. It begins<br />

“peace in the name of friendship” and goes<br />

on to describe in sickening detail what<br />

happened to them after they were arrested<br />

in November 1991.<br />

They still have the idealism, part of their<br />

masculinity, like their bodybuilder strength.<br />

I suppose that’s why the Indonesian government<br />

is so afraid of them.<br />

This week’s issue of NOW contains an<br />

appeal from ETAN/Canada to write to the<br />

Canadian government asking for support<br />

for a resolution on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> at the UN<br />

Commission on Human Rights.<br />

EAST TIMOR UPDATE FROM<br />

ETAN/TORONTO<br />

Number 20 – Feb. 27, 19<strong>93</strong><br />

UN Commission considers <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

resolution<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> was on the agenda as the<br />

United Nations Commission on Human<br />

Rights opened its 49th session in Geneva.<br />

The Commission was scheduled to vote on<br />

an <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> resolution on March 9.<br />

Indonesia managed to get itself elected<br />

vice-president of this year’s session, but<br />

solidarity groups vowed to push for a<br />

strong resolution regardless. Last year,<br />

Indonesia agreed to a consensus declaration<br />

at the Human Rights Commission that called<br />

for improved human rights in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

and access to be granted for international human<br />

rights groups.<br />

Neither condition has been met. Amnesty<br />

International was prevented from visiting<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, most recently when a<br />

representative was banned from the trial of<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> resistance leader Xanana<br />

Gusmão which opened on Feb. 1.<br />

Canadian Ambassador Anne Park, who<br />

this year chairs the Western group of coun-


<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 95<br />

tries, has not yet indicated whether Canada<br />

will support a resolution on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

Last year, the Canadian delegation was a<br />

key mover in a successful bid to water down<br />

a draft resolution from the European<br />

Community.<br />

However, American Ambassador Richard<br />

Schifter has promised to seek a joint text<br />

this year with other democracies on China’s<br />

actions in Tibet and Indonesia’s crackdown<br />

on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, a major break with past US<br />

policy.<br />

The <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Alert <strong>Network</strong> is appealing<br />

for messages to be sent before<br />

March 9 to the department of external affairs,<br />

asking for the government of Canada<br />

to:<br />

(1) back any resolution supported by the<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese delegation at the UN Commission<br />

on Human Rights<br />

(2) support a call for the UN<br />

Commission on Human Rights to mandate a<br />

special rapporteur on the situation in <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong><br />

(3) call on Indonesia to live up to the<br />

terms of last year’s consensus declaration<br />

by taking concrete steps to end repression<br />

in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and allowing free access to<br />

international humanitarian organizations,<br />

including Amnesty International.<br />

Appeals can be sent to External Affairs<br />

Minister Barbara McDougall, House of<br />

Commons, Ottawa Ont. K1A 0A6, Fax<br />

(613)996-3443.<br />

Bishop: thousands arrested, tortured<br />

According to new reports from the<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese resistance movement CNRM,<br />

4,000 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese people may have been<br />

called in for interrogation by the Indonesian<br />

forces of occupation since the capture of<br />

CNRM leader Xanana Gusmão. These detainees<br />

are reported to have been submitted<br />

to torture and humiliation during interrogation.<br />

These reports are confirmed by Carlos<br />

Ximenes Belo, Catholic Bishop of <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>, who said the persecution of <strong>Timor</strong>’s<br />

Christians and of those who did not recognize<br />

<strong>Timor</strong> as part of Indonesia had worsened<br />

since Xanana’s arrest.<br />

Speaking to Portugal’s Catholic Radio<br />

Renascenca, Belo explained “When the<br />

people are taken to prison, the first thing<br />

they do is beat them up. I have received<br />

letters from prisoners ... telling me about all<br />

types of torture, electric shocks, burning of<br />

genitals with cigarettes, placing people in<br />

barrels of cold water and whipping, until<br />

they say they are FRETILIN collaborators.”<br />

He said those arrested were also forced to<br />

confess that Catholic bishops and priests<br />

organized demonstrations and were against<br />

Indonesia.<br />

“People are afraid to walk freely,”<br />

Bishop Belo added. “Everywhere there are<br />

military from the territorial operation. They<br />

are building houses and going to live in<br />

villages. The people do not feel free.”<br />

Reports are also coming through that<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese are being forced to take part in<br />

ceremonies where they have to swear allegiance<br />

before the Indonesian flag, loyalty to<br />

Suharto and their acceptance of the principles<br />

of Pancasila, the Indonesian State<br />

ideology.<br />

Belo also told reporters that suspected<br />

dissidents are being forced to take part in<br />

crude parodies of traditional <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />

ceremonies. People are gathered together in<br />

groups of up to 200 and forced to drink the<br />

blood of an animal and take an oath of allegiance<br />

to Indonesia. He said the oath is an<br />

untrue version of a traditional pact taken by<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese leaders to end tribal wars. Rival<br />

leaders would mix their blood with palm<br />

wine and drink it in an oath to mark the end<br />

of hostilities.<br />

Despite reports in the Indonesian media,<br />

no guerrillas have surrendered to the<br />

Indonesians since the capture of Xanana<br />

Gusmão. In fact the opposite is true:<br />

FALINTIL, the armed wing if the resistance,<br />

have been carrying out frequent attacks<br />

fin the Indonesian army illegally occupying<br />

the country.<br />

Xanana verdict expected in March<br />

The Indonesian court trying <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />

resistance leader Xanana Gusmão has announced<br />

a plan to hand down its verdict on<br />

March 20. In a timetable that makes little<br />

allowance for a defence to be mounted, the<br />

court plans to hear prosecution and defence<br />

arguments on March 12 and 13 and deliver<br />

its verdict a week later. Xanana is charged<br />

with “rebellion” and possession of firearms<br />

Q charges that carry a possible death penalty,<br />

but more likely a long jail term. The<br />

United States and Australia have sent observers<br />

to the trial.<br />

One <strong>Timor</strong>ese youth told Australia’s<br />

Mate-Bian News: “We in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> don’t<br />

believe a word of what the Indonesian<br />

military are trying to force Xanana to say.<br />

You out there, all you can do to help is to<br />

fight for Xanana to regain a breeding space;<br />

and, when he is free like you out there, you<br />

then can criticize what he does or says...”<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese barred from travel<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese youths will no longer be<br />

allowed to travel outside Indonesia, under a<br />

new policy brought in to stop a rash of defections.<br />

Tri Swartanta, chief Indonesian<br />

sports and youth official for <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>,<br />

said more defections “would bring a bad<br />

image to the country.”<br />

In 1991, four <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese soccer players<br />

defected from an Indonesian- sponsored<br />

soccer team visiting Darwin, Australia and<br />

sought political asylum through the<br />

Portuguese embassy in Canberra.<br />

Two more <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese youths defected<br />

to Canada in 1992 during a student<br />

exchange program, Swartanta said.<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Alert <strong>Network</strong>/Toronto PO Box<br />

562, Station P, Toronto, Canada, M5S 2T1<br />

Phone/fax 1-416-531-5850, Email etantor@web.apc.org<br />

CANADIAN GOVERNMENT<br />

ON XANANA<br />

Mar 11, 19<strong>93</strong><br />

We FINALLY have something written on<br />

paper concerning the Canadian government’s<br />

position on Xanana. Following is a<br />

letter written to Ray Funk, MP, Member of<br />

PET (where ETAN/Ottawa does all of it’s<br />

work), from Barbara McDougall who is the<br />

Minister for External Affairs and Secretary<br />

of State<br />

– Sharon<br />

Dear Ray:<br />

Thanks for your letter of December 9,<br />

1992, regarding your concerns about the<br />

imprisonment of Mr. José Xanana Gusmão.<br />

Through our Embassy in Jakarta, Canada<br />

has expressed support for the efforts of the<br />

International Committee of the Red Cross<br />

(ICRC) to see Mr. Gusmão. The ICRC was<br />

able to visit him on two separate occasions<br />

– the first time privately for one hour – in<br />

early December 1992.<br />

We are also making our concerns known<br />

to the Indonesian Ambassador in Ottawa.<br />

Canada has urged the Indonesian authorities<br />

to conform to internationally accepted<br />

standards in dealing with Mr. Gusmão’s<br />

detention and its aftermath and has urged<br />

continued humanitarian treatment of Mr.<br />

Gusmão and Fretilin supporters in <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

I am encouraged that Indonesian<br />

President Suharto issued instructions that<br />

Mr. Gusmão be treated according to the law.<br />

The local press was allowed to see Mr.<br />

Gusmão after his arrest and he appeared in<br />

several television interviews in December<br />

1992. Information we have received through<br />

diplomatic channels indicates that Mr.<br />

Gusmão is being treated well.<br />

Canada will continue to monitor this issue<br />

in an effort to ensure that Mr.<br />

Gusmão’s treatment is in conformity with<br />

humanitarian standards.<br />

Thank you again for writing to express<br />

your concerns.<br />

Yours sincerely,<br />

Barbara McDougall


Page 96 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

EAST TIMOR ALERT<br />

NETWORK / CANADA<br />

NEWSLETTER, FEB. 19<strong>93</strong><br />

Selections from the latest ETAN/Canada<br />

Newsletter, published several weeks ago.<br />

Most of the information included in it has<br />

already been made available on reg.easttimor<br />

– anyone wanting the newsletter should<br />

contact ETAN/Ottawa at PO Box 2002,<br />

Stn. D, Ottawa Ont. K1P 5W3, or by email<br />

at etanott@web.apc.org. Overseas<br />

subscriptions are $10 (Cdn or US);<br />

Canadian subs are free.<br />

The lead editorial and action reports from<br />

local groups follow.<br />

Welcome to the February ETAN newsletter.<br />

It’s been a busy time for ETAN across<br />

the country. Since our last newsletter, local<br />

groups have started up in two new provinces<br />

(Quebec and Alberta) and there are<br />

now local activists busy in 11 cities, as well<br />

as our network of individual supporters<br />

from coast to coast.<br />

A generous grant from the International<br />

Centre for Human Rights and Democratic<br />

Development (headed by Ed Broadbent) has<br />

given us the financial means to expand our<br />

national network and broaden the circle of<br />

popular involvement in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> solidarity<br />

work in Canada.<br />

We also have to send congratulations to<br />

our American friends and counterparts, the<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> <strong>Action</strong> <strong>Network</strong>. ETAN/US<br />

recently marked its first birthday. It too has<br />

spread nationally (with groups from<br />

California to Rhode Island) and was the key<br />

to Congress’ decision to delete military aid<br />

that the United States was providing to<br />

Indonesia under the International Military<br />

Education and Training (IMET) program<br />

(along with other longt ime friends of <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> in the US). With a new president,<br />

American policy may be changing.<br />

ETAN/Canada has been engaged in too<br />

many projects to list them all. The action<br />

reports from local groups later in this issue<br />

give a flavor of the many things that are<br />

being done.<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> is now firmly on the media<br />

agenda in this country. Awareness has been<br />

spread even more by the award-winning<br />

new documentary film “Manufacturing<br />

Consent: Noam Chomsky and the Media.”<br />

Manufacturing Consent includes a lengthy<br />

segment that shows how the media covered<br />

genocide in Cambodia while it covered up<br />

genocide in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. The segment features<br />

ETAN founder Elaine Brière, who is<br />

now working on a film of her own on <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

The situation in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> is at a crucial<br />

point. The arrest of resistance leader Xanana<br />

Gusmão is a severe blow to the <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese people – but the resistance goes<br />

on. Reports reaching the outside world say<br />

it is worse in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> today than it ever<br />

has been since the 1975 invasion – a grim<br />

reminder of how important our work is. The<br />

government of Canada is still backing<br />

Indonesia’s Suharto regime with aid, trade,<br />

diplomatic support and even weapons.<br />

Read on for news about the situation in<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, the position of the Canadian<br />

government, international and Canadian<br />

solidarity actions, ideas on what you can do<br />

to help, press clippings, poetry and more.<br />

MONTREAL<br />

Greetings from Montreal! Over the past<br />

few months, there has been a definite<br />

showing of solidarity among individuals and<br />

groups for the people of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

In November, we hosted Abé Barreto for<br />

a full weekend of events. The weekend was<br />

an indication that we had a lot of support.<br />

Abé’s lecture and presentation of “In<br />

Cold Blood” took place at Concordia<br />

University on Friday November 6 and drew<br />

a crowd of approximately 80 people. There<br />

were about 15 Indonesian students present<br />

as well as an embassy official who was<br />

busily taking notes throughout the meeting.<br />

Many of the Indonesian students tried to<br />

dominate the question period by saying the<br />

video was a fabrication and it did not provide<br />

any concrete evidence, as well as giving<br />

lengthy pro-government proclamations of<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>’s willingness to integrate with<br />

Indonesia. We were not expecting such a<br />

presence of Indonesian students and such a<br />

response but Abé handled their statements<br />

very well, providing the audience with the<br />

documented facts. Overall, it was a good<br />

event and we now have approximately ten<br />

new members.<br />

We also showed “In Cold Blood” to a<br />

Third World Politics class at John Abbott<br />

College, a CEGEP (senior high school) in the<br />

West Island. More presentations are<br />

planned.<br />

On Sunday morning, we attended mass at<br />

the Santa Cruz Church, a Portuguese parish<br />

in the Plateau Mont-Royal neighbourhood.<br />

Abé was introduced to the parish at the end<br />

of the mass and we stayed at the back where<br />

some of the parishioners could ask him<br />

questions and meet with him.<br />

The Montreal Portuguese community<br />

had organized a demonstration in November<br />

1991 to protest the Dili massacre but were<br />

not planning one for the first anniversary.<br />

The Santa Cruz Church seemed like the<br />

most appropriate and a very symbolic place<br />

to hold a march and vigil as it shares the<br />

same name with the cemetery in Dili where<br />

the massacre happened, so we encouraged<br />

them to hold a commemoration.<br />

Over 40 people attended the march and<br />

vigil that Thursday evening and now the<br />

parish is interested in organizing a march for<br />

November 12, 19<strong>93</strong>. There is also the<br />

possibility of organizing a twin parish program<br />

with the Santa Cruz parish through the<br />

Canadian Catholic Organization for<br />

Development and Peace (headquartered in<br />

Montreal) which could begin during Lent.<br />

There has been some local media coverage<br />

on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> during the last few months.<br />

Abé was interviewed on radio twice while<br />

he was here: firstly on Radio Centre-Ville,<br />

Montreal’s community radio station, and<br />

Sunday on McGill Radio’s “Celtic<br />

Communion” show which deals with the<br />

war in the North of Ireland as well as other<br />

related political issues in Canada and around<br />

the world. Bob Palmer and Genny Marilley<br />

have also been on McGill Radio on several<br />

other occasions.<br />

On November 27, the GAIA group at<br />

Dawson College organized a bake sale for<br />

ETAN/Montreal which raised $100. The<br />

group showed “Betrayed but not Beaten” at<br />

the bake sale and provided information as<br />

well as Urgent <strong>Action</strong>s for Xanana’s release.<br />

The Concordia community has been<br />

really supportive to <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. We have<br />

received much support from Indigenous<br />

Peoples International, the Latin American<br />

Committee and the Quebec Public Interest<br />

Research Group (Q-Pirg). They all co-sponsored<br />

the event on November 6 and covered<br />

all the costs. The Concordia University<br />

Student Association gave an honorarium of<br />

$200 while Q-Pirg and John Abbott College<br />

both gave $50.<br />

Thanks to the film “Manufacturing<br />

Consent,” awareness about <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> is<br />

growing and it has made it easier to promote<br />

our events and to gain support.<br />

We have to keep the momentum going.<br />

ONTARIO<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> was a big issue at most<br />

Ontario universities in the fall of 1992,<br />

largely because of a speaking tour by Abé<br />

Barreto Soares, an <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese who became<br />

a refugee in Canada earlier in the year.<br />

ETAN and other groups organized a tour<br />

that took Abé across southern Ontario as<br />

well as to Montreal. It also featured<br />

screenings of Max Stahl’s excellent documentary<br />

on the Santa Cruz massacre of<br />

November 12, 1991: “In Cold Blood: the<br />

Massacre of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.”<br />

By the end of the tour, there were groups<br />

working on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> at almost every city<br />

in southern Ontario.<br />

The tour opened at McMaster<br />

University in Hamilton, where the forum<br />

was promoted with an excellent teaser<br />

campaign featuring posters (“Do you know<br />

where <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> is?”), chalk outlines of


<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 97<br />

dead bodies in the middle of campus,<br />

literature tables and other creative attentiongetters.<br />

About 40 people came out and the<br />

event got excellent press on campus<br />

(including the front page of The Silhouette,<br />

the main student paper) despite almost nonstop<br />

heckling from an unofficial<br />

representative of the Indonesian Consulate<br />

from Toronto. The McMaster ETAN group<br />

has held many events since, including a joint<br />

commemoration of November massacres in<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and El Salvador on November<br />

17.<br />

The speaking tour moved on Windsor,<br />

Brock (St. Catharines), Waterloo, Toronto,<br />

York, Queen’s (Kingston), Guelph,<br />

Concordia (Montreal), Carleton (Ottawa)<br />

and Western (London). It also stopped off<br />

in Oakville for high school events and an<br />

evening at the Oakville Community Centre<br />

for peace, ecology and human rights. In each<br />

community, Abé’s visit and the film of the<br />

massacre brought home the reality of <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> to dozens of new people, and to<br />

thousands more through articles in student<br />

newspapers and radio interviews.<br />

A new feature at many of the forums was<br />

the presence of large numbers of Indonesian<br />

students. Some of them were quietly<br />

supportive; others toed their government’s<br />

line, handing out a “chronology” prepared<br />

by the Indonesian Embassy. Embassy<br />

officials attended speaking nights in<br />

Montreal and Ottawa in an apparent attempt<br />

at intimidation. And Indonesian student<br />

computer nets in North America were<br />

abuzz with talk about the tour, with students<br />

from as far afield as Colorado<br />

weighing in.<br />

The tour concluded with a Parliament<br />

Hill rally on November 12, the first anniversary<br />

of the Santa Cruz massacre, which<br />

was co- sponsored along with Ottawa’s<br />

Coalition to Oppose the Arms Trade. Fifty<br />

people came out to hear from Abé, Svend<br />

Robinson MP and Peter Monet of<br />

ETAN/Ottawa, as well as the peaceful music<br />

of the Raging Grannies. Participants then<br />

walked to the Westin Hotel, where weapons<br />

dealers were holding an arms show. Among<br />

the customers for Canadian weapons is<br />

Indonesia. The Raging Grannies appeared on<br />

the front page of the next day’s Ottawa<br />

Citizen.<br />

After the tour was over, we gathered for<br />

an ETAN conference in Guelph to plan future<br />

actions. Although the meeting ran out<br />

of time, the experience was still useful in<br />

bringing together 20 activists to compare<br />

notes and ideas. At the end of the day, we<br />

paid a call on the university’s acting president,<br />

who was hosting a reception for a<br />

visiting Indonesian government delegation.<br />

Since we weren’t allowed to stay, we held a<br />

spirited protest outside. Special thanks for<br />

organizing the conference and demonstration<br />

should go to Sheila Wilmot, Susanne Blau,<br />

Aloz and all the other Guelph activists.<br />

WINDSOR/ESSEX<br />

The Windsor/Essex County group of<br />

ETAN was very active in the fall, with ten<br />

active members. <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> has really<br />

caught the imagination of the community!<br />

Some highlights of fall activities:<br />

• 450 letters from Windsor and area residents<br />

were sent to all three local MPs,<br />

plus 500 letters to External Affairs<br />

Minster Barbara McDougall. Liberal MP<br />

Herb Gray pledged support to the group,<br />

while the NDP’s Steven Langdon agreed<br />

to join Parliamentarians for <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

(NDP MP Howard McCurdy was<br />

already a member of PET).<br />

• Presentations at classes at the University<br />

of Windsor (Third World Politics, World<br />

Politics, International Business),<br />

Assumption High School, Massey High<br />

School, Iona College, Walkerville High<br />

School, St. Anne High School, Catholic<br />

Central High School, Cardinal Carter<br />

High School, and Brennan High School.<br />

• Meetings with Amnesty International,<br />

Third World Resource Centre, Windsor<br />

Labour Council, Students for Global<br />

Awareness, Windsor Catholic Deanery,<br />

Windsor Catholic Lay Deanery, St.<br />

Vincent de Paul Church Youth Group,<br />

Essex Catholic Deanery.<br />

• ETAN/Windsor co-ordinator Jason<br />

Amyot attended the national conference<br />

of the World University Service of<br />

Canada last November in Ottawa. WUSC<br />

is undertaking an Indonesia project in<br />

19<strong>93</strong>; Jason and many others raised the<br />

issue of human rights at this meeting and<br />

WUSC planning sessions.<br />

• Thirty people came to an <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

coffee house on November 27.<br />

• ETAN wrote several articles in The<br />

Lance (University of Windsor) and was<br />

covered in the Windsor Star and on radio.<br />

TORONTO<br />

ETAN/Toronto has been growing by<br />

leaps and bounds since the summer. We are<br />

now meeting regularly on the third Monday<br />

of every month at the Earthroots office (401<br />

Richmond St. W. at Spadina) at 7:30 p.m.<br />

And every Monday is ETAN office day at<br />

ACT for Disarmament, 736 Bathurst St.<br />

(south of Bloor). We invite all supporters to<br />

join us, or to stay in touch through our<br />

phone line, (416) 531-5850.<br />

We held a successful public forum on<br />

October 28 with Abé Barreto, David<br />

Webster of ETAN/Toronto and Max Stahl,<br />

the maker of “In Cold Blood,” at the<br />

University of Toronto, with the help of the<br />

U of T Student Christian Movement, U of<br />

T Global Development <strong>Network</strong> and ACT<br />

for Disarmament. 75 people came out to the<br />

forum. A hastily-organized event at York<br />

University drew a smaller crowd, but the<br />

people in attendance formed a dynamic new<br />

ETAN group at York.<br />

The York <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> group has held<br />

several public events, including a screening<br />

of “Manufacturing Consent” in January that<br />

drew 200 students. They held a forum on<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> with Elaine Brière of<br />

ETAN/Vancouver and Sujit Chowdhury of<br />

the York group, who is also director of the<br />

National Model United Nations. The<br />

Indonesian Consul in Toronto had initially<br />

said he might attend, but cancelled at the last<br />

minute on orders from his government. At<br />

the same time, an Indonesian delegation was<br />

meeting with environmental studies<br />

professors and students across the hall.<br />

(The delegation refused to meet ETAN activists<br />

while they were in town.)<br />

ETAN/Toronto held two demonstrations<br />

in November. On November 12, we were<br />

part of a national day of action, picketing<br />

outside the Indonesian Consulate (the event,<br />

along with the demonstration the same day<br />

in Ottawa, was seen on CBC-TV national<br />

news). Then on November 28, ETAN<br />

members from across Ontario converged on<br />

the Toronto constituency office of External<br />

Affairs Minister Barbara McDougall. About<br />

30 people attended each event.<br />

Two ETAN activists, Joanne Young and<br />

Maggie Helwig, threw blood on the<br />

Indonesian Consulate during Indonesian<br />

Foreign Minister Ali Alatas’ visit to Canada<br />

a year ago. In August, they were found<br />

guilty of mischief. Joanne was jailed for a<br />

day; Maggie was given a sentence of<br />

community service.<br />

On October 1, “Manufacturing Consent”<br />

opened in Toronto for a week-long run at<br />

the re-opened Euclid Theatre. The first night<br />

was a benefit for ETAN – like all showings,<br />

it sold out all seats. The film has been<br />

playing to packed houses since at several<br />

locations around the city, usually with an<br />

ETAN table in the lobby. We have found<br />

“Manufacturing Consent” to be an excellent<br />

outreach tool, which inspires everyone who<br />

see it to greater levels of activism.<br />

ETAN members have been actively<br />

reaching out to other groups in the community,<br />

attending gatherings on the<br />

Philippines, Sri Lanka and Tibet as well as<br />

other groups’ meetings, like Oxfam and the<br />

International Physicians for the Prevention<br />

of Nuclear War (IPPNW) North American<br />

students’ conference. We have had tables at<br />

Ryerson Polytechnic, Harbourfront’s<br />

International Development Fair, and many<br />

other events. We arranged media coverage,<br />

including in the Toronto Star, Globe and<br />

Mail, CBC-TV, and 3 campus radio stations:<br />

CIUT, CHRY and CKLN.


Page 98 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

After a meeting with Michio Takahashi<br />

of the Free <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Coalition in Japan,<br />

we agreed to set up a fundraising project to<br />

help support an <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese cultural<br />

survival school in Darwin, Australia (home<br />

to a large <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese refugee community).<br />

Angelo Gonsalves jump-started the<br />

project, with help from many others, and<br />

we hope to be sending some large donations<br />

to support the school shortly. A fundraising<br />

party and <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> cultural evening on<br />

February 13 was the first big fundraising<br />

event for the school. There will be more<br />

information on the school in the next<br />

newsletter.<br />

Another piece of good news was the establishment<br />

of the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Alert<br />

<strong>Network</strong>/Toronto Portuguese Committee<br />

last fall, on the initiative of Fernando Nunes.<br />

The group included members of the<br />

Portuguese student associations at U of T<br />

and York. The committee has been hard at<br />

work spreading the word about <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

in the large Portuguese community, translating<br />

ETAN materials into Portuguese, and<br />

reaching out to churches and Portugueselanguage<br />

media. Portuguese programmers on<br />

Channel 47 (multicultural television) and<br />

CHIN (multicultural radio) have been<br />

particularly supportive.<br />

VANCOUVER<br />

ETAN/Vancouver has coalesced into a<br />

group of nine people who have assembled<br />

gradually over the past five months. We are<br />

a new ETAN group – until this year, Elaine<br />

Brière (one of the network’s founders) was<br />

working virtually alone in Vancouver.<br />

Operating on an ad hoc basis, the group organized<br />

a demonstration on November 12,<br />

arranged several public information events,<br />

raised money for the ETAN open letter<br />

published in the Vancouver Sun and elsewhere,<br />

and held a candlelight vigil on<br />

December 7 (which was attended by about<br />

50 people, the largest <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> demonstration<br />

yet in Vancouver). The group also<br />

got a strong response (and several committee<br />

members) from our presence at the many<br />

Vancouver screenings of the film<br />

Manufacturing Consent. This film has<br />

proved extremely effective at politicizing<br />

people on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

In the wake of this activity, we’ve settled<br />

down and begun looking at how our ETAN<br />

group should operate. We’ve sat down to<br />

define our responsibilities, our resources,<br />

some basic operating rules, and the interests<br />

of individual committee members. Projects<br />

that are being discussed include: keeping in<br />

close touch with a newly developed local<br />

membership base (many who donated for<br />

the open letter), organizing lectures in high<br />

schools, developing an accessible archive,<br />

running a letter writing campaign, designing<br />

information packages, and organizing<br />

fundraising events.<br />

Another important local target is Simon<br />

Fraser University, which will soon be reviewing<br />

its huge project in Indonesia. SFU<br />

runs a $22 million CIDA-funded project<br />

servicing Indonesian universities in the<br />

Moluccas and West Papua (details were<br />

published in the last ETAN newsletter).<br />

The group has expressed an interest in<br />

co-ordinating events with other ETAN<br />

groups. These local group reports seem useful<br />

for outlining successful projects across<br />

the country and sharing our information,<br />

leaflets and other materials.<br />

ETAN/Vancouver has set up a new<br />

voice-mail phone number. Please feel free to<br />

call us at (604)739-4947.<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Alert <strong>Network</strong>/Toronto, PO Box<br />

562, Station P, Toronto, Canada, M5S 2T1.<br />

Phone/fax 1-416-531-5850, Email etantor@web.apc.org<br />

UPDATE FROM EAST TIMOR<br />

ALERT NETWORK/CANADA<br />

Number 21 – March 29, 19<strong>93</strong>. Excerpts<br />

EAST TIMOR: ESCAPED<br />

RESISTANCE LEADERS TO VISIT<br />

NORTH AMERICA<br />

Two activists in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>’s nonviolent<br />

resistance movement will be touring North<br />

America in April and May. The young<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese leaders will meet with United<br />

Nations, American and Canadian government<br />

officials, and members of parliament,<br />

and speak to community meetings in 20<br />

U.S. cities and four Canadian cities.<br />

Constancio Pinto, 30, is the keynote<br />

speaker on the tour. He was a chief organizer<br />

of the November 12, 1991, demonstration<br />

that ended in a bloody massacre. He<br />

was executive secretary of the underground<br />

National Council of Maubere Resistance<br />

(the coalition that represents most <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />

nationalist groups) in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> from 1989<br />

to 1992. He has been arrested several times<br />

and tortured by the Indonesian military. He<br />

made a dramatic escape last May, after<br />

being intensively hunted for seven months.<br />

Abé Barreto Soares, 27, is official representative<br />

to Canada for the National Council<br />

of Maubere Resistance. He went into exile<br />

in 1991 and now lives as a refugee in<br />

Toronto. He is a student of English<br />

literature.<br />

There will be events in four cities in<br />

Canada – call the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Alert <strong>Network</strong><br />

for times and places.<br />

Vancouver – April 17 Call (604) 739-<br />

4947<br />

Ottawa – May 4-6<br />

Montreal – May 7-9<br />

Toronto – May 9-10 Call (416) 531-<br />

5850 (More details on the eastern dates next<br />

month.)<br />

UN BLASTS INDONESIA OVER<br />

TIMOR RIGHTS CANADA BACKS<br />

EAST TIMOR FOR FIRST TIME SINCE<br />

INVASION<br />

For the first time, Canada has joined in a<br />

strong United Nations condemnation of<br />

Indonesia’s actions in occupied <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

On March 11, by a vote of 22 to 12, the<br />

United Nations Commission on Human<br />

Rights passed a resolution blasting the government<br />

of Indonesia for its actions since<br />

the Santa Cruz massacre of November 12,<br />

1991, in which Indonesian soldiers opened<br />

fire on an unarmed crowd, killing 273 people<br />

and injuring hundreds more. The<br />

commission regretted “the disparity in the<br />

severity of sentences handed to those civilians<br />

not indicted for violent activities – who<br />

should have been released without delay –<br />

on the one hand, and to the military<br />

involved in the violent incident, on the<br />

other.”<br />

The resolution also condemns more recent<br />

violations of human rights, including<br />

torture, extra-judicial executions, and<br />

“disappearances.” It calls on Indonesia to<br />

improve the respect for human rights of the<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese people, and to permit free<br />

access to humanitarian organizations like<br />

Amnesty International and Asia Watch. It<br />

“urges the Government of Indonesia to invite<br />

the Special Rapporteur on Torture, the<br />

Special Rapporteur on Extra-judicial,<br />

Summary or Arbitrary Executions, the<br />

Working Group on Arbitrary Detention and<br />

the Working Group on Involuntary<br />

Disappearances to visit <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and to<br />

facilitate the discharge of their mandates.”<br />

And it adds <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> as a special agenda<br />

item for the commission’s 50th session next<br />

winter – ensuring that the question of <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> is now firmly on the United Nations<br />

agenda.<br />

The commission heard extensive testimony<br />

on Eats <strong>Timor</strong> from non-governmental<br />

organizations. One of the witnesses was<br />

Abé Barreto Soares, an <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />

refugee now living in Toronto, who testified<br />

on behalf of the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Alert<br />

<strong>Network</strong>/Canada and the International Peace<br />

Bureau.<br />

“Human rights abuses in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

cannot be separated from the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />

struggle for self- determination and independence,”<br />

he noted. “There will be more<br />

human rights abuses in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> as long<br />

as there is no peaceful solution for the <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> problem. I really hope that the this<br />

UN Commission will take meaningful initiatives<br />

to put an end to the human rights<br />

violations in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. The people of <strong>East</strong>


<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 99<br />

<strong>Timor</strong> feel helpless in their own homeland.<br />

They look to you to do everything in your<br />

power to help them.”<br />

This year marks the first time that<br />

Canada backed a resolution in support of<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> in any UN forum since<br />

Indonesia invaded <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> in 1975.<br />

Canadian governments have traditionally<br />

provided strong diplomatic support to<br />

Indonesian lobbyists. This year, Canadian<br />

ambassador Anne Park (chair of the Western<br />

group at the Human Rights Commission)<br />

spoke out on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and pressured<br />

Indonesian diplomats to agree to a<br />

consensus declaration – which they refused<br />

to do. In the end, Canada joined 23 other<br />

governments from Europe, the Americas and<br />

Africa to co-sponsor the resolution. Angola,<br />

Guinea-Bissau, USA, Canada, Russia, Costa<br />

Rica, Austria, Poland and Denmark all<br />

spoke out in support.<br />

According to a report filed by Southam<br />

News, Park and External Affairs Minister<br />

Barbara McDougall had felt the pressure<br />

from “a strong <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> lobby at home”<br />

and were afraid to be seen standing with<br />

Indonesia. The American delegation – which<br />

initially fought the resolution Q also felt<br />

strong pressure from home, including<br />

editorials in several major newspapers.<br />

Finally, incoming State department officials<br />

ordered a reversal of the U.S. stance.<br />

“In the end only dictatorships like Iran,<br />

Sudan and China stood with Indonesia,” said<br />

José Ramos Horta, who headed up<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese lobbyists at the commission. “All<br />

the democracies of the world supported us.<br />

Equally important, and indeed it sets a<br />

precedent for other issues, <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> destroyed<br />

the myth of the Asian block. There<br />

were Latin Americans and Africans voting<br />

with us and important Asian and Muslim<br />

states that abstained.”<br />

Indonesian official waited four days to<br />

issue a denunciation of the resolution as<br />

“unfair” to Indonesia, saying they had no<br />

intention of abiding by it.<br />

ETAN encourages supporters to write to<br />

External Affairs Minister Barbara<br />

McDougall (House of Commons, Ottawa<br />

Ont., K1A 0A6, postage free) to ask Canada<br />

to hold Indonesia to the terms of the UN<br />

resolution. The full text is available from<br />

ETAN/Toronto, PO Box 562, Station P,<br />

Toronto M5S 2T1, phone (416) 531-5850,<br />

Email etantor@web.apc.org.<br />

EVENTS IN EUROPE;<br />

EUROPEAN LEADERS<br />

VISIT INDONESIA<br />

SWITZERLAND’S POSITION<br />

ON EAST TIMOR<br />

Mar 16, 19<strong>93</strong><br />

Pierre-Alain Tissot from Allens<br />

(Switzerland), a long-time <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> activist,<br />

transmitted us some replies of the<br />

Swiss government (Federal Council) to<br />

NGO and Parliamentary queries following<br />

the Santa Cruz massacre and Xanana<br />

Gusmão’s arrest. The outlined position is<br />

not too surprising, but it is welcome information<br />

from a country with a traditionally<br />

discrete diplomacy.<br />

Bruno Kahn, Agir pour <strong>Timor</strong><br />

1. Reply, dated 30 Dec. 1992, of the Federal<br />

Department of Foreign Affairs to Pax<br />

Christi about Xanana’s arrest (in French,<br />

signed Simonin; summarised).<br />

Mr. B. Freymond, the Swiss ambassador<br />

in Indonesia, talked on Dec. 5 with Mr.<br />

Wyriono, General Director for political affairs<br />

of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry.<br />

(The letter seems to imply that this is related<br />

to the ICRC visiting Xanana two days<br />

after.)<br />

2. Reply of the Federal Department of<br />

Foreign Affairs to a parliamentary question<br />

of 2 Dec. 1991 on the Santa Cruz<br />

massacre (question in German of P.<br />

Misteli, answer in French, unsigned).<br />

Question (summarised): What is the Federal<br />

Council’s position relatively to the Santa<br />

Cruz massacre as a blatant human rights<br />

violation, and relatively to the global and<br />

lasting situation [caused by] the<br />

occupation? What measures does the<br />

Federal Council plan to take, e.g. in its<br />

developmental or economical work in<br />

common with Indonesia?<br />

Answer (summarised):<br />

a) Switzerland condemned the massacre,<br />

and asked Indonesia to solve the problems<br />

existing in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> in the respect of<br />

human rights and fundamental liberties as<br />

inscribed in the Universal Declaration of<br />

Human Rights and to punish the culprits.<br />

This was conveyed to the Indonesian government<br />

by the Swiss ambassador in<br />

Jakarta.<br />

b) The Committee of Ministers of the<br />

Council of Europe [N.B.: not to be confused<br />

with the EC European Commission]<br />

adopted on 26 November 1991 a Statement<br />

on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, supported by Switzerland.<br />

c) Switzerland does not recognise the<br />

annexation of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> by Indonesia,<br />

carried out by force; it wishes that a solution<br />

can be found in the framework of the<br />

United Nations.<br />

d) The respect of human rights across the<br />

world is an important aspect of<br />

Switzerland’s foreign policy. Development<br />

cooperation and humanitarian aid can be<br />

instruments for this policy, notably<br />

supporting efforts in the fields of education<br />

and formation and encouraging the creation<br />

of a pluralist society by supporting some<br />

groups and organisations. The Swiss policy<br />

relative to human rights has been detailed in<br />

a report of the Federal Council dated 2 June<br />

1982 (articles 24 and 32).<br />

e) Development cooperation with<br />

Indonesia currently amounts to SFr 20 millions<br />

(about US$ 14 millions) and aims to<br />

promote the most unfavoured parts of the<br />

population. Aid goes to technical professional<br />

formation, development of basic city<br />

and rural structures and infrastructures<br />

(drinking water, increase of revenue).<br />

Switzerland also supports a UNICEF health<br />

and food programme.<br />

f) Therefore a reduction or interruption<br />

of Swiss aid would touch directly the part<br />

of the population that suffers most of human<br />

rights violations. Economic relations<br />

and development cooperation reinforce<br />

Swiss influence in this matter by allowing<br />

Switzerland to plead for causes that are dear<br />

to it during negotiations.<br />

3. Reply of the Federal Military<br />

Department to a parliamentary question<br />

dated 9 March 1992 on arms exports to<br />

Indonesia (question and answer in<br />

German, question of K. Hollenstein, answer<br />

unsigned). This question/answer is<br />

translated in full for the following reasons:<br />

- it deals with arms sales; - the<br />

friend who kindly provided a translation<br />

from German stressed that he felt the<br />

answer to be strange or ambiguous (he is<br />

not involved in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>). This will be<br />

obvious at reading; - it is short.<br />

Question:<br />

a) Can the Federal Council allow, as the<br />

highest decision-making authority, that<br />

weapons and ammunitions originating<br />

from Switzerland keep on reaching<br />

Indonesia where, since General Suharto<br />

took power, more than one million persons<br />

lost their lives in armed battles?<br />

b) Does the Federal Council, like Canada<br />

and The Netherlands, wish to suppress its<br />

credits given in the framework of IGGI,<br />

until a satisfactory report on the human<br />

rights situation is provided?<br />

Answer:


Page 100 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

The Federal Council is not aware of an<br />

arm sales embargo of the EC towards<br />

Indonesia. These last years, war material<br />

exports from Switzerland to this country<br />

have been very modest. In the years 1988<br />

and 1989 they only corresponded to respectively<br />

SFr 22 and 751 [sic].<br />

Last year, exercise ammunitions for antiaircraft<br />

defense batteries, for a value of SFr<br />

500’000 [sic, not 500,000 or 500.000], were<br />

exported from Switzerland to Indonesia.<br />

They were delivered before [sic] the<br />

incidents of last November in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

and have in all certainty nothing to do with<br />

them.<br />

On the Swiss part, the human rights<br />

situation in Indonesia is closely followed.<br />

The military action in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> was condemned<br />

by an intervention of the Swiss<br />

ambassador in Jakarta, and our country<br />

signed the Statement on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> of the<br />

Council of European Ministers on<br />

November 26, 1991. Switzerland does not<br />

recognise <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>’s annexation and<br />

wishes for a solution in the framework of<br />

the United Nations.<br />

Concerning the Swiss development cooperation<br />

program in the framework of<br />

IGGI, this program involves on the one<br />

hand a mixed financing program and on the<br />

other hand a long term construction program<br />

in various domains of major importance.<br />

Until now, Switzerland only granted<br />

Indonesia two projects in a form of mixed<br />

financing. The first [financing?] has been<br />

completely used, the second - for the rehabilitation<br />

of an important rail connection<br />

in Sumatra - cannot be interrupted, if only<br />

for legal reasons.<br />

The Federal Council does not consider<br />

that a suspension of development cooperation<br />

with Indonesia would be an efficient<br />

measure as a reaction to human rights violations;<br />

it would do more harm than good to<br />

the goal subordinate to our cooperation -<br />

namely, better living conditions for the least<br />

favoured parts of the population. In the<br />

framework of IGGI, however, it will have to<br />

be examined periodically whether conditions<br />

for the continuation of [our] present<br />

cooperation are still met.<br />

LACK OF UNEQUIVOCAL<br />

SUPPORT FROM EC<br />

Publico 4 February 19<strong>93</strong>. Original lang<br />

Portuguese. unabridged<br />

(Lisbon) Departing from a meeting yesterday<br />

with the Parliamentary Commission<br />

on the Situation in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, Durão<br />

Barroso said that the question of <strong>Timor</strong><br />

“could already have been resolved if<br />

Portugal had the unequivocal support of the<br />

European Community.”<br />

“Portugal is right, but I do not deny that<br />

it has been extremely difficult to get the<br />

other Twelve to coincide with our position,”<br />

stated the Foreign Minister, believing that<br />

“at this moment, we are the only real and<br />

legitimate advocate of the <strong>Timor</strong>ese cause.”<br />

Repeating the claim that there is lack of<br />

European support, Barroso added that “the<br />

Community countries do not always follow<br />

our view on the matter.” After mentioning<br />

that Indonesia “has much support at the<br />

international level,” the Minister said that<br />

Portugal “will do all it can for its voice to be<br />

heard.” On the Xanana Gusmão trial, taking<br />

place in Dili, he reaffirmed the previously<br />

expressed position: “It is a farce. Indonesia<br />

hasn’t the slightest legitimacy to hold this<br />

trial, which itself does not meet the<br />

minimum conditions from the legal point of<br />

view.” The Minister even admitted that the<br />

EC “could take a position at the Human<br />

Rights Commission.”<br />

Yesterday was the first time that Mr.<br />

Durão Barroso met with the Assembly of<br />

the Republic’s Commission under the new<br />

presidency of Christian Democrat Adriano<br />

Moreira. In agreement with Barroso,<br />

Adriano affirmed his conviction that<br />

Portugal would “continue its efforts with<br />

regards both support to Xanana Gusmão,<br />

and the matter of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.”<br />

MOREIRA INTERVIEW:<br />

PORTUGUESE GOV’T VIEWS<br />

STRUGGLE PASSED FROM GEN-<br />

ERATION TO GENERATION<br />

Publico, 4 February 19<strong>93</strong>. By Angela Silva<br />

& J. de Negreiros. Original Portuguese,<br />

unabridged<br />

(Lisbon) Adriano Moreira, the new<br />

Chairman of the (Portuguese) Parliamentary<br />

Commission on <strong>Timor</strong>, is more concerned<br />

about opening up new space for<br />

interventions, and in this respect concurs<br />

with the new head of Portuguese diplomacy.<br />

He wishes to see <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> involved in the<br />

wider drama of the “dispensable” peoples.<br />

He regards highly the contribution made by<br />

NGOs. But he has no illusions: he believes<br />

the it is “a task for centuries,” and “a<br />

struggle which is passed from generation to<br />

generation.”<br />

He was invited by the PSD to substitute<br />

Vitor Crespo at the head of the<br />

Parliamentary Commission on <strong>Timor</strong>, and<br />

he accepted. Although as yet he has no plan<br />

of action outlined, he is gripping the task<br />

ahead with the convictions he has held for a<br />

long time. For Adriano Moreira, <strong>Timor</strong> is<br />

“the tip of the iceberg,” and Xanana “a<br />

point of reference.” He believes that<br />

Portugal has everything to win if it sees the<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese tragedy in the context of a greater<br />

drama.<br />

Publico: The Commission you have agreed<br />

to Chair has been accused of having very<br />

limited effectiveness. What is going to<br />

change?<br />

Adriano Moreira: I do not share that general<br />

criticism of the Commission. Apart from<br />

any circumstantial difficulties, the problem<br />

is so difficult, the obstacles so enormous,<br />

that defining and then carrying out really<br />

effective actions is limited.<br />

Q.: But what do you intend to do? There is a<br />

whole plan of activities as yet to be<br />

carried out ...<br />

A.: What I think we need to do first is to<br />

invert the current international perception of<br />

the matter, which defines the problem in<br />

terms of Portugal and Indonesia. This perception,<br />

which is totally mistaken, is widespread<br />

throughout the international community.<br />

The correct perception is that this<br />

is a question between Indonesia and the<br />

international community, Portugal being the<br />

voice speaking for <strong>Timor</strong>. I consider this<br />

point to be essential.<br />

Q.: Has the Portuguese Government made it<br />

clear that the problem should be viewed<br />

within these parameters?<br />

A.: I believe that the Government, at least<br />

from a certain moment onwards, has been<br />

trying to impose this perception. However,<br />

it is still not the view which dominates in<br />

the international community, and this fact<br />

causes difficulties when it comes to our<br />

taking actions in support of the <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />

people.<br />

Q.: How can this dominating perception be<br />

altered?<br />

A.: In order to establish a correct perception,<br />

I believe the role of the NGOs (nongovernmental<br />

organisations) extremely important,<br />

because they enjoy an agility and<br />

freedom of movement which governments<br />

are sometimes unable to exercise. Within<br />

that mobilization, we must not sacrifice respect<br />

for human rights to rigid interpretations<br />

on self-determination. We defend selfdetermination<br />

for <strong>Timor</strong>, but this is no<br />

reason for lessening our resolve to battle for<br />

human rights, where advances could be made<br />

more quickly. These points just outline<br />

what will be behind the exercise of my new<br />

function.<br />

Q.: As well as making NGOs more aware<br />

and motivated, the diplomatic dialogue


<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 101<br />

between Lisbon and Jakarta will continue.<br />

What may be expected of these<br />

contacts?<br />

A.: I think the Government, through the<br />

Foreign Office, has been clear in that it has<br />

not expressed much hope of positive results<br />

from this dialogue. Having said that, perhaps<br />

it is worth pointing out that, in the<br />

diplomatic process, keeping up the dialogue<br />

is, in itself, important. On the other hand, it<br />

is also important that the dialogue is not<br />

allowed to develop in such a way that the<br />

aggressor, in this case Indonesia, utilizes the<br />

process in order to improve its image.<br />

Indonesia tries to do just this. For example,<br />

when it tries to link the defence of the<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese people’s interests to Portugal’s<br />

past conduct.<br />

Q.: Since you have mentioned Portugal’s<br />

past conduct in relation to <strong>Timor</strong>, what<br />

do you think of the idea that the<br />

Portuguese “crusade” for <strong>Timor</strong> contains<br />

an element of hypocrisy or guilty<br />

conscience, bearing in mind the <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />

were allegedly “abandoned” by the<br />

Lisbon Government in 1975?<br />

A.: Portugal’s past actions or guilt is not the<br />

matter now in question. What is in hand<br />

now is the right of the <strong>Timor</strong>ese to self-determination<br />

and human rights in the territory.<br />

If Portugal were to give up being the<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese people’s voice on the international<br />

scene, their right would still be the same;<br />

some other voice would have to speak for<br />

them. That is why I think it is totally<br />

spurious to mix the two questions. I think it<br />

has been in Indonesia’s interest to have the<br />

two matters mixed up.<br />

Q.: What concrete outcome would you dare<br />

to predict for the <strong>Timor</strong> problem? Some<br />

are saying that Portugal ought to drop<br />

the self- determination requirement...<br />

A.: Portugal cannot drop self-determination<br />

because it is not one of Portugal’s rights<br />

which is in question. This does not mean,<br />

however, that the international community<br />

will not come up with any solution other<br />

than independence. The difficulty in safeguarding<br />

the interests of the <strong>Timor</strong>ese is<br />

related not to international law, that is very<br />

clear, but to the international balance of<br />

powers. And it so happens that, in that<br />

area, Indonesia is currently the dominant<br />

power.<br />

Q.: What can Portugal do in the face of the<br />

difficulties posed by the “balance of<br />

powers”?<br />

A.: I think that the case of <strong>Timor</strong>, and<br />

namely the Xanana Gusmão trial, are elements<br />

of a world problem, on which<br />

Portugal is taking a position that can give it<br />

an important function, and which should be<br />

demanded by the small countries. Let me<br />

explain. There are probably about 100 million<br />

people in the world right now who belong<br />

to groups whose autonomy or self-determination<br />

has not been recognised. When<br />

Portugal is defending <strong>Timor</strong> it is, in fact,<br />

involved in a question of extraordinary dimensions<br />

- the question of the peoples<br />

which have no voice. And what is more<br />

grave is that they are peoples which the<br />

international community treats as<br />

“dispensable,” because of the balance of<br />

powers.<br />

Q.: But the difficulties which result from the<br />

balance of powers persist...<br />

A.: What I am trying to say is that the difficulties<br />

- or pessimism, if you prefer - must<br />

not be allowed to lessen our commitment,<br />

because this fight is not just a fight for the<br />

people of <strong>Timor</strong>, it is a fight of great international<br />

prominence in which the small<br />

countries will have a role to play. The small<br />

countries have an advantage in the<br />

international scene, which is their large<br />

number. The trial of Xanana Gusmão makes<br />

a good parallel: in that poor land’s modest<br />

courtroom, he is now a point of reference<br />

which allows us to evaluate the respect<br />

which exists for human rights. It not only<br />

concerns Xanana Gusmão. It not only<br />

concerns <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

Q.: Do you think then that Portugal, in its<br />

role of advocate for the people of <strong>Timor</strong>,<br />

would be successful if it integrated the<br />

question of <strong>Timor</strong> with a wider issue...<br />

A.: I believe so, and that will be one of my<br />

guidelines.<br />

Q.: How will this idea be put into practice?<br />

A.: There are many things we can do. There<br />

are various international arenas in which the<br />

message can be voiced. There is one thing I<br />

want to make clear so as not to create any<br />

illusions - this is a long process. It will take<br />

ages. We are in a struggle which passes from<br />

generation to generation. I believe<br />

appreciable progress has been made and,<br />

consequently, what we are doing is<br />

continuing.<br />

Q.: Don’t you think that Portugal wasted an<br />

ideal opportunity while it presided the EC,<br />

and when the <strong>Timor</strong> issue was practically<br />

silenced?<br />

A.: The perception that <strong>Timor</strong> is not an international<br />

question is also prevalent among<br />

the Twelve. That is the way they usually<br />

see the matter. Once again, I am not inclined<br />

to lay blame. I prefer to ask what can now<br />

be done, or what should be done? Is it<br />

worthwhile? Why is it worthwhile? These<br />

are the reference points I like to have at the<br />

forefront on this matter.<br />

Q.: Do you think the Portuguese<br />

Government has done everything that can<br />

or should be done?<br />

A.: I do not have all the information on everything<br />

the Government has done. I do<br />

admit that there are things which the<br />

Government has not done. I am under the<br />

impression that the Portuguese<br />

Government’s active intervention started<br />

late. There was a period which was lost.<br />

But, generally speaking, I think that its actions<br />

were appropriate. Now, what I am<br />

fundamentally interested in is knowing in<br />

which areas we can project the country’s<br />

intervention on not just <strong>Timor</strong>, which is the<br />

reference but which has a bearing on much<br />

wider issues of interest to the international<br />

community and to Portugal.<br />

Q.: Going back to the Commission: it was<br />

prominent at the time of the planned<br />

parliamentary deputation to <strong>Timor</strong>. Your<br />

attitude then was not very enthusiastic.<br />

Why was that?<br />

A.: I was, in fact, highly critical. The reason<br />

for my reservations was Indonesia’s expressed<br />

interest in the visit. I thought that<br />

Indonesia could use the visit to enhance that<br />

distorted image to its own end, just as it is<br />

doing right now with Xanana’s trial.<br />

Q.: Is there any chance of that idea being<br />

taken up again?<br />

A.: At the moment I see no chance of the<br />

proposal being reconsidered.<br />

Q.: Would it be realistic for a <strong>Timor</strong>ese, who<br />

today is 20- years- old, to hope that one<br />

day he would vote in a referendum on the<br />

future of his people?<br />

A.: I don’t like making predictions. Usually,<br />

when experts make medium-term forecasts<br />

they refer to the period of life of each of us,<br />

and when the forecast is for the long-term,<br />

then we are no longer around to check<br />

whether it was correct. What I can say for<br />

certain is that young <strong>Timor</strong>ese is still going<br />

to suffer occupation.


Page 102 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

KOHL TO RAISE TIMOR<br />

ISSUE WITH SUHARTO<br />

The Nation (Thailand), Feb. 25 <strong>93</strong><br />

Abridged, leaving out facts on ET, and<br />

Suharto’s push to attend the G7 summit in<br />

Tokyo in June.<br />

(AP, Jakarta) German Chancellor Helmut<br />

Kohl arrived in Indonesia yesterday for<br />

three days of talks to boost bilateral trade<br />

and economic relations.<br />

Kohl’s visit to Jakarta is part of his<br />

Asian tour to India, Singapore, Indonesia,<br />

Japan and South Korea, his first since the<br />

unification of Germany in Oct. 1990.<br />

“There are still political questions to be<br />

discussed although the main thrust of the<br />

talks would be to enhance bilateral cooperation<br />

in trade and economy,” the German<br />

Ambassador to Indonesia Walter Lewalter<br />

said.<br />

Indonesia’s exports to Germany in 1991<br />

reached US$1.2 billion, an increase of about<br />

8 percent from the previous year. But<br />

German investment in Indonesia has been<br />

declining in the past few years, from<br />

US$59.9 million in 1991 to US$36.7 million<br />

in 1992.<br />

Lewalter said Kohl would raise the issue<br />

of human rights violations in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> in<br />

talks with Suharto.<br />

LETTER TO FRENCH<br />

FOREIGN MINISTRY<br />

Agir Pour <strong>Timor</strong><br />

Paris, 3 March 19<strong>93</strong><br />

Mr. Roland Dumas<br />

Minister of Foreign Affairs<br />

37 Quai d’Orsay<br />

75007 PARIS<br />

Dear Mr. Minister,<br />

We had communication of the proposal<br />

of a resolution on the “situation in <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>,” presented by the Twelve at the<br />

Human Rights Commission, in Geneva.<br />

We find this proposal excellent. We wish<br />

to thank the French government, in the name<br />

of the people of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> that we defend,<br />

for having participated in its elaboration.<br />

We urge the French government to do<br />

whatever it can to support this resolution<br />

proposal, and the French delegation in<br />

Geneva to use all its influence to counterbalance<br />

the current attempts of Indonesia<br />

and other countries to have this project fail.<br />

We are convinced of your support, already<br />

expressed in a letter that you kindly<br />

had sent to us in January.<br />

Respectfully yours,<br />

(signed)<br />

POSSIBLE VOTE IN EP<br />

Publico 10 March 19<strong>93</strong> Dateline:<br />

Strasbourg Byline: J.T. Negreiros/Ana I.<br />

Cabo Translated from Portuguese abridged<br />

Criticism and applause from Durão at<br />

Euro-Parliament:<br />

While the diplomatic contacts in Geneva<br />

continued at a fast pace, Durão Barroso was<br />

meeting with the Inter Group on <strong>Timor</strong>,<br />

yesterday afternoon in Strasbourg. The<br />

(Portuguese) Foreign Minister told the Euro<br />

MPs that “intelligent foreign policy is one<br />

which respects principles, and not one<br />

which goes running after the economic<br />

powers.”<br />

The statement was not just made for effect:<br />

it served both to compliment the<br />

Strasbourg plenary’s stance on the <strong>Timor</strong><br />

issue, as well as to set down criticism, from<br />

which the US and EC Member States did<br />

not escape.<br />

“There has still been no position which<br />

satisfies us,” said the Portuguese minister, in<br />

reference to the Clinton administration’s<br />

promises about <strong>Timor</strong>. Durão Barroso confessed<br />

he felt “disillusioned by some countries<br />

that forget principles” and that put<br />

more weight on human rights violations in<br />

Cuba or in Libya than in <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

The minister said he had detected that,<br />

among the Twelve, the stimulus given to<br />

human rights issues had been corresponded<br />

with “timidity” when it came to the<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese people’s right to self-determination,<br />

and concluded that the EC could be<br />

“more assertive.”<br />

Simone Veil, Inter-Group Chairperson,<br />

welcomed a proposal from Durão Barroso<br />

that the EP should intensify efforts to bring<br />

about awareness and support in the<br />

Australian Parliament, the US Congress, and<br />

the Japanese Diet for the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

question.<br />

NEW PAPAL AMBASSADOR<br />

TO LISBON<br />

Publico 16 March 19<strong>93</strong> Dateline: Lisbon<br />

Original lang: Portuguese unabridged<br />

The Holy See announced yesterday that<br />

64-year-old Msgr. Edoardo Rovida, titular<br />

Archbishop of Taormina, is the new apostolic<br />

nuncio in Portugal. The new Papal<br />

ambassador to Portugal was born in<br />

Alessandria, Italy, specialized in Canonical<br />

Law, and was ordained a priest on 29 June<br />

1950. He entered the Vatican’s diplomatic<br />

service in 1955, and worked in the pontifical<br />

missions in Haiti, Cuba, Mexico and Ireland,<br />

and as permanent observer at UNESCO. He<br />

was appointed apostolic nuncio to Zaire in<br />

1977. Four years later he became permanent<br />

observer at the UN in Geneva.<br />

EP: XANANA TRIAL ILLEGAL<br />

Diario de Noticias, 12 March 19<strong>93</strong><br />

Dateline: Strasbourg Byline: Fernanda<br />

Gabriel. Translated from Portuguese.<br />

unabridged<br />

Yesterday in Strasbourg, the European<br />

Parliament (EP) reaffirmed the illegality of<br />

the proceedings against Xanana Gusmão,<br />

and indicated that it would not accept any<br />

sentence, given the Indonesian judicial<br />

authority’s total lack of legitimacy or competence.<br />

The resolution, put forward by the socialist<br />

group, urges the EP’s President to<br />

implement the visit (already decided upon)<br />

by a delegation to Jakarta and Dili, as a<br />

matter of urgency, so as to collect ample<br />

information about the situation in <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

The Euro-MPs expressed their fear of<br />

seeing Xanana Gusmão condemned to death.<br />

They considered that the first phase of the<br />

trial intensified their greatest apprehensions<br />

about the purely arbitrary nature of<br />

proceedings without the slightest legal basis.<br />

Mr. Hans van den Broeck, the European<br />

Commissioner responsible for the EC’s<br />

external relations, said he was hoping that<br />

the meeting scheduled for 20 April in Rome,<br />

between Durão Barroso and Ali Alatas,<br />

would contribute towards a solution to the<br />

problem of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, and affirmed that<br />

the embassies of the Twelve have been<br />

expressing their concern about Indonesia’s<br />

behaviour in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> to the Jakarta<br />

authorities.<br />

Mr. Van den Broeck’s position on <strong>Timor</strong><br />

has been one of support for Portugal, and he<br />

has distanced himself from the ideas of the<br />

previous Commissioner, Mr. Matutes.<br />

Lately, Portugal has been developing a<br />

diplomatic offensive on this question in the<br />

EP. Before the visit of the Foreign Minister,<br />

the President of the (Portuguese) Republic<br />

went to Strasbourg, towards the end of last<br />

year.<br />

The EP reiterated its deep concern over<br />

the fact that situation in <strong>Timor</strong> was already<br />

seriously affecting not only relations between<br />

the EC and Indonesia, but also relations<br />

between the EC and the ASEAN<br />

group, the development of which is considered<br />

by both parties to be of the utmost importance,<br />

but which must be oriented by respect<br />

for international law and human rights.<br />

The Euro-MPs supported the position<br />

adopted by the EC Council of Ministers regarding<br />

safeguarding human rights and<br />

searching for a political solution within the<br />

framework of UN resolutions.


<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 103<br />

EAST TIMOR MOTION WINS<br />

UK COMMONS SUPPORT<br />

The following Early Day Motion was tabled<br />

in the House of Commons on 23 March and<br />

by 25 March had been signed by 66 MPs:<br />

No. 1657: Human Rights in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

(No. 2)<br />

That this House congratulates the United<br />

Nations Commission on Human Rights for<br />

adopting a resolution highly critical of the<br />

human rights situation in the Indonesianoccupied<br />

territory of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, and congratulates<br />

Her Majesty’s Government for<br />

supporting the resolution; and, further,<br />

called on Her Majesty’s Government to<br />

persuade the Indonesian Government to<br />

comply with paragraph 9 of the resolution<br />

by enabling the United Nations Special<br />

Rapporteurs on torture and on extrajudicial,<br />

summary or arbitrary executions and the<br />

United Nations working groups on arbitrary<br />

detention and on enforced or involuntary<br />

disappearances to discharge their mandates<br />

in accordance with the terms of the resolution.<br />

This resolution was tabled in response to an<br />

action by UK members of Parliamentarians<br />

for <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

UK readers, please contact your MP, urging<br />

her/him to sign.<br />

FRETILIN SATISFIED WITH<br />

PORTUGAL<br />

Publico 20 March 19<strong>93</strong> Dateline : Lisbon<br />

original lang.: Portuguese unabridged<br />

Yesterday, Fretilin reaffirmed its<br />

“confidence in Portuguese diplomacy,” and<br />

in the role Lisbon has been playing in the<br />

<strong>Timor</strong> issue. In a letter sent from<br />

Mozambique, addressed to Foreign Minister<br />

Durão Barroso, Fretilin’s foreign relations<br />

secretary, Mari Alkatiri, welcomed the<br />

“clear orientation” and the “firmness of<br />

position” adopted by Portugal in the recent<br />

session of the UN Human Rights<br />

Commission, which passed by majority<br />

vote a resolution condemning the Suharto<br />

regime. In the same letter, Alkatiri went on<br />

to state that “any political solution<br />

negotiated on <strong>Timor</strong> must be found within<br />

the framework of the UN and through the<br />

mediation of its Secretary General.” The<br />

next round of negotiations between<br />

Portugal’s and Indonesia’s Foreign<br />

Ministers, with Boutros Ghali’s mediation,<br />

is scheduled to commence on 20 April, in<br />

Rome.<br />

DENMARK WANTS EC<br />

OBSERVER FOR EAST<br />

TIMOR<br />

Publico 22 March 19<strong>93</strong> Dateline : Denmark<br />

Byline : Morten Gliemann Original lang:<br />

Portuguese unabridged<br />

Danish Foreign Minister, Niels Helveg<br />

Petersen, is going to try to get a European<br />

Community (EC) observer sent to <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>, while his country is still in the<br />

Presidency of the Community.<br />

On 2 March, Viggo Fischer, a member of<br />

the Folketing, the Danish Parliament,<br />

requested the Foreign Minister to work towards<br />

the sending of a Community observer<br />

to <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. Fischer, member of the<br />

parliamentary commission on foreign policy<br />

and always interested in human rights<br />

issues, has already received a positive reply<br />

from the government: “I can assure you that<br />

the Danish Government, the Community,<br />

and its different Member States are<br />

following the case carefully,” wrote the<br />

Minister, in his reply to the parliament.<br />

“The proceedings against Xanana<br />

Gusmão, in Dili, started on 1 February<br />

19<strong>93</strong>, and the largest Communitary representations<br />

in Jakarta (Holland, France,<br />

Spain, Great Britain, and the European<br />

Commission) established coordinated coverage<br />

of the trial (...) There should be no<br />

doubt that the Government, together with<br />

our Community partners, will continue to<br />

observe the development of the situation in<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>,” added the Danish Foreign<br />

Minister in his reply dated 17 March.<br />

In his letter, the Danish Foreign Minister<br />

did not state directly that an observer from<br />

the EC should be sent to <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, but<br />

Viggo Fischer states that there is a<br />

possibility: “It would be very useful, for<br />

several reasons, if we could send a representative,<br />

or better still, an observer from<br />

the EC: an historic resolution was passed by<br />

the UN, at the 49th Session of the Human<br />

Rights Commission; a relatively short time<br />

ago, there were elections in Indonesia; and<br />

there are reports that Xanana Gusmão’s trial<br />

is going to be postponed.”<br />

Fischer says that the situation demands<br />

“special attention” on the part of the international<br />

community, because the<br />

“repression which the Indonesian<br />

Government wields over the people of <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> is one of the most brutal in the<br />

world,” he concludes.<br />

EURO-MPS’ VISIT AWAITS<br />

GREEN LIGHT<br />

Publico 26 March 19<strong>93</strong> By J. T. Negreiros<br />

Translated from Portuguese abridged<br />

(Lisbon) The old project of a Euro-MPs’<br />

visit to <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> is still awaiting a green<br />

light from the European Parliament’s<br />

“bureau.” Once that is obtained, Jakarta’s<br />

agreement would still be necessary, as well<br />

as finalizing the details of the visit. It is not<br />

surprising, therefore, that the EP’s<br />

Intergroup on <strong>Timor</strong> Chairperson, French<br />

woman Simone Veil, has not advanced any<br />

date for the visit to the territory.<br />

Veil, who arrived in Portugal yesterday<br />

for a two- day visit, and whose first task<br />

was a meeting with the Foreign Minister,<br />

stressed the importance of the existence of<br />

an Intergroup on <strong>Timor</strong> in Strasbourg,<br />

comprised of MPs of various nationalities<br />

and political colours - “the diversity is important,”<br />

but could not foresee any specific<br />

action by the EP on <strong>Timor</strong> in the shortterm.<br />

Less than a month ago, during a meeting<br />

with the Intergroup’s Euro-MPs in<br />

Strasbourg, Durão Barroso proposed that<br />

more intense pressure should be brought to<br />

bear by the EP on the Japanese Diet and the<br />

US Congress. Yesterday, confronted with<br />

the suggestion, Simone Veil would only say<br />

that the EP’s delegations in Tokyo and<br />

Washington continued to develop contacts<br />

with the respective parliaments.<br />

The possibility of getting a new resolution<br />

on <strong>Timor</strong> passed by the plenary in<br />

Strasbourg shortly was rejected by the<br />

Intergroup’s Chairperson, who recalled the<br />

recent text about the illegality of Xanana<br />

Gusmão’s trial. Judging from Simone Veil’s<br />

statements, action by the EP in the near<br />

future is going to stop there.<br />

In spite of reference to a “common strategy”<br />

on <strong>Timor</strong> by the Intergroup and<br />

Lisbon, Simone Veil refused to make any<br />

comment on the possible outcome of the<br />

forthcoming meeting between Durão<br />

Barroso and Ali Alatas, the date of which<br />

has moved from 20 to 21 April.<br />

BRITISH FM DOUGLAS HURD<br />

TO VISIT JAKARTA<br />

According to AFP from Jakarta on 31<br />

March 19<strong>93</strong>, Britain’s Foreign Secretary,<br />

Douglas Hurd, is to visit Jakarta from 3 to 5<br />

April on his way to Tokyo and South<br />

Korea. He is scheduled to have meetings in<br />

Jakarta with Foreign Minister Ali Alatas<br />

and President Suharto for wide-ranging talks<br />

on bilateral and international issues. He is<br />

also scheduled to sign three accords, on<br />

double taxation, copyrights and a soft loan.


Page 104 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

According to TAPOL sources in London,<br />

the G7 group has not agreed to the proposal<br />

that Suharto attend their next meeting in<br />

Tokyo, as chair of the non-aligned movement,<br />

but Britain would have no objection<br />

to Suharto being in Tokyo in advance of the<br />

meeting to make known the views of the<br />

non-aligned movement to members of the<br />

group.<br />

DOUGLAS HURD’S VISIT TO<br />

INDONESIA<br />

The following is a round-up of reports<br />

broadcast by the BBC World Service under<br />

the byline of Adam Brooks, about the visit to<br />

Indonesia of Britain’s Foreign Secretary<br />

Douglas Hurd from 3 - 5 April 19<strong>93</strong>, by<br />

TAPOL:<br />

* In a speech to the Indonesian<br />

Department of Foreign Affairs Forum on<br />

Monday, Hurd said that human rights are<br />

seen as an integral part of economic development,<br />

not what he called some alien<br />

Western and dispensable add-on. He said<br />

there was no contradiction between more<br />

democracy and economic prosperity.<br />

Indonesia’s human rights record has been<br />

widely criticised internationally especially<br />

over the actions of its security forces in <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>. The Indonesian Foreign Minister,<br />

Ali Alatas, said earlier on Monday at a<br />

press conference that accusations leveled at<br />

Indonesia on human rights were often<br />

unsubstantiated and exaggerated and<br />

sometimes took on the nature of a political<br />

campaign rather than a genuine desire to<br />

protect human rights<br />

Mr. Hurd noted in his speech that<br />

Indonesia has proposed the establishment of<br />

a national body to protect human rights. A<br />

BBC correspondent in Jakarta says that<br />

while Mr. Hurd avoided specific criticism of<br />

Indonesia, the speech reflected current<br />

differences of opinion between Western and<br />

developing countries on how human rights<br />

should be implemented.<br />

* British sources said that during a<br />

meeting with Douglas Hurd, President<br />

Suharto raised the question of his possible<br />

attendance at the G7 summit very gently<br />

amid much laughter (sic). He said that this<br />

could contribute to what he calls the revival<br />

of a north/south dialogue. But the idea has<br />

met with a cool reception from G7 countries<br />

and Mr. Hurd on Monday avoided making<br />

any commitment:<br />

Hurd’s voice:<br />

“Two things. First of all it’s perfectly<br />

reasonable that developing countries through<br />

the non-aligned movement should want to<br />

communicate with the industrialised<br />

countries. But the Group of Seven is not<br />

meant to be a great sort of directorate of the<br />

industrialised world and we’re certainly<br />

against adding to it new structures of consultation.<br />

I don’t think that’s a good idea.”<br />

British sources say it’s likely that some<br />

sort of compromise would be reached to<br />

avoid a diplomatic snub to President<br />

Suharto.<br />

* Mr. Hurd, during his visit, also dealt<br />

with the thorny question of human rights in<br />

Indonesia, particularly in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. Mr.<br />

Hurd said there were continuing anxieties<br />

over reports of human rights abuses by<br />

Indonesian troops in the territory.<br />

* Mr. Hurd signed three agreements with<br />

the Indonesians, including a concessionary<br />

loan from Britain for over one hundred<br />

million US dollars.<br />

LONDON ‘INDEPENDENT’ ON<br />

HURD’S VISIT<br />

An Independent, 6 April 19<strong>93</strong> report, bylined<br />

Reuter and datelined Jakarta, reads, slightly<br />

abridged:<br />

The Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd,<br />

said yesterday he had raised concerns about<br />

the relatively light sentences given to<br />

Indonesian soldiers tried in the shooting of<br />

protesters demanding independence for <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

“I mentioned that we do have some continuing<br />

concerns... over the disparity in<br />

sentencing between military and civilians”<br />

although these were matters for Indonesia’s<br />

judicial system, Mr. Hurd said, after talks<br />

with his Indonesian counterpart, Ali Alatas.<br />

Despite Mr. Hurd’s expression of concern,<br />

however, he yesterday signed an<br />

agreement to grant Indonesia 65m in aid to<br />

help finance a power project. The concessional<br />

loan which is ties to the involvement<br />

of British companies, was for a 66-megawatt<br />

gas and steam power plant in eastern<br />

Kalimantan.<br />

TAPOL<br />

WITH THE TIMORESE BUT<br />

WITHOUT FRETILIN AT EC<br />

HEARING<br />

Publico 27 March 19<strong>93</strong> By J. T. Negreiros.<br />

Translated from Portuguese. abridged<br />

(Lisbon) The absence of any Fretilin<br />

representative was the discordant note in<br />

the meeting between Simone Veil and the<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese community, with whom the current<br />

President of the Euro-Parliament’s<br />

Intergroup on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> yesterday commenced<br />

the second and last day of her visit<br />

to Lisbon.<br />

Accompanied by Euro-MPs Rui Amaral,<br />

João Cravinho, Sergio Ribeiro and Pedro<br />

Canavarro - all members of the Intergroups,<br />

composed of MPs of various nationalities<br />

and political tendencies, Simone Veil heard<br />

the <strong>Timor</strong>ese appeal for her help in the task<br />

of making the international community<br />

aware of the situation in the territory.<br />

At the end of yesterday morning’s<br />

meeting, which took place in the EP office in<br />

Lisbon, the statements were left up to the<br />

UDT representatives. Manuel Martires,<br />

Xanana Gusmão’s cousin, pointed out<br />

Simone Veil’s “weight,” and praised her<br />

availability. Zacarias da Costa, heading the<br />

UDT delegation in Portugal, expressed the<br />

hope that such meetings would continue to<br />

occur on a regular basis.<br />

Simone Veil then went on to meeting the<br />

Prime Minister. As well being “impressed”<br />

by the direct contact with the <strong>Timor</strong>ese,<br />

Simone Veil informed Cavaco Silva of the<br />

Intergroup’s activities. The Portuguese PM<br />

told her about the forthcoming meeting<br />

between Durão Barroso and Ali Alatas, set<br />

for 2l April, in Rome.<br />

Before lunch with the President, finalizing<br />

Simone Veil’s visit, the Euro-MP and<br />

Intergroup Chairperson went to the French<br />

Embassy to give the Legion of Honour insignia<br />

to Portuguese deputy Antonio Maria<br />

Pereira, current Chairman of the<br />

Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Commission.<br />

(...)<br />

REPORT FROM FRENCH<br />

SOLIDARITY MOVEMENT<br />

By Bruno Kahn, Agir Pour <strong>Timor</strong>, April 6<br />

Personal comment: whatever the drawbacks<br />

inside, international pressure is constantly<br />

growing. There will eventually be a breaking<br />

point. Cheer up!<br />

1. “500 associations for <strong>Timor</strong>.” This<br />

campaign, launched in 1992 by the<br />

Federation of Portuguese Associations in<br />

France (FAPF), collected to this date about<br />

100 signatures. FAPF, together with<br />

Antonio Dias, President of Agir pour<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>, was received by the Portuguese<br />

Ambassador in France on March 25 and<br />

delivered him the list of these associations.<br />

They will also be received shortly, for the<br />

same purpose, by a representative of the<br />

Direction for Asia of the Foreign Ministry.<br />

The list was also sent to Jacques Delors,<br />

(EC), the UN Secretary General,<br />

UNESCO’s Secretary General, Amnesty<br />

International, the Human Rights League and<br />

the three Portuguese Consults of the greater<br />

Paris area.<br />

FAPF writes: “... (this participation)<br />

shows that our associative movement is<br />

opening itself to other horizons than its<br />

traditional activities. Associations may be<br />

centres of culture, leisure or sports, but they<br />

should also be centres of reflection and<br />

solidarity towards those who need our support<br />

and help.”


<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 105<br />

2. Petition campaign. Agir pour <strong>Timor</strong><br />

launched this week-end a petition to the<br />

new government (formed after the March<br />

elections here). It requests the French government:<br />

a) To demand the immediate release of<br />

Xanana Gusmão and all <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />

prisoners. b) To demand the immediate<br />

opening of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> to foreign observers,<br />

humanitarian and human rights organisations.<br />

c) To demand the visit in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>,<br />

as soon as possible, of the UN Special<br />

Rapporteur on Torture, the Special<br />

Rapporteur on Extra-judicial, Summary or<br />

Arbitrary Executions, the Working Group<br />

on Arbitrary Detention and the Working<br />

Group on Involuntary Disappearances. d)<br />

To end immediately the sales of French<br />

arms and military equipment to Indonesia,<br />

under a direct or indirect form (exploitation<br />

licenses). e) To condition its economic aid to<br />

the respect of human rights by Jakarta’s<br />

regime, in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and in Indonesia. f)<br />

To support the right of the people of <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> to self-determination.<br />

The campaign has already collected over<br />

100 signatures.<br />

3. Reseau Solidarité [Solidarity<br />

<strong>Network</strong>]. This NGOs aim is to “mobilise<br />

the opinion at the sides of the Peoples of<br />

the South fighting for their rights.” For the<br />

first time, they launch a campaign on <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>. 1800 copies of this appeal are mailed<br />

in France, and 250 in Belgium. The<br />

campaign proposes a letter to the<br />

Indonesian ambassador in France, endorsing<br />

the UNHRC resolution and asking the<br />

Indonesian government “to continue the<br />

dialogue with the Secretary-General of the<br />

United Nations for achieving a just, comprehensive<br />

and internationally acceptable<br />

settlement of the question of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.”<br />

Reseau Solidarité also launches campaigns<br />

on specific issues, like unfair labour<br />

practices etc., on the request of the victims.<br />

Their address is:<br />

Reseau Solidarité<br />

5 rue Bizette, 35000 Rennes, France<br />

tel: +33 99 388240, fax: +33 99 380150<br />

4. Reporters sans Frontieres [Reporters<br />

without Borders]. This association of journalists<br />

“acts in favour of the freedom of the<br />

press throughout the world.” They are interested<br />

in breaches of the freedom of the<br />

press in Indonesia, particularly about reporting<br />

on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. The Indonesia/<strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> section of their 1992 report is excellent,<br />

but they are constantly in search of<br />

reliable information. Currently they are interested<br />

in the conditions of Xanana’s trial<br />

in Dili, in particular: - the list of foreign<br />

journalists accredited there - what can they<br />

report on the trial? Also, the way the<br />

Indonesian press reports on it.<br />

We can give partial answers to their<br />

questions, but any more complete information<br />

is welcome. Either post it, forward it to<br />

kahn@mathp7.jussieu.fr or send it directly<br />

to<br />

Jean-Louis Donnadieu<br />

Reporters sans Frontieres<br />

17 rue de l’Abbe de l’Epee, 34000<br />

Montpellier, France<br />

tel: +33 67 79 81 82, fax: +33 67 79 60<br />

80<br />

Many thanks in advance.<br />

EVENTS IN THE<br />

UNITED STATES<br />

REPORT FROM EAST TIMOR<br />

ACTION NETWORK / U.S. TO<br />

THE SOLIDARITY MEETING<br />

Amsterdam, 19 February 19<strong>93</strong><br />

Since our formation a little over a year<br />

ago, ETAN/US has grown to over 600<br />

members in more than half of the fifty<br />

states. As the first broad-based, grassroots,<br />

United States organization focusing on <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> in many years, we discovered that we<br />

are filling a vacuum, and the response is<br />

encouraging ... and overwhelming. We are an<br />

all-volunteer organization with limited<br />

funding, but have been able to achieve much<br />

more than we expected.<br />

Among our major activities in 1992:<br />

• Successfully lobbying Congress to terminate<br />

US military aid to Indonesia<br />

• Working with officials to get the US<br />

Conference of Mayors to pass a resolution<br />

• Organizing or assisting in public meetings<br />

at numerous universities and communities,<br />

and arranging speaking dates in<br />

many others<br />

• Creating a network of active ETAN local<br />

groups in a dozen cities, and developing<br />

working relationships with many other<br />

organizations and public officials<br />

• Providing logistical support for CNRM,<br />

Fretilin and other international <strong>Timor</strong><br />

activists when they come to the US<br />

• Producing four issues of a bi-monthly<br />

Newsletter for all our members, and 20<br />

volumes (over 1100 pages) of a<br />

Document Compilation that goes to subscribers<br />

all over the world<br />

• Organizing protests, memorials and<br />

demonstrations at Indonesian government<br />

facilities, when Indonesian officials<br />

(Alatas and Suharto) visited the US, on<br />

significant anniversaries and internationally<br />

coordinated dates<br />

• Working with the international solidarity<br />

movement on the Urgent Appeal and<br />

other UN-related activities, and providing<br />

information for that movement on US<br />

government policies<br />

• Producing and distributing a nationallybroadcast<br />

cable television program, and<br />

publicizing other media events<br />

• Distributing books, videos, audio tapes,<br />

petitions and other resources to help<br />

educate Americans about <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

• Raising money for victims of the Flores<br />

earthquake<br />

• Providing information, statements and<br />

alerts to American and UN-based journalists,<br />

students and researchers<br />

• Writing or arranging for articles on <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> in many publications, including a<br />

regular column in the Bulletin of<br />

Concerned Asian Scholars<br />

• Sending one of our activists to <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>, and helping him get his observations<br />

out to a wide audience. Receiving<br />

information from inside <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and<br />

disseminating it to appropriate people<br />

• Facilitating US and international computer<br />

communications<br />

• Arranging for the retirement of George<br />

Herbert Walker Bush<br />

• In 19<strong>93</strong>, we will continue these activities.<br />

In addition, we will<br />

• Work with the Australian-initiated<br />

“<strong>Timor</strong>ese UN Project” to bring five <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese exiles on a speaking tour of the<br />

United States in April<br />

• Use the new Noam Chomsky film<br />

Manufacturing Consent to reach out to<br />

new people<br />

• Lobby Congress and the Clinton administration<br />

to cut off US weapons sales<br />

to Indonesia and take other action to increase<br />

pressure the Suharto regime and to<br />

change the US approach to <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> at<br />

the United Nations<br />

SILENT GENOCIDE: EAST<br />

TIMOR STRUGGLES FOR<br />

GLOBAL ATTENTION – AND<br />

FOR ITS LIFE<br />

By Matthew Restall, “Los Angeles Village<br />

View,” Feb. 19-25, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

“Genocide is a word much overused in<br />

modern times for any old massacre. In <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> it suits the circumstances perfectly.”<br />

–"Observer” reporter Hugh O’Shaughnessy<br />

“When I think of Indonesia - a country on<br />

the equator with 180 million people, a<br />

median age of eighteen, and a Muslim ban<br />

on alcohol - I feel I know what heaven looks<br />

like.”


Page 106 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

–Coca-Cola president Donald Keough<br />

Remember those Army wives in the<br />

evening news two years ago talking about<br />

the need to defend Kuwait against the<br />

Iraqis? “Look,” said one, “they raped a<br />

country.”<br />

At about the same time, in another corner<br />

of the world, the following incident was<br />

taking place. “A company of government<br />

troops captured this seventeen-year-old<br />

girl,” a priest later told an undercover British<br />

reporter. “They repeatedly raped her, cut<br />

off her breasts, put one in each hand, cut off<br />

her private parts and stuffed them in her<br />

mouth and left her corpse for the rest to<br />

see.”<br />

This took place in a land that almost no<br />

Americans have even heard of: <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

Were this an isolated act of atrocity, one<br />

might expect it completely to be ignored by<br />

Washington and the U.S. media. But, far<br />

from being isolated, this brutal murder was<br />

only one tragic episode in a seventeen-year<br />

story of torture, murder, and oppression. In<br />

October 1991, yet another young pro- independence<br />

suspect was murdered in <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> by the Indonesian military, which<br />

showed up at his funeral and opened fire on<br />

the unarmed mourners, killing some 200<br />

men, women, and children. The “incident,”<br />

as the government called it, brought the<br />

number of victims in this tragedy to over<br />

200,000. What does our government have to<br />

say about it? Nothing.<br />

The reason is simple enough. The island<br />

nation that is being destroyed has no strategic<br />

value - <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> is located some 400<br />

miles north of Australia - while the aggressor,<br />

Indonesia, is a staunch U.S. ally. So<br />

staunch an ally is Indonesia (whose dictator,<br />

General Suharto, came to power nearly 30<br />

years ago by murdering almost one million<br />

alleged Indonesian communists in less than<br />

two years) that the U.S. not only turned a<br />

blind eye but actually connived in the<br />

invasion of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

A Portuguese colony for centuries, <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> declared independence in December<br />

1974. Six days later, President Ford and<br />

Secretary of State Kissinger visited Suharto<br />

in Jakarta. Kissinger told reporters that,<br />

with respect to <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, “the United<br />

States understands Indonesia’s position on<br />

the question.” The next day, Indonesia invaded.<br />

Said the Indonesian foreign minister<br />

in 1977: “Fifty thousand or perhaps 80,000<br />

might have been killed. It was war... what’s<br />

the big fuss?” His successor admitted two<br />

years later that 120,000 had died.<br />

According to our State Department, 90<br />

percent of the weapons used in the invasion<br />

were U.S.-supplied. “The U.S. regards<br />

Indonesia as a friendly nation,” explained a<br />

department official in 1976, “a nation we do<br />

a lot of business with.” The current death<br />

toll–200,000–amounts to a third of the<br />

population of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

Not that all blame can be assigned to the<br />

Indonesian military government and<br />

Kissinger (how does this man sleep at<br />

night?). Successive U.S. administrations and<br />

other Western governments have studiously<br />

avoided the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> issue for a decade<br />

and a half (only Portugal, in recompense for<br />

its abandonment of the <strong>Timor</strong>ese in the<br />

1970s, has been fighting for international<br />

recognition of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>’s independence).<br />

Pope John Paul II, ever mindful to betray<br />

the common man, recognized the Indonesian<br />

occupation by even refusing to mention it<br />

during his 1989 visit to <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> - despite<br />

the fact that Catholic priests have been<br />

tortured and killed along with their <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />

parishioners.<br />

Another reason why Jakarta has gotten<br />

away with murder is its manipulation of the<br />

international media - and, by the same token,<br />

the media’s failure to shake that manipulation.<br />

Form 1975 to 1989, <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

was completely closed to the world. Yet the<br />

reports that did get out were ignored by the<br />

mainstream press. Not until two New York<br />

City reporters were badly beaten by the<br />

Indonesian military (at the time of the<br />

November 1991 funeral massacre) was attention<br />

drawn to footage of the killings, finally<br />

prompting international condemnation<br />

of Indonesia’ policy.<br />

Even then, the Western political and<br />

media establishments allowed Jakarta’s response<br />

to the outcry - a massive PR campaign<br />

coupled with an increase in repressive<br />

military measures in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> - effectively<br />

to neutralize opposition. Suharto,<br />

hiring the Washington PR firm Hill and<br />

Knowlton (used to peddle the Gulf War to<br />

the American people) to sell the 1991 massacre<br />

as a justifiable “incident,” was assisted<br />

by stooges such as Sens. Inouye and<br />

Stevens, who were “impressed” by the<br />

dictator’s handling of the matter in a visit to<br />

Jakarta last year. Aid cuts and statements of<br />

disapproval had become patchy by early<br />

1992; by the end of the year, business between<br />

the West and Indonesia returned to<br />

normal. Meanwhile, Indonesian troops<br />

captured Xanana Gusmão, head of the<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese independence movement, who<br />

was beaten and tortured for months, forced<br />

to make pro-government statements on<br />

video, and who is now being publicly humiliated<br />

in a show trial.<br />

The world, obsessed by Somalia and<br />

Bosnia and local politics, has ignored the<br />

latest round of brutality in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. New<br />

tales of torture, rape, and murder have yet<br />

to make it to the mainstream press beyond<br />

the occasional <strong>East</strong> Coast editorial. Well<br />

aware of this opportunity, the Indonesian<br />

military has been rounding up thousands of<br />

pro-independence “sympathizers,” who are<br />

now being detained as “guerrillas” and<br />

“terrorists.”<br />

There can be no doubt that what<br />

Indonesia is doing in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> is genocide.<br />

The numbers of <strong>Timor</strong>ese victims, and the<br />

steady, supervised influx of non-<strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />

into the region, speaks of a lethal colonial<br />

policy. Nor can there be any doubt that the<br />

West, in continuing to support the<br />

Indonesian dictatorship through political,<br />

diplomatic, economic, and military aid, is a<br />

party to the genocide. It is reported that<br />

President Clinton has strong views on the<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese issue, but he has yet to make a<br />

public statement on it of any kind. It is time<br />

such a statement is made.<br />

SENATOR PELL STATEMENT<br />

ON EAST TIMOR<br />

In the U.S. Senate, February 24, 19<strong>93</strong><br />

By Claiborne Pell, Democrat-Rhode Island,<br />

Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations<br />

Committee. Taken from the Congressional<br />

Record S1991-1992, full text.<br />

Mr. President, last Monday the trial of<br />

the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese resistance leader, José<br />

“Xanana” Gusmão, began in Dili, <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>. Last year I attempted to visit <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> but was denied permission by<br />

President Suharto. Indonesian authorities<br />

told me that such a visit was not convenient<br />

following the massacre by Indonesian security<br />

forces of 75 to 100 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />

civilians during a peaceful demonstration in<br />

Dili on November 12, 1991.<br />

The roots of the conflict in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

are in the December 7, 1975, Indonesian<br />

invasion of the territory following<br />

Portugal’s precipitous withdrawal after 450<br />

years of colonial rule. The U.N. General<br />

Assembly and Security Council have passed<br />

resolutions condemning the invasion and<br />

calling for self determination for the <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese. American policy has been to<br />

accept Indonesia’s incorporation of <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> without acknowledging that it was a<br />

valid act of self- determination.<br />

The Indonesian human rights situation<br />

overall is deeply troubling. As the recently<br />

released Department of State’s annual human<br />

rights report for 1992 observed generally<br />

about Indonesia:<br />

“In addition to extrajudicial killings and<br />

unfair trials, other serious human rights<br />

problems continued. They include torture<br />

and other mistreatment of prisoners and<br />

detainees, arbitrary arrest and detention,<br />

arbitrary interference with privacy, significant<br />

restrictions on freedom of the speech<br />

and press, assembly and association, and on<br />

freedom of movement, and the inability of


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citizens to change their government. Other<br />

problem areas include harassment of human<br />

rights monitors, discrimination and violence<br />

against women, and restrictions on worker<br />

rights.”<br />

Such is the situation or <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> but<br />

even more so. As the State Department report<br />

notes, for example, last October 5 two<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese were shot by security forces.<br />

One was killed immediately while the other<br />

was taken to a military hospital where he<br />

was then beaten to death. Security forces<br />

involved in the Dili massacre were charged<br />

with relatively minor offenses while 13<br />

civilians charged for demonstrating received<br />

extremely harsh sentences. The Indonesian<br />

authorities have yet to locate 66 people<br />

missing following the massacre whom the<br />

State Department now believes are all dead.<br />

The report further states that in “<strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> military authorities continued the<br />

practice of detaining people without charges<br />

for short periods and then requiring them to<br />

report daily or weekly to the police after<br />

their release. There were credible reports of<br />

scores of people being detained without<br />

charges at various times during the year for<br />

enforced vocational training.”<br />

In addition the State Department reports<br />

that the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese are regularly subjected<br />

to arrest, temporary detentions, intrusive<br />

searches and beatings. After Mr.<br />

Gusmão was arrested, there were credible<br />

reports that members of his family and<br />

friends were also detained possibly to ensure<br />

his cooperation with the Indonesian<br />

authorities during his trial.<br />

The International Committee of the Red<br />

Cross (ICRC) which maintains a presence in<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> has been trying without success<br />

for the last 2 months to gain access to about<br />

24 detainees being held in a military<br />

detention center in Baucau. There has been a<br />

persistent pattern or denial to all requests<br />

by international human rights groups. For<br />

example, the ICRC has been permitted only<br />

one visit to Mr. Gusmão’s jail cell since his<br />

capture on November 20, and this only occurred<br />

on December 7. Amnesty<br />

International’s request to observe his trial in<br />

Dili has been denied despite a claim by the<br />

Indonesian Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas,<br />

that the trial would be open. To Indonesia’s<br />

credit, however, several foreign journalists<br />

have been granted permission to visit Dili,<br />

including ABC although the BBC has not<br />

been so authorized.<br />

In addition Indonesian authorities have<br />

restricted defendant access to legal assistance.<br />

When I was in Jakarta, I met with<br />

lawyers from the Indonesian legal aid society.<br />

They were not permitted to meet with<br />

their <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese clients until the day of<br />

their trial. They were denied access to Mr.<br />

Gusmão and instead later received a letter<br />

from him delivered by the police, authorizing<br />

the police to appoint his defense attorney.<br />

According to reports, this attorney<br />

does not speak Mr. Gusmão’s language.<br />

The pattern of past practices and recent<br />

actions all call into question the fairness of<br />

Mr. Gusmão’s trial as well as Indonesian<br />

policy in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

Last year the Congress passed Foreign<br />

Relations Authorization legislation which<br />

the President signed into law urging the<br />

Indonesian government to end all forms or<br />

human rights violations in <strong>East</strong> and calling<br />

for an internationally acceptable solution to<br />

the conflict. Events since then indicate that<br />

the Government of Indonesia still has not<br />

understood the depth of American concern<br />

for the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese.<br />

Recent Indonesian-Portuguese talks<br />

sponsored by the United Nations to resolve<br />

the dispute are at an impasse. The United<br />

States should press both sides to renew<br />

their discussions while including representatives<br />

from <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

The United States should support a<br />

resolution during the 49th session of the<br />

United Nations Human Rights Commission<br />

expressing international concern about the<br />

continuing human rights abuses in <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

Finally, Indonesia should demonstrate its<br />

good faith by inviting the U.N. Special<br />

Rapporteur on Summary and Arbitrary<br />

Executions and the Working Group on<br />

Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances to<br />

come to <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> to recommend procedures<br />

to prevent human rights abuses.<br />

A peaceful resolution to this conflict can<br />

only be achieved by compromise and negotiation<br />

between the parties most involved –<br />

the Indonesian and the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese. I<br />

hope the Indonesians soon recognize the<br />

value of such discussions because their current<br />

policy is doomed to failure.<br />

US STATE DEPARTMENT’S<br />

ANNUAL REPORT ON HUMAN<br />

RIGHTS PRACTICES IN<br />

INDONESIA<br />

This report covers calendar year 1992. The<br />

State Department is legally required by<br />

Congress to send it this and other country<br />

reports every year. The reports are usually<br />

made available to the public each February.<br />

We reprint the entire report because it<br />

provides an insight into past US policies,<br />

since it was prepared under the Bush<br />

administration.<br />

INDONESIA<br />

Indonesia is a very large, populous, developing<br />

country whose people come from<br />

hundreds of different ethnic, cultural, and<br />

linguistic backgrounds. With the largest<br />

Muslim population in the world, it is a<br />

secular state which advocates religious tolerance<br />

and strives to balance the need for<br />

stability and development with respect and<br />

tolerance for the diversity of its people. The<br />

Government requires allegiance to five<br />

broad, guiding principles of national life<br />

known as “Pancasila": belief in one supreme<br />

God, a just and civilized humanity,<br />

Indonesian national unity, democracy, and<br />

social justice. The Government’s authoritarian<br />

rule restricts basic human rights.<br />

Under the Constitution, the highest<br />

authority of the State is the 1,000-member<br />

people’s Consultative Assembly (MPR),<br />

which meets every 5 years to elect the<br />

President and Vice President and set the<br />

broad outlines of state policy. In theory, the<br />

President is subordinate to the Assembly; in<br />

fact, President Suharto and the armed forces<br />

(ABRI) wield predominant political power,<br />

with 20 percent of the DPR, or Parliament,<br />

appointed from the ranks of ABRI. The<br />

Parliament is constitutionally responsible<br />

for making laws but has not used its power<br />

to initiate legislation in the 27 years of<br />

Suharto’s Government. It remains<br />

essentially passive in its dealings with the<br />

executive branch. Quinquennial<br />

parliamentary elections are tightly controlled<br />

by the Government and the military.<br />

The de facto government party, GOLKAR,<br />

won 68 percent of the vote in the most recent<br />

elections in June 1992.<br />

The armed forces which include the<br />

military services and the police number<br />

445,000. The army constitutes about half of<br />

the armed forces and focuses mainly on internal<br />

security. Total military expenditures<br />

for 1989, the last year for which the U.S.<br />

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency<br />

conducted a detailed analysis, were $1.51<br />

billion. Given the relatively modest size of<br />

the military forces and their budget, there<br />

are no indications that efforts will be made<br />

to reduce these expenditures in the near<br />

future. Under a “dual function” concept,<br />

many military officers serve in the civilian<br />

bureaucracy at all levels and in Parliament.<br />

Public discussion about reducing the military’s<br />

role in national affairs increased<br />

during the year. Security forces continued<br />

operations against separatist groups in<br />

Aceh, Irian Jaya, and <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> in 1992.<br />

On occasion, police in Jakarta and Medan<br />

employed excessive force in subduing suspected<br />

criminals.<br />

Indonesia has a largely free market<br />

economy characterized by large oil revenues<br />

and government attempts to encourage<br />

nonoil exports and revenues. The economy<br />

continued to expand in 1992, growing approximately<br />

6 percent despite government<br />

efforts to contain inflation. Although there


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were substantial increases in real incomes<br />

and in the standard of living of most<br />

Indonesians in the past 20 years, the country<br />

remains poor, with significant unemployment<br />

and wide disparities in wealth.<br />

Corruption and influence peddling are endemic<br />

and distort growth and economic opportunity.<br />

The most important human rights developments<br />

during the year concerned government<br />

efforts to cope with the aftermath<br />

of army troops’ killing of unarmed demonstrators<br />

on November 12, 1991, in <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>. At the recommendation of a military<br />

investigating body formed on President<br />

Suharto’s orders, unprecedented disciplinary<br />

action was taken against 6 senior officers<br />

and 10 officers and enlisted men involved<br />

in the incident. Thirteen <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />

civilians were convicted in connection with<br />

the incident. Most of the latter received<br />

extremely harsh sentences. Members of the<br />

security forces involved in the shootings<br />

were charged only with relatively minor offenses.<br />

While the civilians’ trials were open<br />

and generally conducted in accordance with<br />

Indonesian law, they failed to meet all<br />

international standards of fairness.<br />

Subversion trials in North Sumatra and Aceh<br />

also failed to meet international standards.<br />

In addition to extrajudicial killings and<br />

unfair trials, other serious human rights<br />

problems continued. They include torture<br />

and other mistreatment of prisoners and<br />

detainees, arbitrary arrest and detention,<br />

arbitrary interference with privacy, significant<br />

restrictions on freedom of speech and<br />

press, assembly and association, and on<br />

freedom of movement, and the inability of<br />

citizens to change their government. Other<br />

problem areas include harassment of human<br />

rights monitors, discrimination and violence<br />

against women, and restrictions on worker<br />

rights.<br />

In other human rights areas, foreign travel<br />

requirements were eased. The June 9<br />

elections were free from violence and interference<br />

from security forces, and, while<br />

minor irregularities occurred, the actual<br />

balloting was considered fair. The<br />

Government continued its generous policy<br />

toward Indochinese refugees and its cooperation<br />

with the International Committee of<br />

the Red Cross (ICRC) on the repatriation of<br />

Irianese who had fled to Papua New Guinea<br />

because of separatist violence. But official<br />

and informal discrimination against ethnic<br />

Chinese persisted. The Government<br />

accepted a chairman’s statement at the U.N.<br />

Human Rights Commission which commits<br />

it to respond to recommendations on<br />

preventing torture and to allowing greater<br />

access by human rights groups to <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>. However, the Government has as<br />

yet made no response on the recommendations,<br />

nor has it allowed greater access to<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS<br />

SECTION 1. RESPECT FOR THE<br />

INTEGRITY OF THE PERSON,<br />

INCLUDING FREEDOM FROM:<br />

a. Political and Other Extrajudicial<br />

Killing<br />

The number of credible reports of politically<br />

related civilian deaths has declined<br />

substantially since 1991, owing primarily to<br />

the fact that military operations in Aceh,<br />

Irian Jaya, and <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> declined. In Aceh<br />

in particular, the egregious abuses of the<br />

civilian population eased considerably<br />

compared to 1991, as security forces, having<br />

eliminated all but a handful of Aceh<br />

Merdeka (Free Aceh) armed separatists,<br />

turned to civic action projects. The security<br />

situation in Irian Jaya was also generally<br />

calm, with few, if any, civilian deaths reported<br />

due to actions by the military.<br />

In <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, tightened security and<br />

revised military procedures put into place<br />

following the November 12, 1991, shooting<br />

incident in Dili appeared to have led to a<br />

substantial reduction in civilian deaths attributable<br />

to security forces. The exact<br />

number and circumstances of the deaths of<br />

several Fretilin guerrillas reported killed<br />

could not be confirmed. Although the<br />

Government did take action against those<br />

involved in the November 1991 incident in<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, the Government made only<br />

minor efforts in 1992 to try and punish appropriately<br />

those responsible for killings,<br />

torture, and other abuses committed in<br />

previous years in Aceh and other areas.<br />

In Baucau, <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, two <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese were shot on October 5. One was<br />

killed outright by ABRI forces. A credible<br />

source believes the other, who was taken to<br />

a military hospital, was beaten to death<br />

while in the hands of ABRI.<br />

The Government continued to deal with<br />

the November 12, 1991, shooting of civilians<br />

in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. A military “Honorary<br />

Council” appointed by President Suharto in<br />

December 1991 to investigate the conduct of<br />

security forces in the incident announced its<br />

results in February, finding that some<br />

members of the security forces had been<br />

negligent, had failed to anticipate problems<br />

adequately, or had violated military ethics<br />

and discipline. As a result of this finding, 4<br />

officers and 6 enlisted members of the security<br />

forces were court-martialed in May<br />

and June, one on charges of assault and 9<br />

others on charges of exceeding or failing to<br />

obey official orders. No charges were<br />

brought against ABRI personnel for actually<br />

killing civilians during the incident in which<br />

50 to 100 people are thought to have died as<br />

a result of military action. All of the soldiers<br />

were convicted in sessions open to<br />

diplomatic observers and the press and received<br />

sentences ranging from 6 to 18<br />

months in prison. Six senior officers were<br />

disciplined; three, including the brigadier<br />

general who commanded security forces in<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> at the time of the incident, were<br />

discharged. Five other officers were investigated<br />

further, one of whom was to be retired<br />

early because of his alleged failure to<br />

act decisively during the incident.<br />

Little progress was made in locating<br />

those demonstrators still missing after the<br />

incident. The national investigatory commission<br />

refuted earlier military claims that<br />

only 19 people died on November 12 by<br />

stating in December 1991 that “about 50”<br />

were killed. The Commander of the Armed<br />

Forces reported to President Suharto in July<br />

that 66 people remained missing. But despite<br />

more than 6 months of investigation,<br />

the military claimed it had been unable to<br />

find any additional bodies beyond the 19<br />

originally accounted for. Although official<br />

accounts suggested that some of the 66 were<br />

still in hiding, credible sources believed<br />

most, if not all, of them were dead.<br />

Police continue to use excessive lethal<br />

force in efforts to apprehend suspected<br />

criminals. According to press accounts, police<br />

in Jakarta in 1991 shot 75 criminal<br />

suspects who were reportedly fleeing or<br />

resisting arrest, of whom 38 died. In 1992<br />

up to August, 40 suspects had been shot, 20<br />

of whom died. These shootings came against<br />

a background of a declining overall crime<br />

rate, but an increase in violent crimes.<br />

In Medan, the capital of North Sumatra,<br />

where the crime rate was also falling, police<br />

announced in 1992 that 182 suspects had<br />

been shot in 1991, of whom 2 died. In North<br />

Sumatra as a whole 220 suspects were shot.<br />

Through early December 1992, <strong>93</strong> suspects<br />

had been shot in North Sumatra, many of<br />

them 4 and 5 times. Two died of their<br />

wounds. Authorities maintained those shot<br />

had been fleeing and were given warnings, or<br />

were resisting arrest. They also denied they<br />

were pursuing a systematic policy aimed at<br />

discouraging crime. But human rights groups<br />

reported that at least some of those shot<br />

claimed they had been caught first,<br />

handcuffed, and then shot, sometimes at the<br />

police station.<br />

b. Disappearance<br />

There were no reports of politically motivated<br />

abductions in 1992. Government efforts<br />

to account for those still missing from<br />

the November 12, 1991, shooting incident<br />

were ineffective (see Section 1.a.).


<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 109<br />

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or<br />

Degrading Treatment or Punishment<br />

The Indonesian Criminal Procedures<br />

Code (KUHAP) contains a number of provisions<br />

aimed at protecting the accused.<br />

Statements from suspects or witnesses, for<br />

example, are supposed to be extracted<br />

without pressure of any kind, and pretrial<br />

procedures give suspects or their families<br />

the right to challenge the legality of their<br />

arrest or detention. In practice, however,<br />

torture and mistreatment of criminal suspects,<br />

detainees, and prisoners are common,<br />

and the legal protections are violated by the<br />

Government.<br />

The U.N. Special Rapporteur for Torture<br />

stated in his January report that, based on<br />

his November 1991 visit to Indonesia, he<br />

had concluded that “torture occurs in<br />

Indonesia, in particular in cases which are<br />

considered to endanger the security of the<br />

state.” The Special Rapporteur continued<br />

that in areas such as Aceh, Irian Jaya, and<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> which “are deemed to be unstable...torture<br />

is said to be practiced rather<br />

routinely.” In 1992 Aceh continued to be<br />

the area of greatest concern, although various<br />

credible observers noted a general improvement<br />

in the treatment of detainees and<br />

prisoners, perhaps related to the overall<br />

reduction in tensions there.<br />

Police often resort to physical abuse,<br />

even in minor incidents, and prison conditions<br />

in Indonesia tend to be harsh. Officials<br />

have publicly condemned police brutality<br />

and harsh prison conditions and<br />

occasionally instigate disciplinary action,<br />

including transfer, dismissal, trial, and<br />

sentencing to prison terms. In 1992 several<br />

policemen were court-martialed for mistreating<br />

or beating prisoners. In one case, as<br />

reported in the press, the convicted policeman<br />

continued to beat a suspect even<br />

though the suspect had already confessed.<br />

The suspect died shortly thereafter. This<br />

policeman was dismissed from service and<br />

sentenced to 4 years’ imprisonment. In<br />

Aceh, a military tribunal in January sentenced<br />

three policemen to between 2 1/2 and<br />

3 months in prison for beating a prisoner. A<br />

Medan military court in July sentenced a<br />

police sergeant to 14 months in prison for<br />

beating a suspect to death.<br />

d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile<br />

KUHAP contains protections against<br />

arbitrary arrest and detention and specifies<br />

the right of prisoners to notification of<br />

family. Warrants must be produced during<br />

an arrest except under specified conditions,<br />

such as when a suspect is caught in the act<br />

of committing a crime. Warrants are issued<br />

by police investigators to assist in their investigations<br />

or if sufficient evidence exists<br />

that a crime has been committed.<br />

Defendants have the right to legal counsel of<br />

their choice at every phase of an investigation<br />

and trial, and also have the right to<br />

know in detail the charges against them.<br />

Defendants are presumed innocent and may<br />

be granted bail. They or their families may<br />

also challenge the legality of their arrest and<br />

detention in a pretrial hearing and are<br />

entitled to sue for compensation if wrongfully<br />

detained. KUHAP also contains specific<br />

limits on periods of pretrial detention<br />

and specifies when the courts must get involved<br />

to approve extensions.<br />

In practice, these safeguards are often<br />

violated. Bail is rarely granted, especially in<br />

political cases. The authorities frequently<br />

interfere with access to defense counsel.<br />

Extensions of periods of detention are<br />

routinely approved. Pretrial proceedings are<br />

rarely initiated. In addition, suspects<br />

charged under the 1963 Antisubversion Law<br />

are subject to special procedures outside of<br />

KUHAP that allow, for example, the<br />

Attorney General on his own authority to<br />

hold a suspect for up to a year before trial.<br />

This 1-year period is renewable without<br />

limit. Special laws on corruption, economic<br />

crimes, and narcotics are similarly exempt<br />

from KUHAP’s protections. The Agency<br />

for Coordination of Assistance for the<br />

Consolidation of National Security<br />

(BAKORSTANAS) operates outside<br />

KUHAP and has wide discretion to detain<br />

and interrogate persons thought to threaten<br />

national security.<br />

National estimates on the number of<br />

arbitrary arrests or detentions without trial<br />

are not available. In Aceh 180 people accused<br />

of being members of Aceh Merdeka<br />

(Free Aceh) were released in 1992 after<br />

varying periods of detention, often incommunicado<br />

and without trial. The authorities<br />

released a total of 653 detainees in 1991,<br />

yielding a total of at least 833 persons detained<br />

without trial for various periods in<br />

connection with the Aceh insurgency. Many<br />

of those released were required to report<br />

back to the authorities at regular intervals.<br />

At least 50 more Acehnese were believed to<br />

be awaiting trial at year’s end, many<br />

without clear knowledge of the charges<br />

against them. (See Section 1.e. for a discussion<br />

of those Acehnese who received<br />

trials.)<br />

In <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> military authorities continued<br />

the practice of detaining people<br />

without charges for short periods and then<br />

requiring them to report daily or weekly to<br />

police after their release. There were credible<br />

reports of scores of people being detained<br />

without charges at various times during the<br />

year for enforced “vocational training.” This<br />

occurred during periods of potential unrest,<br />

such as the February visit to <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> of<br />

the U.N. Secretary General’s Special Envoy,<br />

Amos Wako, and the March approach of<br />

the Portuguese car ferry, the Lusitania<br />

Expresso. Arrests, other temporary<br />

detentions, intrusive searches and some<br />

beatings also occurred just before the<br />

anniversary of the November 12 shootings<br />

and in the aftermath of the November 20<br />

arrest of Fretilin leader José “Xanana”<br />

Gusmão. There have been credible reports<br />

that <strong>Timor</strong>ese detainees have been mistreated.<br />

In addition, 24 <strong>Timor</strong>ese arrested in<br />

the aftermath of the November 12 incident<br />

were officially “released” on March 2 when<br />

the Attorney General decided only 8<br />

detainees in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> would be tried. But<br />

the military commander of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> continued<br />

to hold the 24 in military camps<br />

around <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> for most of the remainder<br />

of 1992 for intensive instruction on<br />

Indonesian civics. Although they were allowed<br />

visits by family members, and 10<br />

were seen by the ICRC, their continued<br />

detention in military facilities without<br />

charges was a clear violation of KUHAP.<br />

e. Denial of Fair Public Trial<br />

A quadripartite judiciary of general, religious,<br />

military, and administrative courts<br />

exists below the Supreme Court. The right<br />

of appeal from district court to high court to<br />

Supreme Court exists in all four systems of<br />

justice. The Supreme Court, with a current<br />

backlog variously estimated at 13,000 to<br />

17,000 cases, does not consider factual aspects<br />

of a case, only the lower courts’ application<br />

of law. Initial judgments are rarely<br />

reversed in the appeals process, although<br />

sentences are sometimes increased or<br />

reduced. A three-judge panel conducts trials<br />

at the district court level, poses questions,<br />

hears evidence, decides guilt or innocence,<br />

and assesses punishment.<br />

Defendants have the right to confront<br />

witnesses. An exception is allowed in cases<br />

where distance or expense are deemed excessive<br />

for transporting witnesses to court,<br />

in which case sworn affidavits may be introduced.<br />

In at least one case in 1992, this<br />

practice had the effect of preventing crossexamination<br />

of prosecution witnesses.<br />

The use in trials of forced confessions<br />

and limitations on the presentation of defense<br />

evidence are common. Defendants do<br />

not have the right to remain silent, and in<br />

several cases in 1992 were compelled to<br />

testify in their own trials and in related trials<br />

running simultaneously. In capital cases and<br />

those involving a prison sentence of 15<br />

years or more, a lawyer must be appointed.<br />

In cases involving potential sentences of 5<br />

years or more, a lawyer must be appointed<br />

if the accused desires an attorney but is indigent.<br />

Destitute defendants can obtain private<br />

legal help, such as that provided by the<br />

Legal Aid Institute (LBH).


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The judiciary in Indonesia is not independent.<br />

The Supreme Court does not have<br />

the right of judicial review over laws passed<br />

by Parliament. Although the Supreme Court<br />

has since 1985 had the power to review<br />

ministerial decrees and regulations, the<br />

Court has not yet used this power; Chief<br />

Justice Purwoto Gandasubrata, however,<br />

took a case dealing with a ministerial decree<br />

controlling newspaper publishing permits<br />

under advisement in November. While<br />

judges receive guidance from the Supreme<br />

Court on legal matters, they are civil<br />

servants employed by the executive branch.<br />

They are subject to considerable pressure<br />

from military and other governmental<br />

authorities. In addition, corruption<br />

permeates the Indonesian legal system. In<br />

civil and criminal cases, the payment of<br />

bribes can influence prosecution, conviction,<br />

and sentencing. The Minister of Justice said<br />

in August that while proving judicial<br />

corruption was often difficult, 266 judges<br />

had been prosecuted since 1980. In<br />

September the newly appointed Chief<br />

Justice of the Supreme Court, who pledged<br />

to combat judicial impropriety,<br />

recommended the dismissal of two<br />

administrative court justices who allegedly<br />

accepted bribes. The final decision, however,<br />

rested with the Minister of Justice and<br />

the President, who at year’s end had not<br />

acted on the matter. The Supreme Court<br />

engaged in a nationwide effort to improve<br />

the quality of district court judges, but<br />

public respect for the legal system remained<br />

low.<br />

The 1963 Antisubversion Law, which<br />

carries a maximum penalty of death, was<br />

attacked in several 1992 subversion trials as<br />

outmoded, unfair, and excessively harsh.<br />

The law makes it a crime to engage in acts<br />

that could distort, undermine, or deviate<br />

from the state ideology or broad outlines of<br />

state policy, or which could disseminate<br />

feelings of hostility or arouse hostility,<br />

disturbances, or anxiety among the population.<br />

The U.N. Special Rapporteur for<br />

Torture recommended in his January report<br />

that the law be repealed. He noted that the<br />

law’s definitions are “very broad and loose,”<br />

and that no requirement exists to prove that<br />

allegedly subversive acts actually<br />

endangered the security of the State, only<br />

that they could have. The vagueness of the<br />

law makes a successful defense virtually<br />

impossible; only two persons have ever<br />

been acquitted of subversion charges. Other<br />

statutes that are part of the Indonesian<br />

Criminal Code and therefore subject to<br />

KUHAP protections make it a felony to insult<br />

or sow hatred against the Government<br />

or to seek the separation of one area from<br />

the rest of the country. Defense attorneys<br />

also attacked these laws as holdovers from<br />

the Dutch colonial period and as unwarranted<br />

restraints on free speech.<br />

More than two dozen subversion trials<br />

were conducted in 1992. As in 1991, the<br />

majority of these cases were in Sumatra<br />

where as of August 19 people had been tried<br />

and convicted of subversion in connection<br />

with the Aceh Merdeka insurgency,<br />

including four members of the armed forces.<br />

According to credible observers, KUHAP<br />

provisions were widely violated in the<br />

conduct of these trials, with lack of access<br />

to attorneys and pretrial mistreatment of the<br />

accused the most frequently cited problems.<br />

Four <strong>Timor</strong>ese were convicted of subversion<br />

in 1992 in trials in Dili and Jakarta.<br />

The four were part of a group of 13<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese charged in connection with either a<br />

November 12, 1991, demonstration in Dili<br />

that preceded the shooting incident, or a<br />

November 19, 1991, demonstration in<br />

Jakarta that protested the shootings. The<br />

other 9 were tried on felony hate-sowing or<br />

sedition charges. These trials were attended<br />

by international observers, including representatives<br />

of the International Commission<br />

of Jurists, the Indonesian and foreign press,<br />

and the U.S. and other embassies. In general,<br />

the trials were substantially fairer than the<br />

Aceh proceedings. But in the Dili trials in<br />

particular, they did not meet international<br />

standards for fair trial. For example, access<br />

to legal counsel was obstructed to the extent<br />

that the defendants in several cases met their<br />

chosen attorneys only on the day their trials<br />

began. Even then, the Dili District Court<br />

barred attorneys in the subversion cases<br />

from representing the accused on technical<br />

grounds until the Supreme Court intervened.<br />

All 13 accused <strong>Timor</strong>ese were convicted.<br />

One received a 6-month sentence and was<br />

released immediately. Seven received<br />

sentences of 10 years or more, and one<br />

received a life sentence, which is unusually<br />

harsh even in a subversion case. There is<br />

reason to believe that these harsh sentences<br />

were intended specifically to deter future<br />

such anti-integration activity. Security<br />

personnel responsible for the shootings<br />

were charged with relatively minor offenses.<br />

The Government does not make available<br />

statistics on the number of people currently<br />

serving subversion sentences or sentences<br />

under the felony “hate-sowing” or sedition<br />

laws. But informed sources indicated some<br />

300 persons were serving sentences for<br />

subversion in 1992, including members of<br />

the banned Communist Party of Indonesia<br />

(PKI), Muslim extremists, and those<br />

convicted of subversion in Irian Jaya, Aceh,<br />

and <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. Scores more were believed<br />

to be serving sentences under the hatesowing<br />

or sedition laws. At least some of<br />

these persons advocated or employed<br />

violence.<br />

f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy,<br />

Family, Home, or Correspondence<br />

Judicial warrants for searches are required<br />

except for cases involving suspected<br />

subversion, economic crimes, and corruption.<br />

However, forced or surreptitious entry<br />

by security agencies occurs regularly.<br />

Security agencies intimidate by conducting<br />

surveillance of persons and residences, and<br />

they are believed to monitor selectively local<br />

and international telephone calls without<br />

legal restraint. Government security officials<br />

monitor the movements and activities of<br />

former members of the PKI and its front<br />

organizations, especially persons the<br />

Government believes were involved in the<br />

abortive 1965 Communist-backed coup. The<br />

Government stated in late 1990 that this<br />

latter group then totaled 1,410,333 people.<br />

These persons and their relatives sometimes<br />

are subject to surveillance, required checkins,<br />

and arbitrary actions by officials,<br />

including removal from government<br />

employment and threats of removal from<br />

such employment.<br />

SECTION 2. RESPECT FOR CIVIL<br />

LIBERTIES, INCLUDING:<br />

a. Freedom of Speech and Press<br />

Significant restrictions on freedom of<br />

speech and press exist. Government agencies<br />

exercise broad discretionary authority in<br />

applying laws concerning the rights of<br />

expression, and effective judicial review is<br />

lacking. Public statements or publications<br />

which criticize the Government or are perceived<br />

as critical of Pancasila, top leaders,<br />

their families, or particular religious and<br />

ethnic groups are often harshly punished.<br />

Two students were arrested prior to the<br />

June 9 elections for criticizing the election<br />

process and advocating the casting of blank<br />

ballots or staying away from the polls.<br />

They were released in late June, although<br />

the charges were not dropped. Five<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese were convicted of sowing hatred<br />

against the Government following a<br />

November 19, 1991, peaceful demonstration<br />

in Jakarta (two of these were also convicted<br />

of subversion.) (See Section 1.e.).<br />

The leader of Indonesia’s largest Muslim<br />

organization was prevented by the<br />

authorities from speaking in Surabaya in<br />

April.<br />

The Government operates the nationwide<br />

television network. Private television<br />

companies broadcasting in Jakarta and<br />

Surabaya expanded to other areas, and a<br />

private educational channel began operating<br />

nationally. Some 550 private radio<br />

broadcasting companies exist in Indonesia in<br />

addition to the Government’s national radio<br />

network. Private television and radio<br />

stations, which have considerable pro-


<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 111<br />

gramming latitude, are nonetheless subject to<br />

official scrutiny and required to use government-provided<br />

news programs. Private<br />

radio stations frequently supplement such<br />

news programs with their own reports.<br />

Foreign television and radio broadcasts are<br />

readily accessible to those who can afford<br />

the technology.<br />

The print media, including the nation’s<br />

273 daily newspapers, are largely privately<br />

owned. Officials state that the press is<br />

“free” but also “responsible.” It is expected<br />

to support national development and stability,<br />

be educational, and uphold professional<br />

standards. The Government limits the<br />

number of newspaper licenses, the amount<br />

of advertising, and the number of pages, and<br />

exercises strong control over the press<br />

through its control of publishing permits.<br />

Journalists have protested in the past that<br />

the Department of Information has revoked<br />

these permits without giving the offending<br />

publications an adequate chance to defend<br />

themselves. The Government occasionally<br />

censors domestic and foreign publications<br />

and, in a practice known locally as<br />

“telephone culture,” telephones editors to<br />

suppress stories. In May a provincial<br />

official in South Sumatra ordered the<br />

removal of an article dealing with the June<br />

election from the editing tables of the daily<br />

newspaper, the Sriwijaya Post. His actions<br />

were criticized by Home Affairs Minister<br />

Rudini, who said that press censorship<br />

should be reduced to a minimum. Although<br />

the risk of official sanctions and informal<br />

government instructions generally lead<br />

editors to exercise considerable selfcensorship<br />

in disseminating views of government<br />

critics, the domestic print media<br />

continued to press the limits of official tolerance<br />

in coverage of election issues, <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>, and social problems. Cartoons often<br />

pointedly critical of top government officials<br />

appeared routinely in several newspapers.<br />

The Government closely regulates access<br />

to Indonesia, and particularly to certain<br />

areas of Indonesia, by visiting and resident<br />

foreign correspondents and occasionally<br />

reminds the latter of its prerogative to deny<br />

requests for visa extensions. Although an<br />

American reporter was ordered to leave <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> in February, other journalists were<br />

allowed to visit in May and November.<br />

The importation of foreign publications<br />

and video tapes, which must be reviewed by<br />

government censors, requires a permit.<br />

Importers avoid foreign materials critical of<br />

the Government or dealing with topics<br />

considered sensitive, such as human rights.<br />

Foreign publications, from Time magazine<br />

to the Asian Wall Street Journal, are normally<br />

available although several issues were<br />

delayed or embargoed in 1992 when they<br />

carried sensitive stories or, in one case, an<br />

advertisement some found offensive to the<br />

President. In each instance the decision to<br />

halt distribution was attributed to the<br />

private distributor, although government<br />

pressure is assumed to have triggered that<br />

decision.<br />

While academic freedom is provided for<br />

in law, constraints exist on the activities of<br />

scholars. They sometimes refrain from producing<br />

materials which they believe might<br />

provoke government displeasure. Publishers<br />

are often unwilling to accept manuscripts<br />

dealing with controversial issues, and those<br />

that do sometimes find works banned long<br />

after they have been published. Two<br />

academic works were among the four books<br />

banned by the Attorney General in 1992.<br />

Another work banned was the report by the<br />

Legal Aid Institute (LBH) on violations of<br />

KUHAP during the 1991 Aceh subversion<br />

trials. The Attorney General said he banned<br />

the report because it could mislead the<br />

public and damage national unity.<br />

b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and<br />

Association<br />

Freedom of assembly and association are<br />

recognized in Article 28 of the Constitution.<br />

Nonetheless, significant controls are placed<br />

on citizens who attempt to exercise this<br />

freedom. All organizations must have<br />

government permission to hold regional and<br />

national meetings. Local jurisdictions often<br />

require prior approval for smaller gatherings<br />

as well. While obtaining such approval is<br />

fairly automatic, the authorities occasionally<br />

withhold permission. Two gatherings of the<br />

discussion group Democratic Forum were<br />

ordered ended by police in February and<br />

April because they lacked a police permit,<br />

even though organizers argued they were<br />

holding informal discussions rather than a<br />

formal meeting. A May gathering of the All<br />

Indonesia Association of Muslim<br />

Intellectuals to discuss human rights was<br />

also ended prematurely because it lacked the<br />

appropriate permit. Regulations were issued<br />

in connection with the June elections that<br />

banned a wide variety of mass meetings<br />

around election day. Student gatherings have<br />

often been the target of disapprovals, and<br />

ostensible political activity at universities<br />

remained forbidden. The Government also<br />

banned political campaigning from<br />

university campuses in connection with the<br />

1992 parliamentary elections.<br />

The 1985 Social Organizations Law<br />

(ORMAS) requires all organizations, including<br />

recognized religions and associations,<br />

to adhere to Pancasila. This provision,<br />

which limits political activity, is widely<br />

understood as being designed to inhibit the<br />

activities of groups which seek to make<br />

Indonesia an Islamic state. The law<br />

empowers the Government to disband any<br />

organization it believes to be acting against<br />

Pancasila and requires prior government<br />

approval for any organization’s acceptance<br />

of funds from foreign donors.<br />

c. Freedom of Religion<br />

The Constitution provides for religious<br />

freedom and belief in one supreme God. The<br />

Government recognizes Islam, Christianity,<br />

Buddhism, and Hinduism, and permits<br />

practice of the mystical, traditional beliefs<br />

of “Aliran Kepercayaan.” Although the<br />

population is overwhelmingly Muslim, the<br />

practice and teachings of the other recognized<br />

faiths are respected. Various restrictions<br />

on certain types of religious activity<br />

exist. According to official statistics,<br />

nearly 400 “misleading religious cults” are<br />

banned, including Jehovah’s Witnesses and<br />

Baha’i. Because the first tenet of Pancasila<br />

is belief in a supreme being, atheism is<br />

forbidden. The legal requirement to adhere<br />

to Pancasila extends to all religious and<br />

secular organizations. The Government<br />

strongly opposes Muslim groups which advocate<br />

establishing an Islamic state or acknowledging<br />

only Islamic law, both of<br />

which are outlawed.<br />

There is no legal bar to conversion between<br />

faiths, and conversions occur.<br />

However, proselytizing between the recognized<br />

religions or in areas heavily dominated<br />

by one recognized religion or another is<br />

considered potentially disruptive and is<br />

discouraged. Foreign missionary activities<br />

are relatively unimpeded. In recent years,<br />

some foreign missionaries have had difficulty<br />

renewing visas or residence permits - a<br />

few on unspecified “security grounds.”<br />

Laws and decrees from the 1970’s do not<br />

allow foreign missionaries to spend more<br />

than 10 consecutive years in Indonesia, with<br />

some extensions granted in remote areas like<br />

Irian Jaya. Enforcement of this policy does<br />

not discriminate by sect or nationality.<br />

Foreign missionary work is subject to the<br />

funding stipulations of the ORMAS Law<br />

(see Section 2.b.).<br />

Indonesians practicing the recognized<br />

religions maintain active links with coreligionists<br />

inside and outside Indonesia and<br />

travel abroad for religious gatherings.<br />

The Government organizes the annual<br />

hajj pilgrimage, and more than 100,000<br />

Indonesians made it in 1992.<br />

d. Freedom of Movement Within the<br />

Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration,<br />

and Repatriation<br />

Restrictions on freedom of movement<br />

exist. The Government maintains an unpublished<br />

blacklist of Indonesians who are<br />

forbidden to leave the country, including<br />

various prominent human rights monitors,<br />

and foreigners who are forbidden to enter,


Page 112 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

especially certain foreign journalists. (The<br />

Government announced in early January<br />

19<strong>93</strong> that the number of persons currently<br />

affected by the travel ban was 8,897.)<br />

Reportedly 14 journalists were removed<br />

from the list in July, but their names were<br />

not made public. The DPR passed new<br />

legislation in 1992 affecting the travel ban<br />

which elevated it to the status of law and<br />

required the Government to notify people<br />

when they have been added to the list.<br />

Previously, people discovered their status<br />

only when they tried to enter or leave. As a<br />

result of the new legislation, the<br />

Government also eliminated the requirement<br />

of obtaining an exit permit. But the new<br />

legislation added a provision that will allow<br />

the Government to ban Indonesian citizens<br />

whose return would pose problems for<br />

national security. This provision was<br />

opposed by human rights groups and certain<br />

legislators but strongly supported by the<br />

DPR’s military faction.<br />

Restrictions exist on movement by<br />

Indonesian and foreign citizens to and<br />

within parts of Indonesia. Permits to seek<br />

work in a new location are required in certain<br />

areas, primarily to control further<br />

population movement to crowded cities.<br />

Special permits are required to visit certain<br />

parts of Irian Jaya. Security checks affecting<br />

transportation and travel to and within <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> occurred sporadically in 1992, and<br />

curfews in connection with military operations<br />

were occasionally imposed. Former<br />

political detainees, including those associated<br />

with the abortive 1965 coup, must notify<br />

authorities of their movements and may<br />

not change their place of residence without<br />

official permission.<br />

Indonesia continued its generous attitude<br />

regarding Indochinese asylum seekers in<br />

1992. It has granted first asylum to over<br />

123,000 Indochinese asylum seekers since<br />

1975 and continued to operate a refugee<br />

facility on Galang Island. Cambodian asylum<br />

seekers, whom the Government considers<br />

illegal immigrants, have been allowed<br />

to remain in Indonesia pending repatriation.<br />

Indonesia also continued its cooperation<br />

with the U.N. High Commissioner for<br />

Refugees (UNHCR) and the ICRC on the<br />

return of residents of Irian Jaya who had<br />

fled to Papua New Guinea during separatist<br />

violence in the eastern portion of the<br />

province. A new wave of several hundred<br />

Irianese fled to Papua New Guinea in 1992<br />

following border clashes between OPM insurgents<br />

and security forces, bringing the<br />

total of Irianese in Papua New Guinea’s<br />

<strong>East</strong> Awin refugee camp to approximately<br />

3,700. More than 100 Acehnese who fled to<br />

Malaysia during the height of separatist<br />

violence in 1990-1991 returned to Aceh.<br />

Others continued to seek asylum in<br />

Malaysia, including a group of 43 who entered<br />

the UNHCR compound in Kuala<br />

Lumpur in June claiming their lives would<br />

be threatened if they returned to Indonesia.<br />

SECTION 3. RESPECT FOR<br />

POLITICAL RIGHTS: THE RIGHT OF<br />

CITIZENS TO CHANGE THEIR<br />

GOVERNMENT<br />

Whatever their theoretical rights under<br />

the Constitution, citizens do not in fact have<br />

the ability to change the Government<br />

through democratic means. President<br />

Suharto and a small group of active-duty<br />

and retired military officers and civilian<br />

officials exercise governmental authority.<br />

The military, under a “dual function” doctrine,<br />

is assigned a role in both security and<br />

sociopolitical affairs. Members of the<br />

military are allotted 20 percent of the seats<br />

in national, provincial, and district parliaments,<br />

and occupy numerous key positions<br />

in the administration. The other 80 percent<br />

of national and local parliamentary seats are<br />

filled through elections held every 5 years.<br />

All adult citizens are eligible to vote,<br />

except active-duty members of the armed<br />

forces, convicted criminals serving prison<br />

sentences, and some 36,000 former PKI<br />

members. Voters may choose by secret<br />

ballot between the three government-approved<br />

political organizations, which field<br />

candidate lists in each electoral district.<br />

Those lists must be screened by<br />

BAKORSTANAS (see Section 1.d.), which<br />

determines whether candidates were involved<br />

in the abortive 1965 Communist<br />

coup or pose other broadly defined security<br />

risks. Critics charge these screenings are<br />

unconstitutional, since there is no way to<br />

appeal the results, and note that they can be<br />

used to eliminate government critics from<br />

Parliament. Strict rules establish the length<br />

of the political campaign, access to electronic<br />

media, schedules for public appearances,<br />

and the political symbols that can be<br />

used.<br />

GOLKAR, a government-sponsored organization<br />

of diverse functional groups, won<br />

68 percent of the seats in the June 9<br />

elections. Two small political parties, the<br />

United Development Party and the<br />

Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI), split<br />

the remaining vote. By law all three political<br />

organizations must embrace Pancasila. They<br />

are not considered opposition parties and<br />

seldom espouse policies much different<br />

from those of the Government, although the<br />

PDI raised several controversial issues<br />

during the 1992 campaign. The leaders of all<br />

these organizations are approved, if not<br />

chosen, by the Government, and their activities<br />

are closely scrutinized and often<br />

guided by government authorities.<br />

GOLKAR maintains close institutional links<br />

with the armed forces and KORPRI, the<br />

nonunion association to which all civil<br />

servants automatically belong. Civil servants<br />

may join any of the political parties with<br />

official permission, but most are members of<br />

GOLKAR. Former members of the PKI and<br />

some other banned parties may not run for<br />

office or be active politically. Although<br />

numerous irregularities were reported during<br />

the June polling, most observers believed<br />

they were not widespread or systematic.<br />

The Government initiated criminal<br />

proceedings against some of those accused<br />

of campaign violations.<br />

The 500 members of the national DPR–<br />

100 appointed military and 400 elected -<br />

consider bills presented to them by<br />

government departments and agencies but<br />

do not draft laws on their own, although<br />

they have the constitutional right to do so.<br />

The DPR makes technical and occasionally<br />

substantive alterations to bills it reviews. It<br />

remains clearly subordinate to the executive<br />

branch. The People’s Consultative<br />

Assembly (MPR), made up of the 500 DPR<br />

members and 500 other members appointed<br />

by the Government and political organizations,<br />

meets every 5 years to devise the<br />

broad outlines of state policy and to elect<br />

the President and Vice President. A new<br />

MPR, which began meeting on October 1,<br />

will hold Presidential elections in March<br />

19<strong>93</strong>. Under the Constitution, the President<br />

is subordinate and responsible to the MPR.<br />

In practice, President Suharto and the<br />

military dominate the political system, and<br />

the MPR’s selection of President Suharto to<br />

repeated terms has been pro forma.<br />

SECTION 4. GOVERNMENTAL<br />

ATTITUDE REGARDING<br />

INTERNATIONAL AND<br />

NONGOVERNMENTAL<br />

INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGED<br />

VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS<br />

The Government generally ignores calls<br />

by domestic human rights groups and activists<br />

for investigations of alleged human<br />

rights incidents, with the notable exception<br />

of the various investigations ordered by<br />

President Suharto into the November 12,<br />

1991, shooting incident in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> (see<br />

Section 1.a.). While various domestic organizations<br />

and persons interested in human<br />

rights operate energetically, the Government<br />

discourages public human rights activities.<br />

Some human rights monitors face<br />

government harassment such as frequent<br />

visits by police or agents from military<br />

intelligence, interrogations at police stations,<br />

cancellations of private meetings (see<br />

Section 2.b.), or restrictions on foreign travel<br />

(see Section 2.d.). The Government


<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 113<br />

considers outside investigations of alleged<br />

human rights violations to be interference in<br />

its internal affairs. It expanded on this<br />

concept in 1992, emphasizing its belief that<br />

linking foreign assistance to human rights<br />

observance was unacceptable. This belief<br />

was part of its March decision to reject<br />

Dutch foreign assistance, a decision which<br />

also led to the cutoff of funds from Dutch<br />

nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that<br />

receive Dutch government money. Several<br />

Indonesian human rights organizations<br />

received funding from the affected Dutch<br />

NGOs. The Government continued to ban<br />

the entry of high-profile human rights<br />

groups such as Amnesty International and<br />

refused in April a request by two U.S.<br />

Senators to visit <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

Nonetheless, the ICRC continued to operate<br />

in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, Irian Java, and Aceh,<br />

and to visit prisoners convicted of participation<br />

in the abortive, Communist-backed<br />

coup in 1965 as well as convicted Muslim<br />

extremists. A special envoy of the U.N.<br />

Secretary General, Amos Wako, was allowed<br />

to visit Jakarta and <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> in<br />

February. Indonesia also accepted a chairman’s<br />

statement on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> during the<br />

1992 session of the U.N. Human Rights<br />

Commission. That statement noted serious<br />

concerns with the human rights situation in<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, strongly deplored the<br />

November 12, 1991, shooting incident, and<br />

welcomed government actions to cope with<br />

it. It also called on the Government to facilitate<br />

access to <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> by humanitarian<br />

and human rights organizations. Finally,<br />

it looked forward to a report from the<br />

Government on progress in implementing<br />

recommendations from the U.N. Special<br />

Rapporteur on Torture based on his 1991<br />

trip to Indonesia. (See Section 1.c.) Thus far<br />

the Government has neither responded to<br />

the recommendations nor eased access to<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. In 1992 the ICRC also<br />

experienced increasing difficulty gaining<br />

access to <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese prisoners under<br />

conditions defined in its operating agreement<br />

with the Government. The ICRC highlighted<br />

these difficulties after the arrest November<br />

20 of Fretilin leader José “Xanana” Gusmão,<br />

to whom the ICRC finally gained access on<br />

December 7. The ICRC continued to press<br />

for access to other <strong>Timor</strong>ese arrested since<br />

November 1.<br />

SECTION 5. DISCRIMINATION<br />

BASED ON RACE, SEX, RELIGION,<br />

LANGUAGE, OR SOCIAL STATUS<br />

Indonesians exhibit considerable tolerance<br />

for ethnic, racial, and major religious<br />

differences, with the important exception of<br />

official and informal discrimination against<br />

ethnic Chinese. Since 1959 noncitizen ethnic<br />

Chinese have been denied the right to run<br />

businesses in rural Indonesia. Regulations<br />

prohibit the operation of all-Chinese schools<br />

for ethnic Chinese citizens, formation of<br />

exclusively Chinese cultural groups or trade<br />

associations, and public display of Chinese<br />

characters. Chinese-language publications,<br />

with the exception of one officially<br />

sanctioned daily newspaper, may neither be<br />

imported nor produced domestically.<br />

Jakarta city officials burned thousands of<br />

cassettes, compact discs, and books in<br />

Mandarin Chinese in March. Private<br />

instruction in Chinese is discouraged but<br />

takes place to a limited extent. No laws<br />

prohibit speaking Chinese, but the<br />

Government lays heavy stress on the<br />

learning and use of the national language,<br />

Bahasa Indonesia.<br />

Many people of Chinese ancestry have<br />

nonetheless been successful in business and<br />

the professions, and the enforcement of restrictions<br />

is often haphazard. Some ethnic<br />

Chinese have enjoyed particular government<br />

favor. Social and religious groups exist<br />

which are, in effect, all-Chinese and not<br />

proscribed.<br />

Under the law, and as President Suharto<br />

and other officials periodically affirm,<br />

women are equal to and have the same<br />

rights, obligations, and opportunities as<br />

men. Some Indonesian women enjoy a high<br />

degree of economic and social freedom and<br />

occupy important mid-level positions in the<br />

civil service, educational institutions, labor<br />

organizations, the military, the professions,<br />

and private business. Although women<br />

constitute one-quarter of the civil service,<br />

they occupy only a small fraction of the<br />

service’s top posts. Women make up about<br />

40 percent of the overall work force, with<br />

the majority in the rural sector. Despite legal<br />

guarantees of equal treatment, women<br />

seldom receive equal pay for equal work and<br />

disproportionately experience illiteracy,<br />

poor health, and nutrition. Traditional<br />

attitudes which limit women’s aspirations,<br />

activities, and status undercut state policy<br />

in some areas. Several voluntary, private<br />

groups work actively to advance women’s<br />

legal, economic, social, and political rights<br />

and claim some success in gaining official<br />

cognizance of their concerns.<br />

In 1992 there were increasing reports of<br />

violence against women, including rape and<br />

other violence against female domestic servants.<br />

Human rights and women’s rights<br />

groups believed that the police, prosecutors,<br />

and courts were slow to react in many cases,<br />

and many women who were the victims of<br />

sexual crimes were reluctant to report them<br />

to police. This lack of confidence in the<br />

willingness or ability of authorities to take<br />

effective action to combat crime is not<br />

limited to violence against women but is<br />

part of the overall low esteem in which the<br />

criminal justice system is held. The<br />

Government has acknowledged the problem<br />

of domestic violence in Indonesian society,<br />

which some say has been aggravated by<br />

recent social changes brought about by rapid<br />

urbanization. The Government provides<br />

some counseling, and several private<br />

organizations exist to assist women.<br />

Nonetheless, most observers agree the<br />

problem of violence against women remains<br />

poorly documented.<br />

SECTION 6. WORKER RIGHTS<br />

a. The Right of Association<br />

Private sector workers, including those in<br />

export processing zones, are free to form or<br />

join unions without prior authorization.<br />

However, in order to bargain on behalf of<br />

employees or to represent workers in the<br />

Department of Manpower’s labor courts, a<br />

union must register as a mass organization<br />

with the Department of Home Affairs under<br />

the ORMAS Law (see Section 2.b.) and<br />

meet the requirements for recognition by the<br />

Department of Manpower: union offices in<br />

at least 20 of the country’s 27 provinces,<br />

branch offices in at least 100 districts, and<br />

1,000 plant level units.<br />

While there are no formal constraints on<br />

the establishment of unions, the recognition<br />

requirements are a high legal barrier to<br />

recognition and the right to engage in collective<br />

bargaining. In de facto terms, there is<br />

a single union system, and it is the<br />

Government’s stated policy to seek to improve<br />

the effectiveness of the one recognized<br />

union rather than ease the process for<br />

the formation of alternative organizations.<br />

The one union recognized by the<br />

Department of Manpower is the All<br />

Indonesia Workers Union (Serikat Pekerja<br />

Seluruh Indonesia, SPSI). Two other labor<br />

groups, Setia Kawan (Solidarity), also<br />

known as Serikat Buruh Merdeka (SMB,<br />

Free Trade Union), and Serikat Buruh<br />

Sejahtera Indonesia (SBSI, Indonesian<br />

Workers Welfare Union), are attempting to<br />

satisfy the Department of Manpower requirements.<br />

In existence for 2 years, Setia<br />

Kawan is essentially moribund while the<br />

SBSI, created in 1992, continues to attempt<br />

to form the necessary branches prior to applying<br />

for recognition.<br />

The SPSI has 9,071 units out of roughly<br />

26,000 organizable work sites. It has a<br />

membership of about 1 million dues-paying<br />

members, about 1.4 percent of the total<br />

work force. However, if agricultural workers<br />

and others in categories such as selfemployed<br />

and family workers who are not<br />

normally union members are excluded, the<br />

percentage of union members rises to approximately<br />

6 percent.


Page 114 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

Minister of Manpower Decision<br />

1109/men/1986, which defines the procedures<br />

for establishing an SPSI factory unit,<br />

enjoins workers to consult with the employer<br />

during the process of setting up an<br />

SPSI branch. In practice this often means<br />

obtaining the employer’s consent for the<br />

establishment of a unit. There are numerous<br />

reports that employers will agree to the<br />

organization of SPSI units only if they are<br />

allowed to select the units’ officials.<br />

Employers justify this action under the<br />

terms of Ministerial Decision 1109 which<br />

also specifies the requirements for union<br />

officials which include “high educational<br />

background” and possession of “certain<br />

qualities: reliable, highly disciplined....”<br />

Employers argue that they are in the best<br />

position to know which employees possess<br />

these characteristics.<br />

Civil servants are not permitted to join<br />

unions and must belong to KORPRI, a nonunion<br />

association whose Central<br />

Development Council is chaired by the<br />

Minister of Home Affairs. Teachers must<br />

belong to the Teachers’ Association (PGRI).<br />

While technically classed as a union (its<br />

status was changed from an association<br />

similar to KORPRI in April 1990), PGRI<br />

has continued to function more as a welfare<br />

organization and does not appear to have<br />

engaged in trade union activities. State<br />

enterprise employees, defined to include<br />

those enterprises in which the state has a 5-<br />

percent holding or greater, usually are<br />

required to join KORPRI, but there are<br />

some state enterprises which have SPSI<br />

units.<br />

Unions may draw up their own constitutions<br />

and rules and elect their representatives.<br />

However, the Government has a great<br />

deal of influence over the SPSI, the head of<br />

the SPSI is a senior member of GOLKAR,<br />

two senior SPSI officials are Members of<br />

Parliament representing GOLKAR, and the<br />

Minister of Manpower is a member of the<br />

SPSI’s Consultative Council. According to<br />

credible reports, the Government interferes<br />

in the selection of SPSI officers, especially<br />

the placing of retired military officers in<br />

mid-level SPSI positions.<br />

Under the Criminal Code, police approval<br />

is needed for all meetings outside<br />

offices or normal work sites. This provision<br />

also applies to union meetings. Permission<br />

is routinely given to the SPSI. In October<br />

police and the military halted an SBSI<br />

meeting, for which a permit had not been<br />

requested, and briefly detained its organizers<br />

for questioning. A union may be dissolved if<br />

the Government believes it is acting against<br />

Pancasila, but there are no laws or<br />

regulations specifying the procedures for<br />

union dissolution. There have been no actual<br />

cases of dissolution.<br />

The SPSI maintains international contacts,<br />

but is not affiliated with any international<br />

trade union organizations except the<br />

Association of Southeast Asian Nations<br />

(ASEAN) Trade Union Council. Some elements<br />

of the SPSI, such as the seafarers,<br />

maintain links with international trade union<br />

secretariats. The SPSI has an application for<br />

membership with the International<br />

Confederation of Free Trade Unions pending.<br />

While Pancasila principles call for labormanagement<br />

differences to be settled by<br />

consensus, all organized workers, with the<br />

exception of civil servants, have the right to<br />

strike. In practice, state enterprise<br />

employees and teachers rarely exercise this<br />

right. Before a strike can occur in the private<br />

sector, the law requires intensive mediation<br />

by the Department of Manpower and prior<br />

notice of the intent to strike. However, no<br />

approval is required.<br />

In practice, dispute settlement procedures<br />

are not followed fully, and formal<br />

notice of the intent to strike is rarely given.<br />

The Department of Manpower procedures<br />

are time consuming and decisions are handed<br />

down usually only after a prolonged period<br />

has elapsed. These processes have little<br />

credibility with workers and are mostly<br />

ignored. Strikes, therefore, tend to be<br />

sudden, the result of longstanding grievances<br />

or recognition that legally mandated benefits<br />

or rights are not being given. While strike<br />

leaders are not arrested for illegal strikes,<br />

they often lose their jobs. The number of<br />

strikes has continued to increase over the<br />

last several years, some of them in support<br />

of fired union officials but most of them<br />

over failure of companies to pay legally<br />

mandated minimum wages. In 1991 there<br />

were 112 “illegal” strikes officially recorded<br />

by the Department of Manpower, although<br />

the actual number most likely was larger.<br />

When the figures for 1992 are tallied, it is<br />

probable they will show another increase.<br />

b. The Right to Organize and Bargain<br />

Collectively<br />

Collective bargaining is provided for by<br />

law, but only recognized trade unions may<br />

engage in it. The Department of Manpower<br />

promotes collective bargaining as an instrument<br />

of industrial relations in the context<br />

of the national ideology of Pancasila.<br />

The majority of the collective bargaining<br />

agreements between the SPSI and employers<br />

are negotiated bilaterally.<br />

Once notified that 25 employees have<br />

joined a registered union, an employer is<br />

obligated to bargain with them. As a transitional<br />

stage to encourage collective bargaining,<br />

regulations require that every<br />

company with 25 or more employees issue<br />

company regulations defining the terms and<br />

conditions of employment. Before a company<br />

can register or renew its company<br />

regulations it must demonstrate that it consulted<br />

with the union or in its absence a<br />

committee consisting of employer and employee<br />

representatives.<br />

Only about half of the SPSI units have<br />

collective bargaining agreements. The degree<br />

to which these agreements are freely<br />

negotiated between unions and management<br />

without government interference varies. By<br />

regulation negotiations are to be concluded<br />

within 30 days. If not, the matter is<br />

submitted to the Department of Manpower<br />

for mediation and conciliation or arbitration.<br />

Most negotiations are concluded within the<br />

30-day period. Agreements are for 2 years<br />

and can be extended for 1 more year.<br />

Regulations expressly forbid employers<br />

from discriminating or harassing employees<br />

because of union membership. There are<br />

credible reports from union officials, however,<br />

of employer retribution against union<br />

organizers, and the SPSI claims that some<br />

employers discriminate against its members<br />

and workers who desire to form SPSI units.<br />

Charges of antiunion discrimination are<br />

adjudicated by administrative tribunals.<br />

However, many union members believe the<br />

tribunals generally side with employers.<br />

Because of this perceived partiality, many<br />

workers reject or avoid the process and present<br />

their grievances directly to Parliament<br />

and other agencies. Administrative decisions<br />

in favor of fired workers tend to be<br />

monetary awards; workers are rarely reinstated.<br />

Workers can organize without restriction<br />

in a private enterprise, even if it is designated<br />

vital by the Government. If the State<br />

has a partial interest, the enterprise is considered<br />

to be in the public service domain,<br />

but this does not always legally limit organizing.<br />

There are a number of government/private<br />

joint ventures which have SPSI<br />

units and which bargain collectively.<br />

The military or police have been involved<br />

in a number of labor disputes. Workers have<br />

charged that members of the security forces<br />

have attempted to intimidate union<br />

organizers and have beaten strike leaders.<br />

Police and military in a number of instances<br />

have been present in significant numbers<br />

during strikes, even when there has been no<br />

destruction of property or violence.<br />

Military officials occasionally have been<br />

reported present during negotiations<br />

between workers and management. Their<br />

presence has been described as intimidating<br />

by plant level union officials.<br />

Labor law applies equally in export<br />

processing zones.


<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 115<br />

c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory<br />

Labor<br />

Forced labor is strictly forbidden and enforcement<br />

is generally adequate. There were,<br />

however, credible reports in 1990 of forced<br />

labor by logging companies among the<br />

Asmat tribe in Irian Jaya. There have been<br />

documented reports of girls being sold as<br />

domestic servants or to brothels, and of men<br />

being sold as agricultural workers. The<br />

Government has thus far failed to follow<br />

through on its promise of an investigation<br />

into these reports.<br />

d. Minimum Age for Employment of<br />

Children<br />

Child labor continues to be a serious<br />

problem in industrial areas. The<br />

Government acknowledges that there is a<br />

class of children who must work for socioeconomic<br />

reasons, and in 1987 the Minister<br />

of Manpower issued Regulation PER-<br />

OL/Men/1987 “On Protection of Children<br />

Forced to Work” to regulate this situation.<br />

This regulation legalizes the employment of<br />

children under the age of 14 who must work<br />

to contribute to the income of their families.<br />

It requires parental consent, prohibits<br />

dangerous or difficult work, limits hours to<br />

4 hours daily, and requires employers to<br />

report the number of children working under<br />

its provisions. It does not set a minimum<br />

age for children in this category, effectively<br />

superseding the government Ordinance of<br />

December 17, 1925, on Measures Limiting<br />

Child Labour and Nightwork of Women,<br />

which is still the current law governing child<br />

labor. It sets a a minimum age of 12 for<br />

employment. However, the 1987 regulation<br />

is not enforced; no employers have been<br />

taken to court for violating it, and no reports<br />

are collected from establishments employing<br />

children. Act No. 1 of 1951 was intended to<br />

bring into force certain labor measures, including<br />

provisions on child labor which<br />

would replace those of the 1925 legislation.<br />

However, implementing regulations for the<br />

child labor provisions have never been issued.<br />

Thus the child labor provisions in the<br />

1951 Act have no validity.<br />

e. Acceptable Conditions of Work<br />

In the absence of a national minimum<br />

wage, area wage councils working under the<br />

supervision of the National Wage Council<br />

establish minimum wages for regions. This<br />

is a quadripartite body consisting of<br />

representatives from labor, management,<br />

government, and universities. It also<br />

establishes a basic-needs figure for each<br />

province - a monetary amount considered<br />

sufficient to enable a single worker or family<br />

to meet the basic needs of nutrition,<br />

clothing, and shelter. The minimum wage<br />

rates constantly lag behind the basic needs<br />

figures and fall short of providing a decent<br />

standard of living. Labor law and ministerial<br />

regulations provide workers with a variety<br />

of other benefits, such as social security,<br />

and workers in more modern facilities often<br />

receive health benefits and free meals.<br />

The law establishes 7-hour workdays and<br />

40-hour workweeks, with one 30-minute<br />

rest period for each 4 hours of work. The<br />

daily overtime rate is 1 1/2 times the normal<br />

hourly rate for the first hour, and twice the<br />

hourly rate for additional overtime.<br />

Regulations allow employers to deviate<br />

from the normal work hours upon request to<br />

the Minister of Manpower with the<br />

agreement of the employee.<br />

Observance of minimum wage and other<br />

laws regulating benefits and labor standards<br />

varies from sector to sector and region to<br />

region. Employer violations of legal<br />

requirements are fairly common and often<br />

result in strikes and employee protests. The<br />

Minister of Manpower has publicly urged<br />

employers to comply with the law and<br />

sternly warned one group of foreign investors<br />

in the sports shoe industry about<br />

compliance with minimum wage regulations<br />

and their culturally insensitive industrial<br />

relations practices. However, in general,<br />

government enforcement and supervision of<br />

labor standards is weak.<br />

Both law and regulations provide for<br />

minimum standards of industrial health and<br />

safety. In the largely Western-operated oil<br />

sector, safety and health programs function<br />

reasonably well. In the country’s 100,000<br />

larger, registered companies in the nonoil<br />

sector, the quality of occupational health<br />

and safety programs varies greatly. The enforcement<br />

of health and safety standards is<br />

severely hampered by the limited number of<br />

qualified Department of Manpower inspectors<br />

as well as the lack of employee<br />

appreciation for sound health and safety<br />

practices. Allegations of corruption on the<br />

part of inspectors are not uncommon.<br />

Workers are obligated to report hazardous<br />

working conditions, and while employers<br />

are prevented by law from retaliating against<br />

those who do, such retaliation does occur,<br />

since the law is not effectively enforced.<br />

COMMENTS ON STATE<br />

DEPARTMENT REPORT:<br />

From: Dave Kohr<br />

Seems to me that, with regard to the<br />

situation in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, this report is a<br />

major whitewash. I don’t see any mention<br />

of the violation of the “right to self-determination”<br />

anywhere, which is after all the<br />

fundamental issue at stake in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

Note that the U.N. does not recognize the<br />

Indonesian “annexation” (read: illegal invasion);<br />

certainly this should be mentioned<br />

somewhere in this report, as should be the<br />

(verifiable) extent of the Indonesian massacres<br />

against the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese over the period<br />

of occupation (i.e., since 1975).<br />

From Bruno Kahn:<br />

Dave Kohr has a good point. The US<br />

stated position has been ambiguous ever<br />

since the invasion. “Even though we are not<br />

satisfied with some aspects of the incorporation<br />

of ET into Indonesia, we have accepted<br />

it de facto.” I quote from memory.<br />

At Congressional hearings or meetings with<br />

the press, the State Dept. has consistently<br />

been embarrassed to explain the coherence<br />

of its position “It has been carefully<br />

worded, I’m sorry, I would hate to misquote<br />

it. I’ll have to look it up.” This was more or<br />

less a reply of Richard Boucher to a journalist<br />

a few weeks after the Santa Cruz<br />

massacre.<br />

Would the Clinton administration be an<br />

opportunity to press the State Department<br />

to clarify the US’s official opposition on<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>? Note that all Western-<br />

European countries, most <strong>East</strong>ern-European<br />

countries and Japan officially do not recognise<br />

the Indonesian annexation. Could the<br />

current US position be challenged on legal<br />

grounds, for example in the framework of<br />

the US administrative law?<br />

TIME TO END AN ATROCITY<br />

Op-ed column in the Boston Globe,<br />

Saturday, February 20, 19<strong>93</strong>. By Arnold S.<br />

Kohen, unabridged<br />

As the Clinton administration gears up to<br />

review the foreign policies it has inherited, it<br />

should be prepared to end a legacy from<br />

Henry Kissinger that has caused terrible<br />

suffering over the past 17 years: the illegal<br />

Indonesian occupation of the former<br />

Portuguese colony of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. During<br />

the presidential campaign, Clinton indicated<br />

the need for change in this area. Now is the<br />

time to follow through.<br />

Indonesia invaded <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, which had<br />

been abandoned by Portugal, in 1975, only<br />

hours after President Ford and Secretary of<br />

State Henry Kissinger left Jakarta, the<br />

Indonesian capital. The available evidence<br />

leaves no doubt that Kissinger and Ford<br />

gave American approval for the invasion.<br />

By late 1976, allegations of large-scale<br />

Indonesian military atrocities in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

surfaced, with reports that 60,000 to<br />

100,000 people had perished. (In 1980,<br />

some reports put the figure at more than<br />

200,000, or one third the population.)<br />

Congressional hearings were held, but Carter<br />

administration officials refused to change<br />

American policy.<br />

In late 1979, horrific photographs of<br />

starving people in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> briefly gained


Page 116 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

attention in the world press. The weight of<br />

evidence made it clear that the <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese had reached this appalling state as<br />

a result of a deliberate Indonesian military<br />

campaign. At least some Carter<br />

administration officials belatedly realized<br />

that the United States should have pressured<br />

Indonesia to abide by UN resolutions<br />

and cease its massive violations of human<br />

rights.<br />

Aside from occasional gestures on human<br />

rights issues, there was little fundamental<br />

change in the <strong>Timor</strong> policy under presidents<br />

Reagan and Bush; the original Kissinger<br />

policy was reiterated time and again.<br />

After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, a<br />

growing youth movement in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

took steps to bring the issue to international<br />

notice. The <strong>Timor</strong>ese youth continue to ask<br />

how the international community can call<br />

Iraq to account but not Indonesia.<br />

When an official from the UN Human<br />

Rights Commission came to <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> in<br />

November 1991, thousands of young people<br />

marched to Santa Cruz Cemetery to commemorate<br />

the killing of an 18-year-old activist.<br />

Without warning, and within view of<br />

a British TV cameraman, Indonesian troops<br />

opened fire on the unarmed marchers, killing<br />

and wounding hundreds. Two American<br />

journalists who also witnessed the massacre<br />

were badly beaten. While the Bush<br />

administration protested the massacre, its<br />

response was muted. On the other hand,<br />

candidate Bill Clinton told an interviewer in<br />

April that the United States had ignored<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> in an “unconscionable” manner<br />

and there would be changes if he were<br />

elected.<br />

In the months since then, things have<br />

scarcely improved. In November 1992, the<br />

Indonesians captured the head of the<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese resistance, Xanana Gusmão, and<br />

by many accounts have launched a steppedup<br />

campaign of torture.<br />

Citing <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> as the reason,<br />

Congress cut off American military training<br />

for the Indonesian armed forces in October<br />

1992. Now the Indonesian government is<br />

said to be worried that the Clinton administration<br />

will reverse the longstanding US<br />

stance of support for its occupation of <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>. Indeed, there are indications that the<br />

Clinton administration may review US<br />

policy.<br />

The new assistant secretary of state for<br />

<strong>East</strong> Asia, Winston Lord, is an old protégé<br />

of Kissinger who had serious disagreements<br />

with his mentor over issues of democracy<br />

and human rights in China. He should<br />

jettison the terrible legacy of Kissinger<br />

policy on <strong>Timor</strong> as well.<br />

Arnold S. Kohen, who has worked for NBC<br />

News, is at work on a book on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

and US foreign policy.<br />

EAST TIMORESE WANT<br />

THEIR CONQUERORS OUT<br />

The New York Times. Letters to the Editor,<br />

Sunday, March 7, 19<strong>93</strong><br />

To the Editor:<br />

Your informative survey of ethnic<br />

struggles around the world mischaracterizes<br />

relations between Indonesia and <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

(front page, Feb. 7). The independence<br />

movement in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> is simply not a<br />

“separatist movement.” Nor is it just another<br />

group clamoring for a place in the<br />

limelight. Some clear international legal<br />

rights are involved here.<br />

Following the purported annexation of<br />

the territory by Indonesia, the United<br />

Nations General Assembly adopted resolution<br />

31/53 of Dec. 1, 1976. Paragraph 1 reaffirms<br />

the inalienable right of the people of<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> to self-determination and independence<br />

and the legitimacy of their<br />

struggle to achieve that right.”<br />

Paragraph 5 “Rejects the claim that <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> has been integrated into Indonesia,<br />

inasmuch as the people of the territory have<br />

not been able to exercise their right to selfdetermination<br />

and independence.”<br />

It is true that the <strong>Timor</strong>ese regard themselves<br />

as ethnically and culturally distinct<br />

from the Indonesians, but they make that<br />

claim not as separatists trying to tear apart<br />

an existing country but as a people who<br />

have been recently – and quite illegally –<br />

conquered.<br />

Roger S. Clark<br />

Distinguished Professor of Law<br />

Rutgers University, Camden, NJ<br />

Feb. 24,19<strong>93</strong><br />

ACTION ALERT: THE LAST<br />

CHANCE FOR THE HOUSE<br />

HUNGER COMMITTEE !<br />

From ETAN/US March 9, 19<strong>93</strong><br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> supporters in the US –<br />

As you know, the Hunger Committee,<br />

chaired by Tony Hall, has been the leading<br />

voice for <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> on Capitol Hill for a<br />

decade or more. There continued existence is<br />

in serious jeopardy. Please call TODAY!!<br />

The Speaker has finally indicated that the<br />

House will consider a separate resolution on<br />

the Select Committee on Hunger, probably<br />

next week. The single vote on the Hunger<br />

Committee must take place by March 31, or<br />

the Hunger Committee will expire forever.<br />

A recent whip check of Democrats by<br />

the House leadership shows an uphill, but<br />

not impossible, battle. There is no time to<br />

write - what is critical now is that as many<br />

people as possible telephone<br />

Representatives. Please telephone members<br />

from your state to request their vote for the<br />

Hunger Committee. Now, more than ever<br />

before, the Hunger Committee needs you to<br />

take a few minutes to telephone.<br />

You know what to say – hunger remains<br />

a terrible problem; the Hunger Committee<br />

leads on critical, life saving initiatives; and<br />

the Hunger Committee is the least expensive<br />

committee on Capitol Hill. One last and<br />

important point to make is that you don’t<br />

appreciate the fact that other committees are<br />

apparently lining up it take the little money<br />

allocated to the Hunger Committee.<br />

Please use the Capitol switchboard to call<br />

your members – the burst of interest may be<br />

noted by House Leadership. The Capitol<br />

switchboard number is: 202-225-3121, or<br />

you can fax through PeaceNet’s Interact<br />

database.<br />

STARVING THE HUNGER<br />

COMMITTEE<br />

Editorial, The Boston Globe Tuesday,<br />

March 9, 19<strong>93</strong><br />

It seems that every time one might feel<br />

inclined to defend Congress some members<br />

do something to prove their proclivity for<br />

marrying folly to duplicity.<br />

A flagrant example is the current campaign<br />

to eradicate the Select Committee on<br />

Hunger and three other select committees.<br />

The House may decide the fate of these<br />

committees early next week.<br />

Pretending to heed the call to clean up the<br />

mess in Washington, a number of ersatz<br />

reformers have hit on the cheap and easy<br />

ploy of saving a symbolic sum of money by<br />

seeming to streamline the committee system.<br />

This stratagem is easy politically because<br />

the select committees are not supported by<br />

powerful special interests such as the oil<br />

business or the aerospace industry. The<br />

constituents of the Select Committee on<br />

Hunger are the 5 million American children<br />

who go hungry every night, the 50,000<br />

young mothers who were restored to the<br />

food supplement program known as WIC<br />

because of the committee’s efforts, the<br />

starving Somalis whose plight the committee<br />

foresaw.<br />

The congressional folly is to scuttle in<br />

the name of reform a committee that serves<br />

real needs. The duplicity is revealed in an<br />

accounting trick: The funds saved by terminating<br />

the select committee will enable<br />

powerful chairmen of such standing com-


<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 117<br />

mittees as Energy and Commerce to maintain<br />

or even increase their budgets.<br />

The Senate rejected a similar scheme. Its<br />

select committees were preserved, and all<br />

Senate committees accepted an across-theboard<br />

budget cut. House leaders are<br />

preparing to wipe out their select panels and<br />

institute a “flexible freeze.” This means the<br />

leaders could freeze the overall amount for<br />

committees while deciding which<br />

committees would get more, which would<br />

get less and which would stay the same.<br />

Hungry chairmen would devour funds that<br />

had been spent on hunger.<br />

SPEAKING TOUR: EAST<br />

TIMOR – A NEW<br />

GENERATION OF<br />

RESISTANCE<br />

This is one event in a ten-state, two-country,<br />

five-week speaking tour of five young <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese activists sponsored by ETAN/US,<br />

ETAN/Canada, the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Talks<br />

Campaign (Australia) and the <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />

Association of Victoria. It is reprinted here<br />

as an example.<br />

Tuesday, April 13, 19<strong>93</strong><br />

Goddard Riverside Community Center<br />

5<strong>93</strong> Columbus Ave. (at 88th St.) 7 - 9:30<br />

pm $5, $8, $10 (sliding scale)<br />

Too young to remember the brutal invasion<br />

of their country 17 years ago, the<br />

youth of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> continue to resist<br />

Indonesia’s occupation of their country.<br />

Young <strong>Timor</strong>ese – many now living in exile<br />

– sustain the struggle for self-determination.<br />

This spring, five <strong>Timor</strong>ese activists will<br />

bring their case to U.S. and the United<br />

Nations. Some left <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> shortly after<br />

the invasion, others escaped only recently.<br />

Speakers<br />

• Constâncio Pinto, 30, was a leader of the<br />

November 12, 1991 peaceful demonstration<br />

that ended with Indonesian<br />

troops massacring over 271 people. He<br />

was Executive Secretary of the underground<br />

National Council of Maubere<br />

Resistance (the coalition of most<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese nationalist groups) in <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> from 1989-92. Over the years, he<br />

was arrested several times and tortured.<br />

He escaped <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> in May 1992,<br />

after being intensively hunted by the<br />

Indonesians for seven months.<br />

• Abé Barreto Soares, age 27, official representative<br />

of the National Council of<br />

Maubere Resistance to North America,<br />

went exile in 1991 and now lives in<br />

Toronto.<br />

• Elizabeth Exposto, age 18, and Danilo<br />

Henriques, age 21, students now living in<br />

Australia who fled <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> in 1975.<br />

• Maria Teresa Fernandes, age 24, is a<br />

graduate student and activist who left<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> in 1975 now lives in Portugal.<br />

• Amy Goodman of WBAI/Pacifica Radio<br />

and Allan Nairn of the New Yorker<br />

magazine – U.S. journalists beaten during<br />

the November 12 massacre – will also<br />

participate.<br />

Sponsored by The Learning Alliance and the<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> <strong>Action</strong> <strong>Network</strong> For more<br />

information call: (718)788-6071; (914)428-<br />

7299 ETAN, PO Box 1182, White Plains,<br />

NY 10602<br />

MANUFACTURING DISSENT<br />

The following is excerpted from a leaflet<br />

being distributed at showings of<br />

Manufacturing Consent: Noam Chomsky<br />

and the Media in New York and elsewhere.<br />

The people of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> have suffered<br />

one of the worst catastrophes of this terrible<br />

century, since the Indonesian invasion of<br />

1975. The <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> <strong>Action</strong> <strong>Network</strong> has<br />

succeeded in bringing this awful tragedy to<br />

the awareness of the public and Congress.<br />

Its work has made it possible to hope that<br />

the people of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> may at last enjoy<br />

the right of self-determination for which they<br />

have struggled with such courage and<br />

dedication.<br />

– Noam Chomsky<br />

In 1975, Indonesia invaded <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

with the weapons and blessing of the United<br />

States. Over 200,000 people, nearly onethird<br />

of the population died as result of the<br />

invasion and occupation of the half-island<br />

north of Australia. Throughout the years of<br />

repression, the people of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> have<br />

shown an extraordinary determination to<br />

resist. World attention focused on <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> after years of being ignored by the<br />

media when Indonesian soldiers opened fire<br />

on a nonviolent demonstration on November<br />

12, 1991 – killing over 271 people. This<br />

massacre was different only because it was<br />

witnessed by Western journalists, including<br />

Amy Goodman of WBAI/Pacifica Radio and<br />

Allan Nairn of the New Yorker Magazine.<br />

Last year, a public outcry prompted the<br />

U.S. Congress to terminate military training<br />

assistance to Indonesia.<br />

The <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> <strong>Action</strong> <strong>Network</strong><br />

(ETAN) is working for the right of the <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese to determine their own future.<br />

Since the United States has been one of<br />

Indonesia’s largest weapons supplier,<br />

ETAN is working to mobilize popular sentiment<br />

and pressure on our government to<br />

support <strong>Timor</strong>ese self-determination.<br />

ETAN seeks to protect the human rights of<br />

the <strong>Timor</strong>ese and calls for an end to U.S.<br />

and international military and economic aid<br />

to Indonesia.<br />

The <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> <strong>Action</strong> <strong>Network</strong> is a decentralized,<br />

grassroots, national coalition<br />

with local chapters throughout the U.S.<br />

ETAN organizes public forums, lobbies<br />

Congress and provides videos, books, information,<br />

and speakers.<br />

Now is the time for effective public<br />

pressure in support <strong>Timor</strong>ese independence<br />

to end the genocide there. Join us!<br />

(tear-off coupon and order form)<br />

TIMOR’S UNTELEVISED<br />

TERROR<br />

As the World Looks Elsewhere, A Small<br />

Island Suffers a Hideous War<br />

The Washington Post Outlook<br />

(Commentary) Section<br />

Sunday, March 14, 19<strong>93</strong> Page 2. By Sven<br />

Bergman<br />

DILI, EAST TIMOR - “Can you take<br />

this to the outside world?”<br />

A nervous Catholic priest held a bunch of<br />

papers in his hands, lists with names of<br />

people in his parish who had disappeared or<br />

were imprisoned, tortured or killed in recent<br />

months in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> is half of an island in the<br />

Indonesian archipelago 400 miles north of<br />

Australia. In the last 17 years, as many as<br />

200,000 people - a third of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>’s<br />

population - have been killed by the occupying<br />

forces of the Indonesian government.<br />

Yet unlike the suffering and cruelty in, say,<br />

the former Yugoslavia, the victims and<br />

survivors here have only just begun to<br />

capture the attention of the world.<br />

In November 1991, a British TV crew<br />

was on hand when Indonesian soldiers<br />

opened fire on thousands of young people<br />

participating in a huge pro-independence<br />

funeral march at the Santa Cruz cemetery<br />

here. The videotape of the massacre, which<br />

showed people being shot down, shocked<br />

western politicians - candidate Bill Clinton<br />

among them - into criticizing Indonesia’s<br />

human rights abuses.<br />

Nevertheless, <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> remains tightly<br />

controlled. We did not dare to accept the<br />

priest’s papers. Outside of the building<br />

where we were talking, agents of the everpresent<br />

Indonesian military secret service<br />

were waiting for us. Foreign journalists,<br />

delegations and organizations are allowed<br />

into <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> only on a very selective<br />

basis, and tourists are tightly motored. The<br />

agents decided it was time for us to leave.<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>’s terror began in late 1975<br />

after Portugal withdrew from its colonial<br />

empire. The people of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, ruled


Page 118 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

since the 16th century, were not inclined to<br />

join Indonesia, as West <strong>Timor</strong>, a former<br />

Dutch colony, had done in the 1940s. Four<br />

hundred years of Portuguese rule had created<br />

a distinct language, Tetum, and a distinct<br />

cultural identity. In the fall of 1975, a<br />

leftist group, the Revolutionary Front for an<br />

Independent <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> (FRETILIN), won<br />

a brief civil war and began setting up a national<br />

government.<br />

The military government of Indonesia,<br />

presiding over an island nation with hundreds<br />

of ethnic groups and languages, worried<br />

about the destabilizing influence of an<br />

independent country on its periphery. But<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>’s claim to self-determination had<br />

been recognized in United Nations<br />

resolutions. The Indonesians were also<br />

worried about maintaining good relations<br />

with the rest of the world, especially the<br />

United States. They needn’t have worried.<br />

In December 1975, President Gerald Ford<br />

and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger paid<br />

a state visit to Jakarta, the Indonesian<br />

capital. It is widely thought that Kissinger<br />

and Ford told the Indonesian generals that<br />

the United States would not object to the<br />

annexation of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. The next day,<br />

Dec. 7, 1975, the Indonesian forces, armed<br />

mainly with American weapons, invaded<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

The lightly armed FRETILIN forces offered<br />

strong resistance for three years in the<br />

island’s mountainous interior. The<br />

Indonesian army pursued them, destroying<br />

villages, massacring inhabitants and relocating<br />

refugees in strategic villages. The<br />

Indonesians also destroyed crops, creating<br />

famine. By late 1979, the International Red<br />

Cross and Catholic Relief Services were<br />

comparing the famine in <strong>Timor</strong> to the deliberate<br />

starvation of the citizens of Biafra in<br />

the late 1960s. Protests from U.S. congressmen<br />

helped force Indonesia to allow<br />

foreign humanitarian aid into the besieged<br />

areas. But world attention remained sporadic.<br />

This history is invisible when you first<br />

arrive in Dili, the capital of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. The<br />

city is small and calm. With its distinctive<br />

colonial-era architecture, it could be a port<br />

city in Portugal. Save for the pervasive<br />

presence of Indonesian soldiers, it seems at<br />

first glance like a normal place.<br />

When we drove out to the countryside,<br />

the face of Indonesian occupation became<br />

apparent at the first military checkpoint.<br />

Our hired driver, José, got out to show his<br />

papers to the military police. A large<br />

Balinese soldier leaned over him, studying<br />

the silver ring on José’s hand with an indifferent<br />

look. Then the soldier reached down,<br />

slowly removed the ring and put it on his<br />

own finger. José said nothing. When we<br />

realized what had happened, we wanted to<br />

go back and retrieve the ring. José stopped<br />

us. He just wanted to leave. Fear had forced<br />

him to swallow the humiliation.<br />

We drove west through the dry barren<br />

countryside, passing through resettlement<br />

villages built by the government to accommodate<br />

internal refugees dislocated from<br />

their homes by massive military sweeps.<br />

The villages, strategically placed along main<br />

roads for easy control of the population,<br />

consisted of small, square cement-andbamboo<br />

houses in straight lines. There were<br />

red and white Indonesian flags everywhere<br />

and Indonesian soldiers with U.S.-made M-<br />

16 rifles slung over their shoulders. Morning<br />

and night, military trucks carried<br />

camouflaged soldiers in and out of the<br />

towns. Military helicopters swept overhead<br />

An unofficial curfew left the streets quiet<br />

and empty after nine in the evening. That<br />

same evening we arrived in an isolated<br />

village. About 30 <strong>Timor</strong>ese gathered around<br />

us in the dark.<br />

“Once this was a village full of life. Now<br />

there are only us left,” said an older man<br />

pointing toward the quiet, staring band of<br />

villagers.” All the others are dead.<br />

They wanted to help us, but we had to<br />

drive on - nobody dared to put us up. The<br />

next morning our military babysitters questioned<br />

us about where we had been and took<br />

our pictures. After we made a brief visit to a<br />

Catholic elementary school, the secret<br />

policemen even talked to the nun and her<br />

young pupils. The secret police’s suspicions<br />

left us ill-at-ease, worrying about<br />

the safety of the innocent people who had<br />

talked to us.<br />

Until recently, the West’s concern about<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> has been overshadowed by its<br />

economic ties with the Indonesian government.<br />

“On one side there is a small people<br />

of 600,000,” one priest explained, “and on<br />

the other side a nation with rich natural resources<br />

and 185 million people.<br />

The Santa Cruz massacre in November<br />

1991 did prompt some second thoughts.<br />

The Indonesian government initially put the<br />

death toll at 19. When the British videotape,<br />

which had been smuggled out of the<br />

country, indicated far more casualties, the<br />

estimate was upped to 50. Sources in the<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese resistance put the death toll at<br />

273. Amnesty International estimates that<br />

at least 100 and possibly as many 250<br />

people were killed. Human rights organizations<br />

have also collected eyewitness testimony<br />

that Indonesian soldiers invaded local<br />

hospitals after the massacre and dragged<br />

away the wounded.<br />

The European Parliament and the U.S.<br />

Congress quickly condemned Indonesia.<br />

Last October, Congress cut $2.3 million<br />

dollars in military aid to Indonesia - the first<br />

time in 17 years that Congress has reduced<br />

such aid over the issue of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. On<br />

the campaign trail, candidate Clinton told a<br />

New York radio reporter that <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

had been ignored in an “unconscionable”<br />

manner.<br />

To date, Indonesia has retained strong<br />

international financial backing. The<br />

Consultative Group on Indonesia, a World<br />

Bank consortium of donor countries, decided<br />

in July to give Indonesia $5 billion in<br />

aid, credits and loans in 1992-<strong>93</strong>. But there<br />

are signs that the administration is following<br />

through on Clinton’s campaign statements.<br />

Last week, the United Nations Human<br />

Rights Commission in Geneva approved a<br />

strong resolution on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> that won<br />

unprecedented support from the United<br />

States.<br />

The U.N. action couldn’t be more timely.<br />

Last November, the military arrested<br />

Xanana Gusmão, the leader of the <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />

resistance, and charged him with rebellion,<br />

conspiracy and leading a separatist<br />

movement. As many as 20 relatives and<br />

friends were arrested with him; hundreds of<br />

people have been detained in recent months<br />

for periods ranging from a few hours to a<br />

few months, according to Amnesty international.<br />

Bishop Carlos Ximenes Belo said last<br />

month that the arrested were being subject<br />

to “all types of torture.”<br />

Gusmão is now on trial in Dili. The<br />

Portuguese government, citing various U.N.<br />

resolutions rejecting Indonesian sovereignty<br />

over <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, says that Jakarta “lacks<br />

the legal, political and moral authority” to<br />

put Gusmão on trial. With the exception of<br />

a one hour visit with a representatives of the<br />

International Red Cross, Gusmão has not<br />

been allowed to meet with any independent<br />

observers since his arrest. He has been<br />

shown on TV, however, urging his followers<br />

to surrender, a statement that many believe<br />

was coerced. Indonesian authorities have<br />

selectively admitted international observers<br />

into the courtroom and insist that Gusmão’s<br />

trial is open and impartial.<br />

The leaders of the Indonesian government<br />

remain intransigent. After the Santa Cruz<br />

massacre, Gen. Try Sutrisno, the<br />

commander of the Indonesian Armed<br />

Forces, said that the <strong>Timor</strong>ese who resist<br />

integration into the Indonesian state are<br />

“delinquent people [who] have to be shot,<br />

and we will shoot them.” Last week,<br />

President Suharto, who has ruled Indonesia<br />

for the last 27 years, selected Sutrisno as his<br />

vice president and likely successor.<br />

When we finally boarded the boat to<br />

leave <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, we were visited by two<br />

high-ranking intelligence officers. In a last<br />

awkward effort to influence our impressions,<br />

one of them apologized for our being<br />

followed, interrogated, photographed,


<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 119<br />

videotaped and our baggage thoroughly<br />

searched.<br />

“There are good and bad tourists,” he<br />

explained. “Sometimes the bad tourists try<br />

to smuggle out letters from <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>,<br />

letters which later are given to the U.N. ...”<br />

Sven Bergman, a TV journalist in Sweden,<br />

visited <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> late last year.<br />

The article was accompanied by a cartoon<br />

showing a globe turned on its side, with a<br />

blindfolded man, hidden under the base of<br />

the globe, being shot by a soldier.<br />

ETAN/US NEWSLETTER #5<br />

March 19<strong>93</strong>. Newsletter of the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

<strong>Action</strong> <strong>Network</strong>/US. Edited excerpts here, as<br />

much is elsewhere in this compilation.<br />

Contact ETAN for a paper copy.<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese US Speaking Tour Begins!<br />

On March 27, five young <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />

nationalists will arrive in New York to begin<br />

a month-long tour all over the United States.<br />

In addition to meeting with officials in<br />

Washington and at the UN, our guests will<br />

speak at universities, media outlets and<br />

community meetings in more than a dozen<br />

states and provinces.<br />

The participants of the tour were infants<br />

or children when Indonesia invaded their<br />

homeland 17 years ago. They represent a<br />

new generation of resistance, the human<br />

embodiment of a yearning for independence<br />

which cannot be eradicated by terror and<br />

“education.” Although they were forced to<br />

leave their country, these five people have<br />

committed their lives to struggle for the day<br />

they can go home again.<br />

Constancio Pinto, 30, was a leader of the<br />

November 12, 1991 peaceful demonstration<br />

that ended with Indonesian troops massacring<br />

over 271 people. He was Executive<br />

Secretary of the underground National<br />

Council of Maubere Resistance (the coalition<br />

of most <strong>Timor</strong>ese nationalist groups) in<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> from 1989–92. He has been arrested<br />

several times and tortured. He escaped<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> last May, after being intensively<br />

hunted by the Indonesians for<br />

seven months.<br />

Abé Barreto Soares, 27, official representative<br />

of the National Council of<br />

Maubere Resistance to North America,<br />

went into exile in 1991 and now lives in<br />

Toronto. He is a student of English literature.<br />

Elizabeth Exposto, 18, will attend La<br />

Trobe University in Australia. She fled <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> as an infant in 1975, and returned<br />

there four years ago to visit her<br />

grandparents. Her shock at the conditions<br />

there motivated her to speak out in behalf of<br />

her compatriots.<br />

Danilo Henriques, 21 a student and<br />

diplomat-in-training, escaped with his<br />

mother in 1975. He now lives in Australia.<br />

Maria Teresa Fernandes, 24, is a graduate<br />

student and activist who left <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> in<br />

1975 and now lives in Portugal.<br />

Although parts of the tour are still being<br />

organized, many public events are already<br />

set up. In addition, the <strong>Timor</strong>ese will be<br />

meeting with journalists, academics and<br />

public officials to help American opinionmakers<br />

understand their situation and determination.<br />

The list below is only partial<br />

for the cities listed; our guests will also visit<br />

Washington DC, Toronto, Montreal,<br />

Vancouver, Ottawa, and elsewhere. Call<br />

ETAN at (914)428-7299 or Richard Koch at<br />

(908)542-6275 for details.<br />

White Plains, NY March 28, WESPAC<br />

Princeton University, NJ, March 29<br />

Washington DC, March 31, Institute for<br />

Policy Studies. Also many meetings with<br />

US government officials.<br />

Baltimore, MD April 3. Maryland United<br />

for Peace and Justice.<br />

Long Branch, NJ April 5<br />

New Haven, CT April 7, Yale Council on<br />

Southeast Asia Studies.<br />

Providence, RI April 7, Brown University.<br />

Numerous other events in<br />

Providence/Fall River area.<br />

Cambridge, MA April 8-10 Harvard Law<br />

School. Numerous other events in Boston<br />

area, including media.<br />

Bethlehem, PA April 12. Also Kutztown<br />

New York, NY April 13. Numerous meetings<br />

with UN officials, media.<br />

Los Angeles, CA April 14-17 UCLA and<br />

other locations.<br />

Vancouver, BC April 17.<br />

Seattle, WA April 18.<br />

San Francisco/Berkeley, CA April 18-25.<br />

CCSF, UC/Berkeley, etc.<br />

Madison, Milwaukee, Iowa City,<br />

Minneapolis, Chicago.<br />

Ottawa, Toronto, Montreal<br />

Hopes for the Clinton Administration<br />

During the campaign, Clinton characterized<br />

past US policy toward <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>:<br />

“I’m very concerned about what’s happened<br />

in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, and I think we have to<br />

review it. We have ignored it so far in ways<br />

that I think are unconscionable. ... We have<br />

to engage the (Indonesian) government on<br />

the question of how those people are being<br />

treated. And I certainly wouldn’t rule out<br />

the prospect of cutting aid.” New personnel<br />

in Congress and the State Department are<br />

further reason for hope for a change in US<br />

policy toward Indonesia and <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

When American diplomats in Geneva swung<br />

around to support a UN resolution in<br />

March, the chance of a change became real.<br />

Vice President Albert Gore was one of 52<br />

Senators who signed a letter to Bush after<br />

the Santa Cruz massacre. Peter Tarnoff,<br />

Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs,<br />

moderated a forum on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> last year<br />

and is interested and knowledgeable. John<br />

Shattuck, Undersecretary of State for<br />

Human Rights, is a sincere believer in those<br />

rights. The new post of Assistant Secretary<br />

of Defense for Democracy and Human<br />

Rights has been filled by Morton Halperin,<br />

a Nixon-era policy analyst who resigned to<br />

protest the Vietnam war and has been a civil<br />

liberties activist since.<br />

In 1992, the US Congress defied<br />

President Bush to terminate US military<br />

training (IMET) for Indonesia, the first-ever<br />

cut in funding to protest <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. This<br />

year, some of the obstacles to stronger<br />

action are gone. Ronald Dellums, new<br />

Chairman of the House Armed Services<br />

Committee is an outspoken advocate of<br />

military cuts and human rights. His committee<br />

has jurisdiction over arms sales.<br />

Stephen Solarz, who as Chair of the House<br />

Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asian and<br />

Pacific Affairs consistently blocked positive<br />

action, lost his re-election bid. The new<br />

chair, Gary Ackerman, is one of a dozen<br />

Representatives who last year co-sponsored<br />

H.R.5176, a comprehensive aid/trade<br />

sanctions bill against Indonesia over <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

ETAN’s report How to Influence U.S.<br />

Government Policy contains addresses,<br />

phone and fax numbers for key people in<br />

the new Administration and Congress. We<br />

also have an analysis of The Outlook for a<br />

Change in U.S. Policy Toward <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>,<br />

written for the February international<br />

meeting. If you would like both reports,<br />

please send 50c for copying and postage.<br />

Chomsky Film a Hit in US<br />

The new, highly-acclaimed, full-length<br />

documentary film Manufacturing Consent:<br />

Noam Chomsky and the Media is showing<br />

widely. The movie uses <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> as a<br />

case study of how the media ignores important<br />

issues, and ETAN has been working<br />

with the producers and distributors to help<br />

moviegoers channel their new awareness<br />

into action.<br />

If you can leaflet or table, or would like<br />

to arrange a theatrical run in your community,<br />

contact ETAN’s Eleanor Hoffman<br />

at 914-235-1797 or the distributors,<br />

Zeitgeist Films, 212-274-1989. Here is a<br />

partial schedule of upcoming showings:<br />

New York: Film Forum, 209 West Houston<br />

St., March 17 on.


Page 120 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

San Francisco: Castro Theatre, Castro at<br />

Market St. April 9-15.<br />

Olympia, WA: Olympia Film Society. April<br />

11-14.<br />

Orono, ME: University of Maine. April 15.<br />

Berkeley: U.C. Theatre. Apr. 16-22.<br />

Ithaca: Cornell Cinema. April 22-24.<br />

Boston: Brattle Theatre. April23-29.<br />

Washington, DC: Key Theater. April 23-May<br />

7.<br />

St. Louis, MO: Webster Coll. April 23-May 8.<br />

San Diego: Univ. of Calif., April 27.<br />

Los Angeles: NuArt Cinema. April 29-May 5.<br />

Columbus, OH: Wexner Theater, April 30-<br />

May 1.<br />

Rhinebeck, NY: Upstate Films. April 30-May<br />

2.<br />

Cleveland: Cleveland Cinématheque, May 7-8.<br />

Petaluma, CA: Washington Sq. Theatre. May<br />

7-13.<br />

Santa Cruz, CA: The Sash Mill. May 13-19.<br />

San José: The Towne. May 14-20.<br />

International <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Solidarity<br />

Movement Thrives<br />

The 1991 Santa Cruz massacre motivated<br />

the <strong>Timor</strong>ese resistance and its supporters<br />

worldwide, and the energy continues. In<br />

February, representatives of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

solidarity groups from a dozen countries<br />

met in Amsterdam to share information and<br />

coordinate actions. Twenty-nine groups<br />

described progress in public awareness and<br />

the level of pressure exerted on their own<br />

governments, but acknowledged that there is<br />

still a long way to go.<br />

Participants discussed a coordinated approach<br />

to the UN human rights conference<br />

in Vienna this summer, continued pressure<br />

on countries funding Jakarta, particularly<br />

through the CGI, and focused pressure on<br />

the United Kingdom and Germany because<br />

of massive new warship and warplane sales<br />

to Indonesia. The movement will use of<br />

electronic mail to improve communications,<br />

and will work together at the July UN<br />

Decolonization Hearings in New York.<br />

The next international solidarity meeting<br />

will be in Manila, Philippines, in November<br />

19<strong>93</strong>. Contact ETAN/US if you would like<br />

more information. To help us be part of an<br />

international movement, here is contact<br />

information for a few of the groups:<br />

England: TAPOL, 111 Northwood Road,<br />

Thornton Heath, Surrey CR7 8HW.<br />

44/81-771-2904. fax 44/81-653-0322,<br />

tapol@gn.apc.org<br />

Canada: <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Alert <strong>Network</strong>, 104-<br />

2120 W. 44, Vancouver, BC V6M 2G2.<br />

604-264-9973, etantor@web.apc.org<br />

Japan: Free <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Japan Coalition,<br />

Kure YWCA, 20-19 Nishi Kawaraishicho,<br />

Kure, Hiroshima, 737. 81/823-22-<br />

0962, fax 81/823-22-2684, jinglis@igc.apc.org<br />

Portugal: Comissão para os Direitos do<br />

Povo Maubere, Rua Pinheiro Chagas,<br />

77, 2xEsq, 1000 Lisboa, 351/1-352-<br />

8718, fax 351/1-534-009, cdpm@gn.apc.org<br />

Ireland: <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Ireland Solidarity<br />

Campaign, 210 Le Fanu Rd,<br />

Ballyfermot, Dublin 10. 353/1-623-<br />

3148.<br />

Resources<br />

ETAN is printing some new T-shirts,<br />

and we also have copies of Telling: <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> Personal Testimonies 1942-1992.<br />

This book, written by Michele Turner and<br />

just published in Australia, costs $20 and<br />

contains nearly 50 oral accounts of ordinary<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese people, recounting what they<br />

have witnessed. It adds a human dimension<br />

to <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>’s grim statistics.<br />

Our T-shirts include the traditional “Free<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>” with the FRETILIN flag (now<br />

on black instead of white), as well as two<br />

new designs: (1) “<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>: To Resist Is<br />

To Win” with a photo of a young boy with<br />

his arms outstretched in a victory sign in<br />

front of a banner at the Santa Cruz<br />

demonstration, and (2) “<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>:<br />

Indonesia’s Killing Field” with a photo of a<br />

man in a cemetery with mountains in the<br />

background. The shirts have “End U.S.<br />

Support of Indonesian Genocide” or “End<br />

U.S. Support of the Indonesian Occupation”<br />

on the back. They come in Large and Extra<br />

Large.<br />

Write for our full resource list. If you<br />

order videos, T-shirts, or books, please add<br />

$3 for postage.<br />

INÍCIO DA DIGRESSÃO<br />

TIMORENSE PELOS EUA<br />

By José Antonio Barros Basto, March 29, on<br />

pt-net<br />

Olà a todos:<br />

Depois de uma ausência devida ao meu<br />

“qualifying” (que jà està pelas costas,para<br />

meu grande alívio e alegria...), regresso ao<br />

convívio da rede par vos trazer notícias<br />

frescas da digressão dos estudantes timorenses<br />

por terras da AMérica do Norte.<br />

Desloquei-me ontem a White Plains, um<br />

subu’rbio (?) de NYC ‘a sede da WESPAC,<br />

por assim dizer, o organismo mãe da<br />

ETAN/US (<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Alert <strong>Network</strong>),<br />

onde se realizou um “potluck” - jantar<br />

volante em que cada membro leva comida<br />

(eu cà levei iscas de bacalhau, bastante<br />

apreciadas - excepto pelos vegetarianos<br />

radicais, que nem peixe comem B-)<br />

Constâncio Pinto não tinha ainda chegado<br />

aos EUA B-( Depois de todos os problemas<br />

com o bilhete e com o visto de entrada,<br />

ontem foi posto fora do avião da TAP por<br />

causa de “overbooking” ... [esta faz-me<br />

lembrar uma piada ouvida jà hà muitos anos:<br />

” – Sabes o que significa T.A.P.?”<br />

” – Take Another Plane ...” ]<br />

Este serà porventura o elemente chave da<br />

digressão aqui pelos EUA. Figura envolvida<br />

até Novembro 91 na rede clandestina de<br />

libertação em <strong>Timor</strong> Leste, ele poderà dar o<br />

toque mais dramàtico na ilustração dos<br />

problemas que o seu país atravessa nas<br />

mãos do Exército Indonésio. Fiquei<br />

particularmente chocado ao saber que o seu<br />

filho (que ele nunca viu), de 9 meses,<br />

encontra-se preso (!!!) juntamente com a<br />

mâe (mulher de Constâncio), assim como os<br />

seus pais, em pura represàlia pelo facto de<br />

Constâncio ter conseguido escapar de <strong>Timor</strong><br />

Leste.<br />

Ele não tem notícias da família hà meses,<br />

apenas sabendo que estão (estavam ?) nas<br />

mãos dos Indonésios ...<br />

Os outros estudantes com os quais convivi<br />

um pouco ontem são ainda muito jovens,<br />

e, com a excepcão de um deles, so’ tem<br />

conhecimento da situação em <strong>Timor</strong> Leste<br />

por terceiras pessoas ou por ocasionais<br />

visitas ‘a ilha.<br />

São pessoas muitas simpàticas, tem todos<br />

um inglês muito capaz (dois deles<br />

estudam na Austràlia, um outro no Canadà e<br />

outra em Portugal) o me parece um critério<br />

de escolha acertado dada a necessidade de<br />

transmitir a sua mensagem a uma audiência<br />

directamente, sem tradutores, e para minha<br />

alegria, todos falam português fluentemente<br />

(e muito melhor que 99% dos filhos dos<br />

imigrantes que conheço por aqui...).<br />

A pequena apresentação que fizeram deu<br />

uma visão mais pessoal da histo’ria recente<br />

de <strong>Timor</strong> Leste, com famílias desaparecidas,<br />

tradiço~es culturais espezinhadas ou<br />

subvertidas aos interesses de assimilação<br />

Indonésia, fugas atribuladas, dificuldades de<br />

aclimatação em países distantes...<br />

Houve também uma sessão de diapositivos<br />

representativos da etnografia timorense,<br />

onde mais uma vez fica marcado o equílibrio<br />

com que o povo <strong>Timor</strong>ense vive com a sua<br />

Terra-Mãe e a riqueza das suas tradiço~es...<br />

Como pequena nota, descobri ontem que<br />

existe um grande respeito na cultura<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ense pela “Mulher,” pela lado maternal<br />

da Terra, que é representado por um<br />

símbolo de “Lua Crescente,” em geral usado<br />

na testa, enquanto que o poder do Homem,<br />

simbolizado pelo Sol (círculo(s) dourado(s)<br />

suspensos ao peito) é associado com os<br />

guerreiros tradicionais, armados com uma<br />

espada, que creio ser passada de geração em<br />

geração... De modo algum as mulheres são<br />

colocadas em posição subalterna, situação<br />

que outras sociadades so’ agora começam a<br />

combater ...<br />

No tocante ao massacre de 12 Novembro<br />

91, mais uma vez a ausência de Constâncio


<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 121<br />

Pinto foi notada: para quem jà assistiu aos<br />

depoimentos de Allan Nairn ou Amy<br />

Goodman (sobretudo esta u’ltima...) fica<br />

com uma ideia bem mais pungente do que foi<br />

aquela terrível manhã em Dili...<br />

Nesta altura em que a posição dos EUA<br />

mostra claros sinais de esperança em relação<br />

a <strong>Timor</strong> Leste, graças ‘a mudança de<br />

admnistração (digam o que disserem, nada<br />

podia ser pior que a admnistração Bush - exdirector<br />

da CIA e seguidor das políticas do<br />

“Sr.” Kissinger no Sudeste Asiàtico, das<br />

quais no’s bem sabemos o resultado...), esperemos<br />

que esta digressão sirva para esclarecer<br />

mais americanos da situação crítica<br />

que se vive em <strong>Timor</strong> Leste, de modo a<br />

manter a pressão para que a administração<br />

continue pelo bom caminho (como indicado<br />

pelo recente “volte-face” em Genebra da<br />

delegação “profissional” dos EUA -funcionàrios<br />

de carreira- que inverteram completamente<br />

a sua posição na Conferência de Direitos<br />

Humanos da ONU, depois de devidamente<br />

intruídos a partir de Washington...).<br />

Quem estiver aqui pelos EUA, e tenha<br />

possibilidade de se deslocar a uma das numerosas<br />

conferências, aconselho vivamente a<br />

que o façam, e tentem contactar com os<br />

participantes <strong>Timor</strong>enses, pois é evidente<br />

que eles continuam bastante ligados a<br />

Portugal, quer pela língua, cultura e também<br />

laços de sangue ...<br />

Para mais pormenores, ou detalhes da<br />

digressão (jà publicados na rede hà dias<br />

atràs) estou ‘a vossa disposição.<br />

Um abraço a todos<br />

José Anto’nio<br />

EAST TIMOR: SOARES<br />

WRITES TO CLINTON<br />

Expresso, 20 March 19<strong>93</strong>. Translated from<br />

Portuguese, unabridged<br />

(Lisbon) This week, Pres. Mario Soares<br />

wrote a letter to Pres. Bill Clinton, thanking<br />

him for the decisive support the US gave to<br />

draft resolution on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, passed on<br />

5th in Geneva, by the UN Human Rights<br />

Commission. Observers considered the<br />

resolution, presented by the Twelve, a<br />

victory for Portuguese diplomacy over<br />

Indonesian’s position.<br />

Soares is believed to have played a part<br />

in this process, on the request of the Foreign<br />

Minister, Durão Barroso, himself. A few<br />

days before the discussion of the draft<br />

resolution, (the passing of which inverted,<br />

for the first time in 10 years, the tendency<br />

of reciprocal forces in favour of Jakarta),<br />

Durão Barroso requested the Portuguese<br />

Head of State to intercede with the US<br />

President, and explain to him the importance<br />

of Portugal’s diplomatic concerns on this<br />

matter.<br />

In addition to sending a message to<br />

Clinton, the President called a meeting with<br />

the US Ambassador (who, because he was<br />

out of Lisbon, was substituted by the<br />

Charge d’Affaires) in order to convey<br />

Portugal’s concerns, and Lisbon’s interest in<br />

getting the Twelve’s draft resolution approved.<br />

A Presidential Palace source considered<br />

that “the excellent work done by the<br />

Portuguese diplomats” at the UN<br />

Commission, combined with the intervention<br />

of Soares, was fundamental. US support<br />

for the resolution, which condemned<br />

Indonesia’s non-compliance with a series of<br />

obligations with regards <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, is also<br />

believed to have been essential in drawing in<br />

support from countries traditionally in<br />

favour of Jakarta.<br />

Still on the same subject, Soares is also<br />

going to send a message to the UN Secretary<br />

General, Mr. Boutros Ghali.<br />

TIMORESE EXILE<br />

ACTIVITIES<br />

THE “FREEDOM FOR<br />

XANANA, FREEDOM FOR<br />

TIMOR” COMMISSION<br />

From CDPM, April 3<br />

In the aftermath of Commander Xanana<br />

Gusmão’s arrest and the intensification of<br />

repression in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, a group of<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese, joined by Portuguese solidarity<br />

groups, took the initiative and constituted<br />

an informal organisation to work for the defence<br />

of <strong>Timor</strong>ese political prisoners.<br />

Professor Fernando Sylvan agreed from the<br />

outset to be its Honorary Chairman.<br />

Thus, in January 19<strong>93</strong>, the “Freedom for<br />

Xanana, Freedom for <strong>Timor</strong>” Commission<br />

was formed. Its first initiative was to organise<br />

a human chain on 19 January linking the<br />

UN Information Centre with the Apostolic<br />

Nuncio’s offices in Lisbon. At these two<br />

places, a group of celebrities delivered<br />

letters addressed to the UN Secretary<br />

General and to Pope John Paul II,<br />

respectively.<br />

Objectives<br />

Its main aim being the defence of<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese political prisoners, the “Freedom<br />

for Xanana, Freedom for <strong>Timor</strong>”<br />

Commission defined the following objectives:<br />

- the systematized collection of information<br />

about the prisoners, their families, and<br />

conditions affecting their lives;<br />

- the collection of the above information<br />

produced by international, non-governmental<br />

organisations, parliaments, governments,<br />

and other institutions, as well as news or<br />

studies published in the press;<br />

- publicizing human rights violations in<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, in particular those affecting<br />

political prisoners;<br />

- establishing contact with international<br />

and national organisations which could<br />

collaborate in the effective defence of political<br />

prisoners;<br />

- the organisation of activities to gain<br />

concrete support destined for <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />

political prisoners and their families.<br />

Participation<br />

The “FREEDOM FOR XANANA,<br />

FREEDOM FOR TIMOR”<br />

COMMISSION is an informal group, open<br />

to offers of help from all those who wish to<br />

do something to assist <strong>Timor</strong>ese political<br />

prisoners.<br />

To ensure the level of functioning required<br />

to achieve its objectives, decisions on<br />

the program of activities and the respective<br />

coordination will be carried out by the<br />

founding group. It is hoped, however, that<br />

an increasingly wider group of citizens will<br />

take part in all the initiatives, so as to<br />

strengthen solidarity with the people of<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and, especially, with the political<br />

prisoners and their families.<br />

The ability to carry out actions aimed at<br />

specific objectives was chosen as the basic<br />

criteria for joining the “FREEDOM FOR<br />

XANANA, FREEDOM FOR TIMOR”<br />

COMMISSION. All kinds of activities are<br />

welcome, from all people, groups, and institutions<br />

wishing to contribute towards<br />

helping <strong>Timor</strong>ese political prisoners.<br />

Take an initiative and join the<br />

Commission!<br />

SOME EXILES: HORTA HAS<br />

NEVER BEEN MANDATED<br />

Suara Pembaruan 17 March 19<strong>93</strong> Dateline:<br />

Lisbon Byline: Petrus Suryadi Slightly<br />

abridged<br />

Comment: Suryadi is a crony of Nuno<br />

Rocha, the Portuguese journalist notorious<br />

for his flattering report about <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

after a visit in 1988. The remarks made by<br />

José Martins are predictable, but did Abilio<br />

Araujo really say what he is quoted as<br />

saying? And to such a character? Suryadi is<br />

widely regarded as someone working closely<br />

with Bakin, the Indonesian intelligence<br />

agency. – TAPOL<br />

Some <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese leaders from various<br />

organisations living in Portugal are of the<br />

opinion that Ramos Horta has never been<br />

given a mandate to speak on behalf of the


Page 122 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese people and he only uses <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> to pursue his own interests, according<br />

to Petrus Surjadi who has just visited<br />

Portugal.<br />

“Does Ramos Horta really represent the<br />

entire people of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>,” Pembaruan<br />

asked Manual Martinez, chair of the organisation<br />

of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese Catholic refugees in<br />

Portugal, who replied:<br />

“He’s never been given a mandate to<br />

represent the people of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, especially<br />

the people in my organisation. The<br />

ones who are entitled to represent the <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese people are the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />

people themselves. He only speaks for himself.”<br />

Had Ramos Horta ever had any communication<br />

with his group? “Never. And he<br />

needn’t do so. What he wants is what the<br />

communists want, not the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese,”<br />

said Martinez. He hoped the Indonesian<br />

government would open the door to dialogue<br />

with his group.<br />

As for José Martins, the chair of Kota<br />

party, son of the chief of Ermera, he said<br />

Horta had never got a mandate from him.<br />

“He’s only fighting for himself. He talks in<br />

New York, Geneva and Australia, but only<br />

for himself,” said Martins. According to him<br />

the Portuguese government has no idea how<br />

to solve the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> question which is<br />

why he, as an anti-communist, wants to<br />

have the chance to have a dialogue with the<br />

Indonesian government so as to be able to<br />

help solve the question of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

“<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese people should talk to<br />

Indonesia and not to Portugal,” he said<br />

firmly.<br />

He says he was a journalist working for a<br />

Portuguese paper in October 1975 and<br />

travelled back and forth from Dili to<br />

Atapupu when tens of thousands of<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese coming from UDT, Apodeti and<br />

Trabalhista, fled to the Indonesian side, who<br />

then expressed the wish of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> to<br />

become a part of Indonesia.<br />

Fretilin’s chair<br />

Dr. Abilio Araujo, the chair of Fretilin<br />

who met Pembaruan at his office, said that<br />

as chair of Fretilin he had never given<br />

authority to Ramos Horta to speak on behalf<br />

of Fretilin. “So who did he get authority<br />

from to speak for Fretilin and the people of<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>?”<br />

“Horta got his mandate from Xanana<br />

Gusmão and has never spoken on behalf of<br />

Fretilin. He speaks for the CNRM (National<br />

Council of Maubere Resistance), and<br />

represents Falintil troops and the underground<br />

movement,” said Abilio. He said<br />

Xanana was never president of Fretilin; he<br />

was commander of Falintil and its base organisation,<br />

CNRM. Falintil is no longer the<br />

armed force of Fretilin, but it is a kind of<br />

opposition force of CNRM.<br />

Abilio Araujo even asked: “Who gave<br />

Ramos Horta authority to speak on behalf<br />

of the people of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> everywhere, as<br />

he is a multi-fascist?”<br />

For the past year, Ramos Horta has been<br />

the target of accusations by various <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese who are now living in Portugal. He<br />

is considered as having used the name of<br />

Fretilin and spoken on behalf of the <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese people, from New York to<br />

Australia, for his own personal interests.<br />

Horta hopes to draw financial benefits by<br />

speaking on behalf of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> because he<br />

has received many contributions from<br />

various organisations and states to fund his<br />

leftist lobby.<br />

COMMENT FROM BRUNO KAHN:<br />

To put Suryadi’s essay in some perspective,<br />

it is interesting to note that José<br />

Martins quite willingly recognises that he<br />

worked for Indonesian intelligence in the fall<br />

of 1975. I know at least of two instances: a<br />

radio interview of the Indonesian service of<br />

Radio Nederland at the end of last year, and<br />

a debate on the private Portuguese TV<br />

channel shortly after Xanana’s ‘interview’<br />

by the military (also at the end of last year).<br />

He appears to be now strongly against his<br />

former allegiances. I think he gave some<br />

details on the Intel manipulations, but don’t<br />

recall the details. Perhaps CDPM can be<br />

more specific.<br />

FRETILIN/AUSTRALIA WANTS<br />

MOVEMENT<br />

RESTRUCTURED<br />

Publico, 20 March, Original Portuguese<br />

(Lisbon) Fretilin’s Committees in<br />

Australia decided yesterday to start restructuring<br />

the movement based abroad, and appealed<br />

to Abilio Araujo and Ramos-Horta to<br />

adhere to this process. Following a meeting<br />

with Fretilin’s Directive Commission’s<br />

leaders, the Committees decided to reaffirm<br />

their “total and unconditional submission”<br />

to Fretilin’s central bodies inside <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>. According to the communiqué, the<br />

appeal to Abilio Araujo and Ramos-Horta is<br />

aimed to get them to “actively make every<br />

effort to implement the decisions of<br />

Fretilin’s Directive Commission on the<br />

restructuring of its external wing.”<br />

FRETILIN WITHOUT<br />

MAU HUNU<br />

Publico, 22 March (before his capture) By<br />

J.T.N. Original Portuguese unabridged<br />

(Lisbon) Fretilin’s representative in<br />

Portugal, Abilio Araujo, believes that<br />

Commander Ma’Hunu, Xanana Gusmão’s<br />

successor at the head of the <strong>Timor</strong>ese armed<br />

Resistance, should discontinue the functions<br />

he currently fulfills in the party, which<br />

today combine with his role as leading<br />

official on the Maubere Resistance National<br />

Council (CNRM) within the territory.<br />

According to Abilio Araujo, Ma’Hunu<br />

ought to follow Xanana Gusmão in as far as<br />

the latter, in 1989, decided to resign from<br />

the posts he occupied in the party structure.<br />

But: on formally resigning, Ma’Hunu should<br />

commit himself to not interfere in Fretilin<br />

life, thereby avoiding a repetition of the<br />

behaviour for which Abilio Araujo himself<br />

censured Xanana in 1991.<br />

According to Abilio Araujo, this would<br />

be the only way to ensure that the CNRM<br />

is effectively non- partisan. The CNRM<br />

being the supra-political-party body,<br />

destined to represent the different currents<br />

which go to make up the <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />

Resistance. At the moment, Ma’Hunu<br />

serves simultaneously on the CNRM, the<br />

Politico- Military Commission of the<br />

Resistance (CPM-R), and Fretilin’s<br />

Directive Commission (CDF), of which he<br />

is Secretary.<br />

The proposal to restructure Fretilin<br />

within the territory - of which Ma’Hunu’s<br />

separation (“freeing” him, so he can become<br />

leader of all the resisters) would be just the<br />

first step - was backed by Abilio Araujo,<br />

following a series of suggestions indicating<br />

changes in the structure of the party’s<br />

“external front.”<br />

Gathered in Melbourne last weekend,<br />

representatives from the Fretilin<br />

Committees in Australia as well as some<br />

“mandatory comrades” from the Directive<br />

Commission - such as Mari Alkatiri, based<br />

in Mozambique, and Alfredo Borges<br />

Ferreira - decided to set in motion a reorganization<br />

process of the “external wing” of<br />

the party, the preparation of which would<br />

be carried out by the said “mandatories” and<br />

delegates from the Committees.<br />

In the text which resulted from that<br />

meeting, Ramos Horta (current CNRM representative<br />

abroad), Guilhermina Araujo,<br />

and Abilio Araujo himself are invited to<br />

“actively engage themselves” in the restructuring<br />

process of Fretilin’s external wing.<br />

Contacted by Publico in Lisbon, Abilio<br />

Araujo “welcomed” the Melbourne decisions,<br />

but said that “the priority should be<br />

the internal front, where the consequences


<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 123<br />

of Xanana Gusmão’s capture still cannot be<br />

fully evaluated.”<br />

TIMORESE RESISTANCE<br />

TRIES TO AVOID DIVISIONS<br />

Expresso 3 April 19<strong>93</strong> Dateline : Lisbon<br />

Byline : Mario Robalo Translated from<br />

Portuguese abridged<br />

The <strong>Timor</strong>ese Resistance risks seeing its<br />

already precarious unity weakened further.<br />

This week in Sydney, Australia, Fretilin’s<br />

External Relations officer, Mari Alkatiri, and<br />

UDT Vice-Chairman João Carrascalao,<br />

agreed on the need for restructuring the<br />

“external Front” of the Resistance, so as to<br />

avoid its “multi-polarization.” On the same<br />

occasion, the UDT took up an unprecedented<br />

position in relation to the current<br />

guerrilla leader, Ma’Hunu. This <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />

party recognises that Xanana Gusmão’s<br />

substitute does not need to leave Fretilin<br />

(the Central Committee of which he is<br />

Chairman) in order to be considered the<br />

supreme leader of the entire Resistance.<br />

This position, however, opposes statements<br />

made previously by the head of<br />

Fretilin’s External Management, Abilio<br />

Araujo who, as well as believing that<br />

Ma’Hunu ought to resign from Fretilin in<br />

order to take up leadership of the struggle,<br />

stated that, firstly, a restructuring of the<br />

“internal front” should take place, before<br />

any change in the leadership of Fretilin’s<br />

external component. In other words, this<br />

party - from which Xanana had resigned to<br />

take on the leadership of the Resistance -<br />

could witness two currents emerging, with<br />

irreconcilable concepts of leadership. (...)<br />

MISCELLANEOUS<br />

ARTICLES<br />

SYAFEI ON MILITARY<br />

OPERATIONS IN EAST<br />

TIMOR FROM 1975<br />

Kedaulatan Rakyat (daily), 26 Jan. 19<strong>93</strong><br />

Extract only, via TAPOL<br />

This article is the first in a series of three.<br />

The following quotation shows the present<br />

military commander, Brig-Gen. Theo Syafei,<br />

who has done several tours of duty in <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>, including a stint in the second half of<br />

the 1970s, being frank about the role of the<br />

armed forces in the war in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. The<br />

official line is that only ‘Indonesian<br />

volunteers’ took part. The Syafei account<br />

also gives the lie to Indonesian claims about<br />

the alleged election of two delegates from<br />

each of the 13 districts of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> to the<br />

‘people’s assembly’ of May 1976 which took<br />

the decision to ask Jakarta for integration.<br />

[See, “<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, Building for the Future,”<br />

published by the Indonesian Foreign<br />

Ministry, Jakarta, 1992, page 10] If the<br />

army was still fighting to control the district<br />

and sub-district capitals in the period 1977-<br />

1978, how could elections possibly have<br />

been held?<br />

Is Theo Syafei keen for the history of<br />

Indonesia’s secret war in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> to be<br />

rectified to give the army its due? Another<br />

clue to this likelihood is the publication in<br />

Tempo on 5 December 1992 of a photograph<br />

of Indonesian troops coming off a<br />

landing craft. The caption reads: “ABRI<br />

troops landing in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> (1975)” This<br />

is the first time we have seen anything in the<br />

Indonesian press giving substance to the<br />

historically known fact of the Indonesian<br />

invasion in 1975.<br />

The following is an unabridged translation<br />

of the first four paragraphs of the KR article<br />

of 26 January 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

The province of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> is, up to the<br />

present, still identical with ABRI (the armed<br />

forces), and the native population still tend<br />

to be closer to ABRI than to the village and<br />

district heads. Such a psychological<br />

condition has come about because, ever<br />

since 1976, the community has been far<br />

more closely involved with ABRI in rebuilding<br />

this former Portuguese colonial<br />

territory. This is acknowledged by the<br />

commander of the operational command,<br />

(Kolakops), Brig.Gen. Theo Syafei.<br />

“For hundreds of years the people of<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> have been cooped up under a<br />

coconut shell. It was only after they proclaimed<br />

their integration with the Republic<br />

of Indonesia that they were able to extricate<br />

themselves from the conditions which had<br />

bound them till then,” he said, adding that<br />

the close proximity of the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />

people with ABRI dates back to the territorial<br />

operations which ABRI have been<br />

waging since 1975.<br />

Initially, ABRI had to cope with Fretilin<br />

which among other things possessed 17,000<br />

weapons. In the period from 1975 to 1977-<br />

78, territorial operations were focused on<br />

seizing control of the district and sub-district<br />

towns from Fretilin’s ‘stranglehold.’<br />

As a result, the rebels were pushed back,<br />

forcing them to flee to the hills or the villages<br />

in the interior,” said Brig.Gen Theo<br />

Syafei.<br />

In the period 1978-80, ABRI had the<br />

task of seizing the villages ‘controlled’ by<br />

Fretilin, whereas in 1981-83, the territorial<br />

operation was charged with wiping out the<br />

remnant forces of Fretilin. “In 1983, Fretilin<br />

was left with 700 weapons. However, in<br />

1984, Fretilin declared that opposition<br />

would no longer be waged by means of<br />

armed struggle but by political struggle and<br />

the era of political resistance began in 1986,”<br />

Theo Syafei went on.<br />

ABRI then began to balance combat operations<br />

with territorial operations. “From<br />

1986, territorial operations were aimed at<br />

healing the ‘wounds of the people.’ This<br />

was done by building the infra-structure for<br />

education, health, religious practice and<br />

other economic infra-structure,” he said.<br />

INFORMATION WANTED ON<br />

ENVIRONMENTAL<br />

IMPLICATIONS OF THE<br />

INDONESIAN OCCUPATION<br />

From: John Hontelez, chairman Friends of<br />

the Earth International<br />

PO Box 19199<br />

1000 GD Amsterdam, the Netherlands<br />

fax: +31.20.6221369<br />

Friends of the Earth International is a<br />

worldwide federation of 51 national environmental<br />

organisations. It has decided to<br />

pay special attention to the situation in <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>, and intends to send a delegation to<br />

this country to investigate the environmental<br />

implications of the Indonesian occupation.<br />

We are trying to find information<br />

about the state of the environment in <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>, the direct and indirect effects of the<br />

policies of the Indonesian authorities on<br />

environmental degradation, and the effects<br />

on the health and general condition of the<br />

people of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> of this degradation.<br />

Please inform me about information you<br />

have or where to find it.


Page 124 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

FRIENDS OF THE EARTH<br />

INTERNATIONAL ‘92 AGM ON EAST<br />

TIMOR.<br />

Friends of the Earth International is a<br />

federation of 51 autonomous environmental<br />

organisations worldwide.<br />

1. Considering that the violation of human<br />

rights and the genocide of the people of<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> carried out by the Indonesian<br />

government is a crime against humanity;<br />

2. Considering that the ongoing transmigration<br />

policies forced upon the poor<br />

population of Java (up to 100,000), put<br />

at risk the local environment with projects<br />

of re-colonization;<br />

3. Considering that the destruction of tropical<br />

rainforests in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> (notably<br />

through napalm in the late 1970’s) as a<br />

form of controlling the populations, removing<br />

them to strategic villages, is a<br />

way of finishing with <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>’s natural<br />

heritage;<br />

4. Considering that these interventions are<br />

continuously being denounced by international<br />

organisations such as Amnesty<br />

International and the Red Cross;<br />

The Assembly EXPRESSES its profound<br />

concerns about the situation in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>,<br />

CONDEMNS all the actions of the<br />

Indonesian Government and EXPRESSES<br />

its solidarity with the people of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

The AGM gives the mandate to the FoEI<br />

Executive Commit- tee to send a delegation<br />

to <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> preferably consisting of four<br />

people: a Portuguese, a Dutch, an Australian<br />

and an Indonesian, in order to analyze the<br />

situation mentioned above and produce a<br />

report to be presented to the AGM and<br />

made public. FoEI is not required to provide<br />

the funding to implement this decision.<br />

Valsain, Spain, 5th November 1992<br />

EAST TIMOR COMPUTER<br />

WAR GAME<br />

From TAPOL, 18 Feb.<br />

If a major computer game company has<br />

created a game about getting Indonesia out<br />

of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, it must mean that <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

has edged onto the general consciousness.<br />

And who knows? The game may encourage<br />

some computer buffs to find out more.<br />

Anyway, here is what the promotion ad says<br />

(abridged): [Unfortunately, the contact who<br />

sent this to us did not say which journal he<br />

found it in.]<br />

Gulf war simulations have been given a<br />

new realism by the latest strikes into Iraq.<br />

A batch of games - including Falcon 3 and<br />

Desert Strike - took you to the flashpoints<br />

and put you in Allied pilot’s seats.<br />

Now as the Bosnia civil war fights on,<br />

games creators have chosen the UN as your<br />

side. [Are you listening, Dr. Boutros<br />

Boutros-Ghali?]<br />

But this conflict occurs in the island of<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and the enemy is the Indonesian<br />

army....<br />

You control a task force with the aim of<br />

re-taking <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and you get your orders<br />

and then take off, ready for action.<br />

Etc., etc., etc.<br />

The label is Domark, the title ‘AV8B<br />

Harrier Assault,’ the price 39.99.<br />

AUSTRALIAN TV STARTS<br />

BROADCASTING TO<br />

SOUTHEAST ASIA<br />

Japan Economic Newswire, By Catharine<br />

Munro<br />

(Sydney, Feb. 16 Kyodo) Australian<br />

television will beam from Papua New<br />

Guinea to China from Wednesday, leading<br />

some people to question the effect it will<br />

have on politically sensitive countries.<br />

Australian Television International<br />

(ATVI) will broadcast from an Indonesian<br />

satellite Palapa B2. Launched in 1991 by a<br />

Chinese Long March rocket, the Palapa<br />

satellite also broadcasts the American giant<br />

Cable News <strong>Network</strong> (CNN) into the<br />

Southeast Asian region.<br />

The new service is produced by the<br />

Australian Broadcasting Corporation<br />

(ABC), a government-funded body.<br />

The satellite ‘footprint’ reaches<br />

Australia’s closest neighbors, who are often<br />

very distant in culture, religion and politics.<br />

The service will include news and current<br />

affairs focusing on Southeast Asia, as well<br />

as television shows which depict Australian<br />

culture.<br />

Since ATVI will broadcast into countries<br />

which either suppress information or are<br />

offended by Western cultural attitudes, their<br />

policy is to ‘self-censor’ their programs. In<br />

this way they hope to avoid offending<br />

countries such as Indonesia and China.<br />

This policy may conflict with ATVI’s<br />

commitment not to censor the news.<br />

Executive Producer of News Prokash<br />

Mirchandani told Kyodo News Service that<br />

he would not ‘run away from any stories.’<br />

Mirchandani said that as long as ATVI’s<br />

reports are balanced, there would no problems<br />

with the policy of free reporting.<br />

Yet Indonesia has criticized Australia’s<br />

media for reporting politically sensitive issues.<br />

For example, Jakarta has made official<br />

complaints over reports about the island of<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, which was occupied by<br />

Indonesia in 1976.<br />

Mirchandani said that ATVI would follow<br />

the policy of Radio Australia which has<br />

been broadcasting in the region for 53 years.<br />

But Radio Australia has often been the<br />

target of criticism from various countries in<br />

this region, according to Dr. Michael van<br />

Langenberg, who chairs the Department of<br />

Southeast Asian studies at Sy dney<br />

University.<br />

‘Radio Australia has probably come under<br />

more flack than the BBC and CNN,’<br />

said van Langenberg.<br />

Currently, nine of the 15 nations which<br />

fall under the satellite footprint have significant<br />

restrictions on the distribution of<br />

satellite dishes needed to pick up the service.<br />

Restriction of access to the dish may<br />

difficult to maintain, according to Project<br />

Director Bruce Donald.<br />

China has restricted but not banned the<br />

dishes. Donald suggests that people are<br />

finding innovative ways of receiving satellite<br />

television, so that the censorship is effectively<br />

side-stepped.<br />

‘We’re hoping for a wok-led television<br />

revolution in China,’ he jokingly told the<br />

Sydney Morning Herald, a leading<br />

Australian daily.<br />

PRESS COMMUNIQUÉ FROM<br />

THE INTERNATIONAL<br />

SOLIDARITY MOVEMENT<br />

AMSTERDAM, 19-21 February 19<strong>93</strong><br />

The annual meeting of the International<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Solidarity Movement was held<br />

in Amsterdam, Netherlands from 19-21<br />

February 19<strong>93</strong>. Representatives of 26<br />

groups from Europe, United States, Canada<br />

and Japan attended the meeting. The groups<br />

evaluated their 1992 campaigns and<br />

proposed several campaigns to be launched<br />

in 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

The international solidarity movement<br />

was very honored that five representatives<br />

of the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese resistance were also<br />

present at the meeting: Abilio Araujo (Head<br />

of the External Delegation of FRETILIN),<br />

José Ramos Horta (Special Representative<br />

of CNRM, the National Council of Maubere<br />

Resistance), Constancio Pinto (Executive<br />

Secretary for the Clandestine Front,<br />

CNRM), José Amorim Dias (CNRM<br />

Representative for Europe) and Zacarias da<br />

Costa (UDT Regional Committee, Portugal).<br />

In the last few months, the level of repression<br />

inside <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> has increased<br />

markedly. In the wake of the November 20,<br />

1992 arrest of resistance leader Xanana<br />

Gusmão, the occupying Indonesian military<br />

forces have rounded up scores of other <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese, both civilians and from the underground<br />

resistance. They have intensified<br />

the terror to its worst level in a decade.<br />

Nevertheless, the solidarity groups were<br />

encouraged by the determination of the <strong>East</strong>


<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 125<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese people to fight for their selfdetermination<br />

in extremely difficult circumstances.<br />

As they have since the<br />

Indonesian invasion of 1975, and during the<br />

killings of one-third of their population, the<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese people continue to struggle.<br />

The groups present were inspired by this<br />

commitment and rededicated ourselves to<br />

support them.<br />

The international solidarity groups on<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> present at the Amsterdam<br />

meeting are sending the following message to<br />

the resistance in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>:<br />

• Acknowledging the difficult situation<br />

within <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, especially after the<br />

arrest of the leader of the national resistance,<br />

Xanana Gusmão, we want to express<br />

our deep concern with the ongoing<br />

struggle in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> against the<br />

Indonesian occupation.<br />

• The representatives of the solidarity<br />

groups from Europe, the United States,<br />

Canada and Japan, which were present at<br />

the meeting, also want to emphasize that<br />

we will continue to support the united<br />

front of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese resistance under<br />

the new leadership of Mau Hunu.<br />

• The international solidarity movement<br />

will strengthen its effort in our own<br />

countries to contribute to the struggle of<br />

the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese aiming to result in a<br />

genuine process of self- determination.<br />

• We are very concerned with the situation<br />

of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese political prisoners in<br />

Indonesian jails, especially Xanana<br />

Gusmão, who have been tortured and<br />

forced to act against their own beliefs,<br />

and we demand their immediate freedom<br />

• We express our hope that the proposed<br />

talks between Portugal and Indonesia<br />

under the auspices of the Secretary<br />

General of the United Nations in April in<br />

Rome will show progress favourable to<br />

the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese people. We want to<br />

emphasize the importance of the participation<br />

of representatives from the <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> resistance in further negotiations<br />

on the future of the territory.<br />

• The international solidarity movement<br />

will continue to lobby our national parliaments,<br />

the European Parliament and<br />

international institutions and launch<br />

campaigns in order to direct the attention<br />

of the international community to the<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> issue.<br />

EAST TIMOR WILL NOT BE<br />

FORGOTTEN!<br />

A LUTA CONTINUA!<br />

Amsterdam, February 21, 19<strong>93</strong><br />

Komitee Indonesia, <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Group<br />

Holland, Funding Agency XminY,<br />

International Platform of Jurists for <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>, Front Demokrasi Indonesia, Aksi<br />

Setiakawan, Free Papua Movement,<br />

Indonesian Resources Information Project<br />

(Holland); Tapol, British Coalition for <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> (United Kingdom); <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

Ireland Solidarity Campaign (Ireland);<br />

Initiative fur die Menschenrechte aller<br />

Burger Innen der ASEAN-Staaten<br />

(Germany); SOS <strong>Timor</strong> (Belgium); Agir<br />

pour <strong>Timor</strong>, Association <strong>Timor</strong>-Oriental<br />

(France); Comissao para os Direitos do<br />

Povo Maubere, Paz es Possivel em <strong>Timor</strong><br />

Leste, Oporto University, Paz e Justica<br />

para <strong>Timor</strong> Leste (Portugal); Coordinamento<br />

Italiano dei Gruppi di Solidarieta con il<br />

Populi <strong>Timor</strong>ese (Italy); <strong>Timor</strong> Oriental<br />

(Luxembourg); Osttimor Kommitten<br />

(Sweden); Japanese Supporting Committee<br />

for Darwin <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese School, Free <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> Japan Coalition (Japan); <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

<strong>Action</strong> <strong>Network</strong> (USA); <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Alert<br />

<strong>Network</strong> (Canada).<br />

YEAR OF THE SANDALWOOD<br />

EXHIBITION, LISBON<br />

On March 21st, World Tree Day, a special<br />

exhibition about environmental issues in<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, will be opened to the public, in<br />

Lisbon. The main focus will be forestry<br />

issues with special emphasis on the<br />

Sandalwood Tree which is under threat of<br />

extinction. This species once flourished in<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> but during the Sixteenth and<br />

Nineteenth centuries it was extensively used<br />

as a form of trade due to its spicy oil and<br />

precious wood.<br />

WE NEED YOUR SUPPORT!<br />

In addition to information panels, with<br />

photos and texts, we will be setting up a<br />

“Message board” for visitors. We would like<br />

to invite you and your friends to join in and<br />

send poems, messages, stories etc. so that<br />

these too can be displayed on our board.<br />

This exhibition is a joint effort and supported<br />

by the Commisão de Defensa do<br />

Povo Maubere, Amigos da Terra-Friends of<br />

the Earth Portugal, the Lisbon City Council<br />

and others. This will run until April 11th,<br />

and everyone is welcome to come and visit<br />

the exhibition in the “Casa de <strong>Timor</strong>” or<br />

House of <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

PS your messages can also be sent by fax<br />

to: Amigos da Terra 351 1 347 3586 and we<br />

will pass them on! Thanks for your help.<br />

EVANS FACES PROTEST<br />

OVER TIMOR<br />

Green Left Weekly, March 2. By Nick<br />

Everett<br />

BRISBANE - Foreign minister Gareth<br />

Evans, addressing a breakfast on Australia’s<br />

trade relations with Asia, faced questions<br />

and a protest picket from members of Aksi -<br />

Indonesia Solidarity <strong>Action</strong> on February 25.<br />

Evans described Australia’s relationship<br />

with Indonesia as “very strong, very firm,<br />

very close” and claimed this to be “a much<br />

more productive environment for working<br />

change, both political and economic, than<br />

maintaining the kind of stridency” of countries<br />

“like Portugal [which] jump up and<br />

down on the international scene whenever<br />

some tragedy like Dili occurs.”<br />

Aksi spokesperson Brenden Greenhill<br />

stated, “Indonesia’s invasion of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

has, since 1975, cost the lives of 200,000<br />

people. The massacre in Dili, and continued<br />

human rights violations throughout<br />

Indonesia, reveal the intransigence of the<br />

regime.<br />

“The role of the Australian government,<br />

uncritically aiding the Suharto regime while<br />

companies like Woodside Petroleum and<br />

BHP plunder <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>’s oil, makes Evans<br />

and the Labor government complicit in these<br />

atrocities.”<br />

DEBATE: PORTUGUESE<br />

TEACHERS RESOLUTION ON<br />

EAST TIMOR<br />

12th March 19<strong>93</strong><br />

Note: The following text is the translation<br />

from FENPROF (National Teachers<br />

Federation) which was email by Bruno Kahn<br />

on 5th March. A letter by Teachers<br />

Association of the Republic of Indonesia is<br />

also included.<br />

Submitted by: FENPROF (Portugal) and<br />

ATU (Australia)<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> - a forgotten people<br />

The military occupation of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

by the Indonesian army in 1975 has already<br />

caused the death of over 200.000 <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />

(a third of the population), the plight of tens<br />

of thousands and the creation of a climate of<br />

terror and intimidation. As Amnesty<br />

International has frequently made public,<br />

hundreds of young people are judged in<br />

summary fashion, without the right to any<br />

type of legal defence and very often<br />

condemned to death. Xanana Gusmão, the<br />

leader of the <strong>Timor</strong>ese resistance against the<br />

Indonesian occupation for the last 16 years,<br />

is now facing that very same situation.<br />

Indonesia has also made determined


Page 126 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

attempts to destroy the historical and<br />

cultural identity of the <strong>Timor</strong>ese people.<br />

It is therefore proposed that the 34th<br />

WCOTP Assembly of Delegates, held in<br />

Stockholm from January 21 to 25, 19<strong>93</strong>,<br />

Register its concern at the Indonesian<br />

military occupation of the former<br />

Portuguese colony of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>,<br />

Register the fact that the UN has condemned<br />

the military occupation and never<br />

recognised Indonesian sovereignty over <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>,<br />

Express its concern at the subversion of<br />

the cultural identity of the People of <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>, who are not allowed to speak their<br />

national language and whose children are<br />

forcibly educated in the Indonesian language,<br />

culture and traditions,<br />

Express its revulsion at the violation of<br />

Human Rights carried out in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>,<br />

especially the massacre, on November 12,<br />

1991 of unarmed peaceful civilians by the<br />

Indonesian occupying forces, and the subsequent<br />

treatment meted out to the perpetrators,<br />

very lenient indeed in comparison<br />

with the heightened repression of the<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese in the wake of the massacre,<br />

Call on the international community to<br />

demand that the Indonesian Government<br />

withdraw its troops from <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and<br />

allow the decolonisation programme to<br />

continue by means of negotiations between<br />

Portugal, Indonesia and <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, under<br />

the auspices of the United Nations.<br />

INDONESIANS REBUT RESOLUTION<br />

The Indonesian delegation which call<br />

themselves Teachers Association of the<br />

Republic of Indonesia reacted badly to this<br />

resolution with the aid of their government<br />

officials in Stockholm they came out with the<br />

following standard response. We thought it<br />

is wise to spend sometime sending you this<br />

Indonesian standard propaganda so that all<br />

the interested individuals and groups can<br />

use them to prepare their response in any<br />

international conference that they might take<br />

part in the future. We will in a different item<br />

also include some of our comments to this.<br />

The Indonesian standard propaganda<br />

includes:<br />

1. An introductory letter and;<br />

2. a paper entitled “The reply of PGRI”<br />

1. Dear Colleagues,<br />

You might have received a letter dated 14<br />

October 1991 from teachers’ organization in<br />

Portugal, FENPROF, asking your<br />

organization to send a protest to the<br />

Indonesian Government, and you might<br />

have also received a request from the same<br />

organization asking for the support of your<br />

organization for a resolution concerning <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>. From our stand point of view, the<br />

issue raised by the Portuguese teachers’<br />

organization and the resolution to be presented<br />

to the WCOTP Assembly in<br />

Stockholm are not based on the true facts on<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, but they are based on malicious<br />

and misleading allegation of the number of<br />

lives lost in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> during and after the<br />

process of integration. Even it goes so far as<br />

recklessly accusing Indonesia of “genocide.”<br />

In order that you get a true picture of<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, we would like to give you some<br />

information for your consideration before<br />

you make any decision on the FENPROF<br />

draft resolution:<br />

1. Portugal colonized <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> for<br />

1509 - 1974. In 1974, Portugal’s new regime<br />

announced that its overseas territories,<br />

including <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, would be given<br />

democratic rights. Fully conformed with<br />

that new policy, five political parties were<br />

organized in preparation for self-determination<br />

in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>; they are: Apodeti,<br />

UDT, Trabalhista, Kota and Fretilin. In<br />

1975, Portuguese government abandoned<br />

Dili, the governor and staff return to Lisbon,<br />

and Fretilin, the pro-Portuguese extreme<br />

party, issued a unilateral declaration of<br />

independence without benefit of any act of<br />

self-determination. As a counter measure,<br />

the four other parties issued their<br />

proclamation of independence and simultaneous<br />

integration of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> with the<br />

Republic of Indonesia. Fretilin forces seized<br />

control of Dili, the capital of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>,<br />

touching off the civil war. The other four<br />

parties’ forces together with Indonesian<br />

volunteers began the process of restoring<br />

order in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. With the capture of the<br />

Fretilin’s last guerrilla leader in November<br />

1992, life of the people in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> has<br />

been fully back to normal.<br />

2. In August 1975, the colonial authorities<br />

in Dili, in a most irresponsible manner,<br />

simply packed up and left <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, after<br />

allowing the situation in the territory to<br />

deteriorate to the point of civil war by secretly<br />

turning over its arms and ammunition<br />

to one particular minority group, Fretilin.<br />

By utterly failing in its responsibility,<br />

Portugal in fact has forfeited any right to be<br />

still considered the “administering power”<br />

of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. In the face of this, the <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese people had rightly assumed the<br />

inherent rights to decolonize themselves,<br />

considering themselves no longer bound to<br />

any decolonization covenant with erstwhile<br />

colonial power. This they did by choosing<br />

independence through integration with<br />

Indonesia in accordance with UN General<br />

Assembly Resolution 1541 (XV) and<br />

Principles VI, VIII and IX of General<br />

Assembly Resolution 1541 (XV) and as<br />

further confirmed by the relevant provisions<br />

of General Assembly Resolution 2625<br />

(XXV).<br />

3. The critics charge that <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>’s<br />

population decreased by 200.000 after the<br />

integration, thus implying that about onethird<br />

of the population has either perished<br />

or disappeared, and some even go far as<br />

recklessly accusing Indonesia of “genocide.”<br />

This juggling of number represent of<br />

numbers represents a shameless distortion<br />

of the tragic facts surrounding Portugal’s<br />

mishandled decolonization of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

and shows a complete and often deliberate<br />

misreading of the process of population<br />

surveying and census-taking that has taken<br />

place prior to following the departure of the<br />

colonial government.<br />

The only internationally accepted census<br />

of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> was taken in 1980 by the<br />

Government of Indonesia. The resulting<br />

population figure – 555.350 persons –<br />

seemed to show a decline of some 69.000<br />

from the last colonial estimate of 624.264.<br />

The true difference will never be know:<br />

colonial authorities themselves acknowledged<br />

their figure for 1874 are estimates<br />

based on reports by village headmen, whose<br />

counts were never verified by the<br />

Portuguese Government. These figures and<br />

the apparent short-fall in population have<br />

subsequently been eagerly seized upon by<br />

Indonesia’s critics and, through a process of<br />

mutual citation, have not only constantly<br />

repeated but gradually exaggerated to reach<br />

what has now become the fabricated and<br />

completely unsubstantiated claim of<br />

200,000 lives lost.<br />

Careful examination of the facts by several<br />

observers, including respected Western<br />

journalists, suggest that war-related death<br />

numbered around 5,000 with another 25,000<br />

victims of malnutrition and disease brought<br />

about by a war-ravaged economy and a<br />

gross lack health care services. That people<br />

have died of victims is highly irresponsible<br />

and simply dishonest. It is hoped, therefore,<br />

that this unsavory number game can finally<br />

be put to an end.<br />

4. Since <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> was integrated into<br />

the Republic of Indonesia, the Government<br />

has worked carefully to ensure that cultural<br />

traditions are maintained, local languages are<br />

preserved and religious practices are<br />

respected. <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, like the rest of<br />

Indonesia, is a province of extraordinary<br />

ethic, religious and cultural diversity - a<br />

piece of the diversity, no one group is<br />

dominant. Respect and tolerance for different<br />

cultural and religious tradition is at heart<br />

of our national philosophy, Pancasila.<br />

5. Since the integration, the living conditions<br />

of the people in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> have<br />

improved tremendously, especially in education,<br />

health, religion telecommunication<br />

and transportation. At the time of integration,<br />

there are 580 primary schools, 94<br />

junior high schools, 44 senior high schools,


<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 127<br />

and 1 polytechnic and one university<br />

(tertiary level).<br />

6. At present, <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> is an internal<br />

affair of Indonesia, which could be considered<br />

as a bilateral matter between the<br />

Indonesian and Portuguese Government.<br />

Meetings between the two governments are<br />

being held with the auspices of the Secretary<br />

General of the United Nations. On<br />

December 17, 1992, the Indonesian and<br />

Portuguese Foreign Ministers hold a meeting<br />

with the auspices of the UN Secretary<br />

General to find the most optimum solution<br />

on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> matter and the meeting will<br />

be continued on April 19<strong>93</strong>. It is best we<br />

respect the two parties involved by allowing<br />

them to solve the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> case.<br />

After having presented the true facts and<br />

an accurate information on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, we<br />

sincerely hope that some misunderstanding<br />

about <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> will be put to an end. The<br />

Teachers Association of the Republic of<br />

Indonesia (PGRI) is against any effort to<br />

put the issue of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> in the agenda of<br />

WCOTP Assembly in Stockholm, especially<br />

because the FENPROF draft resolution<br />

is based on malicious and misleading<br />

allegation and distorted facts about <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>. Your understanding and cooperation<br />

on this matter is highly appreciated.<br />

With best wishes, Merry Christmas and<br />

Happy New Year.<br />

Sincerely Yours,<br />

(W.D.F. Rindorindo) Secretary General<br />

The reply of PGRI (The Teachers<br />

Association of the Republic of Indonesia) to<br />

the draft resolutions on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

Submitted by FENPROF and ATU<br />

INTRODUCTION<br />

The Indonesian teachers in this<br />

Assembly express their grave concern on the<br />

activities of FENPROF, the teacher’s union<br />

of Portugal, and the ATU, Australian<br />

Teachers Union, in circulating the draft<br />

resolutions concerning the so called-issue of<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> as contained in the compilation<br />

of Working Papers of WCOTP.<br />

These draft resolution are especially appalling<br />

not only because they will politicize<br />

the nature and the deliberation of the<br />

Indonesian teachers in this Assembly, but<br />

also because they are based on distorted<br />

inferences, slanders and innuendoes.<br />

We honestly do not know what is the<br />

true motivation behind these draft resolutions.<br />

Unlike other resolutions, the nature of<br />

these draft resolutions is particularly directed<br />

to single out a particular country and<br />

a government in order to denigrate the good<br />

name of that country, which is our country,<br />

Indonesia.<br />

FENPROF and ATU never consult us<br />

Indonesian teachers or extend the usual<br />

teacher to teacher professional courtesy to<br />

discuss any matter in a spirit of unity and<br />

solidarity when drafting or submitting the<br />

draft resolutions to the Secretariat of<br />

WCOTP. The way these resolutions are<br />

being drafted and submitted are simply<br />

anathema to the unity theme that we teachers<br />

in this Assembly are supposed to espouse<br />

and develop.<br />

Upon the efforts of the Chairman of the<br />

Committee on Resolution, the representatives<br />

of FENPROF and ATU did have discussion<br />

with the representatives of PGRI<br />

yesterday, 22 January 19<strong>93</strong>. They said that<br />

their draft resolutions were based on human<br />

rights concerns. However, the way they are<br />

drafted and presented to us we cannot help<br />

but to disagree. We are not the one who<br />

started this unfortunate debate in this<br />

Assembly, but in an effort to end this<br />

confrontation to an acceptable solution, we<br />

are ready to offer a draft compromise which<br />

is neutral in character without blaming<br />

anybody or any government.<br />

We Indonesian teachers after suffering for<br />

350 years of colonialism do not need any<br />

lesson from foreigners about how to<br />

promote human rights, especially from<br />

those people who were once the worst colonialist<br />

in history. We believe the best way<br />

to promote human rights is by cooperation<br />

and the promotion of mutual understanding<br />

and certainly is not by heaping abuses,<br />

pointing accusatory finger and by shouting<br />

words of rhetoric based on self-altruism.<br />

Keeping in mind human rights abuses are<br />

happening everywhere, the approach taken<br />

by FENPROF and ATU will only plunge<br />

the Assembly into bitter fighting, enmity,<br />

hatred and division among its members.<br />

Some people accused that Indonesia has<br />

closed the border of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. This is<br />

simply not true. Various people, either they<br />

are journalists, representatives of NGOs or<br />

foreign diplomats were are visiting <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>. These people, however, request<br />

permission politely and quietly to enter our<br />

country. To the, we seldom say no. Indeed,<br />

Portuguese journalists have visited<br />

Indonesia including <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, but<br />

Indonesia journalists are prevented by the<br />

Portuguese government to enter Portugal<br />

when they requested to visit <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />

in Portugal.<br />

To those who shout and hurl abuses to<br />

us from across the street and then knock our<br />

door demanding to enter our house, with<br />

great respect we have and will turn it down.<br />

We cannot have our pride being injured and<br />

our arm being twisted and then ask us to<br />

surrender by opening our door. We have<br />

been physically colonized before and we<br />

will never be colonized once again, not even<br />

mentally.<br />

Some people has said that they are not<br />

against our country and our people, but<br />

only our government. This kind of tactic<br />

only remind us of the old colonial strategy<br />

of “devide et impera (divide and conquer).”<br />

Perhaps, our perception is wrong; but our<br />

history has shown us that when we are divided<br />

we fell, and that is exactly why our<br />

people before can be colonized for centuries.<br />

We respect them when they said that<br />

they are free to criticize their own government.<br />

We do not argue at all with that. We<br />

are also free to constructively criticizes our<br />

own government, but we declined when<br />

foreigners asked us to join them in criticizing<br />

our own people and our own government,<br />

especially when believe that criticism is<br />

based on distorted inferences. It is not our<br />

social and political value.<br />

We Indonesian teachers do not have the<br />

slightest intention to turn this Assembly<br />

into divisive political arena. Politics are not<br />

our profession. We are teachers and not the<br />

political representatives of our government.<br />

We believe the question of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> is<br />

best left to be solved by the United Nations.<br />

it is that international body which has the<br />

full knowledge and the capability to solve<br />

such kind of political problem.<br />

Unfortunately, we Indonesian teachers are<br />

put in a place by FENPROF and ATU with<br />

no other option but to defend the good name<br />

of our country by rejecting point by point<br />

their baseless allegations as contained in<br />

their draft resolutions.<br />

We Indonesian teachers understand this<br />

will take some of your valuable time. We<br />

humbly apologise for it, but FENPROF and<br />

ATU have given us no other choice. We<br />

Indonesian teachers have been put in a “fait<br />

accompli” situation to defend ourselves.<br />

FENPROF DRAFT RESOLUTION<br />

The points in paragraph 1<br />

FENPROF cited in its draft resolution<br />

the repeated baseless accusation that<br />

Indonesia militarily occupied <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

The fact is that long before the alleged<br />

Indonesian invasion on 7 December 1975,<br />

Portugal in August 1975 in most irresponsible<br />

manner abandoned <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> after<br />

allowing the territory plunged into a civil<br />

war.<br />

Indonesia literally beg the Portuguese to<br />

return to <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, because people were<br />

killing each other and thousands of refugees<br />

streamed into Indonesian territory of West<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>. Portugal fails to re-establish its<br />

presence and instead the Tropaz, the<br />

Portuguese colonial army, secretly turned its<br />

weaponry to one particular pro-Community<br />

group, the Fretilin, hoping this favoured<br />

group by the then left leaning government in<br />

Lisbon, could eliminated the other groups<br />

which were representing the majority of the<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese. These other groups were<br />

UDT, Apodeti, Kota and Trabalhista, which


Page 128 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

after seeing the brutality of the Fretilin and<br />

the Tropaz, opted to gain independence<br />

through integration with the Republic of<br />

Indonesia.<br />

After defeating the Fretilin, these other<br />

groups formed a provisional government.<br />

They held election and formed an Assembly<br />

of representatives. This Assembly then<br />

passed a motion of their wish to gain independence<br />

by integrating <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> with the<br />

Republic of Indonesia. This fact have<br />

always been concealed or distorted by those<br />

who support the Fretilin up to this day. We<br />

have living witness, an <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese in the<br />

group of PGRI here in Stockholm. He is<br />

more than happy to explain to you of this<br />

true story in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

During the 450 years of colonial period,<br />

Portugal had never developed <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>,<br />

let alone carrying out a responsible population<br />

census. It was Indonesia in 1980 which<br />

carried out a census using the internationally<br />

accepted standard. The resulting population<br />

figure was 555,350 persons. This figure<br />

suggested a decline of 69,000 persons,<br />

included in it around 40,000 persons who<br />

fled the civil war and took refuge in the<br />

Indonesian western part of the island of<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>. If we compared these figures with<br />

the last colonial government estimate that<br />

the population in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> was 624,564,<br />

therefore, the loss of lives was about 20,000<br />

people due to the civil war and the<br />

immediate ensuing famine. However,<br />

Indonesia’s critics, through a process of<br />

mutual citation, constantly and gradually<br />

exaggerated the figure to reach the baseless<br />

claim of 200,000 lives that had been lost and<br />

then put the blame on Indonesia.<br />

FENPROF claimed that, as frequently<br />

denounced by Amnesty International, hundreds<br />

of young people summarily judged<br />

and sentenced to death in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. This<br />

is just not true. Not even a dozen people<br />

that have been sentenced to death in<br />

Indonesia. These persons were involved in<br />

the Indonesian Communist Party bloody<br />

coup d’état in 1965, terrorists who hijacked<br />

a civilian airliner, and two criminals<br />

committing multiple murder crime. They<br />

were not <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese and have nothing to<br />

do with the case of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

The Points in Paragraph 2<br />

FENPROF accused that Indonesia tried<br />

to destroy <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>’s historical and cultural<br />

identity. This is also not true.<br />

Promoting the culture of <strong>Timor</strong> is nothing<br />

new for Indonesia, because <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

shares the same small island and culture<br />

with West <strong>Timor</strong>. Only these detractors<br />

pretended to perceive that the two are different.<br />

The island of <strong>Timor</strong> was formally<br />

divided into two in 1859 by two colonial<br />

powers, the Dutch and the Portuguese. <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> was colonized by the Portuguese<br />

since the early 16th century.<br />

The western part of the island of <strong>Timor</strong>,<br />

together with their brothers and sisters in<br />

other parts of the Indonesian archipelago,<br />

gained independence from the Dutch in<br />

1945. Unfortunately, the Portuguese still<br />

clutched <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> under their colonial<br />

power until they irresponsibly abandoned<br />

the territory in August 1975.<br />

Indonesia takes pride as a land country of<br />

“unity in diversity” as inscribed in its<br />

national coat of arm. The so-called culture of<br />

Indonesia is comprising each and every<br />

culture belonging to more than 350 ethnic<br />

groups in the Indonesian teachers to promote<br />

Indonesian culture, meaning each and<br />

every one of these existing culture in<br />

Indonesia, including the one in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

Thus, there is nothing farther than the<br />

truth when FENPROF accused that the <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese are forbidden to speak their language.<br />

Tetum is the language spoken by the<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese, in <strong>East</strong> as well as in West <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

Indonesian language is the official language<br />

in Indonesia and is used as the media in each<br />

and every school in Indonesia. However,<br />

since the promotion of each and every<br />

culture in the archipelago is a constitutional<br />

duty, therefore, Indonesian teachers are<br />

required to preserve each and every language<br />

that exists in Indonesia. Accordingly, “local”<br />

language is a compulsory subject and is<br />

taught in each and every school where that<br />

school is located. Meaning, Tetum is taught<br />

not only in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> but also in West<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>, just like Javanese language is taught<br />

in Java or Balinese language in Bali.<br />

It is true that Portuguese language in not<br />

taught in Indonesia. However, like most<br />

countries in this world, other languages area<br />

also being taught in Indonesia schools.<br />

English is a compulsory subject. French,<br />

German, Arabic and Japanese languages are<br />

also taught as optional subjects.<br />

History seems to suggest that it was the<br />

Portuguese themselves who may have tried,<br />

perhaps unintentionally, to destroy the historical<br />

and cultural identity of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

Nearly all <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese were made culturally<br />

ashamed if they do not adopt<br />

Portuguese name. Whereas the majority of<br />

the rest of the population in the Indonesian<br />

archipelago are proudly using their local and<br />

traditional names. Furthermore, during it s<br />

450 years of colonial period in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>,<br />

Portugal provided for the entire <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese a meager number of 47 elementary<br />

schools with 2 or 4 years of education and 2<br />

junior and one senior high schools. There<br />

were no kindergarten or institution of higher<br />

learning. The rate of illiteracy was as high as<br />

92 percent. It is very clear that the<br />

Portuguese had tried to kill the culture of the<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese by depriving them the right<br />

to adequate education for more than 4<br />

centuries.<br />

Today, after gaining their independence<br />

through integration with the rest of the<br />

Republic of Indonesia, and in only a period<br />

of 16 years, in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> there are 587<br />

elementary schools with 6 years of education,<br />

91 junior high schools, 39 senior high<br />

schools and 3 higher learning institutions (2<br />

polytechnic, 1 university). There are also 13<br />

kindergartens. The rate of illiteracy is<br />

drastically reduced to 20 percent. We<br />

Indonesian teachers believe that this the<br />

way to promote human rights, silently but<br />

making concrete and helpful contribution.<br />

The Points In Paragraph 3<br />

FENPROF lamented that the international<br />

community remained silent about<br />

their allegation. The truth is, through tactic<br />

of disinformation, Portugal in the beginning<br />

did manage to gain supports in the middle of<br />

1970’s. However, gradually when nations<br />

learned about the actual facts, many changed<br />

side to support Indonesia while many<br />

others remained neutral. This will be<br />

explained in the next paragraph.<br />

The Points In Paragraph 4<br />

FENPROF alleged that the United<br />

Nations have approved resolution recognizing<br />

the right of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> to what it called<br />

“auto-determination..” This is based on halftruth.<br />

In mid-December 1975, in the efforts<br />

to conceal its guilt of bungling the<br />

decolonization process in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>,<br />

Portugal, through fabricated stories, accused<br />

Indonesia of disrupting the process of<br />

decolonization by invading the territory.<br />

Then Portugal requested the United Nations<br />

to consider the question of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

Unaware of the real situation, the majority<br />

member of the United Nations in a<br />

resolution recommended the Security<br />

Council to take urgent action to protect the<br />

territorial integrity and the inalienable rights<br />

of the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese to self-determination.<br />

The resolution in 1976 was adopted with 72<br />

countries supporting Portugal, 43<br />

abstaining, and only 10 supporting<br />

Indonesia by rejecting the resolution.<br />

However, when nations learned more of<br />

the real problem, they changed their votes.<br />

In 1982, the 72 votes for Portugal decreased<br />

to 50, the support for Indonesia rose<br />

dramatically from 10 to 48. In the Nonaligned<br />

Movement, member countries<br />

unanimously rejected the proposal to recognize<br />

Fretilin as a national liberation<br />

movement and the so-called question of <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> was since then erased from its<br />

agenda.<br />

Looking at the voting number itself can<br />

also be misleading. Each year the resolution<br />

was pressed by the international community<br />

to be diluted and neutralized if this was to


<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 129<br />

maintain continued support. By 1982, the<br />

content of the resolution had been changed<br />

so drastically that nations started wondering<br />

whether the resolution had achieved<br />

anything at all except for prolonging<br />

unnecessarily the so-called question of <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>. Unlike the earlier resolutions, the<br />

last resolution adopted by the United<br />

Nations did not contain any operative paragraph<br />

challenging the validity of the <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese integration process. Instead , in<br />

the last resolution, the General Assembly<br />

merely requested the Secretary-General “to<br />

initiate consultations with all parties directly<br />

concerned, with a view to exploring<br />

all avenues for achieving a comprehensive<br />

settlement of the problem.” Despite its<br />

“weak” content the resolution was nearly<br />

defeated. It was carried by a mere two<br />

votes.<br />

What did this all mean? The last resolution,<br />

of course, has superseded the earlier<br />

resolutions. However, in various debate<br />

some people just ignore this fact. Moreover,<br />

now there are at least 48 countries which<br />

firmly supported the Indonesian position on<br />

the integration of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, but we do not<br />

know how many of those 50 countries<br />

really supported the position on the<br />

question of self-determination process. That<br />

is why, since the 1982, year after year, the<br />

United Nations voted to defer the debate on<br />

the question of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and to let the<br />

Secretary-General, Indonesia and Portugal to<br />

find a solution through a dialog. The last<br />

dialog was carried out on 17 December 1992<br />

and the next session will be in Rome on 20<br />

April 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

On the point about the resolution of the<br />

European Parliament, we Indonesian teachers<br />

can only say that Indonesia is not a<br />

member of that Parliament and obviously<br />

Indonesia cannot defend itself adequately<br />

against those people who launched the<br />

baseless allegations in the proceeding.<br />

ATU DRAFT RESOLUTION<br />

Australia as a government and a national<br />

recognized the sovereignty of Indonesia in<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. Despite some protest of minority<br />

of people in Australia, the Australian<br />

government signed an agreement called “The<br />

<strong>Timor</strong> Gap Treaty” with Indonesia, and the<br />

Australian parliament support the<br />

Australian government position by ratifying<br />

the treaty. This treaty explicitly and legally<br />

recognized the sovereignty of Indonesia in<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. It is apparent, therefore, ATU<br />

represents the view of that minority in<br />

Australia in opposing Indonesia on the<br />

question of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

We Indonesian teachers in this Assembly<br />

have friendly relation with many Australian<br />

teachers. The overwhelming majority of<br />

Australia people and the government of<br />

Australia enjoy excellent relationship with<br />

their counterparts in Indonesia. Thus, it is<br />

with deep regret that we have to fight with<br />

some of our Australian counterparts in this<br />

Assembly in our defense against the<br />

slanderous ATU draft resolution. We wish<br />

to reiterate, we are not the one who started<br />

this divisive debate.<br />

Points in Preambular Paragraph 1,2 & 3<br />

The above arguments put forward in refuting<br />

FENPROF proposal are relevant in<br />

this respect.<br />

Points In Preambular Paragraph 5<br />

We Indonesian teachers are equally<br />

shocked and deeply regret the tragic incident<br />

of 12 November 1991 in Dili, <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

However, we believe that our country has<br />

reacted more than adequate to this tragedy.<br />

Our President repeatedly and in front of the<br />

Indonesian House of Representatives<br />

expressed his deepest regret and conveyed<br />

humbly his condolence to the bereaved<br />

families in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> caused by the<br />

tragedy.<br />

It was the President himself which instructed<br />

the government to establish an independent<br />

National Commission of Inquiry<br />

into the tragedy. As a demonstration of his<br />

deep concern and in order to obtain a thorough,<br />

unbiased and impartial report on the<br />

matter, he requested not a member of the<br />

government but the Supreme Court to<br />

nominate a supreme judge to head the seven<br />

member Commission.<br />

The Commission’s report was straight<br />

forward. It apportioned blame where blame<br />

was due; and it concluded by stressing that<br />

in order to hold justice, all those who were<br />

violating the law must be held accountable.<br />

Many countries commended Indonesia on<br />

this action, including the Australian government<br />

the United States government and<br />

the European Council.<br />

On receiving the report and using his<br />

constitutional power, the President removed<br />

from their posts two senior generals<br />

responsible for the security in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

The President then instructed the Army<br />

Chief of Staff to set up an Honorary<br />

Military Council to determine what went<br />

wrong and the accountability of the military<br />

personnel involved in the tragedy. Base on<br />

the findings of the Council, trials were held<br />

and witnessed by various domestic and<br />

foreign journalists, diplomats and representatives<br />

of NGOs. The others were removed<br />

from their posts and faced disciplinary consequences.<br />

Undoubtedly, Indonesian action<br />

stand in contrast with that of many nations<br />

in dealing with such kind tragedy when its<br />

involved military personnel.<br />

Unfortunately, some people chose to<br />

turn a blind eye on this fact and continued<br />

their campaign to denigrate Indonesia.<br />

Nothing seems to satisfy them except to<br />

bring Indonesia into total humiliation. This<br />

we cannot accept and we will defend the<br />

honour of our country in any Assembly.<br />

Points In The Last Paragraph<br />

We Indonesian teachers are truly mystified<br />

with this paragraph. It is clearly drafted<br />

by people who are trying to heap all kinds<br />

of sinister motivation towards Indonesia or<br />

are ignorant of the facts on the question of<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

The international community cannot be<br />

called to resume a dialog while the dialog<br />

itself has resumed and is continuing. The<br />

next session of the dialog, as mentioned<br />

above, will be in Rome on 20 April 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

Thus, this paragraph is totally pointless.<br />

Furthermore, the international community<br />

cannot call the withdrawal of Indonesian<br />

troops out of Indonesian territory. As<br />

stated above at least there are 48 countries<br />

in the United Nations, including Australia,<br />

recognized Indonesian sovereignty over <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>. The Non-Aligned movement consisting<br />

of 118 countries have also ceased to<br />

discuss the issue of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

Conclusion<br />

It is obvious that these two draft resolutions<br />

are either drafted on the basis of distorted<br />

inferences, slanders and innuendoes<br />

or simply ignorance.<br />

If the latter is true then we respectfully<br />

request that they be withdrawn and not<br />

submitted to be debated in the Assembly.<br />

Accordingly, we extend our thanks for the<br />

mutual understanding and cooperation.<br />

After all we are only teachers, not politicians.<br />

If the former its true, then these drafts<br />

are politically motivated. The human rights<br />

arguments are used only as a pretext to gain<br />

sympathy and support in the efforts to<br />

denigrate our country. Accordingly, we the<br />

Indonesian teachers respectfully request the<br />

kind support of members of this Assembly<br />

to reject the draft resolutions of FENPROF<br />

and ATU with regard to <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

Keeping in mind that there are abuses of<br />

human rights in nearly every part of the<br />

world, these resolutions will serve as a bad<br />

precedence. These resolutions are against<br />

the spirit of unity and solidarity that we<br />

teachers are supposed to espouse and develop<br />

in accordance with the teacher unity<br />

theme. Such kind of resolutions will only<br />

create bitterness and sow the seeds of<br />

enmity and hatred among members of this<br />

Assembly. we must reject this bad precedence.<br />

STOCKHOLM, 21 JANUARY 19<strong>93</strong><br />

PGRI (The Teachers Association of the<br />

Republic of Indonesia)


Page 130 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

INDONESIAN PROPAGANDA<br />

DEBUNKED<br />

Sydney, 16 Mar 19<strong>93</strong>. By Agio Pereira<br />

The above Indonesian propaganda has set<br />

a “standard.” That is, the bulk of the<br />

Indonesian arguments are simply aiming at<br />

the so-called (economic) developmental<br />

nature of their occupation of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

Everywhere, their argument is the same.<br />

Hence, we decided to throw in these arguments<br />

used by the Indonesian teachers<br />

with the hope that they reach all interested<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese supporters. Once you have it, you<br />

can read and become accustomed to these<br />

arguments and. in the process, organise your<br />

own response/s.<br />

Here are some comments we would like<br />

to make regarding this Indonesian propaganda<br />

fiction matrix:<br />

Fiction number 1: Education<br />

A person uninformed about the political<br />

process of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> might be manipulated<br />

by the figures the Indonesian government<br />

publishes frequently in their propaganda<br />

bulletins. The Indonesian teachers<br />

distributed tables of information in the<br />

Stockholm-Sweden conference of Teachers,<br />

showing dramatic increase in the number of<br />

primary and high schools, including universities.<br />

They also show that they have<br />

dramatically increased the number of medical<br />

personnel, doctors, hospitals and clinics<br />

in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

However, these are simply sterile figures,<br />

hiding behind the scenes a mammoth<br />

tragedy. For instance, about 150,000<br />

transmigrants have made their way to <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>. The bulk of these transmigrants are<br />

relatives of the Indonesian soldiers and<br />

public servants. In Dili, there are 120,000<br />

households today. The bulk of these people<br />

are transmigrants. More than 120,000<br />

households, but only 300 households<br />

benefit from tap water.<br />

Even the water system is not funded by<br />

the Indonesian government. It is, in fact, a<br />

scheme funded by the Australian government<br />

agency - AIDAB. The funding for this<br />

project was costed at $A6 to $A10 million<br />

dollars in 1990. Last year, prior to his first<br />

trip to Jakarta, Prime Minister of Australia<br />

Paul Keating had increased the funding to up<br />

to $A30 million dollars. He outlined the aim:<br />

to develop <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and reach reconciliation.<br />

The rational is the same: they<br />

think (and seem to believe) that the<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese people stands up against<br />

Indonesia simply because the people of <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> have not been given enough goodies!<br />

In November 1991, I met a catholic priest<br />

who was in Dili during the Santa Cruz<br />

Massacre looking at the educational system.<br />

He said to me that he was terrified with the<br />

“textbooks” used in the schools in <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>; if anything, he said, they teach only<br />

Indonesian politics with special focus on<br />

“Pancasila.” It the Indonesianisation of the<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese society that the Indonesian<br />

military is trying desperately to achieve.<br />

Fiction number 2: Hospitals/health<br />

There are 10 hospitals in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> today<br />

compared to only 2 in 1974, the<br />

Indonesian government says. However, the<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese people are frightened to use these<br />

hospitals for fear of being killed while they<br />

are hospitalized. Five years ago, I made it<br />

public in Australia that the Indonesian<br />

doctors have been using outdated medicine<br />

to treat <strong>Timor</strong>ese patients in the hospitals.<br />

The Indonesian government reacted by<br />

saying that it all “Fretilin propaganda.”<br />

Some days later, the former Indonesian<br />

puppet gubernur - Mario Carrascalão himself,<br />

said that boxes of outdated medicine<br />

have been used and he asked for the doctors<br />

responsible to be sent back to Jakarta.<br />

The hospitals are purely equipped to the<br />

point where a promise of second hand<br />

hospital equipment made by a former Chief<br />

Minister in Darwin-NT made headlines. The<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese youth that were killed in the<br />

massacre of Santa Cruz and immediately<br />

after, were taken away to be buried in the<br />

pits dug specially for that purpose. They<br />

were not taken to these famous hospitals to<br />

be treated as human beings. Many more<br />

students were left wounded in the hospitals<br />

without treatment so that they can die as<br />

soon as possible. These may sound unbelievable;<br />

but when you hear the story recounted<br />

by eyewitnesses of these horrible<br />

crimes, you understand how traumatized the<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese people are.<br />

A well-known medical doctor from<br />

Australia, wrote this, after three weeks unofficial<br />

visit to Dili, <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, last year:<br />

“The main persisting health problems<br />

are: TB, Malaria, Dysentery, Leprosy,<br />

Nutritional Deficiencies.<br />

“In the course of my travels I saw<br />

frequent evidence of intercurrent infections -<br />

discharging noses, coughs, skin lesions and<br />

sores. It seemed that there was sufficient<br />

basic grain food available but not enough<br />

protein and vitamin supplement. (...) There<br />

is little food to spare. There is real need for<br />

more polyclinics, primary health care<br />

centres and community nurses.”<br />

In his conclusion, this Doctor wrote one<br />

sentence that summarizes everything:<br />

“<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> is a police/military state. Its<br />

people are being systematically obliterated”<br />

Fiction number 3: Economic<br />

development<br />

The Indonesian propaganda says that<br />

there are now 536 Km of paved road comparing<br />

to only 20 Km made by the<br />

Portuguese up to 1974.<br />

Everyone that return from <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

accepts that the paved roads are of very<br />

poor quality. Only one wet season is<br />

enough to de-asphalt most of these roads.<br />

There are also strong military and<br />

Indonesian military economic reasons to<br />

pave those roads as quick as possible so<br />

that they can kill the <strong>Timor</strong>ese and loot<br />

everything they can from the <strong>Timor</strong>ese, before<br />

it becomes too late!<br />

Let’s look at some facts.<br />

The <strong>Timor</strong> Gap Treaty is a clear proof of<br />

gigantic looting of the <strong>Timor</strong>ese people’s<br />

natural resources. The facts exempt us from<br />

adding more information on this matter.<br />

As far as business goes, the military took<br />

over all the business in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. PT<br />

Batara Indra Group, PT Denok and PT<br />

Backri are the most prominent companies<br />

with total monopoly of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> resources.<br />

Very few <strong>Timor</strong>ese that managed to<br />

set up some sort of business, find themselves<br />

in “tetters” as soon as the Indonesian<br />

generals suspect them of any involvement<br />

with the <strong>Timor</strong>ese National Resistance. One<br />

businessman, called Oscar Lima, has been<br />

held incommunicado since the capture of<br />

Commander Xanana Gusmão. He was<br />

forced to testify against Xanana in the<br />

Indonesian court. Yet, he is still being held<br />

incommunicado and all his business taken<br />

over by the army.<br />

The head of PT Batara Indra Group is<br />

Robby Sumampouw, a close friend of<br />

General Benny Murdani. Suamampouw<br />

owns the franchise licence on direct shipping<br />

between Dili and Singapore. A percentage<br />

of his profits are also used to buy<br />

Portuguese wines, Portuguese ‘bacalau’ and<br />

American cigarettes to be sold in Dili. The<br />

port of Dili has been declared a duty free<br />

port in order to allow Suamanpouw all the<br />

facilities he can dream of. Sumanpouw also<br />

bought the Turismo Hotel two years ago<br />

and he now owns the expensive Makota<br />

Hotel.<br />

PT Denok is a military control company<br />

which has the monopoly of coffee export of<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. The only coffee that is not<br />

strictly controlled by PT Denok is the coffee<br />

from “Fazenda Algarve,” owned by the<br />

Carrascalao family. This exemption was<br />

made possible as a pay for the servant<br />

obedience of former Indonesian gubernur<br />

Mario Carrascalao. The Carrascalao brothers<br />

have recently bought more land in the<br />

surrounding area in order to increase their<br />

coffee business. In general, the <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />

have no choice but to sell their crop to PT<br />

Denok under a price stipulated by the generals<br />

themselves.


<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 131<br />

The “godfather” of PT Denok is general<br />

Benny Murdani. Gen. Benny Murdani used<br />

to be known as the “president” of the<br />

Committee for the Development of <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>. It simply means that every aid from<br />

abroad must pass through him.<br />

PT Denok has set up partnership with<br />

PT Batara Indra to exploit sandal wood in<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. It is said that, unlike Imelda<br />

Marcos who has shoes disease, Mrs. Tien<br />

“per cent” Suharto, has sandalwood oil disease;<br />

she has been reported to have express<br />

interest in the sandalwood industry in <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> and apparently she is already into<br />

sandalwood perfume (in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>).<br />

Suharto’s family has extensive interest in<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. The latest connection was<br />

found to be with the mining and processing<br />

of marbles in Subao region, east of Dili. The<br />

operation is a co-operation between general<br />

Benny Murdani’s brother, Harry Murdani<br />

and Suharto’s family - according to an<br />

Australian source.<br />

This has not always been a happy honeymoon.<br />

Clashing interests have prompted<br />

public criticism made by general Benny<br />

Murdani against president Suharto’s family.<br />

General Benny Murdani made a remark in<br />

Dili, two years ago, saying that “this<br />

business of the president’s family is going<br />

too far!” What he did not say was that he<br />

was upset because of competition, between<br />

themselves, for <strong>Timor</strong>ese national resources.<br />

Another Indonesian business group<br />

which has come into <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> is the<br />

Wanandi Group. Wanandi Group has also a<br />

political role in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. It is owned by<br />

Yusuf Wanandi and his brother Sofyan<br />

Wanandi. Yusuf Wanandi is the director of<br />

Indonesian government think-tank, CSIS<br />

(Centre for Strategic International Studies).<br />

Yusuf Wanandi has also a brother now well<br />

positioned inside the <strong>Timor</strong>ese Catholic<br />

Church. His name is Marcus Wanandi, a<br />

Jesuit priest. Marcus Wanandi is always<br />

informed about any important church person<br />

that goes to <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and, often, he<br />

tends to be the “friendly guide” for these<br />

important visitors. Other priests would not<br />

show the sense of security and protection<br />

that Marcus Wanandi shows to his visitors.<br />

The Wanandi Group, directed by Sofyan<br />

Wanandi, is planning a 400 bed tourist resort<br />

in Baucau beach, using the international<br />

airport of Baucau, built by the Portuguese,<br />

as the main moving force. Mario<br />

Carrascalao, the former Indonesian gubernur,<br />

was known to be supportive of this project<br />

and he did ask Jakarta to allow the Baucau<br />

airport to be re-used so that this project of<br />

Wanandi Group can go ahead. Another<br />

ambition of Sofyan Wanandi is a golf course<br />

in Mau-Bisse. The political and military<br />

situation of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, however, has not<br />

given these projects the “green light.”<br />

The <strong>Timor</strong>ese people have no jobs and<br />

no chance to succeed at all. Instead, they are<br />

forced to leave their own country, go to<br />

other islands to look for survival. Many<br />

young <strong>Timor</strong>ese are now in Ambon, forced<br />

to work in wood chipping - a very unpopular<br />

job in the sense that the company destroys<br />

the natural habitat of the people.<br />

Politically, it is of the interest of the generals<br />

to make the local people feel unhappy<br />

with the <strong>Timor</strong>ese; and, culturally, it<br />

amounts to a process of genocide of the<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese, in the sense that they are forced<br />

to leave their own homeland and Indonesian<br />

transmigrants take over.<br />

This is our small contribution to disarm<br />

the Indonesian generals’ propaganda. For<br />

more information, please contact us via<br />

email at etra@peg.apc.org.<br />

ASIA BOLDLY TAKING ON<br />

THE WEST<br />

by Leah Makabenta<br />

Jakarta, Mar. 22 (IPS) - Demonstrating<br />

that economic success can also mean power,<br />

dynamic Asian ‘tigers’ and ‘dragons’ are<br />

learning to use their rapid rise in the global<br />

economy as a political weapon.<br />

Unthinkable just a few years ago, Asia is<br />

now telling Europe and north America that<br />

it would reject western attempts to impose<br />

democracy, human rights and the environment<br />

as conditions for trade and aid to developing<br />

countries.<br />

Western-style democracy and its related<br />

values, according to Asian leaders like<br />

Singapore senior minister Lee Kuan Yew,<br />

have no universal validity and are particularly<br />

ill-suited to poor, unstable and divided<br />

developing societies.<br />

That they are succeeding was demonstrated<br />

recently, first by the Indonesians<br />

with the Dutch and then by the Association<br />

of South-<strong>East</strong> Asian Nations (ASEAN)<br />

against the European Community.<br />

Despite Jakarta’s unilateral ending of<br />

development cooperation with the<br />

Netherlands, its former colonial ruler, in<br />

1992, trade between the two countries increased<br />

in that period.<br />

Early this month, Austria was forced to<br />

set aside a law that would place restrictions<br />

on tropical timber imports because of pressure<br />

from Malaysia, Indonesia and their<br />

ASEAN partners.<br />

The law sought to protect the indiscriminate<br />

felling of tropical hardwoods by<br />

imposing a tax on their import and compulsory<br />

labeling of products made from such<br />

wood.<br />

Indonesia and Malaysia, the two top<br />

tropical timber exporters, stopped dealing in<br />

Austrian company shares. Worse, Austria<br />

found itself isolated, as other western<br />

countries failed to support it.<br />

Sources in development circles say<br />

German chancellor Helmut Kohl, who visited<br />

Indonesia and Singapore late last month<br />

to drum up Asian investment in the former<br />

east Germany, was firmly told not to<br />

interfere in human rights in the region.<br />

The sources said German aid agencies<br />

have been instructed to tone down their active<br />

support for the trade union movement<br />

and social activists in the region.<br />

This weekend, Beijing warned<br />

Washington it could lose out in the lucrative<br />

Sino-U.S. trade if it failed to renew China’s<br />

most favoured nation status (MFN). China<br />

has accused some members of the U.S.<br />

Congress of using the MFN issue to<br />

interfere in its internal affairs, meaning its<br />

human rights record.<br />

Citizens’ groups and non-governmental<br />

organisations (NGOs) have strongly rejected<br />

this reversal of the western policy of using<br />

threats of trade restrictions to promote<br />

human rights as a “crude form of economic<br />

determinism.”<br />

“While it is true that concepts of democracy<br />

and human rights emerged at a particular<br />

stage of western history, this is being<br />

used by authoritarian governments in Asia<br />

to reject pressures for political reform and<br />

civil liberties,” said a spokesman for the<br />

Kuala Lumpur-based Institute for Social<br />

Analysis (INSAN), an NGO that conducts<br />

research into labour and social issues.<br />

In early 1992, Indonesia refused to accept<br />

any more aid from the Netherlands<br />

which it accused of interfering in its domestic<br />

affairs. The Dutch had criticised the<br />

Indonesian army for firing at civilians in the<br />

former Portuguese colony of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

The Netherlands was also expelled as<br />

chair of the 14-member inter-governmental<br />

group on Indonesia (IGGI), a consortium of<br />

aid donors to the country.<br />

There have been repeated allegations of<br />

human rights abuses in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, whose<br />

annexation by Jakarta in 1976 has never<br />

been recognised by the United Nations. Last<br />

year, Washington suspended military aid to<br />

Indonesia because of the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

massacre.<br />

Indonesia has rejected criticism of its<br />

human rights record, saying it should not be<br />

judged on western individualistic principles<br />

but on the basis of its own culture and<br />

traditions.<br />

Indonesian president Suharto opened a<br />

U.N. workshop here last month saying the<br />

north should not seek to impose its values<br />

on poor countries which are dependent on<br />

them for aid. He said each country should be<br />

left alone to promote and protect human<br />

rights.


Page 132 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

Indonesian human rights lawyer Adnan<br />

Buyong Nasution dismisses such arguments.<br />

He says the government routinely uses them<br />

to cover up the manipulation and<br />

infringement of people’s rights.<br />

“The government should change its orientation<br />

towards a universal concept of<br />

human rights, towards internationally accepted<br />

norms of law and democracy so that<br />

we can see our shortcomings and our failings,”<br />

he says.<br />

Development experts say the Dutch have<br />

been suitably chastised and have not tried to<br />

channel development assistance to the<br />

country clandestinely.<br />

But the loss of Dutch aid has set back<br />

NGOs and many small-scale agricultural,<br />

health and development projects in rural<br />

Indonesia funded by the Netherlands’ 110-<br />

million-dollar annual aid budget for the<br />

country.<br />

The end of development cooperation,<br />

however, has not affected trade between the<br />

two countries, which continued to grow resulting<br />

in a surplus in favour of Jakarta.<br />

The official Antara news agency reported<br />

last week that Indonesia’s exports to the<br />

Netherlands increased significantly in 1992<br />

compared to those in previous years.<br />

Dutch embassy figures place the total<br />

trade between the two countries at 2.2 billion<br />

dollars in 1992, with the Netherlands<br />

ranking fifth among Indonesia’s trade partners.<br />

Businessmen from both countries had<br />

been worried that the halt in development<br />

cooperation would have an adverse effect on<br />

bilateral ties. No such development has<br />

taken place, Antara reported, quoting an<br />

Indonesian embassy official in the Hague.<br />

RELIGIOUS CONFLICT<br />

DISINFORMATION QUERY<br />

We hear that the report of this ambush<br />

filed by Ian Macintosh and run on ABC on<br />

Saturday, 20 March said that, according to<br />

army sources, the four men killed had just<br />

left a mosque. I have not seen any such reference<br />

in other reports but does the ABC<br />

report mean that the army there is trying to<br />

highlight an assault on Islam, and provoke<br />

the idea of religious conflict in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>?<br />

There have been some lengthy reports in<br />

the Indonesian-language press recently<br />

about a Muslim community in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

among <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese. Nothing wrong in<br />

that of course but the recent attention to<br />

Islam in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> appears to be an attempt<br />

to show that Catholicism does not<br />

represent the entire <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese people.<br />

If anyone has a fuller report, do post it<br />

on reg.easttimor. Thank you.<br />

Carmel, TAPOL<br />

LOBBYING FOR EAST<br />

TIMOR IN BRAZIL<br />

TAPOL report, 4 April 19<strong>93</strong><br />

Estevao Cabral, an <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese who is<br />

currently resident in the UK and is chair of<br />

the British Coalition for <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, has<br />

been in Brazil since mid March to lobby for<br />

support for <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

Among the politicians he has met so far<br />

is Federal Deputy of the Labour Party (PT),<br />

Luiz Gushiken, responsible for foreign affairs<br />

for the PT who agreed to table a motion<br />

in the Brazilian Congress which:<br />

- welcomes the fact that Brazil co-sponsored<br />

a resolution adopted in March 19<strong>93</strong><br />

by the UN Human Rights Commission condemning<br />

human rights violations by the<br />

Indonesian military in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>,<br />

- calls upon the Brazilian government to<br />

maintain this position in future,<br />

- asks the Brazilian government to express<br />

concern about continuing human rights<br />

violations in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, and<br />

- calls for effective support from the<br />

Brazilian government for Portuguese government<br />

efforts for self-determination and<br />

independence for <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

He also met Senator Eduardo Suplicy of<br />

the same party who agreed to work along<br />

the same lines.<br />

Estevao later gave a talk on the ‘Situation<br />

in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and International Solidarity’<br />

at the University of Brazil jointly organised<br />

by the Students Nucleus for Peace and the<br />

Centre for Exchange and International<br />

Relations. He showed the Yorkshire TV<br />

film, ‘Cold Blood.’<br />

He has also had a meeting with the Union<br />

of Brazilian Journalists and was interviewed<br />

by a member of the Union; the interview<br />

will be published in the mainstream press or<br />

the Union’s journal.<br />

Estevao is travelling to other cities in<br />

Brazil to solicit support for <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and<br />

hopes to help the creation of an <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

solidarity group in Brazil.<br />

RESOURCES<br />

TAPOL BULLETIN<br />

CONTENTS, APRIL 19<strong>93</strong><br />

The April edition of the bimonthly<br />

TAPOL Bulletin is now available. It contains<br />

the latest news and analysis of events<br />

in Indonesia, <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and West Papua.<br />

This edition of TAPOL Bulletin fronts<br />

with an article entitled UN Victory for<br />

<strong>Timor</strong> and contains articles on:<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>:<br />

* <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese at the UN<br />

* UN Resolution on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> (full text)<br />

* The trial of Xanana Gusmão, witness’s<br />

defiant stand (Saturnino da Costa Belo)<br />

* The true aim of territorial operations in<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />

* Indonesian shaken by events in Geneva<br />

Politics:<br />

* Suharto and ABRI<br />

* A more nationalistic course<br />

Aceh:<br />

* Acehnese refugees in Malaysia under<br />

threat<br />

Discrimination:<br />

* Discrimination against the Chinese<br />

Minority<br />

Law and human rights:<br />

* Draft Criminal Code under attack<br />

* Tortured for defending land rights<br />

* Human rights under the spotlight<br />

(including reviews of three recent publications,<br />

by the Lawyers Committee for<br />

Human Rights, Amnesty International<br />

and the US State Department)<br />

West Papua:<br />

* Indonesians accused of implicit racism<br />

* <strong>East</strong> Awin camp conditions exposed<br />

Arms sales:<br />

* Arm sales briefs<br />

Religious disputes:<br />

* Army interference in Batak church<br />

TAPOL Bulletin is published 6 times a<br />

year. The annual subscription rate for individuals<br />

worldwide is 14.00 (Australian<br />

$35.00, Dutch guilders 40.00), for students<br />

and unwaged 7.00 (A$18.00, Dfl 20.00) and<br />

for institutions 20.00 (A$65.00). If you<br />

would like to subscribe, please send your<br />

details and subscription fee to:<br />

TAPOL 111 Northwood Road, Thornton<br />

Heath, Surrey. CR7 8HW. UK Tel: 081 771<br />

2904 Fax: 081 653 0322<br />

Back issues are also available at 6.00 per<br />

year plus postage.


<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 133<br />

FIRST PLAY BY TIMORESE<br />

CULTURAL GROUP<br />

Green Left #95, April 7, By Peter Boyle<br />

MELBOURNE - José Pires left <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> 17 years ago. He was eight years old.<br />

With his brothers and sisters he was bundled<br />

into a car and rushed to Dili wharf<br />

where the last ship was preparing to depart.<br />

The port was ablaze. They were thrown<br />

into a boat and older men of the family were<br />

able to join them only by pretending to<br />

carry on food. José now works at the Ford<br />

car factory in Broadmeadows.<br />

Elizabeth Bothelheiro is now a child<br />

caseworker in Springvale, an outer suburb of<br />

Melbourne. Her family left <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> on a<br />

business trip to Mozambique, never<br />

dreaming that they wouldn’t return.<br />

Margarida Pires, mother of seven children,<br />

has lived in Meadow Heights since<br />

1975, when she fled <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> after the<br />

Indonesian invasion. These are three of the<br />

cast of Matebian Nia Lian (“Voices of<br />

Souls”), a play composed, produced and<br />

performed by Melbourne’s <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />

Cultural Group.<br />

The group was formed in 1984 as an attempt<br />

to preserve traditional stories, song,<br />

dance, painting and poetry. It has been performing<br />

at festivals, schools and universities<br />

ever since. But this is the group’s first play,<br />

put together with the assistance of a team of<br />

professional theatre workers.<br />

The play, which incorporates traditional<br />

songs and dances as well as more contemporary<br />

forms, is about the lives of three heroic<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese women. But the experiences<br />

in exile of the members of the Cultural<br />

Group are also woven into the text.<br />

Madeleine Blackwell, who co-directs the<br />

play with James McCaughey, told Green<br />

Left Weekly: “Matebian is a mountain in<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>, where people believe souls go after<br />

death. In this play the actors invoke some of<br />

those souls to come to the theatre to tell of<br />

their sufferings but also to share their<br />

humour, music and dance.<br />

“I hope the play doesn’t only make audiences<br />

more aware of the tragedy and injustices<br />

of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, but also provokes them<br />

to ask why this has happened.<br />

“These stories of the experiences of the<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese people since the brutal invasion in<br />

1975 are somehow also my own story as an<br />

Australian, whose governments have known<br />

and kept silent, sacrificing the <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />

people and their culture for the sake of<br />

regional power relations, diplomacy and<br />

profits. It is my story too because <strong>Timor</strong> is<br />

a metaphor by which I see the shadowy<br />

nature of our Australian democracy.”<br />

AUSTRALIAN BID TO SAVE<br />

THE TETUM LANGUAGE<br />

Justice Trends, published by Australian<br />

Catholic Social Justice Council March 19<strong>93</strong><br />

Abridged<br />

In a bid to preserve <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese language<br />

and culture, two Australian Catholic<br />

agencies are paying for publication of a<br />

course to teach English speakers Tetum.<br />

The Australian Catholic Social Justice<br />

Council and Australian Catholic Relief have<br />

joined forces to fund the book which will be<br />

the first ever to teach the language most<br />

commonly spoken in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

Written by University of Western<br />

Sydney linguistics lecturer Dr. Geoffrey<br />

Hull with three <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese who now<br />

living in Australia -Estanislau da Silva,<br />

Cristiano da Costa and Manuel Viegas - the<br />

course will be available here and in <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>, where school children now learn in<br />

Indonesian.<br />

Explained Dr. Hull, “Although <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong> is far from being a poverty-free zone,<br />

the real problem... is a social and cultural<br />

one. The <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese today suffer not<br />

only political oppression as second-class<br />

citizens in an alien state, but face the threat<br />

of the destruction of their culture and the<br />

languages that form an integral part of it.<br />

“It is a fact that the key to any culture is<br />

the national language.... Hence for the <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese to survive as a nation, the preservation<br />

of their common language, Tetum<br />

(also the medium of evangelisation), is essential.<br />

One cannot save the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />

without saving its culture and common language.”<br />

Called “Mai Kolia Tetun: A Course in<br />

Tetum-Praca, the Lingua Franca of <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>,” the book contains 18 lessons, each<br />

with points of grammar and an example<br />

either of spoken or written Tetum. Tetum<br />

literature includes passages from St Mark’s<br />

gospel and folk-tales of the animist culture.<br />

The course will be dedicated to the late<br />

Paulo Quintao da Costa, a pioneer in<br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese linguistics considered a sage<br />

among his people.<br />

It will provide the first standard spelling<br />

for the language and can be used by <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>ese living abroad to recover or learn<br />

their ancestral tongue as well as by those<br />

visiting the territory.”<br />

Due to be published mid-year, the course<br />

will be available from the ACSJC, 19<br />

Mackenzie Street, North Sydney 2060,<br />

Australia at a modest price.<br />

ANNOUNCEMENT OF NEW<br />

PRIVATE ‘INDONESIA’ AND<br />

‘EASTTIMOR’ LISTS<br />

The number of online lists, conferences,<br />

and newsgroups dealing with Indonesia and<br />

<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> continues to escalate. Yet there<br />

remains too little temperate, informed, frank<br />

discussion of sensitive issues, at least in the<br />

public online sources. Some of the public<br />

sources also suffer from too few postings or<br />

over-reliance on a few principal<br />

contributors.<br />

For these reasons, I have set up two private<br />

lists called ‘Indonesia’ and ‘easttimor.’<br />

They represent efforts to present some of<br />

the more useful or interesting materials out<br />

there in the vast ‘matrix,’ to provide a forum<br />

for serious discussion, and to offer a meeting<br />

place for persons concerned with Indonesia<br />

and <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> problems.<br />

You are invited to apply to join either or<br />

both lists after considering the material<br />

below on how the lists work at present.<br />

‘INDONESIA’ AND ‘EAS TTIMOR’<br />

GROUND RULES<br />

1. There are two (2) distinct lists – one<br />

for Indonesia-related postings, one for <strong>East</strong><br />

<strong>Timor</strong>-related postings.<br />

2. I will send the procedures to post to<br />

the lists to all new members. However, to<br />

apply to join, or to send me administrative<br />

messages relating to the lists and other<br />

general and private correspondence, all you<br />

need do is email<br />

apakabar@access.digex.com<br />

A brief message will do, such as ‘signup<br />

Indonesia’ or ‘signup easttimor’ along with<br />

your true name and preferred email address.<br />

If someone who is already a list member has<br />

suggested you join, please mention that. In<br />

most cases, I’ll ask you a few simple<br />

questions before putting you on the list(s).<br />

You won’t have to do anything like<br />

‘registering your biodata.’<br />

3. You will be able to post directly to the<br />

Indonesia and easttimor lists. The software<br />

has been set to unmoderated. I intend to<br />

leave it that way unless matters get out of<br />

hand (e.g., too many flames, too many<br />

extraneous or misdirected postings, mailing<br />

to the lists by unauthorized persons).<br />

4. You will only need to send your<br />

postings to apakabar@access.digex.com if<br />

you need your postings to be made anonymously,<br />

since direct posting to the list will<br />

reveal your identity. You may also, if you<br />

have good reason, use one of the several<br />

‘anon’ services available, provided you have<br />

been previously accepted as a list(s)<br />

member and registered your ‘anon id.’<br />

5. You are very strongly encouraged to<br />

exchange info, news, and commentary on the


Page 134 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />

Indonesia and easttimor lists, while retaining<br />

your ties with other online sources relating<br />

to Indonesia or <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />

6. I’ll take responsibility for forwarding<br />

to Indonesia and easttimor lists postings<br />

from the APC reg.indonesia and<br />

reg.easttimor conferences. If you post there,<br />

you don’t need to post on Indonesia or<br />

easttimor. I will also forward materials from<br />

some other APC conferences, though I can<br />

hardly cover them all. Anyone on an APC<br />

network is invited to forward material from<br />

public conferences there I do not cover (no<br />

postings from ips.englibrary though unless<br />

they are brief excerpts or re-writes).<br />

7. List members on APC may get<br />

reg.indonesia and reg.easttimor postings<br />

twice. To ease this problem if it applies to<br />

you, just quickly delete these duplicates<br />

when you see them in your mailbox. They<br />

will be prefaced with the capital letters ‘IN’<br />

or ‘ET’ for easy recognition. The duplication<br />

is necessary so that the postings in<br />

these conferences (and others on APC) get<br />

to the large majority of Indonesia and easttimor<br />

readers who do not have access to<br />

public APC conferences.<br />

8. Indonesia and easttimor are Internet<br />

lists. The lists originate from a commercial<br />

part of the Internet. This means advertisements<br />

of any materials you think worthwhile<br />

promoting may be posted to<br />

Indonesia and easttimor. You may also use<br />

the lists for fund-raising.<br />

9. The postings on Indonesia and easttimor<br />

lists come from the Internet and some<br />

parts of the larger ‘matrix’ of networks<br />

worldwide. You may selectively re-post or<br />

re-write them for distribution on APC and<br />

elsewhere, but you may not fully or substantially<br />

‘mirror’ the lists anywhere online.<br />

Also exercise prudence and good judgment<br />

where special sensitivities may be involved.<br />

Finally, if a list member explicitly requests<br />

in a posting for one or another good reason<br />

that his or her posting not be re-posted<br />

elsewhere, please honor that request.<br />

10. Indonesia and easttimor are private<br />

lists. They are designed for persons who<br />

will make some good use of the material<br />

posted. The main obligation of list members<br />

is to render some minimal amount of<br />

reciprocity for the service. Periodic posting<br />

to either list (or the APC lists from which<br />

some material is forwarded) satisfies this<br />

commitment. Others make equally satisfactory<br />

commitments such as occasional<br />

translation work. But whatever you do, you<br />

must contribute something every now and<br />

then to remain on the list. This is a major<br />

difference between Indonesia and easttimor<br />

and other lists on the Internet or matrix. If<br />

you are not doing your bit, eventually you’ll<br />

get a reminder from me.<br />

11. Please don’t ask for the names or<br />

email addresses of list recipients. There are<br />

persons on both lists whose identities must<br />

be protected for various good reasons.<br />

Direct posters to either list are obviously<br />

not in this category.<br />

12. It’s always possible that glitches in<br />

list software and list procedures will occur,<br />

especially in the early stages of the lists. If<br />

you spot any, please email apakabar@access.digex.com<br />

right away.<br />

13. I intend to expand substantially the<br />

membership of both lists. In this regard,<br />

anyone can play a helpful role by asking<br />

others who may benefit from the lists to<br />

sign up.<br />

14. You may want to save this message<br />

for future reference, or to use all or part of it<br />

for recruiting purposes, with or without<br />

your own endorsement. You are free to<br />

forward it to particular individuals and to repost<br />

it on other lists, conferences, and<br />

newsgroups.<br />

Let’s try to make this work. Thanks.<br />

John MacDougall, Task Force Indonesia<br />

apakabar@access.digex.com

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