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ABOUT THE COVER<br />

1<br />

The use of the Great Seal of the United<br />

States is not without significance. At first we<br />

contemplated having an artist change the<br />

eagle into a vulture. That, we thought,<br />

would attract attention and also make a<br />

statement. Upon reflection, however, we<br />

realized that the vulture is really harmless. It<br />

may be ugly, but it is a scavenger, not a<br />

killer. The eagle, on the other hand, is a<br />

predator. It is a regal creature to behold, but<br />

it is deadly to its prey. Furthermore, as<br />

portrayed on the dollar, it is protected by the<br />

shield of the United States government even<br />

though it is independent of it. Finally, it<br />

holds within its grasp the choice between<br />

peace or war. The parallels were too great to<br />

ignore. We decided to keep the eagle.<br />

G. Edward Griffin is a writer and<br />

documentary film producer with many<br />

successful titles to his credit. Listed in Who's<br />

Who in America, he is well known because of<br />

his talent for researching difficult topics and<br />

presenting them in clear terms that all<br />

(Continued on inside of back cover)<br />

can


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THE CREATURE<br />

FROM<br />

JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

A Second Look at the<br />

Federal Reserve<br />

Third edition<br />

by G. Edward Griffin<br />

American Media


Dedicated to the next generation-especially my own brood:<br />

James, Daniel, Ralph, and Kathleen.<br />

May this effort help to build for them a better world.<br />

TABLE OF CONTENTS<br />

Preface<br />

Acknowledgments<br />

Introduction<br />

i<br />

iv<br />

v<br />

Seventh printing: May 1998<br />

Sixth printing: September 1997<br />

Fifth printing: August 1996<br />

Fourth printing: September 1995<br />

Third printing: April 1995<br />

Second printing: November 1994<br />

First printing: July 1994<br />

Third edition: May 1998<br />

Second edition: September 1995<br />

First edition: July 1994<br />

© Copyright 1998, 1995 and 1994 by G. Edward Griffin<br />

Published by American Media<br />

P.O. Box 4646<br />

Westlake Village, California 91359-1646<br />

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 98-71615<br />

ISBN 0-912986-21-2<br />

Manufactured in the United States<br />

I. WHAT CREATURE IS THIS? 1<br />

What is the Federal Reserve System? The answer may<br />

surprise you. It is not federal and there are no reserves.<br />

Furthermore, the Federal Reserve Banks are not even banks. The<br />

key to this riddle is to be found, not at the beginning of the story,<br />

but in the middle. Since this is not a <strong>text</strong>book, we are not<br />

confined to a chronological structure. The subject matter is not a<br />

curriculum to be mastered but a mystery to be solved. So let us<br />

start where the action is.<br />

1. The Journey to <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island 3<br />

2. The Name of the Game Is Bailout 25<br />

3. Protectors of the Public 41<br />

4. Home Sweet Loan 67<br />

5. Nearer to the Heart's Desire 85<br />

6. Building the New World Order 107<br />

II. A CRASH COURSE ON MONEY 133<br />

The eight chapters contained in this and the following<br />

section deal with material that is organized by topic, not<br />

chronology. Several of them will jump ahead of events that are<br />

not covered until later.<br />

Furthermore, the scope is such that the<br />

reader may wonder what, if any, is the connection with the<br />

Federal Reserve System. Please be patient. The importance will<br />

eventually become clear. It is the author's intent to cover<br />

concepts and principles before looking at events. Without this<br />

background, the history of the Federal Reserve is boring. With it,<br />

the story emerges as an exciting drama which profoundly affects<br />

our lives today. So let us begin this adventure with a few<br />

discoveries about the nature of money itself.<br />

7. The Barbaric Metal 135<br />

8. Fool's Gold . . .- 155<br />

9. The Secret Science 171<br />

10. The Mandrake Mechanism 185


III. THE NEW ALCHEMY 215<br />

The ancient alchemists sought in vain to convert lead into<br />

gold. Modern alchemists have succeeded in that quest. The lead<br />

bullets of war have yielded an endless source of gold for those<br />

magicians who control the Mandrake Mechanism. The startling<br />

fact emerges that, without the ability to create fiat money, most<br />

modern wars simply would not have occurred. As long as the<br />

Mechanism is allowed to function, future wars are inevitable.<br />

This is the story of how that came to pass.<br />

11. The Rothschild Formula 217<br />

12. Sink the Lusitanial 235<br />

13. Masquerade in Moscow 263<br />

14. The Best Enemy Money Can Buy 285<br />

IV. A TALE OF THREE BANKS 307<br />

It has been said that those who are ignorant of history are<br />

doomed to repeat its mistakes. It may come as a surprise to learn<br />

that the Federal Reserve System is America's fourth central<br />

bank, not its first. We have been through all this before and, each<br />

time, the result has been the same. Interested in what happened?<br />

Then let's set the coordinates of our time machine to the colony<br />

of Massachusetts and the year 1690. To activate, turn to chapter<br />

fifteen.<br />

15. The Lost Treasure Map 309<br />

16. The Creature Comes to America 325<br />

17. A Den of Vipers 341<br />

18. Loaves and Fishes, and Civil War 361<br />

19. Greenbacks and Other Crimes 377<br />

V. THE HARVEST 405<br />

Monetary and political scientists continue to expound the<br />

theoretical merits of the Federal Reserve System. It has become a<br />

modern act of faith that economic life simply could not go on<br />

without it. But the time for theory is past. The Creature moved<br />

into its final lair in 1913 and has snorted and thrashed about the<br />

landscape ever since. If we wish to know if it is a creature of<br />

service or a beast of prey, we merely have to look at what it has<br />

done. And, after the test of all those years, we can be sure that<br />

what it has done, it will continue to do. Or, to use the Biblical<br />

axiom, a tree shall be known by the fruit it bears. Let us now<br />

examine the harvest.<br />

20. The London Connection 407<br />

21. Competition Is A Sin 431<br />

22. The Creature Swallows Congress 451<br />

23. Hie Great Duck Dinner 471<br />

VI. TIME TRAVEL INTO THE FUTURE 505<br />

In the previous sections of this book, we have travelled<br />

through time. We began our journey by stepping into the past.<br />

As we crisscrossed the centuries, we observed wars, treachery,<br />

profiteering, and political deception. That has brought us to the<br />

present. Now we are prepared to ride our time machine into the<br />

future. It will be a hair-raising trip, and much of what lies ahead<br />

will be unpleasant. But it has not yet come to pass. It is merely<br />

the projection of present forces. If we do not like what we see,<br />

we still have an opportunity to change those forces. The future<br />

will be what we choose to make it.<br />

24. Doomsday Mechanisms 507<br />

25. A Pessimistic Scenario 537<br />

26. A Realistic Scenario 565<br />

PHOTOGRAPHS<br />

The seven men who met in secret at <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island 24<br />

The Fabian Society stained-glass window 106<br />

First photo section 208-214<br />

Period cartoons about the Rothschilds 234<br />

Items relating to the sinking of the Lusitania . 262<br />

Second photo section 396-404<br />

APPENDIX<br />

A. Structure and Function of the Federal Reserve 590<br />

B. Natural Laws of Human Behavior in Economics .... 592<br />

C. Is Ml Subtractive or Accumulative? 594<br />

BIBLIOGRAPHY 596<br />

INDEX 602


PREFACE<br />

Does the world really need another book on the Federal<br />

Reserve System?<br />

I have struggled with that question for several years. My<br />

own library is mute testimony to the fact that there has been no<br />

shortage of writers willing to set off into the dark forest to do<br />

battle with the evil dragon. But, for the most part, their books<br />

have been ignored by the mainstream, and the giant snorter<br />

remains undaunted in his lair. There seemed to be little reason to<br />

think that I could succeed where so many others have failed.<br />

Yet, the idea was haunting. There was no doubt in my mind<br />

that the Federal Reserve is one of the most dangerous creatures<br />

ever to stalk our land. Furthermore, as my probing brought me<br />

into contact with more and more hard data, I came to realize that<br />

I was investigating one of the greatest "who-dunits" of history.<br />

And, to make matters worse, I discovered who did it.<br />

Someone has to get this story through to the public. The<br />

problem, however, is that the public doesn't want to hear it. After<br />

all, this is bad news, and we certainly get enough of that as it is.<br />

Another obstacle to communication is that this tale truly is<br />

incredible, which means unbelievable. The magnitude by which<br />

reality deviates from the accepted myth is so great that, for most<br />

people, it simply is beyond credibility. Anyone carrying this<br />

message is immediately suspected of paranoia. Who will listen<br />

to a madman?<br />

And, finally, there is the subject matter itself.<br />

It can become<br />

pretty complex. Well, at least that's how it seems at first.<br />

Treatises on this topic often read like curriCfllum <strong>text</strong>books for<br />

banking and finance. It is easy to become ensnared in a sticky<br />

web of terminology and abstractions. Only monetary professionals<br />

are motivated to master the new language, and even they<br />

often find themselves in serious disagreement. For example, in a<br />

recent letter circulated by a group of monetary experts who, for<br />

years, have conducted an ongoing exchange of ideas regarding<br />

monetary reform, the editor said: "It is frustrating that we<br />

cannot find more agreement among ourselves on this vital issue.<br />

We seem to differ so much on definitions and on, really, an<br />

unbiased, frank, honest, correct understanding of just how our<br />

current monetary system does function/ 7<br />

So why am I now making my own charge into the dragon's<br />

teeth? It's because I believe there is a definite change in the wind<br />

of public attitude. As the gathering economic storm draws<br />

nearer, more and more people will tune into the weather<br />

report—even if it is bad news. Furthermore, the evidence of the<br />

truth of this story is now so overpowering that I trust my readers<br />

will have no choice but to accept it, all questions of sanity aside.<br />

If the village idiot says the bell has fallen from the steeple and<br />

comes dragging the bell behind him, well,. .<br />

Lastly, I have discovered that this subject is not as complicated<br />

as it first appeared to be, and I am resolved to avoid the<br />

pitfall of trodding the usual convoluted path. What follows,<br />

therefore, will be the story of a crime, not a course on criminology.<br />

It was intended that this book would be half its present size<br />

and be completed in about one year. From the beginning,<br />

however, it took on a life force of its own, and I became but a<br />

servant to its will. It refused to stay within the confines<br />

prescribed and, like the genie released from its bottle, grew to<br />

enormous size. When the job was done and it was possible to<br />

assess the entire manuscript, I was surprised to realize that four<br />

books had been written instead of one.<br />

First, there is a crash course on money, the basics of banking<br />

and currency. Without that, it would be impossible to understand<br />

the fraud that now passes for acceptable practice within<br />

the banking system.<br />

Second, there is a book on how the world's central banks<br />

the Federal Reserve being one of them—are catalysts for war.<br />

That is what puts real fire into the subject, because it shows that<br />

we are dealing, not with mere money, but with blood, human<br />

suffering, and freedom itself.<br />

is<br />

Third, there is a history of central banking in America. That<br />

essential to a realization that the concept behind the Federal<br />

Reserve was tried three times before in America. We need to<br />

know that and especially need to know why those institutions<br />

were eventually junked.<br />

Finally, there is an analysis of the Federal Reserve itself and<br />

its dismal record since 1913. This is probably the least important<br />

part of all, but it is the reason we are here. It is the least<br />

important, not because the subject lacks significance, but<br />

11


ecause it has been written before by writers far more qualified<br />

and more skilled than I. As mentioned previously, however,<br />

those volumes generally have remained unread except by<br />

technical historians, and the Creature has continued to dine<br />

upon its hapless victims.<br />

There are seven discernible threads that are woven throughout<br />

the fabric of this study. They represent the reasons for<br />

abolition of the Federal Reserve System. When stated in their<br />

purest form, without embellishment or explanation, they sound<br />

absurd to the casual observer. It is the purpose of this book,<br />

however, to show that these statements are all-too-easy to<br />

substantiate.<br />

The Federal Reserve System should be abolished for the<br />

following reasons:<br />

• It is incapable of accomplishing its stated objectives.<br />

(Chapter 1.)<br />

• It is a cartel operating against the public interest. (Chapter 3.)<br />

• It is the supreme instrument of usury. (Chapter 10.)<br />

• It generates our most unfair tax. (Chapter 10.)<br />

• It encourages war. (Chapter 14.)<br />

• It destabilizes the economy. (Chapter 23.)<br />

• It is an instrument of totalitarianism. (Chapters 5 and 26.)<br />

This is a story about limitless money and hidden global<br />

power. The good news is that it is as fascinating as any work of<br />

fiction could be, and this, I trust, will add both pleasure and<br />

excitement to the learning process.<br />

The bad news is that every detail of what follows is true.<br />

m<br />

G. Edward Griffin<br />

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS<br />

A writer who steals the work of another is called a plagiarist.<br />

One who takes from the works of many is called a researcher. That<br />

is a roundabout way of saying I am deeply indebted to the efforts of<br />

so many who have previously grappled this topic. It is impossible<br />

to acknowledge them except in footnote and bibliography. Without<br />

the cumulative product of their efforts, it would have taken a<br />

lifetime to pull together the material you are about to read.<br />

In addition to the historical facts, however, there are numerous<br />

concepts which, to the best of my knowledge, are not to be found in<br />

prior literature. Primary among these are the formulation of certain<br />

"natural laws" which, it seemed to me, were too important to leave<br />

buried beneath the factual data. You will easily recognize these and<br />

other editorial expressions as the singular product of my own<br />

perceptions for which no one else can be held responsible.<br />

I would like to give special thanks to Myril Creer and Jim Toft<br />

for having first invited me to give a lecture on this subject and, thus,<br />

forcing me to delve into it at some depth; and to Herb Joiner for<br />

encouraging me, after the speech, to "take it on the road." This<br />

book is the end result of a seven-year journey that began with those<br />

first steps. Wayne C. Rickert deserves a special medal for his<br />

financial support to get the project started and for his incredible<br />

patience while it crawled toward completion. Thanks to Bill Jasper<br />

for providing copies of numerous hard-to-locate documents.<br />

Thanks, also, to Linda Perlstein and Melinda Wiman for keeping<br />

my business enterprises functioning during my preoccupation with<br />

this project And a very personal thanks to my wife, Patricia, for<br />

putting up with my periods of long absence while completing the<br />

manuscript, for meticulous proofreading, and for a most perceptive<br />

critique of its development along the way.<br />

Finally, I would like to acknowledge those readers of the first<br />

three printings who have assisted in the refinement of this work<br />

Because of their efforts most of the inevitable errata have been<br />

corrected for the second edition. Even so, it would be foolhardy to<br />

think that there are no more errors within the following pages. I<br />

have tried to be meticulous with even the smallest detail, but one<br />

cannot harvest such a huge crop without dropping a few seeds.<br />

Therefore, corrections and suggestions from new readers are sincerely<br />

invited. In my supreme optimism, I would like to think that<br />

they will be incorporated into future editions of this book.<br />

IV


INTRODUCTION<br />

The following exchange was published in the British humor<br />

magazine, Punch, on April 3, 1957. It is reprinted here as an<br />

appropriate introduction and as a mental exercise to limber the<br />

mind for the material contained in this book.<br />

Q. What are banks for?<br />

A. To make money.<br />

Q. For the customers?<br />

A. For the banks.<br />

Q. Why doesn't bank advertising<br />

mention this?<br />

A. It would not be in good taste.<br />

But it is mentioned by implication<br />

in references to reserves of<br />

$249,000,000 or thereabouts.<br />

That is the money that they have<br />

made.<br />

Q. Out of the customers?<br />

A. I suppose so.<br />

Q. They also mention Assets of<br />

$500,000,000 or thereabouts.<br />

Have they made that too?<br />

A. Not exactly. That is the<br />

money they use to make money.<br />

Q. I see. And they keep it in a<br />

safe somewhere?<br />

A. Not at all. They lend it to<br />

customers.<br />

Q. Then they haven't got it?<br />

A. No.<br />

Q. Then how is it Assets?<br />

A. They maintain that it would<br />

be if they got it back.<br />

Q. But they must have some<br />

money in a safe somewhere?<br />

A. Yes, usually $500,000,000 or<br />

thereabouts. This is called<br />

Liabilities.<br />

Q. But if they've got it, how can<br />

they be liable for it?<br />

A. Because it isn't theirs.<br />

Q. Then why do they have it?<br />

A. It has been lent to them by<br />

customers.<br />

Q. You mean customers lend<br />

banks money?<br />

A. In effect. They put money<br />

into their accounts, so it is really<br />

lent to the banks.<br />

Q. And what do the banks do<br />

with it?<br />

A. Lend it to other customers.<br />

Q. But you said that money they<br />

lent to other people was Assets?<br />

A. Yes.<br />

Q. Then Assets and Liabilities<br />

must be the same thing?<br />

A. You can't really say that.<br />

Q. But you've just said it. If I put<br />

$100 into my account the bank is<br />

liable to have to pay it back, so<br />

it's Liabilities. But they go and<br />

lend it to someone else, and he is<br />

liable to have to pay it back, so<br />

it's Assets. It's the same $100,<br />

isn't it?<br />

A. Yes. But ...<br />

Q. Then it cancels out. It means,<br />

doesn't it, that banks haven't<br />

really any money at all?<br />

A. Theoretically.. .<br />

Q. Never mind theoretically.<br />

And if they haven't any money,<br />

where do they get their<br />

Reserves of $249,000,000 or<br />

thereabouts?<br />

A. I told you. That is the money<br />

they have made.<br />

Q. How?<br />

A. Well, when they lend your<br />

$100 to someone they charge<br />

him interest.<br />

Q. How much?<br />

A. It depends on the Bank Rate.<br />

Say five and a-half per cent.<br />

That's their profit.<br />

Q. Why isn't it my profit? Isn't it<br />

my money?<br />

A. It's the theory of banking<br />

practice that ...<br />

Q. When I lend them my $100<br />

why don't I charge them interest?<br />

A. You do.<br />

Q. You don't say. How much?<br />

A. It depends on the Bank Rate.<br />

Say half a per cent.<br />

Q. Grasping of me, rather?<br />

A. But that's only if you're not<br />

going to draw the money out<br />

again.<br />

Q. But of course, I'm going to<br />

draw it out again. If I hadn't<br />

wanted to draw it out again I<br />

could have buried it in the garden,<br />

couldn't I?<br />

A. They wouldn't like you to<br />

draw it out again.<br />

Q. Why not? If I keep it there<br />

you say ifs a Liability. Wouldn't<br />

they be glad if I reduced their<br />

Liabilities by removing it?<br />

A. No. Because if you remove it<br />

they can't lend it to anyone else.<br />

Q. But if I wanted to remove it<br />

they'd have to let me?<br />

A. Certainly.<br />

Q. But suppose they've already<br />

lent it to another customer?<br />

A. Then they'll let you have<br />

someone else's money.<br />

Q. But suppose he wants his too<br />

. . . and they've let me have it?<br />

A. You're being purposely obtuse.<br />

Q. I think I'm being acute. What<br />

if everyone wanted their money<br />

at once?<br />

A. It's the theory of banking<br />

practice that they never would.<br />

Q. So what banks bank on is not<br />

having to meet their commitments?<br />

A. I wouldn't say that.<br />

Q. Naturally. Well, if there's<br />

nothing else you think you can<br />

tell me ...?<br />

A. Quite so. Now you can go off<br />

and open a banking account.<br />

Q. Just one last question.<br />

A. Of course.<br />

Q. Wouldn't I do better to go off<br />

and open up a bank?<br />

VI


Section I<br />

WHAT CREATURE<br />

IS THIS?<br />

What is the Federal Reserve System? The answer<br />

may surprise you. It is not federal and there are<br />

no reserves. Furthermore, the Federal Reserve<br />

Banks are not even banks. The key to this riddle is<br />

to be found, not at the beginning of the story, but<br />

in the middle. Since this is not a <strong>text</strong>book, we are<br />

not confined to a chronological structure. The<br />

subject matter is not a curriculum to be mastered<br />

but a mystery to be solved. So let us start where<br />

the action is.


Chapter One<br />

THE JOURNEY TO<br />

JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

The secret meeting on <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island in Georgia at<br />

which the Federal Reserve was conceived; the<br />

birth of a banking cartel to -protect its members<br />

from competition; the strategy of haw to convince<br />

Congress and the public that this cartel was an<br />

agency of the United States government.<br />

The New Jersey railway station was bitterly cold that night.<br />

Flurries of the year's first snow swirled around street lights.<br />

November wind rattled roof panels above the track shed and gave<br />

a long, mournful sound among the rafters.<br />

It was approaching ten P.M., and the station was nearly empty<br />

except for a few passengers scurrying to board the last Southbound<br />

of the day. The rail equipment was typical for that year of 1910,<br />

mostly chair cars that converted into sleepers with cramped upper<br />

and lower berths. For those with limited funds, coach cars were<br />

coupled to the front. They would take the brunt of the engine's<br />

noise and smoke that, somehow, always managed to seep through<br />

unseen cracks. A dining car was placed between the sections as a<br />

subtle barrier between the two classes of travelers. By today's<br />

standards, the environment was drab. Chairs and mattresses were<br />

hard. Surfaces were metal or scarred wood. Colors were dark green<br />

and gray.<br />

In their hurry to board the train and escape the chill of the<br />

wind, few passengers noticed the activity at the far end of the<br />

platform. At a gate seldom used at this hour of the night was a<br />

Spectacular sight. Nudged against the end-rail bumper was a long<br />

car that caused those few who saw it to stop and stare. Its gleaming<br />

black paint was accented with polished brass hand rails, knobs,<br />

frames, and filigrees. The shades were drawn, but through the open<br />

door, one could see mahogany paneling, velvet drapes, plush


THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

armchairs, and a well stocked bar. Porters with white serving coats<br />

were busying themselves with routine chores. And there was the<br />

distinct aroma of expensive cigars. Other cars in the station bore<br />

numbers on each end to distinguish them from their dull brothers.<br />

But numbers were not needed for this beauty. On the center of each<br />

side was a small plaque bearing but a single word: ALDRICH.<br />

The name of Nelson Aldrich, senator from Rhode Island, was<br />

well known even in New Jersey. By 1910, he was one of the most<br />

powerful men in Washington, D.C., and his private railway car<br />

often was seen at the New York and New Jersey rail terminals<br />

during frequent trips to Wall Street. Aldrich was far more than a<br />

senator. He was considered to be the political spokesman for big<br />

business. As an investment associate of J.F. Morgan, he had<br />

extensive holdings in banking, manufacturing, and public utilities.<br />

His son-in-law was John D. Rockefeller, Jr. Sixty years later, his<br />

grandson, Nelson Aldrich Rockefeller, would become Vice-<br />

President of the United States.<br />

When Aldrich arrived at the station, there was no doubt he was<br />

the commander of the private car.<br />

Wearing a long, fur-collared<br />

coat, a silk top hat, and carrying a silver-tipped walking stick, he<br />

strode briskly down the platform with his private secretary,<br />

Shelton, and a<br />

cluster of porters behind them hauling assorted<br />

trunks and cases.<br />

No sooner had the Senator boarded his car when several more<br />

passengers arrived with similar collections of luggage. The last<br />

man appeared just moments before the final "aaall aboarrrd." He<br />

was carrying a shotgun case.<br />

While Aldrich was easily recognized by most of the travelers<br />

who saw him stride through the station, the other faces were not<br />

familiar. These strangers had been instructed to arrive separately,<br />

to avoid reporters, and, should they meet inside the station, to<br />

pretend they did not know each other. After boarding the train,<br />

they had been told to use first names only so as not to reveal each<br />

other's identity. As a result of these precautions, not even the<br />

private-car porters and servants knew the names of these guests.<br />

Back at the main gate, there was a double blast from the<br />

engine's whistle. Suddenly, the gentle sensation of motion; the<br />

excitement of a journey begun. But, no sooner had the train cleared<br />

the platform when it shuttered to a stop. Then, to everyone's<br />

surprise, it reversed direction and began moving toward the station<br />

THE JOURNEY TO JEKYLL ISLAND 5<br />

again. Had they forgotten something? Was there a problem with<br />

the engine?<br />

A sudden lurch and the slam of couplers gave the answer. They<br />

had picked up another car at the end of the train. Possibly the mail<br />

car? In an instant the forward motion was resumed, and all<br />

thoughts returned to the hip ahead and to the minimal comforts of<br />

the accommodations.<br />

And so, as the passengers drifted off to sleep that night to the<br />

rhythmic clicking of steel wheels against rail, little did they dream<br />

that, riding in the car at the end of their train, were seven men who<br />

represented an estimated one-fourth of the total wealth of the entire<br />

world.<br />

This was the roster of the Aldrich car that night:<br />

1. Nelson W. Aldrich, Republican "whip" in the Senate, Chairman<br />

of the National Monetary Commission, business associate of J.P,<br />

Morgan, father-in-law to John D. Rockefeller, Jr.;<br />

2. Abraham Piatt Andrew, Assistant Secretary of the United States<br />

Treasury;<br />

3. Frank A. Vanderlip, president of the National City Bank of New<br />

York, the most powerful of the banks at that time, representing<br />

William Rockefeller and the international investment banking<br />

house of Kuhn, Loeb & Company;<br />

4. Henry P. Davison, senior partner of the J.P. Morgan Company;<br />

5. Charles D. Norton, president of J.P. Morgan's First National Bank<br />

of New York;<br />

6. Benjamin Strong, head of J.P. Morgan's Bankers Trust Company;<br />

and<br />

7. Paul M. Warburg, a partner in Kuhn, Loeb & Company, a<br />

representative of the Rothschild banking dynasty in England<br />

and France, and brother to Max Warburg who was head of the<br />

Warburg banking consortium in Germany and the Netherlands.<br />

1. In private correspondence between the author and Andrew L. Gray, the Grand<br />

Nephew of Abraham P. Andrew, Mr. Gray claims that Strong was not in<br />

attendance. On the other hand, Frank Vanderlip—who was there—says in his<br />

memoirs that he was. How could Vanderlip be wrong? Gray's response: "He was<br />

in his late seventies when he wrote the book and the essay in question. . . Perhaps<br />

the wish was father to the thought." If Vanderlip truly was in error, it was perhaps<br />

not so significant after all because, as Gray admits: "Strong would have been among<br />

those few to be let in on the secret." In the absence of further confirmation to the<br />

contrary, we are compelled to accept Vanderlip's account.


THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

CONCENTRATION OF WEALTH<br />

Centralization of control over financial resources was far<br />

advanced by 1910. In the United States, there were two main focal<br />

points of this control: the Morgan group and the Rockefeller group.<br />

Within each orbit was a maze of commercial banks, acceptance<br />

banks, and investment firms. In Europe, the same process had<br />

proceeded even further and had coalesced into the Rothschild<br />

group and the Warburg group. An article appeared in the New York<br />

Times on May 3, 1931, commenting on the death of George Baker,<br />

one of Morgan's closest associates. It said: "One-sixth of the total<br />

wealth of the world was represented by members of the <strong>Jekyll</strong><br />

Island Club." The reference was only to those in the Morgan group,<br />

(members of the <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island Club), It did not include the<br />

Rockefeller group or the European financiers. When all of these are<br />

combined, the previous estimate that one-fourth of the world's<br />

wealth was represented by these groups is probably conservative.<br />

In 1913, the year that the Federal Reserve Act became law, a<br />

subcommittee of the House Committee on Currency and Banking,<br />

under the chairmanship of Arsene Pujo of Louisiana, completed its<br />

investigation into the concentration of financial power in the<br />

United States. Pujo was considered to be a spokesman for the oil<br />

interests, part of the very group under investigation, and did<br />

everything possible to sabotage the hearings. In spite of his efforts,<br />

however, the final report of the committee at large was devastating:<br />

Your committee is satisfied from the proofs submitted ... that<br />

there is an established and well defined identity and community of<br />

interest between a few leaders of finance . . . which has resulted in great<br />

and rapidly growing concentration of the control of money and credit<br />

in the hands of these few men. . .<br />

Under our system of issuing and distributing corporate securities<br />

the investing public does not buy directly from the corporation. The<br />

securities travel from the issuing house through middlemen to the<br />

investor. It is only the great banks or bankers with access to the<br />

mainsprings of the concentrated resources made up of other people's<br />

money, in the banks, trust companies, and life insurance companies,<br />

and with control of the machinery for creating markets and<br />

distributing securities, who have had the power to underwrite or<br />

guarantee the sale of large-scale security issues. The men who through<br />

their control over the funds of our railroad and industrial companies<br />

are able to direct where such funds shall be kept, and thus to create<br />

these great reservoirs of the people's money are the ones who are in a<br />

THE JOURNEY TO JEKYLL ISLAND 7<br />

position to tap those reservoirs for the ventures in which they are<br />

interested and to prevent their being tapped for purposes which they<br />

do not approve....<br />

When we consider, also, in this connection that into these<br />

reservoirs of money and credit there flow a large part of the reserves of<br />

the banks of the country, that they are also the agents and<br />

correspondents of the out-of-town banks in the loaning of their<br />

surplus funds in the only public money market of the country, and<br />

that a small group of men and their partners and associates have now<br />

further strengthened their hold upon the resources of these<br />

institutions by acquiring large stock holdings therein, by<br />

representation on their boards and through valuable patronage, we<br />

begin to realize something of the extent to which this practical and<br />

effective domination and control over our greatest financial, railroad<br />

and industrial corporations has developed, largely within the past five<br />

years, and that it is fraught with peril to the welfare of the country.<br />

Such was the nature of the wealth and power represented by<br />

those seven men who gathered in secret that night and travelled in<br />

the luxury of Senator Aldrich's private car.<br />

DESTINATION JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

As the train neared its destination of Raleigh, North Carolina,<br />

the next afternoon, it slowed and then stopped in the switching<br />

yard just outside the station terminal. Quickly, the crew threw a<br />

switch, and the engine nudged the last car onto a siding where, just<br />

as quickly, it was uncoupled and left behind. When passengers<br />

stepped onto the platform at<br />

the terminal a few moments later,<br />

their train appeared exactly as it had been when they boarded.<br />

They could not know that their travelling companions for the night,<br />

at that very instant, were joining still<br />

another train which, within<br />

the hour, would depart Southbound once again.<br />

The elite group of financiers was embarked on a thousand-mile<br />

journey that led them to Atlanta, then to Savannah and, finally, to<br />

the small town of Brunswick, Georgia. At first, it would seem that<br />

Brunswick was an unlikely destination. Located on the Atlantic<br />

seaboard, it was primarily a fishing village with a small but lively<br />

port for cotton and lumber. It had a population of only a few<br />

thousand people. But, by that time, the Sea Islands that sheltered<br />

I- Herman E. Krooss, ed., Documentary History of Currency and Banking in tJie United<br />

States (New York: Chelsea House, 1983), Vol. Ill, "Final Report from the Pujo<br />

Committee, February 28, 1913," pp. 222-24.


8 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND THE JOURNEY TO JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

the coast from South Carolina to Florida already had become<br />

popular as winter resorts for the very wealthy. One such island, just<br />

off the coast of Brunswick, had recently been purchased by J.P.<br />

Morgan and several of his business associates, and it was here that<br />

they came in the fall and winter to hunt ducks or deer and to escape<br />

the rigors of cold weather in the North. It was called <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island.<br />

When the Aldrich car was uncoupled onto a siding at the small<br />

Brunswick station, it was, indeed, conspicuous. Word travelled<br />

quickly to the office of the town's weekly newspaper. While the<br />

group was waiting to be transferred to the dock, several people<br />

from the paper approached and began asking questions. Who were<br />

Mr. Aldrich's guests? Why were they here? Was there anything<br />

special happening? Mr. Davison, who was one of the owners of<br />

<strong>Jekyll</strong> Island and who was well known to the local paper, told them<br />

that these were merely personal friends and that they had come for<br />

the simple amusement of duck hunting. Satisfied that there was no<br />

real news in the event, the reporters returned to their office.<br />

Even after arrival at the remote island lodge, the secrecy<br />

continued. For nine days the rule for first-names-only remained in<br />

effect. Full-time caretakers and servants had been given vacation,<br />

and an entirely new, carefully screened staff was brought in for the<br />

occasion. This was done to make absolutely sure that none of the<br />

servants might recognize by sight the identities of these guests. It is<br />

difficult to imagine any event in history—including preparation for<br />

war—that was shielded from public view with greater mystery and<br />

secrecy.<br />

The purpose of this meeting on lekyll Island was not to hunt<br />

ducks. Simply stated, it was to come to an agreement on the<br />

structure and operation of a banking cartel. The goal of the cartel,<br />

as is true with all of them, was to maximize profits by minimizing<br />

competition between members, to make it difficult for new competitors<br />

to enter the field, and to utilize the police power of<br />

government to enforce the cartel agreement. In more specific terms,<br />

the purpose and, indeed, the actual outcome of this meeting was to<br />

create the blueprint for the Federal Reserve System.<br />

THE STORY IS CONFIRMED<br />

For many years after the event, educators, commentators, and<br />

historians denied that the <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island meeting ever took place.<br />

Even now, the accepted view is that the meeting was relatively<br />

unimportant, and only paranoid unsophisticates would try to make<br />

anything out of it. Ron Chemow writes: "The <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island meeting<br />

would be the fountain of a thousand conspiracy theories." Little<br />

by little, however, the story has been pieced together in amazing<br />

detail, and it has come directly or indirectly from those who<br />

actually were there. Furthermore, if what they say about their own<br />

purposes and actions does not constitute a classic conspiracy, then<br />

there is little meaning to that word.<br />

The first leak regarding this meeting found its way into print in<br />

1916. It appeared in Leslie's Weekly and was written by a young<br />

financial reporter by the name of B.C. Forbes, who later founded<br />

Forbes Magazine. The article was primarily in praise of Paul<br />

Warburg, and it is likely that Warburg let the story out during<br />

conversations with the writer. At any rate, the opening paragraph<br />

contained a<br />

dramatic but highly accurate summary of both the<br />

nature and purpose of the meeting:<br />

Picture a party of the nation's greatest bankers stealing out of New<br />

York on a<br />

private railroad car under cover of darkness, stealthily<br />

hieing hundreds of miles South, embarking on a mysterious launch,<br />

sneaking on to an island deserted by all but a few servants, living there<br />

a full week under such rigid secrecy that the names of not one of them<br />

was once mentioned lest the servants learn the identity and disclose to<br />

the world this strangest, most secret expedition in the history of<br />

American finance.<br />

I am not romancing. I am giving to the world, for the first time, the<br />

real story of how the famous Aldrich currency report, the foundation<br />

of our new currency system, was written.<br />

In 1930, Paul Warburg wrote a massive book—1750 pages in<br />

all—entitled The Federal Reserve System, Its Origin and Growth. In this<br />

tome, he described the meeting and its purpose but did not<br />

mention either*its location or the names of those who attended. But<br />

he did say: "The results of the conference were entirely confidential.<br />

Even the fact there had been a meeting was not permitted to<br />

become public." Then, in a footnote he added: "Though eighteen<br />

years have since gone by, I do not feel free to give a description of<br />

1 . Ron Chernow, The House of Morgan: An American Banking Dynasty and the Rise of<br />

Modern Finance (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1990), p. 129.<br />

I "Men Who Are Making America/' by B.C. Forbes, Leslies Weekly, October 19,<br />

1916, p. 423.<br />

I


10 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

THE JOURNEY TO JEKYLL ISLAND 11<br />

this most interesting conference concerning which Senator Aldrich<br />

In the February 9, 1935, issue of the Saturday Evening Post, an<br />

pledged all participants to secrecy." 1<br />

article appeared written by Frank Vanderlip. In it he said:<br />

An interesting insight to Paul Warburg's attendance at the<br />

Jekyl] Island meeting came<br />

Despite my views about the value to society of greater publicity<br />

thirty-four years later, in a book written<br />

for the affairs of corporations, there was an occasion, near the close of<br />

by his son, James. James had been appointed by F.D.R. as Director<br />

1910, when I was as secretive—indeed, as furtive—as any<br />

of the Budget and, during World War II, as head of the Office of<br />

conspirator.. . . I do not feel it is any exaggeration to speak of our secret<br />

War Information. In his book he described how his father, who<br />

expedition to <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island as the occasion of the actual conception of<br />

didn't know one end of a gun from the other, borrowed a shotgun<br />

what eventually became the Federal Reserve System....<br />

from a friend and carried it with him to the train<br />

We were told to leave our last names behind us. We were told,<br />

to disguise himself<br />

as a duck hunter.<br />

further, that we should avoid dining together on the night of our<br />

departure. We were instructed to come one at a time and as<br />

This part of the story was corroborated in the official biography<br />

unobtrusively as possible to the railroad tenninal on the New Jersey<br />

of Senator Aldrich, written by Nathaniel Wright Stephenson:<br />

littoral of the Hudson, where Senator Aldrich's private car would be in<br />

In the autumn of 1910, six men [in addition to Aldrich]<br />

readiness, attached to the rear<br />

went<br />

end of a train for the South....<br />

out to<br />

shoot ducks. That is to say, they told the world that was<br />

Once aboard the private car we began to observe the taboo that<br />

their purpose.<br />

Mr. Warburg, who was of the number, gives an amusing<br />

had been fixed on last names. We addressed one another as "Ben/'<br />

account of his<br />

feelings when he boarded a private "Paul/ 7<br />

"Nelson/' "Abe"—it is Abraham Piatt Andrew. Davison and I<br />

car in Jersey City, bringing with<br />

him all the accoutrements of a duck adopted even deeper disguises, abandoning our first names.<br />

shooter. The<br />

On the<br />

joke was in the fact<br />

that he had never shot a duck theory that we were always right, he became Wilbur and I became<br />

in his life and had no intention of<br />

shooting any.... The duck shoot was a blind. 3<br />

Orville, after those two aviation pioneers, the Wright brothers....<br />

The servants and train crew may have known the identities of one<br />

Stephenson continues with a description of the encounter at<br />

or two of us, but they did not know all, and it was the names of all<br />

Brunswick station. He tells us that, shortly after they arrived, the<br />

printed together that would have made our mysterious journey<br />

station master walked into the private car and shocked<br />

significant in<br />

them by Washington, in Wall Street,<br />

his<br />

even in London. Discovery,<br />

apparent knowledge of the<br />

we knew, simply must not happen,<br />

identities<br />

or else all our time and effort<br />

of everyone on board. To<br />

make matters<br />

would be wasted. If it were to be exposed publicly that our particular<br />

even worse, he said that a group of reporters were<br />

group had got together and written a banking bill, that bill would have<br />

waiting outside. Davison took charge. "Come outside, old man," he<br />

no chance whatever of passage by Congress.<br />

said, "and I will tell you a story.' 7 No one claims to know what story<br />

was told standing on the railroad<br />

THE<br />

ties that morning,<br />

STRUCTURE WAS PURE CARTEL<br />

but a few<br />

moments later Davison returned with a broad<br />

The composition of the <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island meeting was a classic<br />

smile on his face.<br />

"It's all right," he said reassuringly. "They<br />

example of cartel structure. A cartel is a<br />

won't<br />

group of independent<br />

give us away."<br />

Stephenson continues: "The businesses which join together<br />

rest<br />

to coordinate the production,<br />

is silence. The reporters dispersed,<br />

and the secret<br />

pricing,<br />

of the strange<br />

or marketing of their members. The purpose of a cartel is to<br />

journey was not divulged. No<br />

one asked him how he<br />

reduce<br />

managed<br />

competition and thereby increase profitability. This is<br />

it and he did not volunteer the<br />

information.'<br />

accomplished through a shared monopoly over their industry<br />

which forces the public to pay higher prices for their goods or<br />

1. Paul Warburg, The Federal Reserve System<br />

services than would be otherwise required under free-enterprise<br />

Its Origin and Growth (New York-<br />

Macmil an, 1930), Vol. I, p. 58. It is apparent that Warburg wrote this line two years<br />

competition.<br />

before the book was published.<br />

2. James Warburg, The Long Road Home (New York: Doubleday, 1964) p 29<br />

1- "From<br />

3. Nathaniel<br />

Farm Boy to Financier," by Frank A. Vanderlip, The Saturday Evening<br />

Wright Stephenson, Nelson W. Aldrich in American Politics '(New York-<br />

Post, Feb. 9,<br />

Scnbners,<br />

1933,<br />

1930;<br />

pp. 25, 70. The identical story was told two years later in<br />

rpt. New York: Kennikat Press, 1971), p. 373.<br />

Vanderlip's book bearing the same title as the article<br />

4. Stephenson, p. 376.<br />

(New York: D. Appleton-<br />

Century Company, 1935), pp. 210-219.


12 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND THE JOURNEY TO JEKYLL ISLAND 13<br />

Here were representatives of the world's leading banking<br />

consortia: Morgan, Rockefeller, Rothschild, Warburg, and Kuhn-<br />

Loeb. They were often competitors, and there is little doubt that<br />

there was considerable distrust between them and skillful maneuvering<br />

for favored position in any agreement. But they were driven<br />

together by one overriding desire to fight their common enemy.<br />

The enemy was competition.<br />

In 1910, the number of banks in the United States was growing<br />

at a phenomenal rate. In fact it had more than doubled to over<br />

twenty thousand in just the previous ten years. Furthermore, most<br />

of them were springing up in the South and West, causing the New<br />

York banks to suffer a steady decline of market share. Almost all<br />

banks in the 1880s were national banks, which means they were<br />

chartered by the federal government. Generally, they were located<br />

in the big cities, and were allowed by law to issue their own<br />

currency in the form of bank notes. Even as early as 1896, however,<br />

the number of non-national banks had grown to sixty-one per cent,<br />

and they already held fifty-four per cent of the country's total<br />

banking deposits. By 1913, when the Federal Reserve Act was<br />

passed, those numbers were seventy-one per cent non-national<br />

banks holding fifty-seven per cent of the deposits. 1<br />

In the eyes of<br />

those duck hunters from New York, this was a trend that simply<br />

had to be reversed.<br />

Competition also was coming from a new trend in industry to<br />

finance future growth out of profits rather than from borrowed<br />

capital. This was the outgrowth of free-market interest rates which<br />

set a realistic balance between debt and thrift. Rates were low<br />

enough to attract serious borrowers who were confident of the<br />

success of their business ventures and of their ability to repay, but<br />

they were high enough to discourage loans for frivolous ventures<br />

or those for which there were alternative sources of funding—for<br />

example, one's own capital. That balance between debt and thrift<br />

was the result of a limited money supply. Banks could create loans<br />

in excess of their actual deposits, as we shall see, but there was a<br />

limit to that process. And that limit was ultimately determined by<br />

the supply of gold they held. Consequently, between 1900 and<br />

1910, seventy per cent of the funding for American corporate<br />

1. See Gabriel Kolko, Vie Triumph of Conservatism (New York: The Free Press of<br />

Glencoe, a division of the MacmUIan Co., 1963), p. 140.<br />

growth was generated internally, making industry increasingly<br />

independent of the banks. Even the federal government was<br />

becoming thrifty. It had a growing stockpile of gold, was systemati-<br />

redeeming the Greenbacks—which had been issued during<br />

cally<br />

the Civil War—and was rapidly reducing the national debt.<br />

Here was another trend that had to be halted. What the bankers<br />

wanted—and what many businessmen wanted also—was to intervene<br />

in the free market and tip the balance of interest rates<br />

downward, to favor debt over thrift. To accomplish this, the money<br />

supply simply had to be disconnected from gold and made more<br />

plentiful or, as they described it, more elastic.<br />

THE SPECTER OF BANK FAILURE<br />

The greatest threat, however, came, not from rivals or private<br />

capital formation, but from the public at large in the form of what<br />

bankers call a run on the bank. This is because, when banks accept a<br />

customer's deposit, they give in return a "balance" in his account.<br />

This is the equivalent of a promise to pay back the deposit anytime<br />

he wants. Likewise, when another customer borrows money from<br />

the bank, he also is given an account balance which usually is<br />

withdrawn immediately to satisfy the purpose of the loan. This<br />

creates a ticking time bomb because, at that point, the bank has<br />

issued more promises to "pay-on-demand" than it<br />

has money in<br />

the vault. Even though the depositing customer thinks he can get<br />

his money any time he wants, in reality it has been given to the<br />

borrowing customer and no longer is available at the bank.<br />

The problem is compounded further by the fact that banks are<br />

allowed to loan even more money than they have received in<br />

deposit. The mechanism for accomplishing this seemingly impossible<br />

feat will be described in a later chapter, but it is a fact of modern<br />

banking that promises-to-pay often exceed savings deposits by a<br />

factor of ten-to-one. And, because only about three per cent of these<br />

accounts are actually retained in the vault in the form of cash—the<br />

rest having been put into even more loans and investments—the<br />

bank's promises exceed its ability to keep those promises by a factor<br />

of over three hundred-to-one. As long as only a small percentage<br />

1. William Greider, Secrets of the Temple (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), p.<br />

274, 275. Also Kolko, p. 145,<br />

2. Another way of putting it is that their reserves are underfunded by over<br />

33,333% (10-to-1 divided by .03 = 333.333-to-l . That divided by .01 = 33333%.)


14 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND THE JOURNEY TO JEKYLL ISLAND 15<br />

of depositors request their money at one time, no one is the wiser.<br />

But if public confidence is shaken, and if more than a few per cent<br />

attempt to withdraw their funds, the scheme is finally exposed. The<br />

bank cannot keep all its promises and is forced to close its doors.<br />

Bankruptcy usually follows in due course.<br />

CURRENCY DRAINS<br />

The same result could happen—and, prior to the Federal<br />

Reserve System, often did happen-^even without depositors making<br />

a run on the bank. Instead of withdrawing their funds at the<br />

teller's window, they simply wrote checks to purchase goods or<br />

services. People receiving those checks took them to a bank for<br />

deposit. If that bank happened to be the same one from which the<br />

check was drawn, then all was well, because it was not necessary to<br />

remove any real money from the vault. But if the holder of the<br />

check took it to another bank, it was quickly passed back to the<br />

issuing bank and settlement was demanded between banks.<br />

This is not a one-way street, however. While the Downtown<br />

Bank is demanding payment from the Uptown Bank, the Uptown<br />

Bank is also clearing checks and demanding payment from the<br />

Downtown bank. As long as the money flow in both directions is<br />

equal, then everything can be handled with simple bookkeeping.<br />

But if the flow is not equal, then one of the banks will have to<br />

actually send money to the other to make up the difference. If the<br />

amount of money required exceeds a few percentage points of the<br />

bank's total deposits, the result is the same as a run on the bank by<br />

depositors. This demand of money by other banks rather than by<br />

depositors is called a currency drain.<br />

In 1910, the most common cause of a bank having to declare<br />

bankruptcy due to a currency drain was that it followed a loan<br />

policy that was more reckless than that of its competitors. More<br />

money was demanded from it because more money was loaned by<br />

it. It was dangerous enough to loan ninety per cent of their<br />

customers' savings (keeping only one dollar in reserve out of every<br />

ten), but that had proven to be adequate most of the time. Some<br />

banks, however, were tempted to walk even closer to the precipice.<br />

They pushed the ratio to ninety-too per cent, ninety-^ per cent,<br />

ninety-mwe per cent. After all, the way a bank makes money is to<br />

collect interest, and the only way to do that is to make loans. The<br />

more loans, the better. And, so, there was a practice among some of<br />

the more reckless banks to "loan up," as they call it.<br />

another way of saying to push dawn their reserve ratios.<br />

A BANKERS' UTOPIA<br />

Which was<br />

If all banks could be forced to issue loans in the same ratio to<br />

their reserves as other banks did, then, regardless of how small that<br />

ratio was, the amount of checks to be cleared between them would<br />

No major currency drains would ever<br />

balance in the long run.<br />

occur. The entire banking industry might collapse under such a<br />

system, but not individual banks—at least not those that were part<br />

of the cartel.<br />

All would walk the same distance from the edge,<br />

obligations. The<br />

regardless of how close it was. Under such uniformity, no individual<br />

bank could be blamed for failure to meet its<br />

blame could be shifted, instead, to the "economy" or "government<br />

policy" or "interest rates" or "trade deficits" or the "exchangevalue<br />

of the dollar" or even to the "capitalist system" itself.<br />

But, in 1910, such a bankers' utopia had not yet been created. If<br />

the Downtown bank began to loan at a greater ratio to its reserves<br />

than its competitors, the amount of checks which would come back<br />

to it for payment also would be greater. Thus, the bank which<br />

pursued a more reckless lending policy had to draw against its<br />

reserves in order to make payments to the more conservative banks<br />

and, when those funds were exhausted, it usually was forced into<br />

bankruptcy-<br />

Historian John Klein tells us that "The financial panics of 1873,<br />

1884, 1893, and 1907 were in large part an outgrowth of ... reserve<br />

pyramiding and excessive deposit creation by reserve city ...<br />

banks. These panics were triggered by the currency drains that took<br />

place in periods of relative prosperity when banks were loaned<br />

up." In other words, the "panics" and resulting bank failures were<br />

caused, not by negative factors in the economy, but by currency<br />

drains on the banks which were loaned up to the point where they<br />

had practically no reserves at all. The banks did not fail because the<br />

system was weak. The system failed because the banks were weak.<br />

This was another common problem that brought these seven<br />

men over a thousand miles to a tiny island off the shore of Georgia.<br />

Each was a potentially fierce competitor, but uppermost in their<br />

minds were the so-called panics and the very real 1,748 bank<br />

I<br />

See Vera C. Smith, The Rationale of Central Banking (London: P.S. King & Son,<br />

1936), p. 36.


16 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND THE JOURNEY TO JEKYLL ISLAND 17<br />

failures of the preceding two decades. Somehow, they had to join<br />

forces. A method had to be devised to enable them to continue to<br />

make more promises to pay-on-demand than they could keep. To<br />

do this, they had to find a way to force all banks to walk the same<br />

distance from the edge, and, when the inevitable disasters<br />

happened, to shift public blame away from themselves. By making<br />

it appear to be a problem of the national economy rather than of<br />

private banking practice, the door then could be opened for the use<br />

of tax money rather than their own funds for paying off the losses.<br />

Here, then, were the main challenges that faced that tiny but<br />

powerful group assembled on <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island:<br />

1. How to stop the growing influence of small, rival banks and to<br />

insure that control over the nation's financial resources would<br />

remain in the hands of those present;<br />

2. How to make the money supply more elastic in order to reverse<br />

the trend of private capital formation and to recapture the<br />

industrial loan market;<br />

3. How to pool the meager reserves of the nation's banks into one<br />

large reserve so that all banks will be motivated to follow the<br />

same loan-to-deposit ratios. This would protect at least some of<br />

them from currency drains and bank runs;<br />

4. Should this lead eventually to the collapse of the whole banking<br />

system, then how to shift<br />

banks to the taxpayers.<br />

THE CARTEL ADOPTS A NAME<br />

Everyone knew that the solution to all<br />

the losses from the owners of the<br />

these problems was a<br />

cartel mechanism that had been devised and already put into<br />

similar operation in Europe. As with all cartels, it had to be created<br />

by legislation and sustained by the power of government under the<br />

deception of protecting the consumer. The most important task<br />

before them, therefore, can be stated as objective number five:<br />

5. How to convince Congress that the scheme was a measure to<br />

protect the public.<br />

The task was a delicate one. The American people did not like<br />

the concept of a cartel. The idea of business enterprises joining<br />

together to fix prices and prevent competition was alien to the<br />

free-enterprise system, It could never be sold to the voters. But, if<br />

the word cartel was not used, if<br />

the venture could be described<br />

with words which are emotionally neutral-perhaps even allurine—then<br />

half the battle would be won.<br />

The first decision, therefore, was to follow the practice adopted<br />

in Europe. Henceforth, the cartel would operate as a central bank.<br />

And even that was to be but a generic expression. For purposes of<br />

public relations and legislation,<br />

they would devise a name that<br />

would avoid the word bank altogether and which would conjure<br />

the image of the federal government itself. Furthermore, to create<br />

the impression that there would be no concentration of power, they<br />

would establish regional branches of the cartel and make that a<br />

main selling point. Stephenson tells us: "Aldrich entered this<br />

discussion at <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island an ardent convert to the idea of a central<br />

bank His desire was to transplant the system of one of the great<br />

European banks, say the Bank of England, bodily to America." But<br />

political expediency required that such plans be concealed from the<br />

public. As John Kenneth Galbraith explained it "It was his<br />

[Aldrich's] thought to outflank the opposition by having not one<br />

central bank but many. And the word bank would itself be<br />

avoided."<br />

With the exception of Aldrich, all of those present were<br />

bankers, but only one was an expert on the European model of a<br />

central bank. Because of this knowledge, Paul Warburg became the<br />

dominant and guiding mind throughout all of the discussions.<br />

Even a casual perusal of the literature on the creation of the Federal<br />

Reserve System is sufficient to find that he was, indeed, the cartel's<br />

mastermind. Galbraith says "... Warburg has, with some justice,<br />

been called the father of the system." 3 Professor Edwin Seligman, a<br />

member of the international banking family of J. & W. Seligman,<br />

and head of the Department of Economics at Columbia University,<br />

writes that "... in its fundamental features, the Federal Reserve Act<br />

is the work of Mr. Warburg more than any other man in the<br />

country ,A<br />

I J<br />

Soh P h<br />

3<br />

n Ke^;th 2lbraith, Money: Whence It Came, Where If Went (Boston,<br />

Houghton Mifflin, 1975), p. 122.<br />

3. Galbraith, p. 123. . -„,<br />

4. The Academy of Political Science, Proceedings, 1914, Vol. 4, No. 4, p. 387.


18 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND THE JOURNEY TO JEKYLL ISLAND 19<br />

THE REAL DADDY WARBUCKS<br />

Paul Moritz Warburg was a leading member of the investment<br />

banking firm of MM. Warburg & Company of Hamburg,<br />

Germany, and Amsterdam, the Netherlands. He had come to the<br />

United States only nine years previously. Soon after arrival, however,<br />

and with funding provided mostly by the Rothschild group,<br />

he and his brother, Felix, had been able to buy partnerships in the<br />

New York investment banking firm of Kuhn, Loeb & Company,<br />

while continuing as partners in Warburg of Hamburg. Within<br />

twenty years, Paul would become one of the wealthiest men in<br />

America with an unchallenged domination over the country's<br />

railroad system.<br />

At this distance in history, it is difficult to appreciate the<br />

importance of this man. But some understanding may be had from<br />

the fact that the legendary character, Daddy Warbucks, in the<br />

comic strip Little Orphan Annie, was a contemporary commentary<br />

on the presumed benevolence of Paul Warburg, and the almost<br />

magic ability to accomplish good through the power of his unlimited<br />

wealth.<br />

A third brother, Max Warburg, was the financial adviser of the<br />

Kaiser and became Director of the Reichsbank in Germany. This<br />

was, of course, a central bank, and it was one of the cartel models<br />

used in the construction of the Federal Reserve System. The<br />

Reichsbank, incidentally, a few years later would create the massive<br />

hyperinflation that occurred in Germany, wiping out the middle<br />

class and the entire German economy as well.<br />

Paul Warburg soon became well known on Wall Street as a<br />

persuasive advocate for a central bank in America. Three years<br />

before the <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island meeting, he had published several pamphlets.<br />

One was entitled Defects and Needs of Our Banking System,<br />

and the other was A Plan for A Modified Central Bank, These<br />

attracted wide attention in both financial and academic circles and<br />

set the intellectual climate for all future discussions regarding<br />

banking legislation. In these treatises, Warburg complained that the<br />

American monetary system was crippled by its dependency on<br />

gold and government bonds, both of which were in limited supply.<br />

What America needed, he argued, was an elastic money supply that<br />

1. Anthony Sutton, Wall Street and FDR (New Rochelle, New Ycrk: Arlington House,<br />

1975), p. 92.<br />

could be expanded and contracted to accommodate the fluctuating<br />

needs of commerce. The solution, he said, was to follow the<br />

German example whereby banks could create currency solely on<br />

the basis of "commercial paper," which is banker language for<br />

I O.U.s from corporations.<br />

Warburg was tireless in his efforts. He was a featured speaker<br />

before scores of influential audiences and wrote a steady stream of<br />

published articles on the subject. In March of that year, for example,<br />

The Neiv York Times published an eleven-part series written by<br />

Warburg explaining and expounding what he called the Reserve<br />

Bank of the United States. 1<br />

THE MESSAGE WAS PLAIN FOR THOSE WHO<br />

UNDERSTOOD<br />

Most of Warburg's writing and lecturing on this topic was<br />

eyewash for the public. To cover the fact that a central bank is<br />

merely a cartel which has been legalized, its proponents had to lay<br />

down a thick smoke screen of technical jargon focusing always on<br />

would supposedly benefit commerce, the public, and the<br />

how it<br />

nation; how it would lower interest rates, provide funding for<br />

needed industrial projects, and prevent panics in the economy.<br />

There was not the slightest glimmer that, underneath it all, was a<br />

master plan which was designed from top to bottom to serve<br />

private interests at the expense of the public.<br />

This was, nevertheless, the cold reality, and the more perceptive<br />

bankers were well aware of it. In an address before the<br />

American Bankers Association the following year, Aldrich laid it<br />

out for anyone who was really listening to the meaning of his<br />

words. He said: "The organization proposed is<br />

not a bank, but a<br />

cooperative union of all the banks of the country for definite<br />

purposes." 2 Precisely. A union of banks.<br />

Two years later, in a speech before that same group of bankers,<br />

A. Barton Hepburn of Chase National Bank was even more candid.<br />

He said: "The measure recognizes and adopts the principles of a<br />

central bank. Indeed, if it works out as the sponsors of the law<br />

hope, it will make all incorporated banks together joint owners of a<br />

1. See J.<br />

Lawrence Laughlin, The Federal Reserve Act: Us Origin and Problems (New<br />

York: Macmillan, 1933), p. 9.<br />

2. The full <strong>text</strong> of the speech is reprinted by Herman E. Krooss and Paul A.<br />

Samuel son, Vol. 3, p. 1202.


20 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

THE JOURNEY TO JEKYLL ISLAND 21<br />

central dominating power."<br />

of a cartel as one is likely to find.<br />

And that is about as good a definition<br />

In 1914, one year after the Federal Reserve Act was passed into<br />

law, Senator Aldrich could afford to be less guarded in his remarks.<br />

In an article published in luly of that year in a magazine called The<br />

Independent, he boasted: "Before the passage of this Act, the New<br />

York bankers could only dominate the reserves of New York. Now<br />

we are able to dominate the bank reserves of the entire country."<br />

MYTH ACCEPTED AS HISTORY<br />

The accepted version of history is that the Federal Reserve was<br />

created to stabilize our economy. One of the most widely-used<br />

<strong>text</strong>books on this subject says: "It sprang from the panic of 1907,<br />

with its alarming epidemic of bank failures: the country was fed up<br />

once and for all with the anarchy of unstable private banking."<br />

Even the most naive student must sense a grave contradiction<br />

between this cherished view and the System's actual performance.<br />

Since its inception, it has presided over the crashes of 1921 and<br />

1929; the Great Depression of '29 to '39; recessions in '53, '57, '69,<br />

'75, and '81; a stock market "Black Monday" in '87; and a 1000%<br />

inflation which has destroyed 90% of the dollar's purchasing<br />

power.<br />

Let us be more specific on that last point. By 1990, an annual<br />

income of $10,000 was required to buy what took only $1,000 in<br />

1914. That incredible loss in value was quietly transferred to the<br />

federal government in the form of hidden taxation, and the Federal<br />

Reserve System was the mechanism by which it was accomplished.<br />

Actions have consequences. The consequences of wealth confiscation<br />

by the Federal-Reserve mechanism are now upon us. In the<br />

current decade/ corporate debt is soaring; personal debt is greater<br />

than ever; both business and personal bankruptcies are at an<br />

all-time high; banks and savings and loan associations are failing in<br />

1 . Quoted by KoLko, Triumph, p. 235.<br />

Z Paul A. SamueLson, Economics, 8th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970), p. 272.<br />

3. See "Money, Banking, and Biblical Ethics/' by Ronald H. Nash, Durell Journal of<br />

Money and Banking, February, 1990.<br />

4. When one considers that the income tax had just been introduced in 1913 and<br />

that such low figures were completely exempt, an income at that time of $1,000<br />

actually was the equivalent of earning $15,400 now, before paying 35% taxes. When<br />

the amount now taken by state and local governments is added to the total bite, the<br />

figure is close to $20,000.<br />

larger numbers than ever before; interest on the national debt is<br />

consuming half of our tax dollars; heavy industry has been largely<br />

replaced by overseas competitors; we are facing an international<br />

trade deficit for the first time in our history; 75% of downtown Los<br />

Angeles and other metropolitan areas is now owned by foreigners;<br />

and over half of our nation is in a state of economic recession.<br />

FIRST REASON TO ABOLISH THE SYSTEM<br />

That is the scorecard eighty years after the Federal Reserve was<br />

created supposedly to stabilize our economy! There can be no<br />

argument that the System has failed in its stated objectives.<br />

Furthermore, after all this time, after repeated changes in personnel,<br />

after operating under both political parties, after numerous<br />

experiments in monetary philosophy, after almost a hundred<br />

revisions to its charter, and after the development of countless new<br />

formulas and techniques, there has been more than ample opportunity<br />

to work out mere procedural flaws. It is not unreasonable to<br />

conclude, therefore, that the System has failed, not because it needs<br />

a new set of rules or more intelligent directors, but because it<br />

incapable ofachieving its stated objectives.<br />

If an institution is incapable of achieving its objectives, there is<br />

no reason to preserve it—unless it can be altered in some way to<br />

change its capability. That leads to the question: why is the System<br />

incapable of achieving its stated objectives? The painful answer is:<br />

those were never its true objectives. When one realizes the circumstances<br />

under which it<br />

was created, when one contemplates the<br />

identities of those who authored it, and when one studies its actual<br />

performance over the years, it becomes obvious that the System is<br />

merely a cartel with a government facade. There is no doubt that<br />

those who run it are motivated to maintain full employment, high<br />

productivity, low inflation, and a generally sound economy. They<br />

are not interested in killing the goose that lays such beautiful<br />

golden eggs. But, when there is a conflict between the public<br />

interest and the private needs of the cartel—a conflict that arises<br />

almost daily—the public will be sacrificed. That is the nature of the<br />

beast. It is foolish to expect a cartel to act in any other way.<br />

This view is not encouraged by Establishment institutions and<br />

has become their apparent mission to convince the<br />

publishers. It<br />

American people that the system is not intrinsically flawed. It<br />

merely has been in the hands of bumbling oafs. For example,<br />

is


22 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

23<br />

William Greider was a former Assistant Managing Editor for The<br />

the problem goes undiscussed and almost entirely uncomprehended.<br />

Washington Post. His book, Secrets of The Temple, was published in<br />

The Federal Reserve System is a legal private monopoly of the money<br />

1987 by Simon and Schuster. It was critical of the Federal Reserve<br />

supply operated for the benefit of the few under the guise of<br />

because of its failures, but, according to Greider, these were not<br />

protecting and promoting the public interest.<br />

caused by any defect in the System itself, but merely because the<br />

The real significance of the journey to <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island and the<br />

economic factors are "sooo complicated" that the good men who<br />

have struggled to make the System work have just not yet been able<br />

creature that was hatched there was inadvertently summarized by<br />

the words of Paul Warburg's admiring biographer, Harold Kellock:<br />

to figure it all out. But, don't worry, folks, they're working on it!<br />

Paul M. Warburg is probably the mildest-mannered man that ever<br />

That is exactly the kind of powder-puff criticism which is acceptable<br />

personally conducted a revolution. It was a bloodless revolution: he<br />

in our mainstream media. Yet, Greider's own research points<br />

did not attempt to rouse the populace to arms. He stepped forth armed<br />

to an entirely different interpretation. Speaking of the System's<br />

simply with an idea. And he conquered. That's the amazing thing. A<br />

origin, he says:<br />

shy, sensitive man, he imposed his idea on a nation of a hundred<br />

million people.<br />

As new companies prospered without Wall Street, so did the hew<br />

regional banks that handled their funds, New York's concentrated SUMMARY<br />

share of bank deposits was still huge, about half the nation's total, but<br />

it was declining steadily. Wall Street was still "the biggest kid on the<br />

The basic plan for the Federal Reserve System was drafted at a<br />

secret meeting held in November of 1910 at the private resort of J.P.<br />

block," but less and less able to bully the others.<br />

Morgan on <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island off the coast of Georgia. Those who<br />

This trend was a crucial fact of history, a misunderstood reality<br />

attended represented the great financial institutions of Wall Street<br />

that completely alters the political meaning of the reform legislation<br />

and, indirectly, Europe as well. The reason for secrecy was simple.<br />

that created the Federal Reserve. At the time, the conventional wisdom<br />

in Congress, widely shared and sincerely espoused by<br />

Had it been known that rival factions of the banking community<br />

Progressive<br />

reformers, was that a government institution would finally harness the<br />

had joined together, the public would have been alerted to the<br />

"money trust," disarm its powers, and establish broad democratic<br />

possibility that the bankers were plotting an agreement in restraint<br />

control over money and credit. . . . The results were nearly the opposite.<br />

of trade—which, of course, is exactly what they were doing. What<br />

The money reforms enacted in 1913, in fact, helped to preserve the<br />

emerged was a cartel agreement with five objectives: stop the<br />

status quo, to stabilize the old order. Money-center bankers would not<br />

growing competition from the nation's newer banks; obtain a<br />

only gain dominance over the new central bank, but would also enjoy<br />

franchise to create money out of nothing for the purpose of lending;<br />

new insulation against instability and their own decline. Once the Fed<br />

get control of the reserves of all banks so that the more reckless<br />

was in operation, the steady diffusion of financial power halted. Wall<br />

Street maintained its dominant position—and even enhanced<br />

ones would not be exposed to currency drains and bank runs; get<br />

it.<br />

the taxpayer to pick up the cartel's inevitable losses; and convince<br />

Anthony Sutton, former Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution<br />

for War, Revolution and Peace, and also Professor of Econom-<br />

Congress that the purpose was to protect the public. It was realized<br />

that the bankers would have to become partners with the politicians<br />

and that the structure of the cartel would have to be a central<br />

ics at California State University, Los Angeles, provides a<br />

somewhat deeper analysis. He writes:<br />

bank. The record shows that the Fed has failed to achieve its stated<br />

Warburg's revolutionary plan to get American Society to go to<br />

objectives- That is because those were never its true goals. As a<br />

work for Wall Street was astonishingly simple. Even today,... academic<br />

banking cartel, and in terms of the five objectives stated above, it<br />

theoreticians cover their blackboards with meaningless equations, and<br />

has been an Unqualified success.<br />

the general public struggles in bewildered confusion with inflation<br />

and the coming credit collapse, while the quite simple explanation of<br />

1. Sutton, Wall Street and F.D.R., p, 94.<br />

2. Harold Kellock, "Warburg, the Revolutionist/' The Century Magazine, May 1915,<br />

Greider, 275.<br />

p. 79.


,<br />

Nelson<br />

W. Aldrich<br />

JekyU Island Museum<br />

UPl/Beltmar,<br />

Henry P. Davison (L) and Charles D. Norton (R)<br />

Chapter Two<br />

THE NAME OF THE<br />

GAME IS BAILOUT<br />

<strong>Jekyll</strong> Island Museum<br />

Abraham Piatt Andrew<br />

The seven men who attended the secret meetining on Jekyii<br />

Island, where the Federal Reserve System was conceived,<br />

represented an estimated one-fourth of the total wealth of ttt<br />

entire world. They were:<br />

1<br />

Nelson W. Aldrich, Republican "whip" in the Senate,<br />

Chairman of the National Monetary Commission,<br />

father-in-law to John D. Rockefeller, Jr.;<br />

Henry P. Davison, Sr. Partner of J. P. Morgan Company;<br />

Charles D. Norton, Pres. of 1st National Bank of New Yof.<br />

A. Piatt Andrew, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury;<br />

Frank A. Vanderlip, President of the National City Bank ci<br />

New York, representing William Rockefeller.<br />

Benjamin Strong, head of J. P. Morgan's Bankers Trust<br />

Company, later to become head of the System;<br />

Paul M. Warburg, a partner in Kuhn, Loeb & Company,<br />

representing the Rothschilds and Warburgs in Europe.<br />

The analogy of a spectator sporting event as a<br />

means of explaining the rules by which taxpayers<br />

are required to pick up the cost of bailing out the<br />

banks when their loans go sour.<br />

It was stated in the previous chapter that the <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island<br />

group which conceived the Federal Reserve System actually created<br />

a national cartel which was dominated by the larger banks. It<br />

was also stated that a primary objective of that cartel was to involve<br />

the federal government as an agent for shifting the inevitable losses<br />

from the owners of those banks to the taxpayers. That, of course, is<br />

one of the more controversial assertions made in this book. Yet,<br />

there is little room for any other interpretation when one confronts<br />

the massive evidence of history since the System was created. Let<br />

us, therefore, take another leap through time. Having jumped to<br />

the year 1910 to begin this story, let us now return to the present<br />

era.<br />

To understand how banking losses are shifted to the taxpayers,<br />

it is first necessary to know a little bit about how the scheme was<br />

designed to work There are certain procedures and formulas<br />

which must be understood or else the entire process seems like<br />

chaos. It is as though we had been isolated all our lives on a South<br />

Sea island with no knowledge of the outside world. Imagine what it<br />

would then be like the first time we travelled to the mainland and<br />

witnessed a game of professional football. We would stare with<br />

incredulity at men dressed like aliens from another planet; throwing<br />

their bodies against each other; tossing a funny shaped object<br />

back and forth; fighting over it as though it were of great value, yet,<br />

Island Museum<br />

Frank A. Vanderlip<br />

Benjamin Strong<br />

UPl/B&ttmann<br />

<strong>Jekyll</strong> Island Museum<br />

Paul M. Warburg<br />

occasionally kicking it out of the area as though it were worthless<br />

and despised; chasing each other, knocking each other to the<br />

ground and then walking away to regroup for another surge; all


26 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

this with tens of thousand of spectators riotously shouting in<br />

unison for no apparent reason at all. Without a basic understanding<br />

that this was a game and without knowledge of the rules of that<br />

game, the event would appear as total chaos and universal<br />

madness.<br />

The operation of our monetary system through the Federal<br />

Reserve has much in common with professional football. First,<br />

there are certain plays that are repeated over and over again with<br />

only minor variations to suit the special circumstances. Second,<br />

there are definite rules which the players follow with great<br />

precision. Third, there is a clear objective to the game which is<br />

uppermost in the minds of the players. And fourth, if the spectators<br />

are not familiar with that objective and if they do not understand<br />

the rules, they will never comprehend what is going on. Which, as<br />

far as monetary matters is concerned, is<br />

the common state of the<br />

vast majority of Americans today.<br />

Let us, therefore, attempt to spell out in plain language what<br />

that objective is and how the players expect to achieve it. To<br />

demystify the process, we shall present an overview first. After the<br />

concepts are clarified, we then shall follow up with actual examples<br />

taken from the recent past.<br />

The name of the game is Bailout. As stated previously, the<br />

objective of this game is to shift the inevitable losses from the<br />

owners of the larger banks to the taxpayers. The procedure by<br />

which this is accomplished is as follows:<br />

RULES OF THE GAME<br />

The game begins when the Federal<br />

Reserve System allows<br />

commercial banks to create checkbook money out of nothing.<br />

(Details regarding how this incredible feat is accomplished are<br />

given in chapter ten entitled The Mandrake Mechanism.) The banks<br />

derive profit from this easy money, not by spending it, but by<br />

lending it to others and collecting interest.<br />

When such a loan is placed on the bank's books it is shown as<br />

an asset because it is earning interest and, presumably, someday<br />

will be paid back. At the same time an equal entry is mad,? on the<br />

liability side of the ledger. That is because the newly created<br />

checkbook money now is in circulation, and most of it will end up<br />

in other banks which will return the canceled checks to the issuing<br />

bank for payment. Individuals may also bring some of this check-<br />

THE NAME OF THE GAME IS BAILOUT 27<br />

book money back to the bank and request cash. The issuing bank,<br />

therefore, has a potential money pay-out liability equal to the<br />

amount of the loan asset.<br />

When a borrower cannot repay and there are no assets which<br />

can be taken to compensate, the bank must write off that loan as a<br />

loss- However, since most of the money originally was created out<br />

of nothing and cost<br />

the bank nothing except bookkeeping overhead,<br />

there is little of tangible value that is actual lost. It is primarily<br />

a bookkeeping entry.<br />

A bookkeeping loss can still be undesirable to a bank because it<br />

causes the loan to be removed from the ledger as an asset without a<br />

reduction in liabilities. The difference must come from the equity of<br />

those who own the bank. In other words, the loan asset is removed,<br />

but the money liability remains. The original checkbook money is<br />

still circulating out there even though the borrower cannot repay,<br />

and the issuing bank still has the obligation to redeem those checks.<br />

The only way to do this and balance the books once again is to<br />

draw upon the capital which was invested by the bank's stockholders<br />

or to deduct the loss from the bank's current profits. In either<br />

case, the owners of the bank lose an amount equal to the value of<br />

the defaulted loan. So, to them, the loss becomes very real. If the<br />

bank is forced to write off a large amount of bad loans, the amount<br />

could exceed the entire value of the owners' equity.<br />

happens, the game is over, and the bank is insolvent.<br />

When that<br />

This concern would be sufficient to motivate most bankers to be<br />

very conservative in their loan policy, and in fact most of them do<br />

act with great caution when dealing with individuals and small<br />

businesses. But the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit<br />

Insurance Corporation, and the Federal Deposit Loan Corporation<br />

now guarantee that massive loans made to large corporations and<br />

to other governments will not be allowed to fall entirely upon the<br />

bank's owners should those loans go into default. This is done<br />

under the argument that, if these corporations or banks are allowed<br />

to fail, the nation would suffer from vast unemployment and<br />

economic disruption. More on that in a moment.<br />

THE PERPETUAL-DEBT PLAY<br />

The end result of this policy is that the banks have little motive<br />

to be cautious and are protected against the effect of their<br />

own<br />

folly. The larger the loan, the better it is, because it will produce the


—<br />

28 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND THE NAME OF THE GAME IS BAILOUT 29<br />

greatest amount of profit with the least amount of effort. A single<br />

loan to a third-world country netting hundreds of millions of<br />

dollars in annual interest is just as easy to process—if not easier<br />

than a loan for $50,000 to a local merchant on the shopping mall. If<br />

the interest is paid, it's gravy time. If the loan defaults, the federal<br />

government will "protect the public" and, through various mechanisms<br />

described shortly, will make sure that the banks continue to<br />

receive their interest.<br />

The individual and the small businessman find it increasingly<br />

difficult to borrow money at reasonable rates, because the banks<br />

can make more money on loans to the corporate giants and to<br />

foreign governments. Also, the bigger loans are safer for the banks,<br />

because the government will make them good even if they default.<br />

There are no such guarantees for the small loans. The public will<br />

not swallow the line that bailing out the little guy is necessary to<br />

save the system. The dollar amounts are too small. Only when the<br />

figures become mind-boggling does the ploy become plausible.<br />

It is important to remember that banks do not really want to<br />

have their loans repaid, except as evidence of the dependability of<br />

the borrower. They make a profit from interest on the loan,<br />

repayment of the loan. If a loan is paid off, the bank merely has to<br />

find another borrower, and that can be an expensive nuisance. It is<br />

much better to have the existing borrower pay only the interest and<br />

never make payments on the loan itself. That process is called<br />

rolling over the debt. One of the reasons banks prefer to lend to<br />

governments is that they do not expect those loans ever to be<br />

repaid. When Walter Wriston was chairman of the Citicorp Bank in<br />

1982, he extolled the virtue of the action this way:<br />

If we had a truth-in-Government act comparable to the<br />

truth-in-advertising law, every note issued by the Treasury would be<br />

obliged to include a sentence stating: "This note will be redeemed with<br />

the proceeds from an identical note which will be sold to the public<br />

when this one comes due."<br />

When this activity is carried out in the United States, as it is<br />

weekly, it is described as a Treasury bill auction. But when<br />

basically the same process is conducted abroad in a foreign<br />

language, our news media usually speak of a country's "rolling<br />

over its debts." The perception remains that some form of disaster<br />

is inevitable. It is not.<br />

not<br />

To see why, it is only necessary to understand the basic facts of<br />

government borrowing. The first is that there are few recorded<br />

instances in history of government—any government—actually<br />

getting out of debt. Certainly in an era of $100-billion deficits, no<br />

one lending money to our Government by buying a Treasury bill<br />

expects that it will be paid at maturity in any way except by our<br />

Government's selling a new bill of like amount.<br />

THE DEBT ROLL-OVER PLAY<br />

Since the system makes it profitable for banks to make large,<br />

unsound loans, that is the kind of loans which banks will make.<br />

Furthermore, it is predictable that most unsound loans eventually<br />

will go into default. When the borrower finally declares that he<br />

cannot pay, the bank responds by rolling over the loan. This often is<br />

stage managed to appear as a concession on the part of the bank<br />

but, in reality, it is a significant forward move toward the objective<br />

of perpetual interest.<br />

Eventually the borrower comes to the point where he can no<br />

longer pay even the interest. Now the play becomes more complex.<br />

The bank does not want to lose the interest, because that is its<br />

stream of income. But it cannot afford to allow the borrower to go<br />

into default either, because that would require a write-off which, in<br />

turn, could wipe out the owners' equity and put the bank out of<br />

business. So the bank's next move is to create additional money out<br />

of nothing and lend that to the borrower so he will have enough to<br />

continue paying the interest, which by now must be paid on the<br />

original<br />

loan plus the additional loan as well. What looked like<br />

certain disaster suddenly is converted by a brilliant play into a<br />

major score. This not only maintains the old loan on the books as an<br />

asset, it<br />

actually increases the apparent size of that asset and also<br />

results in higher interest payments, thus, greater profit to the bank.<br />

THE UP-THE-ANTE PLAY<br />

Sooner or later, the borrower becomes restless. He is not<br />

interested in making interest payments with nothing left for<br />

himself. He comes to realize that he is merely working for the bank<br />

and, once again, interest payments stop. The opposing teams go<br />

into a huddle to plan the next move, then rush to the scrimmage<br />

1. "Banking Against Disaster/' by Walter B. Wriston, The New York Times, Septem<br />

ber 14,1982.


30 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

line where they hurl threatening innuendoes at each other. The<br />

borrower simply cannot, will not pay. Collect if you can. The lender<br />

threatens to blackball the borrower, to see to it that he will never<br />

again be able to obtain a loan. Finally, a "compromise" is worked<br />

out. As before, the bank agrees to create still<br />

more money out of<br />

nothing and lend that to the borrower to cover the interest on both<br />

of the previous loans but, this time, they up the ante to provide still<br />

additional money for the borrower to spend on something other than<br />

interest. That is a perfect score. The borrower suddenly has a fresh<br />

supply of money for his purposes plus enough to keep making<br />

those bothersome interest payments. The bank, on the other hand,<br />

now has still larger assets, higher interest income, and greater profits.<br />

What an exciting game!<br />

THE RESCHEDULING PLAY<br />

The previous plays can be repeated several times until the<br />

reality finally dawns on the borrower that he is sinking deeper and<br />

deeper into the debt pit with no prospects of climbing out. This<br />

realization usually comes when the interest payments become so<br />

large they represent almost as much as the entire corporate<br />

earnings or the country's total tax base. This time around, roll-overs<br />

with larger loans are rejected, and default seems inevitable.<br />

But wait. What's this? The players are back at the scrimmage<br />

line. There is a great confrontation. Referees are called in. Two<br />

shrill blasts from the horn tell us a score has been made for both<br />

sides. A voice over the public address system announces: "This<br />

loan has been rescheduled/'<br />

Rescheduling usually means a combination of a lower interest<br />

rate and a longer period for repayment. The effect is primarily<br />

cosmetic. It reduces the monthly payment but extends the period<br />

further into the future. This makes the current burden to the<br />

borrower a little easier to carry, but it also makes repayment of the<br />

capital even more unlikely. It postpones the day of reckoning but,<br />

in the meantime, you guessed it: The loan remains as an asset, and<br />

the interest payments continue.<br />

THE PROTECT-THE-PUBLIC PLAY<br />

Eventually the day of reckoning arrives. The borrower realizes<br />

he can never repay the capital and flatly refuses to pay interest on it.<br />

It is time for the Final Maneuver.<br />

THE NAME OF THE GAME IS BAILOUT 31<br />

According to the Banking Safety Digest, which specializes in<br />

rating the safety of America's banks and S&Ls, most of the banks<br />

involved with "problem loans" are quite profitable businesses:<br />

Note that, exceptfor third-world loans, most of the large banks in the<br />

country are operating quite profitably. In contrast with the<br />

continually-worsening S&L crisis, the banks' profitability has been the<br />

engine with which they have been working off (albeit slowly) their<br />

overseas debt... At last year's profitability levels, the banking<br />

industry could, in theory, "buy out" the entirety of their own Latin<br />

American loans within two years.<br />

The banks can absorb the losses of their<br />

bad loans to multinational<br />

corporations and foreign governments, but that is not<br />

according to the rules. It would be a major loss to the stockholders<br />

who would receive little or no dividends during the adjustment<br />

period, and any chief executive officer who embarked upon such a<br />

course would soon be looking for a new job. That this is not part of<br />

the game plan is evident by the fact that, while a small portion of<br />

the Latin American debt has been absorbed, the banks are continuing<br />

to make gigantic loans to governments in other parts of the<br />

world, particularly Africa, Red China, and Eastern European<br />

nations. For reasons which will be analyzed in chapter four, there is<br />

little hope that the performance of these loans will be different than<br />

those in Latin America. But the most important reason for<br />

absorbing the losses is that there is<br />

not<br />

a standard play that can still<br />

breathe life back into those dead loans and reactivate the bountiful<br />

income stream that flows from them.<br />

Here's how it works. The captains of both teams approach the<br />

referee and the Game Commissioner to request that the game be<br />

extended. The reason given is that this is in the interest of the<br />

public, the spectators who are having such a wonderful time and<br />

who will be sad to see the game ended. They request also that,<br />

while the spectators are in the stadium enjoying themselves, the<br />

parking-lot attendants be ordered to quietly remove the hub caps<br />

from every car. These can be sold to provide money for additional<br />

salaries for all the players, including the referee and, of course, the<br />

Commissioner himself. That is only fair since they are now<br />

1- "Overseas Lending ... Trigger for A Severe Depression?" The Banking Safety<br />

Digest (U.S. Business Publishing/Veribanc, Wakefield, Massachusetts), August,<br />

1989, p. 3.


32 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

working overtime for the benefit of the spectators. When the deal is<br />

finally struck, the horn will blow three times, and a roar of joyous<br />

relief will sweep across the stadium.<br />

In a somewhat less recognizable form, the same play may look<br />

like this: The president of the lending bank and the finance officer<br />

of the defaulting corporation or government will join together and<br />

approach Congress. They will explain that the borrower has<br />

exhausted his ability to service the loan and, without assistance<br />

from the federal government, there will be dire consequences for<br />

the American people. Not only will there be unemployment and<br />

hardship at home, there will be massive disruptions in world<br />

markets. And, since we are now so dependent on those markets,<br />

our exports will drop, foreign capital will dry up, and we will<br />

suffer greatly. What is needed, they will say, is for Congress to<br />

provide money to the borrower, either directly or indirectly,<br />

allow him to continue to pay interest on the loan and to initiate new<br />

spending programs which will be so profitable he will soon be able<br />

to pay everyone back.<br />

As part of the proposal, the borrower will agree to accept the<br />

direction of a third-party referee in adopting an austerity program<br />

to make sure that none of the new money is wasted. The bank also<br />

will agree to write off a small part of the loan as a gesture of its<br />

willingness to share the burden. This move, of course, will have<br />

been foreseen from the very beginning of the game, and is a small<br />

step backward to achieve a giant stride forward. After all, the<br />

amount to be lost through the write-off was created out of nothing<br />

in the first place and, without this Final Maneuver, the entirety<br />

would be written off. Furthermore, this modest write down is<br />

dwarfed by the amount to be gained through restoration of the<br />

income stream.<br />

THE GUARANTELD-PAYMENT PLAY<br />

One of the standard variations of the Final Maneuver is for the<br />

government, not always to directly provide the funds, but to<br />

provide the credit for the funds. That means to guarantee future<br />

payments should the borrower again default. Once Congress<br />

agrees to this, the government becomes a co-signer to the loan, and<br />

the inevitable losses are finally lifted from the ledger of the bank<br />

and placed onto the backs of the American taxpayer.<br />

to<br />

THE NAME OF THE GAME IS BAILOUT 33<br />

Money now begins to move into the banks through a complex<br />

system of federal agencies, international agencies, foreign aid, and<br />

direct subsidies. All of these mechanisms extract payments from<br />

the American people and channel them to the deadbeat borrowers<br />

who then send them to the banks to service their loans. Very little<br />

of this money actually comes from taxes. Almost all of it is<br />

generated by the Federal Reserve System. When this newly created<br />

money returns to the banks, it quickly moves out again into the<br />

economy where it mingles with and dilutes the value of the money<br />

already there. The result is the appearance of rising prices but<br />

which, in reality, is a lowering of the value of the dollar.<br />

The American people have no idea they are paying the bill.<br />

They know that someone is stealing their hub caps, but they think it<br />

is the greedy businessman who raises prices or the selfish laborer<br />

who demands higher wages or the unworthy farmer who demands<br />

too much for his crop or the wealthy foreigner who bids up our<br />

prices. They do not realize that these groups also are victimized by a<br />

monetary system which is constantly being eroded in value by and<br />

through the Federal Reserve System,<br />

Public ignorance of how the game is really played was dramatically<br />

displayed during a recent Phil Donahue TV show. The topic<br />

was the Savings and Loan crisis and the billions of dollars that it<br />

would cost the taxpayer. A man from the audience rose and asked<br />

angrily: "Why can't the government pay for these debts instead of<br />

the taxpayer?" And the audience of several hundred people<br />

actually cheered in enthusiastic approval!<br />

PROSPERITY THROUGH INSOLVENCY<br />

Since large, corporate loans are often guaranteed by the federal<br />

government, one would think that the banks which make those<br />

loans would never have a problem. Yet, many of them still manage<br />

to bungle themselves into insolvency. As we shall see in a later<br />

section of this study, insolvency actually is inherent in the system<br />

itself, a system called fractional-reserve banking.<br />

Nevertheless, a bank can operate quite nicely in a state of<br />

insolvency so long as its customers don't know it. Money is<br />

brought into being and transmuted from one imaginary form to<br />

another by mere entries on a ledger, and creative bookkeeping can<br />

always make the bottom line appear to balance. The problem arises<br />

when depositors decide, for whatever reason, to withdraw their


34 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

money. Lo and behold, there isn't enough to go around and, when<br />

that happens, the cat is finally out of the bag. The bank must close<br />

its doors, and the depositors still waiting in line outside are ... well,<br />

just that: still waiting.<br />

The proper solution to this problem is to require the banks, like<br />

all other businesses, to honor their contracts. If they tell their<br />

customers that deposits are<br />

"payable upon demand," then they<br />

should hold enough cash to make good on that promise, regardless<br />

of when the customers want it or how many of them want it. In<br />

other words, they should keep cash in the vault equal to 100% of<br />

their depositors' accounts. When we give our hat to the hat-check<br />

girl and obtain a receipt for it, we don't expect her to rent it out<br />

while we eat dinner hoping she'll get it back—or one just like it—in<br />

time for our departure. We expect all the hats to remain there all the<br />

time so there will be no question of getting ours back precisely<br />

when we want it.<br />

On the other hand, if the bank tells us it is going to lend our<br />

deposit to others so we can earn a little interest on it, then it should<br />

also tell us forthrightly that we cannot have our money back on<br />

demand. Why not? Because it is loaned out and not in the vault any<br />

longer. Customers who earn interest on their accounts should be<br />

told that they have time deposits, not demand deposits, because the<br />

bank will need a stated amount of time before it will be able to<br />

recover the money which was loaned out.<br />

None of this is difficult to understand, yet bank customers are<br />

seldom informed of it. They are told they can have their money any<br />

time they want it and they are paid interest as well. Even if they do<br />

not receive interest, the bank does, and this is how so many<br />

customer services can be offered at little or no direct cost. Occasionally,<br />

a thirty-day or sixty-day delay will be mentioned as a<br />

possibility, but that is greatly inadequate for deposits which have<br />

been transformed into ten, twenty, or thirty-year loans. The banks<br />

are simply playing the odds that everything will work out most of<br />

the time.<br />

We shall examine this issue in greater detail in a later section<br />

but, for now, it is sufficient to know that total disclosure is not how<br />

the banking game is played. The Federal Reserve System has<br />

legalized and institutionalized the dishonesty of issuing more hat<br />

checks than there are hats and it has devised complex methods of<br />

disguising this practice as a perfectly proper and normal feature of<br />

THE NAME OF THE GAME IS BAILOUT 35<br />

banking. Students of finance are told that there simply is no other<br />

way for the system to function. Once that premise is accepted, then<br />

all attention can be focused, not on the inherent fraud, but on ways<br />

and means to live with it and make it as painless as possible.<br />

Based on the assumption that only a small percentage of the<br />

depositors will<br />

ever want to withdraw their money at the same<br />

time, the Federal Reserve allows the nation's commercial banks to<br />

operate with an incredibly thin layer of cash to cover their promises<br />

to pay "on demand." When a bank runs out of money and is unable<br />

to keep that promise, the System then acts as a lender of last resort.<br />

That is banker language meaning it stands ready to create money<br />

out of nothing and immediately lend it to any bank in trouble.<br />

(Details on how that is accomplished are in chapter eight.) But there<br />

are practical limits to just how far that process can work. Even the<br />

Fed will not support a bank that has gotten itself so deeply in the<br />

hole it has no realistic chance of digging out. When a bank's<br />

bookkeeping assets finally become less than its liabilities, the rules<br />

of the game call for transferring the losses to the depositors<br />

themselves. This means they pay twice: once as taxpayers and again<br />

as depositors. The mechanism by which this is accomplished is<br />

called the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.<br />

THE FDIC PLAY<br />

The FDIC guarantees that every insured deposit will be paid<br />

back regardless of the financial condition of the bank. The money to<br />

do this comes out of a special fund which is derived from<br />

assessments against participating banks. The banks, of course, do<br />

not pay this assessment. As with all other expenses, the bulk of the<br />

cost ultimately is passed on to their customers in the form of higher<br />

service fees and lower interest rates on deposits.<br />

The FDIC is usually described as an insurance fund, but that is<br />

deceptive advertising at its worst. One of the primary conditions of<br />

insurance is that it must avoid what underwriters call "moral<br />

hazard/' That is a situation in which the policyholder has little<br />

incentive to avoid or prevent that which is being insured against<br />

When moral hazard is present, it is normal for people to become<br />

careless, and the likelihood increases that what is being insured<br />

against will actually happen. An example would be a government<br />

Program forcing everyone to pay an equal amount into a fund to<br />

Protect them from the expense of parking fines. One hesitates even


36 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

THE NAME OF THE GAME IS BAILOUT 37<br />

to mention this absurd proposition lest some enterprising politician<br />

should decide to put it on the ballot. Therefore, let us hasten to<br />

point out that, if such a numb-skull plan were adopted, two things<br />

would happen: (1) just about everyone soon would be getting<br />

parking tickets and (2), since there now would be so many of them,<br />

the taxes to pay for those tickets would greatly exceed the previous<br />

cost of paying them uritfwut the so-called protection.<br />

The FDIC operates exactly in this fashion. Depositors are told<br />

their insured accounts are protected in the event their bank should<br />

become insolvent. To pay for this protection, each bank is assessed<br />

a specified percentage of its total deposits. That percentage is the<br />

same for all banks regardless of their previous record or how risky<br />

their loans. Under such conditions, it does not pay to be cautious.<br />

The banks making reckless loans earn a higher rate of interest than<br />

those making conservative loans. They also are far more likely to<br />

collect from the fund, yet they pay not one cent more. Conservative<br />

banks are penalized and gradually become motivated to make<br />

more risky loans to keep up with their competitors and to get their<br />

"fair<br />

share" of the fund's protection. Moral hazard, therefore, is<br />

built right into the system. As with protection against parking<br />

tickets, the FDIC increases the likelihood that what is being insured<br />

against will actually happen. It is not a solution to the problem, it is<br />

part of the problem.<br />

REAL INSURANCE WOULD BE A BLESSING<br />

A true deposit-insurance program which was totally voluntary<br />

and which geared its rates to the actual risks would be a blessing.<br />

Banks with solid loans on their books would be able to obtain<br />

protection for their depositors at reasonable rates, because the<br />

chances of the insurance company having to pay would be small.<br />

Banks with unsound loans, however, would have to pay much<br />

higher rates or possibly would not be able to obtain coverage at any<br />

price. Depositors, therefore, would know instantly, without need to<br />

investigate further, that a bank without insurance is not a place<br />

where they want to put their money. In order to attract deposits,<br />

banks would have to have insurance. In order to have insurance at<br />

rates they could afford, they would have to demonstrate to the<br />

insurance company that their financial affairs<br />

are in good order.<br />

Consequently, banks which failed to meet the minimum standards<br />

of sound business practice would soon have no customers and<br />

would be forced out of business. A voluntary, private insurance<br />

program would act as a powerful regulator of the entire banking<br />

industry far more effectively and honestly than any political<br />

scheme ever could. Unfortunately, such is not the banking world of<br />

today.<br />

The FDIC "protection" is not insurance in any sense of the<br />

word. It is merely part of a political scheme to bail out the most<br />

influential members of the banking cartel when they get into<br />

financial difficulty. As we have already seen, the first line of<br />

defense in this scheme is to have large, defaulted loans restored to<br />

life by a Congressional pledge of tax dollars. If that should fail and<br />

the bank can no longer conceal its insolvency through creative<br />

bookkeeping, it is almost certain that anxious depositors will soon<br />

line up to withdraw their money—which the bank does not have.<br />

The second line of defense, therefore, is to have the FDIC step in<br />

and make those payments for them.<br />

Bankers, of course, do not want this to happen. It is a last resort.<br />

If the bank is rescued in this fashion, management is fired and what<br />

is left of the business usually is absorbed by another bank.<br />

Furthermore, the value of the stock will plummet, but this will<br />

affect the small stockholders only. Those with controlling interest<br />

and those in management know long in advance of the pending<br />

catastrophe and are able to sell<br />

the bulk of their shares while the<br />

price is still high. The people who create the problem seldom suffer<br />

the economic consequences of their actions.<br />

THE FDIC WILL NEVER BE ADEQUATELY FUNDED<br />

The FDIC never will have enough money to cover its potential<br />

liability for the entire banking system. If that amount were in<br />

existence, it could be held by the banks themselves, and an<br />

insurance fund would not even be necessary. Instead, the FDIC<br />

operates on the same assumption as the banks: that only a small<br />

percentage will ever need money at the same time. So the amount<br />

held in reserve is never more than a few percentage points of the<br />

total liability. Typically, the FDIC holds about $1.20 for every $100<br />

of covered deposits. At the time of this writing, however, that<br />

figure had slipped to only 70 cents and was still<br />

means that the financial exposure is<br />

dropping. That<br />

about 99.3% larger than the<br />

safety net which is supposed to catch it. The failure of just one or


38 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND THE NAME OF THE GAME IS BAILOUT 39<br />

two large banks in the system could completely wipe out the entire<br />

fund.<br />

And it gets even worse. Although the ledger may show that so<br />

many millions or billions are in the fund, that also is but creative<br />

bookkeeping. By law, the money collected from bank assessments<br />

must be invested in Treasury bonds, which means it is loaned to the<br />

government and spent immediately by Congress. In the final stage<br />

of this process, therefore, the FDIC itself runs out of money and<br />

turns, first to the Treasury, then to Congress for help. This step, of<br />

course, is an act of final desperation, but it is usually presented in<br />

the media as though it were a sign of the system's great strength.<br />

U.S. News & World Report blandly describes it this way: "Should the<br />

agencies need more money yet, Congress has pledged the full faith<br />

and credit of the federal government/' 1<br />

Gosh, gee whiz. Isn't that<br />

wonderful? It sort of makes one feel rosy all over to know that the<br />

fund is so well secured.<br />

Let's see what "full faith and credit of the federal government"<br />

actually means. Congress, already deeply in debt, has no money<br />

either. It doesn't dare openly raise taxes for the shortfall, so it<br />

applies for an additional loan by offering still more Treasury bonds<br />

for sale. The public picks up a portion of these I.O.U.s, and the<br />

Federal Reserve buys the rest. If there is a monetary crisis at hand<br />

and the size of the loan is<br />

issue.<br />

great, the Fed will pick up the entire<br />

But the Fed has no money either. So it responds by creating out of<br />

nothing an amount of brand new money equal to the I.O.U.s and,<br />

through the magic of central banking, the FDIC is finally funded.<br />

This new money gushes into the banks where it is used to pay off<br />

the depositors. From there it floods through the economy diluting<br />

the value of all money and causing prices to rise. The old paycheck<br />

doesn't buy as much any more, so we learn to get along with a little<br />

bit less. But, see? The bank's doors are open again, and all the<br />

depositors are happy—until they return to their cars and discover<br />

the missing hub caps!<br />

That is what is meant by "the full faith and credit of the federal<br />

government."<br />

1. "How Safe Are Deposits in Ailing Banks, S&L's?" U.S. News & World Report,<br />

March 25, 1985, p. 73.<br />

SUMMARY<br />

Although national monetary events may appear mysterious<br />

and chaotic, they are governed by well-established rules which<br />

bankers and politicians rigidly follow. The central fact to understanding<br />

these events is that all the money in the banking system<br />

has been created out of nothing through the process of making<br />

loans. A defaulted loan, therefore, costs the bank little<br />

of tangible<br />

value, but it shows up on the ledger as a reduction in assets without<br />

a corresponding reduction in liabilities. If the bad loans exceed the<br />

size of the assets, the bank becomes technically insolvent and must<br />

close its doors. The first rule of survival, therefore, is to avoid<br />

writing off large, bad loans and, if possible, to at least continue<br />

receiving interest payments on them. To accomplish that, the<br />

endangered loans are rolled over and increased in size. This<br />

provides the borrower with money to continue paying interest plus<br />

fresh funds for new spending. The basic problem is not solved, but<br />

it is postponed for a little while and made worse.<br />

The final solution on behalf of the banking cartel is to have the<br />

federal government guarantee payment of the loan should the<br />

borrower default in the future. This is accomplished by convincing<br />

Congress that not to do so would result in great damage to the<br />

economy and hardship for the people. From that point forward, the<br />

burden of the loan is removed from the bank's ledger and<br />

transferred to the taxpayer. Should this effort fail and the bank be<br />

forced into insolvency, the last resort is to use the FDIC to pay off<br />

the depositors. The FDIC is not insurance, because the presence of<br />

"moral hazard" makes the thing it supposedly protects against<br />

more likely to happen. A portion of the FDIC funds are derived<br />

from assessments against the banks. Ultimately, however, they are<br />

paid by the depositors themselves. When these funds run out, the<br />

balance is provided by the Federal Reserve System in the form of<br />

freshly created new money. This floods through the economy<br />

causing the appearance of rising prices but which, in reality, is the<br />

lowering of the value of the dollar. The final cost of the bailout,<br />

therefore, is passed to the public in the form of a hidden tax called<br />

inflation.<br />

So much for the rules of the game. In the next chapter we shall<br />

look at the scorecard of the actual play itself.


Chapter Three<br />

PROTECTORS OF THE<br />

PUBLIC<br />

The Game-Called-Bailout as it actually has been<br />

applied to specific cases including Venn Central,<br />

Lockheed, New York City, Chrysler, Commonwealth<br />

Bank of Detroit, First Pennsylvania Bank,<br />

Continental Illinois, and others.<br />

In the previous chapter, we offered the whimsical analogy of a<br />

sporting event to clarify the maneuvers of monetary and political<br />

scientists to bail out those commercial banks which comprise the<br />

Federal-Reserve cartel. The danger in such an approach is that it<br />

could leave the impression the topic is frivolous. So, let us abandon<br />

the analogy and turn to reality. Now that we have studied the<br />

hypothetical rules of the game, it is time to check the scorecard of<br />

the actual play itself, and it will become obvious that this is no<br />

trivial matter. A good place to start is with the rescue of a<br />

consortium of banks which were holding the endangered loans of<br />

Penn Central Railroad.<br />

PENN CENTRAL<br />

Penn Central was the nation's largest railroad with 96,000<br />

employees and a payroll of $20 million a week. In 1970, it also<br />

became the nation's biggest bankruptcy. It was deeply in debt to<br />

just about every bank that was willing to lend it money, and that<br />

list included Chase Manhattan, Morgan Guaranty, Manufacturers<br />

Hanover, First National City, Chemical Bank, and Continental<br />

Illinois. Officers of the largest of those banks had been appointed to<br />

Penn Central's board of directors as a condition for obtaining<br />

funds, and they gradually had acquired control over the railroad's<br />

management The banks also held large blocks of Penn Central<br />

stock in their trust departments.<br />

The arrangement was convenient in many ways, not the least of<br />

which was that the bankers sitting on the board of directors were


—<br />

42 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND PROTECTORS OF THE PUBLIC 43<br />

privy to information, long before the public received it, which<br />

would affect the market price of Perm Central's stock. Chris Welles,<br />

in The Last Days of the Club, describes what happened:<br />

On May 21, a month before the railroad went under, David Bevan,<br />

Penn Central's chief financial officer, privately informed<br />

representatives of the company's banking creditors that its<br />

financial<br />

condition was so weak it would have to postpone an attempt to raise<br />

$100 million in desperately needed operating funds through a bond<br />

issue. Instead, said Bevan, the railroad would seek some kind of<br />

government loan guarantee. In other words, unless the railroad could<br />

manage a federal bailout, it would have to close down. The following<br />

day, Chase Manhattan's trust department sold 134,300 shares of its<br />

Penn Central holdings. Before May 28, when the public was informed<br />

of the postponement of the bond issue, Chase sold another 128,000<br />

shares. David Rockefeller, the bank's chairman, vigorously denied<br />

Chase had acted on the basis of inside information.<br />

More to the point of this study is the fact that virtually all of the<br />

major management decisions which led to Penn Central's demise<br />

were made by or with the concurrence of its board of directors,<br />

which is to say, by the banks that provided the loans. In other<br />

words, the bankers were not in trouble because of Penn Central's<br />

poor management, they were Penn Central's poor management. An<br />

investigation conducted in 1972 by Congressman Wright Patman,<br />

Chairman of the House Banking and Currency Committee,<br />

revealed the following: The banks provided large loans for disastrous<br />

expansion and diversification projects. They loaned additional<br />

millions to the railroad so it could pay dividends to its<br />

stockholders. This created the false appearance of prosperity and<br />

artificially inflated the market price of its stock long enough to<br />

dump it<br />

on the unsuspecting public. Thus, the banker-managers<br />

were able to engineer a three-way bonanza for themselves. They (1)<br />

received dividends on essentially worthless stock, (2) earned<br />

interest on the loans which provided the money to pay those<br />

dividends, and (3) were able to unload 1.8 million shares of<br />

stock after the dividends, of course—at unrealistically high<br />

prices. Reports from the Securities and Exchange Commission<br />

1. Chris Welles, The Last Days of the Club (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1975), pp. 398-99.<br />

2 "Penn Central/' 1971 Congressional Quarterly Almanac (Washington, D.C.: Congressional<br />

Quarterly, 1971), p. 838.<br />

showed that the company's top executives had disposed of their<br />

stock in this fashion at a personal savings of more than $1 million.<br />

Had the railroad been allowed to go into bankruptcy at that<br />

point and been forced to sell off its assets, the bankers still would<br />

have been protected. In any liquidation, debtors are paid off first,<br />

stockholders last; so the manipulators had dumped most of their<br />

stock while prices were relatively high. That is a common practice<br />

among corporate raiders who use borrowed funds to seize control<br />

of a company, bleed off its assets to other enterprises which they<br />

abo control, and then toss the debt-ridden, dying carcass upon the<br />

remaining stockholders or, in this case, the taxpayers.<br />

THE PUBLIC BE DAMNED<br />

In his letter of transmittal accompanying the staff report,<br />

Congressman Patman provided this summary:<br />

It was as though everyone was a part of a close knit club in which<br />

Penn Central and its officers could obtain, with very few questions<br />

asked, loans for almost everything they desired both for the company<br />

and for their own personal interests, where the bankers sitting on the<br />

Board asked practically no questions as to what was going on, simply<br />

allowing management to destroy the company, to invest in<br />

questionable activities, and to engage in some cases in illegal activities.<br />

These banks in return obtained most of the company's lucrative<br />

banking business. The attitude of everyone seemed to be, while the<br />

game was going on, that all these dealings were of benefit to every<br />

member of the club, and the railroad and the public be damned.<br />

The banking cartel, commonly called the Federal Reserve<br />

System, was created for exactly this kind of bailout. Arthur Burns,<br />

who was the Fed's chairman, would have preferred to provide a<br />

direct infusion of newly created money, but that was contrary to<br />

the rules at that time. In his own words: "Everything fell through.<br />

We couldn't lend it to them ourselves under the law.. . .<br />

I worked on<br />

this thing in other ways."^<br />

The company's cash crisis came to a head over a weekend and,<br />

in order to avoid having the corporation forced to file for bankruptcy<br />

on Monday morning, Burns called the homes of the heads of<br />

the Federal Reserve banks around the country and told them to get<br />

1- "Penn Central: Bankruptcy Filed After Loan Bill Fails/' 1970 Congressional<br />

Quarterly Almanac (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1970), p. 811.<br />

2- Quoted by Welles, pp. 404-05.<br />

3- Quoted by Welles, p. 407.


44 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

the word out immediately that the System was anxious to help. On<br />

Sunday, William Treiber, who was the first vice-president of the<br />

New York branch of the Fed, contacted the chief executives of the<br />

ten largest banks in New York and told them that the Fed's<br />

Discount Window would be wide open the next morning. Translated,<br />

that means the Federal Reserve System was prepared to<br />

create money out of nothing and then immediately loan it<br />

to the<br />

commercial banks so they, in turn, could multiply and re-lend it to<br />

Perm Central and other corporations, such as Chrysler, which were<br />

in similar straits. Furthermore, the rates at which the Fed would<br />

make these funds available would be low enough to compensate<br />

for the risk, ^peaking of what transpired on the following Monday,<br />

Burns boasted: "I kept the Board in session practically all day to<br />

change regulation Q so that money could flow into CDs at the<br />

banks." Looking back at the event, Chris Welles approvingly<br />

describes it as "what is by common consent the Fed's finest hour."<br />

Finest hour or not, the banks were not that interested in the<br />

proposition unless they could be assured the taxpayer would<br />

co-sign the loans and guarantee payment. So the action inevitably<br />

shifted back to Congress. Perm Central's executives, bankers, and<br />

union representatives came in droves to explain how the railroad's<br />

continued existence was in the best interest of the public, of the<br />

working man, of the economic system itself. The Navy Department<br />

spoke of protecting the nation's "defense resources." Congress, of<br />

course, could not callously ignore these pressing needs of the<br />

nation. It responded by ordering a retroactive, 13 Vi per cent pay<br />

raise for all<br />

union employees. After having added that burden to<br />

the railroad's cash drain and putting it even deeper into the hole, it<br />

then passed the Emergency Rail Services Act of 1970 authorizing<br />

$125 million in federal loan guarantees.<br />

None of this, of course, solved the basic problem, nor was it<br />

really intended to. Almost everyone knew that, eventually, the<br />

railroad would be "nationalized," which is a euphemism for<br />

becoming a black hole into which tax dollars disappear. This came<br />

1. For an explanation of the multiplier effect, see chapter eight, The Mandrake<br />

Mechanism.<br />

2. Welles, pp. 407-08.<br />

3. "Congress Clears Railroad Aid Bill, Acts on Strike," 1970 Congressional Almanac<br />

(Washington, DC: 1970), pp. 810-16.<br />

PROTECTORS OF THE PUBLIC 45<br />

to pass with the creation of AMTRAK in 1971 and CONRAIL in<br />

1973- AMTRAK took over the passenger services of Perm Central,<br />

and CONRAIL assumed operation of its freight services, along<br />

with five other Eastern railroads. CONRAIL technically is a private<br />

corporation. When it was created, however, 85% of its stock was<br />

held by the government. The remainder was held by employees.<br />

Fortunately, the government's stock was sold in a public offering in<br />

1987. AMTRAK continues under political control and operates at a<br />

loss. It is sustained by government subsidies—which is to say by<br />

taxpayers. In 1997, Congress dutifully gave it another $5.7 billion<br />

and by 1998, liabilities exceeded assets by an estimated $14 billion.<br />

CONRAIL, on the other hand, since it was returned to the private<br />

sector, has experienced an impressive turnaround and has been<br />

running at a profit— paying taxes instead of consuming them.<br />

LOCKHEED<br />

In that same year, 1970, the Lockheed Corporation, which was<br />

the nation's largest defense contractor, was teetering on the verge<br />

of bankruptcy. The Bank of America and several smaller banks had<br />

loaned $400 million to the Goliath and they were not anxious to<br />

lose the bountiful interest-income stream that flowed from that; nor<br />

did they wish to see such a large bookkeeping asset disappear from<br />

their ledgers. In due course, the banks joined forces with Lockheed's<br />

management, stockholders, and labor unions, and the group<br />

descended on Washington. Sympathetic politicians were told that,<br />

if Lockheed were allowed to fail, 31,000 jobs would be lost,<br />

hundreds of sub contractors would go down, thousands of suppliers<br />

would be forced into bankruptcy, and national security would<br />

be seriously jeopardized. What the company needed was to borrow<br />

more money and lots of it. But, because of its current financial<br />

predicament, no one was willing to lend. The answer? In the<br />

interest of protecting the economy and defending the nation, the<br />

government simply had to provide either the money or the credit.<br />

A bailout plan was quickly engineered by Treasury Secretary<br />

John B. Connally which provided the credit. The government<br />

agreed to guarantee payment on an additional $250 million in<br />

loans—an amount which would put Lockheed 60% deeper into the<br />

debt hole than it had been before. But that made no difference now.<br />

Unce the taxpayer had been made a co-signer to the account, the<br />

banks had no qualms about advancing the funds.


46 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND PROTECTORS OF THE PUBLIC 47<br />

The not-so-obvious part of this story is that the government<br />

now had a powerful motivation to make sure Lockheed would be<br />

awarded as many defense contracts as possible and that those<br />

contracts would be as profitable as possible. This would be an<br />

indirect method of paying off the banks with tax dollars, but doing<br />

so in such a way as not to arouse public indignation. Other defense<br />

contractors which had operated more efficiently would lose business,<br />

but that could not be proven. Furthermore, a slight increase in<br />

defenses expenditures would hardly be noticed.<br />

By 1977, Lockheed had, indeed, paid back this loan, and that<br />

fact was widely advertised as proof of the wisdom and skill of all<br />

the players, including the referee and the game commissioner. A<br />

deeper analysis, however, must include two facts. First, there is no<br />

evidence that Lockheed's operation became more cost efficient<br />

during these years. Second, every bit of the money used to pay<br />

back the loans came from defense contracts which were awarded<br />

by the same government which was guaranteeing those loans.<br />

Under such an arrangement, it makes little difference if the loans<br />

were paid back or not.<br />

Taxpayers were doomed to pay the bill<br />

either way.<br />

NEW YORK CITY<br />

Although the government of New York City is not a corporation<br />

in the usual sense, it functions as one in many respects,<br />

particularly regarding debt<br />

In 1975, New York had reached the end of its credit rope and<br />

was unable even to make payroll. The cause was not mysterious.<br />

New York had long been a welfare state within itself, and success<br />

in city politics was traditionally achieved by lavish promises of<br />

benefits and subsidies for "the poor." Not surprisingly, the city also<br />

was notorious for political corruption and bureaucratic fraud.<br />

Whereas the average large city employed thirty-one people per<br />

one-thousand residents, New York had forty nine. That's an excess<br />

of fifty-eight per cent. The salaries of these employees far outstripped<br />

those in private industry. While an X-ray technician in a<br />

private hospital earned $187 per week, a porter working for the city<br />

earned $203. The average bank teller earned $154 per week, but a<br />

change maker on the city subway received $212. And municipal<br />

fringe benefits were fully twice as generous as those in private<br />

industry within the state. On top of this mountainous overhead<br />

were heaped additional costs for free college educations, subsidized<br />

housing, free medical care, and endless varieties of welfare<br />

programs.<br />

City taxes were greatly inadequate to cover the cost of this<br />

utopia- Even after transfer payments from Albany and Washington<br />

added state and federal taxes to the take, the outflow continued to<br />

exceed the inflow. There were now only three options: increase city<br />

taxes, reduce expenses, or go into debt. The choice was never in<br />

serious doubt. By 1975, New York had floated so many bonds it<br />

had saturated the market and could find no more lenders. Two<br />

billion dollars of this<br />

debt was held by a small group of banks,<br />

dominated by Chase Manhattan and Citicorp.<br />

When the payment of interest on these loans finally came to a<br />

halt, it was time for serious action. The bankers and the city fathers<br />

traveled down the coast to Washington and put their case before<br />

Congress. The largest city in the world could not be allowed to go<br />

bankrupt, they said. Essential services would be halted and millions<br />

of people would be without garbage removal, without<br />

transportation, even without police protection. Starvation, disease,<br />

and crime would run rampant through the city. It would be a<br />

disgrace to America. David Rockefeller at Chase Manhattan persuaded<br />

his friend Helmut Schmidt, Chancellor of West Germany,<br />

to make a statement to the media that the disastrous situation in<br />

New York could trigger an international financial crisis.<br />

Congress, understandably, did not want to turn New York into<br />

a zone of anarchy, nor to disgrace America, nor to trigger a<br />

world-wide financial panic. So, in December of 1975, it passed a bill<br />

authorizing the Treasury to make direct loans to the city up to $2.3<br />

billion, an amount which would more than double the size of its<br />

current debt to the banks. Interest payments on the old debt<br />

resumed immediately. All of this money, of course, would first<br />

have to be borrowed by Congress which was, itself, deeply in debt.<br />

And most of it would be created, directly or indirectly, by the<br />

Federal Reserve System. That money would be taken from the<br />

taxpayer through the loss of purchasing power called inflation, but<br />

at least the banks could be repaid, which is the object of the game.<br />

There were several restrictions attached to this loan, including<br />

^ austerity program and a systematic repayment schedule. None<br />

°f these conditions was honored. New York City has continued to<br />

be a welfare utopia, and it is unlikely that it will ever get out of debt.


48 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND PROTECTORS OF THE PUBLIC 49<br />

CHRYSLER<br />

By 1978, the Chrysler Corporation was on the verge of bankruptcy.<br />

It had rolled over its debt to the banks many times, and the<br />

game was nearing an end. In spite of an OPEC oil embargo which<br />

had pushed up the cost of gasoline and in spite of the increasing<br />

popularity of small-automobile imports, the company had continued<br />

to build the traditional gas hog. It was now saddled with a<br />

mammoth inventory of unsaleable cars and with a staggering debt<br />

which it had acquired to build those cars.<br />

The timing was doubly bad. America was also experiencing<br />

high interest rates which, coupled with fears of U.S. military<br />

involvement in Cambodia, had led to a slump in the stock market.<br />

Banks felt the credit crunch keenly and, in one of those rare<br />

instances in modern history, the money makers themselves were<br />

scouring for money.<br />

Chrysler needed additional cash to stay in business. It was not<br />

interested in borrowing just enough to pay the interest on its<br />

existing loans. To make the game worth playing, it wanted over a<br />

billion dollars in new capital. But, in the prevailing economic<br />

environment, the banks were hard pressed to create anything close<br />

to that kind of money.<br />

Managers, bankers, and union leaders found common cause in<br />

Washington. If one of the largest corporations in America was<br />

allowed to fold, think of the hardship to thousands of employees<br />

and their families; consider the damage to the economy as shock<br />

waves of unemployment move across the country; tremble at the<br />

thought of lost competition in the automobile market, of only two<br />

major brands from which to choose instead of three.<br />

Well, could anyone blame Congress for not wanting to plunge<br />

innocent families into poverty nor to upend the national economy<br />

nor to deny anyone their Constitutional right to freedom-of-choice?<br />

So a bill was passed directing the Treasury to guarantee up to $1.5<br />

billion in new loans to Chrysler. The banks agreed to write down<br />

$600 million of their old loans and to exchange an additional $700<br />

million for preferred stock. Both of these moves were advertised as<br />

evidence the banks were taking a terrible loss but were willing to<br />

yield in order to save the nation. It should be noted, however, that<br />

the value of the stock which was exchanged for previously uncollectable<br />

debt rose drastically after the settlement was announced to<br />

the public. Furthermore, not only did interest payments resume on<br />

the balance of the old loans, but the banks now replaced the written<br />

down portion with fresh loans, and these were far superior in<br />

quality because they were fully guaranteed by the taxpayers. So<br />

valuable was this guarantee that Chrysler, in spite of its previously<br />

poor debt performance, was able to obtain loans at 10.35% interest<br />

while its more solvent competitor, Ford, had to pay 13.5%. Applying;<br />

the difference of 3.15% to one and-a-half billion dollars, with a<br />

declining balance continuing for only six years, produces a savings<br />

in excess of $165 million. That is a modest estimate of the size of the<br />

federal subsidy. The real value was far greater because, without it,<br />

ihe corporation would have ceased to exist, and the banks would<br />

have taken a loss of almost their entire loan exposure.<br />

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION<br />

It will be recalled from the previous chapter that the FDIC is not<br />

a true insurance program and, because it has been politicized, it<br />

embodies the principle of moral hazard and it actually increases the<br />

likelihood that bank failures will occur.<br />

The FDIC has three options when bailing out an insolvent bank.<br />

The first is called a payoff. It involves simply paying off the insured<br />

depositors and then letting the bank fall to the mercy of the<br />

liquidators. This is the option usually chosen for small banks with<br />

no political clout The second possibility is called a sell off, and it<br />

involves making arrangements for a larger bank to assume all the<br />

real assets and liabilities of the failing bank. Banking services are<br />

uninterrupted and, aside from a change in name, most customers<br />

are unaware of the transaction. This option is generally selected for<br />

small and medium banks. In both a payoff and a sell off, the FDIC<br />

takes over the bad loans of the failed bank and supplies the money<br />

to pay back the insured depositors.<br />

The third option is called bailout, and this is the one which<br />

deserves our special attention. Irvine Sprague, a former director of<br />

the FDIC, explains: "In a bailout, the bank does not close, and<br />

everyone— insured or not—is fully protected.... Such privileged<br />

treatment is accorded by FDIC only rarely to an elect few/' 1<br />

That's right, he said everyone—insured or not—is fully protected.<br />

The banks which comprise the elect few generally are the<br />

1- Irvine H. Sprague, Bailout: An Insider's Account of Bank Failures and Rescues (New<br />

York: Basic Books, 1986), p, 23.


50 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND PROTECTORS OF THE PUBLIC 51<br />

large ones. It is only when the number of dollars at risk becomes<br />

mind numbing that a bailout can be camouflaged as protection of<br />

the public. Sprague says:<br />

The FDI Act gives the FDIC board sole discretion to prevent a<br />

bank from failing, at whatever cost. The board need only make the<br />

finding that the insured bank is in danger of failing and "is essential to<br />

provide adequate banking service in its community."... FDIC boards<br />

have been reluctant to make an essentiality finding unless they<br />

perceive a clear and present danger to the nation's financial system.<br />

Favoritism toward the large banks is obvious at many levels.<br />

One of them is the fact that, in a bailout, the FDIC covers all<br />

deposits, whether insured or not. That is<br />

significant, because the<br />

banks pay an assessment based only on their insured deposits. So, if<br />

un insured deposits are covered also, that coverage is free—more<br />

precisely, paid by someone else. What deposits are tminsured?<br />

Those in excess of $100,000 and those held outside the United<br />

States. Which banks hold the vast majority of such deposits? The<br />

large<br />

operations.<br />

ones, of course, particularly those with extensive overseas<br />

The bottom line is that the large banks get a whopping<br />

free ride when they are bailed out. Their uninsured accounts are<br />

paid by FDIC, and the cost of that benefit is passed to the smaller<br />

banks and to the taxpayer. This is not an oversight. Part of the plan<br />

at <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island was to give a competitive edge to the large banks.<br />

UNITY BANK<br />

The first application of the FDIC essentiality rule was, in fact, an<br />

exception. In 1971, Unity Bank and Trust Company in the Roxbury<br />

section of Boston found itself hopelessly insolvent, and the federal<br />

agency moved in. This is what was found: Unity's capital was<br />

depleted; most of its loans were bad; its loan collection practices<br />

were weak; and its personnel represented the worst of two worlds:<br />

overstaffing and inexperience. The examiners reported that there<br />

were two persons for every job, and neither one had been taught<br />

the job.<br />

With only $11.4 million on its books, the bank was small by<br />

current standards. Normally, the depositors would have been paid<br />

back, and the stockholders—like<br />

1. Sprague, pp. 27-29.<br />

the owners of any other failed<br />

2. The Bank of America is the exception. Despite its size, it has not acquired foreign<br />

deposits to the same degree as its competitors.<br />

business venture—would have lost their investment. As Sprague,<br />

himself, admitted: "If market discipline means anything, stockholders<br />

should be wiped out when a bank fails. Our assistance would<br />

nave the side effect ... of keeping the stockholders alive at<br />

government expense." But Unity Bank was different. It was<br />

located in a black neighborhood and was minority owned. As is<br />

often the case when government agencies are given discretionary<br />

powers, decisions are determined more by political pressures than<br />

by logic or merit, and Unity was a perfect example. In 1971, the<br />

specter of rioting in black communities still haunted the halls of<br />

Congress. Would the FDIC allow this bank to fail and assume the<br />

awesome responsibility for new riots and bloodshed? Sprague<br />

answers:<br />

Neither Wille [another director] nor I had any trouble viewing the<br />

problem in its broader social con<strong>text</strong>. We were willing to look for a<br />

creative solution.... My vote to make the "essentiality" finding and<br />

thus save the little bank was probably foreordained, an inevitable<br />

legacy of Watts.... The Watts riots ultimately triggered the essentiality<br />

doctrine.<br />

On July 22, 1971, the FDIC declared that the continued operation<br />

of Unity Bank was, indeed, essential and authorized a direct<br />

infusion of $1 .5 million. Although appearing on the agency's ledger<br />

as a loan, no one really expected repayment. In 1976, in spite of the<br />

FDIC's own staff report that the bank's operations continued "as<br />

slipshod and haphazard as ever/' the agency rolled over the "loan"<br />

for another five years. Operations did not improve and, on June 30,<br />

1982, the Massachusetts Banking Commissioner finally revoked<br />

Unity's charter. There were no riots in the streets, and the FDIC<br />

quietly wrote off the sum of $4,463,000 as the final cost of the<br />

bailout.<br />

COMMONWEALTH BANK OF DETROIT<br />

The bailout of the Unity Bank of Boston was the exception to<br />

the rule that small banks are dispensable while the giants must be<br />

saved at all costs. From that point forward, however, the FDIC<br />

game plan was strictly according to Hoyle. The next bailout<br />

occurred in 1972 involving the $1.5 billion Bank of the Common-<br />

Wealth of Detroit. Commonwealth had funded most of its<br />

I'<br />

2<br />

-<br />

Sprague, pp. 41^2.<br />

#"*., p. 48.


52 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND PROTECTORS OF THE PUBLIC 53<br />

phenomenal growth through loans from another bank, Chase<br />

Manhattan in New York. When Commonwealth went belly up,<br />

princes. Better to have financial power concentrated in Saudi<br />

Arabia than in Detroit. The bank continued to flounder and, in<br />

largely due to securities speculation and self dealing on the part of<br />

1983, what was left of it was resold to the former Detroit Bank &<br />

its management, Chase seized 39% of its common stock and<br />

Trust Company, now called Comerica. Thus the dreaded concentration<br />

of local power was realized after all, but not until Chase<br />

actually took control of the bank in an attempt to find a way to get<br />

its money back. FDIC director Sprague describes the inevitable<br />

Manhattan was able to walk away from the deal with most of its<br />

sequel:<br />

losses covered.<br />

Chase officers ... suggested that Commonwealth was a public<br />

FIRST PENNSYLVANIA BANK<br />

interest problem that the government agencies should resolve. That<br />

The 1980 bailout of the First Pennsylvania Bank of Philadelphia<br />

unsubtle hint was the way Chase phrased its request for a bailout by<br />

the government.... Their proposal would come down was next. First Perm was the nation's twenty-third largest bank<br />

to bailing out<br />

the shareholders, the Largest of which was Chase.<br />

with assets in excess of $9 billion. It was six times the size of<br />

Commonwealth; nine hundred times larger than Unity. It was also<br />

The bankers argued that Commonwealth must not be allowed<br />

the nation's oldest bank, dating back to the Bank of North America<br />

to fold because it provided "essential" banking services to the<br />

which was created by the Continental Congress in 1781.<br />

community. That was justified on two counts: (1) it served many<br />

The bank had experienced rapid growth and handsome profits<br />

minority neighborhoods and, (2) there were not enough other<br />

largely due to the aggressive leadership of its chief executive<br />

banks in the city to absorb its operation without creating an<br />

officer, John Bunting, who had previously been an economist with<br />

unhealthy concentration of banking power in the hands of a few. It<br />

the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. Bunting was the epitome<br />

was unclear what the minority issue had to do with it inasmuch as<br />

of the era's go-go bankers. He vastly increased earnings ratios by<br />

every neighborhood in which Commonwealth had a branch was<br />

reducing safety margins, taking on risky loans, and speculating in<br />

served by other banks as well. Furthermore, if Commonwealth<br />

the bond market. As long as the economy expanded, these<br />

were to be liquidated, many<br />

gambles<br />

of those branches undoubtedly would<br />

were profitable, and the stockholders loved<br />

have been purchased by competitors, and service to the communities<br />

would have continued. Judging by the absence<br />

him dearly. When his<br />

gamble in the bond market turned sour, however,<br />

of attention<br />

the bank<br />

plunged into a negative<br />

given<br />

cash flow.<br />

to this issue during discussions, it is apparent that it was<br />

By 1979, First Perm was forced<br />

to sell off<br />

merely thrown in for good measure, and no several<br />

one took it very<br />

of its profitable subsidiaries in order to obtain<br />

operating funds,<br />

seriously.<br />

and it was carrying $328 million in questionable<br />

loans.<br />

In any event, the FDIC did not want to be accused of being<br />

That was $16 million more than the entire stockholder<br />

investment.<br />

indifferent to the needs of Detroit's minorities and it certainly did<br />

The bank was insolvent, and the time had arrived to hit<br />

up<br />

not want to be a destroyer of free-enterprise competition. So, on<br />

the taxpayer for the loss.<br />

January 17, 1972, Commonwealth was bailed out with a $60 million<br />

The bankers went to Washington and presented their case.<br />

Fhey<br />

loan plus numerous federal guarantees. Chase absorbed some<br />

were joined by spokesmen from the nation's top three: Bank<br />

losses, primarily as a result of Commonwealth's weak bond<br />

of America, Citibank, and of course the ever-present Chase Manhattan.<br />

portfolio, but those were minor compared to what would have<br />

They argued that, not only was the bailout of First Penn<br />

been lost without FDIC intervention.<br />

essential" for the continuation of banking services in Philadelphia,<br />

rt<br />

Since continuation of the bank was necessary to prevent<br />

was also critical to the preservation of world economic stability.<br />

concentration of financial power, FDIC engineered its sale to the<br />

£ bank was so large, they said, if it were allowed to fall, it would<br />

First Arabian Corporation, a Luxembourg firm funded by Saudi<br />

^ct as the first domino leading to an international financial crisis. At<br />

r sfr,<br />

the directors of the FDIC resisted that theory and earned the<br />

^gry impatience of the Federal Reserve. Sprague recalls:


.<br />

—<br />

54 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND PROTECTORS OF THE PUBLIC 55<br />

We were far from a decision on how to proceed. There was strong<br />

pressure from the beginning not to let the bank fail. Besides hearing<br />

from the bank itself, the other large banks, and the comptroller, we<br />

heard frequently from the Fed. I recall at one session, Fred Schultz, the<br />

Fed deputy chairman, argued in an ever rising voice, that there were<br />

no alternatives—we had to save the bank. He said, "Quit wasting time<br />

talking about anything else!''. .<br />

The Fed's role as lender of last resort first generated contention<br />

between the Fed and FDIC during this period. The Fed was lending<br />

heavily to First Pennsylvania, fully secured, and Fed Chairman Paul<br />

Volcker said he planned to continue funding indefinitely until we<br />

could work out a merger or a bailout to save the bank.<br />

The directors of the FDIC did not want to cross swords with the<br />

Federal Reserve System, and they most assuredly did not want to<br />

be blamed for tumbling the entire world economic system by<br />

allowing the first domino to fall. "The theory had never been<br />

tested/ 7<br />

said Sprague. "I was not sure I wanted it to be just then."<br />

So, in due course, a bailout package was put together which<br />

featured a $325 million loan from FDIC, interest free for the first<br />

year and at a subsidized rate thereafter; about half the market rate.<br />

Several other banks which were financially tied to First Penn, and<br />

which would have suffered great losses if it had folded, loaned an<br />

additional $175 million and offered a $1 billion line of credit FDIC<br />

insisted on this move to demonstrate that the banking industry<br />

itself was helping and that it had faith in the venture. To bolster<br />

that faith, the Federal Reserve opened its Discount Window<br />

offering low-interest funds for that purpose.<br />

The outcome of this particular bailout was somewhat happier<br />

than with the others, at least as far as the bank is concerned. At the<br />

end of the five-year taxpayer subsidy, the FDIC loan was fully<br />

repaid. The bank has remained on shaky ground, however, and the<br />

final page of this episode has not yet been written.<br />

CONTINENTAL ILLINOIS<br />

Everything up to this point was but mere practice for the big<br />

event which was yet to come. In the early 1980s, Chicago's<br />

Continental Illinois was the nation's seventh largest bank. With<br />

assets of $42 billion and with 12,000 employees working in offices<br />

1. Sprague, pp. 88-89.<br />

2. Ibid., p. 89.<br />

in almost every major country in the world, its loan portfolio had<br />

undergone spectacular growth. Its net income on loans had literally<br />

doubled in just five years and by 1981 had rocketed to an annual<br />

figure of $254 million. It had become the darling of the market<br />

analysts and even had been named by Dun's Review as one of the<br />

five best managed companies in the country. These opinion leaders<br />

failed to perceive that the spectacular performance was due, not to<br />

an expertise in banking or investment, but to the financing of shaky<br />

business enterprises and foreign governments which could not<br />

obtain loans anywhere else. But the public didn't know that and<br />

wanted in on the action. For awhile, the bank's common stock<br />

actually sold at a premium over others which were more prudently<br />

managed.<br />

The gaudy fabric began to unravel during the Fourth of July<br />

weekend of 1982 with the failure of the Perm Square Bank in<br />

Oklahoma. That was the notorious shopping-center bank that had<br />

booked a billion dollars in oil and gas loans and resold them to<br />

Continental just before the collapse of the energy market Other<br />

loans also began to sour at the same time. The Mexican and<br />

Argentine debt crisis was coming to a head, and a series of major<br />

corporate bankruptcies were receiving almost daily headlines.<br />

Continental had placed large chunks of its easy money with all of<br />

them. When these events caused the bank's credit rating to drop,<br />

cautious depositors began to withdraw their funds, and new<br />

funding dwindled to a trickle. The bank became desperate for cash<br />

to meet its daily expenses. In an effort to attract new money, it<br />

began to offer unrealistically high rates of interest on its CDs. Loan<br />

officers were sent to scour the European and Japanese markets and<br />

to conduct a public relations campaign aimed at convincing market<br />

managers that the bank was calm and steady. David Taylor, the<br />

bank's chairman at that time, said: "We had the Continental Illinois<br />

Reassurance Brigade and we fanned out all over the world." 1<br />

In the fantasy land of modern finance, glitter is often more<br />

important than substance, image more valuable than reality. The<br />

bank paid the usual quarterly dividend in August, in spite of the<br />

feet that this intensified its cash crunch. As with the Perm Central<br />

Railroad twelve years earlier, that move was calculated to project<br />

a^ image of business-as-usual prosperity. And the ploy worked<br />

?' Quoted by Chernow, p. 657.


56 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

for a while, at least. By November, the public's confidence had been<br />

restored, and the bank's stock recovered to its pre-Penn Square<br />

level. By March of 1983, it had risen even higher. But the worst was<br />

yet to come.<br />

By the end of 1983, the bank's burden of non-performing loans<br />

had reached unbearable proportions and was growing at an<br />

alarming rate. By 1984, it was $2.7 billion. That same year, the bank<br />

sold off its profitable credit-card operation to make up for the loss<br />

of income and to obtain money for paying stockholders their<br />

expected quarterly dividend. The internal structure was near<br />

collapse, but the external facade continued to look like business as<br />

usual.<br />

The first crack in that facade appeared at 11:39 A.M. On<br />

Tuesday, May 8, Reuters, the British news agency, moved a story<br />

on its wire service stating that banks in the Netherlands, West<br />

Germany, Switzerland, and Japan had increased their interest rate<br />

on loans to Continental and that some of them had begun to<br />

withdraw their funds. The story also quoted the bank's official<br />

statement that rumors of pending bankruptcy were "totally preposterous."<br />

Within hours, another wire, the Commodity News Service,<br />

reported a second rumor: that a Japanese bank was interested in<br />

buying Continental.<br />

WORLD'S FIRST ELECTRONIC BANK RUN<br />

As the sun rose the following morning, foreign investors began<br />

to withdraw their deposits. A billion dollars in Asian money<br />

moved out that first day* The next day—a little more than<br />

twenty-four hours following Continental's assurance that bankruptcy<br />

was totally preposterous, its<br />

long-standing customer, the<br />

Board of Trade Clearing Corporation, located just down the<br />

street—withdrew $50 million. Word of the defection spread<br />

through the financial wire services, and the panic was on. It became<br />

the world's first global electronic bank run.<br />

By Friday, the bank had been forced to borrow $3.6 billion from<br />

the Federal Reserve in order to cover its escaping deposits. A<br />

consortium of sixteen banks, lead by Morgan Guaranty, offered a<br />

generous thirty-day line of credit, but all of this was far short of the<br />

need. Within seven more days, the outflow surged to over<br />

$6 billion.<br />

PROTECTORS OF THE PUBLIC 57<br />

In the beginning, almost all of this action was at the institutional<br />

level: other banks and professionally managed funds which closely<br />

monitor every minuscule detail of the financial markets. The<br />

general public had no inkling of the catastrophe, even as it<br />

unfolded. Chernow says: "The Continental run was like some<br />

rnodernistic fantasy: there were no throngs of hysterical depositors,<br />

just cool nightmare flashes on computer screens." Sprague writes:<br />

"Inside the bank, all was calm, the teller lines moved as always, and<br />

bank officials recall no visible sign of trouble—except in the wire<br />

room- Here the employees knew what was happening as withdrawal<br />

order after order moved on the wire, bleeding Continental<br />

to death. Some cried."<br />

This was the golden moment for which the Federal Reserve and<br />

the FDIC were created. Without government intervention, Continental<br />

would have collapsed, its stockholders would have been<br />

wiped out, depositors would have been badly damaged, and the<br />

financial world would have learned that banks, not only have to<br />

talk about prudent management, they actually have to adopt it.<br />

Future banking practices would have been severely altered, and the<br />

long-term economic benefit to the nation would have been enormous.<br />

But with government intervention, the discipline of a free<br />

market is suspended, and the cost of failure or fraud is politically<br />

passed to the taxpayers. Depositors continue to live in a dream<br />

world of false security, and banks can operate recklessly and<br />

fraudulently with the knowledge that their political partners in<br />

government will come to their rescue when they get into trouble.<br />

FDIC GENEROSITY WITH TAX DOLLARS<br />

One of the challenges at Continental was that, while only four<br />

per cent of its liability was covered by FDIC "insurance," the<br />

regulators felt compelled to cover the entire exposure. Which<br />

means that the bank paid insurance premiums into the fund based<br />

on only four per cent of its total coverage, and the taxpayers now<br />

would pick up the other ninety-six per cent. FDIC director Sprague<br />

explains:<br />

Although Continental Illinois had over $30 billion in deposits, 90<br />

percent were uninsured foreign deposits or large certificates<br />

substantially exceeding the $100,000 insurance limit. Off-book<br />

1-<br />

Chernow, p. 658,<br />

2-<br />

Sprague, p. 153.


.<br />

58 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND PROTECTORS OF THE PUBLIC 59<br />

liabilities swelled Continental's real size to $69 billion. In this massive<br />

liability structure only some $3 billion within the insured limit was<br />

scattered among 850,000 deposit accounts. So it was in our power and<br />

entirely legal simply to pay off the insured depositors, let everything<br />

else collapse, and stand back to watch the carnage.<br />

That course was never seriously considered by any of the<br />

players. From the beginning, there were only two questions: how to<br />

come to Continental's rescue by covering its total liabilities and,<br />

equally important, how to politically justify such a fleecing of the<br />

taxpayer. As pointed out in the previous chapter, the rules of the<br />

game require that the scam must always be described as a heroic<br />

effort to protect the public. In the case of Continental, the sheer size<br />

of the numbers made the ploy relatively easy. There were so many<br />

depositors involved, so many billions at risk, so many other banks<br />

interlocked, it could be claimed that the economic fabric of the<br />

entire nation—of the world itself—was at stake. And who could<br />

say that it was not so. Sprague argues the case in familiar terms:<br />

An early morning meeting was scheduled for Tuesday, May 15, at<br />

the Fed.... We talked over the alternatives. They were few—none<br />

really.... [Treasury Secretary] Regan and [Fed Chairman] Volcker<br />

raised the familiar concern about a national banking collapse, that is, a<br />

chain reaction if Continental should fail. Volcker was worried about an<br />

international crisis. We all were acutely aware that never before had a<br />

bank even remotely approaching Continentars size closed. No one<br />

knew what might happen in the nation and in the world. It was no<br />

time to find out just for the purpose of intellectual curiosity.<br />

THE FINAL BAILOUT PACKAGE<br />

The bailout was predictable from the start. There would be<br />

some preliminary lip service given to the necessity of allowing the<br />

banks themselves to work out their own problem. That would be<br />

followed by a plan to have the banks and the government share the<br />

burden. And that finally would collapse into a mere publicrelations<br />

illusion. In the end, almost the entire cost of the bailout<br />

would be assumed by the government and passed on to the<br />

taxpayer.<br />

At the May 15 meeting, Treasury Secretary Regan spoke<br />

eloquently about the value of a<br />

free market and the necessity of<br />

having the banks mount their own rescue plan, at least for a part of<br />

the money. To work out that plan, a summit meeting was arranged<br />

the next morning among the chairmen of the seven largest banks:<br />

Morgan Guaranty, Chase Manhattan, Citibank, Bank of America,<br />

Chemical Bank, Bankers Trust, and Manufacturers Hanover. The<br />

meeting was perfunctory at best. The bankers knew full well that<br />

the Reagan Administration would not risk the political embarrassment<br />

of a major bank failure. That would make the President and<br />

the Congress look bad at re-election time. But, still, some kind of<br />

tokenism was called for to preserve the Administration's conservative<br />

image. So, with urging from the Fed and the Treasury, the<br />

consortium agreed to put up the sum of $500 million—an average<br />

of only $71 million for each, far short of the actual need. Chernow<br />

describes the plan as "make-believe" and says "they pretended to<br />

mount a rescue." Sprague supplies the details:<br />

The bankers said they wanted to be in on any deal, but they did<br />

not want to lose any money. They kept asking for guarantees. They<br />

wanted it to look as though they were putting money in but, at the<br />

same time, wanted to be absolutely sure they were not risking<br />

anything.. .<br />

.<br />

By 7:30 A.M. we had made little progress. We were certain<br />

the situation would be totally out of control in a few hours.<br />

Continental would soon be exposing itself to a new business day, and<br />

the stock market would open at ten o'clock. Isaac [another FDIC<br />

director] and I held a hallway conversation. We agreed to go ahead<br />

without the banks. We told Conover [the third FDIC director] the plan<br />

and he concurred.. .<br />

[Later], we got word from Bernie McKeon, our regional director in<br />

New York, that the bankers had agreed to be at risk. Actually, the risk<br />

was remote since our announcement had promised 100 percent<br />

insurance.<br />

The final bailout package was a whopper. Basically, the government<br />

took over Continental Illinois and assumed all of its losses.<br />

Specifically, the FDIC took $4.5 billion in bad loans and paid<br />

Continental $3-5 billion for them. The difference was then made up<br />

b y the infusion of $1 billion in fresh capital in the form of stock<br />

Purchase. The bank, therefore, now had the federal government as<br />

a stockholder controlling 80 per cent of its shares, and its bad loans<br />

had been dumped onto the taxpayer. In effect, even though<br />

1. Sprague, p. 184.<br />

2. Ibid., pp. 154-55, 183.<br />

* Chernow, p. 659.<br />

2<br />

-<br />

Sprague, pp. 159-60.


60 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND PROTECTORS OF THE PUBLIC 61<br />

Continental retained the appearance of a private institution, it had<br />

been nationalized.<br />

LENDER OF LAST RESORT<br />

Perhaps the most important part of the bailout, however, was<br />

that the money to make it possible was created—directly or<br />

indirectly— by the Federal Reserve System. If the bank had been<br />

allowed to fail, and the FDIC had been required to cover the losses,<br />

the drain would have emptied the entire fund with nothing left to<br />

cover the liabilities of thousands of other banks. In other words,<br />

this one failure alone, if it were allowed to happen, would have<br />

wiped out the entire FDIC! That's one reason the bank had to be<br />

kept operating, losses or no losses, and that's why the Fed had to be<br />

involved in the bail out In fact, that was precisely the reason the<br />

System was created at <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island: to manufacture whatever<br />

amount of money might be necessary to cover the losses of the<br />

cartel. The scam could never work unless the Fed was able to create<br />

money out of nothing and pump it into the banks along with<br />

"credit" and "liquidity" guarantees. Which means, if the loans go<br />

sour, the money is eventually extracted from the American people<br />

through the hidden tax called inflation. That's the meaning of the<br />

phrase "lender of last resort."<br />

FDIC director Irvine Sprague, while discussing the press release<br />

which announced the Continental bail-out package, describes<br />

the Fed's role this way:<br />

The third paragraph ... granted 100 percent insurance to all<br />

depositors, including the uninsured, and all general creditors.... The<br />

next paragraph ...<br />

set forth the conditions under which the Fed, as<br />

lender of last resort, would make its loans. .. . . The Fed would lend to<br />

Continental to meet "any extraordinary liquidity requirements." That<br />

would include another run. All agreed that Continental could not be<br />

saved without 100 percent insurance by FDIC and unlimited liquidity<br />

support by the Federal Reserve. No plan would work without these<br />

two elements.<br />

By 1984, "unlimited liquidity support" had translated into the<br />

staggering sum of $8 billion. By early 1986, the figure had climbed<br />

to $9.24 billion and was still rising. While explaining this fleecing of<br />

the taxpayer to the Senate Banking Committee, Fed Chairman Paul<br />

Volcker said: "The operation is the most basic function of the<br />

1. Sprague, pp. 162-63.<br />

Federal<br />

Reserve. It was why it was founded."<br />

With those words,<br />

he has confirmed one of the more controversial assertions of this<br />

book.<br />

SMALL BANKS BE DAMNED<br />

It has been mentioned previously that the large banks receive a<br />

free ride on their FDIC coverage at the expense of the small banks.<br />

There could be no better example of this than the bail out of<br />

Continental Illinois. In 1983, the bank paid a premium into the fund<br />

of only $6.5 million to protect its insured deposits of $3 billion. The<br />

actual<br />

liability, however—including its institutional and overseas<br />

deposits—was ten times that figure, and the FDIC guaranteed<br />

payment on the whole amount As Sprague admitted, "Small banks<br />

pay proportionately far more for their insurance and have far less<br />

chance of a Continental-style bailout."<br />

How true. Within the same week that the FDIC and the Fed<br />

were providing billions in payments, stock purchases, loans, and<br />

guarantees for Continental Illinois, it closed down the tiny Bledsoe<br />

County Bank of Pikeville, Tennessee, and the Planters Trust and<br />

Savings Bank of Opelousas, Louisiana. During the first half of that<br />

year, forty-three smaller banks failed without an FDIC bailout. In<br />

most cases, a merger was arranged with a larger bank, and only the<br />

uninsured deposits were at risk. The impact of this inequity upon<br />

the banking system is enormous. It sends a message to bankers and<br />

depositors alike that small banks, if they get into trouble, will be<br />

allowed to fold, whereas large banks are safe regardless of how<br />

poorly or fraudulently they are managed. As a New York investment<br />

analyst stated to news reporters, Continental Illinois, even<br />

though it had just failed, was "obviously the safest bank in the<br />

country to have your money in."<br />

Nothing could be better calculated<br />

to drive the small independent banks out of business or to<br />

force them to sell out to the giants. And that, in fact, is exactly what<br />

has been happening. Since 1984, while hundreds of small banks<br />

have been forced out of business, the average size of the banks<br />

which remain—with government protection—has more than<br />

doubled. It will be recalled that this advantage of the big banks<br />

* Quoted by Greider, p. 628.<br />

3 ^ague /P .250.<br />

New Continental Illinois Facing Uncertain Future/' by Keith E. Leighty, Associated<br />

Press, Thousand Oaks, Calif., News Chronicle, May 13, 1985, p. 18.


,<br />

62 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND PROTECTORS OF THE PUBLIC 63<br />

over their smaller competitors was also one of the objectives of the<br />

holding company. The FDIC pumped $130 million into its main<br />

<strong>Jekyll</strong> Island plan.<br />

banking unit and took warrants for 55% ownership. The pattern<br />

Perhaps the most interesting—and depressing—aspect of the j^d been set. By accepting stock in a failing bank in return for<br />

Continental Illinois bailout was the lack of public indignation over<br />

bailing it out, the government had devised an ingenious way to<br />

the principle of using taxes and inflation to protect the banking<br />

nationalize banks without calling it that. Issuing stock sounds like a<br />

industry. Smaller banks have complained of the unfair advantage<br />

business transaction in the private sector. And the public didn't<br />

given to the larger banks, but not on the basis that the government<br />

seem to notice the reality that Uncle Sam was going into banking.<br />

should have let the giant fall. Their lament was that it should now<br />

protect them in the same paternalistic fashion. Voters and<br />

SECOND REASON TO ABOLISH THE FEDERAL RESERVE<br />

politicians<br />

were silent on the issue, apparently awed<br />

A sober evaluation of this long and continuing record leads to<br />

by the sheer size of<br />

the second reason for abolishing the Federal Reserve System: Far<br />

the numbers and the specter of economic chaos. Decades of public<br />

education had left their mark. After all, wasn't this exactly what<br />

from being a protector of the public, it is a cartel operating against the<br />

public interest.<br />

government schools have taught is the proper function of government?<br />

Wasn't this the American way? Even Ronald Reagan, SUMMARY<br />

viewed as the national champion of economic conservatism,<br />

ITie game called bailout is not a whimsical figment of the<br />

praised the action. From aboard Air Force One on the way to<br />

imagination, it is for real. Here are some of the big games of the<br />

California, the President said: "It was a thing that we should do and<br />

season and their final scores.<br />

we did it. It was in the best interest of all concerned."<br />

In 1970, Perm Central railroad became bankrupt. The banks<br />

The Reagan endorsement brought into focus one of the most which loaned the money had taken over its board of directors and<br />

amazing phenomena of the 20th century: the process by which had driven it further into the hole, all the while extending bigger<br />

America has moved to the Left toward statism while marching and bigger loans to cover the losses. Directors concealed reality<br />

behind the political banner of those who speak the language of from the stockholders and made additional loans so the company<br />

opposing statism. William Greider, a former writer for the liberal<br />

could pay dividends to keep up the false front. During this time,<br />

Washington Post and The Rolling Stone, complains:<br />

the directors and their banks unloaded their stock at unrealistically<br />

high prices.<br />

The<br />

When the truth became public, the<br />

nationalization of Continental was,<br />

stockholders were<br />

in fact, a quintessential act<br />

left<br />

of modern liberalism—the state intervening in behalf of private<br />

holding the empty bag. The bailout, which was engineered by<br />

interests and a broad public purpose. In this supposedly conservative<br />

the Federal Reserve, involved government subsidies to other banks<br />

era, federal authorities were setting aside the harsh verdict of market<br />

to grant additional loans. Then Congress was told that the collapse<br />

competition (and grossly expanding their own involvement in the<br />

of Perm Central would be devastating to the public interest.<br />

private economy). . .<br />

Congress responded by granting $125 million in loan guarantees so<br />

In the past, conservative scholars and pundits had objected loudly<br />

that banks would not<br />

at any<br />

be at risk. The railroad eventually failed<br />

federal intervention in the private economy, particularly<br />

emergency assistance for failing companies. Now, they hardly seemed<br />

anyway, but the bank loans were covered. Perm Central was<br />

to notice. Perhaps they would have been more vocal if the deed had<br />

nationalized into AMTRAK and continues to operate at a loss.<br />

been done by someone other than the conservative champion, Ronald<br />

In 1970, as Lockheed faced bankruptcy, Congress heard<br />

Reagan.<br />

essentially the same story. Thousands would be unemployed,<br />

Four years after the bailout of Continental Illinois, the same<br />

subcontractors would go out of business, and the public would<br />

suffer<br />

play was used in the rescue of BankOklahoma, which was a bank<br />

greatly. So Congress agreed to guarantee $250 million in new<br />

loans, which put Lockheed 60% deeper into debt than before. Now<br />

1. "Reagan Calls Rescue of Bank No Bailout/' New York Times, July 29, 1984.<br />

that government was guaranteeing the loans, it had to make sure<br />

2. Greider, p. 631. '<br />

Lockheed became profitable. This was accomplished by granting


64 THE, CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND PROTECTORS OF THE PUBLIC 65<br />

lucrative defense contracts at non-competitive bids. The banks<br />

were paid back.<br />

In 1975, New York City had reached the end of its credit rope. It<br />

had borrowed heavily to maintain an extravagant bureaucracy and<br />

a miniature welfare state. Congress was told that the public would<br />

be jeopardized if city services were curtailed, and that America<br />

would be disgraced in the eyes of the world. So Congress authorized<br />

additional direct loans up to $2.3 billion, which more than<br />

doubled the size of the current debt. The banks continued to receive<br />

their interest.<br />

In 1978, Chrysler was on the verge of bankruptcy. Congress<br />

was informed that the public would suffer greatly if the company<br />

folded, and that it would be a blow to the American way if<br />

freedom-of-choice were reduced from three to two makes of<br />

automobiles. So Congress guaranteed up to $1.5 billion in new<br />

loans. The banks reduced part of their loans and exchanged another<br />

portion for preferred stock. News of the deal pushed up the market<br />

value of that stock and largely offset the loan write-off. The banks'<br />

previously uncollectable debt was converted into a governmentbacked,<br />

interest-bearing asset.<br />

In 1972, the Commonwealth Bank of Detroit—with $1.5 billion<br />

in assets, became insolvent. It had borrowed heavily from the<br />

Chase Manhattan Bank in New York to invest in high-risk and<br />

potentially high-profit ventures. Now that it was in trouble, so was<br />

Chase. The bankers went to Washington and told the FDIC the<br />

public must be protected from the great financial hardship that<br />

would follow if Commonwealth were allowed to close. So the FDIC<br />

pumped in a $60 million loan plus federal guarantees of repayment.<br />

Commonwealth was sold to an Arab consortium. Chase took<br />

a minor write down but converted most of its potential loss into<br />

government-backed assets.<br />

In 1979, the First Pennsylvania Bank of Philadelphia became<br />

insolvent. With assets in excess of $9 billion, it was nine-times the<br />

size of Commonwealth. It, too, had been an aggressive player in the<br />

'80s. Now the bankers and the Federal Reserve told the FDIC that<br />

the public must be protected from the calamity of a bank failure of<br />

this size, that the national economy was at stake, perhaps even the<br />

entire world. So the FDIC gave a $325 million loan—interest-free<br />

for the first year, and at half the market rate thereafter. The Federal<br />

Reserve offered money to other banks at a subsidized rate for the<br />

specific purpose of relending to First Perm. With that enticement,<br />

they advanced $175 million in immediate loans plus a $1 billion<br />

line of credit.<br />

In 1982, Chicago's Continental Illinois became insolvent. It was<br />

the nation's seventh largest bank with $42 billion in assets. The<br />

previous year, its profits had soared as a result of loans to high-risk<br />

business ventures and foreign governments. Although it had been<br />

the darling of market analysts, it quickly unraveled when its cash<br />

flow turned negative, and overseas banks began to withdraw<br />

deposits. It was the world's first electronic bank run. Federal<br />

Reserve Chairman Volcker told the FDIC that it would be unthinkable<br />

to allow the world economy to be ruined by a bank failure of<br />

this magnitude. So, the FDIC assumed $4.5 billion in bad loans and,<br />

in return for the bailout, took 80% ownership of the bank in the<br />

form of stock. In effect, the bank was nationalized, but no one<br />

called it that. The United States government was now in the<br />

banking business.<br />

All of the money to accomplish these bailouts was made<br />

possible by the Federal Reserve System acting as the "lender of last<br />

resort." That was one of the purposes for which it had been created.<br />

We must not forget that the phrase "lender of last resort" means<br />

that the money is created out of nothing, resulting in the confiscation<br />

of our nation's wealth through the hidden tax called inflation.


Chapter Four<br />

HOME, SWEET LOAN<br />

The history of increasing government intervention<br />

in the housing industry; the stifling of<br />

free-market forces in residential real estate; the<br />

resulting crisis in the S&L industry; the bailout of<br />

that industry with money taken from the taxpayer.<br />

As we have seen in previous chapters, the damage done by the<br />

banking cartel is made possible by the fact that money can be<br />

created out of nothing. It also destroys our purchasing power<br />

through the hidden tax called inflation. The mechanism by which it<br />

works is hidden and subtle.<br />

Let us turn, now, from the arcane world of central banking to<br />

the giddy world of savings-and-loan institutions. By comparison,<br />

the problem in the savings-and-loan industry is easy to comprehend.<br />

It is simply that vast amounts of money are disappearing into<br />

the black hole of government mismanagement, and the losses must<br />

eventually be paid by us. The end result is the same in both cases.<br />

SOCIALISM TAKES ROOT IN AMERICA<br />

It all began with a concept. The concept took root in America<br />

largely as a result of the Great Depression of the 1930s. American<br />

politicians were impressed at how radical Marxists were able to<br />

attract popular support by blaming the capitalist system for the<br />

country's woes and by promising a socialist Utopia. They admired<br />

and feared these radicals; admired them for their skill at mass<br />

psychology; feared them lest they become so popular as to win a<br />

plurality at the ballot box. It was not long before many political<br />

hgures began to mimic the soap-box orators, and the voters<br />

enthusiastically put them into office.<br />

While the extreme and violent aspects of Communism generally<br />

were rejected, the more genteel theories of socialism became<br />

Popular among the educated elite. It was they who would naturally<br />

become the leaders in an American socialist system. Someone had


—<br />

68 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND HOME, SWEET LOAN 69<br />

to look after the masses and tell them what to do for their own<br />

good, and many with college degrees and those with great wealth<br />

became enamored by the thought of playing that role. And so, the<br />

concept became widely accepted at all levels of American life—the<br />

"downtrodden masses" as well as the educated elite—that it was<br />

desirable for the government to take care of its citizens and to<br />

protect them in their economic affairs.<br />

And so, when more than 1900 S&Ls went belly-up in the Great<br />

Depression, Herbert Hoover—and a most willing Congress<br />

created the Federal Home Loan Bank Board to protect depositors in<br />

the future. It began to issue charters to institutions that would<br />

submit to its regulations, and the public was led to believe that<br />

government regulators would be more wise, prudent, and honest<br />

than private managers. A federal charter became a kind of government<br />

seal of approval. The public, at last, was being protected.<br />

Hoover was succeeded by FDR in the White House who<br />

became the epitome of the new breed. Earlier in his political career,<br />

he had been the paragon of free enterprise and individualism. He<br />

spoke out against big government and for the free market, but in<br />

mid life he reset his sail to catch the shifting political wind. He went<br />

down in history as a pioneer of socialism in America.<br />

It was FDR who took the next step toward government<br />

paternalism in the S&L industry—as well as the banking industry—<br />

by establishing the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation<br />

(FDIC) and the Federal Saving and Loan Insurance Corporation<br />

(FSLIC). From that point forward, neither the public nor the<br />

managers of the thrifts needed to worry about losses. Everything<br />

would be reimbursed by the government.<br />

A HOUSE ON EVERY LOT<br />

At about the same time, loans on private homes became<br />

subsidized through the Federal Housing Authority (FHA) which<br />

allowed S&Ls to make loans at rates lower than would have been<br />

possible without the subsidy. This was to make it easier for<br />

everyone to realize the dream of having their own home. While the<br />

Marxists were promising a chicken in every pot, the New Dealers<br />

were winning elections by pushing for a house on every lot.<br />

In the beginning, many people were able to purchase a home<br />

who, otherwise, might not have been able to do so or who would<br />

have had to wait longer to accumulate a higher down payment. On<br />

the other hand, the FHA-induced easy credit began to push up the<br />

price of houses for the middle class, and that quickly offset any real<br />

advantage of the subsidy. The voters, however, were not perceptive<br />

enough to understand this canceling effect and continued to vote<br />

for politicians who promised to expand the system.<br />

The next step was for the Federal Reserve Board to require<br />

banks to offer interest rates lower than those offered by S&Ls. The<br />

result was that funds moved from the banks into the S&Ls and<br />

became abundantly available for home loans. This was a deliberate<br />

national policy to favor the home industry at the expense of other<br />

industries that were competing for the same investment dollars. It<br />

may not have been good for the economy as a whole but it was<br />

good politics.<br />

ABANDONMENT OF THE FREE MARKET<br />

These measures effectively removed real estate loans from the<br />

free market and placed them into the political arena, where they<br />

have remained ever since. The damage to the public as a result of<br />

this intervention would be delayed a long time in coming, but<br />

when it came, it would be cataclysmic.<br />

The reality of government disruption of the free market cannot<br />

be overemphasized, for it is at the heart of our present and future<br />

crisis. We have savings institutions that are controlled by government<br />

at every step of the way. Federal agencies provide protection<br />

against losses and lay down rigid guidelines for capitalization<br />

levels, number of branches, territories covered, management policies,<br />

services rendered, and interest rates charged. The additional<br />

cost to S&Ls of compliance with this regulation has been estimated<br />

by the American Bankers Association at about $11 billion per year,<br />

which represents a whopping 60% of all their profits.<br />

On top of that, the healthy component of the industry must<br />

spend over a billion dollars each year for extra premiums into the<br />

so-called insurance fund to make up for the failures of the<br />

unhealthy component, a form of penalty for success. When some of<br />

the healthy institutions attempted to convert to banks to escape this<br />

Penalty, the regulators said no. Their cash flow was needed to<br />

support the bailout fund.<br />

!NSURANCE FOR THE COMMON MAN?<br />

The average private savings deposit is about $6,000. Yet, under<br />

the Carter administration, the level of FDIC insurance was raised


70 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND HOME, SWEET LOAN 71<br />

from $40,000 to $100,000 for each account. Those with more than<br />

that merely had to open several accounts, so, in reality, the sky was<br />

the limit. Clearly this had nothing to do with protecting the<br />

common man. The purpose was to prepare the way for brokerage<br />

houses to reinvest huge blocks of capital at high rates of interest<br />

virtually without risk. It was, after all, insured by the federal<br />

government.<br />

In 1979, Federal Reserve policy had pushed up interest rates,<br />

and the S&Ls had to keep pace to attract deposits. By December of<br />

1980, they were paying 15.8% interest on their money-market<br />

certificates. Yet, the average rate they were charging for new<br />

mortgages was only 12.9%. Many of their older loans were still<br />

crunching away at 7 or 8% and, to compound the problem, some of<br />

those were in default, which means they were really paying 0%.<br />

The thrifts were operating deep in the red and had to make up the<br />

difference somewhere.<br />

The weakest S&Ls paid the highest interest rates to attract<br />

depositors and they are the ones which obtained the large blocks of<br />

brokered funds. Brokers no longer cared how weak the operation<br />

was, because the funds were fully insured. They just cared about<br />

the interest rate.<br />

On the other hand, the S&L managers reasoned that they had to<br />

make those funds work miracles for the short period they had<br />

them. It was their only chance to dig out, and they were willing to<br />

take big risks. For them also, the government's insurance program<br />

had removed any chance of loss to their depositors, so many of<br />

them plunged into high-profit, high-risk real-estate developments.<br />

Deals began to go sour, and 1979 was the first year since the<br />

Great Depression of the 1930s that the total net worth of federally<br />

insured S&Ls became negative. And that was despite expansion<br />

almost everywhere else in the economy. The public began to<br />

worry.<br />

FULL FAITH AND CREDIT<br />

The protectors in Washington responded in 1982 with a joint<br />

resolution of Congress declaring that the full faith & credit of the<br />

United States government stood behind the FSLIC. That was a<br />

reassuring phrase, but many people had the gnawing feeling that<br />

somehow, we were going to pay for it ourselves. And they were<br />

right. Consumer Reports explained:<br />

Behind the troubled banks and the increasingly troubled<br />

insurance agencies stands "the full faith and credit" of the<br />

Government—in effect, a promise, sure to be honored by Congress,<br />

that all citizens will chip in through taxes or through inflation to make<br />

all depositors whole.<br />

The plight of the S&Ls was dramatically brought to light in<br />

Ohio in 1985 when the Home State Savings Bank of Cincinnati<br />

collapsed as a result of a potential $150 million loss in a Florida<br />

securities firm. This triggered a run, not only on the thirty-three<br />

branches of Home State, but on many of the other S&Ls as well. The<br />

news impacted international markets where overseas speculators<br />

dumped paper dollars for other currencies, and some rushed to<br />

buy gold.<br />

Within a few days, depositors demanding their money caused<br />

$60 million to flow out of the state's $130 million "insurance" fund<br />

which, true to form for all government protection schemes, was<br />

terribly inadequate. If the run had been allowed to continue, the<br />

fund likely would have been obliterated the next day. It was time<br />

for a political fix.<br />

Chi March 15, Ohio Governor Richard Celeste declared one of<br />

the few "bank holidays" since the Great Depression and closed all<br />

seventy-one of the state-insured thrifts. He assured the public there<br />

was nothing to worry about. He said this was merely a "cooling-off<br />

period . . . until we can convincingly demonstrate the soundness of<br />

our system." Then he flew to Washington and met with Paul<br />

Volcker, chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, and with Edwin<br />

Gray, chairman of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, to request<br />

federal assistance. They assured him it was available.<br />

A few days later, depositors were authorized to withdraw up to<br />

$750 from their accounts. On March 21, President Reagan calmed<br />

the world money markets with assurances that the crisis was over.<br />

Furthermore, he said, the problem was "limited to Ohio." 2<br />

This was not the first time there had been a failure of statesponsored<br />

insurance funds. The one in Nebraska was pulled down<br />

^ 1983 when the Commonwealth Savings Company of Lincoln<br />

failed. It had over $60 million in deposits, but the insurance fund<br />

1. "<br />

How Safe Are<br />

2. -<br />

Your Deposits?", Consumer Reports, August, 1988, p. 503.<br />

Ohio Bank Crisis That Ruffled World/' US. News & World Report, April 1, 1985,<br />

P-ll


72 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

had less than $2 million to cover, not just Commonwealth, but the<br />

whole system. Depositors were lucky to get 65 cents on the dollar,<br />

and even that was expected to take up to 10 yeaTs.<br />

AN INVITATION TO FRAUD<br />

In the early days of the Reagan administration, government<br />

regulations were changed so that the S&Ls were no longer<br />

restricted to the issuance of home mortgages, the sole reason for<br />

their creation in the first place. In fact, they no longer even were<br />

required to obtain a down payment on their loans. They could now<br />

finance 100% of a deal—or even more. Office buildings and<br />

shopping centers sprang up everywhere regardless of the need.<br />

Developers, builders, managers, and appraisers made millions. The<br />

field soon became overbuilt and riddled with fraud. Billions of<br />

dollars disappeared into defunct projects. In at least twenty-two of<br />

the failed S&Ls, there is evidence that the Mafia and CIA were<br />

involved.<br />

Fraud is not necessarily against the law. In fact, most of the<br />

fraud in the S&L saga was, not only legal, it was encouraged by the<br />

government. The Garn-St Germain Act allowed the thrifts to lend<br />

an amount of money equal to the appraised value of real estate<br />

rather than the market value. It wasn't long before appraisers were<br />

receiving handsome fees for appraisals that were, to say the least,<br />

unrealistic. But that was not fraud, it was the intent of the<br />

regulators. The amount by which the appraisal exceeded the<br />

market value was defined as "appraised equity" and was counted<br />

the same as capital.<br />

Since the S&Ls were required to have $1 in<br />

capital for every $33 held in deposits, an appraisal that exceeded<br />

market value by $1 million could be used to pyramid $33 million in<br />

deposits from Wall Street brokerage houses. And the anticipated<br />

profits from those funds was one of the ways in which the S&Ls<br />

were supposed to recoup their losses without the government<br />

having to cough up the money—which it didn't have. In effect the<br />

government was saying: "We can't make good on our protection<br />

scheme, so go get the money yourself by putting the investors at<br />

risk. Not only will we back you up if you fail, we'll show you<br />

exactly how to do it."<br />

1. "How Safe Are Deposits in Ailing Banks, S&Ls?/' U.S. 'News & World Report,<br />

March 25, 1985, p. 74.<br />

THE FALLOUT BEGINS<br />

In<br />

HOME, SWEET LOAN 73<br />

spite of the accounting gimmicks which were created to<br />

make the walking-dead S&Ls look healthy, by 1984 the fallout<br />

began- The FSLIC closed one institution that year and arranged for<br />

the merger of twenty-six others which were insolvent. In order to<br />

persuade healthy firms to absorb insolvent ones, the government<br />

provides cash settlements to compensate for the liabilities. By 1984,<br />

these<br />

subsidized mergers were costing the FDIC over $1 billion per<br />

year. Yet, that was just the small beginning.<br />

Between 1980 and 1986, a total of 664 insured S&Ls failed.<br />

Government regulators had promised to protect the public in the<br />

event of losses, but the losses were already far beyond what they<br />

could handle. They could not afford to close down all the insolvent<br />

thrifts because they simply didn't have enough money to cover the<br />

pay out. In March of 1986, the FSLIC had only 3 cents for every<br />

dollar of deposits. By the end of that year, the figure had dropped<br />

to two-tenths of a penny for each dollar "insured." Obviously, they<br />

had to keep those thrifts in business, which meant they had to<br />

invent even more accounting gimmicks to conceal the reality.<br />

Postponement of the inevitable made matters even worse.<br />

Keeping the S&Ls in business was costing the FSLIC $6 million per<br />

day. By 1988, two years later, the thrift industry as a whole was<br />

losing $9.8 million per day, and the unprofitable ones—the corpses<br />

which were propped up by the FSLIC—were losing $35.6 million<br />

per day. And, still, the game continued.<br />

By 1989, the FSLIC no longer had even two-tenths of a penny<br />

for each dollar insured. Its reserves had vanished altogether. Like<br />

the thrifts it supposedly protected, it was, itself, insolvent and<br />

looking for loans. It had tried offering bond issues, but these fell far<br />

short of its<br />

tailed<br />

needs. Congress had discussed the problem but had<br />

to provide new funding. The collapse of Lincoln Savings<br />

brought the crisis to a head. There was no money, period.<br />

THE FED USURPS THE ROLE OF CONGRESS<br />

In February, an agreement was reached between Alan<br />

Greenspan, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, and M. Danny<br />

Wall, Chairman of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, to have<br />

Fizzling FSLIC" by Shirley Hobbs Scheibla, Barron's, Feb. 9, 1987, p. 16.


74 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

$70 million of bailout funding for Lincoln Savings come directly<br />

from the Federal Reserve.<br />

This was a major break in precedent. Historically, the Fed has<br />

served to create money only for the government or for banks. If it<br />

were the will of the people to bail out a savings institution, then it is<br />

up to Congress to approve the funding. If Congress does not have<br />

the money or cannot borrow it from the public, then the Fed can<br />

create it (out of nothing, of course) and give it to the government.<br />

But, in this instance, the Fed was usurping the role of Congress and<br />

making political decisions entirely on its own. There is no basis in<br />

the Federal Reserve Act for this action. Yet, Congress remained<br />

silent, apparently out of collective guilt for its own paralysis.<br />

Finally, in August of that year, Congress was visited by the<br />

ghost of FDR and sprang into action. It passed the Financial<br />

Institutions Reform and Recovery Act (FIRREA) and allocated a<br />

minimum of $66 billion for the following ten years, $300 billion<br />

over thirty years. Of this amount, $225 billion was to come from<br />

taxes or inflation, and $75 billion was to come from the healthy<br />

S&Ls. It was the biggest bailout ever, bigger than the combined cost<br />

for Lockheed, Chrysler, Penn Central, and New York City.<br />

In the process, the FSLIC was eliminated because it was<br />

hopelessly insolvent and replaced by the Savings Association<br />

Insurance Fund. Also created was the Banking Insurance Fund for<br />

the protection of commercial banks, and both are now administered<br />

by the FDIC.<br />

As is often the case when previous government control fails to<br />

produce the desired result, the response of Congress is to increase<br />

the controls. Four entirely new layers of bureaucracy were added to<br />

the existing tangled mess: the Resolution Trust Oversight Board, to<br />

establish strategies for the RTC; the Resolution Funding Corporation,<br />

to raise money to operate the RTC; The Office of Thrift<br />

Supervision, to supervise thrift institutions even more than they<br />

had been; and the Oversight Board for the Home Loan Banks, the<br />

purpose of which remains vague but probably is to make sure that<br />

the S&Ls continue to serve the political directive of subsidizing the<br />

home industry. When President Bush signed the bill, he said:<br />

This legislation will safeguard and stabilize America's financial<br />

system and put in place permanent reforms so these problems wiU<br />

never happen again. Moreover, it says to tens of millions of<br />

savings-and-loan depositors, "You will not be the victim of others'<br />

mistakes. We will<br />

secure."<br />

HOME, SWEET LOAN 75<br />

see— guarantee—that your insured deposits are<br />

THE ESTIMATES ARE SLIGHTLY WRONG<br />

By the middle of the following year, it was clear that the $66<br />

billion funding would be greatly inadequate. Treasury spokesmen<br />

were now quoting $130 billion, about twice the original estimate.<br />

How much is $130 billion? In 1990, it was 30% more than the<br />

salaries of all the schoolteachers in America. It was more than the<br />

combined profits of all the Fortune-500 industrial companies. It<br />

would send 1.6 million students through the best four-year colleges,<br />

including room and board. And the figure did not even<br />

include the cost of liquidating the huge backlog of thrifts already<br />

seized nor the interest that had to be paid on borrowed funds.<br />

Within only a few days of the announced increase, the Treasury<br />

again revised the figure upward from $130 billion to $150 billion.<br />

As Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady told the press, "No one<br />

should assume that the estimates won't change. They will."<br />

Indeed, the estimates continued to change with each passing<br />

week. The government had sold or merged 223 insolvent thrifts<br />

during 1988 and had given grossly inadequate estimates of the cost.<br />

Financiers such as Ronald Perelman and the Texas investment<br />

partnership called Temple-Inland, Inc., picked up many of these at<br />

fantastic bargains, especially considering that they were given cash<br />

subsidies and tax advantages to sweeten the deal. At the time,<br />

Danny Wall, who was then Chairman of the Federal Home Loan<br />

Bank Board, announced that these deals "took care" of the worst<br />

thrift problems. He said the cost of the bailout was $39 billion. The<br />

Wall Street Journal replied:<br />

Wrong again. The new study, a compilation of audits prepared by<br />

the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, indicates that the total cost<br />

of the so-called Class of '88 will be $90 billion to $95 billion, including<br />

tax benefits granted the buyers and a huge amount of interest on<br />

government debt to help finance this assistance....<br />

But the 1988 thrift rescues' most expensive flaw doesn't appear to<br />

be the enrichment of tycoons. Rather it's that none of the deals ended<br />

or even limited the government's exposure to mismanagement by the<br />

new owners, hidden losses on real estate in the past, or the vicissitudes<br />

of the real-estate markets in the future.... And some of the deals<br />

1.<br />

'Review of the News," The New American, Sept. ll y 1989, p. 15.


76 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

appear to be sham transactions, in which failing thrifts were sold to<br />

failing thrifts, which are failing all over again....<br />

Although the thrifts proved to be in far worse shape than the Bank<br />

Board estimated, Mr. Wall defends his strategy for rescuing them with<br />

open-ended assistance. "We didn't have the money to liquidate/' he<br />

says.<br />

When Congress passed FIRREA the previous year to "safeguard<br />

and stabilize America's financial system/ 7 the staggering<br />

sum of $300 billion dollars was authorized to be taken from taxes<br />

and inflation over the following thirty years to do the job. Now,<br />

Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan was saying that<br />

true long-term cost would stand at $500 billion, an amount even<br />

greater than the default of loans to all<br />

the<br />

the Third-World countries<br />

combined. The figure was still too low. A non-biased private study<br />

released by Veribank, Inc. showed that, when all the hidden costs<br />

are included, the bill presented to the American people will be<br />

about $532 billion. The problems that President Bush promised<br />

would ''never happen again" were happening again.<br />

BOOKKEEPING SLEIGHT OF HAND<br />

Long before this point, the real estate market had begun to<br />

contract, and many mortgages exceeded the actual price for which<br />

the property could be sold. Furthermore, market interest rates had<br />

risen far above the rates that were locked into most of the S&L<br />

loans, and that decreased the value of those mortgages. The true<br />

value of a $50,000 mortgage that is paying 7% interest is only half of<br />

a $50,000 mortgage that is<br />

earning 14%. So the protectors of the<br />

public devised a scheme whereby the S&Ls were allowed to value<br />

their assets according to the original loan value rather than their<br />

true market value. That helped, but much more was still needed.<br />

The next step was to create bookkeeping assets out of thin air.<br />

This was accomplished by authorizing the S&Ls to place a monetary<br />

value on community "good will"! With the mere stroke of a<br />

pen, the referees created $2.5 billion in such assets, and the players<br />

continued the game.<br />

1. "Audit Report by FDIC Shows Wall's Estimates for Thrift Bailouts in 1988 Were<br />

Wildly Low/' by Charles McCoy and Todd Mason, The Wall Street Journal, Sept. 14,<br />

1990, p. A-l 2.<br />

2. "S&L Industry Rebuilds As Bailout Reaches Pinal Phase," Veribank News Release,<br />

Veribank, Inc. (Wakefield, Massachusetts), January 12, 1994, p. 2.<br />

HOME, SWEET LOAN 77<br />

Then the FSLIC began to issue "certificates of net worth/' which<br />

vvere basically promises to bail out the ailing S&Ls should they<br />

need The government had already promised it-<br />

to do that but, by<br />

printing<br />

it on pieces of paper and calling them "certificates of net<br />

worth/' the S&Ls were allowed to count them as assets on their<br />

books. Such promises are assets but, since the thrifts would be<br />

obligated to pay back any money it received in a bailout, those<br />

pay-back obligations should also have been put on the books as<br />

liabilities. The net position would not change. The only way they<br />

could count the certificates as assets without adding the offsetting<br />

liabilities would be for the bailout promises to be outright gifts with<br />

no obligation to ever repay. That may be the eventual result, but it<br />

is not the way the plan was set up. In any event, the thrifts were<br />

told they could count these pieces of paper as capital, the same as if<br />

the owners had put up their own cash. And the game continued.<br />

The moment of truth arrives when the S&Ls have to liquidate<br />

some of their holdings, such as in the sale of their mortgages or<br />

foreclosed homes to other S&Ls, commercial banks, or private<br />

parries. That is when the inflated bookkeeping value is converted<br />

into the true market value, and the difference has to be entered into<br />

the ledger as a loss.<br />

But not in the never-never land of socialism<br />

where government is the great protector. Dennis Turner explains:<br />

The FSUC permits the S&L which sold the mortgage to take the<br />

loss over a 40-year period. Most companies selling an asset at a loss<br />

must take the loss immediately: only S&Ls can engage in this patent<br />

fraud. Two failing S&Ls could conceivably sell their lowest-yielding<br />

mortgages to one another, and both wouJd raise their net worth! This<br />

dishonest accounting in the banking system is approved by the higfiest<br />

regulatory authorities.<br />

1<br />

U.S. News & World Report continues the commentary:<br />

Today, scores of savings-and-loan associations, kept alive mainly<br />

by accounting gimrrucks, continue to post big losses.. . . Only a fraction<br />

of the industry's aggregate net worth comprises hard assets such as<br />

mortgage notes. Intangible assets, which include bookkeeping entries<br />

such as good will, make up nearly all of the industry's estimated net<br />

Worth of 37.6 billion dollars.<br />

2<br />

P J? e .nnis Turner '<br />

When Your Bank Fails (Princeton, New Jersey: Amwell<br />

f ub «shing,Inc. / 1983) /P .141.<br />

Tt's Touch And Go for Troubled S&Ls/' by Patricia M. Scherschel, U.S. News &<br />

world Report, March 4, 1985, p. 92.


78 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

ACCOUNTING GIMMICKS ARE NOT FRAUD<br />

We must keep in mind that a well managed institution would<br />

never assume these kinds of risks or resort to fraudulent<br />

accounting if it wanted to stay in business for the long haul. But<br />

with Washington setting guidelines and standing by to make up<br />

losses, a manager would be fired if he didn't take advantage of the<br />

opportunity. After all, Congress specifically said it was OK when it<br />

passed the laws. These were loopholes deliberately put there to be<br />

used. Dr. Edward Kane explains:<br />

Deception itself doesn't constitute illegal fraud when it's<br />

authorized by an accounting system such as the Generally Accepted<br />

Accounting Principles (GAAP) system which allows institutions to<br />

forego recording assets at their true worth, maintaining them instead<br />

at their inflated value. The regulatory accounting principles system in<br />

1982 added even new options to overstate capital.... Intense<br />

speculation, such as we observed in these firms, is not necessarily bad<br />

management at all. In most of these cases, it was clever management.<br />

There were clever gambles that exploited, not depositors or savers, but<br />

taxpayers.<br />

The press has greatly exaggerated the role of illegal fraud in<br />

these matters with much time spent excoriating the likes of Donald<br />

Dixon at Vernon S&L and Charles Keating at Lincoln Savings.<br />

True, these flops cost the taxpayer well over $3 billion dollars, but<br />

all the illegal fraud put together amounts to only about one-half of<br />

one per cent of the total losses so far.<br />

Focusing on that minuscule<br />

component serves only to distract from the fact that the real<br />

problem is government regulation itself.<br />

JUNK BONDS ARE NOT JUNK<br />

Another part of the distraction has been to make it appear that<br />

the thrifts got into trouble because they were heavily invested in<br />

"junk bonds/'<br />

Wait a minute! What are junk bonds, anyway? This may come<br />

as a surprise, but those held by the S&Ls were anything but junk. In<br />

fact, in terms of risk-return ratios, most of them were superiorgrade<br />

investments to bonds from the Fortune-500 companies-<br />

1. "FIRREA: Financial Malpractice/' by Edward J.<br />

Kane, Durell Journal of Money<br />

and Banking, May, 1990, p. 5.<br />

2. "Banking on Government/' by Jane H. Ingraham, The New American, August 24,<br />

1992, p. 24.<br />

of older companies—but the small-company sector generally pro-<br />

more jobs, has greater profit margins, and pays more<br />

dividends than the so-called "investment-grade" companies. From<br />

rvides<br />

HOME, SWEET LOAN 79<br />

So-called junk bonds are merely those that are offered by smaller<br />

orn panies which are not large enough to be counted among the<br />

ation's giants. The large reinvestors, such as managers of mutual<br />

funds and retirement funds, prefer to stay with well-known names<br />

like General Motors and IBM. They need to invest truly huge<br />

blocks of money every day, and the smaller companies just don't<br />

have enough to offer to satisfy their needs. Consequently, many<br />

stocks and bonds from smaller companies are not traded in the<br />

New York Stock Exchange. They are traded in smaller exchanges or<br />

directly between brokers in what is called "over the counter."<br />

Because they do not have the advantage of being traded in<br />

larger markets, they have to pay a higher interest rate to attract<br />

investors, and for that reason, they are commonly called high-yield<br />

bonds.<br />

Bonds offered by these companies are derided by some brokers<br />

as not being "investment grade," yet, many of them are excellent<br />

performers. In fact,<br />

the<br />

they have become an important part of the<br />

American economy because they are the backbone of new industry.<br />

The most successful companies of the future will be found among<br />

their ranks. During the last decade, while the Fortune-500 companies<br />

were shrinking and eliminating 3.6 million jobs, this segment<br />

of new industry has been growing and has created 18 million new<br />

jobs.<br />

Not all new companies are good investments—the same is true<br />

1981 to 1991, the average return on ten-year Treasury bills was 10.4<br />

per cent; the Dow Jones Industrial Average was 12.9 per cent; and<br />

the average return on so-called junk bonds was 14.1 per cent.<br />

Because of this higher yield, they attracted more than $180 billion<br />

from savvy investors, some of whom were S&Ls- It was basically a<br />

new market which was orchestrated by an upstart, Michael Milken,<br />

a t the California-based Drexel Burnham Lambert brokerage house.<br />

CAPITAL GROWTH WITHOUT BANK LOANS OR<br />

JNFLATION<br />

One of the major concerns at <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island in 1910 was the trend<br />

to obtain business-growth capital from sources other than bank<br />

loans. Here, seventy years later, the same trend was developing


.<br />

80 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

"<br />

again in a slightly different form. Capital, especially for small<br />

companies, was now corning from bonds which Drexel had found a<br />

way to mass market. In fact, Drexel was even able to use those<br />

bonds to engineer corporate takeovers, an activity that previously<br />

had been reserved for the mega-investment houses. By 1986, Drexel<br />

had become the most profitable investment bank in the country.<br />

Here was $180 billion that no longer was being channeled<br />

through Wall Street. Here was $180 billion that was coming from<br />

people's savings instead of being created out of nothing by the<br />

banks. In other words, here was growth built upon real investment,<br />

not inflation. Certain people were not happy about it.<br />

Glenn Yago, Director of the Economic Research Bureau and<br />

Associate Professor of Management at the State University of New<br />

York at Stony Brook, explains the problem:<br />

It was not until high yield securities were applied to restructuring<br />

through deconglomeration and takeovers that hostilities against the<br />

junk bond market broke out.... The high yield market grew at the<br />

expense of bank debt, and high yield companies grew at the expense<br />

of the hegemony of many established firms. As Peter Passell noted in<br />

The New York Times, the impact was first felt on Wall Street, "where<br />

sharp elbows and a working knowledge of computer spreadsheets<br />

suddenly counted more than a nose for dry sherry or membership in<br />

Skull and Bones." 1<br />

The first line of attack on this new market of high-yield bonds<br />

was to call them "junk." The word itself was powerful. The<br />

financial media picked it up and many investors were frightened<br />

away.<br />

The next step was for compliant politicians to pass a law<br />

requiring S&Ls to get rid of their "junk/' supposedly to protect the<br />

public. That this was a hoax is evident by the fact that only 5% ever<br />

held any of these bonds, and their holdings represented only 1.2%<br />

of the total S&Ls assets. Furthermore, the bonds were performing<br />

satisfactorily and were a source of much needed revenue. Nevertheless,<br />

The Financial Institutions Reform and Recovery Act, which<br />

was discussed previously, was passed in 1989. It forced S&Ls to<br />

liquidate at once their "junk" bond holdings. That caused their<br />

HOME, SWEET LOAN 81<br />

rices to plummet, and the thrifts were even further weakened as<br />

jL>y took a loss on the sale. Jane Ingraham comments:<br />

Overnight, profitable S&Ls were turned into government-owned<br />

basket cases in the hands of the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC).<br />

t add to the disaster, the RTC itself, which became the country's<br />

largest owner of junk bonds ... flooded the market again with $1.6<br />

billion of its holdings at the market's bottom in 1990.. .<br />

So it was government itself that crashed the junk bond market, not<br />

Michael Milken, although the jailed Milken and other former officials<br />

of Drexel Burnham Lambert have just agreed to a $1.3 billion<br />

settlement of the hundreds of lawsuits brought against them by<br />

government regulators, aggrieved investors, and others demanding<br />

"justice." 1<br />

Incidentally,<br />

these bonds have since recovered and, had the<br />

S&Ls been allowed to keep them, they would be in better financial<br />

condition today. And so would be the RTC.<br />

With the California upstarts out of the way, it was a simple<br />

matter to buy up the detested bonds at bargain prices and to bring<br />

control of the new market back to Wall Street. The New York firm<br />

of Salomon Brothers, for example, one of Drexel's most severe<br />

critics during the 1980s, is now a leading trader in the market<br />

Drexel created.<br />

REAL PROBLEM IS GOVERNMENT REGULATION<br />

So the real problem within the savings-and-loan industry is<br />

government regulation which has insulated it from the free market<br />

and encouraged it to embark upon unsound business practices. As<br />

the Wall Street Journal stated on March 10, 1992:<br />

If<br />

you're going to wreck a business the size of the U.S. Thrift<br />

industry, you need a lot more power than Michael Milken ever had.<br />

You need the power of national political authority, the kind of power<br />

possessed only by regulators and Congress. Whatever "hold" Milken<br />

or junk bonds may have had on the S&Ls, it was nothing compared<br />

with the interventions of Congress.<br />

At the time this book went to press, the number of S&Ls that<br />

operated during the 1980s had dropped to less than half. As<br />

failures, mergers, and conversion into banks continue, the number<br />

w iU decline further. Those that remain fall into two groups: those<br />

1. Glenn Yago, Junk Bonds: How High Yield Securities Restructured Corporate America<br />

(New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 5.<br />

1-<br />

'"Banking on Government/' pp. 24, 25.<br />

-<br />

Quoted in "Banking on Government," p. 26.


82 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND HOME, SWEET LOAN 83<br />

that have been taken over by the RTC and those that have not Most<br />

of those that remain under private control—and that is a relative<br />

term in view of the regulations they endure—are slowly returning<br />

to a healthy state as a result of improved profitability, asset quality,<br />

and capitalization. The RTC-run organizations, on the other hand,<br />

continue to hemorrhage due to failure by Congress to provide<br />

funding to close them down and pay them off. Losses from this<br />

group are adding $6 billion per year to the ultimate cost of bailout.<br />

President Clinton was asking Congress for an additional $45 billion<br />

and hinting that this should be the last bailout—but no promises.<br />

The game continues.<br />

CONGRESS IS PARALYZED, WITH GOOD REASON<br />

Congress seems disinterested and paralyzed with inaction. One<br />

would normally expect dozens of politicians to be calling for a<br />

large-scale investigation of the ongoing disaster, but there is hardly<br />

a peep. The reason becomes obvious when one realizes that<br />

savings-and-loan associations, banks, and other federally regulated<br />

institutions are heavy contributors to the election campaigns of<br />

those who write the regulatory laws. A thorough, public investigation<br />

would undoubtedly turn up some cozy relationships that the<br />

legislators would just as soon keep confidential.<br />

The second reason is that any honest inquiry would soon reveal<br />

the shocking truth that Congress itself is the primary cause of the<br />

problem. By following the socialist path and presuming to protect<br />

or benefit their constituency, they have suspended and violated the<br />

natural laws that drive a free-market economy. In so doing, they<br />

created a Frankenstein monster they could not control The more<br />

they tried to tame the thing, the more destructive it became. As<br />

economist Hans Sennholz has observed:<br />

The real cause of the disaster is the very financial structure that<br />

was fashioned by legislators and guided by regulators; they together<br />

created a cartel that, like all other monopolistic concoctions, is playing<br />

mischief with its victims.<br />

A CARTEL WITHIN A CARTEL<br />

Sennholz has chosen exactly the right word: cartel. The savingsand-loan<br />

industry, is really a cartel within a cartel. It could not<br />

1. "The Great Banking Scandal," by Hans F. Sennholz, The Freeman, Nov., 1990/<br />

p. 405.<br />

function<br />

without Congress standing by to push unlimited amounts<br />

of money into it. And Congress could not do that without the<br />

banking cartel called the Federal Reserve System standing by as the<br />

"lender of last resort" to create money out of nothing for Congress<br />

to borrow. This comfortable arrangement between political scientists<br />

and monetary scientists permits Congress to vote for any<br />

scheme it wants, regardless of the cost. If politicians tried to raise<br />

that money through taxes, they would be thrown out of office. But<br />

being able to "borrow" it from the Federal Reserve System upon<br />

demand, allows them to collect it through the hidden mechanism of<br />

inflation, and not one voter in a hundred will complain.<br />

The thrifts have become the illegitimate half-breed children of<br />

the Creature. And that is why the savings-and-loan story is<br />

included in this study.<br />

[f America is to survive as a free nation, her citizens must<br />

become far more politically educated than they are at present. As a<br />

people, we must learn not to reach for every political carrot<br />

dangled in front of us. As desirable as it may be for everyone to<br />

afford a home, we must understand that government programs<br />

pretending to make that possible actually wreak havoc with our<br />

system and bring about just the opposite of what they promise.<br />

After 60 years of subsidizing and regulating the housing industry,<br />

how many young people today can afford a home? Tinkering with<br />

the laws of supply and demand, plus the hidden tax called inflation<br />

to pay for the tinkering, has driven prices beyond the reach of<br />

many and has wiped out the down payments of others. Without<br />

such costs, common people would have much more money and<br />

purchasing power than they do today, and homes would be well<br />

within their reach.<br />

SUMMARY<br />

Our present-day problems within the savings-and-loan industry<br />

can be traced back to the Great Depression of the 1930s.<br />

Americans were becoming impressed by the theories of socialism<br />

and soon embraced the concept that it was proper for government<br />

D provide benefits for its citizens and to protect them against<br />

economic hardship.<br />

Under the Hoover and Roosevelt administrations, new government<br />

agencies were established which purported to protect depos-<br />

in the S&Ls and to subsidize home mortgages for the middle<br />

lts


84 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

class.<br />

These measures distorted the laws of supply and demand<br />

and, from that point forward, the housing industry was moved out<br />

of the free market and into the political arena.<br />

Once the pattern of government intervention had been established,<br />

there began a long, unbroken series of federal rules and<br />

regulations that were the source of windfall profits for managers,<br />

appraiser, brokers, developers, and builders. They also weakened<br />

the industry by encouraging unsound business practices and<br />

high-risk investments.<br />

When these ventures failed, and when the value of real estate<br />

began to drop, many S&Ls became insolvent. The federal insurance<br />

fund was soon depleted, and the government was confronted with<br />

its own promise to bail out these companies but not having any<br />

money to do so.<br />

The response of the regulators was to create accounting gimmicks<br />

whereby insolvent thrifts could be made to appear solvent<br />

and, thus, continue in business. This postponed the inevitable and<br />

made matters considerably worse. The failed S&Ls continued to<br />

lose billions of dollars each month and added greatly to the<br />

ultimate cost of bailout, all of which would eventually have to be<br />

paid by the common man out of taxes and inflation. The ultimate<br />

cost is estimated at over one trillion dollars.<br />

Congress appears to be unable to act and is<br />

strangely silent.<br />

This is understandable. Many representatives and senators are the<br />

beneficiaries of generous donations from the S&Ls. But perhaps the<br />

main reason is that Congress, itself, is the main culprit in this crime.<br />

In either case, the politicians would like to talk about something<br />

else.<br />

In the larger view, the S&L industry is a cartel within a cartel.<br />

The fiasco could never have happened without the cartel called the<br />

Federal Reserve System standing by to create the vast amounts of<br />

bailout money pledged by Congress.<br />

Chapter Five<br />

NEARER TO THE<br />

HEART'S DESIRE<br />

The 1944 meeting in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire,<br />

at which the world's most prominent socialists<br />

established the International Monetary Fund<br />

and the World Bank as mechanisms far eliminating<br />

gold from world finance; the hidden agenda<br />

behind the IMF/World Bank revealed as the<br />

building of world socialism; tlie role of the Federal<br />

Reserve in bringing that about.<br />

As we have seen, the game called Bailout has been played over<br />

and over again in the rescue of large corporations, domestic banks,<br />

and savings-and-loan institutions. The pretense has been that these<br />

measures were necessary to protect the public. The result, however,<br />

has been just the opposite. The public has been exploited as billions<br />

of dollars have been expropriated through taxes and inflation. The<br />

money has been used to make up losses that should have been paid<br />

by the failing banks and corporations as the penalty for mismanagement<br />

and fraud.<br />

While this was happening in our home-town stadium, the same<br />

game was being played in the international arena. There are two<br />

primary differences. One is that the amount of money at stake in<br />

the international game is much larger. Through a complex tangle of<br />

bank loans, subsidies, and grants, the Federal Reserve is becoming<br />

the "lender of last resort" for virtually the entire planet. The other<br />

difference is that, instead of claiming to be Protectors of the Public,<br />

the players have emblazoned across the backs of their uniforms:<br />

Saviors of the World.<br />

BRETTON WOODS: AN ATTACK ON GOLD<br />

fhe game began at an international meeting of financiers,<br />

Politicians, and theoreticians held in July of 1944 at the Mount<br />

Washington Hotel in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire. Officially, it


86 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

was called the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference,<br />

but is generally referred to today as simply the Bretton Woods<br />

Conference. Two international agencies were created at that meeting:<br />

the International Monetary Fund and its sister organisation,<br />

the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development—<br />

commonly called the World Bank.<br />

The announced purposes of these organizations were admirable.<br />

The World Bank was to make loans to war-torn and underdeveloped<br />

nations so they could build stronger economies. The<br />

International Monetary Fund (IMF) was to promote monetary<br />

cooperation between nations by maintaining fixed exchange rates<br />

between their currencies. But the method by which these goals<br />

were to be achieved was less admirable. It was to terminate the use<br />

of gold as the basis of international currency exchange and replace<br />

it with a politically manipulated paper standard. In other words, it<br />

was to allow governments to escape the discipline of gold so they<br />

could create money out of nothing without paying the penalty of<br />

having their currencies drop in value on world markets.<br />

Prior to this conference, currencies were exchanged in terms of<br />

their gold value, and the arrangement was called the "goldexchange<br />

standard." This is not the same as a "gold-standard" in<br />

which a currency is backed by gold. It was merely that the<br />

exchange ratios of the various currencies—most of which were not<br />

backed by gold—were determined by how much gold they could<br />

buy in the open market. Their values, therefore, were set by supply<br />

and demand. Politicians and bankers hated the arrangement,<br />

because it was beyond their ability to manipulate. In the past, it had<br />

served as a remarkably efficient mechanism but it was a strict<br />

disciplinarian. As John Kenneth Galbraith observed:<br />

The Bretton Woods arrangements sought to recapture the<br />

advantages of the gold standard—currencies that were exchangeable<br />

at stable and predictable rates into gold and thus at stable and<br />

predictable rates into each other. And this it sought to accomplish<br />

while minimizing the pain imposed by the gold standard on countries<br />

that were buying too much, selling too little and thus losing gold."<br />

The method by which this was to be accomplished was exactly<br />

the method devised on <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island to allow American banks to<br />

1. John Kenneth Galbraith, Money: Whence It Came, Where It Went (Boston:<br />

Houghton Mifflin, 1975), pp. 258, 259.<br />

NEARER TO THE HEART'S DESIRE 87<br />

cresXe money out of nothing without paying the penalty of having<br />

their<br />

currencies devalued by other banks. It was the establishment<br />

of a world central bank which would create a common fiat money<br />

for all nations and then require them to inflate together at the same<br />

rate. There was to be a kind of international insurance fund which<br />

vvould rush that fiat money to any nation that temporarily needed<br />

it to face down a "run" on its currency. It wasn't born with all these<br />

features fully developed, just as the Federal Reserve wasn't fully<br />

developed when it was born. That, nevertheless, was the plan, and<br />

it was launched with all the structures in place.<br />

The theoreticians who drafted this plan were the well-known<br />

Fabian Socialist from England, John Maynard Keynes, 1 and the<br />

Assistant Secretary of the U.S. Treasury, Harry Dexter White.<br />

THE FABIAN SOCIETY<br />

The Fabians were an elite group of intellectuals who formed a<br />

semi-secret society for the purpose of bringing socialism to the<br />

world. Whereas Communists wanted to establish socialism quickly<br />

through violence and revolution, the Fabians preferred to do it<br />

slowly through propaganda and legislation. The word socialism<br />

was not to be used. Instead, they would speak of benefits for the<br />

people such as welfare, medical care,<br />

higher wages, and better<br />

working conditions. In this way, they planned to accomplish their<br />

objective without bloodshed and even without serious opposition.<br />

They scorned the Communists, not because they disliked their<br />

goals, but because they disagreed with their methods. To emphasize<br />

the importance of gradualism, they adopted the turtle as the<br />

symbol of their movement. The three most prominent leaders in the<br />

early days were Sidney and Beatrice Webb and George Bernard<br />

Shaw. A stained-glass window in the Beatrice Webb House in<br />

Surrey, England is especially enlightening. Across the top appears<br />

the last line from Omar Khayyam:<br />

Dear love, couldst thou and I with fate conspire<br />

To grasp this sorry scheme of things entire,<br />

Would we not shatter it to bits, and then<br />

Remould it nearer to the heart's desire!<br />

Keynes often is portrayed as having been merely a liberal. But, for his Lifelong<br />

voivement with Fabians and their work, see Rose Martin, Fabian Freeway; High<br />

^"w to Socialism in the U.S.A. (Boston: Western [stands, 1966).


88 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

•"<br />

NEARER TO THE HEART'S DESIRE 89<br />

Beneath the line Remould it nearer to the heart's desire, the mural<br />

depicts Shaw and Webb striking the earth with hammers. Across<br />

the bottom, the masses kneel in worship of a stack of books<br />

advocating the theories of socialism. Thumbing his nose at the<br />

docile masses is H.G. Wells who, after quitting the Fabians,<br />

denounced them as "the new machiavellians." The most revealing<br />

component, however, is the Fabian crest which appears Between<br />

Shaw and Webb. It is a wolf in sheep's clothing!<br />

COMMUNIST MOLES<br />

Harry Dexter White was America's chief technical expert and<br />

the dominant force at the conference. He eventually became the<br />

first Executive Director for the United States at the IMF. An<br />

interesting footnote to this story is that White was simultaneously a<br />

member of the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and a member<br />

of a Communist espionage ring in Washington while he served as<br />

Assistant Secretary of the Treasury. And even more interesting is<br />

that the White House was informed of that fact when President<br />

Truman appointed him to his post. The FBI had transmitted to the<br />

White House detailed proof of White's activities on at least two<br />

separate occasions.<br />

Serving as the technical secretary at the Bretton<br />

Woods conference was Virginius Frank Coe, a member of the same<br />

espionage ring to which White belonged. Coe later became the first<br />

Secretary of the IMF.<br />

Thus, completely hidden from public view, there was a complex<br />

drama taking place in which the intellectual guiding lights at<br />

the Bretton Woods conference were Fabian Socialists and Communists.<br />

Although they were in disagreement over method, they were<br />

in perfect harmony on goal: international socialism.<br />

There were undoubtedly other reasons for Communists to be<br />

enthusiastic about the IMF and the World Bank, despite the fact<br />

1. See Zygmund Dobbs, The Great Deceit: Social Pseudo-Sciences (West SayviNe,<br />

New York: Veritas Foundation, 1964), opposite p. 1. Also Rose L. Martin, Fabian<br />

Freeway: High Road to Socialism in the U.S.A. (Boston: Western Islands, 1966), pp. 30,<br />

31.<br />

2. See: David Rees, Harry Dexter White: A Study in Paradox (New York: Coward,<br />

McCann & Geoghegan, 1973); Whittaker Chambers, Witness (New York: Random<br />

House, 1952); Allen Weinstein, Perjury: The Hiss-Chambers Case (New York: Vintage<br />

Books, 1978); James Burnham, TJie Web of Subversion: Underground Networks in the<br />

US. Government (New York: The John Day Co., 1954); Elizabeth Bentley, Out of<br />

Bondage (New York: Devin-Adair, 1951)<br />

that the Soviet Union elected at the time not to become a member.<br />

The goal of the organizations was to create a world currency, a<br />

world central bank, and a mechanism to control the economies of<br />

all<br />

nations. In order for these things to happen, the United States<br />

would of necessity have to surrender its dominant position. In fact,<br />

it would have to be reduced to just one part of the collective whole.<br />

FXhat fit in quite nicely with the Soviet plan. Furthermore, the World<br />

Bank was seen as a vehicle for moving capital from the United<br />

States and other industrialized nations to the underdeveloped<br />

1<br />

nations, the very ones over which Marxists have always had the<br />

greatest control. They looked forward to the day when we would<br />

pay their bills. It has all come to pass.<br />

IMF STRUCTURE AND FUNDING<br />

The International Monetary Fund appears to be a part of the<br />

United Nations, much as the Federal Reserve System appears to be<br />

a part of the United States government, but it is entirely independent.<br />

It is funded on a quota basis by its member nations,<br />

almost two hundred in number. The greatest share of capital,<br />

however, comes from the more highly industrialized nations such<br />

as Great Britain, Japan, France, and Germany, The United States<br />

contributes the most, at about twenty per cent of the total. In<br />

reality, that twenty per cent represents about twice as much as the<br />

number indicates, because most of the other nations contribute<br />

worthless currencies which no one wants. The world prefers<br />

dollars.<br />

One of the routine operations at the IMF is to exchange<br />

worthless currencies for dollars so the weaker countries can pay<br />

their international bills. This is supposed to cover temporary<br />

"cash-flow" problems. It is a kind of international FDIC which<br />

rushes money to a country that has gone bankrupt so it can avoid<br />

devaluing its currency. The transactions are seldom paid back.<br />

Although escape from the gold-exchange standard was the<br />

lor >g-range goal of the IMF, the only way to convince nations to<br />

Participate at the outset was to use gold itself as a backing for its<br />

own money supply—at least as a temporary expedient. As Keynes<br />

explained it:<br />

I felt that the leading central banks would never voluntarily<br />

relinquish the then existing forms of the gold standard; and I did not<br />

desire a catastrophe sufficiently violent to shake them off


90 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

involuntarily. The only practical hope lay, therefore, in a gradual<br />

evolution in the forms of a managed world currency, taking the<br />

existing gold standard as a starting point.<br />

It was illegal for American citizens to own gold at that time, but<br />

everyone else in the world could exchange their paper dollars for<br />

gold at a fixed price of $35 per ounce. That made it<br />

international currency because, unlike any other at<br />

the de facto<br />

the time, its<br />

value was guaranteed. So, at the outset, the IMF adopted the dollar<br />

as its own international monetary unit.<br />

PAPER GOLD<br />

But the Fabian turtle was crawling inexorably toward its<br />

destination. In 1970, the IMF created a new monetary unit called<br />

the SDR, or Special Drawing Right. The media optimistically<br />

described it as "paper gold," but it was pure bookkeeping wizardry<br />

with no relationship to gold or anything else of tangible value.<br />

SDRs are based on "credits" which are provided by the member<br />

nations. These credits are not money. They are merely promises<br />

that the governments will get the money by taxing their own<br />

citizens should the need arise. The IMF considers these to be<br />

"assets" which then become the "reserves" from which loans are<br />

made to other governments. As we shall see in chapter ten, this is<br />

almost identical to the bookkeeping sleight-of-hand that is used to<br />

create money out of nothing at the Federal Reserve System.<br />

Dennis Turner cuts through the garbage:<br />

SDRs are turned into loans to Third-World nations by the creation<br />

of checking accounts in the commercial or central banks of the member<br />

nations in the name of the debtor governments. These bank accounts<br />

are created out of thin air. The IMF creates dollars, francs, pounds, or<br />

other hard currencies and gives them to a Third-World dictator, with<br />

inflation<br />

resulting in the country where the currency originated.,..<br />

Inflation is caused in the industrialized nations while wealth is<br />

transferred from the eeneral public to the debtor country. And the<br />

debtor doesn't repay.<br />

When the IMF was created, it was the vision of Fabian Socialist<br />

John Maynard Keynes that there be a world central bank issuing a<br />

1. John Maynard Keynes, The Collected Writings of, Vol V (1930 rpt. New York:<br />

Macmillan, 1971), p. xx.<br />

2. Dennis Turner, When Your Bank Fails (Princeton, New Jersey: Amwell<br />

Publishing, 1983), p. 32.<br />

NEARER TO THE HEART'S DESIRE 91<br />

Seive currency called the "bancor" to free all governments from<br />

the discipline of gold. With the creation of SDRs, the IMF had<br />

begun to fulfill that dream.<br />

finally<br />

GOLD IS FINALLY ABANDONED<br />

But there was still<br />

nrimary<br />

an obstacle. As long as the dollar was the<br />

currency used by the IMF and as long as it was redeemable<br />

in gold at $35 per ounce, the amount of international money that<br />

could be created would be limited. If the IMF were to function as a<br />

true world central bank with unlimited issue, the dollar had to be<br />

broken away from its gold backing as a first step toward replacing<br />

it completely with a bancor, an SDR or something else equally free<br />

from restraint.<br />

On August 15, 1971, President Nixon signed an executive order<br />

declaring that the United States would no longer redeem its paper<br />

dollars for gold. So ended the first phase of the IMF's metamorphosis.<br />

It was not yet a true central bank, because it could not create its<br />

own world currency. It had to depend on the central banks of its<br />

member nations to provide cash and so-called credits; but since<br />

these banks, themselves, could create as much money as they<br />

wished, from now on, there would be no limit.<br />

The original purpose had been to maintain fixed rates of<br />

exchange between currencies; but the IMF has presided over more<br />

than two hundred currency devaluations. In private industry, a<br />

failure of that magnitude might be cause for going out of business,<br />

but not in the world of politics. The greater the failure, the greater<br />

the pressure to expand the program. So, when the dollar broke loose<br />

from gold and there was no longer a ready standard for measuring<br />

currency values, the IMF merely changed its goal and continued to<br />

expand its operation. The new goal was to "overcome trade<br />

deficits."<br />

TRADE DEFICITS<br />

The topic of trade deficits is a favorite among politicians,<br />

economists, and talk-show hosts. Everyone agrees they are bad, but<br />

tt^re is much disagreement over what causes them. Let's have a try<br />

at itȦ<br />

trade deficit is a condition that exists when a country imports<br />

a greater value of goods than it exports. In other words, it spends<br />

aore than it earns in international trade. This is similar to the<br />

^tuation of an individual who spends more than he earns. In both


—<br />

92 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND NEARER TO THE HEART'S DESIRE 93<br />

cases, the process cannot be sustained unless: (1) earnings are<br />

increased; (2) money is taken out of savings; (3) assets are sold; (4)<br />

money is counterfeited; or (5) money is borrowed. Unless one of<br />

these occurs, the individual or the country has no choice but to<br />

decrease spending.<br />

Increasing one's earnings is the best solution. In fact, it is the<br />

only solution for the long haul. All else is temporary at best. An<br />

individual can increase his income by working harder or smarter or<br />

longer. A country does it the same way. But it cannot happen<br />

unless private industry is allowed to flourish in a system of<br />

free-enterprise. The problem with this option is that few politicians<br />

respect the dynamic power of the free-enterprise system. Their<br />

world is built upon political programs in which the laws of the free<br />

market are manipulated to achieve politically popular goals. They<br />

may desire the option of increasing the nation's income by increasing<br />

its productivity, but their political agenda prevents that from<br />

happening.<br />

The second option is to obtain extra money out of savings. But<br />

there are virtually no governments in the world today that have<br />

any savings. Their debts and liabilities exceed assets by a large<br />

margin. Likewise, most of their industries and their citizens are in a<br />

similar position. Their savings already have been consumed by<br />

government.<br />

The third option, the selling of assets, also is not available for<br />

most countries. By assets, we mean tangible items other than<br />

merchandise which is normally for sale. Although these, too, are<br />

assets in the broad meaning, in accounting methodology, they are<br />

classified as inventory. The only government asset that is<br />

readily<br />

marketable is gold, and few countries today have a stockpile from<br />

which to draw. Even in those cases, what little they have is already<br />

1. It is the author's opinion that it's time to get the politicians wearing Uncle-Sam<br />

suits off our backs. Which is easier said than done, because Americans still like their<br />

protectionist subsidies: tariffs to protect the business man, minimum wages and<br />

compulsory unionism to protect the worker, ethnic quotas in hiring to protect the<br />

underdog, cradle-to-the-grave insurance programs, unemployment benefits, disability<br />

compensation, extreme environmental and safety measures—regardless of<br />

cost. Free enterprise can and will produce all of these benefits in order to compete<br />

for buyers and employees alike. But, as long as these measures are compulsory arid<br />

chosen on the basis of political popularity without regard to economic consequences,<br />

American industry will never be able to recover. And then none of the<br />

illusory benefits will remain.<br />

wed to another government or a bank. As for private assets,<br />

rions can, for a while, sell these to foreign buyers and offset their<br />

ative trade balances. That is what has been happening in the<br />

United States for many years as office buildings, stocks, factories,<br />

nd entire companies have been sold to foreign investors. But the<br />

fact remains that the nation is still spending more than it earns, and<br />

that process cannot continue indefinitely. Foreign ownership and<br />

control over industry and commerce also create sociological and<br />

political problems. Underdeveloped countries do not have to<br />

worry about any of that, however, because they have few private<br />

assets to sell.<br />

THE COUNTERFEIT OPTION<br />

The counterfeit option is available only if a country happens to<br />

be in the unique position of having its currency accepted as the<br />

medium of international trade, as has been the case for the United<br />

States. In that event, it is possible to create money out of nothing,<br />

and other nations have no choice but to accept it.<br />

Thus, for years,<br />

the United States has been able to spend more money than it earned<br />

in trade by having the Federal Reserve create whatever it needed.<br />

When the dollar was separated entirely from gold in 1971, it<br />

ceased being the official IMF world currency and finally had to<br />

compete with other currencies — primarily the mark and the yen<br />

on the basis of its relative merit. From that point forward, its value<br />

increasingly became discounted. Nevertheless, it was still the<br />

preferred medium of exchange. Also, the U.S. was one of the safest<br />

places in the world to invest one's money. But, to do so, one first<br />

had to convert his native currency into dollars. These facts gave the<br />

U.S. dollar greater value on international markets than it otherwise<br />

would have merited. So, in spite of the fact that the Federal Reserve<br />

was creating huge amounts of money during this time, the demand<br />

for it by foreigners was seemingly limitless. The result is that<br />

America has continued to finance its trade deficit with fiat money<br />

-ounterfeit, if you will—a feat which no other nation in the world<br />

could hope to accomplish.<br />

We have been told that our nation's trade deficit is a terrible<br />

^g/ and that it would be better to "weaken the dollar" to bring it<br />

art end. Weakening the dollar is a euphemism for increasing<br />

lation. In truth, America is not hurt by a trade deficit at all.<br />

' We are the benefactors while our trading partners are the<br />

In


94 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

victims. We get the cars and TV sets while they get the funny<br />

money. We get the hardware. They get the paperware.<br />

There is a dark side to the exchange, however. As long as the<br />

dollar remains in high esteem as a trade currency, America can<br />

continue to spend more than it earns. But when the day arrives—as<br />

it certainly must—when the dollar tumbles and foreigners no<br />

longer want it, the free ride will be over. When that happens,<br />

hundreds of billions of dollars that are now resting in foreign<br />

countries will quickly come back to our shores as people everywhere<br />

in the world attempt to convert them into yet more real<br />

estate, factories, and tangible products, and to do so as quickly as<br />

possible before they become even more worthless. As this flood of<br />

dollars bids up prices, we will finally experience the inflation that<br />

should have been caused in years past but which was postponed<br />

because foreigners were kind enough to take the dollars out of our<br />

economy in exchange for their products.<br />

The chickens will come home to roost. But, when they do, it will<br />

not be because of the trade deficit. It will be because we were able<br />

to finance the trade deficit with fiat money created by the Federal<br />

Reserve. If it were not for that, the trade deficit could not have<br />

happened.<br />

Back to the main topic, which is the five methods by which a<br />

trade deficit can be paid. Through the process of elimination, the<br />

fourth option of borrowing is where the action is today for most of<br />

the world, and that is where the IMF positioned itself in 1970. Its<br />

new mission was to provide loans so countries can continue to<br />

spend more than they earn, but to do so in the name of "overcoming<br />

trade deficits."<br />

IMF LOANS: DOOMED BUT SWEET<br />

These loans do not go into private enterprises where they have<br />

a chance of being turned for a profit. They go into state-owned and<br />

state-operated industries which are constipated by bureaucracy<br />

and poisoned by corruption. Doomed to economic failure from the<br />

start, they consume the loans with no possibility of repayment<br />

Even the interest quickly becomes too much to handle. Which<br />

means the IMF must fall back to the "reserves," back to the<br />

"assets," back to the "credits," and eventually back to the taxpayers<br />

to bail them out<br />

world<br />

NEARER TO THE HEART'S DESIRE 95<br />

Whereas the International Monetary Fund is<br />

evolving into a<br />

central bank which eventually will issue a world currency<br />

based on nothing, its sister organization, the World Bank, has<br />

become its lending agency. Acting as Savior of the World, it seeks to<br />

aid the underdeveloped nations, to feed the hungry, and to bring a<br />

better life to all mankind. In pursuit of these humanitarian goals, it<br />

provides loans to governments at favorable terms, usually at rates<br />

below market, for terms as long as fifty years, and often with no<br />

payments due until after ten years.<br />

Funding for these loans comes from member states in the form<br />

of a small amount of cash, plus promises to deliver about ten-times<br />

more if the Bank gets into trouble. The promises, described as<br />

"callable capital," constitute a kind of FDIC insurance program but<br />

with no pretense at maintaining a reserve fund. (In that sense it is<br />

more honest than the real FDIC which does maintain the pretense<br />

but, in reality, is based on nothing more than a similar promise.)<br />

Based upon the small amount of seed money plus the far<br />

greater amount of "credits" and "promises" from governments of<br />

the industrialized countries, the World Bank is able to go into the<br />

commercial loan markets and borrow larger sums at extremely low<br />

interest rates. After all, the loans are backed by the most powerful<br />

governments in the world which have promised to force their<br />

taxpayers to make the payments if the Bank should get into trouble.<br />

It then takes these funds and relends them to the underdeveloped<br />

countries at slightly higher rates, making a profit on the arbitrage.<br />

The unseen aspect of this operation is that the money it<br />

processes is money which, otherwise, would have been available<br />

for investment in the private sector or as loans to consumers. It<br />

siphons off much-needed development capital for private industry,<br />

prevents new jobs from being created, causes interest rates to rise,<br />

and retards the economy at large.<br />

THE HIDDEN AGENDA: WORLD SOCIALISM<br />

Although most of the policy statements of the World Bank deal<br />

with economic issues, a close monitoring of its activities reveal a<br />

preoccupation with social and political issues. This should not be<br />

surprising considering that the Bank was perceived by its founders<br />

as an instrument for social and political change. The change which<br />

il Was designed to bring about was the building of world socialism,<br />

^d that is exactly what it is accomplishing today.


96 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND NEARER TO THE HEART'S DESIRE 97<br />

This hidden agenda becomes crystal clear in the nature of what<br />

the Bank calls Sectoral Loans and Structural-Adjustment Loans. In<br />

the first category, only part of the money is to be used for the costs<br />

of specific projects while the rest goes to support policy changes in<br />

the economic sector. In the second group, all of the money is for<br />

policy changes and none of it is for projects. In recent years, almost<br />

half of the loans to underdeveloped countries have been in that<br />

category. What are the policy changes that are the object of these<br />

loans? They add up to one thing: the building ofworld socialism.<br />

As the Fabians had planned it, the word socialism is not to be<br />

used. Instead, the loans are issued for government hydro-electric<br />

projects, government oil refineries, government lumber mills, government<br />

mining companies, and government steel plants. It is<br />

delivered from the hands of politicians and bureaucrats into the<br />

hands of other politicians and bureaucrats. When the money comes<br />

from government, goes to government, and is administered by<br />

government, the result will be the expansion of government.<br />

Here is an example. One of the policy changes often required by<br />

the World Bank as a condition of granting a loan is that the<br />

recipient country must hold down its<br />

wages. The assumption is<br />

that the government has the power—and rightfully should have the<br />

power—to set wages! In other words, one of the conditions of its<br />

loan is that the state must be omnipotent.<br />

Paul Roberts holds the William E. Simon Chair of Political<br />

Economy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in<br />

Washington. Writing in Business Week, he says:<br />

The entire "development process 7 '<br />

has been guided by the belief<br />

that reliance on private enterprise and equity investment is<br />

incompatible with economic and social progress. In place of such<br />

proven avenues of success, development planning substituted loans<br />

and foreign aid so that governments of the LDCs [Less Developed<br />

Countries] could control economic activity in keeping with plans<br />

drawn up by experts.<br />

Consequently, economic life in the LDCs was politicized from the<br />

start. By endowing governments with extensive control over their<br />

economies, the U.S. set up conditions exactly opposite to those<br />

required for economic growth.<br />

Ken Ewert explains further that the conditions imposed by the<br />

fund are seldom free-market oriented. He says:<br />

The Fund concentrates on "macro-policies/' such as fiscal and<br />

monetary policies or exchange rates, and pays little attention to<br />

fundamental issues like private property rights and freedom of<br />

enterprise. Implicit ... is the belief that with proper "macromanagement"<br />

any economic system is viable....<br />

Even more important, it has allowed governments the world over<br />

to expropriate the wealth of their citizens more efficiently (through the<br />

hidden tax of inflation) while at the same time aggrandizing their own<br />

r?ower. There is little doubt that the IMF is an influence for world-wide<br />

socialism.<br />

An important feature of the Structural-Adjustment Loans is that<br />

the money need not be applied to any specific development project.<br />

It can be spent for anything the recipient wishes. That includes<br />

interest payments on overdue bank loans. Thus, the World Bank<br />

becomes yet one more conduit from the pockets of taxpayers to the<br />

assets of commercial banks which have made risky loans to<br />

Third-World countries.<br />

AUSTERITY MEASURES AND SCAPEGOATS<br />

Not every measure advocated by the IMF and World Bank is<br />

socialistic. Some of them even appear to be in support of the private<br />

sector, such as the reduction of government subsidies and welfare.<br />

They may include tax increases to reduce budget deficits. These<br />

policy changes are often described in the press as "austerity<br />

measures/ 7<br />

and they are seen as hard-nosed business decisions to<br />

salvage the failing economies of underdeveloped countries. But, as<br />

the wolf (in sheep's clothing) said to Little Red-Riding-Hood, "All<br />

the better to fool you with, my dear." These austerity measures are<br />

mostly rhetoric. The borrowing nations usually ignore the conditions<br />

with impunity, and the World Bank keeps the money coming<br />

anyway. It's all part of the game.<br />

Nevertheless, the "structural-adjustment" conditions provide a<br />

scapegoat for local<br />

politicians who can now place the blame for<br />

their nation's misery on big, bad "capitalists" from America and the<br />

*MF. People who have been taught that it is government's role to<br />

provide for their welfare, their health care, their food and housing,<br />

1. "How 'Experts' Caused the Third World Debt Crisis/' by Paul Craig Roberts,<br />

Business Week, November 2, 1987.<br />

b "The International Monetary Fund/' by Ken S. Ewert, The Freeman, April, 1989,<br />

PP* 157, 158.


98 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND NEARER TO THE HEART'S DESIRE 99<br />

their jobs and retirement—such people will not be happy when<br />

they hear that these "rights" are being threatened. So they demonstrate<br />

in the streets in protest, they riot in the commercial sections<br />

of town so they can steal goods from stores, and they throng to the<br />

banner of leftist politicians who promise to restore or increase their<br />

benefits. As described by Insight magazine:<br />

National strikes, riots, political upheavals and social unrest in<br />

Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Egypt, Haiti, Liberia, Peru, Sudan<br />

and elsewhere have at various times been attributed to IMF austerity<br />

programs....<br />

Some came to the fund with domestic trouble already brewing<br />

and seized on the fund as a convenient scapegoat.<br />

Quite true. An honest reading of the record shows that the IMF,<br />

far from being a force for austerity in these countries, has been an<br />

engine of socialist waste and a fountain of abundance for the<br />

corrupt leaders who rule.<br />

FINANCING CORRUPTION AND DESPOTISM<br />

Nowhere is this pattern more blatant than in Africa. Julius<br />

Nyerere, the dictator of Tanzania, is notorious for his "villagization"<br />

program in which the army has driven the peasants from<br />

their land, burned their huts, and loaded them like cattle into trucks<br />

for relocation into government villages- The purpose is to eliminate<br />

opposition by bringing everyone into compounds where they can<br />

be watched and controlled. Meanwhile the economy staggers,<br />

farms have gone to weed, and hunger is commonplace. Yet,<br />

Tanzania has received more aid per capita from the World Bank<br />

than any other nation.<br />

In Uganda, government security forces have engaged in mass<br />

detentions, torture, and killing of prisoners. The same is true under<br />

the terrorist government in Zimbabwe. Yet, both regimes continue<br />

to be the recipients of millions of dollars in World Bank funding.<br />

Zimbabwe (formerly Rhodesia) is a classic case. After its<br />

independence, the leftist government nationalized (confiscated)<br />

many of the farms previously owned by white settlers. The most<br />

desirable of these lands became occupied by the government's<br />

senior ruling-party officials, and the rest were turned into state-run<br />

collectives. They were such miserable failures that the workers on<br />

1 . "IMF<br />

Hands Out Prescription for Sour Economic Medicine/' Insight, February 9,<br />

1987, p. 14.<br />

^ese farmlands were, themselves, soon begging for food. Not<br />

daunted by these failures, the socialist politicians announced in<br />

1 991 that they were going to nationalize half of the remaining farms<br />

W And eil. they barred the courts from inquiring into how much<br />

^mpensation would be paid to their owners.<br />

The IMF was represented in Zimbabwe at the time by Michel<br />

Camdessus, the Governor of the central Bank of France, and a<br />

former finance minister in Francois Mitterrand's Socialist govern-<br />

After being informed of Zimbabwe's plan to confiscate<br />

ment<br />

additional land and to resettle people to work on those lands,<br />

Camdessus agreed to a loan valued at 42 billion rands with full<br />

knowledge that much of it would be used for the resettlement<br />

project.<br />

Perhaps the worst violations of human rights have occurred in<br />

Ethiopia under the Marxist regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam. The<br />

famine of 1984-85, which threatened the lives of millions of people,<br />

was the result of government nationalization and disruption of<br />

agriculture. Massive resettlement programs have torn hundreds of<br />

thousands of people from their privately owned land in the north<br />

and deported them to concentration-camp "villages" in the south,<br />

complete with guard towers. A report by a French voluntary<br />

medical-assistance group, Doctors without Borders, reveals that the<br />

forced resettlement program may have killed as many people as<br />

the famine itself. 1<br />

describes their experience:<br />

Dr. Rony Brauman, director of the organization,<br />

Armed militiamen burst into our compounds, seized our<br />

equipment and menaced our volunteers. Some of our employees were<br />

beaten, and our trucks, medicines and food stores confiscated. We left<br />

Ethiopia branded as enemies of the revolution. The regime spoke the<br />

truth. The atrocities committed in the name of Mengistu's master plan<br />

did make us enemies of the revolution.<br />

FINANCING FAMINE AND GENOCIDE<br />

In the 1980s, the world was saddened by photographs of<br />

starving children in Ethiopia, but what the West did not realize was<br />

that this was a planned famine. It was modelled after Stalin's<br />

} "Ethiopia Bars Relief Team/' by Blaine Harden, Washington Post, December 3,<br />

*9 85,p.A-21.<br />

7" "Famine Aid: Were we Duped?" by Dr. Rony Brauman, Reader's Digest, October<br />

l98 6,p.71.


.<br />

100 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND NEARER TO THE HEART'S DESIRE 101<br />

starvation program in the Ukraine in the 1930s and Mao's starvation<br />

of the peasants in the '40s. Its purpose was to starve the<br />

population into total submission to the government, for it is the<br />

government which decides who will eat and who will not. Yet,<br />

right up to the time Mengistu was overthrown, the World Bank<br />

continued to send him hundreds of millions of dollars, with much<br />

of it going specifically to the Ministry of Agriculture, the very<br />

agency in charge of the resettlement program.<br />

In the late 1970s the same story unfolded in Communist<br />

Vietnam. There were resettlement programs, forced collectivization,<br />

concentration camps, atrocities, and tens of thousands of<br />

dissidents escaping to the sea only to drown in overcrowded, leaky<br />

boats. Throughout it all, the regime was generously funded by the<br />

World Bank.<br />

Laos has jailed thousands of political prisoners; Syria has<br />

massacred 20,000 members of its<br />

opposition; Indonesia has uprooted<br />

several<br />

million people from their homelands in Java; the<br />

Sandinistas in Nicaragua murdered their opposition and terrorized<br />

the nation into submission; Poland, while a puppet state of the<br />

Soviet Union, brutally suppressed its trade-union movement;<br />

China massacred its dissident students and imprisoned its religious<br />

leaders; and the former Soviets slaughtered civilians in Afghanistan<br />

while conducting a relentless espionage war against the entire<br />

free world. Yet, these regimes have been the recipient of literally<br />

billions of dollars from the World Bank.<br />

How can the Bank's managers continue in conscience to fund<br />

such genocidal regimes? Part of the answer is that they are not<br />

permitted to have a conscience. David Dunn, head of the Bank's<br />

Ethiopia Desk explained: "Political distinctions are not something<br />

our charter allows us to take into account." The greater part of the<br />

answer, however, is that all socialist regimes have the potential for<br />

genocide, and the Bank is committed to socialism. The brutalities of<br />

these countries are all in a days work for serious socialists who<br />

view them as merely unfortunate necessities for the building of<br />

their Utopia. Lenin said you cannot make an omelet without<br />

1 James Bovard, The World Bank vs. The World's Poor, Cato Policy Analysis (Washington,<br />

D.C.: Cato Institute, 1987), pp. 4-6,<br />

2. "Harnessing World Bank to the West," insight, February 9, 1987, p. 8.<br />

cracking a few eggs. George Bernard Shaw, one of the early leaders<br />

of the Fabian Socialist movement, expressed it this way:<br />

Under Socialism, you would not be allowed to be poor. You would<br />

be forcibly fed, clothed, lodged, taught, and employed whether you<br />

liked it or not. If it were discovered that you had not character and<br />

industry enough to be worth all this trouble, you might possibly be<br />

executed in a kindly manner; but whilst you were permitted to live,<br />

you would have to live well.<br />

REASON TO ABOLISH THE FEDERAL RESERVE<br />

The top echelon at the World Bank are brothers under the skin<br />

to the socialist dictators with whom they do daily business. Under<br />

the right circumstances, they could easily switch roles. What we<br />

have seen is merely a preview of what can be expected for the<br />

entire world if<br />

the envisioned New World Order becomes operational.<br />

The IMF/World Bank is the protege of the Federal Reserve. It<br />

would not exist without the flow of American dollars and the<br />

benevolence of American leadership. The Fed has become an<br />

accomplice in the support of totalitarian regimes throughout the<br />

world. As stated at the beginning of this study, that is one of the<br />

reasons it should be abolished: It is an instrument of totalitarianism.<br />

GETTING RICH FIGHTING POVERTY<br />

While the top leaders and theoreticians at the IMF and World<br />

Bank dream of world socialism, the middle managers and political<br />

rulers have more immediate goals in mind. The bureaucracy enjoys<br />

a plush life<br />

administering the process, and the politicians on the<br />

receiving end obtain wealth and power. Ideology is not their<br />

concern. Socialism, capitalism, fascism, it makes no difference to<br />

them as long as the money flows.<br />

Graham Hancock has been an astute observer of the international-aid<br />

"industry" and has attended their plush conferences. He<br />

knows many of the leading players personally. In his book, Lords of<br />

Poverty, he speaks of the IMF's Structural-Adjustment loans:<br />

Corrupt Ministers of Finance and dictatorial Presidents from Asia,<br />

Africa, and Latin America are tripping over their own expensive<br />

footwear in their unseemly haste to "get adjusted." For such people,<br />

money has probably never been easier to obtain than it is today; with<br />

e0rge Bernard shaw '<br />

The intelligent Woman's Guide to Socialism and Capitalism<br />

(19; riQ*?« UV28<br />

; rpt New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1984), p. 470.


102 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND NEARER TO THE HEART'S DESIRE 103<br />

no complicated projects to administer and no messy accounts to keep,<br />

the venal, the cruel and the ugly are laughing literally all the way to<br />

the bank. For them structural adjustment is like a dream come true. No<br />

sacrifices are demanded of them personally. All they have to<br />

do—amazing but true—is screw the poor, and they've already had<br />

plenty of practice at that.<br />

In India, the World Bank funded the construction of a dam that<br />

displaced two million people, flooded 360 square miles, and wiped<br />

out 81,000 acres of forest cover. In Brazil, it spent a billion dollars to<br />

"develop" a part of the Amazon basin and to fund a series of<br />

hydroelectric projects. It resulted in the deforestation of an area half<br />

the size of Great Britain and has caused great human suffering<br />

because of resettlement. In Kenya, the Bura irrigation scheme<br />

caused such desolation that a fifth of the native population<br />

abandoned the land. The cost was $50,000 per family served. In<br />

Indonesia, the transmigration program mentioned previously has<br />

devastated tropical forests—at the same time that the World Bank<br />

is funding reforestation projects. The cost of resettling one family is<br />

$7,000, which is about ten-times the Indonesian per-capita income.<br />

Livestock projects in Botswana led to the destruction of grazing<br />

land and the death of thousands of migratory animals. This<br />

resulted in the inability of the natives to obtain food by hunting,<br />

forcing them into dependence on the government for survival.<br />

While Nigeria and Argentina are drowning in debt, billions from<br />

the World Bank have gone into building lavish new capital cities to<br />

house government agencies and the ruling elite. In Zaire, Mexico,<br />

and the Philippines, political leaders became billionaires while<br />

receiving World Bank loans on behalf of their nations. In the<br />

Central African Republic, IMF and World Bank loans were used to<br />

stage a coronation for its emperor.<br />

The record of corruption and waste is endless. But the real<br />

eye-opener is in the failure of socialist ventures, those magnificent<br />

projects which were to bring prosperity to the underdeveloped<br />

countries. Here are just a few examples.<br />

CONVERTING MONEY INTO FAILURE<br />

Before receiving loans from the World Bank, Tanzania was not<br />

wealthy, but it fed its own people, and it had economic growth-<br />

1. Graham Hancock, Lords of Poverty: The Power, Prestige, and Corruption of the<br />

International Aid Business (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1989), pp. 59,60.<br />

the World Bank. The country is hopelessly in debt with no way to<br />

^After receiving more than 3 billion dollars in loans, it nationalized<br />

the nation's farms and industries and converted every business into<br />

a<br />

government agency. It built a truck assembly plant, a tire factory,<br />

electronic factories, highways, ports, railways, and dams. Tanzania's<br />

industrial production and agricultural output fell by almost<br />

one-third. Food was the main export in 1966. Under socialism, food<br />

had to be imported — paid for by foreign aid and more loans from<br />

repay-<br />

Argentina once had one of the highest standards of living in<br />

Latin America. But then it became the recipient of massive loans<br />

from the World Bank as well as commercial banks in the United<br />

States- Since the money was given to politicians, it was used to<br />

build the only system politicians know how to build: socialism. By<br />

1982, the Gross National Product was in a nose dive, manufacturing<br />

had fallen to less than half of capacity, thousands of privately<br />

owned companies had been forced into bankruptcy, unemployment<br />

was soaring, and so was welfare. By 1989, inflation was<br />

running at an average of 5,000% and, in the summer of that year,<br />

topped at 1,000,000%! Banks were offering interest rates of 600%<br />

per month in hopes of keeping deposits from being moved out of<br />

the country. People were rioting in the streets for food, and the<br />

government was blaming greedy shop owners for raising prices.<br />

The nation was hopelessly in debt with no way to repay.<br />

Brazil is run by the military, and the state controls the economy.<br />

Government-owned companies consume 65% of all industrial<br />

investment, which means that the private sector is Limited to 35%<br />

and is shrinking. The government used loans from U.S. banks to<br />

create an oil company, Petroleo Brasileiro S. A., which became Latin<br />

America's largest corporation. Despite huge oil deposits and<br />

record-high oil prices, the company operated at a loss and was not<br />

even able to produce enough gasoline for its own citizens. By 1990,<br />

Nation was running at 5,000%. Since 1960, its prices had risen to<br />

164,000 times their original level. A new crime was invented called<br />

hedging against inflation/' and people were arrested for charging<br />

the free-market price for their goods and for using dollars or gold<br />

as money. Led by Communist organizers, mobs roamed the streets<br />

shouting '"We're hungry. Steal what you will!<br />

7 '<br />

The nation was<br />

hopelessly in debt with no way to repay.


104 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

NEARER TO THE HEART'S DESIRE 105<br />

The experience in Mexico was a carbon copy of that in Brazil,<br />

except that the amount of money was larger. When the world's<br />

fourth largest oil reserves were discovered, Mexican politicians<br />

reached for the brass ring. With billions borrowed from U.S. banks,<br />

they launched Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) and soon became the<br />

world's fifth largest oil producer. They also built chemical plants<br />

and railroads, and launched many other industrial projects. These<br />

were run as welfare agencies instead of businesses: too many<br />

people on the payroll, too many managers, excessive salaries, too<br />

many holidays, and unrealistic benefits. The ventures floundered<br />

and lost money. Private businesses failed by the thousands, and<br />

unemployment rose. The government increased the minimum<br />

wage causing more businesses to fail and more unemployment<br />

That led to more welfare and unemployment benefits. To pay for<br />

that, the government borrowed even more and began creating its<br />

own fiat money. Inflation destroyed what was left of the economy.<br />

Price controls were next, along with rent and food subsidies,<br />

and doubling the minimum wage. By 1982, Mexicans were trading<br />

their pesos for dollars and sending their savings out of the country,<br />

as the peso became all but worthless in commerce. In 1981, the<br />

average wage for Mexican workers was 31% of the average wage<br />

for Americans. By 1989, it had fallen to 10%. Mexico, once one of<br />

the major food exporters in the world, was now required to import<br />

millions of dollars worth of food grains. This required still more<br />

money and more loans. All this occurred while oil prices were high<br />

and production was booming. A few years later, when oil prices<br />

fell, the failures and shortfalls became even more dramatic.<br />

In 1995, Mexico's bank loans were once again on the brink of<br />

default, and, once again, U.S. taxpayers were thrown into the<br />

breech by Congress to cover more than $30 billion at risk. Although<br />

this loan was eventually repaid, the money to do so was extracted<br />

from the Mexican people through another round of massive<br />

inflation, which plunged their standard of living even lower. The<br />

nation is now hopelessly mired in socialism. The Communist Party,<br />

promising "reform" and still more socialism, is attracting a large<br />

following and could become a potent political force.<br />

1 - The same American b anks that were making the loans were soliciting this flight<br />

capital and ended up getting deposits of the same money they had lent. It was nice<br />

business both ways.<br />

Thus, the saga continues. After pouring billions of dollars into<br />

underdeveloped countries around the globe, no development has<br />

taken place. In fact, we have seen just the opposite. Most countries<br />

are worse off than before the Saviors of the World got to them.<br />

SUMMARY<br />

The IMF and the World Bank, were created at a meeting of<br />

global financiers and politicians held at Bretton Woods, New<br />

Hampshire, in 1944. Their announced goals were to facilitate<br />

international trade and to stabilize the exchange rates of national<br />

currencies. The unannounced goals were quite different. They were<br />

the elimination of the gold-exchange standard as the basis of<br />

currency valuation and the establishment of world socialism.<br />

The method by which gold was to be eliminated in international<br />

trade was to replace it with a world currency which the IMF,<br />

acting as a world central bank, would create out of nothing. The<br />

method by which world socialism was to be established was to use<br />

the World Bank to transfer money-—disguised as loans—to the<br />

governments of the underdeveloped countries and to do so in such<br />

a way as to insure the demise of free enterprise. The money was to<br />

be delivered from the hands of politicians and bureaucrats into the<br />

hands of other politicians and bureaucrats. When the money comes<br />

from government, goes to government, and is administered by<br />

government, the result will be the expansion of government.<br />

The theoreticians who dominated the conference at Bretton<br />

Woods were the well-known Fabian Socialist from England, John<br />

Maynard Keynes, and the Assistant Secretary of the U.S. Treasury,<br />

Harry Dexter White. White became the first Executive Director for<br />

the United States at the IMF.<br />

The Fabians were an elite group of intellectuals who agreed<br />

with Communists as to the goal of socialism but disagreed over<br />

tactics. Whereas Communists advocated revolution by force and<br />

violence, Fabians advocated gradualism and the transformation of<br />

society through legislation.<br />

It was learned in later years that Harry Dexter White was a<br />

member of a Communist espionage ring. Thus, hidden from view,<br />

there was a complex drama taking place in which the two intellectual<br />

founders of the Bretton-Woods accords were a Fabian Socialist<br />

*nd a Communist, working together to bring about their mutual<br />

goal: world socialism.


106 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

Capital for the IMF and the World Bank comes from the<br />

industrialized nations, with the United States putting up the most.<br />

Funds consist partly of hard currencies—such as the dollar, yen,<br />

mark and franc—but these are augmented by many times that<br />

amount in the form of "credits." These are merely promises by the<br />

member governments to get the money from their taxpayers if the<br />

Bank gets into trouble with its loans.<br />

While the IMF is gradually evolving into a central bank for the<br />

world, the World Bank is serving as its lending arm. As such, it has<br />

become the engine for transferring wealth from the industrialized<br />

nations to the underdeveloped countries. While this has lowered<br />

the economic level of the donating countries, it has not raised the<br />

level of the recipients. The money has simply disappeared down<br />

the drain of political corruption and waste.<br />

HEMOUILD tT [NEARER | TO THE | HEARTS' JDES1RE<br />

Chapter Six<br />

BUILDING THE NEW<br />

WORLD ORDER<br />

The Game-Called-Bailout reexamined and shown<br />

to<br />

be far more than merely a means of getting<br />

taxpayers to foot the cost of bad loans; the final<br />

play revealed as the merger of all nations into<br />

world government; the unfolding of that strategy<br />

as applied to Panama, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina,<br />

China, Eastern Europe, and Russia.<br />

Let us return now to the game called bailout. Everything in the<br />

previous chapter has been merely background information to<br />

understand the game as it is played in the international arena.<br />

Here, finally, are the rules:<br />

This is an accurate rendering of the stained-glass window in the Beatrice<br />

Webb House in Surrey, England, headquarters of the Fabian Society. It<br />

depicts Sidney Webb and George Bernard Shaw striking the earth with<br />

hammers to "REMOULD IT NEARER TO THE HEARTS DESIRE." Note<br />

the wolf in sheep's clothing in the Fabian crest above the globe.<br />

1. Commercial banks in the industrialized nations, backed by their<br />

respective central banks, create money out of nothing and lend<br />

it to the governments of underdeveloped nations. They know<br />

that these are risky loans, so they charge an interest rate that is<br />

high enough to compensate. It is more than what they expect to<br />

receive in the long run.<br />

2. When the underdeveloped nations cannot pay the interest on<br />

their loans, the IMF and World Bank enter the game as both<br />

players and referees. Using additional money created out of<br />

nothing by the central banks of their member nations, they<br />

advance "development" loans to the governments which now<br />

have enough to pay the interest on the original loans with<br />

enough left over for their own political purposes.<br />

3. The recipient country quickly exhausts the new supply of money,<br />

and the play returns to point number two. This time, however,<br />

the new loans are guaranteed by the World Bank and the central<br />

banks of the industrialized nations. Now that the risk of default<br />

is removed, the commercial banks agree to reduce the interest to


108 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND BUILDING THE NEW WORLD ORDER 109<br />

the point anticipated at the beginning. The debtor governments<br />

resume payments.<br />

4. The final play is — well, in this version of the game there appears<br />

to be no final play, because the plan is to keep the game going<br />

forever. To make that possible, certain things must happen that<br />

are very final, indeed. They include the conversion of the IMF<br />

into a world central bank as Keynes had planned, which then<br />

issues an international fiat money. Once that "Bank of Issue" is<br />

in place, the IMF can collect unlimited resources from the<br />

citizens of the world through the hidden tax called inflation. The<br />

money stream then can be sustained indefinitely—with or<br />

without the approval of the separate nations—because they will<br />

no longer have money of their own.<br />

Since this game results in a hemorrhage of wealth from the<br />

industrialized nations, their economies are doomed to be brought<br />

down further and further, a process that has been going on since<br />

Bretton Woods. The result will be a severe lowering of their living<br />

standards and their demise as independent nations. The hidden<br />

reality behind so-called development loans is that America and<br />

other industrialized nations are being subverted by that process.<br />

That is not an accident; it is the essence of the plan. A strong nation is<br />

not likely to surrender its sovereignty. Americans would not agree<br />

to turn over their monetary system, their military, or their courts to<br />

a world body made up of governments which have been despotic<br />

to their own people, especially since most of those regimes have<br />

already revealed anti-American hostility. But if Americans can be<br />

brought to the point where they are suffering from a collapse of<br />

their economy and from a breakdown in civil order, things will be<br />

different. When they stand in bread lines and face anarchy in their<br />

streets, they will be more willing to give up sovereignty in return<br />

for "assistance" from the World Bank and the UN "peacekeeping"<br />

forces. This will become even more acceptable if a structured<br />

demise of Communism can be arranged ahead of time to make it<br />

appear that the world's major political systems have converged<br />

into the common denominator of "social democracy."<br />

THE FINAL PLAY<br />

The underdeveloped nations, on the other hand, are not being<br />

raised up. What is happening to them is that their political leaders<br />

are becoming addicted to the IMF cash flow and will be unable to<br />

break the habit. These countries are being conquered by money<br />

no longer be truly independent<br />

instead of arms. Soon they will<br />

nations- They are becoming mere components in the system of<br />

world socialism planned by Harry Dexter White and John Maynard<br />

Keynes. Their leaders are being groomed to become potentates in a<br />

new, high-tech feudalism, paying homage to their Lords in New<br />

York. And they are eager to do it in return for privilege and power<br />

within the "New World Order." That is the final play.<br />

The essence of socialism is redistribution of the wealth. The<br />

goal is equality, and that means taking from the rich and giving to<br />

the poor. At least that's the theory. Unfortunately, the poor are<br />

never benefited by this maneuver. They either do not get the<br />

money in the first place—too much is siphoned off by the bureaucracies<br />

which administer the programs—or, if they do get any of it,<br />

they don't know what to do with it. They merely spend it until it is<br />

gone, and then no one has any money— except, of course, those<br />

who administer the government programs. Nevertheless, politicians<br />

know that promises to redistribute the wealth are popular<br />

among two groups: the voters who naively believe it will help the<br />

poor, and the socialist managers who see it as job security.<br />

Supported by these two voting blocs, election to office is assured.<br />

One of the early American advocates of socialism on a global<br />

scale—including the draining of wealth away from the "rich"<br />

United States—was John F. Kennedy. He undoubtedly learned the<br />

concept while attending the Fabian London School of Economics in<br />

1935-36 just prior to his father's appointment as Ambassador to<br />

England. When JFK became President, his political views continued<br />

to carry the imprint of that training. In September of 1963, he<br />

addressed the finance ministers and central-bank governors from<br />

102 nations at the annual meeting of the IMF/World Bank. He<br />

explained the concept of world socialism in glowing terms:<br />

. .<br />

Twenty years ago, when the architects of these institutions met to<br />

design an international banking structure, the economic life of the<br />

world was polarized in overwhelming, and even alarming, measure<br />

on the United States..,. Sixty per cent of the gold reserves of the world<br />

were here in the United States.... There was a need for redistribution<br />

of the financial resources of the world. . And there was an equal need<br />

to organize a flow of capital to the impoverished countries of the<br />

!<br />

-<br />

Martin, p. 25.


110 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND BUILDING THE NEW WORLD ORDER 111<br />

world. All this has come about. It did not come about by chance but by<br />

conscious and deliberate and responsible planning.<br />

CFR SETS STRATEGY<br />

The brain trust for implementing the Fabian plan in America is<br />

called the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). We shall look at it<br />

closely in future chapters, but it is important to know at this point<br />

that almost all<br />

of America's leadership has come from this small<br />

group. That includes our presidents and their advisers, cabinet<br />

members, ambassadors, board members of the Federal Reserve<br />

System, directors of the largest banks and investment houses,<br />

presidents of universities, and heads of metropolitan newspapers,<br />

news services, and TV networks. It is not an exaggeration to<br />

describe this group as the hidden government of the United States.<br />

CFR members have never been shy about calling for the<br />

weakening of America as a necessary step toward the greater good<br />

of building world government. One of the CFR founders was John<br />

Foster Dulles, who later was appointed Secretary-of-State by CFR<br />

member Dwight Eisenhower. In 1939, Dulles said:<br />

Some dilution or leveling off of the sovereignty system as it<br />

prevails in the world today must take place ... to the immediate<br />

disadvantage of those nations which now possess the preponderance<br />

of power.. . . The establishment of a common money . . . would deprive<br />

our government of exclusive control over a national money.... The<br />

United States must be prepared to make sacrifices afterward in setting<br />

up a world politico-economic order which would level off inequalities<br />

of economic opportunity with respect to nations.<br />

CFR member Zbigniew Brzezinski was the National Security<br />

Adviser to CFR member Jimmy Carter. In 1970, Brzezinski wrote:<br />

... some international cooperation has already been achieved, but<br />

further progress will require greater American sacrifices. More<br />

intensive efforts to shape a new world monetary structure will have to<br />

be undertaken, with some consequent risk to the present relatively<br />

favorable American position.<br />

1. "Text of Kennedy Speech to World Monetary Parley/' New York Times,<br />

October 1, 1963, p. 16.<br />

2. For an in-depth analysis of the CFR, including a comprehensive list of members,<br />

see James Perloff, Shadows of Power (Appleton, Wisconsin: Western Islands, 1988).<br />

3. "Dulles Outlines World Peace Plan/' New York Times, October 28, 1939.<br />

4. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Between Two Ages: America's Role in the Technetronic Era<br />

(Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1970), p. 300.<br />

At the Spring, 1983, Economic Summit in Williamsburg, Virginia,<br />

President Ronald Reagan declared:<br />

Nation al economies need monetary coordination mechanisms,<br />

and that is why an integrated world economy needs a common<br />

But, no national currency will do—only a world<br />

monetary standard... .<br />

currency will work.<br />

The CFR strategy for convergence of the world's monetary<br />

systems was spelled out by Harvard Professor Richard N. Cooper,<br />

a CFR member who had been the Under Secretary of State<br />

Economic Affairs in the Carter Administration:<br />

I<br />

suggest a radical alternative scheme for the next century: the<br />

creation of a common currency for all of the industrial democracies, with a<br />

common monetary policy and a joint Bank of Issue to determine that monetary<br />

policy. . . . How can independent states accomplish that? They need to<br />

turn over the determination of monetary policy to a supranational<br />

body. [Emphasis in original] . .<br />

It is highly doubtful whether the American public, to take just one<br />

example, could ever accept that countries with oppressive autocratic<br />

regimes should vote on the monetary policy that would affect<br />

monetary conditions in the United States.... For such a bold step to<br />

work at all, it presupposes a certain convergence of political values.. .<br />

Phrases such as, monetary coordination mechanisms, modern world<br />

economic order, convergence of political values, or new world order are<br />

not very specific. To the average person, they sound pleasant and<br />

harmless. Yet, to the insiders of the club, they are code phrases<br />

which have a specific meaning: the terrnination of national sovereignty<br />

and the creation of world government. CFR member,<br />

Richard Gardner—another adviser to President Carter—explains<br />

the meaning of these phrases and also calls for the Fabian strategy<br />

of deception and gradualism:<br />

In short, the "house of world order" will have to be built from the<br />

bottom up.... An end run around national sovereignty, eroding it<br />

piece by piece, will accomplish much more than the old-fashioned<br />

frontal assault<br />

As for the programmed decline of the American economy, CFR<br />

Member Samuel Huntington argues that, if higher education is<br />

1 "A Monetary System for the Future,"by Richard N. Cooper, Foreign Affairs, Fall,<br />

^Hpp- 166,177, 184.<br />

"The Hard Road to World Order," by Richard Gardner, Foreign<br />

J-<br />

Affairs, April,<br />

19 ?4, p. 558.<br />

for


112 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND BUILDING THE NEW WORLD ORDER 113<br />

considered to be desirable for the general population, "a program is<br />

then necessary to lower the job expectations of those who receive a<br />

college education." CFR member Paul Volcker, former Chairman<br />

of the Federal Reserve, says: "The standard of living of the average<br />

American has to decline. ... I don't think you can escape that."<br />

By 1993, Volcker had become the U.S. Chairman of the Trilateral<br />

Commission. The TLC was created by David Rockefeller to<br />

coordinate the building of The New World Order in accordance<br />

with the Gardner strategy: "An end run around national sovereignty,<br />

eroding it piece by piece." The objective is to draw the<br />

United States,<br />

Mexico, Canada, Japan, and Western Europe into<br />

political and economic union. Under slogans such as free trade and<br />

environmental protection, each nation is to surrender its sovereignty<br />

"piece by piece" until a full-blown regional government<br />

emerges from the process. The new government will control each<br />

nation's working conditions, wages, and taxes. Once that has<br />

happened, it will be a relatively simple step to merge the regionals<br />

into global government. That is the reality behind the so-called<br />

trade treaties within the European Union (EU), the North American<br />

Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation<br />

agreement (APEC), and the General Agreement on Tariffs<br />

and Trade (GATT). They have little to do with trade. In the<br />

Trilateral Commission's annual report for 1993, Volcker explains:<br />

Interdependence Is driving our countries toward convergence in<br />

areas once considered fully within the domestic purview. Some of<br />

these areas involve government regulatory policy, such as<br />

environmental standards, the fair treatment of workers, and taxation.^<br />

In 1992, the Trilateral Commission released a report coauthored<br />

by Toyoo Gyohten, Chairman of the Board of the Bank of<br />

Tokyo and formerly Japan's Minister of Finance for International<br />

Affairs. Gyohten had been a Fulbright Scholar who was trained at<br />

Princeton and taught at Harvard Business School. He also had been<br />

in charge of the Japan Desk of the International Monetary Fund. In<br />

short, he represents the Japanese monetary interests within The<br />

f^jew World Order. In this report, Gyohten explains that the real<br />

importance of "trade" agreements is not trade but the building of<br />

global government:<br />

Regional trade arrangements should not be regarded as ends in<br />

themselves, but as supplements to global liberalization,... Regional<br />

arrangements provide models or building blocks for increased or<br />

strengthened globalism.... Western Europe [the EU] represents<br />

regionalism in its truest form.... The steps toward deepening<br />

[increasing the number of agreements] are dramatic and designed to<br />

be irreversible.... A common currency.... central bank.... court and<br />

parliament—will have expanded powers.... After the Maastricht<br />

summit [the Dutch town where the meeting was held], an Economist<br />

editorial pronounced the verdict: "Call it what you will: by any other<br />

name it is federal government."... In sum, the regional integration<br />

process in Europe can be seen as akin to an exercise in<br />

nation-b uilding.<br />

Applying this same perspective to the NAFTA treaty, former<br />

Secretary-of-State, Henry Kissinger (CFR), said it "is not a conventional<br />

trade agreement but the architecture of a new international<br />

system.... the vital first step for a new kind of community of<br />

nations/' The newspaper article that contained this statement was<br />

appropriately entitled: "With NAFTA, U.S. Finally Creates a New<br />

World Order."<br />

David Rockefeller (CFR) was even more emphatic.<br />

He said that it would be "criminal" not to pass the treaty because:<br />

"Everything is in place—after 500 years—to build a true 'new<br />

world' in the Western Hemisphere." 3<br />

By early 1994, the drift toward the New World Order had<br />

become a rush. On April 15, the government of Morocco placed a<br />

full-page ad in the New York Times celebrating the creation of the<br />

World Trade Organization which was formed by the signing of the<br />

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) which took place<br />

in the Moroccan city of Marrakech. While Americans were still<br />

^eing told that GATT was merely a "trade" agreement, the<br />

*nternationalists were celebrating a much larger concept. The ad<br />

spelled it out in unmistakable terms:<br />

1 Michael Crozier, Samuel P. Huntington, and Joji Watanuki, The Crisis ofDemocracy<br />

(New York: New York University Press, 1975), pp. 183-84.<br />

2. "Volcker Asserts U.S. Must Trim Living Standard/' New York Times, October 18,<br />

1979, p. 1.<br />

3. Washington 1993: The Annual Meeting of the Trilateral Commission, Trialogue 46<br />

(New York: Trilateral Commission, 1993), p. 77.<br />

Toyoo Gyohten and Charles E. Morrison, Regionalism in A Converging World<br />

Ne V°rk: Trilateral<br />

)v Commission, 1992), pp. 4, 7-9, 1 1.<br />

L<br />

NAFTA<br />

'lWith<br />

-<br />

U -S- Finally Creates a New World Order/' by Henry Kissinger,<br />

^Angeles Times, July 18, 1993, pp. M-2, 6.<br />

• A<br />

Hemisphere in the Balance," by David Rockefeller, Wall Street journal,<br />

**** 1,1993, p. A-10.


114 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND BUILDING THE NEW WORLD ORDER 115<br />

1944, Bretton Woods: The IMF and the World Bank<br />

1945, San Francisco: The United Nations<br />

1994, Marrakech: The World Trade Organization<br />

History knows where it is going.... The World Trade Organization,<br />

the third pillar of the New World Order, along with the United<br />

Nations and the International Monetary Fund.<br />

A RARE GUMPSE INTO THE INNER WORKINGS<br />

So much for the final play. Let us return, now, to the game called<br />

bailout as it is actually played today on the international scene. Let<br />

us begin with a glimpse into the inner workings of the Presidential<br />

Cabinet James Watt was the Secretary of the Interior in the Reagan<br />

Administration. In his memoirs, he described an incident at a<br />

Cabinet meeting in the spring of 1982. The first items on the agenda<br />

were reports by Treasury Secretary Donald Regan and Budget<br />

Director David Stockman concerning problems the less-developed<br />

countries were having with their bank loans. Watt said:<br />

Secretary Regan was explaining the inability<br />

of those destitute<br />

countries to pay even the Interest on the loans that individual banks<br />

such as Bank of America, Chase Manhattan and Citibank had made.<br />

The President was being told what actions the United States "must"<br />

take to salvage the situation.<br />

After the Regan and Stockman briefings,, there were several<br />

minutes of discussion before I asked, "Does anyone believe that these<br />

less developed countries will ever be able to pay back the principal on<br />

these loans?" When no one spoke up, I asked, "If the loans are never<br />

going to be repaid, why should we again bail out the countries and<br />

arrange payment for their interest?"<br />

The answer came from several voices at once, "If we don't arrange<br />

for their interest payments, the loans will go into default, and it could<br />

put our American banks in jeopardy." Would the customers lose their<br />

money? No, came the answer, but the stockholders might lose<br />

dividends.<br />

In amazement, I leaned back in my large, leather chair, only two<br />

seats from the President of the United States. I realized that nothing in<br />

the world could keep these high government officials from scrambUng<br />

to protect and bail out a few very large and sorely troubled American<br />

banks.<br />

1 New York Times, April 15, 1994, p. A9.<br />

2. James G. Watt, The Courage of A Conservative (New York: Simon and Schuster,<br />

1985), pp. 124-25.<br />

PANAMA<br />

Carter<br />

of its<br />

First<br />

The first major score in the game had been made under the<br />

Administration when Panama fell in arrears on the payment<br />

loans. A consortium of banks including Chase Manhattan,<br />

National of Chicago, and Citibank brought pressure to bear on<br />

Washington to give the Canal to the Panamanian government so it<br />

could use the revenue to pay interest on its loans. Although there<br />

was massive opposition to this move among the American people,<br />

the Senate yielded to insider pressure and passed the give-away<br />

treaty. The Panamanian government inherited $120 million in<br />

annual revenue, and the interest payments to the banks were<br />

restored. As Congressman Philip Crane observed:<br />

At the time of the Torrijos-backed coup in 1968, Panama's total<br />

official overseas debt stood at a manageable and, by world standards,<br />

modest $167 million. Under Torrijos, indebtedness has skyrocketed<br />

nearly one thousand percent to a massive $1.5 billion. Debt-service ratio<br />

now consumes an estimated 39 percent of the entire Panamanian<br />

budget... What it appears we really have here is not just aid to a<br />

tinhorn dictator in the form of new subsidies and canal revenues the<br />

treaties would give to the Torrijos regime, but a bailout of a number of<br />

banks which should have known better than to invest in Panama and,<br />

in any event, should not escape responsibility for having done so.<br />

The Panama bailout was a unique play. In no other country did<br />

we have an income-producing property to give away, so from that<br />

point forward the bailout would have to be done with mere money.<br />

To pave the way for that, Congress passed the Monetary Control<br />

Act of 1980 which authorized the Federal Reserve to "monetize<br />

foreign debt." That is banker language meaning that the Fed was<br />

now authorized to create money out of nothing for the purpose of<br />

lending to foreign governments. It classifies those loans as "assets"<br />

and then uses them as collateral for the creation of even more<br />

money here in the United States. That was truly a revolutionary<br />

expansion of the Fed's power to inflate. Until then, it was permitted<br />

to rnake money only for the American government Now, it was able<br />

to do it for any government. Since then it has been functioning as a<br />

central bank for the entire world.<br />

w 8), pp. 64, 68.<br />

%n--^P M. Crane, Surrender in Panama (Ottawa, Illinois: Caroline House Books,


116 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND BUILDING THE NEW WORLD ORDER 117<br />

MEXICO<br />

By 1982, almost every Third-World government was running<br />

behind in payments. Mexico led the way by announcing it could<br />

not send any more money that year on its $85 billion debt. Federal<br />

Reserve Governor Henry Wallich rushed to Switzerland to negotiate<br />

an IMF loan of $4.5 billion through the Bank of International<br />

Settlements. The central banks of Europe and Japan provided $1.85<br />

billion (about 40%); the rest came from the Federal Reserve.<br />

Commercial banks postponed payments on the principal for two<br />

years; but, with the infusion of new loans, payment on the interest<br />

was resumed. That did not solve the problem. Within a few years,<br />

Mexico was in arrears again and, in 1985, the banks agreed to<br />

postpone $29 billion in payments and rolled over another $20<br />

billion, which means they issued new loans to pay off the old.<br />

In that same year, Secretary of the Treasury James Baker<br />

announced the government's plan to solve the world's debt crisis. It<br />

was a formal statement encouraging banks to continue lending to<br />

Third-World governments provided they promised to enact economic<br />

reforms favoring a free market. It was more of a philosophy<br />

than a plan, because there was no hope that it would be implemented<br />

by any of the socialist governments receiving the loans.<br />

Behind the announcement was the implication that the federal<br />

government acting through the Federal Reserve System, could be<br />

counted on to assist if the loans went sour. Baker called for<br />

funneling $29 billion over three years primarily to Latin American<br />

countries, of which Mexico was a prime recipient.<br />

CURRENCY SWAP<br />

Shortly after the Mexican government had loaned $55 million to<br />

Fidel Castro, it announced to the banks: "We will pay only what we<br />

have, and no more." Whereupon Paul Volcker, head of the Federal<br />

Reserve, rushed to meet with Mexico's finance minister, Jesus Silva<br />

Herzog, and offered to put the American taxpayer into the breach.<br />

A $600 million short-term loan was extended to get Mexico past its<br />

election date of July 4. It was called a "currency swap" because<br />

Mexico exchanged an equal number of pesos which it promised to<br />

redeem in U.S. dollars. Pesos, of course, were worthless in international<br />

markets—which is the reason Mexico wanted the dollars.<br />

The importance of this loan was not its size nor even the<br />

question of repayment. It was the manner in which it was made-<br />

First it was made by the Federal Reserve directly, acting as a central<br />

bank for Mexico, not the U.S.; and secondly, it was done almost in<br />

total secrecy. William Greider gives the details:<br />

The currency swaps had another advantage: they could be done<br />

secretly. Volcker discreetly informed both the Administration and the<br />

key congressional chairmen, and none objected. But the public<br />

reporting of currency swaps was required only every quarter, so the<br />

emergency loan from the Fed would not be disclosed for three or four<br />

months...- By that time, Volcker hoped, Mexico would be arranging<br />

more substantial new financing from the IMF.. . . The foreign assistance<br />

was done as discreetly as possible to avoid setting off a panic, but also<br />

to avoid domestic political controversy.... Bailing out Mexico, it<br />

seemed, was too grave to be controversial.<br />

DEBT SWAP<br />

The currency swap did not solve the problem. So, in March of<br />

1988, the players and referees agreed to introduce a new maneuver<br />

in the game: an accounting trick called a "debt swap." A debt swap<br />

is similar to a currency swap in that the United States exchanges<br />

something of real value in return for something that is worthless.<br />

But instead of currencies, they exchange government bonds. The<br />

transaction is complicated by the time-value of those bonds.<br />

Currencies are valued by their immediate worth, what they will buy<br />

today, but bonds are valued by their future worth, what they will<br />

buy in the future. After that differential factor is calculated, the<br />

process is essentially the same. Here is how it worked.<br />

Mexico, using U.S. dollars, purchased $492 million worth of<br />

American Treasury Bonds that pay no interest but which will pay<br />

$3.67 billion when they mature in twenty years. (Technically, these<br />

are called zero-coupon bonds.) Then Mexico issued its own bonds<br />

with the U.S. securities tied to them as collateral. This meant that<br />

the future value of Mexico's bonds, previously considered worthless,<br />

were now guaranteed by the United States government. The<br />

banks eagerly swapped their old loans for these new Mexican<br />

bonds at a ratio of about 1.4 to 1. In other words, they accepted $100<br />

million in bonds in return for canceling $140 million in old debt,<br />

^hat reduced their interest income, but they were happy to do it,<br />

because they had swapped worthless loans for fully-guaranteed<br />

bonds.<br />

Greide t, pp. 485-6.


118 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

This maneuver was hailed in the press as true monetary magic.<br />

It would save the Mexican government more than $200 million in<br />

annual interest charges; it would restore cash flow to the banks;<br />

and—miracle of miracles—it would cost nothing to American<br />

taxpayers. The reasoning was that the Treasury bonds were sold at<br />

normal market rates. The Mexican government paid as much for<br />

them as anyone else. That part was true, but what the commentators<br />

failed to notice was where Mexico got the American dollars<br />

with which to buy the bonds. They came through the IMF in the<br />

form of "foreign-currency exchange reserves." In other words, they<br />

were subsidies from the industrialized nations, primarily the<br />

United States. So, the U.S. Treasury put up the lion's share of the<br />

money to buy its own bonds. It went a half-billion dollars deeper in<br />

debt and agreed to pay $3.7 billion more in future payments so the<br />

Mexican government could continue paying interest to the banks.<br />

That is called bailout, and it does fall on the American taxpayer.<br />

IMF BECOMES FINAL GUARANTOR<br />

The following year, Secretary of State, James Baker (CFR), and<br />

Treasury Secretary, Nicholas Brady (CFR), flew to Mexico to work<br />

out a new debt agreement that would begin to phase in the IMF as<br />

final guarantor. The IMF gave Mexico a new loan of $3.5 billion<br />

(later increased to $7.5 billion), the World Bank gave another $1.5<br />

billion, and the banks reduced their previous loan values by about<br />

a third. The private banks were quite willing to extend new loans<br />

and reschedule the old. Why not? Interest payments would now be<br />

guaranteed by the taxpayers of the United States and Japan.<br />

That did not permanently solve the problem, either, because the<br />

Mexican economy was suffering from massive inflation caused by<br />

interna] debt, which was in addition to the external debt owed to the<br />

banks. The phrases "internal debt" and "domestic borrowing" are<br />

code for the fact that government has inflated its money supply by<br />

selling bonds. The interest it must pay to entice people to purchase<br />

those bonds can be staggering and, in fact, interest on Mexico's<br />

domestic borrowing was draining three times as much from the<br />

economy as the foreign debt service had been siphoning off.<br />

1 "U.S. Bond Issue Will Aid Mexico in Paying Debts/' by Tom Redburn, Los<br />

Angeles Times, December 30, 1987.<br />

2. "With Foreign IOUs Massaged, Interest Turns to Internal Debt," Insight, October<br />

2, 1989, p. 34.<br />

BUILDING THE NEW WORLD ORDER 119<br />

Notwithstanding this reality, Citicorp chairman, John S. Reed<br />

(CFR)/ whose bank is one of Mexico's largest lenders, said they<br />

vvere prepared to lend even more now. Why? Did it have anything<br />

to do with the fact that the Federal Reserve and the IMF would<br />

guarantee payments? Not so. "Because we believe the Mexican<br />

economy is doing well/' he said.<br />

At the end of 1994, the game was still going, and the play was<br />

the same. On December 21, the Mexican government announced<br />

could no longer pay the fixed exchange rate between the<br />

that it<br />

peso and the dollar and that the peso would now have to float in<br />

the free market to find its true value. The next day it plummeted 39<br />

per cent and the Mexican stock market tumbled. Once again,<br />

Mexico could not pay the interest on its loans. On January 11,<br />

President Clinton (CFR) urged Congress to approve U.S. guarantees<br />

for new loans up to $40 billion. Secretary of the Treasury<br />

•<br />

Robert Rubin (CFR) explained: "It is the judgment of all, including<br />

Chairman Alan Greenspan [CFR], that the probability of the debts<br />

being paid [by Mexico] is exceedingly high." But, while Congress<br />

debated the issue, the loan clock was ticking. Payment of $17 billion<br />

in Mexican bonds was due within 60 days, and $4 billion of that<br />

was due on the first of February! Who was going to pay the banks?<br />

This matter could not wait. On January 31, acting independently<br />

of Congress, President Clinton announced a bailout<br />

package of over $50 billion in loan guarantees to Mexico; $20 billion<br />

from the U.S. Exchange Stabilization Fund, $17.8 billion from the<br />

IMF, $10 billion from the Bank of International Settlements, and<br />

$3 billion from commercial banks.<br />

BRAZIL<br />

Brazil became a major player in 1982 when it announced that it<br />

too was unable to make payments on its debt. In response, the U.S.<br />

Treasury made a direct loan of $1.23 billion to keep those checks<br />

going to the banks while negotiations were under way for a more<br />

Permanent solution through the IMF. Twenty days later, it gave<br />

bother $1.5 billion; the Bank of International Settlements advanced<br />

$!-2 billion. The following month, the IMF provided $5.5 billion;<br />

Western banks extended $10 billion in trade credits; old loans were<br />

^scheduled; and $4.4 billion in new loans were made by a Morgan<br />

Jkd., p. 35.


120 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

^<br />

BUILDING<br />

THE NEW WORLD ORDER 121<br />

Bank syndication. The "temporary" loans from the U.S. Treasury<br />

months later, Argentina announced it could not make any more<br />

were extended with no repayment date established. Ron Chernovv<br />

payments until the fall of 1983. The banks immediately began<br />

Argentinian politicians a little extra spending money. Seven<br />

''/^°tt\er<br />

2<br />

Plan to Mop Up the Mess/' Insight, April 10, 1989, p. 31.<br />

Uther mechanisms which involve culture, education, political sovereignty, and<br />

Jitary<br />

1. Chernow, p. 644. power are embodied in agencies of the United Nations.<br />

comments:<br />

negotiations for rollovers, guarantees, and new IMF loans.<br />

The plan set a fateful precedent of "curing" the debt Argentina then signed an agreement with<br />

crisis<br />

350 creditor<br />

by<br />

banks to<br />

heaping on more debt. In this charade, bankers would lend more to<br />

stretch out payments on nearly a fourth of its $13.4 billion debt, and<br />

Brazil with one hand, then take it back with the other. This preserved<br />

the banks agreed to lend an extra $4.2 billion to cover interest<br />

the fictitious book value of loans on bank balance sheers. Approaching<br />

payments and political incentives. The IMF gave $1.7 billion. The<br />

the rescue as a grand new syndication, the bankers piled on high<br />

United States government gave an additional $500 million directly.<br />

interest rates and rescheduling fees.<br />

By 1983, Third-World governments owed $300 billion to banks<br />

Argentina then paid $850 million in overdue interest charges to the<br />

banks.<br />

and $400 billion to the industrialized governments. Twenty-five<br />

By 1988, Argentina had again stopped payment on its loans and<br />

nations were already behind in their payments. Brazil was in<br />

was falling hopelessly behind as bankers and politicians went into<br />

default a second time and asked for rescheduling, as did Rumania,<br />

a huddle to call the next bailout play. Somehow, the payments had<br />

Cuba, and Zambia. The IMF stepped in and made additional<br />

to be passed on one more time to the taxpayers—which they were<br />

in the<br />

billions of dollars available to the delinquent countries. The<br />

form of new loans, rollovers,<br />

Department<br />

of Agriculture, through its Commodity Credit Corporation,<br />

and guarantees. As summarized<br />

by Larry A. Sjaastad at the University of Chicago:<br />

paid $431 million to American banks to cover payments on loans<br />

There isn't a U.S. bank that would not sell its entire Latin<br />

from Brazil, Morocco, Peru, and Rumania. At the conclusion of<br />

American portfolio for 40 cents on the dollar were it not for the<br />

possibility that skillful political<br />

these agreements, the April 20, 1983, Wall Street Journal editorialized<br />

that "the international debt And that<br />

lobbying might turn up a sucker<br />

willing to pay 50 or 60 or even 90 cents on the dollar.<br />

crisis ... is, for all practical<br />

sucker<br />

is the U.S. Taxpayer.<br />

purposes, over."<br />

Not quite. By 1987, Brazil was again in default on its monstrous<br />

As mentioned previously, this history can become repetitious<br />

$121 billion debt, this time for one and<br />

and<br />

a-half years. In spite of the<br />

boring. It would be counterproductive to cover the same<br />

sordid<br />

torrent of money that had passed through its hands, it was now so<br />

story as it has unfolded in each country. Suffice it to say that<br />

the identical<br />

broke, it couldn't even buy gasoline for its police cars. In 1989, as a<br />

game has been played with teams from Bolivia, Peru,<br />

Venezuela,<br />

new round of bailout was being organized, President Bush(CFR)<br />

Costa Rica, Morocco, the Philippines, the Dominican<br />

Republic, and<br />

announced that the only real solution to the Third-World debt<br />

almost every other less-developed country in the<br />

world.<br />

problem was debt forgiveness.<br />

Perhaps, through repetition, we are running this history into THE NEED FOR CONVERGENCE<br />

the ground, but here are just a few more examples before moving<br />

This sets the stage for understanding the next phase of the game<br />

along.<br />

vhich is unfolding as these words are being written. It is the<br />

j^lusion of China<br />

ARGENTINA<br />

and the former Soviet bloc into the Grand<br />

Design for<br />

By 1982, Argentina was unable to make a $2.3 billion payment<br />

global government. As with all the other countries in the<br />

'°rld, the primary mechanism<br />

that was due in July and August. The banks extended their loans<br />

being used to accomplish this<br />

goal— a t least in the field<br />

while the IMF prepared a new of<br />

infusion in the amount economics—is<br />

of $2.15<br />

the IMF/ World Bank. 2<br />

he process is: (1) the transfer of money from<br />

billion. This restored the interest payments and gave the<br />

the industrialized


122 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND BUILDING THE NEW WORLD ORDER 123<br />

nations—which drags them down economically to a suitable<br />

common denominator—and (2) the acquisition of effective control<br />

over the political leaders of the recipient countries as they become<br />

dependent upon the money stream. The thing that is new and<br />

which sets this stage apart from previous developments is that the<br />

an acceptable<br />

apparent crumbling of Communism has created<br />

rationale for the industrialized nations to now allow their lifeblood<br />

to flow into the veins of their former enemies. It also creates the<br />

appearance of global, political "convergence/' a condition which<br />

CFR theoretician, Richard Cooper, said was necessary before<br />

Americans would accept having their own destinies determined by<br />

governments other than their own.<br />

CHINA<br />

Red China joined the IMF/World Bank in 1980 and immediately<br />

began to receive billions of dollars in loans, although it was<br />

well known that she was devoting a huge portion of her resources<br />

to military development. By 1987, China was the IMF's second<br />

largest borrower, next to India, and the transfusions have grown at<br />

a steady pace ever since.<br />

The Bank has asserted that loans will encourage economic<br />

reforms in favor of the private sector. Yet, none of the money has<br />

gone to the private sector. All of it is funneled into the government<br />

bureaucracy which, in turn, wages war against the free market. In<br />

1989, after small businesses and farms in the private sector had<br />

begun to flourish and surpass the performance of similar government<br />

enterprises, Red China's leaders clamped down on them with<br />

harsh controls and increased taxes. Vice Premier Yao Yilin<br />

announced that there was too much needless construction, too<br />

many private loans, and too much spending on "luxuries" such as<br />

cars and banquets. To stop these excesses, he said, it would be<br />

necessary to increase government controls over wages, prices, and<br />

business activities.<br />

Then there is the question of why China needs the money in the<br />

first place. Is it to develop her industry or natural resources? Is it to<br />

fight<br />

poverty and improve the living standard of her citizens?<br />

James Bovard answers:<br />

The Bank's defense of its China Policy is especially puzzling<br />

because China itself is going on a foreign investment binge. The World<br />

Bank gives China money at zero interest, and then China buys<br />

property in Hong Kong, the United States, Australia, and elsewhere.<br />

An economist with Citibank estimated that China's "direct investment<br />

in property, manufacturing and services [in Hong Kong alone] topped<br />

$6 billion." In 1984, China had a net outflow of capital of $1 billion.<br />

Moreover, China has its own foreign aid program, which has given<br />

more than $6 billion in recent decades, largely to leftist governments. 1<br />

THE GREAT DECEPTION<br />

It is the author's contention that the much heralded demise of<br />

Communism in the Soviet bloc is a mixture of fact and fantasy. It is<br />

fact at the bottom level of Communist society where the people, in<br />

truth, rejected it long ago. The only reason they appeared to<br />

embrace it for so many years was that they had no choice. As long<br />

as the Soviets held control of the weapons and the means of<br />

communication, the people had to accept their fate.<br />

But at the tip of the pyramid of state power, it is a different<br />

story. The top Communist leaders have never been as hostile to<br />

their counterparts in the West as the rhetoric suggests. They are<br />

quite friendly to the world's leading financiers and have worked<br />

closely with them when it suits their purposes. As we shall see in<br />

the following section, the Bolshevik revolution actually was<br />

financed by wealthy financiers in London and New York. Lenin<br />

and Trotsky were on the closest of terms with these moneyed<br />

interests^-both before and after the Revolution. Those hidden<br />

liaisons have continued to<br />

this day and occasionally pop to the<br />

surface when we discover a David Rockefeller holding confidential<br />

meetings with a Mikhail Gorbachev in the absence of government<br />

sponsorship or diplomatic purpose.<br />

It is not unreasonable to imagine a scenario in which the leaders<br />

of the Communist bloc come to realize they cannot hold themselves<br />

in power much longer. There comes a point where even physical<br />

force is not enough, especially when the loyalties of those who hold<br />

the weapons also begin to falter. With economic gangrene creeping<br />

U P the legs of their socialist systems, they realize they must obtain<br />

outside financial assistance or perish.<br />

In such a scenario, quiet agreements can be worked out to the<br />

^utual advantage of all negotiators. The plan could be as simple as<br />

^statue-of-liberty play in a college football game: the appearance of<br />

01ng one thing as a cover for accomplishing something else. While<br />

f Bovard, pp. 18^19.


124 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND BUILDING THE NEW WORLD ORDER 125<br />

Americans are prepared to accept such deception on a football<br />

field, they cannot believe that world financiers and politicians are<br />

capable of it. The concept is rejected out of hand as a "conspiracy<br />

theory."<br />

Nevertheless, in this scenario, we theorize it<br />

is agreed among<br />

the negotiators that the Soviet Bloc needs financial support. It<br />

agreed that the Western nations have the capacity to provide it.<br />

is<br />

It is<br />

agreed that the best way to move money from the industrialized<br />

nations into the Soviet bloc is through international agencies such<br />

as the IMF/World Bank. It is agreed this cannot happen until<br />

hostility between world systems is replaced by political convergence.<br />

It is agreed that future conflict is wasteful and dangerous to<br />

all<br />

parties- Therefore, it is finally agreed that the Soviet bloc must<br />

abandon its posture of global aggression while the Western nations<br />

continue to move toward socialism, necessary steps for the longrange<br />

goal of merger into a world government. But, in doing so, it<br />

must be insured that the existing Communist leaders retain control<br />

over their respective states.<br />

COMMUNISTS BECOME SOCIAL DEMOCRATS<br />

To that end, they change their public identities to "Social<br />

Democrats." They speak out against the brutal<br />

excesses of their<br />

predecessors and they offer greater freedom of expression in the<br />

media. A few dispensable individuals among their ranks are<br />

publicly purged as examples of the demise of the old order. States<br />

that once were held captive by the Soviet Union are allowed to<br />

break away and then return on a voluntary basis. If any leaders of<br />

the newly emancipated states prefer true independence instead of<br />

alignment with Russia, they are replaced.<br />

No other changes are required. Socialism remains the economic<br />

system of choice and, although lip service may be given to<br />

free-market concepts, the economy and all<br />

means of production<br />

remain under state control. The old Communists are now Social<br />

Democrats and, without exception, they become the leaders in the<br />

new system.<br />

The West rejoices, and the money starts to move. As an extra<br />

bonus, the former Bolsheviks are now hailed by the world as great<br />

statesmen who put an end to the Cold War, brought freedom to<br />

their people, and helped to forge a New World Order.<br />

When did Communism depart? We are not quite sure. All we<br />

know is that one day we opened our newspapers and it was<br />

accomplished. Social Democrats were everywhere. No one could<br />

find any Communists. Russian leaders spoke as long-time enemies<br />

of the old regime. Peristroika was here. Communism was dead. It<br />

was not killed by an enemy. It voted itself out of existence. It<br />

committed suicide!<br />

Does it not seem strange that Communism fell without a<br />

struggle? Is it not curious that the system which was born out of<br />

class conflict and revolution and which maintained itself by force<br />

and violence for almost a century just went away on its own?<br />

Communism was not overthrown by people rising up with clubs<br />

and pitchforks to throw off their yoke of tyranny. There was no<br />

revolution or counterrevolution, no long period of fragmentation,<br />

no bloody surges between opposing forces. Poof! It just happened.<br />

True, there was blood in the streets in those areas where opposing<br />

groups vied for power, but that was after Communism had<br />

departed, not before. Such an event had never occurred in history.<br />

Until then, it had been contrary to the way governments act;<br />

contrary to the very nature of power which never surrenders<br />

without a life-and-death struggle. This, indeed, is<br />

a great curiosity—which<br />

should cause people to think.<br />

Our premise is that the so-called demise of Communism is a<br />

Great Deception—not awfully different from many of the others<br />

that are the focus of this volume. We see it<br />

as having been stage<br />

managed for the purposes outlined previously: the transition to<br />

world government. In our view, tlmt scenario is<br />

the only one that<br />

makes sense in terms of today's geopolitical realities and the only<br />

one consistent with the lessons of history.<br />

We realize, of course, that such a view runs contrary to popular<br />

opinion and conventional wisdom. For many, it is shocking just to<br />

hear it spelled out. It would not be possible to convince anyone of<br />

Jts truth without extensive evidence. Certainly, such evidence<br />

abounds, but it is not within the scope of this study. So, now that<br />

w e have stated it, we shall leave it behind merely as a clarification<br />

°f the author's point of view so the reader can step around it if he<br />

"*<br />

Wishes.


126 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND BUILDING THE NEW WORLD ORDER 127<br />

EASTERN EUROPE<br />

full 70% of the $3.8 billion owed to the United States. Taxpayers<br />

American aid to Eastern European governments, while they<br />

picked up the bill.<br />

were still puppet states of the Soviet Union, has been justified by<br />

The same story has been unfolding in all the former Soviet-bloc<br />

the same theory advanced on behalf of China: it would improve<br />

countries. In 1980, for example, just before Hungary was brought<br />

their economies, show their people a better way of life, and wean<br />

into the IMF/World Bank, her annual per-capita GNP was $4,180.<br />

them from Communism. Advocates of that theory now point to the<br />

This was a problem, because the policy of the World Bank was to<br />

demise of Communism as evidence of the soundness of their plan.<br />

make development loans only to countries that had per-capita<br />

The truth, however, is that the money did not improve the economy GNPs of less than $2,650. Not to worry. In 1981, the Hungarian<br />

government simply revised its statistics<br />

and did not show the people a better way of life. In fact, it did<br />

downward from<br />

not<br />

$4,180 to<br />

$2,10Q. 1<br />

That was a drop of 50% in<br />

help the people in any way.<br />

one year,<br />

It went directly to their governments<br />

surely one of the<br />

sharpest depressions in world history. Everyone<br />

and was<br />

knew it<br />

used for government priorities. It strengthened the<br />

was<br />

ruling<br />

a lie,<br />

but no one raised an eyebrow. It was all part of the<br />

parties and enabled them<br />

game. By<br />

to solidify their control.<br />

1989,<br />

the Bush Administration had granted "most favored nation"<br />

It is well known that one of the reasons Poland's economy<br />

trade<br />

was<br />

status to the Hungarian government and established<br />

weak is that much of her productive output was shipped<br />

on its behalf a<br />

to the<br />

special $25 million development fund.<br />

Soviet Union at concessionary prices, primarily to support the<br />

military. Polish-built tanks fought in the Vietnam war; 20% of the RUSSIA<br />

Soviet merchant marine was built in Poland; 70% of Poland's<br />

American banks had always been willing to make loans to the<br />

computer and locomotive production and 80% of her communications<br />

equipment was shipped to the Soviets; American grain Cuban Missile Crisis, the Vietnam War, the Soviet invasion of<br />

Soviet Union, except for short periods of expediency during the<br />

purchased by Poland with money borrowed from American banks<br />

Afghanistan, and other minor business interruptions. In 1985, after<br />

was sent to Cuba. Poland was merely a middle man, a conduit to<br />

the public had lost interest in Afghanistan, banks of the "free<br />

Russia and her satellites. The banks were really funding Russia.<br />

world" reopened their loan windows to the Soviets. A $400 million<br />

It was in 1982 that Poland first defaulted on bank loans which<br />

package was put together by a consortium of First National of<br />

had been guaranteed by the U.S. government through the Commodity<br />

Credit Corporation. Under the terms of the guarantee,<br />

London subsidiary of the Royal Bank of Canada. The loan was<br />

Chicago, Morgan Guaranty, Bankers Trust, and Irving Trust—plus<br />

a<br />

offered<br />

taxpayers would make payments on any bank loan that went into<br />

at unusually low interest rates "to buy American and<br />

Canadian<br />

default. That was what the banks were counting on when they<br />

grain."<br />

Public<br />

made those loans, but to classify them as "in default" would<br />

indignation is easily disarmed when the announced<br />

purpose of<br />

require the banks to remove them from their books as assets. That<br />

a loan to a totalitarian government is to purchase<br />

commodities<br />

was unacceptable, because it would make their balance sheets look<br />

from the country where the loan originates—especially<br />

if the<br />

as bad as they really were. So the Treasury agreed to bend the rules<br />

commodity is grain for the assumed purpose of making<br />

bread or feeding<br />

and make livestock.<br />

payments without requiring the loans to be<br />

Who could<br />

in default.<br />

possibly object to having the<br />

money come right back to<br />

That was eventually stopped by an irate Congress, but not until the<br />

our own farmers and merchants in the<br />

Jorm of profits? And<br />

Reagan<br />

who<br />

Administration had stalled long enough to pay $400<br />

could fault a project that provided food<br />

for the hungry?<br />

million directly to the banks on behalf of Poland.<br />

The deception is subtly appealing. It<br />

In November, 1988, the World Bank made its first loan to<br />

is true that the money will<br />

e used— in part at<br />

Poland in the amount of $17.9 million. Three years later, in a<br />

least—to buy grain or other locally produced<br />

dramatic demonstration of what the President had meant when he<br />

advocated "debt forgiveness," the Bush Administration canceled a gust 30° rl Bank Courts Eastern Europe/'<br />

Q<br />

by Jerry Lewis, Wall Street Journal Au-


128 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

commodities. But the borrowing nations are like a homeowner who<br />

increases the mortgage on his house "to enlarge his living room."<br />

He probably wilJ make the addition, but he borrows twice as much<br />

as he needs so he can also buy a new car. Since the government<br />

allows a tax deduction on mortgage interest, in effect he now gets a<br />

tax deduction for the interest paid on his car as well. Likewise, the<br />

borrowing nations usually borrow more than they need for the<br />

announced purchase, but they receive all the money at favorable<br />

rates.<br />

Yet, this is not the most serious fault in the transaction. In the<br />

case of Russia, the grain was no small item on her list<br />

of needs.<br />

After repeated failures of her socialist agriculture, she was not able<br />

to feed her population. Hungry people are dangerous to a government.<br />

Russia needed grain to head off internal revolt far more than<br />

the homeowner needed to increase the size of his living room. In<br />

other words, Russia had to have the grain, with or without the loan,<br />

Without it, she would have had to curtail spending Somewhere else<br />

to obtain the money, most likely in her military. By giving her the<br />

money "to buy grain," we actually allowed her to spend more<br />

money on armaments.<br />

But even that is not the primary flaw in making loans to Russia.<br />

The bottom line is that most of those loans will never be repaid* As<br />

we have seen, the name of the game is bailout, and it is as certain as<br />

the setting sun that, somewhere down the line, Russia will not be<br />

able to make her payments, and the taxpayers of the industrialized<br />

nations will be put through the IMF wringer one more time to<br />

squeeze out the transferred purchasing power-<br />

BUSINESS VENTURES IN RUSSIA INSURED BY U.S.<br />

In 1990, the U.S. Export-Import Bank announced it would begin<br />

making direct loans to Russia. Meanwhile, the U.S. Overseas<br />

Private Investment Corporation was providing free "insurance" to<br />

private companies that were willing to invest in the ex-Soviet state.<br />

In other words, it was now doing for industrial corporations what it<br />

had been doing all along for banks: guaranteeing that, if their<br />

investments turned sour, the government—make that taxpayers-—<br />

would compensate them for their losses. The limit on that insurance<br />

had been $100 million, a generous figure, indeed. But, to<br />

encourage an even greater flow of private capital into Russia, the<br />

r<br />

BUILDING THE NEW WORLD ORDER 129<br />

gush Administration authorized unlimited protection for "sound<br />

American corporate investments."<br />

these truly were sound investments, they would not need<br />

If<br />

foreign-aid subsidies or government guarantees. What is really<br />

happening in this play is a triple score:<br />

1.<br />

International lending agencies provide the Social Democrats with<br />

money to purchase goods and services from American firms. No<br />

one really expects them to repay. It is merely a clever method of<br />

redistributing wealth from those who have it to those who<br />

don't—without those who have it catching on.<br />

2. American firms do not need money to participate. Since their<br />

ventures are guaranteed, banks are anxious to loan whatever<br />

amount of money is required. Efficiency or competitiveness are<br />

not important factors. Contracts are awarded on the basis of<br />

political influence. Profits are generous and without risk.<br />

3. When the Social Democrats eventually default in their contracts<br />

to the American firms or when the joint venture loses money<br />

because of socialist mismanagement, the federal government<br />

provides funds to cover corporate profits and repayment of<br />

bank loans.<br />

There you have it: The Social Democrats get the goodies; the<br />

corporations get the profits, and the banks get the interest on<br />

money created out of nothing. You know what the taxpayers get!<br />

By 1992, the wearisome pattern was clearly visible. Writing in<br />

the New York Times, columnist Leslie H. Gelb gave the numbers:<br />

The ex-Soviet states<br />

are now meeting only 30 percent of their<br />

interest payments (and almost no principal) on debts to the West of<br />

$70 billion.... Various forms of Western aid to the ex-Soviet states<br />

totaled about $50 billion in the last 20 months, and the money has<br />

virtually disappeared without a trace or a dent on the economic<br />

picture.<br />

The interesting thing about this report is<br />

that Leslie Gelb has<br />

been a member of the CFR since 1973. Why would a CFR<br />

spokesman blow the whistle on one of their most important<br />

Maneuvers toward The New World Order? The answer is that he is<br />

doing just the opposite. Actually he is making a plea for more loans<br />

*- "The Russian Sinkhole/' by Leslie H. Gelb, New York Times, March 30, 1992, p.


130 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

BUILDING THE NEW WORLD ORDER<br />

exception.<br />

The industrialized nations of the world are being bled to near<br />

The international version of the game called Bailout is similar to<br />

death in a global transfer of their wealth to the less developed<br />

domestic version in that the overall objective is to have the<br />

countries. Is it being done according to plan? Or is it an accident? It<br />

taxpayers cover the defaulted loans so that interest payments can<br />

is not being done to them by their enemies. It is being done by then<br />

continue going to the banks. The differences are: (1) instead of<br />

awn leaders. The process is well coordinated across national lines<br />

justifying this as protecting the American public, the pretense is<br />

and perfectly dovetails with the actions of other leaders who are ^at it is to save the world from poverty; and (2) the main money<br />

doing the same thing to their respective countries. Furthermore;<br />

Pipeline goes from the Federal Reserve through the IMF/ World<br />

these leaders regularly meet together to better coordinate their K ank. Otherwise, the rules are basically the same.<br />

131<br />

and more outright aid on the basis that the need is so great! He<br />

activities. Could anything that complex be accomplished by accident?<br />

Or would some kind of a plan be required?<br />

advocates the prioritizing of funding with first attention to aiding<br />

Russia's nuclear-power facilities, agriculture, and industrial capacity.<br />

At the end of his article, he writes: "The stakes could not be<br />

and it is to aid the less developed countries. But, after forty years<br />

A spokesman from the IMF would answer, yes, there is a plan,<br />

higher. All the more reason for substantial, practical and immediate<br />

and hundreds of billions of dollars, they have totally failed to<br />

aid—not for grand illusions."<br />

accomplish that goal. Would intelligent people believe that pursuing<br />

the same plan will produce different results in the future? Then<br />

Congress hears and obeys. In spite of the fact that all the<br />

preceding billions have "disappeared without a trace or a dent/'<br />

why do they follow a plan that cannot work? The answer is they are<br />

the transfusion continues. In 1993 the World Bank advanced<br />

not following that plan. They are following a different one: one<br />

another half-billion-dollar loan to Russia; before leaving office,<br />

which has been very successful from their point of view. Otherwise,<br />

we must conclude that the leaders of the industrialized<br />

President Bush arranged for another $2 billion loan through the<br />

Export-Import Bank; and Congress authorized hitting the voters<br />

nations are, to a man, just plain stupid. We do not believe it.<br />

with another $Z5 billion in foreign aid earmarked specifically for<br />

There is little room to escape the conclusion that these men and<br />

Russia. In July, at the Tokyo summit meeting of the Group-ofwomen<br />

are following a higher loyalty than the self interest of their<br />

Seven industrialized nations, another $24 billion was promised,<br />

respective countries. In their hearts they may honestly believe that,<br />

half of which will come from the IMF. As this book goes to print,<br />

in the long run, the world will be better for it, including their fellow<br />

there is no end in sight.<br />

THE CONSPIRACY THEORY<br />

countrymen. But, for the present, their goals and their methods are<br />

not shared by those who have placed them in office. Under those<br />

A moment's reflection on the events described in this section<br />

circumstances, they must conceal their plan from public view. If<br />

leads us to a crossroads of conscience. We must choose between<br />

their fellow citizens really knew what they were doing, they would<br />

two paths. Either we conclude that Americans have lost control<br />

be thrown out of office and, in some cases, might even be shot as<br />

over their government, or we reject this information as a mere<br />

traitors. Add all that together and it spells CONSPIRACY.<br />

distortion of history. In the first case, we become advocates of the<br />

The only other explanation is that it's all accidental: no plan, no<br />

conspiratorial view of history. In the latter, we endorse the accidental<br />

cooperation, no goal, just the blind forces of history following the<br />

view. It is a difficult choice.<br />

path of least resistance. For some it will be easier and more<br />

The reason it is difficult is that we have been conditioned to<br />

comfortable to accept that model. But the evidence speaks loudly<br />

laugh at conspiracy theories, and few people will risk public<br />

against it. What is the evidence? Not just the previous chapters, but<br />

ridicule by advocating them. On the other hand, to endorse the<br />

accidental view is absurd. Almost all of history is an unbroken trail<br />

of one conspiracy after another. Conspiracies are the norm, not the<br />

everything that follows in this book. By contrast, the evidence for<br />

the accidental theory of history is — a blank page.<br />

SUMMARY


132 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

There is another dimension to the game, however, that involves<br />

more than mere profits and scam. It is the conscious and deliberate<br />

evolution of the IMF/World Bank into a world central bank with<br />

the power to issue a world fiat currency. And that is an important<br />

step in an even larger plan to build a true world government within<br />

the framework of the United Nations.<br />

Economically strong nations are not candidates for surrendering<br />

their sovereignty to a world government. Therefore, through<br />

"loans" that will never be paid back, the IMF/World Bank directs<br />

the massive transfer of wealth from the industrialized nations to<br />

the less developed nations. This ongoing process eventually drains<br />

their economies to the point where they also will be in need of<br />

assistance. No longer capable of independent action, they will<br />

accept the loss of sovereignty in return for international aid.<br />

The less developed countries, on the other hand, are being<br />

brought into The New World Order along an entirely<br />

different<br />

route. Many of these countries are ruled by petty tyrants who care<br />

little for their people except how to extract more taxes from them<br />

without causing a revolt. Loans from the IMF/World Bank are<br />

used primarily to perpetuate themselves and their ruling parties in<br />

power—and that is exactly what the IMF/ World Bank intends.<br />

Rhetoric about helping the poor notwithstanding, the true goal of<br />

the transfer of wealth disguised as loans is to get control over the<br />

leaders of the less developed countries. After these despots get<br />

used to the taste of such an unlimited supply of sweet cash, they<br />

will never be able to break the habit. They will be content—already<br />

are content—to become little gold-plated cogs in the giant machinery<br />

of world government. Ideology means nothing to them: capitalist,<br />

communist, socialist, fascist what does it matter so long as the<br />

money keeps coming. The IMF/World Bank literally is buying these<br />

countries and using our money to do it.<br />

The recent inclusion of Red China and the former Soviet bloc on<br />

the list of IMF /World Bank recipient countries signals the final<br />

phase of the game. Now that Latin America and Africa have been<br />

"purchased" into the New World Order, this is the final frontier- In<br />

a relatively short time span, China, Russia, and the Eastern<br />

European countries have now become the biggest borrowers an&<br />

already, they are in arrears on their payments. This is where the<br />

action will lie in the months ahead.<br />

Section II<br />

A CRASH COURSE<br />

ON MONEY<br />

The eight chapters contained in this and the<br />

following section deal with material that is<br />

organized by topic, not chronology. Several of<br />

them will jump ahead of events that are not<br />

covered until later. Furthermore, the scope is such<br />

that the reader may wonder what, if any, is the<br />

connection with the Federal Reserve System.<br />

Please be patient. The importance will eventually<br />

become clear. It is the author's intent to cover<br />

concepts and principles before looking at events.<br />

Without this background, the history of the<br />

Federal Reserve is boring. With it, the story<br />

emerges as an exciting drama which profoundly<br />

affects our lives today. So let us begin this<br />

adventure with a few discoveries about the<br />

nature of money itself.


Chapter Seven<br />

THE BARBARIC METAL<br />

The history and evolution of money; the emergence<br />

of gold as the universal money supply; the<br />

attempts by governments to cheat their subjects<br />

by clipping or debasing gold coins; the reality that<br />

any quantity of gold will suffice for a monetary<br />

system and that "more money" does not require<br />

more gold.<br />

There is a great mystique surrounding the nature of money. It is<br />

generally regarded as beyond the understanding of mere mortals.<br />

Questions of the origin of money or the mechanism of its creation<br />

are seldom matters of public debate. We accept them as facts of life<br />

which are beyond our sphere of control. Thus, in a nation which is<br />

founded on the principle of government by the people, and which<br />

assumes a high level of understanding among the electorate, the<br />

people themselves have blocked out one of the most important<br />

factors affecting, not only their government, but their personal lives<br />

as well.<br />

This attitude is not accidental, nor was it always so. There was a<br />

titue in the fairly recent past when the humble voter—even without<br />

formal education—was well informed on money matters and<br />

vitally concerned about their political implementation. In fact, as<br />

we shall see in a later chapter, major elections were won or lost<br />

depending on how candidates stood on the issue of a central bank.<br />

It has been in the interest of the money mandarins, however, to<br />

convince the public that, now, these issues are too complicated for<br />

n ovices. Through the use of technical jargon and by hiding simple<br />

reality inside a maze of bewildering procedures, they have caused<br />

ar * understanding of the nature<br />

of money to fade from the public<br />

consciousness.<br />

^HAT IS MONEY?<br />

The first step in this maneuver was to scramble the definition of<br />

m °ney itself. For example, the July 20, 1975 issue of the New York


136 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND THE BARBARIC METAL 137<br />

Times, in an article entitled "Money Supply: A Growing Muddle/'<br />

begins with the question: "What is money nowadays?" The Wall<br />

Street Journal of August 29, 1975, comments: "The men and women<br />

involved in this arcane exercise [of watching the money supply] ...<br />

aren't exactly sure what the money supply consists of." And, in its<br />

September 24, 1971 issue, the same paper said: "A pro-International<br />

Monetary Fund Seminar of eminent economists couldn't agree on<br />

what money is or how banks create it."<br />

Even the government cannot define money. Some years ago, a<br />

Mr. A.F. Davis mailed a ten-dollar Federal Reserve Note to the<br />

Treasury Department. In his letter of transmittal, he called attention<br />

to the inscription on the bill which said that it was redeemable in<br />

"lawful money," and then requested that such money be sent to<br />

him. In reply, the Treasury merely sent two five-dollar bills from a<br />

different printing series bearing a similar promise to pay. Mr. Davis<br />

responded:<br />

Dear Sir:<br />

Receipt is hereby acknowledged of two $5.00 United States notes,<br />

which we interpret from your letter are to be considered as lawful<br />

money. Are we to infer from this that the Federal Reserve notes are not<br />

lawful money?<br />

I am enclosing one of the $5.00 notes which you sent to me. I note<br />

that it states on the face, "The United States of America will pay to the<br />

bearer on demand five dollars." I am hereby demanding five dollars.<br />

One week later, Mr. Davis received the following reply from<br />

Acting Treasurer, M.E. Slindee:<br />

Dear Mr. Davis:<br />

Receipt is acknowledged of your letter of December 23rd,<br />

transmitting one $5. United States Note with a demand for payment of<br />

five dollars. You are advised that the term "lawful money" has not<br />

been defined in federal legislation.... The term "lawful currency" no<br />

longer has such special significance. The $5. United States Note<br />

received with your letter of December 23rd is returned herewith.<br />

The phrases "...will pay to the bearer on demand" and "— is<br />

redeemable in lawful money" were deleted from our currency<br />

altogether in 1964.<br />

1. As quoted by C.V. Myers, Money and Energy: Weathering the Storm (Darien,<br />

Connecticut: Soundview Books, 1980), pp. 161, 163. Also by Lawrence S. Ritter, ed v<br />

Money and Economic Activity (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967), p. 33.<br />

Is money really so mysterious that it cannot be defined? Is it the<br />

coin and currency we have in our pockets? Is it numbers in a<br />

checking account or electronic impulses in a computer? Does it<br />

include the balance in a savings account or the available credit on a<br />

charge card? Does it include the value of stocks and bonds, houses,<br />

land, or personal possessions? Or is money nothing more than<br />

purchasing power?<br />

The main function of the Federal Reserve is to regulate the<br />

supply of money. Yet, if no one is able to define what money is,<br />

how can we have an opinion about how the System is performing?<br />

The answer, of course, is that we cannot, and that is exactly the way<br />

the cartel wants it.<br />

The reason the<br />

Federal Reserve appears to be a complicated<br />

subject is because most discussions start somewhere in the middle.<br />

By the time we get into it, definitions have been scrambled and<br />

basic concepts have been assumed. Under such conditions, intellectual<br />

chaos is inevitable. If we start at the beginning, however, and<br />

deal with each concept in sequence from the general to the specific,<br />

and if we agree on definitions as we go, we shall find to our<br />

amazement that the issues are really quite simple. Furthermore, the<br />

process is not only painless, it is—believe it or not—intensely<br />

interesting.<br />

The purpose of this and the next three chapters, therefore, is to<br />

provide what could be called a crash course on money. It will not be<br />

complicated. In fact, you already know much of what follows. All<br />

we shall attempt to do is tie it all together so that it will have<br />

continuity and relativity to our subject. When you are through with<br />

these next few pages, you will understand money. That's a promise.<br />

So, lefs get started with the basics. What is money?<br />

A WORKING DEFINITION<br />

The dictionary is of little help. If economists cannot agree on<br />

w hat money is, it is partly due to the fact that there are so many<br />

fehnitions available that it<br />

is difficult to insist that any of them is<br />

the obvious choice. For the purpose of our analysis, however, it will<br />

e necessary to establish one definition so we can at least know<br />

vhat is meant when the word is used within this <strong>text</strong> To that end,<br />

e shall introduce our own definition which has been assembled<br />

°*H bits and dabs taken from numerous sources. The structure is<br />

esi gned, not to reflect what we think money ought to be or to


138 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND THE BARBARIC METAL 139<br />

support the view of any particular school of economics, but simply<br />

to reduce the concept to its most fundamental essence and to reflect<br />

the reality of today's world. It is not necessary to agree or disagree<br />

with this definition. It is introduced solely for the purpose of<br />

providing an understanding of the word as it is used within these<br />

pages. This, then, shall be our working definition:<br />

Money is anything which is accepted as a medium of exchange<br />

and it may be classified into the following forms:<br />

1. Commodity money<br />

Z Receipt money<br />

3. Fiat money<br />

4. Fractional money<br />

Understanding the difference between these forms of money is<br />

practically all<br />

we need to know to fully comprehend the Federal<br />

Reserve System and to come to a judgment regarding its value to<br />

our economy and to our nation. Let us, therefore, examine each of<br />

them in some detail.<br />

BARTER (PRE-MONEY)<br />

Before there was any kind of money, however, there was barter,<br />

and it is important first to understand the link between the two.<br />

Barter is defined as that which is directly exchanged for something<br />

of like value. Mr. Jones swaps his restored Model-T Ford for a<br />

Steinway grand piano.<br />

This exchange is not monetary in nature<br />

because both items are valued for themselves rather than held as a<br />

medium of exchange to be used later for something else. Note,<br />

however, that both items have intrinsic value or they would not be<br />

accepted by the other parties.<br />

Labor also may be exchanged as<br />

barter when it, too, is perceived to have intrinsic value to the<br />

person for whom the labor is performed. The concept of intrinsic<br />

value is the key to an understanding of the various forms of money<br />

that evolved from the process of barter.<br />

COMMODITY MONEY<br />

In the natural evolution of every society,<br />

barter than all<br />

others. This was because they had certain characteristics<br />

which made them useful or attractive to almost everyone.<br />

Eventually, they were traded, not for themselves, but because they<br />

represented a storehouse of value which could be exchanged at a<br />

latex time for something else. At that point, they ceased being<br />

barter and became true money. They were, according to our<br />

working definition, a medium of exchange. And, since that medium<br />

Was a commodity of intrinsic value, it may be described as<br />

commodity money.<br />

Among primitive people, the most usual item to become<br />

commodity money was some form of food, either produce or<br />

livestock. Lingering testimony to this fact is our word pecuniary,<br />

which means pertaining to money. It is derived from the word<br />

pecunia, which is the Latin word for cow.<br />

But, as society progressed beyond the level of bare existence,<br />

items other than food came into general demand. Ornaments were<br />

occasionally prized when the food supply was ample, and there is<br />

evidence of some societies using colored sea shells and unusual<br />

stones for this purpose. But these never seriously challenged the<br />

use of cattle, or sheep, or corn, or wheat, because these staples<br />

possessed greater intrinsic value for themselves even if they were<br />

not used as money.<br />

METALS AS MONEY<br />

Eventually, when man learned how to refine crude ores and to<br />

craft them into tools or weapons, the metals themselves became of<br />

^alue. This was the dawning of the Bronze Age in which iron,<br />

copper, tin, and bronze were traded between craftsmen and<br />

merchants along trade routes and at major sea ports.<br />

The value of metal ingots was originally determined by weight.<br />

ten, as it became customary for the merchants who cast them to<br />

arnp the uniform weights on the top, they eventually were valued<br />

imply by counting their number. Although they were too large to<br />

**)' m<br />

%<br />

a pouch, they were still small enough to be transported<br />

there always have<br />

and, in this form, they became, in effect, primitive but<br />

been one or two items which became more commonly used ^nctional tf1<br />

coins.<br />

The primary reason metals became widely<br />

1. Strictly speaking, each party holds the value of what he is receiving to be more<br />

used as commodity<br />

money<br />

than what he is giving. Otherwise he would not make the trade. In the mind of th e<br />

is that they meet all of the requirements for convenient<br />

traders, therefore, the items have unequal value. That opinion is shared equally by<br />

lading. In addition to being of intrinsic value for uses other than<br />

them both. The shorter explanation, however, is less unwieldy. . 10 *ey, they are not perishable, which is more than one can say for


140 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND w<br />

THE<br />

BARBARIC METAL 141<br />

cows; by melting and reforming they can be divided into smaller<br />

units and conveniently used for purchases of minor items, which is<br />

not possible with diamonds, for example; and, because they are not<br />

in great abundance, small quantities carry high value, which means<br />

they are more portable than such items as timber, for example.<br />

Perhaps the most important monetary attribute of metals,<br />

however, is their ability to be precisely measured. It is important to<br />

keep in mind that, in its fundamental form and function, money is<br />

both a storehouse and a measure of value. It is the reference by<br />

which all other things in the economy can be compared. It is<br />

essential, therefore, that the monetary unit itself be both measurable<br />

and constant. The ability to precisely assay metals in both<br />

purity and weight makes them ideally suited for this function.<br />

Experts may haggle over the precise quality of a gemstone, but an<br />

ingot of metal is either 99% pure or it isn't, and it either weighs 100<br />

ounces or it doesn't. One's opinion has little to do with it. It is not<br />

without reason, therefore, that, on every continent and throughout<br />

history, man has chosen metals as the ideal storehouse and<br />

measure of value.<br />

THE SUPREMACY OF GOLD<br />

There is one metal, of course, that has been selected by<br />

centuries of trial and error above all others. Even today, in a world<br />

where money can no longer be defined, the common man instinctively<br />

knows that gold will do just fine until something better<br />

comes along. We shall leave it to the sociologists to debate why gold<br />

has been chosen as the universal money. For our purposes, it<br />

only important to know that it has been. But we should not<br />

overlook the possibility that it was an excellent choice. As for<br />

quantity, there seems to be just the right amount to keep its value<br />

high enough for useful coinage. It is less plentiful than silver<br />

—which, incidentally, has run a close second in the monetary<br />

contest—and more abundant than platinum. Either could have<br />

served the purpose quite well, but gold has provided what appears<br />

to be the perfect compromise. Furthermore, it is a commodity in<br />

great demand for purposes other than money. It is sought for both<br />

industry and ornament, thus assuring its intrinsic value under all<br />

conditions. And, of course, its<br />

measured.<br />

purity and weight can be precisely<br />

is<br />

THE MISLEADING THEORY OF QUANTITY<br />

It often is argued that gold is inappropriate as money because it<br />

js too limited in supply to satisfy the needs of modern commerce.<br />

On the surface, that may sound logical—after all, we do need a lot<br />

of money out there to keep the wheels of the economy turning<br />

but, upon examination, this turns out to be one of the most childish<br />

ideas imaginable.<br />

First of all, it is estimated that approximately 45% of all the gold<br />

mined throughout the world since the discovery of America is now<br />

in government or banking stockpiles. There undoubtedly is at<br />

least an additional 30% in jewelry, ornaments, and private hoards.<br />

Any commodity which exists to the extent of 75% of its total world<br />

production since Columbus discovered America can hardly be<br />

described as in short supply.<br />

The deeper reality, however, is that the supply is not even<br />

important. Remember that the primary function of money is<br />

measure the value of the items for which it is exchanged. In this<br />

sense, it serves as a yardstick or ruler of value. It really makes no<br />

difference if we measure the length of our rug in inches, feet, yards,<br />

or meters. We could even manage it quite well in miles if we used<br />

decimals and expressed the result in millimiles. We could even use<br />

multiple rulers, but no matter what measurement we use, the<br />

reality of what we are measuring does not change. Our rug does<br />

not become larger just because we have increased the quantity of<br />

measurement units by painting additional markers onto our rulers.<br />

If the supply of gold in relation to the supply of available goods<br />

!S so small that a one-ounce coin would be too valuable for minor<br />

transactions, people simply would use half-ounce coins or tenthounce<br />

coins. The amount of gold in the world does not affect its<br />

ability to serve as money, it<br />

used to measure any given transaction.<br />

only affects the quantity that will be<br />

Let us illustrate the point by imagining that we are playing a<br />

game of Monopoly. Each person has been given a starting supply<br />

£* play money with which to transact business. It doesn't take long<br />

before we all begin to feel the shortage of cash. If we just had more<br />

oney, we could really wheel and deal. Let us suppose further that<br />

^nieone discovers another game-box of Monopoly sitting in the<br />

(Oli<br />

*^n Groseclose, Money and Man: A survey of Monetary Experience, 4th ed.<br />

^Wahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1976), p. 259.<br />

to


142 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

THE BARBARIC METAL<br />

effectiveness,<br />

planned increase<br />

of its<br />

in<br />

gold-unit.<br />

the money<br />

There is<br />

supply, for<br />

no need whatever for a* 1 )'<br />

the supply to rise to offset %<br />

prOCesS does not end there '<br />

however. When the miners see<br />

that fK<br />

are no better off than before in spite of the extra work, and<br />

pecia y when they see the teilors making a greats profit for no<br />

143<br />

any condition, or to follow any artificial criteria. More money does not<br />

supply more capital, is not more productive, does not permit<br />

"economic growth."<br />

GOLD GUARANTEES PRICE STABILITY<br />

The Federal Reserve claims that one of its primary objectives is<br />

better off? There is no corresponding increase in the quantity<br />

f<br />

to stabilize prices. In this, of course, it has failed miserably. The<br />

property, so everyone would bid up the prices of existing pieces<br />

irony, however, is that maintaining stable prices is the easiest thing<br />

until they became twice as expensive. In other words, the law of<br />

in the world. All we have to do is stop tinkering with the money<br />

supply and demand would rapidly seek exactly the same equilibrium<br />

as existed with the more limited money supply. When the<br />

ically stable under a commodity money system, and this is particu-<br />

supply and let the free market do its job. Prices become automat-<br />

quantity of money expands without a corresponding increase in<br />

larly true under a gold standard.<br />

goods, the effect is a reduction in the purchasing power of each<br />

Economists like to illustrate the workings of the marketplace by<br />

monetary unit. In other words, nothing really changes except that<br />

the quoted price of everything goes up. But that is merely the quoted<br />

creating hypothetical micro and macro economies in which everything<br />

is reduced to only a few factors and a few people. In that<br />

price, the price as expressed in terms of the monetary unit. In truth,<br />

spirit, therefore, let us create a hypothetical economy consisting of<br />

the real price, in terms of its relationship to all other prices, remains<br />

only two classes of people: gold miners and tailors. Let us suppose<br />

the same. It's merely that the relative value of the money supply<br />

that the law of supply and demand has settled on the value of one<br />

ounce of gold to be equal to a fine, custom-tailored suit of clothes.<br />

That means that the labor, tools, materials, and talent required to<br />

mine and refine one ounce of gold are equally traded for the labor,<br />

tools, and talent required to weave and tailor the suit. Up until<br />

tow, the number of ounces of gold produced each year have been<br />

over the sudden increase in wealth. By New Year's day, however,<br />

roughly equal to the number of fine suits made each year, so prices<br />

prices would have doubled for everything, and the net result on<br />

have<br />

the<br />

remained stable. The price of a suit is one ounce of gold, and<br />

the<br />

world's standard of living would be exactly<br />

value<br />

zero.<br />

of one ounce of gold is equal to one finely-tailored suit.<br />

The reason so many people fall for the appealing argument that<br />

Let us now suppose that the miners, in their quest for a better<br />

dard of living, work extra hours and produce more gold this<br />

year ftan previously—or that they discover a new lode of gold<br />

reflect on the consequences of the total supply increasing, the<br />

jjtocii greatly increases the available supply with little extra effort.<br />

Now things are no longer in balance. There are more ounces of gold<br />

^an there are suits. The result of this expansion of the money<br />

"pply over and above the supply of available goods is the same as<br />

our game of Monopoly. The quoted prices of the suits go up<br />

^^se the relative value of the gold has gone down.<br />

closet and proposes that the currency from that be added to the<br />

game under progress. By general agreement, the little bills are<br />

distributed equally among all players. What would happen?<br />

The money supply has now been doubled. We all have twice as<br />

much money as we did a moment before. But would we be any<br />

has gone down. This, of course, is the classic mechanism of<br />

inflation. Prices do not go up. The value of the money goes down.<br />

If Santa Claus were to visit everyone on Earth next Christmas<br />

and leave in our stockings an amount of money exactly equal to the<br />

amount we already had, there is no doubt that many would rejoice<br />

the economy needs a larger money supply is that they zero in only<br />

on the need to increase their supply. If they paused for a moment to<br />

nonsense of the proposal becomes immediately apparent.<br />

Murray Rothbard, professor of economics at the University of<br />

Nevada at Las Vegas, says:<br />

We come to the startling truth that it doesn't matter what the sttppty<br />

of money is. Any supply will do as well as any other supply. The fre€<br />

market will simply adjust by changing the purchasing power, ot<br />

1 . Those who rushed to market first, however, would benefit temporarily from the<br />

old prices. Under inflation, those who save are punished.<br />

^olorrHi a R°thbard What Has<br />

' Government<br />

n.<br />

Done to Our Money?<br />

^oo:<br />

(Larkspur<br />

Pine Tree Press,<br />

V<br />

1964), '<br />

p. 13.


144 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND THE BARBARIC METAL 145<br />

period of time. For example, in 1913, the year the Federal Reserve<br />

increase in labor, some of them decide to put down their picks and<br />

1. See Galbraith, p. 250.<br />

turn to the trade of tailoring. In other words, they are responding to<br />

the law of supply and demand in labor. When this happens, the<br />

annual production of gold goes down while the production of suits<br />

vvas enacted into law, the average annual wage in America was<br />

$633. The exchange value of gold that year was $20.67. That means<br />

that the average worker earned the equivalent of 30.6 ounces of<br />

gold per year.<br />

In 1990, the average annual wage had risen to $20,468. That is a<br />

politicians and money mechanics, will always maintain a stable whopping increase of 3,233 per cent, an average rise of 42 per cent<br />

price structure which is automatically regulated by the underlying<br />

each year for 77 years. But the exchange value of gold in 1990 had<br />

also risen. It was at $386.90 per ounce. The average worker,<br />

therefore, was earning the equivalent of 52.9 ounces of gold per<br />

the amount of human effort required to provide the goods and<br />

year- That is an increase of only 73 per cent, a rise of less than 1 per<br />

services for which it is freely exchanged.<br />

cent per year over that same period. It is obvious that the dramatic<br />

increase in the size of the paycheck was meaningless to the average<br />

CIGARETTES AS MONEY<br />

American. The reality has been a small but steady increase in<br />

A perfect example of how commodities tend to self-regulate<br />

purchasing power (about 1 per cent per year) that has resulted from<br />

their value occurred in Germany at the end of World War II. The<br />

the gradual improvement in technology. This and only this has<br />

German mark had become useless, and barter was common. But<br />

improved the standard of living and brought down real prices—as<br />

one item of exchange, namely cigarettes, actually became a commodity<br />

money, and they served quite well. Some cigarettes were<br />

revealed by the relative value of gold.<br />

In areas where personal service is the primary factor and where<br />

smuggled into the country, but most of them were brought in by<br />

technology is less important, the stability of gold as a measure of<br />

U.S. servicemen. In either case, the quantity was limited and the<br />

value is even more striking. At the Savoy Hotel in London, one<br />

demand was high. A single cigarette was considered small change.<br />

gold sovereign will still buy dinner for three, exactly as it did in<br />

A package of twenty and a carton of two hundred served as larger<br />

1913. And, in ancient Rome, the cost of a finely made toga, belt, and<br />

units of currency. If the exchange rate began to fall too low—in<br />

pair of sandals was one ounce of gold. That is almost exactly the<br />

other words, if the quantity of cigarettes tended to expand at a rate same cost today, two-thousand years later, for a hand-crafted suit,<br />

faster than the expansion of other goods—the holders of the<br />

belt, and a pair of dress shoes. There are no central banks or other<br />

currency, more than likely, would smoke some of it rather than human institutions which could even come close to providing that<br />

spend it. The supply would diminish and the value would return to<br />

kind of price stability. And, yet, it is totally automatic under a gold<br />

its previous equilibrium. That is not theory, it actually happened.<br />

standard.<br />

With gold as the monetary base, we would expect that<br />

In any event, before leaving the subject of gold, we should<br />

improvements in manufacturing technology would gradually<br />

^knowledge that there is nothing mystical about it. It is merely a<br />

reduce the cost of production, causing, not stability, but a downward<br />

ornrnodity which, because it has intrinsic value and possesses<br />

movement of all prices. That downward pressure, however, is<br />

ertatn qualities, has become accepted throughout history as a<br />

partially offset by an increase in the cost of the more sophisticated ^edium of exchange. Hitler waged a campaign against gold as a<br />

tools that are required. Furthermore, similar technological effiriencies<br />

are being applied in the field of mining, so everything tends to<br />

gely financed their war machine with it. Lenin claimed that gold<br />

OQi of the Jewish bankers. But the Nazis traded heavily in gold and<br />

balance out. History has shown that changes in this natural<br />

is used only to keep the workers in bondage and that, after the<br />

equilibrium are minimal and occur only gradually over a long ^olution, it would be used to cover the floors of public lavatories.<br />

goes up, and an equilibrium is reached once again in which suits<br />

and gold are traded as before. The free market, if unfettered by<br />

factor of human effort. The human effort required to extract one<br />

ounce of gold from the earth will always be approximately equal to<br />

L<br />

e Soviet Union under Communism became one of the world's<br />

^gest producers and users of gold. Economist John Maynard


146 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND THE BARBARIC METAL 147<br />

Keynes once dismissed gold as a "barbaric metal." Many followers<br />

of Keynes today are heavily invested in gold. It is entirely possible<br />

of course, that something other than gold would be better as the<br />

basis for money. It's just that in over two thousand years, no one<br />

has been able to find it.<br />

NATURAL LAW NO. 1<br />

The amazing stability of gold as a measure of value is simply<br />

the result of human nature reacting to the forces of supply and<br />

demand. The process, therefore, may be stated as a natural law of<br />

human behavior:<br />

LESSON: When gold (or silver) is used as money and when<br />

the forces of supply and demand are not thwarted by<br />

government intervention, the amount of new metal added to the<br />

money supply will always be closely proportional to the<br />

expanding services and goods which can be purchased with it<br />

Long-term stability of prices is the dependable result of these<br />

forces. This process is automatic and impartial. Any attempt by<br />

politicians to intervene will destroy the benefit for all.<br />

Therefore,<br />

LAW: Long-term price stability is possible only when the<br />

money supply is based upon the gold (or silver) supply without<br />

government interference.<br />

As the concept of money was slowly developing in the mind of<br />

ancient man, it became obvious that one of the advantages of using<br />

gold or silver as the medium of exchange was that, because of their<br />

rarity as compared to copper or iron, great value could be<br />

represented by small size. Tiny ingots could be carried in a pouch<br />

or fastened to a belt for ease of transportation. And, of course, they<br />

could be more readily hidden for safekeeping. Goldsmiths then<br />

began to fashion them into round discs and to put their stamps on<br />

them to attest to purity and weight. In this way, the world's first<br />

coins began to make their appearance.<br />

It is believed that the first precious metal coins were minted by<br />

the Lydians in Asia Minor (now Northwest Turkey), in about 600<br />

B.C. The Chinese used gold cubes as early as 2100 B.C. But it wasn't<br />

until the kings stepped into the picture that true coinage became a<br />

reality. It was only when the state certified the tiny discs that they<br />

became widely accepted, and it is to the Greeks more than anyone<br />

that we owe this development. Groseclose describes the result:<br />

These light, shining discs, adorned with curious new emblems and<br />

a variety of vigorous, striking images, made a deep impression on<br />

both Greek and barbarian. And to the more practical minded, the<br />

abundance of uniform pieces of metal, each of a standard weight,<br />

certified by the authority of the state, meant a release from the<br />

cumbersomeness of barter and new and dazzling opportunities in<br />

every direction. . .<br />

All classes of men succumbed to money, and those who had<br />

formerly been content to produce only for their needs and the<br />

necessities of the household, found themselves going to the market<br />

place with their handicraft, or the fruits of their toil, to exchange them<br />

for the coins they might obtain. 1<br />

EXPANDING THE MONEY SUPPLY BY COIN CLIPPING<br />

From the very beginning, the desire for a larger money supply<br />

led to practices which were destructive to the economy. Unscrupulous<br />

merchants began to shave off a tiny portion of each coin they<br />

handled— a process known as coin clipping—and then having the<br />

shavings melted down into new coins. Before long, the king's<br />

treasury began to do the same thing to the coins it received in taxes.<br />

In this way, the money supply was increased, but the supply of<br />

gold was not. The result was exactly what we now know always<br />

happens when the money supply is artificially expanded. There<br />

was inflation. Whereas one coin previously would buy twelve<br />

sheep, now it would only be accepted for ten. The total amount of<br />

gold needed for twelve sheep never really changed. It's<br />

just that<br />

everyone knew that one coin no longer contained it.<br />

As governments became more brazen in their debasement of<br />

2 currency, even to the extent of diluting the gold or silver<br />

content, the population adapted quite well by simply "discount-<br />

,r «" the new coins. That is to say, they accepted them at a realistic<br />

^alue, which was lower than what the government had intended.<br />

s was, as always, reflected in a general rise in prices quoted in<br />

Tms of those coins. Real prices, in terms of labor or other goods or<br />

^en of gold itself remained unchanged.<br />

^<br />

Governments do not like to be thwarted in their plans to exploit<br />

I subjects. So a way had to be found to force people to accept<br />

-se slugs as real money. This led to the first legal-tender laws. By<br />

°ya! decree, the "coin of the realm," was declared legal for the<br />

G rosecllose, Money and Man, p. 13.


148 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND THE BARBARIC METAL 149<br />

settlement of all debts. Anyone who refused it at face value was<br />

subject to fine, imprisonment, or, in some cases, even death. The<br />

result was that the good coins disappeared from circulation and<br />

went into private hoards. After all, if the government forces you to<br />

accept junk at the same rate of exchange as gold, wouldn't you<br />

keep the gold and spend the junk? That is what happened in<br />

America in the '60s when the mint began to issue cheap metal<br />

tokens to replace the silver dimes, quarters, and half-dollars.<br />

Within a few months, the silver coins were in dresser drawers and<br />

safe-deposit boxes. The same thing has happened repeatedly<br />

throughout antiquity. In economics, that is called Gresham's Law:<br />

"Bad money drives out good/'<br />

The final move in this game of legal plunder was for the<br />

government to fix prices so that, even if everyone is using only junk<br />

as money, they can no longer compensate for the continually<br />

expanding supply of it. Now the people were caught. They had no<br />

escape except to become criminals, which most of them, incidentally,<br />

chose to do. The history of artificially expanding money is the<br />

history of great dissatisfaction with government, much lawlessness,<br />

and a massive underground economy.<br />

GOLD IS THE ENEMY OF THE WELFARE STATE<br />

In more modern times, rulers of nations have become more<br />

sophisticated in the methods by which they debase the currency.<br />

Instead of clipping coins, it is done through the banking system.<br />

The consequences of that process were summarized in 1966 by Alan<br />

Greenspan who, a few years later, would became Chairman of the<br />

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve. Greenspan wrote:<br />

The abandonment of the gold standard made it possible for the<br />

welfare statists to use the banking system as a means to an unlimited<br />

expansion of credit. . .<br />

The law of supply and demand is not to be conned. As the supply<br />

of money (of claims) increases relative to the supply of tangible assets<br />

in the economy, prices must eventually rise. Thus the earnings saved<br />

by the productive members of the society lose value in terms of goods.<br />

When the economy's books are finally balanced, one finds that this<br />

loss in value represents the goods purchased by the government for<br />

welfare or other purposes. .<br />

.<br />

In the absence of the gold standard, there is no way to protect<br />

savings from confiscation through inflation. There is no safe store oi<br />

value. If there were, the government would have to make its holding<br />

illegal, as was done in the case of gold.... The financial policy of the<br />

welfare state requires that there be no way for the owners of wealth to<br />

protect themselves.<br />

This is the shabby secret of the welfare statists' tirades against<br />

gold. Deficit spending is simply a scheme for the "hidden"<br />

confiscation of wealth. Gold stands in the way of this insidious<br />

process. It stands as a protector of property rights.<br />

Unfortunately, when Greenspan was appointed as Chairman of<br />

the Federal Reserve System, he became silent on the issue of gold.<br />

Once he was seated at the control panel which holds the levers of<br />

power, he served the statists well as they continued to confiscate<br />

the people's wealth through the hidden tax of inflation. Even the<br />

wisest of men can be corrupted by power and wealth.<br />

REAL COMMODITY MONEY IN HISTORY<br />

Returning to the topic of debasing the currency in ancient<br />

times, it must be stated that such practices were by no means<br />

universal. There are many examples throughout history of regents<br />

and kingdoms which used great restraint in money creation.<br />

Ancient Greece, where coinage was first developed, is one of them.<br />

The drachma became the defacto monetary unit of the civilized<br />

world because of the dependability of its gold content. Within its<br />

borders, cities flourished and trade abounded. Even after the fall of<br />

Athens in the Peloponnesian War, her coinage remained, for<br />

centuries, as the standard by which all others were measured. 2<br />

Perhaps the greatest example of a nation with sound money,<br />

however, was the Byzantine Empire. Building on the sound monetary<br />

tradition of Greece, the emperor Constantine ordered the<br />

creation of a new gold piece called the solidus and a silver piece<br />

called the miliarense. The gold weight of the solidus soon became<br />

ed at 65 grains and was minted at that standard for the next<br />

eight-hundred years. Its quality was so dependable that it was<br />

freely accepted, under the name bezant, from China to Brittany,<br />

from the Baltic Sea to Ethiopia.<br />

Byzantine laws regarding money were strict. Before being<br />

l drrutted to the profession of banking, the candidate had to have<br />

sponsors who would attest to his character, that he would not file<br />

Greens<br />

Idrntla ? P an " '<br />

Gold and Economic Freedom/' in Capitalism: The Unknown<br />

£*h ed. Ayn Rand (New York: Signet Books, 1967), p. 101.<br />

the Greeks<br />

ren<br />

'<br />

under Solon, had one, brief experience with a debased cur-<br />

Ut<br />

PP U<br />

'* WaS Sh°rt liVed/ and neVer re P eated See Groseclose, Money<br />

"<br />

and Man,<br />

9


150 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

9 THE BARBARIC METAL 151<br />

or chip either the solidi or the miliarensia, and that he would not<br />

issue false coin.<br />

hand. 1<br />

Violation of these rules called for cutting off a<br />

It is an amazing fact of history that the Byzantine Empire<br />

flourished as the center of world commerce for eight-hundred<br />

years without falling into bankruptcy nor, for that matter, even into<br />

debt. Not once during this period did it devalue its money.<br />

"Neither the ancient nor the modern world/' says Heinrich Gelzer,<br />

"can offer a complete parallel to this phenomenon. This prodigious<br />

stability...secured the bezant as universal currency. On account of its<br />

full weight, it passed with all the neighboring nations as a valid<br />

medium of exchange. By her money, Byzantium controlled bom the<br />

civilized and the barbarian worlds/'<br />

BAD COMMODITY MONEY IN HISTORY<br />

The experience of the Romans was quite different. Basically a<br />

militaristic people, they had little patience for the niceties of<br />

monetary restraint. Especially in the later Empire, debasement of<br />

the coinage became a deliberate state policy. Every imaginable<br />

means for plundering the people was devised. In addition to<br />

taxation, coins were clipped, reduced, diluted, and plated. Favored<br />

groups were given franchises for state-endorsed monopolies, the<br />

origin of our present-day corporation. And, amidst constantly<br />

rising prices in terms of constantly expanding money, speculation<br />

and dishonesty became rampant.<br />

By the year 301 A.D., mutiny was developing in the army/<br />

remote regions were displaying disloyalty, the treasury was empty,<br />

agriculture depressed, and trade almost at a standstill. It was then<br />

that Diocletian issued his famous price-fixing proclamation as the<br />

last measure of a desperate emperor. We are struck by the<br />

similarity to such proclamations in our own time. Most of the chaos<br />

can be traced directly to government policy. Yet, the politicians<br />

point the accusing finger at everyone else for their "greed" and<br />

"disregard for the common good." Diocletian declared:<br />

1. he livre du prifet ou Vempereur Uon le Sage sur les corporations de Constantino?*'<br />

French translation from the Geneva <strong>text</strong> by Jules Nicole, p. 38. Cited by Groseclose,<br />

Money and Man, p. 52.<br />

2. Byzantininsche Kulturgeschichte (Tubingen, 1909), p. 78. As quoted by Grosedose,<br />

Money and Man, p. 54.<br />

Who is of so hardened a heart and so untouched by a feeling of<br />

humanity that he can be unaware, nay that he has not noticed, that in<br />

the sale of wares which are exchanged in the market, or dealt with in<br />

the daily business of the cities, an exorbitant tendency in prices has<br />

spread to such an extent that the unbridled desire of plundering is<br />

held in check neither by abundance nor by seasons of plenty....<br />

Inasmuch as there is seen only a mad desire without control, to pay no<br />

heed to the needs of the many,...it seems good to us, as we look into the<br />

future, to us who are the fathers of the people, that justice intervene to<br />

settle matters impartially. 1<br />

What followed was an incredibly detailed list<br />

of mandated<br />

prices for everything from a serving of beer or a bunch of<br />

watercress to a lawyer's fee and a bar of gold. The result?<br />

Conditions became even worse, and the royal decree was rescinded<br />

five years later.<br />

The Roman Empire never recovered from the crisis. By the<br />

fourth century, all coins were weighed, and the economy was<br />

slipping back into barter again. By the seventh century, the weights<br />

themselves had been so frequently changed that it was no longer<br />

possible to effect an exchange in money at all. For all practical<br />

purposes, money became extinct, and the Roman Empire was no<br />

more.<br />

RECEIPT MONEY<br />

When new civilizations rose from the ruins of Rome, they<br />

reclaimed the lost discovery of money and used it to great<br />

advantage. The invention was truly a giant step forward for<br />

mankind, but there were many problems yet to be solved and<br />

much experimentation lay ahead. The development of paper<br />

oney was a case in point. When a man accumulated more coins<br />

than he required for daily purchases, he needed a safe place to store<br />

an. The goldsmiths, who handled large amounts of precious<br />

metals in their<br />

trades, had already built sturdy vaults to protect<br />

their own inventory, so it was natural for them to offer vault space<br />

o their customers for a fee. The goldsmith could be trusted to<br />

guard the coins well because he also would be euardine 6 his own<br />

wealth.<br />

When the coins were placed into the vault, the warehouseman<br />

ould give the owner a written receipt which entitled him to<br />

As quoted by Groseclose, Money and Man, pp. 43-44.


152 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND THE BARBARIC METAL 153<br />

withdraw at any time. At first,<br />

the only way the coins could be<br />

taken from the vault was for the owner to personally present the<br />

receipt. Eventually, however, it became customary for the owner to<br />

merely endorse his receipt to a third party who, upon presentation<br />

could make the withdrawal. These endorsed receipts were the<br />

forerunners of today's checks.<br />

The final stage in this development was the custom of issuing,<br />

not just one receipt for the entire deposit, but a series of smaller<br />

receipts, adding up to the same total, and each having printed<br />

across the top: PAY TO THE BEAKER ON DEMAND. As the population<br />

learned from experience that these paper receipts were truly<br />

backed by good coin in the goldsmith's warehouse and that the<br />

coin really would be given out in exchange for the receipts, it<br />

became increasingly common to use the paper instead of the coin.<br />

Thus, receipt<br />

money came into existence. The paper itself was<br />

useless, but what it represented was quite valuable. As long as the<br />

coin was held in safe keeping as promised, there was no difference<br />

in value between the receipt and the coin which backed it. And, as<br />

we shall see in the next chapter, there were notable examples of the<br />

honest use of receipt money at the very beginning of the development<br />

of banking. When the receipt was scrupulously honored, the<br />

economy moved forward. When it was used as a gimmick for the<br />

artificial expansion of the money supply, the economy convulsed<br />

and stagnated.<br />

NATURAL LAW NO. 2<br />

This is not a <strong>text</strong>book on the history of money, so we cannot<br />

afford the luxury of lingering among the fascinating details. For our<br />

purposes, it is sufficient to recognize that human behavior in these<br />

matters is predictable and, because of that predictability, it is<br />

possible to formulate another principle that is so universal that it<br />

too, may be considered a natural law. Drawing from the vast<br />

experience of this early period, it can be stated as follows:<br />

metals, the result is price stability, economic prosperity, and<br />

political tranquility. Therefore,<br />

LAW: For a nation to enjoy economic prosperity and<br />

political tranquility, the monetary power of its politicians must<br />

be limited solely to the maintenance of honest weights and<br />

measures of precious metals.<br />

As we shall see in the following chapters, the centuries of<br />

monetary upheaval that followed that early period contain no<br />

evidence that this law has been repealed by modern man.<br />

SUMMARY<br />

Knowledge of the nature of money is essential to an under-<br />

rstanding of the Federal Reserve. Contrary to common belief,<br />

topic is<br />

the<br />

neither mysterious nor complicated. For the purposes of<br />

this study, money is defined as anything which is accepted as a<br />

medium of exchange. Building on that, we find there are four kinds<br />

of money: commodity, receipt, fiat, and fractional. Precious metals<br />

were the First commodity money to appear in history and ever<br />

since have been proven by actual experience to be the only reliable<br />

base for an honest monetary system. Gold, as the basis of money,<br />

can take several forms: bullion, coins, and fully backed paper<br />

receipts. Man has been plagued throughout history with the false<br />

theory that the quantity of money is important, specifically that<br />

more money is better than less. This has led to perpetual manipulation<br />

and expansion of the money supply through such practices as<br />

coin clipping, debasement of the coin content, and, in later centuries,<br />

the issuance of more paper receipts than there was gold to<br />

back them. In every case, these practices have led to economic and<br />

political disaster. In those rare instances where man has refrained<br />

from manipulating the money supply and has allowed it to be<br />

determined by free-market production of the gold supply, the<br />

result has been prosperity and tranquility.<br />

LESSON: Whenever government sets out to manipulate the<br />

money supply, regardless of the intelligence or good intentions<br />

of those who attempt to direct the process, the result is inflation/<br />

economic chaos, and political upheaval. By contrast, whenever<br />

government is limited in its monetary power to only the<br />

maintenance of honest weights and measures of precious


Chapter Eight<br />

FOOL'S GOLD<br />

The history of paper money without preciousmetal<br />

backingforced on the public by government<br />

decree; the emergence of our present-day<br />

fractional-reserve<br />

banking system based on the<br />

issuance of a greater amount of receipts for gold<br />

than the bank has in gold to back them up.<br />

We previously have broken down the concept of money into<br />

four categories: commodity, receipt, fiat, and fractional. In the last<br />

chapter we examined commodity and receipt money in some<br />

detail. In doing so, we also established certain monetary principles<br />

which apply regardless of their form. We shall now turn to the<br />

remaining two categories, both of which are represented by paper<br />

and which are at the root of almost all of modern man's economic<br />

woes.<br />

FIAT MONEY<br />

The American Heritage Dictionary defines fiat money as "paper<br />

money decreed legal tender, not backed by gold or silver." The two<br />

characteristics of fiat money, therefore, are (1) it does not represent<br />

anything of intrinsic value and (2) it is decreed legal tender. Legal<br />

tender simply means that there is a law requiring everyone to<br />

accept the currency in commerce. The two always go together<br />

because, since the money really is worthless, it soon would be<br />

rejected by the public in favor of a more reliable medium of<br />

exchange, such as gold or silver coin. Thus, when governments<br />

issue fiat money, they always declare it to be legal tender under<br />

pain of fine or imprisonment. The only way a government can<br />

exchange its worthless paper money for tangible goods and<br />

services is to give its citizens no choice.<br />

The first notable use of this practice was recorded by Marco<br />

Polo during his travels to China in the thirteenth century. The<br />

famous explorer gives us this account:


156 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND FOOL'S GOLD 157<br />

The Emperor's mint then is in this same City of Cambaluc, and the<br />

way it is wrought is such that you might say he hath the Secret of<br />

Alchemy in perfection, and you would be right!...<br />

What they take is a certain fine white bast or skin which lies<br />

between the wood of the tree and the thick outer bark, and this they<br />

make into something resembling sheets of paper, but black. When<br />

these sheets have been prepared they are cut up into pieces of different<br />

sizes. The smallest of these sizes is worth a half tornesel.... There is<br />

also a kind worth one Bezant of gold, and others of three Bezants, and<br />

so up to ten.<br />

All these pieces of paper are issued with as much solemnity and<br />

authority as if they were of pure gold or silver; and on every piece, a<br />

variety of officials, whose duty it is, have to write their names and to<br />

put their seals. And when all is prepared duly, the chief officer<br />

deputed by the Kaan smears the Seal entrusted to him with vermilion<br />

and impresses it on the paper, so that the form of the Seal remains<br />

stamped upon it in red; the money is then authentic. Any one forging<br />

it would be punished with death. And the Kaan causes every year to<br />

be made such a vast quantity of this money, which costs him nothing,<br />

that it must equal in amount all the treasures in the world!<br />

With these pieces of paper, made as I have described, he causes all<br />

payments on his own account to be made, and he makes them to pass<br />

current universally over all his Kingdoms.... And nobody, however<br />

important he may think himself, dares to refuse them on pain of death.<br />

And indeed everybody takes them readily.<br />

One is tempted to marvel at the Kaan's audacious power and<br />

the subservience of his subjects who endured such an outrage; but<br />

our smugness rapidly vanishes when we consider the similarity to<br />

our own Federal Reserve Notes. They are adorned with signatures<br />

and seals; counterfeiters are severely punished; the government<br />

pays its expenses with them; the population is forced to accept<br />

them; they—and the "invisible" checkbook money into which they<br />

can be converted—are made in such vast quantity that it must<br />

equal in amount all<br />

the treasures of the world. And yet they cost<br />

nothing to make. In truth, our present monetary system is an<br />

almost exact replica of that which supported the warlords of seven<br />

centuries ago.<br />

1. Original from Henry Thule's edition of Marco Polo's Travels, reprinted in W-<br />

Vissering, On Chinese Currency: Coin and Paper Money (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1877),<br />

reprinted 1968 by Ch'eng-wen Publishing Co., Taiwan, as cited by Anthony Sutton,<br />

The War on Gold (Seal Beach, California: '76 Press, 1977), pp. 26-28.<br />

THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE<br />

Unfortunately, the present situation is not unique to our<br />

history. In fact, after China, the next place in the world to adopt the<br />

use of fiat money was America; specifically, the Massachusetts Bay<br />

Colony. This event has been described as "not only the origin of<br />

paper money in America, but also in the British Empire, and almost<br />

in the Christian world."<br />

In 1690, Massachusetts launched a military raid against the<br />

French colony in Quebec. She had done this before and, each time,<br />

had brought back sufficient plunder to more than pay for the<br />

expedition. This time, however, the foray was a dismal failure, and<br />

the men returned empty handed. When the soldiers demanded<br />

their pay, Massachusetts found its coffers empty. Disgruntled<br />

soldiers have a way of becoming unruly, so the officials scrambled<br />

for some way to raise the funds. Additional taxes would have been<br />

extremely unpopular, so they decided simply to print paper<br />

money. In order to convince the soldiers and the citizenry to accept<br />

it, the government made two solemn promises: (1) it would redeem<br />

the paper for gold or silver coin just as soon as there was sufficient<br />

tax revenue to do so, and (2) absolutely no additional paper notes<br />

would ever be issued. Both pledges were promptly broken. Only a<br />

few months later, it was announced that the original issue was<br />

insufficient to discharge the government's debt, and a new issue<br />

almost six times greater was put into circulation. The currency<br />

wasn't redeemed for nearly forty years, long after those who had<br />

made the pledge had faded from the scene.<br />

A CLASSIC PATTERN<br />

Most of the other colonies were quick to learn the magic of the<br />

printing press, and the history that followed is a classic example of<br />

cause and effect: Governments artificially expanded the money<br />

supply through the issuance of fiat currency. This was followed by<br />

legal tender laws to force its acceptance. Next came the disappearance<br />

of gold or silver coins which went, instead, into private hoards<br />

or to foreign traders who insisted on the real thing for their wares.<br />

Many of the colonies repudiated their previous money by issuing<br />

new bills valued at multiples of the old. Then came political<br />

1- Ernest Ludlow Bogart, Economic History of the American People (New York:<br />

Longmans, Green and Co., 1930), p. 172.


I.<br />

158 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

discontent and civil<br />

disobedience. And at the end of each cycle<br />

there was rampant inflation and economic chaos.<br />

In 1703, South Carolina declared that its money was "a good<br />

payment and tender in law" and then added that, should anyone<br />

refuse to honor it as such, they would be fined an amount equal to<br />

"double the value of the bills so refused." By 1716, the penalty had<br />

been increased to "treble the value."<br />

THE PRINTING PRESS AND INFLATION<br />

Benjamin Franklin was an ardent proponent of fiat money<br />

during those years and used his great influence to sell the idea to<br />

the public. We can get some idea of the ferment of the times by<br />

noting that, in 1736, writing in his Pennsylvania Gazette, Franklin<br />

apologized for its irregular publication, and explained that the<br />

printer was "with the Press, labouring for the publick Good, to<br />

make Money more plentiful." 2 The printing of money was apparently<br />

a major, time-consuming operation.<br />

In 1737, Massachusetts devalued its fiat currency by 66%,<br />

offering one dollar of new currency for three of the old. The<br />

promise was made that, after five years, the new money would be<br />

fully redeemed in silver or gold. The promise was not kept<br />

By the late 1750s, Connecticut had price inflated by 800%. The<br />

Carolinas had inflated 900%. Massachusetts 1000%. Rhode Island<br />

2300%. 4 Naturally, these inflations all had to come to an end and,<br />

they turned into equally massive deflations and<br />

when they did,<br />

depressions. It has been shown that, even in colonial times, the<br />

classic booms and busts which modern economists are fond of<br />

blaming on an "unbridled free market" actually were direct<br />

manifestations of the expansion and contraction of fiat monev^<br />

which no longer was governed by the laws of supply and demand.<br />

1 Statutes at Large of South Carolina, 11. 211,665, as cited by George Bancroft, A<br />

Plea for the Constitution (Originally published by Harpers in 1886. Reprinted m<br />

Sewanee, Tennessee: Spencer Judd Publishers, 1982), p. 7.<br />

2. Leonard W. Labaree, ed., The Papers of Benjamin Franklin (New Haven: Yaie<br />

University Press, 1960), Vol. 2, p. 159.<br />

3. Province Laws, II. 826, cited by Bancroft, p. 14.<br />

4. Ron Paul and Lewis Lehrman, The Case for Gold (Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute,<br />

1982), p. 22. Also Sutton, The War on Gold, p. 44.<br />

n<br />

5 See Donald L. Kemmerer, "Paper Money in New Jersey, 1668-1775, New<br />

Jersey Historical Society, Proceedings 74 (April 1956): pp. 107-144, as cited by Paul<br />

and Lehrman, The Casefor Gold, p. 22.<br />

FOOL'S GOLD 159<br />

By this time, coins had completely disappeared from the scene.<br />

Some were in private hoards, but most of them had been exported<br />

to other countries, leaving the colonies with little choice but to use<br />

fiat<br />

money or barter. Merchants from abroad were interested in<br />

neither of those, however, and international trade ground almost to<br />

a halt<br />

A BLESSING IN DISGUISE<br />

The experiment with fiat money was a calamity to the colonists,<br />

but it was also a thorn in the side of the Bank of England. The bank<br />

had used its influence with the Crown to forbid the colonies to mint<br />

their own coins or to establish local banks. This meant that, if the<br />

colonists wanted the convenience of paper money, they would be<br />

forced to use the notes issued by the Bank of England. No one had<br />

anticipated that the colonial governments would be so inventive as<br />

to create their own paper money. So, in 1751, Great Britain began to<br />

pressure the colonies to redeem all of their currency and withdraw<br />

it from circulation. This they eventually did, and at bargain prices.<br />

By then, their fiat money was heavily discounted in the market<br />

place and the governments were able to buy back their own<br />

currency for pennies on the dollar.<br />

The decree from the British Parliament, although heavily<br />

resented by the colonists, turned out to be a blessing in disguise.<br />

The paper notes of the Bank of England never did become a<br />

primary medium of exchange. Probably because of their recent bad<br />

experience with paper money, the colonists merely brought what<br />

few gold and silver coins they had out of hiding and returned to a<br />

true commodity-money system. At first, the doomsdayers predicted<br />

this would spell further ruin for the colonial economy.<br />

'"There isn't enough money" was the all-too-familiar cry. But there<br />

was, indeed, quite enough for, as we have already seen, any<br />

amount is sufficient.<br />

TOBACCO BECOMES MONEY<br />

There was, in fact, a period in which other commodities became<br />

accepted as a secondary medium of exchange. Such items as nails,<br />

lumber, rice, and whisky filled the monetary void, but tobacco was<br />

the most common. Here was a commodity which was in great<br />

demand both within the colonies and for overseas commerce. It<br />

had intrinsic value; it could not be counterfeited; it could be<br />

divided into almost any denominational quantity; and its supply


160 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND FOOL'S GOLD 161<br />

could not be increased except by the exertion of labor. In other<br />

words, it was regulated by the law of supply and demand, which<br />

gave it great stability in value. In many ways, it was an ideal<br />

money. It was officially adopted as such by Virginia in 1642 and a<br />

few years later by Maryland, but it was used unofficially in all the<br />

other colonies, as well. So close was the identity of tobacco with<br />

money that the previous fiat currency of New Jersey, not a tobacco<br />

growing state, displayed a picture of a tobacco leaf on its<br />

face. It<br />

also carried the inscription: "To counterfeit is Death" Tobacco was<br />

used in early America as a secondary medium of exchange for<br />

about two-hundred years, until the new Constitution declared that<br />

money was, henceforth, the sole prerogative of the federal government.<br />

The primary currency at that juncture, however, was still gold<br />

and silver coin, or specie, as it is called. And the immediate result of<br />

returning to a sound monetary unit was a rapid recovery from the<br />

economic stagnation previously inflicted by the booms and busts of<br />

fiat money. Trade and production rose dramatically, and this, in<br />

turn, attracted an inflow of gold and silver coin from around the<br />

world, filling the void that had been created by years of worthless<br />

paper. The law of supply and demand was visibly at work. For a<br />

while, Massachusetts had returned to specie while Rhode Island<br />

remained on fiat money. The result was that Newport, which had<br />

been the trade center for the West Indies, lost its trade to Boston<br />

and became an empty port. 2 After the colonies had returned to<br />

coin, prices quickly found their natural equilibrium and then stayed<br />

at that point, even during the Seven Years War and the disruption<br />

of trade that occurred immediately prior to the Revolution. There<br />

is no better example of the fact that economic systems in distress<br />

can and do recover rapidly if government does not interfere with<br />

the natural healing process.<br />

WAR BRINGS A RETURN OF FIAT MONEY<br />

The War for Independence brought all of this to a sudden halt.<br />

Wars are seldom funded out of the existing treasury, nor are they<br />

even done so out of increased taxes. If governments were to levy<br />

1. Galbraith, pp. 48-50.<br />

2. Paul and Lehrman, pp. 22-23.<br />

3. 'The Colonial Monetary Standard of Massachusetts/' by Roger W. Weiss,<br />

Economic History Review, No. 27, November, 1974, p. 589.<br />

taxes on their citizens fully adequate to finance the conflict, the<br />

amount would be so great that many of even its most ardent<br />

supporters would lose enthusiasm. By artificially increasing the<br />

money supply, however, the real cost is hidden from view. It is still<br />

paid, of course, but through inflation, a process that few people<br />

understand.<br />

The American Revolution was no exception. In order to pay the<br />

bill<br />

for independence, both the Confederation and the individual<br />

states went heavily into the printing business. At the beginning of<br />

the war in 1775, the total money supply stood at $12 million.<br />

June of that year, the Continental Congress issued another<br />

$2 million. Before the notes were even put into circulation, another<br />

$1 million was authorized. By the end of the year, another<br />

$3 million. In 1776, another $19 million. $13 million in 1777.<br />

$64 million in 1778. $125 million in 1779. And still more: the<br />

Continental Army issued its own "certificates" for the purchase of<br />

supplies totalling $200 million. A total of $425 million in five years<br />

on top of a base of $12 million is an increase of over 3500%. And, in<br />

addition to this massive expansion of the money supply on the part<br />

of the central government, it must be remembered that the states<br />

were doing exactly the same thing. It is estimated that, in just five<br />

years from 1775 to the end of 1779, the total money supply<br />

expanded by 5000%. By contrast, the amount raised in taxes over<br />

the five-year period was inconsequential, amounting to only a few<br />

million dollars.<br />

AND A MASSIVE INFLATION<br />

The first exhilarating effect of this flood of new money was the<br />

flush of apparent prosperity, but that was quickly followed by<br />

inflation as the self-destruct mechanism began to operate. In 1775,<br />

paper Continentals were traded for one dollar in gold. In 1777, they<br />

were exchanged for twenty-five cents. By 1779, just four years from<br />

their issue, they were worth less than a penny. The phrase "Not<br />

Worth V<br />

a Continental'' has its origin in this dismal period. Shoes sold<br />

for $5,000 a pair. A suit of clothes cost a million.<br />

It was in that year that George Washington wrote, "A wagon<br />

oad of money will scarcely purchase a wagon load oP*provisions."<br />

I Quoted by Albert S. Bolles, The Financial History of the United States (New York:<br />

D. Appleton, 1896, 4th ed.), Vol. I, p. 13Z<br />

In


162 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

FOOL'S GOLD 163<br />

Even Benjamin Franklin began to see the light. In a mood of<br />

sarcasm, he wrote:<br />

This Currency, as we manage it, is a wonderful machine. It<br />

performs its Office when we issue it; it pays and clothes Troops and<br />

provides Victuals and Ammunition; and when we are obliged to issue<br />

a Quantity excessive, it pays itself off by Depreciation.<br />

When speaking of deficit spending, it is common to hear the<br />

complaint that we are saddling future generations with the bill for<br />

what we enjoy today. Why not let those in the future help pay for<br />

what will benefit them also? Don't be deceived. That is a misconception<br />

encouraged by politicians to calm the public. When money<br />

is fiat, as the colonists discovered, every government building,<br />

public work, and cannon of war is paid out of current labor and<br />

current wealth. These things must be built today with today's labor,<br />

and the man who performs that labor must also be paid today. It is<br />

true that interest payments fall partly to future generations, but the<br />

initial cost is paid by those in the present. It is paid by loss of value<br />

in the monetary unit and loss of purchasing power for one's wages.<br />

INFLATION IS A HIDDEN TAX<br />

Fiat money is the means by which governments obtain instant<br />

purchasing power without taxation. But where does that purchasing<br />

power come from? Since fiat money has nothing of tangible<br />

value to offset it, government's fiat purchasing power can be<br />

obtained only by subtracting it from somewhere else. It is, in fact,<br />

"collected" from us all through a decline in our purchasing power.<br />

It is, therefore, exactly the same as a tax, but one that is hidden from<br />

view, silent in operation, and little understood by the taxpayer.<br />

In 1786, Thomas Jefferson provided a clear explanation of this<br />

process when he wrote:<br />

Every one, through whose hands a bill passed, lost on that bill<br />

what it lost in value during the time it was in his hands. This was a real<br />

tax on him; and in this way the people of the United States actually<br />

contributed those... millions of dollars during the war, and by a mode<br />

of taxation the most oppressive of all because the most unequal of all-<br />

1 Letter to Samuel Cooper, April 22, 1779, quoted by Albert Henry Smyth, ed., The<br />

Writings of Benjamin Franklin, (New York: Macmillan, 1906), Vol. VII, p. 294.<br />

2. Thomas Jefferson, Observations on the Article Etats-Unis Prepared for the<br />

Encyclopedia, June 22, 1786, from Writings (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1894),<br />

Vol. IV, p. 165.<br />

ENTER PRICE CONTROLS AND LEGAL TENDER LAWS<br />

As prices skyrocketed, the colonies enacted wage and price<br />

controls, which was like plugging up the whistle on a tea kettle in<br />

hopes of keeping the steam from escaping. When that failed, there<br />

followed a series of harsh legal tender laws. One law even invoked<br />

the specter of treason. It said: "If any person shall hereafter be so<br />

lost to all virtue and regard for his Country as to refuse to receive<br />

said bills in payment-he shall be deemed, published, and treated<br />

as an enemy in this Country and precluded from all trade or<br />

intercourse with the inhabitants of these colonies." 1<br />

Rhode Island not only levied a heavy fine for non-acceptance of<br />

its<br />

notes but, upon a secmd offense, an individual was stripped of<br />

citizenship. When a court declared the act unconstitutional, the<br />

legislature called the judges before it and summarily dismissed the<br />

offenders from office.<br />

ENTER ECONOMIC CHAOS AND INSURRECTION<br />

If the ravages of war were a harsh burden for the colonies to<br />

bear, the havoc of fiat money was equally so. After the war,<br />

inflation was followed by deflation as reality returned to the<br />

market place. Prices fell drastically, which was wonderful for those<br />

who were buying. But, for the merchants who were selling or the<br />

farmers who had borrowed heavily to acquire property at inflated<br />

wartime prices, it was a disaster. The new, lower prices were not<br />

adequate to sustain their fixed, inflated mortgages, and many<br />

hard-working families were ruined by foreclosure. Furthermore,<br />

most people still did not understand the inflation process, and<br />

there were many who continued to advocate the "paper money<br />

cure." Several of the states were receptive to the pressure, and their<br />

printing presses continued to roll.<br />

Historian Andrew McLaughlin recalls a typical scene in Rhode<br />

Island at that time as witnessed by a visiting Frenchman:<br />

A French traveler who passed through Newport about this time<br />

gives a dismal picture of the place: idle men standing with folded arms<br />

at the corners of the streets; houses falling to ruins; miserable shops<br />

offering for sale nothing but a few coarse stuffs;...grass growing in the<br />

streets; windows stuffed with rags; everywhere announcing misery,<br />

| David Ramsay, History of the American Revolution (London: Johnson and Stock-<br />

Jale, 1791), Vol. II, pp. 134-36.<br />

2<br />

- Merrill Jensen, The New Nation (New York: Vintage Books, 1950), p. 324.


164 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

the triumph of paper money and the influence of bad governmen*. The<br />

merchants had closed their stores rather than take payment in pape^r;<br />

farmers from neighboring states did not care to bring their produce.<br />

Idleness and economic depression also led to outbursts of<br />

rebellion and insurrection. In 1786, George Washington wrote to<br />

James Warren: "The wheels of government are clogged anck.. we<br />

are descending into the vale of confusion and darkness/' Two<br />

years later, in a letter to Henry Knox, he said: "If ... any person had<br />

told me that there would have been such formidable rebellion as<br />

exists, I would have thought him a bedlamite, a fit subject for a<br />

madhouse."<br />

Fortunately, there is a happy ending to that part of the story. As<br />

we shall see in a subsequent chapter, when the state delegates<br />

assembled to draft the Constitution, the effects of fiat money were<br />

so fresh in their minds they decided to put an end to it once and for<br />

all Then, the new republic not only rapidly recovered but went on<br />

to become the economic envy of the world—for a while, at<br />

least—until the lesson had been forgotten by following generations.<br />

But that is getting ahead of our story. For now, we are dealing with<br />

the topic of fiat money; and the experience of the American<br />

colonies is<br />

a classic example of what always happens when men<br />

succumb to its siren call.<br />

NATURAL LAW NO. 3<br />

Let us pause at this point and observe another of those lessons<br />

derived from centuries of experience. That lesson is so clear and so<br />

universal and so widely seen throughout history that it may be<br />

stated as a natural law of human behavior:<br />

LESSON: Fiat money is paper money without<br />

precious-metal backing and which people are required by law<br />

to accept. It allows politicians to increase spending without<br />

raising taxes. Fiat money is the cause of inflation, and the<br />

amount which people lose in purchasing power is exactly the<br />

amount which was taken from them and transferred to their<br />

government by this process. Inflation, therefore, is a hidden tax.<br />

1. Andrew C. McLaughlin, The Confederation and the Constitution (New York<br />

Collier Books, 1962), pp. 107-08. .<br />

2. Harry Atwood, The Constitution Explained (Merrimac, Massachusetts: Destiny<br />

Publishers, 1927; 2nd ed. 1962), p. 3.<br />

3. IM., p.4<br />

FOOL'S GOLD 165<br />

This tax is the most unfair of all because it falls most heavily on<br />

those who are least able to pay, the small wage earner and those<br />

on fixed incomes. It also punishes the thrifty by eroding the<br />

value of their savings. This creates resentment among the<br />

people, leading always to political unrest and national disunity.<br />

Therefore,<br />

LAW: A nation that resorts to the use of fiat money has<br />

doomed itself to economic hardship and political disunity.<br />

FRACTIONAL MONEY<br />

Let us turn, now, to the fourth and final possible form of<br />

money: a most intriguing concept called fractional money. And, to<br />

understand how this functions, we must return to Europe and the<br />

practice of the early goldsmiths who stored the precious metal<br />

coins of their customers for a fee.<br />

In addition to the goldsmiths who stored coins, there was<br />

another class of merchants, called "scriveners/' who loaned coins.<br />

The goldsmiths reasoned that they, too, could act as scriveners, but<br />

do so with other people's money. They said it was a pity for all that<br />

coin to just sit idle in their vaults- Why not lend it out and earn a<br />

profit which then could be split between themselves and their<br />

depositors? Put it to work, instead of merely gathering dust. They<br />

had learned from experience that very few of their depositors ever<br />

wanted to remove their coins at the same time. In fact, net<br />

withdrawals seldom exceeded ten or fifteen per cent of their<br />

stockpile. It seemed perfectly safe to lend up to eighty or even<br />

eighty-five per cent of their coins. And so the warehousemen began<br />

to act as loan brokers on behalf of their depositors, and the concept<br />

of banking, as we know it today^ was born.<br />

That's the way many history books describe it, but there is more<br />

involved here than merely putting idle money to work. First of all,<br />

sharing the interest income with the owners of the deposits was not<br />

part of the original concept. That only became general practice<br />

many years later after the depositors became outraged and needed<br />

to be reassured that these loans were in their interest as well. In the<br />

beginning, they didn't even know that their coins were being<br />

loaned out. They naively thought that the goldsmiths were lending<br />

their own money.


166 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND FOOL'S GOLD 167<br />

DEPOSITS ARE NOT AVAILABLE FOR LENDING<br />

In the second place, we need to consider whether the coin in the<br />

vault was even available for lending—regardless of whether or not<br />

the depositors received a part of the profit. Let us suppose that we<br />

are playing a game of poker at the home of Charlie Smith. Each of<br />

us has given $20 to Charlie who, acting as the banker, has put our<br />

money into a shoe box and given us, in return, twenty poker chips.<br />

It is the understanding that, anytime we want to go home, we can<br />

get back a dollar for each chip we have at that time. Now let us<br />

suppose that Charlie's brother-in-law, Larry, shows up, not to play<br />

poker, but to borrow some money. Since six of us are playing and<br />

each has put in $20, there is a total of $120 in the shoe box, and that<br />

turns out to be perfect for Larry's needs. You can imagine what<br />

would happen if Charlie decided to lend out the "idle" money. It is<br />

not available for lending.<br />

Neither Charlie nor any of the players have the right to loan<br />

those dollars, because they are being held in escrow, so to speak,<br />

pending completion of the contract between Charlie and his guests.<br />

Those dollars no longer even exist as money. They have been<br />

replaced—in concept at least—by the poker chips. If any of us are<br />

so touched by Larry's story that we decide to loan him the money<br />

ourselves, we would have to do it with other dollars or cash in our<br />

chips for the dollars in the shoe box. In that case, of course, we<br />

could no longer stay in the game. VJe cannot spend, loan, or give away<br />

the deposit and also consider the chips to be worth anything.<br />

If you are a member of an organization and have given your<br />

proxy to a friend to vote in your absence at the annual meeting, you<br />

cannot then show up and cast your own vote in addition to your<br />

proxy. Likewise, in the beginning of banking, the certificates which<br />

were circulated as money were, in effect, proxies for the coins.<br />

Consequently, those coins were not available for lending. Their<br />

monetary value had been assigned to the certificates. If the certificate<br />

holders had wanted to lend out their coins, they should have<br />

retired the certificates first. They were not entitled to hold spendable<br />

paper money and also authorize their banker to lend that same<br />

money as coins. One cannot spend, loan, or give away the coins and also<br />

consider the certificates to be worth anything.<br />

All of this is just common sense. But there is another dimension<br />

to the problem which has to do with honesty in business contracts-<br />

When the bankers used those coins as the basis for loans, they were<br />

putting themselves in a position of not having enough coin in the<br />

vault to make good on their contracts when it came time for<br />

depositors to take their money home. In other words, the new<br />

contracts were made with the full knowledge that, under certain<br />

circumstances, they would have to be broken. But the bankers<br />

never bothered to explain that. The general public was led to<br />

believe that, if they approved of putting these supposedly idle<br />

funds to work, they would be helping the economy and earning a<br />

little profit besides. It was an appealing proposal, and the idea<br />

caught on like wildfire.<br />

FRACTIONAL-RESERVE BANKING<br />

Most borrowers wanted paper money, of course, not bulky<br />

coins, so, when they received their loans, they usually put the coins<br />

right back into the vault for safekeeping. They were then given<br />

receipts for these deposits which, as we have observed, were readily<br />

accepted in commerce as money. At this point, things began to get<br />

complicated. The original depositors had been given receipts for all<br />

of the bank's coins. But the bank now issued loans in the amount of<br />

eighty-five per cent of its<br />

deposits, and the borrowers were given<br />

receipts for that same amount. These were in addition to the original<br />

receipts. That made 85% more receipts than coins. Thus, the banks<br />

created 85% more money and placed it into circulation through their<br />

borrowers. In other words, by issuing phony receipts, they artificially<br />

expanded the money supply. At this point, the certificates<br />

were no longer 100% backed by gold. They now had a backing of<br />

only 54%,<br />

but they were accepted by the unsuspecting public as<br />

equal in value to the old receipts. The gold behind all of them,<br />

however, now represented only a fraction of their face value. Thus,<br />

the receipts became what may be called fractional money / and the<br />

process by which they were created is called fractional-reserve<br />

banking.<br />

None of this shortfall unfortunately, was ever explained. The<br />

bankers decided that it would be better not to discuss reality where<br />

the public could hear. These facts became the arcane secrets of the<br />

profession. The depositors were never encouraged to question how<br />

the banks could lend out their money and still have it on hand to<br />

1. 100 units of gold divided by 185 certificates equals .54


168 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND FOOL'S GOLD 169<br />

pay back on an instant's notice. Instead, bankers put on great airs of<br />

respectability, stability, and accountability; dressed and acted serious<br />

if not stern; erected great edifices resembling government<br />

buildings and temples, all to bolster the false image of being able to<br />

honor their contracts to pay on demand.<br />

It was John Maynard Keynes who observed:<br />

A "sound" banker, alas! is not one who foresees danger, and<br />

avoids it, but one who, when he is ruined, is ruined in a conventional<br />

and orthodox way along with his fellows, so that no one can readily<br />

blame him. It is necessarily part of the business of a banker to maintain<br />

appearances, and to confess a conventional respectability, which is<br />

more than human. Life-long practices of this kind make them the most<br />

romantic and the least realistic of men.<br />

CREATING MONEY OUT OF DEBT<br />

Let us step back for a moment and analyze. In the beginning,<br />

banks served as warehouses for the safe keeping of their customers'<br />

coins. When they issued paper receipts for those coins, they<br />

converted commodity money into receipt money. This was a great<br />

convenience, but it<br />

did not alter the money supply. People had a<br />

choice of using either coin or paper but they could not use both. If<br />

they used coin, the receipt was never issued. If they used the<br />

receipt, the coin remained in the vault and did not circulate.<br />

When the banks abandoned this practice and began to issue<br />

receipts to borrowers, they became magicians. Some have said they<br />

created money out of nothing, but that is not quite true. What they<br />

did was even more amazing. They created money out of debt<br />

is easier for people to go into debt than to mine<br />

Obviously, it<br />

gold. Consequently, money no longer was limited by the natural<br />

forces of supply and demand. From that point in history forward, it<br />

was to be limited only by the degree to which bankers have been<br />

able to push down the gold-reserve fraction of their deposits.<br />

From this perspective, we can now look back on fractional<br />

money and recognize that it really is a transitional form between<br />

receipt money and fiat money. It has some of the characteristics of<br />

both. As the fraction becomes smaller, the less it resembles receipt<br />

money and the more closely it comes to fiat money. When the<br />

fraction finally reaches zero, then it has made the complete<br />

transition and becomes pure fiat. Furthermore, there is no example<br />

in history where men, once they had accepted the concept of<br />

fractional money, didn't reduce the fraction lower and lower until,<br />

eventually, it became zero.<br />

No bank can stay in business for very long with a zero reserve.<br />

The only way to make people accept such a worthless currency is<br />

by government force. That's what legal-tender laws are all about.<br />

The transition from fractional-reserve money to fiat money, therefore,<br />

requires the participation of government through a mechanism<br />

which is called a central bank. Most of the balance of this book<br />

will be devoted to a study of that Creature, but, for now, suffice it<br />

to say that the euphoria of being able to create money without<br />

human effort is so great that, once such a narcotic is taken, there is<br />

no politician or banker who can kick the habit. As William Sumner<br />

observed: "A man mieht as well jump off a precipice intending to<br />

stop half way down/<br />

NATURAL LAW NO. 4<br />

And so, once again, we come to one of those natural laws that<br />

emerge from centuries of human experience. It can be stated as<br />

follows:<br />

LESSON: Fractional money is paper money which is backed<br />

by precious metals up to only a portion of the face amount. It is<br />

a hybrid, being part receipt money and part fiat money.<br />

Generally, the public is unaware of this fact and believes that<br />

fractional money can be redeemed in full at any time. When the<br />

truth is discovered, as periodically happens, there are runs on<br />

the bank, and only the first few depositors in line can be paid.<br />

Since fractional money earns just as much interest for the<br />

bankers as does gold or silver, the temptation is great for them<br />

to create as much of it as possible. As this happens, the fraction<br />

which represents the reserve becomes smaller and smaller until,<br />

eventually, it is reduced to zero. Therefore,<br />

LAW: Fractional money will always degenerate into fiat<br />

money. It is but fiat money in transition.<br />

So much for the overview and generalities. In the next chapter<br />

We shall see what history has to say on this process. And what a<br />

history it is!<br />

1. As quoted by Lever and Huhne, Debt and Danger: The World Financial Crisis<br />

(New York: The Atlantic Monthly, 1986), p. 42.<br />

Gmham Swmer<br />

'<br />

A<br />

l^i]li<br />

n4 Hisior y °f American Currency (New York: Holt,


170 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

SUMMARY<br />

Fiat money is paper money without precious-metal backing<br />

which people are required by law to accept. The first recorded<br />

appearance of fiat money was in thirteenth century China, but its<br />

use on a major scale did not occur until colonial America. The<br />

experience was disastrous, leading to massive inflation, unemployment,<br />

loss of property, and political unrest. During one period<br />

when the Bank of England forced the colonies to abandon theh fiat<br />

money, general prosperity quickly returned. The Revolutionary<br />

War brought fiat money back to the colonies with a vengeance. The<br />

economic chaos that resulted led the colonial governments to<br />

impose price controls and harsh legal tender laws, neither of which<br />

were effective.<br />

Fractional money is defined as paper money with preciousmetal<br />

backing for part, not all, of its stated value. It was introduced<br />

in Europe when goldsmiths began to issue receipts for gold which<br />

they did not have, thus only a fraction of their receipts was<br />

redeemable. Fractional money always degenerates into pure fiat<br />

money.<br />

Chapter Nine<br />

THE SECRET SCIENCE<br />

The condensed history offractional-reserve banking;<br />

the unbroken record offraud, booms, busts,<br />

and economic chaos; the formation of the Bank of<br />

England, the world's first central bank, which<br />

became the model for the Federal Reserve System,<br />

Banks of deposit first appeared in early Greece, concurrent with<br />

the development of coinage itself. They were known in India at the<br />

time of Alexander the Great. They also operated in Egypt as part of<br />

the public granary system. They appeared in Damascus in 1200 and<br />

in Barcelona in 1401. It was the city-state of Venice, however, which<br />

is considered the cradle of banking as we know it today.<br />

THE BANK OF VENICE<br />

By the year 1361, there already had been sufficient abuse in<br />

banking that the Venetian Senate passed a law forbidding bankers<br />

to engage in any other commercial pursuit, thus removing the<br />

temptation to use their depositors' funds to finance their own<br />

enterprises. They were also required to open their books for public<br />

inspection and to keep their stockpile of coins available for viewing<br />

at all reasonable times. In 1524, a board of bank examiners was<br />

created and, two years later, all bankers were required to settle<br />

accounts between themselves in coin rather than by check.<br />

In spite of these precautions, however, the largest bank at that<br />

time, the house of Pisano and Tiepolo, had been active in lending<br />

against its reserves and A in 1584, was forced to close its doors<br />

because of inability to refund depositors. The government picked<br />

up the pieces at that point and a state bank was established, the<br />

Banco della Piazza del Rialto. Having learned from the recent<br />

experience with bankruptcy, the new bank was not allowed to<br />

make any loans. There could be no profit from the issuance of<br />

credit. The bank was required to sustain itself solely from fees for<br />

coin storage, exchanging currencies, handling the transfer of payments<br />

between customers, and notary services.


172 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

The formula for honest banking had been found. The bank<br />

prospered and soon became the center of Venetian commerce. Its<br />

paper receipts were widely accepted far beyond the country's<br />

borders and, in fact,<br />

instead of being discounted in exchange for<br />

gold coin as was the usual practice, they actually carried a premium<br />

over coins. This was because there were so many kinds of coin in<br />

circulation and such a wide variance of quality within the same<br />

type of coin that one had to be an expert to evaluate their worth.<br />

The bank performed this service automatically when it took the<br />

coins into its vault. Each was evaluated, and the receipt given for it<br />

was an accurate reflection of its intrinsic worth. The public,<br />

therefore, was far more certain of the value of the paper receipts<br />

than of many of the coins and, consequently, was willing to<br />

exchange a little bit more for them.<br />

Unfortunately, with the passage of time and the fading from<br />

memory of previous banking abuses, the Venetian Senate eventually<br />

succumbed to the temptation of credit. Strapped for funds and<br />

not willing to face the voters with a tax increase, the politicians<br />

decided they would authorize a new bank without restrictions<br />

against loans, have the bank create the money they needed, and<br />

then "borrow" it. So, in 1619, the Banco del Giro was formed, which,<br />

like its bankrupt predecessor, began immediately to create money<br />

out of nothing for the purpose of lending it to the government.<br />

Eighteen years later, the Banco della Piazza del Rialto was absorbed<br />

into the new bank, and history's first tiny flame of sound banking<br />

sputtered and died.<br />

Throughout the fifteenth<br />

and sixteenth centuries, banks had<br />

been springing up all over Europe. Almost without exception,<br />

however, they followed the lucrative practice of lending money<br />

which was not truly available for loan. They created excess<br />

obligations against their reserves and, as a result, every one of them<br />

failed. That is<br />

not to say that their owners and directors did not<br />

prosper. It merely means that their depositors lost all or a part of<br />

their assets entrusted for safekeeping.<br />

THE BANK OF AMSTERDAM<br />

It wasn't until the Bank of Amsterdam was founded in 1609 that<br />

we find a second example of sound banking practices, and the<br />

results were virtually the same as previously experienced by the<br />

Banco della Piazza del Rialto, The bank only accepted deposits and<br />

THE SECRET SCIENCE 173<br />

steadfastly refused to make loans. Its income was derived solely<br />

All payments in and around Amsterdam soon<br />

from service fees.<br />

came to be made in paper currency issued by the bank and, in fact,<br />

that currency carried a premium over coin itself. The burgomasters<br />

and the city council were required to take an annual oath swearing<br />

that the coin reserve of the bank was intact. Galbraith reminds us:<br />

For a century after its founding it functioned usefully and with<br />

notably strict rectitude. Deposits were deposits, and initially the metal<br />

remained in storage for the man who owned it until he transferred it to<br />

another. None was loaned out. In 1672, when the armies of Louis XIV<br />

approached Amsterdam, there was grave alarm. Merchants besieged<br />

the bank, some in the suspicion that their wealth might not be there.<br />

All who sought their money were paid, and when they found this to be<br />

so, they did not want payment. As was often to be observed in the<br />

future, however desperately people want their money from a bank,<br />

when they are assured they can get it, they no longer want it.<br />

The principles of honesty and restraint were not to be long<br />

lived, however. The temptation of easy profit from money creation<br />

was simply too great. As early as 1657, individuals had been<br />

permitted to overdraw their accounts which means, of course, that<br />

the bank created new money out of their debt. In later years<br />

enormous loans were made to the Dutch East Indies Company. The<br />

truth finally became known to the public in January of 1790, and<br />

demands for a return of deposits were steady from that date<br />

forward. Ten months later, the bank was declared insolvent and<br />

was taken over by the City of Amsterdam.<br />

THE BANK OF HAMBURG<br />

The third and last experience with honest banking occurred in<br />

Germany with the Bank of Hamburg. For over two centuries it<br />

faithfully adhered to the principle of safe deposit. So scrupulous<br />

was its administration that, when Napoleon took possession of the<br />

bank in 1813, he found 7,506,956 marks in silver held against<br />

liabilities of 7,489,343. That was 17,613 more than was actually<br />

needed. Most of the bank's treasure that Napoleon hauled away<br />

was restored a few years later by the French government in the<br />

form of securities. It is not clear if the securities were of much value<br />

but, even if they were, they were not the same as silver. Because of<br />

foreign invasion, the bank's currency was no longer fully convert-<br />

1- Galbraith, p. 16.


174 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND THE SECRET SCIENCE 175<br />

ible into coin as receipt money. It was now fractional mone>, and<br />

the self-destruct mechanism had been set in motion. The bank<br />

lasted another fifty-five years until 1871 when it was ordered to<br />

liquidate all of its accounts.<br />

That is the end of the short story of honest banking. From that<br />

point forward, fractional-reserve banking became the universaJ<br />

practice. But there were to be many interesting twists and turns in<br />

its development before it would be ready for something as sophisticated<br />

as the Federal Reserve System.<br />

EARLY BANKING IN ENGLAND<br />

In England, the first paper money was the exchequer order of<br />

Charles II. It was pure fiat and, although it was decreed legal<br />

tender, it was not widely used. It was replaced in 1696 by the<br />

exchequer bill. The bill was redeemable in gold, and the government<br />

went to great lengths to make sure that there was enough<br />

actual coin or bullion to make good on the pledge. In other words,<br />

it was true receipt money, and it became widely accepted as the<br />

medium of exchange. Furthermore, the bills were considered as<br />

short-term loans to the government and actually paid interest to the<br />

holders.<br />

In 1707, the recently created Bank of England was given the<br />

responsibility of managing this currency, but the bank found more<br />

profit in the circulation of its own banknotes, which were in the<br />

form of fractional money and which provided for the collection of<br />

interest, not the payment of it. Consequently, the government bills<br />

gradually passed out of use and were replaced by banknotes<br />

which, by the middle of the eighteenth century, became England's<br />

only paper money.<br />

It must be understood that, at this time, the Bank of England<br />

was not yet fully developed as a central bank. It had been given a<br />

monopoly over the issue of banknotes within London and other<br />

prime geographic areas, but they were not yet decreed as legal<br />

tender. No one was forced to use them. They were merely private<br />

fractional receipts for gold coin issued by a private bank which the<br />

public could accept, reject, or discount at its pleasure. Legal tender<br />

status was not conferred upon the bank's money until 1833.<br />

Meanwhile, Parliament had granted charters to numerous other<br />

banks throughout the empire and, without exception, the issuance<br />

of fractional money led to their ultimate demise and the ruin of<br />

their depositors. "Disaster after disaster had to come upon the<br />

country," says Shaw, because "of the indifference of the state to<br />

these mere private paper tokens." 1<br />

The Bank of England, however,<br />

was favored by the government above all<br />

time,<br />

others and, time after<br />

it was saved from insolvency by Parliament. How it came to<br />

be that way is an interesting story.<br />

THE BANK OF ENGLAND<br />

England was financially exhausted after half a century of war<br />

against France and numerous civil wars fought largely over<br />

excessive taxation. By the time of the War of the League of<br />

Augsberg in 1693, King William was in serious need for new<br />

revenue. Twenty years previously, King Charles II had flat out<br />

repudiated a debt of over a million pounds which had been lent to<br />

him by scores of goldsmiths, with the result that ten-thousand<br />

depositors lost their savings. This was still fresh in everyone's<br />

memory, and, needless to say, the government was no longer<br />

considered a good investment risk. Unable to increase taxes and<br />

unable to borrow, Parliament became desperate for some other<br />

way to obtain the money. The objective, says Groseclose, was not to<br />

bring "the money mechanism under more intelligent control, but to<br />

provide means outside the onerous sources of taxes and public<br />

loans for the financial requirements of an impecunious government."<br />

2<br />

There were two groups of men who saw a unique opportunity<br />

arise out of this necessity. The first group consisted of the political<br />

scientists within the government. The second was comprised of the<br />

monetary scientists from the emerging business of banking. The<br />

organizer and spokesman of this group was William Paterson from<br />

Scotland.<br />

Paterson had been to America and came back with a<br />

grandiose scheme to obtain a British charter for a commercial<br />

company to colonize the Isthmus of Panama, then known as<br />

Darien. The government was not interested in that,<br />

so Paterson<br />

turned his attention to a scheme that did interest it very much, the<br />

creation of money.<br />

The two groups came together and formed an alliance. No, that<br />

is too ~"<br />

soft a word. The American Heritage Dictionary defines a cabal<br />

1- W. A. Shaw, Theory and Principles of Central Banking (London & New York; Sir L<br />

* itman & Sons, Ltd, 1930), pp. 32-32.<br />

1


176 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

as "A conspiratorial group of plotters or intriguers/' There is no<br />

other word that could so accurately describe this group. With much<br />

of the same secrecy and mystery that surrounded the meeting on<br />

<strong>Jekyll</strong> Island, the Cabal met in Mercer's Chapel in London and<br />

hammered out a seven-point plan which would serve their mutual<br />

purposes:<br />

1. The government would grant a charter to the monetary scientists<br />

to form a bank;<br />

2. The bank would be given a monopoly to issue banknotes which<br />

would circulate as England's paper currency;<br />

3. The bank would create money out of nothing with only a fraction<br />

of its total currency backed by coin;<br />

4. The monetary scientists then would loan the government all the<br />

money it needed;<br />

5. The money created for government loans would be backed<br />

primarily by government I.O.U.s;<br />

6. Although this money was to be created out of nothing and would<br />

cost nothing to create, the government would pay "interest" on<br />

it at the rate of 8%;<br />

7. Government LO.U.s would also be considered as "reserves" for<br />

creating additional loan money for private commerce. These<br />

loans also would earn interest. Thus, the monetary scientists<br />

would collect double interest on the same nothing.<br />

The circular which was distributed to attract subscribers to the<br />

Bank's initial<br />

stock offering explained: "The Bank hath benefit of<br />

interest on all the moneys which it, the Bank, creates out of<br />

nothing/'<br />

The charter was issued in 1694, and a strange creature<br />

took its initial breath of life. It was the world's first central bank.<br />

Rothbard writes:<br />

1. For an overview of these agreements, see Murray Rothbard, The Mystery of<br />

Banking (New York: Richardson & Snyder, 1983), p. 180. Also Martin Mayer, The<br />

Bankers (New York: Weybright & Talley, 1974), pp. 24-25.<br />

2. Quoted by Carol! Quigley, Tragedy and Hope. A History of the World in Our Time<br />

(New York: Macmillan, 1966), p. 49. Paterson did not benefit from his own creation-<br />

He withdrew from the Bank over a policy disagreement within a few months after<br />

its formation and then returned to Scotland where he succeeded in selling his<br />

Darien scheme. Frugal Scots thronged to buy stock and to book passage to the<br />

fever-ridden land. The stock became worthless and almost all the 1200 colonists lost<br />

their lives.<br />

THE SECRET SCIENCE 177<br />

In short, since there were not enough private savers willing to<br />

finance the deficit, Paterson and his group were graciously willing to<br />

buy government bonds, provided they could do so with<br />

newly-created out-of-thin-air bank notes carrying a raft of special<br />

privileges with them. This was a splendid deal for Paterson and<br />

company, and the government benefited from the flimflam of a<br />

seemingly legitimate bank's financing their debts....<br />

As soon as the<br />

Bank of England was chartered in 1694, King William himself and<br />

various members of Parliament rushed to become shareholders of the<br />

new money factory they had just created. 1<br />

THE SECRET SCIENCE OF MONEY<br />

Both groups within the Cabal were handsomely rewarded for<br />

their efforts. The political scientists had been seeking about<br />

£500,000 to finance the current war. The Bank promptly gave them<br />

more than twice what they originally sought. The monetary<br />

scientists started with a pledged capital investment of £1,200,000.<br />

Textbooks tell us that this was lent to the government at 8%<br />

interest, but what is usually omitted is the fact that, at the time the<br />

loan was made, only £720,000 had been invested, which means the<br />

Bank "loaned" 66% more than it had on hand. 2 Furthermore, the<br />

Bauik was given the privilege of creating at least an equal amount of<br />

money in the form of loans to the public. So, after lending their<br />

capital to the government, they still had it available to loan out a<br />

second time.<br />

An honest loan of their £720,000 at 8% would have yielded<br />

£57,600 interest. But, with the new secret science, they were able to<br />

earn 8% on £1,200,000 given to the government plus an estimated<br />

9% on £720,000 loaned to the public. That adds up to £160,800,<br />

more than 22% on their investment. The real point, however, is<br />

that, under these circumstances, it is meaningless to talk about a<br />

rate of interest. When money is created out of nothing, the true<br />

interest rate is not 8% or 9% or even 22%. It is infinity.<br />

In this first official act of the world's first central bank can be<br />

seen the grand pretense that has characterized all those which have<br />

followed. The Bank pretended to make a loan but what it really did<br />

was to manufacture the money for government's use. If the government<br />

had done this directly, the fiat nature of the currency would<br />

I Rothbard, Mystery, p. 180.<br />

I See R.D. Richards, Ph.D., The Early History of Banking in England (New York-<br />

Augustus M. Kelley, original edition 1929, reprinted 1965), pp. 148-50.


178<br />

_ P CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

T]rm<br />

probably would not<br />

been immediately recognized, and it<br />

have been accepted at full face value in payment for the expenses of<br />

war. By creating money through the banking system, however, the<br />

process became mystifying to the general public. The newly created<br />

bills and notes were indistinguishable from those previously<br />

backed by coin, and the public was none the wiser.<br />

The reality of central banks, therefore—and we must not forget<br />

that the Federal Reserve System is such a creature—is that, under<br />

the guise of purchasing government bonds, they act as hidden<br />

money machines which can be activated any time the politicians<br />

want. This is<br />

must depend on taxes or the good credit of their treasury to raise<br />

money. It is even easier than printing and, because the process is<br />

a godsend to the political scientists who no longer<br />

not understood by the public, it is politically safe.<br />

The monetary scientists, of course, are amply paid for this<br />

service. To preserve the pretense of banking, it is said they collect<br />

interest, but this is a misnomer. They didn't lend money, they<br />

created it. Their compensation, therefore, should be called what it<br />

is: a professional fee, or commission, or royalty, or kickback,<br />

depending on your perspective, but not interest.<br />

FROM INFLATION TO BANK RUNS<br />

The new money created by the Bank of England splashed<br />

through the economy like rain in April. The country banks outside<br />

of the London area were authorized to create money on their own,<br />

but they had to hold a certain percentage of either coin or Bank of<br />

England certificates in reserve. Consequently, when these plentiful<br />

banknotes landed in their hands, they quickly put them into the<br />

vaults and then issued their own certificates in even greater<br />

amounts. As a result of this pyramiding effect, prices rose 100% in<br />

just two years. Then, the inevitable happened: There was a run on<br />

the bank, and the Bank of England could not produce the coin.<br />

When banks cannot honor their contracts to deliver coin in<br />

return for their receipts, they are, in fact, bankrupt. They should be<br />

allowed to go out of business and liquidate their assets to satisfy<br />

their creditors just like any other business. This, in fact, is what<br />

always had happened to banks which loaned out their deposits and<br />

created fractional money. Had this practice been allowed to continue,<br />

there is little doubt that people eventually would have<br />

understood that they simply do not want to do business with those<br />

THE SECRET SCIENCE 179<br />

kinds of banks. Through the painful but highly effective process of<br />

trial and error, mankind would have learned to distinguish real<br />

money from fool's gold. And the world would be a lot better<br />

because of it today.<br />

That, of course, was not allowed to happen. The Cabal is a<br />

partnership, and each of the two groups is committed to protect each<br />

other, not out of loyalty, but out of mutual self interest. They know<br />

that, if one falls, so does the other. It is not surprising, therefore<br />

that, when there was a run on the Bank of England, Parliament<br />

intervened. In May of 1696, just two years after the Bank was<br />

formed, a law was passed authorizing it to "suspend payment in<br />

specie." By force of law, the Bank was now exempted from having<br />

to honor its contract to return the gold.<br />

THE PATTERN OF PROTECTION WAS SET<br />

This was a fateful event in the history of money, because the<br />

precedent has been followed ever since. In Europe and America<br />

the banks have always operated with the assumption that their<br />

partners m government will come to their aid when they get into<br />

trouble. Politicians may speak about "protecting the public," but<br />

the underlining reality is that the government needs the fiat money<br />

produced by the banks. The banks, therefore-at least the bie<br />

ones- must not be allowed to fait Only a cartel with government<br />

KS 10n can ^W su


180 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

BOOMS AND BUSTS NOW GUARANTEED<br />

Once the Bank of England had been legally protected from the<br />

consequences of converting debt into money, the British economy<br />

was doomed to a nauseating roller-coaster ride of inflation, booms,<br />

and busts. The natural and immediate result was the granting of<br />

massive loans for just about any wild scheme imaginable. Why not?<br />

The money cost nothing to make, and the potential profits could be<br />

enormous. So the Bank of England, and the country banks which<br />

pyramided their own money supply on top of the Bank s supply,<br />

pumped a steady stream of new money into the economy. Great<br />

stock companies were formed and financed by this money. One<br />

was for the purpose of draining the Red Sea to recover the gold<br />

Egyptians when pursuing the Isrealites.<br />

supposedly lost by the<br />

£150,000,000 were siphoned into vague and fruitless ventures in<br />

South America and Mexico.<br />

The result of this flood of new money—how many times mus<br />

history repeat it?-was even more inflation. In 1810, the House of<br />

Commons created a special committee, called the Select Committee<br />

on the High Price of Gold Bullion, to explore the problem and to<br />

find a solution. The verdict handed down in the final report was a<br />

model of clarity. Prices were not going up, it said. The value of the<br />

currency was going down, and that was due to the fact that it was<br />

being created at a faster rate than the creation of goods to be<br />

purchased with it. The solution? The committee recommended that<br />

She notes of the Bank of England be made fully convertible into<br />

gold coin, thus putting a brake on the supply of money that could<br />

be created.<br />

IN DEFENSE OF THE GOLD STANDARD<br />

One of the most outspoken proponents of a true gold standard<br />

was a Jewish London stockbroker by the name of David Ricardc<br />

Ricardo argued that an ideal currency "should be absolutely<br />

invariable in value/' 1<br />

He conceded that precious metals were not<br />

perfect in this regard because they do shift in purchasing power to<br />

a small degree. Then he


182 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

THE SECRET SCIENCE 183<br />

their banknotes were backed by gold or silver. It was a good try,<br />

but it ultimately failed because it fell short on three counts: (1) It<br />

was a political compromise and was not strict enough, allowing the<br />

banks to still create lending money out of nothing to the extent of<br />

£14,000,000; in other words, a "fractional" amount thought to be<br />

safe at the time; (2) The limitation applied only to paper currency<br />

issued by the Bank. It did not apply to checkbook money, and that<br />

was then becoming the preferred form of exchange. Consequently,<br />

the scxalled reform did not even apply to the area where the<br />

greatest amount of abuse was taking place; and (3) The basic<br />

concept was allowed to remain unchallenged that man, in his<br />

infinite political wisdom, can determine what the money supply<br />

should be more effectively than an unmanaged system of gold or<br />

silver responding to the law of supply and demand.<br />

THE ROLLER COASTER CONTINUES<br />

Within three years of the "reform/' England faced another crisis<br />

with still more bank failures and more losses to depositors. But<br />

when the Bank of England tottered on the edge of insolvency, once<br />

again the government intervened. In 1847, the Bank was exempted<br />

from the legal reserve requirements of the Peel Act. Such is the<br />

rock-steady dependability of man-made limits to the money<br />

supply.<br />

Groseclose continues the stoiy:<br />

Ten years later, in 1857, another crisis occurred, due to excessive<br />

and unwise lending as a result of over-optimism regarding foreign<br />

trade prospects. The bank found itself in the same position as in 1847,<br />

and similar measures were taken. On this occasion the bank was<br />

forced to use the authority to increase its fiduciary [debt-based money]<br />

issue beyond the limit imposed by the Bank Charter Act.. .<br />

Again in 1866, the growth of banking without sufficient attention<br />

to liquidity, and the use of bank credit to support a speculative<br />

craze...prepared the way for a crash which was finally precipitated by<br />

the failure of the famous house of Overend, Gurney and Co. The Act of<br />

1844 was once more suspended...<br />

In 1890, the Bank of England once again faced crisis, again the<br />

result of widespread and excessive speculation in foreign securities,<br />

particularly American and Argentine. This time it was the failure of<br />

Baring Brothers that precipitated the crash.<br />

1. Groseclose, Money and Man, pp. 195-96. tUity<br />

THE MECHANISM SPREADS TO OTHER COUNTRIES<br />

It is an incredible fact of history that, in spite of the general and<br />

recurring failures of the Bank of England during these years, the<br />

central-bank mechanism was so attractive to the political and<br />

monetary scientists that it became the model for all of Europe. The<br />

Rank of Prussia became the Reichsbank. Napoleon established the<br />

Banque de France. A few decades later, the concept became the<br />

venerated model for the Federal Reserve System. Who cares if the<br />

scheme is destructive? Here is the perfect tool for obtaining<br />

unlimited funding for politicians and endless profits for bankers.<br />

And, best of all, the little people who pay the bills for both groups<br />

have practically no idea what is being done to them.<br />

SUMMARY<br />

The business of banking began in Europe in the fourteenth<br />

century. Its function was to evaluate, exchange, and safeguard<br />

people's coins. In the beginning, there were notable examples of<br />

totally<br />

honest banks which operated with remarkable efficiency<br />

considering the vast variety of coinage they handled. They also<br />

issued paper receipts which were so dependable they freely<br />

circulated as money and cheated no one in the process. But there<br />

was a great demand for more money and more loans, and the<br />

temptation soon caused the bankers to seek easier paths. They<br />

began lending out pieces of paper that said they were receipts, but<br />

which in fact were counterfeit. The public could not tell one from<br />

the other and accepted both of them as money. From that point<br />

forward, the receipts in circulation exceeded the gold held in<br />

reserve, and the age of fractional-reserve banking had dawned.<br />

This led immediately to what would become an almost unbroken<br />

record from then to the present: a record of inflation, booms and<br />

busts, suspension of payments, bank failures, repudiation of currencies,<br />

and recurring spasms of economic chaos.<br />

The Bank of England was formed in 1694 to institutionalize<br />

fractional-reserve banking. As the world's first central bank, it<br />

introduced the concept of a partnership between bankers and<br />

politicians. The politicians would receive spendable money (created<br />

out of nothing by the bankers) without having to raise taxes. In<br />

return,<br />

the bankers would receive a commission on the transaction—deceptively<br />

called interest—which would continue in perpetuity.<br />

Since it all seemed to be wrapped up in the mysterious rituals


184 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

of banking, which the common man was not expected to understand,<br />

there was practically no opposition to the scheme. The<br />

arrangement proved so profitable to the participants that it soon<br />

spread to many other countries in Europe and, eventually, to the<br />

United States.<br />

Chapter Ten<br />

THE MANDRAKE<br />

MECHANISM<br />

The method by which the Federal Reserve creates<br />

money out of nothing; the concept of usury as the<br />

payment of interest on pretended loans; the true<br />

cause of the hidden tax called inflation; the way in<br />

which the Fed creates boom-bust cycles.<br />

In the 1940s, there was a comic strip character called Mandrake<br />

the Magician. His specialty was creating things out of nothing and,<br />

when appropriate, to make them disappear back into that same<br />

void. It is fitting, therefore, that the process to be described in this<br />

section should be named in his honor.<br />

In the previous chapters, we examined the technique developed<br />

by the political and monetary scientists to create money out of nothing<br />

for the purpose of lending. This is not an entirely accurate<br />

description because it implies that money is created first and then<br />

waits for someone to borrow it. On the other hand, <strong>text</strong>books on<br />

banking often state that money is created out of debt. This also is<br />

misleading because it implies that debt exists first and then is<br />

converted into money. In truth, money is not created until the<br />

instant it is borrowed. It is the act of borrowing which causes it to<br />

spring into existence. And, incidentally, it is the act of paying off the<br />

debt that causes it to vanish. There is no short phrase that perfectly<br />

describes that process. So, until one is invented along the way, we<br />

shall continue using the phrase "create money out of nothing" and<br />

occasionally add "for the purpose of lending" where necessary to<br />

further clarify the meaning.<br />

B Printed Federal Reserve Notes that sit in the Treasury's vault do not become<br />

money until they are released into circulation in exchange for checkbook money<br />

that was created by a bank loan. As long as the bills are in the vault with no<br />

debt-based money to replace them, they technically are just paper, not money.


186 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

So, let us now leave the historical figures of the past and jump<br />

into their "future/' in other words, into our present, and see just how<br />

far this money/debt-creation process has been carried—and how it<br />

works.<br />

The first fact that needs to be considered is that our money today<br />

has no gold or silver behind it whatsoever. The fraction is not 54%<br />

nor 15%. It is 0%. It has travelled the path of all previous fractional<br />

money in history and already has degenerated into pure fiat money.<br />

The fact that most of it is in the form of checkbook balances rather<br />

than paper currency is a mere technicality; and the fact that bankers<br />

speak about "reserve ratios" is eye wash. The so-called reserves to<br />

which they refer are, in fact, Treasury bonds and other certificates of<br />

debt .<br />

Our money is pure fiat through and through.<br />

The second fact that needs to be clearly understood is that, in<br />

spite of the technical jargon and seemingly complicated procedures,<br />

the actual mechanism by which the Federal Reserve creates money<br />

is quite simple. They do it exactly the same way the goldsmiths of<br />

old did except, of course, the goldsmiths were limited by the need to<br />

hold some precious metal in reserve, whereas the Fed has no such<br />

restriction.<br />

THE FEDERAL RESERVE IS CANDID<br />

The Federal Reserve itself is amazingly frank about this process.<br />

A booklet published by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York tells<br />

us: "Currency cannot be redeemed, or exchanged, for Treasury gold<br />

or any other asset used as backing. The question of just what assets<br />

'back' Federal Reserve notes has little but bookkeeping significance."<br />

Elsewhere in the same publication we are told: "Banks are creating<br />

money based on a borrower's promise to pay (the IOU)... Banks<br />

create money by 'monetizing' the private debts of businesses and<br />

individuals."<br />

In a booklet entitled Modern Money Mechanics, the Federal<br />

Reserve Bank of Chicago says:<br />

In the United States neither paper currency nor deposits have<br />

value as commodities. Intrinsically, a dollar bill is just a piece of paper.<br />

Deposits are merely book entries. Coins do have some intrinsic value<br />

as metal, but generally far less than their face amount.<br />

1. I Bet You Thought, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, p. 11.<br />

2. Ibid., p. 19.<br />

THE MANDRAKE MECHANISM 187<br />

What, then, makes these instruments—checks, paper money, and<br />

coins—acceptable at face value in payment of all debts and for other<br />

monetary uses? Mainly, it is the confidence people have that they will<br />

be able to exchange such money for other financial assets and real<br />

goods and services whenever they choose to do so. This partly is a<br />

matter of law; currency has been designated "legal tender" by the<br />

government—that is, it must be accepted. 1<br />

In the fine print of a footnote in a bulletin of the Federal Reserve<br />

Bank of St. Louis, we find this surprisingly candid explanation:<br />

Modern monetary systems have a fiat base—literally money by<br />

decree—with depository institutions, acting as fiduciaries, creating<br />

obligations against themselves with the fiat base acting in part as<br />

reserves. The decree appears on the currency notes: "This note is legal<br />

tender for all debts, public and private." While no individual could<br />

refuse to accept such money for debt repayment, exchange contracts<br />

could easily be composed to thwart its use in everyday commerce.<br />

However, a forceful explanation as to why money is accepted is that<br />

the federal government requires it as payment for tax liabilities.<br />

Anticipation of the need to clear this debt creates a demand for the<br />

pure fiat dollar.<br />

MONEY WOULD VANISH WITHOUT DEBT<br />

It is<br />

difficult for Americans to come to grips with the fact that<br />

their total money supply is backed by nothing but debt, and it<br />

even more mind boggling to visualize that, if everyone paid back all<br />

that was borrowed, there would be no money left<br />

is<br />

in existence. That's<br />

right, there would be not one penny in circulation—all coins and all<br />

paper currency would be returned to bank vaults—and there would<br />

be not one dollar in any one's checking account. In short, all money<br />

would disappear.<br />

Marriner Eccles was the Governor of the Federal Reserve System<br />

in 1941. On September 30 of that year, Eccles was asked to give<br />

testimony before the House Committee on Banking and Currency.<br />

The purpose of the hearing was to obtain information regarding the<br />

role of the Federal Reserve in creating conditions that led to the depression<br />

of the 1930s. Congressman Wright Patman, who was<br />

Chairman of that committee, asked how the Fed got the money to<br />

- Modern Money Mechanics, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, revised October<br />

1982, p. 3.<br />

2. "Money, Credit and Velocity," Review, May, 1982, Vol. 64, No. 5, Federal<br />

Reserve Bank of St. Louis, p. 25.


188 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

THE MANDRAKE MECHANISM 189<br />

purchase two billion dollars worth of government bonds in 1933.<br />

This is the exchange that followed.<br />

ECCLES: We created it.<br />

PATMAN: Out of what?<br />

ECCLES: Out of the right to issue credit money.<br />

PATMAN: And there is nothing behind it,<br />

is there, except oux<br />

government's credit?<br />

ECCLES: That is what our money system is. If there were no<br />

debts in our money system, there wouldn't be any money.<br />

It must be realized that, while money may represent an asset to<br />

selected individuals, when it is considered as an aggregate of the<br />

total money supply, it is not an asset at all. A man who borrows<br />

$1,000 may think that he has increased his financial position by that<br />

amount but he has not. His $1,000 cash asset is offset by his $1,000<br />

loan liability, and his net position is zero. Bank accounts are exactly<br />

the same on a larger scale. Add up all<br />

nation, and it would be easy to assume that all<br />

the bank accounts in the<br />

that money represents<br />

a gigantic pool of assets which support the economy. Yet,<br />

every bit of this money is owed by someone. Some will owe<br />

nothing. Others will owe many times what they possess. All added<br />

together, the national balance is zero. What we think is money is but<br />

a grand illusion. The reality is debt.<br />

Robert Hemphill was the Credit Manager of the Federal Reserve<br />

Bank in Atlanta. In the foreword to a book by Irving Fisher, entitled<br />

100% Money, Hemphill said this:<br />

If all the bank loans were paid, no one could have a bank deposit,<br />

and there would not be a dollar of coin or currency in circulation. This<br />

is a staggering thought. We are completely dependent on the<br />

commercial banks. Someone has to borrow every dollar we have in<br />

circulation, cash, or credit. If the banks create ample synthetic money<br />

we are prosperous; if not, we starve. We are absolutely without a<br />

permanent money system. When one gets a complete grasp of the<br />

picture, the tragic absurdity of our hopeless situation is almost<br />

1<br />

incredible—but there it is.<br />

With the knowledge that money in America is based on debt, it<br />

should not come as a surprise to learn that the Federal Reserve<br />

System is not the least interested in seeing a reduction in debt in this<br />

1. Irving Fisher, 100% Money (New York: Adelphi, 1936), p. xxii.<br />

country, regardless of public utterances to the contrary. Here is the<br />

bottom line from the System's own publications. The Federal<br />

Reserve Bank of Philadelphia says: "A large and growing number of<br />

analysts, on the other hand, now regard the national debt as something<br />

useful, if not an actual blessing... . [They believe] the national<br />

debt need not be reduced at all."<br />

The Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago adds: "Debt — public and<br />

private—is here to stay. It plays an essential role in economic processes..<br />

What . .<br />

is required is not the abolition of debt, but its prudent<br />

use and intelligent management. "2<br />

WHAT'S WRONG WITH A LITTLE DEBT?<br />

There is a kind of fascinating appeal to this theory. It gives those<br />

who expound it an aura of intellectualism, the appearance of being<br />

able to grasp a complex economic principle that is beyond the comprehension<br />

of mere mortals. And, for the less academically minded,<br />

it offers the comfort of at least sounding moderate. After all, whafs<br />

wrong with a little debt, prudently used and intelligently managed?<br />

The answer is nothing, provided the debt is based on an honest transaction.<br />

There is plenty wrong with it if it is based upon fraud.<br />

An honest transaction is one in which a borrower pays an<br />

agreed upon sum in return for the temporary use of a lender's asset.<br />

That asset could be anything of tangible value. If it were an automobile,<br />

for example, then the borrower would pay "rent." If it is<br />

money, then the rent is called "interest." Either way, the concept is<br />

the same.<br />

When we go to a lender—either a bank or a private party—and<br />

receive a loan of money, we are willing to pay interest on the loan in<br />

recognition of the fact that the money we are borrowing is an asset<br />

which we want to use. It seems only fair to pay a rental fee for that<br />

asset to the person who owns it. It is not easy to acquire an automobile,<br />

and it is not easy to acquire money real money, that is. If the<br />

money we are borrowing was earned by someone's labor and talent,<br />

they are fully entitled to receive interest on it.<br />

But what are we to<br />

Wnk of money that is created by the mere stroke of a pen or the<br />

click of a computer key? Why should anyone collect a rental fee on<br />

that?<br />

] TheNational Debt, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, pp. 2, 11<br />

2<br />

- Two Faces of Debt, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, p. 33.


190 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

When banks place credits into your checking account, they are<br />

merely pretending to lend you money. In reality, they have nothing<br />

to lend. Even the money that non-indebted depositors have placed<br />

with them was originally created out of nothing in response to<br />

someone else's loan. So what entitles the banks to collect rent on<br />

nothing? It is immaterial that men everywhere are forced by law to<br />

accept these nothing certificates in exchange for real goods and<br />

services. We are talking here, not about what is legal, but what is<br />

moral. As Thomas Jefferson observed at the time of his protracted<br />

battle against central banking in the United States, "No one has a<br />

natural right to the trade of money lender, but he who has money to<br />

lend/' 1<br />

THIRD REASON TO ABOLISH THE SYSTEM<br />

Centuries ago, usury was defined as any interest charged for a<br />

loan. Modern usage has redefined it as excessive interest. Certainly,<br />

any amount of interest charged for a pretended loan is excessive. The<br />

dictionary, therefore, needs a new definition. Usury: The charging of<br />

any interest on a loan offiat money.<br />

Let us, therefore, look at debt and interest in this light Thomas<br />

Edison summed up the immorality of the system when he said:<br />

People who will not turn a shovel full of dirt on the project nor<br />

contribute a pound of materials will collect more money...than will the<br />

people who will supply all the materials and do all the work<br />

Is that an exaggeration? Let us consider the purchase of a<br />

$100,000 home in which $30,000 represents the cost of the land,<br />

architect's fee, sales commissions, building permits, and that sort of<br />

thing and $70,000 is the cost of labor and building materials. If the<br />

home buyer puts up $30,000 as a down payment, then $70,000 must<br />

be borrowed. If the loan is issued at 11% over a 30-year period, the<br />

amount of interest paid will be $167,806. That means the amount<br />

paid to those who loan the money is about 2 V2 times greater than<br />

1. The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Library Edition (Washington: Jefferson Memorial<br />

Association, 1903), Vol XIII, p. 277-78.<br />

2. As quoted by Brian L. Bex, The Hidden Hand (Spencer, Indiana: Owen Litho,<br />

1975), p. 161. Unfortunately, Edison did not understand the whole problem. He was<br />

correctly opposed to paying interest to banks for their fiat money, but he was not<br />

opposed to government fiat money. It was only the interest to which he objected. He<br />

did not see the larger picture of how fiat money, even when issued solely by the<br />

government and without interest has always been destructive of the economy<br />

through the creation of inflation, booms, and busts.<br />

THE MANDRAKE MECHANISM 191<br />

paid to those who provide all the labor and all the materials. It is<br />

that this figure represents the time-value of that money over<br />

true<br />

thirty years and easily could be justified on the basis that a lender<br />

deserves to be compensated for surrendering the use of his capital<br />

for half a lifetime. But that assumes the lender actually had something<br />

to surrender, that he had earned the capital, saved it, and then<br />

loaned it for construction of someone else's house. What are we to<br />

think, however, about a lender who did nothing to earn the money,<br />

had not saved it, and, in fact, simply created it out of thin air? What<br />

is the time-value of nothing?<br />

As we have already shown, every dollar that exists today, either<br />

in the form of currency, checkbook money, or even credit card<br />

money—in other words, our entire money supply—exists only<br />

because it was borrowed by someone; perhaps not you, but someone.<br />

That means all the American dollars in the entire world are earning<br />

daily and compounded interest for the banks which created them. A<br />

portion of every business venture, every investment, every profit,<br />

every transaction which involves money—and that even includes<br />

losses and the payment of taxes—a portion of all that is earmarked as<br />

payment to a bank. And what did the banks do to earn this perpetually<br />

flowing river of wealth? Did they lend out their own capital<br />

obtained through the investment of stockholders? Did they lend out<br />

the hard-earned savings of their depositors? No, neither of these<br />

were their major source of income. They simply waved the magic<br />

wand called fiat money.<br />

The flow of such unearned wealth under the guise of interest<br />

can only be viewed as usury of the highest magnitude. Even if there<br />

were no other reasons to abolish the Fed, the fact that it is the supreme<br />

instrument of usury would be more than sufficient by itself.<br />

WHO CREATES THE MONEY TO PAY THE INTEREST?<br />

One of the most perplexing questions associated with this process<br />

is "Where does the money come from to pay the interest?" If you<br />

borrow $10,000 from a bank at 9%, you owe $10,900. But the bank<br />

Only manufactures $10,000 for the loan. It would seem, therefore,<br />

that there is no way that you—and all others with similar loans<br />

can possibly pay off your indebtedness. The amount of money put<br />

into circulation just isn't enough to cover the total debt, including<br />

interest. This has led some to the conclusion that it is necessary for<br />

you to borrow the $900 for the interest, and that, in turn, leads to still


192 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

more interest. The assumption is that, the more we borrow, the more<br />

we have to borrow, and that debt based on fiat money is a neverending<br />

spiral leading inexorably to more and more debt.<br />

This is a partial truth. It is true that there is not enough money<br />

created to include the interest, but it is a fallacy that the only way to<br />

pay it back is to borrow still more. The assumption fails to take into<br />

account the exchange value of labor. Let us assume that you pay<br />

back your $10,000 loan at the rate of approximately $900 per month<br />

and that about $80 of that represents interest. You realize you are<br />

hard pressed to make your payments so you decide to take on a<br />

part-time job. The bank, on the other hand, is now making $80 profit<br />

each month on your loan. Since this amount is classified as "interest,"<br />

it is not extinguished as is the larger portion which is a return<br />

of the loan itself. So this remains as spendable money in the account<br />

of the bank. The decision then is made to have the bank's floors<br />

waxed once a week. You respond to the ad in the paper and are<br />

hired at $80 per month to do the job. The result is that you earn the<br />

money to pay the interest on your loan, and—this is the point—the<br />

money you receive is the same money which you previously had<br />

paid. As long as you perform labor for the bank each month, the<br />

same dollars go into the bank as interest, then out the revolving<br />

door as your wages, and then back into the bank as loan repayment.<br />

It is not necessary that you work directly for the bank. No matter<br />

where you earn the money, its origin was a bank and its ultimate<br />

destination is a bank. The loop through which it travels can be large<br />

or small, but the fact remains all interest is paid eventually by<br />

human effort. And the significance of that fact is even more startling<br />

than the assumption that not enough money is created to pay back<br />

the interest. It is that the total of this human effort ultimately is for<br />

the benefit of those who create fiat money. It is a form of modern<br />

serfdom in which the great mass of society works as indentured<br />

servants to a ruling class of financial nobility.<br />

UNDERSTANDING THE ILLUSION<br />

That's really all<br />

one needs to know about the operation of the<br />

banking cartel under the protection of the Federal Reserve. But it<br />

would be a shame to stop here without taking a look at the actual<br />

cogs, mirrors, and pulleys that make the magical mechanism work.<br />

It is<br />

a truly fascinating engine of mystery and deception. Let us,<br />

therefore, turn our attention to the actual process by which the<br />

THE MANDRAKE MECHANISM 193<br />

magicians create the illusion of modern money. First we shall stand<br />

back for a general view to see the overall action. Then we shall move<br />

in closer and examine each component in detail.<br />

THE MANDRAKE MECHANISM: AN OVERVIEW<br />

DEBT<br />

The entire function of this machine is<br />

to convert debt<br />

into money. It's just that simple. First, the Fed takes all<br />

the government bonds which the public does not buy<br />

and writes a check to Congress in exchange for them. (It<br />

acquires other debt obligations as well, but government<br />

bonds comprise most of its inventory.) There is no<br />

money to back up this check. These fiat dollars are created<br />

on the spot for that purpose. By calling those bonds<br />

"reserves," the Fed then uses them as the base for creating<br />

9 additional dollars for every dollar created for the<br />

bonds themselves. The money created for the bonds is<br />

spent by the government, whereas the money created on<br />

top of those bonds is the source of all the bank loans<br />

made to the nation's businesses and individuals. The<br />

result of this process is the same as creating money on a<br />

printing press, but the illusion is based on an accounting<br />

trick rather than a printing trick. The bottom line is that<br />

Congress and the banking cartel have entered into a<br />

partnership in which the cartel has the privilege of<br />

collecting interest on money which it creates out of nothing,<br />

a perpetual override on every American dollar that<br />

exists in the world. Congress, on the other hand, has<br />

access to unlimited funding without having to tell<br />

the<br />

voters their taxes are being raised through the process of<br />

inflation. If you understand this paragraph, you understand<br />

the Federal Reserve System.<br />

MONEY<br />

Now for a more detailed view. There are three general ways in<br />

which the Federal Reserve creates fiat money out of debt. One is by<br />

making loans to the member banks through what is called the<br />

Discount Window. The second is by purchasing Treasury bonds and


194 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

other certificates of debt through what is called the Open Market<br />

Committee. The third is by changing the so-called reserve ratio that<br />

member banks are required to hold. Each method is merely a different<br />

path to the same objective: taking in IOUs and converting them<br />

into spendable money.<br />

THE DISCOUNT WINDOW<br />

The Discount Window is merely bankers' language for the loan<br />

window. When banks run short of money, the Federal Reserve<br />

stands ready as the "bankers' bank" to lend it. There are many reasons<br />

for them to need loans. Since they hold "reserves" of only<br />

about one or two per cent of their deposits in vault cash and eight or<br />

nine per cent in securities, their operating margin is extremely thin.<br />

It is common for them to experience temporary negative balances<br />

caused by unusual customer demand for cash or unusually large<br />

clusters of checks all clearing through other banks at the same time.<br />

Sometimes they make bad loans and, when these former "assets"<br />

are removed from their books, their "reserves" are also decreased<br />

and may, in fact, become negative. Finally, there is the profit motive.<br />

When banks borrow from the Federal Reserve at one interest rate<br />

and lend it out at a higher rate, there is an obvious advantage. But<br />

that is merely the beginning. When a bank borrows a dollar from the<br />

Fed, it becomes a one-dollar reserve. Since the banks are required to<br />

keep reserves of only about ten per cent, they actually can loan up to<br />

nine dollars for each dollar borrowed.<br />

Let's take a look at the math. Assume the bank receives $1 million<br />

from the Fed at a rate of 8%. The total annual cost, therefore, is<br />

$80,000 (.08 X $1,000,000). The bank treats the loan as a cash deposit,<br />

which means it becomes the basis for manufacturing an additional<br />

$9 million to be lent to its customers. If we assume that it lends that<br />

money at 11% interest, its gross return would be $990,000 (.11 X<br />

$9,000,000). Subtract from this the bank's cost of $80,000 plus an<br />

appropriate share of its overhead, and we have a net return of about<br />

$900,000. In other words, the bank borrows a million and can almost<br />

1. This 10% figure (ten-to-one ratio) is based on averages. The Federal Reserve<br />

requires a minimum reserve of 10% on deposits over $46.8 million but only 3% on<br />

deposits up to that amount. Deposits in Eurodollars and nonpersonal time deposits<br />

require no reserves at all. Reserves consist of vault cash and deposits at the Federal<br />

Reserve. See Regulation D; Reserve Requirements of Depositor]/ Institutions, Federal<br />

Reserve document 12 CFR 204; as amended effective December 22, 1992, p. 23.<br />

THE MANDRAKE MECHANISM 195<br />

double it in one year. 1<br />

That's leverage] But don't forget the source of<br />

that leverage: the manufacture of another $9 million which is added<br />

to the nation's money supply.<br />

THE OPEN MARKET OPERATION<br />

The most important method used by the Federal Reserve for the<br />

creation of fiat money is the purchase and sale of securities on the<br />

open market. But, before jumping into this, a word of warning.<br />

Don't expect what follows to make any sense. Just be prepared to<br />

know that this is how they do it.<br />

The trick lies in the use of words and phrases which have technical<br />

meanings quite different from what they imply to the average<br />

citizen. So keep your eye on the words. They are not meant to<br />

explain but to deceive. In spite of first appearances, the process is<br />

not complicated. It is just absurd.<br />

THE MANDRAKE MECHANISM: A DETAILED VIEW<br />

Start with...<br />

GOVERNMENT DEBT<br />

The federal government adds ink to a piece of paper,<br />

creates impressive designs around the edges, and calls it<br />

a bond or Treasury note. It is merely a promise to pay a<br />

specified sum at a specified interest on a specified date.<br />

As we shall see in the following steps, this debt eventually<br />

becomes the foundation for almost the entire<br />

nation's money supply. 2 In reality, the government has<br />

created cash, but it doesn't yet look like cash. To convert<br />

these IOUs into paper bills and checkbook money is the<br />

function of The Federal Reserve System. To bring about<br />

that transformation, the bond is given to the Fed where it<br />

is then classified as a ...<br />

(Continued on next page)<br />

I lite banks must cover these loans with bonds or other interest-bearing assets<br />

wnich it possesses, but that does not diminish the money-multiplier<br />

new effect of the<br />

deposit.<br />

r<br />

I Debt obligations from the private sector and from other governments also are<br />

used in the same way, but government bonds are the primary instruments.


196 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

THE MANDRAKE MECHANISM<br />

197<br />

(Continued from previous page)<br />

SECURITIES ASSET<br />

An instrument of government debt is<br />

considered an<br />

asset because it is assumed the government will keep its<br />

promise to pay. This is based upon its ability to obtain<br />

whatever money it needs through taxation. Thus, the<br />

strength of this asset is the power to take back that which<br />

it<br />

gives. So the Federal Reserve now has an "asset"<br />

which can be used to offset a liability. It then creates this<br />

liability by adding ink to yet another piece of paper and<br />

exchanging that with the government in return for the<br />

asset. That second piece of paper is a ...<br />

FEDERAL RESERVE CHECK<br />

There is no money in any account to cover this check.<br />

Anyone else doing that would be sent to prison. It is<br />

legal for the Fed, however, because Congress wants the<br />

money, and this is the easiest way to get it. (To raise<br />

taxes would be political suicide; to depend on the public<br />

to buy all the bonds would not be realistic, especially if<br />

interest rates are set artificially low; and to print very<br />

large quantities of currency would be obvious and controversial.)<br />

This way, the process is mysteriously<br />

wrapped up in the banking system. The end result, however,<br />

is the same as turning on government printing<br />

presses and simply manufacturing fiat money (money<br />

created by the order of government with nothing of tangible<br />

value backing it) to pay government expenses. Yet,<br />

in accounting terms, the books are said to be balanced"<br />

because the liability of the money is offset by the "asset"<br />

of the IOU. The Federal Reserve check received by the<br />

government then is endorsed and sent back to one of the<br />

Federal Reserve banks where it now becomes a ...<br />

i<br />

c<br />

c<br />

(Continued from previous page)<br />

GOVERNMENT DEPOSIT<br />

Once the Federal Reserve check has been deposited into<br />

the government's account, it is used to pay government<br />

expenses and, thus, is transformed into many ...<br />

GOVERNMENT CHECKS<br />

These checks become the means by which the first wave<br />

of fiat money floods into the economy. Recipients now<br />

deposit them into their own bank accounts where they<br />

become ...<br />

COMMERCIAL BANK DEPOSITS<br />

Commercial bank deposits immediately take on a split<br />

personality. On the one hand, they are liabilities to the<br />

bank because they are owed back to the depositors. But,<br />

as long as they remain in the bank, they also are considered<br />

as assets because they are on hand. Once again, the<br />

books are balanced: the assets offset the liabilities. But<br />

the process does not stop there. Through the magic of<br />

fractional-reserve banking, the deposits are made to<br />

serve an additional and more lucrative purpose. To<br />

accomplish this, the on-hand deposits now become<br />

reclassified in the books and called ...<br />

BANK RESERVES<br />

Reserves for what? Are these for paying off depositors<br />

should they want to close out their accounts? No. That's<br />

the lowly function they served when they were classified<br />

as mere assets. Now that they have been given the name<br />

of "reserves," they become the magic wand to materialize<br />

even larger amounts of fiat money. This is where the<br />

real action is: at the level of the commercial banks. Here's<br />

how it works. The banks are permitted by the Fed to<br />

hold as little as 10% of their deposits in "reserve." That<br />

means, if<br />

they receive deposits of $1 million from the<br />

first wave of fiat money created by the Fed, they have


198 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

$900,000 more than they are required to keep on hand<br />

($1 million less 10% reserve). In bankers' language, that<br />

$900,000 is called ...<br />

EXCESS RESERVES<br />

The word "excess" is a<br />

tipoff that these so-called<br />

reserves have a special destiny. Now that they have been<br />

transmuted into an excess, they are considered as available<br />

for lending. And so in due course these excess<br />

reserves are converted into ...<br />

BANK LOANS<br />

But wait a minute. How can this money be loaned out<br />

when it is owned by the original depositors who are still<br />

free to write checks and spend it any time they wish?<br />

Isn't that a double claim against the same money? The<br />

answer is that, when the new loans are made, they are<br />

not made with the same money at all. They are made<br />

with brand new money created out of thin air for that<br />

purpose. The nation's money supply simply increases by<br />

ninety per cent of the bank's deposits. Furthermore, this<br />

new money is far more interesting to the banks than the<br />

old. The old money, which they received from depositors,<br />

requires them to pay out interest or perform services<br />

for the privilege of using it. But, with the new<br />

money, the banks collect interest, instead, which is not<br />

too bad considering it cost them nothing to make. Nor is<br />

that the end of the process. When this second wave of hat<br />

money moves into the economy, it comes right back into<br />

the banking system, just as the first wave did, in the form<br />

of...<br />

MORE COMMERCIAL BANK DEPOSITS<br />

The process now repeats but with slightly smaller numbers<br />

each time around. What was a "loan" on Friday<br />

comes back into the bank as a "deposit" on Monday. The<br />

deposit then is reclassified as a "reserve" and ninety per<br />

cent of that becomes an "excess" reserve which, once<br />

again, is available for a new "loan." Thus, the $1 million<br />

THE MANDRAKE MECHANISM 199<br />

of first wave fiat money gives birth to $900,000 in the<br />

second wave, and that gives birth to $810,000 in the third<br />

wave ($900,000 less 10% reserve). It takes about twentyeight<br />

times through the revolving door of deposits<br />

becoming loans becoming deposits becoming more<br />

loans until the process plays itself out to the maximum<br />

effect, which is...<br />

BANK FIAT MONEY = UP TO 9 TIMES GOVERNMENT<br />

The amount of fiat money created by the banking cartel<br />

is approximately nine times the amount of the original<br />

government debt which made the entire process possible.<br />

When the original debt itself is added to that figure,<br />

we finally have ...<br />

[TOTAL FIAT MONEY = UP TO 10 TIMES GOVERNMENT<br />

[*•<br />

The total amount of fiat money created by the Federal<br />

Reserve and the commercial banks together is approximately<br />

ten times the amount of the underlying government<br />

debt. To the degree that this newly created money<br />

floods into the economy in excess of goods and services,<br />

it causes the purchasing power of all money, both old<br />

and new, to decline. Prices go up because the relative<br />

value of the money has gone down. The result is the<br />

same as if that purchasing power had been taken from us<br />

in taxes. The reality of this process, therefore, is that it is<br />

a ...<br />

HIDDEN TAX = UP TO 10 TIMES THE NATIONAL DEBT<br />

Without realizing it,<br />

Americans have paid over the<br />

years, in addition to their federal income taxes and excise<br />

taxes, a completely hidden tax equal to many times the<br />

national debt! And that still is not the end of the process.<br />

Since our money supply is purely an arbitrary entity<br />

with nothing behind it except debt, its quantity can go<br />

That is a theoretical maximum. In actual practice, the banks can seldom loan out<br />

all of the money they are allowed to create, and the numbers fall short of the<br />

rciaximum.


200 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

down as well as up. When people are going deeper into<br />

debt, the nation's money supply expands and prices go<br />

up, but when they pay off their debts and refuse to<br />

renew, the money supply contracts and prices rumble.<br />

That is exactly what happens in times of economic or<br />

political uncertainty. This alternation between periods of<br />

expansion and contraction of the money supply is the<br />

underlying cause of ...<br />

BOOMS, BUSTS, AND DEPRESSIONS<br />

Who benefits from all of this? Certainly not the average<br />

citizen. The only beneficiaries are the political scientists<br />

in Congress who enjoy the effect of unlimited revenue to<br />

perpetuate their power, and the monetary scientists<br />

within the banking cartel called the Federal Reserve<br />

System who have been able to harness the American<br />

people, without their knowing it, to the yoke of modern<br />

feudalism.<br />

RESERVE RATIOS<br />

The previous figures are based on a "reserve" ratio of 10% (a<br />

money-expansion ratio of 10-to-l). It must be remembered, however,<br />

that this is purely arbitrary. Since the money is fiat with no<br />

precious-metal backing, there is no real limitation except what the<br />

politicians and money managers decide is expedient for the<br />

moment. Altering this ratio is the third way in which the Federal<br />

Reserve can influence the nation's supply of money. The numbers,<br />

therefore, must be considered as transient. At any time there is a<br />

"need" for more money, the ratio can be increased to 20-to-l or 50-<br />

to-1, or the pretense of a reserve can be dropped altogether. There is<br />

virtually no limit to the amount of fiat money that can be manufactured<br />

under the present system.<br />

NATIONAL DEBT NOT NECESSARY FOR INFLATION<br />

Because the Federal Reserve can be counted on to "monetize"<br />

(convert into money) virtually any amount of government debt, and<br />

because this process of expanding the money supply is the primary<br />

cause of inflation, it is tempting to jump to the conclusion that federal<br />

debt and inflation are but two aspects of the same phenomenon.<br />

This, however, is not necessarily true. It is quite possible to have<br />

either one without the other.<br />

THE MANDRAKE MECHANISM 201<br />

The banking cartel holds a monopoly in the manufacture of<br />

money. Consequently, money is created only when lOUs are<br />

"monetized" by the Fed or by commercial banks. When private<br />

individuals, corporations, or institutions purchase government<br />

bonds, they must use money they have previously earned and<br />

saved. In other words, no new money is created, because they are<br />

using funds that are already in existence. Therefore, the sale of government<br />

bonds to the banking system is inflationary, but when sold<br />

to the private sector, it is not . That is the primary reason the United<br />

States avoided massive inflation during the 1980s when the federal<br />

government was going into debt at a greater rate than ever before in<br />

its history. By keeping interest rates high, these bonds became<br />

attractive to private investors, including those in other countries.<br />

Very little new money was created, because most of the bonds were<br />

purchased with American dollars already in existence. This, of<br />

course, was a temporary fix at best. Today, those bonds are continually<br />

maturing and are being replaced by still more bonds to include<br />

the original debt plus accumulated interest. Eventually this process<br />

must come to an end and, when it does, the Fed will have no choice<br />

but to literally buy back all the debt of the '80s—that is, to replace all<br />

of the formerly invested private money with newly manufactured<br />

fiat money— plus a great deal more to cover the interest. Then we<br />

will understand the meaning of inflation.<br />

On the other side of the coin, the Federal Reserve has the option<br />

of manufacturing money even if the federal government does not go<br />

deeper into debt. For example, the huge expansion of the money<br />

supply leading up to the stock market crash in 1929 occurred at a<br />

time when the national debt was being paid off. In every year from<br />

1920 through 1930, federal revenue exceeded expenses, and there<br />

were relatively few government bonds being offered. The massive<br />

inflation of the money supply was made possible by converting<br />

commercial bank loans into "reserves" at the Fed's discount window<br />

and by the Fed's purchase of banker's acceptances, which are<br />

commercial contracts for the purchase of goods.<br />

Now the options are even greater. The Monetary Control Act of<br />

1980 has made it possible for the Creature to monetize virtually any<br />

1. Only about 11 to 15 per cent of the federal debt at that time was held by the<br />

Federal Reserve System.<br />

2. See chapter twenty-three.


:<br />

202 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND THE MANDRAKE MECHANISM 203<br />

debt instrument, including IOUs from foreign governments. The<br />

apparent purpose of this legislation is to make it possible to bail out<br />

those governments which are having trouble paying the interest on<br />

their loans from American banks. When the Fed creates fiat Ameri~<br />

can dollars to give foreign governments in exchange for their worthless<br />

bonds, the money path is slightly longer and more twisted, but<br />

the effect is similar to the purchase of U.S. Treasury Bonds. The<br />

newly created dollars go to the foreign governments, then to the<br />

American banks where they become cash reserves. Finally, they<br />

flow back into the U.S. money pool (multiplied by nine) in the form<br />

of additional loans. The cost of the operation once again is born by<br />

the American citizen through the loss of purchasing power. Expansion<br />

of the money supply, therefore, and the inflation that follows,<br />

no longer even require federal deficits. As long as someone is willing<br />

to borrow American dollars, the cartel will have the option of creating<br />

those dollars specifically to purchase their bonds and, by so doing,<br />

continue to expand the money supply.<br />

We must not forget, however, that one of the reasons the Fed<br />

was created in the first place was to make it possible for Congress to<br />

spend without the public knowing it was being taxed. Americans<br />

have shown an amazing indifference to this fleecing, explained<br />

undoubtedly by their lack of understanding of how the Mandrake<br />

Mechanism works. Consequently, at the present time, this cozy contract<br />

between the banking cartel and the politicians is in little danger<br />

of being altered. As a practical matter, therefore, even though the<br />

Fed may also create fiat money in exchange for commercial debt<br />

and for bonds of foreign governments, its major concern likely will<br />

be to continue supplying Congress.<br />

The implications of this fact are mind boggling. Since our money<br />

supply, at present at least, is tied to the national debt, to pay off that<br />

debt would cause money to disappear. Even to seriously reduce it<br />

would cripple the economy. 1<br />

Therefore, as long as the Federal<br />

Reserve exists, America will be, must be, in debt.<br />

The purchase of bonds from other governments is accelerating<br />

in the present political climate of internationalism. Our own money<br />

1. With the Fed holding only 7% of the national debt, the effect would still be<br />

devastating. Since the money supply is pyramided ten times on top of the underlying<br />

government bonds, each $1 eliminated from the federal debt would cause the<br />

money supply to shrink by 70


204 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

generates our most unfair tax. Both the tax and the System that makes<br />

it possible should be abolished.<br />

The political scientists who authorize this process of monetizing<br />

the national debt, and the monetary scientists who carry it out,<br />

know that it is not true debt. It is not true debt, because no one in<br />

Washington really expects to repay it ever. The dual purpose of<br />

this magic show is simply to create free spending money for the<br />

politicians, without the inconvenience of raising direct taxes, and<br />

also to generate a perpetual river of gold flowing into the banking<br />

cartel. The partnership is merely looking out for itself.<br />

Why, then, does the federal government bother with taxes at all?<br />

Why not just operate on monetized debt? The answer is twofold<br />

First, if it did, people would begin to wonder about the source of the<br />

money, and that might cause them to wake up to the reality that<br />

inflation is a tax. Thus, open taxes at some level serve to perpetuate<br />

public ignorance which is essential to the success of the scheme. The<br />

second reason is that taxes, particularly progressive taxes, are weapons<br />

by which elitist social planners can wage war on the middle<br />

class.<br />

A TOOL FOR SOCIAL PLANNING<br />

The January 1946 issue of American Affairs carried an article written<br />

by Beardsley Ruml who, at that time, was Chairman of the Federal<br />

Reserve Bank of New York. Ruml had devised the system of<br />

automatic withholding during World War II,<br />

so he was well qualified<br />

to speak on the nature and purpose of the federal income tax.<br />

His theme was spelled out in the title of his article: "Taxes for Revenue<br />

Are Obsolete."<br />

In an introduction to the article, the magazine's editor summarized<br />

Ruml's views as follows:<br />

His thesis is that, given control of a central banking system and an<br />

inconvertible currency [a currency not backed by gold], a sovereign<br />

national government is finally free of money worries and needs no<br />

longer levy taxes for the purpose of providing itself with revenue. All<br />

taxation, therefore, should be regarded from the point of view of social<br />

and economic consequences.<br />

Ruml explained that, since the Federal Reserve now can create<br />

out of nothing all the money the government could ever want, there<br />

Iof<br />

THE MANDRAKE MECHANISM 205<br />

remain only two reasons to have taxes at all. The first of these is to<br />

combat a rise in the general level of prices. His argument was that,<br />

when people have money in their pockets, they will spend it for<br />

goods and services, and this will bid up the prices. The solution, he<br />

says, is to take the money away from them through taxation and let<br />

the government spend it instead. This, too, will bid up prices, but<br />

Ruml chose not to go into that He explained his theory this way:<br />

The dollars the government spends become purchasing power in<br />

the hands of the people who have received them. The dollars the<br />

government takes by taxes cannot be spent by the people, and<br />

therefore, these dollars can no longer be used to acquire the things<br />

which are available for sale. Taxation is, therefore, an instrument of the<br />

first importance in the administration of any fiscal and monetary<br />

policy.<br />

REDISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH<br />

The other purpose of taxation, according to Ruml, is to redistribute<br />

the wealth from one class of citizens to another. This must<br />

always be done in the name of social justice or equality, but the real<br />

objective is to override the free market and bring society under the<br />

control of the master planners. Ruml said:<br />

The second principle purpose of federal taxes is to attain more<br />

equality of wealth and of income than would result from economic<br />

forces working alone. The taxes which are effective for this purpose<br />

are the progressive individual income tax, the progressive estate tax,<br />

and the gift tax. What these taxes should be depends on public policy<br />

with respect to the distribution of wealth and of income. These taxes<br />

should be defended and attacked in terms of their effect on the<br />

character of American life, not as revenue measures. 2<br />

As we have seen, Senator Nelson Aldrich was one of the creators<br />

of the Federal Reserve System. That is not surprising in light of the<br />

cai cartel nature of the System and the financial interests which he represented.<br />

Aldrich also was one of the prime sponsors of the federal<br />

come tax. The two creations work together as a far more delicate<br />

mechanism for control over the economic and social life of society<br />

than either one alone.<br />

In more recent years, there has been hopeful evidence that the<br />

master planners were about to abandon Ruml's blueprint. We have<br />

1. "Taxes for Revenue Are Obsolete/' by Beardsley Ruml, American Affairs,<br />

January, 1946, p. 35.<br />

* Ruml, p. 36.<br />

2<br />

- Ibid., p. 36.


206 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND THE MANDRAKE MECHANISM 207<br />

heard a great deal both in Congress and at the Federal Reserve<br />

about the necessity of reducing expenses so as to diminisn the<br />

growth of federal debt and inflation. But it has been lip service only,<br />

The great bulk of federal funding continues to be created by the<br />

Mandrake Mechanism, the cost of government continues to outpace<br />

tax revenues, and the Ruml formula reigns supreme.<br />

EXPANSION LEADS TO CONTRACTION<br />

While it is true that the Mandrake Mechanism is responsible for<br />

the expansion of the money supply, the process also works in<br />

reverse. Just as money is created when the Federal Reserve purchases<br />

bonds or other debt instruments, it is extinguished by the sale of<br />

those same items. When they are sold, the money is given back to<br />

the System and disappears into the inkwell or computer chip from<br />

which it came. Then, the same secondary ripple effect that created<br />

money through the commercial banking system causes it to be withdrawn<br />

from the economy. Furthermore, even if the Federal Reserve<br />

does not deliberately contract the money supply, the same result<br />

can and often does occur when the public decides to resist the availability<br />

of credit and reduce its debt. A man can only be tempted to<br />

borrow, he cannot be forced to do so.<br />

There are many psychological factors involved in a decision to<br />

go into debt that can offset the easy availability of money and a low<br />

interest rate: A downturn in the economy, the threat of civil disorder,<br />

the fear of pending war, an uncertain political climate, to name<br />

just a few. Even though the Fed may try to pump money into the<br />

economy by making it abundantly available, the public can thwart<br />

that move simply by saying no, thank you. When this happens, the<br />

old debts that are being paid off are not replaced by new ones to<br />

take their place, and the entire amount of consumer and business<br />

debt will shrink. That means the money supply also will shrink,<br />

because, in modern America, debt is money. And it is this very<br />

expansion and contraction of the monetary pool—a phenomenon<br />

that could not occur if based upon the laws of supply and<br />

demand—that is at the very core of practically every boom and bust<br />

that has plagued mankind throughout history.<br />

In conclusion, it can be said that modern money is a grand illu~<br />

sion conjured by the magicians of finance and politics. We are living<br />

in an age of fiat money, and it is sobering to realize that every previous<br />

nation in history that has adopted such money eventually was<br />

economically destroyed by it. Furthermore, there is nothing in our<br />

present monetary structure that offers any assurance that we may<br />

be exempted from that morbid roll call.<br />

Correction. There is one. It is still within the power of Congress<br />

to abolish the Federal Reserve System.<br />

SUMMARY<br />

The American dollar has no intrinsic value. It is a classic example<br />

of fiat money with no limit to the quantity that can be produced.<br />

Its primary value lies in the willingness of people to accept it and, to<br />

that end, legal tender laws require them to do so. It is true that our<br />

money is created out of nothing, but it is more accurate to say that it<br />

is based upon debt. In one sense, therefore, our money is created out<br />

of less than nothing. The entire money supply would vanish into<br />

bank vaults and computer chips if all debts were repaid. Under the<br />

present System, therefore, our leaders cannot allow a serious reduction<br />

in either the national or consumer debt. Charging interest on<br />

pretended loans is usury, and that has become institutionalized<br />

under the Federal Reserve System. The Mandrake Mechanism by<br />

which the Fed converts debt into money may seem complicated at<br />

first, but it is simple if one remembers that the process is not<br />

intended to be logical but to confuse and deceive. The end product<br />

of the Mechanism is artificial expansion of the money supply which<br />

is the root cause of the hidden tax called inflation. This expansion<br />

then leads to contraction and, together, they produce the destructive<br />

boom-bust cycle that has plagued mankind throughout history<br />

wherever fiat money has existed.


Cecil Rhodes made one of the<br />

world's greatest fortunes of the 18th<br />

century. Financed by Nathan<br />

Rothschild and the Bank of England,<br />

he established a monopoly over the<br />

diamond output of South Africa and<br />

most of the gold as well. He formed<br />

a secret society which included<br />

many of the top leaders of British<br />

government. Their elitist goal was<br />

nothing less than world domination<br />

and the establishment of a modern<br />

feudalist society controlled by<br />

themselves through the world's<br />

central banks. In America, the<br />

Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)<br />

was an outgrowth of that group.<br />

August Belmont came to New York<br />

in 1837 as the financial agent of the<br />

Rothschilds. He funneled vast<br />

amounts of capital into American I<br />

investments, often without anyone }<br />

knowing whose money he was<br />

Library of Congress Library of Congress<br />

spending. The purpose of<br />

J .P. Morgan, Sr. (left)<br />

concealment was to blunt the<br />

was brought into banking by his father, Junius Morgan, in<br />

growing anti-Rothschild nesentmer<br />

:ngland. The Morgans were friendly competitors with the Rothschilds and became<br />

that was then prevalent in Europe socially close to them. Morgan's London-based firm was saved from financial ruin in<br />

1857<br />

as well as America. When his<br />

by the Bank of England over which the Rothschilds held great influence,<br />

affiliation became commonly kno ^hereafter, Morgan appears to have served as a Rothschild financial agent and went<br />

his usefulness came to an end ar<br />

tC)<br />

great length to appear totally American.<br />

he was replaced by J.P. Morgan. °bn D. Rockefeller (right) made his initial fortune in oil but soon gravitated into<br />

Ranking and finance. His entry into the field was not welcomed by Morgan, and they<br />

came fierce competitors. Eventually, they decided to minimize their competition by<br />

tering into joint ventures. In the end, they worked together to create a national<br />

inking cartel called the Federal Reserve System.


'DEE'LlGhTED'"<br />

K 1<br />

I<br />

r w A LL<br />

111 *r".i' ST.<br />

M<br />

Above is the clubhouse for the<br />

private resort on <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island in<br />

Georgia where the Federal Reserve<br />

great<br />

System was conceived in<br />

secrecy in 1910. It is shown here<br />

shortly after completion.<br />

Jekytl Island Muset/i<br />

Jacob Schiff (right) was head of the<br />

New York investment firm, Kuhn,<br />

Loeb & Co. He was one of the<br />

principal backers of the Bolshevik<br />

revolution and personally financed<br />

Trotsky's trip from New York to<br />

Russia. He was a major contributor to<br />

Woodrow Wilson's presidential<br />

campaign and an advocate for<br />

passage of the Federal Reserve Act.<br />

This cartoon by Robert Minor appeared in the St Louis Post-Dispatch in<br />

1 91 1 . It shows Karl Marx surrounded by enthusiastic Wall Street financiers:<br />

Morgan partner George Perkins; J.P. Morgan; John Ryan of National City<br />

Bank; John D. Rockefeller; and Andrew Carnegie. Immediately behind<br />

Marx is Teddy Roosevelt, leader of the Progressive Party.<br />

upi/b^


J<br />

Harry Dexter White (left) and<br />

John Maynard Keynes (right)<br />

were the theoreticians who<br />

guided the 1944 Bretton Woods<br />

Monetary Conference at which<br />

the IMF/World Bank was<br />

created. White was a member of<br />

the Communist Party. Keynes<br />

was a member of the Fabian<br />

Society. They shared the same<br />

goal of international socialism.<br />

The IMF/World Bank has<br />

furthered that goal ever since.<br />

Edward Mandell House was the<br />

man who secured Wood row<br />

Wilson's nomination for<br />

President and who, thereafter,<br />

became the hidden power at the<br />

White House. He negotiated a<br />

secret agreement to draw the<br />

U.S. into World War I at the very<br />

time Wilson was campaigning<br />

on the promise to keep America<br />

out of the war. On behalf of Wall<br />

Street, House lobbied Congress<br />

to pass the Federal Reserve Act.<br />

Macr<br />

National Archives<br />

Raymond Robins is shown here as<br />

the Chairman of the Progressive PaW<br />

convention in Chicago in 1912. He<br />

later became head of the American<br />

Red Cross Mission in Russia after th*<br />

Bolshevik revolution. Although he<br />

represented Wall Street interests,^<br />

was a disciple of Cecil Rhodes and ,<br />

was anti-capitalist in his beliefs- He<br />

held great influence over Lenin.<br />

Carroll Quigley was a professor of<br />

Nstory at Georgetown University. His<br />

book, Tragedy and Hope, revealed<br />

mat the Council on Foreign Relations<br />

(CFR) is an outgrowth of the secret<br />

society formed by Cecil Rhodes.<br />

He wrote the history of how an<br />

international network of financiers<br />

bas created a system of financial<br />

control able to dominate the political<br />

systems of all countries through their<br />

central banks. He named names and<br />

Provided meticulous documentation.<br />

His book was suppressed.<br />

I IDI/Roiirrtann


l<br />

Winston Churchill was the First Lord of the<br />

Admiralty in World War I. As the Lusitania,<br />

'<br />

entered into an area where a German<br />

U-Boat was known to be operating, he<br />

called off the destroyer escort that had been<br />

assigned to protect her. He calculated that<br />

the destruction of a British ship with U.S.<br />

passengers aboard would inflame Amencan<br />

passions against Germany and help create a<br />

political climate for coming into the war.<br />

Hulton Deutsch<br />

Section III<br />

THE NEW<br />

ALCHEMY<br />

U.S. Army Pictoral Service<br />

The ancient alchemists sought in vain to convert<br />

lead into gold. Modern alchemists have<br />

succeeded in that quest. The lead bullets of war<br />

have yielded an endless source of gold for those<br />

magicians who control the Mandrake<br />

Mechanism. The startling fact emerges that,<br />

without the ability to create fiat money, most<br />

modern wars simply would not have occurred.<br />

As long as the Mechanism is allowed to function,<br />

future wars are inevitable. This is the story of how<br />

that came to pass.<br />

Lord Mersey (right) was put in charge of<br />

an official inquiry into the sinking of the<br />

Lusitania. It was not an investigation but a<br />

coverup. He was instructed by the<br />

Admiralty to place the entire blame on the<br />

Captain of the ship. Mersey obeyed his<br />

orders but refused payment for his<br />

services and declined to accept further<br />

judicial assignments. In later years, he<br />

said the affair "was a damn dirty business."


Chapter Eleven<br />

THE ROTHSCHILD<br />

FORMULA<br />

The rise of the House of Rothschild in Europe; the<br />

tradition among financiers of profiting from both<br />

sides of armed conflict; the formula by which war<br />

is<br />

converted into debt and debt converted back<br />

into war.<br />

So far we have adhered closely to the subject of money and the<br />

history of its manipulation by political and monetary scientists.<br />

Now we are going to take a short detour along a parallel path and<br />

view some of the same historical scenery from a different perspective.<br />

As we progress, it may seem that we have lost our way, and<br />

you may wonder what connection any of this can possibly have<br />

with the Federal Reserve System. Please be assured, however, it has<br />

everything to do with it,<br />

and, when we finally return to that topic,<br />

the connection will have become painfully clear.<br />

THE PROFITS OF WAR<br />

The focus of this chapter is<br />

on the profits of war and, more<br />

specifically, the tendency of those who reap those profits to<br />

manipulate governments into military conflicts, not for national or<br />

patriotic reasons, but for private gain. The mechanism by which<br />

this was accomplished in the past was more complex than simply<br />

lending money to warring governments and then collecting interest,<br />

although that was part of it The real payoff has always been in<br />

the form of political favoritism in the market place. Writing in the<br />

year 1937, French historian Richard Lewinsohn explains:<br />

Although often called bankers, those who financed wars in the<br />

pre-capitalist period ... were not bankers in the modern sense of the<br />

word. Unlike modern bankers who operate with money deposited<br />

with them by their clients [or, in more recent times, created out of<br />

nothing by a central bank—E.G.], they generally worked with the<br />

fortune which they themselves had amassed or inherited, and which


218 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

they lent at a high rate of interest Thus those who risked the financing<br />

of a war were for the most part already very rich, and this was the case<br />

down to the seventeenth century.<br />

When they agreed to finance a war, these rich lenders did not,<br />

however, always attach great importance to the rate of interest In this<br />

respect they often showed the greatest compliance to their august<br />

clients. But in return they secured for themselves privileges which<br />

could be turned into industrial or commercial profit, such as mining<br />

concessions, monopolies of sale or importation, etc. Sometimes even<br />

they were given the right to appropriate certain taxes as a guarantee of<br />

their loans. So though the loan itself carried a very real risk and often<br />

did not bring in much interest, the indirect profits were very<br />

considerable, and the lenders' leniency well rewarded.<br />

THE ROTHSCHILD DYNASTY<br />

No discussion of banking as a mechanism for financing wars<br />

would be complete without turning eventually to the name<br />

Rothschild. It was Mayer Amschel Rothschild who is quoted as<br />

saying: "Let me issue and control a nation's money and I care not<br />

who writes the laws.<br />

the Rothschild dynasty had: "...conquered<br />

Biographer Frederic Morton concluded that<br />

the world more thoroughly,<br />

more cunningly, and much more lastingly than all the<br />

Ceasars before or all the Hitlers after them." The dynasty was<br />

begun in Frankfurt, Germany, in the middle of the eighteenth<br />

century by Mayer Amschel Bauer, the son of a goldsmith. Mayer<br />

became a clerk in the Oppenheimer Bank in Hanover and was<br />

eventually promoted to junior partner. After his father's death, he<br />

returned to his home in Frankfurt to continue the family business.<br />

Over the door hung a red shield with an eagle as a sign to identify<br />

the establishment. The German words for red shield are roth schild,<br />

so he changed his name from Bauer to Rothschild and added five<br />

gold arrows held in the talons of the eagle to represent his five sons.<br />

1 Richard Lewinsohn, The Profits of War through the Ages (New York: E.P. Dutton,<br />

1937), pp. 55-56.<br />

2. Quoted by Senator Robert L. Owen, former Chairman of the Senate Committee<br />

on Banking and Currency and one of the sponsors of the Federal Reserve Act,<br />

National Economy and the Banking System, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government<br />

Printing Office, 1939), p. 99. This quotation could not be verified in a primary<br />

reference work. However, when one considers the life and accomplishments of the<br />

elder Rothschild, there can be little doubt that this sentiment was, in fact, his<br />

outlook and guiding principle.<br />

3. Frederic Morton, The Rothschilds: A Family Portrait (New York: Atheneum, 1962),<br />

p. 14.<br />

of<br />

THE ROTHSCHILD FORMULA 219<br />

The Rothschild fortune began when Mayer adopted the practice<br />

fractional-reserve banking. As we have seen, he was not alone in<br />

this, but the House of Rothschild greatly surpassed the competition.<br />

That was due to his sharp business acumen and also because<br />

of his five most unusual sons, all of whom became financial power<br />

centers of their own. As they matured and learned the magic of<br />

converting debt into money, they moved beyond the confines of<br />

Frankfurt and established additional operations in the financial<br />

centers, not only of Europe, but of much of the civilized world.<br />

Throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, the brothers<br />

conducted important transactions on behalf of the governments of<br />

England, France, Prussia, Austria, Belgium, Spain, Naples,<br />

Portugal, Brazil, various German states, and other smaller countries.<br />

They were the personal bankers of many of the crowned<br />

heads of Europe. They made large investments, through agents, in<br />

markets as distant as the United States, India, Cuba, and Australia.<br />

They were financiers to Cecil Rhodes, making it possible for him to<br />

establish a monopoly over the diamond fields of South Africa. They<br />

are still connected with the de Beers.<br />

Biographer Derek Wilson writes:<br />

Those who lampooned or vilified the Rothschilds for their<br />

"sinister" influence had a considerable amount of justification for their<br />

anger and anxiety. The banking community had always constituted a<br />

"fifth estate" whose members were able, by their control of royal purse<br />

strings, to affect important events. But the house of Rothschild was<br />

immensely more powerful than any financial empire that had ever<br />

preceded it. It commanded vast wealth. It was international. It was<br />

independent. Royal governments were nervous of it because they<br />

could not control it. Popular movements hated it because it was not<br />

answerable to the people. Constitutionalists resented it because its<br />

influence was exercised behind the scenes—secretly.<br />

Secrecy, of course, is essential for the success of a cabal, and the<br />

Rothschilds perfected the art. By remaining behind the scenes, they<br />

Were able to avoid the brunt of public anger which was directed,<br />

instead, at the political figures which they largely controlled. This is<br />

a technique which has been practiced by financial<br />

1- Morton, pp. 145, 219.<br />

manipulators<br />

2, Derek Wilson, Rothschild: The Wealth and Power of A Dynasty (New York: Charles<br />

Scribner's Sons, 1988), pp. 79, 98^-99.


,<br />

meet<br />

220 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

ever since, and it is fully utilized by those who operate the Federal<br />

Reserve System today. Wilson continues:<br />

Clandestinity was and remained a feature of Rothschild political<br />

activity. Seldom were they to be seen engaging in open public debate<br />

on important issues. Never did they seek government office. Even<br />

when, in later years, some of them entered parliament, they did not<br />

feature prominently in the assembly chambers of London, Paris or<br />

Berlin. Yet all the while they were helping to shape the major events of<br />

the day: by granting or withholding funds; by providing statesmen<br />

with an official diplomatic service; by influencing appointments to<br />

high office; and by an almost daily intercourse with the great decision<br />

makers.<br />

A FORTUNE IN SMUGGLING<br />

Continual war in Europe created excellent opportunities for<br />

profit from smuggling scarce consumer goods past military blockades.<br />

Since the Rothschilds often financed both sides in a conflict<br />

and were known to have great political influence, the mere sight of<br />

the red shield on a leather pouch, a carriage, or a ship's flag was<br />

sufficient to insure that the messenger or his cargo could pass<br />

through check points in either direction. This immunity allowed<br />

them to deal in a thriving black market for cotton goods, yarn,<br />

tobacco, coffee, sugar, and indigo; and they moved freely through<br />

the borders of Germany, Scandinavia, Holland, Spain, England,<br />

and France. This government protection was one of those indirect<br />

benefits that generated commercial profits far in excess of the<br />

interest received on the underlying government loans.<br />

It is generally true that, one man's loss is another man's gain.<br />

And even the friendliest of biographers admit that, for more than<br />

two centuries, the House of Rothschild profited handsomely from<br />

wars and economic collapses, the very occasions on which others<br />

sustained the greatest losses.<br />

NAPOLEON VS THE BANKERS<br />

If one picture is worth a thousand words, then one example<br />

surely must be worth a dozen explanations. There is no better<br />

example than the economic war waged by the financiers of<br />

nineteenth-century Europe against Napoleon Bonaparte. It is an<br />

easily forgotten fact of history that Napoleon had restored law and<br />

1. Derek Wilson, p. 99.<br />

2. Morton, pp. 40-41.<br />

f THE ROTHSCHILD FORMULA 221<br />

order to a chaotic, post-revolutionary France and had turned his<br />

attention, not to war, but to establishing peace and improving<br />

economic conditions at home. He was particularly anxious to get<br />

jus country and his people out of debt and out of the control of<br />

bankers. R. McNair Wilson, in Monarchy or Money Power, says:<br />

It was ordained by him that money should not be exported from<br />

France on any pre<strong>text</strong> whatever except with the consent of the<br />

Government, and that in no circumstance should loans be employed to<br />

current expenditure whether civil or military. . . . "One has only to<br />

consider," Napoleon remarked, "what loans can lead to in order to<br />

realize their danger. Therefore, I would never have anything to do<br />

with them and have always striven against them."...<br />

The object was to withhold from finance the power to embarrass<br />

the Government as it had embarrassed the Government of Louis XVI.<br />

When a Government, Bonaparte declared, is dependent for money<br />

upon bankers, they and not the leaders of that Government control the<br />

situation, since "the hand that gives is above the hand that takes."...<br />

"Money/' he declared, "has no motherland; financiers are without<br />

patriotism and without decency: their sole object is gain."<br />

One of Napoleon's first blows against the bankers was to<br />

establish an independent Bank of France with himself as president.<br />

But even this bank was not trusted, and government funds were<br />

never placed into it It was his refusal to borrow, however, that<br />

caused the most concern among the financiers. Actually, to them<br />

this was a mixture of both bad and good news. The bad news was<br />

that they were denied the benefit of royalty payments on fractional<br />

money. The good news was that, without resorting to debt, they<br />

were confident Napoleon could not militarily defend himself. Thus,<br />

he easily could be toppled and replaced by Louis XVI of the old<br />

monarchic dynasty who was receptive to banker influence. Wilson<br />

continues:<br />

pi.<br />

They had good hope of compassing his downfall. None believed<br />

that he could finance war on a great scale now that the resource of<br />

paper money had been denied him by the destruction of the Assignaf<br />

Where would he obtain the indispensable gold and silver to feed and<br />

equip a great army? Pitt [the Prime Minister of England] counted<br />

already on a coalition of England, Austria, Prussia, Russia, Spain,<br />

R. McNair Wilson, Monarchy or Money Power (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode,<br />

Ltd., 1933), pp. 68, 72.<br />

2. The Assignat was pure fiat money which rapidly became totally worthless in<br />

commerce and which all but destroyed the French economy.


222 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND THE ROTHSCHILD FORMULA 223<br />

Sweden, and numerous small states. Some 600,000 men would be put<br />

the northern states, united with Canada, while the southern states<br />

into the field. All the resources of England's wealth—that is to say, of<br />

would fall to France. Napoleon was to be tempted by offering him<br />

the world's wealth—would be placed at the disposal of this<br />

the awesome title of "King of America." McNair Wilson tells us:<br />

overwhelming force. Could the Corsican muster 200,000? Could he<br />

arm them? Could he feed them? If the lead bullets did not destroy<br />

Labouchere wrote to Baring on March 21, and enclosed a note for<br />

him,<br />

[British Foreign Secretary] Wellesley dictated by Ouvrard which ran:<br />

the gold bullets would soon make an end. He would be forced, like his<br />

"From a conqueror he (Napoleon) is becoming a preserver; the<br />

neighbors, to come, hat in hand, for loans and, like them, to accept the<br />

first result of his marriage with Marie Louise will be that he will make<br />

banker's terms....<br />

He could not put his hands on £2,000,000, so empty was<br />

an offer of peace to England. It is to this nation's (i.e., England's)<br />

the<br />

interest to make peace, for it has the command of the sea; on the<br />

Treasury and so depleted the nation's stock of metallic money.<br />

contrary, it is really in the interest of France to continue war, which<br />

London waited with interest to see how the puzzle would be solved.<br />

allows her to expand indefinitely and make a fresh fleet, which cannot<br />

Napoleon solved the puzzle quite simply by selling off some<br />

be done once peace is established. Why does not the English Cabinet<br />

real estate. Those crazy Americans gave him £3,000,000 for a vast<br />

make a proposal to France to destroy the United States of America,<br />

and by making them again dependent on England, persuade<br />

swamp called Louisiana.<br />

Napoleon to lend his aid to destroy the life-work of Louis XVI?... It is<br />

A PLAN TO DESTROY THE UNITED STATES<br />

to her (England's) interest to conclude peace and to flatter Napoleon's<br />

Napoleon did not want war, but he knew that Europe's<br />

vanity by recognizing his work and his imperial title."...<br />

1. R. McNair Wilson, pp. 71-72. 1. R. McNair Wilson, pp. 81-82.<br />

financial rulers would not settle for peace—unless, of course, they<br />

The Cabinet discussed the proposals and approved them.<br />

were forced into it by the defeat of their puppet regimes or unless,<br />

Wellesley at once hurried to Baring's house to give him the good<br />

news....<br />

somehow, it would be to their monetary advantage. It was<br />

The Dutch would be able to pay and would be compelled to<br />

in<br />

pay in gold.<br />

pursuit of the latter tactic that he threatened to take direct possession<br />

of Holland, which then was ruled by his brother, King Louis.<br />

somewhat strong objections to the plan of a joint attack on the United<br />

Unhappily Napoleon found out what was afoot and took<br />

Napoleon knew that the Dutch were heavily in debt to the English<br />

States. He arrested Ouvrard, dismissed and exiled Fouche, and<br />

bankers. If Holland were to be annexed by France, this debt would<br />

published the whole story, to the grave distress of Wellesley and<br />

never be repaid. So Napoleon made a proposal to England's<br />

Baring.<br />

bankers that, if they would convince the English government to<br />

It must not be concluded from this that Napoleon was a<br />

accept peace with France, he would agree to leave Holland alone.<br />

paragon of virtue or a champion of honest money. His objection to<br />

The negotiations were handled by the banker, Pierre-Cesar<br />

the bankers was that their monetary power was able to threaten the<br />

Labouchere, who was sent by the Dutch, and the English banker,<br />

Sir Francis Baring who was Labouchere's father-in-law. Although<br />

sovereignty of his own political power. He allowed them a free<br />

hand while they served the purpose of the state. Then, when the<br />

this was an attractive proposal to the bankers, at least on a<br />

need for military financing subsided, he would condemn them for<br />

short-term basis, it was still against their nature to forego the<br />

making "unholy profits" and simply take it from them in the name<br />

immense profits of war and mercantilism. They revised the proposal,<br />

i'of the people. If the bankers protested, they were sent to prison.<br />

therefore, to include a plan whereby both England and<br />

And so the battle lines were drawn. Napoleon had to be<br />

France would combine forces to destroy the newly independent<br />

destroyed at all costs. To make this possible, the Bank of England<br />

United States and bring at least half of it—the industrial half—back<br />

created vast new amounts of fiat money to "lend" to the government<br />

so it could finance an overpowering army. A steady stream of<br />

under the domination of England. The incredible plan, conceived<br />

by the French banker, Ouvard, called for military invasion and<br />

gold flowed out of the country to finance the armies of Russia,<br />

conquest followed by division of the spoils. England would receive<br />

[Prussia, and Austria. The economy staggered once again under the


224 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

THE ROTHSCHILD FORMULA 225<br />

load of war debt, and the little people paid the bill with hardly a<br />

grumble because they hadn't the slightest knowledge it was being<br />

charged to their account. Wilson concludes the story:<br />

The bankers won. Louis XVIII was restored by British arms and<br />

British diplomacy to the throne of his ancestors. Loans were placed at<br />

his disposal, though Napoleon had left a France which enjoyed a credit<br />

balance.<br />

A year later the man whom every King and every banker in<br />

Europe called "usurper" won back his throne with 800 men and<br />

without the firing of a single shot. On this occasion he had no option<br />

but to raise a loan for the defense of France. The City of London<br />

[banking district] accommodated him with £5,000,000. With this sum<br />

he equipped the army which Wellington defeated at Waterloo.<br />

GOLD FOR THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON<br />

One of the most fascinating and revealing episodes to be<br />

recorded by Rothschild biographers concerns the smuggling of a<br />

large shipment of gold to finance the Duke of Wellington who was<br />

attempting to feed and equip an army in Portugal and in the<br />

Pyrenees mountains between Spain and France.<br />

It was not at all certain that Wellington would be able to defeat<br />

Napoleon in the coming battle, and the Duke was hard pressed to<br />

convince bankers and merchants in Portugal and Spain to accept<br />

his written promises-to-pay, even though they were officially<br />

guaranteed by the British government These notes were deeply<br />

discounted, and Wellington was desperate for gold coin. It was at<br />

this point that Nathan Rothschild offered the services of himself<br />

and his brothers. With an efficient smuggling apparatus already<br />

functioning throughout Europe, he was able to offer Wellington<br />

much better terms while still making a magnificent profit. But, to<br />

accomplish this, the gold had to pass right under Napoleon's nose.<br />

Frederic Morton describes the scene:<br />

There was only one way to route the cash: through the very France<br />

England's army was fighting. Of course, the Rothschild<br />

blockade-running machine already had superb cogs whirring all over<br />

Germany, Scandinavia and England, even in Spain and Southern<br />

France. But a very foxy new wheel was needed in Napoleon's capital<br />

itself. Enter Jacob—henceforth called James—the youngest of Mayer's<br />

sons.<br />

1. R. McNair Wilson, p. 83.<br />

2. Morton, p. 46.<br />

James was only nineteen years old but was well trained by his<br />

father in the art of deception. He arrived in Paris with a dual<br />

mission. First, he was to provide the French authorities with a false<br />

report about the British gold movement, with just enough truth in it<br />

lo sound convincing. He presented the government with falsified<br />

letters indicating that the English were desperate to halt the flow of<br />

their gold into France. The ploy paid off when the French authorities<br />

then actually encouraged the financial community to accept<br />

British gold and to convert it into commercially sound banknotes.<br />

Second, James was to serve as a vital link in a financial chain<br />

stretching between London and the Pyrenees. He was to coordinate<br />

the receipt of the gold into France, the conversion of that gold into<br />

Spanish banknotes, and the movement of those notes out of the<br />

country on their way to Wellington. All of this he did with amazing<br />

dexterity, especially considering his youth. Morton concludes:<br />

In the space of a few hundred hours Mayer's youngest had not<br />

only gotten the English gold rolling through France, but conjured a<br />

fiscal mirage that took in Napoleon himself. A teen-age Rothschild<br />

tricked the imperial government into sanctioning the very process that<br />

helped to ruin it...<br />

The family machine began to hum. Nathan sent big shipments of<br />

British guineas, Portuguese gold ounces, French napoleons d'or (often<br />

freshly minted in London) across the Channel. From the coast James<br />

saw them to Paris and secretly transmuted the metal into bills on<br />

certain Spanish bankers. South of the capital, Kalmann [another of<br />

Mayer's sons] materialized, took over the bills, blurred into a<br />

thousand shadowed canyons along the Pyrenees—and reappeared,<br />

with Wellington's receipts in hand. Salomon [another son] was<br />

everywhere, trouble-shooting, making sure the transit points were<br />

diffuse and obscure enough not to disturb either the French delusion<br />

or the British guinea rate. Amschel stayed in Frankfurt and helped<br />

father Mayer to staff headquarters.<br />

The French did catch a few whiffs of the<br />

truth. Sometimes the<br />

suspicious could be prosperously purged of their suspicion. The police<br />

chief of Calais, for example, suddenly was able to live in such<br />

distracting luxury that he found it difficult to patrol the shoreline<br />

thoroughly....<br />

While Napoleon struggled his might away in the Russian Winter,<br />

there passed through France itself a gold vein to the army staving in<br />

the Empire's back door.<br />

I Morton, p. 47.


•<br />

we<br />

226 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND THE ROTHSCHILD FORMULA 227<br />

At a dinner party in later years, Nathan casually summed up<br />

At least one friendly biographer claims that Nathan's first act<br />

the episode as though it were merely a good piece of routine<br />

was to deliver the news to the Prime Minister, but that government<br />

business. He said:<br />

officials were hesitant at first to believe it, because it ran contrary to<br />

reports they had received<br />

The East India Company had £800,000 worth<br />

previously<br />

of<br />

telling<br />

gold to of<br />

sell. I went<br />

serious British<br />

to the sale and bought it all. I knew the Duke of Wellington must<br />

setbacks. At any rate, there is<br />

have<br />

no doubt that Nathan's second act of<br />

it. The government sent for me and said they must have the gold. I sold<br />

the morning was to set off for the stock exchange to take up a<br />

the gold to them, but they didn't know how to get it to the Duke in<br />

position at his usual pillar.<br />

Portugal. I undertook all that and sent it through France. It was the<br />

All eyes were upon him as he slumped dejectedly, staring at the<br />

best business I have ever done.<br />

floor. Then, he raised his gaze and, with pained expression, began<br />

to sell The whisper<br />

THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO<br />

went through the crowded room, "Nathan is<br />

i selling?"<br />

The final outcome of the battle at Waterloo between<br />

"Nathan is<br />

Wellington<br />

selling*" "Wellington must have lost." "Our<br />

government bonds will<br />

and Napoleon was crucial to Europe both politically and never<br />

economically.<br />

If Napoleon had been victorious, England would have<br />

be repaid/' "Sell them now. Sell. Sell!"<br />

Prices tumbled, and Nathan sold again.<br />

been<br />

Prices plummeted, and<br />

still Nathan sold. Finally, prices<br />

in even greater economic trouble than before. Not only would<br />

collapsed<br />

she<br />

altogether and, in one<br />

quick move, Nathan reversed his call<br />

have lost international power and prestige, but even at home,<br />

and<br />

her<br />

purchased the entire<br />

market in government bonds. In a matter<br />

subjects would have been further disgruntled over<br />

of just<br />

such<br />

a<br />

great<br />

few hours, he<br />

had acquired the dominant holding of England's entire<br />

personal and financial wartime sacrifices. Her defeat almost surely<br />

debt at but<br />

a tiny fraction of its worth.<br />

would have resulted in not being able to repay the great amounts<br />

she had borrowed to conduct the war. In the London stock SIDONIA<br />

exchange, therefore, where British government bonds were traded<br />

Benjamin Disraeli, the Prime Minister of England, wrote a book<br />

in<br />

along with other securities, everyone waited anxiously for news of<br />

1844 called Coningsby. It was a political novel in which the author<br />

the outcome.<br />

expressed his views about contemporary issues. One of the strong<br />

It was well known that the Rothschilds had developed a private<br />

characters in the book was a financier named Sidonia, but every<br />

detail<br />

courier service that was used, not only to transport gold and other<br />

of Sidonia's actions was an exact replica of the real Lord<br />

Rothschild,<br />

tangible cargo, but to rapidly move information that could be useful<br />

whom Disraeli greatly admired. In the guise of a novel,<br />

we read<br />

in making investment decisions. It was<br />

about<br />

expected, therefore, that<br />

Rothschild's emigration from Germany, his family<br />

and banking ties<br />

Nathan in London would be the first to know the name of the victor<br />

throughout Europe, his handling of the gold for<br />

Wellington, and his financial<br />

after the cannon smoke had cleared from the battlefield. And they<br />

coup after Waterloo. Then Disraeli<br />

wrote:<br />

were not to be disappointed. The first news of Wellington's victory<br />

arrived in Brussels around midnight on June 18, 1815, where a<br />

Europe did require money, and Sidonia was ready to lend it to<br />

Rothschild agent named Rothworth was waiting in readiness. He<br />

Europe. France wanted some; Austria more; Prussia a little; Russia a<br />

few<br />

immediately mounted a fresh horse and set off for the port of<br />

millions. Sidonia could furnish them all....<br />

It is not difficult to<br />

Ostend where a boat was standing by to speed him across the<br />

conceive that, after having pursued the career<br />

have intimated for about ten years, Sidonia had<br />

channel to London. In the early hours of June 20, the exhausted<br />

become one of the<br />

messenger was pounding on Nathan's door, a full twenty-four<br />

* The New York Times, in its April 1, 1915, edition, reported that Baron Nathan<br />

hours before Wellington's own courier, Major Henry Percy,<br />

Mayer de Rothschild had attempted to secure a court order to suppress a book<br />

vvntten by Ignatious Balla entitled<br />

arrived.<br />

The Romance of the Rothschilds on the grounds that<br />

£e Waterloo story about his grandfather was untrue and libelous. The court ruled<br />

pt the story was true, dismissed the suit, and ordered Rothschild to pay all court<br />

1. Morton, p. 45. costs. r J


228 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

THE ROTHSCHILD FORMULA 229<br />

most considerable personages in Europe. He had established a<br />

brother, or a near relative, in whom he could confide, in most of the<br />

the courts. They are the police. Who will seize their assets?<br />

principal capitals. He was lord and master of the money market of the<br />

answer is another government. Speaking of a relatively<br />

world, and of course virtually lord and master of everything else. He<br />

example of this principle, Ron<br />

literally held the revenues of Southern Italy in pawn; and<br />

Chernow explains:<br />

monarchs<br />

The<br />

modern<br />

3. Quoted in The New York Times, October 21, 1987, cited by Chernow, p. 13.<br />

1 Quoted by Jacques Attali, translated by Barbara Ellis, A Man of Influence: Sir<br />

4. Disraeli, p. 229. siegmund Warburg, 1902-82 (London: Weidenfeld, & Nicolson, 1986), p. 57.<br />

and ministers of all countries courted his advice and were guided by<br />

The new alliance [between the monetary and political scientists]<br />

his suggestions.<br />

was mutually advantageous, Washington wanted to harness the new<br />

financial power to coerce<br />

That Disraeli was not exaggerating was made clear<br />

foreign<br />

by the boast<br />

governments into opening their<br />

markets to American goods or adopting<br />

of James Rothschild himself. When U.S. Treasury agents<br />

pro-American policies.<br />

approached<br />

him in Paris in 1842 with a request for a loan to the<br />

the government's police powers in distant places. The threat of<br />

The<br />

banks, in turn, needed levers to force debt repayment and welcomed<br />

American government, he said to them: "You have seen the man<br />

military intervention was an excellent means by which to speed loan<br />

who is at the head of the finances of Europe."<br />

repayment. When Kuhn, Loeb considered a loan to the Dominican<br />

There have always been men who were in a position to make<br />

Republic, backed by customs receipts, Jacob Schiff inquired of his<br />

private fortunes out of cooperating with both sides in a war. The<br />

London associate Sir Ernest Cassel, "If they do not pay, who will<br />

Rothschilds were not unique in this, but they no doubt perfected<br />

the art and became the personification of that breed. They were not<br />

collect<br />

ours." 1<br />

these customs duties?" Cassel replied, "Your marines and<br />

necessarily evil in a moral sense. What preoccupied their minds<br />

One of the great puzzles of history is why governments always<br />

were not questions of right or wrong but of profit and loss. This<br />

go into debt and seldom attempt to put themselves on a "pay-asyou-go"<br />

basis, A partial answer is that kings and politicians lack<br />

analytical indifference to human suffering was aptly described by<br />

one Rothschild when he said: "When the streets of Paris are<br />

the courage to tax their subjects the enormous sums that would<br />

Q<br />

be<br />

running with blood, I buy." They may have held citizenship in the<br />

required under such an arrangement. There is also the deeper<br />

country of their residence, but patriotism was beyond their comprehension.<br />

question of why the expenditures are so high in the first place.<br />

They were also very bright, if not cunning, and these<br />

Given the mentality of the world's financial lords and masters,<br />

combined traits made them the role model of the cool pragmatists<br />

as Disraeli described them, it is conceivable that a coldly calculated<br />

who dominate the political and financial world of today. Disraeli<br />

strategy has been developed over the years to insure this result. In<br />

well described this type when he wrote of Sidonia:<br />

fact, the historical evidence strongly suggests that just such a plan<br />

He was a man without affections. It would be harsh to say he had<br />

was developed in eighteenth-century Europe and perfected in<br />

no heart, for he was susceptible of deep emotions, but not for<br />

twentieth-century America. For the purposes of hypothetical analysis,<br />

individuals.... The individual never touched him. Woman was to him<br />

a toy, man a machine.<br />

let us identify this strategy as The Rothschild Formula.<br />

THE FORMULA<br />

It would seem that an absence of patriotism and a cold,<br />

Let us imagine a man who is totally pragmatic. He is smarter<br />

analytical outlook would lead financiers to avoid making loans to<br />

and more cunning than most men and, in fact, holds them in thinly<br />

governments, particularly foreign ones. Private borrowers can be<br />

disguised contempt. He may respect the talents of a few, but has<br />

hauled into court and their assets confiscated to make good on their<br />

little concern over the condition of mankind. He has observed that<br />

kings and politicians are always fighting over something or other<br />

1 Benjamin Disraeli, Coningsby (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, originally published<br />

and has concluded that wars are inevitable. He<br />

in England<br />

also has learned<br />

in 1844), p. 225.<br />

that<br />

2. Stephen Birmingham, "Our Crowd": The Great Jewish Families ofNew York (New<br />

wars can be profitable, not only by lending or creating the<br />

York: Harper & Row, 1986), p. 73.


230 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

money to finance them, but from government favoritism in the<br />

granting of commercial subsidies or monopolies. He is not capable<br />

of such a primitive feeling as patriotism, so he is free to participate<br />

in the funding of any side in any conflict, limited only by factors of<br />

self interest. If such a man were to survey the world around him, it<br />

is not difficult to imagine that he would come to the following<br />

conclusions which would become the prime directives of his career:<br />

1. War is the ultimate discipline to any government. If it can<br />

successfully meet the challenge of war, it will survive. If it<br />

cannot, it will perish. All else is secondary. The sanctity of its<br />

laws, the prosperity of its citizens, and the solvency of its<br />

treasury will be quickly sacrificed by any government in its<br />

primal act of self-survival.<br />

2. All that is necessary, therefore, to insure that a government will<br />

maintain or expand its debt is to involve it in war or the threat of<br />

war. The greater the threat and the more destructive the war, the<br />

greater the need for debt.<br />

3. To involve a country in war or the threat of war, it will be<br />

necessary for it to have enemies with credible military might. If<br />

such enemies already exist, all<br />

the better. If they exist but lack<br />

military strength, it will be necessary to provide them the<br />

money to build their war machine. If an enemy does not exist at<br />

all, then it will be necessary to create one by financing the rise of<br />

a hostile regime.<br />

x<br />

4. The ultimate obstacle is a government which declines to finance<br />

its wars through debt. Although this seldom happens, when it<br />

does, it will be necessary to encourage internal political<br />

opposition, insurrection, or revolution to replace that<br />

government with one that is more compliant to our will. The<br />

assassination of heads of state could play an important role in<br />

this process.<br />

5. No nation can be allowed to remain militarily stronger than its<br />

adversaries, for that could lead to peace and a reduction of debt.<br />

To accomplish this balance of power, it may be necessary to<br />

finance both sides of the conflict. Unless one of the combatants<br />

is hostile to our interests and, therefore, must be destroyed,<br />

neither side should be allowed a decisive victory or defeat.<br />

While we must always proclaim the virtues of peace, the<br />

unspoken objective is perpetual war.<br />

r<br />

THE ROTHSCHILD FORMULA 231<br />

Whether anyone actually put this strategy into words or passed<br />

it along from generation to generation is not important. In fact, it is<br />

doubtful it has ever worked that way. Whether it is the product of<br />

conscious planning or merely the consequence of men responding<br />

to the profit opportunities inherent in fiat money, the world's<br />

financial<br />

lords have acted as though they were following such a<br />

plan, and this has become especially apparent since the creation of<br />

the central-bank Mandrake Mechanism three centuries ago.<br />

The "balance-of-power" question is particularly intriguing.<br />

Most history <strong>text</strong>s present the concept as though it were some kind<br />

of natural, social phenomenon which, somehow, has worked to the<br />

benefit of mankind. The implication is that it's just wonderful how,<br />

after all those European wars, no nation was strong enough to<br />

completely dominate the others. When the United States emerged<br />

from World War II with exactly such power, it was widely<br />

deplored, and massive political/financial mechanisms such as<br />

foreign aid and disarmament were set in motion to restore the<br />

balance. This has become almost a revered doctrine of international<br />

democracy. But the overlooked consequence of this sentimental<br />

notion is that wars "between equals" have become the permanent<br />

landscape of history.<br />

This does not mean that every war-like group that comes along<br />

will find easy financing from the lords and masters. It depends on<br />

whom they threaten and how likely they are to succeed. In 1830, for<br />

example, the Dutch were facing an uprising of their subjects in<br />

Belgium. Both the ruling government and the revolutionaries were<br />

dependent upon the Rothschilds for financing their conflict.<br />

The<br />

Dutch rulers were reliable customers for loans and, just as important,<br />

they were reliable in their payment of interest on those loans.<br />

It would have been foolhardy to provide more than token assistance<br />

to the rebels who, if they came to power, quite likely would<br />

have refused to honor the debts of the former puppet regime.<br />

Salomon Rothschild explained:<br />

These gentlemen should not count on us unless they decide to<br />

follow a line of prudence and moderation.... Our goodwill does not<br />

yet extend to the point of putting clubs into the hands that would beat<br />

us, that is, lending money to make war and ruin the credit that we<br />

sustain with all our efforts and all our means. 1<br />

I- As quoted by Derek Wilson, p. 100.


232 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

After the revolution was resolved by negotiation rather than by<br />

arms, the new government in Brussels was a natural target<br />

financial takeover. James Rothschild laid out the strategy that has<br />

become the model of such operations ever since:<br />

Now is the moment of which we should take advantage to make<br />

ourselves absolute masters of that country's finances. The first step<br />

will be to establish ourselves on an intimate footing with Belgium's<br />

new Finance Minister, to gain his confidence ... and to take all the<br />

treasury bonds he may offer us.<br />

PERPETUAL WAR IN OGHTEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND<br />

Wars, great and small, have always been a plague to Europe,<br />

but it was not until they were easy to finance through central<br />

banking and fiat money that they became virtually perpetual. For<br />

example, the following war chronicle begins immediately following<br />

the formation of the Bank of England which, as you recall, was<br />

created for the specific purpose of financing a war:<br />

1689-1697 The War of the League of Augsberg<br />

1702-1713 The War of Spanish Succession<br />

1739-1742 The War of Jenkin's Ear<br />

1744-1748 The War of Austrian Succession<br />

1754-1763 The French and Indian War<br />

1793-1801 The War against Revolutionary France<br />

1803-1815 The Napoleonic Wars<br />

In addition to these European conflicts, there also wer^ two<br />

wars with America: the War for Independence and the War of 1812.<br />

In the 126 years between 1689 and 1815, England was at war 63 of<br />

them. That is one out of every two years in combat. The others were<br />

spent preparing for combat.<br />

The mark of the Rothschild Formula is unmistakable in these<br />

conflicts. The monetary scientists often were seen financing both<br />

sides. Whether ending in victory or defeat, the outcome merely<br />

preserved or restored the European "balance of power/ 7<br />

And the<br />

most permanent result of any of these wars was expanded government<br />

debt for all parties.<br />

SUMMARY<br />

By the end of the eighteenth century, the House of Rothschild<br />

had become one of the most successful financial institutions the<br />

1. Derek Wilson, p. 100.<br />

for<br />

world has ever known. Its<br />

THE ROTHSCHILD FORMULA 233<br />

meteoric rise can be attributed to the<br />

great industry and shrewdness of the five brothers who established<br />

themselves in various capitals of Europe and forged the world's<br />

first international financial network. As pioneers in the practice of<br />

lending money to governments, they soon learned that this provided<br />

unique opportunities to parlay wealth into political power as<br />

Before long, most of the princes and kings of Europe had<br />

well.<br />

come within their influence.<br />

The Rothschilds also had mastered the art of smuggling on a<br />

grand scale, often with the tacit approval of the governments<br />

whose laws they violated. This was perceived by all parties as an<br />

unofficial bonus for providing needed funding to those same<br />

governments, particularly in time of war. The fact that different<br />

branches of the Rothschild network also might be providing funds<br />

for the enemy was pragmatically ignored. Thus, a time-honored<br />

practice among financiers was born: profiting from both sides.<br />

The Rothschilds operated a highly efficient intelligence gathering<br />

system which provided them with advance knowledge of<br />

important events, knowledge which was invaluable for investment<br />

decisions. When an exhausted Rothschild courier delivered the first<br />

news of the Battle of Waterloo, Nathan was able to deceive the<br />

London bond traders into a selling panic, and that allowed him to<br />

acquire the dominant holding of England's entire debt at but a tiny<br />

fraction of its worth.<br />

A study of these and similar events reveals a personality<br />

profile, not just of the Rothschilds, but of that special breed of<br />

international financiers whose success typically is built upon<br />

certain character traits. Those include cold objectivity, immunity to<br />

patriotism, and indifference to the human condition. That profile is<br />

the basis for proposing a theoretical strategy, called the Rothschild<br />

Formula, which motivates such men to propel governments into<br />

war for the profits they yield. This formula most likely has never<br />

been consciously phrased as it appears here, but subconscious<br />

motivations and personality traits work together to implement it<br />

nevertheless. As long as the mechanism of central banking exists, it<br />

will be to such men an irresistible temptation to convert debt into<br />

perpetual war and war into perpetual debt.<br />

In the following chapters we shall track the distinctive footprint<br />

of the Rothschild Formula as it leads up to our own doorstep in the<br />

present day.


Chapter Twelve<br />

SINK THE LUSITANIA!<br />

The role of J. P. Morgan in providing loans to<br />

England and France in World War I;<br />

the souring<br />

of those loans as it became apparent that Germany<br />

would win; the betrayal of a British ship and the<br />

sacrifice ofAmerican passengers as a stratagem to<br />

bring America into the war; the use of American<br />

taxes to pay off the loans.<br />

Historisches Museum, Frankfurt, Germany<br />

A satirical cartoon of 1848 depicts "Rothschild"<br />

pondering over which of Europe's rulers to<br />

favor with loans, while revolutionaries<br />

challenge the ancient order he is supporting.<br />

A caricature of Nathan Rothschild,<br />

showing him in his habitual position<br />

before one of the pillars in the Exchange.<br />

It was here that he capitalized on his<br />

advance knowledge of Wellington's<br />

defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo and was<br />

able to acquire the dominant holding of<br />

England's entire debt at but a small<br />

fraction of its worth.<br />

The origin of World War I usually is attributed to the assassination<br />

of Archduke Francis Ferdinand of Austria-Hungary by a<br />

Serbian nationalist in 1914. This was a serious affront to Austria but<br />

hardly sufficient reason to plunge the world into a mortal conflict<br />

that would claim over ten million lives and twenty million<br />

wounded. American schoolchildren are taught that Uncle Sam<br />

came into the war "to make the world safe for democracy/ 7<br />

But, as<br />

we shall see, the American war drums were pounded by men with<br />

far less idealistic objectives.<br />

Since the latter part of the eighteenth century, the Rothschild<br />

Formula had controlled the political climate of Europe. Nations had<br />

increasingly confronted each other over border disputes, colonial<br />

territories, and trade routes. An arms race had been in progress for<br />

many years; large, standing armies had been recruited and trained;<br />

military alliances had been hammered together; all in preparation<br />

for war. The assassination of Ferdinand was not the cause but the<br />

trigger. It was merely the spark that lit the fuse that fired the first<br />

loaded cannon.<br />

AN INVESTMENT IN WAR<br />

The exigencies of war in Europe required England and France to<br />

go heavily into debt When their respective central banks and local<br />

merchant banks could no longer meet that need, the beleaguered<br />

governments turned to the Americans and selected the House of<br />

Morgan—acting as partners of the Rothschilds—to act as sales agent<br />

for their bonds. Most of the money raised in this fashion was<br />

234<br />

British Museum Print Room


236 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

SINK THE LUSITANIA! 237<br />

quickly returned to the United States to acquire war-sensitive materials,<br />

and Morgan was selected as the U.S. purchase agent for those<br />

as well. A commission was paid on all<br />

transactions in both directions:<br />

once when the money was borrowed and again when it was<br />

spent. Furthermore, many of the companies receiving production<br />

contracts were either owned outright by Morgan holding companies<br />

or were securely within his orbit of bank control- Under such an<br />

arrangement it will not be surprising to learn, as we shall in a<br />

moment, that Morgan was not overly anxious to see hostilities come<br />

to a close. Even the most honorable of men can be corrupted by the<br />

temptation of such gigantic flows of cash.<br />

Writing in the year 1919, just a few months after the end of the<br />

war, John Moody says:<br />

Not only did England and France pay for their supplies with<br />

money furnished by Wall Street, but they made their purchases<br />

through the same medium.... Inevitably the house of Morgan was<br />

selected for this important task Thus the war had given Wall Street an<br />

entirely new role. Hitherto it has been exclusively the headquarters of<br />

finance; now it became the greatest industrial mart the world had ever<br />

known. In addition to selling stocks and bonds, financing railroads,<br />

and performing the other tasks of a great banking center, Wall Street<br />

began to deal in shells, cannon, submarines, blankets, clothing, shoes,<br />

canned meats, wheat and the thousands of other articles needed for<br />

the prosecution of a great war.<br />

The money began to flow in January of 1915 when the Hduse of<br />

Morgan signed a contract with the British Army Council and the<br />

Admiralty. The first purchase, curiously, was for horses, and the<br />

amount tendered was $12 million. But that was but the first drop of<br />

rain before the deluge. Total purchases would eventually climb to<br />

an astronomical $3 billion. The firm became the largest consumer on<br />

earth, spending up to $10 million per day. Morgan offices at 23 Wall<br />

Street were mobbed by brokers and manufacturers seeking to cut a<br />

deal The bank had to post guards at every door and at the partners'<br />

homes as well. Each month, Morgan presided over purchases which<br />

were equal to the gross national product of the entire world just one<br />

generation before.<br />

1. John Moody, The Masters of Capital (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1919),<br />

pp. 164-165.<br />

2. Chemow, pp. 187-89.<br />

1<br />

Throughout all this, Morgan vigorously claimed to be a pacifist.<br />

"Nobody could hate war more than I do/' he told the Senate<br />

Munitions Committee. But such professions of righteousness were<br />

difficult to accept. Lewinsohn comments:<br />

The 500 million dollar loan contracted in autumn 1915 brought to<br />

the group of bankers, at whose head Morgan was, a net profit of 9<br />

million dollars.... Again, in 1917, the French government paid to<br />

Morgan's and other banks a commission of 1,500,000 dollars, and a<br />

further million in 1918.<br />

Besides the issue of loans there was another source of profit: the<br />

purchase and sale of American stock which the Allies surrendered so<br />

that they could buy munitions in the States. It is estimated that in the<br />

course of the war some 2000 million [two billion] dollars passed in this<br />

way through Morgan's hands. Even if the commission was very small,<br />

transactions of such dimensions would give him an influence on the<br />

stock market which would carry very real advantages.. .<br />

His hatred against war did not prevent him, citizen of a neutral<br />

country, from furnishing belligerent powers with 4,400,000 rifles for a<br />

matter of $194,000,000.... The profits were such as to compensate to<br />

some degree his hatred of warfare. According to his own account, he<br />

received, as agent of the English and French governments, a<br />

commission of 1% on orders totalling $3,000,000,000. That is, he<br />

received some $30,000,000.... Besides these two chief principals,<br />

Morgan, however, also acted for Russia (for whom he did business<br />

amounting to $412,000,000) and for Italy and Canada (figures for his<br />

business with the last two not having been published).. .<br />

J.P. Morgan, and some of his partners in the bank, were at the time<br />

shareholders in companies that were ... concerns which made<br />

substantial profits from the orders he placed with them.... It is really<br />

astonishing that a central buying organization should have been<br />

confided to one who was buyer and seller at the same time.<br />

GERMANY'S U-BOATS ALMOST WON THE WAR<br />

But there were dark clouds gathering above Wall Street as the<br />

war began to go badly for the Allies. With the passage of time and<br />

the condensing of history, it is easy to forget that Germany and the<br />

Central Powers almost won the war prior to U.S. entry. Employing<br />

a small fleet of newly developed submarines, Germany was well on<br />

her way to cutting off England and her allies from all outside help.<br />

It was an amazing feat and it changed forever the concept of naval<br />

warfare. Germany had a total of twenty-one U-boats, but, because<br />

1- Lewinsohn, pp. 103-4, 222-24.


238 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND SINK THE LUSITANIA! 239<br />

they constantly had to be repaired and serviced, the maximum<br />

number at sea was only seven at any one time. Yet, between 1914<br />

and 1918, German submarines had sunk over 5,700 surface ships.<br />

Three-hundred thousand tons of Allied shipping were sent to the<br />

bottom every week. One out of every four steamers leaving the<br />

British Isles never returned. In later years, British Foreign Secretary,<br />

Arthur Balfour, wrote: "At that time, it certainly looked as though<br />

we were going to lose the war/' Robert Ferrell, in his Woodrow<br />

Wilson and World War J, concluded: "The Allies approached the<br />

brink of disaster, with no recourse other than to ask Germany for<br />

terms."<br />

William McAdoo, who was Secretary of the Treasury at the<br />

time, says in his memoirs:<br />

Across the sea came the dismay of the British—a dismay that<br />

carried a deepening note of disaster. There was a fear, and a<br />

well-grounded one, that England might be starved into abject<br />

surrender.... On April 27, 1917, Ambassador Walter H. Page reported<br />

confidentially to the President that the food in the British Isles was not<br />

more than enough to feed the civil population for six weeks or two<br />

months.<br />

rAs<br />

previously mentioned by William McAdoo, the American<br />

ambassador to England at that time was Walter Hines Page, a trustee<br />

of Rockefeller's social-engineering foundation called the<br />

General Education Board. It was learned by the Nye committee that,<br />

in addition to his government salary, which he complained was not<br />

high enough, Page also received an allowance of $25,000 a year (an<br />

enormous amount in 1917) from Cleveland Dodge, president of<br />

Rockefeller's National City Bank. On March 15, 1917, Ambassador<br />

Page sent a telegram to the State Department outlining the financial<br />

crisis in England. Since sources of new capital had dried up, the<br />

only way to keep the war going, he said, was to make direct grants<br />

from the U.S. Treasury. But, since this would be a violation of neutrality<br />

treaties, the United States would have to abandon its neutrality<br />

and enter the war. He said:<br />

I think that the pressure of this approaching crisis has gone<br />

beyond the ability of the Morgan Financial Agency for the British and<br />

French Governments.... The greatest help we could give the Allies<br />

would be such a credit.... Unless we go to war with Germany, our<br />

Government, of course, cannot make such a direct grant of credit. 1<br />

Under these circumstances, it became impossible for Morgan to<br />

find new buyers for the Allied war bonds, neither for fresh funding<br />

nor to replenish the old bonds which were coming due and facing<br />

default. This was serious on several counts. If bond sales came to a<br />

halt, there would be no money to continue purchasing war materials.<br />

Commissions would be lost at both ends. Furthermore^ if the<br />

previously sold bonds were to go into default, as they certainly<br />

would if Britain and France were forced to accept peace on<br />

Germany's terms, the investors would sustain gigantic losses. Something<br />

had to be done. But what? Robert Ferrell hints at the answer:<br />

In the mid thirties a Senate committee headed by Gerald P. Nye of<br />

North Dakota investigated the pre-1917 munitions trade and raised a<br />

possibility that the Wilson administration went to war because<br />

American bankers needed to protect their Allied loans.<br />

1. Balfour MSS, FO/800/208, British Foreign Office records, Public Record Office,<br />

London, as cited by Robert H. Ferrell, Woodrow Wilson and World War I (New York:<br />

Harper & Row, 1985), p. 35.<br />

2. Ferrell, p. 12.<br />

3. William G. McAdoo, Crowded Years (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1931; rpt.<br />

New York: Kennikat Press, 1971), p. 392.<br />

4. Ferrell, p. 88.<br />

The Morgan group had floated one-and-a-half billion dollars in<br />

loans to Britain and France. With the fortunes of war turning against<br />

them, investors were facing the threat of a total loss. As Ferdinand<br />

Lundberg observed: "The declaration of war by the United States, in<br />

addition to extricating the wealthiest American families from a dangerous<br />

situation, also opened new vistas of profits." 2<br />

COLONEL HOUSE<br />

One of the most influential men behind the scenes at this time<br />

was Colonel Edward Mandell House, personal adviser to Woodrow<br />

Wilson and, later, to F.D.R. House had close contacts with both J.P.<br />

Morgan and the old banking families of Europe. He had received<br />

several years of his schooling in England and, in later years, surrounded<br />

himself with prominent members of the Fabian Society.<br />

Furthermore, he was a man of great personal wealth, most of it<br />

acquired during the War Between the States. His father, Thomas<br />

William House, had acted as the confidential American agent of<br />

1- Quoted by Ferdinand Lundberg, America's Sixty Families (New York: Vanguard<br />

Press, 1937), p. 141. Also see Link et al, eds., The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Vol. 41<br />

(1983), pp. 336-37, cited by Ferrell, p. 90.<br />

2- Lundberg, pp. 141-42.


240 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

SINK THE LUSITANIA! 241<br />

unknown banking interests in London. It was commonly believed<br />

he represented the Rothschilds. Although settled in Houston, Texas,<br />

the elder often remarked that he wanted his sons to "know and<br />

serve England." He was one of the few residents of a Confederate<br />

state who emerged from the War with a great fortune.<br />

It is widely acknowledged that Colonel House was the man who<br />

selected Wilson as a presidential candidate and who secured his<br />

nomination. He became Wilson's constant companion, and the<br />

President admitted publicly that he depended on him greatly for<br />

instruction and guidance. Many of Wilson's important appointive<br />

posts in government were hand selected by House. He and Wilson<br />

even went so far as to develop a private code so they could communicate<br />

freely over the telephone. The President himself had written:<br />

"Mr. House is my second personality. He is my independent self.<br />

His thoughts and mine are one,"<br />

George Viereck, an admiring biographer of House, tells us:<br />

House had the Texas delegation in his pocket.... Always moving<br />

quietly in the background, he made and unmade several governors of<br />

Texas.... House selected Wilson because he regarded him as the best<br />

available candidate....<br />

For seven long years Colonel House was Woodrow Wilson's other<br />

self. For six long years he shared with him all but the title of the Chief<br />

Magistracy of the Republic. For six years two rooms were at his<br />

disposal in the North Wing of the White House.... It was House who<br />

made the slate for the Cabinet formulated the first policies of the<br />

Administration and practically directed the foreign affairs of the<br />

United States. We had, indeed, two Presidents for one!...<br />

Super-ambassador, he talked to emperors and kings as an equal. He<br />

was the spiritual generalissimo of the Administration. He was the pilot<br />

who guided the ship.<br />

A SECRET AGREEMENT TO GET THE U.S. INTO WAR<br />

As the presidential election neared for Wilson's second term,<br />

Colonel House entered into a series of confidential talks with Sir<br />

1. The Columbia Encyclopedia (Third Edition, 1962, p. 2334) says the Democratic<br />

Party nomination went to Wilson when William Jennings Bryan switched his<br />

support to him "prompted by Edward M. House." For details, see Martin, p. 155-<br />

2. Charles Seymour, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House (New York: Houghton<br />

Mifflin Co., 1926), Vol 1, pp. 114-15.<br />

3. Seymour, Vol . I, p<br />

. 1 1 4<br />

4. George Sylvester Viereck, The Strangest Friendship in History: Woodrow Wilson<br />

and Colonel House (New York: Liveright Publishers, 1932), pp. 4, 18-19, 33, 35.<br />

William Wiseman, who was attached to the British embassy in<br />

Washington and who acted as a secret intermediary between House<br />

and the British Foreign Office. Charles Seymour writes: "Between<br />

House and Wiseman there were soon to be few political secrets." 1<br />

his was upsetting to the Secretary of State, William Jennings<br />

Bryan. Mrs. Bryan, as co-author of her husband's memoirs, writes:<br />

While Secretary Bryan was bearing the heavy responsibility of the<br />

Department of State, there arose the curious conditions surrounding<br />

Mr. E.M. House's unofficial connection with the President and his<br />

voyages abroad on affairs of State, which were not communicated to<br />

Secretary Bryan.. . . The President was unofficially dealing with foreign<br />

governments.<br />

What was the purpose of those dealings? It<br />

was nothing less<br />

than to work out the means whereby the United States could be<br />

brought into the war. Viereck explains:<br />

Ten months before the election which returned Wilson to the<br />

White House in 1916 "because he kept us out of war," Colonel House<br />

negotiated a secret agreement with England and France on behalf of<br />

Wilson which pledged the United States to intervene on behalf of the<br />

Allies.<br />

On March 9, 1916, Woodrow Wilson formally sanctioned the<br />

undertaking. If an inkling of the conversations between Colonel<br />

House and the leaders of England and France had reached the<br />

American people before the election, it might have caused incalculable<br />

revulsions of public opinion....<br />

From this conversation and various conferences with Sir Edward<br />

Grey grew the Secret Treaty, made without the knowledge and<br />

consent of the United States Senate, by which Woodrow Wilson and<br />

House chained the United States to the chariot of the Entente.... After<br />

the War the <strong>text</strong> of the agreement leaked out. Grey was the first to<br />

tattle. Page discussed it at length. Colonel House tells its history.<br />

C. Hartley Grattan discusses it at length in his book, Why We FoughL<br />

But for some incomprehensible reason the enormous significance of<br />

the revelation never penetrated the consciousness of the American<br />

people. 3<br />

l> Seymour, Vol. 11, p. 399.<br />

|- William Jennings Bryan and Mary Baird Bryan, The Memoirs of William Jennings<br />

Bryan (New York: Kennikat Press, 1925), Vol. II, pp. 404^5.<br />

3<br />

- Viereck, pp. 106-08. This matter, along with the complete <strong>text</strong> of Sir Grey's<br />

memorandum, is discussed in The Memoirs of William Jennings Bryan Vol. 11, pp.


242 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

SINK THE LUSITANIA! 243<br />

The basic terms of the agreement were that the United States<br />

government would offer to negotiate a peaceful settlement between<br />

Germany and the Allies and would then put forth a specific proposal<br />

for the terms of that settlement. If either side refused to accept<br />

the proposal, then the United States would come into the war as an<br />

ally of the other side. The catch was that the terms of the proposal<br />

were carefully drafted so that Germany could not possibly accept<br />

them. Thus, to the world, it would look as though Germany was at<br />

fault and the United States was humanitarian. As Ambassador Page<br />

observed in a memorandum dated February 9, 1916:<br />

House arrived from Berlin-Havre-Paris full of the idea of<br />

American intervention. First his plan was that he and I and a group of<br />

the British Cabinet (Grey, Asquith, Lloyd George, Reading, etc.)<br />

should at once work out a minimum programme of peace—the least<br />

that the Allies would accept, which, he assumed, would be unacceptable to<br />

the Germans; and that the President would take this programme and<br />

present it to both sides; the side that declined would be responsible for<br />

continuing the war.... Of course, the fatal moral weakness of the<br />

foregoing scheme is that we should plunge into the War, not on the<br />

merits of the cause, but by a carefully sprung trick.<br />

On the surface it is a paradox that Wilson, who had always been<br />

a pacifist, should now enter into a secret agreement with foreign<br />

powers to involve the United States in a war which she could easily<br />

avoid. The key that unlocks this mystery is the fact that Wilson also<br />

was an internationalist. One of the strongest bonds between House<br />

and himself was their common dream of a world government. They<br />

both recognized that the American people would never accept such<br />

a concept unless there were extenuating circumstances. They reasoned<br />

that a long and bloody war was probably the only event that<br />

could condition the American mind to accept the loss of national<br />

sovereignty, especially if it were packaged with the promise of putting<br />

an end to all wars in the future. Wilson knew, also, that, if the<br />

United States came into the war early enough to make a real difference<br />

on the battlefield and if large amounts of American dollars<br />

could be loaned to the Allied powers, he would be in a position after<br />

the war to dictate the terms of peace. He wrote to Colonel House:<br />

"England and France have not the same views with regard to peace<br />

as we have by any means. When the war is over, we can force them<br />

1. Quoted by Viereck, pp. 112-13.<br />

lo our way of thinking, because by that rime they will among other<br />

things be financially in our hands." 1<br />

And so Wilson tolerated the<br />

agony of mixed emotions as he plotted for war as a necessary evil to<br />

bring about what he perceived as the ultimate good of world government.<br />

With the arrival of 1917, the President was planting hints of both<br />

war and world government in almost every public utterance. In a<br />

typical statement made in March of that year, he said: "The tragic<br />

ents of the thirty months of vital turmoil through which we have<br />

just passed have made us citizens of the world. There can be no<br />

turning back. Our own fortunes as a nation are involved, whether<br />

we would have it so or not/<br />

It was about this same time that Wilson called together the<br />

Democratic leaders of Congress to a special breakfast meeting at the<br />

White House. He told them that, in spite of public sentiment, there<br />

were many sound reasons for the country to enter the war and he<br />

asked them to help him sell this plan to Congress and the voters.<br />

Harry Elmer Barnes tells us:<br />

These men were opposed to war and, hence, rejected his proposals<br />

somewhat heatedly. Wilson knew that it was a poor time to split the<br />

party just before an election, so he dropped the matter at once and,<br />

with Col. House, mapped out a pacifist platform for the coming<br />

campaign. Governor Martin Glynn of New York and Senator Ollie<br />

James of Kentucky were sent to the St. Louis convention to make<br />

keynote speeches, which were based on the slogan: "He kept us out of<br />

war!"... Before he had been inaugurated a second time, the Germans<br />

played directly into his hands by announcing the resumption of<br />

submarine warfare. ...<br />

It was fortunate for Britain and the bankers that<br />

the Germans made this timely blunder, as Great Britain had<br />

overdrawn her American credit by some $450,000,000 and the bankers<br />

were having trouble in floating more large private loans. It was<br />

necessary now to_pass on the burden of financing the Entente to the<br />

Federal Treasury.<br />

1- Quoted by Ferrell, p. 88.<br />

2- Ferrell, p. 12.<br />

3. Harry Elmer Barnes, In Quest of Truth and Justice: De-Bunkmg the War Guilt Myth<br />

(Chicago: National Historical Society, 1928; rpt. New York: Arno Press & The New<br />

York Times, 1972), p. 104. For an additional account of this meeting, see Viereck, pp.<br />

180—83.


244 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

SINK THE LUSITANIA! 245<br />

Lundberg, p. 257.<br />

financial group, a factor which immediately gives the banking<br />

SELLING WAR TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE<br />

house the respectful attention of all alert independent publishers."<br />

Through secret agreements and trickery, America had been<br />

Morgan control over the media at that time is well documented,<br />

committed to war, but the political and monetary scientists realized<br />

that something still had to be done to change public sentiment. How<br />

» but he was by no means alone in this. During the 1912 hearings held<br />

could that be accomplished?<br />

by the Senate Privileges and Elections Committee, it was revealed<br />

Wall Street control over important segments of the media was<br />

that Representative Joseph Sibley from Pennsylvania was acting as<br />

3.<br />

considerable. George Wheeler tells us: "Around this time the<br />

a funnel for Rockefeller money to various cooperative Congressmen.<br />

A letter was introduced to the Committee written by Sibley in<br />

Morgan firm was choosing the top executives for the old and troubled<br />

Harper & Brothers publishing house.. . . In the newspaper field,<br />

1905 to John D. Archbold, the man at Rockefeller's Standard Oil<br />

Pierpont Morgan at this period was in effective control of the New Company who provided the money. In that letter Sibley said: "An<br />

York Sun,... the Boston News Bureau, Barron's magazine, and the<br />

efficient literary bureau<br />

Wall Street Journal." 1<br />

is needed, not for a day or a crisis but a<br />

permanent healthy control of the Associated Press and kindred<br />

On February 9, 1917, Representative Callaway from Texas took<br />

avenues. It will cost<br />

the floor of Congress and provided further insight. He<br />

money but will be the cheapest in the end."<br />

said:<br />

Lundberg comments further:<br />

In March, 1915, the J.<br />

P. Morgan interests, the steel, shipbuilding,<br />

and powder interests, and their subsidiary organizations, got together<br />

12 men high up in the newspaper world and employed them to select<br />

the most influential newspapers in the United States and sufficient<br />

number of them to control generally the policy of the daily press....<br />

They found it was only necessary to purchase the control of 25 of the<br />

So far as can be learned, the Rockefellers have given up their old<br />

policy of owning newspapers and magazines outright, relying now<br />

upon the publications of all camps to serve their best interests in return<br />

for the vast volume of petroleum and allied advertising under<br />

Rockefeller control. After the J.P. Morgan bloc, the Rockefellers have<br />

greatest papers.. . . An agreement was reached; the policy of the papers<br />

the most advertising of any group to dispose of. And when advertising<br />

was bought to be paid for by the month; an editor was furnished for<br />

alone is not sufficient to insure the fealty of a newspaper, the<br />

each paper to properly supervise and edit information regarding the<br />

Rockefeller companies have been known to make direct payments in<br />

questions of preparedness, militarism, financial policies, and other<br />

return for a friendly editorial attitude.<br />

things of national and international nature considered vital to the<br />

interests of the purchasers.<br />

I<br />

It is not surprising, therefore, that a large part of the nation's<br />

Charles S. Mellen of the New Haven Railroad testified before<br />

press, particularly in the East, began to editorially denounce<br />

Congress that his Morgan-owned railroad had more than onethousand<br />

Germany. The cry spread across the land to take up arms against<br />

New England newspapers on the payroll, costing about<br />

"the enemy of western civilization." Editors became eloquent on the<br />

$400,000 annually. The railroad also held almost a half-million dollars<br />

in bonds issued by the Boston Herald. This web of control was<br />

patriotic duty of all Americans to defend world democracy. Massive<br />

"preparedness" demonstrations and parades were organized.<br />

multiplied by hundreds of additional companies which also were<br />

But it was not enough. In spite of this massive sales campaign,<br />

controlled by Morgan and other investment-banking houses.<br />

the American people still were not buying. Polls conducted at the<br />

In addition, the Morgan trust exercised media control by its<br />

time<br />

power<br />

showed popular sentiment continuing to run ten-to-one in<br />

of advertising. Writing in 1937, Lundberg says: "More advertising<br />

is controlled by the<br />

favor of J.P. Morgan junta than by any<br />

staying<br />

single<br />

out of Europe's war. Clearly, what was needed was<br />

something both drastic and dramatic to change public opinion.<br />

1. George Wheeler, Pierpont Morgan and Friends: The Anatomy of a Myth (Englewood<br />

Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1973), pp. 283-84.<br />

1- Lundberg, p. 252.<br />

2. Congressional Record, Vol. 54, Feb- 9, 1917, p. 2947<br />

2- Ibid.,pp.97,249.<br />

3- ifctf.,p.247.


246 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND SINK THE LUSITANIA! 247<br />

MORGAN CONTROL OVER SHIPPING<br />

Banking was not the only business in which Morgan had a<br />

strong financial interest. Using his control over the nation's railroads<br />

as financial leverage, he had created an international shipping<br />

trust which included Germany's two largest lines plus one of the<br />

two in England, the White Star Lines. Morgan had attempted in<br />

1902 to take over the remaining British line, the Cunard Company,<br />

but was blocked by the British Admiralty which wanted to keep<br />

Cunard out of foreign control so her ships could be pressed into<br />

military service, if necessary, in time of war. The Lusitania and the<br />

Mauretania were built by Cunard and became major competitors of<br />

the Morgan cartel. It is an interesting footnote of history, therefore,<br />

that, from the Morgan perspective, the Lusitania was quite dispensable.<br />

Ron Chernow explains:<br />

Pierpont assembled a plan for an American-owned shipping trust<br />

that would transpose his "community of interest"<br />

principle—cooperation among competitors in a given industry—to a<br />

global plane. He created ... the world's largest [fleet] under private<br />

ownership.... An important architect of the shipping trust was Albert<br />

Ballin, whose Hamburg-Amerika Steamship Line, with hundreds of<br />

vessels, was the world's largest shipping company.... Pierpont had to<br />

contend with a single holdout, Britain's Cunard Line.. . . After the Boer<br />

War, the Morgan combine and Cunard exhausted each other in<br />

debilitating rate wars." 1<br />

As stated previously, Morgan had been retained as the official<br />

trade agent for Britain. He handled the purchasing of all war materials<br />

in the United States and coordinated their shipping as well.<br />

Following in the footsteps of the Rothschilds of centuries past, he<br />

quickly learned the profitable skills of war-time smuggling. Colin<br />

Simpson, author of The Lusitania, describes the operation:<br />

Throughout the period of America's neutrality, British servicemen<br />

in civilian clothes worked at Morgan's. This great banking combine<br />

rapidly established such a labyrinthine network of false shippers, bank<br />

accounts and all the paraphernalia of smuggling that, although they<br />

fooled the Germans, there were also some very serious occasions<br />

when they flummoxed the Admiralty and Cunard, not to speak of the<br />

unfortunate passengers on the liners which carried the contraband. 2<br />

1 Chernow, .<br />

pp 1 00-01<br />

2. Colin Simpson, The Lusitania (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1 972), p. 50.<br />

THE LUSITANIA<br />

The Lusitania was a British passenger liner that sailed regularly<br />

between Liverpool and New York. She was owned by the Cunard<br />

Company, which, as previously mentioned, was the only major ship<br />

line which was a competitor of the Morgan cartel. She left New York<br />

harbor on May 1, 1915, and was sunk by a German submarine off<br />

the coast of Ireland six days later. Of the 1,195 persons who lost their<br />

lives, 195 were Americans. It was this event, more than any other,<br />

that provided the advocates of war with a convincing platform for<br />

their views, and it became the turning point where Americans reluctantly<br />

began to accept, if not the necessity of war, at least its inevitability.<br />

The fact that the Lusitania was a passenger ship is misleading.<br />

Although she was built as a luxury liner, her construction specifications<br />

were drawn up by the British Admiralty so that she could be<br />

converted, if necessary, into a ship of war. Everything from the<br />

horsepower of her engines and the shape of her hull to the placement<br />

of ammunition storage areas were, in fact, military designs.<br />

She was built specifically to carry twelve six-inch guns. The construction<br />

costs for these features were paid for by the British government.<br />

Even in times of peace, it was required that her crew include<br />

officers and seamen from the Royal Navy Reserve.<br />

In May of 1913, she was brought back into dry dock and outfitted<br />

with extra armor, revolving gun rings on her decks, and shell<br />

racks in the hold for ammunition. Handling elevators to lift<br />

shells to the guns were also installed. Twelve high-explosive cannons<br />

were delivered to the dry dock. All this is a matter of public<br />

record at the National Maritime Museum in Greenwich, England,<br />

but whether the guns were actually installed at that time is still hotly<br />

debated. There is no evidence that they were. In any event, on<br />

September 17, the Lusitania returned to sea ready for the rigors of<br />

war, and she was entered into the Admiralty fleet register, not as a<br />

passenger liner, but an armed auxiliary cruiser] From then on, she was<br />

listed in Jane's Fighting Ships as an auxiliary cruiser and in the British<br />

publication, The Naval Annual, as an armed merchant man.<br />

Part of the dry dock modification was to remove all the passenger<br />

accommodations in the lower deck to make room for more<br />

I. Simpson, pp. 17-28, 70.<br />

the


248 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND SINK THE LUSTTANIA! 249<br />

military cargo. Thus, the Lusitania became one of the most important<br />

carriers of war materials—including munitions—from the<br />

United States to England. On March 8, 1915, after several close calls<br />

with German submarines, the captain of the Lusitania turned in his<br />

resignation. He was willing to face the U-boats, he said, but he was<br />

no longer willing "to carry the responsibility of mixing passengers<br />

with munitions or contraband/'<br />

CHURCHILL SETS A TRAP<br />

From England's point of view, the handwriting on the wall was<br />

clear. Unless the United States could be brought into the war as her<br />

ally, she soon would have to sue for peace. The challenge was how<br />

to push Americans off their position of stubborn neutrality. How<br />

that was accomplished is one of the more controversial aspects of<br />

the war. It is inconceivable to many that English leaders might have<br />

deliberately plotted the destruction of one of their own vessels with<br />

American citizens aboard as a means of drawing the United States<br />

into the war as an ally. Surely, any such idea is merely German<br />

propaganda. Robert Ballard, writing in National Geographic, says:<br />

"Within days of the sinking, German sympathizers in New York<br />

came up with a conspiracy theory. The British Admiralty, they said,<br />

had deliberately exposed Lusitania to harm, hoping she would be<br />

attacked and thus draw the U.S. into the war."<br />

Let's take a closer look at this conspiracy theory. Winston<br />

Churchill, who was First Lord of the Admiralty at that time, said:<br />

There are many kinds of maneuvers in war.... There are<br />

maneuvers in time, in diplomacy, in mechanics, in psychology; all of<br />

which are removed from the battlefield, but react often decisively<br />

upon it.... The maneuver which brings an ally into the field is as<br />

serviceable as that which wins a great battle. The maneuver which<br />

gains an important strategic point may be less valuable than that<br />

which placates or overawes a dangerous neutral.<br />

The maneuver chosen by Churchill was particularly ruthless.<br />

Under what was called the Cruiser Rules, warships of both England<br />

and Germany gave the crews of unarmed enemy merchant ships a<br />

1 Sunpson, p. 87.<br />

2. "Riddle of the Lusitania/' by Robert Ballard, National Geographic, AprU, 1994,<br />

p. 74.<br />

3. Winston Churchill, The World Crisis (New York: Scribner's Sons, 1949), p. 300.<br />

This appears on p. 464 of the Barnes & Noble 1993 reprint.<br />

chance to take to the lifeboats before sinking them. But, in October<br />

of 1914, Churchill issued orders that British merchant ships must no<br />

longer obey a U-boat order to halt and be searched. If they had<br />

armament, they were to engage the enemy, If they did not, they<br />

were to attempt to ram the sub. The immediate result of this change<br />

was to force German U-boats to remain submerged for protection<br />

and to simply sink the ships without warning.<br />

Why would the British want to do such a stupid thing that<br />

would cost the lives of thousands of their own seamen? The answer<br />

is that it was not an act of stupidity. It was cold blooded strategy.<br />

Churchill boasted:<br />

The first British countermove, made on my responsibility,... was to<br />

deter the Germans from surface attack. The submerged U-boat had to<br />

rely increasingly on underwater attack and thus ran the greater risk of<br />

mistaking neutral for British ships and of drowning neutral crews and<br />

thus embroiling Germany with other Great Powers. 1<br />

To increase the likelihood of accidentally sinking a ship from a<br />

neutral "Great Power," Churchill ordered British ships to remove<br />

their names from their hulls and, when in port, to fly the flag of a<br />

neutral power, preferably that of the United States. As further<br />

provocation, the British navy was ordered to treat captured U-boat<br />

crew members not as prisoners of war but as felons. "Survivors/'<br />

wrote Churchill, "should be taken prisoner or shot—whichever is<br />

the most convenient."<br />

Other orders, which now are an embarrassing<br />

part of official navy archives, were even more ruthless: "In a)]<br />

actions, white flags should be fired upon with promptitude/<br />

The trap was carefully laid. The German navy was goaded into<br />

a position of shoot-first and ask questions later and, under those<br />

conditions, it was inevitable that American lives would be lost<br />

A FLOATING MUNITIONS DEPOT<br />

After many years of investigation, it is now possible to identify<br />

the cargo that was loaded aboard the Lusitania on her last voyage. It<br />

included 600 tons of pyroxyline (commonly called gun cotton), 4<br />

I Churchill, pp. 274-75.<br />

2. Taken from the Diaries of Admiral Sir Hubert Richmond, Feb. 27, 1915, National<br />

Maritime Museum, Greenwich, as quoted by Simpson, p. 37.<br />

3- P.R.O., ADM/116/1359, Dec. 23, 1914, quoted by Simpson, p. 37.<br />

4. Gun cotton explodes with three-times the force of gunpowder in a confined<br />

space and can be ignited at a much lower flash point. See Eissler, Manuel, Modern<br />

Higt<br />

High Explosives (New York John Wiley & Sons, 1914), pp. 110, 112, 372.


250 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND SINK THE LUSITANIA! 251<br />

six-million rounds of ammunition, 1,248 cases of shrapnel shells<br />

(which may not have included explosive charges), plus an unknown<br />

quantity of munitions that completely filled the holds on the lowest<br />

deck and the trunkways and passageways of F deck. In addition,<br />

there were many tons of "cheese," "lard," "furs" and other items<br />

which were shown later to be falsely labelled. What they were is not<br />

now known, but it is certain they were at least contraband if not<br />

outright weapons of war. They were all consigned through the J.P.<br />

Morgan Company. But none of this was suspected by the public,<br />

least of all those hapless Americans who unknowingly booked a<br />

passage to death for themselves and their families as human decoys<br />

in a global game of high finance and low politics.<br />

The German embassy in Washington was well aware of the<br />

nature of the cargo being loaded aboard the Lusitania and filed a<br />

formal complaint to the United States government, because almost<br />

all of it was in direct violation of international neutrality treaties.<br />

The response was a flat denial of any knowledge of such cargo.<br />

Seeing that the Wilson Administration was tacitly approving the<br />

shipment, the German embassy made one final effort to avert disaster.<br />

It placed an ad in fifty East Coast newspapers, including those<br />

in New York City, warning Americans not to take passage on the<br />

Lusitania. The ad was prepaid and requested to be placed on the<br />

paper's travel page a full week before the sailing date. It read as<br />

follows:<br />

NOTICE!<br />

TRAVELERS intending to embark on the Atlantic voyage<br />

are reminded that a state of war exists between Germany<br />

and her allies and Great Britain and her allies; that the zone<br />

of war includes the waters adjacent to the British Isles; that,<br />

in accordance with formal notice given by the Imperial<br />

German Government, vessels flying the flag of Great<br />

Britain, or of any of her allies, are liable to destruction in<br />

those waters and that travelers sailing in the war zone on<br />

ships of Great Britain or her allies do so at their own risk.<br />

IMPERIAL GERMAN EMBASSY<br />

Washington, D.C., April 22, 1915.<br />

Icial<br />

Although the ad was in the hands of newspapers in time for the<br />

requested deadline, the State Department intervened and, raising<br />

the specter of possible libel suits, frightened the publishers into not<br />

printing it without prior clearance from State Department attorneys.<br />

Of the fifty newspapers, only the Des Moines Register carried the ad<br />

pn the requested date. What happened next is described by<br />

Simpson:<br />

George Viereck [who was the editor of a German-owned<br />

newspaper at that time and who had placed the ads on behalf of the<br />

embassy] spent April 26 asking the State Department why his<br />

advertisement had not been published. Eventually he managed to<br />

obtain an interview with [Secretary of State, William Jennings] Bryan<br />

and pointed out to him that on all but one of her wartime voyages the<br />

Lusitania had carried munitions. He produced copies of her<br />

supplementary manifests, which were open to public inspection at the<br />

collector's office. More important, he informed Bryan, no fewer than<br />

six million rounds of ammunition were due to be shipped on the<br />

Lusitania the following Friday and could be seen at that moment being<br />

loaded on pier 54. Bryan picked up the telephone and cleared the<br />

publication of the advertisement. He promised Viereck that he would<br />

endeavor to persuade the President publicly to warn Americans not to<br />

travel. No such warning was issued by the President, but there can be<br />

no doubt that President Wilson was told of the character of the cargo<br />

destined for the Lusitania. He did nothing, but was to concede on the<br />

day he was told of her sinking that his foreknowledge had given him<br />

many sleepless hours.<br />

It is probably true that Wilson was a pacifist at heart, but it is<br />

equally certain that he was not entirely the master of his own destiny.<br />

He was a transplanted college professor from the ivy-covered<br />

walls of Princeton, an internationalist at heart who dreamed of helping<br />

to create a world government and to usher in a millennium of<br />

peace. But he found himself surrounded by and dependent upon<br />

men of strong wills, astute political aptitudes, and powerful finan-<br />

resources. Against these forces, he was all but powerless to act<br />

on his own, and there is good reason to believe that he inwardly<br />

suffered over many of the events in which he was compelled to participate.<br />

We shall leave it to others to moralize about a man who, by<br />

his deliberate refusal to warn his countrymen of their mortal peril,<br />

sends 195 of them to their watery graves. We may wonder, also,<br />

1. Simpson, p. 97.


252 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND SINK THE LUSITANIA! 253<br />

about how such a man can commit the ultimate hypocrisy of<br />

condemning the Germans for this act and then doing everything<br />

possible to prevent the American public from learning the truth. It<br />

would be surprising if the extent of his private remorse was not<br />

greater than merely a few sleepless hours.<br />

THE FINAL VOYAGE<br />

But we are getting slightly ahead of the story. While Morgan<br />

and Wilson were setting the deadly stage on the American side of<br />

the Atlantic, Churchill was playing his part on the European side.<br />

When the Lusitania left New York Harbor on May 1, her orders were<br />

to rendezvous with a British destroyer, the Jnno, just off the coast of<br />

Ireland so she would have naval protection as she entered hostile<br />

waters. When the Lusitania reached the rendezvous point, however,<br />

she was alone, and the captain assumed they had missed each other<br />

in the fog. In truth, the Juno had been called out of the area at the last<br />

minute and ordered to return to Queenstown. And this was done<br />

with the full knowledge that the Lusitania was on a direct course<br />

into an area where a German submarine was known to be operating.<br />

To make matters worse, the Lusitania had been ordered to cut<br />

back on the use of coal, not because of shortages, but because it<br />

would be less expensive. Slow targets, of course, are much easier to<br />

hit. Yet, she was required to shut down one of her four boilers and,<br />

consequently, was now entering submarine-infested waters at only<br />

75% of her potential speed.<br />

As the Lusitania drew closer to hostile waters, almost everyone<br />

knew she was in grave danger. Newspapers in London were alive<br />

with the story of German warnings and recent sinkings. In the map<br />

room of the British Admiralty, Churchill watched the play unfold<br />

and coldly called the shots. Small disks marked the places where<br />

two ships had been torpedoed the day before. A circle indicated the<br />

area within which the U-boat must still be operating. A larger disk<br />

represented the Lusitania travelling at nineteen knots directly into the<br />

circle. Yet, nothing was done to help her. Admiral Coke at Queenstown<br />

was given perfunctory instructions to protect her as best he<br />

could, but he had no means to do so and, in fact, no one even bothered<br />

to notify the captain of the Lusitania that the rendezvous with<br />

the Juno had been canceled.<br />

One of the officers present in the high-command map room on<br />

that fateful day was Commander Joseph Kenworthy, who pre- 3.<br />

viously had been called upon by Churchill to submit a paper on<br />

w hat would be the political results of an ocean liner being sunk with<br />

American passengers aboard. He left the room in disgust at the<br />

cynicism of his superiors. In 1927, in his book, The Freedom of the<br />

Seas, he wrote without further comment: "The Lusitania was sent at<br />

considerably reduced speed into an area where a U-boat was<br />

known to be waiting and with her escorts withdrawn/' Further<br />

comment is not needed.<br />

Colonel House was in England at that time and, on the day of<br />

the sinking, was scheduled to have an audience with King<br />

George V. He was accompanied by Sir Edward Grey and, on the<br />

way, Sir Grey asked him: "What will America do if the Germans<br />

sink an ocean liner with American passengers on board?" As<br />

recorded in House's diaries, he replied: "I told him if<br />

this were<br />

done, a flame of indignation would sweep America, which would in<br />

itself probably carry us into the war." 2 Once at Buckingham Palace,<br />

King George also brought up the subject and was even more specific<br />

about the possible target. He asked, "Suppose they should sink the<br />

."<br />

Lusitania with American passengers on board.. .<br />

A MIGHTY EXPLOSION, A WATERY GRAVE<br />

Four hours after this conversation, the black smoke of the<br />

Lusitania was spotted on the horizon through the periscope of the<br />

German submarine, 17-20. The ship came directly toward the<br />

U-boat, allowing it to full-throttle out of her path and swing around<br />

for a ninety-degree shot at her bow as she passed only 750 yards<br />

away. The torpedo struck nine feet below the water line on the starboard<br />

side slightly forward of the bridge. A second torpedo was<br />

readied but not needed. Quickly after the explosion of the impact,<br />

there was a second and much larger explosion that literally blew the<br />

side off of cargo hold number two and started the great ship immediately<br />

toward the bottom. And what a hole it must have been. The<br />

Lusitania, one of the largest ships ever built, sank in less than eightn<br />

minutes!<br />

| Joseph M. Kenworthy and George Young, The Freedom of the Seas (New York:<br />

Ayer Company, 1929), p. 211.<br />

Seymour, Vol I, p. 432<br />

&&., p. 432.


254 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

SINK THE LUSITANIA! 255<br />

Survivors among the crew who were working in the boiler<br />

, In the final analysis, it makes little difference whether the explosion<br />

was caused by munitions or coal dust. The fact that it could have<br />

rooms during the attack have attested that the boilers did not blow<br />

at that time. Simpson tells us:<br />

been caused by munitions is sufficient for the case.<br />

The G torpedo had failed to blow in the inner bulkhead of No l A HURRIED COVER-UP<br />

boiler room, but just further forward something blew out most of the<br />

bottom<br />

An official inquiry, under the direction of Lord Mersey, was<br />

of the bow of the ship. It may have been the Bethlehem<br />

Company's 3-inch held to determine the facts of the sinking and to place the blame. It<br />

shells, the six million rounds of rifle ammunition or<br />

the highly dubious contents of the bales was a rigged affair from the beginning. All evidence and testimony<br />

of furs or the small<br />

forty-pound boxes of cheese. Divers who have been down was carefully pre-screened to make sure that nothing was admitted<br />

to the wreck<br />

unanimously testify that the bow was blasted by a massive internal<br />

ffnto the record which would reveal duplicity on the part of British<br />

explosion, and large pieces of the bow plating, buckled from the<br />

or American officials. Among the papers submitted to Lord Mersey<br />

inside, are to be found some distance from the hull. 1<br />

prior to the hearings was one from Captain Richard Webb, one of<br />

When a search team from the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute<br />

surveyed the wreckage in the summer of 1993, they directed by the board of Admiralty to inform you that it is consid-<br />

the men chosen by the navy to assist in the cover up. It read: "I am<br />

reported:<br />

"When our cameras swept across the hold, we got a big surpriseered<br />

politically expedient that Captain Turner, the master of the<br />

There was no hole.... We found no evidence that U-20's torpedo Lusitania,<br />

had<br />

be most prominently blamed for the disaster."<br />

detonated an explosion, undermining one theory of why the The final report was a most interesting document. Anyone reading<br />

it without knowledge of the facts would conclude that Captain<br />

liner<br />

sank.'<br />

It is difficult to share the team's surprise. Photographs show that<br />

William Turner was to blame for the disaster. Even so, Mersey<br />

the wreck is resting on its starboard (right) side. Since that is where<br />

'attempted to soften the blow. He wrote: "...blame ought not to be<br />

the torpedo struck, it is logical that the hole would not be visible.<br />

imputed to the captain.... His omission to follow the advice in all<br />

It<br />

would be on the side buried in the ocean floor. The team reported<br />

respects cannot fairly be attributed either to negligence or incompetence."<br />

And then he added a final paragraph which, on the surface,<br />

that they were able to inspect only part of the hull's underside. That<br />

is because most of it—plus the entire starboard side—is buried in the<br />

appears to be a condemnation of the Germans but which, if read<br />

muck. Since the torpedo struck only nine feet below the waterline,<br />

with understanding of the background, was an indictment of<br />

the hole would not logically be anywhere near the bottom of the<br />

Churchill, Wilson, House and Morgan. He wrote:<br />

hull but at a point midway between the main deck and the bottom<br />

The whole blame for the cruel destruction of life in this<br />

In other words, it would be at the midpoint of the side that is now<br />

catastrophe must rest solely with those who plotted and with those<br />

facing down. Failure to see the hole does not undermine the theory<br />

L who committed the crime.<br />

of internal explosion. It is exactly what one would expect.<br />

Did Lord Mersey know that there could be a dual meaning to his<br />

In any event, it should be obvious that the Lusitania would not<br />

Words? Perhaps not, but, two days after delivering his judgment, he<br />

have gone to the bottom in eighteen minutes without a hole someivhere.<br />

Even the search team had to acknowledge that fact indirectly<br />

ices.<br />

wrote to Prime Minister Asquith and turned down his fee for serv-<br />

when<br />

He added: "I must request that henceforth I be excused from<br />

it addressed the question of what might have caused the<br />

pdministering His Majesty's Justice." In later years, his only comment<br />

on the event was: "The Lusitania case was a damn dirty<br />

second explosion. In an obvious effort to avoid giving support to a<br />

"conspiracy theory," the report concluded that the explosion probably<br />

was caused, not by munitions, but by coal dust.<br />

business." 3<br />

1- The Papers of Lord Mersey, Bignor Park, Sussex, as quoted by Simpson, p. 190.<br />

1. Simpson, p. 157.<br />

2. Simpson, p. 241.<br />

2. Ballard, "Riddle of the Lusitania/' pp. 74, 76.<br />

3. Ibid., p. 241.


256 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND SINK THE LUSITANIA! 257<br />

THE CRY FOR WAR<br />

The purposes of the Cabal would have been better served had<br />

an American ship been sunk by the Germans, but a British ship with<br />

195 Americans drowned was sufficient to do the job. The players<br />

wasted no time in whipping up public sentiment. Wilson sent a note<br />

of outraged indignation to the Imperial German Government and<br />

this was widely quoted in the press.<br />

By that time, Bryan had become completely disillusioned by the<br />

duplicity of his own government. On May 9, he sent a dour note to<br />

Wilson:<br />

Germany has a right to prevent contraband going to the Allies<br />

and a ship carrying contraband should not rely upon passengers to<br />

protect her from attack-it would be like putting women and children<br />

in front of an army.<br />

This did not deter Wilson from his commitment. The first note<br />

was followed by an even stronger one with threatening overtones<br />

which was intensely discussed at the Cabinet meeting on the first of<br />

June. McAdoo, who was present at the meeting, says:<br />

I remember that Bryan had little to say at this meeting; he sat<br />

Uvoughout the proceedings with his eyes half closed most of the time<br />

After the meeting he told the President, as I learned later, that he could<br />

not sign the note.... Bryan went on to say that he thought his<br />

usefulness as Secretary of State was over, and he proposed to resign. 2<br />

At the request of Wilson, McAdoo was dispatched to the Bryans'<br />

home to persuade the Secretary to change his mind, lest his resignation<br />

be taken as a sign of disunity within the President's Cabinet.<br />

Bryari agreed to think it over one more day but, the following morning<br />

his decision remained firm. In his memoirs, annotated by his<br />

wife, Mrs. Bryan reveals that her husband could not sleep that night<br />

He was so restless I suggested that he read a little rill he should<br />

become drowsy. He had in his handbag a copy of an old book<br />

printed in 1829 and called A Wreath of Appreciation of Andrew<br />

Jackson. He found it very interesting."<br />

3<br />

What irony. In chapter seventeen we shall review the total war<br />

waged by President Jackson against the Bank of the United States,<br />

the<br />

predecessor of the Federal Reserve System, and we shall be<br />

reminded that it was Jackson who prophesied:<br />

Is there no danger to our liberty and independence in a bank that<br />

in its nature has so little to bind it to our country?... [Is there not] cause<br />

to tremble for the purity of our elections in peace and for the<br />

independence of our country in war?... Controlling our currency,<br />

receiving our public monies, and holding thousands of our citizens in<br />

dependence, it would be more formidable and dangerous than a naval<br />

and military power of the enemy.<br />

One can only wonder what thoughts went through Bryan's<br />

mind as he recalled Jackson's warning and applied it to the artificially<br />

created war hysteria that, at that very moment, was being<br />

generated by the financial powers on Wall Street and at the newly<br />

created Federal Reserve.<br />

From England, Colonel House sent a telegram to President<br />

Wilson which he, in turn, read to his Cabinet It became the genesis<br />

of thousands of newspaper editorials across the land. He said<br />

piously:<br />

America has come to the parting of the ways, when she must<br />

determine whether she stands for civilized or uncivilized warfare. We<br />

can no longer remain neutral spectators. Our action in this crisis will<br />

determine the part we will play when peace is made, and how far we<br />

may influence a settlement for the lasting good of humanity. We are<br />

being weighed in the balance, and our position amongst nations is<br />

being assessed by mankind.<br />

In another telegram two days later, House reveals himself as the<br />

master psycho-politician playing on Wilson's ego like a violinist<br />

stroking the strings of a Stradivarius. He wrote:<br />

If, unhappily, it is necessary to go to war, I hope you will give the<br />

world an exhibition of American efficiency that will be a lesson for a<br />

century or more. It is generally believed throughout Europe that we<br />

are so unprepared and that it would take so long to put our resources<br />

into action, that our entering would make but little difference.<br />

In the event of war, we should accelerate the manufacture of<br />

munitions to such an extent that we could supply not only ourselves<br />

but the Allies, and so quickly that the world would be astounded.<br />

1 - Bryan, Vol II,<br />

pp. 398-9.<br />

2. McAdoo, p. 333.<br />

3. Bryan, Vol. II, p. 424.<br />

1 - Herman E. Krooss, ed., Documentary History of Banking and Currency in the Unites<br />

States (New York: Chelsea House, 1983), Vol. ni, pp. 26-27.<br />

2. Seymour, p. 434.<br />

3. JM.,p.435.


258 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND SINK THE LUSITANIA! 259<br />

Congress could not resist the combined pressure of the press<br />

and the President On April 16, 1917, the United States officially<br />

declared war on the Axis powers. Eight days later, Congress dutifully<br />

passed the War Loan Act which extended $1 billion in credit to<br />

the Allies. The first advance of $200 million went to the British the<br />

next day and was immediately applied as payment on the debt to<br />

Morgan. A few days later, $100 million went to France for the same<br />

purpose. But the drain continued. Within three months the British<br />

had run up their overdraft with Morgan to $400 million dollars, and<br />

the firm presented it to the government for payment. The Treasury,<br />

however, was unable to put its hands on that amount of money<br />

without jeopardizing its own spendable funds and, at first, refused<br />

to pay. The problem was quickly solved, however, through a<br />

maneuver described at some length in chapter ten. The Federal<br />

Reserve System under Benjamin Strong simply created the needed<br />

money through the Mandrake Mechanism. "The Wilson Administration<br />

found itself in an extremely awkward position, having to<br />

bail out J.P. Morgan," wrote Ferrell, but Benjamin Strong "offered to<br />

help [Treasury-Secretary] McAdoo out of the difficulty. Over the<br />

following months in 1917-18 the Treasury quietly paid Morgan<br />

piecemeal for the overdraft." 1<br />

By the time the war was over, the<br />

Treasury had loaned a total of $9,466,000,000 including<br />

$2,170,000,000 given after the Armistice.<br />

That was the cash flow they had long awaited. In addition to<br />

saving the Morgan loans, even larger profits were to be made from<br />

war production. The government had been secretly preparing for<br />

war for six months prior to the actual declaration. According to<br />

Franklin D. Roosevelt, then Assistant Secretary of the Navy, the<br />

Navy Department began extensive purchasing of war supplies in<br />

the Fall of 1916.<br />

Ferdinand Lundberg adds this perspective:<br />

By no accident all the strategic government posts, notably those<br />

concerned with buying, were reserved for the Wall Street patriots. On<br />

the most vital appointments, Wilson consulted with Dodge [President<br />

of Rockefeller's National City Bank], who ...<br />

recommended the<br />

hitherto unknown [Bernard] Baruch, speculator in copper stocks, as<br />

chairman of the all-powerful War Industries Board....<br />

1. Ferrell, p. 89,90.<br />

2. Clarence W. Barron, They Told Barron- Notes of Clarence Walker Barron, edited<br />

and SamUel Tayl°r M°0re (NeW Y° rk;<br />

193$'<br />

Har<br />

51<br />

P er and Br0*e


260 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND SINK THE LUSITANIA!<br />

between the political and monetary scientists had performed its<br />

mission well.<br />

SUMMARY<br />

To finance the early stages of World War I, England and France<br />

had borrowed heavily from investors in America and had selected<br />

the House of Morgan as sales agent for their bonds. Morgan also<br />

acted as their U.S. purchasing agent for war materials, thus profiting<br />

from both ends of the cash flow: once when the money was borrowed<br />

and again when it was spent. Further profits were derived<br />

from production contracts placed with companies within the<br />

Morgan orbit. But the war began to go badly for the Allies when<br />

Germany's submarines took virtual control of the Atlantic shipping<br />

lanes. As England and France moved closer to defeat or a negotiated<br />

peace on Germany's terms, it became increasingly difficult to sell<br />

their bonds. No bonds meant no purchases, and the Morgan cash<br />

flow was threatened. Furthermore, if the previously sold bonds<br />

should go into default, as they certainly would in the wake of<br />

defeat, the Morgan consortium would suffer gigantic losses.<br />

The only way to save the British Empire, to restore the value of<br />

the bonds, and to sustain the Morgan cash flow was for the United<br />

States government to provide the money. But, since neutral nations<br />

were prohibited from doing that by treaty, America would have to<br />

be brought into the war. A secret agreement to that effect was made<br />

between British officials and Colonel House, with the concurrence<br />

of the President. From that point forward, Wilson began to pressure<br />

Congress for a declaration of war. This was done at the very time he<br />

was campaigning for reelection on the slogan "He kept us out of<br />

war." Meanwhile, Morgan purchased control over major segments<br />

of the news media and engineered a nation-wide editorial blitz<br />

against Germany, calling for war as an act of American patriotism.<br />

Morgan had created an international shipping cartel, including<br />

Germany's merchant fleet, which maintained a near monopoly on<br />

the high seas. Only the British Cunard Lines remained aloof. The<br />

Lusitania was owned by Cunard and operated in competition with<br />

Morgan's carteL The Lusitania was built to military specifications<br />

and was registered with the British Admiralty as an armed auxiliary<br />

cruiser. She carried passengers as a cover to conceal her real mission,<br />

which was to bring contraband war materials from the United<br />

States. This fact was known to Wilson and others in his administration,<br />

but they did nothing to stop it.<br />

261<br />

When the German en*assy<br />

Xd to publish a warning to American passengers, the Sta e<br />

Apartment intervened and prevented newspapers from printing it<br />

wC*e Lusitania left New York harbor on her final voyage, she<br />

-^»^2S«States into the war<br />

7Z that could accomplish that was proper-^ven the coldly calcu-<br />

SacrificeofoneofhergreatshipswithEngUshmenaboard^u<br />

ht trick was to have Americans on board also in order to create the<br />

toper emotional climate in the United States. As the Lus^nn<br />

Cved -to hostile waters, where a German U-boat was known o<br />

"operating, First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Church<br />

would mean the difference between defeat and victory, and any-<br />

ordered her destroyer protection to abandon her. This, plus the fact<br />

SJ£ had been oVred to travel at reduced speed, made her an<br />

easy target. After the impact of one well placed torpedo, a mighty<br />

second explosion from within ripped her apart, and the ship that<br />

many believed could not be sunk, guxgled to the bottom in less than<br />

ei^hTd^tad been done, and it set in motion great waves of<br />

revulsion against the Germans. These waves eventually flooded<br />

through Washington and swept the United States into war. Within<br />

days of the declaration, Congress voted $1 bilhon in credit for<br />

England and France. $200 million was sent to England immediately<br />

and was applied to the Morgan account. The vast quantity of money<br />

needed to" finance the war was created by the Federal Reserve<br />

System, which means it was collected from Americans through that<br />

fully one-half of all they had saved. The infinitely higher cost in<br />

American blood was added to the bill.<br />

>rs0nali-<br />

Thus it was that the separate motives of such diverse personal!<br />

ties as Winston Churchill, J.P. Morgan, Colonel House, and<br />

Woodrow Wilson all found common cause in bringing America into<br />

World War I. Churchill maneuvered for military advantage<br />

Morean sought the profits of war, House schemed for political<br />

power, and Wilson Lamed of a chance to dominate a post-war<br />

League of Nations.


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Chapter Thirteen<br />

ASQUERADE<br />

N MOSCOW<br />

The secret societyfounded by Cecil Rhodes for the<br />

purpose of world dominion; the establishment in<br />

America of a branch of tluit group called the<br />

Council cm Foreign Relations; the role played by<br />

financiers<br />

representing both of these groups in<br />

financing the Russian revolution; the use of the<br />

Red Cross mission in Moscow as a caver for that<br />

maneuver.<br />

The German<br />

Embassy attempted<br />

to place ads in 50<br />

newspapers warning<br />

that the Lusitania was<br />

a target of war, but<br />

the U.S. government<br />

prevented them from<br />

being printed except<br />

for this one which<br />

was run in the<br />

Des Moines Register.<br />

When the ship was<br />

sunk off the coast of<br />

Ireland with 195<br />

Americans aboard, it<br />

became the center of<br />

a national campaign<br />

to generate emotional<br />

support for coming<br />

into the war.<br />

One of the greatest myths of contemporary history is that the<br />

Bolshevik Revolution in Russia was a popular uprising of the<br />

downtrodden masses against the hated ruling class of the Tsars. As<br />

we shall see, however, the planning, the leadership, and especially<br />

the financing came entirely from outside Russia, mostly from<br />

ifinanciers in Germany, Britain, and the United States. Furthermore,<br />

we shall see that the Rothschild Formula played a major role in<br />

shaping these events.<br />

This amazing story begins with the war between Russia and<br />

Japan in 1904. Jacob Schiff, who was head of the New York<br />

investment firm of Kuhn, Loeb, and Company, had raised the<br />

capital for large war loans to Japan. It was due to this funding that<br />

the Japanese were able to launch a stunning attack against the<br />

Russians at Port Arthur and, the following year, to virtually<br />

decimate the Russian fleet. In 1905, the Mikado awarded Jacob<br />

Schiff a medal, the Second Order of the Treasure of ]apan, in<br />

recognition of his important role in that campaign.<br />

During the two years of hostilities, thousands of Russian<br />

soldiers and sailors were taken as prisoners. Schiff paid for the<br />

printing of one-and-a-half tons of Marxist propaganda and had it<br />

delivered to the prison camps. He also sent scores of Russianspeaking<br />

revolutionaries, trained in New York, to distribute the


264 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

MASQUERADE IN MOSCOW 265<br />

pamphlets among the prisoners and to indoctrinate them into<br />

Russian revolution as "...what we had hoped and striven for these<br />

rebellion against their own government. When the war was ended,<br />

long years."<br />

50,000 officers and enlisted men returned home to become virtual<br />

In the February 3, 1949, issue of the New York Journal American,<br />

seeds of treason against the Tsar. They were to play a major role a<br />

Schiff's grandson, John, was quoted by columnist Cholly Knickerbocker<br />

as saying that his grandfather had given about $20 million<br />

few years later in creating mutiny among the military during the<br />

Communist takeover of Russia.<br />

for the triumph of Communism in Russia.<br />

TROTSKY WAS SCHIFFS AGENT<br />

When Trotsky returned to Petrograd in May of 1917 to organize<br />

One of the best known Russian revolutionaries at that time was<br />

the Bolshevik phase of the Russian Revolution, he carried $10,000<br />

Leon Trotsky. In January of 1916, Trotsky was expelled from France<br />

for travel expenses, a generously ample fund considering the value<br />

and came to the United States at the invitation of Schiff. His travel<br />

of the dollar at that time. The amount is known with certainty<br />

expenses aboard the Monserrat were paid by his host. He remained<br />

because Trotsky was arrested by Canadian and British naval<br />

for several months while writing for a Russian socialist paper<br />

personnel when the ship on which he was travelling, the S.S.<br />

the<br />

Novy Mir (New World), and giving revolutionary Kristianiafjord, put in at Halifax.<br />

speeches<br />

The money in his possession is now<br />

at mass<br />

meetings in New York City. According to Trotsky himself,<br />

a matter of official record. Because Trotsky<br />

on many<br />

was a known enemy of<br />

occasions a chauffeured limousine was placed the Tsar and because Germany was then at war with Russia, it was<br />

at the service of his<br />

family by a wealthy friend identified as Dr. M. In his book,<br />

assumed that the $10,000 was German money given to him in<br />

My<br />

New<br />

Life'<br />

Trotsky wrote:<br />

York. The evidence, however, is that this, too, came from Kuhn,<br />

The<br />

Loeb and Company.<br />

doctor's wife took my wife and the boys out driving and was<br />

very kind Trotsky was not arrested<br />

to them.<br />

on a whim. He was recognized as a<br />

But she was a mere mortal, whereas the chauffeur<br />

was a magician, a titan, a<br />

threat to<br />

superman!<br />

the best interests of England, Canada's mother country in<br />

With the wave of his hand he<br />

made the machine obey his slightest command. the British<br />

To<br />

Commonwealth. Russia was an ally of England in the<br />

sit beside him was<br />

the supreme delight. When they went into a tea-room, the<br />

First<br />

boys would<br />

World War which then was raging in Europe. Anything that<br />

anxiously demand of their mother, "Why doesn't the chauffeur come<br />

would weaken Russia—and that certainly included internal revolution—would<br />

be, in effect, to strengthen Germany and weaken<br />

in?<br />

It must have been a curious sight to see the<br />

England. In<br />

family<br />

New York, on the night before his departure, Trotsky<br />

of the great<br />

socialist radical, defender of the working class,<br />

had given a<br />

enemy<br />

speech in which he said: "I am going back to Russia to<br />

of capitalism,<br />

enjoying the pleasures of tea rooms and<br />

overthrow the provisional government and stop the war with<br />

chauffeurs, the very<br />

symbols of capitalist luxury. In any Germany."<br />

event,<br />

Trotsky, therefore, represented a real threat to<br />

it is now known that<br />

almost all of his expenses in New York,<br />

England's war effort.<br />

including<br />

He was arrested as a German agent and taken<br />

the mass rallies,<br />

were paid for by Jacob Schiff.<br />

as a prisoner of war.<br />

On March 23, 1917, a mass meeting was held<br />

With this in mind, at Carnegie<br />

we can appreciate the great strength of those<br />

Hall to<br />

celebrate the abdication of Nicholas II, which<br />

mysterious forces, both in England<br />

meant<br />

and the United States, that<br />

the overthrow<br />

of Tsanst rule in Russia. Thousands intervened<br />

of<br />

on Trotsky's behalf. Immediately, telegrams began to<br />

socialists, Marxists, nihilists,<br />

and anarchists attended to cheer come<br />

the<br />

into Halifax from such divergent sources as an obscure<br />

event. The following day there<br />

was published on page two of the New York Times, a telegram from<br />

1<br />

Jacob<br />

"Mayor Calls Pacifists Traitors/' The<br />

Schiff which<br />

New York Times, March 24, 1917,<br />

had p. 2.<br />

been read to this audience. He expressed<br />

|t See Anthony C. Sutton, Ph.D., Wall Street and the Bolshevik Revolution (New<br />

regrets that he could not attend and then described the Rochelle,<br />

successful<br />

New York: Arlington House, 1974), pp. 21-24.<br />

3. A full report on this meeting had been submitted to the U.S. Military Intelli-<br />

I- Leon Trotsky, My Life (New York: Scribner's, 1930), p. 277.<br />

gence. See Senate Document No. 62, 66th Congress, Report and Hearings of t\\e<br />

Subcommittee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 1919, Vol. II, p. 2680.


266 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

attorney in New York City, from the Canadian Deputy Postmaster-<br />

General, and even from a high-ranking British military officer<br />

mqu^nng into Trotsky's situation and urging his immediate release<br />

The head of the British Secret Service in America at the time was Sir<br />

Wilham Wiseman who, as fate would have it, occupied t^<br />

apartment directly above the apartment of Edward Mandell House<br />

and who had become fast friends with him. House advised<br />

Wiseman that President Wilson wished to have Trotsky released<br />

Wiseman advised his government, and the British Admiralty'<br />

issued orders on April 21st that Trotsky was to be sent on his waJ<br />

It was a fateful decision that would affect, not only the outcome of<br />

war, but the future of the entire world.<br />

SCHIFF WAS NOT ALONE<br />

It would be a mistake to conclude that Jacob Schiff acted alone<br />

m his drama. Trotsky could not have gone even as far as Halifax<br />

withou having been granted an American passport, and this<br />

accomplished<br />

was<br />

by the personal intervention of President Wilson.<br />

Professor Anthony Sutton says:<br />

President Woodrow Wilson was the fairy godmother<br />

provided<br />

who<br />

Trotsky with a passport to return to Russia to<br />

forward" the<br />

Cry<br />

revolution.... At the same time careful State DeparmS<br />

bureaucrats, concerned about such revolutionaries entering<br />

were unilaterally<br />

RusTa<br />

attempting to tighten up passport procedureJ<br />

oUh£ilf ere T' 6 °^eTS ^^<br />

3S WeU<br />

'<br />

- ^ 1911 the SL L'<br />

'<br />

s MP**<br />

""^ Robert Minor. Mnor<br />

^<br />

*<br />

was lat r i X<br />

T1<br />

RUSSia f°r evolutionary and, fn f t i*??"** activities<br />

in fact, was himself bankrolled by famous Wall Street financartoonT<br />

7 "T i<br />

akly 3SSUme that hC^** to P ic we "' ^<br />

t0riCal<br />

S£TT£ t *% inP****- ^Sc<br />

» strays Karl<br />

with<br />

Marx,<br />

a book entitled Sialism under his arm, standing amid a<br />

t^2r<br />

*<br />

^Jf Street Gathered ar0Und and 8^ng Hm<br />

: UdS^eS are CharaCterS in Silk hats Stifled<br />

T^TT( D'<br />

Rockefe"^ J-P. Morgan, John D. Ryan of National City<br />

all<br />

MASQUERADE IN MOSCOW 267<br />

What emerges from this sampling of events is a clear pattern of<br />

strong support for Bolshevism coming from the highest financial<br />

power centers in the United States; from men who,<br />

and political<br />

supposedly, were "capitalists" and who, according to conventional<br />

wisdom, should have been the mortal enemies of socialism and<br />

communism.<br />

Nor was this phenomenon confined to the United States.<br />

Trotsky, in his book, My Life, tells of a British financier who, in 1907,<br />

gave him a<br />

"large loan" to be repaid after the overthrow of the<br />

Tsar. Arsene de Goulevitch, who witnessed the Bolshevik Revolution<br />

first hand, has identified both the name of the financier and the<br />

amount of the loan. "In private interviews," he said, "I have been<br />

told that over 21 million roubles were spent by Lord [Alfred]<br />

Milner in financing the Russian Revolution,... The financier just<br />

mentioned was by no means alone among the British to support the<br />

Russian revolution with large financial donations." Another name<br />

specifically mentioned by de Goulevitch was that of Sir George<br />

Buchanan, the British Ambassador to Russia at the time.<br />

It was one thing for Americans to undermine Tsarist Russia<br />

and, thus, indirectly help Germany in the war, because Americans<br />

were not then into it, but for British citizens to do so was<br />

tantamount to treason. To understand what higher loyalty compelled<br />

these men to betray their battlefield ally and to sacrifice the<br />

blood of their own countrymen, we must take a look at the unique<br />

organization to which they belonged.<br />

THE SECRET SOCIETY<br />

Lord Alfred Milner was a key figure in organizing a secret<br />

society which, at the time of these events, was about sixteen years<br />

old. It was dedicated to nothing less than the quiet domination of<br />

the world. The conquest of Russia was seen as but the first phase of<br />

that plan. Since the organization is still in existence today and<br />

continues to make progress toward its goal, it is important to have<br />

its history included in this narrative.<br />

One of the most authoritative reference works on the history of<br />

this group is Tragedy and Hope by Dr. Carroll Quigley. Dr. Quigley<br />

Was a professor of history at Georgetown University where President<br />

Clinton had been one of his students. He was the author of the<br />

1 - See Arsene de Goulevitch, Czarism and Revolution (Hawthorne, California: Omni<br />

Publications, n.d v rpt. from 1962 French edition), pp. 224, 230.


268 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

widely used <strong>text</strong>book, Evolution of Civilization; he was a member of<br />

the editorial board of the monthly periodical Current History; and<br />

7^,^If consult^ h,rer and ^ such groups as the<br />

ndus^al CoUege of the Armed Forces, the Brooking Institution,<br />

the US. Naval Weapons Laboratory, the Naval College, the Smithsonian<br />

Institute, and the State Department But Dr. Quielev was<br />

mere<br />

no<br />

academic He also had been closely associated with many of<br />

the family dynasties of the super-rich. He was, by his own boast, an<br />

a fr0nt FOW<br />

^<br />

°f<br />

sTucSre^<br />

** W°rId,S m°ney P°wer<br />

When Dr. Quigley wrote his scholarly, 1300-page book of dry<br />

history, it was not intended for the masses. It was to be read by the<br />

intellectual elite and to that select readership he cautiously<br />

exposed one of the best-kept secrets of all time. He also made it<br />

dear however, that he was a friendly apologist for this group and<br />

that he supported its goals and purposes. Dr. Quigley said:<br />

I know of the operation of this network because I have studied it<br />

tor twenty years and was permitted for two years, in the 1960s to<br />

exarnme lts papers and secret record, I have no aversion toTor to<br />

mosl.of its aims and have, for much of my life, been close to it and to<br />

many of its mstruments. ... In general, my chief difference of opinion is<br />

that it wishes to remain unknown. F<br />

1<br />

As mentioned, Quigley's book was intended for an elite readership<br />

composed of scholars and network insiders. But, unexpectedly,<br />

it began to be quoted in the journals of the John Birch<br />

which<br />

Sodety<br />

correctly had perceived that his work provided a valuabfe<br />

insight to the inner workings of a hidden power structure<br />

That<br />

exposure triggered a large demand for the book by people who<br />

were opposed to the network and curious to see what LLfder had<br />

to say about it.<br />

faT That was not according to the original plan What<br />

by<br />

wSXi hT oeSmbed Q^' "«*•£ * a persona<br />

letter dated December 9, 1975, he wrote:<br />

brou^h?^VVT<br />

^^ °f^^ Und H °P e a book < "***^<br />

KS<br />

3t<br />

and^H e °T^^ kn°Wn -<br />

P ubl^her stoppedLlHng it<br />

^<br />

Sh,? ^ he W°Uld reprint^* 197 * ^ told my Wer<br />

1<br />

me ^ches as it apparently says something which<br />

that they had destroyed the plates in 1968). The rare-book price wIS<br />

MacMln^<br />

MASQUERADE IN MOSCOW 269<br />

up to $135 and parts were reprinted in violation of copyright, but I<br />

could do nothing because I believed the publisher, and he would not<br />

take action even when a pirate copy of the book appeared. Only when<br />

I hired a lawyer in 1974 did I get any answers to my questions.. .<br />

In another personal letter, Quigley commented further on the<br />

duplicity of his publisher:<br />

Tliey lied to me for six years, telling me that they would reprint<br />

when they got 2,000 orders, which could never happen because they<br />

told anyone who asked that it was out of print and would not be<br />

reprinted. They denied this to me until I sent them Xerox copies of<br />

such replies in libraries, at which they told me it was a clerk's error. In<br />

other words, they lied to me but prevented me from regaining<br />

publication rights.... I am now quite sure that Tragedy and Hope was<br />

suppressed....<br />

To understand why "powerful people" would want to suppress<br />

this book, note carefully what follows. Dr. Quigley describes the<br />

goal of this network of world financiers as:<br />

. , . nothing less than to create a world system of financial control in<br />

private hands able to dominate the political system of each country<br />

and the economy of the world as a whole. This system was to be<br />

controlled in a feudalist fashion by the central banks of the world<br />

acting in concert, by secret agreements arrived at in frequent private<br />

meetings and conferences. . .<br />

Each central bank, in the hands of men like Montagu Norman<br />

of the Bank of England, Benjamin Strong of the New York Federal<br />

Reserve Bank, Charles Rist of the Bank of France, and HJalmar<br />

Schacht of the Reichsbank, sought to dominate its government by<br />

its ability to control treasury loans, to manipulate foreign<br />

exchanges, to influence the level of economic activity in the<br />

country, and to influence cooperative politicians by subsequent<br />

economic rewards in the business world.<br />

1. These letters were first published in the Summer, 1976, issue of Conspiracy<br />

Digest, published by Peter McAlpine (Alpine Press, Dearborn, Michigan). The<br />

originals cannot now be located. However, the author was able to locate the<br />

attorney, Mr. Paul Wolff (with the firm of Williams & Connolly in Washington,<br />

D.C.) who represented Quigley in his legal action against the publisher. Mr. Wolff<br />

cannot vouch for the authenticity of the letters themselves, but has confirmed in<br />

phone conversations and later in writing that the essential details are correct. He<br />

writes: "It is my recollection that they withheld from me and the Professor for some<br />

time the information that they had in fact destroyed 'the plates/"<br />

2. Quigley, Tragedy, p. 324.


270 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

That is the information that "powerful people" do not want the<br />

common man to know.<br />

Notice that Quigley refers to this group as a "network." That is<br />

a precise choice of words, and it is important to an understanding<br />

of the forces of international finance. The network to which he<br />

refers is not the secret society. It is no doubt directed by it, and there<br />

are society members in key positions within the network, but we<br />

can be sure that there are many in the network who have little or no<br />

knowledge of hidden control. To explain how this can be possible,<br />

let us turn to the origin and growth of the secret society itself.<br />

RUSKIN, RHODES, AND MILNER<br />

In 1870, a wealthy British socialist by the name of John Ruskin<br />

was appointed as professor of fine arts at Oxford University in<br />

London. He tjught that the state must take control of the means of<br />

production and organize them for the good of the community as a<br />

whole. He advocated placing control of the state into the hands of a<br />

small ruling class, perhaps even a single dictator. He said: "My<br />

continual aim has been to show the eternal superiority of some men<br />

to others, sometimes even of one man to all others."<br />

This, of course, is the same intellectual appeal of Communism.<br />

Lenin taught that the masses could not be trusted to handle their<br />

own affairs and that a special group of disciplined intellectuals<br />

must assume this role for them. That is the function of the<br />

Communist Party, which never comprises more than about three<br />

per cent of the population. Even when the charade of free elections<br />

is allowed, only members of the Party—or those over whom the<br />

KGB has total control—are permitted to run for office. The concept<br />

that a ruling party or class is the ideal structure for society is at the<br />

heart of all collectivist schemes, regardless of whether they are<br />

called Socialism, Communism, Nazism, Fascism, or any other<br />

"ism" which may yet be invented to disguise it. It is easy, therefore,<br />

for adherents of this elitist mentality to be comfortable in almost<br />

any of these collectivist camps, a fact to which Dr. Quigley alluded<br />

when he wrote: "This network, which we may identify as the<br />

Round Table Groups, has no aversion to cooperating with the<br />

Communists, or any other groups, and frequently does so."<br />

MASQUERADE IN MOSCOW 271<br />

Returning to the subject of the origins of this group, however,<br />

t)r. Quigley tells us:<br />

Ruskin spoke to the Oxford undergraduates as members of the<br />

privileged ruling class. He told them that they were the possessors of<br />

a magnificent tradition of education, beauty, rule of law, freedom,<br />

decency, and self-discipline, but that this tradition could not be saved,<br />

and did not deserve to be saved, unless it could be extended to the<br />

lower classes in England itself and to the non-English masses<br />

throughout the world.<br />

Ruskin's message had a sensational impact. His inaugural lecture<br />

was copied out in long-hand by one undergraduate, Cecil Rhodes,<br />

who kept it with him for thirty years.<br />

Cecil Rhodes made one of the world's greatest fortunes. With<br />

the cooperation of the Bank of England and financiers like<br />

Rothschild, he was able to establish a virtual monopoly over the<br />

diamond output of South Africa and most of the gold as well. The<br />

major portion of this vast income was spent to advance the<br />

ruling-class ideas of John Ruskin.<br />

Dr. Quigley explains:<br />

The Rhodes Scholarships, established by the terms of Cecil<br />

Rhodes' seventh will, are known to everyone. What is not so widely<br />

known is that Rhodes in five previous wills left his fortune to form a<br />

secret society, which was to devote itself to the preservation and<br />

expansion of the British Empire. And what does not seem to be known<br />

to anyone is that this secret society was created by Rhodes and his<br />

principal trustee, Lord Milner, and continues to exist to this day.. .. In<br />

his book on Rhodes' wills, he [Stead, who was a member of the inner<br />

circle] wrote in one place: "Mr. Rhodes was more than the founder of<br />

a dynasty. He aspired to be the creator of one of those vast<br />

semi-religious, quasi-political associations which, like the Society of<br />

Jesus, have played so large a part in the history of the world. To be<br />

more strictly accurate, he wished to found an Order as the instrument<br />

of the will of the Dynasty. 2 ...<br />

In this secret society Rhodes was to be leader; Stead, Brett (Lord<br />

Esher), and Milner were to form an executive committee; Arthur<br />

(Lord) Balfour, (Sir) Harry Johnston, Lord Rothschild, Albert (Lord)<br />

Grey, and others were listed<br />

as potential members of a "Circle of<br />

Initiates;" while there was to be an outer circle known as the<br />

1. See Kenneth Clark, Ruskin Today (New York: Holt, Reinhart & Winston, 1964),<br />

p. 267.<br />

2. Quigley, Tragedy, p. 950.<br />

|- Quigley, Tragedy, p. 130.<br />

2 -<br />

Carroll Quigley, The Anglo-American Establishment: From Rhodes to Cliveden (N<br />

Y °rk: Books in Focus, 1981), pp. ix, 36.<br />

ew


272 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND MASQUERADE IN MOSCOW 273<br />

"Association of Helpers" (later<br />

organized by MiLner as the Round<br />

Table organization).<br />

THE PATTERN OF CONSPIRACY<br />

Here, then, was the classical pattern of political conspiracy. This<br />

was the structure that made it possible for Quigley to differentiate<br />

between an international "network" and the secret society within<br />

that network. At the center, there is always a tiny group in<br />

complete control, with one man as the undisputed leader. Next is a<br />

circle of secondary leadership that, for the most part, is unaware of<br />

an inner core. They are led to believe that they are the inner-most<br />

ring.<br />

In time, as these conspiracies are built from the center out, they<br />

form additional rings of organization. Those in the outer echelons<br />

usually are idealists with an honest desire to improve the world.<br />

They never suspect an inner control for other purposes, and only<br />

At the end of the war of 1914, it became clear that the organization<br />

of this system had to be greatly extended. Once again the task was<br />

entrusted to Lionel Curtis who established, in England and each<br />

dominion, a front organization to the existing local Round Table<br />

Group. This front organization, called the Royal Institute of<br />

International Affairs, had as its nucleus in each area the existing<br />

submerged Round Table Group. In New York it was known as the<br />

Council on Foreign Relations, and was a front for J.P.<br />

Morgan and<br />

Company in association with the very small American Round Table<br />

Group.<br />

failure of the world's leaders at the end of World War I to embrace<br />

the League of Nations as a true world government. It became clear<br />

to the master planners that they had been unrealistic in their<br />

expectations for rapid acceptance. If their plan were to be carried<br />

forward, it would have to be done on the basis of patient gradualism<br />

symbolized by the Fabian turtle. Rose Martin says:<br />

those few who demonstrate a ruthless capacity for higher leadership<br />

are ever allowed to see it.<br />

After the death of Cecil<br />

Rhodes, the inner core of his secret<br />

society fell under the control of Lord Alfred Milner, Governor-<br />

General and High Commissioner of South Africa. As director of a<br />

number of public banks and as corporate precursor of England's<br />

Midland Bank, he became one of the greatest political and financial<br />

powers in the world. Milner recruited into his secret society a<br />

group of young men chiefly from Oxford and Toynbee Hall and,<br />

according to Quigley:<br />

Through his influence these men were able to win influential posts<br />

in government and international finance and became the dominant<br />

influence in British imperial and foreign affairs up to 1939.... In<br />

1909-1913 they organized semi-secret groups, known as Round Table<br />

Groups, in the chief British dependencies and the United States....<br />

Money for the widely ramified activities of this organization came<br />

. . . chiefly from the Rhodes Trust itself, and from wealthy associates<br />

such as the Beit brothers, from Sir Abe Bailey, and (after 1915) from the<br />

Astor family ... and from foundations and firms associated with the<br />

international banking fraternity, especially the Carnegie United<br />

Kingdom Trust, and other organizations associated with J.P. Morgan,<br />

the Rockefeller and Whitney families, and the associates of Lazard<br />

Brothers and of Morgan, Grenfell, and Company. . .<br />

Colonel House was only one man, where a multitude was needed.<br />

He had set the pattern and outlined goals for the future, and he still<br />

had a scheme or two in mind. In particular, he foresaw it would be<br />

necessary for the Fabians to develop a top level Anglo-American<br />

, planning group in the field of foreign relations which could secretly<br />

1 . Quigley, Tragedy, p. 131<br />

2 - Martin, pp. 174-5.<br />

! Quigley, Tragedy, pp. 132, 951-52.<br />

influence policy on the one hand and gradually "educate" public<br />

opinion on the other.. .<br />

To the ambitious young Fabians, British and American, who had<br />

flocked to the peace conference as economists and junior officials, it<br />

soon became evident that a New World Order was not about to be<br />

produced at Paris.... For them, Colonel House arranged a dinner<br />

meeting at the Hotel Majestic on May 19, 1919, together with a select<br />

group of Fabian-certified Englishmen—notably, Arnold Toynbee,<br />

R.H. Tawney and John Maynard Keynes. All were equally<br />

disillusioned, for various reasons, by the consequences of the peace.<br />

They made a gentlemen's agreement to set up an organization, with<br />

branches in England and America, "to facilitate the scientific study of<br />

international questions." As a result two potent and closely related<br />

opinion-making bodies were founded.... The English branch was<br />

called the Royal Institute of International Affairs. The American<br />

branch, first known as the Institute of International Affairs, was<br />

reorganized in 1921 as the Council on Foreign Relations. 2


274 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

MASQUERADE IN MOSCOW 275<br />

It is through this front group, called the Council on Foreign<br />

effect, purchased a franchise to operate in its name. Professor<br />

Relations, and its influence over the media, tax-exempt foundations,<br />

universities, and government agencies that the international<br />

The 1910 [Red Cross] fund-raising campaign for $2 million, for<br />

Sutton tells us:<br />

financiers have been able to dominate the domestic and foreign<br />

example, was successful only because it was supported by these<br />

policies of the United States ever since.<br />

wealthy residents of New York City. J.R Morgan himself contributed<br />

$100,000. . . . Henry P. Davison [a Morgan partner] was chairman of the<br />

We shall have more to say about the CFR, but our focal point<br />

1910 New York Fund-Raising Committee and later became chairman<br />

for now is Great Britain and, in particular, the help given to<br />

of the War Council of the American Red Cross.... The Red Cross was<br />

Communism in Russia by Lord Alfred Milner and his web of secret<br />

unable to cope with the demands of World War I and in effect was<br />

societies.<br />

taken over by these New York bankers.<br />

ROUND TABLE AGENTS IN RUSSIA<br />

For the duration of the war, the Red Cross had been made,<br />

In Russia, prior to and during the revolution, there were many<br />

nominally, a part of the armed forces and subject to orders from the<br />

local observers, tourists, and newsmen who reported that British<br />

proper military authorities. It was not clear who these authorities<br />

and American agents were everywhere, particularly in Petrograd,<br />

were and, in fact, there were never any orders, but the arrangement<br />

providing money for insurrection. One report said, for example,<br />

made it possible for the participants to receive military commissions<br />

and wear the uniform of American army officers. The entire<br />

that British agents were seen handing out 25-rouble notes to the<br />

men at the Pavlovski regiment just a few hours before it mutinied<br />

expense of the Red Cross Mission in Russia, including the purchase<br />

of uniforms,<br />

against its officers and sided with the revolution. The<br />

was paid for by the man who was appointed by<br />

subsequent<br />

President Wilson to become its head, "Colonel" William Boyce<br />

publication of various memoirs and documents made it clear that<br />

Thompson.<br />

this funding was provided by Milner and channeled through Sir<br />

Thompson was a classical specimen of the Round Table network.<br />

Having begun his career as a speculator in copper mines, he<br />

George Buchanan who was the British Ambassador to Russia at<br />

that time. It was a repeat of the ploy that had worked so well for<br />

soon moved into the world of high finance. He refinanced the<br />

the cabal many times in the past. Round Table members were once<br />

American Woolen Company and the Tobacco Products Companylaunched<br />

the Cuban Cane Sugar Company; purchased controlling<br />

again working both sides of the conflict to weaken and topple a<br />

target government Tsar Nicholas had every reason to believe that,<br />

interest in the Pierce Arrow Motor Car Company; organized the<br />

since the British were Russia's allies in the war against Germany,<br />

Submarine Boat Corporation and the Wright-Martin Aeroplane<br />

British officials would be the last persons on Earth to conspire<br />

Company; became a director of the Chicago Rock Island & Pacific<br />

against hirru Yet, the British Ambassador himself represented the<br />

Railway, the Magma Arizona Railroad, and the Metropolitan Life<br />

hidden group which was financing the regime's downfall.<br />

insurance Company; was one of the heaviest stockholders in the<br />

The Round Table agents from America did not have the<br />

Chase National Bank; was the agent for J.P. Morgan's British<br />

advantage of using the diplomatic service as a cover and, therefore,<br />

securities operation; became the first full-time director of the<br />

had to be considerably more ingenious. They came, not as diplomats<br />

or even as interested businessmen, but disguised as Red Cross<br />

Federal Reserve System; and, of course, contributed a quarter-<br />

Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the most important bank in the<br />

officials on a humanitarian mission. The group consisted almost<br />

million dollars to the Red Cross.<br />

entirely of financiers, lawyers, and accountants from New York<br />

When Thompson arrived in Russia, he made it clear that he was<br />

banks and investment houses. They simply had overpowered the<br />

not your typical Red Cross representative. According to Hermann<br />

American Red Cross organization with large contributions and, in<br />

Hagedorn, Thompson's biographer:<br />

1. See de Goulevitch, p. 230. 1. Sutton, Revolution, p. 72.


276 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND MASQUERADE IN MOSCOW 277<br />

He deliberately created the kind of setting which would be<br />

expected of an American magnate: established himself in a suite in the<br />

Hotel de I'Europe, bought a French limousine, went dutifully to<br />

receptions and teas and evinced an interest in objects of art. Society<br />

and the diplomats, noting that here was a man of parts and power,<br />

began to flock about him. He was entertained at the embassies, at the<br />

houses of Kerensky's ministers. It was discovered that he was a<br />

collector, and those with antiques to sell fluttered around him, offering<br />

him miniatures, Dresden china, tapestries, even a palace or two. 1<br />

When Thompson attended the opera, he was given the imperial<br />

box. People on the street called him the American Tsar. And it<br />

not surprising that, according to George Kennan, "He was viewed<br />

by the Kerensky authorities as the 'real' ambassador of the United<br />

States/' 2<br />

It is now a matter of record that Thompson syndicated the<br />

purchase on Wall Street of Russian bonds in the amount of<br />

ten-million roubles.<br />

In addition, he gave over two-million roubles<br />

to Aleksandr Kerensky for propaganda purposes inside Russia<br />

and, with J.P. Morgan, gave the rouble equivalent of one-million<br />

dollars to the Bolsheviks for the spreading of revolutionary propaganda<br />

outside of Russia, particularly in Germany and Austria.<br />

photograph of the cablegram from Morgan to Thompson advising<br />

that the money had been transferred to the National City Bank<br />

branch in Petrograd is included in this book.<br />

AN OBJECT LESSON IN SOUTH AFRICA<br />

At first it may seem incongruous that the Morgan group would<br />

provide funding for both Kerensky and Lenin. These men may<br />

have both been socialist revolutionaries, but they were miles apart<br />

in their plans for the future and, in fact, were bitter competitors for<br />

control of the new government. But the tactic of funding both sides<br />

in a political contest by then had been refined by members of the<br />

1. Hermann Hagedorn, The Magnate: William Boyce Thompson and His Time (New<br />

York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1935), pp. 192-93.<br />

2. George R Kennan, Russia Leaves the War; Soviet-American Relations, 1917-1920<br />

(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1956), p. 60.<br />

3. Hagedorn,p. 192.<br />

4. Sutton, Revolution, pp. 83, 91. It was the agitation made possible by this funding<br />

that led to the abortive German Sparticus Revolt of 1918. See "W.B. Thompson, Red<br />

Cross Donor, Believes Parry Misrepresented," Washington Post, Feb. 2, 1918.<br />

is<br />

A<br />

Round Table into a fine art. A stunning example of this occurred in<br />

South Africa during the outset of Boer War in 1899.<br />

The British and Dutch had been active in the settlement of<br />

Southern Africa for decades. The Dutch had developed the provinces<br />

of Transvaal and the Orange Free State, while the British had<br />

colonized such areas as Rhodesia, Cape Hope, Basutoland,<br />

Swaziland, and Bechuanaland. Conflict was inevitable between<br />

these two groups of settlers whenever they found themselves in<br />

competition for the resources of the same territory, but it was the<br />

discovery of gold in the Whitewater area of the Transvaal that<br />

provided the motive for war.<br />

Politically, the Transvaal was in the hands of the Boers, who<br />

were the descendants of the Dutch settlers. But, after the discovery<br />

of gold in that area, the mine fields had been developed primarily<br />

by the British and became solidly under their control. Not surprisingly,<br />

one of the largest players in that game was Cecil Rhodes who<br />

already had monopolized the diamond fields under British control<br />

to the South. Historian Henry Pike tells us:<br />

With the discovery of gold in the Transvaal, Rhodes' greed<br />

became passionate. His hatred of Paul Kruger, the Afrikaner President<br />

of the Transvaal, knew no limits. He was bitterly opposed to Kruger's<br />

independent Transvaal, and viewed this as the main obstacle to his<br />

efforts to sweep all Southern Africa under British rule.<br />

In 1895, Rhodes set in motion a plan to overthrow Kruger's<br />

government by organizing an uprising among the British inhabitants<br />

in Johannesburg. The uprising was financed by himself and<br />

was to be led by his brother, Frank, and other loyal supporters. This<br />

was to be followed by a military invasion of the Transvaal by<br />

British troops from Bechuanaland and Rhodesia led by Sir Leander<br />

Jameson, The uprising fizzled and ended in Jameson's arrest and<br />

public disgrace.<br />

But Rhodes was determined to have the Transvaal, and began<br />

immediately to prepare a second, more patient ploy. Through<br />

Rhodes' influence, Lord Alfred Milner was appointed as the British<br />

High Commissioner of South Africa. In London, Lord Esher<br />

another member of the secret society—became the chief political<br />

adviser to King Edward and was in daily contact with him<br />

L<br />

Henry R. Pike, Ph.D., A History of Communism in South Africa (Germiston, South<br />

Africa: Christian Mission International of South Africa, 1985), p. 39.


278 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

MASQUERADE IN MOSCOW 279<br />

throughout this period. That took care of the British<br />

side of this<br />

contest. With regard to the Boers' side, Professor Quigley tells the<br />

amazing story:<br />

By a process whose details are still obscure, a brilliant young<br />

graduate of Cambridge, Jan Smuts, who had been a vigorous<br />

supporter of Rhodes and acted as his agent in Kimberly [South<br />

Africa's largest diamond mine] as late as 1895 and who was one of the<br />

most important members of the Rhodes-Milner group in the period<br />

1908-1950, went to the Transvaal and, by violent anti-British agitation,<br />

became state secretary of that country (although a British subject) and<br />

chief political adviser to President Kruger; Milner made provocative<br />

troop movements on the Boer frontiers in spite of the vigorous protests<br />

of his commanding general in South Africa, who had to be removed;<br />

and, finally, war was precipitated when Smuts drew up an ultimatum<br />

insisting that the British troop movements cease and when this was<br />

rejected by Milner.<br />

And so, as a result of careful engineering by Round Table<br />

members on both sides—one making outrageous demands and the<br />

other responding to those demands in pretended indignation—the<br />

war finally began with a British invasion in October of 1899. After<br />

2 l /i years of fierce fighting, the Boers were forced to surrender, and<br />

Milner administered the former republic as a militarily occupied<br />

territory. Round Table members, known to the public as "Milner's<br />

Kindergarten," were placed into all key government posts, and the<br />

gold fields were finally secured.<br />

PLACING BETS ON ALL HORSES<br />

On the other side of the world, in New York City, the same<br />

tactic of playing both sides against each other was being applied<br />

with brilliant precision by Round Table member J.P. Morgan.<br />

Professor Quigley tells us:<br />

To Morgan all<br />

political parties were simply organizations to be<br />

used, and the firm always was careful to keep a foot in all camps.<br />

Morgan himself, Dwight Morrow, and other partners were allied with<br />

Republicans; Russell C. Leffingwell was allied with the Democrats;<br />

Grayson Murphy was allied with the extreme Right; and Thomas W.<br />

Lamont was allied with the Left. 2<br />

1. Quigley, Tragedy, pp. 137-38.<br />

2. m,p.945.<br />

regarded as a man of leftist persuasions, it<br />

Although it is true that Thomas Lamont was the father of<br />

Corliss Lamont, a well-known Communist, and was himself widely<br />

must also be remembered<br />

that he felt equally at home among the Fascists and, in fact,<br />

served as an unofficial business consultant for Mussolini in<br />

1920s. 1<br />

At the same time that Morgan was funding pro-Bolshevik<br />

groups, he founded what was probably the most virulent anti-<br />

Bolshevik organization ever to exist in America. It was called<br />

United Americans and it set about to frighten everyone into<br />

believing that a Red mob was at that very moment poised to<br />

capture New York City. It issued shocking reports warning about a<br />

pending financial collapse, widespread starvation, and a desperate<br />

working class being maneuvered into accepting Communist slogans<br />

and rhetoric as a last resort. Ironically, the officers of this<br />

organization were Allen Walker of the Guarantee Trust Company,<br />

which was then acting as the Soviet's fiscal agent in the U.S.; Daniel<br />

Willard, president of the Baltimore & Ohio Railway, which was<br />

then active in the development of Soviet railways; H.H. Westinghouse<br />

of Westinghouse Air Brake Company which was then<br />

operating a major plant in Russia; and Otto H. Kahn of Kuhn, Loeb<br />

& Company, which was one of the principal financial backers of the<br />

fledgling Soviet regime.<br />

Even inside Russia itself,<br />

the Round Table was spreading its<br />

bets. In addition to the funding, previously mentioned, which was<br />

given to the Bolsheviks and to their opponents, the Mensheviks,<br />

Morgan also financed the military forces of Admiral Kolchak who<br />

was fighting against the Bolsheviks in Siberia. Not surprisingly,<br />

Kolchak also received funding from a consortium of British financiers,<br />

including Alfred Milner.<br />

It is commonly stated that the original intent of the Red Cross<br />

mission to Moscow was to prevent the Russian government from<br />

making a separate peace with Germany which would release<br />

German troops to fight against England and France. According to<br />

that version of the story—which portrays the actors as patriots<br />

1. See John P. Diggins, Mussolini and Fascism: The View from America (Princeton,<br />

New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1972).<br />

2. Sutton, Revolution, pp. 163-68.<br />

fe. Ibid., pp. 102,146,166-67.<br />

the


280 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

merely doing what was best for the war effort—the first goal was to<br />

support the Tsar. When the Tsar was overthrown, they supported<br />

the Mensheviks because they had pledged to stay in the war. When<br />

the Mensheviks were ousted, they continued to support the<br />

Bolsheviks in order to gain sufficient influence to convince them<br />

not to give aid to Germany. It<br />

takes a great deal of gullibility to<br />

swallow that line. A far more plausible reading is that the Morgan<br />

interests were merely doing what they had always done: placing<br />

bets on all horses so that, no matter which one crossed the finish<br />

line, the winner would be obligated to them.<br />

BRITISH AGENT OF THE ROUND TABLE<br />

After the Bolsheviks had seized power in Russia, Sir George<br />

Buchanan was recalled as the British Ambassador and replaced by<br />

a member of Milner's Kindergarten, a young man by the name of<br />

Bruce Lockhart. In his book, British Agent, Lockhart describes the<br />

circumstances of his assignment. Speaking of a meeting with Prime<br />

Minister Lloyd George, he wrote:<br />

I<br />

saw that his own mind was made up. He had been greatly<br />

impressed, as Lord Milner told me afterwards, by an interview with<br />

Colonel Thompson of the American Red Cross, who had just returned<br />

from Russia and who had denounced in blunt language the folly of the<br />

Allies in not opening up negotiations with the Bolsheviks....<br />

Three days later all my doubts were put at rest. I was to go to<br />

Russia as head of a special mission to establish unofficial relations with<br />

the Bolsheviks.... I had been selected for this Russian mission not by<br />

the Foreign Secretary but by the War Cabinet—actually by Lord<br />

Milner and Mr. Lloyd George....<br />

Lord Milner I saw almost daily. Five days before my departure I<br />

dined alone with him at Brook's. He was in his most inspiring mood.<br />

He talked to me with a charming frankness about the war, about the<br />

future of England, about his own career, and about the opportunities<br />

of youth.... He was, too, very far from being the Jingo and the<br />

Conservative reactionary whom popular opinion at one time<br />

represented him to be. On the contrary, many of his views on society<br />

were startling modern. He believed in the highly organized state, in<br />

which service, efficiency, and hard work were more important than<br />

titles or money-bags.<br />

MASQUERADE IN MOSCOW 281<br />

AMERICAN AGENT OF THE ROUND TABLE<br />

When Thompson returned to the United States, the man he<br />

selected to replace himself as head of the American Red Cross<br />

Mission was his second-in-command, Raymond Robins. Not much<br />

known about Robins except that he was the protege of Col.<br />

is<br />

Edward Mandell House, and he might have remained an obscure<br />

player in this drama had it not been for the fact that he became one<br />

of the central characters in Bruce Lockhart's book. It is there that we<br />

get this inside view:<br />

Another new acquaintance of these first days in the Bolshevized<br />

St. Petersburg was Raymond Robins, the head of the American Red<br />

Cross Mission.... He had been a leading figure in Roosevelt's "Bull<br />

Moose" campaign for the American Presidency in 1912. Although a<br />

rich man himself, he was an anti-capitalist.... Hitherto, his two heroes<br />

had been Roosevelt and Cecil Rhodes. Now Lenin had captured his<br />

imagination..,. Robins was the only man whom Lenin was always<br />

willing to see and who ever succeeded in imposing his own<br />

personality on the unemotional Bolshevik leader.<br />

In a less official sense Robins had a similar mission to my own. He<br />

was the intermediary between the Bolsheviks and the American<br />

Government and had set himself the task of persuading President<br />

Wilson to recognize the Soviet regime.<br />

What an amazing revelation is contained in those words. First,<br />

we learn that Robins was a leader in the team effort that threw the<br />

election of 1912 to Woodrow Wilson. Then we learn that he was an<br />

anti-capitalist. Third, we discover that an anti-capitalist can heroworship<br />

Cecil Rhodes. Then we see the tremendous power he<br />

wielded over Lenin. And finally, we are told that, although he was<br />

part of a private group financed by Wall Street bankers, he was in<br />

reality the intermediary between the Bolsheviks and the American<br />

Government One will look in vain for a better summary.<br />

The fact that Cecil Rhodes was one of Robin's great heroes has<br />

special significance for this story. It was not merely an intellectual<br />

infatuation from college days. On the night before he left Russia,<br />

Robins dined with Lockhart. Describing the occasion, Lockhart<br />

says: "He had been reading Rhodes' life and after dinner he gave us<br />

a wonderful exposition of Rhodes' character."<br />

Thus, both Lockhart<br />

1. R.H. Bruce Lockhart, British Agent (New York and London: G.P. Putnam's Sons,<br />

1933), pp. 198-99, 204, 206-07.<br />

1. Lockhart, p. 220.<br />

2. JM.,p.270.


282 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

and Robins were dedicated disciples of Cecil Rhodes and both were<br />

undoubtedly part of the international network to which Professor<br />

Quigley alluded — possibly even members of the Round Table.<br />

Lockhart reported to the British group while Robins reported to the<br />

American group, but both were clearly working for identical<br />

objectives and doing the work of the unseen hand.<br />

The Bolsheviks were well aware of the power these men<br />

represented, and there was no door closed to them. They were<br />

allowed to attend meetings of the Central Executive Committee 1 ,<br />

and were consulted regarding important decisions. 2 But perhaps<br />

the best way to appraise the extent of the influence these "capitalists"<br />

had over the "anti-capitalists" is to let Lockhart tell his own<br />

story. In his memoirs, he wrote:<br />

I returned from our interview to our flat to find an urgent message<br />

from Robins requesting me to come to see him at once. I found him in<br />

a state of great agitation. He had been in conflict with Saalkind, a<br />

nephew of Trotsky and then Assistant Commissar for Foreign Affairs.<br />

Saalkind had been rude, and the American, who had a promise from<br />

Lenin that, whatever happened, a train would always be ready for him<br />

at an hour's notice, was determined to exact an apology or to leave the<br />

country. When I arrived, he had just finished telephoning to Lenin. He<br />

had delivered his ultimatum, and Lenin had promised to give a reply<br />

within ten minutes. I waited, while Robins fumed. Then the telephone<br />

rang and Robins picked up the receiver. Lenin had capitulated.<br />

Saalkind was dismissed from his post. But he was an old member of<br />

the Party. Would Robins have any objection if Lenin sent him as a<br />

Bolshevik emissary to Beme? Robins smiled grimly. "Thank you, Mr.<br />

Lenin/' he said. "As I can't send the son of a bitch to hell, 'burn' is the<br />

next best thing you can do with him." 3<br />

Such was the raw power over the leaders of Communism that<br />

was concealed behind the innocent facade of the American Red<br />

Cross Mission. And yet, the world—even today—has no inkling of<br />

its reality. It has been a carefully guarded secret, and even many of<br />

those who were close to it were unable to see it. The assistant to<br />

William Thompson in Russia was Cornelius Kelleher. In later years,<br />

reflecting on the naivete of Dr. Franklin Billings, who was head of<br />

the mission's medical team, Kelleher wrote:<br />

1. Ibid., p. 253.<br />

2. U.S. State Dept. Decimal File, 861 .00/3449.<br />

3. Lockhart, pp. 225-26.<br />

MASQUERADE IN MOSCOW 283<br />

Poor Mr. Billings believed he was in charge of a scientific mission<br />

for the relief of Russia.... He was in reality nothing but a mask—the<br />

Red Cross complexion of the mission was nothing but a mask.<br />

The purpose of a mask, of course, is to conceal. And so we are<br />

led to ask the question, what was behind that mask? What were the<br />

true motives and goals of the masqueraders?<br />

We shall turn to that subject next.<br />

SUMMARY<br />

The Bolshevik revolution was not a spontaneous uprising of the<br />

masses. It was planned, financed, and orchestrated by outsiders.<br />

Some of the financing came from Germany which hoped that<br />

internal problems would force Russia out of the war against her.<br />

But most of the money and leadership came from financiers in<br />

England and the United States. It was a perfect example of the<br />

Rothschild formula in action.<br />

This group centered mainly around a secret society created by<br />

Cecil Rhodes, one of the world's wealthiest men at the time. The<br />

purpose of that group was nothing less than world dorninion and<br />

the establishment of a modern feudalist society controlled by the<br />

world's central banks. Headquartered in England, the Rhodes<br />

inner-most directorate was called the Round Table. In other countries,<br />

there were established subordinate structures called Round-<br />

Table Groups. The Round-Table Group in the United States became<br />

known as the Council on Foreign Relations. The CFR y<br />

which was<br />

initially dominated by J.P. Morgan and later by the Rockefellers, is<br />

the most powerful group in America today. It is even more<br />

powerful than the federal government, because almost all of the<br />

key positions in government are held by its members. In other<br />

words, it is the United States government.<br />

Agents of these two groups cooperated closely in pre-revolutionary<br />

Russia and particularly after the Tsar was overthrown. The<br />

American contingent in Russia disguised itself as a Red Cross<br />

mission allegedly doing humanitarian work. Cashing in on their<br />

close friendship with Trotsky and Lenin, they obtained profitable<br />

business concessions from the new government which returned<br />

their initial investment many times over.<br />

1 . Kennan,<br />

Russia, p. 59.


Courtesy of Edward Warded<br />

Above is the "Red Cross Mission" in Moscow shortly after the Bolshevik<br />

Revolution. (L-R) J.W. Andrews, Raymond Robins, Allen Wardell, D. Heywood<br />

Hardy. Under the pretense of humanitarianism, the Misson's key personnel were<br />

Wall Street financiers following their own agenda for acquiring profitable<br />

commercial concessions from the new government. They heavily financed all<br />

factions of the revolutionary movement to be sure of gaining influence with<br />

whatever group should come out on top.<br />

Below is a cablegram from J.P. Morgan to William Boyce Thompson-head of the<br />

Red Cross Mission prior to Robins-advising that one million dollars had been<br />

transferred to Thompson via the National City Bank. There were many such<br />

infusions of "Capitalist" money into the new Communist regime. The process<br />

continues to this day.<br />

* V¥<br />

I<br />

l£ff>A**A\f<br />

¥UU -JUL; JlifS '•; n W<br />

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Chapter Fourteen<br />

THE BEST ENEMY<br />

MONEY CAN BUY<br />

The coup d'etat in Russia in which the Bolshevik<br />

minority seized control from the revolutionary<br />

majority; the role played by New Yorkfinanciers,<br />

masquerading as Red Cross officials,<br />

in supporting<br />

the Bolsheviks; the unbroken record since their<br />

of American assistance in building Russia's warmaking<br />

potential; the emergence of a "credible<br />

enemy" in accordance with the Rothschild<br />

Formula.<br />

In the previous section we saw that the Red Cross Mission in<br />

revolutionary Russia was, in the words of its own personnel,<br />

"nothing but a mask/' This leads to the logical question, what were<br />

the true motives and goals that were hidden behind that mask.<br />

In later years, it would be explained by the participants<br />

themselves that they simply were engaged in a humanitarian effort<br />

to keep Russia in the war against Germany and, thus, to help the<br />

cause of freedom for England and her allies. For Jacob Schiff and<br />

other Jewish financiers in New York, there was the additional<br />

explanation that they opposed the Tsar because of his anti-<br />

Semitism. These, of course, are admirable motives, and they have<br />

been uncritically accepted by mainstream historians ever since.<br />

Unfortunately, the official explanations do not square with the<br />

facts.<br />

RUSSIA'S TWO REVOLUTIONS<br />

The facts are that there were two revolutions in Russia that<br />

year, not one. The first, called the February Revolution, resulted in<br />

the establishment of a provisional socialist government under the<br />

leadership of Aleksandr Kerensky. It was relatively moderate in its<br />

policies and attempted to accommodate all revolutionary factions<br />

including the Bolsheviks who were the smallest minority. When<br />

284


286 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND THE BEST ENEMY MONEY CAN BUY 287<br />

the February Revolution occurred, neither Lenin nor Trotsky were<br />

even in Russia. Lenin was in Switzerland and didn't arrive until<br />

April. Trotsky was still in New York writing propaganda and<br />

giving speeches.<br />

The second revolution, called the October Revolution, was the<br />

one through which the Bolsheviks came to power. It was, in fact, no<br />

revolution at all. It was a coup d'etat. The Bolsheviks simply took<br />

advantage of the confusion and indecisiveness that existed among<br />

the various groups that comprised the new government and caught<br />

them by surprise with a lightening strike of force. With a combination<br />

of bribes and propaganda, they recruited several regiments of<br />

soldiers and sailors and, in the early morning darkness of October<br />

25, methodically took military possession of all government buildings<br />

and communication centers. No one was prepared for such<br />

audacity, and resistance was almost non-existent. By dawn, without<br />

the Russian people even knowing what had happened—much<br />

less having any voice in that action, their country had been captured<br />

by a minority faction and become the world's first so-called<br />

"people's republic." Within two days, Kerensky had fled for his<br />

life, and all Provisional Government ministers had been arrested.<br />

That is<br />

how the Communists seized Russia and that is how they<br />

held it afterward. Contrary to the Marxian myth, they have never<br />

represented the people. They simply have the guns.<br />

The basic facts of this so-called revolution are described by<br />

Professor Leonard Schapiro in his authoritative work, The Russian<br />

Revolutions of 1917:<br />

All the evidence suggests that when the crisis came the great<br />

majority of units of the Petrograd Garrison did not support the<br />

government but simply remained neutral.... The Cossack units<br />

rejected its call for support, leaving the government with only a few<br />

hundred women soldiers and around two thousand military cadets on<br />

its<br />

side. The Bolsheviks, on the other hand, could count on several<br />

regiments to carry out their orders. Units of the Baltic Fleet also<br />

supported them.. .<br />

In the event, the Bolshevik take-over was almost bloodless: in<br />

contrast with what had happened in February, nothing could have<br />

been less like a city in the throes of revolution than Petrograd on 25<br />

October. Crowds of well-dressed people thronged the streets in the<br />

evening. Theaters and restaurants were open, and at the opera,<br />

Shaliapin sang in Boris Godunov. The principal stations and services<br />

had all been taken over by the morning of 25 October without a shot<br />

being fired....<br />

A battleship and several cruisers, including the Aurora, had<br />

reached Petrograd from Kronstadt and were anchored with their guns<br />

trained on targets in the city.. .<br />

The Provisional Government inside the Winter Palace...received<br />

an ultimatum calling for surrender of its members, under threat of<br />

bombardment of the palace by Aurora and by the guns of the Peter and<br />

Paul Fortress. ...<br />

It was only at 9:40 P.M. that the Aurora was ordered to<br />

fire—and discharged one blank shell. The main effect of this was to<br />

accelerate the thinning out of the cadet defenders of the palace, who<br />

had already begun to dwindle. The women soldiers, who had formed<br />

part of its defense force, also left before the palace was invaded. At<br />

11P.M. some live shells were fired, and the palace was slightly<br />

damaged., .<br />

The story of the dramatic storming of the Winter Palace, popular<br />

with Soviet historians and in the cinema, is a myth. At around 2 A.M. on<br />

26 October, a small detachment of troops, followed by an unruly<br />

crowd and led by two members of the MRC [Military Revolutionary<br />

Committee], entered the palace. The remaining officer cadets were,<br />

apparently, prepared to resist, but were ordered to surrender by the<br />

ministers. In the end, the total casualties were three officer cadets<br />

wounded.<br />

POPULAR SUPPORT WAS NOT NECESSARY<br />

Eugene Lyons had been a correspondent for United Press in<br />

revolutionary Russia. He began his career as highly sympathetic to<br />

the Bolsheviks and their new regime, but six years of actual living<br />

inside the new socialist Utopia shattered his illusions. In his<br />

acclaimed book, Workers' Paradise host, he summarizes the true<br />

meaning of the October Revolution:<br />

Lenin, Trotsky, and their cohorts did not overthrow the<br />

monarchy. They overthrew the first democratic society in Russian<br />

history, set up through a truly popular revolution in March, 1917....<br />

They represented the smallest of the Russian radical movements....<br />

But theirs was a movement that scoffed at numbers and frankly<br />

mistrusted the multitudes. The workers could be educated for their<br />

role after the revolution; they would not be led but driven to their<br />

terrestrial heaven. Lenin always sneered at the obsession of competing<br />

socialist groups with their "mass base." "Give us an organization of<br />

& Leonard Shapiro, The Russian Revolutions ofl917 (New York: Basic Books, 1984),<br />

pp. 135-36.


288 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

professional revolutionaries," he used to say, "and we will turn Russia<br />

upside down/'...<br />

Even these contingents were pathetically duped, having not the<br />

remotest notion of the real purposes for which they were being used.<br />

They were striking out, they thought, for the multi-party Soviets, for<br />

freedom, equality, and other goals which their organizers regarded as<br />

emotional garbage.. .<br />

On the brink of the dictatorship, Lenin dared to promise that the<br />

state will fade away, since "all need of force will vanish/' Not at some<br />

remote future, but at once: "The proletarian state begins to wither<br />

immediately after its triumph, for in a classless society a state is<br />

unnecessary and impossible.. . . Soviet power is a new kind of state, in<br />

which there is no bureaucracy, no police, no standing army." Also: "So<br />

long as the state exists, there is no freedom. When there is freedom,<br />

there will be no state."<br />

Within a few months after they attained power, most of the tsarist<br />

practices the Leninists had condemned were revived, usually in more<br />

ominous forms: political prisoners, convictions without trial and<br />

without the formality of charges, savage persecution of dissenting<br />

views, death penalties for more varieties of crime than in any other<br />

modern nation. The rest were put into effect in the following years,<br />

including the suppression of all other parties, restoration of the<br />

internal passport, a state monopoly of the press, along with repressive<br />

practices the monarchy had outlived for a century or more.<br />

All of this, of course, is a departure from the main narrative, but<br />

it has been necessary to illustrate a fact that has been obscured by<br />

the passage of time and the acceptance of myth by mainstream<br />

historians. The fact is that Lenin and Trotsky were not sent to<br />

Russia to overthrow the anti-Semitic Tsar. Their assignment from<br />

Wall Street was to overthrow the revolution.<br />

NOTES FROM LINCOLN STEFFENS' DIARY<br />

That this was the prevailing motive of the New York money<br />

powers was clearly brought to light in the diary of Lincoln Steffens,<br />

one of America's best-known leftist writers of that time. Steffens<br />

was on board the SS. Kristianwfjord when Trotsky was taken off<br />

and arrested in Halifax. He carefully wrote down the conversations<br />

he had with other passengers who also were headed to strife-torn<br />

Russia. One of these was Charles Crane, vice president of the Crane<br />

Company. Crane was a backer of Woodrow Wilson and former<br />

THE BEST ENEMY MONEY CAN BUY 289<br />

chairman of the Democratic Party's finance committee. He also had<br />

organized the Westinghouse Company in Russia and had made no<br />

less than twenty-three prior visits. His son, Richard Crane, was<br />

confidential assistant to then Secretary of State, Robert Lansing. It is<br />

instructive, therefore, to read Steffens' notes regarding the views of<br />

these traveling companions. He wrote: "... all agree that the<br />

revolution is in its first phase only, that it must grow. Crane and the<br />

Russian Radicals on the ship think we shall be in Petrograd for the<br />

re-revolution."<br />

Precisely. Re-revolution was the expectation and the goal, not<br />

the elimination of anti-Semitism.<br />

With regard to Thompson's claim that he was merely trying to<br />

keep Russia in the war against Germany, here again, the logic of<br />

actual events speak against it. Kerensky and the provisional<br />

government were for the war effort. Yet, the Red Cross masqueraders<br />

eventually threw their strongest support to the Bolsheviks who<br />

were against it. Their excuse was that it was obvious the Bolsheviks<br />

would soon control the new government and they were merely<br />

looking to the future. They did not like the Bolsheviks, they said,<br />

but had to deal with them pragmatically. So they became staunch<br />

supporters merely to gain influence with the inevitable victors and,<br />

hopefully, to persuade them to change their position on the war.<br />

Alas, it didn't work out that way. Influence they had, as we<br />

have seen, but the Bolsheviks never wavered in their views. After<br />

seizing control in the October coup d'etat, they did exactly what they<br />

claimed all along they would do. They signed a peace treaty with<br />

Germany and confiscated private property. They also began one of<br />

the world's greatest bloodbaths to eliminate their opposition. None<br />

of this could be blamed on the masqueraders, you understand. It<br />

was all the fault of Wilson and the other politicians at home who,<br />

.by not following Thompson's recommendation to send U.S.<br />

dollars to the Bolsheviks, forced them into such drastic action. That,<br />

at least, is the accepted view.<br />

In reality, a Bolshevik victory at that time was anything but<br />

certain, and there was little reason—beyond the support given by<br />

the New York financiers themselves—to believe they would<br />

become the dominant voice of Russia. But, even if we grant the<br />

tax<br />

1. Eugene Lyons, Workers' Paradise Lost (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1967)<br />

pp. 13-29.<br />

1. Lincoln Steffens, The Let ters ofLincoln Steffens (New York Harcourt, Brace, 1 94 1 ),<br />

p. 396.


290 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

assumption that these men were unusually astute political<br />

observers who were truly able to foresee the future course, we are<br />

still<br />

faced with serious obstacles^ not the least of which are the<br />

thoughts and words of the masqueraders themselves. For example,<br />

in February of 1918, Arthur Bullard was in Russia as head of the<br />

Russian branch of the Committee on Public Information, which was<br />

the war-propaganda arm of the U.S. government. Bullard was aptly<br />

described by historian George Kennan as a "liberal socialist, free<br />

lance writer, and private eye of Colonel House/ In his official<br />

capacity he had many occasions to consult with Raymond Robins<br />

and, in a report describing one of these conversations, Bullard<br />

wrote:<br />

He [Robins] had one or two reservations—in particular, that<br />

recognition of the Bolsheviks was long overdue, that it should have<br />

been effected immediately, and that had the U.S. so recognized the<br />

Bolsheviks, "I believe that we would now be in control of the surplus<br />

resources of Russia and have control officers at all points on the<br />

frontier." 2<br />

WOLVES BEHIND THE MASK<br />

The following year, the U.S. Senate conducted an investigation<br />

into the role played by prominent American citizens in supporting<br />

the Bolshevik's rise to power. One of the documents entered into<br />

the record was an early communique from Robins to Bruce<br />

Lockhart. In it Robins said:<br />

You will hear it said that I am an agent of Wall Street; that I am the<br />

servant of William B. Thompson to get Altai Copper for him; that I<br />

have already got 500,000 acres of the best timber land in Russia for<br />

myself; that I have already copped off the Trans-Siberian Railway; that<br />

they have given me a monopoly of the platinum in Russia; that this<br />

explains my working for the soviet.... You will hear that talk Now, I<br />

do not think it is true, Commissioner, but let us assume it is true. Let us<br />

assume that I am here to capture Russia for Wall Street and American<br />

business men. Let us assume that you are a British wolf and I am, an<br />

American wolf, and that when this war is over we are going to eat each<br />

other up for the Russian market; let us do so in perfectly frank, man<br />

fashion, but let us assume at the same time that we are fairly intelligent<br />

THE BEST ENEMY MONEY CAN BUY 291<br />

wolves, and that we know that if we do not hunt together in this hour<br />

the German wolf will eat us both up.<br />

Professor Sutton has placed all this into perspective. In the<br />

following passage, he is spealcing specifically about William<br />

Thompson, but his remarks apply with equal force to Robins and<br />

all of the other financiers who were part of the Red Cross Mission<br />

in Russia.<br />

Thompson's motives were primarily financial and commercial.<br />

Specifically, Thompson was interested in the Russian market, and how<br />

this market could be influenced, diverted, and captured for postwar<br />

(exploitation by a Wall Street syndicate, or syndicates. Certainly<br />

Thompson viewed Germany as an enemy, but less a political enemy<br />

than an economic or a commercial enemy. German industry and<br />

German banking were the real enemy. To outwit Germany, Thompson<br />

was willing to place seed money on any political power vehicle that<br />

would achieve his objective. In other words, Thompson was an<br />

American imperialist fighting against German imperialism, and this<br />

struggle was shrewdly recognized and exploited by Lenin and<br />

Trotsky.. .<br />

Thompson was not a Bolshevik; he was not even pro-Bolshevik.<br />

Neither was he pro-Kerensky. Nor was he even pro-American. The<br />

overriding motivation was the capturing of the postwar Russian market. This<br />

was a commercial objective. Ideology could sway revolutionary<br />

operators like Kerensky, Trotsky, Lenin et al., but not financiers.<br />

Did the wolves of the Round Table actually succeed in their<br />

goal? Did they, in fact, capture the surplus resources of Russia? The<br />

answer to that question will not be found in our history books. It<br />

must be tracked down along the trail of subsequent events, and<br />

what we must look for is this. If the plan had not been successful,<br />

we would expect to find a decline of interest on the part of high<br />

finance, if not outright hostility. On the other hand, if it did succeed,<br />

we would expect to see, not only continued support, but some<br />

I evidence of profit taking by the investors, a payback for their<br />

efforts and their risk. With those footprints as our guide, let us turn<br />

«r\ow to an overview of what has actually happened since the<br />

Bolsheviks were assisted to power by the Round Table network.<br />

1 George F. Kennan, The Decision to Intervene: Soviet-American Relations, 1917-1920<br />

(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1958), pp. 190, 235.<br />

2. Bullard ms., U.S. State Dept. Decimal File, 316-11-1265, March 19, 1918.<br />

1 U.S. Cong., Senate, Bolshevik Propaganda, Subcommittee of the Committee on the<br />

Judiciary, 65th Cong., 1919, p. 802.<br />

% Sutton, Revolution, pp. 97-98.


292 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

ITEM: After the October Revolution, all the banks in Russia<br />

were taken over and "nationalized" by the Bolsheviks—except one:<br />

the Petrograd branch of Rockefeller's National City Bank.<br />

ITEM: Heavy industry in Russia was also nationalized— except<br />

the Westinghouse plant, which had been established by Charles<br />

Crane, one of the dignitaries aboard the S.S. Kristianiafjord who had<br />

traveled to Russia with Trotsky to witness the re-revolution.<br />

ITEM: In 1922, the Soviets formed their first international bank.<br />

It was not owned and run by the state as would be dictated by<br />

Communist theory, but was put together by a syndicate of private<br />

bankers. These included, not only former Tsarist bankers, but<br />

representatives of German, Swedish, and American banks. Most of<br />

the foreign capital came from England, including the British<br />

government itself. The man appointed as Director of the Foreign<br />

Division of the new bank was Max May, Vice President of<br />

Morgan's Guaranty Trust Company in New York.<br />

ITEM: In the years immediately following the October Revolution,<br />

there was a steady stream of large and lucrative (read<br />

non-competitive) contracts issued by the Soviets to British and<br />

American businesses which were directly or indirectly run by the<br />

Round Table network. The largest of these, for example, was a<br />

contract for fifty million pounds of food products to Morris &<br />

Company, Chicago meat packers. Helen Swift was married to<br />

Edward Morris who was the brother of Harold Swift Harold Swift<br />

had been a "Major" at the Red Cross Mission in Russia.<br />

ITEM: In payment for these contracts and to return the "loans"<br />

of the financiers, the Bolsheviks all but drained their country of its<br />

gold—which included the Tsarist government's sizable reserve—<br />

and shipped it primarily to American and British banks. In 1920<br />

alone, one shipment came to the U.S. through Stockholm valued at<br />

39,000,000 Swedish kroner; three shipments came direct involving<br />

540 boxes of gold valued at 97,200,000 gold roubles; plus at least<br />

one other direct shipment bringing the total to about $20 million.<br />

(Remember, these are 1 920 values!) The arrival of these shipments<br />

was coordinated by Jacob Schiff's Kuhn, Loeb & Company and<br />

deposited by Morgan's Guaranty Trust.<br />

1. U.S. State Dept. Decimal File, 861.516/129, August 28, 1922.<br />

2. U.S. State Dept., Decimal File, 861 .51 /815, 836, 837, October, 1920. Also Sutton,<br />

Revolution, pp. 159-60, 165.<br />

THE BEST ENEMY MONEY CAN BUY 293<br />

ITEM: It was at about this time that the Wilson Administration<br />

sent 700,000 tons of food to the Soviet Union which, not only saved<br />

the regime from certain collapse, but gave Lenin the power to<br />

consolidate his control over all of Russia. The U.S. Food Administration,<br />

which handled this giant operation, was handsomely<br />

profitable for those commercial enterprises that participated. It was<br />

headed by Herbert Hoover and directed by Lewis Lichtenstein<br />

Strauss, married to Alice Hanauer, daughter of one of the partners<br />

of Kuhn, Loeb & Company.<br />

ITEM: U.S., British, and German wolves soon found a bonanza<br />

of profit in selling to the new Soviet regime. Standard Oil and<br />

supplied $37 million worth of machinery from<br />

General Electric<br />

1921 to 1925, and that was just the beginning. Junkers Aircraft in<br />

Germany literally created Soviet air power. At least three million<br />

slave laborers perished in the icy mines of Siberia digging ore for<br />

Britain's Lena Goldfields, Ltd. W. Averell Harriman—a railroad<br />

magnate and banker from the United States who later was to<br />

become Ambassador to Russia—acquired a twenty-year monopoly<br />

over all<br />

personal<br />

Soviet manganese production. Armand Hammer—close<br />

friend of Lenin—made one of the world's greatest fortunes<br />

by mining Russian asbestos.<br />

ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND: THE DEAF MUTE<br />

BLINDMEN<br />

In those early years, the Bolsheviks were desperate for foreign<br />

goods, services, and capital investment. They knew that they<br />

would be gouged by their "capitalist" associates, but what of it? It<br />

wasn't their money. All they cared about was staying in power.<br />

And that was not as easy as it may have seemed. Even after the coup<br />

d'etat<br />

in which they seized control of the mechanism of government,<br />

they still did not control the country at large. In fact, in 1919,<br />

Lenin had almost given up hope of expanding beyond Petrograd<br />

and a part of Moscow. Except for Odessa, all of Southern Russia<br />

and the Crimea were in the hands of General Deniken who was<br />

strongly anti-Communist. Speaking before the Tenth Congress of<br />

the Russian Communist Party, Lenin laid it out plainly:<br />

1 See George F. Kennan, Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin (Boston: Little,<br />

Brown and Company, 1961), p. 180.


294 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND THE BEST ENEMY MONEY CAN BUY 295<br />

Without the assistance of capital it<br />

will be impossible for us to<br />

retain proletarian power in an incredibly ruined country in which the<br />

peasantry, also ruined, constitutes the overwhelming majority—and,<br />

of course, for this assistance capital will squeeze hundreds per cent out<br />

of us. This is what we have to understand. Hence, either this type of<br />

economic relations or nothing.. .<br />

On another occasion Lenin further explained his rationale for<br />

accepting Wall Street's terms. He said:<br />

The Capitalists of the world and their governments, in pursuit of<br />

conquest of the Soviet market, will close their eyes to the indicated<br />

higher reality and thus will turn into deaf mute blindmen. They will<br />

extend credits, which will strengthen for us the Communist Party in<br />

their countries; and giving us the materials and technology we lack,<br />

they will restore our military industry, indispensable for our future<br />

victorious attack on our suppliers. In other words, they will labor for<br />

the preparation of their own suicide.<br />

Arthur Bullard, mentioned previously as the representative in<br />

Russia of the U.S. Committee on Public Information, apparently<br />

understood the Bolshevik strategy well. Even as early as March of<br />

1918, he sent a cablegram to Washington warning that, while it is<br />

true we ought to be ready to help any honest government in need,<br />

nevertheless, he said, "men or money sent to the present rulers of<br />

Russia will be used against Russians at least as much as against<br />

Germans.... I<br />

strongly advise against giving material help to the<br />

present Russian government. Sinister elements in Soviets seem to<br />

be gaining control/'<br />

Unfortunately, Mr. Bullard was a minor player in this game,<br />

and his opinion was filtered by others along the way. This<br />

cablegram was sent to his superior, none other than Col. Edward<br />

Mandell House, in hopes that it would be relayed to the President.<br />

The message did not get through.<br />

A SIDE TRIP THROUGH WORLD WAR II<br />

Returning to the trail of actual events since that time, let us<br />

pause briefly to take a short side trip through World War II.<br />

1. V.I. Lenin, Report to the Tenth Congress of the Russian Communist Party,<br />

March 15, 1921. Quoted by Sutton, Revolution, p. 157.<br />

2. Quoted by Joseph Finder, Red Carpet (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,<br />

1983), p. 8.<br />

3. Arthur Bullard papers, Princeton University, cited by Sutton, Revolution, p. 46.<br />

Financing and profiting from both sides in a conflict has never been<br />

more blatant.<br />

ITEM: From the beginning of Hitler's rise to power, German<br />

industry was heavily financed by American and British bankers.<br />

Most of the largest U.S. Corporations were knowingly invested in<br />

war industries. I.G. Farben was the largest of the industrial cartels<br />

and was a primary source of political funding for Hitler. It was<br />

Farben that staffed and directed Hitler's intelligence section and<br />

ran the Nazi slave labor camps as a supplemental source of<br />

manpower for Germany's factories. Farben even hired the New<br />

York public relations firm of Ivy Lee, who was John D. Rockefeller's<br />

PR specialist, to help improve Hitler's public image in<br />

America. Lee, incidentally, had also been used to help sell the<br />

Soviet regime to the American public in the late 1920s.<br />

ITEM: Much of the capital for the expansion of I.G. Farben<br />

came from Wall Street, primarily Rockefeller's National City Bank;<br />

Dillon, Read & Company, also a Rockefeller firm; Morgan's Equitable<br />

Trust Company; Harris Forbes & Company; and, yes, the<br />

predominantly Jewish firm of Kuhn, Loeb & Company.<br />

ITEM: During the Allied bombing raids over Germany, the<br />

factories and administrative buildings of I.G. Farben were spared<br />

upon instructions from the U.S. War Department. The War Department<br />

was liberally staffed with men, who in civilian life, had been<br />

associates of the investment firms previously mentioned. For<br />

example, the Secretary of War at that time was Robert P. Patterson.<br />

James Forrestal was Secretary of the Navy and later became<br />

Secretary of Defense. Both men had come from Dillon Read and, in<br />

fact, Forrestal had been president of that firm.<br />

ITEM: During World War II, under the Lend-Lease program,<br />

the United States sent to the Soviets more than $11 billion in aid,<br />

including 14,000 aircraft, nearly half a million tanks and other<br />

military vehicles, more than 400 combat ships, and even half of the<br />

entire U.S. supply of uranium which then was critically needed for<br />

the development of the atomic bomb. But fully one-third of all the<br />

Lend-Lease shipments during this period comprised industrial<br />

equipment and supplies to be used for the development of the<br />

3- Anthony Sutton, Wall Street and the Rise of Hitler (Seal Beach, California: '76<br />

Press, 1976),. 15-18, 33^3, 67-97, 99-113. Also Revolution, p. 174.<br />

2. Sutton, Hitler, pp. 23-61.


296 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND THE BEST ENEMY MONEY CAN BUY 297<br />

Russian economy after the war. And when the war did end, the<br />

Lend-Lease program continued to flow into the Soviet Union for<br />

over a year. As late as the end of 1946, Russia was still<br />

receiving<br />

twenty-year credit terms at 2 3 /g per cent interest, a far lower rate<br />

than returning GIs could obtain.<br />

THE TRANSFUSION MECHANISM<br />

With the termination of the Lend-Lease program, it was necessary<br />

to invent new mechanisms for the support of Soviet Russia<br />

and her satellites. One of these was the sale of much-needed<br />

commodities at prices below the world market and, in fact, below<br />

the prices that Americans themselves had to pay for the same<br />

items. This meant, of course—as it did in the case of Lend<br />

Lease—that the American taxpayer had to make up the difference.<br />

The Soviets were not even required to have the money to buy these<br />

goods. American financial institutions, the federal government, and<br />

international agencies which are largely funded by the federal<br />

government, such as the International Monetary Fund and the<br />

World Bank lent the money to them. Furthermore, the interest<br />

rates on these loans also are below the market requiring still<br />

additional subsidy by American citizens. And that is not all. Almost<br />

all of these loans have been guaranteed by the United States<br />

government, which means that if—no, make that when—these<br />

countries default in their payments, the gullible American public is<br />

once again called upon to make them good. In other words, the<br />

new mechanism, innocently and deceptively referred to as "trade,"<br />

is<br />

little more than a thinly disguised means by which members of<br />

the Round Table who direct our national policies have bled billions<br />

of dollars from American citizens for an ongoing economic transfusion<br />

into the Soviet bloc—and continue to do so now that the word<br />

Soviet has been changed to the less offensive Democratic Socialism.<br />

This enables those regimes to enter into contracts with American<br />

businessmen to provide essential services. And the circle is complete:<br />

From tlte American taxpayer to the American government to the<br />

"socialist" regime to the American businessman and, ultimately, to tlte<br />

American financier who funded the project and provided the political<br />

influence to make it all possible.<br />

1. Anthony C. Sutton, National Suicide: Military Aid to the Soviet Union (New<br />

Rochelle. New York: Arlington House, 1973), p: 24.<br />

kcan<br />

This is the key to understanding the transfusion mechanism.<br />

Many Americans have looked at this process and have jumped to<br />

the conclusion that there must be a nest of Communist agents<br />

within our government. In an exam on reality politics, they would<br />

receive half credit for that answer. Yes, there undoubtedly have<br />

been, and continue to be, Red agents and sympathizers burrowed<br />

deep into our government woodwork, and they are all too happy to<br />

help the process along. But the main motive force has always come<br />

from the non-Communist, non-Democratic Socialist, non-<br />

American, non-anything members of the Round Table network<br />

who, as Lenin said, in the pursuit of profit are laboring for the<br />

preparation of their own suicide.<br />

These men are incapable of genuine patriotism. They think of<br />

themselves, not as citizens of any particular country, but as citizens<br />

of the world. They can do business just as easily with bloodthirsty<br />

dictatorships as with any other government—especially since they<br />

are assured by the transfer mechanism that the American taxpayer<br />

is going to make good on the deal.<br />

When David Rockefeller was asked about the propriety of<br />

providing funding for Marxist and Communist countries which are<br />

openly hostile to the United States, he responded: "I don't think an<br />

international bank such as ours ought to try to set itself as a judge<br />

about what kind of government a country wishes to have."<br />

Wishes to have? He was talking about Angola where the<br />

Marxist dictatorship was forced upon the people with Cuban<br />

soldiers and Soviet weapons!<br />

Thomas Theobald, Vice President of Citicorp, was asked in 1981<br />

about his bank's loans to Poland. Was he embarrassed by making<br />

loans to a Communist country, especially following the regime's<br />

brutal repression of free-trade unions? Not at all. "Who knows<br />

which political system works?" he replied. "The only test we care<br />

about is,<br />

can they pay their bills." What he meant, of course, was<br />

the American taxpayer pay Poland's bills.<br />

ITEM: The following item, taken directly from the Los Angeles<br />

Times just a few months after Theobald's statement, tells the story:<br />

WASHINGTON—For months, the Reagan Administration has<br />

been using federal funds to repay Polish loans owed to U.S. banks, and<br />

the bill for this fiscal year may amount to $400 million, Deputy<br />

Secretary of Agriculture Richard E. Lyng said Monday.... "They (the<br />

Polish authorities) have not been making payments for at least the last


298 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

half of the last year/' Lyng said. "When they don't make a payment,<br />

the U.S. Department of Agriculture makes a payment."...<br />

Lyng said the U.S. Government paid $60 million to $70 million a<br />

month on guaranteed Polish loans in October, November, December,<br />

and January—and "we will continue to pay them."<br />

This, remember, was precisely at the time the Polish government<br />

had declared martial law and was using military force to<br />

crush workers' demonstrations for political reform. The Polish<br />

default on this $1.6 billion loan was by no means an isolated event.<br />

Communist Rumania and a multitude of Latin American countries<br />

were soon to follow.<br />

The hard fact is that American taxpayers unknowingly have<br />

been making monthly bank payments on behalf of Communist,<br />

socialist, and so-called Third-World countries for many years. And,<br />

with the more recent staging of apparent reform within the former<br />

Soviet bloc, Congress has tripped all over itself to greatly accelerate<br />

that trend.<br />

Americans, of course, want to believe that the Evil Empire is<br />

crumbling, and the Soviets-turned-Democrats play directly to that<br />

desire. Since the end of World War II, their primary objectives have<br />

been (1) to disarm us and (2) to get our money. The facade of<br />

Perestroika and Glasnost has been merely a ploy to accomplish both<br />

objectives at once. All they have had to do is get rid of a few of the<br />

old hard-liners, replace them with less well-known personalities<br />

who are essentially the same (all of the new leaders come from the<br />

ranks of the old leadership), change their labels from "Communists"<br />

to "Social Democrats," and then sit back while we happily<br />

tear down our military defenses and rush billions of dollars to their<br />

failing economies. There undoubtedly will be some progress<br />

allowed in<br />

the area of free speech, but the military and security<br />

organizations continue in full<br />

readiness. The iron fist beneath the<br />

velvet glove remains ready to strike when the time comes that the<br />

facade is no longer necessary.<br />

Even if the entire ploy were genuine, there is no reason to<br />

believe that these Social Democracies will ever become better<br />

investment risks. The primary thing that has held them back<br />

economically in the past is their socialist system, and that most<br />

1. "U.S. Repaying Loans Owed by Poland to American Banks/' by William J.<br />

Eaton, Los Angeles Times, February 2, 1982.<br />

.<br />

If<br />

THE BEST ENEMY MONEY CAN BUY 299<br />

definitely will not be changed. All of the new "anti-Communist<br />

Social Democrats" have pledged their loyalty to the principles of<br />

Marx and have said in plain language that they will use our money<br />

to develop, not abandon socialism. These countries will continue to<br />

be unproductive and will continue to be unable to pay their loans.<br />

The American taxpayers will continue to be forced by the Cabal to<br />

pay the bill.<br />

ITEM: Before the Bolshevik coup d'etat, Russia was one of the<br />

most productive agricultural nations in the world. The great wheat<br />

fields in Ukraine justly earned her the title of the Bread Basket of<br />

Europe. But when the people's Utopia arrived, agriculture came to<br />

a standstill, and famine stalked the land. Even after Stalin, when the<br />

regime is said to have adopted more humane and productive<br />

policies, Russia never produced enough food for itself. A nation that<br />

cannot feed its citizens cannot develop its industry and it certainly<br />

cannot build a potent military force. It is not surprising, therefore,<br />

that for decades, the United States has annually "sold" tens of<br />

millions of tons of wheat—and other food stuffs—to Russia. The<br />

quote marks are to emphasize the underlying transfusion mechanism<br />

previously described.<br />

ITEM: The American government-industrial complex provided<br />

the Soviets with the money, technology, and the actual construction<br />

of two of the world's largest and most modern truck plants. The<br />

Kama River plant and the Zil plant produce over 150,000 heavyduty<br />

trucks per year—including armored personnel carriers and<br />

missile launchers — plus 250,000 diesel engines, many of which are<br />

used to power Soviet tanks. Forty-five per cent of the cost of this<br />

project came from the U.S. Export-Import Bank, an agency of the<br />

federal government, and an equal amount from David<br />

Rockefeller's Chase Manhattan Bank. The Soviets put up only ten<br />

per cent. The loan, of course, was taxpayer-guaranteed by the U.S.<br />

Export-Import Bank which, at the time, was under the direction of<br />

William Casey. Casey later was appointed as head of the CIA. to<br />

protect America from global Communism. (Are you beginning to<br />

get the picture?)<br />

ITEM: Almost every important facet of Eastern-Bloc heavy<br />

industry could well be stamped "Made in the USA." With the<br />

1- "U.S. Builds Soviet War Machine/' Industrial Research & Development, July, 1980,<br />

Pp. 51-54.


300 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND THE BEST ENEMY MONEY CAN BUY 301<br />

specific approval of each successive president, we have provided<br />

the latest oil-drilling equipment, chemical processing plants, airtraffic<br />

radar systems, equipment to produce precision bearings,<br />

large-craft helicopter engines, laser technology, highly advanced<br />

computer systems, and nuclear power plants. We have trained<br />

hundreds of their technicians in American institutions and factories<br />

and have provided their astronauts with the space suits developed<br />

by NASA. We have even trained their pilots at U.S. Air Force bases<br />

and paid for their military officers to attend our War College. All of<br />

this has been used by the Russian government—as Lenin predicted<br />

it would—to build their military industry in preparation for an<br />

attack on their suppliers. The great pretense of crumbling Communism,<br />

has not altered that strategy. It may even be the implementation<br />

of it.<br />

ITEM: When Boris Yeltsin seized control of the former Soviet<br />

government, one of his first official acts was to decree that foreign<br />

businesses had the right to take their profits out of the country.<br />

From a purely business perspective, that was a sound move<br />

because it would provide incentive for foreign investment. But<br />

there was more to it than that Recall from a previous chapter that<br />

the lion's share of that investment was to be funded by American<br />

taxpayers in the form of direct aid, bank-loan bailouts, and<br />

government insurance through the Overseas Private Investment<br />

Corporation. Jane Ingraham provides the details:<br />

During 1992 Yeltsin wheeled and dealed with Royal Dutch/Shell,<br />

British Petroleum, Amoco, Texaco, and Exxon. The Chevron joint<br />

venture to develop the Tengiz oil field was signed. McDermott<br />

International, Marathon Oil, and Mitsui signed a contract with the<br />

Russian government to develop oil and natural gas off Sakhalin Island.<br />

Chevron and Oman formed a consortium to build a huge pipeline to<br />

carry crude oil from Kazakhstan to the Black Sea, Mediterranean, and<br />

Persian Gulf. Occidental Petroleum signed a joint venture with Russia<br />

to modernize two oil fields in Siberia.... Newmont mining signed a<br />

joint venture to extract gold in Uzbekistan. Merrill Lynch's chairman,<br />

William Schreyer (CFR), signed up as financial adviser to "aid in<br />

privatizing" the Ukrainian State Property Fund. AT&T CEO Robert<br />

Allen (CFR, TC ) signed a huge contract to supply switching systems<br />

for all of Kazakhstan..<br />

.<br />

1 .<br />

Trila tera 1 Commission.<br />

US West joined with the Hungarian government to own and<br />

operate a national cellular telephone system; GM Vice President<br />

Marina Whitman (CFR, TC) joined the governments of Hungary and<br />

Yugoslavia to make cars; GE CEO John Welch (CFR) and vice<br />

chairman of the board, Lawrence Bossidy (TC), bought a majority<br />

stake in Hungary's lighting industry; Ralston-Purina, Dow Chemical,<br />

Eastman Kodak, SC Johnson & Son, Xerox, American Express, Procter<br />

& Gamble, Woolworth, Philip Morris, Ford, Compaq<br />

Computer—hardly a single American brand name was missing.<br />

ITEM: In February of 1996, the Clinton Administration made a<br />

$1 billion loan of US taxpayers' money to Russia's state-controlled<br />

Aeroflot company so it could more effectively compete with<br />

American companies such as Boeing in the building of jumbo jets.<br />

By the end of that year, the former Soviet Bloc countries had<br />

received transfusions from the World Bank of over $3 billion.<br />

ITEM: Now the action has spread to China. American banks<br />

and businessmen—with taxpayers standing by with guarantees<br />

have provided power-generating equipment, modern steel mills,<br />

and military hardware including artillery shells, anti-submarine<br />

torpedoes, and high-tech electronic gear to update Russian-made<br />

jet fighters. All of this is explained as a means of weaning the Red<br />

Chinese away from mother Russia and encouraging them to move<br />

closer to free-enterprise capitalism. Yet, in 1985, at the height of the<br />

frenzy over building trade bridges to China, the regime signed a<br />

$14 billion trade pact with Russia and, in 1986, sent a $20 million<br />

interest-free loan to the Communist Sandinistas in Nicaragua. Even<br />

after the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre in Beijing, when U.S.<br />

officials were publicly condemning China for human-rights violations,<br />

business quietly continued as usual. "The United States<br />

cannot condone the violent attacks and cannot ignore the consequence<br />

for our relationship with China," said President Bush. Yet,<br />

within only a few weeks of the bloodshed, and at the very time that<br />

student leaders were being executed, the Administration approved<br />

a $200 million, low-interest loan for delivery of four of Boeing's<br />

newest jumbo-jet aircraft. In 1993, forty-seven more jetliners were<br />

sold with a projected sale of 800 more over the next fifteen years.<br />

Amoco is spending $1.5 billion to develop oil fields in the China<br />

Sea. A joint venture between the Chinese government and Chrysler<br />

ft "The Payoff/' by Jane H. Ingraham, The New American, June 28, 1993, pp. 25-6.


302 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND THE BEST ENEMY MONEY CAN BUY 303<br />

is building military jeeps. A similar joint project is being used to<br />

upgrade their F-8 fighter planes. Three communications satellites<br />

were cleared for delivery. AT&T contracted a $30 million cellular<br />

communications network. Even the President's brother, Prescott<br />

Bush, resumed his plan to set up a satellite-linked computer<br />

network and to build a golf course near Shanghai.<br />

China's interest in military technology is revealing. In addition<br />

to the advanced hardware purchased from the United States, the<br />

Chinese have bought MIG-31 and SU-27 jet fighters from Russia<br />

and an aircraft carrier constructed in Ukraine. In May of 1992,<br />

China set off its biggest underground nuclear blast In 1997, the<br />

purchase list was extended to include self-propelled gun-mortar<br />

systems and Russia's most advanced diesel-electric submarines.<br />

Although it is known that China maintains a slave-labor work<br />

force in excess of a million people—they call them "convicts"—and<br />

although the Tariff Act of 1930 prohibits the United States from<br />

importing any goods made even in part by convicts or other forced<br />

labor, every administration starting with Nixon has renewed the<br />

"most-favored-nation" trade status for China.<br />

How is China expected to pay for all this "trade"? Very simple.<br />

By 1996, China had become the largest single recipient of guaranteed<br />

loans and subsidies from the World Bank.<br />

ITEM: In addition to these decades of global trade, credit, and<br />

taxpayer guarantees, the United States government has transferred<br />

tens of billions of dollars in direct foreign-aid grants with no pretense<br />

at all regarding expectation of repayment.<br />

The trail leads to Wall Street, and the tracks are fresh. The<br />

Round Table network did succeed in exploiting the markets of<br />

Eastern Europe and continues to do so today. The cast of characters<br />

has changed, but the play remains the same. In the beginning, the<br />

Council on Foreign Relations was dominated by J.P. Morgan. It is<br />

still controlled by international financiers. The Morgan group<br />

gradually has been replaced by the Rockefeller consortium, and the<br />

roll call of participating businesses now reads like the Fortune 500.<br />

The operation no longer pretends to be a Red Cross mission; it now<br />

masquerades under the cover of "East-West Trade."<br />

Politicians are fond of talking about the necessity of preserving<br />

world peace, and trade, we are told, is one of the best ways to do it.<br />

The implication is that this is a time of peace. In truth, we live in<br />

one of the most war-torn eras the world has ever seen. No continent<br />

today, except Antarctica, is free from war. There are from 25 to 40<br />

military struggles going on somewhere every day of the year.<br />

There have been more than 150 armed conflicts since the end of<br />

World War II with the death count already in excess of 20 million<br />

We cannot help noticing that this also has been a period<br />

and rising.<br />

of rising government debt and the global creation of fiat money.<br />

THE NEW ALCHEMY<br />

The alchemists of ancient times vainly sought the philosophers'<br />

stone which they believed would turn lead into gold. Is it possible<br />

that such a stone actually has been found? Can it be that the money<br />

alchemists of our own time have learned how to transmute war<br />

into debt, and debt into war, and both into gold for themselves?<br />

In a previous section, we theorized a strategy, dubbed the<br />

Rothschild Formula, in which the world's money cabal deliberately<br />

encourages war as a means of stimulating the profitable production<br />

of armaments and of keeping nations perpetually in debt. This is<br />

not profit seeking, it is genocide. It is not a trivial matter, therefore,<br />

to inquire into the possibility that our elected and non-elected<br />

leaders are, in fact, implementing the Rothschild Formula today.<br />

ITEM: In his address to the graduating class at Annapolis in<br />

1983, Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman, said: "Within weeks,<br />

many of you will be looking across just hundreds of feet of water at<br />

some of the most modern technology ever invented in America.<br />

Unfortunately, it is on Soviet ships/'<br />

As Professor Sutton observed in his book, The Best Enemy Money<br />

Can Buy, the guns, the ammunition, the weapons, and the transportation<br />

systems that killed Americans in Korea and Vietnam came<br />

from the American-subsidized economy of the Soviet Union. The<br />

trucks that carried these weapons down the Ho Chi Minh Trail<br />

were manufactured in American-built plants. The ships that carried<br />

the supplies to Sihanoukville and Haiphong and later to Angola<br />

and Nicaragua came from NATO allies and used propulsion<br />

systems that our State Department could have kept out of Soviet<br />

hands. Sutton concludes: "The technical capability to wage the<br />

1- These figures are taken from United Nations publication E/CN5/1985/Rev.l,<br />

1985 Report on the World Social Situation (New York: United Nations, 1985), p. 14. The<br />

January 1993 revision of that document does not give cumulative figures but shows<br />

that the number of conflicts has been accelerating. So the current numbers, whatever<br />

they may be, are even worse.


304 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND THE BEST ENEMY MONEY CAN BUY 305<br />

Korean and Vietnamese wars originated on both sides in Western,<br />

mainly American, technology, and the political illusion of "peaceful<br />

trade" promoted by the deaf mute blindmen was the carrier for<br />

this war-making technology."<br />

ITEM: That leads us to the more recent wars in the Middle East<br />

and the rise of "Islamic Fundamentalism." Iran, Iraq, Syria, Algeria,<br />

the PLO, the Muslim Brotherhood, and similar anti-American<br />

groupings have all<br />

received weapons, funding, and clandestine<br />

support from the U.S. government. In the Gulf War, every effort<br />

was made to insure that Hussein's regime was contained but not<br />

destroyed (shades of the Korean and Vietnam wars). Most of his<br />

bacterial-weapons factories were spared. After the cease fire,<br />

was allowed to keep his fleet of helicopter gunships, which he<br />

promptly used to put down a large-scale internal revolt.<br />

The big pill to swallow is that Saddam Hussein has been an<br />

asset to the global planners in the West, and they have done<br />

everything possible to keep him in power. This strategy has lately<br />

become so obvious that there is no longer any serious attempt to<br />

conceal it.<br />

The task now is how to explain it to the gullible public so<br />

as to make it sound like a good idea.<br />

As mentioned previously, the think-tank and talent pool for the<br />

implementation of this strategy has been the Council on Foreign<br />

Relations. In 1996, the Managing Editor of the CFR's monthly<br />

journal, Foreign Affairs, was Fareed Zakaria, who offered the<br />

following rationalization:<br />

Yes, it's tempting to get rid of Saddam. But his bad behavior<br />

actually serves America's purposes in the region.... If Saddam<br />

Hussein did not exist, we would have to invent him.... The end of<br />

Saddam Hussein would be the end of the anti-Saddam coalition.<br />

Nothing destroys an alliance like the disappearance of the enemy....<br />

Maintaining a long-term American presence in the gulf would be<br />

difficult in the absence of a regional threat.<br />

That is about as clear a statement of the Rothschild Formula as<br />

one is apt to find. Yet, many people cannot believe it is real, even<br />

Congressmen. For example, Representative James Traficant from<br />

Ohio, speaking before the House on April 29, 1997, exclaimed:<br />

1. Anthony Sutton, The Best Enemy Money Can Buy (Billings, Montana: Liberty<br />

House Press, 1986), p. 191.<br />

2. "Thank Goodness for a Villain," Newsweek, Sept. 16, 1996, p. 43.<br />

he<br />

America gives billions to Russia. With American cash, Russia<br />

builds missiles. Russia then sells those missiles to China. And China,<br />

who gets about $45 billion in trade giveaways from Uncle Sam, then<br />

sells those Russian-made missiles to Iran.<br />

Now Iran, with those Russian-made missiles sold to them by<br />

China, threatens the Mideast. So Uncle Sam, who is concerned about<br />

about Iran threatening the Mideast because of those Russian-made<br />

missiles sold to them by China that we financed by American cash<br />

sends more troops and sends more dollars.... Mr. Speaker, this is not<br />

foreign policy. This is foreign stupidity.<br />

Traficant is<br />

on target with his analysis of the problem, but he<br />

missed the bull's eye regarding the cause. American leaders are not<br />

stupid. They merely are implementing the Rothschild Formula. To<br />

justify world government, it is necessary to have wars and the<br />

threat of wars. Wars require enemies with frightful weapons.<br />

Saddam Hussein is one of the best enemies money can buy.<br />

If it is true that Western leaders are deliberately funding their<br />

own enemies, we must assume they have considered Lenin's<br />

prediction that, by so doing, they are preparing their own suicide<br />

ours, also, by the way. We must also conclude that they are<br />

confident of avoiding that destiny. Whether they are right or wrong<br />

is not the issue here. The point is they believe they are correct and,<br />

further, they are building a world order which they are confident of<br />

being able to control. How they plan to bring that to pass is<br />

subject of a later section, but perpetual war is an important part of<br />

it Unless we are able to break the grip of these strategists,<br />

Rothschild Formula will continue to play a major role in our future.<br />

FIFTH REASON TO ABOLISH THE SYSTEM<br />

There are few historians who would challenge the fact that the<br />

funding of World War I, World War II, the Korean War, and the<br />

Vietnam War was accomplished by the Mandrake Mechanism<br />

through the Federal Reserve System. An overview of all wars since<br />

the establishment of the Bank of England in 1694 suggests that most<br />

of them would have been greatly reduced in severity, or perhaps<br />

not even fought at all, without fiat money. It is the ability of<br />

governments to acquire money without direct taxation that makes<br />

Modern warfare possible, and a central bank has become the<br />

preferred method of accomplishing that.<br />

Congressional Record, April 29, 1997.<br />

the<br />

the


306 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

One can argue the necessity, or at least the inevitability, of fiat<br />

money in time of war as a means of raw survival. That is the primal<br />

instinct of both individuals and governments, all other considerations<br />

aside. We shall leave that for the philosophers. But there can<br />

be no debate over the fact that fiat money in time of peace has no<br />

such justification. Furthermore, the ability of governments and<br />

banking institutions to use fiat money to fund the wars of other<br />

nations is a powerful temptation for them to become embroiled in<br />

those wars for personal profit, political advancement, or other<br />

reasons which fall far short of a moral justification for bloodshed.<br />

The Federal Reserve System has always served that function.<br />

The on-going strategy of building up the military capabilities of<br />

America's potential enemies leaves us no reason to believe we have<br />

seen the last of war. Therefore, it is not an exaggeration to say that<br />

the Federal Reserve System encourages war. There can be no better<br />

reason for the Creature to be put to sleep.<br />

SUMMARY<br />

The Bolshevik Revolution was a coup d'etat in which a radical<br />

minority captured the Russian government from the moderate<br />

revolutionary majority. They accomplished this through deception,<br />

organization, discipline, and surprise. The Red Cross Mission of<br />

New York financiers threw support to the Bolsheviks and, in<br />

return, received economic rewards in the form of rights to Russia's<br />

natural resources plus contracts for construction and supplies. The<br />

continued participation in the economic development of Russia<br />

and Eastern Europe since that time indicates that this relationship<br />

has survived to the present day. These financiers are not pro-<br />

Communist nor pro-anything else. Their motivation is<br />

profit and<br />

power. They are now working to bring both Russia and the United<br />

States into a world government which they expect to control. War<br />

and threats of war are tools to prod the masses toward the<br />

acceptance of that goal. It is essential, therefore, that the United<br />

States and the industrialized nations of the world have credible<br />

enemies. As these words are being written, Russia is wearing the<br />

mask of peace and cooperation. But we have seen that before. We<br />

may yet see a return of the Evil Empire when the timing is right.<br />

U.S. government and megabank funding, first of Russian, and now<br />

of Chinese and Middle-East military capabilities, cannot be understood<br />

without this insight.<br />

Section IV<br />

A TALE OF THREE<br />

BANKS<br />

It has been said that those who are ignorant of<br />

history are doomed to repeat its mistakes. It may<br />

come as a surprise to learn that the Federal<br />

Reserve System is America's fourth central bank,<br />

not its first. We have been through all this before<br />

and, each time, the result has been the same.<br />

Interested in what happened? Then let's set the<br />

coordinates of our time machine to the colony of<br />

Massachusetts and the year 1690. To activate, turn<br />

the page.


Chapter Fifteen<br />

THE LOST<br />

TREASURE MAP<br />

The bitter<br />

experience of the American colonies<br />

with fiat money; the resolve of the founding<br />

fathers to prohibit the new nation from resorting<br />

to paper money without backing; the drafting of<br />

the Constitution to that end; the creation ofa true<br />

American dollar; the prosperity that followed.<br />

In the golden days of radio, on the Edgar Bergen Show, the<br />

ventriloquist would ask his dummy, Mortimer Snerd, "How can<br />

you be so stupid?" And the answer was always the same. After a<br />

moment of deep thought on the part of Mortimer, he would drawl<br />

his reply, "Well, it ain't easy!"<br />

When we look at the monetary chaos around us today—the<br />

evaporating value of the dollar and the collapsing financial institutions—we<br />

are compelled to ask: How did we get into this fix? And,<br />

unfortunately, Mortimer's response would be quite appropriate.<br />

To find out how we got to where we are, it will be necessary to<br />

know where we started, and a good place to begin that inquiry is<br />

with the Constitution of the United States. Article I, Sections 8 and<br />

10 say:<br />

Congress shall have the power —<br />

To borrow money ... to coin money, regulate the value thereof,<br />

and of foreign coin, and fix the standard of weights and measures;...<br />

[and] to provide for the punishrnent of counterfeiting....<br />

No state shall ... coin money; emit bills of credit; [or] make<br />

anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts.<br />

The delegates were precise in their use of these words.<br />

Congress was given the power to "coin money," not to print it.<br />

Thomas M. Cooley's Principles of Constitutional Law explains that<br />

'to coin money is to stamp pieces of metal for use as a medium of<br />

exchange in commerce according to fixed standards of value."


310 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

What was prohibited was to "emit bills of credit" which, according<br />

to the speeches and writings of those who drafted the document,<br />

meant the printing of paper IOUs which were intended to be<br />

circulated as money—in other words, the printing of fiat money<br />

not backed by gold or silver.<br />

At first, it would seem that nothing could be more clear. Yet,<br />

these two simple clauses have become the basis for literally<br />

thousands of pages of conflicting interpretation. The crux of the<br />

problem is that, while the Constitution clearly prohibits the states<br />

from issuing fiat money, it does not specifically prevent the federal<br />

government from doing so. That was truly an unfortunate oversight<br />

on the part of the document's framers, but they probably<br />

never dreamed in their wildest nightmares that their descendants<br />

"could be so stupid" as to not understand their intent.<br />

Furthermore, "it ain't easy 7 '<br />

to miss their intent. All one has to<br />

do is look at the monetary history that led up to the Constitutional<br />

Convention and to read the published letters and debates of the<br />

men who affixed their signatures to that founding document.<br />

As one reads through the debates on the floor of the convention,<br />

one is struck by the passion that these delegates held on the<br />

subject of money. Every one of them could remember from his<br />

personal experience the utter chaos in the colonies caused by the<br />

issuance of fiat money. They spoke out against it in no uncertain<br />

terms, and they were adamant that it<br />

again in America—at either the state or federal level.<br />

should never be tolerated<br />

PAPER MONEY IN THE COLONIES<br />

The first colonial experience with fiat money was in the period<br />

from 1690 to 1764. Massachusetts was the first to use it as a means<br />

of financing its military raids against the French colony in Quebec.<br />

The other colonies were quick to follow suit and, within a few<br />

years, were engaging in a virtual orgy of printing "bills of credit."<br />

There was no central bank involved. The process was simple and<br />

direct, as was the reasoning behind it. As one colonial legislator<br />

explained it:<br />

Do you think, gentlemen, that I will consent to load my<br />

constituents with taxes when we can send to our printer and get a<br />

wagon load of money, one quire of which will pay for the whole?<br />

1. See William ML Gouge, A Short History of Paper Money and Banking in the United<br />

States (Philadelphia: T.W. Ustick, 1833), Part II, p. 27.<br />

THE LOST TREASURE MAP 311<br />

The consequences of this enlightened statesmanship were classic.<br />

Prices skyrocketed, legal tender laws were enacted to force the<br />

colonists to accept the worthless paper, and the common man<br />

endured great personal losses and hardship. By the late 1750s,<br />

Connecticut had price inflated by 800%, the Carolinas had inflated<br />

900%, Massachusetts 1000%, Rhode Island 2300%. 1<br />

The situation was so out of hand that, beginning in 1751, the<br />

British Parliament stepped in and, in one of those rare instances<br />

where interference from the mother country actually benefited the<br />

colonies, it forced them to cease the production of fiat money.<br />

Henceforth, the Bank of England would be the only source.<br />

What followed was unforeseen by the promoters of fiat money.<br />

Amid great gloom about "insufficient money/ 7<br />

a miracle boom of<br />

prosperity occurred. The forced use of fiat money had compelled<br />

everyone to hoard their real money and use the worthless paper<br />

instead. Now that the paper was in disgrace, the colonists began to<br />

use their English and French and Dutch gold coins once again,<br />

prices rapidly adjusted to reality, and commerce returned to a solid<br />

footing. It remained so even during the economic strain of the<br />

Seven-Years War (1756-1763) and during the period immediately<br />

prior to the Revolution. Here was a perfect example of how an<br />

economic system in distress can recover if government does not<br />

interfere with the healing process.<br />

WARTIME INFLATION<br />

But all of this came to a halt with the onset of colonial rebellion.<br />

Not only did open hostilities throw England deeper into the cogs<br />

and wheels of the central-bank mechanism, it also was the compelling<br />

motive for the colonies to return to their printing presses. The<br />

following figures speak eloquently for themselves:<br />

m<br />

• At the beginning of the war in 1775, the total money supply for<br />

the federated colonies stood at $12 million.<br />

In June of that year, the Continental Congress issued another<br />

$2 million. Before the notes were printed, another $1 million<br />

was authorized.<br />

By the end of the year, another $3 million.<br />

1- Paul and Lehrman, p. 23.<br />

2 -<br />

Roger W. Weiss, "The Colonial Monetary Standard of Massachusetts/<br />

History Review 27 (November 1974), p. 589.<br />

Economic


312 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND THE LOST TREASURE MAP 313<br />

• $19 million in 1776.<br />

• $13 million in 1777.<br />

• $64 million in 1778.<br />

• $125 million in 1779.<br />

• A total of $227 million in five years on top of a base of<br />

$12 million is an increase of about 2000%.<br />

• On top of this "federal" money, the states were doing the same<br />

in an approximately equal amount.<br />

• And still more: the Continental Army, unable to get enough<br />

money from Congress, issued "certificates" for the purchase of<br />

supplies totalling $200 million.<br />

• $650 million created in five years on top of a base of $12 million<br />

is an expansion of the money supply of over SOOO^o. 1<br />

Although the economy was devastated by this flood of fiat<br />

money, most victims were totally unaware of the cause. In 1777, the<br />

sentiment of a large segment of the population was expressed by<br />

the words of one patriotic old lady who said: "What a shame it is<br />

that Congress should let the poor soldiers suffer when they have<br />

power to make just as much money as they choose." 2<br />

The immediate result of this money infusion was the appearance<br />

of prosperity. After all, everyone had more money and that was<br />

perceived as a very good thing. But this was quickly followed by<br />

inflation as the self-destruct mechanism began to roll. In 1775, the<br />

colonial monetary unit, called the Continental, was valued at<br />

one-dollar in gold. In 1778, it was exchanged for twenty-five cents.<br />

By 1779, just four years from its issue, it was worth less than a<br />

penny and ceased to circulate as money at all. It was in that year<br />

that George Washington wrote: "A wagon-load of money will<br />

scarcely purchase a wagon-load of provisions." 3<br />

The saying "Not worth a Continental" has its<br />

gloomy period.<br />

origin in this<br />

The true nature of the inflation effect has never been more<br />

accurately perceived or more vividly described than it was by<br />

Thomas Jefferson:<br />

It<br />

will be asked how will the two masses of Continental and of<br />

State money have cost the people of the United States seventy-two<br />

millions of dollars, when they are to be redeemed now with about six<br />

million? I answer that the difference, being sixty-six millions, has been<br />

lost on the paper bills separately by the successive holders of them.<br />

Every one, through whose hands a bill passed, lost on that bill what it<br />

lost in value during the time it was in his hands. This was a real tax on<br />

him; and in this way the people of the United States actually<br />

contributed those sixty-six millions of dollars during the war, and by a<br />

mode of taxation the most oppressive of all because the most unequal<br />

of all. 1<br />

PRICE CONTROLS AND LEGAL-TENDER LAWS<br />

It was natural that people struggled to find ways to escape the<br />

destruction of their savings, and the two most obvious methods<br />

were (1) to regularly adjust prices upward as the value of the<br />

money went downward or (2) exchange their goods and services<br />

only for gold coins. In response, the colonial legislatures and the<br />

Continental Congress did what governments always do to prevent<br />

it They resorted to wage and price controls and to legal-tender<br />

laws with harsh penalties for non-compliance. Under one such law,<br />

those who refused to accept worthless money were even described<br />

as traitors. It declared:<br />

If any person shall hereafter be so lost to all virtue and regard for<br />

his Country as to refuse to accept its notes, such person shall be<br />

deemed an enemy of his Country.<br />

Rhode Island not only leveled a substantial fine for nonacceptance<br />

of its notes but, upon a second offense, an individual<br />

lost his citizenship. When this was declared unlawful by a panel of<br />

judges, the legislature reacted by dismissing the judges from<br />

office. 3<br />

1. For an overview of expenditures, see Paul and Lehrman, pp. 26-27.<br />

2. Gouge, p. 28. The naivite of this lady may be humorous, but are Americans any<br />

more enlightened today? Would she not feel at home among our modern-day<br />

electorate who clamor for legislation to pump Federal-Reserve fiat money into<br />

projects to alleviate hardship among the poor and unemployed?<br />

3. QuotedbyBolles,Vol.i,p.l32.<br />

P Thomas Jefferson, Observations on the Article Etats-Unis Prepared for the<br />

Encyclopedia, June 22, 1786, Writings, Vol. IV, p. 165.<br />

2- F- Tupper Saussy, The Miracle on Mainstreet (Sewanee, Tennessee Spencer Judd,<br />

9fi 0), p. 12. Also see Anthony Sutton, The War on Gold (Seal Beach, Calif.: 76 Press,<br />

1 W), pp. 47, 48.<br />

3 -<br />

Jensen, p. 324.


314 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND THE LOST TREASURE MAP 315<br />

Then, as now, those who suffered the most from fiat money<br />

were those who held the most trust in government. In 1777 these<br />

were mostly the Whigs, for it was they who patriotically held paper<br />

money and, as a result, lost their livelihoods and their life savings.<br />

The Tories, on the other hand, mistrusting both government and its<br />

paper money, passed the bills as quickly as possible in trade for<br />

real assets, especially gold. Consequently, as a group, they weathered<br />

the storm fairly well. But they often were derided by their less<br />

prudent neighbors as "Torie speculators," "hoarders," and even<br />

"traitors."<br />

All of this was painfully fresh in the memories of the delegates<br />

to the Constitutional Convention and, as the opening session<br />

convened in Philadelphia in 1787, there were angry mobs in the<br />

streets threatening the legislators. Looting was rampant. Businesses<br />

were bankrupt, Drunkenness and lawlessness were everywhere to<br />

be seen. The fruit of fiat money had ripened, and the delegates did<br />

not enjoy its taste.<br />

In October of 1785, George Washington wrote: "The wheels of<br />

government are clogged, and . . . we are descending into the vale of<br />

confusion and darkness." A year later, in a letter to James<br />

Madison, he said: "No day was ever more clouded than the<br />

present. We are fast verging to anarchy."<br />

In February of 1787, Washington wrote to Henry Knox: "If any<br />

person had told me that there would have been such formidable<br />

rebellion as exists, I would have thought him fit for a madhouse."<br />

Just three months prior to the opening of the convention,<br />

Washington voiced his reasons for rejecting the notion of fiat<br />

money. In answer to the complaint that there was not enough gold<br />

coin (specie) to satisfy the needs of commerce, he replied:<br />

The necessity arising from a want of specie is represented as<br />

greater than it really is. I contend that it is by the substance, not the<br />

shadow of a thing, we are to be benefited. The wisdom of man, in my<br />

humble opinion, cannot at this time devise a plan by which the credit<br />

of paper money would be long supported; consequently, depreciation<br />

keeps pace with the quantity of the emission, and articles for which it<br />

is exchanged rise in a greater ratio than the sinking value of the<br />

money. Wherein, then, is the farmer, the planter, the artisan benefited?<br />

1. Quoted by Atwood, p. 3.<br />

2. Ibid., p. 4.<br />

3. Ibid., p. 4.<br />

An evil equally great is the door it immediately opens for speculation,<br />

by which the least designing and perhaps most valuable part of the<br />

community are preyed upon by the more knowing and crafty<br />

speculators.<br />

THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION<br />

This was the prevailing view held by the great majority of<br />

delegates to the Convention. They were adamant in their resolve to<br />

create a constitution which would prevent any state, and especially<br />

the federal government itself, from ever again issuing fiat money.<br />

And they said so in unmistakable terms.<br />

Oliver Ellsworth from Connecticut, who later was to become<br />

our third Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, said:<br />

This is a favorable moment to shut and bar the door against paper<br />

money. The mischief of the various experiments which have been<br />

made are now fresh in the public mind and have excited the disgust of<br />

all the respectable parts of America.<br />

George Mason from Virginia told the delegates he had a<br />

"mortal hatred to paper money." Previously he had written to<br />

George Washington: "They may pass a law to issue paper money,<br />

but twenty laws will not make the people receive it. Paper money is<br />

founded upon fraud and knavery."<br />

James Wilson from Pennsylvania said: "It will have the most<br />

salutary influence on the credit of the United States to remove the<br />

possibility of paper money/'<br />

John Langdon from New Hampshire warned that he would<br />

rather reject the whole plan of federation than to grant the new<br />

gpvernment the right to issue fiat money.<br />

George Reed from Delaware declared that a provision in the<br />

Constitution granting the new government the right to issue fiat<br />

money "would be as alarming as the mark of the beast in<br />

Revelation/'<br />

Thomas Paine, although not a delegate to the Convention, had<br />

written the previous year that he was strongly opposed to fiat<br />

money, which he called counterfeiting by the state, and he especially<br />

abhorred legal tender laws which force people to accept the<br />

1. Washington to Stone, 16 February, 1787. Quoted by Bancroft, pp. 231-32.<br />

2 "<br />

2- For the con<strong>text</strong> of this and the following statements expressing a similar<br />

ser sentiment, see Bancroft, pp. 30, 43-44, 82; also Paul and Lehrman, p. 168.


316 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

counterfeit. He said:<br />

"The punishment of a member [of a legislature]<br />

who should move for such a law ought to be death/'<br />

An interesting thought.<br />

If any further evidence is needed that the Founding Fathers<br />

intended to prohibit the federal government from issuing "bills of<br />

credit/' consider this. The first draft of the Constitution was copied<br />

in large measure from the original Articles of Confederation. When<br />

it was taken up for consideration by the delegates, therefore, it<br />

contained the old provision that had caused so much chaos.<br />

stated: "The legislature of the United States shall have the power to<br />

borrow money and emit bills of credit." But, after a lively discussion<br />

on the matter, the offending provision was voted to be removed<br />

from the Constitution by an overwhelming margin. 1<br />

It<br />

Voicing the<br />

sentiment of the majority of the delegates, Alexander Hamilton<br />

said: "To emit an unfunded paper as the sign of value ought not to<br />

continue a formal part of the Constitution, nor ever hereafter to be<br />

employed; being, in its nature, repugnant with abuses and liable to<br />

be made the engine of imposition and fraud." 2<br />

The journal of the Convention for August 16 contains this<br />

notation:<br />

It was moved and seconded to strike out the words "and emit bills<br />

of credit/' and the motion ... passed in the affirmative. [The vote<br />

cleared by a margin of better than four to one.] 3<br />

The Tenth Amendment states:<br />

"The powers not delegated to<br />

the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the<br />

States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." The<br />

power to issue bills of credit is definitely not delegated to the<br />

United States, and it is specifically prohibited to the States. Therefore,<br />

if any power to issue fiat money legally exists at all, it is<br />

reserved for the people. In other words, individuals and private<br />

institutions, such as banks, have the right to issue lOUs and hope<br />

that the public will use them as money, but government, at any level<br />

is clearly prohibited by the Constitution from doing so.<br />

1. For an excellent summary of the interplay of ideas between the delegates, see<br />

Edwin Vieira, Jr., Pieces of Eight: The Monetary Pozvers and Disabilities of the United<br />

States Constitution (New Jersey: Sound Dollar Committee, 1983), pp. 71-76.<br />

2. Alexander Hamilton, Works, Part II, p. 271, as cited by Bancroft, p. 26.<br />

3. Quoted by Bancroft, pp. 39, 40.<br />

»<br />

Ltant<br />

THE LOST TREASURE MAP 317<br />

A SUGGESTION FOR YOUR CONGRESSMAN<br />

Incidentally, the Constitution has never been amended on this<br />

point, nor has the provision that only silver and gold can be used as<br />

lawful money. It would be interesting if each reader of this book<br />

would send copies to his or her elected representatives in Washington,<br />

or at least a photocopy of this section. Every member of<br />

Congress has sworn to uphold the Constitution, and you might<br />

attach a short note asking them when they intend to begin.<br />

Do not be disappointed if your reply is less than satisfactory.<br />

Politicians have a similar problem to that which judges have. It is<br />

permissible to rock the boat from time to time, but they are not<br />

supposed to sink it.<br />

Suits against the government challenging the<br />

constitutionality of our monetary system seldom get to court. It is<br />

safer for the justices to decline to accept these cases or to dismiss<br />

them as supposedly "frivolous." Otherwise they would face a<br />

difficult choice. Either they would have to mutilate logic in order to<br />

uphold the present inconsistencies—thus, opening themselves to<br />

possible ridicule—or they would have to declare in favor of the<br />

Constitution and literally cause the collapse of the entire deficit-<br />

spending, central-bank mechanism. Such an act would take a<br />

considerable amount of courage. Not only would they suffer the<br />

wrath of the Establishment that is nourished by that mechanism,<br />

they also would have to face a bewildered public which, because of<br />

lack of knowledge about the Constitution or the nature of money,<br />

could easily be convinced that the judges had lost their minds.<br />

Likewise, it is safer for politicians to respond to inquiries of this<br />

kind merely by quoting some self-serving government document<br />

which makes our fiat monetary system sound quite legal and<br />

marvelously constitutional.<br />

Unfortunately, that is reality. Until the public becomes considerably<br />

better informed than it is at present, we cannot expect too<br />

much from the courts or from Congress. Bringing this matter to the<br />

attention of your elected representatives, however, is still well<br />

worth the effort, because the process of education has to start<br />

somewhere, and Washington is an excellent place to begin.<br />

Returning to the point of this digression, however, it is impor-<br />

to know that the federal government was given a precisely<br />

limited monetary function: "to coin money" and to "regulate the


318 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

specifically defined as the only kind of money to be allowed, there<br />

can be no doubt of what was meant by the first half of that power.<br />

To coin money meant to mint precious-metal coins. Period.<br />

The second half is equally clear. Both in the Constitution and in<br />

the discussions among the delegates, the power to regulate the<br />

value of gold and silver coin was closely tied to the power to<br />

determine weights and measures. They are, in fact, one and the<br />

same. To regulate the value of coin is exactly the same as to set the<br />

nationally accepted value of a mile or a pound or a quart. It is to<br />

create a standard against which a thing may be measured. The<br />

wording of this section of the Constitution can be traced to the<br />

original Articles of Confederation which further clarifies the meaning<br />

that was generally understood at that time:<br />

The United States in congress assembled shall . . . have the sole and<br />

exclusive right and power of regulating the alloy and value of coin<br />

struck by their own authority, or by that of the respective<br />

states—fixing the Standard of Weights and Measures throughout the<br />

United States.<br />

The intent, therefore, was simply for Congress to determine the<br />

exact weight of a precious metal that would constitute the national<br />

monetary unit.<br />

THE ORIGIN OF THE DOLLAR<br />

At the time of these deliberations, Spanish silver coins, called<br />

pieces of eight, had already become the de facto monetary unit. An<br />

official commission had been established by the Continental Congress<br />

to sample the circulating coins in the country and determine<br />

their average value by weight and purity. Charts were published,<br />

and all<br />

coins of various origin were listed by comparative value.<br />

Congress was already "regulating the value of" the nation's money<br />

by the time the Constitution was drafted. How these coins became<br />

dollars is an interesting story. Edwin Vieira tells us:<br />

Monetary historians generally first associate the dollar with one<br />

Count Schlick, who began striking such silver coins in 1519 in<br />

Joachim's Thai, Bavaria. Then called " Schlicktenthalers" or<br />

"joachimsthalers," the coins became known simply as "thalers," which<br />

transliterated into "dollars." Interestingly, the American colonies did<br />

not adopt the dollar from England, but from Spain. Under that<br />

country's monetary reform of 1497, the silver real became the Spanish<br />

money -unit, or unit of account. A new coin consisting of eight teaks<br />

also appeared. Variously known as pesos, duros, piezas de ocho ("pieces<br />

THE LOST TREASURE MAP 319<br />

of eight"), or Spanish dollars (because of their similarity in weight and<br />

fineness to the thaler), the coins quickly achieved predominance in<br />

financial markets of the New World because of Spain's then-important<br />

commercial and political position.<br />

In 1785, Thomas Jefferson urged the adoption of the Spanish<br />

silver dollar as the nation's official monetary unit. In a pamphlet<br />

submitted to the delegates of the Continental Congress, he said:<br />

Taking into our view all money transactions, great and small, I<br />

question if a common measure, of more convenient size than the<br />

dollar, could be proposed.... The unit or dollar is a known coin, and<br />

the most familiar of all to the minds of people. It is already adopted<br />

from south to north; has identified our currency, and therefore happily<br />

offers itself as an unit already introduced.<br />

On July 6, 1785, Congress unanimously voted to adopt the<br />

Spanish dollar as the official monetary unit of the United States.<br />

Jefferson realized, however, that this was not sufficient. Although<br />

the coin had been one of the most dependable in terms of weight<br />

and quality, it still varied in content between issues, and a way had<br />

to be found to rate one coin in value against another. That was,<br />

after all, the service that Congress was required to render when it<br />

was given the power to "regulate the value" of money. Jefferson<br />

came directly to the point when he said: "If we determine that a<br />

dollar shall be our unit, we must then say with precision what a<br />

dollar is. This coin as struck at different times, of different weight<br />

and fineness, is of different values."<br />

The logic voiced by Jefferson could not be ignored. Two years<br />

later, after carefully examining the actual weight and fineness of<br />

the Spanish dollars currently in circulation, Congress defined the<br />

dollar. After ratification of the Constitution, a dollar would contain<br />

371.25 grains of fine silver, and all items in commerce, including<br />

other coins, were to be measured in value against that standard.<br />

As the Spaniards continued to reduce the silver content of their<br />

coins, the pressure for the minting of an American dollar of<br />

predictable value began to mount. Secretary of the Treasury,<br />

Alexander Hamilton, in his 1791 report to Congress, urged the<br />

1- Vieira, p. 66.<br />

2. Propositions Respecting the Coinage of Gold, Silver, and Copper (printed pamphlet<br />

Presented to the Continental Congress on May 13, 1785), pp. 9-10. Cited by Vieira,<br />

P- 68.<br />

3 - Ihid., p. 11.


320 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND THE LOST TREASURE MAP 321<br />

establishment of a federal mint and also presented a powerful case<br />

for maintaining an inviolable standard for the coins to be produced<br />

by that mint. He said:<br />

The dollar originally contemplated in the money transactions of<br />

this country, by successive diminutions of its weight and fineness, has<br />

sustained a depreciation of five per cent, and yet the new dollar has a<br />

currency in all payments in place of the old, with scarcely any<br />

attention to the difference between them. The operation of this in<br />

depredating the value of property depending upon past contracts,<br />

and ...<br />

of all other property is apparent. Nor can it require argument to<br />

prove that a nation ought not to suffer the value of the property of its<br />

citizens to fluctuate with the fluctuations of a foreign mint, or to<br />

change with the changes in the regulations of a foreign sovereign.. .<br />

The quantity of gold and silver in the national coins,<br />

corresponding with a given sum, cannot be made less than heretofore<br />

without disturbing the balance of intrinsic value, and making every<br />

acre of land, as well as every bushel of wheat, of less actual worth than<br />

in time past.... [This] could not fail to distract the ideas of the<br />

community, and would be apt to breed discontent as well among those<br />

who live on the income of their money as among the poorer classes of<br />

the people to whom the necessities of life would . . . become dearer. 1<br />

BIMETALLISM<br />

Note in the preceding quotation that Hamilton referred to both<br />

gold and silver coins, not merely silver. That is because it was<br />

precisely at this time that Congress began to consider a bimetallic<br />

coinage. In retrospect, this was a mistake for, throughout history,<br />

bimetallism has never worked well very long. It always has led to<br />

confusion and, ultimately, the disappearance as money of one of the<br />

metals. This is because there is always a subtle shifting of the<br />

relative values between gold and silver—or any other two metals<br />

for that matter—depending on constantly changing supply and<br />

demand. We may set a value ratio of one to the other that is quite<br />

acceptable today but, eventually, that ratio will no longer reflect<br />

reality. The metal which grows in value over the other will be<br />

hoarded or possibly even melted down because it will bring a<br />

higher price as metal than it will as money.<br />

That is precisely what happened in the early days of our<br />

Republic. It was determined after careful analysis of the free-<br />

1. Vie Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the United States (J. Gales, compil.<br />

1834), Appendix, pp. 2059, 2071-73. Cited by Vieira, pp. 95, 97.<br />

•<br />

market that the value of gold at that time was approximately fifteen<br />

times the value of silver. The Coinage Act of 1792 accordingly set<br />

the relative value of gold-to-silver at fifteen-to-one. It then authorized<br />

the federal government to mint gold coins called Eagles, and it<br />

specified that their value was ten dollars. In other words, the gold<br />

courts would be equal in value to ten silver coins. Ten silver coins,<br />

each of 371.25 grains of fine silver, would contain a total of 3,712.5<br />

grains. The content of the Eagle, therefore, was one-fifteenth that<br />

amount, or 247.5 grains of fine gold.<br />

Contrary to popular misconception/ Congress did not create a<br />

"gold dollar." (It didn't do that until fifty-seven years later in The<br />

Coinage Act of 1849.) In fact it reaffirmed that "the money of<br />

account of the United States shall be expressed in dollars or units"<br />

and again defined those units as coins containing 371.25 grains of<br />

pure silver. What Congress did do was authorize the minting of a<br />

gpld coin and arbitrarily fix<br />

the value of the gold in that coin at<br />

fifteen times the value of the dollar. And it also stated that all silver<br />

and gold coins produced in the federal mint were to be legal tender<br />

in accordance with their value, based on weight and purity, relative<br />

to the standard of the silver dollar.<br />

Oh yes, another thing. It set the death penalty for anyone who<br />

debases the nation's coinage; a law which, if enforced today, would<br />

wipe out the House of Representatives, the Senate, the managerial<br />

level of the Treasury Department, and the Presidency as well.<br />

FREE COINAGE<br />

Perhaps the most important provision of this Act, however, was<br />

the establishment of what is called free coinage. Under free coinage,<br />

any citizen may take raw silver or gold to the mint and, for a<br />

nominal fee, have it converted into coins for personal use. The<br />

government merely performs a technical function of creating the<br />

coin and stamping it with its insignia to certify the correct weight<br />

and purity. The state's role in this is exactly the same as inspecting<br />

the scales in a grocery store or the meter on a gasoline pump. It is<br />

merely fulfilling<br />

the Constitutional requirement to set standards<br />

and verify the accuracy of weights and measures.<br />

Free coinage was to become an important part of the American<br />

success story, and it lasted until the Gold Reserve Act of 1934<br />

which, not only terminated it, but even made it illegal for citizens to<br />

possess gold. We shall take a closer look at that dismal period in a


322 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

later section but, for now, it is important to recall the greatness of<br />

our monetary system as it once was. Elgin Groseclose explains:<br />

The principle of free coinage has proved its practical worth as a<br />

deterrent to debasement and depreciation. Where coinage is on<br />

private account there is no profit to the state in tampering with the<br />

standard, and there is no opportunity for such practice by the<br />

individual. The circulation of coins of similar appearance and<br />

denomination but of uncertain standard, the arbitrary and<br />

unpredictable modifications in the standard by autocratic<br />

government, the temptations to profit which were constantly dangled<br />

before despotic rulers—these were evils which had perplexed and<br />

harassed society and hindered the natural growth of economy since<br />

the days when coined money first appeared. By a stroke they were<br />

swept away. At the same time, the institution of free coinage, by giving<br />

stability and character to one of the chief instruments of organized<br />

economy, made possible a more vigorous and healthy commercial life<br />

and gave prestige and increased substance to the government<br />

adopting it.<br />

SOUND MONEY AND ECONOMIC PROSPERITY<br />

This was, indeed, an auspicious beginning for the new nation,<br />

and the result was immediately observable in an upsurge in<br />

prosperity. The December 16, 1789 edition of the Pennsylvania<br />

Gazette declared: "Since the federal constitution has removed all<br />

danger of our having a paper tender, our trade is advanced fifty per<br />

cent." But that was just the beginning. Historian Douglass North<br />

says that "the years 1793-1808, were years of unparalleled prosperity/<br />

Louis Hacker describes the period as one "of unexampled<br />

business expansion, one of the greatest, in fact, the United States<br />

has had.... The exports of the country mounted from $19 millions<br />

in 1791 to $93 millions in 1801.<br />

4 Furthermore, the federal deficit,<br />

which amounted to twenty-eight per cent of expenditures in 1792,<br />

dropped to twenty-one per cent in 1795. By 1802, the deficit had<br />

disappeared altogether and had been replaced by a surplus that<br />

was almost as large as the governments, total spending.<br />

George Washington watched this economic miracle with great<br />

satisfaction and, in correspondence to his friend, LaFayette, the<br />

1 Groseclose, Money and Man, p. 1 67.<br />

2. Quoted by Saussy, p. 36.<br />

3. Douglass C. North, The Economic Growth of the United States (New York: W.W-<br />

Norton, 1966), p. 53.<br />

4. Louis M. Hacker, American Capitalism (New York: Anvil, 1957), p. 39.<br />

THE LOST TREASURE MAP 323<br />

French statesman and former General in the Continental Army,<br />

Washington commented: "Our country, my dear sir,... is fast<br />

progressing in its political importance and social happiness." In a<br />

letter to Catherine Macaulay Graham, he said: "The United States<br />

enjoys a sense of prosperity and tranquility under the new government<br />

that could hardly have been hoped for." And in a letter to the<br />

American poet and diplomat, David Humphreys, Washington<br />

exclaimed: "Our public credit stands on that high ground which<br />

three years ago it would have been considered as a species of<br />

madness to have foretold/'<br />

On the specific subject of paper money without backing by gold<br />

or silver, Washington wrote:<br />

We may one day become a great commercial and flourishing<br />

nation. But if in the pursuit of the means we should unfortunately<br />

stumble again on unfunded paper money or any similar species of<br />

fraud, we shall assuredly give a fatal stab to our national credit in its<br />

infancy.<br />

This, then, was the monetary blueprint laid down by the men<br />

who drafted our Constitution. In retrospect, about the only flaw<br />

one can find was the attempt to set a fixed ratio between the value<br />

of gold and silver. Rather than placing a dollar value on a gold coin,<br />

the mint should have imprinted the gold value in terms of weight<br />

and fineness. The free market then would have assigned it an<br />

exchange value in terms of goods and services, and that automatically<br />

would have determined its correct monetary value as a ratio to<br />

the silver dollars which were bidding for the purchase of the same<br />

items. It was inevitable, therefore, that soon after the "ten-dollar"<br />

Eagle was created, the value of gold over silver began to climb<br />

higher than the prescribed<br />

ratio of fifteen-to-one, and the Eagles<br />

ceased to circulate. In later years, with the discovery of the great<br />

gold fields in California and Australia, the process reversed itself,<br />

and silver dollars disappeared from commerce. But, even though<br />

this bimetallism led to a discrepancy between the actual conversion<br />

ratio and that which the government had prescribed, nevertheless,<br />

it took place in the open market and no one was greatly injured by<br />

the inconvenience. Throughout it all, there was just one standard:<br />

1- These letters were written in 1790 and 1791, quoted by Atwood, pp. 5-6.<br />

2 -<br />

Written in 1 789, quoted by Louis Basso, A Treatise on Monetary Reform (St. Louis,<br />

Missouri: Monetary Realist Society, 1982), p. 5.


324 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

the defined silver content of a dollar. Furthermore, both the silver<br />

and gold coins were of intrinsic value and totally honest in their<br />

measure. No nation could do more for the prosperity of its citizens<br />

than that.<br />

SUMMARY<br />

The Constitution prohibits both the states and the federal<br />

government from issuing fiat money. This was the deliberate intent<br />

of the Founding Fathers who had bitter experience with fiat money<br />

before and especially during the Revolutionary War. In response to<br />

the need to have a precisely defined national monetary unit,<br />

Congress adopted the Spanish dollar then currently in use and<br />

defined the content of that dollar to be 371.25 grains of pure silver.<br />

With the establishment of a federal mint, American silver dollars<br />

were issued in accordance with that standard, and gold Eagles also<br />

were produced which were then equal in value to ten silver dollars.<br />

Most importantly, free coinage was established wherein Americans<br />

were able to convert their raw silver and gold into national coins<br />

officially certified by the government as to their intrinsic value. The<br />

product of these measures was a period of sound money and great<br />

economic prosperity, a period that would come to an end only<br />

when the next generation of Americans forgot to read their history<br />

and returned to the use of paper money and "bills of credit."<br />

The monetary plan laid down by the Founding Fathers was the<br />

product of collective genius. Nowhere in history can one find so<br />

many men in one legislative body who understood the fraud<br />

inherent in fiat money and the hidden-taxation nature of inflation.<br />

There was never such an assembly of scholars and statesmen<br />

determined to set a safe course for the nation of their own creation.<br />

Literally, they handed us a treasure map. All we had to do was<br />

follow it to economic security and national prosperity. But, as we<br />

shall see in the following sections, that map was discarded when<br />

the lessons of history died out with tiV/se who had lived it.<br />

Chapter Sixteen<br />

THE CREATURE<br />

COMES TO AMERICA<br />

The story of the Bank of North America, the<br />

nation's first central bank, which wasformed even<br />

before the Constitution was drafted; the story of<br />

the First Bank of the United States, the nation's<br />

second central bank, which was formed in 1791;<br />

the massive inflation caused by both banks; the<br />

causes of their demise.<br />

It is a surprising fact that the United States had its first central<br />

bank even before the Constitution was drafted. It was chartered by<br />

the Continental Congress in the Spring of 1781 and opened its<br />

doors the following year. There were great expectations at that time<br />

that the province of Canada would soon join the rebel colonies to<br />

form a union extending across the entire North American continent.<br />

In anticipation of that, the new financial institution was called<br />

the Bank of North America.<br />

The Bank was organized by Robert Morris, a member of<br />

Congress, who was a leader of a group of politicians and merchants<br />

who wanted the new nation to imitate the mercantilism of England.<br />

They wanted high taxes to support a powerful, centralized government,<br />

high tariffs to subsidize domestic industry, a large army and<br />

navy, and the acquisition of colonial outposts to expand into<br />

foreign lands and markets. He was a wealthy Philadelphia mer-<br />

chant who had profited greatly from war contracts during the<br />

Revolution. He had carefully studied the secret science of money<br />

Land, by 1781, was widely considered to be the financial wizard of<br />

Congress.<br />

The Bank of North America was modeled closely after the Bank<br />

°f England. Following the practice of fractional reserve, it was<br />

allowed to issue paper promissory notes in excess of actual<br />

deposits, but, since some gold and silver had to be held in the vault,


326 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND THE CREATURE COMES TO AMERICA 327<br />

there were definite limits to how far that process could go. Bank<br />

notes were not forced on the people as legal tender for all<br />

debts,<br />

public and private, but the government did agree to accept them at<br />

theirface value in payment of all taxes and duties, which made them<br />

as good as gold for that specific purpose. Furthermore, unlike the<br />

central banks of today, the Bank of North America was not given<br />

the power to directly issue the nation's money.<br />

FUNCTIONED AS A CENTRAL BANK<br />

On the other hand, the Bank was given the right of monopoly in<br />

its<br />

field, which means there were no other bank notes allowed to<br />

circulate in competition. This, plus the fact that they were accepted<br />

at face value in payment of all federal and state taxes, plus the<br />

further fact that the federal government did not at that time have a<br />

functioning money of its own, made these bank notes attractive for<br />

use as a circulating medium of exchange. The intended result was<br />

that the Bank's paper would be accepted as money, which for a<br />

while, it was. Furthermore, the Bank was made the official depository<br />

for all federal funds and it almost immediately loaned<br />

$1.2 million to the government, much of which was created out of<br />

nothing for that purpose. So, in spite of the limitations placed upon<br />

the Bank, and in spite of the fact that it was essentially a private<br />

institution, it was intended to be and, in fact, did function as a<br />

central bank.<br />

The Bank of North America was fraudulent from the very start.<br />

The charter required that private investors provide $400,000 for the<br />

initial subscription. When Morris was unable to raise that money,<br />

he used his political influence to make up the shortfall out of<br />

government funds. In a maneuver that was nothing less than<br />

legalized embezzlement, he took the gold that had been loaned to<br />

the United States from France and had it<br />

deposited in the Bank.<br />

Then, using this as a fractional-reserve base, he simply created the<br />

money that was needed for the subscription and loaned it to<br />

himself and his associates. Such is the power of the secret science.<br />

It is hard to reconcile the fact that the same men who adopted<br />

the brilliant monetary restraints of the Constitution a few years<br />

later would have allowed the Bank of North America to exist. It<br />

must be remembered, however, that the war was still in progress<br />

1 . See Murray N- Rothbard, Conceived in Liberty: The Revolutionary War, 1 775-1 784<br />

(New Rochelle, New York: Arlington House, 1979), Vol. IV, p. 392.<br />

the charter was issued, and even the wisest of statesmen are<br />

often obliged to follow expediency in such times. One also must<br />

conclude that, while the founding fathers were wise on the nature<br />

Ivtfhen<br />

of<br />

not yet had extensive experience with the same mechanism hidden<br />

behind the obscurities of fractional-reserve banking.<br />

In any event, the Bank was not to have its charter renewed by<br />

Congress and it did not survive beyond the end of the war. Murray<br />

Rothbard details its demise:<br />

fiat money created by the government's printing press, they had<br />

Despite the monopoly privileges conferred upon the Bank of<br />

North America and its nominal redeemability in specie, the market's<br />

lack of confidence in the inflated notes led to their depreciation outside<br />

the Bank's home base in Philadelphia. The Bank even tried to bolster<br />

the value of its notes by hiring people to urge redeemers of its notes<br />

not to insist on specie—a move scarcely calculated to improve the<br />

long-run confidence in the Bank.<br />

After a year of operation, Morris's political power slipped, and he<br />

moved quickly to shift the Bank of North America from a central bank<br />

to a purely commercial bank chartered by the state of Pennsylvania. By<br />

the end of 1783,... the first experiment with a central bank in the United<br />

States had ended.<br />

A fitting epilogue to this story was written two hundred years<br />

later when, in 1980, the First Pennsylvania Bank of Philadelphia,<br />

the "oldest bank in the nation/ 7 was bailed out by the FDIC<br />

AN END RUN AROUND THE CONSTITUTION<br />

It will be recalled that, after the Bank of North America was<br />

tenninated and after the Constitutional Convention "closed the<br />

door on paper money/' the United States enjoyed a period of<br />

unparalleled economic growth and prosperity. But, while the door<br />

may have been closed, the window was still open. Congress was<br />

denied the power to print money, but it was not denied the power<br />

to borrow it.<br />

In the vocabulary of the common man, to borrow is to accept a<br />

loan of something that already exists. He is confused, therefore,<br />

when the banker issues money out of nothing and then says he is<br />

lending it. He appears to be lending but, in reality, he is creating.<br />

Then, as now, the mysteries of banking vocabulary were not<br />

revealed to the average man, and it was difficult to understand<br />

1- Rothbard, Mystery, pp. 194-95.


328 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

how privately-issued bank notes could serve precisely the same<br />

purpose as printing-press money—with precisely the same disastrous<br />

results. That being the case, the monetary and political<br />

scientists decided to end run the Constitution. Their plan was to<br />

establish a bank, to give that bank the power to create money, to<br />

lend most of that money to the government, and then to make sure<br />

the IOUs are accepted as money by the public. Congress, therefore,<br />

would not be emitting bills of credit. The bank would do that.<br />

Thus, the First Bank of the United States was conceived.<br />

The proposal was submitted to Congress in 1790 by Alexander<br />

Hamilton who, at that time, was Secretary of the Treasury.<br />

Hamilton, incidentally, was a former aide to Robert Morris, founder<br />

of the Bank of North America, so in that sense his role in this<br />

matter is not surprising. What is surprising is the fact that Hamilton<br />

had been a staunch supporter of a sound currency during the<br />

Constitutional Convention. This is hard to reconcile, and one must<br />

suspect that, even the most well intentioned of men can become<br />

corrupted by the temptations of wealth and power. It is possible<br />

that Hamilton, Morris, and other Federalist leaders had hoped to<br />

keep the government out of the money-making business, not<br />

because it was the constitutional thing to do, but because that<br />

would leave the field clear for a central-bank mechanism which,<br />

because it was further from public view and political control, could<br />

become their own private engine of profit. It would appear that the<br />

only other explanation is that these men were fickle in their views<br />

and did not really understand the implications of their acts. In view<br />

of their brilliance in all other matters, however, it is difficult to<br />

muster enthusiasm for that interpretation.<br />

THE HAMILTON-JEFFERSON CONFLICT<br />

Hamilton's proposal was strongly opposed by Thomas<br />

Jefferson, then Secretary of State, and this was the beginning of a<br />

heated political debate that would preoccupy Congress for many<br />

decades to come. In fact, it was one of the central issues that led to<br />

the creation of our first political parties. The Federalists gathered<br />

around the ideas of Hamilton. The anti-Federalists, later called the<br />

Republicans, were attracted to the ideas of Jefferson. 1<br />

1. Curiously, the present Democratic Party traces its origin to Jefferson's Republi-<br />

THE CREATURE COMES TO AMERICA 329<br />

Jefferson pointed out that the Constitution did not grant to<br />

Congress the power to create a bank or anything similar. That<br />

means such power is reserved to the states or to the people. In a<br />

rebuttal to Hamilton's proposal, he said: "To take a single step<br />

beyond the boundaries thus specially drawn around the powers of<br />

Congress, is to take possession of a boundless field of power, no<br />

Furthermore, he said, even if<br />

longer susceptible of any definition."<br />

the Constitution had granted such power, it would be an extremely<br />

unwise thing to do, because allowing banks to create money could<br />

only lead to national ruin.<br />

Hamilton, on the other hand, argued that debt was a good<br />

thing, if kept within reason, and that the nation needed more<br />

money in circulation to keep up with expanding commerce. Only<br />

the Bank, he said, would be able to provide that. Furthermore,<br />

while it is true the Constitution did not specifically grant the power<br />

to create such a bank, it was, nevertheless, an implied power,<br />

because it was needed to accomplish other functions which were<br />

granted in the Constitution.<br />

That was the end run.<br />

Nothing could be more polarized than the opposing ideas of<br />

these two men:<br />

JEFFERSON: "A private central bank issuing the public currency is a<br />

greater menace to the liberties of the people than a standing army."<br />

"We must not let our rulers load us with perpetual debt"<br />

HAMILTON: "No society could succeed which did not unite the<br />

interest and credit of rich individuals with those of the state." "A<br />

national debt, if it is not excessive, will be to us a national blessing."<br />

AMERICA'S SECOND CENTRAL BANK IS CREATED<br />

After a year of intense debate, Hamilton's views prevailed and,<br />

in 1791, Congress granted a twenty-year charter to the Bank of the<br />

:<br />

I- "Opinion of Thomas Jefferson, Secretary of State/' February 15, 1791, quoted by<br />

Krooss, pp. 147-48.<br />

2. The comparison between private banks and standing armies can be found in<br />

many of Jefferson's letters and public utterances. For example, see The Writings of<br />

Thomas Jefferson (New York: G.P. Putnam & Sons, 1899), Vol. X, p. 31.<br />

©. The Basic Writings of Thomas Jefferson (Willey Book Company, 1944), p. 749.<br />

|k Quoted by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Jackson (New York: Mentor<br />

Books, 1945), pp. 6-7.<br />

5. Written on April 30, 1781, to his mentor, Robert Morris. Quoted by John H.<br />

Makin, The Global Debt Crisis: America's Growing Involvement (New York: Basic<br />

Books, 1984), p. 246.


330 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

United States. It was modelled closely after the Bank of England,<br />

which means it was almost an exact replica of the previous Bank of<br />

North America. In fact, as evidence of continuity with the past, the<br />

president of the new bank was Thomas Willing, the same man who<br />

had been a partner of Robert Morris and president of the old bank.<br />

As before, the new Bank was given a monopoly in the issuance<br />

of bank notes. Once again, these notes were not forced on the<br />

people as legal tender for private debts and contracts, but they were<br />

legal tender at face value for all debts to the government in the form<br />

of taxes and duties, which made them attractive for use as common<br />

money. And once again, the Bank was made the official depository<br />

of all federal funds.<br />

The charter specified that the Bank was required at all times to<br />

redeem its notes in gold or silver specie upon demand by the<br />

depositor. That was an admirable provision but, since the Bank was<br />

not also required to keep specie in its vaults in the full amount of its<br />

note obligations, it was a mathematical impossibility to uphold.<br />

As with the old Bank of North America, the new Bank of the<br />

United States was to have eighty per cent of its capital provided by<br />

private investors with the federal government putting up only<br />

twenty per cent. That was a mere bookkeeping sleight-of-hand,<br />

however, because it had been prearranged for the Bank to immediately<br />

loan back to the federal government exactly that same<br />

amount. Reminiscent of the Morris scheme in capitalizing the Bank<br />

of North America, this federal ''investment" was essentially a<br />

means whereby federal funds could be used to make up the<br />

short-fall of the private investors. "Call it by what name you<br />

please/' said Jefferson, this was not a loan or an investment but an<br />

outright gift. And he was certainly right. The Bank was able to open<br />

its doors with less than nine per cent of the private capital required<br />

by its charter. The total capitalization was specified at $10 million,<br />

which means that $8 million was to come from private stockholders.<br />

However, as John Kenneth Galbraith wryly observed: "Numerous<br />

thrifty participants confined themselves to a modest down<br />

payment, and the bank began operations on around $675,000 in<br />

hard cash/' 2<br />

1 It is interesting to note that, as a member of the Continental Congress, Willing<br />

had been one of those who voted against the Declaration of Independence-<br />

2. Galbraith, p. 72<br />

THE CREATURE COMES TO AMERICA 331<br />

THE CREATURE COMES FROM EUROPE<br />

Who were these private investors? Their names do not appear<br />

in the published literature, but we can be certain they included the<br />

Congressmen and Senators—and their associates—who engineered<br />

the charter. But there is an interesting line in Galbraith's <strong>text</strong> that<br />

hints at another dimension to the composition of this group. On<br />

page 72 of Money: Whence It Came, Where It Went, he states<br />

matter-of-factly: "Foreigners could own shares but not vote them/ 7<br />

What a story is hidden behind that innocuous statement. The<br />

blunt reality is that the Rothschild banking dynasty in Europe was<br />

Ithe dominant force, both financially and politically, in the formation<br />

of the Bank of the United States.<br />

explains:<br />

Biographer, Derek Wilson,<br />

Over the years since NJM [Rothschild], the Manchester <strong>text</strong>ile<br />

manufacturer, had bought cotton from the Southern states,<br />

Rothschilds had developed heavy American commitments. Nathan . .<br />

had made loans to various states of the Union, had been, for a time, the<br />

official European banker for the US government and was a pledged<br />

supporter of the Bank of the United States.<br />

Gustavus Myers, in his History of the Great American Fortunes, is<br />

more pointed. He says:<br />

Under the surface, the Rothschilds long had a powerful influence<br />

in dictating American financial laws. The law records show that they<br />

were the power in the old Bank of the United States.<br />

The Rothschilds, therefore, were not merely investors nor just<br />

an important power. They were the power behind the Bank of the<br />

United States! The significance of the Rothschild power in American<br />

finance and politics was the subject of extensive comment in a<br />

previous section, so there is no need to cover that ground again. It<br />

is important here, however, to at least make a mental note of the<br />

fact that the Creature from <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island is descended from a species<br />

that is not native to this land.<br />

INFLATION ALL OVER AGAIN<br />

iFrom<br />

the beginning, the primary purpose of the Bank was to<br />

create money for the federal government. Money for the private<br />

1. Derek Wilson, p. 178.<br />

2. Gustavus Myers, History of the Great American Fortunes (New York: Random<br />

House, 1936), p. 556.


332 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

sector was strictly secondary. That was made clear by the fact that<br />

the maximum rate of interest it was allowed to charge was six per<br />

cent That made it impractical to make loans to anyone except the<br />

federal government and a few large, prime-rate borrowers. And the<br />

government wasted no time putting its new central-bank mechanism<br />

to work. Having "invested" $2 million at the start, it converted<br />

that into $8.2 million borrowed within the next five years.<br />

Which means that $6.2 million was created specifically for its use.<br />

Anyone familiar with the history of money as outlined in the<br />

previous section could easily write the following paragraph.<br />

The creation of millions of new fractional-reserve dollars,<br />

which the government pushed into the economy through spending<br />

programs, caused an imbalance between the supply of money and<br />

the supply of goods and services. Prices appeared to go up as the<br />

relative value of the dollar went down. In that same five-year<br />

period, wholesale prices rose by 72%, which is<br />

another way of<br />

saying that 42% of everything people had saved in the form of<br />

money was quietly confiscated by the government through the<br />

hidden tax called inflation.<br />

The same inflation effect that previously had plagued the<br />

colonies now returned to plague the new generation. This time,<br />

instead of being caused by printing-press money, it was fractionalreserve<br />

money. The cog that linked the two mechanisms together<br />

and caused them to function as one was federal debt. It was federal<br />

debt that allowed the political and monetary scientists to violate the<br />

intent of the founding fathers, and it was this same federal debt that<br />

prompted Jefferson to exclaim:<br />

I wish it were possible to obtain a single amendment to our<br />

Constitution. I would be willing to depend on that alone for the<br />

reduction of the administration of our government to the general<br />

principle of the Constitution; I mean an additional article, taking from<br />

the federal government their power of borrowing.<br />

Like so many things in the real world, the Bank of the United<br />

States was a mixture of evil with some good. It certainly was not all<br />

bad. In colonial times, the state governments printed as much<br />

paper money as they pleased, and the loss of purchasing power<br />

was, in many cases, total. The Bank, on the other hand, was<br />

1. Letter to John Taylor, November 26, 1789. Quoted by Martin A. Larson, The<br />

Continuing Tax Rebellion (Old Greenwich, Connecticut: Devin-Adair, 1979), p. xii.<br />

THE CREATURE COMES TO AMERICA 333<br />

required to maintain some gold and specie as a base for its pyramid<br />

of money. Even though it was an inverted pyramid with reserves<br />

being smaller than the quantity of bank notes, it still represented a<br />

boundary to just how far the money supply could be expanded.<br />

And that was good.<br />

Furthermore, it is apparent that the bank's directors were<br />

imbued with a certain amount of enlightened self interest in that<br />

they actually wanted to keep the creation of new money within<br />

some kind of control. They could profit from the central-bank<br />

mechanism only so long as the economy as a whole was productive<br />

enough to support it. They did not want to kill the goose that laid<br />

the golden egg. So, like their counterparts in the Federal Reserve<br />

System of our modern day, they spoke the language of restraint<br />

and, in a few instances, even acted with restraint as well.<br />

WILDCAT BANKS<br />

For example, it<br />

was during this period that "wildcat banks''<br />

began to flourish. They were given that name not because they<br />

were untamed—although that would have been another good<br />

reason to do so—but because they were located in areas so remote<br />

in the frontier that it was said their only customers were wildcats.<br />

Wildcat banks were not noted for meticulous accounting or<br />

business practices. Like all banks at that time, they were required to<br />

keep a certain portion of their deposits on hand in the form of gold<br />

or silver coin. To engender public confidence in their faithfulness to<br />

that obligation, it was common practice to keep the vault door open<br />

so a keg or two of gold coins could be viewed during business<br />

hours—not altogether different from the modern practice of financial<br />

institutions advertising how many billions in assets they hold<br />

but never mentioning the size of their liabilities. The wildcatters,<br />

however, were not reluctant to sprinkle a few precious-metal coins<br />

over the top of nails and let that take care of public relations. In<br />

some cases, as state examiners went from bank to bank to check the<br />

reserves, the gold would arrive only a few minutes ahead of them,<br />

having been rushed from the vault of the bank previously audited.<br />

The point is that the Bank of the United States was able to place<br />

considerable restraint upon the practices of all banks, both wildcat<br />

and urban. It did this simply by refusing to accept the notes of any<br />

other bank unless it had a reputation for redeeming those notes in<br />

,<br />

specie on demand. The public reacted accordingly. If<br />

the notes


334 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

were not good enough for the Bank of the United States, they were<br />

not good enough for them either. This served as an indirect force of<br />

moderation that affected all banks of that time. And that too, was<br />

good.<br />

Some historians have said that the Bank was a positive force in<br />

yet another way. Galbraith, for example, writes admiringly:<br />

On occasion, the Bank of the United States came to the assistance<br />

of good state banks that were being besieged by their note holders or<br />

other creditors. So, besides enforcing restraint, it served also as the<br />

lender of last resort. Thus in its short span of life it went far to perceive<br />

and develop the basic regulatory functions of a central bank.<br />

One who is less enamored with the idea of a central bank<br />

would be tempted to ask: If those state banks were so "good/' why<br />

did they need assistance in keeping faith with their depositors? The<br />

whole idea of a "lender of last resort/ 7<br />

which is accepted as sacred<br />

dogma today, is based on the assumption that it is perfectly<br />

acceptable for the entire banking system to be fraudulent. It is<br />

assumed that any single bank or cluster of banks could at any time<br />

become "besieged by their note holders or other creditors." Therefore,<br />

it is prudent to have a central bank to take what meager<br />

reserves there are within the system and rush them from bank to<br />

bank, if not minutes before the examiner arrives, at least before the<br />

customers do.<br />

As for the much talked about restraint exercised over other<br />

is not unreasonable to think that this same effect would<br />

banks, it<br />

have developed even without the presence of a government bank.<br />

If the free market had been left to operate, it is certain that, before<br />

long, one or more banks would gain a deserved reputation for<br />

honesty and full faith with their depositors. They would become<br />

the most popular banks and, therefore,<br />

order to accomplish this,<br />

the most prosperous. In<br />

however, they would have to reject the<br />

worthless notes of other banks. The public would react as expected,<br />

and even the most unscrupulous banks would have to toe the line if<br />

they wanted to survive. Moderation would be forced on the entire<br />

banking system as a result of open competition within a free<br />

market. To assume that only a federally-chartered central bank<br />

could have brought moderation into the monetary system is<br />

1. Galbraith, p. 73.<br />

to<br />

)THE CREATURE COMES TO AMERICA 335<br />

believe that only politicians, bureaucrats, and agencies of government<br />

can act with integrity, a shaky notion at best.<br />

AN INSTRUMENT OF PLUTOCRACY<br />

In any event, there is no denying the fact that the Bank of the<br />

United States did provide some braking force to the runaway<br />

tendencies of many of the nation's private banks. So it could have<br />

been worse. The inflation that it caused by its own activities could<br />

have been enlarged even further by the activities of the other banks<br />

as well. But, that it could have been worse does not make it good.<br />

As it was, the Bank was the means by which the American people<br />

lost forty-two per cent of the value of all the money they earned or<br />

possessed during just those five years. We must not forget, either,<br />

that this confiscation of property was selective. It did not work<br />

against the wealthy classes which were able to ride the wave of<br />

inflation aboard the raft of tangible property which they owned.<br />

And it especially did not work against those elite few, the political<br />

and monetary scientists, who were making huge profits from the<br />

enterprise. The Bank had done precisely what Hamilton had<br />

advocated: "... unite the interest and credit of rich individuals with<br />

those of the state."<br />

The development of this plutocracy was well described by<br />

Governeur Morris, the former delegate from New York who had<br />

helped to draft the Constitution into its final form. He had been an<br />

assistant to Robert Morris (not related) and was a champion of the<br />

concept of a natural aristocracy. So he knew his subject well when<br />

he warned:<br />

The rich will strive to establish their dominion and enslave the<br />

rest. They always did. They always will.... They will have the same<br />

effect here as elsewhere, if we do not, by such a government, keep<br />

them within their proper spheres. We should remember that the<br />

people never act from reason alone. The rich will take advantage of<br />

their passions, and make these the instruments for oppressing them.<br />

The result of the contest will be a violent aristocracy, or a more violent<br />

despotism.<br />

The tide of political pressure against the Bank was steadily<br />

rising during these years. It is tempting for critics of the centralbank<br />

mechanism to attribute that to the awakening common sense<br />

1. Written on July 2, 1787, in a letter to James Madison. Quoted in "Prosperity<br />

Economics/' by W. Cleon Skousen, Freeman Digest, February, 1985, p. 9.


336 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

THE CREATURE COMES TO AMERICA 337<br />

of the American public. Unfortunately, the picture is not that<br />

pleasing. It is true that the Jeffersonian Republicans were eloquently<br />

holding forth against the Creature's progenitor, and their<br />

influence was substantial. But there was another group that joined<br />

with them which had almost exactly opposite ideas and goals. The<br />

Jeffersonians opposed the Bank because they believed it was<br />

unconstitutional and because they wanted a monetary system<br />

based only upon gold and silver coin. The other group was made<br />

up of the wildcatters, the land speculators, and the empire-building<br />

industrialists. They opposed the Bank because they wanted a<br />

monetary system with no restraints at all, not even those associated<br />

with fractional reserve. They wanted every local bank to be free to<br />

create as much paper money as the public would swallow^ because<br />

they would then use that money for their own projects and profit.<br />

Indeed, politics does produce strange bedfellows.<br />

As the time approached for renewal of the Bank's charter, the<br />

battle lines inched toward each other. They were of equal force. The<br />

halls of Congress echoed with the cannon roar of angry debate. The<br />

vote was deadlocked. Another attack and counter attack. Again a<br />

deadlock. Into the night the forces clashed.<br />

When the smoke of battle lifted, the bill for charter renewal had<br />

been defeated by one vote in the House and one vote, cast by<br />

Vice-President George Clinton to break the tie, in the Senate. And<br />

so, on January 24, 1811, the Bank of the United States closed its<br />

doors.<br />

The battle may have been decided, but the war was far from<br />

over. The losers, bitter with defeat, merely regrouped their forces<br />

and began to prepare for the next encounter. Unfortunately, the<br />

events that followed were ideally suited for their plans.<br />

With the moderating effect of the Bank now removed from the<br />

scene, the nation's banking system passed wholly into the hands of<br />

the state-chartered corporations, many of which were imbued with<br />

the wildcat mentality. Their numbers grew rapidly, and so did the<br />

money supply which they created. Inflation followed in their<br />

footsteps. Public dissatisfaction began to rise.<br />

If the free market had been allowed to operate, it is likely that<br />

competition soon would have weeded out the wildcatters and<br />

restored balance to the system, but it was never given a chance. The<br />

War of 1812 saw to that<br />

ITHE WAR OF 1812<br />

The War of 1812 was one of the most senseless wars in history.<br />

The primary cause, we are told, was the British impressment into<br />

their navy of American sailors on the high seas to assist in the war<br />

against Napoleonic France. But the French had done exactly the<br />

same thing to assist in the war against England, yet their acts were<br />

ignored. Furthermore, the British had already rescinded their<br />

policy regarding American seamen before the war was underway,<br />

which means that the cause of the war had been removed, and<br />

peace could have been restored in honor if Congress had so<br />

wanted. One must conclude that the pro-banking interests in the<br />

United States actually wanted the conflict because of the profits that<br />

could be realized from it. As evidence of this is the fact that the<br />

New England states, which were home to the seamen who had<br />

been impressed into service, were firmly against the war, while the<br />

Western and inland Southern states, which were home to the<br />

myriad of wildcat banks, howled loudly for a clash of arms.<br />

In any event, the war was unpopular with the average citizen,<br />

and it was out of the question for Congress to obtain funding for<br />

armaments through an increase in taxes. So the government needed<br />

the state banks to create that money outside the tax structure and<br />

came to their rescue to protect them from the discipline of the free<br />

market. It was a classic case of the unholy alliance, the cabal, that<br />

always develops between political and monetary scientists. Professor<br />

Rothbard gives the details:<br />

The U.S. government encouraged an enormous expansion in the<br />

number of banks and in bank notes and deposits to purchase the<br />

growing war debt. These new and recklessly inflationary banks in the<br />

Middle Atlantic, Southern, and Western states, printed enormous<br />

quantities of new notes to purchase government bonds. The federal<br />

government then used these notes to purchase arms and<br />

manufactured goods in New England...<br />

By August 1814, it became clear that the banks of the nation apart<br />

from New England could not pay [in specie], that they were insolvent.<br />

Rather than allow the banks of the nation to fail, the governments,<br />

state and federal, decided in August 1814 to allow the banks to<br />

continue in business while refusing to redeem their obligations in<br />

specie. In other words, the banks were allowed to refuse to pay their<br />

solemn contractual obligations....<br />

This general suspension was not only highly inflationary at the<br />

time; it set a precedent for all financial crises from then on. Whether


338 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

the U.S. had a central bank or not, the banks were assured that if they<br />

inflated together and then got in trouble, government would bail them<br />

out 1<br />

The state banks had created enough instant money for the<br />

federal government to raise the debt from $45 million to $127<br />

million, a staggering sum for the fledgling nation. Tripling the<br />

money supply, with no appreciable increase in goods, means the<br />

value of the dollar shrank to about one-third its former purchasing<br />

power. By 1814, when the depositors began to awake to the scam<br />

and demanded their gold instead of paper, the banks closed their<br />

doors and had to hire extra guards to protect officials and employees<br />

from the angry crowds. Once again, the monetary and political<br />

scientists had succeeded in fleecing the American public of<br />

approximately 66% of all the money they held during that period,<br />

and that was on top of the 42% fleecing they got a few years earlier<br />

by the Bank of the United States.<br />

JUGGLING TRICKS AND BANKING DREAMS<br />

Leaning against the storm of paper money all<br />

this time was<br />

Thomas Jefferson, by now, past-President of the United States.<br />

Trying to bring the nation to its senses, he never ceased speaking<br />

out against the evil of dishonest money and debt:<br />

Although all the nations of Europe have tried and trodden every<br />

path of force and folly in a fruitless quest of the same object, yet we still<br />

expect to find in juggling tricks and banking dreams, that money can<br />

be made out of nothing, and in sufficient quantity to meet the expense<br />

of heavy war. ...<br />

The toleration of banks of paper discount costs the United States<br />

one-half of their war taxes; or, in other words, doubles the expenses of<br />

every war. ...<br />

The crisis, then, of the abuses of banking is arrived. The banks<br />

have pronounced their own sentence of death. Between two and three<br />

hundred millions of dollars of their promissory notes are in the hands<br />

of the people, for solid produce and property sold, and they [the<br />

banks] formally declare that they will not pay them.... Paper was<br />

received on a belief that it was cash [gold], and such scenes are now to<br />

take place as will open the eyes of credulity and of insanity itself to the<br />

1. Rothbard, Mystery, pp. 198-99.<br />

2. Writings, Library Edition, Vol. XIV, p. 227.<br />

3. Writings, Library Edition, Vol. XIII, p. 364.<br />

THE CREATURE COMES TO AMERICA 339<br />

dangers of a paper medium abandoned to the discretion of avarice and<br />

of swindlers. ...<br />

It is a wise rule never to borrow a dollar without laying a tax at the<br />

same instant for paying the interest annually and the principal within<br />

a given term. 2 ... We shall consider ourselves unauthorized to saddle<br />

posterity with our debts, and morally bound to pay them ourselves.<br />

... The earth belongs to the living, not the dead.... We may consider<br />

each generation as a distinct nation with a right to . . .<br />

bind themselves,<br />

but not the succeeding generation. ...<br />

The modern theory of the perpetuation of debt has drenched the<br />

earth with blood, and crushed its inhabitants under burdens ever<br />

accumulating.<br />

And still, Congress did not listen.<br />

SUMMARY<br />

America had its first central bank even before the Constitution<br />

was drafted. It was called the Bank of North America and was<br />

chartered by the Continental Congress in 1781. Modeled after the<br />

Bank of England, it was authorized to issue more paper promissory<br />

notes than it held in deposits. In the beginning, these notes were<br />

widely circulated and served as a national currency. Although the<br />

bank was essentially a private institution, it was designed for the<br />

purpose of creating money to lend to the federal government,<br />

which it did from the start.<br />

The Bank of North America was riddled with fraud, and it<br />

quickly fell into political disfavor. Its inflated bank notes eventually<br />

were rejected by ordinary citizens and ceased to circulate outside of<br />

the Bank's home city of Philadelphia. Its charter was allowed to<br />

expire and, in 1783, it was converted into a purely commercial bank<br />

chartered by the state of Pennsylvania.<br />

The advocates of fiat money did not give up. In 1791, the First<br />

Bank of the United States (America's second central bank) was<br />

created by Congress. The new bank was a replica of the first,<br />

including fraud. Private investors in the Bank were among the<br />

nation's most wealthy and influential citizens, including some<br />

Congressmen and Senators. But the largest investment and the<br />

I<br />

Letter to Dr. Thomas Cooper, Sept. 10, 1814, Writings, Library Edition, Vol. XIV,<br />

pp. 187-89.<br />

2. Writings, Library Edition, Vol. XIII, p. 269.<br />

3. Ibid, p. 358.<br />

4. Ibid., p. 270.<br />

5. Ibid., p. 272.


340 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

most powerful influence in the new Bank came from the<br />

Rothschilds in Europe.<br />

The Bank set about immediately to serve its function of creating<br />

money for the government. This led to a massive inflation of the<br />

money supply and rising prices. In the first five years, 42% of<br />

everything people had saved in the form of money was confiscated<br />

through the hidden tax called inflation. This was the same phenomenon<br />

that had plagued the colonies less than two decades<br />

earlier, but instead of being caused by printing-press money, it was<br />

now fueled by fractional-reserve bank notes created by a central<br />

bank.<br />

As the time for renewal of the Bank's charter approached, two<br />

groups with opposite intentions became strange political allies<br />

against it:<br />

the Jeffersonians who wanted sound money; and the<br />

frontier banks, called wildcatters, who wanted unlimited license to<br />

steal. On January 24, 1811, the charter was defeated by one vote in<br />

the Senate and one in the House. The central bank was gone, but<br />

the wildcatters were everywhere.<br />

The War of 1812 was not popular among the American public,<br />

and funding would have been impossible through taxes alone. The<br />

government chose to fund the war by encouraging wildcat banks to<br />

purchase its war-debt bonds and convert them into bank notes<br />

which the government then used to purchase war material. Within<br />

two years, the nation's money supply had tripled, and so had<br />

prices. Once again, the monetary and political scientists had<br />

succeeded in fleecing the American public of approximately 66% of<br />

all the money they held during that period. And that was on top of<br />

the 42% fleecing they got a few years earlier by the Bank of the<br />

United States.<br />

Chapter Seventeen<br />

A DEN OF VIPERS<br />

The story of the Second Bank of the United States,<br />

the nation's third central bank; the election of<br />

Andrew Jackson on an anti-bank -platform; the<br />

battle between President Jackson and the head of<br />

the bank, Nicholas Biddle; the deliberate creation<br />

of a depression to frighten the public into keeping<br />

the bank; Jackson's ultimate victory.<br />

The monetary chaos that existed at the end of the War of 1812,<br />

outlined in the previous chapter, was caused by an almost universal<br />

fraud within the banking industry. Depositors in good faith<br />

placed their gold and silver into banks for safekeeping and for the<br />

convenience of using paper money in their everyday transactions.<br />

The banks, in turn, promised them they could exchange the paper<br />

for their coins whenever they wished. At the same time, however,<br />

through the mechanism of fractional-reserve banking, paper<br />

money was created far in excess of the value of the coins held in<br />

reserve. Since the new money had just as much claim to the coins as<br />

the old, the bankers knew that, if a sizable percentage of their<br />

customers were to request a withdrawal of their coins, that solemn<br />

promise simply could not be kept. This, in fact, is precisely what<br />

happened over and over again during that period.<br />

By 1814, Thomas Jefferson had retired to Monticello and had<br />

bitterly resigned himself to defeat on the issue of money. In a letter<br />

to John Adams he said:<br />

I have ever been the enemy of banks; not of those discounting for<br />

cash [that is, charging interest on loans of real money], but of those<br />

foisting their own paper into circulation, and thus banishing our cash.<br />

My zeal against those institutions was so warm and open at the<br />

establishment of the bank of the U.S. that I was derided as a Maniac by<br />

the tribe of bank-mongers, who were seeking to filch from the public<br />

their swindling and barren gains.... Shall we build an altar to the old<br />

paper money of the revolution, which ruined individuals but saved<br />

the republic, and burn on that all the bank charters present and future,


342 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND A DEN OF VIPERS 343<br />

and their notes with them? For these are to ruin both republic and<br />

the Second Bank of the United States was rooted as deeply in<br />

individuals. This cannot be done. The Mania is too strong. It has seized<br />

by<br />

pritain as it was in America.<br />

its delusions and corruptions all the members of our governments<br />

general, special, and The nation's third central bank ran into deep trouble from the<br />

individual. 1<br />

start. It had promised to continue the tradition of moderating the<br />

Jefferson was right. Congress had neither the wisdom nor the<br />

other banks by refusing to accept any of their notes unless they<br />

courage to let the free market clean up the mess that remained after<br />

were redeemable in specie on demand. But when the other banks<br />

the demise of the first bank of the U.S. If it had, the fraud soon<br />

returned the gesture and required that the new Bank also pay out<br />

would have become understood by the public, the dishonest banks<br />

specie on their demand, it frequently lost its resolve. There was also<br />

would have folded, the losses would have been taken, and the<br />

the tiny matter of corruption. As the Bank's major historian writes:<br />

suffering would have been ended, perhaps forever. Instead, Congress<br />

moved to protect the banks, to organize the fraud, and to<br />

stockholders that it was not advisable to give offense by demand-<br />

"So many influential people were interested [in the state banks] as<br />

perpetuate the losses. All of this was accomplished in 1816 when a<br />

ing payment in specie, and borrowers were anxious to keep the<br />

twenty-year charter was given to the Second Bank of the United<br />

banks in the humor to lend."<br />

States.<br />

In economics, every policy carries a consequence, and the<br />

THE SECOND BANK OF THE UNITED STATES<br />

consequence of the loose monetary policy of the Second Bank of the<br />

In every respect the new bank was a carbon copy of the old,<br />

United States was that America was introduced to her first experience<br />

with what now is called the "boom-bust" cycle. Galbraith tells<br />

with one minor exception. Congress unashamedly extracted from<br />

the private investors what amounted to nothing less than a bribe in<br />

us: "In 1816, the postwar boom was full on; there was especially<br />

the form of $1.5 million "in consideration of the exclusive privileges<br />

active speculation in western lands. The new Bank joyously participated.<br />

and benefits conferred by this Act." 2 The bankers were glad to pay<br />

the fee, not only because it was a modest price for such a profitable<br />

The Bank had the advantage over its competitors of a federal<br />

enterprise, but also because, as before, they received an immediate<br />

charter plus the government's agreement to accept its notes in the<br />

government deposit of one-fifth the total capitalization which then<br />

payment of taxes. But the state banks were by no means left out of<br />

was used as the base for manufacturing much of the remaining<br />

the game. It was still within their power to create money through<br />

startup capital. The charter required the Bank to raise a minimum<br />

fractional-reserve banking and, thus, to further inflate the amount<br />

of $7 million in specie, but even in its second year of operation, its<br />

of the nation's circulating currency. Anxious to get in on this action,<br />

specie never rose above $2.5 million. 3 Once again, the monetary<br />

Pennsylvania chartered thirty-seven new banks in 1817. That same<br />

and political scientists had carved out their profitable niches, and<br />

year, Kentucky followed suit with forty new charters. The total<br />

the gullible taxpayer, his head filled with sweet visions of "banking number of banks grew by 46% in just the first two years after the<br />

reform," was left to pick up the tab.<br />

central bank was created. Any spot along the road that had "a<br />

Another important continuity between the old and the new<br />

church, a tavern, or a blacksmith shop was deemed a suitable place<br />

Bank was the concentration of foreign investment. In fact, the<br />

for setting up a bank." In that same time frame, the money supply<br />

largest single block of stock in the new Bank, about one-third in all, was expanded by an additional $27.4 million; another taxpayer<br />

was held by this group. It is certainly no exaggeration to say that<br />

fleecing of over forty per cent<br />

L<br />

I u T P^ e \L^Fr ed 7 The Adams -fflerson Letters (New York: Simon and 1 Ralph C.H. Catterall, The Second Bankofthe United States (Chicago: University of<br />

Schuster, 1971), Vol. II, p. 424.<br />

Chicago Press, 1902), p. 36.<br />

2. Act of 1816, Section 20, 3 Stat, at 191.<br />

2. Galbraith, p. 77.<br />

3. Rothbard, Mystery, p. 203.<br />

3. Norman Angell, The Story<br />

4. Krooss, p. 25.<br />

ofMoney (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Co., 1929),<br />

1 279.


344 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND A DEN OF VIPERS 345<br />

THE FIRST BOOM-BUST CYCLE<br />

In the past, the effect of this inflationary process always had<br />

been the gradual evaporation of purchasing power and the continuous<br />

transfer of property from those who produced it to those<br />

who controlled the government and ran the banks. This time,<br />

however, the process took on a new twist Gradualism was<br />

replaced by catastrophism. The monetary scientists, with their<br />

hands firmly on the controls of the money machine, now began to<br />

throw the levers, first one way, and then the other. The expansion<br />

and then deliberate contraction of the money supply literally threw<br />

the nation into economic convulsions. Why wait for the apples to<br />

fall when the harvest can be hastened simply by shaking the tree?<br />

In 1818, the Bank suddenly began to tighten its<br />

requirements<br />

for new loans and to call in as many of the old loans as possible.<br />

This contraction of the money supply was justified<br />

to the public<br />

then exactly as it is justified today. It was necessary, they said, to<br />

put the brakes on inflation. The fact that this was the same inflation<br />

the Bank had helped to create in the first place, seems to have gone<br />

unnoticed.<br />

There is no doubt that many bankers and politicians act in good<br />

faith in their attempt to bring under control the inflation they<br />

themselves have caused. Not everyone who benefits from the<br />

central-bank mechanism fully understands it.<br />

Like Frankenstein,<br />

they create a monster without realizing they cannot control it. Their<br />

crime is one of stupidity, not malice. But stupidity is not a<br />

characteristic of the average banker, especially a central banker, and<br />

we must conclude that many of the monetary scientists are well<br />

aware of the monster's power for destruction. At best, they just<br />

don't care as long as they are safe. And at worst, they perceive that<br />

they are in the apple-harvesting business. They deliberately tease<br />

and prod the monster in anticipation of his rampage through the<br />

village orchards. In the final analysis, of course, it is of little<br />

importance whether the shaking of the trees is out of innocence or<br />

malice. The end result is the same. My, how the apples do fall.<br />

The country's first experience with a deliberately created monetary<br />

contraction began in 1818 when the Bank became concerned<br />

about its own ability to survive. Professor Rothbard says:<br />

Starting in July 1818, the government and the BUS [Bank of the<br />

United States] began to see what dire straits they were in; the<br />

enormous inflation of money and credit, aggravated by the massive<br />

fraud, had put the BUS in danger of going under and illegally failing<br />

to maintain specie payments. Over the next year, the BUS began a<br />

series of enormous contractions, forced curtailment of loans,<br />

contractions of credit in the south and west.... The contraction of<br />

money and credit swiftly brought to the United States its first<br />

widespread economic and financial depression. The first nationwide<br />

"boom-bust" cycle had arrived in the United States....<br />

The result of this contraction was a rash of defaults, bankruptcies<br />

of business and manufacturers, and a liquidation of unsound<br />

investments during the boom.<br />

THE CYCLE IS WORSENED BY GOVERNMENT<br />

INTERFERENCE<br />

It is widely believed that panics, boom-bust cycles, and depressions<br />

are caused by unbridled competition between banks; thus the<br />

need for government regulation. The truth is just the opposite.<br />

These disruptions in the free market are the result of government<br />

prevention of competition by the granting of monopolistic power to<br />

a central bank. In the absence of a monopoly, individual banks may<br />

operate in a fraudulent manner only to a limited extent and for a<br />

short period of time. Inevitably, they will be exposed by their more<br />

honest competitors and will be forced out of business. Yes, their<br />

depositors will be injured by the bankruptcy, but the damage will<br />

be limited to a relatively few and will occur only now and then.<br />

Even geographical regions may be hard hit on occasion, but it will<br />

not be a national tragedy with everyone brought to their knees. The<br />

overall economy will absorb the losses, and commerce at large will<br />

continue to prosper. Within an environment of prosperity, even<br />

those who have been injured by fraudulent banking would have a<br />

good chance for rapid recovery. But, when a central bank is<br />

allowed to protect the fraudulent operators and to force all banks to<br />

function the same, the forces of competition can no longer dampen<br />

the effect The expansion becomes universal and gigantic. And, of<br />

course, so does the contraction. Except for the bankers and the<br />

politicians, everyone is injured at the same time; depression is<br />

everywhere; and recovery is long delayed.<br />

This is exactly what happened in the so-called panic of 1819. In<br />

the Documentary History of Banking and Currency, Herman Krooss<br />

writes:<br />

r1. Rothbard, Mystery, pp. 204-05. Also see Galbraith, p. 77.


346 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

A DEN OF VIPERS 347<br />

The Bank, as the largest creditor [to<br />

alternatives: it<br />

the state banks], had two<br />

could write off its debts which of course would wipe<br />

out the stockholders' equity and result in bankruptcy, or it could force<br />

the state banks to meet their obligations which would mean wholesale<br />

bankruptcy among state banks. There was no doubt about the<br />

choice.... The pressure placed upon state banks deflated the economy<br />

drastically, and as the money supply wilted, the country sank into<br />

severe depression.<br />

As historian William Gouge observed: "The Bank was saved,<br />

and the people were ruined/'<br />

Competition between the national Bank and the state banks<br />

during this period had been moved from the open field of the free<br />

market to the closed arena of politics. Free-market competition had<br />

been replaced by government favoritism in the form of charters<br />

which granted the right of monopoly. A federal charter was clearly<br />

better than one issued by a state, but the states fought back fiercely<br />

with what weapons they possessed, and one of those was the<br />

power to tax. Several states began to levy a tax on the paper notes<br />

issued by any bank doing business within their borders which was<br />

not also locally chartered. The intent, although pretended to be the<br />

raising of state revenue, was really to put the federal Bank out of<br />

business.<br />

THE SUPREME COURT UPHOLDS THE BANK<br />

When the Bank refused to pay such a tax to the state of<br />

Maryland, the issue was taken to the Supreme Court in 1819 as the<br />

celebrated case of McCulloch v. Maryland. The Chief Justice at that<br />

time was John Marshall, a leading Federalist and advocate of a<br />

strong, centralized federal government. As was expected, the<br />

Marshall Court carefully tailored its decision to support the federal<br />

government's central bank.<br />

The narrow issue upon which the constitutionality of the Bank<br />

was decided was not whether Congress had the power to directly<br />

or indirectly emit bills of credit or otherwise convert debt into<br />

money. If that had been the issue, the Court would have been hard<br />

pressed to uphold the Bank, for that not only is expressly prohibited<br />

by the Constitution, it is precisely what the Bank had been<br />

1. Krooss, pp. 190-91.<br />

2. William M. Gouge, A Short History of Paper Money and Banking in the United States<br />

(New York: Augustus M. Kelly, 1968), p. 110.<br />

doing all along, and everyone knew it. Instead, the Court focused<br />

upon the narrow question of whether or not the Bank was a<br />

"necessary and proper" means for Congress to execute any other<br />

constitutional powers it might have. From that perspective, it was<br />

unanimously held that the Bank was, indeed, constitutional.<br />

Were the Bank's paper notes the same as Bills of Credit? No,<br />

because they were backed by the credit of the Bank, not the federal<br />

government. True, the Bank created money, and most of it was<br />

used by the government Never mind all that. The Treasury did not<br />

print it, therefore, it was not government money.<br />

Was not the Bank the same as an agency of government? No,<br />

because merely granting it a national monopoly and enforcing that<br />

monopoly with the power of the state does not necessarily make it<br />

"state action/'<br />

Furthermore, the states cannot tax the federal government or<br />

any of its<br />

instruments, including the Bank of the United States,<br />

because, as Marshall stated: "The power to tax is the power to<br />

destroy/'<br />

Here was another end run around the Constitution, executed<br />

this time by the very men who were assumed to be its most loyal<br />

defenders.<br />

The Supreme Court had spoken, but the Court of Public<br />

Opinion had not yet disposed of the case. During the 1820s,<br />

popular sentiment shifted back to the laissez-faire and soundmoney<br />

principles espoused by the Jeffersonian Republicans. But<br />

since the Republican Party had by then abandoned those principles,<br />

a new coalition was formed, headed by Martin Van Buren and<br />

Andrew Jackson, to resurrect them. It was called the Democratic<br />

Party, and one of its agenda items was to abolish the Bank of the<br />

United States. After Jackson was elected to the Presidency in 1828,<br />

he wasted no time in attempting to build Congressional support for<br />

that goal.<br />

NICHOLAS BIDDLE<br />

By this time, the Bank had come under the direction of Nicholas<br />

Biddle who was a formidable adversary to Jackson, not only<br />

because of the power of his position, but because of his strong will<br />

and sense of personal destiny. He was the archetype of the new<br />

Eastern Establishment: wealthy, arrogant, ruthless, and brilliant.<br />

He had graduated from the University of Pennsylvania at the age


348 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND A DEN OF VIPERS 349<br />

of only thirteen, and, as a young man entering business, had fully<br />

mastered the secret science of money.<br />

With the ability to control the flow of the nation's credit, Biddle<br />

soon became one of the most powerful men in America. This was<br />

brought out dramatically when he was asked by a Senate Committee<br />

if his bank ever took advantage of its superior position over the<br />

state banks. He replied: "Never. There are very few banks which<br />

might not have been destroyed by an exertion of the powers of the<br />

Bank. None has ever been injured." As Jackson publicly noted a<br />

few months later, this was an admission that most of the state<br />

banks existed only at the pleasure of the Bank of the United States,<br />

and that, of course, meant at the pleasure of Mr. Biddle.<br />

The year was 1832. The Bank's charter was good for another<br />

four years. But Biddle decided not to wait that long for Jackson to<br />

build his forces. He knew that the President was up for reelection,<br />

and he reasoned that, as a candidate, he would hesitate to be too<br />

controversial. To criticize the Bank is one thing, but to come down<br />

squarely for its elimination altogether would surely cost him many<br />

votes. So, Biddle requested Congress to grant an early renewal of<br />

the charter as a means of softening Jackson's campaign against it.<br />

The bill was backed by the Republicans led by Senator John Clay<br />

and was passed into law on July 3, just before the election<br />

campaigns began in earnest.<br />

JACKSON OVERRIDES CONGRESS<br />

It was brilliant strategy on Biddle's part but it didn't work.<br />

Jackson decided to place his entire political career on the line for<br />

this one issue and, with perhaps the most passionate message ever<br />

delivered to Congress by any President, before or since, he vetoed<br />

the measure. The President's biographer, Robert Remini, says: "The<br />

veto message hit the nation like a tornado. For it not only cited<br />

constitutional arguments against recharter—supposedly the only<br />

reason for resorting to a veto—but political, social, economic, and<br />

nationalistic reasons as well."<br />

Jackson devoted most of his veto message to three general<br />

topics: (1) the injustice that is inherent in granting a government-<br />

1 J.D. Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1 789-<br />

1908 (Washington: Bureau of National Literature and Art, 1908), Vol. II, p. 581.<br />

2. Robert V. Remini, The Life of Andrew Jackson (New York: Harper & Row, 1988),<br />

pp. 227-28.<br />

sponsored monopoly to the Bank; (2) the unconstitutionality of the<br />

Bank even if it were not unjust; and (3) the danger to the country in<br />

having the Bank heavily dominated by foreign investors.<br />

Regarding the injustice of a government-sponsored monopoly,<br />

he pointed out that the stock of the Bank was owned only by the<br />

richest citizens of the country and that, since the sale of stock was<br />

limited to a chosen few with political influence, the common man,<br />

not only is<br />

unfairly excluded from an opportunity to participate,<br />

but he is forced to pay for his banking services far more than they<br />

are worth. Unearned profits are bad enough when they are taken<br />

from one class of citizens and given to another, but it is even worse<br />

when the people receiving those benefits are not even citizens at all<br />

but are, in factforeigners. Jackson said:<br />

It is not our own citizens only who are to receive the bounty of our<br />

Government. More than eight millions of the stock of this bank are<br />

held by foreigners. By this act the American Republic proposes<br />

virtually to make them a present of some millions of dollars.... It<br />

appears that more than a fourth part of the stock is held by foreigners<br />

and the residue is held by a few hundred of our own citizens, chiefly<br />

of the richest class. For their benefit does this act exclude the whole<br />

American people from competition in the purchase of this monopoly<br />

and dispose of it for many millions less than it is worth.<br />

Regarding the issue of constitutionality, he said that he was not<br />

bound by the previous decision of the Supreme Court, because the<br />

President and Congress had just as much right to decide for<br />

themselves whether or not a particular law is<br />

constitutional This<br />

view, incidentally, was not novel at that time. It is only in relatively<br />

recent decades that people have begun to think of the Supreme<br />

Court as being specifically authorized to pass on this question. In<br />

fact, as Jackson correctly pointed out in his veto message, the<br />

founding fathers created a government with power divided between<br />

the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, and that the<br />

purpose of this division was, not merely to divvy up the chores, but<br />

to balance one branch against the other. The goal was not to make<br />

government efficient but to deliberately make it inefficient. Each<br />

President and each legislator is<br />

morally bound, even by oath, to<br />

uphold the Constitution. If each of them does not have the power to<br />

:1- Krooss, pp. 22-23.


350 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND A DEN OF VIPERS 351<br />

decide in conscience what is constitutional, then taking an oath to<br />

uphold it has little meaning.<br />

THE BANK CONTROLLED BY FOREIGN INVESTORS<br />

Regarding the danger to our national security, Jackson returned<br />

to the fact that a major portion of the Bank's stockholders were<br />

foreigners. Even though foreign investors technically were not<br />

allowed to vote their shares, their financial power was so great that<br />

the American investors were clearly beholden to them and would<br />

likely follow their instructions. Jackson concluded:<br />

Is there no danger to our liberty and independence in a bank that<br />

in its nature has so little to bind it to our country?... [Is there not] cause<br />

to tremble for the purity of our elections in peace and for the<br />

independence of our country in war?... Of the course which would be<br />

pursued by a bank almost wholly owned by the subjects of a foreign<br />

power, and managed by those whose interests, if not affections, would<br />

run in the same direction there can be no doubt.... Controlling our<br />

currency, receiving our public monies, and holding thousands of our<br />

citizens in dependence, it would be more formidable and dangerous<br />

than a naval and military power of the enemy.<br />

Jackson saved the greatest passion of his argument for the end.<br />

Speaking now, not to Congress, but to the voters at large, he said:<br />

It is to be regretted that the rich and powerful too often bend the<br />

acts of government to their selfish purposes. Distinctions in society<br />

will always exist under every just government. Equality of talents, of<br />

education, or of wealth cannot be produced by human institutions. In<br />

the full enjoyment of the gifts of Heaven and the fruits of superior<br />

industry, economy, and virtue, every man is equally entitled to<br />

protection by law; but when the laws undertake to add to these natural<br />

and just advantages artificial distinctions, to grant titles, gratuities,<br />

and exclusive privileges, to make the rich richer and the potent more<br />

powerful, the humble members of society—the farmers, mechanics,<br />

and laborers—who have neither the time nor the means of securing<br />

like favors to themselves, have a right to complain of the injustice of<br />

their Government. There are no necessary evils in government. Its<br />

evils exist only in its abuses. If it would confine itself to equal<br />

protection, and, as Heaven does its rains, shower its favor alike on the<br />

high and the low, the rich and the poor, it would be an unqualified<br />

blessing. In the act before me there seems to be a wide and<br />

unnecessary departure from these just principles.<br />

The veto did not defeat the Bank. It was merely a declaration of<br />

war. The major battles were yet to come.<br />

BIDDLE'S CONTROL OVER CONGRESS<br />

As Commanding General of the pro-bank forces,<br />

Biddle had<br />

one powerful advantage over his adversary. For all practical<br />

purposes, Congress was in his pocket. Or, more accurately, the<br />

product of his generosity was in the pockets of Congressmen.<br />

Following the Rothschild Formula, Biddle had been careful to<br />

reward compliant politicians with success in the business world.<br />

Few of them were willing to bite the hand that fed them. Even the<br />

great Senator, Daniel Webster, found himself kneeling at Biddle's<br />

throne. Galbraith says:<br />

Biddle was not without resources. In keeping with his belief that<br />

banking was the ultimate source of power, he had regularly advanced<br />

funds to members of Congress when delay on appropriations bills had<br />

held up their pay. Daniel Webster was, at various times, a director of<br />

the Bank and on retainer as its counsel. "I believe my retainer has not<br />

been renewed or refreshed as usual. If it be wished that my relation to<br />

the Bank should be continued, it may be well to send me the usual<br />

retainers." Numerous other men of distinction had been<br />

accommodated, including members of the press. 1<br />

Webster is a particularly interesting study in how even socalled<br />

"great" men can be compromised by an addiction to wealth.<br />

He had always been an advocate of sound money in Congress, yet,<br />

as a lawyer on Biddle's payroll, he represented the Bank's position<br />

before the Supreme Court in McCulloch v. Maryland. Much of the<br />

twisted logic that allowed the Court to end-run the Constitution<br />

and destroy sound money came from his pen.<br />

After Jackson's veto of the Bank's charter, Biddle requested<br />

Webster to deliver speeches specifically for the purpose of having<br />

the Bank reprint them for mass distribution. In one of those<br />

speeches, Webster echoed the old refrain that the Bank served as a<br />

moderating influence on the nation's other banks and then piously<br />

proclaimed: "Congress can alone coin money;... no State (nor even<br />

Congress itself) can make anything a tender but gold and silver, in<br />

the payment of debts." In an act of astounding hypocrisy, this<br />

speech was distributed widely by the very institution that was<br />

1. Krooss, pp. 26-27.<br />

2. Ibid., pp. 36-37.<br />

1- Galbraith, p. 80.<br />

2. Krooss, p. 2.


352 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

designed specifically for creating fractional fiat money, without<br />

gold or silver backing, to function as tender in the payment of<br />

debts. Then, as now, most people did not discern between words<br />

and actions and believed that this speech, delivered by such a<br />

"great" man, was evidence of the Bank's worthiness. Biddle even<br />

distributed 300,000 copies of Jackson's veto message, apparently in<br />

the belief that many would not read it Obviously, if the Bank<br />

thought it was so bad as to distribute it, it must be bad.<br />

The power of the Bank's money was everywhere. It was as John<br />

Randolph, the fiery Old Republican from Virginia, had said: "Every<br />

man you meet in this House or out of it, with some rare exceptions,<br />

which only serve to prove the rule, is either a stockholder,<br />

president, cashier, clerk or doorkeeper, runner, engraver, papermaker,<br />

or mechanic in some other way to a bank/'<br />

JACKSON APPEALS DIRECTLY TO THE VOTERS<br />

Congress, the banks, speculators, industrialists, and segments<br />

of the press; these were the forces commanded by Biddle. But<br />

[ackson had a secret weapon which had never been used before in<br />

American politics. That weapon was a direct appeal to the electorate.<br />

He took his message on the campaign trail and delivered it in<br />

words well chosen to make a lasting impression on the voter. He<br />

spoke out against a moneyed aristocracy which had invaded the<br />

halls of Congress, impaired the morals of the people, threatened<br />

their liberty, and subverted the electoral process. The Bank, he said,<br />

was a hydra-headed monster eating the flesh of the common man.<br />

He swore to do battle with the monster and slay it or be slain by it.<br />

He bellowed his position to every crowd he could reach: Bank and<br />

no Jackson, or no bank and jacksonl<br />

On the subject of paper money, the President was equally<br />

emphatic. His biographer describes the campaign:<br />

On his homeward journey he reportedly paid all his expenses in<br />

gold. "No more paper money, you see, fellow citizens," he remarked<br />

with each gold payment, "if I can only put down this Nicholas Biddle<br />

and his monster bank." Gold, hardly the popular medium of<br />

exchange, was held up to the people as the safe and sound currency<br />

1. Remini, Life, p. 234.<br />

2. Annals of Congress, 14 Cong., 1st sess., pp. T066, 1110 ff.<br />

3. Robert Remini, Andrew Jackson and the Course of American Freedom, 1822-1832<br />

(New York: Harper & Row, 1981), p. 373.<br />

A DEN OF VIPERS 353<br />

which Jackson and his administration hoped to restore to regular use.<br />

Unlike paper money, gold represented real value and true worth. It<br />

was the corn of honest men. Rag money, on the other hand, was the<br />

instrument of banks and swindlers to corrupt and cheat an innocent<br />

and virtuous public.<br />

Jackson had awakened the indignation of the American people.<br />

When the November ballots were cast, he received a mammoth<br />

vote of confidence. He received fifty-five per cent of the popular<br />

vote (with thirty-seven per cent for Clay, eight per cent for Wirt)<br />

and eighty per cent of the vote in the electoral college. But the war<br />

still was not over. Jackson won the election, but the Bank had four<br />

more years to operate, and it intended to use those years to sway<br />

public sentiment back to its support. The biggest battles were yet to<br />

come.<br />

JACKSON REMOVES FEDERAL DEPOSITS<br />

Jackson did not wait to act. He knew that time would be used as<br />

a weapon against him. "The hydra of corruption is only scotched,<br />

not dead" he said.<br />

Soon after the election, he ordered Secretary of<br />

the Treasury, William Duane, to place all new deposits of the<br />

federal government into various state banks around the country<br />

and to pay current expenses out of the funds still held by the Bank<br />

of the United States until that account was drained to zero. Without<br />

the use of federal money, surely the monster would perish. To<br />

Jackson's chagrin, however, Duane balked at the order out of a<br />

sincere conviction that, to do so, would be disruptive to the<br />

economy.<br />

This was not the first time a Cabinet officer and a President had<br />

come to disagreement. In the past, however, the impasse had<br />

always been resolved by the resignation of the Secretary. This time<br />

was different. Duane refused to resign, and that raised an interesting<br />

constitutional question. A President could appoint a member of<br />

the executive branch only with the consent of the Senate. The<br />

Constitution was silent, however, on the matter of dismissal. Did<br />

that, too, require Senate approval? The implication was that it did,<br />

but the issue had never been tested.<br />

Jackson had no patience for such theoretical<br />

questions. The<br />

letter arrived promptly on Duane's desk: "Your further services as<br />

1- Remini, Life, pp. 234-35.<br />

2. Remini, Course, p. 52.


354 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND A DEN OF VIPERS 355<br />

own course is decided. All other banks and all the merchants may<br />

Secretary of the Treasury are no longer required." On October 1,<br />

5. Remini, Democracy, p. 111. 2. Quoted by Viola, p. 86.<br />

1833, federal deposits began to move out of the Bank.<br />

break, but the Bank of the United States shall not break."<br />

Jackson felt that he finally had the monster firmly within his<br />

Biddle, therefore, decided to use the American people as<br />

grasp. "I have it chained/ 7 he said. With gleeful confidence, he<br />

sacrificial pawns in the giant chess match for the Bank's survival.<br />

added: "I am ready with the screws to draw every tooth and then<br />

the stumps/ 7 If I am not mistaken, he went on, we will have "Mr.<br />

Biddle and his Bank as quiet and harmless as a lamb in six weeks."<br />

The resulting economic chaos is not difficult to imagine. Biddle's<br />

contraction of the money supply was executed at a particularly<br />

vulnerable moment. Business had been expanding as a result of the<br />

Bank's prior easy credit and<br />

BIDDLE DELIBERATELY CREATES MONETARY CHAOS<br />

now was dependent on it. Also, the<br />

tariff came due at precisely this time, placing still more demand for<br />

The President's view of the Bank's meek captivity was premature,<br />

to say the least. Biddle responded, not like a lamb, but more<br />

cash and credit Losses were sustained everywhere, wages and<br />

prices sagged, men were put out of work, companies went bankrupt.<br />

By the time Congress reconvened in December, in what was<br />

like a wounded lion. His plan was to rapidly contract the nation's<br />

money supply and create another panic-depression similar to the<br />

called the "Panic Session," the nation was in an uproar. Newspapers<br />

editorialized with alarm, and letters of angry protest flooded<br />

one the Bank had created thirteen years earlier. This then could be<br />

blamed on Jackson's withdrawal of federal deposits, and the<br />

into Washington.<br />

resulting backlash surely would cause Congress to override the<br />

As the pressure continued to build in Congress, it began to look<br />

President's veto. Remini tells us:<br />

as though Biddle's plan would work. In the public eye, it was<br />

Biddle counterattacked. He initiated a general curtailment of loans<br />

throughout the entire banking system.. . . It marked the beginning of a<br />

Jackson who was solely responsible for the nation's woes. It was his<br />

arrogant removal of Secretary Duane; it was his foolish insistence<br />

bone-crushing struggle between a powerful financier and a<br />

on removing the deposits; it was his obstinate opposition to<br />

determined and equally powerful politician. Biddle understood what<br />

Congress.<br />

he was about. He knew that if he brought enough pressure and agony<br />

to the money market, only then could he force the President to restore JACKSON IS CENSURED BY THE SENATE<br />

the deposits. He almost gloated. "This worthy President thinks that<br />

because he has scalped Indians and imprisoned Judges, he is to have<br />

his way with the Bank. He is mistaken. ,/4 ...<br />

For one-hundred days, a "phalanx of orators" daily excoriated<br />

the President for his arrogant and harmful conduct. At length, a<br />

resolution of censure was introduced into the Senate and, on March<br />

"The ties of party allegiance can only be broken/' he declared, "by<br />

28, 1834, it was passed by a vote of 26 to 20. This was the first time<br />

the actual conviction of existing distress in the community." And such<br />

that a President had ever been censured by Congress, and it was a<br />

distress, of course, would eventually put everything to rights.<br />

savage blow to Jackson's pride. Biddle, at last, had the upper hand.<br />

"Nothing but widespread suffering will produce any effect on<br />

The President<br />

Congress.... Our<br />

rumbled around the White House in a fit of rage.<br />

only safety is in pursuing a steady course of firm<br />

restriction—and I have no doubt<br />

"You<br />

that such a course<br />

are<br />

will ultimately<br />

a den of vipers," he said to a delegation of the Bank's<br />

lead to restoration of the currency and the recharter of the Bank. ... My<br />

supporters. 'T intend to rout you out and by the Eternal God I will<br />

rout you out." 2<br />

1. William J. Duane, Narrative and Correspondence Concerning the Removal of the<br />

The censure was by no means indicative of popular sentiment.<br />

Deposits and Occurrences Connected Therewith (Philadelphia: n.p., 1838), pp. 101-03.<br />

Even in the Senate, which was a hotbed of pro-Bank support, a<br />

Quoted by Remini, Life, p. 264.<br />

2. Quoted by Herman J. Viola, Andrew Jackson (New<br />

swing<br />

York: Chelsea House,<br />

of only three votes would have defeated the measure.<br />

1986),<br />

p. 88.<br />

3. A letter from Jackson to Van Buren, November 19, 1833, Van Buren Papers,<br />

1 Biddle to William Appleton, January 27, 1834, and to J.G. Watmough,<br />

Library of Congress. Quoted by Remini, Life, p. 264.<br />

February 8, 1834. Nicholas Biddle, Correspondence, 1807-1844, Reginald C<br />

4. Remini, Life, p. 265.<br />

McGrane, ed. (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1919), pp. 219, 221.


356 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND A DEN OF VIPERS 357<br />

During all this time, imperceptibly at first, but quickly growing, the<br />

public had been learning the truth. Jackson, of course, was doing<br />

everything within his power to hasten the process, but other factors<br />

also were at work, not the least of which was Biddle himself. So<br />

large was his ego that he could not keep from boasting in public<br />

about his plan to deliberately disrupt the economy. People heard<br />

these boasts and they believed him. The turning point came when<br />

Governor George Wolf of Pennsylvania, the Bank's home state,<br />

came out publicly with a strong denunciation of both the Bank and<br />

Biddle. This was like the starting bell at a horse race. With the<br />

Bank's home state turned against it, there was no one left to defend<br />

it and, literally within days, the mood of the country and of<br />

Congress changed.<br />

The Democrats wasted no time consolidating these unexpected<br />

gains. To test their strength on the issue, on April 4,<br />

1834, they<br />

called for a vote in the House on a series of resolutions which were<br />

aimed at nullifying the censure in the Senate. In essence, the<br />

resolutions stated that the House totally approved the President's<br />

bank policy. The first resolution, passed by a vote of 134 to 82,<br />

declared that the Bank of the United States "ought not to be<br />

rechartered." The second, passed by a vote of 118 to 103, agreed<br />

that the deposits "ought not to be restored." And the third, passed<br />

by an overwhelming vote of 175 to 42, called for the establishment<br />

of a special committee of Congress to investigate whether the Bank<br />

had deliberately instigated the current economic crisis. It was an<br />

overwhelming victory for Jackson which would be culminated a<br />

few years later with the passage of a resolution in the Senate which<br />

formally rescinded the previous vote of censure.<br />

BIDDLE DEFIES CONGRESS<br />

When the investigating committee arrived at the Bank's doors<br />

in Philadelphia armed with a subpoena to examine the books,<br />

Biddle flatly refused. Nor would he allow inspection of correspondence<br />

with Congressmen relating to their personal loans and<br />

advances. And he steadfastly refused to testify before the committee<br />

back in Washington. For lesser mortals, such action would have<br />

resulted in citations of contempt of Congress and would have<br />

carried stiff<br />

Remini explains:<br />

fines or imprisonment. But not for Nicholas Biddle.<br />

The committeemen demanded a citation for contempt, but many<br />

southern Democrats opposed this extreme action, and refused to<br />

cooperate. As Biddle bemusedly observed, it would be ironic if he<br />

went to prison "by the votes of members of Congress because I would<br />

not give up to their enemies their confidential letters." Although<br />

Biddle escaped a contempt citation, his outrageous defiance of the<br />

House only condemned him still further in the eyes of the American<br />

public.<br />

The Bank was still<br />

alive but had been mortally wounded. By<br />

this time, Jackson had completely paid off the national debt<br />

incurred by the War of 1812 and had even run up a surplus. In fact,<br />

he ordered the Treasury to give back to the states more than<br />

$35 million, which was used for the construction of a wide variety<br />

of public works.<br />

With these accomplishments close on the heels of his victory<br />

over the Bank, the President had earned the undying hatred of<br />

monetary scientists, both in America and abroad. It is not surprising,<br />

therefore, that on January 30, 1835, an assassination attempt<br />

was made against him. Miraculously, both pistols of the assailant<br />

misfired, and Jackson was spared by a quirk of fate. It was the first<br />

such attempt to be made against the life of a President of the United<br />

States. The would-be assassin was Richard Lawrence who either<br />

was truly insane or who pretended to be insane to escape harsh<br />

punishment. At any rate, Lawrence was found not guilty due to<br />

insanity. Later, he boasted to friends that he had been in touch<br />

with powerful people in Europe who had promised to protect him<br />

from punishment should he be caught.<br />

The ending to this saga holds no surprises. The Bank's charter<br />

expired in 1836 and it was restructured as a state bank by the<br />

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. After a spree of speculation in<br />

cotton, lavish advances to the Bank's officers, and the suspension of<br />

payment in specie, Biddle was arrested and charged with fraud.<br />

Although not convicted, he was still undergoing civil litigation<br />

when he died. Within five years, the establishment was forced to<br />

close its doors forever, and America's third experience with central<br />

banking came to a close.<br />

1. Remini, Life, p. 274.<br />

2- Remini, Democracy, p. 228-29.<br />

Robert J. Donovan, The Assassins (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952), p. 83.


358 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

SOME BAD MDCED IN WITH THE GOOD<br />

It is tempting to let the story stop right there and allow Jackson<br />

to forever wear the crown of hero and dragon slayer. But a more<br />

balanced view of these events leads to the conclusion that the forces<br />

of virtue were not without contamination. Jackson represented the<br />

position of those who wanted only gold and silver for the nation's<br />

money- But this group was not large enough to match the power of<br />

the Bank. He was joined in that battle by many groups which hated<br />

the Bank for other, less admirable reasons. State banks and business<br />

interests along the expanding frontier, for example, were not the<br />

least interested in Constitutional money. They wanted just the<br />

opposite. They viewed the modest restraints of the federal Bank as<br />

excessive. With the federal Bank out of the way, they anticipated no<br />

restraints at all. As we shall see in the following section, it is ironic<br />

that this is the group that got what it wanted, not the hard-money<br />

Jacksonians.<br />

One cannot blame Jackson for accepting the support of these<br />

groups in his effort to slay the dragon. In politics, it often is<br />

necessary to make temporary alliances with one's opponents to<br />

achieve occasional common objectives.<br />

But Jackson went further<br />

than that. More than any other President before him, and rivalled<br />

by only a few since, he changed the character of American politics.<br />

He led the nation away from the new concept of diffused powers,<br />

carefully worked out by the founding fathers, back toward the<br />

Old-World tradition of concentration and monarchy. By strongly<br />

challenging the right of the States to secede from the Union, he set<br />

into motion a concept that, not only would lead to civil war, but<br />

which would put an end forever to the ability of the states to check<br />

the expanding power of the federal government. No longer was the<br />

Union to be based on the principle of consent of the governed. It<br />

was now to be based on force of arms. And through the manipulation<br />

of voter passion on the Bank issue, he changed the perception<br />

of the role of President from public servant to national leader.<br />

At the height of the battle against the Bank, when Jackson was<br />

making a direct appeal to the voters for support, he declared: "The<br />

President is the direct representative of the people." To fully<br />

comprehend the significance of that statement, it must be remembered<br />

that the plan of the Constitution was for the President to be<br />

elected indirectly by the state legislatures, not by the voters at large.<br />

A DEN OF VIPERS 359<br />

After fighting a war to throw off the rule of King George, in, the<br />

founding fathers wanted nothing more to do with kings of any<br />

land, and they went out of their way to make sure that the<br />

president of the United States would never be looked upon as such.<br />

They realized that an elected ruler, unless his power is carefully<br />

limited and diffused, can become just as despotic as an unelected<br />

one. Article 2, Section 1, of the Constitution, therefore, established<br />

an electoral college to select the President.<br />

Members of the college are to be appointed by the states.<br />

Congressmen, Senators, or other officers of the federal government<br />

are specifically and wisely excluded. The college is supposed to<br />

select a President strictly on the basis of his integrity and executive<br />

ability, not his party label, political connections, good looks,<br />

charisma, or stirring orations. The people may elect their Congressmen,<br />

but the electoral college chooses the President. Thus, it was<br />

intended that the President would have a different constituency<br />

from Congress, and this difference was important to insure the<br />

balance of power that the framers of the Constitution worked so<br />

hard to create. As a means of keeping government under control, it<br />

was a truly brilliant piece of political engineering.<br />

All of that was changed in the election of 1832. One of the sad<br />

facts of history is that good causes often are the occasion for<br />

establishing bad precedents. Jackson's fight against the Bank of the<br />

United States was one of those events.<br />

SUMMARY<br />

The government had encouraged widespread banking fraud<br />

during the War of 1812 as an expedient for paying its bills, and this<br />

had left the nation in monetary chaos. At the end of the war,<br />

instead of allowing the fraudulent banks to fall and letting the free<br />

market heal the damage, Congress decided to protect the banks, to<br />

organize the fraud, and to perpetuate the losses. It did this by<br />

creating the nation's third central bank called the Second Bank of<br />

the United States.<br />

The new bank was almost an exact carbon copy of the previous<br />

one. It was authorized to create money for the federal government<br />

and to regulate state banks. It influenced larger amounts of capital<br />

and was better organized across state lines than the old bank.<br />

Consequently its policies had a greater impact on the creation and<br />

extinguishing of the nation's money supply. For the first time in


360 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

our history, the effects began to ricochet across the entire country at<br />

once instead of being confined to geographical regions. The age of<br />

the boom-bust cycle had at last arrived in America.<br />

In 1820, public opinion began to swing back in favor of the<br />

sound-money principles espoused by the Jeffersonian Republicans.<br />

But since the Republican Party had by then abandoned those<br />

principles, a new coalition was formed, headed by Martin Van<br />

Buren and Andrew Jackson, called the Democrat Party. One of its<br />

primary platforms was the abolishment of the Bank. After Jackson<br />

was elected in 1828, he began in full earnest to bring that about<br />

The head of the Bank was a formidable adversary by the name<br />

of Nicholas Biddle. Biddle, not only possessed great personal<br />

abilities, but many members of Congress were indebted to him for<br />

business favors. Consequently, the Bank had many political<br />

friends.<br />

As Jackson's first term of office neared its end, Biddle asked<br />

Congress for an early renewal of the Bank's charter, hoping that<br />

Jackson would not risk controversy in a reelection year. The bill<br />

was easily passed, but Jackson accepted the challenge and vetoed<br />

the measure. Thus, a battle over the Bank's future became the<br />

primary presidential campaign issue.<br />

Jackson was reelected by a large margin, and one of his first acts<br />

was to remove federal deposits from the Bank and place them into<br />

private, regional banks. Biddle counterattacked by contracting<br />

credit and calling in loans. This was calculated to shrink the money<br />

supply and trigger a national panic-depression, which it did. He<br />

publicly blamed the downturn on Jackson's removal of deposits.<br />

The plan almost worked. Biddle's political allies succeeded in<br />

having Jackson officially censured in the Senate. However, when<br />

the truth about Biddle's strategy finally leaked out, it backfired<br />

against him. He was called before a special Congressional investigative<br />

committee to explain his actions, the censure against Jackson<br />

was rescinded, and the nation's third central bank passed into<br />

oblivion.<br />

Chapter Eighteen<br />

LOAVES AND FISHES<br />

AND CIVIL WAR<br />

Attempts to stabilize the banking system by<br />

political<br />

measures, including regulation of fractional-reserve<br />

ratios and establishing bank-failure<br />

insurance funds; the failure of all such schemes;<br />

the resulting economic conditions that led up to<br />

the Civil War.<br />

As detailed in the previous chapter, by 1836 the hydra-headed<br />

monster had been slain and, true to the President's campaign<br />

promise, the nation had Jackson and no Bank.<br />

In April of that year, the Administration moved to consolidate<br />

its victory and pushed a series of monetary reforms through<br />

Congress. One of these required all banks to cease issuing paper<br />

notes under five dollars. The figure later was increased to twenty<br />

dollars, and its purpose was to compel the nation to return to the<br />

use of gold and silver coin for everyday use, leaving bank notes<br />

primarily for large commercial transactions. The White House also<br />

announced that, in the future, all federal land sales would require<br />

full payment in "lawful money," which, of course, meant preciousmetal<br />

coins.<br />

It must be remembered, however, that even though the Bank of<br />

the United States was dead, banking was very much alive, and so<br />

were Jackson's enemies. Much to the disappointment of the hardmoney<br />

advocates, these measures were not sufficient to usher in<br />

the millennium. Not only were they inadequate by themselves,<br />

they were soon circumvented by the development of new banking<br />

techniques and eventually were dismantled completely by a fickle<br />

Congress.<br />

I<br />

(Columbia, South Carolina: Foundation for American Education, 1979), p. 115.<br />

Otto Scott, The Secret Six: The Fool as Martyr, Vol. Ill of The Sacred Fool Quartet


362 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND LOAVES AND FISHES AND CIVIL WAR 363<br />

The prohibition against bank notes of small denomination<br />

deserves special notice. It was an excellent concept, but what the<br />

legislators failed to understand, or at least pretended not to understand,<br />

was that banks at this time were increasingly dealing with<br />

checkbook money, technically called demand deposits. As people<br />

gradually became accustomed to this new method of transferring<br />

funds, the importance of bank notes declined. Placing a limit on the<br />

issuance of bank notes without any restriction on the creation of<br />

demand deposits was an exercise in futility.<br />

In 1837, as the Bank of the United States slipped into history,<br />

the nation was at the tail end of an economic boom. Professor<br />

Rothbard tells us that this expansion and the accompanying<br />

inflation had been "fueled by the central bank/'<br />

Total money in<br />

circulation had risen by eighty-four per cent in just four years.<br />

Then, as inevitable as the setting sun, that portion of the money<br />

supply which had been created by fractional-reserve banking—in<br />

other words, the<br />

part which was backed by nothing—began to<br />

contract. Sixteen per cent of all the nation's money totally disappeared<br />

in just that first year. Again, men were put out of work,<br />

businesses went into bankruptcy, homes and savings were lost.<br />

Many banks folded also, but their operators walked away with the<br />

spoils. Only the depositors were left holding the empty bag.<br />

There were numerous proposals advanced regarding how to<br />

infuse stability into the banking system. But, then as now, none of<br />

them dealt with the real problem, which was fractional-reserve<br />

banking itself- As Groseclose observed, these proposals were "each<br />

according to a particular theory of how to multiply loaves and<br />

fishes, or how to make candy wool/ 7<br />

Since the proposals presented<br />

then are identical to the ones being offered today, and since each of<br />

them was actually tried, it would seem appropriate to inquire into<br />

the actual results of these experiments.<br />

PROPOSAL TO BASE MONEY ON BANK ASSETS<br />

There were four schools of thought regarding the multiplication<br />

of loaves and fishes. The first of these was that the creation of<br />

money should be limited to a ratio of the bank's assets. This was the<br />

formula that was tried in the New England states. In Massachusetts,<br />

for example, the issuance of bank notes was limited to two<br />

1 Rothbard, Mystery, p. 21 1<br />

2. Groseclose, Money and Man, p. 184.<br />

times the amount of the bank's capital actually held in the vault.<br />

Furthermore, this could not be in the form of paper money, bonds,<br />

securities, or other debt instruments; it had to be strictly gold or<br />

silver coin. Also, the banks were limited in the number of smalldenomination<br />

bank notes they could issue and, in this, Massachusetts<br />

served as the model for Jackson's attempted reform at the<br />

federal level. By previous standards, and certainly by the standards<br />

that prevail today, this was an exceptionally conservative policy. In<br />

fact, even during the previous stress of the War of 1812, when<br />

banks were failing by the hundreds across the country, the Massachusetts<br />

banks, and most of the other New England banks as well,<br />

were able to maintain full payment in specie.<br />

With fhe passage of time, however, the limit on bank notes<br />

became less important, because the banks now were using checkbook<br />

money instead. Their paper notes may have been limited to<br />

two-hundred per cent of their capital, but there was no effective<br />

limit to the numbers they could ink into people's deposit books. So<br />

the "fraction" in fractional-reserve banking began to shrink again.<br />

Consequently, the monetary contraction of 1837 "was like a scythe<br />

bver the crop," says Groseclose, and thirty-two Massachusetts<br />

banks collapsed between that year and 1844.<br />

The state attempted to patch the system by instituting a<br />

network of bank examiners and by increasing the liability of bank<br />

stockholders for the lost funds of their depositors, but the underlying<br />

problem was still<br />

ignored. A new crop of banks then sprang<br />

into existence and a new wave of speculative mania swept through<br />

the economy. By 1862, even though the law still limited bank notes<br />

po two times capital, the banks had created $73,685,000 in total<br />

money, including checkbook money. This was supported by a base<br />

of only $9,595,000 of specie, a reserve of only thirteen per cent.<br />

Massachusetts had not solved the problem.<br />

PROPOSAL TO PROTECT DEPOSITS WITH A SAFETY<br />

FUND<br />

The second theory about how to have stable banking and allow<br />

the banks to create money out of nothing was to create a "safety<br />

fund." This fund, supported by all<br />

the banks, would come to the<br />

aia aid of any member which needed an emergency loan to cover a<br />

1. Groseclose, Money and Man, p. 185.


364 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

365<br />

sudden drain of its reserves. It was the forerunner of today's<br />

So rampant was the note-issue mania that the notes came to be<br />

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and related agencies.<br />

called by the appropriate name of "red dog" and "wild cat"<br />

The first safety fund was established in New York in 1829. The<br />

currency.. . . The rising crop of banks created a fictitious demand and a<br />

law required each bank to contribute annually one-half of one per<br />

rising market for securities (to be used as capital stock) and a<br />

cent of its capital stock until the total reached three per cent. The<br />

consequent stimulus to the creation of public debt by the issue of<br />

fund was first put to the test during the crisis of 1837, and was<br />

securities. This was followed by more bank notes being issued against<br />

almost swamped. The only thing that saved it was that the state<br />

the securities, demand increasing and the market rising, more<br />

securities issues, more bank notes, and so on in an endless chain of<br />

agreed to accept the worthless notes of all the defunct banks as<br />

debt creation and the inflation of paper wealth. The process was finally<br />

payment for canal tolls. In other words, the taxpayers were<br />

brought to a stop by the panic of 1857.<br />

compelled to make up the difference. When the fund was<br />

exhausted, the solvent banks were punished by being forced to pay PROPOSAL TO BACK MONEY WITH STATE CREDIT<br />

for the deficits of the insolvent ones. Naturally, this impelled The fourth proposal for producing something out of nothing<br />

all<br />

banks to act more recklessly. Why not? The up side was that profits<br />

was to back the issuance of money by the full faith and credit of the<br />

state.<br />

would be higher—for a time, at least—and the down side was This was the method tried by many of the Southern states and<br />

that,<br />

it, too,<br />

if recklessness got them into trouble, the safety fund would has survived<br />

bail<br />

to become one of the cornerstones of our<br />

them out. The result was that the system provided a penalty modern-day banking system.<br />

for<br />

Alabama, for<br />

prudence and an incentive for recklessness; a situation with<br />

example, in 1835 created a state bank funded by a<br />

perfect<br />

public bond issue of $13,800,000. Instant<br />

parallel to that which exists in the banking system money flooded through<br />

today.<br />

the economy and people were joyous over the miracle prosperity.<br />

Groseclose says:<br />

The legislators were so intoxicated with the scheme that they<br />

The conservatively managed institutions, lending upon the safer<br />

completely abolished direct taxation and decided to run the<br />

risks, upon which naturally the margins of profit were smaller, found<br />

government<br />

the assessments burdensome, and were compelled to embark upon<br />

on bank money instead. In other words, instead of<br />

the<br />

raising<br />

more speculative business in order to carry the charges.<br />

state revenue through taxes, they found it easier to raise it<br />

through inflation.<br />

Gradually, all banks sank into the quagmire and, in 1857, the<br />

Like all the others, this bubble also burst in the panic of 1837. A<br />

Massachusetts safety-fund was abandoned.<br />

postmortem examination of the Bank showed that $6,000,000 of its<br />

Michigan's experience with a safety fund was perhaps more<br />

assets were completely worthless. The people who had loaned their<br />

typical of the period. It was established in 1836 and was completely<br />

real money to the venture, backed by the full faith and credit of the<br />

blown away the next year, during the panic of 1837.<br />

state, lost almost all of their investment—in addition to what they<br />

PROPOSAL TO BASE MONEY ON SECURITIES<br />

had paid through inflation.<br />

The third proposal for maintaining a stable monetary system<br />

while, at the same time, allowing the banks to operate fraudulently<br />

was to base the money supply on government securities; in other<br />

words, upon paper certificates of government debt. This was the<br />

Mississippi put its full faith and credit behind a state bank in<br />

1838 and issued $15,000,000 in bonds as backing for its bank notes.<br />

The bank was belly-up within four years, and the state completely<br />

repudiated its obligations on the bonds. This infuriated the bond<br />

scheme adopted in the 1850s by Illinois, Indiana, Wisconsin and<br />

holders, particularly the British financiers who had purchased a<br />

other Midwestern states. It also set the precedent for the Federal<br />

Reserve System sixty years later. Groseclose continues:<br />

large portion of the issue. The devastating effect upon the state and<br />

its people is described by Henry Poor:<br />

Groseclose, Money and Man, pp. 188-89.


366 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

LOAVES AND FISHES AND CIVIL WAR 367<br />

The $48,000,000 of the bank's loans were never paid; the<br />

$23,000,000 of notes and deposits were never redeemed. The whole<br />

system fell, a huge and shapeless wreck, leaving the people of the State<br />

very much as they came into the world.... Everybody was in debt,<br />

without any possible means of payment. Lands became worthless, for<br />

the reason that no one had any money to pay for them.... Such<br />

numbers of people fled . . . from the State that the common return upon<br />

legal processes against debtors was in the very abbreviated form<br />

"G.T.T."—gone to Texas. 1<br />

Money, based on the full faith and credit of the state, met<br />

similar fates in Illinois, Kentucky, Florida, Tennessee, and Louisiana.<br />

When the state bank collapsed in Illinois in 1825, all of the<br />

"full-faith" bank notes left in its possession were ceremoniously<br />

burned at the public square. Another bank was formed in 1835 and<br />

collapsed in 1842. So devastating were these experiences that the<br />

Illinois Constitution of 1848 stipulated that, henceforth, the state<br />

should never again create a bank or own banking stock.<br />

In Arkansas, even real estate was tried as a magic wand.<br />

Subscribers to the state bank, instead of putting up cash, were<br />

allowed merely to pledge their real estate holdings as collateral.<br />

The bank notes rapidly plummeted in value to only twenty-five per<br />

cent of their face amount, and within four years, the bank was<br />

gone.<br />

THE MIRAGE OF FREE BANKING<br />

There was a parallel development at this time called "free<br />

banking." The name is an insult to truth. What was called free<br />

banking was merely the conversion of banks from corporations to<br />

private associations. Aside from no longer receiving a charter from<br />

the state, practically every other aspect of the system remained the<br />

same, including a multitude of government controls, regulations,<br />

supports, and other blocks against the free market. George Selgin<br />

reminds us that "permission to set up a bank was usually accompanied<br />

by numerous restrictions, including especially required loans<br />

to the state." 2<br />

1. Henry V. Poor, Money and Its Laws (London: Henry S. King and Co., 1877),<br />

p. 540.<br />

2. George A. Selgin, The TJieory ofFree Banking: Money Supply under Competitive Note<br />

Issue (Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman & Littlefield, 1988), p. 13.<br />

The free banks were no less fraudulent than the chartered<br />

banks. The old custom was revived of rushing gold coins from one<br />

bank to another just ahead of the bank examiners, and of "putting a<br />

ballast of lead, broken glass and (appropriately) ten-penny nails in<br />

the box under a thinner covering of gold coins." 1<br />

When one such<br />

free bank collapsed in Massachusetts, it was discovered that its<br />

bank note circulation of $500,000 was backed by exactly $86.48. 2<br />

Professor Hans Sennholz writes:<br />

Although economists disagree on many things, most see eye to<br />

eye on their acceptance of political control... These economists<br />

invariably point at American money and banking before the Civil War<br />

which, in their judgment, confirms their belief. In particular, they cite<br />

the "Free Banking Era" of 1838-1860 as a frightening example of<br />

turbulent banking and, therefore, applaud the legislation that<br />

strengthened the role of government.<br />

In reality, the instability experienced during the Free Banking Era<br />

was not caused by anything inherent in banking, but resulted from<br />

extensive political intervention..,, "Free banking" acts ... did not<br />

repeal burdensome statutory provisions and regulatory directives. In<br />

fact they added a few. 3<br />

For banking to have been truly free, the states would have had<br />

to do only two things: (1) enforce banking contracts the same as any<br />

other contract, and then (2)<br />

step out of the picture. By enforcing<br />

banking contracts, the executives of any bank which failed to<br />

redeem its currency in specie would have been sent to prison, an<br />

eventuality which soon would have put a halt to currency overissue.<br />

By stepping out of the picture and dropping the pretense of<br />

protecting the public with a barrage of rules, regulations, safety<br />

funds, and guarantees, people would have realized that it was their<br />

responsibility to be cautious and informed. But, instead, the banks<br />

continued to enjoy the special privilege of suspending payment<br />

without punishment, and the politicians clamored to convince the<br />

voters that they were taking care of everything.<br />

In short, throughout this entire period of bank failures, economic<br />

chaos, and fleecing of both investors and taxpayers, America<br />

I Galbraith,p. 87.<br />

2. Charles Beard, The Rise of American Civilization (New York: Macmillan, 1930),<br />

Vol. r, pp. 429-30.<br />

3. "Old Banking Myths/' by Hans F. Sennholz, The Freeman (Irvington-on-<br />

Hudson, New York), May, 1989, pp. 175-76.


368 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

LOAVES AND FISHES AND CIVIL WAR 369<br />

tried everything except full redemption by gold and silver. As the<br />

name of Andrew Jackson faded into history, so did the dream of<br />

honest banking.<br />

Not all banks were corrupt, and certainly not all bankers were<br />

conspirators against the public. There were many examples of<br />

honest men striving to act in an ethical manner in the discharge of<br />

their fiduciary responsibilities. But they were severely hampered<br />

by the system within which they labored, a system which, as<br />

previously illustrated, punished prudence and rewarded recklessness.<br />

In balance, the prudent banker was pushed aside by the<br />

mainstream and became but a footnote to the history of that period.<br />

INDUSTRIAL EXPANSION IN SPITE OF DISHONEST<br />

BANKING<br />

Another positive aspect to the picture is that it was during this<br />

same time that many business enterprises came into being and<br />

greatly prospered, albeit at the expense of those who had no desire<br />

to contribute. The great canals were dug, the railroads pushed back<br />

the frontier, boom towns sprang up along the way, prairies were<br />

turned into agricultural land, and new businesses followed in their<br />

wake. Much of this expansion was facilitated by a flood of<br />

fraudulent money created by the banks. Apologists for fractionalreserve<br />

banking have been prone to look at this development and<br />

conclude that, in net balance, it was a good thing. The fact that<br />

some people were cheated in order for others to prosper did not<br />

seem to be important. America just wouldn't have grown and<br />

prospered without funny money. Galbraith, for example, exudes:<br />

As civilization, or some approximation, came to an Indiana or<br />

Michigan crossroads in the 1830s or 1840s, so did a bank. Its notes,<br />

when used and loaned to a farmer to buy land, livestock, feed, seed,<br />

food or simple equipment, put him into business. If he and others<br />

prospered and paid off their loans, the bank survived. If he and others<br />

did not so prosper and pay, the bank failed, and someone — perhaps a<br />

local creditor, perhaps an eastern supplier—was left holding the<br />

worthless notes. But some borrowers from this bank were by now in<br />

business. Somewhere, someone holding the notes had made an<br />

involuntary contribution to the winning of the West.... The [banking]<br />

anarchy served the frontier far better than a more orderly system that<br />

kept a tight hand on credit could have done. 1<br />

pitted brother against brother.<br />

1. Galbraith, p. 85.<br />

r<br />

William Greider continues this rationale:<br />

"Reckless, booming anarchy/' in short, produced fundamental<br />

progress. It was not a stable system, racked as it was with bank failures<br />

and collapsed business ventures, outrageous speculation and<br />

defaulted loans. Yet it was also energetic and inventive, creating<br />

permanent economic growth that endured after the froth had blown<br />

away.<br />

This, of course, is a classic example of the failure of liberal<br />

economics. When evaluating a policy, it focuses only on one<br />

beneficial<br />

consequence for one group of people and ignores the<br />

multitude of harmful effects which befall all other groups. Yes, if we<br />

look only at the frontiersmen who acquired new ranches and<br />

established new business, the fractional-reserve system looks<br />

pretty good. But, if we add in to the equation all the financial losses<br />

to all of the people who were victimized by the system—what<br />

Galbraith calls "an involuntary contribution ,/ and what Greider<br />

lightly dismisses as "froth"—then the product is zero at best and, in<br />

terms of morality, is deeply in the negative.<br />

Galbraith, Greider, and other popular economists assume that<br />

the West could not possibly have been won with honest banking.<br />

Logic does not support such a conclusion. There is every reason to<br />

believe that the bank failures and the resulting business failures on<br />

the frontier all but canceled out the gains that were made by hard<br />

work and honest industry. Had these destructive convulsions been<br />

absent, as most of them would have been under a less chaotic<br />

system, there likely would have been fewer business starts, but a<br />

greater number would have finished, and it is entirely possible that<br />

the West would have been won even faster than it was.<br />

It's too bad the theory has never been tried.<br />

THE UNION IN JEOPARDY<br />

As chronicled in a previous section, economic conflict has<br />

always played a major role in fomenting war. There is no time in<br />

American history in which there was more economic conflict<br />

between segments of the population than there was prior to the<br />

Civil War. It is not surprising, therefore, that this period led directly<br />

into the nation's bloodiest war, made all the more tragic because it<br />

Gteider, p. 259.


370 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND LOAVES AND FISHES AND CIVIL WAR 371<br />

There are many popular myths about the cause of the War<br />

Between the States. Just as the Bolshevik Revolution is commonly<br />

believed to have been a spontaneous mass uprising against a<br />

tyrannical aristocracy, so, too, it is generally accepted that the Civil<br />

War was fought over the issue of slavery. That, at best, is a<br />

half-truth. Slavery was an issue, but the primary force for war was a<br />

clash between the economic interests of the North and the South.<br />

Even the issue of slavery itself was based on economics. It may<br />

have been a moral issue in the North where prosperity was derived<br />

from the machines of heavy industry, but in the agrarian South,<br />

where fields had to be tended by vast work forces of human labor,<br />

the issue was primarily a matter of economics.<br />

The relative unimportance of slavery as a cause for war was<br />

made clear by Lincoln himself during his campaign for the<br />

Presidency in 1860, and he repeated that message in his first<br />

inaugural address:<br />

Apprehension seems to exist among the people of the Southern<br />

States that by the accession of a Republican administration their<br />

property and their peace and personal security are to be<br />

endangered.... I have no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere<br />

with the institution of slavery in the states where it now exists. I<br />

believe I have no lawful right to do so, and I have no inclination to do<br />

so.<br />

Even after the outbreak of war in 1861, Lincoln confirmed his<br />

previous stand. He declared:<br />

My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and it is<br />

not either to save or destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without<br />

freeing any slave, I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing all the<br />

slaves, I would do it; and if I could do it by freeing some and leaving<br />

others alone, I would also do that.<br />

It may come as a surprise to learn that, by strict definition,<br />

Abraham Lincoln was a white supremacist. In his fourth debate<br />

with Senator Stephen Douglas, he addressed the subject bluntly:<br />

I am not nor ever have been in favor of bringing about in any way<br />

the social and political equality of the white and black races—that I am<br />

1. Don E. Fehrenbacher, ed., Abraham Lincoln: Speeches and Writings, 1859-1865<br />

(New York: Library of America, 1989), p. 215.<br />

2, Quoted by Robert L. Polley, ed., Lincoln: His Words and His World (Waukesha,<br />

Wisconsin: Country Beautiful Foundation, 1965), p. 54.<br />

not nor ever have been in favor of making voters or jurors of Negroes,<br />

nor of qualifying them to hold office, nor to intermarry with white<br />

people; and I will say in addition to this that there is a physical<br />

difference between the white and black races which I believe will<br />

forever forbid the two races living together on terms of social and<br />

political equality. And inasmuch as they cannot so live, while they do<br />

remain together there must be the position of superior and inferior,<br />

and I as much as any other man am in favor of having the superior<br />

position assigned to the white race. 1<br />

This is not to say that Lincoln was indifferent to the institution<br />

of slavery, for he felt strongly that it was a violation of personal and<br />

national<br />

morality, but he also knew that slavery was gradually<br />

being swept away all over the world—with the possible exception<br />

of Africa itself—and he believed that it would soon disappear in<br />

America simply by allowing the natural forces of enlightenment to<br />

work their way through the political system. He feared—and<br />

rightly so—that to demand immediate and total reform, not only<br />

would destroy the Union, it would lead to massive bloodshed and<br />

more human suffering than was endured even under slavery itself.<br />

He said:<br />

I have not allowed myself to forget that the abolition of the Slave<br />

trade by Great Britain was agitated a hundred years before it was a<br />

final success; that the measure had its open fire-eating opponents; its<br />

stealthy "don't-care" opponents; its dollar-and-cent opponents; its<br />

inferior-race opponents; its Negro-equality opponents; and its religion<br />

and good-order opponents; that all these opponents got offices, and<br />

their adversaries got none. But I have also remembered that though<br />

they blazed like tallow-candles for a century, at last they flickered in<br />

the socket, died out, stank in the dark for a brief season, and were<br />

remembered no more, even by the smell. School boys know that<br />

Wilbeforce and Granville Sharpe helped that cause forward; but who<br />

can now name a single man who labored to retard it? Remembering<br />

these things I cannot but regard it as possible that the higher object of<br />

this contest may not be completely attained within the term of my<br />

natural life.<br />

If Lincoln's primary goal in the War was not the abolition of<br />

slavery but simply to preserve the Union, the question arises: Why<br />

did the Union need preserving? Or, more pointedly, why did the<br />

Southern states want to secede?<br />

1. Fehrenbacher, p. 636.<br />

Ibid., p. 438.


372 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

LEGAL PLUNDER, NOT SLAVERY, THE CAUSE OF WAR<br />

The South, being predominantly an agricultural region, had to<br />

import practically all of its manufactured goods from the Northern<br />

states or from Europe, both of which reciprocated by providing a<br />

market for the South's cotton. However, many of the <strong>text</strong>iles and<br />

manufactured items were considerably cheaper from Europe, even<br />

after the cost of shipping had been added. The Southern states,<br />

therefore, often found it to their advantage to purchase these<br />

European goods rather than those made in the North. This put<br />

considerable competitive pressure on the American manufacturers<br />

to lower their prices and operate more efficiently.<br />

The Republicans were not satisfied with that arrangement.<br />

They decided to use the power of the federal government to tip the<br />

scales of competition in their favor. Claiming that this was in the<br />

"national interest/' they levied stiff import duties on almost every<br />

item coming from Europe that was also manufactured in the North.<br />

Not surprisingly, there was no duty applied to cotton which,<br />

presumedly, was not a commodity in the national interest One<br />

result was that European countries countered by stopping the<br />

purchase of U.S. cotton, which badly hurt the Southern economy.<br />

The other result was that manufacturers in the North were able to<br />

charge higher prices without fear of competition, and the South<br />

was forced to pay more for practically all of its necessities. It was a<br />

classic<br />

case of legalized plunder in which the law was used to<br />

enrich one group of citizens at the expense of another.<br />

Pressure from the North against slavery in the South made<br />

matters even more volatile. A fact often overlooked in this episode<br />

is that the cost of a slave was very high, around $1,500 each. A<br />

modest plantation with only forty or fifty slaves, therefore, had a<br />

large capital investment which, in terms of today's purchasing<br />

power, represented many millions of dollars. To the South, therefore,<br />

abolition meant, not only the loss of its ability to produce a<br />

cash crop, but the total destruction of an enormous capital base.<br />

Many Southern plantation owners were working toward the<br />

day when they could convert their investment to more profitable<br />

industrial production as had been done in the North, and others felt<br />

that freemen who were paid wages would be more efficient than<br />

slaves who had no incentive to work. For the present, however,<br />

they were stuck with the system they inherited. They felt<br />

that a<br />

LOAVES AND FISHES AND CIVIL WAR 373<br />

complete and sudden abolition of slavery with no transition period<br />

would destroy their economy and leave many of the former slaves<br />

to starve—all of which actually happened in due course. 1<br />

That was the situation that existed at the time of Lincoln's<br />

campaign and why, in his speeches, he attempted to calm the fears<br />

of the South about his intentions. But his words were mostly<br />

political rhetoric. Lincoln was a Republican, and he was totally<br />

dependent on the Northern industrialists who controlled the Party.<br />

Even if he had wanted to—and there is no indication that he<br />

did—he could not have reversed the trend of economic favoritism<br />

and protectionism that swept him into office.<br />

MEXICO AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE<br />

In addition to the conflicting interests between North and<br />

South, there were other forces also working to split the nation in<br />

two. Those forces were rooted in Europe and centered around the<br />

desire of France, Spain, and England to control the markets of Latin<br />

America. Mexico was the prime target. This was the reason the<br />

Monroe Doctrine had been formulated thirty-eight years previously.<br />

President James Monroe had put the European nations on<br />

notice that the United States would not interfere in their affairs, and<br />

that any interference by them in American affairs would not be<br />

tolerated. In particular, the proclamation said that the American<br />

continents were no longer to be considered as available for<br />

colonization.<br />

None of the European powers wanted to put this issue to the<br />

test, but they knew that if the United States were to become<br />

embroiled in a civil war, it could not also cross swords in Latin<br />

America. To encourage war between the states, therefore, was to<br />

pave the way for colonial expansion in Mexico. The Americas had<br />

become a giant chess board for the game of global politics.<br />

In the American Heritage Picture History of the Civil War, we read:<br />

The war had not progressed very far before it was clear that the<br />

ruling classes in each of these two countries [England and France]<br />

sympathized strongly with the Confederacy—so strongly that with<br />

just a little prodding they might be moved to intervene and bring<br />

about Southern independence by force of arms.... Europe's<br />

aristocracies had never been happy about the prodigious success of<br />

| See "No Civil War at All; Part One/' by WiUiam Mcllhany, Journal ofIndividualist<br />

Studies, Winter, 1992, p. 41.


374 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND LOAVES AND FISHES AND CIVIL WAR 375<br />

the Yankee democracy. If the nation now broke into halves, proving<br />

that democracy did not contain the stuff of survival, the rulers of<br />

Europe would be well pleased.<br />

The global chess match between Lincoln on the one side and<br />

England and France on the other was closely watched by the other<br />

leaders of Europe. One of the most candid observers at that time<br />

was the Chancellor of Germany, Otto von Bismarck. Since Bismarck<br />

was, himself, deeply obligated to the power of international<br />

finance, his observations are doubly revealing. He said:<br />

The division of the United States into federations of equal force<br />

was decided long before the Civil War by the high financial powers of<br />

Europe. These bankers were afraid that the United States, if they<br />

remained in one block and as one nation, would attain economic and<br />

financial independence, which would upset their financial domination<br />

over the Europe and the world. Of course, in the "inner circle" of<br />

Finance, the voice of the Rothschilds prevailed. They saw an<br />

opportunity for prodigious booty if they could substitute two feeble<br />

democracies, burdened with debt to the financiers,... in place of a<br />

vigorous Republic sufficient unto herself. Therefore, they sent<br />

their<br />

emissaries into the field to exploit the question of slavery and to drive<br />

a wedge between the two parts of the Union.. . .<br />

The rupture between<br />

the North and the South became inevitable; the masters of European<br />

finance employed all their forces to bring it about and to rum it to their<br />

advantage.<br />

The strategy was simple but effective. Within months after the<br />

first clash of arms between North and South, France had landed<br />

troops in Mexico. By 1864, the Mexicans were subdued, and the<br />

French monarch installed Ferdinand Maximilian as the puppet<br />

emperor. The Confederacy found a natural ally in Maximilian, and<br />

it was anticipated by both groups that, after the successful execution<br />

of the War, they would combine into a new nation<br />

dominated by the financial power of Rothschild, of course. At the<br />

same time, England moved eleven-thousand troops into Canada,<br />

1. Bruce Catton, author; Richard M. Ketchum, ed v The American Heritage Picture<br />

History of the Civil War (New York: American Heritage Publishing Co., I960), p. 249.<br />

2. This statement was quoted by Conrad Siem, a German who became a U.S.<br />

citizen and who wrote about the lifeand views of Bismark. It was published in La<br />

Vieille France, No. 216, March 17-24, 1921, pp. 13-16. The reader should be<br />

cautioned that Bismarck was no paragon of virtue and, as the father of modern<br />

socialism, his political views should be taken with a healthy degree of caution. All<br />

that aside, there is little doubt that this quotation represents an accurate appraisal<br />

of the machinations of the European Cabal at that time.<br />

positioned them menacingly along the Union's northern flank, and<br />

placed the British fleet onto war-time alert<br />

The European powers were closing in for a checkmate.<br />

SUMMARY<br />

The Second Bank of the United States was dead, but banking<br />

was very much alive. Many of the old problems continued, and<br />

new ones arrived. The issuance of banknotes had been severely<br />

limited, but that was largely offset by the increasing use of<br />

checkbook money, which had no limits at all on its issue.<br />

When the Bank of the U.S. slipped into history, the nation was<br />

nearing the end of the boom phase of a boom /bust cycle. When the<br />

inevitable contraction of the money supply came, politicians began<br />

to offer proposals on how to infuse stability into the banking<br />

system. None dealt with the real problem, which was fractionalreserve<br />

banking itself. They concentrated instead on proposals on<br />

how to make it work. All of these proposals were tried and they<br />

failed.<br />

These years are sometimes described as a period of free<br />

banking, which is an insult to truth. All that happened was that<br />

banks were converted from corporations to private associations, a<br />

change in form, not substance. They continued to be burdened by<br />

^government controls, regulations, supports, and other blocks<br />

against the free market.<br />

The economic chaos and conflict of this period was a major<br />

cause of the Civil War. Lincoln made it clear during his public<br />

speeches that slavery was not the issue. The basic problem was the<br />

North and the South were dependent on each other for trade. The<br />

industrialized North sold its products to the South which sold its<br />

•cotton to the North. The South also had a similar trade with<br />

Europe, and that was an annoyance to the North. Europe was<br />

selling many products at lower prices, and the North was losing<br />

-market share. Northern politicians passed protectionist legislation<br />

putting import duties on industrial products. This all but stopped<br />

§he importation of European goods and forced the South to buy<br />

(from the North at higher prices. Europe retaliated by curtailing the<br />

burchase of American cotton. That hurt the South even more. It was<br />

a classic case of legalized plunder, and the South wanted out.<br />

1 . Catton and Ketchum, p. 250. Also Otto Eisenschiml, The Hidden Face of the Civil<br />

War (New York: Bobbs-Merril, 1961), p. 25.


376 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

Meanwhile, there were powerful forces in Europe that wanted<br />

to see America embroiled in civil war. If she could be split into two<br />

hostile countries, there would be less obstacle to European expansion<br />

on the North American continent. France was eager to capture<br />

Mexico and graft it onto a new empire which would include many<br />

of the Southern states as well. England, on the other hand, had<br />

military forces poised along the Canadian border ready for action.<br />

Political agitators, funded and organized from Europe, were active<br />

on both sides of the Mason-Dixon line. The issue of slavery was but<br />

a ploy. America had become the target in a ruthless game of world<br />

economics and politics.<br />

Chapter Nineteen<br />

GREENBACKS AND<br />

OTHER CRIMES<br />

The causes of the Civil War shown to be economic<br />

and political, not the issue offreedom vs. slavery;<br />

the manner in which both sides used fiat money to<br />

finance the war; the important role played by<br />

foreign powers.<br />

In the previous chapter, we saw how the American continent<br />

had become a giant chess board in a game of global politics. The<br />

European powers had been anxious to see the United States<br />

become embroiled in a civil war and eventually break into two<br />

smaller and weaker nations. That would pave the way for their<br />

further colonization of Latin America without fear of the Americans<br />

being able to enforce the Monroe Doctrine. And so it was that,<br />

within a few months after the outbreak of war between North and<br />

South, France landed troops in Mexico and, by 1864, had installed<br />

Maximilian as her puppet monarch. Negotiations were begun<br />

immediately to bring Mexico into the war on the side of the<br />

Confederacy. England moved her troops to the Canadian border in<br />

a show of strength. America was facing what appeared to be a<br />

checkmate from the powers in Europe.<br />

RUSSIA AUGNS WITH THE NORTH<br />

It was a masterful move that possibly could have won the game<br />

had not an unexpected event tipped the scale against it. Tsar<br />

Alexander II—who, incidentally, had never allowed a central bank<br />

to be established in Russia —notified Lincoln that he stood ready<br />

to militarily align with the North. Although the Tsar had recently<br />

freed the serfs in his own country, his primary motivation for<br />

1- His grandson, Tsar Nicholas, II, did accept loans from J.P. Morgan. In a classic<br />

application of the Rothschild Formula, Morgan also funded the Mensheviks and the<br />

Bolsheviks. The Mensheviks forced Nicholas to abdicate, and the Bolsheviks executed<br />

him. See Chernow, pp. 195, 211.


378 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND GREENBACKS AND OTHER CRIMES 379<br />

coming to the aid of the Union undoubtedly had little to do with<br />

emancipating the slaves in the South. England and France had been<br />

maneuvering to break up the Russian empire by splitting off<br />

Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Crimea, and Georgia. Napoleon<br />

III,<br />

of France, proposed to Great Britain and Austria that the three<br />

nations immediately declare war on Russia to hasten this dismemberment.<br />

Knowing that war was being considered by his enemies, Tsar<br />

Alexander decided to play a chess game of his own. In September<br />

of 1863, he dispatched his Baltic fleet of war ships to Alexandria,<br />

Virginia, and his Asiatic fleet to San Francisco. The significance of<br />

this move was explained by Russian-born Carl Wrangell-<br />

Rokassowsky:<br />

No treaty was signed between Russia and the United States, but<br />

their mutual interest, and the threat of war to both, unified these two<br />

nations at this critical moment. By dispatching his Baltic Fleet to the<br />

North American harbors, the Tsar changed his position from a<br />

defensive to an offensive one. Paragraph 3 of the instructions given to<br />

Admiral Lessovsky by Admiral Krabbe, at that time Russian Secretary<br />

of the Navy, dated July 14th, 1863, ordered the Russian Fleet, in case of<br />

war, to attack the enemies' commercial shipping and their colonies so<br />

as to cause them the greatest possible damage. The same instructions<br />

were given to Admiral Popov, Commander of the Russian Asiatic<br />

Fleet.<br />

The presence of the Russian Navy helped the Union enforce a<br />

devastating naval blockade against the Southern states which<br />

denied them access to critical supplies from Europe. It was not that<br />

these ships single-handedly kept the French and English vessels at<br />

bay. Actually there is<br />

no record of them even firing upon each<br />

other, but that is the point. The fact that neither France nor England<br />

at that time wanted to risk becoming involved in an open war with<br />

the United States and Russia led them to be extremely cautious with<br />

overt military aid to the South. Throughout the entire conflict, they<br />

found it expedient to remain officially neutral. Without the inhibiting<br />

effect of the presence of the Russian fleet, the course of the war<br />

could have been significantly different.<br />

I<br />

The beginning of the war did not go well for the North, and in<br />

the early years, the outcome was far from certain. Not only did the<br />

Union army face repeated defeats on the battlefield, but enthusiasm<br />

from the people at home was badly sagging. As mentioned<br />

previously, at the outset this was not a popular war based on<br />

humanitarian principle; it was a war of business interests. That<br />

presented two serious problems for the North. The first was how to<br />

get people to fight, and the second was how to get them to pay.<br />

Both problems were solved by the simple expediency of violating<br />

the Constitution.<br />

THE EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION<br />

To get people to fight, it was decided to convert the war into an<br />

anti-slavery crusade. The Emancipation Proclamation was primarily<br />

a move on the part of Lincoln to fan the dying embers of support<br />

for the "Rich-man's war and the poor-man's fight/' as it was<br />

commonly called in the North. Furthermore, it was not an amendment<br />

to the Constitution nor even an act of Congress. It was issued,<br />

totally without constitutional authority, as the solitary order of<br />

Lincoln himself, acting as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces.<br />

Preservation of the Union was not enough to fire men's<br />

enthusiasm for war. Only the higher issue of freedom could do<br />

that. To make the cause of freedom synonymous with the cause of<br />

the North, there was no alternative but to officially declare against<br />

slavery. After having emphasized over and over again that slavery<br />

was not the reason for war, Lincoln later explained why he changed<br />

his course and issued the Proclamation:<br />

Things had gone from bad to worse until I felt we had reached the<br />

end of our rope on the plan we were pursuing; that we had about<br />

played our last card, and must change our tactics or lose the game. I<br />

now determined upon the adoption of the emancipation policy.<br />

The rhetoric of the Proclamation was superb, but the concept<br />

left a great deal to be desired. Bruce Catton, writing in the American<br />

Heritage Pictorial History of the Civil War explains:<br />

Technically, the proclamation was almost absurd. It proclaimed<br />

freedom for all slaves in precisely those areas where the United States<br />

could not make its authority effective, and allowed slavery to continue<br />

in slave states which remained under Federal control. . . . But in the end<br />

1. Carl Wrangell-Rokassowsky, Before the Storm (Ventimiglia, Italy: Tipo-<br />

Litografia Ligure, 1972), p. 57.<br />

1. Quoted by Charles Adams, Fight, Flight, Fraud: The Story of Taxation (Curacao,<br />

Th, The Netherlands: Euro-Dutch Publishers, 1982), p. 229.


380 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND GREENBACKS AND OTHER CRIMES 381<br />

it<br />

changed the whole character of the war and, more than any other<br />

single thing, doomed the Confederacy to defeat.<br />

The Proclamation had a profound impact on the European<br />

powers as well. As long as the war had been viewed as an attempt<br />

on the part of a government to put down rebellion, there was<br />

nothing sacred about it, and there was no stigma attached to<br />

helping either side. But now thatfreedom was the apparent issue, no<br />

government in Europe—least of all England and France—dared to<br />

anger its own subjects by taking sides against a country that was<br />

trying to destroy slavery. After 1862 the chance that Europe would<br />

militarily intervene on behalf of the Confederacy rapidly faded to<br />

zero. On the propaganda front, the South had been maneuvered<br />

into a position which could not be defended in the modern world.<br />

Converting the war into an antislavery crusade was a brilliant<br />

move on Lincoln's part, and it resulted in a surge of voluntary<br />

recruits into the Union army. But this did not last. Northerners may<br />

have disapproved of slavery in the South but, once the bloodletting<br />

began in earnest, their willingness to die for that conviction began<br />

to wane. At the beginning of the war, enlistments were for only<br />

three months and, when that period was over, many of the soldiers<br />

declined to renew. Lincoln faced the embarrassing reality that he<br />

soon would have no army to carry on the crusade.<br />

RAISING ARMIES ON BOTH SIDES<br />

Historically, men are willing to take up arms to defend their<br />

families, their homes, and their country when threatened by a<br />

hostile foe. But the only way to get them to fight in a war in which<br />

they have no perceived personal interest is either to pay them large<br />

bonuses and bounties or toforce them to do so by conscription. It is<br />

not surprising, therefore, that both methods were employed to<br />

keep the Union army in the field. Furthermore, although the<br />

Constitution specifies that only Congress can declare war and raise<br />

an army, Lincoln did so entirely on his own authority.<br />

The Northern states were given an opportunity to fill<br />

a specified<br />

quota with volunteers before conscription began. To meet<br />

these quotas and to avoid the draft, every state, township, and<br />

county developed an elaborate bounty system. By 1864, there were<br />

1 Catton and Ketchum, p. 252.<br />

2. Congress later ratified Lincoln's actions, but, by that time, it had little choice.<br />

The War was underway.<br />

many areas where a man could receive more than $1,000<br />

equivalent to over $50,000 today —<br />

just for joining the army. A<br />

person of wealth could avoid the draft simply by paying a<br />

commutation fee or by hiring someone else to serve in his place.<br />

In the South, the government was even more bold in its<br />

approach to conscription. Despite its cherished views on states'<br />

rights, the Confederacy immediately gathered into Richmond<br />

many of the powers and prerogatives of a centralized, national<br />

government. In 1862 it passed a conscription law which placed<br />

exclusive control over every male citizen between the ages of<br />

eighteen and thirty-five into the hands of the Confederate President.<br />

As in the North, there were important loopholes. The owner<br />

or overseer of twenty slaves, for example, could not be called into<br />

military service.<br />

In all fairness, it must be noted that many did not<br />

take advantage of this exclusion. In contrast to the North, soldiers<br />

perceived that they were fighting for the defense of their families,<br />

homes, and property rather than for an abstract cause or for a cash<br />

bounty.<br />

REBELLION IN THE NORTH<br />

When conscription was initiated by Lincoln in 1863, people in<br />

&he North were outraged. In New York's Madison Square,<br />

thousands of protesters marched in torch parades and attended<br />

anti-Lincoln rallies.<br />

Historian James Horan describes the mood:<br />

''When caricatures of the President were lifted above the speaker's<br />

stand, hisses rose to fill the night with the noise of a million angry<br />

bees/'<br />

Federal troops eventually had to be called in to put down<br />

Itfitidraft riots in Ohio and Illinois. In New York City, when the first<br />

names of the draft were published in the papers on July 12, mobs<br />

Stormed the draft offices and set fire to buildings. The riots<br />

continued for four days and were suppressed only when the<br />

federal Army of the Potomac was ordered to fire into the crowds.<br />

Over a thousand civilians were killed or wounded.<br />

After the passage of many years, it is easy to forget that Lincoln<br />

had an insurrection on his hands in the North as well as in the<br />

South. The shooting of a thousand civilians by soldiers of their own<br />

1. Catton and Ketchum, pp. 484-85.<br />

2. James D. Horan, Confederate Agent: A Discovery in History (New York: Crown,<br />

1954), p. 209.<br />

3. Catton and Ketchum, pp. 486, 511.


382 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND GREENBACKS AND OTHER CRIMES 383<br />

government is a tragedy of mammoth proportions and it tells much<br />

about the desperate state of the Union at that time. To control that<br />

insurrection, Lincoln ignored the Constitution once again by suspending<br />

the right of Imbeas corpus, which made it possible for the<br />

government to imprison its critics without formal charges and<br />

without trial. Thus, under the banner of opposing slavery,<br />

American citizens in the North, not only were killed on the streets<br />

of their own cities, they were put into military combat against their<br />

will and thrown into prison without due process of law. In other<br />

words, free men were enslaved so that slaves could be made free.<br />

Even if the pretended crusade had been genuine, it was a bad<br />

exchange.<br />

How to get people to pay for the war was handled in a similar<br />

fashion. If the Constitution could be pushed aside on the issue of<br />

personal rights and of war itself, it certainly would not stand in the<br />

way of mere funding.<br />

It has often been said that truth is the first casualty in war. To<br />

which we should add: money is the second. During the fiscal year<br />

ending in 1861, expenses of the federal government had been<br />

$67 million. After the first year of armed conflict they were<br />

$475 million and, by 1865, had risen to one billion, three-hundred<br />

million dollars. On the income side of the ledger, taxes covered only<br />

about eleven per cent of that figure. By the end of the war, the<br />

deficit had risen to $2.61 billion. That money had to come from<br />

somewhere.<br />

INCOME TAXES AND WAR BONDS<br />

The nation's first experiment with the income tax was tried at<br />

this time; another violation of the Constitution. By today's standards<br />

it was a small bite, but it was still an extremely unpopular<br />

measure, and Congress knew that any additional taxes would<br />

further fan the flames of rebellion.<br />

Previously, the traditional source of funding in time of war had<br />

been the banks which simply created money under the pretense of<br />

loaning it. But that method had been severely hampered by the<br />

demise of the Bank of the United States. The state banks were<br />

anxious to step into that role; but, by this time, most of them had<br />

already defaulted in their promise to pay in specie and were in no<br />

position to manufacture further money, at least not money which<br />

the public would be willing to accept.<br />

American banks may have been unable to supply adequate<br />

loans, but the Rothschild consortium in Britain was both able and<br />

willing. It was during this time that the Rothschilds were consolidating<br />

their new industrial holdings in the United States through<br />

their agent, August Belmont. Derek Wilson tells us: "They owned<br />

or had major shareholdings in Central American ironworks, North<br />

American canal construction companies, and a multiplicity of other<br />

concerns. They became the major importers of bullion from the<br />

newly discovered goldfields."<br />

Belmont had placed large amounts of Rothschild money into<br />

the bonds of state-sponsored banks in the South. Those bonds, of<br />

course, had fallen in value to practically zero. As the war shifted in<br />

favor of the North, however, he began to buy up as many<br />

additional bonds as he could, paying but a few pennies on each<br />

dollar of face value. It was his plan to have the Union force the<br />

Southern states at the end of the war to honor all of their pre-war<br />

debt obligations—in full. That, of course, would have been a source<br />

of gigantic speculative profits to the Rothschilds. Meanwhile, on<br />

the northern side of the Mason-Dixon Line, Belmont became the<br />

chief agent for the sale of Union bonds in England and France. It<br />

was rumored that, when Belmont called on President Lincoln and<br />

personally offered Rothschild money at 27 Vi per cent interest, he<br />

was rudely thrown out of the office. The story is doubtful, but it<br />

represents a larger truth. Profiting from war and placing money on<br />

both sides of the conflict were exactly the kind of maneuvers for<br />

which the Rothschilds had become famous throughout Europe and<br />

were now practicing in America.<br />

In the North, the sale of government bonds was the one<br />

measure for raising funds that seemed to work. Even that,<br />

however, with the lure of compounded interest to be paid in gold at<br />

a future date, failed to raise more than about half the needed<br />

amount. So the Union faced a real dilemma. The only options<br />

remaining were (1) terminate the war or (2) print fiat money. For<br />

Lincoln and the Republicans who controlled Congress, the choice<br />

Was never seriously in doubt.<br />

The precedent had already been set during the War of 1812. At<br />

that time, Secretary of the Treasury, Albert Gallatin, had abrogated<br />

the Constitutional ban against "bills of credit" by printing Treasury<br />

1- See Derek Wilson, p. 178.


384 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND GREENBACKS AND OTHER CRIMES 385<br />

notes, most of which paid interest at 5.4 per cent. The money was<br />

tender, and that probably was the basis on<br />

never declared legal<br />

which it was defended as constitutional.<br />

THE GREENBACKS<br />

By the time of the War Between the States, however, all<br />

pretense at constitutionality had been dropped. In 1862, Congress<br />

authorized the Treasury to print $150 million worth of bills of credit<br />

and put them into circulation as money to pay for its<br />

They were declared as legal tender for all<br />

expenses.<br />

private debts but could<br />

not be used for government duties or taxes. The notes were printed<br />

with green ink and, thus, became immortalized as "greenbacks."<br />

Voters were assured that this was a one-time emergency measure, a<br />

promise that was soon broken. By the end of the war, a total of<br />

$432 million in greenbacks had been issued.<br />

The pragmatic mood in Washington was that a constitution is<br />

nice to have in times of peace, but an unaffordable luxury in war.<br />

Salmon P. Chase, for example, as Secretary of the Treasury,<br />

strongly endorsed the greenbacks which were issued under his<br />

direction. They were, in his words, an "indispensable necessity."<br />

Eight years later, as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, he declared<br />

that they were unconstitutional. Had he changed his mind? Not at<br />

all. When he endorsed them, the nation was at war. When he<br />

declared them unconstitutional, it was at peace. It was merely<br />

another example of the universal trait of all governments in time of<br />

war. That trait was presented in a previous section as the premise<br />

of the Rothschild Formula: "The sanctity of its laws, the prosperity<br />

of its citizens, and the solvency of its treasury will be quickly<br />

sacrificed by any government in its primal act of self-survival."<br />

The pressure for issuance of greenbacks originated in Congress,<br />

but Lincoln was an enthusiastic supporter. His view was that:<br />

Government, possessing power to create and issue currency and<br />

credit as money and enjoying the right to withdraw currency and<br />

credit from circulation by taxation and otherwise, need not and should<br />

not borrow capital at interest... The privilege of creating and issuing<br />

money is not only the supreme prerogative of the government but it is<br />

the government's greatest creative opportunity.<br />

It would appear that Lincoln objected to having the government<br />

pay interest to the banks for money they create out of nothing<br />

when the government can create money out of nothing just as easily<br />

and not pay interest on it. If one ignores the fact that both of these<br />

schemes are forbidden by the Constitution and is willing to tolerate<br />

the plunder-by-inflation that is the consequence of both, then there<br />

is an appealing logic to the argument. The politicians continue to<br />

have their fiat money, but at least the banks are denied a free ride.<br />

LINCOLN'S MIXED VIEW OF BANKING<br />

It is apparent that Lincoln had undergone a change of heart<br />

regarding banks. Early in his political career, he had been a friend<br />

of the banking industry and an advocate of easy credit. As a<br />

member of the Whig political party in the 1830s—before becoming<br />

a Republican in his campaign for the Presidency—he had been a<br />

supporter of Biddle's Second Bank of the United States. During his<br />

famous debates with Senator Stephen Douglas, one of the points of<br />

contention between the two was that Lincoln defended the Bank<br />

and advocated its reestablishment. Furthermore, after becoming<br />

President, he took the initiative in requesting Congress to reestablish<br />

central banking.<br />

Lincoln appears to have been inconsistent, and one gets a<br />

gnawing feeling that, in his effort to finance an unpopular war, he<br />

sometimes found it necessary, like Salmon Chase and other politicians<br />

of the time, to anesthetize his personal convictions and do<br />

whatever was required to meet the exigencies of governmental<br />

survival.<br />

One thing, however, is clear. Regardless of Lincoln's personal<br />

rs on money, the greenbacks were not pleasing to the bankers<br />

who were thereby denied their customary override on government<br />

debt. They were anxious to have this federal fiat money replaced by<br />

bank fiat money. For that to be possible, it would be necessary to<br />

create a whole new monetary system with government bonds used<br />

as backing for the issuance of bank notes; in other words, a return<br />

to central banking. And that was precisely what Secretary Chase<br />

was preparing to establish.<br />

1. This is taken from an abstract of Lincoln's monetary policy that was prepared<br />

by the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress. Quoted by Owen,<br />

I. See Lincoln's speech on the Sub-Treasury, Fehrenbacher, pp. 56-57.<br />

i. See Lincoln's annual message to Congress, December 1, 1862, Fehrenbacher,<br />

p. 91. " p. 398.


, Another<br />

386 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND GREENBACKS AND OTHER CRIMES 387<br />

In 1862, the basic position of the bankers was outlined in a<br />

memo, called The Hazard Circular, prepared by an American agent<br />

of British financiers and circulated among the country's wealthy<br />

businessmen. It said:<br />

The great debt that capitalists will see to it is made out of the war<br />

must be used as a means to control the volume of money. To<br />

accomplish this the bonds must be used as a banking basis. We are<br />

now waiting for the Secretary of the Treasury to make this<br />

recommendation to Congress. It will not do to allow the greenback, as<br />

it is called, to circulate as money any length of time, as we cannot<br />

control that. But we can control the bonds and through them the bank<br />

issues.<br />

THE NATIONAL BANKING ACT<br />

On February 25, 1863, Congress passed the National Banking<br />

Act (with major amendments the following year) which established<br />

a new system of nationally-chartered banks. The structure was<br />

similar to the Bank of the United States with the exception that,<br />

instead of one central bank with power to influence the activities of<br />

the others, there were now to be many national banks with control<br />

over all of them coming from Washington. Most banking legislation<br />

is sold to the public under the attractive label of reform. The<br />

National Banking Act was one of the rare exceptions. It was<br />

promoted fairly honestly as a wartime emergency scheme to raise<br />

money for military expenses by creating a market for government<br />

bonds and then transforming those bonds into circulating money.<br />

Here is how it worked:<br />

When a national bank purchased government bonds, it did not<br />

hold on to them. It turned them back to the Treasury which<br />

exchanged them for an equal amount of "United States Bank<br />

Notes" with the bank's name engraved on them. The government<br />

declared these to be legal tender for taxes and duties, and that<br />

status caused them to be generally accepted by the public as<br />

money. The bank's net cost for these bonds was zero, because they<br />

got their money back immediately. Technically, the bank still<br />

owned the bonds and collected interest on them, but they also had<br />

the use of an equal amount of newly created bank-note money<br />

which also could be loaned out at interest. When all the smoke and<br />

1. The Hon. Charles A, Lindburgh, Banking and Currency and the Money Trust<br />

(Washington, D.C: National Capital Press, 1913), p. 102.<br />

mirrors were moved away, it was merely a variation on the ancient<br />

scheme. The monetary and political scientists had simply converted<br />

government debt into money, and the bankers were collecting a<br />

substantial fee at both ends for their service.<br />

The one shortcoming of the system, at least from the point of<br />

view of the manipulators, was that, even though the bank notes<br />

were widely circulated, they were not classified as "lawful" money.<br />

In other words, they were not legal tender for all debts, just for<br />

taxes and duties. Precious-metal coins and greenbacks were still the<br />

country's official money. It was not until the arrival of the Federal<br />

Reserve System fifty years later that government debt in the form<br />

of bank notes would be mandated as the nation's official money for<br />

all transactions—under penalty of law.<br />

The National Banking Act of 1863 required banks to keep a<br />

percentage of their notes and deposits in the form of lawful money<br />

(gold coins) as a reserve to cover the possibility of a run. That<br />

percentage varied depending on the size and location of the bank<br />

but, on an average, it was about twelve per cent. That means a bank<br />

with $1 million in coin deposits could use approximately $880,000<br />

of that ($1 million less 12%) to purchase government bonds,<br />

exchange the bonds for bank notes, lend out the bank notes, and<br />

collect interest on both the bonds and the loans. The bank could now<br />

earn interest on $880,000 loaned to the government in the form of<br />

coins plus interest on $880,000 loaned to its customers in the form of<br />

bank notes. That doubled the bank's income without the inconvenience<br />

of having to increase its capital. Needless to say, the<br />

bonds were gobbled up just as fast as they could be printed, and the<br />

problem of funding the war had been solved.<br />

consequence of the national banking system was to<br />

make it impossible from that date forward for the federal government<br />

ever to get out of debt- Please reread that statement. It is not<br />

an exaggeration. Even friends of central-banking are forced to<br />

admit this reality. Galbraith says gloomily:<br />

Rarely has economic circumstance managed more successfully to<br />

confound the most prudent in economic foresight. In numerous years<br />

1 That represents the theoretical maximum. The actual numbers would have been<br />

lightly less due to the fact that banks seldom were able to keep a full 100% of their<br />

bank notes circulating in the form of loans. The functional asset leverage probably<br />

averaged about 70% rather than 88%.


388 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND GREENBACKS AND OTHER CRIMES 389<br />

following the war the Federal government ran a heavy surplus. It<br />

could not pay off its debt, retire its securities, because to do so meant<br />

there would be no bonds to back the national bank notes. To pay off<br />

the debt was to destroy the money supply.<br />

As pointed out in a previous section, that is essentially the<br />

situation which exists today. Every dollar of our currency and<br />

checkbook money was created by the act of lending. If all debt were<br />

repaid, our entire money supply would vanish back into the<br />

inkwells and computers. The national debt is the principal foundation<br />

upon which money is created for private debt. To pay off or<br />

even greatly reduce the national debt would cripple our monetary<br />

system. No politician would dare to advocate that, even if surplus<br />

funds were available in the Treasury. The Federal Reserve System,<br />

therefore, has virtually locked our nation into perpetual debt.<br />

THE HIDDEN COST OF WAR<br />

The third consequence of the National Banking Act will come<br />

as no surprise to anyone who has survived the previous pages of<br />

this book. During the war, the purchasing power of the greenbacks<br />

fell by 65%. The money supply increased by 138%. Prices more than<br />

doubled while wages rose by less than half. By that mechanism,<br />

Americans surrendered to the government and to the banks more<br />

than half of all the money they earned or held during that<br />

period—in addition to their taxes.<br />

Financial conditions in the South were even worse. With the<br />

exception of the seizure of about $400,000 in gold from the Federal<br />

mint at New Orleans, almost all of the war was funded by the<br />

printing of fiat money. Confederate notes increased in volume by<br />

214% per year, while the volume of all money, including bank<br />

notes and check-book money, rose by over 300% per year. In<br />

addition to the Confederate notes, each of the Southern states<br />

issued its own fiat money and, by the end of the war, the total of all<br />

notes was about a billion dollars. Within the four-year period,<br />

prices shot up by 9,100%. After Appomattox, of course, Confederate<br />

notes and bonds alike were totally worthless.<br />

1. Galbraith, p. 90.<br />

2. See chapter ten, The Mandrake Mechanism.<br />

3. See Paul and Lehrman, pp. 80-81 ; Groseclose, Money and Man, p. 193; Galbraith,<br />

pp. 93-94; Rothbard, Mystery, p. 222.<br />

4. See Galbraith, p. 94. Also Paul and Lehrman, p. 81.<br />

As usual, the average citizen did not understand that the newly<br />

created money represented a hidden tax which he would soon have<br />

Ito pay in the form of higher prices. Voters in the Northern states<br />

certainly would not have tolerated an open and honest tax increase<br />

of that magnitude. Even in the South where the cause was<br />

perceived as one of self defense, it is possible that they would not<br />

have done so had they known in advance the true dimension of the<br />

assessment. But especially in the North, because they did not<br />

understand the secret science of money, Americans not only paid<br />

the hidden tax but applauded Congress for creating it.<br />

On June 25, 1863, exactly four months after the National Bank<br />

Act was signed into law, a confidential communique was sent from<br />

the Rothschild investment house in London to an associate banking<br />

firm in New York. It contained an amazingly frank and boastful<br />

summary:<br />

The few who understand the system [bank loans earning interest<br />

and also serving as money] will either be so interested in its profits or<br />

so dependent upon its favors that there will be no opposition from that<br />

class while, on the other hand, the great body of people, mentally<br />

incapable of comprehending,... will bear its burdens without<br />

complaint,<br />

LINCOLN'S CONCERN FOR THE FUTURE<br />

Lincoln was privately apprehensive about the Bank Act, but<br />

loyalty to his Party and the need to maintain unity in time of war<br />

compelled him to withhold his veto. His personal view, however,<br />

was unequivocal. In a letter to William Elkins the following year he<br />

said:<br />

The money power preys upon the nation in times of peace and<br />

conspires against it in times of adversity. It is more despotic than<br />

monarchy, more insolent than autocracy, more selfish than<br />

bureaucracy. I see in the near future a crisis approaching that unnerves<br />

me and causes me to tremble for the safety of my country.<br />

Corporations have been enthroned, an era of corruption will follow,<br />

and the money power of the country will endeavor to prolong its reign<br />

by working upon the prejudices of the people, until the wealth is<br />

aggregated in a few hands, and the republic destroyed. 2<br />

j* Quoted by Owen, pp. 99-100.<br />

2- A letter to William F. Elkins, November 21, 1864. Archer H. Shaw, ed., The<br />

uncoln Encyclopedia; The Spoken and Written Words of A. Lincoln (New York:<br />

MacmilJan Co., 1950), p. 40.


390 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND GREENBACKS AND OTHER CRIMES 391<br />

In reviewing Lincoln's role throughout this painful chapter of<br />

history, it is impossible not to feel ambivalence. On the one hand,<br />

he declared war without Congress, suspended the writ of habeas<br />

corpus, and issued the Emancipation Proclamation, not as an<br />

administrative executive carrying out the wishes of Congress, but<br />

as the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. Furthermore, the<br />

Proclamation was not issued out of humanitarian motives, as<br />

popular history portrays, but as a maneuver to generate popular<br />

support for the war. By participating in the issuance of the<br />

greenbacks, he violated one of the most clearly written and<br />

important sections of the Constitution. And by failing to veto the<br />

National Bank Act, he acquiesced in the delivery of the American<br />

people back into the hands of the international Cabal, an act which<br />

was similar in many ways to the forcible return of captured<br />

runaway slaves.<br />

On the positive side, there is no question of Lincoln's patriotism.<br />

His concern was in preserving the Union, not the Constitution,<br />

and his refusal to let the European powers split America into a<br />

cluster of warring nation-states was certainly wise. Lincoln<br />

believed that he had to violate part of the Constitution in order to<br />

save the whole. But that is dangerous reasoning. It can be used in<br />

almost any national crisis as the excuse for the expansion of<br />

totalitarian power. There is no reason to believe that the only way<br />

to save the Union was to scrap the Constitution. In fact, if the<br />

Constitution had been meticulously observed from the very beginning,<br />

the Southern minority could never have been legally plundered<br />

by the Northern majority and there likely would have been<br />

no movement for secession in the first place. And, even if there had<br />

been, a strict reading of the Constitution at that point could have<br />

led the way to an honorable and peaceful settlement of differences.<br />

The result would have been, not only the preservation of the Union<br />

without war, but Americans would be enjoying far less government<br />

intervention in their daily lives today.<br />

WITH MALICE TOWARD NONE<br />

There is one point that is clearly on Lincoln's side. While his<br />

political compatriots were howling for economic vengeance against<br />

the South, the President stood firmly against it. "With malice<br />

toward none" was more than a slogan with him, and he was willing<br />

to risk his political survival on that one issue. The reason he had<br />

vetoed the Wade-Davis emancipation bill was because it would<br />

have applied a lien against Southern cotton at the end of the war to<br />

the benefit of New England <strong>text</strong>ile manufactures. The cotton also<br />

would have been taken as security to pay off Southern debt which<br />

had been contracted before the war, thus providing the funds to<br />

buy back at face value all of the bonds which had been purchased at<br />

discount by Rothschild's agent, August Belmont. Such defiance of<br />

the financiers and speculators undoubtedly required great courage.<br />

But the issue ran deeper than that. Lincoln had offered a<br />

general amnesty to any citizen in the South who would agree to<br />

take a loyalty oath to the Union. When ten per cent of the voters<br />

had taken such an oath, he proposed that they could then elect<br />

Congressmen, Senators, and a state government which would be<br />

recognized as part of the Union once again. The Republicans, on<br />

the other hand, had incorporated into the Wade-Davis bill the<br />

provision that each seceded state was to be treated like a conquered<br />

country. Political<br />

representation was to be denied until fifty-one<br />

per cent, not ten per cent, had taken an oath. Former slaves were<br />

given the right to vote—although women had not yet gained that<br />

right even in the North—but, because of their lack of education and<br />

political awareness, no one expected them to play a meaningful<br />

role in government for many years to come. Furthermore, those<br />

taking the oath had to swear that they had never taken up arms<br />

against the Union. Since almost every able-bodied white male had<br />

done so, the effect would have been to deny the South political<br />

representation for at least two generations.<br />

Under Lincoln's amnesty policy, it would not be long before the<br />

Republicans would be overwhelmed in Congress by a large majority<br />

of Democrats. The Democrats in the North were already gaining<br />

strength on their own and, once they could be joined by the solid<br />

block of Democrats from the reunited South, the Republicans'<br />

political and economic power would be lost. So, when Lincoln<br />

vetoed the bill, his own Party bitterly turned against him.<br />

Running throughout these cross-currents of motives and special<br />

interests were two groups which found it increasingly to their<br />

advantage to have Lincoln out of the way. One group consisted of<br />

the financiers, Northern industrialists, and radical Republicans, all<br />

of whom wanted to legally plunder the South at the end of the war.<br />

The politicians within that group also looked forward to further<br />

consolidating their power and literally establishing a military


|<br />

stereotyped<br />

392 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND GREENBACKS AND OTHER CRIMES 393<br />

dictatorship. 1 The other group was smaller in size but equally<br />

dangerous. It consisted of hothead Confederate sympathizers—<br />

from both South and North—who sought revenge. Later events<br />

revealed that both of these groups had been involved in a conspiratorial<br />

liaison with an organization called the Knights of the Golden<br />

Circle.<br />

KNIGHTS OF THE GOLDEN CIRCLE<br />

The Order of the Knights of the Golden Circle was a<br />

secret<br />

organization dedicated to revolution and conquest. Two of its<br />

better known members were Jesse James and John Wilkes Booth. It<br />

was organized by George W.L. Bickley who established its first<br />

"castle" in Cincinnati in 1854, drawing membership primarily from<br />

Masonic lodges. It had close ties with a secret society in France<br />

called The Seasons, which itself was a branch of the Illuminati.<br />

After the beginning of the war, Bickley was made head of the<br />

Confederacy's secret service, and his organization quickly spread<br />

throughout the border and Southern states as well.<br />

In the North, the conspirators were seeking "to seize political<br />

power and overthrow the Lincoln government/ 7 In fact, the<br />

Northern anti-draft riots<br />

mentioned previously were largely the<br />

result of the planning and leadership of this group.<br />

In the South<br />

"they tried to promote the extension of slavery by the conquest of<br />

Mexico/ 75<br />

In partnership with Maximilian, the Knights hoped to<br />

establish a Mexican-American empire which would be an effective<br />

counter force against the North. In fact, the very name of the<br />

organization is based on their goal of carving an empire out of<br />

North America with geographical boundaries forming a circle with<br />

the center in Cuba, and its<br />

Pennsylvania, southward to Panama.<br />

circumference reaching northward to<br />

1 For highly readable accounts of this movement, see Theodore Roscoe, The Web<br />

of Conspiracy: The Complete Story of the Men Who Murdered Abraham Lincoln (Englewood<br />

Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1959); also Claude G. Bowers, The Tragic<br />

Era: The Revolution after Lincoln, (New YoTk: Houghton Mifflin, 1957).<br />

2. "No Civil War at All, Part Two/' by Will^m Mcllhany, Journal of Individualist<br />

Studies, Fall, 1992, pp. 1&-20.<br />

3. Horan, p. 15.<br />

4. Ibid., pp. 20&-23.<br />

5. Ibid., p. 16. Regarding the annexation of Mexico, also see the Columbia Encyclopedia,<br />

Third Edition, p. 1143.<br />

In 1863 the group was reorganized as the Order of American<br />

Knights and, again the following year, as the Order of the Sons of<br />

Liberty. Its membership then was estimated at between 200,000 and<br />

300,000. After the war, it went further underground and remnants<br />

eventually emerged as the Ku Klux Klan.<br />

JOHN WILKES BOOTH<br />

One of the persistent legends of this period is that John Wilkes<br />

Booth was not killed in Garretfs barn, as generally accepted, but<br />

was allowed to escape; that the corpse actually was that of an<br />

accomplice; and that the government, under the firm control of<br />

War Secretary Edwin M. Stanton, moved heaven and earth to cover<br />

up the facts. On the face of it, that is an absurd story. But, when the<br />

voluminous files of the War Department were finally declassified<br />

and put into the public domain in the mid 1930s, historians were<br />

shocked to discover that there are many facts in those files which<br />

lend credence to the legend. The first to probe these amazing<br />

records was Otto Eisenschiml whose Why Was Lincoln Murdered?<br />

was published by Little, Brown and Company in 1937. The best and<br />

most readable compilation of the facts, however, was written<br />

twenty years later by Theodore Roscoe. In the preface to this work,<br />

he states the startling conclusions which emerge from those longhidden<br />

files:<br />

I<br />

Of the immense 19th century literature that exists on Lincoln's<br />

assassination, much of the writing treats the tragedy at Ford's theater<br />

as though it were Grand Opera.. . . Only a few have seen the crime as a<br />

murder case: Lincoln dying by crass felony, Booth a stalking gunman<br />

leading a gang of primed henchmen, the murder plot containing<br />

ingredients as base as the profit motive. Seventy years after the crime,<br />

writers were garbling it with a dignity it did not deserve: Lincoln, the<br />

martyr; Booth, the stereotyped villain; the assassination<br />

avenged by classic justice; conspiracy strangled; Virtue (in the robes of<br />

Government) emerging triumphant, and Lincoln "belonging to the<br />

ages."<br />

But the facts of the case are neither so satisfying nor so gratifying.<br />

For the facts indicate that the criminals responsible for Lincoln's death<br />

got away with murder.<br />

Izola Forrester was the granddaughter of John Wilkes Booth. In<br />

book entitled This One Mad Act, she tells of discovering the<br />

Roscoe, p. vii.


394 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND GREENBACKS AND OTHER CRIMES 395<br />

secret records of the Knights of the Golden Circle which had been<br />

SUMMARY<br />

carefully wrapped and placed in a government vault many decades<br />

It is time now to leave this tragic<br />

ago and designated as classified documents by<br />

episode<br />

Secretary Stanton.<br />

and move along. So let<br />

us summarize. America's bloodiest<br />

Since the assassination of Lincoln, no one had ever been allowed<br />

and most<br />

to<br />

devastating war was<br />

fought, not over the issue of<br />

examine that package. Because of her lineage to Booth and because<br />

freedom versus slavery, but because of<br />

clashing economic<br />

of her credentials as a professional writer, she was interests.<br />

eventually<br />

At the heart of this conflict were<br />

questions of legalized<br />

permitted to become the first person in all those years to examine<br />

plunder, banking monopolies, and even<br />

European territorial<br />

its contents. Forrester recounts the experience:<br />

expansion into Latin America. The boot print<br />

of the Rothschild formula is unmistakable across the<br />

It was five years before I was able to examine the contents of graves<br />

the<br />

of<br />

American soldiers on both sides.<br />

mysterious old package hidden away in the safe of the room which<br />

In the North,<br />

contained the relics and exhibits used in the Conspiracy<br />

neither<br />

Trial.... ]<br />

greenbacks, taxes, nor war bonds were<br />

would never have seen them, had I not knelt on the floor of the<br />

enough to<br />

cell five<br />

finance the war. So a national banking system was<br />

years ago and seen into the back of the old safe where the package lay.<br />

created to convert government bonds into fiat money, and the<br />

It is all part of the odd mystery thrown about the case by the officials<br />

people lost over half of their monetary assets to the hidden tax of<br />

of the war period—the concealment of these documents and articles,<br />

inflation. In the South, printing presses accomplished<br />

and the hiding away of the two flakes of bone with the bullet and<br />

the same<br />

effect, and the monetary loss<br />

pistol. What mind<br />

was total.<br />

ever grouped together such apparently<br />

The issuance of the<br />

incongruous and macabre<br />

Emancipation<br />

exhibits?...<br />

Proclamation by Lincoln and<br />

the<br />

Here at last was a link with my grandfather. I knew that he had<br />

naval assistance offered by Tsar Alexander, II, were largely<br />

been a member of the secret order founded by Bickley, the Knights of<br />

responsible for keeping England and France from intervening in<br />

the Golden Circle. I have an old photograph of him taken in a group of<br />

the war on the side of the Confederacy. Lincoln was assassinated<br />

the brotherhood, in full uniform, one that Harry's daughter had by a member of the Knights of the Golden Circle, a secret society<br />

discovered for me in our grandmother's Bible. I knew that the<br />

with rumored ties to American politicians<br />

newspapers, directly following the assassination, had denounced and<br />

the<br />

British financiers.<br />

Tsar Alexander<br />

order as having instigated the killing of Lincoln, and had proclaimed<br />

was assassinated a few years later by a member of<br />

Booth to have been its member and tool. And I was reminded again<br />

the<br />

of<br />

People's Will, a Nihilist secret society in Russia with rumored<br />

those words I had heard from my grandmother's lips, that her<br />

ties to financiers in New York City, specifically, Jacob Schiff and the<br />

husband had been "the tool of other men."<br />

firm of Kuhn, Loeb & Company.<br />

An interesting comment. One is compelled to wonder: The tool<br />

As for the Creature of central banking, there had been some<br />

of what other men? Was Forrester's grandmother referring to the<br />

victories and some defeats. The greenbacks had for a while<br />

leaders of the Knights of the Golden Circle? To agents of European deprived the bankers of their override on a small portion of<br />

financiers? Or was it to conspirators within Lincoln's own Party? government debt, but the National Banking Act quickly put a stop<br />

We shall probably never know with certainty the extent to which<br />

to that. Furthermore, by using government bonds as backing for<br />

any of these groups may have been involved in Lincoln's assassination,<br />

but we do know that there were powerful forces within the foundation was firmly in place, but the ultimate structure still<br />

the money supply, it locked the nation into perpetual debt. The<br />

federal government, centered around Secretary of War Stanton, needed to be erected. The monetary system was yet to be concentrated<br />

into one central-bank mechanism, and the control was yet to<br />

which actively concealed evidence and hastily terminated the<br />

investigation. Someone was protected.<br />

be taken away from the politicians and placed into the hands of the<br />

ankers themselves.<br />

1. Lzola Forrester, This One Mad Act (Boston: Hale, Cushman & Flint, 1937), p. 359- It was time for the Creature to visit Congress.


President Andrew Jackson put<br />

his political career on the line in<br />

1832 by vetoing renewal of the<br />

charter for the Second Bank of<br />

the United States. He called<br />

the Bank a monster and<br />

declared: am "1 ready with the<br />

screws to draw every tooth and<br />

then the stumps." Voters<br />

approved and re-elected him<br />

by a large margin.<br />

ZJL<br />

a<br />

During the Civil War, Lincoln<br />

had an insurrection on his<br />

hands in the North as well as<br />

the South, These two Leslie's<br />

engravings depict the 1 863<br />

anti-draft riots that occurred in<br />


Library of Congress<br />

Hulton Deutsch<br />

I Montagu Norman (above) was head of the<br />

Bank of England during the first years of the<br />

Federal Reserve. He is shown here in 1931<br />

aboard the Duchess of York at Southampton.<br />

Norman frequently traveled to the U.S. to<br />

meet in secret with Benjamin Strong, head of<br />

the Federal Reserve. Strong agreed to use the<br />

Federal Reserve System to unofficially help<br />

Great Britain meet its financial obligations, and<br />

The crew of the Russian ship, Osliaba, posed for this photograph at Alexandria,<br />

Virginia, in 1863. Tsar Alexander II had dispatched his Baltic fleet to Alexandria and<br />

his Asiatic fleet to San Fransciso where they were committed to assist the Union<br />

-j<br />

blockade against the South. This had little to do with freeing the slaves. France ha


nmownrm<br />

V * ><br />

x<br />

John D. Rockefeller, III<br />

(right) presents a check in the amount<br />

of $8,500,000 to Trygve Lie, First Secretary-General of the<br />

United Nations. The date is March 25, 1947. The money is for<br />

buying the land on Manhattan Island which will house the LIN<br />

building. Through the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), the<br />

[Rockefellers have been in the forefront of the drive for a world<br />

government which is to be built upon the principles of<br />

socialism and feudalism. They have no doubt that they and<br />

their counterparts in other countries will be in control.<br />

s*.><br />

John D. Rockefeller, Sr., is shown here giving a dime to a child, while an admirij<br />

crowd looks on. This was one of his favorite publicity stunts, it was conceived by H<br />

public-relations staff as a means of offsetting adverse publicity regarding his busing<br />

dealings. Large-scale philanthropy was an extension of that same technique.<br />

400 401<br />

UPl/Settmann


Treasury Department<br />

'WM<br />

William Jennings Bryan (left) was one of the most powerful Democrats in<br />

Congress. He opposed the Federal Reserve Act because it would privately issue<br />

money rather than through the government. He was fooled into supporting the bill<br />

when phony compromises were made which gave the appearance of public<br />

control and government issue but which, in fact, did neither. Bryan was also<br />

rewarded with an appointment as Secretary of State. He became disillusioned by<br />

Ihe duplicity of his own government and resigned after Wilson failed to warn the<br />

public that the Lusitania was carrying munitions. He complained that it was "like<br />

Butting women and children in front of an army."<br />

Alan Greenspan (above), was an eloquent spokesman for the gold standard and<br />

a critic of the System's subservience to the banking cartel. That was in 1966.<br />

After he became a director of J. P. Morgan & Company and was appointed<br />

hairman of the Federal Reserve in 1987, he became silent on these issues and<br />

did nothing to anger the Creature he now served. Like Bryan, even the best of<br />

rnen can be corrupted by the rewards of politics.<br />

Betxmann Arcmve<br />

402<br />

403


IM<br />

Jmtr J * A A u<br />

ir<br />

Section V<br />

UPl/Bettmann<br />

The First National Bank in St.<br />

Petersburg, Florida experiences a<br />

run on June 12, 1930. Angry<br />

depositors want their money, butthij<br />

bank cannot pay them. Their money<br />

has been loaned to others. This<br />

scene has been repeated thousand<br />

of times throughout history and in<br />

every country. It is the consequence<br />

of fractional-reserve banking.<br />

John Kenneth Galbraith, well-kno^<br />

historian and professor at Harvard<br />

has verified that he was asked to u<br />

part of the team that put together<br />

Report from Iron Mountain, a thinktank<br />

study commissioned by the J<br />

Defense Department. The purpose.<br />

the study was to explore novel yw<br />

keeping the masses in subserviei*<br />

e£<br />

When a copy of the Report was<br />

|<br />

to the press, the government clai^j<br />

it was a hoax. Galbraith confirm^<br />

it was totally authentic.<br />

THE HARVEST<br />

Monetary and political scientists continue to<br />

expound the theoretical merits of the Federal<br />

Reserve System. It has become a modern act of<br />

faith that economic life simply could not go on<br />

without it. But the time for theory is past The<br />

Creature moved into its final lair in 1913 and has<br />

snorted and thrashed about the landscape ever<br />

since. If we wish to know if it is<br />

a creature of<br />

service or a beast of prey, we merely have to look<br />

at what it has done. And, after the test of all those<br />

years, we can be sure that what it has done, it will<br />

continue to do. Or, to use the Biblical axiom, a tree<br />

shall be known by the fruit it bears. Let us now<br />

examine the harvest.<br />

UPl/Bettmann<br />

404


Chapter Twenty<br />

THE LONDON<br />

CONNECTION<br />

The rise of the House of Morgan; Morgan's ties<br />

with England and the House of Rothschild; the<br />

connection between the Federal Reserve System<br />

and the Bank of England; the Fed's decision to<br />

inflate American dollars to assist the ailing<br />

British economy.<br />

The period between the Civil War and the enactment of the<br />

Federal Reserve System was one of great economic volatility and no<br />

small measure of chaos. The National Banking Acts of 1863-65<br />

established a system of federally chartered banks which were given<br />

significant privilege and power over the monetary system. They<br />

were granted a monopoly in the issuance of bank notes, and the<br />

government agreed to accept those notes for the payment of taxes<br />

and duties. They were allowed to back this money up to ninety per<br />

cent with government bonds instead of gold. And they were guaranteed<br />

that every bank in the system would have to accept the notes<br />

of every other bank at face value, regardless of how shaky their<br />

position. The net effect was that the banking system of the United<br />

States after the Civil War, far from being free and unregulated as<br />

some historians have claimed, was literally a halfway house to central<br />

banking.<br />

The notion of being able to generate prosperity simply by creating<br />

more money has always fascinated politicians and businessmen,<br />

but at no time in our history was it more in vogue than in the second<br />

half of the nineteenth century. The nation had gone mad with the<br />

Midas complex, a compulsion to turn everything into money<br />

through the magic of banking. Personal checks gradually had<br />

become accepted in commerce just as readily as bank notes, and the<br />

banks obliged their customers by entering into their passbooks just<br />

as many little numbers as they cared to "borrow." As Groseclose


408 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

observed: 'The manna of cheap money became the universal cry,<br />

and as with the Israelites, the easier the manna was acquired, the<br />

louder became the complaint, the less willing the people to struggle<br />

for it/' 1<br />

The prevailing philosophy of that time was aptly expressed by<br />

Jay Cooke, the famous financier who had marketed the huge Civil<br />

War loans of the federal government and who now was raising $100<br />

million for the Northern Pacific Railroad. Cooke had published a<br />

pamphlet which was aptly summarized by its own title: How Our<br />

National Debt May Be a National Blessing, The Debt is Public Wealth,<br />

Political<br />

Union, Protection of Industry, Secure Basis for National<br />

Currency. "Why," asked Cooke, "should this Grand and Glorious<br />

country be stunted and dwarfed—its activities chilled and its very<br />

life blood curdled by these miserable 'hard coin' theories—the<br />

musty theories of a bygone age." 2 As it turned out, however, the<br />

chilling and curdling came, not from the musty hard-coin theories<br />

of the past, but from the glittering easy-money theories of the present.<br />

The Northern Pacific went bankrupt and, as the mountain of<br />

imaginary money invested in it collapsed back into nothing,<br />

Cooke's giant investment firm disappeared along with it, triggering<br />

the panic of 1873 as it went. Matthew Josephson writes:<br />

"All about the failure of Jay Cooke!" newsboys hawked throughout<br />

the country....<br />

The largest and most pious bank in the Western world had fallen<br />

with the effect of a thunderclap. Soon allied brokers and national<br />

banks and 5,000 commercial houses followed it into the abyss of<br />

bankruptcy. All day long, in Wall Street, one suspension after another<br />

was announced; railroads failed; leading stocks lost 30 to 40 points, or<br />

half their value, within the hour; immeasurable waves of fear altered<br />

the movement of greed; the exchanges were closed; the stampede, the<br />

"greatest" crisis in American history, was on.<br />

AND STILL MORE BOOMS AND BUSTS<br />

Altogether, there were four major contractions of the money<br />

supply during this period: the so-called panics of 1873, 1884, 1893,<br />

and 1907. Each of them was characterized by inadequate bank<br />

reserves and the suspension of specie payment. Congress reacted,<br />

1 Groseclose, Money and Man, p. 202,<br />

2. Quoted by Rothbard, Mystery, p. 231<br />

3. Matthew Josephson, The Robber Barons: The Great American Capitalists, 1861-1901<br />

(New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1934), p- 170.<br />

THE LONDON CONNECTION 409<br />

not by requiring an increase in reserves which would have<br />

improved the safety margin, but by allowing a decrease. In June of<br />

1874, legislation was passed which permitted the banks to back their<br />

notes entirely with government bonds. That, of course, meant more<br />

fiat money for Congress, but it also meant that bank notes no longer<br />

had any specie backing at all, not even ten per cent. This released<br />

over $20 million from bank reserves which then could be used as the<br />

basis for pyramiding even more checkbook money into the economy.<br />

It has become accepted mythology that these panics were<br />

caused by seasonal demands for farm loans at harvest time. To supply<br />

those funds, the country banks had to draw down their cash<br />

reserves which generally were deposited with the larger city banks.<br />

This thinned out the reserves held in the cities, and the whole system<br />

became more vulnerable. Actually that part of the legend is<br />

true, but apparently no one is expected to ask questions about the<br />

rest of the story. Several of them come to mind. Why wasn't there a<br />

painic every Autumn instead of just every eleven years or so? Why<br />

didn't all<br />

banks—country or city—maintain adequate reserves to<br />

cover their depositor demands? And why didn't they do this in all<br />

seasons of the year? Why would merely saying no to some loan applicants<br />

cause hundreds of banks to fail? The myth falls apart under<br />

the weight of these questions.<br />

The truth is that, if it hadn't been seasonal demand by agriculture,<br />

the money magicians simply would have found another scapegoat.<br />

It would have been "immobile" reserves, lack of "elasticity" in<br />

the money supply, "imbalance" of international payments, or some<br />

other technocratic smoke screen to cover the real problem which<br />

Was—and always has been—fractional-reserve banking itself. The<br />

bottom line was that, in spite of an elaborate scheme to pool the<br />

minuscule reserves of country banks into larger regional banks<br />

where they could be rushed from town to town like a keg of coins on<br />

the old frontier, it still didn't work. The loaves and fishes stubbornly<br />

refused to multiply.<br />

Morgan prospers when others fail<br />

The monetary expansions and contractions of this period were<br />

large waves that capsized thousands of investment ships at sea. But<br />

there was one large vessel that, somehow, bobbed up and down<br />

With the surges quite well and could be seen throughout the storm


410 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

THE LONDON CONNECTION 411<br />

salvaging the abandoned cargoes of those that were in distress. This<br />

It was during this trip that Peabody opened an import-export<br />

vessel brought back to port untold riches that once had been the<br />

business at 22 Old Broad Street in London and began to provide<br />

property of others but now belonged to the master of the salvage<br />

loans and letters of credit to many of his shippers. That moved him<br />

ship in accordance with rules of the high sea. The captain's name<br />

into the investment business specializing in transactions between<br />

Britain and the United States.<br />

was J.P. Morgan.<br />

It will be recalled from a previous section that J.P. Morgan and<br />

It was fortunate liming. This was the beginning of a period of<br />

Company was no small player in the world chess match called<br />

rapid expansion in the United States, accompanied by an insatiable<br />

World War I. Morgan had been chosen by the French and British<br />

need for investment capital and a plethora of bond issues offering<br />

governments as the official agent to sell their war bonds in the U.S.<br />

tantalizing rates of return which were substantially higher than<br />

When the war began to go badly for them, the Morgan interests<br />

comparable offerings in Europe. Peabody's firm was in an unusual<br />

began to agitate for American entry into the conflict, a move which<br />

position to exploit this expanding market, and his firm grew rapidly.<br />

was calculated to save the loans. The Morgan firm also was the of h-<br />

cial U.S. trade agent for Britain. In violation of international treaty, it<br />

Peabody never married and, as he advanced in years, began to<br />

handled the purchase and shipping to England of all war material,<br />

look for someone to carry on the business. The qualifications for<br />

including the enormous cargo of munitions aboard the Lusitanw<br />

such a position were difficult. First, the man had to be an American<br />

when she went down.<br />

by birth in order to appear authentic as the representative of<br />

The close relationship between the Morgans and Great Britain<br />

American investments. Secondly, he had to be British by instinct<br />

was no accident. J.P. Morgan, Jr., was the driving force behind the<br />

and preference. This included being well educated and with good<br />

Council on Foreign Relations, the American branch of a secret society<br />

established by Cecil Rhodes for the expansion of the British<br />

breeding in order to be accepted by the aristocracy in London's<br />

financial world. Third, he had to have knowledge of Angloempire.<br />

In truth, the Morgans were more British than American.<br />

American finance. And fourth, Peabody had to like him.<br />

The reason for this is to be found in the origin of the Morgan<br />

dynasty. It all began with an American merchant from Danvers, JUNIUS MORGAN SELECTED BY PEABODY<br />

Massachusetts, by the name of George Peabody. In 1837, Peabody When the Boston merchant, Junius Morgan, met George<br />

travelled to England as a bond salesman for the Chesapeake and Peabody at a London dinner party in 1850, little did he realize that<br />

Ohio Canal, hoping to find British investors to replace the missing<br />

the elder financier took an immediate liking to him and began to<br />

ranks of Americans who, because of a recession at that time, showed<br />

discreetly inquire into his background and reputation. This began<br />

little interest in the project. He routinely was rejected by the large an extended period of business and social contact that eventually<br />

investment houses of London but, eventually, his persistence paid ended in 1854 when Junius moved his family to London and became<br />

off. Stanley Jackson, in his biography of Morgan, says of Peabody:<br />

a full partner in the firm which, eventually became known as<br />

When the panic [in the U.S.] at last started to subside, he called Peabody, Morgan & Company.<br />

time and again on the big City barons [in London] to assure them that<br />

In addition to selling bonds in England for American commercial<br />

ventures and state governments, the partnership also became<br />

Maryland and other states would honor their bonds. He also<br />

continued backing American securities with his personal funds.<br />

the chief fiscal agent for the Union government during the Civil<br />

Buying at almost giveaway levels, he later reaped a rich harvest. He<br />

War, and it was during this period that the firm's great profits<br />

unloaded most of the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal bonds and won<br />

pushed it into the<br />

acclaim back home for returning his $60,000 commission intact to<br />

top echelons of London's financial fraternity. In<br />

1864, Peabody finally retired and completely turned the business<br />

Maryland's meager treasury.<br />

over to Junius who immediately changed the firm's name to J.S.<br />

1. Stanley Jackson, J.P. Morgan (New York: Stein and Day, 1983), p. 37. Morgan and Company.


412 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

THE LONDON CONNECTION 413<br />

Junius's son, John Pierpont, attended the English High School in<br />

eventually was accomplished by the addition of Edward<br />

Boston but, during much of his youth, was enrolled in European<br />

Grenfell, a long-time director of the Bank of England, as the<br />

tThis<br />

new<br />

schools and became engulfed in British tradition. He had been born<br />

senior partner of what became Morgan, Grenfell & Company. But<br />

in the United States, however, and that made him ideally suited to<br />

none of this window dressing altered the reality that J.P. Morgan &<br />

carry on the Anglo-American role played so deftly by Peabody and<br />

Co. in New York remained more British in orientation than Ameri-<br />

Junius. It was inevitable that the boy would be trained in international<br />

finance and groomed to step into his father's shoes. The first<br />

A casual reading of the events of this period would lead to the<br />

can.<br />

move was to find employment for him in 1857 at the New York : conclusion that Peabody and Morgan were fierce competitors of the<br />

investment firm of Duncan, Sherman & Company. Seven years<br />

Rothschilds. It is true they often bid against each other for the same<br />

later, Junius acquired a competitor New York firm and set his son<br />

business, but it is also true that almost every biographer has told<br />

up as a partner in Dabney, Morgan & Company, which became the how the American newcomers to London were in awe of the great<br />

New York branch of the London firm. In 1871, with the addition of<br />

power of the Rothschilds and how they purposely cultivated their<br />

a third partner, Anthony Drexel from Philadelphia, the firm became<br />

friendship, a friendship that eventually became so intimate that the<br />

Drexel, Morgan & Company. In 1895, following the death of Drexel,<br />

Americans were received as the personal house guests of the<br />

there was a final change of name to J.P. Morgan & Company. A<br />

Rothschilds. The Morgan firm often worked closely with the House<br />

branch in Paris became known as Morgan, Harjes & Company.<br />

of Rothschild on large joint ventures, but that was—and still is<br />

AMERICANIZING THE NEW YORK BRANCH<br />

common practice among large investment houses. In light of subsequent<br />

events, however, it is appropriate to consider the possibility<br />

After the unexpected death of Junius in a carriage accident a few<br />

that an arrangement had<br />

years later, it was decided by Pierpont to reshape the image<br />

been worked out in which the<br />

of the<br />

Peabody<br />

London firm to be a more British operation. This would<br />

/Morgan firm went one step further and, on occasion,<br />

allow the<br />

became a secret Rothschild agent.<br />

New York branch to represent the American side with less suspicion<br />

of being essentially the same firm. By that time, his son, J.P. CONCEALED ALLIANCE WITH ROTHSCHILD?<br />

Morgan, Jr.—known as Jack by his friends—had already been<br />

Some writers have suggested that the clandestine relationship<br />

brought into the firm as a partner, and he was to play an important<br />

began almost from the beginning. Eustace Mullins, for example,<br />

role in the creation of that image. Biographer John Forbes tells us:<br />

writes:<br />

J.P, Morgan, Jr., became a partner in the London house of J.S.<br />

Soon after he arrived in London, George Peabody was surprised<br />

Morgan & Co. on January 1, 1898, and a fortnight later, with his wife<br />

to be summoned to an audience with the gruff Baron Nathan Mayer<br />

Jessie and their three children,... he left New York and took up<br />

Rothschild. Without mincing words, Rothschild revealed to Peabody<br />

residence in England for the next eight years.<br />

that much of the London aristocracy openly disliked Rothschild and<br />

Morgan was sent to London to do two specific things. The first<br />

refused his invitations. He proposed that Peabody, a man of modest<br />

was to learn at first hand how the British carried on a banking business<br />

means, be established as a lavish host whose entertainments would<br />

under a central banking system dominated by the Bank of England.<br />

soon be the talk of London. Rothschild would, of course, pay all the<br />

Morgan, Sr., anticipated the establishment of the Federal Reserve<br />

bills. Peabody accepted the offer and soon became known as the most<br />

System in the United States and wanted someone who would<br />

popular host in London. His annual Fourth-of-July dinner, celebrating<br />

eventually have authority in the Morgan firms to know how such a<br />

American Independence, became extremely popular with the English<br />

system worked. The second was quietly to look about the City and<br />

aristocracy, many of whom, while drinking Peabody's wine, regaled<br />

select British partners to convert the elder Morgan's privately owned<br />

each other with jokes about Rothschild's crudities and bad manners,<br />

J.S. Morgan & Co. into a British concern. 1<br />

1. John Douglas Forbes, ].P. Morgan, Jr. (Charlottesville: University Press of<br />

Virginia, 1981), p. 31.<br />

B. This apparently has not diminished over the years. The December 23, 1991,<br />

ffcsue of Business Week (p. 69) reminds us that the CEO of J.P. Morgan & Co., Dennis<br />

Weatherstone who lives in Connecticut, was knighted by Queen Elizabeth 11.


—<br />

414 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

without realizing that every drop they drank had been paid for by<br />

Rothschild. 1<br />

Mullins does not give a reference for the source of this story, and<br />

one cannot help being skeptical that such details could be proved.<br />

Nevertheless, a secret arrangement of this kind is not as absurd as it<br />

may sound. There is no question that the Rothschilds were quite<br />

capable of such a clandestine relationship and, in fact, this is exactly<br />

the kind of deception for which they had become famous. Furthermore,<br />

there was ample reason for them to do so. A strong anti-<br />

Semitic and anti-Rothschild sentiment had grown up in Europe and<br />

the United States, and the family often found it to its advantage to<br />

work through agents rather than to deal directly. Derek Wilson tells<br />

us: "The name 'Rothschild' was, thus, beginning to be heard in<br />

places far removed from sophisticated London and Paris. But the<br />

connection with the great bankers was sometimes tenuous.'"<br />

That tenuous connection was precisely the role to be played by<br />

August Belmont in the United States, and the anti-Semitism he<br />

found there was undoubtedly the reason he changed his name from<br />

Schoenberg to Belmont upon landing in New York in 1837. Prior to<br />

that, the Rothschild agent had been the firm of J.L. and S.I. Joseph &<br />

Company, about as American sounding as one can get. It was not<br />

long, however, before the Belmont-Rothschild connection became<br />

common knowledge, and the ploy ceased to be effective.<br />

In 1848, the family decided to send Alphonse Rothschild to the<br />

United States to check on Belmont's operations and to evaluate the<br />

possibility of replacing him with a direct Rothschild representative,<br />

perhaps Alphonse himself. After an extended visit, he wrote home:<br />

In a few years from now America will have attracted to itself the<br />

greater part of trade with China and the Indies and will be enthroned<br />

between the two oceans.... The country possesses such elements of<br />

prosperity that one would have to be blind not to recognize them. ... I<br />

have no hesitation in saying that a Rothschild house, and not just an<br />

agency, should be established in America.... Today we are presented<br />

with a fine opportunity. Later on, difficulties will of necessity arise as<br />

a result of competition from all sides.<br />

1. Eustace Mullins, Secrets of the Federal Reserve (Virginia: Bankers Research<br />

Institute, 1983), p. 49.<br />

2. Derek Wilson, p. 176.<br />

3. B. Gille, Histoire de la Maison Rothschild, Vol. 1, 1965-1967, p. 581, cited by Derek<br />

Wilson, p. 181.<br />

THE LONDON CONNECTION 415<br />

Some historians have expressed amazement over the fact that<br />

khe recommendation was never acted upon. Wilson says: "This was<br />

the greatest opportunity the Rothschilds ever lost." Those with a<br />

more skeptical bent are tempted to wonder if the opportunity really<br />

was lost or if it was merely taken in a more indirect fashion. It is<br />

significant that, precisely at this time, George Peabody was making<br />

a name for himself in London and had established a close relation-<br />

\<br />

ship with Nathan Rothschild. Is it possible that the Peabody firm<br />

was given the nod from the Rothschild consortium to represent<br />

them in America? And is it possible that the plan included allowing<br />

Belmont to operate as a known Rothschild agent while using<br />

Peabody & Company as an unknown agent, thus, providing their<br />

own competition?<br />

John Moody answers: "The Rothschilds were content to remain<br />

a close ally of Morgan rather than a competitor as far as the<br />

American field was concerned." Gabriel Kolko says: "Morgan's<br />

[activities in 1895-1896 in selling U.S. gold bonds in Europe were<br />

based on his alliance with the House of Rothschild." Sereno Pratt<br />

says: "These houses may, like J.P. Morgan & Company . . . represent<br />

here the great firms and institutions of Europe, just as August<br />

Belmont & Company have long represented the Rothschilds." And<br />

George Wheeler writes: "Part of the reality of the day was an ugly<br />

resurgence of anti-Semitism.... Someone was needed as a cover.<br />

Who better than J.<br />

Pierpont Morgan, a solid, Protestant exemplar of<br />

capitalism able to trace his family back to pre-Revolutionary<br />

times?" 5<br />

RISE OF THE HOUSE OF MORGAN<br />

With these considerations as background, the meteoric rise of<br />

Morgan's star over London and Wall Street can be readily understood.<br />

It is no longer surprising, for example, that Peabody &<br />

Company was the sole American investment firm to receive a<br />

gigantic loan from the Bank of England during the U.S. panic of<br />

1857, a loan which not only saved it from sinking, but made it<br />

1. Derek Wilson, p. 182.<br />

|- Moody, p. 27.<br />

3. Kolko, Triumph, p. 142.<br />

4. Sereno S. Pratt, The Work of Wall Street (New York: D. Appleton, 1916; rpt. New<br />

York: Arno Press, 1975), p. 349.<br />

5. Wheeler, pp. 17-18,42.


416 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

possible to seize and salvage many other ships that were then capsized<br />

on Wall Street.<br />

Peabody had become active in the business of discounting<br />

acceptances, which is banker language for insuring commercial<br />

loans issued for the purchase of goods. This is how it works: The<br />

seller issues a bill with a stipulation that he must be paid at a future<br />

date, usually ninety days. When the buyer receives the bill, his bank<br />

writes the word "accepted" across the face of it and adds the signature<br />

of an officer, making it<br />

a legally binding contract. In other<br />

words, the bank becomes a co-signer on the buyer's credit and guarantees<br />

payment even if the buyer should default.<br />

Naturally, there is a price for this guarantee. That price is stated<br />

as a percentage of the total bill and it is either added to the amount<br />

paid by the buyer or deducted from the amount received by the<br />

seller. Actually there is a fee paid at both ends of the transaction, one<br />

to the seller's bank which receives the acceptance and pays out the<br />

money, and one to the issuing bank which assumes the liability of<br />

guaranteeing payment. The sale is said to be "discounted" by the<br />

amount paid to the banks. And so it was that Peabody & Company<br />

had been active in the business of discounting acceptances, primarily<br />

between sellers in England and buyers in the United States.<br />

MORGAN AND THE PANIC OF 1857<br />

In the Wall Street panic of 1857, many U.S. buyers were unable<br />

to pay their bills, and Peabody and Morgan were expected to make<br />

good on their guarantees. Naturally, they didn't have the money,<br />

and the firm was facing certain bankruptcy unless the money could<br />

be obtained from somewhere. Stanley Jackson provides the details:<br />

The slump was catastrophic for Peabody & Co. It suddenly found<br />

itself committed to acceptances of £2 million and with no hope of<br />

discharging even part of a stockpile of depreciating bonds on New<br />

York brokers and bankers, themselves now desperately short of ready<br />

funds. The firm was soon paying out thousands of pounds a day.<br />

Without raising a large temporary loan the partners would be forced<br />

to suspend business altogether. 1<br />

Ron Chernow, in The House of Morgan, says: "Rumors raced<br />

through London that George Peabody and Company was about to<br />

fail, a prospect heartily relished by rivals.... The major London<br />

1. Jackson, p. 56.<br />

THE LONDON CONNECTION 417<br />

houses told Morgan they would bail out the firm—but only if<br />

Peabody shut down the bank within a year." Jackson continues the<br />

narrative:<br />

The clouds lifted dramatically when the Bank of England<br />

announced a loan to Peabody's of £800,000, at very reasonable interest,<br />

with the promise of further funds up to a million sterling if and when<br />

required. It was a remarkable vote of confidence as Thomas Hankey<br />

[governor of the Bank of England] had already rejected similar appeals<br />

from various American firms who did not measure up to his<br />

standards.... Peabody & Company recovered almost overnight and<br />

indeed hoisted its turnover above pre-slump levels.<br />

With an almost unlimited access to cash and credit backed by<br />

the Bank of England, Peabody and Morgan were able to wade hip<br />

deep through the depreciated stocks and bonds that were sold to<br />

them at sacrifice prices on Wall Street. Within only a few years,<br />

when sanity had been restored to American markets, the assets of<br />

the firm had grown to gigantic proportions.<br />

This event tells us a great deal about relationships. If<br />

Rothschilds truly had been competitors, they would have seized<br />

upon this opportunity and used their great influence within the<br />

Bank of England and the other investment houses in London to<br />

squeeze out Peabody, not to assist him. The Barings, in particular,<br />

were already trying to accomplish exactly that. The Rothschilds<br />

must have believed that a successful Peabody firm ultimately<br />

would be in their own best interest.<br />

ANTI-SEMITISM WAS PROFITABLE<br />

In later years, Jack Morgan Q.P., Jr.) would assume the role of a<br />

staunch anti-Semite, and this undoubtedly strengthened his hand at<br />

dealing with American investors and borrowers who were loath to<br />

have anything to do with Jewish bankers. That, of course, included<br />

officials of the U.S. Treasury. It was particularly helpful during the<br />

1896 rescue of the federal government from a decline in its gold<br />

reserves. Fearing that it would not be able to honor its promise to<br />

exchange paper money for gold coins, the government was forced<br />

to borrow $62 million in gold. The House of Rothschild was an<br />

obvious source for such a loan, but the Treasury wanted to avoid an<br />

1 Chernow, .<br />

p 1 1<br />

2- Jackson, pp. 56-57.<br />

3. Josephson, p. 60.<br />

the


418 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND THE LONDON CONNECTION 419<br />

anti-Semitic backlash. Everything fell into place, however, when<br />

Morgan and Company became the primary lender, with Rothschild<br />

apparently demoted to the role of a mere participant. Wheeler<br />

writes:<br />

The consummate politicians of the Cleveland administration ...<br />

were certainly aware of the dangers inherent in promoting a rescue<br />

effort for the United States Treasury that would be financed by those<br />

archetypes of "international Jewish financiers/' the Rothschilds. .<br />

During these developments, Pierpont Morgan took no direct part<br />

in the salvage effort. Up to this point it looked as if the aging<br />

financier—he would be fifty-eight in two months—would be merely<br />

one among many in this and whatever subsequent bond arrangements<br />

would be necessary. It seemed as though he would move on into old<br />

age with little more to round out his obituary than his awkward<br />

attempt to profiteer on the sale of rifles at the start of the Civil War, his<br />

minor shorting of the Union in gold trading toward the close, and a<br />

bold but largely unsuccessful move in the 1880s to impose an eastern<br />

capitalist cease-fire on the country's warring railroads.<br />

But there were steps being taken even now to bring him out of the<br />

financial backwaters—and they were not being taken by Pierpont<br />

Morgan himself. The first suggestion of his name for a role in the<br />

recharging of the reserve originated with the London branch of the<br />

House of Rothschild.<br />

The apparent anti-Semitism of J. P. Morgan, Jr., was again<br />

extremely profitable during World War 1, when it was widely publicized<br />

that the Kaiser was funded by German-Jew bankers. To deal<br />

with the Morgan group, therefore, as opposed to Kuhn Loeb, for<br />

example, was in some circles almost a point of national patriotism.<br />

When J. P. Morgan, Sr., died in 1913, people were shocked to<br />

learn that his estate was valued at only $68 million, a paltry sum<br />

compared to the fortunes held by the Vanderbilts, Astors, and<br />

Rockefellers. It was even more unbelievable when Jack Morgan<br />

died in 1943 and left an estate valued at only $16 million. A small<br />

amount had been transferred to members of their families prior to<br />

their deaths, but that did not account for the vast fortunes which<br />

they visibly controlled during their lives. Surely, there had been a<br />

bookkeeping sleight-of-hand. On the other hand, it may have been<br />

true. When Alphonse Rothschild died in Paris in 1905, it was revealed<br />

that his estate contained $60 million in American securities.<br />

1. Wheeler, pp. 16-17.<br />

.<br />

The Rothschilds in Britain undoubtedly held an equally large bloc.<br />

Furthermore, many of these securities were handled through the<br />

House of Morgan. The possibilities are obvious that a major portion<br />

of the wealth and power of the Morgan firm was, and always<br />

had been, merely the wealth and power of the Rothschilds who had<br />

raised it up in the beginning and who sustained it through its entire<br />

existence.<br />

How much of Morgan's apparent anti-Semitism was real and<br />

how much may have been a pragmatic guise is, in the final analysis,<br />

of little importance, and we should not give unwarranted emphasis<br />

to it<br />

here. Regardless of one's interpretation of the nature of the<br />

relationship between the Houses of Morgan and Rothschild, the fact<br />

remains that it was close, it was ongoing, and it was profitable to<br />

both. If Morgan truly did harbor feelings of anti-Semitism, neither<br />

he nor the Rothschilds ever allowed them to get in the way of their<br />

business.<br />

To put the London connection into proper perspective, it will be<br />

necessary once again to abandon a strict chronological sequence of<br />

events and jump ahead to the year 1924. So let us put our cast of<br />

characters on hold for a moment and, before allowing them to act<br />

out the drama of creating the Federal Reserve System, we shall pick<br />

up the storyline eleven years after that event had already taken<br />

place.<br />

ENGLAND FACES A DILEMMA<br />

At the end of World War I, Britain faced an economic dilemma.<br />

She had abandoned the gold standard early in the war in order to<br />

remove all limits from the creation of fiat money, and the result had<br />

been extreme inflation. But now she wanted to regain her former<br />

position of power and prestige in the world's financial markets and<br />

decided that, to accomplish this, it would be necessary to return to<br />

the gold standard. It was decided, further, to set the exchange value<br />

of the pound sterling (the British monetary unit) at exactly $4.86 in<br />

U.S. currency, which was approximately what it had been before the<br />

war began.<br />

To say that she wanted to return to the gold standard actually is<br />

misleading. It was not a pure standard in which every unit of money<br />

was totally backed by a stated weight of gold. Rather, it was a<br />

1. See "Head of Rothschilds' Paris House Is Dead/' The New York Times, May 27,<br />

1905, p. 9.


420 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

fractional gold standard in which only a certain fraction of all<br />

monetary units were so backed. But, even that was much to be desired<br />

over no backing whatsoever for three reasons. First, it created<br />

greater consumer confidence in the money system because of the<br />

implied promise to redeem all currency in gold—even though such<br />

promises are always broken when based on a fractional-reserve.<br />

Secondly, it provided an efficient means of settling financial accounts<br />

between nations, gold always being the international medium<br />

of choice. Thirdly, it applied some braking action to the<br />

production of fiat money, thus, providing a certain degree of restraint<br />

to inflation and the boom-bust cycle.<br />

The decision to return to a fractional gold standard, therefore,<br />

while it left much to be desired, was still a step in the right direction.<br />

But there were two serious problems with the plan. The first was<br />

that the exchange value of gold can never be decided by political<br />

decree. It will always be determined by the interplay of supply and<br />

demand within the marketplace. Trying to fix the number of dollars<br />

which people will be willing to exchange for a pound sterling was<br />

like trying to legislate how many baseball cards a schoolboy will<br />

give for a purple agate. The international currency market is like a<br />

huge auction. If the auctioneer sets the opening bid too high, there<br />

will be no takers—which is exactly what happened to the pound.<br />

The other problem was that, during the war, England had<br />

adopted a massive welfare program and a strong network of labor<br />

unions. The reason this was a problem was that the only way to<br />

make the pound acceptable in international trade was to allow its<br />

value to drop to a competitive and realistic level, and that would<br />

have meant, not only a drastic reduction in welfare benefits, but also<br />

a general lowering of prices—including the price of labor which is<br />

called wages. Politicians were quite willing to allow prices of commodities<br />

to move downward, but they did not have the courage to<br />

take any action which would reduce either welfare benefits or<br />

wages. To the contrary, they continued to bid for votes with promises<br />

of still more socialism and easy credit. Prices continued to rise.<br />

1 . The government hedged even on this provision. Only bars of gold bullion were<br />

available for redemption, not coins. This insured that gold would not circulate as<br />

money and that it would be used almost exclusively for large-scale international<br />

transactions.<br />

the<br />

THE LONDON CONNECTION 421<br />

ENGLAND IN DEPRESSION<br />

With the value of the pound set artificially high in order to sustain<br />

prices, wages, and profit levels, the cost of British exports also<br />

became high, and they ceased to be competitive in world markets.<br />

With exports in decline, the amount of money coming into the country<br />

also declined. England became a debtor nation, which means<br />

that her payments to other countries were larger than her income<br />

from those countries.<br />

As pointed out in chapter five, if<br />

an individual spends more<br />

than his income, he must either increase his income, dip into savings,<br />

sell off assets, create counterfeit, or borrow. The same is true of<br />

nations. England had already borrowed to the limit of her credit and<br />

was rapidly exhausting her savings in order to continue purchasing<br />

foreign goods to sustain the high standard of living to which she<br />

had grown accustomed. She couldn't counterfeit because payments<br />

for these imports had to be settled in gold, which meant that, as her<br />

national savings were spent, her gold supply moved out of the<br />

country. The handwriting was on the wall. If this process continued,<br />

the nation soon would be broke. It was a situation, incidentally,<br />

which was amazingly parallel to what has plagued the United<br />

States since the end of Word War II, and for mostly the same reasons.<br />

By March of 1919, England's trade was so depressed that she<br />

had no choice but to let the value of the pound "float," which means<br />

to seek its own level in response to supply and demand. Within a<br />

year it had dropped to $3.21, a loss of thirty-four per cent. Since the<br />

American dollar was the de facto world monetary standard at that<br />

time, receiving fewer dollars for each pound sterling meant that the<br />

pound was valued lower in all the markets of the world. The result<br />

was that the price Britishers had to pay for imported goods was<br />

becoming higher while the price she received for the export of her<br />

own goods was becoming lower. The British economy was, not only<br />

badly anemic, it was experiencing a monetary hangover from the<br />

vast inflation of World War I. In other words, it was undergoing a<br />

painful but, in the long run, healthy recovery and a return to reality.<br />

Such a condition was intolerable to the monetary and political<br />

Pcientists who were determined to find a quick and painless remedy<br />

which would allow the binge to continue. Several emergency<br />

therapies were administered. The first was to use the Financial


422 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

Committee of the League of Nations—which England dominated<br />

to require all the other European nations to follow similar inflationary<br />

monetary policies. They were also required to establish what<br />

was called the "gold exchange standard," a scheme whereby all<br />

countries based their currency, not on gold, but on the pound sterling.<br />

In that way, they could all inflate together without causing a<br />

disruptive flow of gold from one to the other, and England would<br />

act as the regulator and guarantor of the system. In other words,<br />

England used the power of her position within the League of Nations<br />

to establish the Bank of England as a master central bank for all<br />

the other central banks of Europe. It was the prototype for what the<br />

Cabal now is doing with Federal Reserve and the World Bank<br />

within the framework of the United Nations.<br />

PROBLEM OF AMERICAN PROSPERITY<br />

Europe was well in hand, but that still left the United States to be<br />

controlled. America had also inflated during the war but not nearly<br />

as much. She also had a fractional gold standard, but the stockpile of<br />

gold was very large and still growing. As long as America continued<br />

to exist as the producer of so many commodities that England<br />

needed for import, and as long as the value of the dollar continued<br />

to be high, the anemia of the pound sterling would continue.<br />

The therapy chosen for this problem was simple. Perform a<br />

monetary transfusion from a healthy patient to the unhealthy one.<br />

All the London financiers had to do was find a large and robust<br />

specimen who, without asking too many questions, would be willing<br />

to become the donor. The specimen selected, of course, was<br />

Uncle Sam himself. It was the prototype of the transfer mechanism,<br />

previously described, which has been the life support keeping alive<br />

the moribund Communist and Socialist countries since World War<br />

II.<br />

There are several ways the life blood of one nation can be transfused<br />

to another. The most direct method, of course, is to make an<br />

outright gift, such as the bizarre American ritual called foreign aid.<br />

Another is to make a gift disguised as something else, such as needlessly<br />

stationing military bases abroad for the sole purpose of bolstering<br />

the foreign economy, or granting a loan to a foreign<br />

1. For an overview of the foregoing developments, see "The Federal Reserve as A<br />

Cartelization Device/' by Murray N. Rothbard, in Money in Crisis, Barry N. Siegei<br />

ed. (New York: Ballinger, 1984), pp. 115-17.<br />

THE LONDON CONNECTION 423<br />

government at below market rates or—worse—with the full expectation<br />

that the loan will never be repaid. But the third way is the<br />

most ingenious of them all: to have one nation deliberately inflate its<br />

currency at a rate greater than the other nation so that real purchasing<br />

power, in terms of international trade, moves from the more inflating<br />

to the less inflating nation. This is a method truly worthy of<br />

the monetary scientists. It is so subtle and so sophisticated that not<br />

one in a thousand would even think of it, much less object to it. It<br />

was, therefore, the ideal method chosen in 1925 to benefit England<br />

at the expense of America. As Professor Rothbard observed:<br />

In short, the American public was nominated to suffer the burdens<br />

of inflation and subsequent collapse [the crash of 1929] in order to<br />

maintain the British government and the British trade union<br />

movement in the style to which they insisted on becoming<br />

accustomed.<br />

°<br />

At the inception of the Federal Reserve System, there had been a<br />

brief struggle for power but, within a few years, the contest was<br />

decisively won by the head of the New York Bank, Benjamin Strong.<br />

Strong, it will be recalled, previously had been head of Morgan's<br />

Bankers Trust Company and was one of the seven participants at<br />

the secret meeting on <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island. Professor Quigley reminds us<br />

that "Strong owed his career to the favor of the Morgan bank. ... He<br />

became Governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York as the<br />

joint nominee of Morgan and Kuhn, Loeb and Company." 2<br />

Strong was the ideal choice for the cartel. Not the least of his<br />

qualifications was his alliance with the financial powers of London.<br />

When Montagu Norman was made the Governor of the Bank of<br />

England in 1920, there began a close personal relationship between<br />

the two central bankers which lasted until Strong's sudden death in<br />

1928.<br />

Norman was considered by many to be eccentric if not mentally<br />

unbalanced. Quigley says:<br />

Norman was a strange man whose mental outlook was one of<br />

successfully suppressed hysteria or even paranoia. He had no use for<br />

government and feared democracy. Both of these seemed to him to be<br />

threats to private banking, and thus to all that was proper and<br />

[<br />

precious in human life.... When he rebuilt the Bank of England, he<br />

1 Rothbard, Crisis, pp. 131-32.<br />

2<br />

-<br />

Quigley, Tragedy, p. 326.


424 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND THE LONDON CONNECTION 425<br />

constructed it<br />

as a fortress prepared to defend itself against any<br />

popular revolt, with the sacred gold reserves hidden in deep vaults<br />

below the level of underground waters which could be released to<br />

cover them by pressing a button on the governor's desk. For much of<br />

his life, Norman rushed about the world by fast steamship, covering<br />

tens of thousands of miles each year, often travelling incognito,<br />

concealed by a black slouch hat and a long black cloak, under the<br />

assumed name of "Professor Skinner."...<br />

Norman had a devoted colleague in Benjamin Strong.,,. In the<br />

1920s, they were determined to use the financial power of Britain and<br />

of the United States to force all the major countries of the world to go<br />

on the gold standard [with an artificial value set for the benefit of<br />

England] and to operate it through central banks free from all political<br />

control, with all questions of international finance to be settled by<br />

agreements by such central banks without interference from<br />

governments.<br />

Strong and Norman spent many holidays together, sometimes<br />

in Bar Harbor, Maine, but usually in Southern France, and they<br />

crisscrossed the Atlantic on numerous other occasions to consult<br />

with each other on their plan for controlling the world economy.<br />

Lester Chandler tells us: 'Their associations were so frequent and<br />

prolonged and their collaboration so close that it is still impossible<br />

to determine accurately their relative roles in developing some of<br />

the ideas and projects that they shared."<br />

The Bank of England provided<br />

Strong with an office and a private secretary during his visits,<br />

and the two men kept in close contact with each other through the<br />

weekly exchange of private cables. All of these meetings and communiques<br />

were kept in strict secrecy. When their frequent visits<br />

drew inquiries from the press, the standard reply was that they<br />

were just friends getting together for recreation or informal chats.<br />

By 1926, the heads of the central banks of France and Germany were<br />

occasionally included in their meetings which, according to<br />

Norman's biographer, were "more secret than any ever held by<br />

Royal Arch Masons or by any Rosicrucian Order/<br />

1. Quigley, Tragedy, p. 326.<br />

2. Lester V. Chandler, Benjamin Strong, Central Banker (Washington, D.C.: Brookings<br />

Institution, 1958, reprinted by Arno Press, A New York Times Company, 1978),<br />

p. 259.<br />

3. John Hargrave, Montagu Norman (New York: Greystone Press, 1942), p. 108.<br />

SECRET MEETING OF 1927<br />

The culmination of these discussions took place at a secret meeting<br />

in 1927 at which it was agreed that the financial lifeblood of the<br />

American people would be donated for a massive transfusion to<br />

Great Britain. Galbraith sets the scene:<br />

On July 1, 1927, the Maureiania arrived in New York with two<br />

notable passengers, Montagu Norman, Governor of the Bank of<br />

England, and Hjalmar Schacht, head of the German Reichsbank.. . . The<br />

secrecy covering the visit was extreme and to a degree ostentatious.<br />

The names of neither of the great bankers appeared on the passenger<br />

list. Neither, on arriving, met with the press....<br />

In New York the two men were joined by Charles Rist, the Deputy<br />

Governor of the Banque de France, and they went into conference with<br />

Benjamin Strong, the Governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of New<br />

York....<br />

The principle, or in any case the ultimately important, subject of<br />

discussion was the persistently weak reserve position of the Bank of<br />

England. This, the bankers thought, could be helped if the Federal<br />

Reserve System would ease interest rates, encourage lending. Holders<br />

of gold would then seek the higher returns from keeping their metal in<br />

London. And, in time, higher prices in the United States would ease<br />

the competitive position of British industry and labor. 1<br />

Galbraith speaks with soft phrases to cushion a harsh reality.<br />

What he is saying is that the purpose of the meeting was to finalize<br />

a plan whereby the Governor of the Federal Reserve System was to<br />

deliberately create inflation in the U.S. so that American prices<br />

would rise, making U.S. goods less competitive in world markets<br />

and causing American gold to move to the Bank of England. Governor<br />

Strong needed little convincing. That is precisely what he and<br />

Norman had planned to do all along and, in fact, he had already<br />

begun to implement the plan. The purpose of inviting the Germans<br />

and the French to the meeting was to enlist their agreement to create<br />

inflation in their countries as well. Schacht and Rist would have no<br />

part of it and left the meeting early, leaving Strong and Norman to<br />

work out the final details between them.<br />

Strong was more concerned about British fortunes than<br />

American. In a letter written in May of 1924 to Secretary of the<br />

Treasury Andrew Mellon, he discussed the necessity of lowering<br />

American interest rates as a step toward money expansion with the<br />

Galbraith, pp. 174-75.


426 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

objective of raising American prices relative to those in Great<br />

Britain. He acknowledged that the goal was to protect England from<br />

having to cut back on wages, profits, and welfare. He said:<br />

At the present time it is probably true that British prices for goods<br />

internationally dealt in are as a whole, roughly, in the neighborhood of<br />

10 percent above our prices, and one of the preliminaries to the<br />

re-establishment of gold payment by Great Britain will be to facilitate<br />

a gradual readjustment of these price levels before monetary reform is<br />

undertaken. In other words, this means some small advance in prices<br />

here and possibly some small decline in their prices.. .<br />

The burden of this readjustment must fall more largely upon us<br />

than upon them. It will be difficult politically and socially for the<br />

British Government and the Bank of England to face a price<br />

liquidation in England ... in face of the fact that trade is poor and they<br />

have over a million unemployed people receiving government aid.<br />

BRINGING DOWN THE DOLLAR<br />

The Mandrake Mechanism of the Federal Reserve went into<br />

high gear on behalf of the Bank of England in 1924, several years<br />

before the historic meeting between Strong, Norman, and Rist.<br />

There were two great surges of monetary expansion. The first came<br />

with the monetization of $492 million in bonds plus almost twice as<br />

much in banker's acceptances. The second burst of inflation came in<br />

the latter half of 1927, immediately following the secret meeting<br />

between Strong, Norman, Schacht, and Rist. It involved the funding<br />

of $225 million in government bonds plus $220 million in banker's<br />

acceptances, for a total increase in bank reserves of $445 million. At<br />

the same time, the rediscount rate to member banks (the interest<br />

rate they pay to borrow from the Fed) was lowered from 4 to 3.5 per<br />

cent, making it<br />

easier for those banks to acquire additional<br />

"reserves" out of which they could create even more fiat dollars-<br />

The amount created on top of that by the commercial banks is about<br />

five and a-half times the amount created by the Fed, whic±i means a<br />

total money flood in excess of $10 billion in just six years.<br />

L Chandler, pp. 282-84. i<br />

2. Approximately $1,328,000,000 in the first burst, including bothbonds ana<br />

acceptances, plus"$445,000,000 in the second burst equals<br />

S^^^Jg<br />

amount multiplied by 5.5 equals $9,751,500,000. Add the original $1,773,000,000<br />

used as a base, and the total is $11,524,500,000. This estimate is reasonably close to<br />

the figure of $10,661,000,000 published by the Fed itself, which represents the<br />

growth in total deposits and currency in circulation during that period. See Depc*<br />

its and Currency," p. 34.<br />

THE LONDON CONNECTION 427<br />

Throughout this period, the demand by the System for government<br />

bonds and acceptances pushed interest rates down. As anticipated,<br />

people with gold then preferred to send it to London where<br />

it could earn a higher yield, and America's gold supply began to<br />

move abroad. Furthermore, as inflation began to eat its way into the<br />

purchasing power of the dollar, the prices of American-made goods<br />

began to rise in world markets making them less competitive; U.S.<br />

exports began to decline; unemployment began to rise; low interest<br />

rates and easy credit led to speculation in the securities markets;<br />

and the system lunged full speed ahead toward the Great Crash of<br />

1929. But that part of the story must wait for another chapter.<br />

The technician who actually drafted the final version of the<br />

Federal Reserve Act was H. Parker Willis. After the System was created,<br />

he was appointed as First Secretary of the Board of Governors.<br />

By 1929, he had become disillusioned with the cartel and, in an article<br />

published in The North American Review, he wrote:<br />

In the autumn of 1926 a group of bankers, among whom was one<br />

with a world famous name, were sitting at a table in a Washington<br />

hotel. One of them raised the question whether the low discount rates<br />

of the System were not likely to encourage speculation. "Yes," replied<br />

the conspicuous figure referred to, "they will, but that cannot be<br />

helped. It is the price we must pay for helping Europe."<br />

There can be little doubt that the banker in question was J.P.<br />

(Jack) Morgan, Jr. It was Jack who was imbued with English<br />

tradition from the earliest age, whose financial empire had its roots<br />

in London, whose family business was saved by the Bank of<br />

England, who spent six months out of every year of his later life as<br />

a resident of England, who had openly insisted that his junior partners<br />

demonstrate a "loyalty to Britain," and who had directed the<br />

Council on Foreign Relations, the American branch of a secret society<br />

dedicated to the supremacy of British tradition and political<br />

1- When an item is in demand, its price goes up. In the case of bonds and other<br />

interest-bearing debt instruments, the price is expressed in reverse of its interest<br />

yield. The higher the price, the lower the interest. In other words, the higher the<br />

price, the more one has to pay to obtain the same dollar return in interest. Therefore,<br />

when the Fed creates an artificial demand for bonds or commercial paper, such as<br />

acceptances, the interest yield on these items goes down, which makes them more<br />

costly as an investment.<br />

2 -<br />

"The Failure of the Federal Reserve," by H. Parker Willis, The North American<br />

Revieiv, May, 1929, p. 553.<br />

3-<br />

Chernow, p. 167.


428 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND THE LONDON CONNECTION 429<br />

power. It is only with that background that one can fully appreciate<br />

Reunion with her American children is the only sure way to<br />

the willingness to sacrifice American interests. Indeed, "it is the<br />

prevent continued decline.... Whatever obstructs reunion I oppose;<br />

whatever promotes reunion I favor. I judge all political questions from<br />

this standpoint...<br />

The Parliament of Man and the Federation of the World have<br />

already been hailed by the poet, and these mean a step much farther in<br />

advance of the proposed reunion of Britain and America.... I say that<br />

as surely as the sun in the heavens once shone upon Britain and<br />

Our policy of the last four years, up to this January, has been<br />

America united, so surely is it one morning to rise, shine upon, and<br />

effective in accomplishing the purpose for which it was designed. It<br />

greet again the reunited state, "The British-American Union/'<br />

has enabled monetary reorganization to be completed in Europe,<br />

which otherwise would have been impossible. It was undertaken with SUMMARY<br />

the well recognized hazard that we were liable to encounter a big<br />

After the Civil War, America experienced a series of expansions<br />

speculation and some expansion of credit. . .<br />

Our course was perfectly<br />

and contractions of the money supply leading directly to economic<br />

obvious. We had to undertake it. The conditions permitted it, and the<br />

booms and busts. This was the result of the creation of fiat money by<br />

possibility of damage abroad was at a minimum.<br />

a banking system which, far from being free and competitive, was a<br />

Damage abroad? What about damage at home? It is clear that<br />

half-way house to central banking. Throughout the chaos, one banking<br />

firm, the House of Morgan, was able to prosper out of the failure<br />

Strong saw little difference between the two. He was the forerunner<br />

of the internationalists who have operated the Federal Reserve ever<br />

of others. Morgan had close ties with the financial structure and culture<br />

of England and was, in fact, more British than American.<br />

since. He viewed the United States as but one piece in a complex<br />

world financial structure, and what was good for the world was<br />

Events suggest the possibility that Morgan and Company was in<br />

good for America. And, oh yes, what was good for England was<br />

concealed partnership with the House of Rothschild throughout<br />

good for the world!<br />

most of this period.<br />

THE BRITISH-AMERICAN UNION<br />

Benjamin Strong was a Morgan man and was appointed as the<br />

It is one of the least understood realities of modern history that<br />

first Governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York which rapidly<br />

assumed dominance over the System. Strong immediately<br />

many of America's most prominent political and financial figuresthen<br />

as now—have been willing to sacrifice the best interests of the<br />

entered into close alliance with Montagu Norman, Governor of the<br />

United States in order to further their goal of creating a one-world Bank of England, to save the English economy from depression.<br />

government. The strategy has remained unchanged since the formation<br />

of Cecil Rhodes' society and its offspring, the Round Table which caused an outflow of gold, a loss of foreign markets, unem-<br />

This was accomplished by deliberately creating inflation in the U.S.<br />

Groups. It is to merge the English-speaking nations into a single<br />

ployment, and speculation in the stock market, all of which were<br />

political entity, while at the same time creating similar groupings<br />

factors that propelled America into the crash of 1929 and the great<br />

for other geopolitical regions. After this is accomplished, all of these<br />

depression of the 30s.<br />

groupings are to be amalgamated into a global government, the<br />

Although not covered in this chapter, it must be remembered<br />

so-called Parliament of Man. And guess who is planning to control<br />

that the same forces were responsible for American involvement in<br />

that government from behind the scenes.<br />

both world wars to provide the economic and military resources<br />

This strategy was expressed aptly by Andrew Carnegie in his<br />

England<br />

book, Triumphant Democracy. Expressing concern that England was<br />

needed to survive. Furthermore, the key players in this<br />

in decline as a world power, he said:<br />

Andrew Carnegie, Triumphant Democracy (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,<br />

1893), pp. 530-49. This is a revised edition of the book which was originally written<br />

1. Chandler, p. 458. For additional clarification, also see pp. 459-63- *n 1886. Earlier editions do not contain these words.<br />

price we must pay for helping Europe."<br />

In spite of the growing signs of crisis in the American economy,<br />

Morgan's protege, Benjamin Strong, was nonetheless pleased with<br />

his accomplishment. In a letter written in 1929 to Parker Gilbert,<br />

who was the American Agent for Reparations, he said:


430 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

action were men who were part of the network of a secret society<br />

established by Cecil Rhodes for the expansion of the British empire.<br />

Chapter Twenty-One<br />

COMPETITION IS A SIN<br />

The story of how the New York investment<br />

bankers formed a cartel to avoid competition; the<br />

drafting of proposed legislation to legalize that<br />

cartel; the strategy to camouflage the true nature<br />

of the legislation; the failure of the deception and<br />

the defeat of the bill.<br />

We have travelled to many points on a large circle of time and<br />

now are reapproaching the journey to <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island where this book<br />

began.<br />

In the last chapter, we saw how the expansion and contraction<br />

Of the money supply following the Civil War led to a series of<br />

booms and busts. We saw how the firm of J.P. Morgan & Company,<br />

with help from financiers in London, was able to reap great profits<br />

from both sides of those cycles but particularly from the recessions.<br />

At that point, we jumped ahead in time to examine how J.P.<br />

Morgan and other leading American financiers were closely<br />

aligned with British interests. We also saw how, in the 1920s, the<br />

American dollar was deliberately weakened by Morgan agents<br />

within the Federal Reserve System in order to prop up the sagging<br />

British economy. Let us return now to the point of departure and<br />

allow our cast to resume playing out that most important prior<br />

scene: the actual creation of the Federal Reserve System itself.<br />

HALF-WAY HOUSE TO CENTRAL BANKING<br />

Historians seeking to justify governmental control of the monetary<br />

system have claimed that the booms and busts that occurred<br />

during this period were the result of free and competitive banking.<br />

As we have seen, however, these destructive cycles were the direct<br />

result of the creation and then extinguishing of fiat money through<br />

a system of federally chartered national banks—dominated by a<br />

handful of firms on Wall Street—which constituted a half-way<br />

house to central banking. None of these banks were truly free of<br />

state control nor were they competitive in the traditional sense of


432 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND COMPETITION IS A SIN 433<br />

the word. They were in fact subsidized by the government and had<br />

many monopolistic privileges. From the perspective of bankers on<br />

Wall Street, however, there was a great deal more to be desired. For<br />

one thing, America still did not have a "lender of last resort/' That<br />

is banker language for a full-blown central bank with the power to<br />

create unlimited amounts of fiat money which can be rushed to the<br />

aid of any individual bank that is under siege by its depositors<br />

wanting their money back. Having a lender of last resort is the only<br />

way a bank can create money out of nothing and still be protected<br />

from a potential "run" by its customers. In other words, it is the<br />

means by which the public is forced to pay a hidden tax of inflation<br />

to cover the shortfall of fractional-reserve banking. That is why the<br />

so-called virtue of a lender of last resort is taught with great<br />

reverence today in virtually all academic institutions offering<br />

degrees in banking and finance. It is one of the means by which the<br />

system perpetuates itself.<br />

The banks could now inflate more radically and more in unison<br />

than before the war but, when they pushed too far and too fast,<br />

their bank-generated booms still<br />

collapsed into recessions. While<br />

this could be highly profitable to the banks, it was also precarious.<br />

As the American economy expanded in size, the magnitude of the<br />

booms and busts increased also, and it was becoming more and<br />

more difficult for firms like Morgan & Company to safely ride out<br />

the storm. There was a growing dread that the next collapse might<br />

be more than even they could handle.<br />

In addition to these concerns was the fact that many state<br />

banks, mostly in the developing Southern and Western states, had<br />

elected not to join the national banking system and, consequently,<br />

had escaped control by the Wall-Street-Washington axis. As the<br />

population expanded south and westward, much of the nation's<br />

banking moved likewise, and the new banks were becoming an<br />

increasing source of competition to the New York power center. By<br />

1896, the number of non-national banks had grown to sixty-one per<br />

cent, and they already held fifty-four per cent of the country's total<br />

banking deposits. By 1913, the year in which the Federal Reserve<br />

Act was passed, those numbers had swelled to seventy-one per<br />

cent non-national banks holding fifty-seven per cent of the nation's<br />

deposits. 1 Something had to be done to stop this movement.<br />

Additional competition was developing from the trend in<br />

industry to finance itself from profits rather than borrowed capital.<br />

Between 1900 and 1910, seventy per cent of American corporate<br />

growth was funded internally, making industry increasingly independent<br />

of the banks. What the bankers wanted—and what many<br />

businessmen wanted also—was a more "flexible" or "elastic"<br />

money supply which would allow them to create enough of it at<br />

any point in time so as to be able to drive interest rates downward<br />

at will. That would make loans to businessmen so attractive they<br />

would have little choice but to return to the bankers' stable.<br />

TRUSTS AND CARTELS REPLACE COMPETITION<br />

One more problem facing Wall Street was the fact that the<br />

biggest investment houses, such as Morgan & Company and Kuhn,<br />

Loeb & Company, although they remained as competitors, were by<br />

this time so large they had ceased doing serious battle against each<br />

other. The concept of trusts and cartels had dawned in America<br />

and, to those who already had made it<br />

to the top, joint ventures,<br />

market sharing, price fixing, and mergers were far more profitable<br />

than free-enterprise competition. Ron Chernow explains:<br />

»Wall Street was snowballing into one big, Morgan-dominated<br />

institution. In December 1909, Pierpont had bought a majority stake in<br />

the Equitable Life Assurance Society from Thomas Fortune Ryan. This<br />

gave him strong influence over America's three biggest insurance<br />

companies—Mutual Life, Equitable, and New York Life.... His<br />

Bankers Trust had taken over three other banks. In 1909, he had gained<br />

control of Guaranty Trust, which through a series of mergers he<br />

converted into America's largest trust.... The core Money Trust group<br />

included J.P. Morgan and Company, First National Bank, and<br />

National City Bank.. .<br />

Wall Street bankers incestuously swapped seats on each others<br />

boards. Some banks had so many overlapping directors it was hard to<br />

separate them.... The banks also shared large equity stakes in each<br />

other....<br />

Why didn't banks just merge instead of carrying out the charade<br />

of swapping shares and board members? Most were private<br />

partnerships or closely held banks and could have done so. The<br />

answer harked back to traditional American antipathy against<br />

concentrated financial power. The Morgan-First National-National<br />

City trio feared public retribution if it openly declared its allegiance.<br />

1. See Kolko, Triumph, p. 140. f Chernow, pp. 152-53.


434 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

Interlocking directorates and other forms of hidden control<br />

were far more safe than open consolidation but they, too, had their<br />

limitations. For one thing, they could not penetrate the barriers of<br />

similar competitive groupings. As these combines became larger<br />

and larger, ways were sought to bring them together at the top<br />

rather than to capture the corporate entities which comprised them.<br />

Thus was born the concept of a cartel, a "community of interest"<br />

among businessmen in the same field, a mechanism for coming<br />

together as partners at a high level and to reduce or eliminate<br />

altogether the harsh necessity of competition.<br />

All cartels, however, have an internal self-destruct mechanism.<br />

Sooner or later, one of the members inevitably becomes dissatisfied<br />

with his agreed-upon piece of the pie. He decides to compete once<br />

again and seeks a greater share of the market. It was quickly<br />

recognized that the only way to prevent this from happening was<br />

to use the police power of government to enforce the cartel<br />

agreement. The procedure called for the passage of laws disguised<br />

as measures to protect the consumer but which actually worked to<br />

ensure the elimination of competition. Henry P. Davison, who was<br />

a Morgan partner, put it bluntly when he told a Congressional<br />

committee in 1912: '1 would rather have regulation and control<br />

than free competition/'<br />

John D Rockefeller was even more to the<br />

point in one of his often repeated comments: "Competition is a<br />

sin „2<br />

This trend was not unique to the banking industry. Ron Paul<br />

and Lewis Lehrman provide the historical perspective:<br />

After 1896 and 1900, then, America entered a progressive and<br />

predominantly Republican era. Compulsory cartelization in the name<br />

of "progressivism" began to invade every aspect of American<br />

economic life. The railroads had begun the parade with the formation<br />

of the ICC in the 1880s, but now field after field was being centralized<br />

and cartelized in the name of "efficiency," "stability," "progress," and<br />

the general welfare.... In particular, various big business groups, led<br />

by the J.P. Morgan interests, often gathered in the National Civic<br />

Federation and other think tanks and pressure organizations, saw that<br />

the voluntary cartels and the industrial merger movements of the late<br />

1 Quoted by Gabriel Kolko, Main Currents in Modern American History (New York:<br />

Harper & Row, 1976), p.. 13.<br />

2. Quoted by William Hoffman, David: A Report on a Rockefeller (New York: Lyle<br />

Stewart, Inc., 1971), p. 29.<br />

f<br />

1890s<br />

COMPETITION IS A SIN 435<br />

had failed to achieve monopoly prices in industry. Therefore,<br />

they decided to turn to governments, state and federal, to curb the<br />

winds of competition and to establish forms of compulsory cartels, in<br />

the name, of course, of "curbing big business monopoly" and<br />

advancing the general welfare.<br />

The challenge no longer was how to overcome one's adversaries,<br />

but how to keep new ones from entering the field. When John<br />

D. used his enormous profits from Standard Oil to take control of<br />

the Chase National Bank, and his<br />

brother, William, bought the<br />

National City Bank of New York, Wall Street had yet one more<br />

gladiator in the financial arena. Morgan found that he had no<br />

choice except to allow the Rockefellers into the club but, now that<br />

they were in, they all agreed that the influx of competitors had to be<br />

stopped. And that was to be the hidden purpose of federal<br />

legislation and government control. Gabriel Kolko explains:<br />

The sheer magnitude of many of the mergers, culminating in U.S.<br />

Steel, soon forced him [Morgan] to modify his stand, though at times<br />

he would have preferred total control. More important, by 1898 he<br />

could not ignore the massive power of new financial competitors and<br />

had to treat them with deference. Standard Oil Company, utilizing<br />

National City Bank for its investments, had fixed resources<br />

substantially larger than Morgan's, and by 1899 was ready to move<br />

into the general economy.... The test came, of course, in the Northern<br />

Securities battle, which was essentially an expensive draw. Morgan<br />

and Standard paid deference to each other thereafter, and mutual<br />

toleration among bankers increased sharply.... A benign armed<br />

neutrality, rather than positive affection, is as much a reason as any for<br />

the high number of interlocks among the five major New York<br />

banking houses.<br />

Writing in the year 1919, from the perspective of an inside view<br />

of Wall Street at that time, John Moody completes the picture:<br />

J-<br />

This remarkable welding together of great corporate interests<br />

could not, of course, have been accomplished if the "masters of<br />

capital" in Wall Street had not themselves during the same period<br />

become more closely allied. The rivalry of interests which was so<br />

characteristic during the reorganization period a few years before had<br />

very largely disappeared. Although the two great groups of financiers,<br />

represented on the one hand by Morgan and his allies and on the other<br />

by the Standard Oil forces, were still distinguishable, they were now<br />

Paul and Lehrman, p. 119.<br />

2- Kolko, Triumph, pp. 143-44.


436 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

working in practical harmony on the basis of a sort of mutual<br />

"community of interest" of their own. Thus the control of capital and<br />

credit through banking resources tended to become concentrated in<br />

the hands of fewer and fewer men.... Before long it could be said,<br />

indeed, that two rival banking groups no longer existed, but that one<br />

vast and harmonious banking power had taken their pLace.<br />

THE ALDRICH-VREELAND ACT<br />

The monetary contractions of 1879 and 1893 were handled by<br />

Wall Street fairly easily and without government intervention, but<br />

the crisis of 1907 pushed their resources close to the abyss. It<br />

became clear that two changes had to be made: all remnants of<br />

banking competition now had to be totally eliminated and replaced<br />

by a national cartel; and far greater sums of fiat money had to be<br />

made available to the banks to protect them from future runs by<br />

depositors. There was now no question that Congress would have<br />

to be brought in as a partner in order to use the power of<br />

government to accomplish these objectives. Kolko continues:<br />

The crisis of 1907, on the other hand, found the combined banking<br />

structure of New York inadequate to meet the challenge, and<br />

chastened any obstreperous financial powers who thought they might<br />

build their fortunes independently of the entire banking<br />

community.... The nation had grown too large, banking had become<br />

too complex. Wall Street, humbled and almost alone, turned from its<br />

own resources to the national government.<br />

The first step in this direction was openly a stop-gap measure.<br />

In 1908, Congress passed the Aldrich-Vreeland Act which, basically,<br />

accomplished two objectives. First, it authorized the national<br />

banks to issue an emergency currency, called script, to substitute<br />

for regular money when they found themselves unable to pay their<br />

depositors. Script had been used by the bank clearing houses<br />

during the panic of 1907 with partial success, but it had been a bold<br />

experiment with no legal foundation. Now Congress made it quite<br />

legal and, as Galbraith observed, "The new legislation regularized<br />

these arrangements. This could be done against the security of<br />

sundry bonds and commercial loans—these could, in effect, be<br />

turned into cash without being sold/'<br />

1. Moody, pp. 117-18, 150<br />

2. Ko\ko f<br />

Triumph, p. 144.<br />

3. This legalized script was used only once—in 1914 at the outbreak of World<br />

War I. See Galbraith, p. 120.<br />

COMPETITION IS A SIN 437<br />

The second and perhaps most important feature of the Act was<br />

to create a National Monetary Commission to study the problems<br />

of American banking and then make recommendations to Congress<br />

on how to stabilize the monetary system. The commission<br />

consisted of nine senators and nine representatives. The Vice-<br />

Chairman was Representative Edward Vreeland, a banker from the<br />

Buffalo area. The chairman, of course, was Senator Nelson Aldrich.<br />

From the start, it was obvious that the Commission was a sham.<br />

Aldrich conducted virtually a one-man show. The so-called factfinding<br />

body held no official meetings for almost two years while<br />

Aldrich toured Europe consulting with the top central bankers of<br />

England, France, and Germany. Three-hundred thousand tax dollars<br />

were spent on these junkets, and the only tangible product of<br />

the Commission's work was thirty-eight massive volumes of the<br />

history of European banking. None of the members of the Commission<br />

were ever consulted regarding the official recommendations<br />

issued by Aldrich in their name. Actually, these were the work of<br />

Aldrich and six men who were not even members of the Commission,<br />

and their report was drafted, not in a bare Congressional<br />

conference room in Washington, but in a plush private hunting<br />

resort in Georgia.<br />

And this event finally brings us back to that cold, blustery night<br />

at the New Jersey railway station where seven men, representing<br />

one-fourth of the wealth of the world, boarded the Aldrich private<br />

car for a clandestine journey to <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island.<br />

THE JEKYLL ISLAND PLAN<br />

As summarized in the opening chapter of this book, the<br />

purpose of that meeting was to work out a plain to achieve five<br />

primary objectives:<br />

1. How to stop the growing influence of small, rival banks and to<br />

insure that control over the nation's financial resources would<br />

remain in the hands of those present;<br />

2. How to make the money supply more elastic in order to reverse<br />

the trend of private capital formation and to recapture the<br />

industrial loan market;<br />

3- How to pool the meager reserves of all the nation's banks into<br />

one large reserve so that at least a few of them could protect


438 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND COMPETITION IS A SIN 439<br />

4. How to shift the inevitable losses from the owners of the banks to<br />

the taxpayers;<br />

5. How to convince Congress that the scheme was a measure to<br />

protect the public.<br />

It was decided that the first two objectives could be achieved<br />

simply by drafting the proper technical language into a cartel<br />

agreement and then re-working the vocabulary into legislative<br />

phraseology. The third and fourth could be achieved by including<br />

in<br />

that legislation the establishment of a lender of last resort; in<br />

other words, a true central bank with the ability to create unlimited<br />

amounts of fiat money. These were mostly technical matters and,<br />

although there was some disagreement on a few minor points,<br />

generally they were content to follow the advice of Paul Warburg,<br />

the man who had the most experience in these matters and who<br />

was regarded as the group's theoretician. The fifth objective was<br />

the critical one, and there was much discussion on how to achieve<br />

it.<br />

To convince Congress and the public that the establishment of a<br />

banking cartel was, somehow, a measure to protect the public, the<br />

<strong>Jekyll</strong> Island strategists laid down the following plan of action:<br />

1. Do not call it a cartel nor even a central bank.<br />

2. Make it look like a government agency.<br />

3. Establish regional branches to create the appearance of<br />

decentralization, not dominated by Wall Street banks.<br />

4. Begin with a conservative structure including many sound<br />

banking principles knowing that the provisions can be quietly<br />

altered or removed in subsequent years.<br />

5. Use the anger caused by recent panics and bank failures to create<br />

popular demand for monetary reform.<br />

6. Offer the <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island plan as though it were in response to that<br />

need.<br />

7. Employ university professors to give the plan the appearance of<br />

academic approval.<br />

8. Speak out against the plan to convince the public that Wall Street<br />

bankers do not want it.<br />

A CENTRAL BANK BY ANY OTHER NAME<br />

Americans would never have accepted the Federal Reserve<br />

System if they had known that it was half cartel and half central<br />

bank. Even though the concept of government protectionism was<br />

rapidly gaining acceptance in business, academic, and political<br />

circles, the idea of cartels, trusts, and restraint of free competition<br />

was still quite alien to the average voter. And within the halls of<br />

Congress, any forthright proposal for either a cartel or a central<br />

bank would have been soundly defeated. Congressman Everis<br />

Hayes of California warned: "Our people have set their faces like<br />

steel against a central bank/' 1 Senator John Shafroth of Colorado<br />

declared: "The Democratic Party is opposed to a central bank." 2<br />

The monetary scientists on <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island decided, therefore, to<br />

devise a name for their new creature which would avoid the word<br />

bank altogether and which would conjure the image of the federal<br />

government itself. And to create the deception that there would be<br />

no concentration of power in the large New York banks, the<br />

original plan calling for a central bank was replaced by a proposal<br />

for a network of regional institutions which supposedly would<br />

share and diffuse that power.<br />

Nathaniel<br />

Wright Stephenson, Senator Aldrich's biographer,<br />

tells us: "Aldrich entered the discussion at <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island an ardent<br />

convert to the idea of a central bank. His desire was to transplant<br />

the system of one of the great European banks, say the Bank of<br />

England, bodily to America." 3 Galbraith explains further: "It was<br />

his [Senator Aldrich's] thought to outflank the opposition by<br />

having not one central bank but many. And the word bank would<br />

itself be avoided/<br />

Frank Vanderlip tells us the regional concept was merely<br />

window dressing and that the network was always intended to<br />

operate as one central bank. He said: 'The law as enacted provided<br />

for twelve banks instead of one,... but the intent of the law was to<br />

coordinate the twelve through the Federal Reserve Board in<br />

Washington, so that in effect they would operate as a central<br />

bank." 5<br />

If not using the word bank was essential to the <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island<br />

plan, avoiding the word cartel was even more so. Yet, the cartel<br />

nature of the proposed central bank was obvious to any astute<br />

observer. In an address before the American Bankers Association,<br />

1-<br />

Congressional Record, pL 5, 1913, p. 4655.<br />

2- Congressional Record, pt 6, 1913, p. 6021<br />

3 -<br />

Stephenson, p. 378.<br />

4-<br />

Galbraith, p. 122.<br />

5 -<br />

Vanderlip,<br />

"From Farm Boy to Financier/' p, 72.


440 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND COMPETITION IS A SIN 441<br />

Aldrich laid it out plainly. He said: 'The organization proposed is<br />

not a bank, but a cooperative union of all the banks of the country<br />

for definite purposes." Two years later, in a speech before that<br />

same group of bankers, A. Barton Hepburn of Chase National Bank<br />

was even more candid. He said: "The measure recognizes and<br />

adopts the principles of a central bank. Indeed, if it works out as the<br />

sponsors of the law hope, it will make all incorporated banks<br />

together joint owners of a central dominating power/' It would be<br />

difficult to find a better definition of the word cartel than that.<br />

The plan to structure the Creature conservatively at the start<br />

and then to remove the safeguards later was the brainchild of Paul<br />

Warburg. The creation of a powerful Federal Reserve Board was<br />

also his idea as a means by which the regional branches could be<br />

absorbed into a central bank with control safely in New York.<br />

Professor Edwin Seligman, a member of the international banking<br />

family of J&W Seligman, and head of the Department of Economics<br />

at Columbia University, explains and praises the plan:<br />

It was in my study that Mr. Warburg first conceived the idea of<br />

presenting his views to the public. ... In its fundamental features the<br />

Federal Reserve Act is the work of Mr. Warburg more than any other<br />

man in the country.... The existence of a Federal Reserve Board<br />

creates, in everything but in name, a real central bank. . . Mr. Warburg<br />

had a practical object in view. ... It was incumbent on him to remember<br />

that the education of the country must be gradual and that a large part<br />

of the task was to break down prejudices and remove suspicion. His<br />

plans therefore contain all sorts of elaborate suggestions designed to<br />

guard the public against fancied dangers and to persuade the country<br />

that the general scheme was at all practicable. It was the hope of Mr.<br />

Warburg that with the lapse of time it may be possible to eliminate<br />

1. Krooss, Vol. HI, 1969 edition, p. 1202.<br />

2. Quoted by Kolko, Triumph, p. 235.<br />

3. Most historians share Seligman's view regarding Warburg's seminal role in the<br />

creation of the Federal Reserve System. Certain participants in the drama, however,<br />

apparently eager to capture some of the spotlight of fame for themselves, are in<br />

vigorous disagreement. For example, William McAdoo, Secretary of the Treasury<br />

at the time, says: "This assertion is so completely erroneous that it must have<br />

emanated from ignorance rather than mendacity." See McAdoo, p. 281. Competing<br />

egos notwithstanding, an objective reading of the record leads to the conclusion<br />

that, while others no doubt provided great input in the areas of technical drafts and<br />

political negotiations, the essence of the plan, its overall concept and the rationale that<br />

was put forward to sell the plan to Congress was essentially the product of<br />

Warburg's twisted genius.<br />

J<br />

from the law not a few clauses which were inserted largely, at his<br />

suggestion, for educational purposes. 1<br />

THE ALDRICH BILL<br />

The first draft of the <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island plan was submitted to the<br />

Senate by Nelson Aldrich but, due to the Senator's unexpected<br />

illness when he returned to Washington, it was actually written by<br />

Frank Vanderlip and Benjamin Strong. 2 Although it was coauthored<br />

by Congressman Vreeland, it immediately became<br />

known as the Aldrich Bill. Vreeland, by his own admission, had<br />

little to do with it either, but his willingness to be a team player in<br />

the game of national deception was of great value. Writing in the<br />

August 25, 1910, issue of The Independent, which incidentally was<br />

owned by Aldrich himself and was anything but independent,<br />

Vreeland said: "The bank I propose.... is an ideal method of<br />

fighting monopoly. It could not possibly itself become a monopoly<br />

and it would prevent other banks combining into monopolies. With<br />

earnings limited to four and one-half per cent, there could not be a<br />

monopoly.<br />

What an amazing statement. It is brilliantly insidious because of<br />

the half truths it contains. It is true that monopolies cannot—or at<br />

least do not-operate at four and one-half per cent interest. But it is<br />

untrue that the Federal Reserve banks were to be held to that lowly<br />

rate. It is true that four per cent was the stated amount they would<br />

earn on the stock purchased in the System, but it is also true that<br />

the real profits were to be made, not from stock dividends, but<br />

from the harvesting of interest payments on fiat money. To this was<br />

to be added the profits made possible from operating on smaller<br />

safety margins yet still being protected from bankruptcy. Furthermore,<br />

being on the inside of the nation's central bank would make<br />

Jhem privy to the important money-making data and decisions<br />

long before their competitors. The profits that could be derived<br />

from such an advantage would be equal to or even greater than<br />

those from the Mandrake Mechanism. It is<br />

true that the Federal<br />

Reserve was to be a private institution, but it is certainly not true<br />

| Edwin Seligman, Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, Vol IV, No. 4<br />

(New York: 1914), pp. 3-6.<br />

2- Vanderlip, "From Farm Boy to Financier," p. 72.<br />

l„/ A etteṛ ^ste of Banking<br />

?<br />

and Currency," by Edward B. Vreeland, The<br />

'"dependent, August 25, 1910, p. 394.


442 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

that this was to mark the disappearance of the government from<br />

the banking business. In fact, it was just the opposite, because it<br />

marked the appearance of the government as a partner with private<br />

bankers and as the enforcer of their cartel agreement. Government<br />

would now become more deeply involved than ever before in our<br />

history.<br />

Half truths and propaganda notwithstanding, the organizational<br />

structure proposed by the Aldrich Bill was similar in many<br />

ways to the old Bank of the United States. It was to have the right to<br />

convert federal debt into money, to loan that money to the<br />

government, to control the affairs of regional banks, and to be the<br />

depository of government funds. The dissimilarities were in those<br />

provisions which gave the Creature more privilege and power than<br />

the older central bank. The most important of these was the right to<br />

create the official money of the United States. For the first time in<br />

our history, the paper notes of a banking institution became legal<br />

tender, not only for public debts, but for private ones as well.<br />

Henceforth, anyone refusing to accept these notes would be sent to<br />

prison. The words "The United States of America" were to appear<br />

on the face of every note along with the great seal of the United<br />

States Treasury. And, of course, the signature of the Treasurer<br />

himself would be printed in a conspicuous location. All of this was<br />

designed to convince the public that the new institution was surely<br />

an agency of the government itself.<br />

TURNING THE OPPOSITION AGAINST ITSELF<br />

Now that the basic strategy was in place and a specific bill had<br />

been drafted, the next step was to create popular support for it.<br />

This was the critical part of the plan and it required the utmost<br />

finesse. The task actually was made easier by the fact that there was<br />

a great deal of genuine opposition to the concentration of financial<br />

power on Wall Street. Two of the most outspoken critics at that<br />

time were Wisconsin Senator Robert LaFollette and Minnesota<br />

Congressman Charles Lindbergh. Hardly a week passed without<br />

one of them delivering a scathing speech against what they called<br />

"the money trust" which was responsible, they said,<br />

for deliberately<br />

creating economic booms and busts in order to reap the<br />

profits of salvaging foreclosed homes, farms and businesses. If<br />

anyone doubted that such a trust really existed, their skepticism<br />

was abruptly terminated when LaFollette publicly charged that the<br />

COMPETITION IS A SIN 443<br />

entire country was controlled by just fifty men. The monetary<br />

scientists were not dismayed nor did they even bother to deny it. In<br />

fact, when George F. Baker, who was a partner of J.P. Morgan, was<br />

asked by reporters for his reaction to LaFollette's claim, he replied<br />

that it was totally absurd. He knew from personal knowledge, he<br />

said, that the number was not more than eight! 1<br />

The public was, of course, outraged, and the pressure predictably<br />

mounted for Congress to do something. The monetary scientists<br />

were fully prepared to turn this reaction to their own<br />

advantage. The strategy was simple: (1) set up a special Congressional<br />

committee to investigate the money trust; (2) make sure the<br />

committee is staffed by friends of the trust itself; and (3) conceal the<br />

full<br />

scope of the trust's operation while revealing just enough to<br />

intensify the public clamor for reform. Once the political climate<br />

was hot enough, then the Aldrich Bill could be put forward,<br />

supposedly as the answer to that need.<br />

This strategy was certainly not new. As Congressman<br />

Lindbergh explained:<br />

Ever since the Civil War, Congress has allowed the bankers to<br />

completely control financial legislation. The membership of the<br />

Finance Committee in the Senate and the Committee on Banking and<br />

Currency in the House, has been made up of bankers, their agents and<br />

attorneys. These committees have controlled the nature of the bills to<br />

be reported, the extent of them, and the debates that were to be held on<br />

them when they were being considered in the Senate and the House.<br />

No one, not on the committee, is recognized ... unless someone<br />

I<br />

favorable to the committee has been arranged for. 2<br />

nHE PUJO COMMITTEE<br />

The Pujo Committee was a perfect example of this kind of<br />

chicanery. It was a subcommittee of the House Committee on<br />

Banking and Currency and it was given the awesome responsibility<br />

of conducting the famous "Money Trust" investigation of 1912. Its<br />

chairman was Arsene Pujo of Louisiana who, true to form, was<br />

regarded by many as a spokesman for the "Oil Trust" The hearings<br />

dragged on for eight months producing volumes of dry statistics<br />

and self-serving testimony of the great Wall Street bankers themselves.<br />

At no time were the financiers asked any questions about<br />

I MulJins, p. 16.<br />

2. Lindbergh, p. 76.


1<br />

It<br />

444 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND COMPETITION IS A SIN 445<br />

their affairs with foreign investment houses. Nor were they asked<br />

about their response to competition from new banks. There were<br />

no questions about their plan to protect the speculative banks from<br />

currency drains; or their motive for wanting artificially low interest<br />

rates; or their formula for passing on their losses to the taxpayer.<br />

The public was given the impression that Congress was really<br />

prying off the lid of scandal and corruption, but the reality was<br />

more like a fireside chat between old friends. No matter what<br />

vagaries or absurdities fell from the bankers' lips, it was accepted<br />

without contest.<br />

These hearings were conducted largely as a result of the public<br />

accusations made by Congressmen Lindbergh and Senator<br />

LaFollette. Yet, when they requested to appear before the Committee,<br />

both of them were denied access. The only witnesses to testify<br />

were the bankers themselves and their friends. Kolko tells us:<br />

Fortunately for the reformers, the Pujo Committee swung into<br />

high gear in its investigation of the Money Trust during the summer of<br />

1912 and for eight months frightened the nation with its awesome, if<br />

inconclusive, statistics on the power of Wall Street over the nation's<br />

economy.... Five banking firms, the elaborate tables of the committee<br />

showed, held 341 directorships in 112 corporations with an aggregate<br />

capitalization of over $22 billion. The evidence seemed conclusive, and<br />

the nation was suitably frightened into realizing that reform of the<br />

banking system was urgent—presumably to bring Wall Street under<br />

control....<br />

The orgy of Wall Street was resurrected by the newspapers, who<br />

quite ignored the fact that the biggest advocates of banking reform<br />

were the bankers themselves, bankers with a somewhat different view<br />

of the problem.... Yet it was largely the Pujo hearings that made the<br />

topic of banking reform a serious one.<br />

Kolko has touched upon an interesting point. Almost no one<br />

put any significance to the fact that some of the biggest bankers on<br />

Wall Street were the first marchers to lead the parade for banking<br />

reform. The most conspicuous among these was Paul Warburg of<br />

Kuhn, Loeb & Company who, for seven years prior to passage of<br />

the Federal Reserve Act, travelled around the country doing<br />

nothing but giving "reform" speeches and writing scholarly articles<br />

for the media, including an eleven-part series for The New York<br />

Times. Spokesmen from the houses of Morgan and Rockefeller<br />

joined in and made regular appearances before professional and<br />

political bodies echoing the call<br />

attention to the unmistakable odor of fish.<br />

for reform. Yet no one paid any<br />

ENLISTING THE HELP OF ACADEMIA<br />

The speeches and articles by big-name bankers were never<br />

intended to sway the public at large. They served the function of<br />

putting forth the basic arguments and the technical details which<br />

were to be the starting point for the work of others who could not<br />

be accused of having self-serving motives. To carry the message to<br />

the voters, it was decided that representatives from the world of<br />

academia should be enlisted to provide the necessary aura of<br />

respectability and intellectual objectivity. For that purpose, the<br />

banks contributed a sum of $5 million to a special "educational"<br />

fund, and much of that money found its way into the environs of<br />

three universities: Princeton, Harvard, and the University of Chicago,<br />

all of which had been recipients of large endowments from<br />

the captains of industry and finance.<br />

was precisely at this time that the study of "economics" was<br />

becoming a new and acceptable field, and it was not difficult to find<br />

talented but slightly hungry professors who, in return for a grant or<br />

a prestigious appointment, were eager to expound the virtues of<br />

the <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island plan. Not only was such academic pursuit<br />

financially rewarding, it also provided national recognition for<br />

them as pioneers in the new field of economics. Galbraith says:<br />

Under Aldrich's direction a score or more of studies of monetary<br />

institutions in the United States and, more particularly, in other<br />

countries were commissioned from the emergent economics<br />

profession. It is at least possible that the reverence in which the Federal<br />

Reserve System has since been held by economists owes something to<br />

the circumstance that so many who pioneered in the profession<br />

participated also in its [the System's] birth.<br />

The principal accomplishment of the bank's educational fund<br />

Was to create an organization called the National Citizens' League.<br />

Although it was entirely financed and controlled by the banks<br />

under the personal guidance of Paul Warburg, it presented itself<br />

merely as a group of concerned citizens seeking banking reform.<br />

The function of the organization was to disseminate hundreds of<br />

1. Kolko, Triumph, p. 220.<br />

|<br />

Galbraith, p. 121.


446 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

thousands of "educational" pamphlets, to organize letter-writing<br />

campaigns to Congressmen, to supply quotable material to the<br />

news media, and in other ways to create the illusion of grass-roots<br />

support for the JekylJ Island plan.<br />

Nathaniel Stephenson, in his biography of Nelson Aldrich,<br />

says: "The league was non-partisan. It was careful to abstain from<br />

emphasizing Senator Aldrich.... First and last, hundreds of thousands<br />

of dollars were spent by the league in popularizing financial<br />

science/'<br />

The man chosen to head up that effort was an economics<br />

professor by the name of J.<br />

Laurence Laughlin. Kolko says that<br />

"Laughlin, nominally very orthodox in his commitment to laissez<br />

faire theory, was nevertheless a leading academic advocate of<br />

banking regulation . . . and was sensitive to the needs of banking as<br />

well as the realities of politics." Did his appointment bring<br />

intellectual objectivity to the new organization? Stephenson answers:<br />

"Professor Laughlin of the University of Chicago was given<br />

charge of the League's propaganda." To which Congressman<br />

Lindbergh adds this reminder: "The reader knows that the University<br />

of Chicago is<br />

an institution endowed by John D. Rockefeller<br />

with nearly fifty million dollars. It may truly be said to be the<br />

Rockefeller University.<br />

This does not necessarily mean that Laughlin was purchased<br />

like so many pounds of hamburger and told by Rockefeller what to<br />

say and do. It doesn't work that way. The professor undoubtedly<br />

believed in the virtue of the <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island plan, and the evidence is<br />

that he pursued his assignment with enthusiastic sincerity. But<br />

there is no doubt that he was selected for his new post precisely<br />

because he did support the concept of a partnership between<br />

banking and government as a healthy substitute for "destructive"<br />

competition. In other words, if he didn't honestly agree with John<br />

D. that competition was a sin, he probably never even would have<br />

been given a professorship in the first place.<br />

1. Stephenson, pp. 38&-89.<br />

2. Kolko, Triumph, p. 187.<br />

3. Stephenson, p. 388.<br />

4. Lindbergh, p. 131.<br />

5. For an excellent overview of the formation and activities of the League, see<br />

Kolko, Triumph, pp. 186-228.<br />

COMPETITION IS A SIN 447<br />

WILSON AND WALL STREET<br />

Woodrow Wilson was yet another academic who was brought<br />

into the national spotlight as a result of his views on banking<br />

reform. It will be recalled from a previous chapter that Wilson's<br />

name had been put into nomination for President at the Democratic<br />

national convention largely due to the influence of Col. Edward<br />

Mandell House. But that was 1912. Ten years prior to that, he was<br />

relatively unknown. In 1902 he had been elected as the president of<br />

Princeton University, a position he could not have held without the<br />

concurrence of the University's benefactors among Wall Street<br />

bankers. He was particularly close with Andrew Carnegie and had<br />

become a trustee of the Carnegie Foundation.<br />

Two of the most generous donors were Cleveland H. Dodge<br />

and Cyrus McCormick, directors of Rockefeller's National City<br />

Bank. They were part of that Wall Street elite which the Pujo<br />

Committee had described as America's "Money Trust" Both men<br />

had been Wilson's classmates at Princeton University. When Wilson<br />

returned to Princeton as a professor in 1890, Dodge and<br />

McCormick were, by reason of their wealth, University trustees,<br />

and they took it upon themselves to personally advance his career'<br />

Ferdinand Lundberg, in America's Sixty Families, says this:<br />

For nearly twenty years before his nomination Woodrow Wilson<br />

had moved in the shadow of Wall Street.... In 1898 Wilson, his salary<br />

unsatisfactory, besieged with offers of many university presidencies<br />

threatened to resign. Dodge and McCormick thereupon constituted<br />

themselves his financial guardians, and agreed to raise the additional<br />

informal stipendium that kept him at Princeton. The contributors to<br />

this private fund were Dodge, McCormick, and Moses Taylor Pyne<br />

and Percy R. Pyne, of the family that founded the National City Bank<br />

In 1902 this same group arranged Wilson's election as president of the<br />

university.<br />

A grateful Wilson often had spoken in glowing terms about the<br />

rise of vast corporations and had praised J.R Morgan as a great<br />

American leader. He also had come to acceptable conclusions about<br />

the value of a controlled economy. "The old time of individual<br />

competition is probably gone by," he said. "It may come back; I<br />

don't know; it will not come back within our time, I dare say." 2<br />

Lundberg, pp. 114-15.<br />

Greider, p. 276.


448 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

H.S. Kenan tells us the rest of the story:<br />

Woodrow Wilson, President of Princeton University, was the first<br />

prominent educator to speak in favor of the Aldrich Plan a gesture<br />

SSi immediately brought him the Govemorsh.p of New Jersey<br />

^<br />

later the Presidency of the United States. During the panic of 1907<br />

Wilson declared that: "all this trouble could be averted if we<br />

appointed a committee of six or seven public-spirited men like J.P.<br />

Morgan to handle the affairs of our country.<br />

OPPOSITION TO THE ALDRICH BILL<br />

One of the disagreements at the <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island meeting was over<br />

the name to be attached to the proposed legislation^ Warburg,<br />

being the master psychologist he was, wanted it to be called the<br />

National Reserve Bill or the Federal Reserve Bill, something which<br />

would conjure up the dual images of government and reserves,<br />

both of which were calculated to be subconsciously appealing.<br />

Aldrich, on the other hand, acting out of personal ego, insisted that<br />

his name be attached to the bill. Warburg pointed out that the<br />

Aldrich name was associated in the minds of the public with Wall<br />

Street interests, and that would be an unnecessary obstacle to<br />

achieving their goal. Aldrich said that, since he had been the<br />

chairman of the National Monetary Commission which was created<br />

specifically to make recommendations for banking reform,<br />

people would be confused if his name were not associated with the<br />

bill The debate, we are told, was long and heated. But, in the end,<br />

the politician's ego won out over the banker's logic.<br />

Warburg, of course, was right. Aldrich was well known as a<br />

Republican spokesman for big business and banking His loyal >es<br />

were further publicized by recently sponsored tariff bills to protect<br />

banking reform was an easy target for the opposition<br />

the tobacco and rubber trusts. The Aldrich name on a bill for<br />

On December<br />

15,<br />

Representatives and took careful aim:<br />

1911, Congressman Lindbergh rose before the House or<br />

The Aldrich Plan is the Wall Street Plan. It is a broad challenge to<br />

the government by the champion of the money trust. It means another<br />

panic, if necessary, to intimidate the people. Aldr.ch, paid by the<br />

government to represent the people, proposes a plan for the trustinstead.<br />

1. HS.Kenan,TheFederalReserveBank (Los Angeles: Noontide Press, 1966),p. 105-<br />

2. Quoted by H.S. Kenan, p. 118.<br />

COMPETITION IS A SIN 449<br />

The Aldrich Bill never came to a vote. When the Republicans<br />

lost control of the House in 1910 and then lost the Senate and the<br />

Presidency in 1912, any hope there may have been of putting<br />

through a Republican bill was lost. Aldrich had been voted out of<br />

the Senate by his constituents, and the ball was now squarely in the<br />

court of the Democrats and their new president, Woodrow Wilson.<br />

How this came to pass is an interesting lesson on reality<br />

politics, and we shall turn to that part of the story next.<br />

SUMMARY<br />

Banking in the period immediately prior to passage of the<br />

Federal Reserve Act was subject to a myriad of controls, regulations,<br />

subsidies, and privileges at both the federal and state levels.<br />

Popular history portrays this period as one of unbridled competition<br />

and free banking. It was, in fact, a half-way house to central<br />

banking. Wall Street, however, wanted more government participation.<br />

The New York bankers particularly wanted a "lender of last<br />

resort" to create unlimited amounts of fiat money for their use in<br />

the event they were exposed to bank runs or currency drains. They<br />

also wanted to force all banks to follow the same inadequate<br />

reserve policies so that more cautious ones would not draw down<br />

the reserves of the others. An additional objective was to limit the<br />

growth of new banks in the South and West.<br />

This was a time of growing enchantment with the idea of trusts<br />

and cartels. For those who had already made it to the top,<br />

competition was considered chaotic and wasteful. Wall Street was<br />

snowballing into two major banking groups: the Morgans and the<br />

Rockefellers, and even they had largely ceased competing with<br />

each other in favor of cooperative financial structures. But to keep<br />

these cartel combines from flying apart, a means of discipline was<br />

needed to force the participants to abide by the agreements. The<br />

federal government was brought in as a partner to serve that<br />

function.<br />

To sell the plan to Congress, the cartel reality had to be hidden<br />

and the name "central bank" had to be avoided. The word Federal<br />

'was chosen to make it sound like it was a government operation;<br />

the word Reserve was chosen to make it appear financially sound;<br />

fend the word System (the first drafts used the word Association) was<br />

chosen to conceal the fact that it was a central bank. A structure of<br />

12 regional institutions was conceived as a further ploy to create


450 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

the illusion of decentralization, but the mechanism was designed<br />

from the beginning to operate as a central bank closely modeled<br />

after the Bank of England.<br />

The first draft of the Federal Reserve Act was called the Aldrich<br />

Bill and was co-sponsored by Congressman Vreeland, but it was<br />

not the work of either of these politicians. It was the brainchild of<br />

banker Paul Warburg and was actually written by bankers Frank<br />

Vanderlip and Benjamin Strong.<br />

Aldrich' s name attached to a banking bill was bad strategy,<br />

because he was known as a Wall Street Senator. His bill was not<br />

politically acceptable and was never released from committee. The<br />

groundwork had been done, however, and the time had arrived to<br />

change labels and political parties. The measure would now<br />

undergo minor cosmetic surgery and reappear under the sponsorship<br />

of a politician whose name would be associated in the public<br />

mind with anti-Wall Street sentiments.<br />

Chapter Twenty-Two<br />

THE CREATURE<br />

SWALLOWS<br />

CONGRESS<br />

The second attempt to pass legislation to legalize<br />

the banking cartel; the bankers 1 selection of<br />

Woodrow Wilson as a Presidential candidate;<br />

their strategy to get him elected; the role played by<br />

Wilson to promote the cartels legislation; the<br />

final passage of the Federal Reserve Act.<br />

The election of 1912 was a <strong>text</strong>book example of power politics<br />

and voter deception. The Republican President, William Howard<br />

Taft, was up for reelection. Like most Republicans of that era, his<br />

political power was based upon the support of big-business and<br />

banking interests in the industrial regions. He had been elected to<br />

his first term in the expectation that he would continue the<br />

protectionist policies of his predecessor, Teddy Roosevelt, particularly<br />

in the expansion of cartel markets for sugar, coffee, and fruit<br />

from Latin America. Once in office, however, he grew more<br />

restrained in these measures and earned the animosity of many<br />

powerful Republicans, The ultimate breach occurred when Taft<br />

refused to support the Aldrich Plan. He objected, not because it<br />

would create a central bank which would impose government<br />

control over the economy, but because it would not offer enough<br />

government control. He recognized that the <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island formula<br />

Would place the bankers into the driver's seat with only nominal<br />

participation by the government. He did not object to the ancient<br />

partnership between monetary and political scientists, he merely<br />

Wanted a greater share for the political side. The bankers were not<br />

adverse to negotiating the balance of power nor were they unwilling<br />

to make compromises, but what they really needed at this<br />

juncture was a man in the White House who, instead of being


452 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

lukewarm on the plan, could be counted on to become its champion<br />

and who would use his influence as President to garner<br />

support from the fence straddlers in Congress. From that moment<br />

forward, Taft was marked for political extinction.<br />

This was a period of general prosperity, and Taft was popular<br />

with the voters as well as with the rank-and-file Party organization<br />

He had easily won the nomination at the Republican convention,<br />

and there was little doubt that he could take the presidential<br />

election as well. Wilson had been put forth as the Democratic<br />

challenger, but his dry personality and aloof mannerisms had<br />

failed to arouse sufficient voter interest to make him a serious<br />

contender.<br />

THE BULL MOOSE CANDIDATE<br />

However, when Teddy Roosevelt returned from his latest<br />

African safari, he was persuaded by Morgan's deputies, George<br />

Perkins and Frank Munsey, to challenge the President for the<br />

Party's nomination. When that effort failed, he was then persuaded<br />

to run against Taft as the "Bull Moose" candidate on the Progressive<br />

Party ticket. It is unclear what motivated him to accept such a<br />

proposition, but there is no doubt regarding the intent of his<br />

backers. They did not expect Roosevelt to win, but, as a former<br />

Republican President, they knew he would split the Party and, by<br />

pulling away votes from Taft, put Wilson into the White House.<br />

Presidential campaigns need money and lots of it. The Republican<br />

Party was well financed, largely from the same individuals<br />

who now wanted to see the defeat of its own candidate. It would<br />

not be possible to cut off this funding without causing too many<br />

questions. The solution, therefore, was to provide the financial<br />

resources for all three candidates, with special attention to the needs<br />

of Wilson and Roosevelt.<br />

Some historians, while admitting the facts, have scoffed at the<br />

conclusion that deception was intended. Ron Chernow says: "By<br />

1924, the House of Morgan was so influential in American politics<br />

that conspiracy buffs couldn't tell which presidential candidate was<br />

more beholden to the bank." 1 But one does not have to be a<br />

conspiracy buff to recognize the evidence of foul play. Ferdinand<br />

Lundberg tells us:<br />

1. Chemow, p. 254.<br />

THE CREATURE SWALLOWS CONGRESS 453<br />

J.P. Morgan and Company played the leading role in the national<br />

election of 1912.. . . Roosevelt's preconvention backers were George W.<br />

Perkins and Frank Munsey. These two, indeed, encouraged Roosevelt<br />

to contest Taffs nomination.... Munsey functioned in the newspaper<br />

field for J.P. Morgan and Company—buying, selling, creating, and<br />

suppressing newspapers in consonance with J.P. Morgan's shifting<br />

needs.. . . Perkins resigned from J.P. Morgan and Company on January<br />

1, 1911, to assume a larger political role...<br />

The suspicion seems justified that the two were not over-anxious<br />

to have Roosevelt win. The notion that Perkins and Munsey may have<br />

wanted Wilson to win ... is partly substantiated by the view that<br />

Perkins put a good deal of cash behind the Wilson campaign through<br />

Cleveland H. Dodge. Dodge and Perkins financed, to the extent of<br />

$35,500, the Trenton True American, a newspaper that circulated<br />

nationally with Wilson propaganda. . .<br />

Throughout the three-cornered fight, Roosevelt had Munsey and<br />

George Perkins constantly at his heels, supplying money, going over<br />

his speeches, bringing people from Wall Street in to help,<br />

and, in<br />

general, carrying the entire burden of the campaign against Taft...<br />

Perkins and J.P. Morgan and Company were the substance of the<br />

Progressive Party; everything else was trimming.... Munsey 's cash<br />

contribution to the Progressive Party brought his total political outlay<br />

for 1912 to $229,255.72. Perkins made their joint contribution more<br />

than $500,000, and Munsey expended $1,000,000 in cash additionally<br />

to acquire from Henry Einstein the New York Press so that Roosevelt<br />

would have a New York City morning newspaper. Perkins and<br />

Munsey, as the Clapp [Senate Privileges and Election] Committee<br />

learned from Roosevelt himself, also underwrote the heavy expense of<br />

Roosevelt's campaign train. In short, most of Roosevelfs campaign<br />

fund was supplied by the two Morgan hatchet men who were seeking<br />

Taft's scalp.<br />

Morgan & Company was not the only banking firm on Wall<br />

Street to endorse a three-way election as a means of defeating Taft.<br />

Within the firm of Kuhn, Loeb & Company, Felix Warburg was<br />

dutifully putting money into the Republican campaign as expected,<br />

but his brother, Paul Warburg and Jacob Schiff were backing<br />

Wilson, while yet another partner, Otto Kahn, supported<br />

Roosevelt. Other prominent Republicans who contributed to the<br />

Democratic campaign that year were Bernard Baruch, Henry<br />

Morganthau, and Thomas Fortune Ryan. And the Rockefeller<br />

1. Lundberg, pp. 106-12.<br />

2. Kolko, Triumph, pp. 205-11


454 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND THE CREATURE SWALLOWS CONGRESS 455<br />

component of the cartel was just as deeply involved. William<br />

McAdoo, who was Wilson's national campaign vice chairman, says<br />

that Cleveland Dodge of Rockefeller's National City Bank personally<br />

contributed $51,30C^-more than one-fourth the total raised<br />

from all other sources. In McAdoo's words, "He was a Godsend." 1<br />

Ferdinand Lundberg describes Dodge as "the financial genius<br />

behind Woodrow Wilson." Continuing, he says:<br />

Wilson's nomination represented a personal triumph for<br />

Cleveland H. Dodge, director of the National City Bank, scion of the<br />

Dodge copper and munitions fortune.... The nomination represented<br />

no less a triumph for Ryan, Harvey, and J.P. Morgan and Company.<br />

Sitting with Dodge as co-directors of the National Gty Bank at the<br />

time were the younger J.P. Morgan, now the head of the [Morgan]<br />

firm, Jacob Schiff, William Rockefeller, J.<br />

Ogden Armour, and James<br />

Stillman. In short, except for George F. Baker, everyone whom the Pujo<br />

Committee had termed rulers of the "Money Trust" was in this bank.<br />

And so it<br />

came to pass that the monetary scientists carefully<br />

selected their candidate and set about to clear the way for his<br />

victory. The maneuver was brilliant. Who would suspect that Wall<br />

Street would support a Democrat, especially when the Party<br />

platform contained this plank: "We oppose the so-called Aldrich<br />

Bill or the establishment of a central bank; and . . .<br />

what is known as<br />

the money trust."<br />

What irony it was. The Party of the working man, the Party of<br />

Thomas Jefferson—formed only a few generations earlier for the<br />

specific purpose of opposing a central bank—was now cheering a<br />

new leader who was a political captive of Wall Street bankers and<br />

who had agreed to the hidden agenda of establishing the Federal<br />

Reserve System. As George Harvey later boasted, the financiers<br />

"felt no animosity toward Mr. Wilson for such of his utterances as<br />

they regarded as radical and menacing to their interests. He had<br />

simply played the political game."<br />

William McAdoo, Wilson's national campaign vice chairman,<br />

destined to become Secretary of the Treasury, saw what was<br />

happening from a ringside seat He said:<br />

1. McAdoo, p. 117.<br />

2. Lundberg, pp. 109, 113.<br />

3. Quoted by Lundberg, p. 120.<br />

The major contributions to any candidate's campaign fund are<br />

made by men who have axes to grind—and the campaign chest is the<br />

grindstone.... The fact is that there is a serious danger of this country<br />

becoming a pluto-democracy; that is, a sham republic with the real<br />

government in the hands of a small clique of enormously wealthy<br />

men, who speak through their money, and whose influence, even<br />

today, radiates to every corner of the United States.<br />

Experience has shown that the most practicable method of getting<br />

hold of a political party is to furnish it with money in large quantities.<br />

This brings the big money-giver or givers into close communion with<br />

the party leaders. Contact and influence do the rest.<br />

THE MONEY TRUST THEY LOVE TO HATE<br />

Roosevelt actually had very little interest in the banking issue,<br />

probably because he didn't understand it Furthermore, in the<br />

unlikely event the blustery "trust buster" would actually win the<br />

election, the financiers still had little to fear. In spite of his<br />

well-publicized stance of opposing big business, his true convictions<br />

were quite acceptable to Wall Street. As Chernow observed:<br />

Although the Roosevelt-Morgan relationship is sometimes<br />

caricatured as that of trust buster versus trust king, it was far more<br />

complex than that. The public wrangling obscured deeper ideological<br />

affinities.... Roosevelt saw trusts as natural, organic outgrowths of<br />

economic development. Stopping them, he said, was like trying to<br />

dam the Mississippi River. Both TR and Morgan disliked the rugged,<br />

individualistic economy of the nineteenth century and favored big<br />

business.. . , In the sparring between Roosevelt and Morgan there was<br />

always a certain amount of shadow play, a pretense of greater<br />

animosity than actually existed.... Roosevelt and Morgan were secret<br />

blood brothers.<br />

It is not surprising, therefore, as Warburg noted in January,<br />

1912—ten months before the election—that Teddy had been "fairly<br />

won over to a favorable consideration of the Aldrich Plan."<br />

Inner convictions on these issues notwithstanding, both Wilson<br />

and Roosevelt played their roles to the hilt Privately financed by<br />

Wall Street's most powerful bankers, they publicly carried a<br />

flaming crusade against the "Money Trust" from one end of the<br />

country to the other. Roosevelt bellowed that the "issue of currency<br />

McAdoo, pp. 165-66.<br />

2. Chernow, pp. 106-12.<br />

\ Warburg, Vol. I, p. 78.


, Cabinet,<br />

456 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

should be lodged with the government and be protected from<br />

domination and manipulation by Wall Street/' 1<br />

And he quoted<br />

over and over again the Bull Moose (Progressive Party) platform<br />

which said: "We are opposed to the so-called Aldrich Currency Bill<br />

because its provisions would place our currency and credit system<br />

in private hands/' Meanwhile, at the other end of town, Wilson<br />

declared:<br />

There has come about an extraordinary and very sinister<br />

concentration in the control of business in the country.... The growth<br />

of our nation, therefore, and all our activities, are in the hands of a few<br />

men.. . . This money trust, or as it should be more properly called, this<br />

credit trust ... is no myth.<br />

Throughout the campaign, Taft was portrayed as the champion<br />

of big business and Wall Street banks—which, of course, he was.<br />

But so were Roosevelt and Wilson. The primary difference was that<br />

Taft, judged by his actual performance in office, was known to be<br />

such, whereas his opponents could only be judged by their words.<br />

The outcome of the election was exactly as the strategists had<br />

anticipated. Wilson won with only forty-two per cent of the<br />

popular vote, which means, of course, that fifty-eight per cent had<br />

been cast against him. Had Roosevelt not entered the race, most of<br />

his votes undoubtedly would have gone to Taft, and Wilson would<br />

have become a footnote. As Colonel House confided to author<br />

George Viereck years later, "Wilson was elected by Teddy<br />

Roosevelt/' 3<br />

Now that the Creature had moved into the White House,<br />

passage of the <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island plan went into its final phase. The last<br />

bastion of opposition in Congress consisted of the Populist wing of<br />

the Democratic Party under the<br />

leadership of William Jennings<br />

Bryan. The problem with this group was that they had taken their<br />

campaign platform seriously. They really were opposed to the<br />

Money Trust. While it may have been a simple matter to pull the<br />

would not be so easy to fool this<br />

wool over the eyes of voters, it<br />

group of experienced politicians. What was needed now was an<br />

1. Henry S. Commager, ed., Documents of American History (New York: F.S. Cofts<br />

& Co., 1940), pp. 77-79.<br />

2. Quoted by Carter Glass, Adventures in Constructive Finance (New York:<br />

Doubleday, 1927; rpt. Arno Press, a New York Times Co., 1975), p. 78-79.<br />

3. Viereck, p. 34.<br />

THE CREATURE SWALLOWS CONGRESS 457<br />

entirely new bill that, on the surface, would appear to contain<br />

changes of sufficient magnitude to allow the Bryan wing to change<br />

its position. The essential features of the plan, however, must not be<br />

abandoned. And, to coordinate this final strategy, the services of<br />

someone with great political skill would be essential. Fortunately<br />

for the planners, there was exactly such a man residing at the White<br />

House. It was not the President of the United States. It was Edward<br />

Mandell House.<br />

THE ROLE OF COLONEL HOUSE<br />

Colonel House, who had been educated in England and whose<br />

father represented England's merchant interests in the American<br />

South, had come into public life through the London Connection. It<br />

will be recalled from previous chapters that,<br />

perhaps more than<br />

|any other person in America, he had helped maneuver the United<br />

States into World War I on the side of a desperate Britain and, by so<br />

doing, had also rescued the massive loans to Britain and France<br />

made by the Morgan interests. Not only had he been responsible<br />

for Wilson's nomination at the Democratic convention, but had<br />

become the President's constant companion, his personal adviser,<br />

and in many respects his political superior. It was through House<br />

that Wilson was made aware of the wishes of the Money Trust, and<br />

it was House who guided the President in every aspect of foreign<br />

and economic policy. An admiring biographer, Arthur Smith,<br />

writing in the year 1918, says that House "holds a power never<br />

wielded before in this country by any man out of office, a power<br />

greater than that of any political boss or Cabinet member." A more<br />

recent biographer, George Viereck, was not exaggerating when he<br />

described House as "Chief Magistracy of the Republic," "Superambassador,"<br />

"The pilot who guided the ship."<br />

said:<br />

Continuing, he<br />

For six years two rooms were at his disposal in the North Wing of<br />

the White House.. .. In work and play their thoughts were one. House<br />

was the double of Wilson. It was House who made the slate for the<br />

formulated the first policies of the Administration and<br />

practically directed the foreign affairs of the United States. We had,<br />

indeed, two Presidents for one!...<br />

1 Arthur Smith, The Real Colonel House (New York: George H. Doran Company,<br />

1918), p. 14.<br />

$~ Viereck, p. 4.


458 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

The Schiffs, the Warburgs, the Kahns, the Rockefellers, the<br />

Morgans put their faith in House. When the Federal Reserve<br />

legislation at last assumed definite shape, House was the intermediary<br />

between the White House and the financiers.<br />

Daily entries in the personal journal of Colonel House reveal<br />

the extent to which his office had become the command post for the<br />

<strong>Jekyll</strong> Island team. The following sample notations are typical:<br />

December 19, 1912. I Talked with Paul Warburg over the<br />

telephone regarding the currency reform. I told of my<br />

Washington trip and what I had done there to get it in<br />

working order.<br />

March 24, 1913. 1 had an engagement with Carter Glass at five.<br />

We drove, in order not to be interrupted.... I spoke to the<br />

President about this after dinner and advised that McAdoo<br />

and I whip the Glass measure into final shape, which he<br />

could endorse and take to Owen [Chairman of the Senate<br />

Banking Committee] as his own.<br />

March 27, 1913. Mr. J.P. Morgan, Ir., and Mr. Denny of his firm,<br />

came promptly at five. McAdoo came about ten minutes<br />

afterwards. Morgan had a currency plan already formulated<br />

and printed. We discussed it at some length. I suggested he<br />

have it typewritten [so it would not seem too prearranged]<br />

and sent to us today.<br />

October 19, 1913. I saw Senator Reed of Missouri in the late<br />

afternoon and discussed the currency question with him.<br />

October 19, 1913. Paul Warburg was my first caller, and he came<br />

to discuss the currency measure.... Senator Murray Crane<br />

followed Warburg. He has been in touch with Senators<br />

Weeks and Nelson of the Currency Committee.<br />

November 17, 1913. Paul Warburg telephoned about his trip to<br />

Washington. He is much disturbed over the currency<br />

situation and requested an interview, along with lacob<br />

Schiff and Cleveland H. Dodge.<br />

January 21, 1914. After dinner we [Wilson and House] went to<br />

the President's study as usual and began work on the<br />

Federal Reserve Board appointments.<br />

1. Viereck,pp.4,35,37.<br />

2. Seymour, Vol. I pp. 161-68.<br />

THE CREATURE SWALLOWS CONGRESS 459<br />

As far as the banking issue was concerned, Colonel House was<br />

the President of the United States, and all interested parties knew it.<br />

Wilson made no pretense at knowledge of banking theory. He said:<br />

"The greatest embarrassment of my political career has been that<br />

active duties seem to deprive me of time for careful investigation. I<br />

seem almost obliged to form conclusions from impressions instead<br />

of from study.. . . I wish that I had more knowledge, more thorough<br />

acquaintance, with the matters involved." To which Charles<br />

Seymour adds: "Colonel House was indefatigable in providing for<br />

the President the knowledge that he sought. . . The Colonel was the<br />

unseen guardian angel of the bill,"<br />

DEATH OF THE ALDRICH PLAN<br />

The first task for the <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island team was to hold a funeral for<br />

the Aldrich Plan without actually burying it. Professor Laughlin<br />

had come to agree with Warburg regarding the inadvisability of<br />

having Aldrich's name attached to any banking bill, especially now<br />

that the Democrats were in control of both Congress and the White<br />

House, and he was anxious to give it a new identity. Writing in the<br />

periodical Banking Reform, which was the official publication of the<br />

National Citizens' League, Laughlin said:<br />

"It is progress that the<br />

Aldrich plan came and went. It is progress that the people have<br />

been aroused and interested." The League was now free, he said, to<br />

"try to help in getting a proper bill adopted by the Democrats," a<br />

bill that "in non-essentials . . . could be made different from the old<br />

plan." 3<br />

It did not take long for the Democrats to bring forth their own<br />

proposal. In fact, that process had begun even before the election of<br />

1912. One of the most outspoken critics of the Aldrich plan was the<br />

Democratic Chairman of the House Banking and Currency Committee,<br />

Congressman Carter Glass from Virginia. And it was Glass<br />

1. Seymour, Vol. 1, p. 160.<br />

2. Ibid. William McAdoo, Wilson's Secretary of the Treasury, was indignant over<br />

the credit generally given to Paul Warburg for his part in the creation of the Federal<br />

Reserve because McAdoo felt he should have received the recognition. Later, we<br />

find Carter Glass similarly piqued over Seymour's interpretation of House's importance.<br />

Glass' book, Adventures in Constructive Finance, was written primarily to<br />

show that it was he, not House, who rightfully deserved such glory. But neither<br />

McAdoo nor Glass were part of the hidden power which is the focus of this study<br />

and neither had any inkling of who was really calling the shots.<br />

3. Quoted by Kolko, Triumph, p. 222.


..<br />

460 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

THE CREATURE SWALLOWS CONGRESS 461<br />

who was given the responsibility of developing the new plan. By<br />

monopoly. All of which was correct. What the country needed,<br />

his own admission, however, he had virtually no technical knowledge<br />

of banking. To provide that expertise and to actually write the<br />

which was not written by agents of the Money Trust and which<br />

Glass said, was an entirely fresh approach, a genuine reform bill<br />

bill he hired an economics teacher from Washington and Lee<br />

would truly meet the needs of the common man. That, too, was<br />

University, Henry Parker Willis. We should not be surprised to<br />

quite correct. Then he brought forth his own bill, drafted by Willis<br />

learn that Willis had been a former student and protege of<br />

and inspired by Laughlin, which in every important detail was<br />

Professor Laughlin and had been retained by the National Citizens'<br />

merely the old corpse of the Aldrich Bill pulled from its casket,<br />

League as a technical writer. Explaining the significance of this<br />

freshly perfumed, and dressed in a new suit.<br />

relationship, Kolko<br />

The Glass Bill was soon reconciled with a similar measure<br />

says:<br />

sponsored by Senator Robert L. Owen and it emerged as the<br />

Throughout the spring of 1912 Willis wrote Laughlin about his<br />

work for the Glass Committee, his relationship to his superior, and<br />

Glass-Owen Bill. Although there were initially some minor differences<br />

between Glass and Owen on the proper degree of govern-<br />

Washington gossip. The advice of the old professor was much<br />

revered "When you arrive," he wrote Laughlin concerning a<br />

ment control over banking, Owen was basically of identical mind to<br />

memorandum he had written, "I should like to show it to you for such<br />

Willis and Laughlin. While serving in the Senate, he also was the<br />

criticisms as occur to you." The student-teacher relationship between<br />

president of a bank in Oklahoma. Like Aldrich, he had made<br />

the two men was still prominent ...<br />

several trips to Europe to study the central banks of England and<br />

Laughlin, Colonel House, and Glass were to frequently consult<br />

Germany,<br />

with major bankers about reform, and provided an importantand<br />

and these were the models for his legislation.<br />

continuous bridge for their ideas while bills were being drafted....<br />

The less technically minded members of the cartel became<br />

Colonel House, in addition, was talked to by Frick, Otto Kahn, and<br />

nervous over the anti-Wall Street rhetoric of the Bill's sponsors.<br />

others in late February, and the following month also met Vanderlip,<br />

Warburg, in an attempt to quell their fears and, at the same time,<br />

J<br />

P Morgan, Jr., and other bankers to discuss currency reform.... To<br />

strengthen his private boast that he had been the real author,<br />

make sure the reform was more to the liking of bankers, a steady<br />

published a side-by-side comparison of the Aldrich and Glass<br />

barrage of personal, unobtrusive communications with Glass, House,<br />

proposals. The analysis showed that, not only were the two bills in<br />

and Wilson was kept up throughout February and March^... The<br />

agreement<br />

[Citizens'] league was fulsome in its praise of Glass, and bankers on all essential provisions, but they even contained<br />

felt<br />

greater and greater confidence as Colonel House began visiting Glass<br />

entire sections that were identical in their wording. He wrote:<br />

and showing interest in his currency measure.. "Brushing aside, then, the external differences affecting the 'shells/<br />

.<br />

The new President admitted "he knew nothing" about banking we find the 'kernels' of the two systems very closely resembling<br />

theory or practice. Glass made the same confession to Colonel House<br />

and related to one another."<br />

in November, and this vacuum is of the utmost significance. The entire<br />

It was important for the success of the Glass Bill to create the<br />

banking reform movement, at all crucial stages, was centralized in the<br />

hands of a few men who for years were linked, ideologically and<br />

impression it was in response to the views of a broad cross section<br />

of the financial community. To this end, Glass and his committee<br />

personally with one another.<br />

staged public hearings for the announced purpose of giving<br />

THE GLASS-OWEN BILL EMERGES<br />

everyone a chance for input to the process. It was, of course, a<br />

In his Committee House Report in 1913, Glass objected to the<br />

sham. The first draft of the Bill had already been completed in<br />

Aldrich Bill on the following grounds: It lacked government<br />

secret several months before the hearings were held. And, as was<br />

control, he said; it concentrated power into the hands of the larger<br />

customary in such matters, Congressman Lindbergh and other<br />

New York banks; it opened the door to inflation; it was dishonest in<br />

witnesses opposing the <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island plan were not allowed to<br />

its estimate of cost to the taxpayer; and it established a banking<br />

'1. Warburg, Vol. I, p. 98.<br />

1 . Kolko, Triumph, pp. 219-28. 2. Md., p. 41Z


462 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

speak. 1<br />

The hearings were widely reported in the press, and the<br />

public was given the impression that the favorable testimony was<br />

truly representative of expert opinion. Kolko summarizes:<br />

keep the contents of their work<br />

Although they were careful to<br />

confidential to aid the passage of any bill that might be agreed upon<br />

Glass deemed it desirable to hold public hearings on the topic and to<br />

make sure the course of these hearings was not left to chance... The<br />

public assumption of the hearing was that no bills had been drafted,<br />

and Willis' draft was never mentioned, much less revealed.... The<br />

hearings of Glass' subcommittee in January and February, 1913, were<br />

nothing less than a love feast.<br />

BANKERS BECOME DIVIDED<br />

The public was not the only victim of deception- The bankers<br />

themselves were also targeted—at least the lesser ones who were<br />

not part of the Wall Street power center. As early as February, 1911,<br />

a group of twenty-two of the country's most powerful bankers met<br />

for three days behind closed doors in Atlantic City to work out a<br />

strategy for<br />

getting the smaller banks to support the concept of<br />

using the government to authorize and maintain their own cartel.<br />

The objective frankly discussed among those present was that the<br />

proposed cartel would bring the smaller banks under control of the<br />

larger ones, but that this fact had to be obscured when presenting it<br />

to them for endorsement.<br />

The annual meeting of the American Bankers Association was<br />

held a few months later, and a resolution endorsing the Aldrich Bill<br />

was steam rollered through the plenary session, much to the<br />

dismay of many of those present. Andrew Frame was one of them.<br />

Representing a group of Western bankers, he testified at the<br />

hearings of the Glass subcommittee, mentioned previously, and<br />

described the hoax:<br />

When that monetary bill was given to the country, it was but a few<br />

days previous to the meeting of the American Bankers Association in<br />

New Orleans in 1911. There was not one banker in a hundred who had<br />

read that bill. We had twelve addresses in favor of it. General Hamby<br />

of Austin, Texas, wrote a letter to President Watts asking for a hearing<br />

against the bill. He did not get a very courteous answer. I refused to<br />

1. Lindbergh, p. 129.<br />

2. Kolko, Triumph, p. 225.<br />

3. Rothbard, Crisis, p. 101. Also Kolko, Triumph, p. 186.<br />

THE CREATURE SWALLOWS CONGRESS 463<br />

vote on it, and a great many other bankers did likewise.. . . They would<br />

not allow anyone on the program who was not in favor of the bill.<br />

It is interesting that during Frame's testimony, Congressman<br />

Glass refrained<br />

from commenting on the unfairness of allowing<br />

only one side of an issue to be heard in a public forum. He could<br />

hardly afford to. That is exactly what he was then doing with his<br />

own agenda.<br />

As the Federal Reserve Act moved closer to its birth in the form<br />

of the Glass-Owen Bill (Owen was the co-sponsor in the Senate),<br />

both Aldrich and Vanderlip threw themselves into a great public<br />

display of opposition. No opportunity was overlooked to make a<br />

statement to the press—or anyone else of public prominence<br />

expressing their eternal animosity to this monstrous legislation.<br />

Vanderlip warned against the evils of fiat money and rampant<br />

inflation. Aldrich charged that the Glass-Owen Bill was inimical to<br />

sound banking and good government. Vanderlip predicted speculation<br />

and instability in the stock market. Aldrich sourly complained<br />

that the bill was "revolutionary in its character" (implying<br />

Bolshevistic) and "will be the first and most important step toward<br />

changing our form of government from a democracy to an autocracy."<br />

THE PRETENSE IS DROPPED<br />

That all of this was merely high-level showmanship was made<br />

clear when Vanderlip accepted a debate with Congressman Glass<br />

before the New York Economic Society on November 13. There<br />

were eleven hundred bankers and businessmen present, and<br />

Vanderlip was under pressure to make a good showing before this<br />

impressive group. The debate was going badly for him and, in a<br />

moment of desperation, he finally dropped the pretense. "For<br />

years/ he said, "bankers have been almost the sole advocates of<br />

just this sort of legislation that it is now hoped we will have, and it<br />

is unfair to accuse them of being in opposition to sound legislation/'<br />

Twenty-two years later, when the need for pretense had<br />

long passed, Vanderlip was even more candid. Writing in the<br />

I Quoted by Mullins, p. 13.<br />

2- Aldrich to John A. Sleicher, July 16, 1913; Aldrich to William Howard Taft,<br />

Oct. 3, 1913, Nelson Aldrich Papers, Library of Congress.<br />

3- Frank A. Vanderlip, Address Before the Economics Club of New York, November 13,<br />

1913, (New York: 1913), pp. 6, 11 ff. Also see Glass, pp. 125, 168-76.


464 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

THE CREATURE SWALLOWS CONGRESS<br />

2. pp. 3. Seymour, Vol. I, p. 173,<br />

465<br />

Saturday Evening Post, he said: "Although the Aldrich Federal<br />

the original intent. The goal was to get the bill passed and perfect it<br />

Reserve Plan was defeated when it bore the name Aldrich, nevertheless<br />

later.<br />

its essential points were all contained in the plan that finally<br />

House and Warburg feared that, if they waited until they had<br />

was adopted."<br />

everything they wanted, they would get nothing at all or, worse,<br />

In his autobiography, Treasury Secretary William McAdoo<br />

that opponents of a central bank would be able to muster their<br />

offers this view:<br />

forces and pass a reform bill of their own; a real one. Willis was<br />

quick to agree. In a letter to<br />

Bankers fought the Federal Reserve legislation—and<br />

his<br />

every<br />

former professor, he wrote: "It is<br />

provision of the Federal Reserve Act—with the tireless energy of men<br />

much better to take a half a loaf rather than to be absolutely<br />

fighting a forest fire. They said it was populistic, socialistic, half-baked,<br />

deprived of a chance of getting any bread whatsoever.... The<br />

destructive, infantile, badly conceived, and unworkable.. so-called 'progressive'<br />

.<br />

element—such as Lindbergh and his supporters—will<br />

be encouraged to enact dangerous legislation." 1<br />

Glass<br />

These interviews with bankers led me to an interesting conclusion.<br />

1 perceived gradually, through all the haze and smoke of controversy,<br />

echoed the sentiment. Directing his remarks at those smaller banks<br />

that the banking world was not really as opposed to the bill as it<br />

which were resisting domination by the New York banks, he said:<br />

pretended to be.<br />

"Unless the conservative bankers of the country are willing to yield<br />

That is the key to this entire episode: mass psychology. Since<br />

something and get behind the bill, we shall get legislation very<br />

Aldrich was recognized as associated with the Morgan interests much less to be desired, or have nothing done at all."<br />

and Vanderlip was President of Rockefeller's National City Bank,<br />

the public was skillfully led to believe that the "Money Trust" was<br />

BRYAN MAKES AN ULTIMATUM<br />

The Populist, William Jennings Bryan, was considered at that<br />

mortally afraid of the proposed Federal Reserve Act. The Nation<br />

time to be the most influential Democrat in Congress, and it was<br />

was the only prominent publication to point out that every one of<br />

clear from the start that the Federal Reserve Act could never be<br />

the horrors described by Aldrich and Vanderlip could have been<br />

passed without his approval and support. As Charles Seymour<br />

equally ascribed to the Aldrich Bill as well. But this lone voice was<br />

observed: "The Commoner's sense of loyalty [to the Party] had<br />

easily drowned by the great cacophony of deception and propaganda<br />

would appear,<br />

kept him from an attack upon the Federal Reserve Act which, it<br />

.<br />

he never entirely understood.... With his influence<br />

The Glass Bill was a flexible document which was designed<br />

in the Party, he could have destroyed the measure which failed to<br />

from the beginning to be altered in non-essential matters in order to<br />

accord with his personal doctrines." 3<br />

appear as though compromises were being made to satisfy the<br />

Bryan had said that he would not support any bill that resulted<br />

in<br />

various<br />

private<br />

political factions. Since very few understood central-bank<br />

money being issued by private banks. The money supply,<br />

he<br />

technicalities, the ploy was easy to execute. The basic strategy was<br />

insisted, must be government issue. When he finally saw an<br />

actual draft of the bill in<br />

to focus debate on such relatively unimportant items as the number<br />

midsummer of 1913, he was dismayed to<br />

find that, not only was the<br />

of regional banks, the structure of the governing board, and money to<br />

the<br />

be privately issued, but the<br />

entire governing body of the central<br />

process by which that board was<br />

bank<br />

to be selected. When was to be<br />

truly crucial<br />

composed of<br />

private bankers. His ultimatum was not long in<br />

matters<br />

coming.<br />

could not be avoided, the response was to agree to almost<br />

He hotly<br />

demanded (1) that the Federal-Reserve notes must be Treasury<br />

anything but to write the provisions in vague language. In that<br />

currency, issued and guaranteed by the government; and<br />

way, the back door would be left ajar for later implementation (2) that<br />

of<br />

I Letters from Willis to Laughlin, J. Laurence Laughlin Papers, Library of Congress,<br />

July 14 &.18, 1912.<br />

1. "From Farm Boy to Financier/' by Frank A. Vanderlip, Saturday Evening Post,<br />

February 9, 1935, p. 72.<br />

2. From a letter to Fesrus Wade. Quoted by Kolko, Triumph, p. 234.<br />

McAdoo, 213, 225-26.


466 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

the governing body must be appointed by the President and<br />

approved by the Senate.<br />

Colonel House and the other monetary scientists were reasonably<br />

sure that these provisions eventually would be required for<br />

final approval of the bill but, being master strategists, they deliberately<br />

withheld them from early drafts so they could be used as<br />

bargaining points and added later as concessions in a show of<br />

compromise. Furthermore, since practically no one really understood<br />

the technical aspects of the measure, they knew it would be<br />

easy to fool their opponents by creating the appearance of compromise<br />

when, in actual operation, the originally intended features<br />

would remain.<br />

AN AMAZING REVELATION<br />

The nature of this deception was spelled out years later by<br />

Carter Glass in his book, Adventures in<br />

Constructive Finance. From<br />

this source we learn that, after Bryan had delivered his ultimatum,<br />

Glass was summoned to the White House and told by Wilson that<br />

the decision had been made to make the Federal Reserve notes<br />

obligations of the United States government. "I was for an instant<br />

speechless!" wrote Glass who then explained how he reminded the<br />

President that the only backing for the new currency would be a<br />

small amount of gold, a large amount of government and commercial<br />

debt, and the private assets of the individual banks themselves.<br />

"It would be a pretense on its face," he said. "Was there ever a<br />

government note based primarily on the property of banking<br />

institutions? Was there ever a government issue not one dollar of<br />

which could be put out except by demand of a bank? The<br />

suggested government obligation is so remote it could never be<br />

discovered."<br />

To which the President replied: "Exactly so, Glass. Every word<br />

you say is true; the government liability is a mere thought. And so,<br />

if we can hold the substance of the thing and give the other fellow<br />

the shadow, why not do it, if thereby we may save our bill?"<br />

Years later, Paul Warburg would explain further:<br />

While technically and legally the Federal Reserve note is an<br />

obligation of the United States Government, in reality it is an<br />

obligation, the sole actual responsibility for which rests on the reserve<br />

1. Glass, pp. 124-25.<br />

THE CREATURE SWALLOWS CONGRESS 467<br />

banks.... The government could only be called upon to take them up<br />

after the reserve banks had failed. l<br />

Warburg's explanation should be carefully analyzed. It is an<br />

incredibly important statement. The man who masterminded the<br />

Federal Reserve System is telling us that Federal Reserve notes<br />

constitute privately issued money with the taxpayers standing by to cover<br />

the potential losses of those banks which issue it. One of the more<br />

controversial assertions of this book is that the objectives set forth<br />

at the <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island<br />

meeting included the shifting of the cartel's<br />

losses from the owners of the banks to the taxpayers. Warburg<br />

himself has confirmed it.<br />

But let us return to the great deceit of 1913. The second demand<br />

made by Bryan—political control over the System, not banker<br />

control—was met with an equally beguiling "compromise." In<br />

addition to<br />

the governing board of regional bankers previously<br />

proposed, there now would be a central regulatory commission, to<br />

be called the Federal Reserve Board, appointed by the President<br />

with the advice and consent of the Senate. 2 Thus, the public was to<br />

be protected through a sharing of power, a melding of interests, a<br />

system of checks and balances. In this way, said Wilson, "the banks<br />

may be instruments, not the masters, of business and of individual<br />

enterprise and initiative." 3<br />

The arrangement was heralded as a bold, new experiment in<br />

representative government. In reality, it was but the return of the<br />

ancient partnership between the monetary and political scientists.<br />

The only thing new was that power was now to be shared openly in<br />

plain view of the public. But, of course, there would not be much to<br />

see. All the deliberations and most of the decisions were to happen<br />

behind closed doors. Furthermore, the division of power and<br />

responsibility between these groups was left<br />

deliberately vague.<br />

Without a detailed line of command or even a clear concept of<br />

function, it was inevitable that, as with the drafting of the bill itself,<br />

real power would gravitate into the hands of those with technical<br />

[knowledge and Wall Street connections. To the monetary scientists<br />

drafting the bill and engineering the compromises, the eventual<br />

i- Warburg, Vol. I, p. 409.<br />

i The original plan called for the Secretary of the Treasury and the Comptroller<br />

or the Currency to be on the board also, but this was later dropped<br />

6<br />

- Quoted by Greider, p. 277.


468 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

concentration of effective control into their hands was never in<br />

serious doubt. And, as we shall see in the next chapter, subsequent<br />

events have proved the soundness of that strategy.<br />

BRYAN ENDORSES THE BILL<br />

Bryan was no match for the <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island strategists and he<br />

accepted the "compromises" at face value. Had there been any<br />

lingering doubts in his mind, they were swept away by gratitude<br />

for his appointment as Wilson's Secretary of State. Now that he was<br />

on the team, he declared:<br />

I<br />

appreciate so profoundly the service rendered by the President<br />

to the people in the stand he has taken on the fundamental principles<br />

involved in currency reform, that 1 am with him in all the details....<br />

The right of the government to issue money is not surrendered to the<br />

banks; the control over the money so issued is not relinquished by the<br />

government.... I am glad to endorse earnestly and unreservedly the<br />

currency bill as a much better measure than I supposed it possible to<br />

secure at this time.. . . Conflicting opinions have been reconciled with a<br />

success hardly to have been expected.<br />

With the conversion of Bryan, there was no longer any doubt<br />

about the final outcome. The Federal Reserve Act was released<br />

from the joint House and Senate conference committee on December<br />

22, 1913, just as Congress was preoccupied with departure for<br />

the Christmas recess and in no mood for debate. It quickly passed<br />

by a vote of 282 to 60 in the House and 43 to 23 in the Senate. The<br />

President signed it into law the next day.<br />

The Creature had swallowed Congress.<br />

SUMMARY<br />

President Taft, although a Republican spokesman for big<br />

business, refused to champion the Aldrich Bill<br />

This marked him for political extinction. The Money Trust wanted<br />

a President who would aggressively promote the bill, and the man<br />

selected was Woodrow Wilson who had already publicly declared<br />

for a central bank.<br />

his allegiance. Wilson's nomination at the Democratic national<br />

convention was secured by Colonel House, a close associate<br />

Morgan and Warburg. To make sure that Taft did not win his bid<br />

for reelection, the Money Trust encouraged the former Republican<br />

President, Teddy Roosevelt, to run on the Progressive ticket. The<br />

of<br />

THE CREATURE SWALLOWS CONGRESS 469<br />

result, as planned, was that Roosevelt pulled away Republican<br />

support from Taft, and Wilson won the election with less than a<br />

majority vote. Wilson and Roosevelt campaigned vigorously<br />

against the evils of the Money Trust while, all along, being<br />

dependent upon that same Trust for campaign funding.<br />

When Wilson was elected, Colonel House literally moved into<br />

the White House and became the unseen President of the United<br />

States. Under his guidance, the Aldrich Bill was given cosmetic<br />

surgery and emerged as the Glass-Owen Bill. Although sponsored<br />

by Democrats, in all essential features it was still the <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island<br />

plan. Aldrich, Vanderlip, and others identified with Wall Street put<br />

on a pretense of opposing the Glass-Owen Bill to convince<br />

Congress and the public that big bankers were fearful of it. The<br />

final bill was written with many sound features which were<br />

included to make it palatable during Congressional debate but<br />

which were predesigned to be dropped in later years. To win the<br />

support of the Populists under the leadership of William Jennings<br />

Bryan, the <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island team also engineered what appeared to be<br />

compromises but which in actual operation were, as Wilson called<br />

them, mere "shadows" while the "substance" remained. In short,<br />

Congress was outflanked, outfoxed, and outclassed by a deceptive,<br />

but brilliant, psycho-political attack. The result is that, on December<br />

23, 1913, America once again had a central bank.<br />

1. Glass, pp. 139-42.


Chapter Twenty-Three<br />

THE GREAT<br />

DUCK DINNER<br />

Haw Federal-Reserve policies led to<br />

the crash of<br />

1929; the expansion of the money supply as a<br />

means of helping the economy of England; the<br />

resulting wave of speculation in stocks and real<br />

estate; evidence that the Federal-Reserve Board<br />

had foreknowledge of the crash and even executed<br />

the events that were designed to trigger it.<br />

II<br />

The story is told of a New England farmer with a small pond in<br />

his pasture. Each summer, a group of wild ducks would frequent<br />

that pond but try as he would, the farmer could never catch one.<br />

No matter how early in the morning he approached, or how<br />

carefully he constructed a blind, or what kind of duck call he tried,<br />

somehow those crafty birds sensed the danger and managed to be<br />

out of range. Of course, when fall arrived, the ducks headed South,<br />

and the farmer's craving for a duck dinner only intensified.<br />

Then he got an idea. Early in the spring, he started scattering<br />

corn along the edge of the pond. The ducks liked the corn and,<br />

since it was always there, they soon gave up dipping and foraging<br />

for food of their own. After a while, they became used to the farmer<br />

and began to trust him. They could see he was their benefactor and<br />

they now walked close to him with no sense of fear. Life was so<br />

easy, they forgot how to fly. But that was unimportant, because<br />

they were now so fat they couldn't have gotten off the water even if<br />

they had tried-<br />

Fall came, and the ducks stayed. Winter came, and the pond<br />

. froze. The farmer built a shelter to keep them warm. The ducks<br />

I were happy because they didn't have to fly. And the farmer was<br />

l especially happy because, each week all winter long, he had a<br />

I delicious duck dinner.<br />

That is the story of America's Great Depression of the 1930s.


472 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

THE GREAT DUCK DINNER 473<br />

CONSOLIDATION OF POWER<br />

When the Federal Reserve Act was submitted to Congress,<br />

was head of the New York branch of the System which represented<br />

the nation's largest banks, the "money trust" itself. From the outset,<br />

many of its most important features were written in vague language.<br />

Some details were omitted entirely. That was a tactical move<br />

the national board and the regional branches were dominated by<br />

the New York branch. Strong ruled as an autocrat, determining Fed<br />

to avoid debate over fine points and to allow flexibility for future<br />

policy often without even consulting with the Federal Reserve<br />

interpretation. The goal was to get the bill passed and perfect it later.<br />

Since then, the Act has been amended 195 times, expanding the<br />

power and scope of the System to the point where, today, it would<br />

Board in Washington.<br />

The United States entry into World War I provided the impetus<br />

for increasing the power of the Fed. The System became the sole<br />

be almost unrecognizable to the Congressmen and Senators who<br />

fiscal agent of the Treasury, Federal Reserve Notes were issued,<br />

voted for<br />

virtually all of the<br />

it.<br />

gold reserves of the nation's commercial banks'<br />

In 1913, public distaste for concentration of financial power in<br />

were gathered together into the vaults of the Federal System, and<br />

the hands of a few Wall Street banks helped to fuel the fire for many of the legislative restraints placed into the original Act were<br />

passage of the Federal Reserve Act. To make it appear that the new<br />

abandoned. Voters ask fewer questions when their nation is at war.<br />

System would put an end to the New York "money trust," as it was<br />

The concentration of power into the hands of the very "money<br />

called, the public was told that the Federal Reserve would not<br />

trust" the Fed was supposed to defeat, is described by Ferdinand<br />

represent any one group or one region. Instead, it would have its<br />

Lundberg, author of America's Sixty Families:<br />

power diffused over twelve regional Federal Reserve Banks, and<br />

In practice, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York became the<br />

none would be able to dominate. As Galbraith pointed out,<br />

fountainhead of the system of twelve regional banks, for New York<br />

however, the regional design was "admirable for serving local<br />

was the money market of the nation. The other eleven banks were so<br />

pride and architectural ambition and for lulling the suspicions of<br />

many expensive mausoleums erected to salve the local pride and quell<br />

the<br />

the agrarians/'<br />

Jacksonian fears<br />

But that was not what the planners had in mind for<br />

of the hinterland. Benjamin Strong,... president of<br />

the Bankers Trust<br />

the long<br />

Company<br />

haul.<br />

[J.P. Morgan] was selected as the first<br />

Governor of the New York Reserve Bank.<br />

In the beginning, the regional branches took their autonomy<br />

An adept in high finance,<br />

Strong for many years manipulated the country's monetary system at<br />

seriously, and that led to conflict with members of the national<br />

the discretion of directors representing the leading New York banks.<br />

board. The Board of Governors was composed of political appointees<br />

representing diverse segments of the economy. They were<br />

brought into interlocking relations with the Bank of England and the<br />

Under Strong the Reserve System, unsuspected by the nation, was<br />

outclassed by the heads of the regional branches of the System who<br />

Bank of France.<br />

were bankers with bankers / experience.<br />

BAILING OUT EUROPE<br />

RETURN OF THE NEW YORK "MONEY TRUST"<br />

It will be recalled from Chapters Twelve and Twenty that it was<br />

The greatest power struggle arose from the New York Reserve<br />

this interlock during World War I that was responsible for the<br />

Bank which was headed by Benjamin Strong. Strong had the<br />

confiscation from American taxpayers of billions of dollars which<br />

contacts and the experience. It will be recalled that he was one of were given to the central banks of England and France. Much of<br />

the seven who drafted the cartel's structure at <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island. He had<br />

that money found its way to the associates of J.P. Morgan as<br />

been head of J.P. Morgan's Bankers Trust Company and was<br />

interest payments on war bonds and as fees for supplying munitions<br />

and other war materials.<br />

closely associated with Edward Mandell House. He had become a<br />

personal friend of Montagu Norman, head of the Bank of England;<br />

Seventy per cent of the cost of World War I was paid by<br />

and of Charles Rist, head of the Bank of France. Not least of all, he<br />

inflation rather than taxes, a process that was orchestrated by the<br />

Lundberg, p. 122.


474 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

Federal Reserve System. This was considered by the Fed's supporters<br />

as its first real test, and it passed with flying colors. American<br />

inflation during that period was only slightly less than in England,<br />

which had been more deeply committed to war and for a longer<br />

period of time. That is not surprising inasmuch as a large portion of<br />

Europe's war costs had been transferred to the American taxpayers.<br />

After the war was over, the transfusion of American dollars<br />

continued as part of a plan to pull England out of depression. The<br />

methods chosen for that transfer were artificially low interest rates<br />

and a deliberate inflation of the American money supply. That was<br />

calculated to weaken the value of the dollar relative to the English<br />

pound and cause gold reserves to move from America to England.<br />

Both operations were directed by Benjamin Strong and executed by<br />

the Federal Reserve. It was not hyperbole when President Herbert<br />

Hoover described Strong as "a mental annex to Europe/'<br />

Before Alan Greenspan was appointed as Chairman of the<br />

Federal Reserve by President Reagan in 1987, he had served on the<br />

Board of the J.P. Morgan Company. Before that however, he had<br />

been an outspoken champion of the gold standard and a critic of<br />

the System's subservience to the banking cartel. In 1966 he wrote:<br />

When business in the United States underwent a mild contraction<br />

in 1927, the Federal Reserve created more paper reserves in the hope<br />

of forestalling any possible bank reserve shortage. More disastrous,<br />

however, was the Federal Reserve's attempt to assist Great Britain<br />

who had been losing gold to us„ . . The ''Fed" succeeded: it stopped the<br />

gold loss, but it nearly destroyed the economies of the world in the<br />

process. The excess credit which the Fed pumped into the economy<br />

spilled over into the stock market—triggering a fantastic speculative<br />

boom.... As a result, the American economy collapsed.<br />

After his appointment to the Fed , Greenspan became silent on<br />

these issues and did nothing to anger the Creature he now served.<br />

AGENTS OF A HIGHER POWER<br />

When reviewing this aspect of the Fed's history, questions arise<br />

about the patriotic loyalty of men like Benjamin Strong. How is it<br />

possible for a man who enjoys the best that his nation can<br />

offer—security, wealth, prestige—to conspire to plunder his fellow<br />

citizens in order to assist politicians of other governments to<br />

1. Gaibraith, p. 180.<br />

2. Greenspan, pp. 99-100,<br />

THE GREAT DUCK DINNER 475<br />

continue plundering theirs? The first part of the answer was<br />

illustrated in earlier sections of this book. International money<br />

managers may be citizens of a particular country but, to many of<br />

them, that is a meaningless accident of birth. They consider<br />

themselves to be citizens of the world first. They speak of affection<br />

for all mankind, but their highest loyalty is to themselves and their<br />

profession.<br />

That is only half the answer. It must be remembered that the<br />

men who pulled the financial levers on this doomsday machine, the<br />

governors of the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve, were<br />

themselves tied to strings which were pulled by others above them.<br />

Their minds were not obsessed with concepts of nationalism or<br />

even internationalism. Their loyalties were to men. Professor<br />

Quigley reminds us:<br />

It must not be felt that these heads of the world's chief central<br />

banks were themselves substantive powers in<br />

world finance. They<br />

were not. Rather, they were the technicians and agents of the<br />

dominant investment bankers of their own countries, who had raised<br />

them up and were perfectly capable of throwing them down. The<br />

substantive financial powers of the world were in the hands of these<br />

investment bankers (also called "international" or "merchant"<br />

bankers) who remained largely behind the scenes in their own<br />

unincorporated private banks. These formed a system of international<br />

cooperation and national dominance which was more private, more<br />

powerful, and more secret than that of their agents in the central<br />

banks.<br />

So, we are not dealing with the actions of men who perceive<br />

themselves as betraying their nation, but technicians who are loyal<br />

to the monetary scientists and the political scientists who raised<br />

them up. Of the two groups, the financiers are dominant. Politicians<br />

come and go, but those who wield the power of money<br />

remain to pick their successors.<br />

FARMERS BECOME DUCK DINNER<br />

During the war, prices for agricultural products rose to an<br />

all-time high, and so did profits. Farmers had put part of that<br />

feioney into war bonds, but much of it had been placed into savings<br />

accounts at banks within the farming communities, which is to say,<br />

mostly in the Midwest and South. That was unacceptable to the<br />

Quigley, Tragedy, pp. 326-27.


.<br />

|<br />

Under<br />

476 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

New York banks which saw their share of the nation's deposits<br />

begin to decline. A way had to be devised to reclaim that money.<br />

The Federal Reserve System, which by then was the captive of the<br />

New York banks, was pressed into service to accomplish the deed.<br />

Few of those country banks had chosen to become members of<br />

the Federal Reserve System. That added insult to injury, and it also<br />

provided an excuse for the Fed to wage economic war against<br />

them. The plan was neither complex nor original; it had been used<br />

many times before by central bankers. It was (1) extend easy credit<br />

to the farmers to lure them into heavy debt, and then (2) create a<br />

recession which would decrease their income to the point where<br />

they could not make payments. The country banks then would find<br />

themselves holding non-performing loans and foreclosed property<br />

which they could not sell without tremendous losses. In the end,<br />

both the farmers and the banks would be wiped out. The banks<br />

were the target. Too bad about the farmers.<br />

Congressman Charles Lindbergh, Sr., father of the man who<br />

made the world's first solo transatlantic flight, explained it this<br />

way: "Under the Federal Reserve Act, panics are scientifically<br />

created; the present panic is the first scientifically created one,<br />

worked out as we figure a mathematical problem."<br />

The details of how this panic was created were explained in<br />

1939 by Senator Robert Owen, Chairman of the Senate Banking and<br />

Currency Committee. Owen, a banker himself, had been a coauthor<br />

of the Federal Reserve Act, a role he later regretted. Owen<br />

said:<br />

In May 1920 ... the farmers were exceedingly prosperous.. . .<br />

They<br />

were paying off their mortgages. They had bought a lot of new land, at<br />

the instance of the government—had borrowed money to do it—and<br />

then they were bankrupted by a sudden contraction of credit and<br />

currency, which took place in 1920.. .<br />

The Federal Reserve Board met in a meeting which was not<br />

was a<br />

disclosed to the public—they met on the 18th of May 1920; it<br />

secret meeting—and they spent all day; the minutes made 60 printed<br />

pages, and it appears in Senate Document 310 of February 10, 1923...<br />

Under action taken by the Reserve Board on May 18, 1920, there<br />

resulted a violent contraction of credit. . . . This contraction of credit and<br />

currency had the effect, the next year, of diminishing the national<br />

THE GREAT DUCK DINNER 477<br />

production $15,000,000,000; it had the effect of throwing millions of<br />

people out of employment; it had the effect of reducing the value of<br />

lands and ranches $20,000,000,000. l<br />

The contraction of credit had a disastrous effect on the nation as<br />

U. whole, not just farmers. But the farmers were more deeply<br />

involved, because the recently created Federal Farm Loan Board<br />

had lured them with easy credit—like ducks at the pond—into<br />

extreme debt ratios. Furthermore, the large-city banks which were<br />

members of the System were given support by the Fed during the<br />

summer of 1920 to enable them to extend credit to manufacturers<br />

and merchants. That allowed many of them to ride out the slump.<br />

There was no such support for the farmers or the country banks<br />

which, by 1921, were falling like dominoes. History books refer to<br />

this event as the Agricultural Depression of 1920-21. A better name<br />

would have been Country-Duck Dinner in New York.<br />

BUILDING THE MANDRAKE MECHANISM<br />

In Chapter Ten, we examined the three methods by which the<br />

Federal Reserve is able to create or extinguish money. Of the three,<br />

the purchase and sale of debt-related securities in the open market<br />

is the one that provides the greatest effect on the money supply.<br />

The purchase of securities by the Fed (with checks that have no<br />

money to back them) creates money; the sale of those securities<br />

extinguishes money. Although the Fed is authorized to buy and sell<br />

almost any kind of security that exists in the world, it is obligated to<br />

show preference for bonds and notes of the federal government.<br />

That is the way the monetary scientists discharge the commitment<br />

to create money for their partners, the political scientists. Without<br />

that service, the partnership would dissolve, and Congress would<br />

abolish the Fed.<br />

When the System was created in 1913, it was anticipated that<br />

the primary way to manipulate the money supply would be to<br />

control the "reserve ratios" and the "discount window." That is<br />

banker language for setting the level of mandatory bank reserves<br />

(as a percentage of deposits) and also setting the interest rate on<br />

loans made by the Fed to the banks themselves. The reserve ratio<br />

the old National Bank Act had been 25%. Under the Federal<br />

Reserve Act of 1913, it was reduced to 18% for the large New York<br />

1. Charles A. Lindbergh, Sr. The Economic Pinch (1923 rpt. Hawthorne, California:<br />

Omni Publications, 1968), p. 95.<br />

1 . U.S. Cong., Senate, Special Committee on the Investigation of Silver, Silver, Part<br />

5, 76th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1939), April 7, 1939, pp. 196-97.


478 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

banks, a drop of 28%. In 1917, just four years later, the reserve<br />

requirements for Central Reserve-City Banks were further dropped<br />

from 18% to 13% (with slightly lesser reductions for smaller banks).<br />

That was an additional 28% cut.<br />

It<br />

quickly became apparent that setting reserve ratios was an<br />

inefficient tool. The latitude of control was too small, and the<br />

amount of public attention too great. The second method, influencing<br />

the interest rate on commercial loans, was more useful. Here is<br />

how that works:<br />

Under a fractional-reserve banking system, a bank can create<br />

new money merely by issuing a loan. The amount of new money it<br />

creates is limited by the reserve ratio or "fraction" it is required to<br />

maintain to cover its cash-flow needs. If the reserve ratio is 10%,<br />

then each $10 it lends includes $9 that never existed before. A<br />

commercial bank, therefore, can create a sizable amount of money<br />

merely by making loans. But, once the bank is "loaned up," that is<br />

to say, once the bank has already loaned $9 for every $1 it holds in<br />

reserve, it must stop and wait for some of the old loans to be paid<br />

back before it<br />

can issue new ones. The only way to expand that<br />

process is to make the reserves larger. That can be accomplished in<br />

one of three ways: (1) use some of the bank's profits, (2) sell<br />

additional stock to investors, or (3) borrow money from the Fed.<br />

WHEN BANKS BORROW FROM THE FED<br />

The third option is the most popular and is called going to the<br />

"discount window." When banks go to the Fed's discount window<br />

to obtain a loan, they are expected to put up collateral. This can be<br />

almost any debt contract held by the bank, including government<br />

bonds, but it commonly consists of commercial loans. The Fed then<br />

grants credit to the bank in an amount equal to those contracts. In<br />

essence, this allows the bank to convert its old loans into new<br />

"reserves." Every dollar of those new reserves then can be used as<br />

the basis for lending nine more dollars in checkbook money!<br />

The process does not stop there. Once the new loans are made,,<br />

they, too, can be used as collateral at the Fed for still more reserves.<br />

The music goes 'round and 'round, with each new level of debt<br />

1. In 1980, statutory limits on reserve ratios were eliminated altogether. The<br />

Federal Reserve Board now has the option to lower the ratio to zero, which means<br />

the power to create unlimited quantities of money. It is the ultimate dream of central<br />

bankers.<br />

§1-<br />

THE GREAT DUCK DINNER 479<br />

becoming "reserves" for yet a higher level of loans, until it<br />

finally<br />

plays itself out at about twenty-eight times. That process is<br />

was one of<br />

commonly called "discounting commercial paper." It<br />

the means by which the Fed was able to flood the nation with new<br />

money prior to the Great Dam Rupture of 1929.<br />

But, there is a problem with that method, at least as far as the<br />

Fed is concerned. Even though interest rates at the discount<br />

window can be made so low that most bankers will line up like<br />

ducks looking for free corn, some of them — particularly those<br />

"hicks" in the country banks—have been known to resist the<br />

temptation. There is no way to force the banks to participate.<br />

Furthermore, the banks themselves are dependent upon the whims<br />

tof their customers who, for reasons known only to themselves, may<br />

not want to borrow as much as the bank wants to lend. If the<br />

customers stop borrowing, then the banks have no new loans to<br />

convert into further reserves.<br />

That left the third mechanism as the preferred option: the<br />

purchase and sale of bonds and other debt obligations in the open<br />

^market With the discount window, banks have to be enticed to<br />

borrow money which later must be repaid, and sometimes they are<br />

reluctant to do that. But with the open market, all the Fed has to do<br />

is write a fiat check to pay for the securities. When that check is<br />

cashed, the new money it created moves directly into the economy<br />

without any concurrence required from the recalcitrant banks.<br />

But, there was a problem with this method also. Before World<br />

War I, there were few government bonds available on the open<br />

market. Even after the war, the supply was limited. Which means<br />

the vast inflation that preceded the Crash of 1929 was not caused by<br />

deficit spending. In each year from 1920 through 1930 there was a<br />

surplus of government revenue over expenses. Surprising as it may<br />

be, on the eve of the depression, America was getting out of debt.<br />

As a consequence, there were few government bonds for the Fed to<br />

buy. Without government bonds, the open-market engine was<br />

constantly running out of gas.<br />

The solution to all these problems was to create a new market<br />

tailor-made to the Fed's needs, a kind of half-way house between<br />

See chapter ten for details.<br />

2- See Robert T. Patterson, The Great Boom and Panic; 1921-1929 (Chicago: Henry<br />

Regnery Company, 1965), p. 223.


480 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

the discount window and the open market. It was called the<br />

"acceptance window," and it was through that imagery that the<br />

System purchased a unique type of debt-related security called<br />

bankers acceptances.<br />

BANKER'S ACCEPTANCES<br />

Banker's acceptances are contracts promising payment for<br />

commercial goods scheduled for later delivery. They usually<br />

involve international trade where delays of three to six months are<br />

common. They are a means by which a seller in one country can<br />

ship goods to an unknown buyer in another country with confidence<br />

that he will be paid upon delivery. That is accomplished<br />

through guarantees made by the banks of both buyer and seller.<br />

First, the buyer's bank issues a letter of credit guaranteeing<br />

payment for the goods, even if the buyer should default. When the<br />

seller's bank receives this, one of its officers writes the word<br />

"accepted" on the contract and pays the seller the amount of the<br />

sale. The accepting bank, therefore, advances the money to the<br />

seller in expectation of receiving future payment from the buyer's<br />

bank. For this service, both banks charge a fee expressed as a<br />

percentage of the contract. Thus, the buyer pays a little more than<br />

the amount of the sales contract, and the seller receives a little less.<br />

Historically, these contracts have been safe, because the banks<br />

are careful to guarantee payment only for financially sound firms.<br />

But, in times of economic panic, even sound firms may be unable to<br />

honor their contracts. It was underwriting that kind of business that<br />

nearly bankrupted George Peabody and J.P. Morgan in London<br />

during the panic of 1857, and would have done so had they not<br />

been bailed out by the Bank of England.<br />

Acceptances, like commercial loan contracts, are negotiable<br />

instruments that can be traded in the securities market. The<br />

accepting banks have a choice of holding them until maturity or<br />

selling them. If they hold them, their profit will be realized when<br />

the underlying contract is eventually paid off and it will be equal to<br />

the amount of its "discount," which is banker language for its fee.<br />

Acceptances are said to be "rediscounted" when they are sold by<br />

the original discounter, the underwriter. The advantage of doing<br />

that is<br />

that they do not have to wait three to six months for their<br />

profit. They can acquire immediate capital which can be invested to<br />

earn interest.<br />

I<br />

THE GREAT DUCK DINNER 481<br />

The sale price of an acceptance is always less than the value of<br />

the underlying contracts; otherwise no one would buy them. The<br />

difference represents the potential profit to the buyer. It is expressed<br />

as a percentage and is called the "rate" of discount—or, in<br />

this case, rediscount. But the rate given by the seller must be lower<br />

than what he expects to earn with the money he receives, otherwise<br />

he will be better off not selling.<br />

Although bankers' acceptances were commonly traded in<br />

Europe, they were not popular in the United States.<br />

Before the<br />

Federal Reserve Act was passed, national banks had been prohibited<br />

from purchasing them. A market, therefore, had to be created.<br />

The Fed accomplished this by setting the discount rate on acceptances<br />

so low that underwriters would have been foolish not to take<br />

advantage of it. At a very low discount, they could acquire<br />

short-term funds which then could be invested at a higher rate of<br />

return. Thus, acceptances quickly became plentiful on the open<br />

market in the United States.<br />

But who would want to buy them at a low return? No one, of<br />

course. So, to create that market, not only did the Federal Reserve<br />

set the discount rate artificially low, it also pledged to buy all of the<br />

acceptances that were offered. The Fed, therefore, became the<br />

principal buyer of these securities. Banks also came into the market<br />

as buyers, but only because they knew that, at any time they<br />

wanted to sell, the Fed was pledged to buy.<br />

Since the money was being created out of nothing, the cost did<br />

not really matter, nor did the low profit potential. The Fed's goal<br />

was not to make a profit on investment. It was to increase the<br />

nation's money supply.<br />

WARBURG AND FRIENDS MAKE A LITTLE PROFIT<br />

The man who benefited most from this artificially created<br />

market was none other than Paul Warburg, a partner with Kuhn,<br />

Loeb and Co. Warburg was in attendance at the <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island<br />

meeting at which the Federal Reserve System was conceived. He<br />

was considered by all to have been the master theoretician who led<br />

the others in their deliberations. He was one of the most influential<br />

voices in the public debates that followed. He had been appointed<br />

as one of the first members of the Federal Reserve Board and later<br />

became its Vice Governor until outbreak of war, at which time he


482 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

German banking. He was a director of American I.G. Chemical<br />

Corp. and Agfa Ansco, Inc., firms that were controlled by I.G.<br />

Farben, the infamous German cartel that, only a few years later,<br />

would sponsor the rise to power of Adolph Hitler. He was also a<br />

director of the CFR (Council on Foreign Relations). It should not be<br />

surprising, therefore, to learn that he was able to position himself at<br />

the center of the huge cash flow resulting from the Fed's purchase<br />

of acceptances.<br />

Warburg was the founder and Chairman of the International<br />

Acceptance Bank of New York, the world's largest acceptance<br />

bank. He was also a director of several smaller "competitors,"<br />

including the prestigious Westinghouse Acceptance Bank. He was<br />

founder and Chairman of the American Acceptance Council.<br />

Warburg was the acceptance market in America. But he was not<br />

without friends who also swam in the river of money. Men who<br />

controlled America's largest financial institutions became directors<br />

or officers of the various acceptance banks. The list of companies<br />

that became part of the interlocking directorate included Kuhn,<br />

Loeb and Co.; New York Trust Co.; Bank of Manhattan Trust Co.;<br />

American Trust Co.; New York Title and Mortgage Co.; Chase<br />

National Bank; Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.; American Express<br />

Co.; the Carnegie Corp.; Guaranty Trust Co.; Mutual Life Insurance<br />

Co.; the Equitable Life Assurance Society of New York; and the<br />

First National Banks of Boston, St. Louis, and Los Angeles, to name<br />

just a few. The world of acceptance banking was the private<br />

domain of the financial elite of Wall Street<br />

Behind the American image, however, was a full partnership<br />

with investors from Europe. Total capital of the IAB's American<br />

shareholders was $276 million compared with $271 million from<br />

foreign investors. A significant portion of that was divided between<br />

the Warburgs in Germany and the Rothschilds in England.<br />

Just how large and free-flowing was that river of acceptance<br />

money? In 1929, it was 1.7 trillion-dollars wide. Throughout the<br />

1920s, it was over half of all the new money created by the Federal<br />

Reserve—greater than all the other purchases on the open market<br />

1. For a detailed account of this episode, see Part Two of the author's book, World<br />

without Cancer: The Story of Vitamin B17 (Westlake Village, California: American<br />

Media, 1974).<br />

2. Larry Schweikart, ed. The Encyclopedia of American History and Biography (New<br />

York: Facts on File, 1990), p. 448.<br />

THE GREAT DUCK DINNER 483<br />

plus all the loans to all the banks standing in line at the discount<br />

window.<br />

The monetary scientists who created the Federal Reserve, and<br />

their close business associates, were well-rewarded for their efforts.<br />

Profit-taking by insiders, however, is not the issue. Far more<br />

important is the fact that the consequence of this self-serving<br />

mechanism was the massive expansion of the money supply that<br />

made the Great Depression inevitable. And that is the topic which<br />

impelled us to look at acceptances in the first place.<br />

CONGRESS SUSPICIOUS BUT AFRAID TO TINKER<br />

By 1920, suspicions and resentment were growing in the halls<br />

of Congress. Politicians were not getting their share. It is possible<br />

that many of them failed to realize that, as partners in the scheme,<br />

they were entitled to a share. Nevertheless, they were dazzled by<br />

banker language and accounting tricks and were afraid to tinker<br />

with the System lest they accidentally push the wrong button.<br />

Watching with amusement from London was Fabian Socialist<br />

John Maynard Keynes. Speaking of the Federal Reserve's manipulation<br />

of the value of the dollar, he wrote:<br />

That is the way by which a rich country is able to combine new<br />

wisdom with old prejudice. It can enjoy the latest scientific<br />

improvements, devised in the economic laboratory of Harvard, whilst<br />

leaving Congress to believe that no rash departure will be<br />

permitted.. . . But there is in all such fictions a certain instability.. . . The<br />

suspicions of Congressmen may be aroused. One cannot be quite<br />

certain that some Senator might not read and understand this book.<br />

There was not much danger of that! By then, American politicians<br />

had acquired a taste for the heady wine of war funding and<br />

stopped asking questions. World War I had created enormous<br />

demands for money, and the Fed provided it. By the end of the<br />

war, Congressional hostility to the Federal Reserve became history.<br />

PAYING FOR WORLD WAR I<br />

Much of the war debt was absorbed by the public which<br />

responded to patriotic instincts and purchased war bonds. The<br />

Treasury launched a massive publicity campaign for "Liberty<br />

Loans" to reinforce that sentiment These small-denomination<br />

1- Ibid., p. 448; also Murray N. Rothbard, America's Great Depression (Kansas City:<br />

Sheed and Ward, 1963), p. 11 7.<br />

2. Keynes, A Tract on Monetary Reform, pp. 198-99-


484 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

THE GREAT DUCK DINNER 485<br />

bonds did not expand the money supply and did not cause<br />

the government did not pay off those bonds when they came due.<br />

inflation, because the money came from savings. It already existed.<br />

Instead, it rolled them over by offering new bonds to replace the<br />

However, many people who thought it was their patriotic duty to<br />

old. Why? Was it because Congress needed more money? No. The<br />

support the war effort went to their banks and borrowed money so<br />

bonds had become the basis for money in circulation and, if they<br />

they could buy bonds. The bank created most of that money out of<br />

had been redeemed, the money supply would have decreased. A<br />

nothing, drawing upon credits and bookkeeping entries from the<br />

decrease in the money supply is viewed by politicians and central<br />

Federal Reserve, so those purchases did inflate the money supply.<br />

bankers as a threat to economic stability. Thus, the government<br />

The same result could have been obtained more simply and less<br />

ifcund itself unable to get out of debt even when it had the money<br />

expensively by getting the money directly from the Fed, but the<br />

to do so, a dilemma that continues to this day.<br />

government encouraged the trend anyway, because of its psychological<br />

value in generating popular support for the war. When<br />

There is an apparent contradiction here. In his book, The Great<br />

Boom and Panic, Robert Patterson says that, on the eve of depression,<br />

America was getting out of debt. Yet, Rothbard tells us there<br />

people make sacrifices for an endeavor, it reinforces their belief that<br />

it must be worthy.<br />

were more government bonds held by the banking system than<br />

Although the war was financed partly by taxes and partly by<br />

during the war! The only way both statements can be true is if there<br />

Liberty Bonds purchased by the public, a significant portion was<br />

were, in fact, more bonds outstanding during the war but they<br />

covered by the sale of Treasury bonds to the Federal Reserve in the<br />

were held by the public, not by the banking system. That would<br />

open market. Benjamin Strong's biographer, Lester Chandler,<br />

make it possible for there to be fewer total bonds in 1928 and yet<br />

explains:<br />

the System could still hold more of them than previously. That<br />

The Federal Reserve System became an integral part of the war would be the expected result of the Fed's growing role in the open<br />

financing machinery. The System's overriding objective, both as a<br />

market. As the publicly-held bonds matured, the Treasury rolled<br />

creator of money and as fiscal agent, was to insure that the Treasury<br />

them over, and the Fed picked them up. Bonds purchased by the<br />

would be supplied with all the money it needed, and on terms fixed by<br />

Congress and the Treasury.... A grateful nation now hailed it as a<br />

public do not increase the money supply whereas those purchased<br />

major contributor to the winning of the war, an efficient fiscal agent for by banks do. Therefore, conditions in 1928 would have been far<br />

the Treasury, a great source of currency and reserve funds, and a<br />

jnore inflationary than during the war—even though the government<br />

was getting out of debt.<br />

permanent and indispensable part of the banking system.<br />

Before 1922, the Federal Reserve bought Treasury bonds primarily<br />

for three purposes: (1) for income to operate the system, (2)<br />

THE EMERGENCE OF GOVERNMENT DEBT<br />

The war years were largely a period of testing new strategies<br />

to pay for the newly issued Federal Reserve Notes which were<br />

and consolidating power. Ironically, it was not until after the<br />

replacing silver certificates, and<br />

war—when there was no longer a justification for deficit spending—that<br />

government debt became plentiful. Up until World War<br />

(3) to push down interest rates. The<br />

iriotive for manipulating interest rates was to encourage borrowing<br />

I, annual federal expenses had been running about $750 million. By<br />

from abroad in the United States (where rates were low). It also<br />

the end of the war, it was running $18 and-a-half billion, an increase<br />

encouraged investment from the United States into Europe (where<br />

of 2,466%. Approximately 70% of the cost of war had been financed<br />

rates were higher). By making it possible to borrow American<br />

by debt. Murray Rothbard reminds us that, on the eve of depression<br />

in 1928, ten years after the end of war, the banking system held<br />

Fed was deliberately moving money out of the United States, with<br />

dollars at one rate and invest them elsewhere at a higher rate, the<br />

more government bonds than during the war itself. That means<br />

gold reserves following behind. As President Kennedy had said in<br />

f.<br />

1. Chandler, pp. 101-102.<br />

Page 223.<br />

2.<br />

2. Depression, p. 125. Chandler, p. 211; also Rothbard, Depression, p. 127.


I<br />

486 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

his 1963 address at the IMF, the outflow of American gold "did not<br />

come about by chance/'<br />

THE "DISCOVERY" OF THE OPEN MARKET<br />

It is commonly asserted by writers on this topic that the power<br />

of the open-market mechanism to manipulate the money supply<br />

was "discovered" by the Fed in the early 1920s and that it came as a<br />

total surprise. Martin Mayer, for example, in his book, The Bankers,<br />

writes:<br />

Now, through an accident as startling as those which produced<br />

the discovery of X-Rays or penicillin, the central bank learned that<br />

"open market operations" could have a significant effect on the<br />

behavior of the banks.<br />

This makes the story interesting, but it is difficult to believe that<br />

Benjamin Strong, Paul Warburg, Montagu Norman, and the other<br />

monetary scientists who were pulling the levers at that time were<br />

taken by surprise. These men could not possibly have been<br />

ignorant of the effect of creating money out of nothing and pouring<br />

it into the economy. The open market was merely a differentfunnel<br />

If there was any element of surprise, it likely was only in the ease<br />

with which the mechanism could be activated. It is not important<br />

whether that part of the story is fact or fiction, except that it<br />

perpetuates the "accidental" view of history, the myth that no one<br />

is<br />

responsible for political or economic chaos: Things just happen.<br />

There was no master plan. No one is to blame. Everything is under<br />

control Relax, pay your taxes, and go back to sleep!<br />

In any event, by the end of the war, Congress had awakened to<br />

the fact that it could use the Federal Reserve System to obtain<br />

revenue without taxes. From that point forward, deficit spending<br />

became institutionalized. A gradually increasing issuance of Treasury<br />

bonds was encouraging to the Fed because it provided still one<br />

more source of debt to convert into money, a source that eventually<br />

would become far more reliable than either bank loans or banker's<br />

acceptances. Best of all, now that Congress was becoming dependent<br />

on the free corn, there was little chance it would find its wings<br />

and fly away. The more dependent it became, the more secure the<br />

System itself became.<br />

1. See Chapter six.<br />

2. Mayer, p. 401.<br />

j<br />

f<br />

THE GREAT DUCK DINNER 487<br />

In 1921, the twelve regional Reserve banks were separately<br />

buying and selling in the open market. But motives varied. Some<br />

merely needed income to cover their<br />

operating overhead, while<br />

others—notably the New York branch under Benjamin Strong<br />

were more interested in sending American gold to England. Strong<br />

began immediately to gather control of all open-market operations<br />

into the hands of his own bank. In June of 1922, the "Open-Market<br />

Committee" was formed to coordinate activities among the<br />

regional Governors. In April of the next year, however, the national<br />

board in Washington replaced the Governor's group with one of its<br />

own creation, the "Open-Market Investments Committee." Benjamin<br />

Strong was its chairman. The powers of that group were<br />

enhanced ten years later by legislation which made it mandatory<br />

for the regional branches to follow the Open-Market Committee's<br />

directives, but that was a mere formality, for the die had been cast<br />

much earlier. From 1923 forward, the Fed's open-market operations<br />

have been carried out by the New York Federal Reserve Bank.<br />

The money trust has always been in control.<br />

DROWNING IN CREDIT<br />

Actions have consequences, and one of the consequences of<br />

purchasing Treasury bonds and other debt-related securities in the<br />

open market is that the money created to purchase them eventually<br />

ends up in the commercial banks where it is used for the expansion<br />

of bank credit. "Credit" is another of those weasely words that<br />

have different meanings to different people. In banker language,<br />

the expansion of credit means the banks have "excess reserves"<br />

(bookkeeping entries) which can be multiplied by nine and earn<br />

interest for them—if only someone would be kind enough to<br />

borrow. It is money waiting to be created. The message is: "Come on<br />

to the bank, folks. Don't be bashful. We've got plenty of money to<br />

lend. You have credit you didn't even know you had."<br />

In the 1920s, the greater share of bank credit was bestowed<br />

upon business firms, wealthy investors, and other high rollers, but<br />

the little man was not ignored. In 1910, consumer credit accounted<br />

for only 10% of the nation's retail sales. By 1929, credit transactions<br />

were responsible for half of the $60 billion retail market. In his<br />

book, Money and Man, Elgin Groseclose says: "By 1929 the United<br />

itates was overwhelmed by a flood of credit. It had covered the<br />


488 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

THE GREAT DUCK DINNER 489<br />

Each cycle was at a higher level than the previous one. That is<br />

Groseclose, America's Money Machine, p. 154.<br />

land. It was pouring into every nook and cranny of the national<br />

1.<br />

and the boom returned.<br />

economy."<br />

because the busts that followed the booms were not allowed to play<br />

The impact of expanding credit was compounded by artificially<br />

themselves out. The monetary scientists now had so many mechanisms<br />

at their command they were able to initiate new expansions<br />

low interest rates—the other side of the same coin—which were<br />

intended to help the governments of Europe. But they also stimulated<br />

to cancel out the downward adjustments. It was like prescribing<br />

borrowing here at home. Since borrowing is what causes<br />

increasing doses of narcotics to postpone the awareness of an<br />

money to be created under fractional-reserve banking, the money<br />

supply in America began to expand. From 1921 through June of<br />

advancing disease. It increased the prestige of the doctor, but it did<br />

not bode well for the patient.<br />

1929, the quantity of dollars increased by 61.8%, substantially more THE ROLLER COASTER<br />

than the increase in national product. During that same time, the<br />

Between 1920 and 1929, there were three distinct business<br />

amount of currency in circulation remained virtually unchanged.<br />

cycles with several minor ones within them. For the average<br />

That means the expansion was comprised entirely of money<br />

American, it was confusing and destructive. For the investor, it was<br />

substitutes, such as bonds and loan contracts.<br />

a roller-coaster ride to oblivion:<br />

BOOMS AND BUSTS MADE WORSE<br />

UP! The Fed had inflated the money supply to pay for World<br />

The forces of the free market are amazingly flexible. Like the<br />

War I. The resulting boom caused prices to rise.<br />

black market, they manage to exert themselves in unexpected ways<br />

DOWN! In 1920, the Fed raised interest rates to cool off the<br />

in spite of political decree. That had been the case throughout most<br />

inflation. That caused a recession, and prices tumbled.<br />

of American history. Prior to the creation of the Federal Reserve,<br />

banking had been coddled and hobbled by government. Banks<br />

Farmers were hit<br />

banks were closed.<br />

the hardest, and hundreds of country<br />

were chartered by government, protected by government, and<br />

UP! In 1921, the Fed lowered interest rates to stop the recession<br />

regulated by government. They had been forced to serve the<br />

and to help the governments of Europe. Inflation and<br />

political agendas of those in power. Consequently, the landscape<br />

expanding debt resulted.<br />

was strewn with the tombstones of dead banks which had taken to<br />

DOWN! In 1923, the Fed tightened credit to put the brakes on<br />

their graves the life savings of their hapless depositors. But these<br />

inflation.<br />

were mostly regional tragedies that were offset by growth and<br />

UP! But that was offset by its simultaneous policy of lowering<br />

prosperity in other areas. Even within the communities most<br />

the rate at the discount window, thus encouraging banks to<br />

severely affected, recovery was swift.<br />

borrow new reserves to expand the money supply.<br />

Now that the cartel had firm control over the nation's money<br />

UP! In 1924, the Fed suddenly created $500 million dollars in<br />

supply, the pattern began to change. The corrective forces of the<br />

new money. Within one year, the commercial banks<br />

free market were more firmly straight-jacketed than ever. All banks<br />

parlayed that into more than $4 billion, an expansion of<br />

in the entire country were in lock step with each other. What<br />

eight-to-one. The boom that followed took on the character<br />

happened in one region is what happened in all regions. Banks<br />

of speculation rather than investment. Prices in the stock<br />

were not allowed to die, so there could be no adjustments after<br />

market rose drastically.<br />

their demise. Their illness was sustained and carried like a deadly<br />

DOWN! In 1926, the Florida land boom collapsed, and the<br />

virus to the others.<br />

The expansion of the money supply in the 1920s clearly shows<br />

that effect. It was not a steady advance but a series of convulsions.<br />

economy began to contract once again.<br />

UP! In 1927, Montagu Norman of the Bank of England visited<br />

the United States to consult with Benjamin Strong. Shortly<br />

after his visit, the Fed pumped new money into the system,


490 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

DOWN! In the spring of 1928, the Fed contracted credit to halt<br />

the boom.<br />

UP! But the banks shifted their reserves into time deposits<br />

(where customers agree to wait before withdrawing their<br />

money). Since time deposits require a smaller reserve ratio<br />

than demand deposits, the banks were able to issue more<br />

loans than before. That offset the Fed's contraction of credit.<br />

UP! By that time, the British government had consumed its<br />

previous subsidy which was used to maintain its<br />

state.<br />

welfare<br />

In the spring of 1928, the pound sterling was again<br />

sagging on the international market, and gold began to flow<br />

back into the United States. Once again, the fledgling<br />

Creature came to the aid of the Bank of England, its ailing<br />

parent. The Fed bought a huge volume of banker's<br />

acceptances to depress interest rates and halt the flow of<br />

gold. The money supply suddenly increased by almost<br />

$2 billion.<br />

DOWN! In August, the Fed reversed its expansionist policy by<br />

selling Treasury bonds in the open market and raising<br />

interest rates. The money supply began to contract.<br />

It was the final bubble.<br />

SIXTH REASON TO ABOLISH THE FED<br />

One of the myths about the Federal Reserve is that it is needed<br />

to stabilize the economy. Yet, it has achieved just the opposite.<br />

Destabilization is dramatically clear in the years prior to the Crash,<br />

but the same cause-and-effeet continues to this day. As long as men<br />

are given the power to tinker with the money supply, they will<br />

strive to circumvent the natural laws of supply and demand. No<br />

matter how high their intentions or pure their motives, they will<br />

cause disruptions in the natural flow. When these disruptions are<br />

perceived, they will try to compensate by causing opposite disruptions.<br />

But, long before they act, there will already be new forces at<br />

work which they cannot, in all their wisdom, perceive until they are<br />

already manifest. It is the height of egotistical folly for "experts" to<br />

think they can outsmart or do better than the combined, interactive<br />

decisions of hundreds of millions of people all acting in response to<br />

their own best judgment. Thus, the Fed is doomed to failure by its<br />

nature and its mission. That is the sixth reason it should be<br />

abolished: It destabilizes the economy.<br />

THE GREAT DUCK DINNER 491<br />

TULIPOMANIA<br />

Easy credit was not the only problem in this period. Equally<br />

important was the effect<br />

that had on the behavior patterns of the<br />

populace. Responding to herd instinct and a belief in the possibility<br />

of something-for-nothing, men were driven to the most bizarre<br />

form of investment speculation.<br />

This was not the first time such hysteria had seized a population.<br />

One of the most graphic examples occurred in Holland<br />

between the years 1634 and 1636. It came to pass that a new, rare<br />

flower, called the tulip, was discovered in the gardens of some of<br />

the more wealthy inhabitants of Constantinople, now known as<br />

Istanbul. When the root bulbs of these exotic blossoms were<br />

brought into Holland, they rapidly became a status symbol among<br />

the wealthy—much as race horses or rare breeds of dogs are today<br />

in our own society—and those with surplus funds found that an<br />

investment in tulips brought them significant social recognition.<br />

The price of tulip bulbs climbed steadily until they became, not<br />

merely symbols of status, but speculative investments as well. At<br />

one point, prices doubled every few days, and speculators were<br />

seen everywhere amassing great fortunes with no input of either<br />

labor or service. Many otherwise prudent people found themselves<br />

infected by the hysteria. They borrowed against their homes and<br />

invested their life savings to get in on the anticipated windfall. This<br />

pushed up prices even further and tended to create the fulfillment<br />

of its own prophecy. Contracts for the future delivery of tulip<br />

bulbs—a form of today's commodity market—became a dominant<br />

feature of Holland's stock market<br />

Tulip bulbs eventually became more precious than gemstones.<br />

As new varieties were developed, the market became more complex,<br />

requiring experts to certify their origin and their grade. Prices<br />

soared, and the herd went insane. One bulb of the species called<br />

Admiral Liefken was valued at 4,400 florins; a Semper Augustus,<br />

Worth 5,500 florins, was purchased for a new carriage, two gray<br />

horses, and a complete set of harnesses. It was recorded that, at one<br />

sale, a single Viceroy brought two lasts of wheat, four lasts of rye,<br />

four fat oxen, eight fat swine, twelve fat sheep, two hogsheads of<br />

wine, four casks of butter, one-thousand pounds of cheese, a bed<br />

and mattress, a suit of clothes, and a silver drinking cup.


492 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

Then, one day without warning, reality returned from her<br />

two-year vacation. By that time, everyone knew deep in their hearts<br />

that the spiralling prices bore no honest relationship to the value of<br />

the tulips and that, sooner or later, someone was going to get hurt.<br />

But they continued to speculate for fear of being too quick in their<br />

timing and losing out on profits yet to come. Everyone was<br />

confident they would sell out precisely at the top of the market. In<br />

any herd, however, there are always a few who will take the lead<br />

and, by 1636, all it took was one or two prominent merchants to sell<br />

out their stock. Overnight, there were no buyers whatsoever, at any<br />

price. The tulip market vanished, and speculators by the thousands<br />

saw their dreams of easy wealth—and, in many cases, their life<br />

savings also—disappear with it. Tulipomania, as it was called at the<br />

time, had come to an end.<br />

Or did it? As we have seen, the Federal Reserve can create large<br />

amounts of money simply by going into the open market and<br />

buying debt contracts. But, once it is in the mainstream of the<br />

economy, commercial banks can multiply that money by up to a<br />

factor of nine, and that is where the real inflationary action is. To<br />

protect that privilege is one of the reasons the banks formed this<br />

cartel in the first place. Nevertheless, the public still<br />

has the final<br />

say. If no one wants to borrow their money, the game is over.<br />

That possibility is more theoretical than real. Although men<br />

may be hesitant to go into debt for legitimate business ventures in<br />

times of economic uncertainty, they can be lured by easy credit to<br />

take a long shot. Dreams of instant wealth are powerful motivaters.<br />

Gaming casinos, poker parlors, race tracks, lottery windows, and<br />

other forms of tulipomania are convincing evidence that the lust for<br />

gambling is embedded in generic code. The public has always been<br />

interested in free corn.<br />

TULIPS IN THE STOCK MARKET<br />

During the final phase of America's credit expansion of the<br />

1920s, the rise in prices on the stock market was entirely speculative.<br />

Buyers did not care if their stocks were overpriced compared<br />

to the dividends they paid. Commonly traded issues were selling<br />

for 20 to 50 times their earnings; some traded at 100. Speculators<br />

acquired stock merely to hold for a while and then sell at a profit. It<br />

1. See Charles Mackay, LL.D., Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of<br />

Crowds (1841 rpt. New York: L.C Page & Company, 1932), pp. 89-97.<br />

THE GREAT DUCK DINNER 493<br />

was the "Greater-Fool" strategy. No matter how high the price is<br />

today, there will be a greater fool tomorrow who will buy at an<br />

even higher price. For a while, that strategy seemed to work.<br />

To make the game even more exciting, it was common for<br />

investors to purchase their stocks on margin. That means the buyer<br />

puts up a small amount of money as a deposit (the margin) and<br />

borrows the rest from his stockbroker—who gets it from the bank,<br />

which gets it from the Fed. In the 1920s, the margin for small<br />

investors was as low as 10%. Although the average stock yielded a<br />

modest 3% annual dividend, speculators were willing to pay over<br />

12% interest on their loans, meaning their stock had to appreciate<br />

about 9% per year just to break even.<br />

These margin accounts are sometimes referred to as "call loans"<br />

because the broker has the right to "call<br />

them in" on very short<br />

notice, often as short as twenty-four hours, If the broker calls the<br />

loan, the investor must produce the money immediately. If he<br />

cannot, the broker will obtain the money by selling the stock. In<br />

theory, the sale of the stock will be sufficient to cover the loan. But,<br />

in practice, about the only time brokers call their loans is when the<br />

market is<br />

tumbling. Under those conditions, the stock cannot be<br />

sold except at a loss: a total loss of the investor's margin; and a<br />

variable loss to the broker, depending on the severity of the price<br />

fall. To obtain even more leverage, investors sometimes use the<br />

stocks they already own as collateral for a margin loan on new<br />

stocks. Therefore, if they cannot cover a margin call on their new<br />

stocks, they will lose their old stocks as well.<br />

In any event, such silly concerns were not in vogue in the 1920s.<br />

From August of 1921 to September of 1929, the Dow-Jones industrial<br />

stock-price average went from 63.9 to 381.17, a rise of 597%.<br />

Credit was abundant, loans were cheap, profits were big.<br />

BANKS BECOME SPECULATORS<br />

The commercial banks were the middlemen in this giddy game.<br />

By the end of the decade, they were functioning more like<br />

speculators than banks. Instead of serving as dependable clearing<br />

houses for money, they also had become players in the market.<br />

Loans to commercial enterprises for the production of goods and<br />

services—which normally are the backbone of sound banking<br />

practice—were losing ground to loans for speculating in the stock<br />

market and in urban real estate. Between 1921 and 1929, while


494 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

THE GREAT DUCK DINNER 495<br />

commercial loans remained constant, total<br />

bank loans increased<br />

from $24,121 million to $35,711 million. Loans on securities and real<br />

estate rose nearly $8 billion. Thus, about 70% of the increase during<br />

this period was in speculative investments. And that money was<br />

created by the banks.<br />

New York banks and trust companies had over $7 billion<br />

loaned to brokers at the New York Stock Exchange for use in<br />

margin accounts. Before the war, there were 250 securities dealers.<br />

By 1929, the number had grown to 6,500.<br />

The banks not only generated the money for speculation, they<br />

became speculators themselves by purchasing large blocks of<br />

high-yield bonds, many of which were of dubious quality. Those<br />

were the kinds of securities that are difficult to liquidate in a<br />

declining market. Borrowing money on short term and investing<br />

on long term, the banks were maneuvering themselves into a<br />

precarious position.<br />

Did the Federal Reserve cause the speculation in the stock<br />

market? Of course not. Speculators did that. The Fed undoubtedly<br />

had other objects in mind, but that did not cancel its responsibility.<br />

It was acutely aware of the psychological effect of easy credit and<br />

had consciously used that knowledge to manipulate public behavior<br />

on numerous occasions. Behavioral psychology is<br />

a necessary<br />

tool of the trade. So it could claim neither ignorance nor innocence.<br />

In the unfolding of this tragedy, it was about as innocent as a spider<br />

whose web "accidentally" caught the fly.<br />

THE FINAL BUBBLE<br />

In the Spring of 1928, the Federal Reserve expressed concern<br />

over speculation in the stock market and raised interest rates<br />

curb the expansion of credit. The growth in the money supply<br />

began to slow down, and so did the rise in stock prices. It is<br />

conceivable that the soaring economy could have been brought in<br />

for a "soft landing"—except that there were other agendas to be<br />

considered. Professor Quigley had said that the central bankers<br />

were not substantive powers unto themselves but were as marionettes<br />

whose strings were pulled by others. Just as the speculation<br />

spree appeared to be coming under control, those strings were<br />

yanked, and the Federal Reserve flip-flopped once again.<br />

The strings originated in London. Even after seven years of<br />

subsidy by the Federal Reserve, the British economy was sagging<br />

to<br />

from the weight of its socialist system, and gold was moving back<br />

into the United States. The Fed, in spite of its own public condemnation<br />

of excessive speculation, reversed itself at the brink of<br />

success and purchased over $300 million of banker's acceptances in<br />

the last half of 1928, which caused an increase in the money supply<br />

of almost $2 billion. Professor Rothbard says:<br />

Europe, as we have noted, had found the benefits from the 1927<br />

inflation dissipated, and European opinion now clamored against any<br />

tighter money in the U.S. The easing in late 1928 prevented gold<br />

inflows into the UjS. from getting very large. Great Britain was again<br />

losing gold, and sterling was weak once more. The United States<br />

bowed once again to its overriding wish to see Europe avoid the<br />

inevitable consequences of its own inflationary policies. 1<br />

Prior to the Fed's reversal of policy, stock prices had actually<br />

declined by five per cent. Now, they went through the roof, rising<br />

twenty per cent from July to December. The boom had returned in<br />

spades.<br />

Then, in February of 1929, a curious event occurred. Montagu<br />

Norman travelled to the United States once again to confer<br />

privately with the officers of the Federal Reserve. He also met with<br />

Andrew Mellon, Secretary of the Treasury. There is no detailed<br />

public record of what transpired at these closed meetings, but we<br />

can be certain of three things: it was important; it concerned the<br />

economies of America and Great Britain; and it was thought best<br />

not to tell the public what was going on. It is not unreasonable to<br />

surmise that the central bankers had come to the conclusion that<br />

the bubble—not only in America, but in Europe—was probably<br />

going to rupture very soon. Rather than fight it, as they had in the<br />

past, it was time to stand back and let it happen, clear out the<br />

speculators, and return the markets to reality. As Galbraith put it:<br />

"How much better, as seen from the Federal Reserve, to let nature<br />

take its course and thus allow nature to take the blame." 2<br />

Mellon was even more emphatic. Herbert Hoover described<br />

Mellon's views as follows:<br />

Mr. Mellon had only one formula: "liquidate labor, liquidate<br />

stocks, liquidate the farmers, liquidate real estate." He insisted that,<br />

when the people get an inflation brainstorm, the only way to get it out<br />

1- Rothbard, Depression, p. 147.<br />

2- Galbraith, p. 181.


496 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

THE GREAT DUCK DINNER 497<br />

of their blood is<br />

to let it collapse. He held that even a panic was not<br />

altogether a bad thing. He said: "It will purge the rottenness out of the<br />

system. High costs of living and high living will come down. People<br />

will work harder, live a moral life. Values will be adjusted, and<br />

enterprising people will pick up the wrecks from less competent<br />

people."<br />

If this had been the mindset between Mellon and Norman and<br />

the Federal Reserve Board, the purpose of their meetings would<br />

have been to make sure that, when the implosion happened, the<br />

central banks could coordinate their policies. Rather than be<br />

overwhelmed by it, they should direct it as best they can and turn it<br />

ultimately to their advantage. Perhaps we shall never know if that<br />

scenario is accurate, but the events that followed strongly support<br />

such a view.<br />

ADVANCE WARNING FOR MEMBERS ONLY<br />

Immediately after the meetings, the monetary scientists began<br />

to issue warnings to their colleagues in the financial fraternity to get<br />

out of the market. On February 6, the Federal Reserve issued an<br />

advisory to its<br />

member banks to liquidate their holdings in the<br />

stock market. The following month, Paul Warburg gave the same<br />

advice in the annual report to the stockholders of his International<br />

Acceptance Bank. He explained the reason for that advice:<br />

If the orgies of unrestrained speculation are permitted to spread,<br />

the ultimate collapse is certain not only to affect the speculators<br />

themselves, but to bring about a general depression involving the<br />

entire country.<br />

Paul Warburg was a partner with Kuhn, Loeb & Co. which<br />

maintained a list of preferred customers. These were fellow bankers,<br />

wealthy industrialists, prominent politicians, and high officials<br />

in foreign governments. A similar list was maintained at J.P.<br />

Morgan Co. It was customary to give these men advance notice on<br />

important stock issues and an opportunity to purchase them at two<br />

to fifteen points below their price to the public. That was one of the<br />

means by which investment bankers maintained influence over the<br />

1. Quoted by Burton Hersh, The Melton Family: A Fortune in History (New York:<br />

William Morrow and Co., 1978), p. 290.<br />

2. This advice was reprinted in the Commercial ai\d Financial Chronicle, March 9,<br />

1929, p. 1444.<br />

affairs of the world. The men on these lists<br />

were notified of the<br />

coming crash.<br />

John D. Rockefeller, J.P. Morgan, Joseph P. Kennedy, Bernard<br />

Baruch, Henry Morganthau, Douglas Dillon—the biographies of all<br />

the Wall Street giants at that time boast that these men were "wise"<br />

enough to get out of the stock market just before the Crash. And it<br />

is true. Virtually all of the inner club was rescued. There is no<br />

record of any member of the interlocking directorate between the<br />

Federal Reserve, the major New York banks, and their prime<br />

customers having been caught by surprise. Wisdom, apparently,<br />

was greatly affected by whose list one was on.<br />

A MESSAGE OF COMFORT TO THE PUBLIC<br />

it<br />

While the crew was abandoning ship, the passengers were told<br />

was a lovely cruise. President Coolidge and Treasury Secretary<br />

Mellon had been vociferous in their public utterances that the<br />

economy was in better shape than ever. From his socialist perch in<br />

London, John Maynard Keynes exclaimed that the management of<br />

the dollar by the Federal Reserve Board was a "triumph" of man<br />

over money. And, from the plush offices of his New York Federal<br />

Reserve Bank, Benjamin Strong boasted:<br />

The very existence of the Federal Reserve System is a safeguard<br />

against anything like a calamity growing out of money rates.... In<br />

former days the psychology was different, because the facts of the<br />

banking situation were different. Mob panic, and consequently mob<br />

disaster, is less likely to arise.<br />

The public was comforted, and the balloon continued to<br />

expand. It was now time to sharpen the pin. On April 19, the Fed<br />

held an emergency meeting under cloak of great secrecy. The<br />

following day, the New York Times reported as follows:<br />

RESERVE COUNCIL CONFERS IN HASTE<br />

Atmosphere of Mystery Is Thrown<br />

about Its Meeting in Washington<br />

An atmosphere of deep mystery was thrown about the<br />

proceedings both by the board and the council. No advance<br />

announcement had been made that an extraordinary session<br />

of the council was contemplated, and the fact that the<br />

members were in the city became known only when<br />

I. Quoted by Greider, p. 298.


.<br />

498 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

newspaper correspondents happened to see some of them<br />

entering the Treasury Department building. Even after that,<br />

evasive replies were given.... While the joint meeting was<br />

in progress at the Treasury Department, every effort was<br />

made to guard the proceedings, and a group of newspaper<br />

correspondents were asked to leave the corridor.<br />

Let us return briefly to Montagu Norman. His biographer tells<br />

us that, after he became head of the Bank of England, his custom<br />

was to journey to the United States several times each year,<br />

although his arrival was seldom noted by the press. He travelled in<br />

disguise, wearing a long, black cloak and a large, broad-brimmed<br />

hat, and he used the pseudonym of Professor Skinner. It was on<br />

one of those unpublicized trips that he ran into a young Australian<br />

by the name of W.C. Wentworth. Sixty years later, Wentworth<br />

wrote a letter to The Australian, a newspaper in Sydney, and told of<br />

his encounter:<br />

In 1929 I<br />

was a member of the Oxford and Cambridge athletic<br />

team, visiting America to run against American Universities. Late in<br />

July we split up to return, and I, together with some other members,<br />

boarded a smallish passenger vessel in New York. (There were, of<br />

course, no aeroplanes in those days.)<br />

A fellow passenger was "Mr. Skinner," and a member of our team<br />

recognLzed him. He was Montagu Norman, returning to London, after<br />

a secret visit to the US Central Bank, travelling incognito.<br />

When we told him we knew who he was, he asked us not to blow<br />

his cover, because if the details of his movement were made public, it<br />

could have serious financial consequences. Naturally, we agreed, and<br />

on the days following, as we crossed the Atlantic, he talked to us very<br />

frankly.<br />

He said, "In the next few months there is going to be a shake-out<br />

But don't worry—it won't last for long."<br />

On August 9, just a few weeks after that ship-board encounter,<br />

the Federal Reserve Board reversed its easy-credit policy and raised<br />

the discount rate to six per cent. A few days later, the Bank of<br />

England raised its rate also. Bank reserves in both countries began<br />

to shrink and, along with them, so did the money supply. Simulta-<br />

1<br />

"Reserve Council Confers in Haste," New York Times, April 20, 1929, p. 89.<br />

2. Hargrave, p. 1.<br />

3. "Letters to the editor," The Australian (GPO Box 4162, Sydney, NSW. 2001),<br />

February 7, 1989.<br />

THE GREAT DUCK DINNER 499<br />

neously, the System began to sell securities in the open market, a<br />

maneuver that also contracts the money supply. Call rates on<br />

margin loans had jumped to fifteen, then twenty per cent. The pin<br />

had been inserted.<br />

THE DUCK DINNER BEGINS<br />

The securities market reached its high point on September 19.<br />

Then, it began to slide. The public was not yet aware that the end<br />

had arrived. The roller coaster had dipped before. Surely it would<br />

shoot upward again. For five more weeks, the public bought<br />

heavily on the way down. More than a million shares were traded<br />

during that period. Then, on Thursday, October 24, like a giant<br />

school of fish suddenly turning direction in response to an unseen<br />

signal, thousands of investors stampeded to sell The ticker tape<br />

was hopelessly overloaded. Prices tumbled. Thirteen million shares<br />

exchanged hands. Everyone said the bottom had dropped out of<br />

the market. They were wrong. Five days later, it did.<br />

On Tuesday, October 29, the exchanges were crushed by an<br />

avalanche of selling. At times there were no buyers at all. By the<br />

end of the trading session, over sixteen million shares had been<br />

dumped, in most cases at any price that was offered. Within a single<br />

day, millions of investors were wiped out. Within a few weeks of<br />

further decline, $3 billion of wealth had disappeared. Within<br />

twelve months, $40 billion had vanished. People who had counted<br />

their paper profits and thought they were rich suddenly found<br />

themselves to be very poor.<br />

The other side of the coin is that, for every seller, there was a<br />

buyer. The insiders who had moved their investments into cash<br />

and gold were the buyers. It must be remembered that falling stock<br />

prices didn't necessarily mean that there was anything wrong with<br />

the stocks. Those representing solid companies were still<br />

paying<br />

dividends and were good investments—at a realistic price. In the<br />

panic, prices had tumbled far below their natural levels. Those who<br />

had the cash picked them up for a small fraction of their true worth.<br />

Giant holding companies were formed for that task, such as Marine<br />

Midland Corporation, the Lehman Corporation, and the Equity<br />

Corporation. J.P. Morgan set up the food trust called Standard<br />

Brands. Like the shark swallowing the mackerel, the big speculators<br />

devoured the small.


500 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

There is no evidence that the Crash was planned for the<br />

purpose of profit taking. In fact, there is much to show that the<br />

monetary scientists tried mightily to avert it, and might have done<br />

so had not their higher-priority agendas gotten in the way. Yet,<br />

once they realized the inevitability of a collapse in the market, they<br />

were not bashful about using their privileged position to take full<br />

advantage of it.<br />

In that sense, FDR's son-in-law, Curtis Dall, was<br />

right when he wrote: 'It was the calculated 'shearing' of the public<br />

by the World Money Powers."<br />

NATURAL LAW NO. 5<br />

Here is another of those "natural laws" of economics that needs<br />

to be added to our list:<br />

LESSON: It is human nature for man to place persona]<br />

priorities ahead of all others. Even the best of men cannot long<br />

resist the temptation to benefit at the expense of their neighbors<br />

if the occasion is placed squarely before them. This is especially<br />

true when the means by which they benefit is obscure and not<br />

likely to be perceived as such. There may be exceptional men<br />

from time to time who can resist that temptation, but their<br />

numbers are small. The general rule will prevail in the long run.<br />

A managed economy presents men with precisely that kind<br />

of opportunity. The power to create and extinguish the nation's<br />

money supply provides unlimited potential for personal gain.<br />

Throughout history the granting of that power has been<br />

justified as being necessary to protect the public, but the results<br />

have always been the opposite. It<br />

has been used against the<br />

public and for the personal gain of those who control. Therefore,<br />

LAW: When men are entrusted with the power to control<br />

the money supply, they will eventually use that power to<br />

confiscate the wealth of their neighbors.<br />

There is no better illustration of that law than the Crash of 1929<br />

and the lingering depression that followed.<br />

1. Curtis B. Dall, FDR: My Exploited Father-In-Laiv (Tulsa, Oklahoma: Christian<br />

Crusade Publications, 1967), p. 49.<br />

THE GREAT DUCK DINNER 501<br />

FROM CRASH TO DEPRESSION<br />

The lingering depression is an important part of the story. The<br />

speculators had been ruined, but what they lost was money<br />

acquired without effort. There were some unfortunate souls who<br />

also lost their life<br />

savings on call<br />

savings, but only because they gambled those<br />

loans. Those who bought stock with money they<br />

actually possessed did not have to sell,<br />

and they did quite well in<br />

the long run. For the most part, something-for-nothing had merely<br />

been converted back into nothing. The price of stocks had plummeted,<br />

but the companies behind them were still producing<br />

products, still employing people, and still paying dividends. No<br />

jDne lost his job just because the market fell. The tulips were gone,<br />

but the wheat crop remained.<br />

So, where was the problem? In truth, there was none—at least<br />

not yet. The crash, as devastating as it was to the speculators, had<br />

little effect on the average American. Unemployment didn't<br />

become rampant until the depression years which came later and<br />

were caused by continued government restraint of the free market.<br />

The drop of prices in the stock market was really a long-overdue<br />

knd healthy adjustment to the economy. The stage was now set for<br />

recovery and sound economic growth, as always had happened in<br />

the past.<br />

It did not happen this time. The monetary and political<br />

scientists who had created the problem now were in full charge of<br />

the rescue. They saw the crash as a golden opportunity to justify<br />

even more controls than before. Herbert Hoover launched a<br />

multitude of government programs to bolster wage rates, prevent<br />

prices from dropping, prop up failing firms, stimulate construction,<br />

guarantee home loans, protect the depositors, rescue the banks,<br />

subsidize the farmers, and provide public works. FDR was swept<br />

into office by promising even more of the same under the slogan of<br />

a New Deal, And the Federal Reserve launched a series of "banking<br />

reforms," all<br />

over the money supply.<br />

of which were measures to further extend its power<br />

In 1931, fresh money was pumped into the economy to restart<br />

the cycle, but this time the rocket would not lift off. The dead<br />

Weight of new bureaucracies and government regulations and<br />

subsidies and taxes and welfare benefits and deficit spending and<br />

tinkering with prices had kept it on the launching pad.


502 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

THE GREAT DUCK DINNER 503<br />

Eventually, the productive foundation of the country also<br />

began to crumble under the weight. Taxes and regulatory agencies<br />

forced companies out of business. Those that remained had to<br />

curtail production. Unemployment began to spread. By every<br />

economic measure, the economy was no better or worse in 1939<br />

than it was in 1930 when the rescue began. It wasn't until the<br />

outbreak of World War II, and the tooling up for war production<br />

that followed, that the depression was finally brought to an end.<br />

It was a dubious save. In almost every way, it was a repeat of<br />

the drama played out with World War I, even to the names of two<br />

of its most important players. FDR and Churchill worked together<br />

behind the scenes to bring America into the conflict—Churchill<br />

wanting American assistance in a war England was losing and<br />

could not afford, FDR wanting a jolt to the economy for political<br />

reasons, and the financiers, gathered behind J.P. Morgan, wanting<br />

the profits of war. But that is another chapter, and this book is long<br />

enough.<br />

What happened after World War II was the focus of the first six<br />

chapters. That brings us to the end of historical record. It's time,<br />

now, to reset the coordinates on our time machine and return to the<br />

present.<br />

SUMMARY<br />

Congress had been assured that the Federal Reserve Act would<br />

decentralize banking power away from Wall Street. However,<br />

within a few years of its inception, the System was controlled by<br />

the New York Reserve Bank under the leadership of Benjamin<br />

Strong whose name was synonymous with the Wall Street money<br />

trust.<br />

During the nine years before the crash of 1929,<br />

the Federal<br />

Reserve was responsible for a massive expansion of the money<br />

supply. A primary motive for that policy was to assist the government<br />

of Great Britain to pay for its socialist programs which, by<br />

then, had drained its treasury. By devaluing the dollar and<br />

depressing interest rates in America, investors would move their<br />

money to England where rates and values were higher. That<br />

strategy succeeded in helping Great Britain for a while, but it set in<br />

motion the forces that made the stock-market crash inevitable.<br />

The money supply expanded throughout this period, but the<br />

trend was interspersed with short spasms of contraction which<br />

were the result of attempts to halt the expansions. Each resolve to<br />

use restraint was broken by the higher political agenda of helping<br />

the governments of Europe. In the long view, the result of plentiful<br />

money and easy credit was a wave of speculation in the stock<br />

market and urban real estate that intensified with each passing<br />

month.<br />

There is circumstantial evidence that the Bank of England and<br />

the Federal Reserve had concluded, at a secret meeting in February<br />

of 1929, that a collapse in the market was inevitable and that the<br />

best action was to let nature take its course. Immediately after that<br />

meeting, the financiers sent advisory warnings to lists of preferred<br />

customers—wealthy industrialists, prominent politicians, and high<br />

officials<br />

in foreign governments—to get out of the stock market.<br />

Meanwhile, the American people were being assured that the<br />

economy was in sound condition.<br />

On August 9, the Federal Reserve applied the pin to the bubble.<br />

It increased the bank-loan rate and began to sell securities in the<br />

open market. Both actions have the effect of reducing the money<br />

supply. Rates on brokers' loans jumped to 20%. On October 29, the<br />

stock market collapsed. Thousands of investors were wiped out in<br />

a single day. The insiders who were forewarned had converted<br />

their stocks into cash while prices were still high. They now became<br />

the buyers. Some of the greatest fortunes in America were made in<br />

that fashion.


Section VI<br />

TIME TRAVEL<br />

INTO THE FUTURE<br />

In the previous sections of this book, we have<br />

travelled through time. We began our journey by<br />

stepping into the past. As we crisscrossed the<br />

centuries, we observed wars, treachery,<br />

profiteering, and political deception. That has<br />

brought us to the present. Now we are prepared<br />

to ride our time machine into the future. It will be<br />

a hair-raising trip, and much of what lies ahead<br />

will be unpleasant. But it has not yet come to pass.<br />

It is merely the projection of present forces. If we<br />

do not like what we see, we still<br />

have an<br />

opportunity to change those forces. The future<br />

will be what we choose to make it.


1<br />

Chapter Twenty-Four<br />

DOOMSDAY<br />

MECHANISMS<br />

The decline of American prosperity; the increase<br />

in the size ofgovernment; the decrease in personal<br />

freedom; the growth of taxes; evidence that this is<br />

according to plan by an elite riding group which<br />

hopes to merge the United States into world<br />

government on the basis of "equality'' with lessdeveloped<br />

nations; the environmentalist<br />

movement shown to be an outgrowth of that plan.<br />

That's enough history for one book. It will soon be time to reset<br />

the coordinates on our time machine and jump into the future.<br />

Before activating that switch, however, let's take one last look<br />

around us. The future is molded by the present. Where we are now<br />

will greatly affect where we are going to be.<br />

MIRED IN DEBT<br />

One of the most obvious characteristics of our present time is<br />

the extent to which Americans and their government have become<br />

mired in debt. Annual federal deficits have grown steadily since<br />

1950, and the rate of growth is now in a vertical climb. It had taken<br />

198 years for the federal government to borrow the first trillion<br />

dollars. Then, in just twelve years—mostly under the Reagan<br />

Administration—it borrowed another three trillion. By the end of<br />

1995, after three years of the Clinton Administration, the debt had<br />

grown to about $5 trillion.<br />

It is difficult to comprehend numbers of that size or to translate<br />

them into their effect upon each of us. $5 trillion represents about<br />

80% of all the goods sold and all the services rendered in America<br />

throughout the entire year. If you had a stack of $100 bills 40 inches<br />

high, you would be a millionaire. $5 trillion would rise 3,350 miles<br />

into space.


508 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

By 1993, net interest payments on that debt were running $214<br />

billion per year- That consumed about 14% of all federal revenue.<br />

It now represents the government's largest single expense; greater<br />

than defense; larger than the combined cost of the departments of<br />

Agriculture, Education, Energy, Housing and Urban Development,<br />

Interior, Justice, Labor, State, Transportation, and Veterans' Affairs.<br />

These charges are not paid by the government; they are paid by<br />

you. You provide the money through taxes and inflation. The cost<br />

currently is<br />

about $4,500 for each family of four. All families pay<br />

through inflation but not all pay taxes. The cost to each taxpaying<br />

family, therefore, is higher. On average, over $5,000 is extracted<br />

from your family each year, not to provide government services or<br />

even to pay off previous debt. Nothing is produced by it, not even<br />

roads or government buildings. No welfare or medical benefits<br />

come out of it. No salaries are paid by it. The nation's standard of<br />

living is not raised by it. It does nothing except pay interest.<br />

Furthermore, the interest is compounded, which means, even if<br />

the government were to completely stop its<br />

deficit spending, the<br />

total debt would continue to grow as a result of interest on that<br />

portion which already exists. In 1995, interest on the national debt<br />

was already consuming 57% of all the revenue collected by income<br />

taxes. At the present rate of expansion, it will consume 100% by the<br />

year 2010. That includes corporate taxes. Interest will consume<br />

100% of our personal income taxes much sooner.<br />

Amazing isn't it? Without interest on the national debt, we<br />

would save enough to reduce corporate taxes and eliminate<br />

personal income taxes altogether. Unfortunately, under present<br />

policies and programs, that is not going to happen, because<br />

Congress does not live within its income. Many expenses are paid,<br />

not from taxes, but from selling government bonds and going<br />

deeper into debt each year. So, even though we could save enough<br />

to eliminate personal income taxes, it would not be enough. The<br />

1. The gross interest was running $300 billion. Some of that money, however, is<br />

paid to federal agencies which hold some of the debt, so it is a case of the government<br />

paying itself. Furthermore, the Federal Reserve returns to the Treasury some<br />

of the interest it receives—the amount left over after the cost of operating the<br />

system.<br />

2, See Harry Figgie, Jr., Bankruptcy 1995: The Coming Collapse ofAmerica and How to<br />

Stop It (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1992), pp. 24, 68. Also "Historical<br />

Tables," Budget oftte United States; Fiscal Year 1996, pp. 22, 103.<br />

DOOMSDAY MECHANISMS 509<br />

government would still go into the red to keep up its present life<br />

style. However, if a reduction in the size and scope of the<br />

bureaucracy were accomplished at the same time, then personal<br />

and corporate income taxes could be entirely eliminated, and the<br />

government would have an annual surplus.<br />

THE DOOMSDAY MECHANISM<br />

Unfortunately, the locomotive is running in the opposite direction.<br />

The size of government is growing larger, not smaller. There<br />

are more people working for government than for all manufacturing<br />

companies in the private sector. There are more bank regulators<br />

than bankers, more farm-bureau workers than farmers, more<br />

welfare administrators than recipients. There are more citizens<br />

receiving government checks than there are paying income taxes.<br />

By 1996, welfare benefits in 29 states were higher than the<br />

average secretary's wage; and in 6 states, they were more than the<br />

entry-level wage for computer programmers. When it is possible<br />

for people to vote on issues involving the transfer of wealth to<br />

themselves from others, the ballot box becomes a weapon with<br />

which the majority plunders the minority. That is the point of no<br />

return, the point where the doomsday mechanism begins to<br />

accelerates until the system self-destructs. The plundered grow<br />

weary of carrying the load and eventually join the plunderers. The<br />

productive base of the economy diminishes further and further<br />

until only the state remains.<br />

The doomsday mechanism is also operating within government<br />

itself. By 1992, more than half of all federal outlays went for what<br />

are called entitlements. Those are expenses—such as Medicare,<br />

Social Security, and government retirement programs—which are<br />

based on promises of future payments. Many of them are contractual<br />

obligations, and millions of people depend on them.<br />

That does not mean they cannot be eliminated. For example,<br />

entitlements include $24 billion per year for food stamps. There is<br />

no contractual obligation to continue those, only political expediency.<br />

By now, most Americans have stood in grocery lines and<br />

J- The federal government derives substantial revenue from sources other than<br />

income taxes, such as excise taxes and import taxes. These, plus occasional assessments<br />

to the states, were the only taxes which the founding fathers intended for the<br />

federal government. The arrangement worked well for 135 years until the incometax<br />

was adopted in 1913.


510 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

watched the well-dressed customer in front of them use food<br />

stamps for ice cream, pretzels, candy, and wine and then drive<br />

away in a late-model car. The political function of the food stamp<br />

program is not to help the hungry but to buy votes.<br />

The programs that do involve contractual obligations—such as<br />

Social Security and Medicare—could be turned over to private<br />

firms which would not only operate them more efficiently but also<br />

would pay out higher benefits. Congress, however, does not dare<br />

to touch any of these entitlements for fear of losing votes.<br />

Normally, with contracts for future obligations of this kind, the<br />

issuer is required by law to accumulate money into a fund to make<br />

sure that there will be enough available when future payments<br />

become due. The federal government does not abide by those laws.<br />

The funds exist on paper only. The money that comes in for future<br />

obligations is immediately spent and replaced by a government<br />

IOU. So, as those future payments come due, all of the money must<br />

come from revenue being collected at that time.<br />

Herein lies the doomsday mechanism. These obligations will be<br />

paid out of future taxes or inflation. Entitlements currently represent<br />

52% of all federal outlays, and they are growing at the rate of<br />

12% each year. When this is added to the 14% that is now being<br />

spent for interest payments on the national debt, we come to the<br />

startling conclusion that two-thirds of all federal expenses are now<br />

entirely automatic, and that percentage is growing each month.<br />

Even if Congress were to stop all of the spending programs in<br />

the normal budget—dismantle the armed forces, close down all of<br />

its agencies and bureaus, stop all of its subsidies, and board up all<br />

of its buildings, including the White House—it would be able to<br />

reduce its present spending by only one-third. And even that small<br />

amount is shrinking by 10 to 12% per year. That is a best-case<br />

scenario. The real-case is that Congress is accelerating its discretionary<br />

spending, not canceling it. One does not have to be a<br />

statistical analyst to figure out where this trend is headed.<br />

The biggest doomsday mechanism of all, however, is the<br />

Federal Reserve System. It will be recalled that every cent of our<br />

money supply—including coins, currency, and checkbook<br />

money—came into being for the purpose of being loaned to<br />

someone. These dollars will disappear when those loans are paid<br />

back. They exist only so long as the debt behind them exists.<br />

Underneath the pyramid of money, supporting the entire structure,<br />

DOOMSDAY MECHANISMS 511<br />

are the so-called reserves which represent the Fed's monetization of<br />

debt. If we tried to pay off the national debt, those reserves would<br />

also start to disappear, and our money supply would be undermined.<br />

The Federal Reserve would have to scramble into the<br />

money markets of the world and replace U.S. securities with bonds<br />

from corporations and other countries. Technically, that can be<br />

done, but the transition could be devastating. Under the Federal<br />

Reserve System, therefore, Congress would be fearful to eliminate<br />

the national debt even if it wanted to.<br />

These are the doomsday mechanisms already in operation. If<br />

we do not understand how they function, we will not be prepared<br />

for our trip into the future. The scenes that will unfold there will<br />

appear too bizarre,<br />

the events too shocking. We would be convinced<br />

that something surely had gone wrong with our time<br />

machine.<br />

WHO OWNS THE NATIONAL DEBT?<br />

It has been said that we need not worry about interest on the<br />

national debt because "We owe it to ourselves." Let's take a look at<br />

who owes what to whom.<br />

It may come as a surprise to learn that the Federal Reserve<br />

holds but a small portion of the national debt, only about 8%.<br />

Foreign investors own approximately 27%, and agencies of<br />

federal government have 28% (the lOUs that replaced money taken<br />

from the funds such as the Social Security Fund). Private-sector<br />

investors in the U.S. hold the largest share of about 37%. It is partly<br />

true, therefore, that "We owe it to ourselves" or at least that all of us<br />

owe it to some of us. The some of us who receive the interest are<br />

private investors seeking income that is exempt from state income<br />

taxes, and large institutions such as banks, corporations, insurance<br />

companies, and investment funds. With institutions,<br />

the<br />

the money<br />

represents pooled assets belonging to thousands of small investors.<br />

So, a major portion of the interest on the national debt does, indeed,<br />

accrue to the benefit of a large sector of the American people.<br />

That's the good news. The bad news is that the government<br />

obtains every cent of the money it pays to us by confiscating it from<br />

us in the first place. If it is true that we owe it to ourselves, then it is<br />

also true that we pay it to ourselves. The money goes out of one<br />

pocket back into the other—minus a handling fee. The government


512 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

takes $1000 from us in taxes and inflation and gives us back $350.<br />

The so-called "benefit" to the public is but a giant scam.<br />

And more bad news: When people purchase government<br />

bonds, there is less money available for investment in private<br />

industry. It is well known that government credit "crowds out"<br />

private credit. The result is that the productive side of the nation is<br />

handicapped by unfair competition for investment capital. To<br />

obtain new money for growth, private companies must pay higher<br />

interest rates. These are passed on to the consumer in the form of<br />

higher prices. Many companies are forced to curtail their plans for<br />

expansion, and potentially new jobs are never created. Some<br />

companies are forced out of business altogether, and their employees<br />

are put out of work. The economy is always retarded by<br />

government debt. The larger the debt, the greater the damage.<br />

The 27% portion of the national debt held by foreign investors<br />

may not seem like a large percentage, but it represents a huge<br />

amount of money nevertheless. A trillion dollars cannot be ignored.<br />

These bonds could become a great problem down the line as they<br />

mature. So far, they have been a partial blessing because they were<br />

purchased with money that already existed. Therefore, they were<br />

not inflationary. But it is not difficult to imagine future conditions<br />

under which the bond holders would decide not to renew. In order<br />

to pay off those bonds on maturity, the Treasury would have to<br />

issue new ones. The Federal Reserve then would have to purchase<br />

the new bonds with fiat<br />

money. Therefore, foreign-held federal<br />

debt is a ticking time bomb. If it should ever have to be picked up<br />

by the Fed, the inflationary impact on our country would be<br />

staggering.<br />

WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES IT MAKE?<br />

There is a tendency to read about these trends with a kind of<br />

detached fascination; Isn't that interesting* But where is the relevance?<br />

Why get excited over such technicalities and abstractions?<br />

So what if the government is mired in debt? Who cares if the<br />

interest will never be paid? What of it if we have a world currency<br />

or a world government? What difference will any of it make to me?<br />

The first step toward answering those questions is to see what<br />

difference it<br />

already has made. Our upcoming trip into the future<br />

will merely extend those lines.<br />

J<br />

DOOMSDAY MECHANISMS 513<br />

As illustrated in previous sections of this book, there has been a<br />

long-term policy at the highest levels of government to shift<br />

economic resources away from the United States. That policy has<br />

been successful. Based on doomsday predictions of environmental<br />

disaster, government has saddled private companies with such<br />

burdensome expenses for eliminating waste products that heavy<br />

industry, once the mainstay of American prosperity, has fled our<br />

shores. Because of concern over the natural habitat of the spotted<br />

owl and the desert kangaroo rat, millions of acres of timber and<br />

agricultural land have been taken out of production. High taxes,<br />

rules beyond reason for safety devices in the work place, so-called<br />

fair-employment practices, and mandatory health insurance are<br />

rapidly destroying what is left of America's private industry. The<br />

result is unemployment and dislocation for millions of American<br />

workers.<br />

Federal taxes, including social-security, now take more than<br />

40% of our private incomes. State, county, and local taxes are on top<br />

of that. Inflation feeds on what is left. We spend half of each year<br />

working for the government.<br />

A study by the AFL-CIO in 1977 revealed that, in spite of wage<br />

increases in terms of dollars, the real wages of the average<br />

American—in terms of what he can buy with those dollars—were<br />

going down. That trend was confirmed in 1980 by the U.S. Census<br />

Bureau. In 1992, the Consumers' Union analyzed how many hours<br />

one had to work to buy common items compared to thirty years<br />

previously. Some low-priced items—such as long-distance phone<br />

calls, gasoline, food products, and wrist-watches—were cheaper in<br />

1992 in terms of hours worked to acquire them. But the higherpriced<br />

items—such as housing, college educations, and health<br />

care—were far more costly than ever. The report concludes:<br />

The average U.S. household has maintained its<br />

living standard<br />

largely because families are working more hours. Millions of women<br />

entered the work force in the past 25 years. In 1970, about 21 million<br />

women worked full time. Now that figure is over 36 million. That has<br />

helped to keep family buying power fairly stable. But for many<br />

families, it now represents the labor of two earners rather than one.<br />

The message here is that real wages in America have declined.<br />

Young couples with a single income now have a lower standard of<br />

r l- "Has Our Living Standard Stalled?" Consumer Reports, June, 1992, p. 392,


514 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

living than their parents did. In spite of two incomes, the real net<br />

worth of the average household is falling. The amount of leisure<br />

time is shrinking. The percentage of Americans who own their<br />

homes is dropping. Tne age at which a family acquires a first home<br />

is rising. The number of families counted among the middle class is<br />

falling. The size of the family savings is smaller. The number of<br />

people living below the officially defined poverty level is rising.<br />

The rate of personal bankruptcy is triple of what it was in the 1960s.<br />

Over 90% of all Americans are broke at age 65.<br />

THE NEW WORLD ORDER<br />

None of this is happening by accident. Chapters five and six<br />

documented the currently unfolding plan to create a functional<br />

world government within the framework of the United Nations,<br />

Often referred to as Tlie New World Order by its advocates, the<br />

proposed global government is designed upon the principles of<br />

socialism. It is the dream-come-true for the world's socialist<br />

theoreticians, politicians, and technicians who see it as the ultimate<br />

laboratory for their social experiments upon mankind.<br />

There are two weapons of control now being readied at the UN.<br />

One is a world military command which eventually will control all<br />

national armies and super weapons. That is being accomplished<br />

under the slogans of peace and disarmament. The other is a world<br />

central bank, now called the IMF /World Bank, with the ability to<br />

issue a common money which all nations must accept. That is being<br />

accomplished under the slogans of international trade and economic<br />

growth.<br />

Of the two weapons, monetary control is the most important.<br />

The use of military force is viewed as a crude weapon in the arsenal<br />

of world government to be used only as a last resort. The effect of<br />

monetary control is more powerful than mega-tons of atomic<br />

energy. It reaches into every shop and home, a feat that could never<br />

be accomplished by standing armies. It can be used with precision<br />

against one nation, one group, or even one person while sparing or<br />

benefiting all others. Military force may be irresistible but it causes<br />

resentment and political unrest that can smolder for decades. Since<br />

monetary manipulation is seldom understood by its victims, it does<br />

not incur their wrath. In fact,<br />

the manipulators enjoy high social<br />

status and financial reward. For these reasons, monetary control is<br />

the weapon of choice in The New World Order.<br />

DOOMSDAY MECHANISMS 515<br />

A future world parliament based upon the concept of minimum<br />

coercion and maximum freedom could be a wonderful advent for<br />

mankind. Without trying to cram all nations into a centrallydirected<br />

beehive, it would welcome cultural and religious variety.<br />

Instead of trying to place the world into a collectivist straight-jacket<br />

of rules, regulations, quotas, and subsidies, it would encourage<br />

diversity and freedom-to-choose.<br />

Instead of levying ever-larger<br />

taxes on every conceivable economic activity and destroying<br />

human incentive in the process, it would encourage member<br />

nations to reduce the taxes that already exist and thereby stimulate<br />

production and creativity.<br />

A world parliament, dedicated to the concept of freedom,<br />

would have to withhold membership from any government that<br />

violated the basic rights of its citizens. It could be the means by<br />

which totalitarian governments would be encouraged to abandon<br />

their oppressive policies in order to obtain the economic and<br />

political advantages of acceptance in the world body. It could<br />

become the greatest force for peace and prosperity and freedom we<br />

have ever known.<br />

But The New World Order that is now incubating at the United<br />

Nations is an entirely different creature. Its members represent just<br />

about every dictator and warlord in the world. Its philosophy is<br />

built upon the socialist doctrine that all good flows from the state.<br />

Those who do not conform must be bent to the government's will<br />

or be eliminated. It<br />

reason that it is totalitarianism.<br />

cannot oppose totalitarianism for the simple<br />

AMERICA IS THE TARGET<br />

The New World Order cannot become a functional reality so<br />

long as the United States remains able to go it alone. America is<br />

viewed as a potential bull in the china shop. Right now, it is safely<br />

under control, but the world planners are worried it might break<br />

loose in the future. If the American people were to awaken to the<br />

realities of world politics and regain control over their government,<br />

they still would have the military and economic power to break<br />

away. Among the world planners, therefore, it has become the<br />

prime directive to weaken the United States both militarily and<br />

economically. And this directive has come from American leaders,<br />

not those of other countries. CFR members sitting in the White<br />

House, the State Department, the Defense Department, and the


516 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

Treasury are now working to finalize that part of the plan. It ls yet<br />

one more doomsday mechanism that, once it gains sufficient<br />

momentum, will pass the critical point of no return.<br />

The Korean War was the first time American soldiers fought<br />

under UN authority. That trend has accelerated and already<br />

includes military actions in Iraq, Yugoslavia, Bosnia, Somalia, and<br />

Haiti. By the time this book gets to print, there undoubtedly will be<br />

more. While the American military is being absorbed into the UN,<br />

steps are also underway to hand over American atomic weapons.<br />

When that happens, the doomsday mechanism will become activated.<br />

It will be too late to escape.<br />

Likewise, the IMF/World Bank is already functioning—in<br />

conjunction with the Federal Reserve System—as a world central<br />

bank. The American economy is being deliberately exhausted<br />

through foreign giveaways and domestic boondoggles. The object<br />

is, not to help those in need or to preserve the environment, but to<br />

bring the system dawn. When once-proud and independent Americans<br />

are standing in soup lines, they will be ready to accept the<br />

carefully arranged "rescue" by the world bank. A world currency is<br />

already designed, awaiting only an appropriate crisis to justify its<br />

introduction. From that, too, there will be no escape.<br />

THE REPORT FROM IRON MOUNTAIN<br />

The substance of these stratagems can be traced to a think-tank<br />

study released in 1966 called the Report from Iron Mountain.<br />

Although the origin of the report is highly debated, the document<br />

itself hints that it was commissioned by the Department of Defense<br />

under Defense Secretary, Robert McNamara and was produced by<br />

the Hudson Institute located at the base of Iron Mountain in<br />

Croton-on-Hudson, New York. The Hudson Institute was founded<br />

and directed by Herman Kahn, formerly of the Rand Corporation.<br />

Both McNamara and Kahn were members of the CFR.<br />

The self-proclaimed purpose of the study was to explore<br />

various ways to "stabilize society." Praiseworthy as that may<br />

sound, a reading of the Report soon reveals that the word society is<br />

used synonymously with the word government. Furthermore, the<br />

word stabilize is used as meaning to preserve and to perpetuate, It is<br />

clear from the start that the nature of the study was to analyze the.<br />

different ways a government can perpetuate itself in power, ways<br />

to control its citizens and prevent them from rebelling.<br />

DOOMSDAY MECHANISMS 517<br />

It was stated at the beginning of the report that morality was<br />

not an issue. The study did not address questions of right or wrong;<br />

nor did it deal with such concepts as freedom or human rights.<br />

Ideology was not an issue, nor patriotism, nor religious precepts.<br />

Its sole concern was how to perpetuate the existing government.<br />

The report said:<br />

Previous studies have taken the desirability of peace, the<br />

importance of human life, the superiority of democratic institutions,<br />

the greatest "good" for the greatest number, the "dignity" of the<br />

individual, the desirability of maximum health and longevity, and<br />

other such wishful premises as axiomatic values necessary for the<br />

justification of a study of peace issues. We have not found them so. We<br />

have attempted to apply the standards of physical science to our<br />

thinking, the principal characteristic of which is not quantification, as<br />

is popularly believed, but that, in Whitehead's words, "... it ignores all<br />

judgments of value; for instance, all esthetic and moral judgments."<br />

The major conclusion of the report was that, in the past, war has<br />

been the only reliable means to achieve that goal. It contends that<br />

only during times of war or the threat of war are the masses<br />

compliant enough to carry the yoke of government without complaint.<br />

Fear of conquest and pillage by an enemy can make almost<br />

any burden seem acceptable by comparison. War can be used to<br />

arouse human passion and patriotic feelings of loyalty to the<br />

nation's leaders. No amount of sacrifice in the name of victory will<br />

be rejected. Resistance is viewed as treason. But, in times of peace,<br />

people become resentful of high taxes, shortages, and bureaucratic<br />

intervention. When they become disrespectful of their leaders, they<br />

become dangerous. No government has long survived without<br />

enemies and armed conflict. War, therefore, has been an indispensable<br />

condition for "stabilizing society." These are the report's exact<br />

words:<br />

The war system not only has been essential to the existence of<br />

nations as independent political entities, but has been equally<br />

indispensable to their stable political structure. Without it, no<br />

government has ever been able to obtain acquiescence in its<br />

"legitimacy," or right to rule its society. The possibility of war<br />

provides the sense of external necessity without which no government<br />

can long remain in power. The historical record reveals one instance<br />

1 Leonard Lew in, ed ., Reportfrom Iron Mountain on the Possibility and Desirability of<br />

Peace (New York: Dell Publishing, 1967), pp. 13-14.


.<br />

518 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

DOOMSDAY MECHANISMS 519<br />

after another where the failure of a regime to maintain the credibility<br />

of a war threat led to its dissolution, by the forces of private interest, of<br />

reactions to social injustice, or of other disintegrative elements. The<br />

organization of society for the possibility of war is its principal<br />

political stabilizer.... It has enabled societies to maintain necessary<br />

class distinctions, and it has insured the subordination of the citizens<br />

to the state by virtue of the residual war powers inherent in the<br />

concept of nationhood.<br />

A NEW DEFINITION OF PEACE<br />

The report then explains that we are approaching a point in<br />

history where the old formulas may no longer work. Why? Because<br />

it may now be possible to create a world government in which all<br />

nations will be disarmed and disciplined by a world army, a<br />

condition which will be called peace. The report says: "The word<br />

peace, as we have used it in the following pages,... implies total and<br />

general disarmament/ 7<br />

Under that scenario, independent nations<br />

will no longer exist and governments will not have the capability to<br />

wage war. There could be military action by the world army<br />

against renegade political subdivisions, but these would be called<br />

peace-keeping operations, and soldiers would be called peace<br />

keepers. No matter how much property is destroyed or how much<br />

blood is spilled, the bullets will be "peaceful" bullets and the<br />

bombs—even atomic bombs, if necessary—will be "peaceful"<br />

bombs.<br />

The report then raises the question of whether there can ever be<br />

a suitable substitute for war? What else could the regional governments<br />

use—and what could the world government itself use—to<br />

legitimize and perpetuate itself? To provide an answer to that<br />

question was the stated purpose of the study.<br />

The Report from Iron Mountain concludes that there can be no<br />

substitute for war unless it possesses three properties. It must (1) be<br />

economically wasteful, (2) represent a credible threat of great<br />

magnitude, and (3) provide a logical excuse for compulsory service<br />

to the government.<br />

A SOPHISTICATED FORM OF SLAVERY<br />

On the subject of compulsory service, the report explains that<br />

one of the advantages of standing armies is that they provide a<br />

1. Ibid., pp. 39, 81.<br />

2. Ibid., p. 9.<br />

place for the government to put antisocial and dissident elements<br />

of society. In the absence of war, these forced-labor battalions<br />

would be told they are fighting poverty or cleaning up the planet or<br />

bolstering the economy or serving the common good in some other<br />

fashion. Every teenager would be required to serve^especially<br />

during those years in which young people are most rebellious<br />

against authority. Older people, too, would be drafted as a means<br />

of working off tax payments and fines. Dissidents would face<br />

heavy fines for "hate crimes" and politically incorrect attitudes so<br />

eventually, they would all be in the forced-labor battalions. The<br />

report says:<br />

We will examine ...<br />

the time-honored use of military institutions<br />

to provide anti-social elements with an acceptable role in the social<br />

structure.. . The current<br />

. euphemistic cliches—"juvenile delinquency"<br />

and "alienation"—have had their counterparts in every age. In earlier<br />

days these conditions were dealt with directly by the military without<br />

the complications of due process,<br />

usually through press eanes or<br />

outright enslavement.<br />

.<br />

Most proposals that address themselves, explicitly or otherwise to<br />

the postwar problem of controlling the socially alienated turn to some<br />

variant of the Peace Corps or the soiled Job Corps for a solution.<br />

The socially disaffected, the economically unprepared, the<br />

psychologically uncomfortable, the hard-core "delinquents/' the<br />

incorrigible "subversives," and the rest of the unemployable are seen<br />

as somehow transformed by the disciplines of a service modeled on<br />

military precedent into more or less dedicated social service<br />

workers....<br />

Another possible surrogate for the control of potential enemies of<br />

society is<br />

the rein traduction, in some form consistent with modern<br />

technology and political processes, of slavery.. . . It is entirely possible<br />

that the development of a sophisticated form of slavery may be an<br />

absolute prerequisite for social control in a world at peace. As a<br />

practical matter, conversion of the code of military discipline to a<br />

euphemized form of enslavement would entail surprisingly little<br />

revision; the logical first step would be the adoption of some form of<br />

"universal" military service.<br />

BLOOD GAMES<br />

The report considered ways in which the public could be<br />

preoccupied with non-important activities so that it would not<br />

fcave time to participate in political debate or resistance. Recreation,<br />

l- M* v pp. 41^12, 68, 70.


j<br />

520 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

DOOMSDAY MECHANISMS 521<br />

trivial game shows, pornography, and situation comedies could<br />

play an important role, but blood games were considered to be the<br />

most promising of all the options. Blood games are competitive<br />

events between individuals or teams that are sufficiently violent in<br />

nature to enable the spectators to vicariously work off their<br />

frustrations. As a minimum, these events must evoke a passionate<br />

team loyalty on the part of the fans and must include the expectation<br />

of pain and injury on the part of the players. Even better for<br />

their purpose is<br />

the spilling of blood and the possibility of death.<br />

The common man has a morbid fascination for violence and blood.<br />

Crowds gather to chant "Jump! Jump!" at the suicidal figure on the<br />

hotel roof. Cars slow to a near stop on the highway to gawk at<br />

broken bodies next to a collision. A schoolyard fight instantly<br />

draws a circle of spectators. Boxing matches and football games<br />

and hockey games and automobile races are telecast daily, attracting<br />

millions of cheering fans who give rapt attention to each<br />

moment of danger, each angry blow to the face, each broken bone,<br />

each knockout, each carrying away of the unconscious or possibly<br />

dying contestant. In this fashion, their anger at "society" is defused<br />

and focused, instead, on the opposing team. The emperors of Rome<br />

devised the Circuses and gladiator contests and public executions<br />

by wild beasts for precisely that purpose.<br />

Before jumping to the conclusion that such concepts are absurd<br />

in modern times, recall that during the 1985 European soccer<br />

championship in Belgium, the spectators became so emotionally<br />

involved in the contest that a bloody riot broke out in the bleachers<br />

leaving behind 38 dead and more that 400 injured. U.S. Neius &<br />

World Report gives this account:<br />

The root of the trouble: A tribal loyalty to home teams that<br />

surpasses an obsession and, say some experts, has become a substitute<br />

religion for many. The worst offenders include members of gangs such<br />

as Chelsea's Anti-Personnel Firm, made up of ill-educated young<br />

males who find in soccer rivalry an escape from boredom.<br />

Still, the British do not have a patent on soccer violence. On May<br />

26, eight people were killed and more than 50 injured in Mexico City, -<br />

a 1964 stadium riot in Lima, Peru, killed more than 300—and a hotly<br />

disputed 1969 match between El Salvador and Honduras led to a<br />

week-long shooting war between the two countries, causing hundreds<br />

of casualties.<br />

The U.S. is criticized for the gridiron violence of its favorite sport<br />

football, but outbursts in the bleachers are rare because loyalties are<br />

spread among many sports and national pride is not at stake. Said<br />

Thomas Tutko, professor of psychology at California's San Jose State<br />

University: "In these other countries, it used to be their armies. Now<br />

it's their competitive teams that stir passions." 1<br />

Having considered all<br />

the ramifications of blood games, the<br />

Report from Iron Mountain concluded that they were not an adequate<br />

substitute for war. It is true that violent sports are useful<br />

distracters and do, in fact, allow an outlet for boredom and fierce<br />

group loyalty, but their effect on the nation's psyche could not<br />

match the intensity of war hysteria. Until a better alternative could<br />

be found, world government would have to be postponed so that<br />

nations could continue to wage war.<br />

FINDING A CREDIBLE GLOBAL THREAT<br />

In time of war, most citizens uncomplainingly accept their low<br />

quality of life and remain fiercely loyal to their leaders. If a suitable<br />

substitute for war is to be found, then it must also elicit that same<br />

reaction. Therefore, a new enemy must be found that threatens the<br />

entire world, and the prospects of being overcome by that enemy<br />

must be just as terrifying as war itself. The report is emphatic on<br />

that point:<br />

Allegiance requires a cause; a cause requires an enemy. This much<br />

is obvious; the critical point is that the enemy that defines the cause<br />

must seem genuinely formidable. Roughly speaking, the presumed<br />

power of the "enemy" sufficient to warrant an individual sense of<br />

allegiance to a society must be proportionate to the size and<br />

complexity of the society. Today, of course, that power must be one of<br />

unprecedented magnitude and Mghtfulness. 2<br />

The first consideration in finding a suitable threat to serve as a<br />

global enemy was that it did not have to be real. A real one would<br />

be better, of course, but an invented one would work just as well,<br />

provided the masses could be convinced it was real. The public will<br />

more readily believe some fictions than others. Credibility would<br />

be more important than truth.<br />

Poverty was examined as a potential global enemy but rejected<br />

as not fearful enough. Most of the world was already in poverty.<br />

Only those who had never experienced poverty would see it as a<br />

global threat. For the rest, it was simply a fact of everyday life.<br />

1- "British Soccer's Day of Shame/' U.S. News & World Report.june 10, 1985, p. 11.<br />

U. Lewin, Report, p. 44.


i<br />

only<br />

.<br />

522 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

An invasion by aliens from outer space was given serious<br />

consideration. The report said that experiments along those lines<br />

already may have been tried. Public reaction, however, was not<br />

sufficiently predictable, because the threat was not "credible." Here<br />

is what the report had to say:<br />

Credibility, in fact, lies at the heart of the problem of developing a<br />

political substitute for war. This is where the space-race proposals, in<br />

many ways so well suited as economic substitutes for war, fall short<br />

The most ambitious and unrealistic space project cannot of itself<br />

generate a believable external menace. It has been hotly argued that<br />

such a menace would offer the "last best hope of peace," etc., by<br />

uniting mankind against the danger of destruction by "creatures"<br />

from other planets or from outer space. Experiments have been<br />

proposed to test the credibility of an out-of-our-world invasion threat;<br />

it is possible that a few of the more difficult-to-explain "flying saucer"<br />

incidents of recent years were in fact early experiments of this kind. If<br />

so, they could hardly have been judged encouraging.<br />

This report was released<br />

in 1966 when the idea of an alien<br />

presence seemed far fetched to the average person. In the ensuing<br />

years, however, that perception has changed. A growing segment<br />

of the population now believes that intelligent life forms may exist<br />

beyond our planet and could be monitoring our own civilization.<br />

Whether that belief is right or wrong is not the issue here. The point<br />

is that a dramatic encounter with aliens shown on network<br />

television—even if it were to be entirely fabricated by high-tech<br />

computer graphics or laser shows in the sky—could be used to<br />

stampede all nations into world government supposedly to defend<br />

the Earth from invasion. On the other hand, if the aliens were<br />

perceived to have peaceful intent, an alternative scenario would be<br />

to form world government to represent a unified human species<br />

speaking with a single voice in some kind of galactic federation-<br />

Either scenario would be far more credible today than in 1966.<br />

THE ENVIRONMENTAL-POLLUTION MODEL<br />

The final candidate for a useful global threat was pollution of<br />

the environment. This was viewed as the most likely to succeed<br />

because it could be related to observable conditions such as smog<br />

and water pollution—in other words, it would be based partly on<br />

fact and, therefore, be credible. Predictions could be made showing<br />

DOOMSDAY MECHANISMS 523<br />

end-of-earth scenarios just as horrible as atomic warfare. Accuracy<br />

in these predictions would not be important. Their purpose would<br />

be to frighten, not to inform. It might even be necessary to<br />

deliberately poison the environment to make the predictions more<br />

convincing and to focus the public mind on fighting a new enemy,<br />

more fearful than any invader from another nation—or even from<br />

outer space. The masses would more willingly accept a falling<br />

standard of living, tax increases, and bureaucratic intervention in<br />

their lives as simply "the price we must pay to save Mother Earth."<br />

If a vision of death and destruction from pollution could be<br />

implanted into the public subconscious mind, then the global battle<br />

against it could, indeed, replace war as the mechanism for control.<br />

Did the Report from Iron Mountain really say that? It certainly<br />

did—and much more. Here are just a few of the pertinent passages:<br />

When it comes to postulating a credible substitute for war ... the<br />

"alternate enemy" must imply a more immediate, tangible, and<br />

directly felt threat of destruction. It must justify the need for taking<br />

and paying a "blood price" in wide areas of human concern. In this<br />

respect, the possible substitute enemies noted earlier would be<br />

insufficient. One exception might be the environmental-pollution<br />

model, if the danger to society it posed was genuinely imminent. The<br />

fictive models would have to carry the weight of extraordinary<br />

conviction, underscored with a not inconsiderable actual sacrifice of<br />

life.... It may be, for instance, that gross pollution of the environment<br />

can eventually replace the possibility of mass destruction by nuclear<br />

weapons as the principal apparent threat to the survival of the species.<br />

Poisoning of the air, and of the principal sources of food and water<br />

supply, is already well advanced, and at first glance would seem<br />

promising in this respect; it constitutes a threat that can be dealt with<br />

through social organization and political power. . .<br />

It is true that the rate of pollution could be increased selectively for<br />

this purpose.... But the pollution problem has been so widely<br />

publicized in recent years that it seems highly improbable that a<br />

program of deliberate environmental poisoning could be<br />

implemented in a politically acceptable manner.<br />

However unlikely some of the possible alternative enemies we<br />

have mentioned may seem, we must emphasize that one must be<br />

found of credible quality and magnitude, if a transition to peace is ever<br />

to come about without social disintegration. It is more probable, in our<br />

judgment, that such a threat will have to be invented.<br />

1. Ibid., p. 66.<br />

I. Ibid., pp. 66-67, 70-71.


i<br />

524 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

—<br />

DOOMSDAY MECHANISMS 525<br />

AUTHENTICITY OF THE REPORT<br />

Tlie Report from Iron Mountain states that it was produced by a<br />

Special Study Group of fifteen men whose identities were to remain<br />

secret and that it was not intended to be made public. One member<br />

of the group, however, felt the report was too important to be kept<br />

under wraps. He was not in disagreement with its conclusions. He<br />

merely believed that more people should read it. He delivered his<br />

personal copy to Leonard Lewin, a well-known author and columnist<br />

who, in turn, negotiated its publication by Dial Press. It was<br />

then reprinted by Dell Publishing.<br />

This was during the lohnson Administration, and the President's<br />

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs was CFR<br />

member Walt Rostow. Rostow was quick to announce that the<br />

report was a spurious work. Herman Kahn, CFR director of the<br />

Hudson Institute, said it was not authentic. The Washington Post—<br />

which is owned and run by CFR member Katharine Graham<br />

called it "a delightful satire." Time magazine, founded by<br />

CFR-member Henry Luce, said it was a skillful hoax. Then, on<br />

November 26, 1967, the report was reviewed in the book section of<br />

the Washington Post by Herschel McLandress, which was the pen<br />

name for Harvard professor John Kenneth Galbraith. Galbraith,<br />

who also had been a member of the CFR, said that he knew<br />

firsthand of the report's authenticity because he had been invited to<br />

participate in it.<br />

Although he was unable to be part of the official<br />

group, he was consulted from time to time and had been asked to<br />

keep the project a secret. Furthermore, while he doubted the<br />

wisdom of letting the public know about the report, he agreed<br />

totally with its conclusions. He wrote:<br />

As I would put my personal repute behind the authenticity of this<br />

document, so would I testify to the validity of its conclusions. My<br />

reservations relate only to the wisdom of releasing it to an obviously<br />

unconditioned public.<br />

Six weeks later, in an Associated Press dispatch from London,<br />

Galbraith went even further and jokingly admitted that he was "a<br />

member of the conspiracy ,,2<br />

1. "News of War and Peace You're Not Ready For/' by Herschel McLandress, Book<br />

World, in The Washington Post, November 26, 1967, p. 5.<br />

2. "The Times Diary/' London Times, February 5, 1 968, p<br />

.<br />

8.<br />

That, however, did not settle the issue. The following day,<br />

Galbraith backed off. When asked about his "conspiracy" statement,<br />

he replied: "For the first time since Charles II The Times has<br />

been guilty of a misquotation. . . . Nothing shakes my conviction that<br />

,it was written by either Dean Rusk or Mrs. Clare Booth Luce."<br />

The reporter who conducted the original interview was embarassed<br />

by the allegation and did further research. Six days later,<br />

this is what he reported:<br />

Misquoting seems to be a hazard to which Professor Galbraith is<br />

prone. The latest edition of the Cambridge newspaper Varsity quotes<br />

the following (tape recorded) interchange:<br />

Interviewer: "Are you aware of the identity of the author of Report<br />

from Iron Mountain?"<br />

Galbraith: "I was in general a member of the conspiracy but I was<br />

not the author. I have always assumed that it was the man who wrote<br />

the foreword—Mr. Lewin/'<br />

So, on at least three occasions, Galbraith publicly endorsed the<br />

authenticity of the report but denied that he wrote it. Then who<br />

did? Was it Leonard Lewin, after all? In 1967 he said he did not. In<br />

1972 he said that he did. Writing in the New York Times Book Review<br />

Lewin explained: "I wrote the 'Report/ all of it.... What I intended<br />

was simply to pose the issues of war and peace in a provocative<br />

way.<br />

But wait! A few years before that, columnist William F, Buckley<br />

told the New York Times that he was the author. That statement was<br />

undoubtedly made tongue-in-cheek, but who—and what are we to<br />

believe? Was it written by Herman Kahn, John Kenneth Galbraith,<br />

[Dean Rusk, Clare Booth Luce, Leonard Lewin, or William F.<br />

Buckley?<br />

In the final analysis, it make little difference. The important<br />

point is<br />

that The Report from Iron Mountain, whether written as a<br />

think-tank study or a political satire, explains the reality that<br />

surrounds us. Regardless of its origin, the concepts presented in it<br />

^are now being implemented in almost every detail. All one has to<br />

po is hold the Report in one hand and the daily newspaper in the<br />

bther to realize that every major trend in American life is conform-<br />

1. "Galbraith Says He Was Misquoted,"London Times, February 6, 1968, p. 3.<br />

K "Touche, Vrofessor/'London Times, February 12, 1968, p. 8.<br />

3. "Report from Iron Mountain/'Nea; York Times, March 19, 1968, p. 8.


.<br />

526 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

ing to the blueprint. So many things that otherwise are incomprehensible<br />

suddenly become clear: foreign aid, wasteful spending /<br />

the destruction of American industry, a job corps, gun control, a<br />

national police force, the apparent demise of Soviet power, a UN<br />

army, disarmament, a world bank, a world money, the surrender of<br />

national independence through treaties, and the ecology hysteria.<br />

The Report from Iron Mountain is an accurate summary of the plan<br />

that has already created our present. It is now shaping our future.<br />

ENVIRONMENTALISM A SUBSTITUTE FOR WAR<br />

It is beyond the scope of this study to prove that currently<br />

accepted predictions of environmental doom are based on exaggerated<br />

and fraudulent "scientific studies/' But such proof is easily<br />

found if one is willing to look at the raw data and the assumptions<br />

upon which the projections are based. More important, however, is<br />

the question of why end-of-world scenarios based on phony<br />

scientific studies—or no studies at all—are uncritically publicized<br />

by the CFR-controlled media; or why radical environmental groups<br />

advocating socialist doctrine and anti-business programs are lavishly<br />

funded by CFR-dominated foundations/ banks, and corporations,<br />

the very groups that would appear to have the most to lose.<br />

The Reportfrom Iron Mountain answers those questions.<br />

As the Report pointed out, truth is not important in these<br />

matters. It's what people can be made to believe that counts.<br />

"Credibility" is the key, not reality. There is just enough truth in the<br />

fact of environmental pollution to make predictions of planetary<br />

doom in the year two-thousand-something seem believable. All<br />

that is required is media cooperation and repetition. The plan has<br />

apparently worked. People of the industrialized nations have been<br />

subjected to a barrage of documentaries, dramas, feature films,<br />

ballads, poems, bumper stickers, posters, marches, speeches, seminars,<br />

conferences, and concerts. The result has been phenomenal.<br />

Politicians are now elected to office on platforms consisting of<br />

nothing more than an expressed concern for the environment and a<br />

promise to clamp down on those nasty industries. No one questions<br />

the damage done to the economy or the nation. It makes no<br />

difference when the very planet on which we live is sick and dying-<br />

Not one in a thousand will question that underlying premise. How<br />

could it be false? Look at all the movie celebrities and rock stars<br />

who have joined the movement.<br />

DOOMSDAY MECHANISMS 527<br />

While the followers of the environmental movement are preoccupied<br />

with visions of planetary doom, let us see what the leaders<br />

are thinking. The first Earth Day was proclaimed on April 22, 1970,<br />

at a "Summit" meeting in Rio de Janeiro, attended by environmentalists<br />

and politicians from all over the world. A publication widely<br />

circulated at that meeting was entitled the Environmental Handbook.<br />

The main theme of the book was summarized by a quotation from<br />

Princeton Professor Richard A. Falk, a member of the CFR. Falk<br />

wrote that there are four interconnected threats to the planet—wars<br />

of mass destruction, overpopulation, pollution, and the depletion<br />

of resources. Then he said: "The basis of all four problems is the<br />

inadequacy of the sovereign states to manage the affairs of mankind<br />

in the twentieth century." 1<br />

The Handbook continued the CFR<br />

line by asking these rhetorical questions: "Are nation-states actually<br />

feasible, now that they have power to destroy each other in a<br />

t<br />

single afternoon?... What price would most people be willing to<br />

pay for a more durable kind of human organization—more taxes,<br />

giving up national flags, perhaps the sacrifice of some of our<br />

hard-won liberties?"<br />

In 1989, the CFR-owned Washington Post published an article<br />

written by CFR member George Kennan in which he said: "We<br />

must prepare instead for . . . an age where the great enemy is not the<br />

Soviet Union, but the rapid deterioration of our planet as a<br />

supporting structure for civilized life." 3<br />

On March 27, 1990, in the CFR-controiled New York Times, CFR<br />

member Michael Oppenheimer wrote: "Global warming, ozone<br />

depletion, deforestation and overpopulation are the four horsemen<br />

of a looming 21st century apocalypse As the cold war recedes,<br />

the environment is becoming the No. 1 international security<br />

concern."<br />

1. Garrett de Bell, ed v The Environmental Handbook (New York: Ballantine/Friends<br />

of the Earth, 1970), p. 138.<br />

2. Ibid.,p.U5.<br />

3. "A Europe Now Free from A Confining Cold War Vision/' by George Kennan,<br />

Washington Post syndication, Sacramento Bee, November 14, 1989, p. B7.<br />

The New York Times has been one of the principal means by which CFR policies<br />

are inserted into the mainstream of public opinion. The paper was purchased in<br />

1896 by Alfred Ochs, with financial backing from CFR pioneer J.P. Morgan, Rothschild<br />

agent August Belmont, and Jacob Schiff, a partner in Kuhn, Loeb & Co. It is<br />

now owned by CFR member Arthur Sulzberger, who is also the publisher, and it is<br />

staffed by numerous CFR editors and columnists. See Perloff, p. 181


.<br />

528 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

CFR member, Lester Brown, heads up another think tank called<br />

the Worldwatch Institute. In the Institute's annual report, entitled<br />

State of the World 1991, Brown said that "the battle to save the planet<br />

will replace the battle over ideology as the organizing theme of the<br />

new world order."<br />

In the official publication of the 1992 Earth Summit, we find<br />

this: "The world community now faces together greater risks to our<br />

common security through our impacts on the environment than<br />

from traditional military conflicts with one another."<br />

How many times does it have to be explained? The environmental<br />

movement was created by the CFR. It is a substitute for war<br />

that they hope will become the emotional and psychological<br />

foundation for world government<br />

HUMANITY ITSELF IS THE TARGET<br />

The Club of Rome is a group of global planners who annually<br />

release end-of-world scenarios based on predictions of overpopulation<br />

and famine. Their membership is international, but the American<br />

roster includes such well-known CFR members as Jimmy<br />

Carter, Harlan Cleveland, Claiburne Pell, and Sol Linowitz. Their<br />

solution to overpopulation? A world government to control birth<br />

rates and, if necessary, apply euthanasia. That is a gentle word for<br />

the deliberate killing of the old, the weak, and of course the<br />

uncooperative. Following the same reasoning advanced at Iron<br />

Mountain, the Club of Rome has concluded that fear of environmental<br />

disaster could be used as a substitute enemy for the purpose<br />

of unifying the masses behind their program. In their 1991 book<br />

entitled The First Global Revolution, we find this:<br />

In searching for a new enemy to unite us, we came up with the<br />

idea that pollution, the threat of global warming, water shortages,<br />

famine and the like would fit the bill..,. All these dangers are caused<br />

by human intervention.. . . The real enemy, then, is humanity itself.<br />

Socialist theoreticians have always been fascinated by the<br />

question of controlling population growth. It excites their imagination<br />

because it is the ultimate bureaucratic plan. If the real enemy is<br />

1. Lester R. Brown, "The New World Order/' in Lester R. Brown et aL, State of the<br />

World 1991: A Worldwatch Institute Report on Progress Toward a Sustainable Society<br />

(New York: W.W. Norton, 1991), p. 3.<br />

2. Alexander King and Bertrand Schneider, The First Global Revolution, A Report by<br />

the Council of the Club of Rome (New York: Pantheon Books, 1991), p. 115.<br />

DOOMSDAY MECHANISMS 529<br />

humanity itself, as the Club of Rome says, then humanity itself<br />

must become the target. Fabian Socialist Bertrand Russell 1<br />

expressed it thus:<br />

I do not pretend that birth control is the only way in which<br />

population can be kept from increasing.... War, as I remarked a<br />

moment ago, has hitherto been disappointing in this respect, but<br />

perhaps bacteriological war may prove more effective. If a Black Death<br />

could be spread throughout the world once in every generation,<br />

survivors could procreate freely without making the world too full.. .<br />

A scientific world society cannot be stable unless there is world<br />

government... It will be necessary to find ways of preventing an<br />

increase in world population. If this is to be done otherwise than by<br />

wars, pestilences and famines, it will demand a powerful international<br />

authority. This authority should deal out the world's food to the<br />

various nations in proportion to their population at the time of the<br />

establishments of the authority. If any nation subsequently increased<br />

its population, it should not on that account receive any more food.<br />

The motive for not increasing population would therefore be very<br />

compelling.<br />

Very compelling, indeed. These quiet-spoken socialists are not<br />

kidding around. For example, one of the most visible "environmentalists"<br />

and advocate of population control is Jacques Cousteau.<br />

Interviewed by the United Nations UNESCO Courier in November<br />

fcOf 1991, Cousteau spelled it out. Speaking of death by cancer, he<br />

said:<br />

Should we eliminate suffering diseases? The idea is beautiful, but<br />

perhaps not a benefit for the long term. We should not allow our dread<br />

of diseases to endanger the future of our species. This is a terrible thing<br />

to say. In order to stabilize world population, we must eliminate<br />

350,000 people per day. It is a horrible thing to say, but it's just as bad<br />

not to say it.<br />

GORBACHEV BECOMES AN ECOLOGY WARRIOR<br />

We can now understand how Mikhail Gorbachev, formerly the<br />

leader of one of the most repressive governments the world has<br />

known, became head of a new organization called the International<br />

Creen Cross, which supposedly is dedicated to environmental<br />

1- See Martin, pp. 171, 325, 463-69.<br />

2. Bertrand Arthur William Russell, The Impact of Science on Society (New York:<br />

Simon and Schuster, 1953), pp. 103-104, 111.<br />

3. Interviewed by Bahgat Eluadi and Adel Rifaat, Courrier de l'Unescc, November<br />

1991, p. 13.


.<br />

.<br />

530 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

issues. Gorbachev has never denounced socialism, only the label of<br />

a particular brand of socialism called Communism. His real interest<br />

is not ecology but world government with himself assured a major<br />

position in the socialist power structure. In a public appearance in<br />

Fulton, Missouri, he praised the Club of Rome, of which he is a<br />

member, for its position on population control. Then he said:<br />

One of the worst of the new dangers is ecological.. . Today,<br />

global<br />

climatic shifts; the greenhouse effect; the "ozone hole"; acid rain;<br />

contamination of the atmosphere, soil and water by industrial and<br />

household waste; the destruction of the forests; etc. all threaten the<br />

stability of the planet.<br />

Gorbachev proclaimed that global government was the answer<br />

to these threats and that the use of government force was essential.<br />

He said: "I believe that the new world order will not be fully<br />

realized unless the United Nations and its Security Council create<br />

structures . . . authorized to impose sanctions and make use of other<br />

measures of compulsion."<br />

Here is an arch criminal who fought his way up through the<br />

ranks of the Soviet Communist Party, became the protege of Yuri<br />

Andropov, head of the dreaded KGB, was a member of the USSR's<br />

ruling Politburo throughout the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan,<br />

and who was selected by the Politburo in 1985 as the supreme<br />

leader of world Communism. All of this was during one of the<br />

Soviet's most dismal periods of human-rights violations and subversive<br />

activities against the free world. Furthermore, he ruled over<br />

a nation with one of the worst possible records of environmental<br />

destruction. At no time while he was in power did he ever say or do<br />

anything to show concern over planet Earth.<br />

All that is now forgotten. Gorbachev has been transformed by<br />

the CFR-dominated media into an ecology warrior. He is calling for<br />

world government and telling us that such a government will use<br />

environmental issues as justification for sanctions and other "measures<br />

of compulsion." We cannot say that we were not warned.<br />

DOOMSDAY MECHANISMS 531<br />

U.S. BRANDED AS ECOLOGICAL AGGRESSOR<br />

The use of compulsion is an important point in these plans.<br />

People in the industrialized nations are not expected to cooperate<br />

in their own demise. They will have to be forced. They will not like<br />

it when their food is taken for global distribution. They will not<br />

approve when they are taxed by a world authority to finance<br />

foreign political<br />

projects. They will not voluntarily give up their<br />

cars or resettle into smaller houses or communal barracks to satisfy<br />

the resource-allocation quotas of a UN agency. Club-of-Rome<br />

member Maurice Strong states the problem:<br />

In effect, the United States is committing environmental<br />

aggression against the rest of the world.... At the military level, the<br />

United States is the custodian. At the environmental level, the United<br />

States is clearly the greatest risk.... One of the worst problems in the<br />

United States is energy prices—they're too low.. .<br />

It is clear that current lifestyles and consumption patterns of the<br />

affluent middle class ... involving high meat intake, consumption of<br />

large amounts of frozen and 'convenience' foods, ownership of<br />

motor-vehicles, numerous electric household appliances, home and<br />

work-place air-conditioning . . . expansive suburban housing . . . are not<br />

sustainable<br />

Mr. Strong's remarks were enthusiastically received by world<br />

environmental leaders, but they prompted this angry editorial<br />

response in the Arizona Republic:<br />

Translated from eco-speak, this means two things: (1) a reduction<br />

in the standard of living in Western nations through massive<br />

•<br />

new<br />

taxes and regulations, and (2) a wholesale transfer of wealth from<br />

industrialized to under-developed countries. The dubious premise<br />

here is that if the U.S. economy could be reduced to, say, the size of<br />

Malaysia's, the world would be a better place.... Most Americans<br />

probably would balk at the idea of the U.N. banning automobiles in<br />

the U.S.<br />

Who is this Maurice Strong who sees the United States as the<br />

[Environmental aggressor against the world? Does he live in poverty?<br />

Does he come from a backward country that is resentful of<br />

American prosperity? Does he himself live in modest circum-<br />

1 Michail Gorbachev, "The River o£ Time and the Necessity of Action/' 46th John<br />

Findley Green Foundation Lecture, Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri, May 6,<br />

1992, transcript from Westminster College Department of Press Relations, p. 6.<br />

2. Ibid., p. 9.<br />

1 "Ecology Remedy Costly," (AP), Sacramento Bee, March 12, 1992, p. A8. Also<br />

Maurice Strong, Introduction to Jim MacNeil, Pieter Winsemius, and Taizo<br />

Yakushiji, Beyond Interdependence (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. ix.<br />

2. "Road to Ruin/' Arizona Republic, March 26, 1992.


532 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

DOOMSDAY MECHANISMS 533<br />

stances, avoiding consumption in order to preserve our natural<br />

resources? None of the above. He is one of the wealthiest men in<br />

the world. He lives and travels in great comfort. He is a lavish<br />

entertainer. In addition to having great personal wealth derived<br />

from the oil industry in Canada—which he helped nationalize—<br />

Maurice Strong was the Secretary-General of the 1992 Earth Summit<br />

in Rio; head of the 1972 UN Conference on Human<br />

Environment in Stockholm; the first Secretary-General of the UN<br />

Environment Program; president of the World Federation of<br />

United Nations; co-chairman of the World Economic Forum; member<br />

of the Club of Rome; trustee of the Aspen Institute; and a<br />

director of the World Future Society. That is probably more than<br />

you wanted to know about this man, but it is necessary in order to<br />

appreciate the importance of what follows.<br />

A PLOT FOR ECONOMIC CRISIS<br />

Maurice Strong believes—or says that he believes—the world's<br />

ecosystems can be preserved only if the affluent nations of the<br />

world can be disciplined into lowering their standard of living.<br />

Production and consumption must be curtailed. To bring that<br />

about, those nations must submit to rationing, taxation, and<br />

political domination by world government. They will probably not<br />

do that voluntarily, he says, so they will have to be forced. To<br />

accomplish that, it will be necessary to engineer a global monetary<br />

crisis which will destroy their economic systems. Then they will<br />

have no choice but to accept assistance and control from the UN.<br />

This strategy was revealed in the May, 1990, issue of West<br />

magazine, published in Canada. In an article entitled "The Wizard<br />

of Baca Grande," journalist Daniel Wood described his week-long<br />

experience at<br />

Strong's private ranch in southern Colorado. This<br />

ranch has been visited by such CFR notables as David Rockefeller,<br />

Secretary-of-State Henry Kissinger, founder of the World Bank<br />

Robert McNamara, and the presidents of such organizations as<br />

IBM, Pan Am, and Harvard.<br />

During Wood's stay at the ranch, the tycoon talked freely about<br />

environmentalism and politics. To express his own world view, he<br />

said he was planning to write a<br />

novel about a group of world<br />

leaders who decided to save the planet. As the plot unfolded, it<br />

became obvious that it was based on real people and real events.<br />

Wood continues the story:<br />

Each year, he explains as background to the telling of the novel's<br />

plot, the World Economic Forum convenes in Davos, Switzerland.<br />

Over a thousand CEOs, prime ministers, finance ministers, and<br />

leading academics gather in February to attend meetings and set<br />

economic agendas for the year ahead. With this as a setting, he then<br />

says: "What if a small group of these world leaders were to conclude<br />

that the principal risk to the earth comes from the actions of the rich<br />

countries? And if the world is to survive, those rich countries would<br />

have to sign an agreement reducing their impact on the environment.<br />

Will they do it?... The group's conclusion is 'no.' the rich countries<br />

won't do it. They won't change. So, in order to save the planet, the<br />

group decides: Isn't the only hope for the planet that the industrialized<br />

civilizations collapse? Isn't it our responsibility to bring that about?."<br />

"This group of world leaders," he continues, "form a secret society<br />

to bring about an economic collapse. It's February. They're all at<br />

Davos. These aren't terrorists. They're world leaders. They have<br />

positioned themselves in the world's commodity and stock markets.<br />

They've engineered, using their access to stock exchanges and<br />

computers and gold supplies, a panic. Then, they prevent the world's<br />

stock markets from closing. They jam the gears. They hire mercenaries<br />

who hold the rest of the world leaders at Davos as hostages. The<br />

markets cant close. The rich countries..." And Strong makes a slight<br />

motion with his fingers as if he were flicking a cigarette butt out the<br />

window.<br />

I sit there spellbound. This is not any storyteller talking, this is<br />

Maurice Strong. He knows these world leaders. He is, in fact,<br />

co-chairman of the Council of the World Economic Forum. He sits at<br />

the fulcrum of power. He is in a position to do it.<br />

'T probably shouldn't be saying things like this," he says.<br />

Maurice Strong's fanciful plot probably shouldn't be taken too<br />

seriously, at least in terms of a literal reading of future events. It is<br />

unlikely they will unfold in exactly that manner—although it is not<br />

impossible. For one thing, it would not be necessary to hold the<br />

leaders of the industrialized nations at gun point. They would be<br />

the ones engineering this plot. Leaders from Third-World countries<br />

do not have the means to cause a global crisis. That would have to<br />

come from the money centers in New York, London, or Tokyo.<br />

(Furthermore, the masterminds behind this thrust for global government<br />

have always resided in the industrialized nations. They have<br />

come from the ranks of the CFR in America and from other<br />

p. 35.<br />

"The Wizard of Baca Grande," by Daniel Wood, West magazine, May, 1990,


534 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

DOOMSDAY MECHANISMS 535<br />

branches of the International Roundtable in England, France,<br />

Belgium, Canada, Japan, and elsewhere. They are the ideological<br />

descendants of Cecil Rhodes and they are fulfilling his dream.<br />

It is not important whether or not Maurice Strong's plot for<br />

global economic collapse is to be taken literally. What is important<br />

is that men like him are thinking along those lines. As Wood<br />

pointed out, they are in a position to do it. Or something like it. If it<br />

is not this scenario, they will consider another one with similar<br />

consequences. If history has proven anything, it is that men with<br />

financial and political power are quite capable of heinous plots<br />

against their fellow men. They have launched wars, caused depressions,<br />

and created famines to suit their personal agendas. We have<br />

little reason to believe that the world leaders of today are more<br />

saintly than their predecessors.<br />

Furthermore, we must not be fooled by pretended concern for<br />

Mother Earth. The call-to-arms for saving the planet is a gigantic<br />

ruse. There is just enough truth to environmental pollution to make<br />

the show "credible/' as The Report from Iron Mountain phrased it,<br />

but the end-of-earth scenarios which drive the movement forward<br />

are bogus. The real objective in all of this is world government, the<br />

ultimate doomsday mechanism from which there can be no escape.<br />

Destruction of the economic strength of the industrialized nations<br />

is merely a necessary prerequisite for ensnaring them into the<br />

global web. The thrust of the current ecology movement is directed<br />

totally to that end.<br />

SUMMARY<br />

debt.<br />

The United States government is mired in a 5-trillion-dollar<br />

By 1993, net interest payments on that debt were running<br />

$214 billion per year. That consumes about 14% of all federal<br />

revenue and costs the average family over $5,000 each year.<br />

Nothing is purchased by it. It merely pays interest. It represents the<br />

government's largest single expense. Interest on the national debt is<br />

already consuming more than 57% of all the revenue collected from<br />

income taxes. At the present rate of expansion, it will consume<br />

100% in 1998.<br />

By 1992, there were more people working for government than<br />

for manufacturing companies in the private sector. There are more<br />

citizens receiving government checks than there are paying income<br />

taxes. When it is possible for people to vote on issues involving the<br />

transfer of wealth to themselves from others, the ballot box<br />

becomes a weapon whereby the majority plunders the minority.<br />

That is the point of no return. It is a doomsday mechanism.<br />

By 1992, more than half of all federal outlays went for what are<br />

called entitlements. Here is another doomsday mechanism. Entitlements<br />

are expenses—such as Social Security and Medicare—which<br />

are based on promises of future payments. Entitlements represent<br />

52% of federal outlays. When this is added to the 14% that is now<br />

being spent for interest payments on the national debt, we come to<br />

the startling conclusion that two-thirds of all federal expenses are<br />

now entirely automatic, and that percentage is growing each<br />

month.<br />

The biggest doomsday mechanism of all is the Federal Reserve<br />

System. Every cent of our money supply came into being for the<br />

purpose of being loaned to someone. Those dollars will disappear<br />

when the loans are paid back. If we tried to pay off the national<br />

debt, our money supply would be undermined. Under the Federal<br />

Reserve System, therefore, Congress would be fearful to eliminate<br />

the national debt even if it wanted to.<br />

Political environmentalism has caused millions of acres of<br />

timber and agricultural land to be taken out of production. Heavy<br />

industry has been chased from our shores by our own government.<br />

High taxes, rules beyond reason for safety devices in the work<br />

place, so-called fair-employment practices, and mandatory health<br />

insurance are rapidly destroying what is left of the private sector.<br />

The result is unemployment and dislocation for millions of American<br />

workers. Government moves in to fill the void it creates, and<br />

bureaucracy grows by the hour.<br />

Federal taxes now take more than 40% of our private incomes.<br />

State, county, and local taxes are on top of that. Inflation feeds on<br />

what is left. We spend half of each year working for the government.<br />

Real wages in America have declined. Young couples with a<br />

single income have a lower standard of living than their parents<br />

did. The net worth of the average household is falling. The amount<br />

of leisure time is shrinking. The percentage of Americans who own<br />

their homes is dropping. The age at which a family acquires a first<br />

home is rising. The number of families counted among the middle<br />

class is falling. The number of people living below the officially<br />

defined poverty level is rising. Over 90% of all Americans are broke<br />

at age 65.


536 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

None of this is accidental. It is the fulfillment of a plan by<br />

members of the CFR who comprise the hidden government of the<br />

United States. Their goal is the deliberate weakening of the<br />

industrialized nations as a prerequisite to bringing them into a<br />

world government built upon the principles of socialism, with<br />

themselves in control.<br />

The origin of many of the stratagems in this plan can be traced<br />

to a government-sponsored think-tank study released in 1966<br />

called the Report from Iron Mountain. The purpose of the study was<br />

to analyze methods by which a government can perpetuate itself in<br />

power—ways to control its citizens and prevent them from rebelling.<br />

The conclusion of the report was that, in the past, war has<br />

been the only reliable means to achieve that goal. Under world<br />

government, however, war technically would be impossible. So the<br />

main purpose of the study was to explore other methods for<br />

controlling populations and keeping them loyal to their leaders. It<br />

was concluded that a suitable substitute for war would require a<br />

new enemy which posed a frightful threat to survival. Neither the<br />

threat nor the enemy had to be real. They merely had to be<br />

believable.<br />

Several surrogates for war were considered, but the only one<br />

holding real promise was the environmental-pollution model. This<br />

was viewed as the most likely to succeed because (1) it could be<br />

related<br />

to observable conditions such as smog and water pollution—in<br />

other words, it would be based partly on fact and,<br />

therefore, believable—and (2) predictions could be made showing<br />

end-of-earth scenarios just as horrible as atomic warfare. Accuracy<br />

in these predictions would not be important. Their purpose would<br />

be to frighten, not to inform.<br />

While the followers of the current environmental movement are<br />

preoccupied with visions of planetary doom, the leaders have an<br />

entirely different agenda. It is world government.<br />

Chapter Twenty-Five<br />

A PESSIMISTIC<br />

SCENARIO<br />

Thefuture portrayed as a continuation of present<br />

trends including a hypothetical banking crisis,<br />

massive inflation, collapse of the economy, domestic<br />

violence, the issuance ofa new UN money, the<br />

arrival ofUN "Peacekeeping" forces, and thefinal<br />

merger into<br />

high-tech feudalism.<br />

The New World Order, a form of<br />

We are ready now for the final trip in our time machine. On the<br />

control panel in front of us are several selector switches. The one on<br />

Jthe left indicates Direction of Time. Set it to Future. The switch on the<br />

right indicates Primary Assumptions. Set it to the first notch which<br />

reads: Present trends unaltered. Leave the Secondary-Assumption<br />

switch where it is. The lever in the center is a throttle to determine<br />

speed of travel. Nudge it forward—and hang on tight!<br />

A BANKING CRISIS<br />

It is 4:05 in the morning. While New York City sleeps, the<br />

:omputers on the fourth floor at Citibank are aware that a<br />

full-blown crisis is underway. It started in London—five hours<br />

ahead of the East coast—and within minutes had spread like an<br />

electronic virus to Tokyo and Hong Kong. That was an hour ago.<br />

Alarms are now sounding on computer terminals in all the trading<br />

centers of the world, and automatic dialing devices are summoning<br />

money managers to their board rooms.<br />

The panic started from rumors that one of the large U.S. banks<br />

was in trouble because of the simultaneous default of its loan to<br />

Mexico and the bankruptcy of its second-largest corporate borrower.<br />

Yesterday afternoon, the bank's president held a press<br />

conference and denied that these were serious problems. To<br />

reinforce his optimism, he announced that, on Friday, the bank will<br />

be paying a higher-than-usual quarterly dividend. The professional


538 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

money managers were not convinced. They knew that writing off<br />

these loans would wipe out the bank's entire net worth.<br />

All American banks are now so intertwined in their operations<br />

that trouble for one affects them all. By 5 A.M., the money-center<br />

banks are facing heavy withdrawals from overseas depositors. By<br />

the time the sun peeks between the New York skyscrapers,<br />

Americans are also taking their money. These are not small<br />

transactions. They involve other banks, insurance companies, and<br />

investment funds. The average withdrawal is over $3 million. The<br />

reservoir is draining fast.<br />

It is now 7:45. The banks will soon be opening their doors, and<br />

already newspaper reporters and TV crews are arriving outside. A<br />

plan of unified action must be made quickly.<br />

The Chairman of the Federal Reserve has arranged an emergency<br />

conference call with the CEOs of all the major banks,<br />

including one who was located at great effort at his fishing lodge in<br />

northern Canada. The President is also tied into the telephone<br />

network but on a "silent-monitor" basis. Other than the Chairman,<br />

no one else knows he is listening.<br />

TO SAVE THE BANKS IS TO SAVE THE WORLD<br />

The CEO at Citibank quickly summarizes the problem. None of<br />

the banks will be able to sustain withdrawals of this magnitude for<br />

more than about forty-eight hours. Perhaps less. The money is not<br />

in their vaults. It has been put into interest-bearing loans. Even if<br />

the loans were performing, they would not have the money. Now<br />

that some of the larger loans are in default, the problem is even<br />

worse. If the Fed doesn't provide the money, the banks will have no<br />

choice but to close their doors and go out of business. That would<br />

cause a collapse of the economy and untold suffering Would follow.<br />

Americans would be thrown out of work; families would go<br />

hungry; national security would be weakened. And it would<br />

undoubtedly spread to the entire world. Who knows what dire<br />

consequences would follow—chaos, famine, and riots here at<br />

home? Revolution abroad? The return of a militaristic regime in<br />

Russia? Atomic war?<br />

The Chairman cuts the monologue short. He is well aware that<br />

the banks must not be allowed to fail. That, after all, was one of the<br />

reasons the Federal Reserve was created. He wants to get on with<br />

the details of how to do it.<br />

A PESSIMISTIC SCENARIO 539<br />

Yes, the FDIC is already broke, but don't worry about that.<br />

Congress will authorize a "loan" or some other mechanism for the<br />

Fed to create whatever amount of new money the FDIC might<br />

need. If Congress moves too slowly, the Fed has other technical<br />

means to accomplish the same result. In the meantime, unlimited<br />

funding will be available at the Fed's discount window by 8 A.M.,<br />

Eastern Standard time. The printing presses are already running at<br />

full capacity to provide the currency. Heets of airplanes and<br />

armored cars are standing by to deliver it. Furthermore, don't give<br />

up on those defaulted loans. Congress will probably bailout the<br />

bankrupt American corporation. And the President has said he will<br />

ask for additional funding for the IMF/World Bank. That money<br />

will be created by the Fed and carry the stipulation that it must be<br />

used by Mexico and other defaulting countries to resume interest<br />

payments on their loans.<br />

The bankers are told to open their doors to the public and act<br />

calm. The press already knows that something is going on but not<br />

the seriousness of it. So tell them only what they already know.<br />

Nothing more. If people want to withdraw their money, give it to<br />

them. If lines should develop, call the police to maintain order, but<br />

continue paying out Offer to stay open after closing hours, if<br />

necessary, to accommodate everyone. Above all,<br />

have the tellers<br />

take their time. Check and double check each transaction, Move the<br />

lines slowly.<br />

The armored trucks will arrive at the busiest hours so the<br />

guards can carry sacks of money past the customers for visual<br />

confirmation that there is enough for everyone. A bank officer then<br />

should tell the crowd that a fresh delivery of money has just been<br />

made from the Federal Reserve System and that there is plenty<br />

more where that came from- Once people become convinced that<br />

the bank is able to pay, most of them will tire of the wait and go<br />

home.<br />

PANIC AVERTED<br />

It is now 6 P.M. of the following day. The plan was successful.<br />

Lines of anxious depositors had formed yesterday morning, mostly<br />

in the larger cities, and resumed again this morning. But there has<br />

been enough money for everyone. The news media treated<br />

story lightly, making sure to include sound bites from various<br />

experts that banks can no longer fail, thanks to the FDIC and the<br />

the


540 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

Federal Reserve System. More than half the video time is devoted<br />

to armored trucks and guards carrying sacks of money. The banks<br />

closed on schedule today, and there were no more lines.<br />

While everything appears calm to the passengers on deck, the<br />

fire still rages out of control in the boiler room. Over a billion<br />

dollars has already fled, mostly overseas, and the hemorrhage<br />

continues. The Fed is pumping in fresh money to replace it. Two of<br />

the banks have instructed their computer technicians to activate an<br />

incoming transactions. There is<br />

automatic two-hour delay on all<br />

talk of deliberately disabling the entire network and blaming the<br />

breakdown on overload, but the idea is abandoned. There are too<br />

many people in the system. Someone surely would leak the truth to<br />

the press.<br />

The danger of a run on the banks by private depositors used to<br />

be the nightmare of the Federal Reserve. Now it is nothing<br />

compared to the electronic run that is taking place involving<br />

institutional depositors around the world. These are professionals<br />

who are not impressed by armed guards carrying bags of currency.<br />

They want their money now—and they are getting it. Although<br />

they are receiving it in the form of electronic credits, they are<br />

immediately exchanging that for something more dependable, such<br />

as stocks, other currencies, and bullion.<br />

This is<br />

the Fed's finest hour. It is exercising its many powers,<br />

carefully accumulated over the years, to create money out of<br />

whatever is at hand: U.S. Treasury bonds, bonds from other<br />

governments, corporate debt obligations, even direct loans to<br />

individuals and partnerships. Billions of new dollars are springing<br />

into existence. They are spreading around the globe to fulfill<br />

banks' obligation to give people back their money.<br />

A REAL RUN ON THE BANKS<br />

It is now seven weeks later. Something happened, but no one<br />

knows what. Like a spark igniting a twig, spreading to a branch,<br />

and then engulfing the entire forest, the public has panicked.<br />

Responding to a primitive herd instinct, they are descending on the<br />

banks and the thrifts. They want their money. They want their<br />

savings.<br />

Perhaps it was the newly released statistics showing higher<br />

unemployment, or the continued rise in bankruptcies, or the<br />

Congressional vote to increase the national debt again, or the jump<br />

the<br />

A PESSIMISTIC SCENARIO 541<br />

in Social-Security taxes, or the loss of another 140,000 jobs to<br />

Mexico, or the riots in Chicago and Detroit for more food stamps<br />

and government housing, or the presence of<br />

•<br />

UN "Peacekeeping"<br />

troops to augment the National Guard, or the rumor that the Bank<br />

I of America was technically insolvent, or the UN World Court<br />

ruling that the number of American automobiles had to be cut by<br />

30% by December 31st, or the skeptical tone in the voice of the CBS<br />

news anchor as he quoted the latest prediction of renewed prosperity.<br />

Whatever it was, there are now long lines of sober-faced<br />

depositors outside every bank. There is not enough cash in the<br />

vaults to meet the demand. Most money is checkbook money,<br />

which means it consists merely of magnetic impulses in a computer.<br />

Only about five per cent of the monetary supply is in the<br />

form of coins or currency. Most of that is already outside the banks<br />

in cash registers, wallets, and mattresses. The amount inside the<br />

banks is only about one-half of one per cent. The Fed's emergency<br />

supply of currency—a large quantity warehoused for exactly this<br />

kind of crisis—is inadequate. This time, the printing presses cannot<br />

keep up.<br />

Spokesmen from the Treasury and the Federal Reserve appear<br />

on TV and assure the nation that there is no need for panic.<br />

Everything is under control. The only problem is the irrational<br />

behavior of alarmists who have no faith in their country.<br />

No one believes them. The lines grow longer, and the people<br />

become angry. Bank employees are jeered on their way to work.<br />

Bomb threats are made. Sporadic violence breaks out, and bank<br />

windows are smashed. The /nternational Guard is called up. The<br />

President declares a bank holiday.<br />

Since people cannot close out their bank accounts by withdrawing<br />

currency, they rush through the stores on checkbook-spending<br />

sprees. If they cannot get their money back, at least they can buy<br />

things with it. Garages and basements are filling up with canned<br />

goods, shoes, liquor, tires, ammunition. Goods are becoming<br />

scarce, pushing prices upward. The Dow Jones is going through the<br />

roof as investors empty their checking accounts to buy anything for<br />

sale. The Securities and Exchange Commission finally suspends<br />

trading.<br />

Nine months have now passed. The crisis has been a blessing


—<br />

542 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

because of it. It has given them an excuse to swarm through the<br />

country on fact-finding trips, to appear in shirt sleeves at town-hall<br />

meetings, to give speeches, and to be seen on television—all<br />

time expressing grave concern and appearing to take charge. It has<br />

legitimized their role and somehow made them seem more necessary<br />

than before. They have been converted in the public eye from<br />

oafs and bumpkins to serious-minded statesmen.<br />

The party in power said it inherited the mess. The previous<br />

party blamed the current one for dropping the ball. Both parties,<br />

however, agreed on the solution: more of exactly the same policies<br />

that created the crisis: expanded power to the Federal Reserve,<br />

more government control over the economy, more subsidies and<br />

benefits, and more international commitments. These were called<br />

"emergency reforms" and became law. The same men who created<br />

the problem prescribed the solution. The public was grateful to<br />

have leaders of such vision and wisdom.<br />

BANK BAILOUT AND MORE INFLATION<br />

The most important emergency reform was to bail out the<br />

banks with taxpayers' dollars. Defaulted foreign loans were taken<br />

over by the IMF/World Bank, and the failing corporate borrowers<br />

were given government grants disguised as loans—loans which<br />

everyone knew would never be paid back.<br />

Next, the banks were nationalized, at least in part. In return for<br />

the bailout money, they gave large blocks of stock to the government<br />

which now operates as an official business partner. This was<br />

not a drastic change. The banks were already heavily regulated by<br />

government, even to the point of determining their profits, dividends,<br />

and executive salaries. That is the way the cartel wanted it.<br />

It was the means by which competition was avoided and profits<br />

assured. Monetary scientists and political scientists have always<br />

worked as a hidden partnership. This merely made the relationship<br />

more visible.<br />

Technically, no bank was allowed to fail. The Fed kept its<br />

promise on that. When the troubled banks were taken over, all<br />

depositors with $100,000 or less were fully protected. If they<br />

wanted their money and the bank didn't have it, the Fed simply<br />

manufactured it.<br />

the<br />

No one was worried about the value of those<br />

dollars. They were just happy to have them.<br />

A PESSIMISTIC SCENARIO 543<br />

Ten more months have now passed. Those new dollars are<br />

flooding throughout the system. The money supply has increased<br />

by the amount of the bailout plus the amount of new spending for<br />

welfare, health care, interest on the national debt, and foreign aid,<br />

all of which are in a vertical climb. Inflation has become institutionalized.<br />

The dollar has been dethroned as the world's defacto currency.<br />

Foreign investors and central banks no longer have any use for<br />

dollars. They have sent them back to the United States from<br />

whence they came. Over a trillion of them have returned to our<br />

shores like a huge flock of homing pigeons that fills the sky from<br />

horizon to horizon. They are buying our refrigerators, automobiles,<br />

computers, airplanes, cargo ships, armored tanks, office buildings,<br />

factories, real estate — pushing prices to levels that would have<br />

seemed impossible a year ago. A single postage stamp costs as<br />

many dollars as once would have purchased a new TV set.<br />

Most stores have stopped accepting checks and credit cards.<br />

Workers are paid daily with bundles of paper money. People rush<br />

to the stores to purchase groceries before prices rise even further.<br />

Commerce is paralyzed. Bank loans and mortgages are unobtainable.<br />

Savings accounts have been destroyed, including the cash<br />

values of insurance policies. Factories are shutting down. Businesses<br />

are closing their doors. Barter is commonplace. Old silver<br />

coins come out of private hoards and a hundred-dollar bill is<br />

exchanged for one silver dime.<br />

Following the crash of 1929, the supply of paper money was<br />

limited because it was backed by silver, and the amount of silver<br />

itself was limited. Those who had money were able to buy up the<br />

assets of those who did not. Since prices were falling,<br />

the longer<br />

they held on to their dollars, the more they could buy. Now, things<br />

are exactly the opposite. There is nothing to back the money supply<br />

except politics. There is no limit to the amount of currency that can<br />

be created. It is just a question of printing and delivering it. Money<br />

is abundant, and prices are rising. Those who have money are<br />

spending it as soon as possible to prevent further loss of purchasing<br />

power. In the 1930s, everyone wanted dollars. Now, everyone<br />

wants to get rid of them.<br />

The Emergency Banking Regulation No. 1, originally issued in<br />

1961, empowered the Secretary of the Treasury<br />

without consent of<br />

Congress—to seize anyone's bank account, savings account, or


544 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

safe-deposit box. It also gave him the power to fix rents, prices,<br />

salaries, and hourly wages, and to impose rationing. This was to be<br />

done "in the event of attack on the United States/' That phrase now<br />

has been changed to read: "in the event of national emergency."<br />

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has been<br />

expanded to administer the directives of the Treasury. FEMA also<br />

has the power to detain and forcibly relocate any citizen "in the<br />

event of a national emergency."<br />

NEW MONEY<br />

Three more months have passed, and the President has declared<br />

a state of national emergency. Today, the Secretary of the<br />

Treasury announced that the nations of the world had ratified a<br />

multilateral treaty that would solve the inflationary problems of the<br />

United States. This will be accomplished through the issuance of a<br />

new world-wide monetary unit called the Bancor, the name<br />

proposed by John Maynard Keynes at the Bretton Woods Conference<br />

in 1944. This new money will restore our commerce and put a<br />

stop to inflation. At last said the Treasury Secretary, man will have<br />

total control over his economic destiny. Money will now become<br />

his servant instead of his master.<br />

The United States, he said, has agreed to accept the Bancor as<br />

legal tender for all debts, public and private. The old money will<br />

still be honored but will be phased out over a three-month period.<br />

After that date, Federal Reserve Notes will no longer be valid.<br />

During the transition period, the old money may be exchanged at<br />

any bank at the ratio of one Bancor for five-hundred dollars. All<br />

existing contracts expressed in dollars—including home mortgages—are<br />

now converted to Bancors in that same ratio.<br />

In the same announcement, the Secretary advised that the<br />

IMF/World Bank was backing this new money with something far<br />

more precious than gold. Instead, it will be backed by the assets of<br />

the world. These include bonds from the participating governments<br />

plus millions of acres of wilderness lands that have been<br />

deposited into the UN "Environmental Bank/' 1<br />

The National Parks<br />

1. "Debt-for-nature" swaps were proposed at the 4th World Wilderness Conference<br />

held in Denver, Colorado, in 1987 and they are being implemented right now.<br />

Costa Rica, Bolivia, and Ecuador have already agreed to swap their debt in exchange<br />

for a commitment to prevent wilderness areas from being developed. UN<br />

control over those lands is inevitable.<br />

A PESSIMISTIC SCENARIO 545<br />

and forests of the United States have been added to those reserves,<br />

and they will now be under the supervision of the UN Wilderness<br />

Asset Preservation and Enhancement Agency (WAPEA). From this<br />

date forward, the Federal Reserve System will operate as a subdivision<br />

of the IMF which is now the central bank of the world.<br />

Although the Secretary did not mention it in his public appearance,<br />

the UN treaty also obligated the government to put restrictions<br />

on the use of cash. Every citizen is to be issued an<br />

international ID card. The primary purpose of these machinereadable<br />

cards is to provide positive identification for all citizens at<br />

transportation depots and military checkpoints. They also can be<br />

used by the banks and stores to access checking accounts, which are<br />

now called debit accounts.<br />

Every citizen is being issued an account in a bank near his place<br />

of residence. All payments by employers or government agencies<br />

will be made by electronic transfer. Cash transactions larger than<br />

five Bancors will be illegal in three months. Most expenditures will<br />

be paid by debit card. That is the only way in which the UN<br />

Monetary Transaction Tracking Agency (MTTA) can combat counterfeiting<br />

and prevent money laundering by organized crime. That,<br />

of course, is camouflage. The government complex issuing the new<br />

money is the greatest perpetrator of counterfeiting and organized<br />

crime the world has ever seen. The real targets are political<br />

dissidents and those escaping taxes in the underground economy.<br />

No one will be allowed to earn or buy or sell without this ID<br />

card, nor will<br />

they be allowed to leave the country or even to<br />

migrate to another city. If any government agency has reason to<br />

red -flag an individual, his card will not clear, and he will be<br />

blocked from virtually all economic transactions and geographical<br />

movements. It is the ultimate control.<br />

The new money offers the Cabal yet one more benefit. There<br />

can never be another run on the banks, because it<br />

demand currency.<br />

is now illegal to<br />

1. That is not hyperbole. All fiat money is counterfeit. Furthermore, there is<br />

evidence that the CIA and the DEA have been deeply involved in the smuggling of<br />

illicit drugs. The money derived from those drugs was apparently laundered<br />

through Panamanian branches of U.S. banks and used to finance covert operations<br />

in Nicaragua and elsewhere. Virtually all governments have been involved in<br />

activities that would be criminal offenses if committed by ordinary citizens.


546 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

THE RISE OF REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS<br />

Hyperinflation is fertile ground for the seeds of revolution.<br />

Economic despair led the masses to grasp at the promises of Lenin<br />

in Russia, Hitler in Germany, Mussolini in Italy, and Mao in China.<br />

It has now been three years since that fateful run on the banks in<br />

New York, and inflation has not abated, even with the introduction<br />

of the Bancor. Now we are witnessing massive public demonstrations<br />

in every major city for higher wages, more jobs, larger<br />

government benefits, and more stringent price controls. Since there<br />

are practically no goods in the stores at any price, the demonstrators<br />

are also calling for higher output from government factories.<br />

The demonstrations have been organized by radical organizations<br />

advocating the overthrow of the "decadent capitalist" system and<br />

the enthronement of socialism in its place. The participants in the<br />

street do not understand the words they chant. They are unaware<br />

that capitalism has been dead in America for many years and that it<br />

is socialism they already have.<br />

Nevertheless, there are tens of thousands of desperate people<br />

who are attracted to the rhetoric of revolution. Terrorism and<br />

revolutionary insurgency have become common occurrences in the<br />

major urban areas. The ranks of the revolutionaries are swelled by<br />

those who come solely for the looting that always follows.<br />

People are frightened by these violent events and demand the<br />

restoration of law and order. They are relieved when martial law is<br />

declared. They are happy to see the International Guard patrolling<br />

their neighborhoods. They are not resentful of being confined in<br />

their homes or arbitrarily detained by soldiers. They are actually<br />

grateful for the omni-presence of the police state.<br />

It is curious that the revolutionary groups behind this violence<br />

have not been inhibited by the government. To the contrary, they<br />

have been given grants from CFR organizations, and their leaders<br />

have been treated courteously by CFR politicians. The CFR media<br />

have given them extended coverage in the news and has presented<br />

their cause with sympathy. A few dissidents have begun to wonder<br />

if the revolutionaries are but the unknowing pawns of those in<br />

power and that their primary function is to frighten the population<br />

into accepting the constraints of a police state.<br />

Such voices, however, are quickly silenced. Those who question<br />

the government or the media are branded as extremists at the<br />

A PESSIMISTIC SCENARIO 547<br />

lunatic fringe. Authorities say that they are the cause of our present<br />

woes. They are remnants of the old system based on profit-seeking<br />

and race-hating. They are guilty of politically-incorrect attitudes<br />

and hate crimes. They are sentenced to attitude-correction centers<br />

for psychological treatment and rehabilitation. Those who do not<br />

immediately recant are never seen again.<br />

HOMES ARE NATIONALIZED<br />

One of the first industries to feel the raw power of "emergency<br />

measures" was the home industry. During the early stages of<br />

inflation, people were applying their increasingly worthless dollars<br />

to pay down their mortgages. That was devastating to the lenders.<br />

They were being paid back in dollars that were worth only a<br />

fraction of the ones they had loaned out. The banking crisis had<br />

caused the disappearance of savings and investment capital,<br />

they were unable to issue new loans to replace the old. Besides,<br />

people were afraid to sell their homes under such chaotic times<br />

and, if<br />

they did, very few were willing to buy with interest rates<br />

piat high. Old loans were being paid off, and new loans were not<br />

^replacing them. The S&Ls, which in the 1980s had been in trouble<br />

because home prices were falling, now were going broke because<br />

prices were rising.<br />

Congress applied the expected political fix by bailing them out<br />

and taking them over. But that did not stop the losses. It merely<br />

transferred them to the taxpayers. To put an end to the losses,<br />

Congress passed the Housing Fairness and Reform Act (HFRA). It<br />

converted all Bancor-denominated contracts to a new unit of<br />

value—called the "Fairness Value"— which is determined by the<br />

National Average Price Index (NAPI) on Fridays of the preceding<br />

week. This has nothing to do with interest rates. It relates to Bancor<br />

values. For the purpose of illustration, let us convert Bancors back<br />

to dollars. A $50,000 loan on Friday became a $920,000 loan on<br />

Monday. Few people could afford the payments. Thousands of<br />

angry voters stormed the Capitol building in protest. While the<br />

mob shouted obscenities outside, Congress hastily voted to declare<br />

a moratorium on all mortgage payments. By the end of the day, no<br />

one had to pay anything! The people returned to their homes with<br />

satisfaction and gratitude for their wise and generous leaders.<br />

That was only an "emergency" measure to be handled on a<br />

more sound basis later on. Many months have now passed, and<br />

so


|<br />

competition,<br />

I<br />

J<br />

548 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

Congress has not dared to tamper with the arrangement. The voters<br />

would throw them out of office if they tried. Millions of people<br />

have been living in their homes at no cost, except for county taxes,<br />

which were also beyond the ability of anyone to pay. Following the<br />

lead of Congress, the counties also declared a moratorium on their<br />

taxes—but not until the federal government agreed to make up<br />

their losses under terms of the newly passed Aid to Local Governments<br />

Act (ALGA).<br />

Renters are now in the same position, because virtually all<br />

rental property has been nationalized, even that which had been<br />

totally paid for by their owners. Under HFRA, it<br />

is not "fair" for<br />

those who are buying their homes to have an advantage over those<br />

who are renting. Rent controls made it impossible for apartment<br />

owners to keep pace with the rising costs of maintenance and<br />

especially their rising taxes. Virtually all rental units have been<br />

seized by county governments for back taxes. And since the<br />

counties themselves are now dependent on the federal government<br />

for most of their revenue, their real estate has been transferred to<br />

federal agencies in return for federal aid.<br />

All of this was pleasing to the voters who were gratified that<br />

their leaders were "doing something" to solve their problems. It<br />

gradually became clear, however, that the federal government was<br />

now the owner of all their homes and apartments. The reality is<br />

that people are living in them only at the pleasure of the government.<br />

They can be relocated to other quarters if that is what the<br />

government wants.<br />

WAGE-PRICE CONTROLS AND WORK ARMIES<br />

Meanwhile, the UN Wage and Price Stabilization Agency<br />

(WPSA) has instituted wage and price controls to combat inflation.<br />

What few businesses were able to survive the ravages of inflation<br />

are knocked out by these measures. Vital industries have been<br />

seized by the WPSA and prevented from closing. When employees<br />

refuse to work for low, fixed wages or to take the jobs assigned to<br />

them, they are placed under arrest and convicted of anti-democratic<br />

activities. Given a choice between prison or "volunteering"<br />

for the UN Full Employment and Environmental Restoration Army<br />

(FEERA), most of them chose the army. They are now doing the<br />

work prescribed for them in return for food and shelter. Many have<br />

been reassigned to new jobs, new cities, even new countries/<br />

I<br />

I<br />

I<br />

A PESSIMISTIC SCENARIO 549<br />

depending on the employment quotas established by the UN<br />

International Human Resource Allocation Agency (IHRAA). Their<br />

families have been given living quarters which are appropriate to<br />

their work status and their willingness to cooperate.<br />

Automobiles are now used only by the ruling elite who hold<br />

government positions of authority. To the extent possible, workers<br />

have been relocated to barracks which were constructed within<br />

walking distance of major industries. Others use rapid-transit<br />

systems, which have been greatly expanded by FEERA. For middle<br />

management and the more skilled workers who are allowed to live<br />

in the suburbs, there are "Peoples' Van Pools" (PVPs) that shuttle<br />

them to and from assigned boarding areas.<br />

Last week, Maurice Strong, who is now the Director of IHRAA,<br />

toured the fifteen regional subdivisions that have been carved out<br />

of the North-American continent—including the former United<br />

States and Canada—and expressed gratification that America, at<br />

last, has ceased to be an aggressor against the world.<br />

Another twenty years have slipped by, and we now find<br />

ourselves in The New World Order. No one around us is sure<br />

exactly when it began. In fact, there was no official starting date, no<br />

announcement in the media, no ceremony with blaring of trumpets.<br />

Sometime during the past ten or fifteen years, it became<br />

obvious that it just was, and everyone accepted it as the natural<br />

evolution of political trends and necessities. Now, a whole genera-<br />

tion is in place that has no memory of another way of life. Many of<br />

the older folks have all but forgotten the details of their previous<br />

existence. And, of course, many of them have been eliminated.<br />

Schools and <strong>text</strong>books speak of the bygone era as one of unbridled<br />

selfishness, and injustice. Previously commonplace<br />

possessions such as automobiles and private homes and three pairs<br />

of shoes are hardly mentioned, and when they are, they are derided<br />

as wasteful artifacts of a decadent society that, fortunately, has<br />

ceased to exist<br />

NO TAXES OR INFLATION OR DEPRESSIONS<br />

The public is no longer concerned over high taxes. For the most<br />

part, there are none. Everyone works for the government—directly<br />

pr indirectly—and is paid by electronic transfer to a government-<br />

STegulated bank which controls all spending accounts. Even those<br />

large corporations which have been allowed to maintain the


550 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

appearance of private ownership are merely junior partners of<br />

government. They are totally regulated and, at the same time,<br />

totally protected from failure. The amount each citizen receives for<br />

his labor is determined by his technical usefulness and his political<br />

rank. His taxes are pleasantly low or non-existent. The cost of<br />

government now is derived almost totally from expansion of the<br />

money supply—and from the economic value of the work battalions.<br />

Each regional government of the world determines its spending<br />

needs and then offers to sell bonds in the open market to raise the<br />

money. The IMF/World Bank, acting as the UN's central bank, is<br />

the primary buyer. The Bank determines how much money to<br />

allow each regional government and then "purchases" that amount<br />

of bonds. It accomplishes that by making an electronic transfer of<br />

"credits" to one of its correspondent banks within the region<br />

receiving the money. Once that has happened, the local government<br />

can draw upon those credits to pay its bills. Not a single tax<br />

dollar is needed for any of that. The IMF/World bank simply<br />

creates the money and the regional governments spend it.<br />

In days gone by, this increase in the money supply would have<br />

caused prices and wages to go up almost immediately. Not<br />

anymore. Prices and wages are controlled. What does happen,<br />

however, is that the government is caught in its own trap. It needs<br />

to keep the workers happy by giving them wage increases, but it<br />

also needs to keep its factories functioning by allowing price<br />

increases as well. The wage-price spiral, therefore, is not eliminated.<br />

It is merely delayed a few months. And, instead of happening<br />

in response to the interplay of supply and demand in a free<br />

market, it is directed by bureaucratic formula. The end result is the<br />

same either way. The people of the world are still paying the cost of<br />

their international and local governments through the hidden<br />

taxation called inflation.<br />

In the chaotic past, the industrialized nations of the world went<br />

through phases of disruptive inflation often exceeding 1000% per<br />

year. That served a purpose in helping to destroy public faith in<br />

their existing national governments. It softened them up and made<br />

them more willing to accept drastic changes in their life styles and<br />

their political institutions. It paved the way to The New World<br />

Order. But now we have arrived, and extreme inflation rates—at<br />

least in the absence of war—would cause public dissatisfaction and<br />

be counterproductive. Inflation,<br />

A PESSIMISTIC SCENARIO 551<br />

therefore, has now been institutionalized<br />

at a fairly constant 5% per year. That has been determined<br />

to be the optimum level for generating the most revenue<br />

without causing public alarm. Five per cent, everyone agrees, is<br />

"moderate." They can live with that. But we tend to forget that it is<br />

5% per year, forever.<br />

A 5% devaluation applies, not only to the money earned this<br />

year, but to all that is left over from previous years. At the end of<br />

the first year, the original dollar is worth 95 cents. At the end of the<br />

second year, it is reduced again by 5% leaving its worth at 90 cents,<br />

and so on. After 20 years, the government will have confiscated<br />

64% of every dollar we saved at the beginning of our carreers. After<br />

working 45 years, the hidden tax on those dollars will be 90%. The<br />

government will take virtually all of them over our lifetime. Earned<br />

interest will partially offset this effect but it will not alter the<br />

underlying reality of government confiscation.<br />

EFFECT OF "MODEST" 5% INFLATION<br />

For the past forty years, all the published charts illustrating the<br />

decline of the dollar from such-and-such a date to the "present"<br />

show the following type of curve.<br />

PL<br />

$1.00.<br />

.90<br />

.80<br />

.70<br />

.60<br />

.50<br />

.40<br />

.30<br />

.20<br />

.10<br />

Years:<br />

TRCHASING POWER OF ONE DOLLAR<br />

DIMINISHED BY 5% EACH YEAR<br />

" ^/<br />

A 1<br />

S^r A 1 n<br />

CZAGjL aaaI*<br />

III<br />

1<br />

Confiscates yuvo during<br />

working years<br />

-<br />

S f<br />

To<br />

tal<br />

confiscation<br />

over lifetime<br />

- J^<br />

lO 20 30 40 50 60 70


552 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

— a<br />

A PESSIMISTIC SCENARIO 553<br />

These, of course, are averages. A few people in the middle class<br />

of the bureaucracy will have managed to place some of their dollars<br />

into tangible assets or income-producing securities—what few that<br />

remain—where they are somewhat protected from the effects of<br />

inflation. For the vast majority, however, inflation hedges constitute<br />

but a tiny fraction of all they have earned over a lifetime.<br />

And so we find that, in The New World Order, inflation has<br />

been institutionalized at a "modest" level of five per cent. Once in<br />

every five or six generations—as prices climb higher and higher—<br />

new monetary unit can be issued to replace the old in order to<br />

eliminate some of the zeros. But no one will live long enough to<br />

experience more than one devaluation. Each generation is unconcerned<br />

about the loss of the previous one. Young people come into<br />

the process without realizing it is circular instead of linear. They<br />

cannot comprehend the total<br />

because they were not alive at the<br />

beginning and will not be alive at the end. In fact, there need not<br />

even be an end. The process can be continued forever.<br />

By this mechanism—and with the output of work battalions<br />

government can operate entirely without taxes. The lifetime output<br />

of every human being is at its disposal. Workers are allowed a color<br />

TV, state-subsidized alcohol and recreational drugs, and violent<br />

sports to amuse them, but they have no other options. They cannot<br />

escape their class. Society is divided into the rulers and the ruled,<br />

with an administrative bureaucracy in between. Privilege is now<br />

largely a right of birth. The worker class and even most of the<br />

administrators serve masters whom they do not know by name.<br />

But serve they do. Their new lords are the monetary and political<br />

scientists who created and who now control The New World<br />

Order. All of mankind is in a condition of high-tech feudalism.<br />

HIGH-TECH FEUDALISM<br />

Inflation is not the only aspect of economic chaos that is now<br />

under control. Booms and busts in the business cycle are also a<br />

thing of the past Like direct taxes, there are no business cycles any<br />

more. Now that the government has firm control over every<br />

economic check point, business cycles simply are not allowed.<br />

There is no speculation in the market because no one has funds<br />

with which to speculate. There are no expansions of inventories or<br />

capital goods in order to maximize future profits, because inventories<br />

now are determined by formula. Besides, profits are also<br />

determined by formula and, although they are just large enough to<br />

keep pace with inflation, they are guaranteed.<br />

Chaos in the economy is now impossible because it is not<br />

tolerated. Neither is a depression. Yes, there are hundreds of<br />

millions of human beings living under conditions of extreme<br />

hardship, and thousands die of starvation every day, but depressions<br />

are outlawed. No politician, no author, no one in the media<br />

would dare to suggest that the system was a failure. Each month<br />

the government releases new statistics showing in some obscure<br />

way or another that the economy is steadily improving. Although<br />

people are starving everywhere, hunger does not exist anymore.<br />

Although work battalions are crammed into flimsy barracks and<br />

tents, and although older homes and apartment buildings are<br />

falling down for lack of maintenance, forcing more and more<br />

families to share their tiny, unheated dwellings—nevertheless, the<br />

housing shortage is officially being eliminated. There are no more<br />

problems in the economy, because they now are illegal.<br />

VOICES FROM THE PAST<br />

There is a message flashing on the front panel of our time<br />

machine. It reads: Duplicate sequence in memory bank Check years<br />

2826, 2832, 2904, and 1949, That tells us that the on-board computer<br />

has found a similarity between what we are now viewing in the<br />

future and something that was recorded in the past. We had better<br />

check it out. On your keyboard, type: Send data to printer and press<br />

the key labelled Execute.<br />

The first item is coming out of the printer now. It is a warning.<br />

In the year 1816, Thomas Jefferson wrote a letter to Sam Kercheval<br />

in which he said:<br />

We must make our election between economy and liberty, or<br />

profusion and servitude. If we run into such debts as that we must be<br />

taxed in our meat and in our drink, in our necessities and our<br />

comforts, in our labors and our amusements,... our people ... must<br />

come to labor sixteen hours in the twenty-four, give our earnings of<br />

fifteen of these to the government,... have no time to think, no means<br />

of calling our mis-managers to account; but be glad to obtain<br />

sustenance by hiring ourselves out to rivet their chains on the necks of<br />

our fellow-sufferers.... And this is the tendency of all human<br />

governments ... till the bulk of society is reduced to be mere<br />

automatons of misery.... And the forehorse of this frightful team is


.<br />

.<br />

554 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

public debt. Taxation follows that, and in its train wretchedness and<br />

oppression.<br />

Here is the second printout. It is a political commentary and a<br />

prophesy. In the year 1831, a young Frenchman, named Alexis de<br />

Tocqueville, toured the United States to prepare an official report to<br />

his government on the American prison system. His real interest,<br />

however, was the social and political environment in the New<br />

World. He found much to admire in America but he also observed<br />

what he thought were the seeds of its destruction. Upon his return<br />

to France the following year, he began work on a four-volume<br />

analysis of the strengths and weaknesses he found. His perceptivity<br />

was remarkable, and his work, entitled Democracy in America, has<br />

remained as one of the worlds classic works in political science.<br />

This is the part that our computer recognized:<br />

The Americans hold that in every state the supreme power ought<br />

to emanate from the people; but when once that power is constituted,<br />

they can conceive, as it were, no limits to it, and they are ready to<br />

admit that it has the right to do whatever it pleases.... The idea of<br />

rights inherent in certain individuals is rapidly disappearing from the<br />

minds of men; the idea of the omnipotence and sole authority of<br />

society at large rises to fill its place.. .<br />

The first thing that strikes the observation is an innumerable<br />

multitude of men, all equal and alike, incessantly endeavoring to<br />

procure the petty and paltry pleasures with which they glut their lives.<br />

Each of them, living apart, is a stranger to the fate of all the rest; his<br />

children and his private friends constitute to him the whole of<br />

mankind....<br />

Above this race of men stands an immense and tutelary power,<br />

which takes upon itself alone to secure their gratifications and to<br />

watch over their fate. That power is absolute, minute, regular,<br />

provident, and mild. It would be like the authority of a parent ifV like<br />

that authority, its object was to prepare men for manhood; but it seeks,<br />

on the contrary, to keep them in perpetual childhood: it is well content<br />

that the people should rejoice, provided they think of nothing but<br />

rejoicing...<br />

After having thus successively taken each member of the<br />

community in its powerful grasp and fashioned him at will, the<br />

supreme power then extends its arm over the whole community. It<br />

covers the surface of society with a network of small, complicated<br />

rules, minute and uniform, through which the most original minds<br />

1. Basic Writings (New York: Willey Book Co., 1944), pp. 749-50.<br />

A PESSIMISTIC SCENARIO 555<br />

and the most energetic characters cannot penetrate, to rise above the<br />

crowd. The will of man is not shattered, but softened, bent, and<br />

guided; men are seldom forced by it to act, but they are constantly<br />

restrained from acting. Such a power does not destroy, but it prevents<br />

existence; it does not tyrannize, but it compresses, enervates,<br />

extinguishes, and stupefies a people, till each nation is reduced to<br />

nothing better than a flock of timid and industrious animals, of which<br />

the government is the shepherd.. .<br />

Our contemporaries are constantly excited by two conflicting<br />

passions: they want to be led, and they wish to remain free. As they<br />

cannot destroy either the one or the other of these contrary<br />

propensities, they strive to satisfy them both at once. They devise a<br />

sole, tutelary, and all-powerful form of government, but elected by the<br />

people. They combine the principle of centralization and that of<br />

popular sovereignty; this gives them a respite: they console<br />

themselves for being in tutelage by the reflection that they have chosen<br />

their own guardians. Every man allows himself to be put in<br />

leading-strings, because he sees that it is not a person or a class of<br />

persons, but the people at large who hold the end of his chain. By this<br />

system the people shake off their state of dependence just long enough<br />

to select their master and then relapse into it again.<br />

EDUCATION AS A TOOL FOR HUMAN ENGINEERING<br />

The third printout is dated 1904 and is a report issued by the<br />

General Education Board, one of the first foundations established<br />

by John D. Rockefeller, Sr.. The purpose of the foundation was to<br />

use the power of money, not to raise the level of education in<br />

America, as was widely believed at the time, but to influence the<br />

direction of that education. Specifically, it was to promote the<br />

ideology of collectivism and internationalism. The object was to use<br />

the classroom to teach attitudes that encourage people to be passive<br />

and submissive to their rulers. The goal was—and is—to create<br />

citizens who are educated enough for productive work under<br />

supervision but not enough to question authority or seek to rise<br />

above their class. True education was to be restricted to the sons<br />

and daughters of the elite. For the rest, it would be better to<br />

produce skilled workers with no particular aspirations other than<br />

to enjoy life. It was enough, as de Tocqueville phrased it, "that the<br />

people should rejoice, provided they think of nothing but rejoicing."<br />

1 . Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Vol. II (New York: Alfred Knopf,<br />

1945), pp. 290-91, 318-19.


,<br />

and<br />

.<br />

556 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

A PESSIMISTIC SCENARIO 557<br />

In the first publication of the General Education Board, Fred<br />

Gates explained the plan:<br />

In our dreams we have limitless resources, and the people yield<br />

themselves with perfect docility to our molding hands. The present<br />

educational conventions fade from our minds, and unhampered by<br />

tradition, we work our own good upon a grateful and responsive rural<br />

folk. We shall not try to make these people or any of their children into<br />

philosophers of mental learning or of science. We have not to raise<br />

from among them authors, editors, poets, or men of letters. We shall<br />

not search for embryo great artists, painters, musicians, nor lawyers,<br />

doctors, preachers, politicians,<br />

statesmen of whom we have ample<br />

supply. The task we set before ourselves is very simple as well as a<br />

very beautiful one: To train these people as we find them to a perfectly<br />

ideal life just where they are.... in the homes, in the shop, and on the<br />

farm.<br />

BACK TO THE FUTURE<br />

Here is the fourth computer printout from the past. It is a<br />

satire—and a warning. In the year 1949, George Orwell wrote his<br />

classic novel entitled 2984. In it, he portrayed the same "futuristic"<br />

scenes that now lie before us as we sit in our time machine. His<br />

only error appears to have been the date that became the title of his<br />

book. If he were writing it today, it is likely he would call it 2054,<br />

Orwell described the world of our future as being divided into<br />

three regions called Oceania, Eurasia, and Eastasia. Oceania consists<br />

of the Americas plus England, Australia, and the Pacific<br />

Islands; Eurasia is<br />

Russia and continental Europe; Eastasia comprises<br />

China, Japan, Southeast Asia, & India. These superstates are<br />

constantly at war with each other.<br />

The wars are not fought to<br />

conquer the enemy, they are waged for the primary purpose of<br />

controlling the population. The people in all three territories<br />

tolerate their misery and oppression because sacrifices are necessary<br />

in time of war. Most of the stratagems outlined in The Report<br />

from Iron Mountain are to be found in Orwell's narrative, but Orwell<br />

described them first. The think-tank was even willing to credit<br />

Orwell as the source of some of its concepts. For example, on the<br />

subject of establishing a modern, sophisticated form of slavery, the<br />

group at Iron Mountain said:<br />

Up to now, this has been suggested only in fiction, notably in the<br />

works of Wells, Huxley, Orwell, and others engaged in the<br />

imaginative anticipation of the sociology of the future. But the<br />

fantasies projected in Brave New World and 1984 have seemed less and<br />

less implausible over the years since their publication. The traditional<br />

association of slavery with ancient preindustrial cultures should not<br />

blind us to its adaptability to advanced forms of social organization. 1<br />

From this we see that Orwell's work is far more than an<br />

entertaining novel. It is relevant to our present journey in time. Our<br />

would-be masters have studied him carefully. So should we. This is<br />

what he wrote:<br />

[<br />

These three superstates are permanently at war, and have been so<br />

for the past twenty-five years. War, however, is no longer the<br />

desperate, annihilating struggle that it was in the early decades of the<br />

twentieth century.... This is not to say that either the conduct of the<br />

war, or the prevailing attitude toward it, has become less bloodthirsty<br />

or more chivalrous. On the contrary, war hysteria is continuous and<br />

universal in all countries, and such acts as raping, looting, the<br />

slaughter of children, the reduction of whole populations to slavery,<br />

reprisals against prisoners which extend even to boiling and'<br />

burying alive, are looked upon as normal.. .<br />

The primary aim of modern warfare ... is to use up the products of<br />

the machine without raising the general standard of living. [The<br />

"machine" is society's technical and industrial capacity to produce<br />

goods.] ... From the moment when the machine first made its<br />

appearance it was clear to all thinking people that the need for human<br />

drudgery, and therefore to a great extent for human inequality, had<br />

disappeared. If the machine were used deliberately for that end,<br />

hunger, overwork, dirt, illiteracy, and disease could be eliminated<br />

within a few generations....<br />

But it was also clear that an all-around increase in wealth<br />

threatened the destruction—indeed in some cases was the<br />

destruction—of a hierarchical society. In a world in which everyone<br />

worked short hours, had enough to eat, lived in a house with a<br />

bathroom and a refrigerator, and possessed a motorcar or even an<br />

airplane, the most obvious and perhaps the most important form of<br />

inequality would already have disappeared. If it once became general,<br />

wealth would confer no distinction,... Such a society could not long<br />

remain stable. For if leisure and security were enjoyed by all alike, the<br />

great mass of human beings who are normally stupefied by poverty<br />

would become literate and would learn to think for themselves; and<br />

1. "Occasional Paper No. 1," General Education Board, 1904. 1 . Lewin, Report, p. 70.


.<br />

.<br />

.<br />

.<br />

.<br />

558 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

when once they had done this, they would sooner or later realize that<br />

the privileged minority had no function, and they would sweep it<br />

away. In the long run, a hierarchical society was only possible on a<br />

basis of poverty and ignorance. .<br />

.<br />

The essential act of war is destruction, not necessarily of human<br />

lives, but of the products of human labor. War is a way of shattering to<br />

pieces, or pouring into the stratosphere, or sinking into the depths of<br />

the sea, materials which might otherwise be used to make the masses<br />

too comfortable, and hence, in the long run, too intelligent.. .<br />

In practice the needs of the population are always underestimated,<br />

with the result that there is a chronic shortage of half the necessities of<br />

life; but this is looked on as an advantage. It is deliberate policy to keep<br />

even the favored groups somewhere near the brink of hardship,<br />

because a general state of scarcity increases the importance of small<br />

privileges and thus magnifies the distinction between one group and<br />

another.. . . The social atmosphere is that of a besieged city, where the<br />

possession of a lump of horseflesh makes the difference between<br />

wealth and poverty- And at the same time the consequences of being<br />

at war, and therefore in danger, makes the handing over of all power<br />

to a small caste seem the natural, unavoidable condition of survival. .<br />

War, it will be seen, not only accomplishes the necessary<br />

destruction, but accomplishes it in a psychologically acceptable way.<br />

In principle it would be quite simple to waste the surplus labor of the<br />

world by building temples and pyramids, by digging holes and filling<br />

them up again, or even by producing vast quantities of goods and then<br />

setting fire to them. But this would provide only the economic and not<br />

the emotional basis for a hierarchical society.. .<br />

War, it will be seen, is now a purely internal affair.... waged by<br />

each ruling group against its own subjects, and the object of the war is<br />

not to make or prevent conquests of territory, but to keep the structure<br />

of society intact.<br />

THE FUNCTION OF WASTE IN MODERN<br />

TOTALITARIANISM<br />

Once again, it is clear that Orwell's grim narrative was a<br />

primary model for The Report from Iron Mountain. The authors of<br />

that blueprint for our future spoke at length about the value of<br />

planned waste as a means of preventing the masses from improving<br />

their standard of living. They wrote:<br />

The production of weapons of mass destruction has always been<br />

associated with economic "waste." The term is pejorative, since it<br />

1. George Orwell, 1984 (New York: New American Library/Signet, 1949), pp<br />

153-164.<br />

A PESSIMISTIC SCENARIO 559<br />

implies a failure of function. But no human activity can properly be<br />

considered wasteful if it achieves its con<strong>text</strong>ual objective.. .<br />

In the case of military "waste," there is indeed a larger social<br />

utility.. . . In advanced modern democratic societies, the war system . .<br />

has served as the last great safeguard against the elimination of<br />

necessary social classes. As economic productivity increases to a level<br />

further and further above that of minimum subsistence, it becomes<br />

more and more difficult for a society to maintain distribution patterns<br />

insuring the existence of "hewers of wood and drawers of water."...<br />

The arbitrary nature of war expenditures and of other military<br />

activities make them ideally suited to control these essential class<br />

relationships.. . . The continuance of the war system must be assured, if<br />

for no other reason, among others, than to preserve whatever quality<br />

and degree of poverty a society requires as an incentive, as well as to<br />

maintain the stability of its internal organization of power.<br />

These documents from the real past and the imagined future<br />

can help us to better understand our present. The spectacle of<br />

wasteful government spending suddenly becomes logical. It is not<br />

stupidity that pays farmers to destroy their crops, or that purchases<br />

trillion-dollar weapons systems that are never deployed or in some<br />

cases not even completed, or that provides funding for studies of<br />

the sex life of the tse-tse fly, or that gives grants to pornographers<br />

posing as artists. The overriding object behind most of these<br />

boondoggles is to waste the resources of the nation. It is obvious by<br />

now that the decline in living standards in the Western world is<br />

associated with a widening gap between the haves and the<br />

have-nots. What is not so obvious, however, is that this is according<br />

to plan. To that end, massive waste in government spending is not<br />

an unfortunate by-product, it is the goal.<br />

That brings us back to the question of finding an acceptable<br />

substitute for war. War is not only the ultimate waste, it is also the<br />

[ultimate motivation for human action. As Orwell said, waste in the<br />

(absence of war "would provide only the economic and not the<br />

'emotional basis for a hierarchical society." Will the environmentalpollution<br />

model be able to sufficiently motivate human action to be<br />

a substitute for war?<br />

That is<br />

not a safe assumption. The possibility of war in our<br />

future cannot be ruled out. The environmental-pollution model is<br />

not yet thoroughly proven. It is working well for limited purposes<br />

1. Lewiii, Report, pp. 34-35, 40-41.


560 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

and on a limited scale, but it is still doubtful that it will ever equal<br />

the hysteria potential of a physical war. The world planners will<br />

not abandon the use of war until the new model has been proven<br />

over many years. On that point, the Report from Iron Mountain was<br />

emphatic:<br />

When asked how best to prepare for the advent of peace, we must<br />

first reply, as strongly as we can, that the war system cannot<br />

responsibly be allowed to disappear until 1) we know exactly what it<br />

is we plan to put in its place, and 2) we are certain, beyond reasonable<br />

doubt, that these substitute institutions will serve their purposes in<br />

terms of the survival and stability of society.... It is uncertain, at this<br />

time, whether peace will ever be possible. It is far more questionable<br />

. . . that it would be desirable even if it were demonstrably attainable.<br />

REGIONALISM AS A TRANSITION TO WORLD<br />

GOVERNMENT<br />

The coalescing of the world's nations into three regional<br />

superstates was already visible even before we activated our time<br />

machine. The first steps had been strictly economic but were soon<br />

followed by political and military consolidation. The European<br />

Union (EU), including Russia, began with the issuance of a<br />

common money and eventually merged into a functional regional<br />

government. It was Orwell's Eurasia, even though it avoided<br />

calling itself by that name. Treaties binding Canada, the United<br />

States,<br />

Mexico, and South America formed the basic outline of<br />

Oceania, built around the Federal-Reserve Note as the regional<br />

money. Japan eventually became hostile to the West when trading<br />

was no longer to her sole advantage and, along with China which<br />

had been built up by Western aid and technology, and with India<br />

which had been given atomic technology by the West, became the<br />

political center of Eastasia. Even as far back as the 1980s, it was<br />

known as the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere/' Its monetary<br />

system was to be based upon the Yen.<br />

The people of the former nations were not yet ready for a giant<br />

leap into world government. They had to be led to that goal by a<br />

series of shorter and less frightening steps. They were more willing<br />

to surrender their economic and military independence to regional<br />

groupings of people who were closer in ethnic and cultural origin<br />

and who shared common borders. Only after several decades of<br />

1. Ibid., pp. 88-90.<br />

transition was it<br />

A PESSIMISTIC SCENARIO 561<br />

possible to make the final merger. In the meantime,<br />

the world was plunged alternately between war and peace.<br />

After each cycle of war, the population was more frightened,<br />

impoverished, and collectivised. In the end, world government was<br />

irresistible. By that time, the environmental-pollution model and<br />

the alien-invasion model had been perfected to provide high levels<br />

of human motivation. But, even then, regional uprisings were<br />

occasionally engineered when necessary to justify massive<br />

"peacekeeping" operations. War was never fully abandoned. It<br />

remained, as it always had been, a necessity for the stabilization of<br />

society.<br />

HOW FIXED IS THE FUTURE?<br />

Let us return now to the present from which we departed and<br />

reflect upon our journey. The first thing that strikes us is that we<br />

cannot be certain the future will unfold exactly as we have seen it.<br />

There are too many variables. When we originally set our Primary-<br />

Assumption selector to Present trends unaltered, we left the Secondary-<br />

Assumption selector where it was. It was pointing to Banking Crisis.<br />

Had we chosen the next position, No Banking Crisis, our journey<br />

would have been different. We would not have seen long lines of<br />

depositors or panic-buying in<br />

the stores or closing of the stock<br />

market. But we would still have witnessed the same scenes of<br />

despair in the more distant future. We merely would have travelled<br />

a different path of events to get there.<br />

The forces driving our society into global totalitarianism would<br />

not change one iota. We still would have the doomsday mechanisms<br />

at work. We would have the CFR in control of the power<br />

centers of government and the media. And we would have an<br />

electorate which is<br />

unaware of what is being done to them and,<br />

therefore, unable to resist. Through environmental and economic<br />

treaties and through military disarmament to the UN, we would<br />

witness the same emergence of a world central bank, a world<br />

government, and a world army to enforce its dictates. Inflation and<br />

wage/price controls would have progressed more or less the same,<br />

driving consumer goods out of existence and men into bondage.<br />

Instead of moving toward The New World Order in a series of<br />

economic spasms, we merely would have travelled a less violent<br />

path and arrived at exactly the same destination.


I who<br />

562 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

A PESSIMISTIC SCENARIO 563<br />

There is little doubt that the master planners would prefer to<br />

follow the more tranquil route. Patient gradualism is less risky. But<br />

not everything is within their control. Events can get out of hand,<br />

and powerful economic forces can become suddenly unleashed.<br />

Banking crises can occur even without being deliberately caused.<br />

On the other hand, the Cabal also knows that crises are useful<br />

in driving the masses into the corral faster than they would<br />

otherwise move. Therefore, the application of some kind of scientifically<br />

engineered crisis cannot be ruled out. It could take many<br />

forms: Ethnic violence, terrorism, plague, even war itself. But none<br />

of that makes any difference. It will not alter our direction of travel<br />

through time. It will only determine our specific route. Like a<br />

flowing river, it may be diverted this way or that by natural<br />

barriers or even by man-made channels, dikes, and dams, but it<br />

eventually will reach the sea. Our concluding reflection, therefore,<br />

is that it is relatively unimportant whether there will be a banking<br />

crisis or any other cataclysmic event These are all secondary<br />

assumptions which are meaningless. Our only real hope for<br />

averting the new feudalism of the future is to change the Primary<br />

assumption. We must change it to read: Present Trends Reversed.<br />

SUMMARY<br />

A pessimistic scenario of future events includes a banking<br />

crisis, followed by a government bailout and the eventual nationalization<br />

of all banks. The final cost is staggering and is paid with<br />

money created by the Federal Reserve. It is passed on to the public<br />

in the form of inflation.<br />

Further inflation is caused by the continual expansion of<br />

welfare programs, socialized medicine, entitlement programs, and<br />

interest on the national debt. The dollar is finally abandoned as the<br />

defacto currency of the world. Trillions of dollars are sent back to<br />

the United States by foreign investors to be converted as quickly as<br />

possible into tangible assets. That causes even greater inflation than<br />

before. So massive is the inflationary pressure that industry and<br />

commerce come to a halt. Barter becomes the means of exchange.<br />

America takes her place among the depressed nations of South<br />

America, Africa, and Asia—mired together in economic equality.<br />

Politicians seize upon the opportunity and offer bold reforms.<br />

The reforms are more of exactly what created the problem in the<br />

first place: expanded governmental power, new regulatory agen-<br />

I<br />

i<br />

cies, and more restrictions on freedom. But this time, the programs<br />

begin to take on an international flavor. The American dollar is<br />

replaced by a new UN money, and the Federal Reserve System<br />

becomes a branch operation of the IMF/World Bank.<br />

Electronic transfers gradually replace cash and checking accounts.<br />

This permits UN agencies to monitor the financial activities<br />

of every person. A machine-readable ID card is used for that<br />

purpose. If an individual is red flagged by any government agency,<br />

the card does not clear, and he is cut off from all economic<br />

transactions and travel. It is the ultimate control.<br />

Increasing violence in the streets from revolutionary movements<br />

and ethnic clashes provide an excuse for martial law. The<br />

public is happy to see UN soldiers checking ID cards. The<br />

police-state arrives in the name of public safety.<br />

Eventually all private dwellings are taken over by the government<br />

as a result of bailing out the home-mortgage industry. Rental<br />

property is also taken, as former landlords are unable to pay<br />

property taxes. People are allowed to live in these dwellings at<br />

reasonable cost, or no cost at all. It gradually becomes clear,<br />

however, that the government is now the owner of all homes and<br />

apartments. People are living in them only at the pleasure of the<br />

government. They can be reassigned at any time.<br />

Wages and prices are controlled. Dissidents are placed into<br />

work armies. There are no more autos except for the ruling elite.<br />

Public transportation is provided for the masses, and those with<br />

limited skills live in government housing within walking distance<br />

of their assigned jobs. Men have been reduced to the level of serfs<br />

are subservient to their masters. Their condition of life can<br />

only be described as high-tech feudalism.<br />

There is no certainty that the future will unfold in exactly that<br />

manner, because there are too many variables. For example, if we<br />

had assumed that there will not be a banking crisis, then our<br />

journey would be different. We would not see long lines of<br />

depositors or panic-buying in the stores or closing of the stock<br />

market But we would still witness the same scenes of despair in<br />

the more distant future. We merely would have travelled a<br />

different path of events to get there. That is because the forces<br />

driving our society into global totalitarianism would not have<br />

changed one iota. We still would have the doomsday mechanisms<br />

at work. We would have the CFR in control of the power centers of


564 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

government and the media. We would have an electorate which is<br />

unaware of what is being done to them and, therefore, unable to<br />

resist. Through environmental and economic treaties and through<br />

military disarmament to the UN, we would witness the same<br />

emergence of a world central bank, a world government, and a<br />

world army to enforce its dictates. Inflation and wage/price<br />

controls would have progressed more or less<br />

the same, driving<br />

consumer goods out of existence and men into bondage. Instead of<br />

moving toward The New World Order in a series of economic<br />

spasms, we merely would have travelled a less violent path and<br />

arrived at exactly tine same destination.<br />

Chapter Twenty-Six<br />

A REALISTIC<br />

SCENARIO<br />

What must be done if we are to avert the<br />

pessimistic scenario; a list of specific measures<br />

that must be taken to stop the monetary binge; an<br />

appraisal of how severe the economic hangover<br />

will be; a checklist for personal survival— and<br />

beyond.<br />

The pessimistic scenario presented in the previous chapter is<br />

the kind of narrative that turns people off. No one wants to hear<br />

those things, even if<br />

they are true—or we should say especially if<br />

they are true. As Adlai Stevenson said when he was a candidate for<br />

President: "The contest between agreeable fancy and disagreeable<br />

fact is unequal. Americans are suckers for good news."<br />

So, where is<br />

the optimistic scenario in which everything turns<br />

out all right, in which prosperity is restored and freedom is<br />

preserved after all? Actually, it is not hard to locate. You can find it<br />

every day somewhere in your newspaper. It is the shared faith of<br />

almost all politicians, experts, and commentators. If that is what<br />

you want to hear, you have just wasted a lot of time reading this<br />

book.<br />

There is no optimistic scenario. Events have progressed too far<br />

for that. Even if we begin to turn things around by forcing<br />

Congress to cut spending, reduce the debt, and disentangle from<br />

UN treaties, the Cabal will not let go without a ferocious fight.<br />

When the Second Bank of the United States was struggling for its<br />

life in 1834, Nicholas Biddle, who controlled it, set about to cause as<br />

much havoc in the economy as possible and then to blame it on<br />

President Jackson's anti-bank policies. By suddenly tightening<br />

credit and withdrawing money from circulation, he triggered<br />

full-scale national depression. At the height of his attack, he<br />

declared: "All other banks and all the merchants may break, but the<br />

a


566 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND A REALISTIC SCENARIO 567<br />

Bank of the United States shall not break." The amount of<br />

devastation that could be caused by today's Federal Reserve is<br />

infinitely greater than what Biddle was able to unleash. It would be<br />

pure self-deception to think that the Cabal would quietly give up<br />

its power without exercising that option. We must conclude that no<br />

one is going to get out of this one unscathed. There is hell to pay,<br />

and it is we who are going to pay it.<br />

SEVENTH REASON TO ABOLISH THE FED<br />

What has any of this to do with the Federal Reserve System?<br />

The answer is that the Federal Reserve is the starting point of the<br />

pessimistic scenario. The chain of events begins with fiat money<br />

created by a central bank, which leads to government debt, which<br />

causes inflation, which destroys the economy, which impoverishes<br />

the people, which provides an excuse for increasing government<br />

power, which is £n on-going process culminating in totalitarianism.<br />

Eliminate the Federal Reserve from this equation, and the pessimistic<br />

scenario ceases to exist. That is the seventh and final reason to<br />

abolish the Fed: It is an instrument of totalitarianism.<br />

If the optimistic scenario is<br />

too optimistic and the pessimistic<br />

scenario is too pessimistic, then what is the scenario that we should<br />

hope lies in our future?<br />

There is a middle course that lies between optimism and<br />

pessimism. It is called realism. Calling it a realistic scenario is not<br />

meant to imply that it is predetermined to happen, nor that it is<br />

even likely to happen. It is realistic only in the sense that it can<br />

happen if certain conditions are met. The balance of this chapter<br />

will be devoted to an analysis of those conditions.<br />

Let us begin by allowing our opponent, Cynicism, to state the<br />

problem we face: "Is it realistic to believe that the current trends<br />

can actually be reversed? Isn't it just fantasy to think that anything<br />

can be done at this late date to break the CFR's hold over<br />

government, media, and education? Do we really expect the<br />

gum-chewing public to go upstream against the indoctrination of<br />

newspapers, magazines, television, and movies?"<br />

Apathy joins in: "Forget it. There's nothing you can do. The<br />

bankers and politicians have all the money and all the power. The<br />

1 . See chapter seventeen.<br />

game is already over. Make the most of it, and enjoy life while you<br />

can.<br />

Do not listen to Cynicism and Apathy. They are agents of your<br />

enemy. They want you to quietly get in line and submit without a<br />

struggle. However, they do make a point that must not be<br />

overlooked. The battle has progressed far, and our position is not<br />

good. If we are to reverse the present trends, we must be prepared<br />

to make a herculean effort. That does not mean "Write your<br />

Congressman" or ''Vote on Tuesday" or "Sign a petition" or "Send<br />

in a donation." That is far too easy. Those measures still play an<br />

important role in the battle plan but they fall far short of the need.<br />

Armchair campaigns will no longer do it.<br />

Before turning to the question of what kind of effort will be<br />

required, let us first be clear on what it is we want to accomplish.<br />

WHAT MUST NOT BE DONE<br />

Let us begin with the negatives: what must not be done. The<br />

most obvious item in this category is that we must not turn to<br />

government for more of the same "cures" that have made us ill. We<br />

do not want more power granted to the Fed or the Treasury or the<br />

President, nor do we need another government agency. We probably<br />

don't even need any new laws, with the possible exception of<br />

those legislative acts which repeal some of the old laws now on the<br />

books. Our goal is the reduction of government, not its expansion.<br />

We do not want to merely abolish the Fed and turn over its<br />

operation to the Treasury. That is a popular proposal among those<br />

who know there is a problem but who have not studied the history<br />

of central banking. It is a recurrent theme of the Populist movement<br />

and those advocating what they call Social Credit. Their argument<br />

is that the Federal Reserve is privately owned and is independent<br />

of political control. Only Congress is authorized to issue the<br />

nation's money, not a group of private bankers. Let the Treasury<br />

issue paper money and bank credit, they say, and we can have all<br />

the money we need without having to pay one penny in interest to<br />

the bankers.<br />

It is an appealing argument, but it contains serious flaws. First,<br />

the concept that the Fed is privately owned is a legal fiction The<br />

member banks hold stock, but it carries no voting weight. No<br />

matter how large the bank or how much capital is<br />

paid in, each<br />

bank has one vote. The stock cannot be sold or traded. Stockholders


568 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

have none of the usual elements of control that come with<br />

ownership and, in fact, they are subservient to the central board.<br />

The seven members of the Board of Governors are appointed by the<br />

President and confirmed by the Senate. It is true that the Fed is<br />

independent of direct political control, but it must never be forgotten<br />

that it was created by Congress and it can be extinguished by<br />

Congress. In truth, the Federal Reserve is neither an arm of<br />

government nor is it private. It is a hybrid. It is an association of the<br />

large commercial banks which has been granted special privileges<br />

by Congress. A more accurate description would be simply that it<br />

is a cartel protected by federal law.<br />

But the more important point is that it makes no difference<br />

whether the Fed is government or private. Even if it were entirely<br />

private, merely turning it over to the government would not alter<br />

its function. The same people undoubtedly would run it, and they<br />

would continue to create money for political purposes. The Bank of<br />

England is the granddaddy of central banks. It was privately<br />

owned at its inception but became an official arm of the British<br />

government in more recent times. It continues to operate as a<br />

central bank, and nothing of substance has changed. The central<br />

banks of all the other industrialized nations are direct arms of their<br />

respective governments. They are indistinguishable in function<br />

from the Federal Reserve. The technicalities of structure and<br />

ownership are not as important as function. Turning the Federal<br />

Reserve over to the Treasury without at the same time denuding it<br />

of its function as a central bank—that is, its ability to manipulate<br />

the money supply—would be a colossal waste of time.<br />

The proposal of having the Treasury issue the nation's money is<br />

another question and has nothing to do with who owns the Fed.<br />

There is nothing wrong with the federal government Issuing<br />

money so long as it abides by the Constitution and adheres to the<br />

principle of honesty. Both of these restraints forbid Congress from<br />

issuing paper money that is not 100% backed by gold or silver. If<br />

you are in doubt about the reasoning behind that statement, it<br />

would be a good idea to review chapter fifteen before continuing.<br />

It is true that, if Congress had the power to create as much<br />

money as it needs without the Federal Reserve System, interest<br />

would not have to be paid on the national debt. But the Fed holds<br />

only a small percentage of the debt. Over 90% of those bonds are<br />

held by individuals and institutions in the private sector. Terminat-<br />

A REALISTIC SCENARIO 569<br />

ing interest payments would not hurt those big, bad bankers nearly<br />

as much as it would the millions of people who would lose their<br />

insurance policies, investments, and retirement plans. The Social<br />

Credit scheme would wipe out the economy in one fell swoop.<br />

And we still would not have solved the deeper problem. The<br />

bankers would be cut out of the scam, but the politicians would<br />

remain. Congress would now be acting as its own central bank, the<br />

money supply would continue to expand, inflation would continue<br />

to roar, and the nation would continue to die. Besides, issuing<br />

money without gold or silver backing violates the Constitution.<br />

THE JFK RUMOR<br />

In 1981, a rumor was circulated that President Kennedy had<br />

been assassinated by agents of the hidden money power because he<br />

had signed Executive Order #11110 instructing the Treasury to<br />

print more than $4 billion in United States Notes. That is precisely<br />

the kind of money we are discussing: paper bills without gold or<br />

silver backing issued by the government, not the Federal Reserve.<br />

According to the rumor, the bankers were furious because they<br />

would lose interest payments on the money supply. When the<br />

Order was tracked down, however, it involved Silver Certificates,<br />

not United States Notes. Silver Certificates are backed by silver'<br />

which means they are real money, so the rumor was wrong on that<br />

point. But there is no interest paid on Silver Certificates either, so<br />

the rumor held up on that point. There was a third point, however,<br />

which everyone seemed to overlook. The Executive Order did not<br />

instruct the Treasury to issue Silver Certificates. It merely authorized<br />

it to do so. There is no evidence that this was ever done. If the<br />

Certificates were printed at all,<br />

they never found their way into<br />

circulation. In 1987, the order was rescinded by President Reagan.<br />

The Treasury did print a small supply of United States Notes in<br />

1963, but these were authorized by an 1878 act of Congress to<br />

replace Civil War Greenbacks which had been retired from circulation.<br />

JFK did not initiate that issue. The greatest quantity of those<br />

Notes to be in circulation since their last printing in 1969 was $322<br />

million—not a significant figure compared to Federal Reserve<br />

Notes. Most of them are now collectors' items. 1<br />

1. See Currency in U.S. History, (Kansas City: Federal Reserve Bank, n.d.), pp. 10, 11.


[<br />

570 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

A REALISTIC SCENARIO 571<br />

The persistent rumor regarding the bankers' role in JFK's death<br />

was reinforced by several books circulated in conservative circles.<br />

They contained an ominous passage from Kennedy's speech at<br />

Columbia University, just ten days before his assassination. He is<br />

quoted as saying: "The high office of President has been used to<br />

foment a plot to destroy the Americans' freedom, and before I leave<br />

office I must inform the citizen of his plight." However, when<br />

Columbia University was contacted to provide a transcript of the<br />

speech, it was learned that Kennedy never spoke there—neither ten<br />

days before his assassination nor at any other timel Ronald Whealan,<br />

head librarian at the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library in Boston,<br />

provides this additional information: "Ten days prior to the<br />

assassination he was at the White House meeting with, among<br />

others, the ambassador to the United States from Portugal."<br />

It is possible that the President did make the remarks attributed<br />

to him on a different date before a different audience. Even so, it is<br />

a cryptic message which could have several meanings. That he<br />

intended to expose the Fed is the least likely of them all. Kennedy<br />

had been a life-long socialist and internationalist. He had attended<br />

the Fabian London School of Economics; participated in the<br />

destruction of the American money supply; and engineered the<br />

transfer of American wealth to foreign nations. There is little reason<br />

to believe that he had suddenly "seen the light" and was preparing<br />

to reverse his life-long beliefs and commitments.<br />

MONETARISTS VS SUPPLY-SIDERS<br />

But we are off the topic. Let us return to those unworkable<br />

theories regarding monetary reform. Prominent in this category are<br />

the Monetarists and the Supply-Siders. The Monetarists, adhering<br />

to the theories of Milton Friedman, believe that money should<br />

continue to<br />

be be created by the Mandrake Mechanism of the<br />

Federal Reserve, but that the supply should be determined by a<br />

strict formula established by Congress, not the Fed. The Supplysiders,<br />

represented by Arthur Laffer and Charles Kadlec, believe in<br />

formulas also, but they have a different one. They want the<br />

1. Quoted by M.J. "Red" Beckman, Born Again Republic (Billings, Montana: Freedom<br />

Church, 1981), p. 23; also by Lindsey Williams, To Seduce A Nation (Kasilof,<br />

Arkansas: Worth Publishing, 1984), p. 26.<br />

2. Letter to Hoi lee Haswell, Curator at the Low Memorial Library, Columbia<br />

University, October 13, 1987.<br />

quantity of money to be determined by the current demand for<br />

gold. They are not talking about a true gold standard in which<br />

paper money is fully backed. By following what they call a<br />

''gold-price rule/' they would simply observe the price of gold in<br />

the free market and then tinker with the dollar by expanding or<br />

contracting the money supply to keep its relative value, compared<br />

to gold, fairly constant.<br />

These groups are alike in their underlying philosophy. Each has<br />

a different goal and a different formula, but they agree on method:<br />

manipulation of the money supply. They share the same conviction<br />

that the free market will not work without assistance; the same<br />

faith in the wisdom and integrity of politically-created formulas,<br />

bureaus, and agencies. The Fed remains unscathed throughout all<br />

these debates because it is the ultimate mechanism for intervention.<br />

These people don't really want to change it. They just want their<br />

turn at running it.<br />

Occasionally a truly original proposal appears that captures<br />

one's attention. Addressing a prestigious gathering of conservative<br />

monetary theorists in 1989, Jerry Jordan suggested that the monetary<br />

base could be expanded by holding a national lottery. The<br />

government would pay out more dollars in prize money than it<br />

received in ticket sales. The excess would represent the amount by<br />

which the monetary base would expand. Presumably, if they<br />

wanted to contract the money supply, they would pay out fewer<br />

dollars than taken in. It was an intriguing thought, but Mr. Jordan<br />

was quick to add: 'The problem, of course, is that there would not<br />

be any effective institutional restraint on the growth of the monetary<br />

base."<br />

Indeed, that is the problem with all schemes involving<br />

monetary control by men.<br />

BALANCED-BUDGET AMENDMENT<br />

A so-called balanced-budget amendment to the Constitution is<br />

not the answer either. In fact, it is an illusion and a fraud. Some of<br />

the biggest spenders in Congress are supporters. They know that it<br />

is<br />

popular with the voters but would not cramp their spending<br />

style in the least. If<br />

they were not permitted to spend more than<br />

they receive in taxes, they would have a perfect excuse for raising<br />

taxes. It would be a way of punishing the voters for placing limits<br />

"The Future of Price Stability in A Fiat Money World/' by Jerry L. Jordan, Dwell<br />

Journal ofMoney and Banking, August, 1989, p. 24.


572 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

on them. The voters, on the other hand, would collapse under the<br />

burden of higher taxes and demand that their Congressmen<br />

circumvent the very amendment they previously supported. And<br />

that would be easy. Most versions of the balanced-budget amendment<br />

have an escape hatch built for just that purpose. Congress<br />

shall balance its budget "except in cases of emergency." Who decides<br />

what constitutes an emergency? Congress, of course. In other<br />

words, Congress shall balance its budget except when it doesn't<br />

want to. So what else is new?<br />

A serious amendment would have to tackle, not balancing the<br />

budget, but limiting the spending. If that were done, the budget<br />

would take care of itself. But even that would be a waste of time<br />

considering the present composition of Congress. Instead of generating<br />

political pressure for a Constitutional amendment, we would<br />

be better off directing that same effort toward throwing the big<br />

spenders out of office. As long as the spenders are allowed to stay<br />

in there, they will find a way to get around any law—including the<br />

Constitution itself.<br />

Another flaw in most versions of the balanced-budget amendment<br />

is that it would not affect the off-budget expenditures called<br />

entitlements. They now represent 52% of all federal outlays and are<br />

growing by 12% each year. A strategy that ignores that backbreaking<br />

load is not worth even considering. Furthermore, even if<br />

Congress could be forced to stop deficit spending, the balancedbudget<br />

amendment would not solve the problem of inflation or<br />

paying off the national debt. The Federal Reserve can now inflate<br />

our money supply by using literally any debt in the world. It does<br />

not have to come from Congress. Unless we zero in on the Fed<br />

itself, we will just be playing political games with no chance of<br />

winning.<br />

Every year, a few concerned Congressmen submit a bill to<br />

investigate or audit the Federal Reserve System. They are to be<br />

commended for their effort, but the process has been an exercise in<br />

futility. Their bills receive little or no publicity and never get out of<br />

committee for a vote. Even if they did receive serious attention,<br />

however, they could actually be counterproductive.<br />

On the surface, it would appear that there is nothing wrong<br />

with a Congressional investigation or an audit, but what is there to<br />

investigate? We must assume the Fed is doing exactly what it says<br />

and is in total compliance with the law. A few minor improprieties<br />

"<br />

A REALISTIC SCENARIO 573<br />

probably would be discovered involving personal abuse of funds<br />

or insider profiteering, but that would be minor compared to the<br />

gigantic fraud that already is out in the open for all to see. The<br />

Federal Reserve is<br />

the world's largest and most successful scam.<br />

Anyone who understands the nature of money can see that without<br />

a team of investigators and auditors.<br />

The danger in a proposal to audit the Fed is that it would<br />

provide an excuse to delay serious action for several years while<br />

the audit is going on. It would give the public a false impression<br />

that Congress is doing something. It also would give the monetary<br />

technicians an opportunity to lay down a smoke screen of verbiage<br />

and confusing statistics. The public would expect that all the<br />

answers will be forthcoming from the investigation, but the very<br />

groups and combines that need to be investigated would be<br />

conducting, or at least confounding, the investigation. By the time<br />

fourteen volumes of testimony, charts, tables, and exhibits finally<br />

appear, the public would be intimidated and fatigued. The bottom<br />

line is that we do not need a bill to audit the Fed. We need one to<br />

abolish it.<br />

A PLAN FOR ELIMINATING THE FED<br />

So much for things not to do. Now let's get down to the<br />

business at hand. To abolish the Federal Reserve System would be<br />

quite simple. All that would be required is an act of Congress<br />

consisting of one sentence: The Federal Reserve Act and all of its<br />

amendments are hereby rescinded. But that would wipe out our<br />

monetary system overnight and create such havoc in the economy<br />

that it would play right into the hands of the globalists. They would<br />

use the resulting chaos as evidence that such a move was a mistake,<br />

and the American people would likely welcome a, rescue from the<br />

IMF/World Bank. We would find ourselves back in the Pessimistic<br />

Scenario even though we had done the right thing.<br />

There are certain steps that must precede the abandonment of<br />

the Fed if we are to have a safe passage. The first step is to convert<br />

our present fiat money into real money. That means we must create<br />

an entirely new money supply which is 100% backed by precious<br />

jQnetal—and we must do so within a reasonably short period of<br />

ime. To that end, we also must establish the true value of our<br />

present fiat money so it can be exchanged for new money on a


574 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

realistic basis and phased out of circulation. Here is how it can be<br />

done:<br />

1. Repeal the legal-tender laws. The federal government will<br />

continue accepting Federal Reserve Notes in the payment of<br />

taxes, but everyone else will be free to accept them, reject them,<br />

or discount them as they wish. There is no need to force people<br />

to accept honest money. Only fiat money needs the threat of<br />

imprisonment to back it up. Private institutions should be free to<br />

innovate and to compete. If people want to use Green Stamps or<br />

Disney-ride coupons or Bank-of-America Notes as a medium of<br />

exchange, they should be free to do so. The only requirement<br />

the Green-Stamp<br />

should be faithful fulfillment of contract. If<br />

company says it will give a crystal lamp for seven books of<br />

stamps, then it should be compelled to do so. Disney should be<br />

required to accept the coupon in exactly the manner printed on<br />

the back. And, if Bank of America tells its depositors they can<br />

have their dollars back any time they want, it shouJd be required<br />

to keep 100% backing (coins or Treasury Certificates) in its vault<br />

at all times. In the transition to a new money, it is anticipated<br />

that the old Federal Reserve Notes will continue to be widely<br />

used.<br />

2. Freeze the present supply of Federal Reserve Notes, except for<br />

what will he needed in step number eleven.<br />

3. Define the "real" dollar in terms of precious-metal content,<br />

preferably what it was in the past: 371.25 grains of silver. It<br />

could be another weight of silver or even another metal, but the<br />

old silver dollar is a proven winner.<br />

4. Establish gold as an auxiliary monetary reserve which can be<br />

substituted for silver, not at a fixed-price ratio, but at whatever<br />

ratio is set by the free market. Fixed ratios always become unfair<br />

over time as the prices of gold and silver drift relative to each<br />

other. Although gold may be substituted for silver at this ratio,<br />

it is only silver that is the foundation for the dollar.<br />

5. Restore free coinage at the U.S. Mint and issue silver "dollars"<br />

as well as gold "pieces." Both dollars and pieces will be defined<br />

by metal content, but only coins with silver content can be called<br />

dollars, half-dollars, quarter-dollars, or tenth-dollars (dimes). At<br />

first,<br />

these coins will be derived only from metal brought into<br />

A REALISTIC SCENARIO 575<br />

the Mint by private parties. They must not be drawn from the<br />

Treasury's supply which is reserved for use in step number six.<br />

6. Pay off the national debt with Federal Reserve Notes created for<br />

that purpose. Creating money without backing is forbidden by<br />

the Constitution; however, when no one is<br />

forced by law to<br />

accept Federal Reserve Notes as legal tender, they will no longer<br />

be the official money of the United States. They will be merely a<br />

kind of government script which no one is required to accept.<br />

Their utility will be determined by their usefulness in payment<br />

of taxes and by the public's anticipation of having them<br />

exchanged for real money at a later date. The creation of Federal<br />

Reserve Notes, with the understanding that they are not the<br />

official money of the United States, would therefore not be a<br />

violation of the Constitution. In any event, the deed is already<br />

done. The decision to redeem government bonds with Federal<br />

Reserve Notes is not ours. Congress decided that long ago, and<br />

the course was set at the instant those bonds were issued. We are<br />

merely playing out the hand. The money will be created for that<br />

purpose. Our only choice is when: now or later. If we allow the<br />

bonds to stand, the national debt will be repudiated by inflation.<br />

The value of the original dollars will gradually be reduced to<br />

zero while only the interest remains. Everyone's purchasing<br />

power will be destroyed, and the nation will die. But if we want<br />

not to repudiate the national debt and decide to pay it off now,<br />

we will be released from the burden of interest payments and, at<br />

the same time, prepare the way for a sound monetary system.<br />

7. Pledge the government's hoard of gold and silver (except the<br />

military stockpile) to be used as backing for all the Federal<br />

Reserve Notes in circulation. The denationalization of these<br />

assets is long overdue. At various times in recent history, it was<br />

illegal for Americans to own gold, and their private holdings<br />

were confiscated. The amount which was taken should be<br />

returned to the private sector as a matter of principle. The rest of<br />

the gold supply also belongs to the people, because they paid for<br />

it<br />

through taxes and inflation. The government has no use for<br />

gold or silver except to support the money supply. The time has<br />

come to give it back to the people and use it for that purpose.<br />

8. Determine the weight of all the gold and silver owned by the<br />

U.S. government and then calculate the total value of that<br />

supply in terms of real (silver) dollars.


576 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

9. Determine the number of all the Federal Reserve Notes in<br />

circulation and then calculate the real-dollar value of each one<br />

by dividing the value of the precious metals by the number of<br />

Notes.<br />

10. Retire all Federal Reserve Notes from circulation by offering to<br />

exchange them for dollars at the calculated ratio. There will be<br />

enough gold or silver to redeem every Federal Reserve Note in<br />

circulation.<br />

11. Convert all contracts based on Federal Reserve Notes to dollars<br />

using the same exchange ratio. That includes the contracts called<br />

mortgages and government bonds. In that way, monetary<br />

values expressed within debt obligations will be converted on<br />

the same basis and at the same time as currency.<br />

12. Issue Silver Certificates. As the Treasury redeems Federal<br />

Reserve Notes for dollars,<br />

recipients will have the option of<br />

taking coins or Treasury Certificates which are 100% backed.<br />

These Certificates will become the new paper currency.<br />

13. Abolish the Federal Reserve System. It would be possible to<br />

allow the System to continue as a check clearing-house so long<br />

as it did not function as a central bank. A check clearing-house<br />

will be needed, and the banks that presently own the Fed should<br />

be allowed to continue performing that service. However, they<br />

must no longer receive tax subsidies to operate, and competition<br />

must be allowed. However, the Federal Reserve System, as<br />

presently chartered by Congress, must be abolished.<br />

14. Introduce free banking. Banks should be deregulated and, at<br />

the same time, cut loose from protection at taxpayers' expense.<br />

No more bailouts. The FDIC and other government "insurance"<br />

agencies should be phased out, and their functions turned over<br />

to real insurance companies in the private sector. Banks should<br />

be required to keep 100% reserves for demand deposits, because<br />

that is a contractual obligation. All forms of time deposits<br />

should be presented to the public exactly as CDs are today. In<br />

other words, the depositor should be fully informed that his<br />

1. Since the value of FRNs would be firmly established in terms of real dollars,<br />

there would be no compelling reason to exchange them, and it is possible that<br />

people would continue to use them in daily commerce. Therefore, to retire the FRNs<br />

and make the transition as quickly as possible, it would be necessary to have the<br />

banks automatically exchange them for real dollars whenever they are deposited.<br />

In short order, they would become collectors' items and historical curiosities.<br />

A REALISTIC SCENARIO 577<br />

money is invested and he will have to wait a specified time<br />

before he can have it back. Competition will insure that those<br />

institutions that best serve their customers' needs will prosper.<br />

Those that do not will fall by the wayside—without the need of<br />

an army of bank regulators.<br />

15. Reduce the size and scope of government No solution to our<br />

economic problems is possible under socialism. It is the author's<br />

view that the government should be limited to the protection of<br />

life, liberty, and property—nothing more. That means the<br />

elimination of almost all of the socialist-oriented programs that<br />

now infest the federal bureaucracy. If we hope to<br />

retain—or<br />

perhaps to regain—our freedom, they simply have to go. To that<br />

end, the federal government should sell all assets not directly<br />

related to its primary function of protection; it should privately<br />

sub-contract as many of its services as possible; and it should<br />

greatly reduce and simplify its taxes.<br />

16. Restore national independence. A similar restraint must be<br />

applied at the international level. We must reverse all programs<br />

leading to disarmament and economic interdependence. The<br />

most significant step in that direction will be to Get us out of the<br />

UN and the UN out of the US, but that will be just the beginning.<br />

There are hundreds of treaties and administrative agreements<br />

that must be rescinded. There may be a few that are constructive<br />

and mutually beneficial to us and other nations, but the great<br />

majority of them will have to go. That is<br />

not because we are<br />

isolationist. It is simply because we want to avoid being<br />

engulfed in global tyranny.<br />

Some will say that paying off the national debt with Federal<br />

Reserve Notes amounts to a repudiation of the debt. Not so.<br />

Accepting the old Notes for payment of taxes is not repudiation.<br />

Exchanging them for their appropriate share of the nation's gold or<br />

silver is not repudiation. Converting them straight across to a<br />

sound money with little or no loss of purchasing power is not<br />

repudiation. The only thing that would be repudiated is<br />

the old<br />

I monetary system, but that was designed to be repudiated. The<br />

monetary and political scientists who created and sustained the<br />

Federal Reserve System never intended to repay the national debt.<br />

It has been their ticket to profit and power. Inflation is repudiation<br />

on the installment plan. The present system is a political trick, an


Although<br />

578 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

accounting gimmick. We are merely acknowledging what it is. We<br />

are simply refusing to pretend we don't understand what they are<br />

doing to us. We are refusing to play the game any longer.<br />

MEASURING THE SIZE OF THE HANGOVER<br />

So those are the sixteen steps, but what are their effects?<br />

should come as no surprise that there is a price to pay for a return<br />

to monetary sobriety. A hangover cannot be avoided, except by<br />

continuing the binge, which is the road to death. Lef s take a look at<br />

what this binge has already cost us. We will measure that by<br />

calculating how much each Federal Reserve Note will be worth<br />

when the new money appears.<br />

The following figures are presented for illustrative purposes<br />

only. The data are drawn from public sources and from the Federal<br />

Reserve itself, but there is no way to know how accurate they really<br />

are. In addition to the question of accuracy, there are some<br />

statistical items which are so obscure that not even the experts at<br />

the Fed are certain what they mean. When the time comes to apply<br />

this program, it will be necessary to assemble a task force of experts<br />

who can audit the books and assay the metals. Nevertheless, based<br />

on the best information available to the public, this is what we get:<br />

The total quantity of silver held by the government on<br />

September 30, 1993, was 30,200,000 troy ounces. If we<br />

assume the new dollar will be defined as 371.25 grains of<br />

silver (which equals .77344 troy ounces), then that supply is<br />

valued at $39,046,338. 1<br />

The price of gold on that date was 384.95 Federal-Reserve notes<br />

per ounce. Silver was 4.99 fiat dollars per ounce. The ratio<br />

between them, therefore, was 77-to-l.<br />

The supply of gold was 261,900,000 ounces. The value of the<br />

gold supply, therefore, (at 77 times its weight in ounces) was<br />

$26,073,517,000.<br />

The value of silver and gold combined would be<br />

$26,112,563,338.<br />

It<br />

I<br />

The<br />

A REALISTIC SCENARIO 579<br />

The number of Federal-Reserve notes this supply would have to<br />

redeem would be the combined total of the Ml money<br />

supply (currency and demand deposits) plus the additional<br />

number of notes needed to pay off the national debt. Ml on<br />

September 27, 1993, was 1,103,700,000,000 FRNs. 1 The<br />

national debt stood at 4,395,700,000,000 FRNs. The total<br />

amount to be redeemed, therefore, would be<br />

5,499,400,000,000 FRNs.<br />

bottom line of this calculation is that the value of each<br />

Federal-Reserve note will be equal to .0047 silver dollar. One<br />

silver dollar would be worth 213 Federal-Reserve notes!<br />

BAD, BUT NOT THAT BAD<br />

That will be a bitter pill to swallow, but it sounds worse than it<br />

really is.<br />

Remember that the new dollars will have more purchasing<br />

power than the old. Coins will play a larger role in everyday<br />

transactions. The nickel phone call and the ten-cent cigar will have<br />

returned. In the beginning at least, the price of these items probably<br />

will be less than that. As explained in chapter seven, any quantity of<br />

gold or silver will work as the foundation for a monetary system. If<br />

the quantity is low—as certainly will be the case at the time of<br />

transition—it merely means the value of each unit of measure will<br />

be high. In that case, coins will solve the problem. Pennies would<br />

be used for a cup of coffee; one mill (a tenth of a cent) would pay<br />

for a phone call, and so on. New, small-denomination tokens<br />

would fill that need. In a relatively short period of time, however,<br />

the monetary supply of gold and silver would increase in response<br />

to free-market demand. When the supply increases,<br />

the relative<br />

value will decrease until a natural equilibrium is reached—as<br />

always has happened in the past. At that point, the tokens will no<br />

longer be needed and can be phased out.<br />

An inconvenience? Yes. Vending machines will have to be<br />

retrofitted for the new coins, but that would be no more difficult<br />

than retrofitting them to take paper bills or plastic debit cards,<br />

which is what will be required if we do not adopt these measures. It<br />

is a small price to pay for an orderly return to real money.<br />

1 ,<br />

the weight of the silver-dollar is 412.5 grains (.8594 troy ounces), it is<br />

only 90% pure. Its silver content, however, is exactly 371.25 grains (.77344 troy<br />

ounces).<br />

1. For those who feel that M2 or M3 would be a more logical figure, see "Is Ml<br />

Subtractive or Accumulative?" in the Appendix, containing the author's notes and<br />

correspondence with the Federal Reserve.


580 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

Another possible solution would be to redefine the new dollar<br />

to contain a smaller quantity of silver. The advantage would be that<br />

we could continue to use our present coinage. On the negative side,<br />

however, is the fact that it would create headaches after the<br />

transition, because coinage then would be too cheap. Instead of<br />

changing over now, we would merely be postponing the task for<br />

later. Now is the time to do it—and do it right. The original value of<br />

a silver dollar was determined after centuries of trial and error. We<br />

don't have to reinvent the wheel. We know that it will work in the<br />

long run.<br />

In the past, the banks have enjoyed a bountiful cash flow from<br />

interest on money created out of nothing. That will change. They<br />

will have to make a clear distinction between demand deposits and<br />

time deposits. Customers wilJ be informed that, if they want the<br />

privilege of receiving their money back on demand, their deposit of<br />

coins or Treasury Certificates will be kept in<br />

the vault and not<br />

loaned to others. Therefore, it will not earn interest for the bank. If<br />

must charge<br />

the bank cannot make money on the deposit, then it<br />

the depositor a fee for safeguarding his money and for checking<br />

services. If the customer wants to earn interest on his deposit, then<br />

he will be informed that it will be invested or loaned out, in which<br />

case he cannot expect to get it back any time he wants. He will<br />

knowingly put his money into a time deposit with the agreement<br />

that a specified amount of time must pass before the investment<br />

matures.<br />

The effect of this practice on banking will be enormous. Banks<br />

will have to pay higher interest rates to attract investment capital.<br />

They will have to trim their overhead expenses and eliminate some<br />

of the plush. Profit margins will be tightened. Efficiency will<br />

improve. They used to offer "free" services which actually were<br />

paid out of interest earned on their customers' demand deposits.<br />

Now they will charge for those services, such as checking and safe<br />

storage of deposits. Customers probably will grumble at first at<br />

having to pay for those things, and there will be no more free<br />

toasters.<br />

Electronic transfer systems will probably become popular for<br />

their convenience, but they will be optional. Cash and check<br />

transactions will continue to play an important role. Government<br />

monitoring will be illegal. Although there will be fewer dollars in<br />

circulation than there were Federal Reserve Notes, the value of<br />

A REALISTIC SCENARIO 581<br />

each one will be correspondingly greater. Each person will end up<br />

with the same purchasing power he had before the conversion. For<br />

a<br />

short period, both the old and the new money will circulate<br />

together, and some people will have difficulty making the necessary<br />

calculations to determine their relative values. But that is<br />

routine operation for people who live in Europe or for anyone who<br />

travels to a foreign country. There is no reason to think that<br />

Americans are too stupid to handle it.<br />

SOME BAD NEWS AND SOME GOOD<br />

We should not delude ourselves into thinking that this will be<br />

an easy transition. It will be a very difficult period, and people will<br />

have to get used to a whole new way of thinking and doing. The<br />

freeze on the current money supply may trigger panic in the stock<br />

market and the business community. Stock prices could tumble,<br />

causing paper fortunes to disappear back into the computers from<br />

which they came. Some businesses may fold for a lack of easy<br />

credit. Weak banks will be allowed to close rather than be bailed<br />

out with taxes. Unemployment may worsen for a while. Those who<br />

have been used to a free ride will now have to walk or push or pay<br />

their way. The masses on welfare will not give up their checks and<br />

food stamps quietly. The media will fan the flames of discontent.<br />

The Cabal will be at every switch to derail the train.<br />

This will be the moment of our greatest danger, the moment<br />

when the people could tire of their hard journey in the desert and<br />

lose interest in the promised land. This is the time when they may<br />

long for a return to captivity and head back to the slave pits of<br />

Pharaoh.<br />

The important point, however, is that most of these problems<br />

would be temporary. They would be present only during the<br />

period of transition to a new money. As soon as free coinage is<br />

available at the Mint, and as soon as people see how much demand<br />

there is for silver and gold coins, there will be a steady stream of<br />

miners and jewelers who will add great new stores of precious<br />

metal to the nation's monetary stock. Foreigners undoubtedly will<br />

add to the inflow. Old silver and gold coins will also reappear in<br />

the market place. Very quickly, as the stores of precious metal<br />

respond to supply and demand, the quantity of money will<br />

increase and its per-unit value will drop to its natural equilibrium.<br />

a


582 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

'<br />

A REALISTIC SCENARIO 583<br />

Won't that be inflation? Yes it will, but it will be significantly<br />

different from inflation by fiat money on four counts: (1) instead of<br />

being caused by politicians and bankers attempting to manipulate<br />

the economy to enhance their personal agendas, it will be caused<br />

by natural economic forces seeking an equilibrium of supply and<br />

demand; (2) instead of being harmful to the nation, leading to the<br />

destruction of the economy, it<br />

will be part of a healing process,<br />

leading to prosperity; (3) it will be less severe than what we will<br />

experience if we do not make the transition; and (4), instead of<br />

being part of a continuum that is designed to go on forever, it will<br />

have a built-in termination point: the point of natural equilibrium<br />

where the human effort to mine gold and silver equals the effort to<br />

create those things which gold and silver can buy. When that point<br />

is<br />

reached, the money supply will cease to expand, and inflation<br />

will stop—once and for all. The hangover will be gone. From that<br />

point forward, prices will begin a gradual descent as advances in<br />

technology allow improved efficiency in production. With the<br />

arrival of lower prices, better job opportunities, and increasing<br />

prosperity, the voices of discontent will gradually fade. After the<br />

storm is over, America will have an honest money supply, a<br />

government with no national debt, and an economy without<br />

inflation.<br />

No matter what scenario unfolds in the future, there is white<br />

water ahead. We had better tighten our straps and prepare for the<br />

rapids. We owe it to ourselves and our families to take measures<br />

which will increase our chances of coming out at the other side. If<br />

the pessimistic scenario is played out, it will make little difference<br />

what we do, because there will be no other side. But in the realistic<br />

scenario, there are certain precautions that will make a big difference<br />

in our economic well being.<br />

To fully appreciate the wisdom of some of these measures, it is<br />

well for us to pause and consider the possibility that a transition to<br />

economic safety and sanity will not be orderly. Another variant of<br />

the realistic scenario is that our entire system could collapse,<br />

including the international structure being assembled at the UN. If<br />

that should happen, we won't have to worry about an orderly<br />

transition to a sound monetary system, because it won't happen.<br />

Our primary concern will be basic survival.<br />

Economic chaos and civil disorder would not necessarily have to<br />

be the prelude to world government. If a sufficient number of<br />

people were well enough informed to know in advance what the<br />

enemy's game plan is, and especially if they were in the right places<br />

within the system, they might be able to provide leadership at the<br />

critical moment. If there is blood in the streets and long periods of<br />

anarchy, it is theoretically possible that groups of enlightened<br />

individuals who have prepared in advance could move into the<br />

power vacuum and take charge. That may sound like another<br />

pessimistic scenario, but it is not. In the final analysis, it may be the<br />

most realistic one of all. But we should not hope for it. All we can<br />

do is prepare for it should it come to pass.<br />

HOW TO PREPARE<br />

What can we do to prepare financially? To avoid making this a<br />

lengthy dissertation, let's use the outline form. Elaboration should<br />

not be necessary.<br />

1. Get out of debt. A mortgage on one's home is a logical exception,<br />

provided the price is right. Borrowing for one's business is also<br />

an exception if based on a sound business plan. Speculative<br />

investments are not a good idea in these times unless they are<br />

made with money you can afford to lose.<br />

2. Pick a sound bank. Maintain accounts at several institutions. Do<br />

not keep over $100,000 in any one bank. Remember that not all<br />

types of accounts are covered by FDIC. Some institutions now<br />

offer private insurance. Make sure you know to what extent you<br />

are at risk.<br />

3. Diversify your investments among blue ribbon, over-thecounter,<br />

growth, income, large, small, mutuals, bonds, real<br />

estate, bullion coins, mining stock, and tangibles. Industries that<br />

do well in hard times are gambling, alcohol, and escapist<br />

entertainment. Study the fields and companies in which you<br />

invest. Personal knowledge is indispensable.<br />

:4. Avoid the most recent "best" performers. Their great track<br />

records are historical. They have no bearing on future<br />

performance. To the contrary, they may now be overpriced and<br />

1. That is not an easy assignment. It helps to have professional assistance from an<br />

independent source which is able to analyze asset quality> loan ratios, equity ratios,<br />

loan-loss reserves, and the like. One of the best sources of this kind of information<br />

is Veribanc. For a nominal fee, this bank-rating service will provide you with<br />

detailed reports on any bank or saving & loan in America. If you want their<br />

brochure, write to them at P.O. Box 461, Wakefield, MA 01880.


584 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

poised for a fall.<br />

See how an investment fared over the long<br />

run—at least fifteen years—and particularly how it performed<br />

during periods of economic downturn.<br />

5. When investing in coins, avoid those with high numismatic<br />

value—unless you are prepared to become an expert. As with<br />

other types of investments, seek advice but don't depend on it.<br />

The same is true for diamonds, art pieces, and other collectibles.<br />

Stay with what you know. Otherwise, you will be vulnerable in<br />

shark-infested waters where even the most experienced traders<br />

can lose money.<br />

6. Maintain a stash of cash, including some old silver coins. The<br />

currency should be enough to provide your family with<br />

necessities for about two months. The coins are for more severe<br />

and prolonged conditions. There is no "correct" quantity. It is a<br />

matter of personal judgment and financial ability.<br />

PROFITING FROM DISASTER<br />

All of this is aimed at surviving the storm and preparing<br />

ourselves to offer leadership in troubled times ahead. That is a<br />

rather negative view. There is a more positive outlook for those<br />

who are looking for good news, as Adlai Stevenson said. It is the<br />

exciting prospect that we can turn this calamity to our advantage.<br />

We can actually profit from the coming collapse. That thought has<br />

spawned hundreds of books and newsletters offering advice on<br />

how to get rich while others are being destroyed. There is even one<br />

that gives advice on how to cash in on the environmental-industry<br />

boom. The pitch is how to make a fortune on the downfall of<br />

America.<br />

There is no doubt that opportunities exist to profit from<br />

investment decisions based on a realistic appraisal of current<br />

trends. Most of those opportunities/ however depend on making<br />

market-timing decisions. One must know precisely when to buy,<br />

when to self, and at what price. To know all that, the investor must<br />

become expert on the nature of the industries involved and must<br />

monitor the daily shifts in market forces. He must attempt to<br />

complete his analysis and reach his conclusions in advance of the<br />

crowd. And, of course, he must be right Most investors are not<br />

prepared to do that, so they must depend on the services of<br />

professionals, usually the same experts who are encouraging them<br />

to invest in these kinds of enterprises. If the investment is<br />

profit-<br />

A REALISTIC SCENARIO 585<br />

able, the analyst receives an income. If the investment turns sour,<br />

the analyst still receives an income.<br />

That relationship is not unique to the "profit-from-crash"<br />

group, however. It is to be found at every level of the investment<br />

business as well as within the legal and medical professions. The<br />

customer pays for the advice regardless of its quality. What is<br />

disturbing about this investment concept is that it actually may<br />

help to make matters worse. By focusing on finding clever ways to<br />

avoid the effects of inflation or of making a profit from it, we are<br />

doing nothing to stop it and, thereby, encouraging its continuation.<br />

Those who are gaining from inflation are not likely to offer serious<br />

resistance to it. As they watch their profits pile up, they may<br />

become its most ardent supporters—


586 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND A REALISTIC SCENARIO 587<br />

working together, however, they multiply their efforts and<br />

equal a force of nine. That is the power of organization. When<br />

choosing an organization, look for experienced and principled<br />

leadership which has proven that it understands the deeper<br />

issues and cannot be sidetracked by the Cabal.<br />

4. Form an educational study group. Give it an enticing name such<br />

as The Reality Club or The Awareness Lunch Bunch. Make the<br />

meetings interesting and short. Use local speakers, ask members<br />

to give book reviews, show videos, have mock debates, throw<br />

parties. The goal is<br />

choir.<br />

to reach new people, not to preach to the<br />

5. Form ad-hoc committees, along with other like-minded friends,<br />

to promote specific projects and programs. Here are a few<br />

hypothetical examples covering a range of issues: The<br />

Committee for Sound Money, Parents for Better Education,<br />

Americans for Tax Relief, North-Bay Residents for Private<br />

Property. That is an excellent way to bring pressure to bear on<br />

the political structure and, at the same time, attract the support<br />

of new people who share your common objective.<br />

6. Expand your influence within the community. People seldom<br />

follow strangers. Become known and respected for your<br />

knowledge. Join groups which are influential within your city<br />

or profession. Political groups are particularly important,<br />

regardless of party. Volunteer for work and seek a leadership<br />

role. Personally visit your city and county politicians and<br />

maintain ongoing communication. Send them books, articles,<br />

baseball tickets—anything to make sure they don't forget who<br />

you are. This is doubly important for political candidates. If you<br />

have the talent and the aptitude, consider running for some kind<br />

of public office yourself.<br />

7. Use politics, don't be used by it We got into our present mess<br />

through politics and we must get out the same way; but getting<br />

out is a lot harder than getting in. The strategy, however, is<br />

simple: remove the big-spending internationalists from office<br />

and replace them with men and women dedicated to sound<br />

money and national independence. The way to remove the<br />

spenders is to expose their voting records to their constituents,<br />

most of whom have no idea how they vote on key issues. The<br />

way to get better candidates elected is to volunteer to work in<br />

their campaigns. Work within party organizations where<br />

possible but beware! Never allow loyalty to the party to<br />

override loyalty to principle. Political parties are always<br />

controlled from the top, and the major parties are controlled by<br />

the very forces we must oppose. It is imperative that you and<br />

your candidate remain independent of party control. Otherwise,<br />

your money and your effort eventually will be used against<br />

you.<br />

With that warning aside, we should be encouraged by the fact<br />

that the task is not as overwhelming as it seems. The power to<br />

reverse the present trend rests in the hands of only 535 people.<br />

There are 435 Representatives and 100 Senators. To control a<br />

majority, all we have to do is influence the election of 268 people. In<br />

reality, if we began to come even close to that figure, we likely<br />

would see a wave of sudden political conversions among those<br />

who remain in office. It is possible that we could achieve our goal<br />

by influencing the election in only 100 Congressional districts! By<br />

using the political freedom that yet remains in our system, we can<br />

overthrow the government of the United States every two years<br />

without firing a shot! But we had better get going on it. Time is<br />

running out.<br />

CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY<br />

We have finally come to the end of this book. It was not a<br />

<strong>text</strong>book on banking theory. It was a who-dunnit, and by now you<br />

know the answer.<br />

We have covered a vast expanse of history and have wandered<br />

yfar afield from our main topic. It was necessary. Without the larger<br />

TOew, the case against the Federal Reserve System would have been<br />

^veak. It would have omitted the elements of war, revolution,<br />

[depression, and fraud. Without that long journey, we would be<br />

limited to a sterile discussion of interest rates, discount policies,<br />

and reserve ratios. That is not where the body is hidden.<br />

In the foreword, it was stated that there were seven reasons to<br />

abolish the Federal Reserve System. It is time to repeat them here:<br />

1. An excellent analysis of the voting records of all Congressmen and Senators is<br />

published each year by The New American magazine, P.O. Box 8040, Appleton,<br />

Wisconsin 54913. The same organization makes available bulk supplies of<br />

pamphlets tailored to each Congressional district for distribution to the public. The<br />

big spenders hate them!


588 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />

• It is incapable of accomplishing its stated objectives.<br />

• It is a cartel operating against the public interest.<br />

• It is the supreme instrument of usury.<br />

• It generates our most unfair tax.<br />

• It encourages war.<br />

• It destabilizes the economy.<br />

• It is an instrument of totalitarianism.<br />

The purpose of this book has been to demonstrate the accuracy<br />

of those assertions.<br />

A plan for recovery was finally presented which involves<br />

sixteen steps, each based upon lessons which emerged from<br />

history. These lessons were mingled with a large amount of theory<br />

which is traceable only to the mind of the author himself. Which is<br />

to say there is no guarantee the plan will work. But it is a plan. It is<br />

better to fail trying than to do nothing. Like men on a sinking ship,<br />

we must risk the water. We cannot stay where we are.<br />

There undoubtedly are technical flaws in these proposals, for<br />

the mechanism is merely a prototype. Someone surely will discover<br />

a gear that will not mesh or a lever that is disconnected. It will need<br />

the additional work of specialists in many diverse fields. Even then,<br />

the job will not be complete, for it must finally be handed over to<br />

those who are skilled in drafting legislation. Their task will be<br />

two-fold. First, they must make it workable in the real world of<br />

politics. Secondly, they must prevent loopholes and vagaries which<br />

could eventually subvert the plan.<br />

But none of these considerations should deter us from beginning<br />

the process. We may not have answers to all<br />

the technical<br />

questions, but we do have an answer to the big question. We do<br />

know that the Federal Reserve System must be abolished. Let us,<br />

therefore, begin.<br />

The Creature has grown large and powerful since its conception<br />

on <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island. It now roams across every continent and<br />

compels the masses to serve it, feed it, obey it, worship it. If it is not<br />

slain, it will become our eternal lord and master.<br />

Can it be slain? Yes it can.<br />

How will it be slain? By piercing it with a million lances of truth.<br />

Who will slay it? A million crusaders with determination and<br />

courage.<br />

The crusade has already begun.<br />

AN INVITATION<br />

If you would like to join me in this crusade to<br />

abolish the Federal Reserve and to restore American<br />

prosperity, let me know who you are. I will advise<br />

you of important developments and will put you in<br />

touch with others who are already in the battle. I<br />

will also send you a list of books, videos, pamphlets,<br />

and other materials you will need for carrying the<br />

message to your friends. Send a self-addressed,<br />

business-size envelope with two postage stamps to:<br />

G. Edward Griffin<br />

P.O. Box 4646<br />

Westlake Village, CA 91359-1646<br />

Materials may also be obtained at our website:<br />

www.realityzone.com


590 APPENDIX<br />

(A.) STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION<br />

OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM<br />

The three main components of the Fed are: (1) the national Board<br />

of Governors, (2) the regional Reserve Banks, and (3) the Federal Open<br />

Market Committee. Lesser components include: (4) the commercial<br />

banks which hold the stock, and (5) the advisory councils.<br />

The function of the national Board of Governors is to determine<br />

the system's monetary policy. The Board consists of seven members<br />

who are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.<br />

Their terms of office are fourteen years and are staggered so that they<br />

do not coincide with the presidential term of office. The purpose of this<br />

is to insure that no single President can dominate Fed policy by<br />

stacking the Board with his appointments. One Board member is<br />

appointed as the Chairman for four years and another as Vice<br />

Chairman for four years. The Chairman controls the staff and is the<br />

single most powerful influence within the system.<br />

Control is exercised by the Board and a handful of top staff<br />

employees. The Federal Reserve Act mandated that the President,<br />

when selecting Governors "shall have due regard to a fair representation<br />

of the financial, agricultural, industrial and commercial<br />

interests, and geographical divisions of the country." This mandate is<br />

now almost completely ignored, and the men come primarily from the<br />

fields of banking and finance.<br />

The function of the regional Reserve Banks is to hold cash reserves<br />

of the system, supply currency to member banks, clear checks, and act<br />

as fiscal agent for the government.<br />

The twelve regional Reserve Banks are located in Atlanta, Boston,<br />

Chicago, Cleveland, Dallas, Kansas City, Minneapolis, New York,<br />

Philadelphia, Richmond, San Francisco, and St. Louis. They are<br />

corporations with stock held by the commercial banks which are<br />

members of the system. Member banks elect the directors of the<br />

regional Reserve Banks of which they are a part. The larger banks hold<br />

more shares but they have only one vote in the selection of the<br />

Directors.<br />

Within each regional-bank system there are nine Directors. The<br />

member banks elect three Class-A directors who represent the banking<br />

industry and three Class-B directors who represent the general public.<br />

The remaining three Class-C directors are appointed by the national<br />

Board. The Chairman and Vice Chairman of each regional Reserve<br />

Bank must be Class-C directors. The selection of President and other<br />

officers is subject to veto by the national Board of Governors. In this<br />

way, the national Board is able to exercise control over the regional<br />

branches of the system.<br />

APPENDIX 591<br />

The function of the Federal Open Market Committee is to implement<br />

the monetary policy set by national Board, although it exercises<br />

considerable autonomy in setting its own policy. It manipulates the<br />

money supply and interest rates primarily by purchasing or selling<br />

government securities—although it also accomplishes that through the<br />

purchase or sale of foreign currencies and the securities of other<br />

governments as well. Money is<br />

created and interest rates go down<br />

when it purchases. Money is extinguished and interest rates go up<br />

when it sells. Policy is formulated on a daily basis. In fact, it is<br />

monitored by the minute and the Committee often intervenes in the<br />

market to affect immediate changes.<br />

The Open Market Committee is composed of the national Board of<br />

Governors plus five of the twelve regional Presidents who serve on a<br />

rotating basis. The exception to this is the President of the New York<br />

regional Bank who is always on the Committee. Thus, once again, the<br />

System is firmly in control of the national Board with the President of<br />

the New York regional Bank being more powerful than the others.<br />

Twenty-four bond dealers handle all sales of government securities.<br />

Government agencies cannot exchange with each other without<br />

going through dealers who earn commissions on each transaction.<br />

Decisions are made at secret meetings. A brief report is released to<br />

the public six weeks later, but transcripts of the deliberations are<br />

destroyed. That policy was begun in 1970 when the Freedom-of-Information<br />

Act was passed. Not even the CIA enjoys such secrecy.<br />

The function of the member banks is to conduct the nation's<br />

banking business and to implement the System's monetary policy in<br />

terms of putting money into or drawing it out of the system at the<br />

point of contact with individual or corporate borrowers.<br />

This leads to the troublesome question of ownership. The federal<br />

government does not own any stock in the System. In that sense, the<br />

Fed is privately owned. That, however, is misleading in that it implies<br />

a typical private-ownership relationship in which the stockholders<br />

own and control. Nothing could be further from the truth. In this case,<br />

the stock carries no proprietary interest, cannot be sold or pledged as<br />

collateral, and does not carry ordinary voting rights. Each bank is<br />

entitled to but one vote regardless of the amount of stock it holds. In<br />

reality, the stock is not evidence of "ownership" but simply certificates<br />

showing how much operating capital each bank has put into the<br />

System. It is not a government agency and it is not a private corporation<br />

in the normal sense of the word. It is subject to political control yet,<br />

because of its tremendous power over politicians and the elective<br />

process, it has managed to remain independent of political oversight.<br />

Simply stated, it is a cartel, and its organizational structure is uniquely<br />

structured to serve that end.


592 APPENDIX<br />

(B.) NATURAL LAWS<br />

OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR IN ECONOMICS<br />

NATURAL LAW NO. 1<br />

LESSON: When gold (or silver) is used as money and when the<br />

forces of supply and demand are not thwarted by government<br />

intervention, the amount of new metal added to the money supply<br />

will always be closely proportional to the expanding services and<br />

goods which can be purchased with it. Long-term stability of prices<br />

is the dependable result of these forces. This process is automatic<br />

and impartial. Any attempt by politicians to intervene will destroy<br />

the benefit for all. Therefore,<br />

LAW: Long-term price stability is possible only when the<br />

money supply is based upon the gold (or silver) supply without<br />

government interference.<br />

NATURAL LAW NO. 2<br />

LESSON: Whenever government sets out to manipulate the<br />

money supply, regardless of the intelligence or good intentions of<br />

those who attempt to direct the process, the result is inflation,<br />

economic chaos, and political upheaval. By contrast, whenever<br />

government is limited in its monetary power to only the<br />

maintenance of honest weights and measures of precious metals,<br />

the result is price stability, economic prosperity, and political<br />

tranquility. Therefore,<br />

LAW: For a nation to enjoy economic prosperity and political<br />

tranquility, the monetary power of its politicians must be limited<br />

solely to the maintenance of honest weights and measures of<br />

precious metals.<br />

NATURAL LAW NO. 3<br />

LESSON: Fiat money is paper money without precious-metal<br />

backing and which people are required by law to accept. It allows<br />

politicians to increase spending without raising taxes. Fiat money<br />

is the cause of inflation, and the amount which people lose in<br />

purchasing power is exactly the amount which was taken from<br />

them and transferred to their government by this process. Inflation,<br />

therefore, is a hidden tax. This tax is the most unfair of all because<br />

it falls most heavily on those who are least able to pay: the small<br />

wage earner and those on fixed incomes. It also punishes the thrifty<br />

by eroding the value of their savings. This creates resentment<br />

among the people/ leading always to political unrest and national<br />

disunity. Therefore,<br />

LAW: A nation that resorts to the use of hat money has doomed<br />

itself to economic hardship and political disunity.<br />

APPENDIX 593<br />

NATURAL LAW NO. 4<br />

LESSON: Fractional money is paper money which is backed by<br />

precious metals up to only a portion of the face amount. It is a<br />

hybrid, being part receipt money and part fiat money. Generally,<br />

the public is unaware of this fact and believes that fractional money<br />

can be redeemed in full at any time. When the truth is discovered,<br />

as periodically happens, there are runs on the bank, and only the<br />

first few depositors in line can be paid. Since fractional money<br />

earns just as much interest for the bankers as does gold or silver, the<br />

temptation is great for them to create as much of it as possible. As<br />

this happens, the fraction which represents the reserve becomes<br />

smaller and smaller until, eventually, it is reduced to zero.<br />

Therefore,<br />

LAW: Fractional money will always degenerate into fiat<br />

money. It is but fiat money in transition.<br />

NATURAL LAW NO. 5<br />

LESSON: It is human nature for man to place personal<br />

priorities ahead of all<br />

others. Even the best of men cannot long<br />

resist the temptation to benefit at the expense of their neighbors if<br />

the occasion is placed squarely before them. This is especially true<br />

when the means by which they benefit is obscure and not likely to<br />

be perceived as such. There may be exceptional men from time to<br />

time who can resist that temptation, but their numbers are small.<br />

The general rule will prevail in the long run.<br />

A managed economy presents men with precisely that kind of<br />

opportunity. The power to create and extinguish the nation's<br />

money supply provides unlimited potential for personal gain.<br />

Throughout history the granting of that power has been justified as<br />

being necessary to protect the public, but the results have always<br />

been the opposite. It has been used against the public and for the<br />

personal gain of those who control. Therefore,<br />

LAW: When men are entrusted with the power to control the<br />

money supply, they will eventually use that power to confiscate the<br />

wealth of their neighbors.


.<br />

594 APPENDIX APPENDIX 595<br />

(C.)<br />

IS M-l SUBTRACTIVE OR ACCUMULATIVE?<br />

Below is a copy of the author's letter to Mike Dubrow at the Public<br />

Information department of the Federal Reserve System. In a telephone<br />

conversation on February 14, 1994, Mr. Dubrow said that the assumption<br />

stated in the letter would be correct if it were not for the fact that<br />

the system is under the control of a central bank. The Federal Reserve,<br />

he said, would not allow that to happen, because it would be<br />

inflationary. The Fed would reduce the money supply to offset the<br />

effect of monetary expansion as dollars moved from M-l to M-2 and<br />

back to M-l again. In other words, the assumption is correct, but the<br />

Fed has the power to offset it—if it wants to. The bottom line is that<br />

M-l is accumulative. As such, it is the most meaningful measure of the<br />

money supply.<br />

Q. Cdwwtd Qfdffin<br />

ftaoc 4646, Wntfafa Vtfbtye OR 91359<br />

MikeDubrow<br />

FAX #(202) 452-2707<br />

FederalReserveSystem<br />

Washington.DC<br />

DearMr. Dubrow,<br />

January 19, 1994<br />

Aswe discussed duringourphoneconversation this<br />

morning, I am preparing a paper on the Federal Reserve<br />

System, and an interesting question has arisen. Jt is so<br />

fund amental that almost everyone withwhom I have spoken<br />

thought they knew the answer but, upon analysis,<br />

have concluded theywere not so su re after alJ<br />

IS Ml SUBTRACTIVE OR ACCUMULATIVE?<br />

It is my u nderstanding that there are three optional<br />

definitions ofthemoney supply:<br />

Ml = currency + short-term deposits.<br />

+ short-term time deposits,<br />

M2 = M 1<br />

M3 = M2 + institutional long-term deposits.<br />

It is clear that, when money is paid out ofa checking<br />

account and put into a savings account, it increases M2,<br />

but the question is: Does it remain as part ofM 1 or is it<br />

subtracted from it? Herbert Mayo, in his book Investments<br />

(Chicago: Dryden Press, 1983), says "If individuals<br />

shift funds from savings accounts to checking<br />

accounts, the money supply is increased under the<br />

narrow definition (M-l) but is unaffected if the<br />

broader definition (M-2) is employed." This implies<br />

that, when money is moved from a checking account<br />

to a savings account, it is subtracted from M 1 . Otherwise,<br />

it would not increase Ml when it is moved back<br />

again from savings to checking. When we spoke on<br />

the phone, you confirmed that his interpretation is<br />

correct.<br />

But how can that be?The money moved from checking<br />

to savings or any other investment does not d isappear<br />

into a vault. It is spent in fulfillment ofthe<br />

investment project. It is given to a vendor or a contractor<br />

or an employee and reappears in theircheckingaccounts<br />

where it becomes part ofM 1 once again. It would seem,<br />

therefore, that it doesn't really leave M 1 at all. It merely<br />

increases M2.<br />

I have hypothesized one possible explanation. It is<br />

that the money does, in fact, disappear into a vault, or<br />

at least into a bookkeeping ledger, for a short period of<br />

time. That would be the time between its deposit into<br />

the savings account and its subsequent transfer to<br />

the checking accounts of borrowers. The time period<br />

might be short — perhaps less than thirty days on the<br />

average—but it still needs to be considered when calculating<br />

the money aggregates. Therefore, Ml is reduced<br />

when money is transferred from checking to<br />

savings, but that is only a temporary effect. M 1 will<br />

be increased once again just as soon as the new M2<br />

money is redirected to borrowers. Is that a correct explanation?<br />

Thankyou foryou r help with these puzzling items.<br />

Sincerely,<br />

G.EdwardGriffin<br />

(805)496-1649


. Why<br />

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Siegel, Barry. Money in Crisis: The Federal Reserve, the Economy, and Monetary Reform.<br />

Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger, 1984<br />

Simpson, Colin. The Lusitania. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1972.<br />

Smith, Arthur. The Real Colonel House. New York: George H. Doran Company, 1918.<br />

Smith, Vera C. The Rationale of Central Banking. London: P.S. King & Son, 1936.<br />

Smyth, Albert Henry, ed. The Writings of Benjamin Franklin. New York: Macmillan, 1906.<br />

VoL VU<br />

BIBUOGRAPHY 601<br />

Sprague, Irvine H. Bailout: An Insider's Account of Bank Failures and Rescues. New York:<br />

Basic Books, 1986.<br />

Steffens, Lincoln. The Letters of Lincoln Steffens. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1941.<br />

Stephenson, Nathaniel Wright. Nelson W. Aldrich in American Politics. New York:<br />

Scribners, 1930; rpt. New York: Kennikat Press, 1971.<br />

Sumner, William Graham. A History ofAmerican Currency. New York: Holt, 1884.<br />

Sutton, Anthony C The Best Enemy Money Can Buy. Billings, Montana: Liberty House<br />

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. National Suicide: Military Aid to the Soviet Union. New Rochelle. New York:<br />

Arlington House, 1973.<br />

Wall Street and the Bolshevik Revolution.<br />

House, 1974<br />

.<br />

—<br />

.<br />

New Rochelle, New York: Arlington<br />

Wall Street and FDR. New Rochelle, New York: Arlington House, 1975.<br />

Wall Street and the Rise of Hitler. Seal Beach, California; '76 Press, 1976.<br />

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Tocqueville, Alexis de. Democracy in America, Vol. II. New York: Alfred Knopf, 1945.<br />

Trotsky, Leon. My Life. New York: Scribner's, 1930.<br />

Turner, Dennis. When Your Bank Fails. Princeton, New Jersey: Am well Publishing, Inc.,<br />

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United Nations. 1985 Report on the World Social Situation. New York: United Nations,<br />

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. From Farm Boy to Financier. New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1935.<br />

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Watt, James G. The Courage of A Conservative. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985.<br />

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1972.<br />

Yago, Glenn, junk Bonds: How High Yield Securities Restructured Corporate America. New<br />

York: Oford University Press, 1991.


602 INDEX<br />

INDEX 603<br />

Acceptances: 416, 426-427, 480-483, 486,<br />

490, 495<br />

Adlai Stevenson: 565, 584<br />

Aeroflot: 301<br />

Agfa Ansco: 482<br />

Aldrich Bill: 441^143, 448, 456, 459, 462,<br />

464, 469<br />

Aldrich, Nelson: «, 20, 24, 205, 437,<br />

439, 441, 445, 448, 464, 469<br />

American Acceptance Council: 482<br />

American Bankers Association: 462<br />

American Express Company: 482<br />

American I.G. Chemical Corporation: 482<br />

American Trust Company: 482<br />

AMTRAX: 45, 63<br />

Andrew, Abraham Piatt: 5, 11, 24<br />

Andropov, Yuri: 530<br />

Anti-Semitism: 285, 289, 414-415, 417-419<br />

Archbold, John D.: 245<br />

Armour, J. Ogden: 454<br />

Articles of Confederation: 316, 318<br />

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation<br />

Agreement (APEC): 112<br />

Aspen Institute: 532<br />

Astor family: 272<br />

Bailey, Sir Abe: 272<br />

Baker, George F.: 6, 443, 454<br />

Baker, James: 116,118<br />

Balanced-budget amendment: 571-572<br />

Balfour, Arthur: 238, 271<br />

Ballard, Robert: 248<br />

Baltimore & Ohio Railway: 279<br />

Bancor: 544-547<br />

Bank notes: 174, 176, 178, 182<br />

Bank of America: 114<br />

Bank of England: 171, 174hl75, 177-183,<br />

223, 232, 269, 271, 311, 325, 330, 339,<br />

412, 415, 417, 422-427, 429, 439, 450,<br />

472-473, 475, 480, 489-490, 498, 503<br />

Bank of France: 183, 221, 269, 425, 472-<br />

473<br />

Bank of Intemaf 1 Settlements: 115, 119<br />

Bank of Manhattan Trust Company: 482<br />

Bank of North America: 325-328, 330, 339<br />

Bankers Trust Company: 5, 127, 423, 433,<br />

472-473<br />

BankOklahoma: 62<br />

Baring, Sir Francis: 222<br />

Barnes, Harry Elmer: 243<br />

Baruch, Bernard: 258, 453<br />

Bauer, Mayer Amschel: 218<br />

Beit brothers: 272<br />

Belmont, August: 208, 383, 391, 414^415<br />

Bezant: 149-150, 156<br />

Bickley, George W.L.: 392, 394<br />

Biddle, Nicholas: 341, 347-348, 351-352,<br />

354, 356-357, 360, 396, 565<br />

Bills of credit: 309-310, 316, 324, 346-347,<br />

383<br />

Bimetallism: 320, 323<br />

Bismarck, Otto von: 374<br />

Boer War: 277-278<br />

Bolshevik Revolution: 263, 267, 283<br />

Bolsheviks: 123, 125, 266, 276, 279-282,<br />

285-286, 289-293, 306<br />

Boom-bust cycle 343-345, 360, 420, 488-<br />

489, 552<br />

Booth, John Wilkes: 392-394<br />

Bovard, James: 122<br />

Brady, Nicholas: 75, 119<br />

Bretton Woods Conference: 85-86, 88,<br />

105,114,544<br />

Brown, Lester: 528<br />

Bryan, William Jennings: 241, 251, 256-<br />

257,403,456,465^59<br />

Brzezinski, Zbigniew: 110<br />

Buchanan, Sir George: 267, 274, 280<br />

Buckley, William: 525<br />

Bullard, Arthur: 290, 294<br />

Bunting, John: 53<br />

Burns, Arthur: 43-44<br />

Bush, George: 74, 76, 120, 126-130<br />

Bush, Prescott: 302<br />

Carnegie Corporation: 482<br />

Carnegie Foundation: 447<br />

Carnegie United Kingdom Trust: 272<br />

Carnegie, Andrew: 428<br />

Carter, Jimmy: 110-111, 528<br />

Casey, William: 299<br />

Castro, Fidel; 116<br />

Catton, Bruce: 379<br />

Celeste, Richard: 71<br />

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA): 72,<br />

Chandler, Lester 424, 484<br />

Chase Manhattan Bank: 41-42, 47,52-53,<br />

59, 64, 115, 299<br />

Chase National Bank: 19, 435, 440, 482<br />

Chase, Salmon P.: 384-385<br />

Chemical Bank: 41, 59<br />

Chernow, Ron: 9, 57, 120, 229, 246, 416,<br />

433,452,455<br />

China: 107, 121-123, 126, 132, 301-305<br />

Chrysler Corporation: 41, 44, 48-49, 64<br />

Churchill, Winston: 214, 248-249, 252-<br />

253, 255, 261, 502<br />

Citibank: 115, 123, 537^538<br />

Citicorp: 119, 297<br />

Civil War: 358, 361, 367, 369, 373-377,<br />

379, 397, 398, 407-408, 411, 418, 429<br />

Cleveland, Harlan: 528<br />

Clinton, George: 336<br />

Clinton, William: 82, 119, 267, 301, 507<br />

Club of Rome: 528-532<br />

Coe, Virginius Frank: 88<br />

Commodity Credit Corporation: 120, 126<br />

Commonwealth Bank of Detroit: 41, 51-<br />

53,64<br />

Commonwealth Savings Company of<br />

Lincoln: 71<br />

Communism/Communists: 67-68, 87-<br />

88, 105, 108, 122-126, 265, 267, 270,<br />

274, 282, 286, 298-299, 304, 529-530<br />

Coningsby: 227<br />

Continental Army: 312, 323<br />

Continental Congress: 311, 313, 318-319,<br />

325,339<br />

Continental Illinois: 41, 54-55, 57-62, 65<br />

Continentals: 161<br />

Cooke, Jay: 408<br />

Coolidge, Calvin: 497<br />

Cooper, Richard N.: Ill, 122<br />

Council on Foreign Relations (CFR): 88,<br />

110-111, 113,122, 129, 263, 273, 283,<br />

302, 304, 410, 427, 482, 515-516, 52^-<br />

528, 531, 533-536, 546, 561, 563<br />

Cousteau, Jacques: 529<br />

Crane, Charles: 288, 292<br />

Crane, Philip: 115<br />

Cunard Lines: 246-247, 262<br />

Dabney, Morgan & Company: 412<br />

Daddy Warbucks: 18<br />

Dall, Curtis: 500<br />

Davison, Henry P.: 5, 8-11, 24, 275, 434<br />

Deficit spending: 479, 484, 486, 501, 507<br />

Dillon, Read & Company: 295<br />

Disarmament: 514, 518, 526<br />

Discount Window: 44, 54, 193, 201, 477-<br />

479, 483, 489<br />

Disraeli, Benjamin: 227-228<br />

Dixon, Donald: 78<br />

Dodge, Cleveland H.: 239,447, 453-454,<br />

Douglas, Stephen: 370, 385<br />

Drachma: 149<br />

Drexel Burnham Lambert: 79, 81<br />

Drexel, Anthony: 412<br />

Duane, William: 353<br />

Dulles, John Foster: 110<br />

Duncan, Sherman & Company: 412<br />

Dutch East Indies Company: 173<br />

Earth Summit: 528, 532<br />

East India Company: 226<br />

Eccles, Marriner: 187<br />

Edison, Thomas: 190<br />

Eisenhower, Dwight: 110<br />

Ellsworth, Oliver: 315<br />

Emancipation Proclamation: 379-380,<br />

390, 395<br />

Entitlements: 509-510, 535<br />

Environmentalism: 516, 523, 526-536<br />

Equitable Life Assurance Society: 433,<br />

482<br />

Equitable Trust Company: 295<br />

Equity Corporation: 499<br />

Esher, Lord: 271, 277<br />

European Union (EU): 112, 560<br />

Export-Import Bank: 128, 130, 299<br />

Fabians: 87^88, 96, 105, 106, 109-111, 239,<br />

273, 483, 529, 570<br />

Falk, Richard A.: 527<br />

Fascism /Fascists: 270, 279<br />

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation<br />

(FDIC): 27, 49-54, 57, 60-61, 63-65,<br />

68-69, 7^-75, 89, 95, 327, 364, 539,<br />

576,583<br />

Federal Deposit Loan Corporation<br />

r<br />

(FDLCJ:27<br />

Federal Emergency Management<br />

Agency (FEMA): 544<br />

Federal Farm Loan Board: 477<br />

Federal Housing Authority (FHA): 68<br />

Federal Reserve Act: 463-465, 468, 472,<br />

476477,481,502<br />

Federal Reserve Board: 69, 71, 73<br />

Federal Savings & Loan Insurance Corporation<br />

(FSLIC): 68, 73-74, 77<br />

Ferrell, Robert: 238<br />

Fiat money: 155, 157-160, 162-165, 169-<br />

170, 186, 190-193, 195-203, 206-207,<br />

309-312, 314h316, 324, 352, 409, 419-<br />

420, 429, 566, 573-574, 582<br />

Financial Institutions Reform and<br />

Recovery Act: 74, 80<br />

First Arabian Corporation: 52<br />

First Bank of the United States: 325, 328,<br />

330-333,335,338-339<br />

First National Bank: 433<br />

First National Bank of Boston: 482<br />

First National Bank of Chicago: 115, 127<br />

First National Bank of Los Angeles: 482<br />

First National Bank of New York: 5<br />

First National Bank of St. Louis: 482<br />

First National City Bank: 41<br />

First Pennsylvania Bank of Philadelphia:<br />

53-54, 64, 327


604 INDEX<br />

INDEX 605<br />

Fisher, Irving. 188<br />

Forbes, B.C.: 9<br />

Forbes, John: 412<br />

Ford Motor Corporation: 49<br />

Forrestal, James: 295<br />

Forrester, Izola: 393<br />

Fractional money: 165, 167, 169-170, 174<br />

Fractional-reserve banking: 155, 167, 197,<br />

219, 341, 343, 362-363, 368, 375, 409,<br />

478, 488<br />

Frame, Andrew: 462<br />

Franklin, Benjamin: 158, 162<br />

Free banking: 366-367, 375, 576<br />

Free coinage: 321, 324<br />

Friedman, Milton: 570<br />

Galbraith, John Kenneth: 17, 86, 179, 330,<br />

334, 343, 351, 368-369, 387, 404, 425,<br />

436, 439, 445, 472, 495, 524, 525<br />

Gallatin, Albert: 383<br />

Gardner, I^ichard: 111<br />

Garn-St. Germain Act: 72<br />

Gates, Fred: 556<br />

Gelb, Leslie H.: 129<br />

Gelzer, Heinrich: 150<br />

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade<br />

(GATT):112,113<br />

General Education Board: 239, 555<br />

George, Lloyd: 280<br />

Glass Bill: 464<br />

Glass, Carter: 458^63, 465-466<br />

Glass-Owen Bill: 461, 463, 469<br />

Gorbachev, Mikhail: 123, 529-530<br />

Gouge, William: 346<br />

Goulevitch, Arsene de: 267<br />

Graham, Katharine: 524<br />

Grattan, C. Hartley: 241<br />

Gray, Edwin: 71<br />

Greenbacks: 384-385, 387-388, 390, 395<br />

Greenspan, Alan: 73, 76, 119, 148, 403, 474<br />

Greider, William: 22, 62, 117, 369<br />

Grenfell, Edward: 413<br />

Gresham's Law: 148<br />

Grey, Lord Albert: 271<br />

Grey, Sir Edward: 241, 253<br />

Groseclose, Elgin: 146, 175, 182, 322, 362-<br />

364, 407, 487<br />

Guaranty Trust Company: 292, 433, 482<br />

Gyohten, Toyoo: 112<br />

Hacker, Louis: 322<br />

Hagedorn, Hermann: 275<br />

Hamilton, Alexander: 316, 319, 328, 335<br />

Hammer, Armand: 293<br />

Harper & Brothers: 244<br />

Harriman, W. Averell: 293<br />

Harris Forbes & Company: 295<br />

Harvey, George: 454<br />

Hayes, Everis: 439<br />

Hazard Circular: 386<br />

Hazlitt, Henry: 585<br />

Hemphill, Robert: 188<br />

Hepburn, A. Barton: 19, 440<br />

Herzog, Jesus Silva: 116<br />

Hitler: 295, 546<br />

Home Savings Bank of Cincinnati: 71<br />

Hoover Institution for War, Revolution<br />

and Peace: 22<br />

Hoover, Herbert: 68, 293, 474, 495, 501<br />

Horan, James: 381<br />

House, Edward Mandell: 213, 239-245,<br />

253, 255, 257, 260-261, 266, 273, 281,<br />

290, 294, 456-460, 465^69, 472<br />

Hudson Institute: 516, 524<br />

Hussein, Saddam: 304, 305<br />

Huntington, Samuel: 111<br />

I.G. Farben: 295, 482<br />

Illuminati: 392<br />

Income tax: 204-205, 382, 508-509, 511,<br />

534<br />

Ingraham, Jane: 81, 300<br />

Insight magazine: 118<br />

International Acceptance Bank of New<br />

York: 482<br />

International Green Cross: 529<br />

International Monetary Fund<br />

(IMF/World Bank): 85-94, 97-108,<br />

112, 114-121, 124, 127-132, 296, 514,<br />

516, 539, 542, 544, 550, 563, 573<br />

Irving Trust: 127<br />

Islamic Fundamentalism: 304<br />

J.P. Morgan & Company: 431, 433, 453-<br />

Jackson, Andrew: 256, 341, 347-353, 355-<br />

356, 358-360, 396, 565<br />

Jackson, Stanley: 410, 416<br />

James, Jesse: 392<br />

Jameson, Sir Leander: 277<br />

Jastram, Roy: 181<br />

Jefferson, Thomas: 162, 190, 313, 319, 328,<br />

330, 332, 338, 341-342, 553<br />

<strong>Jekyll</strong> Island: 3, 6-11, 16-18, 23, 50, 60, 62,<br />

423, 437<br />

<strong>Jekyll</strong> Island Club: 6, 210<br />

Joachimsthalers; 318<br />

John Birch Society: 268<br />

Johnston, Sir Harry: 271<br />

Jordan, Jerry: 571<br />

Josephson, Matthew: 408<br />

Junk bonds: 78-79, 81<br />

Kadlec, Charles: 570<br />

Kahn, Herman: 516, 524, 525<br />

Kahn, Otto H.: 279, 453, 460<br />

Kane, Edward: 78<br />

Keating, Charles: 78<br />

Kelleher, Cornelius: 282<br />

Kellock, Harold: 23<br />

Kenan, H.S.: 448<br />

Kennan, George: 290, 527<br />

Kennedy, John R: 109, 485, 569-570<br />

Kenworthy, Joseph: 252<br />

Kerensky, Aleksandr: 276, 285, 289, 291<br />

Keynes, John Maynard: 87, 89-90, 105,<br />

146, 168, 212, 273, 483, 497, 544<br />

KGB: 270<br />

King George III: 359<br />

King George V: 253<br />

Kissinger, Henry: 113, 532<br />

Knights of the Golden Circle: 392-395<br />

Kolko, Gabriel: 415, 435-436, 444, 446,<br />

460, 462<br />

Korean War: 516<br />

Krooss, Herman: 345<br />

Kruger, Paul: 277<br />

Ku Klux Klan: 393<br />

Kuhn, Loeb & Company: 5, 18, 263, 279,<br />

292-293, 295, 395, 423, 433, 444, 453,<br />

481^82, 496<br />

Labouchere, Pierre-Cesar: 222<br />

Laffer, Arthur: 570<br />

LaFollette, Robert: 442<br />

Lamont, Corliss: 279<br />

Lamont, Thomas W.: 278<br />

Langdon, John: 315<br />

Laughlin, J. Laurence: 446, 459-461<br />

Lawrence, Richard: 357<br />

Lazard Brothers: 272<br />

League of Nations: 273, 422<br />

Lee, Ivy: 295<br />

Leffingwell, Russell C: 278<br />

Legal tender: 155-163, 169-170, 187, 207,<br />

311, 315, 321, 326, 330, 384, 386, 574<br />

Lehman Corporation: 499<br />

Lehman, John: 303<br />

Lehrman, Lewis: 434<br />

Lenin: 270, 276, 281-283, 286-287, 291,<br />

293, 297, 300, 305, 546<br />

Lewin, Leonard: 524, 525<br />

Lewinsohn, Richard: 217, 237<br />

Lie, Trygve: 401<br />

Lincoln Savings: 73-74, 78<br />

Lincoln, Abraham: 370-371, 373-375,<br />

377, 379-381, 383-385, 389-395<br />

Lindbergh, Sr„ Charles: 442-443, 446,<br />

448,461,465,476<br />

Linowitz, Sol: 528<br />

Lockhart, Bruce: 280-282, 290<br />

Lockheed: 41, 45-46, 63<br />

London School of Economics: 109, 570<br />

Luce, Clare Booth: 525<br />

Luce, Henry: 524<br />

Lundberg, Ferdinand: 239, 245, 258, 447,<br />

452,454,473<br />

Lusitania: 246-255, 260-262, 410<br />

Lyons, Eugene: 287<br />

Manufacturers Hanover: 41, 59<br />

Mao: 546<br />

Marine Midland Corporation: 499<br />

Marshall, John: 346<br />

Martin, Rose: 273<br />

Marx, Karl: 211, 266<br />

Mason, George: 315<br />

Masonic lodges: 392<br />

Massachusetts: 157-158, 160, 307, 310-<br />

311,362-364,367<br />

Mauretania: 246, 425<br />

Maximilian, Ferdinand: 374, 377, 392<br />

May, Max: 292<br />

Mayer, Martin: 486<br />

McAdoo, William: 238-239, 256, 258, 454,<br />

458, 464<br />

McCormick, Cyrus: 447<br />

McCulloch v. Maryland: 346, 351<br />

McLandress, Herschel: 524<br />

McLaughlin, Andrew: 163<br />

McNamara, Robert: 516, 532<br />

Medicare: 509-510, 535<br />

MelJon, Andrew: 425, 495, 497<br />

Mellen,CS.:244<br />

Mensheviks: 279-280<br />

Mersey, Lord: 214, 255<br />

Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. 482<br />

Mexico: 104<br />

Midland Bank: 272<br />

Miliarense: 149<br />

Milken, Michael: 79, 81<br />

Milner, Lord Alfred: 267, 270-272, 274,<br />

277-280<br />

Minor, Robert: 211, 266<br />

Monetarists; 570<br />

Monetary Control Act of 1980: 115, 201<br />

Monroe Doctrine: 373, 377


606 INDEX<br />

INDEX 607<br />

Monroe, James: 373<br />

Monserrat: 264<br />

Moral hazard: 35, 36, 39<br />

Moody, John: 236, 415, 435<br />

Morgan Guaranty: 41, 56, 59, 127<br />

Morgan, Grenfell, and Company: 272<br />

Morgan, Harjes & Company; 412<br />

Morgan, House of: 119, 419, 429, 452<br />

Morgan, J .P.: 4^8, 23, 209, 235-239, 244-<br />

261, 266, 272-278, 283, 302, 410-418,<br />

427, 431, 433-434, 443, 447-448, 455,<br />

496, 499, 502<br />

Morgan, Jr., J.P.: 412, 417-^18, 454, 458,<br />

&0<br />

Morgan, Junius: 411<br />

Morgan thau, Henry: 453<br />

Morris, Edward: 292<br />

Morris, Robert: 325-326, 328, 330, 335<br />

Morrow, Dwight: 278<br />

Morton, Frederic: 218, 224-225<br />

Mullins, Eustace: 413<br />

Munsey, Frank: 452-453<br />

Murphy, Grayson: 278<br />

Mussolini: 546<br />

Mutual Life Insurance Company: 433, 482<br />

Myers, Gustavus: 331<br />

Napoleon Bonaparte: 173, 181, 183, 220-<br />

226<br />

Napoleon 111: 378<br />

National Banking Acts of 1863-65: 386-<br />

388,407<br />

National Citizens' League: 445, 459-460<br />

National City Bank: 5, 239, 258, 266, 276,<br />

292, 295, 433, 435, 447, 454, 464<br />

National Civic Federation: 434<br />

National debt: 388, 508, 510-512, 534,<br />

535, 568, 572, S75-S77, 579, 582<br />

National Monetary Commission: 437, 448<br />

Nazism /Nazis: 270, 295<br />

New Haven Railroad: 244<br />

New World Order: 109, 111-113, 122,<br />

125, 129, 132, 514, 528, 530, 549-550,<br />

552,561,564<br />

New York City: 41, 46-47, 64<br />

New York Life Insurance Company: 433<br />

New York Title and Mortgage Company:<br />

New York Trust Company: 482<br />

Nixon, Richard: 91, 302<br />

Norman, Montagu: 269, 399, 423, 425,<br />

429, 472, 486, 489, 495, 498<br />

North American Free Trade Agreement<br />

(NAFTA): 112, 113<br />

North, Douglass: 322<br />

Northern Pacific Railroad: 408<br />

Norton, Charles D.: 5, 24<br />

Nye, Gerald P.: 238<br />

Office of Thrift Supervision: 74<br />

Open Market: 194, 477, 479, 481-482, 484-<br />

487, 490, 492, 499, 503<br />

Oppenheimer, Michael: 527<br />

Order of American Knights: 393<br />

Order of the Sons of Liberty: 393<br />

Orwell, George: 556-557, 560<br />

Overseas Private Investment Corporation<br />

(OP1C): 128, 300<br />

Owen, Robert L.: 461, 476<br />

Page, Walter H.: 238-239, 241-242<br />

Paine, Thomas: 315<br />

Panama Canal: 115<br />

Passell, Peter 80<br />

Paterson, William: 175<br />

Patman, Wright: 42-43, 187<br />

Patterson, Robert P.: 295, 485<br />

Patterson, William: 177<br />

Paul, Ron: 434<br />

Peabody & Company: 415-417<br />

Peabody, George: 410-413, 415-416<br />

Peel, Sir Robert: 181<br />

Pel], Claiburne: 528<br />

Penn Central: 41-44, 55, 63<br />

Perm Square Bank of Oklahoma: 55<br />

Perkins, George W.: 266, 452-453<br />

Pieces of Eight: 318-319<br />

Pike, Henry: 277<br />

Planters Trust and Savings Bank of<br />

Opelousa: 61<br />

Poland: 126, 297<br />

Politburo: 530<br />

Polo, Marco; 155<br />

Poor, Henry: 365<br />

Pratt, Sereno: 415<br />

Pujo Committee: 443-444, 447, 454<br />

Pujo, Arsene: 6, 443<br />

Quigley, Carroll: 213, 267-272, 278, 282,<br />

423, 475, 494<br />

Rand Corporation: 516<br />

Randolph, John: 352<br />

Reagan, Ronald: 62, 71, 111, 126, 474, 507<br />

Reales: 318<br />

Red Cross: 263, 274-275, 279-284, 285,<br />

289, 291-292, 302, 306<br />

Reed, George: 315<br />

Reed, John: 119<br />

Regan, Donald. 58, 114<br />

Reichsbank: 18, 183, 269, 425<br />

Remini, Robert: 354, 356<br />

Report from Iron Mountain: 516, 518,<br />

521, 523-526, 534, 536, 556, 558, 560<br />

Resolution Funding Corporation: 74<br />

Resolution Trust Corporation: 81-82<br />

Resolution Trust Oversight Board: 74<br />

Rhodes, Cecil: 208, 219, 263, 270-272,<br />

277-278, 281-283, 410, 428, 430, 534<br />

Ricardo, David: 180<br />

Rist, Charles: 269, 425, 472<br />

Roberts, Paul: 96<br />

Robins, Raymond: 212, 281-282, 284, 290<br />

Rockefeller, David: 42, 47, 112-113, 123,<br />

297, 299, 532<br />

Rockefeller, John D.: 209, 266, 400, 434,<br />

446,555<br />

Rockefeller, John D. Ill: 401<br />

Rockefeller, Jr., John D.: 4r-5<br />

Rockefeller, William: 5, 454<br />

Rockefellers: 245, 272<br />

Roosevelt, Franklin Delano: 10, 68, 239,<br />

258,502<br />

Roosevelt, Theodore: 266, 451-453, 455-<br />

456, 468<br />

Roscoe, Theodore: 393<br />

Rostow, Walt: 524<br />

Rothbard, Murray: 142, 176, 327, 337,<br />

344, 362, 423, 484-485, 495<br />

Rothschild, Alphonse: 414, 418<br />

Rothschild, Amschel: 225<br />

Rothschild, House of: 5, 219-220, 227,<br />

232, 413, 415, 417-418, 429<br />

Rothschild, James (Jacob): 224, 228, 232<br />

Rothschild, Kalmann: 225<br />

Rothschild, Nathan: 22^227, 234, 271,<br />

331,413,415<br />

Rothschild, Salomon: 225, 231<br />

Rothschild Formula: Chap. 11 + 303-305<br />

Rothschilds: 234, 235, 240, 246, 271, 331,<br />

340, 374, 383, 389, 413-419, 482<br />

Round Table: 270, 272-275, 277-283, 291-<br />

292, 296^297, 302, 305, 428<br />

Royal Bank of Canada: 127<br />

Royal Institute of Intemtl Affairs: 273<br />

Rubin, Robert: 119<br />

Ruml, Beardsley: 204<br />

Rusk, Dean: 525<br />

Ruskin, John: 270-271<br />

Russell, Bertrand: 529<br />

Russia: 107, 124-132, 263-267, 27^276,<br />

279-296, 299-302, 306, 377-378, 395<br />

Russian Revolution: 263, 265, 267<br />

Ryan, John D.: 266<br />

Ryan, Thomas: 453<br />

S&Ls: 68-74, 76-81, 83^-84<br />

S.S. Kristianiafjord: 265, 288, 292<br />

Salinas, Carlos: 119<br />

Salomon Brothers: 81<br />

Sandinistas: 301<br />

Schacht, Hjalmar: 269, 425<br />

Schapiro, Leonard: 286<br />

Schiff, Jacob: 210, 263-266, 285, 292, 395,<br />

45^454, 458<br />

Schlicktenthalers: 318<br />

Schmidt, Helmut: 47<br />

Second Bank of the United States: 341-<br />

359, 375, 382-386, 442, 565<br />

Selgin, George: 366<br />

Seligman, Edwin: 17, 440<br />

Sennholz, Hans: 76, 82, 367<br />

Seymour, Charles: 241, 459, 465<br />

Shafroth, John: 439<br />

Shaw, George Bernard: 87, 101<br />

Sibley, Joseph: 245<br />

Sidonia: 227-228<br />

Silver certificates: 485<br />

Simpson, Colin: 246, 251, 254<br />

Sjaastad, Larry A.: 121<br />

Skull and Bones: 80<br />

Slavery: 370-377, 379, 382, 392, 395<br />

Smuts, Jan: 278<br />

Social Democrats: 12^125, 129<br />

Social Security: 509-510, 535<br />

Socialism/Socialists: 85-88, 95-106, 109,<br />

124, 266-267, 270, 420, 530, 535, 546<br />

Solidus: 149<br />

South Africa: 271-272, 276-278<br />

Soviet Union: 89, 100, 293, 296, 304<br />

Soviets: 121, 123-124, 126-129, 132<br />

Spanish dollar: 319, 324<br />

Special Drawing Right (SDR): 90<br />

Sprague, Irvine: 49-54, 57-61<br />

Standard Brands: 499<br />

Standard Oil Company; 245, 435<br />

Stanton, Edwin M.: 393-394<br />

Steffens, Lincoln: 288<br />

Stephenson, Nathaniel Wright: 10, 439,<br />

446<br />

Stillman, James: 454<br />

Stockman, David: 114<br />

Strong, Benjamin: 24, 258, 269, 423-429,<br />

441, 450, 472-^74, 484-489, 497, 502<br />

Strong, Maurice: 531^533, 549<br />

Sumner, William: 169<br />

Supply-siders: 570<br />

Supreme Court: 346-347, 349, 351


608 INDEX<br />

Sutton, Anthony: 22, 266, 275, 291, 303<br />

Swift, Harold: 292<br />

Swift, Helen: 292<br />

Taft, William Howard: 451-453, 456, 468<br />

Tawney, R.H: 273<br />

Taxes: 191, 193, 196, 199, 203-205<br />

Terrorism: 546, 562<br />

Thalers:318<br />

Theobald, Thomas: 297<br />

Thompson, William: 289-291<br />

Thompson, William Boyce: 275-276, 280-<br />

Tiananmen Square: 301<br />

Tocqueville, Alexis de: 554<br />

Torrijos: 115<br />

Toynbee, Arnold: 273<br />

Trade deficit: 91, 93-94<br />

Trafkant, Rep. James: 304, 305<br />

Transvaal: 277-278<br />

Trilateral Commission: 112<br />

Trotsky: 264-267, 282-283, 286-287, 291<br />

Truman, Harry: 88<br />

Tsar Alexander II: 377-378, 395<br />

Tsar Nicholas: 264-265, 267, 274, 280,<br />

283, 285, 288<br />

Tulipomania: 491-492<br />

Turner, Dennis: 77, 90<br />

Turner, Captain William: 255<br />

Tutko, Thomas: 521<br />

U-boat: 237, 248-249, 252-253, 261<br />

U.S. Steel; 435<br />

United Americans: 279<br />

United Nations: 86, 89, 108, 114, 422, 514-<br />

516, 526, 530-532, 541, 544-545, 548,<br />

550,561,563-564,577<br />

Unity Bank and Trust Company: 50-51<br />

Usury: 190-191, 207<br />

Vanderlip, Frank: 5, 11, 24, 439, 441, 450,<br />

460,463-464,469<br />

Vernon S&L: 78<br />

Vieira, Edwin: 318<br />

Viereck, George: 240-241, 251, 456-457<br />

Volcker, Paul; 54, 58, 60, 65, 71, 112, 116,<br />

117<br />

Vreeland, Edward: 437, 441, 450<br />

Wall Street: 4, 11, 18, 22-23, 72-^1, 236-<br />

237, 244, 257-259, 266, 276, 281, 288,<br />

29C-295, 302, 408, 415, 417, 431, 433,<br />

435, 442-448, 453-456, 461-462, 472,<br />

482, 497, 502<br />

Wall, M. Danny; 73<br />

Wallich, Henry: 116<br />

War Industries Board: 258-259<br />

War of 1812: 336, 340-341, 357, 359, 363<br />

Warburg & Company, M.M.: 18<br />

Warburg, Felix: 18, 453<br />

Warburg, James: 10<br />

Warburg, Max: 5, 18<br />

Warburg, Paul: 5, 9-10, 17-19, 22-24, 438,<br />

440, 444-445, 448, 450, 453, 455, 458,<br />

461, 465-466, 481-482, 486, 496<br />

Washington, George: 161, 164, 312, 314-<br />

315,322-323<br />

Waterloo: 224, 226-227, 233<br />

Watt, James: 114, 119<br />

Webb, Sidney and Beatrice: 87<br />

Webster, Daniel: 351<br />

Welles, Chris: 42, 44<br />

Wellington, Duke of: 224-227<br />

Wells, H.G.: 88<br />

Wenrworth, W.C: 399, 498<br />

Westinghouse Acceptance Bank: 482<br />

Westinghouse, H.H.: 279<br />

Wheeler, George: 244, 415<br />

White Star Lines: 246<br />

White, Harry Dexter: 87, 105, 212<br />

Whitney family: 272<br />

Wildcat banks: 333, 336-337, 340<br />

Willard, Daniel: 279<br />

Willing, Thomas: 330<br />

Willis, Henry Parker: 427, 460-462, 465<br />

Wilson, Derek: 219, 227, 331, 383, 414-415<br />

Wilson, James: 315<br />

Wilson, R. McNair: 221, 223<br />

Wilson, Woodrow: 238-243, 250-252,<br />

255-258, 260-261, 266, 275, 281, 288-<br />

289, 293, 447-449, 452-460, 466-469<br />

Wolf, George: 356<br />

Wood, Daniel: 532<br />

Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute: 254<br />

World Bank: 85-86, 88-89, 95-98, 100-<br />

103, 105-109, 118, 121, 124, 126, 130-<br />

132,296,301,302<br />

World Future Society: 532<br />

World Trade Organization (WTO): 1 13,<br />

114<br />

World War I: 235, 238, 259-261, 265, 275,<br />

473, 479, 483-484, 489, 502<br />

World War II: 502<br />

WorldWatch Institute: 528<br />

Wrangell-Rokassowsky, Carl: 378<br />

Yago, Glenn: 80<br />

Yeltsin, Boris: 300<br />

Yilin,Yao:122<br />

Zakaria, Fareed: 304<br />

understand. He has dealt with such diverse<br />

subjects as archaeology and ancient earth<br />

history, terrorism, international banking,<br />

internal subversion, the history of taxation,<br />

U.S. foreign policy, the science and politics<br />

of cancer therapy, the Supreme Court, and<br />

the United Nations. Some of his previous<br />

works include World without Cancer, The<br />

Discovery of Noah's Ark, Moles in High Places,<br />

The Open Gates of Troy, No Place to Hide, The<br />

Capitalist Conspiracy, More Deadly than War,<br />

The Grand Design, The Great Prison Break, and<br />

The Fearful Master.<br />

Mr. Griffin is<br />

a graduate of the University<br />

of Michigan where he majored in speech<br />

and communications. In preparation for<br />

writing this book, he enrolled in the College<br />

of Financial Planning located in Denver. His<br />

goal was not to become a professional financial<br />

planner but to better understand the real<br />

world of investments and money markets.<br />

He obtained his CFP designation (Certified<br />

Financial Planner) in 1989.<br />

Mr. Griffin is<br />

a recipient of the coveted<br />

Telly Award for excellence in television<br />

production, a Contributing Editor for The<br />

New American magazine, the creator of The<br />

Reality Zone Audio Archives, and is<br />

President<br />

of American Media, a publishing and videoproduction<br />

company in Southern California.


Where does money come from? Where does it go? Who<br />

makes it? The money magicians' secrets are unveiled. Here is a<br />

close look at<br />

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A boring subject? Just wait! You'll be hooked in five<br />

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all true. This book is about the most blatant scam of history. If s<br />

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prosperity. Your world view will definitely change.<br />

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"What every American needs to know about central bank<br />

power. A gripping adventure into the secret world of the<br />

international banking cartel/'<br />

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Ludwig von Mises Institute<br />

"A magnificent accomplishment - a train-load of heavy history,<br />

organized so well and written in such a relaxed and easy style<br />

that it captivated me. I hated to put it down/'<br />

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Publisher/Editor, Dan Smoot Report<br />

"As a career banker and president of a bank consulting firm, I<br />

thought I had a good understanding of the Federal Reserve. But<br />

this book changed the way I view our entire monetary system/'<br />

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Grand Junction, Colorado<br />

ISBN<br />

D-^lETflb-lfl-E<br />

51950 ><br />

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