TIMMAS21 93-04.DOC - East Timor Action Network/U.S.
TIMMAS21 93-04.DOC - East Timor Action Network/U.S.
TIMMAS21 93-04.DOC - East Timor Action Network/U.S.
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Documents on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> from<br />
PeaceNet and Connected Computer <strong>Network</strong>s<br />
Volume 21: February 15 – April 10, 19<strong>93</strong><br />
Published by:<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> <strong>Action</strong> <strong>Network</strong> / U.S.<br />
P.O. Box 1182, White Plains, NY 10602 USA<br />
Tel: 914-428-7299 Fax: 914-428-7383 E-mail PeaceNet:CSCHEINER or CSCHEINER@IGC.APC.ORG<br />
For additional copies, please enclose US$10. per volume to cover costs; add an extra $3.00 for international<br />
air mail. Activist rate: $6. domestic, $7.50 international.<br />
These documents are usually produced monthly, and mailed to subscribers.<br />
If you would like to subscribe, send $60 for the next six issues (US), or $69 for international air mail.<br />
Reduced rate for activists: $36 in the US, $45 international. Lower, subsidized prices are available for<br />
groups in Third World countries working on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. Checks should be made out to “Foreign Bases<br />
Project/ETAN.” Tax-deductible contributions can be made out to “WESPAC Foundation/ETAN.”<br />
The material is grouped by subject, with articles under each category in approximately chronological<br />
order. It is also available on IBM-compatible diskette, in either WinWord 2 or ASCII format.<br />
Reprinting and distribution without permission is welcomed.<br />
Much of this information is translated and supplied by TAPOL (London), Task Force Indonesia (USA),<br />
CDPM (Lisbon), CNRM, Free <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Japan Coalition, Mate-Bian News (Sydney) and solidarity<br />
groups, but they are not responsible for edi torial comment or selection.<br />
TABLE OF CONTENTS<br />
XANANA GUSMÃO’S TRIAL CONTINUES ...................................................................................................... 6<br />
PORTUGUESE PARLIAMEN T: TRIAL IS ILLEGAL..............................................................................................6<br />
XANANA LAWYER COURT STATEMENT...........................................................................................................6<br />
XANANA REKINDLES EXPECTATION OVER HIS TRIAL IN DILI .......................................................................7<br />
XANANA’S LAWYER USES ALATAS’S ARGUMENT............................................................................................8<br />
RAMOS HORTA AGREES TO TESTIFY .............................................................................................................9<br />
INDONESIAN UN MISSION CHIEF MEETS XANANA .....................................................................................10<br />
FOUR WITNESSES HEARD AT XANANA TRIAL ON FEB. 15 ............................................................................10<br />
XANANA’S LAWYER UNDER PRESSURE........................................................................................................10<br />
GUSMÃO ADMITS ‘DEATH’ EVIDENCE..........................................................................................................11<br />
XANANA CONFOUNDS HIS LAWYER ............................................................................................................11<br />
AUSTRALIAN CASH SENT TO FRETILIN: WITNESS........................................................................................12<br />
FORMER REBEL NOW “INDONESIAN CITIZEN”............................................................................................12<br />
XANANA: A LEADER WHO DOES NOT APPEAR BEATEN ................................................................................12<br />
FRETILIN ‘GOT AID FROM AUSTRALIA’ ........................................................................................................14<br />
MATE-BIAN NEWS COMMENTS ON COVERAGE OF XANANA TRIAL ..............................................................14<br />
XANANA: THE TRIAL OF JUSTICE.................................................................................................................15<br />
RETICENT WITNESSES.................................................................................................................................16<br />
TRIAL RESUMES TODAY...............................................................................................................................16
Page 2 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
SATURNINO DA COSTA BELO BRAVELY CRIES OUT .....................................................................................17<br />
SOS RE: SATURNINO’S CONDITION ............................................................................................................18<br />
BACKGROUND ON SATURNINO...................................................................................................................18<br />
SATURNINO’S ‘TESTIMONY’ USED IN COURT...............................................................................................20<br />
NOTHING DELIBERATE ABOUT DELAY IN TRIAL ..........................................................................................20<br />
XANANA TRIAL DRAGS ON ..........................................................................................................................20<br />
DEFENCE WITNESSES HEARD .....................................................................................................................21<br />
EVENTS INSIDE EAST TIMOR.................................................................................................................... 21<br />
WHO’S WHO IN THE RESISTANCE...............................................................................................................21<br />
CNRM CHRISTMAS MESSAGE......................................................................................................................21<br />
STATE OF WAR: A DIARY..............................................................................................................................22<br />
FIGHTING AND ARRESTS IN FIVE MUNICIPALITIES.....................................................................................26<br />
ALIAS CORTHE.............................................................................................................................................26<br />
VIDEO OF XANANA CIRCULATES AROUND TIMORESE SCHOOLS ................................................................27<br />
THE OLD MISSIONARY’S MONOLOGUE .......................................................................................................27<br />
BELO: TIMOR LIKE THE AZORES, MADEIRA, PUERTO RICO .........................................................................27<br />
EAST TIMOR PADDY FIELDS NEGLECTED ....................................................................................................29<br />
AROUND THE TRIAL.....................................................................................................................................30<br />
SIX TIMORESE REBELS SURRENDER WITH BOWS AND ARROWS................................................................30<br />
RESISTANCE LEADERS ANSWER QUESTIONS..............................................................................................30<br />
MA’HUNU VOWS TO CONTINUE THE STRUGGLE..........................................................................................32<br />
NEW BAR ON EAST TIMORESE GOING OVERSEAS? .....................................................................................33<br />
LIKE IT OR QUIT TIMOR, GOVERNOR TELLS PRIESTS..................................................................................33<br />
AUSTRALIAN INVESTS IN DILI GARMENT BUSINESS ...................................................................................34<br />
EAST TIMOR’S CATHOLIC PRIEST AGAIN DENOUNCES ABUSES ..................................................................34<br />
RESISTANCE GROUP DEN OUNCES INDONESIAN ATROCITIES ....................................................................34<br />
PROPAGATION OF ISLAM IN DILI ...............................................................................................................35<br />
INDONESIA TO CHANGE MILITARY ROLE IN EAST TIMOR...........................................................................35<br />
MILITARY REDUCTION IN EAST TIMOR?......................................................................................................35<br />
TIMORESE REBEL SURRENDERS TO INDONESIAN MILITARY ......................................................................35<br />
FOUR INDONESIAN SOLDIERS KILLED BY “FRETILIN” (BBC) .......................................................................36<br />
EDI: TROOPS KILLED WON’T DELAY WITHDRAWAL.....................................................................................36<br />
CNRM COMMUNIQUÉ ON XANANA, OSORIO...............................................................................................37<br />
MORE INDONESIAN DEATHS IN TIMOR ......................................................................................................37<br />
NEW TORTURE CHARGED AGAINST INDONESIA .........................................................................................37<br />
SYAFEI BECOMES UDAYANA COMMANDER..................................................................................................38<br />
DEMONSTRATION PLANNED IN DILI? .........................................................................................................38<br />
YOUNG PEOPLE DEMONSTRATE IN DILI .....................................................................................................38<br />
ARMY CHANGES IN TIMOR..........................................................................................................................38<br />
MA’HUNU CAPTURED................................................................................................................................. 39<br />
QUESTIONS SURROUND MA’HUNU CAPTURE..............................................................................................39<br />
ACTION ALERT TO PREVENT MA HUNU TORTURE........................................................................................39<br />
STATEMENT BY JOSE RAMOS-HORTA ..........................................................................................................40<br />
FURTHER EXCERPTS FROM WIRES ON EAST TIMOR DEVELOPMENTS:........................................................40<br />
REACTIONS TO MA HUNU CAPTURE ............................................................................................................40<br />
HARSH BLOW TO THE RESISTANCE.............................................................................................................41<br />
MA’HUNU CAPTURED IN BATTLE..................................................................................................................41<br />
MORE WEAPONS FLOW TO INDONESIA.................................................................................................... 42<br />
PORTUGAL PROTESTS LONDON-JAKARTA MILITARY PLANES DEAL.............................................................42
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 3<br />
SOUTHEAST ASIAN NAVIES GROWING BIGGER...........................................................................................42<br />
INDONESIA NO THREAT TO ITS NEIGHBORS ..............................................................................................42<br />
PORTUGAL PROTESTS AT GERMAN ARMS SALE ...........................................................................................43<br />
GERMANY SELLS WAR SHIPS TO INDONESIA..............................................................................................43<br />
KOHL IN TOKYO CHASTISED FOR ARMS SALE.............................................................................................43<br />
NGOS PROTEST WARSHIP DEAL TO KOHL...................................................................................................44<br />
PERPETRATORS OF VIOLENCE ARE UNLIKELY CHAMPIONS OF PEACE .......................................................44<br />
DEMONSTRATION AT BRITISH AEROSPACE................................................................................................45<br />
GERMAN EMBASSY REPLIES TO CANADA ....................................................................................................45<br />
PROSPECTS FOR MORE HAWK SALES FROM BAE ........................................................................................45<br />
SUHARTO “RE-ELECTED”, TRY IS NEW V.P............................................................................................. 46<br />
PETITION SUPPORT SWELLS FOR SUHARTO ................................................................................................46<br />
ENVOY AT UN TOLD TO CAMPAIGN FOR TIMOR ACCEPTANCE ....................................................................46<br />
GEN. TRY KEEPS MUM ABOUT ACCEPTING V-P NOMINATION .....................................................................46<br />
SUDRADJAT LOCALLY TRAINED...................................................................................................................47<br />
NEW ABRI CHIEF A TIMOR VETERAN ...........................................................................................................47<br />
STUDENTS DETAINED FOR DEMO ..............................................................................................................47<br />
STUDENTS ARRESTED AS SUHARTO ACCEPTS TRY......................................................................................47<br />
SUHARTO STILL SILENT ON VICE-PRESIDENT.............................................................................................48<br />
TRY SUTRISNO IS TRUSTED SUHARTO MAN, DEVOUT MUSLIM ..................................................................48<br />
THE END GAME FOR INDONESIA’S SUHARTO .............................................................................................48<br />
SUHARTO ANNOUNCES NEW CABINET.......................................................................................................50<br />
PROFILES OF KEY MEN IN NEW SUHARTO CABI NET ...................................................................................51<br />
ABRI REASSERTS SELF.................................................................................................................................51<br />
SUHARTO EXCLUDES ARMY FROM CABINET................................................................................................52<br />
SUHARTO TO ATTEND G7 SUMMIT? ............................................................................................................52<br />
INDONESIA’S NEW AMBASSADOR TO INDIA ...............................................................................................53<br />
HUMAN RIGHTS: BACKGROUND PAPERS.................................................................................................. 54<br />
INDONESIA/EAST TIMOR A NEW ORDER? HUMAN RIGHTS IN 1992 (AI)......................................................54<br />
THE HUMAN RIGHTS CRISIS IN EAST TIMOR: REGIONAL AND GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES..............................56<br />
BACKGROUND TO THE CURRENT HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION (FROM CANADA) .........................................59<br />
INDONESIA’S JUSTICE SYSTEM VIOLATES BASIC RIGHTS ...........................................................................62<br />
PRISONERS FACE TORTURE, SAYS HUMAN RIGHTS GROUP........................................................................62<br />
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW BODY RECEIVES AWARD ...........................................................................................63<br />
UN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION PASSES STRONG RESOLUTION .......................................................... 64<br />
THE JAKARTA REGIME AND ITS GENEVA COMMITMENTS............................................................................64<br />
EAST TIMOR REBEL LEADER PLEADS FOR U.N. SUPPORT............................................................................64<br />
URGE YOUR GOVERNMENT TO SUPPORT EAST TIMOR AT THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION .............64<br />
CLOSED EYES ON EAST TIMOR...................................................................................................................65<br />
UNHRC STATEMENT OF CONSTANCIO PINTO ..............................................................................................66<br />
UNHRC STATEMENT BY ABE BARRETO SOARES ...........................................................................................67<br />
CNRM UPDATE.............................................................................................................................................67<br />
INDONESIA SUFFERS HUMILIATING DEFEAT AT UN ....................................................................................68<br />
AUSTRALIA’S UN VOTE ‘A SURPRISE’ ..........................................................................................................69<br />
UN SLAMS DILI KILLERS’ JAIL TERMS ........................................................................................................69<br />
U.N. CRITICIZES INDONESIA ABOUT EAST TIMOR.......................................................................................69<br />
INDONESIA REJECTS UNHRC RESOLUTION ON ET .....................................................................................70<br />
INDONESIA, DESERVEDLY REBUKED ..........................................................................................................71<br />
ACTION ALERT ON INDONESIAN RESPONSE TO UNHRC RESOLUTION .......................................................71
Page 4 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
INDONESIA LOSES GEN EVA VOTE..............................................................................................................73<br />
SELECTIVE FOCUS ON HUMAN RIGHTS CRITICISED ...................................................................................73<br />
UN ROUND-UP OF UNHRC SESSION ..........................................................................................................76<br />
EUROPEAN POSITIONS AT UNHRC .............................................................................................................76<br />
U.S. CONCERN OVER EAST TIMOR MAY SIGNAL ASIAN POLICY CHANGE ...................................................76<br />
SOME TIMORESE BEING GROOMED FOR INDONESIA.................................................................................77<br />
INDONESIA ASKS NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES TO SUPPORT REPRESSION .................................................77<br />
CHAIRMAN OF COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS ANNOUNCES SEVEN SPECIAL RAPPORTEURS..............78<br />
TIMOR CONTROVERSY AT BANGKOK HUMAN RIGHTS MEETING ............................................................ 78<br />
ROW OVER NGO ACCREDITATION...............................................................................................................78<br />
GROUPS PLEDGE TO BOOST EAST TIMOR FIGHT.........................................................................................78<br />
HUMAN RIGHTS MEETING IN BANGKOK - IS IT A SHAM?............................................................................79<br />
HUMAN RIGHTS VALUES – EASTERN, WESTERN OR UNIVERSAL?................................................................79<br />
NGOS BANNED FROM ASIAN MEETING......................................................................................................80<br />
NEED FOR REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS MECHANISM STRESSED ................................................................81<br />
HUMAN RIGHTS: INDONESIA HITS BACK AT CRITICS .................................................................................81<br />
ASSISTANT S-G FOR HUMAN RIGHTS STRESSES ASIAN CONTRIBUTION TO WORLD CONFERENCE ...........82<br />
BANGKOK DECLARATION ............................................................................................................................82<br />
ASIA-PACIFIC STATES SET STRONG AGENDA ..............................................................................................84<br />
BBC ON BANGKOK DECLARATION AND TIMOR ...........................................................................................85<br />
JOSÉ RAMOS HORTA SAYS HE PLANS TO RETURN TO EAST TIMOR.............................................................86<br />
CONTINUING TALKS BETW EEN INDONESIA AND PORTUGAL................................................................... 87<br />
JAPANESE GROUPS URGE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REDOUBLE EFFORTS ...........................................87<br />
CHURCH TO MEDIATE TIMOR TALKS?.........................................................................................................88<br />
ROME AWAITS THE TIMORESE.....................................................................................................................89<br />
VATICAN MEDIATION NOT CONFIRMED BY FOREI GN OFFICE.....................................................................89<br />
ALATAS STEPS “BACKWARD” TOWARDS ROME ?..........................................................................................90<br />
INDONESIA SAYS PORTUGAL UNHELPFUL OVER TIMOR .............................................................................90<br />
DIPLOMACY VERSUS LOGIC OF WAR..........................................................................................................90<br />
AMOS WAKO RETURNS TO EAST TIMOR .................................................................................................. 91<br />
SECRETARY-GENERAL TO SEND PERSONAL ENVOY TO INDONESIA AND EAST TIMOR...............................91<br />
JAKARTA ASKED TO REVEAL ALL FROM PROBE OF 1991 DILI INCIDENT.....................................................91<br />
JAKARTA’S HANDLING OF THE AMOS WAKO VISIT......................................................................................92<br />
AMOS WAKO’S RETURN VISIT TO INDONESIA.............................................................................................92<br />
WAKO: “MY DOOR IS OPEN”........................................................................................................................<strong>93</strong><br />
AMOS WAKO MEETS XANANA AND MAU HUNU............................................................................................<strong>93</strong><br />
RADIO AUSTRALIA ON WAKO VISIT............................................................................................................<strong>93</strong><br />
UN ENVOY IN TALKS WITH XANANA...........................................................................................................<strong>93</strong><br />
EVENTS IN CANADA................................................................................................................................... 94<br />
FIVE DAYS IN EAST TIMOR ..........................................................................................................................94<br />
EAST TIMOR UPDATE FROM ETAN/TORONTO ..............................................................................................94<br />
CANADIAN GOVERNMENT ON XANANA......................................................................................................95<br />
EAST TIMOR ALERT NETWORK / CANADA NEWSLETTER, FEB. 19<strong>93</strong>.............................................................96<br />
UPDATE FROM EAST TIMOR ALERT NETWORK/CANADA..............................................................................98<br />
EVENTS IN EUROPE; EUROPEAN LEADERS VISIT INDONESIA ................................................................. 99<br />
SWITZERLAND’S POSITION ON EAST TIMOR ...............................................................................................99<br />
LACK OF UNEQUIVOCAL SUPPORT FROM EC ............................................................................................. 100<br />
MOREIRA INTERVIEW: PORTUGUESE GOV’T VIEWS................................................................................... 100
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 5<br />
KOHL TO RAISE TIMOR ISSUE WITH SUHARTO ......................................................................................... 102<br />
LETTER TO FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTRY .................................................................................................. 102<br />
POSSIBLE VOTE IN EP ............................................................................................................................... 102<br />
NEW PAPAL AMBASSADOR TO LISBON ...................................................................................................... 102<br />
EP: XANANA TRIAL ILLEGAL....................................................................................................................... 102<br />
EAST TIMOR MOTION WINS UK COMMONS SUPPORT ............................................................................... 103<br />
FRETILIN SATISFIED WITH PORTUGAL ...................................................................................................... 103<br />
DENMARK WANTS EC OBSERVER FOR EAST TIMOR .................................................................................. 103<br />
EURO-MPS’ VISIT AWAITS GREEN LIGHT................................................................................................... 103<br />
BRITISH FM DOUGLAS HURD TO VISIT JAKARTA....................................................................................... 103<br />
WITH THE TIMORESE BUT WITHOUT FRETILIN AT EC HEARING................................................................ 104<br />
REPORT FROM FRENCH SOLIDARITY MOVEMENT..................................................................................... 104<br />
EVENTS IN THE UNITED STATES............................................................................................................ 105<br />
REPORT FROM EAST TIMOR ACTION NETWORK / U.S. TO THE SOLIDARITY MEETING.............................. 105<br />
SILENT GENOCIDE: EAST TIMOR STRUGGLES FOR GLOBAL ATTENTION – AND FOR ITS LIFE ................... 105<br />
SENATOR PELL STATEMENT ON EAST TIMOR............................................................................................. 106<br />
US STATE DEPARTMENT’S ANNUAL REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES IN INDONESIA................... 107<br />
TIME TO END AN ATROCITY....................................................................................................................... 115<br />
EAST TIMORESE WANT THEIR CONQUERORS OUT .................................................................................... 116<br />
ACTION ALERT: THE LAST CHANCE FOR THE HOUSE HUNGER COMMITTEE !............................................ 116<br />
SPEAKING TOUR: EAST TIMOR – A NEW GENERATION OF RESISTANCE.................................................... 117<br />
TIMOR’S UNTELEVISED TERROR................................................................................................................ 117<br />
ETAN/US NEWSLETTER # 5......................................................................................................................... 119<br />
INÍCIO DA DIGRESSÃO TIMORENSE PELOS EUA....................................................................................... 120<br />
EAST TIMOR: SOARES WRITES TO CLINTON .............................................................................................. 121<br />
TIMORESE EXILE ACTIVITIES................................................................................................................. 121<br />
THE “FREEDOM FOR XANANA, FREEDOM FOR TIMOR” COMMISSION ....................................................... 121<br />
SOME EXILES: HORTA HAS NEVER BEEN MANDATED................................................................................ 121<br />
FRETILIN/AUSTRALIA WANTS MOVEMENT RESTRUCTURED ...................................................................... 122<br />
FRETILIN WITHOUT MAU HUNU................................................................................................................ 122<br />
TIMORESE RESISTANCE TRIES TO AVOID DIVISIONS ............................................................................... 123<br />
MISCELLANEOUS ARTICLES ................................................................................................................... 123<br />
SYAFEI ON MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EAST TIMOR FROM 1975................................................................ 123<br />
INFORMATION WANTED ON ENVIRONMENTAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE INDONESIAN OCCUPATION ........ 123<br />
EAST TIMOR COMPUTER WAR GAME ......................................................................................................... 124<br />
AUSTRALIAN TV STARTS BROADCASTING TO SOUTHEAST ASIA................................................................. 124<br />
PRESS COMMUNIQUÉ FROM THE INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY MOVEMENT............................................ 124<br />
YEAR OF THE SANDALWOOD EXHIBITION, LISBON................................................................................... 125<br />
EVANS FACES PROTEST OVER TIMOR........................................................................................................ 125<br />
DEBATE: PORTUGUESE TEACHERS RESOLUTION ON EAST TIMOR ............................................................ 125<br />
ASIA BOLDLY TAKING ON THE WEST......................................................................................................... 131<br />
RELIGIOUS CONFLICT DISINFORMATION QUERY ..................................................................................... 132<br />
LOBBYING FOR EAST TIMOR IN BRAZIL.................................................................................................... 132<br />
RESOURCES............................................................................................................................................. 132<br />
TAPOL BULLETIN CONTENTS, APRIL 19<strong>93</strong> .................................................................................................. 132<br />
FIRST PLAY BY TIMORESE CULTURAL GROUP ............................................................................................ 133<br />
AUSTRALIAN BID TO SAVE THE TETUM LANGUAGE.................................................................................... 133<br />
ANNOUNCEMENT OF NEW PRIVATE ‘INDONESIA’ AND ‘EASTTIMOR’ LISTS............................................... 133
Page 6 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
XANANA GUSMÃO’S<br />
TRIAL CONTINUES<br />
PORTUGUESE PARLIAMENT:<br />
TRIAL IS ILLEGAL<br />
Publico 3 February 19<strong>93</strong>. By Angela Silva.<br />
Original Portuguese. abridged<br />
(Lisbon) The Assembly of the Republic<br />
yesterday unanimously passed a vote of<br />
“vehement repudiation of the pursuance of<br />
Xanana Gusmão’s trial,” considering it to be<br />
“unjust, unlawful, biased, and gravely<br />
offensive to human dignity and to the internationally<br />
recognised rights of the people of<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.” The vote, proposed by all the<br />
members of the parliamentary Commission<br />
on the Situation in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, alerts the<br />
UN Human Rights Commission to the<br />
“urgency of the Presidency’s statement on<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> being respected.” Furthermore,<br />
it asks non- governmental organisations and<br />
the Portuguese Lawyers’ Council “that they<br />
collaborate in the restoration of the violated<br />
international juridical order.”<br />
In the preamble to the vote, Xanana’s<br />
trial is considered “an abusive attempt to<br />
impose, upon the international community,<br />
the qualification of the resistance as a<br />
question of domestic jurisdiction, thereby<br />
passively bringing about acceptance of the<br />
subjugation and integration” of the territory<br />
of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. In this regard, the Assembly<br />
of the Republic requests Parliaments and<br />
Governments, “especially those of the<br />
United States and Australia, that they urgently<br />
proceed to an evaluation of the disparities<br />
between the policies imposed on the<br />
people of <strong>Timor</strong> and the Universal<br />
Declaration of Human Rights and principles<br />
of self-determination and independence of<br />
peoples, embodied in the UN Charter.”<br />
This vote came from the Parliamentary<br />
Commission on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> which is now<br />
chaired, since just a few days ago, by the<br />
Christian-Democrat deputy Adriano Moreira,<br />
substituting the Social-Democrat Vitor<br />
Crespo.<br />
XANANA LAWYER COURT<br />
STATEMENT<br />
Delivered 3 February, 19<strong>93</strong><br />
DOCUMENT: EKSEPSI DELIVERED BY<br />
XANANA’S LAWYER, SUDJONO AT DILI<br />
TRIAL.<br />
Law Office Sudjono and Partners<br />
Counselor: Prof. Sahetbi, SH, Dr. Lubby<br />
Loqman, SH, MH<br />
No. 500/SP/I/<strong>93</strong><br />
E K S E P S I in response to LIST OF<br />
THE PROSECUTION’S CHARGES<br />
No.: PDM - 90/DILI/01/19<strong>93</strong>25 January<br />
19<strong>93</strong><br />
A. IDENTITY OF THE ACCUSED<br />
Name in Full: JOSE ALEXANDRE<br />
GUSMÃO alias KAY RALA GUSMÃO<br />
Al XANANA<br />
Place and Date of Birth: Manatuto, <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>, 20 June 1946<br />
Age: 46 years<br />
Sex: Male<br />
Nationality/Citizenship: Indonesian<br />
Place of Residence: West Lahane, RT. 2<br />
RK. 1, West Dili sub-district, District of<br />
Dili<br />
Religion: Catholic<br />
Employment: GPK (Gerombolan Pengacau<br />
Keamanan: rebel/secessionist/ disturber<br />
of common safety)<br />
Education: Liceu (Senior High School)<br />
B. HELD BY THE INVESTIGATING<br />
OFFICER<br />
Since November 20 1992 Extended Detention<br />
by General Prosecutor/ Indonesian<br />
Attorneys Office, Dili from 10 December<br />
1992 to 18 January 19<strong>93</strong>. Detention extended<br />
by Dili District Court as of 19 January<br />
19<strong>93</strong><br />
C. TYPE OF DETENTION<br />
Detained in Prison<br />
Respected Judge, Beloved Prosecution:<br />
INTRODUCTION:<br />
Before the trial begins, allow us to present<br />
an eksepsi in response to the charges<br />
laid by the Public Prosecutor as included in<br />
the List of Charges No. -90/PDM/<br />
DILI/01/19<strong>93</strong>, 25 January, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
The charges laid against the accused are<br />
inextricably linked to administrative law, in<br />
particular from the concept of the emergence<br />
of a state. The contract theory is one of the<br />
theories concerning the emergence of states,<br />
a theory which has been illustrated in the<br />
emergence of ex-Soviet or ex-<br />
Czechoslovakian states. Likewise, states<br />
formerly colonized by Portugal.<br />
The emergence of a state is not only<br />
based on contract but also relates to the<br />
history of a particular group of people. The<br />
emergence of the Indonesian state, for example,<br />
is not based on contract between<br />
states but on the common history of a people<br />
from a certain location/geographic area.<br />
States also emerge out of radical change<br />
often referred to as revolution. Thus, states<br />
may emerge from either peaceful or violent<br />
processes.<br />
A GLANCE AT THE TIMOR PROBLEM<br />
Since the departure of the Portuguese<br />
colonial government, there has been no <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese state. The conditions for establishing<br />
a state are that it must constitute<br />
a people, a geographic area and a government.<br />
Other conditions include other countries’<br />
recognition (of the new state). <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> only has a geographic area and a<br />
people, but no government.<br />
Nevertheless, recognition by other<br />
countries has been present in the form of<br />
United Nations recognition. Recognition by<br />
other states tends to be the dominant factor<br />
in determining the formation of new states.<br />
At present (the validity/legality of) the integration<br />
of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> remains in question.<br />
Following the departure of the Portuguese<br />
colonial government, several groups of<br />
people formed parties which had varying<br />
aspirations regarding the nature of the administration<br />
of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. These aspirations<br />
included the desire to integrate with<br />
Indonesia, and the desire to form a separate<br />
state. Presently, these groups maintain their<br />
respective followings, and are in possession<br />
of weapons formerly belonging to the ex-<br />
Portuguese colonial administration. The<br />
group aspiring to integration received assistance<br />
from the Republic of Indonesia. The<br />
group desiring a separate state received assistance<br />
from overseas. The group desiring a<br />
separate state was known as Fretilin, led by<br />
the accused. A leadership body was formed,<br />
thus fulfilling the conditions necessary for<br />
establishing a state.<br />
Another group refused to accept the establishing<br />
of an independent <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />
state. This group wanted to integrate with<br />
Indonesia. Armed conflict broke out between<br />
these two groups.<br />
The leadership of several groups then<br />
approached the Indonesian government to<br />
request integration as soon as possible.<br />
Attempts were made to hold a referendum.<br />
Whether this referendum was selfinitiated<br />
or carried out by other people remains<br />
a question. Was not a neutral third<br />
party not required to oversee such a referendum?<br />
The ‘non-integration’ group continued to<br />
question the validity of the referendum.<br />
Moreover, according to the referendum results,<br />
the majority of people chose to integrate<br />
with the Republic of Indonesia.<br />
At this stage, the United Nations continued<br />
to question the validity of the general<br />
election (referendum). Was the decision<br />
taken by the four parties excluding Fretilin a<br />
pure manifestation of the will of the people<br />
of the ex-Portuguese colony? This may<br />
relate to the fact that, due to the poor level<br />
of education of the (majority of ) people left
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 7<br />
by the Portuguese colonial government,<br />
decision making power rested with their<br />
leaders.<br />
The group which opposed integration<br />
(‘non-integration group’) considered the result<br />
of the referendum invalid. Thus, this<br />
group, of which the accused was leader, did<br />
not recognise the Indonesian rule.<br />
We may compare this situation with Indonesia’s<br />
annexation of West Irian. Although<br />
this discredited Indonesia internationally,<br />
West Irian was formerly a Dutch<br />
colony. Juridically, therefore, Indonesia’s<br />
annexation was recognised internationally,<br />
and was not really questioned by anyone<br />
but the Dutch government.<br />
THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT<br />
These events occurred long before the<br />
declaration of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>’s integration into<br />
Indonesia (i.e.: before 1976).<br />
Basic to the accused’s beliefs are his refusal<br />
to recognise the act o integration, and<br />
thus the jurisdiction of this court to try him<br />
is questionable.<br />
Additionally, the list of charges notes<br />
that the accused carried out (illegal) activities<br />
between July 17 1976 and November 20<br />
1992. This is beyond the existing facts.<br />
The existing facts are presented as follows:<br />
1. 1942-5 Dutch <strong>East</strong> Indies occupied by<br />
the Japanese military regime. <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
included in the area of occupation.<br />
2. 17 August 1945 Indonesian people proclaim<br />
independence. Area encompassed<br />
by Indonesia as yet unclear.<br />
3. August 1945 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese people began<br />
to revolt against Portuguese colonialism<br />
but were crushed by the Portuguese.<br />
4. 27 December 1949 Surrender of Dutch<br />
sovereignty of Indonesia. Indonesia accompanies<br />
all that was former Dutch<br />
<strong>East</strong> Indies, not including <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
which was still under Portuguese colonial<br />
rule.<br />
5. April-May 1974 Portuguese government<br />
planed to grant democratic rights to its<br />
colonies, including <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
6. September-October 1974 Discussion<br />
concerning the decolonisation of <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> held for the first time between the<br />
Portuguese and Indonesian governments.<br />
7. May-November 1974 Five <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />
political parties organise themselves for<br />
self-government.<br />
8. March 1975 Plans to hold a referendum<br />
are thwarted by the Portuguese military.<br />
Fretilin begins its activities. UDT also<br />
begins to stage demonstrations demanding<br />
integration with Indonesia.<br />
9. 20 August 1975 Fretilin controls a large<br />
area of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
10. 26 August 1975 The Portuguese colonial<br />
government leaves <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. Various<br />
groups claim to control the ex-Portuguese<br />
territory.<br />
11. 28 November 1975 Fretilin declares <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese independence.<br />
12. 29 November 1975 Portuguese government<br />
announces that in three months<br />
<strong>East</strong> TImor will gain administrative independence.<br />
13. 30 November 1975 Four other parties<br />
also proclaim their independence and<br />
approach Indonesia to integrate.<br />
14. 15 January 1976 A United Nations<br />
delegate (Vittorio Winspeare Gucciardi)<br />
visits Indonesia and meets with Adam<br />
Malik to enquire about the situation in<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
15. 20-22 January 1976 UN delegate visits<br />
Dili to meet with leaders, including<br />
Fretilin leaders, in various parts of <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>. Following this the UN delegate<br />
visited Australia to meet with Fretilin<br />
members.<br />
16. April-May 1976 A letter sent to the UN<br />
requests that the imminent election be<br />
observed.<br />
17. May 1976 Election held and the result is<br />
the choice to integrate with Indonesia.<br />
18. 5 June 1976 <strong>Timor</strong>ese delegation visits<br />
Jakarta to present a petition requesting<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>’s integration with Indonesia.<br />
19. 23 June 1976 Fact-finding team led by<br />
Indonesian Internal Affairs Minister<br />
(Amir Machmud) visits <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> to<br />
inspect the situation there.<br />
20. 17 July 1976 President Suharto announces<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> as the 27th Province<br />
of Indonesia.<br />
21. End 1978 Discussion about the integration<br />
of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> held in the UN.<br />
As evident in the above chronology,<br />
Fretilin did not agree to integration from the<br />
beginning, and that they wanted to establish<br />
a separate state. The will to establish<br />
independent states emerged at the end of<br />
World War II, when even the <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />
people had begun to oppose the Portuguese<br />
colonial government.<br />
The group of which the accused was<br />
leader existed within the ex-Portuguese<br />
colonial territory. This group maintained<br />
their desire for free state, independent of all<br />
other countries.<br />
The proclamation of self-governance by<br />
groups led by the accused was based on<br />
their conviction to maintain/uphold their<br />
power. According to the existing facts, the<br />
actions of the accused and his followers<br />
show a desire for self-governance and , according<br />
to administrative law, did not recognise<br />
the new legal system.<br />
Because the Indonesian government’s<br />
presence in the ex-Portuguese colonial<br />
territory was not recognised (by Fretilin), all<br />
existing institutions were considered nonexistent,<br />
including the court currently trying<br />
the accused. The present court only came<br />
into existence long after the void of<br />
governance in the ex-Portuguese colony. The<br />
group opposed to integration and led by the<br />
accused already existed (before Indonesian<br />
annexation).<br />
The activities carried out by the accused<br />
began in 1975 and were carried out on a<br />
continual basis. Claims in the list of charges<br />
as to the accused’s actions beginning in 1976<br />
are false.<br />
Thus we conclude that this court has no<br />
authority to try the accused. We request<br />
that the Dili District Court declare itself<br />
without the authority to try the accused in<br />
the trial proposed by the Dili State Public<br />
Prosecutor No. PDM/90 /DILI/01/19<strong>93</strong><br />
based on fact and according to the current<br />
constitution.<br />
I thank you for your attention and<br />
wisdom.<br />
Sudjono<br />
3 February 19<strong>93</strong><br />
Translated by Bibi and Emma for MANIC<br />
(Marrickville Activists <strong>Network</strong> for International<br />
Social Change).<br />
XANANA REKINDLES<br />
EXPECTATION OVER HIS<br />
TRIAL IN DILI<br />
BRILLIANT & EDUCATED<br />
Diario de Noticias 4 February 19<strong>93</strong> By<br />
Oscar Mascarenhas. Translated from<br />
Portuguese. unabridged<br />
(Dili) Xanana Gusmão is not unprovided<br />
for with regards his defence. His lawyer,<br />
Sudjono, made it clear yesterday in the Dili<br />
courtroom that he will fight every legal inch<br />
of the way throughout the proceedings.<br />
The defence strategy is being overseen by<br />
Loebby Loqman, a respected university<br />
professor from Jakarta, specialist in matters<br />
related to the Anti-Subversion Law. Perhaps<br />
for this reason Xanana, in a mood different<br />
from that of the first day, asked that the<br />
journalists “wait until the end of the<br />
proceedings.”<br />
In black, white and grey checkered shirt<br />
with rolled up sleeves, Xanana left the cell<br />
yesterday under a smaller escort. He looked<br />
spiritedly, with head slightly inclined, to the<br />
right and behind, towards the journalists. He<br />
didn’t look right and then left until he<br />
reached the courtroom, to which he had been<br />
summoned by the judge.<br />
With determination he crossed the tiny<br />
lawn, clouds of minute grasshoppers rising
Page 8 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
with each step. It was Xanana who led his<br />
escort.<br />
“You must attend this process until the<br />
end,” he said in English in a good loud voice,<br />
head lowered and left arm raised as if to<br />
wave good-bye. Was he addressing the<br />
international press? Or, not knowing Indonesian<br />
Bahasa, was he sending a message to<br />
the local journalists? The defence lawyer<br />
later told the journalists that the prisoner’s<br />
gesture had not been prearranged.<br />
Xanana entered the courtroom and was<br />
before the judge for 22 minutes. 17 of those<br />
he spent listening to his lawyer’s response<br />
to the public prosecutor’s indictment, which<br />
had been read on Monday. He returned to<br />
his cell, waving his hand when a Portuguese<br />
reporter asked how he was feeling, to await<br />
his reappearance in court the following day.<br />
The judge had ordered two days<br />
adjournment for the prosecutor to reply to<br />
the procedural matter raised by the defence.<br />
Contrary to what we had officially been<br />
informed, there will be a session on Friday.<br />
A little more than a quarter of an hour<br />
was enough for Sudjono to say that the Indonesian<br />
court lacks legitimacy to try<br />
Xanana. It was what could be called an<br />
historic intervention, because Sudjono recalled<br />
the various steps of <strong>Timor</strong>’s international<br />
situation from 1974 onwards, and the<br />
word referendum was included several times<br />
in his speech. Sudjono explained to the<br />
journalists that the stage of having to answer<br />
the prosecutor’s accusations had not yet<br />
been reached. At this time, he opted for<br />
counter-attack, aimed at the court itself. But<br />
Xanana declared himself to be Indonesian at<br />
the outset of the trial when he identified<br />
himself to the judge. Sudjono smiled: “Even<br />
if he says he is Indonesian, this does not<br />
mean that the court has the competence to<br />
try him.” Amused, he revealed a trump card<br />
in his hand - “At the right moment I’ll ask<br />
the prosecutor to prove that Xanana is<br />
Indonesian. I want to see just how he proposes<br />
to do that.”<br />
Might not the lawyer be bringing personal<br />
problems down upon himself by employing<br />
a defence based upon questioning<br />
the legitimacy of Indonesia’s presence in<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>? “Only God knows that,” he replies<br />
jokingly: “I am a fanatical Moslem, I can but<br />
believe in God...” He did not, however,<br />
reveal his own view on the problem of <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>: “I am a professional lawyer and that<br />
question is a political one. It goes beyond<br />
my profession.”<br />
Sudjono receives no remuneration for his<br />
work and even pays the costs of the trial.<br />
And what costs! As well as his own hotel<br />
expenses in Dili for at least two months, he<br />
has to foot the bill for Prof. Loebby<br />
Loqman’s attendance as well as that of the<br />
young lawyers Bhismoko and Iwan Pradana,<br />
his assistants. Pointing to Pradana, Sudjono<br />
laughs and says: “And this one certainly<br />
needs to earn his living because he has a sixmonth-old<br />
son....”<br />
Why did he take on this case? “For humanitarian<br />
reasons,” he replied, striking his<br />
breast. And, as if to say “that’s just the<br />
way I am,” he added “Just lately I had the<br />
joy of saving someone from the hangman’s<br />
noose, in Malaysia.”<br />
For him the primary objective is not to<br />
win or lose the case: “My main motivation<br />
is to fight with the law, as best I can. Success<br />
or failure is of secondary importance.”<br />
He speaks to Xanana in English, and has<br />
already met with him in prison seven times.<br />
He offered him this line of defence and the<br />
prisoner had no objections. But Xanana<br />
speaks poor English. “So do I,” Sudjono<br />
laughs. Someone expressed surprise that<br />
Xanana speaks to quietly, in court. “But he<br />
always speaks quietly!,” retorted Sudjono.<br />
“It is his politeness. He is a brilliant and<br />
well mannered man.” The defence lawyer<br />
appears to be fascinated by Xanana’s personality:<br />
“He’s like an artist. He is particularly<br />
brilliant in the way he thinks and the<br />
way he understands. He seems more an intellectual<br />
than a rebel.”<br />
When they told him that the news had<br />
said that Xanana’s cell had an Indian carpet<br />
and marble washbasin, the lawyer burst into<br />
laughter: “All I said was that he is being well<br />
treated...”<br />
Sudjono’s intervention surprised the international<br />
observers, but was considered<br />
“very good,” by both the presiding judge,<br />
Christian Javanese Hyeronimus Godang,<br />
and the leader of the public prosecutor’s<br />
bench, Moslem Ketut Swara from Bali. An<br />
Australian reporter met with bafflement on<br />
the other end of the line when sending<br />
through his report for editing: “We understand<br />
what you are saying,” they said, “We<br />
just don’t see what it is that the lawyer’s<br />
aiming at.” It is, after all, quite simple: the<br />
Indonesian Moslem lawyer, who has never<br />
seen <strong>Timor</strong>, working with an essentially<br />
Dutch penal code, outlined a strategy just in<br />
the same way a good Portuguese lawyer,<br />
expert in international law, would do.<br />
XANANA’S LAWYER USES<br />
ALATAS’S ARGUMENT<br />
Publico 4 February 19<strong>93</strong> Byline : Adelino<br />
Gomes Translated from Portuguese unabridged<br />
(Dili) A reversal of position, or simply a<br />
procedural incident? Xanana’s lawyer insists<br />
he is just a professional, but his strategy,<br />
yesterday, could have been the first<br />
sign that Jakarta is going to have difficulty<br />
in trying the <strong>Timor</strong>ese ex- leader as a<br />
common criminal.<br />
Only tomorrow will the public prosecutor<br />
reply to the procedural incident raised<br />
by Xanana Gusmão’s defence counsel, lawyer<br />
Sudjono, in his 9-page intervention<br />
which, by questioning the Dili Tribunal’s<br />
competence to try the defendant, represents<br />
the first attempt to shake the logic of the<br />
Indonesian authorities’ juridical construction<br />
of the entire proceedings. The judges will<br />
then spend almost a week studying the<br />
arguments presented by both sides, before<br />
announcing their decision on 11 February.<br />
The defence lawyer upholds his argument<br />
on two main grounds: Fretilin’s fight for<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>’s independence had already started<br />
when Suharto proclaimed the territory<br />
Indonesia’s 17th province, and the guerrillas<br />
never having recognised the Dili Tribunal’s<br />
jurisdiction.<br />
“He must have read the book on the <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> question, distributed a few months<br />
ago by the Indonesian Foreign Ministry,”<br />
commented foreign observers at the end of<br />
the trial’s second hearing. It had lasted just<br />
22 minutes and comprised of Sudjono’s<br />
intervention, the prosecutor’s request for<br />
the hearing to be again suspended, and the<br />
judges’ concession of just one day.<br />
The document on which Sudjono based<br />
his arguments for his first public appearance<br />
in Xanana’s defence, had been specially<br />
prepared for the Non-Aligned Countries’<br />
Summit held in September in Jakarta. It<br />
constituted “the best legal justification for<br />
the occupation, produced by the Indonesians<br />
until now,” thought one press correspondent<br />
based in the Indonesian capital,<br />
impressed by the defence lawyer’s astuteness<br />
in employing the arguments of Ali<br />
Alatas himself against the basis of the<br />
prosecutor’s position.<br />
It should be emphasized here that Sudjono<br />
did not contest the competence of the<br />
Dili Tribunal to try this case. He asked the<br />
court to accept that it does not have the<br />
authority. Or, to repeat the comments made<br />
by an observer to Publico, “He gave the Indonesian<br />
legal system a chance to decide for<br />
itself.”<br />
Xanana’s defence counsel chose, therefore,<br />
“cooperation” rather than<br />
“confrontation,” in contrast to, for example,<br />
the <strong>Timor</strong>ese Fernando Araujo and Francisco<br />
Miranda Branco, when they declared<br />
themselves Portuguese and rejected Indonesia’s<br />
laws and courts, during their trial last<br />
year in Jakarta. They were given heavy<br />
sentences for allegedly encouraging activities<br />
in opposition to the regime, while members<br />
of the resistance. To this end, the lawyer<br />
minimized the effects of Xanana’s<br />
statement, during the first hearing, in which<br />
he identified himself as Indonesian.
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 9<br />
Although a source linked to the proceedings<br />
admitted that “that is an obstacle which the<br />
defence is going to have to remove,” it<br />
would seem that Sudjono is relying on legal<br />
rather than political logic prevailing.<br />
“The crimes of which Xanana is accused<br />
were committed while he was leader of an<br />
organisation which never accepted integration.<br />
The fact that he identified himself as<br />
Indonesian cannot go against him, when it is<br />
his responsibility in acts committed over the<br />
past 17 years, and not today, that is being<br />
investigated,” argues a diplomat who is<br />
following the proceedings in Dili. And, in<br />
this respect, he could be referring to the<br />
lawyer when, yesterday, he said to foreign<br />
reporters here that “there is a right time for<br />
each legal question to be raised.”<br />
Sudjono, who revealed to Publico that he<br />
accepted the case purely for humanitarian<br />
reasons and without any kind of remuneration,<br />
insists that he sees his whole performance<br />
in this trial as being within the<br />
strict limits of a professional relationship.<br />
He says he studied <strong>Timor</strong>’s recent history<br />
only when he became defence lawyer for<br />
Agapito Cardoso last year, and insists on<br />
not revealing any political view on the<br />
subject.<br />
However, this is not stopping him from<br />
scrutinizing every legal hypothesis possible,<br />
even when it would have sensitive political<br />
implications for the Suharto regime. “De<br />
facto, <strong>Timor</strong> belongs to Indonesia. But, de<br />
jure, the international community refuses to<br />
accept integration,” he said during a long<br />
meeting with the foreign press, during which<br />
he agreed to make some small revelations<br />
about his visits to Xanana.<br />
Hope, until we die<br />
Sudjono’s team consists of the university<br />
professor of law, Prof. Loqman, a known<br />
and respected Indonesian critic of the Anti-<br />
Subversion Law. It is practically impossible<br />
for western observers to this trial to imagine<br />
that the Dili Tribunal would recognise its<br />
incompetence to try Xanana. It will,<br />
therefore, be impossible for the defence to<br />
invoke the political nature of the “crimes” of<br />
which his client is accused by the Indonesian<br />
state. But Sudjono suggests he may<br />
have new surprises in store, when he says<br />
that he will bring out Xanana’s testimony<br />
“at the right time.”<br />
By asking the reporters in English yesterdays<br />
to “wait until the end of the trial,”<br />
Xanana must have wanted to indicate that<br />
he has confidence in the lawyers and that<br />
everyone, starting with the <strong>Timor</strong>ese, was<br />
wrong when, seeing Xanana apathetic,<br />
“Indonesian,” and “disturber of the peace,”<br />
at the first hearing, they regarded him as a<br />
warrior who had given up the fight. Good<br />
news for the <strong>Timor</strong>ese, about 200 of whom<br />
gathered again yesterday in the street in<br />
front of the court, in spite of the dissuasive<br />
presence of, this time, groups of Indonesians<br />
in civilian clothing, armed with sticks<br />
measuring about one and a half metres long<br />
and 3 centimetres in diameter.<br />
Indifferent to the danger, some awaited<br />
the reporters to transmit a message of resistance.<br />
“They drugged the old man. We are<br />
very sad because he declared himself Indonesian,”<br />
said two demonstrators quietly, as<br />
the Publico’s correspondent passed by.<br />
“Don’t abandon us. We want independence,<br />
we don’t want integration.”<br />
In the middle of the road, towards the<br />
cathedral, under the violent blaze of the<br />
morning sun, the voice of a middle- aged<br />
woman sounds like a cry of anger: “We will<br />
hope until we die.” Only she knows<br />
whether it was meant for the world, or for<br />
the ears of her own compatriots.<br />
Calendar of the Trial<br />
Day 5 - Prosecutor’s reply to the<br />
procedural incident raised yesterday by<br />
the defence.<br />
Day 11 - Court’s decision on the incident<br />
Days 15 to 25 - Listening to testimonies.<br />
Possible start of Xanana’s testimony.<br />
Days 26 & 27 - Xanana to be questioned.<br />
Days 4 to 10 March - Proceedings continue,<br />
and final statements.<br />
Day 20 or 21 - Sentencing.<br />
RAMOS HORTA<br />
AGREES TO TESTIFY<br />
The following is the text of a letter faxed by<br />
José Ramos Horta in Geneva to Sudjono,<br />
the Indonesian defence lawyer of Xanana<br />
Gusmão, on 11 February 19<strong>93</strong>, in response<br />
to a request that he testify at Xanana’s trial<br />
as a defence witness:<br />
Dear Mr. Sudjono,<br />
I acknowledge receipt of your fax of 9<br />
February 19<strong>93</strong> and thank you for your efforts<br />
in trying to obtain clearance from the<br />
competent authorities to enable me to testify<br />
in Dili as a defence witness.<br />
While I wish to reiterate my interest in<br />
attending the proceedings, let me make the<br />
following points clear from the outset:<br />
1. Indonesia does not have any jurisdiction<br />
in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and therefore the trial of<br />
Xanana Gusmão is illegal under international<br />
law. Xanana has neither<br />
committed a crime under international<br />
law nor under Indonesian law, since <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> is NOT a territory of Indonesia.<br />
2. Indonesia has occupied <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> illegally<br />
since 1975 in breach of provisions<br />
of the United Nations Charter on the<br />
non-use of force in international relations.<br />
This has also been in defiance of two<br />
Security Council and eight General<br />
Assembly resolutions which reaffirm the<br />
right of the people of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> to selfdetermination<br />
and independence, and call<br />
on the government of Indonesia to<br />
withdraw from <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
3. As a direst consequence of the invasion<br />
and occupation of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> by Indonesian<br />
armed forces in 1975, the people<br />
of the territory have not been able to exercise<br />
their inalienable right to self-determination.<br />
Having stated these points, which I<br />
would ask you to read to the court, I remain<br />
ready to travel to my homeland, <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>,<br />
at short notice. There, together with Xanana<br />
Gusmão and my... [one line left out in the<br />
copy we have]... help, you will prove<br />
beyond doubt that Xanana Gusmão and all<br />
our compatriots, who have been fighting for<br />
self-determination, independence and freedom,<br />
have not violated any laws of any<br />
country. We will prove that they should<br />
therefore be set free and Indonesia should<br />
begin its disengagement from <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
and work for a true resolution of this conflict<br />
for the future of peace and prosperity<br />
of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and the Indonesian people.<br />
This would be in line with the true spirit of<br />
understanding which should prevail amongst<br />
our regional family and which we ardently<br />
desire.<br />
I remain in Geneva until 14 March, attending<br />
the UN Commission on Human<br />
Rights where, for your information, <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> has been the most talked about issue.<br />
Yours sincerely,<br />
José RAMOS HORTA<br />
XANANA INDIFFERENT TO RAMOS<br />
HORTA OFFER<br />
Publico, From the Portuguese unabridged<br />
(Lisbon) The announcement that the<br />
representative abroad of the Maubere Resistance<br />
National Council (CNRM), Mr.<br />
Ramos Horta, could be a witness in Xanana<br />
Gusmão’s trial was received yesterday with<br />
indifference by the latter. According to the<br />
defence lawyer, S.H. Sudjono, who passed<br />
the information on, Xanana just said “I myself<br />
am my best witness.”<br />
The reaction of the <strong>Timor</strong>ese armed resistance’s<br />
former leader surprised Sudjono<br />
who, in a letter to which Lusa’s special envoy<br />
to Dili had access, thanked Ramos<br />
Horta’s offer to travel to <strong>Timor</strong>’s capital in<br />
order to testify at the trial.<br />
The CNRM’s representative, currently<br />
in Geneva for the UN Human Rights<br />
Commission, offered to testify as “enemy<br />
number one abroad” of the Jakarta regime,
Page 10 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
and was prepared to go to Dili with a group<br />
of celebrities and reporters, in order to<br />
“transform the court into an international<br />
forum for the defence of the Maubere people.”<br />
As well as expressing appreciation for<br />
the offer to stand as witness, Mr. Sudjono<br />
pointed out in his reply to Ramos Horta<br />
that entering the territory would be<br />
“difficult” for him, but promised to make<br />
every effort to ensure his presence in the<br />
Dili court.<br />
Forced to Testify<br />
Those giving evidence for the prosecution<br />
against Xanana Gusmão will probably start<br />
being called next Monday. This information<br />
was given to Lusa by an unidentified<br />
“<strong>Timor</strong>ese source,” according to which most<br />
of the witnesses were arrested after<br />
Xanana’s capture and, under torture, forced<br />
to agree to give evidence.<br />
According to the same source, the deponents<br />
for the prosecution were even made to<br />
swear loyalty to Suharto and given instructions<br />
by the Indonesian authorities<br />
with regards the content of their testimony<br />
before the court trying the <strong>Timor</strong>ese former<br />
leader.<br />
INDONESIAN UN MISSION<br />
CHIEF MEETS XANANA<br />
Jawa Pos, 13 February 19<strong>93</strong>.Abridged.<br />
Comment: This is an important item about a<br />
visit to Dili of Nugroho Wisnumurti, head of<br />
Indonesia’s mission to the UN in New York.<br />
Much of what happened in Nugroho’s<br />
discussions in Dili is left unsaid but the<br />
impression is that the visit was part of the<br />
preparation for Indonesia’s strategy being<br />
planned for the meeting in Rome on 20 April<br />
between Indonesia and Portugal.<br />
There are reports circulating in Jakarta that<br />
Indonesia intends to take Xanana to Rome,<br />
although how they think they can pull this off<br />
is difficult to imagine.<br />
Also, we have seen reports in the Portuguese<br />
press that Bishop Belo is likely to be in Rome<br />
at the time of the talks in order to play a<br />
part. Several newspapers have given<br />
credence to this story while others like<br />
Publico, usually up front with reporting<br />
about <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, have treated the report<br />
with a considerable amount of skepticism.<br />
– TAPOL<br />
Although he did not carry out his plan to<br />
attend a session of the Xanana Gusmão trial<br />
now under way in Dili, Indonesia ‘s head of<br />
UN mission in New York, Nugroho<br />
Wisnumurti had the opportunity of having a<br />
private meeting with the Fretilin leader at<br />
the police detention centre.<br />
Nugroho told Jawa Pos that he had held a<br />
frank discussion with Xanana who had made<br />
it clear that he is ready to help the<br />
Indonesian government on the question of<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> at the UN.<br />
During a 90-minute meeting with Xanana<br />
- which Nugroho admitted was somewhat<br />
hampered by language because Xanana does<br />
not speak English well - Xanana had spoken<br />
very frankly and openly. Nugroho hoped<br />
that this was a sign of goodwill on Xanana’s<br />
part and was not a manoeuvre to promote<br />
his own interests.<br />
Asked what he discussed with Xanana,<br />
Nugroho said that they had discussed a<br />
number of things but “my main purpose<br />
was to get to know him in connection with<br />
my work at the UN, so as to provide information<br />
to the international community, via<br />
the UN, about <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.”<br />
Asked how Xanana had responded,<br />
Nugroho said: “Very well indeed. He spoke<br />
very openly and said he would like to help<br />
the Indonesian government reach a solution<br />
to the question of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> at the UN. I<br />
am sorry I cannot say more than this because<br />
many of the things we discussed were<br />
matters of substance.”<br />
Nugroho also said that the conversation<br />
with Xanana had convinced him that what<br />
Xanana had said on Indonesian TV was indeed<br />
true. “Portugal’s assessment that the<br />
various statements made recently by<br />
Xanana were made under duress from the<br />
Indonesian government is quite wrong.”<br />
Asked whether he had discussed the trial<br />
with Xanana, Nugroho said that Xanana told<br />
him he would speak in court about his<br />
position.<br />
During the visit to Dili, Nugroho also<br />
held a lengthy discussion with the military<br />
commander, Brig.Gen. Theo Syafei [who, as<br />
reg.easttimor readers will recall, recently<br />
called for the talks between Indonesia and<br />
Portugal to be halted] as well as having a<br />
meeting Bishop Belo.<br />
FOUR WITNESSES HEARD AT<br />
XANANA TRIAL ON FEB. 15<br />
According to an AFP report filed from<br />
Dili, four witnesses were heard today, 15<br />
February, at the Xanana Gusmão trial which<br />
opened on 1 February. Three were members<br />
of the armed forces and the fourth was an<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese member of the police, Agusto<br />
Pereira, in whose house Xanana Gusmão<br />
was taking refuge when he was captured on<br />
20 November last.<br />
First to testify was Private João Jesus<br />
Costa, member of the special force which<br />
captured Xanana, who told the court he<br />
found a Minimi rifle and an FN-45 pistol in<br />
Xanana’s room. He said the weapons belong<br />
to the armed forces; this was corroborated<br />
by a statement from ABRI’s Support Arms<br />
department.<br />
Agusto Pereira confirmed that the two<br />
weapons were Xanana’s.<br />
According to a written statement, army<br />
commander Brig.Gen. Theo Syafei, told the<br />
court the army lost several [sic] weapons<br />
from 1975 to 1989 during engagements with<br />
Fretilin units.<br />
Two other witnesses, Captain Kadio and<br />
police chief Sergeant Made Maja, told the<br />
court they were guarding the Dili TV station<br />
in 1980 when it was attacked by about 100<br />
Fretilin members, killing two policemen and<br />
wounding several others. The attackers were<br />
driven back with the help of security forces<br />
from nearby posts and 15 people were<br />
arrested.<br />
The trial was adjourned till tomorrow,<br />
Tuesday.<br />
XANANA’S LAWYER UNDER<br />
PRESSURE<br />
Publico, Lisbon 16 February 19<strong>93</strong><br />
Remark: Portuguese journalists who were in<br />
Dili last week for Xanana’s trial reported<br />
that his lawyer, Sudjono, was having greater<br />
difficulty communicating with his client who<br />
had become far less talkative than before.<br />
This change seems to have occurred after<br />
Xanana called out to journalists on the<br />
second day of his trial, asking them to follow<br />
the proceedings to the end.<br />
Sudjono last week contacted José Ramos-<br />
Horta inviting him to testify as a defence<br />
witness at the trial of Xanana. We hope to<br />
publish more details about this shortly.<br />
SUDJONO NOT CONTACTABLE<br />
– CDPM<br />
XANANA’S LAWYER MOVES TO A<br />
HOTEL WITH NO TELEPHONE<br />
The Indonesian defence lawyer of<br />
Xanana Gusmão cannot be contacted. Sudjono<br />
suddenly moved from the hotel where<br />
he was staying in Dili and transferred to a<br />
tiny hotel without a telephone, in Liquica,<br />
outside the capital, Dili.<br />
Contacted by the agency LUSA, the<br />
Hotel Mahkota receptionist in Dili said that<br />
Sudjono checked out of the hotel last<br />
Thursday, the day the Portuguese journalists<br />
left Dili.<br />
According to sources close to the trial,<br />
Sudjono’s move to a hotel in Liquica, which<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese refugees in Lisbon say is nothing<br />
more than a restaurant with a couple of<br />
rooms, coincides with an intensification of<br />
pressure from Jakarta on Xanana’s lawyer.<br />
After last Thursday’s court hearing just<br />
before leaving Dili, the Portuguese journal-
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 11<br />
ists made arrangements with Sudjono to<br />
stay in contact with him. He expressed a<br />
willingness to do so, as he has done up to<br />
now, saying nothing about any intention to<br />
move to a hotel without a telephone.<br />
GUSMÃO ADMITS ‘DEATH’<br />
EVIDENCE<br />
The Melbourne Age, 16 February <strong>93</strong> By<br />
Lindsay Murdoch, Southeast Asia Correspondent,<br />
Full text<br />
The <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> guerrilla leader, Mr. José<br />
“Xanana” Gusmão, today admitted evidence<br />
that could make him liable to a death<br />
sentence under Indonesian law.<br />
Indonesian prosecutors said Mr. Gusmão<br />
was in possession of a high-powered automatic<br />
rifle and pistol when he was arrested<br />
in Dili, the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese capital, on<br />
20November last year.<br />
When asked in court whether evidence<br />
about the weapons was correct, Mr.<br />
Gusmão replied in Portuguese: “Right.”<br />
Under a 1951 Indonesian law the offence<br />
carries a maximum penalty of death.<br />
The evidence by an arresting soldier, Indonesian<br />
special forces Private João Jesus<br />
Costa, was the first for the prosecution at<br />
the trial which opened today after preliminary<br />
hearings.<br />
Mr. Gusmão has pleaded not guilty to<br />
rebellion, conspiracy and the weapons<br />
charges.<br />
Diplomats observing the trial had<br />
speculated that Indonesia did not intend to<br />
execute Mr. Gusmão, since the rebellion<br />
charges he faces come under the country’s<br />
criminal law and not harsher subversion<br />
laws.<br />
The policeman owner of a house in which<br />
Mr. Gusmão was arrested, Mr. Agusto<br />
Pereira, told the court that Mr. Gusmão<br />
confided in him that he felt “responsible”<br />
for the violence in Dili in November 1991<br />
when Indonesian soldiers opened fire on<br />
pro-independence demonstrators, killing and<br />
wounding scores of people.<br />
When Mr. Pereira finished giving his<br />
evidence Mr. Gusmão said through an interpreter<br />
that he knew the witness well and<br />
agreed with what he had said.<br />
Mr. Gusmão, 45, the leader of the<br />
Fretilin guerrilla group fighting to end<br />
Indonesian rule of the former Portuguese<br />
territory, complained to his counsel during<br />
today’s three-hour hearing about what he<br />
described as aggressive questioning of witnesses<br />
by one of three judges hearing the<br />
case.<br />
His chief counsel, Mr. Sudjono, said Mr.<br />
Gusmão was in good health. He was being<br />
treated well at a jail in Dili where he spent<br />
much of his time playing dominoes with a<br />
guard.<br />
Mr. Sudjono said after the hearing he<br />
would appeal against a decision of the court<br />
last week to refuse his application challenging<br />
its right to hear the case as Fretilin had<br />
been fighting against Indonesian rule since<br />
1975.<br />
The appeal will be heard by the<br />
Indonesian High Court sitting in West<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
Mr. Gusmão’s lawyers appeared to be<br />
basing their case on the jurisdiction issue,<br />
challenging a prosecution claim that <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese were willing to integrate with<br />
Indonesia in 1975.<br />
Asked about Mr. Gusmão’s admission<br />
on the weapons Mr. Sudjono said: “I have<br />
an idea Xanana had the guns long before<br />
1975.”<br />
In dismissing the jurisdiction issue last<br />
week the judges noted that Mr. Gusmão had<br />
admitted in court that he was an Indonesian<br />
national and his profession was the leader of<br />
the “security disturbance movement.”<br />
Mr. Pereira, a <strong>Timor</strong>ese, told the court he<br />
was a distant relative by marriage to Mr.<br />
Gusmão whom he had known since 1981.<br />
He said he first “picked up” Mr. Gusmão<br />
in 1981 after receiving a message from Mr.<br />
Constâncio Pinto, the main organiser of the<br />
demonstration in 1991 that turned into the<br />
Dili massacre.<br />
Mr. Pinto, a central and controversial<br />
figure in the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> resistance movement,<br />
is now believed to be in Lisbon,<br />
Portugal. Mr. Pereira said Mr. Gusmão<br />
asked him last year to build a secret bunker<br />
behind a cupboard in his house.<br />
He said Mr. Gusmão paid for the bunker<br />
and had lived there for some time before his<br />
arrest.<br />
Private Costa said he went to the house<br />
with 21 other soldiers at 6am on 20<br />
November, 1992, after earlier arresting an<br />
informant. He said he found Mr. Gusmão<br />
hiding in the bunker and confronted him<br />
with a gun.<br />
Mr. Gusmão put his hands in the air and<br />
surrendered without a struggle.<br />
The weapons in Mr. Gusmão’s possession<br />
had been issued by the Indonesian<br />
military, the court was told.<br />
A prosecutor read to the court a statement<br />
from the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> military command<br />
detailing the loss of weapons from<br />
military compounds between 1979 and<br />
1984.<br />
Two Dili policemen testified that Fretilin<br />
guerrillas attacked the television station in<br />
Dili in 1980. Two officers were killed and<br />
several other people wounded in the attack.<br />
Asked about the evidence Mr. Gusmão<br />
said he was not there at the time.<br />
XANANA CONFOUNDS HIS<br />
LAWYER<br />
The Age 17 Feb. 19<strong>93</strong>.By Lindsay Murdoch,<br />
Southeast Asia Correspondent. Slightly<br />
abridged. Some well known facts omitted.<br />
(Dili, Monday) <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese resistance<br />
leader Mr. José “Xanana” Gusmão today<br />
accepted responsibility for the killing of<br />
Indonesians by his guerrillas as his lawyer<br />
said his case was virtually lost.<br />
The lawyer, Mr. Sudjono, told diplomats<br />
he would consider his representation a success<br />
if Mr. Gusmão escaped execution and<br />
received life imprisonment on the charges he<br />
faces [...]<br />
During the second day of prosecution<br />
evidence, Mr. Sudjono pleaded with Mr.<br />
Gusmão not to admit responsibility for<br />
[the] alleged attacks, but he refused.<br />
“I shook him and said, ‘Do you understand<br />
the process... do you understand?”<br />
Mr. Sudjono said later. “But Xanana said<br />
yes he understood.”<br />
Mr. Sudjono said he was certain Mr.<br />
Gusmão had a strategy. “But I don’t know<br />
what it is,” he said.<br />
“This is a big question for me... why he<br />
is confessing. I think he is very clever.<br />
Maybe when the moment is right he will<br />
take action.”<br />
Mr. Sudjono said he considered an appeal<br />
he intended to make to the High Court<br />
challenging the right of the Dili court to hear<br />
the charges had little, if any, chance of<br />
success. Appeals to Indonesia’s High Court<br />
[sic - should be High Courts] are rarely<br />
successful.<br />
[...]Speaking outside the court, Mr.<br />
Sudjono shrugged his shoulders and said:<br />
“What can I do? I will try to talk with my<br />
client tomorrow. Maybe we can talk about a<br />
global strategy and a narrow strategy.”<br />
Mr. Gusmão’s frank and solemn admissions<br />
today surprised court observers.<br />
Asked about evidence that Fretilin had<br />
carried out attacks including the burning of<br />
houses and the killing of soldiers in 1982,<br />
Mr. Gusmão told the court: “I don’t want<br />
to tell the story in detail but I admit that I<br />
have responsibility for these incidents.”<br />
Since three Indonesian judges started to<br />
hear evidence yesterday, Mr. Gusmão has<br />
spent much of the time in his cell writing<br />
notes.<br />
Mr. Sudjono said Mr. Gusmão asked him<br />
to get the trial over with as soon as possible.<br />
He has refused to see members of his<br />
family, who are watching the proceedings at<br />
the back of the court.<br />
Mr. Gusmão, 45, told Mr. Sudjono:<br />
“Please don’t involve my family in the case.<br />
I do not want to see them.”
Page 12 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
Although Mr. Gusmão has pleaded not<br />
guilty to the charges he appears unwilling to<br />
challenge the prosecution case.[...]<br />
Witnesses today told the court of numerous<br />
Fretilin attacks between 1979 and last<br />
year.<br />
A provincial civil servant, Mr. Martinho<br />
Fernandez, 46, told the court Fretilin<br />
guerrillas attacked and killed 14 Indonesian<br />
soldiers in Viqueque district in 1982. The<br />
soldiers were tortured and had their penises<br />
cut off, he said.<br />
Mr. Fernandez, who went to a<br />
Portuguese school in Dili with Mr. Gusmão<br />
but split with him in 1975, testified that<br />
Fretilin burnt 300 houses in Viqueque between<br />
1982 and 1983, forcing 1000 villagers<br />
to live in the jungle.<br />
Witnesses told the court about an attack<br />
on an Indonesian soldier who was drinking<br />
in a cafe on in the coastal town of Baucau in<br />
October last year. The man died after being<br />
shot nine times.<br />
Asked about the attack, Mr. Gusmão<br />
said: “I agree with the witnesses’ statement.<br />
It was done by my men.”<br />
A teacher, Mr. Islamat Widodo, 46, told<br />
the court Fretilin killed his 12 year old<br />
daughter at Baucau in 1990. He said he was<br />
later told by the military his daughter’s<br />
killer was a Fretilin member, David Alex.<br />
Asked about the attack, Mr. Gusmão<br />
said he neither denied nor agreed with the<br />
evidence. But he said: “It is true David Alex<br />
is one of my men.”<br />
During the court’s sitting hours Mr.<br />
Gusmão appears disinterested in Mr.<br />
Sudjono’s handling of the case.<br />
AUSTRALIAN CASH SENT TO<br />
FRETILIN: WITNESS<br />
Age (Melbourne, Australia) February 18,<br />
19<strong>93</strong>. By Lindsay Murdoch, SE Asian<br />
correspondent, Dili, Wednesday<br />
[unabridged]<br />
A prosecution witness in the trial of <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> resistance leader, Mr. José ‘Xanana’<br />
Gusmão has alleged that his Fretilin fighters<br />
received money from supporters in<br />
Australia. Mr. Oscar Lima, an <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
businessman, has told Indonesian prosecutors<br />
that money was regularly passed to<br />
Fretilin representatives by Australians<br />
posing as tourists in Kupang, West <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
Mr. Lima is listed to give evidence at the<br />
trial of Mr. Gusmão on charges of rebellion,<br />
conspiracy and possession of illegal<br />
weapons. Mr. Gusmão, who has pleaded<br />
not guilty, faces a possible death sentence.<br />
Court sources say that prosecutors had evidence<br />
from Mr. Lima and other witnesses<br />
that money from sources in Australia was<br />
used in part to buy weapons and ammunition<br />
for Fretilin, which has been waging a<br />
guerrilla campaign against Indonesia’s rule<br />
since 1975. Some weapons were supplied<br />
by arms dealers in Java, according to evidence<br />
said to have been gathered by prosecutors.<br />
Mr. Gusmão admitted in court on<br />
Monday that he had an automatic rifle and<br />
pistol when arrested in a Dili policeman’s<br />
house last November. The weapons had<br />
been originally issued to the Indonesian<br />
army, the court heard. It will be up to<br />
prosecutors to decide whether to introduce<br />
evidence about Fretilin funding into Mr.<br />
Gusmão’s trial.<br />
Mr. Gusmão’s chief counsel, Mr.<br />
Sudjono, was expected to meet Mr. Gusmão<br />
in his cell in Dili tonight in an attempt to<br />
stop him confessing to allegations being<br />
presented during the trial which began<br />
hearing evidence on Monday. Mr. Sudjono<br />
said today that Mr. Gusmão felt that as<br />
Fretilin’s supreme commander he accepted<br />
responsibility for the actions of his men.<br />
The trial allegations include claims that<br />
Fretilin attacked & killed Indonesian soldiers<br />
and burnt villagers to force people into the<br />
jungle. Mr. Sudjono said he had asked<br />
prosecutors at a meeting this morning to<br />
help him find defence witnesses but had<br />
been told that this was not possible. Mr.<br />
Sudjono said Mr. Gusmão became angry<br />
earlier this week when one of the three trial<br />
judges pressed a <strong>Timor</strong>ese witness for<br />
answers. “Xanana said he was on trial, not<br />
anybody else,” Mr. Sudjono said.<br />
Mr. Sudjono said that he had refused a<br />
request by Fretilin’s international representative,<br />
Mr. José Ramos Horta, who lives in<br />
Australia, to appear as a witness. The trial<br />
will resume tomorrow.<br />
FORMER REBEL NOW<br />
“INDONESIAN CITIZEN”<br />
The Age (Melbourne), February 19, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
By Lindsay Murdoch<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> guerrilla leader, Mr. José<br />
“Xanana” Gusmão, today nodded in agreement<br />
when one of his former platoon commanders<br />
described himself as an Indonesian<br />
citizen.<br />
Mr. Antonio Sadres Da Silva, 33, alias<br />
Maukalo, told Mr. Gusmão’s trial in Dili<br />
that until 1991, when he was captured by<br />
Indonesian forces, he considered his nationality<br />
to be Portuguese.<br />
“I am now Indonesian,” he said as Mr.<br />
Gusmão nodded and smiled.<br />
Later, when the court adjourned, Mr.<br />
Gusmão said he was “sorry” when asked by<br />
reporters if he had a message for the world.<br />
Mr. Gusmão, leader of the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
resistance group, Fretilin, has pleaded not<br />
guilty to charges of rebellion, conspiracy<br />
and possessing illegal weapons. He faces<br />
possible execution. Fretilin has been fighting<br />
Indonesia’s rule of the former Portuguese<br />
territory since 1975.<br />
In an earlier hearing, Mr. Gusmão, 45,<br />
described himself as “Indonesian,” something<br />
Fretilin supporters overseas used to<br />
claim he had been tortured.<br />
Mr. Da Silva testified that between 1975<br />
and 1991 he was involved in 17 attacks<br />
against the Indonesian military and villages,<br />
including the massacre in 1988 of 14 soldiers<br />
who were found with their penises cut off.<br />
He said he was following the orders of<br />
his superiors.<br />
Mr. Da Silva, who is not under arrest,<br />
said he attacked some villages “to show<br />
people in the cities that FALINTIL<br />
(Fretilin’s armed wing) is still active.”<br />
Mr. Da Silva testified that he had never<br />
received a direct order from Mr. Gusmão<br />
although he had heard him outline the aims<br />
of the group’s armed struggle.<br />
An <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> businessman, Mr. Oscar<br />
Lima, 40, told the court that several years<br />
ago, he passed a message to Mr. Gusmão<br />
that a Catholic priest in Dili, Father Mario<br />
Belo, wanted to give $500 to the Fretilin<br />
leader.<br />
An earlier hearing was told that another<br />
Catholic priest had sent a message to a<br />
Fretilin supporter to pick up Mr. Gusmão<br />
on one occasion.<br />
Mr. Lima said he was a former Fretilin<br />
commander but left the group because it was<br />
dissatisfied with his service. Mr. Lima is not<br />
under arrest.<br />
Prosecutors did not introduce into evidence<br />
claims made by Mr. Lima in statements<br />
to police that Australian tourists in<br />
West <strong>Timor</strong> regularly passed money to<br />
Fretilin representatives.<br />
The trial will resume next Monday.<br />
XANANA: A LEADER WHO<br />
DOES NOT APPEAR BEAT EN<br />
Sydney Morning Herald 20th February 19<strong>93</strong><br />
Byline: Lindsay Murdoch Dateline: Dili.<br />
Unabridged<br />
(In Dili the population clings to a faint<br />
hope of independence for <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, as<br />
Herald correspondent Lindsay Murdoch reports.)<br />
Xanana Gusmão is remarkably co-operative<br />
for somebody facing the possibility<br />
of execution.<br />
No crime, it seems, is too grave for him<br />
to admit responsibility, including mass<br />
murder.<br />
But the leader of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>’s resistance<br />
movement does not appear beaten.
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 13<br />
He looks his accusers dead straight in the<br />
eye, as if unrepentant, perhaps even a touch<br />
arrogant. The paradox of Xanana’s trial on<br />
rebellion and other charges, which began in<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> this week, is that a massive legal<br />
case prepared against him by Indonesia<br />
serves to prove him by Indonesia serves to<br />
prove what Xanana himself apparently<br />
want the world to know: he, and nobody<br />
else, has led the guerilla campaign against<br />
Indonesia’s rule since 1979.<br />
José Alexandre Gusmão, better known as<br />
Xanana, is tall and lean with a wispy,<br />
greying beard. When the court heard witnesses<br />
tell this week of gruesome acts<br />
committed by his men, Xanana showed no<br />
emotion and sat staring nonchalantly at the<br />
ceiling.<br />
Xanana, 45, is an enigma. Wily and resourceful,<br />
as he has shown to Indonesia’s<br />
cost in the past, he will remain a key player<br />
in the future of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> no matte what<br />
the trial’s outcome.<br />
Maybe he has a surprise up his sleeve.<br />
It is easy to be seduced by the charm of<br />
Dili, capital of the 18,900 square-kilometer<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> at the south-eastern extremity of<br />
the sprawling Indonesian archipelago.<br />
Young children splash gaily on white,<br />
sandy beaches, Hawkers walk the eucalyptus-lined<br />
streets selling fresh fish tied to a<br />
pole. Give him a day or two and old John,<br />
the waiter at the beachfront Turismo Hotel,<br />
will arrange a delightful Portuguese meal,<br />
complete with chilled rose.<br />
But sullen faces of the dark-skinned and<br />
lightly-built <strong>Timor</strong>ese reveal a population in<br />
deep mourning, clinging to the faint hope of<br />
some sort of independence.<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> has been a dirty little war. It<br />
still is in some ways, although the number<br />
of Xanana’s guerrillas in the jungle has<br />
dwindled and the nature of the struggle has<br />
changed.<br />
A large number of <strong>Timor</strong>ese do not accept<br />
Indonesia’s 1976 annexation of the<br />
former Portuguese colony, according to<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese quoted this week by Catholic<br />
priests.<br />
The head of the Roman Catholic church<br />
in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, Bishop Carlos Ximenes Belo,<br />
says history shows <strong>Timor</strong>ese people to be<br />
brave. “But now they are closed in their<br />
hearts. There is this pressure. Yeah, the<br />
word is sad. They are sad because of the<br />
situation... there is no change in the history<br />
of the repression,” he says.<br />
According to the <strong>Timor</strong>ese, military and<br />
police agents are everywhere, listening to<br />
conversations, watching people and creating<br />
an environment in which people perceive it<br />
dangerous to be seen talking to foreigners or<br />
to gather in small groups.<br />
“People are afraid to walk freely,”<br />
Bishop Belo said. “Everywhere there are<br />
military from the territorial operation. They<br />
are building houses and going to live in<br />
villages. The people do not feel free.”<br />
Dark, wet-season clouds hide peaks of<br />
mountains where in 1942 the <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />
helped Australian commandos resist advancing<br />
Japanese forces; and Xanana’s<br />
Frente Revolutionaria de <strong>Timor</strong>-Leste<br />
Independente (Fretilin) still plays cat-andmouse<br />
with up to 12 Indonesian military<br />
battalions.<br />
Dili’s Santa Cruz Cemetery is cluttered<br />
with graves up to a century old. People<br />
come silently and often to mourn dozens of<br />
independence supporters killed when<br />
Indonesian soldiers opened fire there in<br />
November 1991. They light candles and<br />
spread flower petals on an unmarked grave<br />
with a large iron cross.<br />
The Catholic Motael Church facing the<br />
sea, has been a haven for student activists<br />
wanted by the police or the military. Its<br />
mass is always packed to overflowing. Some<br />
of the people wear black armbands or black<br />
cloth pinned to their chests. A young man,<br />
about 20, wants to talk. Shaking with<br />
nerves, he says to call him “Materuin.”<br />
“I am not Fretilin. I represent many<br />
young people of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>,” he says. “Our<br />
fight is not with the Indonesian constitution.<br />
We have no quarrel with it. Our fight is for<br />
some independence.”<br />
Materuin has rehearsed his speech well.<br />
Xanana, the freedom fighter, has a strategy.<br />
Wait and see. The <strong>Timor</strong>ese know Xanana is<br />
under pressure. The struggle goes on.<br />
I find Bishop Belo pacing the balcony of<br />
his re-roofed colonial house, engrossed in<br />
the Bible. He is deeply disturbed about reports<br />
he has received from villages about<br />
bizarre ceremonies during which <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />
are forced by Indonesian soldiers to drink<br />
animal blood.<br />
People named on military lists as Fretilin<br />
sympathisers are gathered together,<br />
sometimes as many as 200 at a time. The<br />
blood of a chicken, cow or goat is mixed<br />
with wine or whisky. People are forced to<br />
drink it and make a note declaring their acceptance<br />
of Indonesia’s integration.<br />
Bishop Belo says the oath is an untrue<br />
version of a traditional pact taken by<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese leaders to end tribal wars. Rival<br />
leaders would mix their blood with palm<br />
wine and drink it in an oath to mark the end<br />
of hostilities.<br />
Since the 1991 Santa Crux massacre,<br />
Indonesia’s <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> military commander,<br />
Brigadier General Theo Syafei, has<br />
implemented a hardline campaign designed<br />
to break the will of the resistance while<br />
pushing ahead with the development of<br />
roads, bridges and other infrastructure.<br />
The military claims in propaganda that<br />
the crackdown has worked. It says virtually<br />
all of Fretilin’s able fighters have surrendered.<br />
The United Nations does not recognise<br />
Indonesia’s sovereignty of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. A<br />
vote on the question has been postponed<br />
each year since 1982 to give Indonesia and<br />
Portugal the chance to solve the issue under<br />
the auspices of the UN Secretary-General.<br />
Talks between the two countries are due to<br />
resume in April.<br />
The overriding consideration for Jakarta<br />
in any change of policy on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, according<br />
to diplomats, would be not to create<br />
an impression that the Government would<br />
tolerate disintegration of any part of<br />
Indonesia.<br />
Renewed international pressure would be<br />
put on Jakarta if Xanana were sentenced to<br />
death. Australia, which recognises<br />
Indonesia’s annexation of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>,<br />
would be among the countries forced by<br />
popular opinion at home to protest against<br />
an execution.<br />
Remark: This is a report filed from Dili - ET<br />
by RM, who is now in Dili to file report for<br />
The Age and Sydney Morning Herald about<br />
the progress of Indonesian illegal trial of<br />
Xanana Gusmão. The interesting points to<br />
note here are 1. that the Bishop of ET, Don<br />
Carlos Ximenes Belo, is becoming<br />
outspoken on the political situation inside the<br />
country; 2. that Xanana Gusmão shows no<br />
sign of being beaten; 3. that the young<br />
people are trying to let the journalists know<br />
what is going on beyond the farce of peace<br />
and development; and, the feeling of the ET<br />
people about this of the Indonesian military<br />
manipulation of this fake trial.<br />
COMMENT FROM AGIO PEREIRA<br />
Since the capture of Xanana Gusmão, the<br />
Catholic Church of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> has been<br />
forced to fill the gap of speaking against the<br />
Indonesian occupation of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. The<br />
Bishop of ET, Carlos Ximenes Belo, is<br />
trying his best to do that. Bishop Belo, too,<br />
must watch his back, because he is only<br />
Bishop of Lorium and the Pope is not necessarily<br />
his best supporter when it comes to<br />
open criticism of the abuse of Human Rights<br />
and the illegal occupation of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
This seems to be the reason why Bishop<br />
Belo adopted a pragmatic approach when he<br />
needs to tackle the political angle of the<br />
issue of the Indonesian illegal occupation of<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. His suggestion made two weeks<br />
ago to a journalist that an ‘autonomy’ would<br />
be a good way out, must be seen in this<br />
context. Bishop Belo said that after<br />
reiterating that the situation has indeed<br />
deteriorated since the capture of Xanana<br />
Gusmão. He said that arrests, imprisonments<br />
and torture of the <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />
people by the Indonesian military have de-
Page 14 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
teriorated. The Indonesian generals are<br />
trying to ‘hook’ him into the political debate<br />
so that he can be forced to leave <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
like they succeeded with Belo’s<br />
predecessor, the late courageous Mgr.<br />
Lopes.<br />
The territorial operation: weakness or<br />
strength?<br />
Bishop Belo talks about the ‘territorial<br />
operation’ now being carried out in ET by<br />
the Indonesian military. This is aimed at<br />
what brig. gen. Theo Syafei also refers to as<br />
the operation to turn all villages of ET into<br />
‘merdeka’ - the red and white flag or<br />
Indonesianisation of ET. And, this is to be<br />
accomplish with the ‘help’ of 12 battalions<br />
of Indonesian troops.<br />
Over the 17 years of occupation, the<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese have been forced to endure the<br />
consequences of about a dozen operations<br />
beginning with ‘Operasi Komodo’ of 1974.<br />
So, this is just another one. If anything, the<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese are already more than prepared to<br />
deal with this situation.<br />
One new element introduced by Theo<br />
Syafei is the infamous manipulation of the<br />
‘blood oath’ also refers to in this article of<br />
Lindsay Murdoch. LM quotes Bishop Belo<br />
as saying that “the oath is an UNTRUE<br />
version of a traditional pact taken by<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese leaders to end tribal wars. Rival<br />
leaders would mix their blood with palm<br />
wine and drink it in an oath to mark the end<br />
of hostilities.” The Bishop is quite right.<br />
What he does not say though, is that, the<br />
reason why it is “an untrue version of a<br />
traditional pact” is precisely because these<br />
‘blood oath’ which have been reported, are<br />
celebrated between the <strong>Timor</strong>ese themselves,<br />
NOT between the <strong>Timor</strong>ese and the<br />
Indonesian generals! I should let you use<br />
your own imagination...<br />
FRETILIN ‘GOT AID<br />
FROM AUSTRALIA’<br />
The Age 23 Feb. 19<strong>93</strong> Byline: Lindsay<br />
Murdoch Dateline: Dili Unabridged<br />
The <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> resistance group,<br />
Fretilin, sent secret requests for arms to<br />
supporters in Australia, a court in Dili was<br />
told today.<br />
Mr. Antonio Campos, a former Fretilin<br />
radio operator, said Mr. José “Xanana”<br />
Gusmão, that before he was arrested in<br />
1987, he was frequently in contact with<br />
Australia via radio, passing information such<br />
as Fretilin operations and the “beating of<br />
people by Indonesian troops.”<br />
One of three judges hearing charges<br />
against Mr. Gusmão interrupted and asked a<br />
non-related question when Mr. Campos<br />
mentioned the beatings.<br />
Later, Mr. Campos was asked by another<br />
judge if he had seen Fretilin guerrillas kill<br />
villagers in a “cruel and sadistic way.”<br />
“Yes,” he replied. “Who would those<br />
people have been?” - “Spies.”<br />
Mr. Campos said he knew of orders from<br />
Mr. Gusmão to burn the houses of certain<br />
villagers who were “unsympathetic” to the<br />
Fretilin cause. Mr. Campos said Mr.<br />
Gusmão had ordered the death penalty for<br />
any Fretilin member who raped villagers. He<br />
had never heard of the sentence being carried<br />
out.<br />
Mr. Gusmão, 45, has pleaded not guilty<br />
to charges of rebellion, conspiracy and possessing<br />
illegal weapons. He faces possible<br />
execution.<br />
Indonesian prosecutors have alleged that<br />
Mr. Gusmão set up a secret communication<br />
network between Dili and groups overseas,<br />
including some in Australia.<br />
Among people named as having been in<br />
contact with Mr. Gusmão through the network<br />
are Fretilin’s Australian-based representative,<br />
Mr. José Ramos-Horta, and two<br />
other people in Australia, João Carrascalao<br />
and “Vasco” in Darwin.<br />
Prosecutors have claimed that Fretilin<br />
supporters in Australian regularly sent<br />
money to the group via couriers posing as<br />
tourists in Kupang, West <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
Fretilin’s deputy leader, Mr. José Da<br />
Costa, testified today that Mr. Gusmão ordered<br />
Fretilin sympathisers to organise the<br />
demonstration in Dili in November 1991<br />
during which Indonesian troops opened fire<br />
and killed and wounded scores of people.<br />
Mr. Da Costa said Mr. Gusmão’s intention<br />
was to promote Fretilin’s cause internationally.<br />
Mr. Da Costa testified that Fretilin’s<br />
attacks on the Indonesian military during the<br />
1980s were carried out on Mr. Gusmão’s<br />
orders.<br />
He said Mr. Gusmão directed and led one<br />
attack during which 16 Indonesian soldiers<br />
were killed.<br />
Asked about Mr. Da Costa’s evidence,<br />
Mr. Gusmão said he had known the witness<br />
for a long time and verified his evidence.<br />
Mr. Gusmão also agreed with the evidence<br />
of Mr. Campos.<br />
SHADOWS OVER THE TIMOR<br />
SIDESHOW<br />
The following is an Editorial Opinion by the<br />
same newspaper on the same day.<br />
No one, except José “Xanana” Gusmão<br />
himself, knows what ploy, if any, he is using<br />
at his trial in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. Is the captured<br />
Fretilin leader’s apparent indifference to the<br />
prosecution case unfolding against him a<br />
sign of a behind-the-scenes deal? Does it<br />
reflect mistreatment and threats, or a wish<br />
for martyrdom? “Xanana” Gusmão is telling<br />
nobody.<br />
The best that can be hoped for, as some<br />
diplomats suspect, is that Mr. Gusmão is<br />
controlling at least some of the sticks of a<br />
wayang shadow puppet show that sees him<br />
face trial (Jakarta insists on that) but then<br />
able, openly, to play a role in high-level<br />
negotiations. It seems almost much to hope<br />
for after the years of killings, not least the<br />
1991 Dili massacre, and continuing tension<br />
and alleged persecution. But it would not be<br />
a bad result for the Indonesian Government,<br />
either.<br />
The worst outcome for President Suharto<br />
would be for Mr. Gusmão to be sentenced<br />
to death. He would become a renewed focus<br />
of dissent and support for Fretilin, which is<br />
showing continued resilience under new<br />
leadership.<br />
Official claims of flagging support are<br />
weakened by the remaining strong<br />
Indonesian military presence on <strong>Timor</strong>,<br />
continuing arrests and reports of soldiers’<br />
deaths.<br />
International clamor would force even<br />
Canberra - maintaining a close relationship<br />
with Indonesia since the Gusmão hearing -<br />
to reconsider Australia’s official position.<br />
Talks between Portugal and Indonesia under<br />
the United Nations, due to resume in April,<br />
would be lucky to survive.<br />
The Suharto Government cannot wish to<br />
return to ostracism. Whatever the trial’s<br />
outcome, the <strong>Timor</strong>ese will remain dissatisfied<br />
(Mr. Ali Alatas’ “sharp stone” in the<br />
national shoe) unless an accommodation can<br />
be reached.<br />
The resistance movement’s offer last<br />
year, with limited autonomy and before a<br />
referendum, was starting point. It recognised<br />
that neither armed revolt nor official<br />
repression can win the day.<br />
MATE-BIAN NEWS<br />
COMMENTS ON COVERAGE<br />
OF XANANA TRIAL<br />
23 February 19<strong>93</strong><br />
1. This farce called “Xanana’s trial” is<br />
now closed to a conclusion. It will be, of<br />
course, a guilty verdict!<br />
2. As this ‘trial’ progresses, one can see<br />
that the news coverage from Australia has<br />
been good. Lindsay Murdoch, writing for<br />
The Age and Sydney Morning Herald, has<br />
been able to send regular articles covering<br />
the ‘trials’ and the environment surrounding<br />
it. His interviews of Bishop Belo has, once<br />
again, put Bishop Belo at odds with the<br />
generals, including ‘general’ Abilio Osorio<br />
who seems to be very upset with Bishop<br />
Belo’s statements.
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 15<br />
3. Osorio has been active puppet used by<br />
the Indonesian generals to state what they<br />
want so that the outside world can perceive<br />
that pro-Indonesian things in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> are<br />
“under the control of <strong>Timor</strong>ese.” However,<br />
being a ‘handicapped’ puppet often he is<br />
out of tune and signals messages that are not<br />
necessarily shiny for the Indonesians!<br />
4. Malcolm Booker, Canberra Times (16<br />
Feb. 19<strong>93</strong>) wrote that “any departure from<br />
fair judicial trial would be difficult to hide"-<br />
referring to this so-called trial of Xanana.<br />
Although I do not share Malcom’s<br />
confidence in this Indonesian general’s<br />
“trial” because it is, from the outset, illegal<br />
and an insult to any legal system which<br />
claims to be based on fairness and justice, I<br />
must add that Malcolm was right. In spite<br />
of a very well orchestrated farce, as the days<br />
pass, what Malcolm call’s “departure from<br />
fairness” are (inevitably) emerging. One<br />
example was the report filed by Lindsay<br />
Murdoch, The Age, 23 Feb. 19<strong>93</strong>. He<br />
recalled that “one of the three judges hearing<br />
charges against Mr. Gusmão interrupted and<br />
asked a non-related question when Mr.<br />
Campos (supposedly witness for the<br />
prosecutor) mentioned the (Indonesian)<br />
beatings. Later, Mr. Campos was asked by<br />
another judge if he had seen Fretilin guerrillas<br />
kill villagers in a “cruel and sadistic<br />
way.” “Yes” he replied. “Who would those<br />
people have been?” - “Spies.”<br />
Mr. Campos later said things that certainly<br />
made the prosecutors unhappy. He<br />
said that “Mr. Gusmão had ordered death<br />
penalty for any Fretilin member who raped<br />
villagers.”<br />
5. Lindsay Murdoch made a point in his<br />
weekend coverage (SMH, 20 Feb., 19<strong>93</strong>)<br />
that the legal case prepared by Indonesia<br />
against Xanana serves to prove that<br />
“Xanana and nobody else, has led the<br />
guerilla campaign against Indonesia’s rule<br />
since 1979.” This has emerged in the last<br />
five days of this ‘trial.’ And, I believe, it<br />
helps to keep the Australian government<br />
very worried about the “sentence” for<br />
Xanana because the Australian government<br />
seems to argue that Xanana is the vehicle for<br />
“reconciliation” and the generals of Jakarta<br />
should not waste this opportunity. As<br />
Xanana, through the eyes of prosecutors’<br />
witnesses, emerges more and more as the<br />
real moving force and “The Real Leader,”<br />
this kind of argument equally gains weight.<br />
6. The “trial” of Xanana has also allowing<br />
the Australian journalists to comment much<br />
more on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> in the light of<br />
international law. This has never happened<br />
in the past and, I believe, it has become a<br />
good vehicle to educate the Aussie journos<br />
on the illegality of the Indonesian occupation<br />
as opposed to the official line of “real<br />
politiks.”<br />
7. The involvement of priests in the<br />
struggle, although NOT in a military sense<br />
but in a nationalistic sense, is nothing new.<br />
The Indonesian generals do not it well. In<br />
the early days of Bishop Belo’s reign, the<br />
Catholic Church of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> issue a very<br />
strong statement appealing to the world to<br />
stop the cultural, social and religious<br />
genocide of the <strong>Timor</strong>ese people, perpetrated<br />
by Indonesia. Until now, the Church<br />
of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> refuses to be integrated into<br />
KAWI (the Indonesian Conference of<br />
Churches) as a political statement to preserve<br />
the dignity and unity of the <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />
people. All these are obvious political<br />
statement. The Indonesian generals,<br />
knowing this, are trying to build up a dossier<br />
to destroy the power of the <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />
priests in controlling the <strong>Timor</strong>ese Church.<br />
They already sent to <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Fr.<br />
Wanandy, the brother of Yusuf Wanandy,<br />
director of CSIS (Central of Strategic<br />
International Studies) of Indonesian government,<br />
just to infiltrate the inside power<br />
of the <strong>Timor</strong>ese priests and spy on them.<br />
The more they accuse the priests, the more<br />
the world will know through the reports<br />
from Australian and other foreign journalists<br />
that the Resistance against the occupation<br />
is, indeed, well embedded in the <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />
society.<br />
8. Stay with us, IN THE QUI VIVE!!!<br />
XANANA: THE TRIAL OF<br />
JUSTICE<br />
Article by Agio Pereira, Fretilin/Australia,<br />
February 23, 19<strong>93</strong><br />
Xanana Gusmão is not a myth. Xanana is<br />
a man of rare courage and determination,<br />
intellect and vision. Even his enemies are<br />
compelled to recognise that.<br />
If one says that about Xanana Gusmão<br />
today, the people of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and the<br />
Indonesian armed forces do fully agree with<br />
it.<br />
The problem is, it is also not easy, for<br />
those abroad, to understand Xanana’s kind<br />
of Human dimension. This is made particularly<br />
more difficult at a time when he is<br />
going through a test which is, after all,, an<br />
extremely difficult experience, not only for<br />
him, but for many others whom, in one way<br />
or another, have been part of this unique<br />
dynamic in the <strong>Timor</strong>ese politics which one<br />
can simply call: XANANISM.<br />
What is that that makes Xanana what he<br />
is?<br />
Since Xanana’s capture by the occupationists<br />
of the Homeland of the <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />
people, incredible things, worse than<br />
Xanana’s capture itself, have taken place,<br />
almost simultaneously.<br />
Leaders have come out and accused<br />
Xanana of involvement in absurd plans;<br />
Journalists have written about “the end of<br />
the myth"; and opportunists have given interviews<br />
and written articles which by all<br />
means, can either help the Indonesian generals<br />
‘bury’ Xanana and/or bury the facts<br />
that made him a national figure of <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> and a prestigious guerilla leader of the<br />
world.<br />
And... all this is done in the name of the<br />
struggle of the suffering people of <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
It is, therefore, vital for all the <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />
to help sustain the dignity of a struggle<br />
which Xanana and thousands of <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />
man, women and children help sustain in<br />
almost 18 years, against all odds.<br />
The statement sent by the courageous<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese Women in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and the<br />
students organisations for non-violent actions<br />
to the outside world was precisely<br />
aimed at safeguarding this dignity. They<br />
took risks, exposing their own lives to the<br />
guns of the occupationist, but they did because<br />
they believe the dignity of the<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese suffering people must be safeguarded<br />
in this difficult times.<br />
The youth in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, defying the<br />
now highly sophisticated repressive machine<br />
of the Indonesian generals, continue to<br />
approach foreigners to let them know the<br />
truth that lies beyond Turismo Hotel and<br />
Portuguese wines in Dili.<br />
In a message sent from <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> to<br />
Mate-Bian News, a young <strong>Timor</strong>ese said<br />
this about Xanana’s current situation:<br />
“we, in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, don’t believe a word<br />
of what the Indonesian military are trying to<br />
force Xanana to say. You, out there, all you<br />
can do to help is to fight for Xanana to<br />
regain a breeding space; and, when he is free<br />
like you out there, you then can criticize<br />
what he does or says...”<br />
These are words of people who know<br />
exactly what is “Indonesian torture and<br />
systematic repression.” They did not read it<br />
in newspapers or studied it in the universities.<br />
They live it day and night.<br />
As Prof. Kooijmans, the special rapporteur<br />
of the United Nations (now the<br />
foreign Affairs Minister of Netherlands)<br />
that went to <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> in November 1991<br />
said in his report, in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> torture is “a<br />
matter of routine.”<br />
What Xanana has managed to successfully<br />
personified is precisely the best way<br />
to deal with this systematic torture and long<br />
term environment of degradation of human<br />
dignity. Xanana urges the <strong>Timor</strong>ese to use<br />
their available resources to resist the occupation<br />
in a sustainable way, and, at the same<br />
time, to try to find ways to build and<br />
accumulate new resources to crack the occupation<br />
when time is due.
Page 16 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
When Xanana articulates the strategy of<br />
the Resistance, he shows tremendous maturity<br />
and vision. He does not show any<br />
sign of hatred against Indonesia. If anything,<br />
he shows in depth understanding of the<br />
geographical and geopolitical problems<br />
which <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> faces by virtue of its<br />
natural existence.<br />
When Xanana articulates his vision, he<br />
shows a rare understanding of the Human<br />
nature of his struggle for the liberation of<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese people; he shows it in such a<br />
way that he extends it also to the Indonesian<br />
soldiers, the Portuguese people and the rest<br />
of the world.<br />
When Xanana articulates the pros and<br />
cons of the organisational structure of the<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese Resistance, he does not diminish<br />
the role of all leaders by avoiding harsh<br />
criticism, when criticism is due. This in turn,<br />
have made him unpopular amongst some<br />
leaders and extremely admired by the people<br />
of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
Xanana believes in democracy. As a result<br />
of his seventeen years of schooling in<br />
his University which he often calls “The<br />
Mountains of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>,” Xanana have<br />
learnt to love the form of democracy which<br />
he proudly terms: MAUBERE.<br />
This is the strength of Xananism which<br />
many find it heard to grasp. After all, one<br />
may ask, how can one understands it, if one<br />
does not live Maubere’s reality like Xanana<br />
does?<br />
This so-called ‘trial’ of Xanana is shaking<br />
the blood pressure of many people. Many<br />
wish that Xanana walks into the Indonesian<br />
courtroom and start to behave like a “Steve<br />
Biko” in Cry Freedom, challenging the<br />
Indonesian generals from day one to the end.<br />
Others have said that Xanana would have<br />
been a hero if he was killed.<br />
But Xananism, it seems, sees the reality<br />
of the Mauberes inside ET. It may see the<br />
same problem as those outside, but the focus<br />
of its telescope is directed to the<br />
Maubere people suffering under the<br />
Indonesian in this already 18 years of barbarous<br />
military occupation. Xanananism<br />
will never forget that there are already<br />
200,000 <strong>Timor</strong>ese heroes. There is no need<br />
for an extra one!<br />
One of the peculiar aspect of Xananism<br />
is the clear understanding of the strength and<br />
weaknesses of the enemy’s strategy of<br />
occupation, both within the enemy’s camp<br />
itself, and the implementation of this strategy<br />
amongst the <strong>Timor</strong>ese people. It is this<br />
in depth understanding of the dynamics of<br />
the enemy’s camp that allows Xanana to sit<br />
in the Indonesian courtroom and, as Lindsay<br />
Murdoch reported to the Sydney Morning<br />
Herald (Saturday, 20 Feb. <strong>93</strong>), “he looks his<br />
accusers dead straight in the eye, as if<br />
unrepentant, perhaps even a touch<br />
arrogant.”<br />
That is, very briefly, what makes Xanana<br />
what he is today: a national figure with a<br />
strength that blew out the Indonesian<br />
barriers and brought the struggle of the<br />
Maubere into the main stream politics of the<br />
outside world. It has been Xananism that<br />
inspired all activists for <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> in the<br />
last decade in this outside world. It will<br />
continue to do so, until the end of occupation,<br />
even though, some politicians are trying<br />
to score cheap political mileage at the<br />
expense of Xanana’s silence. The cheap<br />
political points are no points at all:<br />
Xanana’s behaviour and statements seen<br />
and made since his capture, often are conveniently<br />
ignored by the opportunists that<br />
try to use the ‘gap’ left by Xanana’s capture<br />
to score cheap political points. Apart<br />
from other things,<br />
- when a journalist asked him if he would<br />
make an appeal to his guerilla fighters to<br />
surrender, Xanana simply said that “they<br />
never fought for myself";<br />
- asked whether those still in the mountains<br />
can continue the struggle Xanana said<br />
that “he (Ma’hunu) can continue the<br />
struggle if he wants to; he has the conditions<br />
to do so";<br />
- at the end of a forced interview given to<br />
a Portuguese journalist in which Xanana<br />
made some ambiguous pro-Indonesian remarks<br />
in the presence of almost three dozens<br />
Indonesian military security officers,<br />
Xanana confided to the journalist that “if I<br />
was free, the answers would be different";<br />
- Xanana, for the first time since his fake<br />
trial started in the first day of February,<br />
asked the journalists, in English, to stay<br />
until the end of the trial. That obviously<br />
cost him another session of psychological<br />
torture by the Indonesian generals. The<br />
following session, Xanana came into the<br />
‘trial’ with his faced covered, for the first<br />
time too;<br />
These are some points which are necessary<br />
to make an objective assessment of<br />
Xanana in the mouth of the ‘lion.’<br />
Xanana has been put on trial, not only by<br />
the Indonesian generals against all suffering<br />
and determination he endures for about 18<br />
years now to fight for justice for his people<br />
and the world; but, worse then that, he has<br />
been put on trial by people who often call<br />
themselves “a freedom fighter.”<br />
The trial of Xanana is, indeed, a trial of<br />
justice!<br />
RETICENT WITNESSES<br />
The Nation (Thailand), Feb. 25 <strong>93</strong><br />
Unabridged<br />
(AFP, Jakarta) - <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> pro-independence<br />
leader Xanana Gusmão’s defence<br />
lawyer has said people are afraid to testify<br />
on behalf of his client, according to press<br />
reports yesterday.<br />
“Most of those who could become witnesses<br />
are afraid to do so,” the Rupublika<br />
daily quoted Defence Lawyer Sudjono as<br />
saying in Dili, <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
“In line with the prevailing regulations, I<br />
will keep on trying to get a defence witness,”<br />
Sudjono added.<br />
The lawyer said Gusmão did not want<br />
any family members used as character witnesses.<br />
TRIAL RESUMES TODAY<br />
The following is a transcript of ABC TV -<br />
The World at Noon, 4 Mar. 19<strong>93</strong><br />
NEWSREADER: In Indonesia (sic) the<br />
trial of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> independence leader<br />
Xanana Gusmão resumes today. Into its<br />
second month it shows no sign of winding<br />
up. The prosecution is scheduled to produce<br />
more witnesses is support of numerous<br />
charges against the 46-year-old rebel leader.<br />
Xanana Gusmão hasn’t contested any of the<br />
testimony which is our Indonesian<br />
correspondent Ian MacIntosh reports is<br />
making the job of defending increasingly him<br />
difficult.<br />
IAN MACINTOSH: When the Dili district<br />
court began hearing Indonesia’s case<br />
against Xanana Gusmão more than a month<br />
ago the court house the street outside were<br />
packed. But the panel of three judges currently<br />
examining prosecution witnesses has<br />
conducted few sittings in the past fortnight<br />
and the crowds have dwindled. Xanana<br />
Gusmão has heard a string of witnesses<br />
testified against him, among them followers<br />
such as his captured former deputy José da<br />
Costa. He described Mr. Gusmão long<br />
leadership of the armed struggle against<br />
Indonesian rule in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, of their attacks<br />
against military and civilian targets and<br />
Fretilin’s alleged links with backers in<br />
Australia and elsewhere overseas.<br />
Predictably most of the evidence has been<br />
damaging to the defendant and more so because<br />
Mr. Gusmão has agreed with the testimony<br />
of each witness. His counsel<br />
Sudjono concedes the defence is facing a<br />
new impossible task even before his client<br />
takes the witness stand. And those in the<br />
public gallery among them western diplomats,<br />
Xanana Gusmão’s parents are left to<br />
speculate on the eventual sentence. The man<br />
who acquired legendary status during his
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 17<br />
years in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>’s mountains and jungles<br />
faces prison term of between 20 years and<br />
life. For the firearms possession charge<br />
carries a maximum death penalty. Whilst the<br />
trial of Xanana Gusmão drags on the future<br />
of the independence movement in <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> remains in question, There is no<br />
doubt his capture dealt a serious blow to<br />
Fretilin but local sources say the movement<br />
has not been broken. Independent<br />
information on those still holding out in the<br />
province’s (sic) rugged interior is virtually<br />
impossible to obtain. despite some recent<br />
clashes there is general agreement the small<br />
groups of armed rebels no longer represent a<br />
serious security threat to the Indonesian<br />
administration. The authorities claim to have<br />
greatly reduced Fretilin influence following<br />
Xanana Gusmão November capture. But<br />
reliable evidence indicates some opposition<br />
to Jakarta’s 17 year rule is continuing with<br />
negotiation and diplomatic pressure likely to<br />
be its future focus.<br />
Video: Xanana shows signs of stress looking<br />
up to ceiling. Pictures of his parents in court<br />
were also shown. A Falintil flag and a pistol<br />
gun was also shown. Later they led him to a<br />
green car with tinted windows.<br />
SATURNINO DA COSTA<br />
BELO BRAVELY CRIES OUT<br />
The following fax was received by the <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> <strong>Action</strong> <strong>Network</strong>/US from an <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese nationalist in Jakarta on the<br />
morning of Friday, March 5. It is repeated<br />
here in its entirety, except for the deletion of<br />
the name of the sender:<br />
Urgently I want to inform you that my<br />
friend Saturnino da Costa Belo, a witness in<br />
the Xanana Trial yesterday in Dili (4 March<br />
19<strong>93</strong>), took the opportunity to act and<br />
showed to the world the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
people’s aspirations. He stood up, held up<br />
his arms in a victory symbol, and said<br />
loudly “Live <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>! Live the Maubere<br />
People! Indonesia must respect human<br />
rights in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.” There was a little<br />
confusion yesterday in the Dili court. The<br />
police doctor said Saturnino was ill. But he<br />
wasn’t ill. He wanted to do that in front of<br />
some diplomats, representatives of the<br />
British Embassy, and members of the<br />
International Jurists who are attending the<br />
trial.<br />
The judges decided to interrupt the trial<br />
for 45 minutes.<br />
The police took my friend Saturnino, and<br />
in the prison’s car, the police beat him,<br />
according to the information I received soon<br />
afterwards. I believe it because it is habitual<br />
experience. Saturnino was punished by 15<br />
years, his trial without advocate or lawyers,<br />
carried out in Baucau city. In need your<br />
attention about his situation now.<br />
Warm embraces to all<br />
the solidarity friends,<br />
(name removed)<br />
Radio Australia News, Thursday March 4,<br />
11.00 pm (AEST)<br />
The trial of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese independence<br />
leader, Xanana Gusmão, in Dili has been<br />
disrupted by a witness for the prosecution.<br />
He shouted pro-Fretilin slogans and greeted<br />
Mr. Gusmão causing the hearing to be adjourned.<br />
Mr. Gusmão faces charges of rebellion,<br />
conspiracy, separatist activity and<br />
possession of firearms.<br />
When the hearing resumed, an army<br />
doctor testified that the witness, Saturnino<br />
da Costa Belo was not fit to continue. He<br />
has been in gaol in Baucau, west of Dili,<br />
after receiving a 9 year sentence for involvement<br />
in the demonstration that preceded<br />
the November 1991 Dili massacre.<br />
Mr. Gusmão’s trial resumes next<br />
Thursday. (March 12)<br />
‘VIVA INDEPENDENCE’ RINGS OUT<br />
IN DILI COURT<br />
TAPOL issued the following Press Release<br />
today, 4 March 19<strong>93</strong>:<br />
An <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese, Saturnino da Costa<br />
Belo, who was present in the Dili court<br />
today to attend the trial of the resistance<br />
leader Xanana Gusmão stunned the court<br />
when he suddenly stood up and shouted:<br />
Viva <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, Viva Xanana, Viva independence!.’<br />
He had been summoned to testify<br />
as a prosecution witness. His action<br />
caused uproar; proceedings were suspended<br />
as he was hustled out of court. An hour<br />
later, a doctor came to inform the court that<br />
the witness was ‘unfit to appear.’<br />
It is highly likely that Saturnino will be<br />
subjected to maltreatment and torture for his<br />
act of defiance so pressure is needed to<br />
protect him.<br />
Saturnino da Costa Belo is himself<br />
serving a nine-year sentence, having been<br />
tried in Baucau, <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, in June last<br />
year under the anti-subversion law for involvement<br />
in the demonstration in Dili on<br />
12 November 1991. At the commencement<br />
of his own trial, he told the court that he did<br />
not want to be defended by an Indonesian<br />
lawyer and would only agree to being<br />
defended by a Fretilin lawyer. The court<br />
appointed a duty solicitor to handle his<br />
case.<br />
At an earlier hearing of the trial, Xanana<br />
Gusmão was severely reprimanded by the<br />
presiding judge for waving to his parents<br />
and his sister who were present in court.<br />
After waving, he placed two fingers on his<br />
lips, as a signal for keeping silent. The judge<br />
warned him that it was “very impolite<br />
indeed” to wave to anyone in court and<br />
ordered him to apologise. Xanana said<br />
nothing in response. According to Kompas<br />
which reported the incident [26.II.19<strong>93</strong>], his<br />
parents were very upset over what had<br />
happened. His younger sister, Felomena<br />
Gusmão, burst into tears, and shouted:<br />
“Fancy telling him off for waving to his<br />
parents!”<br />
XANANA GUSMÃO SHOW TRIAL:<br />
WITNESS’ FINAL(?) CRY FOR<br />
FREEDOM<br />
José Gusmão, CNRM/Darwin, on 5 March,<br />
adds:<br />
* At the continuing show trial of Xanana<br />
Gusmão in Dili, <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, ABC Radio<br />
reported last night that a witness for the<br />
Indonesian military shouted pro-<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
slogans.<br />
* After the court reconvened an hour<br />
later, an army doctor said that the brave<br />
witness, Saturnino da Costa Belo, was not<br />
fit to continue.<br />
* We demand to know what happened to<br />
Mr. Belo during that hour to make him unable<br />
to continue. What kind of tortures were<br />
inflicted.<br />
* We call on all international human<br />
rights bodies and governments of good will<br />
to urgently make intense representatives for<br />
the welfare of Mr. Belo.<br />
* Indonesia’s appalling and increasingly<br />
well-known record of torture and massive<br />
human rights violations in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> indicates<br />
that the Xanana Gusmão show trial<br />
will continue to be a farce until all witnesses<br />
are in 24-hour care of the International Red<br />
Cross and free to leave for a third country.<br />
We call on Australia to offer help and<br />
SANCTUARY!<br />
LONG LIVE EAST TIMOR IN DILI<br />
COURT<br />
Written by FRETILIN Committee in NSW<br />
(peg:nswfretilin) on reg.easttimor on 6<br />
March 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
The following is a transcript of ATVI ( a new<br />
satellite TV for the Asian region) run by<br />
ABC.<br />
NEWSREADER:....(missing bits). The<br />
anti-Indonesian protest took place in the<br />
court in Dili after Ian MacIntosh filed that<br />
report. He joined us by telephone with details.<br />
IAN MACINTOSH: According to<br />
sources the second prosecution witness<br />
called Saturnino Da Costa Belo walked in<br />
saluted put his FIST IN THE AIR and<br />
yelled LONG LIVE EAST TIMOR, LONG<br />
LIVE INDEPENDENCE. The sources said<br />
he then attempted to shake Xanana<br />
Gusmão’s hand but the defendant declined
Page 18 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
to do. Asked his name Saturnino responded<br />
by saying that he was present to defend<br />
EAST TIMORESE INDEPENDENCE and<br />
HUMAN RIGHTS.<br />
The hearing was then adjourned for 15<br />
minutes and an hour later when it was resumed<br />
AN ARMY DOCTOR stated that<br />
the witness was not FIT TO CONTINUE.<br />
SATURNINO has been in jail as we understand<br />
at Baucau, west of Dili after he<br />
received last year, a 9-year sentence for<br />
involvement in the demonstration which<br />
preceded the November 1991 Dili massacre.<br />
Earlier in today’s hearing Luis Cardoso, 46,<br />
testified that he had supplied Fretilin with<br />
food and medicine and last year transported<br />
and sheltered the defendant. Xanana<br />
Gusmão told the court the evidence given<br />
was true. His trial will resume next<br />
Thursday.<br />
WITNESS FOR XANANA FORCES<br />
COURT TO ADJOURN<br />
Jakarta Post, 5 March 19<strong>93</strong><br />
Only the section dealing with Saturnino’s act<br />
of defiance. Saturnino was actually<br />
summoned by the prosecution, not by the<br />
defence.<br />
(Dili, <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>) A witness in the trial<br />
of Fretilin separatist (sic) movement leader<br />
José Alexandre “Xanana” Gusmão refused<br />
yesterday to answer the presiding judge’s<br />
questions and accused the government of<br />
ignoring human rights in the province (sic).<br />
The trial was then suspended.<br />
Saturnino da Costa Belo, 32, the second<br />
witness to testify in yesterday’s session,<br />
yelled Viva <strong>Timor</strong> Leste (Portuguese for<br />
‘Long live <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>’) while looking at<br />
Xanana with his eyes glistening with tears.<br />
The witness then approached Xanana in<br />
his effort to shake hands with the Fretilin<br />
leader, but Xanana refused to shake hands<br />
with him and gestured ordering him to calm<br />
down.<br />
Saturnino ignored Xanana’s gesture,<br />
leading Presiding Judge Hieronymus Godang<br />
to pound his gavel and order him to sit<br />
down.<br />
“I want you to sit down,” the judge said.<br />
The witness however continued to stand<br />
until the court officials led him to his seat.<br />
Saturnino then kept silent when the<br />
presiding judge repeatedly asked him his<br />
identity. Suddenly the witness stood up and<br />
yelled, “I ask the government of Indonesia<br />
to respect human rights in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.”<br />
Hieronymus later suspended the session<br />
for 45 minutes and ordered the prosecutor<br />
to call a doctor to examine the witness.<br />
After examining the witness, Dr. Musadek<br />
Ishac from the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> police said that<br />
Saturnino had a mental disorder. The judge<br />
then adjourned the session till next<br />
Thursday.<br />
SOS RE: SATURNINO’S<br />
CONDITION<br />
From Ines at Fretilin/NSW, 6 March 19<strong>93</strong><br />
It is highly likely that Saturnino was<br />
mistreated after his courageous statement in<br />
court. There are reports that he was dragged<br />
out of the court. We appeal to anyone who<br />
is able to find more information on<br />
Saturnino after yesterday’s events so that<br />
we can once again start some action internationally.<br />
We will keep you posted if further<br />
news comes to hand. Stay in touch for<br />
further action.<br />
TO RESIST IS TO WIN.<br />
BACKGROUND ON<br />
SATURNINO<br />
From Peace is Possible in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, 5<br />
March 19<strong>93</strong> Dateline: Lisbon Translated<br />
from Portuguese unabridged<br />
The case of Saturnino da Costa Belo, the<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese who shouted out in favour of <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>’s independence in the court where he<br />
was supposed to testify against Xanana,<br />
reveals the methods used by the Indonesians<br />
in order to come up with such witnesses.<br />
Even though foreign journalists have been<br />
stopped from attending the trial, and<br />
therefore rendering such acts of courage<br />
practically useless, Saturnino da Costa Belo<br />
refused to play the part he had been given.<br />
Saturnino da Costa Belo had been held in<br />
Indonesian prisons from 1986 to 1990,<br />
serving a total of four years. He was re-arrested<br />
on 30 November 1991 in Baucau, at<br />
the same time as his younger brothers,<br />
Alcino Vital Freitas and Custodio Freitas,<br />
on charges of having links with the guerrilla.<br />
At the time of his arrest the Indonesian<br />
soldiers looted his home, stealing everything<br />
from a gold moon and macassar swords<br />
(objects of traditional <strong>Timor</strong>ese value) to<br />
clothes.<br />
Saturnino and his brothers were subjected<br />
to ill- treatment, especially beatings. After a<br />
few weeks, Alcino and Custodio were<br />
released. Saturnino remained in detention<br />
awaiting trial.<br />
He was taken before the Baucau court in<br />
1992, but rejected the 9- year prison sentence<br />
which the court passed. So he was<br />
taken for torture: “beatings, and his mouth<br />
squeezed with a pliers until it bled.” A new<br />
trial was set for 19 November, this time in<br />
Kupang (Indonesian <strong>Timor</strong>).<br />
Meanwhile, during guerrilla activity on 5<br />
October in Baucau, an Indonesian officer<br />
was killed for his weapon inside a hotel. The<br />
hotel is situated between the market and the<br />
police post, there being about 20 metres<br />
between them. General Syafei, Military<br />
Commander of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, in a statement to<br />
the newspaper Kompas, said there had been<br />
a guerrilla attack in Baucau, that there had<br />
been no Indonesian casualties, but that an<br />
AR16 weapon had been captured, and two<br />
terrorists had been killed.<br />
It is known from a <strong>Timor</strong>ese source that,<br />
in unclear circumstances, a young man was<br />
received a bullet wound and a child was<br />
killed. It would appear that the child was<br />
crushed in the general confusion caused by<br />
the shooting. The young man wounded was<br />
Alcino Vital Freitas, Saturnino’s brother. He<br />
was first taken by car to the military<br />
hospital but, once identified, he was taken<br />
from the hospital by soldiers and killed<br />
three days later, on 8 October, in Liamari:<br />
“he was nailed, like Jesus Christ, and cut to<br />
death little by little,” a <strong>Timor</strong>ese wrote.<br />
Another young man, Domingos, was<br />
wounded in the leg by a bullet about 500<br />
metres from the hotel in Uma Lima. He was<br />
shot and killed the following day, next to the<br />
Indonesian flag pole (merah putih) by 315<br />
Battalion soldiers.<br />
Numerous arrests (over 200 by 10<br />
October, according to one witness) followed,<br />
including that of Sebastião Fraga<br />
Freitas, son of Mateus and Madalena<br />
Freitas. He was captured on 6 October at<br />
around 5 pm by Battalion 315 soldiers, in<br />
Ossaluga (Samalari), as he returned home<br />
from work (opening an irrigation canal for<br />
Father Locatelli). Sebastião subsequently<br />
disappeared and it is feared he has been<br />
killed.<br />
On 17 October, Alcino’s 60-year-old<br />
father, Afonso Freitas, his daughter, and his<br />
daughter-in-law were all arrested in<br />
Ossaluga.<br />
In Samalari, between 70 and 80 people -<br />
men, women, young and old,- were arrested.<br />
Among them was the former Liurai<br />
(traditional leader) and ex-DPR (deputy,<br />
appointed by the Indonesians) Manuel<br />
Marcal Sequeira, with his wife and their<br />
children, later given conditional release.<br />
Some of those said to have been<br />
“released,” were actually transferred to<br />
Battalion 315 military posts in Uailili,<br />
Gariwai, Uatona and Buibau, and forced to<br />
act as scouts for the military in their search<br />
for others who had fled. The majority of<br />
detainees was tortured.<br />
After these events, Saturnino da Costa<br />
Belo disappeared from Baucau prison, only<br />
to reappear now in Dili to testify against<br />
Xanana. It is not known whether his trial,<br />
set for November in Kupang, ever took<br />
place.<br />
Apart from Saturnino himself, among<br />
those believed to be most in danger of re-
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 19<br />
prisals following Saturnino’s statements at<br />
Xanana’s trial, are:<br />
Custodio Freitas, his brother, living in<br />
Baucau<br />
Afonso Freitas, his father, and other<br />
relatives, living in Ossaluga (Samalari,<br />
Baucau).<br />
LETTERS FROM SATURNINO<br />
10 September 1992 Dateline: prison in<br />
Baucau. Translated from Portuguese.<br />
unabridged<br />
Letter to IPJET Secretary General, Pedro<br />
Pinto Leite<br />
“My respectful and best wishes. In spite<br />
of being imprisoned in the infernal<br />
Indonesian cell in which, not on rare occasions,<br />
I am beaten up and subjected to other<br />
kinds of punishment, I felt greatly relieved<br />
from pain when, at the end of August, I received<br />
the letter sent to us. However, the<br />
copies of the letters to the UN Secretary<br />
General and the Indonesian Minister of<br />
Justice have still not arrived - I believe my<br />
seven compatriots must have them.<br />
I should also tell you that it is the second<br />
time that I am in prison. The first was from<br />
1986 to 1990, when I was sentenced to four<br />
years imprisonment. But it is the first time I<br />
have received a letter from an organisation<br />
sympathizing with our martyrised and<br />
defenceless people’s struggle.<br />
In spite of being in this painful situation,<br />
I feel more and more encouraged and<br />
stimulated by the warmth of solidarity from<br />
the IPJET in general, and from you in particular,<br />
since this gesture of solidarity<br />
constitutes moral support not only for me<br />
but also for my people.<br />
My most sincere thanks go to all the<br />
IPJET members, and especially to the organization’s<br />
Secretary General, for the<br />
solidarity shown and the efforts made to<br />
defend my People’s cause, and protect<br />
me/us from the unjust sentences of<br />
Indonesia’s laws. I hope, and I am fully<br />
confident, that the IPJET, of which you are<br />
Secretary General, will continue to make<br />
untiring efforts, through the means available<br />
to you, to secure my/our protection and to<br />
fight for my/our release from Indonesian<br />
prison. I am sure you will do everything<br />
possible to defend my People’s right, and to<br />
free it from Indonesian captivity, since my<br />
People rejects, with the annexation of its<br />
Motherland to the Republic of Indonesia.<br />
I enclose a copy of the letter addressed to<br />
the Prime Minister. I hope you will intercede<br />
with him and the Government so<br />
they might heed my cry.<br />
With sincere consideration and respect,<br />
Saturnino da Costa Belo<br />
Letter to Portuguese Prime Minister:<br />
His Excellency, the Portuguese Prime<br />
Minister Mr. Anibal Cavaco Silva.<br />
Excellency,<br />
May I first offer you my respectful and<br />
best wishes. I have the honour of writing<br />
this insignificant letter in order to inform<br />
your excellency of my situation: I was captured<br />
by Indonesian forces on 30 November<br />
1991, together with my two younger brothers,<br />
Alcino Freitas Vital and Custodio<br />
Freitas. We were accused of being in contact<br />
with the guerrilla and of subversion. Some<br />
weeks later, my two brothers were released,<br />
while I continue to be held, now in the<br />
Baucau Prison.<br />
I would also like to inform your excellency<br />
that, at the time of our capture, our<br />
personal belongings, ranging from an ordinary<br />
pair of sports shorts to a gold moon<br />
and macassar swords, of traditional value,<br />
were stolen by the Indonesian soldiers and<br />
their collaborators. All we have left are the<br />
clothes on our backs, and not even the<br />
slightest article has been returned to us.<br />
I have been taken before the Indonesian<br />
Court in Baucau eight times already, where I<br />
was given a 9-year sentence. However, I did<br />
not accept their sentence, not only because<br />
the trials are nothing but a farce, but above<br />
all because I am not an Indonesian citizen<br />
and have never acknowledged to one, to be<br />
now sentenced by Indonesian law. Within<br />
international legality, I am still legally a<br />
Portuguese citizen and identify myself as<br />
such. Since I would not accept the sentence<br />
passed, the proceedings have been<br />
transferred to the Kupang Court, Indonesian<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>, and the trial is set for 19 November<br />
next.<br />
At the time of my previous trials I was<br />
tortured with beatings and with pliers,<br />
applied to my mouth and squeezed until it<br />
bled. I was also ordered to undress, and<br />
wearing only underpants, forced to lie on<br />
the ground.<br />
Assistance from international and humanitarian<br />
organisations was non-existent,<br />
given that they were not allowed to give it.<br />
In this regard, I request your excellency,<br />
the Prime Minister and the Government to<br />
afford me the most active, maximum diplomatic<br />
protection, within international law<br />
which still supports Portugal and its responsibility.<br />
Furthermore, I ask that<br />
through the Dutch Government, which represents<br />
Portugal’s interests in Indonesia, I<br />
am given real assistance, given that because<br />
of the break in diplomatic relations between<br />
the two countries, Portugal is unable to give<br />
me any direct help.<br />
With sincere respect and gratitude,<br />
Saturnino da Costa Belo<br />
PORTUGUESE PM CAVACO<br />
RESPONDS<br />
Publico 24 March 19<strong>93</strong> Dateline : Lisbon<br />
Byline : A.G. Translated from Portuguese<br />
unabridged<br />
Yesterday, Prime Minister Cavaco Silva<br />
promised to intercede with the International<br />
Red Cross to investigate the whereabouts of<br />
Saturnino Belo, a <strong>Timor</strong>ese prisoner sentenced<br />
to 12 years’ imprisonment. Since, on<br />
5 March, he shouted out in favour of independence<br />
for <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> in front of the<br />
judges hearing the case in Dili against former<br />
Resistance leader Xanana Gusmão,<br />
Saturnino’s whereabouts are unknown.<br />
Cavaco Silva also agreed to speak to his<br />
Dutch counterpart about the situation of<br />
Saturnino Belo, whose letter reached the<br />
PM via a delegation of the “Freedom for<br />
Xanana, Freedom for <strong>Timor</strong>” Commission,<br />
founded in January this year, and the<br />
Honorary Chairman of which is the<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese poet Fernando Sylvan.<br />
In the letter, dated 10 September, Belo<br />
says he had been subjected to torture, says<br />
that he is legally still a Portuguese citizen,<br />
asks Portugal for “maximum diplomatic<br />
protection,” and that he be given “real help”<br />
through Holland, which represents<br />
Portuguese interests following the break in<br />
relations with Indonesia in the wake of the<br />
invasion of <strong>Timor</strong> on 7 December 1975.<br />
The delegation, consisting of Fernando<br />
Sylvan, Ana Nunes (from the “Peace is<br />
Possible in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>” organisation), and<br />
Luisa Teotonio Pereira (from the CDPM -<br />
the Maubere People’s Rights Commission)<br />
emphasized to the PM the need for the<br />
European Presidency’s representation in<br />
Jakarta to visit Xanana Gusmão and other<br />
political prisoners.<br />
Meanwhile, Indonesian sources established<br />
for the first time a link between the<br />
fate of Xanana Gusmão - whose sentence<br />
(originally expected to be passed at the end<br />
of last week) has been successively delayed<br />
- and the outcome of the talks between<br />
Portugal and Indonesia. Yesterday, a member<br />
of the Indonesian diplomatic corps in<br />
Holland told the Lusa agency that the sentence<br />
will only be passed after the next<br />
round of talks, scheduled for 20 April in<br />
Rome. He was, in this way, indirectly supporting<br />
the criticisms levelled by Portugal<br />
and other countries about the unjust nature<br />
of the trial.<br />
On Monday, 22 March, during an audience<br />
held at the request of the solidarity organisation<br />
CDPM, Foreign Minister Durão<br />
Barroso said there had been no contact<br />
whatsoever with the St. Egidio community,<br />
which has been mentioned in the last few<br />
weeks as possible mediator on the <strong>Timor</strong><br />
question. It was at this religious commu-
Page 20 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
nity’s facilities in Rome that the<br />
Mozambique peace talks were held, between<br />
the Frelimo government and Renamo.<br />
“The CDPM is not against the initiative<br />
in principle,” said Luisa Teotonio Pereira to<br />
Publico, “but the differences existing<br />
between the internal characteristics of the<br />
Mozambique conflict and the <strong>Timor</strong> question,<br />
whose main and irreplaceable focal<br />
point for solution is at the UN, must be<br />
made clear.”<br />
At the conclusion of the one and a half<br />
hour audience, the CDPM left convinced<br />
that Portuguese diplomacy did have<br />
“finally, a consistent strategy” for <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
“Only putting it into practice will show<br />
whether it is good or bad,” said a spokesperson<br />
for the solidarity organisation.<br />
SATURNINO’S ‘TESTIMONY’<br />
USED IN COURT<br />
TAPOL REPORT, 21 MARCH 19<strong>93</strong><br />
At a hearing of the Xanana Gusmão trial<br />
in Dili on 11 March, the presiding-judge<br />
announced that one of the witnesses,<br />
Saturnino da Costa Belo, who was to have<br />
appeared on that day, was ‘too mentally<br />
disturbed’ to appear. The prosecution was<br />
therefore given permission to read out the<br />
‘verbatim report’ of his interrogation.<br />
[Kompas, 12 March 19<strong>93</strong>]<br />
This is an outrageous abuse of<br />
Saturnino’s basic rights. When Saturnino<br />
appeared in court on 4 March, he used the<br />
opportunity to shout pro-independence slogans,<br />
clearly signalling that he was refusing<br />
to testify.<br />
The document read out in court has him<br />
‘testifying’ about alleged attacks by guerrilla<br />
units in Baucau in 1984 when villagers were<br />
allegedly killed, their possessions looted and<br />
their houses burned to the ground. Saturnino<br />
allegedly also ‘confessed’ that he acted as a<br />
courier between the guerrillas and the<br />
clandestine movement.<br />
The press report of Saturnino’s<br />
“testimony” used in his absence does not<br />
say whether it was challenged by the defence<br />
lawyer, Sudjono, as a gross infringement<br />
of court proceedings. He may well<br />
have done so and the press was ‘advised’<br />
not to report it. Testimony ‘in absentia’ can<br />
only be used in very exceptional circumstances.<br />
It is evident from what has happened<br />
that Saturnino’s act of defiance<br />
spiked a hole in the prosecution’s case, as<br />
evidence he was expected to give was lost.<br />
Having declared him “mad” and therefore<br />
“unfit to appear” a week earlier, the court<br />
knew very well that he would not be allowed<br />
to appear yet summoned him nevertheless<br />
then went through the farce of being<br />
told that he could not appear, so as to be<br />
able to use his highly suspect interrogation<br />
report.<br />
This incident again highlights the fact that<br />
Saturnino’s life is in grave danger. TAPOL<br />
has been informed that a request by an<br />
International Red Cross delegate to meet<br />
Saturnino following his appearance in court<br />
on 4 March has been turned down.<br />
TAPOL has today written to the British<br />
government asking that the Indonesian authorities<br />
be pressed to allow the International<br />
Red Cross immediate access to Saturnino.<br />
NOTHING DELIBERATE<br />
ABOUT DELAY IN TRIAL<br />
Kompas 17 March 19<strong>93</strong> Dateline: Dili<br />
Abridged<br />
Comment: No doubt this denial is made to<br />
hide an embarrassing truth. I would link the<br />
timing rather to the forthcoming talks in<br />
Rome on 20 April. It may be that the regime<br />
does not want Xanana to speak in open<br />
court before the talks commence. – TAPOL<br />
The Public Relations chief of the Dili<br />
district court, Amir Pane, said that the court<br />
was not purposely dragging out the Xanana<br />
Gusmão trial. If things have slowed down, it<br />
is purely for technical reasons.<br />
At first the court fixed a rapid timetable<br />
with four or five hearings a week but this<br />
happened only in the first weeks. Since<br />
then, hearings have been less frequent, first<br />
three times a week, then twice a week and<br />
now only once a week.<br />
Defence lawyer Sudjono has told the<br />
presiding-judge that things are becoming<br />
slower and slower. Judge Godang says the<br />
court has other things to do and he himself<br />
who is chairman of the court has various<br />
duties that he cannot desert.<br />
The timetable was only a plan and can<br />
change at any time and anyway the court<br />
wants to give the prosecution more time to<br />
summon witnesses. “They don’t all live in<br />
Dili. Some live in Baucau, Lospalos, Same,<br />
Aileu and even Bali,” said Pane<br />
The court also needs to keep fresh. Haste<br />
will not give the court the chance to try<br />
Xanana properly.<br />
But Pane is certain that the trial will end<br />
before the 120 days from Xanana’s arrest<br />
runs out.*) All that is left is to hear a few<br />
remaining witnesses and then some a-decharge<br />
witnesses (for the defence). Then the<br />
defendant will be cross-examined, the<br />
prosecutor will read his summing-up and<br />
demand for sentence, then the defence will<br />
speak, after which will come the verdict.<br />
“The court has cut down the number of<br />
witnesses to be heard from the original<br />
thirty as some are not relevant to the case.”<br />
The defence lawyer said he has no<br />
problem with the slower programme. “This<br />
is a test of resilience and stamina. I am ready<br />
to deal with it. I am not asking the court to<br />
speed things up.” His client, Xanana, whom<br />
he regularly meets, is also of the same<br />
opinion.<br />
Sudjono confirmed that two a-de-charge<br />
witnesses will testify in court. The two men<br />
knew Xanana when he was a young boy.<br />
But Sudjono would not reveal their names.<br />
“I want everything to proceed smoothly,”<br />
he said.<br />
*There must be something wrong here. 120<br />
days from 20 November ends on 18 March.<br />
XANANA TRIAL DRAGS ON<br />
Kompas 19 March 19<strong>93</strong> Dateline: Dili<br />
Abridged<br />
Comment: The list of prosecution witnesses<br />
revised from thirty down to ‘about twenty’<br />
still listed Gregorio da Cunha Saldanha and<br />
Francisco Miranda Branco, both serving<br />
long sentences, as being due to testify.<br />
However, they will not after all appear in<br />
court as it was announced on 18 March that<br />
no further witnesses summoned by the<br />
prosecution would appear. The change of<br />
plan is likely to be because of Saturnino’s<br />
act of defiance in court on 4 March, to avoid<br />
giving the chance to any other <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese to use the court in the same way.<br />
Regarding the appearance of defence<br />
witnesses, Sudjono, the defence lawyer has<br />
spoken repeatedly of the reluctance of<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese to appear for the defence. He has<br />
refused so far to divulge the identities of the<br />
two who are scheduled to appear. – TAPOL<br />
Witness Armando da Silva (23 years old)<br />
told the court hearing the case of Xanana<br />
Gusmão in Dili that the accused was sent an<br />
appeal by the Indonesian government,<br />
signed by governor Mario Carrascalao and<br />
military commander, Brig.Gen Warouw, to<br />
come down from the hills in 1990. This was<br />
discussed with his followers but his reply<br />
was that he could not surrender as he totally<br />
rejected integration. Xanana had also told<br />
him he could accept some other form such<br />
as autonomy.<br />
Armando da Silva is described as a government<br />
employee and former head of<br />
FITUN, the clandestine organisation which<br />
maintained contact with Xanana in the hills.<br />
FITUN had 170 young members helping<br />
Xanana in the towns and providing a<br />
‘bridge’ between the urban centres and the<br />
bush.<br />
The witness told the court that every<br />
time he met Xanana he had been given instructions<br />
about organising a large-scale<br />
demonstration to welcome the visiting<br />
Portuguese MPs. But I didn’t do this, he<br />
said, as by this time FITUN had broken up
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 21<br />
and disbanded. He said he had asked Xanana<br />
what the purpose of the demonstration was<br />
and had been told that it was to show to the<br />
outside world that “we still exist.” Xanana<br />
had always said the clandestine organisation<br />
should maintain discipline, not indulge in<br />
violence, maintain mutual respect and never<br />
act without permission.<br />
The witness told the court he never implemented<br />
anything Xanana had asked him<br />
to do as he believed that none of this could<br />
be achieved and in any case, he dissolved<br />
FITUN in August 1991.<br />
Xanana told the court he knew the witness<br />
and confirmed his testimony.<br />
The court announced that it has completed<br />
the hearing of (prosecution) witnesses.<br />
The hearings will resume on<br />
Thursday 1 April to hear witnesses presented<br />
by the defence (a de charge).<br />
DEFENCE WITNESSES<br />
HEARD<br />
wire services, 1 April 19<strong>93</strong><br />
Note that the court will convene on a<br />
Monday for the first time in weeks to hear<br />
the second defence witness. That will make it<br />
possible for Amos Wako to be present. Nice<br />
management! They could of course have<br />
heard the two defence witnesses on<br />
Thursday as originally planned but it is neat<br />
to have a hearing to convince the UN Sec-<br />
Gen’s envoy just how ‘fair’ Xanana’s trial<br />
is. – TAPOL<br />
The Dili district court hearing the trial of<br />
Xanana Gusmão, heard testimony from the<br />
first defence witness (a-de-charge). He was a<br />
38-year old farmer, José da Conceicão who<br />
told the court he was a member of Fretilin in<br />
the late seventies.<br />
The witness told the court that Xanana<br />
Gusmão had always treated prisoners well,<br />
including members of the Indonesian army.<br />
He mentioned one occasion when Xanana<br />
Gusmão overruled other guerrillas who<br />
wanted to execute a captured army sergeant<br />
and how he had treated the sergeant’s<br />
wounds.<br />
The next court hearing will be on<br />
Monday, 5 April, to hear another defence<br />
witness.<br />
EVENTS INSIDE EAST<br />
TIMOR<br />
WHO’S WHO IN THE<br />
RESISTANCE<br />
Publico, Translated from Portuguese unabridged<br />
(Lisbon) In a document dated 28<br />
November 1992, but which is entitled “20th<br />
November Statement” (date on which<br />
Xanana Gusmão was captured), the new<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese leader, Ma’Hunu Bulerek<br />
Karathayano- Bukar (Antonio João Gomes<br />
da Costa, as he is named on his Portuguese<br />
birth certificate) made public the highest<br />
ranks in the Resistance and Fretilin. The text<br />
was received in Portugal via a recording<br />
transmitted by Radio Nova, but its written<br />
version arrived only now. It had been<br />
included in a package of documents<br />
delivered in Dili to the Independente and<br />
Publico reporters by “Corthe,” spokesman<br />
for the interior’s Clandestine Front.<br />
In spite of the unclear formulation of<br />
some of the decisions taken, especially regarding<br />
the role of the Maubere Resistance<br />
National Council (CNRM), it would appear<br />
that “prisoner of war” Xanana Gusmão’s<br />
functions as Resistance leader have been<br />
“frozen,” and power within the territory has<br />
passed to a so-called Politico-Military<br />
Commission of the Resistance (CPM-R).<br />
This was described as a “tactical/operational<br />
mechanism” which takes action, while being<br />
the “arm of the Falintil commander concept<br />
on the ground.” Its motto, just as it appears<br />
in the document, is “talks without preconditions,<br />
sponsored by the UN,” in order<br />
to achieve “an internationally acceptable<br />
solution to the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> problem.”<br />
The other decisions point to the reappearance<br />
of Fretilin as directing structure of<br />
the struggle, (in contrast to Xanana, who in<br />
1989 gave up the duties he was fulfilling in<br />
this party, Ma’Hunu has taken on its leadership)<br />
and to a strengthening of the position<br />
of José Ramos Horta, with whom<br />
Ma’Hunu now “coordinates” the struggle on<br />
the internal level. The non-partisan nature of<br />
the Falintil (armed wing of the Resistance) is<br />
maintained.<br />
Leader of the Resistance & Falintil<br />
Commander: Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão<br />
(functions “frozen”).<br />
Maubere Resistance National Council<br />
(CNRM): Ma’Hunu.<br />
CNRM Special Representative Abroad:<br />
José Ramos Horta<br />
Politico-Military Commission of the<br />
Resistance (CPM-R): Ma’Hunu*<br />
Fretilin Directive Commission (CDF):<br />
Ma’Hunu (Secretary); Lu-Olo and Konis<br />
Santana (Vice- Secretaries).<br />
Falintil General Staff: Taur Matan Ruak<br />
(subordinate to Ma’Hunu)<br />
*Responsible “for the struggle on an internal<br />
level,” “in coordination with the<br />
CNRM Special Representative abroad.<br />
CNRM CHRISTMAS<br />
MESSAGE<br />
Maubere Resistance National Council -<br />
CNRM<br />
Fretilin Directive Commission - CDF<br />
20 December, 1992<br />
Dear fellow <strong>Timor</strong>ese and companions in<br />
the struggle of the armed front in the bush,<br />
in the clandestine front in the towns and<br />
cities of our violated country’s soil, in the<br />
diplomatic front abroad, and friends of the<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese people all over the world:<br />
Following the imprisonment of our<br />
Commander Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão on<br />
20 November 1992, I am addressing you,<br />
this Christmas time, to send you all our<br />
warm wishes for a Holy Christmas and<br />
Happy New Year 19<strong>93</strong>, and to ask that you<br />
continue to fight for the Christmas feast of<br />
the <strong>Timor</strong>ese, for life, and the right to live as<br />
human beings, as a People and as a Nation.<br />
For many, and above all for Indonesia,<br />
our fight for the Maubere People’s rights<br />
suffered a considerable defeat on 20<br />
November 1992, but for the true children of<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> it was a day of great victory for<br />
our struggle, for the following reasons:<br />
l. With the arrest of our companion<br />
Xanana Gusmão, the Maubere People’s<br />
Resistance acquired a concrete symbol, in<br />
accordance with the 20th November<br />
Declaration, i.e. KAY RALA XANANA<br />
GUSMÃO, Symbol of <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />
Resistance.<br />
2. The arrest of our companion Xanana<br />
Gusmão, and that of the many other companions<br />
of the Clandestine Resistance, as<br />
well as the publication by the invading<br />
authority itself of the names of thousands of<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese in the clandestine front, including<br />
important public officials such as the current<br />
governor, Abilio Osorio, municipal and<br />
administrative post officials, soldiers, police,<br />
and the occupiers’ own spies, demonstrates<br />
to the world and to the Indonesians<br />
themselves, the strength of the clandestine<br />
front, which truly represents the intimate<br />
will of a people.<br />
3. The “surrender,” or the reporting to<br />
the Indonesians of thousands of clandestine<br />
members, does not signify to us a defeat,<br />
but rather heroism, since the flame of love<br />
for one’s country is not put out by a couple<br />
of songs, and their struggle will intensify, in
Page 22 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
one way or another, to an ever greater<br />
extent.<br />
4. The heathen form of taking an oath,<br />
drinking a mixture containing blood, is an<br />
attitude against the Catholic Church.<br />
Consequently, by forcing the Catholic<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese to practice these heathen acts, the<br />
Javanese are forcing the faithful to violate<br />
their own Faith, weakening the “good relationship”<br />
(according to them) between<br />
Indonesia and the Catholic Church.<br />
5. This all means condemnation of<br />
Indonesian policy itself, forcing itself to let<br />
go of <strong>Timor</strong>ese soil, leaving this poor people<br />
to live according to its right.<br />
So that we continue united, so that Jesus<br />
is born for the <strong>Timor</strong>ese people, its right as<br />
a people and nation recognised soon, we<br />
would like to send the following messages to<br />
you:<br />
l. A sincere thank you to all, without exception,<br />
big and small, rich and poor, for all<br />
the collaboration with regards our companion<br />
Xanana Gusmão, Symbol of<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese Resistance, with a request that<br />
this collaboration continue and grow.<br />
2. Everyone should bear in mind that our<br />
companion Xanana Gusmão’s functions<br />
have been frozen, in accordance with the<br />
20th November Declaration. For this reason,<br />
any statement which he makes must not be<br />
considered as coming from the CNRM.<br />
3. To the prisoners and their families, as<br />
well as to those persecuted, especially to<br />
the young people, we extend to you our<br />
moral and spiritual unity, and urge you to<br />
muster up COURAGE, according to each<br />
individual’s faith.<br />
4. We wish to remind everyone that the<br />
Indonesians are Moslems, and they want to<br />
destroy the Catholic Church. Do not, therefore,<br />
give in easily to their proposals with<br />
regards the heathen practices or any other<br />
kind of collaboration.<br />
I end with a big festive season embrace<br />
for all! The fight continues! To fight is to<br />
win! Victory is ours!<br />
The mountain of our occupied motherland<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, 20 December 1992.<br />
The CNRM<br />
(signature) Ma’Hunu Bulerek<br />
Karathavano (Bukar) Secretary of the CDF<br />
STATE OF WAR: A DIARY<br />
Independente, 19 February 19<strong>93</strong><br />
By Ines Serra Lopes. Translated from<br />
Portuguese. unabridged<br />
Wednesday, 3 February<br />
The beauty of the island is unforgettable,<br />
and the approach by air exceeded all<br />
expectations. <strong>Timor</strong> is the loveliest of<br />
places.<br />
I arrived in <strong>Timor</strong> today. I came with Rui<br />
Moreira (Lusa, Brussels) from Jakarta. I<br />
landed at Dili airport inside the cockpit of<br />
the place, beside an Indonesian pilot who,<br />
after spending 2 years in Luanda, working<br />
for Taag, had acquired a considerable<br />
Portuguese vocabulary. The only subject<br />
which the pilots (there were two) would not<br />
talk about was politics. “I not like,” said the<br />
one who spoke no Portuguese.<br />
We were met at the airport by colleagues<br />
and authorities. We came straight to the<br />
Hotel Turismo. After a lunch of grilled fish,<br />
a long day began. They asked us to go to the<br />
Indonesian hotel, the Makhota, to be<br />
“introduced” (to report, in the original version)<br />
to the Indonesian who was to be responsible<br />
for us in Dili: Kosky Zakaria.<br />
Zakaria, was insistent: if you want to<br />
return for the end of Xanana’s trial, then<br />
you must not write anything against<br />
Indonesia. You have to stick to the “facts.”<br />
And be quite objective. At the end of the<br />
conversation, on that Wednesday afternoon,<br />
Kosky announced that perhaps we would<br />
have to leave the following Saturday, just<br />
three days away. Basically, what he was<br />
saying was that it all depended on our behaviour.<br />
We would have the chance to realise<br />
that he meant what he said.<br />
On my return from the interview,<br />
Adelino Gomes was waiting for me. We<br />
went to the cathedral, to the anniversary<br />
mass for Msgr. Ximenes Belo, Bishop of<br />
Dili. The cathedral was impressively full. Of<br />
sorrowful and poor faces. Then came the<br />
endless line of people wanting to greet the<br />
Bishop. Humble and barefooted, they kissed<br />
his hand and shyly congratulated him.<br />
Outside I heard the first cry for help: “..<br />
The people of <strong>Timor</strong> are suffering. We are<br />
just waiting for Portugal. Only Portugal can<br />
help us.. All the <strong>Timor</strong>ese people are going<br />
to die. When is Portugal coming?” The tone<br />
and content (to which there was no answer)<br />
was to be repeated from the mouths of old<br />
and young, throughout the coming days in<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>. The key words, repeated again and<br />
again were: The Portuguese man (the<br />
“malae”) will be coming soon).<br />
The “malae” did not come at the time of<br />
the “Lusitania Express.” The “malae” did<br />
not come on a parliamentary delegation<br />
visit. But the <strong>Timor</strong>ese wait and trust: the<br />
“malae” has to come. He’ll be here soon...I<br />
felt a knot in my throat, a shiver, when I<br />
heard the question and the insistence: the<br />
Portuguese man is coming. Isn’t he?<br />
Teresinha believes that the Portuguese<br />
are not coming. She emigrated to Australia,<br />
and only came back to Dili to visit her<br />
family. She speaks perfect Portuguese, as<br />
did many people between the ages of 20 and<br />
30 with whom we spoke. Teresinha does<br />
not want to talk about politics. She says<br />
that in <strong>Timor</strong> there are both good and bad<br />
things. She admits she would prefer to keep<br />
quiet about the bad things. Of the good<br />
things, she laughs and can only remember<br />
her family that she left behind.<br />
Back at the hotel, we scarcely have time<br />
enough to go to our rooms. Xanana<br />
Gusmão’s lawyer is waiting for us to have<br />
dinner. We go to the restaurant. Sudjono<br />
takes along his two assistants. It is a long<br />
conversation. Sudjono confirms that he was<br />
indicated to Xanana by the police, but that<br />
Xanana could have chosen any other lawyer<br />
from among the seven that the police proposed<br />
to him. I don’t know if I believe this.<br />
The man seems to be sincere. But faces, in<br />
these parts, are almost impenetrable.<br />
There are two certainties: Sudjono knows<br />
very little about <strong>Timor</strong> and about the<br />
guerrilla. And we know nothing about the<br />
strategy of Xanana Gusmão’s defence, except<br />
that, obviously, Sudjono knows that<br />
the Indonesian court is going to reject his<br />
objection on grounds of incompetence.<br />
Sudjono is maintaining that, firstly, the<br />
anti- integrationist group to which Xanana<br />
belonged and in which he was accepted as<br />
leader, never recognised Indonesian sovereignty<br />
over the territory, formerly colonized<br />
by Portugal; secondly, until the present<br />
time, the international community, especially<br />
via the UN, has not recognised integration<br />
of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>; thirdly, that Xanana<br />
Gusmão’s “activities” had begun before the<br />
facts described in the indictment, i.e., before<br />
17 July 1976, the aim being not to attack<br />
Indonesia, but to achieve <strong>Timor</strong>’s independence.<br />
The lawyer assures me he will appeal<br />
against the decision which will be given the<br />
following week. He also says he believes it<br />
very important for us to stay and hear the<br />
testimonies, above all that of Xanana himself.<br />
I think so too.<br />
Thursday, 4 February<br />
There is no trial session today. I am<br />
staying in Dili, even though a group of<br />
Portuguese journalists are going to visit<br />
Baucau. I want to try to make some contacts,<br />
and to make up for the loss of time -<br />
two precious days - caused by the visa delay<br />
in Amsterdam.<br />
Straight after breakfast Petrus Suryadi<br />
appears. He is an Indonesian journalist,<br />
“Europe correspondent,” for the Jakarta<br />
daily “Suara Pembaruan.” He lives in<br />
Holland and used his considerable influence<br />
to get many of us over here, through his<br />
friend in Lisbon, Nuno Rocha, who untiringly<br />
helped us to get entry permits.<br />
As well as being a journalist, Petrus<br />
Suryadi is a strong man of the Indonesian<br />
regime. His sister is married to one of<br />
Jakarta’s most powerful generals. With even
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 23<br />
more power, and one more star on his<br />
shoulder, than the well-known Armed<br />
Forces’ spokesman, Brig. Gen. Nurhadi<br />
Purwosaputro, the famous General Nurhadi<br />
to whom we all turned when the visas<br />
threatened not to be forthcoming.<br />
I could not have felt worse seeing Suryadi<br />
this morning, just when I thought I could<br />
have walk around on my own, to see and to<br />
hear. Worse was to come, however: Petrus<br />
announced that I had to report to Zakaria,<br />
my inquisitor of the previous evening.<br />
Suryadi asked me what I would like to<br />
see. Off the top of my head, I said what<br />
seemed the most innocent - the Dili market<br />
place. When we arrived, I told Suryadi that<br />
it would be best to leave the car and driver<br />
and go in on foot. Petrus Suryadi did not<br />
agree. He ordered the driver to drive on into<br />
the market. Desperately sounding the horn,<br />
through narrow pedestrian paths. And I was<br />
feeling so bad, from on high, behind the<br />
smoked colored windows of the jeep. I<br />
forced him to stop, and said I would continue<br />
on foot. Petrus followed me and tried<br />
to make me go back to the jeep. I refused.<br />
To the relief of both of us, we left there for<br />
the Hotel Makhota, to meet up with Kosky.<br />
Even Kosky was preferable to visiting the<br />
market in a jeep. The Makhota is the<br />
Indonesian hotel par excellence, made by the<br />
Indonesians for the Indonesians. All prior<br />
advice we had received recommended us not<br />
to stay there. Even with the 50 per cent<br />
discount the hotel had offered us. At the<br />
Makhota, nobody is there just by chance: in<br />
the lobby there are at least half a dozen<br />
informers and Intel (Indonesian intelligence)<br />
agents. In the front garden, hidden among<br />
the trees and foliage, live the spies who, day<br />
and night, watch the comings and goings of<br />
the road to the hotel and the Dili diocese,<br />
just right next to it.<br />
I went up to the first floor, with Suryadi,<br />
to Kosky Zakaria’s room/office, where I had<br />
been yesterday with Rui Moreira. The<br />
Ministry of Information’s representative -<br />
who had been introduced to me the day before<br />
as the person responsible for security<br />
in <strong>Timor</strong> during the trial of Xanana Gusmão<br />
- unreeled his threats: no journalist would be<br />
allowed to return for the final week of the<br />
trial if s/he had been writing anything against<br />
Indonesia. Just as I had done the day before,<br />
I stuck to my ground: I repeated that I<br />
wanted facts and figures. The indictment,<br />
the objection, and the translations of the<br />
penal code and penal procedures code. I said<br />
I was going to the court, to speak to one of<br />
the judges. Kosky Zakaria said I could and,<br />
without realizing my surprise, wrote a<br />
letter, on government-headed paper,<br />
“ordering” the court through his spokesman,<br />
Judge Hitzbullah, to grant me trial<br />
documents. We parted and I went off to the<br />
Dili court, escorted by Petrus Suryadi.<br />
Hitzbullah is an Indonesian judge, of<br />
medium height, with mustache, and friendly<br />
appearance. He received us, listened to<br />
Suryadi attentively and smiled effusively.<br />
Then, more serious, he read the letter, and<br />
said no. A determined no, not very Moslem.<br />
A convinced no, which an hour of arguing<br />
and a bit of shouting did not manage to<br />
reverse. In the middle of the conversation,<br />
Hitzbullah left the office to talk to the<br />
presiding judge, and Petrus Suryadi went<br />
straight to the desk to look for the<br />
documents which the judge had refused me.<br />
A little later, Judge Hitzbullah, in almost<br />
non-existent English, offered his apology. It<br />
was nothing personal. I asked him how long<br />
he had been at the Dili court and, without<br />
waiting for the translation, he replied: 1986.<br />
“And how long do you expect to stay for<br />
now?,” I kidded. He laughed and shrugged<br />
his shoulders. God, or the Indonesian<br />
Minister of Justice would have to decide.<br />
But he would not hand over the trial<br />
documents. “I’m sorry,” he repeated.<br />
With a copy of the indictment under<br />
Suryadi’s arm, we went to the Resende<br />
Hotel to look for Espedito, the supposed<br />
translator of the indictment, to whom<br />
Suryadi was doing me the favour of introducing.<br />
I refused his services, in spite of<br />
Espedito’s excellent arguments in his own<br />
favour. He had little more than primary<br />
school. But, to compensate, he has got a<br />
brother with a Law degree! The osmosis of<br />
family knowledge did not convince me and I<br />
rejected Espedito and his translations.<br />
Suryadi, visibly annoyed, left me at the<br />
hotel. He had to go to Jakarta. I breathed a<br />
sigh of relief and left on foot. I passed by<br />
the Bishop’s house, but D. Ximenes was<br />
not in and the reception was, to say the<br />
least, cold. I left a message saying that I<br />
would be back.<br />
After a very long walk around the bay, I<br />
finally arrived at the Motael church. I was<br />
received by an employee, whose welcome<br />
made the previous one at the Bishop’s<br />
house seem like it had been warm and intimate!<br />
None of the priests was in, and he<br />
did not know where they were. I went back<br />
to the diocese, the Ecclesiastic Tribunal. I<br />
crossed through the muddy side entrance,<br />
by the low wall (which encircles the whole<br />
block) looking right on to the spies in the<br />
next street - where the Makhota Hotel is.<br />
No priest was in there either. Through the<br />
kitchen window, two old employees, who<br />
only spoke the local dialect Tetun, discouraged<br />
me from waiting.<br />
I left the diocese and saw the taxi driver,<br />
who had been following me since I had left<br />
the hotel on foot over an hour before. I gave<br />
in to tiredness and to the young driver’s<br />
persistence and, indicating that I surrendered,<br />
got into the car. I asked him where we<br />
were going. He didn’t understand - he didn’t<br />
speak Portuguese. I repeated in English. He,<br />
who had been following me, ought to know<br />
where it was that I wanted to and could go.<br />
The driver thought he understood: I was a<br />
tourist and wanted him to show me the<br />
sights of the city. He took me inside Dili,<br />
showed me the police headquarters, where<br />
Xanana was supposedly being held. He<br />
showed me the market, open 24 hours a<br />
day. It was a far more wild market than the<br />
one Suryadi had taken me to hours before.<br />
He took me to the house of the Osorio<br />
family, where the former leader was<br />
captured. Afterwards, inevitably, to the<br />
Santa Cruz cemetery. When he finally understood<br />
that I was a “wartawan”<br />
(journalist), he refused to stop at the<br />
cemetery so I could take photos, and we<br />
suddenly started back for the hotel. On the<br />
way he explained that, if the “others” were<br />
to see him, he would be arrested. With his<br />
hand hidden from the view from the street,<br />
he made the international sign for fear.<br />
Once again I left the hotel on foot. I met a<br />
young boy scout, carrying books. He spoke<br />
to me in Portuguese and accompanied me as<br />
far as the Ecclesiastic Tribunal. Father José<br />
Antonio Costa wasn’t in. Neither,<br />
apparently, was Father Leão. I could feel<br />
the stares of the informers on my back as I<br />
left. My companion apologised. I could not<br />
be walking around the streets of Dili as a<br />
foreigner, especially a journalist, and more<br />
especially being Portuguese. One of the<br />
spies followed behind the boy scout.<br />
Another overtook me, half turning around.<br />
He said “boa tarde” (good afternoon) to<br />
confirm that I was Portuguese, then disappeared<br />
around the next corner, only to appear<br />
again later.<br />
I decided to go back and try one more<br />
time: the priest was having a nap. I sat<br />
down on the veranda that joins the two diocesan<br />
buildings. Three old and honest tables,<br />
each with four chairs, all in the shade. I<br />
decided not to move from there before<br />
speaking to the Vicar-General, Father José<br />
Antonio.<br />
While I waited, I thought about a talk I’d<br />
had a few hours earlier, in another place<br />
enveloped by the stares paid by Indonesia.<br />
Amid a lion’s mane of hair and a somewhat<br />
frightening face, a gentle smile appeared<br />
when I said who I was. “We knew you were<br />
coming,” said the dark little lion, hidden<br />
behind a column of an old Dili building.<br />
He told me how life was in the bush,<br />
where he had been until the month before.<br />
Far from the adventures one imagines, life in<br />
the mountains is spent in holes, very near<br />
the villages, sometimes inside the villages<br />
themselves, too near the Indonesians. In
Page 24 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
holes dug in the ground, inside and outside<br />
houses, watched by the people who, in turn,<br />
are watched by Indonesia.<br />
I showed him news from the previous<br />
day’s Diario de Noticias. The headline read<br />
that Ma’Hunu, Xanana Gusmão’s substitute<br />
in the leadership of the guerrilla, would<br />
give himself up within the next two months.<br />
The article had been based on statements<br />
made by the governor, Abilio Osorio. That<br />
was clear in the article, but the <strong>Timor</strong>ese did<br />
not want to read more. With eyes filled with<br />
tears, he replied: “Lies! Lies! Lies!” I tried<br />
to explain that they were just the governor’s<br />
statements. He was deaf to my words and<br />
repeated: “Lies!” He did not read on. He<br />
told me about his brother who had been<br />
“caught,” and about whom there was now<br />
no news. He told me that in his village,<br />
when the soldiers hear that a certain Manuel<br />
is working for the resistance, they arrest, interrogate<br />
and torture all the Manuels, until<br />
they find the Manuel they are looking for.<br />
Many confess to deeds they know nothing<br />
of. Many die. “It’s better to die for <strong>Timor</strong>,”<br />
said the young man, like one who is explaining<br />
the inexplicable.<br />
Father José Antonio awoke and received<br />
me in the same cane chairs. Cautious, he<br />
confirmed only what he could. He spoke a<br />
lot about the <strong>Timor</strong>ese Church and teaching<br />
in <strong>Timor</strong>. Portuguese, which until a few<br />
years ago had been the language in which the<br />
young <strong>Timor</strong>ese were taught, right from<br />
their first year at primary school, had been<br />
banned by Indonesia. Portuguese became the<br />
language of the Resistance, and of the antiintegrationists.<br />
José Antonio Costa is just<br />
another <strong>Timor</strong>ese priest who knows the<br />
regime and prefers not to talk about it.<br />
Later on, I would be told the story of a<br />
seminarist in Baucau, who started to teach<br />
his classes in Portuguese. When leaving after<br />
the first lesson, the seminarist was called by<br />
the Indonesian police. “He was left with a<br />
disfigured face,” they told me. The lessons<br />
in Portuguese ended that very same day...<br />
When I interviewed the governor, Abilio<br />
Osorio, I told him the story. He did not<br />
even try to deny it, and insinuated with<br />
malice: “It couldn’t only have been on<br />
account of the Portuguese...” Why such<br />
words, when the Bishop of Dili publicly<br />
affirms that torture is routinely used in<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>?<br />
When <strong>Timor</strong>ese start speaking to us in<br />
English so as to pretend they do not know<br />
how to speak the language detested by the<br />
Suharto regime...; when the Governor insinuates<br />
that torture is justified...; when all<br />
this happens, we are left with no doubts<br />
whatsoever: we are not in the 27th province<br />
of Indonesia. We are in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, the<br />
territory occupied 17 years ago by<br />
Indonesia’s force and violence.<br />
Friday, 5 February<br />
In court in the morning, Xanana enters<br />
covering his face with his hand. He remains<br />
like this almost throughout the hearing.<br />
A walk through Dili, with a carefully<br />
chosen itinerary, led to contact with someone<br />
who says he is in the resistance. He<br />
brought messages, communiqués from the<br />
Maubere Resistance National Council<br />
(CNRM), introducing himself as the new<br />
spokesman for the CNRM and for his<br />
leader, Ma’Hunu. He goes by the name of<br />
Corthe (taken from the initial letters in a<br />
phrase which, in English, means Reasoning<br />
elevates all men), and we talked for hours.<br />
We asked many intense questions. The<br />
replies were plausible. We had to be sure.<br />
A further meeting was arranged for the<br />
next day, in a conveniently public place.<br />
Then we would see. The greatest risk was<br />
falling into an Indonesian ambush. You can’t<br />
play games with these people.<br />
On our way back to the hotel, over a<br />
dozen taxis refused to stop. Finally, one<br />
does. He speaks Portuguese, as usual, and<br />
says his name is Martinho. He asks if we<br />
are reporters. Whether we already know<br />
about the situation in <strong>Timor</strong>. On arrival at<br />
the hotel he looks through his wallet, saying<br />
that he has something for us. He doesn’t<br />
find what he wants and suggests he delivers<br />
it the following day. At what time? As we<br />
had planned to go to the 6 am mass at the<br />
Cathedral, we tell him he could come and<br />
pick us up before six and take us to the<br />
Cathedral.<br />
It has been quite a day, and the weariness<br />
is beginning to tell. But the day is not over<br />
yet. Henri Sobroto, yet another “journalist”<br />
which the Indonesian government sends to<br />
us as a “guide,” calls a meeting with all of us<br />
Portuguese. The evening before, we had<br />
asked our “colleague” Sobroto to request the<br />
government to allow us to extend our stay.<br />
This would be the only way we could get to<br />
be present at a little of Xanana Gusmão’s<br />
real trial. Until today, the sessions had only<br />
been procedural formalities. We insisted on<br />
the need to hear the witnesses and Xanana<br />
Gusmão himself. On orders from above, the<br />
visas, originally for 28 days, had all been<br />
transformed into 10-day permits. The first<br />
of us to arrive could now only stay until the<br />
Monday.<br />
With a formal tone, Sobroto called the<br />
meeting, and announced that our stay could<br />
not be extended. In fact, all to the contrary -<br />
the Portuguese journalists would have to<br />
leave Dili and Indonesia in a few hours time,<br />
the following morning. Only one or two of<br />
us, as yet not named, would be allowed to<br />
stay on.<br />
We asked what the reason for the expulsion<br />
was. The answer was immediate:<br />
bad behaviour, both written and spoken,<br />
against Indonesia. We quickly came to the<br />
conclusion that the ones chosen to stay<br />
ought to accept that choice, and there should<br />
be no question of solidarity with the others<br />
leaving. It was more important that at least<br />
someone was staying in Dili. We calculated<br />
that the choice would be one of the<br />
televisions, one of the radios, or the Lusa<br />
news agency.<br />
The hotel bill was paid. Some packed<br />
their suitcases. Around 3 am, General<br />
Nurhadi, Armed Forces’ spokesman, called<br />
the hotel from Jakarta, stating that there had<br />
been some mistake, that no one would be<br />
expelled. Five minutes later, my old acquaintance<br />
Kosky Zakaria appeared, giving<br />
apologies, explaining that it had been<br />
nothing more than a “crossed wires,” and<br />
that we could all stay in Dili for the agreed<br />
10 days. Good night.<br />
Saturday, 6 February<br />
I leave for the 6 o’clock mass alone and<br />
late. The taxi driver Martinho was waiting<br />
for me, as we had agreed, with engine<br />
running. He stops in front of the hotel the<br />
moment I come down the stairs. I get in and<br />
ask him to go quickly to the Cathedral.<br />
Martinho seems to be making a point of<br />
driving at a snail’s pace. He asks about my<br />
colleague Adelino Gomes, with me the<br />
previous day. He wants to know whether<br />
we now have information, whether we have<br />
already been contacted. I do not like the<br />
conversation. I ask him to hurry up, and say<br />
that I have neither contacts nor information,<br />
and do not know what he is talking about. I<br />
remind him that the yesterday he had said<br />
he had something to hand over to us.<br />
The driver becomes silent. I don’t know<br />
exactly what I’m sorry about. Could it be<br />
that, yesterday, one of us said too much? I<br />
don’t want to be afraid. I realise that we are<br />
traveling in the opposite direction to the<br />
cathedral. Irritatingly insistent, he once again<br />
asks about our contacts. I order him to stop<br />
the car. He carries on. He ignores me and<br />
then comes out with: “the clandestine<br />
network wants a meeting with you tonight.”<br />
I tell him that I want no part of any meeting<br />
or clandestine network. I want him to stop<br />
the car. I want to go to the cathedral. I want<br />
to hit him. My insults have no effect. I am<br />
taken through streets in Dili which I don’t<br />
recognise, far from the cathedral. I get the<br />
impression that we are almost on the<br />
outskirts of the city. I see two soldiers on<br />
the next corner and, at that moment, the<br />
sight of them is actually a relief to me. I<br />
open the door and say I’m getting out of the<br />
moving car. The soldiers look at us, and the<br />
driver stops near them. I leave the car,<br />
slamming the door behind me. I had spent<br />
40 minutes being driven around Dili.
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 25<br />
I get another taxi. He turns left in order to<br />
turn back. At the end of the street I see my<br />
taxi driver. He is talking through the window<br />
with a face I recognise: one of the diocese<br />
spies, with his lettuce- green T-shirt. I<br />
breathe a sigh of relief. The cathedral is<br />
empty and mass finished long ago. I return<br />
to the hotel. I’ve missed my meeting. I get a<br />
phone call; another meeting is set. Once<br />
again, I cannot go with the group. I need<br />
antibiotics as I have a sore throat - just as<br />
well, I’ll tell less lies. I have a rest. The<br />
phone calls start at breakfast time: reporters<br />
from Associated Press and other agencies,<br />
and some newspapers, are looking for<br />
confirmation - were we expelled or not? A<br />
dispatch from Antara (Indonesian news<br />
agency) says that, not only were we not<br />
expelled, but that some of us had wanted to<br />
bring forward our departure date. The lie<br />
exceeds the limits, even in a hypocritical<br />
diplomatic perspective. The worst thing<br />
though, is that all past experience<br />
discourages making any statement to<br />
Indonesian journalists. In fact the headlines<br />
in today’s “Voice of <strong>Timor</strong>” are about our<br />
expulsion, and we did not give them the<br />
story. I just make a short statement to AP.<br />
Once again, the meeting fails to happen.<br />
But I am told about Maria. She is <strong>Timor</strong>ese.<br />
She needs money. She has to have various<br />
surgical operations. She had been with the<br />
resistance and was arrested. She had sewn<br />
up her trousers, as she had been advised,<br />
only unsewing them once a day when she<br />
was alone. She went around unnoticed for a<br />
while, but her day arrived. She was<br />
repeatedly raped, in different ways.<br />
However, the final, merciless blow came<br />
when she was raped with a branch of a tree.<br />
Only God knows why he didn’t let her die<br />
then. She is alive, and trying to reconstruct,<br />
through different surgery, what is left after<br />
the violence, the rest of her body, torn in<br />
pieces. Her belly has been cut and stitched<br />
together, and is to be re-cut and re-stitched,<br />
in an attempt to repair what the insane and<br />
unstoppable violence tried to destroy.<br />
Maria says it was God who spared her.<br />
I try to find Corthe, the CNRM spokesman<br />
we met yesterday. It’s impossible, and<br />
I cannot carry on now. I will just have to<br />
wait for a while.<br />
Sunday, 7 February<br />
D. Ximenes Belo said mass at 6 am, in<br />
the gardens of his residence. Hundreds<br />
(maybe thousands?) have squashed themselves<br />
into the rooms, down the stairs, into<br />
the gardens. It is a sung mass. There is still<br />
the sensation that, just as all the other<br />
masses in <strong>Timor</strong>, this is also a mass for the<br />
souls of the dead. The only difference is that<br />
here, at the end, their names remain a secret.<br />
Suddenly, during the mass, dozens of<br />
bicycle bells are heard. I don’t know<br />
whether it is on purpose but, at the same<br />
time, the governor of <strong>Timor</strong> and his staff of<br />
several dozen people pass happily in front<br />
of the garden where the prayers are being<br />
said. They noisily ring the bells of their bicycles<br />
as they go. The praying <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />
don’t even look around. No one seems to<br />
hear. They are used to being provoked.<br />
A visit to the Motael Church at the time<br />
of the mass, said in Indonesian Bahasa,<br />
puzzles us somewhat. The Indonesian<br />
Catholics there appear, after all, as devote as<br />
the <strong>Timor</strong>ese. It is true, however, that there<br />
are far fewer spies around when this mass is<br />
over and people are leaving. It is also true<br />
that here the faithful are well dressed, and<br />
come and go in jeeps of the latest model.<br />
But it is also here that a family persuades a<br />
little child of three or four years old to come<br />
over and give me a picture of Jesus Christ in<br />
the countryside, without any message at all.<br />
After a visit to the Santa Cruz cemetery,<br />
at which police and troops stopped us from<br />
taking any photographs, we went to yet<br />
another mass at the cathedral. In between<br />
the church visits, we had time enough for a<br />
short and illuminating talk with a young<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese on the Areia Branca beach. He<br />
introduced himself as a teacher, and spoke<br />
very quietly. Regarding the situation of the<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese, he said “Our silence says it all.”<br />
He asked us to pretend we had been<br />
speaking in English to him and, as he left us,<br />
said in a good loud voice “Bye Bye” (in<br />
English).<br />
Monday, 8 February<br />
We went up to Ermera, the old city, on<br />
the top of the mountain. There we met<br />
Domingos Soares, a 4l- year-old priest, who<br />
does not hide the fact that the Indonesians<br />
do not like him. He explains that the occupiers<br />
tried to kill the people of Ermera,<br />
moving the town from the mountain top<br />
down to the valley, where the still rain<br />
waters, the heat and paludism would exterminate<br />
the population. He suggests that<br />
this particular battle was won by the people<br />
who, in spite of being forced on several occasions<br />
to go down to the new city, would<br />
return up the mountain to their old houses<br />
to sleep. Now, it seems that little more than<br />
some businesses are working down in the<br />
torrid valley of pre-fabricated houses. The<br />
mountain, in the Ermera zone, is beautiful.<br />
The magnificent view and the coffee trees<br />
that line the road under the mountain are<br />
really breathtaking. There is cassava, and<br />
incredible vegetation framing the way up the<br />
mountainside. Sometimes I have to try hard<br />
so as not to forget we are in <strong>Timor</strong>. On our<br />
way down, back to Dili, we stop briefly in a<br />
village of just a few houses called Rai Lako.<br />
To my surprise, the first person I approach<br />
to speak to asks me in good Portuguese<br />
whether we are Portuguese. He shies away<br />
at the sight of our guide - a <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />
working for the Indonesians, which is<br />
obvious a mile away.<br />
A woman comes forward with her son in<br />
her arms for a photograph. I took her to be<br />
the man’s wife. Only later, through someone<br />
in the local resistance, I would find out that<br />
her husband has been missing since the 12<br />
November massacre. The man in the village<br />
with her was her father, who for security<br />
reasons won’t be identified. He has already<br />
been arrested, interrogated and tortured<br />
many times. So many times that now he<br />
says no more than “good afternoon” to me.<br />
Two tall, good-looking <strong>Timor</strong>ese men<br />
approach from across the road. They speak<br />
very good Portuguese and, in contrast to the<br />
old embittered man, they want to talk. I ask<br />
one of them his name. The conversation is<br />
quick, and always under the watchful eye of<br />
our esteemed guide, Mr. Soares who has to<br />
submit a daily report on our comings and<br />
goings and contacts. I take note of the name<br />
the <strong>Timor</strong>ese, but only later, once back in<br />
the car, do I realise that he said his name<br />
was Domingos da Silva Soares - the name of<br />
the priest with whom we had just spoken<br />
up in Ermera. <strong>Timor</strong> is like that!<br />
Tuesday, 9 February<br />
I am thinking about Francisco, my most<br />
recent <strong>Timor</strong>ese friend. I would like to be<br />
with him now, in the cemetery, to attend the<br />
funeral of his 6-year- old son. But my friend<br />
almost cried yesterday when I told him of<br />
my intention. “Please, don’t go to the<br />
funeral!.” This is because being Portuguese<br />
in <strong>Timor</strong>, and being seen next to a <strong>Timor</strong>ese,<br />
could easily be reason enough to lead to<br />
interrogations, and to put someone’s life at<br />
risk.<br />
Later on, I have the good fortune to meet<br />
two remarkable people, about whom I can<br />
only say just that - that they are remarkable.<br />
For about an hour we spoke together very<br />
quietly - someone is always on guard at the<br />
window, watching outside. They are<br />
witnesses to the Santa Cruz massacre.<br />
Speaking softly, one of them described how<br />
the bodies of the young people were dragged<br />
along to uncovered trucks, some dead, and<br />
others only God knows if they were still<br />
alive. She confides that it is true, the bodies<br />
are in Tibar, a valley on the other side of the<br />
mountains, in front of which the Pope, John<br />
Paul II, prayed with the <strong>Timor</strong>ese. It is not<br />
possible to go there. There is a detour in the<br />
road leading to Ermera, but the troops do<br />
not allow anyone to go that way. And,<br />
above the mounds that are common graves,<br />
next to a stream, five military posts,<br />
situated up on the neighbouring mountains,
Page 26 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
are watching day and night for anything that<br />
moves.<br />
Later that same day, I heard the most<br />
complete version of the massacre. After<br />
taking the bodies away from the cemetery,<br />
battalions of soldiers took away the young<br />
people who had been in the demonstration.<br />
Using the same system of uncovered trucks,<br />
they transported hundreds of <strong>Timor</strong>ese to<br />
Tibar, on the night of 12/13 November.<br />
There they shot them in cold blood. The<br />
young people were seen in Comoro, sitting<br />
in the trucks escorted by the army troops.<br />
They numbered around 300, in addition to<br />
those who had already lost their lives in the<br />
cemetery itself, at least 180.<br />
I was told about what was said in confidence<br />
by a remorseful Indonesian official,<br />
who was unable to sleep, had lost his peace<br />
of mind and conscience, and who had still<br />
not managed to get transferred away from<br />
Dili, away from the nightmare that pursued<br />
him.<br />
Another witness recalls that, the evening<br />
before, and during the 12th November itself,<br />
the <strong>Timor</strong> radio station Loro Sae, controlled<br />
by the Javanese military, invited the young<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese to join in the walk to place<br />
flowers in the cemetery. The Suharto regime<br />
seems to have been preparing to catch the<br />
resisters all in one go.<br />
Wednesday, 10 February<br />
It was by chance that we met once more<br />
with the CNRM spokesman, Corthe, in the<br />
presence of a sponsor to vouch for him. The<br />
sponsor was a reliable one, worthy of credit.<br />
Corthe was genuine. For hours Corthe and<br />
his companions told us about the days in<br />
Dili, stories about the mountain, the state of<br />
the resistance. They spoke about Xanana<br />
Gusmão, the plan to get him to New York<br />
last December to take part in the talks<br />
between Durão Barroso and Ali Alatas.<br />
They assured us that Boutros Ghali was not<br />
only aware of this intention but was<br />
sponsoring it. They said that Xanana let<br />
himself to be taken, precisely because he<br />
expected the UN Secretary General to<br />
intervene.<br />
They told how it had all happened, and<br />
who had given the information which led to<br />
Xanana’s capture: a girl by the name of<br />
Moniz, the girlfriend of Jorge Araujo, Abilio<br />
Araujo’s nephew. After Xanana’s arrest,<br />
she went on to Jakarta and never came back.<br />
It had been her van that had been used so<br />
many times by the guerrilla to carry<br />
guerrillas, provisions and messages back and<br />
forth. One of those present explained and<br />
dissected the various phases through which<br />
the resistance has gone: the armed stage, the<br />
period of strength of clandestine movement,<br />
the current phase of the diplomatic struggle<br />
abroad, in which associations, support<br />
groups, etc. need to be encouraged to put<br />
pressure on the powerful countries. And he<br />
concluded, while Corthe lowered his eyes,:<br />
“Here, now, we are just trying to survive.<br />
Just that.” After tense hours of murmured<br />
talk, Corthe and the others asked on behalf<br />
of <strong>Timor</strong>. They transmitted to us just one<br />
certainty: that without the international<br />
community and without Portugal, the days<br />
of <strong>Timor</strong> and the <strong>Timor</strong>ese are numbered.<br />
FIGHTING AND ARRESTS IN<br />
FIVE MUNICIPALITIES<br />
Publico, 8 February 19<strong>93</strong> Translated from<br />
Portuguese. unabridged<br />
The <strong>Timor</strong>ese resistance unleashed a<br />
series of armed attacks on Thursday, 4th, in<br />
the Baucau and Los Palos (east), Viqueque<br />
(south east) and Same (central) municipalities,<br />
which resulted in at least two killed<br />
and an unspecified number of wounded<br />
among the passengers of a bus, belonging to<br />
the Indonesian company Nusantara, Publico<br />
learned. At around the same time,<br />
Indonesian security forces arrested three<br />
seminarists in Ermera.<br />
Fundraising<br />
The confrontation in Viqueque took place<br />
among the Kabo, Baso and Lugaca villages,<br />
and is said to have been aimed at the<br />
collection of money and provisions. A<br />
religious source assured Publico that no<br />
Indonesian soldiers were killed, so contradicting<br />
information previously supplied by<br />
other sources. “No guerrilla has come down<br />
from the forest,” says a well placed source,<br />
who wished to remain anonymous. He went<br />
on to explain that, in the repentance ceremonies,<br />
which take place in various parts of<br />
the territory, the military authorities use<br />
“town people.”<br />
The confrontations last week coincided<br />
with the third day of the trial of Xanana<br />
Gusmão, former resistance leader, who will<br />
only return to the courtroom next Thursday,<br />
11 February, the date on which the judges<br />
will reply to the judicial incident introduced<br />
by the defence. He argues that the Dili<br />
Court and, by extension, all Indonesian<br />
courts, do not have the competence to try<br />
him.<br />
In addition to Xanana’s arrest, the resistance<br />
is said to have been weakened by the<br />
capture of hundreds of people, also on 20<br />
November 1992, according to a <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />
who supports integration but is critical of<br />
the methods used by Suharto’s armed<br />
forces. According to the same source, who<br />
was allegedly quoting an Indonesian official,<br />
the real number of those killed in the Santa<br />
Cruz cemetery in November 1991 was 500 -<br />
ten times more than the figure quoted in the<br />
official enquiry.<br />
ALIAS CORTHE<br />
Publico, 12 February 19<strong>93</strong> By Adelino<br />
Gomes Original lang.: Portuguese. unabridged<br />
(Dili) A man with no face, no name and<br />
no age, Corthe comes down to the capital in<br />
search of the “four Portuguese journalists.”<br />
News of their arrival had been passed<br />
through the resistance’s grapevine to the<br />
mountain. He treads without leaving a track;<br />
he speaks without raising his voice; he<br />
passes in the street without any feature<br />
being evident, to linger in the memory.<br />
These characteristics are appropriate for the<br />
job he has done since l2 September last as<br />
the CNRM (Maubere Resistance National<br />
Council) spokesman in the interior, and link<br />
to the outside.<br />
Corthe is the first figure that emerges<br />
from the resistance structure, reorganized<br />
following Xanana Gusmão’s capture. He<br />
comes from the side of Ma’Hunu, the new<br />
guerrilla leader, pursued, surrounded, with<br />
neither clothing nor money, or enough<br />
weapons for the five Indonesian battalions<br />
hurled into an intensive search of the region<br />
in which he is believed to be.<br />
Alatas wants his head before meeting<br />
with Durão Barroso on 20 April, just as he<br />
had Xanana’s, before the 17 December talks.<br />
The troops had been within a hairbreadth of<br />
capturing him on the 5th - two weeks before<br />
the first meeting between the two ministers<br />
in New York - in a battle in which one of his<br />
most loyal men, Commander Ma’Luli, was<br />
killed.<br />
Ma’Hunu lost communication equipment,<br />
weapon, left behind documents, but<br />
managed to escape. “The people are in his<br />
care,” says Corthe, although it is not possible<br />
to know for sure whether it is the<br />
hunted leader’s presence which gives the<br />
population confidence, or if it is the latter<br />
which protects and comes to the aid of the<br />
leader.<br />
“You can tell the whole world that<br />
Ma’Hunu is not surrendering,” says Corthe<br />
to the Publico, in response to <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />
Governor Abilio Osorio’s recent statements<br />
in Dili, guaranteeing that surrender was<br />
imminent. He admits that the resistance<br />
never before went through such a period of<br />
weakness on the organisational level. But he<br />
rapidly resorts to complicated, worn out<br />
phrases to make his point, saying that “it is<br />
not only the CNRM which Jakarta will have<br />
to defeat in order to consolidate its presence<br />
here, but the entire population.”<br />
Just as the writers of the ‘50s, Corthe<br />
has chosen a principle of the Greeks for his<br />
life’s maxim or guiding motto: “Reasoning<br />
elevates all men.” And it is in these words<br />
that the mystery of his alias is unveiled:
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 27<br />
“Corthe” consists of the first letter of each<br />
word of that sentence (in Portuguese). He<br />
faithfully repeats for the exterior the speech<br />
approved in September by the CNRM. It<br />
seems very far from the catastrophic vision<br />
which many, both in and outside the territory,<br />
continue provide of Xanana’s arrest.<br />
He repeats: Xanana was arrested as he prepared<br />
to flee from Dili on his way to New<br />
York. It was decided that his appearance at<br />
the headquarters of the UN, during the<br />
Alatas/Barroso talks, could constitute a<br />
psychological whiplash, capable of bringing<br />
a breath of fresh air to the international<br />
community.<br />
Did Xanana betray? “If (Commander-in-<br />
Chief of the Armed Forces) Try Sutrisno,<br />
(General) Murdani, or even Suharto got into<br />
the hands of the CNRM, they would be<br />
making the same statements as Xanana.”<br />
Carried away by the propaganda speech, he<br />
even admits that victory will be theirs<br />
“soon.” But what prevail are formulae used<br />
by <strong>Timor</strong>ese common sense when the resistance<br />
is being spoken of. Sprinkled with a<br />
certain fatal note like those of a people<br />
destined for great deeds: “Even if only one<br />
woman is left, she will not get lost half way<br />
along the road.”<br />
The main question for the resistance today<br />
is how to wake up the international<br />
community. For Ma’Hunu’s adviser,<br />
Portugal has only to persevere to the very<br />
end with its statute of administering power.<br />
Why not share it with its ally the USA?<br />
Hunu wrote to Bill Clinton, says his<br />
spokesman, impressed by the fact that the<br />
US allowed “one people to invade another<br />
people.”<br />
Corthe leaves us, as discreetly as when<br />
he arrived, but not without first taking an<br />
address book and odd bits and pieces, and<br />
dictating for the world four of the most<br />
immediate priorities: a tape recorder,<br />
medicines for the stomach and headaches,<br />
two dictionaries - English/Portuguese, the<br />
other just Portuguese. Somewhere in the<br />
Centre or <strong>East</strong> of the territory - the places in<br />
which the guerrilla leaders are to be found -<br />
Ma’Hunu will carry on hiding. “60 metres<br />
away from the enemy,” Corthe assures us.<br />
He did not delay in leaving for the interior.<br />
Silent and discreet.<br />
VIDEO OF XANANA<br />
CIRCULATES AROUND<br />
TIMORESE SCHOOLS<br />
Publico 11 February 19<strong>93</strong> Dateline: Lisbon<br />
Translated from Portuguese unabridged<br />
Yesterday, a Church source in Dili,<br />
quoted by the Lusa agency’s Rui Moreira,<br />
revealed that a video film containing pictures<br />
of and statements by Xanana Gusmão,<br />
which was made after his capture, is being<br />
shown in schools in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. The video,<br />
which started being shown on 11 January in<br />
schools and villages in the territory’s interior,<br />
was made by the Indonesian Armed<br />
Forces. It shows pictures of Xanana’s arrest,<br />
and different conversations between<br />
the former resistance leader and local<br />
authority officials, namely, Governor Abilio<br />
Osorio. The film also includes Xanana<br />
Gusmão’s appeal to the guerrillas, and another<br />
addressed to youngsters for them not<br />
to follow his example but to concentrate on<br />
their studies.<br />
THE OLD MISSIONARY’S<br />
MONOLOGUE<br />
Publico 11 February 19<strong>93</strong> Dateline : Dili<br />
Byline : Adelino Gomes Translated from<br />
Portuguese unabridged<br />
For nearly an hour, his voice breathy, he<br />
spoke of the <strong>Timor</strong>ese, the Church he belongs<br />
to, the Pope, Indonesia. And of<br />
Portugal, from which, he says, the <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />
expect so much. Above all, that Portugal<br />
“does not ever recognise integration.” Like<br />
all the sources in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, he will remain<br />
nameless and faceless. He will just be “a<br />
man in the heart of the <strong>Timor</strong>ese,” as he<br />
says.<br />
It’s like a spider on an insect. These<br />
people cannot do anything else. He fought<br />
20 years, waiting for help to arrive. No one<br />
ever sent a bazooka, a missile, a mine here.<br />
The condemnation was timid, of a genocide<br />
in direct line with that of Pol Pot in<br />
Cambodia, and Hitler in Germany. I wish to<br />
say to Mario Soares, Durão Barroso, and<br />
the other ministers: How can we abandon<br />
thousands of <strong>Timor</strong>ese? Are those 200,000<br />
dead <strong>Timor</strong>ese not 200,000 dead Portuguese<br />
- <strong>Timor</strong>ese/Portuguese? In Portugal they say<br />
that they abandoned these poor things, and<br />
that Indonesia took the right action,<br />
otherwise communism would have installed<br />
itself here. The communist forces in Angola<br />
and Mozambique never carried out such<br />
butchery in those enormous countries.<br />
Portugal should be stronger. The<br />
Government seems to ask for permission to<br />
speak each time it mentions the case.<br />
Portugal never officially left <strong>Timor</strong>. The<br />
departure of Lemos Pires (governor) was a<br />
wise move. Had he stayed, he would have<br />
been humiliated, like Vassalo e Silva<br />
(governor of Goa at the time of the Indian<br />
invasion). All the <strong>Timor</strong>ese stood up for<br />
him, even today. Do we say that Portugal<br />
was delivered into Napoleon’s hands because<br />
João VI abandoned Lisbon and sought<br />
refuge in Brazil? It was our bad luck.<br />
Portuguese sovereignty was maintained<br />
there.<br />
The government must never recognise it<br />
(integration with Indonesia). If it were to do<br />
so, it would be the greatest shameful act<br />
since the time Afonso Henriques proclaimed<br />
independence. It would be as mad as<br />
handing over a growing child to a savage<br />
beast. Let it never recognise integration. The<br />
idea of an autonomy along the lines of the<br />
Azores is being spoken of. That would be a<br />
contemptuous solution which would result<br />
in the people hating Portugal even more than<br />
Indonesia. Is it with betrayal that the<br />
Portuguese intend to preserve their culture<br />
and inheritance? It is true that (after<br />
Xanana’s arrest) a man with a name is<br />
lacking. But the people knows what it<br />
wants. Indonesia was condemned (by the<br />
UN Security Council) in 1975. Can we allow<br />
the criminal to be rewarded? We would<br />
not have done as much as this people has<br />
done, if we had been invaded by the Spanish<br />
or French. Neither would we have lived this<br />
historical experience with such faith.<br />
BELO: TIMOR LIKE THE<br />
AZORES, MADEIRA, PUERTO<br />
RICO<br />
Publico, 12 February 19<strong>93</strong>. By Adelino<br />
Gomes. Translated from Portuguese. unabridged<br />
(Dili) He acknowledges that “in a way”<br />
he is a resister. The repentance ceremonies<br />
are fabrications, he accuses. He confesses<br />
that he still has not understood Xanana’s<br />
radical change in prison. He complains of<br />
the silence from Soares, Cavaco, the<br />
Assembly, fellow dioceses in Portugal. He<br />
has abandoned the idea of a referendum and<br />
today supports a certain kind of autonomy.<br />
He is 45-year-old Carlos Filipe Ximenes<br />
Belo.<br />
Publico: During an interview by the<br />
SIC/TSF, Xanana Gusmão admitted he<br />
gave your name as being linked to the<br />
resistance. Have the Indonesian authorities<br />
reacted to that? In what way?<br />
Ximenes Belo: Xanana has the right to say<br />
that I belong to the resistance. Personally, I<br />
do not consider myself as belonging to the<br />
resistance, if we are referring to a political,<br />
armed, military resistance.<br />
Q.: What kind of resistance then?<br />
A.: It is more a statement of values.<br />
Spiritual values and a certain resistance,<br />
defending the religious, cultural, ethnic<br />
identity of the people. That, yes. As far as<br />
the Government’s reaction is concerned,<br />
they have not said anything to me until<br />
now.
Page 28 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
Q.: Has the human rights situation in <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> improved or worsened since<br />
Xanana’s arrest? How many have been<br />
arrested?<br />
A.: There are arrests in all the municipalities.<br />
I have no information as to how many;<br />
some. I cannot say that the human rights<br />
situation has worsened. It was always<br />
something continuous. Lately, what it more<br />
noticeable is the violation of people’s consciences<br />
- forcing them to confess to being<br />
part of the clandestine network when they<br />
are not, never were, nor formally took any<br />
part in it. They forced people to sign their<br />
names, drinking goat’s or dog’s blood, like<br />
what happened in Baucau. This is authentic<br />
abuse.<br />
Q.: Have you visited Xanana since he was<br />
transferred to Dili?<br />
A.: Never.<br />
Q.: Why not?<br />
A.: I made attempts, asked for information.<br />
I was given to understand that it was out of<br />
the question.<br />
Q.: What about the other prisoners, among<br />
whom are Xanana’s mother and one of<br />
his sisters, as well as the mother and<br />
nephews of Abilio Araujo?<br />
A.: Regarding the first ones, I have not visited<br />
them yet, but the vicar-general has. I<br />
visited the other group (Abilio Araujo’s<br />
family) on 17 January, and even celebrated<br />
mass. They are awaiting trial, but are in<br />
good spirits. I have also visited Abilio<br />
Araujo’s mother. She was on her own with<br />
eight grandchildren, plus all the nephews.<br />
One could see she is a morally resistant<br />
women.<br />
Q.: What is your interpretation of Xanana’s<br />
declaring himself Indonesian, and a<br />
“disturber of the peace” (the name the<br />
Indonesian military give to the<br />
guerrillas)?<br />
A.: I don’t know what to say. It is a<br />
mystery to me. I try to ask and find out just<br />
to what extent he did, in fact, do an aboutturn.<br />
All this is a game. We do not know, it<br />
is still a mystery.<br />
Q.: We have heard, in the street, some<br />
people saying that he is a traitor. Do you<br />
think this is so?<br />
A.: The simple fact that he left documents<br />
behind with people’s names on, makes one<br />
think. A leader should not do that. All over<br />
the world, in Tamil, in Afghanistan, the<br />
leaders kill themselves or run, they react. He<br />
didn’t even react. He allowed himself to be<br />
caught just like that, with documents.<br />
Concessions on both sides<br />
Q.: Xanana’s capture meant a great victory<br />
for Indonesia. Governor Abilio Osorio<br />
has said he is convinced that within 2<br />
months the same will happen to<br />
Ma’Hunu. If that were to happen, would<br />
it mean the end of the resistance?<br />
A.: I do not think so. Xanana is just a man.<br />
Maybe the armed resistance could finish.<br />
But this psychological, cultural resistance,<br />
as a people, takes time.<br />
Q.: Do you mean to say that, even if the<br />
guerrilla were to end, you could not say<br />
that the resistance in the territory had<br />
come to an end?<br />
A.: For as long as the people exist, no. The<br />
people will maintain its identity, with its<br />
legends, traditions, and its way of being.<br />
Q.: Ali Alatas and Durão Barroso are going<br />
to meet in April in Rome, under UN<br />
auspices. What advice would you give to<br />
each one if you were given the<br />
opportunity?<br />
A.: That they arrive at a solution. There<br />
have to be concessions, both on the<br />
Indonesian and on the Portuguese side. That<br />
they give some ground. I always say:<br />
Portugal and Indonesia should be on good<br />
terms and, then, that <strong>Timor</strong> should have<br />
peace and tranquillity. For this to happen,<br />
an effort must be made by both sides.<br />
Q.: What solution do you see, today, for <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>?<br />
A.: An autonomous region. I have asked for<br />
information about the Azores and Madeira.<br />
I have already read what there is on Macau.<br />
It would be something of this nature. Or like<br />
Puerto Rico within the US.<br />
Q.: An autonomy which evolves towards<br />
independence, like what happened to<br />
Singapore?<br />
A.: Let’s first get a certain autonomy. We<br />
have not got that far yet...<br />
Q.: In Indonesia’s current situation, would<br />
the regime or the generals be in a position<br />
to make a concession of this kind<br />
without creating dangerous precedents?<br />
A.: There was an article in the Integration<br />
Law which gave <strong>Timor</strong> a special place for<br />
development later. If Indonesia wants to get<br />
rid of this stone in its shoe, it will have to<br />
reach this conclusion. It would also do the<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese good to feel a little free, masters or<br />
their own land.<br />
Q.: Do you think that, if Portugal, Indonesia<br />
and the UN reached a solution of this<br />
kind, the <strong>Timor</strong>ese would accept it?<br />
A.: You ought to ask the <strong>Timor</strong>ese that<br />
question. The first step would be: a certain<br />
amount of autonomy, and then we could see<br />
about other things - the establishment of<br />
Portuguese culture, Indonesian culture. So<br />
we would be like a bridge linking Portugal<br />
and Indonesia.<br />
Q.: Why did you drop the “pure and hard”<br />
idea of the referendum? Was it not the<br />
theoretically most correct and fair solution?<br />
A.: In theory it is the most correct and fair.<br />
But I ask you this: How did Portugal view<br />
this referendum? President Mario Soares did<br />
not even dare to answer my letter. He did<br />
not reply at all. Therefore, it means that not<br />
even Portugal considered it.<br />
Q.: President Mario Soares never spoke to<br />
you?<br />
A.: He spoke to me when he was Prime<br />
Minister.<br />
Q.: In 1985.<br />
A.: In 1985, in the Nuncio’s offices in<br />
Lisbon. But when I was there the last time,<br />
in 1990, he only sent an adviser to say that<br />
he had received my letter and thanked me.<br />
But I never received a written reply on the<br />
referendum.<br />
Q.: Did you have any contact on this issue<br />
with the present government of Prof.<br />
Cavaco Silva?<br />
A.: No, not up to now. Only in 1990, someone,<br />
what was his name, Queiroz... And he<br />
said that they were continuing to take the<br />
<strong>Timor</strong> problem to the UN. Nothing else.<br />
Q.: And did the Assembly of the Republic<br />
never contact you?<br />
A.: Not until now. When I was there, I was<br />
also in touch with a Mr. Sousa Lara in<br />
Estoril. He also wanted information about<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
Q.: There are indications that Indonesia is<br />
preparing to put the case of <strong>Timor</strong> to the<br />
vote of the UN General Assembly next<br />
summer. If this were so, it is admissible<br />
that Portugal could lose the vote. What<br />
would you do in that case? Would you<br />
advise the <strong>Timor</strong>ese to conform, if that<br />
were the wish of the international community,<br />
expressed by that vote?<br />
A.: Before saying that they ought to conform,<br />
we too want some advantage points:<br />
an autonomous region. With regards con-
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 29<br />
forming, history is in motion, and the people<br />
who might conform today might not<br />
conform in say 100 years time.<br />
Q.: Where did Indonesia go wrong in winning<br />
over the hearts of the <strong>Timor</strong>ese?<br />
A.: Its basis was violence. And then, it did<br />
not consult the people. No matter how<br />
backward a people might be, it does have its<br />
dignity. Saying “Now you are all<br />
Indonesians” - people will not accept in this<br />
way.<br />
Q.: But, as you know, one of Indonesia’s<br />
main arguments is that, in 1976, firstly,<br />
the majority of the population asked for<br />
the intervention, through the Balibo<br />
Declaration. Then, through its representatives,<br />
it accepted <strong>Timor</strong> as the 27th<br />
province. Was this a puppet show?<br />
A.: In 1976 I was in Macau. But in 1975 I<br />
went to Atamboa with the UDT and<br />
Apodeti refugees. I was a seminarist. They<br />
always say majority. But what majority?<br />
They have no facts to back this up. Who<br />
had elected that assembly which made the<br />
request for integration? If there were deputies,<br />
there ought to have been elections.<br />
Now I ask: were there election? And these<br />
deputies - who were they representing? As<br />
far as the 4 parties are concerned, I think<br />
that (the Balibo Declaration) was written<br />
out of fear. They were being ousted by<br />
Fretilin. They had no way out except to<br />
turn to Indonesia, who took them in.<br />
Q.: The masses said in Bahasa are well<br />
attended. Have you noticed an increase in<br />
the Indonesian faithful?<br />
A.: In <strong>Timor</strong> there are many Indonesians<br />
from the various provinces, like civil servants,<br />
teachers, soldiers, police.<br />
Q.: Is there real religious freedom in<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>?<br />
A.: There is freedom. However, what we see<br />
is that, as the military and the government<br />
recognise the strength of the Catholic<br />
Church’s influence, they look for ways, and<br />
above all the military, of persecuting the<br />
Church in a veiled way: arresting catechists,<br />
brothers, the priests’ intimate helpers in the<br />
parishes; stopping the young people from<br />
attending liturgical meetings and acts. In<br />
Bobonaro, a military commander even said:<br />
“And what are you going to do at mass? In<br />
the church they don’t give you a sack of<br />
rice, as we do every Sunday.”<br />
Q.: Are there indications that a transmigration<br />
policy is getting underway to<br />
solve the problem of <strong>Timor</strong>?<br />
A.: A transmigration program does, in fact,<br />
exist. Not only here in <strong>Timor</strong>. It is all over<br />
Indonesia. I do not think it is necessary to<br />
send people here to occupy vacant lands.<br />
The government should, in the first place,<br />
promote the <strong>Timor</strong>ese here.<br />
Q.: Have any Church properties been<br />
confiscated?<br />
A.: Not up to now.<br />
Q.: The San José School has been closed,<br />
and Portuguese is practically no longer<br />
taught in <strong>Timor</strong>. Were you forced to take<br />
that decision?<br />
A.: I was not forced. The educational services<br />
published a closure decree. But I must<br />
confess that I have not originated any official<br />
document saying that it closed. There<br />
was a problem of the teachers,’ students’<br />
and parents’ physical safety. There was a<br />
shortage of teachers for the schools. And<br />
finally, what was the diocese on its own<br />
doing here, organising the teaching, when it<br />
should be the Portuguese Government’s responsibility?<br />
If it had wanted to defend<br />
Portugal’s cultural and historic interests,<br />
then Portugal’s presence here in <strong>Timor</strong><br />
ought to have taken a few steps in that direction.<br />
Seventeen years have gone by, and<br />
nothing’s been done in this respect. What<br />
we teach is still with books from 1972-73.<br />
Q.: What concrete initiative could Portugal<br />
take in order to spread its language and<br />
culture?<br />
A.: Perhaps the Foreign Ministry entering in<br />
contact with Indonesia, so as to maintain<br />
this official teaching, just as they maintain<br />
here the teaching of German and English, in<br />
the last years of high school.<br />
Q.: As you know, that was part of a package<br />
in negotiations 10 years ago at the UN.<br />
Nothing can advance on its own, without<br />
everything else going ahead too. With<br />
regards the Portuguese Catholic Church,<br />
what can it do specifically to help the<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese?<br />
A.: It could organise a “twin” for the diocese<br />
of Dili, in order to with help the financial<br />
aspect, maintenance of schools, seminaries,<br />
health clinics, and, at the same time, with<br />
the recycling of our priests. Some have been<br />
here since 1972 and have never left. They<br />
could go for 3 or 6-month courses in<br />
Portugal, and return with more incentive for<br />
work.<br />
Q.: At the moment, the Vatican is taking<br />
some initiative on <strong>Timor</strong>. What suggestions<br />
would you give?<br />
A.: I do not know. I am no diplomat, and I<br />
do not know what the diplomatic corridors<br />
are cooking up for <strong>Timor</strong>. I always suggest<br />
that the Vatican bears in mind this aspiration<br />
of the people of <strong>Timor</strong> to be as it is.<br />
But, the world is so complicated that,<br />
sometimes, the Vatican cannot resolve<br />
bearing in mind aspects of the Indonesian<br />
Church as well as diplomatic aspects.<br />
Q.: Were you ever physically afraid?<br />
A.: No, not physically. I know that this is a<br />
place in which any day I could be found<br />
with a bullet in me. To die and stop<br />
speaking, and stop walking, I am not afraid<br />
of.<br />
EAST TIMOR PADDY FIELDS<br />
NEGLECTED<br />
February 12 19<strong>93</strong> Jakarta Post news brief<br />
Dateline: Dili<br />
Remark: It is virtually certain that former<br />
tillers of this unused land are the tens of<br />
thousands of people driven into armycontrolled<br />
settlements in the late 1970s. This<br />
report gives the lie to Jakarta’s claims that<br />
Indonesian control has served the <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese better than Portuguese control. –<br />
TAPOL<br />
Some 48,000 hectares of rice fields built<br />
during the Portuguese colonial era in <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> have been left uncultivated since<br />
Portugal left the region 16 years ago.<br />
Chief of the provincial office of the<br />
Ministry of Agriculture Naek Haloman<br />
Nababan told the Jakarta Post here yesterday<br />
that the large number of idle paddy<br />
fields has contributed to the failure of the<br />
province to be self-sufficient in food. “<strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> still has to import 25,000 tons of rice<br />
from outside the province every year,” he<br />
said.<br />
Nababan confirmed that only 15,000<br />
hectares of the 63,000 ha. of rice fields<br />
established by the Portuguese were cultivated<br />
by farmers.<br />
The uncultivated rice fields have turned<br />
into unproductive land overgrown by coarse<br />
grass and shrubbery. Irrigation facilities built<br />
during the colonial era have also been<br />
overgrown.
Page 30 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
AROUND THE TRIAL<br />
Publico 12 February 19<strong>93</strong> Dateline: Lisbon<br />
Translated from Portuguese abridged<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>’s Robinson Crusoes<br />
They number 51 all told: 47 boys and 4<br />
girls. They found refuge in the mountain<br />
after fleeing the 12 November 1991 massacre.<br />
With neither clothing nor medicines,<br />
they roam through <strong>Timor</strong>’s green countryside<br />
like zombies, waiting for a time which<br />
never comes. Maria died in the fighting of 5<br />
December, when the troops almost captured<br />
the new resistance leader, Ma’Hunu.<br />
Irmenegilde, Carla and Sandra are still left,<br />
living a fascinating experience for the past<br />
year, like oriental Robinson Crusoes, for<br />
whom the enemy’s savagery makes surrender<br />
more feared than the thousand sacrifices<br />
they have to make as guerrillas.<br />
In the Line of Fire<br />
Another group of youngsters are paying<br />
the price, a year later, of having been heroes<br />
in Santa Cruz on 12 November. There are 24<br />
of them. The military have sent them to<br />
serve in the very front lines of the battalions<br />
which, in the territory’s interior, have for<br />
some time been surrounding the weakened<br />
guerrilla. They have to go in first - right into<br />
the firing line. Greater cruelty could not be<br />
invented, claims an angry Church source. It<br />
is not known into which battalions they<br />
were enlisted.<br />
SIX TIMORESE REBELS<br />
SURRENDER WITH BOWS<br />
AND ARROWS<br />
Reuter, Jakarta, Feb. 16<br />
Six rebels armed with a gun, a grenade and<br />
bows and arrows surrendered to Indonesian<br />
troops in the former Portuguese colony of<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, a military spokesman said on<br />
Tuesday.<br />
“They came to us and gave themselves<br />
up with their weapons,” the spokesman told<br />
Reuters by telephone from Dili, capital of<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
He said the six surrendered on Monday<br />
in Malisaga village, west of Dili.<br />
The military spokesman said all were<br />
members of the Fretilin separatist group and<br />
had laid down arms in response to an appeal<br />
from their captured leader Xanana Gusmão.<br />
Xanana, who was seized on November<br />
20, is being tried for leading the campaign to<br />
win <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>’s independence from<br />
Indonesia. The charge carries a maximum<br />
penalty of life imprisonment.<br />
Xanana issued a hand-written appeal to<br />
his followers shortly after his capture, asking<br />
them to give themselves up to the government<br />
which has declared an amnesty.<br />
Human rights groups have expressed<br />
concern that the appeal might have been<br />
wrung from Xanana under pressure.<br />
Fretilin was blamed by Jakarta for masterminding<br />
events which led to troops firing<br />
into a crowd of mourners in Dili in 1991.<br />
Witnesses said up to 180 people were killed<br />
in the firing, but Jakarta puts the toll at 50<br />
dead and 66 missing.<br />
Indonesia invaded <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> in 1975<br />
and annexed it the following year in a move<br />
which is still not recognised by the United<br />
Nations.<br />
RESISTANCE LEADERS<br />
ANSWER QUESTIONS<br />
The following document was produced by<br />
the National Council for Maubere Resistance<br />
in February 19<strong>93</strong>:<br />
The Resistance leaders of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
here answer some important questions often<br />
asked by journalists, academics, politicians,<br />
diplomats, students and many interested<br />
individuals. The responses of these three<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese leaders represent the official<br />
stand of the National Council of Maubere<br />
Resistance (CNRM).<br />
They are:<br />
• Mr. Xanana GUSMÃO, Resistance<br />
Leader of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>,<br />
• Mr. Ma’hunu Bulerek KARATHAYNO<br />
(also known as BUKAR), deputy Leader<br />
of the Resistance (now Leader “ad interim”<br />
since the capture of Mr. Xanana<br />
Gusmão) and Commander of the National<br />
Liberation Armed Forces of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
(FALINTIL), and<br />
• Mr. José RAMOS-HORTA, Sp ecial<br />
Representative of the National Council of<br />
Maubere Resistance.<br />
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS<br />
I. The National Council of Maubere<br />
Resistance - CNRM<br />
Question: What is the National Council of<br />
Maubere Resistance?<br />
Answer: The National Council of<br />
Maubere Resistance (CNRM) is based<br />
within <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and is the supreme organisation<br />
representing all <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />
people. It comprises the Commander of<br />
FALINTIL, the Secretary of the Directive<br />
Commission of FRETILIN and the<br />
Executive Secretary of the CNRM for the<br />
Clandestine Front which encompasses a<br />
large number of underground groups that<br />
operate in the occupied cities and towns.<br />
FRETILIN (Frente Revolucionaria de<br />
<strong>Timor</strong> Leste Independente) is the largest<br />
political force in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> today and is<br />
based on social democracy. The next largest<br />
force is the UDT, the União Democràtica<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ense (<strong>Timor</strong> Democratic Union) and<br />
this also opposes integration with<br />
Indonesia. There is no party in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
which supports integration.<br />
The CNRM is a non-partisan, non-ideological<br />
body. It is equivalent to a coalition<br />
government, encompassing all <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese nationalist political parties and<br />
organisations struggling for self-determination<br />
and independence.<br />
FALINTIL is a non-partisan army owing<br />
loyalty only to the CNRM and to no political<br />
group. This non-partisanship helps to<br />
consolidate national unity and guarantees<br />
that, as in all democratic states, the army<br />
swears loyalty only to the Constitution, the<br />
elected Parliament and the Government. It<br />
will not allow itself to be the tool of one<br />
group or another as happens in Indonesia<br />
today.<br />
Question: What is the role of the Special<br />
Representative?<br />
Answer: The Special Representative is<br />
the international spokesperson for the<br />
Resistance. He is vested with full powers to<br />
represent the CNRM internationally and<br />
appoints Resistance representatives for<br />
other countries. He also chooses personal<br />
aides to assist him in discharging his responsibilities.<br />
Within the strategic consensus of the<br />
Resistance, the Special Representative undertakes<br />
diplomatic initiatives. In view of<br />
the special circumstances of the Resistance<br />
in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, the Special Representative<br />
has exceptional powers to initiate policies<br />
without prior consultation and approval by<br />
the leadership within the country.<br />
II. The struggle for self-determination:<br />
historical, diplomatic and legal foundations<br />
Question: What is the basis of your claims to<br />
Independence?<br />
Answer: <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> has never been a<br />
part of what is today called the Republic of<br />
Indonesia: neither in the period of the Dutch<br />
and Portuguese colonisations of the region<br />
nor before the arrival of European powers.<br />
On independence, the Republic of Indonesia<br />
based itself on the area colonized by the<br />
Dutch, claiming the same political<br />
boundaries. But the Republic of Indonesia is<br />
in reality only a geographical term which<br />
encompasses over 250 distinct nationalities,<br />
thrown together by the Dutch for simple<br />
administrative expediency.<br />
For 500 years, the people of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
were colonized by the Portuguese. With<br />
them they brought the Catholic faith together<br />
with their Latin culture and values,<br />
which combined with <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese animist
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 31<br />
beliefs and rituals which had existed for over<br />
a thousand years. Throughout that period,<br />
there was little or no contact between the<br />
people of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and the peoples and<br />
rulers in the remote islands of Java or<br />
Sumatra.<br />
We are a different country and a different<br />
people: we have our own history and<br />
culture; our own languages and values; and<br />
our own religion and perception of material<br />
values.<br />
Indonesia claimed to be the successor<br />
State to only the Dutch <strong>East</strong> Indies. This<br />
was the basis of Indonesia’s claims to exist.<br />
However, through its invasion and annexation<br />
of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> which was never a part<br />
of the Dutch <strong>East</strong> Indies, Indonesia substantially<br />
weakened its own legal arguments.<br />
It laid itself open to the challenge by the<br />
West Papuans, who rightly consider that the<br />
Javanese colonialists have no more right to<br />
colonize them than did the Dutch, and by<br />
the people of Aceh (North Sumatra) who<br />
have absolutely nothing in common with the<br />
Javanese.<br />
Last, but not least, our right to self-determination<br />
is well established in international<br />
law and in ten United Nations’<br />
resolutions. We refer only to the two binding<br />
Security Council Resolutions, Res. 384<br />
(1975) and Res. 389 (1976), which reaffirmed<br />
our right to self-determination and<br />
independence.<br />
Question: Indonesia claims to have built<br />
roads, schools, hospitals etc. Aren’t you<br />
satisfied?<br />
Answer: First of all, this is not a competition<br />
between the colonial rule of the<br />
Portuguese and that of the Indonesians. We<br />
are not here to choose one from the other,<br />
but to seek our own rule, as is our right.<br />
Second, the Indonesian government, in<br />
building all these schools and roads and<br />
hospitals seeks merely to fool the outside<br />
world that <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> is happily integrated<br />
with Indonesia. Ironically these are the very<br />
arguments that the colonial powers used in<br />
the past against their subjects who yearned<br />
for freedom. Indonesia seems to have learnt<br />
all the colonial tricks and are now practicing<br />
them on us.<br />
Give us a thousand miles of freedom,<br />
rather than a thousand miles of roads, which<br />
our people cannot use anyway: to travel<br />
from one village to another we need a special<br />
permit. Allow us to build our own schools<br />
of thought and to care for our sick and<br />
elderly in hospitals that we build ourselves,<br />
as poor as they may be.<br />
But above all leave us alone: we are not<br />
fighting for the Portuguese colonisers or for<br />
a better Indonesian neo-colonialist.<br />
III. The Resistance Peace Proposals<br />
Question: What is your negotiating stand for<br />
resolving the conflict?<br />
Answer: We again reaffirm our readiness<br />
to enter into a process of dialogue with<br />
Indonesia and Portugal under UN auspices<br />
and without pre-conditions. The aim of such<br />
a dialogue would be to explore all possible<br />
avenues conducive to an internationally<br />
acceptable solution to the problem of <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
The CNRM Special Representative presented<br />
a comprehensive peace proposal to<br />
the European Parliament in Brussels in<br />
April 1992, to the Council on Foreign<br />
Relations in New York in May 1992 and<br />
later to the UN .<br />
The Peace Proposal is in three phases:<br />
* Phase One, which would last for about<br />
two years, would involve all three parties<br />
working with the UN to implement a wide<br />
range of “confidence building measures.”<br />
These measures will necessarily include a<br />
drastic scaling down of the presence of<br />
Indonesian troops and weaponry in <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>, together with the introduction of a<br />
significant UN presence in the territory .<br />
* Phase Two, lasting between five and<br />
ten years, would be a period of genuine<br />
political autonomy based on ample powers<br />
vested in a local, democratically elected<br />
People’s Assembly.<br />
* Phase Three, the final phase, would see<br />
a referendum to determine the final status of<br />
the territory.<br />
This is our policy and remains valid. We<br />
believe that this represents the best possible<br />
prescription for a resolution of the conflict.<br />
It allows time for a cooling-off period in<br />
which all sides should try to prove their<br />
good-faith; it will also allow Indonesia to<br />
save face.<br />
Indonesia should seize the olive branch<br />
we are now offering. It has only to gain. It is<br />
obvious now that the invasion of <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> was a colossal mistake: the occupation<br />
has sapped so much of Indonesia’s energy<br />
and resources. If Indonesia withdraws<br />
from <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, it would be able to regain<br />
its international reputation as a peace-loving<br />
country and not be threatening to its smaller<br />
neighbours such as Malaysia and Singapore.<br />
Moreover, an independent <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> will<br />
be an asset for Indonesia, for ASEAN and<br />
the whole region in many ways.<br />
IV. Foreign Relations of an independent<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
Question: Can you outline the foreign<br />
relations policy of an independent <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>?<br />
Answer: We can assure everyone that the<br />
government of an independent <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
will apply for membership in ASEAN and<br />
the South Pacific Forum within days of our<br />
independence. This will be a top priority.<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> will maintain close ties with<br />
Portugal and the rest of Europe. We are a<br />
crossroads of three cultures and religions:<br />
Melanesian which binds us to our brothers<br />
and sisters of the South Pacific region;<br />
Malay-Polynesian which reminds us that<br />
many of our peoples trace their origins to<br />
South <strong>East</strong> Asia; and after five hundred<br />
years of Portuguese-catholic influence, we<br />
are a distinct nation-state in the region since<br />
we have a special understanding and<br />
relationship with the European Community.<br />
indeed an independent <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> will be a<br />
valuable advocate of the region’s interests in<br />
that forum.<br />
The majority of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese resident<br />
outside the country, are based in Australia.<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese have a special understanding<br />
of white Australians and this will serve as a<br />
bridge between Australia and the South<br />
Pacific island states as well as between<br />
Australia and South <strong>East</strong> Asia.<br />
We will not have a standing army. For<br />
our external security, we will rely on a<br />
Treaty of Neutrality to be guaranteed by the<br />
permanent members of the Security Council.<br />
We will endeavor with the UN and our<br />
neighbours to declare the seas surrounding<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> a Zone of Peace and work<br />
towards total demilitarization of the entire<br />
South <strong>East</strong> Asia and South Pacific regions.<br />
V. Domestic policies<br />
Question: What is your vision of an independent<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> on a domestic level?<br />
Can <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> survive economically?<br />
Answer: These two questions beg a long<br />
answer. We have divided up the responses<br />
according to the subject matter.<br />
a. Rule of law First and foremost, we will<br />
endeavor to build a strong democratic state<br />
based on the rule of law which must<br />
emanate from the will of the people expressed<br />
through free and democratic elections.<br />
b. Freedom of Expression We will encourage<br />
a free, independent, aggressive and<br />
responsible media as the voice of the people:<br />
a media that informs and educates. We<br />
believe that there can be no foreign interests<br />
controlling the local media. However, we are<br />
conscious that there will not be much<br />
private wealth to support an independent<br />
media. In order to avoid monopolies, we<br />
would try incorporate an obligation on the<br />
State to allocate funds in support of the<br />
media written into the Constitution.<br />
In order to ensure the independence of<br />
the media, the Constitution and the laws of<br />
the country should state that government<br />
interference in the editorial policies of the<br />
press and their day to day operations is inadmissible.<br />
In final analysis, we believe the
Page 32 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
media should be as independent as the judiciary.<br />
c. Human Rights From day one of independence,<br />
all international human rights<br />
treaties which would open up <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
for international scrutiny will be submitted<br />
to the Parliament for ratification. We believe<br />
that human rights transcend boundaries and<br />
prevail over state sovereignty. No<br />
government can hide under the cover of<br />
“domestic jurisdiction” when it comes to<br />
human rights. We will actively work with<br />
like-minded countries, NGOs and the media<br />
to strengthen the UN human rights machinery.<br />
We will actively support the creation<br />
of an international human rights court.<br />
We will seek the cooperation of UN human<br />
rights agencies as well as of NGOs such<br />
as Amnesty International, the International<br />
Commission of Jurists and Asia Watch to<br />
advise and assist us in our own efforts to<br />
promote respect for human rights and the<br />
rule of law in our country.<br />
From the first, we will proclaim a general<br />
amnesty and national reconciliation. To be<br />
true to ourselves, we will forgive our worst<br />
enemies. For a society to be healthy, sane<br />
and happy, it cannot be based on hatred and<br />
revenge.<br />
d. Economic policies and priorities <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> is a relatively small country. But<br />
with an area of 18,889 km2 and a total<br />
population of 700,000 (1974 figures), it is at<br />
least equal, if not larger, in size and<br />
population than at least 30 independent<br />
states members of the UN. For instance, it<br />
is almost ten times the size of Luxembourg<br />
and has twice the population. It is sixty<br />
times larger than the Seychelles.<br />
In terms of natural resources, <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
is potentially self-sufficient in most agricultural<br />
goods, meat and fish. It also has large<br />
oil reserves and other minerals.<br />
On the economic front, we will channel<br />
our resources into food production in order<br />
to feed our people. We will seek the cooperation<br />
of the UN Specialized Agencies such<br />
as the FAO, World Food Program, UNDP.<br />
However, all our policies will be a result of<br />
close consultation with the people in each<br />
region, town and village in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
In addition, in cooperation with the FAO<br />
and other international bodies, we will initiate<br />
a massive reforestation program to<br />
replant our forests and save our environment.<br />
Regarding the “<strong>Timor</strong> Gap Treaty” we<br />
will look at its terms, seek clarification and<br />
renegotiate if necessary. The sea boundary<br />
dispute will have to be settled through an<br />
international tribunal. We will seek international<br />
partnership in mineral explorations<br />
such as oil, but we will not sacrifice our own<br />
environment for short term gains.<br />
The civil war in 1975, and the subsequent<br />
invasion, up-rooted thousands of peoples.<br />
Properties were abandoned, destroyed or<br />
sold at unfair prices. This situation will have<br />
to be redressed.<br />
e. Education and health We believe in free<br />
education and health care for our people.<br />
The money saved from not having a<br />
standing army will be well used in these<br />
areas. At least 40% of our resources will be<br />
allocated to our best resource - our people -<br />
through massive investment in health and<br />
education.<br />
With the cooperation of WHO we will<br />
seek to eradicate malaria, tuberculosis and<br />
other preventable diseases within a decade.<br />
f. Indonesian settlers It is estimated that<br />
over 100,000 Indonesians are now living in<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. Most are poor Indonesians who<br />
came to our country looking for a better life.<br />
We would not be true to ourselves if we<br />
were to turn our backs on our poor<br />
neighbours.<br />
Indonesian migrants in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> will be<br />
welcome to stay and, with us, build a better<br />
home for us all. They have brought with<br />
them the wealth of their culture which can<br />
enrich the whole community.<br />
CNRM, February 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
MA’HUNU VOWS TO<br />
CONTINUE THE STRUGGLE<br />
Lisbon, Feb. 19 (IPS) – The guerrillas of<br />
the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese resistance movement will<br />
continue the armed struggle against the<br />
Indonesian authorities, despite the capture<br />
and trial of their former leader, Xanana<br />
Gusmão, according to a rebel communiqué<br />
released here Friday.<br />
In a letter addressed to “Portuguese<br />
journalists,” the new leader of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>’s<br />
rebels, Antonio João Gomes da Costa, or<br />
commander “Ma’hunu,” denied recent<br />
claims by the governor of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>,<br />
Abilio Soares, that his group had abandoned<br />
the armed struggle.<br />
The former leader of the <strong>Timor</strong>ese resistance,<br />
Xanana Gusmão, who launched the<br />
armed struggle for independence from<br />
Indonesia in 1976, was arrested in the <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese capital, Dili, last November.<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, a former Portuguese colony,<br />
was invaded by Indonesian troops in 1975.<br />
In a statement filmed by the Indonesian<br />
army a week after his capture, Gusmão expressed<br />
regret for his actions, declared<br />
himself an Indonesian, and recognised<br />
Jakarta’s claims on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, despite the<br />
fact that these have not been recognized by<br />
the United Nations.<br />
Gusmão’s trial began in Dili towards the<br />
end of January, in the presence of foreign<br />
journalists.<br />
In his letter to the press, the new rebel<br />
leader, Antonio Gomes, says he addressed<br />
his statement to journalists because “we’re<br />
in the same trench defending <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />
rights” and fighting against a “barbarous<br />
occupation by the ASEAN hawks,” a reference<br />
to the organisation of south east Asian<br />
countries.<br />
The letter describes <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese governor<br />
Abilio Soares, a former sergeant in the<br />
Portuguese colonial army, as “an accomplice<br />
to genocide” (estimated at 210,000 people<br />
by amnesty international) and a staunch<br />
defender of Indonesian expansionism.<br />
“Surrender, no. dialogue, yes. Because<br />
we’re fighting for peace in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>,”<br />
Gomes stressed.<br />
The letter recalls that the <strong>Timor</strong>ese resistance<br />
movement exists because Indonesia<br />
still refuses to abide by a 1975 U.N.<br />
security council resolution.<br />
The resolution calls for Jakarta’s withdrawal<br />
from <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and appoints<br />
Portugal as “administrative power in the<br />
territory until a referendum on autonomy is<br />
held.”<br />
The <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese resistance “reaffirms<br />
its support for the position of the administrative<br />
power and for the cause of peace and<br />
the right to self-determination” of the<br />
people of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, concludes the rebel<br />
leader’s letter.<br />
TEXT OF COMMUNIQUÉ<br />
Diario de Noticias 19 February 19<strong>93</strong><br />
Original lang. Portuguese. abridged<br />
...<br />
“Dear Portuguese Journalists,<br />
You are going away from this bloodstained<br />
land, where the language of Camoes<br />
is still maintained. Our best wishes go with<br />
you. We are sure that, in the case of you<br />
four journalists, we are addressing people<br />
who speak on the same pitch as ourselves,<br />
that is, in defence of the legitimate <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />
cause. In fact, to remember the solidarity<br />
with <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> of the Lusitanian soil and<br />
hearts is something which fills the<br />
humiliated but heroic Maubere People with<br />
pride, in their battle for the independence of<br />
this land, which cradled Xanana Gusmão.<br />
I believe that the presence here of you<br />
four journalists constituted another facet of<br />
what was expressed last year by the<br />
Lusitania Express - a gesture of solidarity<br />
against the barbarous occupation of the<br />
ASEAN hawks and its disgraceful consequences.<br />
Following this line of thinking, I<br />
proposed to go ahead, address you four<br />
journalists, and request that you make public<br />
the attached document. On account of the<br />
time limitations and conditions surrounding<br />
my duties, I have been unable to approach<br />
at any length questions in which the
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 33<br />
Resistance are engaged in the interior.<br />
However, it is my duty to let it be known<br />
about the developments, which are summed<br />
up by what Mr. Mario Carrascalao inferred,<br />
and I quote: “Annihilation of the Resistance<br />
is a complex matter.” This puts paid to Mr.<br />
Abilio Osorio’s view, in his contact with<br />
you, that: “Only two months are needed.”<br />
The very presence in the territory of 15 operational<br />
battalions, and the rigorously carried<br />
out control by the military are, in<br />
themselves, a reflection of the evolution of<br />
the conflict. Osorio was merely playing the<br />
role of accomplice to the genocide, while a<br />
persistent defender of annexation and, above<br />
all, an acolyte of the hard line. We do admit<br />
our weakness in the military operations<br />
theatre. But the popular support behind<br />
independence, sets the dominant tone in the<br />
political situation of this occupied <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>. Proof of this is the very location of<br />
Xanana’s capture, i.e. Dili itself. Further<br />
evidence is the vast array of <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />
names contained in a list that surfaced<br />
following the arrest of Xanana. Another fact<br />
is the arrest in Dili in January 1992 of Mau-<br />
Hodu (José da Costa). This situation affirms<br />
that, if the occupiers violence is at its most,<br />
then <strong>Timor</strong>ese nationalism is invincible. In<br />
other words, the tree of Our Country’s<br />
Liberation continues to push out its roots<br />
through to succeeding generations. On the<br />
other hand, the no-boundary solidarity with<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>, for peace, is noticeable. I remind<br />
Paul Moore, lobby Bill Clinton. Other<br />
personalities have appeared on the scene<br />
from, e.g. the Anglican Church, South Africa<br />
and Northern Ireland. Portugal has,<br />
therefore, widened its support base for the<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese cause. So peace is possible,<br />
because the annihilation of the Resistance is<br />
a complex matter.<br />
I will finish here. I am sure that you four<br />
will understand the need to make public our<br />
(the CNRM’s) thinking, contained in the 20<br />
November Declaration and in the attached<br />
communiqué. In the name of the fighters for<br />
the Maubere People’s Country, I take your<br />
stay here as a clear gesture of solidarity with<br />
Xanana, of which we are proud. Our best<br />
wishes accompany this letter.<br />
With the greatest respect,<br />
Ma’hunu Bulerek Karathayano (Bukar).<br />
In the CNRM and CDF communiqué,<br />
Ma’hunu analyses Xanana’s trial and the<br />
statement made by the “eloquent Abilio<br />
Osorio Soares before foreign journalists, e.g.<br />
Portuguese.” Abilio promised Ma’Hunu’s<br />
surrender within two months, and his reply<br />
was not long in coming: “No surrender! We<br />
reject surrender because it is the language of<br />
the hard, militarist line, which Abilio Osorio<br />
upholds by maintaining the presence of the<br />
occupying troops in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. Talks, yes!<br />
This we do support because we fight for<br />
peace for <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and its people.” The<br />
communiqué adds that the referendum for<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> “should result from the<br />
indispensable involvement of <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />
representatives in the talks without preconditions,<br />
sponsored by the UN.”<br />
Regarding the trial of Xanana Gusmão, the<br />
Resistance “demands Jakarta to immediately<br />
and unconditionally release the prisoner of<br />
war,” appeals for Boutros Ghali’s<br />
intervention in order to secure protection for<br />
Xanana by “legal, diplomatic and moral<br />
means,” and “again reaffirms its recognition<br />
of Ray Kala Xanana Gusmão as the symbol<br />
of <strong>Timor</strong>ese Resistance, his functions as<br />
Resistance Leader and Falintil Commander<br />
being frozen.” The Resistance “reaffirms its<br />
wholehearted support for the administrating<br />
power’s position in favour of peace and the<br />
heroic Maubere People’s right to selfdetermination.”<br />
NEW BAR ON EAST<br />
TIMORESE GOING<br />
OVERSEAS?<br />
UPI, Jakarta, Feb. 23 - Young people in<br />
the troubled province of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> will not<br />
be sent overseas for study or sporting<br />
events because of earlier defections by<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese youths, a newspaper reported<br />
Tuesday.<br />
The Media Indonesia newspaper said Tri<br />
Swartana, chief youth and sports official in<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, told reporters there were no<br />
plans to allow <strong>Timor</strong>ese youths to go<br />
abroad.<br />
Swartana was quoted as saying the move<br />
was made to avoid defections by <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese youths because it would “bring a<br />
bad image to the country.”<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, 1,500 miles east of Jakarta,<br />
is a former Portuguese colony annexed by<br />
Indonesia soon after Lisbon ended its colonial<br />
rule in 1975. The United Nations still<br />
does not recognize Indonesia’s sovereignty<br />
over the territory of 750,000 people.<br />
Indonesia suffered a major diplomatic<br />
setback when government troops opened<br />
fire on unarmed demonstrators in <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> Nov. 12, 1991, killing at least 50<br />
people by official count. Another 66 people<br />
remain unaccounted for following the incident,<br />
which brought widespread international<br />
criticism of the Jakarta government.<br />
In 1991, four <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese soccer players<br />
defected from an Indonesian-sponsored<br />
soccer team visiting Darwin, Australia and<br />
sought political asylum through the<br />
Portuguese embassy in Canberra.<br />
Two more <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese youths defected<br />
to Canada in 1992 during a student<br />
exchange program, Swartanta said.<br />
The defecting <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese soccer<br />
players said at the time they faced retribution<br />
by Indonesia’s security forces if they<br />
returned to <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> due to their political<br />
involvement.<br />
LIKE IT OR QUIT TIMOR,<br />
GOVERNOR TELLS PRIESTS<br />
The Age (Melbourne) 23 Feb. <strong>93</strong> Dateline:<br />
Dili, <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Byline: Lindsay Murdoch<br />
unabridged<br />
The <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Governor, Mr. Abilio<br />
Soares, has bluntly told Roman Catholic<br />
priests in the former Portuguese colony to<br />
leave if they opposed Indonesian policies.<br />
Speaking in Dili, the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> capital,<br />
Mr. Soares said he would not resign or listen<br />
to complaints from church leaders such as<br />
Bishop Carlos Belo, who claimed in an<br />
interview last week that <strong>Timor</strong>ese were been<br />
tortured and force succumb to the<br />
Indonesia’s integration of the territory.<br />
“If Bishop Belo thinks integration is<br />
being forced on the people, it is his opinion<br />
but not my opinion. If somebody does not<br />
agree with us they should go,” said Mr.<br />
Soares, who was appointed Governor by<br />
Jakarta last year.<br />
Bishop Belo, head of the Church in <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>, said last week that Indonesian<br />
military was using “psychological torture”<br />
to force people to abandon support for the<br />
Resistance group Fretilin and agree with<br />
Indonesia’s integration.<br />
The methods used included forcing<br />
people to drink animals’ blood, a version of<br />
a traditional <strong>Timor</strong>ese peace pact among<br />
tribal leaders, he said.<br />
More than 90% of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>’s 100,000<br />
people are Catholic.<br />
In an interview this weekend, Mr. Soares<br />
denied that there was disharmony between<br />
the Church and the other two pillars of <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>, the military and the provincial<br />
government.<br />
“If the are some persons in the church<br />
who what they like we cannot categorize<br />
them as the Church as a whole,” Mr. Soares<br />
said.<br />
“You cannot say the Church is against or<br />
protesting because of the statements of the<br />
priests. The Church is made of both the<br />
congregation and priests.”<br />
Mr. Soares is a long time supporter of<br />
Indonesia’s 1976 annexation of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
One of his brothers was killed by Fretilin in<br />
the late 1970s.<br />
Mr. Soares said Fretilin was now a spent<br />
force with only 60 armed men left in the<br />
jungle. He strongly defended the presence in<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> of 10 Indonesian military<br />
battalions, saying they were necessary for<br />
the province’s development (sic).
Page 34 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
Mr. Soares said the military had informed<br />
him it intended to reduce its troop strength<br />
in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> beginning in March. But he<br />
said he would prefer that the troops remain<br />
to assist in projects such as irrigation and<br />
housing, particularly in remote areas.<br />
“I don’t know how many troops will<br />
leave,” he said.<br />
Bishop Belo said last week that troop<br />
withdrawals should be the first confidencebuilding<br />
measure to allow <strong>Timor</strong>ese to feel<br />
free of repression.<br />
Mr. Soares, asked if he would like to see<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> get some sort of autonomy, said<br />
“I have no problem with the present conditions...<br />
(but) if we think we would like to<br />
ask for further autonomy I don’t have to let<br />
anybody know. It is our right to discuss<br />
autonomy with the Indonesian<br />
Government.”<br />
Some western diplomats have speculated<br />
that Jakarta is considering limited autonomy<br />
for <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> as part of a settlement that<br />
would remove the question from the United<br />
Nations agenda. The UN does not recognise<br />
Indonesia’s sovereignty of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
Mr. Soares said that if arrested the<br />
Fretilin leader, Mr. José “Xanana” Gusmão<br />
now on trial in Dili, was sentenced to death,<br />
the penalty should carried out. But he said<br />
he did not think the court would impose the<br />
sentenced as Mr. Gusmão was charged with<br />
rebellion not subversion.<br />
Mr. Gusmão’s trial is scheduled to resume<br />
tomorrow.<br />
The Sydney Morning Herald also carried a<br />
shorter version of the story.<br />
AUSTRALIAN INVESTS IN DILI<br />
GARMENT BUSINESS<br />
Jakarta Post 23 February 19<strong>93</strong> unabridged<br />
An Australian investor, attracted by <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>’s cheap labour costs, has agreed to<br />
establish a business cooperation with a<br />
garment company in Dili.<br />
Between 1,000 and 1,500 local people<br />
will be recruited for the project which is<br />
scheduled to start next month, director of<br />
CV Tira Octora, Fatmawati Sultan told<br />
journalists.<br />
This will be the first Australian investment<br />
in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
She said her Australian business partner<br />
had stopped his business in Australia because<br />
he could not afford the high labour<br />
costs. He had to pay each worker the<br />
equivalent of Rp10,000 (US$4.80) per hour<br />
in his country she said<br />
She refused to say how much the <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese workers to be deployed would<br />
receive but she said the average minimum<br />
daily labour cost in Indonesia is about<br />
Rp2,500 (US$1.2).<br />
Fatmawati said that she was arranging her<br />
visa to enter Australia . She said a visit to<br />
the site could allow her to see her partner’s<br />
machines which would later be sent to Dili<br />
after the cooperation accord was signed.<br />
More than 50 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese had been<br />
trained to operate the sewing machines but<br />
the project needs more skilled workers who<br />
cannot be found in the province, she said.<br />
Consequently she would have to bring<br />
skilled workers from outside <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
she said her partner would send designs.<br />
Fatmawati said that the economic cooperation<br />
was sponsored by a minister of the<br />
Northern territory who had visited her stand<br />
in an exhibition in the south Sulawesi capital<br />
of Ujung Pandang recently. The minister<br />
was interested in her work and had invited<br />
her to visit Darwin she said .<br />
Manuel Carrascalao head of the provincial<br />
chamber of industry and commerce, said<br />
on a separate occasion that the government<br />
encouraged local business men to cultivate<br />
economic cooperation with ones from<br />
Australia.<br />
“If the government does not support<br />
such cooperation, the businessmen will<br />
never be able to invest in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
EAST TIMOR’S CATHOLIC<br />
PRIEST AGAIN DENOUNCES<br />
ABUSES<br />
Press release from CNRM at the<br />
Commission on Human Rights in Geneva, 1<br />
March 19<strong>93</strong><br />
Bishop Carlos Ximenes Belo, head of the<br />
Catholic church of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, told Radio<br />
Australia on 28 February 19<strong>93</strong> of his anger<br />
over public ceremonies where <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />
are forced to renounce past links with the<br />
Independence movement. He repeated<br />
earlier charges that human rights continue to<br />
be abused in the former Portuguese colony.<br />
Radio Australia’s Ian MacIntosh in Dili<br />
quoted the Bishop as saying it was the<br />
church’s moral and spiritual duty to speak<br />
out against human rights abuse and injustice.<br />
At the ceremonies to which Bishop Belo<br />
was referring, <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese are required to<br />
drink chicken or animal blood mixed with<br />
wine, then sign an oath of allegiance. The<br />
Indonesian authorities say it is a traditional<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese oath of peace. The Bishop said<br />
such ceremonies have taken place in all the<br />
districts of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
“For me and for us from the church, this<br />
is a form of pressure on the people, forcing<br />
them to say what they don’t want to say.”<br />
He also told Radio Australia that beatings<br />
and torture were continuing. The church has<br />
collected data and he would soon write to<br />
the UN if the abuses continue.<br />
The Bishop offered his own solution to<br />
break out of the pattern of violence that has<br />
plagued the territory for so long. “Give the<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese some kind of autonomy. In<br />
Indonesia they don’t like to talk about this<br />
but we must try to find a solution,” he said.<br />
Asked whether political events in Jakarta<br />
this month - when Suharto will be<br />
appointed president for a sixth term on 10<br />
March -would provide impetus for change,<br />
the Bishop sounded pessimistic. He said<br />
that he held his present post for ten years<br />
during which time nothing had changed.<br />
RESISTANCE GROUP<br />
DENOUNCES INDONESIAN<br />
ATROCITIES<br />
by victor ego ducrot<br />
Geneva, Mar. 4 (IPS) – Indonesian occupation<br />
forces have been forcing people in<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> to drink human blood in a pledge<br />
of allegiance to the Jakarta regime, a<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese resistance group told the United<br />
Nations Thursday.<br />
The blood pledge is an ancient religious<br />
rite which had long fallen into disuse in the<br />
region. the vast majority of the Maubere<br />
(<strong>Timor</strong>ese) are Catholics.<br />
The charge made by the Maubere<br />
National Resistance Council (CNRM) was<br />
substantiated by a video cassette shown<br />
here by the Portuguese delegation at the UN<br />
Human Rights Commission.<br />
The video, produced by the Indonesians<br />
themselves, showed people being forced to<br />
have their blood extracted.<br />
The blood was blessed by the leader of<br />
an ancient religious cult before being emptied<br />
into a recipient where it was mixed with<br />
that of other persons and alcohol.<br />
The <strong>Timor</strong>ese were then forced to drink<br />
the mixture while an Indonesian official<br />
dressed in civilian clothing read a document<br />
stating that the act signified a pledge of<br />
loyalty to the Jakarta regime.<br />
José Ramos-Horta, the CNRM’s international<br />
representative, said that it was “a<br />
barbarous act through which the Indonesians<br />
are exposing the <strong>Timor</strong>ese to contagion by<br />
aids (acquired immune deficiency syndrome)<br />
and other infections.”<br />
“After seeing this, the international<br />
community can no longer have doubts about<br />
doing something against the systematic<br />
human rights violations which the<br />
Indonesian authorities are committing,”<br />
Ramos-Horta said Thursday.<br />
The CNRM is a political and military<br />
organization which groups all the forces<br />
fighting for the self-determination and independence<br />
for <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
Ramos-Horta said that the umbrella<br />
group was trying to get the international
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 35<br />
community to condemn the “inhuman repression”<br />
perpetrated by the Indonesian<br />
regime against the Mauberes.<br />
The CNRM spokesman is participating<br />
in the 49th session of the UN Human Rights<br />
Commission, which ends on Mar. 12.<br />
He said the Council was trying to get the<br />
Commission to appoint a special rapporteur<br />
to investigate the human rights situation in<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
On Feb. 25, a former inmate of<br />
Indonesian jails, Domingos Seixas, explained<br />
to the commission the mechanisms used by<br />
Jakarta to repress the Maubere population.<br />
Seixas, who now lives in Portugal, revealed<br />
the cruelty to which political prisoners<br />
are subjected in Indonesian prisons and<br />
said that he and many others, who also testified<br />
before the United Nations, suffered<br />
reprisals and persecution.<br />
Ramos-Horta recalled that the international<br />
human rights organization, Amnesty<br />
International, had reported that the<br />
Indonesian forces killed 200,000 people in<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> between 1975, when they invaded<br />
the territory, and 1981.<br />
This represents “almost a third of the<br />
population of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>,” he said.<br />
According to a document distributed here<br />
by the CNRM, Indonesia has subjected the<br />
territory to a colonial and repressive regime<br />
since the 1975 invasion. Jakarta annexed it<br />
in 1976.<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> was colonized by the<br />
Portuguese 500 years ago and there is no<br />
historical element linking it to what is now<br />
the republic of Indonesia, the document<br />
stated.<br />
Portugal has expressed its support, at the<br />
United Nations, for the Mauberes’ call for<br />
self-determination and has repeatedly asked<br />
the international community to take steps to<br />
end the repression.<br />
PROPAGATION OF<br />
ISLAM IN DILI<br />
Jakarta Post, 13 March 19<strong>93</strong>. Brief news<br />
item, unabridged. Dateline: Dili<br />
For the first time in history, an exhibition<br />
of Islamic books is being held in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>,<br />
a predominantly Christian province (sic).<br />
The three-day exhibition, organised by<br />
the Agency for the Development of Library<br />
of Indonesian Mosques, in cooperation with<br />
the An-Nur mosque in Kampung Alor, Dili,<br />
was opened Thursday by the chairman of<br />
the An-Nur Foundation, Umar Balafif.<br />
He said that the exhibition which also<br />
features books on technology, was a new<br />
step in the propagation of Islam in <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>, especially in Dili, Antara news<br />
agency reported.<br />
INDONESIA TO CHANGE<br />
MILITARY ROLE IN EAST<br />
TIMOR<br />
(Reuters, DILI, <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, March 15)<br />
Indonesia is preparing to end its special<br />
military command in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and cut the<br />
number of troops in the Portuguese colony<br />
it invaded 17 years ago.<br />
<strong>East</strong> Indonesian military commander<br />
Major General Suwardi said on Monday<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> would soon change over to the<br />
ordinary military command used in the rest<br />
of the 16,000-island archipelago.<br />
“If things are okay we can soon break it<br />
(the special military command) up,” he told<br />
reporters after installing a new army commander<br />
in the local capital Dili.<br />
There will only be eight battalions by<br />
next month and six by October, from 10 at<br />
the end of last year, military sources in Dili<br />
said.<br />
A battalion has about 600 soldiers.<br />
Since the invasion of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and its<br />
subsequent annexation in 1976, Jakarta has<br />
faced constant international criticism of its<br />
human rights policy there.<br />
It has tried to win international approval<br />
of its rule, still unrecognized by the United<br />
Nations. But world opinion turned further<br />
against it after Indonesian troops killed up<br />
to 180 people in Dili by firing into a crowd<br />
of mourners on November 12, 1991.<br />
Jakarta says it is trying to develop the<br />
territory after centuries of Portuguese neglect<br />
and most <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese want to remain<br />
part of Indonesia.<br />
With the arrest late last year of the leader<br />
of the Fretilin rebel movement, diplomats<br />
said the military could no longer justify the<br />
large numbers of troops in the impoverished<br />
territory.<br />
Military commander Suwardi said a team<br />
of high ranking officers from Jakarta military<br />
headquarters were in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> to assess<br />
the situation.<br />
“None of the remaining soldiers will<br />
belong to combat battalions. They will be<br />
from territorial units,” an army officer said.<br />
The territorial troops are meant to help<br />
with civilian projects and efforts to develop<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>’s economy.<br />
MILITARY REDUCTION IN<br />
EAST TIMOR?<br />
Radio Australia, 2am news 17th March<br />
19<strong>93</strong> Dateline: Jakarta Unabridged<br />
The following is a partial transcript of news<br />
broadcast. Material dealing with the<br />
UNHRC resolution is elsewhere.<br />
READER: Indonesia has rejected United<br />
Nations criticism of its human rights record<br />
in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>... At the same time the military<br />
authorities in for former Portuguese<br />
colony has taken what they say is a step<br />
towards winding up the Special Operation<br />
Command responsible for armed forces activities<br />
there since 1989.<br />
IAN MacINTOSH:<br />
But the Indonesian press has all but ignored<br />
the Geneva vote and the authorities<br />
appeared to be pressing ahead with steps<br />
they believe offer proof that the situation in<br />
the trouble province in improving. Whilst<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>’s Roman Catholic Bishop<br />
Monsignor Carlos Belo and other sources<br />
have recently accused Jakarta of continuing<br />
human rights abuses, the Indonesian military<br />
says its began the process of reducing its<br />
command presence and the troops strength<br />
in the former Portuguese colony.<br />
I what might otherwise have been a routine<br />
event the local army commander just<br />
been rotated, with the officer-in-charge of<br />
the military region which includes <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>, major general Suwardi who attended<br />
the hand over ceremony saying preparations<br />
had began to wind up the special command<br />
in charge forces of operations in the<br />
province for the past 4 years.<br />
Officials says if things go smoothly and<br />
the security situation permits, that command,<br />
currently headed by Brigadier Theo<br />
Syafei should cease to function in coming<br />
weeks. And they say troop numbers are to<br />
be further reduced with 8 territorial and 2<br />
local battalions remaining by next month.<br />
That would amount to just over 6000<br />
troops. But western military analysts estimate<br />
that support personnel and other detachments<br />
still leave the total armed forces<br />
presence at closer to 12,000. Despite official<br />
claims that armed opposition to Indonesian<br />
rule in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> no longer represent a<br />
significant threat.<br />
TIMORESE REBEL<br />
SURRENDERS TO<br />
INDONESIAN MILITARY<br />
(Reuter, DILI, <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, March 18)<br />
Another <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese rebel has surrendered<br />
to Indonesian armed forces in the<br />
territory, military sources said on Thursday.<br />
Sebastião Mariano, 37, a member of the<br />
Fretilin guerrilla movement, gave himself up<br />
to the army in the village of Same on<br />
Wednesday.<br />
“He came to us with his rifle after<br />
roaming across hilly areas outside the capital<br />
Dili for some time,” an army officer said.<br />
The dwindling Fretilin group, which<br />
wants independence for the former<br />
Portuguese colony, has fought against<br />
Jakarta’s rule for the past 17 years.
Page 36 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
Indonesian troops invaded the territory<br />
in 1975 and annexed it the following year, a<br />
move not recognised by the United Nations.<br />
Fretilin’s top man Xanana Gusmão is<br />
currently on trial on charges of promoting<br />
separatism, which carries a maximum<br />
penalty of life imprisonment. Several other<br />
rebels surrendered following his capture last<br />
November.<br />
The government says Xanana’s movement<br />
masterminded events which led to an<br />
army massacre in Dili in November 1991.<br />
Witnesses said up to 180 people were<br />
killed when troops fired into a crowd<br />
mourning the earlier death of an independence<br />
sympathizer. Jakarta put the death toll<br />
at 50 and listed 66 as missing.<br />
FOUR INDONESIAN<br />
SOLDIERS KILLED BY<br />
“FRETILIN” (BBC)<br />
BBC 19 March 19<strong>93</strong> Language : Indonesian<br />
(abridged)<br />
The Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI)<br />
issued an statement saying that 4 Indonesian<br />
soldiers have been killed recently by Fretilin<br />
guerrillas in the area of Lospalos (eastern<br />
part of ET). General Edi Sudradjat, the<br />
Commander in Chief of the Armed<br />
Forces/Defence Minister reiterated that,<br />
despite this event, ABRI will proceed with<br />
the withdrawal of the special forces from<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> as planned.<br />
This seems to me a new move as opposed to<br />
the usually reserved attitude from the<br />
military regarding issuing information to the<br />
public about their casualties. Is this just a<br />
tactic in response to the recent UNHRC<br />
resolution? On the other hand, this might be<br />
just another pretext/tactic to justify the delay<br />
of the ‘planned withdrawal’ of their special<br />
forces. I still recall that they’ve been talking<br />
about this plan since last year.<br />
– John MacD.<br />
REUTERS REPORT<br />
(Reuters, Jakarta, March 19) <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese rebels killed four people including<br />
two soldiers in an attack in the former<br />
Portuguese colony, Indonesia’s Antara news<br />
agency reported on Friday.<br />
It quoted the military as saying the other<br />
two victims of Wednesday’s attack were<br />
students doing field work in Los Palos,<br />
about 200 km (120 miles) east of the<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese capital of Dili.<br />
The rebels of Fretilin, which wants to set<br />
up an independent <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, have fought<br />
Jakarta’s rule for the past 17 years.<br />
Indonesian troops invaded the territory<br />
in 1975 after the departure of its colonial<br />
rulers and annexed it the following year, a<br />
move not recognised by the United Nations.<br />
AFP: TROOPS KILLED IN<br />
GUERRILLA AMBUSH<br />
Comment: Note that the Xanana Gusmão<br />
trial originally scheduled to end on 20<br />
March is now likely to drag for at least<br />
another month. Hearings are now taking<br />
place only once a week, making it obvious<br />
that the authorities do not want it to end<br />
before the next round of talks between<br />
Indonesia and Portugal scheduled to take<br />
place in Rome on 20 April.<br />
It is very likely that Indonesian casualties<br />
were higher than acknowledged in this<br />
report. – TAPOL<br />
According to an AFP report from Jakarta<br />
on 19 March 19<strong>93</strong>, two Indonesian soldiers<br />
and two students were killed in an ambush<br />
by <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese guerrillas in Los Palos on<br />
Wednesday. An army spokesman, Lt.<br />
Colonel Panggih, described the two students<br />
as being from a group carrying out field<br />
work but AFP said that according to sources<br />
in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, the students, both from Java,<br />
were members of a student regiment. The<br />
army did not disclose the size of the group<br />
that mounted the ambush.<br />
Armed forces commander-in-chief<br />
General Edi Sudradjat said that the ambush<br />
would not alter plans to disband the special<br />
military command, Kolakops, in <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>. He declined to say when this would<br />
happen but said it would not be before the<br />
trial of Xanana Gusmão has ended. The trial<br />
is expected to end in late April at the<br />
earliest.<br />
CNRM: NINE SOLDIERS KILLED IN<br />
LOS PALOS<br />
News from protected sources inside <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>, April 3.<br />
On March 29, 19<strong>93</strong>, guerrillas killed nine<br />
Indonesian soldiers in Los Palos, cutting<br />
their throats with knives in a nighttime<br />
ambush. No guerrillas were killed. The<br />
soldiers’ weapons were taken to the jungle<br />
by the guerrillas.<br />
The administrator in Los Palos, José<br />
Valente, mentioned the incident in the<br />
Indonesian newspaper, but he denied that<br />
people were killed.<br />
EDI: TROOPS KILLED WON’T<br />
DELAY WITHDRAWAL<br />
By Ian MacIntosh, International Report,<br />
Radio Australia, Monday 22 March 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
ANNOUNCER: The head of Indonesia’s<br />
armed forces believes last week’s attack on<br />
troops stationed in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> will not affect<br />
the government’s plans to disband its<br />
Special Command in the province.<br />
General Edi Sudradjat was speaking after<br />
being sworn-in to serve concurrently as<br />
Defence Minister in Indonesia’s new<br />
Cabinet.<br />
Ian MacIntosh reports from Jakarta ...<br />
MACINTOSH: Talking to reporters<br />
after his swearing-in by President Suharto,<br />
General Edi said the attack near the town of<br />
Los Palos in the eastern part of the Province<br />
on Wednesday night, would not change<br />
Jakarta’s plan to reduce <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>’s<br />
special operational command. He said the<br />
incident was not a serious one.<br />
He reiterated recent military claims that<br />
the pro- independence movement - Fretilin -<br />
no longer pose a serious threat and that the<br />
security situation in the former Portuguese<br />
colony was stable.<br />
But it is known that small groups of<br />
armed rebels are still operating from <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>’s forest and mountains. The Los<br />
Palos attack appears to confirm this belief.<br />
Earlier, a military spokesman reported<br />
that two soldiers and two university students<br />
were shot dead. They appeared to<br />
have been attacked, near the town, by what<br />
was described as elements of the pro-independence<br />
rebel movement.<br />
A spokesman said the students who were<br />
named were from Java and had been<br />
involved in field work in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. The<br />
dead soldiers were not identified.<br />
According to reliable local sources, the<br />
four were killed when a van in which they<br />
were travelling was ambushed soon after<br />
they left evening prayers at a local mosque.<br />
And the sources had a different description<br />
of the dead students, some claiming they<br />
were members of a university military<br />
training corp.<br />
The release of the armed forces statement<br />
just 24 hours after the attack contrasted<br />
with the time it normally takes for the<br />
Indonesian military to confirm such incidents.<br />
That prompted some speculation that the<br />
latest bloodshed might affect the proposed<br />
downgrading of the military command to the<br />
size of a normal provincial military<br />
administration.<br />
But General Edi’s subsequent remarks<br />
prove otherwise.<br />
The Armed forces commander and<br />
Defence Minister did not say when the<br />
command which begun in 1989, was to be<br />
disbanded. However, he indicated it would<br />
happen after the current trial of the <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese independent leader, Xanana<br />
Gusmão.<br />
For many months now, Indonesian officials<br />
have also been foreshadowing a reduction<br />
in troop numbers as part of the<br />
plan. However, General Edi made no mention<br />
of the pullout when he made his comments.
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 37<br />
Earlier last week, some officials had said<br />
the number of battalion stationed in <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> would be reduced to eight with two<br />
local battalions, next month. That would<br />
amount to just over 6,000 troops.<br />
However, military analysts estimate that<br />
with support personnel and other security<br />
detachments in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, the total armed<br />
forces present would still be in the order of<br />
10 to 12,000.<br />
CNRM COMMUNIQUÉ ON<br />
XANANA, OSORIO<br />
March 21, 19<strong>93</strong>. Translated from<br />
Portuguese; unabridged<br />
Communiqué from the Maubere Resistance<br />
National Council (CNRM), Fretilin Directive<br />
Commission (CDF):<br />
“The CNRM, based in the mountains of<br />
occupied <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, wishes to make public<br />
its position vis-a-vis the most recent developments<br />
concerning two questions:<br />
firstly, the trial of our companion Kay Rala<br />
Xanana Gusmão at the hands of Indonesian<br />
justice; secondly, the statement made by the<br />
eloquent Abilio Osorio Soares to foreign<br />
journalists, including, e.g., Portuguese.<br />
With regards the Xanana Gusmão case,<br />
the CNRM rejects any kind of proceedings<br />
by the judiciary of our Motherland’s occupier<br />
against prisoner of war Xanana<br />
Gusmão. Furthermore, it considers the argumentation,<br />
on which it intends to base the<br />
accusations against Xanana Gusmão, to be<br />
totally lacking in legal substance.<br />
The basis of the CNRM’s position is<br />
derived from the fact that the subject of <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>, in which Xanana Gusmão’s case is<br />
interwoven, is an international question,<br />
because of:<br />
l. the UN’s recognition of the <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />
People’s right to self-determination and<br />
independence;<br />
2. From Portugal’s internationally recognised<br />
legal/political position, as administrating<br />
power, it should be reiterated<br />
that:<br />
a) it maintains the <strong>Timor</strong>ese question<br />
under the protection of the UN Charter,<br />
b) it reaffirms its position on the decolonisation<br />
process of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, so<br />
brutally interrupted by the 1975<br />
Indonesian invasion, while endeavoring in<br />
every way to achieve for the <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />
People the free exercise of their right to<br />
self-determination and independence, in<br />
accordance with the Constitution of the<br />
Portuguese Republic.<br />
3. Xanana Gusmão’s trial is implicated in<br />
the legitimate <strong>Timor</strong>ese cause, to which<br />
the positions taken by certain wellknown<br />
people with responsibilities connected<br />
to the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> problem bear<br />
witness:<br />
a) Portugal’s Head of State, Dr. Mario<br />
Soares, demanding that Jakarta immediately<br />
and unconditionally release the <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />
Resistance leader Kay Rala Xanana<br />
Gusmão;<br />
b) UN Secretary General Dr. Boutros<br />
Boutros Ghali advocating the involvement<br />
of the man, now a prisoner, incommunicado,<br />
in the hands of the Indonesian military, in<br />
the talks aimed at finding an internationally<br />
acceptable solution to the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
problem.<br />
We have, therefore, strong evidence<br />
which questions the legitimacy of the<br />
Xanana Gusmão case, and makes both the<br />
prisoner’s trial and Indonesia’s argumentation<br />
void of any juridical value, as for example,<br />
the charge of “rebellion,” as one of<br />
the pillars supporting the accusations<br />
against Xanana Gusmão.<br />
It is from within this framework, therefore,<br />
that the CNRM drew its position:<br />
1. It demands the immediate and unconditional<br />
release of the prisoner of war,<br />
symbol of <strong>Timor</strong>ese Resistance, our companion<br />
and dear brother Kay Rala Xanana<br />
Gusmão.<br />
2. It appeals to the UN Secretary General<br />
to use his good offices to secure the<br />
protection of Xanana Gusmão by legal,<br />
diplomatic and moral means.<br />
3. It reaffirms its recognition of Kay Rala<br />
Xanana Gusmão as the symbol of the<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese Resistance, his functions as Head<br />
of the Resistance and Commander of the<br />
Falintil being frozen.<br />
4. It reaffirms that it fully supports the<br />
administrative power’s positions in favour<br />
of peace and the right to self-determination<br />
for the Heroic Maubere People.<br />
So, in answer to Abilio Osorio:<br />
1. No surrender! We reject surrender because<br />
that is the language of the hard-line,<br />
the militarist line, which Abilio Osorio corroborates<br />
by maintaining the presence of the<br />
occupier’s troops in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
2. Talks, yes! This we do affirm, because<br />
we are fighting for peace for <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and<br />
its People.<br />
We reaffirm, therefore, our backing for<br />
the demands of the administrating power’s<br />
government (Portugal):<br />
A REFERENDUM for <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>,<br />
which should result from the involvement of<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese representatives in the UN<br />
sponsored talks without pre-conditions. In<br />
this way, a fair and lasting peace can be<br />
achieved, in the Motherland of all <strong>Timor</strong>ese.<br />
Motherland or Death! The fight continues<br />
on all fronts!<br />
Headquarters of the Maubere Resistance<br />
National Council, in this 18th year of<br />
struggle against Indonesian occupation for a<br />
free and independent <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
CNRM<br />
(Ma’Hunu’s signature)<br />
Ma’hunu Bulerek Karathayano (Bukar)<br />
Secretary-CDF”<br />
MORE INDONESIAN DEAT HS<br />
IN TIMOR<br />
BBC, March 29<br />
Comment: It marks a new phase when<br />
reports of Indonesian casualties are coming<br />
from Indonesian sources, not the guerrillas.<br />
For reasons not unrelated presumably to<br />
their case for a continued presence in <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>, the army has reversed its tactics<br />
about admission of casualties in the war.<br />
According to the BBC’s Adam Brooks<br />
filing from Jakarta, military sources in<br />
Jakarta say that six soldiers serving in <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> are missing, feared dead, after an<br />
ambush by pro- independence guerrillas last<br />
week. The attack took place near Iliomar<br />
and indicates that armed resistance is<br />
continuing despite army statements that the<br />
guerrillas no longer pose a threat to security.<br />
While there has been no official confirmation<br />
of the report, senior military sources<br />
in Jakarta are quoted as saying the attack<br />
occurred early on 22 March, when a squad<br />
of nine soldiers was ambushed outside<br />
Iliomar. [Iliomar is on the south coast, some<br />
fifty kms south-west by road from<br />
Lospalos.] Three survived the attack while<br />
the other six are missing, feared dead.<br />
Another report of the same incident<br />
claims that the nine soldiers were all stabbed<br />
to death while they were sleeping and that<br />
eight weapons were seized by the guerrillas<br />
during the attack. A local district chief,<br />
named Maukoni, was mentioned as the<br />
source of the report.<br />
This comes little more than a week after<br />
the Indonesian army confirmed that four of<br />
their men were killed when their truck was<br />
ambushed near Lospalos.<br />
NEW TORTURE CHARGED<br />
AGAINST INDONESIA<br />
Letter to New York Times; March 31, 19<strong>93</strong><br />
To the Editor:<br />
“Indonesia, Deservedly Rebuked”<br />
(Topics of The Times, March 17) commends<br />
the Clinton Administration’s policy<br />
change on the situation in the former<br />
Portuguese colony <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. The<br />
Administration, unlike its predecessor,<br />
supported a resolution at the United<br />
Nations Human Rights Commission in<br />
Geneva expressing “deep concern” over<br />
human rights abuses in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.
Page 38 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
You note that the resolution “asks<br />
Indonesia to cooperate (which Jakarta says<br />
it will) with a U.N. inquiry into charges of<br />
torture and secret executions on the island,”<br />
which is occupied by Indonesia. Such<br />
cooperation could not be more timely, but<br />
much more is needed. I have received<br />
information from authoritative sources with<br />
whom I made acquaintance when I visited<br />
the region in late 1989 that indicate severe<br />
abuse of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>’s resistance leader<br />
Xanana Gusmão, who was captured by<br />
Indonesian forces last November and is on<br />
trial for political offenses.<br />
There had been charges of torture and<br />
coercion of Mr. Gusmão, with the<br />
Indonesians having members of his family at<br />
their mercy. Now, my source say, “the<br />
Indonesians are trying to break down<br />
Gusmão, to the point of his losing his<br />
mind.” Last month, the Roman Catholic<br />
Bishop of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, Carlos Ximenes<br />
Belo, stated that people arrested in the wake<br />
of Mr. Gusmão’s capture were being<br />
subjected to “all types of torture.” This, and<br />
the situation of Mr. Gusmão, should be high<br />
on the agenda of the Clinton Administration<br />
and the United Nations as they pursue the<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> matter with Indonesia.<br />
(Rev.) Paul Moore Jr. New York,<br />
March 24, l9<strong>93</strong><br />
The writer was Episcopal Bishop of<br />
New York, 1972-89.<br />
SYAFEI BECOMES UDAYANA<br />
COMMANDER<br />
Sources: UPI, Jakarta, 31 March 19<strong>93</strong> and<br />
Suara Pembaruan, Dili, 16 March 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
Summarised only.<br />
Brig. General Theo Syafei was today<br />
installed as commander of the Udayana regional<br />
military command based in Bali. This<br />
command covers <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
Syafei has been commander of Kolakops<br />
in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> since the month after the Dili<br />
massacre of 12 November 1991. Shortly<br />
before Syafei’s promotion to become regional<br />
military commander, the commandership<br />
of the Wira Dharma sub-regional<br />
command, 164/Korem in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>,<br />
changed hands from Colonel Dunija to<br />
Colonel Suntoro. This is reportedly in<br />
preparation for the dissolution of Kolakops,<br />
the special army command in control of <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
At the installation ceremony in Dili of<br />
the new Korem commander, Theo Syafei’s<br />
predecessor as commander in Bali, Major-<br />
General Suwardi, said that Kolakops is<br />
likely to be disbanded after the end of the<br />
Xanana Gusmão trial.<br />
General Edi Sudradjat who was is Bali to<br />
install Syafei in his new post also said that<br />
Lieut. General Wismoyo Arismundar,<br />
brother-in-law of President Suharto, will<br />
shortly be appointed chief-of-staff of the<br />
army, currently still being held by General<br />
Edi himself.<br />
DEMONSTRATION PLANNED<br />
IN DILI?<br />
Portugal’s independent TV station, SIC-<br />
TV, announced last night (April 6) that<br />
young <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese were planning to hold<br />
a demonstration outside the Bishop’s residence<br />
this morning, Wednesday, when UN<br />
envoy Amos Wako was scheduled to visit<br />
the Bishop. We have been informed that SIC<br />
broadcast the voice of someone in Dili<br />
expressing their determination to hold the<br />
demonstration.<br />
It is disturbing to see that such an event,<br />
if indeed it was planned, should have been<br />
made public in such a way unless those in<br />
charge felt that giving it publicity might<br />
provide protection for the demonstrators.<br />
No news has yet been received that any<br />
demonstration actually took place.<br />
Other reports about the Wako visit say<br />
that he met Xanana Gusmão and Mau Hunu<br />
in Dili. We have also heard that he asked to<br />
meet Saturnino da Costa Belo (who shouted<br />
slogans of defiance in the Xanana trial courtroom<br />
on 4 March) but there is no news that<br />
Wako did actually meet him.<br />
TAPOL<br />
YOUNG PEOPLE<br />
DEMONSTRATE IN DILI<br />
Publico 7 April 19<strong>93</strong> Dateline : Lisbon<br />
Translated from Portuguese unabridged<br />
According to a (Portuguese) independent<br />
TV channel (SIC) evening news program,<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese Resistance sources reported yesterday<br />
that young people held a demonstration<br />
that morning in the area around residence<br />
of Msgr. Ximenes Belo, Bishop of<br />
Dili. The protest was reportedly connected<br />
with the capture on Saturday by the<br />
Indonesian authorities of Ma’hunu, Xanana<br />
Gusmão’s successor as leader of the armed<br />
Resistance. The same sources added that the<br />
young people are prepared for anything,<br />
even to die.<br />
ARMY CHANGES IN TIMOR<br />
TAPOL report, 7 April 19<strong>93</strong><br />
The following is based on several media<br />
reports, mainly Tempo April 3 19<strong>93</strong> and<br />
Jakarta Post April 1 19<strong>93</strong>. In the past few<br />
days a number of new army commanders<br />
have been appointed around the country,<br />
with special attention going to the changes in<br />
and around <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>:<br />
Particular attention is given to two<br />
changes in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. First is the appointment<br />
of Colonel Soentoro to replace<br />
Colonel Dunidja as commander of the <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> sub-regional command, Korem<br />
164/Wira Dharma. Prior to this appointment,<br />
Colonel Soentoro was intelligence<br />
assistant to the commander of the<br />
Udayana/IX regional military command<br />
based in Bali.<br />
The appointment of Col. Soentoro is<br />
consistently reported as being a step in the<br />
direction of the disbandment of Kolakops,<br />
the special military command in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
of which Brig-Gen. Theo Syafei has been<br />
commander since December 1991.<br />
In Bali, Brig. General Theo Syafei has<br />
meanwhile been appointed commander of<br />
the Udayana/IX regional military command,<br />
putting him in overall control of military<br />
operations in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> as this regional<br />
command covers <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. He has not<br />
handed over the commandership of<br />
Kolakops to anyone, meaning presumably<br />
that he will hang on to that post until its<br />
formal dissolution, when Colonel Soentoro<br />
will take full control in what some senior<br />
officers have referred to as a ‘Korem-plus’<br />
or beefed-up Korem as compared with korems<br />
elsewhere.<br />
Reporting these changes, Tempo of 3<br />
April 19<strong>93</strong> says of Theo Syafei that he has<br />
spent “most of his military career in <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>.”<br />
Jakarta Post of 1 April 19<strong>93</strong> quotes Theo<br />
Syafei, after his installation as Udayana<br />
chief, as saying the army will go ahead with<br />
its plan to dismantle its special operation<br />
[i.e. Kolakops] in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> despite the<br />
continued present of armed resistance there.<br />
He said that both “territorial and organic”<br />
forces would be pulled out of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
gradually.<br />
“By 1995 (sic) at the latest, all the affairs<br />
currently being handled by the military<br />
should already be transferred to the local<br />
government,” he said, after the installation<br />
ceremony.<br />
JP reports also that Theo retains his post<br />
as chief of the special operational command<br />
in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> to oversee the withdrawal of<br />
the combat troops which have been stationed<br />
there since 1976 (sic).
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 39<br />
He said that there are 13 to 14 pockets of<br />
“security disturbing groups,” possessing<br />
104 weapons and spread out in five regencies<br />
but “militarily they are insignificant.”<br />
For more information about the precise<br />
nature of the army’s territorial operations in<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, as spelt out by Brig.Gen Theo<br />
Syafei himself, see “The true aim of<br />
territorial operations” in the latest issue of<br />
TAPOL Bulletin, No 116, April 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
MA’HUNU CAPTURED<br />
First reports, April 5<br />
According to ABC Radio National,<br />
broadcast just after 4PM Australian EST<br />
April 5, Indonesian forces captured Mau<br />
Hunu on Sunday.<br />
According to an AFP report from Jakarta<br />
which we have not yet seen ourselves, Mau<br />
Hunu was captured somewhere in the interior<br />
on Saturday evening 3 April. Portuguese<br />
radio this morning broadcast an interview<br />
with José Ramos-Horta in Sydney who<br />
confirmed the report, saying that Mau Hunu<br />
had been betrayed.<br />
(UPI, Jakarta, April 5) Veteran <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> resistance fighter Ma Hunu has been<br />
captured and is undergoing interrogation, a<br />
military spokesman in the troubled province<br />
said Monday.<br />
Hunu had taken over the leadership of<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>’s Fretilin guerrilla following the<br />
arrest late last year of the group’s leader,<br />
Xanana Gusmão.<br />
The 43-year-old Hunu was captured<br />
Saturday without resistance by Indonesian<br />
forces in a rural house with the help of local<br />
villagers, Maj. L. Simbolon said. The troops<br />
also seized a number of rifles and<br />
ammunition, he said.<br />
Hunu was being interrogated in <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> capital of Dili, Simbolon said.<br />
With the capture of Hunu - who is the<br />
son of a Portuguese and originally was<br />
named Antonio Gomes Da Costa -<br />
Indonesia marked a major success in its bid<br />
to quell the last remnants of the Fretilin<br />
guerrillas.<br />
Hunu reportedly was the last major<br />
Fretilin leader at large following the capture<br />
of top guerrilla leader Xanana in November.<br />
(Reuter, Sydney, April 5) <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />
rebels exiled in Australia, shocked by the<br />
capture of their second leader in five months<br />
by Indonesian forces, said on Monday the<br />
guerrillas had moved swiftly to find a<br />
replacement.<br />
Indonesian officials said on Monday that<br />
rebel Fretilin leader Antonio Gomes da<br />
Costa had been caught in a weekend raid of a<br />
safe house in Ainaro village, about 50 km<br />
(31 miles) south of Dili, <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>’s<br />
capital.<br />
Rebel sources said that after the capture<br />
of da Costa, known by his nom de guerre<br />
Ma’hunu, the top post had been taken over<br />
by second-ranking Konis Santana, a former<br />
student in his 30s who had joined Fretilin in<br />
1981.<br />
“While it may be terrible news, the imprisonment<br />
of another of our leaders is not<br />
going to see the resistance collapse,” said<br />
high-ranking Australian-based rebel official<br />
José Ramos Horta.<br />
Da Costa, 44, intensified the war after<br />
Gusmão’s capture. Rebels in January said<br />
they had killed at least 78 Indonesian soldiers<br />
and officers in six clashes between<br />
November 27 and December 23 last year.<br />
Da Costa’s capture was announced as<br />
Amos Wako, personal envoy of U.N.<br />
Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali,<br />
began a visit to Indonesia for a fact-finding<br />
mission on the shooting.<br />
The human rights group Amnesty<br />
International, expressing fears that Da Costa<br />
would be tortured, called on Jakarta to allow<br />
him immediate access to lawyers, his family<br />
and the International Committee of the Red<br />
Cross.<br />
“There are grave concerns given the past<br />
ill treatment of Fretilin prisoners,” said<br />
Amnesty’s Australian director Andre<br />
Frankovits.<br />
“It is our experience that the first 72<br />
hours of incommunicado detention are the<br />
most dangerous.”<br />
QUESTIONS SURROUND<br />
MA’HUNU CAPTURE<br />
‘PM’ ABC Radio (Australia) 5 April 19<strong>93</strong><br />
6pm. Jakarta correspondent Ian<br />
MacIntosh, Full transcript<br />
Ian MacIntosh:<br />
Ever since the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese independence<br />
leader XG was captured last<br />
November, Indonesian military officials<br />
have been insisting the network supporting<br />
Fretilin and other opponents of Jakarta’s<br />
rule in the province were severely weakened.<br />
In early February <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>’s civilian<br />
governor, Abilio Soares, boasted to<br />
Portuguese journalists that the authorities<br />
knew the whereabouts of Antonio Gomes<br />
da Costa, XG’s successor as Fretilin commander<br />
and predicted he’d surrender within<br />
two months. Last Saturday night, just two<br />
months later, the military says da Costa was<br />
captured alone in a hideout 55 km south of<br />
Dili after a tip-off from a local villager.<br />
Whilst the arrest of the man generally<br />
known by his nom de guerre, Ma’hunu, is<br />
yet to be independently confirmed, it<br />
appears to represent another serious blow<br />
to <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>’s independence movement.<br />
According to sources close to Fretilin,<br />
Ma’hunu had served with the group’s armed<br />
wing for much of the time since Indonesia<br />
annexed the territory 17 years ago. More<br />
recently he’d been XG’s deputy, and as<br />
such was fully versed in the rebels’<br />
strategies and policies. The sources indicate<br />
that when Mr. Gusmão shifted his attention<br />
to seeking support in the towns in recent<br />
years, Ma’hunu was effectively in charge of<br />
Fretilin’s armed operations in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>’s<br />
forests and mountains.<br />
But his reported capture has raised many<br />
questions, to which few answers have yet<br />
been provided. Colonel Suntoro, the military’s<br />
deputy commander in Dili, has<br />
claimed that Ma’hunu had been holed up in<br />
his hideout since January and was separated<br />
from his men. If that is the case it raises the<br />
question of whether XG’s successor was in<br />
effective command during a period when<br />
guerrillas carried out attacks on Indonesian<br />
troops which claimed the lives of at least<br />
eight soldiers. His reported arrest also<br />
comes at a time when <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> is back in<br />
the international spotlight. A personal<br />
envoy of UN Secretary General Dr. Boutros<br />
Ghali, on a return mission to Indonesia to<br />
further examine the human rights situation in<br />
the province, travelled to Dili to today for<br />
two days of talks there. The envoy, Amos<br />
Wako, is to report back to the secretary<br />
general before Dr. Boutros Ghali holds talks<br />
on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> later this month in Rome<br />
with the foreign ministers of Portugal and<br />
Indonesia. And as the interrogation was<br />
beginning in Dili of the man local officials<br />
say is Antonio Gomes da Costa, alias<br />
Ma’hunu, his predecessor, XG, was back in<br />
court for the 14th session of his trial on<br />
rebellion, conspiracy, separatist and<br />
firearms charges.<br />
ACTION ALERT TO PREVENT<br />
MA HUNU TORTURE<br />
April 5 19<strong>93</strong>. Case IDN/TIM 0504<strong>93</strong><br />
The International Secretariat of<br />
OMCT/SOS-Torture calls upon you to intervene<br />
on behalf of the following situation<br />
in Indonesia/<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
Brief description of the situation:<br />
According to information received from<br />
TAPOL, a member of our network, during<br />
the weekend the Indonesian Military arrested<br />
Mr. Antonio GOMES DA COSTA,<br />
44, (also known as Ma’hunu), the leader of<br />
the FRETILIN movement in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
Mr. DA COSTA, who assumed leadership<br />
of FRETILIN following the arrest of<br />
its leader Xanana GUSMÃO in November
Page 40 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
1992, was reportedly arrested in Ainaro<br />
Village, some 50km south of Dili, the capital<br />
of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, following a weekend raid on<br />
a safe house.<br />
Given that torture is regularly used<br />
against detainees, and particularly against<br />
members and suspected members of opposition<br />
groups, this arrest gives rise to<br />
genuine fears for the physical and psychological<br />
integrity of Mr. DA COSTA. In this<br />
context, it should be remembered that<br />
Xanana Gusmão, the jailed leader of<br />
FRETILIN, appeared on television shortly<br />
after his arrest bearing what some witnesses<br />
claimed to be signs of torture and illtreatment.<br />
The Indonesian authorities have accused<br />
FRETILIN of being behind the peaceful<br />
demonstration in November 1991, which<br />
ended in bloodshed when the Indonesian<br />
authorities opened fire on the demonstrators,<br />
killing some 180 and wounding many<br />
others. Following this massacre, the government<br />
jailed some civilians for up to 15<br />
years while those actually involved in the<br />
shooting received very lenient sentences.<br />
<strong>Action</strong> requested:<br />
Please write to the Indonesian authorities<br />
immediately demanding that they ensure the<br />
personal safety of Mr. Antonio GOMES<br />
DA COSTA at all times and guarantee his<br />
physical and psychological integrity and<br />
urge that his family and international<br />
observers have access to him.<br />
Insist that he be brought before a fair and<br />
impartial tribunal and that his procedural<br />
rights, including his right to legal counsel of<br />
his own choice, be guaranteed at all times in<br />
accordance with international standards.<br />
Demand that they ensure the respect for<br />
human rights and fundamental freedoms in<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> at all times in accordance with<br />
international standards.<br />
Please inform the authorities in your respective<br />
countries, the UN, the European<br />
Community and other inter-governmental<br />
and non- governmental organisations urging<br />
them to intervene both at the national and<br />
international levels so that appropriate<br />
measures are adopted to put an end to human<br />
rights violations in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and to<br />
ensure the respect for human rights and<br />
fundamental freedoms in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and<br />
Indonesia at all times. Urge them also to<br />
intervene in order to ensure that Mr.<br />
Antonio GOMES DA COSTA be brought<br />
before a fair and impartial tribunal and that<br />
his legal rights be guaranteed at all times.<br />
Addresses:<br />
President Suharto, Bina Graha, Jalan<br />
Veteran 17, Jakarta, Indonesia. Tlx 44469<br />
Attn. pres. Suharto and Tlx : 44283<br />
Let. Ismail Saleh, Minister of Justice,<br />
Jalan Rasuna Said, Kav 6-7, Kuningan,<br />
Kuningen, Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia. Tlx :<br />
44404 DITJENIM IA - Fax : 62 21 32 1625<br />
General Kunarto, Chief of the National<br />
Police, Kepala Kepolisian RI, Markas Besar<br />
Kepolisian RI JI, Trunojoyo 13, Kebayoran<br />
Baru, Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia.<br />
General Try Sutrisno, Commander of the<br />
Armed Forces, Markas Besar Abri,<br />
Cilangkap, <strong>East</strong> Jakarta, Indonesia. Fax : 62<br />
21 36 1471 / 62 21 37 8144 / 62 21 35 6404<br />
Ali Alatas, Minister of Foreign Affairs,<br />
Kementerian Luar Negeri, Jalan Tamam<br />
Pejambon 6, Jakarta, Indonesia. Tlx 44205<br />
His Excellency, The Ambassador of the<br />
Republic of Indonesia, 8 Darwin Ave.,<br />
Yarralumla (Ambassador to Australia)<br />
EAST TIMOR<br />
Abilio Osorio Soares, Governor of <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>, Gubernur KDH Tk.1 <strong>Timor</strong> Timur,<br />
Jalan Inpantal D. Hendrikue, Dili, <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong><br />
Brig. Gen. Theo Syafei, Military<br />
Commander for <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, Markas Besar<br />
Korem 164, Dili, <strong>Timor</strong> Timur, <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
Geneva, 5 April 19<strong>93</strong><br />
Please inform us of any action undertaken,<br />
(kindly quote the code number of our<br />
appeal in any related correspondence).<br />
STATEMENT BY JOSE<br />
RAMOS-HORTA<br />
From the Special Representative of the <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese Resistance abroad, in Sydney.<br />
Original document, 5 April 19<strong>93</strong><br />
News of the capture of Ma’hunu, the<br />
resistance leader of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> is now<br />
confirmed. As in the case of his predecessor,<br />
Xanana Gusmão, there are well-grounded<br />
fears that he will be tortured to extract<br />
confessions.<br />
“I call upon the Indonesian government<br />
to provide immediate, unrestricted access to<br />
Ma’hunu by independent international<br />
organisations,” Mr. Ramos-Horta said today.<br />
“Jakarta must abandon the show-trial<br />
methods they have been using to try to deal<br />
with the legitimate resistance of the <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese people.”<br />
As with the capture of Xanana,<br />
Ma’Hunu’s capture in no way diminishes<br />
the strength and determination of the<br />
Resistance. With serenity and determination<br />
the leadership of the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />
resistance, both inside and outside the<br />
country, will continue the struggle.<br />
On the diplomatic front, substantial gains<br />
have been made in spite of the capture of<br />
Xanana. The new arrest of another leader, if<br />
anything, will once again highlight the<br />
occupation and the need for a negotiated<br />
settlement of the conflict in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
Australia media inquiries for José Ramos-<br />
Horta: Margherita Tracanelli<br />
(02) 369 2676 (phone) (02) 389 2488<br />
(fax)<br />
FURTHER EXCERPTS FROM<br />
WIRES ON EAST TIMOR<br />
DEVELOPMENTS:<br />
UPI, Jakarta, April 5<br />
In Lisbon, Portuguese authorities and<br />
supporters of Hunu said his detention by<br />
Indonesian troops would not end unrest in<br />
the area.<br />
“The cause of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> is on-going,”<br />
said Portuguese President Mario Soares.<br />
“When a people is sacrificed and is brutally<br />
treated by a cruel dictatorship, the people<br />
always win out in the end.”<br />
Portuguese Foreign Minister José Durão<br />
Barroso said in Luxembourg Monday that<br />
Hunu’s arrest would not make negotiations<br />
any easier.<br />
“Things were already difficult, so obviously<br />
this arrest will not help. Certainly it<br />
will create a less favourable climate for<br />
talks,” he said.<br />
REACTIONS TO MA HUNU<br />
CAPTURE<br />
Publico 6 April 19<strong>93</strong> Dateline : Lisbon<br />
Translated from Portuguese unabridged<br />
Mario Soares (Portuguese President):<br />
“This is not the end of the Resistance<br />
and, essentially, it changes nothing, i.e. the<br />
fact that Indonesia is a dictatorship and does<br />
not respect human rights in the territory of<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. (...) Portugal should continue to<br />
defend the application of international<br />
resolutions with regards the condemnation<br />
of Indonesia’s behaviour.”<br />
Cavaco Silva (Prime Minister):<br />
“I hope this is not one more of<br />
Indonesia’s schemes, saying that on one side<br />
there are the politicians and diplomats and<br />
on the other there are the military.<br />
Something similar happened before the<br />
meeting in New York, with Xanana<br />
Gusmão’s arrest (...) That would not be<br />
good for the negotiations between Portugal<br />
and Indonesia.”<br />
Durão Barroso (Foreign Minister):<br />
“The news gives us no satisfaction, and<br />
just confirms that the situation in the territory<br />
gives rise to concern. (...) Any settlement<br />
for the question will be reached<br />
through diplomatic means and, therefore, the<br />
facts of the situation are unaltered by this<br />
arrest, just as it was by the arrest of Xanana<br />
Gusmão.”<br />
Adriano Moreira (Pres. Parliamentary<br />
Commission on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>):
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 41<br />
“The arrest of Ma’hunu demonstrates<br />
that Indonesia is extremely active in eliminating<br />
the external signs of Resistance, because<br />
it links this outward show of reducing<br />
the Resistance to the international campaign<br />
to show that the population adheres to the<br />
invader, when there is no relationship<br />
between the two circumstances at all.”<br />
Ramos Horta (spokesman for Maubere<br />
Resistance National Council):<br />
“On the international front, the<br />
Resistance was unaffected by Xanana<br />
Gusmão’s arrest. Also, our diplomatic position<br />
was not affected. Therefore, neither<br />
will Ma’Hunu’s capture have a negative<br />
effect on our strategy. (...) Time, as well as<br />
international circumstances, are in our favour.”<br />
Mari Alkatiri (member of Fretilin’s exterior<br />
delegation):<br />
“The Indonesians were clearly in hot<br />
pursuit of Ma’hunu, especially bearing in<br />
mind the Amos Wako visit, but also on account<br />
of the forthcoming Rome negotiations.<br />
Nothing surprises me. The situation in <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> is quite difficult, and when there is a<br />
17-year long guerrilla war in such a small a<br />
territory, any commander is at risk of being<br />
captured.”<br />
Vicente Guterres (Political Commission<br />
President of the <strong>Timor</strong>ese Democratic<br />
Union - UDT):<br />
“What has happened highlights an<br />
enormous military pressure of the<br />
Indonesian Government, namely on the UN,<br />
Portugal, the Resistance, and the <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />
people.”<br />
Abilio Osorio (Governor of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>):<br />
“You can almost say that he surrendered,<br />
because he came and hid in a house among<br />
the people, right in the town, and then they<br />
sent for the troops to come. They went<br />
there and he surrendered.”<br />
Francisco Lopes da Cruz (Pres. Suharto’s<br />
special adviser on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>):<br />
“Going on information from the people,<br />
and with the cooperation of that same civilian<br />
population, the armed forces easily located<br />
the place where (Ma’hunu) was and,<br />
naturally, arrested him.”<br />
HARSH BLOW TO THE<br />
RESISTANCE<br />
Diario de Noticias 6 April 19<strong>93</strong> Dateline :<br />
Lisbon Byline : Antonio Sampaio and João<br />
Pedro Henriques Translated from<br />
Portuguese abridged<br />
The <strong>Timor</strong>ese Resistance suffered a<br />
further blow with the arrest of Xanana’s<br />
successor, Ma’hunu. <strong>Timor</strong>ese leaders<br />
abroad are pointing at the almost unheard of<br />
Konis Santana as the new leader. Again,<br />
Jakarta chose the eve of an Alatas-Barroso<br />
meeting to arrest the Resistance leader.<br />
Ma’hunu, Xanana’s successor in the<br />
leadership of <strong>Timor</strong>ese Resistance, was arrested<br />
on Saturday night in a house in<br />
Manufasi, Ainaro, 55 kilometres from Dili.<br />
He reportedly did not resist arrest, in spite<br />
of allegedly being in possession of a (USmade)<br />
M-16 machine gun and 60 rounds of<br />
ammunition. On Sunday he was taken to<br />
Dili.<br />
Yesterday, Mario Carrascalao, former<br />
Governor of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> (appointed by<br />
Jakarta), told the Diario de Noticias (DN)<br />
that Ma’hunu was informed on by a<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese, whose initials are said to be F.A.<br />
However, the betrayal scenario - similar<br />
to that of Xanana’s capture less than 5<br />
months ago - was denied by analysts of the<br />
situation in <strong>Timor</strong>, living in Australia.<br />
These same analysts, contacted by the<br />
DN, stated that Jakarta could be “selling”<br />
this version of events in order to refute any<br />
claim that information which led to<br />
Ma’Hunu’s detention was obtained through<br />
torture of <strong>Timor</strong>ese prisoners, while at the<br />
same time claiming to the world that the<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese people are behind Indonesia, and<br />
not behind self- determination or independence,<br />
- just 15 days before a new meeting<br />
between Lisbon’s and Jakarta’s diplomatic<br />
chiefs.<br />
According to Mario Carrascalao, it is<br />
unlikely that Ma’hunu (<strong>Timor</strong>ese name of<br />
Antonio João Gomes da Costa) would take<br />
part in the same kind of repentance ceremonies<br />
as Xanana. The newly arrested<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese leader “is a true man of arms,”<br />
contrary to Xanana, who is “much more sophisticated”<br />
and has “greater mental<br />
flexibility,” said the former Governor, who<br />
knows both men personally. “I do not believe<br />
that he will publicly show any repentance,”<br />
he pointed out.<br />
The news of Xanana’s successor’s arrest<br />
hit Australia’s <strong>Timor</strong>ese community like a<br />
bombshell, and there were some immediate<br />
reactions, especially since some of the main<br />
leaders of the Resistance abroad are living in<br />
Darwin and Sydney: Alfredo Borges<br />
Ferreira and Mari Alkatiri (both Fretilin), as<br />
well as José Ramos Horta (special representative<br />
of the CNRM).<br />
In the wake of the news, and after time<br />
for confirming the reports, emergency<br />
meetings were organised, and it was then<br />
that the name of Konis Santana was indicated<br />
as Ma’Hunu’s successor. Mario<br />
Carrascalao told the DN he did not know<br />
the new leader: “That must be his nom de<br />
guerre. The only Santana I met in <strong>Timor</strong> was<br />
a priest of Indian origin,” he added.<br />
Dead and Resisters:<br />
Among the over 60 founding members of<br />
Fretilin, the following are still alive: abroad -<br />
José Ramos Horta, Mari Alkatiri, José Luis<br />
Guterres, Antonio Araujo, Antonio<br />
Barbosa, Francisco Joaquim Babo; inside<br />
<strong>Timor</strong> there are still - Filomena Paixao de<br />
Jesus, Alarico Fernandes, Abel Ximenes,<br />
Mariano Bonapartes Soares and Octavio<br />
Araujo.<br />
Regarding those who have died, were<br />
imprisoned, or chose to go over to the<br />
Indonesian side: Xavier do Amaral, Alarico<br />
Fernandes, and Leopoldo, “betrayed” the<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese and embraced pro- integrationist<br />
ideas; Borja da Costa, shot on Dili’s quayside<br />
on 7 December 1975; Justino da Costa<br />
Mota, arrested in 1975, died later in Lisbon;<br />
Mariano Bonaparte Soares, arrested in 1975,<br />
released, later re-arrested, and still in prison;<br />
Joaquim Urbano Saldanha, Maria do Ceu<br />
Pereira and Afonso de Araujo, killed in<br />
1979; José Sirilo Nunes, killed in Viqueque<br />
during a surround- annihilate operation in<br />
1979; Afonso Redentor de Araujo, killed in<br />
1979 after being arrested earlier that same<br />
year; Nicolau Lobato, killed on 31 December<br />
1978; Eduardo dos Anjos, killed in action in<br />
1980; Juvenal Inacio, disappeared in 1988;<br />
Ma’hunu, arrested on 3 April 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
MA’HUNU CAPTURED IN<br />
BATTLE<br />
Seminario 8 April 19<strong>93</strong> Original language:<br />
Portuguese Storytype: abridged translation<br />
According to a report in Seminario, 8<br />
April 19<strong>93</strong>, Ma’hunu was captured after a<br />
violent clash between guerrillas and the<br />
army. The information comes from José<br />
Ramos Horta who was contacted in Sydney<br />
by Seminario. He explained that he had received<br />
information from the interior which<br />
spoke of confrontation between guerrillas<br />
and a military platoon. The capture occurred<br />
last Saturday in Manufahi in the region of<br />
Ainaro, 56 km to the south of Dili,<br />
following a betrayal by a local inhabitant<br />
named Fernando Araujo (a well-known<br />
collaborator with the Indonesians).<br />
According to Ramos Horta, Ma’hunu<br />
was together with 20 guerrillas. Following<br />
the betrayal, a platoon of 30-40 Indonesian<br />
soldiers surrounded the area and started<br />
firing. As a result, 7 guerrillas and 4 Indo<br />
soldiers were killed and Ma’hunu was<br />
captured.<br />
Two months ago Abilio Osorio Soares<br />
told Portuguese journalists visiting the<br />
territory that Ma’hunu would be captured<br />
in 2 months time: he said he would surrender.<br />
No successor to Ma’hunu has yet been<br />
designated. Mari Alkatiri, a Fretilin leader,<br />
told Seminario that there were 3 candidates,
Page 42 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
Konis Santana, Lu-Ulo, acting Secretary<br />
General of the Fretilin Committee, and Ru<br />
Materuak.<br />
MORE WEAPONS FLOW<br />
TO INDONESIA<br />
PORTUGAL PROTESTS<br />
LONDON-JAKARTA MILITARY<br />
PLANES DEAL<br />
Diario de Noticias 5 February 19<strong>93</strong><br />
Dateline : Lisbon Original Lang.:<br />
Portuguese abridged<br />
The Diario de Noticias learned that last<br />
week the Foreign Ministry sent a letter of<br />
protest to the British Government over the<br />
sale of 44 Hawk military aircraft to<br />
Indonesia. The protest was sent as soon as<br />
Portuguese diplomatic channels confirmed<br />
the completion of the contract. With regards<br />
the offer to Indonesia of 39 warships by<br />
Germany, a source contacted by the DN<br />
recalled that the Portuguese Government<br />
had made known its concerns to Bonn when<br />
the contract was first being negotiated in<br />
1992. It was given guarantees that one of the<br />
contract’s clauses would be that the ships<br />
would not be employed in military actions<br />
against <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
SOUTHEAST ASIAN NAVIES<br />
GROWING BIGGER<br />
By Moses Manoharan<br />
(Reuter, Jakarta, Feb. 9) Southeast Asian<br />
navies are beefing-up in a strategic region<br />
made jittery by a power vacuum and a<br />
number of festering territorial disputes,<br />
analysts said.<br />
Indonesia’s purchase of 39 aging German<br />
naval vessels highlighted the trend in the<br />
region, where some of the world’s busiest<br />
sealanes are located and a dispute over the<br />
Spratly islands is on the boil, defence<br />
analysts said.<br />
Last month, Philippine President Fidel<br />
Ramos said the islands, in the South China<br />
Sea, were a possible flashpoint which had<br />
provoked “a mini-arms race of sorts.”<br />
A Japanese Defence Ministry official<br />
said there had been a vacuum in the area<br />
since the balance of power maintained by<br />
the United States and the former Soviet<br />
Union broke down.<br />
“Border disputes that remained quiet<br />
under the presence of the two superpowers<br />
have now surfaced as sensitive issues. The<br />
buildup in naval power can be seen as a result<br />
of this,” said the official, who declined<br />
to be named.<br />
Kensuke Ebata, a prominent Japanese<br />
defence analyst, said Indonesia’s acquisition<br />
was the latest move by countries in and near<br />
the Southeast Asian region to modernize the<br />
military.<br />
“The purchase can also be explained in<br />
terms of the power vacuum left in the area,”<br />
Ebata added.<br />
The potentially oil-rich Spratlys, claimed<br />
by China, Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia, the<br />
Philippines and Brunei are the most likely<br />
trouble-spot in the region.<br />
Chinese and Vietnamese naval forces had<br />
a brief clash over the islands in 1988. There<br />
was further tension last year when China<br />
announced plans to search for oil off<br />
Vietnam’s shores, set up a presence on a<br />
small island in the Spratlys and seized<br />
Vietnamese cargo ships sailing near southern<br />
China.<br />
Indonesia, which has no claim on the<br />
Spratlys, fears any military clash there<br />
could spill over to its Natuna island gas<br />
fields.<br />
It says its recent acquisitions are aging<br />
vessels from the former <strong>East</strong> Germany,<br />
without any blue water capability, which<br />
will be used for pacific purposes like transporting<br />
food to the nation’s far-flung islands.<br />
Armed forces commander, General Try<br />
Sutrisno, told Reuters the 39 ships would<br />
operate only within territorial waters.<br />
Jane’s Defence Weekly said the 39<br />
comprised 16 corvettes, nine minesweepers<br />
and 14 landing craft. Indonesia is also<br />
planning to buy two submarines to add to<br />
the two it has at present.<br />
The purchases, the biggest by Indonesia<br />
in recent years, are matched by other countries<br />
in the region.<br />
Singapore, whose 50-ship navy includes<br />
missile corvettes, landing ships and patrol<br />
planes, has four minehunters on order for<br />
1994. The first of 12 new large patrol craft<br />
is also due for delivery next year, analysts<br />
said.<br />
Singapore wants the United States to<br />
keep a strong presence in the region and<br />
provided the Seventh Fleet with a logistical<br />
headquarters after Manila closed the U.S.<br />
naval base at Subic Bay last year.<br />
In the Philippines, analyst Julius Caesar<br />
Parrenas of Manila’s Centre for Research<br />
and Communication said of the Indonesian<br />
purchases: “It might lead to an arms race,<br />
not because other countries could see<br />
Indonesia as a threat but because they<br />
would like to keep up with her.”<br />
Mak Joon Nam, a senior defence analyst<br />
at Malaysia’s state-backed institute of<br />
strategic and international studies, said: “It<br />
is a quantitative purchase rather than a<br />
qualitative one... if Indonesia’s intention<br />
was to match the defence capabilities of<br />
either China or Japan, it would have bought<br />
five new frigates instead of the second-hand<br />
units.”<br />
Malaysia is buying two frigates from<br />
Britain and also considering purchasing 27<br />
Russian-made MiG 29 fighters.<br />
In Taiwan, arch-foe of Beijing, defence<br />
analyst Richard Yang said Indonesia’s<br />
hardware purchases were aimed at resisting<br />
any threat from China and would increase<br />
pressure for a military buildup among Asian<br />
countries.<br />
“Indonesia has its own fears about<br />
Beijing’s military expansion. China is determined<br />
to be number one in Asia... The<br />
dispute over the Spratlys could lead to<br />
conflict,” said Yang, of the Sun Yat-sen<br />
Centre for Policy Studies.<br />
Taiwan has also been building up its<br />
navy in recent years to maintain a military<br />
balance with China, which claims sovereignty<br />
over the island and has refused to rule<br />
out the use of military force against it.<br />
In Beijing, a spokesman at the state-run<br />
China Institute of Contemporary<br />
International Relations said: “Some describe<br />
China as a tiger, claiming that Beijing dreams<br />
of setting up a greater China which may turn<br />
into the biggest tiger.<br />
“It seems that these people cannot go<br />
without an enemy.”<br />
INDONESIA NO THREAT TO<br />
ITS NEIGHBORS<br />
By Muklis Ali<br />
(Reuter, Jakarta, Feb. 11) Southeast<br />
Asian giant Indonesia, which is strengthening<br />
its military hardware, told its neighbours<br />
on Thursday it posed no threat to them.<br />
“President Suharto stressed that neighbouring<br />
countries do not need to worry<br />
about our military development,” State<br />
Secretary Murdiono told reporters.<br />
He was quoting Suharto’s comments<br />
during talks with Papua New Guinea Prime<br />
Minister Paias Wingti who is on a five-day<br />
visit to Indonesia with an entourage of<br />
nearly 200 businessmen, officials and politicians<br />
to promote economic cooperation.<br />
The two countries have long had border<br />
problems in the huge island of New Guinea,<br />
which they share. The problems are now all<br />
but settled but a small rebel movement<br />
continues to fight Indonesian rule.<br />
Suharto said Indonesia’s security and<br />
defence doctrine was based on a state ideology<br />
and constitution which guaranteed<br />
that Jakarta would not pose a threat to its<br />
neighbours.<br />
With a population of 180 million in over<br />
16,000 islands, Indonesia is by far the largest<br />
country in Southeast Asia.
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 43<br />
It recently bought 39 second-hand<br />
German naval ships and is negotiating to<br />
buy 24 Hawk trainer planes from British<br />
Aerospace. It also wants to add to its fleet<br />
of American F-16 warplanes.<br />
From 1963-66, Indonesia crossed swords<br />
with Malaysia on Borneo island, which they<br />
share. British troops helped Malaysia defeat<br />
what was known as a policy of<br />
“Confrontation.”<br />
In 1975 Indonesian forces invaded the<br />
eastern half of <strong>Timor</strong> island, then a<br />
Portuguese colony recently abandoned by<br />
Lisbon. Jakarta integrated <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> into<br />
Indonesia the following year, a move not<br />
recognised by the United Nations.<br />
Political analysts say that while<br />
Indonesia is not now seen as a belligerent,<br />
some countries in the region consider it a<br />
latent threat because of its sheer size, if<br />
nothing else.<br />
Suharto’s government says it does not<br />
feel threatened by other countries but must<br />
remain on guard for dissent at home. There<br />
are at least three small armed separatist<br />
movements in the archipelago which is home<br />
to a wide variety of ethnic groups.<br />
“But if Indonesia is disturbed certainly it<br />
will defend its honour,” Murdiono said.<br />
PORTUGAL PROTESTS AT<br />
GERMAN ARMS SALE<br />
AFP in Bonn reported on 16 February<br />
that Portugal has formally protested to<br />
Germany over the sale to Indonesia of 39<br />
second-hand surface warships and three new<br />
submarines, citing Indonesia’s ‘extremely<br />
regrettable’ human rights record in <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
The protest was made last Thursday but<br />
released Tuesday.<br />
German officials justify the sale by saying<br />
Indonesia was entitled to receive military<br />
equipment from Germany and that the ships<br />
would be partially disarmed and could only<br />
be used for coastal patrols, minesweeping<br />
and fighting pirates.<br />
GERMANY SELLS WAR SHIPS<br />
TO INDONESIA<br />
Brussels, Feb. 24 (IPS/Bob Mantiri) –<br />
reports in the German press that Bonn will<br />
sell 39 war ships and three submarines to<br />
Indonesia raised a strong protest<br />
Wednesday from Portugal.<br />
An official of the Portuguese foreign<br />
ministry in Lisbon said that Portugal will<br />
condemn Germany during the forthcoming<br />
EC foreign ministers meeting, scheduled for<br />
March 7 in Brussels.<br />
“Indonesia will use the war ships to<br />
suppress the people of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>,” the official<br />
said. <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> is a former<br />
Portuguese colony, which has been annexed<br />
by Indonesia since 1975. According to him<br />
the ships could also be used against people<br />
in Aceh and in Irian Jaya, who are also<br />
fighting for their independence from Jakarta.<br />
The German embassy in Jakarta would<br />
not confirm nor deny the reports in the<br />
German daily ‘die woche,’ which revealed<br />
last week that the deal will be signed during<br />
the visit of chancellor Helmut Kohl to<br />
Indonesia, next week. Kohl is visiting<br />
Singapore at this moment.<br />
A spokesman of the Indonesian ministry<br />
for security and political affairs in Jakarta,<br />
however, said that “negotiations on the delivery<br />
of German war ships had already<br />
started last year.”<br />
The talks with the Bonn government<br />
have been conducted by the Indonesian<br />
minister for science and research, professor<br />
Rudy Habibie, who is a member of the<br />
board of directors of German aircraft company<br />
messcherschmitt. Habibie, who studied<br />
aviation technology in Germany, is often<br />
mentioned in the Indonesian press as the<br />
serious choice of president Suharto for the<br />
post of his country’s vice-president.<br />
The spokesman of the security and political<br />
affairs ministry, headed by Admiral<br />
Sudomo, denied that the Indonesian navy<br />
would use the ships against the <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese people.<br />
There is still resistance against Indonesia<br />
in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. Indonesian troops recently<br />
caught resistance leader Xanana Gusmão,<br />
who, according to Amnesty International<br />
has been tortured while in prison. In Nov.<br />
1991 Indonesian soldiers killed, according to<br />
Amnesty International, more than 100 <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese students during an anti-Indonesian<br />
demonstration in the capital of Dili.<br />
Portugal has effectively blocked a new<br />
economic cooperation agreement with the<br />
six countries of the association of south-east<br />
Asian nations (ASEAN), of which Indonesia<br />
is a prominent member.<br />
It would only approve such an agreement<br />
if Indonesia promised not to violate human<br />
rights and allow a referendum, in which the<br />
people on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> could say whether<br />
they want independence or to remain an<br />
Indonesian province.<br />
KOHL IN TOKYO CHASTISED<br />
FOR ARMS SALE<br />
“Would You Sell Weapons to Iraq?” asks<br />
Japanese <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Support Group<br />
From FETJC, Feb. 28, 19<strong>93</strong><br />
The Free <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Japan Coalition<br />
protested Germany’s recent sale of frigates,<br />
submarines and other naval vessels to<br />
Indonesia in a letter to Chancellor Helmut<br />
Kohl, currently on a 4-day visit to Japan.<br />
Referring to the deaths of “at least<br />
100,000 to 200,000 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese since<br />
Indonesia’s 1975 invasion of the former<br />
Portuguese colony, and the fact that<br />
“Indonesia continues its military occupation<br />
of the territory in defiance of eight United<br />
Nations General Assembly and two<br />
Security Council resolutions,” the Japanese<br />
group compared the arms deal to “selling<br />
submarines and the like to Iraq,” which has<br />
been subject to international sanctions since<br />
its short-lived invasion of Kuwait.<br />
The deal involves 39 frigates, landing<br />
ships, and minesweepers, nearly a third of<br />
the former <strong>East</strong> German Navy, as well as<br />
three new submarines that Germany is<br />
building on order. The weapons transaction<br />
drew sharp criticism in Bonn earlier in the<br />
month. Norbert Gansel, Social Democratic<br />
Party spokesperson said: “Indonesia should<br />
not get any military support because of its<br />
involvement in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>,”<br />
Akira Matsubara, secretary of the Tokyo<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Association, one of eleven<br />
grassroots organizations grouped in the<br />
Japanese coalition, conveyed the letter to<br />
the German Chancellor on February 27<br />
through an official of the Germany Embassy<br />
in Tokyo. The letter cited a resolution<br />
passed by the Council of<br />
Europe banning the export of weapons to<br />
Indonesia in view of the human rights<br />
situation in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. It also recalled<br />
Germany’s own legal restrictions on supplying<br />
weapons to non-NATO regions involved<br />
in conflicts. The recent sale, it<br />
stressed, “not only ignores these rulings, but<br />
also goes against the post-Cold War<br />
aspirations of the world to affirm human<br />
rights and disarmament.”<br />
While Bonn has sought to allay criticism<br />
with assurances that the ships would be<br />
“partially disarmed” and could only be used<br />
for coastal patrols, the Japanese group<br />
challenged this: “One wonders if Germany<br />
would have agreed to weapons sales to Iraq<br />
by a country that defended the sales with<br />
the same reasoning.”<br />
Free <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Japan Coalition c/o<br />
Tokyo <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Association Tel: 0422-<br />
55-7<strong>93</strong>7 Fax: 0422-55-7768
Page 44 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
NGOS PROTEST WARSHIP<br />
DEAL TO KOHL<br />
1 March 19<strong>93</strong> Source: IMBAS<br />
The following letter was sent on the 24<br />
February to the German Chancellor, Kohl,<br />
protesting the sale of German war vessels to<br />
Indonesia at bargain prices.<br />
Please direct send such a protest to the<br />
German embassy in your home country.<br />
Dear Mr. Chancellor<br />
We are writing to express our concern<br />
about reports we have received regarding the<br />
intended sale of 39 most modern NVA<br />
warships (from <strong>East</strong> German Navy) to<br />
Indonesia.<br />
We wish to remind you that Indonesia<br />
has illegally occupied <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> in defiance<br />
of numerous UN resolutions since 1975 and<br />
has waged a continuing war against the local<br />
population.<br />
During this time up to 200,000 people<br />
have lost their lives and human rights abuses<br />
cause continuing and serious concern.<br />
The deal was reported postponed after<br />
the Santa Cruz massacre when at least 273<br />
people were murdered by the Indonesian<br />
military.<br />
Since then the situation of human rights<br />
has not been improved and the repression<br />
inside <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> is said to be as bad as in<br />
the late 1970s.<br />
The Federal Republic of Germany, like<br />
the UN, has never recognised the Indonesian<br />
annexation, and claims that it does not sell<br />
weapons to countries at war. Because of the<br />
aforesaid, Germany is in breach of its<br />
undertaking.<br />
We strongly condemn this deal.<br />
Furthermore we note that the vessels<br />
under negotiation may be sold at prices<br />
significantly below their actual value.<br />
According to the press, all 39 vessels are<br />
said to be sold for an amount of US$ 150<br />
million only, whereas only one corvette<br />
values US$200 million actually. This can<br />
only be regarded as covert military aid to a<br />
repressive regime.<br />
We call on you to investigate this matter<br />
and look forward to your early reply.<br />
Yours faithfully,<br />
A Paz es possivel em <strong>Timor</strong> Leste, Portugal<br />
Agir pour <strong>Timor</strong>, France<br />
Aksi Setiakawan<br />
Association <strong>Timor</strong> Oriental, France<br />
British Coalition for <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, UK<br />
CDPM<br />
Coordinamento Italiano dei gruppi di<br />
Solidarieta con il Populi <strong>Timor</strong>ese, Italy<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> <strong>Action</strong> <strong>Network</strong>, USA<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Alert <strong>Network</strong>, Canada<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Group Holland<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Solidarity Campaign, Ireland<br />
Free <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Japan Coalition, Japan<br />
Free Papua Movement<br />
Front Demokrasi Indonesia<br />
IMBAS, Germany<br />
Indonesian Resources Information Project,<br />
Holland<br />
International Platform of Jurists for <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong><br />
Japanese Supporting Committee for Darwin<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> School<br />
Komitee Indonesie, Holland<br />
Oporto University, Portugal<br />
Osttimor Kommitten, Sweden<br />
Paz e justicia para <strong>Timor</strong> Leste, Portugal<br />
SOS <strong>Timor</strong>, Belgium<br />
Tapol, UK<br />
<strong>Timor</strong> Oriental a.s.b.l. Luxembourg<br />
XminY Founding Agency, Holland<br />
PERPETRATORS OF<br />
VIOLENCE ARE UNLIKELY<br />
CHAMPIONS OF PEACE<br />
Vancouver Sun, 1 March 19<strong>93</strong>. From<br />
Stephen Hume’s At Large column.<br />
A proposed United Nations tribunal on<br />
war crimes in response to the vicious civil<br />
war in the Balkans simply offers yet more<br />
proof that we’re all prisoners of our own<br />
delusions.<br />
There are as many white-collar war<br />
criminals among the righteous nations that<br />
now talk pompously about a New World<br />
order as there are blood-soaked rapists in<br />
Bosnia.<br />
The atrocities in the Balkans are horrific,<br />
but are they more horrific than the<br />
butchering of one-third of the indigenous<br />
civilian population of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> by our<br />
Indonesian trading pals? There is one obvious<br />
difference that is not mentioned in polite<br />
society. The 10,000 victims in the<br />
Balkans were white Europeans, while the<br />
200,000 killed in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> were not.<br />
Indonesia’s invasion of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
parallels Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Iraq was<br />
bombed back to a pre-industrial state to<br />
enforce UN resolutions, yet since 1975<br />
Indonesia has openly defied UN security<br />
council resolutions ordering it to withdraw.<br />
At the time of the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> invasion,<br />
the U.S. supplied Indonesia with 90 per<br />
cent of its weapons while sitting on the<br />
same security council that condemned the<br />
aggression.<br />
Since 1980, 33 per cent of the world’s<br />
nations have indulged in state-sanctioned<br />
torture. One of those cited by Amnesty<br />
International is another security council<br />
member that enjoys delivering lofty sermons<br />
on human rights.<br />
Britain’s record of torture, tainted and<br />
miscarried justice and human rights abuses<br />
in Northern Ireland leaves it in no position<br />
to instruct anyone else in proper conduct.<br />
And what legitimate moral indignation<br />
over war crimes may we expect from China,<br />
where fractious students can be crushed<br />
under the treads of tanks and forgotten<br />
overnight?<br />
In 1992, there were 24 wars going on<br />
around the world. They cost more than $50<br />
billion. Virtually all have been supported<br />
with weapons, military and economic aid<br />
from the sanctimonious members of the<br />
UN’s security council.<br />
In fact, while the value of development<br />
aid to the Third World from industrial nations<br />
between 1985 and 1989 was $166<br />
billion, the value of weapons sold there was<br />
$195 billion. In other words, the rich nations<br />
made $29 billion in the exchange.<br />
So far, those killed in the continuing wars<br />
with the weapons and expertise provided by<br />
the people who say they want to punish<br />
war criminals – I’ll only count the dead, not<br />
the maimed, mutilated and mentally<br />
impaired – amount to about 250,000, most<br />
of them civilian non-combatants, many of<br />
them children.<br />
Since 1980, close to six million people<br />
have been killed in wars financed by the<br />
industrial giants of the First World.<br />
Seventy-five per cent have been non-combatants.<br />
All this violence diverts money from<br />
education, health care and economic infrastructure<br />
at a rate of $2 million a minute. In<br />
1991, the world spent $1 trillion to equip<br />
and maintain 66 million soldiers in preparation<br />
for war. In developing countries, soldiers<br />
now outnumber physicians by eight<br />
to one.<br />
One of the biggest supporters of the<br />
butchers, villains and lunatics responsible<br />
for this carnage has been that loudest and<br />
most officious upholder of human rights, the<br />
United States.<br />
I note that of the 14 high-ranking officers<br />
whose troops have committed “brutal<br />
human rights abuses” in El Salvador, 12<br />
were trained by the U.S. military.<br />
The Centre for Defence Information in<br />
Washington, D.C. estimates that the U.S.<br />
has supplied $300 billion in weapons,<br />
military assistance and economic aid in the<br />
Third World since 1962. In all but two of<br />
the countries now racked by war, factions<br />
were armed, trained and given economic<br />
support by the U.S.<br />
Uncle Sam is in Somalia milking our<br />
brain-dead media for every available ounce<br />
of high-mindedness about the noble purpose<br />
of its mission. But U.S. policy is responsible<br />
for much of the bloody chaos that<br />
convulses that sorry country.<br />
It was the U.S. that provided dictator<br />
Siad Barre with $700 million in military and
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 45<br />
economic aid so that he could wage an<br />
unbelievably cruel campaign of state terror<br />
against his people.<br />
Propped up by the U.S., this fool destroyed<br />
vital water supplies, slaughtered the<br />
herds of nomadic tribes and tortured and<br />
killed civilians on a grand scale. By the time<br />
he was finished, one in seven civilians had<br />
become a refugee.<br />
Rank of the U.S. among all countries in<br />
arms sales to Somalia since 1985? Number<br />
one.<br />
Today Somalia. Tomorrow Sudan.<br />
Between 1975 and 1985, despite incredible<br />
economic mismanagement and a campaign of<br />
state terror against non-Muslims that totally<br />
traumatized the country, fully two-thirds of<br />
U.S. military aid in sub-Saharan Africa went<br />
to the military dictatorship in Sudan.<br />
The real crime is war and the most dangerous<br />
war criminals are those who subvert<br />
peaceful development by selling weapons<br />
and feeding the conflicts that create their<br />
markets.<br />
DEMONSTRATION AT<br />
BRITISH AEROSPACE<br />
From Peace News 2365 (April 19<strong>93</strong>).<br />
Cherry trees for BAe<br />
On Saturday 6 March, more than 30<br />
demonstrators gathered at the British<br />
Aerospace (BAe) plant in Stevenage, Herts,<br />
in solidarity with Chris Cole (PN March<br />
19<strong>93</strong>) and to protest against BAe arms sales<br />
to Indonesia. BAe is currently finalizing a<br />
deal to sell up to 144 Hawk strike attack<br />
aircraft to Indonesia, which has occupied<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> since 1975 in defiance of more<br />
than 10 UN resolutions. Hundreds of<br />
thousands of <strong>Timor</strong>ese have died as a result.<br />
Protesters walked onto BAe property<br />
and at first met with no resistance, even<br />
when planting bulbs and a flowering<br />
Japanese cherry tree in the lawn in front of<br />
the main gate. A child-sized grave was dug<br />
in the lawn, with a paper headstone saying<br />
“Remember the dead of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.”<br />
There were eventually seven arrests, and<br />
six were taken to the police station. Three<br />
trespassers crawled under a fence in front of<br />
a police officer and were chased through the<br />
site. Three other activists were pulled off a<br />
pillar inside a neighbouring BAe site as they<br />
were holding a banner saying “Hammer BAe<br />
swords into ploughshares.”<br />
One ARROW member was arrested near<br />
the main gate and driven out of town by the<br />
police. He refused to be dumped in the<br />
middle of nowhere and was driven back to<br />
the police station, where he was simply left<br />
by the side of the road. No charges were laid<br />
against any of the protesters who had been<br />
detained, though there was some rough<br />
handling.<br />
The mass trespass was organised by<br />
ARROW at the request of the BAe<br />
Ploughshares Support Group, with legal<br />
support by the Peace Movement Legal<br />
Support Unit. Our action was featured on<br />
Anglia and Carlton regional television news.<br />
Emily Johns, BAe Ploughshares, c/o<br />
NVRN, 162 Holloway Rd, London N7 8DQ<br />
GERMAN EMBASSY REPLIES<br />
TO CANADA<br />
March 18, 19<strong>93</strong><br />
I think the letter speaks for itself and require<br />
no interpretation, ETAN/Ottawa<br />
Dear Madam, dear Sir,<br />
with reference to your letter dated March<br />
3, 19<strong>93</strong> I would like to state the following.<br />
It is true that the Federal Republic of<br />
Germany sold 39 ex-National People’s<br />
Navy vessels to Indonesia. Although the<br />
term “warship” is technically correct, it<br />
might convey the wrong impression. The<br />
vessels in question are predominantly vintage-1960s<br />
coast patrol boats. Furthermore,<br />
the price you stated (US-$150 million) is<br />
incorrect. Unfortunately I am in no position<br />
to inform you about the correct amount.<br />
Under the terms of the contract, the 39<br />
vessels will be de-militarized at the expense<br />
of the Indonesian government, i.e. all armory<br />
fixed to the vessels will be dismounted.<br />
The vessels will be used by Indonesia to<br />
counter the threat posed by an increasing<br />
number of acts of piracy and drug-trafficking<br />
within its territorial waters. Because of<br />
the aforesaid, the contract for sale of those<br />
vessels does by no means constitute a covert<br />
military aid to Indonesia.<br />
I would like to emphasize the fact that in<br />
the past the Federal Republic of Germany<br />
has repeatedly protested against the human<br />
rights infractions committed by the<br />
Indonesian government and has never recognized<br />
the annexation of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. The<br />
Federal Republic of Germany is unequivocally<br />
in line with the numerous UN resolutions<br />
on that matter.<br />
Furthermore, the contract for sale of the<br />
39 coast patrol vessels was completed only<br />
after the European Community had explicitly<br />
stated that the human rights situation<br />
had significantly improved. If the<br />
Federal Republic of Germany had had any<br />
legitimate concerns, it would not have<br />
concluded that deal.<br />
Yours sincerely,<br />
(Rainer Sulzer), First Secretary<br />
This letter is dated March 18, 19<strong>93</strong>; with<br />
regards to the last paragraph, I guess<br />
Germany didn’t inform its embassies of the<br />
vote at the UN on March 12, 19<strong>93</strong>!!<br />
I am curious though, of the other countries<br />
that wrote to their German embassies, did<br />
you receive a reply?<br />
PROSPECTS FOR MORE<br />
HAWK SALES FROM BAE<br />
From TAPOL, April 8, 19<strong>93</strong>, Storytype:<br />
combined<br />
The Indonesian airforce needs nearly 100<br />
more warplanes and could buy them from<br />
Britain if Jakarta’s conditions are met,<br />
Research and Technology Minister<br />
Bacharuddin Habibie said on Wednesday [7<br />
April].<br />
The deal depends on British Aerospace<br />
giving 35 per cent of the manufacture of its<br />
Hawk aircraft to Indonesia’s state-run<br />
Industry Pesawat Terbang Nusantara<br />
(IPTN) and helping Jakarta acquire Britain’s<br />
Civil Aviation Authority airworthiness<br />
certificate for IPTN’s 35-seat CN-235<br />
transport aircraft, said Habibie. “These are<br />
our conditions,” he said, adding that British<br />
Aerospace and the British government were<br />
showing a willingness to cooperate.<br />
Talking only a day after British Foreign<br />
Minister Douglas Hurd visited Jakarta,<br />
Habibie said “It is normal that we need more<br />
fighter planes for our airforce. According to<br />
the planning . . . our airforce in the future<br />
could use six squadrons of Hawks. This<br />
means at least 96 planes,” Habibie said.<br />
Indonesia is currently negotiating with<br />
British Aerospace for 24 Hawks, worth<br />
about 500 million.<br />
A British embassy spokesperson said<br />
that the planes were being sold as trainers<br />
and the company is adamant that the aircraft<br />
under discussion cannot be armed. Habibie,<br />
however, said “The planes will be used not<br />
only to train pilots but also for ground<br />
attack.”<br />
Any sale of military equipment to<br />
Indonesia is politically sensitive because of<br />
concerns over the country’s human rights<br />
record. Two years ago Indonesian troops<br />
slaughtered more than 50 mourners at a funeral<br />
in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
Analysts predict a possible arms race<br />
since Indonesia, with 180 million people and<br />
an air force with five squadrons of combat<br />
aircraft, is now matched in its defence<br />
purchases by several countries in the region.<br />
Air Chief Marshall Siboen, head of the<br />
airforce, who has made a number of proud<br />
announcements about the Hawk deal in the<br />
last six months, was recently replaced in the<br />
new cabinet. Habibie seems to be back in<br />
control, driving a hard bargain for the<br />
benefit of both sides of Indonesia’s aerospace<br />
industry - military and civilian.
Page 46 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
SUHARTO<br />
“RE-ELECTED”,<br />
TRY IS NEW V.P.<br />
PETITION SUPPORT SWELLS<br />
FOR SUHARTO<br />
The Straits Times, February 10, 19<strong>93</strong><br />
SUPPORT for the re-election of<br />
President Suharto continues to swell as<br />
more groups filed petitions of support with<br />
the People’s Consultative Assembly<br />
(MPR), according to a report in The Jakarta<br />
Post yesterday.<br />
The All-Java Association of Youth and<br />
Student <strong>Action</strong> and a dozen organisation<br />
leaders from Irian Jaya were quoted as<br />
saying in Jakarta that they needed President<br />
Suharto to stay at the helm “to ensure the<br />
continuity of development.”<br />
They also supported the role of the<br />
armed forces in both defence and politics<br />
which, they said, had maintained national<br />
unity and safeguarded development successfully.<br />
According to the newspaper, the petitions<br />
filed with MPR deputy speaker<br />
Achmad Amiruddin added to the long list of<br />
support for President Suharto’s renomination<br />
in next month’s presidential polls.<br />
The five political organisations making<br />
up the MPR, the United Development<br />
Party (PPP), the Golkar political grouping,<br />
the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI), the<br />
armed forces and the Regional<br />
Representatives, have endorsed the reelection<br />
of Mr. Suharto, who has been in<br />
power for 25 years.<br />
The association’s 10-member delegation,<br />
led by Mr. Aly Saleh, also backed armed<br />
forces chief Try Sutrisno for the vicepresidential<br />
post.<br />
Mr. Saleh was quoted as saying that the<br />
decision to renominate Mr. Suharto and<br />
back General Try was taken at a recent<br />
congress in Linggajati, West Java.<br />
The association requested that its members<br />
be given a more political role, claiming<br />
that the organisation had been an ardent<br />
supporter of the New Order regime under<br />
Mr. Suharto.<br />
The group from Irian Jaya did not make<br />
any mention of the vice-presidential candidate.<br />
But the group sought support for Mr.<br />
Jannes Johan Karubaba to replace Governor<br />
Barnabas Suebu, whose term of office would<br />
end in the near future.<br />
MPR deputy speaker Amiruddin said<br />
that he could not endorse Mr. Karubaba’s<br />
candidacy for governor as only the Home<br />
Minister, Mr. Rudini, had the authority to<br />
do so.<br />
ENVOY AT UN TOLD TO<br />
CAMPAIGN FOR TIMOR<br />
ACCEPTANCE<br />
Jakarta Post, 16 February 19<strong>93</strong>. slightly<br />
abridged<br />
(Jakarta) President Suharto said yesterday<br />
Indonesia must continue with its campaign<br />
in the UN to gain international acceptance<br />
of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>’s integration into the<br />
republic.<br />
Suharto told the Indonesian Ambassador<br />
to the UN, Nugroho Wisnumurti, that as far<br />
as Indonesia is concerned the question of<br />
integration has been settled and that the<br />
people of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> have already exercised<br />
their right to self-determination.<br />
“It is then our task to inform the world<br />
of all the events that have taken place and of<br />
the real situation in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>,” Nugroho<br />
said after meeting with the President at the<br />
Merdeka Palace.<br />
The world body has yet to give its recognition<br />
of the 1976 integration of <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> and instead continues to regard<br />
Portugal, the province’s colonial master for<br />
four centuries until 1975, as the territory’s<br />
administering power.<br />
Nugroho said <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> has remained in<br />
the UN agenda since the issue was raised in<br />
1982 by Portugal which questioned the<br />
legitimacy of Indonesia’s rule over the<br />
territory.<br />
“But the issue no longer reverberates in<br />
the United Nations and does not attract too<br />
much attention,” the diplomat said, noting<br />
that the world body was preoccupied with<br />
the problems in Bosnia, Somalia, Palestine<br />
and Cambodia.<br />
He said Indonesia’s explanation of the<br />
tragic incident in Dili in November in 1991<br />
and the subsequent steps taken by the government<br />
were strongly appreciated by many<br />
UN members.<br />
The tragedy, in which the government<br />
reported that 50 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> demonstrators<br />
were killed in clashes with troops, caused an<br />
international uproar, prompting Indonesia to<br />
take drastic steps to remedy the situation<br />
including the removal of two army generals<br />
from their posts.<br />
Vote<br />
Nugroho said if the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> question<br />
was put to a vote this year, “there is a very<br />
slim chance for Portugal to win.”<br />
Many of countries that had supported<br />
Portugal in the past have altered their view.<br />
Mozambique, which had been very vocal,<br />
no longer raises the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> question, he<br />
said citing an example.<br />
Although still in the UN agenda, the <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> question has been repeatedly<br />
postponed each year since 1982 to give<br />
Indonesia and Portugal a chance to resolve<br />
the issue under the auspices of the UN<br />
Secretary General.<br />
The foreign ministers of the two countries<br />
last met in the United Nations in<br />
December. The two agreed to meet again on<br />
April 20 in Rome.<br />
Several UN members, including some<br />
European Community states and Balkan<br />
countries have questioned Indonesia about<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> but it was on the human rights<br />
situation in the territory and on the steps<br />
taken in connection with the Dili tragedy,<br />
Nugroho said.<br />
The diplomat said he had just visited<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and met with local leaders including<br />
Bishop Carlos Ximenes Felipe Belo.<br />
He also held talks with José Alexandre<br />
“Xanana” Gusmão, the former leader of the<br />
Fretilin separatist rebel movement currently<br />
on trial on charges of armed rebellion.<br />
Non-Aligned<br />
Nugroho yesterday reported to the<br />
President about he recent UN General<br />
Assembly, specifically on the efforts of the<br />
Non- Aligned Movement (NAM), currently<br />
chaired by Indonesia, in fighting for its interests<br />
in the world body.<br />
Nugroho said NAM’s Coordinating<br />
Bureau, which includes all NAM members<br />
working through their representatives at the<br />
UN, is following up on the decisions taken<br />
at the NAM Summit in September.<br />
NAM had also formed a working group,<br />
in compliance with the Summit’s mandate,<br />
to specifically look into the current efforts<br />
to restructure the United Nations.<br />
GEN. TRY KEEPS MUM<br />
ABOUT ACCEPTING V-P<br />
NOMINATION<br />
The Straits Times, February 18, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
BYLINE: Paul Jacob, Jakarta<br />
Correspondent<br />
Jakarta -Indonesia’s highly-respected<br />
army chief Edi Sudradjat will be appointed<br />
commander-in-chief of the country’s nearly<br />
500,000-strong armed forces (ABRI) tomorrow.<br />
Outgoing ABRI chief General Try<br />
Sutrisno, who appears headed for unanimous<br />
nomination as Indonesia’s next vicepresident,<br />
made the announcement at the<br />
military’s headquarters yesterday.<br />
He said Gen. Sudradjat, who at 54 is the<br />
oldest man appointed by President Suharto<br />
to the powerful position, would hold the<br />
post of army chief until further notice.
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 47<br />
Gen. Try said he had no immediate announcement<br />
to make on impending changes<br />
to the chiefs of the air force, navy and police.<br />
He said that Gen. Sudradjat was chosen<br />
because he was the most senior of the<br />
service chiefs -all of whom hold four-star<br />
general rank -and because the army was the<br />
senior-most military service.<br />
Gen. Sudradjat, a trim, tall figure, succeeded<br />
Gen. Try as army chief in February<br />
1988 and was promoted to four-star rank<br />
the same day he took up the appointment.<br />
Analysts said his elevation to commander-in-chief<br />
reflects not only the trust<br />
he enjoys from the President, the military<br />
and political leadership, but also demonstrates<br />
his political astuteness.<br />
He will preside over an armed forces<br />
which exerts considerable influence over the<br />
country because of its historical dualfunction<br />
as a security force and a sociopolitical<br />
organisation.<br />
Analysts have long pointed out that one<br />
of the most, if not the most important factor<br />
Mr. Suharto uses to decide on the appointment,<br />
is the degree of “political confidence”<br />
he has in a nominee.<br />
Some analysts said, however, that a<br />
possible recurrence of Gen. Sudradjat’s<br />
throat cancer, which he appears to have<br />
overcome, could affect his tenure as ABRI<br />
chief.<br />
One analyst said Gen. Sudradjat might be<br />
shifted to “a less strenuous ministerial<br />
position” once the new Cabinet is appointed<br />
towards the end of March.<br />
Gen. Try said yesterday that a change at<br />
the helm of ABRI was long overdue. He<br />
himself should have stepped down in 1990<br />
on reaching the retirement age of 55 but his<br />
term had been extended on a yearly basis<br />
since then. He said that he was now<br />
“preparing to enter pensionable service.”<br />
Though asked repeatedly by journalists,<br />
Gen. Try declined to give a firm response to<br />
whether he would accept the vice-presidential<br />
nomination.<br />
The question has dogged him since the<br />
Indonesian Democratic Party, ABRI and the<br />
Muslim-based United Development Party<br />
announced that they were backing him for<br />
the position.<br />
SUDRADJAT LOCALLY<br />
TRAINED<br />
The Straits Times, February 18, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
BYLINE: Paul Jacob, Jakarta<br />
Correspondent<br />
Jakarta -General Edi Sudradjat, the<br />
Indonesian army chief who becomes armed<br />
forces commander-in-chief tomorrow, is<br />
most proud of one important fact.<br />
“I’m a local army man,” he once told<br />
journalists, referring to the fact that his entire<br />
military training had been done within<br />
Indonesia.<br />
Gen. Sudradjat was among the first batch<br />
of officers to graduate from Indonesia’s elite<br />
National Military Academy in 1960 and his<br />
appointment to the military’s senior-most<br />
post comes just nine weeks short of his<br />
55th birthday.<br />
He also appears to have overcome a difficult<br />
obstacle which could have put paid to<br />
any advancement beyond his position as<br />
army chief.<br />
It was only in 1990 that news first surfaced<br />
publicly that he had throat cancer.<br />
Now, however, he is said to have overcome<br />
the problem.<br />
Journalists who covered his activities in<br />
those intervening years said that he never let<br />
it get in the way of his job.<br />
He has also remained active in sports,<br />
and still plays golf and tennis once a week.<br />
Last year, at a shooting meet attended by<br />
several senior ASEAN military officers, he<br />
walked away the champion in the rifle<br />
category.<br />
His varied experience in command-andfield<br />
appointments was not unrecognized.<br />
At a time when brigadier-general was the<br />
highest rank given to a regional military<br />
commander serving outside Java, he was one<br />
of the very few to attain the two-star rank<br />
of major-general.<br />
He has served and commanded units of<br />
the elite Special Forces and Strategic<br />
Reserve Command, and also served in<br />
peacekeeping operations in Vietnam in<br />
1973.<br />
His most difficult task in recent years<br />
came when he appointed a panel to probe<br />
the military’s conduct in the 1991 <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> killings -and then meted out punishment<br />
to senior officers and servicemen<br />
found guilty of misconduct.<br />
Gen. Sudradjat, a Muslim and married<br />
with four children, has been consistently<br />
described as a true professional. He is highly<br />
regarded for his integrity and reportedly has<br />
outstanding ties with subordinates.<br />
“I do not think there is anyone who will<br />
argue that he is the right man for the job as<br />
ABRI commander. He is a true soldier, an<br />
outstanding commander and a respected<br />
leader,” said a military attaché here.<br />
NEW ABRI CHIEF A TIMOR<br />
VETERAN<br />
TAPOL report, 17 February 19<strong>93</strong><br />
General Edi Sudradjat was today appointed<br />
commander-in-chief of the<br />
Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI), in place<br />
of General Try Sutrisno who is the ABRI<br />
candidate for vice-president. General Try<br />
reached the age of retirement a year ago and<br />
was due to be replaced anyway.<br />
General Edi Sudradjat is from the elite<br />
red-beret Kopassus, which makes him a<br />
much tougher soldier than his predecessor<br />
who is from the corps of engineers. The new<br />
C-in-C is a <strong>Timor</strong> war veteran, having<br />
served in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> during the period of<br />
Operasi Seroja, from 1978. This is when the<br />
war to crush the armed resistance was at its<br />
height.<br />
STUDENTS DETAINED<br />
FOR DEMO<br />
(Jakarta, March 9 Kyodo) Indonesia’s<br />
military and police detained several students<br />
who demonstrated Tuesday against<br />
President Suharto’s unopposed nomination<br />
for a sixth five-year term, witnesses said.<br />
Students from several big cities, carrying<br />
banners, marched to the front gate of the<br />
People’s Consultative Assembly one day<br />
ahead of the legislature’s reelection of<br />
Suharto.<br />
The assembly was convened on March 1<br />
and will end Thursday with the swearing in<br />
of the president. Retired Gen. Try Sutrisno<br />
is certain to be elected vice president.<br />
The military has deployed 11,000 personnel<br />
to guard the assembly session.<br />
‘The assembly sessions are only a play<br />
act of democracy,’ one banner read. ‘For the<br />
future of the nation, we refuse Suharto,’ said<br />
another.<br />
Police and military personnel forced the<br />
students away from the assembly area and<br />
after some scuffles five were detained and<br />
taken away in two cars, witnesses said.<br />
STUDENTS ARRESTED AS<br />
SUHARTO ACCEPTS TRY<br />
Green Left #92, March 17, 19<strong>93</strong><br />
Forty students demonstrated outside the<br />
Indonesian parliament on March 10 to protest<br />
against the nomination and election of<br />
ex- general Suharto as president.<br />
The demonstrators, carrying placards<br />
attacking recent price rises and rises in<br />
MPs’ salaries, were arrested as soon as they<br />
unfurled their banners and raised their<br />
placards. The parliament had been surrounded<br />
by army and police units for over a<br />
week.<br />
According to Green Left’s sources in<br />
Jakarta, the students were released the next<br />
morning. Among those arrested was Yenny<br />
Damianto, who visited Australia in 1991 to<br />
participate in the Beyond Borders environmental<br />
tour of Victorian high schools.<br />
Inside the parliament, the show proceeded<br />
as planned. This time, however, the
Page 48 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
scenario was determined by the armed<br />
forces leadership rather than Suharto. The<br />
president was unable to get any of the parliamentary<br />
fractions to nominate an additional<br />
candidate for vice-president. The<br />
military’s candidate, former armed forces<br />
chief Try Sutrisno, was therefore elected<br />
unopposed (as was Suharto).<br />
The ongoing struggle between Suharto<br />
and the armed forces is now likely to focus<br />
on the appointment of the defence minister<br />
in the next Cabinet. The current minister is<br />
the main plotter against Suharto, ex-general<br />
Benny Murdani.<br />
The other key position to be decided is<br />
chief of staff of the army, the second most<br />
powerful position after commander in chief<br />
of the armed forces. Sources in Jakarta say<br />
that the main candidates are Suharto’s<br />
cousin-in-law, General Wismoyo, and<br />
General Feisal Tanjung, reputedly favoured<br />
by the anti-Suharto establishment.<br />
SUHARTO STILL SILENT ON<br />
VICE-PRESIDENT<br />
Green Left #91, March 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. By Max<br />
Lane<br />
The Indonesian People’s Deliberative<br />
Assembly (MPR) began meeting on March<br />
1. It is expected to re-elect Suharto as<br />
president and to choose a new vice-president<br />
sometime between March 9 and 11.<br />
The armed forces (ABRI) has now secured<br />
public statements of support for its<br />
candidate - outgoing ABRI commander in<br />
chief Try Sutrisno - from the four major<br />
groupings in parliament. At the same time,<br />
Suharto - who is more identified with monopoly<br />
business interests than with the<br />
army - has made no public statement on the<br />
question, continuing to fuel rumours that he<br />
may make a surprise announcement seeking<br />
support for an alternative candidate.<br />
Dissension continues on this issue, especially<br />
inside Golkar, the government<br />
party. Several newspaper editors were<br />
summoned this week by politics and security<br />
minister Sudomo, who reprimanded<br />
them for reporting on the dissension and<br />
disruptions that occurred during a meeting<br />
of the Golkar fraction in the MPR.<br />
According to journalistic sources in<br />
Jakarta, the Golkar caucus divided into a<br />
number of factions, and some speakers were<br />
heckled off the podium. In particular, the<br />
newspapers gave prominence to the charge<br />
by Mrs. Sudharmono, the wife of the<br />
current vice- president, that the caucus was<br />
no longer functioning democratically. There<br />
was no public airing, however, of what the<br />
internal disputes were about. Sudharmono is<br />
thought to be Suharto’s first choice for vicepresident.<br />
Meanwhile, observers are wondering<br />
whether a statement of support for Try by<br />
Suharto’s businessman son, Tommy<br />
Suharto, is a sign that Suharto is willing to<br />
do a deal with the army. According to Green<br />
Left’s sources in Jakarta, Tommy also said<br />
that Suharto was getting tired of ruling. This<br />
was immediately rejected by Suharto’s big<br />
businessman brother, Probosutejo.<br />
It is now unlikely that Suharto will make<br />
his position on the vice-president clear until<br />
he has been confirmed as president for the<br />
next term. Announcing surprise candidates<br />
at the last minute is not a new tactic for<br />
Suharto, and there are reports that one of<br />
the country’s most influential and wellconnected<br />
Muslim figures is saying that<br />
Suharto wants to nominate the new ABRI<br />
commander in chief, Edi Sudradjat - a move<br />
that theoretically might split the leadership.<br />
TRY SUTRISNO IS<br />
TRUSTED SUHARTO MAN,<br />
DEVOUT MUSLIM<br />
(Jakarta, March 11 Kyodo) His defense<br />
in parliament of the Indonesian troops who<br />
shot dozens of demonstrators in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
in November 1991 did no harm within the<br />
Indonesian hierarchy to the reputation of<br />
former armed forces commander Try<br />
Sutrisno.<br />
On Thursday, Try was officially<br />
‘elected’ by acclamation by the 1,000-<br />
member People’s Consultative Assembly,<br />
the country’s highest authority, as the sixth<br />
vice president, and the fifth during the 27-<br />
year regime of President Suharto.<br />
Prior to his election, all five factions in<br />
the assembly had already endorsed him as<br />
the sole vice presidential candidate.<br />
Try, who retired last month as armed<br />
forces chief, is known as a close supporter<br />
of Suharto, as well as a devout Muslim.<br />
Born in Surabaya, the capital of <strong>East</strong><br />
Java, on November 15 1<strong>93</strong>5, Try was<br />
brought up by Javanese parents close to the<br />
schools of Koranic studies, known as<br />
‘pesantren.’<br />
Many leading Indonesian Islamic clergymen<br />
gave their backing for Try’s election<br />
as vice president.<br />
During the past few years, when still<br />
armed forces commander, Try was known<br />
to have visited various rural ‘pesantren’ and<br />
preached in mosques.<br />
In the past two years, Suharto has undertaken<br />
some pro-Muslim measures, among<br />
his own first pilgrimage to Mecca in late<br />
1991, bills to grant more time for Islamic<br />
teaching in the national curriculum, allowing<br />
Muslim girls to wear veils in class, and in<br />
late 1990 approving the creation of the<br />
Indonesian Association of Muslim<br />
Intellectuals, known as ICMI.<br />
In the military, Try’s career to the top<br />
began when he became a leading light at an<br />
army seminar in Bandung, West Java, in the<br />
late 1960s, the early years of Suharto’s New<br />
Order administration.<br />
From 1974 to 1978, he was military adjutant<br />
to Suharto before being promoted to<br />
chief of staff of the Udayana military command<br />
and commander of the Sriwijaya<br />
military command, which oversees several<br />
provinces in Sumatra, in 1982.<br />
He was later appointed commander of<br />
the Jaya military command which oversees<br />
Jakarta.<br />
After being army chief, Try became<br />
commander of the armed forces prior to the<br />
convening of the People’s Consultative<br />
Assembly in March 1988 to reelect Suharto<br />
for a fifth five-year term.<br />
The weekly Tempo magazine described<br />
him as someone who is ‘not so skillful’ at<br />
giving statements to the press.<br />
The English-language daily Jakarta Post<br />
said in its editorial on Wednesday that Try<br />
‘appears to be a rather shy, unassertive<br />
man.’<br />
Try does not seem to have much tolerance<br />
of critics. He said in November that<br />
Indonesian advocates of human rights, democracy<br />
and the environment are the ‘fourth<br />
generation of communists.’<br />
He is married with seven children.<br />
THE END GAME FOR<br />
INDONESIA’S SUHARTO<br />
By Jeffrey A. Winters, Ph.D., University of<br />
Michigan. 17 March 19<strong>93</strong><br />
“The older a coconut gets, the more juice<br />
it has.” Mrs. Tien (“ten percent”) Suharto<br />
recalled this Javanese adage on the occasion<br />
of her husband’s 71st birthday, just one day<br />
before Indonesia’s carefully-staged<br />
plebiscite gave President Suharto’s Golkar<br />
Party its most recent solid victory.<br />
After Kim Il Sung of South Korea,<br />
General Suharto is the longest-reigning head<br />
of state in Asia today. The MPR, the<br />
combined houses of the Indonesian parliament,<br />
convened this month to hand him his<br />
sixth five-year term. The outcome was certain<br />
because Suharto directly appoints fully<br />
60 percent of the 1,000 seats in the MPR.<br />
The remaining 400 were contested in the<br />
June 1992 general election, with Golkar<br />
winning just over two-thirds.<br />
If Suharto has enough juice to hold on<br />
until 1996, he will round out three full decades<br />
at the helm of this island nation of<br />
more than 190 million people.
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 49<br />
The Price of Stability<br />
One would think that the long and remarkable<br />
political stability under Suharto<br />
(purchased, in part, with the blood of upwards<br />
of a million people following a failed<br />
putsch in the mid 1960s) would be reason<br />
for calm. And yet, there is palpable unease<br />
among interested parties both in Indonesia<br />
and abroad.<br />
The reasons for this are fairly straightforward.<br />
Since independence at the end of<br />
W.W.II, the country has had only two<br />
presidents, with the transfer of power between<br />
them going rather badly. Suharto has<br />
played a shrewd game of elite politics, while<br />
doing everything he could to de-politicize<br />
and de-mobilize the rest of the population.<br />
This allowed investors, both foreign and<br />
domestic, to feel safe and made the<br />
country’s high real growth rates possible.<br />
But the cost has been a striking absence<br />
of basic political development. Suharto,<br />
with his allies in the military, has managed<br />
the country’s “politics of exclusion” personally,<br />
rather than through building strong<br />
political institutions which function no<br />
matter who is in power. This is what makes<br />
the prospect of the portly general’s departure<br />
so disquieting. The legacy of Suharto’s<br />
long and stable rule, ironically, is the real<br />
possibility of instability both as he leaves<br />
and when he is gone.<br />
It is this realization which explains the<br />
tension. And the more one hears diplomats<br />
and business leaders proclaiming their<br />
confidence in Indonesia’s ability to handle<br />
the coming succession, the less convinced<br />
and convincing they sound.<br />
Politics without Political Development<br />
Indonesians are eager to demonstrate that<br />
they have matured politically since the<br />
tumultuous years under Sukarno. There has<br />
not, for instance, been even a hint that the<br />
armed forces might replace Suharto in a<br />
coup. The generals stress that this transition<br />
must proceed according to the constitution -<br />
at least on the face of it.<br />
But no one quite knows what an election<br />
in Indonesia would be like if there were<br />
more than one viable candidate for president.<br />
Only the military and the government’s<br />
Golkar party are permitted to operate<br />
at the village level. The Muslim party (PPP)<br />
and the Democratic party (PDI) would<br />
surely challenge this arrangement if they<br />
suddenly could back their own candidates<br />
for president. That said, most elites in<br />
Indonesia shudder at the thought of a return<br />
to contested politics involving the masses in<br />
anything beyond symbolism.<br />
The election last June was instructive.<br />
The campaign among the three recognized<br />
parties lasted for the specified period of<br />
twenty-five days, followed by a week of<br />
“cool down” (which was hardly needed). No<br />
policy issues were discussed or debated.<br />
The biggest draw at political rallies were not<br />
politicians and candidates, but rather<br />
performers offering the Indonesian equivalent<br />
of country-western music. Even Vice-<br />
Admiral Soedibyo Rahardjo, who stepped<br />
down in July of 1992 as head of the general<br />
staff of the armed forces, lamented the poor<br />
quality of the election campaign. “It was a<br />
lot of dancing and parading, with no political<br />
sophistication,” he said in a private interview.<br />
But should such behavior be surprising<br />
given that ordinary Indonesians only get to<br />
practice their political skills for one month<br />
in every five-year election cycle?<br />
In the past, Suharto has always chosen a<br />
vice president who could not threaten him<br />
politically. Because most Indonesians cannot<br />
imagine a contested presidential election<br />
using the existing political institutions and<br />
practices, there has been much speculation,<br />
and hope, that Suharto will solve the<br />
immediate dilemma by breaking with the<br />
past and designating a clear successor when<br />
he chooses his next vice president. With a<br />
truly viable candidate in the number-two<br />
spot, Suharto could then step aside well before<br />
the 1997-98 election. This way the next<br />
president could assume power constitutionally<br />
and also have time to consolidate<br />
his position politically before having to face<br />
an election. With any luck, goes the thinking<br />
in elite circles, he might also block the<br />
emergence of opposing candidates. In short,<br />
if Suharto plays it the way powerful social<br />
groups hope he will, the vacuum problem<br />
could conceivably be pushed into the next<br />
century.<br />
While this scenario allows for the<br />
Indonesian political system to escape being<br />
tested fully, it shifts the political heat from<br />
the late 1990s to the present.<br />
It remains to be seen how the choice of<br />
former armed forces chief General Try<br />
Sutrisno as the country’s vice- president<br />
will be played out. Some immediate observations<br />
are possible. First, because Sutrisno<br />
is a Muslim, a military man, and Javanese,<br />
he is clearly a viable candidate for the<br />
presidency. Indeed, of all Suharto’s vicepresidents,<br />
this one has the greatest potential<br />
not only for ruling the country, but also<br />
for pushing Suharto out in the event the<br />
transition gets messy. Second, although<br />
Sutrisno is close to Suharto and enjoys the<br />
president’s trust, there are indications that<br />
he may have preferred once again to have a<br />
weaker vice-president – perhaps the former<br />
VP, Sudharmono (who is hated by much of<br />
the military brass) or even the energetic<br />
Minister for Research and Technology ,<br />
Habibie.<br />
Key Considerations<br />
Three issues stand out most prominently<br />
in the dynamics surrounding succession.<br />
The first concerns important political divisions<br />
within Indonesia involving the military,<br />
the bureaucracy, the have and havenots,<br />
and Islam. None of these can be separated<br />
cleanly from the others. Second is<br />
Suharto’s own concerns about the security<br />
of his family once he is out of power. They<br />
have amassed a huge fortune, and their<br />
propensity for grabbing every business opportunity<br />
in sight is trying the patience of<br />
the country’s middle and upper classes.<br />
And third, close attention must be paid to<br />
the role of international economic linkages.<br />
Indonesia’s capital regime is one of the most<br />
open in the Third World, and signs of<br />
political instability would trigger a reaction<br />
from mobile capital which would destabilize<br />
the situation still further.<br />
Political Divisions<br />
The single greatest threat to Suharto to<br />
emerge since the anti-Japanese riots of 1974<br />
is General Benny Murdani, the recently<br />
retired Minister of Defense, the officer<br />
responsible for Indonesia’s brutal invasion<br />
of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> in 1976, and the man behind<br />
the “mysterious killings” in the early 1980s.<br />
Murdani’s strong influence within the armed<br />
forces has set up a divide between Suharto<br />
and the military that complicates the<br />
president’s ability to manage the country’s<br />
politics. To counter Murdani’s power base,<br />
Suharto adopted a two-pronged strategy.<br />
The first was to depend more on Golkar and<br />
one of its leading figures, Sudharmono. But<br />
Golkar, although strongly supported by the<br />
civilian bureaucracy, has proven unable to<br />
draw mass support with its sterile,<br />
technocratic policy agenda.<br />
Suharto has sought to compensate for<br />
this weakness by making overtures to longexcluded<br />
Muslim organizations, which have<br />
a far more substantial and dedicated popular<br />
base than Golkar. This second element of<br />
Suharto’s strategy is significant for two<br />
reasons. First, it means the country’s demobilized<br />
population might be re-mobilized,<br />
and second, it means the political role of<br />
Islam is being augmented considerably.<br />
Suharto, who is not known for his religious<br />
orthodoxy, made a showy pilgrimage to<br />
Mecca, supported the formation of ICMI, a<br />
Muslim intellectuals’ organization (making<br />
Habibie its general chairman), and<br />
encouraged the formation of an Islamic bank<br />
in Jakarta. President “Haji Mohammad”<br />
Suharto also established personal links with<br />
Mohammad Natsir, an Islamic<br />
fundamentalist thought to have direct ties to<br />
the Middle <strong>East</strong>. Opening up to the<br />
Muslims has necessarily signalled a<br />
relaxation of political controls in general,
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with the results that the dominant political<br />
role of the military has been challenged<br />
publicly.<br />
The military do not like these developments.<br />
They displayed their lukewarm support<br />
for Sudharmono’s Golkar machine by<br />
suggesting repeatedly during the June 1992<br />
general election that people can vote for<br />
whomever they prefer. This was a first.<br />
Although Golkar’s victory was secure, ten<br />
seats were lost in <strong>East</strong> Java and eight in<br />
Central Java. Suharto had instructed his<br />
Golkar point man in Jakarta that he wanted<br />
at least 60 percent of the vote in the capital.<br />
Golkar got a disappointing 50 percent. In<br />
response to calls that the military should<br />
properly be in the barracks, the armed<br />
forces made it clear last October that its<br />
social-political role is constitutional and a<br />
reduction in the number of seats in the parliament<br />
reserved for officers is not necessary.<br />
The generals also reiterated their<br />
conviction that the wider Indonesian population<br />
should not be re-politicized at the<br />
village level.<br />
Meanwhile, Suharto’s Muslim card has<br />
begun to backfire– in large part because<br />
religious tensions in the country are inseparable<br />
from economic and racial jealousies.<br />
Ethnic- Chinese Indonesians comprise just<br />
three percent of the population, but control<br />
more than 75 percent of the wealth. They<br />
also happen to be mostly Christian. Last<br />
November a series of attacks on churches<br />
began in <strong>East</strong> Java and North Sumatra,<br />
spreading most recently to Jakarta. The reaction<br />
by the military to these events, which<br />
moderate Muslim leaders claim were<br />
provoked in part by fundamentalist elements<br />
in ICMI, has been swift. Army<br />
troops were deployed when churches were<br />
set ablaze in Jakarta. If this violence<br />
spreads, it will enhance the position of<br />
Benny Murdani in his struggle against the<br />
president and Sudharmono.<br />
The Suharto Family<br />
The greed of the president and his family<br />
emerged in the 1980s as a serious political<br />
liability, particularly as Suharto’s six<br />
children dug themselves ever more deeply<br />
into the country’s economy. Intelligence<br />
sources at the US embassy in Jakarta estimated<br />
in 1989 that Suharto himself was<br />
worth about $15 billion. With his wife and<br />
children the total came to about $30 billion.<br />
And if the president’s circle of civilian and<br />
military cronies was thrown in, the total<br />
came to $60 billion, which was roughly<br />
equivalent to the country’s sovereign foreign<br />
debt. A good portion of this private wealth<br />
is, to be sure, held abroad in accounts in<br />
Singapore and Switzerland.<br />
Indonesians do not get terribly ruffled<br />
about patronage. But they do object to blatant<br />
nepotism when the family members involved<br />
are as insatiable as Suharto’s children<br />
have proven to be. A little skimming is one<br />
thing. But entrepreneurs complain that it is<br />
practically impossible to do business in<br />
Indonesia without giving “the kids” a hefty<br />
cut.<br />
Suharto can endure the criticism and defend<br />
his family’s wealth as long as he is<br />
president. The constraint lies in what might<br />
happen if he steps down. He will certainly<br />
seek a commitment of protection from his<br />
chosen successor. But, as one retired general<br />
explained in a private interview, Suharto<br />
knows from his own experience trying to<br />
protect Sukarno and his family in the late<br />
1960s that such guarantees tend to fall apart<br />
after a year or two.<br />
An additional factor rarely noted when<br />
possible attacks on Suharto’s children are<br />
discussed is that their business interests are<br />
not a strictly domestic matter. Joint-ventures<br />
with powerful international players<br />
have been forged. This means that any post-<br />
Suharto campaign to undermine the<br />
children’s business conglomerates will necessarily<br />
involve confronting their highly<br />
influential global partners. An inexhaustive<br />
list of the companies with which Suharto’s<br />
children have invested jointly would include:<br />
from the U.S., AT&T, General Motors, and<br />
Waste Management International; from<br />
Japan, Marubeni, Mitsui, Showa Denko,<br />
Toyo Engineering, and NEC; from France,<br />
Alcatel; and from South Korea, KIA<br />
Motors.<br />
These arrangements raise the political and<br />
economic stakes of dismantling the First<br />
Family’s conglomerates and represent a set<br />
of circumstances that had no parallel when<br />
Sukarno and his associates fell from power<br />
in the mid 1960s.<br />
International Linkages<br />
The outside world constrains the political<br />
options in Indonesia in more ways than<br />
merely increasing the costs of seizing the<br />
assets of the president’s overstuffed children.<br />
The country’s deep involvement in<br />
international flows of goods and capital, and<br />
the ever-wider relocation options of those<br />
controlling crucial investment resources,<br />
mean that powerful political actors in<br />
Indonesia must weigh their moves carefully.<br />
If capital is spooked – and this applies to<br />
all players, both foreign and domestic, who<br />
are mobile transnationally – Indonesia’s<br />
political leaders must be prepared to endure<br />
the cascading destabilization that could<br />
result from capital flight, severe pressure on<br />
the rupiah, declining investment rates,<br />
slowed production, layoffs in industrial and<br />
service sectors, and a contracting tax base.<br />
This is the tremendous, though often<br />
unwitting, structural power that mobile investors<br />
exert in today’s international political<br />
economy. It is obvious that Suharto possesses<br />
a subtle understanding of these<br />
forces. It remains to be seen in the months<br />
and years ahead if those eager to replace him<br />
do as well.<br />
SUHARTO ANNOUNCES<br />
NEW CABINET<br />
BBC, March 20, 19<strong>93</strong>, Saturday<br />
Radio Republic of Indonesia in Indonesian<br />
Excerpts from 17th March announcement by<br />
President Suharto on new cabinet; live<br />
In the name of Allah the Merciful and the<br />
Compassionate, honourable journalists, my<br />
fellow countrymen: Peace be upon you.<br />
Tonight [17th March], I will announce<br />
my first step after my election by the<br />
People’s Consultative Assembly [MPR] as<br />
president of the Republic of Indonesia on<br />
11th March 19<strong>93</strong>. This pertains to the<br />
composition of a cabinet that I will lead...<br />
The cabinet under my leadership will<br />
strictly adhere to Pancasila as the ideological<br />
foundation, the 1945 Constitution as the<br />
constitutional foundation and the 19<strong>93</strong><br />
Broad Outline of State Policies to be implemented<br />
during the Sixth Five-Year<br />
Development Plan and other MPR resolutions<br />
in force from 19<strong>93</strong> to 1998, including<br />
MPR Resolution No 2/MPR/1978 on<br />
Guidelines on the Perception and<br />
Implementation of Pancasila or Eka<br />
Prasetya Pancakarsa [Sanskrit for “one<br />
loyalty and five aims”] as the operational<br />
foundation.<br />
By understanding these foundations, seriously<br />
attending to the people’s hopes and<br />
wishes and perceiving the spirit of the recent<br />
MPR General Session, I define the<br />
main duties and target of the cabinet in the<br />
next five years as follows:<br />
1. To continue, enhance, deepen and<br />
broaden national development as a means to<br />
implement Pancasila on the basis of the<br />
trilogy of development and the archipelagic<br />
concept to enhance national resilience and<br />
self-reliance.<br />
2. To enhance national discipline to be<br />
pioneered by the state apparatus with a<br />
view to establishing a clean and authoritative<br />
government that will render services to the<br />
Indonesian people.<br />
3. To institutionalize the mechanism of<br />
national leadership on the basis of the 1945<br />
Constitution, the Pancasila ideology,<br />
Pancasila Democracy and the Eka Prasetya<br />
Pancakarsa in state, national and social life.<br />
4. To implement a free and active foreign<br />
policy based on the principles of peaceful<br />
coexistence in bilateral, regional and global
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 51<br />
relations for the sake of national<br />
development.<br />
5. To hold a direct, general, free and secret<br />
general election in 1997.<br />
These duties are known as Panca Krida<br />
Kabinet Pembangunan [Five Duties of the<br />
Development Cabinet] and I name the<br />
cabinet the Sixth Development Cabinet...<br />
In accordance with the constitutional<br />
provisions, the vice-president is an assistant<br />
to the President. In this regard, I assign the<br />
vice-president to plan and conduct supervision.<br />
Both internal and external supervision<br />
must be continuously enhanced<br />
until it is institutionalized. The internal supervision<br />
to be conducted by the Vice-<br />
President is to reach the first echelon of<br />
departments, offices of state ministers and<br />
non-departmental government agencies. In<br />
addition, the Vice-President is assigned to<br />
supervise large projects. Serious attention<br />
must be paid to ensure that external supervision<br />
proceeds in addition to internal supervision.<br />
For this purpose, the Vice-<br />
President’s office will accommodate all<br />
kinds of information from the general public<br />
and subsequently process and use this as a<br />
resource for necessary measures.<br />
Supervision is necessary to improve government<br />
control and the implementation of<br />
development programmes in general, and to<br />
prevent and suppress abuse of power, wastage<br />
and misappropriations. The full composition<br />
of the Sixth Development Cabinet<br />
is as follows: Minister of Home Affairs<br />
Yogi S. Memet Minister of Foreign Affairs<br />
Ali Alatas S.H. [Master of Law] Minister of<br />
Defence and Security Gen. Edi Sudradjat<br />
Minister of Justice Haji [Islamic title]<br />
Utoyo Usman S.H. Minister of Information<br />
Haji Harmoko Minister of Finance Drs<br />
[Master of Arts] Mari’e Muhammad<br />
Minister of Trade Prof Dr Satrio Budiarjo<br />
Yudono Minister of Industry Ir [Master in<br />
Engineering] T. Aribowo Minister of<br />
Agriculture Dr Ir Syarifudin Baharsyah<br />
Minister of Mining and Energy I.G. Sujana<br />
Minister of Forestry Ir Jamaludin<br />
Suryohadikusumo Minister of Public Works<br />
Ir Radinal Mochtar Minister of<br />
Communications Dr Haryanto Danudirto<br />
Minister of Tourism, Posts and<br />
Telecommunications Joop Ave<br />
Minister of Cooperatives and the<br />
Upbringing of Small Businessmen Drs<br />
Subiyakto (?Cakrawerdaya) Minister of<br />
Manpower Drs Abdul Latief<br />
Minister of Transmigration and Forest<br />
Settlements Ir Siswono Yudohusodo<br />
Minister of Education and Culture Dr Ir<br />
Wargiman Joyonegoro Minister of Health<br />
Prof Dr Suyudi Minister of Religious<br />
Affairs Dr Tarmizi Taher<br />
Minister of Social Affairs Mrs Dra<br />
[Master of Arts] Endang Kusuma Intan<br />
Suweno Minister/State Secretary Drs<br />
Murdiono<br />
Minister of State and Cabinet Secretary<br />
Drs Sayadilah Mursid MPH [Master of<br />
Public Health] Minister of State for<br />
National Development Ir Drs Ginandjar<br />
Planning and Chairman of the National<br />
Planning Development Board Kartasasmita<br />
Minister of State for Research and<br />
Technology, Chairman of the Board for<br />
Technological Application and Research,<br />
and Head of the Strategic Industrial Board<br />
Prof Dr Ir B.T. Habibie<br />
Minister of State for Food Affairs and<br />
Head of the Logistics Board Prof Dr Ibrahim<br />
Hassan<br />
Minister of State for Population and<br />
Head of the National Family Planning Board<br />
Dr Haji Haryono Suyono<br />
Minister of State for Investment and<br />
Chairman of the Investment Coordinating<br />
Board Ir Sanyoto Sastrowardoyo<br />
Minister of State for Agrarian Affairs and<br />
Chairman of the National Land Agency Ir<br />
Sonny Harsono Minister of State for<br />
People’s Housing Ir Akbar Tanjung<br />
Minister of State for Environment Ir<br />
Sarwono Kusumaatmaja Minister of State<br />
for Women’s Affairs Mrs Mien Sugandhi<br />
Minister of State for Youth and Sports<br />
Haryono Isman Minister of State for<br />
Administrative Reform T.B. Silalahi<br />
Coordinating Minister for Economics,<br />
Finance, and Industry and Development<br />
Supervision Prof Dr Saleh Afiff<br />
Coordinating Minister for Industrial and<br />
Trade Affairs Ir Hartarto Coordinating<br />
Minister for Politics and Security Susilo<br />
Sudarman Coordinating Minister for<br />
People’s Welfare Ir Azwar Anas<br />
In addition, there are state officials accorded<br />
ministerial ranks. They are:<br />
Governor of Bank Indonesia [Central Bank]<br />
Dr J. Sudrajat Jiwandono<br />
Commander of the Armed Forces of the<br />
Republic of Indonesia Gen Edi Sudrajat<br />
Attorney General Singgih S.H.<br />
I will swear in the ministers of the Sixth<br />
Development Cabinet, the Attorney General<br />
and the Governor of Bank Indonesia on 19th<br />
March 19<strong>93</strong>. Thank you and peace be upon<br />
you again.<br />
PROFILES OF KEY MEN IN<br />
NEW SUHARTO CABINET<br />
The Straits Times, March 18, 19<strong>93</strong><br />
BYLINE: Paul Jacob, Jakarta<br />
Correspondent<br />
Excerpts<br />
The new Indonesian Cabinet line-up,<br />
named by President Suharto last night, is<br />
aimed at pushing forward his sixth-term goal<br />
of maintaining tried and trusted policies for<br />
economic growth and political stability. The<br />
following are brief sketches of some of the<br />
key men in the line-up:<br />
Co-ordinating Minister for Political<br />
and Security Affairs: General Soesilo<br />
Sudarman, 64.<br />
A long-time Suharto ally and senior<br />
former military man, he was Ambassador to<br />
the United States from 1985 until his recall<br />
in 1988, when he was appointed Minister<br />
for Tourism, Post and Telecommunications.<br />
A retired three-star general, he has served<br />
in key command positions throughout the<br />
country.<br />
Defence and Security Minister: Gen.<br />
Edi Sudradjat, 54.<br />
In appointing the Indonesian armed<br />
forces chief to the concurrent position of<br />
Defence and Security Minister, Mr. Suharto<br />
has reverted to the previous practice of<br />
having one man hold two jobs to ensure<br />
greater efficiency and effectiveness.<br />
He is expected to eventually relinquish<br />
his post of army chief to deputy Wismoyo<br />
Arismundar.<br />
ABRI REASSERTS SELF<br />
By Leah Makabenta<br />
(IPS, Jakarta, March 29) The Indonesian<br />
military is moving ahead to secure its stake<br />
on the national leadership as the country<br />
approaches the end of the Suharto era.<br />
Diplomats and analysts say the armed<br />
forces, known by the acronym ABRI, have<br />
succeeded in strengthening their position in<br />
the complicated maneuvering for the succession<br />
to aging President Suharto, who was<br />
re-elected to a probable last five-year term<br />
this month.<br />
“The way ABRI pulled the vice-presidential<br />
nomination of (former ABRI commander)<br />
Try Sutrisno was masterful. Now it<br />
is in a position to take over when Suharto<br />
goes,” said a Jakarta-based diplomat.<br />
Suharto is only the second president in<br />
Indonesia’s 48-year post-independence<br />
history, taking over from President Sukarno<br />
after crushing a alleged Communist-led coup<br />
attempt in 1965. Thousands of Indonesians<br />
were killed in the anti-Communist purge<br />
that followed, and Suharto has since ruled<br />
the world’s fourth most populous country<br />
with an iron hand, with strong backing from<br />
ABRI. That partnership began to cool<br />
through Suharto’s 27-year rule, however, as<br />
the president built up his own power base<br />
to secure his successive re-elections. Suharto<br />
had been the only candidate in each of the<br />
past six presidential elections.<br />
The 72-year-old former general has won<br />
much credit for bringing political stability<br />
and economic prosperity to his country
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after the turbulent rule of his charismatic<br />
predecessor. But Suharto’s patronage of big<br />
business interests – mostly Chinese – and<br />
Muslim political forces worried ABRI,<br />
which has a strong belief in its role as<br />
guardian of a unified and non- sectarian<br />
state. Analysts say that around the time of<br />
the 1988 presidential election, ABRI had<br />
become concerned that Suharto’s apparent<br />
disinclination to secure the succession<br />
would bring instability, growing unease over<br />
economic inequalities and agitation from the<br />
indigenous Muslim majority. Having failed<br />
to get Suharto to accept their vicepresidential<br />
choice in 1988, ABRI wanted to<br />
see its own man in place to ensure military<br />
dominance.<br />
Their choice fell on Try, who was once<br />
Suharto’s adjutant, but it is by no means<br />
sure that he will be the anointed successor.<br />
“Try is in the best position to succeed, but<br />
Suharto and even ABRI may have other<br />
ideas by then,” said a politician from the<br />
Christian-backed Indonesian Democratic<br />
Party (PDI). The drive to reassert its<br />
authority comes at a particularly crucial<br />
time for ABRI. Since 1990, internal debates<br />
have been going on in ABRI over its dual<br />
role as a civilian and military organization.<br />
The military’s role in politics is fiercely<br />
debated amid the dramatic social changes<br />
that Indonesia is undergoing. The country’s<br />
increasing wealth has brought rising<br />
expectations, clamor for democracy and a<br />
more open political system. Many analysts<br />
who foresee a period of instability in the<br />
post- Suharto era say a military successor is<br />
not necessarily bad. Unlike in other<br />
Southeast Asian countries, the military is<br />
not the most conservative institution here,<br />
said one diplomat. “The level of education<br />
in ABRI is quite high. They think about the<br />
future; they could be a more progressive<br />
force than the politicians in the ruling<br />
Golkar party,” he added.<br />
Even those in anti-government and progressive<br />
circles agree that ABRI’s success in<br />
putting its own vice-presidential candidate<br />
in place is a new, positive factor. “There is a<br />
faction in the army which is for social<br />
change, young generals of the post-Suharto<br />
generation,” said a former political detainee.<br />
“They would like to keep the establishment<br />
intact, but want more democratic freedoms,<br />
less corruption.”<br />
Human-rights lawyer Adnan Buyong<br />
Nasution said that, “Suharto now has to<br />
reckon with another factor. Between the<br />
two forces, the people watch, they don’t<br />
take sides, they see if there are any loopholes<br />
for change.” ABRI has been known to<br />
support the Christian-backed PDI, one of<br />
two officially sanctioned opposition parties.<br />
The other is the Muslim-led United<br />
Development Party (PPP). Ben Mardun, a<br />
PDI representative in the People’s<br />
Consultative Assembly (MPR) says that<br />
from his discussions with the military, he<br />
believes ABRI would be more open to democratization.<br />
“They want to anticipate the<br />
democratization process. They know that<br />
too much power would be very dangerous<br />
for them, they have to democratize,” he<br />
said. But analysts say ABRI has its own<br />
internal problems, including that of discipline.<br />
Many members are said to be engaged in<br />
business, though only on an incidental scale,<br />
and there are many more who reportedly<br />
misuse their power. When it wants to do<br />
something, however, ABRI can do it, said<br />
the diplomat. If it wants to promote<br />
democracy, it can do so, he added. The organization<br />
is also deeply divided, although<br />
Adnan believes it is very well united at<br />
present. Said Adnan: “The fact that ABRI<br />
was able to influence all the other factions in<br />
the MPR (behind Try) – the Muslims, the<br />
PDI, the Golkar and the regional representatives<br />
– showed that the army is a very<br />
united force now.”<br />
SUHARTO EXCLUDES ARMY<br />
FROM CABINET<br />
By Max Lane, Green Left News, March 30<br />
After having being forced to accept the<br />
armed forces (ABRI) vice-presidential<br />
candidate, Try Sutrisno, President Suharto<br />
has chosen a new cabinet which deliberately<br />
excludes figures close to ABRI. It comprises<br />
a select few older political cronies who have<br />
neither a political base nor any political<br />
authority in the eyes of the political elite<br />
and the mass of the population.<br />
The two key political positions went to<br />
retired generals of Suharto’s generation who<br />
owe their long and unspectacular careers to<br />
Suharto. The former transmigration minister,<br />
retired General Soesilo Sudarman, replaces<br />
aged retired Admiral Sudomo as minister for<br />
political and security affairs. The former<br />
governor of West Java, retired General<br />
Yoggie Memet, has been appointed minister<br />
for home affairs.<br />
Green Left Weekly’s Jakarta sources say<br />
that ABRI lobbied unsuccessfully for a<br />
senior political appointment for General<br />
Harsudiyono Hartas, ABRI’s chief spokesperson<br />
on political and social affairs.<br />
By excluding people with ABRI connections,<br />
Suharto is prolonging the conflict with<br />
military headquarters. This guarantees that<br />
ABRI will continue its oppositional role and<br />
will most likely use its representation in<br />
parliament to raise issues that embarrass<br />
Suharto. Thus the military will continue its<br />
contradictory role of being vocal in support<br />
of modest democratic reform in parliament<br />
and in Jakarta while implementing<br />
repressive measures against grassroots<br />
activism and against the movement for selfdetermination<br />
in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
Most of the senior cabinet appointments<br />
in the economic and technocratic ministries<br />
have gone to close associates and collaborators<br />
of Suharto’s initial choice as vicepresident,<br />
industry and technology minister<br />
Habibie. These appointments serve Suharto<br />
in two ways.<br />
First, they keep power away from ABRI<br />
by concentrating control over government<br />
departments in the hands of those most personally<br />
loyal to Suharto. Second, they remove<br />
from the cabinet those economic<br />
ministers closest to the World Bank and<br />
IMF and who have operated as a brake on<br />
the extravagant commercial activities of<br />
Suharto’s children and cronies.<br />
In particular the former senior economic<br />
ministers, such as Ali Wardhana, fought to<br />
postpone or even cancel many mega-projects<br />
initiated by the Suharto children or<br />
cronies and which relied on massive commercial<br />
loans from private foreign banks.<br />
The IMF- World Bank-oriented ministers<br />
always tried to keep foreign borrowing<br />
within the limits set by the consortium of<br />
imperialist governments that decides annually<br />
upon new credits for Indonesia.<br />
The new ministers have a record of supporting<br />
state-guaranteed business megaprojects.<br />
So far ABRI has remained silent on the<br />
cabinet. Economists supporting deregulation<br />
and privatization (excluding privatization<br />
into the hands of the children and cronies)<br />
have stated their concerns about the cabinet.<br />
At the grassroots level, most concern and<br />
contempt has been expressed towards the<br />
new minister for labour, Abdul Latief.<br />
Latief, 53, was the founder and first chairman<br />
of the Young Businessmen’s<br />
Association in 1972-3. He is now the millionaire<br />
managing director of a major Jakarta<br />
department store business. This is the first<br />
time a prominent Jakarta capitalist has been<br />
appointed labour minister.<br />
Comment from John MacDougall: The<br />
headline is misleading. There are nine<br />
Armed Forces members in the Cabinet, 7<br />
Army, 1 Navy, 1 Air Force.<br />
SUHARTO TO ATTEND<br />
G7 SUMMIT?<br />
[Radio Japan/NHK 12 Mar <strong>93</strong>]<br />
The Japanese government has decided to<br />
propose to the Group of Seven industrial<br />
countries that Indonesian President Suharto<br />
be invited to Japan just before the Tokyo<br />
summit in July. The government will make<br />
the proposal on Friday in the Group of
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 53<br />
Seven three-day working-level meeting in<br />
Hong Kong. Japan will propose to invite<br />
President Suharto to Tokyo prior to the<br />
summit to consider the views of the Non-<br />
Aligned Movement, of which the President<br />
is chairman, but some industrialised nations<br />
are reluctant in invite Mr. Suharto to Tokyo<br />
as a formal participant in the summit.<br />
FROM BRUNO KAHN, MARCH 20:<br />
According to a source, G7 members have<br />
no intention to invite Suharto to attend the<br />
G7. The (non-) move is directed against the<br />
NAM, which is not supposed to “play in<br />
the big ones’ courtyard.” Inviting Suharto in<br />
Tokyo a few days before the summit is<br />
merely a face-saving gesture.<br />
CANADA’S BARBARA<br />
MCDOUGALL: INDONESIA WILL<br />
NOT BE AT G7<br />
Letter from Barbara McDougall, Secretary<br />
of State for External Affairs of Canada, to<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Alert <strong>Network</strong>/Toronto. Full text<br />
Comment: McDougall has decided not to<br />
seek the leadership of the Conservative<br />
party, now up for grabs, and will be retiring<br />
from politics this year. However, she seems<br />
to still be toeing party line on Indonesia.<br />
March 9, 19<strong>93</strong><br />
Thank you for your letter of December 9,<br />
1992, regarding Indonesia.<br />
Indonesia has not been invited to the G-7<br />
summit in July. In its capacity as current<br />
leader of the Non-Aligned Movement,<br />
Indonesia has requested attendance, but to<br />
date this has not been accepted by this<br />
year’s host, Japan.<br />
At the 1992 meeting of the United<br />
Nations Commission on Human Rights<br />
(UNCHR), Canada was instrumental in<br />
achieving a strongly- worded consensus text<br />
condemning Indonesian actions in <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> and demanding an appropriate response.<br />
Canada intends to take a similar<br />
approach in concert with other like-minded<br />
countries during the current UNCHR in<br />
Geneva. This was clearly expressed to<br />
Foreign Minister Alatas in the context of the<br />
Association of Southeast Asian Nations<br />
Post Ministerial Conference in Manila last<br />
July.<br />
Indonesia has announced that in the<br />
spring of 19<strong>93</strong> it will establish a National<br />
commission on Human Rights. Canada<br />
views this as a positive step, but is awaiting<br />
further information about the financing of<br />
this commission and the extent of its independence<br />
from the government.<br />
Thank you once again for writing to express<br />
your concerns.<br />
Yours sincerely,<br />
Barbara McDougall<br />
SUHARTO INTENDS TO ATTEND<br />
SUMMIT<br />
Japan Times April 8, 19<strong>93</strong>, Unabridged<br />
Indonesian President Suharto is determined<br />
to visit Tokyo to address leaders of<br />
the Group of seven nations in July, despite<br />
Japanese pressure to stay away,<br />
government sources said Tuesday.<br />
Japan sent Deputy Foreign Minister<br />
Koichiro Matsuura to Jakarta last weekend<br />
for secret talks, and proposed Suharto meet<br />
Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa as soon as<br />
possible.<br />
But Suharto, who wants to attend the<br />
summit as leader of the Nonaligned<br />
Movement and present its views, did not<br />
accept the offer.<br />
INDONESIA’S NEW<br />
AMBASSADOR TO INDIA<br />
Bio-data on Lieutenant-General Adolf<br />
Sahala Radjagukguk, Indonesian ambassador<br />
to India<br />
From TAPOL, March 26.<br />
In February 19<strong>93</strong>, Lieutenant-General<br />
Sahala Radjagukguk, was appointed<br />
Indonesia’s ambassador to India. It is important<br />
for the international community to<br />
know that this general’s hands are stained<br />
with the blood of the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese people.<br />
An <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese refugee who was held as a<br />
captive at Radjagukguk’s headquarters for<br />
several years described him as “one of the<br />
most murderous Indonesian officers to do<br />
service in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.”<br />
Adolf Sahala Radjagukguk graduated from<br />
the National Military Academy in 1961 and<br />
rose through the ranks as an infantry soldier<br />
and company commander. He served as<br />
commander of the sub-regional military<br />
command, Korem 164/Wira Dharma,<br />
covering the territory of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, from<br />
March 1979 until late 1982. From 1986<br />
until August 1987, he again held<br />
responsibility for <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, this time as<br />
commander of the regional military<br />
command, Kodam IX/Udayana, based in<br />
Bali, whose territory includes <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
Thereafter he became commander of<br />
Kostrad, the Army’s Strategic Command<br />
which controls special, rapid-deployment<br />
infantry battalions for use in ‘troublespots,’<br />
including <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. His last army post<br />
before becoming ambassador to Indonesia<br />
was as deputy chief-of-staff of the army.<br />
He is widely recognised to be a close associate<br />
of General Benny Murdani who<br />
commanded the invasion of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and<br />
has been deeply involved in the military<br />
campaign against <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> ever since.<br />
Radjagukguk’s tour of duty as 164/Wira<br />
Dharma military commander from March<br />
1979 until late 1982<br />
During the period when Lt. General, then<br />
Colonel, Radjagukguk commanded the <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> military command, Indonesia’s war<br />
against the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese resistance<br />
underwent significant change. When he took<br />
over, the leadership of Fretilin’s armed<br />
resistance had just been all but destroyed,<br />
culminating in the murder of Nicolau<br />
Lobato, chairman of Fretilin on 31<br />
December 1978.<br />
However, Fretilin forces quickly regrouped<br />
under their new leader, Xanana<br />
Gusmão and by early 1981 were again<br />
posing a serious challenge to the army of<br />
occupation, now commanded by<br />
Radjagukguk. The armed resistance was<br />
fighting under very different circumstances<br />
however; by now, after some 200,000 <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese had been killed during the army’s<br />
ground and aerial ‘encirclement and annihilation<br />
campaign’ of the late 1970s, most of<br />
the surviving population had been driven<br />
into encampments (pemukiman) under army<br />
control. Fretilin forces, now fighting a<br />
classic guerrilla war with highly mobile units<br />
against the army of occupation, were able to<br />
establish a network of contacts with the<br />
encampments where the population was<br />
forced to live.<br />
By early 1981, Fretilin forces had again<br />
become such a threat that Radjagukguk<br />
launched a huge fence-of-legs [pagar-betis]<br />
campaign against the guerrilla forces. During<br />
this campaign, tens of thousands of <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese men over 14 years old were forced<br />
to participate in a mass encirclement. A<br />
huge circle was created, covering much of<br />
the countryside, using <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese who<br />
moved forward in order to drive the<br />
guerrillas back and eventually corner them.<br />
As a military operation, Radjagukguk’s<br />
fence-of-legs was a failure, largely because<br />
the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese required to take part did<br />
what they could to help guerrillas escape,<br />
rather than handing them over to the army.<br />
However, pagar betis caused serious<br />
hardship and more casualties for those<br />
forced to take part, many of whom returned<br />
home ill and exhausted through lack of food.<br />
The absence of men from their homes also<br />
had a devastating impact on food production<br />
in and around the pemukiman.<br />
It was this campaign that caused the then<br />
Apostolic Administrator of Dili, Msgr.<br />
Martinho da Costa Lopes, to start speaking<br />
out against the forces of occupation, leading<br />
to his eventual enforced retirement in 1983.<br />
Later, after leaving <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, Msgr. da<br />
Costa Lopes told TAPOL: “During the<br />
three months of July, August and<br />
September (1981), all the people, all the<br />
males from young boys to men in their fif-
Page 54 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
ties, were away on these operations. They<br />
returned home weak and exhausted. As a<br />
result, the fields were not prepared for<br />
planting new crops... Indeed there was a<br />
serious shortage of food during those years,<br />
1981 and 1982.” [TAPOL Bulletin, No. 59,<br />
September 1983]<br />
The <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese refugee quoted above,<br />
Cristiano Costa, who is now living in<br />
Australia, had been captured by the army in<br />
1979 and was one of those forced to take<br />
part in the pagar betis campaign.<br />
After the failure of this campaign, the<br />
army under Radjagukguk’s command developed<br />
a new strategy to isolate the guerrillas<br />
in the bush from the centres of population<br />
under Indonesian control. The details<br />
of this strategy became known through the<br />
capture of nine secret military documents<br />
which were smuggled to the outside world.<br />
Some of the documents were signed by then<br />
colonel Radjagukguk and some by his chief<br />
of intelligence, Major Williem da Costa.<br />
They explained how the population must be<br />
monitored at all times, prevented from<br />
travelling out of the pemukiman, and forced<br />
to reveal the whereabouts of relatives<br />
fighting with the resistance. One document<br />
instructed troops on the conduct of interrogation<br />
teams towards captured guerrillas and<br />
the use of torture. This document<br />
[PROTAP/B-1/VII/1982], which was signed<br />
by Colonel Radjagukguk himself, became the<br />
basis for a major campaign by Amnesty<br />
International, exposing the officiallyendorsed<br />
use of torture by the Indonesian<br />
army of occupation in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
All nine documents were reproduced in<br />
English translation, in The War Against <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>, by Carmel Budiardjo and Liem Soei<br />
Liong, Zed Books, 1984.<br />
Hence, Lt.-General Radjagukguk’s two<br />
major contributions to Indonesia’s campaign<br />
to crush the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese resistance were<br />
the 1981 pagar betis campaign and the<br />
campaign to control centres of population.<br />
The latter campaign continued to be the<br />
backbone of Indonesian strategy in <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> for many years after Lt. General<br />
Radjagukguk ended his tour of duty as<br />
164/Wira Dharma Korem commander.<br />
London, 26 March 19<strong>93</strong><br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese wherever they are who have<br />
personal experience or recollections of Adolf<br />
Sahala Radjagukguk are kindly requested to<br />
write this down and send it as a response to<br />
this topic or, if they wish to maintain their<br />
anonymity, to send it in confidence to<br />
TAPOL, 111 Northwood Rd, Thornton<br />
Heath, Surrey CR7 8HW, UK<br />
HUMAN RIGHTS:<br />
BACKGROUND PAPERS<br />
INDONESIA/EAST TIMOR<br />
A NEW ORDER?<br />
HUMAN RIGHTS IN 1992 (AI)<br />
Due to space limitations, we cannot reprint<br />
the 20-plus page report, dated February<br />
19<strong>93</strong>. It is designed as AI Index: ASA<br />
21/03/<strong>93</strong>, and is available from Amnesty<br />
International offices around the world. A few<br />
sections follow.<br />
INTRODUCTION<br />
In the past year the Indonesian<br />
Government has taken a number of unprecedented<br />
initiatives which appear to<br />
signal a positive shift in its attitude toward<br />
human rights. Yet the grim factual record of<br />
human rights practice in 1992 tells a different<br />
story. Political killing,<br />
“disappearance,” torture, arbitrary detention,<br />
political imprisonment and the use of<br />
the death penalty have continued without<br />
significant interruption, despite intermittent<br />
changes in the level and nature of violations<br />
reported in particular regions. The violations<br />
have not been confined to <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> but<br />
have occurred throughout the territory under<br />
Indonesian rule.<br />
Government forces extrajudicially executed<br />
and “disappeared” scores of alleged<br />
supporters of independence in Aceh and<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> in 1992, as well as criminal<br />
suspects in Jakarta and other cities. Torture<br />
and ill-treatment of political detainees,<br />
peaceful demonstrators and criminal suspects<br />
continued to be common and resulted<br />
in some deaths. Hundreds of people were<br />
arrested and held without trial for up to two<br />
years as suspected opponents of the government.<br />
More than 180 suspected government<br />
opponents were prisoners of conscience,<br />
including some 30 sentenced during<br />
the year. At least 300 political prisoners,<br />
and possibly many more, continued to serve<br />
lengthy sentences imposed after unfair<br />
trials. Twenty-two political prisoners were<br />
judicially executed between 1985 and 1992,<br />
most after serving more than twenty years<br />
in jail, and seven political prisoners<br />
remained on death row.<br />
This report examines the record of human<br />
rights practice in Indonesia and <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
since the Santa Cruz massacre of November<br />
1991. It finds that there has been no<br />
fundamental change in the government’s<br />
repressive posture toward political dissent,<br />
and that basic human rights continue to be<br />
violated in the name of national security,<br />
stability and order. It also finds that the<br />
government’s human rights initiatives, while<br />
certainly a step in the right direction, have<br />
not addressed the root causes of human<br />
rights abuse. The report concludes that<br />
human rights abuse has become institutionalized<br />
in Indonesia and <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, and<br />
that concrete measures are urgently needed<br />
to remedy the problem. To this end,<br />
Amnesty International offers a number of<br />
practical recommendations to the Indonesian<br />
Government and to the United Nations<br />
Commission on Human Rights which, if<br />
implemented, it believes would contribute to<br />
the future protection and promotion of<br />
human rights.<br />
1. AN OVERVIEW OF HUMAN RIGHTS<br />
IN 1992<br />
The gravest violations of human rights<br />
reported to Amnesty International in the<br />
past year have occurred in the context of<br />
counter-insurgency operations in <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> and Aceh, where the government has<br />
continued to face both peaceful and armed<br />
opposition to its rule. In these areas, military<br />
authorities have been free to employ<br />
virtually any means - including unlawful<br />
execution, “disappearance,” arbitrary detention<br />
and torture - in the interest of<br />
maintaining national security, and destroying<br />
what the government calls Gerakan<br />
Pengacau Keamanan (Security Disruptors<br />
Movements). Yet, as the evidence in this<br />
report demonstrates, the human rights<br />
problem is not confined to areas of rebel<br />
activity. Serious violations occur throughout<br />
the country, including on the most populous<br />
island of Java and in the major cities. Here,<br />
too, it is the logic of national security which<br />
is frequently used to justify violations by<br />
government security forces.<br />
The most widely reported human rights<br />
abuses have occurred in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, the<br />
former Portuguese colony invaded by<br />
Indonesia in 1975, and still occupied in defiance<br />
of United Nations General Assembly<br />
and Security Council resolutions. In<br />
Amnesty International’s view, the human<br />
rights situation there has not improved since<br />
the Santa Cruz massacre of 12 November<br />
1991, in which at least 100 peaceful<br />
demonstrators, and possibly many more,<br />
were killed by Indonesian forces. While<br />
there has been no single incident on a<br />
comparable scale in the past year, the<br />
overall pattern of human rights violations -<br />
encompassing short term detention, torture<br />
and ill-treatment of suspected political opponents,<br />
intermittent political killings and<br />
“disappearances,” long-term political imprisonment<br />
after unfair trials, and the intimidation<br />
of relatives and human rights<br />
workers - has continued unabated.<br />
Far less well known, and certainly less<br />
widely reported, has been the pattern of
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 55<br />
grave violations in Aceh, where an armed<br />
secessionist movement, Aceh Merdeka, has<br />
been active since early 1989. Aceh Merdeka<br />
is reported to have committed some abuses<br />
against the civilian population; Amnesty<br />
International condemns these unreservedly.<br />
However, human rights violations by government<br />
forces in Aceh have been both more<br />
systematic and more widespread. An<br />
estimated 2,000 civilians, including children<br />
and the very elderly, have been unlawfully<br />
killed, sometimes in public executions;<br />
hundreds, possibly thousands of villagers<br />
have been arbitrarily arrested on the merest<br />
suspicion of supporting Aceh Merdeka;<br />
many of those detained have been held<br />
incommunicado for long periods, and<br />
subjected to ill-treatment and torture to extract<br />
confessions or political intelligence;<br />
and more than 50 have been sentenced to<br />
lengthy prison sentences after unfair trials,<br />
including some who neither used nor advocated<br />
violence.<br />
The absolute level of political killings and<br />
other violations reported from Aceh has<br />
subsided somewhat in the past year.<br />
However, in Amnesty International’s view,<br />
it would be wrong to conclude from this<br />
evidence that there is no longer a serious<br />
human rights problem in the area, or that the<br />
situation does not warrant urgent international<br />
concern. There are at least three<br />
reasons why.<br />
First, as the evidence in this report suggests,<br />
grave violations do continue, even if<br />
on a reduced scale. That the cases of political<br />
killing, “disappearance” and arbitrary<br />
arrest reported in 1992 were in the scores<br />
rather than the hundreds or thousands is<br />
small consolation to the victims, or to the<br />
relatives of those killed or still missing.<br />
Second, the relative “peace and order” which<br />
now prevails in Aceh does not appear to<br />
reflect any significant change in the policies<br />
or practices of the Indonesian security<br />
forces. It reflects, rather, a significant decline<br />
in open opposition to the government and a<br />
pervasive fear of government retribution on<br />
the part of ordinary people living in areas of<br />
suspected rebel activity. Under the<br />
circumstances, a pattern of grave and<br />
widespread violations may quickly reemerge<br />
in the event of renewed opposition<br />
to Indonesian rule. Third, thorough, independent<br />
and impartial investigations of the<br />
violations committed over the past four<br />
years have not yet been carried out, nor<br />
have the suspected perpetrators been<br />
brought to justice. Not only does this leave<br />
unresolved the fate of thousands of victims,<br />
it sends a clear message to the perpetrators<br />
that such violations can be committed with<br />
impunity, thereby making future violations<br />
even more likely to occur.<br />
The same combination of factors which<br />
has given rise to serious violations in Aceh<br />
and <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> has also been evident outside<br />
the areas of rebel activity. Taken together,<br />
the pervasive rationale of national<br />
security, the preponderant influence of the<br />
military, and the failure to investigate abuses<br />
and bring the suspected perpetrators to<br />
justice, has contributed to the institutionalization<br />
of a pattern of grave human<br />
rights abuse throughout the country.<br />
...<br />
9. CONCLUSIONS AND<br />
RECOMMENDATIONS<br />
The Indonesian authorities have stated<br />
that the November 1991 Santa Cruz massacre<br />
in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> was an isolated incident,<br />
an unfortunate aberration in an otherwise<br />
acceptable pattern of behaviour by government<br />
security forces. However, the information<br />
available to Amnesty International<br />
indicates that this is far from the truth. In<br />
the quarter of a century since the current<br />
regime came to power, the Government of<br />
Indonesia has been responsible for a staggering<br />
range of violations of human rights, of<br />
which the November 1991 massacre was<br />
only one of the most widely publicized examples.<br />
Extrajudicial execution,<br />
“disappearance,” political imprisonment,<br />
torture and the death penalty have become<br />
part of an institutional repertoire for dealing<br />
with political dissent and other perceived<br />
threats to national security, stability and<br />
order throughout the country. Amnesty<br />
International believes that, unless concrete<br />
measures are taken promptly, there is every<br />
likelihood that this pattern of abuse will<br />
continue.<br />
Amnesty International offers the following<br />
recommendations which, if implemented,<br />
it believes would contribute toward the<br />
future protection of basic human rights in<br />
Indonesia and <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. Most of the<br />
recommendations are based on the<br />
principles and standards enshrined in international<br />
human rights law, particularly the<br />
International Covenant on Civil and Political<br />
Rights (ICCPR) and the Convention against<br />
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or<br />
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT).<br />
Some of the recommendations are also based<br />
on standards set out in the following United<br />
Nations (UN) instruments: The Body of<br />
Principles for the Protection of All Persons<br />
under Any Form of Detention or<br />
Imprisonment, adopted by the UN General<br />
Assembly in December 1988; and The<br />
Principles on the Effective Prevention and<br />
Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and<br />
Summary Executions, adopted by the UN<br />
Economic and Social Council in May 1989.<br />
Recommendations to the Government of<br />
Indonesia<br />
To prevent the occurrence of extra-judicial<br />
execution, Amnesty International urges<br />
the government to:<br />
1. prohibit by law all extra-legal, arbitrary<br />
and summary executions and ensure that<br />
any such executions are recognized as<br />
criminal offenses and are punishable by<br />
penalties which take into account the<br />
seriousness of such offenses;<br />
2. invite the UN Special Rapporteur on<br />
summary or arbitrary executions to visit<br />
Indonesia and <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> in order to<br />
conduct a full investigation of the human<br />
rights situation there;<br />
To protect detainees against torture,<br />
other ill-treatment or “disappearance,”<br />
Amnesty International urges the government<br />
to:<br />
3. ensure that all detainees, including those<br />
held for suspected national security offenses,<br />
are permitted prompt and regular<br />
access to legal counsel of their choice and<br />
to doctors and relatives;<br />
4. establish and maintain centralized public<br />
registers of all people detained in all parts<br />
of the country, to be updated on a regular<br />
basis and made available to detainees,<br />
family and lawyers;<br />
5. prohibit explicitly by law, all forms of<br />
torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading<br />
treatment or punishment; and<br />
ensure that all such acts are recognized as<br />
criminal offenses and are punishable by<br />
appropriate penalties which take into<br />
account the seriousness of such offenses;<br />
6. take all necessary steps, including the<br />
effective enforcement of existing legislation<br />
and the introduction of further<br />
legislation, to ensure that statements<br />
extracted under torture cannot be admitted<br />
as evidence during legal proceedings,<br />
except against a person accused of torture<br />
as evidence that the statement was made.<br />
7. invite the UN Special Rapporteur on<br />
Torture to conduct a follow-up visit to<br />
Indonesia and <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, to assess implementation<br />
of the recommendations set<br />
out in the report of his November 1991<br />
visit.<br />
To ensure that national security interests<br />
are not and cannot be invoked to imprison,<br />
or justify execution of, people for the<br />
peaceful exercise of their right to freedom of<br />
expression, Amnesty International urges the<br />
government to:<br />
8. conduct a thorough review of all legislation<br />
pertaining to national security and<br />
public order, and promptly repeal the<br />
Anti-Subversion Law;
Page 56 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
9. release immediately and unconditionally<br />
all those held solely for the non-violent<br />
expression of their political or religious<br />
views;<br />
10 take immediate steps toward the abolition<br />
of the death penalty, including the<br />
suspension of its application and commutation<br />
of all sentences currently imposed.<br />
To ensure that members of the security<br />
forces cannot commit human rights violations<br />
with impunity, Amnesty International<br />
urges the government to:<br />
11 bring to justice before a civilian court all<br />
members of the security forces suspected<br />
of committing human rights violations;<br />
12 ensure that all those suspected of<br />
committing human rights violations are<br />
immediately disarmed and removed from<br />
active service;<br />
13 establish an independent and impartial<br />
body whose duty is to initiate prompt<br />
and thorough investigations into all reports<br />
of human rights violations.<br />
To demonstrate commitment to international<br />
human rights standards, and to encourage<br />
their full and effective implementation,<br />
Amnesty International urges the<br />
government to:<br />
14 ratify or accede to the International<br />
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights<br />
(ICCPR), as well as the (first) Optional<br />
Protocol of the ICCPR, which permits<br />
the Human Rights Committee to receive<br />
individual complaints;<br />
15 ratify or accede to the Convention against<br />
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or<br />
Degrading Treatment or Punishment<br />
(CAT) and recognize the competence of<br />
the UN Committee against Torture to<br />
receive individual complaints (article 22),<br />
and to hear inter-state complaints (article<br />
21);<br />
16 permit the regular and unhindered<br />
monitoring of human rights in Indonesia<br />
and <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> by national and international<br />
humanitarian and human rights<br />
organizations, including Amnesty<br />
International;<br />
17 Welcome international observers at political<br />
trials.<br />
Recommendations to the UN<br />
Commission on Human Rights<br />
In view of the grave concern about human<br />
rights in Indonesia and <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> expressed<br />
in a consensus statement at the 48th<br />
Session of the UN Commission on Human<br />
Rights, and in Resolution 1992/20 of the<br />
44th Session of the UN Sub-Commission,<br />
Amnesty International urges the UN<br />
Commission on Human Rights to:<br />
1. seek a systematic follow up, through the<br />
UN Commission on Human Rights, to<br />
the January 1992 report of the Special<br />
Rapporteur on Torture on his visit to<br />
Indonesia and <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>;<br />
2. seek a full report to the UN Commission<br />
on Human Rights by the UN Secretary-<br />
General regarding the results of the visit<br />
to <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> in February 1992 by his<br />
emissary Mr. Amos Wako;<br />
3. encourage the Government of Indonesia<br />
to invite the UN Special Rapporteur on<br />
summary or arbitrary executions, and the<br />
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention,<br />
to visit Indonesia and <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> in order<br />
to conduct full investigations of the<br />
human rights situation there;<br />
4. seek effective means whereby the regular<br />
monitoring of the human rights situation<br />
in Indonesia and <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> under UN<br />
auspices can be assured.<br />
5. urge the Indonesian Government to<br />
permit the regular and unhindered<br />
monitoring of human rights in Indonesia<br />
and <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> by national and international<br />
humanitarian and human rights<br />
organizations, including Amnesty<br />
International;<br />
6. encourage the Government of Indonesia<br />
to ratify or accede to the International<br />
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights<br />
(ICCPR), as well as the (first) Optional<br />
Protocol of the ICCPR, which permits<br />
the Human Rights Committee to receive<br />
individual complaints;<br />
7. encourage the Government of Indonesia<br />
ratify or accede to the Convention against<br />
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or<br />
Degrading Treatment or Punishment<br />
(CAT) and recognize the competence of<br />
the UN Committee against Torture to<br />
receive individual complaints (article 22),<br />
and to hear inter-state complaints (article<br />
21).<br />
THE HUMAN RIGHTS CRISIS<br />
IN EAST TIMOR: REGIONAL<br />
AND GLOBAL<br />
PERSPECTIVES<br />
From Newsletter, February 19<strong>93</strong>, published<br />
by the Student Union of Hannover<br />
University, Germany<br />
by Shambhu Chopra, Jurist, member of the<br />
International Council of the International<br />
Platform of Jurist for <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
Introduction<br />
In this paper, I have thought to focus<br />
upon some of the regional and global perspectives<br />
of the human rights crisis in <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> and to offer some suggestions for<br />
finding a peaceful solution to this highly<br />
vexatious issue. The array of highly distinguished<br />
jurist, professors and intellectuals<br />
assembled here at this august gathering have,<br />
studied the various dimensions of the<br />
Indonesian occupation of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and<br />
would be placing their analyses, deductions<br />
as well as their suggestions for ending the<br />
occupation within the scope and ambit of<br />
international law and the applicable international<br />
instruments concerning this subject.<br />
In my humble view, apart from the other<br />
legal perspectives, the human rights perspective<br />
is perhaps the most vital significance<br />
as it would also encompass the relevant<br />
legal questions and issues concerning us<br />
today, which may be brought up for discussion<br />
by other learned speakers.<br />
I have attempted to briefly focus first<br />
upon the human rights dimension, and then<br />
on the regional and global dimensions, and,<br />
finally, have tried to put forward for consideration<br />
some suggestions which could<br />
form the basis for deciding about a possible<br />
course of action for finding a permanent,<br />
peaceful and negotiated settlement of the<br />
human rights crisis in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
At the very outset, I wish to be pardoned<br />
for my rather simplistic approach to this<br />
subject, which has indeed drawn the attention<br />
of very eminent jurists and scholars and<br />
has been studied in-depth from almost all<br />
angels and perspectives. As a public interest<br />
lawyer and as a human rights activist, it is<br />
rather difficult not to get emotionally<br />
affected whenever one thinks of the terrible<br />
sufferings of the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese people and<br />
of their sad plight especially at a time when<br />
we are fast approaching the 21st Century.<br />
The Human Rights Approach<br />
It is a self-evident truism that almost all<br />
the international instruments on human<br />
rights existing today including the Universal<br />
Declaration of Human Rights, the two<br />
Covenants, the U.N. Charter, as well as the<br />
various U.N. Security Council and General<br />
Assembly Resolutions and Declarations<br />
have been violated by Indonesian<br />
Occupation Forces, blatantly and with<br />
impunity in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
Thousands of men, women and children<br />
have been killed, injured or tortured ever<br />
since the occupation began and despite<br />
worldwide condemnation, the atrocities<br />
being committed upon the innocent people<br />
there continue unabated. The recent farcical<br />
trials of the youth arrested in November<br />
1991, agitations and demonstrations resulting<br />
in the Santa Cruz Massacre, have shown<br />
without any shadow of a doubt that the<br />
Indonesian Authorities have no desire to<br />
give up their hold over, and control of <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>.
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 57<br />
In my perception and to the best of my<br />
knowledge, the current situation in <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> represents a human rights tragedy<br />
with few parallels in human history. The<br />
denial of the Right to self-determination and<br />
the denial of the Right to development has<br />
reduced the people of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> since the<br />
past four centuries, first under Portuguese<br />
rule and later under Indonesian rule, to a<br />
state of virtual slavery. Apart from the legal,<br />
political, economic and other considerations,<br />
the human rights crisis in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
remains a matter of the gravest concern and<br />
the world community should focus its<br />
attention upon it as well as to make efforts<br />
to stop forthwith the violations of the<br />
human rights of the people of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. It<br />
is indeed a very sad commentary that<br />
despite the several international instruments<br />
of human rights in existence today, there are<br />
still certain peoples on this earth who are<br />
still suffering under colonial yoke. Any<br />
discussion on the legal questions of<br />
Indonesia’s occupation of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> must<br />
necessarily, therefore, embrace and<br />
encompass the human rights perspective<br />
since any strategy for its liberation from<br />
colonial rule, must take into account the full<br />
restoration of all the human rights of its<br />
native population.<br />
Colonization by former colonies<br />
To a keen observer of history and of international<br />
affairs, it would be apparent that<br />
almost all post world war II attempts at<br />
colonization have been made by countries<br />
which were former colonies themselves. We<br />
have the example of Tibet occupied by<br />
China, a former colony of Japan and<br />
England, and, of Western Sahara by<br />
Morocco, a former colony of France. <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> is a colony of Indonesia and so is<br />
West Papua and West Irian, which was itself<br />
a colony of Holland. Colonization by<br />
Western Powers ended in the aftermath of<br />
World War II, following the independence of<br />
India in 1947. Soon thereafter, as if by cue,<br />
one after another almost all former colonies<br />
became independent. However, China’s<br />
occupation of Tibet is a little different from<br />
Indonesia’s occupation of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. Tibet<br />
was an independent sovereign country with<br />
the Dalai Lama as its Head of State, before<br />
China forcibly occupied it. <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, as<br />
we all very well know, was under<br />
Portuguese control and the election process<br />
was underway before Indonesia occupied it.<br />
We also have the example of some former<br />
European colonies which after<br />
independence, got absorbed into, or merged<br />
with larger or bigger former colonies. For<br />
example, Goa’s merger with India, the cessation<br />
of certain French enclaves with India<br />
like the enclave of Pondicherry and<br />
Dahomey’s incorporation of the Portuguese<br />
enclave of Sao João Batista de Ajuda.<br />
However, it must be noted here that absorption<br />
appeared to be the only logical result<br />
for these enclaves, although, a small size<br />
or lack of economic viability cannot detract<br />
from the right of a former colony to achieve<br />
independence. And <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> by no<br />
stretch of imagination, could be said to be an<br />
“enclave” of Portugal, just as the assumption<br />
of control over Hong Kong and<br />
Macao by China cannot be said, by the<br />
same yardstick, to be a part of Chinese<br />
territory, and their peoples cannot be<br />
viewed as not having any rights to self-determination.<br />
As Judge Nagendra Singh noted<br />
in the Western Sahara Case:<br />
“Thus even if integration of territory<br />
was demanded by an interested<br />
state, as in this case, it could not be<br />
had without ascertaining the freely<br />
expressed will of the people - the very<br />
sine qua non of all decolonisation.”<br />
(Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion,<br />
I.C.J. Reports 1975, Page 12 at 81).<br />
The Declaration on the Granting of<br />
Independence to Colonial Countries and<br />
Peoples in 1960 adopted by the General<br />
Assembly vide G.A. Resolution No. 1514,<br />
15 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 16), UN DOC<br />
A/4684 (1960) first evolved this principle<br />
which was premised on the “necessity of<br />
bring to a speedy and unconditional end<br />
colonialism in all its forms and manifestations”<br />
(See preamble, para 2 Resn. No.<br />
1514).<br />
Ten years later in 1970, the legal questions<br />
arising in the Declaration on Colonial<br />
Countries were further clarified in the<br />
Declaration on Principles of International<br />
Law concerning Friendly relations and Cooperation<br />
among States in accordance with<br />
the Charter of the United Nations (G.A.<br />
Resn. 2625, UN. Doc. A/5217 (1970) at<br />
121. Here, too, it was clearly premised that<br />
the future status of the territory should be<br />
determined by the free and genuine expression<br />
of the will of its contemporary inhabitants.<br />
Based on all these considerations,<br />
it is my firm view that international law is<br />
hospitable to, and sanctions, claims of selfdetermination<br />
and independence by an<br />
ethnic community like <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> which<br />
fulfills all the requirements for “self-governance,”<br />
as envisaged by general Assembly<br />
Resolution No. 1541 (XV) and General<br />
Assembly resolution No. 1514 of the<br />
United Nations.<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> - A Regional Perspective<br />
The world is witnessing today very fast<br />
moving changes. The break up of the Soviet<br />
Union and the fall of the communist regimes<br />
in <strong>East</strong>ern Europe on the one hand and the<br />
emergence of Namibia as an independent<br />
sovereign state, are harbingers of a new era<br />
in international affairs. The dismantling of<br />
the remaining bastions of apartheid in South<br />
Africa is another positive development in<br />
this direction. The firm U.N. reaction to<br />
Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait and the<br />
Security Council’s resolutions permitting<br />
military action to drive out Iraq’s<br />
occupation forces is an example of swift<br />
reaction to attempts or re-colonization.<br />
Like Iraq’s false and baseless claims of<br />
historical bonds with Kuwait, Indonesia too<br />
has tried to mask its occupation of <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> on similar false and unjustifiable<br />
grounds. In all fairness, it should be noted<br />
that the U.N. General Assembly called for<br />
the withdrawal of Indonesian troops from<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and reaffirmed <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>’s<br />
right to self-determination (See G.A. Resn.<br />
3485, 30 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 34) 118,<br />
UN Doc. A /10034 (1975); SC Resn. 384,<br />
30 UN SCOR, Resolutions and Decisions<br />
10, UN Doc. S/Resn./384 (1975). Yet <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> continues to remain firmly in control<br />
over it with no signs of any let up despite<br />
world-wide pressure and condemnation.<br />
While governments, scholars and diplomats<br />
may debate the legal questions arising<br />
from Indonesia’s occupation of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>,<br />
and whether or not it is limited to colonial<br />
situations, the ground reality is that <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> continues to reel under foreign yoke.<br />
The sad tragedy of the situation is the <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> is nobody’s baby. It holds no special<br />
economic or strategic interest for Western<br />
Powers, like Kuwait does so as to precipitate<br />
military retaliation to them. It also bears<br />
no security or humanitarian risks for any<br />
neighbouring country like Bangladesh which<br />
eventually gave birth to a new nation in<br />
Asia. Moreover, <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> cannot also be<br />
said to be part of any larger territory of<br />
some sovereign state in order to bring about<br />
a merger or absorption into it as was the<br />
case with Goa, Daman and Diu, which being<br />
an integral part-and-parcel of India since<br />
ancient times, finally merged into India after<br />
liberation from almost four centuries of<br />
Portuguese occupation.<br />
Perhaps the nearest comparison to the<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> situation could be made with<br />
that of the forcible occupation of Tibet by<br />
China. International law experts could well<br />
find several legal or other parallels in the<br />
two fact-situations, although prior to the<br />
Chinese occupation, Tibet was an independent<br />
country. China’s long occupation<br />
of Tibet since 1949-50 and its ethnic<br />
cleansing of Tibetan culture and religion has<br />
provoked consistent world reaction. Yet,<br />
there has been no tangible outcome of the<br />
outcry against human rights violations in<br />
Tibet. The Government of India, unfortunately,<br />
and for reasons perhaps known<br />
best to it, has termed China’s political<br />
domination and subjugation of Tibet as
Page 58 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
China’s own internal matter although it has<br />
provided political asylum to the Dalai Lama<br />
and thousands of Tibetan refugees in India.<br />
Hence, it would be significant to note here<br />
that, given its special responsibility of<br />
monitoring peace and liberty world-wide,<br />
unless the United nations takes upon itself<br />
the onerous task of freeing all occupied<br />
territories on this Earth, fortified as it is<br />
with several General Assembly resolutions,<br />
declarations and mandates under its own<br />
charter, countries like <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, Tibet,<br />
Western Sahara, West Papua and all other<br />
colonized territories would continue to suffer<br />
the same fate which scores of newly<br />
independent countries once had to suffer in<br />
the colonial era.<br />
The Role of the United Nations<br />
While it is not my desire or intention to<br />
comment upon the functioning of the United<br />
Nations at this forum or even to offer a<br />
critique of its many successes and failures, I<br />
perceive that there is undoubtedly an urgent<br />
need today to review and to reconsider the<br />
question whether the World Body has<br />
adequately subserved the fundamental<br />
interests of the entire world community<br />
instead of only those few select nations<br />
which are in a strong position either to<br />
dominate or to influence the decision-making<br />
processes inside the UNO. Perhaps the<br />
question of enlarging the membership of the<br />
Security Council to make it more<br />
representative of the world community, as<br />
is being raised in many quarters, and in<br />
particular, by India, Germany and Japan,<br />
does not seem to be without sound reasoning<br />
or proper purpose. It might well provide<br />
some food for thought for the distinguished<br />
gathering here to seriously consider as to<br />
how can the Security Council be made, not<br />
only be more representative of peoples from<br />
all the continents on this globe, but also as<br />
to how could it be made more reflective of<br />
fulfilling the needs and aspirations of the<br />
millions of poverty-stricken, impoverished<br />
and subjugated peoples in many parts of the<br />
world. It should not, in this age and time,<br />
become the handmaiden of a few powerful<br />
western colonial power-brokers.<br />
A Global Perspective of the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
Crisis<br />
Against this backdrop, it would perhaps<br />
be more appropriate to view the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
issue not in isolation, but from a global<br />
perspective, as part of any international effort<br />
to bring about the liberation of men and<br />
women kept in bondage anywhere in this<br />
world. In this era of globalization, it is<br />
virtually impossible to keep silent anymore.<br />
The farcical trials of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese youth in<br />
Jakarta following the Santa Cruz Massacre<br />
is no more the internal matter of Indonesia<br />
and <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> alone, just as the ethnic<br />
cleansing of Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina<br />
is no longer the internal matter of the Serbs,<br />
Croats and Bosnians. Law and social justice,<br />
cannot be allowed to remain distant<br />
neighbours anywhere and at any time. It is<br />
for us, international lawyers and jurists and<br />
informed intellectuals to provide the healing<br />
touch to the victims of human rights<br />
violations, wherever it might occur, as true<br />
citizens of the world. And it is for this<br />
reasons, perhaps more than anything else,<br />
that an internationally acceptable, effective,<br />
permanent solution must be found to free all<br />
occupied territories in the world. This can<br />
be brought about, in my view, by adopting a<br />
global perspective towards this whole<br />
question of liberation of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> rather<br />
than viewing it as an isolated issue alone. A<br />
global approach as opposed to a narrow or<br />
parochialistic approach is the need of the<br />
hour, in this age of globalization.<br />
Suggestions and Conclusions<br />
In my presentation, I have sought to<br />
highlight the human rights dimension of<br />
Indonesia’s occupation of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. It is<br />
my perception that the humanitarian and<br />
human rights concerns of the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
issue also broadly encompass the various<br />
legal questions and aspects relating thereto.<br />
No matter how much we debate and discuss<br />
the legal and juridical issues or questions<br />
from the perspective of international law,<br />
the quintessential question that continues to<br />
stare us in the face is that the battle of<br />
freedom that these poor people have been<br />
relentlessly waging against a much stronger<br />
adversary must be won for it is a battle for<br />
freedom and truth. As Lord Byron has said<br />
in one of his immortal poems:<br />
“For Freedom’s battle once begun,<br />
Bequeathed by bleeding syre to son,<br />
Though baffled oft is ever won.”<br />
It maybe perhaps be easy for the participants<br />
in this seminar to talk about the right<br />
to self-determination, about decolonisation,<br />
about human rights and freedoms available<br />
under the many covenants and conventions,<br />
declarations and resolutions of the United<br />
Nations General Assembly and the Security<br />
Council, but for the man who suffers under<br />
foreign and an alien regime, all such talk of<br />
human rights, liberty and dignity is but like<br />
a teasing illusion, like water is to a thirsty<br />
man in a desert. To me, it seems no real fun<br />
for us men of law to go on holding seminars<br />
and conferences on legal issues while ought<br />
remains to be done. The time to act in<br />
realistic and concrete terms has now come.<br />
Mahatma Gandhi once told someone that if<br />
you want to do something, do it. If you<br />
don’t want to do it, go to a lawyer and he<br />
will tell you one hundred ways of how not<br />
to do it. So let us now put on our thinktanks<br />
and do some brain-storming as to how<br />
we could evoke and raise world public<br />
opinion against the many atrocities being<br />
committed upon the innocent people of <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>. Perhaps the most unfortunate reality<br />
in the present-day civilized world of ours,<br />
is, that despite having so many rights and<br />
freedoms guaranteed to us in as many<br />
international covenants, instruments and<br />
conventions, there is a total lack of<br />
international fora where these fundamental<br />
rights and freedoms could be enforced. They<br />
remain rights only on paper without any<br />
forum, court or tribunal where they could be<br />
enforced or implemented. For rights,<br />
undoubtedly, raise the whole question of<br />
remedies, and human rights, of whatever<br />
nature they may be, keep getting further<br />
enlarged under more and more international<br />
instruments; yet, sadly enough, no forum<br />
exists at the international level, leave alone<br />
the choice of choosing one’s forum, for<br />
enforcement of these rights, the most basic<br />
of which remains the right to exercise selfdetermination.<br />
I am convinced in my mind,<br />
after having considered all the approaches<br />
and dimensions relating to the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
issue, that our collective efforts should be<br />
aimed at devising mechanisms and lobbying<br />
strategies to bring about a peaceful, negotiated<br />
and bloodless transfer of power in<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. By influencing world public<br />
opinion on the one hand and by highlighting<br />
the emancipation cause of the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />
people and on the other, at all international<br />
and regional forums, a situation for isolation<br />
of Indonesia could be created. An updated<br />
status report on the effects of Indonesia’s<br />
encroachment upon <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>’s<br />
sovereignty should be prepared highlighting<br />
the continued human rights violations there.<br />
An emergency meeting of the Security<br />
Council should be summoned for the<br />
immediate and unconditional withdrawal of<br />
Indonesian occupation forces and for<br />
initiating a United Nations sponsored peace<br />
talks for installing an interim government in<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
The independence of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> is not<br />
only an idea whose time has come, it is now<br />
a race against time. Let us be guided in this<br />
battle for truth by the noble motto of<br />
“Satyamev Jayate,” which when translated<br />
from Sanskrit, means, “Truth alone shall<br />
triumph,” for, in the eternal battle of good<br />
with evil, sometimes good wins over evil<br />
and vice-versa, but, in the ultimate analysis,<br />
it is truth and truth alone, that always<br />
triumphs.
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 59<br />
BACKGROUND TO THE<br />
CURRENT HUMAN RIGHTS<br />
SITUATION (FROM CANADA)<br />
Canada Asia Working Group to UN Human<br />
Rights Commission.<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> achieved international<br />
prominence for the first time since the 1975<br />
Indonesian invasion on 12 November 1991,<br />
when soldiers opened fire on a crowd of<br />
unarmed civilians at the Santa Cruz cemetery<br />
in Dili, the capital of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. At<br />
least 100 people, and possibly as many as<br />
273, were killed in the Santa Cruz massacre.<br />
[1] However, the Santa Cruz massacre was<br />
just one instance of a series of similar<br />
violations.<br />
Since Indonesian troops invaded the<br />
territory in December 1975, and illegally<br />
annexed it in July 1976, a third of the<br />
population has died as a result of killings,<br />
bombings and famine brought on by the war.<br />
According to Amnesty International, the<br />
death toll is 200,000; sources in <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>’s Roman Catholic Church put the<br />
number at as many as 300,000 killed. [2]<br />
Figures compiled by the Canadian Institute<br />
for International Peace and Security peg the<br />
death rate at more than twice that of<br />
Cambodia under Pol Pot. [3]<br />
Armed resistance to Indonesian occupation<br />
continues, although the focus has<br />
shifted to non-violent clandestine actions in<br />
cities and villages under Indonesian rule. At<br />
midyear, there were around 10,000<br />
Indonesian soldiers in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> – half of<br />
them in territorial battalions, where their job<br />
is to keep control of <strong>Timor</strong>ese civilians. [4]<br />
Brig.-Gen. Theo SYAFEI, new armed forces<br />
commander in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, stationed<br />
between 40 and 60 soldiers in every village<br />
in the territory. [5] Repeated United<br />
Nations (UN) resolutions in the General<br />
Assembly have affirmed the right of the<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese to a free and fair act of selfdetermination,<br />
and have called for Indonesia<br />
to withdraw its troops from the territory.<br />
[6] In February 1991, the UN Commission<br />
on Human Rights made a consensus<br />
declaration calling on Indonesia to improve<br />
the human rights situation in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and<br />
allow free access to the territory for<br />
humanitarian organizations and international<br />
human rights groups.<br />
Despite this call, access to <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
was increasingly limited in 1992. There have<br />
been no official delegations allowed in since<br />
a brief February mission by UN envoy<br />
Amos Wako. [7] In 1992, requests from<br />
American, Australian and European<br />
parliamentarians to go to <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> were<br />
turned down, while Amnesty International<br />
and Asia Watch was banned from the territory.<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> was closed to the media<br />
throughout the year, with the exception of a<br />
BBC team during Indonesian elections in<br />
June and a Reuter correspondent in<br />
November. [8] Several journalists and ordinary<br />
tourists were expelled from <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
during the year.<br />
The “opening” of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> declared by<br />
President Suharto in 1989 seems to have<br />
finally come to an end. Despite the media<br />
blackout, however, information continued to<br />
reach the outside through tourist accounts,<br />
and sources in the Catholic church, and the<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese resistance. Reports signalled<br />
an increase in repression in the year since<br />
the Santa Cruz massacre, despite promises<br />
to the international community.<br />
“Far from putting an end to the violations,<br />
the official reaction to the incident has<br />
been accompanied by commission of further<br />
serious violations, including arrest for<br />
political reasons, torture, ill-treatment and<br />
extra-judicial executions,” Amnesty<br />
International has noted. [9] The appointment<br />
of a new governor for <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, José<br />
Abilio Osorio SOARES, signalled a harder<br />
stance. Soares, a leader of the prointegrationist<br />
Apodeti party before 1975, is<br />
much more closely associated with the<br />
Indonesian military than was his predecessor,<br />
Mario Viegas CARRASCALAO. He<br />
began his rule by telling reporters that “In<br />
my opinion, there should have been more<br />
people killed (at Santa Cruz). Why did only<br />
that number die? Why not all the one thousand?”<br />
[10]<br />
On 2 October, the United States ended<br />
its $2.3 million International Military<br />
Education and Training (IMET) aid to<br />
Indonesia to protest against continuing denial<br />
of human rights in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. [11] On<br />
the other hand, aid to Indonesia funneled<br />
through the Consultative Group on<br />
Indonesia (CGI) increased to $4.94 billion.<br />
[12] Canada’s suspension of $30 million in<br />
aid remained in place.<br />
Violations of Individual and Collective<br />
Rights<br />
Amnesty International reports that “In<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> a pattern of short term detention,<br />
torture and ill treatment of alleged<br />
political opponents continues to be reported.”<br />
[13] Widespread arrests were reported<br />
before major events to prevent proindependence<br />
demonstrations. The last<br />
week of October, for instance, saw the arrest<br />
for short periods of 1,000 people, a<br />
staggering figure in a territory Indonesia<br />
says is pacified. [14] The arrests, announced<br />
by Governor Soares, were just part of a<br />
campaign to prevent demonstrations on the<br />
first anniversary of the Santa Cruz massacre,<br />
which also included the expulsion from<br />
Dili of anyone without proper identification<br />
cards, house-to-house searches, and a pervasive<br />
military presence in the streets. [15]<br />
Short term detentions of suspected dissidents<br />
invariably include intensive interrogation.<br />
“Forms of torture and ill-treatment<br />
include: electrocution; slashing with razor<br />
blades and knives, including inside the<br />
mouth; beating on the head, shins and torso<br />
with fists, batons, iron bars, bottles, rocks<br />
and lengths of electric cable; sexual molestation<br />
and rape; kicking with heavy military<br />
boots; burning with lighted cigarettes;<br />
threats and deliberate wounding with firearms;<br />
immersion for long periods in fetid<br />
water, isolation and sleep deprivation.” [16]<br />
One recent detainee was beaten with a<br />
wooden club, after which a soldier thrust a<br />
ballpoint pen into his penis. He was then<br />
kicked and beaten during interrogation, along<br />
with a group of 30 others. His experience is<br />
by no means untypical. [17]<br />
Intensified repression was also reported<br />
around other significant dates. “Scores”<br />
were arrested in February as the Indonesian<br />
military went on full alert to prevent the<br />
landing of a Portuguese ship carrying 100<br />
students and journalists who planned to lay<br />
flowers at Santa Cruz cemetery. [18]<br />
Hundreds of fully-armed riot troops patrolled<br />
Dili during the Wako visit and arrested<br />
several people who had been planning<br />
to demonstrate, including village chief Jacob<br />
FERNANDES. [19]<br />
Security also tightened during the Non<br />
Aligned Movement summit in Jakarta.<br />
Thirty-three people (mostly high school<br />
students) were arrested in Dili during the<br />
summit [20], with a further 17 arrested in<br />
Viqueque. [21] Twenty-five were arrested in<br />
Maliana and underwent 120 hours of indoctrination.<br />
[22] Sunday mass was cancelled<br />
to prevent a march on 6 September,<br />
when 1,000 people gathered at Dili cathedral.<br />
[23]<br />
News of earlier atrocities continued to<br />
come to light in 1992. In one example from<br />
1990, Eurosia DA SILVA ALVES, a 15-<br />
year old student, was killed after her genitals<br />
were cut off and placed in her mouth and her<br />
breasts cut off and placed one in each hand.<br />
[24] Another report tells of 20 human hearts<br />
being found in a box by villagers outside Dili<br />
in November 1991. [25]<br />
In October 1992, soldiers in Belo summarily<br />
executed Dominggus AIKARAK and<br />
his relative Alcino Freitas BELO. At the<br />
same time, several dozen others were arrested.<br />
Five more people were killed the<br />
following day. [26] Another family member,<br />
Saturnino da Costa BELO, was arrested<br />
earlier with two of his brothers and an uncle<br />
near Baucau earlier. He was tortured daily<br />
until his ears, mouth and nose bled. [27]<br />
Seven young men in Viqueque were<br />
reportedly beaten until “their faces were
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black” during a two-week period in<br />
detention. [28]<br />
On 20 November, Indonesian troops<br />
captured Xanana GUSMÃO, leader of the<br />
armed resistance. Human rights organizations<br />
have expressed concern that he may<br />
have been tortured and drugged while in<br />
captivity. Access was not granted for the<br />
International Committee of the Red Cross<br />
until 7 December. [29] At least 60 of his<br />
family and associates were arrested over the<br />
following month in Manatuto, Dili and<br />
Same. [30] At least one of those detained,<br />
Jorge Manuel ARAUJO SERRANO, has<br />
reportedly been tortured to death. [31]<br />
Indonesia holds at least 122 <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese political prisoners (tahanan politik),<br />
and probably far more. [32] According<br />
to resistance sources, more than 500 young<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese are being held in camps and the<br />
homes of military officers “which are in fact<br />
slave houses and torture centres.” [33]<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese continue to face jail simply<br />
for asking questions about government<br />
policy. Lucas Wilson BAUMAU was arrested<br />
for writing a letter to the Indonesian<br />
press that disagreed with local government<br />
development priorities. [34] Yoanita de<br />
Yesus VIEGAS GALOCHU was charged<br />
with slander when she wrote a letter to the<br />
governor asking him to protect the life of her<br />
imprisoned husband. [35]<br />
Freedom of association has also become<br />
more restrictive as authorities moved to<br />
crack down on independent youth groups<br />
that have sprung up in the last two years, a<br />
period when government policy officially<br />
aimed at winning the “love” of the<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese. In November, the Young <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese Catholic Students Organization<br />
and Fitun (Tetun for “star”) officially dissolved<br />
themselves – almost certainly a result<br />
of government threats. [36] Both groups had<br />
been part of a youth federation that<br />
organized the 12 November 1991 demonstration.<br />
Thematic Concerns<br />
1. Right to development<br />
Indonesia has used “development” as the<br />
chief argument justifying its rule over <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>. However, the “development” under<br />
way in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> seems aimed more at the<br />
development of infrastructure to reinforce<br />
Indonesian rule than at “the constant improvement<br />
of the well-being of the entire<br />
population” described in the UN’s declaration<br />
on the right to development. Further, it<br />
ignores “the right of peoples to self-determination<br />
... [and] sovereignty over their<br />
natural wealth and resources.”<br />
Indonesian-built schools teach in Bahasa<br />
Indonesian rather than Tetun; roads facilitate<br />
the movement of Indonesian troops<br />
more than they do the movement of a traditional<br />
mountain-based society; hospitals and<br />
administrative systems benefit Indonesian<br />
settlers while doing little to help most <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese. Indonesia’s highly coercive<br />
population control program in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
has been criticized as “tantamount to<br />
genocide” by the (US) National Conference<br />
of Catholic Bishops.<br />
All these things are considered<br />
“instruments of subjugation by the<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese,” according to Peace is Possible in<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. “Economic development is, for<br />
the most part, dominated by monopolies<br />
which are in the hands of a few generals who<br />
practice an outdated colonialism.” [37]<br />
The right to control of resources is violated<br />
by the <strong>Timor</strong> Gap treaty between<br />
Indonesia and Australia, which divides the<br />
oil reserves (estimated at one billion barrels)<br />
under the <strong>Timor</strong> Sea. Drilling in the gap was<br />
expected to begin in December 1992. [38]<br />
2. Impunity<br />
In an unprecedented move after the Santa<br />
Cruz massacre last year, President Suharto<br />
promised that “no matter who they are,<br />
those found responsible for the shooting<br />
will be dealt with by the courts.” [39]<br />
However, no criminal charges have been laid<br />
against any of the soldiers who opened fire<br />
on an unarmed crowd or their commanding<br />
officers. Twelve soldiers were courtmartialled,<br />
but the charges were disciplinary<br />
rather than criminal and, as Asia Watch<br />
noted, the sentences meted out were<br />
“ludicrous.” [40]<br />
One corporal, Marthin ALAU, received a<br />
17-month sentence. An eyewitness reports<br />
seeing him kill two wounded men at Santa<br />
Cruz by repeatedly stabbing them. [41] He<br />
is also accused of cutting off the ear of one<br />
protester. Nine other soldiers were also<br />
court- martialled, and received jail terms that<br />
ranged from 8 months to 18 months.<br />
In contrast, <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese survivors of<br />
the massacre received long jail terms under<br />
Indonesia’s anti-subversion law. Gregorio da<br />
Cunha SALDANHA received a life sentence<br />
for subversion, while Francisco Miranda<br />
BRANCO was jailed for 15 years. Carlos<br />
dos Santos LEMOS was sentenced to 8<br />
years for taking photographs of the<br />
demonstration. Filomeno da Silva<br />
FERREIRA was sentenced to 5 years, 8<br />
months for translating Portuguese newspaper<br />
articles about <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. Ten more<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese in Dili have been jailed for up to<br />
10 years. In a related case, two men and a<br />
woman were jailed for three to five years for<br />
sending “secret” military papers (an<br />
interview with Governor Carrascalao)<br />
abroad. [42]<br />
Five <strong>Timor</strong>ese students studying in<br />
Indonesia were also jailed under the antisubversion<br />
law for organizing a demonstration<br />
in Jakarta on 19 November 1991, including<br />
Fernando de ARAUJO, chair of the<br />
National Resistance of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Students<br />
(RENETIL). Araujo received a 9 year sentence;<br />
he has been awarded the Reebok<br />
Human Rights award. Four other RENETIL<br />
members in Jakarta were also sentenced to<br />
as much as 10 years imprisonment. [43]<br />
3. Internally displaced persons<br />
Almost the entire population of <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> has been uprooted since the 1975 invasion.<br />
Thousands fled to the mountains in<br />
the late 1970s. When they surrendered to<br />
Indonesian troops they were often prevented<br />
from returning to their ancestral<br />
villages or moving freely about the countryside.<br />
Many were forced to take part in<br />
Indonesian military operations against<br />
guerrillas. Virtually all rural <strong>Timor</strong>ese are<br />
now living in resettlement villages, which<br />
they describe as “concentration camps.”<br />
[44]<br />
4. Minority and religious rights<br />
Annexation reduced the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese to<br />
a tiny minority within Indonesia. The<br />
displacement of traditional villages has made<br />
room for as many as 100,000 Indonesian<br />
settlers and transmigrants, who threaten to<br />
swamp the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese demographically.<br />
[45] “It is the new Indonesian civilization<br />
we are bringing. And it is not easy to civilize<br />
a backward people,” said one former army<br />
commander. [46] Bishop Belo has said that<br />
“we continue to die as a people and as a<br />
nation.” The sheer numbers killed in <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> since the Indonesian invasion qualify<br />
as genocide against the <strong>Timor</strong>ese, but the<br />
people are also subjected to cultural genocide:<br />
deliberate attempts to destroy their<br />
indigenous culture and their future as a<br />
distinct people in their own land. A full<br />
generation has now grown up cut off from<br />
their rich cultural heritage. <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>’s 12<br />
separate languages now stand on the brink<br />
of extinction. Traditional languages, religions<br />
and ceremonies are now banned. Sacred lulik<br />
sites and objects have been destroyed.<br />
For many years, the Catholic church<br />
stood as the one tenuous source of protection<br />
from Indonesian repression, despite<br />
restrictions on its operations. An estimated<br />
90 per cent of the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese are now<br />
Catholics. Since Bishop Belo’s 1989 letter<br />
to the UN to ask for a referendum on selfdetermination<br />
in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, however,<br />
Catholic priests and churches have increasingly<br />
come under attack. A raid on the San<br />
Antonio de Motael parish church on 28<br />
October 1991 (in which two men were<br />
killed) was the precursor to the Santa Cruz<br />
massacre.<br />
“Priests and nuns have been pressured,<br />
closely monitored and threatened by military<br />
personnel as they carry out their pas-
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 61<br />
toral duties,” according to the Indonesian<br />
Front for the Defence of Human Rights<br />
(Infight). [47] The intimidation starts with<br />
Bishop Belo himself, who this year was<br />
publicly warned by the armed forces to stay<br />
out of politics. [48] Belo has said that he<br />
fears meeting the fate of murdered El<br />
Salvador Archbishop Oscar Romero.<br />
The vicar-general of the diocese, Father<br />
Alberto RICARDO, spent the early days of<br />
1992 under intensive interrogation. By the<br />
end of the year, he had been sent back to<br />
Rome. [49] Father Hilario MADEIRA and a<br />
travelling companion were arrested while<br />
returning to <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> from a trip to Java.<br />
They were threatened with guns and have<br />
been harassed ever since as suspected dissidents.<br />
[50] In Ermera, armed soldiers interrupted<br />
mass to arrest worshippers, and<br />
later arrested one of the parish’s priests at<br />
his home at 3 a.m. [51] Foreign missionaries<br />
invited by Bishop Belo have been forced to<br />
choose between leaving <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and<br />
becoming Indonesian citizens. In October,<br />
Fathers LOCATELLI, BALTAZAR AND<br />
João DE DEUS were accused of “being<br />
behind” dissent in Baucau and given this<br />
choice. Ever since, they have been required<br />
to report daily to local military<br />
headquarters. [52]<br />
Conclusions and recommendations<br />
In February, the government of Indonesia<br />
undertook to the UN Commission on<br />
Human Rights to improve the human rights<br />
situation in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. Instead, it has<br />
intensified human rights violation in a bid to<br />
crush dissent. At the same time, however,<br />
the support for <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> from within<br />
Indonesia’s democracy movement has never<br />
been higher than today. A statement by<br />
student senates throughout Java following<br />
the Santa Cruz massacre called on the<br />
government of Indonesia to withdraw its<br />
troops from <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and allow a free and<br />
fair act of self-determination, and called on<br />
foreign governments to impose “an arms<br />
embargo and possible economic sanctions”<br />
on Indonesia. [53]<br />
The leadership of the <strong>Timor</strong>ese resistance<br />
movement has effectively passed to a new<br />
generation of activists, most of whom grew<br />
up under Indonesian rule. It should be clear<br />
that Indonesia will not win their loyalty.<br />
Instead, it is time to accept the calls for<br />
peace talks that include the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />
people. Bishop Belo’s proposal for a<br />
referendum on independence, or a new peace<br />
plan offered by the resistance this year that<br />
would delay independence for 7 to 12 years,<br />
are both ideas worth a hearing from<br />
Indonesia. [54] The capture of resistance<br />
leader Xanana Gusmão offers an<br />
opportunity for dialogue. If released to a<br />
third country, he could make a valuable<br />
contribution to talks on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> taking<br />
place between Indonesia and Portugal under<br />
UN auspices as a representative of the <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese themselves.<br />
The government of Canada, along with<br />
most western countries, has not recognized<br />
the de jure incorporation of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> into<br />
Indonesia. Accordingly, we recommend that<br />
the Canadian government:<br />
1. pursue initiatives towards the implementation<br />
of UN Resolution GA 37/30<br />
(1982);<br />
2. call for a withdrawal of Indonesian occupation<br />
forces from <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and demonstrate<br />
support for the right of the<br />
people of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> to a free and fair<br />
act of self-determination, as affirmed by<br />
repeated UN resolutions;<br />
3. call for the release of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese political<br />
prisoners imprisoned solely for<br />
their opposition to Indonesian occupation<br />
of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>; At the United<br />
Nations, Canada should:<br />
4. encourage the Secretary-General of the<br />
UN to include representatives of the <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese people, including the National<br />
Council of Maubere Resistance, in talks<br />
held under his auspices, in accordance<br />
with UN resolution GA 37/30 (1982); At<br />
the 49th session of the UN Commission<br />
on Human Rights, Canada should:<br />
5. call for the publication of Amos Wako’s<br />
report on his February 1992 visit to <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> and Indonesia ;<br />
6. under agenda items 10 and 11, raise the<br />
serious concerns of Canadians about the<br />
human rights situation in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>;<br />
7. under agenda item 12, support a resolution<br />
calling for full respect for human<br />
rights in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>; With regard to<br />
humanitarian concerns, Canada should:<br />
8. help apply international pressure on the<br />
Indonesian government to give free and<br />
unrestricted access to international relief<br />
and independent human rights agencies to<br />
work in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, particularly<br />
Amnesty International.<br />
Notes<br />
[1] Amnesty International, <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>: After<br />
the Massacre, 21 November 1991. The<br />
figure of 273 killed (with another 376<br />
wounded) is from a study by <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />
activists released by the Lisbon-based<br />
ecumenical coalition Peace is Possible in<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> (cited in Tapol Bulletin,<br />
October 1992).<br />
[2] Amnesty International, <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>:<br />
Violations of Human Rights 1975-1984;<br />
Peace is Possible in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>: The Santa Cruz Massacre (Lisbon,<br />
1992).<br />
[3] Dave Todd, “Canada mum on massacres<br />
of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> civilians” in Kitchener-<br />
Waterloo Record, 28 November 1991.<br />
[4] Reuter, June 5.<br />
[5] Tempo, Jakarta, 22 February 1992.<br />
[6] General Assembly Resolution 3485XXX<br />
has been reaffirmed seven times. Security<br />
Council Resolution 384 has been<br />
reaffirmed twice.<br />
[7] Asia Watch, Asia Watch Overview,<br />
December 1992. Wako’s report has still<br />
not been made public, despite a request by<br />
the Human Rights Sub-commission on 1<br />
September 1992.<br />
[8] ibid.<br />
[9] Amnesty International, Santa Cruz: the<br />
Government Response, 6 February 1992.<br />
[10] Linda Hossie, “Massacre merits more<br />
than a slap on the wrist” in The Globe and<br />
Mail, Toronto, 13 November 1992.<br />
[11] <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> <strong>Action</strong> <strong>Network</strong>/US, news<br />
release, 3 October 1992.<br />
[12] Tapol Bulletin, August 1992.<br />
[13] Amnesty International, Indonesia/<strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>: The Suppression of Dissent, July<br />
1992.<br />
[14] David Webster, “Canada puts profits<br />
before rights” in Toronto Star, 12<br />
November 1992.<br />
[15] Reuter, 26 October 1992.<br />
[16] Amnesty International, The Suppression<br />
of Dissent.<br />
[17] ibid.<br />
[18] Jakarta Post, 21 February 1992.<br />
[19] Editor, Jakarta, 22 February.<br />
[20] “The poll that Indonesia dares not hold,”<br />
in The Economist, London, 19 September<br />
1992.<br />
[21] Tapol report, 23 September 1992.<br />
[22] Jawa Pos, 15 September 1992.<br />
[23] Tapol report, 7 September.<br />
[24] Pascoela Barreto testimony to Subcommission<br />
on Human Rights, Geneva, 14<br />
August 1992.<br />
[25] National Council of Maubere Resistance,<br />
news release, 19 February 1992.<br />
[26] Tapol report, 27 October.<br />
[27] Diario de Noticias, Lisbon, 25 April<br />
1992.<br />
[28] Tapol Bulletin, October 1992.<br />
[29] Amnesty International Urgent <strong>Action</strong>,<br />
10 December 1992.<br />
[30] Amnesty International Urgent <strong>Action</strong>,<br />
18 December 1992.<br />
[31] Amnesty International Urgent <strong>Action</strong>, 4<br />
December 1992.<br />
[32] Tapol Bulletin, October 1992.<br />
[33] Interview with José Ramos Horta,<br />
“Hidden terror in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>” in<br />
Newsweek, international edition, 1 June<br />
1992.<br />
[34] Jakarta Post, 3 April 1992.<br />
[35] Jakarta Post, 15 June 1992.<br />
[36] Suara Karya, 24 November 1991; Jawa<br />
Pos, 19 November 1992.
Page 62 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
[37] <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>: the Santa Cruz Massacre.<br />
[38] Reuter, 5 November 1992.<br />
[39] AFP, 7 February 1992.<br />
[40] Asia Watch Overview.<br />
[41] Tapol report, 7 June 1992.<br />
[42] War Resisters International, 1992<br />
Prisoners for Peace Honour Roll,<br />
November 1992.<br />
[43] Amnesty International, Fernando de<br />
Araujo: Prisoner of Conscience, May<br />
1992.<br />
[44] Mark Seddon, “Long-forgotten victims<br />
of an Asian invader” in The Times,<br />
London, 20 April 1991.<br />
[45] Hugh O’Shaughnessy, Irish Times,<br />
Dublin, 27 April 1991.<br />
[46] Colonel Kalangi, quoted in Camel<br />
Budiardjo and Liem Soei Liong, The War<br />
Against <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> (London: Zed Books,<br />
1984).<br />
[47] Infight report, 26 June 1992.<br />
[48] Reuter, 29 June.<br />
[49] Reuter, 13 November 1992.<br />
[50] Amnesty International, The Suppression<br />
of Dissent..<br />
[51] Tapol Bulletin, December 1992.<br />
[52] Tapol report, 27 October 1992.<br />
[53] Communications Forum of Student<br />
Senates, Bandung, 23 November 1991.<br />
[54] José Ramos Horta, speech to European<br />
Parliament, 27 April 1992.<br />
INDONESIA’S JUSTICE<br />
SYSTEM VIOLATES BASIC<br />
RIGHTS<br />
NEWS RELEASE from the Lawyers<br />
Committee for Human Rights, Feb. 25<br />
For Further Information Contact: James<br />
Ross, (212) 629-6170, ext. 140<br />
Today, the New York-based Lawyers<br />
Committee for Human Rights issued Broken<br />
Laws, Broken Bodies: Torture and the Right<br />
to Redress in Indonesia, a 90-page report<br />
that details serious failings of the Indonesian<br />
criminal justice system. The Lawyers<br />
Committee found that torture of detainees is<br />
“pervasive” in Indonesia and that<br />
procedures for redress are “ineffectual.”<br />
According to Michael Posner, Lawyers<br />
Committee Executive Director:<br />
“Rights violations apparent in the<br />
prosecution of Fretilin leader Xanana<br />
Gusmão and others in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>,<br />
such as incommunicado detention, are<br />
by no means exceptional in political<br />
cases. While the details of Gusmão’s<br />
treatment are still not known, the<br />
routine mistreatment of political<br />
detainees in Indonesia and <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
has raised international concern.<br />
Victims of torture find that the<br />
protections set out under Indonesian<br />
law mean very little in practice.”<br />
Broken Laws, Broken Bodies details the<br />
enormous hurdles victims of torture and illegal<br />
detention face in seeking redress for the<br />
violations of their basic rights. Detainees,<br />
particularly those accused of political<br />
offenses, often find their right to legal<br />
counsel denied, effectively preventing them<br />
from raising claims of ill- treatment.<br />
Lawyers will be blocked by the police and<br />
military from meeting with clients. The<br />
authorities have also threatened and harassed<br />
lawyers, as well as lawyers’ groups,<br />
involved in human rights work.<br />
In 1981 the Indonesian government<br />
promulgated a new criminal procedure code<br />
that included greater protections for the<br />
rights of criminal suspects and detainees.<br />
Innovative provisions sought to reduce the<br />
likelihood of torture in Indonesian detention<br />
centers. “More than a decade later,” the<br />
Lawyers Committee’s report finds, “the<br />
aims of the criminal procedure law have yet<br />
to be fulfilled: torture and mistreatment of<br />
criminal and especially political detainees<br />
remain endemic; the likelihood for meaningful<br />
redress for such abuses remains slim.”<br />
The main avenue of redress under<br />
Indonesian law is the pra-peradilan (“pretrial”),<br />
a form of habeas corpus hearing.<br />
Except in rare instances, the pra-peradilan<br />
has been unsuccessful in upholding the<br />
rights of those illegally arrested, detained or<br />
mistreated. Moreover, as evidenced by last<br />
year’s trials of military personnel implicated<br />
in the November 1991 Dili massacre, the<br />
government is unwilling to seriously<br />
prosecute members of the military and<br />
police responsible for human rights violations.<br />
Indonesian authorities commonly take<br />
actions amounting to the obstruction of<br />
justice in order to prevent detainees from<br />
bringing claims of torture before the courts.<br />
Prosecutors knowingly fail to stop torture<br />
during police interrogations. They also hinder<br />
access of non-government physicians to<br />
detainees, making torture difficult to prove<br />
in court. Particularly in political cases, they<br />
have threatened detainees and their families<br />
who file petitions for a pra-peradilan<br />
hearing.<br />
The absence of an independent judiciary<br />
in Indonesia is perhaps the greatest hurdle<br />
to effective redress for ill-treatment. As civil<br />
servants functioning under the Justice<br />
Ministry, judges lack any real independence.<br />
In practice, judges see themselves as another<br />
arm of the government, rather than as<br />
impartial adjudicators of fact and law. As a<br />
result, except in a few non-political cases,<br />
Indonesian judges have gone to great lengths<br />
to decide in favor of the government in praperadilan<br />
hearings.<br />
The Lawyers Committee makes a number<br />
of recommendations to the Indonesian<br />
government, including urging the ratification<br />
of international human rights treaties, the<br />
repeal of the much-abused Anti-Subversion<br />
Law and specific changes to the criminal<br />
procedure code. The report notes, however,<br />
that:<br />
“The political structure of the state is the<br />
fundamental obstacle to the prevention of<br />
torture and the right to redress in Indonesia.<br />
Until there is a recognition of the<br />
importance of constitutionalism, the<br />
realization of separation of powers and, at<br />
the most basic level, government respect for<br />
the rule of law, there is little chance that the<br />
problems addressed in this report can be<br />
substantially met.”<br />
Broken Laws, Broken Bodies is based on<br />
a month-long Lawyers Committee factfinding<br />
mission to Indonesia in June and<br />
July 1992 and research conducted since that<br />
time. The Lawyers Committee delegation<br />
travelled to Jakarta, Bandung, Yogyakarta<br />
and Surabaya and met with lawyers, human<br />
rights activists, legal scholars, former and<br />
current political prisoners, journalists and<br />
embassy officials. In October 1992 the<br />
Lawyers Committee made a written request<br />
to the Indonesian government to send a<br />
delegation to Jakarta to meet with<br />
Indonesian officials, but to date has not received<br />
a reply.<br />
Copies of Broken Laws, Broken Bodies:<br />
Torture and the Right to Redress in<br />
Indonesia are available for $10 from LCHR,<br />
330 Seventh Ave., New York, NY 10001.<br />
Since 1978, the Lawyers Committee for<br />
Human Rights has worked to promote international<br />
human rights and refugee law and<br />
legal procedures in the United States and<br />
abroad. Its work is impartial, holding each<br />
government to the standard affirmed in the<br />
International Bill of Human Rights.<br />
PRISONERS FACE<br />
TORTURE, SAYS HUMAN<br />
RIGHTS GROUP<br />
Washington, Feb. 25 (IPS) – the<br />
Indonesian police and army continue to<br />
torture and mistreat prisoners, the New<br />
York-based Lawyers Committee for Human<br />
Rights (LCHR) charges in a report.<br />
“Torture pervades the criminal justice<br />
system of Indonesia,” says the report released<br />
here Thursday.<br />
The LCHR bases its report, ‘Broken<br />
Laws, Broken Bodies,’ on its month-long<br />
mission to the southeast Asian nation last<br />
year and research conducted since then.<br />
Yhe group says the prosecution of the<br />
alleged <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese guerrilla leader who
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 63<br />
was captured in November and put on trial<br />
has been flawed by rights abuses.<br />
LCHR director Michael Posner charges<br />
that Xanana Gusmão, a founder of the<br />
revolutionary front for an independent <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> (Fretilin), was held incommunicado<br />
for more than a month after his arrest in<br />
Dili.<br />
His treatment and televised repentance in<br />
December prompted charges by some<br />
human rights groups and Portuguese president<br />
Mario Soares that his captors had tortured<br />
him.<br />
Posner said that “while the details of<br />
Gusmão’s treatment are still not known, the<br />
routine mistreatment of political detainees in<br />
Indonesia and <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> has raised<br />
international concern.”<br />
More than 60 of Gusmão’s relatives and<br />
alleged associates have been detained and<br />
held incommunicado since his arrest, says<br />
Posner, who stressed that Gusmão’s treatment<br />
was “by no means exceptional in political<br />
cases.”<br />
The government of Indonesian president<br />
Suharto denies that Gusmão was tortured.<br />
The administration recently took steps to<br />
improve its human rights image which was<br />
tarnished in Nov. 1991 when army troops<br />
machine-gunned pro-Fretilin demonstrators<br />
at Dili’s main cemetery.<br />
Suharto last month announced plans to<br />
form a national human rights body and<br />
hosted a U.N.-sponsored workshop on human<br />
rights in Jakarta.<br />
He, however, denounced western countries<br />
for using Indonesia’s human rights<br />
performance as a criterion for aid.<br />
Several countries cut assistance to Jakarta<br />
after the <strong>Timor</strong> massacre, and the U.S.<br />
congress last year cut its military training<br />
programme for Indonesia to protest the Dili<br />
killings.<br />
The new LCHR report deals primarily<br />
with the hurdles which the victims of torture<br />
face.<br />
It found that detainees, particularly those<br />
accused of political crimes, are often barred<br />
from contact with their lawyers who themselves<br />
are often threatened and harassed by<br />
the police and military authorities.<br />
The report notes that in 1981, Jakarta<br />
adopted a new criminal code which included<br />
greater protections for the rights of criminal<br />
suspects and detainees.<br />
The study found that more than a decade<br />
later, “the aims of the criminal procedure<br />
law have yet to be fulfilled: torture and<br />
mistreatment of criminals, and especially<br />
political detainees, remain endemic.”<br />
Moreover, the government has shown itself<br />
unwilling to seriously prosecute members<br />
of the police and military responsible<br />
for rights violations, according to the report.<br />
In addition, the authorities often take<br />
steps to prevent detainees from bringing<br />
torture claims before the courts, the report<br />
charged.<br />
“The greatest hurdle to effective redress<br />
for ill-treatment,” however, is the “absence<br />
of an independent judiciary in Indonesia,”<br />
the report says.<br />
“In practice, judges see themselves as<br />
another arm of the government, rather than<br />
as impartial adjudicators of fact and law,” it<br />
adds.<br />
“Until there is a recognition of the importance<br />
of constitutionalism, the realization<br />
of separation of powers and, at the<br />
most basic level, government respect for the<br />
rule of law, there is little chance that the<br />
problems addressed in this report can be<br />
substantially met,” the report says.<br />
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW BODY<br />
RECEIVES AWARD<br />
New York, Mar. 18 (IPS) - a Jakartabased<br />
human rights law organisation<br />
Thursday received the International Roger<br />
Baldwin Medal of Liberty Award here.<br />
The New York-based Lawyers<br />
Committee for Human Rights (LCHR) presented<br />
the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation<br />
with the award which recognises<br />
outstanding commitments to the causes of<br />
civil liberties and human rights.<br />
The foundation provides legal aid in<br />
criminal and civil matters for persons unable<br />
to obtain a private lawyer. Most recently, it<br />
represented persons arrested in connection<br />
with the Nov. 12, 1991 massacre <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
Sukardjo Adidjojo, chair of the foundation’s<br />
board of trustees, and executive director<br />
Abdul Hakim Nusantara accepted the<br />
award for the foundation.<br />
The LCHR noted that both are lawyers<br />
who have worked to promote respect for<br />
human rights in Indonesia and for standing<br />
up for the rights of political detainees. And<br />
the LCHR charged that the foundation,<br />
known locally as Lembaga Bantuan Hukum<br />
(LBH), has been the target of government<br />
harassment.<br />
The lawyers’ committee noted that because<br />
the LBH receives foreign funds as a<br />
registered non-governmental organisation<br />
(NGO), the Indonesian government has accused<br />
it of serving foreign interests and of<br />
damaging Indonesia’s name abroad.<br />
“This year, the government has sought to<br />
put pressure on LBH by banning all Dutch<br />
assistance to Indonesian non-governmental<br />
organisations and tightening the laws on<br />
non-governmental institutions,” said the<br />
LCHR.<br />
The foundation was founded in 1971 and<br />
has 13 branches nationwide. Together with<br />
the Indonesian bar association, its lawyers<br />
have defended persons who have been arrested<br />
in connection with demonstrations<br />
against the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese massacre.<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, a former Portuguese colony<br />
was invaded by Indonesian troops in Dec.<br />
1975, and annexed the following year.<br />
International human rights groups such as<br />
Amnesty International charge that in<br />
subduing <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, the Indonesian army<br />
killed as much as one-third of the <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />
population, or 200,000 people.<br />
The United Nations has sought to negotiate<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>’s status in talks with<br />
Indonesia and Portugal. in Nov. 1991,<br />
Indonesian troops fired on hundreds of<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese demonstrators in the capital, Dili,<br />
killing more than 100 people, according to<br />
the catholic church.<br />
Indonesian president Suharto dismissed<br />
several high-ranking officers implicated in<br />
the massacre, following a government<br />
commission’s findings.<br />
But the recently concluded session of the<br />
human rights commission in Geneva said it<br />
regretted that the Indonesian investigation<br />
had failed to identify clearly the people involved<br />
in ordering the massacre.<br />
The commission called on the Indonesian<br />
government to honour fully its human rights<br />
commitments and to ensure that the <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese in custody are treated humanely.<br />
According to the Lawyers’ Committee,<br />
the LBH has been widely involved in promoting<br />
human rights through education. the<br />
LBH has sponsored community legal education<br />
programmes to teach people about<br />
land, labour and civil rights, and to spread<br />
awareness about human rights.<br />
Asked to comment on the award, U.N.<br />
ambassador Wisnumurti of Indonesia said<br />
the recognition was testimony to the<br />
strength of the legal system in Indonesia.<br />
“Although we don’t agree with everything<br />
they (LBH) say, the existence of this<br />
organisation is important to the development<br />
of our society as a whole,”<br />
Wisnumurti said.<br />
The Indonesian government funded the<br />
Foundation for the first eight years of its<br />
existence.<br />
Actress Sigourney Weaver presented the<br />
award at a reception Thursday evening.<br />
The award is presented in alternating<br />
years by the American Civil Liberties Inion<br />
(ACLU) for civil liberties advocacy in the<br />
United States, and by the LCHR for work in<br />
advancing human rights worldwide.<br />
The tribute is named after Roger<br />
Baldwin, the founder of the ACLU who<br />
died in 1981, and who was a major figure in<br />
the civil liberties and human rights<br />
movements.
Page 64 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
UN HUMAN RIGHTS<br />
COMMISSION PASSES<br />
STRONG RESOLUTION<br />
THE JAKARTA REGIME AND<br />
ITS GENEVA COMMITMENTS<br />
Publico 8 February 19<strong>93</strong> Dateline : Lisbon<br />
Byline : A.M. Original lang.: Portuguese<br />
unabridged<br />
“Jakarta had the opportunity of demonstrating<br />
its willingness to cooperate with the<br />
UN. A year later, it is worth analyzing the<br />
results.” This was said on 4 March last year<br />
by the Chairman of the UN Human Rights<br />
Commission (HRC) in his statement,<br />
according to which Indonesia guaranteed it<br />
would comply with a set of demands made<br />
by the HRC on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. A year later,<br />
the ecumenical association Peace is Possible<br />
in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> examined those commitments<br />
made in Geneva.<br />
In a publication presented yesterday, the<br />
association reveals the contrast between the<br />
various measures agreed to by Jakarta, and<br />
the real situation in the territory.<br />
The “clarification of the final outcome of<br />
the massacre” in Santa Cruz on 12<br />
November 1991 confirmed 18 dead, admitting<br />
later that there were 50 victims.<br />
However, lists of names drawn up by humanitarian<br />
organisations - already published<br />
by Publico (see 12 November 1992 edition)<br />
- confirm 271 dead, 250 missing, and 382<br />
wounded.<br />
The commitment to ensure the “fair<br />
treatment of <strong>Timor</strong>ese prisoners” and the<br />
“general improvement in human rights in<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>” has been met with the contrast between<br />
the “severe sentences” passed on the<br />
Dili demonstrators, and the vague references<br />
to “punishments” given to those responsible<br />
for the massacre.<br />
Also, Indonesia’s guarantee to facilitate<br />
access to <strong>Timor</strong> by humanitarian and human<br />
rights organisations was contradicted by the<br />
“tightening up of the blockade.”<br />
In addition to the final figures, the document<br />
publicly divulged yesterday gives a<br />
complete list of those killed, missing and<br />
wounded following the Santa Cruz massacre.<br />
The aim of the publication is to enable<br />
the Human Rights Commission - the 49th<br />
session of which is meeting in Geneva - and<br />
the UN to use “other means” of achieving<br />
the objectives proposed in last year’s<br />
statement.<br />
The document “<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> after Santa<br />
Cruz - Indonesia and the International<br />
Order,” edited in a bilingual brochure<br />
(French and English), was presented during<br />
a seminar held in Lisbon to study possible<br />
lines of action in relation to the <strong>Timor</strong><br />
problem. The seminar, attended by about<br />
two dozen <strong>Timor</strong>ese and people connected<br />
with solidarity groups, took place in the For<br />
<strong>Timor</strong> forum, which has been granted by<br />
Lisbon’s Town Hall to the Maubere<br />
People’s Rights Commission (CDPM),<br />
which also helped to organise the weekend.<br />
EAST TIMOR REBEL LEADER<br />
PLEADS FOR U.N. SUPPORT<br />
Geneva, Feb. 25 (IPS/Victor Ego Ducret)<br />
– Rebels fighting for the right to selfdetermination<br />
in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> issued a<br />
statement here Thursday calling on the<br />
Indonesian government to stop its military<br />
and political repression against the <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />
population.<br />
A spokesperson for the resistance<br />
movement in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> José Ramos-Horta<br />
said: “the Maubere national council for resistance<br />
(CNRM) in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> calls on the<br />
international community to support the<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese fight for independence and selfdetermination<br />
and to condemn the inhumane<br />
repression of Jakarta.”<br />
Ramos-Horta, who is the international<br />
representative of the CNRM, is in Geneva<br />
to participate in the 49th ordinary meeting<br />
of the United Nations (UN) Human Rights<br />
Commission.<br />
He has issued a statement requesting the<br />
Commission to appoint a special rapporteur<br />
to investigate the situation in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>,<br />
which has been under Indonesian occupation<br />
since December 1975.<br />
Dominique Seixas, a former Indonesian<br />
prisoner, testified before the commission<br />
Thursday and described the repressive<br />
measures used by Jakarta against the<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese population.<br />
He spoke of the cruel treatment and persecution<br />
that political prisoners such as<br />
himself had been subjected to. Seixas, who is<br />
now living in Portugal, offered his testimony<br />
to the commission through the auspices of<br />
the international federation of Christians for<br />
action to abolish torture (IFCAAT), a nongovernmental<br />
organisation based in Geneva.<br />
Ramos-Horta reminded the commission<br />
Thursday that the humanitarian organisation<br />
Amnesty International (AI) stated that<br />
between 1975 (the beginning of the<br />
CNRM’s struggle) and 1991, 200,000<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese were killed through the repression.<br />
He said that this amounted to almost a<br />
third of the population of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. He<br />
added that it would be a great boost for the<br />
CNRM if the international community<br />
would take effective measures, even if only<br />
to stop Indonesia from torturing more of the<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese population.<br />
However, he said, countries like<br />
Germany and France continue to give economic<br />
support to the Jakarta government.<br />
He said: “recently, Germany sold them 30<br />
battle ships and France is Indonesia’s third<br />
most important source of aid, after japan<br />
and the United States.”<br />
Portugal, Ireland, Luxembourg, Greece<br />
and the former Portuguese colonies in Africa<br />
– like Angola and Mozambique – support<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>’s demand for self-determination<br />
and independence. In September the United<br />
States Congress pronounced it was against<br />
giving economic aid to Indonesia. according<br />
to a document that was distributed in<br />
Geneva by the CNRM, Indonesia dominates<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> through a colonial and repressive<br />
regime.<br />
“<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> was colonized by the<br />
Portuguese 500 years ago and there is not a<br />
single historic element to tie it to the present<br />
Indonesian republic,” the document states.<br />
The government in Lisbon has backed the<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese demands for independence and<br />
self-determination in various letters and<br />
statements directed at the United Nations<br />
secretary general Boutros Boutros-Ghali.<br />
The letters have been included in a report<br />
on the situation in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> that was<br />
presented to the U.N. human rights commission<br />
by Boutros Boutros-Ghali this<br />
month.<br />
This document also contains the reports<br />
from a Human Rights Commission work<br />
group on disappearances, executions and<br />
torture in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. Reports from AI and<br />
the International Lawyers Commission<br />
(ICJ) have also been included.<br />
Boutros-Ghali’s document also contains<br />
letters and statements from the government<br />
of Indonesia in which it denies the reports<br />
on the violation of human rights in <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
In one of these letters, dated Jan. 4, the<br />
authorities in Jakarta confirm the arrest of<br />
CNRM leader Xanana Gusmão, on Nov. 20<br />
last year. It also states that the request by<br />
the International Red Cross to be allowed to<br />
see him will be answered at a later date.<br />
URGE YOUR GOVERNMENT<br />
TO SUPPORT EAST TIMOR<br />
AT THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS<br />
COMMISSION<br />
ACTION ALERT FROM THE EAST<br />
TIMOR ACTION NETWORK / U.S.<br />
March 2, 19<strong>93</strong><br />
A resolution on the “Situation in <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>” is being introduced today at the UN<br />
Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) annual<br />
meeting in Geneva. The resolution,<br />
whose text is appended, was initiated by the
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 65<br />
12 European Community countries. The<br />
United States, Australia, and many Third<br />
World countries are being asked to sponsor<br />
it.<br />
This is a strong resolution, and would be<br />
a tremendous improvement over the<br />
“consensus declaration” from last year.<br />
There will be a vote early next week. At this<br />
point, the US delegation in Geneva has not<br />
determined its position, with different<br />
members having different views. Urge them<br />
to sponsor, advocate and vote for the<br />
resolution. Last year, the US opposed<br />
strong action on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, and was instrumental<br />
in sabotaging a meaningful<br />
resolution by the UNHRC.<br />
Indonesia is now the head of the Non-<br />
Aligned Movement and was elected a regional<br />
vice-chair of the UNHRC. They have<br />
a large delegation in Geneva which will<br />
strongly oppose this resolution. We must<br />
urge our governments, both in the US and<br />
other countries, to support the passage of<br />
this moderately-worded resolution to show<br />
Indonesia that the world community does<br />
not accept their ongoing genocide, occupation<br />
and repression in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, and to<br />
encourage them to participate seriously in<br />
negotiations with Portugal which resume<br />
next month in Rome.<br />
In the United States, please contact the<br />
following: Your Congressperson and<br />
Senators, who should call the State Dept.<br />
202/224-3121 Peter Tarnoff,<br />
Undersecretary of State for Policy.<br />
(202)647-2417 Sandy Berger, Deputy Asst.<br />
to the Pres. for Nat’l Security Affairs.<br />
202/456-2883<br />
TEXT OF THE PROPOSED<br />
RESOLUTION<br />
SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR<br />
The Commission on Human Rights<br />
Guided by the Universal Declaration of<br />
Human Rights, the International Covenant<br />
on Human Rights and the universally accepted<br />
rule of international law;<br />
Bearing in mind the statement on the<br />
Situation in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> agreed by consensus<br />
by the Commission on Human Rights at its<br />
forty-eighth session (Doc.E/CN. 4/1992/84,<br />
par a. 457) following the violent incident of<br />
the 12 November 1991 in Dili;<br />
Recalling resolution 1992/20 of the Sub-<br />
Commission on Prevention of<br />
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities<br />
of 27 August 1992;<br />
Gravely concerned at continuing allegation<br />
on serious human rights violations and<br />
noting with concern in this context the reports<br />
Or the Special Rapporteur on Torture<br />
(Doc.E/CN.4/19<strong>93</strong>/26); of the Special<br />
Rapporteur on Extra-judicial, Summary or<br />
Arbitrary Executions<br />
(Doc.E/CN.4/19<strong>93</strong>/46), of the Working<br />
Group on Enforced or Involuntary<br />
Disappearances (Doc.E/CN.4/19<strong>93</strong>/25);<br />
Bearing in mind the Body of Principles<br />
on the Protection of all Persons subject to<br />
any form of detention or imprisonment endorsed<br />
by the General Assembly in its<br />
resolution 43/173 and the Principles on the<br />
Effective Prevention and Investigation of<br />
Extra-legal, Arbitrary and Summary<br />
Executions, endorsed by the General<br />
Assembly in its resolution 44/162;<br />
Concerned at the fact that the Indonesian<br />
authorities aid not respond to the provisions<br />
of the statement on the situation of <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> agreed by consensus by the<br />
Commission on Human Rights at its fortyeighth<br />
session;<br />
Disappointed by the frequent denial of<br />
access to the territory of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> to human<br />
rights organizations as well as to some<br />
other relevant international observers;<br />
Having examined the report of the<br />
Secretary-General on the situation in <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> (Doc.E/CN.4/19<strong>93</strong>/49);<br />
Recalling the relevant United Nations<br />
resolutions concerning <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
1. Expresses its deep concern at the reports<br />
of continuing human rights violations in<br />
the territory of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>;<br />
2. Recalls that the Commission has commenced<br />
the decision of the Indonesian<br />
government to set up an enquiry<br />
Commission but regrets that the<br />
Indonesian investigation into the actions<br />
of the members of its security personnel<br />
on 12 November 1991, from which resulted<br />
loss of life, injuries and disappearances,<br />
failed to clearly identify all<br />
those responsible for those actions<br />
3. Expresses its concern over the lack of<br />
clear information about the number of<br />
people killed on 12 November 1991 and<br />
over the persons still unaccounted for;<br />
4. Regrets the disparity in the severity of<br />
sentences handed to those civilians not<br />
indicted for violent activities - who<br />
should have been released without delay -<br />
on the one hand, and to the military involved<br />
in the violent incident, on the<br />
other;<br />
5. Calls upon the government of Indonesia<br />
to honor its commitments undertaken in<br />
the consensus Statement adopted on 4<br />
March 1992 by the Commission on<br />
Human Rights at its 48th session;<br />
6. Calls upon the Indonesian Government to<br />
ensure that all the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese in<br />
custody, including main opposition figures,<br />
be treated humanely and with their<br />
rights fully respected, that all trials be<br />
fair, just, public and recognise the right to<br />
proper legal representation, in accordance<br />
with international humanitarian law, and<br />
that those not involved in violent<br />
activities will be released without delay;<br />
7. Renews its call on the Indonesian<br />
authorities to allow access to <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
for human rights organisations and additional<br />
humanitarian organisations;<br />
8. Encourages once again the Indonesian<br />
authorities to take the necessary steps to<br />
implement the recommendations presented<br />
by the Special Rapporteur on<br />
torture in its report (Doc. E/C.<br />
4/1992/17/Add.1) following his visit to<br />
Indonesia and <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and to keep the<br />
Special Rapporteur informed of the<br />
progress made towards their implementation;<br />
9. Urges the Government of Indonesia to<br />
invite the Special Rapporteur on Torture,<br />
the Special Rapporteur on Extra-judicial,<br />
Summary or Arbitrary Executions, the<br />
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention<br />
and the Working Group on Involuntary<br />
Disappearances to visit <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and<br />
to facilitate the discharge of their<br />
mandates;<br />
10. Invites the Secretary-General to transmit<br />
the full report of his Personal Envoy,<br />
Mr. Amos Wako, to the Commission on<br />
Human Rights;<br />
11. Welcomes the resumption of talks about<br />
the question of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and<br />
encourages the Secretary-General to<br />
continue his good offices for achieving a<br />
just, comprehensive and internationally<br />
acceptable settlement of the question of<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>;<br />
12. Decides to consider the situation in <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> at its fiftieth session on the basis<br />
of the reports of the Special rapporteurs<br />
and Working Groups and that of the<br />
Secretary General, which would include<br />
an analytical compilation of all<br />
information received from, among others,<br />
Governments, intergovernmental and<br />
non-governmental organisations.<br />
CLOSED EYES<br />
ON EAST TIMOR<br />
Editorial, The Boston Globe, Friday, March<br />
5, 19<strong>93</strong><br />
During the presidential campaign, Bill<br />
Clinton lamented the “unconscionable” indifference<br />
previous administrations displayed<br />
toward Indonesian violations of human<br />
rights in the occupied territory of <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>. He promised a change in American<br />
policy if he were elected.<br />
Whether because of inertia, the confusion<br />
of a transition or a change of heart, US<br />
policy under Clinton seems to be no different<br />
from what it has been since the
Page 66 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
Indonesians first invaded and occupied <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> in 1975.<br />
Since then, as many as 200,000<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese, out of a population of 700,000,<br />
have perished, victims of Indonesia’s<br />
genocidal repression. Though the United<br />
Nations never recognized Indonesia’s annexation<br />
of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, successive US<br />
presidents bestowed arms, military training<br />
and diplomatic support on the Indonesian<br />
executioners.<br />
Sad to say, US delegates to a meeting of<br />
the UN Human Rights Commission in<br />
Geneva reportedly lobbied this week against<br />
a resolution on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> prepared for the<br />
European Community by the Portuguese<br />
delegation. The EC resolution calls on<br />
Indonesia to cease its abuse of human rights<br />
in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, to honor its previous<br />
commitments, to allow access to human<br />
rights organizations and “to invite the<br />
special rapporteur on torture, the special<br />
rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or<br />
arbitrary executions, the working groups on<br />
arbitrary detention and the working group<br />
on involuntary disappearances to visit <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>.”<br />
Following policy guidelines established<br />
last fall by the Bush administration, the<br />
American delegates in Geneva left other<br />
nations’ delegates in no doubt that they<br />
found the Portuguese resolution too strong<br />
and instead wanted a mild “consensus<br />
statement” like the one produced last year.<br />
Indonesia’s crimes against humanity are<br />
no less repugnant than those committed in<br />
Bosnia or Iraq. If Clinton truly wants<br />
America to become a protector of human<br />
rights, he must change the Bush policy on<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
UNHRC STATEMENT OF<br />
CONSTANCIO PINTO<br />
FOR ANTI-SLAVERY INTERNATIONAL<br />
Forty-Ninth Session, UN Human Rights<br />
Commission, Item 12 Geneva, 5 March<br />
19<strong>93</strong><br />
Mr. Chairman Distinguished members of<br />
the United Nations Commission on Human<br />
Rights<br />
First, I would like to introduce myself.<br />
My name is Constancio Pinto and I am<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese. I am one of the people who organised<br />
the peaceful demonstration on 12<br />
November 1991 in Dili, the capital of <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>, where the massacre took place.<br />
Fortunately I escaped from Dili on 16 May<br />
1992 to Indonesia and then to Lisbon in<br />
Portugal on 11 November 1992.<br />
Today I am here as an eye-witness of the<br />
abuses of the human rights of my people<br />
which continued after the 12th of November<br />
massacre 1991. But while I am reading this<br />
statement I am concerned about the life of<br />
my wife and my son who is only one year<br />
old as well as the lives of my parents. To<br />
guarantee their safety I would like to hand<br />
over to this commission the list of their<br />
names.<br />
Mr. Chairman,<br />
Since I left them on 2 November 1991, I<br />
have not seen or communicated with my<br />
family. I do not even know if they are alive<br />
or not.<br />
I wish the United Nations Commission<br />
on Human Rights to take this into consideration.<br />
If not, I am sure my wife, my child<br />
and my parents will be subjected to repression<br />
by the Indonesian army.<br />
Repression is a tradition of Indonesia which<br />
is practiced in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
I was one of the young people who suffered<br />
ill-treatment in Indonesian custody.<br />
When I was arrested on 25th January 1991<br />
at 9.30am, I was beaten by many policeman<br />
at the station. I was beaten for over 14<br />
hours until blood came from my mouth, my<br />
nose, my eyes and my ears. After that, I<br />
was taken into the “Senopati II” prison<br />
where I was interrogated by Captain Edy<br />
Suprianto and Let Colonel Gatot, the head<br />
of Intelligence in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. In Senopati II<br />
I was interrogated and threatened for 4 days.<br />
Unfortunately I met with 13 other prisoners<br />
that had been detained three months before.<br />
David Aleong (20), Talofo Moniz (23), José<br />
Antonio Galucho (40), Abilio Sarmento (25)<br />
and Francisco Dias (55). most of them were<br />
young people. David, Talofo, and José<br />
Galucho are now in prison together with<br />
Alexio Gama, Grigorio Saldanha, Francisco<br />
Miranda, Filomena Ferreira, Juvencio<br />
Martins, Jacinto Alves, Carlos Lemos and<br />
many others. These people were subjected<br />
to all kinds of torture: punched and slapped,<br />
electric shock, burnt with cigarettes, cut<br />
with blades. As a consequence Abilio<br />
Sarmento had his jaw broken and Talofo<br />
suffered mental trauma.<br />
One week later I was released but on the<br />
condition that I present myself to Captain<br />
Edy and Colonel Gatot three times a week.<br />
Even then, I was continuously monitored by<br />
their intelligence police. That was my life<br />
from January to October 1991.<br />
At the times I had to present myself, I<br />
was threatened to make me denounce the<br />
position of Xanana Gusmão and the activities<br />
of the underground organisations. In the<br />
beginning of October 1991, one of the<br />
soldiers of Captain Edy Suprianto said to<br />
me “Let’s see who will be the hero: you or<br />
me?” In this case he failed. This intimidation<br />
happen to all <strong>Timor</strong>ese people, especially<br />
the young.<br />
On 29 October, when the Indonesian<br />
army ambushed Motael church and killed<br />
Sebastião Gomes, many young people were<br />
detained, among them Alfonso Rangel who<br />
was then sentenced to 5 years in prison.<br />
As a result of the torture some of the<br />
detainees were forced to say that I was their<br />
leader. That is why on 1 November 1991 at<br />
5pm Martino Alau, an intelligence policeman,<br />
held a meeting in his house with other<br />
intelligence officials. The purpose of the<br />
meeting was to arrest me again and possibly<br />
to execute me. Fortunately I was informed<br />
about the meeting.<br />
Then, on 2 November at 3am I left my<br />
wife, who was 5 months pregnant and my<br />
parents to go into hiding around Dili,<br />
moving from house to house during the night<br />
and sometimes sleeping in the jungle,<br />
without knowing the situation of my family.<br />
After the November massacre, my picture<br />
was distributed to all the intelligence<br />
police and army, my name was published in<br />
the newspaper and announced over the<br />
television. Fortunately I had the<br />
opportunity to escape to Portugal.<br />
Mr. Chairman,<br />
In the massacre of 12 November 1991,<br />
the Indonesian army killed more than 200<br />
people, most of them young people, and<br />
wounded at least 382.<br />
Indonesia, after killing 200,000 <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />
people over the past 17 years are still not<br />
satisfied. From 1989 until the present day,<br />
the presence of a strategy to exterminate the<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese people has clearly emerged,<br />
starting with the extermination of the youth.<br />
From 12 November massacre to the present<br />
day, many young people have been<br />
persecuted: some of them have been arrested<br />
and imprisoned; some o them are still<br />
persecuted. Because of that, they have had<br />
to leave their family, their jobs and their<br />
schools.<br />
Now with the isolation of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
from the eyes of the international community,<br />
the <strong>Timor</strong>ese are being forced to bend<br />
to the will of the Indonesian army, our persecutors<br />
and executers. As an example are<br />
the trials of Mr. Xanana Gusmão’s trial and<br />
of the many others. Xanana Gusmão, who<br />
before his capture always proposed to negotiate<br />
with Indonesia under UN auspices<br />
without pre-conditions, is now the victim.<br />
Mr. Chairman,<br />
The military Commander of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>,<br />
Theo Syafei, continues to use “Operasi<br />
Tuntas” (operation thoroughness or operation<br />
once and for all). The victims of this<br />
operation are and will continue to be the<br />
young <strong>Timor</strong>ese people. Hence, the extermination<br />
of the <strong>Timor</strong>ese youth will be the<br />
extermination of the next generation of<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese people.<br />
To conclude, I would like to say that,<br />
this time, my people are following the<br />
Commission of Human Rights with great<br />
expectation and hope for its success in re-
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 67<br />
gard to the continuing human rights violations<br />
in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. On the other hand, my<br />
people would like to hear the response of<br />
the Commission in the light of the<br />
Consensus statement made by this<br />
Commission on Human Rights in March<br />
1992, dealing with human rights violations<br />
in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. Does this Commission think<br />
that Indonesian government has had any<br />
respect for that decision?<br />
Thank you Mr. Chairman.<br />
UNHRC STATEMENT BY ABE<br />
BARRETO SOARES<br />
Geneva, 8 March 19<strong>93</strong><br />
I am grateful for the opportunity I have<br />
to address this Commission on behalf of the<br />
International Peace Bureau.<br />
My name is Barnabé Barreto Soares, a<br />
fourth-year English student from the wellknown<br />
Gadjah Mada University in<br />
Yogyakarta, Central Java, Indonesia.<br />
Talking about human rights abuse in <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> is like “pulling a scab off an old<br />
wound.” For any <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese like me<br />
who experienced the brutal invasion and<br />
occupation of their country by the<br />
Indonesian military, it is hard to make a<br />
decision to choose between speaking out or<br />
not speaking out about human rights abuse<br />
in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. I chose the latter and so I am<br />
here free to talk about my experience.<br />
Even though I am free to speak out about<br />
conditions in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> since the invasion<br />
in 1975, I feel rather scared as it might cause<br />
trouble to my family back home: my family<br />
could be harassed by the Indonesian military<br />
because of my being out-spoken. But that is<br />
a risk that I have to face. I was nine years<br />
old when <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> was invaded by the<br />
Indonesian military on December 7, 1975. I<br />
had to flee to the countryside with my<br />
family to avoid the Indonesian military<br />
onslaught. I started a new life under<br />
Indonesian occupation in my father’s<br />
hometown after 1975 and I went to primary<br />
school under the Indonesian education<br />
system.<br />
Already while still a small boy living in<br />
my father’s hometown I began asking: “If<br />
the Indonesian military say that we are<br />
brothers and sisters, why do they kill people<br />
in the jungle, kill people who surrender,<br />
kill innocent people who know nothing<br />
about politics?” Let me tell you what I personally<br />
experienced about human rights<br />
violations during my childhood and while I<br />
was a teenager:<br />
* people who I knew in my father’s<br />
hometown ‘disappeared’ after surrendering<br />
to the Indonesian military;<br />
* relatives of mine lost their livestock; a<br />
close relative of my father’s discovered that<br />
his buffaloes had been killed by Indonesian<br />
soldiers. Because he protested he was accused<br />
of being a Fretilin member. This<br />
frightened him so much that he decided to<br />
remain silent about anything else that happened<br />
to him;<br />
* the troops often steal our people’s<br />
livestock to feed themselves, saying that<br />
this ‘helps them carry out their duties in<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>; such a thing often happened to<br />
the inhabitants of the town where I spent<br />
my childhood;<br />
* our people had to carry a travel document<br />
whenever and wherever they go;<br />
* people were not allowed to listen to<br />
foreign broadcasts. If they did, they were<br />
punished;<br />
* people’s houses were raided in the<br />
early morning or late at night;<br />
* people suspected as members of<br />
Fretilin were arrested and put in prison.<br />
But one incident stands out vividly in my<br />
memory. One afternoon as I was playing<br />
football with my friends in the street, I saw<br />
an army truck drive past full of Hansip<br />
soldiers (army-trained militia). The men<br />
were shouting and singing and holding high<br />
so that everyone could see, the severed<br />
heads of several guerrillas. This was meant<br />
as a warning to all of us not to support the<br />
resistance. I can tell you, I felt very scared<br />
when I saw this terrible scene.<br />
When I moved to Dili in 1981 and went<br />
to high school, I continued to hear more and<br />
more stories about the atrocities committed<br />
by the Indonesian army.<br />
In 1985, before leaving for Java to continue<br />
my studies at university, I had to take<br />
a screening test, to indicate whether I was<br />
part of Fretilin or not.<br />
In 1989 I went back to <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> for a<br />
holiday. I attended the Mass celebrated by<br />
the Pope John Paul II in Tacitolu, on the<br />
outskirts of Dili. Right after the Mass, there<br />
was a pro- independence demonstration. I<br />
saw the demonstrators being beaten up by<br />
Indonesian security forces. Later I heard<br />
that the demonstrators were put in jail for<br />
interrogation.<br />
I returned to <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> again in 1991.<br />
My movements were closely monitored by<br />
the Indonesian secret police. I felt very uneasy<br />
in Dili. I asked myself: “If the<br />
Indonesian military claim that everything is<br />
fine in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, why is there always all<br />
this surveillance? ”<br />
I left for Canada to participate in a cultural<br />
exchange program for three months in<br />
September 1991. The massacre of<br />
November 12 1991 in Santa Cruz, Dili, <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> took place just as I was about to<br />
finish my program. A week after the massacre,<br />
I realized that the situation in <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> was becoming worse and worse. I<br />
also realized that my friends who joined the<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese students’ organisation<br />
(Renetil), the group which I was associated<br />
with, had been arrested for conducting a<br />
peaceful demonstration in Jakarta, the<br />
Indonesian capital. They had been protesting<br />
about the massacre and human rights<br />
abuses since the invasion in 1975.<br />
I began to feel afraid about going back to<br />
Indonesia. Finally, I made up my mind to<br />
stay in Canada. That was the hardest decision<br />
I have ever made in my life.<br />
In my view, human rights abuses in <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> cannot be separated from the <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese struggle for self- determination<br />
and independence. There will be more human<br />
rights abuses in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> as long as<br />
there is no peaceful solution for the <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> problem. I really hope that the this<br />
UN Commission will take meaningful initiatives<br />
to put an end to the human rights<br />
violations in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
The people of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> feel helpless in<br />
their own homeland. They look to you to do<br />
everything in your power to help them.<br />
Thank you.<br />
March 8, 19<strong>93</strong><br />
CNRM UPDATE<br />
As we launch into Week 6, the tactics,<br />
moves and strategising are poised to come<br />
into play again. I hardly need to say how<br />
important these next few days are... From<br />
our last Memo, you saw clearly the double<br />
faces of both the US and Australian delegates,<br />
and how the Indonesians are always<br />
ready to capitalize. Wheeling and dealing<br />
will continue to be the order of the day this<br />
week.<br />
We have had great press activity from<br />
friends in the US, with pressure on the<br />
government there. But we need a continuous<br />
intensive attack this week. The vote for the<br />
Resolution is due Wednesday. Please lobby<br />
your home governments.<br />
Now I will let the governments and<br />
NGOs speak for themselves... So far, <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> has been raised over 22 times under<br />
item 12...and the item is still not closed.<br />
The permanent representative for<br />
Denmark, Jacob Esper Larsen, spoke for the<br />
European Community expressing the<br />
concern over “the lack of clear information<br />
about the number of people killed and over<br />
the persons still not accounted for, about<br />
the disparity of the sentences given to civilians<br />
on the one hand and the military on the<br />
other, and by the denial of access to the<br />
territory by human rights organizations.”<br />
The European Community went on to “urge<br />
the Indonesian authorities to honour their<br />
commitments and to respond fully to the<br />
consensus statement on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.”
Page 68 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
The Community also “trust” that all<br />
those in custody, such as Xanana Gusmão,<br />
will be treated humanely with their rights<br />
fully respected, that they will have fair trials<br />
and that the ICRC will have full access. It is<br />
extremely important that an EC policy<br />
statement mentions individual cases: the<br />
personal mention of Xanana is therefore<br />
very significant. The Community also reiterated<br />
its support for the talks under UN<br />
auspices “with full respect for the legitimate<br />
interests and aspirations of the <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese.”<br />
The head of the Canadian delegation,<br />
Anne Park, concurred, adding that access for<br />
international human rights activists and<br />
journalists to the territory should be expanded.<br />
Switzerland considered <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> “an<br />
occupied territory” which is in fact the very<br />
first time a western country has used such<br />
blunt diplomatic and legal language. They<br />
also stressed the importance of the input of<br />
both NGOs and UN special rapporteurs in<br />
exposing the desperate human rights situation<br />
in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. Sri Lanka, Bangladesh<br />
and the new Czech Republic expressed deep<br />
concern over the situation in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> in<br />
their submissions.<br />
The Australian delegation, remaining true<br />
to its allegiance to all things Asian, dwelt on<br />
the positive steps made by Indonesia in<br />
regard to <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. After praising<br />
President Suharto, the national commission<br />
of inquiry, the troop reductions, the access<br />
to the territory, Australia recognised that<br />
the “human rights situation in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
remains of concern.” After their actions last<br />
week we would not really have expected<br />
much more.<br />
As is to be expected, Ambassador Shunji<br />
Maruyama, heading the Japanese delegation,<br />
declared the measures taken by the<br />
Indonesian government since the massacre<br />
as “positive.” The Islamic Republic of Iran,<br />
in a swinging attack on western imperialism<br />
generally and in particular in the field of<br />
human rights, said that Portugal’s interest in<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> was purely because it “has lost<br />
residuals of colonial interests there.”<br />
Our <strong>Timor</strong>ese friends spoke passionately.<br />
Speaking for Anti-Slavery<br />
International, Constancio Pinto described<br />
the brutal torture to which he was subjected<br />
by Indonesian intelligence police and he<br />
spoke of his fears for his family because of<br />
his presence here. Abé Barreto Soares<br />
(International Peace Bureau) described the<br />
day to day violations of basic rights endured<br />
by the <strong>Timor</strong>ese people. “In my view,<br />
human rights abuses in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> cannot<br />
be separated from the <strong>Timor</strong>ese struggle for<br />
self-determination and independence.”<br />
José Ramos Horta (National Aboriginal<br />
and Islander Legal Services Secretariat)<br />
dwelt on “certain half truths, distortions and<br />
outright lies” made by the Indonesian<br />
delegation: “the return to ‘normalcy’ in <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> ... is the on-going practice of torture,<br />
arbitrary arrest and detention.” Mr. Horta<br />
asked “Is this the progress since the<br />
Consensus Statement of last year’s<br />
Commission?”<br />
Siswa Santoso, an Indonesian (MRAP),<br />
spoke of “the culture of violence” which<br />
dominates society in his country, concern<br />
over the human rights situation in the occupied<br />
territories of Aceh and <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>,<br />
while Alexandra Reis spoke on behalf of her<br />
fellow <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese women. She ca1led on<br />
the Commission to “pay special attention to<br />
the sufferings of our womenfolk, especially<br />
the atrocity of rape.”<br />
Support for the <strong>Timor</strong>ese came from<br />
NGOs, both South and North. Dr. William<br />
Wipfler of the Anglican Consultative<br />
Council, spoke solely on the question of<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, describing how “the world has<br />
observed in virtual silence, the incredible,<br />
massive and barbaric genocide of that tiny<br />
nation.” The human rights violations in <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> were also raised by Amnesty<br />
International, the International Indian<br />
Treaty Council, the International League for<br />
the Rights and Liberation of Peoples, the<br />
Commission of the Churches on<br />
International Affairs and the International<br />
Commission of Jurists.<br />
Keep up the struggle!<br />
INDONESIA SUFFERS<br />
HUMILIATING DEFEAT AT UN<br />
The following press communiqué was issued<br />
in Geneva on Thursday, 11 March 19<strong>93</strong> by<br />
the National Council for Maubere Resistance<br />
(CNRM):<br />
Indonesia was dealt a humiliating defeat<br />
at the United Nations today, the penultimate<br />
day of the Commission on Human<br />
Rights, as 22 member states voted in favour<br />
of a resolution on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
The Indonesians, who this year claimed<br />
to have been “licking their wounds” after the<br />
massacre of hundreds of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese in<br />
Dili in November 1991, will be doing so<br />
again this afternoon.<br />
They seriously miscalculated the strength<br />
of support behind the people of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>,<br />
where the violations of human rights by the<br />
Indonesian forces of occupation are wellknown.<br />
The Commission room was packed as<br />
governments and NGOs alike awaited the<br />
outcome. The resolution, which had been<br />
postponed since Wednesday in order to try<br />
and reach an expected consensus, created the<br />
biggest stir yet in the Commission.<br />
No action vote defeated<br />
Last minute attempts to negotiate failed<br />
as Indonesia, a vice chair of the Commission<br />
and head of the Non-Aligned Movement,<br />
remained intractable to the last. Finally the<br />
resolution, sponsored by 24 governments<br />
from the European Community, the United<br />
States of America, the Nordic states,<br />
Angola, Guinea- Bissau, Mozambique,<br />
Costa Rica and Canada, was put to the vote.<br />
The Asian and Islamic countries tried to<br />
avoid any action by the Commission, but<br />
the motion present by Malaysia met with<br />
defeat. This is the first time a motion of<br />
non-action has been defeated at the<br />
Commission for four years.<br />
In the voting on the resolution, the victory<br />
for <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> was resounding with 23<br />
votes to 12 in favour with 15 abstentions.<br />
Angola, Guinea-Bissau, USA, Canada,<br />
Russia, Costa Rica, Austria, Poland and<br />
Denmark all spoke out in support of <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>. This spread of support was the key<br />
to success of the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> strategy. It<br />
successfully challenged the block vote of the<br />
South which has been used in the<br />
Commission to defeat resolutions on human<br />
rights in China and Tibet.<br />
“Stone in the shoe”<br />
Despite all the Indonesian delegation’s<br />
attempt to get rid of the “stone in their<br />
shoe,” the stone remains firmly entrenched.<br />
This will be much to the chagrin of<br />
President Suharto, who has been elected to a<br />
sixth term this week. It is clear that the<br />
leaders of the armed forces in Indonesia<br />
(ABRI) forced the delegation to adopt a<br />
hard position in the negotiations. ABRI ensured<br />
the appointment of Try Sutrisno,<br />
former commander-in-chief of the Armed<br />
Forces, as vice- president.<br />
“In the end only dictatorships like Iran,<br />
Sudan and China stood with Indonesia. All<br />
the democracies of the world supported us.<br />
Equally important, and indeed it sets a<br />
precedent for other issues, <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> destroyed<br />
the myth of the Asian block. There<br />
were Latin Americans and Africans voting<br />
with us and important Asian and Muslim<br />
states that abstained,” said José Ramos<br />
Horta after the voting.<br />
The strongly-worded resolution on <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> comes close on the heels of the consensus<br />
statement on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> at last<br />
year’s Commission. In it, the Commission<br />
expresses its “deep concern” at the reports<br />
of continuing human rights abuses in <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> and calls on Indonesia to honour the<br />
commitments it made under the consensus<br />
statement of the Commission last year.<br />
The resolution was adopted word-for-word<br />
as introduced by the EC Twelve (see above).
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 69<br />
Country voting breakdown on 11 March<br />
Human Rights Commission resolution<br />
on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>:<br />
23 In favour: Angola, Australia, Austria,<br />
Barbados, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile,<br />
Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Finland,<br />
France, Germany, Guinea-Bissau,<br />
Mauritius, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal,<br />
Russian Federation, United Kingdom, USA,<br />
Uruguay, Zambia.<br />
(Uruguay added its vote on the next day,<br />
having been out of the hall during the vote.)<br />
12 Against: Bangladesh, China, Cuba,<br />
Gambia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia,<br />
Nigeria, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria.<br />
15 Abstentions: Argentina, Burundi,<br />
Colombia, Cyprus, Gabon, Japan, Kenya,<br />
Lesotho, Mauritania, Mexico, Pakistan,<br />
Peru, Republic of Korea, Tunisia,<br />
Venezuela.<br />
AUSTRALIA’S UN VOTE<br />
‘A SURPRISE’<br />
13 March. Canberra Times. Unabridged<br />
Melbourne: In an unexpected move,<br />
Australia has backed a strongly worded<br />
United Nations Rights Commission resolution<br />
questioning Indonesia’s human-rights<br />
record in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
Despite its vote on Thursday, the<br />
Department of Foreign Affairs said yesterday<br />
that Australia planned to make statement<br />
to the commission saying would have<br />
preferred if there had not been any vote on<br />
the issue.<br />
In a resolution applauded by humanrights<br />
groups and the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese independence<br />
movement, the UNHRC in<br />
Geneva said it was “gravely concerned” at<br />
reports of continuing violations by<br />
Indonesian forces in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and criticised<br />
light sentences on soldiers involved in<br />
the 1991 Dili massacre.<br />
Australia - which initially had lobbied<br />
against any resolution at the commission -<br />
voted with 22 other countries in favour of<br />
the resolution, which was backed by the<br />
European Community, the United States<br />
and a number of Third World countries.<br />
Twelve voted against and 15 abstained.<br />
Earlier this week, a spokesman for the<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese independence movement,<br />
José Ramos Horta, accused Australia of<br />
trying to soften a resolution critical of<br />
Indonesia.<br />
“It’s pathetic that this little country can<br />
be so servile to Indonesia,” Mr. Ramos<br />
Horta said.<br />
On Monday, a spokesman for the<br />
Department of Foreign Affairs denied the<br />
allegation, but said Australia preferred that a<br />
consensus statement on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> be made<br />
by the commission chairman, rather than the<br />
issue’s going to a vote.<br />
He said yesterday that Australia, after<br />
following the arguments, had decided to vote<br />
with the resolution, even though this was<br />
not its preferred option.<br />
He said Australia intended to explain its<br />
decision in a statement at the UNHRC last<br />
night.<br />
Australia had supported the resolution<br />
because it was consistent with support for<br />
fundamental standards.<br />
It would have preferred a consensus outcome<br />
“which more adequately acknowledge<br />
the positive steps” taken by Indonesia since<br />
the commission met a year ago, the<br />
spokesman said.<br />
In a statement issued yesterday in<br />
Geneva, Mr. Ramos Horta described the<br />
resolution as a humiliating defeat for<br />
Indonesia. The Australia Council for<br />
Overseas Aid, often a critic of Australia’s<br />
stance on human rights in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>,<br />
“warmly endorsed” the vote.<br />
“This vote will do much to restore public<br />
confidence that Australia is even-handed and<br />
non-selective when it comes to grave<br />
violations of universally accepted human<br />
rights,” the executive director of ACFOA,<br />
Russell Rollason, said.<br />
Thursday’s vote followed intense behind-the-scenes<br />
lobbying.<br />
The Associated Press newsagency, in a<br />
report from Geneva , said it was a blow for<br />
Jakarta, which had managed to avoid criticism<br />
by the commission last year and had<br />
campaigned hard for support form developing<br />
countries during this year’s six-week<br />
session.<br />
Human-rights activists in the meeting<br />
chamber greeted the result with jubilation.<br />
Indonesia’s representative described the<br />
charges of violations as “unwarranted<br />
sweeping allegations.”<br />
NB: The Melbourne Age and The Weekend<br />
Australia had similar stories.<br />
UN SLAMS DILI KILLERS’<br />
JAIL TERMS<br />
Sydney Morning Herald 13th March 19<strong>93</strong><br />
Unabridged<br />
GENEVA, Friday, AP: The UN Human<br />
Rights Commission today voiced concern at<br />
reports of continuing violations by<br />
Indonesian forces in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and criticised<br />
light sentences against soldiers involved<br />
in 1991 massacre of pro-independence<br />
demonstrators.<br />
The commission urged Indonesia to allow<br />
UN experts on torture, executions and<br />
disappearances to enter <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and to<br />
increase access for other human rights<br />
monitors.<br />
The resolution was passed by 22 votes<br />
to 12. There were 15 abstentions. Western<br />
governments on the 53-member commission,<br />
including Australia, voted in favour. Most<br />
of Indonesia’s neighbours, including Japan,<br />
either voted against or abstained.<br />
The vote was a blow for Jakarta, which<br />
last year managed to avoid criticism by the<br />
commission and had campaigned hard for<br />
support from developing countries during<br />
this year’s six-week session.<br />
Indonesia described the charges of violations<br />
as “unwarranted sweeping allegations.”<br />
Human rights groups estimate that up to<br />
200 people were killed when Indonesian<br />
troops fired on mourners at a funeral in the<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese capital in Dili in November<br />
1991. Officially, the toll was 50.<br />
Ten soldiers were sentenced to up to 18<br />
months in jail for their role in the shootings.<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese involved in the demonstration,<br />
in contrast, received sentences<br />
from five years to life.<br />
U.N. CRITICIZES INDONESIA<br />
ABOUT EAST TIMOR<br />
By Paul Lewis. New York Times, Sunday<br />
March 14, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
UNITED NATIONS March 13 -<br />
Reflecting a shift in United States policy,<br />
the United Nations Human Rights<br />
Commission has adopted a resolution expressing<br />
“deep concern” at human rights<br />
violations in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> for the first time<br />
since Indonesia annexed the former<br />
Portuguese colony in 1975.<br />
With 22 nations voting in favor, 12 voting<br />
against and 15 abstaining, the Human<br />
Rights Commission also agreed on Thursday<br />
in Geneva to ask Indonesia to allow United<br />
Nations officials to visit the island to<br />
investigate allegations of torture, secret<br />
executions, religious persecution and<br />
continuing detention of citizens by the<br />
Indonesian authorities.<br />
<strong>East</strong> Timer was seized by Indonesia 18<br />
years ago, just as Portugal was preparing to<br />
grant the colony independence. Reports<br />
have persisted ever since of mistreatment of<br />
the territory’s mainly Roman Catholic<br />
inhabitants by the predominantly Muslim<br />
Indonesian police and armed forces.<br />
The issue drew international attention in<br />
November 1991, when the Indonesian security<br />
forces opened fire on a crowd of<br />
mourners at the funeral of a supporter of<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese independence. The government<br />
estimated that 50 died, but witnesses<br />
and local officials said troops killed at least<br />
180 and possibly dozens more.<br />
While the European Community has repeatedly<br />
tried to bring the matter before the
Page 70 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
Human Rights Commission, it is the first<br />
time a resolution criticizing Indonesia for its<br />
conduct in the territory has succeeded in<br />
passing.<br />
Diplomats and human rights campaigners<br />
said a crucial difference this time was a<br />
change in policy introduced by the Clinton<br />
Administration which threw Washington’s<br />
weight behind the European drive last week.<br />
Under the Bush Administration, the United<br />
States joined Australia and Japan last year<br />
in blocking a resolution criticizing Indonesia.<br />
This time Australia also voted in favor of<br />
the measure criticizing Indonesia while<br />
Japan abstained.<br />
“This vote was long overdue,” said Reed<br />
Brody of the Washington-based<br />
International Human Rights Law Group<br />
who attended the meeting. “Despite<br />
Indonesia’s power and the heavy diplomatic<br />
pressure it exerted, the international community<br />
has finally gathered the courage to<br />
speak out.”<br />
The commission’s stance on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
seemed to signal a more aggressive attitude<br />
in denouncing human rights violations<br />
around the world at the annual meeting,<br />
which ended Friday. The commission,<br />
which can only bring diplomatic pressure on<br />
offenders by drawing attention to abuses,<br />
commented unfavorably on the human rights<br />
performance of a record 29 countries,<br />
compared with 21 last year.<br />
It also dealt with human rights abuses for<br />
the first time in Papua New Guinea,<br />
Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Rwanda, Tajikistan<br />
and Togo.<br />
The commission broke new ground in its<br />
efforts to protect individuals by voting to<br />
station human rights monitors on the ground<br />
in Iraq to monitor any abuses as well as in<br />
former Yugoslavia. It also voted to keep<br />
human rights monitors in Cambodia after<br />
elections are held there late this spring and<br />
the United Nations peacekeeping force<br />
withdraws.<br />
But the United States suffered a setback<br />
when a resolution criticizing China for political<br />
repression and other rights abuses was<br />
blocked by China’s allies. The outgoing<br />
Bush Administration had sought to shield<br />
Beijing from such criticism, but the Clinton<br />
Administration took a more aggressive<br />
position in partnership with the 12<br />
European Community countries.<br />
The commission deplored the human<br />
rights situation in Myanmar, formerly<br />
Burma, after its investigator was denied access<br />
to Aung San Suu Kyi, a Nobel Peace<br />
laureate who has been under house arrest<br />
since 1991.<br />
It also criticized Cuba for refusing to<br />
admit its special investigator and adopted<br />
resolutions criticizing the human rights record<br />
of Togo, Zaire, Sudan, Afghanistan,<br />
Equatorial Guinea, Iran, and the truncated<br />
Yugoslav federation, as well as Israel’s<br />
military activities in southern Lebanon.<br />
The Commission also voted to offer aid<br />
to El Salvador, Guatemala, Georgia and<br />
Somalia to improve their justice and police<br />
systems.<br />
INDONESIA REJECTS<br />
UNHRC RESOLUTION ON ET<br />
Radio Australia News (abridged), 15 March<br />
19<strong>93</strong><br />
The leader of the Indonesian delegation to<br />
Geneva, Mr. Wiryono, has stated that<br />
Indonesia rejects the resolution of the<br />
UNHR Commission on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> adopted<br />
last week against Indonesia. He expressed<br />
his view about the resolution saying that<br />
Indonesia has been ‘unfairly treated.’ He<br />
also said that Indonesia was disappointed<br />
with Australia who chose to vote this time<br />
against Indonesia.<br />
Indonesia is obviously upset with the overwhelming<br />
support of the big powers in<br />
favour of ET, including Australia, which has<br />
always lobbied in its favour. My question is:<br />
what is the main reason which pushed<br />
Australia this time to support the resolution?<br />
Was it a genuine move? Or more likely, like<br />
Canada, it was also ‘forced’ to back the<br />
resolution because of Indonesia’s<br />
intransigence to negotiate? I understand that<br />
France, and lately the USA, has been in<br />
favour of a strong resolution, but not<br />
Australia. Moreover, with the reelection of<br />
Keating, I don’t see any good prospects for<br />
a fundamental change in Australia’s position<br />
regarding ET. I might be wrong, but,<br />
assessing from his previous policy to push<br />
Australia towards Asia, it doesn’t seem too<br />
encouraging.<br />
JAKARTA ‘REJECTS UN RESO-<br />
LUTION’ (BBC)<br />
Comment: It is significant that it took four<br />
days for Jakarta to come up with an official<br />
response to the UN resolution condemning<br />
Indonesia for human rights abuses in <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> and calling for investigations by UN<br />
special rapporteurs. We have not yet seen<br />
Indonesian press reports there about the<br />
resolution though sources say the resolution<br />
was widely reported in the Indonesian press<br />
last Friday.<br />
From the unfolding of events surrounding<br />
negotiations in Geneva in an attempt to<br />
adopt a chairman’s statement this year<br />
instead of adopting a resolution, the impression<br />
is that a hardline position adopted<br />
by the military back home made it impossible<br />
for diplomats in Geneva to offer any<br />
concessions at all. It is likely that there are<br />
mutual recriminations in Jakarta between<br />
the foreign ministry and the military over<br />
who should be held responsible for this<br />
serious setback to Indonesia’s diplomacy<br />
over <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
– John MacD.<br />
According to a BBC World Service report<br />
from Jakarta on 15 March, a senior foreign<br />
ministry official has called the UN Human<br />
Rights Commission resolution on <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> “unfair and unacceptable.”<br />
The official, Wiryono Sastrohandoyo,<br />
told journalists on Monday that Indonesia<br />
has been unfairly treated. He said the move<br />
was against the spirit of cooperation<br />
achieved last year when the commission<br />
issued a milder document - a chairman’s<br />
statement.<br />
This year, Mr. Wiryono said, Indonesia<br />
had been working for a similar outcome but<br />
could not accept the wording of a draft<br />
chairman’s statement and the Commission<br />
instead voted through a harsher resolution.<br />
But he added that the resolution was not<br />
binding and that Indonesia rejected it. In a<br />
clear reference to Portugal, Mr. Wiryono<br />
said he felt that some European countries<br />
were openly engaged in scoring points off<br />
Indonesia and wanted to perpetuate the issue<br />
of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. Among those who voted<br />
for the resolution were Portugal, the UK,<br />
France, the US and Australia.<br />
INDONESIA REJECTS UN<br />
CONDEMNATION (AUSTRALIAN<br />
TV)<br />
ABN TV (ATVI), 12.30am 16th March 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
Transcript of news item.<br />
READER: Indonesia has rejected last<br />
week’s United Nations condemnation of its<br />
human rights record in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. A senior<br />
Indonesian offical has described the
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 71<br />
resolution of the Human Rights<br />
Commmission in Geneva as “unfair and<br />
unacceptable.”<br />
IAN MACINTOSH REPORTS FROM<br />
Jakarta: The leader of Indonesia’s delegation<br />
of the Geneva meeting B. Sastro Handoyo<br />
(his real name is Mr. Wiryono<br />
Sastrohandoyo), said his government had<br />
been “unfairly treated.” According to Mr.<br />
Handoyo Jakarta had been working for a<br />
statement by the commission chairman<br />
similar to one adopted last year, which he<br />
said his government had acted upon.<br />
However, Mr. Handoyo said Jakarta would<br />
respond favorably to a further visit to<br />
Indonesia and <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> by the UN official<br />
and he expressed disappointment over<br />
Australia’s support for the strongly worded<br />
European community-sponsored resolution<br />
finally adopted. He said Indonesia had expected<br />
Australia to vote differently.<br />
INDONESIA SLAMS UN REPORT,<br />
WILL CLOSE SPECIAL EAST TIMOR<br />
COMMAND<br />
Jakarta, March 15 (AFP) - A high-ranking<br />
Indonesian official said Monday his<br />
country had been treated unfairly in a U.N.<br />
Human Rights Commission (UNHRC)<br />
resolution condemning Indonesia’s record in<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, as the military announced plans<br />
to close a special military command there.<br />
“We have been treated unfairly by the<br />
commission,” said Wiryono Sastrohandoyo,<br />
policy director at Indonesia’s foreign affairs<br />
ministry, adding that Indonesia found the<br />
resolution “unfair in its content and harsh in<br />
its language.”<br />
In Geneva last Thursday, the U.N. body<br />
adopted a resolution condemning Indonesia<br />
for human rights abuses in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>,<br />
saying it was deeply troubled about continuing<br />
violations.<br />
In a related development, the Indonesian<br />
military said it was taking steps toward<br />
disbanding its special command in <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
Major General Suwardi, who heads the<br />
Bali-based Udayana Military Command that<br />
oversees security in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, said<br />
preparations were under way to wind up<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>’s Military Operational<br />
Command, set up in 1989.<br />
He did not say, however, when the<br />
command would stop operating in the former<br />
Portuguese colony, whose control by<br />
Indonesia is still not recognized by the<br />
United Nations.<br />
If carried out the move would leave security<br />
arrangements in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> on par<br />
with those in the country’s other provinces.<br />
The Indonesian military has said the operational<br />
command will be disbanded when<br />
the fighting troops in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> have all<br />
been replaced by territorial units.<br />
The UNHCR resolution, supported by<br />
22 countries with only 12 opposed, also expressed<br />
“concern at the lack of information<br />
about the number of people killed” when the<br />
Indonesian army opened fire on a crowd of<br />
pro-independence demonstrators in Dili, the<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> capital, in November 1991.<br />
HUMAN RIGHTS CRITICISM<br />
DRIVING INDONESIA INTO A<br />
CORNER, SAYS GENERAL<br />
DPA (official German news agency) 16<br />
March 19<strong>93</strong> Dateline: Jakarta Abridged<br />
Comment: This could be a taking a swipe at<br />
Suharto for “having done so much” (after<br />
Santa Cruz) to no avail. Edi chaired the<br />
Military Tribunal that meted out some<br />
‘punishment’ to his close buddies, causing<br />
quite some humiliation in army circles. It is<br />
more evidently a swipe at the Indonesian<br />
diplomatic corps for failing to “tell the<br />
outside world about our efforts.” – TAPOL<br />
Criticism of Indonesia’s human rights<br />
record is driving the country into a corner,<br />
armed forces commander, General Edi<br />
Sudradjat said Tuesday.<br />
Indonesia had done its best to uphold<br />
democracy, human rights and environmental<br />
protection but international criticism of its<br />
rights policies was still pouring in, he noted.<br />
“The criticism has driven Indonesia into a<br />
corner,” Edi said and added that the country<br />
had done its best “which is better than<br />
many other countries. The problem is, we<br />
haven’t told the outside world enough about<br />
our efforts.”<br />
The general said many countries had only<br />
limited knowledge of Indonesia. The UN<br />
last Thursday adopted a resolution<br />
condemning Indonesia for human rights<br />
abuses in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. Political observers<br />
said the resolution was a blow for Jakarta<br />
after the country held an international conference<br />
on human rights last month.<br />
INDONESIA, DESERVEDLY<br />
REBUKED<br />
The New York Times, Editorial Page, March<br />
17, 19<strong>93</strong> Full text. “Topics of the Times”<br />
An old injustice was redressed at the<br />
United Nations last week, thanks to a<br />
timely policy shift by the Clinton<br />
Administration. The U.N. Human Rights<br />
Commission voted to express “deep concern”<br />
over human rights abuses in <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>, the former Portuguese colony that<br />
Indonesia invaded in 1975 and then annexed.<br />
That’s the first such rebuff administered to<br />
powerful and populous Indonesia by the<br />
commission.<br />
Last year the Bush Administration joined<br />
Australia and Japan in derailing a similar<br />
resolution to avoid offending an influential<br />
third-world state. But with a different signal<br />
from Washington, Australia voted in favor,<br />
Japan abstained and others found their<br />
courage. The result: 22 nations favored, 12<br />
opposed and 15 abstained on a resolution<br />
that asks Indonesia to cooperate (which<br />
Jakarta says it will) with a U.N. inquiry into<br />
charges of torture and secret executions on<br />
the island.<br />
Few paid much attention to <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
until November 1991, when Indonesian<br />
soldiers killed as many as 180 mourners at<br />
the funeral of a <strong>Timor</strong>ese opponent of<br />
Jakarta’s tough military rule. When<br />
President Suharto, just elected unopposed<br />
to a sixth term, subsequently spoke at the<br />
United Nations he volubly condemned Israel<br />
for its occupation of Arab lands – but said<br />
not a word about <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. Thanks to the<br />
Clinton Administration, it will be harder<br />
now for him to pretend that no problems<br />
exist in his own backyard.<br />
ACTION ALERT ON<br />
INDONESIAN RESPONSE TO<br />
UNHRC RESOLUTION<br />
Dear Friends:<br />
Tapol has prepared this statement about<br />
Indonesia’s avowed rejection of the resolution<br />
passed by the UN Commission on<br />
Human Rights. We have today sent a copy<br />
to Douglas Hurd, the UK Foreign Minister,<br />
and we ask readers to press their own governments<br />
along the same lines.<br />
Thanks...<br />
TAPOL, 17 March 19<strong>93</strong><br />
EAST TIMOR: COMMISSION ON<br />
HUMAN RIGHTS RESOLUTION: NO<br />
E/CN.4/19<strong>93</strong>/97<br />
Since the resolution on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> was<br />
passed by the 49th Session of the UN<br />
Commission on Human Rights, the<br />
Indonesian authorities have been claiming<br />
that the resolution is not binding and that<br />
Indonesia therefore rejects it.<br />
Mr. Wiryono Sastrohandoyo, Director-<br />
General for Political Affairs at the Foreign<br />
Ministry, headed the Indonesian delegation<br />
to the United Nations in Geneva. He told<br />
members of the press that the move was<br />
against the spirit of cooperation achieved in<br />
last year’s Commission through the milder<br />
Chairman’s statement and that, this year,<br />
Indonesia had been working for a similar<br />
agreement but could not accept the wording<br />
of the draft presented by the resolutions’<br />
co-sponsors.
Page 72 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
While this is not the first time a State has<br />
taken this stance, the United Nations needs<br />
to take a positive stand in order to confirm<br />
its central role in, and its terms for,<br />
maintaining world harmony and peace in the<br />
“new world order.” In the light of this, the<br />
remarks of the Indonesian authorities are<br />
extremely disquieting. We take this opportunity<br />
to outline our concerns.<br />
1 Challenge to the United Nations<br />
System: Statements to the domestic and<br />
international press, claiming that the resolution<br />
is not binding, present a serious<br />
challenge to the whole foundation of the<br />
United Nations human rights mechanism. If<br />
such arguments are allowed to persist uncontested,<br />
resulting in a fundamental undermining<br />
of international law, the whole<br />
role of the United Nations and, in particular<br />
here, the Commission on Human Rights,<br />
will be threatened. The United Nations is of<br />
course founded in principles of international<br />
law and therefore must treat resolutions of<br />
the Commission as binding on the parties<br />
involved.<br />
2 Membership: Indonesia is a member of<br />
the Commission. In becoming a member, and<br />
embracing the Universal Declaration of<br />
Human Rights, a state explicitly and implicitly<br />
becomes a promoter of human rights<br />
principles through the international<br />
mechanisms. Therefore, as a member<br />
Indonesia is obliged morally, to respect and<br />
honour the decisions taken by the<br />
Commission, even when those decisions are<br />
against its own interests. Without the<br />
acceptance of this basic principle by members<br />
states, the Commission cannot function<br />
in any true sense.<br />
3 Moral obligation: Whether or not this is<br />
accepted, at the very least, the reaction of<br />
the Indonesian authorities should cause<br />
grave concern to those 23 governments who<br />
voted in favour of the resolution as well as<br />
the 15 who abstained. Even if the legal obligation<br />
remains open to discussion, the<br />
moral obligation cannot be disputed.<br />
4 50th Session: Indonesia is under an<br />
obligation to carry out the terms of the<br />
resolution E/CN.4/19<strong>93</strong>/97. In particularly<br />
its obligations appear under operative paragraphs<br />
5, 6, 7, 8 and 9. Since in operative<br />
paragraph 12, the Commission decides to<br />
consider the situation in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> on the<br />
basis, inter alia, of the reports of the two<br />
special rapporteurs and two working<br />
groups, the Indonesian authorities are<br />
obliged to allow the UN officials free access<br />
in order to be able to furnish such reports.<br />
President Suharto explained recently to<br />
Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany that<br />
“Indonesia was committed to meeting the<br />
requirements imposed by the United<br />
Nations” (Jakarta Post, 25.II.19<strong>93</strong>). By rejecting<br />
the resolution of the Commission as<br />
unfair, unacceptable and not binding, the<br />
Indonesian authorities are intimating that<br />
they do not consider international law to be<br />
binding and that the Commission, that is the<br />
53 member governments, has no authority.<br />
Contrary to the statements of President<br />
Suharto, the Indonesian authorities’ have<br />
repeatedly threatened the authority of the<br />
Commission: they have not honored the<br />
terms of the Chairman’s Consensus<br />
Statement of the 48th Session with which<br />
they did agree, they have stated that they<br />
will not implement proposals contained in<br />
the report by the United Nations Special<br />
Rapporteur on Torture, Mr. Peter<br />
Kooijmans, and now they reject the resolution.<br />
If this is their position, we have to ask<br />
the reasons for Indonesia’s membership of<br />
the Commission and whether, if they do not<br />
ever intend to honour decisions of the<br />
Commission and do not regard international<br />
law as binding on them, they should remain<br />
as such?<br />
Indonesia defends its right to reject the<br />
resolution on the grounds that it tried to<br />
negotiate a second consensus statement on<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and that co-sponsors of the<br />
resolution acted unfairly and were “merely<br />
trying to score points off Indonesia” by perpetuating<br />
the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> issue. The member<br />
states of the Commission will have their<br />
own views on the attempted negotiations.<br />
But clearly attempts to claim that the<br />
resolution is not binding because negotiations<br />
failed, cannot be entertained.<br />
When countries only use the<br />
Commission, and concern for human rights,<br />
as a political tool, the future of all peoples<br />
throughout the world becomes more and<br />
more precarious. Stances like that of<br />
Indonesia, if they go unquestioned, threaten<br />
to make a mockery of the Commission. In<br />
addition, member states who are genuinely<br />
committed to the protection and upholding<br />
of human rights and international law become<br />
incapacitated.<br />
The reality of the “new world order” is<br />
that membership of the Commission is increasingly<br />
important, especially politically:<br />
A serious consideration for the Commission.<br />
For the Commission to strengthen the vital<br />
role it has in the world, member states must<br />
be expected and required to honour the<br />
Commission and its decisions and not<br />
merely reap the undoubted benefits of<br />
membership.<br />
COMMENT FROM BRUNO KAHN,<br />
AGIR POUR TIMOR<br />
Mar 18, 19<strong>93</strong><br />
Although I fully agree we should react<br />
along the broad lines of TAPOL’s statement,<br />
I am uncomfortable with a few details<br />
in this proposal:<br />
The United Nations is of course founded<br />
in principles of international law and<br />
therefore must treat resolutions of the<br />
Commission as binding on the parties involved.<br />
I am not sure if this is true. “Binding” is a<br />
legal term and I don’t know if it applies in<br />
this case. Remember the Security Council<br />
resolutions on Kuwait, which were binding<br />
because they were under chapter 4 of the<br />
UN Charter (or something like that), while<br />
the media pointedly recalled that those<br />
concerning the Occupied Territories were<br />
not. Similarly, I bet the two SC resolutions<br />
on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> are not “binding,” and that is<br />
an excuse why no action is taken. I would be<br />
very surprised if this HRC resolution were<br />
legally binding for Indonesia. Last year’s<br />
Consensus Statement looks much more<br />
binding, because Indonesia agreed to it. So I<br />
feel it is a safer ground to demand that<br />
Indonesia at least respects its own<br />
commitments.<br />
Indonesia is under an obligation to carry<br />
out the terms of the resolution<br />
E/CN.4/19<strong>93</strong>/97. In particular its obligations<br />
appear under operative paragraphs 5, 6, 7,<br />
8 and 9. Since in operative paragraph 12,<br />
the Commission decides to consider the<br />
situation in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> on the basis, inter<br />
alia, of the reports of the two special rapporteurs<br />
and two working groups, the<br />
Indonesian authorities are obliged to allow<br />
the UN officials free access in order to be<br />
able to furnish such reports.<br />
Same remark. I am not sure of the value<br />
of the term “operative.” It seems to me that<br />
the only “operative” paragraph is #12,<br />
where the word ‘decides’ appear. Just as in<br />
a trial, a ruling of the court may not be sufficient<br />
to force the loser to do something. A<br />
further ‘executive’ order may be necessary<br />
to implement the ruling if the loser is recalcitrant.<br />
On the contrary:<br />
Therefore, as a member Indonesia is<br />
obliged morally, to respect and honour the<br />
decisions taken by the Commission, even<br />
when those decisions are against its own<br />
interests.<br />
This moral side is a quite safe ground,<br />
because it doesn’t touch legal points that<br />
can be challenged by experts. Just as the<br />
‘grave concern’ of those governments who<br />
voted for the resolution.<br />
I may be wrong in my reservations, but<br />
I’d rather have some advice from an international<br />
jurist.
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 73<br />
INDONESIA LOSES<br />
GENEVA VOTE<br />
Southam News Service (Canada), 19 March<br />
19<strong>93</strong>. By DAVE TODD<br />
Comment: Southam News feeds most major<br />
Canadian dailies. Todd wrote several hardhitting<br />
pieces on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> following the<br />
Santa Cruz massacre, accusing the government<br />
of complicity in genocide; his<br />
criticisms of Canadian “quiet diplomacy”<br />
are toned down substantially in this piece.<br />
OTTAWA Indonesia suffered a humiliating<br />
political defeat Thursday at the<br />
United Nations when it rejected Canada’s<br />
advice and tried to legitimize its control of<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
Authority over the island of <strong>Timor</strong>, north<br />
of Australia, has been disputed since the<br />
mid-1970s when Indonesia invaded the<br />
eastern half of the former Portuguese colony<br />
it inherited through post-colonial force.<br />
A series of bloodbaths over many years<br />
followed Indonesia’s invasion of the tropical<br />
enclave.<br />
Ultimately these led to a confrontation in<br />
the capital, Dili, two years ago in which<br />
government troops killed more than a hundred<br />
protesters and innocent bystanders and<br />
provoked an international incident by<br />
drawing international attention to what<br />
happened.<br />
On Thursday, the UN Human Rights<br />
Commission in Geneva was asked to vote<br />
on what the world body should do about<br />
such concerns. One choice was to censure<br />
Indonesia by placing the country under a<br />
UN human rights watch.<br />
Instead, the government of Indonesia,<br />
part of the 53-member UN Human Rights<br />
Commission at present, chose to raise the<br />
stakes by pushing a proposition that no action<br />
be taken.<br />
Canada, which tried hard to prevent<br />
matters coming to a head and feels itself<br />
under particular pressure because of a strong<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> lobby in its own backyard had<br />
no choice.<br />
It was forced to help vote down the<br />
Indonesian initiative.<br />
A second vote chastized Indonesia’s actions<br />
in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, but fell far short of<br />
calling for a UN human rights monitor to go<br />
in.<br />
The Canadian government has worked<br />
hard to achieve a balance between human<br />
rights concerns in its dealings with Indonesia<br />
and the reality that the country represents<br />
one of the brightest prospects in Asia, in<br />
terms of Canadian commercial interests.<br />
But diplomatic sources say that has<br />
nothing to do with this decision, which in<br />
any case was inevitable.<br />
Indonesian President Suharto was<br />
“elected” to yet another term in office this<br />
week. That, as much as anything, accounts<br />
for the sudden, intransigent stance in<br />
Geneva.<br />
SELECTIVE FOCUS ON<br />
HUMAN RIGHTS CRITICISED<br />
From Third World <strong>Network</strong>, Mar 16, 19<strong>93</strong><br />
Geneva 13 March (Chakravarthi<br />
Raghavan) – The United Nations Human<br />
Rights Commission ended Friday its sixweek<br />
session marked by old <strong>East</strong>-West focus<br />
being replaced by an emerging North-<br />
South one.<br />
This was evident in the debates and<br />
resolutions, both on issues of general focus<br />
and those relating to individual country<br />
situations and how they were handled.<br />
Some Third World delegations noted a<br />
tendency for the industrialized countries,<br />
without any specific overt coordination, by<br />
and large acting or voting together, though an<br />
individual country or group of them might<br />
be taking the lead in tabling resolutions or<br />
negotiating on them.<br />
The discussions and debates at the UN<br />
body which oversees and monitors implementation<br />
of the Universal Declaration of<br />
Human Rights and various international<br />
covenants has long been marked by the<br />
<strong>East</strong>-West ideological battles during the<br />
Cold war and even the détente, with each<br />
side picking on the other as well as the<br />
other’s key supporters in the South.<br />
These went on side by side with the efforts<br />
within the UN system to focus on<br />
various aspects of the human rights – civil,<br />
political, economic, social and cultural – and<br />
seeking to expand international cooperation<br />
to make the rights and their enjoyment<br />
meaningful.<br />
But with the end of the cold war, new<br />
battle lines appear to be forming.<br />
In the just concluded 49th regular session,<br />
the North-South divisions came to the<br />
fore not only over questions like ‘right to<br />
development,’ external debt and structural<br />
adjustment issues, the global macroeconomic<br />
environment and its impact on enjoyment of<br />
human rights but also over some individual<br />
country situations as well as the future<br />
orientations and procedures of the<br />
Commission’s work and of the way several<br />
of its activities are conducted.<br />
On the latter, the developing countries<br />
pushed through two resolutions one asking<br />
for a report on the original mandates of<br />
various treaty and non-treaty mechanisms<br />
for supervision and monitoring of the implementation<br />
of the instruments as well as<br />
international legal standards and norms of<br />
existing non-treaty mechanisms, the norms<br />
and criteria used by them in their procedures,<br />
as well as the criteria used by the<br />
Centre for Human Rights (the secretariat) on<br />
how in practice it channels communications<br />
on these subjects to existing public bodies or<br />
confidential procedure mechanisms.<br />
They also got adopted another resolution<br />
underscoring the need for non-selectivity,<br />
objectivity and impartiality in the promotion,<br />
protection and full protection of human<br />
rights and fundamental freedoms and to<br />
ensure that the UN and international cooperation<br />
efforts in this area are not used for<br />
political ends.<br />
The first was adopted by a roll call vote<br />
of 33 against 16 (mainly the western countries,<br />
while the second was adopted without<br />
a vote.<br />
The countries of the South also got a<br />
resolution adopted on the right of development<br />
and for setting up a thematic working<br />
group on this issue, and two others on poverty<br />
and debt and human rights.<br />
The attempts of some of the major western<br />
countries to pressure individual Third<br />
World countries to fall in line and ‘vote’ or<br />
‘speak’ according to their desires which,<br />
with the end of the Cold war appears to<br />
have become more blatant in some capitals,<br />
figured at the final plenary when Malaysia<br />
spoke up on this.<br />
The Malaysian delegate told the<br />
Commission that while Malaysia welcomed<br />
“friendly and constructive consultations” on<br />
the work of the delegation at this and future<br />
sessions, “we take strong exceptions to approaches<br />
made by representatives of certain<br />
Western countries to our authorities in<br />
Kuala Lumpur that in any way question the<br />
integrity of our national positions on issues<br />
before this Commission or the underlying<br />
purpose of our membership in the<br />
Commission.<br />
” The Malaysian delegate declined later<br />
to elaborate on this or name any names.<br />
In this speech, he made a reference to<br />
Malaysia having moved a ‘no action’ resolution<br />
on the Portuguese-EC sponsored<br />
resolution against Indonesia over <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
(which failed), and voting for another noaction<br />
motion (which was adopted) against a<br />
US sponsored one against China.<br />
Earlier, the Malaysian delegate, in explaining<br />
the Malaysian votes on a number of<br />
decisions and actions had underlined the<br />
delegation’s “serious concern over the increasing<br />
tendency at politicization of human<br />
rights issues where certain Western<br />
countries use double standards and selectiveness”<br />
in the Commission’s work.<br />
“We believe,” the Malaysian delegate<br />
said, “that confrontational and adversarial<br />
approach, accompanied by various forms of<br />
pressure tactics by certain Western countries,<br />
is not conducive towards enhancing
Page 74 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
the work of the Commission in protecting<br />
and promoting human rights.<br />
We are also against politically motivated<br />
moves to bypass well tested procedures<br />
within the Commission such as the<br />
Confidential procedure (under which complaints<br />
against individual countries are<br />
handled in closed sessions and meetings).”<br />
“We are also concerned,” the Malaysian<br />
said, “over the tendency on their part to<br />
push through resolutions that could well go<br />
beyond the competence and mandate of the<br />
Commission, while also contravening the<br />
UN Charter, particularly Art 2 (7) on noninterference<br />
in the domestic affairs of sovereign<br />
states.<br />
We fear that whole credibility of this<br />
Commission could be affected.<br />
” Malaysia also regretted that in initiating<br />
a number of resolutions on country<br />
situations, the same group of countries did<br />
not “deem it fit to conduct serious and adequate<br />
consultations” on the substance of<br />
their resolutions with developing countries,<br />
regional groups and members of the Non-<br />
Aligned Movement.<br />
“It is on the basis of a combination of all<br />
the factors that the Malaysian delegation did<br />
not go along with their resolutions on a<br />
number of country situations,” he said referring<br />
to the Malaysian sponsoring of a noaction<br />
resolution on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and voting<br />
for a no-action resolution on China.<br />
In the case of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, where last year<br />
the Indonesians had agreed to a Chairman’s<br />
statement and had been cooperating with<br />
UN Secretary-General, the Portuguese<br />
pushed through a resolution against<br />
Indonesia.<br />
the no-action motion was turned down<br />
by a 15- 22 vote and the resolution itself<br />
carried by 22 to 12.<br />
Most of the western countries, except for<br />
Japan which abstained, voted with the<br />
Portuguese sponsored resolution against<br />
Indonesia which, among others asked that<br />
country to receive as many as three thematic<br />
special rapporteurs.<br />
Several of the Third World countries who<br />
voted with Indonesia had complained at the<br />
way the attempts to have a compromise<br />
Chairman’s statement, which would have<br />
adequately reflected the cooperation of the<br />
Indonesian authorities and the actions they<br />
had taken, had been thwarted.<br />
Even Australia which voted against<br />
Indonesia, in explaining its vote clearly<br />
recognized the positive steps that Indonesia<br />
had taken and its regret that it had not been<br />
possible to agree upon a Chairman’s statement.<br />
On the effective functioning of the various<br />
human rights mechanisms, the<br />
Commission in a resolution asked the UN<br />
Secretary-General to submit to its next<br />
session, as also to this year’s World<br />
Conference on Human Rights, a report on:<br />
* the original mandates assigned to various<br />
treaty and non- treaty mechanisms for<br />
supervision, investigation and monitoring of<br />
implementation of the provisions of the<br />
international legal instruments and standards,<br />
* the international legal norms and standards<br />
on which existing non-treaty mechanisms<br />
now base their activities, as well as<br />
the conceptual framework, methods of work<br />
and procedural rules that each have deemed<br />
it advisable to apply in the discharge of their<br />
mandate,<br />
* the norms, criteria and practices established<br />
by each of the various existing<br />
mechanisms on the admissibility of communications<br />
as well as their preliminary<br />
consideration and evaluation, their referral to<br />
interest parties and the subsequent course<br />
followed, and<br />
* the criteria used in practice by the<br />
Centre for Human Rights to channel communications<br />
received on these issues either<br />
to existing public machinery or to bodies<br />
provided in the confidential procedure established<br />
under the ECOSOC, together with<br />
the legal foundations for such criteria.<br />
Several of the cosponsors said that over a<br />
period of time the varying standards and<br />
criteria adopted, both by the mechanisms as<br />
well as by the secretariat itself, have become<br />
glaring and appears to be weighted against<br />
the countries of the South depending on<br />
their relationships with the leading Western<br />
powers.<br />
In another resolution on strengthening of<br />
UN action in field of human rights through<br />
international cooperation, the Commission,<br />
among other things,<br />
* reiterated that by virtue of equal rights<br />
and self- determination of peoples, “all<br />
peoples have the right to determine freely,<br />
without external interference, their political<br />
systems and to pursue their economic, social<br />
and cultural development” and every<br />
State has the duty to respect that right<br />
within the provisions of the UN Charter,<br />
including respect for territorial integrity,<br />
* reaffirmed that promotion, protection<br />
and full realization of all human rights and<br />
fundamental freedoms should be guided by<br />
the principles of “non-selectivity, impartiality<br />
and objectivity and should not be used<br />
for political ends,”<br />
* called upon all Member States to have<br />
their activities for promotion and protection<br />
and full realization of human rights and<br />
fundamental freedoms, including development<br />
of further international cooperation in<br />
this area, on the UN Charter, the international<br />
covenants on Human rights and other<br />
relevant instruments and “refrain from activities<br />
inconsistent with this international<br />
legal framework,”<br />
* underlined the “continuing need for<br />
accurate, impartial and objective information<br />
on the political, economic and social<br />
situation and events in all countries,”<br />
* requested all human rights bodies<br />
within the UN system, as well as special<br />
rapporteurs, special representatives, independent<br />
experts and working groups appointed<br />
or set up as special procedures<br />
“duly to take into account the contents of<br />
the present resolution in carrying out their<br />
mandates.”<br />
The resolution also called upon the UN<br />
Secretary-General, on the basis of comments<br />
made by governments, to prepare and<br />
submit to the Commission at its next<br />
session, a comprehensive report on various<br />
ways and means of promoting international<br />
cooperation and strengthening UN action in<br />
the field of human rights “in accordance<br />
with the principles of non-selectivity, impartiality<br />
and objectivity.”<br />
The developing countries also turned<br />
back an Austrian attempt to get the<br />
Commission approval for a resolution calling<br />
for the June World Conference in Vienna<br />
to discuss “an emergency mechanism” to<br />
address serious cases that arise in between<br />
the Commission’s ordinary annual<br />
sessions.”<br />
The near unanimous opposition of the<br />
developing countries to what was seen as a<br />
move to bypass the normal procedures and<br />
set a Northern agenda, resulted in the<br />
adoption of a resolution in effect remitting<br />
the issue to the ECOSOC for its consideration.<br />
Asian diplomats explained that Third<br />
World nations had rejected the proposal<br />
because they sensed that the underlying<br />
intention was to weaken the Commission as<br />
a deliberative body.<br />
Comment: While I don’t agree with the<br />
interpretation, and the description of the vote<br />
on the ET resolution ignores the fact that<br />
several countries of the South voted against<br />
Indonesia, and key Asian countries (Japan,<br />
Pakistan, South Korea) abstained, this<br />
article still raises some issues that need<br />
consideration. – Charlie Scheiner, ETAN/US<br />
RESPONSE FROM BRUNO KAHN,<br />
CHARLIE SCHEINER, OTHERS<br />
This is a draft being circulated among<br />
Malaysian and other Asian activists<br />
We were interested to read Chakravarti<br />
Raghavan’s account of new North-South<br />
antagonisms appearing in the 49th session<br />
of the UN Human Rights Commission.<br />
Without commenting on the substance of<br />
his report as a whole, we would like, as<br />
supporters of the struggle of the <strong>East</strong>
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 75<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese people for self-determination, to<br />
address the part of this report which refers<br />
to the vote of a resolution condemning<br />
Indonesia for its repression in occupied <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>. We feel this part amounts to<br />
disinformation and would like to kindly ask<br />
you to post the following clarification.<br />
Sincerely yours,<br />
(signatures)<br />
1. <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> was militarily invaded by<br />
Indonesia at the end of 1975. This invasion,<br />
which blatantly violates the UN Charter,<br />
was condemned by two Security Council<br />
resolutions and eight General Assembly<br />
resolutions. The annexation that followed is<br />
not recognised by the United Nations, nor<br />
by most countries in the world. <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
has been, and still is, on the list of non selfgoverning<br />
territories since 1961, and is discussed<br />
every summer at the UN<br />
Decolonisation Committee.<br />
2. Continuing reports of grave human<br />
rights violations in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> by the<br />
Indonesian armed forces, including the death<br />
of at least one third of the population since<br />
the invasion, testimonies of large scale<br />
massacres, disappearances, atrocities,<br />
tortures, rapes and other ill-treatments have<br />
been available for several years from <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese refugees and the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />
Catholic church. They have been publicized<br />
by respected human rights organisations,<br />
such as Amnesty International and Asia<br />
Watch.<br />
3. On 12 November, 1991, Indonesian<br />
troops opened fire on a peaceful demonstration<br />
in Dili, killing at least 271 unarmed<br />
civilians, according to exact lists of names<br />
covertly compiled by the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />
resistance. This massacre was witnessed by<br />
foreign journalists, who all stress its<br />
peaceful character and were beaten up by<br />
Indonesian troops. A video of the massacre<br />
was smuggled out of the territory and was<br />
widely shown under the title ‘Cold Blood,’<br />
including by the Malaysian television.<br />
4. Now regarding Mr. Raghavan’s report:<br />
“In the case of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, where last year<br />
the Indonesians had agreed to a Chairman’s<br />
statement and had been cooperating with<br />
UN Secretary-General, the Portuguese<br />
pushed through a resolution against<br />
Indonesia.”<br />
Disinformation #1: the draft resolution<br />
was sponsored not just by Portugal but by<br />
24 governments, including governments<br />
from Europe and North America, but also<br />
Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and<br />
Costa Rica. (For the uninformed reader,<br />
Portugal is the UN recognised administering<br />
power in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, as former colonial<br />
power which has to carry through its process<br />
of decolonisation, interrupted by the invasion).<br />
“Most of the western countries, except for<br />
Japan which abstained, voted with the<br />
Portuguese sponsored resolution against<br />
Indonesia which, among others asked that<br />
country to receive as many as three thematic<br />
special rapporteurs.<br />
Several of the Third World countries who<br />
voted with Indonesia had complained at the<br />
way the attempts to have a compromise<br />
Chairman’s statement, which would have<br />
adequately reflected the cooperation of the<br />
Indonesian authorities and the actions they<br />
had taken, had been thwarted.”<br />
Disinformation #2: Mr. Raghavan conveniently<br />
fails to mention that 9 countries of<br />
the South voted in favour of the resolution<br />
(see country breakdown below).<br />
Disinformation #3: the resolution requests<br />
the Indonesian government to let the<br />
mentioned special rapporteurs visit, not<br />
Indonesia, but illegally occupied <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
Disinformation #4: according to our<br />
sources, the reason why the move towards a<br />
consensus statement failed was not intransigence<br />
of the Western countries, but<br />
Indonesia’s own intransigence, which hampered<br />
attempts of its allies to water down<br />
the resolution into such a consensus statement.<br />
Disinformation #5 (the most serious): the<br />
‘cooperation’ of the Indonesian authorities.<br />
Last year’s consensus statement, agreed on<br />
by Indonesia, asked inter alia:<br />
a) “further investigation into the action of<br />
the security personnel on November 12,<br />
1991, and into the fate of those unaccounted<br />
for (to) clarify the remaining discrepancies,<br />
namely on the number of people killed and<br />
those missing,”<br />
b) “that those brought to trial are assured<br />
of proper legal representation and those not<br />
involved in violent activities are released<br />
without delay,”<br />
c) (that the Indonesian government)<br />
“facilitates access to <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> (to) additional<br />
humanitarian organisations and human<br />
rights organisations,” and<br />
d) (that Indonesia) “improves the human<br />
rights situation in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.”<br />
Relatively to these points, we would like<br />
to observe that:<br />
a) The Indonesian government still uses<br />
an official number of 50 victims and about<br />
90 ‘missing’; the families of the victims have<br />
yet to know were the latter were buried. A<br />
house-to-house survey, necessarily carried<br />
out in secret, found 271 names of people<br />
killed at Santa Cruz, 382 wounded, 250<br />
‘disappeared’ and 364 arrested.<br />
The reader may be interested by the<br />
following quotes of prominent Indonesians,<br />
showing their remorse:<br />
General Try Sutrisno, then Commander<br />
in Chief of the Armed Forces, now Vice-<br />
President: “Delinquents like these agitators<br />
must be shot, and they will be, whenever<br />
that is necessary.”<br />
General Theo Syafei, new Commander<br />
for <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> after the massacre: “Under<br />
my command, the number of victims would<br />
probably have been greater.”<br />
General Herman Mantiri, new<br />
Commander for Udayana (<strong>East</strong>ern<br />
Indonesia) after the massacre: the shooting<br />
was “appropriate.”<br />
Abilio Osorio Soares, the new<br />
“Governor” of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, a civilian: “In<br />
my view, in fact many more should have<br />
died. Why only that much? Why did not all<br />
the thousand die?”<br />
b) Demonstrators from November 12<br />
were convicted and given sentences as harsh<br />
as life imprisonment for merely participating<br />
to or organising a peaceful demonstration,<br />
while the few low-ranking soldiers<br />
convicted in court martials got sentences<br />
of two years or less under typical<br />
charges of “firing into the crowd without<br />
orders to do so.”<br />
c) Amnesty International was refused<br />
access to <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> twice since the consensus<br />
statement: once in November 1992<br />
and once in January 19<strong>93</strong>. Asia Watch has<br />
also been refused.<br />
d) The human rights situation has seriously<br />
worsened since the massacre, the<br />
territory being closed officially to foreign<br />
journalists and de facto to foreign visitors;<br />
according to reports from inside, repression<br />
and violations reached an unprecedented<br />
level last November/December, at the time<br />
of the capture of Xanana Gusmão, the head<br />
of the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese resistance. The latter is<br />
currently enjoying a show trial in Dili,<br />
where he could be sentenced to death.<br />
Portuguese journalists admitted to observe<br />
the trial were ordered to leave after less than<br />
a week.<br />
It is a mockery to talk about the cooperation<br />
of the Indonesian authorities when,<br />
instead of respecting their own commitments,<br />
they do exactly the opposite.<br />
“Even Australia which voted against<br />
Indonesia, in explaining its vote clearly<br />
recognized the positive steps that Indonesia<br />
had taken and its regret that it had not been<br />
possible to agree upon a Chairman’s<br />
statement.”<br />
Disinformation #6: Mr. Raghavan fails to<br />
mention that Australia is a faithful ally of<br />
Indonesia, the only country in the world<br />
that recognises the annexation of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
de jure. It is currently preparing to exploit<br />
the oil reserves of the <strong>Timor</strong> Sea in concert<br />
with Indonesia, effectively robbing the<br />
people of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> of their natural<br />
resources, although a case pending in the<br />
International Court of Justice would invalidate<br />
the Australia-Indonesia <strong>Timor</strong> Gap<br />
treaty. It is not surprising that such an ally
Page 76 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
should defend Indonesia; on the other hand,<br />
the fact that Australia felt compelled to vote<br />
for the resolution shows the dilemma that<br />
the Indonesia government’s conduct in <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> creates for Jakarta’s supporters.<br />
Appendix 1: text of the UNHRC resolution<br />
adopted 11 March 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
Appendix 2: country voting breakdown.<br />
UN ROUND-UP OF<br />
UNHRC SESSION<br />
HR/CN/453, Official UN Press Release<br />
(Excerpts) 17 March 19<strong>93</strong><br />
FORTY-NINTH SESSION OF HUMAN<br />
RIGHTS COMMISSION<br />
GENEVA, 1 FEBRUARY-12 MARCH<br />
Appoints Special Rapporteurs on<br />
Occupied Territories, Sudan, Equatorial<br />
Guinea, Racism and Freedom of Opinion;<br />
Expert on Somalia<br />
GENEVA, 12 March (UN Information<br />
Service) – Following six weeks of intensive<br />
debate on the situation of human rights in<br />
the world, and the adoption of 98 resolutions<br />
and 16 decisions on a wide spectrum<br />
of human rights issues, the Commission on<br />
Human Rights concluded its forty-ninth<br />
session at Geneva this afternoon.<br />
...<br />
The Commission also expressed deep<br />
concern over the situation in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and<br />
called on Indonesia to step up efforts to<br />
identify those killed and unaccounted for in<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, to find and punish those responsible,<br />
and to solicit visits to the island<br />
by the Commission’s Special Rapporteurs.<br />
Further, the Commission expressed its deep<br />
concern at the serious human rights violations<br />
in the Sudan, including summary executions,<br />
detention without due process,<br />
forced displacement of persons and torture.<br />
It also exp ressed its deep concern at continuing<br />
reports of violations of human rights<br />
in Iran, including the high number of<br />
executions, torture, the lack of guarantees of<br />
due process of law, and discriminatory<br />
treatment of certain groups of citizens for<br />
their religious beliefs, notably the Baha’is.<br />
...<br />
Resolutions Adopted<br />
With regard to the situation in <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>, the Commission expressed its deep<br />
concern at the reports of continuing human<br />
rights violations, regretted that the<br />
Indonesian investigation into the actions of<br />
the members of its security personnel on 12<br />
November 1991 had failed to clearly identify<br />
all those responsible for those actions,<br />
and expressed its concern at the lack of information<br />
about the number of people killed<br />
on that day and those still unaccounted for.<br />
It called upon the Government of<br />
Indonesia to honour fully its human rights<br />
commitments, and called upon it to ensure<br />
that all the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese in custody be<br />
treated humanely and with their rights fully<br />
respected. It urged the Government to invite<br />
the Special Rapporteur on the question of<br />
torture, the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial,<br />
summary or arbitrary executions,<br />
the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention<br />
and the Working Group on Enforced or<br />
Involuntary Disappearances to visit <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> and to facilitate the discharge of their<br />
mandates; and welcomed the agreement<br />
given by the Government to the proposal of<br />
the Secretary-General for a new visit to<br />
Indonesia and <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> by his Personal<br />
Envoy in the coming months.<br />
EUROPEAN POSITIONS<br />
AT UNHRC<br />
From Bruno Kahn, Mar 27, 19<strong>93</strong><br />
According to a diplomatic source, the EC<br />
countries which tried most to obstruct the<br />
drafting of a resolution on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> at the<br />
UN Human Rights Commission were The<br />
Netherlands, Great Britain and France.<br />
Denmark was the most supportive.<br />
U.S. CONCERN OVER EAST<br />
TIMOR MAY SIGNAL ASIAN<br />
POLICY CHANGE<br />
Los Angeles Times, April 2, 19<strong>93</strong>, By<br />
Charles P. Wallace, Times Staff Writer<br />
[Most of this article was also published in<br />
the London Guardian April 3, under the<br />
headline CLINTON SHIFT ON EAST<br />
TIMOR SENDS RIPPLES AROUND ASIA.]<br />
(DENPASAR, Indonesia) The remote<br />
territory of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> has been a thorn in<br />
the Indonesian government’s side for years.<br />
Now a Clinton Administration decision to<br />
adopt a tougher stance on human rights<br />
violations there is being seen as a possible<br />
precursor to a fundamental change in U.S.<br />
human rights policy in Asia.<br />
The departure came late last month in a<br />
little-noticed action when the United States<br />
joined in supporting a resolution of the U.N.<br />
Human Rights Commission expressing<br />
“deep concern” over rights violations in <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>, a former Portuguese colony annexed<br />
by Indonesia in 1976. Under former<br />
Presidents Ronald Reagan and George Bush,<br />
the United States helped block similar<br />
resolutions condemning Indonesia’s behavior<br />
in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
Indonesian government officials were<br />
reported by Asian diplomats to be stunned<br />
by the Clinton Administration shift.<br />
Further, other countries, such as China and<br />
Malaysia, have flatly warned the United<br />
States that adopting tougher human rights<br />
positions could cost America jobs at home<br />
because of probable retaliation by Asian<br />
countries.<br />
As a result, the decision on <strong>Timor</strong> is<br />
being studied widely around the region.<br />
The U.N. action called on Indonesia to<br />
allow international experts on torture, executions<br />
and disappearances to visit the island<br />
to investigate allegations against<br />
Indonesia’s military. Indonesia condemned<br />
the charges as “unwarranted sweeping allegations.”<br />
The Indonesian government has permitted<br />
selected diplomats and observers to visit<br />
the island recently to attend the carefully<br />
stage-managed trial of José Gusmão, 45, the<br />
leader of Fretilin, <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>’s tiny<br />
independence movement.<br />
Gusmão, known by his nom de guerre,<br />
Xanana, is charged with fomenting revolution<br />
and weapons offenses. A televised confession<br />
that he gave before the start of the<br />
trial prompted diplomats to wonder<br />
whether he had been tortured or threatened<br />
by the military.<br />
Diplomats who have visited <strong>Timor</strong> – access<br />
to the island is controlled by the government<br />
– say Fretilin probably has fewer<br />
than 100 fighters after nearly two decades of<br />
Indonesian military rule.<br />
Indonesia’s annexation of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> has<br />
never won the acceptance of the United<br />
Nations, which has repeatedly called for the<br />
people to decide their own future. West<br />
<strong>Timor</strong> has been part of Indonesia since<br />
Indonesian independence after World War<br />
II.<br />
Tensions between the military and the<br />
local population reached a high in<br />
November, 1991, when troops opened fire<br />
on a crowd at a funeral in Dili, killing 60 to<br />
100 people. Four officers and six enlisted<br />
men were court-martialed for the killings.<br />
But the longest sentence handed out was 18<br />
months. The military has never admitted<br />
that more than 19 people were killed. But a<br />
government-appointed investigating commission<br />
said at least 50 people had died.<br />
Most diplomats expect that Gusmão will<br />
be given a severe sentence, which will be<br />
commuted by the government as a sign of its<br />
leniency and flexibility.<br />
But diplomats cautioned that, with restive<br />
populations elsewhere in the archipelago,<br />
it is unlikely that the government in<br />
Jakarta will go beyond that cosmetic gesture<br />
and grant the <strong>Timor</strong>ese any degree of<br />
autonomy.<br />
GRAPHIC: Map, Indonesia, VICTOR<br />
KOTOWITZ / Los Angeles Times
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 77<br />
SOME TIMORESE BEING<br />
GROOMED FOR INDONESIA<br />
From John A. MacDougall, April 2, 19<strong>93</strong><br />
It’s no secret that Indonesian officialdom<br />
has been grooming an increasing contingent<br />
of educated <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese for its own<br />
‘development’ purposes inside <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
and ‘diplomatic’ purposes abroad. Perhaps<br />
sometimes the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese involved have<br />
indeed become ‘convinced,’ as in the expression<br />
‘a convinced Friend.’ But more<br />
often than might be thought, the <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese involved might just have been<br />
caught up in survival dilemmas from which<br />
they see no easy way to extricate themselves.<br />
I was reminded of this latter possibility<br />
when seeing an Indonesian Observer article<br />
dealing mainly with the recent U.N. Human<br />
Rights Commission proceedings.<br />
Salvador Ximenes, a Golkar DPR member<br />
from <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, is quoted as saying<br />
Indonesia fulfilled the EC’s demand to allow<br />
foreign journalists and international<br />
organizations to come to <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
The same article quotes then Interior<br />
Minister Rudini as saying “the first young<br />
Indonesian diplomat, also hailing from <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>, Leonardo Gutteres, now Third<br />
Secretary at the Indonesian Embassy in<br />
Geneva” spoke at the UNHCR session. He<br />
is reported to have said charges by Portugal<br />
and NGOs re human rights in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
were out-of-date.<br />
Two other <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese representatives,<br />
Rui Gomes and Florentino da Cruz,<br />
also reportedly took the floor to respond to<br />
NGOs. Both gave explanations “similar to<br />
those given by the Indonesian delegation<br />
that there had been no violation of human<br />
rights in the province.”<br />
What are we to make of these various<br />
remarks by <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese? Have they become<br />
‘convinced Indonesians,’ or are they<br />
consciously engaging in yet another<br />
‘sandiwara’ not unlike those in the Dili<br />
trials?<br />
COMMENT FROM AN ANONYMOUS<br />
AUSTRALIAN FRIEND<br />
If “Rui Gomes” is the Ruis Gomes I<br />
know he is a strange character. His father is<br />
a Pentecostal minister in Dili who says he is<br />
completely apolitical. Rui has been a<br />
student of psychology and theology in<br />
Semarang and Salatiga. He was always<br />
distrusted by other ET students, spent a lot<br />
of time learning self-defence. Works at the<br />
National Planning Board office in Dili, but<br />
confesses his job description is “something<br />
like spying.” Always has plenty of money,<br />
and travels overseas fairly frequently on<br />
unexplained missions. Yet he has a brother<br />
in Sydney who has had to undergo major<br />
surgery on his head for torture inflicted on<br />
him by the Indonesian military - he was apparently<br />
a Fretilin supporter there till his<br />
escape 2 years ago.<br />
This story indicates not only the opportunism<br />
of many individuals, it also illustrates<br />
the lonely life that these opportunists<br />
have to lead among their own people.<br />
Secondly it indicates the phenomenon of<br />
families that stretch across strongly divergent<br />
political loyalties - as in the Carrascalao<br />
family and many others. I think also of<br />
prominent Irianese families like Kaisiepo.<br />
My feeling is that the balance of advantage<br />
is still to the resistance in such cases,<br />
because of the access they have to “the<br />
system” through these opportunistic<br />
individuals, whose betrayal must be limited<br />
by blood loyalties. Of course ABRI intel are<br />
aware of these risks, and that is what makes<br />
the life of an opportunist so much more<br />
miserable.<br />
INDONESIA ASKS NON-<br />
ALIGNED COUNTRIES TO<br />
SUPPORT REPRESSION<br />
From ETAN/US April 5, 19<strong>93</strong><br />
Indonesia is trying to portray the struggle<br />
for human rights in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> as an effort<br />
by Western countries to undercut the<br />
sovereignty of the Third World.<br />
At a meeting of Non-Aligned countries<br />
this morning (April 5) at the UN in New<br />
York, Indonesia distributed a letter dated 15<br />
March from the UN Representative of<br />
Malaysia to the UN Representative of<br />
Indonesia. Attached to the letter was a<br />
statement delivered by Mr. M. Redzuan<br />
Kushairi (Alternate Leader of the Malaysian<br />
Delegation) at the conclusion of the UN<br />
Human Rights Commission Session in<br />
Geneva on March 12, as well as the “No-<br />
<strong>Action</strong>” motions made by Malaysia in that<br />
Commission regarding <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and<br />
China. (The eight pages of attachments are<br />
too long for me to type, but I will fax them<br />
to anyone who can type or scan them for<br />
broader circulation.)<br />
Some Non-Aligned countries are reluctant<br />
to go along with Indonesia, and there is no<br />
consensus within the Non-Aligned<br />
Movement. Please do what you can to convince<br />
Third World governments that human<br />
rights – such as freedom from murder,<br />
genocide, and colonial domination – are just<br />
as valid for people in the Non-Aligned<br />
world as they are for anyone else, regardless<br />
of the political, economic and ethnic<br />
composition of the oppressing nation.<br />
Certainly, human rights include economic<br />
rights for the people of the developing<br />
countries, and there must be major changes<br />
in the international economic order. But as<br />
we work for global economic justice, we<br />
must also work for the rights, indeed the<br />
survival, of people in territories unfortunate<br />
enough still to be dominated by military or<br />
totalitarian regimes.<br />
The letter reads as follows:<br />
Permanent Representative of Malaysia to<br />
the UN<br />
New York, 15 March 19<strong>93</strong><br />
H.E. Mr. Nugroho Wisnumurti,<br />
Permanent Representative of Indonesia<br />
Your Excellency,<br />
Malaysia participated for the first time<br />
as a member of the Commission on Human<br />
Rights at its 49th Session in Geneva which<br />
concluded on Friday, 12 March 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
As a developing country and member of<br />
the Non-Aligned Movement, the Malaysian<br />
delegation witnessed with serious concern<br />
the politicization of the Commission by<br />
certain Western countries. Practice of political<br />
selectivity and double standards was<br />
often accompanied by various forms of<br />
pressure tactics including those at the<br />
capital. All this prompted the Malaysian<br />
delegation to make a general statement of<br />
explanation at the conclusion of the 49th<br />
Session of the Commission on Human<br />
Rights which I am attaching herewith for<br />
your attention.<br />
As the statement raised issues that are of<br />
concern not only to Malaysia, but to other<br />
developing countries and members of the<br />
Non-Aligned Movement, I shall be most<br />
grateful if you could circulate the statement<br />
to members of the Non-Aligned Movement<br />
for their information.<br />
In addition, in the light of the challenges<br />
faced by developing countries and members<br />
of the Non-Aligned Movement at the<br />
Commission on Human Rights, I thought it<br />
would be useful if a meeting of the<br />
Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned<br />
Movement could be convened at an earliest<br />
convenient date to exchange views on the<br />
49th Session of the Commission on Human<br />
Rights, which amongst others also touched<br />
on the World Conference on Human Rights<br />
to be held in Vienna later in June. I hope our<br />
suggestion will receive a favourable response<br />
from you, in your capacity as Chairman of<br />
the Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned<br />
Movement.<br />
Please accept, Excellency, the assurances<br />
of my highest consideration.<br />
Razali Ismail<br />
Ambassador<br />
Excerpts from Malaysia’s statement at<br />
the close of the Human Rights<br />
Commission:<br />
We believe that with the end of the Cold<br />
War and <strong>East</strong>-West ideological rivalry the
Page 78 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
time is opportune for the international<br />
community to approach the question of<br />
protecting and promoting human rights in<br />
the spirit of constructive dialogue and cooperation<br />
on the basis of objectivity, nonselectivity,<br />
and non politicization of issues.<br />
We also believe that the time has come for<br />
the Commission to take a more holistic approach<br />
to human rights and not to be too<br />
preoccupied with questions of individual<br />
rights and freedoms under the International<br />
Covenant on Political and Civil Rights. This<br />
would require the Commission to give<br />
serious and focused attention on efforts towards<br />
implementing the Declaration on the<br />
Right to Development, whose realization<br />
would facilitate the fulfillment of the goals<br />
of both the International Covenant on<br />
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights as<br />
well as the International Covenant on<br />
Political and Civil Rights.<br />
...<br />
While we welcome the spirit of constructive<br />
dialogue and cooperation to enhance<br />
the work of the Human Rights<br />
Commission, the Malaysian delegation<br />
would like to take this opportunity to underline<br />
our serious concern over the increasing<br />
tendency at politicization of human<br />
rights issues where certain Western<br />
countries use double standards and selectivities<br />
in the work of the Commission. We<br />
believe that confrontational and adversarial<br />
approach, accompanied by various forms of<br />
pressure tactics by certain Western countries,<br />
is not conducive towards enhancing<br />
the work of the Commission in protecting<br />
and promoting human rights. We are also<br />
against politically motivated moves to bypass<br />
well tested procedures within the<br />
Commission such as the Confidential<br />
Procedure 1503. We are also concerned over<br />
the tendency on the part of certain Western<br />
countries to push through resolutions that<br />
could well go beyond the competence and<br />
mandate of the Commission, while also<br />
contravening the UN Charter particularly on<br />
Article 2 paragraph 7 on non interference in<br />
the domestic affairs of sovereign states.<br />
CHAIRMAN OF COMMISSION<br />
ON HUMAN RIGHTS<br />
ANNOUNCES SEVEN<br />
SPECIAL RAPPORTEURS<br />
UN Press Release, 2 April 19<strong>93</strong>, Abridged.<br />
Biographical Note BIO/2763<br />
GENEVA, 2 April (UN Information<br />
Service) – The Chairman of the Commission<br />
on Human Rights, Mohamed Ennaceur<br />
(Tunisia), this morning announced the<br />
designation of seven country or thematic<br />
Special Rapporteurs, as decided by the<br />
Commission at its recently concluded fortyninth<br />
session.<br />
They are as follows:<br />
– Robert Dossou (Benin), as Special<br />
Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism,<br />
racial discrimination, xenophobia and<br />
related intolerance<br />
– Nigel S. Rodley (United Kingdom), as<br />
Special Rapporteur on torture (resolution<br />
19<strong>93</strong>/40 of 5 March). Mr. Rodley is the<br />
doyen of the Faculty of Law of Essex<br />
University, former legal counsellor for<br />
Amnesty International and author of numerous<br />
publications relating to human<br />
rights.<br />
TIMOR CONTROVERSY<br />
AT BANGKOK HUMAN<br />
RIGHTS MEETING<br />
ROW OVER NGO<br />
ACCREDITATION<br />
From Jean Inglis, International Federation<br />
for <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. March 30, 19<strong>93</strong><br />
The issue of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> has been aired<br />
prominently in the two Thai English dailies,<br />
The Nation and The Bangkok Post, for a<br />
week, thanks to a row over NGO accreditation<br />
for the Asian Regional Meeting of the<br />
UN World Conference on Human Rights<br />
which opened in Bangkok on March 29 and<br />
to hitting remarks by <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese José<br />
Ramos Horta at an Asia-Pacific NGOs<br />
conference that preceded the UN meeting<br />
and at the Regional Meeting itself. The<br />
NGO in question, the International<br />
Federation for <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, was unable to be<br />
accredited for the UN meeting due to the<br />
strong objection of the Indonesian government.<br />
I have just returned from Bangkok and<br />
will try to post a sampling of the press that<br />
this issue got. Most encouraging has been<br />
the overwhelming support of other NGOs<br />
in Bangkok for the conference. As pressing<br />
as the various issues of the other NGOs<br />
obviously are, the spirit at Bangkok was one<br />
of insisting on the urgency of lobbying on<br />
the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> issue. The UN conference<br />
winds up Friday, and I will post you on the<br />
outcome when my IFET colleague, Kiyoko<br />
Furusawa, returns. The NGOs in Bangkok<br />
are very strong, very united, and very<br />
determined to win every bit of ground<br />
possible in Bangkok with a view to<br />
maximizing the possibilities for the Vienna<br />
meeting.<br />
GROUPS PLEDGE TO<br />
BOOST EAST TIMOR FIGHT<br />
Sydney Morning Herald, Monday March 31,<br />
19<strong>93</strong>. By Lindsay Murdoch, Herald SE Asia<br />
correspondent. Unabridged. Similar article<br />
in Melbourne Age, 29 March.<br />
(Bangkok, Sunday) <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese independence<br />
activists have won support from<br />
more than 100 non-government organizations<br />
for a public campaign in Asia against<br />
Indonesia’s rule of the former Portuguese<br />
colony.<br />
A <strong>Timor</strong>ese leader, Mr. José Ramos<br />
Horta, said today the campaign would turn<br />
the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> conflict into a regional issue<br />
for the first time.<br />
“Previously we have had support in<br />
Australia and Europe but not in Asia. This<br />
is a breakthrough,” he said. The campaign<br />
will culminate with a three-day seminar on<br />
the human rights situation in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> in<br />
Manila in November.<br />
The E. <strong>Timor</strong> independence lobby was<br />
buoyed early this month when the UN<br />
Human Rights Commission in Geneva condemned<br />
Indonesia for its inaction on human<br />
rights in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. The strength of the<br />
criticism surprised Jakarta, which in January<br />
agreed to the setting up of national<br />
commissions to protect human rights.<br />
The organizations meeting in Bangkok<br />
this weekend before a UN-organized<br />
meeting of the 49 Asian governments on<br />
human rights said in a statement that <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> “must be made into an Asian issue.”<br />
The campaign would be geared towards<br />
negotiations to end the conflict under the<br />
auspices of the UN and on the basis of a<br />
genuine act of self-determination.<br />
However, strong Indonesian objection<br />
has prevent a major lobby group, the<br />
Tokyo-based International Federation of<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, being accredited at the governments<br />
meeting which is to prepare Asia’s<br />
position ahead of a world human rights<br />
conference in Vienna in June.<br />
The forum, one of the largest of its kind<br />
held in Asia, issued a declaration urging<br />
governments to agree to strengthen UN action<br />
on human rights, including the creation<br />
of a UN human rights commissioner with<br />
wide powers.<br />
It said that UN attempts over 10 years<br />
had made little progress in eradicating gross<br />
violations of human rights around the world,<br />
many of them perpetrated by Asian<br />
governments.<br />
The meeting of Asian governments is<br />
expected to close ranks against the critical<br />
West on human rights. Australia will attend<br />
this week’s meeting only as an observer,<br />
without voting rights, because several Asian<br />
governments objected to its participation on
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 79<br />
the basis that Canberra would bring a critical<br />
Western perspective to the meeting.<br />
HUMAN RIGHTS MEETING IN<br />
BANGKOK - IS IT A SHAM?<br />
From the South <strong>East</strong> Asian Information<br />
<strong>Network</strong>, Chaingmai- Thailand, 29 March<br />
The Asian agenda for the upcoming<br />
World Human Rights Conference to be held<br />
in Vienna from June 14-25, is being set at an<br />
inter-governmental meeting which begins in<br />
Bangkok today.<br />
The meeting has been organised by the<br />
Economic and Social Commission for Asia<br />
and Pacific (ESCAP). There are 49 governmental<br />
delegates representing the Asia<br />
Pacific region and will for the first time<br />
attempt to formulate an agreed agenda for<br />
the conference in Vienna.<br />
On the discussion table are proposals to<br />
set up a regional mechanism to monitor,<br />
protect and promote human rights. The<br />
proposal surprisingly came from Indonesia,<br />
who recently hosted a pre-meeting to discuss<br />
human rights in the Asian region.<br />
Given that the Indonesian Government<br />
describes those of us that aim to raise issues<br />
such as democracy, openness, the environment<br />
and human rights as “fourth<br />
generation communists” it is vital that the<br />
voice of the international communities representing<br />
the people are heard.<br />
Prior to the meeting being opened today<br />
by Thailand’s Prime Minister Chuan<br />
Leekpai, there was a 4 day Asia-Pacific Non<br />
Government Organisation (NGO), conference<br />
on human rights held in order to assert<br />
the people’s position which will be<br />
presented to the inter-governmental meeting.<br />
240 representatives of more than 110<br />
NGOs from 26 countries in the region have<br />
put forward a detailed human rights agenda<br />
for the 1990’s and beyond.<br />
Yesterday afternoon 30, NGOs which<br />
have applied to participate in the intergovernmental<br />
meeting including the South <strong>East</strong><br />
Asian Information <strong>Network</strong> were still rejected<br />
as negotiations between the United<br />
Nations organizers continued into today.<br />
There were 234 NGOs from the region that<br />
applied for participation by the March 4th<br />
deadline.<br />
The 4 day conference ended with a declaration<br />
from all participating delegates<br />
which also included challenges and recommendations.<br />
“We affirm our commitment to the<br />
principle of indivisibility and interdependence<br />
of human rights, be they civil, political,<br />
economic, social or cultural.<br />
The Protection of human rights concerns<br />
both individuals and groups. The enjoyment<br />
of human rights implies a degree of<br />
responsibility to the community.<br />
There must be a holistic and integrated<br />
approach to human rights. One set of rights<br />
cannot be used to bargain for another.<br />
Major Recommendations:<br />
Governments of the region must accede<br />
without further delay to the principal<br />
United Nations conventions and human<br />
rights instruments:<br />
These governments must without further<br />
delay remove reservations on those agreements<br />
to which they are a party, particularly<br />
the Convention on the Elimination of<br />
Discrimination Against Women; and:<br />
These international agreements must be<br />
given force not only in domestic law but in<br />
practice.<br />
For an establishment of a UN Special<br />
Commissioner for Human Rights as a new<br />
high-level political authority to bring a more<br />
effective and rapid response, coherence and<br />
co-ordination to the UN’s human rights<br />
effort.<br />
Improvement of current treaty monitoring<br />
bodies and mechanisms; and<br />
Support of a regional human rights<br />
mechanism subject to explicit guarantee of<br />
independence, effectiveness and public access,<br />
including NGOS.<br />
There is great concern of the blatant<br />
blocking of NGO participation by certain<br />
governments of the Asian meeting. The<br />
governments concerned have made it known<br />
that certain NGOS which have been overly<br />
critical of their human rights policies be<br />
excluded.<br />
Some NGOS have been given accreditation<br />
to attend sessions, however a majority<br />
of the meetings will be held in camera. As<br />
for the access to delegates, the main tactic<br />
will have to be approaching a delegate in the<br />
corridors of the ESCAP building, the venue<br />
for the session.<br />
If the United Nations and ESCAP, do not<br />
allow the voices of their constituents to be<br />
heard then the whole human rights<br />
commission will be nothing than a waste of<br />
tax payers money and bureaucratic nonsense.<br />
And what of the people who every day<br />
suffer from the brutality of oppressive regimes.<br />
The people of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> who were<br />
invaded by Indonesia in December 1975 are<br />
not only having to deal with their loss of<br />
sovereignty, but in this process of a human<br />
rights venue have to deal with Indonesia<br />
being the Chair of the Non-Aligned<br />
Movement . A government who has not<br />
been made accountable for its crimes and<br />
massive human rights abuse, will ensure to<br />
block any move for such process to take<br />
place.<br />
And what of the people in Burma?<br />
Whilst the State Law and Order Restoration<br />
Council (SLORC) continues its brutal hold<br />
on the country, with mass relocations of<br />
ethnic nationalities, rape, military<br />
offensives, and mass tortures within their<br />
cities and rural areas? Will the ESCAP<br />
meeting hear their voices?<br />
The NGO community in Asia has made<br />
massive moves forward to ensure their governments<br />
start taking the issue of human<br />
rights seriously. At times with great risk,<br />
having to face their own military and forcing<br />
regimes to resign. It is crucial we keep the<br />
pressure up and ensure that the governments<br />
of the region understand that human<br />
rights are universal.<br />
The South <strong>East</strong> Asian Information<br />
<strong>Network</strong> (SAIN) is an NGO based in<br />
Chiangmai-Thailand. Its mandate is to expose<br />
the human rights and environmental<br />
abuses in the region.<br />
HUMAN RIGHTS VALUES –<br />
EASTERN, WESTERN OR<br />
UNIVERSAL?<br />
by Kunda Dixit<br />
Bangkok, Mar. 26 (IPS) - Differing<br />
definitions of human rights threaten to polarize<br />
an Asia-Pacific regional meeting on<br />
human rights that begins here Monday.<br />
At the heart of the dispute is the argument<br />
that western definitions of human<br />
rights emphasize individual choice and civil<br />
liberties, while oriental cultures attach more<br />
value to community welfare and respect for<br />
elders.<br />
Irritated by what they say is neo-colonial<br />
western attitudes about democracy, Asia’s<br />
newly-affluent nations look set to use the<br />
Bangkok meeting to push for new yardsticks<br />
for human rights that are more rooted<br />
in their own culture and values.<br />
But the region’s activist groups, who are<br />
holding their own parallel meeting here this<br />
week, say concepts of democracy and human<br />
rights should be universal.<br />
Although the two views need not be<br />
mutually exclusive, it is expected to be divisive<br />
for the 49 countries and more than<br />
250 groups attending as observers. The<br />
Bangkok meeting will prepare for the world<br />
conference on human rights in Vienna in<br />
June.<br />
Leading the debate are South-<strong>East</strong> Asia’s<br />
newly-affluent authoritarian capitalist states<br />
like Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia, and<br />
nations that espouse market socialism like<br />
China.<br />
They bristle when human rights and democracy<br />
are measured by what they say are<br />
standards set in Europe and the United<br />
States. They say a community’s right to
Page 80 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
food, shelter and basic health care is more<br />
fundamental than its right to vote.<br />
A society must first be able to achieve a<br />
decent standard of living for all its people –<br />
something, they say, is not possible in<br />
Asia’s rambunctious and chaotic westernstyle<br />
democracies.<br />
But activist groups maintain that a distinction<br />
between individual and community<br />
rights is absurd. They say the suppression<br />
of opposition parties in Burma or the absence<br />
of basic freedoms in North Korea<br />
must be condemned by any yardstick.<br />
“The argument that the people can have<br />
bread now and ballot later is a false dichotomy,”<br />
argues Clarence Dias of the<br />
International Centre for Law in<br />
Development. “There is a danger that the<br />
people will end up having neither bread not<br />
ballot.”<br />
Dias says vigorous calls by third world<br />
governments at international fora in defence<br />
of economic and cultural safeguards for the<br />
underprivileged is not reflected in their<br />
domestic record.<br />
Ross Daniels of Amnesty International<br />
agrees. He told a forum in Bangkok last<br />
month it made little difference to the victim<br />
to be tortured in a western way or an Asian<br />
way.<br />
“Rape is not something that is done In<br />
Asian. Rape is rape, torture is torture, and<br />
human rights are human rights,” he said.<br />
Other activists feel that although several<br />
Asian countries have emerged from totalitarianism<br />
to elect their own leaders, multiparty<br />
democracy has in many cases legitimized<br />
the interests of the ruling classes.<br />
“Multi-party systems have simply<br />
camouflaged democratic dictatorships and<br />
legitimized new forms of authoritarianism,”<br />
says Gopal Sivakoti of the Katmandu-based<br />
International Institute for Human Rights,<br />
environment and development. “Free election<br />
is not the only apparatus to protect<br />
human rights.”<br />
Dazzled by the glittering economic success<br />
of their neighbours, people in some<br />
poorer Asian countries seem to yearn for<br />
strongman rule and agree with Singapore’s<br />
Lee Kuan Yew who has repeatedly told<br />
them too much democracy is keeping them<br />
poor.<br />
Conference host Thailand restored civilian<br />
democracy after a student-led uprising<br />
last year and is caught between joining<br />
fellow members of the Association of<br />
South-<strong>East</strong> Asian Nations (ASEAN) to oppose<br />
the west and to shore up its own<br />
commitment to democratic values.<br />
“Braving batons and bullets, Thais fought<br />
for a government free from the domination<br />
of the military. Against this backdrop ... the<br />
human rights conference is a time endeavor,”<br />
said Bangkok’s the Nation newspaper on<br />
Friday.<br />
Nut human rights activist groups say<br />
inter-governmental meetings like the world<br />
conference in Vienna will be little more than<br />
a rubber stamping exercise since nation<br />
states will not allow discussion of rights<br />
violations of another member country.<br />
“There is no room for discussing specific<br />
national issues at these meetings, that is<br />
why the activities of non-governmental organisations<br />
is so important,” says Dias.<br />
“They are the only ones who can raise<br />
abuses like <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, Bhutan or Burma.”<br />
Asian non-governmental groups are<br />
holding their own forum at Bangkok’s<br />
Chulalongkorn university this week to prepare<br />
a common strategy for the Vienna conference<br />
and are coming up with a conference<br />
statement highlighting their concerns.<br />
Vitit Muntarbhorn of Chulalongkorn’s<br />
law faculty says the theory that economic<br />
development should precede democracy is<br />
flawed, and so is the argument that human<br />
rights is a western concept or that it is a<br />
country’s own business.<br />
Sums up Vitit: “no, economic development<br />
and democracy have to go together.<br />
We say no, human rights is universal. And<br />
no, human rights is not a nation’s internal<br />
affair: it joins hands across borders, it is a<br />
human solidarity issue.”<br />
NGOS BANNED FROM<br />
ASIAN MEETING<br />
The Nation (Bangkok), March 30, 19<strong>93</strong><br />
Slightly Abridged by Jean Inglis<br />
Organizers side with Indonesia in <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> row<br />
Comment: Only one of the two NGOs mentioned,<br />
IFET, actually applied. The<br />
“rejection” of the other NGO, Free <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> Coalition (sic), is, I would guess, a<br />
rejection from a list of NGOs in the area<br />
which the UN Centre drew up on its own<br />
initiative and presented to the governments.<br />
Evidently 30 NGOs in all were rejected, and<br />
efforts are being made to find out who they<br />
are. – Jean Inglis, FET-JC<br />
Two Japan-based non governmental organizations<br />
(NGOs) campaigning for <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> have been barred from participating<br />
in the Asia Regional Meeting for the Second<br />
World Conference on Human Rights that<br />
started in Bangkok yesterday.<br />
John Pace, the World Conference’s coordinator,<br />
without naming any countries,<br />
admitted that “one government” had opposed<br />
their participation while another<br />
supported their presence at the conference.<br />
It was, however, understood that the opposing<br />
party was Indonesia and the proponent<br />
was Japan.<br />
“It may not be an amicable solution to<br />
ban their participation but the organizing<br />
committees felt it was a necessary thing.”<br />
said Pace without elaborating.<br />
One of the NGOs barred is the<br />
International Federation for <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>,<br />
which is associated with the United Nations<br />
Department of Public Information. The<br />
NGO consists of 17 organizations from 12<br />
countries with an interest in the decolonization<br />
process in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. The<br />
other organization is the Free <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
Coalition.<br />
Both NGOs had initially obtained accreditation<br />
from the United Nations to attend<br />
the Asian Meeting.<br />
Informed sources at the conference said<br />
Indonesia threatened to walk out of the conference<br />
if representatives from these NGOs<br />
were allowed to join the meeting.<br />
The sources added that the organizers<br />
bowed to the requests of the Indonesian<br />
government because they did not want to<br />
jeopardize the chances of UN Special<br />
Representative Amos Wako, assigned by<br />
UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros<br />
Ghali to investigate human rights abuses in<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
A <strong>Timor</strong>ese delegate attending the conference<br />
as an adviser to the International<br />
Services for Human Rights called the<br />
Indonesian government’s opposition to the<br />
presence of the two NGOs a tactical mistake.<br />
“Why are they so afraid of little girls<br />
from Japan who are innocent and can do no<br />
harm?” asked José Ramos Horta, referring to<br />
the representatives of the two human rights<br />
groups.<br />
At the conference, Malaysia rallied together<br />
with Indonesia and warned Western<br />
countries against imposing their standard of<br />
human rights on Asian countries.<br />
In response, Horta said if other government<br />
representatives were stronger in their<br />
commitment to protect human rights, such<br />
an “embarrassment” on the part of<br />
Indonesia would not have occurred.<br />
The five-day regional meeting with representatives<br />
from 49 countries will seek to<br />
formulate an Asian agenda for the forthcoming<br />
World Conference on Human Rights<br />
in Vienna between June 1425.<br />
The meeting will also try to form an intergovernmental<br />
Asian Human Rights<br />
Commission. The Asia-Pacific region currently<br />
stands out for not having a mechanism<br />
to address and protect human rights.<br />
The head of the Indonesian delegation,<br />
Wiryono, yesterday called on Asian countries<br />
gathered at the Asia Regional Meeting
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 81<br />
to adopt a balanced approach to human<br />
rights issues.<br />
Wiryono, director-general of the<br />
Indonesian Foreign Ministry’s political department,<br />
urged the Asian group to promote<br />
and protect human rights as suggested at the<br />
last Human Rights commission, meeting by<br />
taking fully into account the level of<br />
political, economic, social and cultural development<br />
of each country in the region.<br />
He emphasized that NGO activities<br />
should be confined to human rights concerns<br />
and not those involving political motives.<br />
Addressing the plenary session yesterday,<br />
Wiryono said the balanced approach,<br />
which he claimed to be in accordance with<br />
the principles embodied in the Universal<br />
Declaration on Human Rights, should express<br />
a symmetry between respect for the<br />
fundamental freedom of individuals on one<br />
hand and respect for the individual’s duties<br />
and responsibilities to society and the State<br />
on the other.<br />
“Without the balance, the right of society<br />
as a whole is rendered moot and this could<br />
lead to social upheaval and even anarchy,”<br />
he said.<br />
“The view that is prevalent in Asia is<br />
that the human being is both an individual<br />
and a member of society. His existence<br />
therefore can only become meaningful when<br />
he functions in a social environment,” he<br />
said.<br />
He stressed that Jakarta subscribed to<br />
social responsibility as well as to human<br />
rights.<br />
Wiryono also rapped the international<br />
community for its lack of sensitivity to political,<br />
economic, social and cultural diversity<br />
in the world.<br />
“When this diversity is disregarded, as it<br />
often is, then we are confronted by imbalances<br />
in the expression of human rights<br />
concerns which are characterized by politicization,<br />
selectivity, double standards and<br />
discrimination,” he said.<br />
He attacked the West for using human<br />
rights as a condition for economic cooperation.<br />
“The full realization of civil and political<br />
rights without the enjoyment of economic,<br />
social and cultural right is impossible,” he<br />
argued.<br />
He said human rights questions were essentially<br />
ethical and moral in nature and any<br />
approach to these questions which was not<br />
motivated by a sincere desire to protect the<br />
fundamental rights, but by disguised<br />
political purposes, could not be justified.<br />
José Ramos Horta of the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> resistance,<br />
referring to Wiryono’s statement<br />
that human rights must take into account<br />
cultural diversity, said it was an old argument<br />
that had been used time after time by<br />
Jakarta to freely arrest, kill, imprison and to<br />
rob their own people with impunity.<br />
José said he agreed with Jakarta’s argument<br />
that human rights issues should not be<br />
misused to protect a country’s economic<br />
interests, but he suggested that Indonesia<br />
could retaliate against those countries by<br />
halting oil and gas sales to other countries<br />
that violated human rights.<br />
The <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> resistance leader stressed<br />
that claims made by Third World leaders<br />
that food was needed before freedom was<br />
just and excuse for dictators to remain in<br />
power.<br />
“In many cases, and in many countries of<br />
Asia, the governments mortgage the wellbeing<br />
and the future of their countries to<br />
multilateral lending agencies, ” he said.<br />
NEED FOR REGIONAL<br />
HUMAN RIGHTS MECHANISM<br />
STRESSED<br />
Bangkok, Mar. 30 (IPS) - Amid the sharp<br />
exchanges between Asia-Pacific governments<br />
and human rights groups meeting<br />
here this week, there seems to be much<br />
agreement, for contrasting reasons, on the<br />
need to set up a regional mechanism to<br />
promote human rights.<br />
The Philippine delegation to the Asia-<br />
Pacific regional conference on human rights,<br />
now on its second day in Bangkok, argued<br />
this was a matter of enlightened selfinterest.<br />
Because Asia does not have a regional<br />
mechanism to redress human rights violations<br />
when national institutions fail, such<br />
complaints are brought to the notice of the<br />
world at large, said ambassador Hector<br />
Villaroel.<br />
“We may not like it ... but we cannot see<br />
how we can prevent this situation when we<br />
do not have a regional arrangement, like the<br />
Latin American and African groups, to<br />
interpose between us and the world at<br />
large,” he said.<br />
The Indonesians, who have taken a tough<br />
stance on the human rights issue, favour the<br />
idea of setting up such “regional<br />
arrangements.”<br />
Delegation head Ambassador S. Wiryono<br />
underscored in his speech Monday the<br />
resolutions of the U.N. Commission on<br />
Human Rights encouraging Asia-Pacific<br />
countries to establish a mechanism to promote<br />
and protect human rights in the region.<br />
This enthusiasm for a regional human<br />
rights formula comes in part from the realization<br />
that the Asia-Pacific is the only region<br />
in the world without such an international<br />
arrangement.<br />
This also highlights the region’s<br />
“disappointingly poor” rate of adherence to<br />
international human rights conventions.<br />
According to Amnesty International,<br />
more than half of Asia-Pacific countries<br />
have not ratified the two international human<br />
rights covenants or the convention<br />
against torture. Only eight countries in the<br />
region have ratified all three.<br />
In their ‘Bangkok declaration,’ non-governmental<br />
groups which held their own regional<br />
meeting here last week urged Asia-<br />
Pacific governments to accede to the main<br />
U.N. human rights agreements without<br />
further delay.<br />
The declaration added these international<br />
instruments must be given force not only in<br />
domestic law, “but more importantly in<br />
practice.”<br />
There was also widespread support for<br />
the view that national mechanisms are crucial<br />
to effective implementation of international<br />
human rights pacts.<br />
“The first line of defiance for human<br />
rights is on the national level and i believe<br />
we should focus significant attention on<br />
how to strengthen national human rights<br />
protection,” said Ibrahima Fall, U.N. assistant<br />
secretary-general for human rights.<br />
“It is essential to remain clear that the<br />
effective promotion and protection of human<br />
rights depends on the commitment of<br />
governments to pursue them,” said Villaroel.<br />
But the matter of national responsibility<br />
has two sides and continues to provoke<br />
much debate.<br />
On the one hand, this underscores the<br />
principle of national sovereignty which<br />
Asian governments prefer to stress.<br />
This means, as Indonesia puts it, that<br />
regional human rights mechanisms must take<br />
fully into account “the geographical<br />
complexity, diversity and vastness of the<br />
region, as well as their stability, economic<br />
development and social progress.”<br />
Non-governmental groups prefer to emphasize<br />
the accountability of governments<br />
to the international community.<br />
“Human rights is a matter of international<br />
concern, an international responsibility,”<br />
said Amnesty International’s Ed Garcia.<br />
National sovereignty is not an adequate<br />
defence when gross human rights violations<br />
and abuses are taking place, he added.<br />
HUMAN RIGHTS: INDONESIA<br />
HITS BACK AT CRITICS<br />
by Yuli Ismartono<br />
Bangkok, Mar. 30 (IPS) - Indonesia,<br />
often targeted as one of south-east Asia’s<br />
worst human rights offenders, is hitting back<br />
at its critics saying freedom from hunger and<br />
illiteracy should precede political freedoms.
Page 82 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
“The full realization of civil and political<br />
rights without the enjoyment of economic,<br />
social and cultural rights is impossible,” said<br />
S. Wiryono, head of the Indonesian<br />
delegation to this week’s Asia-Pacific<br />
meeting on human rights in Bangkok.<br />
“How can one express one’s opinions<br />
freely if one is illiterate? How can one enjoy<br />
the right to property if one languishes below<br />
the poverty line? And how can one exercise<br />
his right to free association in a labour union<br />
if one is unemployed?” he asked.<br />
Wiryono said concern over human rights<br />
should go beyond simple condemnation and<br />
should address the root causes of such<br />
violations, hence the importance attached by<br />
Asian countries to the right to development.<br />
International forums, in his view, mostly<br />
emphasize the civil and political aspects of<br />
human rights at the expense of economic,<br />
social and cultural aspects.<br />
Wiryono decried the misuse of human<br />
rights conditionalities for economic cooperation<br />
and assistance.<br />
“This practice does not only mitigate<br />
against the right to development, it also<br />
presupposes that human rights violations<br />
happen only in the recipient countries and<br />
never in the donor countries,” he said.<br />
Last year, the Suharto government ceased<br />
all aid programmes from the Netherlands<br />
because of Dutch criticism of its policy on<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
Jakarta also disbanded the Netherlandsled<br />
international governmental group on<br />
Indonesia (IGGI) which had been crucial in<br />
mobilizing economic aid to Indonesia following<br />
the 1965 event which left the country<br />
close to bankruptcy.<br />
A new consultative group led by the<br />
World Bank and the Manila-based Asian<br />
Development Bank (ADB) now coordinates<br />
development aid to Indonesia.<br />
Along with other member states of the<br />
Association of South-<strong>East</strong> Asian Nations<br />
(ASEAN), Indonesia recorded an impressive<br />
economic growth in the past two decades.<br />
Wiryono said international concerns on<br />
human rights are often expressed without<br />
taking into account political, economic, social<br />
and cultural diversity, causing imbalances<br />
marked by “politicization, selectivity,<br />
double standards and discrimination.”<br />
“Too often, Asian countries have been<br />
the target of unfair censure,” the Indonesian<br />
delegate said.<br />
He said there is a need for a balanced<br />
approach in accordance with the universal<br />
declaration on human rights, but there<br />
should be a symmetry between respect for<br />
the fundamental freedom of individuals on<br />
one hand and respect for the individual’s<br />
duties and responsibilities to society and the<br />
state on the other.<br />
The prevalent view in Asia, according to<br />
Wiryono, is that the human being is both an<br />
individual and a member of society.<br />
“Therefore it is imperative that the Asian<br />
group urge the world human rights<br />
conference (to be held in Vienna in June) to<br />
effectively ensure once and for all the indivisibility<br />
and interdependence of all aspects<br />
of human rights,” said Wiryono.<br />
ASSISTANT S-G FOR HUMAN<br />
RIGHTS STRESSES ASIAN<br />
CONTRIBUTION TO WORLD<br />
CONFERENCE<br />
UN Press Release, 1 April 19<strong>93</strong><br />
BANGKOK, 1 April (UN Information<br />
Service) – Ibrahima Fall, Assistant<br />
Secretary-General for Human Rights and<br />
Secretary-General of the World Conference<br />
on Human Rights, today addressed a number<br />
of issues linked to the World Conference<br />
on Human Rights and its preparatory<br />
process, at a press conference held at the<br />
new United Nations Conference Centre.<br />
The World Conference, preceded by<br />
three regional meetings (the first held in<br />
Tunis in November 1992, the second in San<br />
José in January, and the third taking place<br />
this week in Bangkok) and four sessions of<br />
the Preparatory Committee, will be held in<br />
Vienna from 14 to 25 June.<br />
Mr. Fall outlined the main objectives of<br />
the Conference, which are as follows:<br />
• To review and assess the progress made<br />
in the field of human rights since the<br />
adoption of the Universal Declaration of<br />
Human Rights in 1948;<br />
• To identify obstacles which have hindered<br />
this progress;<br />
• To examine the link between development<br />
and the enjoyment of human rights;<br />
and<br />
• To make proposals for the improvement<br />
of human rights standards and instruments,<br />
for an increased effectiveness of<br />
United Nations methods and mechanisms<br />
and to ensure adequate resources for<br />
United Nations human rights activities.<br />
Mr. Fall emphasized the important impact<br />
that the result of the Asian meeting<br />
would have on the final outcome of the<br />
World Conference. The significance of that<br />
contribution was due in part to the timing of<br />
the Asian meeting, which followed the two<br />
other regional meetings and could, therefore,<br />
benefit from their experience, and preceded<br />
the last session of the Preparatory<br />
Committee, scheduled for April in Geneva.<br />
It was also linked to the diversity of the<br />
Asian continent and to the different levels of<br />
development reached by the countries<br />
participating in the meeting.<br />
That diversity would enrich, in particular,<br />
the debate on the relation between development,<br />
democracy and human rights.<br />
Mr. Fall stated that while controversy in<br />
the field of human rights could not be<br />
avoided, the present argument opposing<br />
proponents of civil and political rights on<br />
one side and advocates of economic, social<br />
and cultural rights on the other was unfounded<br />
since neither set of rights could<br />
exist without the other. Stressing the indivisibility<br />
of human rights, he pointed out<br />
that, originally, there was to be only one<br />
International Covenant on Human Rights.<br />
Political considerations had led to the<br />
adoption of two separate Covenants, one on<br />
Political and Civil Rights, and the other on<br />
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. A<br />
legitimate point for discussion, however,<br />
was the lack of optional protocols to the<br />
second Covenant.<br />
Mechanisms had been proposed to enhance<br />
the implementation of existing human<br />
rights instruments, he said, among them, the<br />
creation of an international penal court and<br />
the appointment of a United Nations special<br />
commissioner for human rights. Referring to<br />
the Secretary-General’s “An Agenda for<br />
Peace” report and its recommendations for<br />
the application of preventive diplomacy,<br />
Mr. Fall also mentioned the possibility of<br />
setting up a rapid and flexible system by<br />
which the United Nations would respond to<br />
cases of massive human rights violations.<br />
Such a system could include a roster of<br />
independent experts whom the Secretary-<br />
General could use at short notice.<br />
BANGKOK DECLARATION<br />
Adopted 2 April 19<strong>93</strong><br />
This is the full text of the Declaration<br />
adopted by the Ministers and representatives<br />
of Asian States, who met at Bangkok from<br />
29 March to 2 April 19<strong>93</strong>, pursuant to<br />
General Assembly resolution 46/116 of 17<br />
December 1991 in the context of preparations<br />
for the World Conference on Human<br />
rights.<br />
Emphasizing the significance of the<br />
World Conference on Human Rights, which<br />
provides an invaluable opportunity to review<br />
all aspects of human rights and ensure<br />
a just and balanced approach thereto,<br />
Recognizing the contribution that can be<br />
made to the World Conference by Asian<br />
countries with their diverse and rich cultures<br />
and traditions,<br />
Welcoming the increased attention being<br />
paid to human rights in the international<br />
community,<br />
Reaffirming their commitment to principles<br />
contained in the Charter of the United
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 83<br />
Nations and the Universal Declaration on<br />
Human Rights,<br />
Recalling that in the Charter of the<br />
United Nations the question of universal<br />
observance and promotion of human rights<br />
and fundamental freedoms has been rightly<br />
placed within the context of international<br />
cooperation,<br />
Noting the progress made in the codification<br />
of human rights instruments, and in<br />
the establishment of international human<br />
rights mechanisms, while expressing concern<br />
that these mechanisms relate mainly to one<br />
category of rights,<br />
Emphasizing that ratification of international<br />
human rights instruments, particularly<br />
the International Covenant on Civil and<br />
Political Rights and the International<br />
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural<br />
Rights, by all States should be further encouraged,<br />
Reaffirming the principles of respect for<br />
national sovereignty, territorial integrity and<br />
non-interference in the internal affairs of<br />
States,<br />
Stressing the universality, objectivity and<br />
non- selectivity of all human rights and the<br />
need to avoid the application of double<br />
standards in the implementation of human<br />
rights and its politicization,<br />
Recognizing that the promotion of human<br />
rights should be encouraged by cooperation<br />
and consensus, and not through confrontation<br />
and the imposition of incompatible<br />
values,<br />
Reiterating the interdependence and indivisibility<br />
of economic, social, cultural, civil<br />
and political rights, and the inherent<br />
interrelationship between development,<br />
democracy, universal enjoyment of all human<br />
rights, and social justice which must be<br />
addressed in an integrated and balanced<br />
manner,<br />
Recalling that the Declaration on the<br />
Right to Development has recognized the<br />
right to development as a universal and<br />
inalienable right and an integral part of<br />
fundamental human rights,<br />
Emphasizing that endeavours to move<br />
towards the creation of uniform international<br />
human rights norms must go hand in<br />
hand with endeavours to work towards a<br />
just and fair world economic order,<br />
Convinced that economic and social progress<br />
facilitates the growing trend towards<br />
democracy and the promotion and protection<br />
of human rights,<br />
Stressing the importance of education and<br />
training in human rights at the national,<br />
regional and international levels and the need<br />
for international cooperation aimed at<br />
overcoming the lack of public awareness of<br />
human rights,<br />
1. Reaffirm their commitment to the<br />
principles contained in the Charter of the<br />
United Nations and the Universal<br />
Declaration on Human Rights as well as the<br />
full realization of all human rights<br />
throughout the world;<br />
2. Underline the essential need to create<br />
favourable conditions for effective enjoyment<br />
of human rights at both the national<br />
and international levels;<br />
3. Stress the urgent need to democratize<br />
the United Nations system, eliminate selectivity<br />
and improve procedures and<br />
mechanisms in order to strengthen international<br />
cooperation, based on principles of<br />
equality and mutual respect, and ensure a<br />
positive, balanced and non-confrontational<br />
approach in addressing and realizing all aspects<br />
of human rights;<br />
4. Discourage any attempt to use human<br />
rights as a conditionality for extending development<br />
assistance;<br />
5. Emphasize the principles of respect<br />
for national sovereignty and territorial integrity<br />
as well as non-interference in the<br />
internal affairs of States, and the non-use of<br />
human rights as an instrument of political<br />
pressure;<br />
6. Reiterate that all countries, large and<br />
small, have the right to determine their<br />
political systems, control and freely utilize<br />
their resources, and freely pursue their economic,<br />
social and cultural development;<br />
7. Stress the universality, objectivity and<br />
non-selectivity of all human rights and the<br />
need to avoid the application of double<br />
standards in the implementation of human<br />
rights and its politicization, and that no<br />
violation of human rights can be justified;<br />
8. Recognize that while human rights are<br />
universal in nature, they must be considered<br />
in the context of a dynamic and evolving<br />
process of international norm-setting,<br />
bearing in mind the significance of national<br />
and regional particularities and various<br />
historical, cultural and religious<br />
backgrounds;<br />
9. Recognize further that States have the<br />
primary responsibility for the promotion<br />
and protection of human rights through appropriate<br />
infrastructure and mechanisms,<br />
and also recognize that remedies must be<br />
sought and provided primarily through such<br />
mechanisms and procedures;<br />
10. Reaffirm the interdependence and<br />
indivisibility of economic, social, cultural,<br />
civil and political rights, and the need to give<br />
equal emphasis to all categories of human<br />
rights;<br />
11. Emphasize the importance of guaranteeing<br />
the human rights and fundamental<br />
freedoms of vulnerable groups such as<br />
ethnic, national, racial, religious and linguistic<br />
minorities, migrant workers, disabled<br />
persons, indigenous peoples, refugees and<br />
displaced persons;<br />
12. Reiterate that self-determination is a<br />
principle of international law and a universal<br />
right recognized by the United Nations for<br />
peoples under alien or colonial domination<br />
or foreign occupation, by virtue of which<br />
they can freely determine their political<br />
status and freely pursue their economic,<br />
social and cultural development, and that its<br />
denial constitutes a grave violation of human<br />
rights;<br />
13. Stress that the right to self-determination<br />
is applicable to peoples under alien<br />
or colonial domination or foreign occupation,<br />
and should not be used to undermine<br />
the territorial integrity, national sovereignty<br />
and political independence of States;<br />
14. Express concern over all forms of<br />
violation of human rights, including manifestations<br />
of racial discrimination, racism,<br />
apartheid, colonialism, foreign aggression<br />
and occupation, and the establishment of<br />
illegal settlements in occupied territories, as<br />
well as the recent resurgence of neo- nazism,<br />
xenophobia and ethnic cleansing;<br />
15. Underline the need for taking effective<br />
international measures in order to<br />
guarantee and monitor the implementation<br />
of human rights standards and effective and<br />
legal protection of people under foreign occupation;<br />
16. Strongly affirm their support for the<br />
legitimate struggle of the Palestinian people<br />
to restore their national and inalienable<br />
rights to self-determination and independence,<br />
and demand an immediate end to the<br />
grave violations of human rights in the<br />
Palestinian, Syrian Golan and other occupied<br />
Arab territories including Jerusalem;<br />
17. Reaffirm the right to development, as<br />
established in the Declaration on the Right<br />
to Development, as a universal and<br />
inalienable right and an integral part of<br />
fundamental human rights, which must be<br />
realized through international cooperation,<br />
respect for fundamental human rights, the<br />
establishment of a monitoring mechanism<br />
and the creation of essential international<br />
conditions for the realization of such right;<br />
18. Recognize that the main obstacle to<br />
the realization of the right to development<br />
lie at the international macroeconomic level,<br />
as reflected in the widening gap between the<br />
North and the South, the rich and the poor;<br />
19. Affirm that poverty is one of the<br />
major obstacles hindering the full enjoyment<br />
of human rights;<br />
20. Affirm also the need to develop the<br />
right of humankind regarding a clean, safe<br />
and healthy environment;<br />
21. Note that terrorism, in all its forms<br />
and manifestations, as distinguished from<br />
the legitimate struggle of peoples under<br />
colonial or alien domination or foreign occupation,<br />
has emerged as one of the most<br />
dangerous threats to the enjoyment of hu-
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man rights and democracy, threatening the<br />
territorial integrity and security of States<br />
and destabilizing legitimately constituted<br />
governments, and that it must be unequivocally<br />
condemned by the international community;<br />
22. Reaffirm their strong commitment to<br />
the promotion and protection of the rights<br />
of women through the guarantee of equal<br />
participation in the political, social, economic<br />
and cultural concerns of society, and<br />
the eradication of all forms of discrimination<br />
and of gender-based violence against women;<br />
23. Recognize the rights of the child to<br />
enjoy special protection and to be afforded<br />
the opportunities and facilities to develop<br />
physically, mentally, morally, spiritually<br />
and socially in a healthy and normal manner<br />
and in conditions of freedom and dignity;<br />
24. Welcome the important role played<br />
by national institutions in the genuine and<br />
constructive promotion of human rights, and<br />
believe that the conceptualization and<br />
eventual establishment of such institutions<br />
are best left for the States to decide;<br />
25. Acknowledge the importance of cooperation<br />
and dialogue between governments<br />
and non-governmental organizations<br />
on the basis of shared values as well as<br />
mutual respect and understanding in the<br />
promotion of human rights, and encourage<br />
the non-governmental organizations in consultative<br />
status with the Economic and<br />
Social Council to contribute positively to<br />
this process in accordance with Council<br />
resolution 1296 (XLIV);<br />
26. Reiterate the need to explore the<br />
possibilities of establishing regional arrangements<br />
for the promotion and protection<br />
of human rights in Asia;<br />
27. Reiterate further the need to explore<br />
ways to generate international cooperation<br />
and financial support for education and<br />
training in the field of human rights at the<br />
national level and for the establishment of<br />
national infrastructures to promote and<br />
protect human rights if requested by States;<br />
28. Emphasize the necessity to rationalize<br />
the United Nations human rights<br />
mechanism in order to enhance its effectiveness<br />
and efficiency and the need to ensure<br />
avoidance of the duplication of work<br />
that exists between the treaty bodies, the<br />
Sub-Commission on Prevention of<br />
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities<br />
and the Commission on Human Rights, as<br />
well as the need to avoid the multiplicity of<br />
parallel mechanisms;<br />
29. Stress the importance of strengthening<br />
the United Nations Centre for Human<br />
Rights with the necessary resources to enable<br />
it to provide a wide range of advisory<br />
services and technical assistance programmes<br />
in the promotion of human rights<br />
to requesting States in a timely and effective<br />
manner, as well as to enable it to finance<br />
adequately other activities in the field of<br />
human rights authorized by competent<br />
bodies;<br />
30. Call for increased representation of<br />
the developing countries in the Centre for<br />
Human Rights.<br />
ASIAN GOVERNMENTS ADOPT<br />
BANGKOK DECLARATION ON<br />
HUMAN RIGHTS<br />
UN Press Release, 2 April 19<strong>93</strong>. Excerpts<br />
BANGKOK (United Nations<br />
Information Service) – Concluding an unprecedented<br />
regional meeting on human<br />
rights, Asian Governments here have produced<br />
the “Declaration of Bangkok,” a consensus<br />
document reflecting their positions<br />
on a range of human rights issues. The 30-<br />
point Declaration, which will be submitted<br />
to the Preparatory Committee for the World<br />
Conference on Human Rights (Vienna, 14-<br />
25 June), emphasizes the primary responsibility<br />
of states in protecting and promoting<br />
human rights, while recognizing the<br />
crucial role of international cooperation in<br />
achieving these goals.<br />
The Declaration, which was drafted by<br />
representatives of 40 Governments from<br />
West Asia to the Pacific under the chairmanship<br />
of Mr. Mohammad Javad Zarif<br />
(Islamic Republic of Iran), was adopted at<br />
the plenary session of the regional meeting<br />
which was chaired by Mr. Pracha Guna-<br />
Kasem of Thailand. Mr. Pracha Guna-<br />
Kasem said that the Declaration was prepared<br />
in record time, reflecting the spirit of<br />
cooperation among the delegations. “We are<br />
pleased to make this Asian contribution to<br />
the World Conference on Human Rights,” he<br />
said, noting that the document would be<br />
considered together with the African and<br />
Latin American and the Caribbean<br />
Declarations at the fourth and final<br />
Preparatory Committee meeting in Geneva,<br />
19-30 April.<br />
Speaking after the final plenary, Mr.<br />
Ibrahima Fall, Secretary General of the upcoming<br />
World Conference, said that the<br />
Declaration of Bangkok, reflecting the<br />
enormous social, political and cultural diversity<br />
of the Asia and Pacific region, has<br />
particular significance as it completes the<br />
overview of the concerns and proposals of<br />
the three developing regions. “There are<br />
many similarities in the three Declarations,”<br />
he pointed out. “But their differences will<br />
prove to be complementary within the<br />
framework of the World Conference.”<br />
NGO Response<br />
For their part, the NGOs attending the<br />
regional meeting as observers, said they had<br />
demonstrated their unity and that their<br />
voices had been heard. “The meeting has<br />
allowed us to come together for the first<br />
time ever around human rights issues,” said<br />
Cecilia Jimenez, spokesperson for the more<br />
than 170 NGOs represented. “We did not<br />
come here to confront governments but to<br />
encourage dialogue at the local, national and<br />
regional levels.” The Declaration represented<br />
a step forward, she said at a press<br />
conference, in that governments had recognized<br />
a number of issues such as the<br />
rights of women and children. She regretted<br />
however, that the Declaration had failed to<br />
“give proper recognition to the most fundamental<br />
rights of indigenous peoples.”<br />
A positive point, Ms. Jimenez said, was<br />
that the Declaration had acknowledged the<br />
importance of the contribution of NGOs.<br />
“The governments of the Asia/Pacific region<br />
can no longer belittle or deny our right to be<br />
part of the protection and promotion of<br />
human rights.”<br />
Ms. Jimenez expressed concern at the<br />
emphasis placed in the Declaration on<br />
“regional specificities” and what she perceived<br />
as the absence of an unequivocal<br />
statement regarding the universality and<br />
indivisibility of human rights.<br />
ASIA-PACIFIC STATES SET<br />
STRONG AGENDA<br />
by Kunda Dixit<br />
Bangkok, Apr. 2 (IPS) - The first-ever<br />
gathering of Asia-Pacific countries on human<br />
rights that ended here Friday approved a<br />
declaration that counters western pressures<br />
and blunts the concerns of the region’s<br />
activist groups.<br />
The three-cornered tussle at the conference<br />
between Asia- Pacific governments,<br />
human rights NGOs (non-governmental organisations)<br />
and the west, has ended with<br />
some of the more powerful Asian states<br />
seeming to gain the upper hand.<br />
These countries have come under growing<br />
pressure lately from industrialised countries<br />
to adhere to what they see as western<br />
commandments on human rights, democracy<br />
and the environment.<br />
The Bangkok declaration is a document<br />
that prepares a common Asian stand for the<br />
U.N. world conference on human rights to<br />
be held in Vienna in June.<br />
It was crucial for some Asian countries to<br />
draw up a paper that deleted or diluted<br />
references to civil liberties, political pluralism<br />
or NGO participation.<br />
And they seem to have got what they<br />
wanted. the final document considerably<br />
enhances their negotiating power for Vienna.<br />
Even though some south-east Asian<br />
nations have been the most vocal lately<br />
about western pressures on human rights<br />
and democracy, they showed more sophisti-
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cation. Singapore wanted the toughlyworded<br />
first draft toned down because it<br />
could have given the impression that Asia<br />
condoned human rights violations.<br />
Conference sources said China and<br />
Vietnam were most adamant in deleting all<br />
direct references to torture and NGO participation.<br />
South-east Asian countries tried<br />
to strike off phraseology on self-determination<br />
as a principle of international law and<br />
wanted to insert the right of all nations to<br />
“control and freely utilize their natural resources.”<br />
In the end, the final document reflected<br />
the growing clout of Asia’s newly-affluent<br />
nations. the few voices speaking out for civil<br />
liberties and pluralism belonged to the<br />
region’s ailing economies like India, the<br />
Philippines and Nepal.<br />
The notable exceptions were South<br />
Korea, which recently elected its first civilian<br />
president in three decades, and Japan,<br />
the only developed country that attended<br />
the meeting.<br />
Japan strongly objected to an item in the<br />
declaration that discourages attempts to use<br />
human rights conditionalities to development<br />
aid, saying it was not compatible with<br />
japan’s overseas development assistance<br />
(ODA) charter.<br />
Japan also echoed the western emphasis<br />
on civil and political rights. “Human rights<br />
are universal ... these are values common to<br />
all mankind and they are a matter of legitimate<br />
international concern,” said japan’s<br />
Seiichiro Otsuka.<br />
The final declaration drew mixed reactions<br />
from activists who were here to lobby<br />
for a stronger government commitment to<br />
civil and political liberties and the protection<br />
of minorities.<br />
Said Evelyn Serrano of the Philippine<br />
Alliance of Human Rights Advocates: “we<br />
are a bit disappointed that the states have<br />
eroded the NGO recommendations.”<br />
“It was one step forward and one step<br />
back,” said Cecilia Jimenez, spokesperson<br />
of a regional conference of human rights<br />
groups held here last week.<br />
Asia-Pacific NGOs felt the five-day<br />
Bangkok meeting was a historic occasion<br />
that united them for the first time as a<br />
region. many of them are now looking forward<br />
to Vienna, and linking up with other<br />
rights groups in Latin America and Africa.<br />
But they also lost out when some key<br />
concerns were ignored, such as indigenous<br />
people’s rights. Said Jimenez: “we achieved<br />
some points, like reference to women’s and<br />
children’s rights but the resolution’s<br />
weakness and drawbacks far outweigh the<br />
gains.”<br />
Governments were for the most part<br />
happy with the final version. “the resolution<br />
was a balanced one. it reaffirms our<br />
commitment to the Asian point of view,”<br />
said Singapore’s Bilahari Kausikan. “This is<br />
an important achievement. we will go to<br />
Vienna with a coherent voice.”<br />
The five-day Asia-Pacific human rights<br />
meeting had several glaring blind spots.<br />
some parts of the region got over-exposed<br />
while others got left out in the dark.<br />
High-profile crises like those in <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> and Burma were spotlighted by aggressive<br />
activist groups who knew their way<br />
around with the media. Proximity to the<br />
venue of the meeting meant Burmese exile<br />
groups had a strong contingent.<br />
Other human rights hot spots that did<br />
not even register a blip on the conference<br />
radar screens in the past week were north<br />
Korea, Tibet and Kashmir. The middle east<br />
was represented only by groups from<br />
Palestine and Kuwait.<br />
China, home to one-fifth of the world’s<br />
population, had a lone activist who created<br />
ripples by addressing the plenary in<br />
Chinese. Central Asian states, still suffering<br />
an identity crisis, did not even show up.<br />
“China and Tibet were both off screen.<br />
there was no major group pressing attention<br />
on human rights violations in China,” says<br />
Sidney Jones of the U.S.-based Asia Watch.<br />
“And Tibetan groups should have been here.<br />
It was an unfortunate lapse.”<br />
Given the concerns about safeguards to<br />
democracy and human rights in Hong Kong<br />
in the run-up to the 1997 handover of the<br />
British colony to China, it was surprising<br />
that only one Hong Kong NGO came to<br />
Bangkok.<br />
“Hong Kong groups are very concerned<br />
about 1997 and want a venue for discussion,<br />
but they are not so sure about their level of<br />
participation in Vienna. Intervention-wise it<br />
is problematic,” says Tan Meng-Kiat of the<br />
Hong Kong-based Asian Centre for the<br />
Progress of Peoples.<br />
But the question of Hong Kong’s absence<br />
in the Bangkok meeting was raised at this<br />
week’s legislative council meeting in Hong<br />
Kong, and the government’s answer was<br />
that Hong Kong will be present at the<br />
Vienna conference.<br />
Pro-democracy activists in Hong Kong<br />
are concerned that governor Chris Patten’s<br />
battle with Beijing over reforms in the<br />
composition of the legislature does not go<br />
far enough.<br />
Said one activist: “Hong Kong NGOs are<br />
for a totally elected legislative council. but<br />
(Patten) knows this would be too radical for<br />
China.”<br />
Human rights groups from the South<br />
Pacific island states were also under-represented.<br />
A Bougainville group tried hard to<br />
get the media interested in the Papua New<br />
Guinea military’s ongoing suppression of a<br />
separatist struggle in the copper-rich island.<br />
Also striving hard for attention were<br />
other marginalised groups like India’s untouchables.<br />
The little-known abuse of some<br />
200 million victims of south Asia’s caste<br />
system probably makes this numerically the<br />
world’s most widespread rights violation,<br />
“yet you hardly hear of untouchables in international<br />
fora,” said one activist.<br />
BBC ON BANGKOK<br />
DECLARATION AND TIMOR<br />
The BBC World Service’s Newshour at 1pm<br />
GMT on Friday, 2 April 19<strong>93</strong> carried the<br />
following report on the Bangkok meeting of<br />
Asian governments held in preparation of<br />
the UN World Conference on Human Rights<br />
in June this year. It also interviewed<br />
Indonesia’s chief delegate, Wiryono<br />
Sastrohandoyo in Bangkok, and José<br />
Ramos-Horta in Sydney:<br />
The following is an unabridged transcript of<br />
the programme which came in two sections:<br />
The Bangkok meeting was called to agree<br />
a common Asian position ahead of the<br />
World Conference on Human Rights due to<br />
be held in Austria in June. From Bangkok,<br />
here’s our Southeast Asia correspondent,<br />
Jonathan Burcher:<br />
“The Bangkok Declaration describes itself<br />
as setting out the human rights aspirations<br />
and commitments of Asia. Its contents<br />
reflect the reservations of many Asian governments<br />
over what they see as the increasing<br />
dominance of western concerns with<br />
individual, civil and political liberties. The<br />
Declaration opposes in particular attempts<br />
to tie aid to a country’s human rights record.<br />
It says rights should not be promoted<br />
through the imposition of what the<br />
Declaration calls ‘incompatible values.’ And<br />
at a time when the United Nations is<br />
growing increasingly interventionist, the<br />
Declaration stresses the importance of national<br />
sovereignty and the principle of noninterference<br />
in internal affairs.<br />
“Asian non-government human rights<br />
groups represented at the Bangkok meeting<br />
welcomed some parts of the Declaration, in<br />
particular sections on women’s and children’s<br />
rights which had been absent from<br />
the initial draft.<br />
“In a statement, the NGOs accused the<br />
Asian governments of seeking ultimately to<br />
protect themselves from a too critical examination<br />
of their own human rights record.”<br />
The second report drew attention to the<br />
forthcoming talks between Portugal and<br />
Indonesia on the question of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>:<br />
The dispute between Indonesia and<br />
Portugal which is the former colonial power<br />
in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> has exploded into open con-
Page 86 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
frontation. Portugal has led the European<br />
Community in getting the UN Sub-commission<br />
(sic) in Geneva to condemn<br />
Indonesia for its treatment of the <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese. While for his part, the Indonesian<br />
Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas, says such<br />
comments could ruin talks scheduled to<br />
resume in Rome on April 20.<br />
In the meantime Indonesia and 46 other<br />
Asian nations have been attending a conference<br />
on human rights in Bangkok where<br />
delegates were sharply critical of western<br />
intervention on the subject. But the head of<br />
the NGO delegation to the conference<br />
Cecilia Ximenes of the Philippines was not<br />
happy at the outcome:<br />
“They are still continuing to try to limit<br />
the scope of international monitoring of the<br />
violations of human rights in the region. And<br />
this can be seen by the emphasis on the<br />
principle of national sovereignty, the<br />
principle of non- interference in internal affairs,<br />
etc. This has been interpreted by these<br />
Asian-Pacific states as the need not be<br />
accountable for the human rights violations<br />
occurring.”<br />
So, with <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> in mind, what position<br />
has Indonesia been taking at the conference?<br />
Bill Barnes asked the government<br />
representative there, Mr. Wiryono, whether<br />
Asian countries were firmly rejecting western<br />
notions of human rights:<br />
“Of course, human rights are universal.<br />
We accept that. But we also have to accept<br />
the fact that the world is very diverse. And<br />
Indonesia, for a country I must stress, our<br />
motto is Unity in Diversity. We are a nation<br />
of 350 ethnic groups. In the United Nations<br />
we have now about 179 nations and I think<br />
they are all different but we are all committed<br />
to the universality of human rights. But<br />
I think we must not try to contradict each<br />
other but to find common ground. I think<br />
this is the voice of reason and I think we<br />
must be seriously considered by the western<br />
countries in particular because, many times,<br />
Asian countries have been the target of<br />
censure and criticism and often attack.”<br />
Bill Barnes: “Your critics in the West<br />
would presumably argue that you can have<br />
economic development, you can have progress<br />
with the sort of western rights that<br />
they would like you to adopt. And you’re<br />
are saying that you can’t have this.”<br />
Wiryono: “I am not saying that we cant<br />
have both. We must strike a balance between<br />
individual rights and the obligations<br />
of the individual to society. And in<br />
Indonesia as well as in many other Asian<br />
countries, communal rights are sometimes<br />
considered to be superior, to be given more<br />
importance. I think both economic, social<br />
and cultural rights as well as civil and political<br />
rights are important and are to be seen<br />
in an integral way. That is, I think, our<br />
views.”<br />
BB: “You say that human rights have to<br />
be ....[compatible?] in the country in which<br />
they are being applied, but couldn’t people<br />
argue that some of the people at least,<br />
calling for human rights within Asia are<br />
people living in those countries?”<br />
Wiryono: “I think that the NGOs are our<br />
partners and they can express their views<br />
but I think sometimes, I hate to say it, they<br />
reflect more the western views rather than<br />
the their own countries’ cultural heritage. If<br />
they simply make blunt voices and take for<br />
themselves the role of both judge and jury, I<br />
don’t think that it’s very useful. And governments<br />
I think represent the people. They<br />
represent their organisation and their organisations<br />
are given a certain status within<br />
the UN and they play their roles but they<br />
must also observe the same principles<br />
dealing with human rights as I have explained,<br />
in the spirit of the UN Charter and<br />
in the spirit of cooperation.”<br />
–––––––<br />
Bill Barnes: “So how do such comments<br />
go down with Fretilin? This is the rebel<br />
group campaigning for independence in <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> where tens of thousands of people<br />
are thought to have died fighting since<br />
Indonesia annexed the territory in 1975.<br />
Fretilin spokesman is José Ramos-Horta<br />
who spoke to me from Sydney, Australia,<br />
and I asked him whether he accepted the<br />
view that developing countries should have<br />
their own human rights values:<br />
Horta: “I come from a third world country,<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, which in fact is fourth<br />
world. So I have legitimacy to talk about the<br />
problems of the South. When I hear Mr.<br />
Wiryono criticizing, or saying that NGOs in<br />
the South are detached from the reality or<br />
that they reflect more the western views, I<br />
find it perplexing, because the NGOs of the<br />
South are deep-rooted in the villages, in the<br />
small towns, in the countryside. They in<br />
fact reflect the true aspirations, the true<br />
desires of the people of the South, not the<br />
elite that play golf and mortgage the future<br />
of their own countries with the West.”<br />
Barnes: “But it has to be said that the<br />
South does have different values from the<br />
West and Wiryono did make the point for<br />
example that in Indonesia you do have 350<br />
different ethnic groups. How can you possibly<br />
put individual rights ahead of the<br />
communal good?”<br />
Horta: “First let me say that there are<br />
universal standards in terms of the right to<br />
life, the right to education, the right not to<br />
be afraid of being arrested. In Indonesia<br />
student protests against lack of education,<br />
lack of health care or low wages and so on,<br />
are arrested, so what kind of economic rights<br />
is the Indonesian government talking<br />
about?”<br />
Barnes: “So on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, are you putting<br />
your faith in the second visit of Amos<br />
Wako to <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>?”<br />
Horta: “Not entirely. First we hope that<br />
his first report is made public. The UN<br />
Human Rights Commission in Geneva called<br />
on the UN Secretary-General to publish his<br />
first report which I believe is very damaging<br />
on Indonesia and calls for the respect for<br />
self-determination in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. Now let<br />
us see, what will be his second report. And<br />
we hope that he will stay there longer than<br />
in the previous visit. His visit was only one<br />
day. What kind of investigation is that when<br />
you go to a country to stay only one day in<br />
the country? So we hope that he will stay<br />
longer and publish his two reports as has<br />
been requested by the Commission.”<br />
Barnes: “What prospects are there for a<br />
political settlement? Talks are to resume on<br />
April 20; meanwhile Indonesia and Portugal<br />
are criticizing each other’s stand over <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>. The prospects don’t look too good,<br />
do they?”<br />
Horta: “It is not Portugal that invaded<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. Portugal left <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> in the<br />
hope that <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> would achieve selfdetermination<br />
and independence. It is<br />
Indonesia that has to make the gestures.<br />
What kind of gesture can they expect from<br />
Portugal? On our side, the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese, I<br />
have stated repeatedly that we are prepared<br />
to bend backwards to accommodate<br />
Indonesia’s concerns, its legitimate security<br />
interests. We are prepared to work out a<br />
formula that would help Indonesia extricate<br />
itself from <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> with honour, with<br />
dignity, without losing face. All we want is<br />
for the UN, working with Portugal and<br />
Indonesia, to organise a referendum in <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> through which the people of <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> will decide whether they want independence,<br />
whether they want to be a free<br />
associated territory with Portugal or to be<br />
integrated with Indonesia. That’s all we are<br />
asking.”<br />
JOSÉ RAMOS HORTA SAYS<br />
HE PLANS TO RETURN TO<br />
EAST TIMOR<br />
Report on SBS TV program Dateline, Friday<br />
April 2, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
Interview with José Ramos Horta.<br />
Interviewer Paul Murphy. (slightly edited).<br />
PM: <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> wasn’t on the agenda at<br />
the Bangkok Asia-Pacific Human Rights<br />
Conference this week but it scored a victory<br />
in early March at the UNCHR when a motion<br />
highly critical of Indonesia was carried<br />
overwhelmingly. One of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>’s best
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 87<br />
known activists, José Ramos Horta, is back<br />
in Australia after attending the Conference<br />
in Thailand.<br />
José Ramos Horta, <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> wasn’t on<br />
the agenda at Bangkok but was it talked<br />
about in the corridors of the conference ?<br />
JRH: ET was not on the agenda like<br />
many other issues because it was a conference<br />
dealing with diplomatic procedures,<br />
standard setting and so on. I must say that<br />
ET dominated the whole conference, particularly<br />
the NGO conference which preceded<br />
the official conference.<br />
M: Right, but the official conference was<br />
dominated by countries like China, Iran,<br />
Indonesia. Countries not known for their<br />
progressive attitude on human rights.<br />
JRH: Yes the conference was dominated<br />
by Iran, China, Indonesia, Iraq and so many<br />
other dictatorships that I said to one of the<br />
Asian delegates that the only thing missing<br />
was having Pol Pot as one of the rapporteurs.<br />
PM: So you didn’t achieve anything in<br />
Bangkok ?<br />
JRH: Not in terms of standard setting,<br />
adoption of forward looking instruments to<br />
protect human rights, that would go beyond<br />
existing instruments such as the Covenant<br />
on Civil and Political Rights. But in terms of<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> we succeeded in obtaining from<br />
the NGOs, more than 100 NGOs, from all<br />
over the region the adoption of ET as a<br />
country situation to campaign on this year.<br />
PM: Now in Geneva in early March the<br />
UNCHR adopted a very strong motion<br />
against Indonesia. No doubt you would<br />
claim that as a victory but what really<br />
would even that achieve ? What effect<br />
would that have on Indonesia ?<br />
JRH: Well first of all let me say again<br />
that Indonesia went to Geneva as President<br />
of NAM, leader of the North-South dialogue,<br />
member of the Islamic Conference and<br />
it was also a Vice-President of the<br />
Commission itself. So all the odds were<br />
against us but as it turned out Indonesia got<br />
only one fifth of the membership of the<br />
Commission. In terms of practical achievements<br />
I must say yes because right now the<br />
special envoy of the UN Secretary General<br />
is flying to <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
PM: But he’s the Kenyan Attorney<br />
General. They’re not known for their performance<br />
in human rights are they ?<br />
JRH: That’s true but on the other hand<br />
we know of the first report he wrote. This<br />
report has been locked up at the office of<br />
the UN Secretary General because as we<br />
understand it is very damaging to Indonesia<br />
and it is also recommending that the UN<br />
must look at the root causes of the problem<br />
in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
PM: Its been 18 years since Indonesia<br />
annexed <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. What have you<br />
achieved really ? The struggle has gone on<br />
but being pragmatic what have you achieved<br />
?<br />
JRH: Well the fact we have kept the issue<br />
alive, on the agenda, that was a major<br />
success. The fact that we persuaded the US<br />
Congress to cut military training to<br />
Indonesia. The fact that now we have ET<br />
high on the agenda of the UN and of the US<br />
Congress and the Clinton administration.<br />
These, I believe, portend good news for <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> in the next few months, 2 years, 3<br />
years for ET.<br />
PM: Would you risk going to ET yourself<br />
? Would you want to ? Do you think<br />
that it would be worth the risk ?<br />
JRH: Yes, I have all intentions to go<br />
there, sooner rather than later. The<br />
Indonesian military commander, Theo<br />
Sy afei, in a sarcastic manner said that my<br />
boss Xanana Gusmão was there already so I<br />
am most welcome to come. The puppet<br />
governor of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> also said that he<br />
would pick me up at the airport himself.<br />
These are threatening remarks but I still<br />
intend to go.<br />
PM: Even though there is danger.<br />
JRH: Yes there is danger, I just remember<br />
what they did to Ninoy Aquino in the<br />
Philippines. Much more easier to shoot me<br />
but I still intend to go.<br />
PM: When will you go ?<br />
JRH: I don’t know. I have to look into<br />
the logistics.<br />
PM: This year ?<br />
JRH: Yes, I hope so. This year, within a<br />
few weeks, a few months, we are making<br />
arrangements with some international personalities<br />
to travel along with me.<br />
PM: Final question, do you think Xanana<br />
Gusmão was tortured when Indonesian<br />
troops grabbed him ?<br />
JRH: Absolutely, he was tortured. I<br />
showed the footage of the first interview<br />
which Indonesia displayed on national TV<br />
to a specialist group of the UN, the Working<br />
Group on detention and torture and<br />
everyone, 5 specialists from 5 parts of the<br />
world, they all confirmed yes, Xanana<br />
Gusmão was physically and<br />
psychologically tortured.<br />
Before the interview SBS showed extracts<br />
from a play , ‘The Voices of Souls,’ based on<br />
Michelle Turner’s book “Telling <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>” which is due to open in Melbourne<br />
in 2 weeks. (Theatre Works, St Kilda).<br />
Extracts from the play included interviews<br />
with the <strong>Timor</strong>ese ‘actors,’ traditional<br />
dances & songs and a dramatization of part<br />
of the story of Fatima Gusmão in the book.<br />
CONTINUING TALKS<br />
BETWEEN INDONESIA<br />
AND PORTUGAL<br />
JAPANESE GROUPS URGE<br />
UN SECRETARY-GENERAL<br />
TO REDOUBLE EFFORTS<br />
From Free <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Japan Coalition,<br />
Feb. 18.<br />
Letters calling on UN Secretary-General<br />
to take new initiatives to solve the <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> issue were delivered to Dr. Boutros<br />
Boutros-Ghali, who is currently on an official<br />
visit to Tokyo. Eda Satsuki, member of<br />
the Lower House, conveyed the letters at a<br />
reception for the UN chief on Feb. 17.<br />
A letter from the suprapartisan Diet<br />
Members’ Forum on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> expresses<br />
Japanese lawmakers’ concern that representatives<br />
of the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese be included<br />
in negotiations on the issue being conducted<br />
under the Secretary General’s auspices. The<br />
missive also calls on the UN to “put forth a<br />
strategy ...including as one possibility the<br />
holding of a popular referendum” in order to<br />
carry out the two Security Council and eight<br />
General Assembly resolutions on <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>. Such a strategy, the legislators say,<br />
is “absolutely consistent with goals which<br />
the United Nations is most energetically<br />
pursuing at the moment, namely,<br />
peacekeeping in regional disputes and<br />
support for democratic elections.”<br />
After the Indonesian invasion of the<br />
former Portuguese colony of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> in<br />
1975, the UN passed resolutions calling on<br />
Indonesia to withdraw its troops and affirming<br />
the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese’ right of selfdetermination.<br />
The U.S., Japan and other<br />
Western Powers closed their eyes to<br />
Indonesia’s illegal takeover of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
until Nov. 1991 when journalists witnessed<br />
Indonesian troops shoot down hundreds of<br />
mourners at a cemetery in Dili. In spite of<br />
heightened international concern, the UN<br />
has failed to take any new initiative to break<br />
the 17-year deadlock over the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
issue.<br />
The Diet Members’ letter concludes by<br />
urging Dr. Boutros-Ghali “to request the allout<br />
cooperation of Japan and the Japanese<br />
Government in achieving a solution of the<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> issue. Japan, which is the largest<br />
donor of economic aid to Indonesia, has<br />
deep economic ties with that country, so<br />
that it can be said that the issue of <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> represents a veritable test of Japan’s<br />
human rights diplomacy.”<br />
A second letter, from the Free <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> Japan Coalition, representing eleven
Page 88 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
local organizations, urges the UN chief to<br />
“redouble efforts to ensure that opportunities<br />
for a solution are not lost.” The<br />
“favorable international climate” that has<br />
prevailed since the demise of the Cold War<br />
and the “greatly enhanced awareness” of the<br />
issue are sited as opportunities.<br />
“The gravely deteriorating situation” in<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> itself is also given as a “pressing<br />
reason for a new concerted initiative.”<br />
Referring to a recent letter from the Catholic<br />
Bishop of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Ximenes Belo, the<br />
Coalition says that many people have been<br />
arrested and tortured in the wake of the<br />
arrest of resistance leader Xanana Gusmão<br />
in November of last year. Quoting Mr.<br />
Gusmão’s words after his arrest, the letter<br />
says that the only ray of hope lies in “a<br />
global solution for <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.” The<br />
scenario for such a solution would center on<br />
the Secretary-General and, the Coalition<br />
opines, should involve the cooperation of<br />
the Japanese Government.<br />
Further Information: Jean Inglis<br />
Fax:0823222684 Tel:0823220962<br />
CHURCH TO MEDIATE<br />
TIMOR TALKS?<br />
Diario de Noticias 11 March 19<strong>93</strong> Dateline:<br />
Lisbon Byline: Carlos Albino Translated<br />
from Portuguese unabridged<br />
Jakarta and Lisbon may accept intervention<br />
of the St. Egidio Community:<br />
After the Catholic Church offered three<br />
times to serve as mediator between Portugal<br />
and Indonesia, through the St. Egidio<br />
Community, it is now believed that Jakarta<br />
and Lisbon will accept a formula for a first<br />
round of formal negotiations in September<br />
on the future of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
The acceptance of the Church’s mediation<br />
could be the only concrete result of the<br />
talks scheduled for 17 April in Rome between<br />
Durão Barroso and Ali Alatas, a<br />
Community diplomatic source assured us,<br />
stressing the fact that Portugal is not going<br />
to desist from its veto on the third generation<br />
agreement between the EC and<br />
Indonesia.<br />
The same source added that Community<br />
officials were expecting Portugal to withdraw<br />
from or moderate its position, especially<br />
after Germany turned a deaf ear to the<br />
UN resolutions and to the process developed<br />
by SG Boutros-Ghali, in its sale of<br />
war materials to Jakarta.<br />
The response, however, was quick in<br />
coming and Durão Barroso ended up going<br />
to Strasbourg to personally counter the<br />
spreading news of an impending softening in<br />
Lisbon’s negotiating attitude towards<br />
Jakarta.<br />
We are assured from Brussels, besides,<br />
that Indonesia was aware of the possible<br />
moderation in Lisbon’s stance. So Minister<br />
Durão Barroso’s statements in Strasbourg,<br />
namely containing a “first step” criticism of<br />
Germany, took by surprise the Europeans,<br />
who put business dealings with Jakarta before<br />
everything else, even though the latter<br />
are no more than “diplomatic old iron,” as<br />
was the case in which Bonn involved itself,<br />
encouraging Indonesia.<br />
Yesterday, high up Portuguese diplomatic<br />
officials who, in the Foreign Office,<br />
are following the case of <strong>Timor</strong>, drew a<br />
curtain of total silence over the dossiers<br />
being prepared for Rome, and refused to<br />
speak about the case. Nevertheless, it is<br />
known that the scheduling of the Rome<br />
meeting between Durão Barroso and Ali<br />
Alatas was, from the beginning, linked to the<br />
admissibility that the St. Egidio Community<br />
could have a mediating role. Also, the 20<br />
April date was set on account of the ending<br />
of the discussion on <strong>Timor</strong> at the UN<br />
Human Rights Commission in Geneva.<br />
Jakarta always expected a neutral result.<br />
Yesterday, however, the US made a 360<br />
degree alteration to its traditional stance,<br />
when it subscribed to the draft resolution<br />
sponsored by the EC, Angola, Switzerland,<br />
Liechtenstein, Sweden, Norway, Iceland,<br />
Finland, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and<br />
Brazil. Diplomatic observers believe that, in<br />
spite of this being a first sign from<br />
Washington, it has signified a serious setback<br />
for Jakarta, but goes no further than<br />
being a warning.<br />
It is in this context that the Catholic<br />
Church’s mediation, through the St. Egidio<br />
Community, already seen as Vatican diplomacy’s<br />
“worldly goal,” arises as a viable<br />
option.<br />
To the already well-known formula of<br />
“an internationally acceptable solution” for<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>, Portugal now adds the hope of<br />
solving the problem when the Jakarta dictatorship<br />
falls once and for all, giving way to a<br />
democratic regime, for which Lisbon appears<br />
to be definitely prepared to wait for<br />
as long as it takes.<br />
It should be said that the Rome negotiations<br />
scenario will not be influenced by the<br />
forthcoming episodes of the Xanana case, in<br />
which there should be new developments on<br />
19 or 20 March, with the reading of the<br />
sentence of the Indonesian court, set up in<br />
Dili.<br />
ST. EGIDIO CONFIRMS MEDIATION<br />
Diario de Noticias 12 March 19<strong>93</strong> Dateline:<br />
Lisbon original lang.: Portuguese<br />
unabridged<br />
Father Matteo Zuppi, Director of the St.<br />
Egidio Community, confirmed there have<br />
been contacts with regards mediation between<br />
Portugal and Indonesia on the question<br />
of <strong>Timor</strong>, according to news carried<br />
yesterday by the Diario de Noticias. Father<br />
Zupi told our Rome correspondent,<br />
Manuela Paixao, that “the St. Egidio<br />
Community expressed its total willingness,<br />
when contacted in connection with possible<br />
mediation in the future peace process in<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>, to take place some time, somewhere.”<br />
Father Zuppi added that “No official<br />
request has yet been made by the two<br />
parties. This is very likely to happen when<br />
the Indonesian and Portuguese ministers<br />
meet in April.”<br />
TIMOR: VATICAN WANTS TO<br />
MEDIATE<br />
Expresso 13 February 19<strong>93</strong> Dateline:<br />
Lisbon Byline: Mario Robalo Translated<br />
from Portuguese unabridged<br />
A Church source in Rome yesterday assured<br />
the Expresso that the St. Egidio<br />
Community, in Rome, is going to appear as<br />
mediator in the search for a solution to the<br />
problem of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. As from next week,<br />
this Catholic movement, which led the<br />
mediation process between Renamo and the<br />
Mozambique Government, will initiate a<br />
series of contacts with the <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />
Resistance and the Jakarta Government,<br />
with “the committed consent of Vatican<br />
diplomacy,” with a view to finding a political<br />
model to resolve the differences which<br />
have dragged on since December 1975.<br />
According to the same source, the St.<br />
Egidio Community will not as yet be contacting<br />
Portuguese diplomacy, “given the<br />
urgency of Indonesia’s acceptance of<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese presence at the talks.” The<br />
Portuguese and Indonesian Foreign<br />
Ministers’ decision, at the end of the inconclusive<br />
December meeting, to schedule a<br />
new round of talks for Rome on 20 April<br />
next, is probably connected to this attitude<br />
taken by the Church. However, Minister<br />
Durão Barroso’s office does not confirm<br />
this version: “The meeting was set to be<br />
held in Rome because of the agenda problems<br />
faced by the three parties involved.”<br />
Meanwhile, statements made by the<br />
Bishop of Dili, Msgr. Ximenes Belo, referring<br />
to <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> becoming an<br />
“autonomous territory” of Indonesia, confirm<br />
reports that the Holy See is making<br />
diplomatic efforts to get the Suharto<br />
Government to agree to concede autonomy<br />
to the former Portuguese colony.<br />
Having until now supported a referendum<br />
through which the <strong>Timor</strong>ese could express<br />
their wishes regarding their political<br />
future, on Thursday the prelate unexpectedly<br />
admitted to Portuguese reporters, covering<br />
the Xanana Gusmão trial, that “the
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 89<br />
most realistic solution” for the territory<br />
would be to achieve autonomous region<br />
status. This statement connects with what<br />
the Expresso published in its 30 January<br />
edition, regarding the Vatican’s efforts in the<br />
search for a solution which “does not lessen<br />
the Indonesian nation’s prestige but which,<br />
at the same time, satisfies the <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />
population.” Msgr. Ximenes Belo must<br />
have received the same message that the<br />
Apostolic Nuncio in Jakarta, Msgr. Pietro<br />
Sambi, delivered to General Suharto.<br />
In spite of the Indonesian President<br />
having stated to the Catholic Church’s<br />
diplomatic representative that the proposed<br />
model could mean the disintegration of the<br />
nation, Msgr. Belo becomes, now, the<br />
Vatican’s spokesman. It may be recalled<br />
that, last year, the Holy See admitted officially<br />
that it would agree to the Msgr.<br />
Belo’s presence at the meetings between<br />
Portugal and Indonesia, as mediator.<br />
ST. EGIDIO WITH TIMOR<br />
Expresso 13 March 19<strong>93</strong> Dateline: Lisbon<br />
Translated from Portuguese unabridged<br />
The St. Egidio Community has established<br />
contacts with the <strong>Timor</strong>ese Resistance<br />
abroad, with regards becoming mediator in<br />
the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> conflict.<br />
An ecclesiastical source in Rome assured<br />
the Expresso yesterday that in the past two<br />
weeks Father Matteo Zuppi, the Catholic<br />
movement’s leader, has met with members<br />
“with responsibilities for representing<br />
abroad the command of the Maubere<br />
struggle,” so that the Community’s<br />
willingness to make efforts to establish<br />
contacts between the Resistance and the<br />
Jakarta Government could be transmitted to<br />
the new <strong>Timor</strong>ese guerrilla leader, Mau<br />
Hunu.<br />
As the Expresso reported in its 13<br />
February edition, the St. Egidio Community,<br />
“with the committed consent of Vatican<br />
diplomacy,” is interested in leading the<br />
reconciliation process between <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />
and Indonesians, just as it did the process of<br />
mediation between Renamo and the<br />
Mozambique Government. This attitude on<br />
the Church’s part is certainly not unconnected<br />
with the fact that the next round of<br />
talks between Portugal and Indonesia will be<br />
taking place in Rome next month, at which<br />
time Msgr. Ximenes Belo, Bishop of Dili,<br />
will be travelling there.<br />
Meanwhile, Indonesia unexpectedly suffered<br />
an unprecedented defeat on Thursday<br />
at the Human Rights Commission in<br />
Geneva, when the draft resolution proposed<br />
by the EC Twelve was passed. 22 votes<br />
were cast in favour (EC, US, Australia and<br />
PALOP - Portuguese-speaking African<br />
nations - among others), against the 12<br />
countries that sided with Jakarta, which<br />
always rejected a consensus solution. Now<br />
Suharto has to agree to four UN rapporteurs<br />
visiting <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, to investigate issues<br />
connected with torture, disappearances and<br />
summary executions. The resolution further<br />
demands clarification by the Indonesian<br />
authorities of the 12 November massacre.<br />
ROME AWAITS THE<br />
TIMORESE<br />
Diario de Noticias, March 22 Dateline :<br />
Lisbon Translated from Portuguese unabridged<br />
Before Durão Barroso and Ali Alatas<br />
meet in the Italian capital, <strong>Timor</strong>ese representatives,<br />
both in favour of and against<br />
Indonesia, will be meeting in Rome under<br />
the mediation of the Catholic Church. This<br />
objective led to contacts in Lisbon between<br />
informal representatives of Indonesia’s interests<br />
and <strong>Timor</strong>ese resistance leaders. The<br />
holding in Rome of the meeting, however, is<br />
a certainty.<br />
Yesterday, observers assured the Diario<br />
de Noticias that the St. Egidio Community<br />
was not involved in the attempted convergence<br />
which should, however, be taking<br />
place under the mediation of the Church.<br />
The presence of the Bishop of Dili, reportedly<br />
as moderator, is almost certain.<br />
The same sources reported that the mediation<br />
is going to be a fundamental instrument<br />
for the political debate between<br />
Lisbon and Jakarta, in which Indonesia is<br />
said to have already given signs of being less<br />
intransigent, especially after the setback it<br />
suffered in Geneva. In this way, Durão<br />
Barroso and Ali Alatas will be able to<br />
discuss formulas for mediation at the highest<br />
level, since they will be in possession of<br />
elements which, until now, were not<br />
available and which could only be filtered<br />
from discussions between the <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />
themselves. Furthermore, the definitive alternative<br />
profile of the most appropriate<br />
Catholic institution (and this role may not<br />
fall to the St. Egidio Community, as a diplomatic<br />
source assured some days ago, and<br />
which was later confirmed by Father<br />
Matteo Zuppi himself) will depend, eventually,<br />
on the success or failure of the<br />
meeting of <strong>Timor</strong>ese and whether the<br />
Church’s mediation is formally accepted by<br />
the ministers. Specifically, it is now known<br />
that Father Mario Marisi of the St. Egidio<br />
Community was given the task of examining<br />
the mediation process in more depth.<br />
There are reportedly four points on the<br />
agenda for the meeting of the <strong>Timor</strong>ese, said<br />
to be scheduled for the second week of<br />
April: the pacification of <strong>Timor</strong>; demilitarization;<br />
reconciliation; consultation on selfdetermination<br />
or not. The postponement of<br />
Xanana Gusmão’s trial to 1 April could be<br />
linked to the subjects to be discussed by the<br />
<strong>Timor</strong> integrationists and pro-independence<br />
groups, since the pacification process would<br />
imply the release of all political prisoners.<br />
VATICAN MEDIATION NOT<br />
CONFIRMED BY FOREIGN<br />
OFFICE<br />
Publico, 24 March 19<strong>93</strong>. By Joaquim Trigo<br />
de Negreiros, Translated from Portuguese,<br />
unabridged<br />
(Lisbon)Yesterday, the (Portuguese)<br />
Foreign Office (FO) broke its silence on the<br />
alleged Vatican mediation in the talks on<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>. The FO does not endorse the statements<br />
and continues to stake everything on<br />
Boutros Ghali’s role.<br />
The Portuguese FO continues to back the<br />
current negotiating format of the talks on<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> - under the auspices of the UN<br />
Secretary General, with the personal<br />
involvement of Jakarta’s and Lisbon’s diplomatic<br />
heads - and does not confirm any<br />
change regarding the Vatican taking on the<br />
role of “mediator,” - a role played today by<br />
the UN.<br />
The official FO position on the matter<br />
was made public for the first time yesterday<br />
by way of a<br />
“clarification” released hours after a Lusa<br />
agency dispatch reached the newspapers,<br />
containing statements by a non-identified<br />
“Portuguese diplomatic source,” according<br />
to which the Portuguese Government would<br />
look favorably upon the mediation of the<br />
Vatican, “the world’s best diplomacy.”<br />
Dismissing the possibility of the St.<br />
Egidio Community eventually assuming the<br />
role - and thereby contradicting the view<br />
which had been insistently put forward on<br />
other occasions - the same source argued the<br />
advantages of the entrance on scene of the<br />
Vatican, “which would carefully ponder<br />
each step to be taken.”<br />
It was the military commander of <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>, Theo Syafei, who first floated the<br />
idea of Vatican mediation. Members of the<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese Church, linked to the Resistance,<br />
expressed their opposition to the idea to the<br />
Publico’s envoy, at the start of the Xanana<br />
Gusmão trial. They argued that the Vatican<br />
favours an autonomy solution for the territory.<br />
The rumours about the Holy See being<br />
given a more active role started straight after<br />
last December’s meeting between Ghali,<br />
Barroso and Alatas in New York, when it<br />
was announced that the next meeting would<br />
be held in April in Rome, in order to suit the<br />
Secretary General’s agenda commitments.
Page 90 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
Since then, the FO has kept silent about<br />
the reported “news” of the Vatican’s greater<br />
involvement, a silence only broken<br />
yesterday by the “clarification,” stating that<br />
“no authorised Portuguese diplomatic<br />
source made the comments” contained in the<br />
Lusa agency’s dispatch, and that “no<br />
comments whatsoever were made by this<br />
Ministry’s officials regarding the news<br />
carried by the Portuguese media concerning<br />
the alleged offers by the Holy See and the<br />
St. Egidio Community to mediate on the<br />
matter of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.” The “clarification”<br />
goes on to refer to Lisbon’s “full and constructive<br />
collaboration” with “the efforts<br />
being made by the UN Secretary General in<br />
the process of dialogue between Portugal<br />
and Indonesia.”<br />
In this way, in the usual cautious diplomatic<br />
style, Portugal rejects any attempt to<br />
substitute the UN, today at the vertex of the<br />
negotiations triangle. The presence of Dr.<br />
Boutros Ghali at the negotiating table guarantees<br />
the internationalization - and an international<br />
visibility - of the <strong>Timor</strong> problem,<br />
fitting into Lisbon’s way of seeing the<br />
matter. Minister Durão Barroso himself<br />
does not miss an opportunity of saying that<br />
the so-called “<strong>Timor</strong> question” is not a difference<br />
between Portugal and Indonesia, but<br />
a contentious issue between Jakarta and the<br />
international community. In this perspective,<br />
it would not make sense to give up<br />
the UN’s role through its Secretary<br />
General’s good offices and the most discreet<br />
contacts maintained by high-ranking UN<br />
officials.<br />
ALATAS STEPS<br />
“BACKWARD” TOWARDS<br />
ROME ?<br />
From an <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese, posted anonymously.<br />
March 26.<br />
This only a brief insight in the perspective<br />
of Rome bilateral meeting - Portugal and<br />
Indonesia - on the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> problem.<br />
Although Indonesia has given its green<br />
light to hold a bilateral talk with Portugal in<br />
Rome concerning ET question under UNO<br />
auspices, there still remain some questions<br />
on its position.<br />
Whether Indonesia will “soften” its hard<br />
line towards the ET question? Several<br />
months ago (soon after their first meeting)<br />
Alatas stated, “......Please go fishing if<br />
Portugal wants a referendum in ET......”<br />
That shows an impossible solution will<br />
be taken from their talks. On the other hand<br />
ET people will continue to be oppressed<br />
under Theo Syafei’s crucial actions.<br />
However, I personally wouldn’t believe<br />
that such statement was Alatas original<br />
thinking. As a Diplomat with a high international<br />
reputation, he wouldn’t have hardly<br />
issued such statement, then who was behind<br />
the scene ? It is not difficult to figure out...<br />
Overall, Indonesia’s willingness to attend<br />
that meeting and the deliberate delay of<br />
“Xanana Kay Rala Gusmão” trial implies<br />
Indonesia’s seriousness to face the meeting..<br />
Or is it simply a lure to handle the concerns<br />
of human rights abuses and the Geneva<br />
conference last couple of weeks ago?<br />
Hopefully, Suharto will take such matters<br />
(and his status as NAM’s leader) into<br />
his consideration to achieve a proper acceptable<br />
solution for all parties involved.<br />
The outcome of the Rome meeting, I<br />
think, will depend on Indonesia’s good will<br />
and its consciousness concerning the question,<br />
whether it is favourable to Indonesia to<br />
keep on occupying that territory which<br />
refuse to be integrated ?<br />
Otherwise, Alatas will step “backward”<br />
towards Rome.<br />
Comments welcome.!!!!!!!!!!!!!<br />
With all the best.<br />
We will fight them under their own<br />
shadows.(Xanana)<br />
INDONESIA SAYS PORTUGAL<br />
UNHELPFUL OVER TIMOR<br />
(Reuters, Jakarta, April 2) Indonesia has<br />
accused Portugal of damaging the atmosphere<br />
ahead of talks this month to try to<br />
settle the troubled issue of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
“We have to say the atmosphere of the<br />
second meeting has not been helped much<br />
by what Portugal has been doing in Geneva<br />
lately and in other forums,” Indonesian<br />
Foreign Minister Ali Alatas told reporters<br />
on Thursday.<br />
“The real intention (of Portugal) was not<br />
the betterment of human rights in <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> but to score political points,” he said<br />
of Portugal’s procedural maneuvering during<br />
the U.N. human rights conference in Geneva<br />
last month.<br />
Portugal praised the 12 European<br />
Community member states for sponsoring a<br />
resolution approved by the U.N. Human<br />
Rights Commission that condemned<br />
Indonesia for violations of human rights in<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
“The adoption of this resolution represents<br />
a very significant victory in the fight<br />
which has been taken in defence of the rights<br />
of the <strong>Timor</strong>ese people, which have been<br />
systematically and brutally violated by the<br />
illegal and forced occupation of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
by Indonesia, ” the Portuguese foreign<br />
ministry said in a statement.<br />
Alatas and his Portuguese counterpart<br />
Durão Barroso are due to meet on April 21<br />
in Rome to discuss <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, which was<br />
invaded by Indonesia in 1975 shortly after<br />
the Portuguese colonial rulers of three<br />
centuries had left.<br />
In an interview this week with the<br />
Indonesian daily, Suara Pembaruan, Barroso<br />
said Portugal considered its former colony a<br />
non-autonomous territory with the right to<br />
self-determination.<br />
Indonesia says the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese have<br />
already chosen to come under Jakarta rule.<br />
The head of the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> guerrilla<br />
movement which has been battling Jakarta<br />
for 17 years is currently on trial in the local<br />
capital Dili on charges including being involved<br />
in inciting an army massacre in late<br />
1991 when witnesses say up to 180 people<br />
were killed.<br />
Jakarta puts the toll at 50 people dead<br />
and 66 missing.<br />
Alatas said he was hopeful that there<br />
would be some move forward in finding a<br />
solution to the issue.<br />
“But you need two hands to clap. When<br />
you start negotiating means that both sides<br />
understand that there should be give and<br />
take on both sides,” he said.<br />
The United Nations does not recognise<br />
Jakarta’s rule over the territory but<br />
Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali is<br />
sending his personal envoy to Indonesia this<br />
weekend to report on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
“(The visit) will be a good opportunity<br />
for us to explain what is actually going on<br />
there because sometimes there is still misinformation<br />
and exaggerated reports on <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>,” Alatas said.<br />
DIPLOMACY VERSUS<br />
LOGIC OF WAR<br />
Publico 6 April 19<strong>93</strong> Dateline : Lisbon<br />
Byline : Joaquim Trigo de Negreiros<br />
Translated from Portuguese unabridged<br />
Alatas, who arrived in New York with<br />
Xanana’s capture in his pocket, will get to<br />
Rome with Ma’hunu in prison. It is “fait<br />
accompli” logic, which Portugal strikes out<br />
against with international condemnation of<br />
Jakarta. The reality reveals other ambiguities,<br />
under the clear argumentation of both<br />
parties.<br />
The arrest of Ma’Hunu, which occurred<br />
just over two weeks away from another<br />
round of talks between Lisbon and Jakarta<br />
on the so-called “<strong>Timor</strong> question,” and<br />
which will take place in Rome under the<br />
auspices of the UN Secretary General, has<br />
made even clearer the content of Indonesian<br />
Minister Ali Alatas’s argument, in preparation<br />
for voicing before Durão Barroso and<br />
Boutros Ghali at the negotiating table: the<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese Resistance is becoming extinct, the<br />
few guerrillas still in the mountains have<br />
their days numbered, life in the territory is<br />
getting back to normal.
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 91<br />
To counter this argument, Portugal will<br />
have at its disposal a different kind of<br />
weaponry to that used by Ma’Hunu’s captors:<br />
when Ali Alatas presents a picture of<br />
“normality” - exemplified by the recent imprisonment<br />
of Xanana Gusmão’s successor<br />
- Durão Barroso will counter with the international<br />
condemnation of Jakarta - exemplified<br />
by the equally recent resolution<br />
on <strong>Timor</strong> passed by the UN Human Rights<br />
Commission, with the active “complicity”<br />
of the always decisive US diplomacy.<br />
It will, therefore, be a clash between<br />
Indonesia’s bet on the “fait accompli,” and<br />
Portugal’s efforts to make international<br />
pressure on Jakarta prevail,<br />
mainly on the basis of human rights arguments.<br />
The first “round” is set for today,<br />
at a meeting (scheduled before Ma’Hunu’s<br />
capture) between representatives of<br />
Portugal and Indonesia at the UN.<br />
In Rome, the two ministers, under the<br />
watchful eye of Boutros Ghali, will probably<br />
try to get across a clear picture of their<br />
respective positions. That is to say, Ali<br />
Alatas will tend to overrate the arrests of<br />
Xanana and Ma’Hunu in order to demonstrate<br />
the relinquishment of the opponents<br />
to integration, while Barroso will probably<br />
press more insistently on the international<br />
condemnation button.<br />
The reality - or the “realities” - behind<br />
the arguments of the two ministers is not,<br />
however, quite so clear.<br />
Although it is difficult to evaluate with<br />
any accuracy the current state of the<br />
Resistance in <strong>Timor</strong>, the guerrilla actions<br />
carried out after Xanana’s arrest, as well as<br />
the size of the Indonesian military presence<br />
in the territory, show that the “mountain<br />
men” are still a cause for concern for Jakarta.<br />
On the other hand, there is no indication<br />
that Indonesia’s repression has managed to<br />
destroy the so-called “clandestine network,”<br />
especially in Dili. It is, therefore, an<br />
exaggeration to say that the Resistance is<br />
finished.<br />
With regards the international community’s<br />
position on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, ambiguity<br />
reigns. Indonesia is condemned in Geneva<br />
for violating human rights in <strong>Timor</strong>; a month<br />
later, Indonesia is a candidate for<br />
representative of the developing countries at<br />
the next G7 summit meeting - Germany,<br />
which had voted in favour of the condemnatory<br />
resolution at the UN Human Rights<br />
Commission, immediately supported<br />
Indonesia’s candidature, as did Japan. So, to<br />
say that the world condemns Indonesia is,<br />
therefore, an exaggeration.<br />
The statements of British Foreign<br />
Minister, Douglas Hurd, (who, since yesterday,<br />
is in Jakarta) are symptomatic.<br />
Hurd, who is expected to clarify the British<br />
position vis-a-vis Jakarta’s participation in<br />
the G7 summit, told journalists that there is<br />
“still” concern about Indonesia’s behaviour<br />
in <strong>Timor</strong>, and chose to emphasize the disproportion<br />
between the sentences passed on<br />
the military involved in the Santa Cruz<br />
massacre and sentences received by the<br />
civilians on that occasion - a point which<br />
can hardly be considered crucial in the<br />
framework of the situation as it is today in<br />
the territory.<br />
While Douglas Hurd had talks with the<br />
Indonesian authorities in Jakarta, Kenyan<br />
Amos Wako (Boutros Ghali’s Special<br />
Envoy to <strong>Timor</strong>) arrived in Dili. “Please,<br />
don’t be afraid of me,” Wako said, on arrival.<br />
“my door is open to all those who wish<br />
to speak to me.” But it is surely not Amos<br />
Wako who the <strong>Timor</strong>ese fear.<br />
AMOS WAKO RETURNS<br />
TO EAST TIMOR<br />
SECRETARY-GENERAL TO<br />
SEND PERSONAL ENVOY TO<br />
INDONESIA AND EAST TIMOR<br />
TO ASSESS IMPLEMENTATION OF<br />
RECOMMENDATIONS<br />
UN Press Release, 31 March 19<strong>93</strong><br />
Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali<br />
has decided to send Amos Wako, Attorney-<br />
General of Kenya and an international<br />
authority on human rights, to Indonesia and<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> as his Personal Envoy. This will<br />
be a follow-up to a similar visit which he<br />
undertook on behalf of the Secretary-<br />
General in February 1992.<br />
Mr. Wako’s mission will begin on 2<br />
April and will last for approximately one<br />
week. Mr. Wako will examine the implementation<br />
of the recommendations which he<br />
had following his first visit, and will apprise<br />
the Secretary-General of his impression of<br />
the overall human rights situation in <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>. Upon completion of his mission, he<br />
will report to the Secretary-General.<br />
Mr. Wako will be accompanied by two<br />
officials of the United Nations Secretariat.<br />
AMOS WAKO TO VISIT<br />
TIMOR AGAIN<br />
Wire services, 1 April 19<strong>93</strong><br />
UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali has<br />
announced that he is to send his special<br />
envoy, Mr. Amos Wako, the attorney-general<br />
of Kenya, to Indonesia and <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
on a second visit this week. Mr. Wako is<br />
due to arrive in Jakarta Saturday 2 April for<br />
a week’s visit. He is expected to spend at<br />
least two days in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> early next<br />
week. where he will have meetings with the<br />
governor and Indonesian military commanders<br />
in the territory.<br />
Mr. Wako visited <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> in<br />
February last year but his report to the<br />
Secretary-General has remained confidential.<br />
He will be accompanied by two UN<br />
officials. The follow-up visit is intended to<br />
apprise the Secretary-General of the human<br />
rights situation in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and to review<br />
implementation of the recommendations<br />
which he made following his first visit. The<br />
forthcoming visit is also in preparation for<br />
the next round of talks between the<br />
Indonesian and Portuguese foreign ministers<br />
in Rome on 20 April, under the auspices of<br />
the UN Secretary-General.<br />
JAKARTA ASKED TO REVEAL<br />
ALL FROM PROBE OF 1991<br />
DILI INCIDENT<br />
Jakarta Post 3 April 19<strong>93</strong>. Abridged<br />
This call for the facts about the Dili massacre<br />
was well-timed to appear on the day<br />
Amos Wako, UN Secretary- General’s<br />
special envoy to investigation the Dili<br />
massacre, arrived in Jakarta for his second<br />
visit to <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. Franz Hendra Winarta<br />
was one of the lawyers who defended the<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese on trial in Dili last year.<br />
– TAPOL<br />
(Jakarta) Human rights activists called on<br />
the government yesterday to divulge all the<br />
findings from its investigation of people<br />
reported missing following the clash (sic)<br />
between military and protesters in Dili in<br />
1991.<br />
“The government has promised to investigate<br />
the case and we, the people, want<br />
to know the results of the investigation,”<br />
lawyer Franz Hendra Winarta told Jakarta<br />
Post.<br />
He said the government should reveal the<br />
entire findings of the investigation even if<br />
these could be used by developed countries<br />
to criticize Indonesia. He said it should be<br />
remembered that human rights abuses<br />
occurred throughout the world, in both<br />
developed and developing nations.<br />
Human rights lawyer Mulya Lubis said<br />
that openness was required for the improvement<br />
of the human rights situation in<br />
the country. “If mistakes were made in the<br />
past, let’s correct them,” Lubis said.
Page 92 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
JAKARTA’S HANDLING OF<br />
THE AMOS WAKO VISIT<br />
Antara news agency reports date 6 April<br />
datelined Jakarta and Dili, and Jakarta Post<br />
report of 2 April, datelined Jakarta. All<br />
abridged to leave out background<br />
information.<br />
As compared with a visit of inspection by the<br />
International Red Cross (ICRC), a visit by<br />
the UN Sec-Gen’s envoy seems to offer the<br />
worst of both worlds. With an ICRC<br />
inspection visit, the Indonesian government<br />
would not dare to publish its own version of<br />
what the ICRC was told. The rules of<br />
operation for ICRC inspections mean that<br />
the ICRC would likewise publish its version.<br />
Strict confidentiality on both sides is<br />
therefore assured. With Wako, it seems, he<br />
and Boutros-Ghali are pledged to make<br />
nothing public whilst the Indonesian side can<br />
present their side with impunity and without<br />
fear of being contradicted.<br />
Note that although Brig.Gen. Theo Syafei<br />
has been appointed commander of the<br />
Udayana Military Command based in Dili,<br />
he still continues to hold the position of<br />
commander of Kolakops, the special military<br />
command in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
– TAPOL<br />
The Jakarta Post reported Foreign<br />
Minister Ali Alatas as saying: “The visit<br />
will be useful for us to explain what was<br />
actually going on, what is continuing to go<br />
on in this welter of sometimes misinformation,<br />
sometimes deliberate misinformation<br />
and sometimes exaggeration of the developments<br />
occurring in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.”<br />
JP continues by reporting that in his second<br />
visit, Amos Wako will study the implementation<br />
of his recommendations he made<br />
in 1992. Wako recommended that the<br />
government try to ascertain the whereabouts<br />
of people reported missing following the<br />
Dili incident. He also called for greater<br />
access of non-government organisations in<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
“We are continuing the search for the<br />
missing people,” Alatas said in his first<br />
press conference since being reappointed to<br />
the post of Foreign Minister.<br />
Wako is scheduled to arrive in Jakarta<br />
Saturday and will have an informal dinner<br />
with Alatas that day. Formal talks will take<br />
place on Sunday and on Monday he will<br />
depart for Dili where he will meet with the<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> special military operation<br />
commander [this presumably means Brig-<br />
Gen. Theo Syafei], the chief of the Dili<br />
district court which is trying Xanana<br />
Gusmão and possibly Bishop Belo. He will<br />
later return to Jakarta to meet top officials<br />
including Defence Minister and armed forces<br />
commander General Edi Sudradjat and<br />
Minister of Justice Oetoyo Oesman.<br />
According to Antara on 6 April, Foreign<br />
Minister Alatas has contacted chief of the<br />
supreme court Purwoto Gandasubrata to get<br />
permission for Amos Wako to meet former<br />
resistance leader Xanana who is now on trial<br />
in Dili. “As Xanana is still in the examination<br />
process, a special permit from the<br />
chief of the supreme court will be required,”<br />
Alatas told the press.<br />
“The time for the meeting between Wako<br />
and Xanana can be arranged later,” Alatas<br />
said, denying allegations that the<br />
government will try to give ‘directives’ to<br />
Xanana in answering questions from Wako.<br />
Wako arrived in Dili Monday for a threeday<br />
visit to collect inputs and data on<br />
developments in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> which he will<br />
submit to the UN Secretary-General after<br />
his second visit to <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. Alatas said<br />
he is certain Wako fully understands that<br />
the examination process over Xanana has<br />
been going on properly.<br />
Chief of the armed forces General Edi<br />
Sudradjat also said that the government will<br />
give all opportunities to Wako to meet<br />
Xanana or any other persons he wants to<br />
see. He further said there will not be any<br />
efforts on the part of the government to<br />
‘guide’ Xanana in replying to Wako’s<br />
questions.<br />
Meanwhile from Dili, Antara reported<br />
that the results of Wako’s current visit to<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> are not meant for publication<br />
despite requests by certain members of the<br />
European Community. Wako told the press<br />
here Tuesday that his three-day visit to <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> is aimed at collecting inputs and updating<br />
data to smoothen the task of the UN<br />
Sec-Gen to settle the so-called <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
issue.<br />
“I know there are requests by certain EC<br />
members to publish the results of my visit<br />
but I will not do so because everything I<br />
have will be for the Secretary-General only,”<br />
he said. He also said he would not make any<br />
recommendations to the Indonesian<br />
government because such things will solely<br />
depend on the UN chief.<br />
Wako and delegation includes Director<br />
for International Organisations, Hadi<br />
Wayarabi of Indonesia’s Foreign Ministry<br />
[he was a member of the government’s team<br />
of inquiry into the Dili massacre set up in<br />
November 1991], and five UN officials. His<br />
first day in Dili was marked by a meeting<br />
with governor Osorio Soares and the<br />
younger sister of Xanana Gusmão,<br />
Armandina.<br />
Wako described his meeting with Soares<br />
as “satisfactory,” saying that his meeting<br />
with Armandina and her husband Gilman do<br />
Santos was also “beneficial.” He said he was<br />
assigned by Boutros-Ghali to check reports<br />
that the Indonesian government had<br />
maltreated those involved in the Nov., 12<br />
1991 Dili incident as well as Xanana who<br />
was captured last year.<br />
Wako said that in carrying out his assignment<br />
he will also meet several <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> administration officials, Bishop Belo,<br />
Xanana, Mau Hodu (arrested in January last<br />
year) and Mau Hunu (arrested last week).<br />
Armandina Maria Gusmão, after meeting<br />
Wako, dismissed as baseless allegations that<br />
she was maltreated by the Indonesian<br />
government.<br />
“There is no truth whatsoever in it as my<br />
husband Gilman dos Santos and I have<br />
always been treated well ever since Xanana<br />
was captured,” she told newsmen. She<br />
further said however, that four days after<br />
Xanana’s arrest she was approached by<br />
local security officials for information on her<br />
brother’s activities as well as her involvement<br />
in them. “But now everything is<br />
OK and we enjoy our freedom like any<br />
other Indonesian citizens. She confirmed<br />
that she once tried to assist Xanana but now<br />
regrets it very much. Armandina during the<br />
meeting with Wako also expressed the hope<br />
that the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> issue can be settled<br />
immediately at the UN. She said she told<br />
Wako that <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> has now gained a<br />
much better progress and prosperity compared<br />
to the days under Portuguese colonialism.<br />
AMOS WAKO’S RETURN<br />
VISIT TO INDONESIA<br />
ABC Radio report - Sunday, April 4, 19<strong>93</strong>.-<br />
12 noon.<br />
Reporter: Ian Mackintosh in Jakarta.<br />
IM: In February 1991, 3 months after<br />
Indonesian troops killed scores of civilian<br />
demonstrators in Dili, Amos Wako was<br />
despatched to Indonesia by the UN<br />
Secretary General. The Kenyan lawyer<br />
spent 5 days in the country, including 24<br />
hrs in Dili and declared himself satisfied<br />
with the contents of his discussions and the<br />
range of people he met. Mr. Wako’s subsequent<br />
report to the Secretary General was<br />
never made public although last week<br />
Indonesia’s Foreign Minister Mr. Ali Alatas<br />
told reporters that its conclusions and<br />
recommendations had been sent to Jakarta<br />
for comment. Mr. Alatas also noted that<br />
both sides had agreed that the envoy would<br />
be able to follow up his first visit saying<br />
that Mr. Wako was expected to make<br />
comparisons, to see what had happened<br />
since and in the Foreign Minister’s words<br />
see to what extent some of the recommendations<br />
had been implemented or not<br />
implemented and why.
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page <strong>93</strong><br />
When the UN envoy arrived in Jakarta he<br />
said that he had returned with an open mind<br />
to take a first hand look at developments in<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
AW: I will be looking at the issue of the<br />
trial that’s going on, looking at the issue of<br />
the detainees that are there. I’ll be looking<br />
into the issue of the disappeared persons,<br />
those who cannot be identified up to date,<br />
looking at the issue of allegations of torture,<br />
if they are there, and so on. I’ll also be<br />
looking at the fundamental issue as to why<br />
all these moral concerns are there.<br />
IM: Mr. Wako told reporters he would<br />
be making a report to Dr. Boutros-Ghali before<br />
he hosted talks between the Indonesian<br />
and Portuguese Foreign Ministers in Rome<br />
this month. While the details of the envoy’s<br />
original report have not been released it is<br />
understood to have been highly critical of<br />
the behaviour of Indonesian troops and their<br />
civilian counterparts during & after the Nov.<br />
1991 killings in Dili. It is also believed to<br />
have questioned the level of human rights<br />
and personal freedoms in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and<br />
the number of troops stationed in the<br />
province.<br />
WAKO: “MY DOOR IS OPEN”<br />
AP, Dili, April 5<br />
“Please do not be afraid of me. My door<br />
is open to all who wish to talk with me,”<br />
U.N. envoy Amos Wako said in a statement<br />
upon his arrival for three days of discussions.<br />
Wako was to meet Xanana Gusmão, <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> military commander Brig. Gen. Theo<br />
Syafei and other officials and detainees. He<br />
will report his findings to U.N. Secretary-<br />
General Boutros Boutros-Ghali.<br />
In Jakarta, British Foreign Minister<br />
Douglas Hurd met with Indonesian officials<br />
and expressed his concern over the killings<br />
by Indonesian troops of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese proindependence<br />
protesters in 1991.<br />
In his talks with Indonesian Foreign<br />
Minister Ali Alatas, Hurd said Britain still<br />
has “some continuing concerns over the<br />
disparity in sentencing between military and<br />
civilians” regarding the 1991 demonstrations.<br />
A spokesman for the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
Military Command said Antonio Gomes Da<br />
Costa was captured Saturday in a cave in<br />
Manufasi, a village 30 miles south of Dili,<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>’s capital.<br />
Da Costa was transferred to Dili on<br />
Sunday, officials said.<br />
AMOS WAKO MEETS XANANA<br />
AND MAU HUNU<br />
BBC World Service and Portuguese radio 7<br />
April 19<strong>93</strong>. Summarised by TAPOL<br />
The BBC World Service reported<br />
Wednesday that the UN Secretary-<br />
General’s special envoy, Amos Wako, met<br />
Xanana Gusmão, <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese resistance<br />
leader who is now on trial in Dili, and Mau<br />
Hunu, the resistance leader arrested last<br />
week, who took over the leadership after<br />
Xanana’s arrest.<br />
The circumstances of Wako’s meetings<br />
with the two captives are not known.<br />
Wako also had a private meeting with<br />
Bishop Belo in Dili.<br />
On Portuguese radio TSF Monday,<br />
Wako said in an interview that he was<br />
anxious to meet a number of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />
now in captivity and mentioned specifically<br />
Xanana Gusmão, Mau Hunu and Saturnino<br />
da Costa Belo. There is no report of his<br />
having been able to meet Saturnino however.<br />
Amos Wako left Dili Wednesday and<br />
returned to Jakarta for more talks with<br />
senior Indonesian officials.<br />
RADIO AUSTRALIA<br />
ON WAKO VISIT<br />
Thursday April 8, 19<strong>93</strong> 11pm AEST.<br />
Reporter Ian Mackintosh (slightly abridged)<br />
Amos Wako, ending a 6 day mission to<br />
Indonesia today, told reporters that during<br />
his visit he had received different figures<br />
from the Indonesian authorities and an<br />
NGO. 17 months after the killed the UN<br />
envoy said he didn’t think anyone could say<br />
with any finality how many people were<br />
still missing. Mr. Wako told reporters that<br />
the government put the number at 61 but<br />
that an NGO had given him a list of 112<br />
names. Mr. Wako said details were still<br />
being cross-checked and he declined to say<br />
how long it would take to finish what he<br />
said was a difficult exercise - one that would<br />
also require the people of ET to come<br />
forward with information.<br />
Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas<br />
told reporters that the process needed to<br />
continue until the matter was resolved.<br />
Jakarta now says that of the 115 people it<br />
earlier listed as missing, 31 had been found,<br />
23 were confirmed dead and 61 were<br />
unaccounted for. Some human rights groups<br />
and eye witnesses put the death toll much<br />
higher.<br />
UN ENVOY IN TALKS<br />
WITH XANANA<br />
Sydney Morning Herald Date:8th April 19<strong>93</strong><br />
Dateline: Jakarta Agence France-Presse<br />
Unabridged<br />
The personal envoy of the United<br />
Nations Secretary-General, Dr. Boutros<br />
Boutros-Ghali, has met the detained <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese pro-independence leader Xanana<br />
Gusmão, an Indonesian official said today.<br />
“[Envoy]” Amos Wako was allowed to<br />
meet [Xanana] in his detention place [on]<br />
Tuesday after we received a call from the<br />
Foreign Minister,” Dili court spokesman<br />
Mr. Joseph Phenu said by telephone form<br />
Dili, <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
He said the Foreign Minister, Mr. Ali<br />
Alatas, had given the go-ahead for the visit<br />
after Mr. Wako, who arrived in Dili on<br />
Monday, had failed in his first attempt<br />
yesterday to see Xanana, who has been on<br />
trial since February 1.<br />
Mr. Alatas had called to say that following<br />
consultations with the Chief Justice and<br />
the Attorney-General, it was agreed that<br />
Mr. Wako be allowed to meet Xanana.<br />
The UN envoy had earlier yesterday<br />
failed to meet Xanana because Dili court<br />
officials refused permission, saying that the<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Justice Chief, Mr. Hironymus<br />
Godang, was absent and they had no<br />
authority.<br />
Mr. Wako, who is also Kenya’s<br />
Attorney-General, met Xanana alone and<br />
later met alone Xanana’s successor Antonio<br />
Gomes da Costa, alias Ma’hunu, who was<br />
captured on Saturday, a reliable Dili source<br />
said.<br />
The source said Mr. Wako also met<br />
Xanana’s former deputy José da Costa, alias<br />
Ma’Hodu, and two other former Fretilin<br />
members at his hotel in Dili. Da Costa was<br />
captured in Dili in February last year.<br />
The Media Indonesia daily today quoted<br />
Mr. Wako saying that Xanana had appeared<br />
to be in good health and was playing cards<br />
with other people when he arrived.
Page 94 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
EVENTS IN CANADA<br />
FIVE DAYS IN EAST TIMOR<br />
NOW Magazine, Toronto, Feb. 18-24.<br />
The Feb. 18-24 issue of NOW Magazine,<br />
Toronto’s weekly news and entertainment<br />
paper, carries three articles on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
The lead article in the News Front section is<br />
entitled “Five days in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.” The<br />
other articles are “Independence leader<br />
goes on trial” by Nantha Kumar and<br />
“Tough Talks on <strong>Timor</strong>” (about Portugal-<br />
Indonesia “peace talks”) by Glenn Wheeler.<br />
The articles are too long to post here, but<br />
are reprinted in the ETAN/Canada<br />
newsletter – email etanott@web.apc.org if<br />
you need a copy.<br />
The third article also contains the first (non-<br />
) statement from Canada’s External Affairs<br />
ministry we’ve seen on the peace talks<br />
process: “We think both sides should show<br />
more flexibility.”<br />
Excerpts follow:<br />
Five days in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Fear fuels paranoia<br />
in a land of military saturation, political<br />
surveillance and bitter young men<br />
By Glenn Wheeler<br />
....<br />
A man wearing a straw hat, white cotton<br />
shirt, shorts and sandals approaches, smiling<br />
tentatively.<br />
“Is it all right for us to walk here?” we<br />
ask. “Yes,” but then he adds nervously,<br />
“Tentera” (military). He speaks softly,<br />
looking over his shoulder. “You can walk,”<br />
he says, “but we’ll be hassled after you<br />
leave.” Then someone calls from somewhere,<br />
he puts up his hand as if to say,<br />
“Please, no more,” then he’s gone.<br />
....<br />
It’s teenage boys who are most anxious<br />
to talk, first checking to see if there are “any<br />
eyes” around.... One afternoon, we sit on<br />
the steps of the Dili stadium, waiting for the<br />
souvenir shop across the street to open, and<br />
someone invites us inside.<br />
Soon, we’re surrounded by a dozen or so<br />
football players aged 14 to 23. They don’t<br />
go to school because they can’t afford the<br />
5,000 rupiah a month in fees. It’s hard to get<br />
jobs, they say, because people from Java<br />
with better education are usually chosen<br />
over the <strong>Timor</strong>ese.<br />
After they’ve talked as long as they think<br />
they should, they ask us to come back<br />
another time.<br />
The next afternoon, we sit on the steps<br />
again. Promptly at 3, a lanky player from<br />
yesterday approaches. But there’s a soldier<br />
coming down the street, so he whispers that<br />
we should walk in the opposite direction,<br />
and then back, to the rear.<br />
Five minutes later, someone older, in his<br />
early 20s, crosses the field to where we sit<br />
in the stands. He has heard about us from<br />
his friends.<br />
Shooing away the younger boys, he tells<br />
us he’s been imprisoned five times. Once,<br />
after the massacre, he was in jail for a week.<br />
They were thirsty, and when they were<br />
given water, it was mixed with blood. He’s<br />
been hit with pieces of wood and iron bars,<br />
had his fingernails pulled out. Had a gun put<br />
to his head and heard the trigger click.<br />
Pulling up his jersey, he shows us the scars<br />
on his back.<br />
Many <strong>Timor</strong>ese have fled. Four soccer<br />
players who went to Darwin, Australia, for<br />
an exhibition game absconded, never came<br />
back.<br />
He, however, sounds defiant. “We love<br />
our land. We will stay and fight.” Abruptly,<br />
he stands and says, “Eyes are watching.”<br />
He stands and runs out on the field<br />
laughing, stopping the ball with his head.<br />
....<br />
Ian makes contact with two members of<br />
Fretilin, the underground independence<br />
movement. They don’t want to come to the<br />
hotel. Too risky. They want to meet on the<br />
beach after dark. And they want to meet at<br />
7, not 8, because it’s too dangerous walking<br />
home after that. Ian will meet them first, and<br />
then come get me.<br />
It’s still pouring at 7. But they show up<br />
anyway. “They want to honour their promise,”<br />
Ian says, as I shake their hands, wondering<br />
if the melodramatic language is the<br />
result of the translation, or the fact that<br />
they’re still teens. One of them has brought<br />
a picture of his brother, who died in his<br />
arms on November 12, 1991. Print it in your<br />
newspaper, he says.<br />
It’s men between 18 and 25 who have the<br />
hardest time with the police, because it was<br />
mostly young people who were in the<br />
funeral procession on November 12, 1991,<br />
and that’s where resistance to integration is<br />
strongest.<br />
They don’t feel safe walking alone, but if<br />
they’re in a group of three or more, they’re<br />
harassed, accused of planning another<br />
demonstration. And the army can tell<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese from settlers, because of the color<br />
of their skin and the way they speak.<br />
The wind whips the rain off the harbour,<br />
and we move to a picnic table closer to the<br />
road. Cars making right-hand turns send<br />
beams are way. They glance in the direction<br />
of the light, but keep talking.<br />
“I’d rather die than integrate,” one of<br />
them says. And then there are those words<br />
again, “We love our land.”<br />
But what are your chances, I ask. Do you<br />
have support in other countries? No, they<br />
say, “but if other countries want to give us<br />
arms, we will accept.” Sitting in the rain,<br />
watching them punctuate their remarks with<br />
the palms of their hands, I’m Skeptical,<br />
knowing they stand little chance against the<br />
Indonesian army, that their freedom is more<br />
likely to come from the halls of the United<br />
Nations than the barrel of a gun.<br />
Back, in the hindsight of home, I wonder<br />
if I missed the point. Whether their words<br />
are teen dreams or political logistics, they’re<br />
still criminals under the laws of Indonesia,<br />
which make it an offence to engage in<br />
“public expression of feelings of hostility,<br />
hatred or contempt towards the government<br />
of Indonesia,” and “the spreading or<br />
exhibiting of letters or pictures which<br />
express hatred of the government of<br />
Indonesia.”<br />
I have such a letter here on my desk, one<br />
they handed us on the beach. It begins<br />
“peace in the name of friendship” and goes<br />
on to describe in sickening detail what<br />
happened to them after they were arrested<br />
in November 1991.<br />
They still have the idealism, part of their<br />
masculinity, like their bodybuilder strength.<br />
I suppose that’s why the Indonesian government<br />
is so afraid of them.<br />
This week’s issue of NOW contains an<br />
appeal from ETAN/Canada to write to the<br />
Canadian government asking for support<br />
for a resolution on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> at the UN<br />
Commission on Human Rights.<br />
EAST TIMOR UPDATE FROM<br />
ETAN/TORONTO<br />
Number 20 – Feb. 27, 19<strong>93</strong><br />
UN Commission considers <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
resolution<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> was on the agenda as the<br />
United Nations Commission on Human<br />
Rights opened its 49th session in Geneva.<br />
The Commission was scheduled to vote on<br />
an <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> resolution on March 9.<br />
Indonesia managed to get itself elected<br />
vice-president of this year’s session, but<br />
solidarity groups vowed to push for a<br />
strong resolution regardless. Last year,<br />
Indonesia agreed to a consensus declaration<br />
at the Human Rights Commission that called<br />
for improved human rights in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
and access to be granted for international human<br />
rights groups.<br />
Neither condition has been met. Amnesty<br />
International was prevented from visiting<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, most recently when a<br />
representative was banned from the trial of<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> resistance leader Xanana<br />
Gusmão which opened on Feb. 1.<br />
Canadian Ambassador Anne Park, who<br />
this year chairs the Western group of coun-
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 95<br />
tries, has not yet indicated whether Canada<br />
will support a resolution on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
Last year, the Canadian delegation was a<br />
key mover in a successful bid to water down<br />
a draft resolution from the European<br />
Community.<br />
However, American Ambassador Richard<br />
Schifter has promised to seek a joint text<br />
this year with other democracies on China’s<br />
actions in Tibet and Indonesia’s crackdown<br />
on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, a major break with past US<br />
policy.<br />
The <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Alert <strong>Network</strong> is appealing<br />
for messages to be sent before<br />
March 9 to the department of external affairs,<br />
asking for the government of Canada<br />
to:<br />
(1) back any resolution supported by the<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese delegation at the UN Commission<br />
on Human Rights<br />
(2) support a call for the UN<br />
Commission on Human Rights to mandate a<br />
special rapporteur on the situation in <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong><br />
(3) call on Indonesia to live up to the<br />
terms of last year’s consensus declaration<br />
by taking concrete steps to end repression<br />
in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and allowing free access to<br />
international humanitarian organizations,<br />
including Amnesty International.<br />
Appeals can be sent to External Affairs<br />
Minister Barbara McDougall, House of<br />
Commons, Ottawa Ont. K1A 0A6, Fax<br />
(613)996-3443.<br />
Bishop: thousands arrested, tortured<br />
According to new reports from the<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese resistance movement CNRM,<br />
4,000 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese people may have been<br />
called in for interrogation by the Indonesian<br />
forces of occupation since the capture of<br />
CNRM leader Xanana Gusmão. These detainees<br />
are reported to have been submitted<br />
to torture and humiliation during interrogation.<br />
These reports are confirmed by Carlos<br />
Ximenes Belo, Catholic Bishop of <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>, who said the persecution of <strong>Timor</strong>’s<br />
Christians and of those who did not recognize<br />
<strong>Timor</strong> as part of Indonesia had worsened<br />
since Xanana’s arrest.<br />
Speaking to Portugal’s Catholic Radio<br />
Renascenca, Belo explained “When the<br />
people are taken to prison, the first thing<br />
they do is beat them up. I have received<br />
letters from prisoners ... telling me about all<br />
types of torture, electric shocks, burning of<br />
genitals with cigarettes, placing people in<br />
barrels of cold water and whipping, until<br />
they say they are FRETILIN collaborators.”<br />
He said those arrested were also forced to<br />
confess that Catholic bishops and priests<br />
organized demonstrations and were against<br />
Indonesia.<br />
“People are afraid to walk freely,”<br />
Bishop Belo added. “Everywhere there are<br />
military from the territorial operation. They<br />
are building houses and going to live in<br />
villages. The people do not feel free.”<br />
Reports are also coming through that<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese are being forced to take part in<br />
ceremonies where they have to swear allegiance<br />
before the Indonesian flag, loyalty to<br />
Suharto and their acceptance of the principles<br />
of Pancasila, the Indonesian State<br />
ideology.<br />
Belo also told reporters that suspected<br />
dissidents are being forced to take part in<br />
crude parodies of traditional <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />
ceremonies. People are gathered together in<br />
groups of up to 200 and forced to drink the<br />
blood of an animal and take an oath of allegiance<br />
to Indonesia. He said the oath is an<br />
untrue version of a traditional pact taken by<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese leaders to end tribal wars. Rival<br />
leaders would mix their blood with palm<br />
wine and drink it in an oath to mark the end<br />
of hostilities.<br />
Despite reports in the Indonesian media,<br />
no guerrillas have surrendered to the<br />
Indonesians since the capture of Xanana<br />
Gusmão. In fact the opposite is true:<br />
FALINTIL, the armed wing if the resistance,<br />
have been carrying out frequent attacks<br />
fin the Indonesian army illegally occupying<br />
the country.<br />
Xanana verdict expected in March<br />
The Indonesian court trying <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />
resistance leader Xanana Gusmão has announced<br />
a plan to hand down its verdict on<br />
March 20. In a timetable that makes little<br />
allowance for a defence to be mounted, the<br />
court plans to hear prosecution and defence<br />
arguments on March 12 and 13 and deliver<br />
its verdict a week later. Xanana is charged<br />
with “rebellion” and possession of firearms<br />
Q charges that carry a possible death penalty,<br />
but more likely a long jail term. The<br />
United States and Australia have sent observers<br />
to the trial.<br />
One <strong>Timor</strong>ese youth told Australia’s<br />
Mate-Bian News: “We in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> don’t<br />
believe a word of what the Indonesian<br />
military are trying to force Xanana to say.<br />
You out there, all you can do to help is to<br />
fight for Xanana to regain a breeding space;<br />
and, when he is free like you out there, you<br />
then can criticize what he does or says...”<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese barred from travel<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese youths will no longer be<br />
allowed to travel outside Indonesia, under a<br />
new policy brought in to stop a rash of defections.<br />
Tri Swartanta, chief Indonesian<br />
sports and youth official for <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>,<br />
said more defections “would bring a bad<br />
image to the country.”<br />
In 1991, four <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese soccer players<br />
defected from an Indonesian- sponsored<br />
soccer team visiting Darwin, Australia and<br />
sought political asylum through the<br />
Portuguese embassy in Canberra.<br />
Two more <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese youths defected<br />
to Canada in 1992 during a student<br />
exchange program, Swartanta said.<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Alert <strong>Network</strong>/Toronto PO Box<br />
562, Station P, Toronto, Canada, M5S 2T1<br />
Phone/fax 1-416-531-5850, Email etantor@web.apc.org<br />
CANADIAN GOVERNMENT<br />
ON XANANA<br />
Mar 11, 19<strong>93</strong><br />
We FINALLY have something written on<br />
paper concerning the Canadian government’s<br />
position on Xanana. Following is a<br />
letter written to Ray Funk, MP, Member of<br />
PET (where ETAN/Ottawa does all of it’s<br />
work), from Barbara McDougall who is the<br />
Minister for External Affairs and Secretary<br />
of State<br />
– Sharon<br />
Dear Ray:<br />
Thanks for your letter of December 9,<br />
1992, regarding your concerns about the<br />
imprisonment of Mr. José Xanana Gusmão.<br />
Through our Embassy in Jakarta, Canada<br />
has expressed support for the efforts of the<br />
International Committee of the Red Cross<br />
(ICRC) to see Mr. Gusmão. The ICRC was<br />
able to visit him on two separate occasions<br />
– the first time privately for one hour – in<br />
early December 1992.<br />
We are also making our concerns known<br />
to the Indonesian Ambassador in Ottawa.<br />
Canada has urged the Indonesian authorities<br />
to conform to internationally accepted<br />
standards in dealing with Mr. Gusmão’s<br />
detention and its aftermath and has urged<br />
continued humanitarian treatment of Mr.<br />
Gusmão and Fretilin supporters in <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
I am encouraged that Indonesian<br />
President Suharto issued instructions that<br />
Mr. Gusmão be treated according to the law.<br />
The local press was allowed to see Mr.<br />
Gusmão after his arrest and he appeared in<br />
several television interviews in December<br />
1992. Information we have received through<br />
diplomatic channels indicates that Mr.<br />
Gusmão is being treated well.<br />
Canada will continue to monitor this issue<br />
in an effort to ensure that Mr.<br />
Gusmão’s treatment is in conformity with<br />
humanitarian standards.<br />
Thank you again for writing to express<br />
your concerns.<br />
Yours sincerely,<br />
Barbara McDougall
Page 96 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
EAST TIMOR ALERT<br />
NETWORK / CANADA<br />
NEWSLETTER, FEB. 19<strong>93</strong><br />
Selections from the latest ETAN/Canada<br />
Newsletter, published several weeks ago.<br />
Most of the information included in it has<br />
already been made available on reg.easttimor<br />
– anyone wanting the newsletter should<br />
contact ETAN/Ottawa at PO Box 2002,<br />
Stn. D, Ottawa Ont. K1P 5W3, or by email<br />
at etanott@web.apc.org. Overseas<br />
subscriptions are $10 (Cdn or US);<br />
Canadian subs are free.<br />
The lead editorial and action reports from<br />
local groups follow.<br />
Welcome to the February ETAN newsletter.<br />
It’s been a busy time for ETAN across<br />
the country. Since our last newsletter, local<br />
groups have started up in two new provinces<br />
(Quebec and Alberta) and there are<br />
now local activists busy in 11 cities, as well<br />
as our network of individual supporters<br />
from coast to coast.<br />
A generous grant from the International<br />
Centre for Human Rights and Democratic<br />
Development (headed by Ed Broadbent) has<br />
given us the financial means to expand our<br />
national network and broaden the circle of<br />
popular involvement in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> solidarity<br />
work in Canada.<br />
We also have to send congratulations to<br />
our American friends and counterparts, the<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> <strong>Action</strong> <strong>Network</strong>. ETAN/US<br />
recently marked its first birthday. It too has<br />
spread nationally (with groups from<br />
California to Rhode Island) and was the key<br />
to Congress’ decision to delete military aid<br />
that the United States was providing to<br />
Indonesia under the International Military<br />
Education and Training (IMET) program<br />
(along with other longt ime friends of <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> in the US). With a new president,<br />
American policy may be changing.<br />
ETAN/Canada has been engaged in too<br />
many projects to list them all. The action<br />
reports from local groups later in this issue<br />
give a flavor of the many things that are<br />
being done.<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> is now firmly on the media<br />
agenda in this country. Awareness has been<br />
spread even more by the award-winning<br />
new documentary film “Manufacturing<br />
Consent: Noam Chomsky and the Media.”<br />
Manufacturing Consent includes a lengthy<br />
segment that shows how the media covered<br />
genocide in Cambodia while it covered up<br />
genocide in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. The segment features<br />
ETAN founder Elaine Brière, who is<br />
now working on a film of her own on <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
The situation in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> is at a crucial<br />
point. The arrest of resistance leader Xanana<br />
Gusmão is a severe blow to the <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese people – but the resistance goes<br />
on. Reports reaching the outside world say<br />
it is worse in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> today than it ever<br />
has been since the 1975 invasion – a grim<br />
reminder of how important our work is. The<br />
government of Canada is still backing<br />
Indonesia’s Suharto regime with aid, trade,<br />
diplomatic support and even weapons.<br />
Read on for news about the situation in<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, the position of the Canadian<br />
government, international and Canadian<br />
solidarity actions, ideas on what you can do<br />
to help, press clippings, poetry and more.<br />
MONTREAL<br />
Greetings from Montreal! Over the past<br />
few months, there has been a definite<br />
showing of solidarity among individuals and<br />
groups for the people of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
In November, we hosted Abé Barreto for<br />
a full weekend of events. The weekend was<br />
an indication that we had a lot of support.<br />
Abé’s lecture and presentation of “In<br />
Cold Blood” took place at Concordia<br />
University on Friday November 6 and drew<br />
a crowd of approximately 80 people. There<br />
were about 15 Indonesian students present<br />
as well as an embassy official who was<br />
busily taking notes throughout the meeting.<br />
Many of the Indonesian students tried to<br />
dominate the question period by saying the<br />
video was a fabrication and it did not provide<br />
any concrete evidence, as well as giving<br />
lengthy pro-government proclamations of<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>’s willingness to integrate with<br />
Indonesia. We were not expecting such a<br />
presence of Indonesian students and such a<br />
response but Abé handled their statements<br />
very well, providing the audience with the<br />
documented facts. Overall, it was a good<br />
event and we now have approximately ten<br />
new members.<br />
We also showed “In Cold Blood” to a<br />
Third World Politics class at John Abbott<br />
College, a CEGEP (senior high school) in the<br />
West Island. More presentations are<br />
planned.<br />
On Sunday morning, we attended mass at<br />
the Santa Cruz Church, a Portuguese parish<br />
in the Plateau Mont-Royal neighbourhood.<br />
Abé was introduced to the parish at the end<br />
of the mass and we stayed at the back where<br />
some of the parishioners could ask him<br />
questions and meet with him.<br />
The Montreal Portuguese community<br />
had organized a demonstration in November<br />
1991 to protest the Dili massacre but were<br />
not planning one for the first anniversary.<br />
The Santa Cruz Church seemed like the<br />
most appropriate and a very symbolic place<br />
to hold a march and vigil as it shares the<br />
same name with the cemetery in Dili where<br />
the massacre happened, so we encouraged<br />
them to hold a commemoration.<br />
Over 40 people attended the march and<br />
vigil that Thursday evening and now the<br />
parish is interested in organizing a march for<br />
November 12, 19<strong>93</strong>. There is also the<br />
possibility of organizing a twin parish program<br />
with the Santa Cruz parish through the<br />
Canadian Catholic Organization for<br />
Development and Peace (headquartered in<br />
Montreal) which could begin during Lent.<br />
There has been some local media coverage<br />
on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> during the last few months.<br />
Abé was interviewed on radio twice while<br />
he was here: firstly on Radio Centre-Ville,<br />
Montreal’s community radio station, and<br />
Sunday on McGill Radio’s “Celtic<br />
Communion” show which deals with the<br />
war in the North of Ireland as well as other<br />
related political issues in Canada and around<br />
the world. Bob Palmer and Genny Marilley<br />
have also been on McGill Radio on several<br />
other occasions.<br />
On November 27, the GAIA group at<br />
Dawson College organized a bake sale for<br />
ETAN/Montreal which raised $100. The<br />
group showed “Betrayed but not Beaten” at<br />
the bake sale and provided information as<br />
well as Urgent <strong>Action</strong>s for Xanana’s release.<br />
The Concordia community has been<br />
really supportive to <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. We have<br />
received much support from Indigenous<br />
Peoples International, the Latin American<br />
Committee and the Quebec Public Interest<br />
Research Group (Q-Pirg). They all co-sponsored<br />
the event on November 6 and covered<br />
all the costs. The Concordia University<br />
Student Association gave an honorarium of<br />
$200 while Q-Pirg and John Abbott College<br />
both gave $50.<br />
Thanks to the film “Manufacturing<br />
Consent,” awareness about <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> is<br />
growing and it has made it easier to promote<br />
our events and to gain support.<br />
We have to keep the momentum going.<br />
ONTARIO<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> was a big issue at most<br />
Ontario universities in the fall of 1992,<br />
largely because of a speaking tour by Abé<br />
Barreto Soares, an <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese who became<br />
a refugee in Canada earlier in the year.<br />
ETAN and other groups organized a tour<br />
that took Abé across southern Ontario as<br />
well as to Montreal. It also featured<br />
screenings of Max Stahl’s excellent documentary<br />
on the Santa Cruz massacre of<br />
November 12, 1991: “In Cold Blood: the<br />
Massacre of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.”<br />
By the end of the tour, there were groups<br />
working on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> at almost every city<br />
in southern Ontario.<br />
The tour opened at McMaster<br />
University in Hamilton, where the forum<br />
was promoted with an excellent teaser<br />
campaign featuring posters (“Do you know<br />
where <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> is?”), chalk outlines of
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 97<br />
dead bodies in the middle of campus,<br />
literature tables and other creative attentiongetters.<br />
About 40 people came out and the<br />
event got excellent press on campus<br />
(including the front page of The Silhouette,<br />
the main student paper) despite almost nonstop<br />
heckling from an unofficial<br />
representative of the Indonesian Consulate<br />
from Toronto. The McMaster ETAN group<br />
has held many events since, including a joint<br />
commemoration of November massacres in<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and El Salvador on November<br />
17.<br />
The speaking tour moved on Windsor,<br />
Brock (St. Catharines), Waterloo, Toronto,<br />
York, Queen’s (Kingston), Guelph,<br />
Concordia (Montreal), Carleton (Ottawa)<br />
and Western (London). It also stopped off<br />
in Oakville for high school events and an<br />
evening at the Oakville Community Centre<br />
for peace, ecology and human rights. In each<br />
community, Abé’s visit and the film of the<br />
massacre brought home the reality of <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> to dozens of new people, and to<br />
thousands more through articles in student<br />
newspapers and radio interviews.<br />
A new feature at many of the forums was<br />
the presence of large numbers of Indonesian<br />
students. Some of them were quietly<br />
supportive; others toed their government’s<br />
line, handing out a “chronology” prepared<br />
by the Indonesian Embassy. Embassy<br />
officials attended speaking nights in<br />
Montreal and Ottawa in an apparent attempt<br />
at intimidation. And Indonesian student<br />
computer nets in North America were<br />
abuzz with talk about the tour, with students<br />
from as far afield as Colorado<br />
weighing in.<br />
The tour concluded with a Parliament<br />
Hill rally on November 12, the first anniversary<br />
of the Santa Cruz massacre, which<br />
was co- sponsored along with Ottawa’s<br />
Coalition to Oppose the Arms Trade. Fifty<br />
people came out to hear from Abé, Svend<br />
Robinson MP and Peter Monet of<br />
ETAN/Ottawa, as well as the peaceful music<br />
of the Raging Grannies. Participants then<br />
walked to the Westin Hotel, where weapons<br />
dealers were holding an arms show. Among<br />
the customers for Canadian weapons is<br />
Indonesia. The Raging Grannies appeared on<br />
the front page of the next day’s Ottawa<br />
Citizen.<br />
After the tour was over, we gathered for<br />
an ETAN conference in Guelph to plan future<br />
actions. Although the meeting ran out<br />
of time, the experience was still useful in<br />
bringing together 20 activists to compare<br />
notes and ideas. At the end of the day, we<br />
paid a call on the university’s acting president,<br />
who was hosting a reception for a<br />
visiting Indonesian government delegation.<br />
Since we weren’t allowed to stay, we held a<br />
spirited protest outside. Special thanks for<br />
organizing the conference and demonstration<br />
should go to Sheila Wilmot, Susanne Blau,<br />
Aloz and all the other Guelph activists.<br />
WINDSOR/ESSEX<br />
The Windsor/Essex County group of<br />
ETAN was very active in the fall, with ten<br />
active members. <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> has really<br />
caught the imagination of the community!<br />
Some highlights of fall activities:<br />
• 450 letters from Windsor and area residents<br />
were sent to all three local MPs,<br />
plus 500 letters to External Affairs<br />
Minster Barbara McDougall. Liberal MP<br />
Herb Gray pledged support to the group,<br />
while the NDP’s Steven Langdon agreed<br />
to join Parliamentarians for <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
(NDP MP Howard McCurdy was<br />
already a member of PET).<br />
• Presentations at classes at the University<br />
of Windsor (Third World Politics, World<br />
Politics, International Business),<br />
Assumption High School, Massey High<br />
School, Iona College, Walkerville High<br />
School, St. Anne High School, Catholic<br />
Central High School, Cardinal Carter<br />
High School, and Brennan High School.<br />
• Meetings with Amnesty International,<br />
Third World Resource Centre, Windsor<br />
Labour Council, Students for Global<br />
Awareness, Windsor Catholic Deanery,<br />
Windsor Catholic Lay Deanery, St.<br />
Vincent de Paul Church Youth Group,<br />
Essex Catholic Deanery.<br />
• ETAN/Windsor co-ordinator Jason<br />
Amyot attended the national conference<br />
of the World University Service of<br />
Canada last November in Ottawa. WUSC<br />
is undertaking an Indonesia project in<br />
19<strong>93</strong>; Jason and many others raised the<br />
issue of human rights at this meeting and<br />
WUSC planning sessions.<br />
• Thirty people came to an <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
coffee house on November 27.<br />
• ETAN wrote several articles in The<br />
Lance (University of Windsor) and was<br />
covered in the Windsor Star and on radio.<br />
TORONTO<br />
ETAN/Toronto has been growing by<br />
leaps and bounds since the summer. We are<br />
now meeting regularly on the third Monday<br />
of every month at the Earthroots office (401<br />
Richmond St. W. at Spadina) at 7:30 p.m.<br />
And every Monday is ETAN office day at<br />
ACT for Disarmament, 736 Bathurst St.<br />
(south of Bloor). We invite all supporters to<br />
join us, or to stay in touch through our<br />
phone line, (416) 531-5850.<br />
We held a successful public forum on<br />
October 28 with Abé Barreto, David<br />
Webster of ETAN/Toronto and Max Stahl,<br />
the maker of “In Cold Blood,” at the<br />
University of Toronto, with the help of the<br />
U of T Student Christian Movement, U of<br />
T Global Development <strong>Network</strong> and ACT<br />
for Disarmament. 75 people came out to the<br />
forum. A hastily-organized event at York<br />
University drew a smaller crowd, but the<br />
people in attendance formed a dynamic new<br />
ETAN group at York.<br />
The York <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> group has held<br />
several public events, including a screening<br />
of “Manufacturing Consent” in January that<br />
drew 200 students. They held a forum on<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> with Elaine Brière of<br />
ETAN/Vancouver and Sujit Chowdhury of<br />
the York group, who is also director of the<br />
National Model United Nations. The<br />
Indonesian Consul in Toronto had initially<br />
said he might attend, but cancelled at the last<br />
minute on orders from his government. At<br />
the same time, an Indonesian delegation was<br />
meeting with environmental studies<br />
professors and students across the hall.<br />
(The delegation refused to meet ETAN activists<br />
while they were in town.)<br />
ETAN/Toronto held two demonstrations<br />
in November. On November 12, we were<br />
part of a national day of action, picketing<br />
outside the Indonesian Consulate (the event,<br />
along with the demonstration the same day<br />
in Ottawa, was seen on CBC-TV national<br />
news). Then on November 28, ETAN<br />
members from across Ontario converged on<br />
the Toronto constituency office of External<br />
Affairs Minister Barbara McDougall. About<br />
30 people attended each event.<br />
Two ETAN activists, Joanne Young and<br />
Maggie Helwig, threw blood on the<br />
Indonesian Consulate during Indonesian<br />
Foreign Minister Ali Alatas’ visit to Canada<br />
a year ago. In August, they were found<br />
guilty of mischief. Joanne was jailed for a<br />
day; Maggie was given a sentence of<br />
community service.<br />
On October 1, “Manufacturing Consent”<br />
opened in Toronto for a week-long run at<br />
the re-opened Euclid Theatre. The first night<br />
was a benefit for ETAN – like all showings,<br />
it sold out all seats. The film has been<br />
playing to packed houses since at several<br />
locations around the city, usually with an<br />
ETAN table in the lobby. We have found<br />
“Manufacturing Consent” to be an excellent<br />
outreach tool, which inspires everyone who<br />
see it to greater levels of activism.<br />
ETAN members have been actively<br />
reaching out to other groups in the community,<br />
attending gatherings on the<br />
Philippines, Sri Lanka and Tibet as well as<br />
other groups’ meetings, like Oxfam and the<br />
International Physicians for the Prevention<br />
of Nuclear War (IPPNW) North American<br />
students’ conference. We have had tables at<br />
Ryerson Polytechnic, Harbourfront’s<br />
International Development Fair, and many<br />
other events. We arranged media coverage,<br />
including in the Toronto Star, Globe and<br />
Mail, CBC-TV, and 3 campus radio stations:<br />
CIUT, CHRY and CKLN.
Page 98 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
After a meeting with Michio Takahashi<br />
of the Free <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Coalition in Japan,<br />
we agreed to set up a fundraising project to<br />
help support an <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese cultural<br />
survival school in Darwin, Australia (home<br />
to a large <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese refugee community).<br />
Angelo Gonsalves jump-started the<br />
project, with help from many others, and<br />
we hope to be sending some large donations<br />
to support the school shortly. A fundraising<br />
party and <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> cultural evening on<br />
February 13 was the first big fundraising<br />
event for the school. There will be more<br />
information on the school in the next<br />
newsletter.<br />
Another piece of good news was the establishment<br />
of the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Alert<br />
<strong>Network</strong>/Toronto Portuguese Committee<br />
last fall, on the initiative of Fernando Nunes.<br />
The group included members of the<br />
Portuguese student associations at U of T<br />
and York. The committee has been hard at<br />
work spreading the word about <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
in the large Portuguese community, translating<br />
ETAN materials into Portuguese, and<br />
reaching out to churches and Portugueselanguage<br />
media. Portuguese programmers on<br />
Channel 47 (multicultural television) and<br />
CHIN (multicultural radio) have been<br />
particularly supportive.<br />
VANCOUVER<br />
ETAN/Vancouver has coalesced into a<br />
group of nine people who have assembled<br />
gradually over the past five months. We are<br />
a new ETAN group – until this year, Elaine<br />
Brière (one of the network’s founders) was<br />
working virtually alone in Vancouver.<br />
Operating on an ad hoc basis, the group organized<br />
a demonstration on November 12,<br />
arranged several public information events,<br />
raised money for the ETAN open letter<br />
published in the Vancouver Sun and elsewhere,<br />
and held a candlelight vigil on<br />
December 7 (which was attended by about<br />
50 people, the largest <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> demonstration<br />
yet in Vancouver). The group also<br />
got a strong response (and several committee<br />
members) from our presence at the many<br />
Vancouver screenings of the film<br />
Manufacturing Consent. This film has<br />
proved extremely effective at politicizing<br />
people on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
In the wake of this activity, we’ve settled<br />
down and begun looking at how our ETAN<br />
group should operate. We’ve sat down to<br />
define our responsibilities, our resources,<br />
some basic operating rules, and the interests<br />
of individual committee members. Projects<br />
that are being discussed include: keeping in<br />
close touch with a newly developed local<br />
membership base (many who donated for<br />
the open letter), organizing lectures in high<br />
schools, developing an accessible archive,<br />
running a letter writing campaign, designing<br />
information packages, and organizing<br />
fundraising events.<br />
Another important local target is Simon<br />
Fraser University, which will soon be reviewing<br />
its huge project in Indonesia. SFU<br />
runs a $22 million CIDA-funded project<br />
servicing Indonesian universities in the<br />
Moluccas and West Papua (details were<br />
published in the last ETAN newsletter).<br />
The group has expressed an interest in<br />
co-ordinating events with other ETAN<br />
groups. These local group reports seem useful<br />
for outlining successful projects across<br />
the country and sharing our information,<br />
leaflets and other materials.<br />
ETAN/Vancouver has set up a new<br />
voice-mail phone number. Please feel free to<br />
call us at (604)739-4947.<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Alert <strong>Network</strong>/Toronto, PO Box<br />
562, Station P, Toronto, Canada, M5S 2T1.<br />
Phone/fax 1-416-531-5850, Email etantor@web.apc.org<br />
UPDATE FROM EAST TIMOR<br />
ALERT NETWORK/CANADA<br />
Number 21 – March 29, 19<strong>93</strong>. Excerpts<br />
EAST TIMOR: ESCAPED<br />
RESISTANCE LEADERS TO VISIT<br />
NORTH AMERICA<br />
Two activists in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>’s nonviolent<br />
resistance movement will be touring North<br />
America in April and May. The young<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese leaders will meet with United<br />
Nations, American and Canadian government<br />
officials, and members of parliament,<br />
and speak to community meetings in 20<br />
U.S. cities and four Canadian cities.<br />
Constancio Pinto, 30, is the keynote<br />
speaker on the tour. He was a chief organizer<br />
of the November 12, 1991, demonstration<br />
that ended in a bloody massacre. He<br />
was executive secretary of the underground<br />
National Council of Maubere Resistance<br />
(the coalition that represents most <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />
nationalist groups) in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> from 1989<br />
to 1992. He has been arrested several times<br />
and tortured by the Indonesian military. He<br />
made a dramatic escape last May, after<br />
being intensively hunted for seven months.<br />
Abé Barreto Soares, 27, is official representative<br />
to Canada for the National Council<br />
of Maubere Resistance. He went into exile<br />
in 1991 and now lives as a refugee in<br />
Toronto. He is a student of English<br />
literature.<br />
There will be events in four cities in<br />
Canada – call the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Alert <strong>Network</strong><br />
for times and places.<br />
Vancouver – April 17 Call (604) 739-<br />
4947<br />
Ottawa – May 4-6<br />
Montreal – May 7-9<br />
Toronto – May 9-10 Call (416) 531-<br />
5850 (More details on the eastern dates next<br />
month.)<br />
UN BLASTS INDONESIA OVER<br />
TIMOR RIGHTS CANADA BACKS<br />
EAST TIMOR FOR FIRST TIME SINCE<br />
INVASION<br />
For the first time, Canada has joined in a<br />
strong United Nations condemnation of<br />
Indonesia’s actions in occupied <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
On March 11, by a vote of 22 to 12, the<br />
United Nations Commission on Human<br />
Rights passed a resolution blasting the government<br />
of Indonesia for its actions since<br />
the Santa Cruz massacre of November 12,<br />
1991, in which Indonesian soldiers opened<br />
fire on an unarmed crowd, killing 273 people<br />
and injuring hundreds more. The<br />
commission regretted “the disparity in the<br />
severity of sentences handed to those civilians<br />
not indicted for violent activities – who<br />
should have been released without delay –<br />
on the one hand, and to the military<br />
involved in the violent incident, on the<br />
other.”<br />
The resolution also condemns more recent<br />
violations of human rights, including<br />
torture, extra-judicial executions, and<br />
“disappearances.” It calls on Indonesia to<br />
improve the respect for human rights of the<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese people, and to permit free<br />
access to humanitarian organizations like<br />
Amnesty International and Asia Watch. It<br />
“urges the Government of Indonesia to invite<br />
the Special Rapporteur on Torture, the<br />
Special Rapporteur on Extra-judicial,<br />
Summary or Arbitrary Executions, the<br />
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention and<br />
the Working Group on Involuntary<br />
Disappearances to visit <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and to<br />
facilitate the discharge of their mandates.”<br />
And it adds <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> as a special agenda<br />
item for the commission’s 50th session next<br />
winter – ensuring that the question of <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> is now firmly on the United Nations<br />
agenda.<br />
The commission heard extensive testimony<br />
on Eats <strong>Timor</strong> from non-governmental<br />
organizations. One of the witnesses was<br />
Abé Barreto Soares, an <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />
refugee now living in Toronto, who testified<br />
on behalf of the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Alert<br />
<strong>Network</strong>/Canada and the International Peace<br />
Bureau.<br />
“Human rights abuses in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
cannot be separated from the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />
struggle for self- determination and independence,”<br />
he noted. “There will be more<br />
human rights abuses in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> as long<br />
as there is no peaceful solution for the <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> problem. I really hope that the this<br />
UN Commission will take meaningful initiatives<br />
to put an end to the human rights<br />
violations in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. The people of <strong>East</strong>
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 99<br />
<strong>Timor</strong> feel helpless in their own homeland.<br />
They look to you to do everything in your<br />
power to help them.”<br />
This year marks the first time that<br />
Canada backed a resolution in support of<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> in any UN forum since<br />
Indonesia invaded <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> in 1975.<br />
Canadian governments have traditionally<br />
provided strong diplomatic support to<br />
Indonesian lobbyists. This year, Canadian<br />
ambassador Anne Park (chair of the Western<br />
group at the Human Rights Commission)<br />
spoke out on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and pressured<br />
Indonesian diplomats to agree to a<br />
consensus declaration – which they refused<br />
to do. In the end, Canada joined 23 other<br />
governments from Europe, the Americas and<br />
Africa to co-sponsor the resolution. Angola,<br />
Guinea-Bissau, USA, Canada, Russia, Costa<br />
Rica, Austria, Poland and Denmark all<br />
spoke out in support.<br />
According to a report filed by Southam<br />
News, Park and External Affairs Minister<br />
Barbara McDougall had felt the pressure<br />
from “a strong <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> lobby at home”<br />
and were afraid to be seen standing with<br />
Indonesia. The American delegation – which<br />
initially fought the resolution Q also felt<br />
strong pressure from home, including<br />
editorials in several major newspapers.<br />
Finally, incoming State department officials<br />
ordered a reversal of the U.S. stance.<br />
“In the end only dictatorships like Iran,<br />
Sudan and China stood with Indonesia,” said<br />
José Ramos Horta, who headed up<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese lobbyists at the commission. “All<br />
the democracies of the world supported us.<br />
Equally important, and indeed it sets a<br />
precedent for other issues, <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> destroyed<br />
the myth of the Asian block. There<br />
were Latin Americans and Africans voting<br />
with us and important Asian and Muslim<br />
states that abstained.”<br />
Indonesian official waited four days to<br />
issue a denunciation of the resolution as<br />
“unfair” to Indonesia, saying they had no<br />
intention of abiding by it.<br />
ETAN encourages supporters to write to<br />
External Affairs Minister Barbara<br />
McDougall (House of Commons, Ottawa<br />
Ont., K1A 0A6, postage free) to ask Canada<br />
to hold Indonesia to the terms of the UN<br />
resolution. The full text is available from<br />
ETAN/Toronto, PO Box 562, Station P,<br />
Toronto M5S 2T1, phone (416) 531-5850,<br />
Email etantor@web.apc.org.<br />
EVENTS IN EUROPE;<br />
EUROPEAN LEADERS<br />
VISIT INDONESIA<br />
SWITZERLAND’S POSITION<br />
ON EAST TIMOR<br />
Mar 16, 19<strong>93</strong><br />
Pierre-Alain Tissot from Allens<br />
(Switzerland), a long-time <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> activist,<br />
transmitted us some replies of the<br />
Swiss government (Federal Council) to<br />
NGO and Parliamentary queries following<br />
the Santa Cruz massacre and Xanana<br />
Gusmão’s arrest. The outlined position is<br />
not too surprising, but it is welcome information<br />
from a country with a traditionally<br />
discrete diplomacy.<br />
Bruno Kahn, Agir pour <strong>Timor</strong><br />
1. Reply, dated 30 Dec. 1992, of the Federal<br />
Department of Foreign Affairs to Pax<br />
Christi about Xanana’s arrest (in French,<br />
signed Simonin; summarised).<br />
Mr. B. Freymond, the Swiss ambassador<br />
in Indonesia, talked on Dec. 5 with Mr.<br />
Wyriono, General Director for political affairs<br />
of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry.<br />
(The letter seems to imply that this is related<br />
to the ICRC visiting Xanana two days<br />
after.)<br />
2. Reply of the Federal Department of<br />
Foreign Affairs to a parliamentary question<br />
of 2 Dec. 1991 on the Santa Cruz<br />
massacre (question in German of P.<br />
Misteli, answer in French, unsigned).<br />
Question (summarised): What is the Federal<br />
Council’s position relatively to the Santa<br />
Cruz massacre as a blatant human rights<br />
violation, and relatively to the global and<br />
lasting situation [caused by] the<br />
occupation? What measures does the<br />
Federal Council plan to take, e.g. in its<br />
developmental or economical work in<br />
common with Indonesia?<br />
Answer (summarised):<br />
a) Switzerland condemned the massacre,<br />
and asked Indonesia to solve the problems<br />
existing in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> in the respect of<br />
human rights and fundamental liberties as<br />
inscribed in the Universal Declaration of<br />
Human Rights and to punish the culprits.<br />
This was conveyed to the Indonesian government<br />
by the Swiss ambassador in<br />
Jakarta.<br />
b) The Committee of Ministers of the<br />
Council of Europe [N.B.: not to be confused<br />
with the EC European Commission]<br />
adopted on 26 November 1991 a Statement<br />
on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, supported by Switzerland.<br />
c) Switzerland does not recognise the<br />
annexation of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> by Indonesia,<br />
carried out by force; it wishes that a solution<br />
can be found in the framework of the<br />
United Nations.<br />
d) The respect of human rights across the<br />
world is an important aspect of<br />
Switzerland’s foreign policy. Development<br />
cooperation and humanitarian aid can be<br />
instruments for this policy, notably<br />
supporting efforts in the fields of education<br />
and formation and encouraging the creation<br />
of a pluralist society by supporting some<br />
groups and organisations. The Swiss policy<br />
relative to human rights has been detailed in<br />
a report of the Federal Council dated 2 June<br />
1982 (articles 24 and 32).<br />
e) Development cooperation with<br />
Indonesia currently amounts to SFr 20 millions<br />
(about US$ 14 millions) and aims to<br />
promote the most unfavoured parts of the<br />
population. Aid goes to technical professional<br />
formation, development of basic city<br />
and rural structures and infrastructures<br />
(drinking water, increase of revenue).<br />
Switzerland also supports a UNICEF health<br />
and food programme.<br />
f) Therefore a reduction or interruption<br />
of Swiss aid would touch directly the part<br />
of the population that suffers most of human<br />
rights violations. Economic relations<br />
and development cooperation reinforce<br />
Swiss influence in this matter by allowing<br />
Switzerland to plead for causes that are dear<br />
to it during negotiations.<br />
3. Reply of the Federal Military<br />
Department to a parliamentary question<br />
dated 9 March 1992 on arms exports to<br />
Indonesia (question and answer in<br />
German, question of K. Hollenstein, answer<br />
unsigned). This question/answer is<br />
translated in full for the following reasons:<br />
- it deals with arms sales; - the<br />
friend who kindly provided a translation<br />
from German stressed that he felt the<br />
answer to be strange or ambiguous (he is<br />
not involved in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>). This will be<br />
obvious at reading; - it is short.<br />
Question:<br />
a) Can the Federal Council allow, as the<br />
highest decision-making authority, that<br />
weapons and ammunitions originating<br />
from Switzerland keep on reaching<br />
Indonesia where, since General Suharto<br />
took power, more than one million persons<br />
lost their lives in armed battles?<br />
b) Does the Federal Council, like Canada<br />
and The Netherlands, wish to suppress its<br />
credits given in the framework of IGGI,<br />
until a satisfactory report on the human<br />
rights situation is provided?<br />
Answer:
Page 100 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
The Federal Council is not aware of an<br />
arm sales embargo of the EC towards<br />
Indonesia. These last years, war material<br />
exports from Switzerland to this country<br />
have been very modest. In the years 1988<br />
and 1989 they only corresponded to respectively<br />
SFr 22 and 751 [sic].<br />
Last year, exercise ammunitions for antiaircraft<br />
defense batteries, for a value of SFr<br />
500’000 [sic, not 500,000 or 500.000], were<br />
exported from Switzerland to Indonesia.<br />
They were delivered before [sic] the<br />
incidents of last November in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
and have in all certainty nothing to do with<br />
them.<br />
On the Swiss part, the human rights<br />
situation in Indonesia is closely followed.<br />
The military action in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> was condemned<br />
by an intervention of the Swiss<br />
ambassador in Jakarta, and our country<br />
signed the Statement on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> of the<br />
Council of European Ministers on<br />
November 26, 1991. Switzerland does not<br />
recognise <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>’s annexation and<br />
wishes for a solution in the framework of<br />
the United Nations.<br />
Concerning the Swiss development cooperation<br />
program in the framework of<br />
IGGI, this program involves on the one<br />
hand a mixed financing program and on the<br />
other hand a long term construction program<br />
in various domains of major importance.<br />
Until now, Switzerland only granted<br />
Indonesia two projects in a form of mixed<br />
financing. The first [financing?] has been<br />
completely used, the second - for the rehabilitation<br />
of an important rail connection<br />
in Sumatra - cannot be interrupted, if only<br />
for legal reasons.<br />
The Federal Council does not consider<br />
that a suspension of development cooperation<br />
with Indonesia would be an efficient<br />
measure as a reaction to human rights violations;<br />
it would do more harm than good to<br />
the goal subordinate to our cooperation -<br />
namely, better living conditions for the least<br />
favoured parts of the population. In the<br />
framework of IGGI, however, it will have to<br />
be examined periodically whether conditions<br />
for the continuation of [our] present<br />
cooperation are still met.<br />
LACK OF UNEQUIVOCAL<br />
SUPPORT FROM EC<br />
Publico 4 February 19<strong>93</strong>. Original lang<br />
Portuguese. unabridged<br />
(Lisbon) Departing from a meeting yesterday<br />
with the Parliamentary Commission<br />
on the Situation in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, Durão<br />
Barroso said that the question of <strong>Timor</strong><br />
“could already have been resolved if<br />
Portugal had the unequivocal support of the<br />
European Community.”<br />
“Portugal is right, but I do not deny that<br />
it has been extremely difficult to get the<br />
other Twelve to coincide with our position,”<br />
stated the Foreign Minister, believing that<br />
“at this moment, we are the only real and<br />
legitimate advocate of the <strong>Timor</strong>ese cause.”<br />
Repeating the claim that there is lack of<br />
European support, Barroso added that “the<br />
Community countries do not always follow<br />
our view on the matter.” After mentioning<br />
that Indonesia “has much support at the<br />
international level,” the Minister said that<br />
Portugal “will do all it can for its voice to be<br />
heard.” On the Xanana Gusmão trial, taking<br />
place in Dili, he reaffirmed the previously<br />
expressed position: “It is a farce. Indonesia<br />
hasn’t the slightest legitimacy to hold this<br />
trial, which itself does not meet the<br />
minimum conditions from the legal point of<br />
view.” The Minister even admitted that the<br />
EC “could take a position at the Human<br />
Rights Commission.”<br />
Yesterday was the first time that Mr.<br />
Durão Barroso met with the Assembly of<br />
the Republic’s Commission under the new<br />
presidency of Christian Democrat Adriano<br />
Moreira. In agreement with Barroso,<br />
Adriano affirmed his conviction that<br />
Portugal would “continue its efforts with<br />
regards both support to Xanana Gusmão,<br />
and the matter of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.”<br />
MOREIRA INTERVIEW:<br />
PORTUGUESE GOV’T VIEWS<br />
STRUGGLE PASSED FROM GEN-<br />
ERATION TO GENERATION<br />
Publico, 4 February 19<strong>93</strong>. By Angela Silva<br />
& J. de Negreiros. Original Portuguese,<br />
unabridged<br />
(Lisbon) Adriano Moreira, the new<br />
Chairman of the (Portuguese) Parliamentary<br />
Commission on <strong>Timor</strong>, is more concerned<br />
about opening up new space for<br />
interventions, and in this respect concurs<br />
with the new head of Portuguese diplomacy.<br />
He wishes to see <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> involved in the<br />
wider drama of the “dispensable” peoples.<br />
He regards highly the contribution made by<br />
NGOs. But he has no illusions: he believes<br />
the it is “a task for centuries,” and “a<br />
struggle which is passed from generation to<br />
generation.”<br />
He was invited by the PSD to substitute<br />
Vitor Crespo at the head of the<br />
Parliamentary Commission on <strong>Timor</strong>, and<br />
he accepted. Although as yet he has no plan<br />
of action outlined, he is gripping the task<br />
ahead with the convictions he has held for a<br />
long time. For Adriano Moreira, <strong>Timor</strong> is<br />
“the tip of the iceberg,” and Xanana “a<br />
point of reference.” He believes that<br />
Portugal has everything to win if it sees the<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese tragedy in the context of a greater<br />
drama.<br />
Publico: The Commission you have agreed<br />
to Chair has been accused of having very<br />
limited effectiveness. What is going to<br />
change?<br />
Adriano Moreira: I do not share that general<br />
criticism of the Commission. Apart from<br />
any circumstantial difficulties, the problem<br />
is so difficult, the obstacles so enormous,<br />
that defining and then carrying out really<br />
effective actions is limited.<br />
Q.: But what do you intend to do? There is a<br />
whole plan of activities as yet to be<br />
carried out ...<br />
A.: What I think we need to do first is to<br />
invert the current international perception of<br />
the matter, which defines the problem in<br />
terms of Portugal and Indonesia. This perception,<br />
which is totally mistaken, is widespread<br />
throughout the international community.<br />
The correct perception is that this<br />
is a question between Indonesia and the<br />
international community, Portugal being the<br />
voice speaking for <strong>Timor</strong>. I consider this<br />
point to be essential.<br />
Q.: Has the Portuguese Government made it<br />
clear that the problem should be viewed<br />
within these parameters?<br />
A.: I believe that the Government, at least<br />
from a certain moment onwards, has been<br />
trying to impose this perception. However,<br />
it is still not the view which dominates in<br />
the international community, and this fact<br />
causes difficulties when it comes to our<br />
taking actions in support of the <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />
people.<br />
Q.: How can this dominating perception be<br />
altered?<br />
A.: In order to establish a correct perception,<br />
I believe the role of the NGOs (nongovernmental<br />
organisations) extremely important,<br />
because they enjoy an agility and<br />
freedom of movement which governments<br />
are sometimes unable to exercise. Within<br />
that mobilization, we must not sacrifice respect<br />
for human rights to rigid interpretations<br />
on self-determination. We defend selfdetermination<br />
for <strong>Timor</strong>, but this is no<br />
reason for lessening our resolve to battle for<br />
human rights, where advances could be made<br />
more quickly. These points just outline<br />
what will be behind the exercise of my new<br />
function.<br />
Q.: As well as making NGOs more aware<br />
and motivated, the diplomatic dialogue
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 101<br />
between Lisbon and Jakarta will continue.<br />
What may be expected of these<br />
contacts?<br />
A.: I think the Government, through the<br />
Foreign Office, has been clear in that it has<br />
not expressed much hope of positive results<br />
from this dialogue. Having said that, perhaps<br />
it is worth pointing out that, in the<br />
diplomatic process, keeping up the dialogue<br />
is, in itself, important. On the other hand, it<br />
is also important that the dialogue is not<br />
allowed to develop in such a way that the<br />
aggressor, in this case Indonesia, utilizes the<br />
process in order to improve its image.<br />
Indonesia tries to do just this. For example,<br />
when it tries to link the defence of the<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese people’s interests to Portugal’s<br />
past conduct.<br />
Q.: Since you have mentioned Portugal’s<br />
past conduct in relation to <strong>Timor</strong>, what<br />
do you think of the idea that the<br />
Portuguese “crusade” for <strong>Timor</strong> contains<br />
an element of hypocrisy or guilty<br />
conscience, bearing in mind the <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />
were allegedly “abandoned” by the<br />
Lisbon Government in 1975?<br />
A.: Portugal’s past actions or guilt is not the<br />
matter now in question. What is in hand<br />
now is the right of the <strong>Timor</strong>ese to self-determination<br />
and human rights in the territory.<br />
If Portugal were to give up being the<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese people’s voice on the international<br />
scene, their right would still be the same;<br />
some other voice would have to speak for<br />
them. That is why I think it is totally<br />
spurious to mix the two questions. I think it<br />
has been in Indonesia’s interest to have the<br />
two matters mixed up.<br />
Q.: What concrete outcome would you dare<br />
to predict for the <strong>Timor</strong> problem? Some<br />
are saying that Portugal ought to drop<br />
the self- determination requirement...<br />
A.: Portugal cannot drop self-determination<br />
because it is not one of Portugal’s rights<br />
which is in question. This does not mean,<br />
however, that the international community<br />
will not come up with any solution other<br />
than independence. The difficulty in safeguarding<br />
the interests of the <strong>Timor</strong>ese is<br />
related not to international law, that is very<br />
clear, but to the international balance of<br />
powers. And it so happens that, in that<br />
area, Indonesia is currently the dominant<br />
power.<br />
Q.: What can Portugal do in the face of the<br />
difficulties posed by the “balance of<br />
powers”?<br />
A.: I think that the case of <strong>Timor</strong>, and<br />
namely the Xanana Gusmão trial, are elements<br />
of a world problem, on which<br />
Portugal is taking a position that can give it<br />
an important function, and which should be<br />
demanded by the small countries. Let me<br />
explain. There are probably about 100 million<br />
people in the world right now who belong<br />
to groups whose autonomy or self-determination<br />
has not been recognised. When<br />
Portugal is defending <strong>Timor</strong> it is, in fact,<br />
involved in a question of extraordinary dimensions<br />
- the question of the peoples<br />
which have no voice. And what is more<br />
grave is that they are peoples which the<br />
international community treats as<br />
“dispensable,” because of the balance of<br />
powers.<br />
Q.: But the difficulties which result from the<br />
balance of powers persist...<br />
A.: What I am trying to say is that the difficulties<br />
- or pessimism, if you prefer - must<br />
not be allowed to lessen our commitment,<br />
because this fight is not just a fight for the<br />
people of <strong>Timor</strong>, it is a fight of great international<br />
prominence in which the small<br />
countries will have a role to play. The small<br />
countries have an advantage in the<br />
international scene, which is their large<br />
number. The trial of Xanana Gusmão makes<br />
a good parallel: in that poor land’s modest<br />
courtroom, he is now a point of reference<br />
which allows us to evaluate the respect<br />
which exists for human rights. It not only<br />
concerns Xanana Gusmão. It not only<br />
concerns <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
Q.: Do you think then that Portugal, in its<br />
role of advocate for the people of <strong>Timor</strong>,<br />
would be successful if it integrated the<br />
question of <strong>Timor</strong> with a wider issue...<br />
A.: I believe so, and that will be one of my<br />
guidelines.<br />
Q.: How will this idea be put into practice?<br />
A.: There are many things we can do. There<br />
are various international arenas in which the<br />
message can be voiced. There is one thing I<br />
want to make clear so as not to create any<br />
illusions - this is a long process. It will take<br />
ages. We are in a struggle which passes from<br />
generation to generation. I believe<br />
appreciable progress has been made and,<br />
consequently, what we are doing is<br />
continuing.<br />
Q.: Don’t you think that Portugal wasted an<br />
ideal opportunity while it presided the EC,<br />
and when the <strong>Timor</strong> issue was practically<br />
silenced?<br />
A.: The perception that <strong>Timor</strong> is not an international<br />
question is also prevalent among<br />
the Twelve. That is the way they usually<br />
see the matter. Once again, I am not inclined<br />
to lay blame. I prefer to ask what can now<br />
be done, or what should be done? Is it<br />
worthwhile? Why is it worthwhile? These<br />
are the reference points I like to have at the<br />
forefront on this matter.<br />
Q.: Do you think the Portuguese<br />
Government has done everything that can<br />
or should be done?<br />
A.: I do not have all the information on everything<br />
the Government has done. I do<br />
admit that there are things which the<br />
Government has not done. I am under the<br />
impression that the Portuguese<br />
Government’s active intervention started<br />
late. There was a period which was lost.<br />
But, generally speaking, I think that its actions<br />
were appropriate. Now, what I am<br />
fundamentally interested in is knowing in<br />
which areas we can project the country’s<br />
intervention on not just <strong>Timor</strong>, which is the<br />
reference but which has a bearing on much<br />
wider issues of interest to the international<br />
community and to Portugal.<br />
Q.: Going back to the Commission: it was<br />
prominent at the time of the planned<br />
parliamentary deputation to <strong>Timor</strong>. Your<br />
attitude then was not very enthusiastic.<br />
Why was that?<br />
A.: I was, in fact, highly critical. The reason<br />
for my reservations was Indonesia’s expressed<br />
interest in the visit. I thought that<br />
Indonesia could use the visit to enhance that<br />
distorted image to its own end, just as it is<br />
doing right now with Xanana’s trial.<br />
Q.: Is there any chance of that idea being<br />
taken up again?<br />
A.: At the moment I see no chance of the<br />
proposal being reconsidered.<br />
Q.: Would it be realistic for a <strong>Timor</strong>ese, who<br />
today is 20- years- old, to hope that one<br />
day he would vote in a referendum on the<br />
future of his people?<br />
A.: I don’t like making predictions. Usually,<br />
when experts make medium-term forecasts<br />
they refer to the period of life of each of us,<br />
and when the forecast is for the long-term,<br />
then we are no longer around to check<br />
whether it was correct. What I can say for<br />
certain is that young <strong>Timor</strong>ese is still going<br />
to suffer occupation.
Page 102 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
KOHL TO RAISE TIMOR<br />
ISSUE WITH SUHARTO<br />
The Nation (Thailand), Feb. 25 <strong>93</strong><br />
Abridged, leaving out facts on ET, and<br />
Suharto’s push to attend the G7 summit in<br />
Tokyo in June.<br />
(AP, Jakarta) German Chancellor Helmut<br />
Kohl arrived in Indonesia yesterday for<br />
three days of talks to boost bilateral trade<br />
and economic relations.<br />
Kohl’s visit to Jakarta is part of his<br />
Asian tour to India, Singapore, Indonesia,<br />
Japan and South Korea, his first since the<br />
unification of Germany in Oct. 1990.<br />
“There are still political questions to be<br />
discussed although the main thrust of the<br />
talks would be to enhance bilateral cooperation<br />
in trade and economy,” the German<br />
Ambassador to Indonesia Walter Lewalter<br />
said.<br />
Indonesia’s exports to Germany in 1991<br />
reached US$1.2 billion, an increase of about<br />
8 percent from the previous year. But<br />
German investment in Indonesia has been<br />
declining in the past few years, from<br />
US$59.9 million in 1991 to US$36.7 million<br />
in 1992.<br />
Lewalter said Kohl would raise the issue<br />
of human rights violations in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> in<br />
talks with Suharto.<br />
LETTER TO FRENCH<br />
FOREIGN MINISTRY<br />
Agir Pour <strong>Timor</strong><br />
Paris, 3 March 19<strong>93</strong><br />
Mr. Roland Dumas<br />
Minister of Foreign Affairs<br />
37 Quai d’Orsay<br />
75007 PARIS<br />
Dear Mr. Minister,<br />
We had communication of the proposal<br />
of a resolution on the “situation in <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>,” presented by the Twelve at the<br />
Human Rights Commission, in Geneva.<br />
We find this proposal excellent. We wish<br />
to thank the French government, in the name<br />
of the people of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> that we defend,<br />
for having participated in its elaboration.<br />
We urge the French government to do<br />
whatever it can to support this resolution<br />
proposal, and the French delegation in<br />
Geneva to use all its influence to counterbalance<br />
the current attempts of Indonesia<br />
and other countries to have this project fail.<br />
We are convinced of your support, already<br />
expressed in a letter that you kindly<br />
had sent to us in January.<br />
Respectfully yours,<br />
(signed)<br />
POSSIBLE VOTE IN EP<br />
Publico 10 March 19<strong>93</strong> Dateline:<br />
Strasbourg Byline: J.T. Negreiros/Ana I.<br />
Cabo Translated from Portuguese abridged<br />
Criticism and applause from Durão at<br />
Euro-Parliament:<br />
While the diplomatic contacts in Geneva<br />
continued at a fast pace, Durão Barroso was<br />
meeting with the Inter Group on <strong>Timor</strong>,<br />
yesterday afternoon in Strasbourg. The<br />
(Portuguese) Foreign Minister told the Euro<br />
MPs that “intelligent foreign policy is one<br />
which respects principles, and not one<br />
which goes running after the economic<br />
powers.”<br />
The statement was not just made for effect:<br />
it served both to compliment the<br />
Strasbourg plenary’s stance on the <strong>Timor</strong><br />
issue, as well as to set down criticism, from<br />
which the US and EC Member States did<br />
not escape.<br />
“There has still been no position which<br />
satisfies us,” said the Portuguese minister, in<br />
reference to the Clinton administration’s<br />
promises about <strong>Timor</strong>. Durão Barroso confessed<br />
he felt “disillusioned by some countries<br />
that forget principles” and that put<br />
more weight on human rights violations in<br />
Cuba or in Libya than in <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
The minister said he had detected that,<br />
among the Twelve, the stimulus given to<br />
human rights issues had been corresponded<br />
with “timidity” when it came to the<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese people’s right to self-determination,<br />
and concluded that the EC could be<br />
“more assertive.”<br />
Simone Veil, Inter-Group Chairperson,<br />
welcomed a proposal from Durão Barroso<br />
that the EP should intensify efforts to bring<br />
about awareness and support in the<br />
Australian Parliament, the US Congress, and<br />
the Japanese Diet for the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
question.<br />
NEW PAPAL AMBASSADOR<br />
TO LISBON<br />
Publico 16 March 19<strong>93</strong> Dateline: Lisbon<br />
Original lang: Portuguese unabridged<br />
The Holy See announced yesterday that<br />
64-year-old Msgr. Edoardo Rovida, titular<br />
Archbishop of Taormina, is the new apostolic<br />
nuncio in Portugal. The new Papal<br />
ambassador to Portugal was born in<br />
Alessandria, Italy, specialized in Canonical<br />
Law, and was ordained a priest on 29 June<br />
1950. He entered the Vatican’s diplomatic<br />
service in 1955, and worked in the pontifical<br />
missions in Haiti, Cuba, Mexico and Ireland,<br />
and as permanent observer at UNESCO. He<br />
was appointed apostolic nuncio to Zaire in<br />
1977. Four years later he became permanent<br />
observer at the UN in Geneva.<br />
EP: XANANA TRIAL ILLEGAL<br />
Diario de Noticias, 12 March 19<strong>93</strong><br />
Dateline: Strasbourg Byline: Fernanda<br />
Gabriel. Translated from Portuguese.<br />
unabridged<br />
Yesterday in Strasbourg, the European<br />
Parliament (EP) reaffirmed the illegality of<br />
the proceedings against Xanana Gusmão,<br />
and indicated that it would not accept any<br />
sentence, given the Indonesian judicial<br />
authority’s total lack of legitimacy or competence.<br />
The resolution, put forward by the socialist<br />
group, urges the EP’s President to<br />
implement the visit (already decided upon)<br />
by a delegation to Jakarta and Dili, as a<br />
matter of urgency, so as to collect ample<br />
information about the situation in <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
The Euro-MPs expressed their fear of<br />
seeing Xanana Gusmão condemned to death.<br />
They considered that the first phase of the<br />
trial intensified their greatest apprehensions<br />
about the purely arbitrary nature of<br />
proceedings without the slightest legal basis.<br />
Mr. Hans van den Broeck, the European<br />
Commissioner responsible for the EC’s<br />
external relations, said he was hoping that<br />
the meeting scheduled for 20 April in Rome,<br />
between Durão Barroso and Ali Alatas,<br />
would contribute towards a solution to the<br />
problem of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, and affirmed that<br />
the embassies of the Twelve have been<br />
expressing their concern about Indonesia’s<br />
behaviour in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> to the Jakarta<br />
authorities.<br />
Mr. Van den Broeck’s position on <strong>Timor</strong><br />
has been one of support for Portugal, and he<br />
has distanced himself from the ideas of the<br />
previous Commissioner, Mr. Matutes.<br />
Lately, Portugal has been developing a<br />
diplomatic offensive on this question in the<br />
EP. Before the visit of the Foreign Minister,<br />
the President of the (Portuguese) Republic<br />
went to Strasbourg, towards the end of last<br />
year.<br />
The EP reiterated its deep concern over<br />
the fact that situation in <strong>Timor</strong> was already<br />
seriously affecting not only relations between<br />
the EC and Indonesia, but also relations<br />
between the EC and the ASEAN<br />
group, the development of which is considered<br />
by both parties to be of the utmost importance,<br />
but which must be oriented by respect<br />
for international law and human rights.<br />
The Euro-MPs supported the position<br />
adopted by the EC Council of Ministers regarding<br />
safeguarding human rights and<br />
searching for a political solution within the<br />
framework of UN resolutions.
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 103<br />
EAST TIMOR MOTION WINS<br />
UK COMMONS SUPPORT<br />
The following Early Day Motion was tabled<br />
in the House of Commons on 23 March and<br />
by 25 March had been signed by 66 MPs:<br />
No. 1657: Human Rights in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
(No. 2)<br />
That this House congratulates the United<br />
Nations Commission on Human Rights for<br />
adopting a resolution highly critical of the<br />
human rights situation in the Indonesianoccupied<br />
territory of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, and congratulates<br />
Her Majesty’s Government for<br />
supporting the resolution; and, further,<br />
called on Her Majesty’s Government to<br />
persuade the Indonesian Government to<br />
comply with paragraph 9 of the resolution<br />
by enabling the United Nations Special<br />
Rapporteurs on torture and on extrajudicial,<br />
summary or arbitrary executions and the<br />
United Nations working groups on arbitrary<br />
detention and on enforced or involuntary<br />
disappearances to discharge their mandates<br />
in accordance with the terms of the resolution.<br />
This resolution was tabled in response to an<br />
action by UK members of Parliamentarians<br />
for <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
UK readers, please contact your MP, urging<br />
her/him to sign.<br />
FRETILIN SATISFIED WITH<br />
PORTUGAL<br />
Publico 20 March 19<strong>93</strong> Dateline : Lisbon<br />
original lang.: Portuguese unabridged<br />
Yesterday, Fretilin reaffirmed its<br />
“confidence in Portuguese diplomacy,” and<br />
in the role Lisbon has been playing in the<br />
<strong>Timor</strong> issue. In a letter sent from<br />
Mozambique, addressed to Foreign Minister<br />
Durão Barroso, Fretilin’s foreign relations<br />
secretary, Mari Alkatiri, welcomed the<br />
“clear orientation” and the “firmness of<br />
position” adopted by Portugal in the recent<br />
session of the UN Human Rights<br />
Commission, which passed by majority<br />
vote a resolution condemning the Suharto<br />
regime. In the same letter, Alkatiri went on<br />
to state that “any political solution<br />
negotiated on <strong>Timor</strong> must be found within<br />
the framework of the UN and through the<br />
mediation of its Secretary General.” The<br />
next round of negotiations between<br />
Portugal’s and Indonesia’s Foreign<br />
Ministers, with Boutros Ghali’s mediation,<br />
is scheduled to commence on 20 April, in<br />
Rome.<br />
DENMARK WANTS EC<br />
OBSERVER FOR EAST<br />
TIMOR<br />
Publico 22 March 19<strong>93</strong> Dateline : Denmark<br />
Byline : Morten Gliemann Original lang:<br />
Portuguese unabridged<br />
Danish Foreign Minister, Niels Helveg<br />
Petersen, is going to try to get a European<br />
Community (EC) observer sent to <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>, while his country is still in the<br />
Presidency of the Community.<br />
On 2 March, Viggo Fischer, a member of<br />
the Folketing, the Danish Parliament,<br />
requested the Foreign Minister to work towards<br />
the sending of a Community observer<br />
to <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. Fischer, member of the<br />
parliamentary commission on foreign policy<br />
and always interested in human rights<br />
issues, has already received a positive reply<br />
from the government: “I can assure you that<br />
the Danish Government, the Community,<br />
and its different Member States are<br />
following the case carefully,” wrote the<br />
Minister, in his reply to the parliament.<br />
“The proceedings against Xanana<br />
Gusmão, in Dili, started on 1 February<br />
19<strong>93</strong>, and the largest Communitary representations<br />
in Jakarta (Holland, France,<br />
Spain, Great Britain, and the European<br />
Commission) established coordinated coverage<br />
of the trial (...) There should be no<br />
doubt that the Government, together with<br />
our Community partners, will continue to<br />
observe the development of the situation in<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>,” added the Danish Foreign<br />
Minister in his reply dated 17 March.<br />
In his letter, the Danish Foreign Minister<br />
did not state directly that an observer from<br />
the EC should be sent to <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, but<br />
Viggo Fischer states that there is a<br />
possibility: “It would be very useful, for<br />
several reasons, if we could send a representative,<br />
or better still, an observer from<br />
the EC: an historic resolution was passed by<br />
the UN, at the 49th Session of the Human<br />
Rights Commission; a relatively short time<br />
ago, there were elections in Indonesia; and<br />
there are reports that Xanana Gusmão’s trial<br />
is going to be postponed.”<br />
Fischer says that the situation demands<br />
“special attention” on the part of the international<br />
community, because the<br />
“repression which the Indonesian<br />
Government wields over the people of <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> is one of the most brutal in the<br />
world,” he concludes.<br />
EURO-MPS’ VISIT AWAITS<br />
GREEN LIGHT<br />
Publico 26 March 19<strong>93</strong> By J. T. Negreiros<br />
Translated from Portuguese abridged<br />
(Lisbon) The old project of a Euro-MPs’<br />
visit to <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> is still awaiting a green<br />
light from the European Parliament’s<br />
“bureau.” Once that is obtained, Jakarta’s<br />
agreement would still be necessary, as well<br />
as finalizing the details of the visit. It is not<br />
surprising, therefore, that the EP’s<br />
Intergroup on <strong>Timor</strong> Chairperson, French<br />
woman Simone Veil, has not advanced any<br />
date for the visit to the territory.<br />
Veil, who arrived in Portugal yesterday<br />
for a two- day visit, and whose first task<br />
was a meeting with the Foreign Minister,<br />
stressed the importance of the existence of<br />
an Intergroup on <strong>Timor</strong> in Strasbourg,<br />
comprised of MPs of various nationalities<br />
and political colours - “the diversity is important,”<br />
but could not foresee any specific<br />
action by the EP on <strong>Timor</strong> in the shortterm.<br />
Less than a month ago, during a meeting<br />
with the Intergroup’s Euro-MPs in<br />
Strasbourg, Durão Barroso proposed that<br />
more intense pressure should be brought to<br />
bear by the EP on the Japanese Diet and the<br />
US Congress. Yesterday, confronted with<br />
the suggestion, Simone Veil would only say<br />
that the EP’s delegations in Tokyo and<br />
Washington continued to develop contacts<br />
with the respective parliaments.<br />
The possibility of getting a new resolution<br />
on <strong>Timor</strong> passed by the plenary in<br />
Strasbourg shortly was rejected by the<br />
Intergroup’s Chairperson, who recalled the<br />
recent text about the illegality of Xanana<br />
Gusmão’s trial. Judging from Simone Veil’s<br />
statements, action by the EP in the near<br />
future is going to stop there.<br />
In spite of reference to a “common strategy”<br />
on <strong>Timor</strong> by the Intergroup and<br />
Lisbon, Simone Veil refused to make any<br />
comment on the possible outcome of the<br />
forthcoming meeting between Durão<br />
Barroso and Ali Alatas, the date of which<br />
has moved from 20 to 21 April.<br />
BRITISH FM DOUGLAS HURD<br />
TO VISIT JAKARTA<br />
According to AFP from Jakarta on 31<br />
March 19<strong>93</strong>, Britain’s Foreign Secretary,<br />
Douglas Hurd, is to visit Jakarta from 3 to 5<br />
April on his way to Tokyo and South<br />
Korea. He is scheduled to have meetings in<br />
Jakarta with Foreign Minister Ali Alatas<br />
and President Suharto for wide-ranging talks<br />
on bilateral and international issues. He is<br />
also scheduled to sign three accords, on<br />
double taxation, copyrights and a soft loan.
Page 104 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
According to TAPOL sources in London,<br />
the G7 group has not agreed to the proposal<br />
that Suharto attend their next meeting in<br />
Tokyo, as chair of the non-aligned movement,<br />
but Britain would have no objection<br />
to Suharto being in Tokyo in advance of the<br />
meeting to make known the views of the<br />
non-aligned movement to members of the<br />
group.<br />
DOUGLAS HURD’S VISIT TO<br />
INDONESIA<br />
The following is a round-up of reports<br />
broadcast by the BBC World Service under<br />
the byline of Adam Brooks, about the visit to<br />
Indonesia of Britain’s Foreign Secretary<br />
Douglas Hurd from 3 - 5 April 19<strong>93</strong>, by<br />
TAPOL:<br />
* In a speech to the Indonesian<br />
Department of Foreign Affairs Forum on<br />
Monday, Hurd said that human rights are<br />
seen as an integral part of economic development,<br />
not what he called some alien<br />
Western and dispensable add-on. He said<br />
there was no contradiction between more<br />
democracy and economic prosperity.<br />
Indonesia’s human rights record has been<br />
widely criticised internationally especially<br />
over the actions of its security forces in <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>. The Indonesian Foreign Minister,<br />
Ali Alatas, said earlier on Monday at a<br />
press conference that accusations leveled at<br />
Indonesia on human rights were often<br />
unsubstantiated and exaggerated and<br />
sometimes took on the nature of a political<br />
campaign rather than a genuine desire to<br />
protect human rights<br />
Mr. Hurd noted in his speech that<br />
Indonesia has proposed the establishment of<br />
a national body to protect human rights. A<br />
BBC correspondent in Jakarta says that<br />
while Mr. Hurd avoided specific criticism of<br />
Indonesia, the speech reflected current<br />
differences of opinion between Western and<br />
developing countries on how human rights<br />
should be implemented.<br />
* British sources said that during a<br />
meeting with Douglas Hurd, President<br />
Suharto raised the question of his possible<br />
attendance at the G7 summit very gently<br />
amid much laughter (sic). He said that this<br />
could contribute to what he calls the revival<br />
of a north/south dialogue. But the idea has<br />
met with a cool reception from G7 countries<br />
and Mr. Hurd on Monday avoided making<br />
any commitment:<br />
Hurd’s voice:<br />
“Two things. First of all it’s perfectly<br />
reasonable that developing countries through<br />
the non-aligned movement should want to<br />
communicate with the industrialised<br />
countries. But the Group of Seven is not<br />
meant to be a great sort of directorate of the<br />
industrialised world and we’re certainly<br />
against adding to it new structures of consultation.<br />
I don’t think that’s a good idea.”<br />
British sources say it’s likely that some<br />
sort of compromise would be reached to<br />
avoid a diplomatic snub to President<br />
Suharto.<br />
* Mr. Hurd, during his visit, also dealt<br />
with the thorny question of human rights in<br />
Indonesia, particularly in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. Mr.<br />
Hurd said there were continuing anxieties<br />
over reports of human rights abuses by<br />
Indonesian troops in the territory.<br />
* Mr. Hurd signed three agreements with<br />
the Indonesians, including a concessionary<br />
loan from Britain for over one hundred<br />
million US dollars.<br />
LONDON ‘INDEPENDENT’ ON<br />
HURD’S VISIT<br />
An Independent, 6 April 19<strong>93</strong> report, bylined<br />
Reuter and datelined Jakarta, reads, slightly<br />
abridged:<br />
The Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd,<br />
said yesterday he had raised concerns about<br />
the relatively light sentences given to<br />
Indonesian soldiers tried in the shooting of<br />
protesters demanding independence for <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
“I mentioned that we do have some continuing<br />
concerns... over the disparity in<br />
sentencing between military and civilians”<br />
although these were matters for Indonesia’s<br />
judicial system, Mr. Hurd said, after talks<br />
with his Indonesian counterpart, Ali Alatas.<br />
Despite Mr. Hurd’s expression of concern,<br />
however, he yesterday signed an<br />
agreement to grant Indonesia 65m in aid to<br />
help finance a power project. The concessional<br />
loan which is ties to the involvement<br />
of British companies, was for a 66-megawatt<br />
gas and steam power plant in eastern<br />
Kalimantan.<br />
TAPOL<br />
WITH THE TIMORESE BUT<br />
WITHOUT FRETILIN AT EC<br />
HEARING<br />
Publico 27 March 19<strong>93</strong> By J. T. Negreiros.<br />
Translated from Portuguese. abridged<br />
(Lisbon) The absence of any Fretilin<br />
representative was the discordant note in<br />
the meeting between Simone Veil and the<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese community, with whom the current<br />
President of the Euro-Parliament’s<br />
Intergroup on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> yesterday commenced<br />
the second and last day of her visit<br />
to Lisbon.<br />
Accompanied by Euro-MPs Rui Amaral,<br />
João Cravinho, Sergio Ribeiro and Pedro<br />
Canavarro - all members of the Intergroups,<br />
composed of MPs of various nationalities<br />
and political tendencies, Simone Veil heard<br />
the <strong>Timor</strong>ese appeal for her help in the task<br />
of making the international community<br />
aware of the situation in the territory.<br />
At the end of yesterday morning’s<br />
meeting, which took place in the EP office in<br />
Lisbon, the statements were left up to the<br />
UDT representatives. Manuel Martires,<br />
Xanana Gusmão’s cousin, pointed out<br />
Simone Veil’s “weight,” and praised her<br />
availability. Zacarias da Costa, heading the<br />
UDT delegation in Portugal, expressed the<br />
hope that such meetings would continue to<br />
occur on a regular basis.<br />
Simone Veil then went on to meeting the<br />
Prime Minister. As well being “impressed”<br />
by the direct contact with the <strong>Timor</strong>ese,<br />
Simone Veil informed Cavaco Silva of the<br />
Intergroup’s activities. The Portuguese PM<br />
told her about the forthcoming meeting<br />
between Durão Barroso and Ali Alatas, set<br />
for 2l April, in Rome.<br />
Before lunch with the President, finalizing<br />
Simone Veil’s visit, the Euro-MP and<br />
Intergroup Chairperson went to the French<br />
Embassy to give the Legion of Honour insignia<br />
to Portuguese deputy Antonio Maria<br />
Pereira, current Chairman of the<br />
Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Commission.<br />
(...)<br />
REPORT FROM FRENCH<br />
SOLIDARITY MOVEMENT<br />
By Bruno Kahn, Agir Pour <strong>Timor</strong>, April 6<br />
Personal comment: whatever the drawbacks<br />
inside, international pressure is constantly<br />
growing. There will eventually be a breaking<br />
point. Cheer up!<br />
1. “500 associations for <strong>Timor</strong>.” This<br />
campaign, launched in 1992 by the<br />
Federation of Portuguese Associations in<br />
France (FAPF), collected to this date about<br />
100 signatures. FAPF, together with<br />
Antonio Dias, President of Agir pour<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>, was received by the Portuguese<br />
Ambassador in France on March 25 and<br />
delivered him the list of these associations.<br />
They will also be received shortly, for the<br />
same purpose, by a representative of the<br />
Direction for Asia of the Foreign Ministry.<br />
The list was also sent to Jacques Delors,<br />
(EC), the UN Secretary General,<br />
UNESCO’s Secretary General, Amnesty<br />
International, the Human Rights League and<br />
the three Portuguese Consults of the greater<br />
Paris area.<br />
FAPF writes: “... (this participation)<br />
shows that our associative movement is<br />
opening itself to other horizons than its<br />
traditional activities. Associations may be<br />
centres of culture, leisure or sports, but they<br />
should also be centres of reflection and<br />
solidarity towards those who need our support<br />
and help.”
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 105<br />
2. Petition campaign. Agir pour <strong>Timor</strong><br />
launched this week-end a petition to the<br />
new government (formed after the March<br />
elections here). It requests the French government:<br />
a) To demand the immediate release of<br />
Xanana Gusmão and all <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />
prisoners. b) To demand the immediate<br />
opening of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> to foreign observers,<br />
humanitarian and human rights organisations.<br />
c) To demand the visit in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>,<br />
as soon as possible, of the UN Special<br />
Rapporteur on Torture, the Special<br />
Rapporteur on Extra-judicial, Summary or<br />
Arbitrary Executions, the Working Group<br />
on Arbitrary Detention and the Working<br />
Group on Involuntary Disappearances. d)<br />
To end immediately the sales of French<br />
arms and military equipment to Indonesia,<br />
under a direct or indirect form (exploitation<br />
licenses). e) To condition its economic aid to<br />
the respect of human rights by Jakarta’s<br />
regime, in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and in Indonesia. f)<br />
To support the right of the people of <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> to self-determination.<br />
The campaign has already collected over<br />
100 signatures.<br />
3. Reseau Solidarité [Solidarity<br />
<strong>Network</strong>]. This NGOs aim is to “mobilise<br />
the opinion at the sides of the Peoples of<br />
the South fighting for their rights.” For the<br />
first time, they launch a campaign on <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>. 1800 copies of this appeal are mailed<br />
in France, and 250 in Belgium. The<br />
campaign proposes a letter to the<br />
Indonesian ambassador in France, endorsing<br />
the UNHRC resolution and asking the<br />
Indonesian government “to continue the<br />
dialogue with the Secretary-General of the<br />
United Nations for achieving a just, comprehensive<br />
and internationally acceptable<br />
settlement of the question of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.”<br />
Reseau Solidarité also launches campaigns<br />
on specific issues, like unfair labour<br />
practices etc., on the request of the victims.<br />
Their address is:<br />
Reseau Solidarité<br />
5 rue Bizette, 35000 Rennes, France<br />
tel: +33 99 388240, fax: +33 99 380150<br />
4. Reporters sans Frontieres [Reporters<br />
without Borders]. This association of journalists<br />
“acts in favour of the freedom of the<br />
press throughout the world.” They are interested<br />
in breaches of the freedom of the<br />
press in Indonesia, particularly about reporting<br />
on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. The Indonesia/<strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> section of their 1992 report is excellent,<br />
but they are constantly in search of<br />
reliable information. Currently they are interested<br />
in the conditions of Xanana’s trial<br />
in Dili, in particular: - the list of foreign<br />
journalists accredited there - what can they<br />
report on the trial? Also, the way the<br />
Indonesian press reports on it.<br />
We can give partial answers to their<br />
questions, but any more complete information<br />
is welcome. Either post it, forward it to<br />
kahn@mathp7.jussieu.fr or send it directly<br />
to<br />
Jean-Louis Donnadieu<br />
Reporters sans Frontieres<br />
17 rue de l’Abbe de l’Epee, 34000<br />
Montpellier, France<br />
tel: +33 67 79 81 82, fax: +33 67 79 60<br />
80<br />
Many thanks in advance.<br />
EVENTS IN THE<br />
UNITED STATES<br />
REPORT FROM EAST TIMOR<br />
ACTION NETWORK / U.S. TO<br />
THE SOLIDARITY MEETING<br />
Amsterdam, 19 February 19<strong>93</strong><br />
Since our formation a little over a year<br />
ago, ETAN/US has grown to over 600<br />
members in more than half of the fifty<br />
states. As the first broad-based, grassroots,<br />
United States organization focusing on <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> in many years, we discovered that we<br />
are filling a vacuum, and the response is<br />
encouraging ... and overwhelming. We are an<br />
all-volunteer organization with limited<br />
funding, but have been able to achieve much<br />
more than we expected.<br />
Among our major activities in 1992:<br />
• Successfully lobbying Congress to terminate<br />
US military aid to Indonesia<br />
• Working with officials to get the US<br />
Conference of Mayors to pass a resolution<br />
• Organizing or assisting in public meetings<br />
at numerous universities and communities,<br />
and arranging speaking dates in<br />
many others<br />
• Creating a network of active ETAN local<br />
groups in a dozen cities, and developing<br />
working relationships with many other<br />
organizations and public officials<br />
• Providing logistical support for CNRM,<br />
Fretilin and other international <strong>Timor</strong><br />
activists when they come to the US<br />
• Producing four issues of a bi-monthly<br />
Newsletter for all our members, and 20<br />
volumes (over 1100 pages) of a<br />
Document Compilation that goes to subscribers<br />
all over the world<br />
• Organizing protests, memorials and<br />
demonstrations at Indonesian government<br />
facilities, when Indonesian officials<br />
(Alatas and Suharto) visited the US, on<br />
significant anniversaries and internationally<br />
coordinated dates<br />
• Working with the international solidarity<br />
movement on the Urgent Appeal and<br />
other UN-related activities, and providing<br />
information for that movement on US<br />
government policies<br />
• Producing and distributing a nationallybroadcast<br />
cable television program, and<br />
publicizing other media events<br />
• Distributing books, videos, audio tapes,<br />
petitions and other resources to help<br />
educate Americans about <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
• Raising money for victims of the Flores<br />
earthquake<br />
• Providing information, statements and<br />
alerts to American and UN-based journalists,<br />
students and researchers<br />
• Writing or arranging for articles on <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> in many publications, including a<br />
regular column in the Bulletin of<br />
Concerned Asian Scholars<br />
• Sending one of our activists to <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>, and helping him get his observations<br />
out to a wide audience. Receiving<br />
information from inside <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and<br />
disseminating it to appropriate people<br />
• Facilitating US and international computer<br />
communications<br />
• Arranging for the retirement of George<br />
Herbert Walker Bush<br />
• In 19<strong>93</strong>, we will continue these activities.<br />
In addition, we will<br />
• Work with the Australian-initiated<br />
“<strong>Timor</strong>ese UN Project” to bring five <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese exiles on a speaking tour of the<br />
United States in April<br />
• Use the new Noam Chomsky film<br />
Manufacturing Consent to reach out to<br />
new people<br />
• Lobby Congress and the Clinton administration<br />
to cut off US weapons sales<br />
to Indonesia and take other action to increase<br />
pressure the Suharto regime and to<br />
change the US approach to <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> at<br />
the United Nations<br />
SILENT GENOCIDE: EAST<br />
TIMOR STRUGGLES FOR<br />
GLOBAL ATTENTION – AND<br />
FOR ITS LIFE<br />
By Matthew Restall, “Los Angeles Village<br />
View,” Feb. 19-25, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
“Genocide is a word much overused in<br />
modern times for any old massacre. In <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> it suits the circumstances perfectly.”<br />
–"Observer” reporter Hugh O’Shaughnessy<br />
“When I think of Indonesia - a country on<br />
the equator with 180 million people, a<br />
median age of eighteen, and a Muslim ban<br />
on alcohol - I feel I know what heaven looks<br />
like.”
Page 106 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
–Coca-Cola president Donald Keough<br />
Remember those Army wives in the<br />
evening news two years ago talking about<br />
the need to defend Kuwait against the<br />
Iraqis? “Look,” said one, “they raped a<br />
country.”<br />
At about the same time, in another corner<br />
of the world, the following incident was<br />
taking place. “A company of government<br />
troops captured this seventeen-year-old<br />
girl,” a priest later told an undercover British<br />
reporter. “They repeatedly raped her, cut<br />
off her breasts, put one in each hand, cut off<br />
her private parts and stuffed them in her<br />
mouth and left her corpse for the rest to<br />
see.”<br />
This took place in a land that almost no<br />
Americans have even heard of: <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
Were this an isolated act of atrocity, one<br />
might expect it completely to be ignored by<br />
Washington and the U.S. media. But, far<br />
from being isolated, this brutal murder was<br />
only one tragic episode in a seventeen-year<br />
story of torture, murder, and oppression. In<br />
October 1991, yet another young pro- independence<br />
suspect was murdered in <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> by the Indonesian military, which<br />
showed up at his funeral and opened fire on<br />
the unarmed mourners, killing some 200<br />
men, women, and children. The “incident,”<br />
as the government called it, brought the<br />
number of victims in this tragedy to over<br />
200,000. What does our government have to<br />
say about it? Nothing.<br />
The reason is simple enough. The island<br />
nation that is being destroyed has no strategic<br />
value - <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> is located some 400<br />
miles north of Australia - while the aggressor,<br />
Indonesia, is a staunch U.S. ally. So<br />
staunch an ally is Indonesia (whose dictator,<br />
General Suharto, came to power nearly 30<br />
years ago by murdering almost one million<br />
alleged Indonesian communists in less than<br />
two years) that the U.S. not only turned a<br />
blind eye but actually connived in the<br />
invasion of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
A Portuguese colony for centuries, <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> declared independence in December<br />
1974. Six days later, President Ford and<br />
Secretary of State Kissinger visited Suharto<br />
in Jakarta. Kissinger told reporters that,<br />
with respect to <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, “the United<br />
States understands Indonesia’s position on<br />
the question.” The next day, Indonesia invaded.<br />
Said the Indonesian foreign minister<br />
in 1977: “Fifty thousand or perhaps 80,000<br />
might have been killed. It was war... what’s<br />
the big fuss?” His successor admitted two<br />
years later that 120,000 had died.<br />
According to our State Department, 90<br />
percent of the weapons used in the invasion<br />
were U.S.-supplied. “The U.S. regards<br />
Indonesia as a friendly nation,” explained a<br />
department official in 1976, “a nation we do<br />
a lot of business with.” The current death<br />
toll–200,000–amounts to a third of the<br />
population of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
Not that all blame can be assigned to the<br />
Indonesian military government and<br />
Kissinger (how does this man sleep at<br />
night?). Successive U.S. administrations and<br />
other Western governments have studiously<br />
avoided the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> issue for a decade<br />
and a half (only Portugal, in recompense for<br />
its abandonment of the <strong>Timor</strong>ese in the<br />
1970s, has been fighting for international<br />
recognition of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>’s independence).<br />
Pope John Paul II, ever mindful to betray<br />
the common man, recognized the Indonesian<br />
occupation by even refusing to mention it<br />
during his 1989 visit to <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> - despite<br />
the fact that Catholic priests have been<br />
tortured and killed along with their <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />
parishioners.<br />
Another reason why Jakarta has gotten<br />
away with murder is its manipulation of the<br />
international media - and, by the same token,<br />
the media’s failure to shake that manipulation.<br />
Form 1975 to 1989, <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
was completely closed to the world. Yet the<br />
reports that did get out were ignored by the<br />
mainstream press. Not until two New York<br />
City reporters were badly beaten by the<br />
Indonesian military (at the time of the<br />
November 1991 funeral massacre) was attention<br />
drawn to footage of the killings, finally<br />
prompting international condemnation<br />
of Indonesia’ policy.<br />
Even then, the Western political and<br />
media establishments allowed Jakarta’s response<br />
to the outcry - a massive PR campaign<br />
coupled with an increase in repressive<br />
military measures in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> - effectively<br />
to neutralize opposition. Suharto,<br />
hiring the Washington PR firm Hill and<br />
Knowlton (used to peddle the Gulf War to<br />
the American people) to sell the 1991 massacre<br />
as a justifiable “incident,” was assisted<br />
by stooges such as Sens. Inouye and<br />
Stevens, who were “impressed” by the<br />
dictator’s handling of the matter in a visit to<br />
Jakarta last year. Aid cuts and statements of<br />
disapproval had become patchy by early<br />
1992; by the end of the year, business between<br />
the West and Indonesia returned to<br />
normal. Meanwhile, Indonesian troops<br />
captured Xanana Gusmão, head of the<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese independence movement, who<br />
was beaten and tortured for months, forced<br />
to make pro-government statements on<br />
video, and who is now being publicly humiliated<br />
in a show trial.<br />
The world, obsessed by Somalia and<br />
Bosnia and local politics, has ignored the<br />
latest round of brutality in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. New<br />
tales of torture, rape, and murder have yet<br />
to make it to the mainstream press beyond<br />
the occasional <strong>East</strong> Coast editorial. Well<br />
aware of this opportunity, the Indonesian<br />
military has been rounding up thousands of<br />
pro-independence “sympathizers,” who are<br />
now being detained as “guerrillas” and<br />
“terrorists.”<br />
There can be no doubt that what<br />
Indonesia is doing in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> is genocide.<br />
The numbers of <strong>Timor</strong>ese victims, and the<br />
steady, supervised influx of non-<strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />
into the region, speaks of a lethal colonial<br />
policy. Nor can there be any doubt that the<br />
West, in continuing to support the<br />
Indonesian dictatorship through political,<br />
diplomatic, economic, and military aid, is a<br />
party to the genocide. It is reported that<br />
President Clinton has strong views on the<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese issue, but he has yet to make a<br />
public statement on it of any kind. It is time<br />
such a statement is made.<br />
SENATOR PELL STATEMENT<br />
ON EAST TIMOR<br />
In the U.S. Senate, February 24, 19<strong>93</strong><br />
By Claiborne Pell, Democrat-Rhode Island,<br />
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations<br />
Committee. Taken from the Congressional<br />
Record S1991-1992, full text.<br />
Mr. President, last Monday the trial of<br />
the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese resistance leader, José<br />
“Xanana” Gusmão, began in Dili, <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>. Last year I attempted to visit <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> but was denied permission by<br />
President Suharto. Indonesian authorities<br />
told me that such a visit was not convenient<br />
following the massacre by Indonesian security<br />
forces of 75 to 100 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />
civilians during a peaceful demonstration in<br />
Dili on November 12, 1991.<br />
The roots of the conflict in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
are in the December 7, 1975, Indonesian<br />
invasion of the territory following<br />
Portugal’s precipitous withdrawal after 450<br />
years of colonial rule. The U.N. General<br />
Assembly and Security Council have passed<br />
resolutions condemning the invasion and<br />
calling for self determination for the <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese. American policy has been to<br />
accept Indonesia’s incorporation of <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> without acknowledging that it was a<br />
valid act of self- determination.<br />
The Indonesian human rights situation<br />
overall is deeply troubling. As the recently<br />
released Department of State’s annual human<br />
rights report for 1992 observed generally<br />
about Indonesia:<br />
“In addition to extrajudicial killings and<br />
unfair trials, other serious human rights<br />
problems continued. They include torture<br />
and other mistreatment of prisoners and<br />
detainees, arbitrary arrest and detention,<br />
arbitrary interference with privacy, significant<br />
restrictions on freedom of the speech<br />
and press, assembly and association, and on<br />
freedom of movement, and the inability of
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citizens to change their government. Other<br />
problem areas include harassment of human<br />
rights monitors, discrimination and violence<br />
against women, and restrictions on worker<br />
rights.”<br />
Such is the situation or <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> but<br />
even more so. As the State Department report<br />
notes, for example, last October 5 two<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese were shot by security forces.<br />
One was killed immediately while the other<br />
was taken to a military hospital where he<br />
was then beaten to death. Security forces<br />
involved in the Dili massacre were charged<br />
with relatively minor offenses while 13<br />
civilians charged for demonstrating received<br />
extremely harsh sentences. The Indonesian<br />
authorities have yet to locate 66 people<br />
missing following the massacre whom the<br />
State Department now believes are all dead.<br />
The report further states that in “<strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> military authorities continued the<br />
practice of detaining people without charges<br />
for short periods and then requiring them to<br />
report daily or weekly to the police after<br />
their release. There were credible reports of<br />
scores of people being detained without<br />
charges at various times during the year for<br />
enforced vocational training.”<br />
In addition the State Department reports<br />
that the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese are regularly subjected<br />
to arrest, temporary detentions, intrusive<br />
searches and beatings. After Mr.<br />
Gusmão was arrested, there were credible<br />
reports that members of his family and<br />
friends were also detained possibly to ensure<br />
his cooperation with the Indonesian<br />
authorities during his trial.<br />
The International Committee of the Red<br />
Cross (ICRC) which maintains a presence in<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> has been trying without success<br />
for the last 2 months to gain access to about<br />
24 detainees being held in a military<br />
detention center in Baucau. There has been a<br />
persistent pattern or denial to all requests<br />
by international human rights groups. For<br />
example, the ICRC has been permitted only<br />
one visit to Mr. Gusmão’s jail cell since his<br />
capture on November 20, and this only occurred<br />
on December 7. Amnesty<br />
International’s request to observe his trial in<br />
Dili has been denied despite a claim by the<br />
Indonesian Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas,<br />
that the trial would be open. To Indonesia’s<br />
credit, however, several foreign journalists<br />
have been granted permission to visit Dili,<br />
including ABC although the BBC has not<br />
been so authorized.<br />
In addition Indonesian authorities have<br />
restricted defendant access to legal assistance.<br />
When I was in Jakarta, I met with<br />
lawyers from the Indonesian legal aid society.<br />
They were not permitted to meet with<br />
their <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese clients until the day of<br />
their trial. They were denied access to Mr.<br />
Gusmão and instead later received a letter<br />
from him delivered by the police, authorizing<br />
the police to appoint his defense attorney.<br />
According to reports, this attorney<br />
does not speak Mr. Gusmão’s language.<br />
The pattern of past practices and recent<br />
actions all call into question the fairness of<br />
Mr. Gusmão’s trial as well as Indonesian<br />
policy in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
Last year the Congress passed Foreign<br />
Relations Authorization legislation which<br />
the President signed into law urging the<br />
Indonesian government to end all forms or<br />
human rights violations in <strong>East</strong> and calling<br />
for an internationally acceptable solution to<br />
the conflict. Events since then indicate that<br />
the Government of Indonesia still has not<br />
understood the depth of American concern<br />
for the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese.<br />
Recent Indonesian-Portuguese talks<br />
sponsored by the United Nations to resolve<br />
the dispute are at an impasse. The United<br />
States should press both sides to renew<br />
their discussions while including representatives<br />
from <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
The United States should support a<br />
resolution during the 49th session of the<br />
United Nations Human Rights Commission<br />
expressing international concern about the<br />
continuing human rights abuses in <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
Finally, Indonesia should demonstrate its<br />
good faith by inviting the U.N. Special<br />
Rapporteur on Summary and Arbitrary<br />
Executions and the Working Group on<br />
Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances to<br />
come to <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> to recommend procedures<br />
to prevent human rights abuses.<br />
A peaceful resolution to this conflict can<br />
only be achieved by compromise and negotiation<br />
between the parties most involved –<br />
the Indonesian and the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese. I<br />
hope the Indonesians soon recognize the<br />
value of such discussions because their current<br />
policy is doomed to failure.<br />
US STATE DEPARTMENT’S<br />
ANNUAL REPORT ON HUMAN<br />
RIGHTS PRACTICES IN<br />
INDONESIA<br />
This report covers calendar year 1992. The<br />
State Department is legally required by<br />
Congress to send it this and other country<br />
reports every year. The reports are usually<br />
made available to the public each February.<br />
We reprint the entire report because it<br />
provides an insight into past US policies,<br />
since it was prepared under the Bush<br />
administration.<br />
INDONESIA<br />
Indonesia is a very large, populous, developing<br />
country whose people come from<br />
hundreds of different ethnic, cultural, and<br />
linguistic backgrounds. With the largest<br />
Muslim population in the world, it is a<br />
secular state which advocates religious tolerance<br />
and strives to balance the need for<br />
stability and development with respect and<br />
tolerance for the diversity of its people. The<br />
Government requires allegiance to five<br />
broad, guiding principles of national life<br />
known as “Pancasila": belief in one supreme<br />
God, a just and civilized humanity,<br />
Indonesian national unity, democracy, and<br />
social justice. The Government’s authoritarian<br />
rule restricts basic human rights.<br />
Under the Constitution, the highest<br />
authority of the State is the 1,000-member<br />
people’s Consultative Assembly (MPR),<br />
which meets every 5 years to elect the<br />
President and Vice President and set the<br />
broad outlines of state policy. In theory, the<br />
President is subordinate to the Assembly; in<br />
fact, President Suharto and the armed forces<br />
(ABRI) wield predominant political power,<br />
with 20 percent of the DPR, or Parliament,<br />
appointed from the ranks of ABRI. The<br />
Parliament is constitutionally responsible<br />
for making laws but has not used its power<br />
to initiate legislation in the 27 years of<br />
Suharto’s Government. It remains<br />
essentially passive in its dealings with the<br />
executive branch. Quinquennial<br />
parliamentary elections are tightly controlled<br />
by the Government and the military.<br />
The de facto government party, GOLKAR,<br />
won 68 percent of the vote in the most recent<br />
elections in June 1992.<br />
The armed forces which include the<br />
military services and the police number<br />
445,000. The army constitutes about half of<br />
the armed forces and focuses mainly on internal<br />
security. Total military expenditures<br />
for 1989, the last year for which the U.S.<br />
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency<br />
conducted a detailed analysis, were $1.51<br />
billion. Given the relatively modest size of<br />
the military forces and their budget, there<br />
are no indications that efforts will be made<br />
to reduce these expenditures in the near<br />
future. Under a “dual function” concept,<br />
many military officers serve in the civilian<br />
bureaucracy at all levels and in Parliament.<br />
Public discussion about reducing the military’s<br />
role in national affairs increased<br />
during the year. Security forces continued<br />
operations against separatist groups in<br />
Aceh, Irian Jaya, and <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> in 1992.<br />
On occasion, police in Jakarta and Medan<br />
employed excessive force in subduing suspected<br />
criminals.<br />
Indonesia has a largely free market<br />
economy characterized by large oil revenues<br />
and government attempts to encourage<br />
nonoil exports and revenues. The economy<br />
continued to expand in 1992, growing approximately<br />
6 percent despite government<br />
efforts to contain inflation. Although there
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were substantial increases in real incomes<br />
and in the standard of living of most<br />
Indonesians in the past 20 years, the country<br />
remains poor, with significant unemployment<br />
and wide disparities in wealth.<br />
Corruption and influence peddling are endemic<br />
and distort growth and economic opportunity.<br />
The most important human rights developments<br />
during the year concerned government<br />
efforts to cope with the aftermath<br />
of army troops’ killing of unarmed demonstrators<br />
on November 12, 1991, in <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>. At the recommendation of a military<br />
investigating body formed on President<br />
Suharto’s orders, unprecedented disciplinary<br />
action was taken against 6 senior officers<br />
and 10 officers and enlisted men involved<br />
in the incident. Thirteen <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />
civilians were convicted in connection with<br />
the incident. Most of the latter received<br />
extremely harsh sentences. Members of the<br />
security forces involved in the shootings<br />
were charged only with relatively minor offenses.<br />
While the civilians’ trials were open<br />
and generally conducted in accordance with<br />
Indonesian law, they failed to meet all<br />
international standards of fairness.<br />
Subversion trials in North Sumatra and Aceh<br />
also failed to meet international standards.<br />
In addition to extrajudicial killings and<br />
unfair trials, other serious human rights<br />
problems continued. They include torture<br />
and other mistreatment of prisoners and<br />
detainees, arbitrary arrest and detention,<br />
arbitrary interference with privacy, significant<br />
restrictions on freedom of speech and<br />
press, assembly and association, and on<br />
freedom of movement, and the inability of<br />
citizens to change their government. Other<br />
problem areas include harassment of human<br />
rights monitors, discrimination and violence<br />
against women, and restrictions on worker<br />
rights.<br />
In other human rights areas, foreign travel<br />
requirements were eased. The June 9<br />
elections were free from violence and interference<br />
from security forces, and, while<br />
minor irregularities occurred, the actual<br />
balloting was considered fair. The<br />
Government continued its generous policy<br />
toward Indochinese refugees and its cooperation<br />
with the International Committee of<br />
the Red Cross (ICRC) on the repatriation of<br />
Irianese who had fled to Papua New Guinea<br />
because of separatist violence. But official<br />
and informal discrimination against ethnic<br />
Chinese persisted. The Government<br />
accepted a chairman’s statement at the U.N.<br />
Human Rights Commission which commits<br />
it to respond to recommendations on<br />
preventing torture and to allowing greater<br />
access by human rights groups to <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>. However, the Government has as<br />
yet made no response on the recommendations,<br />
nor has it allowed greater access to<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS<br />
SECTION 1. RESPECT FOR THE<br />
INTEGRITY OF THE PERSON,<br />
INCLUDING FREEDOM FROM:<br />
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial<br />
Killing<br />
The number of credible reports of politically<br />
related civilian deaths has declined<br />
substantially since 1991, owing primarily to<br />
the fact that military operations in Aceh,<br />
Irian Jaya, and <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> declined. In Aceh<br />
in particular, the egregious abuses of the<br />
civilian population eased considerably<br />
compared to 1991, as security forces, having<br />
eliminated all but a handful of Aceh<br />
Merdeka (Free Aceh) armed separatists,<br />
turned to civic action projects. The security<br />
situation in Irian Jaya was also generally<br />
calm, with few, if any, civilian deaths reported<br />
due to actions by the military.<br />
In <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, tightened security and<br />
revised military procedures put into place<br />
following the November 12, 1991, shooting<br />
incident in Dili appeared to have led to a<br />
substantial reduction in civilian deaths attributable<br />
to security forces. The exact<br />
number and circumstances of the deaths of<br />
several Fretilin guerrillas reported killed<br />
could not be confirmed. Although the<br />
Government did take action against those<br />
involved in the November 1991 incident in<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, the Government made only<br />
minor efforts in 1992 to try and punish appropriately<br />
those responsible for killings,<br />
torture, and other abuses committed in<br />
previous years in Aceh and other areas.<br />
In Baucau, <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, two <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese were shot on October 5. One was<br />
killed outright by ABRI forces. A credible<br />
source believes the other, who was taken to<br />
a military hospital, was beaten to death<br />
while in the hands of ABRI.<br />
The Government continued to deal with<br />
the November 12, 1991, shooting of civilians<br />
in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. A military “Honorary<br />
Council” appointed by President Suharto in<br />
December 1991 to investigate the conduct of<br />
security forces in the incident announced its<br />
results in February, finding that some<br />
members of the security forces had been<br />
negligent, had failed to anticipate problems<br />
adequately, or had violated military ethics<br />
and discipline. As a result of this finding, 4<br />
officers and 6 enlisted members of the security<br />
forces were court-martialed in May<br />
and June, one on charges of assault and 9<br />
others on charges of exceeding or failing to<br />
obey official orders. No charges were<br />
brought against ABRI personnel for actually<br />
killing civilians during the incident in which<br />
50 to 100 people are thought to have died as<br />
a result of military action. All of the soldiers<br />
were convicted in sessions open to<br />
diplomatic observers and the press and received<br />
sentences ranging from 6 to 18<br />
months in prison. Six senior officers were<br />
disciplined; three, including the brigadier<br />
general who commanded security forces in<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> at the time of the incident, were<br />
discharged. Five other officers were investigated<br />
further, one of whom was to be retired<br />
early because of his alleged failure to<br />
act decisively during the incident.<br />
Little progress was made in locating<br />
those demonstrators still missing after the<br />
incident. The national investigatory commission<br />
refuted earlier military claims that<br />
only 19 people died on November 12 by<br />
stating in December 1991 that “about 50”<br />
were killed. The Commander of the Armed<br />
Forces reported to President Suharto in July<br />
that 66 people remained missing. But despite<br />
more than 6 months of investigation,<br />
the military claimed it had been unable to<br />
find any additional bodies beyond the 19<br />
originally accounted for. Although official<br />
accounts suggested that some of the 66 were<br />
still in hiding, credible sources believed<br />
most, if not all, of them were dead.<br />
Police continue to use excessive lethal<br />
force in efforts to apprehend suspected<br />
criminals. According to press accounts, police<br />
in Jakarta in 1991 shot 75 criminal<br />
suspects who were reportedly fleeing or<br />
resisting arrest, of whom 38 died. In 1992<br />
up to August, 40 suspects had been shot, 20<br />
of whom died. These shootings came against<br />
a background of a declining overall crime<br />
rate, but an increase in violent crimes.<br />
In Medan, the capital of North Sumatra,<br />
where the crime rate was also falling, police<br />
announced in 1992 that 182 suspects had<br />
been shot in 1991, of whom 2 died. In North<br />
Sumatra as a whole 220 suspects were shot.<br />
Through early December 1992, <strong>93</strong> suspects<br />
had been shot in North Sumatra, many of<br />
them 4 and 5 times. Two died of their<br />
wounds. Authorities maintained those shot<br />
had been fleeing and were given warnings, or<br />
were resisting arrest. They also denied they<br />
were pursuing a systematic policy aimed at<br />
discouraging crime. But human rights groups<br />
reported that at least some of those shot<br />
claimed they had been caught first,<br />
handcuffed, and then shot, sometimes at the<br />
police station.<br />
b. Disappearance<br />
There were no reports of politically motivated<br />
abductions in 1992. Government efforts<br />
to account for those still missing from<br />
the November 12, 1991, shooting incident<br />
were ineffective (see Section 1.a.).
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c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or<br />
Degrading Treatment or Punishment<br />
The Indonesian Criminal Procedures<br />
Code (KUHAP) contains a number of provisions<br />
aimed at protecting the accused.<br />
Statements from suspects or witnesses, for<br />
example, are supposed to be extracted<br />
without pressure of any kind, and pretrial<br />
procedures give suspects or their families<br />
the right to challenge the legality of their<br />
arrest or detention. In practice, however,<br />
torture and mistreatment of criminal suspects,<br />
detainees, and prisoners are common,<br />
and the legal protections are violated by the<br />
Government.<br />
The U.N. Special Rapporteur for Torture<br />
stated in his January report that, based on<br />
his November 1991 visit to Indonesia, he<br />
had concluded that “torture occurs in<br />
Indonesia, in particular in cases which are<br />
considered to endanger the security of the<br />
state.” The Special Rapporteur continued<br />
that in areas such as Aceh, Irian Jaya, and<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> which “are deemed to be unstable...torture<br />
is said to be practiced rather<br />
routinely.” In 1992 Aceh continued to be<br />
the area of greatest concern, although various<br />
credible observers noted a general improvement<br />
in the treatment of detainees and<br />
prisoners, perhaps related to the overall<br />
reduction in tensions there.<br />
Police often resort to physical abuse,<br />
even in minor incidents, and prison conditions<br />
in Indonesia tend to be harsh. Officials<br />
have publicly condemned police brutality<br />
and harsh prison conditions and<br />
occasionally instigate disciplinary action,<br />
including transfer, dismissal, trial, and<br />
sentencing to prison terms. In 1992 several<br />
policemen were court-martialed for mistreating<br />
or beating prisoners. In one case, as<br />
reported in the press, the convicted policeman<br />
continued to beat a suspect even<br />
though the suspect had already confessed.<br />
The suspect died shortly thereafter. This<br />
policeman was dismissed from service and<br />
sentenced to 4 years’ imprisonment. In<br />
Aceh, a military tribunal in January sentenced<br />
three policemen to between 2 1/2 and<br />
3 months in prison for beating a prisoner. A<br />
Medan military court in July sentenced a<br />
police sergeant to 14 months in prison for<br />
beating a suspect to death.<br />
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile<br />
KUHAP contains protections against<br />
arbitrary arrest and detention and specifies<br />
the right of prisoners to notification of<br />
family. Warrants must be produced during<br />
an arrest except under specified conditions,<br />
such as when a suspect is caught in the act<br />
of committing a crime. Warrants are issued<br />
by police investigators to assist in their investigations<br />
or if sufficient evidence exists<br />
that a crime has been committed.<br />
Defendants have the right to legal counsel of<br />
their choice at every phase of an investigation<br />
and trial, and also have the right to<br />
know in detail the charges against them.<br />
Defendants are presumed innocent and may<br />
be granted bail. They or their families may<br />
also challenge the legality of their arrest and<br />
detention in a pretrial hearing and are<br />
entitled to sue for compensation if wrongfully<br />
detained. KUHAP also contains specific<br />
limits on periods of pretrial detention<br />
and specifies when the courts must get involved<br />
to approve extensions.<br />
In practice, these safeguards are often<br />
violated. Bail is rarely granted, especially in<br />
political cases. The authorities frequently<br />
interfere with access to defense counsel.<br />
Extensions of periods of detention are<br />
routinely approved. Pretrial proceedings are<br />
rarely initiated. In addition, suspects<br />
charged under the 1963 Antisubversion Law<br />
are subject to special procedures outside of<br />
KUHAP that allow, for example, the<br />
Attorney General on his own authority to<br />
hold a suspect for up to a year before trial.<br />
This 1-year period is renewable without<br />
limit. Special laws on corruption, economic<br />
crimes, and narcotics are similarly exempt<br />
from KUHAP’s protections. The Agency<br />
for Coordination of Assistance for the<br />
Consolidation of National Security<br />
(BAKORSTANAS) operates outside<br />
KUHAP and has wide discretion to detain<br />
and interrogate persons thought to threaten<br />
national security.<br />
National estimates on the number of<br />
arbitrary arrests or detentions without trial<br />
are not available. In Aceh 180 people accused<br />
of being members of Aceh Merdeka<br />
(Free Aceh) were released in 1992 after<br />
varying periods of detention, often incommunicado<br />
and without trial. The authorities<br />
released a total of 653 detainees in 1991,<br />
yielding a total of at least 833 persons detained<br />
without trial for various periods in<br />
connection with the Aceh insurgency. Many<br />
of those released were required to report<br />
back to the authorities at regular intervals.<br />
At least 50 more Acehnese were believed to<br />
be awaiting trial at year’s end, many<br />
without clear knowledge of the charges<br />
against them. (See Section 1.e. for a discussion<br />
of those Acehnese who received<br />
trials.)<br />
In <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> military authorities continued<br />
the practice of detaining people<br />
without charges for short periods and then<br />
requiring them to report daily or weekly to<br />
police after their release. There were credible<br />
reports of scores of people being detained<br />
without charges at various times during the<br />
year for enforced “vocational training.” This<br />
occurred during periods of potential unrest,<br />
such as the February visit to <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> of<br />
the U.N. Secretary General’s Special Envoy,<br />
Amos Wako, and the March approach of<br />
the Portuguese car ferry, the Lusitania<br />
Expresso. Arrests, other temporary<br />
detentions, intrusive searches and some<br />
beatings also occurred just before the<br />
anniversary of the November 12 shootings<br />
and in the aftermath of the November 20<br />
arrest of Fretilin leader José “Xanana”<br />
Gusmão. There have been credible reports<br />
that <strong>Timor</strong>ese detainees have been mistreated.<br />
In addition, 24 <strong>Timor</strong>ese arrested in<br />
the aftermath of the November 12 incident<br />
were officially “released” on March 2 when<br />
the Attorney General decided only 8<br />
detainees in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> would be tried. But<br />
the military commander of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> continued<br />
to hold the 24 in military camps<br />
around <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> for most of the remainder<br />
of 1992 for intensive instruction on<br />
Indonesian civics. Although they were allowed<br />
visits by family members, and 10<br />
were seen by the ICRC, their continued<br />
detention in military facilities without<br />
charges was a clear violation of KUHAP.<br />
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial<br />
A quadripartite judiciary of general, religious,<br />
military, and administrative courts<br />
exists below the Supreme Court. The right<br />
of appeal from district court to high court to<br />
Supreme Court exists in all four systems of<br />
justice. The Supreme Court, with a current<br />
backlog variously estimated at 13,000 to<br />
17,000 cases, does not consider factual aspects<br />
of a case, only the lower courts’ application<br />
of law. Initial judgments are rarely<br />
reversed in the appeals process, although<br />
sentences are sometimes increased or<br />
reduced. A three-judge panel conducts trials<br />
at the district court level, poses questions,<br />
hears evidence, decides guilt or innocence,<br />
and assesses punishment.<br />
Defendants have the right to confront<br />
witnesses. An exception is allowed in cases<br />
where distance or expense are deemed excessive<br />
for transporting witnesses to court,<br />
in which case sworn affidavits may be introduced.<br />
In at least one case in 1992, this<br />
practice had the effect of preventing crossexamination<br />
of prosecution witnesses.<br />
The use in trials of forced confessions<br />
and limitations on the presentation of defense<br />
evidence are common. Defendants do<br />
not have the right to remain silent, and in<br />
several cases in 1992 were compelled to<br />
testify in their own trials and in related trials<br />
running simultaneously. In capital cases and<br />
those involving a prison sentence of 15<br />
years or more, a lawyer must be appointed.<br />
In cases involving potential sentences of 5<br />
years or more, a lawyer must be appointed<br />
if the accused desires an attorney but is indigent.<br />
Destitute defendants can obtain private<br />
legal help, such as that provided by the<br />
Legal Aid Institute (LBH).
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The judiciary in Indonesia is not independent.<br />
The Supreme Court does not have<br />
the right of judicial review over laws passed<br />
by Parliament. Although the Supreme Court<br />
has since 1985 had the power to review<br />
ministerial decrees and regulations, the<br />
Court has not yet used this power; Chief<br />
Justice Purwoto Gandasubrata, however,<br />
took a case dealing with a ministerial decree<br />
controlling newspaper publishing permits<br />
under advisement in November. While<br />
judges receive guidance from the Supreme<br />
Court on legal matters, they are civil<br />
servants employed by the executive branch.<br />
They are subject to considerable pressure<br />
from military and other governmental<br />
authorities. In addition, corruption<br />
permeates the Indonesian legal system. In<br />
civil and criminal cases, the payment of<br />
bribes can influence prosecution, conviction,<br />
and sentencing. The Minister of Justice said<br />
in August that while proving judicial<br />
corruption was often difficult, 266 judges<br />
had been prosecuted since 1980. In<br />
September the newly appointed Chief<br />
Justice of the Supreme Court, who pledged<br />
to combat judicial impropriety,<br />
recommended the dismissal of two<br />
administrative court justices who allegedly<br />
accepted bribes. The final decision, however,<br />
rested with the Minister of Justice and<br />
the President, who at year’s end had not<br />
acted on the matter. The Supreme Court<br />
engaged in a nationwide effort to improve<br />
the quality of district court judges, but<br />
public respect for the legal system remained<br />
low.<br />
The 1963 Antisubversion Law, which<br />
carries a maximum penalty of death, was<br />
attacked in several 1992 subversion trials as<br />
outmoded, unfair, and excessively harsh.<br />
The law makes it a crime to engage in acts<br />
that could distort, undermine, or deviate<br />
from the state ideology or broad outlines of<br />
state policy, or which could disseminate<br />
feelings of hostility or arouse hostility,<br />
disturbances, or anxiety among the population.<br />
The U.N. Special Rapporteur for<br />
Torture recommended in his January report<br />
that the law be repealed. He noted that the<br />
law’s definitions are “very broad and loose,”<br />
and that no requirement exists to prove that<br />
allegedly subversive acts actually<br />
endangered the security of the State, only<br />
that they could have. The vagueness of the<br />
law makes a successful defense virtually<br />
impossible; only two persons have ever<br />
been acquitted of subversion charges. Other<br />
statutes that are part of the Indonesian<br />
Criminal Code and therefore subject to<br />
KUHAP protections make it a felony to insult<br />
or sow hatred against the Government<br />
or to seek the separation of one area from<br />
the rest of the country. Defense attorneys<br />
also attacked these laws as holdovers from<br />
the Dutch colonial period and as unwarranted<br />
restraints on free speech.<br />
More than two dozen subversion trials<br />
were conducted in 1992. As in 1991, the<br />
majority of these cases were in Sumatra<br />
where as of August 19 people had been tried<br />
and convicted of subversion in connection<br />
with the Aceh Merdeka insurgency,<br />
including four members of the armed forces.<br />
According to credible observers, KUHAP<br />
provisions were widely violated in the<br />
conduct of these trials, with lack of access<br />
to attorneys and pretrial mistreatment of the<br />
accused the most frequently cited problems.<br />
Four <strong>Timor</strong>ese were convicted of subversion<br />
in 1992 in trials in Dili and Jakarta.<br />
The four were part of a group of 13<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese charged in connection with either a<br />
November 12, 1991, demonstration in Dili<br />
that preceded the shooting incident, or a<br />
November 19, 1991, demonstration in<br />
Jakarta that protested the shootings. The<br />
other 9 were tried on felony hate-sowing or<br />
sedition charges. These trials were attended<br />
by international observers, including representatives<br />
of the International Commission<br />
of Jurists, the Indonesian and foreign press,<br />
and the U.S. and other embassies. In general,<br />
the trials were substantially fairer than the<br />
Aceh proceedings. But in the Dili trials in<br />
particular, they did not meet international<br />
standards for fair trial. For example, access<br />
to legal counsel was obstructed to the extent<br />
that the defendants in several cases met their<br />
chosen attorneys only on the day their trials<br />
began. Even then, the Dili District Court<br />
barred attorneys in the subversion cases<br />
from representing the accused on technical<br />
grounds until the Supreme Court intervened.<br />
All 13 accused <strong>Timor</strong>ese were convicted.<br />
One received a 6-month sentence and was<br />
released immediately. Seven received<br />
sentences of 10 years or more, and one<br />
received a life sentence, which is unusually<br />
harsh even in a subversion case. There is<br />
reason to believe that these harsh sentences<br />
were intended specifically to deter future<br />
such anti-integration activity. Security<br />
personnel responsible for the shootings<br />
were charged with relatively minor offenses.<br />
The Government does not make available<br />
statistics on the number of people currently<br />
serving subversion sentences or sentences<br />
under the felony “hate-sowing” or sedition<br />
laws. But informed sources indicated some<br />
300 persons were serving sentences for<br />
subversion in 1992, including members of<br />
the banned Communist Party of Indonesia<br />
(PKI), Muslim extremists, and those<br />
convicted of subversion in Irian Jaya, Aceh,<br />
and <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. Scores more were believed<br />
to be serving sentences under the hatesowing<br />
or sedition laws. At least some of<br />
these persons advocated or employed<br />
violence.<br />
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy,<br />
Family, Home, or Correspondence<br />
Judicial warrants for searches are required<br />
except for cases involving suspected<br />
subversion, economic crimes, and corruption.<br />
However, forced or surreptitious entry<br />
by security agencies occurs regularly.<br />
Security agencies intimidate by conducting<br />
surveillance of persons and residences, and<br />
they are believed to monitor selectively local<br />
and international telephone calls without<br />
legal restraint. Government security officials<br />
monitor the movements and activities of<br />
former members of the PKI and its front<br />
organizations, especially persons the<br />
Government believes were involved in the<br />
abortive 1965 Communist-backed coup. The<br />
Government stated in late 1990 that this<br />
latter group then totaled 1,410,333 people.<br />
These persons and their relatives sometimes<br />
are subject to surveillance, required checkins,<br />
and arbitrary actions by officials,<br />
including removal from government<br />
employment and threats of removal from<br />
such employment.<br />
SECTION 2. RESPECT FOR CIVIL<br />
LIBERTIES, INCLUDING:<br />
a. Freedom of Speech and Press<br />
Significant restrictions on freedom of<br />
speech and press exist. Government agencies<br />
exercise broad discretionary authority in<br />
applying laws concerning the rights of<br />
expression, and effective judicial review is<br />
lacking. Public statements or publications<br />
which criticize the Government or are perceived<br />
as critical of Pancasila, top leaders,<br />
their families, or particular religious and<br />
ethnic groups are often harshly punished.<br />
Two students were arrested prior to the<br />
June 9 elections for criticizing the election<br />
process and advocating the casting of blank<br />
ballots or staying away from the polls.<br />
They were released in late June, although<br />
the charges were not dropped. Five<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese were convicted of sowing hatred<br />
against the Government following a<br />
November 19, 1991, peaceful demonstration<br />
in Jakarta (two of these were also convicted<br />
of subversion.) (See Section 1.e.).<br />
The leader of Indonesia’s largest Muslim<br />
organization was prevented by the<br />
authorities from speaking in Surabaya in<br />
April.<br />
The Government operates the nationwide<br />
television network. Private television<br />
companies broadcasting in Jakarta and<br />
Surabaya expanded to other areas, and a<br />
private educational channel began operating<br />
nationally. Some 550 private radio<br />
broadcasting companies exist in Indonesia in<br />
addition to the Government’s national radio<br />
network. Private television and radio<br />
stations, which have considerable pro-
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gramming latitude, are nonetheless subject to<br />
official scrutiny and required to use government-provided<br />
news programs. Private<br />
radio stations frequently supplement such<br />
news programs with their own reports.<br />
Foreign television and radio broadcasts are<br />
readily accessible to those who can afford<br />
the technology.<br />
The print media, including the nation’s<br />
273 daily newspapers, are largely privately<br />
owned. Officials state that the press is<br />
“free” but also “responsible.” It is expected<br />
to support national development and stability,<br />
be educational, and uphold professional<br />
standards. The Government limits the<br />
number of newspaper licenses, the amount<br />
of advertising, and the number of pages, and<br />
exercises strong control over the press<br />
through its control of publishing permits.<br />
Journalists have protested in the past that<br />
the Department of Information has revoked<br />
these permits without giving the offending<br />
publications an adequate chance to defend<br />
themselves. The Government occasionally<br />
censors domestic and foreign publications<br />
and, in a practice known locally as<br />
“telephone culture,” telephones editors to<br />
suppress stories. In May a provincial<br />
official in South Sumatra ordered the<br />
removal of an article dealing with the June<br />
election from the editing tables of the daily<br />
newspaper, the Sriwijaya Post. His actions<br />
were criticized by Home Affairs Minister<br />
Rudini, who said that press censorship<br />
should be reduced to a minimum. Although<br />
the risk of official sanctions and informal<br />
government instructions generally lead<br />
editors to exercise considerable selfcensorship<br />
in disseminating views of government<br />
critics, the domestic print media<br />
continued to press the limits of official tolerance<br />
in coverage of election issues, <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>, and social problems. Cartoons often<br />
pointedly critical of top government officials<br />
appeared routinely in several newspapers.<br />
The Government closely regulates access<br />
to Indonesia, and particularly to certain<br />
areas of Indonesia, by visiting and resident<br />
foreign correspondents and occasionally<br />
reminds the latter of its prerogative to deny<br />
requests for visa extensions. Although an<br />
American reporter was ordered to leave <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> in February, other journalists were<br />
allowed to visit in May and November.<br />
The importation of foreign publications<br />
and video tapes, which must be reviewed by<br />
government censors, requires a permit.<br />
Importers avoid foreign materials critical of<br />
the Government or dealing with topics<br />
considered sensitive, such as human rights.<br />
Foreign publications, from Time magazine<br />
to the Asian Wall Street Journal, are normally<br />
available although several issues were<br />
delayed or embargoed in 1992 when they<br />
carried sensitive stories or, in one case, an<br />
advertisement some found offensive to the<br />
President. In each instance the decision to<br />
halt distribution was attributed to the<br />
private distributor, although government<br />
pressure is assumed to have triggered that<br />
decision.<br />
While academic freedom is provided for<br />
in law, constraints exist on the activities of<br />
scholars. They sometimes refrain from producing<br />
materials which they believe might<br />
provoke government displeasure. Publishers<br />
are often unwilling to accept manuscripts<br />
dealing with controversial issues, and those<br />
that do sometimes find works banned long<br />
after they have been published. Two<br />
academic works were among the four books<br />
banned by the Attorney General in 1992.<br />
Another work banned was the report by the<br />
Legal Aid Institute (LBH) on violations of<br />
KUHAP during the 1991 Aceh subversion<br />
trials. The Attorney General said he banned<br />
the report because it could mislead the<br />
public and damage national unity.<br />
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and<br />
Association<br />
Freedom of assembly and association are<br />
recognized in Article 28 of the Constitution.<br />
Nonetheless, significant controls are placed<br />
on citizens who attempt to exercise this<br />
freedom. All organizations must have<br />
government permission to hold regional and<br />
national meetings. Local jurisdictions often<br />
require prior approval for smaller gatherings<br />
as well. While obtaining such approval is<br />
fairly automatic, the authorities occasionally<br />
withhold permission. Two gatherings of the<br />
discussion group Democratic Forum were<br />
ordered ended by police in February and<br />
April because they lacked a police permit,<br />
even though organizers argued they were<br />
holding informal discussions rather than a<br />
formal meeting. A May gathering of the All<br />
Indonesia Association of Muslim<br />
Intellectuals to discuss human rights was<br />
also ended prematurely because it lacked the<br />
appropriate permit. Regulations were issued<br />
in connection with the June elections that<br />
banned a wide variety of mass meetings<br />
around election day. Student gatherings have<br />
often been the target of disapprovals, and<br />
ostensible political activity at universities<br />
remained forbidden. The Government also<br />
banned political campaigning from<br />
university campuses in connection with the<br />
1992 parliamentary elections.<br />
The 1985 Social Organizations Law<br />
(ORMAS) requires all organizations, including<br />
recognized religions and associations,<br />
to adhere to Pancasila. This provision,<br />
which limits political activity, is widely<br />
understood as being designed to inhibit the<br />
activities of groups which seek to make<br />
Indonesia an Islamic state. The law<br />
empowers the Government to disband any<br />
organization it believes to be acting against<br />
Pancasila and requires prior government<br />
approval for any organization’s acceptance<br />
of funds from foreign donors.<br />
c. Freedom of Religion<br />
The Constitution provides for religious<br />
freedom and belief in one supreme God. The<br />
Government recognizes Islam, Christianity,<br />
Buddhism, and Hinduism, and permits<br />
practice of the mystical, traditional beliefs<br />
of “Aliran Kepercayaan.” Although the<br />
population is overwhelmingly Muslim, the<br />
practice and teachings of the other recognized<br />
faiths are respected. Various restrictions<br />
on certain types of religious activity<br />
exist. According to official statistics,<br />
nearly 400 “misleading religious cults” are<br />
banned, including Jehovah’s Witnesses and<br />
Baha’i. Because the first tenet of Pancasila<br />
is belief in a supreme being, atheism is<br />
forbidden. The legal requirement to adhere<br />
to Pancasila extends to all religious and<br />
secular organizations. The Government<br />
strongly opposes Muslim groups which advocate<br />
establishing an Islamic state or acknowledging<br />
only Islamic law, both of<br />
which are outlawed.<br />
There is no legal bar to conversion between<br />
faiths, and conversions occur.<br />
However, proselytizing between the recognized<br />
religions or in areas heavily dominated<br />
by one recognized religion or another is<br />
considered potentially disruptive and is<br />
discouraged. Foreign missionary activities<br />
are relatively unimpeded. In recent years,<br />
some foreign missionaries have had difficulty<br />
renewing visas or residence permits - a<br />
few on unspecified “security grounds.”<br />
Laws and decrees from the 1970’s do not<br />
allow foreign missionaries to spend more<br />
than 10 consecutive years in Indonesia, with<br />
some extensions granted in remote areas like<br />
Irian Jaya. Enforcement of this policy does<br />
not discriminate by sect or nationality.<br />
Foreign missionary work is subject to the<br />
funding stipulations of the ORMAS Law<br />
(see Section 2.b.).<br />
Indonesians practicing the recognized<br />
religions maintain active links with coreligionists<br />
inside and outside Indonesia and<br />
travel abroad for religious gatherings.<br />
The Government organizes the annual<br />
hajj pilgrimage, and more than 100,000<br />
Indonesians made it in 1992.<br />
d. Freedom of Movement Within the<br />
Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration,<br />
and Repatriation<br />
Restrictions on freedom of movement<br />
exist. The Government maintains an unpublished<br />
blacklist of Indonesians who are<br />
forbidden to leave the country, including<br />
various prominent human rights monitors,<br />
and foreigners who are forbidden to enter,
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especially certain foreign journalists. (The<br />
Government announced in early January<br />
19<strong>93</strong> that the number of persons currently<br />
affected by the travel ban was 8,897.)<br />
Reportedly 14 journalists were removed<br />
from the list in July, but their names were<br />
not made public. The DPR passed new<br />
legislation in 1992 affecting the travel ban<br />
which elevated it to the status of law and<br />
required the Government to notify people<br />
when they have been added to the list.<br />
Previously, people discovered their status<br />
only when they tried to enter or leave. As a<br />
result of the new legislation, the<br />
Government also eliminated the requirement<br />
of obtaining an exit permit. But the new<br />
legislation added a provision that will allow<br />
the Government to ban Indonesian citizens<br />
whose return would pose problems for<br />
national security. This provision was<br />
opposed by human rights groups and certain<br />
legislators but strongly supported by the<br />
DPR’s military faction.<br />
Restrictions exist on movement by<br />
Indonesian and foreign citizens to and<br />
within parts of Indonesia. Permits to seek<br />
work in a new location are required in certain<br />
areas, primarily to control further<br />
population movement to crowded cities.<br />
Special permits are required to visit certain<br />
parts of Irian Jaya. Security checks affecting<br />
transportation and travel to and within <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> occurred sporadically in 1992, and<br />
curfews in connection with military operations<br />
were occasionally imposed. Former<br />
political detainees, including those associated<br />
with the abortive 1965 coup, must notify<br />
authorities of their movements and may<br />
not change their place of residence without<br />
official permission.<br />
Indonesia continued its generous attitude<br />
regarding Indochinese asylum seekers in<br />
1992. It has granted first asylum to over<br />
123,000 Indochinese asylum seekers since<br />
1975 and continued to operate a refugee<br />
facility on Galang Island. Cambodian asylum<br />
seekers, whom the Government considers<br />
illegal immigrants, have been allowed<br />
to remain in Indonesia pending repatriation.<br />
Indonesia also continued its cooperation<br />
with the U.N. High Commissioner for<br />
Refugees (UNHCR) and the ICRC on the<br />
return of residents of Irian Jaya who had<br />
fled to Papua New Guinea during separatist<br />
violence in the eastern portion of the<br />
province. A new wave of several hundred<br />
Irianese fled to Papua New Guinea in 1992<br />
following border clashes between OPM insurgents<br />
and security forces, bringing the<br />
total of Irianese in Papua New Guinea’s<br />
<strong>East</strong> Awin refugee camp to approximately<br />
3,700. More than 100 Acehnese who fled to<br />
Malaysia during the height of separatist<br />
violence in 1990-1991 returned to Aceh.<br />
Others continued to seek asylum in<br />
Malaysia, including a group of 43 who entered<br />
the UNHCR compound in Kuala<br />
Lumpur in June claiming their lives would<br />
be threatened if they returned to Indonesia.<br />
SECTION 3. RESPECT FOR<br />
POLITICAL RIGHTS: THE RIGHT OF<br />
CITIZENS TO CHANGE THEIR<br />
GOVERNMENT<br />
Whatever their theoretical rights under<br />
the Constitution, citizens do not in fact have<br />
the ability to change the Government<br />
through democratic means. President<br />
Suharto and a small group of active-duty<br />
and retired military officers and civilian<br />
officials exercise governmental authority.<br />
The military, under a “dual function” doctrine,<br />
is assigned a role in both security and<br />
sociopolitical affairs. Members of the<br />
military are allotted 20 percent of the seats<br />
in national, provincial, and district parliaments,<br />
and occupy numerous key positions<br />
in the administration. The other 80 percent<br />
of national and local parliamentary seats are<br />
filled through elections held every 5 years.<br />
All adult citizens are eligible to vote,<br />
except active-duty members of the armed<br />
forces, convicted criminals serving prison<br />
sentences, and some 36,000 former PKI<br />
members. Voters may choose by secret<br />
ballot between the three government-approved<br />
political organizations, which field<br />
candidate lists in each electoral district.<br />
Those lists must be screened by<br />
BAKORSTANAS (see Section 1.d.), which<br />
determines whether candidates were involved<br />
in the abortive 1965 Communist<br />
coup or pose other broadly defined security<br />
risks. Critics charge these screenings are<br />
unconstitutional, since there is no way to<br />
appeal the results, and note that they can be<br />
used to eliminate government critics from<br />
Parliament. Strict rules establish the length<br />
of the political campaign, access to electronic<br />
media, schedules for public appearances,<br />
and the political symbols that can be<br />
used.<br />
GOLKAR, a government-sponsored organization<br />
of diverse functional groups, won<br />
68 percent of the seats in the June 9<br />
elections. Two small political parties, the<br />
United Development Party and the<br />
Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI), split<br />
the remaining vote. By law all three political<br />
organizations must embrace Pancasila. They<br />
are not considered opposition parties and<br />
seldom espouse policies much different<br />
from those of the Government, although the<br />
PDI raised several controversial issues<br />
during the 1992 campaign. The leaders of all<br />
these organizations are approved, if not<br />
chosen, by the Government, and their activities<br />
are closely scrutinized and often<br />
guided by government authorities.<br />
GOLKAR maintains close institutional links<br />
with the armed forces and KORPRI, the<br />
nonunion association to which all civil<br />
servants automatically belong. Civil servants<br />
may join any of the political parties with<br />
official permission, but most are members of<br />
GOLKAR. Former members of the PKI and<br />
some other banned parties may not run for<br />
office or be active politically. Although<br />
numerous irregularities were reported during<br />
the June polling, most observers believed<br />
they were not widespread or systematic.<br />
The Government initiated criminal<br />
proceedings against some of those accused<br />
of campaign violations.<br />
The 500 members of the national DPR–<br />
100 appointed military and 400 elected -<br />
consider bills presented to them by<br />
government departments and agencies but<br />
do not draft laws on their own, although<br />
they have the constitutional right to do so.<br />
The DPR makes technical and occasionally<br />
substantive alterations to bills it reviews. It<br />
remains clearly subordinate to the executive<br />
branch. The People’s Consultative<br />
Assembly (MPR), made up of the 500 DPR<br />
members and 500 other members appointed<br />
by the Government and political organizations,<br />
meets every 5 years to devise the<br />
broad outlines of state policy and to elect<br />
the President and Vice President. A new<br />
MPR, which began meeting on October 1,<br />
will hold Presidential elections in March<br />
19<strong>93</strong>. Under the Constitution, the President<br />
is subordinate and responsible to the MPR.<br />
In practice, President Suharto and the<br />
military dominate the political system, and<br />
the MPR’s selection of President Suharto to<br />
repeated terms has been pro forma.<br />
SECTION 4. GOVERNMENTAL<br />
ATTITUDE REGARDING<br />
INTERNATIONAL AND<br />
NONGOVERNMENTAL<br />
INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGED<br />
VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS<br />
The Government generally ignores calls<br />
by domestic human rights groups and activists<br />
for investigations of alleged human<br />
rights incidents, with the notable exception<br />
of the various investigations ordered by<br />
President Suharto into the November 12,<br />
1991, shooting incident in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> (see<br />
Section 1.a.). While various domestic organizations<br />
and persons interested in human<br />
rights operate energetically, the Government<br />
discourages public human rights activities.<br />
Some human rights monitors face<br />
government harassment such as frequent<br />
visits by police or agents from military<br />
intelligence, interrogations at police stations,<br />
cancellations of private meetings (see<br />
Section 2.b.), or restrictions on foreign travel<br />
(see Section 2.d.). The Government
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 113<br />
considers outside investigations of alleged<br />
human rights violations to be interference in<br />
its internal affairs. It expanded on this<br />
concept in 1992, emphasizing its belief that<br />
linking foreign assistance to human rights<br />
observance was unacceptable. This belief<br />
was part of its March decision to reject<br />
Dutch foreign assistance, a decision which<br />
also led to the cutoff of funds from Dutch<br />
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that<br />
receive Dutch government money. Several<br />
Indonesian human rights organizations<br />
received funding from the affected Dutch<br />
NGOs. The Government continued to ban<br />
the entry of high-profile human rights<br />
groups such as Amnesty International and<br />
refused in April a request by two U.S.<br />
Senators to visit <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
Nonetheless, the ICRC continued to operate<br />
in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, Irian Java, and Aceh,<br />
and to visit prisoners convicted of participation<br />
in the abortive, Communist-backed<br />
coup in 1965 as well as convicted Muslim<br />
extremists. A special envoy of the U.N.<br />
Secretary General, Amos Wako, was allowed<br />
to visit Jakarta and <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> in<br />
February. Indonesia also accepted a chairman’s<br />
statement on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> during the<br />
1992 session of the U.N. Human Rights<br />
Commission. That statement noted serious<br />
concerns with the human rights situation in<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, strongly deplored the<br />
November 12, 1991, shooting incident, and<br />
welcomed government actions to cope with<br />
it. It also called on the Government to facilitate<br />
access to <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> by humanitarian<br />
and human rights organizations. Finally,<br />
it looked forward to a report from the<br />
Government on progress in implementing<br />
recommendations from the U.N. Special<br />
Rapporteur on Torture based on his 1991<br />
trip to Indonesia. (See Section 1.c.) Thus far<br />
the Government has neither responded to<br />
the recommendations nor eased access to<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. In 1992 the ICRC also<br />
experienced increasing difficulty gaining<br />
access to <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese prisoners under<br />
conditions defined in its operating agreement<br />
with the Government. The ICRC highlighted<br />
these difficulties after the arrest November<br />
20 of Fretilin leader José “Xanana” Gusmão,<br />
to whom the ICRC finally gained access on<br />
December 7. The ICRC continued to press<br />
for access to other <strong>Timor</strong>ese arrested since<br />
November 1.<br />
SECTION 5. DISCRIMINATION<br />
BASED ON RACE, SEX, RELIGION,<br />
LANGUAGE, OR SOCIAL STATUS<br />
Indonesians exhibit considerable tolerance<br />
for ethnic, racial, and major religious<br />
differences, with the important exception of<br />
official and informal discrimination against<br />
ethnic Chinese. Since 1959 noncitizen ethnic<br />
Chinese have been denied the right to run<br />
businesses in rural Indonesia. Regulations<br />
prohibit the operation of all-Chinese schools<br />
for ethnic Chinese citizens, formation of<br />
exclusively Chinese cultural groups or trade<br />
associations, and public display of Chinese<br />
characters. Chinese-language publications,<br />
with the exception of one officially<br />
sanctioned daily newspaper, may neither be<br />
imported nor produced domestically.<br />
Jakarta city officials burned thousands of<br />
cassettes, compact discs, and books in<br />
Mandarin Chinese in March. Private<br />
instruction in Chinese is discouraged but<br />
takes place to a limited extent. No laws<br />
prohibit speaking Chinese, but the<br />
Government lays heavy stress on the<br />
learning and use of the national language,<br />
Bahasa Indonesia.<br />
Many people of Chinese ancestry have<br />
nonetheless been successful in business and<br />
the professions, and the enforcement of restrictions<br />
is often haphazard. Some ethnic<br />
Chinese have enjoyed particular government<br />
favor. Social and religious groups exist<br />
which are, in effect, all-Chinese and not<br />
proscribed.<br />
Under the law, and as President Suharto<br />
and other officials periodically affirm,<br />
women are equal to and have the same<br />
rights, obligations, and opportunities as<br />
men. Some Indonesian women enjoy a high<br />
degree of economic and social freedom and<br />
occupy important mid-level positions in the<br />
civil service, educational institutions, labor<br />
organizations, the military, the professions,<br />
and private business. Although women<br />
constitute one-quarter of the civil service,<br />
they occupy only a small fraction of the<br />
service’s top posts. Women make up about<br />
40 percent of the overall work force, with<br />
the majority in the rural sector. Despite legal<br />
guarantees of equal treatment, women<br />
seldom receive equal pay for equal work and<br />
disproportionately experience illiteracy,<br />
poor health, and nutrition. Traditional<br />
attitudes which limit women’s aspirations,<br />
activities, and status undercut state policy<br />
in some areas. Several voluntary, private<br />
groups work actively to advance women’s<br />
legal, economic, social, and political rights<br />
and claim some success in gaining official<br />
cognizance of their concerns.<br />
In 1992 there were increasing reports of<br />
violence against women, including rape and<br />
other violence against female domestic servants.<br />
Human rights and women’s rights<br />
groups believed that the police, prosecutors,<br />
and courts were slow to react in many cases,<br />
and many women who were the victims of<br />
sexual crimes were reluctant to report them<br />
to police. This lack of confidence in the<br />
willingness or ability of authorities to take<br />
effective action to combat crime is not<br />
limited to violence against women but is<br />
part of the overall low esteem in which the<br />
criminal justice system is held. The<br />
Government has acknowledged the problem<br />
of domestic violence in Indonesian society,<br />
which some say has been aggravated by<br />
recent social changes brought about by rapid<br />
urbanization. The Government provides<br />
some counseling, and several private<br />
organizations exist to assist women.<br />
Nonetheless, most observers agree the<br />
problem of violence against women remains<br />
poorly documented.<br />
SECTION 6. WORKER RIGHTS<br />
a. The Right of Association<br />
Private sector workers, including those in<br />
export processing zones, are free to form or<br />
join unions without prior authorization.<br />
However, in order to bargain on behalf of<br />
employees or to represent workers in the<br />
Department of Manpower’s labor courts, a<br />
union must register as a mass organization<br />
with the Department of Home Affairs under<br />
the ORMAS Law (see Section 2.b.) and<br />
meet the requirements for recognition by the<br />
Department of Manpower: union offices in<br />
at least 20 of the country’s 27 provinces,<br />
branch offices in at least 100 districts, and<br />
1,000 plant level units.<br />
While there are no formal constraints on<br />
the establishment of unions, the recognition<br />
requirements are a high legal barrier to<br />
recognition and the right to engage in collective<br />
bargaining. In de facto terms, there is<br />
a single union system, and it is the<br />
Government’s stated policy to seek to improve<br />
the effectiveness of the one recognized<br />
union rather than ease the process for<br />
the formation of alternative organizations.<br />
The one union recognized by the<br />
Department of Manpower is the All<br />
Indonesia Workers Union (Serikat Pekerja<br />
Seluruh Indonesia, SPSI). Two other labor<br />
groups, Setia Kawan (Solidarity), also<br />
known as Serikat Buruh Merdeka (SMB,<br />
Free Trade Union), and Serikat Buruh<br />
Sejahtera Indonesia (SBSI, Indonesian<br />
Workers Welfare Union), are attempting to<br />
satisfy the Department of Manpower requirements.<br />
In existence for 2 years, Setia<br />
Kawan is essentially moribund while the<br />
SBSI, created in 1992, continues to attempt<br />
to form the necessary branches prior to applying<br />
for recognition.<br />
The SPSI has 9,071 units out of roughly<br />
26,000 organizable work sites. It has a<br />
membership of about 1 million dues-paying<br />
members, about 1.4 percent of the total<br />
work force. However, if agricultural workers<br />
and others in categories such as selfemployed<br />
and family workers who are not<br />
normally union members are excluded, the<br />
percentage of union members rises to approximately<br />
6 percent.
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Minister of Manpower Decision<br />
1109/men/1986, which defines the procedures<br />
for establishing an SPSI factory unit,<br />
enjoins workers to consult with the employer<br />
during the process of setting up an<br />
SPSI branch. In practice this often means<br />
obtaining the employer’s consent for the<br />
establishment of a unit. There are numerous<br />
reports that employers will agree to the<br />
organization of SPSI units only if they are<br />
allowed to select the units’ officials.<br />
Employers justify this action under the<br />
terms of Ministerial Decision 1109 which<br />
also specifies the requirements for union<br />
officials which include “high educational<br />
background” and possession of “certain<br />
qualities: reliable, highly disciplined....”<br />
Employers argue that they are in the best<br />
position to know which employees possess<br />
these characteristics.<br />
Civil servants are not permitted to join<br />
unions and must belong to KORPRI, a nonunion<br />
association whose Central<br />
Development Council is chaired by the<br />
Minister of Home Affairs. Teachers must<br />
belong to the Teachers’ Association (PGRI).<br />
While technically classed as a union (its<br />
status was changed from an association<br />
similar to KORPRI in April 1990), PGRI<br />
has continued to function more as a welfare<br />
organization and does not appear to have<br />
engaged in trade union activities. State<br />
enterprise employees, defined to include<br />
those enterprises in which the state has a 5-<br />
percent holding or greater, usually are<br />
required to join KORPRI, but there are<br />
some state enterprises which have SPSI<br />
units.<br />
Unions may draw up their own constitutions<br />
and rules and elect their representatives.<br />
However, the Government has a great<br />
deal of influence over the SPSI, the head of<br />
the SPSI is a senior member of GOLKAR,<br />
two senior SPSI officials are Members of<br />
Parliament representing GOLKAR, and the<br />
Minister of Manpower is a member of the<br />
SPSI’s Consultative Council. According to<br />
credible reports, the Government interferes<br />
in the selection of SPSI officers, especially<br />
the placing of retired military officers in<br />
mid-level SPSI positions.<br />
Under the Criminal Code, police approval<br />
is needed for all meetings outside<br />
offices or normal work sites. This provision<br />
also applies to union meetings. Permission<br />
is routinely given to the SPSI. In October<br />
police and the military halted an SBSI<br />
meeting, for which a permit had not been<br />
requested, and briefly detained its organizers<br />
for questioning. A union may be dissolved if<br />
the Government believes it is acting against<br />
Pancasila, but there are no laws or<br />
regulations specifying the procedures for<br />
union dissolution. There have been no actual<br />
cases of dissolution.<br />
The SPSI maintains international contacts,<br />
but is not affiliated with any international<br />
trade union organizations except the<br />
Association of Southeast Asian Nations<br />
(ASEAN) Trade Union Council. Some elements<br />
of the SPSI, such as the seafarers,<br />
maintain links with international trade union<br />
secretariats. The SPSI has an application for<br />
membership with the International<br />
Confederation of Free Trade Unions pending.<br />
While Pancasila principles call for labormanagement<br />
differences to be settled by<br />
consensus, all organized workers, with the<br />
exception of civil servants, have the right to<br />
strike. In practice, state enterprise<br />
employees and teachers rarely exercise this<br />
right. Before a strike can occur in the private<br />
sector, the law requires intensive mediation<br />
by the Department of Manpower and prior<br />
notice of the intent to strike. However, no<br />
approval is required.<br />
In practice, dispute settlement procedures<br />
are not followed fully, and formal<br />
notice of the intent to strike is rarely given.<br />
The Department of Manpower procedures<br />
are time consuming and decisions are handed<br />
down usually only after a prolonged period<br />
has elapsed. These processes have little<br />
credibility with workers and are mostly<br />
ignored. Strikes, therefore, tend to be<br />
sudden, the result of longstanding grievances<br />
or recognition that legally mandated benefits<br />
or rights are not being given. While strike<br />
leaders are not arrested for illegal strikes,<br />
they often lose their jobs. The number of<br />
strikes has continued to increase over the<br />
last several years, some of them in support<br />
of fired union officials but most of them<br />
over failure of companies to pay legally<br />
mandated minimum wages. In 1991 there<br />
were 112 “illegal” strikes officially recorded<br />
by the Department of Manpower, although<br />
the actual number most likely was larger.<br />
When the figures for 1992 are tallied, it is<br />
probable they will show another increase.<br />
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain<br />
Collectively<br />
Collective bargaining is provided for by<br />
law, but only recognized trade unions may<br />
engage in it. The Department of Manpower<br />
promotes collective bargaining as an instrument<br />
of industrial relations in the context<br />
of the national ideology of Pancasila.<br />
The majority of the collective bargaining<br />
agreements between the SPSI and employers<br />
are negotiated bilaterally.<br />
Once notified that 25 employees have<br />
joined a registered union, an employer is<br />
obligated to bargain with them. As a transitional<br />
stage to encourage collective bargaining,<br />
regulations require that every<br />
company with 25 or more employees issue<br />
company regulations defining the terms and<br />
conditions of employment. Before a company<br />
can register or renew its company<br />
regulations it must demonstrate that it consulted<br />
with the union or in its absence a<br />
committee consisting of employer and employee<br />
representatives.<br />
Only about half of the SPSI units have<br />
collective bargaining agreements. The degree<br />
to which these agreements are freely<br />
negotiated between unions and management<br />
without government interference varies. By<br />
regulation negotiations are to be concluded<br />
within 30 days. If not, the matter is<br />
submitted to the Department of Manpower<br />
for mediation and conciliation or arbitration.<br />
Most negotiations are concluded within the<br />
30-day period. Agreements are for 2 years<br />
and can be extended for 1 more year.<br />
Regulations expressly forbid employers<br />
from discriminating or harassing employees<br />
because of union membership. There are<br />
credible reports from union officials, however,<br />
of employer retribution against union<br />
organizers, and the SPSI claims that some<br />
employers discriminate against its members<br />
and workers who desire to form SPSI units.<br />
Charges of antiunion discrimination are<br />
adjudicated by administrative tribunals.<br />
However, many union members believe the<br />
tribunals generally side with employers.<br />
Because of this perceived partiality, many<br />
workers reject or avoid the process and present<br />
their grievances directly to Parliament<br />
and other agencies. Administrative decisions<br />
in favor of fired workers tend to be<br />
monetary awards; workers are rarely reinstated.<br />
Workers can organize without restriction<br />
in a private enterprise, even if it is designated<br />
vital by the Government. If the State<br />
has a partial interest, the enterprise is considered<br />
to be in the public service domain,<br />
but this does not always legally limit organizing.<br />
There are a number of government/private<br />
joint ventures which have SPSI<br />
units and which bargain collectively.<br />
The military or police have been involved<br />
in a number of labor disputes. Workers have<br />
charged that members of the security forces<br />
have attempted to intimidate union<br />
organizers and have beaten strike leaders.<br />
Police and military in a number of instances<br />
have been present in significant numbers<br />
during strikes, even when there has been no<br />
destruction of property or violence.<br />
Military officials occasionally have been<br />
reported present during negotiations<br />
between workers and management. Their<br />
presence has been described as intimidating<br />
by plant level union officials.<br />
Labor law applies equally in export<br />
processing zones.
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c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory<br />
Labor<br />
Forced labor is strictly forbidden and enforcement<br />
is generally adequate. There were,<br />
however, credible reports in 1990 of forced<br />
labor by logging companies among the<br />
Asmat tribe in Irian Jaya. There have been<br />
documented reports of girls being sold as<br />
domestic servants or to brothels, and of men<br />
being sold as agricultural workers. The<br />
Government has thus far failed to follow<br />
through on its promise of an investigation<br />
into these reports.<br />
d. Minimum Age for Employment of<br />
Children<br />
Child labor continues to be a serious<br />
problem in industrial areas. The<br />
Government acknowledges that there is a<br />
class of children who must work for socioeconomic<br />
reasons, and in 1987 the Minister<br />
of Manpower issued Regulation PER-<br />
OL/Men/1987 “On Protection of Children<br />
Forced to Work” to regulate this situation.<br />
This regulation legalizes the employment of<br />
children under the age of 14 who must work<br />
to contribute to the income of their families.<br />
It requires parental consent, prohibits<br />
dangerous or difficult work, limits hours to<br />
4 hours daily, and requires employers to<br />
report the number of children working under<br />
its provisions. It does not set a minimum<br />
age for children in this category, effectively<br />
superseding the government Ordinance of<br />
December 17, 1925, on Measures Limiting<br />
Child Labour and Nightwork of Women,<br />
which is still the current law governing child<br />
labor. It sets a a minimum age of 12 for<br />
employment. However, the 1987 regulation<br />
is not enforced; no employers have been<br />
taken to court for violating it, and no reports<br />
are collected from establishments employing<br />
children. Act No. 1 of 1951 was intended to<br />
bring into force certain labor measures, including<br />
provisions on child labor which<br />
would replace those of the 1925 legislation.<br />
However, implementing regulations for the<br />
child labor provisions have never been issued.<br />
Thus the child labor provisions in the<br />
1951 Act have no validity.<br />
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work<br />
In the absence of a national minimum<br />
wage, area wage councils working under the<br />
supervision of the National Wage Council<br />
establish minimum wages for regions. This<br />
is a quadripartite body consisting of<br />
representatives from labor, management,<br />
government, and universities. It also<br />
establishes a basic-needs figure for each<br />
province - a monetary amount considered<br />
sufficient to enable a single worker or family<br />
to meet the basic needs of nutrition,<br />
clothing, and shelter. The minimum wage<br />
rates constantly lag behind the basic needs<br />
figures and fall short of providing a decent<br />
standard of living. Labor law and ministerial<br />
regulations provide workers with a variety<br />
of other benefits, such as social security,<br />
and workers in more modern facilities often<br />
receive health benefits and free meals.<br />
The law establishes 7-hour workdays and<br />
40-hour workweeks, with one 30-minute<br />
rest period for each 4 hours of work. The<br />
daily overtime rate is 1 1/2 times the normal<br />
hourly rate for the first hour, and twice the<br />
hourly rate for additional overtime.<br />
Regulations allow employers to deviate<br />
from the normal work hours upon request to<br />
the Minister of Manpower with the<br />
agreement of the employee.<br />
Observance of minimum wage and other<br />
laws regulating benefits and labor standards<br />
varies from sector to sector and region to<br />
region. Employer violations of legal<br />
requirements are fairly common and often<br />
result in strikes and employee protests. The<br />
Minister of Manpower has publicly urged<br />
employers to comply with the law and<br />
sternly warned one group of foreign investors<br />
in the sports shoe industry about<br />
compliance with minimum wage regulations<br />
and their culturally insensitive industrial<br />
relations practices. However, in general,<br />
government enforcement and supervision of<br />
labor standards is weak.<br />
Both law and regulations provide for<br />
minimum standards of industrial health and<br />
safety. In the largely Western-operated oil<br />
sector, safety and health programs function<br />
reasonably well. In the country’s 100,000<br />
larger, registered companies in the nonoil<br />
sector, the quality of occupational health<br />
and safety programs varies greatly. The enforcement<br />
of health and safety standards is<br />
severely hampered by the limited number of<br />
qualified Department of Manpower inspectors<br />
as well as the lack of employee<br />
appreciation for sound health and safety<br />
practices. Allegations of corruption on the<br />
part of inspectors are not uncommon.<br />
Workers are obligated to report hazardous<br />
working conditions, and while employers<br />
are prevented by law from retaliating against<br />
those who do, such retaliation does occur,<br />
since the law is not effectively enforced.<br />
COMMENTS ON STATE<br />
DEPARTMENT REPORT:<br />
From: Dave Kohr<br />
Seems to me that, with regard to the<br />
situation in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, this report is a<br />
major whitewash. I don’t see any mention<br />
of the violation of the “right to self-determination”<br />
anywhere, which is after all the<br />
fundamental issue at stake in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
Note that the U.N. does not recognize the<br />
Indonesian “annexation” (read: illegal invasion);<br />
certainly this should be mentioned<br />
somewhere in this report, as should be the<br />
(verifiable) extent of the Indonesian massacres<br />
against the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese over the period<br />
of occupation (i.e., since 1975).<br />
From Bruno Kahn:<br />
Dave Kohr has a good point. The US<br />
stated position has been ambiguous ever<br />
since the invasion. “Even though we are not<br />
satisfied with some aspects of the incorporation<br />
of ET into Indonesia, we have accepted<br />
it de facto.” I quote from memory.<br />
At Congressional hearings or meetings with<br />
the press, the State Dept. has consistently<br />
been embarrassed to explain the coherence<br />
of its position “It has been carefully<br />
worded, I’m sorry, I would hate to misquote<br />
it. I’ll have to look it up.” This was more or<br />
less a reply of Richard Boucher to a journalist<br />
a few weeks after the Santa Cruz<br />
massacre.<br />
Would the Clinton administration be an<br />
opportunity to press the State Department<br />
to clarify the US’s official opposition on<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>? Note that all Western-<br />
European countries, most <strong>East</strong>ern-European<br />
countries and Japan officially do not recognise<br />
the Indonesian annexation. Could the<br />
current US position be challenged on legal<br />
grounds, for example in the framework of<br />
the US administrative law?<br />
TIME TO END AN ATROCITY<br />
Op-ed column in the Boston Globe,<br />
Saturday, February 20, 19<strong>93</strong>. By Arnold S.<br />
Kohen, unabridged<br />
As the Clinton administration gears up to<br />
review the foreign policies it has inherited, it<br />
should be prepared to end a legacy from<br />
Henry Kissinger that has caused terrible<br />
suffering over the past 17 years: the illegal<br />
Indonesian occupation of the former<br />
Portuguese colony of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. During<br />
the presidential campaign, Clinton indicated<br />
the need for change in this area. Now is the<br />
time to follow through.<br />
Indonesia invaded <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, which had<br />
been abandoned by Portugal, in 1975, only<br />
hours after President Ford and Secretary of<br />
State Henry Kissinger left Jakarta, the<br />
Indonesian capital. The available evidence<br />
leaves no doubt that Kissinger and Ford<br />
gave American approval for the invasion.<br />
By late 1976, allegations of large-scale<br />
Indonesian military atrocities in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
surfaced, with reports that 60,000 to<br />
100,000 people had perished. (In 1980,<br />
some reports put the figure at more than<br />
200,000, or one third the population.)<br />
Congressional hearings were held, but Carter<br />
administration officials refused to change<br />
American policy.<br />
In late 1979, horrific photographs of<br />
starving people in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> briefly gained
Page 116 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
attention in the world press. The weight of<br />
evidence made it clear that the <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese had reached this appalling state as<br />
a result of a deliberate Indonesian military<br />
campaign. At least some Carter<br />
administration officials belatedly realized<br />
that the United States should have pressured<br />
Indonesia to abide by UN resolutions<br />
and cease its massive violations of human<br />
rights.<br />
Aside from occasional gestures on human<br />
rights issues, there was little fundamental<br />
change in the <strong>Timor</strong> policy under presidents<br />
Reagan and Bush; the original Kissinger<br />
policy was reiterated time and again.<br />
After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, a<br />
growing youth movement in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
took steps to bring the issue to international<br />
notice. The <strong>Timor</strong>ese youth continue to ask<br />
how the international community can call<br />
Iraq to account but not Indonesia.<br />
When an official from the UN Human<br />
Rights Commission came to <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> in<br />
November 1991, thousands of young people<br />
marched to Santa Cruz Cemetery to commemorate<br />
the killing of an 18-year-old activist.<br />
Without warning, and within view of<br />
a British TV cameraman, Indonesian troops<br />
opened fire on the unarmed marchers, killing<br />
and wounding hundreds. Two American<br />
journalists who also witnessed the massacre<br />
were badly beaten. While the Bush<br />
administration protested the massacre, its<br />
response was muted. On the other hand,<br />
candidate Bill Clinton told an interviewer in<br />
April that the United States had ignored<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> in an “unconscionable” manner<br />
and there would be changes if he were<br />
elected.<br />
In the months since then, things have<br />
scarcely improved. In November 1992, the<br />
Indonesians captured the head of the<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese resistance, Xanana Gusmão, and<br />
by many accounts have launched a steppedup<br />
campaign of torture.<br />
Citing <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> as the reason,<br />
Congress cut off American military training<br />
for the Indonesian armed forces in October<br />
1992. Now the Indonesian government is<br />
said to be worried that the Clinton administration<br />
will reverse the longstanding US<br />
stance of support for its occupation of <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>. Indeed, there are indications that the<br />
Clinton administration may review US<br />
policy.<br />
The new assistant secretary of state for<br />
<strong>East</strong> Asia, Winston Lord, is an old protégé<br />
of Kissinger who had serious disagreements<br />
with his mentor over issues of democracy<br />
and human rights in China. He should<br />
jettison the terrible legacy of Kissinger<br />
policy on <strong>Timor</strong> as well.<br />
Arnold S. Kohen, who has worked for NBC<br />
News, is at work on a book on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
and US foreign policy.<br />
EAST TIMORESE WANT<br />
THEIR CONQUERORS OUT<br />
The New York Times. Letters to the Editor,<br />
Sunday, March 7, 19<strong>93</strong><br />
To the Editor:<br />
Your informative survey of ethnic<br />
struggles around the world mischaracterizes<br />
relations between Indonesia and <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
(front page, Feb. 7). The independence<br />
movement in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> is simply not a<br />
“separatist movement.” Nor is it just another<br />
group clamoring for a place in the<br />
limelight. Some clear international legal<br />
rights are involved here.<br />
Following the purported annexation of<br />
the territory by Indonesia, the United<br />
Nations General Assembly adopted resolution<br />
31/53 of Dec. 1, 1976. Paragraph 1 reaffirms<br />
the inalienable right of the people of<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> to self-determination and independence<br />
and the legitimacy of their<br />
struggle to achieve that right.”<br />
Paragraph 5 “Rejects the claim that <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> has been integrated into Indonesia,<br />
inasmuch as the people of the territory have<br />
not been able to exercise their right to selfdetermination<br />
and independence.”<br />
It is true that the <strong>Timor</strong>ese regard themselves<br />
as ethnically and culturally distinct<br />
from the Indonesians, but they make that<br />
claim not as separatists trying to tear apart<br />
an existing country but as a people who<br />
have been recently – and quite illegally –<br />
conquered.<br />
Roger S. Clark<br />
Distinguished Professor of Law<br />
Rutgers University, Camden, NJ<br />
Feb. 24,19<strong>93</strong><br />
ACTION ALERT: THE LAST<br />
CHANCE FOR THE HOUSE<br />
HUNGER COMMITTEE !<br />
From ETAN/US March 9, 19<strong>93</strong><br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> supporters in the US –<br />
As you know, the Hunger Committee,<br />
chaired by Tony Hall, has been the leading<br />
voice for <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> on Capitol Hill for a<br />
decade or more. There continued existence is<br />
in serious jeopardy. Please call TODAY!!<br />
The Speaker has finally indicated that the<br />
House will consider a separate resolution on<br />
the Select Committee on Hunger, probably<br />
next week. The single vote on the Hunger<br />
Committee must take place by March 31, or<br />
the Hunger Committee will expire forever.<br />
A recent whip check of Democrats by<br />
the House leadership shows an uphill, but<br />
not impossible, battle. There is no time to<br />
write - what is critical now is that as many<br />
people as possible telephone<br />
Representatives. Please telephone members<br />
from your state to request their vote for the<br />
Hunger Committee. Now, more than ever<br />
before, the Hunger Committee needs you to<br />
take a few minutes to telephone.<br />
You know what to say – hunger remains<br />
a terrible problem; the Hunger Committee<br />
leads on critical, life saving initiatives; and<br />
the Hunger Committee is the least expensive<br />
committee on Capitol Hill. One last and<br />
important point to make is that you don’t<br />
appreciate the fact that other committees are<br />
apparently lining up it take the little money<br />
allocated to the Hunger Committee.<br />
Please use the Capitol switchboard to call<br />
your members – the burst of interest may be<br />
noted by House Leadership. The Capitol<br />
switchboard number is: 202-225-3121, or<br />
you can fax through PeaceNet’s Interact<br />
database.<br />
STARVING THE HUNGER<br />
COMMITTEE<br />
Editorial, The Boston Globe Tuesday,<br />
March 9, 19<strong>93</strong><br />
It seems that every time one might feel<br />
inclined to defend Congress some members<br />
do something to prove their proclivity for<br />
marrying folly to duplicity.<br />
A flagrant example is the current campaign<br />
to eradicate the Select Committee on<br />
Hunger and three other select committees.<br />
The House may decide the fate of these<br />
committees early next week.<br />
Pretending to heed the call to clean up the<br />
mess in Washington, a number of ersatz<br />
reformers have hit on the cheap and easy<br />
ploy of saving a symbolic sum of money by<br />
seeming to streamline the committee system.<br />
This stratagem is easy politically because<br />
the select committees are not supported by<br />
powerful special interests such as the oil<br />
business or the aerospace industry. The<br />
constituents of the Select Committee on<br />
Hunger are the 5 million American children<br />
who go hungry every night, the 50,000<br />
young mothers who were restored to the<br />
food supplement program known as WIC<br />
because of the committee’s efforts, the<br />
starving Somalis whose plight the committee<br />
foresaw.<br />
The congressional folly is to scuttle in<br />
the name of reform a committee that serves<br />
real needs. The duplicity is revealed in an<br />
accounting trick: The funds saved by terminating<br />
the select committee will enable<br />
powerful chairmen of such standing com-
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 117<br />
mittees as Energy and Commerce to maintain<br />
or even increase their budgets.<br />
The Senate rejected a similar scheme. Its<br />
select committees were preserved, and all<br />
Senate committees accepted an across-theboard<br />
budget cut. House leaders are<br />
preparing to wipe out their select panels and<br />
institute a “flexible freeze.” This means the<br />
leaders could freeze the overall amount for<br />
committees while deciding which<br />
committees would get more, which would<br />
get less and which would stay the same.<br />
Hungry chairmen would devour funds that<br />
had been spent on hunger.<br />
SPEAKING TOUR: EAST<br />
TIMOR – A NEW<br />
GENERATION OF<br />
RESISTANCE<br />
This is one event in a ten-state, two-country,<br />
five-week speaking tour of five young <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese activists sponsored by ETAN/US,<br />
ETAN/Canada, the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Talks<br />
Campaign (Australia) and the <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />
Association of Victoria. It is reprinted here<br />
as an example.<br />
Tuesday, April 13, 19<strong>93</strong><br />
Goddard Riverside Community Center<br />
5<strong>93</strong> Columbus Ave. (at 88th St.) 7 - 9:30<br />
pm $5, $8, $10 (sliding scale)<br />
Too young to remember the brutal invasion<br />
of their country 17 years ago, the<br />
youth of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> continue to resist<br />
Indonesia’s occupation of their country.<br />
Young <strong>Timor</strong>ese – many now living in exile<br />
– sustain the struggle for self-determination.<br />
This spring, five <strong>Timor</strong>ese activists will<br />
bring their case to U.S. and the United<br />
Nations. Some left <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> shortly after<br />
the invasion, others escaped only recently.<br />
Speakers<br />
• Constâncio Pinto, 30, was a leader of the<br />
November 12, 1991 peaceful demonstration<br />
that ended with Indonesian<br />
troops massacring over 271 people. He<br />
was Executive Secretary of the underground<br />
National Council of Maubere<br />
Resistance (the coalition of most<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese nationalist groups) in <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> from 1989-92. Over the years, he<br />
was arrested several times and tortured.<br />
He escaped <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> in May 1992,<br />
after being intensively hunted by the<br />
Indonesians for seven months.<br />
• Abé Barreto Soares, age 27, official representative<br />
of the National Council of<br />
Maubere Resistance to North America,<br />
went exile in 1991 and now lives in<br />
Toronto.<br />
• Elizabeth Exposto, age 18, and Danilo<br />
Henriques, age 21, students now living in<br />
Australia who fled <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> in 1975.<br />
• Maria Teresa Fernandes, age 24, is a<br />
graduate student and activist who left<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> in 1975 now lives in Portugal.<br />
• Amy Goodman of WBAI/Pacifica Radio<br />
and Allan Nairn of the New Yorker<br />
magazine – U.S. journalists beaten during<br />
the November 12 massacre – will also<br />
participate.<br />
Sponsored by The Learning Alliance and the<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> <strong>Action</strong> <strong>Network</strong> For more<br />
information call: (718)788-6071; (914)428-<br />
7299 ETAN, PO Box 1182, White Plains,<br />
NY 10602<br />
MANUFACTURING DISSENT<br />
The following is excerpted from a leaflet<br />
being distributed at showings of<br />
Manufacturing Consent: Noam Chomsky<br />
and the Media in New York and elsewhere.<br />
The people of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> have suffered<br />
one of the worst catastrophes of this terrible<br />
century, since the Indonesian invasion of<br />
1975. The <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> <strong>Action</strong> <strong>Network</strong> has<br />
succeeded in bringing this awful tragedy to<br />
the awareness of the public and Congress.<br />
Its work has made it possible to hope that<br />
the people of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> may at last enjoy<br />
the right of self-determination for which they<br />
have struggled with such courage and<br />
dedication.<br />
– Noam Chomsky<br />
In 1975, Indonesia invaded <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
with the weapons and blessing of the United<br />
States. Over 200,000 people, nearly onethird<br />
of the population died as result of the<br />
invasion and occupation of the half-island<br />
north of Australia. Throughout the years of<br />
repression, the people of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> have<br />
shown an extraordinary determination to<br />
resist. World attention focused on <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> after years of being ignored by the<br />
media when Indonesian soldiers opened fire<br />
on a nonviolent demonstration on November<br />
12, 1991 – killing over 271 people. This<br />
massacre was different only because it was<br />
witnessed by Western journalists, including<br />
Amy Goodman of WBAI/Pacifica Radio and<br />
Allan Nairn of the New Yorker Magazine.<br />
Last year, a public outcry prompted the<br />
U.S. Congress to terminate military training<br />
assistance to Indonesia.<br />
The <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> <strong>Action</strong> <strong>Network</strong><br />
(ETAN) is working for the right of the <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese to determine their own future.<br />
Since the United States has been one of<br />
Indonesia’s largest weapons supplier,<br />
ETAN is working to mobilize popular sentiment<br />
and pressure on our government to<br />
support <strong>Timor</strong>ese self-determination.<br />
ETAN seeks to protect the human rights of<br />
the <strong>Timor</strong>ese and calls for an end to U.S.<br />
and international military and economic aid<br />
to Indonesia.<br />
The <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> <strong>Action</strong> <strong>Network</strong> is a decentralized,<br />
grassroots, national coalition<br />
with local chapters throughout the U.S.<br />
ETAN organizes public forums, lobbies<br />
Congress and provides videos, books, information,<br />
and speakers.<br />
Now is the time for effective public<br />
pressure in support <strong>Timor</strong>ese independence<br />
to end the genocide there. Join us!<br />
(tear-off coupon and order form)<br />
TIMOR’S UNTELEVISED<br />
TERROR<br />
As the World Looks Elsewhere, A Small<br />
Island Suffers a Hideous War<br />
The Washington Post Outlook<br />
(Commentary) Section<br />
Sunday, March 14, 19<strong>93</strong> Page 2. By Sven<br />
Bergman<br />
DILI, EAST TIMOR - “Can you take<br />
this to the outside world?”<br />
A nervous Catholic priest held a bunch of<br />
papers in his hands, lists with names of<br />
people in his parish who had disappeared or<br />
were imprisoned, tortured or killed in recent<br />
months in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> is half of an island in the<br />
Indonesian archipelago 400 miles north of<br />
Australia. In the last 17 years, as many as<br />
200,000 people - a third of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>’s<br />
population - have been killed by the occupying<br />
forces of the Indonesian government.<br />
Yet unlike the suffering and cruelty in, say,<br />
the former Yugoslavia, the victims and<br />
survivors here have only just begun to<br />
capture the attention of the world.<br />
In November 1991, a British TV crew<br />
was on hand when Indonesian soldiers<br />
opened fire on thousands of young people<br />
participating in a huge pro-independence<br />
funeral march at the Santa Cruz cemetery<br />
here. The videotape of the massacre, which<br />
showed people being shot down, shocked<br />
western politicians - candidate Bill Clinton<br />
among them - into criticizing Indonesia’s<br />
human rights abuses.<br />
Nevertheless, <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> remains tightly<br />
controlled. We did not dare to accept the<br />
priest’s papers. Outside of the building<br />
where we were talking, agents of the everpresent<br />
Indonesian military secret service<br />
were waiting for us. Foreign journalists,<br />
delegations and organizations are allowed<br />
into <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> only on a very selective<br />
basis, and tourists are tightly motored. The<br />
agents decided it was time for us to leave.<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>’s terror began in late 1975<br />
after Portugal withdrew from its colonial<br />
empire. The people of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, ruled
Page 118 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
since the 16th century, were not inclined to<br />
join Indonesia, as West <strong>Timor</strong>, a former<br />
Dutch colony, had done in the 1940s. Four<br />
hundred years of Portuguese rule had created<br />
a distinct language, Tetum, and a distinct<br />
cultural identity. In the fall of 1975, a<br />
leftist group, the Revolutionary Front for an<br />
Independent <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> (FRETILIN), won<br />
a brief civil war and began setting up a national<br />
government.<br />
The military government of Indonesia,<br />
presiding over an island nation with hundreds<br />
of ethnic groups and languages, worried<br />
about the destabilizing influence of an<br />
independent country on its periphery. But<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>’s claim to self-determination had<br />
been recognized in United Nations<br />
resolutions. The Indonesians were also<br />
worried about maintaining good relations<br />
with the rest of the world, especially the<br />
United States. They needn’t have worried.<br />
In December 1975, President Gerald Ford<br />
and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger paid<br />
a state visit to Jakarta, the Indonesian<br />
capital. It is widely thought that Kissinger<br />
and Ford told the Indonesian generals that<br />
the United States would not object to the<br />
annexation of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. The next day,<br />
Dec. 7, 1975, the Indonesian forces, armed<br />
mainly with American weapons, invaded<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
The lightly armed FRETILIN forces offered<br />
strong resistance for three years in the<br />
island’s mountainous interior. The<br />
Indonesian army pursued them, destroying<br />
villages, massacring inhabitants and relocating<br />
refugees in strategic villages. The<br />
Indonesians also destroyed crops, creating<br />
famine. By late 1979, the International Red<br />
Cross and Catholic Relief Services were<br />
comparing the famine in <strong>Timor</strong> to the deliberate<br />
starvation of the citizens of Biafra in<br />
the late 1960s. Protests from U.S. congressmen<br />
helped force Indonesia to allow<br />
foreign humanitarian aid into the besieged<br />
areas. But world attention remained sporadic.<br />
This history is invisible when you first<br />
arrive in Dili, the capital of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. The<br />
city is small and calm. With its distinctive<br />
colonial-era architecture, it could be a port<br />
city in Portugal. Save for the pervasive<br />
presence of Indonesian soldiers, it seems at<br />
first glance like a normal place.<br />
When we drove out to the countryside,<br />
the face of Indonesian occupation became<br />
apparent at the first military checkpoint.<br />
Our hired driver, José, got out to show his<br />
papers to the military police. A large<br />
Balinese soldier leaned over him, studying<br />
the silver ring on José’s hand with an indifferent<br />
look. Then the soldier reached down,<br />
slowly removed the ring and put it on his<br />
own finger. José said nothing. When we<br />
realized what had happened, we wanted to<br />
go back and retrieve the ring. José stopped<br />
us. He just wanted to leave. Fear had forced<br />
him to swallow the humiliation.<br />
We drove west through the dry barren<br />
countryside, passing through resettlement<br />
villages built by the government to accommodate<br />
internal refugees dislocated from<br />
their homes by massive military sweeps.<br />
The villages, strategically placed along main<br />
roads for easy control of the population,<br />
consisted of small, square cement-andbamboo<br />
houses in straight lines. There were<br />
red and white Indonesian flags everywhere<br />
and Indonesian soldiers with U.S.-made M-<br />
16 rifles slung over their shoulders. Morning<br />
and night, military trucks carried<br />
camouflaged soldiers in and out of the<br />
towns. Military helicopters swept overhead<br />
An unofficial curfew left the streets quiet<br />
and empty after nine in the evening. That<br />
same evening we arrived in an isolated<br />
village. About 30 <strong>Timor</strong>ese gathered around<br />
us in the dark.<br />
“Once this was a village full of life. Now<br />
there are only us left,” said an older man<br />
pointing toward the quiet, staring band of<br />
villagers.” All the others are dead.<br />
They wanted to help us, but we had to<br />
drive on - nobody dared to put us up. The<br />
next morning our military babysitters questioned<br />
us about where we had been and took<br />
our pictures. After we made a brief visit to a<br />
Catholic elementary school, the secret<br />
policemen even talked to the nun and her<br />
young pupils. The secret police’s suspicions<br />
left us ill-at-ease, worrying about<br />
the safety of the innocent people who had<br />
talked to us.<br />
Until recently, the West’s concern about<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> has been overshadowed by its<br />
economic ties with the Indonesian government.<br />
“On one side there is a small people<br />
of 600,000,” one priest explained, “and on<br />
the other side a nation with rich natural resources<br />
and 185 million people.<br />
The Santa Cruz massacre in November<br />
1991 did prompt some second thoughts.<br />
The Indonesian government initially put the<br />
death toll at 19. When the British videotape,<br />
which had been smuggled out of the<br />
country, indicated far more casualties, the<br />
estimate was upped to 50. Sources in the<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese resistance put the death toll at<br />
273. Amnesty International estimates that<br />
at least 100 and possibly as many 250<br />
people were killed. Human rights organizations<br />
have also collected eyewitness testimony<br />
that Indonesian soldiers invaded local<br />
hospitals after the massacre and dragged<br />
away the wounded.<br />
The European Parliament and the U.S.<br />
Congress quickly condemned Indonesia.<br />
Last October, Congress cut $2.3 million<br />
dollars in military aid to Indonesia - the first<br />
time in 17 years that Congress has reduced<br />
such aid over the issue of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. On<br />
the campaign trail, candidate Clinton told a<br />
New York radio reporter that <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
had been ignored in an “unconscionable”<br />
manner.<br />
To date, Indonesia has retained strong<br />
international financial backing. The<br />
Consultative Group on Indonesia, a World<br />
Bank consortium of donor countries, decided<br />
in July to give Indonesia $5 billion in<br />
aid, credits and loans in 1992-<strong>93</strong>. But there<br />
are signs that the administration is following<br />
through on Clinton’s campaign statements.<br />
Last week, the United Nations Human<br />
Rights Commission in Geneva approved a<br />
strong resolution on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> that won<br />
unprecedented support from the United<br />
States.<br />
The U.N. action couldn’t be more timely.<br />
Last November, the military arrested<br />
Xanana Gusmão, the leader of the <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />
resistance, and charged him with rebellion,<br />
conspiracy and leading a separatist<br />
movement. As many as 20 relatives and<br />
friends were arrested with him; hundreds of<br />
people have been detained in recent months<br />
for periods ranging from a few hours to a<br />
few months, according to Amnesty international.<br />
Bishop Carlos Ximenes Belo said last<br />
month that the arrested were being subject<br />
to “all types of torture.”<br />
Gusmão is now on trial in Dili. The<br />
Portuguese government, citing various U.N.<br />
resolutions rejecting Indonesian sovereignty<br />
over <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, says that Jakarta “lacks<br />
the legal, political and moral authority” to<br />
put Gusmão on trial. With the exception of<br />
a one hour visit with a representatives of the<br />
International Red Cross, Gusmão has not<br />
been allowed to meet with any independent<br />
observers since his arrest. He has been<br />
shown on TV, however, urging his followers<br />
to surrender, a statement that many believe<br />
was coerced. Indonesian authorities have<br />
selectively admitted international observers<br />
into the courtroom and insist that Gusmão’s<br />
trial is open and impartial.<br />
The leaders of the Indonesian government<br />
remain intransigent. After the Santa Cruz<br />
massacre, Gen. Try Sutrisno, the<br />
commander of the Indonesian Armed<br />
Forces, said that the <strong>Timor</strong>ese who resist<br />
integration into the Indonesian state are<br />
“delinquent people [who] have to be shot,<br />
and we will shoot them.” Last week,<br />
President Suharto, who has ruled Indonesia<br />
for the last 27 years, selected Sutrisno as his<br />
vice president and likely successor.<br />
When we finally boarded the boat to<br />
leave <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, we were visited by two<br />
high-ranking intelligence officers. In a last<br />
awkward effort to influence our impressions,<br />
one of them apologized for our being<br />
followed, interrogated, photographed,
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 119<br />
videotaped and our baggage thoroughly<br />
searched.<br />
“There are good and bad tourists,” he<br />
explained. “Sometimes the bad tourists try<br />
to smuggle out letters from <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>,<br />
letters which later are given to the U.N. ...”<br />
Sven Bergman, a TV journalist in Sweden,<br />
visited <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> late last year.<br />
The article was accompanied by a cartoon<br />
showing a globe turned on its side, with a<br />
blindfolded man, hidden under the base of<br />
the globe, being shot by a soldier.<br />
ETAN/US NEWSLETTER #5<br />
March 19<strong>93</strong>. Newsletter of the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
<strong>Action</strong> <strong>Network</strong>/US. Edited excerpts here, as<br />
much is elsewhere in this compilation.<br />
Contact ETAN for a paper copy.<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese US Speaking Tour Begins!<br />
On March 27, five young <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />
nationalists will arrive in New York to begin<br />
a month-long tour all over the United States.<br />
In addition to meeting with officials in<br />
Washington and at the UN, our guests will<br />
speak at universities, media outlets and<br />
community meetings in more than a dozen<br />
states and provinces.<br />
The participants of the tour were infants<br />
or children when Indonesia invaded their<br />
homeland 17 years ago. They represent a<br />
new generation of resistance, the human<br />
embodiment of a yearning for independence<br />
which cannot be eradicated by terror and<br />
“education.” Although they were forced to<br />
leave their country, these five people have<br />
committed their lives to struggle for the day<br />
they can go home again.<br />
Constancio Pinto, 30, was a leader of the<br />
November 12, 1991 peaceful demonstration<br />
that ended with Indonesian troops massacring<br />
over 271 people. He was Executive<br />
Secretary of the underground National<br />
Council of Maubere Resistance (the coalition<br />
of most <strong>Timor</strong>ese nationalist groups) in<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> from 1989–92. He has been arrested<br />
several times and tortured. He escaped<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> last May, after being intensively<br />
hunted by the Indonesians for<br />
seven months.<br />
Abé Barreto Soares, 27, official representative<br />
of the National Council of<br />
Maubere Resistance to North America,<br />
went into exile in 1991 and now lives in<br />
Toronto. He is a student of English literature.<br />
Elizabeth Exposto, 18, will attend La<br />
Trobe University in Australia. She fled <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> as an infant in 1975, and returned<br />
there four years ago to visit her<br />
grandparents. Her shock at the conditions<br />
there motivated her to speak out in behalf of<br />
her compatriots.<br />
Danilo Henriques, 21 a student and<br />
diplomat-in-training, escaped with his<br />
mother in 1975. He now lives in Australia.<br />
Maria Teresa Fernandes, 24, is a graduate<br />
student and activist who left <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> in<br />
1975 and now lives in Portugal.<br />
Although parts of the tour are still being<br />
organized, many public events are already<br />
set up. In addition, the <strong>Timor</strong>ese will be<br />
meeting with journalists, academics and<br />
public officials to help American opinionmakers<br />
understand their situation and determination.<br />
The list below is only partial<br />
for the cities listed; our guests will also visit<br />
Washington DC, Toronto, Montreal,<br />
Vancouver, Ottawa, and elsewhere. Call<br />
ETAN at (914)428-7299 or Richard Koch at<br />
(908)542-6275 for details.<br />
White Plains, NY March 28, WESPAC<br />
Princeton University, NJ, March 29<br />
Washington DC, March 31, Institute for<br />
Policy Studies. Also many meetings with<br />
US government officials.<br />
Baltimore, MD April 3. Maryland United<br />
for Peace and Justice.<br />
Long Branch, NJ April 5<br />
New Haven, CT April 7, Yale Council on<br />
Southeast Asia Studies.<br />
Providence, RI April 7, Brown University.<br />
Numerous other events in<br />
Providence/Fall River area.<br />
Cambridge, MA April 8-10 Harvard Law<br />
School. Numerous other events in Boston<br />
area, including media.<br />
Bethlehem, PA April 12. Also Kutztown<br />
New York, NY April 13. Numerous meetings<br />
with UN officials, media.<br />
Los Angeles, CA April 14-17 UCLA and<br />
other locations.<br />
Vancouver, BC April 17.<br />
Seattle, WA April 18.<br />
San Francisco/Berkeley, CA April 18-25.<br />
CCSF, UC/Berkeley, etc.<br />
Madison, Milwaukee, Iowa City,<br />
Minneapolis, Chicago.<br />
Ottawa, Toronto, Montreal<br />
Hopes for the Clinton Administration<br />
During the campaign, Clinton characterized<br />
past US policy toward <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>:<br />
“I’m very concerned about what’s happened<br />
in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, and I think we have to<br />
review it. We have ignored it so far in ways<br />
that I think are unconscionable. ... We have<br />
to engage the (Indonesian) government on<br />
the question of how those people are being<br />
treated. And I certainly wouldn’t rule out<br />
the prospect of cutting aid.” New personnel<br />
in Congress and the State Department are<br />
further reason for hope for a change in US<br />
policy toward Indonesia and <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
When American diplomats in Geneva swung<br />
around to support a UN resolution in<br />
March, the chance of a change became real.<br />
Vice President Albert Gore was one of 52<br />
Senators who signed a letter to Bush after<br />
the Santa Cruz massacre. Peter Tarnoff,<br />
Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs,<br />
moderated a forum on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> last year<br />
and is interested and knowledgeable. John<br />
Shattuck, Undersecretary of State for<br />
Human Rights, is a sincere believer in those<br />
rights. The new post of Assistant Secretary<br />
of Defense for Democracy and Human<br />
Rights has been filled by Morton Halperin,<br />
a Nixon-era policy analyst who resigned to<br />
protest the Vietnam war and has been a civil<br />
liberties activist since.<br />
In 1992, the US Congress defied<br />
President Bush to terminate US military<br />
training (IMET) for Indonesia, the first-ever<br />
cut in funding to protest <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. This<br />
year, some of the obstacles to stronger<br />
action are gone. Ronald Dellums, new<br />
Chairman of the House Armed Services<br />
Committee is an outspoken advocate of<br />
military cuts and human rights. His committee<br />
has jurisdiction over arms sales.<br />
Stephen Solarz, who as Chair of the House<br />
Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asian and<br />
Pacific Affairs consistently blocked positive<br />
action, lost his re-election bid. The new<br />
chair, Gary Ackerman, is one of a dozen<br />
Representatives who last year co-sponsored<br />
H.R.5176, a comprehensive aid/trade<br />
sanctions bill against Indonesia over <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
ETAN’s report How to Influence U.S.<br />
Government Policy contains addresses,<br />
phone and fax numbers for key people in<br />
the new Administration and Congress. We<br />
also have an analysis of The Outlook for a<br />
Change in U.S. Policy Toward <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>,<br />
written for the February international<br />
meeting. If you would like both reports,<br />
please send 50c for copying and postage.<br />
Chomsky Film a Hit in US<br />
The new, highly-acclaimed, full-length<br />
documentary film Manufacturing Consent:<br />
Noam Chomsky and the Media is showing<br />
widely. The movie uses <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> as a<br />
case study of how the media ignores important<br />
issues, and ETAN has been working<br />
with the producers and distributors to help<br />
moviegoers channel their new awareness<br />
into action.<br />
If you can leaflet or table, or would like<br />
to arrange a theatrical run in your community,<br />
contact ETAN’s Eleanor Hoffman<br />
at 914-235-1797 or the distributors,<br />
Zeitgeist Films, 212-274-1989. Here is a<br />
partial schedule of upcoming showings:<br />
New York: Film Forum, 209 West Houston<br />
St., March 17 on.
Page 120 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
San Francisco: Castro Theatre, Castro at<br />
Market St. April 9-15.<br />
Olympia, WA: Olympia Film Society. April<br />
11-14.<br />
Orono, ME: University of Maine. April 15.<br />
Berkeley: U.C. Theatre. Apr. 16-22.<br />
Ithaca: Cornell Cinema. April 22-24.<br />
Boston: Brattle Theatre. April23-29.<br />
Washington, DC: Key Theater. April 23-May<br />
7.<br />
St. Louis, MO: Webster Coll. April 23-May 8.<br />
San Diego: Univ. of Calif., April 27.<br />
Los Angeles: NuArt Cinema. April 29-May 5.<br />
Columbus, OH: Wexner Theater, April 30-<br />
May 1.<br />
Rhinebeck, NY: Upstate Films. April 30-May<br />
2.<br />
Cleveland: Cleveland Cinématheque, May 7-8.<br />
Petaluma, CA: Washington Sq. Theatre. May<br />
7-13.<br />
Santa Cruz, CA: The Sash Mill. May 13-19.<br />
San José: The Towne. May 14-20.<br />
International <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Solidarity<br />
Movement Thrives<br />
The 1991 Santa Cruz massacre motivated<br />
the <strong>Timor</strong>ese resistance and its supporters<br />
worldwide, and the energy continues. In<br />
February, representatives of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
solidarity groups from a dozen countries<br />
met in Amsterdam to share information and<br />
coordinate actions. Twenty-nine groups<br />
described progress in public awareness and<br />
the level of pressure exerted on their own<br />
governments, but acknowledged that there is<br />
still a long way to go.<br />
Participants discussed a coordinated approach<br />
to the UN human rights conference<br />
in Vienna this summer, continued pressure<br />
on countries funding Jakarta, particularly<br />
through the CGI, and focused pressure on<br />
the United Kingdom and Germany because<br />
of massive new warship and warplane sales<br />
to Indonesia. The movement will use of<br />
electronic mail to improve communications,<br />
and will work together at the July UN<br />
Decolonization Hearings in New York.<br />
The next international solidarity meeting<br />
will be in Manila, Philippines, in November<br />
19<strong>93</strong>. Contact ETAN/US if you would like<br />
more information. To help us be part of an<br />
international movement, here is contact<br />
information for a few of the groups:<br />
England: TAPOL, 111 Northwood Road,<br />
Thornton Heath, Surrey CR7 8HW.<br />
44/81-771-2904. fax 44/81-653-0322,<br />
tapol@gn.apc.org<br />
Canada: <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Alert <strong>Network</strong>, 104-<br />
2120 W. 44, Vancouver, BC V6M 2G2.<br />
604-264-9973, etantor@web.apc.org<br />
Japan: Free <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Japan Coalition,<br />
Kure YWCA, 20-19 Nishi Kawaraishicho,<br />
Kure, Hiroshima, 737. 81/823-22-<br />
0962, fax 81/823-22-2684, jinglis@igc.apc.org<br />
Portugal: Comissão para os Direitos do<br />
Povo Maubere, Rua Pinheiro Chagas,<br />
77, 2xEsq, 1000 Lisboa, 351/1-352-<br />
8718, fax 351/1-534-009, cdpm@gn.apc.org<br />
Ireland: <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Ireland Solidarity<br />
Campaign, 210 Le Fanu Rd,<br />
Ballyfermot, Dublin 10. 353/1-623-<br />
3148.<br />
Resources<br />
ETAN is printing some new T-shirts,<br />
and we also have copies of Telling: <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> Personal Testimonies 1942-1992.<br />
This book, written by Michele Turner and<br />
just published in Australia, costs $20 and<br />
contains nearly 50 oral accounts of ordinary<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese people, recounting what they<br />
have witnessed. It adds a human dimension<br />
to <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>’s grim statistics.<br />
Our T-shirts include the traditional “Free<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>” with the FRETILIN flag (now<br />
on black instead of white), as well as two<br />
new designs: (1) “<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>: To Resist Is<br />
To Win” with a photo of a young boy with<br />
his arms outstretched in a victory sign in<br />
front of a banner at the Santa Cruz<br />
demonstration, and (2) “<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>:<br />
Indonesia’s Killing Field” with a photo of a<br />
man in a cemetery with mountains in the<br />
background. The shirts have “End U.S.<br />
Support of Indonesian Genocide” or “End<br />
U.S. Support of the Indonesian Occupation”<br />
on the back. They come in Large and Extra<br />
Large.<br />
Write for our full resource list. If you<br />
order videos, T-shirts, or books, please add<br />
$3 for postage.<br />
INÍCIO DA DIGRESSÃO<br />
TIMORENSE PELOS EUA<br />
By José Antonio Barros Basto, March 29, on<br />
pt-net<br />
Olà a todos:<br />
Depois de uma ausência devida ao meu<br />
“qualifying” (que jà està pelas costas,para<br />
meu grande alívio e alegria...), regresso ao<br />
convívio da rede par vos trazer notícias<br />
frescas da digressão dos estudantes timorenses<br />
por terras da AMérica do Norte.<br />
Desloquei-me ontem a White Plains, um<br />
subu’rbio (?) de NYC ‘a sede da WESPAC,<br />
por assim dizer, o organismo mãe da<br />
ETAN/US (<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Alert <strong>Network</strong>),<br />
onde se realizou um “potluck” - jantar<br />
volante em que cada membro leva comida<br />
(eu cà levei iscas de bacalhau, bastante<br />
apreciadas - excepto pelos vegetarianos<br />
radicais, que nem peixe comem B-)<br />
Constâncio Pinto não tinha ainda chegado<br />
aos EUA B-( Depois de todos os problemas<br />
com o bilhete e com o visto de entrada,<br />
ontem foi posto fora do avião da TAP por<br />
causa de “overbooking” ... [esta faz-me<br />
lembrar uma piada ouvida jà hà muitos anos:<br />
” – Sabes o que significa T.A.P.?”<br />
” – Take Another Plane ...” ]<br />
Este serà porventura o elemente chave da<br />
digressão aqui pelos EUA. Figura envolvida<br />
até Novembro 91 na rede clandestina de<br />
libertação em <strong>Timor</strong> Leste, ele poderà dar o<br />
toque mais dramàtico na ilustração dos<br />
problemas que o seu país atravessa nas<br />
mãos do Exército Indonésio. Fiquei<br />
particularmente chocado ao saber que o seu<br />
filho (que ele nunca viu), de 9 meses,<br />
encontra-se preso (!!!) juntamente com a<br />
mâe (mulher de Constâncio), assim como os<br />
seus pais, em pura represàlia pelo facto de<br />
Constâncio ter conseguido escapar de <strong>Timor</strong><br />
Leste.<br />
Ele não tem notícias da família hà meses,<br />
apenas sabendo que estão (estavam ?) nas<br />
mãos dos Indonésios ...<br />
Os outros estudantes com os quais convivi<br />
um pouco ontem são ainda muito jovens,<br />
e, com a excepcão de um deles, so’ tem<br />
conhecimento da situação em <strong>Timor</strong> Leste<br />
por terceiras pessoas ou por ocasionais<br />
visitas ‘a ilha.<br />
São pessoas muitas simpàticas, tem todos<br />
um inglês muito capaz (dois deles<br />
estudam na Austràlia, um outro no Canadà e<br />
outra em Portugal) o me parece um critério<br />
de escolha acertado dada a necessidade de<br />
transmitir a sua mensagem a uma audiência<br />
directamente, sem tradutores, e para minha<br />
alegria, todos falam português fluentemente<br />
(e muito melhor que 99% dos filhos dos<br />
imigrantes que conheço por aqui...).<br />
A pequena apresentação que fizeram deu<br />
uma visão mais pessoal da histo’ria recente<br />
de <strong>Timor</strong> Leste, com famílias desaparecidas,<br />
tradiço~es culturais espezinhadas ou<br />
subvertidas aos interesses de assimilação<br />
Indonésia, fugas atribuladas, dificuldades de<br />
aclimatação em países distantes...<br />
Houve também uma sessão de diapositivos<br />
representativos da etnografia timorense,<br />
onde mais uma vez fica marcado o equílibrio<br />
com que o povo <strong>Timor</strong>ense vive com a sua<br />
Terra-Mãe e a riqueza das suas tradiço~es...<br />
Como pequena nota, descobri ontem que<br />
existe um grande respeito na cultura<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ense pela “Mulher,” pela lado maternal<br />
da Terra, que é representado por um<br />
símbolo de “Lua Crescente,” em geral usado<br />
na testa, enquanto que o poder do Homem,<br />
simbolizado pelo Sol (círculo(s) dourado(s)<br />
suspensos ao peito) é associado com os<br />
guerreiros tradicionais, armados com uma<br />
espada, que creio ser passada de geração em<br />
geração... De modo algum as mulheres são<br />
colocadas em posição subalterna, situação<br />
que outras sociadades so’ agora começam a<br />
combater ...<br />
No tocante ao massacre de 12 Novembro<br />
91, mais uma vez a ausência de Constâncio
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 121<br />
Pinto foi notada: para quem jà assistiu aos<br />
depoimentos de Allan Nairn ou Amy<br />
Goodman (sobretudo esta u’ltima...) fica<br />
com uma ideia bem mais pungente do que foi<br />
aquela terrível manhã em Dili...<br />
Nesta altura em que a posição dos EUA<br />
mostra claros sinais de esperança em relação<br />
a <strong>Timor</strong> Leste, graças ‘a mudança de<br />
admnistração (digam o que disserem, nada<br />
podia ser pior que a admnistração Bush - exdirector<br />
da CIA e seguidor das políticas do<br />
“Sr.” Kissinger no Sudeste Asiàtico, das<br />
quais no’s bem sabemos o resultado...), esperemos<br />
que esta digressão sirva para esclarecer<br />
mais americanos da situação crítica<br />
que se vive em <strong>Timor</strong> Leste, de modo a<br />
manter a pressão para que a administração<br />
continue pelo bom caminho (como indicado<br />
pelo recente “volte-face” em Genebra da<br />
delegação “profissional” dos EUA -funcionàrios<br />
de carreira- que inverteram completamente<br />
a sua posição na Conferência de Direitos<br />
Humanos da ONU, depois de devidamente<br />
intruídos a partir de Washington...).<br />
Quem estiver aqui pelos EUA, e tenha<br />
possibilidade de se deslocar a uma das numerosas<br />
conferências, aconselho vivamente a<br />
que o façam, e tentem contactar com os<br />
participantes <strong>Timor</strong>enses, pois é evidente<br />
que eles continuam bastante ligados a<br />
Portugal, quer pela língua, cultura e também<br />
laços de sangue ...<br />
Para mais pormenores, ou detalhes da<br />
digressão (jà publicados na rede hà dias<br />
atràs) estou ‘a vossa disposição.<br />
Um abraço a todos<br />
José Anto’nio<br />
EAST TIMOR: SOARES<br />
WRITES TO CLINTON<br />
Expresso, 20 March 19<strong>93</strong>. Translated from<br />
Portuguese, unabridged<br />
(Lisbon) This week, Pres. Mario Soares<br />
wrote a letter to Pres. Bill Clinton, thanking<br />
him for the decisive support the US gave to<br />
draft resolution on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, passed on<br />
5th in Geneva, by the UN Human Rights<br />
Commission. Observers considered the<br />
resolution, presented by the Twelve, a<br />
victory for Portuguese diplomacy over<br />
Indonesian’s position.<br />
Soares is believed to have played a part<br />
in this process, on the request of the Foreign<br />
Minister, Durão Barroso, himself. A few<br />
days before the discussion of the draft<br />
resolution, (the passing of which inverted,<br />
for the first time in 10 years, the tendency<br />
of reciprocal forces in favour of Jakarta),<br />
Durão Barroso requested the Portuguese<br />
Head of State to intercede with the US<br />
President, and explain to him the importance<br />
of Portugal’s diplomatic concerns on this<br />
matter.<br />
In addition to sending a message to<br />
Clinton, the President called a meeting with<br />
the US Ambassador (who, because he was<br />
out of Lisbon, was substituted by the<br />
Charge d’Affaires) in order to convey<br />
Portugal’s concerns, and Lisbon’s interest in<br />
getting the Twelve’s draft resolution approved.<br />
A Presidential Palace source considered<br />
that “the excellent work done by the<br />
Portuguese diplomats” at the UN<br />
Commission, combined with the intervention<br />
of Soares, was fundamental. US support<br />
for the resolution, which condemned<br />
Indonesia’s non-compliance with a series of<br />
obligations with regards <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, is also<br />
believed to have been essential in drawing in<br />
support from countries traditionally in<br />
favour of Jakarta.<br />
Still on the same subject, Soares is also<br />
going to send a message to the UN Secretary<br />
General, Mr. Boutros Ghali.<br />
TIMORESE EXILE<br />
ACTIVITIES<br />
THE “FREEDOM FOR<br />
XANANA, FREEDOM FOR<br />
TIMOR” COMMISSION<br />
From CDPM, April 3<br />
In the aftermath of Commander Xanana<br />
Gusmão’s arrest and the intensification of<br />
repression in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, a group of<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese, joined by Portuguese solidarity<br />
groups, took the initiative and constituted<br />
an informal organisation to work for the defence<br />
of <strong>Timor</strong>ese political prisoners.<br />
Professor Fernando Sylvan agreed from the<br />
outset to be its Honorary Chairman.<br />
Thus, in January 19<strong>93</strong>, the “Freedom for<br />
Xanana, Freedom for <strong>Timor</strong>” Commission<br />
was formed. Its first initiative was to organise<br />
a human chain on 19 January linking the<br />
UN Information Centre with the Apostolic<br />
Nuncio’s offices in Lisbon. At these two<br />
places, a group of celebrities delivered<br />
letters addressed to the UN Secretary<br />
General and to Pope John Paul II,<br />
respectively.<br />
Objectives<br />
Its main aim being the defence of<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese political prisoners, the “Freedom<br />
for Xanana, Freedom for <strong>Timor</strong>”<br />
Commission defined the following objectives:<br />
- the systematized collection of information<br />
about the prisoners, their families, and<br />
conditions affecting their lives;<br />
- the collection of the above information<br />
produced by international, non-governmental<br />
organisations, parliaments, governments,<br />
and other institutions, as well as news or<br />
studies published in the press;<br />
- publicizing human rights violations in<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, in particular those affecting<br />
political prisoners;<br />
- establishing contact with international<br />
and national organisations which could<br />
collaborate in the effective defence of political<br />
prisoners;<br />
- the organisation of activities to gain<br />
concrete support destined for <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />
political prisoners and their families.<br />
Participation<br />
The “FREEDOM FOR XANANA,<br />
FREEDOM FOR TIMOR”<br />
COMMISSION is an informal group, open<br />
to offers of help from all those who wish to<br />
do something to assist <strong>Timor</strong>ese political<br />
prisoners.<br />
To ensure the level of functioning required<br />
to achieve its objectives, decisions on<br />
the program of activities and the respective<br />
coordination will be carried out by the<br />
founding group. It is hoped, however, that<br />
an increasingly wider group of citizens will<br />
take part in all the initiatives, so as to<br />
strengthen solidarity with the people of<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and, especially, with the political<br />
prisoners and their families.<br />
The ability to carry out actions aimed at<br />
specific objectives was chosen as the basic<br />
criteria for joining the “FREEDOM FOR<br />
XANANA, FREEDOM FOR TIMOR”<br />
COMMISSION. All kinds of activities are<br />
welcome, from all people, groups, and institutions<br />
wishing to contribute towards<br />
helping <strong>Timor</strong>ese political prisoners.<br />
Take an initiative and join the<br />
Commission!<br />
SOME EXILES: HORTA HAS<br />
NEVER BEEN MANDATED<br />
Suara Pembaruan 17 March 19<strong>93</strong> Dateline:<br />
Lisbon Byline: Petrus Suryadi Slightly<br />
abridged<br />
Comment: Suryadi is a crony of Nuno<br />
Rocha, the Portuguese journalist notorious<br />
for his flattering report about <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
after a visit in 1988. The remarks made by<br />
José Martins are predictable, but did Abilio<br />
Araujo really say what he is quoted as<br />
saying? And to such a character? Suryadi is<br />
widely regarded as someone working closely<br />
with Bakin, the Indonesian intelligence<br />
agency. – TAPOL<br />
Some <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese leaders from various<br />
organisations living in Portugal are of the<br />
opinion that Ramos Horta has never been<br />
given a mandate to speak on behalf of the
Page 122 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese people and he only uses <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> to pursue his own interests, according<br />
to Petrus Surjadi who has just visited<br />
Portugal.<br />
“Does Ramos Horta really represent the<br />
entire people of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>,” Pembaruan<br />
asked Manual Martinez, chair of the organisation<br />
of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese Catholic refugees in<br />
Portugal, who replied:<br />
“He’s never been given a mandate to<br />
represent the people of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, especially<br />
the people in my organisation. The<br />
ones who are entitled to represent the <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese people are the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />
people themselves. He only speaks for himself.”<br />
Had Ramos Horta ever had any communication<br />
with his group? “Never. And he<br />
needn’t do so. What he wants is what the<br />
communists want, not the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese,”<br />
said Martinez. He hoped the Indonesian<br />
government would open the door to dialogue<br />
with his group.<br />
As for José Martins, the chair of Kota<br />
party, son of the chief of Ermera, he said<br />
Horta had never got a mandate from him.<br />
“He’s only fighting for himself. He talks in<br />
New York, Geneva and Australia, but only<br />
for himself,” said Martins. According to him<br />
the Portuguese government has no idea how<br />
to solve the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> question which is<br />
why he, as an anti-communist, wants to<br />
have the chance to have a dialogue with the<br />
Indonesian government so as to be able to<br />
help solve the question of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
“<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese people should talk to<br />
Indonesia and not to Portugal,” he said<br />
firmly.<br />
He says he was a journalist working for a<br />
Portuguese paper in October 1975 and<br />
travelled back and forth from Dili to<br />
Atapupu when tens of thousands of<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese coming from UDT, Apodeti and<br />
Trabalhista, fled to the Indonesian side, who<br />
then expressed the wish of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> to<br />
become a part of Indonesia.<br />
Fretilin’s chair<br />
Dr. Abilio Araujo, the chair of Fretilin<br />
who met Pembaruan at his office, said that<br />
as chair of Fretilin he had never given<br />
authority to Ramos Horta to speak on behalf<br />
of Fretilin. “So who did he get authority<br />
from to speak for Fretilin and the people of<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>?”<br />
“Horta got his mandate from Xanana<br />
Gusmão and has never spoken on behalf of<br />
Fretilin. He speaks for the CNRM (National<br />
Council of Maubere Resistance), and<br />
represents Falintil troops and the underground<br />
movement,” said Abilio. He said<br />
Xanana was never president of Fretilin; he<br />
was commander of Falintil and its base organisation,<br />
CNRM. Falintil is no longer the<br />
armed force of Fretilin, but it is a kind of<br />
opposition force of CNRM.<br />
Abilio Araujo even asked: “Who gave<br />
Ramos Horta authority to speak on behalf<br />
of the people of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> everywhere, as<br />
he is a multi-fascist?”<br />
For the past year, Ramos Horta has been<br />
the target of accusations by various <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese who are now living in Portugal. He<br />
is considered as having used the name of<br />
Fretilin and spoken on behalf of the <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese people, from New York to<br />
Australia, for his own personal interests.<br />
Horta hopes to draw financial benefits by<br />
speaking on behalf of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> because he<br />
has received many contributions from<br />
various organisations and states to fund his<br />
leftist lobby.<br />
COMMENT FROM BRUNO KAHN:<br />
To put Suryadi’s essay in some perspective,<br />
it is interesting to note that José<br />
Martins quite willingly recognises that he<br />
worked for Indonesian intelligence in the fall<br />
of 1975. I know at least of two instances: a<br />
radio interview of the Indonesian service of<br />
Radio Nederland at the end of last year, and<br />
a debate on the private Portuguese TV<br />
channel shortly after Xanana’s ‘interview’<br />
by the military (also at the end of last year).<br />
He appears to be now strongly against his<br />
former allegiances. I think he gave some<br />
details on the Intel manipulations, but don’t<br />
recall the details. Perhaps CDPM can be<br />
more specific.<br />
FRETILIN/AUSTRALIA WANTS<br />
MOVEMENT<br />
RESTRUCTURED<br />
Publico, 20 March, Original Portuguese<br />
(Lisbon) Fretilin’s Committees in<br />
Australia decided yesterday to start restructuring<br />
the movement based abroad, and appealed<br />
to Abilio Araujo and Ramos-Horta to<br />
adhere to this process. Following a meeting<br />
with Fretilin’s Directive Commission’s<br />
leaders, the Committees decided to reaffirm<br />
their “total and unconditional submission”<br />
to Fretilin’s central bodies inside <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>. According to the communiqué, the<br />
appeal to Abilio Araujo and Ramos-Horta is<br />
aimed to get them to “actively make every<br />
effort to implement the decisions of<br />
Fretilin’s Directive Commission on the<br />
restructuring of its external wing.”<br />
FRETILIN WITHOUT<br />
MAU HUNU<br />
Publico, 22 March (before his capture) By<br />
J.T.N. Original Portuguese unabridged<br />
(Lisbon) Fretilin’s representative in<br />
Portugal, Abilio Araujo, believes that<br />
Commander Ma’Hunu, Xanana Gusmão’s<br />
successor at the head of the <strong>Timor</strong>ese armed<br />
Resistance, should discontinue the functions<br />
he currently fulfills in the party, which<br />
today combine with his role as leading<br />
official on the Maubere Resistance National<br />
Council (CNRM) within the territory.<br />
According to Abilio Araujo, Ma’Hunu<br />
ought to follow Xanana Gusmão in as far as<br />
the latter, in 1989, decided to resign from<br />
the posts he occupied in the party structure.<br />
But: on formally resigning, Ma’Hunu should<br />
commit himself to not interfere in Fretilin<br />
life, thereby avoiding a repetition of the<br />
behaviour for which Abilio Araujo himself<br />
censured Xanana in 1991.<br />
According to Abilio Araujo, this would<br />
be the only way to ensure that the CNRM<br />
is effectively non- partisan. The CNRM<br />
being the supra-political-party body,<br />
destined to represent the different currents<br />
which go to make up the <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />
Resistance. At the moment, Ma’Hunu<br />
serves simultaneously on the CNRM, the<br />
Politico- Military Commission of the<br />
Resistance (CPM-R), and Fretilin’s<br />
Directive Commission (CDF), of which he<br />
is Secretary.<br />
The proposal to restructure Fretilin<br />
within the territory - of which Ma’Hunu’s<br />
separation (“freeing” him, so he can become<br />
leader of all the resisters) would be just the<br />
first step - was backed by Abilio Araujo,<br />
following a series of suggestions indicating<br />
changes in the structure of the party’s<br />
“external front.”<br />
Gathered in Melbourne last weekend,<br />
representatives from the Fretilin<br />
Committees in Australia as well as some<br />
“mandatory comrades” from the Directive<br />
Commission - such as Mari Alkatiri, based<br />
in Mozambique, and Alfredo Borges<br />
Ferreira - decided to set in motion a reorganization<br />
process of the “external wing” of<br />
the party, the preparation of which would<br />
be carried out by the said “mandatories” and<br />
delegates from the Committees.<br />
In the text which resulted from that<br />
meeting, Ramos Horta (current CNRM representative<br />
abroad), Guilhermina Araujo,<br />
and Abilio Araujo himself are invited to<br />
“actively engage themselves” in the restructuring<br />
process of Fretilin’s external wing.<br />
Contacted by Publico in Lisbon, Abilio<br />
Araujo “welcomed” the Melbourne decisions,<br />
but said that “the priority should be<br />
the internal front, where the consequences
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 123<br />
of Xanana Gusmão’s capture still cannot be<br />
fully evaluated.”<br />
TIMORESE RESISTANCE<br />
TRIES TO AVOID DIVISIONS<br />
Expresso 3 April 19<strong>93</strong> Dateline : Lisbon<br />
Byline : Mario Robalo Translated from<br />
Portuguese abridged<br />
The <strong>Timor</strong>ese Resistance risks seeing its<br />
already precarious unity weakened further.<br />
This week in Sydney, Australia, Fretilin’s<br />
External Relations officer, Mari Alkatiri, and<br />
UDT Vice-Chairman João Carrascalao,<br />
agreed on the need for restructuring the<br />
“external Front” of the Resistance, so as to<br />
avoid its “multi-polarization.” On the same<br />
occasion, the UDT took up an unprecedented<br />
position in relation to the current<br />
guerrilla leader, Ma’Hunu. This <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />
party recognises that Xanana Gusmão’s<br />
substitute does not need to leave Fretilin<br />
(the Central Committee of which he is<br />
Chairman) in order to be considered the<br />
supreme leader of the entire Resistance.<br />
This position, however, opposes statements<br />
made previously by the head of<br />
Fretilin’s External Management, Abilio<br />
Araujo who, as well as believing that<br />
Ma’Hunu ought to resign from Fretilin in<br />
order to take up leadership of the struggle,<br />
stated that, firstly, a restructuring of the<br />
“internal front” should take place, before<br />
any change in the leadership of Fretilin’s<br />
external component. In other words, this<br />
party - from which Xanana had resigned to<br />
take on the leadership of the Resistance -<br />
could witness two currents emerging, with<br />
irreconcilable concepts of leadership. (...)<br />
MISCELLANEOUS<br />
ARTICLES<br />
SYAFEI ON MILITARY<br />
OPERATIONS IN EAST<br />
TIMOR FROM 1975<br />
Kedaulatan Rakyat (daily), 26 Jan. 19<strong>93</strong><br />
Extract only, via TAPOL<br />
This article is the first in a series of three.<br />
The following quotation shows the present<br />
military commander, Brig-Gen. Theo Syafei,<br />
who has done several tours of duty in <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>, including a stint in the second half of<br />
the 1970s, being frank about the role of the<br />
armed forces in the war in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. The<br />
official line is that only ‘Indonesian<br />
volunteers’ took part. The Syafei account<br />
also gives the lie to Indonesian claims about<br />
the alleged election of two delegates from<br />
each of the 13 districts of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> to the<br />
‘people’s assembly’ of May 1976 which took<br />
the decision to ask Jakarta for integration.<br />
[See, “<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, Building for the Future,”<br />
published by the Indonesian Foreign<br />
Ministry, Jakarta, 1992, page 10] If the<br />
army was still fighting to control the district<br />
and sub-district capitals in the period 1977-<br />
1978, how could elections possibly have<br />
been held?<br />
Is Theo Syafei keen for the history of<br />
Indonesia’s secret war in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> to be<br />
rectified to give the army its due? Another<br />
clue to this likelihood is the publication in<br />
Tempo on 5 December 1992 of a photograph<br />
of Indonesian troops coming off a<br />
landing craft. The caption reads: “ABRI<br />
troops landing in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> (1975)” This<br />
is the first time we have seen anything in the<br />
Indonesian press giving substance to the<br />
historically known fact of the Indonesian<br />
invasion in 1975.<br />
The following is an unabridged translation<br />
of the first four paragraphs of the KR article<br />
of 26 January 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
The province of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> is, up to the<br />
present, still identical with ABRI (the armed<br />
forces), and the native population still tend<br />
to be closer to ABRI than to the village and<br />
district heads. Such a psychological<br />
condition has come about because, ever<br />
since 1976, the community has been far<br />
more closely involved with ABRI in rebuilding<br />
this former Portuguese colonial<br />
territory. This is acknowledged by the<br />
commander of the operational command,<br />
(Kolakops), Brig.Gen. Theo Syafei.<br />
“For hundreds of years the people of<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> have been cooped up under a<br />
coconut shell. It was only after they proclaimed<br />
their integration with the Republic<br />
of Indonesia that they were able to extricate<br />
themselves from the conditions which had<br />
bound them till then,” he said, adding that<br />
the close proximity of the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />
people with ABRI dates back to the territorial<br />
operations which ABRI have been<br />
waging since 1975.<br />
Initially, ABRI had to cope with Fretilin<br />
which among other things possessed 17,000<br />
weapons. In the period from 1975 to 1977-<br />
78, territorial operations were focused on<br />
seizing control of the district and sub-district<br />
towns from Fretilin’s ‘stranglehold.’<br />
As a result, the rebels were pushed back,<br />
forcing them to flee to the hills or the villages<br />
in the interior,” said Brig.Gen Theo<br />
Syafei.<br />
In the period 1978-80, ABRI had the<br />
task of seizing the villages ‘controlled’ by<br />
Fretilin, whereas in 1981-83, the territorial<br />
operation was charged with wiping out the<br />
remnant forces of Fretilin. “In 1983, Fretilin<br />
was left with 700 weapons. However, in<br />
1984, Fretilin declared that opposition<br />
would no longer be waged by means of<br />
armed struggle but by political struggle and<br />
the era of political resistance began in 1986,”<br />
Theo Syafei went on.<br />
ABRI then began to balance combat operations<br />
with territorial operations. “From<br />
1986, territorial operations were aimed at<br />
healing the ‘wounds of the people.’ This<br />
was done by building the infra-structure for<br />
education, health, religious practice and<br />
other economic infra-structure,” he said.<br />
INFORMATION WANTED ON<br />
ENVIRONMENTAL<br />
IMPLICATIONS OF THE<br />
INDONESIAN OCCUPATION<br />
From: John Hontelez, chairman Friends of<br />
the Earth International<br />
PO Box 19199<br />
1000 GD Amsterdam, the Netherlands<br />
fax: +31.20.6221369<br />
Friends of the Earth International is a<br />
worldwide federation of 51 national environmental<br />
organisations. It has decided to<br />
pay special attention to the situation in <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>, and intends to send a delegation to<br />
this country to investigate the environmental<br />
implications of the Indonesian occupation.<br />
We are trying to find information<br />
about the state of the environment in <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>, the direct and indirect effects of the<br />
policies of the Indonesian authorities on<br />
environmental degradation, and the effects<br />
on the health and general condition of the<br />
people of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> of this degradation.<br />
Please inform me about information you<br />
have or where to find it.
Page 124 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
FRIENDS OF THE EARTH<br />
INTERNATIONAL ‘92 AGM ON EAST<br />
TIMOR.<br />
Friends of the Earth International is a<br />
federation of 51 autonomous environmental<br />
organisations worldwide.<br />
1. Considering that the violation of human<br />
rights and the genocide of the people of<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> carried out by the Indonesian<br />
government is a crime against humanity;<br />
2. Considering that the ongoing transmigration<br />
policies forced upon the poor<br />
population of Java (up to 100,000), put<br />
at risk the local environment with projects<br />
of re-colonization;<br />
3. Considering that the destruction of tropical<br />
rainforests in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> (notably<br />
through napalm in the late 1970’s) as a<br />
form of controlling the populations, removing<br />
them to strategic villages, is a<br />
way of finishing with <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>’s natural<br />
heritage;<br />
4. Considering that these interventions are<br />
continuously being denounced by international<br />
organisations such as Amnesty<br />
International and the Red Cross;<br />
The Assembly EXPRESSES its profound<br />
concerns about the situation in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>,<br />
CONDEMNS all the actions of the<br />
Indonesian Government and EXPRESSES<br />
its solidarity with the people of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
The AGM gives the mandate to the FoEI<br />
Executive Commit- tee to send a delegation<br />
to <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> preferably consisting of four<br />
people: a Portuguese, a Dutch, an Australian<br />
and an Indonesian, in order to analyze the<br />
situation mentioned above and produce a<br />
report to be presented to the AGM and<br />
made public. FoEI is not required to provide<br />
the funding to implement this decision.<br />
Valsain, Spain, 5th November 1992<br />
EAST TIMOR COMPUTER<br />
WAR GAME<br />
From TAPOL, 18 Feb.<br />
If a major computer game company has<br />
created a game about getting Indonesia out<br />
of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, it must mean that <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
has edged onto the general consciousness.<br />
And who knows? The game may encourage<br />
some computer buffs to find out more.<br />
Anyway, here is what the promotion ad says<br />
(abridged): [Unfortunately, the contact who<br />
sent this to us did not say which journal he<br />
found it in.]<br />
Gulf war simulations have been given a<br />
new realism by the latest strikes into Iraq.<br />
A batch of games - including Falcon 3 and<br />
Desert Strike - took you to the flashpoints<br />
and put you in Allied pilot’s seats.<br />
Now as the Bosnia civil war fights on,<br />
games creators have chosen the UN as your<br />
side. [Are you listening, Dr. Boutros<br />
Boutros-Ghali?]<br />
But this conflict occurs in the island of<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and the enemy is the Indonesian<br />
army....<br />
You control a task force with the aim of<br />
re-taking <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and you get your orders<br />
and then take off, ready for action.<br />
Etc., etc., etc.<br />
The label is Domark, the title ‘AV8B<br />
Harrier Assault,’ the price 39.99.<br />
AUSTRALIAN TV STARTS<br />
BROADCASTING TO<br />
SOUTHEAST ASIA<br />
Japan Economic Newswire, By Catharine<br />
Munro<br />
(Sydney, Feb. 16 Kyodo) Australian<br />
television will beam from Papua New<br />
Guinea to China from Wednesday, leading<br />
some people to question the effect it will<br />
have on politically sensitive countries.<br />
Australian Television International<br />
(ATVI) will broadcast from an Indonesian<br />
satellite Palapa B2. Launched in 1991 by a<br />
Chinese Long March rocket, the Palapa<br />
satellite also broadcasts the American giant<br />
Cable News <strong>Network</strong> (CNN) into the<br />
Southeast Asian region.<br />
The new service is produced by the<br />
Australian Broadcasting Corporation<br />
(ABC), a government-funded body.<br />
The satellite ‘footprint’ reaches<br />
Australia’s closest neighbors, who are often<br />
very distant in culture, religion and politics.<br />
The service will include news and current<br />
affairs focusing on Southeast Asia, as well<br />
as television shows which depict Australian<br />
culture.<br />
Since ATVI will broadcast into countries<br />
which either suppress information or are<br />
offended by Western cultural attitudes, their<br />
policy is to ‘self-censor’ their programs. In<br />
this way they hope to avoid offending<br />
countries such as Indonesia and China.<br />
This policy may conflict with ATVI’s<br />
commitment not to censor the news.<br />
Executive Producer of News Prokash<br />
Mirchandani told Kyodo News Service that<br />
he would not ‘run away from any stories.’<br />
Mirchandani said that as long as ATVI’s<br />
reports are balanced, there would no problems<br />
with the policy of free reporting.<br />
Yet Indonesia has criticized Australia’s<br />
media for reporting politically sensitive issues.<br />
For example, Jakarta has made official<br />
complaints over reports about the island of<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, which was occupied by<br />
Indonesia in 1976.<br />
Mirchandani said that ATVI would follow<br />
the policy of Radio Australia which has<br />
been broadcasting in the region for 53 years.<br />
But Radio Australia has often been the<br />
target of criticism from various countries in<br />
this region, according to Dr. Michael van<br />
Langenberg, who chairs the Department of<br />
Southeast Asian studies at Sy dney<br />
University.<br />
‘Radio Australia has probably come under<br />
more flack than the BBC and CNN,’<br />
said van Langenberg.<br />
Currently, nine of the 15 nations which<br />
fall under the satellite footprint have significant<br />
restrictions on the distribution of<br />
satellite dishes needed to pick up the service.<br />
Restriction of access to the dish may<br />
difficult to maintain, according to Project<br />
Director Bruce Donald.<br />
China has restricted but not banned the<br />
dishes. Donald suggests that people are<br />
finding innovative ways of receiving satellite<br />
television, so that the censorship is effectively<br />
side-stepped.<br />
‘We’re hoping for a wok-led television<br />
revolution in China,’ he jokingly told the<br />
Sydney Morning Herald, a leading<br />
Australian daily.<br />
PRESS COMMUNIQUÉ FROM<br />
THE INTERNATIONAL<br />
SOLIDARITY MOVEMENT<br />
AMSTERDAM, 19-21 February 19<strong>93</strong><br />
The annual meeting of the International<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Solidarity Movement was held<br />
in Amsterdam, Netherlands from 19-21<br />
February 19<strong>93</strong>. Representatives of 26<br />
groups from Europe, United States, Canada<br />
and Japan attended the meeting. The groups<br />
evaluated their 1992 campaigns and<br />
proposed several campaigns to be launched<br />
in 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
The international solidarity movement<br />
was very honored that five representatives<br />
of the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese resistance were also<br />
present at the meeting: Abilio Araujo (Head<br />
of the External Delegation of FRETILIN),<br />
José Ramos Horta (Special Representative<br />
of CNRM, the National Council of Maubere<br />
Resistance), Constancio Pinto (Executive<br />
Secretary for the Clandestine Front,<br />
CNRM), José Amorim Dias (CNRM<br />
Representative for Europe) and Zacarias da<br />
Costa (UDT Regional Committee, Portugal).<br />
In the last few months, the level of repression<br />
inside <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> has increased<br />
markedly. In the wake of the November 20,<br />
1992 arrest of resistance leader Xanana<br />
Gusmão, the occupying Indonesian military<br />
forces have rounded up scores of other <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese, both civilians and from the underground<br />
resistance. They have intensified<br />
the terror to its worst level in a decade.<br />
Nevertheless, the solidarity groups were<br />
encouraged by the determination of the <strong>East</strong>
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 125<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese people to fight for their selfdetermination<br />
in extremely difficult circumstances.<br />
As they have since the<br />
Indonesian invasion of 1975, and during the<br />
killings of one-third of their population, the<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese people continue to struggle.<br />
The groups present were inspired by this<br />
commitment and rededicated ourselves to<br />
support them.<br />
The international solidarity groups on<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> present at the Amsterdam<br />
meeting are sending the following message to<br />
the resistance in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>:<br />
• Acknowledging the difficult situation<br />
within <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, especially after the<br />
arrest of the leader of the national resistance,<br />
Xanana Gusmão, we want to express<br />
our deep concern with the ongoing<br />
struggle in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> against the<br />
Indonesian occupation.<br />
• The representatives of the solidarity<br />
groups from Europe, the United States,<br />
Canada and Japan, which were present at<br />
the meeting, also want to emphasize that<br />
we will continue to support the united<br />
front of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese resistance under<br />
the new leadership of Mau Hunu.<br />
• The international solidarity movement<br />
will strengthen its effort in our own<br />
countries to contribute to the struggle of<br />
the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese aiming to result in a<br />
genuine process of self- determination.<br />
• We are very concerned with the situation<br />
of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese political prisoners in<br />
Indonesian jails, especially Xanana<br />
Gusmão, who have been tortured and<br />
forced to act against their own beliefs,<br />
and we demand their immediate freedom<br />
• We express our hope that the proposed<br />
talks between Portugal and Indonesia<br />
under the auspices of the Secretary<br />
General of the United Nations in April in<br />
Rome will show progress favourable to<br />
the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese people. We want to<br />
emphasize the importance of the participation<br />
of representatives from the <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> resistance in further negotiations<br />
on the future of the territory.<br />
• The international solidarity movement<br />
will continue to lobby our national parliaments,<br />
the European Parliament and<br />
international institutions and launch<br />
campaigns in order to direct the attention<br />
of the international community to the<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> issue.<br />
EAST TIMOR WILL NOT BE<br />
FORGOTTEN!<br />
A LUTA CONTINUA!<br />
Amsterdam, February 21, 19<strong>93</strong><br />
Komitee Indonesia, <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Group<br />
Holland, Funding Agency XminY,<br />
International Platform of Jurists for <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>, Front Demokrasi Indonesia, Aksi<br />
Setiakawan, Free Papua Movement,<br />
Indonesian Resources Information Project<br />
(Holland); Tapol, British Coalition for <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> (United Kingdom); <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
Ireland Solidarity Campaign (Ireland);<br />
Initiative fur die Menschenrechte aller<br />
Burger Innen der ASEAN-Staaten<br />
(Germany); SOS <strong>Timor</strong> (Belgium); Agir<br />
pour <strong>Timor</strong>, Association <strong>Timor</strong>-Oriental<br />
(France); Comissao para os Direitos do<br />
Povo Maubere, Paz es Possivel em <strong>Timor</strong><br />
Leste, Oporto University, Paz e Justica<br />
para <strong>Timor</strong> Leste (Portugal); Coordinamento<br />
Italiano dei Gruppi di Solidarieta con il<br />
Populi <strong>Timor</strong>ese (Italy); <strong>Timor</strong> Oriental<br />
(Luxembourg); Osttimor Kommitten<br />
(Sweden); Japanese Supporting Committee<br />
for Darwin <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese School, Free <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> Japan Coalition (Japan); <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
<strong>Action</strong> <strong>Network</strong> (USA); <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Alert<br />
<strong>Network</strong> (Canada).<br />
YEAR OF THE SANDALWOOD<br />
EXHIBITION, LISBON<br />
On March 21st, World Tree Day, a special<br />
exhibition about environmental issues in<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, will be opened to the public, in<br />
Lisbon. The main focus will be forestry<br />
issues with special emphasis on the<br />
Sandalwood Tree which is under threat of<br />
extinction. This species once flourished in<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> but during the Sixteenth and<br />
Nineteenth centuries it was extensively used<br />
as a form of trade due to its spicy oil and<br />
precious wood.<br />
WE NEED YOUR SUPPORT!<br />
In addition to information panels, with<br />
photos and texts, we will be setting up a<br />
“Message board” for visitors. We would like<br />
to invite you and your friends to join in and<br />
send poems, messages, stories etc. so that<br />
these too can be displayed on our board.<br />
This exhibition is a joint effort and supported<br />
by the Commisão de Defensa do<br />
Povo Maubere, Amigos da Terra-Friends of<br />
the Earth Portugal, the Lisbon City Council<br />
and others. This will run until April 11th,<br />
and everyone is welcome to come and visit<br />
the exhibition in the “Casa de <strong>Timor</strong>” or<br />
House of <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
PS your messages can also be sent by fax<br />
to: Amigos da Terra 351 1 347 3586 and we<br />
will pass them on! Thanks for your help.<br />
EVANS FACES PROTEST<br />
OVER TIMOR<br />
Green Left Weekly, March 2. By Nick<br />
Everett<br />
BRISBANE - Foreign minister Gareth<br />
Evans, addressing a breakfast on Australia’s<br />
trade relations with Asia, faced questions<br />
and a protest picket from members of Aksi -<br />
Indonesia Solidarity <strong>Action</strong> on February 25.<br />
Evans described Australia’s relationship<br />
with Indonesia as “very strong, very firm,<br />
very close” and claimed this to be “a much<br />
more productive environment for working<br />
change, both political and economic, than<br />
maintaining the kind of stridency” of countries<br />
“like Portugal [which] jump up and<br />
down on the international scene whenever<br />
some tragedy like Dili occurs.”<br />
Aksi spokesperson Brenden Greenhill<br />
stated, “Indonesia’s invasion of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
has, since 1975, cost the lives of 200,000<br />
people. The massacre in Dili, and continued<br />
human rights violations throughout<br />
Indonesia, reveal the intransigence of the<br />
regime.<br />
“The role of the Australian government,<br />
uncritically aiding the Suharto regime while<br />
companies like Woodside Petroleum and<br />
BHP plunder <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>’s oil, makes Evans<br />
and the Labor government complicit in these<br />
atrocities.”<br />
DEBATE: PORTUGUESE<br />
TEACHERS RESOLUTION ON<br />
EAST TIMOR<br />
12th March 19<strong>93</strong><br />
Note: The following text is the translation<br />
from FENPROF (National Teachers<br />
Federation) which was email by Bruno Kahn<br />
on 5th March. A letter by Teachers<br />
Association of the Republic of Indonesia is<br />
also included.<br />
Submitted by: FENPROF (Portugal) and<br />
ATU (Australia)<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> - a forgotten people<br />
The military occupation of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
by the Indonesian army in 1975 has already<br />
caused the death of over 200.000 <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />
(a third of the population), the plight of tens<br />
of thousands and the creation of a climate of<br />
terror and intimidation. As Amnesty<br />
International has frequently made public,<br />
hundreds of young people are judged in<br />
summary fashion, without the right to any<br />
type of legal defence and very often<br />
condemned to death. Xanana Gusmão, the<br />
leader of the <strong>Timor</strong>ese resistance against the<br />
Indonesian occupation for the last 16 years,<br />
is now facing that very same situation.<br />
Indonesia has also made determined
Page 126 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
attempts to destroy the historical and<br />
cultural identity of the <strong>Timor</strong>ese people.<br />
It is therefore proposed that the 34th<br />
WCOTP Assembly of Delegates, held in<br />
Stockholm from January 21 to 25, 19<strong>93</strong>,<br />
Register its concern at the Indonesian<br />
military occupation of the former<br />
Portuguese colony of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>,<br />
Register the fact that the UN has condemned<br />
the military occupation and never<br />
recognised Indonesian sovereignty over <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>,<br />
Express its concern at the subversion of<br />
the cultural identity of the People of <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>, who are not allowed to speak their<br />
national language and whose children are<br />
forcibly educated in the Indonesian language,<br />
culture and traditions,<br />
Express its revulsion at the violation of<br />
Human Rights carried out in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>,<br />
especially the massacre, on November 12,<br />
1991 of unarmed peaceful civilians by the<br />
Indonesian occupying forces, and the subsequent<br />
treatment meted out to the perpetrators,<br />
very lenient indeed in comparison<br />
with the heightened repression of the<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese in the wake of the massacre,<br />
Call on the international community to<br />
demand that the Indonesian Government<br />
withdraw its troops from <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and<br />
allow the decolonisation programme to<br />
continue by means of negotiations between<br />
Portugal, Indonesia and <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, under<br />
the auspices of the United Nations.<br />
INDONESIANS REBUT RESOLUTION<br />
The Indonesian delegation which call<br />
themselves Teachers Association of the<br />
Republic of Indonesia reacted badly to this<br />
resolution with the aid of their government<br />
officials in Stockholm they came out with the<br />
following standard response. We thought it<br />
is wise to spend sometime sending you this<br />
Indonesian standard propaganda so that all<br />
the interested individuals and groups can<br />
use them to prepare their response in any<br />
international conference that they might take<br />
part in the future. We will in a different item<br />
also include some of our comments to this.<br />
The Indonesian standard propaganda<br />
includes:<br />
1. An introductory letter and;<br />
2. a paper entitled “The reply of PGRI”<br />
1. Dear Colleagues,<br />
You might have received a letter dated 14<br />
October 1991 from teachers’ organization in<br />
Portugal, FENPROF, asking your<br />
organization to send a protest to the<br />
Indonesian Government, and you might<br />
have also received a request from the same<br />
organization asking for the support of your<br />
organization for a resolution concerning <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>. From our stand point of view, the<br />
issue raised by the Portuguese teachers’<br />
organization and the resolution to be presented<br />
to the WCOTP Assembly in<br />
Stockholm are not based on the true facts on<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, but they are based on malicious<br />
and misleading allegation of the number of<br />
lives lost in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> during and after the<br />
process of integration. Even it goes so far as<br />
recklessly accusing Indonesia of “genocide.”<br />
In order that you get a true picture of<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, we would like to give you some<br />
information for your consideration before<br />
you make any decision on the FENPROF<br />
draft resolution:<br />
1. Portugal colonized <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> for<br />
1509 - 1974. In 1974, Portugal’s new regime<br />
announced that its overseas territories,<br />
including <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, would be given<br />
democratic rights. Fully conformed with<br />
that new policy, five political parties were<br />
organized in preparation for self-determination<br />
in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>; they are: Apodeti,<br />
UDT, Trabalhista, Kota and Fretilin. In<br />
1975, Portuguese government abandoned<br />
Dili, the governor and staff return to Lisbon,<br />
and Fretilin, the pro-Portuguese extreme<br />
party, issued a unilateral declaration of<br />
independence without benefit of any act of<br />
self-determination. As a counter measure,<br />
the four other parties issued their<br />
proclamation of independence and simultaneous<br />
integration of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> with the<br />
Republic of Indonesia. Fretilin forces seized<br />
control of Dili, the capital of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>,<br />
touching off the civil war. The other four<br />
parties’ forces together with Indonesian<br />
volunteers began the process of restoring<br />
order in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. With the capture of the<br />
Fretilin’s last guerrilla leader in November<br />
1992, life of the people in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> has<br />
been fully back to normal.<br />
2. In August 1975, the colonial authorities<br />
in Dili, in a most irresponsible manner,<br />
simply packed up and left <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, after<br />
allowing the situation in the territory to<br />
deteriorate to the point of civil war by secretly<br />
turning over its arms and ammunition<br />
to one particular minority group, Fretilin.<br />
By utterly failing in its responsibility,<br />
Portugal in fact has forfeited any right to be<br />
still considered the “administering power”<br />
of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. In the face of this, the <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese people had rightly assumed the<br />
inherent rights to decolonize themselves,<br />
considering themselves no longer bound to<br />
any decolonization covenant with erstwhile<br />
colonial power. This they did by choosing<br />
independence through integration with<br />
Indonesia in accordance with UN General<br />
Assembly Resolution 1541 (XV) and<br />
Principles VI, VIII and IX of General<br />
Assembly Resolution 1541 (XV) and as<br />
further confirmed by the relevant provisions<br />
of General Assembly Resolution 2625<br />
(XXV).<br />
3. The critics charge that <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>’s<br />
population decreased by 200.000 after the<br />
integration, thus implying that about onethird<br />
of the population has either perished<br />
or disappeared, and some even go far as<br />
recklessly accusing Indonesia of “genocide.”<br />
This juggling of number represent of<br />
numbers represents a shameless distortion<br />
of the tragic facts surrounding Portugal’s<br />
mishandled decolonization of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
and shows a complete and often deliberate<br />
misreading of the process of population<br />
surveying and census-taking that has taken<br />
place prior to following the departure of the<br />
colonial government.<br />
The only internationally accepted census<br />
of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> was taken in 1980 by the<br />
Government of Indonesia. The resulting<br />
population figure – 555.350 persons –<br />
seemed to show a decline of some 69.000<br />
from the last colonial estimate of 624.264.<br />
The true difference will never be know:<br />
colonial authorities themselves acknowledged<br />
their figure for 1874 are estimates<br />
based on reports by village headmen, whose<br />
counts were never verified by the<br />
Portuguese Government. These figures and<br />
the apparent short-fall in population have<br />
subsequently been eagerly seized upon by<br />
Indonesia’s critics and, through a process of<br />
mutual citation, have not only constantly<br />
repeated but gradually exaggerated to reach<br />
what has now become the fabricated and<br />
completely unsubstantiated claim of<br />
200,000 lives lost.<br />
Careful examination of the facts by several<br />
observers, including respected Western<br />
journalists, suggest that war-related death<br />
numbered around 5,000 with another 25,000<br />
victims of malnutrition and disease brought<br />
about by a war-ravaged economy and a<br />
gross lack health care services. That people<br />
have died of victims is highly irresponsible<br />
and simply dishonest. It is hoped, therefore,<br />
that this unsavory number game can finally<br />
be put to an end.<br />
4. Since <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> was integrated into<br />
the Republic of Indonesia, the Government<br />
has worked carefully to ensure that cultural<br />
traditions are maintained, local languages are<br />
preserved and religious practices are<br />
respected. <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, like the rest of<br />
Indonesia, is a province of extraordinary<br />
ethic, religious and cultural diversity - a<br />
piece of the diversity, no one group is<br />
dominant. Respect and tolerance for different<br />
cultural and religious tradition is at heart<br />
of our national philosophy, Pancasila.<br />
5. Since the integration, the living conditions<br />
of the people in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> have<br />
improved tremendously, especially in education,<br />
health, religion telecommunication<br />
and transportation. At the time of integration,<br />
there are 580 primary schools, 94<br />
junior high schools, 44 senior high schools,
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 127<br />
and 1 polytechnic and one university<br />
(tertiary level).<br />
6. At present, <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> is an internal<br />
affair of Indonesia, which could be considered<br />
as a bilateral matter between the<br />
Indonesian and Portuguese Government.<br />
Meetings between the two governments are<br />
being held with the auspices of the Secretary<br />
General of the United Nations. On<br />
December 17, 1992, the Indonesian and<br />
Portuguese Foreign Ministers hold a meeting<br />
with the auspices of the UN Secretary<br />
General to find the most optimum solution<br />
on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> matter and the meeting will<br />
be continued on April 19<strong>93</strong>. It is best we<br />
respect the two parties involved by allowing<br />
them to solve the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> case.<br />
After having presented the true facts and<br />
an accurate information on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, we<br />
sincerely hope that some misunderstanding<br />
about <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> will be put to an end. The<br />
Teachers Association of the Republic of<br />
Indonesia (PGRI) is against any effort to<br />
put the issue of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> in the agenda of<br />
WCOTP Assembly in Stockholm, especially<br />
because the FENPROF draft resolution<br />
is based on malicious and misleading<br />
allegation and distorted facts about <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>. Your understanding and cooperation<br />
on this matter is highly appreciated.<br />
With best wishes, Merry Christmas and<br />
Happy New Year.<br />
Sincerely Yours,<br />
(W.D.F. Rindorindo) Secretary General<br />
The reply of PGRI (The Teachers<br />
Association of the Republic of Indonesia) to<br />
the draft resolutions on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
Submitted by FENPROF and ATU<br />
INTRODUCTION<br />
The Indonesian teachers in this<br />
Assembly express their grave concern on the<br />
activities of FENPROF, the teacher’s union<br />
of Portugal, and the ATU, Australian<br />
Teachers Union, in circulating the draft<br />
resolutions concerning the so called-issue of<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> as contained in the compilation<br />
of Working Papers of WCOTP.<br />
These draft resolution are especially appalling<br />
not only because they will politicize<br />
the nature and the deliberation of the<br />
Indonesian teachers in this Assembly, but<br />
also because they are based on distorted<br />
inferences, slanders and innuendoes.<br />
We honestly do not know what is the<br />
true motivation behind these draft resolutions.<br />
Unlike other resolutions, the nature of<br />
these draft resolutions is particularly directed<br />
to single out a particular country and<br />
a government in order to denigrate the good<br />
name of that country, which is our country,<br />
Indonesia.<br />
FENPROF and ATU never consult us<br />
Indonesian teachers or extend the usual<br />
teacher to teacher professional courtesy to<br />
discuss any matter in a spirit of unity and<br />
solidarity when drafting or submitting the<br />
draft resolutions to the Secretariat of<br />
WCOTP. The way these resolutions are<br />
being drafted and submitted are simply<br />
anathema to the unity theme that we teachers<br />
in this Assembly are supposed to espouse<br />
and develop.<br />
Upon the efforts of the Chairman of the<br />
Committee on Resolution, the representatives<br />
of FENPROF and ATU did have discussion<br />
with the representatives of PGRI<br />
yesterday, 22 January 19<strong>93</strong>. They said that<br />
their draft resolutions were based on human<br />
rights concerns. However, the way they are<br />
drafted and presented to us we cannot help<br />
but to disagree. We are not the one who<br />
started this unfortunate debate in this<br />
Assembly, but in an effort to end this<br />
confrontation to an acceptable solution, we<br />
are ready to offer a draft compromise which<br />
is neutral in character without blaming<br />
anybody or any government.<br />
We Indonesian teachers after suffering for<br />
350 years of colonialism do not need any<br />
lesson from foreigners about how to<br />
promote human rights, especially from<br />
those people who were once the worst colonialist<br />
in history. We believe the best way<br />
to promote human rights is by cooperation<br />
and the promotion of mutual understanding<br />
and certainly is not by heaping abuses,<br />
pointing accusatory finger and by shouting<br />
words of rhetoric based on self-altruism.<br />
Keeping in mind human rights abuses are<br />
happening everywhere, the approach taken<br />
by FENPROF and ATU will only plunge<br />
the Assembly into bitter fighting, enmity,<br />
hatred and division among its members.<br />
Some people accused that Indonesia has<br />
closed the border of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. This is<br />
simply not true. Various people, either they<br />
are journalists, representatives of NGOs or<br />
foreign diplomats were are visiting <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>. These people, however, request<br />
permission politely and quietly to enter our<br />
country. To the, we seldom say no. Indeed,<br />
Portuguese journalists have visited<br />
Indonesia including <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, but<br />
Indonesia journalists are prevented by the<br />
Portuguese government to enter Portugal<br />
when they requested to visit <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />
in Portugal.<br />
To those who shout and hurl abuses to<br />
us from across the street and then knock our<br />
door demanding to enter our house, with<br />
great respect we have and will turn it down.<br />
We cannot have our pride being injured and<br />
our arm being twisted and then ask us to<br />
surrender by opening our door. We have<br />
been physically colonized before and we<br />
will never be colonized once again, not even<br />
mentally.<br />
Some people has said that they are not<br />
against our country and our people, but<br />
only our government. This kind of tactic<br />
only remind us of the old colonial strategy<br />
of “devide et impera (divide and conquer).”<br />
Perhaps, our perception is wrong; but our<br />
history has shown us that when we are divided<br />
we fell, and that is exactly why our<br />
people before can be colonized for centuries.<br />
We respect them when they said that<br />
they are free to criticize their own government.<br />
We do not argue at all with that. We<br />
are also free to constructively criticizes our<br />
own government, but we declined when<br />
foreigners asked us to join them in criticizing<br />
our own people and our own government,<br />
especially when believe that criticism is<br />
based on distorted inferences. It is not our<br />
social and political value.<br />
We Indonesian teachers do not have the<br />
slightest intention to turn this Assembly<br />
into divisive political arena. Politics are not<br />
our profession. We are teachers and not the<br />
political representatives of our government.<br />
We believe the question of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> is<br />
best left to be solved by the United Nations.<br />
it is that international body which has the<br />
full knowledge and the capability to solve<br />
such kind of political problem.<br />
Unfortunately, we Indonesian teachers are<br />
put in a place by FENPROF and ATU with<br />
no other option but to defend the good name<br />
of our country by rejecting point by point<br />
their baseless allegations as contained in<br />
their draft resolutions.<br />
We Indonesian teachers understand this<br />
will take some of your valuable time. We<br />
humbly apologise for it, but FENPROF and<br />
ATU have given us no other choice. We<br />
Indonesian teachers have been put in a “fait<br />
accompli” situation to defend ourselves.<br />
FENPROF DRAFT RESOLUTION<br />
The points in paragraph 1<br />
FENPROF cited in its draft resolution<br />
the repeated baseless accusation that<br />
Indonesia militarily occupied <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
The fact is that long before the alleged<br />
Indonesian invasion on 7 December 1975,<br />
Portugal in August 1975 in most irresponsible<br />
manner abandoned <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> after<br />
allowing the territory plunged into a civil<br />
war.<br />
Indonesia literally beg the Portuguese to<br />
return to <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, because people were<br />
killing each other and thousands of refugees<br />
streamed into Indonesian territory of West<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>. Portugal fails to re-establish its<br />
presence and instead the Tropaz, the<br />
Portuguese colonial army, secretly turned its<br />
weaponry to one particular pro-Community<br />
group, the Fretilin, hoping this favoured<br />
group by the then left leaning government in<br />
Lisbon, could eliminated the other groups<br />
which were representing the majority of the<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese. These other groups were<br />
UDT, Apodeti, Kota and Trabalhista, which
Page 128 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
after seeing the brutality of the Fretilin and<br />
the Tropaz, opted to gain independence<br />
through integration with the Republic of<br />
Indonesia.<br />
After defeating the Fretilin, these other<br />
groups formed a provisional government.<br />
They held election and formed an Assembly<br />
of representatives. This Assembly then<br />
passed a motion of their wish to gain independence<br />
by integrating <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> with the<br />
Republic of Indonesia. This fact have<br />
always been concealed or distorted by those<br />
who support the Fretilin up to this day. We<br />
have living witness, an <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese in the<br />
group of PGRI here in Stockholm. He is<br />
more than happy to explain to you of this<br />
true story in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
During the 450 years of colonial period,<br />
Portugal had never developed <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>,<br />
let alone carrying out a responsible population<br />
census. It was Indonesia in 1980 which<br />
carried out a census using the internationally<br />
accepted standard. The resulting population<br />
figure was 555,350 persons. This figure<br />
suggested a decline of 69,000 persons,<br />
included in it around 40,000 persons who<br />
fled the civil war and took refuge in the<br />
Indonesian western part of the island of<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>. If we compared these figures with<br />
the last colonial government estimate that<br />
the population in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> was 624,564,<br />
therefore, the loss of lives was about 20,000<br />
people due to the civil war and the<br />
immediate ensuing famine. However,<br />
Indonesia’s critics, through a process of<br />
mutual citation, constantly and gradually<br />
exaggerated the figure to reach the baseless<br />
claim of 200,000 lives that had been lost and<br />
then put the blame on Indonesia.<br />
FENPROF claimed that, as frequently<br />
denounced by Amnesty International, hundreds<br />
of young people summarily judged<br />
and sentenced to death in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. This<br />
is just not true. Not even a dozen people<br />
that have been sentenced to death in<br />
Indonesia. These persons were involved in<br />
the Indonesian Communist Party bloody<br />
coup d’état in 1965, terrorists who hijacked<br />
a civilian airliner, and two criminals<br />
committing multiple murder crime. They<br />
were not <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese and have nothing to<br />
do with the case of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
The Points in Paragraph 2<br />
FENPROF accused that Indonesia tried<br />
to destroy <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>’s historical and cultural<br />
identity. This is also not true.<br />
Promoting the culture of <strong>Timor</strong> is nothing<br />
new for Indonesia, because <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
shares the same small island and culture<br />
with West <strong>Timor</strong>. Only these detractors<br />
pretended to perceive that the two are different.<br />
The island of <strong>Timor</strong> was formally<br />
divided into two in 1859 by two colonial<br />
powers, the Dutch and the Portuguese. <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> was colonized by the Portuguese<br />
since the early 16th century.<br />
The western part of the island of <strong>Timor</strong>,<br />
together with their brothers and sisters in<br />
other parts of the Indonesian archipelago,<br />
gained independence from the Dutch in<br />
1945. Unfortunately, the Portuguese still<br />
clutched <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> under their colonial<br />
power until they irresponsibly abandoned<br />
the territory in August 1975.<br />
Indonesia takes pride as a land country of<br />
“unity in diversity” as inscribed in its<br />
national coat of arm. The so-called culture of<br />
Indonesia is comprising each and every<br />
culture belonging to more than 350 ethnic<br />
groups in the Indonesian teachers to promote<br />
Indonesian culture, meaning each and<br />
every one of these existing culture in<br />
Indonesia, including the one in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
Thus, there is nothing farther than the<br />
truth when FENPROF accused that the <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese are forbidden to speak their language.<br />
Tetum is the language spoken by the<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese, in <strong>East</strong> as well as in West <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
Indonesian language is the official language<br />
in Indonesia and is used as the media in each<br />
and every school in Indonesia. However,<br />
since the promotion of each and every<br />
culture in the archipelago is a constitutional<br />
duty, therefore, Indonesian teachers are<br />
required to preserve each and every language<br />
that exists in Indonesia. Accordingly, “local”<br />
language is a compulsory subject and is<br />
taught in each and every school where that<br />
school is located. Meaning, Tetum is taught<br />
not only in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> but also in West<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>, just like Javanese language is taught<br />
in Java or Balinese language in Bali.<br />
It is true that Portuguese language in not<br />
taught in Indonesia. However, like most<br />
countries in this world, other languages area<br />
also being taught in Indonesia schools.<br />
English is a compulsory subject. French,<br />
German, Arabic and Japanese languages are<br />
also taught as optional subjects.<br />
History seems to suggest that it was the<br />
Portuguese themselves who may have tried,<br />
perhaps unintentionally, to destroy the historical<br />
and cultural identity of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
Nearly all <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese were made culturally<br />
ashamed if they do not adopt<br />
Portuguese name. Whereas the majority of<br />
the rest of the population in the Indonesian<br />
archipelago are proudly using their local and<br />
traditional names. Furthermore, during it s<br />
450 years of colonial period in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>,<br />
Portugal provided for the entire <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese a meager number of 47 elementary<br />
schools with 2 or 4 years of education and 2<br />
junior and one senior high schools. There<br />
were no kindergarten or institution of higher<br />
learning. The rate of illiteracy was as high as<br />
92 percent. It is very clear that the<br />
Portuguese had tried to kill the culture of the<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese by depriving them the right<br />
to adequate education for more than 4<br />
centuries.<br />
Today, after gaining their independence<br />
through integration with the rest of the<br />
Republic of Indonesia, and in only a period<br />
of 16 years, in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> there are 587<br />
elementary schools with 6 years of education,<br />
91 junior high schools, 39 senior high<br />
schools and 3 higher learning institutions (2<br />
polytechnic, 1 university). There are also 13<br />
kindergartens. The rate of illiteracy is<br />
drastically reduced to 20 percent. We<br />
Indonesian teachers believe that this the<br />
way to promote human rights, silently but<br />
making concrete and helpful contribution.<br />
The Points In Paragraph 3<br />
FENPROF lamented that the international<br />
community remained silent about<br />
their allegation. The truth is, through tactic<br />
of disinformation, Portugal in the beginning<br />
did manage to gain supports in the middle of<br />
1970’s. However, gradually when nations<br />
learned about the actual facts, many changed<br />
side to support Indonesia while many<br />
others remained neutral. This will be<br />
explained in the next paragraph.<br />
The Points In Paragraph 4<br />
FENPROF alleged that the United<br />
Nations have approved resolution recognizing<br />
the right of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> to what it called<br />
“auto-determination..” This is based on halftruth.<br />
In mid-December 1975, in the efforts<br />
to conceal its guilt of bungling the<br />
decolonization process in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>,<br />
Portugal, through fabricated stories, accused<br />
Indonesia of disrupting the process of<br />
decolonization by invading the territory.<br />
Then Portugal requested the United Nations<br />
to consider the question of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
Unaware of the real situation, the majority<br />
member of the United Nations in a<br />
resolution recommended the Security<br />
Council to take urgent action to protect the<br />
territorial integrity and the inalienable rights<br />
of the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese to self-determination.<br />
The resolution in 1976 was adopted with 72<br />
countries supporting Portugal, 43<br />
abstaining, and only 10 supporting<br />
Indonesia by rejecting the resolution.<br />
However, when nations learned more of<br />
the real problem, they changed their votes.<br />
In 1982, the 72 votes for Portugal decreased<br />
to 50, the support for Indonesia rose<br />
dramatically from 10 to 48. In the Nonaligned<br />
Movement, member countries<br />
unanimously rejected the proposal to recognize<br />
Fretilin as a national liberation<br />
movement and the so-called question of <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> was since then erased from its<br />
agenda.<br />
Looking at the voting number itself can<br />
also be misleading. Each year the resolution<br />
was pressed by the international community<br />
to be diluted and neutralized if this was to
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 129<br />
maintain continued support. By 1982, the<br />
content of the resolution had been changed<br />
so drastically that nations started wondering<br />
whether the resolution had achieved<br />
anything at all except for prolonging<br />
unnecessarily the so-called question of <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>. Unlike the earlier resolutions, the<br />
last resolution adopted by the United<br />
Nations did not contain any operative paragraph<br />
challenging the validity of the <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese integration process. Instead , in<br />
the last resolution, the General Assembly<br />
merely requested the Secretary-General “to<br />
initiate consultations with all parties directly<br />
concerned, with a view to exploring<br />
all avenues for achieving a comprehensive<br />
settlement of the problem.” Despite its<br />
“weak” content the resolution was nearly<br />
defeated. It was carried by a mere two<br />
votes.<br />
What did this all mean? The last resolution,<br />
of course, has superseded the earlier<br />
resolutions. However, in various debate<br />
some people just ignore this fact. Moreover,<br />
now there are at least 48 countries which<br />
firmly supported the Indonesian position on<br />
the integration of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, but we do not<br />
know how many of those 50 countries<br />
really supported the position on the<br />
question of self-determination process. That<br />
is why, since the 1982, year after year, the<br />
United Nations voted to defer the debate on<br />
the question of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and to let the<br />
Secretary-General, Indonesia and Portugal to<br />
find a solution through a dialog. The last<br />
dialog was carried out on 17 December 1992<br />
and the next session will be in Rome on 20<br />
April 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
On the point about the resolution of the<br />
European Parliament, we Indonesian teachers<br />
can only say that Indonesia is not a<br />
member of that Parliament and obviously<br />
Indonesia cannot defend itself adequately<br />
against those people who launched the<br />
baseless allegations in the proceeding.<br />
ATU DRAFT RESOLUTION<br />
Australia as a government and a national<br />
recognized the sovereignty of Indonesia in<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. Despite some protest of minority<br />
of people in Australia, the Australian<br />
government signed an agreement called “The<br />
<strong>Timor</strong> Gap Treaty” with Indonesia, and the<br />
Australian parliament support the<br />
Australian government position by ratifying<br />
the treaty. This treaty explicitly and legally<br />
recognized the sovereignty of Indonesia in<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. It is apparent, therefore, ATU<br />
represents the view of that minority in<br />
Australia in opposing Indonesia on the<br />
question of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
We Indonesian teachers in this Assembly<br />
have friendly relation with many Australian<br />
teachers. The overwhelming majority of<br />
Australia people and the government of<br />
Australia enjoy excellent relationship with<br />
their counterparts in Indonesia. Thus, it is<br />
with deep regret that we have to fight with<br />
some of our Australian counterparts in this<br />
Assembly in our defense against the<br />
slanderous ATU draft resolution. We wish<br />
to reiterate, we are not the one who started<br />
this divisive debate.<br />
Points in Preambular Paragraph 1,2 & 3<br />
The above arguments put forward in refuting<br />
FENPROF proposal are relevant in<br />
this respect.<br />
Points In Preambular Paragraph 5<br />
We Indonesian teachers are equally<br />
shocked and deeply regret the tragic incident<br />
of 12 November 1991 in Dili, <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
However, we believe that our country has<br />
reacted more than adequate to this tragedy.<br />
Our President repeatedly and in front of the<br />
Indonesian House of Representatives<br />
expressed his deepest regret and conveyed<br />
humbly his condolence to the bereaved<br />
families in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> caused by the<br />
tragedy.<br />
It was the President himself which instructed<br />
the government to establish an independent<br />
National Commission of Inquiry<br />
into the tragedy. As a demonstration of his<br />
deep concern and in order to obtain a thorough,<br />
unbiased and impartial report on the<br />
matter, he requested not a member of the<br />
government but the Supreme Court to<br />
nominate a supreme judge to head the seven<br />
member Commission.<br />
The Commission’s report was straight<br />
forward. It apportioned blame where blame<br />
was due; and it concluded by stressing that<br />
in order to hold justice, all those who were<br />
violating the law must be held accountable.<br />
Many countries commended Indonesia on<br />
this action, including the Australian government<br />
the United States government and<br />
the European Council.<br />
On receiving the report and using his<br />
constitutional power, the President removed<br />
from their posts two senior generals<br />
responsible for the security in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
The President then instructed the Army<br />
Chief of Staff to set up an Honorary<br />
Military Council to determine what went<br />
wrong and the accountability of the military<br />
personnel involved in the tragedy. Base on<br />
the findings of the Council, trials were held<br />
and witnessed by various domestic and<br />
foreign journalists, diplomats and representatives<br />
of NGOs. The others were removed<br />
from their posts and faced disciplinary consequences.<br />
Undoubtedly, Indonesian action<br />
stand in contrast with that of many nations<br />
in dealing with such kind tragedy when its<br />
involved military personnel.<br />
Unfortunately, some people chose to<br />
turn a blind eye on this fact and continued<br />
their campaign to denigrate Indonesia.<br />
Nothing seems to satisfy them except to<br />
bring Indonesia into total humiliation. This<br />
we cannot accept and we will defend the<br />
honour of our country in any Assembly.<br />
Points In The Last Paragraph<br />
We Indonesian teachers are truly mystified<br />
with this paragraph. It is clearly drafted<br />
by people who are trying to heap all kinds<br />
of sinister motivation towards Indonesia or<br />
are ignorant of the facts on the question of<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
The international community cannot be<br />
called to resume a dialog while the dialog<br />
itself has resumed and is continuing. The<br />
next session of the dialog, as mentioned<br />
above, will be in Rome on 20 April 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
Thus, this paragraph is totally pointless.<br />
Furthermore, the international community<br />
cannot call the withdrawal of Indonesian<br />
troops out of Indonesian territory. As<br />
stated above at least there are 48 countries<br />
in the United Nations, including Australia,<br />
recognized Indonesian sovereignty over <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>. The Non-Aligned movement consisting<br />
of 118 countries have also ceased to<br />
discuss the issue of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
Conclusion<br />
It is obvious that these two draft resolutions<br />
are either drafted on the basis of distorted<br />
inferences, slanders and innuendoes<br />
or simply ignorance.<br />
If the latter is true then we respectfully<br />
request that they be withdrawn and not<br />
submitted to be debated in the Assembly.<br />
Accordingly, we extend our thanks for the<br />
mutual understanding and cooperation.<br />
After all we are only teachers, not politicians.<br />
If the former its true, then these drafts<br />
are politically motivated. The human rights<br />
arguments are used only as a pretext to gain<br />
sympathy and support in the efforts to<br />
denigrate our country. Accordingly, we the<br />
Indonesian teachers respectfully request the<br />
kind support of members of this Assembly<br />
to reject the draft resolutions of FENPROF<br />
and ATU with regard to <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
Keeping in mind that there are abuses of<br />
human rights in nearly every part of the<br />
world, these resolutions will serve as a bad<br />
precedence. These resolutions are against<br />
the spirit of unity and solidarity that we<br />
teachers are supposed to espouse and develop<br />
in accordance with the teacher unity<br />
theme. Such kind of resolutions will only<br />
create bitterness and sow the seeds of<br />
enmity and hatred among members of this<br />
Assembly. we must reject this bad precedence.<br />
STOCKHOLM, 21 JANUARY 19<strong>93</strong><br />
PGRI (The Teachers Association of the<br />
Republic of Indonesia)
Page 130 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
INDONESIAN PROPAGANDA<br />
DEBUNKED<br />
Sydney, 16 Mar 19<strong>93</strong>. By Agio Pereira<br />
The above Indonesian propaganda has set<br />
a “standard.” That is, the bulk of the<br />
Indonesian arguments are simply aiming at<br />
the so-called (economic) developmental<br />
nature of their occupation of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
Everywhere, their argument is the same.<br />
Hence, we decided to throw in these arguments<br />
used by the Indonesian teachers<br />
with the hope that they reach all interested<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese supporters. Once you have it, you<br />
can read and become accustomed to these<br />
arguments and. in the process, organise your<br />
own response/s.<br />
Here are some comments we would like<br />
to make regarding this Indonesian propaganda<br />
fiction matrix:<br />
Fiction number 1: Education<br />
A person uninformed about the political<br />
process of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> might be manipulated<br />
by the figures the Indonesian government<br />
publishes frequently in their propaganda<br />
bulletins. The Indonesian teachers<br />
distributed tables of information in the<br />
Stockholm-Sweden conference of Teachers,<br />
showing dramatic increase in the number of<br />
primary and high schools, including universities.<br />
They also show that they have<br />
dramatically increased the number of medical<br />
personnel, doctors, hospitals and clinics<br />
in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
However, these are simply sterile figures,<br />
hiding behind the scenes a mammoth<br />
tragedy. For instance, about 150,000<br />
transmigrants have made their way to <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>. The bulk of these transmigrants are<br />
relatives of the Indonesian soldiers and<br />
public servants. In Dili, there are 120,000<br />
households today. The bulk of these people<br />
are transmigrants. More than 120,000<br />
households, but only 300 households<br />
benefit from tap water.<br />
Even the water system is not funded by<br />
the Indonesian government. It is, in fact, a<br />
scheme funded by the Australian government<br />
agency - AIDAB. The funding for this<br />
project was costed at $A6 to $A10 million<br />
dollars in 1990. Last year, prior to his first<br />
trip to Jakarta, Prime Minister of Australia<br />
Paul Keating had increased the funding to up<br />
to $A30 million dollars. He outlined the aim:<br />
to develop <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and reach reconciliation.<br />
The rational is the same: they<br />
think (and seem to believe) that the<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese people stands up against<br />
Indonesia simply because the people of <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> have not been given enough goodies!<br />
In November 1991, I met a catholic priest<br />
who was in Dili during the Santa Cruz<br />
Massacre looking at the educational system.<br />
He said to me that he was terrified with the<br />
“textbooks” used in the schools in <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>; if anything, he said, they teach only<br />
Indonesian politics with special focus on<br />
“Pancasila.” It the Indonesianisation of the<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese society that the Indonesian<br />
military is trying desperately to achieve.<br />
Fiction number 2: Hospitals/health<br />
There are 10 hospitals in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> today<br />
compared to only 2 in 1974, the<br />
Indonesian government says. However, the<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese people are frightened to use these<br />
hospitals for fear of being killed while they<br />
are hospitalized. Five years ago, I made it<br />
public in Australia that the Indonesian<br />
doctors have been using outdated medicine<br />
to treat <strong>Timor</strong>ese patients in the hospitals.<br />
The Indonesian government reacted by<br />
saying that it all “Fretilin propaganda.”<br />
Some days later, the former Indonesian<br />
puppet gubernur - Mario Carrascalão himself,<br />
said that boxes of outdated medicine<br />
have been used and he asked for the doctors<br />
responsible to be sent back to Jakarta.<br />
The hospitals are purely equipped to the<br />
point where a promise of second hand<br />
hospital equipment made by a former Chief<br />
Minister in Darwin-NT made headlines. The<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese youth that were killed in the<br />
massacre of Santa Cruz and immediately<br />
after, were taken away to be buried in the<br />
pits dug specially for that purpose. They<br />
were not taken to these famous hospitals to<br />
be treated as human beings. Many more<br />
students were left wounded in the hospitals<br />
without treatment so that they can die as<br />
soon as possible. These may sound unbelievable;<br />
but when you hear the story recounted<br />
by eyewitnesses of these horrible<br />
crimes, you understand how traumatized the<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese people are.<br />
A well-known medical doctor from<br />
Australia, wrote this, after three weeks unofficial<br />
visit to Dili, <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, last year:<br />
“The main persisting health problems<br />
are: TB, Malaria, Dysentery, Leprosy,<br />
Nutritional Deficiencies.<br />
“In the course of my travels I saw<br />
frequent evidence of intercurrent infections -<br />
discharging noses, coughs, skin lesions and<br />
sores. It seemed that there was sufficient<br />
basic grain food available but not enough<br />
protein and vitamin supplement. (...) There<br />
is little food to spare. There is real need for<br />
more polyclinics, primary health care<br />
centres and community nurses.”<br />
In his conclusion, this Doctor wrote one<br />
sentence that summarizes everything:<br />
“<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> is a police/military state. Its<br />
people are being systematically obliterated”<br />
Fiction number 3: Economic<br />
development<br />
The Indonesian propaganda says that<br />
there are now 536 Km of paved road comparing<br />
to only 20 Km made by the<br />
Portuguese up to 1974.<br />
Everyone that return from <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
accepts that the paved roads are of very<br />
poor quality. Only one wet season is<br />
enough to de-asphalt most of these roads.<br />
There are also strong military and<br />
Indonesian military economic reasons to<br />
pave those roads as quick as possible so<br />
that they can kill the <strong>Timor</strong>ese and loot<br />
everything they can from the <strong>Timor</strong>ese, before<br />
it becomes too late!<br />
Let’s look at some facts.<br />
The <strong>Timor</strong> Gap Treaty is a clear proof of<br />
gigantic looting of the <strong>Timor</strong>ese people’s<br />
natural resources. The facts exempt us from<br />
adding more information on this matter.<br />
As far as business goes, the military took<br />
over all the business in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. PT<br />
Batara Indra Group, PT Denok and PT<br />
Backri are the most prominent companies<br />
with total monopoly of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> resources.<br />
Very few <strong>Timor</strong>ese that managed to<br />
set up some sort of business, find themselves<br />
in “tetters” as soon as the Indonesian<br />
generals suspect them of any involvement<br />
with the <strong>Timor</strong>ese National Resistance. One<br />
businessman, called Oscar Lima, has been<br />
held incommunicado since the capture of<br />
Commander Xanana Gusmão. He was<br />
forced to testify against Xanana in the<br />
Indonesian court. Yet, he is still being held<br />
incommunicado and all his business taken<br />
over by the army.<br />
The head of PT Batara Indra Group is<br />
Robby Sumampouw, a close friend of<br />
General Benny Murdani. Suamampouw<br />
owns the franchise licence on direct shipping<br />
between Dili and Singapore. A percentage<br />
of his profits are also used to buy<br />
Portuguese wines, Portuguese ‘bacalau’ and<br />
American cigarettes to be sold in Dili. The<br />
port of Dili has been declared a duty free<br />
port in order to allow Suamanpouw all the<br />
facilities he can dream of. Sumanpouw also<br />
bought the Turismo Hotel two years ago<br />
and he now owns the expensive Makota<br />
Hotel.<br />
PT Denok is a military control company<br />
which has the monopoly of coffee export of<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. The only coffee that is not<br />
strictly controlled by PT Denok is the coffee<br />
from “Fazenda Algarve,” owned by the<br />
Carrascalao family. This exemption was<br />
made possible as a pay for the servant<br />
obedience of former Indonesian gubernur<br />
Mario Carrascalao. The Carrascalao brothers<br />
have recently bought more land in the<br />
surrounding area in order to increase their<br />
coffee business. In general, the <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />
have no choice but to sell their crop to PT<br />
Denok under a price stipulated by the generals<br />
themselves.
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 131<br />
The “godfather” of PT Denok is general<br />
Benny Murdani. Gen. Benny Murdani used<br />
to be known as the “president” of the<br />
Committee for the Development of <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>. It simply means that every aid from<br />
abroad must pass through him.<br />
PT Denok has set up partnership with<br />
PT Batara Indra to exploit sandal wood in<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. It is said that, unlike Imelda<br />
Marcos who has shoes disease, Mrs. Tien<br />
“per cent” Suharto, has sandalwood oil disease;<br />
she has been reported to have express<br />
interest in the sandalwood industry in <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> and apparently she is already into<br />
sandalwood perfume (in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>).<br />
Suharto’s family has extensive interest in<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. The latest connection was<br />
found to be with the mining and processing<br />
of marbles in Subao region, east of Dili. The<br />
operation is a co-operation between general<br />
Benny Murdani’s brother, Harry Murdani<br />
and Suharto’s family - according to an<br />
Australian source.<br />
This has not always been a happy honeymoon.<br />
Clashing interests have prompted<br />
public criticism made by general Benny<br />
Murdani against president Suharto’s family.<br />
General Benny Murdani made a remark in<br />
Dili, two years ago, saying that “this<br />
business of the president’s family is going<br />
too far!” What he did not say was that he<br />
was upset because of competition, between<br />
themselves, for <strong>Timor</strong>ese national resources.<br />
Another Indonesian business group<br />
which has come into <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> is the<br />
Wanandi Group. Wanandi Group has also a<br />
political role in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>. It is owned by<br />
Yusuf Wanandi and his brother Sofyan<br />
Wanandi. Yusuf Wanandi is the director of<br />
Indonesian government think-tank, CSIS<br />
(Centre for Strategic International Studies).<br />
Yusuf Wanandi has also a brother now well<br />
positioned inside the <strong>Timor</strong>ese Catholic<br />
Church. His name is Marcus Wanandi, a<br />
Jesuit priest. Marcus Wanandi is always<br />
informed about any important church person<br />
that goes to <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and, often, he<br />
tends to be the “friendly guide” for these<br />
important visitors. Other priests would not<br />
show the sense of security and protection<br />
that Marcus Wanandi shows to his visitors.<br />
The Wanandi Group, directed by Sofyan<br />
Wanandi, is planning a 400 bed tourist resort<br />
in Baucau beach, using the international<br />
airport of Baucau, built by the Portuguese,<br />
as the main moving force. Mario<br />
Carrascalao, the former Indonesian gubernur,<br />
was known to be supportive of this project<br />
and he did ask Jakarta to allow the Baucau<br />
airport to be re-used so that this project of<br />
Wanandi Group can go ahead. Another<br />
ambition of Sofyan Wanandi is a golf course<br />
in Mau-Bisse. The political and military<br />
situation of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, however, has not<br />
given these projects the “green light.”<br />
The <strong>Timor</strong>ese people have no jobs and<br />
no chance to succeed at all. Instead, they are<br />
forced to leave their own country, go to<br />
other islands to look for survival. Many<br />
young <strong>Timor</strong>ese are now in Ambon, forced<br />
to work in wood chipping - a very unpopular<br />
job in the sense that the company destroys<br />
the natural habitat of the people.<br />
Politically, it is of the interest of the generals<br />
to make the local people feel unhappy<br />
with the <strong>Timor</strong>ese; and, culturally, it<br />
amounts to a process of genocide of the<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese, in the sense that they are forced<br />
to leave their own homeland and Indonesian<br />
transmigrants take over.<br />
This is our small contribution to disarm<br />
the Indonesian generals’ propaganda. For<br />
more information, please contact us via<br />
email at etra@peg.apc.org.<br />
ASIA BOLDLY TAKING ON<br />
THE WEST<br />
by Leah Makabenta<br />
Jakarta, Mar. 22 (IPS) - Demonstrating<br />
that economic success can also mean power,<br />
dynamic Asian ‘tigers’ and ‘dragons’ are<br />
learning to use their rapid rise in the global<br />
economy as a political weapon.<br />
Unthinkable just a few years ago, Asia is<br />
now telling Europe and north America that<br />
it would reject western attempts to impose<br />
democracy, human rights and the environment<br />
as conditions for trade and aid to developing<br />
countries.<br />
Western-style democracy and its related<br />
values, according to Asian leaders like<br />
Singapore senior minister Lee Kuan Yew,<br />
have no universal validity and are particularly<br />
ill-suited to poor, unstable and divided<br />
developing societies.<br />
That they are succeeding was demonstrated<br />
recently, first by the Indonesians<br />
with the Dutch and then by the Association<br />
of South-<strong>East</strong> Asian Nations (ASEAN)<br />
against the European Community.<br />
Despite Jakarta’s unilateral ending of<br />
development cooperation with the<br />
Netherlands, its former colonial ruler, in<br />
1992, trade between the two countries increased<br />
in that period.<br />
Early this month, Austria was forced to<br />
set aside a law that would place restrictions<br />
on tropical timber imports because of pressure<br />
from Malaysia, Indonesia and their<br />
ASEAN partners.<br />
The law sought to protect the indiscriminate<br />
felling of tropical hardwoods by<br />
imposing a tax on their import and compulsory<br />
labeling of products made from such<br />
wood.<br />
Indonesia and Malaysia, the two top<br />
tropical timber exporters, stopped dealing in<br />
Austrian company shares. Worse, Austria<br />
found itself isolated, as other western<br />
countries failed to support it.<br />
Sources in development circles say<br />
German chancellor Helmut Kohl, who visited<br />
Indonesia and Singapore late last month<br />
to drum up Asian investment in the former<br />
east Germany, was firmly told not to<br />
interfere in human rights in the region.<br />
The sources said German aid agencies<br />
have been instructed to tone down their active<br />
support for the trade union movement<br />
and social activists in the region.<br />
This weekend, Beijing warned<br />
Washington it could lose out in the lucrative<br />
Sino-U.S. trade if it failed to renew China’s<br />
most favoured nation status (MFN). China<br />
has accused some members of the U.S.<br />
Congress of using the MFN issue to<br />
interfere in its internal affairs, meaning its<br />
human rights record.<br />
Citizens’ groups and non-governmental<br />
organisations (NGOs) have strongly rejected<br />
this reversal of the western policy of using<br />
threats of trade restrictions to promote<br />
human rights as a “crude form of economic<br />
determinism.”<br />
“While it is true that concepts of democracy<br />
and human rights emerged at a particular<br />
stage of western history, this is being<br />
used by authoritarian governments in Asia<br />
to reject pressures for political reform and<br />
civil liberties,” said a spokesman for the<br />
Kuala Lumpur-based Institute for Social<br />
Analysis (INSAN), an NGO that conducts<br />
research into labour and social issues.<br />
In early 1992, Indonesia refused to accept<br />
any more aid from the Netherlands<br />
which it accused of interfering in its domestic<br />
affairs. The Dutch had criticised the<br />
Indonesian army for firing at civilians in the<br />
former Portuguese colony of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
The Netherlands was also expelled as<br />
chair of the 14-member inter-governmental<br />
group on Indonesia (IGGI), a consortium of<br />
aid donors to the country.<br />
There have been repeated allegations of<br />
human rights abuses in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, whose<br />
annexation by Jakarta in 1976 has never<br />
been recognised by the United Nations. Last<br />
year, Washington suspended military aid to<br />
Indonesia because of the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
massacre.<br />
Indonesia has rejected criticism of its<br />
human rights record, saying it should not be<br />
judged on western individualistic principles<br />
but on the basis of its own culture and<br />
traditions.<br />
Indonesian president Suharto opened a<br />
U.N. workshop here last month saying the<br />
north should not seek to impose its values<br />
on poor countries which are dependent on<br />
them for aid. He said each country should be<br />
left alone to promote and protect human<br />
rights.
Page 132 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
Indonesian human rights lawyer Adnan<br />
Buyong Nasution dismisses such arguments.<br />
He says the government routinely uses them<br />
to cover up the manipulation and<br />
infringement of people’s rights.<br />
“The government should change its orientation<br />
towards a universal concept of<br />
human rights, towards internationally accepted<br />
norms of law and democracy so that<br />
we can see our shortcomings and our failings,”<br />
he says.<br />
Development experts say the Dutch have<br />
been suitably chastised and have not tried to<br />
channel development assistance to the<br />
country clandestinely.<br />
But the loss of Dutch aid has set back<br />
NGOs and many small-scale agricultural,<br />
health and development projects in rural<br />
Indonesia funded by the Netherlands’ 110-<br />
million-dollar annual aid budget for the<br />
country.<br />
The end of development cooperation,<br />
however, has not affected trade between the<br />
two countries, which continued to grow resulting<br />
in a surplus in favour of Jakarta.<br />
The official Antara news agency reported<br />
last week that Indonesia’s exports to the<br />
Netherlands increased significantly in 1992<br />
compared to those in previous years.<br />
Dutch embassy figures place the total<br />
trade between the two countries at 2.2 billion<br />
dollars in 1992, with the Netherlands<br />
ranking fifth among Indonesia’s trade partners.<br />
Businessmen from both countries had<br />
been worried that the halt in development<br />
cooperation would have an adverse effect on<br />
bilateral ties. No such development has<br />
taken place, Antara reported, quoting an<br />
Indonesian embassy official in the Hague.<br />
RELIGIOUS CONFLICT<br />
DISINFORMATION QUERY<br />
We hear that the report of this ambush<br />
filed by Ian Macintosh and run on ABC on<br />
Saturday, 20 March said that, according to<br />
army sources, the four men killed had just<br />
left a mosque. I have not seen any such reference<br />
in other reports but does the ABC<br />
report mean that the army there is trying to<br />
highlight an assault on Islam, and provoke<br />
the idea of religious conflict in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>?<br />
There have been some lengthy reports in<br />
the Indonesian-language press recently<br />
about a Muslim community in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
among <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese. Nothing wrong in<br />
that of course but the recent attention to<br />
Islam in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> appears to be an attempt<br />
to show that Catholicism does not<br />
represent the entire <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese people.<br />
If anyone has a fuller report, do post it<br />
on reg.easttimor. Thank you.<br />
Carmel, TAPOL<br />
LOBBYING FOR EAST<br />
TIMOR IN BRAZIL<br />
TAPOL report, 4 April 19<strong>93</strong><br />
Estevao Cabral, an <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese who is<br />
currently resident in the UK and is chair of<br />
the British Coalition for <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, has<br />
been in Brazil since mid March to lobby for<br />
support for <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
Among the politicians he has met so far<br />
is Federal Deputy of the Labour Party (PT),<br />
Luiz Gushiken, responsible for foreign affairs<br />
for the PT who agreed to table a motion<br />
in the Brazilian Congress which:<br />
- welcomes the fact that Brazil co-sponsored<br />
a resolution adopted in March 19<strong>93</strong><br />
by the UN Human Rights Commission condemning<br />
human rights violations by the<br />
Indonesian military in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>,<br />
- calls upon the Brazilian government to<br />
maintain this position in future,<br />
- asks the Brazilian government to express<br />
concern about continuing human rights<br />
violations in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, and<br />
- calls for effective support from the<br />
Brazilian government for Portuguese government<br />
efforts for self-determination and<br />
independence for <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
He also met Senator Eduardo Suplicy of<br />
the same party who agreed to work along<br />
the same lines.<br />
Estevao later gave a talk on the ‘Situation<br />
in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and International Solidarity’<br />
at the University of Brazil jointly organised<br />
by the Students Nucleus for Peace and the<br />
Centre for Exchange and International<br />
Relations. He showed the Yorkshire TV<br />
film, ‘Cold Blood.’<br />
He has also had a meeting with the Union<br />
of Brazilian Journalists and was interviewed<br />
by a member of the Union; the interview<br />
will be published in the mainstream press or<br />
the Union’s journal.<br />
Estevao is travelling to other cities in<br />
Brazil to solicit support for <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and<br />
hopes to help the creation of an <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
solidarity group in Brazil.<br />
RESOURCES<br />
TAPOL BULLETIN<br />
CONTENTS, APRIL 19<strong>93</strong><br />
The April edition of the bimonthly<br />
TAPOL Bulletin is now available. It contains<br />
the latest news and analysis of events<br />
in Indonesia, <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> and West Papua.<br />
This edition of TAPOL Bulletin fronts<br />
with an article entitled UN Victory for<br />
<strong>Timor</strong> and contains articles on:<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>:<br />
* <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese at the UN<br />
* UN Resolution on <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> (full text)<br />
* The trial of Xanana Gusmão, witness’s<br />
defiant stand (Saturnino da Costa Belo)<br />
* The true aim of territorial operations in<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong><br />
* Indonesian shaken by events in Geneva<br />
Politics:<br />
* Suharto and ABRI<br />
* A more nationalistic course<br />
Aceh:<br />
* Acehnese refugees in Malaysia under<br />
threat<br />
Discrimination:<br />
* Discrimination against the Chinese<br />
Minority<br />
Law and human rights:<br />
* Draft Criminal Code under attack<br />
* Tortured for defending land rights<br />
* Human rights under the spotlight<br />
(including reviews of three recent publications,<br />
by the Lawyers Committee for<br />
Human Rights, Amnesty International<br />
and the US State Department)<br />
West Papua:<br />
* Indonesians accused of implicit racism<br />
* <strong>East</strong> Awin camp conditions exposed<br />
Arms sales:<br />
* Arm sales briefs<br />
Religious disputes:<br />
* Army interference in Batak church<br />
TAPOL Bulletin is published 6 times a<br />
year. The annual subscription rate for individuals<br />
worldwide is 14.00 (Australian<br />
$35.00, Dutch guilders 40.00), for students<br />
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<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>. Page 133<br />
FIRST PLAY BY TIMORESE<br />
CULTURAL GROUP<br />
Green Left #95, April 7, By Peter Boyle<br />
MELBOURNE - José Pires left <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> 17 years ago. He was eight years old.<br />
With his brothers and sisters he was bundled<br />
into a car and rushed to Dili wharf<br />
where the last ship was preparing to depart.<br />
The port was ablaze. They were thrown<br />
into a boat and older men of the family were<br />
able to join them only by pretending to<br />
carry on food. José now works at the Ford<br />
car factory in Broadmeadows.<br />
Elizabeth Bothelheiro is now a child<br />
caseworker in Springvale, an outer suburb of<br />
Melbourne. Her family left <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> on a<br />
business trip to Mozambique, never<br />
dreaming that they wouldn’t return.<br />
Margarida Pires, mother of seven children,<br />
has lived in Meadow Heights since<br />
1975, when she fled <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> after the<br />
Indonesian invasion. These are three of the<br />
cast of Matebian Nia Lian (“Voices of<br />
Souls”), a play composed, produced and<br />
performed by Melbourne’s <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />
Cultural Group.<br />
The group was formed in 1984 as an attempt<br />
to preserve traditional stories, song,<br />
dance, painting and poetry. It has been performing<br />
at festivals, schools and universities<br />
ever since. But this is the group’s first play,<br />
put together with the assistance of a team of<br />
professional theatre workers.<br />
The play, which incorporates traditional<br />
songs and dances as well as more contemporary<br />
forms, is about the lives of three heroic<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese women. But the experiences<br />
in exile of the members of the Cultural<br />
Group are also woven into the text.<br />
Madeleine Blackwell, who co-directs the<br />
play with James McCaughey, told Green<br />
Left Weekly: “Matebian is a mountain in<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>, where people believe souls go after<br />
death. In this play the actors invoke some of<br />
those souls to come to the theatre to tell of<br />
their sufferings but also to share their<br />
humour, music and dance.<br />
“I hope the play doesn’t only make audiences<br />
more aware of the tragedy and injustices<br />
of <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>, but also provokes them<br />
to ask why this has happened.<br />
“These stories of the experiences of the<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese people since the brutal invasion in<br />
1975 are somehow also my own story as an<br />
Australian, whose governments have known<br />
and kept silent, sacrificing the <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />
people and their culture for the sake of<br />
regional power relations, diplomacy and<br />
profits. It is my story too because <strong>Timor</strong> is<br />
a metaphor by which I see the shadowy<br />
nature of our Australian democracy.”<br />
AUSTRALIAN BID TO SAVE<br />
THE TETUM LANGUAGE<br />
Justice Trends, published by Australian<br />
Catholic Social Justice Council March 19<strong>93</strong><br />
Abridged<br />
In a bid to preserve <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese language<br />
and culture, two Australian Catholic<br />
agencies are paying for publication of a<br />
course to teach English speakers Tetum.<br />
The Australian Catholic Social Justice<br />
Council and Australian Catholic Relief have<br />
joined forces to fund the book which will be<br />
the first ever to teach the language most<br />
commonly spoken in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
Written by University of Western<br />
Sydney linguistics lecturer Dr. Geoffrey<br />
Hull with three <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese who now<br />
living in Australia -Estanislau da Silva,<br />
Cristiano da Costa and Manuel Viegas - the<br />
course will be available here and in <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>, where school children now learn in<br />
Indonesian.<br />
Explained Dr. Hull, “Although <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong> is far from being a poverty-free zone,<br />
the real problem... is a social and cultural<br />
one. The <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese today suffer not<br />
only political oppression as second-class<br />
citizens in an alien state, but face the threat<br />
of the destruction of their culture and the<br />
languages that form an integral part of it.<br />
“It is a fact that the key to any culture is<br />
the national language.... Hence for the <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese to survive as a nation, the preservation<br />
of their common language, Tetum<br />
(also the medium of evangelisation), is essential.<br />
One cannot save the <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>ese<br />
without saving its culture and common language.”<br />
Called “Mai Kolia Tetun: A Course in<br />
Tetum-Praca, the Lingua Franca of <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>,” the book contains 18 lessons, each<br />
with points of grammar and an example<br />
either of spoken or written Tetum. Tetum<br />
literature includes passages from St Mark’s<br />
gospel and folk-tales of the animist culture.<br />
The course will be dedicated to the late<br />
Paulo Quintao da Costa, a pioneer in<br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese linguistics considered a sage<br />
among his people.<br />
It will provide the first standard spelling<br />
for the language and can be used by <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>ese living abroad to recover or learn<br />
their ancestral tongue as well as by those<br />
visiting the territory.”<br />
Due to be published mid-year, the course<br />
will be available from the ACSJC, 19<br />
Mackenzie Street, North Sydney 2060,<br />
Australia at a modest price.<br />
ANNOUNCEMENT OF NEW<br />
PRIVATE ‘INDONESIA’ AND<br />
‘EASTTIMOR’ LISTS<br />
The number of online lists, conferences,<br />
and newsgroups dealing with Indonesia and<br />
<strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> continues to escalate. Yet there<br />
remains too little temperate, informed, frank<br />
discussion of sensitive issues, at least in the<br />
public online sources. Some of the public<br />
sources also suffer from too few postings or<br />
over-reliance on a few principal<br />
contributors.<br />
For these reasons, I have set up two private<br />
lists called ‘Indonesia’ and ‘easttimor.’<br />
They represent efforts to present some of<br />
the more useful or interesting materials out<br />
there in the vast ‘matrix,’ to provide a forum<br />
for serious discussion, and to offer a meeting<br />
place for persons concerned with Indonesia<br />
and <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> problems.<br />
You are invited to apply to join either or<br />
both lists after considering the material<br />
below on how the lists work at present.<br />
‘INDONESIA’ AND ‘EAS TTIMOR’<br />
GROUND RULES<br />
1. There are two (2) distinct lists – one<br />
for Indonesia-related postings, one for <strong>East</strong><br />
<strong>Timor</strong>-related postings.<br />
2. I will send the procedures to post to<br />
the lists to all new members. However, to<br />
apply to join, or to send me administrative<br />
messages relating to the lists and other<br />
general and private correspondence, all you<br />
need do is email<br />
apakabar@access.digex.com<br />
A brief message will do, such as ‘signup<br />
Indonesia’ or ‘signup easttimor’ along with<br />
your true name and preferred email address.<br />
If someone who is already a list member has<br />
suggested you join, please mention that. In<br />
most cases, I’ll ask you a few simple<br />
questions before putting you on the list(s).<br />
You won’t have to do anything like<br />
‘registering your biodata.’<br />
3. You will be able to post directly to the<br />
Indonesia and easttimor lists. The software<br />
has been set to unmoderated. I intend to<br />
leave it that way unless matters get out of<br />
hand (e.g., too many flames, too many<br />
extraneous or misdirected postings, mailing<br />
to the lists by unauthorized persons).<br />
4. You will only need to send your<br />
postings to apakabar@access.digex.com if<br />
you need your postings to be made anonymously,<br />
since direct posting to the list will<br />
reveal your identity. You may also, if you<br />
have good reason, use one of the several<br />
‘anon’ services available, provided you have<br />
been previously accepted as a list(s)<br />
member and registered your ‘anon id.’<br />
5. You are very strongly encouraged to<br />
exchange info, news, and commentary on the
Page 134 <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong> Documents, Volume 21. February 15 - April 10, 19<strong>93</strong>.<br />
Indonesia and easttimor lists, while retaining<br />
your ties with other online sources relating<br />
to Indonesia or <strong>East</strong> <strong>Timor</strong>.<br />
6. I’ll take responsibility for forwarding<br />
to Indonesia and easttimor lists postings<br />
from the APC reg.indonesia and<br />
reg.easttimor conferences. If you post there,<br />
you don’t need to post on Indonesia or<br />
easttimor. I will also forward materials from<br />
some other APC conferences, though I can<br />
hardly cover them all. Anyone on an APC<br />
network is invited to forward material from<br />
public conferences there I do not cover (no<br />
postings from ips.englibrary though unless<br />
they are brief excerpts or re-writes).<br />
7. List members on APC may get<br />
reg.indonesia and reg.easttimor postings<br />
twice. To ease this problem if it applies to<br />
you, just quickly delete these duplicates<br />
when you see them in your mailbox. They<br />
will be prefaced with the capital letters ‘IN’<br />
or ‘ET’ for easy recognition. The duplication<br />
is necessary so that the postings in<br />
these conferences (and others on APC) get<br />
to the large majority of Indonesia and easttimor<br />
readers who do not have access to<br />
public APC conferences.<br />
8. Indonesia and easttimor are Internet<br />
lists. The lists originate from a commercial<br />
part of the Internet. This means advertisements<br />
of any materials you think worthwhile<br />
promoting may be posted to<br />
Indonesia and easttimor. You may also use<br />
the lists for fund-raising.<br />
9. The postings on Indonesia and easttimor<br />
lists come from the Internet and some<br />
parts of the larger ‘matrix’ of networks<br />
worldwide. You may selectively re-post or<br />
re-write them for distribution on APC and<br />
elsewhere, but you may not fully or substantially<br />
‘mirror’ the lists anywhere online.<br />
Also exercise prudence and good judgment<br />
where special sensitivities may be involved.<br />
Finally, if a list member explicitly requests<br />
in a posting for one or another good reason<br />
that his or her posting not be re-posted<br />
elsewhere, please honor that request.<br />
10. Indonesia and easttimor are private<br />
lists. They are designed for persons who<br />
will make some good use of the material<br />
posted. The main obligation of list members<br />
is to render some minimal amount of<br />
reciprocity for the service. Periodic posting<br />
to either list (or the APC lists from which<br />
some material is forwarded) satisfies this<br />
commitment. Others make equally satisfactory<br />
commitments such as occasional<br />
translation work. But whatever you do, you<br />
must contribute something every now and<br />
then to remain on the list. This is a major<br />
difference between Indonesia and easttimor<br />
and other lists on the Internet or matrix. If<br />
you are not doing your bit, eventually you’ll<br />
get a reminder from me.<br />
11. Please don’t ask for the names or<br />
email addresses of list recipients. There are<br />
persons on both lists whose identities must<br />
be protected for various good reasons.<br />
Direct posters to either list are obviously<br />
not in this category.<br />
12. It’s always possible that glitches in<br />
list software and list procedures will occur,<br />
especially in the early stages of the lists. If<br />
you spot any, please email apakabar@access.digex.com<br />
right away.<br />
13. I intend to expand substantially the<br />
membership of both lists. In this regard,<br />
anyone can play a helpful role by asking<br />
others who may benefit from the lists to<br />
sign up.<br />
14. You may want to save this message<br />
for future reference, or to use all or part of it<br />
for recruiting purposes, with or without<br />
your own endorsement. You are free to<br />
forward it to particular individuals and to repost<br />
it on other lists, conferences, and<br />
newsgroups.<br />
Let’s try to make this work. Thanks.<br />
John MacDougall, Task Force Indonesia<br />
apakabar@access.digex.com