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ABOUT THE COVER<br />
1<br />
The use of the Great Seal of the United<br />
States is not without significance. At first we<br />
contemplated having an artist change the<br />
eagle into a vulture. That, we thought,<br />
would attract attention and also make a<br />
statement. Upon reflection, however, we<br />
realized that the vulture is really harmless. It<br />
may be ugly, but it is a scavenger, not a<br />
killer. The eagle, on the other hand, is a<br />
predator. It is a regal creature to behold, but<br />
it is deadly to its prey. Furthermore, as<br />
portrayed on the dollar, it is protected by the<br />
shield of the United States government even<br />
though it is independent of it. Finally, it<br />
holds within its grasp the choice between<br />
peace or war. The parallels were too great to<br />
ignore. We decided to keep the eagle.<br />
G. Edward Griffin is a writer and<br />
documentary film producer with many<br />
successful titles to his credit. Listed in Who's<br />
Who in America, he is well known because of<br />
his talent for researching difficult topics and<br />
presenting them in clear terms that all<br />
(Continued on inside of back cover)<br />
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THE CREATURE<br />
FROM<br />
JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
A Second Look at the<br />
Federal Reserve<br />
Third edition<br />
by G. Edward Griffin<br />
American Media
Dedicated to the next generation-especially my own brood:<br />
James, Daniel, Ralph, and Kathleen.<br />
May this effort help to build for them a better world.<br />
TABLE OF CONTENTS<br />
Preface<br />
Acknowledgments<br />
Introduction<br />
i<br />
iv<br />
v<br />
Seventh printing: May 1998<br />
Sixth printing: September 1997<br />
Fifth printing: August 1996<br />
Fourth printing: September 1995<br />
Third printing: April 1995<br />
Second printing: November 1994<br />
First printing: July 1994<br />
Third edition: May 1998<br />
Second edition: September 1995<br />
First edition: July 1994<br />
© Copyright 1998, 1995 and 1994 by G. Edward Griffin<br />
Published by American Media<br />
P.O. Box 4646<br />
Westlake Village, California 91359-1646<br />
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 98-71615<br />
ISBN 0-912986-21-2<br />
Manufactured in the United States<br />
I. WHAT CREATURE IS THIS? 1<br />
What is the Federal Reserve System? The answer may<br />
surprise you. It is not federal and there are no reserves.<br />
Furthermore, the Federal Reserve Banks are not even banks. The<br />
key to this riddle is to be found, not at the beginning of the story,<br />
but in the middle. Since this is not a <strong>text</strong>book, we are not<br />
confined to a chronological structure. The subject matter is not a<br />
curriculum to be mastered but a mystery to be solved. So let us<br />
start where the action is.<br />
1. The Journey to <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island 3<br />
2. The Name of the Game Is Bailout 25<br />
3. Protectors of the Public 41<br />
4. Home Sweet Loan 67<br />
5. Nearer to the Heart's Desire 85<br />
6. Building the New World Order 107<br />
II. A CRASH COURSE ON MONEY 133<br />
The eight chapters contained in this and the following<br />
section deal with material that is organized by topic, not<br />
chronology. Several of them will jump ahead of events that are<br />
not covered until later.<br />
Furthermore, the scope is such that the<br />
reader may wonder what, if any, is the connection with the<br />
Federal Reserve System. Please be patient. The importance will<br />
eventually become clear. It is the author's intent to cover<br />
concepts and principles before looking at events. Without this<br />
background, the history of the Federal Reserve is boring. With it,<br />
the story emerges as an exciting drama which profoundly affects<br />
our lives today. So let us begin this adventure with a few<br />
discoveries about the nature of money itself.<br />
7. The Barbaric Metal 135<br />
8. Fool's Gold . . .- 155<br />
9. The Secret Science 171<br />
10. The Mandrake Mechanism 185
III. THE NEW ALCHEMY 215<br />
The ancient alchemists sought in vain to convert lead into<br />
gold. Modern alchemists have succeeded in that quest. The lead<br />
bullets of war have yielded an endless source of gold for those<br />
magicians who control the Mandrake Mechanism. The startling<br />
fact emerges that, without the ability to create fiat money, most<br />
modern wars simply would not have occurred. As long as the<br />
Mechanism is allowed to function, future wars are inevitable.<br />
This is the story of how that came to pass.<br />
11. The Rothschild Formula 217<br />
12. Sink the Lusitanial 235<br />
13. Masquerade in Moscow 263<br />
14. The Best Enemy Money Can Buy 285<br />
IV. A TALE OF THREE BANKS 307<br />
It has been said that those who are ignorant of history are<br />
doomed to repeat its mistakes. It may come as a surprise to learn<br />
that the Federal Reserve System is America's fourth central<br />
bank, not its first. We have been through all this before and, each<br />
time, the result has been the same. Interested in what happened?<br />
Then let's set the coordinates of our time machine to the colony<br />
of Massachusetts and the year 1690. To activate, turn to chapter<br />
fifteen.<br />
15. The Lost Treasure Map 309<br />
16. The Creature Comes to America 325<br />
17. A Den of Vipers 341<br />
18. Loaves and Fishes, and Civil War 361<br />
19. Greenbacks and Other Crimes 377<br />
V. THE HARVEST 405<br />
Monetary and political scientists continue to expound the<br />
theoretical merits of the Federal Reserve System. It has become a<br />
modern act of faith that economic life simply could not go on<br />
without it. But the time for theory is past. The Creature moved<br />
into its final lair in 1913 and has snorted and thrashed about the<br />
landscape ever since. If we wish to know if it is a creature of<br />
service or a beast of prey, we merely have to look at what it has<br />
done. And, after the test of all those years, we can be sure that<br />
what it has done, it will continue to do. Or, to use the Biblical<br />
axiom, a tree shall be known by the fruit it bears. Let us now<br />
examine the harvest.<br />
20. The London Connection 407<br />
21. Competition Is A Sin 431<br />
22. The Creature Swallows Congress 451<br />
23. Hie Great Duck Dinner 471<br />
VI. TIME TRAVEL INTO THE FUTURE 505<br />
In the previous sections of this book, we have travelled<br />
through time. We began our journey by stepping into the past.<br />
As we crisscrossed the centuries, we observed wars, treachery,<br />
profiteering, and political deception. That has brought us to the<br />
present. Now we are prepared to ride our time machine into the<br />
future. It will be a hair-raising trip, and much of what lies ahead<br />
will be unpleasant. But it has not yet come to pass. It is merely<br />
the projection of present forces. If we do not like what we see,<br />
we still have an opportunity to change those forces. The future<br />
will be what we choose to make it.<br />
24. Doomsday Mechanisms 507<br />
25. A Pessimistic Scenario 537<br />
26. A Realistic Scenario 565<br />
PHOTOGRAPHS<br />
The seven men who met in secret at <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island 24<br />
The Fabian Society stained-glass window 106<br />
First photo section 208-214<br />
Period cartoons about the Rothschilds 234<br />
Items relating to the sinking of the Lusitania . 262<br />
Second photo section 396-404<br />
APPENDIX<br />
A. Structure and Function of the Federal Reserve 590<br />
B. Natural Laws of Human Behavior in Economics .... 592<br />
C. Is Ml Subtractive or Accumulative? 594<br />
BIBLIOGRAPHY 596<br />
INDEX 602
PREFACE<br />
Does the world really need another book on the Federal<br />
Reserve System?<br />
I have struggled with that question for several years. My<br />
own library is mute testimony to the fact that there has been no<br />
shortage of writers willing to set off into the dark forest to do<br />
battle with the evil dragon. But, for the most part, their books<br />
have been ignored by the mainstream, and the giant snorter<br />
remains undaunted in his lair. There seemed to be little reason to<br />
think that I could succeed where so many others have failed.<br />
Yet, the idea was haunting. There was no doubt in my mind<br />
that the Federal Reserve is one of the most dangerous creatures<br />
ever to stalk our land. Furthermore, as my probing brought me<br />
into contact with more and more hard data, I came to realize that<br />
I was investigating one of the greatest "who-dunits" of history.<br />
And, to make matters worse, I discovered who did it.<br />
Someone has to get this story through to the public. The<br />
problem, however, is that the public doesn't want to hear it. After<br />
all, this is bad news, and we certainly get enough of that as it is.<br />
Another obstacle to communication is that this tale truly is<br />
incredible, which means unbelievable. The magnitude by which<br />
reality deviates from the accepted myth is so great that, for most<br />
people, it simply is beyond credibility. Anyone carrying this<br />
message is immediately suspected of paranoia. Who will listen<br />
to a madman?<br />
And, finally, there is the subject matter itself.<br />
It can become<br />
pretty complex. Well, at least that's how it seems at first.<br />
Treatises on this topic often read like curriCfllum <strong>text</strong>books for<br />
banking and finance. It is easy to become ensnared in a sticky<br />
web of terminology and abstractions. Only monetary professionals<br />
are motivated to master the new language, and even they<br />
often find themselves in serious disagreement. For example, in a<br />
recent letter circulated by a group of monetary experts who, for<br />
years, have conducted an ongoing exchange of ideas regarding<br />
monetary reform, the editor said: "It is frustrating that we<br />
cannot find more agreement among ourselves on this vital issue.<br />
We seem to differ so much on definitions and on, really, an<br />
unbiased, frank, honest, correct understanding of just how our<br />
current monetary system does function/ 7<br />
So why am I now making my own charge into the dragon's<br />
teeth? It's because I believe there is a definite change in the wind<br />
of public attitude. As the gathering economic storm draws<br />
nearer, more and more people will tune into the weather<br />
report—even if it is bad news. Furthermore, the evidence of the<br />
truth of this story is now so overpowering that I trust my readers<br />
will have no choice but to accept it, all questions of sanity aside.<br />
If the village idiot says the bell has fallen from the steeple and<br />
comes dragging the bell behind him, well,. .<br />
Lastly, I have discovered that this subject is not as complicated<br />
as it first appeared to be, and I am resolved to avoid the<br />
pitfall of trodding the usual convoluted path. What follows,<br />
therefore, will be the story of a crime, not a course on criminology.<br />
It was intended that this book would be half its present size<br />
and be completed in about one year. From the beginning,<br />
however, it took on a life force of its own, and I became but a<br />
servant to its will. It refused to stay within the confines<br />
prescribed and, like the genie released from its bottle, grew to<br />
enormous size. When the job was done and it was possible to<br />
assess the entire manuscript, I was surprised to realize that four<br />
books had been written instead of one.<br />
First, there is a crash course on money, the basics of banking<br />
and currency. Without that, it would be impossible to understand<br />
the fraud that now passes for acceptable practice within<br />
the banking system.<br />
Second, there is a book on how the world's central banks<br />
the Federal Reserve being one of them—are catalysts for war.<br />
That is what puts real fire into the subject, because it shows that<br />
we are dealing, not with mere money, but with blood, human<br />
suffering, and freedom itself.<br />
is<br />
Third, there is a history of central banking in America. That<br />
essential to a realization that the concept behind the Federal<br />
Reserve was tried three times before in America. We need to<br />
know that and especially need to know why those institutions<br />
were eventually junked.<br />
Finally, there is an analysis of the Federal Reserve itself and<br />
its dismal record since 1913. This is probably the least important<br />
part of all, but it is the reason we are here. It is the least<br />
important, not because the subject lacks significance, but<br />
11
ecause it has been written before by writers far more qualified<br />
and more skilled than I. As mentioned previously, however,<br />
those volumes generally have remained unread except by<br />
technical historians, and the Creature has continued to dine<br />
upon its hapless victims.<br />
There are seven discernible threads that are woven throughout<br />
the fabric of this study. They represent the reasons for<br />
abolition of the Federal Reserve System. When stated in their<br />
purest form, without embellishment or explanation, they sound<br />
absurd to the casual observer. It is the purpose of this book,<br />
however, to show that these statements are all-too-easy to<br />
substantiate.<br />
The Federal Reserve System should be abolished for the<br />
following reasons:<br />
• It is incapable of accomplishing its stated objectives.<br />
(Chapter 1.)<br />
• It is a cartel operating against the public interest. (Chapter 3.)<br />
• It is the supreme instrument of usury. (Chapter 10.)<br />
• It generates our most unfair tax. (Chapter 10.)<br />
• It encourages war. (Chapter 14.)<br />
• It destabilizes the economy. (Chapter 23.)<br />
• It is an instrument of totalitarianism. (Chapters 5 and 26.)<br />
This is a story about limitless money and hidden global<br />
power. The good news is that it is as fascinating as any work of<br />
fiction could be, and this, I trust, will add both pleasure and<br />
excitement to the learning process.<br />
The bad news is that every detail of what follows is true.<br />
m<br />
G. Edward Griffin<br />
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS<br />
A writer who steals the work of another is called a plagiarist.<br />
One who takes from the works of many is called a researcher. That<br />
is a roundabout way of saying I am deeply indebted to the efforts of<br />
so many who have previously grappled this topic. It is impossible<br />
to acknowledge them except in footnote and bibliography. Without<br />
the cumulative product of their efforts, it would have taken a<br />
lifetime to pull together the material you are about to read.<br />
In addition to the historical facts, however, there are numerous<br />
concepts which, to the best of my knowledge, are not to be found in<br />
prior literature. Primary among these are the formulation of certain<br />
"natural laws" which, it seemed to me, were too important to leave<br />
buried beneath the factual data. You will easily recognize these and<br />
other editorial expressions as the singular product of my own<br />
perceptions for which no one else can be held responsible.<br />
I would like to give special thanks to Myril Creer and Jim Toft<br />
for having first invited me to give a lecture on this subject and, thus,<br />
forcing me to delve into it at some depth; and to Herb Joiner for<br />
encouraging me, after the speech, to "take it on the road." This<br />
book is the end result of a seven-year journey that began with those<br />
first steps. Wayne C. Rickert deserves a special medal for his<br />
financial support to get the project started and for his incredible<br />
patience while it crawled toward completion. Thanks to Bill Jasper<br />
for providing copies of numerous hard-to-locate documents.<br />
Thanks, also, to Linda Perlstein and Melinda Wiman for keeping<br />
my business enterprises functioning during my preoccupation with<br />
this project And a very personal thanks to my wife, Patricia, for<br />
putting up with my periods of long absence while completing the<br />
manuscript, for meticulous proofreading, and for a most perceptive<br />
critique of its development along the way.<br />
Finally, I would like to acknowledge those readers of the first<br />
three printings who have assisted in the refinement of this work<br />
Because of their efforts most of the inevitable errata have been<br />
corrected for the second edition. Even so, it would be foolhardy to<br />
think that there are no more errors within the following pages. I<br />
have tried to be meticulous with even the smallest detail, but one<br />
cannot harvest such a huge crop without dropping a few seeds.<br />
Therefore, corrections and suggestions from new readers are sincerely<br />
invited. In my supreme optimism, I would like to think that<br />
they will be incorporated into future editions of this book.<br />
IV
INTRODUCTION<br />
The following exchange was published in the British humor<br />
magazine, Punch, on April 3, 1957. It is reprinted here as an<br />
appropriate introduction and as a mental exercise to limber the<br />
mind for the material contained in this book.<br />
Q. What are banks for?<br />
A. To make money.<br />
Q. For the customers?<br />
A. For the banks.<br />
Q. Why doesn't bank advertising<br />
mention this?<br />
A. It would not be in good taste.<br />
But it is mentioned by implication<br />
in references to reserves of<br />
$249,000,000 or thereabouts.<br />
That is the money that they have<br />
made.<br />
Q. Out of the customers?<br />
A. I suppose so.<br />
Q. They also mention Assets of<br />
$500,000,000 or thereabouts.<br />
Have they made that too?<br />
A. Not exactly. That is the<br />
money they use to make money.<br />
Q. I see. And they keep it in a<br />
safe somewhere?<br />
A. Not at all. They lend it to<br />
customers.<br />
Q. Then they haven't got it?<br />
A. No.<br />
Q. Then how is it Assets?<br />
A. They maintain that it would<br />
be if they got it back.<br />
Q. But they must have some<br />
money in a safe somewhere?<br />
A. Yes, usually $500,000,000 or<br />
thereabouts. This is called<br />
Liabilities.<br />
Q. But if they've got it, how can<br />
they be liable for it?<br />
A. Because it isn't theirs.<br />
Q. Then why do they have it?<br />
A. It has been lent to them by<br />
customers.<br />
Q. You mean customers lend<br />
banks money?<br />
A. In effect. They put money<br />
into their accounts, so it is really<br />
lent to the banks.<br />
Q. And what do the banks do<br />
with it?<br />
A. Lend it to other customers.<br />
Q. But you said that money they<br />
lent to other people was Assets?<br />
A. Yes.<br />
Q. Then Assets and Liabilities<br />
must be the same thing?<br />
A. You can't really say that.<br />
Q. But you've just said it. If I put<br />
$100 into my account the bank is<br />
liable to have to pay it back, so<br />
it's Liabilities. But they go and<br />
lend it to someone else, and he is<br />
liable to have to pay it back, so<br />
it's Assets. It's the same $100,<br />
isn't it?<br />
A. Yes. But ...<br />
Q. Then it cancels out. It means,<br />
doesn't it, that banks haven't<br />
really any money at all?<br />
A. Theoretically.. .<br />
Q. Never mind theoretically.<br />
And if they haven't any money,<br />
where do they get their<br />
Reserves of $249,000,000 or<br />
thereabouts?<br />
A. I told you. That is the money<br />
they have made.<br />
Q. How?<br />
A. Well, when they lend your<br />
$100 to someone they charge<br />
him interest.<br />
Q. How much?<br />
A. It depends on the Bank Rate.<br />
Say five and a-half per cent.<br />
That's their profit.<br />
Q. Why isn't it my profit? Isn't it<br />
my money?<br />
A. It's the theory of banking<br />
practice that ...<br />
Q. When I lend them my $100<br />
why don't I charge them interest?<br />
A. You do.<br />
Q. You don't say. How much?<br />
A. It depends on the Bank Rate.<br />
Say half a per cent.<br />
Q. Grasping of me, rather?<br />
A. But that's only if you're not<br />
going to draw the money out<br />
again.<br />
Q. But of course, I'm going to<br />
draw it out again. If I hadn't<br />
wanted to draw it out again I<br />
could have buried it in the garden,<br />
couldn't I?<br />
A. They wouldn't like you to<br />
draw it out again.<br />
Q. Why not? If I keep it there<br />
you say ifs a Liability. Wouldn't<br />
they be glad if I reduced their<br />
Liabilities by removing it?<br />
A. No. Because if you remove it<br />
they can't lend it to anyone else.<br />
Q. But if I wanted to remove it<br />
they'd have to let me?<br />
A. Certainly.<br />
Q. But suppose they've already<br />
lent it to another customer?<br />
A. Then they'll let you have<br />
someone else's money.<br />
Q. But suppose he wants his too<br />
. . . and they've let me have it?<br />
A. You're being purposely obtuse.<br />
Q. I think I'm being acute. What<br />
if everyone wanted their money<br />
at once?<br />
A. It's the theory of banking<br />
practice that they never would.<br />
Q. So what banks bank on is not<br />
having to meet their commitments?<br />
A. I wouldn't say that.<br />
Q. Naturally. Well, if there's<br />
nothing else you think you can<br />
tell me ...?<br />
A. Quite so. Now you can go off<br />
and open a banking account.<br />
Q. Just one last question.<br />
A. Of course.<br />
Q. Wouldn't I do better to go off<br />
and open up a bank?<br />
VI
Section I<br />
WHAT CREATURE<br />
IS THIS?<br />
What is the Federal Reserve System? The answer<br />
may surprise you. It is not federal and there are<br />
no reserves. Furthermore, the Federal Reserve<br />
Banks are not even banks. The key to this riddle is<br />
to be found, not at the beginning of the story, but<br />
in the middle. Since this is not a <strong>text</strong>book, we are<br />
not confined to a chronological structure. The<br />
subject matter is not a curriculum to be mastered<br />
but a mystery to be solved. So let us start where<br />
the action is.
Chapter One<br />
THE JOURNEY TO<br />
JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
The secret meeting on <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island in Georgia at<br />
which the Federal Reserve was conceived; the<br />
birth of a banking cartel to -protect its members<br />
from competition; the strategy of haw to convince<br />
Congress and the public that this cartel was an<br />
agency of the United States government.<br />
The New Jersey railway station was bitterly cold that night.<br />
Flurries of the year's first snow swirled around street lights.<br />
November wind rattled roof panels above the track shed and gave<br />
a long, mournful sound among the rafters.<br />
It was approaching ten P.M., and the station was nearly empty<br />
except for a few passengers scurrying to board the last Southbound<br />
of the day. The rail equipment was typical for that year of 1910,<br />
mostly chair cars that converted into sleepers with cramped upper<br />
and lower berths. For those with limited funds, coach cars were<br />
coupled to the front. They would take the brunt of the engine's<br />
noise and smoke that, somehow, always managed to seep through<br />
unseen cracks. A dining car was placed between the sections as a<br />
subtle barrier between the two classes of travelers. By today's<br />
standards, the environment was drab. Chairs and mattresses were<br />
hard. Surfaces were metal or scarred wood. Colors were dark green<br />
and gray.<br />
In their hurry to board the train and escape the chill of the<br />
wind, few passengers noticed the activity at the far end of the<br />
platform. At a gate seldom used at this hour of the night was a<br />
Spectacular sight. Nudged against the end-rail bumper was a long<br />
car that caused those few who saw it to stop and stare. Its gleaming<br />
black paint was accented with polished brass hand rails, knobs,<br />
frames, and filigrees. The shades were drawn, but through the open<br />
door, one could see mahogany paneling, velvet drapes, plush
THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
armchairs, and a well stocked bar. Porters with white serving coats<br />
were busying themselves with routine chores. And there was the<br />
distinct aroma of expensive cigars. Other cars in the station bore<br />
numbers on each end to distinguish them from their dull brothers.<br />
But numbers were not needed for this beauty. On the center of each<br />
side was a small plaque bearing but a single word: ALDRICH.<br />
The name of Nelson Aldrich, senator from Rhode Island, was<br />
well known even in New Jersey. By 1910, he was one of the most<br />
powerful men in Washington, D.C., and his private railway car<br />
often was seen at the New York and New Jersey rail terminals<br />
during frequent trips to Wall Street. Aldrich was far more than a<br />
senator. He was considered to be the political spokesman for big<br />
business. As an investment associate of J.F. Morgan, he had<br />
extensive holdings in banking, manufacturing, and public utilities.<br />
His son-in-law was John D. Rockefeller, Jr. Sixty years later, his<br />
grandson, Nelson Aldrich Rockefeller, would become Vice-<br />
President of the United States.<br />
When Aldrich arrived at the station, there was no doubt he was<br />
the commander of the private car.<br />
Wearing a long, fur-collared<br />
coat, a silk top hat, and carrying a silver-tipped walking stick, he<br />
strode briskly down the platform with his private secretary,<br />
Shelton, and a<br />
cluster of porters behind them hauling assorted<br />
trunks and cases.<br />
No sooner had the Senator boarded his car when several more<br />
passengers arrived with similar collections of luggage. The last<br />
man appeared just moments before the final "aaall aboarrrd." He<br />
was carrying a shotgun case.<br />
While Aldrich was easily recognized by most of the travelers<br />
who saw him stride through the station, the other faces were not<br />
familiar. These strangers had been instructed to arrive separately,<br />
to avoid reporters, and, should they meet inside the station, to<br />
pretend they did not know each other. After boarding the train,<br />
they had been told to use first names only so as not to reveal each<br />
other's identity. As a result of these precautions, not even the<br />
private-car porters and servants knew the names of these guests.<br />
Back at the main gate, there was a double blast from the<br />
engine's whistle. Suddenly, the gentle sensation of motion; the<br />
excitement of a journey begun. But, no sooner had the train cleared<br />
the platform when it shuttered to a stop. Then, to everyone's<br />
surprise, it reversed direction and began moving toward the station<br />
THE JOURNEY TO JEKYLL ISLAND 5<br />
again. Had they forgotten something? Was there a problem with<br />
the engine?<br />
A sudden lurch and the slam of couplers gave the answer. They<br />
had picked up another car at the end of the train. Possibly the mail<br />
car? In an instant the forward motion was resumed, and all<br />
thoughts returned to the hip ahead and to the minimal comforts of<br />
the accommodations.<br />
And so, as the passengers drifted off to sleep that night to the<br />
rhythmic clicking of steel wheels against rail, little did they dream<br />
that, riding in the car at the end of their train, were seven men who<br />
represented an estimated one-fourth of the total wealth of the entire<br />
world.<br />
This was the roster of the Aldrich car that night:<br />
1. Nelson W. Aldrich, Republican "whip" in the Senate, Chairman<br />
of the National Monetary Commission, business associate of J.P,<br />
Morgan, father-in-law to John D. Rockefeller, Jr.;<br />
2. Abraham Piatt Andrew, Assistant Secretary of the United States<br />
Treasury;<br />
3. Frank A. Vanderlip, president of the National City Bank of New<br />
York, the most powerful of the banks at that time, representing<br />
William Rockefeller and the international investment banking<br />
house of Kuhn, Loeb & Company;<br />
4. Henry P. Davison, senior partner of the J.P. Morgan Company;<br />
5. Charles D. Norton, president of J.P. Morgan's First National Bank<br />
of New York;<br />
6. Benjamin Strong, head of J.P. Morgan's Bankers Trust Company;<br />
and<br />
7. Paul M. Warburg, a partner in Kuhn, Loeb & Company, a<br />
representative of the Rothschild banking dynasty in England<br />
and France, and brother to Max Warburg who was head of the<br />
Warburg banking consortium in Germany and the Netherlands.<br />
1. In private correspondence between the author and Andrew L. Gray, the Grand<br />
Nephew of Abraham P. Andrew, Mr. Gray claims that Strong was not in<br />
attendance. On the other hand, Frank Vanderlip—who was there—says in his<br />
memoirs that he was. How could Vanderlip be wrong? Gray's response: "He was<br />
in his late seventies when he wrote the book and the essay in question. . . Perhaps<br />
the wish was father to the thought." If Vanderlip truly was in error, it was perhaps<br />
not so significant after all because, as Gray admits: "Strong would have been among<br />
those few to be let in on the secret." In the absence of further confirmation to the<br />
contrary, we are compelled to accept Vanderlip's account.
THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
CONCENTRATION OF WEALTH<br />
Centralization of control over financial resources was far<br />
advanced by 1910. In the United States, there were two main focal<br />
points of this control: the Morgan group and the Rockefeller group.<br />
Within each orbit was a maze of commercial banks, acceptance<br />
banks, and investment firms. In Europe, the same process had<br />
proceeded even further and had coalesced into the Rothschild<br />
group and the Warburg group. An article appeared in the New York<br />
Times on May 3, 1931, commenting on the death of George Baker,<br />
one of Morgan's closest associates. It said: "One-sixth of the total<br />
wealth of the world was represented by members of the <strong>Jekyll</strong><br />
Island Club." The reference was only to those in the Morgan group,<br />
(members of the <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island Club), It did not include the<br />
Rockefeller group or the European financiers. When all of these are<br />
combined, the previous estimate that one-fourth of the world's<br />
wealth was represented by these groups is probably conservative.<br />
In 1913, the year that the Federal Reserve Act became law, a<br />
subcommittee of the House Committee on Currency and Banking,<br />
under the chairmanship of Arsene Pujo of Louisiana, completed its<br />
investigation into the concentration of financial power in the<br />
United States. Pujo was considered to be a spokesman for the oil<br />
interests, part of the very group under investigation, and did<br />
everything possible to sabotage the hearings. In spite of his efforts,<br />
however, the final report of the committee at large was devastating:<br />
Your committee is satisfied from the proofs submitted ... that<br />
there is an established and well defined identity and community of<br />
interest between a few leaders of finance . . . which has resulted in great<br />
and rapidly growing concentration of the control of money and credit<br />
in the hands of these few men. . .<br />
Under our system of issuing and distributing corporate securities<br />
the investing public does not buy directly from the corporation. The<br />
securities travel from the issuing house through middlemen to the<br />
investor. It is only the great banks or bankers with access to the<br />
mainsprings of the concentrated resources made up of other people's<br />
money, in the banks, trust companies, and life insurance companies,<br />
and with control of the machinery for creating markets and<br />
distributing securities, who have had the power to underwrite or<br />
guarantee the sale of large-scale security issues. The men who through<br />
their control over the funds of our railroad and industrial companies<br />
are able to direct where such funds shall be kept, and thus to create<br />
these great reservoirs of the people's money are the ones who are in a<br />
THE JOURNEY TO JEKYLL ISLAND 7<br />
position to tap those reservoirs for the ventures in which they are<br />
interested and to prevent their being tapped for purposes which they<br />
do not approve....<br />
When we consider, also, in this connection that into these<br />
reservoirs of money and credit there flow a large part of the reserves of<br />
the banks of the country, that they are also the agents and<br />
correspondents of the out-of-town banks in the loaning of their<br />
surplus funds in the only public money market of the country, and<br />
that a small group of men and their partners and associates have now<br />
further strengthened their hold upon the resources of these<br />
institutions by acquiring large stock holdings therein, by<br />
representation on their boards and through valuable patronage, we<br />
begin to realize something of the extent to which this practical and<br />
effective domination and control over our greatest financial, railroad<br />
and industrial corporations has developed, largely within the past five<br />
years, and that it is fraught with peril to the welfare of the country.<br />
Such was the nature of the wealth and power represented by<br />
those seven men who gathered in secret that night and travelled in<br />
the luxury of Senator Aldrich's private car.<br />
DESTINATION JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
As the train neared its destination of Raleigh, North Carolina,<br />
the next afternoon, it slowed and then stopped in the switching<br />
yard just outside the station terminal. Quickly, the crew threw a<br />
switch, and the engine nudged the last car onto a siding where, just<br />
as quickly, it was uncoupled and left behind. When passengers<br />
stepped onto the platform at<br />
the terminal a few moments later,<br />
their train appeared exactly as it had been when they boarded.<br />
They could not know that their travelling companions for the night,<br />
at that very instant, were joining still<br />
another train which, within<br />
the hour, would depart Southbound once again.<br />
The elite group of financiers was embarked on a thousand-mile<br />
journey that led them to Atlanta, then to Savannah and, finally, to<br />
the small town of Brunswick, Georgia. At first, it would seem that<br />
Brunswick was an unlikely destination. Located on the Atlantic<br />
seaboard, it was primarily a fishing village with a small but lively<br />
port for cotton and lumber. It had a population of only a few<br />
thousand people. But, by that time, the Sea Islands that sheltered<br />
I- Herman E. Krooss, ed., Documentary History of Currency and Banking in tJie United<br />
States (New York: Chelsea House, 1983), Vol. Ill, "Final Report from the Pujo<br />
Committee, February 28, 1913," pp. 222-24.
8 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND THE JOURNEY TO JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
the coast from South Carolina to Florida already had become<br />
popular as winter resorts for the very wealthy. One such island, just<br />
off the coast of Brunswick, had recently been purchased by J.P.<br />
Morgan and several of his business associates, and it was here that<br />
they came in the fall and winter to hunt ducks or deer and to escape<br />
the rigors of cold weather in the North. It was called <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island.<br />
When the Aldrich car was uncoupled onto a siding at the small<br />
Brunswick station, it was, indeed, conspicuous. Word travelled<br />
quickly to the office of the town's weekly newspaper. While the<br />
group was waiting to be transferred to the dock, several people<br />
from the paper approached and began asking questions. Who were<br />
Mr. Aldrich's guests? Why were they here? Was there anything<br />
special happening? Mr. Davison, who was one of the owners of<br />
<strong>Jekyll</strong> Island and who was well known to the local paper, told them<br />
that these were merely personal friends and that they had come for<br />
the simple amusement of duck hunting. Satisfied that there was no<br />
real news in the event, the reporters returned to their office.<br />
Even after arrival at the remote island lodge, the secrecy<br />
continued. For nine days the rule for first-names-only remained in<br />
effect. Full-time caretakers and servants had been given vacation,<br />
and an entirely new, carefully screened staff was brought in for the<br />
occasion. This was done to make absolutely sure that none of the<br />
servants might recognize by sight the identities of these guests. It is<br />
difficult to imagine any event in history—including preparation for<br />
war—that was shielded from public view with greater mystery and<br />
secrecy.<br />
The purpose of this meeting on lekyll Island was not to hunt<br />
ducks. Simply stated, it was to come to an agreement on the<br />
structure and operation of a banking cartel. The goal of the cartel,<br />
as is true with all of them, was to maximize profits by minimizing<br />
competition between members, to make it difficult for new competitors<br />
to enter the field, and to utilize the police power of<br />
government to enforce the cartel agreement. In more specific terms,<br />
the purpose and, indeed, the actual outcome of this meeting was to<br />
create the blueprint for the Federal Reserve System.<br />
THE STORY IS CONFIRMED<br />
For many years after the event, educators, commentators, and<br />
historians denied that the <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island meeting ever took place.<br />
Even now, the accepted view is that the meeting was relatively<br />
unimportant, and only paranoid unsophisticates would try to make<br />
anything out of it. Ron Chemow writes: "The <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island meeting<br />
would be the fountain of a thousand conspiracy theories." Little<br />
by little, however, the story has been pieced together in amazing<br />
detail, and it has come directly or indirectly from those who<br />
actually were there. Furthermore, if what they say about their own<br />
purposes and actions does not constitute a classic conspiracy, then<br />
there is little meaning to that word.<br />
The first leak regarding this meeting found its way into print in<br />
1916. It appeared in Leslie's Weekly and was written by a young<br />
financial reporter by the name of B.C. Forbes, who later founded<br />
Forbes Magazine. The article was primarily in praise of Paul<br />
Warburg, and it is likely that Warburg let the story out during<br />
conversations with the writer. At any rate, the opening paragraph<br />
contained a<br />
dramatic but highly accurate summary of both the<br />
nature and purpose of the meeting:<br />
Picture a party of the nation's greatest bankers stealing out of New<br />
York on a<br />
private railroad car under cover of darkness, stealthily<br />
hieing hundreds of miles South, embarking on a mysterious launch,<br />
sneaking on to an island deserted by all but a few servants, living there<br />
a full week under such rigid secrecy that the names of not one of them<br />
was once mentioned lest the servants learn the identity and disclose to<br />
the world this strangest, most secret expedition in the history of<br />
American finance.<br />
I am not romancing. I am giving to the world, for the first time, the<br />
real story of how the famous Aldrich currency report, the foundation<br />
of our new currency system, was written.<br />
In 1930, Paul Warburg wrote a massive book—1750 pages in<br />
all—entitled The Federal Reserve System, Its Origin and Growth. In this<br />
tome, he described the meeting and its purpose but did not<br />
mention either*its location or the names of those who attended. But<br />
he did say: "The results of the conference were entirely confidential.<br />
Even the fact there had been a meeting was not permitted to<br />
become public." Then, in a footnote he added: "Though eighteen<br />
years have since gone by, I do not feel free to give a description of<br />
1 . Ron Chernow, The House of Morgan: An American Banking Dynasty and the Rise of<br />
Modern Finance (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1990), p. 129.<br />
I "Men Who Are Making America/' by B.C. Forbes, Leslies Weekly, October 19,<br />
1916, p. 423.<br />
I
10 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
THE JOURNEY TO JEKYLL ISLAND 11<br />
this most interesting conference concerning which Senator Aldrich<br />
In the February 9, 1935, issue of the Saturday Evening Post, an<br />
pledged all participants to secrecy." 1<br />
article appeared written by Frank Vanderlip. In it he said:<br />
An interesting insight to Paul Warburg's attendance at the<br />
Jekyl] Island meeting came<br />
Despite my views about the value to society of greater publicity<br />
thirty-four years later, in a book written<br />
for the affairs of corporations, there was an occasion, near the close of<br />
by his son, James. James had been appointed by F.D.R. as Director<br />
1910, when I was as secretive—indeed, as furtive—as any<br />
of the Budget and, during World War II, as head of the Office of<br />
conspirator.. . . I do not feel it is any exaggeration to speak of our secret<br />
War Information. In his book he described how his father, who<br />
expedition to <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island as the occasion of the actual conception of<br />
didn't know one end of a gun from the other, borrowed a shotgun<br />
what eventually became the Federal Reserve System....<br />
from a friend and carried it with him to the train<br />
We were told to leave our last names behind us. We were told,<br />
to disguise himself<br />
as a duck hunter.<br />
further, that we should avoid dining together on the night of our<br />
departure. We were instructed to come one at a time and as<br />
This part of the story was corroborated in the official biography<br />
unobtrusively as possible to the railroad tenninal on the New Jersey<br />
of Senator Aldrich, written by Nathaniel Wright Stephenson:<br />
littoral of the Hudson, where Senator Aldrich's private car would be in<br />
In the autumn of 1910, six men [in addition to Aldrich]<br />
readiness, attached to the rear<br />
went<br />
end of a train for the South....<br />
out to<br />
shoot ducks. That is to say, they told the world that was<br />
Once aboard the private car we began to observe the taboo that<br />
their purpose.<br />
Mr. Warburg, who was of the number, gives an amusing<br />
had been fixed on last names. We addressed one another as "Ben/'<br />
account of his<br />
feelings when he boarded a private "Paul/ 7<br />
"Nelson/' "Abe"—it is Abraham Piatt Andrew. Davison and I<br />
car in Jersey City, bringing with<br />
him all the accoutrements of a duck adopted even deeper disguises, abandoning our first names.<br />
shooter. The<br />
On the<br />
joke was in the fact<br />
that he had never shot a duck theory that we were always right, he became Wilbur and I became<br />
in his life and had no intention of<br />
shooting any.... The duck shoot was a blind. 3<br />
Orville, after those two aviation pioneers, the Wright brothers....<br />
The servants and train crew may have known the identities of one<br />
Stephenson continues with a description of the encounter at<br />
or two of us, but they did not know all, and it was the names of all<br />
Brunswick station. He tells us that, shortly after they arrived, the<br />
printed together that would have made our mysterious journey<br />
station master walked into the private car and shocked<br />
significant in<br />
them by Washington, in Wall Street,<br />
his<br />
even in London. Discovery,<br />
apparent knowledge of the<br />
we knew, simply must not happen,<br />
identities<br />
or else all our time and effort<br />
of everyone on board. To<br />
make matters<br />
would be wasted. If it were to be exposed publicly that our particular<br />
even worse, he said that a group of reporters were<br />
group had got together and written a banking bill, that bill would have<br />
waiting outside. Davison took charge. "Come outside, old man," he<br />
no chance whatever of passage by Congress.<br />
said, "and I will tell you a story.' 7 No one claims to know what story<br />
was told standing on the railroad<br />
THE<br />
ties that morning,<br />
STRUCTURE WAS PURE CARTEL<br />
but a few<br />
moments later Davison returned with a broad<br />
The composition of the <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island meeting was a classic<br />
smile on his face.<br />
"It's all right," he said reassuringly. "They<br />
example of cartel structure. A cartel is a<br />
won't<br />
group of independent<br />
give us away."<br />
Stephenson continues: "The businesses which join together<br />
rest<br />
to coordinate the production,<br />
is silence. The reporters dispersed,<br />
and the secret<br />
pricing,<br />
of the strange<br />
or marketing of their members. The purpose of a cartel is to<br />
journey was not divulged. No<br />
one asked him how he<br />
reduce<br />
managed<br />
competition and thereby increase profitability. This is<br />
it and he did not volunteer the<br />
information.'<br />
accomplished through a shared monopoly over their industry<br />
which forces the public to pay higher prices for their goods or<br />
1. Paul Warburg, The Federal Reserve System<br />
services than would be otherwise required under free-enterprise<br />
Its Origin and Growth (New York-<br />
Macmil an, 1930), Vol. I, p. 58. It is apparent that Warburg wrote this line two years<br />
competition.<br />
before the book was published.<br />
2. James Warburg, The Long Road Home (New York: Doubleday, 1964) p 29<br />
1- "From<br />
3. Nathaniel<br />
Farm Boy to Financier," by Frank A. Vanderlip, The Saturday Evening<br />
Wright Stephenson, Nelson W. Aldrich in American Politics '(New York-<br />
Post, Feb. 9,<br />
Scnbners,<br />
1933,<br />
1930;<br />
pp. 25, 70. The identical story was told two years later in<br />
rpt. New York: Kennikat Press, 1971), p. 373.<br />
Vanderlip's book bearing the same title as the article<br />
4. Stephenson, p. 376.<br />
(New York: D. Appleton-<br />
Century Company, 1935), pp. 210-219.
12 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND THE JOURNEY TO JEKYLL ISLAND 13<br />
Here were representatives of the world's leading banking<br />
consortia: Morgan, Rockefeller, Rothschild, Warburg, and Kuhn-<br />
Loeb. They were often competitors, and there is little doubt that<br />
there was considerable distrust between them and skillful maneuvering<br />
for favored position in any agreement. But they were driven<br />
together by one overriding desire to fight their common enemy.<br />
The enemy was competition.<br />
In 1910, the number of banks in the United States was growing<br />
at a phenomenal rate. In fact it had more than doubled to over<br />
twenty thousand in just the previous ten years. Furthermore, most<br />
of them were springing up in the South and West, causing the New<br />
York banks to suffer a steady decline of market share. Almost all<br />
banks in the 1880s were national banks, which means they were<br />
chartered by the federal government. Generally, they were located<br />
in the big cities, and were allowed by law to issue their own<br />
currency in the form of bank notes. Even as early as 1896, however,<br />
the number of non-national banks had grown to sixty-one per cent,<br />
and they already held fifty-four per cent of the country's total<br />
banking deposits. By 1913, when the Federal Reserve Act was<br />
passed, those numbers were seventy-one per cent non-national<br />
banks holding fifty-seven per cent of the deposits. 1<br />
In the eyes of<br />
those duck hunters from New York, this was a trend that simply<br />
had to be reversed.<br />
Competition also was coming from a new trend in industry to<br />
finance future growth out of profits rather than from borrowed<br />
capital. This was the outgrowth of free-market interest rates which<br />
set a realistic balance between debt and thrift. Rates were low<br />
enough to attract serious borrowers who were confident of the<br />
success of their business ventures and of their ability to repay, but<br />
they were high enough to discourage loans for frivolous ventures<br />
or those for which there were alternative sources of funding—for<br />
example, one's own capital. That balance between debt and thrift<br />
was the result of a limited money supply. Banks could create loans<br />
in excess of their actual deposits, as we shall see, but there was a<br />
limit to that process. And that limit was ultimately determined by<br />
the supply of gold they held. Consequently, between 1900 and<br />
1910, seventy per cent of the funding for American corporate<br />
1. See Gabriel Kolko, Vie Triumph of Conservatism (New York: The Free Press of<br />
Glencoe, a division of the MacmUIan Co., 1963), p. 140.<br />
growth was generated internally, making industry increasingly<br />
independent of the banks. Even the federal government was<br />
becoming thrifty. It had a growing stockpile of gold, was systemati-<br />
redeeming the Greenbacks—which had been issued during<br />
cally<br />
the Civil War—and was rapidly reducing the national debt.<br />
Here was another trend that had to be halted. What the bankers<br />
wanted—and what many businessmen wanted also—was to intervene<br />
in the free market and tip the balance of interest rates<br />
downward, to favor debt over thrift. To accomplish this, the money<br />
supply simply had to be disconnected from gold and made more<br />
plentiful or, as they described it, more elastic.<br />
THE SPECTER OF BANK FAILURE<br />
The greatest threat, however, came, not from rivals or private<br />
capital formation, but from the public at large in the form of what<br />
bankers call a run on the bank. This is because, when banks accept a<br />
customer's deposit, they give in return a "balance" in his account.<br />
This is the equivalent of a promise to pay back the deposit anytime<br />
he wants. Likewise, when another customer borrows money from<br />
the bank, he also is given an account balance which usually is<br />
withdrawn immediately to satisfy the purpose of the loan. This<br />
creates a ticking time bomb because, at that point, the bank has<br />
issued more promises to "pay-on-demand" than it<br />
has money in<br />
the vault. Even though the depositing customer thinks he can get<br />
his money any time he wants, in reality it has been given to the<br />
borrowing customer and no longer is available at the bank.<br />
The problem is compounded further by the fact that banks are<br />
allowed to loan even more money than they have received in<br />
deposit. The mechanism for accomplishing this seemingly impossible<br />
feat will be described in a later chapter, but it is a fact of modern<br />
banking that promises-to-pay often exceed savings deposits by a<br />
factor of ten-to-one. And, because only about three per cent of these<br />
accounts are actually retained in the vault in the form of cash—the<br />
rest having been put into even more loans and investments—the<br />
bank's promises exceed its ability to keep those promises by a factor<br />
of over three hundred-to-one. As long as only a small percentage<br />
1. William Greider, Secrets of the Temple (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), p.<br />
274, 275. Also Kolko, p. 145,<br />
2. Another way of putting it is that their reserves are underfunded by over<br />
33,333% (10-to-1 divided by .03 = 333.333-to-l . That divided by .01 = 33333%.)
14 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND THE JOURNEY TO JEKYLL ISLAND 15<br />
of depositors request their money at one time, no one is the wiser.<br />
But if public confidence is shaken, and if more than a few per cent<br />
attempt to withdraw their funds, the scheme is finally exposed. The<br />
bank cannot keep all its promises and is forced to close its doors.<br />
Bankruptcy usually follows in due course.<br />
CURRENCY DRAINS<br />
The same result could happen—and, prior to the Federal<br />
Reserve System, often did happen-^even without depositors making<br />
a run on the bank. Instead of withdrawing their funds at the<br />
teller's window, they simply wrote checks to purchase goods or<br />
services. People receiving those checks took them to a bank for<br />
deposit. If that bank happened to be the same one from which the<br />
check was drawn, then all was well, because it was not necessary to<br />
remove any real money from the vault. But if the holder of the<br />
check took it to another bank, it was quickly passed back to the<br />
issuing bank and settlement was demanded between banks.<br />
This is not a one-way street, however. While the Downtown<br />
Bank is demanding payment from the Uptown Bank, the Uptown<br />
Bank is also clearing checks and demanding payment from the<br />
Downtown bank. As long as the money flow in both directions is<br />
equal, then everything can be handled with simple bookkeeping.<br />
But if the flow is not equal, then one of the banks will have to<br />
actually send money to the other to make up the difference. If the<br />
amount of money required exceeds a few percentage points of the<br />
bank's total deposits, the result is the same as a run on the bank by<br />
depositors. This demand of money by other banks rather than by<br />
depositors is called a currency drain.<br />
In 1910, the most common cause of a bank having to declare<br />
bankruptcy due to a currency drain was that it followed a loan<br />
policy that was more reckless than that of its competitors. More<br />
money was demanded from it because more money was loaned by<br />
it. It was dangerous enough to loan ninety per cent of their<br />
customers' savings (keeping only one dollar in reserve out of every<br />
ten), but that had proven to be adequate most of the time. Some<br />
banks, however, were tempted to walk even closer to the precipice.<br />
They pushed the ratio to ninety-too per cent, ninety-^ per cent,<br />
ninety-mwe per cent. After all, the way a bank makes money is to<br />
collect interest, and the only way to do that is to make loans. The<br />
more loans, the better. And, so, there was a practice among some of<br />
the more reckless banks to "loan up," as they call it.<br />
another way of saying to push dawn their reserve ratios.<br />
A BANKERS' UTOPIA<br />
Which was<br />
If all banks could be forced to issue loans in the same ratio to<br />
their reserves as other banks did, then, regardless of how small that<br />
ratio was, the amount of checks to be cleared between them would<br />
No major currency drains would ever<br />
balance in the long run.<br />
occur. The entire banking industry might collapse under such a<br />
system, but not individual banks—at least not those that were part<br />
of the cartel.<br />
All would walk the same distance from the edge,<br />
obligations. The<br />
regardless of how close it was. Under such uniformity, no individual<br />
bank could be blamed for failure to meet its<br />
blame could be shifted, instead, to the "economy" or "government<br />
policy" or "interest rates" or "trade deficits" or the "exchangevalue<br />
of the dollar" or even to the "capitalist system" itself.<br />
But, in 1910, such a bankers' utopia had not yet been created. If<br />
the Downtown bank began to loan at a greater ratio to its reserves<br />
than its competitors, the amount of checks which would come back<br />
to it for payment also would be greater. Thus, the bank which<br />
pursued a more reckless lending policy had to draw against its<br />
reserves in order to make payments to the more conservative banks<br />
and, when those funds were exhausted, it usually was forced into<br />
bankruptcy-<br />
Historian John Klein tells us that "The financial panics of 1873,<br />
1884, 1893, and 1907 were in large part an outgrowth of ... reserve<br />
pyramiding and excessive deposit creation by reserve city ...<br />
banks. These panics were triggered by the currency drains that took<br />
place in periods of relative prosperity when banks were loaned<br />
up." In other words, the "panics" and resulting bank failures were<br />
caused, not by negative factors in the economy, but by currency<br />
drains on the banks which were loaned up to the point where they<br />
had practically no reserves at all. The banks did not fail because the<br />
system was weak. The system failed because the banks were weak.<br />
This was another common problem that brought these seven<br />
men over a thousand miles to a tiny island off the shore of Georgia.<br />
Each was a potentially fierce competitor, but uppermost in their<br />
minds were the so-called panics and the very real 1,748 bank<br />
I<br />
See Vera C. Smith, The Rationale of Central Banking (London: P.S. King & Son,<br />
1936), p. 36.
16 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND THE JOURNEY TO JEKYLL ISLAND 17<br />
failures of the preceding two decades. Somehow, they had to join<br />
forces. A method had to be devised to enable them to continue to<br />
make more promises to pay-on-demand than they could keep. To<br />
do this, they had to find a way to force all banks to walk the same<br />
distance from the edge, and, when the inevitable disasters<br />
happened, to shift public blame away from themselves. By making<br />
it appear to be a problem of the national economy rather than of<br />
private banking practice, the door then could be opened for the use<br />
of tax money rather than their own funds for paying off the losses.<br />
Here, then, were the main challenges that faced that tiny but<br />
powerful group assembled on <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island:<br />
1. How to stop the growing influence of small, rival banks and to<br />
insure that control over the nation's financial resources would<br />
remain in the hands of those present;<br />
2. How to make the money supply more elastic in order to reverse<br />
the trend of private capital formation and to recapture the<br />
industrial loan market;<br />
3. How to pool the meager reserves of the nation's banks into one<br />
large reserve so that all banks will be motivated to follow the<br />
same loan-to-deposit ratios. This would protect at least some of<br />
them from currency drains and bank runs;<br />
4. Should this lead eventually to the collapse of the whole banking<br />
system, then how to shift<br />
banks to the taxpayers.<br />
THE CARTEL ADOPTS A NAME<br />
Everyone knew that the solution to all<br />
the losses from the owners of the<br />
these problems was a<br />
cartel mechanism that had been devised and already put into<br />
similar operation in Europe. As with all cartels, it had to be created<br />
by legislation and sustained by the power of government under the<br />
deception of protecting the consumer. The most important task<br />
before them, therefore, can be stated as objective number five:<br />
5. How to convince Congress that the scheme was a measure to<br />
protect the public.<br />
The task was a delicate one. The American people did not like<br />
the concept of a cartel. The idea of business enterprises joining<br />
together to fix prices and prevent competition was alien to the<br />
free-enterprise system, It could never be sold to the voters. But, if<br />
the word cartel was not used, if<br />
the venture could be described<br />
with words which are emotionally neutral-perhaps even allurine—then<br />
half the battle would be won.<br />
The first decision, therefore, was to follow the practice adopted<br />
in Europe. Henceforth, the cartel would operate as a central bank.<br />
And even that was to be but a generic expression. For purposes of<br />
public relations and legislation,<br />
they would devise a name that<br />
would avoid the word bank altogether and which would conjure<br />
the image of the federal government itself. Furthermore, to create<br />
the impression that there would be no concentration of power, they<br />
would establish regional branches of the cartel and make that a<br />
main selling point. Stephenson tells us: "Aldrich entered this<br />
discussion at <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island an ardent convert to the idea of a central<br />
bank His desire was to transplant the system of one of the great<br />
European banks, say the Bank of England, bodily to America." But<br />
political expediency required that such plans be concealed from the<br />
public. As John Kenneth Galbraith explained it "It was his<br />
[Aldrich's] thought to outflank the opposition by having not one<br />
central bank but many. And the word bank would itself be<br />
avoided."<br />
With the exception of Aldrich, all of those present were<br />
bankers, but only one was an expert on the European model of a<br />
central bank. Because of this knowledge, Paul Warburg became the<br />
dominant and guiding mind throughout all of the discussions.<br />
Even a casual perusal of the literature on the creation of the Federal<br />
Reserve System is sufficient to find that he was, indeed, the cartel's<br />
mastermind. Galbraith says "... Warburg has, with some justice,<br />
been called the father of the system." 3 Professor Edwin Seligman, a<br />
member of the international banking family of J. & W. Seligman,<br />
and head of the Department of Economics at Columbia University,<br />
writes that "... in its fundamental features, the Federal Reserve Act<br />
is the work of Mr. Warburg more than any other man in the<br />
country ,A<br />
I J<br />
Soh P h<br />
3<br />
n Ke^;th 2lbraith, Money: Whence It Came, Where If Went (Boston,<br />
Houghton Mifflin, 1975), p. 122.<br />
3. Galbraith, p. 123. . -„,<br />
4. The Academy of Political Science, Proceedings, 1914, Vol. 4, No. 4, p. 387.
18 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND THE JOURNEY TO JEKYLL ISLAND 19<br />
THE REAL DADDY WARBUCKS<br />
Paul Moritz Warburg was a leading member of the investment<br />
banking firm of MM. Warburg & Company of Hamburg,<br />
Germany, and Amsterdam, the Netherlands. He had come to the<br />
United States only nine years previously. Soon after arrival, however,<br />
and with funding provided mostly by the Rothschild group,<br />
he and his brother, Felix, had been able to buy partnerships in the<br />
New York investment banking firm of Kuhn, Loeb & Company,<br />
while continuing as partners in Warburg of Hamburg. Within<br />
twenty years, Paul would become one of the wealthiest men in<br />
America with an unchallenged domination over the country's<br />
railroad system.<br />
At this distance in history, it is difficult to appreciate the<br />
importance of this man. But some understanding may be had from<br />
the fact that the legendary character, Daddy Warbucks, in the<br />
comic strip Little Orphan Annie, was a contemporary commentary<br />
on the presumed benevolence of Paul Warburg, and the almost<br />
magic ability to accomplish good through the power of his unlimited<br />
wealth.<br />
A third brother, Max Warburg, was the financial adviser of the<br />
Kaiser and became Director of the Reichsbank in Germany. This<br />
was, of course, a central bank, and it was one of the cartel models<br />
used in the construction of the Federal Reserve System. The<br />
Reichsbank, incidentally, a few years later would create the massive<br />
hyperinflation that occurred in Germany, wiping out the middle<br />
class and the entire German economy as well.<br />
Paul Warburg soon became well known on Wall Street as a<br />
persuasive advocate for a central bank in America. Three years<br />
before the <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island meeting, he had published several pamphlets.<br />
One was entitled Defects and Needs of Our Banking System,<br />
and the other was A Plan for A Modified Central Bank, These<br />
attracted wide attention in both financial and academic circles and<br />
set the intellectual climate for all future discussions regarding<br />
banking legislation. In these treatises, Warburg complained that the<br />
American monetary system was crippled by its dependency on<br />
gold and government bonds, both of which were in limited supply.<br />
What America needed, he argued, was an elastic money supply that<br />
1. Anthony Sutton, Wall Street and FDR (New Rochelle, New Ycrk: Arlington House,<br />
1975), p. 92.<br />
could be expanded and contracted to accommodate the fluctuating<br />
needs of commerce. The solution, he said, was to follow the<br />
German example whereby banks could create currency solely on<br />
the basis of "commercial paper," which is banker language for<br />
I O.U.s from corporations.<br />
Warburg was tireless in his efforts. He was a featured speaker<br />
before scores of influential audiences and wrote a steady stream of<br />
published articles on the subject. In March of that year, for example,<br />
The Neiv York Times published an eleven-part series written by<br />
Warburg explaining and expounding what he called the Reserve<br />
Bank of the United States. 1<br />
THE MESSAGE WAS PLAIN FOR THOSE WHO<br />
UNDERSTOOD<br />
Most of Warburg's writing and lecturing on this topic was<br />
eyewash for the public. To cover the fact that a central bank is<br />
merely a cartel which has been legalized, its proponents had to lay<br />
down a thick smoke screen of technical jargon focusing always on<br />
would supposedly benefit commerce, the public, and the<br />
how it<br />
nation; how it would lower interest rates, provide funding for<br />
needed industrial projects, and prevent panics in the economy.<br />
There was not the slightest glimmer that, underneath it all, was a<br />
master plan which was designed from top to bottom to serve<br />
private interests at the expense of the public.<br />
This was, nevertheless, the cold reality, and the more perceptive<br />
bankers were well aware of it. In an address before the<br />
American Bankers Association the following year, Aldrich laid it<br />
out for anyone who was really listening to the meaning of his<br />
words. He said: "The organization proposed is<br />
not a bank, but a<br />
cooperative union of all the banks of the country for definite<br />
purposes." 2 Precisely. A union of banks.<br />
Two years later, in a speech before that same group of bankers,<br />
A. Barton Hepburn of Chase National Bank was even more candid.<br />
He said: "The measure recognizes and adopts the principles of a<br />
central bank. Indeed, if it works out as the sponsors of the law<br />
hope, it will make all incorporated banks together joint owners of a<br />
1. See J.<br />
Lawrence Laughlin, The Federal Reserve Act: Us Origin and Problems (New<br />
York: Macmillan, 1933), p. 9.<br />
2. The full <strong>text</strong> of the speech is reprinted by Herman E. Krooss and Paul A.<br />
Samuel son, Vol. 3, p. 1202.
20 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
THE JOURNEY TO JEKYLL ISLAND 21<br />
central dominating power."<br />
of a cartel as one is likely to find.<br />
And that is about as good a definition<br />
In 1914, one year after the Federal Reserve Act was passed into<br />
law, Senator Aldrich could afford to be less guarded in his remarks.<br />
In an article published in luly of that year in a magazine called The<br />
Independent, he boasted: "Before the passage of this Act, the New<br />
York bankers could only dominate the reserves of New York. Now<br />
we are able to dominate the bank reserves of the entire country."<br />
MYTH ACCEPTED AS HISTORY<br />
The accepted version of history is that the Federal Reserve was<br />
created to stabilize our economy. One of the most widely-used<br />
<strong>text</strong>books on this subject says: "It sprang from the panic of 1907,<br />
with its alarming epidemic of bank failures: the country was fed up<br />
once and for all with the anarchy of unstable private banking."<br />
Even the most naive student must sense a grave contradiction<br />
between this cherished view and the System's actual performance.<br />
Since its inception, it has presided over the crashes of 1921 and<br />
1929; the Great Depression of '29 to '39; recessions in '53, '57, '69,<br />
'75, and '81; a stock market "Black Monday" in '87; and a 1000%<br />
inflation which has destroyed 90% of the dollar's purchasing<br />
power.<br />
Let us be more specific on that last point. By 1990, an annual<br />
income of $10,000 was required to buy what took only $1,000 in<br />
1914. That incredible loss in value was quietly transferred to the<br />
federal government in the form of hidden taxation, and the Federal<br />
Reserve System was the mechanism by which it was accomplished.<br />
Actions have consequences. The consequences of wealth confiscation<br />
by the Federal-Reserve mechanism are now upon us. In the<br />
current decade/ corporate debt is soaring; personal debt is greater<br />
than ever; both business and personal bankruptcies are at an<br />
all-time high; banks and savings and loan associations are failing in<br />
1 . Quoted by KoLko, Triumph, p. 235.<br />
Z Paul A. SamueLson, Economics, 8th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970), p. 272.<br />
3. See "Money, Banking, and Biblical Ethics/' by Ronald H. Nash, Durell Journal of<br />
Money and Banking, February, 1990.<br />
4. When one considers that the income tax had just been introduced in 1913 and<br />
that such low figures were completely exempt, an income at that time of $1,000<br />
actually was the equivalent of earning $15,400 now, before paying 35% taxes. When<br />
the amount now taken by state and local governments is added to the total bite, the<br />
figure is close to $20,000.<br />
larger numbers than ever before; interest on the national debt is<br />
consuming half of our tax dollars; heavy industry has been largely<br />
replaced by overseas competitors; we are facing an international<br />
trade deficit for the first time in our history; 75% of downtown Los<br />
Angeles and other metropolitan areas is now owned by foreigners;<br />
and over half of our nation is in a state of economic recession.<br />
FIRST REASON TO ABOLISH THE SYSTEM<br />
That is the scorecard eighty years after the Federal Reserve was<br />
created supposedly to stabilize our economy! There can be no<br />
argument that the System has failed in its stated objectives.<br />
Furthermore, after all this time, after repeated changes in personnel,<br />
after operating under both political parties, after numerous<br />
experiments in monetary philosophy, after almost a hundred<br />
revisions to its charter, and after the development of countless new<br />
formulas and techniques, there has been more than ample opportunity<br />
to work out mere procedural flaws. It is not unreasonable to<br />
conclude, therefore, that the System has failed, not because it needs<br />
a new set of rules or more intelligent directors, but because it<br />
incapable ofachieving its stated objectives.<br />
If an institution is incapable of achieving its objectives, there is<br />
no reason to preserve it—unless it can be altered in some way to<br />
change its capability. That leads to the question: why is the System<br />
incapable of achieving its stated objectives? The painful answer is:<br />
those were never its true objectives. When one realizes the circumstances<br />
under which it<br />
was created, when one contemplates the<br />
identities of those who authored it, and when one studies its actual<br />
performance over the years, it becomes obvious that the System is<br />
merely a cartel with a government facade. There is no doubt that<br />
those who run it are motivated to maintain full employment, high<br />
productivity, low inflation, and a generally sound economy. They<br />
are not interested in killing the goose that lays such beautiful<br />
golden eggs. But, when there is a conflict between the public<br />
interest and the private needs of the cartel—a conflict that arises<br />
almost daily—the public will be sacrificed. That is the nature of the<br />
beast. It is foolish to expect a cartel to act in any other way.<br />
This view is not encouraged by Establishment institutions and<br />
has become their apparent mission to convince the<br />
publishers. It<br />
American people that the system is not intrinsically flawed. It<br />
merely has been in the hands of bumbling oafs. For example,<br />
is
22 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
23<br />
William Greider was a former Assistant Managing Editor for The<br />
the problem goes undiscussed and almost entirely uncomprehended.<br />
Washington Post. His book, Secrets of The Temple, was published in<br />
The Federal Reserve System is a legal private monopoly of the money<br />
1987 by Simon and Schuster. It was critical of the Federal Reserve<br />
supply operated for the benefit of the few under the guise of<br />
because of its failures, but, according to Greider, these were not<br />
protecting and promoting the public interest.<br />
caused by any defect in the System itself, but merely because the<br />
The real significance of the journey to <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island and the<br />
economic factors are "sooo complicated" that the good men who<br />
have struggled to make the System work have just not yet been able<br />
creature that was hatched there was inadvertently summarized by<br />
the words of Paul Warburg's admiring biographer, Harold Kellock:<br />
to figure it all out. But, don't worry, folks, they're working on it!<br />
Paul M. Warburg is probably the mildest-mannered man that ever<br />
That is exactly the kind of powder-puff criticism which is acceptable<br />
personally conducted a revolution. It was a bloodless revolution: he<br />
in our mainstream media. Yet, Greider's own research points<br />
did not attempt to rouse the populace to arms. He stepped forth armed<br />
to an entirely different interpretation. Speaking of the System's<br />
simply with an idea. And he conquered. That's the amazing thing. A<br />
origin, he says:<br />
shy, sensitive man, he imposed his idea on a nation of a hundred<br />
million people.<br />
As new companies prospered without Wall Street, so did the hew<br />
regional banks that handled their funds, New York's concentrated SUMMARY<br />
share of bank deposits was still huge, about half the nation's total, but<br />
it was declining steadily. Wall Street was still "the biggest kid on the<br />
The basic plan for the Federal Reserve System was drafted at a<br />
secret meeting held in November of 1910 at the private resort of J.P.<br />
block," but less and less able to bully the others.<br />
Morgan on <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island off the coast of Georgia. Those who<br />
This trend was a crucial fact of history, a misunderstood reality<br />
attended represented the great financial institutions of Wall Street<br />
that completely alters the political meaning of the reform legislation<br />
and, indirectly, Europe as well. The reason for secrecy was simple.<br />
that created the Federal Reserve. At the time, the conventional wisdom<br />
in Congress, widely shared and sincerely espoused by<br />
Had it been known that rival factions of the banking community<br />
Progressive<br />
reformers, was that a government institution would finally harness the<br />
had joined together, the public would have been alerted to the<br />
"money trust," disarm its powers, and establish broad democratic<br />
possibility that the bankers were plotting an agreement in restraint<br />
control over money and credit. . . . The results were nearly the opposite.<br />
of trade—which, of course, is exactly what they were doing. What<br />
The money reforms enacted in 1913, in fact, helped to preserve the<br />
emerged was a cartel agreement with five objectives: stop the<br />
status quo, to stabilize the old order. Money-center bankers would not<br />
growing competition from the nation's newer banks; obtain a<br />
only gain dominance over the new central bank, but would also enjoy<br />
franchise to create money out of nothing for the purpose of lending;<br />
new insulation against instability and their own decline. Once the Fed<br />
get control of the reserves of all banks so that the more reckless<br />
was in operation, the steady diffusion of financial power halted. Wall<br />
Street maintained its dominant position—and even enhanced<br />
ones would not be exposed to currency drains and bank runs; get<br />
it.<br />
the taxpayer to pick up the cartel's inevitable losses; and convince<br />
Anthony Sutton, former Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution<br />
for War, Revolution and Peace, and also Professor of Econom-<br />
Congress that the purpose was to protect the public. It was realized<br />
that the bankers would have to become partners with the politicians<br />
and that the structure of the cartel would have to be a central<br />
ics at California State University, Los Angeles, provides a<br />
somewhat deeper analysis. He writes:<br />
bank. The record shows that the Fed has failed to achieve its stated<br />
Warburg's revolutionary plan to get American Society to go to<br />
objectives- That is because those were never its true goals. As a<br />
work for Wall Street was astonishingly simple. Even today,... academic<br />
banking cartel, and in terms of the five objectives stated above, it<br />
theoreticians cover their blackboards with meaningless equations, and<br />
has been an Unqualified success.<br />
the general public struggles in bewildered confusion with inflation<br />
and the coming credit collapse, while the quite simple explanation of<br />
1. Sutton, Wall Street and F.D.R., p, 94.<br />
2. Harold Kellock, "Warburg, the Revolutionist/' The Century Magazine, May 1915,<br />
Greider, 275.<br />
p. 79.
,<br />
Nelson<br />
W. Aldrich<br />
JekyU Island Museum<br />
UPl/Beltmar,<br />
Henry P. Davison (L) and Charles D. Norton (R)<br />
Chapter Two<br />
THE NAME OF THE<br />
GAME IS BAILOUT<br />
<strong>Jekyll</strong> Island Museum<br />
Abraham Piatt Andrew<br />
The seven men who attended the secret meetining on Jekyii<br />
Island, where the Federal Reserve System was conceived,<br />
represented an estimated one-fourth of the total wealth of ttt<br />
entire world. They were:<br />
1<br />
Nelson W. Aldrich, Republican "whip" in the Senate,<br />
Chairman of the National Monetary Commission,<br />
father-in-law to John D. Rockefeller, Jr.;<br />
Henry P. Davison, Sr. Partner of J. P. Morgan Company;<br />
Charles D. Norton, Pres. of 1st National Bank of New Yof.<br />
A. Piatt Andrew, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury;<br />
Frank A. Vanderlip, President of the National City Bank ci<br />
New York, representing William Rockefeller.<br />
Benjamin Strong, head of J. P. Morgan's Bankers Trust<br />
Company, later to become head of the System;<br />
Paul M. Warburg, a partner in Kuhn, Loeb & Company,<br />
representing the Rothschilds and Warburgs in Europe.<br />
The analogy of a spectator sporting event as a<br />
means of explaining the rules by which taxpayers<br />
are required to pick up the cost of bailing out the<br />
banks when their loans go sour.<br />
It was stated in the previous chapter that the <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island<br />
group which conceived the Federal Reserve System actually created<br />
a national cartel which was dominated by the larger banks. It<br />
was also stated that a primary objective of that cartel was to involve<br />
the federal government as an agent for shifting the inevitable losses<br />
from the owners of those banks to the taxpayers. That, of course, is<br />
one of the more controversial assertions made in this book. Yet,<br />
there is little room for any other interpretation when one confronts<br />
the massive evidence of history since the System was created. Let<br />
us, therefore, take another leap through time. Having jumped to<br />
the year 1910 to begin this story, let us now return to the present<br />
era.<br />
To understand how banking losses are shifted to the taxpayers,<br />
it is first necessary to know a little bit about how the scheme was<br />
designed to work There are certain procedures and formulas<br />
which must be understood or else the entire process seems like<br />
chaos. It is as though we had been isolated all our lives on a South<br />
Sea island with no knowledge of the outside world. Imagine what it<br />
would then be like the first time we travelled to the mainland and<br />
witnessed a game of professional football. We would stare with<br />
incredulity at men dressed like aliens from another planet; throwing<br />
their bodies against each other; tossing a funny shaped object<br />
back and forth; fighting over it as though it were of great value, yet,<br />
Island Museum<br />
Frank A. Vanderlip<br />
Benjamin Strong<br />
UPl/B&ttmann<br />
<strong>Jekyll</strong> Island Museum<br />
Paul M. Warburg<br />
occasionally kicking it out of the area as though it were worthless<br />
and despised; chasing each other, knocking each other to the<br />
ground and then walking away to regroup for another surge; all
26 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
this with tens of thousand of spectators riotously shouting in<br />
unison for no apparent reason at all. Without a basic understanding<br />
that this was a game and without knowledge of the rules of that<br />
game, the event would appear as total chaos and universal<br />
madness.<br />
The operation of our monetary system through the Federal<br />
Reserve has much in common with professional football. First,<br />
there are certain plays that are repeated over and over again with<br />
only minor variations to suit the special circumstances. Second,<br />
there are definite rules which the players follow with great<br />
precision. Third, there is a clear objective to the game which is<br />
uppermost in the minds of the players. And fourth, if the spectators<br />
are not familiar with that objective and if they do not understand<br />
the rules, they will never comprehend what is going on. Which, as<br />
far as monetary matters is concerned, is<br />
the common state of the<br />
vast majority of Americans today.<br />
Let us, therefore, attempt to spell out in plain language what<br />
that objective is and how the players expect to achieve it. To<br />
demystify the process, we shall present an overview first. After the<br />
concepts are clarified, we then shall follow up with actual examples<br />
taken from the recent past.<br />
The name of the game is Bailout. As stated previously, the<br />
objective of this game is to shift the inevitable losses from the<br />
owners of the larger banks to the taxpayers. The procedure by<br />
which this is accomplished is as follows:<br />
RULES OF THE GAME<br />
The game begins when the Federal<br />
Reserve System allows<br />
commercial banks to create checkbook money out of nothing.<br />
(Details regarding how this incredible feat is accomplished are<br />
given in chapter ten entitled The Mandrake Mechanism.) The banks<br />
derive profit from this easy money, not by spending it, but by<br />
lending it to others and collecting interest.<br />
When such a loan is placed on the bank's books it is shown as<br />
an asset because it is earning interest and, presumably, someday<br />
will be paid back. At the same time an equal entry is mad,? on the<br />
liability side of the ledger. That is because the newly created<br />
checkbook money now is in circulation, and most of it will end up<br />
in other banks which will return the canceled checks to the issuing<br />
bank for payment. Individuals may also bring some of this check-<br />
THE NAME OF THE GAME IS BAILOUT 27<br />
book money back to the bank and request cash. The issuing bank,<br />
therefore, has a potential money pay-out liability equal to the<br />
amount of the loan asset.<br />
When a borrower cannot repay and there are no assets which<br />
can be taken to compensate, the bank must write off that loan as a<br />
loss- However, since most of the money originally was created out<br />
of nothing and cost<br />
the bank nothing except bookkeeping overhead,<br />
there is little of tangible value that is actual lost. It is primarily<br />
a bookkeeping entry.<br />
A bookkeeping loss can still be undesirable to a bank because it<br />
causes the loan to be removed from the ledger as an asset without a<br />
reduction in liabilities. The difference must come from the equity of<br />
those who own the bank. In other words, the loan asset is removed,<br />
but the money liability remains. The original checkbook money is<br />
still circulating out there even though the borrower cannot repay,<br />
and the issuing bank still has the obligation to redeem those checks.<br />
The only way to do this and balance the books once again is to<br />
draw upon the capital which was invested by the bank's stockholders<br />
or to deduct the loss from the bank's current profits. In either<br />
case, the owners of the bank lose an amount equal to the value of<br />
the defaulted loan. So, to them, the loss becomes very real. If the<br />
bank is forced to write off a large amount of bad loans, the amount<br />
could exceed the entire value of the owners' equity.<br />
happens, the game is over, and the bank is insolvent.<br />
When that<br />
This concern would be sufficient to motivate most bankers to be<br />
very conservative in their loan policy, and in fact most of them do<br />
act with great caution when dealing with individuals and small<br />
businesses. But the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit<br />
Insurance Corporation, and the Federal Deposit Loan Corporation<br />
now guarantee that massive loans made to large corporations and<br />
to other governments will not be allowed to fall entirely upon the<br />
bank's owners should those loans go into default. This is done<br />
under the argument that, if these corporations or banks are allowed<br />
to fail, the nation would suffer from vast unemployment and<br />
economic disruption. More on that in a moment.<br />
THE PERPETUAL-DEBT PLAY<br />
The end result of this policy is that the banks have little motive<br />
to be cautious and are protected against the effect of their<br />
own<br />
folly. The larger the loan, the better it is, because it will produce the
—<br />
28 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND THE NAME OF THE GAME IS BAILOUT 29<br />
greatest amount of profit with the least amount of effort. A single<br />
loan to a third-world country netting hundreds of millions of<br />
dollars in annual interest is just as easy to process—if not easier<br />
than a loan for $50,000 to a local merchant on the shopping mall. If<br />
the interest is paid, it's gravy time. If the loan defaults, the federal<br />
government will "protect the public" and, through various mechanisms<br />
described shortly, will make sure that the banks continue to<br />
receive their interest.<br />
The individual and the small businessman find it increasingly<br />
difficult to borrow money at reasonable rates, because the banks<br />
can make more money on loans to the corporate giants and to<br />
foreign governments. Also, the bigger loans are safer for the banks,<br />
because the government will make them good even if they default.<br />
There are no such guarantees for the small loans. The public will<br />
not swallow the line that bailing out the little guy is necessary to<br />
save the system. The dollar amounts are too small. Only when the<br />
figures become mind-boggling does the ploy become plausible.<br />
It is important to remember that banks do not really want to<br />
have their loans repaid, except as evidence of the dependability of<br />
the borrower. They make a profit from interest on the loan,<br />
repayment of the loan. If a loan is paid off, the bank merely has to<br />
find another borrower, and that can be an expensive nuisance. It is<br />
much better to have the existing borrower pay only the interest and<br />
never make payments on the loan itself. That process is called<br />
rolling over the debt. One of the reasons banks prefer to lend to<br />
governments is that they do not expect those loans ever to be<br />
repaid. When Walter Wriston was chairman of the Citicorp Bank in<br />
1982, he extolled the virtue of the action this way:<br />
If we had a truth-in-Government act comparable to the<br />
truth-in-advertising law, every note issued by the Treasury would be<br />
obliged to include a sentence stating: "This note will be redeemed with<br />
the proceeds from an identical note which will be sold to the public<br />
when this one comes due."<br />
When this activity is carried out in the United States, as it is<br />
weekly, it is described as a Treasury bill auction. But when<br />
basically the same process is conducted abroad in a foreign<br />
language, our news media usually speak of a country's "rolling<br />
over its debts." The perception remains that some form of disaster<br />
is inevitable. It is not.<br />
not<br />
To see why, it is only necessary to understand the basic facts of<br />
government borrowing. The first is that there are few recorded<br />
instances in history of government—any government—actually<br />
getting out of debt. Certainly in an era of $100-billion deficits, no<br />
one lending money to our Government by buying a Treasury bill<br />
expects that it will be paid at maturity in any way except by our<br />
Government's selling a new bill of like amount.<br />
THE DEBT ROLL-OVER PLAY<br />
Since the system makes it profitable for banks to make large,<br />
unsound loans, that is the kind of loans which banks will make.<br />
Furthermore, it is predictable that most unsound loans eventually<br />
will go into default. When the borrower finally declares that he<br />
cannot pay, the bank responds by rolling over the loan. This often is<br />
stage managed to appear as a concession on the part of the bank<br />
but, in reality, it is a significant forward move toward the objective<br />
of perpetual interest.<br />
Eventually the borrower comes to the point where he can no<br />
longer pay even the interest. Now the play becomes more complex.<br />
The bank does not want to lose the interest, because that is its<br />
stream of income. But it cannot afford to allow the borrower to go<br />
into default either, because that would require a write-off which, in<br />
turn, could wipe out the owners' equity and put the bank out of<br />
business. So the bank's next move is to create additional money out<br />
of nothing and lend that to the borrower so he will have enough to<br />
continue paying the interest, which by now must be paid on the<br />
original<br />
loan plus the additional loan as well. What looked like<br />
certain disaster suddenly is converted by a brilliant play into a<br />
major score. This not only maintains the old loan on the books as an<br />
asset, it<br />
actually increases the apparent size of that asset and also<br />
results in higher interest payments, thus, greater profit to the bank.<br />
THE UP-THE-ANTE PLAY<br />
Sooner or later, the borrower becomes restless. He is not<br />
interested in making interest payments with nothing left for<br />
himself. He comes to realize that he is merely working for the bank<br />
and, once again, interest payments stop. The opposing teams go<br />
into a huddle to plan the next move, then rush to the scrimmage<br />
1. "Banking Against Disaster/' by Walter B. Wriston, The New York Times, Septem<br />
ber 14,1982.
30 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
line where they hurl threatening innuendoes at each other. The<br />
borrower simply cannot, will not pay. Collect if you can. The lender<br />
threatens to blackball the borrower, to see to it that he will never<br />
again be able to obtain a loan. Finally, a "compromise" is worked<br />
out. As before, the bank agrees to create still<br />
more money out of<br />
nothing and lend that to the borrower to cover the interest on both<br />
of the previous loans but, this time, they up the ante to provide still<br />
additional money for the borrower to spend on something other than<br />
interest. That is a perfect score. The borrower suddenly has a fresh<br />
supply of money for his purposes plus enough to keep making<br />
those bothersome interest payments. The bank, on the other hand,<br />
now has still larger assets, higher interest income, and greater profits.<br />
What an exciting game!<br />
THE RESCHEDULING PLAY<br />
The previous plays can be repeated several times until the<br />
reality finally dawns on the borrower that he is sinking deeper and<br />
deeper into the debt pit with no prospects of climbing out. This<br />
realization usually comes when the interest payments become so<br />
large they represent almost as much as the entire corporate<br />
earnings or the country's total tax base. This time around, roll-overs<br />
with larger loans are rejected, and default seems inevitable.<br />
But wait. What's this? The players are back at the scrimmage<br />
line. There is a great confrontation. Referees are called in. Two<br />
shrill blasts from the horn tell us a score has been made for both<br />
sides. A voice over the public address system announces: "This<br />
loan has been rescheduled/'<br />
Rescheduling usually means a combination of a lower interest<br />
rate and a longer period for repayment. The effect is primarily<br />
cosmetic. It reduces the monthly payment but extends the period<br />
further into the future. This makes the current burden to the<br />
borrower a little easier to carry, but it also makes repayment of the<br />
capital even more unlikely. It postpones the day of reckoning but,<br />
in the meantime, you guessed it: The loan remains as an asset, and<br />
the interest payments continue.<br />
THE PROTECT-THE-PUBLIC PLAY<br />
Eventually the day of reckoning arrives. The borrower realizes<br />
he can never repay the capital and flatly refuses to pay interest on it.<br />
It is time for the Final Maneuver.<br />
THE NAME OF THE GAME IS BAILOUT 31<br />
According to the Banking Safety Digest, which specializes in<br />
rating the safety of America's banks and S&Ls, most of the banks<br />
involved with "problem loans" are quite profitable businesses:<br />
Note that, exceptfor third-world loans, most of the large banks in the<br />
country are operating quite profitably. In contrast with the<br />
continually-worsening S&L crisis, the banks' profitability has been the<br />
engine with which they have been working off (albeit slowly) their<br />
overseas debt... At last year's profitability levels, the banking<br />
industry could, in theory, "buy out" the entirety of their own Latin<br />
American loans within two years.<br />
The banks can absorb the losses of their<br />
bad loans to multinational<br />
corporations and foreign governments, but that is not<br />
according to the rules. It would be a major loss to the stockholders<br />
who would receive little or no dividends during the adjustment<br />
period, and any chief executive officer who embarked upon such a<br />
course would soon be looking for a new job. That this is not part of<br />
the game plan is evident by the fact that, while a small portion of<br />
the Latin American debt has been absorbed, the banks are continuing<br />
to make gigantic loans to governments in other parts of the<br />
world, particularly Africa, Red China, and Eastern European<br />
nations. For reasons which will be analyzed in chapter four, there is<br />
little hope that the performance of these loans will be different than<br />
those in Latin America. But the most important reason for<br />
absorbing the losses is that there is<br />
not<br />
a standard play that can still<br />
breathe life back into those dead loans and reactivate the bountiful<br />
income stream that flows from them.<br />
Here's how it works. The captains of both teams approach the<br />
referee and the Game Commissioner to request that the game be<br />
extended. The reason given is that this is in the interest of the<br />
public, the spectators who are having such a wonderful time and<br />
who will be sad to see the game ended. They request also that,<br />
while the spectators are in the stadium enjoying themselves, the<br />
parking-lot attendants be ordered to quietly remove the hub caps<br />
from every car. These can be sold to provide money for additional<br />
salaries for all the players, including the referee and, of course, the<br />
Commissioner himself. That is only fair since they are now<br />
1- "Overseas Lending ... Trigger for A Severe Depression?" The Banking Safety<br />
Digest (U.S. Business Publishing/Veribanc, Wakefield, Massachusetts), August,<br />
1989, p. 3.
32 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
working overtime for the benefit of the spectators. When the deal is<br />
finally struck, the horn will blow three times, and a roar of joyous<br />
relief will sweep across the stadium.<br />
In a somewhat less recognizable form, the same play may look<br />
like this: The president of the lending bank and the finance officer<br />
of the defaulting corporation or government will join together and<br />
approach Congress. They will explain that the borrower has<br />
exhausted his ability to service the loan and, without assistance<br />
from the federal government, there will be dire consequences for<br />
the American people. Not only will there be unemployment and<br />
hardship at home, there will be massive disruptions in world<br />
markets. And, since we are now so dependent on those markets,<br />
our exports will drop, foreign capital will dry up, and we will<br />
suffer greatly. What is needed, they will say, is for Congress to<br />
provide money to the borrower, either directly or indirectly,<br />
allow him to continue to pay interest on the loan and to initiate new<br />
spending programs which will be so profitable he will soon be able<br />
to pay everyone back.<br />
As part of the proposal, the borrower will agree to accept the<br />
direction of a third-party referee in adopting an austerity program<br />
to make sure that none of the new money is wasted. The bank also<br />
will agree to write off a small part of the loan as a gesture of its<br />
willingness to share the burden. This move, of course, will have<br />
been foreseen from the very beginning of the game, and is a small<br />
step backward to achieve a giant stride forward. After all, the<br />
amount to be lost through the write-off was created out of nothing<br />
in the first place and, without this Final Maneuver, the entirety<br />
would be written off. Furthermore, this modest write down is<br />
dwarfed by the amount to be gained through restoration of the<br />
income stream.<br />
THE GUARANTELD-PAYMENT PLAY<br />
One of the standard variations of the Final Maneuver is for the<br />
government, not always to directly provide the funds, but to<br />
provide the credit for the funds. That means to guarantee future<br />
payments should the borrower again default. Once Congress<br />
agrees to this, the government becomes a co-signer to the loan, and<br />
the inevitable losses are finally lifted from the ledger of the bank<br />
and placed onto the backs of the American taxpayer.<br />
to<br />
THE NAME OF THE GAME IS BAILOUT 33<br />
Money now begins to move into the banks through a complex<br />
system of federal agencies, international agencies, foreign aid, and<br />
direct subsidies. All of these mechanisms extract payments from<br />
the American people and channel them to the deadbeat borrowers<br />
who then send them to the banks to service their loans. Very little<br />
of this money actually comes from taxes. Almost all of it is<br />
generated by the Federal Reserve System. When this newly created<br />
money returns to the banks, it quickly moves out again into the<br />
economy where it mingles with and dilutes the value of the money<br />
already there. The result is the appearance of rising prices but<br />
which, in reality, is a lowering of the value of the dollar.<br />
The American people have no idea they are paying the bill.<br />
They know that someone is stealing their hub caps, but they think it<br />
is the greedy businessman who raises prices or the selfish laborer<br />
who demands higher wages or the unworthy farmer who demands<br />
too much for his crop or the wealthy foreigner who bids up our<br />
prices. They do not realize that these groups also are victimized by a<br />
monetary system which is constantly being eroded in value by and<br />
through the Federal Reserve System,<br />
Public ignorance of how the game is really played was dramatically<br />
displayed during a recent Phil Donahue TV show. The topic<br />
was the Savings and Loan crisis and the billions of dollars that it<br />
would cost the taxpayer. A man from the audience rose and asked<br />
angrily: "Why can't the government pay for these debts instead of<br />
the taxpayer?" And the audience of several hundred people<br />
actually cheered in enthusiastic approval!<br />
PROSPERITY THROUGH INSOLVENCY<br />
Since large, corporate loans are often guaranteed by the federal<br />
government, one would think that the banks which make those<br />
loans would never have a problem. Yet, many of them still manage<br />
to bungle themselves into insolvency. As we shall see in a later<br />
section of this study, insolvency actually is inherent in the system<br />
itself, a system called fractional-reserve banking.<br />
Nevertheless, a bank can operate quite nicely in a state of<br />
insolvency so long as its customers don't know it. Money is<br />
brought into being and transmuted from one imaginary form to<br />
another by mere entries on a ledger, and creative bookkeeping can<br />
always make the bottom line appear to balance. The problem arises<br />
when depositors decide, for whatever reason, to withdraw their
34 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
money. Lo and behold, there isn't enough to go around and, when<br />
that happens, the cat is finally out of the bag. The bank must close<br />
its doors, and the depositors still waiting in line outside are ... well,<br />
just that: still waiting.<br />
The proper solution to this problem is to require the banks, like<br />
all other businesses, to honor their contracts. If they tell their<br />
customers that deposits are<br />
"payable upon demand," then they<br />
should hold enough cash to make good on that promise, regardless<br />
of when the customers want it or how many of them want it. In<br />
other words, they should keep cash in the vault equal to 100% of<br />
their depositors' accounts. When we give our hat to the hat-check<br />
girl and obtain a receipt for it, we don't expect her to rent it out<br />
while we eat dinner hoping she'll get it back—or one just like it—in<br />
time for our departure. We expect all the hats to remain there all the<br />
time so there will be no question of getting ours back precisely<br />
when we want it.<br />
On the other hand, if the bank tells us it is going to lend our<br />
deposit to others so we can earn a little interest on it, then it should<br />
also tell us forthrightly that we cannot have our money back on<br />
demand. Why not? Because it is loaned out and not in the vault any<br />
longer. Customers who earn interest on their accounts should be<br />
told that they have time deposits, not demand deposits, because the<br />
bank will need a stated amount of time before it will be able to<br />
recover the money which was loaned out.<br />
None of this is difficult to understand, yet bank customers are<br />
seldom informed of it. They are told they can have their money any<br />
time they want it and they are paid interest as well. Even if they do<br />
not receive interest, the bank does, and this is how so many<br />
customer services can be offered at little or no direct cost. Occasionally,<br />
a thirty-day or sixty-day delay will be mentioned as a<br />
possibility, but that is greatly inadequate for deposits which have<br />
been transformed into ten, twenty, or thirty-year loans. The banks<br />
are simply playing the odds that everything will work out most of<br />
the time.<br />
We shall examine this issue in greater detail in a later section<br />
but, for now, it is sufficient to know that total disclosure is not how<br />
the banking game is played. The Federal Reserve System has<br />
legalized and institutionalized the dishonesty of issuing more hat<br />
checks than there are hats and it has devised complex methods of<br />
disguising this practice as a perfectly proper and normal feature of<br />
THE NAME OF THE GAME IS BAILOUT 35<br />
banking. Students of finance are told that there simply is no other<br />
way for the system to function. Once that premise is accepted, then<br />
all attention can be focused, not on the inherent fraud, but on ways<br />
and means to live with it and make it as painless as possible.<br />
Based on the assumption that only a small percentage of the<br />
depositors will<br />
ever want to withdraw their money at the same<br />
time, the Federal Reserve allows the nation's commercial banks to<br />
operate with an incredibly thin layer of cash to cover their promises<br />
to pay "on demand." When a bank runs out of money and is unable<br />
to keep that promise, the System then acts as a lender of last resort.<br />
That is banker language meaning it stands ready to create money<br />
out of nothing and immediately lend it to any bank in trouble.<br />
(Details on how that is accomplished are in chapter eight.) But there<br />
are practical limits to just how far that process can work. Even the<br />
Fed will not support a bank that has gotten itself so deeply in the<br />
hole it has no realistic chance of digging out. When a bank's<br />
bookkeeping assets finally become less than its liabilities, the rules<br />
of the game call for transferring the losses to the depositors<br />
themselves. This means they pay twice: once as taxpayers and again<br />
as depositors. The mechanism by which this is accomplished is<br />
called the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.<br />
THE FDIC PLAY<br />
The FDIC guarantees that every insured deposit will be paid<br />
back regardless of the financial condition of the bank. The money to<br />
do this comes out of a special fund which is derived from<br />
assessments against participating banks. The banks, of course, do<br />
not pay this assessment. As with all other expenses, the bulk of the<br />
cost ultimately is passed on to their customers in the form of higher<br />
service fees and lower interest rates on deposits.<br />
The FDIC is usually described as an insurance fund, but that is<br />
deceptive advertising at its worst. One of the primary conditions of<br />
insurance is that it must avoid what underwriters call "moral<br />
hazard/' That is a situation in which the policyholder has little<br />
incentive to avoid or prevent that which is being insured against<br />
When moral hazard is present, it is normal for people to become<br />
careless, and the likelihood increases that what is being insured<br />
against will actually happen. An example would be a government<br />
Program forcing everyone to pay an equal amount into a fund to<br />
Protect them from the expense of parking fines. One hesitates even
36 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
THE NAME OF THE GAME IS BAILOUT 37<br />
to mention this absurd proposition lest some enterprising politician<br />
should decide to put it on the ballot. Therefore, let us hasten to<br />
point out that, if such a numb-skull plan were adopted, two things<br />
would happen: (1) just about everyone soon would be getting<br />
parking tickets and (2), since there now would be so many of them,<br />
the taxes to pay for those tickets would greatly exceed the previous<br />
cost of paying them uritfwut the so-called protection.<br />
The FDIC operates exactly in this fashion. Depositors are told<br />
their insured accounts are protected in the event their bank should<br />
become insolvent. To pay for this protection, each bank is assessed<br />
a specified percentage of its total deposits. That percentage is the<br />
same for all banks regardless of their previous record or how risky<br />
their loans. Under such conditions, it does not pay to be cautious.<br />
The banks making reckless loans earn a higher rate of interest than<br />
those making conservative loans. They also are far more likely to<br />
collect from the fund, yet they pay not one cent more. Conservative<br />
banks are penalized and gradually become motivated to make<br />
more risky loans to keep up with their competitors and to get their<br />
"fair<br />
share" of the fund's protection. Moral hazard, therefore, is<br />
built right into the system. As with protection against parking<br />
tickets, the FDIC increases the likelihood that what is being insured<br />
against will actually happen. It is not a solution to the problem, it is<br />
part of the problem.<br />
REAL INSURANCE WOULD BE A BLESSING<br />
A true deposit-insurance program which was totally voluntary<br />
and which geared its rates to the actual risks would be a blessing.<br />
Banks with solid loans on their books would be able to obtain<br />
protection for their depositors at reasonable rates, because the<br />
chances of the insurance company having to pay would be small.<br />
Banks with unsound loans, however, would have to pay much<br />
higher rates or possibly would not be able to obtain coverage at any<br />
price. Depositors, therefore, would know instantly, without need to<br />
investigate further, that a bank without insurance is not a place<br />
where they want to put their money. In order to attract deposits,<br />
banks would have to have insurance. In order to have insurance at<br />
rates they could afford, they would have to demonstrate to the<br />
insurance company that their financial affairs<br />
are in good order.<br />
Consequently, banks which failed to meet the minimum standards<br />
of sound business practice would soon have no customers and<br />
would be forced out of business. A voluntary, private insurance<br />
program would act as a powerful regulator of the entire banking<br />
industry far more effectively and honestly than any political<br />
scheme ever could. Unfortunately, such is not the banking world of<br />
today.<br />
The FDIC "protection" is not insurance in any sense of the<br />
word. It is merely part of a political scheme to bail out the most<br />
influential members of the banking cartel when they get into<br />
financial difficulty. As we have already seen, the first line of<br />
defense in this scheme is to have large, defaulted loans restored to<br />
life by a Congressional pledge of tax dollars. If that should fail and<br />
the bank can no longer conceal its insolvency through creative<br />
bookkeeping, it is almost certain that anxious depositors will soon<br />
line up to withdraw their money—which the bank does not have.<br />
The second line of defense, therefore, is to have the FDIC step in<br />
and make those payments for them.<br />
Bankers, of course, do not want this to happen. It is a last resort.<br />
If the bank is rescued in this fashion, management is fired and what<br />
is left of the business usually is absorbed by another bank.<br />
Furthermore, the value of the stock will plummet, but this will<br />
affect the small stockholders only. Those with controlling interest<br />
and those in management know long in advance of the pending<br />
catastrophe and are able to sell<br />
the bulk of their shares while the<br />
price is still high. The people who create the problem seldom suffer<br />
the economic consequences of their actions.<br />
THE FDIC WILL NEVER BE ADEQUATELY FUNDED<br />
The FDIC never will have enough money to cover its potential<br />
liability for the entire banking system. If that amount were in<br />
existence, it could be held by the banks themselves, and an<br />
insurance fund would not even be necessary. Instead, the FDIC<br />
operates on the same assumption as the banks: that only a small<br />
percentage will ever need money at the same time. So the amount<br />
held in reserve is never more than a few percentage points of the<br />
total liability. Typically, the FDIC holds about $1.20 for every $100<br />
of covered deposits. At the time of this writing, however, that<br />
figure had slipped to only 70 cents and was still<br />
means that the financial exposure is<br />
dropping. That<br />
about 99.3% larger than the<br />
safety net which is supposed to catch it. The failure of just one or
38 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND THE NAME OF THE GAME IS BAILOUT 39<br />
two large banks in the system could completely wipe out the entire<br />
fund.<br />
And it gets even worse. Although the ledger may show that so<br />
many millions or billions are in the fund, that also is but creative<br />
bookkeeping. By law, the money collected from bank assessments<br />
must be invested in Treasury bonds, which means it is loaned to the<br />
government and spent immediately by Congress. In the final stage<br />
of this process, therefore, the FDIC itself runs out of money and<br />
turns, first to the Treasury, then to Congress for help. This step, of<br />
course, is an act of final desperation, but it is usually presented in<br />
the media as though it were a sign of the system's great strength.<br />
U.S. News & World Report blandly describes it this way: "Should the<br />
agencies need more money yet, Congress has pledged the full faith<br />
and credit of the federal government/' 1<br />
Gosh, gee whiz. Isn't that<br />
wonderful? It sort of makes one feel rosy all over to know that the<br />
fund is so well secured.<br />
Let's see what "full faith and credit of the federal government"<br />
actually means. Congress, already deeply in debt, has no money<br />
either. It doesn't dare openly raise taxes for the shortfall, so it<br />
applies for an additional loan by offering still more Treasury bonds<br />
for sale. The public picks up a portion of these I.O.U.s, and the<br />
Federal Reserve buys the rest. If there is a monetary crisis at hand<br />
and the size of the loan is<br />
issue.<br />
great, the Fed will pick up the entire<br />
But the Fed has no money either. So it responds by creating out of<br />
nothing an amount of brand new money equal to the I.O.U.s and,<br />
through the magic of central banking, the FDIC is finally funded.<br />
This new money gushes into the banks where it is used to pay off<br />
the depositors. From there it floods through the economy diluting<br />
the value of all money and causing prices to rise. The old paycheck<br />
doesn't buy as much any more, so we learn to get along with a little<br />
bit less. But, see? The bank's doors are open again, and all the<br />
depositors are happy—until they return to their cars and discover<br />
the missing hub caps!<br />
That is what is meant by "the full faith and credit of the federal<br />
government."<br />
1. "How Safe Are Deposits in Ailing Banks, S&L's?" U.S. News & World Report,<br />
March 25, 1985, p. 73.<br />
SUMMARY<br />
Although national monetary events may appear mysterious<br />
and chaotic, they are governed by well-established rules which<br />
bankers and politicians rigidly follow. The central fact to understanding<br />
these events is that all the money in the banking system<br />
has been created out of nothing through the process of making<br />
loans. A defaulted loan, therefore, costs the bank little<br />
of tangible<br />
value, but it shows up on the ledger as a reduction in assets without<br />
a corresponding reduction in liabilities. If the bad loans exceed the<br />
size of the assets, the bank becomes technically insolvent and must<br />
close its doors. The first rule of survival, therefore, is to avoid<br />
writing off large, bad loans and, if possible, to at least continue<br />
receiving interest payments on them. To accomplish that, the<br />
endangered loans are rolled over and increased in size. This<br />
provides the borrower with money to continue paying interest plus<br />
fresh funds for new spending. The basic problem is not solved, but<br />
it is postponed for a little while and made worse.<br />
The final solution on behalf of the banking cartel is to have the<br />
federal government guarantee payment of the loan should the<br />
borrower default in the future. This is accomplished by convincing<br />
Congress that not to do so would result in great damage to the<br />
economy and hardship for the people. From that point forward, the<br />
burden of the loan is removed from the bank's ledger and<br />
transferred to the taxpayer. Should this effort fail and the bank be<br />
forced into insolvency, the last resort is to use the FDIC to pay off<br />
the depositors. The FDIC is not insurance, because the presence of<br />
"moral hazard" makes the thing it supposedly protects against<br />
more likely to happen. A portion of the FDIC funds are derived<br />
from assessments against the banks. Ultimately, however, they are<br />
paid by the depositors themselves. When these funds run out, the<br />
balance is provided by the Federal Reserve System in the form of<br />
freshly created new money. This floods through the economy<br />
causing the appearance of rising prices but which, in reality, is the<br />
lowering of the value of the dollar. The final cost of the bailout,<br />
therefore, is passed to the public in the form of a hidden tax called<br />
inflation.<br />
So much for the rules of the game. In the next chapter we shall<br />
look at the scorecard of the actual play itself.
Chapter Three<br />
PROTECTORS OF THE<br />
PUBLIC<br />
The Game-Called-Bailout as it actually has been<br />
applied to specific cases including Venn Central,<br />
Lockheed, New York City, Chrysler, Commonwealth<br />
Bank of Detroit, First Pennsylvania Bank,<br />
Continental Illinois, and others.<br />
In the previous chapter, we offered the whimsical analogy of a<br />
sporting event to clarify the maneuvers of monetary and political<br />
scientists to bail out those commercial banks which comprise the<br />
Federal-Reserve cartel. The danger in such an approach is that it<br />
could leave the impression the topic is frivolous. So, let us abandon<br />
the analogy and turn to reality. Now that we have studied the<br />
hypothetical rules of the game, it is time to check the scorecard of<br />
the actual play itself, and it will become obvious that this is no<br />
trivial matter. A good place to start is with the rescue of a<br />
consortium of banks which were holding the endangered loans of<br />
Penn Central Railroad.<br />
PENN CENTRAL<br />
Penn Central was the nation's largest railroad with 96,000<br />
employees and a payroll of $20 million a week. In 1970, it also<br />
became the nation's biggest bankruptcy. It was deeply in debt to<br />
just about every bank that was willing to lend it money, and that<br />
list included Chase Manhattan, Morgan Guaranty, Manufacturers<br />
Hanover, First National City, Chemical Bank, and Continental<br />
Illinois. Officers of the largest of those banks had been appointed to<br />
Penn Central's board of directors as a condition for obtaining<br />
funds, and they gradually had acquired control over the railroad's<br />
management The banks also held large blocks of Penn Central<br />
stock in their trust departments.<br />
The arrangement was convenient in many ways, not the least of<br />
which was that the bankers sitting on the board of directors were
—<br />
42 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND PROTECTORS OF THE PUBLIC 43<br />
privy to information, long before the public received it, which<br />
would affect the market price of Perm Central's stock. Chris Welles,<br />
in The Last Days of the Club, describes what happened:<br />
On May 21, a month before the railroad went under, David Bevan,<br />
Penn Central's chief financial officer, privately informed<br />
representatives of the company's banking creditors that its<br />
financial<br />
condition was so weak it would have to postpone an attempt to raise<br />
$100 million in desperately needed operating funds through a bond<br />
issue. Instead, said Bevan, the railroad would seek some kind of<br />
government loan guarantee. In other words, unless the railroad could<br />
manage a federal bailout, it would have to close down. The following<br />
day, Chase Manhattan's trust department sold 134,300 shares of its<br />
Penn Central holdings. Before May 28, when the public was informed<br />
of the postponement of the bond issue, Chase sold another 128,000<br />
shares. David Rockefeller, the bank's chairman, vigorously denied<br />
Chase had acted on the basis of inside information.<br />
More to the point of this study is the fact that virtually all of the<br />
major management decisions which led to Penn Central's demise<br />
were made by or with the concurrence of its board of directors,<br />
which is to say, by the banks that provided the loans. In other<br />
words, the bankers were not in trouble because of Penn Central's<br />
poor management, they were Penn Central's poor management. An<br />
investigation conducted in 1972 by Congressman Wright Patman,<br />
Chairman of the House Banking and Currency Committee,<br />
revealed the following: The banks provided large loans for disastrous<br />
expansion and diversification projects. They loaned additional<br />
millions to the railroad so it could pay dividends to its<br />
stockholders. This created the false appearance of prosperity and<br />
artificially inflated the market price of its stock long enough to<br />
dump it<br />
on the unsuspecting public. Thus, the banker-managers<br />
were able to engineer a three-way bonanza for themselves. They (1)<br />
received dividends on essentially worthless stock, (2) earned<br />
interest on the loans which provided the money to pay those<br />
dividends, and (3) were able to unload 1.8 million shares of<br />
stock after the dividends, of course—at unrealistically high<br />
prices. Reports from the Securities and Exchange Commission<br />
1. Chris Welles, The Last Days of the Club (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1975), pp. 398-99.<br />
2 "Penn Central/' 1971 Congressional Quarterly Almanac (Washington, D.C.: Congressional<br />
Quarterly, 1971), p. 838.<br />
showed that the company's top executives had disposed of their<br />
stock in this fashion at a personal savings of more than $1 million.<br />
Had the railroad been allowed to go into bankruptcy at that<br />
point and been forced to sell off its assets, the bankers still would<br />
have been protected. In any liquidation, debtors are paid off first,<br />
stockholders last; so the manipulators had dumped most of their<br />
stock while prices were relatively high. That is a common practice<br />
among corporate raiders who use borrowed funds to seize control<br />
of a company, bleed off its assets to other enterprises which they<br />
abo control, and then toss the debt-ridden, dying carcass upon the<br />
remaining stockholders or, in this case, the taxpayers.<br />
THE PUBLIC BE DAMNED<br />
In his letter of transmittal accompanying the staff report,<br />
Congressman Patman provided this summary:<br />
It was as though everyone was a part of a close knit club in which<br />
Penn Central and its officers could obtain, with very few questions<br />
asked, loans for almost everything they desired both for the company<br />
and for their own personal interests, where the bankers sitting on the<br />
Board asked practically no questions as to what was going on, simply<br />
allowing management to destroy the company, to invest in<br />
questionable activities, and to engage in some cases in illegal activities.<br />
These banks in return obtained most of the company's lucrative<br />
banking business. The attitude of everyone seemed to be, while the<br />
game was going on, that all these dealings were of benefit to every<br />
member of the club, and the railroad and the public be damned.<br />
The banking cartel, commonly called the Federal Reserve<br />
System, was created for exactly this kind of bailout. Arthur Burns,<br />
who was the Fed's chairman, would have preferred to provide a<br />
direct infusion of newly created money, but that was contrary to<br />
the rules at that time. In his own words: "Everything fell through.<br />
We couldn't lend it to them ourselves under the law.. . .<br />
I worked on<br />
this thing in other ways."^<br />
The company's cash crisis came to a head over a weekend and,<br />
in order to avoid having the corporation forced to file for bankruptcy<br />
on Monday morning, Burns called the homes of the heads of<br />
the Federal Reserve banks around the country and told them to get<br />
1- "Penn Central: Bankruptcy Filed After Loan Bill Fails/' 1970 Congressional<br />
Quarterly Almanac (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1970), p. 811.<br />
2- Quoted by Welles, pp. 404-05.<br />
3- Quoted by Welles, p. 407.
44 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
the word out immediately that the System was anxious to help. On<br />
Sunday, William Treiber, who was the first vice-president of the<br />
New York branch of the Fed, contacted the chief executives of the<br />
ten largest banks in New York and told them that the Fed's<br />
Discount Window would be wide open the next morning. Translated,<br />
that means the Federal Reserve System was prepared to<br />
create money out of nothing and then immediately loan it<br />
to the<br />
commercial banks so they, in turn, could multiply and re-lend it to<br />
Perm Central and other corporations, such as Chrysler, which were<br />
in similar straits. Furthermore, the rates at which the Fed would<br />
make these funds available would be low enough to compensate<br />
for the risk, ^peaking of what transpired on the following Monday,<br />
Burns boasted: "I kept the Board in session practically all day to<br />
change regulation Q so that money could flow into CDs at the<br />
banks." Looking back at the event, Chris Welles approvingly<br />
describes it as "what is by common consent the Fed's finest hour."<br />
Finest hour or not, the banks were not that interested in the<br />
proposition unless they could be assured the taxpayer would<br />
co-sign the loans and guarantee payment. So the action inevitably<br />
shifted back to Congress. Perm Central's executives, bankers, and<br />
union representatives came in droves to explain how the railroad's<br />
continued existence was in the best interest of the public, of the<br />
working man, of the economic system itself. The Navy Department<br />
spoke of protecting the nation's "defense resources." Congress, of<br />
course, could not callously ignore these pressing needs of the<br />
nation. It responded by ordering a retroactive, 13 Vi per cent pay<br />
raise for all<br />
union employees. After having added that burden to<br />
the railroad's cash drain and putting it even deeper into the hole, it<br />
then passed the Emergency Rail Services Act of 1970 authorizing<br />
$125 million in federal loan guarantees.<br />
None of this, of course, solved the basic problem, nor was it<br />
really intended to. Almost everyone knew that, eventually, the<br />
railroad would be "nationalized," which is a euphemism for<br />
becoming a black hole into which tax dollars disappear. This came<br />
1. For an explanation of the multiplier effect, see chapter eight, The Mandrake<br />
Mechanism.<br />
2. Welles, pp. 407-08.<br />
3. "Congress Clears Railroad Aid Bill, Acts on Strike," 1970 Congressional Almanac<br />
(Washington, DC: 1970), pp. 810-16.<br />
PROTECTORS OF THE PUBLIC 45<br />
to pass with the creation of AMTRAK in 1971 and CONRAIL in<br />
1973- AMTRAK took over the passenger services of Perm Central,<br />
and CONRAIL assumed operation of its freight services, along<br />
with five other Eastern railroads. CONRAIL technically is a private<br />
corporation. When it was created, however, 85% of its stock was<br />
held by the government. The remainder was held by employees.<br />
Fortunately, the government's stock was sold in a public offering in<br />
1987. AMTRAK continues under political control and operates at a<br />
loss. It is sustained by government subsidies—which is to say by<br />
taxpayers. In 1997, Congress dutifully gave it another $5.7 billion<br />
and by 1998, liabilities exceeded assets by an estimated $14 billion.<br />
CONRAIL, on the other hand, since it was returned to the private<br />
sector, has experienced an impressive turnaround and has been<br />
running at a profit— paying taxes instead of consuming them.<br />
LOCKHEED<br />
In that same year, 1970, the Lockheed Corporation, which was<br />
the nation's largest defense contractor, was teetering on the verge<br />
of bankruptcy. The Bank of America and several smaller banks had<br />
loaned $400 million to the Goliath and they were not anxious to<br />
lose the bountiful interest-income stream that flowed from that; nor<br />
did they wish to see such a large bookkeeping asset disappear from<br />
their ledgers. In due course, the banks joined forces with Lockheed's<br />
management, stockholders, and labor unions, and the group<br />
descended on Washington. Sympathetic politicians were told that,<br />
if Lockheed were allowed to fail, 31,000 jobs would be lost,<br />
hundreds of sub contractors would go down, thousands of suppliers<br />
would be forced into bankruptcy, and national security would<br />
be seriously jeopardized. What the company needed was to borrow<br />
more money and lots of it. But, because of its current financial<br />
predicament, no one was willing to lend. The answer? In the<br />
interest of protecting the economy and defending the nation, the<br />
government simply had to provide either the money or the credit.<br />
A bailout plan was quickly engineered by Treasury Secretary<br />
John B. Connally which provided the credit. The government<br />
agreed to guarantee payment on an additional $250 million in<br />
loans—an amount which would put Lockheed 60% deeper into the<br />
debt hole than it had been before. But that made no difference now.<br />
Unce the taxpayer had been made a co-signer to the account, the<br />
banks had no qualms about advancing the funds.
46 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND PROTECTORS OF THE PUBLIC 47<br />
The not-so-obvious part of this story is that the government<br />
now had a powerful motivation to make sure Lockheed would be<br />
awarded as many defense contracts as possible and that those<br />
contracts would be as profitable as possible. This would be an<br />
indirect method of paying off the banks with tax dollars, but doing<br />
so in such a way as not to arouse public indignation. Other defense<br />
contractors which had operated more efficiently would lose business,<br />
but that could not be proven. Furthermore, a slight increase in<br />
defenses expenditures would hardly be noticed.<br />
By 1977, Lockheed had, indeed, paid back this loan, and that<br />
fact was widely advertised as proof of the wisdom and skill of all<br />
the players, including the referee and the game commissioner. A<br />
deeper analysis, however, must include two facts. First, there is no<br />
evidence that Lockheed's operation became more cost efficient<br />
during these years. Second, every bit of the money used to pay<br />
back the loans came from defense contracts which were awarded<br />
by the same government which was guaranteeing those loans.<br />
Under such an arrangement, it makes little difference if the loans<br />
were paid back or not.<br />
Taxpayers were doomed to pay the bill<br />
either way.<br />
NEW YORK CITY<br />
Although the government of New York City is not a corporation<br />
in the usual sense, it functions as one in many respects,<br />
particularly regarding debt<br />
In 1975, New York had reached the end of its credit rope and<br />
was unable even to make payroll. The cause was not mysterious.<br />
New York had long been a welfare state within itself, and success<br />
in city politics was traditionally achieved by lavish promises of<br />
benefits and subsidies for "the poor." Not surprisingly, the city also<br />
was notorious for political corruption and bureaucratic fraud.<br />
Whereas the average large city employed thirty-one people per<br />
one-thousand residents, New York had forty nine. That's an excess<br />
of fifty-eight per cent. The salaries of these employees far outstripped<br />
those in private industry. While an X-ray technician in a<br />
private hospital earned $187 per week, a porter working for the city<br />
earned $203. The average bank teller earned $154 per week, but a<br />
change maker on the city subway received $212. And municipal<br />
fringe benefits were fully twice as generous as those in private<br />
industry within the state. On top of this mountainous overhead<br />
were heaped additional costs for free college educations, subsidized<br />
housing, free medical care, and endless varieties of welfare<br />
programs.<br />
City taxes were greatly inadequate to cover the cost of this<br />
utopia- Even after transfer payments from Albany and Washington<br />
added state and federal taxes to the take, the outflow continued to<br />
exceed the inflow. There were now only three options: increase city<br />
taxes, reduce expenses, or go into debt. The choice was never in<br />
serious doubt. By 1975, New York had floated so many bonds it<br />
had saturated the market and could find no more lenders. Two<br />
billion dollars of this<br />
debt was held by a small group of banks,<br />
dominated by Chase Manhattan and Citicorp.<br />
When the payment of interest on these loans finally came to a<br />
halt, it was time for serious action. The bankers and the city fathers<br />
traveled down the coast to Washington and put their case before<br />
Congress. The largest city in the world could not be allowed to go<br />
bankrupt, they said. Essential services would be halted and millions<br />
of people would be without garbage removal, without<br />
transportation, even without police protection. Starvation, disease,<br />
and crime would run rampant through the city. It would be a<br />
disgrace to America. David Rockefeller at Chase Manhattan persuaded<br />
his friend Helmut Schmidt, Chancellor of West Germany,<br />
to make a statement to the media that the disastrous situation in<br />
New York could trigger an international financial crisis.<br />
Congress, understandably, did not want to turn New York into<br />
a zone of anarchy, nor to disgrace America, nor to trigger a<br />
world-wide financial panic. So, in December of 1975, it passed a bill<br />
authorizing the Treasury to make direct loans to the city up to $2.3<br />
billion, an amount which would more than double the size of its<br />
current debt to the banks. Interest payments on the old debt<br />
resumed immediately. All of this money, of course, would first<br />
have to be borrowed by Congress which was, itself, deeply in debt.<br />
And most of it would be created, directly or indirectly, by the<br />
Federal Reserve System. That money would be taken from the<br />
taxpayer through the loss of purchasing power called inflation, but<br />
at least the banks could be repaid, which is the object of the game.<br />
There were several restrictions attached to this loan, including<br />
^ austerity program and a systematic repayment schedule. None<br />
°f these conditions was honored. New York City has continued to<br />
be a welfare utopia, and it is unlikely that it will ever get out of debt.
48 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND PROTECTORS OF THE PUBLIC 49<br />
CHRYSLER<br />
By 1978, the Chrysler Corporation was on the verge of bankruptcy.<br />
It had rolled over its debt to the banks many times, and the<br />
game was nearing an end. In spite of an OPEC oil embargo which<br />
had pushed up the cost of gasoline and in spite of the increasing<br />
popularity of small-automobile imports, the company had continued<br />
to build the traditional gas hog. It was now saddled with a<br />
mammoth inventory of unsaleable cars and with a staggering debt<br />
which it had acquired to build those cars.<br />
The timing was doubly bad. America was also experiencing<br />
high interest rates which, coupled with fears of U.S. military<br />
involvement in Cambodia, had led to a slump in the stock market.<br />
Banks felt the credit crunch keenly and, in one of those rare<br />
instances in modern history, the money makers themselves were<br />
scouring for money.<br />
Chrysler needed additional cash to stay in business. It was not<br />
interested in borrowing just enough to pay the interest on its<br />
existing loans. To make the game worth playing, it wanted over a<br />
billion dollars in new capital. But, in the prevailing economic<br />
environment, the banks were hard pressed to create anything close<br />
to that kind of money.<br />
Managers, bankers, and union leaders found common cause in<br />
Washington. If one of the largest corporations in America was<br />
allowed to fold, think of the hardship to thousands of employees<br />
and their families; consider the damage to the economy as shock<br />
waves of unemployment move across the country; tremble at the<br />
thought of lost competition in the automobile market, of only two<br />
major brands from which to choose instead of three.<br />
Well, could anyone blame Congress for not wanting to plunge<br />
innocent families into poverty nor to upend the national economy<br />
nor to deny anyone their Constitutional right to freedom-of-choice?<br />
So a bill was passed directing the Treasury to guarantee up to $1.5<br />
billion in new loans to Chrysler. The banks agreed to write down<br />
$600 million of their old loans and to exchange an additional $700<br />
million for preferred stock. Both of these moves were advertised as<br />
evidence the banks were taking a terrible loss but were willing to<br />
yield in order to save the nation. It should be noted, however, that<br />
the value of the stock which was exchanged for previously uncollectable<br />
debt rose drastically after the settlement was announced to<br />
the public. Furthermore, not only did interest payments resume on<br />
the balance of the old loans, but the banks now replaced the written<br />
down portion with fresh loans, and these were far superior in<br />
quality because they were fully guaranteed by the taxpayers. So<br />
valuable was this guarantee that Chrysler, in spite of its previously<br />
poor debt performance, was able to obtain loans at 10.35% interest<br />
while its more solvent competitor, Ford, had to pay 13.5%. Applying;<br />
the difference of 3.15% to one and-a-half billion dollars, with a<br />
declining balance continuing for only six years, produces a savings<br />
in excess of $165 million. That is a modest estimate of the size of the<br />
federal subsidy. The real value was far greater because, without it,<br />
ihe corporation would have ceased to exist, and the banks would<br />
have taken a loss of almost their entire loan exposure.<br />
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION<br />
It will be recalled from the previous chapter that the FDIC is not<br />
a true insurance program and, because it has been politicized, it<br />
embodies the principle of moral hazard and it actually increases the<br />
likelihood that bank failures will occur.<br />
The FDIC has three options when bailing out an insolvent bank.<br />
The first is called a payoff. It involves simply paying off the insured<br />
depositors and then letting the bank fall to the mercy of the<br />
liquidators. This is the option usually chosen for small banks with<br />
no political clout The second possibility is called a sell off, and it<br />
involves making arrangements for a larger bank to assume all the<br />
real assets and liabilities of the failing bank. Banking services are<br />
uninterrupted and, aside from a change in name, most customers<br />
are unaware of the transaction. This option is generally selected for<br />
small and medium banks. In both a payoff and a sell off, the FDIC<br />
takes over the bad loans of the failed bank and supplies the money<br />
to pay back the insured depositors.<br />
The third option is called bailout, and this is the one which<br />
deserves our special attention. Irvine Sprague, a former director of<br />
the FDIC, explains: "In a bailout, the bank does not close, and<br />
everyone— insured or not—is fully protected.... Such privileged<br />
treatment is accorded by FDIC only rarely to an elect few/' 1<br />
That's right, he said everyone—insured or not—is fully protected.<br />
The banks which comprise the elect few generally are the<br />
1- Irvine H. Sprague, Bailout: An Insider's Account of Bank Failures and Rescues (New<br />
York: Basic Books, 1986), p, 23.
50 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND PROTECTORS OF THE PUBLIC 51<br />
large ones. It is only when the number of dollars at risk becomes<br />
mind numbing that a bailout can be camouflaged as protection of<br />
the public. Sprague says:<br />
The FDI Act gives the FDIC board sole discretion to prevent a<br />
bank from failing, at whatever cost. The board need only make the<br />
finding that the insured bank is in danger of failing and "is essential to<br />
provide adequate banking service in its community."... FDIC boards<br />
have been reluctant to make an essentiality finding unless they<br />
perceive a clear and present danger to the nation's financial system.<br />
Favoritism toward the large banks is obvious at many levels.<br />
One of them is the fact that, in a bailout, the FDIC covers all<br />
deposits, whether insured or not. That is<br />
significant, because the<br />
banks pay an assessment based only on their insured deposits. So, if<br />
un insured deposits are covered also, that coverage is free—more<br />
precisely, paid by someone else. What deposits are tminsured?<br />
Those in excess of $100,000 and those held outside the United<br />
States. Which banks hold the vast majority of such deposits? The<br />
large<br />
operations.<br />
ones, of course, particularly those with extensive overseas<br />
The bottom line is that the large banks get a whopping<br />
free ride when they are bailed out. Their uninsured accounts are<br />
paid by FDIC, and the cost of that benefit is passed to the smaller<br />
banks and to the taxpayer. This is not an oversight. Part of the plan<br />
at <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island was to give a competitive edge to the large banks.<br />
UNITY BANK<br />
The first application of the FDIC essentiality rule was, in fact, an<br />
exception. In 1971, Unity Bank and Trust Company in the Roxbury<br />
section of Boston found itself hopelessly insolvent, and the federal<br />
agency moved in. This is what was found: Unity's capital was<br />
depleted; most of its loans were bad; its loan collection practices<br />
were weak; and its personnel represented the worst of two worlds:<br />
overstaffing and inexperience. The examiners reported that there<br />
were two persons for every job, and neither one had been taught<br />
the job.<br />
With only $11.4 million on its books, the bank was small by<br />
current standards. Normally, the depositors would have been paid<br />
back, and the stockholders—like<br />
1. Sprague, pp. 27-29.<br />
the owners of any other failed<br />
2. The Bank of America is the exception. Despite its size, it has not acquired foreign<br />
deposits to the same degree as its competitors.<br />
business venture—would have lost their investment. As Sprague,<br />
himself, admitted: "If market discipline means anything, stockholders<br />
should be wiped out when a bank fails. Our assistance would<br />
nave the side effect ... of keeping the stockholders alive at<br />
government expense." But Unity Bank was different. It was<br />
located in a black neighborhood and was minority owned. As is<br />
often the case when government agencies are given discretionary<br />
powers, decisions are determined more by political pressures than<br />
by logic or merit, and Unity was a perfect example. In 1971, the<br />
specter of rioting in black communities still haunted the halls of<br />
Congress. Would the FDIC allow this bank to fail and assume the<br />
awesome responsibility for new riots and bloodshed? Sprague<br />
answers:<br />
Neither Wille [another director] nor I had any trouble viewing the<br />
problem in its broader social con<strong>text</strong>. We were willing to look for a<br />
creative solution.... My vote to make the "essentiality" finding and<br />
thus save the little bank was probably foreordained, an inevitable<br />
legacy of Watts.... The Watts riots ultimately triggered the essentiality<br />
doctrine.<br />
On July 22, 1971, the FDIC declared that the continued operation<br />
of Unity Bank was, indeed, essential and authorized a direct<br />
infusion of $1 .5 million. Although appearing on the agency's ledger<br />
as a loan, no one really expected repayment. In 1976, in spite of the<br />
FDIC's own staff report that the bank's operations continued "as<br />
slipshod and haphazard as ever/' the agency rolled over the "loan"<br />
for another five years. Operations did not improve and, on June 30,<br />
1982, the Massachusetts Banking Commissioner finally revoked<br />
Unity's charter. There were no riots in the streets, and the FDIC<br />
quietly wrote off the sum of $4,463,000 as the final cost of the<br />
bailout.<br />
COMMONWEALTH BANK OF DETROIT<br />
The bailout of the Unity Bank of Boston was the exception to<br />
the rule that small banks are dispensable while the giants must be<br />
saved at all costs. From that point forward, however, the FDIC<br />
game plan was strictly according to Hoyle. The next bailout<br />
occurred in 1972 involving the $1.5 billion Bank of the Common-<br />
Wealth of Detroit. Commonwealth had funded most of its<br />
I'<br />
2<br />
-<br />
Sprague, pp. 41^2.<br />
#"*., p. 48.
52 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND PROTECTORS OF THE PUBLIC 53<br />
phenomenal growth through loans from another bank, Chase<br />
Manhattan in New York. When Commonwealth went belly up,<br />
princes. Better to have financial power concentrated in Saudi<br />
Arabia than in Detroit. The bank continued to flounder and, in<br />
largely due to securities speculation and self dealing on the part of<br />
1983, what was left of it was resold to the former Detroit Bank &<br />
its management, Chase seized 39% of its common stock and<br />
Trust Company, now called Comerica. Thus the dreaded concentration<br />
of local power was realized after all, but not until Chase<br />
actually took control of the bank in an attempt to find a way to get<br />
its money back. FDIC director Sprague describes the inevitable<br />
Manhattan was able to walk away from the deal with most of its<br />
sequel:<br />
losses covered.<br />
Chase officers ... suggested that Commonwealth was a public<br />
FIRST PENNSYLVANIA BANK<br />
interest problem that the government agencies should resolve. That<br />
The 1980 bailout of the First Pennsylvania Bank of Philadelphia<br />
unsubtle hint was the way Chase phrased its request for a bailout by<br />
the government.... Their proposal would come down was next. First Perm was the nation's twenty-third largest bank<br />
to bailing out<br />
the shareholders, the Largest of which was Chase.<br />
with assets in excess of $9 billion. It was six times the size of<br />
Commonwealth; nine hundred times larger than Unity. It was also<br />
The bankers argued that Commonwealth must not be allowed<br />
the nation's oldest bank, dating back to the Bank of North America<br />
to fold because it provided "essential" banking services to the<br />
which was created by the Continental Congress in 1781.<br />
community. That was justified on two counts: (1) it served many<br />
The bank had experienced rapid growth and handsome profits<br />
minority neighborhoods and, (2) there were not enough other<br />
largely due to the aggressive leadership of its chief executive<br />
banks in the city to absorb its operation without creating an<br />
officer, John Bunting, who had previously been an economist with<br />
unhealthy concentration of banking power in the hands of a few. It<br />
the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. Bunting was the epitome<br />
was unclear what the minority issue had to do with it inasmuch as<br />
of the era's go-go bankers. He vastly increased earnings ratios by<br />
every neighborhood in which Commonwealth had a branch was<br />
reducing safety margins, taking on risky loans, and speculating in<br />
served by other banks as well. Furthermore, if Commonwealth<br />
the bond market. As long as the economy expanded, these<br />
were to be liquidated, many<br />
gambles<br />
of those branches undoubtedly would<br />
were profitable, and the stockholders loved<br />
have been purchased by competitors, and service to the communities<br />
would have continued. Judging by the absence<br />
him dearly. When his<br />
gamble in the bond market turned sour, however,<br />
of attention<br />
the bank<br />
plunged into a negative<br />
given<br />
cash flow.<br />
to this issue during discussions, it is apparent that it was<br />
By 1979, First Perm was forced<br />
to sell off<br />
merely thrown in for good measure, and no several<br />
one took it very<br />
of its profitable subsidiaries in order to obtain<br />
operating funds,<br />
seriously.<br />
and it was carrying $328 million in questionable<br />
loans.<br />
In any event, the FDIC did not want to be accused of being<br />
That was $16 million more than the entire stockholder<br />
investment.<br />
indifferent to the needs of Detroit's minorities and it certainly did<br />
The bank was insolvent, and the time had arrived to hit<br />
up<br />
not want to be a destroyer of free-enterprise competition. So, on<br />
the taxpayer for the loss.<br />
January 17, 1972, Commonwealth was bailed out with a $60 million<br />
The bankers went to Washington and presented their case.<br />
Fhey<br />
loan plus numerous federal guarantees. Chase absorbed some<br />
were joined by spokesmen from the nation's top three: Bank<br />
losses, primarily as a result of Commonwealth's weak bond<br />
of America, Citibank, and of course the ever-present Chase Manhattan.<br />
portfolio, but those were minor compared to what would have<br />
They argued that, not only was the bailout of First Penn<br />
been lost without FDIC intervention.<br />
essential" for the continuation of banking services in Philadelphia,<br />
rt<br />
Since continuation of the bank was necessary to prevent<br />
was also critical to the preservation of world economic stability.<br />
concentration of financial power, FDIC engineered its sale to the<br />
£ bank was so large, they said, if it were allowed to fall, it would<br />
First Arabian Corporation, a Luxembourg firm funded by Saudi<br />
^ct as the first domino leading to an international financial crisis. At<br />
r sfr,<br />
the directors of the FDIC resisted that theory and earned the<br />
^gry impatience of the Federal Reserve. Sprague recalls:
.<br />
—<br />
54 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND PROTECTORS OF THE PUBLIC 55<br />
We were far from a decision on how to proceed. There was strong<br />
pressure from the beginning not to let the bank fail. Besides hearing<br />
from the bank itself, the other large banks, and the comptroller, we<br />
heard frequently from the Fed. I recall at one session, Fred Schultz, the<br />
Fed deputy chairman, argued in an ever rising voice, that there were<br />
no alternatives—we had to save the bank. He said, "Quit wasting time<br />
talking about anything else!''. .<br />
The Fed's role as lender of last resort first generated contention<br />
between the Fed and FDIC during this period. The Fed was lending<br />
heavily to First Pennsylvania, fully secured, and Fed Chairman Paul<br />
Volcker said he planned to continue funding indefinitely until we<br />
could work out a merger or a bailout to save the bank.<br />
The directors of the FDIC did not want to cross swords with the<br />
Federal Reserve System, and they most assuredly did not want to<br />
be blamed for tumbling the entire world economic system by<br />
allowing the first domino to fall. "The theory had never been<br />
tested/ 7<br />
said Sprague. "I was not sure I wanted it to be just then."<br />
So, in due course, a bailout package was put together which<br />
featured a $325 million loan from FDIC, interest free for the first<br />
year and at a subsidized rate thereafter; about half the market rate.<br />
Several other banks which were financially tied to First Penn, and<br />
which would have suffered great losses if it had folded, loaned an<br />
additional $175 million and offered a $1 billion line of credit FDIC<br />
insisted on this move to demonstrate that the banking industry<br />
itself was helping and that it had faith in the venture. To bolster<br />
that faith, the Federal Reserve opened its Discount Window<br />
offering low-interest funds for that purpose.<br />
The outcome of this particular bailout was somewhat happier<br />
than with the others, at least as far as the bank is concerned. At the<br />
end of the five-year taxpayer subsidy, the FDIC loan was fully<br />
repaid. The bank has remained on shaky ground, however, and the<br />
final page of this episode has not yet been written.<br />
CONTINENTAL ILLINOIS<br />
Everything up to this point was but mere practice for the big<br />
event which was yet to come. In the early 1980s, Chicago's<br />
Continental Illinois was the nation's seventh largest bank. With<br />
assets of $42 billion and with 12,000 employees working in offices<br />
1. Sprague, pp. 88-89.<br />
2. Ibid., p. 89.<br />
in almost every major country in the world, its loan portfolio had<br />
undergone spectacular growth. Its net income on loans had literally<br />
doubled in just five years and by 1981 had rocketed to an annual<br />
figure of $254 million. It had become the darling of the market<br />
analysts and even had been named by Dun's Review as one of the<br />
five best managed companies in the country. These opinion leaders<br />
failed to perceive that the spectacular performance was due, not to<br />
an expertise in banking or investment, but to the financing of shaky<br />
business enterprises and foreign governments which could not<br />
obtain loans anywhere else. But the public didn't know that and<br />
wanted in on the action. For awhile, the bank's common stock<br />
actually sold at a premium over others which were more prudently<br />
managed.<br />
The gaudy fabric began to unravel during the Fourth of July<br />
weekend of 1982 with the failure of the Perm Square Bank in<br />
Oklahoma. That was the notorious shopping-center bank that had<br />
booked a billion dollars in oil and gas loans and resold them to<br />
Continental just before the collapse of the energy market Other<br />
loans also began to sour at the same time. The Mexican and<br />
Argentine debt crisis was coming to a head, and a series of major<br />
corporate bankruptcies were receiving almost daily headlines.<br />
Continental had placed large chunks of its easy money with all of<br />
them. When these events caused the bank's credit rating to drop,<br />
cautious depositors began to withdraw their funds, and new<br />
funding dwindled to a trickle. The bank became desperate for cash<br />
to meet its daily expenses. In an effort to attract new money, it<br />
began to offer unrealistically high rates of interest on its CDs. Loan<br />
officers were sent to scour the European and Japanese markets and<br />
to conduct a public relations campaign aimed at convincing market<br />
managers that the bank was calm and steady. David Taylor, the<br />
bank's chairman at that time, said: "We had the Continental Illinois<br />
Reassurance Brigade and we fanned out all over the world." 1<br />
In the fantasy land of modern finance, glitter is often more<br />
important than substance, image more valuable than reality. The<br />
bank paid the usual quarterly dividend in August, in spite of the<br />
feet that this intensified its cash crunch. As with the Perm Central<br />
Railroad twelve years earlier, that move was calculated to project<br />
a^ image of business-as-usual prosperity. And the ploy worked<br />
?' Quoted by Chernow, p. 657.
56 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
for a while, at least. By November, the public's confidence had been<br />
restored, and the bank's stock recovered to its pre-Penn Square<br />
level. By March of 1983, it had risen even higher. But the worst was<br />
yet to come.<br />
By the end of 1983, the bank's burden of non-performing loans<br />
had reached unbearable proportions and was growing at an<br />
alarming rate. By 1984, it was $2.7 billion. That same year, the bank<br />
sold off its profitable credit-card operation to make up for the loss<br />
of income and to obtain money for paying stockholders their<br />
expected quarterly dividend. The internal structure was near<br />
collapse, but the external facade continued to look like business as<br />
usual.<br />
The first crack in that facade appeared at 11:39 A.M. On<br />
Tuesday, May 8, Reuters, the British news agency, moved a story<br />
on its wire service stating that banks in the Netherlands, West<br />
Germany, Switzerland, and Japan had increased their interest rate<br />
on loans to Continental and that some of them had begun to<br />
withdraw their funds. The story also quoted the bank's official<br />
statement that rumors of pending bankruptcy were "totally preposterous."<br />
Within hours, another wire, the Commodity News Service,<br />
reported a second rumor: that a Japanese bank was interested in<br />
buying Continental.<br />
WORLD'S FIRST ELECTRONIC BANK RUN<br />
As the sun rose the following morning, foreign investors began<br />
to withdraw their deposits. A billion dollars in Asian money<br />
moved out that first day* The next day—a little more than<br />
twenty-four hours following Continental's assurance that bankruptcy<br />
was totally preposterous, its<br />
long-standing customer, the<br />
Board of Trade Clearing Corporation, located just down the<br />
street—withdrew $50 million. Word of the defection spread<br />
through the financial wire services, and the panic was on. It became<br />
the world's first global electronic bank run.<br />
By Friday, the bank had been forced to borrow $3.6 billion from<br />
the Federal Reserve in order to cover its escaping deposits. A<br />
consortium of sixteen banks, lead by Morgan Guaranty, offered a<br />
generous thirty-day line of credit, but all of this was far short of the<br />
need. Within seven more days, the outflow surged to over<br />
$6 billion.<br />
PROTECTORS OF THE PUBLIC 57<br />
In the beginning, almost all of this action was at the institutional<br />
level: other banks and professionally managed funds which closely<br />
monitor every minuscule detail of the financial markets. The<br />
general public had no inkling of the catastrophe, even as it<br />
unfolded. Chernow says: "The Continental run was like some<br />
rnodernistic fantasy: there were no throngs of hysterical depositors,<br />
just cool nightmare flashes on computer screens." Sprague writes:<br />
"Inside the bank, all was calm, the teller lines moved as always, and<br />
bank officials recall no visible sign of trouble—except in the wire<br />
room- Here the employees knew what was happening as withdrawal<br />
order after order moved on the wire, bleeding Continental<br />
to death. Some cried."<br />
This was the golden moment for which the Federal Reserve and<br />
the FDIC were created. Without government intervention, Continental<br />
would have collapsed, its stockholders would have been<br />
wiped out, depositors would have been badly damaged, and the<br />
financial world would have learned that banks, not only have to<br />
talk about prudent management, they actually have to adopt it.<br />
Future banking practices would have been severely altered, and the<br />
long-term economic benefit to the nation would have been enormous.<br />
But with government intervention, the discipline of a free<br />
market is suspended, and the cost of failure or fraud is politically<br />
passed to the taxpayers. Depositors continue to live in a dream<br />
world of false security, and banks can operate recklessly and<br />
fraudulently with the knowledge that their political partners in<br />
government will come to their rescue when they get into trouble.<br />
FDIC GENEROSITY WITH TAX DOLLARS<br />
One of the challenges at Continental was that, while only four<br />
per cent of its liability was covered by FDIC "insurance," the<br />
regulators felt compelled to cover the entire exposure. Which<br />
means that the bank paid insurance premiums into the fund based<br />
on only four per cent of its total coverage, and the taxpayers now<br />
would pick up the other ninety-six per cent. FDIC director Sprague<br />
explains:<br />
Although Continental Illinois had over $30 billion in deposits, 90<br />
percent were uninsured foreign deposits or large certificates<br />
substantially exceeding the $100,000 insurance limit. Off-book<br />
1-<br />
Chernow, p. 658,<br />
2-<br />
Sprague, p. 153.
.<br />
58 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND PROTECTORS OF THE PUBLIC 59<br />
liabilities swelled Continental's real size to $69 billion. In this massive<br />
liability structure only some $3 billion within the insured limit was<br />
scattered among 850,000 deposit accounts. So it was in our power and<br />
entirely legal simply to pay off the insured depositors, let everything<br />
else collapse, and stand back to watch the carnage.<br />
That course was never seriously considered by any of the<br />
players. From the beginning, there were only two questions: how to<br />
come to Continental's rescue by covering its total liabilities and,<br />
equally important, how to politically justify such a fleecing of the<br />
taxpayer. As pointed out in the previous chapter, the rules of the<br />
game require that the scam must always be described as a heroic<br />
effort to protect the public. In the case of Continental, the sheer size<br />
of the numbers made the ploy relatively easy. There were so many<br />
depositors involved, so many billions at risk, so many other banks<br />
interlocked, it could be claimed that the economic fabric of the<br />
entire nation—of the world itself—was at stake. And who could<br />
say that it was not so. Sprague argues the case in familiar terms:<br />
An early morning meeting was scheduled for Tuesday, May 15, at<br />
the Fed.... We talked over the alternatives. They were few—none<br />
really.... [Treasury Secretary] Regan and [Fed Chairman] Volcker<br />
raised the familiar concern about a national banking collapse, that is, a<br />
chain reaction if Continental should fail. Volcker was worried about an<br />
international crisis. We all were acutely aware that never before had a<br />
bank even remotely approaching Continentars size closed. No one<br />
knew what might happen in the nation and in the world. It was no<br />
time to find out just for the purpose of intellectual curiosity.<br />
THE FINAL BAILOUT PACKAGE<br />
The bailout was predictable from the start. There would be<br />
some preliminary lip service given to the necessity of allowing the<br />
banks themselves to work out their own problem. That would be<br />
followed by a plan to have the banks and the government share the<br />
burden. And that finally would collapse into a mere publicrelations<br />
illusion. In the end, almost the entire cost of the bailout<br />
would be assumed by the government and passed on to the<br />
taxpayer.<br />
At the May 15 meeting, Treasury Secretary Regan spoke<br />
eloquently about the value of a<br />
free market and the necessity of<br />
having the banks mount their own rescue plan, at least for a part of<br />
the money. To work out that plan, a summit meeting was arranged<br />
the next morning among the chairmen of the seven largest banks:<br />
Morgan Guaranty, Chase Manhattan, Citibank, Bank of America,<br />
Chemical Bank, Bankers Trust, and Manufacturers Hanover. The<br />
meeting was perfunctory at best. The bankers knew full well that<br />
the Reagan Administration would not risk the political embarrassment<br />
of a major bank failure. That would make the President and<br />
the Congress look bad at re-election time. But, still, some kind of<br />
tokenism was called for to preserve the Administration's conservative<br />
image. So, with urging from the Fed and the Treasury, the<br />
consortium agreed to put up the sum of $500 million—an average<br />
of only $71 million for each, far short of the actual need. Chernow<br />
describes the plan as "make-believe" and says "they pretended to<br />
mount a rescue." Sprague supplies the details:<br />
The bankers said they wanted to be in on any deal, but they did<br />
not want to lose any money. They kept asking for guarantees. They<br />
wanted it to look as though they were putting money in but, at the<br />
same time, wanted to be absolutely sure they were not risking<br />
anything.. .<br />
.<br />
By 7:30 A.M. we had made little progress. We were certain<br />
the situation would be totally out of control in a few hours.<br />
Continental would soon be exposing itself to a new business day, and<br />
the stock market would open at ten o'clock. Isaac [another FDIC<br />
director] and I held a hallway conversation. We agreed to go ahead<br />
without the banks. We told Conover [the third FDIC director] the plan<br />
and he concurred.. .<br />
[Later], we got word from Bernie McKeon, our regional director in<br />
New York, that the bankers had agreed to be at risk. Actually, the risk<br />
was remote since our announcement had promised 100 percent<br />
insurance.<br />
The final bailout package was a whopper. Basically, the government<br />
took over Continental Illinois and assumed all of its losses.<br />
Specifically, the FDIC took $4.5 billion in bad loans and paid<br />
Continental $3-5 billion for them. The difference was then made up<br />
b y the infusion of $1 billion in fresh capital in the form of stock<br />
Purchase. The bank, therefore, now had the federal government as<br />
a stockholder controlling 80 per cent of its shares, and its bad loans<br />
had been dumped onto the taxpayer. In effect, even though<br />
1. Sprague, p. 184.<br />
2. Ibid., pp. 154-55, 183.<br />
* Chernow, p. 659.<br />
2<br />
-<br />
Sprague, pp. 159-60.
60 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND PROTECTORS OF THE PUBLIC 61<br />
Continental retained the appearance of a private institution, it had<br />
been nationalized.<br />
LENDER OF LAST RESORT<br />
Perhaps the most important part of the bailout, however, was<br />
that the money to make it possible was created—directly or<br />
indirectly— by the Federal Reserve System. If the bank had been<br />
allowed to fail, and the FDIC had been required to cover the losses,<br />
the drain would have emptied the entire fund with nothing left to<br />
cover the liabilities of thousands of other banks. In other words,<br />
this one failure alone, if it were allowed to happen, would have<br />
wiped out the entire FDIC! That's one reason the bank had to be<br />
kept operating, losses or no losses, and that's why the Fed had to be<br />
involved in the bail out In fact, that was precisely the reason the<br />
System was created at <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island: to manufacture whatever<br />
amount of money might be necessary to cover the losses of the<br />
cartel. The scam could never work unless the Fed was able to create<br />
money out of nothing and pump it into the banks along with<br />
"credit" and "liquidity" guarantees. Which means, if the loans go<br />
sour, the money is eventually extracted from the American people<br />
through the hidden tax called inflation. That's the meaning of the<br />
phrase "lender of last resort."<br />
FDIC director Irvine Sprague, while discussing the press release<br />
which announced the Continental bail-out package, describes<br />
the Fed's role this way:<br />
The third paragraph ... granted 100 percent insurance to all<br />
depositors, including the uninsured, and all general creditors.... The<br />
next paragraph ...<br />
set forth the conditions under which the Fed, as<br />
lender of last resort, would make its loans. .. . . The Fed would lend to<br />
Continental to meet "any extraordinary liquidity requirements." That<br />
would include another run. All agreed that Continental could not be<br />
saved without 100 percent insurance by FDIC and unlimited liquidity<br />
support by the Federal Reserve. No plan would work without these<br />
two elements.<br />
By 1984, "unlimited liquidity support" had translated into the<br />
staggering sum of $8 billion. By early 1986, the figure had climbed<br />
to $9.24 billion and was still rising. While explaining this fleecing of<br />
the taxpayer to the Senate Banking Committee, Fed Chairman Paul<br />
Volcker said: "The operation is the most basic function of the<br />
1. Sprague, pp. 162-63.<br />
Federal<br />
Reserve. It was why it was founded."<br />
With those words,<br />
he has confirmed one of the more controversial assertions of this<br />
book.<br />
SMALL BANKS BE DAMNED<br />
It has been mentioned previously that the large banks receive a<br />
free ride on their FDIC coverage at the expense of the small banks.<br />
There could be no better example of this than the bail out of<br />
Continental Illinois. In 1983, the bank paid a premium into the fund<br />
of only $6.5 million to protect its insured deposits of $3 billion. The<br />
actual<br />
liability, however—including its institutional and overseas<br />
deposits—was ten times that figure, and the FDIC guaranteed<br />
payment on the whole amount As Sprague admitted, "Small banks<br />
pay proportionately far more for their insurance and have far less<br />
chance of a Continental-style bailout."<br />
How true. Within the same week that the FDIC and the Fed<br />
were providing billions in payments, stock purchases, loans, and<br />
guarantees for Continental Illinois, it closed down the tiny Bledsoe<br />
County Bank of Pikeville, Tennessee, and the Planters Trust and<br />
Savings Bank of Opelousas, Louisiana. During the first half of that<br />
year, forty-three smaller banks failed without an FDIC bailout. In<br />
most cases, a merger was arranged with a larger bank, and only the<br />
uninsured deposits were at risk. The impact of this inequity upon<br />
the banking system is enormous. It sends a message to bankers and<br />
depositors alike that small banks, if they get into trouble, will be<br />
allowed to fold, whereas large banks are safe regardless of how<br />
poorly or fraudulently they are managed. As a New York investment<br />
analyst stated to news reporters, Continental Illinois, even<br />
though it had just failed, was "obviously the safest bank in the<br />
country to have your money in."<br />
Nothing could be better calculated<br />
to drive the small independent banks out of business or to<br />
force them to sell out to the giants. And that, in fact, is exactly what<br />
has been happening. Since 1984, while hundreds of small banks<br />
have been forced out of business, the average size of the banks<br />
which remain—with government protection—has more than<br />
doubled. It will be recalled that this advantage of the big banks<br />
* Quoted by Greider, p. 628.<br />
3 ^ague /P .250.<br />
New Continental Illinois Facing Uncertain Future/' by Keith E. Leighty, Associated<br />
Press, Thousand Oaks, Calif., News Chronicle, May 13, 1985, p. 18.
,<br />
62 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND PROTECTORS OF THE PUBLIC 63<br />
over their smaller competitors was also one of the objectives of the<br />
holding company. The FDIC pumped $130 million into its main<br />
<strong>Jekyll</strong> Island plan.<br />
banking unit and took warrants for 55% ownership. The pattern<br />
Perhaps the most interesting—and depressing—aspect of the j^d been set. By accepting stock in a failing bank in return for<br />
Continental Illinois bailout was the lack of public indignation over<br />
bailing it out, the government had devised an ingenious way to<br />
the principle of using taxes and inflation to protect the banking<br />
nationalize banks without calling it that. Issuing stock sounds like a<br />
industry. Smaller banks have complained of the unfair advantage<br />
business transaction in the private sector. And the public didn't<br />
given to the larger banks, but not on the basis that the government<br />
seem to notice the reality that Uncle Sam was going into banking.<br />
should have let the giant fall. Their lament was that it should now<br />
protect them in the same paternalistic fashion. Voters and<br />
SECOND REASON TO ABOLISH THE FEDERAL RESERVE<br />
politicians<br />
were silent on the issue, apparently awed<br />
A sober evaluation of this long and continuing record leads to<br />
by the sheer size of<br />
the second reason for abolishing the Federal Reserve System: Far<br />
the numbers and the specter of economic chaos. Decades of public<br />
education had left their mark. After all, wasn't this exactly what<br />
from being a protector of the public, it is a cartel operating against the<br />
public interest.<br />
government schools have taught is the proper function of government?<br />
Wasn't this the American way? Even Ronald Reagan, SUMMARY<br />
viewed as the national champion of economic conservatism,<br />
ITie game called bailout is not a whimsical figment of the<br />
praised the action. From aboard Air Force One on the way to<br />
imagination, it is for real. Here are some of the big games of the<br />
California, the President said: "It was a thing that we should do and<br />
season and their final scores.<br />
we did it. It was in the best interest of all concerned."<br />
In 1970, Perm Central railroad became bankrupt. The banks<br />
The Reagan endorsement brought into focus one of the most which loaned the money had taken over its board of directors and<br />
amazing phenomena of the 20th century: the process by which had driven it further into the hole, all the while extending bigger<br />
America has moved to the Left toward statism while marching and bigger loans to cover the losses. Directors concealed reality<br />
behind the political banner of those who speak the language of from the stockholders and made additional loans so the company<br />
opposing statism. William Greider, a former writer for the liberal<br />
could pay dividends to keep up the false front. During this time,<br />
Washington Post and The Rolling Stone, complains:<br />
the directors and their banks unloaded their stock at unrealistically<br />
high prices.<br />
The<br />
When the truth became public, the<br />
nationalization of Continental was,<br />
stockholders were<br />
in fact, a quintessential act<br />
left<br />
of modern liberalism—the state intervening in behalf of private<br />
holding the empty bag. The bailout, which was engineered by<br />
interests and a broad public purpose. In this supposedly conservative<br />
the Federal Reserve, involved government subsidies to other banks<br />
era, federal authorities were setting aside the harsh verdict of market<br />
to grant additional loans. Then Congress was told that the collapse<br />
competition (and grossly expanding their own involvement in the<br />
of Perm Central would be devastating to the public interest.<br />
private economy). . .<br />
Congress responded by granting $125 million in loan guarantees so<br />
In the past, conservative scholars and pundits had objected loudly<br />
that banks would not<br />
at any<br />
be at risk. The railroad eventually failed<br />
federal intervention in the private economy, particularly<br />
emergency assistance for failing companies. Now, they hardly seemed<br />
anyway, but the bank loans were covered. Perm Central was<br />
to notice. Perhaps they would have been more vocal if the deed had<br />
nationalized into AMTRAK and continues to operate at a loss.<br />
been done by someone other than the conservative champion, Ronald<br />
In 1970, as Lockheed faced bankruptcy, Congress heard<br />
Reagan.<br />
essentially the same story. Thousands would be unemployed,<br />
Four years after the bailout of Continental Illinois, the same<br />
subcontractors would go out of business, and the public would<br />
suffer<br />
play was used in the rescue of BankOklahoma, which was a bank<br />
greatly. So Congress agreed to guarantee $250 million in new<br />
loans, which put Lockheed 60% deeper into debt than before. Now<br />
1. "Reagan Calls Rescue of Bank No Bailout/' New York Times, July 29, 1984.<br />
that government was guaranteeing the loans, it had to make sure<br />
2. Greider, p. 631. '<br />
Lockheed became profitable. This was accomplished by granting
64 THE, CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND PROTECTORS OF THE PUBLIC 65<br />
lucrative defense contracts at non-competitive bids. The banks<br />
were paid back.<br />
In 1975, New York City had reached the end of its credit rope. It<br />
had borrowed heavily to maintain an extravagant bureaucracy and<br />
a miniature welfare state. Congress was told that the public would<br />
be jeopardized if city services were curtailed, and that America<br />
would be disgraced in the eyes of the world. So Congress authorized<br />
additional direct loans up to $2.3 billion, which more than<br />
doubled the size of the current debt. The banks continued to receive<br />
their interest.<br />
In 1978, Chrysler was on the verge of bankruptcy. Congress<br />
was informed that the public would suffer greatly if the company<br />
folded, and that it would be a blow to the American way if<br />
freedom-of-choice were reduced from three to two makes of<br />
automobiles. So Congress guaranteed up to $1.5 billion in new<br />
loans. The banks reduced part of their loans and exchanged another<br />
portion for preferred stock. News of the deal pushed up the market<br />
value of that stock and largely offset the loan write-off. The banks'<br />
previously uncollectable debt was converted into a governmentbacked,<br />
interest-bearing asset.<br />
In 1972, the Commonwealth Bank of Detroit—with $1.5 billion<br />
in assets, became insolvent. It had borrowed heavily from the<br />
Chase Manhattan Bank in New York to invest in high-risk and<br />
potentially high-profit ventures. Now that it was in trouble, so was<br />
Chase. The bankers went to Washington and told the FDIC the<br />
public must be protected from the great financial hardship that<br />
would follow if Commonwealth were allowed to close. So the FDIC<br />
pumped in a $60 million loan plus federal guarantees of repayment.<br />
Commonwealth was sold to an Arab consortium. Chase took<br />
a minor write down but converted most of its potential loss into<br />
government-backed assets.<br />
In 1979, the First Pennsylvania Bank of Philadelphia became<br />
insolvent. With assets in excess of $9 billion, it was nine-times the<br />
size of Commonwealth. It, too, had been an aggressive player in the<br />
'80s. Now the bankers and the Federal Reserve told the FDIC that<br />
the public must be protected from the calamity of a bank failure of<br />
this size, that the national economy was at stake, perhaps even the<br />
entire world. So the FDIC gave a $325 million loan—interest-free<br />
for the first year, and at half the market rate thereafter. The Federal<br />
Reserve offered money to other banks at a subsidized rate for the<br />
specific purpose of relending to First Perm. With that enticement,<br />
they advanced $175 million in immediate loans plus a $1 billion<br />
line of credit.<br />
In 1982, Chicago's Continental Illinois became insolvent. It was<br />
the nation's seventh largest bank with $42 billion in assets. The<br />
previous year, its profits had soared as a result of loans to high-risk<br />
business ventures and foreign governments. Although it had been<br />
the darling of market analysts, it quickly unraveled when its cash<br />
flow turned negative, and overseas banks began to withdraw<br />
deposits. It was the world's first electronic bank run. Federal<br />
Reserve Chairman Volcker told the FDIC that it would be unthinkable<br />
to allow the world economy to be ruined by a bank failure of<br />
this magnitude. So, the FDIC assumed $4.5 billion in bad loans and,<br />
in return for the bailout, took 80% ownership of the bank in the<br />
form of stock. In effect, the bank was nationalized, but no one<br />
called it that. The United States government was now in the<br />
banking business.<br />
All of the money to accomplish these bailouts was made<br />
possible by the Federal Reserve System acting as the "lender of last<br />
resort." That was one of the purposes for which it had been created.<br />
We must not forget that the phrase "lender of last resort" means<br />
that the money is created out of nothing, resulting in the confiscation<br />
of our nation's wealth through the hidden tax called inflation.
Chapter Four<br />
HOME, SWEET LOAN<br />
The history of increasing government intervention<br />
in the housing industry; the stifling of<br />
free-market forces in residential real estate; the<br />
resulting crisis in the S&L industry; the bailout of<br />
that industry with money taken from the taxpayer.<br />
As we have seen in previous chapters, the damage done by the<br />
banking cartel is made possible by the fact that money can be<br />
created out of nothing. It also destroys our purchasing power<br />
through the hidden tax called inflation. The mechanism by which it<br />
works is hidden and subtle.<br />
Let us turn, now, from the arcane world of central banking to<br />
the giddy world of savings-and-loan institutions. By comparison,<br />
the problem in the savings-and-loan industry is easy to comprehend.<br />
It is simply that vast amounts of money are disappearing into<br />
the black hole of government mismanagement, and the losses must<br />
eventually be paid by us. The end result is the same in both cases.<br />
SOCIALISM TAKES ROOT IN AMERICA<br />
It all began with a concept. The concept took root in America<br />
largely as a result of the Great Depression of the 1930s. American<br />
politicians were impressed at how radical Marxists were able to<br />
attract popular support by blaming the capitalist system for the<br />
country's woes and by promising a socialist Utopia. They admired<br />
and feared these radicals; admired them for their skill at mass<br />
psychology; feared them lest they become so popular as to win a<br />
plurality at the ballot box. It was not long before many political<br />
hgures began to mimic the soap-box orators, and the voters<br />
enthusiastically put them into office.<br />
While the extreme and violent aspects of Communism generally<br />
were rejected, the more genteel theories of socialism became<br />
Popular among the educated elite. It was they who would naturally<br />
become the leaders in an American socialist system. Someone had
—<br />
68 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND HOME, SWEET LOAN 69<br />
to look after the masses and tell them what to do for their own<br />
good, and many with college degrees and those with great wealth<br />
became enamored by the thought of playing that role. And so, the<br />
concept became widely accepted at all levels of American life—the<br />
"downtrodden masses" as well as the educated elite—that it was<br />
desirable for the government to take care of its citizens and to<br />
protect them in their economic affairs.<br />
And so, when more than 1900 S&Ls went belly-up in the Great<br />
Depression, Herbert Hoover—and a most willing Congress<br />
created the Federal Home Loan Bank Board to protect depositors in<br />
the future. It began to issue charters to institutions that would<br />
submit to its regulations, and the public was led to believe that<br />
government regulators would be more wise, prudent, and honest<br />
than private managers. A federal charter became a kind of government<br />
seal of approval. The public, at last, was being protected.<br />
Hoover was succeeded by FDR in the White House who<br />
became the epitome of the new breed. Earlier in his political career,<br />
he had been the paragon of free enterprise and individualism. He<br />
spoke out against big government and for the free market, but in<br />
mid life he reset his sail to catch the shifting political wind. He went<br />
down in history as a pioneer of socialism in America.<br />
It was FDR who took the next step toward government<br />
paternalism in the S&L industry—as well as the banking industry—<br />
by establishing the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation<br />
(FDIC) and the Federal Saving and Loan Insurance Corporation<br />
(FSLIC). From that point forward, neither the public nor the<br />
managers of the thrifts needed to worry about losses. Everything<br />
would be reimbursed by the government.<br />
A HOUSE ON EVERY LOT<br />
At about the same time, loans on private homes became<br />
subsidized through the Federal Housing Authority (FHA) which<br />
allowed S&Ls to make loans at rates lower than would have been<br />
possible without the subsidy. This was to make it easier for<br />
everyone to realize the dream of having their own home. While the<br />
Marxists were promising a chicken in every pot, the New Dealers<br />
were winning elections by pushing for a house on every lot.<br />
In the beginning, many people were able to purchase a home<br />
who, otherwise, might not have been able to do so or who would<br />
have had to wait longer to accumulate a higher down payment. On<br />
the other hand, the FHA-induced easy credit began to push up the<br />
price of houses for the middle class, and that quickly offset any real<br />
advantage of the subsidy. The voters, however, were not perceptive<br />
enough to understand this canceling effect and continued to vote<br />
for politicians who promised to expand the system.<br />
The next step was for the Federal Reserve Board to require<br />
banks to offer interest rates lower than those offered by S&Ls. The<br />
result was that funds moved from the banks into the S&Ls and<br />
became abundantly available for home loans. This was a deliberate<br />
national policy to favor the home industry at the expense of other<br />
industries that were competing for the same investment dollars. It<br />
may not have been good for the economy as a whole but it was<br />
good politics.<br />
ABANDONMENT OF THE FREE MARKET<br />
These measures effectively removed real estate loans from the<br />
free market and placed them into the political arena, where they<br />
have remained ever since. The damage to the public as a result of<br />
this intervention would be delayed a long time in coming, but<br />
when it came, it would be cataclysmic.<br />
The reality of government disruption of the free market cannot<br />
be overemphasized, for it is at the heart of our present and future<br />
crisis. We have savings institutions that are controlled by government<br />
at every step of the way. Federal agencies provide protection<br />
against losses and lay down rigid guidelines for capitalization<br />
levels, number of branches, territories covered, management policies,<br />
services rendered, and interest rates charged. The additional<br />
cost to S&Ls of compliance with this regulation has been estimated<br />
by the American Bankers Association at about $11 billion per year,<br />
which represents a whopping 60% of all their profits.<br />
On top of that, the healthy component of the industry must<br />
spend over a billion dollars each year for extra premiums into the<br />
so-called insurance fund to make up for the failures of the<br />
unhealthy component, a form of penalty for success. When some of<br />
the healthy institutions attempted to convert to banks to escape this<br />
Penalty, the regulators said no. Their cash flow was needed to<br />
support the bailout fund.<br />
!NSURANCE FOR THE COMMON MAN?<br />
The average private savings deposit is about $6,000. Yet, under<br />
the Carter administration, the level of FDIC insurance was raised
70 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND HOME, SWEET LOAN 71<br />
from $40,000 to $100,000 for each account. Those with more than<br />
that merely had to open several accounts, so, in reality, the sky was<br />
the limit. Clearly this had nothing to do with protecting the<br />
common man. The purpose was to prepare the way for brokerage<br />
houses to reinvest huge blocks of capital at high rates of interest<br />
virtually without risk. It was, after all, insured by the federal<br />
government.<br />
In 1979, Federal Reserve policy had pushed up interest rates,<br />
and the S&Ls had to keep pace to attract deposits. By December of<br />
1980, they were paying 15.8% interest on their money-market<br />
certificates. Yet, the average rate they were charging for new<br />
mortgages was only 12.9%. Many of their older loans were still<br />
crunching away at 7 or 8% and, to compound the problem, some of<br />
those were in default, which means they were really paying 0%.<br />
The thrifts were operating deep in the red and had to make up the<br />
difference somewhere.<br />
The weakest S&Ls paid the highest interest rates to attract<br />
depositors and they are the ones which obtained the large blocks of<br />
brokered funds. Brokers no longer cared how weak the operation<br />
was, because the funds were fully insured. They just cared about<br />
the interest rate.<br />
On the other hand, the S&L managers reasoned that they had to<br />
make those funds work miracles for the short period they had<br />
them. It was their only chance to dig out, and they were willing to<br />
take big risks. For them also, the government's insurance program<br />
had removed any chance of loss to their depositors, so many of<br />
them plunged into high-profit, high-risk real-estate developments.<br />
Deals began to go sour, and 1979 was the first year since the<br />
Great Depression of the 1930s that the total net worth of federally<br />
insured S&Ls became negative. And that was despite expansion<br />
almost everywhere else in the economy. The public began to<br />
worry.<br />
FULL FAITH AND CREDIT<br />
The protectors in Washington responded in 1982 with a joint<br />
resolution of Congress declaring that the full faith & credit of the<br />
United States government stood behind the FSLIC. That was a<br />
reassuring phrase, but many people had the gnawing feeling that<br />
somehow, we were going to pay for it ourselves. And they were<br />
right. Consumer Reports explained:<br />
Behind the troubled banks and the increasingly troubled<br />
insurance agencies stands "the full faith and credit" of the<br />
Government—in effect, a promise, sure to be honored by Congress,<br />
that all citizens will chip in through taxes or through inflation to make<br />
all depositors whole.<br />
The plight of the S&Ls was dramatically brought to light in<br />
Ohio in 1985 when the Home State Savings Bank of Cincinnati<br />
collapsed as a result of a potential $150 million loss in a Florida<br />
securities firm. This triggered a run, not only on the thirty-three<br />
branches of Home State, but on many of the other S&Ls as well. The<br />
news impacted international markets where overseas speculators<br />
dumped paper dollars for other currencies, and some rushed to<br />
buy gold.<br />
Within a few days, depositors demanding their money caused<br />
$60 million to flow out of the state's $130 million "insurance" fund<br />
which, true to form for all government protection schemes, was<br />
terribly inadequate. If the run had been allowed to continue, the<br />
fund likely would have been obliterated the next day. It was time<br />
for a political fix.<br />
Chi March 15, Ohio Governor Richard Celeste declared one of<br />
the few "bank holidays" since the Great Depression and closed all<br />
seventy-one of the state-insured thrifts. He assured the public there<br />
was nothing to worry about. He said this was merely a "cooling-off<br />
period . . . until we can convincingly demonstrate the soundness of<br />
our system." Then he flew to Washington and met with Paul<br />
Volcker, chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, and with Edwin<br />
Gray, chairman of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, to request<br />
federal assistance. They assured him it was available.<br />
A few days later, depositors were authorized to withdraw up to<br />
$750 from their accounts. On March 21, President Reagan calmed<br />
the world money markets with assurances that the crisis was over.<br />
Furthermore, he said, the problem was "limited to Ohio." 2<br />
This was not the first time there had been a failure of statesponsored<br />
insurance funds. The one in Nebraska was pulled down<br />
^ 1983 when the Commonwealth Savings Company of Lincoln<br />
failed. It had over $60 million in deposits, but the insurance fund<br />
1. "<br />
How Safe Are<br />
2. -<br />
Your Deposits?", Consumer Reports, August, 1988, p. 503.<br />
Ohio Bank Crisis That Ruffled World/' US. News & World Report, April 1, 1985,<br />
P-ll
72 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
had less than $2 million to cover, not just Commonwealth, but the<br />
whole system. Depositors were lucky to get 65 cents on the dollar,<br />
and even that was expected to take up to 10 yeaTs.<br />
AN INVITATION TO FRAUD<br />
In the early days of the Reagan administration, government<br />
regulations were changed so that the S&Ls were no longer<br />
restricted to the issuance of home mortgages, the sole reason for<br />
their creation in the first place. In fact, they no longer even were<br />
required to obtain a down payment on their loans. They could now<br />
finance 100% of a deal—or even more. Office buildings and<br />
shopping centers sprang up everywhere regardless of the need.<br />
Developers, builders, managers, and appraisers made millions. The<br />
field soon became overbuilt and riddled with fraud. Billions of<br />
dollars disappeared into defunct projects. In at least twenty-two of<br />
the failed S&Ls, there is evidence that the Mafia and CIA were<br />
involved.<br />
Fraud is not necessarily against the law. In fact, most of the<br />
fraud in the S&L saga was, not only legal, it was encouraged by the<br />
government. The Garn-St Germain Act allowed the thrifts to lend<br />
an amount of money equal to the appraised value of real estate<br />
rather than the market value. It wasn't long before appraisers were<br />
receiving handsome fees for appraisals that were, to say the least,<br />
unrealistic. But that was not fraud, it was the intent of the<br />
regulators. The amount by which the appraisal exceeded the<br />
market value was defined as "appraised equity" and was counted<br />
the same as capital.<br />
Since the S&Ls were required to have $1 in<br />
capital for every $33 held in deposits, an appraisal that exceeded<br />
market value by $1 million could be used to pyramid $33 million in<br />
deposits from Wall Street brokerage houses. And the anticipated<br />
profits from those funds was one of the ways in which the S&Ls<br />
were supposed to recoup their losses without the government<br />
having to cough up the money—which it didn't have. In effect the<br />
government was saying: "We can't make good on our protection<br />
scheme, so go get the money yourself by putting the investors at<br />
risk. Not only will we back you up if you fail, we'll show you<br />
exactly how to do it."<br />
1. "How Safe Are Deposits in Ailing Banks, S&Ls?/' U.S. 'News & World Report,<br />
March 25, 1985, p. 74.<br />
THE FALLOUT BEGINS<br />
In<br />
HOME, SWEET LOAN 73<br />
spite of the accounting gimmicks which were created to<br />
make the walking-dead S&Ls look healthy, by 1984 the fallout<br />
began- The FSLIC closed one institution that year and arranged for<br />
the merger of twenty-six others which were insolvent. In order to<br />
persuade healthy firms to absorb insolvent ones, the government<br />
provides cash settlements to compensate for the liabilities. By 1984,<br />
these<br />
subsidized mergers were costing the FDIC over $1 billion per<br />
year. Yet, that was just the small beginning.<br />
Between 1980 and 1986, a total of 664 insured S&Ls failed.<br />
Government regulators had promised to protect the public in the<br />
event of losses, but the losses were already far beyond what they<br />
could handle. They could not afford to close down all the insolvent<br />
thrifts because they simply didn't have enough money to cover the<br />
pay out. In March of 1986, the FSLIC had only 3 cents for every<br />
dollar of deposits. By the end of that year, the figure had dropped<br />
to two-tenths of a penny for each dollar "insured." Obviously, they<br />
had to keep those thrifts in business, which meant they had to<br />
invent even more accounting gimmicks to conceal the reality.<br />
Postponement of the inevitable made matters even worse.<br />
Keeping the S&Ls in business was costing the FSLIC $6 million per<br />
day. By 1988, two years later, the thrift industry as a whole was<br />
losing $9.8 million per day, and the unprofitable ones—the corpses<br />
which were propped up by the FSLIC—were losing $35.6 million<br />
per day. And, still, the game continued.<br />
By 1989, the FSLIC no longer had even two-tenths of a penny<br />
for each dollar insured. Its reserves had vanished altogether. Like<br />
the thrifts it supposedly protected, it was, itself, insolvent and<br />
looking for loans. It had tried offering bond issues, but these fell far<br />
short of its<br />
tailed<br />
needs. Congress had discussed the problem but had<br />
to provide new funding. The collapse of Lincoln Savings<br />
brought the crisis to a head. There was no money, period.<br />
THE FED USURPS THE ROLE OF CONGRESS<br />
In February, an agreement was reached between Alan<br />
Greenspan, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, and M. Danny<br />
Wall, Chairman of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, to have<br />
Fizzling FSLIC" by Shirley Hobbs Scheibla, Barron's, Feb. 9, 1987, p. 16.
74 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
$70 million of bailout funding for Lincoln Savings come directly<br />
from the Federal Reserve.<br />
This was a major break in precedent. Historically, the Fed has<br />
served to create money only for the government or for banks. If it<br />
were the will of the people to bail out a savings institution, then it is<br />
up to Congress to approve the funding. If Congress does not have<br />
the money or cannot borrow it from the public, then the Fed can<br />
create it (out of nothing, of course) and give it to the government.<br />
But, in this instance, the Fed was usurping the role of Congress and<br />
making political decisions entirely on its own. There is no basis in<br />
the Federal Reserve Act for this action. Yet, Congress remained<br />
silent, apparently out of collective guilt for its own paralysis.<br />
Finally, in August of that year, Congress was visited by the<br />
ghost of FDR and sprang into action. It passed the Financial<br />
Institutions Reform and Recovery Act (FIRREA) and allocated a<br />
minimum of $66 billion for the following ten years, $300 billion<br />
over thirty years. Of this amount, $225 billion was to come from<br />
taxes or inflation, and $75 billion was to come from the healthy<br />
S&Ls. It was the biggest bailout ever, bigger than the combined cost<br />
for Lockheed, Chrysler, Penn Central, and New York City.<br />
In the process, the FSLIC was eliminated because it was<br />
hopelessly insolvent and replaced by the Savings Association<br />
Insurance Fund. Also created was the Banking Insurance Fund for<br />
the protection of commercial banks, and both are now administered<br />
by the FDIC.<br />
As is often the case when previous government control fails to<br />
produce the desired result, the response of Congress is to increase<br />
the controls. Four entirely new layers of bureaucracy were added to<br />
the existing tangled mess: the Resolution Trust Oversight Board, to<br />
establish strategies for the RTC; the Resolution Funding Corporation,<br />
to raise money to operate the RTC; The Office of Thrift<br />
Supervision, to supervise thrift institutions even more than they<br />
had been; and the Oversight Board for the Home Loan Banks, the<br />
purpose of which remains vague but probably is to make sure that<br />
the S&Ls continue to serve the political directive of subsidizing the<br />
home industry. When President Bush signed the bill, he said:<br />
This legislation will safeguard and stabilize America's financial<br />
system and put in place permanent reforms so these problems wiU<br />
never happen again. Moreover, it says to tens of millions of<br />
savings-and-loan depositors, "You will not be the victim of others'<br />
mistakes. We will<br />
secure."<br />
HOME, SWEET LOAN 75<br />
see— guarantee—that your insured deposits are<br />
THE ESTIMATES ARE SLIGHTLY WRONG<br />
By the middle of the following year, it was clear that the $66<br />
billion funding would be greatly inadequate. Treasury spokesmen<br />
were now quoting $130 billion, about twice the original estimate.<br />
How much is $130 billion? In 1990, it was 30% more than the<br />
salaries of all the schoolteachers in America. It was more than the<br />
combined profits of all the Fortune-500 industrial companies. It<br />
would send 1.6 million students through the best four-year colleges,<br />
including room and board. And the figure did not even<br />
include the cost of liquidating the huge backlog of thrifts already<br />
seized nor the interest that had to be paid on borrowed funds.<br />
Within only a few days of the announced increase, the Treasury<br />
again revised the figure upward from $130 billion to $150 billion.<br />
As Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady told the press, "No one<br />
should assume that the estimates won't change. They will."<br />
Indeed, the estimates continued to change with each passing<br />
week. The government had sold or merged 223 insolvent thrifts<br />
during 1988 and had given grossly inadequate estimates of the cost.<br />
Financiers such as Ronald Perelman and the Texas investment<br />
partnership called Temple-Inland, Inc., picked up many of these at<br />
fantastic bargains, especially considering that they were given cash<br />
subsidies and tax advantages to sweeten the deal. At the time,<br />
Danny Wall, who was then Chairman of the Federal Home Loan<br />
Bank Board, announced that these deals "took care" of the worst<br />
thrift problems. He said the cost of the bailout was $39 billion. The<br />
Wall Street Journal replied:<br />
Wrong again. The new study, a compilation of audits prepared by<br />
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, indicates that the total cost<br />
of the so-called Class of '88 will be $90 billion to $95 billion, including<br />
tax benefits granted the buyers and a huge amount of interest on<br />
government debt to help finance this assistance....<br />
But the 1988 thrift rescues' most expensive flaw doesn't appear to<br />
be the enrichment of tycoons. Rather it's that none of the deals ended<br />
or even limited the government's exposure to mismanagement by the<br />
new owners, hidden losses on real estate in the past, or the vicissitudes<br />
of the real-estate markets in the future.... And some of the deals<br />
1.<br />
'Review of the News," The New American, Sept. ll y 1989, p. 15.
76 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
appear to be sham transactions, in which failing thrifts were sold to<br />
failing thrifts, which are failing all over again....<br />
Although the thrifts proved to be in far worse shape than the Bank<br />
Board estimated, Mr. Wall defends his strategy for rescuing them with<br />
open-ended assistance. "We didn't have the money to liquidate/' he<br />
says.<br />
When Congress passed FIRREA the previous year to "safeguard<br />
and stabilize America's financial system/ 7 the staggering<br />
sum of $300 billion dollars was authorized to be taken from taxes<br />
and inflation over the following thirty years to do the job. Now,<br />
Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan was saying that<br />
true long-term cost would stand at $500 billion, an amount even<br />
greater than the default of loans to all<br />
the<br />
the Third-World countries<br />
combined. The figure was still too low. A non-biased private study<br />
released by Veribank, Inc. showed that, when all the hidden costs<br />
are included, the bill presented to the American people will be<br />
about $532 billion. The problems that President Bush promised<br />
would ''never happen again" were happening again.<br />
BOOKKEEPING SLEIGHT OF HAND<br />
Long before this point, the real estate market had begun to<br />
contract, and many mortgages exceeded the actual price for which<br />
the property could be sold. Furthermore, market interest rates had<br />
risen far above the rates that were locked into most of the S&L<br />
loans, and that decreased the value of those mortgages. The true<br />
value of a $50,000 mortgage that is paying 7% interest is only half of<br />
a $50,000 mortgage that is<br />
earning 14%. So the protectors of the<br />
public devised a scheme whereby the S&Ls were allowed to value<br />
their assets according to the original loan value rather than their<br />
true market value. That helped, but much more was still needed.<br />
The next step was to create bookkeeping assets out of thin air.<br />
This was accomplished by authorizing the S&Ls to place a monetary<br />
value on community "good will"! With the mere stroke of a<br />
pen, the referees created $2.5 billion in such assets, and the players<br />
continued the game.<br />
1. "Audit Report by FDIC Shows Wall's Estimates for Thrift Bailouts in 1988 Were<br />
Wildly Low/' by Charles McCoy and Todd Mason, The Wall Street Journal, Sept. 14,<br />
1990, p. A-l 2.<br />
2. "S&L Industry Rebuilds As Bailout Reaches Pinal Phase," Veribank News Release,<br />
Veribank, Inc. (Wakefield, Massachusetts), January 12, 1994, p. 2.<br />
HOME, SWEET LOAN 77<br />
Then the FSLIC began to issue "certificates of net worth/' which<br />
vvere basically promises to bail out the ailing S&Ls should they<br />
need The government had already promised it-<br />
to do that but, by<br />
printing<br />
it on pieces of paper and calling them "certificates of net<br />
worth/' the S&Ls were allowed to count them as assets on their<br />
books. Such promises are assets but, since the thrifts would be<br />
obligated to pay back any money it received in a bailout, those<br />
pay-back obligations should also have been put on the books as<br />
liabilities. The net position would not change. The only way they<br />
could count the certificates as assets without adding the offsetting<br />
liabilities would be for the bailout promises to be outright gifts with<br />
no obligation to ever repay. That may be the eventual result, but it<br />
is not the way the plan was set up. In any event, the thrifts were<br />
told they could count these pieces of paper as capital, the same as if<br />
the owners had put up their own cash. And the game continued.<br />
The moment of truth arrives when the S&Ls have to liquidate<br />
some of their holdings, such as in the sale of their mortgages or<br />
foreclosed homes to other S&Ls, commercial banks, or private<br />
parries. That is when the inflated bookkeeping value is converted<br />
into the true market value, and the difference has to be entered into<br />
the ledger as a loss.<br />
But not in the never-never land of socialism<br />
where government is the great protector. Dennis Turner explains:<br />
The FSUC permits the S&L which sold the mortgage to take the<br />
loss over a 40-year period. Most companies selling an asset at a loss<br />
must take the loss immediately: only S&Ls can engage in this patent<br />
fraud. Two failing S&Ls could conceivably sell their lowest-yielding<br />
mortgages to one another, and both wouJd raise their net worth! This<br />
dishonest accounting in the banking system is approved by the higfiest<br />
regulatory authorities.<br />
1<br />
U.S. News & World Report continues the commentary:<br />
Today, scores of savings-and-loan associations, kept alive mainly<br />
by accounting gimrrucks, continue to post big losses.. . . Only a fraction<br />
of the industry's aggregate net worth comprises hard assets such as<br />
mortgage notes. Intangible assets, which include bookkeeping entries<br />
such as good will, make up nearly all of the industry's estimated net<br />
Worth of 37.6 billion dollars.<br />
2<br />
P J? e .nnis Turner '<br />
When Your Bank Fails (Princeton, New Jersey: Amwell<br />
f ub «shing,Inc. / 1983) /P .141.<br />
Tt's Touch And Go for Troubled S&Ls/' by Patricia M. Scherschel, U.S. News &<br />
world Report, March 4, 1985, p. 92.
78 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
ACCOUNTING GIMMICKS ARE NOT FRAUD<br />
We must keep in mind that a well managed institution would<br />
never assume these kinds of risks or resort to fraudulent<br />
accounting if it wanted to stay in business for the long haul. But<br />
with Washington setting guidelines and standing by to make up<br />
losses, a manager would be fired if he didn't take advantage of the<br />
opportunity. After all, Congress specifically said it was OK when it<br />
passed the laws. These were loopholes deliberately put there to be<br />
used. Dr. Edward Kane explains:<br />
Deception itself doesn't constitute illegal fraud when it's<br />
authorized by an accounting system such as the Generally Accepted<br />
Accounting Principles (GAAP) system which allows institutions to<br />
forego recording assets at their true worth, maintaining them instead<br />
at their inflated value. The regulatory accounting principles system in<br />
1982 added even new options to overstate capital.... Intense<br />
speculation, such as we observed in these firms, is not necessarily bad<br />
management at all. In most of these cases, it was clever management.<br />
There were clever gambles that exploited, not depositors or savers, but<br />
taxpayers.<br />
The press has greatly exaggerated the role of illegal fraud in<br />
these matters with much time spent excoriating the likes of Donald<br />
Dixon at Vernon S&L and Charles Keating at Lincoln Savings.<br />
True, these flops cost the taxpayer well over $3 billion dollars, but<br />
all the illegal fraud put together amounts to only about one-half of<br />
one per cent of the total losses so far.<br />
Focusing on that minuscule<br />
component serves only to distract from the fact that the real<br />
problem is government regulation itself.<br />
JUNK BONDS ARE NOT JUNK<br />
Another part of the distraction has been to make it appear that<br />
the thrifts got into trouble because they were heavily invested in<br />
"junk bonds/'<br />
Wait a minute! What are junk bonds, anyway? This may come<br />
as a surprise, but those held by the S&Ls were anything but junk. In<br />
fact, in terms of risk-return ratios, most of them were superiorgrade<br />
investments to bonds from the Fortune-500 companies-<br />
1. "FIRREA: Financial Malpractice/' by Edward J.<br />
Kane, Durell Journal of Money<br />
and Banking, May, 1990, p. 5.<br />
2. "Banking on Government/' by Jane H. Ingraham, The New American, August 24,<br />
1992, p. 24.<br />
of older companies—but the small-company sector generally pro-<br />
more jobs, has greater profit margins, and pays more<br />
dividends than the so-called "investment-grade" companies. From<br />
rvides<br />
HOME, SWEET LOAN 79<br />
So-called junk bonds are merely those that are offered by smaller<br />
orn panies which are not large enough to be counted among the<br />
ation's giants. The large reinvestors, such as managers of mutual<br />
funds and retirement funds, prefer to stay with well-known names<br />
like General Motors and IBM. They need to invest truly huge<br />
blocks of money every day, and the smaller companies just don't<br />
have enough to offer to satisfy their needs. Consequently, many<br />
stocks and bonds from smaller companies are not traded in the<br />
New York Stock Exchange. They are traded in smaller exchanges or<br />
directly between brokers in what is called "over the counter."<br />
Because they do not have the advantage of being traded in<br />
larger markets, they have to pay a higher interest rate to attract<br />
investors, and for that reason, they are commonly called high-yield<br />
bonds.<br />
Bonds offered by these companies are derided by some brokers<br />
as not being "investment grade," yet, many of them are excellent<br />
performers. In fact,<br />
the<br />
they have become an important part of the<br />
American economy because they are the backbone of new industry.<br />
The most successful companies of the future will be found among<br />
their ranks. During the last decade, while the Fortune-500 companies<br />
were shrinking and eliminating 3.6 million jobs, this segment<br />
of new industry has been growing and has created 18 million new<br />
jobs.<br />
Not all new companies are good investments—the same is true<br />
1981 to 1991, the average return on ten-year Treasury bills was 10.4<br />
per cent; the Dow Jones Industrial Average was 12.9 per cent; and<br />
the average return on so-called junk bonds was 14.1 per cent.<br />
Because of this higher yield, they attracted more than $180 billion<br />
from savvy investors, some of whom were S&Ls- It was basically a<br />
new market which was orchestrated by an upstart, Michael Milken,<br />
a t the California-based Drexel Burnham Lambert brokerage house.<br />
CAPITAL GROWTH WITHOUT BANK LOANS OR<br />
JNFLATION<br />
One of the major concerns at <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island in 1910 was the trend<br />
to obtain business-growth capital from sources other than bank<br />
loans. Here, seventy years later, the same trend was developing
.<br />
80 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
"<br />
again in a slightly different form. Capital, especially for small<br />
companies, was now corning from bonds which Drexel had found a<br />
way to mass market. In fact, Drexel was even able to use those<br />
bonds to engineer corporate takeovers, an activity that previously<br />
had been reserved for the mega-investment houses. By 1986, Drexel<br />
had become the most profitable investment bank in the country.<br />
Here was $180 billion that no longer was being channeled<br />
through Wall Street. Here was $180 billion that was coming from<br />
people's savings instead of being created out of nothing by the<br />
banks. In other words, here was growth built upon real investment,<br />
not inflation. Certain people were not happy about it.<br />
Glenn Yago, Director of the Economic Research Bureau and<br />
Associate Professor of Management at the State University of New<br />
York at Stony Brook, explains the problem:<br />
It was not until high yield securities were applied to restructuring<br />
through deconglomeration and takeovers that hostilities against the<br />
junk bond market broke out.... The high yield market grew at the<br />
expense of bank debt, and high yield companies grew at the expense<br />
of the hegemony of many established firms. As Peter Passell noted in<br />
The New York Times, the impact was first felt on Wall Street, "where<br />
sharp elbows and a working knowledge of computer spreadsheets<br />
suddenly counted more than a nose for dry sherry or membership in<br />
Skull and Bones." 1<br />
The first line of attack on this new market of high-yield bonds<br />
was to call them "junk." The word itself was powerful. The<br />
financial media picked it up and many investors were frightened<br />
away.<br />
The next step was for compliant politicians to pass a law<br />
requiring S&Ls to get rid of their "junk/' supposedly to protect the<br />
public. That this was a hoax is evident by the fact that only 5% ever<br />
held any of these bonds, and their holdings represented only 1.2%<br />
of the total S&Ls assets. Furthermore, the bonds were performing<br />
satisfactorily and were a source of much needed revenue. Nevertheless,<br />
The Financial Institutions Reform and Recovery Act, which<br />
was discussed previously, was passed in 1989. It forced S&Ls to<br />
liquidate at once their "junk" bond holdings. That caused their<br />
HOME, SWEET LOAN 81<br />
rices to plummet, and the thrifts were even further weakened as<br />
jL>y took a loss on the sale. Jane Ingraham comments:<br />
Overnight, profitable S&Ls were turned into government-owned<br />
basket cases in the hands of the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC).<br />
t add to the disaster, the RTC itself, which became the country's<br />
largest owner of junk bonds ... flooded the market again with $1.6<br />
billion of its holdings at the market's bottom in 1990.. .<br />
So it was government itself that crashed the junk bond market, not<br />
Michael Milken, although the jailed Milken and other former officials<br />
of Drexel Burnham Lambert have just agreed to a $1.3 billion<br />
settlement of the hundreds of lawsuits brought against them by<br />
government regulators, aggrieved investors, and others demanding<br />
"justice." 1<br />
Incidentally,<br />
these bonds have since recovered and, had the<br />
S&Ls been allowed to keep them, they would be in better financial<br />
condition today. And so would be the RTC.<br />
With the California upstarts out of the way, it was a simple<br />
matter to buy up the detested bonds at bargain prices and to bring<br />
control of the new market back to Wall Street. The New York firm<br />
of Salomon Brothers, for example, one of Drexel's most severe<br />
critics during the 1980s, is now a leading trader in the market<br />
Drexel created.<br />
REAL PROBLEM IS GOVERNMENT REGULATION<br />
So the real problem within the savings-and-loan industry is<br />
government regulation which has insulated it from the free market<br />
and encouraged it to embark upon unsound business practices. As<br />
the Wall Street Journal stated on March 10, 1992:<br />
If<br />
you're going to wreck a business the size of the U.S. Thrift<br />
industry, you need a lot more power than Michael Milken ever had.<br />
You need the power of national political authority, the kind of power<br />
possessed only by regulators and Congress. Whatever "hold" Milken<br />
or junk bonds may have had on the S&Ls, it was nothing compared<br />
with the interventions of Congress.<br />
At the time this book went to press, the number of S&Ls that<br />
operated during the 1980s had dropped to less than half. As<br />
failures, mergers, and conversion into banks continue, the number<br />
w iU decline further. Those that remain fall into two groups: those<br />
1. Glenn Yago, Junk Bonds: How High Yield Securities Restructured Corporate America<br />
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 5.<br />
1-<br />
'"Banking on Government/' pp. 24, 25.<br />
-<br />
Quoted in "Banking on Government," p. 26.
82 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND HOME, SWEET LOAN 83<br />
that have been taken over by the RTC and those that have not Most<br />
of those that remain under private control—and that is a relative<br />
term in view of the regulations they endure—are slowly returning<br />
to a healthy state as a result of improved profitability, asset quality,<br />
and capitalization. The RTC-run organizations, on the other hand,<br />
continue to hemorrhage due to failure by Congress to provide<br />
funding to close them down and pay them off. Losses from this<br />
group are adding $6 billion per year to the ultimate cost of bailout.<br />
President Clinton was asking Congress for an additional $45 billion<br />
and hinting that this should be the last bailout—but no promises.<br />
The game continues.<br />
CONGRESS IS PARALYZED, WITH GOOD REASON<br />
Congress seems disinterested and paralyzed with inaction. One<br />
would normally expect dozens of politicians to be calling for a<br />
large-scale investigation of the ongoing disaster, but there is hardly<br />
a peep. The reason becomes obvious when one realizes that<br />
savings-and-loan associations, banks, and other federally regulated<br />
institutions are heavy contributors to the election campaigns of<br />
those who write the regulatory laws. A thorough, public investigation<br />
would undoubtedly turn up some cozy relationships that the<br />
legislators would just as soon keep confidential.<br />
The second reason is that any honest inquiry would soon reveal<br />
the shocking truth that Congress itself is the primary cause of the<br />
problem. By following the socialist path and presuming to protect<br />
or benefit their constituency, they have suspended and violated the<br />
natural laws that drive a free-market economy. In so doing, they<br />
created a Frankenstein monster they could not control The more<br />
they tried to tame the thing, the more destructive it became. As<br />
economist Hans Sennholz has observed:<br />
The real cause of the disaster is the very financial structure that<br />
was fashioned by legislators and guided by regulators; they together<br />
created a cartel that, like all other monopolistic concoctions, is playing<br />
mischief with its victims.<br />
A CARTEL WITHIN A CARTEL<br />
Sennholz has chosen exactly the right word: cartel. The savingsand-loan<br />
industry, is really a cartel within a cartel. It could not<br />
1. "The Great Banking Scandal," by Hans F. Sennholz, The Freeman, Nov., 1990/<br />
p. 405.<br />
function<br />
without Congress standing by to push unlimited amounts<br />
of money into it. And Congress could not do that without the<br />
banking cartel called the Federal Reserve System standing by as the<br />
"lender of last resort" to create money out of nothing for Congress<br />
to borrow. This comfortable arrangement between political scientists<br />
and monetary scientists permits Congress to vote for any<br />
scheme it wants, regardless of the cost. If politicians tried to raise<br />
that money through taxes, they would be thrown out of office. But<br />
being able to "borrow" it from the Federal Reserve System upon<br />
demand, allows them to collect it through the hidden mechanism of<br />
inflation, and not one voter in a hundred will complain.<br />
The thrifts have become the illegitimate half-breed children of<br />
the Creature. And that is why the savings-and-loan story is<br />
included in this study.<br />
[f America is to survive as a free nation, her citizens must<br />
become far more politically educated than they are at present. As a<br />
people, we must learn not to reach for every political carrot<br />
dangled in front of us. As desirable as it may be for everyone to<br />
afford a home, we must understand that government programs<br />
pretending to make that possible actually wreak havoc with our<br />
system and bring about just the opposite of what they promise.<br />
After 60 years of subsidizing and regulating the housing industry,<br />
how many young people today can afford a home? Tinkering with<br />
the laws of supply and demand, plus the hidden tax called inflation<br />
to pay for the tinkering, has driven prices beyond the reach of<br />
many and has wiped out the down payments of others. Without<br />
such costs, common people would have much more money and<br />
purchasing power than they do today, and homes would be well<br />
within their reach.<br />
SUMMARY<br />
Our present-day problems within the savings-and-loan industry<br />
can be traced back to the Great Depression of the 1930s.<br />
Americans were becoming impressed by the theories of socialism<br />
and soon embraced the concept that it was proper for government<br />
D provide benefits for its citizens and to protect them against<br />
economic hardship.<br />
Under the Hoover and Roosevelt administrations, new government<br />
agencies were established which purported to protect depos-<br />
in the S&Ls and to subsidize home mortgages for the middle<br />
lts
84 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
class.<br />
These measures distorted the laws of supply and demand<br />
and, from that point forward, the housing industry was moved out<br />
of the free market and into the political arena.<br />
Once the pattern of government intervention had been established,<br />
there began a long, unbroken series of federal rules and<br />
regulations that were the source of windfall profits for managers,<br />
appraiser, brokers, developers, and builders. They also weakened<br />
the industry by encouraging unsound business practices and<br />
high-risk investments.<br />
When these ventures failed, and when the value of real estate<br />
began to drop, many S&Ls became insolvent. The federal insurance<br />
fund was soon depleted, and the government was confronted with<br />
its own promise to bail out these companies but not having any<br />
money to do so.<br />
The response of the regulators was to create accounting gimmicks<br />
whereby insolvent thrifts could be made to appear solvent<br />
and, thus, continue in business. This postponed the inevitable and<br />
made matters considerably worse. The failed S&Ls continued to<br />
lose billions of dollars each month and added greatly to the<br />
ultimate cost of bailout, all of which would eventually have to be<br />
paid by the common man out of taxes and inflation. The ultimate<br />
cost is estimated at over one trillion dollars.<br />
Congress appears to be unable to act and is<br />
strangely silent.<br />
This is understandable. Many representatives and senators are the<br />
beneficiaries of generous donations from the S&Ls. But perhaps the<br />
main reason is that Congress, itself, is the main culprit in this crime.<br />
In either case, the politicians would like to talk about something<br />
else.<br />
In the larger view, the S&L industry is a cartel within a cartel.<br />
The fiasco could never have happened without the cartel called the<br />
Federal Reserve System standing by to create the vast amounts of<br />
bailout money pledged by Congress.<br />
Chapter Five<br />
NEARER TO THE<br />
HEART'S DESIRE<br />
The 1944 meeting in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire,<br />
at which the world's most prominent socialists<br />
established the International Monetary Fund<br />
and the World Bank as mechanisms far eliminating<br />
gold from world finance; the hidden agenda<br />
behind the IMF/World Bank revealed as the<br />
building of world socialism; tlie role of the Federal<br />
Reserve in bringing that about.<br />
As we have seen, the game called Bailout has been played over<br />
and over again in the rescue of large corporations, domestic banks,<br />
and savings-and-loan institutions. The pretense has been that these<br />
measures were necessary to protect the public. The result, however,<br />
has been just the opposite. The public has been exploited as billions<br />
of dollars have been expropriated through taxes and inflation. The<br />
money has been used to make up losses that should have been paid<br />
by the failing banks and corporations as the penalty for mismanagement<br />
and fraud.<br />
While this was happening in our home-town stadium, the same<br />
game was being played in the international arena. There are two<br />
primary differences. One is that the amount of money at stake in<br />
the international game is much larger. Through a complex tangle of<br />
bank loans, subsidies, and grants, the Federal Reserve is becoming<br />
the "lender of last resort" for virtually the entire planet. The other<br />
difference is that, instead of claiming to be Protectors of the Public,<br />
the players have emblazoned across the backs of their uniforms:<br />
Saviors of the World.<br />
BRETTON WOODS: AN ATTACK ON GOLD<br />
fhe game began at an international meeting of financiers,<br />
Politicians, and theoreticians held in July of 1944 at the Mount<br />
Washington Hotel in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire. Officially, it
86 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
was called the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference,<br />
but is generally referred to today as simply the Bretton Woods<br />
Conference. Two international agencies were created at that meeting:<br />
the International Monetary Fund and its sister organisation,<br />
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development—<br />
commonly called the World Bank.<br />
The announced purposes of these organizations were admirable.<br />
The World Bank was to make loans to war-torn and underdeveloped<br />
nations so they could build stronger economies. The<br />
International Monetary Fund (IMF) was to promote monetary<br />
cooperation between nations by maintaining fixed exchange rates<br />
between their currencies. But the method by which these goals<br />
were to be achieved was less admirable. It was to terminate the use<br />
of gold as the basis of international currency exchange and replace<br />
it with a politically manipulated paper standard. In other words, it<br />
was to allow governments to escape the discipline of gold so they<br />
could create money out of nothing without paying the penalty of<br />
having their currencies drop in value on world markets.<br />
Prior to this conference, currencies were exchanged in terms of<br />
their gold value, and the arrangement was called the "goldexchange<br />
standard." This is not the same as a "gold-standard" in<br />
which a currency is backed by gold. It was merely that the<br />
exchange ratios of the various currencies—most of which were not<br />
backed by gold—were determined by how much gold they could<br />
buy in the open market. Their values, therefore, were set by supply<br />
and demand. Politicians and bankers hated the arrangement,<br />
because it was beyond their ability to manipulate. In the past, it had<br />
served as a remarkably efficient mechanism but it was a strict<br />
disciplinarian. As John Kenneth Galbraith observed:<br />
The Bretton Woods arrangements sought to recapture the<br />
advantages of the gold standard—currencies that were exchangeable<br />
at stable and predictable rates into gold and thus at stable and<br />
predictable rates into each other. And this it sought to accomplish<br />
while minimizing the pain imposed by the gold standard on countries<br />
that were buying too much, selling too little and thus losing gold."<br />
The method by which this was to be accomplished was exactly<br />
the method devised on <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island to allow American banks to<br />
1. John Kenneth Galbraith, Money: Whence It Came, Where It Went (Boston:<br />
Houghton Mifflin, 1975), pp. 258, 259.<br />
NEARER TO THE HEART'S DESIRE 87<br />
cresXe money out of nothing without paying the penalty of having<br />
their<br />
currencies devalued by other banks. It was the establishment<br />
of a world central bank which would create a common fiat money<br />
for all nations and then require them to inflate together at the same<br />
rate. There was to be a kind of international insurance fund which<br />
vvould rush that fiat money to any nation that temporarily needed<br />
it to face down a "run" on its currency. It wasn't born with all these<br />
features fully developed, just as the Federal Reserve wasn't fully<br />
developed when it was born. That, nevertheless, was the plan, and<br />
it was launched with all the structures in place.<br />
The theoreticians who drafted this plan were the well-known<br />
Fabian Socialist from England, John Maynard Keynes, 1 and the<br />
Assistant Secretary of the U.S. Treasury, Harry Dexter White.<br />
THE FABIAN SOCIETY<br />
The Fabians were an elite group of intellectuals who formed a<br />
semi-secret society for the purpose of bringing socialism to the<br />
world. Whereas Communists wanted to establish socialism quickly<br />
through violence and revolution, the Fabians preferred to do it<br />
slowly through propaganda and legislation. The word socialism<br />
was not to be used. Instead, they would speak of benefits for the<br />
people such as welfare, medical care,<br />
higher wages, and better<br />
working conditions. In this way, they planned to accomplish their<br />
objective without bloodshed and even without serious opposition.<br />
They scorned the Communists, not because they disliked their<br />
goals, but because they disagreed with their methods. To emphasize<br />
the importance of gradualism, they adopted the turtle as the<br />
symbol of their movement. The three most prominent leaders in the<br />
early days were Sidney and Beatrice Webb and George Bernard<br />
Shaw. A stained-glass window in the Beatrice Webb House in<br />
Surrey, England is especially enlightening. Across the top appears<br />
the last line from Omar Khayyam:<br />
Dear love, couldst thou and I with fate conspire<br />
To grasp this sorry scheme of things entire,<br />
Would we not shatter it to bits, and then<br />
Remould it nearer to the heart's desire!<br />
Keynes often is portrayed as having been merely a liberal. But, for his Lifelong<br />
voivement with Fabians and their work, see Rose Martin, Fabian Freeway; High<br />
^"w to Socialism in the U.S.A. (Boston: Western [stands, 1966).
88 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
•"<br />
NEARER TO THE HEART'S DESIRE 89<br />
Beneath the line Remould it nearer to the heart's desire, the mural<br />
depicts Shaw and Webb striking the earth with hammers. Across<br />
the bottom, the masses kneel in worship of a stack of books<br />
advocating the theories of socialism. Thumbing his nose at the<br />
docile masses is H.G. Wells who, after quitting the Fabians,<br />
denounced them as "the new machiavellians." The most revealing<br />
component, however, is the Fabian crest which appears Between<br />
Shaw and Webb. It is a wolf in sheep's clothing!<br />
COMMUNIST MOLES<br />
Harry Dexter White was America's chief technical expert and<br />
the dominant force at the conference. He eventually became the<br />
first Executive Director for the United States at the IMF. An<br />
interesting footnote to this story is that White was simultaneously a<br />
member of the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and a member<br />
of a Communist espionage ring in Washington while he served as<br />
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury. And even more interesting is<br />
that the White House was informed of that fact when President<br />
Truman appointed him to his post. The FBI had transmitted to the<br />
White House detailed proof of White's activities on at least two<br />
separate occasions.<br />
Serving as the technical secretary at the Bretton<br />
Woods conference was Virginius Frank Coe, a member of the same<br />
espionage ring to which White belonged. Coe later became the first<br />
Secretary of the IMF.<br />
Thus, completely hidden from public view, there was a complex<br />
drama taking place in which the intellectual guiding lights at<br />
the Bretton Woods conference were Fabian Socialists and Communists.<br />
Although they were in disagreement over method, they were<br />
in perfect harmony on goal: international socialism.<br />
There were undoubtedly other reasons for Communists to be<br />
enthusiastic about the IMF and the World Bank, despite the fact<br />
1. See Zygmund Dobbs, The Great Deceit: Social Pseudo-Sciences (West SayviNe,<br />
New York: Veritas Foundation, 1964), opposite p. 1. Also Rose L. Martin, Fabian<br />
Freeway: High Road to Socialism in the U.S.A. (Boston: Western Islands, 1966), pp. 30,<br />
31.<br />
2. See: David Rees, Harry Dexter White: A Study in Paradox (New York: Coward,<br />
McCann & Geoghegan, 1973); Whittaker Chambers, Witness (New York: Random<br />
House, 1952); Allen Weinstein, Perjury: The Hiss-Chambers Case (New York: Vintage<br />
Books, 1978); James Burnham, TJie Web of Subversion: Underground Networks in the<br />
US. Government (New York: The John Day Co., 1954); Elizabeth Bentley, Out of<br />
Bondage (New York: Devin-Adair, 1951)<br />
that the Soviet Union elected at the time not to become a member.<br />
The goal of the organizations was to create a world currency, a<br />
world central bank, and a mechanism to control the economies of<br />
all<br />
nations. In order for these things to happen, the United States<br />
would of necessity have to surrender its dominant position. In fact,<br />
it would have to be reduced to just one part of the collective whole.<br />
FXhat fit in quite nicely with the Soviet plan. Furthermore, the World<br />
Bank was seen as a vehicle for moving capital from the United<br />
States and other industrialized nations to the underdeveloped<br />
1<br />
nations, the very ones over which Marxists have always had the<br />
greatest control. They looked forward to the day when we would<br />
pay their bills. It has all come to pass.<br />
IMF STRUCTURE AND FUNDING<br />
The International Monetary Fund appears to be a part of the<br />
United Nations, much as the Federal Reserve System appears to be<br />
a part of the United States government, but it is entirely independent.<br />
It is funded on a quota basis by its member nations,<br />
almost two hundred in number. The greatest share of capital,<br />
however, comes from the more highly industrialized nations such<br />
as Great Britain, Japan, France, and Germany, The United States<br />
contributes the most, at about twenty per cent of the total. In<br />
reality, that twenty per cent represents about twice as much as the<br />
number indicates, because most of the other nations contribute<br />
worthless currencies which no one wants. The world prefers<br />
dollars.<br />
One of the routine operations at the IMF is to exchange<br />
worthless currencies for dollars so the weaker countries can pay<br />
their international bills. This is supposed to cover temporary<br />
"cash-flow" problems. It is a kind of international FDIC which<br />
rushes money to a country that has gone bankrupt so it can avoid<br />
devaluing its currency. The transactions are seldom paid back.<br />
Although escape from the gold-exchange standard was the<br />
lor >g-range goal of the IMF, the only way to convince nations to<br />
Participate at the outset was to use gold itself as a backing for its<br />
own money supply—at least as a temporary expedient. As Keynes<br />
explained it:<br />
I felt that the leading central banks would never voluntarily<br />
relinquish the then existing forms of the gold standard; and I did not<br />
desire a catastrophe sufficiently violent to shake them off
90 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
involuntarily. The only practical hope lay, therefore, in a gradual<br />
evolution in the forms of a managed world currency, taking the<br />
existing gold standard as a starting point.<br />
It was illegal for American citizens to own gold at that time, but<br />
everyone else in the world could exchange their paper dollars for<br />
gold at a fixed price of $35 per ounce. That made it<br />
international currency because, unlike any other at<br />
the de facto<br />
the time, its<br />
value was guaranteed. So, at the outset, the IMF adopted the dollar<br />
as its own international monetary unit.<br />
PAPER GOLD<br />
But the Fabian turtle was crawling inexorably toward its<br />
destination. In 1970, the IMF created a new monetary unit called<br />
the SDR, or Special Drawing Right. The media optimistically<br />
described it as "paper gold," but it was pure bookkeeping wizardry<br />
with no relationship to gold or anything else of tangible value.<br />
SDRs are based on "credits" which are provided by the member<br />
nations. These credits are not money. They are merely promises<br />
that the governments will get the money by taxing their own<br />
citizens should the need arise. The IMF considers these to be<br />
"assets" which then become the "reserves" from which loans are<br />
made to other governments. As we shall see in chapter ten, this is<br />
almost identical to the bookkeeping sleight-of-hand that is used to<br />
create money out of nothing at the Federal Reserve System.<br />
Dennis Turner cuts through the garbage:<br />
SDRs are turned into loans to Third-World nations by the creation<br />
of checking accounts in the commercial or central banks of the member<br />
nations in the name of the debtor governments. These bank accounts<br />
are created out of thin air. The IMF creates dollars, francs, pounds, or<br />
other hard currencies and gives them to a Third-World dictator, with<br />
inflation<br />
resulting in the country where the currency originated.,..<br />
Inflation is caused in the industrialized nations while wealth is<br />
transferred from the eeneral public to the debtor country. And the<br />
debtor doesn't repay.<br />
When the IMF was created, it was the vision of Fabian Socialist<br />
John Maynard Keynes that there be a world central bank issuing a<br />
1. John Maynard Keynes, The Collected Writings of, Vol V (1930 rpt. New York:<br />
Macmillan, 1971), p. xx.<br />
2. Dennis Turner, When Your Bank Fails (Princeton, New Jersey: Amwell<br />
Publishing, 1983), p. 32.<br />
NEARER TO THE HEART'S DESIRE 91<br />
Seive currency called the "bancor" to free all governments from<br />
the discipline of gold. With the creation of SDRs, the IMF had<br />
begun to fulfill that dream.<br />
finally<br />
GOLD IS FINALLY ABANDONED<br />
But there was still<br />
nrimary<br />
an obstacle. As long as the dollar was the<br />
currency used by the IMF and as long as it was redeemable<br />
in gold at $35 per ounce, the amount of international money that<br />
could be created would be limited. If the IMF were to function as a<br />
true world central bank with unlimited issue, the dollar had to be<br />
broken away from its gold backing as a first step toward replacing<br />
it completely with a bancor, an SDR or something else equally free<br />
from restraint.<br />
On August 15, 1971, President Nixon signed an executive order<br />
declaring that the United States would no longer redeem its paper<br />
dollars for gold. So ended the first phase of the IMF's metamorphosis.<br />
It was not yet a true central bank, because it could not create its<br />
own world currency. It had to depend on the central banks of its<br />
member nations to provide cash and so-called credits; but since<br />
these banks, themselves, could create as much money as they<br />
wished, from now on, there would be no limit.<br />
The original purpose had been to maintain fixed rates of<br />
exchange between currencies; but the IMF has presided over more<br />
than two hundred currency devaluations. In private industry, a<br />
failure of that magnitude might be cause for going out of business,<br />
but not in the world of politics. The greater the failure, the greater<br />
the pressure to expand the program. So, when the dollar broke loose<br />
from gold and there was no longer a ready standard for measuring<br />
currency values, the IMF merely changed its goal and continued to<br />
expand its operation. The new goal was to "overcome trade<br />
deficits."<br />
TRADE DEFICITS<br />
The topic of trade deficits is a favorite among politicians,<br />
economists, and talk-show hosts. Everyone agrees they are bad, but<br />
tt^re is much disagreement over what causes them. Let's have a try<br />
at itȦ<br />
trade deficit is a condition that exists when a country imports<br />
a greater value of goods than it exports. In other words, it spends<br />
aore than it earns in international trade. This is similar to the<br />
^tuation of an individual who spends more than he earns. In both
—<br />
92 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND NEARER TO THE HEART'S DESIRE 93<br />
cases, the process cannot be sustained unless: (1) earnings are<br />
increased; (2) money is taken out of savings; (3) assets are sold; (4)<br />
money is counterfeited; or (5) money is borrowed. Unless one of<br />
these occurs, the individual or the country has no choice but to<br />
decrease spending.<br />
Increasing one's earnings is the best solution. In fact, it is the<br />
only solution for the long haul. All else is temporary at best. An<br />
individual can increase his income by working harder or smarter or<br />
longer. A country does it the same way. But it cannot happen<br />
unless private industry is allowed to flourish in a system of<br />
free-enterprise. The problem with this option is that few politicians<br />
respect the dynamic power of the free-enterprise system. Their<br />
world is built upon political programs in which the laws of the free<br />
market are manipulated to achieve politically popular goals. They<br />
may desire the option of increasing the nation's income by increasing<br />
its productivity, but their political agenda prevents that from<br />
happening.<br />
The second option is to obtain extra money out of savings. But<br />
there are virtually no governments in the world today that have<br />
any savings. Their debts and liabilities exceed assets by a large<br />
margin. Likewise, most of their industries and their citizens are in a<br />
similar position. Their savings already have been consumed by<br />
government.<br />
The third option, the selling of assets, also is not available for<br />
most countries. By assets, we mean tangible items other than<br />
merchandise which is normally for sale. Although these, too, are<br />
assets in the broad meaning, in accounting methodology, they are<br />
classified as inventory. The only government asset that is<br />
readily<br />
marketable is gold, and few countries today have a stockpile from<br />
which to draw. Even in those cases, what little they have is already<br />
1. It is the author's opinion that it's time to get the politicians wearing Uncle-Sam<br />
suits off our backs. Which is easier said than done, because Americans still like their<br />
protectionist subsidies: tariffs to protect the business man, minimum wages and<br />
compulsory unionism to protect the worker, ethnic quotas in hiring to protect the<br />
underdog, cradle-to-the-grave insurance programs, unemployment benefits, disability<br />
compensation, extreme environmental and safety measures—regardless of<br />
cost. Free enterprise can and will produce all of these benefits in order to compete<br />
for buyers and employees alike. But, as long as these measures are compulsory arid<br />
chosen on the basis of political popularity without regard to economic consequences,<br />
American industry will never be able to recover. And then none of the<br />
illusory benefits will remain.<br />
wed to another government or a bank. As for private assets,<br />
rions can, for a while, sell these to foreign buyers and offset their<br />
ative trade balances. That is what has been happening in the<br />
United States for many years as office buildings, stocks, factories,<br />
nd entire companies have been sold to foreign investors. But the<br />
fact remains that the nation is still spending more than it earns, and<br />
that process cannot continue indefinitely. Foreign ownership and<br />
control over industry and commerce also create sociological and<br />
political problems. Underdeveloped countries do not have to<br />
worry about any of that, however, because they have few private<br />
assets to sell.<br />
THE COUNTERFEIT OPTION<br />
The counterfeit option is available only if a country happens to<br />
be in the unique position of having its currency accepted as the<br />
medium of international trade, as has been the case for the United<br />
States. In that event, it is possible to create money out of nothing,<br />
and other nations have no choice but to accept it.<br />
Thus, for years,<br />
the United States has been able to spend more money than it earned<br />
in trade by having the Federal Reserve create whatever it needed.<br />
When the dollar was separated entirely from gold in 1971, it<br />
ceased being the official IMF world currency and finally had to<br />
compete with other currencies — primarily the mark and the yen<br />
on the basis of its relative merit. From that point forward, its value<br />
increasingly became discounted. Nevertheless, it was still the<br />
preferred medium of exchange. Also, the U.S. was one of the safest<br />
places in the world to invest one's money. But, to do so, one first<br />
had to convert his native currency into dollars. These facts gave the<br />
U.S. dollar greater value on international markets than it otherwise<br />
would have merited. So, in spite of the fact that the Federal Reserve<br />
was creating huge amounts of money during this time, the demand<br />
for it by foreigners was seemingly limitless. The result is that<br />
America has continued to finance its trade deficit with fiat money<br />
-ounterfeit, if you will—a feat which no other nation in the world<br />
could hope to accomplish.<br />
We have been told that our nation's trade deficit is a terrible<br />
^g/ and that it would be better to "weaken the dollar" to bring it<br />
art end. Weakening the dollar is a euphemism for increasing<br />
lation. In truth, America is not hurt by a trade deficit at all.<br />
' We are the benefactors while our trading partners are the<br />
In
94 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
victims. We get the cars and TV sets while they get the funny<br />
money. We get the hardware. They get the paperware.<br />
There is a dark side to the exchange, however. As long as the<br />
dollar remains in high esteem as a trade currency, America can<br />
continue to spend more than it earns. But when the day arrives—as<br />
it certainly must—when the dollar tumbles and foreigners no<br />
longer want it, the free ride will be over. When that happens,<br />
hundreds of billions of dollars that are now resting in foreign<br />
countries will quickly come back to our shores as people everywhere<br />
in the world attempt to convert them into yet more real<br />
estate, factories, and tangible products, and to do so as quickly as<br />
possible before they become even more worthless. As this flood of<br />
dollars bids up prices, we will finally experience the inflation that<br />
should have been caused in years past but which was postponed<br />
because foreigners were kind enough to take the dollars out of our<br />
economy in exchange for their products.<br />
The chickens will come home to roost. But, when they do, it will<br />
not be because of the trade deficit. It will be because we were able<br />
to finance the trade deficit with fiat money created by the Federal<br />
Reserve. If it were not for that, the trade deficit could not have<br />
happened.<br />
Back to the main topic, which is the five methods by which a<br />
trade deficit can be paid. Through the process of elimination, the<br />
fourth option of borrowing is where the action is today for most of<br />
the world, and that is where the IMF positioned itself in 1970. Its<br />
new mission was to provide loans so countries can continue to<br />
spend more than they earn, but to do so in the name of "overcoming<br />
trade deficits."<br />
IMF LOANS: DOOMED BUT SWEET<br />
These loans do not go into private enterprises where they have<br />
a chance of being turned for a profit. They go into state-owned and<br />
state-operated industries which are constipated by bureaucracy<br />
and poisoned by corruption. Doomed to economic failure from the<br />
start, they consume the loans with no possibility of repayment<br />
Even the interest quickly becomes too much to handle. Which<br />
means the IMF must fall back to the "reserves," back to the<br />
"assets," back to the "credits," and eventually back to the taxpayers<br />
to bail them out<br />
world<br />
NEARER TO THE HEART'S DESIRE 95<br />
Whereas the International Monetary Fund is<br />
evolving into a<br />
central bank which eventually will issue a world currency<br />
based on nothing, its sister organization, the World Bank, has<br />
become its lending agency. Acting as Savior of the World, it seeks to<br />
aid the underdeveloped nations, to feed the hungry, and to bring a<br />
better life to all mankind. In pursuit of these humanitarian goals, it<br />
provides loans to governments at favorable terms, usually at rates<br />
below market, for terms as long as fifty years, and often with no<br />
payments due until after ten years.<br />
Funding for these loans comes from member states in the form<br />
of a small amount of cash, plus promises to deliver about ten-times<br />
more if the Bank gets into trouble. The promises, described as<br />
"callable capital," constitute a kind of FDIC insurance program but<br />
with no pretense at maintaining a reserve fund. (In that sense it is<br />
more honest than the real FDIC which does maintain the pretense<br />
but, in reality, is based on nothing more than a similar promise.)<br />
Based upon the small amount of seed money plus the far<br />
greater amount of "credits" and "promises" from governments of<br />
the industrialized countries, the World Bank is able to go into the<br />
commercial loan markets and borrow larger sums at extremely low<br />
interest rates. After all, the loans are backed by the most powerful<br />
governments in the world which have promised to force their<br />
taxpayers to make the payments if the Bank should get into trouble.<br />
It then takes these funds and relends them to the underdeveloped<br />
countries at slightly higher rates, making a profit on the arbitrage.<br />
The unseen aspect of this operation is that the money it<br />
processes is money which, otherwise, would have been available<br />
for investment in the private sector or as loans to consumers. It<br />
siphons off much-needed development capital for private industry,<br />
prevents new jobs from being created, causes interest rates to rise,<br />
and retards the economy at large.<br />
THE HIDDEN AGENDA: WORLD SOCIALISM<br />
Although most of the policy statements of the World Bank deal<br />
with economic issues, a close monitoring of its activities reveal a<br />
preoccupation with social and political issues. This should not be<br />
surprising considering that the Bank was perceived by its founders<br />
as an instrument for social and political change. The change which<br />
il Was designed to bring about was the building of world socialism,<br />
^d that is exactly what it is accomplishing today.
96 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND NEARER TO THE HEART'S DESIRE 97<br />
This hidden agenda becomes crystal clear in the nature of what<br />
the Bank calls Sectoral Loans and Structural-Adjustment Loans. In<br />
the first category, only part of the money is to be used for the costs<br />
of specific projects while the rest goes to support policy changes in<br />
the economic sector. In the second group, all of the money is for<br />
policy changes and none of it is for projects. In recent years, almost<br />
half of the loans to underdeveloped countries have been in that<br />
category. What are the policy changes that are the object of these<br />
loans? They add up to one thing: the building ofworld socialism.<br />
As the Fabians had planned it, the word socialism is not to be<br />
used. Instead, the loans are issued for government hydro-electric<br />
projects, government oil refineries, government lumber mills, government<br />
mining companies, and government steel plants. It is<br />
delivered from the hands of politicians and bureaucrats into the<br />
hands of other politicians and bureaucrats. When the money comes<br />
from government, goes to government, and is administered by<br />
government, the result will be the expansion of government.<br />
Here is an example. One of the policy changes often required by<br />
the World Bank as a condition of granting a loan is that the<br />
recipient country must hold down its<br />
wages. The assumption is<br />
that the government has the power—and rightfully should have the<br />
power—to set wages! In other words, one of the conditions of its<br />
loan is that the state must be omnipotent.<br />
Paul Roberts holds the William E. Simon Chair of Political<br />
Economy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in<br />
Washington. Writing in Business Week, he says:<br />
The entire "development process 7 '<br />
has been guided by the belief<br />
that reliance on private enterprise and equity investment is<br />
incompatible with economic and social progress. In place of such<br />
proven avenues of success, development planning substituted loans<br />
and foreign aid so that governments of the LDCs [Less Developed<br />
Countries] could control economic activity in keeping with plans<br />
drawn up by experts.<br />
Consequently, economic life in the LDCs was politicized from the<br />
start. By endowing governments with extensive control over their<br />
economies, the U.S. set up conditions exactly opposite to those<br />
required for economic growth.<br />
Ken Ewert explains further that the conditions imposed by the<br />
fund are seldom free-market oriented. He says:<br />
The Fund concentrates on "macro-policies/' such as fiscal and<br />
monetary policies or exchange rates, and pays little attention to<br />
fundamental issues like private property rights and freedom of<br />
enterprise. Implicit ... is the belief that with proper "macromanagement"<br />
any economic system is viable....<br />
Even more important, it has allowed governments the world over<br />
to expropriate the wealth of their citizens more efficiently (through the<br />
hidden tax of inflation) while at the same time aggrandizing their own<br />
r?ower. There is little doubt that the IMF is an influence for world-wide<br />
socialism.<br />
An important feature of the Structural-Adjustment Loans is that<br />
the money need not be applied to any specific development project.<br />
It can be spent for anything the recipient wishes. That includes<br />
interest payments on overdue bank loans. Thus, the World Bank<br />
becomes yet one more conduit from the pockets of taxpayers to the<br />
assets of commercial banks which have made risky loans to<br />
Third-World countries.<br />
AUSTERITY MEASURES AND SCAPEGOATS<br />
Not every measure advocated by the IMF and World Bank is<br />
socialistic. Some of them even appear to be in support of the private<br />
sector, such as the reduction of government subsidies and welfare.<br />
They may include tax increases to reduce budget deficits. These<br />
policy changes are often described in the press as "austerity<br />
measures/ 7<br />
and they are seen as hard-nosed business decisions to<br />
salvage the failing economies of underdeveloped countries. But, as<br />
the wolf (in sheep's clothing) said to Little Red-Riding-Hood, "All<br />
the better to fool you with, my dear." These austerity measures are<br />
mostly rhetoric. The borrowing nations usually ignore the conditions<br />
with impunity, and the World Bank keeps the money coming<br />
anyway. It's all part of the game.<br />
Nevertheless, the "structural-adjustment" conditions provide a<br />
scapegoat for local<br />
politicians who can now place the blame for<br />
their nation's misery on big, bad "capitalists" from America and the<br />
*MF. People who have been taught that it is government's role to<br />
provide for their welfare, their health care, their food and housing,<br />
1. "How 'Experts' Caused the Third World Debt Crisis/' by Paul Craig Roberts,<br />
Business Week, November 2, 1987.<br />
b "The International Monetary Fund/' by Ken S. Ewert, The Freeman, April, 1989,<br />
PP* 157, 158.
98 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND NEARER TO THE HEART'S DESIRE 99<br />
their jobs and retirement—such people will not be happy when<br />
they hear that these "rights" are being threatened. So they demonstrate<br />
in the streets in protest, they riot in the commercial sections<br />
of town so they can steal goods from stores, and they throng to the<br />
banner of leftist politicians who promise to restore or increase their<br />
benefits. As described by Insight magazine:<br />
National strikes, riots, political upheavals and social unrest in<br />
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Egypt, Haiti, Liberia, Peru, Sudan<br />
and elsewhere have at various times been attributed to IMF austerity<br />
programs....<br />
Some came to the fund with domestic trouble already brewing<br />
and seized on the fund as a convenient scapegoat.<br />
Quite true. An honest reading of the record shows that the IMF,<br />
far from being a force for austerity in these countries, has been an<br />
engine of socialist waste and a fountain of abundance for the<br />
corrupt leaders who rule.<br />
FINANCING CORRUPTION AND DESPOTISM<br />
Nowhere is this pattern more blatant than in Africa. Julius<br />
Nyerere, the dictator of Tanzania, is notorious for his "villagization"<br />
program in which the army has driven the peasants from<br />
their land, burned their huts, and loaded them like cattle into trucks<br />
for relocation into government villages- The purpose is to eliminate<br />
opposition by bringing everyone into compounds where they can<br />
be watched and controlled. Meanwhile the economy staggers,<br />
farms have gone to weed, and hunger is commonplace. Yet,<br />
Tanzania has received more aid per capita from the World Bank<br />
than any other nation.<br />
In Uganda, government security forces have engaged in mass<br />
detentions, torture, and killing of prisoners. The same is true under<br />
the terrorist government in Zimbabwe. Yet, both regimes continue<br />
to be the recipients of millions of dollars in World Bank funding.<br />
Zimbabwe (formerly Rhodesia) is a classic case. After its<br />
independence, the leftist government nationalized (confiscated)<br />
many of the farms previously owned by white settlers. The most<br />
desirable of these lands became occupied by the government's<br />
senior ruling-party officials, and the rest were turned into state-run<br />
collectives. They were such miserable failures that the workers on<br />
1 . "IMF<br />
Hands Out Prescription for Sour Economic Medicine/' Insight, February 9,<br />
1987, p. 14.<br />
^ese farmlands were, themselves, soon begging for food. Not<br />
daunted by these failures, the socialist politicians announced in<br />
1 991 that they were going to nationalize half of the remaining farms<br />
W And eil. they barred the courts from inquiring into how much<br />
^mpensation would be paid to their owners.<br />
The IMF was represented in Zimbabwe at the time by Michel<br />
Camdessus, the Governor of the central Bank of France, and a<br />
former finance minister in Francois Mitterrand's Socialist govern-<br />
After being informed of Zimbabwe's plan to confiscate<br />
ment<br />
additional land and to resettle people to work on those lands,<br />
Camdessus agreed to a loan valued at 42 billion rands with full<br />
knowledge that much of it would be used for the resettlement<br />
project.<br />
Perhaps the worst violations of human rights have occurred in<br />
Ethiopia under the Marxist regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam. The<br />
famine of 1984-85, which threatened the lives of millions of people,<br />
was the result of government nationalization and disruption of<br />
agriculture. Massive resettlement programs have torn hundreds of<br />
thousands of people from their privately owned land in the north<br />
and deported them to concentration-camp "villages" in the south,<br />
complete with guard towers. A report by a French voluntary<br />
medical-assistance group, Doctors without Borders, reveals that the<br />
forced resettlement program may have killed as many people as<br />
the famine itself. 1<br />
describes their experience:<br />
Dr. Rony Brauman, director of the organization,<br />
Armed militiamen burst into our compounds, seized our<br />
equipment and menaced our volunteers. Some of our employees were<br />
beaten, and our trucks, medicines and food stores confiscated. We left<br />
Ethiopia branded as enemies of the revolution. The regime spoke the<br />
truth. The atrocities committed in the name of Mengistu's master plan<br />
did make us enemies of the revolution.<br />
FINANCING FAMINE AND GENOCIDE<br />
In the 1980s, the world was saddened by photographs of<br />
starving children in Ethiopia, but what the West did not realize was<br />
that this was a planned famine. It was modelled after Stalin's<br />
} "Ethiopia Bars Relief Team/' by Blaine Harden, Washington Post, December 3,<br />
*9 85,p.A-21.<br />
7" "Famine Aid: Were we Duped?" by Dr. Rony Brauman, Reader's Digest, October<br />
l98 6,p.71.
.<br />
100 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND NEARER TO THE HEART'S DESIRE 101<br />
starvation program in the Ukraine in the 1930s and Mao's starvation<br />
of the peasants in the '40s. Its purpose was to starve the<br />
population into total submission to the government, for it is the<br />
government which decides who will eat and who will not. Yet,<br />
right up to the time Mengistu was overthrown, the World Bank<br />
continued to send him hundreds of millions of dollars, with much<br />
of it going specifically to the Ministry of Agriculture, the very<br />
agency in charge of the resettlement program.<br />
In the late 1970s the same story unfolded in Communist<br />
Vietnam. There were resettlement programs, forced collectivization,<br />
concentration camps, atrocities, and tens of thousands of<br />
dissidents escaping to the sea only to drown in overcrowded, leaky<br />
boats. Throughout it all, the regime was generously funded by the<br />
World Bank.<br />
Laos has jailed thousands of political prisoners; Syria has<br />
massacred 20,000 members of its<br />
opposition; Indonesia has uprooted<br />
several<br />
million people from their homelands in Java; the<br />
Sandinistas in Nicaragua murdered their opposition and terrorized<br />
the nation into submission; Poland, while a puppet state of the<br />
Soviet Union, brutally suppressed its trade-union movement;<br />
China massacred its dissident students and imprisoned its religious<br />
leaders; and the former Soviets slaughtered civilians in Afghanistan<br />
while conducting a relentless espionage war against the entire<br />
free world. Yet, these regimes have been the recipient of literally<br />
billions of dollars from the World Bank.<br />
How can the Bank's managers continue in conscience to fund<br />
such genocidal regimes? Part of the answer is that they are not<br />
permitted to have a conscience. David Dunn, head of the Bank's<br />
Ethiopia Desk explained: "Political distinctions are not something<br />
our charter allows us to take into account." The greater part of the<br />
answer, however, is that all socialist regimes have the potential for<br />
genocide, and the Bank is committed to socialism. The brutalities of<br />
these countries are all in a days work for serious socialists who<br />
view them as merely unfortunate necessities for the building of<br />
their Utopia. Lenin said you cannot make an omelet without<br />
1 James Bovard, The World Bank vs. The World's Poor, Cato Policy Analysis (Washington,<br />
D.C.: Cato Institute, 1987), pp. 4-6,<br />
2. "Harnessing World Bank to the West," insight, February 9, 1987, p. 8.<br />
cracking a few eggs. George Bernard Shaw, one of the early leaders<br />
of the Fabian Socialist movement, expressed it this way:<br />
Under Socialism, you would not be allowed to be poor. You would<br />
be forcibly fed, clothed, lodged, taught, and employed whether you<br />
liked it or not. If it were discovered that you had not character and<br />
industry enough to be worth all this trouble, you might possibly be<br />
executed in a kindly manner; but whilst you were permitted to live,<br />
you would have to live well.<br />
REASON TO ABOLISH THE FEDERAL RESERVE<br />
The top echelon at the World Bank are brothers under the skin<br />
to the socialist dictators with whom they do daily business. Under<br />
the right circumstances, they could easily switch roles. What we<br />
have seen is merely a preview of what can be expected for the<br />
entire world if<br />
the envisioned New World Order becomes operational.<br />
The IMF/World Bank is the protege of the Federal Reserve. It<br />
would not exist without the flow of American dollars and the<br />
benevolence of American leadership. The Fed has become an<br />
accomplice in the support of totalitarian regimes throughout the<br />
world. As stated at the beginning of this study, that is one of the<br />
reasons it should be abolished: It is an instrument of totalitarianism.<br />
GETTING RICH FIGHTING POVERTY<br />
While the top leaders and theoreticians at the IMF and World<br />
Bank dream of world socialism, the middle managers and political<br />
rulers have more immediate goals in mind. The bureaucracy enjoys<br />
a plush life<br />
administering the process, and the politicians on the<br />
receiving end obtain wealth and power. Ideology is not their<br />
concern. Socialism, capitalism, fascism, it makes no difference to<br />
them as long as the money flows.<br />
Graham Hancock has been an astute observer of the international-aid<br />
"industry" and has attended their plush conferences. He<br />
knows many of the leading players personally. In his book, Lords of<br />
Poverty, he speaks of the IMF's Structural-Adjustment loans:<br />
Corrupt Ministers of Finance and dictatorial Presidents from Asia,<br />
Africa, and Latin America are tripping over their own expensive<br />
footwear in their unseemly haste to "get adjusted." For such people,<br />
money has probably never been easier to obtain than it is today; with<br />
e0rge Bernard shaw '<br />
The intelligent Woman's Guide to Socialism and Capitalism<br />
(19; riQ*?« UV28<br />
; rpt New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1984), p. 470.
102 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND NEARER TO THE HEART'S DESIRE 103<br />
no complicated projects to administer and no messy accounts to keep,<br />
the venal, the cruel and the ugly are laughing literally all the way to<br />
the bank. For them structural adjustment is like a dream come true. No<br />
sacrifices are demanded of them personally. All they have to<br />
do—amazing but true—is screw the poor, and they've already had<br />
plenty of practice at that.<br />
In India, the World Bank funded the construction of a dam that<br />
displaced two million people, flooded 360 square miles, and wiped<br />
out 81,000 acres of forest cover. In Brazil, it spent a billion dollars to<br />
"develop" a part of the Amazon basin and to fund a series of<br />
hydroelectric projects. It resulted in the deforestation of an area half<br />
the size of Great Britain and has caused great human suffering<br />
because of resettlement. In Kenya, the Bura irrigation scheme<br />
caused such desolation that a fifth of the native population<br />
abandoned the land. The cost was $50,000 per family served. In<br />
Indonesia, the transmigration program mentioned previously has<br />
devastated tropical forests—at the same time that the World Bank<br />
is funding reforestation projects. The cost of resettling one family is<br />
$7,000, which is about ten-times the Indonesian per-capita income.<br />
Livestock projects in Botswana led to the destruction of grazing<br />
land and the death of thousands of migratory animals. This<br />
resulted in the inability of the natives to obtain food by hunting,<br />
forcing them into dependence on the government for survival.<br />
While Nigeria and Argentina are drowning in debt, billions from<br />
the World Bank have gone into building lavish new capital cities to<br />
house government agencies and the ruling elite. In Zaire, Mexico,<br />
and the Philippines, political leaders became billionaires while<br />
receiving World Bank loans on behalf of their nations. In the<br />
Central African Republic, IMF and World Bank loans were used to<br />
stage a coronation for its emperor.<br />
The record of corruption and waste is endless. But the real<br />
eye-opener is in the failure of socialist ventures, those magnificent<br />
projects which were to bring prosperity to the underdeveloped<br />
countries. Here are just a few examples.<br />
CONVERTING MONEY INTO FAILURE<br />
Before receiving loans from the World Bank, Tanzania was not<br />
wealthy, but it fed its own people, and it had economic growth-<br />
1. Graham Hancock, Lords of Poverty: The Power, Prestige, and Corruption of the<br />
International Aid Business (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1989), pp. 59,60.<br />
the World Bank. The country is hopelessly in debt with no way to<br />
^After receiving more than 3 billion dollars in loans, it nationalized<br />
the nation's farms and industries and converted every business into<br />
a<br />
government agency. It built a truck assembly plant, a tire factory,<br />
electronic factories, highways, ports, railways, and dams. Tanzania's<br />
industrial production and agricultural output fell by almost<br />
one-third. Food was the main export in 1966. Under socialism, food<br />
had to be imported — paid for by foreign aid and more loans from<br />
repay-<br />
Argentina once had one of the highest standards of living in<br />
Latin America. But then it became the recipient of massive loans<br />
from the World Bank as well as commercial banks in the United<br />
States- Since the money was given to politicians, it was used to<br />
build the only system politicians know how to build: socialism. By<br />
1982, the Gross National Product was in a nose dive, manufacturing<br />
had fallen to less than half of capacity, thousands of privately<br />
owned companies had been forced into bankruptcy, unemployment<br />
was soaring, and so was welfare. By 1989, inflation was<br />
running at an average of 5,000% and, in the summer of that year,<br />
topped at 1,000,000%! Banks were offering interest rates of 600%<br />
per month in hopes of keeping deposits from being moved out of<br />
the country. People were rioting in the streets for food, and the<br />
government was blaming greedy shop owners for raising prices.<br />
The nation was hopelessly in debt with no way to repay.<br />
Brazil is run by the military, and the state controls the economy.<br />
Government-owned companies consume 65% of all industrial<br />
investment, which means that the private sector is Limited to 35%<br />
and is shrinking. The government used loans from U.S. banks to<br />
create an oil company, Petroleo Brasileiro S. A., which became Latin<br />
America's largest corporation. Despite huge oil deposits and<br />
record-high oil prices, the company operated at a loss and was not<br />
even able to produce enough gasoline for its own citizens. By 1990,<br />
Nation was running at 5,000%. Since 1960, its prices had risen to<br />
164,000 times their original level. A new crime was invented called<br />
hedging against inflation/' and people were arrested for charging<br />
the free-market price for their goods and for using dollars or gold<br />
as money. Led by Communist organizers, mobs roamed the streets<br />
shouting '"We're hungry. Steal what you will!<br />
7 '<br />
The nation was<br />
hopelessly in debt with no way to repay.
104 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
NEARER TO THE HEART'S DESIRE 105<br />
The experience in Mexico was a carbon copy of that in Brazil,<br />
except that the amount of money was larger. When the world's<br />
fourth largest oil reserves were discovered, Mexican politicians<br />
reached for the brass ring. With billions borrowed from U.S. banks,<br />
they launched Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) and soon became the<br />
world's fifth largest oil producer. They also built chemical plants<br />
and railroads, and launched many other industrial projects. These<br />
were run as welfare agencies instead of businesses: too many<br />
people on the payroll, too many managers, excessive salaries, too<br />
many holidays, and unrealistic benefits. The ventures floundered<br />
and lost money. Private businesses failed by the thousands, and<br />
unemployment rose. The government increased the minimum<br />
wage causing more businesses to fail and more unemployment<br />
That led to more welfare and unemployment benefits. To pay for<br />
that, the government borrowed even more and began creating its<br />
own fiat money. Inflation destroyed what was left of the economy.<br />
Price controls were next, along with rent and food subsidies,<br />
and doubling the minimum wage. By 1982, Mexicans were trading<br />
their pesos for dollars and sending their savings out of the country,<br />
as the peso became all but worthless in commerce. In 1981, the<br />
average wage for Mexican workers was 31% of the average wage<br />
for Americans. By 1989, it had fallen to 10%. Mexico, once one of<br />
the major food exporters in the world, was now required to import<br />
millions of dollars worth of food grains. This required still more<br />
money and more loans. All this occurred while oil prices were high<br />
and production was booming. A few years later, when oil prices<br />
fell, the failures and shortfalls became even more dramatic.<br />
In 1995, Mexico's bank loans were once again on the brink of<br />
default, and, once again, U.S. taxpayers were thrown into the<br />
breech by Congress to cover more than $30 billion at risk. Although<br />
this loan was eventually repaid, the money to do so was extracted<br />
from the Mexican people through another round of massive<br />
inflation, which plunged their standard of living even lower. The<br />
nation is now hopelessly mired in socialism. The Communist Party,<br />
promising "reform" and still more socialism, is attracting a large<br />
following and could become a potent political force.<br />
1 - The same American b anks that were making the loans were soliciting this flight<br />
capital and ended up getting deposits of the same money they had lent. It was nice<br />
business both ways.<br />
Thus, the saga continues. After pouring billions of dollars into<br />
underdeveloped countries around the globe, no development has<br />
taken place. In fact, we have seen just the opposite. Most countries<br />
are worse off than before the Saviors of the World got to them.<br />
SUMMARY<br />
The IMF and the World Bank, were created at a meeting of<br />
global financiers and politicians held at Bretton Woods, New<br />
Hampshire, in 1944. Their announced goals were to facilitate<br />
international trade and to stabilize the exchange rates of national<br />
currencies. The unannounced goals were quite different. They were<br />
the elimination of the gold-exchange standard as the basis of<br />
currency valuation and the establishment of world socialism.<br />
The method by which gold was to be eliminated in international<br />
trade was to replace it with a world currency which the IMF,<br />
acting as a world central bank, would create out of nothing. The<br />
method by which world socialism was to be established was to use<br />
the World Bank to transfer money-—disguised as loans—to the<br />
governments of the underdeveloped countries and to do so in such<br />
a way as to insure the demise of free enterprise. The money was to<br />
be delivered from the hands of politicians and bureaucrats into the<br />
hands of other politicians and bureaucrats. When the money comes<br />
from government, goes to government, and is administered by<br />
government, the result will be the expansion of government.<br />
The theoreticians who dominated the conference at Bretton<br />
Woods were the well-known Fabian Socialist from England, John<br />
Maynard Keynes, and the Assistant Secretary of the U.S. Treasury,<br />
Harry Dexter White. White became the first Executive Director for<br />
the United States at the IMF.<br />
The Fabians were an elite group of intellectuals who agreed<br />
with Communists as to the goal of socialism but disagreed over<br />
tactics. Whereas Communists advocated revolution by force and<br />
violence, Fabians advocated gradualism and the transformation of<br />
society through legislation.<br />
It was learned in later years that Harry Dexter White was a<br />
member of a Communist espionage ring. Thus, hidden from view,<br />
there was a complex drama taking place in which the two intellectual<br />
founders of the Bretton-Woods accords were a Fabian Socialist<br />
*nd a Communist, working together to bring about their mutual<br />
goal: world socialism.
106 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
Capital for the IMF and the World Bank comes from the<br />
industrialized nations, with the United States putting up the most.<br />
Funds consist partly of hard currencies—such as the dollar, yen,<br />
mark and franc—but these are augmented by many times that<br />
amount in the form of "credits." These are merely promises by the<br />
member governments to get the money from their taxpayers if the<br />
Bank gets into trouble with its loans.<br />
While the IMF is gradually evolving into a central bank for the<br />
world, the World Bank is serving as its lending arm. As such, it has<br />
become the engine for transferring wealth from the industrialized<br />
nations to the underdeveloped countries. While this has lowered<br />
the economic level of the donating countries, it has not raised the<br />
level of the recipients. The money has simply disappeared down<br />
the drain of political corruption and waste.<br />
HEMOUILD tT [NEARER | TO THE | HEARTS' JDES1RE<br />
Chapter Six<br />
BUILDING THE NEW<br />
WORLD ORDER<br />
The Game-Called-Bailout reexamined and shown<br />
to<br />
be far more than merely a means of getting<br />
taxpayers to foot the cost of bad loans; the final<br />
play revealed as the merger of all nations into<br />
world government; the unfolding of that strategy<br />
as applied to Panama, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina,<br />
China, Eastern Europe, and Russia.<br />
Let us return now to the game called bailout. Everything in the<br />
previous chapter has been merely background information to<br />
understand the game as it is played in the international arena.<br />
Here, finally, are the rules:<br />
This is an accurate rendering of the stained-glass window in the Beatrice<br />
Webb House in Surrey, England, headquarters of the Fabian Society. It<br />
depicts Sidney Webb and George Bernard Shaw striking the earth with<br />
hammers to "REMOULD IT NEARER TO THE HEARTS DESIRE." Note<br />
the wolf in sheep's clothing in the Fabian crest above the globe.<br />
1. Commercial banks in the industrialized nations, backed by their<br />
respective central banks, create money out of nothing and lend<br />
it to the governments of underdeveloped nations. They know<br />
that these are risky loans, so they charge an interest rate that is<br />
high enough to compensate. It is more than what they expect to<br />
receive in the long run.<br />
2. When the underdeveloped nations cannot pay the interest on<br />
their loans, the IMF and World Bank enter the game as both<br />
players and referees. Using additional money created out of<br />
nothing by the central banks of their member nations, they<br />
advance "development" loans to the governments which now<br />
have enough to pay the interest on the original loans with<br />
enough left over for their own political purposes.<br />
3. The recipient country quickly exhausts the new supply of money,<br />
and the play returns to point number two. This time, however,<br />
the new loans are guaranteed by the World Bank and the central<br />
banks of the industrialized nations. Now that the risk of default<br />
is removed, the commercial banks agree to reduce the interest to
108 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND BUILDING THE NEW WORLD ORDER 109<br />
the point anticipated at the beginning. The debtor governments<br />
resume payments.<br />
4. The final play is — well, in this version of the game there appears<br />
to be no final play, because the plan is to keep the game going<br />
forever. To make that possible, certain things must happen that<br />
are very final, indeed. They include the conversion of the IMF<br />
into a world central bank as Keynes had planned, which then<br />
issues an international fiat money. Once that "Bank of Issue" is<br />
in place, the IMF can collect unlimited resources from the<br />
citizens of the world through the hidden tax called inflation. The<br />
money stream then can be sustained indefinitely—with or<br />
without the approval of the separate nations—because they will<br />
no longer have money of their own.<br />
Since this game results in a hemorrhage of wealth from the<br />
industrialized nations, their economies are doomed to be brought<br />
down further and further, a process that has been going on since<br />
Bretton Woods. The result will be a severe lowering of their living<br />
standards and their demise as independent nations. The hidden<br />
reality behind so-called development loans is that America and<br />
other industrialized nations are being subverted by that process.<br />
That is not an accident; it is the essence of the plan. A strong nation is<br />
not likely to surrender its sovereignty. Americans would not agree<br />
to turn over their monetary system, their military, or their courts to<br />
a world body made up of governments which have been despotic<br />
to their own people, especially since most of those regimes have<br />
already revealed anti-American hostility. But if Americans can be<br />
brought to the point where they are suffering from a collapse of<br />
their economy and from a breakdown in civil order, things will be<br />
different. When they stand in bread lines and face anarchy in their<br />
streets, they will be more willing to give up sovereignty in return<br />
for "assistance" from the World Bank and the UN "peacekeeping"<br />
forces. This will become even more acceptable if a structured<br />
demise of Communism can be arranged ahead of time to make it<br />
appear that the world's major political systems have converged<br />
into the common denominator of "social democracy."<br />
THE FINAL PLAY<br />
The underdeveloped nations, on the other hand, are not being<br />
raised up. What is happening to them is that their political leaders<br />
are becoming addicted to the IMF cash flow and will be unable to<br />
break the habit. These countries are being conquered by money<br />
no longer be truly independent<br />
instead of arms. Soon they will<br />
nations- They are becoming mere components in the system of<br />
world socialism planned by Harry Dexter White and John Maynard<br />
Keynes. Their leaders are being groomed to become potentates in a<br />
new, high-tech feudalism, paying homage to their Lords in New<br />
York. And they are eager to do it in return for privilege and power<br />
within the "New World Order." That is the final play.<br />
The essence of socialism is redistribution of the wealth. The<br />
goal is equality, and that means taking from the rich and giving to<br />
the poor. At least that's the theory. Unfortunately, the poor are<br />
never benefited by this maneuver. They either do not get the<br />
money in the first place—too much is siphoned off by the bureaucracies<br />
which administer the programs—or, if they do get any of it,<br />
they don't know what to do with it. They merely spend it until it is<br />
gone, and then no one has any money— except, of course, those<br />
who administer the government programs. Nevertheless, politicians<br />
know that promises to redistribute the wealth are popular<br />
among two groups: the voters who naively believe it will help the<br />
poor, and the socialist managers who see it as job security.<br />
Supported by these two voting blocs, election to office is assured.<br />
One of the early American advocates of socialism on a global<br />
scale—including the draining of wealth away from the "rich"<br />
United States—was John F. Kennedy. He undoubtedly learned the<br />
concept while attending the Fabian London School of Economics in<br />
1935-36 just prior to his father's appointment as Ambassador to<br />
England. When JFK became President, his political views continued<br />
to carry the imprint of that training. In September of 1963, he<br />
addressed the finance ministers and central-bank governors from<br />
102 nations at the annual meeting of the IMF/World Bank. He<br />
explained the concept of world socialism in glowing terms:<br />
. .<br />
Twenty years ago, when the architects of these institutions met to<br />
design an international banking structure, the economic life of the<br />
world was polarized in overwhelming, and even alarming, measure<br />
on the United States..,. Sixty per cent of the gold reserves of the world<br />
were here in the United States.... There was a need for redistribution<br />
of the financial resources of the world. . And there was an equal need<br />
to organize a flow of capital to the impoverished countries of the<br />
!<br />
-<br />
Martin, p. 25.
110 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND BUILDING THE NEW WORLD ORDER 111<br />
world. All this has come about. It did not come about by chance but by<br />
conscious and deliberate and responsible planning.<br />
CFR SETS STRATEGY<br />
The brain trust for implementing the Fabian plan in America is<br />
called the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). We shall look at it<br />
closely in future chapters, but it is important to know at this point<br />
that almost all<br />
of America's leadership has come from this small<br />
group. That includes our presidents and their advisers, cabinet<br />
members, ambassadors, board members of the Federal Reserve<br />
System, directors of the largest banks and investment houses,<br />
presidents of universities, and heads of metropolitan newspapers,<br />
news services, and TV networks. It is not an exaggeration to<br />
describe this group as the hidden government of the United States.<br />
CFR members have never been shy about calling for the<br />
weakening of America as a necessary step toward the greater good<br />
of building world government. One of the CFR founders was John<br />
Foster Dulles, who later was appointed Secretary-of-State by CFR<br />
member Dwight Eisenhower. In 1939, Dulles said:<br />
Some dilution or leveling off of the sovereignty system as it<br />
prevails in the world today must take place ... to the immediate<br />
disadvantage of those nations which now possess the preponderance<br />
of power.. . . The establishment of a common money . . . would deprive<br />
our government of exclusive control over a national money.... The<br />
United States must be prepared to make sacrifices afterward in setting<br />
up a world politico-economic order which would level off inequalities<br />
of economic opportunity with respect to nations.<br />
CFR member Zbigniew Brzezinski was the National Security<br />
Adviser to CFR member Jimmy Carter. In 1970, Brzezinski wrote:<br />
... some international cooperation has already been achieved, but<br />
further progress will require greater American sacrifices. More<br />
intensive efforts to shape a new world monetary structure will have to<br />
be undertaken, with some consequent risk to the present relatively<br />
favorable American position.<br />
1. "Text of Kennedy Speech to World Monetary Parley/' New York Times,<br />
October 1, 1963, p. 16.<br />
2. For an in-depth analysis of the CFR, including a comprehensive list of members,<br />
see James Perloff, Shadows of Power (Appleton, Wisconsin: Western Islands, 1988).<br />
3. "Dulles Outlines World Peace Plan/' New York Times, October 28, 1939.<br />
4. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Between Two Ages: America's Role in the Technetronic Era<br />
(Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1970), p. 300.<br />
At the Spring, 1983, Economic Summit in Williamsburg, Virginia,<br />
President Ronald Reagan declared:<br />
Nation al economies need monetary coordination mechanisms,<br />
and that is why an integrated world economy needs a common<br />
But, no national currency will do—only a world<br />
monetary standard... .<br />
currency will work.<br />
The CFR strategy for convergence of the world's monetary<br />
systems was spelled out by Harvard Professor Richard N. Cooper,<br />
a CFR member who had been the Under Secretary of State<br />
Economic Affairs in the Carter Administration:<br />
I<br />
suggest a radical alternative scheme for the next century: the<br />
creation of a common currency for all of the industrial democracies, with a<br />
common monetary policy and a joint Bank of Issue to determine that monetary<br />
policy. . . . How can independent states accomplish that? They need to<br />
turn over the determination of monetary policy to a supranational<br />
body. [Emphasis in original] . .<br />
It is highly doubtful whether the American public, to take just one<br />
example, could ever accept that countries with oppressive autocratic<br />
regimes should vote on the monetary policy that would affect<br />
monetary conditions in the United States.... For such a bold step to<br />
work at all, it presupposes a certain convergence of political values.. .<br />
Phrases such as, monetary coordination mechanisms, modern world<br />
economic order, convergence of political values, or new world order are<br />
not very specific. To the average person, they sound pleasant and<br />
harmless. Yet, to the insiders of the club, they are code phrases<br />
which have a specific meaning: the terrnination of national sovereignty<br />
and the creation of world government. CFR member,<br />
Richard Gardner—another adviser to President Carter—explains<br />
the meaning of these phrases and also calls for the Fabian strategy<br />
of deception and gradualism:<br />
In short, the "house of world order" will have to be built from the<br />
bottom up.... An end run around national sovereignty, eroding it<br />
piece by piece, will accomplish much more than the old-fashioned<br />
frontal assault<br />
As for the programmed decline of the American economy, CFR<br />
Member Samuel Huntington argues that, if higher education is<br />
1 "A Monetary System for the Future,"by Richard N. Cooper, Foreign Affairs, Fall,<br />
^Hpp- 166,177, 184.<br />
"The Hard Road to World Order," by Richard Gardner, Foreign<br />
J-<br />
Affairs, April,<br />
19 ?4, p. 558.<br />
for
112 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND BUILDING THE NEW WORLD ORDER 113<br />
considered to be desirable for the general population, "a program is<br />
then necessary to lower the job expectations of those who receive a<br />
college education." CFR member Paul Volcker, former Chairman<br />
of the Federal Reserve, says: "The standard of living of the average<br />
American has to decline. ... I don't think you can escape that."<br />
By 1993, Volcker had become the U.S. Chairman of the Trilateral<br />
Commission. The TLC was created by David Rockefeller to<br />
coordinate the building of The New World Order in accordance<br />
with the Gardner strategy: "An end run around national sovereignty,<br />
eroding it piece by piece." The objective is to draw the<br />
United States,<br />
Mexico, Canada, Japan, and Western Europe into<br />
political and economic union. Under slogans such as free trade and<br />
environmental protection, each nation is to surrender its sovereignty<br />
"piece by piece" until a full-blown regional government<br />
emerges from the process. The new government will control each<br />
nation's working conditions, wages, and taxes. Once that has<br />
happened, it will be a relatively simple step to merge the regionals<br />
into global government. That is the reality behind the so-called<br />
trade treaties within the European Union (EU), the North American<br />
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation<br />
agreement (APEC), and the General Agreement on Tariffs<br />
and Trade (GATT). They have little to do with trade. In the<br />
Trilateral Commission's annual report for 1993, Volcker explains:<br />
Interdependence Is driving our countries toward convergence in<br />
areas once considered fully within the domestic purview. Some of<br />
these areas involve government regulatory policy, such as<br />
environmental standards, the fair treatment of workers, and taxation.^<br />
In 1992, the Trilateral Commission released a report coauthored<br />
by Toyoo Gyohten, Chairman of the Board of the Bank of<br />
Tokyo and formerly Japan's Minister of Finance for International<br />
Affairs. Gyohten had been a Fulbright Scholar who was trained at<br />
Princeton and taught at Harvard Business School. He also had been<br />
in charge of the Japan Desk of the International Monetary Fund. In<br />
short, he represents the Japanese monetary interests within The<br />
f^jew World Order. In this report, Gyohten explains that the real<br />
importance of "trade" agreements is not trade but the building of<br />
global government:<br />
Regional trade arrangements should not be regarded as ends in<br />
themselves, but as supplements to global liberalization,... Regional<br />
arrangements provide models or building blocks for increased or<br />
strengthened globalism.... Western Europe [the EU] represents<br />
regionalism in its truest form.... The steps toward deepening<br />
[increasing the number of agreements] are dramatic and designed to<br />
be irreversible.... A common currency.... central bank.... court and<br />
parliament—will have expanded powers.... After the Maastricht<br />
summit [the Dutch town where the meeting was held], an Economist<br />
editorial pronounced the verdict: "Call it what you will: by any other<br />
name it is federal government."... In sum, the regional integration<br />
process in Europe can be seen as akin to an exercise in<br />
nation-b uilding.<br />
Applying this same perspective to the NAFTA treaty, former<br />
Secretary-of-State, Henry Kissinger (CFR), said it "is not a conventional<br />
trade agreement but the architecture of a new international<br />
system.... the vital first step for a new kind of community of<br />
nations/' The newspaper article that contained this statement was<br />
appropriately entitled: "With NAFTA, U.S. Finally Creates a New<br />
World Order."<br />
David Rockefeller (CFR) was even more emphatic.<br />
He said that it would be "criminal" not to pass the treaty because:<br />
"Everything is in place—after 500 years—to build a true 'new<br />
world' in the Western Hemisphere." 3<br />
By early 1994, the drift toward the New World Order had<br />
become a rush. On April 15, the government of Morocco placed a<br />
full-page ad in the New York Times celebrating the creation of the<br />
World Trade Organization which was formed by the signing of the<br />
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) which took place<br />
in the Moroccan city of Marrakech. While Americans were still<br />
^eing told that GATT was merely a "trade" agreement, the<br />
*nternationalists were celebrating a much larger concept. The ad<br />
spelled it out in unmistakable terms:<br />
1 Michael Crozier, Samuel P. Huntington, and Joji Watanuki, The Crisis ofDemocracy<br />
(New York: New York University Press, 1975), pp. 183-84.<br />
2. "Volcker Asserts U.S. Must Trim Living Standard/' New York Times, October 18,<br />
1979, p. 1.<br />
3. Washington 1993: The Annual Meeting of the Trilateral Commission, Trialogue 46<br />
(New York: Trilateral Commission, 1993), p. 77.<br />
Toyoo Gyohten and Charles E. Morrison, Regionalism in A Converging World<br />
Ne V°rk: Trilateral<br />
)v Commission, 1992), pp. 4, 7-9, 1 1.<br />
L<br />
NAFTA<br />
'lWith<br />
-<br />
U -S- Finally Creates a New World Order/' by Henry Kissinger,<br />
^Angeles Times, July 18, 1993, pp. M-2, 6.<br />
• A<br />
Hemisphere in the Balance," by David Rockefeller, Wall Street journal,<br />
**** 1,1993, p. A-10.
114 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND BUILDING THE NEW WORLD ORDER 115<br />
1944, Bretton Woods: The IMF and the World Bank<br />
1945, San Francisco: The United Nations<br />
1994, Marrakech: The World Trade Organization<br />
History knows where it is going.... The World Trade Organization,<br />
the third pillar of the New World Order, along with the United<br />
Nations and the International Monetary Fund.<br />
A RARE GUMPSE INTO THE INNER WORKINGS<br />
So much for the final play. Let us return, now, to the game called<br />
bailout as it is actually played today on the international scene. Let<br />
us begin with a glimpse into the inner workings of the Presidential<br />
Cabinet James Watt was the Secretary of the Interior in the Reagan<br />
Administration. In his memoirs, he described an incident at a<br />
Cabinet meeting in the spring of 1982. The first items on the agenda<br />
were reports by Treasury Secretary Donald Regan and Budget<br />
Director David Stockman concerning problems the less-developed<br />
countries were having with their bank loans. Watt said:<br />
Secretary Regan was explaining the inability<br />
of those destitute<br />
countries to pay even the Interest on the loans that individual banks<br />
such as Bank of America, Chase Manhattan and Citibank had made.<br />
The President was being told what actions the United States "must"<br />
take to salvage the situation.<br />
After the Regan and Stockman briefings,, there were several<br />
minutes of discussion before I asked, "Does anyone believe that these<br />
less developed countries will ever be able to pay back the principal on<br />
these loans?" When no one spoke up, I asked, "If the loans are never<br />
going to be repaid, why should we again bail out the countries and<br />
arrange payment for their interest?"<br />
The answer came from several voices at once, "If we don't arrange<br />
for their interest payments, the loans will go into default, and it could<br />
put our American banks in jeopardy." Would the customers lose their<br />
money? No, came the answer, but the stockholders might lose<br />
dividends.<br />
In amazement, I leaned back in my large, leather chair, only two<br />
seats from the President of the United States. I realized that nothing in<br />
the world could keep these high government officials from scrambUng<br />
to protect and bail out a few very large and sorely troubled American<br />
banks.<br />
1 New York Times, April 15, 1994, p. A9.<br />
2. James G. Watt, The Courage of A Conservative (New York: Simon and Schuster,<br />
1985), pp. 124-25.<br />
PANAMA<br />
Carter<br />
of its<br />
First<br />
The first major score in the game had been made under the<br />
Administration when Panama fell in arrears on the payment<br />
loans. A consortium of banks including Chase Manhattan,<br />
National of Chicago, and Citibank brought pressure to bear on<br />
Washington to give the Canal to the Panamanian government so it<br />
could use the revenue to pay interest on its loans. Although there<br />
was massive opposition to this move among the American people,<br />
the Senate yielded to insider pressure and passed the give-away<br />
treaty. The Panamanian government inherited $120 million in<br />
annual revenue, and the interest payments to the banks were<br />
restored. As Congressman Philip Crane observed:<br />
At the time of the Torrijos-backed coup in 1968, Panama's total<br />
official overseas debt stood at a manageable and, by world standards,<br />
modest $167 million. Under Torrijos, indebtedness has skyrocketed<br />
nearly one thousand percent to a massive $1.5 billion. Debt-service ratio<br />
now consumes an estimated 39 percent of the entire Panamanian<br />
budget... What it appears we really have here is not just aid to a<br />
tinhorn dictator in the form of new subsidies and canal revenues the<br />
treaties would give to the Torrijos regime, but a bailout of a number of<br />
banks which should have known better than to invest in Panama and,<br />
in any event, should not escape responsibility for having done so.<br />
The Panama bailout was a unique play. In no other country did<br />
we have an income-producing property to give away, so from that<br />
point forward the bailout would have to be done with mere money.<br />
To pave the way for that, Congress passed the Monetary Control<br />
Act of 1980 which authorized the Federal Reserve to "monetize<br />
foreign debt." That is banker language meaning that the Fed was<br />
now authorized to create money out of nothing for the purpose of<br />
lending to foreign governments. It classifies those loans as "assets"<br />
and then uses them as collateral for the creation of even more<br />
money here in the United States. That was truly a revolutionary<br />
expansion of the Fed's power to inflate. Until then, it was permitted<br />
to rnake money only for the American government Now, it was able<br />
to do it for any government. Since then it has been functioning as a<br />
central bank for the entire world.<br />
w 8), pp. 64, 68.<br />
%n--^P M. Crane, Surrender in Panama (Ottawa, Illinois: Caroline House Books,
116 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND BUILDING THE NEW WORLD ORDER 117<br />
MEXICO<br />
By 1982, almost every Third-World government was running<br />
behind in payments. Mexico led the way by announcing it could<br />
not send any more money that year on its $85 billion debt. Federal<br />
Reserve Governor Henry Wallich rushed to Switzerland to negotiate<br />
an IMF loan of $4.5 billion through the Bank of International<br />
Settlements. The central banks of Europe and Japan provided $1.85<br />
billion (about 40%); the rest came from the Federal Reserve.<br />
Commercial banks postponed payments on the principal for two<br />
years; but, with the infusion of new loans, payment on the interest<br />
was resumed. That did not solve the problem. Within a few years,<br />
Mexico was in arrears again and, in 1985, the banks agreed to<br />
postpone $29 billion in payments and rolled over another $20<br />
billion, which means they issued new loans to pay off the old.<br />
In that same year, Secretary of the Treasury James Baker<br />
announced the government's plan to solve the world's debt crisis. It<br />
was a formal statement encouraging banks to continue lending to<br />
Third-World governments provided they promised to enact economic<br />
reforms favoring a free market. It was more of a philosophy<br />
than a plan, because there was no hope that it would be implemented<br />
by any of the socialist governments receiving the loans.<br />
Behind the announcement was the implication that the federal<br />
government acting through the Federal Reserve System, could be<br />
counted on to assist if the loans went sour. Baker called for<br />
funneling $29 billion over three years primarily to Latin American<br />
countries, of which Mexico was a prime recipient.<br />
CURRENCY SWAP<br />
Shortly after the Mexican government had loaned $55 million to<br />
Fidel Castro, it announced to the banks: "We will pay only what we<br />
have, and no more." Whereupon Paul Volcker, head of the Federal<br />
Reserve, rushed to meet with Mexico's finance minister, Jesus Silva<br />
Herzog, and offered to put the American taxpayer into the breach.<br />
A $600 million short-term loan was extended to get Mexico past its<br />
election date of July 4. It was called a "currency swap" because<br />
Mexico exchanged an equal number of pesos which it promised to<br />
redeem in U.S. dollars. Pesos, of course, were worthless in international<br />
markets—which is the reason Mexico wanted the dollars.<br />
The importance of this loan was not its size nor even the<br />
question of repayment. It was the manner in which it was made-<br />
First it was made by the Federal Reserve directly, acting as a central<br />
bank for Mexico, not the U.S.; and secondly, it was done almost in<br />
total secrecy. William Greider gives the details:<br />
The currency swaps had another advantage: they could be done<br />
secretly. Volcker discreetly informed both the Administration and the<br />
key congressional chairmen, and none objected. But the public<br />
reporting of currency swaps was required only every quarter, so the<br />
emergency loan from the Fed would not be disclosed for three or four<br />
months...- By that time, Volcker hoped, Mexico would be arranging<br />
more substantial new financing from the IMF.. . . The foreign assistance<br />
was done as discreetly as possible to avoid setting off a panic, but also<br />
to avoid domestic political controversy.... Bailing out Mexico, it<br />
seemed, was too grave to be controversial.<br />
DEBT SWAP<br />
The currency swap did not solve the problem. So, in March of<br />
1988, the players and referees agreed to introduce a new maneuver<br />
in the game: an accounting trick called a "debt swap." A debt swap<br />
is similar to a currency swap in that the United States exchanges<br />
something of real value in return for something that is worthless.<br />
But instead of currencies, they exchange government bonds. The<br />
transaction is complicated by the time-value of those bonds.<br />
Currencies are valued by their immediate worth, what they will buy<br />
today, but bonds are valued by their future worth, what they will<br />
buy in the future. After that differential factor is calculated, the<br />
process is essentially the same. Here is how it worked.<br />
Mexico, using U.S. dollars, purchased $492 million worth of<br />
American Treasury Bonds that pay no interest but which will pay<br />
$3.67 billion when they mature in twenty years. (Technically, these<br />
are called zero-coupon bonds.) Then Mexico issued its own bonds<br />
with the U.S. securities tied to them as collateral. This meant that<br />
the future value of Mexico's bonds, previously considered worthless,<br />
were now guaranteed by the United States government. The<br />
banks eagerly swapped their old loans for these new Mexican<br />
bonds at a ratio of about 1.4 to 1. In other words, they accepted $100<br />
million in bonds in return for canceling $140 million in old debt,<br />
^hat reduced their interest income, but they were happy to do it,<br />
because they had swapped worthless loans for fully-guaranteed<br />
bonds.<br />
Greide t, pp. 485-6.
118 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
This maneuver was hailed in the press as true monetary magic.<br />
It would save the Mexican government more than $200 million in<br />
annual interest charges; it would restore cash flow to the banks;<br />
and—miracle of miracles—it would cost nothing to American<br />
taxpayers. The reasoning was that the Treasury bonds were sold at<br />
normal market rates. The Mexican government paid as much for<br />
them as anyone else. That part was true, but what the commentators<br />
failed to notice was where Mexico got the American dollars<br />
with which to buy the bonds. They came through the IMF in the<br />
form of "foreign-currency exchange reserves." In other words, they<br />
were subsidies from the industrialized nations, primarily the<br />
United States. So, the U.S. Treasury put up the lion's share of the<br />
money to buy its own bonds. It went a half-billion dollars deeper in<br />
debt and agreed to pay $3.7 billion more in future payments so the<br />
Mexican government could continue paying interest to the banks.<br />
That is called bailout, and it does fall on the American taxpayer.<br />
IMF BECOMES FINAL GUARANTOR<br />
The following year, Secretary of State, James Baker (CFR), and<br />
Treasury Secretary, Nicholas Brady (CFR), flew to Mexico to work<br />
out a new debt agreement that would begin to phase in the IMF as<br />
final guarantor. The IMF gave Mexico a new loan of $3.5 billion<br />
(later increased to $7.5 billion), the World Bank gave another $1.5<br />
billion, and the banks reduced their previous loan values by about<br />
a third. The private banks were quite willing to extend new loans<br />
and reschedule the old. Why not? Interest payments would now be<br />
guaranteed by the taxpayers of the United States and Japan.<br />
That did not permanently solve the problem, either, because the<br />
Mexican economy was suffering from massive inflation caused by<br />
interna] debt, which was in addition to the external debt owed to the<br />
banks. The phrases "internal debt" and "domestic borrowing" are<br />
code for the fact that government has inflated its money supply by<br />
selling bonds. The interest it must pay to entice people to purchase<br />
those bonds can be staggering and, in fact, interest on Mexico's<br />
domestic borrowing was draining three times as much from the<br />
economy as the foreign debt service had been siphoning off.<br />
1 "U.S. Bond Issue Will Aid Mexico in Paying Debts/' by Tom Redburn, Los<br />
Angeles Times, December 30, 1987.<br />
2. "With Foreign IOUs Massaged, Interest Turns to Internal Debt," Insight, October<br />
2, 1989, p. 34.<br />
BUILDING THE NEW WORLD ORDER 119<br />
Notwithstanding this reality, Citicorp chairman, John S. Reed<br />
(CFR)/ whose bank is one of Mexico's largest lenders, said they<br />
vvere prepared to lend even more now. Why? Did it have anything<br />
to do with the fact that the Federal Reserve and the IMF would<br />
guarantee payments? Not so. "Because we believe the Mexican<br />
economy is doing well/' he said.<br />
At the end of 1994, the game was still going, and the play was<br />
the same. On December 21, the Mexican government announced<br />
could no longer pay the fixed exchange rate between the<br />
that it<br />
peso and the dollar and that the peso would now have to float in<br />
the free market to find its true value. The next day it plummeted 39<br />
per cent and the Mexican stock market tumbled. Once again,<br />
Mexico could not pay the interest on its loans. On January 11,<br />
President Clinton (CFR) urged Congress to approve U.S. guarantees<br />
for new loans up to $40 billion. Secretary of the Treasury<br />
•<br />
Robert Rubin (CFR) explained: "It is the judgment of all, including<br />
Chairman Alan Greenspan [CFR], that the probability of the debts<br />
being paid [by Mexico] is exceedingly high." But, while Congress<br />
debated the issue, the loan clock was ticking. Payment of $17 billion<br />
in Mexican bonds was due within 60 days, and $4 billion of that<br />
was due on the first of February! Who was going to pay the banks?<br />
This matter could not wait. On January 31, acting independently<br />
of Congress, President Clinton announced a bailout<br />
package of over $50 billion in loan guarantees to Mexico; $20 billion<br />
from the U.S. Exchange Stabilization Fund, $17.8 billion from the<br />
IMF, $10 billion from the Bank of International Settlements, and<br />
$3 billion from commercial banks.<br />
BRAZIL<br />
Brazil became a major player in 1982 when it announced that it<br />
too was unable to make payments on its debt. In response, the U.S.<br />
Treasury made a direct loan of $1.23 billion to keep those checks<br />
going to the banks while negotiations were under way for a more<br />
Permanent solution through the IMF. Twenty days later, it gave<br />
bother $1.5 billion; the Bank of International Settlements advanced<br />
$!-2 billion. The following month, the IMF provided $5.5 billion;<br />
Western banks extended $10 billion in trade credits; old loans were<br />
^scheduled; and $4.4 billion in new loans were made by a Morgan<br />
Jkd., p. 35.
120 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
^<br />
BUILDING<br />
THE NEW WORLD ORDER 121<br />
Bank syndication. The "temporary" loans from the U.S. Treasury<br />
months later, Argentina announced it could not make any more<br />
were extended with no repayment date established. Ron Chernovv<br />
payments until the fall of 1983. The banks immediately began<br />
Argentinian politicians a little extra spending money. Seven<br />
''/^°tt\er<br />
2<br />
Plan to Mop Up the Mess/' Insight, April 10, 1989, p. 31.<br />
Uther mechanisms which involve culture, education, political sovereignty, and<br />
Jitary<br />
1. Chernow, p. 644. power are embodied in agencies of the United Nations.<br />
comments:<br />
negotiations for rollovers, guarantees, and new IMF loans.<br />
The plan set a fateful precedent of "curing" the debt Argentina then signed an agreement with<br />
crisis<br />
350 creditor<br />
by<br />
banks to<br />
heaping on more debt. In this charade, bankers would lend more to<br />
stretch out payments on nearly a fourth of its $13.4 billion debt, and<br />
Brazil with one hand, then take it back with the other. This preserved<br />
the banks agreed to lend an extra $4.2 billion to cover interest<br />
the fictitious book value of loans on bank balance sheers. Approaching<br />
payments and political incentives. The IMF gave $1.7 billion. The<br />
the rescue as a grand new syndication, the bankers piled on high<br />
United States government gave an additional $500 million directly.<br />
interest rates and rescheduling fees.<br />
By 1983, Third-World governments owed $300 billion to banks<br />
Argentina then paid $850 million in overdue interest charges to the<br />
banks.<br />
and $400 billion to the industrialized governments. Twenty-five<br />
By 1988, Argentina had again stopped payment on its loans and<br />
nations were already behind in their payments. Brazil was in<br />
was falling hopelessly behind as bankers and politicians went into<br />
default a second time and asked for rescheduling, as did Rumania,<br />
a huddle to call the next bailout play. Somehow, the payments had<br />
Cuba, and Zambia. The IMF stepped in and made additional<br />
to be passed on one more time to the taxpayers—which they were<br />
in the<br />
billions of dollars available to the delinquent countries. The<br />
form of new loans, rollovers,<br />
Department<br />
of Agriculture, through its Commodity Credit Corporation,<br />
and guarantees. As summarized<br />
by Larry A. Sjaastad at the University of Chicago:<br />
paid $431 million to American banks to cover payments on loans<br />
There isn't a U.S. bank that would not sell its entire Latin<br />
from Brazil, Morocco, Peru, and Rumania. At the conclusion of<br />
American portfolio for 40 cents on the dollar were it not for the<br />
possibility that skillful political<br />
these agreements, the April 20, 1983, Wall Street Journal editorialized<br />
that "the international debt And that<br />
lobbying might turn up a sucker<br />
willing to pay 50 or 60 or even 90 cents on the dollar.<br />
crisis ... is, for all practical<br />
sucker<br />
is the U.S. Taxpayer.<br />
purposes, over."<br />
Not quite. By 1987, Brazil was again in default on its monstrous<br />
As mentioned previously, this history can become repetitious<br />
$121 billion debt, this time for one and<br />
and<br />
a-half years. In spite of the<br />
boring. It would be counterproductive to cover the same<br />
sordid<br />
torrent of money that had passed through its hands, it was now so<br />
story as it has unfolded in each country. Suffice it to say that<br />
the identical<br />
broke, it couldn't even buy gasoline for its police cars. In 1989, as a<br />
game has been played with teams from Bolivia, Peru,<br />
Venezuela,<br />
new round of bailout was being organized, President Bush(CFR)<br />
Costa Rica, Morocco, the Philippines, the Dominican<br />
Republic, and<br />
announced that the only real solution to the Third-World debt<br />
almost every other less-developed country in the<br />
world.<br />
problem was debt forgiveness.<br />
Perhaps, through repetition, we are running this history into THE NEED FOR CONVERGENCE<br />
the ground, but here are just a few more examples before moving<br />
This sets the stage for understanding the next phase of the game<br />
along.<br />
vhich is unfolding as these words are being written. It is the<br />
j^lusion of China<br />
ARGENTINA<br />
and the former Soviet bloc into the Grand<br />
Design for<br />
By 1982, Argentina was unable to make a $2.3 billion payment<br />
global government. As with all the other countries in the<br />
'°rld, the primary mechanism<br />
that was due in July and August. The banks extended their loans<br />
being used to accomplish this<br />
goal— a t least in the field<br />
while the IMF prepared a new of<br />
infusion in the amount economics—is<br />
of $2.15<br />
the IMF/ World Bank. 2<br />
he process is: (1) the transfer of money from<br />
billion. This restored the interest payments and gave the<br />
the industrialized
122 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND BUILDING THE NEW WORLD ORDER 123<br />
nations—which drags them down economically to a suitable<br />
common denominator—and (2) the acquisition of effective control<br />
over the political leaders of the recipient countries as they become<br />
dependent upon the money stream. The thing that is new and<br />
which sets this stage apart from previous developments is that the<br />
an acceptable<br />
apparent crumbling of Communism has created<br />
rationale for the industrialized nations to now allow their lifeblood<br />
to flow into the veins of their former enemies. It also creates the<br />
appearance of global, political "convergence/' a condition which<br />
CFR theoretician, Richard Cooper, said was necessary before<br />
Americans would accept having their own destinies determined by<br />
governments other than their own.<br />
CHINA<br />
Red China joined the IMF/World Bank in 1980 and immediately<br />
began to receive billions of dollars in loans, although it was<br />
well known that she was devoting a huge portion of her resources<br />
to military development. By 1987, China was the IMF's second<br />
largest borrower, next to India, and the transfusions have grown at<br />
a steady pace ever since.<br />
The Bank has asserted that loans will encourage economic<br />
reforms in favor of the private sector. Yet, none of the money has<br />
gone to the private sector. All of it is funneled into the government<br />
bureaucracy which, in turn, wages war against the free market. In<br />
1989, after small businesses and farms in the private sector had<br />
begun to flourish and surpass the performance of similar government<br />
enterprises, Red China's leaders clamped down on them with<br />
harsh controls and increased taxes. Vice Premier Yao Yilin<br />
announced that there was too much needless construction, too<br />
many private loans, and too much spending on "luxuries" such as<br />
cars and banquets. To stop these excesses, he said, it would be<br />
necessary to increase government controls over wages, prices, and<br />
business activities.<br />
Then there is the question of why China needs the money in the<br />
first place. Is it to develop her industry or natural resources? Is it to<br />
fight<br />
poverty and improve the living standard of her citizens?<br />
James Bovard answers:<br />
The Bank's defense of its China Policy is especially puzzling<br />
because China itself is going on a foreign investment binge. The World<br />
Bank gives China money at zero interest, and then China buys<br />
property in Hong Kong, the United States, Australia, and elsewhere.<br />
An economist with Citibank estimated that China's "direct investment<br />
in property, manufacturing and services [in Hong Kong alone] topped<br />
$6 billion." In 1984, China had a net outflow of capital of $1 billion.<br />
Moreover, China has its own foreign aid program, which has given<br />
more than $6 billion in recent decades, largely to leftist governments. 1<br />
THE GREAT DECEPTION<br />
It is the author's contention that the much heralded demise of<br />
Communism in the Soviet bloc is a mixture of fact and fantasy. It is<br />
fact at the bottom level of Communist society where the people, in<br />
truth, rejected it long ago. The only reason they appeared to<br />
embrace it for so many years was that they had no choice. As long<br />
as the Soviets held control of the weapons and the means of<br />
communication, the people had to accept their fate.<br />
But at the tip of the pyramid of state power, it is a different<br />
story. The top Communist leaders have never been as hostile to<br />
their counterparts in the West as the rhetoric suggests. They are<br />
quite friendly to the world's leading financiers and have worked<br />
closely with them when it suits their purposes. As we shall see in<br />
the following section, the Bolshevik revolution actually was<br />
financed by wealthy financiers in London and New York. Lenin<br />
and Trotsky were on the closest of terms with these moneyed<br />
interests^-both before and after the Revolution. Those hidden<br />
liaisons have continued to<br />
this day and occasionally pop to the<br />
surface when we discover a David Rockefeller holding confidential<br />
meetings with a Mikhail Gorbachev in the absence of government<br />
sponsorship or diplomatic purpose.<br />
It is not unreasonable to imagine a scenario in which the leaders<br />
of the Communist bloc come to realize they cannot hold themselves<br />
in power much longer. There comes a point where even physical<br />
force is not enough, especially when the loyalties of those who hold<br />
the weapons also begin to falter. With economic gangrene creeping<br />
U P the legs of their socialist systems, they realize they must obtain<br />
outside financial assistance or perish.<br />
In such a scenario, quiet agreements can be worked out to the<br />
^utual advantage of all negotiators. The plan could be as simple as<br />
^statue-of-liberty play in a college football game: the appearance of<br />
01ng one thing as a cover for accomplishing something else. While<br />
f Bovard, pp. 18^19.
124 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND BUILDING THE NEW WORLD ORDER 125<br />
Americans are prepared to accept such deception on a football<br />
field, they cannot believe that world financiers and politicians are<br />
capable of it. The concept is rejected out of hand as a "conspiracy<br />
theory."<br />
Nevertheless, in this scenario, we theorize it<br />
is agreed among<br />
the negotiators that the Soviet Bloc needs financial support. It<br />
agreed that the Western nations have the capacity to provide it.<br />
is<br />
It is<br />
agreed that the best way to move money from the industrialized<br />
nations into the Soviet bloc is through international agencies such<br />
as the IMF/World Bank. It is agreed this cannot happen until<br />
hostility between world systems is replaced by political convergence.<br />
It is agreed that future conflict is wasteful and dangerous to<br />
all<br />
parties- Therefore, it is finally agreed that the Soviet bloc must<br />
abandon its posture of global aggression while the Western nations<br />
continue to move toward socialism, necessary steps for the longrange<br />
goal of merger into a world government. But, in doing so, it<br />
must be insured that the existing Communist leaders retain control<br />
over their respective states.<br />
COMMUNISTS BECOME SOCIAL DEMOCRATS<br />
To that end, they change their public identities to "Social<br />
Democrats." They speak out against the brutal<br />
excesses of their<br />
predecessors and they offer greater freedom of expression in the<br />
media. A few dispensable individuals among their ranks are<br />
publicly purged as examples of the demise of the old order. States<br />
that once were held captive by the Soviet Union are allowed to<br />
break away and then return on a voluntary basis. If any leaders of<br />
the newly emancipated states prefer true independence instead of<br />
alignment with Russia, they are replaced.<br />
No other changes are required. Socialism remains the economic<br />
system of choice and, although lip service may be given to<br />
free-market concepts, the economy and all<br />
means of production<br />
remain under state control. The old Communists are now Social<br />
Democrats and, without exception, they become the leaders in the<br />
new system.<br />
The West rejoices, and the money starts to move. As an extra<br />
bonus, the former Bolsheviks are now hailed by the world as great<br />
statesmen who put an end to the Cold War, brought freedom to<br />
their people, and helped to forge a New World Order.<br />
When did Communism depart? We are not quite sure. All we<br />
know is that one day we opened our newspapers and it was<br />
accomplished. Social Democrats were everywhere. No one could<br />
find any Communists. Russian leaders spoke as long-time enemies<br />
of the old regime. Peristroika was here. Communism was dead. It<br />
was not killed by an enemy. It voted itself out of existence. It<br />
committed suicide!<br />
Does it not seem strange that Communism fell without a<br />
struggle? Is it not curious that the system which was born out of<br />
class conflict and revolution and which maintained itself by force<br />
and violence for almost a century just went away on its own?<br />
Communism was not overthrown by people rising up with clubs<br />
and pitchforks to throw off their yoke of tyranny. There was no<br />
revolution or counterrevolution, no long period of fragmentation,<br />
no bloody surges between opposing forces. Poof! It just happened.<br />
True, there was blood in the streets in those areas where opposing<br />
groups vied for power, but that was after Communism had<br />
departed, not before. Such an event had never occurred in history.<br />
Until then, it had been contrary to the way governments act;<br />
contrary to the very nature of power which never surrenders<br />
without a life-and-death struggle. This, indeed, is<br />
a great curiosity—which<br />
should cause people to think.<br />
Our premise is that the so-called demise of Communism is a<br />
Great Deception—not awfully different from many of the others<br />
that are the focus of this volume. We see it<br />
as having been stage<br />
managed for the purposes outlined previously: the transition to<br />
world government. In our view, tlmt scenario is<br />
the only one that<br />
makes sense in terms of today's geopolitical realities and the only<br />
one consistent with the lessons of history.<br />
We realize, of course, that such a view runs contrary to popular<br />
opinion and conventional wisdom. For many, it is shocking just to<br />
hear it spelled out. It would not be possible to convince anyone of<br />
Jts truth without extensive evidence. Certainly, such evidence<br />
abounds, but it is not within the scope of this study. So, now that<br />
w e have stated it, we shall leave it behind merely as a clarification<br />
°f the author's point of view so the reader can step around it if he<br />
"*<br />
Wishes.
126 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND BUILDING THE NEW WORLD ORDER 127<br />
EASTERN EUROPE<br />
full 70% of the $3.8 billion owed to the United States. Taxpayers<br />
American aid to Eastern European governments, while they<br />
picked up the bill.<br />
were still puppet states of the Soviet Union, has been justified by<br />
The same story has been unfolding in all the former Soviet-bloc<br />
the same theory advanced on behalf of China: it would improve<br />
countries. In 1980, for example, just before Hungary was brought<br />
their economies, show their people a better way of life, and wean<br />
into the IMF/World Bank, her annual per-capita GNP was $4,180.<br />
them from Communism. Advocates of that theory now point to the<br />
This was a problem, because the policy of the World Bank was to<br />
demise of Communism as evidence of the soundness of their plan.<br />
make development loans only to countries that had per-capita<br />
The truth, however, is that the money did not improve the economy GNPs of less than $2,650. Not to worry. In 1981, the Hungarian<br />
government simply revised its statistics<br />
and did not show the people a better way of life. In fact, it did<br />
downward from<br />
not<br />
$4,180 to<br />
$2,10Q. 1<br />
That was a drop of 50% in<br />
help the people in any way.<br />
one year,<br />
It went directly to their governments<br />
surely one of the<br />
sharpest depressions in world history. Everyone<br />
and was<br />
knew it<br />
used for government priorities. It strengthened the<br />
was<br />
ruling<br />
a lie,<br />
but no one raised an eyebrow. It was all part of the<br />
parties and enabled them<br />
game. By<br />
to solidify their control.<br />
1989,<br />
the Bush Administration had granted "most favored nation"<br />
It is well known that one of the reasons Poland's economy<br />
trade<br />
was<br />
status to the Hungarian government and established<br />
weak is that much of her productive output was shipped<br />
on its behalf a<br />
to the<br />
special $25 million development fund.<br />
Soviet Union at concessionary prices, primarily to support the<br />
military. Polish-built tanks fought in the Vietnam war; 20% of the RUSSIA<br />
Soviet merchant marine was built in Poland; 70% of Poland's<br />
American banks had always been willing to make loans to the<br />
computer and locomotive production and 80% of her communications<br />
equipment was shipped to the Soviets; American grain Cuban Missile Crisis, the Vietnam War, the Soviet invasion of<br />
Soviet Union, except for short periods of expediency during the<br />
purchased by Poland with money borrowed from American banks<br />
Afghanistan, and other minor business interruptions. In 1985, after<br />
was sent to Cuba. Poland was merely a middle man, a conduit to<br />
the public had lost interest in Afghanistan, banks of the "free<br />
Russia and her satellites. The banks were really funding Russia.<br />
world" reopened their loan windows to the Soviets. A $400 million<br />
It was in 1982 that Poland first defaulted on bank loans which<br />
package was put together by a consortium of First National of<br />
had been guaranteed by the U.S. government through the Commodity<br />
Credit Corporation. Under the terms of the guarantee,<br />
London subsidiary of the Royal Bank of Canada. The loan was<br />
Chicago, Morgan Guaranty, Bankers Trust, and Irving Trust—plus<br />
a<br />
offered<br />
taxpayers would make payments on any bank loan that went into<br />
at unusually low interest rates "to buy American and<br />
Canadian<br />
default. That was what the banks were counting on when they<br />
grain."<br />
Public<br />
made those loans, but to classify them as "in default" would<br />
indignation is easily disarmed when the announced<br />
purpose of<br />
require the banks to remove them from their books as assets. That<br />
a loan to a totalitarian government is to purchase<br />
commodities<br />
was unacceptable, because it would make their balance sheets look<br />
from the country where the loan originates—especially<br />
if the<br />
as bad as they really were. So the Treasury agreed to bend the rules<br />
commodity is grain for the assumed purpose of making<br />
bread or feeding<br />
and make livestock.<br />
payments without requiring the loans to be<br />
Who could<br />
in default.<br />
possibly object to having the<br />
money come right back to<br />
That was eventually stopped by an irate Congress, but not until the<br />
our own farmers and merchants in the<br />
Jorm of profits? And<br />
Reagan<br />
who<br />
Administration had stalled long enough to pay $400<br />
could fault a project that provided food<br />
for the hungry?<br />
million directly to the banks on behalf of Poland.<br />
The deception is subtly appealing. It<br />
In November, 1988, the World Bank made its first loan to<br />
is true that the money will<br />
e used— in part at<br />
Poland in the amount of $17.9 million. Three years later, in a<br />
least—to buy grain or other locally produced<br />
dramatic demonstration of what the President had meant when he<br />
advocated "debt forgiveness," the Bush Administration canceled a gust 30° rl Bank Courts Eastern Europe/'<br />
Q<br />
by Jerry Lewis, Wall Street Journal Au-
128 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
commodities. But the borrowing nations are like a homeowner who<br />
increases the mortgage on his house "to enlarge his living room."<br />
He probably wilJ make the addition, but he borrows twice as much<br />
as he needs so he can also buy a new car. Since the government<br />
allows a tax deduction on mortgage interest, in effect he now gets a<br />
tax deduction for the interest paid on his car as well. Likewise, the<br />
borrowing nations usually borrow more than they need for the<br />
announced purchase, but they receive all the money at favorable<br />
rates.<br />
Yet, this is not the most serious fault in the transaction. In the<br />
case of Russia, the grain was no small item on her list<br />
of needs.<br />
After repeated failures of her socialist agriculture, she was not able<br />
to feed her population. Hungry people are dangerous to a government.<br />
Russia needed grain to head off internal revolt far more than<br />
the homeowner needed to increase the size of his living room. In<br />
other words, Russia had to have the grain, with or without the loan,<br />
Without it, she would have had to curtail spending Somewhere else<br />
to obtain the money, most likely in her military. By giving her the<br />
money "to buy grain," we actually allowed her to spend more<br />
money on armaments.<br />
But even that is not the primary flaw in making loans to Russia.<br />
The bottom line is that most of those loans will never be repaid* As<br />
we have seen, the name of the game is bailout, and it is as certain as<br />
the setting sun that, somewhere down the line, Russia will not be<br />
able to make her payments, and the taxpayers of the industrialized<br />
nations will be put through the IMF wringer one more time to<br />
squeeze out the transferred purchasing power-<br />
BUSINESS VENTURES IN RUSSIA INSURED BY U.S.<br />
In 1990, the U.S. Export-Import Bank announced it would begin<br />
making direct loans to Russia. Meanwhile, the U.S. Overseas<br />
Private Investment Corporation was providing free "insurance" to<br />
private companies that were willing to invest in the ex-Soviet state.<br />
In other words, it was now doing for industrial corporations what it<br />
had been doing all along for banks: guaranteeing that, if their<br />
investments turned sour, the government—make that taxpayers-—<br />
would compensate them for their losses. The limit on that insurance<br />
had been $100 million, a generous figure, indeed. But, to<br />
encourage an even greater flow of private capital into Russia, the<br />
r<br />
BUILDING THE NEW WORLD ORDER 129<br />
gush Administration authorized unlimited protection for "sound<br />
American corporate investments."<br />
these truly were sound investments, they would not need<br />
If<br />
foreign-aid subsidies or government guarantees. What is really<br />
happening in this play is a triple score:<br />
1.<br />
International lending agencies provide the Social Democrats with<br />
money to purchase goods and services from American firms. No<br />
one really expects them to repay. It is merely a clever method of<br />
redistributing wealth from those who have it to those who<br />
don't—without those who have it catching on.<br />
2. American firms do not need money to participate. Since their<br />
ventures are guaranteed, banks are anxious to loan whatever<br />
amount of money is required. Efficiency or competitiveness are<br />
not important factors. Contracts are awarded on the basis of<br />
political influence. Profits are generous and without risk.<br />
3. When the Social Democrats eventually default in their contracts<br />
to the American firms or when the joint venture loses money<br />
because of socialist mismanagement, the federal government<br />
provides funds to cover corporate profits and repayment of<br />
bank loans.<br />
There you have it: The Social Democrats get the goodies; the<br />
corporations get the profits, and the banks get the interest on<br />
money created out of nothing. You know what the taxpayers get!<br />
By 1992, the wearisome pattern was clearly visible. Writing in<br />
the New York Times, columnist Leslie H. Gelb gave the numbers:<br />
The ex-Soviet states<br />
are now meeting only 30 percent of their<br />
interest payments (and almost no principal) on debts to the West of<br />
$70 billion.... Various forms of Western aid to the ex-Soviet states<br />
totaled about $50 billion in the last 20 months, and the money has<br />
virtually disappeared without a trace or a dent on the economic<br />
picture.<br />
The interesting thing about this report is<br />
that Leslie Gelb has<br />
been a member of the CFR since 1973. Why would a CFR<br />
spokesman blow the whistle on one of their most important<br />
Maneuvers toward The New World Order? The answer is that he is<br />
doing just the opposite. Actually he is making a plea for more loans<br />
*- "The Russian Sinkhole/' by Leslie H. Gelb, New York Times, March 30, 1992, p.
130 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
BUILDING THE NEW WORLD ORDER<br />
exception.<br />
The industrialized nations of the world are being bled to near<br />
The international version of the game called Bailout is similar to<br />
death in a global transfer of their wealth to the less developed<br />
domestic version in that the overall objective is to have the<br />
countries. Is it being done according to plan? Or is it an accident? It<br />
taxpayers cover the defaulted loans so that interest payments can<br />
is not being done to them by their enemies. It is being done by then<br />
continue going to the banks. The differences are: (1) instead of<br />
awn leaders. The process is well coordinated across national lines<br />
justifying this as protecting the American public, the pretense is<br />
and perfectly dovetails with the actions of other leaders who are ^at it is to save the world from poverty; and (2) the main money<br />
doing the same thing to their respective countries. Furthermore;<br />
Pipeline goes from the Federal Reserve through the IMF/ World<br />
these leaders regularly meet together to better coordinate their K ank. Otherwise, the rules are basically the same.<br />
131<br />
and more outright aid on the basis that the need is so great! He<br />
activities. Could anything that complex be accomplished by accident?<br />
Or would some kind of a plan be required?<br />
advocates the prioritizing of funding with first attention to aiding<br />
Russia's nuclear-power facilities, agriculture, and industrial capacity.<br />
At the end of his article, he writes: "The stakes could not be<br />
and it is to aid the less developed countries. But, after forty years<br />
A spokesman from the IMF would answer, yes, there is a plan,<br />
higher. All the more reason for substantial, practical and immediate<br />
and hundreds of billions of dollars, they have totally failed to<br />
aid—not for grand illusions."<br />
accomplish that goal. Would intelligent people believe that pursuing<br />
the same plan will produce different results in the future? Then<br />
Congress hears and obeys. In spite of the fact that all the<br />
preceding billions have "disappeared without a trace or a dent/'<br />
why do they follow a plan that cannot work? The answer is they are<br />
the transfusion continues. In 1993 the World Bank advanced<br />
not following that plan. They are following a different one: one<br />
another half-billion-dollar loan to Russia; before leaving office,<br />
which has been very successful from their point of view. Otherwise,<br />
we must conclude that the leaders of the industrialized<br />
President Bush arranged for another $2 billion loan through the<br />
Export-Import Bank; and Congress authorized hitting the voters<br />
nations are, to a man, just plain stupid. We do not believe it.<br />
with another $Z5 billion in foreign aid earmarked specifically for<br />
There is little room to escape the conclusion that these men and<br />
Russia. In July, at the Tokyo summit meeting of the Group-ofwomen<br />
are following a higher loyalty than the self interest of their<br />
Seven industrialized nations, another $24 billion was promised,<br />
respective countries. In their hearts they may honestly believe that,<br />
half of which will come from the IMF. As this book goes to print,<br />
in the long run, the world will be better for it, including their fellow<br />
there is no end in sight.<br />
THE CONSPIRACY THEORY<br />
countrymen. But, for the present, their goals and their methods are<br />
not shared by those who have placed them in office. Under those<br />
A moment's reflection on the events described in this section<br />
circumstances, they must conceal their plan from public view. If<br />
leads us to a crossroads of conscience. We must choose between<br />
their fellow citizens really knew what they were doing, they would<br />
two paths. Either we conclude that Americans have lost control<br />
be thrown out of office and, in some cases, might even be shot as<br />
over their government, or we reject this information as a mere<br />
traitors. Add all that together and it spells CONSPIRACY.<br />
distortion of history. In the first case, we become advocates of the<br />
The only other explanation is that it's all accidental: no plan, no<br />
conspiratorial view of history. In the latter, we endorse the accidental<br />
cooperation, no goal, just the blind forces of history following the<br />
view. It is a difficult choice.<br />
path of least resistance. For some it will be easier and more<br />
The reason it is difficult is that we have been conditioned to<br />
comfortable to accept that model. But the evidence speaks loudly<br />
laugh at conspiracy theories, and few people will risk public<br />
against it. What is the evidence? Not just the previous chapters, but<br />
ridicule by advocating them. On the other hand, to endorse the<br />
accidental view is absurd. Almost all of history is an unbroken trail<br />
of one conspiracy after another. Conspiracies are the norm, not the<br />
everything that follows in this book. By contrast, the evidence for<br />
the accidental theory of history is — a blank page.<br />
SUMMARY
132 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
There is another dimension to the game, however, that involves<br />
more than mere profits and scam. It is the conscious and deliberate<br />
evolution of the IMF/World Bank into a world central bank with<br />
the power to issue a world fiat currency. And that is an important<br />
step in an even larger plan to build a true world government within<br />
the framework of the United Nations.<br />
Economically strong nations are not candidates for surrendering<br />
their sovereignty to a world government. Therefore, through<br />
"loans" that will never be paid back, the IMF/World Bank directs<br />
the massive transfer of wealth from the industrialized nations to<br />
the less developed nations. This ongoing process eventually drains<br />
their economies to the point where they also will be in need of<br />
assistance. No longer capable of independent action, they will<br />
accept the loss of sovereignty in return for international aid.<br />
The less developed countries, on the other hand, are being<br />
brought into The New World Order along an entirely<br />
different<br />
route. Many of these countries are ruled by petty tyrants who care<br />
little for their people except how to extract more taxes from them<br />
without causing a revolt. Loans from the IMF/World Bank are<br />
used primarily to perpetuate themselves and their ruling parties in<br />
power—and that is exactly what the IMF/ World Bank intends.<br />
Rhetoric about helping the poor notwithstanding, the true goal of<br />
the transfer of wealth disguised as loans is to get control over the<br />
leaders of the less developed countries. After these despots get<br />
used to the taste of such an unlimited supply of sweet cash, they<br />
will never be able to break the habit. They will be content—already<br />
are content—to become little gold-plated cogs in the giant machinery<br />
of world government. Ideology means nothing to them: capitalist,<br />
communist, socialist, fascist what does it matter so long as the<br />
money keeps coming. The IMF/World Bank literally is buying these<br />
countries and using our money to do it.<br />
The recent inclusion of Red China and the former Soviet bloc on<br />
the list of IMF /World Bank recipient countries signals the final<br />
phase of the game. Now that Latin America and Africa have been<br />
"purchased" into the New World Order, this is the final frontier- In<br />
a relatively short time span, China, Russia, and the Eastern<br />
European countries have now become the biggest borrowers an&<br />
already, they are in arrears on their payments. This is where the<br />
action will lie in the months ahead.<br />
Section II<br />
A CRASH COURSE<br />
ON MONEY<br />
The eight chapters contained in this and the<br />
following section deal with material that is<br />
organized by topic, not chronology. Several of<br />
them will jump ahead of events that are not<br />
covered until later. Furthermore, the scope is such<br />
that the reader may wonder what, if any, is the<br />
connection with the Federal Reserve System.<br />
Please be patient. The importance will eventually<br />
become clear. It is the author's intent to cover<br />
concepts and principles before looking at events.<br />
Without this background, the history of the<br />
Federal Reserve is boring. With it, the story<br />
emerges as an exciting drama which profoundly<br />
affects our lives today. So let us begin this<br />
adventure with a few discoveries about the<br />
nature of money itself.
Chapter Seven<br />
THE BARBARIC METAL<br />
The history and evolution of money; the emergence<br />
of gold as the universal money supply; the<br />
attempts by governments to cheat their subjects<br />
by clipping or debasing gold coins; the reality that<br />
any quantity of gold will suffice for a monetary<br />
system and that "more money" does not require<br />
more gold.<br />
There is a great mystique surrounding the nature of money. It is<br />
generally regarded as beyond the understanding of mere mortals.<br />
Questions of the origin of money or the mechanism of its creation<br />
are seldom matters of public debate. We accept them as facts of life<br />
which are beyond our sphere of control. Thus, in a nation which is<br />
founded on the principle of government by the people, and which<br />
assumes a high level of understanding among the electorate, the<br />
people themselves have blocked out one of the most important<br />
factors affecting, not only their government, but their personal lives<br />
as well.<br />
This attitude is not accidental, nor was it always so. There was a<br />
titue in the fairly recent past when the humble voter—even without<br />
formal education—was well informed on money matters and<br />
vitally concerned about their political implementation. In fact, as<br />
we shall see in a later chapter, major elections were won or lost<br />
depending on how candidates stood on the issue of a central bank.<br />
It has been in the interest of the money mandarins, however, to<br />
convince the public that, now, these issues are too complicated for<br />
n ovices. Through the use of technical jargon and by hiding simple<br />
reality inside a maze of bewildering procedures, they have caused<br />
ar * understanding of the nature<br />
of money to fade from the public<br />
consciousness.<br />
^HAT IS MONEY?<br />
The first step in this maneuver was to scramble the definition of<br />
m °ney itself. For example, the July 20, 1975 issue of the New York
136 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND THE BARBARIC METAL 137<br />
Times, in an article entitled "Money Supply: A Growing Muddle/'<br />
begins with the question: "What is money nowadays?" The Wall<br />
Street Journal of August 29, 1975, comments: "The men and women<br />
involved in this arcane exercise [of watching the money supply] ...<br />
aren't exactly sure what the money supply consists of." And, in its<br />
September 24, 1971 issue, the same paper said: "A pro-International<br />
Monetary Fund Seminar of eminent economists couldn't agree on<br />
what money is or how banks create it."<br />
Even the government cannot define money. Some years ago, a<br />
Mr. A.F. Davis mailed a ten-dollar Federal Reserve Note to the<br />
Treasury Department. In his letter of transmittal, he called attention<br />
to the inscription on the bill which said that it was redeemable in<br />
"lawful money," and then requested that such money be sent to<br />
him. In reply, the Treasury merely sent two five-dollar bills from a<br />
different printing series bearing a similar promise to pay. Mr. Davis<br />
responded:<br />
Dear Sir:<br />
Receipt is hereby acknowledged of two $5.00 United States notes,<br />
which we interpret from your letter are to be considered as lawful<br />
money. Are we to infer from this that the Federal Reserve notes are not<br />
lawful money?<br />
I am enclosing one of the $5.00 notes which you sent to me. I note<br />
that it states on the face, "The United States of America will pay to the<br />
bearer on demand five dollars." I am hereby demanding five dollars.<br />
One week later, Mr. Davis received the following reply from<br />
Acting Treasurer, M.E. Slindee:<br />
Dear Mr. Davis:<br />
Receipt is acknowledged of your letter of December 23rd,<br />
transmitting one $5. United States Note with a demand for payment of<br />
five dollars. You are advised that the term "lawful money" has not<br />
been defined in federal legislation.... The term "lawful currency" no<br />
longer has such special significance. The $5. United States Note<br />
received with your letter of December 23rd is returned herewith.<br />
The phrases "...will pay to the bearer on demand" and "— is<br />
redeemable in lawful money" were deleted from our currency<br />
altogether in 1964.<br />
1. As quoted by C.V. Myers, Money and Energy: Weathering the Storm (Darien,<br />
Connecticut: Soundview Books, 1980), pp. 161, 163. Also by Lawrence S. Ritter, ed v<br />
Money and Economic Activity (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967), p. 33.<br />
Is money really so mysterious that it cannot be defined? Is it the<br />
coin and currency we have in our pockets? Is it numbers in a<br />
checking account or electronic impulses in a computer? Does it<br />
include the balance in a savings account or the available credit on a<br />
charge card? Does it include the value of stocks and bonds, houses,<br />
land, or personal possessions? Or is money nothing more than<br />
purchasing power?<br />
The main function of the Federal Reserve is to regulate the<br />
supply of money. Yet, if no one is able to define what money is,<br />
how can we have an opinion about how the System is performing?<br />
The answer, of course, is that we cannot, and that is exactly the way<br />
the cartel wants it.<br />
The reason the<br />
Federal Reserve appears to be a complicated<br />
subject is because most discussions start somewhere in the middle.<br />
By the time we get into it, definitions have been scrambled and<br />
basic concepts have been assumed. Under such conditions, intellectual<br />
chaos is inevitable. If we start at the beginning, however, and<br />
deal with each concept in sequence from the general to the specific,<br />
and if we agree on definitions as we go, we shall find to our<br />
amazement that the issues are really quite simple. Furthermore, the<br />
process is not only painless, it is—believe it or not—intensely<br />
interesting.<br />
The purpose of this and the next three chapters, therefore, is to<br />
provide what could be called a crash course on money. It will not be<br />
complicated. In fact, you already know much of what follows. All<br />
we shall attempt to do is tie it all together so that it will have<br />
continuity and relativity to our subject. When you are through with<br />
these next few pages, you will understand money. That's a promise.<br />
So, lefs get started with the basics. What is money?<br />
A WORKING DEFINITION<br />
The dictionary is of little help. If economists cannot agree on<br />
w hat money is, it is partly due to the fact that there are so many<br />
fehnitions available that it<br />
is difficult to insist that any of them is<br />
the obvious choice. For the purpose of our analysis, however, it will<br />
e necessary to establish one definition so we can at least know<br />
vhat is meant when the word is used within this <strong>text</strong> To that end,<br />
e shall introduce our own definition which has been assembled<br />
°*H bits and dabs taken from numerous sources. The structure is<br />
esi gned, not to reflect what we think money ought to be or to
138 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND THE BARBARIC METAL 139<br />
support the view of any particular school of economics, but simply<br />
to reduce the concept to its most fundamental essence and to reflect<br />
the reality of today's world. It is not necessary to agree or disagree<br />
with this definition. It is introduced solely for the purpose of<br />
providing an understanding of the word as it is used within these<br />
pages. This, then, shall be our working definition:<br />
Money is anything which is accepted as a medium of exchange<br />
and it may be classified into the following forms:<br />
1. Commodity money<br />
Z Receipt money<br />
3. Fiat money<br />
4. Fractional money<br />
Understanding the difference between these forms of money is<br />
practically all<br />
we need to know to fully comprehend the Federal<br />
Reserve System and to come to a judgment regarding its value to<br />
our economy and to our nation. Let us, therefore, examine each of<br />
them in some detail.<br />
BARTER (PRE-MONEY)<br />
Before there was any kind of money, however, there was barter,<br />
and it is important first to understand the link between the two.<br />
Barter is defined as that which is directly exchanged for something<br />
of like value. Mr. Jones swaps his restored Model-T Ford for a<br />
Steinway grand piano.<br />
This exchange is not monetary in nature<br />
because both items are valued for themselves rather than held as a<br />
medium of exchange to be used later for something else. Note,<br />
however, that both items have intrinsic value or they would not be<br />
accepted by the other parties.<br />
Labor also may be exchanged as<br />
barter when it, too, is perceived to have intrinsic value to the<br />
person for whom the labor is performed. The concept of intrinsic<br />
value is the key to an understanding of the various forms of money<br />
that evolved from the process of barter.<br />
COMMODITY MONEY<br />
In the natural evolution of every society,<br />
barter than all<br />
others. This was because they had certain characteristics<br />
which made them useful or attractive to almost everyone.<br />
Eventually, they were traded, not for themselves, but because they<br />
represented a storehouse of value which could be exchanged at a<br />
latex time for something else. At that point, they ceased being<br />
barter and became true money. They were, according to our<br />
working definition, a medium of exchange. And, since that medium<br />
Was a commodity of intrinsic value, it may be described as<br />
commodity money.<br />
Among primitive people, the most usual item to become<br />
commodity money was some form of food, either produce or<br />
livestock. Lingering testimony to this fact is our word pecuniary,<br />
which means pertaining to money. It is derived from the word<br />
pecunia, which is the Latin word for cow.<br />
But, as society progressed beyond the level of bare existence,<br />
items other than food came into general demand. Ornaments were<br />
occasionally prized when the food supply was ample, and there is<br />
evidence of some societies using colored sea shells and unusual<br />
stones for this purpose. But these never seriously challenged the<br />
use of cattle, or sheep, or corn, or wheat, because these staples<br />
possessed greater intrinsic value for themselves even if they were<br />
not used as money.<br />
METALS AS MONEY<br />
Eventually, when man learned how to refine crude ores and to<br />
craft them into tools or weapons, the metals themselves became of<br />
^alue. This was the dawning of the Bronze Age in which iron,<br />
copper, tin, and bronze were traded between craftsmen and<br />
merchants along trade routes and at major sea ports.<br />
The value of metal ingots was originally determined by weight.<br />
ten, as it became customary for the merchants who cast them to<br />
arnp the uniform weights on the top, they eventually were valued<br />
imply by counting their number. Although they were too large to<br />
**)' m<br />
%<br />
a pouch, they were still small enough to be transported<br />
there always have<br />
and, in this form, they became, in effect, primitive but<br />
been one or two items which became more commonly used ^nctional tf1<br />
coins.<br />
The primary reason metals became widely<br />
1. Strictly speaking, each party holds the value of what he is receiving to be more<br />
used as commodity<br />
money<br />
than what he is giving. Otherwise he would not make the trade. In the mind of th e<br />
is that they meet all of the requirements for convenient<br />
traders, therefore, the items have unequal value. That opinion is shared equally by<br />
lading. In addition to being of intrinsic value for uses other than<br />
them both. The shorter explanation, however, is less unwieldy. . 10 *ey, they are not perishable, which is more than one can say for
140 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND w<br />
THE<br />
BARBARIC METAL 141<br />
cows; by melting and reforming they can be divided into smaller<br />
units and conveniently used for purchases of minor items, which is<br />
not possible with diamonds, for example; and, because they are not<br />
in great abundance, small quantities carry high value, which means<br />
they are more portable than such items as timber, for example.<br />
Perhaps the most important monetary attribute of metals,<br />
however, is their ability to be precisely measured. It is important to<br />
keep in mind that, in its fundamental form and function, money is<br />
both a storehouse and a measure of value. It is the reference by<br />
which all other things in the economy can be compared. It is<br />
essential, therefore, that the monetary unit itself be both measurable<br />
and constant. The ability to precisely assay metals in both<br />
purity and weight makes them ideally suited for this function.<br />
Experts may haggle over the precise quality of a gemstone, but an<br />
ingot of metal is either 99% pure or it isn't, and it either weighs 100<br />
ounces or it doesn't. One's opinion has little to do with it. It is not<br />
without reason, therefore, that, on every continent and throughout<br />
history, man has chosen metals as the ideal storehouse and<br />
measure of value.<br />
THE SUPREMACY OF GOLD<br />
There is one metal, of course, that has been selected by<br />
centuries of trial and error above all others. Even today, in a world<br />
where money can no longer be defined, the common man instinctively<br />
knows that gold will do just fine until something better<br />
comes along. We shall leave it to the sociologists to debate why gold<br />
has been chosen as the universal money. For our purposes, it<br />
only important to know that it has been. But we should not<br />
overlook the possibility that it was an excellent choice. As for<br />
quantity, there seems to be just the right amount to keep its value<br />
high enough for useful coinage. It is less plentiful than silver<br />
—which, incidentally, has run a close second in the monetary<br />
contest—and more abundant than platinum. Either could have<br />
served the purpose quite well, but gold has provided what appears<br />
to be the perfect compromise. Furthermore, it is a commodity in<br />
great demand for purposes other than money. It is sought for both<br />
industry and ornament, thus assuring its intrinsic value under all<br />
conditions. And, of course, its<br />
measured.<br />
purity and weight can be precisely<br />
is<br />
THE MISLEADING THEORY OF QUANTITY<br />
It often is argued that gold is inappropriate as money because it<br />
js too limited in supply to satisfy the needs of modern commerce.<br />
On the surface, that may sound logical—after all, we do need a lot<br />
of money out there to keep the wheels of the economy turning<br />
but, upon examination, this turns out to be one of the most childish<br />
ideas imaginable.<br />
First of all, it is estimated that approximately 45% of all the gold<br />
mined throughout the world since the discovery of America is now<br />
in government or banking stockpiles. There undoubtedly is at<br />
least an additional 30% in jewelry, ornaments, and private hoards.<br />
Any commodity which exists to the extent of 75% of its total world<br />
production since Columbus discovered America can hardly be<br />
described as in short supply.<br />
The deeper reality, however, is that the supply is not even<br />
important. Remember that the primary function of money is<br />
measure the value of the items for which it is exchanged. In this<br />
sense, it serves as a yardstick or ruler of value. It really makes no<br />
difference if we measure the length of our rug in inches, feet, yards,<br />
or meters. We could even manage it quite well in miles if we used<br />
decimals and expressed the result in millimiles. We could even use<br />
multiple rulers, but no matter what measurement we use, the<br />
reality of what we are measuring does not change. Our rug does<br />
not become larger just because we have increased the quantity of<br />
measurement units by painting additional markers onto our rulers.<br />
If the supply of gold in relation to the supply of available goods<br />
!S so small that a one-ounce coin would be too valuable for minor<br />
transactions, people simply would use half-ounce coins or tenthounce<br />
coins. The amount of gold in the world does not affect its<br />
ability to serve as money, it<br />
used to measure any given transaction.<br />
only affects the quantity that will be<br />
Let us illustrate the point by imagining that we are playing a<br />
game of Monopoly. Each person has been given a starting supply<br />
£* play money with which to transact business. It doesn't take long<br />
before we all begin to feel the shortage of cash. If we just had more<br />
oney, we could really wheel and deal. Let us suppose further that<br />
^nieone discovers another game-box of Monopoly sitting in the<br />
(Oli<br />
*^n Groseclose, Money and Man: A survey of Monetary Experience, 4th ed.<br />
^Wahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1976), p. 259.<br />
to
142 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
THE BARBARIC METAL<br />
effectiveness,<br />
planned increase<br />
of its<br />
in<br />
gold-unit.<br />
the money<br />
There is<br />
supply, for<br />
no need whatever for a* 1 )'<br />
the supply to rise to offset %<br />
prOCesS does not end there '<br />
however. When the miners see<br />
that fK<br />
are no better off than before in spite of the extra work, and<br />
pecia y when they see the teilors making a greats profit for no<br />
143<br />
any condition, or to follow any artificial criteria. More money does not<br />
supply more capital, is not more productive, does not permit<br />
"economic growth."<br />
GOLD GUARANTEES PRICE STABILITY<br />
The Federal Reserve claims that one of its primary objectives is<br />
better off? There is no corresponding increase in the quantity<br />
f<br />
to stabilize prices. In this, of course, it has failed miserably. The<br />
property, so everyone would bid up the prices of existing pieces<br />
irony, however, is that maintaining stable prices is the easiest thing<br />
until they became twice as expensive. In other words, the law of<br />
in the world. All we have to do is stop tinkering with the money<br />
supply and demand would rapidly seek exactly the same equilibrium<br />
as existed with the more limited money supply. When the<br />
ically stable under a commodity money system, and this is particu-<br />
supply and let the free market do its job. Prices become automat-<br />
quantity of money expands without a corresponding increase in<br />
larly true under a gold standard.<br />
goods, the effect is a reduction in the purchasing power of each<br />
Economists like to illustrate the workings of the marketplace by<br />
monetary unit. In other words, nothing really changes except that<br />
the quoted price of everything goes up. But that is merely the quoted<br />
creating hypothetical micro and macro economies in which everything<br />
is reduced to only a few factors and a few people. In that<br />
price, the price as expressed in terms of the monetary unit. In truth,<br />
spirit, therefore, let us create a hypothetical economy consisting of<br />
the real price, in terms of its relationship to all other prices, remains<br />
only two classes of people: gold miners and tailors. Let us suppose<br />
the same. It's merely that the relative value of the money supply<br />
that the law of supply and demand has settled on the value of one<br />
ounce of gold to be equal to a fine, custom-tailored suit of clothes.<br />
That means that the labor, tools, materials, and talent required to<br />
mine and refine one ounce of gold are equally traded for the labor,<br />
tools, and talent required to weave and tailor the suit. Up until<br />
tow, the number of ounces of gold produced each year have been<br />
over the sudden increase in wealth. By New Year's day, however,<br />
roughly equal to the number of fine suits made each year, so prices<br />
prices would have doubled for everything, and the net result on<br />
have<br />
the<br />
remained stable. The price of a suit is one ounce of gold, and<br />
the<br />
world's standard of living would be exactly<br />
value<br />
zero.<br />
of one ounce of gold is equal to one finely-tailored suit.<br />
The reason so many people fall for the appealing argument that<br />
Let us now suppose that the miners, in their quest for a better<br />
dard of living, work extra hours and produce more gold this<br />
year ftan previously—or that they discover a new lode of gold<br />
reflect on the consequences of the total supply increasing, the<br />
jjtocii greatly increases the available supply with little extra effort.<br />
Now things are no longer in balance. There are more ounces of gold<br />
^an there are suits. The result of this expansion of the money<br />
"pply over and above the supply of available goods is the same as<br />
our game of Monopoly. The quoted prices of the suits go up<br />
^^se the relative value of the gold has gone down.<br />
closet and proposes that the currency from that be added to the<br />
game under progress. By general agreement, the little bills are<br />
distributed equally among all players. What would happen?<br />
The money supply has now been doubled. We all have twice as<br />
much money as we did a moment before. But would we be any<br />
has gone down. This, of course, is the classic mechanism of<br />
inflation. Prices do not go up. The value of the money goes down.<br />
If Santa Claus were to visit everyone on Earth next Christmas<br />
and leave in our stockings an amount of money exactly equal to the<br />
amount we already had, there is no doubt that many would rejoice<br />
the economy needs a larger money supply is that they zero in only<br />
on the need to increase their supply. If they paused for a moment to<br />
nonsense of the proposal becomes immediately apparent.<br />
Murray Rothbard, professor of economics at the University of<br />
Nevada at Las Vegas, says:<br />
We come to the startling truth that it doesn't matter what the sttppty<br />
of money is. Any supply will do as well as any other supply. The fre€<br />
market will simply adjust by changing the purchasing power, ot<br />
1 . Those who rushed to market first, however, would benefit temporarily from the<br />
old prices. Under inflation, those who save are punished.<br />
^olorrHi a R°thbard What Has<br />
' Government<br />
n.<br />
Done to Our Money?<br />
^oo:<br />
(Larkspur<br />
Pine Tree Press,<br />
V<br />
1964), '<br />
p. 13.
144 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND THE BARBARIC METAL 145<br />
period of time. For example, in 1913, the year the Federal Reserve<br />
increase in labor, some of them decide to put down their picks and<br />
1. See Galbraith, p. 250.<br />
turn to the trade of tailoring. In other words, they are responding to<br />
the law of supply and demand in labor. When this happens, the<br />
annual production of gold goes down while the production of suits<br />
vvas enacted into law, the average annual wage in America was<br />
$633. The exchange value of gold that year was $20.67. That means<br />
that the average worker earned the equivalent of 30.6 ounces of<br />
gold per year.<br />
In 1990, the average annual wage had risen to $20,468. That is a<br />
politicians and money mechanics, will always maintain a stable whopping increase of 3,233 per cent, an average rise of 42 per cent<br />
price structure which is automatically regulated by the underlying<br />
each year for 77 years. But the exchange value of gold in 1990 had<br />
also risen. It was at $386.90 per ounce. The average worker,<br />
therefore, was earning the equivalent of 52.9 ounces of gold per<br />
the amount of human effort required to provide the goods and<br />
year- That is an increase of only 73 per cent, a rise of less than 1 per<br />
services for which it is freely exchanged.<br />
cent per year over that same period. It is obvious that the dramatic<br />
increase in the size of the paycheck was meaningless to the average<br />
CIGARETTES AS MONEY<br />
American. The reality has been a small but steady increase in<br />
A perfect example of how commodities tend to self-regulate<br />
purchasing power (about 1 per cent per year) that has resulted from<br />
their value occurred in Germany at the end of World War II. The<br />
the gradual improvement in technology. This and only this has<br />
German mark had become useless, and barter was common. But<br />
improved the standard of living and brought down real prices—as<br />
one item of exchange, namely cigarettes, actually became a commodity<br />
money, and they served quite well. Some cigarettes were<br />
revealed by the relative value of gold.<br />
In areas where personal service is the primary factor and where<br />
smuggled into the country, but most of them were brought in by<br />
technology is less important, the stability of gold as a measure of<br />
U.S. servicemen. In either case, the quantity was limited and the<br />
value is even more striking. At the Savoy Hotel in London, one<br />
demand was high. A single cigarette was considered small change.<br />
gold sovereign will still buy dinner for three, exactly as it did in<br />
A package of twenty and a carton of two hundred served as larger<br />
1913. And, in ancient Rome, the cost of a finely made toga, belt, and<br />
units of currency. If the exchange rate began to fall too low—in<br />
pair of sandals was one ounce of gold. That is almost exactly the<br />
other words, if the quantity of cigarettes tended to expand at a rate same cost today, two-thousand years later, for a hand-crafted suit,<br />
faster than the expansion of other goods—the holders of the<br />
belt, and a pair of dress shoes. There are no central banks or other<br />
currency, more than likely, would smoke some of it rather than human institutions which could even come close to providing that<br />
spend it. The supply would diminish and the value would return to<br />
kind of price stability. And, yet, it is totally automatic under a gold<br />
its previous equilibrium. That is not theory, it actually happened.<br />
standard.<br />
With gold as the monetary base, we would expect that<br />
In any event, before leaving the subject of gold, we should<br />
improvements in manufacturing technology would gradually<br />
^knowledge that there is nothing mystical about it. It is merely a<br />
reduce the cost of production, causing, not stability, but a downward<br />
ornrnodity which, because it has intrinsic value and possesses<br />
movement of all prices. That downward pressure, however, is<br />
ertatn qualities, has become accepted throughout history as a<br />
partially offset by an increase in the cost of the more sophisticated ^edium of exchange. Hitler waged a campaign against gold as a<br />
tools that are required. Furthermore, similar technological effiriencies<br />
are being applied in the field of mining, so everything tends to<br />
gely financed their war machine with it. Lenin claimed that gold<br />
OQi of the Jewish bankers. But the Nazis traded heavily in gold and<br />
balance out. History has shown that changes in this natural<br />
is used only to keep the workers in bondage and that, after the<br />
equilibrium are minimal and occur only gradually over a long ^olution, it would be used to cover the floors of public lavatories.<br />
goes up, and an equilibrium is reached once again in which suits<br />
and gold are traded as before. The free market, if unfettered by<br />
factor of human effort. The human effort required to extract one<br />
ounce of gold from the earth will always be approximately equal to<br />
L<br />
e Soviet Union under Communism became one of the world's<br />
^gest producers and users of gold. Economist John Maynard
146 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND THE BARBARIC METAL 147<br />
Keynes once dismissed gold as a "barbaric metal." Many followers<br />
of Keynes today are heavily invested in gold. It is entirely possible<br />
of course, that something other than gold would be better as the<br />
basis for money. It's just that in over two thousand years, no one<br />
has been able to find it.<br />
NATURAL LAW NO. 1<br />
The amazing stability of gold as a measure of value is simply<br />
the result of human nature reacting to the forces of supply and<br />
demand. The process, therefore, may be stated as a natural law of<br />
human behavior:<br />
LESSON: When gold (or silver) is used as money and when<br />
the forces of supply and demand are not thwarted by<br />
government intervention, the amount of new metal added to the<br />
money supply will always be closely proportional to the<br />
expanding services and goods which can be purchased with it<br />
Long-term stability of prices is the dependable result of these<br />
forces. This process is automatic and impartial. Any attempt by<br />
politicians to intervene will destroy the benefit for all.<br />
Therefore,<br />
LAW: Long-term price stability is possible only when the<br />
money supply is based upon the gold (or silver) supply without<br />
government interference.<br />
As the concept of money was slowly developing in the mind of<br />
ancient man, it became obvious that one of the advantages of using<br />
gold or silver as the medium of exchange was that, because of their<br />
rarity as compared to copper or iron, great value could be<br />
represented by small size. Tiny ingots could be carried in a pouch<br />
or fastened to a belt for ease of transportation. And, of course, they<br />
could be more readily hidden for safekeeping. Goldsmiths then<br />
began to fashion them into round discs and to put their stamps on<br />
them to attest to purity and weight. In this way, the world's first<br />
coins began to make their appearance.<br />
It is believed that the first precious metal coins were minted by<br />
the Lydians in Asia Minor (now Northwest Turkey), in about 600<br />
B.C. The Chinese used gold cubes as early as 2100 B.C. But it wasn't<br />
until the kings stepped into the picture that true coinage became a<br />
reality. It was only when the state certified the tiny discs that they<br />
became widely accepted, and it is to the Greeks more than anyone<br />
that we owe this development. Groseclose describes the result:<br />
These light, shining discs, adorned with curious new emblems and<br />
a variety of vigorous, striking images, made a deep impression on<br />
both Greek and barbarian. And to the more practical minded, the<br />
abundance of uniform pieces of metal, each of a standard weight,<br />
certified by the authority of the state, meant a release from the<br />
cumbersomeness of barter and new and dazzling opportunities in<br />
every direction. . .<br />
All classes of men succumbed to money, and those who had<br />
formerly been content to produce only for their needs and the<br />
necessities of the household, found themselves going to the market<br />
place with their handicraft, or the fruits of their toil, to exchange them<br />
for the coins they might obtain. 1<br />
EXPANDING THE MONEY SUPPLY BY COIN CLIPPING<br />
From the very beginning, the desire for a larger money supply<br />
led to practices which were destructive to the economy. Unscrupulous<br />
merchants began to shave off a tiny portion of each coin they<br />
handled— a process known as coin clipping—and then having the<br />
shavings melted down into new coins. Before long, the king's<br />
treasury began to do the same thing to the coins it received in taxes.<br />
In this way, the money supply was increased, but the supply of<br />
gold was not. The result was exactly what we now know always<br />
happens when the money supply is artificially expanded. There<br />
was inflation. Whereas one coin previously would buy twelve<br />
sheep, now it would only be accepted for ten. The total amount of<br />
gold needed for twelve sheep never really changed. It's<br />
just that<br />
everyone knew that one coin no longer contained it.<br />
As governments became more brazen in their debasement of<br />
2 currency, even to the extent of diluting the gold or silver<br />
content, the population adapted quite well by simply "discount-<br />
,r «" the new coins. That is to say, they accepted them at a realistic<br />
^alue, which was lower than what the government had intended.<br />
s was, as always, reflected in a general rise in prices quoted in<br />
Tms of those coins. Real prices, in terms of labor or other goods or<br />
^en of gold itself remained unchanged.<br />
^<br />
Governments do not like to be thwarted in their plans to exploit<br />
I subjects. So a way had to be found to force people to accept<br />
-se slugs as real money. This led to the first legal-tender laws. By<br />
°ya! decree, the "coin of the realm," was declared legal for the<br />
G rosecllose, Money and Man, p. 13.
148 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND THE BARBARIC METAL 149<br />
settlement of all debts. Anyone who refused it at face value was<br />
subject to fine, imprisonment, or, in some cases, even death. The<br />
result was that the good coins disappeared from circulation and<br />
went into private hoards. After all, if the government forces you to<br />
accept junk at the same rate of exchange as gold, wouldn't you<br />
keep the gold and spend the junk? That is what happened in<br />
America in the '60s when the mint began to issue cheap metal<br />
tokens to replace the silver dimes, quarters, and half-dollars.<br />
Within a few months, the silver coins were in dresser drawers and<br />
safe-deposit boxes. The same thing has happened repeatedly<br />
throughout antiquity. In economics, that is called Gresham's Law:<br />
"Bad money drives out good/'<br />
The final move in this game of legal plunder was for the<br />
government to fix prices so that, even if everyone is using only junk<br />
as money, they can no longer compensate for the continually<br />
expanding supply of it. Now the people were caught. They had no<br />
escape except to become criminals, which most of them, incidentally,<br />
chose to do. The history of artificially expanding money is the<br />
history of great dissatisfaction with government, much lawlessness,<br />
and a massive underground economy.<br />
GOLD IS THE ENEMY OF THE WELFARE STATE<br />
In more modern times, rulers of nations have become more<br />
sophisticated in the methods by which they debase the currency.<br />
Instead of clipping coins, it is done through the banking system.<br />
The consequences of that process were summarized in 1966 by Alan<br />
Greenspan who, a few years later, would became Chairman of the<br />
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve. Greenspan wrote:<br />
The abandonment of the gold standard made it possible for the<br />
welfare statists to use the banking system as a means to an unlimited<br />
expansion of credit. . .<br />
The law of supply and demand is not to be conned. As the supply<br />
of money (of claims) increases relative to the supply of tangible assets<br />
in the economy, prices must eventually rise. Thus the earnings saved<br />
by the productive members of the society lose value in terms of goods.<br />
When the economy's books are finally balanced, one finds that this<br />
loss in value represents the goods purchased by the government for<br />
welfare or other purposes. .<br />
.<br />
In the absence of the gold standard, there is no way to protect<br />
savings from confiscation through inflation. There is no safe store oi<br />
value. If there were, the government would have to make its holding<br />
illegal, as was done in the case of gold.... The financial policy of the<br />
welfare state requires that there be no way for the owners of wealth to<br />
protect themselves.<br />
This is the shabby secret of the welfare statists' tirades against<br />
gold. Deficit spending is simply a scheme for the "hidden"<br />
confiscation of wealth. Gold stands in the way of this insidious<br />
process. It stands as a protector of property rights.<br />
Unfortunately, when Greenspan was appointed as Chairman of<br />
the Federal Reserve System, he became silent on the issue of gold.<br />
Once he was seated at the control panel which holds the levers of<br />
power, he served the statists well as they continued to confiscate<br />
the people's wealth through the hidden tax of inflation. Even the<br />
wisest of men can be corrupted by power and wealth.<br />
REAL COMMODITY MONEY IN HISTORY<br />
Returning to the topic of debasing the currency in ancient<br />
times, it must be stated that such practices were by no means<br />
universal. There are many examples throughout history of regents<br />
and kingdoms which used great restraint in money creation.<br />
Ancient Greece, where coinage was first developed, is one of them.<br />
The drachma became the defacto monetary unit of the civilized<br />
world because of the dependability of its gold content. Within its<br />
borders, cities flourished and trade abounded. Even after the fall of<br />
Athens in the Peloponnesian War, her coinage remained, for<br />
centuries, as the standard by which all others were measured. 2<br />
Perhaps the greatest example of a nation with sound money,<br />
however, was the Byzantine Empire. Building on the sound monetary<br />
tradition of Greece, the emperor Constantine ordered the<br />
creation of a new gold piece called the solidus and a silver piece<br />
called the miliarense. The gold weight of the solidus soon became<br />
ed at 65 grains and was minted at that standard for the next<br />
eight-hundred years. Its quality was so dependable that it was<br />
freely accepted, under the name bezant, from China to Brittany,<br />
from the Baltic Sea to Ethiopia.<br />
Byzantine laws regarding money were strict. Before being<br />
l drrutted to the profession of banking, the candidate had to have<br />
sponsors who would attest to his character, that he would not file<br />
Greens<br />
Idrntla ? P an " '<br />
Gold and Economic Freedom/' in Capitalism: The Unknown<br />
£*h ed. Ayn Rand (New York: Signet Books, 1967), p. 101.<br />
the Greeks<br />
ren<br />
'<br />
under Solon, had one, brief experience with a debased cur-<br />
Ut<br />
PP U<br />
'* WaS Sh°rt liVed/ and neVer re P eated See Groseclose, Money<br />
"<br />
and Man,<br />
9
150 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
9 THE BARBARIC METAL 151<br />
or chip either the solidi or the miliarensia, and that he would not<br />
issue false coin.<br />
hand. 1<br />
Violation of these rules called for cutting off a<br />
It is an amazing fact of history that the Byzantine Empire<br />
flourished as the center of world commerce for eight-hundred<br />
years without falling into bankruptcy nor, for that matter, even into<br />
debt. Not once during this period did it devalue its money.<br />
"Neither the ancient nor the modern world/' says Heinrich Gelzer,<br />
"can offer a complete parallel to this phenomenon. This prodigious<br />
stability...secured the bezant as universal currency. On account of its<br />
full weight, it passed with all the neighboring nations as a valid<br />
medium of exchange. By her money, Byzantium controlled bom the<br />
civilized and the barbarian worlds/'<br />
BAD COMMODITY MONEY IN HISTORY<br />
The experience of the Romans was quite different. Basically a<br />
militaristic people, they had little patience for the niceties of<br />
monetary restraint. Especially in the later Empire, debasement of<br />
the coinage became a deliberate state policy. Every imaginable<br />
means for plundering the people was devised. In addition to<br />
taxation, coins were clipped, reduced, diluted, and plated. Favored<br />
groups were given franchises for state-endorsed monopolies, the<br />
origin of our present-day corporation. And, amidst constantly<br />
rising prices in terms of constantly expanding money, speculation<br />
and dishonesty became rampant.<br />
By the year 301 A.D., mutiny was developing in the army/<br />
remote regions were displaying disloyalty, the treasury was empty,<br />
agriculture depressed, and trade almost at a standstill. It was then<br />
that Diocletian issued his famous price-fixing proclamation as the<br />
last measure of a desperate emperor. We are struck by the<br />
similarity to such proclamations in our own time. Most of the chaos<br />
can be traced directly to government policy. Yet, the politicians<br />
point the accusing finger at everyone else for their "greed" and<br />
"disregard for the common good." Diocletian declared:<br />
1. he livre du prifet ou Vempereur Uon le Sage sur les corporations de Constantino?*'<br />
French translation from the Geneva <strong>text</strong> by Jules Nicole, p. 38. Cited by Groseclose,<br />
Money and Man, p. 52.<br />
2. Byzantininsche Kulturgeschichte (Tubingen, 1909), p. 78. As quoted by Grosedose,<br />
Money and Man, p. 54.<br />
Who is of so hardened a heart and so untouched by a feeling of<br />
humanity that he can be unaware, nay that he has not noticed, that in<br />
the sale of wares which are exchanged in the market, or dealt with in<br />
the daily business of the cities, an exorbitant tendency in prices has<br />
spread to such an extent that the unbridled desire of plundering is<br />
held in check neither by abundance nor by seasons of plenty....<br />
Inasmuch as there is seen only a mad desire without control, to pay no<br />
heed to the needs of the many,...it seems good to us, as we look into the<br />
future, to us who are the fathers of the people, that justice intervene to<br />
settle matters impartially. 1<br />
What followed was an incredibly detailed list<br />
of mandated<br />
prices for everything from a serving of beer or a bunch of<br />
watercress to a lawyer's fee and a bar of gold. The result?<br />
Conditions became even worse, and the royal decree was rescinded<br />
five years later.<br />
The Roman Empire never recovered from the crisis. By the<br />
fourth century, all coins were weighed, and the economy was<br />
slipping back into barter again. By the seventh century, the weights<br />
themselves had been so frequently changed that it was no longer<br />
possible to effect an exchange in money at all. For all practical<br />
purposes, money became extinct, and the Roman Empire was no<br />
more.<br />
RECEIPT MONEY<br />
When new civilizations rose from the ruins of Rome, they<br />
reclaimed the lost discovery of money and used it to great<br />
advantage. The invention was truly a giant step forward for<br />
mankind, but there were many problems yet to be solved and<br />
much experimentation lay ahead. The development of paper<br />
oney was a case in point. When a man accumulated more coins<br />
than he required for daily purchases, he needed a safe place to store<br />
an. The goldsmiths, who handled large amounts of precious<br />
metals in their<br />
trades, had already built sturdy vaults to protect<br />
their own inventory, so it was natural for them to offer vault space<br />
o their customers for a fee. The goldsmith could be trusted to<br />
guard the coins well because he also would be euardine 6 his own<br />
wealth.<br />
When the coins were placed into the vault, the warehouseman<br />
ould give the owner a written receipt which entitled him to<br />
As quoted by Groseclose, Money and Man, pp. 43-44.
152 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND THE BARBARIC METAL 153<br />
withdraw at any time. At first,<br />
the only way the coins could be<br />
taken from the vault was for the owner to personally present the<br />
receipt. Eventually, however, it became customary for the owner to<br />
merely endorse his receipt to a third party who, upon presentation<br />
could make the withdrawal. These endorsed receipts were the<br />
forerunners of today's checks.<br />
The final stage in this development was the custom of issuing,<br />
not just one receipt for the entire deposit, but a series of smaller<br />
receipts, adding up to the same total, and each having printed<br />
across the top: PAY TO THE BEAKER ON DEMAND. As the population<br />
learned from experience that these paper receipts were truly<br />
backed by good coin in the goldsmith's warehouse and that the<br />
coin really would be given out in exchange for the receipts, it<br />
became increasingly common to use the paper instead of the coin.<br />
Thus, receipt<br />
money came into existence. The paper itself was<br />
useless, but what it represented was quite valuable. As long as the<br />
coin was held in safe keeping as promised, there was no difference<br />
in value between the receipt and the coin which backed it. And, as<br />
we shall see in the next chapter, there were notable examples of the<br />
honest use of receipt money at the very beginning of the development<br />
of banking. When the receipt was scrupulously honored, the<br />
economy moved forward. When it was used as a gimmick for the<br />
artificial expansion of the money supply, the economy convulsed<br />
and stagnated.<br />
NATURAL LAW NO. 2<br />
This is not a <strong>text</strong>book on the history of money, so we cannot<br />
afford the luxury of lingering among the fascinating details. For our<br />
purposes, it is sufficient to recognize that human behavior in these<br />
matters is predictable and, because of that predictability, it is<br />
possible to formulate another principle that is so universal that it<br />
too, may be considered a natural law. Drawing from the vast<br />
experience of this early period, it can be stated as follows:<br />
metals, the result is price stability, economic prosperity, and<br />
political tranquility. Therefore,<br />
LAW: For a nation to enjoy economic prosperity and<br />
political tranquility, the monetary power of its politicians must<br />
be limited solely to the maintenance of honest weights and<br />
measures of precious metals.<br />
As we shall see in the following chapters, the centuries of<br />
monetary upheaval that followed that early period contain no<br />
evidence that this law has been repealed by modern man.<br />
SUMMARY<br />
Knowledge of the nature of money is essential to an under-<br />
rstanding of the Federal Reserve. Contrary to common belief,<br />
topic is<br />
the<br />
neither mysterious nor complicated. For the purposes of<br />
this study, money is defined as anything which is accepted as a<br />
medium of exchange. Building on that, we find there are four kinds<br />
of money: commodity, receipt, fiat, and fractional. Precious metals<br />
were the First commodity money to appear in history and ever<br />
since have been proven by actual experience to be the only reliable<br />
base for an honest monetary system. Gold, as the basis of money,<br />
can take several forms: bullion, coins, and fully backed paper<br />
receipts. Man has been plagued throughout history with the false<br />
theory that the quantity of money is important, specifically that<br />
more money is better than less. This has led to perpetual manipulation<br />
and expansion of the money supply through such practices as<br />
coin clipping, debasement of the coin content, and, in later centuries,<br />
the issuance of more paper receipts than there was gold to<br />
back them. In every case, these practices have led to economic and<br />
political disaster. In those rare instances where man has refrained<br />
from manipulating the money supply and has allowed it to be<br />
determined by free-market production of the gold supply, the<br />
result has been prosperity and tranquility.<br />
LESSON: Whenever government sets out to manipulate the<br />
money supply, regardless of the intelligence or good intentions<br />
of those who attempt to direct the process, the result is inflation/<br />
economic chaos, and political upheaval. By contrast, whenever<br />
government is limited in its monetary power to only the<br />
maintenance of honest weights and measures of precious
Chapter Eight<br />
FOOL'S GOLD<br />
The history of paper money without preciousmetal<br />
backingforced on the public by government<br />
decree; the emergence of our present-day<br />
fractional-reserve<br />
banking system based on the<br />
issuance of a greater amount of receipts for gold<br />
than the bank has in gold to back them up.<br />
We previously have broken down the concept of money into<br />
four categories: commodity, receipt, fiat, and fractional. In the last<br />
chapter we examined commodity and receipt money in some<br />
detail. In doing so, we also established certain monetary principles<br />
which apply regardless of their form. We shall now turn to the<br />
remaining two categories, both of which are represented by paper<br />
and which are at the root of almost all of modern man's economic<br />
woes.<br />
FIAT MONEY<br />
The American Heritage Dictionary defines fiat money as "paper<br />
money decreed legal tender, not backed by gold or silver." The two<br />
characteristics of fiat money, therefore, are (1) it does not represent<br />
anything of intrinsic value and (2) it is decreed legal tender. Legal<br />
tender simply means that there is a law requiring everyone to<br />
accept the currency in commerce. The two always go together<br />
because, since the money really is worthless, it soon would be<br />
rejected by the public in favor of a more reliable medium of<br />
exchange, such as gold or silver coin. Thus, when governments<br />
issue fiat money, they always declare it to be legal tender under<br />
pain of fine or imprisonment. The only way a government can<br />
exchange its worthless paper money for tangible goods and<br />
services is to give its citizens no choice.<br />
The first notable use of this practice was recorded by Marco<br />
Polo during his travels to China in the thirteenth century. The<br />
famous explorer gives us this account:
156 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND FOOL'S GOLD 157<br />
The Emperor's mint then is in this same City of Cambaluc, and the<br />
way it is wrought is such that you might say he hath the Secret of<br />
Alchemy in perfection, and you would be right!...<br />
What they take is a certain fine white bast or skin which lies<br />
between the wood of the tree and the thick outer bark, and this they<br />
make into something resembling sheets of paper, but black. When<br />
these sheets have been prepared they are cut up into pieces of different<br />
sizes. The smallest of these sizes is worth a half tornesel.... There is<br />
also a kind worth one Bezant of gold, and others of three Bezants, and<br />
so up to ten.<br />
All these pieces of paper are issued with as much solemnity and<br />
authority as if they were of pure gold or silver; and on every piece, a<br />
variety of officials, whose duty it is, have to write their names and to<br />
put their seals. And when all is prepared duly, the chief officer<br />
deputed by the Kaan smears the Seal entrusted to him with vermilion<br />
and impresses it on the paper, so that the form of the Seal remains<br />
stamped upon it in red; the money is then authentic. Any one forging<br />
it would be punished with death. And the Kaan causes every year to<br />
be made such a vast quantity of this money, which costs him nothing,<br />
that it must equal in amount all the treasures in the world!<br />
With these pieces of paper, made as I have described, he causes all<br />
payments on his own account to be made, and he makes them to pass<br />
current universally over all his Kingdoms.... And nobody, however<br />
important he may think himself, dares to refuse them on pain of death.<br />
And indeed everybody takes them readily.<br />
One is tempted to marvel at the Kaan's audacious power and<br />
the subservience of his subjects who endured such an outrage; but<br />
our smugness rapidly vanishes when we consider the similarity to<br />
our own Federal Reserve Notes. They are adorned with signatures<br />
and seals; counterfeiters are severely punished; the government<br />
pays its expenses with them; the population is forced to accept<br />
them; they—and the "invisible" checkbook money into which they<br />
can be converted—are made in such vast quantity that it must<br />
equal in amount all<br />
the treasures of the world. And yet they cost<br />
nothing to make. In truth, our present monetary system is an<br />
almost exact replica of that which supported the warlords of seven<br />
centuries ago.<br />
1. Original from Henry Thule's edition of Marco Polo's Travels, reprinted in W-<br />
Vissering, On Chinese Currency: Coin and Paper Money (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1877),<br />
reprinted 1968 by Ch'eng-wen Publishing Co., Taiwan, as cited by Anthony Sutton,<br />
The War on Gold (Seal Beach, California: '76 Press, 1977), pp. 26-28.<br />
THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE<br />
Unfortunately, the present situation is not unique to our<br />
history. In fact, after China, the next place in the world to adopt the<br />
use of fiat money was America; specifically, the Massachusetts Bay<br />
Colony. This event has been described as "not only the origin of<br />
paper money in America, but also in the British Empire, and almost<br />
in the Christian world."<br />
In 1690, Massachusetts launched a military raid against the<br />
French colony in Quebec. She had done this before and, each time,<br />
had brought back sufficient plunder to more than pay for the<br />
expedition. This time, however, the foray was a dismal failure, and<br />
the men returned empty handed. When the soldiers demanded<br />
their pay, Massachusetts found its coffers empty. Disgruntled<br />
soldiers have a way of becoming unruly, so the officials scrambled<br />
for some way to raise the funds. Additional taxes would have been<br />
extremely unpopular, so they decided simply to print paper<br />
money. In order to convince the soldiers and the citizenry to accept<br />
it, the government made two solemn promises: (1) it would redeem<br />
the paper for gold or silver coin just as soon as there was sufficient<br />
tax revenue to do so, and (2) absolutely no additional paper notes<br />
would ever be issued. Both pledges were promptly broken. Only a<br />
few months later, it was announced that the original issue was<br />
insufficient to discharge the government's debt, and a new issue<br />
almost six times greater was put into circulation. The currency<br />
wasn't redeemed for nearly forty years, long after those who had<br />
made the pledge had faded from the scene.<br />
A CLASSIC PATTERN<br />
Most of the other colonies were quick to learn the magic of the<br />
printing press, and the history that followed is a classic example of<br />
cause and effect: Governments artificially expanded the money<br />
supply through the issuance of fiat currency. This was followed by<br />
legal tender laws to force its acceptance. Next came the disappearance<br />
of gold or silver coins which went, instead, into private hoards<br />
or to foreign traders who insisted on the real thing for their wares.<br />
Many of the colonies repudiated their previous money by issuing<br />
new bills valued at multiples of the old. Then came political<br />
1- Ernest Ludlow Bogart, Economic History of the American People (New York:<br />
Longmans, Green and Co., 1930), p. 172.
I.<br />
158 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
discontent and civil<br />
disobedience. And at the end of each cycle<br />
there was rampant inflation and economic chaos.<br />
In 1703, South Carolina declared that its money was "a good<br />
payment and tender in law" and then added that, should anyone<br />
refuse to honor it as such, they would be fined an amount equal to<br />
"double the value of the bills so refused." By 1716, the penalty had<br />
been increased to "treble the value."<br />
THE PRINTING PRESS AND INFLATION<br />
Benjamin Franklin was an ardent proponent of fiat money<br />
during those years and used his great influence to sell the idea to<br />
the public. We can get some idea of the ferment of the times by<br />
noting that, in 1736, writing in his Pennsylvania Gazette, Franklin<br />
apologized for its irregular publication, and explained that the<br />
printer was "with the Press, labouring for the publick Good, to<br />
make Money more plentiful." 2 The printing of money was apparently<br />
a major, time-consuming operation.<br />
In 1737, Massachusetts devalued its fiat currency by 66%,<br />
offering one dollar of new currency for three of the old. The<br />
promise was made that, after five years, the new money would be<br />
fully redeemed in silver or gold. The promise was not kept<br />
By the late 1750s, Connecticut had price inflated by 800%. The<br />
Carolinas had inflated 900%. Massachusetts 1000%. Rhode Island<br />
2300%. 4 Naturally, these inflations all had to come to an end and,<br />
they turned into equally massive deflations and<br />
when they did,<br />
depressions. It has been shown that, even in colonial times, the<br />
classic booms and busts which modern economists are fond of<br />
blaming on an "unbridled free market" actually were direct<br />
manifestations of the expansion and contraction of fiat monev^<br />
which no longer was governed by the laws of supply and demand.<br />
1 Statutes at Large of South Carolina, 11. 211,665, as cited by George Bancroft, A<br />
Plea for the Constitution (Originally published by Harpers in 1886. Reprinted m<br />
Sewanee, Tennessee: Spencer Judd Publishers, 1982), p. 7.<br />
2. Leonard W. Labaree, ed., The Papers of Benjamin Franklin (New Haven: Yaie<br />
University Press, 1960), Vol. 2, p. 159.<br />
3. Province Laws, II. 826, cited by Bancroft, p. 14.<br />
4. Ron Paul and Lewis Lehrman, The Case for Gold (Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute,<br />
1982), p. 22. Also Sutton, The War on Gold, p. 44.<br />
n<br />
5 See Donald L. Kemmerer, "Paper Money in New Jersey, 1668-1775, New<br />
Jersey Historical Society, Proceedings 74 (April 1956): pp. 107-144, as cited by Paul<br />
and Lehrman, The Casefor Gold, p. 22.<br />
FOOL'S GOLD 159<br />
By this time, coins had completely disappeared from the scene.<br />
Some were in private hoards, but most of them had been exported<br />
to other countries, leaving the colonies with little choice but to use<br />
fiat<br />
money or barter. Merchants from abroad were interested in<br />
neither of those, however, and international trade ground almost to<br />
a halt<br />
A BLESSING IN DISGUISE<br />
The experiment with fiat money was a calamity to the colonists,<br />
but it was also a thorn in the side of the Bank of England. The bank<br />
had used its influence with the Crown to forbid the colonies to mint<br />
their own coins or to establish local banks. This meant that, if the<br />
colonists wanted the convenience of paper money, they would be<br />
forced to use the notes issued by the Bank of England. No one had<br />
anticipated that the colonial governments would be so inventive as<br />
to create their own paper money. So, in 1751, Great Britain began to<br />
pressure the colonies to redeem all of their currency and withdraw<br />
it from circulation. This they eventually did, and at bargain prices.<br />
By then, their fiat money was heavily discounted in the market<br />
place and the governments were able to buy back their own<br />
currency for pennies on the dollar.<br />
The decree from the British Parliament, although heavily<br />
resented by the colonists, turned out to be a blessing in disguise.<br />
The paper notes of the Bank of England never did become a<br />
primary medium of exchange. Probably because of their recent bad<br />
experience with paper money, the colonists merely brought what<br />
few gold and silver coins they had out of hiding and returned to a<br />
true commodity-money system. At first, the doomsdayers predicted<br />
this would spell further ruin for the colonial economy.<br />
'"There isn't enough money" was the all-too-familiar cry. But there<br />
was, indeed, quite enough for, as we have already seen, any<br />
amount is sufficient.<br />
TOBACCO BECOMES MONEY<br />
There was, in fact, a period in which other commodities became<br />
accepted as a secondary medium of exchange. Such items as nails,<br />
lumber, rice, and whisky filled the monetary void, but tobacco was<br />
the most common. Here was a commodity which was in great<br />
demand both within the colonies and for overseas commerce. It<br />
had intrinsic value; it could not be counterfeited; it could be<br />
divided into almost any denominational quantity; and its supply
160 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND FOOL'S GOLD 161<br />
could not be increased except by the exertion of labor. In other<br />
words, it was regulated by the law of supply and demand, which<br />
gave it great stability in value. In many ways, it was an ideal<br />
money. It was officially adopted as such by Virginia in 1642 and a<br />
few years later by Maryland, but it was used unofficially in all the<br />
other colonies, as well. So close was the identity of tobacco with<br />
money that the previous fiat currency of New Jersey, not a tobacco<br />
growing state, displayed a picture of a tobacco leaf on its<br />
face. It<br />
also carried the inscription: "To counterfeit is Death" Tobacco was<br />
used in early America as a secondary medium of exchange for<br />
about two-hundred years, until the new Constitution declared that<br />
money was, henceforth, the sole prerogative of the federal government.<br />
The primary currency at that juncture, however, was still gold<br />
and silver coin, or specie, as it is called. And the immediate result of<br />
returning to a sound monetary unit was a rapid recovery from the<br />
economic stagnation previously inflicted by the booms and busts of<br />
fiat money. Trade and production rose dramatically, and this, in<br />
turn, attracted an inflow of gold and silver coin from around the<br />
world, filling the void that had been created by years of worthless<br />
paper. The law of supply and demand was visibly at work. For a<br />
while, Massachusetts had returned to specie while Rhode Island<br />
remained on fiat money. The result was that Newport, which had<br />
been the trade center for the West Indies, lost its trade to Boston<br />
and became an empty port. 2 After the colonies had returned to<br />
coin, prices quickly found their natural equilibrium and then stayed<br />
at that point, even during the Seven Years War and the disruption<br />
of trade that occurred immediately prior to the Revolution. There<br />
is no better example of the fact that economic systems in distress<br />
can and do recover rapidly if government does not interfere with<br />
the natural healing process.<br />
WAR BRINGS A RETURN OF FIAT MONEY<br />
The War for Independence brought all of this to a sudden halt.<br />
Wars are seldom funded out of the existing treasury, nor are they<br />
even done so out of increased taxes. If governments were to levy<br />
1. Galbraith, pp. 48-50.<br />
2. Paul and Lehrman, pp. 22-23.<br />
3. 'The Colonial Monetary Standard of Massachusetts/' by Roger W. Weiss,<br />
Economic History Review, No. 27, November, 1974, p. 589.<br />
taxes on their citizens fully adequate to finance the conflict, the<br />
amount would be so great that many of even its most ardent<br />
supporters would lose enthusiasm. By artificially increasing the<br />
money supply, however, the real cost is hidden from view. It is still<br />
paid, of course, but through inflation, a process that few people<br />
understand.<br />
The American Revolution was no exception. In order to pay the<br />
bill<br />
for independence, both the Confederation and the individual<br />
states went heavily into the printing business. At the beginning of<br />
the war in 1775, the total money supply stood at $12 million.<br />
June of that year, the Continental Congress issued another<br />
$2 million. Before the notes were even put into circulation, another<br />
$1 million was authorized. By the end of the year, another<br />
$3 million. In 1776, another $19 million. $13 million in 1777.<br />
$64 million in 1778. $125 million in 1779. And still more: the<br />
Continental Army issued its own "certificates" for the purchase of<br />
supplies totalling $200 million. A total of $425 million in five years<br />
on top of a base of $12 million is an increase of over 3500%. And, in<br />
addition to this massive expansion of the money supply on the part<br />
of the central government, it must be remembered that the states<br />
were doing exactly the same thing. It is estimated that, in just five<br />
years from 1775 to the end of 1779, the total money supply<br />
expanded by 5000%. By contrast, the amount raised in taxes over<br />
the five-year period was inconsequential, amounting to only a few<br />
million dollars.<br />
AND A MASSIVE INFLATION<br />
The first exhilarating effect of this flood of new money was the<br />
flush of apparent prosperity, but that was quickly followed by<br />
inflation as the self-destruct mechanism began to operate. In 1775,<br />
paper Continentals were traded for one dollar in gold. In 1777, they<br />
were exchanged for twenty-five cents. By 1779, just four years from<br />
their issue, they were worth less than a penny. The phrase "Not<br />
Worth V<br />
a Continental'' has its origin in this dismal period. Shoes sold<br />
for $5,000 a pair. A suit of clothes cost a million.<br />
It was in that year that George Washington wrote, "A wagon<br />
oad of money will scarcely purchase a wagon load oP*provisions."<br />
I Quoted by Albert S. Bolles, The Financial History of the United States (New York:<br />
D. Appleton, 1896, 4th ed.), Vol. I, p. 13Z<br />
In
162 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
FOOL'S GOLD 163<br />
Even Benjamin Franklin began to see the light. In a mood of<br />
sarcasm, he wrote:<br />
This Currency, as we manage it, is a wonderful machine. It<br />
performs its Office when we issue it; it pays and clothes Troops and<br />
provides Victuals and Ammunition; and when we are obliged to issue<br />
a Quantity excessive, it pays itself off by Depreciation.<br />
When speaking of deficit spending, it is common to hear the<br />
complaint that we are saddling future generations with the bill for<br />
what we enjoy today. Why not let those in the future help pay for<br />
what will benefit them also? Don't be deceived. That is a misconception<br />
encouraged by politicians to calm the public. When money<br />
is fiat, as the colonists discovered, every government building,<br />
public work, and cannon of war is paid out of current labor and<br />
current wealth. These things must be built today with today's labor,<br />
and the man who performs that labor must also be paid today. It is<br />
true that interest payments fall partly to future generations, but the<br />
initial cost is paid by those in the present. It is paid by loss of value<br />
in the monetary unit and loss of purchasing power for one's wages.<br />
INFLATION IS A HIDDEN TAX<br />
Fiat money is the means by which governments obtain instant<br />
purchasing power without taxation. But where does that purchasing<br />
power come from? Since fiat money has nothing of tangible<br />
value to offset it, government's fiat purchasing power can be<br />
obtained only by subtracting it from somewhere else. It is, in fact,<br />
"collected" from us all through a decline in our purchasing power.<br />
It is, therefore, exactly the same as a tax, but one that is hidden from<br />
view, silent in operation, and little understood by the taxpayer.<br />
In 1786, Thomas Jefferson provided a clear explanation of this<br />
process when he wrote:<br />
Every one, through whose hands a bill passed, lost on that bill<br />
what it lost in value during the time it was in his hands. This was a real<br />
tax on him; and in this way the people of the United States actually<br />
contributed those... millions of dollars during the war, and by a mode<br />
of taxation the most oppressive of all because the most unequal of all-<br />
1 Letter to Samuel Cooper, April 22, 1779, quoted by Albert Henry Smyth, ed., The<br />
Writings of Benjamin Franklin, (New York: Macmillan, 1906), Vol. VII, p. 294.<br />
2. Thomas Jefferson, Observations on the Article Etats-Unis Prepared for the<br />
Encyclopedia, June 22, 1786, from Writings (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1894),<br />
Vol. IV, p. 165.<br />
ENTER PRICE CONTROLS AND LEGAL TENDER LAWS<br />
As prices skyrocketed, the colonies enacted wage and price<br />
controls, which was like plugging up the whistle on a tea kettle in<br />
hopes of keeping the steam from escaping. When that failed, there<br />
followed a series of harsh legal tender laws. One law even invoked<br />
the specter of treason. It said: "If any person shall hereafter be so<br />
lost to all virtue and regard for his Country as to refuse to receive<br />
said bills in payment-he shall be deemed, published, and treated<br />
as an enemy in this Country and precluded from all trade or<br />
intercourse with the inhabitants of these colonies." 1<br />
Rhode Island not only levied a heavy fine for non-acceptance of<br />
its<br />
notes but, upon a secmd offense, an individual was stripped of<br />
citizenship. When a court declared the act unconstitutional, the<br />
legislature called the judges before it and summarily dismissed the<br />
offenders from office.<br />
ENTER ECONOMIC CHAOS AND INSURRECTION<br />
If the ravages of war were a harsh burden for the colonies to<br />
bear, the havoc of fiat money was equally so. After the war,<br />
inflation was followed by deflation as reality returned to the<br />
market place. Prices fell drastically, which was wonderful for those<br />
who were buying. But, for the merchants who were selling or the<br />
farmers who had borrowed heavily to acquire property at inflated<br />
wartime prices, it was a disaster. The new, lower prices were not<br />
adequate to sustain their fixed, inflated mortgages, and many<br />
hard-working families were ruined by foreclosure. Furthermore,<br />
most people still did not understand the inflation process, and<br />
there were many who continued to advocate the "paper money<br />
cure." Several of the states were receptive to the pressure, and their<br />
printing presses continued to roll.<br />
Historian Andrew McLaughlin recalls a typical scene in Rhode<br />
Island at that time as witnessed by a visiting Frenchman:<br />
A French traveler who passed through Newport about this time<br />
gives a dismal picture of the place: idle men standing with folded arms<br />
at the corners of the streets; houses falling to ruins; miserable shops<br />
offering for sale nothing but a few coarse stuffs;...grass growing in the<br />
streets; windows stuffed with rags; everywhere announcing misery,<br />
| David Ramsay, History of the American Revolution (London: Johnson and Stock-<br />
Jale, 1791), Vol. II, pp. 134-36.<br />
2<br />
- Merrill Jensen, The New Nation (New York: Vintage Books, 1950), p. 324.
164 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
the triumph of paper money and the influence of bad governmen*. The<br />
merchants had closed their stores rather than take payment in pape^r;<br />
farmers from neighboring states did not care to bring their produce.<br />
Idleness and economic depression also led to outbursts of<br />
rebellion and insurrection. In 1786, George Washington wrote to<br />
James Warren: "The wheels of government are clogged anck.. we<br />
are descending into the vale of confusion and darkness/' Two<br />
years later, in a letter to Henry Knox, he said: "If ... any person had<br />
told me that there would have been such formidable rebellion as<br />
exists, I would have thought him a bedlamite, a fit subject for a<br />
madhouse."<br />
Fortunately, there is a happy ending to that part of the story. As<br />
we shall see in a subsequent chapter, when the state delegates<br />
assembled to draft the Constitution, the effects of fiat money were<br />
so fresh in their minds they decided to put an end to it once and for<br />
all Then, the new republic not only rapidly recovered but went on<br />
to become the economic envy of the world—for a while, at<br />
least—until the lesson had been forgotten by following generations.<br />
But that is getting ahead of our story. For now, we are dealing with<br />
the topic of fiat money; and the experience of the American<br />
colonies is<br />
a classic example of what always happens when men<br />
succumb to its siren call.<br />
NATURAL LAW NO. 3<br />
Let us pause at this point and observe another of those lessons<br />
derived from centuries of experience. That lesson is so clear and so<br />
universal and so widely seen throughout history that it may be<br />
stated as a natural law of human behavior:<br />
LESSON: Fiat money is paper money without<br />
precious-metal backing and which people are required by law<br />
to accept. It allows politicians to increase spending without<br />
raising taxes. Fiat money is the cause of inflation, and the<br />
amount which people lose in purchasing power is exactly the<br />
amount which was taken from them and transferred to their<br />
government by this process. Inflation, therefore, is a hidden tax.<br />
1. Andrew C. McLaughlin, The Confederation and the Constitution (New York<br />
Collier Books, 1962), pp. 107-08. .<br />
2. Harry Atwood, The Constitution Explained (Merrimac, Massachusetts: Destiny<br />
Publishers, 1927; 2nd ed. 1962), p. 3.<br />
3. IM., p.4<br />
FOOL'S GOLD 165<br />
This tax is the most unfair of all because it falls most heavily on<br />
those who are least able to pay, the small wage earner and those<br />
on fixed incomes. It also punishes the thrifty by eroding the<br />
value of their savings. This creates resentment among the<br />
people, leading always to political unrest and national disunity.<br />
Therefore,<br />
LAW: A nation that resorts to the use of fiat money has<br />
doomed itself to economic hardship and political disunity.<br />
FRACTIONAL MONEY<br />
Let us turn, now, to the fourth and final possible form of<br />
money: a most intriguing concept called fractional money. And, to<br />
understand how this functions, we must return to Europe and the<br />
practice of the early goldsmiths who stored the precious metal<br />
coins of their customers for a fee.<br />
In addition to the goldsmiths who stored coins, there was<br />
another class of merchants, called "scriveners/' who loaned coins.<br />
The goldsmiths reasoned that they, too, could act as scriveners, but<br />
do so with other people's money. They said it was a pity for all that<br />
coin to just sit idle in their vaults- Why not lend it out and earn a<br />
profit which then could be split between themselves and their<br />
depositors? Put it to work, instead of merely gathering dust. They<br />
had learned from experience that very few of their depositors ever<br />
wanted to remove their coins at the same time. In fact, net<br />
withdrawals seldom exceeded ten or fifteen per cent of their<br />
stockpile. It seemed perfectly safe to lend up to eighty or even<br />
eighty-five per cent of their coins. And so the warehousemen began<br />
to act as loan brokers on behalf of their depositors, and the concept<br />
of banking, as we know it today^ was born.<br />
That's the way many history books describe it, but there is more<br />
involved here than merely putting idle money to work. First of all,<br />
sharing the interest income with the owners of the deposits was not<br />
part of the original concept. That only became general practice<br />
many years later after the depositors became outraged and needed<br />
to be reassured that these loans were in their interest as well. In the<br />
beginning, they didn't even know that their coins were being<br />
loaned out. They naively thought that the goldsmiths were lending<br />
their own money.
166 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND FOOL'S GOLD 167<br />
DEPOSITS ARE NOT AVAILABLE FOR LENDING<br />
In the second place, we need to consider whether the coin in the<br />
vault was even available for lending—regardless of whether or not<br />
the depositors received a part of the profit. Let us suppose that we<br />
are playing a game of poker at the home of Charlie Smith. Each of<br />
us has given $20 to Charlie who, acting as the banker, has put our<br />
money into a shoe box and given us, in return, twenty poker chips.<br />
It is the understanding that, anytime we want to go home, we can<br />
get back a dollar for each chip we have at that time. Now let us<br />
suppose that Charlie's brother-in-law, Larry, shows up, not to play<br />
poker, but to borrow some money. Since six of us are playing and<br />
each has put in $20, there is a total of $120 in the shoe box, and that<br />
turns out to be perfect for Larry's needs. You can imagine what<br />
would happen if Charlie decided to lend out the "idle" money. It is<br />
not available for lending.<br />
Neither Charlie nor any of the players have the right to loan<br />
those dollars, because they are being held in escrow, so to speak,<br />
pending completion of the contract between Charlie and his guests.<br />
Those dollars no longer even exist as money. They have been<br />
replaced—in concept at least—by the poker chips. If any of us are<br />
so touched by Larry's story that we decide to loan him the money<br />
ourselves, we would have to do it with other dollars or cash in our<br />
chips for the dollars in the shoe box. In that case, of course, we<br />
could no longer stay in the game. VJe cannot spend, loan, or give away<br />
the deposit and also consider the chips to be worth anything.<br />
If you are a member of an organization and have given your<br />
proxy to a friend to vote in your absence at the annual meeting, you<br />
cannot then show up and cast your own vote in addition to your<br />
proxy. Likewise, in the beginning of banking, the certificates which<br />
were circulated as money were, in effect, proxies for the coins.<br />
Consequently, those coins were not available for lending. Their<br />
monetary value had been assigned to the certificates. If the certificate<br />
holders had wanted to lend out their coins, they should have<br />
retired the certificates first. They were not entitled to hold spendable<br />
paper money and also authorize their banker to lend that same<br />
money as coins. One cannot spend, loan, or give away the coins and also<br />
consider the certificates to be worth anything.<br />
All of this is just common sense. But there is another dimension<br />
to the problem which has to do with honesty in business contracts-<br />
When the bankers used those coins as the basis for loans, they were<br />
putting themselves in a position of not having enough coin in the<br />
vault to make good on their contracts when it came time for<br />
depositors to take their money home. In other words, the new<br />
contracts were made with the full knowledge that, under certain<br />
circumstances, they would have to be broken. But the bankers<br />
never bothered to explain that. The general public was led to<br />
believe that, if they approved of putting these supposedly idle<br />
funds to work, they would be helping the economy and earning a<br />
little profit besides. It was an appealing proposal, and the idea<br />
caught on like wildfire.<br />
FRACTIONAL-RESERVE BANKING<br />
Most borrowers wanted paper money, of course, not bulky<br />
coins, so, when they received their loans, they usually put the coins<br />
right back into the vault for safekeeping. They were then given<br />
receipts for these deposits which, as we have observed, were readily<br />
accepted in commerce as money. At this point, things began to get<br />
complicated. The original depositors had been given receipts for all<br />
of the bank's coins. But the bank now issued loans in the amount of<br />
eighty-five per cent of its<br />
deposits, and the borrowers were given<br />
receipts for that same amount. These were in addition to the original<br />
receipts. That made 85% more receipts than coins. Thus, the banks<br />
created 85% more money and placed it into circulation through their<br />
borrowers. In other words, by issuing phony receipts, they artificially<br />
expanded the money supply. At this point, the certificates<br />
were no longer 100% backed by gold. They now had a backing of<br />
only 54%,<br />
but they were accepted by the unsuspecting public as<br />
equal in value to the old receipts. The gold behind all of them,<br />
however, now represented only a fraction of their face value. Thus,<br />
the receipts became what may be called fractional money / and the<br />
process by which they were created is called fractional-reserve<br />
banking.<br />
None of this shortfall unfortunately, was ever explained. The<br />
bankers decided that it would be better not to discuss reality where<br />
the public could hear. These facts became the arcane secrets of the<br />
profession. The depositors were never encouraged to question how<br />
the banks could lend out their money and still have it on hand to<br />
1. 100 units of gold divided by 185 certificates equals .54
168 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND FOOL'S GOLD 169<br />
pay back on an instant's notice. Instead, bankers put on great airs of<br />
respectability, stability, and accountability; dressed and acted serious<br />
if not stern; erected great edifices resembling government<br />
buildings and temples, all to bolster the false image of being able to<br />
honor their contracts to pay on demand.<br />
It was John Maynard Keynes who observed:<br />
A "sound" banker, alas! is not one who foresees danger, and<br />
avoids it, but one who, when he is ruined, is ruined in a conventional<br />
and orthodox way along with his fellows, so that no one can readily<br />
blame him. It is necessarily part of the business of a banker to maintain<br />
appearances, and to confess a conventional respectability, which is<br />
more than human. Life-long practices of this kind make them the most<br />
romantic and the least realistic of men.<br />
CREATING MONEY OUT OF DEBT<br />
Let us step back for a moment and analyze. In the beginning,<br />
banks served as warehouses for the safe keeping of their customers'<br />
coins. When they issued paper receipts for those coins, they<br />
converted commodity money into receipt money. This was a great<br />
convenience, but it<br />
did not alter the money supply. People had a<br />
choice of using either coin or paper but they could not use both. If<br />
they used coin, the receipt was never issued. If they used the<br />
receipt, the coin remained in the vault and did not circulate.<br />
When the banks abandoned this practice and began to issue<br />
receipts to borrowers, they became magicians. Some have said they<br />
created money out of nothing, but that is not quite true. What they<br />
did was even more amazing. They created money out of debt<br />
is easier for people to go into debt than to mine<br />
Obviously, it<br />
gold. Consequently, money no longer was limited by the natural<br />
forces of supply and demand. From that point in history forward, it<br />
was to be limited only by the degree to which bankers have been<br />
able to push down the gold-reserve fraction of their deposits.<br />
From this perspective, we can now look back on fractional<br />
money and recognize that it really is a transitional form between<br />
receipt money and fiat money. It has some of the characteristics of<br />
both. As the fraction becomes smaller, the less it resembles receipt<br />
money and the more closely it comes to fiat money. When the<br />
fraction finally reaches zero, then it has made the complete<br />
transition and becomes pure fiat. Furthermore, there is no example<br />
in history where men, once they had accepted the concept of<br />
fractional money, didn't reduce the fraction lower and lower until,<br />
eventually, it became zero.<br />
No bank can stay in business for very long with a zero reserve.<br />
The only way to make people accept such a worthless currency is<br />
by government force. That's what legal-tender laws are all about.<br />
The transition from fractional-reserve money to fiat money, therefore,<br />
requires the participation of government through a mechanism<br />
which is called a central bank. Most of the balance of this book<br />
will be devoted to a study of that Creature, but, for now, suffice it<br />
to say that the euphoria of being able to create money without<br />
human effort is so great that, once such a narcotic is taken, there is<br />
no politician or banker who can kick the habit. As William Sumner<br />
observed: "A man mieht as well jump off a precipice intending to<br />
stop half way down/<br />
NATURAL LAW NO. 4<br />
And so, once again, we come to one of those natural laws that<br />
emerge from centuries of human experience. It can be stated as<br />
follows:<br />
LESSON: Fractional money is paper money which is backed<br />
by precious metals up to only a portion of the face amount. It is<br />
a hybrid, being part receipt money and part fiat money.<br />
Generally, the public is unaware of this fact and believes that<br />
fractional money can be redeemed in full at any time. When the<br />
truth is discovered, as periodically happens, there are runs on<br />
the bank, and only the first few depositors in line can be paid.<br />
Since fractional money earns just as much interest for the<br />
bankers as does gold or silver, the temptation is great for them<br />
to create as much of it as possible. As this happens, the fraction<br />
which represents the reserve becomes smaller and smaller until,<br />
eventually, it is reduced to zero. Therefore,<br />
LAW: Fractional money will always degenerate into fiat<br />
money. It is but fiat money in transition.<br />
So much for the overview and generalities. In the next chapter<br />
We shall see what history has to say on this process. And what a<br />
history it is!<br />
1. As quoted by Lever and Huhne, Debt and Danger: The World Financial Crisis<br />
(New York: The Atlantic Monthly, 1986), p. 42.<br />
Gmham Swmer<br />
'<br />
A<br />
l^i]li<br />
n4 Hisior y °f American Currency (New York: Holt,
170 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
SUMMARY<br />
Fiat money is paper money without precious-metal backing<br />
which people are required by law to accept. The first recorded<br />
appearance of fiat money was in thirteenth century China, but its<br />
use on a major scale did not occur until colonial America. The<br />
experience was disastrous, leading to massive inflation, unemployment,<br />
loss of property, and political unrest. During one period<br />
when the Bank of England forced the colonies to abandon theh fiat<br />
money, general prosperity quickly returned. The Revolutionary<br />
War brought fiat money back to the colonies with a vengeance. The<br />
economic chaos that resulted led the colonial governments to<br />
impose price controls and harsh legal tender laws, neither of which<br />
were effective.<br />
Fractional money is defined as paper money with preciousmetal<br />
backing for part, not all, of its stated value. It was introduced<br />
in Europe when goldsmiths began to issue receipts for gold which<br />
they did not have, thus only a fraction of their receipts was<br />
redeemable. Fractional money always degenerates into pure fiat<br />
money.<br />
Chapter Nine<br />
THE SECRET SCIENCE<br />
The condensed history offractional-reserve banking;<br />
the unbroken record offraud, booms, busts,<br />
and economic chaos; the formation of the Bank of<br />
England, the world's first central bank, which<br />
became the model for the Federal Reserve System,<br />
Banks of deposit first appeared in early Greece, concurrent with<br />
the development of coinage itself. They were known in India at the<br />
time of Alexander the Great. They also operated in Egypt as part of<br />
the public granary system. They appeared in Damascus in 1200 and<br />
in Barcelona in 1401. It was the city-state of Venice, however, which<br />
is considered the cradle of banking as we know it today.<br />
THE BANK OF VENICE<br />
By the year 1361, there already had been sufficient abuse in<br />
banking that the Venetian Senate passed a law forbidding bankers<br />
to engage in any other commercial pursuit, thus removing the<br />
temptation to use their depositors' funds to finance their own<br />
enterprises. They were also required to open their books for public<br />
inspection and to keep their stockpile of coins available for viewing<br />
at all reasonable times. In 1524, a board of bank examiners was<br />
created and, two years later, all bankers were required to settle<br />
accounts between themselves in coin rather than by check.<br />
In spite of these precautions, however, the largest bank at that<br />
time, the house of Pisano and Tiepolo, had been active in lending<br />
against its reserves and A in 1584, was forced to close its doors<br />
because of inability to refund depositors. The government picked<br />
up the pieces at that point and a state bank was established, the<br />
Banco della Piazza del Rialto. Having learned from the recent<br />
experience with bankruptcy, the new bank was not allowed to<br />
make any loans. There could be no profit from the issuance of<br />
credit. The bank was required to sustain itself solely from fees for<br />
coin storage, exchanging currencies, handling the transfer of payments<br />
between customers, and notary services.
172 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
The formula for honest banking had been found. The bank<br />
prospered and soon became the center of Venetian commerce. Its<br />
paper receipts were widely accepted far beyond the country's<br />
borders and, in fact,<br />
instead of being discounted in exchange for<br />
gold coin as was the usual practice, they actually carried a premium<br />
over coins. This was because there were so many kinds of coin in<br />
circulation and such a wide variance of quality within the same<br />
type of coin that one had to be an expert to evaluate their worth.<br />
The bank performed this service automatically when it took the<br />
coins into its vault. Each was evaluated, and the receipt given for it<br />
was an accurate reflection of its intrinsic worth. The public,<br />
therefore, was far more certain of the value of the paper receipts<br />
than of many of the coins and, consequently, was willing to<br />
exchange a little bit more for them.<br />
Unfortunately, with the passage of time and the fading from<br />
memory of previous banking abuses, the Venetian Senate eventually<br />
succumbed to the temptation of credit. Strapped for funds and<br />
not willing to face the voters with a tax increase, the politicians<br />
decided they would authorize a new bank without restrictions<br />
against loans, have the bank create the money they needed, and<br />
then "borrow" it. So, in 1619, the Banco del Giro was formed, which,<br />
like its bankrupt predecessor, began immediately to create money<br />
out of nothing for the purpose of lending it to the government.<br />
Eighteen years later, the Banco della Piazza del Rialto was absorbed<br />
into the new bank, and history's first tiny flame of sound banking<br />
sputtered and died.<br />
Throughout the fifteenth<br />
and sixteenth centuries, banks had<br />
been springing up all over Europe. Almost without exception,<br />
however, they followed the lucrative practice of lending money<br />
which was not truly available for loan. They created excess<br />
obligations against their reserves and, as a result, every one of them<br />
failed. That is<br />
not to say that their owners and directors did not<br />
prosper. It merely means that their depositors lost all or a part of<br />
their assets entrusted for safekeeping.<br />
THE BANK OF AMSTERDAM<br />
It wasn't until the Bank of Amsterdam was founded in 1609 that<br />
we find a second example of sound banking practices, and the<br />
results were virtually the same as previously experienced by the<br />
Banco della Piazza del Rialto, The bank only accepted deposits and<br />
THE SECRET SCIENCE 173<br />
steadfastly refused to make loans. Its income was derived solely<br />
All payments in and around Amsterdam soon<br />
from service fees.<br />
came to be made in paper currency issued by the bank and, in fact,<br />
that currency carried a premium over coin itself. The burgomasters<br />
and the city council were required to take an annual oath swearing<br />
that the coin reserve of the bank was intact. Galbraith reminds us:<br />
For a century after its founding it functioned usefully and with<br />
notably strict rectitude. Deposits were deposits, and initially the metal<br />
remained in storage for the man who owned it until he transferred it to<br />
another. None was loaned out. In 1672, when the armies of Louis XIV<br />
approached Amsterdam, there was grave alarm. Merchants besieged<br />
the bank, some in the suspicion that their wealth might not be there.<br />
All who sought their money were paid, and when they found this to be<br />
so, they did not want payment. As was often to be observed in the<br />
future, however desperately people want their money from a bank,<br />
when they are assured they can get it, they no longer want it.<br />
The principles of honesty and restraint were not to be long<br />
lived, however. The temptation of easy profit from money creation<br />
was simply too great. As early as 1657, individuals had been<br />
permitted to overdraw their accounts which means, of course, that<br />
the bank created new money out of their debt. In later years<br />
enormous loans were made to the Dutch East Indies Company. The<br />
truth finally became known to the public in January of 1790, and<br />
demands for a return of deposits were steady from that date<br />
forward. Ten months later, the bank was declared insolvent and<br />
was taken over by the City of Amsterdam.<br />
THE BANK OF HAMBURG<br />
The third and last experience with honest banking occurred in<br />
Germany with the Bank of Hamburg. For over two centuries it<br />
faithfully adhered to the principle of safe deposit. So scrupulous<br />
was its administration that, when Napoleon took possession of the<br />
bank in 1813, he found 7,506,956 marks in silver held against<br />
liabilities of 7,489,343. That was 17,613 more than was actually<br />
needed. Most of the bank's treasure that Napoleon hauled away<br />
was restored a few years later by the French government in the<br />
form of securities. It is not clear if the securities were of much value<br />
but, even if they were, they were not the same as silver. Because of<br />
foreign invasion, the bank's currency was no longer fully convert-<br />
1- Galbraith, p. 16.
174 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND THE SECRET SCIENCE 175<br />
ible into coin as receipt money. It was now fractional mone>, and<br />
the self-destruct mechanism had been set in motion. The bank<br />
lasted another fifty-five years until 1871 when it was ordered to<br />
liquidate all of its accounts.<br />
That is the end of the short story of honest banking. From that<br />
point forward, fractional-reserve banking became the universaJ<br />
practice. But there were to be many interesting twists and turns in<br />
its development before it would be ready for something as sophisticated<br />
as the Federal Reserve System.<br />
EARLY BANKING IN ENGLAND<br />
In England, the first paper money was the exchequer order of<br />
Charles II. It was pure fiat and, although it was decreed legal<br />
tender, it was not widely used. It was replaced in 1696 by the<br />
exchequer bill. The bill was redeemable in gold, and the government<br />
went to great lengths to make sure that there was enough<br />
actual coin or bullion to make good on the pledge. In other words,<br />
it was true receipt money, and it became widely accepted as the<br />
medium of exchange. Furthermore, the bills were considered as<br />
short-term loans to the government and actually paid interest to the<br />
holders.<br />
In 1707, the recently created Bank of England was given the<br />
responsibility of managing this currency, but the bank found more<br />
profit in the circulation of its own banknotes, which were in the<br />
form of fractional money and which provided for the collection of<br />
interest, not the payment of it. Consequently, the government bills<br />
gradually passed out of use and were replaced by banknotes<br />
which, by the middle of the eighteenth century, became England's<br />
only paper money.<br />
It must be understood that, at this time, the Bank of England<br />
was not yet fully developed as a central bank. It had been given a<br />
monopoly over the issue of banknotes within London and other<br />
prime geographic areas, but they were not yet decreed as legal<br />
tender. No one was forced to use them. They were merely private<br />
fractional receipts for gold coin issued by a private bank which the<br />
public could accept, reject, or discount at its pleasure. Legal tender<br />
status was not conferred upon the bank's money until 1833.<br />
Meanwhile, Parliament had granted charters to numerous other<br />
banks throughout the empire and, without exception, the issuance<br />
of fractional money led to their ultimate demise and the ruin of<br />
their depositors. "Disaster after disaster had to come upon the<br />
country," says Shaw, because "of the indifference of the state to<br />
these mere private paper tokens." 1<br />
The Bank of England, however,<br />
was favored by the government above all<br />
time,<br />
others and, time after<br />
it was saved from insolvency by Parliament. How it came to<br />
be that way is an interesting story.<br />
THE BANK OF ENGLAND<br />
England was financially exhausted after half a century of war<br />
against France and numerous civil wars fought largely over<br />
excessive taxation. By the time of the War of the League of<br />
Augsberg in 1693, King William was in serious need for new<br />
revenue. Twenty years previously, King Charles II had flat out<br />
repudiated a debt of over a million pounds which had been lent to<br />
him by scores of goldsmiths, with the result that ten-thousand<br />
depositors lost their savings. This was still fresh in everyone's<br />
memory, and, needless to say, the government was no longer<br />
considered a good investment risk. Unable to increase taxes and<br />
unable to borrow, Parliament became desperate for some other<br />
way to obtain the money. The objective, says Groseclose, was not to<br />
bring "the money mechanism under more intelligent control, but to<br />
provide means outside the onerous sources of taxes and public<br />
loans for the financial requirements of an impecunious government."<br />
2<br />
There were two groups of men who saw a unique opportunity<br />
arise out of this necessity. The first group consisted of the political<br />
scientists within the government. The second was comprised of the<br />
monetary scientists from the emerging business of banking. The<br />
organizer and spokesman of this group was William Paterson from<br />
Scotland.<br />
Paterson had been to America and came back with a<br />
grandiose scheme to obtain a British charter for a commercial<br />
company to colonize the Isthmus of Panama, then known as<br />
Darien. The government was not interested in that,<br />
so Paterson<br />
turned his attention to a scheme that did interest it very much, the<br />
creation of money.<br />
The two groups came together and formed an alliance. No, that<br />
is too ~"<br />
soft a word. The American Heritage Dictionary defines a cabal<br />
1- W. A. Shaw, Theory and Principles of Central Banking (London & New York; Sir L<br />
* itman & Sons, Ltd, 1930), pp. 32-32.<br />
1
176 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
as "A conspiratorial group of plotters or intriguers/' There is no<br />
other word that could so accurately describe this group. With much<br />
of the same secrecy and mystery that surrounded the meeting on<br />
<strong>Jekyll</strong> Island, the Cabal met in Mercer's Chapel in London and<br />
hammered out a seven-point plan which would serve their mutual<br />
purposes:<br />
1. The government would grant a charter to the monetary scientists<br />
to form a bank;<br />
2. The bank would be given a monopoly to issue banknotes which<br />
would circulate as England's paper currency;<br />
3. The bank would create money out of nothing with only a fraction<br />
of its total currency backed by coin;<br />
4. The monetary scientists then would loan the government all the<br />
money it needed;<br />
5. The money created for government loans would be backed<br />
primarily by government I.O.U.s;<br />
6. Although this money was to be created out of nothing and would<br />
cost nothing to create, the government would pay "interest" on<br />
it at the rate of 8%;<br />
7. Government LO.U.s would also be considered as "reserves" for<br />
creating additional loan money for private commerce. These<br />
loans also would earn interest. Thus, the monetary scientists<br />
would collect double interest on the same nothing.<br />
The circular which was distributed to attract subscribers to the<br />
Bank's initial<br />
stock offering explained: "The Bank hath benefit of<br />
interest on all the moneys which it, the Bank, creates out of<br />
nothing/'<br />
The charter was issued in 1694, and a strange creature<br />
took its initial breath of life. It was the world's first central bank.<br />
Rothbard writes:<br />
1. For an overview of these agreements, see Murray Rothbard, The Mystery of<br />
Banking (New York: Richardson & Snyder, 1983), p. 180. Also Martin Mayer, The<br />
Bankers (New York: Weybright & Talley, 1974), pp. 24-25.<br />
2. Quoted by Carol! Quigley, Tragedy and Hope. A History of the World in Our Time<br />
(New York: Macmillan, 1966), p. 49. Paterson did not benefit from his own creation-<br />
He withdrew from the Bank over a policy disagreement within a few months after<br />
its formation and then returned to Scotland where he succeeded in selling his<br />
Darien scheme. Frugal Scots thronged to buy stock and to book passage to the<br />
fever-ridden land. The stock became worthless and almost all the 1200 colonists lost<br />
their lives.<br />
THE SECRET SCIENCE 177<br />
In short, since there were not enough private savers willing to<br />
finance the deficit, Paterson and his group were graciously willing to<br />
buy government bonds, provided they could do so with<br />
newly-created out-of-thin-air bank notes carrying a raft of special<br />
privileges with them. This was a splendid deal for Paterson and<br />
company, and the government benefited from the flimflam of a<br />
seemingly legitimate bank's financing their debts....<br />
As soon as the<br />
Bank of England was chartered in 1694, King William himself and<br />
various members of Parliament rushed to become shareholders of the<br />
new money factory they had just created. 1<br />
THE SECRET SCIENCE OF MONEY<br />
Both groups within the Cabal were handsomely rewarded for<br />
their efforts. The political scientists had been seeking about<br />
£500,000 to finance the current war. The Bank promptly gave them<br />
more than twice what they originally sought. The monetary<br />
scientists started with a pledged capital investment of £1,200,000.<br />
Textbooks tell us that this was lent to the government at 8%<br />
interest, but what is usually omitted is the fact that, at the time the<br />
loan was made, only £720,000 had been invested, which means the<br />
Bank "loaned" 66% more than it had on hand. 2 Furthermore, the<br />
Bauik was given the privilege of creating at least an equal amount of<br />
money in the form of loans to the public. So, after lending their<br />
capital to the government, they still had it available to loan out a<br />
second time.<br />
An honest loan of their £720,000 at 8% would have yielded<br />
£57,600 interest. But, with the new secret science, they were able to<br />
earn 8% on £1,200,000 given to the government plus an estimated<br />
9% on £720,000 loaned to the public. That adds up to £160,800,<br />
more than 22% on their investment. The real point, however, is<br />
that, under these circumstances, it is meaningless to talk about a<br />
rate of interest. When money is created out of nothing, the true<br />
interest rate is not 8% or 9% or even 22%. It is infinity.<br />
In this first official act of the world's first central bank can be<br />
seen the grand pretense that has characterized all those which have<br />
followed. The Bank pretended to make a loan but what it really did<br />
was to manufacture the money for government's use. If the government<br />
had done this directly, the fiat nature of the currency would<br />
I Rothbard, Mystery, p. 180.<br />
I See R.D. Richards, Ph.D., The Early History of Banking in England (New York-<br />
Augustus M. Kelley, original edition 1929, reprinted 1965), pp. 148-50.
178<br />
_ P CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
T]rm<br />
probably would not<br />
been immediately recognized, and it<br />
have been accepted at full face value in payment for the expenses of<br />
war. By creating money through the banking system, however, the<br />
process became mystifying to the general public. The newly created<br />
bills and notes were indistinguishable from those previously<br />
backed by coin, and the public was none the wiser.<br />
The reality of central banks, therefore—and we must not forget<br />
that the Federal Reserve System is such a creature—is that, under<br />
the guise of purchasing government bonds, they act as hidden<br />
money machines which can be activated any time the politicians<br />
want. This is<br />
must depend on taxes or the good credit of their treasury to raise<br />
money. It is even easier than printing and, because the process is<br />
a godsend to the political scientists who no longer<br />
not understood by the public, it is politically safe.<br />
The monetary scientists, of course, are amply paid for this<br />
service. To preserve the pretense of banking, it is said they collect<br />
interest, but this is a misnomer. They didn't lend money, they<br />
created it. Their compensation, therefore, should be called what it<br />
is: a professional fee, or commission, or royalty, or kickback,<br />
depending on your perspective, but not interest.<br />
FROM INFLATION TO BANK RUNS<br />
The new money created by the Bank of England splashed<br />
through the economy like rain in April. The country banks outside<br />
of the London area were authorized to create money on their own,<br />
but they had to hold a certain percentage of either coin or Bank of<br />
England certificates in reserve. Consequently, when these plentiful<br />
banknotes landed in their hands, they quickly put them into the<br />
vaults and then issued their own certificates in even greater<br />
amounts. As a result of this pyramiding effect, prices rose 100% in<br />
just two years. Then, the inevitable happened: There was a run on<br />
the bank, and the Bank of England could not produce the coin.<br />
When banks cannot honor their contracts to deliver coin in<br />
return for their receipts, they are, in fact, bankrupt. They should be<br />
allowed to go out of business and liquidate their assets to satisfy<br />
their creditors just like any other business. This, in fact, is what<br />
always had happened to banks which loaned out their deposits and<br />
created fractional money. Had this practice been allowed to continue,<br />
there is little doubt that people eventually would have<br />
understood that they simply do not want to do business with those<br />
THE SECRET SCIENCE 179<br />
kinds of banks. Through the painful but highly effective process of<br />
trial and error, mankind would have learned to distinguish real<br />
money from fool's gold. And the world would be a lot better<br />
because of it today.<br />
That, of course, was not allowed to happen. The Cabal is a<br />
partnership, and each of the two groups is committed to protect each<br />
other, not out of loyalty, but out of mutual self interest. They know<br />
that, if one falls, so does the other. It is not surprising, therefore<br />
that, when there was a run on the Bank of England, Parliament<br />
intervened. In May of 1696, just two years after the Bank was<br />
formed, a law was passed authorizing it to "suspend payment in<br />
specie." By force of law, the Bank was now exempted from having<br />
to honor its contract to return the gold.<br />
THE PATTERN OF PROTECTION WAS SET<br />
This was a fateful event in the history of money, because the<br />
precedent has been followed ever since. In Europe and America<br />
the banks have always operated with the assumption that their<br />
partners m government will come to their aid when they get into<br />
trouble. Politicians may speak about "protecting the public," but<br />
the underlining reality is that the government needs the fiat money<br />
produced by the banks. The banks, therefore-at least the bie<br />
ones- must not be allowed to fait Only a cartel with government<br />
KS 10n can ^W su
180 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
BOOMS AND BUSTS NOW GUARANTEED<br />
Once the Bank of England had been legally protected from the<br />
consequences of converting debt into money, the British economy<br />
was doomed to a nauseating roller-coaster ride of inflation, booms,<br />
and busts. The natural and immediate result was the granting of<br />
massive loans for just about any wild scheme imaginable. Why not?<br />
The money cost nothing to make, and the potential profits could be<br />
enormous. So the Bank of England, and the country banks which<br />
pyramided their own money supply on top of the Bank s supply,<br />
pumped a steady stream of new money into the economy. Great<br />
stock companies were formed and financed by this money. One<br />
was for the purpose of draining the Red Sea to recover the gold<br />
Egyptians when pursuing the Isrealites.<br />
supposedly lost by the<br />
£150,000,000 were siphoned into vague and fruitless ventures in<br />
South America and Mexico.<br />
The result of this flood of new money—how many times mus<br />
history repeat it?-was even more inflation. In 1810, the House of<br />
Commons created a special committee, called the Select Committee<br />
on the High Price of Gold Bullion, to explore the problem and to<br />
find a solution. The verdict handed down in the final report was a<br />
model of clarity. Prices were not going up, it said. The value of the<br />
currency was going down, and that was due to the fact that it was<br />
being created at a faster rate than the creation of goods to be<br />
purchased with it. The solution? The committee recommended that<br />
She notes of the Bank of England be made fully convertible into<br />
gold coin, thus putting a brake on the supply of money that could<br />
be created.<br />
IN DEFENSE OF THE GOLD STANDARD<br />
One of the most outspoken proponents of a true gold standard<br />
was a Jewish London stockbroker by the name of David Ricardc<br />
Ricardo argued that an ideal currency "should be absolutely<br />
invariable in value/' 1<br />
He conceded that precious metals were not<br />
perfect in this regard because they do shift in purchasing power to<br />
a small degree. Then he
182 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
THE SECRET SCIENCE 183<br />
their banknotes were backed by gold or silver. It was a good try,<br />
but it ultimately failed because it fell short on three counts: (1) It<br />
was a political compromise and was not strict enough, allowing the<br />
banks to still create lending money out of nothing to the extent of<br />
£14,000,000; in other words, a "fractional" amount thought to be<br />
safe at the time; (2) The limitation applied only to paper currency<br />
issued by the Bank. It did not apply to checkbook money, and that<br />
was then becoming the preferred form of exchange. Consequently,<br />
the scxalled reform did not even apply to the area where the<br />
greatest amount of abuse was taking place; and (3) The basic<br />
concept was allowed to remain unchallenged that man, in his<br />
infinite political wisdom, can determine what the money supply<br />
should be more effectively than an unmanaged system of gold or<br />
silver responding to the law of supply and demand.<br />
THE ROLLER COASTER CONTINUES<br />
Within three years of the "reform/' England faced another crisis<br />
with still more bank failures and more losses to depositors. But<br />
when the Bank of England tottered on the edge of insolvency, once<br />
again the government intervened. In 1847, the Bank was exempted<br />
from the legal reserve requirements of the Peel Act. Such is the<br />
rock-steady dependability of man-made limits to the money<br />
supply.<br />
Groseclose continues the stoiy:<br />
Ten years later, in 1857, another crisis occurred, due to excessive<br />
and unwise lending as a result of over-optimism regarding foreign<br />
trade prospects. The bank found itself in the same position as in 1847,<br />
and similar measures were taken. On this occasion the bank was<br />
forced to use the authority to increase its fiduciary [debt-based money]<br />
issue beyond the limit imposed by the Bank Charter Act.. .<br />
Again in 1866, the growth of banking without sufficient attention<br />
to liquidity, and the use of bank credit to support a speculative<br />
craze...prepared the way for a crash which was finally precipitated by<br />
the failure of the famous house of Overend, Gurney and Co. The Act of<br />
1844 was once more suspended...<br />
In 1890, the Bank of England once again faced crisis, again the<br />
result of widespread and excessive speculation in foreign securities,<br />
particularly American and Argentine. This time it was the failure of<br />
Baring Brothers that precipitated the crash.<br />
1. Groseclose, Money and Man, pp. 195-96. tUity<br />
THE MECHANISM SPREADS TO OTHER COUNTRIES<br />
It is an incredible fact of history that, in spite of the general and<br />
recurring failures of the Bank of England during these years, the<br />
central-bank mechanism was so attractive to the political and<br />
monetary scientists that it became the model for all of Europe. The<br />
Rank of Prussia became the Reichsbank. Napoleon established the<br />
Banque de France. A few decades later, the concept became the<br />
venerated model for the Federal Reserve System. Who cares if the<br />
scheme is destructive? Here is the perfect tool for obtaining<br />
unlimited funding for politicians and endless profits for bankers.<br />
And, best of all, the little people who pay the bills for both groups<br />
have practically no idea what is being done to them.<br />
SUMMARY<br />
The business of banking began in Europe in the fourteenth<br />
century. Its function was to evaluate, exchange, and safeguard<br />
people's coins. In the beginning, there were notable examples of<br />
totally<br />
honest banks which operated with remarkable efficiency<br />
considering the vast variety of coinage they handled. They also<br />
issued paper receipts which were so dependable they freely<br />
circulated as money and cheated no one in the process. But there<br />
was a great demand for more money and more loans, and the<br />
temptation soon caused the bankers to seek easier paths. They<br />
began lending out pieces of paper that said they were receipts, but<br />
which in fact were counterfeit. The public could not tell one from<br />
the other and accepted both of them as money. From that point<br />
forward, the receipts in circulation exceeded the gold held in<br />
reserve, and the age of fractional-reserve banking had dawned.<br />
This led immediately to what would become an almost unbroken<br />
record from then to the present: a record of inflation, booms and<br />
busts, suspension of payments, bank failures, repudiation of currencies,<br />
and recurring spasms of economic chaos.<br />
The Bank of England was formed in 1694 to institutionalize<br />
fractional-reserve banking. As the world's first central bank, it<br />
introduced the concept of a partnership between bankers and<br />
politicians. The politicians would receive spendable money (created<br />
out of nothing by the bankers) without having to raise taxes. In<br />
return,<br />
the bankers would receive a commission on the transaction—deceptively<br />
called interest—which would continue in perpetuity.<br />
Since it all seemed to be wrapped up in the mysterious rituals
184 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
of banking, which the common man was not expected to understand,<br />
there was practically no opposition to the scheme. The<br />
arrangement proved so profitable to the participants that it soon<br />
spread to many other countries in Europe and, eventually, to the<br />
United States.<br />
Chapter Ten<br />
THE MANDRAKE<br />
MECHANISM<br />
The method by which the Federal Reserve creates<br />
money out of nothing; the concept of usury as the<br />
payment of interest on pretended loans; the true<br />
cause of the hidden tax called inflation; the way in<br />
which the Fed creates boom-bust cycles.<br />
In the 1940s, there was a comic strip character called Mandrake<br />
the Magician. His specialty was creating things out of nothing and,<br />
when appropriate, to make them disappear back into that same<br />
void. It is fitting, therefore, that the process to be described in this<br />
section should be named in his honor.<br />
In the previous chapters, we examined the technique developed<br />
by the political and monetary scientists to create money out of nothing<br />
for the purpose of lending. This is not an entirely accurate<br />
description because it implies that money is created first and then<br />
waits for someone to borrow it. On the other hand, <strong>text</strong>books on<br />
banking often state that money is created out of debt. This also is<br />
misleading because it implies that debt exists first and then is<br />
converted into money. In truth, money is not created until the<br />
instant it is borrowed. It is the act of borrowing which causes it to<br />
spring into existence. And, incidentally, it is the act of paying off the<br />
debt that causes it to vanish. There is no short phrase that perfectly<br />
describes that process. So, until one is invented along the way, we<br />
shall continue using the phrase "create money out of nothing" and<br />
occasionally add "for the purpose of lending" where necessary to<br />
further clarify the meaning.<br />
B Printed Federal Reserve Notes that sit in the Treasury's vault do not become<br />
money until they are released into circulation in exchange for checkbook money<br />
that was created by a bank loan. As long as the bills are in the vault with no<br />
debt-based money to replace them, they technically are just paper, not money.
186 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
So, let us now leave the historical figures of the past and jump<br />
into their "future/' in other words, into our present, and see just how<br />
far this money/debt-creation process has been carried—and how it<br />
works.<br />
The first fact that needs to be considered is that our money today<br />
has no gold or silver behind it whatsoever. The fraction is not 54%<br />
nor 15%. It is 0%. It has travelled the path of all previous fractional<br />
money in history and already has degenerated into pure fiat money.<br />
The fact that most of it is in the form of checkbook balances rather<br />
than paper currency is a mere technicality; and the fact that bankers<br />
speak about "reserve ratios" is eye wash. The so-called reserves to<br />
which they refer are, in fact, Treasury bonds and other certificates of<br />
debt .<br />
Our money is pure fiat through and through.<br />
The second fact that needs to be clearly understood is that, in<br />
spite of the technical jargon and seemingly complicated procedures,<br />
the actual mechanism by which the Federal Reserve creates money<br />
is quite simple. They do it exactly the same way the goldsmiths of<br />
old did except, of course, the goldsmiths were limited by the need to<br />
hold some precious metal in reserve, whereas the Fed has no such<br />
restriction.<br />
THE FEDERAL RESERVE IS CANDID<br />
The Federal Reserve itself is amazingly frank about this process.<br />
A booklet published by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York tells<br />
us: "Currency cannot be redeemed, or exchanged, for Treasury gold<br />
or any other asset used as backing. The question of just what assets<br />
'back' Federal Reserve notes has little but bookkeeping significance."<br />
Elsewhere in the same publication we are told: "Banks are creating<br />
money based on a borrower's promise to pay (the IOU)... Banks<br />
create money by 'monetizing' the private debts of businesses and<br />
individuals."<br />
In a booklet entitled Modern Money Mechanics, the Federal<br />
Reserve Bank of Chicago says:<br />
In the United States neither paper currency nor deposits have<br />
value as commodities. Intrinsically, a dollar bill is just a piece of paper.<br />
Deposits are merely book entries. Coins do have some intrinsic value<br />
as metal, but generally far less than their face amount.<br />
1. I Bet You Thought, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, p. 11.<br />
2. Ibid., p. 19.<br />
THE MANDRAKE MECHANISM 187<br />
What, then, makes these instruments—checks, paper money, and<br />
coins—acceptable at face value in payment of all debts and for other<br />
monetary uses? Mainly, it is the confidence people have that they will<br />
be able to exchange such money for other financial assets and real<br />
goods and services whenever they choose to do so. This partly is a<br />
matter of law; currency has been designated "legal tender" by the<br />
government—that is, it must be accepted. 1<br />
In the fine print of a footnote in a bulletin of the Federal Reserve<br />
Bank of St. Louis, we find this surprisingly candid explanation:<br />
Modern monetary systems have a fiat base—literally money by<br />
decree—with depository institutions, acting as fiduciaries, creating<br />
obligations against themselves with the fiat base acting in part as<br />
reserves. The decree appears on the currency notes: "This note is legal<br />
tender for all debts, public and private." While no individual could<br />
refuse to accept such money for debt repayment, exchange contracts<br />
could easily be composed to thwart its use in everyday commerce.<br />
However, a forceful explanation as to why money is accepted is that<br />
the federal government requires it as payment for tax liabilities.<br />
Anticipation of the need to clear this debt creates a demand for the<br />
pure fiat dollar.<br />
MONEY WOULD VANISH WITHOUT DEBT<br />
It is<br />
difficult for Americans to come to grips with the fact that<br />
their total money supply is backed by nothing but debt, and it<br />
even more mind boggling to visualize that, if everyone paid back all<br />
that was borrowed, there would be no money left<br />
is<br />
in existence. That's<br />
right, there would be not one penny in circulation—all coins and all<br />
paper currency would be returned to bank vaults—and there would<br />
be not one dollar in any one's checking account. In short, all money<br />
would disappear.<br />
Marriner Eccles was the Governor of the Federal Reserve System<br />
in 1941. On September 30 of that year, Eccles was asked to give<br />
testimony before the House Committee on Banking and Currency.<br />
The purpose of the hearing was to obtain information regarding the<br />
role of the Federal Reserve in creating conditions that led to the depression<br />
of the 1930s. Congressman Wright Patman, who was<br />
Chairman of that committee, asked how the Fed got the money to<br />
- Modern Money Mechanics, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, revised October<br />
1982, p. 3.<br />
2. "Money, Credit and Velocity," Review, May, 1982, Vol. 64, No. 5, Federal<br />
Reserve Bank of St. Louis, p. 25.
188 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
THE MANDRAKE MECHANISM 189<br />
purchase two billion dollars worth of government bonds in 1933.<br />
This is the exchange that followed.<br />
ECCLES: We created it.<br />
PATMAN: Out of what?<br />
ECCLES: Out of the right to issue credit money.<br />
PATMAN: And there is nothing behind it,<br />
is there, except oux<br />
government's credit?<br />
ECCLES: That is what our money system is. If there were no<br />
debts in our money system, there wouldn't be any money.<br />
It must be realized that, while money may represent an asset to<br />
selected individuals, when it is considered as an aggregate of the<br />
total money supply, it is not an asset at all. A man who borrows<br />
$1,000 may think that he has increased his financial position by that<br />
amount but he has not. His $1,000 cash asset is offset by his $1,000<br />
loan liability, and his net position is zero. Bank accounts are exactly<br />
the same on a larger scale. Add up all<br />
nation, and it would be easy to assume that all<br />
the bank accounts in the<br />
that money represents<br />
a gigantic pool of assets which support the economy. Yet,<br />
every bit of this money is owed by someone. Some will owe<br />
nothing. Others will owe many times what they possess. All added<br />
together, the national balance is zero. What we think is money is but<br />
a grand illusion. The reality is debt.<br />
Robert Hemphill was the Credit Manager of the Federal Reserve<br />
Bank in Atlanta. In the foreword to a book by Irving Fisher, entitled<br />
100% Money, Hemphill said this:<br />
If all the bank loans were paid, no one could have a bank deposit,<br />
and there would not be a dollar of coin or currency in circulation. This<br />
is a staggering thought. We are completely dependent on the<br />
commercial banks. Someone has to borrow every dollar we have in<br />
circulation, cash, or credit. If the banks create ample synthetic money<br />
we are prosperous; if not, we starve. We are absolutely without a<br />
permanent money system. When one gets a complete grasp of the<br />
picture, the tragic absurdity of our hopeless situation is almost<br />
1<br />
incredible—but there it is.<br />
With the knowledge that money in America is based on debt, it<br />
should not come as a surprise to learn that the Federal Reserve<br />
System is not the least interested in seeing a reduction in debt in this<br />
1. Irving Fisher, 100% Money (New York: Adelphi, 1936), p. xxii.<br />
country, regardless of public utterances to the contrary. Here is the<br />
bottom line from the System's own publications. The Federal<br />
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia says: "A large and growing number of<br />
analysts, on the other hand, now regard the national debt as something<br />
useful, if not an actual blessing... . [They believe] the national<br />
debt need not be reduced at all."<br />
The Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago adds: "Debt — public and<br />
private—is here to stay. It plays an essential role in economic processes..<br />
What . .<br />
is required is not the abolition of debt, but its prudent<br />
use and intelligent management. "2<br />
WHAT'S WRONG WITH A LITTLE DEBT?<br />
There is a kind of fascinating appeal to this theory. It gives those<br />
who expound it an aura of intellectualism, the appearance of being<br />
able to grasp a complex economic principle that is beyond the comprehension<br />
of mere mortals. And, for the less academically minded,<br />
it offers the comfort of at least sounding moderate. After all, whafs<br />
wrong with a little debt, prudently used and intelligently managed?<br />
The answer is nothing, provided the debt is based on an honest transaction.<br />
There is plenty wrong with it if it is based upon fraud.<br />
An honest transaction is one in which a borrower pays an<br />
agreed upon sum in return for the temporary use of a lender's asset.<br />
That asset could be anything of tangible value. If it were an automobile,<br />
for example, then the borrower would pay "rent." If it is<br />
money, then the rent is called "interest." Either way, the concept is<br />
the same.<br />
When we go to a lender—either a bank or a private party—and<br />
receive a loan of money, we are willing to pay interest on the loan in<br />
recognition of the fact that the money we are borrowing is an asset<br />
which we want to use. It seems only fair to pay a rental fee for that<br />
asset to the person who owns it. It is not easy to acquire an automobile,<br />
and it is not easy to acquire money real money, that is. If the<br />
money we are borrowing was earned by someone's labor and talent,<br />
they are fully entitled to receive interest on it.<br />
But what are we to<br />
Wnk of money that is created by the mere stroke of a pen or the<br />
click of a computer key? Why should anyone collect a rental fee on<br />
that?<br />
] TheNational Debt, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, pp. 2, 11<br />
2<br />
- Two Faces of Debt, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, p. 33.
190 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
When banks place credits into your checking account, they are<br />
merely pretending to lend you money. In reality, they have nothing<br />
to lend. Even the money that non-indebted depositors have placed<br />
with them was originally created out of nothing in response to<br />
someone else's loan. So what entitles the banks to collect rent on<br />
nothing? It is immaterial that men everywhere are forced by law to<br />
accept these nothing certificates in exchange for real goods and<br />
services. We are talking here, not about what is legal, but what is<br />
moral. As Thomas Jefferson observed at the time of his protracted<br />
battle against central banking in the United States, "No one has a<br />
natural right to the trade of money lender, but he who has money to<br />
lend/' 1<br />
THIRD REASON TO ABOLISH THE SYSTEM<br />
Centuries ago, usury was defined as any interest charged for a<br />
loan. Modern usage has redefined it as excessive interest. Certainly,<br />
any amount of interest charged for a pretended loan is excessive. The<br />
dictionary, therefore, needs a new definition. Usury: The charging of<br />
any interest on a loan offiat money.<br />
Let us, therefore, look at debt and interest in this light Thomas<br />
Edison summed up the immorality of the system when he said:<br />
People who will not turn a shovel full of dirt on the project nor<br />
contribute a pound of materials will collect more money...than will the<br />
people who will supply all the materials and do all the work<br />
Is that an exaggeration? Let us consider the purchase of a<br />
$100,000 home in which $30,000 represents the cost of the land,<br />
architect's fee, sales commissions, building permits, and that sort of<br />
thing and $70,000 is the cost of labor and building materials. If the<br />
home buyer puts up $30,000 as a down payment, then $70,000 must<br />
be borrowed. If the loan is issued at 11% over a 30-year period, the<br />
amount of interest paid will be $167,806. That means the amount<br />
paid to those who loan the money is about 2 V2 times greater than<br />
1. The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Library Edition (Washington: Jefferson Memorial<br />
Association, 1903), Vol XIII, p. 277-78.<br />
2. As quoted by Brian L. Bex, The Hidden Hand (Spencer, Indiana: Owen Litho,<br />
1975), p. 161. Unfortunately, Edison did not understand the whole problem. He was<br />
correctly opposed to paying interest to banks for their fiat money, but he was not<br />
opposed to government fiat money. It was only the interest to which he objected. He<br />
did not see the larger picture of how fiat money, even when issued solely by the<br />
government and without interest has always been destructive of the economy<br />
through the creation of inflation, booms, and busts.<br />
THE MANDRAKE MECHANISM 191<br />
paid to those who provide all the labor and all the materials. It is<br />
that this figure represents the time-value of that money over<br />
true<br />
thirty years and easily could be justified on the basis that a lender<br />
deserves to be compensated for surrendering the use of his capital<br />
for half a lifetime. But that assumes the lender actually had something<br />
to surrender, that he had earned the capital, saved it, and then<br />
loaned it for construction of someone else's house. What are we to<br />
think, however, about a lender who did nothing to earn the money,<br />
had not saved it, and, in fact, simply created it out of thin air? What<br />
is the time-value of nothing?<br />
As we have already shown, every dollar that exists today, either<br />
in the form of currency, checkbook money, or even credit card<br />
money—in other words, our entire money supply—exists only<br />
because it was borrowed by someone; perhaps not you, but someone.<br />
That means all the American dollars in the entire world are earning<br />
daily and compounded interest for the banks which created them. A<br />
portion of every business venture, every investment, every profit,<br />
every transaction which involves money—and that even includes<br />
losses and the payment of taxes—a portion of all that is earmarked as<br />
payment to a bank. And what did the banks do to earn this perpetually<br />
flowing river of wealth? Did they lend out their own capital<br />
obtained through the investment of stockholders? Did they lend out<br />
the hard-earned savings of their depositors? No, neither of these<br />
were their major source of income. They simply waved the magic<br />
wand called fiat money.<br />
The flow of such unearned wealth under the guise of interest<br />
can only be viewed as usury of the highest magnitude. Even if there<br />
were no other reasons to abolish the Fed, the fact that it is the supreme<br />
instrument of usury would be more than sufficient by itself.<br />
WHO CREATES THE MONEY TO PAY THE INTEREST?<br />
One of the most perplexing questions associated with this process<br />
is "Where does the money come from to pay the interest?" If you<br />
borrow $10,000 from a bank at 9%, you owe $10,900. But the bank<br />
Only manufactures $10,000 for the loan. It would seem, therefore,<br />
that there is no way that you—and all others with similar loans<br />
can possibly pay off your indebtedness. The amount of money put<br />
into circulation just isn't enough to cover the total debt, including<br />
interest. This has led some to the conclusion that it is necessary for<br />
you to borrow the $900 for the interest, and that, in turn, leads to still
192 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
more interest. The assumption is that, the more we borrow, the more<br />
we have to borrow, and that debt based on fiat money is a neverending<br />
spiral leading inexorably to more and more debt.<br />
This is a partial truth. It is true that there is not enough money<br />
created to include the interest, but it is a fallacy that the only way to<br />
pay it back is to borrow still more. The assumption fails to take into<br />
account the exchange value of labor. Let us assume that you pay<br />
back your $10,000 loan at the rate of approximately $900 per month<br />
and that about $80 of that represents interest. You realize you are<br />
hard pressed to make your payments so you decide to take on a<br />
part-time job. The bank, on the other hand, is now making $80 profit<br />
each month on your loan. Since this amount is classified as "interest,"<br />
it is not extinguished as is the larger portion which is a return<br />
of the loan itself. So this remains as spendable money in the account<br />
of the bank. The decision then is made to have the bank's floors<br />
waxed once a week. You respond to the ad in the paper and are<br />
hired at $80 per month to do the job. The result is that you earn the<br />
money to pay the interest on your loan, and—this is the point—the<br />
money you receive is the same money which you previously had<br />
paid. As long as you perform labor for the bank each month, the<br />
same dollars go into the bank as interest, then out the revolving<br />
door as your wages, and then back into the bank as loan repayment.<br />
It is not necessary that you work directly for the bank. No matter<br />
where you earn the money, its origin was a bank and its ultimate<br />
destination is a bank. The loop through which it travels can be large<br />
or small, but the fact remains all interest is paid eventually by<br />
human effort. And the significance of that fact is even more startling<br />
than the assumption that not enough money is created to pay back<br />
the interest. It is that the total of this human effort ultimately is for<br />
the benefit of those who create fiat money. It is a form of modern<br />
serfdom in which the great mass of society works as indentured<br />
servants to a ruling class of financial nobility.<br />
UNDERSTANDING THE ILLUSION<br />
That's really all<br />
one needs to know about the operation of the<br />
banking cartel under the protection of the Federal Reserve. But it<br />
would be a shame to stop here without taking a look at the actual<br />
cogs, mirrors, and pulleys that make the magical mechanism work.<br />
It is<br />
a truly fascinating engine of mystery and deception. Let us,<br />
therefore, turn our attention to the actual process by which the<br />
THE MANDRAKE MECHANISM 193<br />
magicians create the illusion of modern money. First we shall stand<br />
back for a general view to see the overall action. Then we shall move<br />
in closer and examine each component in detail.<br />
THE MANDRAKE MECHANISM: AN OVERVIEW<br />
DEBT<br />
The entire function of this machine is<br />
to convert debt<br />
into money. It's just that simple. First, the Fed takes all<br />
the government bonds which the public does not buy<br />
and writes a check to Congress in exchange for them. (It<br />
acquires other debt obligations as well, but government<br />
bonds comprise most of its inventory.) There is no<br />
money to back up this check. These fiat dollars are created<br />
on the spot for that purpose. By calling those bonds<br />
"reserves," the Fed then uses them as the base for creating<br />
9 additional dollars for every dollar created for the<br />
bonds themselves. The money created for the bonds is<br />
spent by the government, whereas the money created on<br />
top of those bonds is the source of all the bank loans<br />
made to the nation's businesses and individuals. The<br />
result of this process is the same as creating money on a<br />
printing press, but the illusion is based on an accounting<br />
trick rather than a printing trick. The bottom line is that<br />
Congress and the banking cartel have entered into a<br />
partnership in which the cartel has the privilege of<br />
collecting interest on money which it creates out of nothing,<br />
a perpetual override on every American dollar that<br />
exists in the world. Congress, on the other hand, has<br />
access to unlimited funding without having to tell<br />
the<br />
voters their taxes are being raised through the process of<br />
inflation. If you understand this paragraph, you understand<br />
the Federal Reserve System.<br />
MONEY<br />
Now for a more detailed view. There are three general ways in<br />
which the Federal Reserve creates fiat money out of debt. One is by<br />
making loans to the member banks through what is called the<br />
Discount Window. The second is by purchasing Treasury bonds and
194 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
other certificates of debt through what is called the Open Market<br />
Committee. The third is by changing the so-called reserve ratio that<br />
member banks are required to hold. Each method is merely a different<br />
path to the same objective: taking in IOUs and converting them<br />
into spendable money.<br />
THE DISCOUNT WINDOW<br />
The Discount Window is merely bankers' language for the loan<br />
window. When banks run short of money, the Federal Reserve<br />
stands ready as the "bankers' bank" to lend it. There are many reasons<br />
for them to need loans. Since they hold "reserves" of only<br />
about one or two per cent of their deposits in vault cash and eight or<br />
nine per cent in securities, their operating margin is extremely thin.<br />
It is common for them to experience temporary negative balances<br />
caused by unusual customer demand for cash or unusually large<br />
clusters of checks all clearing through other banks at the same time.<br />
Sometimes they make bad loans and, when these former "assets"<br />
are removed from their books, their "reserves" are also decreased<br />
and may, in fact, become negative. Finally, there is the profit motive.<br />
When banks borrow from the Federal Reserve at one interest rate<br />
and lend it out at a higher rate, there is an obvious advantage. But<br />
that is merely the beginning. When a bank borrows a dollar from the<br />
Fed, it becomes a one-dollar reserve. Since the banks are required to<br />
keep reserves of only about ten per cent, they actually can loan up to<br />
nine dollars for each dollar borrowed.<br />
Let's take a look at the math. Assume the bank receives $1 million<br />
from the Fed at a rate of 8%. The total annual cost, therefore, is<br />
$80,000 (.08 X $1,000,000). The bank treats the loan as a cash deposit,<br />
which means it becomes the basis for manufacturing an additional<br />
$9 million to be lent to its customers. If we assume that it lends that<br />
money at 11% interest, its gross return would be $990,000 (.11 X<br />
$9,000,000). Subtract from this the bank's cost of $80,000 plus an<br />
appropriate share of its overhead, and we have a net return of about<br />
$900,000. In other words, the bank borrows a million and can almost<br />
1. This 10% figure (ten-to-one ratio) is based on averages. The Federal Reserve<br />
requires a minimum reserve of 10% on deposits over $46.8 million but only 3% on<br />
deposits up to that amount. Deposits in Eurodollars and nonpersonal time deposits<br />
require no reserves at all. Reserves consist of vault cash and deposits at the Federal<br />
Reserve. See Regulation D; Reserve Requirements of Depositor]/ Institutions, Federal<br />
Reserve document 12 CFR 204; as amended effective December 22, 1992, p. 23.<br />
THE MANDRAKE MECHANISM 195<br />
double it in one year. 1<br />
That's leverage] But don't forget the source of<br />
that leverage: the manufacture of another $9 million which is added<br />
to the nation's money supply.<br />
THE OPEN MARKET OPERATION<br />
The most important method used by the Federal Reserve for the<br />
creation of fiat money is the purchase and sale of securities on the<br />
open market. But, before jumping into this, a word of warning.<br />
Don't expect what follows to make any sense. Just be prepared to<br />
know that this is how they do it.<br />
The trick lies in the use of words and phrases which have technical<br />
meanings quite different from what they imply to the average<br />
citizen. So keep your eye on the words. They are not meant to<br />
explain but to deceive. In spite of first appearances, the process is<br />
not complicated. It is just absurd.<br />
THE MANDRAKE MECHANISM: A DETAILED VIEW<br />
Start with...<br />
GOVERNMENT DEBT<br />
The federal government adds ink to a piece of paper,<br />
creates impressive designs around the edges, and calls it<br />
a bond or Treasury note. It is merely a promise to pay a<br />
specified sum at a specified interest on a specified date.<br />
As we shall see in the following steps, this debt eventually<br />
becomes the foundation for almost the entire<br />
nation's money supply. 2 In reality, the government has<br />
created cash, but it doesn't yet look like cash. To convert<br />
these IOUs into paper bills and checkbook money is the<br />
function of The Federal Reserve System. To bring about<br />
that transformation, the bond is given to the Fed where it<br />
is then classified as a ...<br />
(Continued on next page)<br />
I lite banks must cover these loans with bonds or other interest-bearing assets<br />
wnich it possesses, but that does not diminish the money-multiplier<br />
new effect of the<br />
deposit.<br />
r<br />
I Debt obligations from the private sector and from other governments also are<br />
used in the same way, but government bonds are the primary instruments.
196 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
THE MANDRAKE MECHANISM<br />
197<br />
(Continued from previous page)<br />
SECURITIES ASSET<br />
An instrument of government debt is<br />
considered an<br />
asset because it is assumed the government will keep its<br />
promise to pay. This is based upon its ability to obtain<br />
whatever money it needs through taxation. Thus, the<br />
strength of this asset is the power to take back that which<br />
it<br />
gives. So the Federal Reserve now has an "asset"<br />
which can be used to offset a liability. It then creates this<br />
liability by adding ink to yet another piece of paper and<br />
exchanging that with the government in return for the<br />
asset. That second piece of paper is a ...<br />
FEDERAL RESERVE CHECK<br />
There is no money in any account to cover this check.<br />
Anyone else doing that would be sent to prison. It is<br />
legal for the Fed, however, because Congress wants the<br />
money, and this is the easiest way to get it. (To raise<br />
taxes would be political suicide; to depend on the public<br />
to buy all the bonds would not be realistic, especially if<br />
interest rates are set artificially low; and to print very<br />
large quantities of currency would be obvious and controversial.)<br />
This way, the process is mysteriously<br />
wrapped up in the banking system. The end result, however,<br />
is the same as turning on government printing<br />
presses and simply manufacturing fiat money (money<br />
created by the order of government with nothing of tangible<br />
value backing it) to pay government expenses. Yet,<br />
in accounting terms, the books are said to be balanced"<br />
because the liability of the money is offset by the "asset"<br />
of the IOU. The Federal Reserve check received by the<br />
government then is endorsed and sent back to one of the<br />
Federal Reserve banks where it now becomes a ...<br />
i<br />
c<br />
c<br />
(Continued from previous page)<br />
GOVERNMENT DEPOSIT<br />
Once the Federal Reserve check has been deposited into<br />
the government's account, it is used to pay government<br />
expenses and, thus, is transformed into many ...<br />
GOVERNMENT CHECKS<br />
These checks become the means by which the first wave<br />
of fiat money floods into the economy. Recipients now<br />
deposit them into their own bank accounts where they<br />
become ...<br />
COMMERCIAL BANK DEPOSITS<br />
Commercial bank deposits immediately take on a split<br />
personality. On the one hand, they are liabilities to the<br />
bank because they are owed back to the depositors. But,<br />
as long as they remain in the bank, they also are considered<br />
as assets because they are on hand. Once again, the<br />
books are balanced: the assets offset the liabilities. But<br />
the process does not stop there. Through the magic of<br />
fractional-reserve banking, the deposits are made to<br />
serve an additional and more lucrative purpose. To<br />
accomplish this, the on-hand deposits now become<br />
reclassified in the books and called ...<br />
BANK RESERVES<br />
Reserves for what? Are these for paying off depositors<br />
should they want to close out their accounts? No. That's<br />
the lowly function they served when they were classified<br />
as mere assets. Now that they have been given the name<br />
of "reserves," they become the magic wand to materialize<br />
even larger amounts of fiat money. This is where the<br />
real action is: at the level of the commercial banks. Here's<br />
how it works. The banks are permitted by the Fed to<br />
hold as little as 10% of their deposits in "reserve." That<br />
means, if<br />
they receive deposits of $1 million from the<br />
first wave of fiat money created by the Fed, they have
198 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
$900,000 more than they are required to keep on hand<br />
($1 million less 10% reserve). In bankers' language, that<br />
$900,000 is called ...<br />
EXCESS RESERVES<br />
The word "excess" is a<br />
tipoff that these so-called<br />
reserves have a special destiny. Now that they have been<br />
transmuted into an excess, they are considered as available<br />
for lending. And so in due course these excess<br />
reserves are converted into ...<br />
BANK LOANS<br />
But wait a minute. How can this money be loaned out<br />
when it is owned by the original depositors who are still<br />
free to write checks and spend it any time they wish?<br />
Isn't that a double claim against the same money? The<br />
answer is that, when the new loans are made, they are<br />
not made with the same money at all. They are made<br />
with brand new money created out of thin air for that<br />
purpose. The nation's money supply simply increases by<br />
ninety per cent of the bank's deposits. Furthermore, this<br />
new money is far more interesting to the banks than the<br />
old. The old money, which they received from depositors,<br />
requires them to pay out interest or perform services<br />
for the privilege of using it. But, with the new<br />
money, the banks collect interest, instead, which is not<br />
too bad considering it cost them nothing to make. Nor is<br />
that the end of the process. When this second wave of hat<br />
money moves into the economy, it comes right back into<br />
the banking system, just as the first wave did, in the form<br />
of...<br />
MORE COMMERCIAL BANK DEPOSITS<br />
The process now repeats but with slightly smaller numbers<br />
each time around. What was a "loan" on Friday<br />
comes back into the bank as a "deposit" on Monday. The<br />
deposit then is reclassified as a "reserve" and ninety per<br />
cent of that becomes an "excess" reserve which, once<br />
again, is available for a new "loan." Thus, the $1 million<br />
THE MANDRAKE MECHANISM 199<br />
of first wave fiat money gives birth to $900,000 in the<br />
second wave, and that gives birth to $810,000 in the third<br />
wave ($900,000 less 10% reserve). It takes about twentyeight<br />
times through the revolving door of deposits<br />
becoming loans becoming deposits becoming more<br />
loans until the process plays itself out to the maximum<br />
effect, which is...<br />
BANK FIAT MONEY = UP TO 9 TIMES GOVERNMENT<br />
The amount of fiat money created by the banking cartel<br />
is approximately nine times the amount of the original<br />
government debt which made the entire process possible.<br />
When the original debt itself is added to that figure,<br />
we finally have ...<br />
[TOTAL FIAT MONEY = UP TO 10 TIMES GOVERNMENT<br />
[*•<br />
The total amount of fiat money created by the Federal<br />
Reserve and the commercial banks together is approximately<br />
ten times the amount of the underlying government<br />
debt. To the degree that this newly created money<br />
floods into the economy in excess of goods and services,<br />
it causes the purchasing power of all money, both old<br />
and new, to decline. Prices go up because the relative<br />
value of the money has gone down. The result is the<br />
same as if that purchasing power had been taken from us<br />
in taxes. The reality of this process, therefore, is that it is<br />
a ...<br />
HIDDEN TAX = UP TO 10 TIMES THE NATIONAL DEBT<br />
Without realizing it,<br />
Americans have paid over the<br />
years, in addition to their federal income taxes and excise<br />
taxes, a completely hidden tax equal to many times the<br />
national debt! And that still is not the end of the process.<br />
Since our money supply is purely an arbitrary entity<br />
with nothing behind it except debt, its quantity can go<br />
That is a theoretical maximum. In actual practice, the banks can seldom loan out<br />
all of the money they are allowed to create, and the numbers fall short of the<br />
rciaximum.
200 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
down as well as up. When people are going deeper into<br />
debt, the nation's money supply expands and prices go<br />
up, but when they pay off their debts and refuse to<br />
renew, the money supply contracts and prices rumble.<br />
That is exactly what happens in times of economic or<br />
political uncertainty. This alternation between periods of<br />
expansion and contraction of the money supply is the<br />
underlying cause of ...<br />
BOOMS, BUSTS, AND DEPRESSIONS<br />
Who benefits from all of this? Certainly not the average<br />
citizen. The only beneficiaries are the political scientists<br />
in Congress who enjoy the effect of unlimited revenue to<br />
perpetuate their power, and the monetary scientists<br />
within the banking cartel called the Federal Reserve<br />
System who have been able to harness the American<br />
people, without their knowing it, to the yoke of modern<br />
feudalism.<br />
RESERVE RATIOS<br />
The previous figures are based on a "reserve" ratio of 10% (a<br />
money-expansion ratio of 10-to-l). It must be remembered, however,<br />
that this is purely arbitrary. Since the money is fiat with no<br />
precious-metal backing, there is no real limitation except what the<br />
politicians and money managers decide is expedient for the<br />
moment. Altering this ratio is the third way in which the Federal<br />
Reserve can influence the nation's supply of money. The numbers,<br />
therefore, must be considered as transient. At any time there is a<br />
"need" for more money, the ratio can be increased to 20-to-l or 50-<br />
to-1, or the pretense of a reserve can be dropped altogether. There is<br />
virtually no limit to the amount of fiat money that can be manufactured<br />
under the present system.<br />
NATIONAL DEBT NOT NECESSARY FOR INFLATION<br />
Because the Federal Reserve can be counted on to "monetize"<br />
(convert into money) virtually any amount of government debt, and<br />
because this process of expanding the money supply is the primary<br />
cause of inflation, it is tempting to jump to the conclusion that federal<br />
debt and inflation are but two aspects of the same phenomenon.<br />
This, however, is not necessarily true. It is quite possible to have<br />
either one without the other.<br />
THE MANDRAKE MECHANISM 201<br />
The banking cartel holds a monopoly in the manufacture of<br />
money. Consequently, money is created only when lOUs are<br />
"monetized" by the Fed or by commercial banks. When private<br />
individuals, corporations, or institutions purchase government<br />
bonds, they must use money they have previously earned and<br />
saved. In other words, no new money is created, because they are<br />
using funds that are already in existence. Therefore, the sale of government<br />
bonds to the banking system is inflationary, but when sold<br />
to the private sector, it is not . That is the primary reason the United<br />
States avoided massive inflation during the 1980s when the federal<br />
government was going into debt at a greater rate than ever before in<br />
its history. By keeping interest rates high, these bonds became<br />
attractive to private investors, including those in other countries.<br />
Very little new money was created, because most of the bonds were<br />
purchased with American dollars already in existence. This, of<br />
course, was a temporary fix at best. Today, those bonds are continually<br />
maturing and are being replaced by still more bonds to include<br />
the original debt plus accumulated interest. Eventually this process<br />
must come to an end and, when it does, the Fed will have no choice<br />
but to literally buy back all the debt of the '80s—that is, to replace all<br />
of the formerly invested private money with newly manufactured<br />
fiat money— plus a great deal more to cover the interest. Then we<br />
will understand the meaning of inflation.<br />
On the other side of the coin, the Federal Reserve has the option<br />
of manufacturing money even if the federal government does not go<br />
deeper into debt. For example, the huge expansion of the money<br />
supply leading up to the stock market crash in 1929 occurred at a<br />
time when the national debt was being paid off. In every year from<br />
1920 through 1930, federal revenue exceeded expenses, and there<br />
were relatively few government bonds being offered. The massive<br />
inflation of the money supply was made possible by converting<br />
commercial bank loans into "reserves" at the Fed's discount window<br />
and by the Fed's purchase of banker's acceptances, which are<br />
commercial contracts for the purchase of goods.<br />
Now the options are even greater. The Monetary Control Act of<br />
1980 has made it possible for the Creature to monetize virtually any<br />
1. Only about 11 to 15 per cent of the federal debt at that time was held by the<br />
Federal Reserve System.<br />
2. See chapter twenty-three.
:<br />
202 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND THE MANDRAKE MECHANISM 203<br />
debt instrument, including IOUs from foreign governments. The<br />
apparent purpose of this legislation is to make it possible to bail out<br />
those governments which are having trouble paying the interest on<br />
their loans from American banks. When the Fed creates fiat Ameri~<br />
can dollars to give foreign governments in exchange for their worthless<br />
bonds, the money path is slightly longer and more twisted, but<br />
the effect is similar to the purchase of U.S. Treasury Bonds. The<br />
newly created dollars go to the foreign governments, then to the<br />
American banks where they become cash reserves. Finally, they<br />
flow back into the U.S. money pool (multiplied by nine) in the form<br />
of additional loans. The cost of the operation once again is born by<br />
the American citizen through the loss of purchasing power. Expansion<br />
of the money supply, therefore, and the inflation that follows,<br />
no longer even require federal deficits. As long as someone is willing<br />
to borrow American dollars, the cartel will have the option of creating<br />
those dollars specifically to purchase their bonds and, by so doing,<br />
continue to expand the money supply.<br />
We must not forget, however, that one of the reasons the Fed<br />
was created in the first place was to make it possible for Congress to<br />
spend without the public knowing it was being taxed. Americans<br />
have shown an amazing indifference to this fleecing, explained<br />
undoubtedly by their lack of understanding of how the Mandrake<br />
Mechanism works. Consequently, at the present time, this cozy contract<br />
between the banking cartel and the politicians is in little danger<br />
of being altered. As a practical matter, therefore, even though the<br />
Fed may also create fiat money in exchange for commercial debt<br />
and for bonds of foreign governments, its major concern likely will<br />
be to continue supplying Congress.<br />
The implications of this fact are mind boggling. Since our money<br />
supply, at present at least, is tied to the national debt, to pay off that<br />
debt would cause money to disappear. Even to seriously reduce it<br />
would cripple the economy. 1<br />
Therefore, as long as the Federal<br />
Reserve exists, America will be, must be, in debt.<br />
The purchase of bonds from other governments is accelerating<br />
in the present political climate of internationalism. Our own money<br />
1. With the Fed holding only 7% of the national debt, the effect would still be<br />
devastating. Since the money supply is pyramided ten times on top of the underlying<br />
government bonds, each $1 eliminated from the federal debt would cause the<br />
money supply to shrink by 70
204 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
generates our most unfair tax. Both the tax and the System that makes<br />
it possible should be abolished.<br />
The political scientists who authorize this process of monetizing<br />
the national debt, and the monetary scientists who carry it out,<br />
know that it is not true debt. It is not true debt, because no one in<br />
Washington really expects to repay it ever. The dual purpose of<br />
this magic show is simply to create free spending money for the<br />
politicians, without the inconvenience of raising direct taxes, and<br />
also to generate a perpetual river of gold flowing into the banking<br />
cartel. The partnership is merely looking out for itself.<br />
Why, then, does the federal government bother with taxes at all?<br />
Why not just operate on monetized debt? The answer is twofold<br />
First, if it did, people would begin to wonder about the source of the<br />
money, and that might cause them to wake up to the reality that<br />
inflation is a tax. Thus, open taxes at some level serve to perpetuate<br />
public ignorance which is essential to the success of the scheme. The<br />
second reason is that taxes, particularly progressive taxes, are weapons<br />
by which elitist social planners can wage war on the middle<br />
class.<br />
A TOOL FOR SOCIAL PLANNING<br />
The January 1946 issue of American Affairs carried an article written<br />
by Beardsley Ruml who, at that time, was Chairman of the Federal<br />
Reserve Bank of New York. Ruml had devised the system of<br />
automatic withholding during World War II,<br />
so he was well qualified<br />
to speak on the nature and purpose of the federal income tax.<br />
His theme was spelled out in the title of his article: "Taxes for Revenue<br />
Are Obsolete."<br />
In an introduction to the article, the magazine's editor summarized<br />
Ruml's views as follows:<br />
His thesis is that, given control of a central banking system and an<br />
inconvertible currency [a currency not backed by gold], a sovereign<br />
national government is finally free of money worries and needs no<br />
longer levy taxes for the purpose of providing itself with revenue. All<br />
taxation, therefore, should be regarded from the point of view of social<br />
and economic consequences.<br />
Ruml explained that, since the Federal Reserve now can create<br />
out of nothing all the money the government could ever want, there<br />
Iof<br />
THE MANDRAKE MECHANISM 205<br />
remain only two reasons to have taxes at all. The first of these is to<br />
combat a rise in the general level of prices. His argument was that,<br />
when people have money in their pockets, they will spend it for<br />
goods and services, and this will bid up the prices. The solution, he<br />
says, is to take the money away from them through taxation and let<br />
the government spend it instead. This, too, will bid up prices, but<br />
Ruml chose not to go into that He explained his theory this way:<br />
The dollars the government spends become purchasing power in<br />
the hands of the people who have received them. The dollars the<br />
government takes by taxes cannot be spent by the people, and<br />
therefore, these dollars can no longer be used to acquire the things<br />
which are available for sale. Taxation is, therefore, an instrument of the<br />
first importance in the administration of any fiscal and monetary<br />
policy.<br />
REDISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH<br />
The other purpose of taxation, according to Ruml, is to redistribute<br />
the wealth from one class of citizens to another. This must<br />
always be done in the name of social justice or equality, but the real<br />
objective is to override the free market and bring society under the<br />
control of the master planners. Ruml said:<br />
The second principle purpose of federal taxes is to attain more<br />
equality of wealth and of income than would result from economic<br />
forces working alone. The taxes which are effective for this purpose<br />
are the progressive individual income tax, the progressive estate tax,<br />
and the gift tax. What these taxes should be depends on public policy<br />
with respect to the distribution of wealth and of income. These taxes<br />
should be defended and attacked in terms of their effect on the<br />
character of American life, not as revenue measures. 2<br />
As we have seen, Senator Nelson Aldrich was one of the creators<br />
of the Federal Reserve System. That is not surprising in light of the<br />
cai cartel nature of the System and the financial interests which he represented.<br />
Aldrich also was one of the prime sponsors of the federal<br />
come tax. The two creations work together as a far more delicate<br />
mechanism for control over the economic and social life of society<br />
than either one alone.<br />
In more recent years, there has been hopeful evidence that the<br />
master planners were about to abandon Ruml's blueprint. We have<br />
1. "Taxes for Revenue Are Obsolete/' by Beardsley Ruml, American Affairs,<br />
January, 1946, p. 35.<br />
* Ruml, p. 36.<br />
2<br />
- Ibid., p. 36.
206 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND THE MANDRAKE MECHANISM 207<br />
heard a great deal both in Congress and at the Federal Reserve<br />
about the necessity of reducing expenses so as to diminisn the<br />
growth of federal debt and inflation. But it has been lip service only,<br />
The great bulk of federal funding continues to be created by the<br />
Mandrake Mechanism, the cost of government continues to outpace<br />
tax revenues, and the Ruml formula reigns supreme.<br />
EXPANSION LEADS TO CONTRACTION<br />
While it is true that the Mandrake Mechanism is responsible for<br />
the expansion of the money supply, the process also works in<br />
reverse. Just as money is created when the Federal Reserve purchases<br />
bonds or other debt instruments, it is extinguished by the sale of<br />
those same items. When they are sold, the money is given back to<br />
the System and disappears into the inkwell or computer chip from<br />
which it came. Then, the same secondary ripple effect that created<br />
money through the commercial banking system causes it to be withdrawn<br />
from the economy. Furthermore, even if the Federal Reserve<br />
does not deliberately contract the money supply, the same result<br />
can and often does occur when the public decides to resist the availability<br />
of credit and reduce its debt. A man can only be tempted to<br />
borrow, he cannot be forced to do so.<br />
There are many psychological factors involved in a decision to<br />
go into debt that can offset the easy availability of money and a low<br />
interest rate: A downturn in the economy, the threat of civil disorder,<br />
the fear of pending war, an uncertain political climate, to name<br />
just a few. Even though the Fed may try to pump money into the<br />
economy by making it abundantly available, the public can thwart<br />
that move simply by saying no, thank you. When this happens, the<br />
old debts that are being paid off are not replaced by new ones to<br />
take their place, and the entire amount of consumer and business<br />
debt will shrink. That means the money supply also will shrink,<br />
because, in modern America, debt is money. And it is this very<br />
expansion and contraction of the monetary pool—a phenomenon<br />
that could not occur if based upon the laws of supply and<br />
demand—that is at the very core of practically every boom and bust<br />
that has plagued mankind throughout history.<br />
In conclusion, it can be said that modern money is a grand illu~<br />
sion conjured by the magicians of finance and politics. We are living<br />
in an age of fiat money, and it is sobering to realize that every previous<br />
nation in history that has adopted such money eventually was<br />
economically destroyed by it. Furthermore, there is nothing in our<br />
present monetary structure that offers any assurance that we may<br />
be exempted from that morbid roll call.<br />
Correction. There is one. It is still within the power of Congress<br />
to abolish the Federal Reserve System.<br />
SUMMARY<br />
The American dollar has no intrinsic value. It is a classic example<br />
of fiat money with no limit to the quantity that can be produced.<br />
Its primary value lies in the willingness of people to accept it and, to<br />
that end, legal tender laws require them to do so. It is true that our<br />
money is created out of nothing, but it is more accurate to say that it<br />
is based upon debt. In one sense, therefore, our money is created out<br />
of less than nothing. The entire money supply would vanish into<br />
bank vaults and computer chips if all debts were repaid. Under the<br />
present System, therefore, our leaders cannot allow a serious reduction<br />
in either the national or consumer debt. Charging interest on<br />
pretended loans is usury, and that has become institutionalized<br />
under the Federal Reserve System. The Mandrake Mechanism by<br />
which the Fed converts debt into money may seem complicated at<br />
first, but it is simple if one remembers that the process is not<br />
intended to be logical but to confuse and deceive. The end product<br />
of the Mechanism is artificial expansion of the money supply which<br />
is the root cause of the hidden tax called inflation. This expansion<br />
then leads to contraction and, together, they produce the destructive<br />
boom-bust cycle that has plagued mankind throughout history<br />
wherever fiat money has existed.
Cecil Rhodes made one of the<br />
world's greatest fortunes of the 18th<br />
century. Financed by Nathan<br />
Rothschild and the Bank of England,<br />
he established a monopoly over the<br />
diamond output of South Africa and<br />
most of the gold as well. He formed<br />
a secret society which included<br />
many of the top leaders of British<br />
government. Their elitist goal was<br />
nothing less than world domination<br />
and the establishment of a modern<br />
feudalist society controlled by<br />
themselves through the world's<br />
central banks. In America, the<br />
Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)<br />
was an outgrowth of that group.<br />
August Belmont came to New York<br />
in 1837 as the financial agent of the<br />
Rothschilds. He funneled vast<br />
amounts of capital into American I<br />
investments, often without anyone }<br />
knowing whose money he was<br />
Library of Congress Library of Congress<br />
spending. The purpose of<br />
J .P. Morgan, Sr. (left)<br />
concealment was to blunt the<br />
was brought into banking by his father, Junius Morgan, in<br />
growing anti-Rothschild nesentmer<br />
:ngland. The Morgans were friendly competitors with the Rothschilds and became<br />
that was then prevalent in Europe socially close to them. Morgan's London-based firm was saved from financial ruin in<br />
1857<br />
as well as America. When his<br />
by the Bank of England over which the Rothschilds held great influence,<br />
affiliation became commonly kno ^hereafter, Morgan appears to have served as a Rothschild financial agent and went<br />
his usefulness came to an end ar<br />
tC)<br />
great length to appear totally American.<br />
he was replaced by J.P. Morgan. °bn D. Rockefeller (right) made his initial fortune in oil but soon gravitated into<br />
Ranking and finance. His entry into the field was not welcomed by Morgan, and they<br />
came fierce competitors. Eventually, they decided to minimize their competition by<br />
tering into joint ventures. In the end, they worked together to create a national<br />
inking cartel called the Federal Reserve System.
'DEE'LlGhTED'"<br />
K 1<br />
I<br />
r w A LL<br />
111 *r".i' ST.<br />
M<br />
Above is the clubhouse for the<br />
private resort on <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island in<br />
Georgia where the Federal Reserve<br />
great<br />
System was conceived in<br />
secrecy in 1910. It is shown here<br />
shortly after completion.<br />
Jekytl Island Muset/i<br />
Jacob Schiff (right) was head of the<br />
New York investment firm, Kuhn,<br />
Loeb & Co. He was one of the<br />
principal backers of the Bolshevik<br />
revolution and personally financed<br />
Trotsky's trip from New York to<br />
Russia. He was a major contributor to<br />
Woodrow Wilson's presidential<br />
campaign and an advocate for<br />
passage of the Federal Reserve Act.<br />
This cartoon by Robert Minor appeared in the St Louis Post-Dispatch in<br />
1 91 1 . It shows Karl Marx surrounded by enthusiastic Wall Street financiers:<br />
Morgan partner George Perkins; J.P. Morgan; John Ryan of National City<br />
Bank; John D. Rockefeller; and Andrew Carnegie. Immediately behind<br />
Marx is Teddy Roosevelt, leader of the Progressive Party.<br />
upi/b^
J<br />
Harry Dexter White (left) and<br />
John Maynard Keynes (right)<br />
were the theoreticians who<br />
guided the 1944 Bretton Woods<br />
Monetary Conference at which<br />
the IMF/World Bank was<br />
created. White was a member of<br />
the Communist Party. Keynes<br />
was a member of the Fabian<br />
Society. They shared the same<br />
goal of international socialism.<br />
The IMF/World Bank has<br />
furthered that goal ever since.<br />
Edward Mandell House was the<br />
man who secured Wood row<br />
Wilson's nomination for<br />
President and who, thereafter,<br />
became the hidden power at the<br />
White House. He negotiated a<br />
secret agreement to draw the<br />
U.S. into World War I at the very<br />
time Wilson was campaigning<br />
on the promise to keep America<br />
out of the war. On behalf of Wall<br />
Street, House lobbied Congress<br />
to pass the Federal Reserve Act.<br />
Macr<br />
National Archives<br />
Raymond Robins is shown here as<br />
the Chairman of the Progressive PaW<br />
convention in Chicago in 1912. He<br />
later became head of the American<br />
Red Cross Mission in Russia after th*<br />
Bolshevik revolution. Although he<br />
represented Wall Street interests,^<br />
was a disciple of Cecil Rhodes and ,<br />
was anti-capitalist in his beliefs- He<br />
held great influence over Lenin.<br />
Carroll Quigley was a professor of<br />
Nstory at Georgetown University. His<br />
book, Tragedy and Hope, revealed<br />
mat the Council on Foreign Relations<br />
(CFR) is an outgrowth of the secret<br />
society formed by Cecil Rhodes.<br />
He wrote the history of how an<br />
international network of financiers<br />
bas created a system of financial<br />
control able to dominate the political<br />
systems of all countries through their<br />
central banks. He named names and<br />
Provided meticulous documentation.<br />
His book was suppressed.<br />
I IDI/Roiirrtann
l<br />
Winston Churchill was the First Lord of the<br />
Admiralty in World War I. As the Lusitania,<br />
'<br />
entered into an area where a German<br />
U-Boat was known to be operating, he<br />
called off the destroyer escort that had been<br />
assigned to protect her. He calculated that<br />
the destruction of a British ship with U.S.<br />
passengers aboard would inflame Amencan<br />
passions against Germany and help create a<br />
political climate for coming into the war.<br />
Hulton Deutsch<br />
Section III<br />
THE NEW<br />
ALCHEMY<br />
U.S. Army Pictoral Service<br />
The ancient alchemists sought in vain to convert<br />
lead into gold. Modern alchemists have<br />
succeeded in that quest. The lead bullets of war<br />
have yielded an endless source of gold for those<br />
magicians who control the Mandrake<br />
Mechanism. The startling fact emerges that,<br />
without the ability to create fiat money, most<br />
modern wars simply would not have occurred.<br />
As long as the Mechanism is allowed to function,<br />
future wars are inevitable. This is the story of how<br />
that came to pass.<br />
Lord Mersey (right) was put in charge of<br />
an official inquiry into the sinking of the<br />
Lusitania. It was not an investigation but a<br />
coverup. He was instructed by the<br />
Admiralty to place the entire blame on the<br />
Captain of the ship. Mersey obeyed his<br />
orders but refused payment for his<br />
services and declined to accept further<br />
judicial assignments. In later years, he<br />
said the affair "was a damn dirty business."
Chapter Eleven<br />
THE ROTHSCHILD<br />
FORMULA<br />
The rise of the House of Rothschild in Europe; the<br />
tradition among financiers of profiting from both<br />
sides of armed conflict; the formula by which war<br />
is<br />
converted into debt and debt converted back<br />
into war.<br />
So far we have adhered closely to the subject of money and the<br />
history of its manipulation by political and monetary scientists.<br />
Now we are going to take a short detour along a parallel path and<br />
view some of the same historical scenery from a different perspective.<br />
As we progress, it may seem that we have lost our way, and<br />
you may wonder what connection any of this can possibly have<br />
with the Federal Reserve System. Please be assured, however, it has<br />
everything to do with it,<br />
and, when we finally return to that topic,<br />
the connection will have become painfully clear.<br />
THE PROFITS OF WAR<br />
The focus of this chapter is<br />
on the profits of war and, more<br />
specifically, the tendency of those who reap those profits to<br />
manipulate governments into military conflicts, not for national or<br />
patriotic reasons, but for private gain. The mechanism by which<br />
this was accomplished in the past was more complex than simply<br />
lending money to warring governments and then collecting interest,<br />
although that was part of it The real payoff has always been in<br />
the form of political favoritism in the market place. Writing in the<br />
year 1937, French historian Richard Lewinsohn explains:<br />
Although often called bankers, those who financed wars in the<br />
pre-capitalist period ... were not bankers in the modern sense of the<br />
word. Unlike modern bankers who operate with money deposited<br />
with them by their clients [or, in more recent times, created out of<br />
nothing by a central bank—E.G.], they generally worked with the<br />
fortune which they themselves had amassed or inherited, and which
218 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
they lent at a high rate of interest Thus those who risked the financing<br />
of a war were for the most part already very rich, and this was the case<br />
down to the seventeenth century.<br />
When they agreed to finance a war, these rich lenders did not,<br />
however, always attach great importance to the rate of interest In this<br />
respect they often showed the greatest compliance to their august<br />
clients. But in return they secured for themselves privileges which<br />
could be turned into industrial or commercial profit, such as mining<br />
concessions, monopolies of sale or importation, etc. Sometimes even<br />
they were given the right to appropriate certain taxes as a guarantee of<br />
their loans. So though the loan itself carried a very real risk and often<br />
did not bring in much interest, the indirect profits were very<br />
considerable, and the lenders' leniency well rewarded.<br />
THE ROTHSCHILD DYNASTY<br />
No discussion of banking as a mechanism for financing wars<br />
would be complete without turning eventually to the name<br />
Rothschild. It was Mayer Amschel Rothschild who is quoted as<br />
saying: "Let me issue and control a nation's money and I care not<br />
who writes the laws.<br />
the Rothschild dynasty had: "...conquered<br />
Biographer Frederic Morton concluded that<br />
the world more thoroughly,<br />
more cunningly, and much more lastingly than all the<br />
Ceasars before or all the Hitlers after them." The dynasty was<br />
begun in Frankfurt, Germany, in the middle of the eighteenth<br />
century by Mayer Amschel Bauer, the son of a goldsmith. Mayer<br />
became a clerk in the Oppenheimer Bank in Hanover and was<br />
eventually promoted to junior partner. After his father's death, he<br />
returned to his home in Frankfurt to continue the family business.<br />
Over the door hung a red shield with an eagle as a sign to identify<br />
the establishment. The German words for red shield are roth schild,<br />
so he changed his name from Bauer to Rothschild and added five<br />
gold arrows held in the talons of the eagle to represent his five sons.<br />
1 Richard Lewinsohn, The Profits of War through the Ages (New York: E.P. Dutton,<br />
1937), pp. 55-56.<br />
2. Quoted by Senator Robert L. Owen, former Chairman of the Senate Committee<br />
on Banking and Currency and one of the sponsors of the Federal Reserve Act,<br />
National Economy and the Banking System, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government<br />
Printing Office, 1939), p. 99. This quotation could not be verified in a primary<br />
reference work. However, when one considers the life and accomplishments of the<br />
elder Rothschild, there can be little doubt that this sentiment was, in fact, his<br />
outlook and guiding principle.<br />
3. Frederic Morton, The Rothschilds: A Family Portrait (New York: Atheneum, 1962),<br />
p. 14.<br />
of<br />
THE ROTHSCHILD FORMULA 219<br />
The Rothschild fortune began when Mayer adopted the practice<br />
fractional-reserve banking. As we have seen, he was not alone in<br />
this, but the House of Rothschild greatly surpassed the competition.<br />
That was due to his sharp business acumen and also because<br />
of his five most unusual sons, all of whom became financial power<br />
centers of their own. As they matured and learned the magic of<br />
converting debt into money, they moved beyond the confines of<br />
Frankfurt and established additional operations in the financial<br />
centers, not only of Europe, but of much of the civilized world.<br />
Throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, the brothers<br />
conducted important transactions on behalf of the governments of<br />
England, France, Prussia, Austria, Belgium, Spain, Naples,<br />
Portugal, Brazil, various German states, and other smaller countries.<br />
They were the personal bankers of many of the crowned<br />
heads of Europe. They made large investments, through agents, in<br />
markets as distant as the United States, India, Cuba, and Australia.<br />
They were financiers to Cecil Rhodes, making it possible for him to<br />
establish a monopoly over the diamond fields of South Africa. They<br />
are still connected with the de Beers.<br />
Biographer Derek Wilson writes:<br />
Those who lampooned or vilified the Rothschilds for their<br />
"sinister" influence had a considerable amount of justification for their<br />
anger and anxiety. The banking community had always constituted a<br />
"fifth estate" whose members were able, by their control of royal purse<br />
strings, to affect important events. But the house of Rothschild was<br />
immensely more powerful than any financial empire that had ever<br />
preceded it. It commanded vast wealth. It was international. It was<br />
independent. Royal governments were nervous of it because they<br />
could not control it. Popular movements hated it because it was not<br />
answerable to the people. Constitutionalists resented it because its<br />
influence was exercised behind the scenes—secretly.<br />
Secrecy, of course, is essential for the success of a cabal, and the<br />
Rothschilds perfected the art. By remaining behind the scenes, they<br />
Were able to avoid the brunt of public anger which was directed,<br />
instead, at the political figures which they largely controlled. This is<br />
a technique which has been practiced by financial<br />
1- Morton, pp. 145, 219.<br />
manipulators<br />
2, Derek Wilson, Rothschild: The Wealth and Power of A Dynasty (New York: Charles<br />
Scribner's Sons, 1988), pp. 79, 98^-99.
,<br />
meet<br />
220 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
ever since, and it is fully utilized by those who operate the Federal<br />
Reserve System today. Wilson continues:<br />
Clandestinity was and remained a feature of Rothschild political<br />
activity. Seldom were they to be seen engaging in open public debate<br />
on important issues. Never did they seek government office. Even<br />
when, in later years, some of them entered parliament, they did not<br />
feature prominently in the assembly chambers of London, Paris or<br />
Berlin. Yet all the while they were helping to shape the major events of<br />
the day: by granting or withholding funds; by providing statesmen<br />
with an official diplomatic service; by influencing appointments to<br />
high office; and by an almost daily intercourse with the great decision<br />
makers.<br />
A FORTUNE IN SMUGGLING<br />
Continual war in Europe created excellent opportunities for<br />
profit from smuggling scarce consumer goods past military blockades.<br />
Since the Rothschilds often financed both sides in a conflict<br />
and were known to have great political influence, the mere sight of<br />
the red shield on a leather pouch, a carriage, or a ship's flag was<br />
sufficient to insure that the messenger or his cargo could pass<br />
through check points in either direction. This immunity allowed<br />
them to deal in a thriving black market for cotton goods, yarn,<br />
tobacco, coffee, sugar, and indigo; and they moved freely through<br />
the borders of Germany, Scandinavia, Holland, Spain, England,<br />
and France. This government protection was one of those indirect<br />
benefits that generated commercial profits far in excess of the<br />
interest received on the underlying government loans.<br />
It is generally true that, one man's loss is another man's gain.<br />
And even the friendliest of biographers admit that, for more than<br />
two centuries, the House of Rothschild profited handsomely from<br />
wars and economic collapses, the very occasions on which others<br />
sustained the greatest losses.<br />
NAPOLEON VS THE BANKERS<br />
If one picture is worth a thousand words, then one example<br />
surely must be worth a dozen explanations. There is no better<br />
example than the economic war waged by the financiers of<br />
nineteenth-century Europe against Napoleon Bonaparte. It is an<br />
easily forgotten fact of history that Napoleon had restored law and<br />
1. Derek Wilson, p. 99.<br />
2. Morton, pp. 40-41.<br />
f THE ROTHSCHILD FORMULA 221<br />
order to a chaotic, post-revolutionary France and had turned his<br />
attention, not to war, but to establishing peace and improving<br />
economic conditions at home. He was particularly anxious to get<br />
jus country and his people out of debt and out of the control of<br />
bankers. R. McNair Wilson, in Monarchy or Money Power, says:<br />
It was ordained by him that money should not be exported from<br />
France on any pre<strong>text</strong> whatever except with the consent of the<br />
Government, and that in no circumstance should loans be employed to<br />
current expenditure whether civil or military. . . . "One has only to<br />
consider," Napoleon remarked, "what loans can lead to in order to<br />
realize their danger. Therefore, I would never have anything to do<br />
with them and have always striven against them."...<br />
The object was to withhold from finance the power to embarrass<br />
the Government as it had embarrassed the Government of Louis XVI.<br />
When a Government, Bonaparte declared, is dependent for money<br />
upon bankers, they and not the leaders of that Government control the<br />
situation, since "the hand that gives is above the hand that takes."...<br />
"Money/' he declared, "has no motherland; financiers are without<br />
patriotism and without decency: their sole object is gain."<br />
One of Napoleon's first blows against the bankers was to<br />
establish an independent Bank of France with himself as president.<br />
But even this bank was not trusted, and government funds were<br />
never placed into it It was his refusal to borrow, however, that<br />
caused the most concern among the financiers. Actually, to them<br />
this was a mixture of both bad and good news. The bad news was<br />
that they were denied the benefit of royalty payments on fractional<br />
money. The good news was that, without resorting to debt, they<br />
were confident Napoleon could not militarily defend himself. Thus,<br />
he easily could be toppled and replaced by Louis XVI of the old<br />
monarchic dynasty who was receptive to banker influence. Wilson<br />
continues:<br />
pi.<br />
They had good hope of compassing his downfall. None believed<br />
that he could finance war on a great scale now that the resource of<br />
paper money had been denied him by the destruction of the Assignaf<br />
Where would he obtain the indispensable gold and silver to feed and<br />
equip a great army? Pitt [the Prime Minister of England] counted<br />
already on a coalition of England, Austria, Prussia, Russia, Spain,<br />
R. McNair Wilson, Monarchy or Money Power (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode,<br />
Ltd., 1933), pp. 68, 72.<br />
2. The Assignat was pure fiat money which rapidly became totally worthless in<br />
commerce and which all but destroyed the French economy.
222 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND THE ROTHSCHILD FORMULA 223<br />
Sweden, and numerous small states. Some 600,000 men would be put<br />
the northern states, united with Canada, while the southern states<br />
into the field. All the resources of England's wealth—that is to say, of<br />
would fall to France. Napoleon was to be tempted by offering him<br />
the world's wealth—would be placed at the disposal of this<br />
the awesome title of "King of America." McNair Wilson tells us:<br />
overwhelming force. Could the Corsican muster 200,000? Could he<br />
arm them? Could he feed them? If the lead bullets did not destroy<br />
Labouchere wrote to Baring on March 21, and enclosed a note for<br />
him,<br />
[British Foreign Secretary] Wellesley dictated by Ouvrard which ran:<br />
the gold bullets would soon make an end. He would be forced, like his<br />
"From a conqueror he (Napoleon) is becoming a preserver; the<br />
neighbors, to come, hat in hand, for loans and, like them, to accept the<br />
first result of his marriage with Marie Louise will be that he will make<br />
banker's terms....<br />
He could not put his hands on £2,000,000, so empty was<br />
an offer of peace to England. It is to this nation's (i.e., England's)<br />
the<br />
interest to make peace, for it has the command of the sea; on the<br />
Treasury and so depleted the nation's stock of metallic money.<br />
contrary, it is really in the interest of France to continue war, which<br />
London waited with interest to see how the puzzle would be solved.<br />
allows her to expand indefinitely and make a fresh fleet, which cannot<br />
Napoleon solved the puzzle quite simply by selling off some<br />
be done once peace is established. Why does not the English Cabinet<br />
real estate. Those crazy Americans gave him £3,000,000 for a vast<br />
make a proposal to France to destroy the United States of America,<br />
and by making them again dependent on England, persuade<br />
swamp called Louisiana.<br />
Napoleon to lend his aid to destroy the life-work of Louis XVI?... It is<br />
A PLAN TO DESTROY THE UNITED STATES<br />
to her (England's) interest to conclude peace and to flatter Napoleon's<br />
Napoleon did not want war, but he knew that Europe's<br />
vanity by recognizing his work and his imperial title."...<br />
1. R. McNair Wilson, pp. 71-72. 1. R. McNair Wilson, pp. 81-82.<br />
financial rulers would not settle for peace—unless, of course, they<br />
The Cabinet discussed the proposals and approved them.<br />
were forced into it by the defeat of their puppet regimes or unless,<br />
Wellesley at once hurried to Baring's house to give him the good<br />
news....<br />
somehow, it would be to their monetary advantage. It was<br />
The Dutch would be able to pay and would be compelled to<br />
in<br />
pay in gold.<br />
pursuit of the latter tactic that he threatened to take direct possession<br />
of Holland, which then was ruled by his brother, King Louis.<br />
somewhat strong objections to the plan of a joint attack on the United<br />
Unhappily Napoleon found out what was afoot and took<br />
Napoleon knew that the Dutch were heavily in debt to the English<br />
States. He arrested Ouvrard, dismissed and exiled Fouche, and<br />
bankers. If Holland were to be annexed by France, this debt would<br />
published the whole story, to the grave distress of Wellesley and<br />
never be repaid. So Napoleon made a proposal to England's<br />
Baring.<br />
bankers that, if they would convince the English government to<br />
It must not be concluded from this that Napoleon was a<br />
accept peace with France, he would agree to leave Holland alone.<br />
paragon of virtue or a champion of honest money. His objection to<br />
The negotiations were handled by the banker, Pierre-Cesar<br />
the bankers was that their monetary power was able to threaten the<br />
Labouchere, who was sent by the Dutch, and the English banker,<br />
Sir Francis Baring who was Labouchere's father-in-law. Although<br />
sovereignty of his own political power. He allowed them a free<br />
hand while they served the purpose of the state. Then, when the<br />
this was an attractive proposal to the bankers, at least on a<br />
need for military financing subsided, he would condemn them for<br />
short-term basis, it was still against their nature to forego the<br />
making "unholy profits" and simply take it from them in the name<br />
immense profits of war and mercantilism. They revised the proposal,<br />
i'of the people. If the bankers protested, they were sent to prison.<br />
therefore, to include a plan whereby both England and<br />
And so the battle lines were drawn. Napoleon had to be<br />
France would combine forces to destroy the newly independent<br />
destroyed at all costs. To make this possible, the Bank of England<br />
United States and bring at least half of it—the industrial half—back<br />
created vast new amounts of fiat money to "lend" to the government<br />
so it could finance an overpowering army. A steady stream of<br />
under the domination of England. The incredible plan, conceived<br />
by the French banker, Ouvard, called for military invasion and<br />
gold flowed out of the country to finance the armies of Russia,<br />
conquest followed by division of the spoils. England would receive<br />
[Prussia, and Austria. The economy staggered once again under the
224 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
THE ROTHSCHILD FORMULA 225<br />
load of war debt, and the little people paid the bill with hardly a<br />
grumble because they hadn't the slightest knowledge it was being<br />
charged to their account. Wilson concludes the story:<br />
The bankers won. Louis XVIII was restored by British arms and<br />
British diplomacy to the throne of his ancestors. Loans were placed at<br />
his disposal, though Napoleon had left a France which enjoyed a credit<br />
balance.<br />
A year later the man whom every King and every banker in<br />
Europe called "usurper" won back his throne with 800 men and<br />
without the firing of a single shot. On this occasion he had no option<br />
but to raise a loan for the defense of France. The City of London<br />
[banking district] accommodated him with £5,000,000. With this sum<br />
he equipped the army which Wellington defeated at Waterloo.<br />
GOLD FOR THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON<br />
One of the most fascinating and revealing episodes to be<br />
recorded by Rothschild biographers concerns the smuggling of a<br />
large shipment of gold to finance the Duke of Wellington who was<br />
attempting to feed and equip an army in Portugal and in the<br />
Pyrenees mountains between Spain and France.<br />
It was not at all certain that Wellington would be able to defeat<br />
Napoleon in the coming battle, and the Duke was hard pressed to<br />
convince bankers and merchants in Portugal and Spain to accept<br />
his written promises-to-pay, even though they were officially<br />
guaranteed by the British government These notes were deeply<br />
discounted, and Wellington was desperate for gold coin. It was at<br />
this point that Nathan Rothschild offered the services of himself<br />
and his brothers. With an efficient smuggling apparatus already<br />
functioning throughout Europe, he was able to offer Wellington<br />
much better terms while still making a magnificent profit. But, to<br />
accomplish this, the gold had to pass right under Napoleon's nose.<br />
Frederic Morton describes the scene:<br />
There was only one way to route the cash: through the very France<br />
England's army was fighting. Of course, the Rothschild<br />
blockade-running machine already had superb cogs whirring all over<br />
Germany, Scandinavia and England, even in Spain and Southern<br />
France. But a very foxy new wheel was needed in Napoleon's capital<br />
itself. Enter Jacob—henceforth called James—the youngest of Mayer's<br />
sons.<br />
1. R. McNair Wilson, p. 83.<br />
2. Morton, p. 46.<br />
James was only nineteen years old but was well trained by his<br />
father in the art of deception. He arrived in Paris with a dual<br />
mission. First, he was to provide the French authorities with a false<br />
report about the British gold movement, with just enough truth in it<br />
lo sound convincing. He presented the government with falsified<br />
letters indicating that the English were desperate to halt the flow of<br />
their gold into France. The ploy paid off when the French authorities<br />
then actually encouraged the financial community to accept<br />
British gold and to convert it into commercially sound banknotes.<br />
Second, James was to serve as a vital link in a financial chain<br />
stretching between London and the Pyrenees. He was to coordinate<br />
the receipt of the gold into France, the conversion of that gold into<br />
Spanish banknotes, and the movement of those notes out of the<br />
country on their way to Wellington. All of this he did with amazing<br />
dexterity, especially considering his youth. Morton concludes:<br />
In the space of a few hundred hours Mayer's youngest had not<br />
only gotten the English gold rolling through France, but conjured a<br />
fiscal mirage that took in Napoleon himself. A teen-age Rothschild<br />
tricked the imperial government into sanctioning the very process that<br />
helped to ruin it...<br />
The family machine began to hum. Nathan sent big shipments of<br />
British guineas, Portuguese gold ounces, French napoleons d'or (often<br />
freshly minted in London) across the Channel. From the coast James<br />
saw them to Paris and secretly transmuted the metal into bills on<br />
certain Spanish bankers. South of the capital, Kalmann [another of<br />
Mayer's sons] materialized, took over the bills, blurred into a<br />
thousand shadowed canyons along the Pyrenees—and reappeared,<br />
with Wellington's receipts in hand. Salomon [another son] was<br />
everywhere, trouble-shooting, making sure the transit points were<br />
diffuse and obscure enough not to disturb either the French delusion<br />
or the British guinea rate. Amschel stayed in Frankfurt and helped<br />
father Mayer to staff headquarters.<br />
The French did catch a few whiffs of the<br />
truth. Sometimes the<br />
suspicious could be prosperously purged of their suspicion. The police<br />
chief of Calais, for example, suddenly was able to live in such<br />
distracting luxury that he found it difficult to patrol the shoreline<br />
thoroughly....<br />
While Napoleon struggled his might away in the Russian Winter,<br />
there passed through France itself a gold vein to the army staving in<br />
the Empire's back door.<br />
I Morton, p. 47.
•<br />
we<br />
226 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND THE ROTHSCHILD FORMULA 227<br />
At a dinner party in later years, Nathan casually summed up<br />
At least one friendly biographer claims that Nathan's first act<br />
the episode as though it were merely a good piece of routine<br />
was to deliver the news to the Prime Minister, but that government<br />
business. He said:<br />
officials were hesitant at first to believe it, because it ran contrary to<br />
reports they had received<br />
The East India Company had £800,000 worth<br />
previously<br />
of<br />
telling<br />
gold to of<br />
sell. I went<br />
serious British<br />
to the sale and bought it all. I knew the Duke of Wellington must<br />
setbacks. At any rate, there is<br />
have<br />
no doubt that Nathan's second act of<br />
it. The government sent for me and said they must have the gold. I sold<br />
the morning was to set off for the stock exchange to take up a<br />
the gold to them, but they didn't know how to get it to the Duke in<br />
position at his usual pillar.<br />
Portugal. I undertook all that and sent it through France. It was the<br />
All eyes were upon him as he slumped dejectedly, staring at the<br />
best business I have ever done.<br />
floor. Then, he raised his gaze and, with pained expression, began<br />
to sell The whisper<br />
THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO<br />
went through the crowded room, "Nathan is<br />
i selling?"<br />
The final outcome of the battle at Waterloo between<br />
"Nathan is<br />
Wellington<br />
selling*" "Wellington must have lost." "Our<br />
government bonds will<br />
and Napoleon was crucial to Europe both politically and never<br />
economically.<br />
If Napoleon had been victorious, England would have<br />
be repaid/' "Sell them now. Sell. Sell!"<br />
Prices tumbled, and Nathan sold again.<br />
been<br />
Prices plummeted, and<br />
still Nathan sold. Finally, prices<br />
in even greater economic trouble than before. Not only would<br />
collapsed<br />
she<br />
altogether and, in one<br />
quick move, Nathan reversed his call<br />
have lost international power and prestige, but even at home,<br />
and<br />
her<br />
purchased the entire<br />
market in government bonds. In a matter<br />
subjects would have been further disgruntled over<br />
of just<br />
such<br />
a<br />
great<br />
few hours, he<br />
had acquired the dominant holding of England's entire<br />
personal and financial wartime sacrifices. Her defeat almost surely<br />
debt at but<br />
a tiny fraction of its worth.<br />
would have resulted in not being able to repay the great amounts<br />
she had borrowed to conduct the war. In the London stock SIDONIA<br />
exchange, therefore, where British government bonds were traded<br />
Benjamin Disraeli, the Prime Minister of England, wrote a book<br />
in<br />
along with other securities, everyone waited anxiously for news of<br />
1844 called Coningsby. It was a political novel in which the author<br />
the outcome.<br />
expressed his views about contemporary issues. One of the strong<br />
It was well known that the Rothschilds had developed a private<br />
characters in the book was a financier named Sidonia, but every<br />
detail<br />
courier service that was used, not only to transport gold and other<br />
of Sidonia's actions was an exact replica of the real Lord<br />
Rothschild,<br />
tangible cargo, but to rapidly move information that could be useful<br />
whom Disraeli greatly admired. In the guise of a novel,<br />
we read<br />
in making investment decisions. It was<br />
about<br />
expected, therefore, that<br />
Rothschild's emigration from Germany, his family<br />
and banking ties<br />
Nathan in London would be the first to know the name of the victor<br />
throughout Europe, his handling of the gold for<br />
Wellington, and his financial<br />
after the cannon smoke had cleared from the battlefield. And they<br />
coup after Waterloo. Then Disraeli<br />
wrote:<br />
were not to be disappointed. The first news of Wellington's victory<br />
arrived in Brussels around midnight on June 18, 1815, where a<br />
Europe did require money, and Sidonia was ready to lend it to<br />
Rothschild agent named Rothworth was waiting in readiness. He<br />
Europe. France wanted some; Austria more; Prussia a little; Russia a<br />
few<br />
immediately mounted a fresh horse and set off for the port of<br />
millions. Sidonia could furnish them all....<br />
It is not difficult to<br />
Ostend where a boat was standing by to speed him across the<br />
conceive that, after having pursued the career<br />
have intimated for about ten years, Sidonia had<br />
channel to London. In the early hours of June 20, the exhausted<br />
become one of the<br />
messenger was pounding on Nathan's door, a full twenty-four<br />
* The New York Times, in its April 1, 1915, edition, reported that Baron Nathan<br />
hours before Wellington's own courier, Major Henry Percy,<br />
Mayer de Rothschild had attempted to secure a court order to suppress a book<br />
vvntten by Ignatious Balla entitled<br />
arrived.<br />
The Romance of the Rothschilds on the grounds that<br />
£e Waterloo story about his grandfather was untrue and libelous. The court ruled<br />
pt the story was true, dismissed the suit, and ordered Rothschild to pay all court<br />
1. Morton, p. 45. costs. r J
228 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
THE ROTHSCHILD FORMULA 229<br />
most considerable personages in Europe. He had established a<br />
brother, or a near relative, in whom he could confide, in most of the<br />
the courts. They are the police. Who will seize their assets?<br />
principal capitals. He was lord and master of the money market of the<br />
answer is another government. Speaking of a relatively<br />
world, and of course virtually lord and master of everything else. He<br />
example of this principle, Ron<br />
literally held the revenues of Southern Italy in pawn; and<br />
Chernow explains:<br />
monarchs<br />
The<br />
modern<br />
3. Quoted in The New York Times, October 21, 1987, cited by Chernow, p. 13.<br />
1 Quoted by Jacques Attali, translated by Barbara Ellis, A Man of Influence: Sir<br />
4. Disraeli, p. 229. siegmund Warburg, 1902-82 (London: Weidenfeld, & Nicolson, 1986), p. 57.<br />
and ministers of all countries courted his advice and were guided by<br />
The new alliance [between the monetary and political scientists]<br />
his suggestions.<br />
was mutually advantageous, Washington wanted to harness the new<br />
financial power to coerce<br />
That Disraeli was not exaggerating was made clear<br />
foreign<br />
by the boast<br />
governments into opening their<br />
markets to American goods or adopting<br />
of James Rothschild himself. When U.S. Treasury agents<br />
pro-American policies.<br />
approached<br />
him in Paris in 1842 with a request for a loan to the<br />
the government's police powers in distant places. The threat of<br />
The<br />
banks, in turn, needed levers to force debt repayment and welcomed<br />
American government, he said to them: "You have seen the man<br />
military intervention was an excellent means by which to speed loan<br />
who is at the head of the finances of Europe."<br />
repayment. When Kuhn, Loeb considered a loan to the Dominican<br />
There have always been men who were in a position to make<br />
Republic, backed by customs receipts, Jacob Schiff inquired of his<br />
private fortunes out of cooperating with both sides in a war. The<br />
London associate Sir Ernest Cassel, "If they do not pay, who will<br />
Rothschilds were not unique in this, but they no doubt perfected<br />
the art and became the personification of that breed. They were not<br />
collect<br />
ours." 1<br />
these customs duties?" Cassel replied, "Your marines and<br />
necessarily evil in a moral sense. What preoccupied their minds<br />
One of the great puzzles of history is why governments always<br />
were not questions of right or wrong but of profit and loss. This<br />
go into debt and seldom attempt to put themselves on a "pay-asyou-go"<br />
basis, A partial answer is that kings and politicians lack<br />
analytical indifference to human suffering was aptly described by<br />
one Rothschild when he said: "When the streets of Paris are<br />
the courage to tax their subjects the enormous sums that would<br />
Q<br />
be<br />
running with blood, I buy." They may have held citizenship in the<br />
required under such an arrangement. There is also the deeper<br />
country of their residence, but patriotism was beyond their comprehension.<br />
question of why the expenditures are so high in the first place.<br />
They were also very bright, if not cunning, and these<br />
Given the mentality of the world's financial lords and masters,<br />
combined traits made them the role model of the cool pragmatists<br />
as Disraeli described them, it is conceivable that a coldly calculated<br />
who dominate the political and financial world of today. Disraeli<br />
strategy has been developed over the years to insure this result. In<br />
well described this type when he wrote of Sidonia:<br />
fact, the historical evidence strongly suggests that just such a plan<br />
He was a man without affections. It would be harsh to say he had<br />
was developed in eighteenth-century Europe and perfected in<br />
no heart, for he was susceptible of deep emotions, but not for<br />
twentieth-century America. For the purposes of hypothetical analysis,<br />
individuals.... The individual never touched him. Woman was to him<br />
a toy, man a machine.<br />
let us identify this strategy as The Rothschild Formula.<br />
THE FORMULA<br />
It would seem that an absence of patriotism and a cold,<br />
Let us imagine a man who is totally pragmatic. He is smarter<br />
analytical outlook would lead financiers to avoid making loans to<br />
and more cunning than most men and, in fact, holds them in thinly<br />
governments, particularly foreign ones. Private borrowers can be<br />
disguised contempt. He may respect the talents of a few, but has<br />
hauled into court and their assets confiscated to make good on their<br />
little concern over the condition of mankind. He has observed that<br />
kings and politicians are always fighting over something or other<br />
1 Benjamin Disraeli, Coningsby (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, originally published<br />
and has concluded that wars are inevitable. He<br />
in England<br />
also has learned<br />
in 1844), p. 225.<br />
that<br />
2. Stephen Birmingham, "Our Crowd": The Great Jewish Families ofNew York (New<br />
wars can be profitable, not only by lending or creating the<br />
York: Harper & Row, 1986), p. 73.
230 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
money to finance them, but from government favoritism in the<br />
granting of commercial subsidies or monopolies. He is not capable<br />
of such a primitive feeling as patriotism, so he is free to participate<br />
in the funding of any side in any conflict, limited only by factors of<br />
self interest. If such a man were to survey the world around him, it<br />
is not difficult to imagine that he would come to the following<br />
conclusions which would become the prime directives of his career:<br />
1. War is the ultimate discipline to any government. If it can<br />
successfully meet the challenge of war, it will survive. If it<br />
cannot, it will perish. All else is secondary. The sanctity of its<br />
laws, the prosperity of its citizens, and the solvency of its<br />
treasury will be quickly sacrificed by any government in its<br />
primal act of self-survival.<br />
2. All that is necessary, therefore, to insure that a government will<br />
maintain or expand its debt is to involve it in war or the threat of<br />
war. The greater the threat and the more destructive the war, the<br />
greater the need for debt.<br />
3. To involve a country in war or the threat of war, it will be<br />
necessary for it to have enemies with credible military might. If<br />
such enemies already exist, all<br />
the better. If they exist but lack<br />
military strength, it will be necessary to provide them the<br />
money to build their war machine. If an enemy does not exist at<br />
all, then it will be necessary to create one by financing the rise of<br />
a hostile regime.<br />
x<br />
4. The ultimate obstacle is a government which declines to finance<br />
its wars through debt. Although this seldom happens, when it<br />
does, it will be necessary to encourage internal political<br />
opposition, insurrection, or revolution to replace that<br />
government with one that is more compliant to our will. The<br />
assassination of heads of state could play an important role in<br />
this process.<br />
5. No nation can be allowed to remain militarily stronger than its<br />
adversaries, for that could lead to peace and a reduction of debt.<br />
To accomplish this balance of power, it may be necessary to<br />
finance both sides of the conflict. Unless one of the combatants<br />
is hostile to our interests and, therefore, must be destroyed,<br />
neither side should be allowed a decisive victory or defeat.<br />
While we must always proclaim the virtues of peace, the<br />
unspoken objective is perpetual war.<br />
r<br />
THE ROTHSCHILD FORMULA 231<br />
Whether anyone actually put this strategy into words or passed<br />
it along from generation to generation is not important. In fact, it is<br />
doubtful it has ever worked that way. Whether it is the product of<br />
conscious planning or merely the consequence of men responding<br />
to the profit opportunities inherent in fiat money, the world's<br />
financial<br />
lords have acted as though they were following such a<br />
plan, and this has become especially apparent since the creation of<br />
the central-bank Mandrake Mechanism three centuries ago.<br />
The "balance-of-power" question is particularly intriguing.<br />
Most history <strong>text</strong>s present the concept as though it were some kind<br />
of natural, social phenomenon which, somehow, has worked to the<br />
benefit of mankind. The implication is that it's just wonderful how,<br />
after all those European wars, no nation was strong enough to<br />
completely dominate the others. When the United States emerged<br />
from World War II with exactly such power, it was widely<br />
deplored, and massive political/financial mechanisms such as<br />
foreign aid and disarmament were set in motion to restore the<br />
balance. This has become almost a revered doctrine of international<br />
democracy. But the overlooked consequence of this sentimental<br />
notion is that wars "between equals" have become the permanent<br />
landscape of history.<br />
This does not mean that every war-like group that comes along<br />
will find easy financing from the lords and masters. It depends on<br />
whom they threaten and how likely they are to succeed. In 1830, for<br />
example, the Dutch were facing an uprising of their subjects in<br />
Belgium. Both the ruling government and the revolutionaries were<br />
dependent upon the Rothschilds for financing their conflict.<br />
The<br />
Dutch rulers were reliable customers for loans and, just as important,<br />
they were reliable in their payment of interest on those loans.<br />
It would have been foolhardy to provide more than token assistance<br />
to the rebels who, if they came to power, quite likely would<br />
have refused to honor the debts of the former puppet regime.<br />
Salomon Rothschild explained:<br />
These gentlemen should not count on us unless they decide to<br />
follow a line of prudence and moderation.... Our goodwill does not<br />
yet extend to the point of putting clubs into the hands that would beat<br />
us, that is, lending money to make war and ruin the credit that we<br />
sustain with all our efforts and all our means. 1<br />
I- As quoted by Derek Wilson, p. 100.
232 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
After the revolution was resolved by negotiation rather than by<br />
arms, the new government in Brussels was a natural target<br />
financial takeover. James Rothschild laid out the strategy that has<br />
become the model of such operations ever since:<br />
Now is the moment of which we should take advantage to make<br />
ourselves absolute masters of that country's finances. The first step<br />
will be to establish ourselves on an intimate footing with Belgium's<br />
new Finance Minister, to gain his confidence ... and to take all the<br />
treasury bonds he may offer us.<br />
PERPETUAL WAR IN OGHTEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND<br />
Wars, great and small, have always been a plague to Europe,<br />
but it was not until they were easy to finance through central<br />
banking and fiat money that they became virtually perpetual. For<br />
example, the following war chronicle begins immediately following<br />
the formation of the Bank of England which, as you recall, was<br />
created for the specific purpose of financing a war:<br />
1689-1697 The War of the League of Augsberg<br />
1702-1713 The War of Spanish Succession<br />
1739-1742 The War of Jenkin's Ear<br />
1744-1748 The War of Austrian Succession<br />
1754-1763 The French and Indian War<br />
1793-1801 The War against Revolutionary France<br />
1803-1815 The Napoleonic Wars<br />
In addition to these European conflicts, there also wer^ two<br />
wars with America: the War for Independence and the War of 1812.<br />
In the 126 years between 1689 and 1815, England was at war 63 of<br />
them. That is one out of every two years in combat. The others were<br />
spent preparing for combat.<br />
The mark of the Rothschild Formula is unmistakable in these<br />
conflicts. The monetary scientists often were seen financing both<br />
sides. Whether ending in victory or defeat, the outcome merely<br />
preserved or restored the European "balance of power/ 7<br />
And the<br />
most permanent result of any of these wars was expanded government<br />
debt for all parties.<br />
SUMMARY<br />
By the end of the eighteenth century, the House of Rothschild<br />
had become one of the most successful financial institutions the<br />
1. Derek Wilson, p. 100.<br />
for<br />
world has ever known. Its<br />
THE ROTHSCHILD FORMULA 233<br />
meteoric rise can be attributed to the<br />
great industry and shrewdness of the five brothers who established<br />
themselves in various capitals of Europe and forged the world's<br />
first international financial network. As pioneers in the practice of<br />
lending money to governments, they soon learned that this provided<br />
unique opportunities to parlay wealth into political power as<br />
Before long, most of the princes and kings of Europe had<br />
well.<br />
come within their influence.<br />
The Rothschilds also had mastered the art of smuggling on a<br />
grand scale, often with the tacit approval of the governments<br />
whose laws they violated. This was perceived by all parties as an<br />
unofficial bonus for providing needed funding to those same<br />
governments, particularly in time of war. The fact that different<br />
branches of the Rothschild network also might be providing funds<br />
for the enemy was pragmatically ignored. Thus, a time-honored<br />
practice among financiers was born: profiting from both sides.<br />
The Rothschilds operated a highly efficient intelligence gathering<br />
system which provided them with advance knowledge of<br />
important events, knowledge which was invaluable for investment<br />
decisions. When an exhausted Rothschild courier delivered the first<br />
news of the Battle of Waterloo, Nathan was able to deceive the<br />
London bond traders into a selling panic, and that allowed him to<br />
acquire the dominant holding of England's entire debt at but a tiny<br />
fraction of its worth.<br />
A study of these and similar events reveals a personality<br />
profile, not just of the Rothschilds, but of that special breed of<br />
international financiers whose success typically is built upon<br />
certain character traits. Those include cold objectivity, immunity to<br />
patriotism, and indifference to the human condition. That profile is<br />
the basis for proposing a theoretical strategy, called the Rothschild<br />
Formula, which motivates such men to propel governments into<br />
war for the profits they yield. This formula most likely has never<br />
been consciously phrased as it appears here, but subconscious<br />
motivations and personality traits work together to implement it<br />
nevertheless. As long as the mechanism of central banking exists, it<br />
will be to such men an irresistible temptation to convert debt into<br />
perpetual war and war into perpetual debt.<br />
In the following chapters we shall track the distinctive footprint<br />
of the Rothschild Formula as it leads up to our own doorstep in the<br />
present day.
Chapter Twelve<br />
SINK THE LUSITANIA!<br />
The role of J. P. Morgan in providing loans to<br />
England and France in World War I;<br />
the souring<br />
of those loans as it became apparent that Germany<br />
would win; the betrayal of a British ship and the<br />
sacrifice ofAmerican passengers as a stratagem to<br />
bring America into the war; the use of American<br />
taxes to pay off the loans.<br />
Historisches Museum, Frankfurt, Germany<br />
A satirical cartoon of 1848 depicts "Rothschild"<br />
pondering over which of Europe's rulers to<br />
favor with loans, while revolutionaries<br />
challenge the ancient order he is supporting.<br />
A caricature of Nathan Rothschild,<br />
showing him in his habitual position<br />
before one of the pillars in the Exchange.<br />
It was here that he capitalized on his<br />
advance knowledge of Wellington's<br />
defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo and was<br />
able to acquire the dominant holding of<br />
England's entire debt at but a small<br />
fraction of its worth.<br />
The origin of World War I usually is attributed to the assassination<br />
of Archduke Francis Ferdinand of Austria-Hungary by a<br />
Serbian nationalist in 1914. This was a serious affront to Austria but<br />
hardly sufficient reason to plunge the world into a mortal conflict<br />
that would claim over ten million lives and twenty million<br />
wounded. American schoolchildren are taught that Uncle Sam<br />
came into the war "to make the world safe for democracy/ 7<br />
But, as<br />
we shall see, the American war drums were pounded by men with<br />
far less idealistic objectives.<br />
Since the latter part of the eighteenth century, the Rothschild<br />
Formula had controlled the political climate of Europe. Nations had<br />
increasingly confronted each other over border disputes, colonial<br />
territories, and trade routes. An arms race had been in progress for<br />
many years; large, standing armies had been recruited and trained;<br />
military alliances had been hammered together; all in preparation<br />
for war. The assassination of Ferdinand was not the cause but the<br />
trigger. It was merely the spark that lit the fuse that fired the first<br />
loaded cannon.<br />
AN INVESTMENT IN WAR<br />
The exigencies of war in Europe required England and France to<br />
go heavily into debt When their respective central banks and local<br />
merchant banks could no longer meet that need, the beleaguered<br />
governments turned to the Americans and selected the House of<br />
Morgan—acting as partners of the Rothschilds—to act as sales agent<br />
for their bonds. Most of the money raised in this fashion was<br />
234<br />
British Museum Print Room
236 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
SINK THE LUSITANIA! 237<br />
quickly returned to the United States to acquire war-sensitive materials,<br />
and Morgan was selected as the U.S. purchase agent for those<br />
as well. A commission was paid on all<br />
transactions in both directions:<br />
once when the money was borrowed and again when it was<br />
spent. Furthermore, many of the companies receiving production<br />
contracts were either owned outright by Morgan holding companies<br />
or were securely within his orbit of bank control- Under such an<br />
arrangement it will not be surprising to learn, as we shall in a<br />
moment, that Morgan was not overly anxious to see hostilities come<br />
to a close. Even the most honorable of men can be corrupted by the<br />
temptation of such gigantic flows of cash.<br />
Writing in the year 1919, just a few months after the end of the<br />
war, John Moody says:<br />
Not only did England and France pay for their supplies with<br />
money furnished by Wall Street, but they made their purchases<br />
through the same medium.... Inevitably the house of Morgan was<br />
selected for this important task Thus the war had given Wall Street an<br />
entirely new role. Hitherto it has been exclusively the headquarters of<br />
finance; now it became the greatest industrial mart the world had ever<br />
known. In addition to selling stocks and bonds, financing railroads,<br />
and performing the other tasks of a great banking center, Wall Street<br />
began to deal in shells, cannon, submarines, blankets, clothing, shoes,<br />
canned meats, wheat and the thousands of other articles needed for<br />
the prosecution of a great war.<br />
The money began to flow in January of 1915 when the Hduse of<br />
Morgan signed a contract with the British Army Council and the<br />
Admiralty. The first purchase, curiously, was for horses, and the<br />
amount tendered was $12 million. But that was but the first drop of<br />
rain before the deluge. Total purchases would eventually climb to<br />
an astronomical $3 billion. The firm became the largest consumer on<br />
earth, spending up to $10 million per day. Morgan offices at 23 Wall<br />
Street were mobbed by brokers and manufacturers seeking to cut a<br />
deal The bank had to post guards at every door and at the partners'<br />
homes as well. Each month, Morgan presided over purchases which<br />
were equal to the gross national product of the entire world just one<br />
generation before.<br />
1. John Moody, The Masters of Capital (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1919),<br />
pp. 164-165.<br />
2. Chemow, pp. 187-89.<br />
1<br />
Throughout all this, Morgan vigorously claimed to be a pacifist.<br />
"Nobody could hate war more than I do/' he told the Senate<br />
Munitions Committee. But such professions of righteousness were<br />
difficult to accept. Lewinsohn comments:<br />
The 500 million dollar loan contracted in autumn 1915 brought to<br />
the group of bankers, at whose head Morgan was, a net profit of 9<br />
million dollars.... Again, in 1917, the French government paid to<br />
Morgan's and other banks a commission of 1,500,000 dollars, and a<br />
further million in 1918.<br />
Besides the issue of loans there was another source of profit: the<br />
purchase and sale of American stock which the Allies surrendered so<br />
that they could buy munitions in the States. It is estimated that in the<br />
course of the war some 2000 million [two billion] dollars passed in this<br />
way through Morgan's hands. Even if the commission was very small,<br />
transactions of such dimensions would give him an influence on the<br />
stock market which would carry very real advantages.. .<br />
His hatred against war did not prevent him, citizen of a neutral<br />
country, from furnishing belligerent powers with 4,400,000 rifles for a<br />
matter of $194,000,000.... The profits were such as to compensate to<br />
some degree his hatred of warfare. According to his own account, he<br />
received, as agent of the English and French governments, a<br />
commission of 1% on orders totalling $3,000,000,000. That is, he<br />
received some $30,000,000.... Besides these two chief principals,<br />
Morgan, however, also acted for Russia (for whom he did business<br />
amounting to $412,000,000) and for Italy and Canada (figures for his<br />
business with the last two not having been published).. .<br />
J.P. Morgan, and some of his partners in the bank, were at the time<br />
shareholders in companies that were ... concerns which made<br />
substantial profits from the orders he placed with them.... It is really<br />
astonishing that a central buying organization should have been<br />
confided to one who was buyer and seller at the same time.<br />
GERMANY'S U-BOATS ALMOST WON THE WAR<br />
But there were dark clouds gathering above Wall Street as the<br />
war began to go badly for the Allies. With the passage of time and<br />
the condensing of history, it is easy to forget that Germany and the<br />
Central Powers almost won the war prior to U.S. entry. Employing<br />
a small fleet of newly developed submarines, Germany was well on<br />
her way to cutting off England and her allies from all outside help.<br />
It was an amazing feat and it changed forever the concept of naval<br />
warfare. Germany had a total of twenty-one U-boats, but, because<br />
1- Lewinsohn, pp. 103-4, 222-24.
238 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND SINK THE LUSITANIA! 239<br />
they constantly had to be repaired and serviced, the maximum<br />
number at sea was only seven at any one time. Yet, between 1914<br />
and 1918, German submarines had sunk over 5,700 surface ships.<br />
Three-hundred thousand tons of Allied shipping were sent to the<br />
bottom every week. One out of every four steamers leaving the<br />
British Isles never returned. In later years, British Foreign Secretary,<br />
Arthur Balfour, wrote: "At that time, it certainly looked as though<br />
we were going to lose the war/' Robert Ferrell, in his Woodrow<br />
Wilson and World War J, concluded: "The Allies approached the<br />
brink of disaster, with no recourse other than to ask Germany for<br />
terms."<br />
William McAdoo, who was Secretary of the Treasury at the<br />
time, says in his memoirs:<br />
Across the sea came the dismay of the British—a dismay that<br />
carried a deepening note of disaster. There was a fear, and a<br />
well-grounded one, that England might be starved into abject<br />
surrender.... On April 27, 1917, Ambassador Walter H. Page reported<br />
confidentially to the President that the food in the British Isles was not<br />
more than enough to feed the civil population for six weeks or two<br />
months.<br />
rAs<br />
previously mentioned by William McAdoo, the American<br />
ambassador to England at that time was Walter Hines Page, a trustee<br />
of Rockefeller's social-engineering foundation called the<br />
General Education Board. It was learned by the Nye committee that,<br />
in addition to his government salary, which he complained was not<br />
high enough, Page also received an allowance of $25,000 a year (an<br />
enormous amount in 1917) from Cleveland Dodge, president of<br />
Rockefeller's National City Bank. On March 15, 1917, Ambassador<br />
Page sent a telegram to the State Department outlining the financial<br />
crisis in England. Since sources of new capital had dried up, the<br />
only way to keep the war going, he said, was to make direct grants<br />
from the U.S. Treasury. But, since this would be a violation of neutrality<br />
treaties, the United States would have to abandon its neutrality<br />
and enter the war. He said:<br />
I think that the pressure of this approaching crisis has gone<br />
beyond the ability of the Morgan Financial Agency for the British and<br />
French Governments.... The greatest help we could give the Allies<br />
would be such a credit.... Unless we go to war with Germany, our<br />
Government, of course, cannot make such a direct grant of credit. 1<br />
Under these circumstances, it became impossible for Morgan to<br />
find new buyers for the Allied war bonds, neither for fresh funding<br />
nor to replenish the old bonds which were coming due and facing<br />
default. This was serious on several counts. If bond sales came to a<br />
halt, there would be no money to continue purchasing war materials.<br />
Commissions would be lost at both ends. Furthermore^ if the<br />
previously sold bonds were to go into default, as they certainly<br />
would if Britain and France were forced to accept peace on<br />
Germany's terms, the investors would sustain gigantic losses. Something<br />
had to be done. But what? Robert Ferrell hints at the answer:<br />
In the mid thirties a Senate committee headed by Gerald P. Nye of<br />
North Dakota investigated the pre-1917 munitions trade and raised a<br />
possibility that the Wilson administration went to war because<br />
American bankers needed to protect their Allied loans.<br />
1. Balfour MSS, FO/800/208, British Foreign Office records, Public Record Office,<br />
London, as cited by Robert H. Ferrell, Woodrow Wilson and World War I (New York:<br />
Harper & Row, 1985), p. 35.<br />
2. Ferrell, p. 12.<br />
3. William G. McAdoo, Crowded Years (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1931; rpt.<br />
New York: Kennikat Press, 1971), p. 392.<br />
4. Ferrell, p. 88.<br />
The Morgan group had floated one-and-a-half billion dollars in<br />
loans to Britain and France. With the fortunes of war turning against<br />
them, investors were facing the threat of a total loss. As Ferdinand<br />
Lundberg observed: "The declaration of war by the United States, in<br />
addition to extricating the wealthiest American families from a dangerous<br />
situation, also opened new vistas of profits." 2<br />
COLONEL HOUSE<br />
One of the most influential men behind the scenes at this time<br />
was Colonel Edward Mandell House, personal adviser to Woodrow<br />
Wilson and, later, to F.D.R. House had close contacts with both J.P.<br />
Morgan and the old banking families of Europe. He had received<br />
several years of his schooling in England and, in later years, surrounded<br />
himself with prominent members of the Fabian Society.<br />
Furthermore, he was a man of great personal wealth, most of it<br />
acquired during the War Between the States. His father, Thomas<br />
William House, had acted as the confidential American agent of<br />
1- Quoted by Ferdinand Lundberg, America's Sixty Families (New York: Vanguard<br />
Press, 1937), p. 141. Also see Link et al, eds., The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Vol. 41<br />
(1983), pp. 336-37, cited by Ferrell, p. 90.<br />
2- Lundberg, pp. 141-42.
240 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
SINK THE LUSITANIA! 241<br />
unknown banking interests in London. It was commonly believed<br />
he represented the Rothschilds. Although settled in Houston, Texas,<br />
the elder often remarked that he wanted his sons to "know and<br />
serve England." He was one of the few residents of a Confederate<br />
state who emerged from the War with a great fortune.<br />
It is widely acknowledged that Colonel House was the man who<br />
selected Wilson as a presidential candidate and who secured his<br />
nomination. He became Wilson's constant companion, and the<br />
President admitted publicly that he depended on him greatly for<br />
instruction and guidance. Many of Wilson's important appointive<br />
posts in government were hand selected by House. He and Wilson<br />
even went so far as to develop a private code so they could communicate<br />
freely over the telephone. The President himself had written:<br />
"Mr. House is my second personality. He is my independent self.<br />
His thoughts and mine are one,"<br />
George Viereck, an admiring biographer of House, tells us:<br />
House had the Texas delegation in his pocket.... Always moving<br />
quietly in the background, he made and unmade several governors of<br />
Texas.... House selected Wilson because he regarded him as the best<br />
available candidate....<br />
For seven long years Colonel House was Woodrow Wilson's other<br />
self. For six long years he shared with him all but the title of the Chief<br />
Magistracy of the Republic. For six years two rooms were at his<br />
disposal in the North Wing of the White House.... It was House who<br />
made the slate for the Cabinet formulated the first policies of the<br />
Administration and practically directed the foreign affairs of the<br />
United States. We had, indeed, two Presidents for one!...<br />
Super-ambassador, he talked to emperors and kings as an equal. He<br />
was the spiritual generalissimo of the Administration. He was the pilot<br />
who guided the ship.<br />
A SECRET AGREEMENT TO GET THE U.S. INTO WAR<br />
As the presidential election neared for Wilson's second term,<br />
Colonel House entered into a series of confidential talks with Sir<br />
1. The Columbia Encyclopedia (Third Edition, 1962, p. 2334) says the Democratic<br />
Party nomination went to Wilson when William Jennings Bryan switched his<br />
support to him "prompted by Edward M. House." For details, see Martin, p. 155-<br />
2. Charles Seymour, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House (New York: Houghton<br />
Mifflin Co., 1926), Vol 1, pp. 114-15.<br />
3. Seymour, Vol . I, p<br />
. 1 1 4<br />
4. George Sylvester Viereck, The Strangest Friendship in History: Woodrow Wilson<br />
and Colonel House (New York: Liveright Publishers, 1932), pp. 4, 18-19, 33, 35.<br />
William Wiseman, who was attached to the British embassy in<br />
Washington and who acted as a secret intermediary between House<br />
and the British Foreign Office. Charles Seymour writes: "Between<br />
House and Wiseman there were soon to be few political secrets." 1<br />
his was upsetting to the Secretary of State, William Jennings<br />
Bryan. Mrs. Bryan, as co-author of her husband's memoirs, writes:<br />
While Secretary Bryan was bearing the heavy responsibility of the<br />
Department of State, there arose the curious conditions surrounding<br />
Mr. E.M. House's unofficial connection with the President and his<br />
voyages abroad on affairs of State, which were not communicated to<br />
Secretary Bryan.. . . The President was unofficially dealing with foreign<br />
governments.<br />
What was the purpose of those dealings? It<br />
was nothing less<br />
than to work out the means whereby the United States could be<br />
brought into the war. Viereck explains:<br />
Ten months before the election which returned Wilson to the<br />
White House in 1916 "because he kept us out of war," Colonel House<br />
negotiated a secret agreement with England and France on behalf of<br />
Wilson which pledged the United States to intervene on behalf of the<br />
Allies.<br />
On March 9, 1916, Woodrow Wilson formally sanctioned the<br />
undertaking. If an inkling of the conversations between Colonel<br />
House and the leaders of England and France had reached the<br />
American people before the election, it might have caused incalculable<br />
revulsions of public opinion....<br />
From this conversation and various conferences with Sir Edward<br />
Grey grew the Secret Treaty, made without the knowledge and<br />
consent of the United States Senate, by which Woodrow Wilson and<br />
House chained the United States to the chariot of the Entente.... After<br />
the War the <strong>text</strong> of the agreement leaked out. Grey was the first to<br />
tattle. Page discussed it at length. Colonel House tells its history.<br />
C. Hartley Grattan discusses it at length in his book, Why We FoughL<br />
But for some incomprehensible reason the enormous significance of<br />
the revelation never penetrated the consciousness of the American<br />
people. 3<br />
l> Seymour, Vol. 11, p. 399.<br />
|- William Jennings Bryan and Mary Baird Bryan, The Memoirs of William Jennings<br />
Bryan (New York: Kennikat Press, 1925), Vol. II, pp. 404^5.<br />
3<br />
- Viereck, pp. 106-08. This matter, along with the complete <strong>text</strong> of Sir Grey's<br />
memorandum, is discussed in The Memoirs of William Jennings Bryan Vol. 11, pp.
242 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
SINK THE LUSITANIA! 243<br />
The basic terms of the agreement were that the United States<br />
government would offer to negotiate a peaceful settlement between<br />
Germany and the Allies and would then put forth a specific proposal<br />
for the terms of that settlement. If either side refused to accept<br />
the proposal, then the United States would come into the war as an<br />
ally of the other side. The catch was that the terms of the proposal<br />
were carefully drafted so that Germany could not possibly accept<br />
them. Thus, to the world, it would look as though Germany was at<br />
fault and the United States was humanitarian. As Ambassador Page<br />
observed in a memorandum dated February 9, 1916:<br />
House arrived from Berlin-Havre-Paris full of the idea of<br />
American intervention. First his plan was that he and I and a group of<br />
the British Cabinet (Grey, Asquith, Lloyd George, Reading, etc.)<br />
should at once work out a minimum programme of peace—the least<br />
that the Allies would accept, which, he assumed, would be unacceptable to<br />
the Germans; and that the President would take this programme and<br />
present it to both sides; the side that declined would be responsible for<br />
continuing the war.... Of course, the fatal moral weakness of the<br />
foregoing scheme is that we should plunge into the War, not on the<br />
merits of the cause, but by a carefully sprung trick.<br />
On the surface it is a paradox that Wilson, who had always been<br />
a pacifist, should now enter into a secret agreement with foreign<br />
powers to involve the United States in a war which she could easily<br />
avoid. The key that unlocks this mystery is the fact that Wilson also<br />
was an internationalist. One of the strongest bonds between House<br />
and himself was their common dream of a world government. They<br />
both recognized that the American people would never accept such<br />
a concept unless there were extenuating circumstances. They reasoned<br />
that a long and bloody war was probably the only event that<br />
could condition the American mind to accept the loss of national<br />
sovereignty, especially if it were packaged with the promise of putting<br />
an end to all wars in the future. Wilson knew, also, that, if the<br />
United States came into the war early enough to make a real difference<br />
on the battlefield and if large amounts of American dollars<br />
could be loaned to the Allied powers, he would be in a position after<br />
the war to dictate the terms of peace. He wrote to Colonel House:<br />
"England and France have not the same views with regard to peace<br />
as we have by any means. When the war is over, we can force them<br />
1. Quoted by Viereck, pp. 112-13.<br />
lo our way of thinking, because by that rime they will among other<br />
things be financially in our hands." 1<br />
And so Wilson tolerated the<br />
agony of mixed emotions as he plotted for war as a necessary evil to<br />
bring about what he perceived as the ultimate good of world government.<br />
With the arrival of 1917, the President was planting hints of both<br />
war and world government in almost every public utterance. In a<br />
typical statement made in March of that year, he said: "The tragic<br />
ents of the thirty months of vital turmoil through which we have<br />
just passed have made us citizens of the world. There can be no<br />
turning back. Our own fortunes as a nation are involved, whether<br />
we would have it so or not/<br />
It was about this same time that Wilson called together the<br />
Democratic leaders of Congress to a special breakfast meeting at the<br />
White House. He told them that, in spite of public sentiment, there<br />
were many sound reasons for the country to enter the war and he<br />
asked them to help him sell this plan to Congress and the voters.<br />
Harry Elmer Barnes tells us:<br />
These men were opposed to war and, hence, rejected his proposals<br />
somewhat heatedly. Wilson knew that it was a poor time to split the<br />
party just before an election, so he dropped the matter at once and,<br />
with Col. House, mapped out a pacifist platform for the coming<br />
campaign. Governor Martin Glynn of New York and Senator Ollie<br />
James of Kentucky were sent to the St. Louis convention to make<br />
keynote speeches, which were based on the slogan: "He kept us out of<br />
war!"... Before he had been inaugurated a second time, the Germans<br />
played directly into his hands by announcing the resumption of<br />
submarine warfare. ...<br />
It was fortunate for Britain and the bankers that<br />
the Germans made this timely blunder, as Great Britain had<br />
overdrawn her American credit by some $450,000,000 and the bankers<br />
were having trouble in floating more large private loans. It was<br />
necessary now to_pass on the burden of financing the Entente to the<br />
Federal Treasury.<br />
1- Quoted by Ferrell, p. 88.<br />
2- Ferrell, p. 12.<br />
3. Harry Elmer Barnes, In Quest of Truth and Justice: De-Bunkmg the War Guilt Myth<br />
(Chicago: National Historical Society, 1928; rpt. New York: Arno Press & The New<br />
York Times, 1972), p. 104. For an additional account of this meeting, see Viereck, pp.<br />
180—83.
244 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
SINK THE LUSITANIA! 245<br />
Lundberg, p. 257.<br />
financial group, a factor which immediately gives the banking<br />
SELLING WAR TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE<br />
house the respectful attention of all alert independent publishers."<br />
Through secret agreements and trickery, America had been<br />
Morgan control over the media at that time is well documented,<br />
committed to war, but the political and monetary scientists realized<br />
that something still had to be done to change public sentiment. How<br />
» but he was by no means alone in this. During the 1912 hearings held<br />
could that be accomplished?<br />
by the Senate Privileges and Elections Committee, it was revealed<br />
Wall Street control over important segments of the media was<br />
that Representative Joseph Sibley from Pennsylvania was acting as<br />
3.<br />
considerable. George Wheeler tells us: "Around this time the<br />
a funnel for Rockefeller money to various cooperative Congressmen.<br />
A letter was introduced to the Committee written by Sibley in<br />
Morgan firm was choosing the top executives for the old and troubled<br />
Harper & Brothers publishing house.. . . In the newspaper field,<br />
1905 to John D. Archbold, the man at Rockefeller's Standard Oil<br />
Pierpont Morgan at this period was in effective control of the New Company who provided the money. In that letter Sibley said: "An<br />
York Sun,... the Boston News Bureau, Barron's magazine, and the<br />
efficient literary bureau<br />
Wall Street Journal." 1<br />
is needed, not for a day or a crisis but a<br />
permanent healthy control of the Associated Press and kindred<br />
On February 9, 1917, Representative Callaway from Texas took<br />
avenues. It will cost<br />
the floor of Congress and provided further insight. He<br />
money but will be the cheapest in the end."<br />
said:<br />
Lundberg comments further:<br />
In March, 1915, the J.<br />
P. Morgan interests, the steel, shipbuilding,<br />
and powder interests, and their subsidiary organizations, got together<br />
12 men high up in the newspaper world and employed them to select<br />
the most influential newspapers in the United States and sufficient<br />
number of them to control generally the policy of the daily press....<br />
They found it was only necessary to purchase the control of 25 of the<br />
So far as can be learned, the Rockefellers have given up their old<br />
policy of owning newspapers and magazines outright, relying now<br />
upon the publications of all camps to serve their best interests in return<br />
for the vast volume of petroleum and allied advertising under<br />
Rockefeller control. After the J.P. Morgan bloc, the Rockefellers have<br />
greatest papers.. . . An agreement was reached; the policy of the papers<br />
the most advertising of any group to dispose of. And when advertising<br />
was bought to be paid for by the month; an editor was furnished for<br />
alone is not sufficient to insure the fealty of a newspaper, the<br />
each paper to properly supervise and edit information regarding the<br />
Rockefeller companies have been known to make direct payments in<br />
questions of preparedness, militarism, financial policies, and other<br />
return for a friendly editorial attitude.<br />
things of national and international nature considered vital to the<br />
interests of the purchasers.<br />
I<br />
It is not surprising, therefore, that a large part of the nation's<br />
Charles S. Mellen of the New Haven Railroad testified before<br />
press, particularly in the East, began to editorially denounce<br />
Congress that his Morgan-owned railroad had more than onethousand<br />
Germany. The cry spread across the land to take up arms against<br />
New England newspapers on the payroll, costing about<br />
"the enemy of western civilization." Editors became eloquent on the<br />
$400,000 annually. The railroad also held almost a half-million dollars<br />
in bonds issued by the Boston Herald. This web of control was<br />
patriotic duty of all Americans to defend world democracy. Massive<br />
"preparedness" demonstrations and parades were organized.<br />
multiplied by hundreds of additional companies which also were<br />
But it was not enough. In spite of this massive sales campaign,<br />
controlled by Morgan and other investment-banking houses.<br />
the American people still were not buying. Polls conducted at the<br />
In addition, the Morgan trust exercised media control by its<br />
time<br />
power<br />
showed popular sentiment continuing to run ten-to-one in<br />
of advertising. Writing in 1937, Lundberg says: "More advertising<br />
is controlled by the<br />
favor of J.P. Morgan junta than by any<br />
staying<br />
single<br />
out of Europe's war. Clearly, what was needed was<br />
something both drastic and dramatic to change public opinion.<br />
1. George Wheeler, Pierpont Morgan and Friends: The Anatomy of a Myth (Englewood<br />
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1973), pp. 283-84.<br />
1- Lundberg, p. 252.<br />
2. Congressional Record, Vol. 54, Feb- 9, 1917, p. 2947<br />
2- Ibid.,pp.97,249.<br />
3- ifctf.,p.247.
246 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND SINK THE LUSITANIA! 247<br />
MORGAN CONTROL OVER SHIPPING<br />
Banking was not the only business in which Morgan had a<br />
strong financial interest. Using his control over the nation's railroads<br />
as financial leverage, he had created an international shipping<br />
trust which included Germany's two largest lines plus one of the<br />
two in England, the White Star Lines. Morgan had attempted in<br />
1902 to take over the remaining British line, the Cunard Company,<br />
but was blocked by the British Admiralty which wanted to keep<br />
Cunard out of foreign control so her ships could be pressed into<br />
military service, if necessary, in time of war. The Lusitania and the<br />
Mauretania were built by Cunard and became major competitors of<br />
the Morgan cartel. It is an interesting footnote of history, therefore,<br />
that, from the Morgan perspective, the Lusitania was quite dispensable.<br />
Ron Chernow explains:<br />
Pierpont assembled a plan for an American-owned shipping trust<br />
that would transpose his "community of interest"<br />
principle—cooperation among competitors in a given industry—to a<br />
global plane. He created ... the world's largest [fleet] under private<br />
ownership.... An important architect of the shipping trust was Albert<br />
Ballin, whose Hamburg-Amerika Steamship Line, with hundreds of<br />
vessels, was the world's largest shipping company.... Pierpont had to<br />
contend with a single holdout, Britain's Cunard Line.. . . After the Boer<br />
War, the Morgan combine and Cunard exhausted each other in<br />
debilitating rate wars." 1<br />
As stated previously, Morgan had been retained as the official<br />
trade agent for Britain. He handled the purchasing of all war materials<br />
in the United States and coordinated their shipping as well.<br />
Following in the footsteps of the Rothschilds of centuries past, he<br />
quickly learned the profitable skills of war-time smuggling. Colin<br />
Simpson, author of The Lusitania, describes the operation:<br />
Throughout the period of America's neutrality, British servicemen<br />
in civilian clothes worked at Morgan's. This great banking combine<br />
rapidly established such a labyrinthine network of false shippers, bank<br />
accounts and all the paraphernalia of smuggling that, although they<br />
fooled the Germans, there were also some very serious occasions<br />
when they flummoxed the Admiralty and Cunard, not to speak of the<br />
unfortunate passengers on the liners which carried the contraband. 2<br />
1 Chernow, .<br />
pp 1 00-01<br />
2. Colin Simpson, The Lusitania (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1 972), p. 50.<br />
THE LUSITANIA<br />
The Lusitania was a British passenger liner that sailed regularly<br />
between Liverpool and New York. She was owned by the Cunard<br />
Company, which, as previously mentioned, was the only major ship<br />
line which was a competitor of the Morgan cartel. She left New York<br />
harbor on May 1, 1915, and was sunk by a German submarine off<br />
the coast of Ireland six days later. Of the 1,195 persons who lost their<br />
lives, 195 were Americans. It was this event, more than any other,<br />
that provided the advocates of war with a convincing platform for<br />
their views, and it became the turning point where Americans reluctantly<br />
began to accept, if not the necessity of war, at least its inevitability.<br />
The fact that the Lusitania was a passenger ship is misleading.<br />
Although she was built as a luxury liner, her construction specifications<br />
were drawn up by the British Admiralty so that she could be<br />
converted, if necessary, into a ship of war. Everything from the<br />
horsepower of her engines and the shape of her hull to the placement<br />
of ammunition storage areas were, in fact, military designs.<br />
She was built specifically to carry twelve six-inch guns. The construction<br />
costs for these features were paid for by the British government.<br />
Even in times of peace, it was required that her crew include<br />
officers and seamen from the Royal Navy Reserve.<br />
In May of 1913, she was brought back into dry dock and outfitted<br />
with extra armor, revolving gun rings on her decks, and shell<br />
racks in the hold for ammunition. Handling elevators to lift<br />
shells to the guns were also installed. Twelve high-explosive cannons<br />
were delivered to the dry dock. All this is a matter of public<br />
record at the National Maritime Museum in Greenwich, England,<br />
but whether the guns were actually installed at that time is still hotly<br />
debated. There is no evidence that they were. In any event, on<br />
September 17, the Lusitania returned to sea ready for the rigors of<br />
war, and she was entered into the Admiralty fleet register, not as a<br />
passenger liner, but an armed auxiliary cruiser] From then on, she was<br />
listed in Jane's Fighting Ships as an auxiliary cruiser and in the British<br />
publication, The Naval Annual, as an armed merchant man.<br />
Part of the dry dock modification was to remove all the passenger<br />
accommodations in the lower deck to make room for more<br />
I. Simpson, pp. 17-28, 70.<br />
the
248 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND SINK THE LUSTTANIA! 249<br />
military cargo. Thus, the Lusitania became one of the most important<br />
carriers of war materials—including munitions—from the<br />
United States to England. On March 8, 1915, after several close calls<br />
with German submarines, the captain of the Lusitania turned in his<br />
resignation. He was willing to face the U-boats, he said, but he was<br />
no longer willing "to carry the responsibility of mixing passengers<br />
with munitions or contraband/'<br />
CHURCHILL SETS A TRAP<br />
From England's point of view, the handwriting on the wall was<br />
clear. Unless the United States could be brought into the war as her<br />
ally, she soon would have to sue for peace. The challenge was how<br />
to push Americans off their position of stubborn neutrality. How<br />
that was accomplished is one of the more controversial aspects of<br />
the war. It is inconceivable to many that English leaders might have<br />
deliberately plotted the destruction of one of their own vessels with<br />
American citizens aboard as a means of drawing the United States<br />
into the war as an ally. Surely, any such idea is merely German<br />
propaganda. Robert Ballard, writing in National Geographic, says:<br />
"Within days of the sinking, German sympathizers in New York<br />
came up with a conspiracy theory. The British Admiralty, they said,<br />
had deliberately exposed Lusitania to harm, hoping she would be<br />
attacked and thus draw the U.S. into the war."<br />
Let's take a closer look at this conspiracy theory. Winston<br />
Churchill, who was First Lord of the Admiralty at that time, said:<br />
There are many kinds of maneuvers in war.... There are<br />
maneuvers in time, in diplomacy, in mechanics, in psychology; all of<br />
which are removed from the battlefield, but react often decisively<br />
upon it.... The maneuver which brings an ally into the field is as<br />
serviceable as that which wins a great battle. The maneuver which<br />
gains an important strategic point may be less valuable than that<br />
which placates or overawes a dangerous neutral.<br />
The maneuver chosen by Churchill was particularly ruthless.<br />
Under what was called the Cruiser Rules, warships of both England<br />
and Germany gave the crews of unarmed enemy merchant ships a<br />
1 Sunpson, p. 87.<br />
2. "Riddle of the Lusitania/' by Robert Ballard, National Geographic, AprU, 1994,<br />
p. 74.<br />
3. Winston Churchill, The World Crisis (New York: Scribner's Sons, 1949), p. 300.<br />
This appears on p. 464 of the Barnes & Noble 1993 reprint.<br />
chance to take to the lifeboats before sinking them. But, in October<br />
of 1914, Churchill issued orders that British merchant ships must no<br />
longer obey a U-boat order to halt and be searched. If they had<br />
armament, they were to engage the enemy, If they did not, they<br />
were to attempt to ram the sub. The immediate result of this change<br />
was to force German U-boats to remain submerged for protection<br />
and to simply sink the ships without warning.<br />
Why would the British want to do such a stupid thing that<br />
would cost the lives of thousands of their own seamen? The answer<br />
is that it was not an act of stupidity. It was cold blooded strategy.<br />
Churchill boasted:<br />
The first British countermove, made on my responsibility,... was to<br />
deter the Germans from surface attack. The submerged U-boat had to<br />
rely increasingly on underwater attack and thus ran the greater risk of<br />
mistaking neutral for British ships and of drowning neutral crews and<br />
thus embroiling Germany with other Great Powers. 1<br />
To increase the likelihood of accidentally sinking a ship from a<br />
neutral "Great Power," Churchill ordered British ships to remove<br />
their names from their hulls and, when in port, to fly the flag of a<br />
neutral power, preferably that of the United States. As further<br />
provocation, the British navy was ordered to treat captured U-boat<br />
crew members not as prisoners of war but as felons. "Survivors/'<br />
wrote Churchill, "should be taken prisoner or shot—whichever is<br />
the most convenient."<br />
Other orders, which now are an embarrassing<br />
part of official navy archives, were even more ruthless: "In a)]<br />
actions, white flags should be fired upon with promptitude/<br />
The trap was carefully laid. The German navy was goaded into<br />
a position of shoot-first and ask questions later and, under those<br />
conditions, it was inevitable that American lives would be lost<br />
A FLOATING MUNITIONS DEPOT<br />
After many years of investigation, it is now possible to identify<br />
the cargo that was loaded aboard the Lusitania on her last voyage. It<br />
included 600 tons of pyroxyline (commonly called gun cotton), 4<br />
I Churchill, pp. 274-75.<br />
2. Taken from the Diaries of Admiral Sir Hubert Richmond, Feb. 27, 1915, National<br />
Maritime Museum, Greenwich, as quoted by Simpson, p. 37.<br />
3- P.R.O., ADM/116/1359, Dec. 23, 1914, quoted by Simpson, p. 37.<br />
4. Gun cotton explodes with three-times the force of gunpowder in a confined<br />
space and can be ignited at a much lower flash point. See Eissler, Manuel, Modern<br />
Higt<br />
High Explosives (New York John Wiley & Sons, 1914), pp. 110, 112, 372.
250 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND SINK THE LUSITANIA! 251<br />
six-million rounds of ammunition, 1,248 cases of shrapnel shells<br />
(which may not have included explosive charges), plus an unknown<br />
quantity of munitions that completely filled the holds on the lowest<br />
deck and the trunkways and passageways of F deck. In addition,<br />
there were many tons of "cheese," "lard," "furs" and other items<br />
which were shown later to be falsely labelled. What they were is not<br />
now known, but it is certain they were at least contraband if not<br />
outright weapons of war. They were all consigned through the J.P.<br />
Morgan Company. But none of this was suspected by the public,<br />
least of all those hapless Americans who unknowingly booked a<br />
passage to death for themselves and their families as human decoys<br />
in a global game of high finance and low politics.<br />
The German embassy in Washington was well aware of the<br />
nature of the cargo being loaded aboard the Lusitania and filed a<br />
formal complaint to the United States government, because almost<br />
all of it was in direct violation of international neutrality treaties.<br />
The response was a flat denial of any knowledge of such cargo.<br />
Seeing that the Wilson Administration was tacitly approving the<br />
shipment, the German embassy made one final effort to avert disaster.<br />
It placed an ad in fifty East Coast newspapers, including those<br />
in New York City, warning Americans not to take passage on the<br />
Lusitania. The ad was prepaid and requested to be placed on the<br />
paper's travel page a full week before the sailing date. It read as<br />
follows:<br />
NOTICE!<br />
TRAVELERS intending to embark on the Atlantic voyage<br />
are reminded that a state of war exists between Germany<br />
and her allies and Great Britain and her allies; that the zone<br />
of war includes the waters adjacent to the British Isles; that,<br />
in accordance with formal notice given by the Imperial<br />
German Government, vessels flying the flag of Great<br />
Britain, or of any of her allies, are liable to destruction in<br />
those waters and that travelers sailing in the war zone on<br />
ships of Great Britain or her allies do so at their own risk.<br />
IMPERIAL GERMAN EMBASSY<br />
Washington, D.C., April 22, 1915.<br />
Icial<br />
Although the ad was in the hands of newspapers in time for the<br />
requested deadline, the State Department intervened and, raising<br />
the specter of possible libel suits, frightened the publishers into not<br />
printing it without prior clearance from State Department attorneys.<br />
Of the fifty newspapers, only the Des Moines Register carried the ad<br />
pn the requested date. What happened next is described by<br />
Simpson:<br />
George Viereck [who was the editor of a German-owned<br />
newspaper at that time and who had placed the ads on behalf of the<br />
embassy] spent April 26 asking the State Department why his<br />
advertisement had not been published. Eventually he managed to<br />
obtain an interview with [Secretary of State, William Jennings] Bryan<br />
and pointed out to him that on all but one of her wartime voyages the<br />
Lusitania had carried munitions. He produced copies of her<br />
supplementary manifests, which were open to public inspection at the<br />
collector's office. More important, he informed Bryan, no fewer than<br />
six million rounds of ammunition were due to be shipped on the<br />
Lusitania the following Friday and could be seen at that moment being<br />
loaded on pier 54. Bryan picked up the telephone and cleared the<br />
publication of the advertisement. He promised Viereck that he would<br />
endeavor to persuade the President publicly to warn Americans not to<br />
travel. No such warning was issued by the President, but there can be<br />
no doubt that President Wilson was told of the character of the cargo<br />
destined for the Lusitania. He did nothing, but was to concede on the<br />
day he was told of her sinking that his foreknowledge had given him<br />
many sleepless hours.<br />
It is probably true that Wilson was a pacifist at heart, but it is<br />
equally certain that he was not entirely the master of his own destiny.<br />
He was a transplanted college professor from the ivy-covered<br />
walls of Princeton, an internationalist at heart who dreamed of helping<br />
to create a world government and to usher in a millennium of<br />
peace. But he found himself surrounded by and dependent upon<br />
men of strong wills, astute political aptitudes, and powerful finan-<br />
resources. Against these forces, he was all but powerless to act<br />
on his own, and there is good reason to believe that he inwardly<br />
suffered over many of the events in which he was compelled to participate.<br />
We shall leave it to others to moralize about a man who, by<br />
his deliberate refusal to warn his countrymen of their mortal peril,<br />
sends 195 of them to their watery graves. We may wonder, also,<br />
1. Simpson, p. 97.
252 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND SINK THE LUSITANIA! 253<br />
about how such a man can commit the ultimate hypocrisy of<br />
condemning the Germans for this act and then doing everything<br />
possible to prevent the American public from learning the truth. It<br />
would be surprising if the extent of his private remorse was not<br />
greater than merely a few sleepless hours.<br />
THE FINAL VOYAGE<br />
But we are getting slightly ahead of the story. While Morgan<br />
and Wilson were setting the deadly stage on the American side of<br />
the Atlantic, Churchill was playing his part on the European side.<br />
When the Lusitania left New York Harbor on May 1, her orders were<br />
to rendezvous with a British destroyer, the Jnno, just off the coast of<br />
Ireland so she would have naval protection as she entered hostile<br />
waters. When the Lusitania reached the rendezvous point, however,<br />
she was alone, and the captain assumed they had missed each other<br />
in the fog. In truth, the Juno had been called out of the area at the last<br />
minute and ordered to return to Queenstown. And this was done<br />
with the full knowledge that the Lusitania was on a direct course<br />
into an area where a German submarine was known to be operating.<br />
To make matters worse, the Lusitania had been ordered to cut<br />
back on the use of coal, not because of shortages, but because it<br />
would be less expensive. Slow targets, of course, are much easier to<br />
hit. Yet, she was required to shut down one of her four boilers and,<br />
consequently, was now entering submarine-infested waters at only<br />
75% of her potential speed.<br />
As the Lusitania drew closer to hostile waters, almost everyone<br />
knew she was in grave danger. Newspapers in London were alive<br />
with the story of German warnings and recent sinkings. In the map<br />
room of the British Admiralty, Churchill watched the play unfold<br />
and coldly called the shots. Small disks marked the places where<br />
two ships had been torpedoed the day before. A circle indicated the<br />
area within which the U-boat must still be operating. A larger disk<br />
represented the Lusitania travelling at nineteen knots directly into the<br />
circle. Yet, nothing was done to help her. Admiral Coke at Queenstown<br />
was given perfunctory instructions to protect her as best he<br />
could, but he had no means to do so and, in fact, no one even bothered<br />
to notify the captain of the Lusitania that the rendezvous with<br />
the Juno had been canceled.<br />
One of the officers present in the high-command map room on<br />
that fateful day was Commander Joseph Kenworthy, who pre- 3.<br />
viously had been called upon by Churchill to submit a paper on<br />
w hat would be the political results of an ocean liner being sunk with<br />
American passengers aboard. He left the room in disgust at the<br />
cynicism of his superiors. In 1927, in his book, The Freedom of the<br />
Seas, he wrote without further comment: "The Lusitania was sent at<br />
considerably reduced speed into an area where a U-boat was<br />
known to be waiting and with her escorts withdrawn/' Further<br />
comment is not needed.<br />
Colonel House was in England at that time and, on the day of<br />
the sinking, was scheduled to have an audience with King<br />
George V. He was accompanied by Sir Edward Grey and, on the<br />
way, Sir Grey asked him: "What will America do if the Germans<br />
sink an ocean liner with American passengers on board?" As<br />
recorded in House's diaries, he replied: "I told him if<br />
this were<br />
done, a flame of indignation would sweep America, which would in<br />
itself probably carry us into the war." 2 Once at Buckingham Palace,<br />
King George also brought up the subject and was even more specific<br />
about the possible target. He asked, "Suppose they should sink the<br />
."<br />
Lusitania with American passengers on board.. .<br />
A MIGHTY EXPLOSION, A WATERY GRAVE<br />
Four hours after this conversation, the black smoke of the<br />
Lusitania was spotted on the horizon through the periscope of the<br />
German submarine, 17-20. The ship came directly toward the<br />
U-boat, allowing it to full-throttle out of her path and swing around<br />
for a ninety-degree shot at her bow as she passed only 750 yards<br />
away. The torpedo struck nine feet below the water line on the starboard<br />
side slightly forward of the bridge. A second torpedo was<br />
readied but not needed. Quickly after the explosion of the impact,<br />
there was a second and much larger explosion that literally blew the<br />
side off of cargo hold number two and started the great ship immediately<br />
toward the bottom. And what a hole it must have been. The<br />
Lusitania, one of the largest ships ever built, sank in less than eightn<br />
minutes!<br />
| Joseph M. Kenworthy and George Young, The Freedom of the Seas (New York:<br />
Ayer Company, 1929), p. 211.<br />
Seymour, Vol I, p. 432<br />
&&., p. 432.
254 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
SINK THE LUSITANIA! 255<br />
Survivors among the crew who were working in the boiler<br />
, In the final analysis, it makes little difference whether the explosion<br />
was caused by munitions or coal dust. The fact that it could have<br />
rooms during the attack have attested that the boilers did not blow<br />
at that time. Simpson tells us:<br />
been caused by munitions is sufficient for the case.<br />
The G torpedo had failed to blow in the inner bulkhead of No l A HURRIED COVER-UP<br />
boiler room, but just further forward something blew out most of the<br />
bottom<br />
An official inquiry, under the direction of Lord Mersey, was<br />
of the bow of the ship. It may have been the Bethlehem<br />
Company's 3-inch held to determine the facts of the sinking and to place the blame. It<br />
shells, the six million rounds of rifle ammunition or<br />
the highly dubious contents of the bales was a rigged affair from the beginning. All evidence and testimony<br />
of furs or the small<br />
forty-pound boxes of cheese. Divers who have been down was carefully pre-screened to make sure that nothing was admitted<br />
to the wreck<br />
unanimously testify that the bow was blasted by a massive internal<br />
ffnto the record which would reveal duplicity on the part of British<br />
explosion, and large pieces of the bow plating, buckled from the<br />
or American officials. Among the papers submitted to Lord Mersey<br />
inside, are to be found some distance from the hull. 1<br />
prior to the hearings was one from Captain Richard Webb, one of<br />
When a search team from the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute<br />
surveyed the wreckage in the summer of 1993, they directed by the board of Admiralty to inform you that it is consid-<br />
the men chosen by the navy to assist in the cover up. It read: "I am<br />
reported:<br />
"When our cameras swept across the hold, we got a big surpriseered<br />
politically expedient that Captain Turner, the master of the<br />
There was no hole.... We found no evidence that U-20's torpedo Lusitania,<br />
had<br />
be most prominently blamed for the disaster."<br />
detonated an explosion, undermining one theory of why the The final report was a most interesting document. Anyone reading<br />
it without knowledge of the facts would conclude that Captain<br />
liner<br />
sank.'<br />
It is difficult to share the team's surprise. Photographs show that<br />
William Turner was to blame for the disaster. Even so, Mersey<br />
the wreck is resting on its starboard (right) side. Since that is where<br />
'attempted to soften the blow. He wrote: "...blame ought not to be<br />
the torpedo struck, it is logical that the hole would not be visible.<br />
imputed to the captain.... His omission to follow the advice in all<br />
It<br />
would be on the side buried in the ocean floor. The team reported<br />
respects cannot fairly be attributed either to negligence or incompetence."<br />
And then he added a final paragraph which, on the surface,<br />
that they were able to inspect only part of the hull's underside. That<br />
is because most of it—plus the entire starboard side—is buried in the<br />
appears to be a condemnation of the Germans but which, if read<br />
muck. Since the torpedo struck only nine feet below the waterline,<br />
with understanding of the background, was an indictment of<br />
the hole would not logically be anywhere near the bottom of the<br />
Churchill, Wilson, House and Morgan. He wrote:<br />
hull but at a point midway between the main deck and the bottom<br />
The whole blame for the cruel destruction of life in this<br />
In other words, it would be at the midpoint of the side that is now<br />
catastrophe must rest solely with those who plotted and with those<br />
facing down. Failure to see the hole does not undermine the theory<br />
L who committed the crime.<br />
of internal explosion. It is exactly what one would expect.<br />
Did Lord Mersey know that there could be a dual meaning to his<br />
In any event, it should be obvious that the Lusitania would not<br />
Words? Perhaps not, but, two days after delivering his judgment, he<br />
have gone to the bottom in eighteen minutes without a hole someivhere.<br />
Even the search team had to acknowledge that fact indirectly<br />
ices.<br />
wrote to Prime Minister Asquith and turned down his fee for serv-<br />
when<br />
He added: "I must request that henceforth I be excused from<br />
it addressed the question of what might have caused the<br />
pdministering His Majesty's Justice." In later years, his only comment<br />
on the event was: "The Lusitania case was a damn dirty<br />
second explosion. In an obvious effort to avoid giving support to a<br />
"conspiracy theory," the report concluded that the explosion probably<br />
was caused, not by munitions, but by coal dust.<br />
business." 3<br />
1- The Papers of Lord Mersey, Bignor Park, Sussex, as quoted by Simpson, p. 190.<br />
1. Simpson, p. 157.<br />
2. Simpson, p. 241.<br />
2. Ballard, "Riddle of the Lusitania/' pp. 74, 76.<br />
3. Ibid., p. 241.
256 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND SINK THE LUSITANIA! 257<br />
THE CRY FOR WAR<br />
The purposes of the Cabal would have been better served had<br />
an American ship been sunk by the Germans, but a British ship with<br />
195 Americans drowned was sufficient to do the job. The players<br />
wasted no time in whipping up public sentiment. Wilson sent a note<br />
of outraged indignation to the Imperial German Government and<br />
this was widely quoted in the press.<br />
By that time, Bryan had become completely disillusioned by the<br />
duplicity of his own government. On May 9, he sent a dour note to<br />
Wilson:<br />
Germany has a right to prevent contraband going to the Allies<br />
and a ship carrying contraband should not rely upon passengers to<br />
protect her from attack-it would be like putting women and children<br />
in front of an army.<br />
This did not deter Wilson from his commitment. The first note<br />
was followed by an even stronger one with threatening overtones<br />
which was intensely discussed at the Cabinet meeting on the first of<br />
June. McAdoo, who was present at the meeting, says:<br />
I remember that Bryan had little to say at this meeting; he sat<br />
Uvoughout the proceedings with his eyes half closed most of the time<br />
After the meeting he told the President, as I learned later, that he could<br />
not sign the note.... Bryan went on to say that he thought his<br />
usefulness as Secretary of State was over, and he proposed to resign. 2<br />
At the request of Wilson, McAdoo was dispatched to the Bryans'<br />
home to persuade the Secretary to change his mind, lest his resignation<br />
be taken as a sign of disunity within the President's Cabinet.<br />
Bryari agreed to think it over one more day but, the following morning<br />
his decision remained firm. In his memoirs, annotated by his<br />
wife, Mrs. Bryan reveals that her husband could not sleep that night<br />
He was so restless I suggested that he read a little rill he should<br />
become drowsy. He had in his handbag a copy of an old book<br />
printed in 1829 and called A Wreath of Appreciation of Andrew<br />
Jackson. He found it very interesting."<br />
3<br />
What irony. In chapter seventeen we shall review the total war<br />
waged by President Jackson against the Bank of the United States,<br />
the<br />
predecessor of the Federal Reserve System, and we shall be<br />
reminded that it was Jackson who prophesied:<br />
Is there no danger to our liberty and independence in a bank that<br />
in its nature has so little to bind it to our country?... [Is there not] cause<br />
to tremble for the purity of our elections in peace and for the<br />
independence of our country in war?... Controlling our currency,<br />
receiving our public monies, and holding thousands of our citizens in<br />
dependence, it would be more formidable and dangerous than a naval<br />
and military power of the enemy.<br />
One can only wonder what thoughts went through Bryan's<br />
mind as he recalled Jackson's warning and applied it to the artificially<br />
created war hysteria that, at that very moment, was being<br />
generated by the financial powers on Wall Street and at the newly<br />
created Federal Reserve.<br />
From England, Colonel House sent a telegram to President<br />
Wilson which he, in turn, read to his Cabinet It became the genesis<br />
of thousands of newspaper editorials across the land. He said<br />
piously:<br />
America has come to the parting of the ways, when she must<br />
determine whether she stands for civilized or uncivilized warfare. We<br />
can no longer remain neutral spectators. Our action in this crisis will<br />
determine the part we will play when peace is made, and how far we<br />
may influence a settlement for the lasting good of humanity. We are<br />
being weighed in the balance, and our position amongst nations is<br />
being assessed by mankind.<br />
In another telegram two days later, House reveals himself as the<br />
master psycho-politician playing on Wilson's ego like a violinist<br />
stroking the strings of a Stradivarius. He wrote:<br />
If, unhappily, it is necessary to go to war, I hope you will give the<br />
world an exhibition of American efficiency that will be a lesson for a<br />
century or more. It is generally believed throughout Europe that we<br />
are so unprepared and that it would take so long to put our resources<br />
into action, that our entering would make but little difference.<br />
In the event of war, we should accelerate the manufacture of<br />
munitions to such an extent that we could supply not only ourselves<br />
but the Allies, and so quickly that the world would be astounded.<br />
1 - Bryan, Vol II,<br />
pp. 398-9.<br />
2. McAdoo, p. 333.<br />
3. Bryan, Vol. II, p. 424.<br />
1 - Herman E. Krooss, ed., Documentary History of Banking and Currency in the Unites<br />
States (New York: Chelsea House, 1983), Vol. ni, pp. 26-27.<br />
2. Seymour, p. 434.<br />
3. JM.,p.435.
258 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND SINK THE LUSITANIA! 259<br />
Congress could not resist the combined pressure of the press<br />
and the President On April 16, 1917, the United States officially<br />
declared war on the Axis powers. Eight days later, Congress dutifully<br />
passed the War Loan Act which extended $1 billion in credit to<br />
the Allies. The first advance of $200 million went to the British the<br />
next day and was immediately applied as payment on the debt to<br />
Morgan. A few days later, $100 million went to France for the same<br />
purpose. But the drain continued. Within three months the British<br />
had run up their overdraft with Morgan to $400 million dollars, and<br />
the firm presented it to the government for payment. The Treasury,<br />
however, was unable to put its hands on that amount of money<br />
without jeopardizing its own spendable funds and, at first, refused<br />
to pay. The problem was quickly solved, however, through a<br />
maneuver described at some length in chapter ten. The Federal<br />
Reserve System under Benjamin Strong simply created the needed<br />
money through the Mandrake Mechanism. "The Wilson Administration<br />
found itself in an extremely awkward position, having to<br />
bail out J.P. Morgan," wrote Ferrell, but Benjamin Strong "offered to<br />
help [Treasury-Secretary] McAdoo out of the difficulty. Over the<br />
following months in 1917-18 the Treasury quietly paid Morgan<br />
piecemeal for the overdraft." 1<br />
By the time the war was over, the<br />
Treasury had loaned a total of $9,466,000,000 including<br />
$2,170,000,000 given after the Armistice.<br />
That was the cash flow they had long awaited. In addition to<br />
saving the Morgan loans, even larger profits were to be made from<br />
war production. The government had been secretly preparing for<br />
war for six months prior to the actual declaration. According to<br />
Franklin D. Roosevelt, then Assistant Secretary of the Navy, the<br />
Navy Department began extensive purchasing of war supplies in<br />
the Fall of 1916.<br />
Ferdinand Lundberg adds this perspective:<br />
By no accident all the strategic government posts, notably those<br />
concerned with buying, were reserved for the Wall Street patriots. On<br />
the most vital appointments, Wilson consulted with Dodge [President<br />
of Rockefeller's National City Bank], who ...<br />
recommended the<br />
hitherto unknown [Bernard] Baruch, speculator in copper stocks, as<br />
chairman of the all-powerful War Industries Board....<br />
1. Ferrell, p. 89,90.<br />
2. Clarence W. Barron, They Told Barron- Notes of Clarence Walker Barron, edited<br />
and SamUel Tayl°r M°0re (NeW Y° rk;<br />
193$'<br />
Har<br />
51<br />
P er and Br0*e
260 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND SINK THE LUSITANIA!<br />
between the political and monetary scientists had performed its<br />
mission well.<br />
SUMMARY<br />
To finance the early stages of World War I, England and France<br />
had borrowed heavily from investors in America and had selected<br />
the House of Morgan as sales agent for their bonds. Morgan also<br />
acted as their U.S. purchasing agent for war materials, thus profiting<br />
from both ends of the cash flow: once when the money was borrowed<br />
and again when it was spent. Further profits were derived<br />
from production contracts placed with companies within the<br />
Morgan orbit. But the war began to go badly for the Allies when<br />
Germany's submarines took virtual control of the Atlantic shipping<br />
lanes. As England and France moved closer to defeat or a negotiated<br />
peace on Germany's terms, it became increasingly difficult to sell<br />
their bonds. No bonds meant no purchases, and the Morgan cash<br />
flow was threatened. Furthermore, if the previously sold bonds<br />
should go into default, as they certainly would in the wake of<br />
defeat, the Morgan consortium would suffer gigantic losses.<br />
The only way to save the British Empire, to restore the value of<br />
the bonds, and to sustain the Morgan cash flow was for the United<br />
States government to provide the money. But, since neutral nations<br />
were prohibited from doing that by treaty, America would have to<br />
be brought into the war. A secret agreement to that effect was made<br />
between British officials and Colonel House, with the concurrence<br />
of the President. From that point forward, Wilson began to pressure<br />
Congress for a declaration of war. This was done at the very time he<br />
was campaigning for reelection on the slogan "He kept us out of<br />
war." Meanwhile, Morgan purchased control over major segments<br />
of the news media and engineered a nation-wide editorial blitz<br />
against Germany, calling for war as an act of American patriotism.<br />
Morgan had created an international shipping cartel, including<br />
Germany's merchant fleet, which maintained a near monopoly on<br />
the high seas. Only the British Cunard Lines remained aloof. The<br />
Lusitania was owned by Cunard and operated in competition with<br />
Morgan's carteL The Lusitania was built to military specifications<br />
and was registered with the British Admiralty as an armed auxiliary<br />
cruiser. She carried passengers as a cover to conceal her real mission,<br />
which was to bring contraband war materials from the United<br />
States. This fact was known to Wilson and others in his administration,<br />
but they did nothing to stop it.<br />
261<br />
When the German en*assy<br />
Xd to publish a warning to American passengers, the Sta e<br />
Apartment intervened and prevented newspapers from printing it<br />
wC*e Lusitania left New York harbor on her final voyage, she<br />
-^»^2S«States into the war<br />
7Z that could accomplish that was proper-^ven the coldly calcu-<br />
SacrificeofoneofhergreatshipswithEngUshmenaboard^u<br />
ht trick was to have Americans on board also in order to create the<br />
toper emotional climate in the United States. As the Lus^nn<br />
Cved -to hostile waters, where a German U-boat was known o<br />
"operating, First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Church<br />
would mean the difference between defeat and victory, and any-<br />
ordered her destroyer protection to abandon her. This, plus the fact<br />
SJ£ had been oVred to travel at reduced speed, made her an<br />
easy target. After the impact of one well placed torpedo, a mighty<br />
second explosion from within ripped her apart, and the ship that<br />
many believed could not be sunk, guxgled to the bottom in less than<br />
ei^hTd^tad been done, and it set in motion great waves of<br />
revulsion against the Germans. These waves eventually flooded<br />
through Washington and swept the United States into war. Within<br />
days of the declaration, Congress voted $1 bilhon in credit for<br />
England and France. $200 million was sent to England immediately<br />
and was applied to the Morgan account. The vast quantity of money<br />
needed to" finance the war was created by the Federal Reserve<br />
System, which means it was collected from Americans through that<br />
fully one-half of all they had saved. The infinitely higher cost in<br />
American blood was added to the bill.<br />
>rs0nali-<br />
Thus it was that the separate motives of such diverse personal!<br />
ties as Winston Churchill, J.P. Morgan, Colonel House, and<br />
Woodrow Wilson all found common cause in bringing America into<br />
World War I. Churchill maneuvered for military advantage<br />
Morean sought the profits of war, House schemed for political<br />
power, and Wilson Lamed of a chance to dominate a post-war<br />
League of Nations.
«^ T*AVPI<br />
JSSIJCUWARD<br />
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ffMMENUSSr,<br />
EUROPE via LIVEU,<br />
Ilusitania:<br />
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F*i,M* * J Wit I<br />
Chapter Thirteen<br />
ASQUERADE<br />
N MOSCOW<br />
The secret societyfounded by Cecil Rhodes for the<br />
purpose of world dominion; the establishment in<br />
America of a branch of tluit group called the<br />
Council cm Foreign Relations; the role played by<br />
financiers<br />
representing both of these groups in<br />
financing the Russian revolution; the use of the<br />
Red Cross mission in Moscow as a caver for that<br />
maneuver.<br />
The German<br />
Embassy attempted<br />
to place ads in 50<br />
newspapers warning<br />
that the Lusitania was<br />
a target of war, but<br />
the U.S. government<br />
prevented them from<br />
being printed except<br />
for this one which<br />
was run in the<br />
Des Moines Register.<br />
When the ship was<br />
sunk off the coast of<br />
Ireland with 195<br />
Americans aboard, it<br />
became the center of<br />
a national campaign<br />
to generate emotional<br />
support for coming<br />
into the war.<br />
One of the greatest myths of contemporary history is that the<br />
Bolshevik Revolution in Russia was a popular uprising of the<br />
downtrodden masses against the hated ruling class of the Tsars. As<br />
we shall see, however, the planning, the leadership, and especially<br />
the financing came entirely from outside Russia, mostly from<br />
ifinanciers in Germany, Britain, and the United States. Furthermore,<br />
we shall see that the Rothschild Formula played a major role in<br />
shaping these events.<br />
This amazing story begins with the war between Russia and<br />
Japan in 1904. Jacob Schiff, who was head of the New York<br />
investment firm of Kuhn, Loeb, and Company, had raised the<br />
capital for large war loans to Japan. It was due to this funding that<br />
the Japanese were able to launch a stunning attack against the<br />
Russians at Port Arthur and, the following year, to virtually<br />
decimate the Russian fleet. In 1905, the Mikado awarded Jacob<br />
Schiff a medal, the Second Order of the Treasure of ]apan, in<br />
recognition of his important role in that campaign.<br />
During the two years of hostilities, thousands of Russian<br />
soldiers and sailors were taken as prisoners. Schiff paid for the<br />
printing of one-and-a-half tons of Marxist propaganda and had it<br />
delivered to the prison camps. He also sent scores of Russianspeaking<br />
revolutionaries, trained in New York, to distribute the
264 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
MASQUERADE IN MOSCOW 265<br />
pamphlets among the prisoners and to indoctrinate them into<br />
Russian revolution as "...what we had hoped and striven for these<br />
rebellion against their own government. When the war was ended,<br />
long years."<br />
50,000 officers and enlisted men returned home to become virtual<br />
In the February 3, 1949, issue of the New York Journal American,<br />
seeds of treason against the Tsar. They were to play a major role a<br />
Schiff's grandson, John, was quoted by columnist Cholly Knickerbocker<br />
as saying that his grandfather had given about $20 million<br />
few years later in creating mutiny among the military during the<br />
Communist takeover of Russia.<br />
for the triumph of Communism in Russia.<br />
TROTSKY WAS SCHIFFS AGENT<br />
When Trotsky returned to Petrograd in May of 1917 to organize<br />
One of the best known Russian revolutionaries at that time was<br />
the Bolshevik phase of the Russian Revolution, he carried $10,000<br />
Leon Trotsky. In January of 1916, Trotsky was expelled from France<br />
for travel expenses, a generously ample fund considering the value<br />
and came to the United States at the invitation of Schiff. His travel<br />
of the dollar at that time. The amount is known with certainty<br />
expenses aboard the Monserrat were paid by his host. He remained<br />
because Trotsky was arrested by Canadian and British naval<br />
for several months while writing for a Russian socialist paper<br />
personnel when the ship on which he was travelling, the S.S.<br />
the<br />
Novy Mir (New World), and giving revolutionary Kristianiafjord, put in at Halifax.<br />
speeches<br />
The money in his possession is now<br />
at mass<br />
meetings in New York City. According to Trotsky himself,<br />
a matter of official record. Because Trotsky<br />
on many<br />
was a known enemy of<br />
occasions a chauffeured limousine was placed the Tsar and because Germany was then at war with Russia, it was<br />
at the service of his<br />
family by a wealthy friend identified as Dr. M. In his book,<br />
assumed that the $10,000 was German money given to him in<br />
My<br />
New<br />
Life'<br />
Trotsky wrote:<br />
York. The evidence, however, is that this, too, came from Kuhn,<br />
The<br />
Loeb and Company.<br />
doctor's wife took my wife and the boys out driving and was<br />
very kind Trotsky was not arrested<br />
to them.<br />
on a whim. He was recognized as a<br />
But she was a mere mortal, whereas the chauffeur<br />
was a magician, a titan, a<br />
threat to<br />
superman!<br />
the best interests of England, Canada's mother country in<br />
With the wave of his hand he<br />
made the machine obey his slightest command. the British<br />
To<br />
Commonwealth. Russia was an ally of England in the<br />
sit beside him was<br />
the supreme delight. When they went into a tea-room, the<br />
First<br />
boys would<br />
World War which then was raging in Europe. Anything that<br />
anxiously demand of their mother, "Why doesn't the chauffeur come<br />
would weaken Russia—and that certainly included internal revolution—would<br />
be, in effect, to strengthen Germany and weaken<br />
in?<br />
It must have been a curious sight to see the<br />
England. In<br />
family<br />
New York, on the night before his departure, Trotsky<br />
of the great<br />
socialist radical, defender of the working class,<br />
had given a<br />
enemy<br />
speech in which he said: "I am going back to Russia to<br />
of capitalism,<br />
enjoying the pleasures of tea rooms and<br />
overthrow the provisional government and stop the war with<br />
chauffeurs, the very<br />
symbols of capitalist luxury. In any Germany."<br />
event,<br />
Trotsky, therefore, represented a real threat to<br />
it is now known that<br />
almost all of his expenses in New York,<br />
England's war effort.<br />
including<br />
He was arrested as a German agent and taken<br />
the mass rallies,<br />
were paid for by Jacob Schiff.<br />
as a prisoner of war.<br />
On March 23, 1917, a mass meeting was held<br />
With this in mind, at Carnegie<br />
we can appreciate the great strength of those<br />
Hall to<br />
celebrate the abdication of Nicholas II, which<br />
mysterious forces, both in England<br />
meant<br />
and the United States, that<br />
the overthrow<br />
of Tsanst rule in Russia. Thousands intervened<br />
of<br />
on Trotsky's behalf. Immediately, telegrams began to<br />
socialists, Marxists, nihilists,<br />
and anarchists attended to cheer come<br />
the<br />
into Halifax from such divergent sources as an obscure<br />
event. The following day there<br />
was published on page two of the New York Times, a telegram from<br />
1<br />
Jacob<br />
"Mayor Calls Pacifists Traitors/' The<br />
Schiff which<br />
New York Times, March 24, 1917,<br />
had p. 2.<br />
been read to this audience. He expressed<br />
|t See Anthony C. Sutton, Ph.D., Wall Street and the Bolshevik Revolution (New<br />
regrets that he could not attend and then described the Rochelle,<br />
successful<br />
New York: Arlington House, 1974), pp. 21-24.<br />
3. A full report on this meeting had been submitted to the U.S. Military Intelli-<br />
I- Leon Trotsky, My Life (New York: Scribner's, 1930), p. 277.<br />
gence. See Senate Document No. 62, 66th Congress, Report and Hearings of t\\e<br />
Subcommittee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 1919, Vol. II, p. 2680.
266 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
attorney in New York City, from the Canadian Deputy Postmaster-<br />
General, and even from a high-ranking British military officer<br />
mqu^nng into Trotsky's situation and urging his immediate release<br />
The head of the British Secret Service in America at the time was Sir<br />
Wilham Wiseman who, as fate would have it, occupied t^<br />
apartment directly above the apartment of Edward Mandell House<br />
and who had become fast friends with him. House advised<br />
Wiseman that President Wilson wished to have Trotsky released<br />
Wiseman advised his government, and the British Admiralty'<br />
issued orders on April 21st that Trotsky was to be sent on his waJ<br />
It was a fateful decision that would affect, not only the outcome of<br />
war, but the future of the entire world.<br />
SCHIFF WAS NOT ALONE<br />
It would be a mistake to conclude that Jacob Schiff acted alone<br />
m his drama. Trotsky could not have gone even as far as Halifax<br />
withou having been granted an American passport, and this<br />
accomplished<br />
was<br />
by the personal intervention of President Wilson.<br />
Professor Anthony Sutton says:<br />
President Woodrow Wilson was the fairy godmother<br />
provided<br />
who<br />
Trotsky with a passport to return to Russia to<br />
forward" the<br />
Cry<br />
revolution.... At the same time careful State DeparmS<br />
bureaucrats, concerned about such revolutionaries entering<br />
were unilaterally<br />
RusTa<br />
attempting to tighten up passport procedureJ<br />
oUh£ilf ere T' 6 °^eTS ^^<br />
3S WeU<br />
'<br />
- ^ 1911 the SL L'<br />
'<br />
s MP**<br />
""^ Robert Minor. Mnor<br />
^<br />
*<br />
was lat r i X<br />
T1<br />
RUSSia f°r evolutionary and, fn f t i*??"** activities<br />
in fact, was himself bankrolled by famous Wall Street financartoonT<br />
7 "T i<br />
akly 3SSUme that hC^** to P ic we "' ^<br />
t0riCal<br />
S£TT£ t *% inP****- ^Sc<br />
» strays Karl<br />
with<br />
Marx,<br />
a book entitled Sialism under his arm, standing amid a<br />
t^2r<br />
*<br />
^Jf Street Gathered ar0Und and 8^ng Hm<br />
: UdS^eS are CharaCterS in Silk hats Stifled<br />
T^TT( D'<br />
Rockefe"^ J-P. Morgan, John D. Ryan of National City<br />
all<br />
MASQUERADE IN MOSCOW 267<br />
What emerges from this sampling of events is a clear pattern of<br />
strong support for Bolshevism coming from the highest financial<br />
power centers in the United States; from men who,<br />
and political<br />
supposedly, were "capitalists" and who, according to conventional<br />
wisdom, should have been the mortal enemies of socialism and<br />
communism.<br />
Nor was this phenomenon confined to the United States.<br />
Trotsky, in his book, My Life, tells of a British financier who, in 1907,<br />
gave him a<br />
"large loan" to be repaid after the overthrow of the<br />
Tsar. Arsene de Goulevitch, who witnessed the Bolshevik Revolution<br />
first hand, has identified both the name of the financier and the<br />
amount of the loan. "In private interviews," he said, "I have been<br />
told that over 21 million roubles were spent by Lord [Alfred]<br />
Milner in financing the Russian Revolution,... The financier just<br />
mentioned was by no means alone among the British to support the<br />
Russian revolution with large financial donations." Another name<br />
specifically mentioned by de Goulevitch was that of Sir George<br />
Buchanan, the British Ambassador to Russia at the time.<br />
It was one thing for Americans to undermine Tsarist Russia<br />
and, thus, indirectly help Germany in the war, because Americans<br />
were not then into it, but for British citizens to do so was<br />
tantamount to treason. To understand what higher loyalty compelled<br />
these men to betray their battlefield ally and to sacrifice the<br />
blood of their own countrymen, we must take a look at the unique<br />
organization to which they belonged.<br />
THE SECRET SOCIETY<br />
Lord Alfred Milner was a key figure in organizing a secret<br />
society which, at the time of these events, was about sixteen years<br />
old. It was dedicated to nothing less than the quiet domination of<br />
the world. The conquest of Russia was seen as but the first phase of<br />
that plan. Since the organization is still in existence today and<br />
continues to make progress toward its goal, it is important to have<br />
its history included in this narrative.<br />
One of the most authoritative reference works on the history of<br />
this group is Tragedy and Hope by Dr. Carroll Quigley. Dr. Quigley<br />
Was a professor of history at Georgetown University where President<br />
Clinton had been one of his students. He was the author of the<br />
1 - See Arsene de Goulevitch, Czarism and Revolution (Hawthorne, California: Omni<br />
Publications, n.d v rpt. from 1962 French edition), pp. 224, 230.
268 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
widely used <strong>text</strong>book, Evolution of Civilization; he was a member of<br />
the editorial board of the monthly periodical Current History; and<br />
7^,^If consult^ h,rer and ^ such groups as the<br />
ndus^al CoUege of the Armed Forces, the Brooking Institution,<br />
the US. Naval Weapons Laboratory, the Naval College, the Smithsonian<br />
Institute, and the State Department But Dr. Quielev was<br />
mere<br />
no<br />
academic He also had been closely associated with many of<br />
the family dynasties of the super-rich. He was, by his own boast, an<br />
a fr0nt FOW<br />
^<br />
°f<br />
sTucSre^<br />
** W°rId,S m°ney P°wer<br />
When Dr. Quigley wrote his scholarly, 1300-page book of dry<br />
history, it was not intended for the masses. It was to be read by the<br />
intellectual elite and to that select readership he cautiously<br />
exposed one of the best-kept secrets of all time. He also made it<br />
dear however, that he was a friendly apologist for this group and<br />
that he supported its goals and purposes. Dr. Quigley said:<br />
I know of the operation of this network because I have studied it<br />
tor twenty years and was permitted for two years, in the 1960s to<br />
exarnme lts papers and secret record, I have no aversion toTor to<br />
mosl.of its aims and have, for much of my life, been close to it and to<br />
many of its mstruments. ... In general, my chief difference of opinion is<br />
that it wishes to remain unknown. F<br />
1<br />
As mentioned, Quigley's book was intended for an elite readership<br />
composed of scholars and network insiders. But, unexpectedly,<br />
it began to be quoted in the journals of the John Birch<br />
which<br />
Sodety<br />
correctly had perceived that his work provided a valuabfe<br />
insight to the inner workings of a hidden power structure<br />
That<br />
exposure triggered a large demand for the book by people who<br />
were opposed to the network and curious to see what LLfder had<br />
to say about it.<br />
faT That was not according to the original plan What<br />
by<br />
wSXi hT oeSmbed Q^' "«*•£ * a persona<br />
letter dated December 9, 1975, he wrote:<br />
brou^h?^VVT<br />
^^ °f^^ Und H °P e a book < "***^<br />
KS<br />
3t<br />
and^H e °T^^ kn°Wn -<br />
P ubl^her stoppedLlHng it<br />
^<br />
Sh,? ^ he W°Uld reprint^* 197 * ^ told my Wer<br />
1<br />
me ^ches as it apparently says something which<br />
that they had destroyed the plates in 1968). The rare-book price wIS<br />
MacMln^<br />
MASQUERADE IN MOSCOW 269<br />
up to $135 and parts were reprinted in violation of copyright, but I<br />
could do nothing because I believed the publisher, and he would not<br />
take action even when a pirate copy of the book appeared. Only when<br />
I hired a lawyer in 1974 did I get any answers to my questions.. .<br />
In another personal letter, Quigley commented further on the<br />
duplicity of his publisher:<br />
Tliey lied to me for six years, telling me that they would reprint<br />
when they got 2,000 orders, which could never happen because they<br />
told anyone who asked that it was out of print and would not be<br />
reprinted. They denied this to me until I sent them Xerox copies of<br />
such replies in libraries, at which they told me it was a clerk's error. In<br />
other words, they lied to me but prevented me from regaining<br />
publication rights.... I am now quite sure that Tragedy and Hope was<br />
suppressed....<br />
To understand why "powerful people" would want to suppress<br />
this book, note carefully what follows. Dr. Quigley describes the<br />
goal of this network of world financiers as:<br />
. , . nothing less than to create a world system of financial control in<br />
private hands able to dominate the political system of each country<br />
and the economy of the world as a whole. This system was to be<br />
controlled in a feudalist fashion by the central banks of the world<br />
acting in concert, by secret agreements arrived at in frequent private<br />
meetings and conferences. . .<br />
Each central bank, in the hands of men like Montagu Norman<br />
of the Bank of England, Benjamin Strong of the New York Federal<br />
Reserve Bank, Charles Rist of the Bank of France, and HJalmar<br />
Schacht of the Reichsbank, sought to dominate its government by<br />
its ability to control treasury loans, to manipulate foreign<br />
exchanges, to influence the level of economic activity in the<br />
country, and to influence cooperative politicians by subsequent<br />
economic rewards in the business world.<br />
1. These letters were first published in the Summer, 1976, issue of Conspiracy<br />
Digest, published by Peter McAlpine (Alpine Press, Dearborn, Michigan). The<br />
originals cannot now be located. However, the author was able to locate the<br />
attorney, Mr. Paul Wolff (with the firm of Williams & Connolly in Washington,<br />
D.C.) who represented Quigley in his legal action against the publisher. Mr. Wolff<br />
cannot vouch for the authenticity of the letters themselves, but has confirmed in<br />
phone conversations and later in writing that the essential details are correct. He<br />
writes: "It is my recollection that they withheld from me and the Professor for some<br />
time the information that they had in fact destroyed 'the plates/"<br />
2. Quigley, Tragedy, p. 324.
270 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
That is the information that "powerful people" do not want the<br />
common man to know.<br />
Notice that Quigley refers to this group as a "network." That is<br />
a precise choice of words, and it is important to an understanding<br />
of the forces of international finance. The network to which he<br />
refers is not the secret society. It is no doubt directed by it, and there<br />
are society members in key positions within the network, but we<br />
can be sure that there are many in the network who have little or no<br />
knowledge of hidden control. To explain how this can be possible,<br />
let us turn to the origin and growth of the secret society itself.<br />
RUSKIN, RHODES, AND MILNER<br />
In 1870, a wealthy British socialist by the name of John Ruskin<br />
was appointed as professor of fine arts at Oxford University in<br />
London. He tjught that the state must take control of the means of<br />
production and organize them for the good of the community as a<br />
whole. He advocated placing control of the state into the hands of a<br />
small ruling class, perhaps even a single dictator. He said: "My<br />
continual aim has been to show the eternal superiority of some men<br />
to others, sometimes even of one man to all others."<br />
This, of course, is the same intellectual appeal of Communism.<br />
Lenin taught that the masses could not be trusted to handle their<br />
own affairs and that a special group of disciplined intellectuals<br />
must assume this role for them. That is the function of the<br />
Communist Party, which never comprises more than about three<br />
per cent of the population. Even when the charade of free elections<br />
is allowed, only members of the Party—or those over whom the<br />
KGB has total control—are permitted to run for office. The concept<br />
that a ruling party or class is the ideal structure for society is at the<br />
heart of all collectivist schemes, regardless of whether they are<br />
called Socialism, Communism, Nazism, Fascism, or any other<br />
"ism" which may yet be invented to disguise it. It is easy, therefore,<br />
for adherents of this elitist mentality to be comfortable in almost<br />
any of these collectivist camps, a fact to which Dr. Quigley alluded<br />
when he wrote: "This network, which we may identify as the<br />
Round Table Groups, has no aversion to cooperating with the<br />
Communists, or any other groups, and frequently does so."<br />
MASQUERADE IN MOSCOW 271<br />
Returning to the subject of the origins of this group, however,<br />
t)r. Quigley tells us:<br />
Ruskin spoke to the Oxford undergraduates as members of the<br />
privileged ruling class. He told them that they were the possessors of<br />
a magnificent tradition of education, beauty, rule of law, freedom,<br />
decency, and self-discipline, but that this tradition could not be saved,<br />
and did not deserve to be saved, unless it could be extended to the<br />
lower classes in England itself and to the non-English masses<br />
throughout the world.<br />
Ruskin's message had a sensational impact. His inaugural lecture<br />
was copied out in long-hand by one undergraduate, Cecil Rhodes,<br />
who kept it with him for thirty years.<br />
Cecil Rhodes made one of the world's greatest fortunes. With<br />
the cooperation of the Bank of England and financiers like<br />
Rothschild, he was able to establish a virtual monopoly over the<br />
diamond output of South Africa and most of the gold as well. The<br />
major portion of this vast income was spent to advance the<br />
ruling-class ideas of John Ruskin.<br />
Dr. Quigley explains:<br />
The Rhodes Scholarships, established by the terms of Cecil<br />
Rhodes' seventh will, are known to everyone. What is not so widely<br />
known is that Rhodes in five previous wills left his fortune to form a<br />
secret society, which was to devote itself to the preservation and<br />
expansion of the British Empire. And what does not seem to be known<br />
to anyone is that this secret society was created by Rhodes and his<br />
principal trustee, Lord Milner, and continues to exist to this day.. .. In<br />
his book on Rhodes' wills, he [Stead, who was a member of the inner<br />
circle] wrote in one place: "Mr. Rhodes was more than the founder of<br />
a dynasty. He aspired to be the creator of one of those vast<br />
semi-religious, quasi-political associations which, like the Society of<br />
Jesus, have played so large a part in the history of the world. To be<br />
more strictly accurate, he wished to found an Order as the instrument<br />
of the will of the Dynasty. 2 ...<br />
In this secret society Rhodes was to be leader; Stead, Brett (Lord<br />
Esher), and Milner were to form an executive committee; Arthur<br />
(Lord) Balfour, (Sir) Harry Johnston, Lord Rothschild, Albert (Lord)<br />
Grey, and others were listed<br />
as potential members of a "Circle of<br />
Initiates;" while there was to be an outer circle known as the<br />
1. See Kenneth Clark, Ruskin Today (New York: Holt, Reinhart & Winston, 1964),<br />
p. 267.<br />
2. Quigley, Tragedy, p. 950.<br />
|- Quigley, Tragedy, p. 130.<br />
2 -<br />
Carroll Quigley, The Anglo-American Establishment: From Rhodes to Cliveden (N<br />
Y °rk: Books in Focus, 1981), pp. ix, 36.<br />
ew
272 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND MASQUERADE IN MOSCOW 273<br />
"Association of Helpers" (later<br />
organized by MiLner as the Round<br />
Table organization).<br />
THE PATTERN OF CONSPIRACY<br />
Here, then, was the classical pattern of political conspiracy. This<br />
was the structure that made it possible for Quigley to differentiate<br />
between an international "network" and the secret society within<br />
that network. At the center, there is always a tiny group in<br />
complete control, with one man as the undisputed leader. Next is a<br />
circle of secondary leadership that, for the most part, is unaware of<br />
an inner core. They are led to believe that they are the inner-most<br />
ring.<br />
In time, as these conspiracies are built from the center out, they<br />
form additional rings of organization. Those in the outer echelons<br />
usually are idealists with an honest desire to improve the world.<br />
They never suspect an inner control for other purposes, and only<br />
At the end of the war of 1914, it became clear that the organization<br />
of this system had to be greatly extended. Once again the task was<br />
entrusted to Lionel Curtis who established, in England and each<br />
dominion, a front organization to the existing local Round Table<br />
Group. This front organization, called the Royal Institute of<br />
International Affairs, had as its nucleus in each area the existing<br />
submerged Round Table Group. In New York it was known as the<br />
Council on Foreign Relations, and was a front for J.P.<br />
Morgan and<br />
Company in association with the very small American Round Table<br />
Group.<br />
failure of the world's leaders at the end of World War I to embrace<br />
the League of Nations as a true world government. It became clear<br />
to the master planners that they had been unrealistic in their<br />
expectations for rapid acceptance. If their plan were to be carried<br />
forward, it would have to be done on the basis of patient gradualism<br />
symbolized by the Fabian turtle. Rose Martin says:<br />
those few who demonstrate a ruthless capacity for higher leadership<br />
are ever allowed to see it.<br />
After the death of Cecil<br />
Rhodes, the inner core of his secret<br />
society fell under the control of Lord Alfred Milner, Governor-<br />
General and High Commissioner of South Africa. As director of a<br />
number of public banks and as corporate precursor of England's<br />
Midland Bank, he became one of the greatest political and financial<br />
powers in the world. Milner recruited into his secret society a<br />
group of young men chiefly from Oxford and Toynbee Hall and,<br />
according to Quigley:<br />
Through his influence these men were able to win influential posts<br />
in government and international finance and became the dominant<br />
influence in British imperial and foreign affairs up to 1939.... In<br />
1909-1913 they organized semi-secret groups, known as Round Table<br />
Groups, in the chief British dependencies and the United States....<br />
Money for the widely ramified activities of this organization came<br />
. . . chiefly from the Rhodes Trust itself, and from wealthy associates<br />
such as the Beit brothers, from Sir Abe Bailey, and (after 1915) from the<br />
Astor family ... and from foundations and firms associated with the<br />
international banking fraternity, especially the Carnegie United<br />
Kingdom Trust, and other organizations associated with J.P. Morgan,<br />
the Rockefeller and Whitney families, and the associates of Lazard<br />
Brothers and of Morgan, Grenfell, and Company. . .<br />
Colonel House was only one man, where a multitude was needed.<br />
He had set the pattern and outlined goals for the future, and he still<br />
had a scheme or two in mind. In particular, he foresaw it would be<br />
necessary for the Fabians to develop a top level Anglo-American<br />
, planning group in the field of foreign relations which could secretly<br />
1 . Quigley, Tragedy, p. 131<br />
2 - Martin, pp. 174-5.<br />
! Quigley, Tragedy, pp. 132, 951-52.<br />
influence policy on the one hand and gradually "educate" public<br />
opinion on the other.. .<br />
To the ambitious young Fabians, British and American, who had<br />
flocked to the peace conference as economists and junior officials, it<br />
soon became evident that a New World Order was not about to be<br />
produced at Paris.... For them, Colonel House arranged a dinner<br />
meeting at the Hotel Majestic on May 19, 1919, together with a select<br />
group of Fabian-certified Englishmen—notably, Arnold Toynbee,<br />
R.H. Tawney and John Maynard Keynes. All were equally<br />
disillusioned, for various reasons, by the consequences of the peace.<br />
They made a gentlemen's agreement to set up an organization, with<br />
branches in England and America, "to facilitate the scientific study of<br />
international questions." As a result two potent and closely related<br />
opinion-making bodies were founded.... The English branch was<br />
called the Royal Institute of International Affairs. The American<br />
branch, first known as the Institute of International Affairs, was<br />
reorganized in 1921 as the Council on Foreign Relations. 2
274 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
MASQUERADE IN MOSCOW 275<br />
It is through this front group, called the Council on Foreign<br />
effect, purchased a franchise to operate in its name. Professor<br />
Relations, and its influence over the media, tax-exempt foundations,<br />
universities, and government agencies that the international<br />
The 1910 [Red Cross] fund-raising campaign for $2 million, for<br />
Sutton tells us:<br />
financiers have been able to dominate the domestic and foreign<br />
example, was successful only because it was supported by these<br />
policies of the United States ever since.<br />
wealthy residents of New York City. J.R Morgan himself contributed<br />
$100,000. . . . Henry P. Davison [a Morgan partner] was chairman of the<br />
We shall have more to say about the CFR, but our focal point<br />
1910 New York Fund-Raising Committee and later became chairman<br />
for now is Great Britain and, in particular, the help given to<br />
of the War Council of the American Red Cross.... The Red Cross was<br />
Communism in Russia by Lord Alfred Milner and his web of secret<br />
unable to cope with the demands of World War I and in effect was<br />
societies.<br />
taken over by these New York bankers.<br />
ROUND TABLE AGENTS IN RUSSIA<br />
For the duration of the war, the Red Cross had been made,<br />
In Russia, prior to and during the revolution, there were many<br />
nominally, a part of the armed forces and subject to orders from the<br />
local observers, tourists, and newsmen who reported that British<br />
proper military authorities. It was not clear who these authorities<br />
and American agents were everywhere, particularly in Petrograd,<br />
were and, in fact, there were never any orders, but the arrangement<br />
providing money for insurrection. One report said, for example,<br />
made it possible for the participants to receive military commissions<br />
and wear the uniform of American army officers. The entire<br />
that British agents were seen handing out 25-rouble notes to the<br />
men at the Pavlovski regiment just a few hours before it mutinied<br />
expense of the Red Cross Mission in Russia, including the purchase<br />
of uniforms,<br />
against its officers and sided with the revolution. The<br />
was paid for by the man who was appointed by<br />
subsequent<br />
President Wilson to become its head, "Colonel" William Boyce<br />
publication of various memoirs and documents made it clear that<br />
Thompson.<br />
this funding was provided by Milner and channeled through Sir<br />
Thompson was a classical specimen of the Round Table network.<br />
Having begun his career as a speculator in copper mines, he<br />
George Buchanan who was the British Ambassador to Russia at<br />
that time. It was a repeat of the ploy that had worked so well for<br />
soon moved into the world of high finance. He refinanced the<br />
the cabal many times in the past. Round Table members were once<br />
American Woolen Company and the Tobacco Products Companylaunched<br />
the Cuban Cane Sugar Company; purchased controlling<br />
again working both sides of the conflict to weaken and topple a<br />
target government Tsar Nicholas had every reason to believe that,<br />
interest in the Pierce Arrow Motor Car Company; organized the<br />
since the British were Russia's allies in the war against Germany,<br />
Submarine Boat Corporation and the Wright-Martin Aeroplane<br />
British officials would be the last persons on Earth to conspire<br />
Company; became a director of the Chicago Rock Island & Pacific<br />
against hirru Yet, the British Ambassador himself represented the<br />
Railway, the Magma Arizona Railroad, and the Metropolitan Life<br />
hidden group which was financing the regime's downfall.<br />
insurance Company; was one of the heaviest stockholders in the<br />
The Round Table agents from America did not have the<br />
Chase National Bank; was the agent for J.P. Morgan's British<br />
advantage of using the diplomatic service as a cover and, therefore,<br />
securities operation; became the first full-time director of the<br />
had to be considerably more ingenious. They came, not as diplomats<br />
or even as interested businessmen, but disguised as Red Cross<br />
Federal Reserve System; and, of course, contributed a quarter-<br />
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the most important bank in the<br />
officials on a humanitarian mission. The group consisted almost<br />
million dollars to the Red Cross.<br />
entirely of financiers, lawyers, and accountants from New York<br />
When Thompson arrived in Russia, he made it clear that he was<br />
banks and investment houses. They simply had overpowered the<br />
not your typical Red Cross representative. According to Hermann<br />
American Red Cross organization with large contributions and, in<br />
Hagedorn, Thompson's biographer:<br />
1. See de Goulevitch, p. 230. 1. Sutton, Revolution, p. 72.
276 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND MASQUERADE IN MOSCOW 277<br />
He deliberately created the kind of setting which would be<br />
expected of an American magnate: established himself in a suite in the<br />
Hotel de I'Europe, bought a French limousine, went dutifully to<br />
receptions and teas and evinced an interest in objects of art. Society<br />
and the diplomats, noting that here was a man of parts and power,<br />
began to flock about him. He was entertained at the embassies, at the<br />
houses of Kerensky's ministers. It was discovered that he was a<br />
collector, and those with antiques to sell fluttered around him, offering<br />
him miniatures, Dresden china, tapestries, even a palace or two. 1<br />
When Thompson attended the opera, he was given the imperial<br />
box. People on the street called him the American Tsar. And it<br />
not surprising that, according to George Kennan, "He was viewed<br />
by the Kerensky authorities as the 'real' ambassador of the United<br />
States/' 2<br />
It is now a matter of record that Thompson syndicated the<br />
purchase on Wall Street of Russian bonds in the amount of<br />
ten-million roubles.<br />
In addition, he gave over two-million roubles<br />
to Aleksandr Kerensky for propaganda purposes inside Russia<br />
and, with J.P. Morgan, gave the rouble equivalent of one-million<br />
dollars to the Bolsheviks for the spreading of revolutionary propaganda<br />
outside of Russia, particularly in Germany and Austria.<br />
photograph of the cablegram from Morgan to Thompson advising<br />
that the money had been transferred to the National City Bank<br />
branch in Petrograd is included in this book.<br />
AN OBJECT LESSON IN SOUTH AFRICA<br />
At first it may seem incongruous that the Morgan group would<br />
provide funding for both Kerensky and Lenin. These men may<br />
have both been socialist revolutionaries, but they were miles apart<br />
in their plans for the future and, in fact, were bitter competitors for<br />
control of the new government. But the tactic of funding both sides<br />
in a political contest by then had been refined by members of the<br />
1. Hermann Hagedorn, The Magnate: William Boyce Thompson and His Time (New<br />
York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1935), pp. 192-93.<br />
2. George R Kennan, Russia Leaves the War; Soviet-American Relations, 1917-1920<br />
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1956), p. 60.<br />
3. Hagedorn,p. 192.<br />
4. Sutton, Revolution, pp. 83, 91. It was the agitation made possible by this funding<br />
that led to the abortive German Sparticus Revolt of 1918. See "W.B. Thompson, Red<br />
Cross Donor, Believes Parry Misrepresented," Washington Post, Feb. 2, 1918.<br />
is<br />
A<br />
Round Table into a fine art. A stunning example of this occurred in<br />
South Africa during the outset of Boer War in 1899.<br />
The British and Dutch had been active in the settlement of<br />
Southern Africa for decades. The Dutch had developed the provinces<br />
of Transvaal and the Orange Free State, while the British had<br />
colonized such areas as Rhodesia, Cape Hope, Basutoland,<br />
Swaziland, and Bechuanaland. Conflict was inevitable between<br />
these two groups of settlers whenever they found themselves in<br />
competition for the resources of the same territory, but it was the<br />
discovery of gold in the Whitewater area of the Transvaal that<br />
provided the motive for war.<br />
Politically, the Transvaal was in the hands of the Boers, who<br />
were the descendants of the Dutch settlers. But, after the discovery<br />
of gold in that area, the mine fields had been developed primarily<br />
by the British and became solidly under their control. Not surprisingly,<br />
one of the largest players in that game was Cecil Rhodes who<br />
already had monopolized the diamond fields under British control<br />
to the South. Historian Henry Pike tells us:<br />
With the discovery of gold in the Transvaal, Rhodes' greed<br />
became passionate. His hatred of Paul Kruger, the Afrikaner President<br />
of the Transvaal, knew no limits. He was bitterly opposed to Kruger's<br />
independent Transvaal, and viewed this as the main obstacle to his<br />
efforts to sweep all Southern Africa under British rule.<br />
In 1895, Rhodes set in motion a plan to overthrow Kruger's<br />
government by organizing an uprising among the British inhabitants<br />
in Johannesburg. The uprising was financed by himself and<br />
was to be led by his brother, Frank, and other loyal supporters. This<br />
was to be followed by a military invasion of the Transvaal by<br />
British troops from Bechuanaland and Rhodesia led by Sir Leander<br />
Jameson, The uprising fizzled and ended in Jameson's arrest and<br />
public disgrace.<br />
But Rhodes was determined to have the Transvaal, and began<br />
immediately to prepare a second, more patient ploy. Through<br />
Rhodes' influence, Lord Alfred Milner was appointed as the British<br />
High Commissioner of South Africa. In London, Lord Esher<br />
another member of the secret society—became the chief political<br />
adviser to King Edward and was in daily contact with him<br />
L<br />
Henry R. Pike, Ph.D., A History of Communism in South Africa (Germiston, South<br />
Africa: Christian Mission International of South Africa, 1985), p. 39.
278 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
MASQUERADE IN MOSCOW 279<br />
throughout this period. That took care of the British<br />
side of this<br />
contest. With regard to the Boers' side, Professor Quigley tells the<br />
amazing story:<br />
By a process whose details are still obscure, a brilliant young<br />
graduate of Cambridge, Jan Smuts, who had been a vigorous<br />
supporter of Rhodes and acted as his agent in Kimberly [South<br />
Africa's largest diamond mine] as late as 1895 and who was one of the<br />
most important members of the Rhodes-Milner group in the period<br />
1908-1950, went to the Transvaal and, by violent anti-British agitation,<br />
became state secretary of that country (although a British subject) and<br />
chief political adviser to President Kruger; Milner made provocative<br />
troop movements on the Boer frontiers in spite of the vigorous protests<br />
of his commanding general in South Africa, who had to be removed;<br />
and, finally, war was precipitated when Smuts drew up an ultimatum<br />
insisting that the British troop movements cease and when this was<br />
rejected by Milner.<br />
And so, as a result of careful engineering by Round Table<br />
members on both sides—one making outrageous demands and the<br />
other responding to those demands in pretended indignation—the<br />
war finally began with a British invasion in October of 1899. After<br />
2 l /i years of fierce fighting, the Boers were forced to surrender, and<br />
Milner administered the former republic as a militarily occupied<br />
territory. Round Table members, known to the public as "Milner's<br />
Kindergarten," were placed into all key government posts, and the<br />
gold fields were finally secured.<br />
PLACING BETS ON ALL HORSES<br />
On the other side of the world, in New York City, the same<br />
tactic of playing both sides against each other was being applied<br />
with brilliant precision by Round Table member J.P. Morgan.<br />
Professor Quigley tells us:<br />
To Morgan all<br />
political parties were simply organizations to be<br />
used, and the firm always was careful to keep a foot in all camps.<br />
Morgan himself, Dwight Morrow, and other partners were allied with<br />
Republicans; Russell C. Leffingwell was allied with the Democrats;<br />
Grayson Murphy was allied with the extreme Right; and Thomas W.<br />
Lamont was allied with the Left. 2<br />
1. Quigley, Tragedy, pp. 137-38.<br />
2. m,p.945.<br />
regarded as a man of leftist persuasions, it<br />
Although it is true that Thomas Lamont was the father of<br />
Corliss Lamont, a well-known Communist, and was himself widely<br />
must also be remembered<br />
that he felt equally at home among the Fascists and, in fact,<br />
served as an unofficial business consultant for Mussolini in<br />
1920s. 1<br />
At the same time that Morgan was funding pro-Bolshevik<br />
groups, he founded what was probably the most virulent anti-<br />
Bolshevik organization ever to exist in America. It was called<br />
United Americans and it set about to frighten everyone into<br />
believing that a Red mob was at that very moment poised to<br />
capture New York City. It issued shocking reports warning about a<br />
pending financial collapse, widespread starvation, and a desperate<br />
working class being maneuvered into accepting Communist slogans<br />
and rhetoric as a last resort. Ironically, the officers of this<br />
organization were Allen Walker of the Guarantee Trust Company,<br />
which was then acting as the Soviet's fiscal agent in the U.S.; Daniel<br />
Willard, president of the Baltimore & Ohio Railway, which was<br />
then active in the development of Soviet railways; H.H. Westinghouse<br />
of Westinghouse Air Brake Company which was then<br />
operating a major plant in Russia; and Otto H. Kahn of Kuhn, Loeb<br />
& Company, which was one of the principal financial backers of the<br />
fledgling Soviet regime.<br />
Even inside Russia itself,<br />
the Round Table was spreading its<br />
bets. In addition to the funding, previously mentioned, which was<br />
given to the Bolsheviks and to their opponents, the Mensheviks,<br />
Morgan also financed the military forces of Admiral Kolchak who<br />
was fighting against the Bolsheviks in Siberia. Not surprisingly,<br />
Kolchak also received funding from a consortium of British financiers,<br />
including Alfred Milner.<br />
It is commonly stated that the original intent of the Red Cross<br />
mission to Moscow was to prevent the Russian government from<br />
making a separate peace with Germany which would release<br />
German troops to fight against England and France. According to<br />
that version of the story—which portrays the actors as patriots<br />
1. See John P. Diggins, Mussolini and Fascism: The View from America (Princeton,<br />
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1972).<br />
2. Sutton, Revolution, pp. 163-68.<br />
fe. Ibid., pp. 102,146,166-67.<br />
the
280 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
merely doing what was best for the war effort—the first goal was to<br />
support the Tsar. When the Tsar was overthrown, they supported<br />
the Mensheviks because they had pledged to stay in the war. When<br />
the Mensheviks were ousted, they continued to support the<br />
Bolsheviks in order to gain sufficient influence to convince them<br />
not to give aid to Germany. It<br />
takes a great deal of gullibility to<br />
swallow that line. A far more plausible reading is that the Morgan<br />
interests were merely doing what they had always done: placing<br />
bets on all horses so that, no matter which one crossed the finish<br />
line, the winner would be obligated to them.<br />
BRITISH AGENT OF THE ROUND TABLE<br />
After the Bolsheviks had seized power in Russia, Sir George<br />
Buchanan was recalled as the British Ambassador and replaced by<br />
a member of Milner's Kindergarten, a young man by the name of<br />
Bruce Lockhart. In his book, British Agent, Lockhart describes the<br />
circumstances of his assignment. Speaking of a meeting with Prime<br />
Minister Lloyd George, he wrote:<br />
I<br />
saw that his own mind was made up. He had been greatly<br />
impressed, as Lord Milner told me afterwards, by an interview with<br />
Colonel Thompson of the American Red Cross, who had just returned<br />
from Russia and who had denounced in blunt language the folly of the<br />
Allies in not opening up negotiations with the Bolsheviks....<br />
Three days later all my doubts were put at rest. I was to go to<br />
Russia as head of a special mission to establish unofficial relations with<br />
the Bolsheviks.... I had been selected for this Russian mission not by<br />
the Foreign Secretary but by the War Cabinet—actually by Lord<br />
Milner and Mr. Lloyd George....<br />
Lord Milner I saw almost daily. Five days before my departure I<br />
dined alone with him at Brook's. He was in his most inspiring mood.<br />
He talked to me with a charming frankness about the war, about the<br />
future of England, about his own career, and about the opportunities<br />
of youth.... He was, too, very far from being the Jingo and the<br />
Conservative reactionary whom popular opinion at one time<br />
represented him to be. On the contrary, many of his views on society<br />
were startling modern. He believed in the highly organized state, in<br />
which service, efficiency, and hard work were more important than<br />
titles or money-bags.<br />
MASQUERADE IN MOSCOW 281<br />
AMERICAN AGENT OF THE ROUND TABLE<br />
When Thompson returned to the United States, the man he<br />
selected to replace himself as head of the American Red Cross<br />
Mission was his second-in-command, Raymond Robins. Not much<br />
known about Robins except that he was the protege of Col.<br />
is<br />
Edward Mandell House, and he might have remained an obscure<br />
player in this drama had it not been for the fact that he became one<br />
of the central characters in Bruce Lockhart's book. It is there that we<br />
get this inside view:<br />
Another new acquaintance of these first days in the Bolshevized<br />
St. Petersburg was Raymond Robins, the head of the American Red<br />
Cross Mission.... He had been a leading figure in Roosevelt's "Bull<br />
Moose" campaign for the American Presidency in 1912. Although a<br />
rich man himself, he was an anti-capitalist.... Hitherto, his two heroes<br />
had been Roosevelt and Cecil Rhodes. Now Lenin had captured his<br />
imagination..,. Robins was the only man whom Lenin was always<br />
willing to see and who ever succeeded in imposing his own<br />
personality on the unemotional Bolshevik leader.<br />
In a less official sense Robins had a similar mission to my own. He<br />
was the intermediary between the Bolsheviks and the American<br />
Government and had set himself the task of persuading President<br />
Wilson to recognize the Soviet regime.<br />
What an amazing revelation is contained in those words. First,<br />
we learn that Robins was a leader in the team effort that threw the<br />
election of 1912 to Woodrow Wilson. Then we learn that he was an<br />
anti-capitalist. Third, we discover that an anti-capitalist can heroworship<br />
Cecil Rhodes. Then we see the tremendous power he<br />
wielded over Lenin. And finally, we are told that, although he was<br />
part of a private group financed by Wall Street bankers, he was in<br />
reality the intermediary between the Bolsheviks and the American<br />
Government One will look in vain for a better summary.<br />
The fact that Cecil Rhodes was one of Robin's great heroes has<br />
special significance for this story. It was not merely an intellectual<br />
infatuation from college days. On the night before he left Russia,<br />
Robins dined with Lockhart. Describing the occasion, Lockhart<br />
says: "He had been reading Rhodes' life and after dinner he gave us<br />
a wonderful exposition of Rhodes' character."<br />
Thus, both Lockhart<br />
1. R.H. Bruce Lockhart, British Agent (New York and London: G.P. Putnam's Sons,<br />
1933), pp. 198-99, 204, 206-07.<br />
1. Lockhart, p. 220.<br />
2. JM.,p.270.
282 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
and Robins were dedicated disciples of Cecil Rhodes and both were<br />
undoubtedly part of the international network to which Professor<br />
Quigley alluded — possibly even members of the Round Table.<br />
Lockhart reported to the British group while Robins reported to the<br />
American group, but both were clearly working for identical<br />
objectives and doing the work of the unseen hand.<br />
The Bolsheviks were well aware of the power these men<br />
represented, and there was no door closed to them. They were<br />
allowed to attend meetings of the Central Executive Committee 1 ,<br />
and were consulted regarding important decisions. 2 But perhaps<br />
the best way to appraise the extent of the influence these "capitalists"<br />
had over the "anti-capitalists" is to let Lockhart tell his own<br />
story. In his memoirs, he wrote:<br />
I returned from our interview to our flat to find an urgent message<br />
from Robins requesting me to come to see him at once. I found him in<br />
a state of great agitation. He had been in conflict with Saalkind, a<br />
nephew of Trotsky and then Assistant Commissar for Foreign Affairs.<br />
Saalkind had been rude, and the American, who had a promise from<br />
Lenin that, whatever happened, a train would always be ready for him<br />
at an hour's notice, was determined to exact an apology or to leave the<br />
country. When I arrived, he had just finished telephoning to Lenin. He<br />
had delivered his ultimatum, and Lenin had promised to give a reply<br />
within ten minutes. I waited, while Robins fumed. Then the telephone<br />
rang and Robins picked up the receiver. Lenin had capitulated.<br />
Saalkind was dismissed from his post. But he was an old member of<br />
the Party. Would Robins have any objection if Lenin sent him as a<br />
Bolshevik emissary to Beme? Robins smiled grimly. "Thank you, Mr.<br />
Lenin/' he said. "As I can't send the son of a bitch to hell, 'burn' is the<br />
next best thing you can do with him." 3<br />
Such was the raw power over the leaders of Communism that<br />
was concealed behind the innocent facade of the American Red<br />
Cross Mission. And yet, the world—even today—has no inkling of<br />
its reality. It has been a carefully guarded secret, and even many of<br />
those who were close to it were unable to see it. The assistant to<br />
William Thompson in Russia was Cornelius Kelleher. In later years,<br />
reflecting on the naivete of Dr. Franklin Billings, who was head of<br />
the mission's medical team, Kelleher wrote:<br />
1. Ibid., p. 253.<br />
2. U.S. State Dept. Decimal File, 861 .00/3449.<br />
3. Lockhart, pp. 225-26.<br />
MASQUERADE IN MOSCOW 283<br />
Poor Mr. Billings believed he was in charge of a scientific mission<br />
for the relief of Russia.... He was in reality nothing but a mask—the<br />
Red Cross complexion of the mission was nothing but a mask.<br />
The purpose of a mask, of course, is to conceal. And so we are<br />
led to ask the question, what was behind that mask? What were the<br />
true motives and goals of the masqueraders?<br />
We shall turn to that subject next.<br />
SUMMARY<br />
The Bolshevik revolution was not a spontaneous uprising of the<br />
masses. It was planned, financed, and orchestrated by outsiders.<br />
Some of the financing came from Germany which hoped that<br />
internal problems would force Russia out of the war against her.<br />
But most of the money and leadership came from financiers in<br />
England and the United States. It was a perfect example of the<br />
Rothschild formula in action.<br />
This group centered mainly around a secret society created by<br />
Cecil Rhodes, one of the world's wealthiest men at the time. The<br />
purpose of that group was nothing less than world dorninion and<br />
the establishment of a modern feudalist society controlled by the<br />
world's central banks. Headquartered in England, the Rhodes<br />
inner-most directorate was called the Round Table. In other countries,<br />
there were established subordinate structures called Round-<br />
Table Groups. The Round-Table Group in the United States became<br />
known as the Council on Foreign Relations. The CFR y<br />
which was<br />
initially dominated by J.P. Morgan and later by the Rockefellers, is<br />
the most powerful group in America today. It is even more<br />
powerful than the federal government, because almost all of the<br />
key positions in government are held by its members. In other<br />
words, it is the United States government.<br />
Agents of these two groups cooperated closely in pre-revolutionary<br />
Russia and particularly after the Tsar was overthrown. The<br />
American contingent in Russia disguised itself as a Red Cross<br />
mission allegedly doing humanitarian work. Cashing in on their<br />
close friendship with Trotsky and Lenin, they obtained profitable<br />
business concessions from the new government which returned<br />
their initial investment many times over.<br />
1 . Kennan,<br />
Russia, p. 59.
Courtesy of Edward Warded<br />
Above is the "Red Cross Mission" in Moscow shortly after the Bolshevik<br />
Revolution. (L-R) J.W. Andrews, Raymond Robins, Allen Wardell, D. Heywood<br />
Hardy. Under the pretense of humanitarianism, the Misson's key personnel were<br />
Wall Street financiers following their own agenda for acquiring profitable<br />
commercial concessions from the new government. They heavily financed all<br />
factions of the revolutionary movement to be sure of gaining influence with<br />
whatever group should come out on top.<br />
Below is a cablegram from J.P. Morgan to William Boyce Thompson-head of the<br />
Red Cross Mission prior to Robins-advising that one million dollars had been<br />
transferred to Thompson via the National City Bank. There were many such<br />
infusions of "Capitalist" money into the new Communist regime. The process<br />
continues to this day.<br />
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Chapter Fourteen<br />
THE BEST ENEMY<br />
MONEY CAN BUY<br />
The coup d'etat in Russia in which the Bolshevik<br />
minority seized control from the revolutionary<br />
majority; the role played by New Yorkfinanciers,<br />
masquerading as Red Cross officials,<br />
in supporting<br />
the Bolsheviks; the unbroken record since their<br />
of American assistance in building Russia's warmaking<br />
potential; the emergence of a "credible<br />
enemy" in accordance with the Rothschild<br />
Formula.<br />
In the previous section we saw that the Red Cross Mission in<br />
revolutionary Russia was, in the words of its own personnel,<br />
"nothing but a mask/' This leads to the logical question, what were<br />
the true motives and goals that were hidden behind that mask.<br />
In later years, it would be explained by the participants<br />
themselves that they simply were engaged in a humanitarian effort<br />
to keep Russia in the war against Germany and, thus, to help the<br />
cause of freedom for England and her allies. For Jacob Schiff and<br />
other Jewish financiers in New York, there was the additional<br />
explanation that they opposed the Tsar because of his anti-<br />
Semitism. These, of course, are admirable motives, and they have<br />
been uncritically accepted by mainstream historians ever since.<br />
Unfortunately, the official explanations do not square with the<br />
facts.<br />
RUSSIA'S TWO REVOLUTIONS<br />
The facts are that there were two revolutions in Russia that<br />
year, not one. The first, called the February Revolution, resulted in<br />
the establishment of a provisional socialist government under the<br />
leadership of Aleksandr Kerensky. It was relatively moderate in its<br />
policies and attempted to accommodate all revolutionary factions<br />
including the Bolsheviks who were the smallest minority. When<br />
284
286 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND THE BEST ENEMY MONEY CAN BUY 287<br />
the February Revolution occurred, neither Lenin nor Trotsky were<br />
even in Russia. Lenin was in Switzerland and didn't arrive until<br />
April. Trotsky was still in New York writing propaganda and<br />
giving speeches.<br />
The second revolution, called the October Revolution, was the<br />
one through which the Bolsheviks came to power. It was, in fact, no<br />
revolution at all. It was a coup d'etat. The Bolsheviks simply took<br />
advantage of the confusion and indecisiveness that existed among<br />
the various groups that comprised the new government and caught<br />
them by surprise with a lightening strike of force. With a combination<br />
of bribes and propaganda, they recruited several regiments of<br />
soldiers and sailors and, in the early morning darkness of October<br />
25, methodically took military possession of all government buildings<br />
and communication centers. No one was prepared for such<br />
audacity, and resistance was almost non-existent. By dawn, without<br />
the Russian people even knowing what had happened—much<br />
less having any voice in that action, their country had been captured<br />
by a minority faction and become the world's first so-called<br />
"people's republic." Within two days, Kerensky had fled for his<br />
life, and all Provisional Government ministers had been arrested.<br />
That is<br />
how the Communists seized Russia and that is how they<br />
held it afterward. Contrary to the Marxian myth, they have never<br />
represented the people. They simply have the guns.<br />
The basic facts of this so-called revolution are described by<br />
Professor Leonard Schapiro in his authoritative work, The Russian<br />
Revolutions of 1917:<br />
All the evidence suggests that when the crisis came the great<br />
majority of units of the Petrograd Garrison did not support the<br />
government but simply remained neutral.... The Cossack units<br />
rejected its call for support, leaving the government with only a few<br />
hundred women soldiers and around two thousand military cadets on<br />
its<br />
side. The Bolsheviks, on the other hand, could count on several<br />
regiments to carry out their orders. Units of the Baltic Fleet also<br />
supported them.. .<br />
In the event, the Bolshevik take-over was almost bloodless: in<br />
contrast with what had happened in February, nothing could have<br />
been less like a city in the throes of revolution than Petrograd on 25<br />
October. Crowds of well-dressed people thronged the streets in the<br />
evening. Theaters and restaurants were open, and at the opera,<br />
Shaliapin sang in Boris Godunov. The principal stations and services<br />
had all been taken over by the morning of 25 October without a shot<br />
being fired....<br />
A battleship and several cruisers, including the Aurora, had<br />
reached Petrograd from Kronstadt and were anchored with their guns<br />
trained on targets in the city.. .<br />
The Provisional Government inside the Winter Palace...received<br />
an ultimatum calling for surrender of its members, under threat of<br />
bombardment of the palace by Aurora and by the guns of the Peter and<br />
Paul Fortress. ...<br />
It was only at 9:40 P.M. that the Aurora was ordered to<br />
fire—and discharged one blank shell. The main effect of this was to<br />
accelerate the thinning out of the cadet defenders of the palace, who<br />
had already begun to dwindle. The women soldiers, who had formed<br />
part of its defense force, also left before the palace was invaded. At<br />
11P.M. some live shells were fired, and the palace was slightly<br />
damaged., .<br />
The story of the dramatic storming of the Winter Palace, popular<br />
with Soviet historians and in the cinema, is a myth. At around 2 A.M. on<br />
26 October, a small detachment of troops, followed by an unruly<br />
crowd and led by two members of the MRC [Military Revolutionary<br />
Committee], entered the palace. The remaining officer cadets were,<br />
apparently, prepared to resist, but were ordered to surrender by the<br />
ministers. In the end, the total casualties were three officer cadets<br />
wounded.<br />
POPULAR SUPPORT WAS NOT NECESSARY<br />
Eugene Lyons had been a correspondent for United Press in<br />
revolutionary Russia. He began his career as highly sympathetic to<br />
the Bolsheviks and their new regime, but six years of actual living<br />
inside the new socialist Utopia shattered his illusions. In his<br />
acclaimed book, Workers' Paradise host, he summarizes the true<br />
meaning of the October Revolution:<br />
Lenin, Trotsky, and their cohorts did not overthrow the<br />
monarchy. They overthrew the first democratic society in Russian<br />
history, set up through a truly popular revolution in March, 1917....<br />
They represented the smallest of the Russian radical movements....<br />
But theirs was a movement that scoffed at numbers and frankly<br />
mistrusted the multitudes. The workers could be educated for their<br />
role after the revolution; they would not be led but driven to their<br />
terrestrial heaven. Lenin always sneered at the obsession of competing<br />
socialist groups with their "mass base." "Give us an organization of<br />
& Leonard Shapiro, The Russian Revolutions ofl917 (New York: Basic Books, 1984),<br />
pp. 135-36.
288 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
professional revolutionaries," he used to say, "and we will turn Russia<br />
upside down/'...<br />
Even these contingents were pathetically duped, having not the<br />
remotest notion of the real purposes for which they were being used.<br />
They were striking out, they thought, for the multi-party Soviets, for<br />
freedom, equality, and other goals which their organizers regarded as<br />
emotional garbage.. .<br />
On the brink of the dictatorship, Lenin dared to promise that the<br />
state will fade away, since "all need of force will vanish/' Not at some<br />
remote future, but at once: "The proletarian state begins to wither<br />
immediately after its triumph, for in a classless society a state is<br />
unnecessary and impossible.. . . Soviet power is a new kind of state, in<br />
which there is no bureaucracy, no police, no standing army." Also: "So<br />
long as the state exists, there is no freedom. When there is freedom,<br />
there will be no state."<br />
Within a few months after they attained power, most of the tsarist<br />
practices the Leninists had condemned were revived, usually in more<br />
ominous forms: political prisoners, convictions without trial and<br />
without the formality of charges, savage persecution of dissenting<br />
views, death penalties for more varieties of crime than in any other<br />
modern nation. The rest were put into effect in the following years,<br />
including the suppression of all other parties, restoration of the<br />
internal passport, a state monopoly of the press, along with repressive<br />
practices the monarchy had outlived for a century or more.<br />
All of this, of course, is a departure from the main narrative, but<br />
it has been necessary to illustrate a fact that has been obscured by<br />
the passage of time and the acceptance of myth by mainstream<br />
historians. The fact is that Lenin and Trotsky were not sent to<br />
Russia to overthrow the anti-Semitic Tsar. Their assignment from<br />
Wall Street was to overthrow the revolution.<br />
NOTES FROM LINCOLN STEFFENS' DIARY<br />
That this was the prevailing motive of the New York money<br />
powers was clearly brought to light in the diary of Lincoln Steffens,<br />
one of America's best-known leftist writers of that time. Steffens<br />
was on board the SS. Kristianwfjord when Trotsky was taken off<br />
and arrested in Halifax. He carefully wrote down the conversations<br />
he had with other passengers who also were headed to strife-torn<br />
Russia. One of these was Charles Crane, vice president of the Crane<br />
Company. Crane was a backer of Woodrow Wilson and former<br />
THE BEST ENEMY MONEY CAN BUY 289<br />
chairman of the Democratic Party's finance committee. He also had<br />
organized the Westinghouse Company in Russia and had made no<br />
less than twenty-three prior visits. His son, Richard Crane, was<br />
confidential assistant to then Secretary of State, Robert Lansing. It is<br />
instructive, therefore, to read Steffens' notes regarding the views of<br />
these traveling companions. He wrote: "... all agree that the<br />
revolution is in its first phase only, that it must grow. Crane and the<br />
Russian Radicals on the ship think we shall be in Petrograd for the<br />
re-revolution."<br />
Precisely. Re-revolution was the expectation and the goal, not<br />
the elimination of anti-Semitism.<br />
With regard to Thompson's claim that he was merely trying to<br />
keep Russia in the war against Germany, here again, the logic of<br />
actual events speak against it. Kerensky and the provisional<br />
government were for the war effort. Yet, the Red Cross masqueraders<br />
eventually threw their strongest support to the Bolsheviks who<br />
were against it. Their excuse was that it was obvious the Bolsheviks<br />
would soon control the new government and they were merely<br />
looking to the future. They did not like the Bolsheviks, they said,<br />
but had to deal with them pragmatically. So they became staunch<br />
supporters merely to gain influence with the inevitable victors and,<br />
hopefully, to persuade them to change their position on the war.<br />
Alas, it didn't work out that way. Influence they had, as we<br />
have seen, but the Bolsheviks never wavered in their views. After<br />
seizing control in the October coup d'etat, they did exactly what they<br />
claimed all along they would do. They signed a peace treaty with<br />
Germany and confiscated private property. They also began one of<br />
the world's greatest bloodbaths to eliminate their opposition. None<br />
of this could be blamed on the masqueraders, you understand. It<br />
was all the fault of Wilson and the other politicians at home who,<br />
.by not following Thompson's recommendation to send U.S.<br />
dollars to the Bolsheviks, forced them into such drastic action. That,<br />
at least, is the accepted view.<br />
In reality, a Bolshevik victory at that time was anything but<br />
certain, and there was little reason—beyond the support given by<br />
the New York financiers themselves—to believe they would<br />
become the dominant voice of Russia. But, even if we grant the<br />
tax<br />
1. Eugene Lyons, Workers' Paradise Lost (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1967)<br />
pp. 13-29.<br />
1. Lincoln Steffens, The Let ters ofLincoln Steffens (New York Harcourt, Brace, 1 94 1 ),<br />
p. 396.
290 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
assumption that these men were unusually astute political<br />
observers who were truly able to foresee the future course, we are<br />
still<br />
faced with serious obstacles^ not the least of which are the<br />
thoughts and words of the masqueraders themselves. For example,<br />
in February of 1918, Arthur Bullard was in Russia as head of the<br />
Russian branch of the Committee on Public Information, which was<br />
the war-propaganda arm of the U.S. government. Bullard was aptly<br />
described by historian George Kennan as a "liberal socialist, free<br />
lance writer, and private eye of Colonel House/ In his official<br />
capacity he had many occasions to consult with Raymond Robins<br />
and, in a report describing one of these conversations, Bullard<br />
wrote:<br />
He [Robins] had one or two reservations—in particular, that<br />
recognition of the Bolsheviks was long overdue, that it should have<br />
been effected immediately, and that had the U.S. so recognized the<br />
Bolsheviks, "I believe that we would now be in control of the surplus<br />
resources of Russia and have control officers at all points on the<br />
frontier." 2<br />
WOLVES BEHIND THE MASK<br />
The following year, the U.S. Senate conducted an investigation<br />
into the role played by prominent American citizens in supporting<br />
the Bolshevik's rise to power. One of the documents entered into<br />
the record was an early communique from Robins to Bruce<br />
Lockhart. In it Robins said:<br />
You will hear it said that I am an agent of Wall Street; that I am the<br />
servant of William B. Thompson to get Altai Copper for him; that I<br />
have already got 500,000 acres of the best timber land in Russia for<br />
myself; that I have already copped off the Trans-Siberian Railway; that<br />
they have given me a monopoly of the platinum in Russia; that this<br />
explains my working for the soviet.... You will hear that talk Now, I<br />
do not think it is true, Commissioner, but let us assume it is true. Let us<br />
assume that I am here to capture Russia for Wall Street and American<br />
business men. Let us assume that you are a British wolf and I am, an<br />
American wolf, and that when this war is over we are going to eat each<br />
other up for the Russian market; let us do so in perfectly frank, man<br />
fashion, but let us assume at the same time that we are fairly intelligent<br />
THE BEST ENEMY MONEY CAN BUY 291<br />
wolves, and that we know that if we do not hunt together in this hour<br />
the German wolf will eat us both up.<br />
Professor Sutton has placed all this into perspective. In the<br />
following passage, he is spealcing specifically about William<br />
Thompson, but his remarks apply with equal force to Robins and<br />
all of the other financiers who were part of the Red Cross Mission<br />
in Russia.<br />
Thompson's motives were primarily financial and commercial.<br />
Specifically, Thompson was interested in the Russian market, and how<br />
this market could be influenced, diverted, and captured for postwar<br />
(exploitation by a Wall Street syndicate, or syndicates. Certainly<br />
Thompson viewed Germany as an enemy, but less a political enemy<br />
than an economic or a commercial enemy. German industry and<br />
German banking were the real enemy. To outwit Germany, Thompson<br />
was willing to place seed money on any political power vehicle that<br />
would achieve his objective. In other words, Thompson was an<br />
American imperialist fighting against German imperialism, and this<br />
struggle was shrewdly recognized and exploited by Lenin and<br />
Trotsky.. .<br />
Thompson was not a Bolshevik; he was not even pro-Bolshevik.<br />
Neither was he pro-Kerensky. Nor was he even pro-American. The<br />
overriding motivation was the capturing of the postwar Russian market. This<br />
was a commercial objective. Ideology could sway revolutionary<br />
operators like Kerensky, Trotsky, Lenin et al., but not financiers.<br />
Did the wolves of the Round Table actually succeed in their<br />
goal? Did they, in fact, capture the surplus resources of Russia? The<br />
answer to that question will not be found in our history books. It<br />
must be tracked down along the trail of subsequent events, and<br />
what we must look for is this. If the plan had not been successful,<br />
we would expect to find a decline of interest on the part of high<br />
finance, if not outright hostility. On the other hand, if it did succeed,<br />
we would expect to see, not only continued support, but some<br />
I evidence of profit taking by the investors, a payback for their<br />
efforts and their risk. With those footprints as our guide, let us turn<br />
«r\ow to an overview of what has actually happened since the<br />
Bolsheviks were assisted to power by the Round Table network.<br />
1 George F. Kennan, The Decision to Intervene: Soviet-American Relations, 1917-1920<br />
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1958), pp. 190, 235.<br />
2. Bullard ms., U.S. State Dept. Decimal File, 316-11-1265, March 19, 1918.<br />
1 U.S. Cong., Senate, Bolshevik Propaganda, Subcommittee of the Committee on the<br />
Judiciary, 65th Cong., 1919, p. 802.<br />
% Sutton, Revolution, pp. 97-98.
292 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
ITEM: After the October Revolution, all the banks in Russia<br />
were taken over and "nationalized" by the Bolsheviks—except one:<br />
the Petrograd branch of Rockefeller's National City Bank.<br />
ITEM: Heavy industry in Russia was also nationalized— except<br />
the Westinghouse plant, which had been established by Charles<br />
Crane, one of the dignitaries aboard the S.S. Kristianiafjord who had<br />
traveled to Russia with Trotsky to witness the re-revolution.<br />
ITEM: In 1922, the Soviets formed their first international bank.<br />
It was not owned and run by the state as would be dictated by<br />
Communist theory, but was put together by a syndicate of private<br />
bankers. These included, not only former Tsarist bankers, but<br />
representatives of German, Swedish, and American banks. Most of<br />
the foreign capital came from England, including the British<br />
government itself. The man appointed as Director of the Foreign<br />
Division of the new bank was Max May, Vice President of<br />
Morgan's Guaranty Trust Company in New York.<br />
ITEM: In the years immediately following the October Revolution,<br />
there was a steady stream of large and lucrative (read<br />
non-competitive) contracts issued by the Soviets to British and<br />
American businesses which were directly or indirectly run by the<br />
Round Table network. The largest of these, for example, was a<br />
contract for fifty million pounds of food products to Morris &<br />
Company, Chicago meat packers. Helen Swift was married to<br />
Edward Morris who was the brother of Harold Swift Harold Swift<br />
had been a "Major" at the Red Cross Mission in Russia.<br />
ITEM: In payment for these contracts and to return the "loans"<br />
of the financiers, the Bolsheviks all but drained their country of its<br />
gold—which included the Tsarist government's sizable reserve—<br />
and shipped it primarily to American and British banks. In 1920<br />
alone, one shipment came to the U.S. through Stockholm valued at<br />
39,000,000 Swedish kroner; three shipments came direct involving<br />
540 boxes of gold valued at 97,200,000 gold roubles; plus at least<br />
one other direct shipment bringing the total to about $20 million.<br />
(Remember, these are 1 920 values!) The arrival of these shipments<br />
was coordinated by Jacob Schiff's Kuhn, Loeb & Company and<br />
deposited by Morgan's Guaranty Trust.<br />
1. U.S. State Dept. Decimal File, 861.516/129, August 28, 1922.<br />
2. U.S. State Dept., Decimal File, 861 .51 /815, 836, 837, October, 1920. Also Sutton,<br />
Revolution, pp. 159-60, 165.<br />
THE BEST ENEMY MONEY CAN BUY 293<br />
ITEM: It was at about this time that the Wilson Administration<br />
sent 700,000 tons of food to the Soviet Union which, not only saved<br />
the regime from certain collapse, but gave Lenin the power to<br />
consolidate his control over all of Russia. The U.S. Food Administration,<br />
which handled this giant operation, was handsomely<br />
profitable for those commercial enterprises that participated. It was<br />
headed by Herbert Hoover and directed by Lewis Lichtenstein<br />
Strauss, married to Alice Hanauer, daughter of one of the partners<br />
of Kuhn, Loeb & Company.<br />
ITEM: U.S., British, and German wolves soon found a bonanza<br />
of profit in selling to the new Soviet regime. Standard Oil and<br />
supplied $37 million worth of machinery from<br />
General Electric<br />
1921 to 1925, and that was just the beginning. Junkers Aircraft in<br />
Germany literally created Soviet air power. At least three million<br />
slave laborers perished in the icy mines of Siberia digging ore for<br />
Britain's Lena Goldfields, Ltd. W. Averell Harriman—a railroad<br />
magnate and banker from the United States who later was to<br />
become Ambassador to Russia—acquired a twenty-year monopoly<br />
over all<br />
personal<br />
Soviet manganese production. Armand Hammer—close<br />
friend of Lenin—made one of the world's greatest fortunes<br />
by mining Russian asbestos.<br />
ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND: THE DEAF MUTE<br />
BLINDMEN<br />
In those early years, the Bolsheviks were desperate for foreign<br />
goods, services, and capital investment. They knew that they<br />
would be gouged by their "capitalist" associates, but what of it? It<br />
wasn't their money. All they cared about was staying in power.<br />
And that was not as easy as it may have seemed. Even after the coup<br />
d'etat<br />
in which they seized control of the mechanism of government,<br />
they still did not control the country at large. In fact, in 1919,<br />
Lenin had almost given up hope of expanding beyond Petrograd<br />
and a part of Moscow. Except for Odessa, all of Southern Russia<br />
and the Crimea were in the hands of General Deniken who was<br />
strongly anti-Communist. Speaking before the Tenth Congress of<br />
the Russian Communist Party, Lenin laid it out plainly:<br />
1 See George F. Kennan, Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin (Boston: Little,<br />
Brown and Company, 1961), p. 180.
294 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND THE BEST ENEMY MONEY CAN BUY 295<br />
Without the assistance of capital it<br />
will be impossible for us to<br />
retain proletarian power in an incredibly ruined country in which the<br />
peasantry, also ruined, constitutes the overwhelming majority—and,<br />
of course, for this assistance capital will squeeze hundreds per cent out<br />
of us. This is what we have to understand. Hence, either this type of<br />
economic relations or nothing.. .<br />
On another occasion Lenin further explained his rationale for<br />
accepting Wall Street's terms. He said:<br />
The Capitalists of the world and their governments, in pursuit of<br />
conquest of the Soviet market, will close their eyes to the indicated<br />
higher reality and thus will turn into deaf mute blindmen. They will<br />
extend credits, which will strengthen for us the Communist Party in<br />
their countries; and giving us the materials and technology we lack,<br />
they will restore our military industry, indispensable for our future<br />
victorious attack on our suppliers. In other words, they will labor for<br />
the preparation of their own suicide.<br />
Arthur Bullard, mentioned previously as the representative in<br />
Russia of the U.S. Committee on Public Information, apparently<br />
understood the Bolshevik strategy well. Even as early as March of<br />
1918, he sent a cablegram to Washington warning that, while it is<br />
true we ought to be ready to help any honest government in need,<br />
nevertheless, he said, "men or money sent to the present rulers of<br />
Russia will be used against Russians at least as much as against<br />
Germans.... I<br />
strongly advise against giving material help to the<br />
present Russian government. Sinister elements in Soviets seem to<br />
be gaining control/'<br />
Unfortunately, Mr. Bullard was a minor player in this game,<br />
and his opinion was filtered by others along the way. This<br />
cablegram was sent to his superior, none other than Col. Edward<br />
Mandell House, in hopes that it would be relayed to the President.<br />
The message did not get through.<br />
A SIDE TRIP THROUGH WORLD WAR II<br />
Returning to the trail of actual events since that time, let us<br />
pause briefly to take a short side trip through World War II.<br />
1. V.I. Lenin, Report to the Tenth Congress of the Russian Communist Party,<br />
March 15, 1921. Quoted by Sutton, Revolution, p. 157.<br />
2. Quoted by Joseph Finder, Red Carpet (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,<br />
1983), p. 8.<br />
3. Arthur Bullard papers, Princeton University, cited by Sutton, Revolution, p. 46.<br />
Financing and profiting from both sides in a conflict has never been<br />
more blatant.<br />
ITEM: From the beginning of Hitler's rise to power, German<br />
industry was heavily financed by American and British bankers.<br />
Most of the largest U.S. Corporations were knowingly invested in<br />
war industries. I.G. Farben was the largest of the industrial cartels<br />
and was a primary source of political funding for Hitler. It was<br />
Farben that staffed and directed Hitler's intelligence section and<br />
ran the Nazi slave labor camps as a supplemental source of<br />
manpower for Germany's factories. Farben even hired the New<br />
York public relations firm of Ivy Lee, who was John D. Rockefeller's<br />
PR specialist, to help improve Hitler's public image in<br />
America. Lee, incidentally, had also been used to help sell the<br />
Soviet regime to the American public in the late 1920s.<br />
ITEM: Much of the capital for the expansion of I.G. Farben<br />
came from Wall Street, primarily Rockefeller's National City Bank;<br />
Dillon, Read & Company, also a Rockefeller firm; Morgan's Equitable<br />
Trust Company; Harris Forbes & Company; and, yes, the<br />
predominantly Jewish firm of Kuhn, Loeb & Company.<br />
ITEM: During the Allied bombing raids over Germany, the<br />
factories and administrative buildings of I.G. Farben were spared<br />
upon instructions from the U.S. War Department. The War Department<br />
was liberally staffed with men, who in civilian life, had been<br />
associates of the investment firms previously mentioned. For<br />
example, the Secretary of War at that time was Robert P. Patterson.<br />
James Forrestal was Secretary of the Navy and later became<br />
Secretary of Defense. Both men had come from Dillon Read and, in<br />
fact, Forrestal had been president of that firm.<br />
ITEM: During World War II, under the Lend-Lease program,<br />
the United States sent to the Soviets more than $11 billion in aid,<br />
including 14,000 aircraft, nearly half a million tanks and other<br />
military vehicles, more than 400 combat ships, and even half of the<br />
entire U.S. supply of uranium which then was critically needed for<br />
the development of the atomic bomb. But fully one-third of all the<br />
Lend-Lease shipments during this period comprised industrial<br />
equipment and supplies to be used for the development of the<br />
3- Anthony Sutton, Wall Street and the Rise of Hitler (Seal Beach, California: '76<br />
Press, 1976),. 15-18, 33^3, 67-97, 99-113. Also Revolution, p. 174.<br />
2. Sutton, Hitler, pp. 23-61.
296 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND THE BEST ENEMY MONEY CAN BUY 297<br />
Russian economy after the war. And when the war did end, the<br />
Lend-Lease program continued to flow into the Soviet Union for<br />
over a year. As late as the end of 1946, Russia was still<br />
receiving<br />
twenty-year credit terms at 2 3 /g per cent interest, a far lower rate<br />
than returning GIs could obtain.<br />
THE TRANSFUSION MECHANISM<br />
With the termination of the Lend-Lease program, it was necessary<br />
to invent new mechanisms for the support of Soviet Russia<br />
and her satellites. One of these was the sale of much-needed<br />
commodities at prices below the world market and, in fact, below<br />
the prices that Americans themselves had to pay for the same<br />
items. This meant, of course—as it did in the case of Lend<br />
Lease—that the American taxpayer had to make up the difference.<br />
The Soviets were not even required to have the money to buy these<br />
goods. American financial institutions, the federal government, and<br />
international agencies which are largely funded by the federal<br />
government, such as the International Monetary Fund and the<br />
World Bank lent the money to them. Furthermore, the interest<br />
rates on these loans also are below the market requiring still<br />
additional subsidy by American citizens. And that is not all. Almost<br />
all of these loans have been guaranteed by the United States<br />
government, which means that if—no, make that when—these<br />
countries default in their payments, the gullible American public is<br />
once again called upon to make them good. In other words, the<br />
new mechanism, innocently and deceptively referred to as "trade,"<br />
is<br />
little more than a thinly disguised means by which members of<br />
the Round Table who direct our national policies have bled billions<br />
of dollars from American citizens for an ongoing economic transfusion<br />
into the Soviet bloc—and continue to do so now that the word<br />
Soviet has been changed to the less offensive Democratic Socialism.<br />
This enables those regimes to enter into contracts with American<br />
businessmen to provide essential services. And the circle is complete:<br />
From tlte American taxpayer to the American government to the<br />
"socialist" regime to the American businessman and, ultimately, to tlte<br />
American financier who funded the project and provided the political<br />
influence to make it all possible.<br />
1. Anthony C. Sutton, National Suicide: Military Aid to the Soviet Union (New<br />
Rochelle. New York: Arlington House, 1973), p: 24.<br />
kcan<br />
This is the key to understanding the transfusion mechanism.<br />
Many Americans have looked at this process and have jumped to<br />
the conclusion that there must be a nest of Communist agents<br />
within our government. In an exam on reality politics, they would<br />
receive half credit for that answer. Yes, there undoubtedly have<br />
been, and continue to be, Red agents and sympathizers burrowed<br />
deep into our government woodwork, and they are all too happy to<br />
help the process along. But the main motive force has always come<br />
from the non-Communist, non-Democratic Socialist, non-<br />
American, non-anything members of the Round Table network<br />
who, as Lenin said, in the pursuit of profit are laboring for the<br />
preparation of their own suicide.<br />
These men are incapable of genuine patriotism. They think of<br />
themselves, not as citizens of any particular country, but as citizens<br />
of the world. They can do business just as easily with bloodthirsty<br />
dictatorships as with any other government—especially since they<br />
are assured by the transfer mechanism that the American taxpayer<br />
is going to make good on the deal.<br />
When David Rockefeller was asked about the propriety of<br />
providing funding for Marxist and Communist countries which are<br />
openly hostile to the United States, he responded: "I don't think an<br />
international bank such as ours ought to try to set itself as a judge<br />
about what kind of government a country wishes to have."<br />
Wishes to have? He was talking about Angola where the<br />
Marxist dictatorship was forced upon the people with Cuban<br />
soldiers and Soviet weapons!<br />
Thomas Theobald, Vice President of Citicorp, was asked in 1981<br />
about his bank's loans to Poland. Was he embarrassed by making<br />
loans to a Communist country, especially following the regime's<br />
brutal repression of free-trade unions? Not at all. "Who knows<br />
which political system works?" he replied. "The only test we care<br />
about is,<br />
can they pay their bills." What he meant, of course, was<br />
the American taxpayer pay Poland's bills.<br />
ITEM: The following item, taken directly from the Los Angeles<br />
Times just a few months after Theobald's statement, tells the story:<br />
WASHINGTON—For months, the Reagan Administration has<br />
been using federal funds to repay Polish loans owed to U.S. banks, and<br />
the bill for this fiscal year may amount to $400 million, Deputy<br />
Secretary of Agriculture Richard E. Lyng said Monday.... "They (the<br />
Polish authorities) have not been making payments for at least the last
298 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
half of the last year/' Lyng said. "When they don't make a payment,<br />
the U.S. Department of Agriculture makes a payment."...<br />
Lyng said the U.S. Government paid $60 million to $70 million a<br />
month on guaranteed Polish loans in October, November, December,<br />
and January—and "we will continue to pay them."<br />
This, remember, was precisely at the time the Polish government<br />
had declared martial law and was using military force to<br />
crush workers' demonstrations for political reform. The Polish<br />
default on this $1.6 billion loan was by no means an isolated event.<br />
Communist Rumania and a multitude of Latin American countries<br />
were soon to follow.<br />
The hard fact is that American taxpayers unknowingly have<br />
been making monthly bank payments on behalf of Communist,<br />
socialist, and so-called Third-World countries for many years. And,<br />
with the more recent staging of apparent reform within the former<br />
Soviet bloc, Congress has tripped all over itself to greatly accelerate<br />
that trend.<br />
Americans, of course, want to believe that the Evil Empire is<br />
crumbling, and the Soviets-turned-Democrats play directly to that<br />
desire. Since the end of World War II, their primary objectives have<br />
been (1) to disarm us and (2) to get our money. The facade of<br />
Perestroika and Glasnost has been merely a ploy to accomplish both<br />
objectives at once. All they have had to do is get rid of a few of the<br />
old hard-liners, replace them with less well-known personalities<br />
who are essentially the same (all of the new leaders come from the<br />
ranks of the old leadership), change their labels from "Communists"<br />
to "Social Democrats," and then sit back while we happily<br />
tear down our military defenses and rush billions of dollars to their<br />
failing economies. There undoubtedly will be some progress<br />
allowed in<br />
the area of free speech, but the military and security<br />
organizations continue in full<br />
readiness. The iron fist beneath the<br />
velvet glove remains ready to strike when the time comes that the<br />
facade is no longer necessary.<br />
Even if the entire ploy were genuine, there is no reason to<br />
believe that these Social Democracies will ever become better<br />
investment risks. The primary thing that has held them back<br />
economically in the past is their socialist system, and that most<br />
1. "U.S. Repaying Loans Owed by Poland to American Banks/' by William J.<br />
Eaton, Los Angeles Times, February 2, 1982.<br />
.<br />
If<br />
THE BEST ENEMY MONEY CAN BUY 299<br />
definitely will not be changed. All of the new "anti-Communist<br />
Social Democrats" have pledged their loyalty to the principles of<br />
Marx and have said in plain language that they will use our money<br />
to develop, not abandon socialism. These countries will continue to<br />
be unproductive and will continue to be unable to pay their loans.<br />
The American taxpayers will continue to be forced by the Cabal to<br />
pay the bill.<br />
ITEM: Before the Bolshevik coup d'etat, Russia was one of the<br />
most productive agricultural nations in the world. The great wheat<br />
fields in Ukraine justly earned her the title of the Bread Basket of<br />
Europe. But when the people's Utopia arrived, agriculture came to<br />
a standstill, and famine stalked the land. Even after Stalin, when the<br />
regime is said to have adopted more humane and productive<br />
policies, Russia never produced enough food for itself. A nation that<br />
cannot feed its citizens cannot develop its industry and it certainly<br />
cannot build a potent military force. It is not surprising, therefore,<br />
that for decades, the United States has annually "sold" tens of<br />
millions of tons of wheat—and other food stuffs—to Russia. The<br />
quote marks are to emphasize the underlying transfusion mechanism<br />
previously described.<br />
ITEM: The American government-industrial complex provided<br />
the Soviets with the money, technology, and the actual construction<br />
of two of the world's largest and most modern truck plants. The<br />
Kama River plant and the Zil plant produce over 150,000 heavyduty<br />
trucks per year—including armored personnel carriers and<br />
missile launchers — plus 250,000 diesel engines, many of which are<br />
used to power Soviet tanks. Forty-five per cent of the cost of this<br />
project came from the U.S. Export-Import Bank, an agency of the<br />
federal government, and an equal amount from David<br />
Rockefeller's Chase Manhattan Bank. The Soviets put up only ten<br />
per cent. The loan, of course, was taxpayer-guaranteed by the U.S.<br />
Export-Import Bank which, at the time, was under the direction of<br />
William Casey. Casey later was appointed as head of the CIA. to<br />
protect America from global Communism. (Are you beginning to<br />
get the picture?)<br />
ITEM: Almost every important facet of Eastern-Bloc heavy<br />
industry could well be stamped "Made in the USA." With the<br />
1- "U.S. Builds Soviet War Machine/' Industrial Research & Development, July, 1980,<br />
Pp. 51-54.
300 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND THE BEST ENEMY MONEY CAN BUY 301<br />
specific approval of each successive president, we have provided<br />
the latest oil-drilling equipment, chemical processing plants, airtraffic<br />
radar systems, equipment to produce precision bearings,<br />
large-craft helicopter engines, laser technology, highly advanced<br />
computer systems, and nuclear power plants. We have trained<br />
hundreds of their technicians in American institutions and factories<br />
and have provided their astronauts with the space suits developed<br />
by NASA. We have even trained their pilots at U.S. Air Force bases<br />
and paid for their military officers to attend our War College. All of<br />
this has been used by the Russian government—as Lenin predicted<br />
it would—to build their military industry in preparation for an<br />
attack on their suppliers. The great pretense of crumbling Communism,<br />
has not altered that strategy. It may even be the implementation<br />
of it.<br />
ITEM: When Boris Yeltsin seized control of the former Soviet<br />
government, one of his first official acts was to decree that foreign<br />
businesses had the right to take their profits out of the country.<br />
From a purely business perspective, that was a sound move<br />
because it would provide incentive for foreign investment. But<br />
there was more to it than that Recall from a previous chapter that<br />
the lion's share of that investment was to be funded by American<br />
taxpayers in the form of direct aid, bank-loan bailouts, and<br />
government insurance through the Overseas Private Investment<br />
Corporation. Jane Ingraham provides the details:<br />
During 1992 Yeltsin wheeled and dealed with Royal Dutch/Shell,<br />
British Petroleum, Amoco, Texaco, and Exxon. The Chevron joint<br />
venture to develop the Tengiz oil field was signed. McDermott<br />
International, Marathon Oil, and Mitsui signed a contract with the<br />
Russian government to develop oil and natural gas off Sakhalin Island.<br />
Chevron and Oman formed a consortium to build a huge pipeline to<br />
carry crude oil from Kazakhstan to the Black Sea, Mediterranean, and<br />
Persian Gulf. Occidental Petroleum signed a joint venture with Russia<br />
to modernize two oil fields in Siberia.... Newmont mining signed a<br />
joint venture to extract gold in Uzbekistan. Merrill Lynch's chairman,<br />
William Schreyer (CFR), signed up as financial adviser to "aid in<br />
privatizing" the Ukrainian State Property Fund. AT&T CEO Robert<br />
Allen (CFR, TC ) signed a huge contract to supply switching systems<br />
for all of Kazakhstan..<br />
.<br />
1 .<br />
Trila tera 1 Commission.<br />
US West joined with the Hungarian government to own and<br />
operate a national cellular telephone system; GM Vice President<br />
Marina Whitman (CFR, TC) joined the governments of Hungary and<br />
Yugoslavia to make cars; GE CEO John Welch (CFR) and vice<br />
chairman of the board, Lawrence Bossidy (TC), bought a majority<br />
stake in Hungary's lighting industry; Ralston-Purina, Dow Chemical,<br />
Eastman Kodak, SC Johnson & Son, Xerox, American Express, Procter<br />
& Gamble, Woolworth, Philip Morris, Ford, Compaq<br />
Computer—hardly a single American brand name was missing.<br />
ITEM: In February of 1996, the Clinton Administration made a<br />
$1 billion loan of US taxpayers' money to Russia's state-controlled<br />
Aeroflot company so it could more effectively compete with<br />
American companies such as Boeing in the building of jumbo jets.<br />
By the end of that year, the former Soviet Bloc countries had<br />
received transfusions from the World Bank of over $3 billion.<br />
ITEM: Now the action has spread to China. American banks<br />
and businessmen—with taxpayers standing by with guarantees<br />
have provided power-generating equipment, modern steel mills,<br />
and military hardware including artillery shells, anti-submarine<br />
torpedoes, and high-tech electronic gear to update Russian-made<br />
jet fighters. All of this is explained as a means of weaning the Red<br />
Chinese away from mother Russia and encouraging them to move<br />
closer to free-enterprise capitalism. Yet, in 1985, at the height of the<br />
frenzy over building trade bridges to China, the regime signed a<br />
$14 billion trade pact with Russia and, in 1986, sent a $20 million<br />
interest-free loan to the Communist Sandinistas in Nicaragua. Even<br />
after the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre in Beijing, when U.S.<br />
officials were publicly condemning China for human-rights violations,<br />
business quietly continued as usual. "The United States<br />
cannot condone the violent attacks and cannot ignore the consequence<br />
for our relationship with China," said President Bush. Yet,<br />
within only a few weeks of the bloodshed, and at the very time that<br />
student leaders were being executed, the Administration approved<br />
a $200 million, low-interest loan for delivery of four of Boeing's<br />
newest jumbo-jet aircraft. In 1993, forty-seven more jetliners were<br />
sold with a projected sale of 800 more over the next fifteen years.<br />
Amoco is spending $1.5 billion to develop oil fields in the China<br />
Sea. A joint venture between the Chinese government and Chrysler<br />
ft "The Payoff/' by Jane H. Ingraham, The New American, June 28, 1993, pp. 25-6.
302 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND THE BEST ENEMY MONEY CAN BUY 303<br />
is building military jeeps. A similar joint project is being used to<br />
upgrade their F-8 fighter planes. Three communications satellites<br />
were cleared for delivery. AT&T contracted a $30 million cellular<br />
communications network. Even the President's brother, Prescott<br />
Bush, resumed his plan to set up a satellite-linked computer<br />
network and to build a golf course near Shanghai.<br />
China's interest in military technology is revealing. In addition<br />
to the advanced hardware purchased from the United States, the<br />
Chinese have bought MIG-31 and SU-27 jet fighters from Russia<br />
and an aircraft carrier constructed in Ukraine. In May of 1992,<br />
China set off its biggest underground nuclear blast In 1997, the<br />
purchase list was extended to include self-propelled gun-mortar<br />
systems and Russia's most advanced diesel-electric submarines.<br />
Although it is known that China maintains a slave-labor work<br />
force in excess of a million people—they call them "convicts"—and<br />
although the Tariff Act of 1930 prohibits the United States from<br />
importing any goods made even in part by convicts or other forced<br />
labor, every administration starting with Nixon has renewed the<br />
"most-favored-nation" trade status for China.<br />
How is China expected to pay for all this "trade"? Very simple.<br />
By 1996, China had become the largest single recipient of guaranteed<br />
loans and subsidies from the World Bank.<br />
ITEM: In addition to these decades of global trade, credit, and<br />
taxpayer guarantees, the United States government has transferred<br />
tens of billions of dollars in direct foreign-aid grants with no pretense<br />
at all regarding expectation of repayment.<br />
The trail leads to Wall Street, and the tracks are fresh. The<br />
Round Table network did succeed in exploiting the markets of<br />
Eastern Europe and continues to do so today. The cast of characters<br />
has changed, but the play remains the same. In the beginning, the<br />
Council on Foreign Relations was dominated by J.P. Morgan. It is<br />
still controlled by international financiers. The Morgan group<br />
gradually has been replaced by the Rockefeller consortium, and the<br />
roll call of participating businesses now reads like the Fortune 500.<br />
The operation no longer pretends to be a Red Cross mission; it now<br />
masquerades under the cover of "East-West Trade."<br />
Politicians are fond of talking about the necessity of preserving<br />
world peace, and trade, we are told, is one of the best ways to do it.<br />
The implication is that this is a time of peace. In truth, we live in<br />
one of the most war-torn eras the world has ever seen. No continent<br />
today, except Antarctica, is free from war. There are from 25 to 40<br />
military struggles going on somewhere every day of the year.<br />
There have been more than 150 armed conflicts since the end of<br />
World War II with the death count already in excess of 20 million<br />
We cannot help noticing that this also has been a period<br />
and rising.<br />
of rising government debt and the global creation of fiat money.<br />
THE NEW ALCHEMY<br />
The alchemists of ancient times vainly sought the philosophers'<br />
stone which they believed would turn lead into gold. Is it possible<br />
that such a stone actually has been found? Can it be that the money<br />
alchemists of our own time have learned how to transmute war<br />
into debt, and debt into war, and both into gold for themselves?<br />
In a previous section, we theorized a strategy, dubbed the<br />
Rothschild Formula, in which the world's money cabal deliberately<br />
encourages war as a means of stimulating the profitable production<br />
of armaments and of keeping nations perpetually in debt. This is<br />
not profit seeking, it is genocide. It is not a trivial matter, therefore,<br />
to inquire into the possibility that our elected and non-elected<br />
leaders are, in fact, implementing the Rothschild Formula today.<br />
ITEM: In his address to the graduating class at Annapolis in<br />
1983, Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman, said: "Within weeks,<br />
many of you will be looking across just hundreds of feet of water at<br />
some of the most modern technology ever invented in America.<br />
Unfortunately, it is on Soviet ships/'<br />
As Professor Sutton observed in his book, The Best Enemy Money<br />
Can Buy, the guns, the ammunition, the weapons, and the transportation<br />
systems that killed Americans in Korea and Vietnam came<br />
from the American-subsidized economy of the Soviet Union. The<br />
trucks that carried these weapons down the Ho Chi Minh Trail<br />
were manufactured in American-built plants. The ships that carried<br />
the supplies to Sihanoukville and Haiphong and later to Angola<br />
and Nicaragua came from NATO allies and used propulsion<br />
systems that our State Department could have kept out of Soviet<br />
hands. Sutton concludes: "The technical capability to wage the<br />
1- These figures are taken from United Nations publication E/CN5/1985/Rev.l,<br />
1985 Report on the World Social Situation (New York: United Nations, 1985), p. 14. The<br />
January 1993 revision of that document does not give cumulative figures but shows<br />
that the number of conflicts has been accelerating. So the current numbers, whatever<br />
they may be, are even worse.
304 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND THE BEST ENEMY MONEY CAN BUY 305<br />
Korean and Vietnamese wars originated on both sides in Western,<br />
mainly American, technology, and the political illusion of "peaceful<br />
trade" promoted by the deaf mute blindmen was the carrier for<br />
this war-making technology."<br />
ITEM: That leads us to the more recent wars in the Middle East<br />
and the rise of "Islamic Fundamentalism." Iran, Iraq, Syria, Algeria,<br />
the PLO, the Muslim Brotherhood, and similar anti-American<br />
groupings have all<br />
received weapons, funding, and clandestine<br />
support from the U.S. government. In the Gulf War, every effort<br />
was made to insure that Hussein's regime was contained but not<br />
destroyed (shades of the Korean and Vietnam wars). Most of his<br />
bacterial-weapons factories were spared. After the cease fire,<br />
was allowed to keep his fleet of helicopter gunships, which he<br />
promptly used to put down a large-scale internal revolt.<br />
The big pill to swallow is that Saddam Hussein has been an<br />
asset to the global planners in the West, and they have done<br />
everything possible to keep him in power. This strategy has lately<br />
become so obvious that there is no longer any serious attempt to<br />
conceal it.<br />
The task now is how to explain it to the gullible public so<br />
as to make it sound like a good idea.<br />
As mentioned previously, the think-tank and talent pool for the<br />
implementation of this strategy has been the Council on Foreign<br />
Relations. In 1996, the Managing Editor of the CFR's monthly<br />
journal, Foreign Affairs, was Fareed Zakaria, who offered the<br />
following rationalization:<br />
Yes, it's tempting to get rid of Saddam. But his bad behavior<br />
actually serves America's purposes in the region.... If Saddam<br />
Hussein did not exist, we would have to invent him.... The end of<br />
Saddam Hussein would be the end of the anti-Saddam coalition.<br />
Nothing destroys an alliance like the disappearance of the enemy....<br />
Maintaining a long-term American presence in the gulf would be<br />
difficult in the absence of a regional threat.<br />
That is about as clear a statement of the Rothschild Formula as<br />
one is apt to find. Yet, many people cannot believe it is real, even<br />
Congressmen. For example, Representative James Traficant from<br />
Ohio, speaking before the House on April 29, 1997, exclaimed:<br />
1. Anthony Sutton, The Best Enemy Money Can Buy (Billings, Montana: Liberty<br />
House Press, 1986), p. 191.<br />
2. "Thank Goodness for a Villain," Newsweek, Sept. 16, 1996, p. 43.<br />
he<br />
America gives billions to Russia. With American cash, Russia<br />
builds missiles. Russia then sells those missiles to China. And China,<br />
who gets about $45 billion in trade giveaways from Uncle Sam, then<br />
sells those Russian-made missiles to Iran.<br />
Now Iran, with those Russian-made missiles sold to them by<br />
China, threatens the Mideast. So Uncle Sam, who is concerned about<br />
about Iran threatening the Mideast because of those Russian-made<br />
missiles sold to them by China that we financed by American cash<br />
sends more troops and sends more dollars.... Mr. Speaker, this is not<br />
foreign policy. This is foreign stupidity.<br />
Traficant is<br />
on target with his analysis of the problem, but he<br />
missed the bull's eye regarding the cause. American leaders are not<br />
stupid. They merely are implementing the Rothschild Formula. To<br />
justify world government, it is necessary to have wars and the<br />
threat of wars. Wars require enemies with frightful weapons.<br />
Saddam Hussein is one of the best enemies money can buy.<br />
If it is true that Western leaders are deliberately funding their<br />
own enemies, we must assume they have considered Lenin's<br />
prediction that, by so doing, they are preparing their own suicide<br />
ours, also, by the way. We must also conclude that they are<br />
confident of avoiding that destiny. Whether they are right or wrong<br />
is not the issue here. The point is they believe they are correct and,<br />
further, they are building a world order which they are confident of<br />
being able to control. How they plan to bring that to pass is<br />
subject of a later section, but perpetual war is an important part of<br />
it Unless we are able to break the grip of these strategists,<br />
Rothschild Formula will continue to play a major role in our future.<br />
FIFTH REASON TO ABOLISH THE SYSTEM<br />
There are few historians who would challenge the fact that the<br />
funding of World War I, World War II, the Korean War, and the<br />
Vietnam War was accomplished by the Mandrake Mechanism<br />
through the Federal Reserve System. An overview of all wars since<br />
the establishment of the Bank of England in 1694 suggests that most<br />
of them would have been greatly reduced in severity, or perhaps<br />
not even fought at all, without fiat money. It is the ability of<br />
governments to acquire money without direct taxation that makes<br />
Modern warfare possible, and a central bank has become the<br />
preferred method of accomplishing that.<br />
Congressional Record, April 29, 1997.<br />
the<br />
the
306 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
One can argue the necessity, or at least the inevitability, of fiat<br />
money in time of war as a means of raw survival. That is the primal<br />
instinct of both individuals and governments, all other considerations<br />
aside. We shall leave that for the philosophers. But there can<br />
be no debate over the fact that fiat money in time of peace has no<br />
such justification. Furthermore, the ability of governments and<br />
banking institutions to use fiat money to fund the wars of other<br />
nations is a powerful temptation for them to become embroiled in<br />
those wars for personal profit, political advancement, or other<br />
reasons which fall far short of a moral justification for bloodshed.<br />
The Federal Reserve System has always served that function.<br />
The on-going strategy of building up the military capabilities of<br />
America's potential enemies leaves us no reason to believe we have<br />
seen the last of war. Therefore, it is not an exaggeration to say that<br />
the Federal Reserve System encourages war. There can be no better<br />
reason for the Creature to be put to sleep.<br />
SUMMARY<br />
The Bolshevik Revolution was a coup d'etat in which a radical<br />
minority captured the Russian government from the moderate<br />
revolutionary majority. They accomplished this through deception,<br />
organization, discipline, and surprise. The Red Cross Mission of<br />
New York financiers threw support to the Bolsheviks and, in<br />
return, received economic rewards in the form of rights to Russia's<br />
natural resources plus contracts for construction and supplies. The<br />
continued participation in the economic development of Russia<br />
and Eastern Europe since that time indicates that this relationship<br />
has survived to the present day. These financiers are not pro-<br />
Communist nor pro-anything else. Their motivation is<br />
profit and<br />
power. They are now working to bring both Russia and the United<br />
States into a world government which they expect to control. War<br />
and threats of war are tools to prod the masses toward the<br />
acceptance of that goal. It is essential, therefore, that the United<br />
States and the industrialized nations of the world have credible<br />
enemies. As these words are being written, Russia is wearing the<br />
mask of peace and cooperation. But we have seen that before. We<br />
may yet see a return of the Evil Empire when the timing is right.<br />
U.S. government and megabank funding, first of Russian, and now<br />
of Chinese and Middle-East military capabilities, cannot be understood<br />
without this insight.<br />
Section IV<br />
A TALE OF THREE<br />
BANKS<br />
It has been said that those who are ignorant of<br />
history are doomed to repeat its mistakes. It may<br />
come as a surprise to learn that the Federal<br />
Reserve System is America's fourth central bank,<br />
not its first. We have been through all this before<br />
and, each time, the result has been the same.<br />
Interested in what happened? Then let's set the<br />
coordinates of our time machine to the colony of<br />
Massachusetts and the year 1690. To activate, turn<br />
the page.
Chapter Fifteen<br />
THE LOST<br />
TREASURE MAP<br />
The bitter<br />
experience of the American colonies<br />
with fiat money; the resolve of the founding<br />
fathers to prohibit the new nation from resorting<br />
to paper money without backing; the drafting of<br />
the Constitution to that end; the creation ofa true<br />
American dollar; the prosperity that followed.<br />
In the golden days of radio, on the Edgar Bergen Show, the<br />
ventriloquist would ask his dummy, Mortimer Snerd, "How can<br />
you be so stupid?" And the answer was always the same. After a<br />
moment of deep thought on the part of Mortimer, he would drawl<br />
his reply, "Well, it ain't easy!"<br />
When we look at the monetary chaos around us today—the<br />
evaporating value of the dollar and the collapsing financial institutions—we<br />
are compelled to ask: How did we get into this fix? And,<br />
unfortunately, Mortimer's response would be quite appropriate.<br />
To find out how we got to where we are, it will be necessary to<br />
know where we started, and a good place to begin that inquiry is<br />
with the Constitution of the United States. Article I, Sections 8 and<br />
10 say:<br />
Congress shall have the power —<br />
To borrow money ... to coin money, regulate the value thereof,<br />
and of foreign coin, and fix the standard of weights and measures;...<br />
[and] to provide for the punishrnent of counterfeiting....<br />
No state shall ... coin money; emit bills of credit; [or] make<br />
anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts.<br />
The delegates were precise in their use of these words.<br />
Congress was given the power to "coin money," not to print it.<br />
Thomas M. Cooley's Principles of Constitutional Law explains that<br />
'to coin money is to stamp pieces of metal for use as a medium of<br />
exchange in commerce according to fixed standards of value."
310 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
What was prohibited was to "emit bills of credit" which, according<br />
to the speeches and writings of those who drafted the document,<br />
meant the printing of paper IOUs which were intended to be<br />
circulated as money—in other words, the printing of fiat money<br />
not backed by gold or silver.<br />
At first, it would seem that nothing could be more clear. Yet,<br />
these two simple clauses have become the basis for literally<br />
thousands of pages of conflicting interpretation. The crux of the<br />
problem is that, while the Constitution clearly prohibits the states<br />
from issuing fiat money, it does not specifically prevent the federal<br />
government from doing so. That was truly an unfortunate oversight<br />
on the part of the document's framers, but they probably<br />
never dreamed in their wildest nightmares that their descendants<br />
"could be so stupid" as to not understand their intent.<br />
Furthermore, "it ain't easy 7 '<br />
to miss their intent. All one has to<br />
do is look at the monetary history that led up to the Constitutional<br />
Convention and to read the published letters and debates of the<br />
men who affixed their signatures to that founding document.<br />
As one reads through the debates on the floor of the convention,<br />
one is struck by the passion that these delegates held on the<br />
subject of money. Every one of them could remember from his<br />
personal experience the utter chaos in the colonies caused by the<br />
issuance of fiat money. They spoke out against it in no uncertain<br />
terms, and they were adamant that it<br />
again in America—at either the state or federal level.<br />
should never be tolerated<br />
PAPER MONEY IN THE COLONIES<br />
The first colonial experience with fiat money was in the period<br />
from 1690 to 1764. Massachusetts was the first to use it as a means<br />
of financing its military raids against the French colony in Quebec.<br />
The other colonies were quick to follow suit and, within a few<br />
years, were engaging in a virtual orgy of printing "bills of credit."<br />
There was no central bank involved. The process was simple and<br />
direct, as was the reasoning behind it. As one colonial legislator<br />
explained it:<br />
Do you think, gentlemen, that I will consent to load my<br />
constituents with taxes when we can send to our printer and get a<br />
wagon load of money, one quire of which will pay for the whole?<br />
1. See William ML Gouge, A Short History of Paper Money and Banking in the United<br />
States (Philadelphia: T.W. Ustick, 1833), Part II, p. 27.<br />
THE LOST TREASURE MAP 311<br />
The consequences of this enlightened statesmanship were classic.<br />
Prices skyrocketed, legal tender laws were enacted to force the<br />
colonists to accept the worthless paper, and the common man<br />
endured great personal losses and hardship. By the late 1750s,<br />
Connecticut had price inflated by 800%, the Carolinas had inflated<br />
900%, Massachusetts 1000%, Rhode Island 2300%. 1<br />
The situation was so out of hand that, beginning in 1751, the<br />
British Parliament stepped in and, in one of those rare instances<br />
where interference from the mother country actually benefited the<br />
colonies, it forced them to cease the production of fiat money.<br />
Henceforth, the Bank of England would be the only source.<br />
What followed was unforeseen by the promoters of fiat money.<br />
Amid great gloom about "insufficient money/ 7<br />
a miracle boom of<br />
prosperity occurred. The forced use of fiat money had compelled<br />
everyone to hoard their real money and use the worthless paper<br />
instead. Now that the paper was in disgrace, the colonists began to<br />
use their English and French and Dutch gold coins once again,<br />
prices rapidly adjusted to reality, and commerce returned to a solid<br />
footing. It remained so even during the economic strain of the<br />
Seven-Years War (1756-1763) and during the period immediately<br />
prior to the Revolution. Here was a perfect example of how an<br />
economic system in distress can recover if government does not<br />
interfere with the healing process.<br />
WARTIME INFLATION<br />
But all of this came to a halt with the onset of colonial rebellion.<br />
Not only did open hostilities throw England deeper into the cogs<br />
and wheels of the central-bank mechanism, it also was the compelling<br />
motive for the colonies to return to their printing presses. The<br />
following figures speak eloquently for themselves:<br />
m<br />
• At the beginning of the war in 1775, the total money supply for<br />
the federated colonies stood at $12 million.<br />
In June of that year, the Continental Congress issued another<br />
$2 million. Before the notes were printed, another $1 million<br />
was authorized.<br />
By the end of the year, another $3 million.<br />
1- Paul and Lehrman, p. 23.<br />
2 -<br />
Roger W. Weiss, "The Colonial Monetary Standard of Massachusetts/<br />
History Review 27 (November 1974), p. 589.<br />
Economic
312 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND THE LOST TREASURE MAP 313<br />
• $19 million in 1776.<br />
• $13 million in 1777.<br />
• $64 million in 1778.<br />
• $125 million in 1779.<br />
• A total of $227 million in five years on top of a base of<br />
$12 million is an increase of about 2000%.<br />
• On top of this "federal" money, the states were doing the same<br />
in an approximately equal amount.<br />
• And still more: the Continental Army, unable to get enough<br />
money from Congress, issued "certificates" for the purchase of<br />
supplies totalling $200 million.<br />
• $650 million created in five years on top of a base of $12 million<br />
is an expansion of the money supply of over SOOO^o. 1<br />
Although the economy was devastated by this flood of fiat<br />
money, most victims were totally unaware of the cause. In 1777, the<br />
sentiment of a large segment of the population was expressed by<br />
the words of one patriotic old lady who said: "What a shame it is<br />
that Congress should let the poor soldiers suffer when they have<br />
power to make just as much money as they choose." 2<br />
The immediate result of this money infusion was the appearance<br />
of prosperity. After all, everyone had more money and that was<br />
perceived as a very good thing. But this was quickly followed by<br />
inflation as the self-destruct mechanism began to roll. In 1775, the<br />
colonial monetary unit, called the Continental, was valued at<br />
one-dollar in gold. In 1778, it was exchanged for twenty-five cents.<br />
By 1779, just four years from its issue, it was worth less than a<br />
penny and ceased to circulate as money at all. It was in that year<br />
that George Washington wrote: "A wagon-load of money will<br />
scarcely purchase a wagon-load of provisions." 3<br />
The saying "Not worth a Continental" has its<br />
gloomy period.<br />
origin in this<br />
The true nature of the inflation effect has never been more<br />
accurately perceived or more vividly described than it was by<br />
Thomas Jefferson:<br />
It<br />
will be asked how will the two masses of Continental and of<br />
State money have cost the people of the United States seventy-two<br />
millions of dollars, when they are to be redeemed now with about six<br />
million? I answer that the difference, being sixty-six millions, has been<br />
lost on the paper bills separately by the successive holders of them.<br />
Every one, through whose hands a bill passed, lost on that bill what it<br />
lost in value during the time it was in his hands. This was a real tax on<br />
him; and in this way the people of the United States actually<br />
contributed those sixty-six millions of dollars during the war, and by a<br />
mode of taxation the most oppressive of all because the most unequal<br />
of all. 1<br />
PRICE CONTROLS AND LEGAL-TENDER LAWS<br />
It was natural that people struggled to find ways to escape the<br />
destruction of their savings, and the two most obvious methods<br />
were (1) to regularly adjust prices upward as the value of the<br />
money went downward or (2) exchange their goods and services<br />
only for gold coins. In response, the colonial legislatures and the<br />
Continental Congress did what governments always do to prevent<br />
it They resorted to wage and price controls and to legal-tender<br />
laws with harsh penalties for non-compliance. Under one such law,<br />
those who refused to accept worthless money were even described<br />
as traitors. It declared:<br />
If any person shall hereafter be so lost to all virtue and regard for<br />
his Country as to refuse to accept its notes, such person shall be<br />
deemed an enemy of his Country.<br />
Rhode Island not only leveled a substantial fine for nonacceptance<br />
of its notes but, upon a second offense, an individual<br />
lost his citizenship. When this was declared unlawful by a panel of<br />
judges, the legislature reacted by dismissing the judges from<br />
office. 3<br />
1. For an overview of expenditures, see Paul and Lehrman, pp. 26-27.<br />
2. Gouge, p. 28. The naivite of this lady may be humorous, but are Americans any<br />
more enlightened today? Would she not feel at home among our modern-day<br />
electorate who clamor for legislation to pump Federal-Reserve fiat money into<br />
projects to alleviate hardship among the poor and unemployed?<br />
3. QuotedbyBolles,Vol.i,p.l32.<br />
P Thomas Jefferson, Observations on the Article Etats-Unis Prepared for the<br />
Encyclopedia, June 22, 1786, Writings, Vol. IV, p. 165.<br />
2- F- Tupper Saussy, The Miracle on Mainstreet (Sewanee, Tennessee Spencer Judd,<br />
9fi 0), p. 12. Also see Anthony Sutton, The War on Gold (Seal Beach, Calif.: 76 Press,<br />
1 W), pp. 47, 48.<br />
3 -<br />
Jensen, p. 324.
314 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND THE LOST TREASURE MAP 315<br />
Then, as now, those who suffered the most from fiat money<br />
were those who held the most trust in government. In 1777 these<br />
were mostly the Whigs, for it was they who patriotically held paper<br />
money and, as a result, lost their livelihoods and their life savings.<br />
The Tories, on the other hand, mistrusting both government and its<br />
paper money, passed the bills as quickly as possible in trade for<br />
real assets, especially gold. Consequently, as a group, they weathered<br />
the storm fairly well. But they often were derided by their less<br />
prudent neighbors as "Torie speculators," "hoarders," and even<br />
"traitors."<br />
All of this was painfully fresh in the memories of the delegates<br />
to the Constitutional Convention and, as the opening session<br />
convened in Philadelphia in 1787, there were angry mobs in the<br />
streets threatening the legislators. Looting was rampant. Businesses<br />
were bankrupt, Drunkenness and lawlessness were everywhere to<br />
be seen. The fruit of fiat money had ripened, and the delegates did<br />
not enjoy its taste.<br />
In October of 1785, George Washington wrote: "The wheels of<br />
government are clogged, and . . . we are descending into the vale of<br />
confusion and darkness." A year later, in a letter to James<br />
Madison, he said: "No day was ever more clouded than the<br />
present. We are fast verging to anarchy."<br />
In February of 1787, Washington wrote to Henry Knox: "If any<br />
person had told me that there would have been such formidable<br />
rebellion as exists, I would have thought him fit for a madhouse."<br />
Just three months prior to the opening of the convention,<br />
Washington voiced his reasons for rejecting the notion of fiat<br />
money. In answer to the complaint that there was not enough gold<br />
coin (specie) to satisfy the needs of commerce, he replied:<br />
The necessity arising from a want of specie is represented as<br />
greater than it really is. I contend that it is by the substance, not the<br />
shadow of a thing, we are to be benefited. The wisdom of man, in my<br />
humble opinion, cannot at this time devise a plan by which the credit<br />
of paper money would be long supported; consequently, depreciation<br />
keeps pace with the quantity of the emission, and articles for which it<br />
is exchanged rise in a greater ratio than the sinking value of the<br />
money. Wherein, then, is the farmer, the planter, the artisan benefited?<br />
1. Quoted by Atwood, p. 3.<br />
2. Ibid., p. 4.<br />
3. Ibid., p. 4.<br />
An evil equally great is the door it immediately opens for speculation,<br />
by which the least designing and perhaps most valuable part of the<br />
community are preyed upon by the more knowing and crafty<br />
speculators.<br />
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION<br />
This was the prevailing view held by the great majority of<br />
delegates to the Convention. They were adamant in their resolve to<br />
create a constitution which would prevent any state, and especially<br />
the federal government itself, from ever again issuing fiat money.<br />
And they said so in unmistakable terms.<br />
Oliver Ellsworth from Connecticut, who later was to become<br />
our third Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, said:<br />
This is a favorable moment to shut and bar the door against paper<br />
money. The mischief of the various experiments which have been<br />
made are now fresh in the public mind and have excited the disgust of<br />
all the respectable parts of America.<br />
George Mason from Virginia told the delegates he had a<br />
"mortal hatred to paper money." Previously he had written to<br />
George Washington: "They may pass a law to issue paper money,<br />
but twenty laws will not make the people receive it. Paper money is<br />
founded upon fraud and knavery."<br />
James Wilson from Pennsylvania said: "It will have the most<br />
salutary influence on the credit of the United States to remove the<br />
possibility of paper money/'<br />
John Langdon from New Hampshire warned that he would<br />
rather reject the whole plan of federation than to grant the new<br />
gpvernment the right to issue fiat money.<br />
George Reed from Delaware declared that a provision in the<br />
Constitution granting the new government the right to issue fiat<br />
money "would be as alarming as the mark of the beast in<br />
Revelation/'<br />
Thomas Paine, although not a delegate to the Convention, had<br />
written the previous year that he was strongly opposed to fiat<br />
money, which he called counterfeiting by the state, and he especially<br />
abhorred legal tender laws which force people to accept the<br />
1. Washington to Stone, 16 February, 1787. Quoted by Bancroft, pp. 231-32.<br />
2 "<br />
2- For the con<strong>text</strong> of this and the following statements expressing a similar<br />
ser sentiment, see Bancroft, pp. 30, 43-44, 82; also Paul and Lehrman, p. 168.
316 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
counterfeit. He said:<br />
"The punishment of a member [of a legislature]<br />
who should move for such a law ought to be death/'<br />
An interesting thought.<br />
If any further evidence is needed that the Founding Fathers<br />
intended to prohibit the federal government from issuing "bills of<br />
credit/' consider this. The first draft of the Constitution was copied<br />
in large measure from the original Articles of Confederation. When<br />
it was taken up for consideration by the delegates, therefore, it<br />
contained the old provision that had caused so much chaos.<br />
stated: "The legislature of the United States shall have the power to<br />
borrow money and emit bills of credit." But, after a lively discussion<br />
on the matter, the offending provision was voted to be removed<br />
from the Constitution by an overwhelming margin. 1<br />
It<br />
Voicing the<br />
sentiment of the majority of the delegates, Alexander Hamilton<br />
said: "To emit an unfunded paper as the sign of value ought not to<br />
continue a formal part of the Constitution, nor ever hereafter to be<br />
employed; being, in its nature, repugnant with abuses and liable to<br />
be made the engine of imposition and fraud." 2<br />
The journal of the Convention for August 16 contains this<br />
notation:<br />
It was moved and seconded to strike out the words "and emit bills<br />
of credit/' and the motion ... passed in the affirmative. [The vote<br />
cleared by a margin of better than four to one.] 3<br />
The Tenth Amendment states:<br />
"The powers not delegated to<br />
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the<br />
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." The<br />
power to issue bills of credit is definitely not delegated to the<br />
United States, and it is specifically prohibited to the States. Therefore,<br />
if any power to issue fiat money legally exists at all, it is<br />
reserved for the people. In other words, individuals and private<br />
institutions, such as banks, have the right to issue lOUs and hope<br />
that the public will use them as money, but government, at any level<br />
is clearly prohibited by the Constitution from doing so.<br />
1. For an excellent summary of the interplay of ideas between the delegates, see<br />
Edwin Vieira, Jr., Pieces of Eight: The Monetary Pozvers and Disabilities of the United<br />
States Constitution (New Jersey: Sound Dollar Committee, 1983), pp. 71-76.<br />
2. Alexander Hamilton, Works, Part II, p. 271, as cited by Bancroft, p. 26.<br />
3. Quoted by Bancroft, pp. 39, 40.<br />
»<br />
Ltant<br />
THE LOST TREASURE MAP 317<br />
A SUGGESTION FOR YOUR CONGRESSMAN<br />
Incidentally, the Constitution has never been amended on this<br />
point, nor has the provision that only silver and gold can be used as<br />
lawful money. It would be interesting if each reader of this book<br />
would send copies to his or her elected representatives in Washington,<br />
or at least a photocopy of this section. Every member of<br />
Congress has sworn to uphold the Constitution, and you might<br />
attach a short note asking them when they intend to begin.<br />
Do not be disappointed if your reply is less than satisfactory.<br />
Politicians have a similar problem to that which judges have. It is<br />
permissible to rock the boat from time to time, but they are not<br />
supposed to sink it.<br />
Suits against the government challenging the<br />
constitutionality of our monetary system seldom get to court. It is<br />
safer for the justices to decline to accept these cases or to dismiss<br />
them as supposedly "frivolous." Otherwise they would face a<br />
difficult choice. Either they would have to mutilate logic in order to<br />
uphold the present inconsistencies—thus, opening themselves to<br />
possible ridicule—or they would have to declare in favor of the<br />
Constitution and literally cause the collapse of the entire deficit-<br />
spending, central-bank mechanism. Such an act would take a<br />
considerable amount of courage. Not only would they suffer the<br />
wrath of the Establishment that is nourished by that mechanism,<br />
they also would have to face a bewildered public which, because of<br />
lack of knowledge about the Constitution or the nature of money,<br />
could easily be convinced that the judges had lost their minds.<br />
Likewise, it is safer for politicians to respond to inquiries of this<br />
kind merely by quoting some self-serving government document<br />
which makes our fiat monetary system sound quite legal and<br />
marvelously constitutional.<br />
Unfortunately, that is reality. Until the public becomes considerably<br />
better informed than it is at present, we cannot expect too<br />
much from the courts or from Congress. Bringing this matter to the<br />
attention of your elected representatives, however, is still well<br />
worth the effort, because the process of education has to start<br />
somewhere, and Washington is an excellent place to begin.<br />
Returning to the point of this digression, however, it is impor-<br />
to know that the federal government was given a precisely<br />
limited monetary function: "to coin money" and to "regulate the
318 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
specifically defined as the only kind of money to be allowed, there<br />
can be no doubt of what was meant by the first half of that power.<br />
To coin money meant to mint precious-metal coins. Period.<br />
The second half is equally clear. Both in the Constitution and in<br />
the discussions among the delegates, the power to regulate the<br />
value of gold and silver coin was closely tied to the power to<br />
determine weights and measures. They are, in fact, one and the<br />
same. To regulate the value of coin is exactly the same as to set the<br />
nationally accepted value of a mile or a pound or a quart. It is to<br />
create a standard against which a thing may be measured. The<br />
wording of this section of the Constitution can be traced to the<br />
original Articles of Confederation which further clarifies the meaning<br />
that was generally understood at that time:<br />
The United States in congress assembled shall . . . have the sole and<br />
exclusive right and power of regulating the alloy and value of coin<br />
struck by their own authority, or by that of the respective<br />
states—fixing the Standard of Weights and Measures throughout the<br />
United States.<br />
The intent, therefore, was simply for Congress to determine the<br />
exact weight of a precious metal that would constitute the national<br />
monetary unit.<br />
THE ORIGIN OF THE DOLLAR<br />
At the time of these deliberations, Spanish silver coins, called<br />
pieces of eight, had already become the de facto monetary unit. An<br />
official commission had been established by the Continental Congress<br />
to sample the circulating coins in the country and determine<br />
their average value by weight and purity. Charts were published,<br />
and all<br />
coins of various origin were listed by comparative value.<br />
Congress was already "regulating the value of" the nation's money<br />
by the time the Constitution was drafted. How these coins became<br />
dollars is an interesting story. Edwin Vieira tells us:<br />
Monetary historians generally first associate the dollar with one<br />
Count Schlick, who began striking such silver coins in 1519 in<br />
Joachim's Thai, Bavaria. Then called " Schlicktenthalers" or<br />
"joachimsthalers," the coins became known simply as "thalers," which<br />
transliterated into "dollars." Interestingly, the American colonies did<br />
not adopt the dollar from England, but from Spain. Under that<br />
country's monetary reform of 1497, the silver real became the Spanish<br />
money -unit, or unit of account. A new coin consisting of eight teaks<br />
also appeared. Variously known as pesos, duros, piezas de ocho ("pieces<br />
THE LOST TREASURE MAP 319<br />
of eight"), or Spanish dollars (because of their similarity in weight and<br />
fineness to the thaler), the coins quickly achieved predominance in<br />
financial markets of the New World because of Spain's then-important<br />
commercial and political position.<br />
In 1785, Thomas Jefferson urged the adoption of the Spanish<br />
silver dollar as the nation's official monetary unit. In a pamphlet<br />
submitted to the delegates of the Continental Congress, he said:<br />
Taking into our view all money transactions, great and small, I<br />
question if a common measure, of more convenient size than the<br />
dollar, could be proposed.... The unit or dollar is a known coin, and<br />
the most familiar of all to the minds of people. It is already adopted<br />
from south to north; has identified our currency, and therefore happily<br />
offers itself as an unit already introduced.<br />
On July 6, 1785, Congress unanimously voted to adopt the<br />
Spanish dollar as the official monetary unit of the United States.<br />
Jefferson realized, however, that this was not sufficient. Although<br />
the coin had been one of the most dependable in terms of weight<br />
and quality, it still varied in content between issues, and a way had<br />
to be found to rate one coin in value against another. That was,<br />
after all, the service that Congress was required to render when it<br />
was given the power to "regulate the value" of money. Jefferson<br />
came directly to the point when he said: "If we determine that a<br />
dollar shall be our unit, we must then say with precision what a<br />
dollar is. This coin as struck at different times, of different weight<br />
and fineness, is of different values."<br />
The logic voiced by Jefferson could not be ignored. Two years<br />
later, after carefully examining the actual weight and fineness of<br />
the Spanish dollars currently in circulation, Congress defined the<br />
dollar. After ratification of the Constitution, a dollar would contain<br />
371.25 grains of fine silver, and all items in commerce, including<br />
other coins, were to be measured in value against that standard.<br />
As the Spaniards continued to reduce the silver content of their<br />
coins, the pressure for the minting of an American dollar of<br />
predictable value began to mount. Secretary of the Treasury,<br />
Alexander Hamilton, in his 1791 report to Congress, urged the<br />
1- Vieira, p. 66.<br />
2. Propositions Respecting the Coinage of Gold, Silver, and Copper (printed pamphlet<br />
Presented to the Continental Congress on May 13, 1785), pp. 9-10. Cited by Vieira,<br />
P- 68.<br />
3 - Ihid., p. 11.
320 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND THE LOST TREASURE MAP 321<br />
establishment of a federal mint and also presented a powerful case<br />
for maintaining an inviolable standard for the coins to be produced<br />
by that mint. He said:<br />
The dollar originally contemplated in the money transactions of<br />
this country, by successive diminutions of its weight and fineness, has<br />
sustained a depreciation of five per cent, and yet the new dollar has a<br />
currency in all payments in place of the old, with scarcely any<br />
attention to the difference between them. The operation of this in<br />
depredating the value of property depending upon past contracts,<br />
and ...<br />
of all other property is apparent. Nor can it require argument to<br />
prove that a nation ought not to suffer the value of the property of its<br />
citizens to fluctuate with the fluctuations of a foreign mint, or to<br />
change with the changes in the regulations of a foreign sovereign.. .<br />
The quantity of gold and silver in the national coins,<br />
corresponding with a given sum, cannot be made less than heretofore<br />
without disturbing the balance of intrinsic value, and making every<br />
acre of land, as well as every bushel of wheat, of less actual worth than<br />
in time past.... [This] could not fail to distract the ideas of the<br />
community, and would be apt to breed discontent as well among those<br />
who live on the income of their money as among the poorer classes of<br />
the people to whom the necessities of life would . . . become dearer. 1<br />
BIMETALLISM<br />
Note in the preceding quotation that Hamilton referred to both<br />
gold and silver coins, not merely silver. That is because it was<br />
precisely at this time that Congress began to consider a bimetallic<br />
coinage. In retrospect, this was a mistake for, throughout history,<br />
bimetallism has never worked well very long. It always has led to<br />
confusion and, ultimately, the disappearance as money of one of the<br />
metals. This is because there is always a subtle shifting of the<br />
relative values between gold and silver—or any other two metals<br />
for that matter—depending on constantly changing supply and<br />
demand. We may set a value ratio of one to the other that is quite<br />
acceptable today but, eventually, that ratio will no longer reflect<br />
reality. The metal which grows in value over the other will be<br />
hoarded or possibly even melted down because it will bring a<br />
higher price as metal than it will as money.<br />
That is precisely what happened in the early days of our<br />
Republic. It was determined after careful analysis of the free-<br />
1. Vie Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the United States (J. Gales, compil.<br />
1834), Appendix, pp. 2059, 2071-73. Cited by Vieira, pp. 95, 97.<br />
•<br />
market that the value of gold at that time was approximately fifteen<br />
times the value of silver. The Coinage Act of 1792 accordingly set<br />
the relative value of gold-to-silver at fifteen-to-one. It then authorized<br />
the federal government to mint gold coins called Eagles, and it<br />
specified that their value was ten dollars. In other words, the gold<br />
courts would be equal in value to ten silver coins. Ten silver coins,<br />
each of 371.25 grains of fine silver, would contain a total of 3,712.5<br />
grains. The content of the Eagle, therefore, was one-fifteenth that<br />
amount, or 247.5 grains of fine gold.<br />
Contrary to popular misconception/ Congress did not create a<br />
"gold dollar." (It didn't do that until fifty-seven years later in The<br />
Coinage Act of 1849.) In fact it reaffirmed that "the money of<br />
account of the United States shall be expressed in dollars or units"<br />
and again defined those units as coins containing 371.25 grains of<br />
pure silver. What Congress did do was authorize the minting of a<br />
gpld coin and arbitrarily fix<br />
the value of the gold in that coin at<br />
fifteen times the value of the dollar. And it also stated that all silver<br />
and gold coins produced in the federal mint were to be legal tender<br />
in accordance with their value, based on weight and purity, relative<br />
to the standard of the silver dollar.<br />
Oh yes, another thing. It set the death penalty for anyone who<br />
debases the nation's coinage; a law which, if enforced today, would<br />
wipe out the House of Representatives, the Senate, the managerial<br />
level of the Treasury Department, and the Presidency as well.<br />
FREE COINAGE<br />
Perhaps the most important provision of this Act, however, was<br />
the establishment of what is called free coinage. Under free coinage,<br />
any citizen may take raw silver or gold to the mint and, for a<br />
nominal fee, have it converted into coins for personal use. The<br />
government merely performs a technical function of creating the<br />
coin and stamping it with its insignia to certify the correct weight<br />
and purity. The state's role in this is exactly the same as inspecting<br />
the scales in a grocery store or the meter on a gasoline pump. It is<br />
merely fulfilling<br />
the Constitutional requirement to set standards<br />
and verify the accuracy of weights and measures.<br />
Free coinage was to become an important part of the American<br />
success story, and it lasted until the Gold Reserve Act of 1934<br />
which, not only terminated it, but even made it illegal for citizens to<br />
possess gold. We shall take a closer look at that dismal period in a
322 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
later section but, for now, it is important to recall the greatness of<br />
our monetary system as it once was. Elgin Groseclose explains:<br />
The principle of free coinage has proved its practical worth as a<br />
deterrent to debasement and depreciation. Where coinage is on<br />
private account there is no profit to the state in tampering with the<br />
standard, and there is no opportunity for such practice by the<br />
individual. The circulation of coins of similar appearance and<br />
denomination but of uncertain standard, the arbitrary and<br />
unpredictable modifications in the standard by autocratic<br />
government, the temptations to profit which were constantly dangled<br />
before despotic rulers—these were evils which had perplexed and<br />
harassed society and hindered the natural growth of economy since<br />
the days when coined money first appeared. By a stroke they were<br />
swept away. At the same time, the institution of free coinage, by giving<br />
stability and character to one of the chief instruments of organized<br />
economy, made possible a more vigorous and healthy commercial life<br />
and gave prestige and increased substance to the government<br />
adopting it.<br />
SOUND MONEY AND ECONOMIC PROSPERITY<br />
This was, indeed, an auspicious beginning for the new nation,<br />
and the result was immediately observable in an upsurge in<br />
prosperity. The December 16, 1789 edition of the Pennsylvania<br />
Gazette declared: "Since the federal constitution has removed all<br />
danger of our having a paper tender, our trade is advanced fifty per<br />
cent." But that was just the beginning. Historian Douglass North<br />
says that "the years 1793-1808, were years of unparalleled prosperity/<br />
Louis Hacker describes the period as one "of unexampled<br />
business expansion, one of the greatest, in fact, the United States<br />
has had.... The exports of the country mounted from $19 millions<br />
in 1791 to $93 millions in 1801.<br />
4 Furthermore, the federal deficit,<br />
which amounted to twenty-eight per cent of expenditures in 1792,<br />
dropped to twenty-one per cent in 1795. By 1802, the deficit had<br />
disappeared altogether and had been replaced by a surplus that<br />
was almost as large as the governments, total spending.<br />
George Washington watched this economic miracle with great<br />
satisfaction and, in correspondence to his friend, LaFayette, the<br />
1 Groseclose, Money and Man, p. 1 67.<br />
2. Quoted by Saussy, p. 36.<br />
3. Douglass C. North, The Economic Growth of the United States (New York: W.W-<br />
Norton, 1966), p. 53.<br />
4. Louis M. Hacker, American Capitalism (New York: Anvil, 1957), p. 39.<br />
THE LOST TREASURE MAP 323<br />
French statesman and former General in the Continental Army,<br />
Washington commented: "Our country, my dear sir,... is fast<br />
progressing in its political importance and social happiness." In a<br />
letter to Catherine Macaulay Graham, he said: "The United States<br />
enjoys a sense of prosperity and tranquility under the new government<br />
that could hardly have been hoped for." And in a letter to the<br />
American poet and diplomat, David Humphreys, Washington<br />
exclaimed: "Our public credit stands on that high ground which<br />
three years ago it would have been considered as a species of<br />
madness to have foretold/'<br />
On the specific subject of paper money without backing by gold<br />
or silver, Washington wrote:<br />
We may one day become a great commercial and flourishing<br />
nation. But if in the pursuit of the means we should unfortunately<br />
stumble again on unfunded paper money or any similar species of<br />
fraud, we shall assuredly give a fatal stab to our national credit in its<br />
infancy.<br />
This, then, was the monetary blueprint laid down by the men<br />
who drafted our Constitution. In retrospect, about the only flaw<br />
one can find was the attempt to set a fixed ratio between the value<br />
of gold and silver. Rather than placing a dollar value on a gold coin,<br />
the mint should have imprinted the gold value in terms of weight<br />
and fineness. The free market then would have assigned it an<br />
exchange value in terms of goods and services, and that automatically<br />
would have determined its correct monetary value as a ratio to<br />
the silver dollars which were bidding for the purchase of the same<br />
items. It was inevitable, therefore, that soon after the "ten-dollar"<br />
Eagle was created, the value of gold over silver began to climb<br />
higher than the prescribed<br />
ratio of fifteen-to-one, and the Eagles<br />
ceased to circulate. In later years, with the discovery of the great<br />
gold fields in California and Australia, the process reversed itself,<br />
and silver dollars disappeared from commerce. But, even though<br />
this bimetallism led to a discrepancy between the actual conversion<br />
ratio and that which the government had prescribed, nevertheless,<br />
it took place in the open market and no one was greatly injured by<br />
the inconvenience. Throughout it all, there was just one standard:<br />
1- These letters were written in 1790 and 1791, quoted by Atwood, pp. 5-6.<br />
2 -<br />
Written in 1 789, quoted by Louis Basso, A Treatise on Monetary Reform (St. Louis,<br />
Missouri: Monetary Realist Society, 1982), p. 5.
324 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
the defined silver content of a dollar. Furthermore, both the silver<br />
and gold coins were of intrinsic value and totally honest in their<br />
measure. No nation could do more for the prosperity of its citizens<br />
than that.<br />
SUMMARY<br />
The Constitution prohibits both the states and the federal<br />
government from issuing fiat money. This was the deliberate intent<br />
of the Founding Fathers who had bitter experience with fiat money<br />
before and especially during the Revolutionary War. In response to<br />
the need to have a precisely defined national monetary unit,<br />
Congress adopted the Spanish dollar then currently in use and<br />
defined the content of that dollar to be 371.25 grains of pure silver.<br />
With the establishment of a federal mint, American silver dollars<br />
were issued in accordance with that standard, and gold Eagles also<br />
were produced which were then equal in value to ten silver dollars.<br />
Most importantly, free coinage was established wherein Americans<br />
were able to convert their raw silver and gold into national coins<br />
officially certified by the government as to their intrinsic value. The<br />
product of these measures was a period of sound money and great<br />
economic prosperity, a period that would come to an end only<br />
when the next generation of Americans forgot to read their history<br />
and returned to the use of paper money and "bills of credit."<br />
The monetary plan laid down by the Founding Fathers was the<br />
product of collective genius. Nowhere in history can one find so<br />
many men in one legislative body who understood the fraud<br />
inherent in fiat money and the hidden-taxation nature of inflation.<br />
There was never such an assembly of scholars and statesmen<br />
determined to set a safe course for the nation of their own creation.<br />
Literally, they handed us a treasure map. All we had to do was<br />
follow it to economic security and national prosperity. But, as we<br />
shall see in the following sections, that map was discarded when<br />
the lessons of history died out with tiV/se who had lived it.<br />
Chapter Sixteen<br />
THE CREATURE<br />
COMES TO AMERICA<br />
The story of the Bank of North America, the<br />
nation's first central bank, which wasformed even<br />
before the Constitution was drafted; the story of<br />
the First Bank of the United States, the nation's<br />
second central bank, which was formed in 1791;<br />
the massive inflation caused by both banks; the<br />
causes of their demise.<br />
It is a surprising fact that the United States had its first central<br />
bank even before the Constitution was drafted. It was chartered by<br />
the Continental Congress in the Spring of 1781 and opened its<br />
doors the following year. There were great expectations at that time<br />
that the province of Canada would soon join the rebel colonies to<br />
form a union extending across the entire North American continent.<br />
In anticipation of that, the new financial institution was called<br />
the Bank of North America.<br />
The Bank was organized by Robert Morris, a member of<br />
Congress, who was a leader of a group of politicians and merchants<br />
who wanted the new nation to imitate the mercantilism of England.<br />
They wanted high taxes to support a powerful, centralized government,<br />
high tariffs to subsidize domestic industry, a large army and<br />
navy, and the acquisition of colonial outposts to expand into<br />
foreign lands and markets. He was a wealthy Philadelphia mer-<br />
chant who had profited greatly from war contracts during the<br />
Revolution. He had carefully studied the secret science of money<br />
Land, by 1781, was widely considered to be the financial wizard of<br />
Congress.<br />
The Bank of North America was modeled closely after the Bank<br />
°f England. Following the practice of fractional reserve, it was<br />
allowed to issue paper promissory notes in excess of actual<br />
deposits, but, since some gold and silver had to be held in the vault,
326 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND THE CREATURE COMES TO AMERICA 327<br />
there were definite limits to how far that process could go. Bank<br />
notes were not forced on the people as legal tender for all<br />
debts,<br />
public and private, but the government did agree to accept them at<br />
theirface value in payment of all taxes and duties, which made them<br />
as good as gold for that specific purpose. Furthermore, unlike the<br />
central banks of today, the Bank of North America was not given<br />
the power to directly issue the nation's money.<br />
FUNCTIONED AS A CENTRAL BANK<br />
On the other hand, the Bank was given the right of monopoly in<br />
its<br />
field, which means there were no other bank notes allowed to<br />
circulate in competition. This, plus the fact that they were accepted<br />
at face value in payment of all federal and state taxes, plus the<br />
further fact that the federal government did not at that time have a<br />
functioning money of its own, made these bank notes attractive for<br />
use as a circulating medium of exchange. The intended result was<br />
that the Bank's paper would be accepted as money, which for a<br />
while, it was. Furthermore, the Bank was made the official depository<br />
for all federal funds and it almost immediately loaned<br />
$1.2 million to the government, much of which was created out of<br />
nothing for that purpose. So, in spite of the limitations placed upon<br />
the Bank, and in spite of the fact that it was essentially a private<br />
institution, it was intended to be and, in fact, did function as a<br />
central bank.<br />
The Bank of North America was fraudulent from the very start.<br />
The charter required that private investors provide $400,000 for the<br />
initial subscription. When Morris was unable to raise that money,<br />
he used his political influence to make up the shortfall out of<br />
government funds. In a maneuver that was nothing less than<br />
legalized embezzlement, he took the gold that had been loaned to<br />
the United States from France and had it<br />
deposited in the Bank.<br />
Then, using this as a fractional-reserve base, he simply created the<br />
money that was needed for the subscription and loaned it to<br />
himself and his associates. Such is the power of the secret science.<br />
It is hard to reconcile the fact that the same men who adopted<br />
the brilliant monetary restraints of the Constitution a few years<br />
later would have allowed the Bank of North America to exist. It<br />
must be remembered, however, that the war was still in progress<br />
1 . See Murray N- Rothbard, Conceived in Liberty: The Revolutionary War, 1 775-1 784<br />
(New Rochelle, New York: Arlington House, 1979), Vol. IV, p. 392.<br />
the charter was issued, and even the wisest of statesmen are<br />
often obliged to follow expediency in such times. One also must<br />
conclude that, while the founding fathers were wise on the nature<br />
Ivtfhen<br />
of<br />
not yet had extensive experience with the same mechanism hidden<br />
behind the obscurities of fractional-reserve banking.<br />
In any event, the Bank was not to have its charter renewed by<br />
Congress and it did not survive beyond the end of the war. Murray<br />
Rothbard details its demise:<br />
fiat money created by the government's printing press, they had<br />
Despite the monopoly privileges conferred upon the Bank of<br />
North America and its nominal redeemability in specie, the market's<br />
lack of confidence in the inflated notes led to their depreciation outside<br />
the Bank's home base in Philadelphia. The Bank even tried to bolster<br />
the value of its notes by hiring people to urge redeemers of its notes<br />
not to insist on specie—a move scarcely calculated to improve the<br />
long-run confidence in the Bank.<br />
After a year of operation, Morris's political power slipped, and he<br />
moved quickly to shift the Bank of North America from a central bank<br />
to a purely commercial bank chartered by the state of Pennsylvania. By<br />
the end of 1783,... the first experiment with a central bank in the United<br />
States had ended.<br />
A fitting epilogue to this story was written two hundred years<br />
later when, in 1980, the First Pennsylvania Bank of Philadelphia,<br />
the "oldest bank in the nation/ 7 was bailed out by the FDIC<br />
AN END RUN AROUND THE CONSTITUTION<br />
It will be recalled that, after the Bank of North America was<br />
tenninated and after the Constitutional Convention "closed the<br />
door on paper money/' the United States enjoyed a period of<br />
unparalleled economic growth and prosperity. But, while the door<br />
may have been closed, the window was still open. Congress was<br />
denied the power to print money, but it was not denied the power<br />
to borrow it.<br />
In the vocabulary of the common man, to borrow is to accept a<br />
loan of something that already exists. He is confused, therefore,<br />
when the banker issues money out of nothing and then says he is<br />
lending it. He appears to be lending but, in reality, he is creating.<br />
Then, as now, the mysteries of banking vocabulary were not<br />
revealed to the average man, and it was difficult to understand<br />
1- Rothbard, Mystery, pp. 194-95.
328 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
how privately-issued bank notes could serve precisely the same<br />
purpose as printing-press money—with precisely the same disastrous<br />
results. That being the case, the monetary and political<br />
scientists decided to end run the Constitution. Their plan was to<br />
establish a bank, to give that bank the power to create money, to<br />
lend most of that money to the government, and then to make sure<br />
the IOUs are accepted as money by the public. Congress, therefore,<br />
would not be emitting bills of credit. The bank would do that.<br />
Thus, the First Bank of the United States was conceived.<br />
The proposal was submitted to Congress in 1790 by Alexander<br />
Hamilton who, at that time, was Secretary of the Treasury.<br />
Hamilton, incidentally, was a former aide to Robert Morris, founder<br />
of the Bank of North America, so in that sense his role in this<br />
matter is not surprising. What is surprising is the fact that Hamilton<br />
had been a staunch supporter of a sound currency during the<br />
Constitutional Convention. This is hard to reconcile, and one must<br />
suspect that, even the most well intentioned of men can become<br />
corrupted by the temptations of wealth and power. It is possible<br />
that Hamilton, Morris, and other Federalist leaders had hoped to<br />
keep the government out of the money-making business, not<br />
because it was the constitutional thing to do, but because that<br />
would leave the field clear for a central-bank mechanism which,<br />
because it was further from public view and political control, could<br />
become their own private engine of profit. It would appear that the<br />
only other explanation is that these men were fickle in their views<br />
and did not really understand the implications of their acts. In view<br />
of their brilliance in all other matters, however, it is difficult to<br />
muster enthusiasm for that interpretation.<br />
THE HAMILTON-JEFFERSON CONFLICT<br />
Hamilton's proposal was strongly opposed by Thomas<br />
Jefferson, then Secretary of State, and this was the beginning of a<br />
heated political debate that would preoccupy Congress for many<br />
decades to come. In fact, it was one of the central issues that led to<br />
the creation of our first political parties. The Federalists gathered<br />
around the ideas of Hamilton. The anti-Federalists, later called the<br />
Republicans, were attracted to the ideas of Jefferson. 1<br />
1. Curiously, the present Democratic Party traces its origin to Jefferson's Republi-<br />
THE CREATURE COMES TO AMERICA 329<br />
Jefferson pointed out that the Constitution did not grant to<br />
Congress the power to create a bank or anything similar. That<br />
means such power is reserved to the states or to the people. In a<br />
rebuttal to Hamilton's proposal, he said: "To take a single step<br />
beyond the boundaries thus specially drawn around the powers of<br />
Congress, is to take possession of a boundless field of power, no<br />
Furthermore, he said, even if<br />
longer susceptible of any definition."<br />
the Constitution had granted such power, it would be an extremely<br />
unwise thing to do, because allowing banks to create money could<br />
only lead to national ruin.<br />
Hamilton, on the other hand, argued that debt was a good<br />
thing, if kept within reason, and that the nation needed more<br />
money in circulation to keep up with expanding commerce. Only<br />
the Bank, he said, would be able to provide that. Furthermore,<br />
while it is true the Constitution did not specifically grant the power<br />
to create such a bank, it was, nevertheless, an implied power,<br />
because it was needed to accomplish other functions which were<br />
granted in the Constitution.<br />
That was the end run.<br />
Nothing could be more polarized than the opposing ideas of<br />
these two men:<br />
JEFFERSON: "A private central bank issuing the public currency is a<br />
greater menace to the liberties of the people than a standing army."<br />
"We must not let our rulers load us with perpetual debt"<br />
HAMILTON: "No society could succeed which did not unite the<br />
interest and credit of rich individuals with those of the state." "A<br />
national debt, if it is not excessive, will be to us a national blessing."<br />
AMERICA'S SECOND CENTRAL BANK IS CREATED<br />
After a year of intense debate, Hamilton's views prevailed and,<br />
in 1791, Congress granted a twenty-year charter to the Bank of the<br />
:<br />
I- "Opinion of Thomas Jefferson, Secretary of State/' February 15, 1791, quoted by<br />
Krooss, pp. 147-48.<br />
2. The comparison between private banks and standing armies can be found in<br />
many of Jefferson's letters and public utterances. For example, see The Writings of<br />
Thomas Jefferson (New York: G.P. Putnam & Sons, 1899), Vol. X, p. 31.<br />
©. The Basic Writings of Thomas Jefferson (Willey Book Company, 1944), p. 749.<br />
|k Quoted by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Jackson (New York: Mentor<br />
Books, 1945), pp. 6-7.<br />
5. Written on April 30, 1781, to his mentor, Robert Morris. Quoted by John H.<br />
Makin, The Global Debt Crisis: America's Growing Involvement (New York: Basic<br />
Books, 1984), p. 246.
330 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
United States. It was modelled closely after the Bank of England,<br />
which means it was almost an exact replica of the previous Bank of<br />
North America. In fact, as evidence of continuity with the past, the<br />
president of the new bank was Thomas Willing, the same man who<br />
had been a partner of Robert Morris and president of the old bank.<br />
As before, the new Bank was given a monopoly in the issuance<br />
of bank notes. Once again, these notes were not forced on the<br />
people as legal tender for private debts and contracts, but they were<br />
legal tender at face value for all debts to the government in the form<br />
of taxes and duties, which made them attractive for use as common<br />
money. And once again, the Bank was made the official depository<br />
of all federal funds.<br />
The charter specified that the Bank was required at all times to<br />
redeem its notes in gold or silver specie upon demand by the<br />
depositor. That was an admirable provision but, since the Bank was<br />
not also required to keep specie in its vaults in the full amount of its<br />
note obligations, it was a mathematical impossibility to uphold.<br />
As with the old Bank of North America, the new Bank of the<br />
United States was to have eighty per cent of its capital provided by<br />
private investors with the federal government putting up only<br />
twenty per cent. That was a mere bookkeeping sleight-of-hand,<br />
however, because it had been prearranged for the Bank to immediately<br />
loan back to the federal government exactly that same<br />
amount. Reminiscent of the Morris scheme in capitalizing the Bank<br />
of North America, this federal ''investment" was essentially a<br />
means whereby federal funds could be used to make up the<br />
short-fall of the private investors. "Call it by what name you<br />
please/' said Jefferson, this was not a loan or an investment but an<br />
outright gift. And he was certainly right. The Bank was able to open<br />
its doors with less than nine per cent of the private capital required<br />
by its charter. The total capitalization was specified at $10 million,<br />
which means that $8 million was to come from private stockholders.<br />
However, as John Kenneth Galbraith wryly observed: "Numerous<br />
thrifty participants confined themselves to a modest down<br />
payment, and the bank began operations on around $675,000 in<br />
hard cash/' 2<br />
1 It is interesting to note that, as a member of the Continental Congress, Willing<br />
had been one of those who voted against the Declaration of Independence-<br />
2. Galbraith, p. 72<br />
THE CREATURE COMES TO AMERICA 331<br />
THE CREATURE COMES FROM EUROPE<br />
Who were these private investors? Their names do not appear<br />
in the published literature, but we can be certain they included the<br />
Congressmen and Senators—and their associates—who engineered<br />
the charter. But there is an interesting line in Galbraith's <strong>text</strong> that<br />
hints at another dimension to the composition of this group. On<br />
page 72 of Money: Whence It Came, Where It Went, he states<br />
matter-of-factly: "Foreigners could own shares but not vote them/ 7<br />
What a story is hidden behind that innocuous statement. The<br />
blunt reality is that the Rothschild banking dynasty in Europe was<br />
Ithe dominant force, both financially and politically, in the formation<br />
of the Bank of the United States.<br />
explains:<br />
Biographer, Derek Wilson,<br />
Over the years since NJM [Rothschild], the Manchester <strong>text</strong>ile<br />
manufacturer, had bought cotton from the Southern states,<br />
Rothschilds had developed heavy American commitments. Nathan . .<br />
had made loans to various states of the Union, had been, for a time, the<br />
official European banker for the US government and was a pledged<br />
supporter of the Bank of the United States.<br />
Gustavus Myers, in his History of the Great American Fortunes, is<br />
more pointed. He says:<br />
Under the surface, the Rothschilds long had a powerful influence<br />
in dictating American financial laws. The law records show that they<br />
were the power in the old Bank of the United States.<br />
The Rothschilds, therefore, were not merely investors nor just<br />
an important power. They were the power behind the Bank of the<br />
United States! The significance of the Rothschild power in American<br />
finance and politics was the subject of extensive comment in a<br />
previous section, so there is no need to cover that ground again. It<br />
is important here, however, to at least make a mental note of the<br />
fact that the Creature from <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island is descended from a species<br />
that is not native to this land.<br />
INFLATION ALL OVER AGAIN<br />
iFrom<br />
the beginning, the primary purpose of the Bank was to<br />
create money for the federal government. Money for the private<br />
1. Derek Wilson, p. 178.<br />
2. Gustavus Myers, History of the Great American Fortunes (New York: Random<br />
House, 1936), p. 556.
332 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
sector was strictly secondary. That was made clear by the fact that<br />
the maximum rate of interest it was allowed to charge was six per<br />
cent That made it impractical to make loans to anyone except the<br />
federal government and a few large, prime-rate borrowers. And the<br />
government wasted no time putting its new central-bank mechanism<br />
to work. Having "invested" $2 million at the start, it converted<br />
that into $8.2 million borrowed within the next five years.<br />
Which means that $6.2 million was created specifically for its use.<br />
Anyone familiar with the history of money as outlined in the<br />
previous section could easily write the following paragraph.<br />
The creation of millions of new fractional-reserve dollars,<br />
which the government pushed into the economy through spending<br />
programs, caused an imbalance between the supply of money and<br />
the supply of goods and services. Prices appeared to go up as the<br />
relative value of the dollar went down. In that same five-year<br />
period, wholesale prices rose by 72%, which is<br />
another way of<br />
saying that 42% of everything people had saved in the form of<br />
money was quietly confiscated by the government through the<br />
hidden tax called inflation.<br />
The same inflation effect that previously had plagued the<br />
colonies now returned to plague the new generation. This time,<br />
instead of being caused by printing-press money, it was fractionalreserve<br />
money. The cog that linked the two mechanisms together<br />
and caused them to function as one was federal debt. It was federal<br />
debt that allowed the political and monetary scientists to violate the<br />
intent of the founding fathers, and it was this same federal debt that<br />
prompted Jefferson to exclaim:<br />
I wish it were possible to obtain a single amendment to our<br />
Constitution. I would be willing to depend on that alone for the<br />
reduction of the administration of our government to the general<br />
principle of the Constitution; I mean an additional article, taking from<br />
the federal government their power of borrowing.<br />
Like so many things in the real world, the Bank of the United<br />
States was a mixture of evil with some good. It certainly was not all<br />
bad. In colonial times, the state governments printed as much<br />
paper money as they pleased, and the loss of purchasing power<br />
was, in many cases, total. The Bank, on the other hand, was<br />
1. Letter to John Taylor, November 26, 1789. Quoted by Martin A. Larson, The<br />
Continuing Tax Rebellion (Old Greenwich, Connecticut: Devin-Adair, 1979), p. xii.<br />
THE CREATURE COMES TO AMERICA 333<br />
required to maintain some gold and specie as a base for its pyramid<br />
of money. Even though it was an inverted pyramid with reserves<br />
being smaller than the quantity of bank notes, it still represented a<br />
boundary to just how far the money supply could be expanded.<br />
And that was good.<br />
Furthermore, it is apparent that the bank's directors were<br />
imbued with a certain amount of enlightened self interest in that<br />
they actually wanted to keep the creation of new money within<br />
some kind of control. They could profit from the central-bank<br />
mechanism only so long as the economy as a whole was productive<br />
enough to support it. They did not want to kill the goose that laid<br />
the golden egg. So, like their counterparts in the Federal Reserve<br />
System of our modern day, they spoke the language of restraint<br />
and, in a few instances, even acted with restraint as well.<br />
WILDCAT BANKS<br />
For example, it<br />
was during this period that "wildcat banks''<br />
began to flourish. They were given that name not because they<br />
were untamed—although that would have been another good<br />
reason to do so—but because they were located in areas so remote<br />
in the frontier that it was said their only customers were wildcats.<br />
Wildcat banks were not noted for meticulous accounting or<br />
business practices. Like all banks at that time, they were required to<br />
keep a certain portion of their deposits on hand in the form of gold<br />
or silver coin. To engender public confidence in their faithfulness to<br />
that obligation, it was common practice to keep the vault door open<br />
so a keg or two of gold coins could be viewed during business<br />
hours—not altogether different from the modern practice of financial<br />
institutions advertising how many billions in assets they hold<br />
but never mentioning the size of their liabilities. The wildcatters,<br />
however, were not reluctant to sprinkle a few precious-metal coins<br />
over the top of nails and let that take care of public relations. In<br />
some cases, as state examiners went from bank to bank to check the<br />
reserves, the gold would arrive only a few minutes ahead of them,<br />
having been rushed from the vault of the bank previously audited.<br />
The point is that the Bank of the United States was able to place<br />
considerable restraint upon the practices of all banks, both wildcat<br />
and urban. It did this simply by refusing to accept the notes of any<br />
other bank unless it had a reputation for redeeming those notes in<br />
,<br />
specie on demand. The public reacted accordingly. If<br />
the notes
334 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
were not good enough for the Bank of the United States, they were<br />
not good enough for them either. This served as an indirect force of<br />
moderation that affected all banks of that time. And that too, was<br />
good.<br />
Some historians have said that the Bank was a positive force in<br />
yet another way. Galbraith, for example, writes admiringly:<br />
On occasion, the Bank of the United States came to the assistance<br />
of good state banks that were being besieged by their note holders or<br />
other creditors. So, besides enforcing restraint, it served also as the<br />
lender of last resort. Thus in its short span of life it went far to perceive<br />
and develop the basic regulatory functions of a central bank.<br />
One who is less enamored with the idea of a central bank<br />
would be tempted to ask: If those state banks were so "good/' why<br />
did they need assistance in keeping faith with their depositors? The<br />
whole idea of a "lender of last resort/ 7<br />
which is accepted as sacred<br />
dogma today, is based on the assumption that it is perfectly<br />
acceptable for the entire banking system to be fraudulent. It is<br />
assumed that any single bank or cluster of banks could at any time<br />
become "besieged by their note holders or other creditors." Therefore,<br />
it is prudent to have a central bank to take what meager<br />
reserves there are within the system and rush them from bank to<br />
bank, if not minutes before the examiner arrives, at least before the<br />
customers do.<br />
As for the much talked about restraint exercised over other<br />
is not unreasonable to think that this same effect would<br />
banks, it<br />
have developed even without the presence of a government bank.<br />
If the free market had been left to operate, it is certain that, before<br />
long, one or more banks would gain a deserved reputation for<br />
honesty and full faith with their depositors. They would become<br />
the most popular banks and, therefore,<br />
order to accomplish this,<br />
the most prosperous. In<br />
however, they would have to reject the<br />
worthless notes of other banks. The public would react as expected,<br />
and even the most unscrupulous banks would have to toe the line if<br />
they wanted to survive. Moderation would be forced on the entire<br />
banking system as a result of open competition within a free<br />
market. To assume that only a federally-chartered central bank<br />
could have brought moderation into the monetary system is<br />
1. Galbraith, p. 73.<br />
to<br />
)THE CREATURE COMES TO AMERICA 335<br />
believe that only politicians, bureaucrats, and agencies of government<br />
can act with integrity, a shaky notion at best.<br />
AN INSTRUMENT OF PLUTOCRACY<br />
In any event, there is no denying the fact that the Bank of the<br />
United States did provide some braking force to the runaway<br />
tendencies of many of the nation's private banks. So it could have<br />
been worse. The inflation that it caused by its own activities could<br />
have been enlarged even further by the activities of the other banks<br />
as well. But, that it could have been worse does not make it good.<br />
As it was, the Bank was the means by which the American people<br />
lost forty-two per cent of the value of all the money they earned or<br />
possessed during just those five years. We must not forget, either,<br />
that this confiscation of property was selective. It did not work<br />
against the wealthy classes which were able to ride the wave of<br />
inflation aboard the raft of tangible property which they owned.<br />
And it especially did not work against those elite few, the political<br />
and monetary scientists, who were making huge profits from the<br />
enterprise. The Bank had done precisely what Hamilton had<br />
advocated: "... unite the interest and credit of rich individuals with<br />
those of the state."<br />
The development of this plutocracy was well described by<br />
Governeur Morris, the former delegate from New York who had<br />
helped to draft the Constitution into its final form. He had been an<br />
assistant to Robert Morris (not related) and was a champion of the<br />
concept of a natural aristocracy. So he knew his subject well when<br />
he warned:<br />
The rich will strive to establish their dominion and enslave the<br />
rest. They always did. They always will.... They will have the same<br />
effect here as elsewhere, if we do not, by such a government, keep<br />
them within their proper spheres. We should remember that the<br />
people never act from reason alone. The rich will take advantage of<br />
their passions, and make these the instruments for oppressing them.<br />
The result of the contest will be a violent aristocracy, or a more violent<br />
despotism.<br />
The tide of political pressure against the Bank was steadily<br />
rising during these years. It is tempting for critics of the centralbank<br />
mechanism to attribute that to the awakening common sense<br />
1. Written on July 2, 1787, in a letter to James Madison. Quoted in "Prosperity<br />
Economics/' by W. Cleon Skousen, Freeman Digest, February, 1985, p. 9.
336 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
THE CREATURE COMES TO AMERICA 337<br />
of the American public. Unfortunately, the picture is not that<br />
pleasing. It is true that the Jeffersonian Republicans were eloquently<br />
holding forth against the Creature's progenitor, and their<br />
influence was substantial. But there was another group that joined<br />
with them which had almost exactly opposite ideas and goals. The<br />
Jeffersonians opposed the Bank because they believed it was<br />
unconstitutional and because they wanted a monetary system<br />
based only upon gold and silver coin. The other group was made<br />
up of the wildcatters, the land speculators, and the empire-building<br />
industrialists. They opposed the Bank because they wanted a<br />
monetary system with no restraints at all, not even those associated<br />
with fractional reserve. They wanted every local bank to be free to<br />
create as much paper money as the public would swallow^ because<br />
they would then use that money for their own projects and profit.<br />
Indeed, politics does produce strange bedfellows.<br />
As the time approached for renewal of the Bank's charter, the<br />
battle lines inched toward each other. They were of equal force. The<br />
halls of Congress echoed with the cannon roar of angry debate. The<br />
vote was deadlocked. Another attack and counter attack. Again a<br />
deadlock. Into the night the forces clashed.<br />
When the smoke of battle lifted, the bill for charter renewal had<br />
been defeated by one vote in the House and one vote, cast by<br />
Vice-President George Clinton to break the tie, in the Senate. And<br />
so, on January 24, 1811, the Bank of the United States closed its<br />
doors.<br />
The battle may have been decided, but the war was far from<br />
over. The losers, bitter with defeat, merely regrouped their forces<br />
and began to prepare for the next encounter. Unfortunately, the<br />
events that followed were ideally suited for their plans.<br />
With the moderating effect of the Bank now removed from the<br />
scene, the nation's banking system passed wholly into the hands of<br />
the state-chartered corporations, many of which were imbued with<br />
the wildcat mentality. Their numbers grew rapidly, and so did the<br />
money supply which they created. Inflation followed in their<br />
footsteps. Public dissatisfaction began to rise.<br />
If the free market had been allowed to operate, it is likely that<br />
competition soon would have weeded out the wildcatters and<br />
restored balance to the system, but it was never given a chance. The<br />
War of 1812 saw to that<br />
ITHE WAR OF 1812<br />
The War of 1812 was one of the most senseless wars in history.<br />
The primary cause, we are told, was the British impressment into<br />
their navy of American sailors on the high seas to assist in the war<br />
against Napoleonic France. But the French had done exactly the<br />
same thing to assist in the war against England, yet their acts were<br />
ignored. Furthermore, the British had already rescinded their<br />
policy regarding American seamen before the war was underway,<br />
which means that the cause of the war had been removed, and<br />
peace could have been restored in honor if Congress had so<br />
wanted. One must conclude that the pro-banking interests in the<br />
United States actually wanted the conflict because of the profits that<br />
could be realized from it. As evidence of this is the fact that the<br />
New England states, which were home to the seamen who had<br />
been impressed into service, were firmly against the war, while the<br />
Western and inland Southern states, which were home to the<br />
myriad of wildcat banks, howled loudly for a clash of arms.<br />
In any event, the war was unpopular with the average citizen,<br />
and it was out of the question for Congress to obtain funding for<br />
armaments through an increase in taxes. So the government needed<br />
the state banks to create that money outside the tax structure and<br />
came to their rescue to protect them from the discipline of the free<br />
market. It was a classic case of the unholy alliance, the cabal, that<br />
always develops between political and monetary scientists. Professor<br />
Rothbard gives the details:<br />
The U.S. government encouraged an enormous expansion in the<br />
number of banks and in bank notes and deposits to purchase the<br />
growing war debt. These new and recklessly inflationary banks in the<br />
Middle Atlantic, Southern, and Western states, printed enormous<br />
quantities of new notes to purchase government bonds. The federal<br />
government then used these notes to purchase arms and<br />
manufactured goods in New England...<br />
By August 1814, it became clear that the banks of the nation apart<br />
from New England could not pay [in specie], that they were insolvent.<br />
Rather than allow the banks of the nation to fail, the governments,<br />
state and federal, decided in August 1814 to allow the banks to<br />
continue in business while refusing to redeem their obligations in<br />
specie. In other words, the banks were allowed to refuse to pay their<br />
solemn contractual obligations....<br />
This general suspension was not only highly inflationary at the<br />
time; it set a precedent for all financial crises from then on. Whether
338 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
the U.S. had a central bank or not, the banks were assured that if they<br />
inflated together and then got in trouble, government would bail them<br />
out 1<br />
The state banks had created enough instant money for the<br />
federal government to raise the debt from $45 million to $127<br />
million, a staggering sum for the fledgling nation. Tripling the<br />
money supply, with no appreciable increase in goods, means the<br />
value of the dollar shrank to about one-third its former purchasing<br />
power. By 1814, when the depositors began to awake to the scam<br />
and demanded their gold instead of paper, the banks closed their<br />
doors and had to hire extra guards to protect officials and employees<br />
from the angry crowds. Once again, the monetary and political<br />
scientists had succeeded in fleecing the American public of<br />
approximately 66% of all the money they held during that period,<br />
and that was on top of the 42% fleecing they got a few years earlier<br />
by the Bank of the United States.<br />
JUGGLING TRICKS AND BANKING DREAMS<br />
Leaning against the storm of paper money all<br />
this time was<br />
Thomas Jefferson, by now, past-President of the United States.<br />
Trying to bring the nation to its senses, he never ceased speaking<br />
out against the evil of dishonest money and debt:<br />
Although all the nations of Europe have tried and trodden every<br />
path of force and folly in a fruitless quest of the same object, yet we still<br />
expect to find in juggling tricks and banking dreams, that money can<br />
be made out of nothing, and in sufficient quantity to meet the expense<br />
of heavy war. ...<br />
The toleration of banks of paper discount costs the United States<br />
one-half of their war taxes; or, in other words, doubles the expenses of<br />
every war. ...<br />
The crisis, then, of the abuses of banking is arrived. The banks<br />
have pronounced their own sentence of death. Between two and three<br />
hundred millions of dollars of their promissory notes are in the hands<br />
of the people, for solid produce and property sold, and they [the<br />
banks] formally declare that they will not pay them.... Paper was<br />
received on a belief that it was cash [gold], and such scenes are now to<br />
take place as will open the eyes of credulity and of insanity itself to the<br />
1. Rothbard, Mystery, pp. 198-99.<br />
2. Writings, Library Edition, Vol. XIV, p. 227.<br />
3. Writings, Library Edition, Vol. XIII, p. 364.<br />
THE CREATURE COMES TO AMERICA 339<br />
dangers of a paper medium abandoned to the discretion of avarice and<br />
of swindlers. ...<br />
It is a wise rule never to borrow a dollar without laying a tax at the<br />
same instant for paying the interest annually and the principal within<br />
a given term. 2 ... We shall consider ourselves unauthorized to saddle<br />
posterity with our debts, and morally bound to pay them ourselves.<br />
... The earth belongs to the living, not the dead.... We may consider<br />
each generation as a distinct nation with a right to . . .<br />
bind themselves,<br />
but not the succeeding generation. ...<br />
The modern theory of the perpetuation of debt has drenched the<br />
earth with blood, and crushed its inhabitants under burdens ever<br />
accumulating.<br />
And still, Congress did not listen.<br />
SUMMARY<br />
America had its first central bank even before the Constitution<br />
was drafted. It was called the Bank of North America and was<br />
chartered by the Continental Congress in 1781. Modeled after the<br />
Bank of England, it was authorized to issue more paper promissory<br />
notes than it held in deposits. In the beginning, these notes were<br />
widely circulated and served as a national currency. Although the<br />
bank was essentially a private institution, it was designed for the<br />
purpose of creating money to lend to the federal government,<br />
which it did from the start.<br />
The Bank of North America was riddled with fraud, and it<br />
quickly fell into political disfavor. Its inflated bank notes eventually<br />
were rejected by ordinary citizens and ceased to circulate outside of<br />
the Bank's home city of Philadelphia. Its charter was allowed to<br />
expire and, in 1783, it was converted into a purely commercial bank<br />
chartered by the state of Pennsylvania.<br />
The advocates of fiat money did not give up. In 1791, the First<br />
Bank of the United States (America's second central bank) was<br />
created by Congress. The new bank was a replica of the first,<br />
including fraud. Private investors in the Bank were among the<br />
nation's most wealthy and influential citizens, including some<br />
Congressmen and Senators. But the largest investment and the<br />
I<br />
Letter to Dr. Thomas Cooper, Sept. 10, 1814, Writings, Library Edition, Vol. XIV,<br />
pp. 187-89.<br />
2. Writings, Library Edition, Vol. XIII, p. 269.<br />
3. Ibid, p. 358.<br />
4. Ibid., p. 270.<br />
5. Ibid., p. 272.
340 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
most powerful influence in the new Bank came from the<br />
Rothschilds in Europe.<br />
The Bank set about immediately to serve its function of creating<br />
money for the government. This led to a massive inflation of the<br />
money supply and rising prices. In the first five years, 42% of<br />
everything people had saved in the form of money was confiscated<br />
through the hidden tax called inflation. This was the same phenomenon<br />
that had plagued the colonies less than two decades<br />
earlier, but instead of being caused by printing-press money, it was<br />
now fueled by fractional-reserve bank notes created by a central<br />
bank.<br />
As the time for renewal of the Bank's charter approached, two<br />
groups with opposite intentions became strange political allies<br />
against it:<br />
the Jeffersonians who wanted sound money; and the<br />
frontier banks, called wildcatters, who wanted unlimited license to<br />
steal. On January 24, 1811, the charter was defeated by one vote in<br />
the Senate and one in the House. The central bank was gone, but<br />
the wildcatters were everywhere.<br />
The War of 1812 was not popular among the American public,<br />
and funding would have been impossible through taxes alone. The<br />
government chose to fund the war by encouraging wildcat banks to<br />
purchase its war-debt bonds and convert them into bank notes<br />
which the government then used to purchase war material. Within<br />
two years, the nation's money supply had tripled, and so had<br />
prices. Once again, the monetary and political scientists had<br />
succeeded in fleecing the American public of approximately 66% of<br />
all the money they held during that period. And that was on top of<br />
the 42% fleecing they got a few years earlier by the Bank of the<br />
United States.<br />
Chapter Seventeen<br />
A DEN OF VIPERS<br />
The story of the Second Bank of the United States,<br />
the nation's third central bank; the election of<br />
Andrew Jackson on an anti-bank -platform; the<br />
battle between President Jackson and the head of<br />
the bank, Nicholas Biddle; the deliberate creation<br />
of a depression to frighten the public into keeping<br />
the bank; Jackson's ultimate victory.<br />
The monetary chaos that existed at the end of the War of 1812,<br />
outlined in the previous chapter, was caused by an almost universal<br />
fraud within the banking industry. Depositors in good faith<br />
placed their gold and silver into banks for safekeeping and for the<br />
convenience of using paper money in their everyday transactions.<br />
The banks, in turn, promised them they could exchange the paper<br />
for their coins whenever they wished. At the same time, however,<br />
through the mechanism of fractional-reserve banking, paper<br />
money was created far in excess of the value of the coins held in<br />
reserve. Since the new money had just as much claim to the coins as<br />
the old, the bankers knew that, if a sizable percentage of their<br />
customers were to request a withdrawal of their coins, that solemn<br />
promise simply could not be kept. This, in fact, is precisely what<br />
happened over and over again during that period.<br />
By 1814, Thomas Jefferson had retired to Monticello and had<br />
bitterly resigned himself to defeat on the issue of money. In a letter<br />
to John Adams he said:<br />
I have ever been the enemy of banks; not of those discounting for<br />
cash [that is, charging interest on loans of real money], but of those<br />
foisting their own paper into circulation, and thus banishing our cash.<br />
My zeal against those institutions was so warm and open at the<br />
establishment of the bank of the U.S. that I was derided as a Maniac by<br />
the tribe of bank-mongers, who were seeking to filch from the public<br />
their swindling and barren gains.... Shall we build an altar to the old<br />
paper money of the revolution, which ruined individuals but saved<br />
the republic, and burn on that all the bank charters present and future,
342 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND A DEN OF VIPERS 343<br />
and their notes with them? For these are to ruin both republic and<br />
the Second Bank of the United States was rooted as deeply in<br />
individuals. This cannot be done. The Mania is too strong. It has seized<br />
by<br />
pritain as it was in America.<br />
its delusions and corruptions all the members of our governments<br />
general, special, and The nation's third central bank ran into deep trouble from the<br />
individual. 1<br />
start. It had promised to continue the tradition of moderating the<br />
Jefferson was right. Congress had neither the wisdom nor the<br />
other banks by refusing to accept any of their notes unless they<br />
courage to let the free market clean up the mess that remained after<br />
were redeemable in specie on demand. But when the other banks<br />
the demise of the first bank of the U.S. If it had, the fraud soon<br />
returned the gesture and required that the new Bank also pay out<br />
would have become understood by the public, the dishonest banks<br />
specie on their demand, it frequently lost its resolve. There was also<br />
would have folded, the losses would have been taken, and the<br />
the tiny matter of corruption. As the Bank's major historian writes:<br />
suffering would have been ended, perhaps forever. Instead, Congress<br />
moved to protect the banks, to organize the fraud, and to<br />
stockholders that it was not advisable to give offense by demand-<br />
"So many influential people were interested [in the state banks] as<br />
perpetuate the losses. All of this was accomplished in 1816 when a<br />
ing payment in specie, and borrowers were anxious to keep the<br />
twenty-year charter was given to the Second Bank of the United<br />
banks in the humor to lend."<br />
States.<br />
In economics, every policy carries a consequence, and the<br />
THE SECOND BANK OF THE UNITED STATES<br />
consequence of the loose monetary policy of the Second Bank of the<br />
In every respect the new bank was a carbon copy of the old,<br />
United States was that America was introduced to her first experience<br />
with what now is called the "boom-bust" cycle. Galbraith tells<br />
with one minor exception. Congress unashamedly extracted from<br />
the private investors what amounted to nothing less than a bribe in<br />
us: "In 1816, the postwar boom was full on; there was especially<br />
the form of $1.5 million "in consideration of the exclusive privileges<br />
active speculation in western lands. The new Bank joyously participated.<br />
and benefits conferred by this Act." 2 The bankers were glad to pay<br />
the fee, not only because it was a modest price for such a profitable<br />
The Bank had the advantage over its competitors of a federal<br />
enterprise, but also because, as before, they received an immediate<br />
charter plus the government's agreement to accept its notes in the<br />
government deposit of one-fifth the total capitalization which then<br />
payment of taxes. But the state banks were by no means left out of<br />
was used as the base for manufacturing much of the remaining<br />
the game. It was still within their power to create money through<br />
startup capital. The charter required the Bank to raise a minimum<br />
fractional-reserve banking and, thus, to further inflate the amount<br />
of $7 million in specie, but even in its second year of operation, its<br />
of the nation's circulating currency. Anxious to get in on this action,<br />
specie never rose above $2.5 million. 3 Once again, the monetary<br />
Pennsylvania chartered thirty-seven new banks in 1817. That same<br />
and political scientists had carved out their profitable niches, and<br />
year, Kentucky followed suit with forty new charters. The total<br />
the gullible taxpayer, his head filled with sweet visions of "banking number of banks grew by 46% in just the first two years after the<br />
reform," was left to pick up the tab.<br />
central bank was created. Any spot along the road that had "a<br />
Another important continuity between the old and the new<br />
church, a tavern, or a blacksmith shop was deemed a suitable place<br />
Bank was the concentration of foreign investment. In fact, the<br />
for setting up a bank." In that same time frame, the money supply<br />
largest single block of stock in the new Bank, about one-third in all, was expanded by an additional $27.4 million; another taxpayer<br />
was held by this group. It is certainly no exaggeration to say that<br />
fleecing of over forty per cent<br />
L<br />
I u T P^ e \L^Fr ed 7 The Adams -fflerson Letters (New York: Simon and 1 Ralph C.H. Catterall, The Second Bankofthe United States (Chicago: University of<br />
Schuster, 1971), Vol. II, p. 424.<br />
Chicago Press, 1902), p. 36.<br />
2. Act of 1816, Section 20, 3 Stat, at 191.<br />
2. Galbraith, p. 77.<br />
3. Rothbard, Mystery, p. 203.<br />
3. Norman Angell, The Story<br />
4. Krooss, p. 25.<br />
ofMoney (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Co., 1929),<br />
1 279.
344 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND A DEN OF VIPERS 345<br />
THE FIRST BOOM-BUST CYCLE<br />
In the past, the effect of this inflationary process always had<br />
been the gradual evaporation of purchasing power and the continuous<br />
transfer of property from those who produced it to those<br />
who controlled the government and ran the banks. This time,<br />
however, the process took on a new twist Gradualism was<br />
replaced by catastrophism. The monetary scientists, with their<br />
hands firmly on the controls of the money machine, now began to<br />
throw the levers, first one way, and then the other. The expansion<br />
and then deliberate contraction of the money supply literally threw<br />
the nation into economic convulsions. Why wait for the apples to<br />
fall when the harvest can be hastened simply by shaking the tree?<br />
In 1818, the Bank suddenly began to tighten its<br />
requirements<br />
for new loans and to call in as many of the old loans as possible.<br />
This contraction of the money supply was justified<br />
to the public<br />
then exactly as it is justified today. It was necessary, they said, to<br />
put the brakes on inflation. The fact that this was the same inflation<br />
the Bank had helped to create in the first place, seems to have gone<br />
unnoticed.<br />
There is no doubt that many bankers and politicians act in good<br />
faith in their attempt to bring under control the inflation they<br />
themselves have caused. Not everyone who benefits from the<br />
central-bank mechanism fully understands it.<br />
Like Frankenstein,<br />
they create a monster without realizing they cannot control it. Their<br />
crime is one of stupidity, not malice. But stupidity is not a<br />
characteristic of the average banker, especially a central banker, and<br />
we must conclude that many of the monetary scientists are well<br />
aware of the monster's power for destruction. At best, they just<br />
don't care as long as they are safe. And at worst, they perceive that<br />
they are in the apple-harvesting business. They deliberately tease<br />
and prod the monster in anticipation of his rampage through the<br />
village orchards. In the final analysis, of course, it is of little<br />
importance whether the shaking of the trees is out of innocence or<br />
malice. The end result is the same. My, how the apples do fall.<br />
The country's first experience with a deliberately created monetary<br />
contraction began in 1818 when the Bank became concerned<br />
about its own ability to survive. Professor Rothbard says:<br />
Starting in July 1818, the government and the BUS [Bank of the<br />
United States] began to see what dire straits they were in; the<br />
enormous inflation of money and credit, aggravated by the massive<br />
fraud, had put the BUS in danger of going under and illegally failing<br />
to maintain specie payments. Over the next year, the BUS began a<br />
series of enormous contractions, forced curtailment of loans,<br />
contractions of credit in the south and west.... The contraction of<br />
money and credit swiftly brought to the United States its first<br />
widespread economic and financial depression. The first nationwide<br />
"boom-bust" cycle had arrived in the United States....<br />
The result of this contraction was a rash of defaults, bankruptcies<br />
of business and manufacturers, and a liquidation of unsound<br />
investments during the boom.<br />
THE CYCLE IS WORSENED BY GOVERNMENT<br />
INTERFERENCE<br />
It is widely believed that panics, boom-bust cycles, and depressions<br />
are caused by unbridled competition between banks; thus the<br />
need for government regulation. The truth is just the opposite.<br />
These disruptions in the free market are the result of government<br />
prevention of competition by the granting of monopolistic power to<br />
a central bank. In the absence of a monopoly, individual banks may<br />
operate in a fraudulent manner only to a limited extent and for a<br />
short period of time. Inevitably, they will be exposed by their more<br />
honest competitors and will be forced out of business. Yes, their<br />
depositors will be injured by the bankruptcy, but the damage will<br />
be limited to a relatively few and will occur only now and then.<br />
Even geographical regions may be hard hit on occasion, but it will<br />
not be a national tragedy with everyone brought to their knees. The<br />
overall economy will absorb the losses, and commerce at large will<br />
continue to prosper. Within an environment of prosperity, even<br />
those who have been injured by fraudulent banking would have a<br />
good chance for rapid recovery. But, when a central bank is<br />
allowed to protect the fraudulent operators and to force all banks to<br />
function the same, the forces of competition can no longer dampen<br />
the effect The expansion becomes universal and gigantic. And, of<br />
course, so does the contraction. Except for the bankers and the<br />
politicians, everyone is injured at the same time; depression is<br />
everywhere; and recovery is long delayed.<br />
This is exactly what happened in the so-called panic of 1819. In<br />
the Documentary History of Banking and Currency, Herman Krooss<br />
writes:<br />
r1. Rothbard, Mystery, pp. 204-05. Also see Galbraith, p. 77.
346 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
A DEN OF VIPERS 347<br />
The Bank, as the largest creditor [to<br />
alternatives: it<br />
the state banks], had two<br />
could write off its debts which of course would wipe<br />
out the stockholders' equity and result in bankruptcy, or it could force<br />
the state banks to meet their obligations which would mean wholesale<br />
bankruptcy among state banks. There was no doubt about the<br />
choice.... The pressure placed upon state banks deflated the economy<br />
drastically, and as the money supply wilted, the country sank into<br />
severe depression.<br />
As historian William Gouge observed: "The Bank was saved,<br />
and the people were ruined/'<br />
Competition between the national Bank and the state banks<br />
during this period had been moved from the open field of the free<br />
market to the closed arena of politics. Free-market competition had<br />
been replaced by government favoritism in the form of charters<br />
which granted the right of monopoly. A federal charter was clearly<br />
better than one issued by a state, but the states fought back fiercely<br />
with what weapons they possessed, and one of those was the<br />
power to tax. Several states began to levy a tax on the paper notes<br />
issued by any bank doing business within their borders which was<br />
not also locally chartered. The intent, although pretended to be the<br />
raising of state revenue, was really to put the federal Bank out of<br />
business.<br />
THE SUPREME COURT UPHOLDS THE BANK<br />
When the Bank refused to pay such a tax to the state of<br />
Maryland, the issue was taken to the Supreme Court in 1819 as the<br />
celebrated case of McCulloch v. Maryland. The Chief Justice at that<br />
time was John Marshall, a leading Federalist and advocate of a<br />
strong, centralized federal government. As was expected, the<br />
Marshall Court carefully tailored its decision to support the federal<br />
government's central bank.<br />
The narrow issue upon which the constitutionality of the Bank<br />
was decided was not whether Congress had the power to directly<br />
or indirectly emit bills of credit or otherwise convert debt into<br />
money. If that had been the issue, the Court would have been hard<br />
pressed to uphold the Bank, for that not only is expressly prohibited<br />
by the Constitution, it is precisely what the Bank had been<br />
1. Krooss, pp. 190-91.<br />
2. William M. Gouge, A Short History of Paper Money and Banking in the United States<br />
(New York: Augustus M. Kelly, 1968), p. 110.<br />
doing all along, and everyone knew it. Instead, the Court focused<br />
upon the narrow question of whether or not the Bank was a<br />
"necessary and proper" means for Congress to execute any other<br />
constitutional powers it might have. From that perspective, it was<br />
unanimously held that the Bank was, indeed, constitutional.<br />
Were the Bank's paper notes the same as Bills of Credit? No,<br />
because they were backed by the credit of the Bank, not the federal<br />
government. True, the Bank created money, and most of it was<br />
used by the government Never mind all that. The Treasury did not<br />
print it, therefore, it was not government money.<br />
Was not the Bank the same as an agency of government? No,<br />
because merely granting it a national monopoly and enforcing that<br />
monopoly with the power of the state does not necessarily make it<br />
"state action/'<br />
Furthermore, the states cannot tax the federal government or<br />
any of its<br />
instruments, including the Bank of the United States,<br />
because, as Marshall stated: "The power to tax is the power to<br />
destroy/'<br />
Here was another end run around the Constitution, executed<br />
this time by the very men who were assumed to be its most loyal<br />
defenders.<br />
The Supreme Court had spoken, but the Court of Public<br />
Opinion had not yet disposed of the case. During the 1820s,<br />
popular sentiment shifted back to the laissez-faire and soundmoney<br />
principles espoused by the Jeffersonian Republicans. But<br />
since the Republican Party had by then abandoned those principles,<br />
a new coalition was formed, headed by Martin Van Buren and<br />
Andrew Jackson, to resurrect them. It was called the Democratic<br />
Party, and one of its agenda items was to abolish the Bank of the<br />
United States. After Jackson was elected to the Presidency in 1828,<br />
he wasted no time in attempting to build Congressional support for<br />
that goal.<br />
NICHOLAS BIDDLE<br />
By this time, the Bank had come under the direction of Nicholas<br />
Biddle who was a formidable adversary to Jackson, not only<br />
because of the power of his position, but because of his strong will<br />
and sense of personal destiny. He was the archetype of the new<br />
Eastern Establishment: wealthy, arrogant, ruthless, and brilliant.<br />
He had graduated from the University of Pennsylvania at the age
348 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND A DEN OF VIPERS 349<br />
of only thirteen, and, as a young man entering business, had fully<br />
mastered the secret science of money.<br />
With the ability to control the flow of the nation's credit, Biddle<br />
soon became one of the most powerful men in America. This was<br />
brought out dramatically when he was asked by a Senate Committee<br />
if his bank ever took advantage of its superior position over the<br />
state banks. He replied: "Never. There are very few banks which<br />
might not have been destroyed by an exertion of the powers of the<br />
Bank. None has ever been injured." As Jackson publicly noted a<br />
few months later, this was an admission that most of the state<br />
banks existed only at the pleasure of the Bank of the United States,<br />
and that, of course, meant at the pleasure of Mr. Biddle.<br />
The year was 1832. The Bank's charter was good for another<br />
four years. But Biddle decided not to wait that long for Jackson to<br />
build his forces. He knew that the President was up for reelection,<br />
and he reasoned that, as a candidate, he would hesitate to be too<br />
controversial. To criticize the Bank is one thing, but to come down<br />
squarely for its elimination altogether would surely cost him many<br />
votes. So, Biddle requested Congress to grant an early renewal of<br />
the charter as a means of softening Jackson's campaign against it.<br />
The bill was backed by the Republicans led by Senator John Clay<br />
and was passed into law on July 3, just before the election<br />
campaigns began in earnest.<br />
JACKSON OVERRIDES CONGRESS<br />
It was brilliant strategy on Biddle's part but it didn't work.<br />
Jackson decided to place his entire political career on the line for<br />
this one issue and, with perhaps the most passionate message ever<br />
delivered to Congress by any President, before or since, he vetoed<br />
the measure. The President's biographer, Robert Remini, says: "The<br />
veto message hit the nation like a tornado. For it not only cited<br />
constitutional arguments against recharter—supposedly the only<br />
reason for resorting to a veto—but political, social, economic, and<br />
nationalistic reasons as well."<br />
Jackson devoted most of his veto message to three general<br />
topics: (1) the injustice that is inherent in granting a government-<br />
1 J.D. Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1 789-<br />
1908 (Washington: Bureau of National Literature and Art, 1908), Vol. II, p. 581.<br />
2. Robert V. Remini, The Life of Andrew Jackson (New York: Harper & Row, 1988),<br />
pp. 227-28.<br />
sponsored monopoly to the Bank; (2) the unconstitutionality of the<br />
Bank even if it were not unjust; and (3) the danger to the country in<br />
having the Bank heavily dominated by foreign investors.<br />
Regarding the injustice of a government-sponsored monopoly,<br />
he pointed out that the stock of the Bank was owned only by the<br />
richest citizens of the country and that, since the sale of stock was<br />
limited to a chosen few with political influence, the common man,<br />
not only is<br />
unfairly excluded from an opportunity to participate,<br />
but he is forced to pay for his banking services far more than they<br />
are worth. Unearned profits are bad enough when they are taken<br />
from one class of citizens and given to another, but it is even worse<br />
when the people receiving those benefits are not even citizens at all<br />
but are, in factforeigners. Jackson said:<br />
It is not our own citizens only who are to receive the bounty of our<br />
Government. More than eight millions of the stock of this bank are<br />
held by foreigners. By this act the American Republic proposes<br />
virtually to make them a present of some millions of dollars.... It<br />
appears that more than a fourth part of the stock is held by foreigners<br />
and the residue is held by a few hundred of our own citizens, chiefly<br />
of the richest class. For their benefit does this act exclude the whole<br />
American people from competition in the purchase of this monopoly<br />
and dispose of it for many millions less than it is worth.<br />
Regarding the issue of constitutionality, he said that he was not<br />
bound by the previous decision of the Supreme Court, because the<br />
President and Congress had just as much right to decide for<br />
themselves whether or not a particular law is<br />
constitutional This<br />
view, incidentally, was not novel at that time. It is only in relatively<br />
recent decades that people have begun to think of the Supreme<br />
Court as being specifically authorized to pass on this question. In<br />
fact, as Jackson correctly pointed out in his veto message, the<br />
founding fathers created a government with power divided between<br />
the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, and that the<br />
purpose of this division was, not merely to divvy up the chores, but<br />
to balance one branch against the other. The goal was not to make<br />
government efficient but to deliberately make it inefficient. Each<br />
President and each legislator is<br />
morally bound, even by oath, to<br />
uphold the Constitution. If each of them does not have the power to<br />
:1- Krooss, pp. 22-23.
350 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND A DEN OF VIPERS 351<br />
decide in conscience what is constitutional, then taking an oath to<br />
uphold it has little meaning.<br />
THE BANK CONTROLLED BY FOREIGN INVESTORS<br />
Regarding the danger to our national security, Jackson returned<br />
to the fact that a major portion of the Bank's stockholders were<br />
foreigners. Even though foreign investors technically were not<br />
allowed to vote their shares, their financial power was so great that<br />
the American investors were clearly beholden to them and would<br />
likely follow their instructions. Jackson concluded:<br />
Is there no danger to our liberty and independence in a bank that<br />
in its nature has so little to bind it to our country?... [Is there not] cause<br />
to tremble for the purity of our elections in peace and for the<br />
independence of our country in war?... Of the course which would be<br />
pursued by a bank almost wholly owned by the subjects of a foreign<br />
power, and managed by those whose interests, if not affections, would<br />
run in the same direction there can be no doubt.... Controlling our<br />
currency, receiving our public monies, and holding thousands of our<br />
citizens in dependence, it would be more formidable and dangerous<br />
than a naval and military power of the enemy.<br />
Jackson saved the greatest passion of his argument for the end.<br />
Speaking now, not to Congress, but to the voters at large, he said:<br />
It is to be regretted that the rich and powerful too often bend the<br />
acts of government to their selfish purposes. Distinctions in society<br />
will always exist under every just government. Equality of talents, of<br />
education, or of wealth cannot be produced by human institutions. In<br />
the full enjoyment of the gifts of Heaven and the fruits of superior<br />
industry, economy, and virtue, every man is equally entitled to<br />
protection by law; but when the laws undertake to add to these natural<br />
and just advantages artificial distinctions, to grant titles, gratuities,<br />
and exclusive privileges, to make the rich richer and the potent more<br />
powerful, the humble members of society—the farmers, mechanics,<br />
and laborers—who have neither the time nor the means of securing<br />
like favors to themselves, have a right to complain of the injustice of<br />
their Government. There are no necessary evils in government. Its<br />
evils exist only in its abuses. If it would confine itself to equal<br />
protection, and, as Heaven does its rains, shower its favor alike on the<br />
high and the low, the rich and the poor, it would be an unqualified<br />
blessing. In the act before me there seems to be a wide and<br />
unnecessary departure from these just principles.<br />
The veto did not defeat the Bank. It was merely a declaration of<br />
war. The major battles were yet to come.<br />
BIDDLE'S CONTROL OVER CONGRESS<br />
As Commanding General of the pro-bank forces,<br />
Biddle had<br />
one powerful advantage over his adversary. For all practical<br />
purposes, Congress was in his pocket. Or, more accurately, the<br />
product of his generosity was in the pockets of Congressmen.<br />
Following the Rothschild Formula, Biddle had been careful to<br />
reward compliant politicians with success in the business world.<br />
Few of them were willing to bite the hand that fed them. Even the<br />
great Senator, Daniel Webster, found himself kneeling at Biddle's<br />
throne. Galbraith says:<br />
Biddle was not without resources. In keeping with his belief that<br />
banking was the ultimate source of power, he had regularly advanced<br />
funds to members of Congress when delay on appropriations bills had<br />
held up their pay. Daniel Webster was, at various times, a director of<br />
the Bank and on retainer as its counsel. "I believe my retainer has not<br />
been renewed or refreshed as usual. If it be wished that my relation to<br />
the Bank should be continued, it may be well to send me the usual<br />
retainers." Numerous other men of distinction had been<br />
accommodated, including members of the press. 1<br />
Webster is a particularly interesting study in how even socalled<br />
"great" men can be compromised by an addiction to wealth.<br />
He had always been an advocate of sound money in Congress, yet,<br />
as a lawyer on Biddle's payroll, he represented the Bank's position<br />
before the Supreme Court in McCulloch v. Maryland. Much of the<br />
twisted logic that allowed the Court to end-run the Constitution<br />
and destroy sound money came from his pen.<br />
After Jackson's veto of the Bank's charter, Biddle requested<br />
Webster to deliver speeches specifically for the purpose of having<br />
the Bank reprint them for mass distribution. In one of those<br />
speeches, Webster echoed the old refrain that the Bank served as a<br />
moderating influence on the nation's other banks and then piously<br />
proclaimed: "Congress can alone coin money;... no State (nor even<br />
Congress itself) can make anything a tender but gold and silver, in<br />
the payment of debts." In an act of astounding hypocrisy, this<br />
speech was distributed widely by the very institution that was<br />
1. Krooss, pp. 26-27.<br />
2. Ibid., pp. 36-37.<br />
1- Galbraith, p. 80.<br />
2. Krooss, p. 2.
352 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
designed specifically for creating fractional fiat money, without<br />
gold or silver backing, to function as tender in the payment of<br />
debts. Then, as now, most people did not discern between words<br />
and actions and believed that this speech, delivered by such a<br />
"great" man, was evidence of the Bank's worthiness. Biddle even<br />
distributed 300,000 copies of Jackson's veto message, apparently in<br />
the belief that many would not read it Obviously, if the Bank<br />
thought it was so bad as to distribute it, it must be bad.<br />
The power of the Bank's money was everywhere. It was as John<br />
Randolph, the fiery Old Republican from Virginia, had said: "Every<br />
man you meet in this House or out of it, with some rare exceptions,<br />
which only serve to prove the rule, is either a stockholder,<br />
president, cashier, clerk or doorkeeper, runner, engraver, papermaker,<br />
or mechanic in some other way to a bank/'<br />
JACKSON APPEALS DIRECTLY TO THE VOTERS<br />
Congress, the banks, speculators, industrialists, and segments<br />
of the press; these were the forces commanded by Biddle. But<br />
[ackson had a secret weapon which had never been used before in<br />
American politics. That weapon was a direct appeal to the electorate.<br />
He took his message on the campaign trail and delivered it in<br />
words well chosen to make a lasting impression on the voter. He<br />
spoke out against a moneyed aristocracy which had invaded the<br />
halls of Congress, impaired the morals of the people, threatened<br />
their liberty, and subverted the electoral process. The Bank, he said,<br />
was a hydra-headed monster eating the flesh of the common man.<br />
He swore to do battle with the monster and slay it or be slain by it.<br />
He bellowed his position to every crowd he could reach: Bank and<br />
no Jackson, or no bank and jacksonl<br />
On the subject of paper money, the President was equally<br />
emphatic. His biographer describes the campaign:<br />
On his homeward journey he reportedly paid all his expenses in<br />
gold. "No more paper money, you see, fellow citizens," he remarked<br />
with each gold payment, "if I can only put down this Nicholas Biddle<br />
and his monster bank." Gold, hardly the popular medium of<br />
exchange, was held up to the people as the safe and sound currency<br />
1. Remini, Life, p. 234.<br />
2. Annals of Congress, 14 Cong., 1st sess., pp. T066, 1110 ff.<br />
3. Robert Remini, Andrew Jackson and the Course of American Freedom, 1822-1832<br />
(New York: Harper & Row, 1981), p. 373.<br />
A DEN OF VIPERS 353<br />
which Jackson and his administration hoped to restore to regular use.<br />
Unlike paper money, gold represented real value and true worth. It<br />
was the corn of honest men. Rag money, on the other hand, was the<br />
instrument of banks and swindlers to corrupt and cheat an innocent<br />
and virtuous public.<br />
Jackson had awakened the indignation of the American people.<br />
When the November ballots were cast, he received a mammoth<br />
vote of confidence. He received fifty-five per cent of the popular<br />
vote (with thirty-seven per cent for Clay, eight per cent for Wirt)<br />
and eighty per cent of the vote in the electoral college. But the war<br />
still was not over. Jackson won the election, but the Bank had four<br />
more years to operate, and it intended to use those years to sway<br />
public sentiment back to its support. The biggest battles were yet to<br />
come.<br />
JACKSON REMOVES FEDERAL DEPOSITS<br />
Jackson did not wait to act. He knew that time would be used as<br />
a weapon against him. "The hydra of corruption is only scotched,<br />
not dead" he said.<br />
Soon after the election, he ordered Secretary of<br />
the Treasury, William Duane, to place all new deposits of the<br />
federal government into various state banks around the country<br />
and to pay current expenses out of the funds still held by the Bank<br />
of the United States until that account was drained to zero. Without<br />
the use of federal money, surely the monster would perish. To<br />
Jackson's chagrin, however, Duane balked at the order out of a<br />
sincere conviction that, to do so, would be disruptive to the<br />
economy.<br />
This was not the first time a Cabinet officer and a President had<br />
come to disagreement. In the past, however, the impasse had<br />
always been resolved by the resignation of the Secretary. This time<br />
was different. Duane refused to resign, and that raised an interesting<br />
constitutional question. A President could appoint a member of<br />
the executive branch only with the consent of the Senate. The<br />
Constitution was silent, however, on the matter of dismissal. Did<br />
that, too, require Senate approval? The implication was that it did,<br />
but the issue had never been tested.<br />
Jackson had no patience for such theoretical<br />
questions. The<br />
letter arrived promptly on Duane's desk: "Your further services as<br />
1- Remini, Life, pp. 234-35.<br />
2. Remini, Course, p. 52.
354 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND A DEN OF VIPERS 355<br />
own course is decided. All other banks and all the merchants may<br />
Secretary of the Treasury are no longer required." On October 1,<br />
5. Remini, Democracy, p. 111. 2. Quoted by Viola, p. 86.<br />
1833, federal deposits began to move out of the Bank.<br />
break, but the Bank of the United States shall not break."<br />
Jackson felt that he finally had the monster firmly within his<br />
Biddle, therefore, decided to use the American people as<br />
grasp. "I have it chained/ 7 he said. With gleeful confidence, he<br />
sacrificial pawns in the giant chess match for the Bank's survival.<br />
added: "I am ready with the screws to draw every tooth and then<br />
the stumps/ 7 If I am not mistaken, he went on, we will have "Mr.<br />
Biddle and his Bank as quiet and harmless as a lamb in six weeks."<br />
The resulting economic chaos is not difficult to imagine. Biddle's<br />
contraction of the money supply was executed at a particularly<br />
vulnerable moment. Business had been expanding as a result of the<br />
Bank's prior easy credit and<br />
BIDDLE DELIBERATELY CREATES MONETARY CHAOS<br />
now was dependent on it. Also, the<br />
tariff came due at precisely this time, placing still more demand for<br />
The President's view of the Bank's meek captivity was premature,<br />
to say the least. Biddle responded, not like a lamb, but more<br />
cash and credit Losses were sustained everywhere, wages and<br />
prices sagged, men were put out of work, companies went bankrupt.<br />
By the time Congress reconvened in December, in what was<br />
like a wounded lion. His plan was to rapidly contract the nation's<br />
money supply and create another panic-depression similar to the<br />
called the "Panic Session," the nation was in an uproar. Newspapers<br />
editorialized with alarm, and letters of angry protest flooded<br />
one the Bank had created thirteen years earlier. This then could be<br />
blamed on Jackson's withdrawal of federal deposits, and the<br />
into Washington.<br />
resulting backlash surely would cause Congress to override the<br />
As the pressure continued to build in Congress, it began to look<br />
President's veto. Remini tells us:<br />
as though Biddle's plan would work. In the public eye, it was<br />
Biddle counterattacked. He initiated a general curtailment of loans<br />
throughout the entire banking system.. . . It marked the beginning of a<br />
Jackson who was solely responsible for the nation's woes. It was his<br />
arrogant removal of Secretary Duane; it was his foolish insistence<br />
bone-crushing struggle between a powerful financier and a<br />
on removing the deposits; it was his obstinate opposition to<br />
determined and equally powerful politician. Biddle understood what<br />
Congress.<br />
he was about. He knew that if he brought enough pressure and agony<br />
to the money market, only then could he force the President to restore JACKSON IS CENSURED BY THE SENATE<br />
the deposits. He almost gloated. "This worthy President thinks that<br />
because he has scalped Indians and imprisoned Judges, he is to have<br />
his way with the Bank. He is mistaken. ,/4 ...<br />
For one-hundred days, a "phalanx of orators" daily excoriated<br />
the President for his arrogant and harmful conduct. At length, a<br />
resolution of censure was introduced into the Senate and, on March<br />
"The ties of party allegiance can only be broken/' he declared, "by<br />
28, 1834, it was passed by a vote of 26 to 20. This was the first time<br />
the actual conviction of existing distress in the community." And such<br />
that a President had ever been censured by Congress, and it was a<br />
distress, of course, would eventually put everything to rights.<br />
savage blow to Jackson's pride. Biddle, at last, had the upper hand.<br />
"Nothing but widespread suffering will produce any effect on<br />
The President<br />
Congress.... Our<br />
rumbled around the White House in a fit of rage.<br />
only safety is in pursuing a steady course of firm<br />
restriction—and I have no doubt<br />
"You<br />
that such a course<br />
are<br />
will ultimately<br />
a den of vipers," he said to a delegation of the Bank's<br />
lead to restoration of the currency and the recharter of the Bank. ... My<br />
supporters. 'T intend to rout you out and by the Eternal God I will<br />
rout you out." 2<br />
1. William J. Duane, Narrative and Correspondence Concerning the Removal of the<br />
The censure was by no means indicative of popular sentiment.<br />
Deposits and Occurrences Connected Therewith (Philadelphia: n.p., 1838), pp. 101-03.<br />
Even in the Senate, which was a hotbed of pro-Bank support, a<br />
Quoted by Remini, Life, p. 264.<br />
2. Quoted by Herman J. Viola, Andrew Jackson (New<br />
swing<br />
York: Chelsea House,<br />
of only three votes would have defeated the measure.<br />
1986),<br />
p. 88.<br />
3. A letter from Jackson to Van Buren, November 19, 1833, Van Buren Papers,<br />
1 Biddle to William Appleton, January 27, 1834, and to J.G. Watmough,<br />
Library of Congress. Quoted by Remini, Life, p. 264.<br />
February 8, 1834. Nicholas Biddle, Correspondence, 1807-1844, Reginald C<br />
4. Remini, Life, p. 265.<br />
McGrane, ed. (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1919), pp. 219, 221.
356 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND A DEN OF VIPERS 357<br />
During all this time, imperceptibly at first, but quickly growing, the<br />
public had been learning the truth. Jackson, of course, was doing<br />
everything within his power to hasten the process, but other factors<br />
also were at work, not the least of which was Biddle himself. So<br />
large was his ego that he could not keep from boasting in public<br />
about his plan to deliberately disrupt the economy. People heard<br />
these boasts and they believed him. The turning point came when<br />
Governor George Wolf of Pennsylvania, the Bank's home state,<br />
came out publicly with a strong denunciation of both the Bank and<br />
Biddle. This was like the starting bell at a horse race. With the<br />
Bank's home state turned against it, there was no one left to defend<br />
it and, literally within days, the mood of the country and of<br />
Congress changed.<br />
The Democrats wasted no time consolidating these unexpected<br />
gains. To test their strength on the issue, on April 4,<br />
1834, they<br />
called for a vote in the House on a series of resolutions which were<br />
aimed at nullifying the censure in the Senate. In essence, the<br />
resolutions stated that the House totally approved the President's<br />
bank policy. The first resolution, passed by a vote of 134 to 82,<br />
declared that the Bank of the United States "ought not to be<br />
rechartered." The second, passed by a vote of 118 to 103, agreed<br />
that the deposits "ought not to be restored." And the third, passed<br />
by an overwhelming vote of 175 to 42, called for the establishment<br />
of a special committee of Congress to investigate whether the Bank<br />
had deliberately instigated the current economic crisis. It was an<br />
overwhelming victory for Jackson which would be culminated a<br />
few years later with the passage of a resolution in the Senate which<br />
formally rescinded the previous vote of censure.<br />
BIDDLE DEFIES CONGRESS<br />
When the investigating committee arrived at the Bank's doors<br />
in Philadelphia armed with a subpoena to examine the books,<br />
Biddle flatly refused. Nor would he allow inspection of correspondence<br />
with Congressmen relating to their personal loans and<br />
advances. And he steadfastly refused to testify before the committee<br />
back in Washington. For lesser mortals, such action would have<br />
resulted in citations of contempt of Congress and would have<br />
carried stiff<br />
Remini explains:<br />
fines or imprisonment. But not for Nicholas Biddle.<br />
The committeemen demanded a citation for contempt, but many<br />
southern Democrats opposed this extreme action, and refused to<br />
cooperate. As Biddle bemusedly observed, it would be ironic if he<br />
went to prison "by the votes of members of Congress because I would<br />
not give up to their enemies their confidential letters." Although<br />
Biddle escaped a contempt citation, his outrageous defiance of the<br />
House only condemned him still further in the eyes of the American<br />
public.<br />
The Bank was still<br />
alive but had been mortally wounded. By<br />
this time, Jackson had completely paid off the national debt<br />
incurred by the War of 1812 and had even run up a surplus. In fact,<br />
he ordered the Treasury to give back to the states more than<br />
$35 million, which was used for the construction of a wide variety<br />
of public works.<br />
With these accomplishments close on the heels of his victory<br />
over the Bank, the President had earned the undying hatred of<br />
monetary scientists, both in America and abroad. It is not surprising,<br />
therefore, that on January 30, 1835, an assassination attempt<br />
was made against him. Miraculously, both pistols of the assailant<br />
misfired, and Jackson was spared by a quirk of fate. It was the first<br />
such attempt to be made against the life of a President of the United<br />
States. The would-be assassin was Richard Lawrence who either<br />
was truly insane or who pretended to be insane to escape harsh<br />
punishment. At any rate, Lawrence was found not guilty due to<br />
insanity. Later, he boasted to friends that he had been in touch<br />
with powerful people in Europe who had promised to protect him<br />
from punishment should he be caught.<br />
The ending to this saga holds no surprises. The Bank's charter<br />
expired in 1836 and it was restructured as a state bank by the<br />
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. After a spree of speculation in<br />
cotton, lavish advances to the Bank's officers, and the suspension of<br />
payment in specie, Biddle was arrested and charged with fraud.<br />
Although not convicted, he was still undergoing civil litigation<br />
when he died. Within five years, the establishment was forced to<br />
close its doors forever, and America's third experience with central<br />
banking came to a close.<br />
1. Remini, Life, p. 274.<br />
2- Remini, Democracy, p. 228-29.<br />
Robert J. Donovan, The Assassins (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952), p. 83.
358 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
SOME BAD MDCED IN WITH THE GOOD<br />
It is tempting to let the story stop right there and allow Jackson<br />
to forever wear the crown of hero and dragon slayer. But a more<br />
balanced view of these events leads to the conclusion that the forces<br />
of virtue were not without contamination. Jackson represented the<br />
position of those who wanted only gold and silver for the nation's<br />
money- But this group was not large enough to match the power of<br />
the Bank. He was joined in that battle by many groups which hated<br />
the Bank for other, less admirable reasons. State banks and business<br />
interests along the expanding frontier, for example, were not the<br />
least interested in Constitutional money. They wanted just the<br />
opposite. They viewed the modest restraints of the federal Bank as<br />
excessive. With the federal Bank out of the way, they anticipated no<br />
restraints at all. As we shall see in the following section, it is ironic<br />
that this is the group that got what it wanted, not the hard-money<br />
Jacksonians.<br />
One cannot blame Jackson for accepting the support of these<br />
groups in his effort to slay the dragon. In politics, it often is<br />
necessary to make temporary alliances with one's opponents to<br />
achieve occasional common objectives.<br />
But Jackson went further<br />
than that. More than any other President before him, and rivalled<br />
by only a few since, he changed the character of American politics.<br />
He led the nation away from the new concept of diffused powers,<br />
carefully worked out by the founding fathers, back toward the<br />
Old-World tradition of concentration and monarchy. By strongly<br />
challenging the right of the States to secede from the Union, he set<br />
into motion a concept that, not only would lead to civil war, but<br />
which would put an end forever to the ability of the states to check<br />
the expanding power of the federal government. No longer was the<br />
Union to be based on the principle of consent of the governed. It<br />
was now to be based on force of arms. And through the manipulation<br />
of voter passion on the Bank issue, he changed the perception<br />
of the role of President from public servant to national leader.<br />
At the height of the battle against the Bank, when Jackson was<br />
making a direct appeal to the voters for support, he declared: "The<br />
President is the direct representative of the people." To fully<br />
comprehend the significance of that statement, it must be remembered<br />
that the plan of the Constitution was for the President to be<br />
elected indirectly by the state legislatures, not by the voters at large.<br />
A DEN OF VIPERS 359<br />
After fighting a war to throw off the rule of King George, in, the<br />
founding fathers wanted nothing more to do with kings of any<br />
land, and they went out of their way to make sure that the<br />
president of the United States would never be looked upon as such.<br />
They realized that an elected ruler, unless his power is carefully<br />
limited and diffused, can become just as despotic as an unelected<br />
one. Article 2, Section 1, of the Constitution, therefore, established<br />
an electoral college to select the President.<br />
Members of the college are to be appointed by the states.<br />
Congressmen, Senators, or other officers of the federal government<br />
are specifically and wisely excluded. The college is supposed to<br />
select a President strictly on the basis of his integrity and executive<br />
ability, not his party label, political connections, good looks,<br />
charisma, or stirring orations. The people may elect their Congressmen,<br />
but the electoral college chooses the President. Thus, it was<br />
intended that the President would have a different constituency<br />
from Congress, and this difference was important to insure the<br />
balance of power that the framers of the Constitution worked so<br />
hard to create. As a means of keeping government under control, it<br />
was a truly brilliant piece of political engineering.<br />
All of that was changed in the election of 1832. One of the sad<br />
facts of history is that good causes often are the occasion for<br />
establishing bad precedents. Jackson's fight against the Bank of the<br />
United States was one of those events.<br />
SUMMARY<br />
The government had encouraged widespread banking fraud<br />
during the War of 1812 as an expedient for paying its bills, and this<br />
had left the nation in monetary chaos. At the end of the war,<br />
instead of allowing the fraudulent banks to fall and letting the free<br />
market heal the damage, Congress decided to protect the banks, to<br />
organize the fraud, and to perpetuate the losses. It did this by<br />
creating the nation's third central bank called the Second Bank of<br />
the United States.<br />
The new bank was almost an exact carbon copy of the previous<br />
one. It was authorized to create money for the federal government<br />
and to regulate state banks. It influenced larger amounts of capital<br />
and was better organized across state lines than the old bank.<br />
Consequently its policies had a greater impact on the creation and<br />
extinguishing of the nation's money supply. For the first time in
360 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
our history, the effects began to ricochet across the entire country at<br />
once instead of being confined to geographical regions. The age of<br />
the boom-bust cycle had at last arrived in America.<br />
In 1820, public opinion began to swing back in favor of the<br />
sound-money principles espoused by the Jeffersonian Republicans.<br />
But since the Republican Party had by then abandoned those<br />
principles, a new coalition was formed, headed by Martin Van<br />
Buren and Andrew Jackson, called the Democrat Party. One of its<br />
primary platforms was the abolishment of the Bank. After Jackson<br />
was elected in 1828, he began in full earnest to bring that about<br />
The head of the Bank was a formidable adversary by the name<br />
of Nicholas Biddle. Biddle, not only possessed great personal<br />
abilities, but many members of Congress were indebted to him for<br />
business favors. Consequently, the Bank had many political<br />
friends.<br />
As Jackson's first term of office neared its end, Biddle asked<br />
Congress for an early renewal of the Bank's charter, hoping that<br />
Jackson would not risk controversy in a reelection year. The bill<br />
was easily passed, but Jackson accepted the challenge and vetoed<br />
the measure. Thus, a battle over the Bank's future became the<br />
primary presidential campaign issue.<br />
Jackson was reelected by a large margin, and one of his first acts<br />
was to remove federal deposits from the Bank and place them into<br />
private, regional banks. Biddle counterattacked by contracting<br />
credit and calling in loans. This was calculated to shrink the money<br />
supply and trigger a national panic-depression, which it did. He<br />
publicly blamed the downturn on Jackson's removal of deposits.<br />
The plan almost worked. Biddle's political allies succeeded in<br />
having Jackson officially censured in the Senate. However, when<br />
the truth about Biddle's strategy finally leaked out, it backfired<br />
against him. He was called before a special Congressional investigative<br />
committee to explain his actions, the censure against Jackson<br />
was rescinded, and the nation's third central bank passed into<br />
oblivion.<br />
Chapter Eighteen<br />
LOAVES AND FISHES<br />
AND CIVIL WAR<br />
Attempts to stabilize the banking system by<br />
political<br />
measures, including regulation of fractional-reserve<br />
ratios and establishing bank-failure<br />
insurance funds; the failure of all such schemes;<br />
the resulting economic conditions that led up to<br />
the Civil War.<br />
As detailed in the previous chapter, by 1836 the hydra-headed<br />
monster had been slain and, true to the President's campaign<br />
promise, the nation had Jackson and no Bank.<br />
In April of that year, the Administration moved to consolidate<br />
its victory and pushed a series of monetary reforms through<br />
Congress. One of these required all banks to cease issuing paper<br />
notes under five dollars. The figure later was increased to twenty<br />
dollars, and its purpose was to compel the nation to return to the<br />
use of gold and silver coin for everyday use, leaving bank notes<br />
primarily for large commercial transactions. The White House also<br />
announced that, in the future, all federal land sales would require<br />
full payment in "lawful money," which, of course, meant preciousmetal<br />
coins.<br />
It must be remembered, however, that even though the Bank of<br />
the United States was dead, banking was very much alive, and so<br />
were Jackson's enemies. Much to the disappointment of the hardmoney<br />
advocates, these measures were not sufficient to usher in<br />
the millennium. Not only were they inadequate by themselves,<br />
they were soon circumvented by the development of new banking<br />
techniques and eventually were dismantled completely by a fickle<br />
Congress.<br />
I<br />
(Columbia, South Carolina: Foundation for American Education, 1979), p. 115.<br />
Otto Scott, The Secret Six: The Fool as Martyr, Vol. Ill of The Sacred Fool Quartet
362 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND LOAVES AND FISHES AND CIVIL WAR 363<br />
The prohibition against bank notes of small denomination<br />
deserves special notice. It was an excellent concept, but what the<br />
legislators failed to understand, or at least pretended not to understand,<br />
was that banks at this time were increasingly dealing with<br />
checkbook money, technically called demand deposits. As people<br />
gradually became accustomed to this new method of transferring<br />
funds, the importance of bank notes declined. Placing a limit on the<br />
issuance of bank notes without any restriction on the creation of<br />
demand deposits was an exercise in futility.<br />
In 1837, as the Bank of the United States slipped into history,<br />
the nation was at the tail end of an economic boom. Professor<br />
Rothbard tells us that this expansion and the accompanying<br />
inflation had been "fueled by the central bank/'<br />
Total money in<br />
circulation had risen by eighty-four per cent in just four years.<br />
Then, as inevitable as the setting sun, that portion of the money<br />
supply which had been created by fractional-reserve banking—in<br />
other words, the<br />
part which was backed by nothing—began to<br />
contract. Sixteen per cent of all the nation's money totally disappeared<br />
in just that first year. Again, men were put out of work,<br />
businesses went into bankruptcy, homes and savings were lost.<br />
Many banks folded also, but their operators walked away with the<br />
spoils. Only the depositors were left holding the empty bag.<br />
There were numerous proposals advanced regarding how to<br />
infuse stability into the banking system. But, then as now, none of<br />
them dealt with the real problem, which was fractional-reserve<br />
banking itself- As Groseclose observed, these proposals were "each<br />
according to a particular theory of how to multiply loaves and<br />
fishes, or how to make candy wool/ 7<br />
Since the proposals presented<br />
then are identical to the ones being offered today, and since each of<br />
them was actually tried, it would seem appropriate to inquire into<br />
the actual results of these experiments.<br />
PROPOSAL TO BASE MONEY ON BANK ASSETS<br />
There were four schools of thought regarding the multiplication<br />
of loaves and fishes. The first of these was that the creation of<br />
money should be limited to a ratio of the bank's assets. This was the<br />
formula that was tried in the New England states. In Massachusetts,<br />
for example, the issuance of bank notes was limited to two<br />
1 Rothbard, Mystery, p. 21 1<br />
2. Groseclose, Money and Man, p. 184.<br />
times the amount of the bank's capital actually held in the vault.<br />
Furthermore, this could not be in the form of paper money, bonds,<br />
securities, or other debt instruments; it had to be strictly gold or<br />
silver coin. Also, the banks were limited in the number of smalldenomination<br />
bank notes they could issue and, in this, Massachusetts<br />
served as the model for Jackson's attempted reform at the<br />
federal level. By previous standards, and certainly by the standards<br />
that prevail today, this was an exceptionally conservative policy. In<br />
fact, even during the previous stress of the War of 1812, when<br />
banks were failing by the hundreds across the country, the Massachusetts<br />
banks, and most of the other New England banks as well,<br />
were able to maintain full payment in specie.<br />
With fhe passage of time, however, the limit on bank notes<br />
became less important, because the banks now were using checkbook<br />
money instead. Their paper notes may have been limited to<br />
two-hundred per cent of their capital, but there was no effective<br />
limit to the numbers they could ink into people's deposit books. So<br />
the "fraction" in fractional-reserve banking began to shrink again.<br />
Consequently, the monetary contraction of 1837 "was like a scythe<br />
bver the crop," says Groseclose, and thirty-two Massachusetts<br />
banks collapsed between that year and 1844.<br />
The state attempted to patch the system by instituting a<br />
network of bank examiners and by increasing the liability of bank<br />
stockholders for the lost funds of their depositors, but the underlying<br />
problem was still<br />
ignored. A new crop of banks then sprang<br />
into existence and a new wave of speculative mania swept through<br />
the economy. By 1862, even though the law still limited bank notes<br />
po two times capital, the banks had created $73,685,000 in total<br />
money, including checkbook money. This was supported by a base<br />
of only $9,595,000 of specie, a reserve of only thirteen per cent.<br />
Massachusetts had not solved the problem.<br />
PROPOSAL TO PROTECT DEPOSITS WITH A SAFETY<br />
FUND<br />
The second theory about how to have stable banking and allow<br />
the banks to create money out of nothing was to create a "safety<br />
fund." This fund, supported by all<br />
the banks, would come to the<br />
aia aid of any member which needed an emergency loan to cover a<br />
1. Groseclose, Money and Man, p. 185.
364 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
365<br />
sudden drain of its reserves. It was the forerunner of today's<br />
So rampant was the note-issue mania that the notes came to be<br />
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and related agencies.<br />
called by the appropriate name of "red dog" and "wild cat"<br />
The first safety fund was established in New York in 1829. The<br />
currency.. . . The rising crop of banks created a fictitious demand and a<br />
law required each bank to contribute annually one-half of one per<br />
rising market for securities (to be used as capital stock) and a<br />
cent of its capital stock until the total reached three per cent. The<br />
consequent stimulus to the creation of public debt by the issue of<br />
fund was first put to the test during the crisis of 1837, and was<br />
securities. This was followed by more bank notes being issued against<br />
almost swamped. The only thing that saved it was that the state<br />
the securities, demand increasing and the market rising, more<br />
securities issues, more bank notes, and so on in an endless chain of<br />
agreed to accept the worthless notes of all the defunct banks as<br />
debt creation and the inflation of paper wealth. The process was finally<br />
payment for canal tolls. In other words, the taxpayers were<br />
brought to a stop by the panic of 1857.<br />
compelled to make up the difference. When the fund was<br />
exhausted, the solvent banks were punished by being forced to pay PROPOSAL TO BACK MONEY WITH STATE CREDIT<br />
for the deficits of the insolvent ones. Naturally, this impelled The fourth proposal for producing something out of nothing<br />
all<br />
banks to act more recklessly. Why not? The up side was that profits<br />
was to back the issuance of money by the full faith and credit of the<br />
state.<br />
would be higher—for a time, at least—and the down side was This was the method tried by many of the Southern states and<br />
that,<br />
it, too,<br />
if recklessness got them into trouble, the safety fund would has survived<br />
bail<br />
to become one of the cornerstones of our<br />
them out. The result was that the system provided a penalty modern-day banking system.<br />
for<br />
Alabama, for<br />
prudence and an incentive for recklessness; a situation with<br />
example, in 1835 created a state bank funded by a<br />
perfect<br />
public bond issue of $13,800,000. Instant<br />
parallel to that which exists in the banking system money flooded through<br />
today.<br />
the economy and people were joyous over the miracle prosperity.<br />
Groseclose says:<br />
The legislators were so intoxicated with the scheme that they<br />
The conservatively managed institutions, lending upon the safer<br />
completely abolished direct taxation and decided to run the<br />
risks, upon which naturally the margins of profit were smaller, found<br />
government<br />
the assessments burdensome, and were compelled to embark upon<br />
on bank money instead. In other words, instead of<br />
the<br />
raising<br />
more speculative business in order to carry the charges.<br />
state revenue through taxes, they found it easier to raise it<br />
through inflation.<br />
Gradually, all banks sank into the quagmire and, in 1857, the<br />
Like all the others, this bubble also burst in the panic of 1837. A<br />
Massachusetts safety-fund was abandoned.<br />
postmortem examination of the Bank showed that $6,000,000 of its<br />
Michigan's experience with a safety fund was perhaps more<br />
assets were completely worthless. The people who had loaned their<br />
typical of the period. It was established in 1836 and was completely<br />
real money to the venture, backed by the full faith and credit of the<br />
blown away the next year, during the panic of 1837.<br />
state, lost almost all of their investment—in addition to what they<br />
PROPOSAL TO BASE MONEY ON SECURITIES<br />
had paid through inflation.<br />
The third proposal for maintaining a stable monetary system<br />
while, at the same time, allowing the banks to operate fraudulently<br />
was to base the money supply on government securities; in other<br />
words, upon paper certificates of government debt. This was the<br />
Mississippi put its full faith and credit behind a state bank in<br />
1838 and issued $15,000,000 in bonds as backing for its bank notes.<br />
The bank was belly-up within four years, and the state completely<br />
repudiated its obligations on the bonds. This infuriated the bond<br />
scheme adopted in the 1850s by Illinois, Indiana, Wisconsin and<br />
holders, particularly the British financiers who had purchased a<br />
other Midwestern states. It also set the precedent for the Federal<br />
Reserve System sixty years later. Groseclose continues:<br />
large portion of the issue. The devastating effect upon the state and<br />
its people is described by Henry Poor:<br />
Groseclose, Money and Man, pp. 188-89.
366 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
LOAVES AND FISHES AND CIVIL WAR 367<br />
The $48,000,000 of the bank's loans were never paid; the<br />
$23,000,000 of notes and deposits were never redeemed. The whole<br />
system fell, a huge and shapeless wreck, leaving the people of the State<br />
very much as they came into the world.... Everybody was in debt,<br />
without any possible means of payment. Lands became worthless, for<br />
the reason that no one had any money to pay for them.... Such<br />
numbers of people fled . . . from the State that the common return upon<br />
legal processes against debtors was in the very abbreviated form<br />
"G.T.T."—gone to Texas. 1<br />
Money, based on the full faith and credit of the state, met<br />
similar fates in Illinois, Kentucky, Florida, Tennessee, and Louisiana.<br />
When the state bank collapsed in Illinois in 1825, all of the<br />
"full-faith" bank notes left in its possession were ceremoniously<br />
burned at the public square. Another bank was formed in 1835 and<br />
collapsed in 1842. So devastating were these experiences that the<br />
Illinois Constitution of 1848 stipulated that, henceforth, the state<br />
should never again create a bank or own banking stock.<br />
In Arkansas, even real estate was tried as a magic wand.<br />
Subscribers to the state bank, instead of putting up cash, were<br />
allowed merely to pledge their real estate holdings as collateral.<br />
The bank notes rapidly plummeted in value to only twenty-five per<br />
cent of their face amount, and within four years, the bank was<br />
gone.<br />
THE MIRAGE OF FREE BANKING<br />
There was a parallel development at this time called "free<br />
banking." The name is an insult to truth. What was called free<br />
banking was merely the conversion of banks from corporations to<br />
private associations. Aside from no longer receiving a charter from<br />
the state, practically every other aspect of the system remained the<br />
same, including a multitude of government controls, regulations,<br />
supports, and other blocks against the free market. George Selgin<br />
reminds us that "permission to set up a bank was usually accompanied<br />
by numerous restrictions, including especially required loans<br />
to the state." 2<br />
1. Henry V. Poor, Money and Its Laws (London: Henry S. King and Co., 1877),<br />
p. 540.<br />
2. George A. Selgin, The TJieory ofFree Banking: Money Supply under Competitive Note<br />
Issue (Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman & Littlefield, 1988), p. 13.<br />
The free banks were no less fraudulent than the chartered<br />
banks. The old custom was revived of rushing gold coins from one<br />
bank to another just ahead of the bank examiners, and of "putting a<br />
ballast of lead, broken glass and (appropriately) ten-penny nails in<br />
the box under a thinner covering of gold coins." 1<br />
When one such<br />
free bank collapsed in Massachusetts, it was discovered that its<br />
bank note circulation of $500,000 was backed by exactly $86.48. 2<br />
Professor Hans Sennholz writes:<br />
Although economists disagree on many things, most see eye to<br />
eye on their acceptance of political control... These economists<br />
invariably point at American money and banking before the Civil War<br />
which, in their judgment, confirms their belief. In particular, they cite<br />
the "Free Banking Era" of 1838-1860 as a frightening example of<br />
turbulent banking and, therefore, applaud the legislation that<br />
strengthened the role of government.<br />
In reality, the instability experienced during the Free Banking Era<br />
was not caused by anything inherent in banking, but resulted from<br />
extensive political intervention..,, "Free banking" acts ... did not<br />
repeal burdensome statutory provisions and regulatory directives. In<br />
fact they added a few. 3<br />
For banking to have been truly free, the states would have had<br />
to do only two things: (1) enforce banking contracts the same as any<br />
other contract, and then (2)<br />
step out of the picture. By enforcing<br />
banking contracts, the executives of any bank which failed to<br />
redeem its currency in specie would have been sent to prison, an<br />
eventuality which soon would have put a halt to currency overissue.<br />
By stepping out of the picture and dropping the pretense of<br />
protecting the public with a barrage of rules, regulations, safety<br />
funds, and guarantees, people would have realized that it was their<br />
responsibility to be cautious and informed. But, instead, the banks<br />
continued to enjoy the special privilege of suspending payment<br />
without punishment, and the politicians clamored to convince the<br />
voters that they were taking care of everything.<br />
In short, throughout this entire period of bank failures, economic<br />
chaos, and fleecing of both investors and taxpayers, America<br />
I Galbraith,p. 87.<br />
2. Charles Beard, The Rise of American Civilization (New York: Macmillan, 1930),<br />
Vol. r, pp. 429-30.<br />
3. "Old Banking Myths/' by Hans F. Sennholz, The Freeman (Irvington-on-<br />
Hudson, New York), May, 1989, pp. 175-76.
368 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
LOAVES AND FISHES AND CIVIL WAR 369<br />
tried everything except full redemption by gold and silver. As the<br />
name of Andrew Jackson faded into history, so did the dream of<br />
honest banking.<br />
Not all banks were corrupt, and certainly not all bankers were<br />
conspirators against the public. There were many examples of<br />
honest men striving to act in an ethical manner in the discharge of<br />
their fiduciary responsibilities. But they were severely hampered<br />
by the system within which they labored, a system which, as<br />
previously illustrated, punished prudence and rewarded recklessness.<br />
In balance, the prudent banker was pushed aside by the<br />
mainstream and became but a footnote to the history of that period.<br />
INDUSTRIAL EXPANSION IN SPITE OF DISHONEST<br />
BANKING<br />
Another positive aspect to the picture is that it was during this<br />
same time that many business enterprises came into being and<br />
greatly prospered, albeit at the expense of those who had no desire<br />
to contribute. The great canals were dug, the railroads pushed back<br />
the frontier, boom towns sprang up along the way, prairies were<br />
turned into agricultural land, and new businesses followed in their<br />
wake. Much of this expansion was facilitated by a flood of<br />
fraudulent money created by the banks. Apologists for fractionalreserve<br />
banking have been prone to look at this development and<br />
conclude that, in net balance, it was a good thing. The fact that<br />
some people were cheated in order for others to prosper did not<br />
seem to be important. America just wouldn't have grown and<br />
prospered without funny money. Galbraith, for example, exudes:<br />
As civilization, or some approximation, came to an Indiana or<br />
Michigan crossroads in the 1830s or 1840s, so did a bank. Its notes,<br />
when used and loaned to a farmer to buy land, livestock, feed, seed,<br />
food or simple equipment, put him into business. If he and others<br />
prospered and paid off their loans, the bank survived. If he and others<br />
did not so prosper and pay, the bank failed, and someone — perhaps a<br />
local creditor, perhaps an eastern supplier—was left holding the<br />
worthless notes. But some borrowers from this bank were by now in<br />
business. Somewhere, someone holding the notes had made an<br />
involuntary contribution to the winning of the West.... The [banking]<br />
anarchy served the frontier far better than a more orderly system that<br />
kept a tight hand on credit could have done. 1<br />
pitted brother against brother.<br />
1. Galbraith, p. 85.<br />
r<br />
William Greider continues this rationale:<br />
"Reckless, booming anarchy/' in short, produced fundamental<br />
progress. It was not a stable system, racked as it was with bank failures<br />
and collapsed business ventures, outrageous speculation and<br />
defaulted loans. Yet it was also energetic and inventive, creating<br />
permanent economic growth that endured after the froth had blown<br />
away.<br />
This, of course, is a classic example of the failure of liberal<br />
economics. When evaluating a policy, it focuses only on one<br />
beneficial<br />
consequence for one group of people and ignores the<br />
multitude of harmful effects which befall all other groups. Yes, if we<br />
look only at the frontiersmen who acquired new ranches and<br />
established new business, the fractional-reserve system looks<br />
pretty good. But, if we add in to the equation all the financial losses<br />
to all of the people who were victimized by the system—what<br />
Galbraith calls "an involuntary contribution ,/ and what Greider<br />
lightly dismisses as "froth"—then the product is zero at best and, in<br />
terms of morality, is deeply in the negative.<br />
Galbraith, Greider, and other popular economists assume that<br />
the West could not possibly have been won with honest banking.<br />
Logic does not support such a conclusion. There is every reason to<br />
believe that the bank failures and the resulting business failures on<br />
the frontier all but canceled out the gains that were made by hard<br />
work and honest industry. Had these destructive convulsions been<br />
absent, as most of them would have been under a less chaotic<br />
system, there likely would have been fewer business starts, but a<br />
greater number would have finished, and it is entirely possible that<br />
the West would have been won even faster than it was.<br />
It's too bad the theory has never been tried.<br />
THE UNION IN JEOPARDY<br />
As chronicled in a previous section, economic conflict has<br />
always played a major role in fomenting war. There is no time in<br />
American history in which there was more economic conflict<br />
between segments of the population than there was prior to the<br />
Civil War. It is not surprising, therefore, that this period led directly<br />
into the nation's bloodiest war, made all the more tragic because it<br />
Gteider, p. 259.
370 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND LOAVES AND FISHES AND CIVIL WAR 371<br />
There are many popular myths about the cause of the War<br />
Between the States. Just as the Bolshevik Revolution is commonly<br />
believed to have been a spontaneous mass uprising against a<br />
tyrannical aristocracy, so, too, it is generally accepted that the Civil<br />
War was fought over the issue of slavery. That, at best, is a<br />
half-truth. Slavery was an issue, but the primary force for war was a<br />
clash between the economic interests of the North and the South.<br />
Even the issue of slavery itself was based on economics. It may<br />
have been a moral issue in the North where prosperity was derived<br />
from the machines of heavy industry, but in the agrarian South,<br />
where fields had to be tended by vast work forces of human labor,<br />
the issue was primarily a matter of economics.<br />
The relative unimportance of slavery as a cause for war was<br />
made clear by Lincoln himself during his campaign for the<br />
Presidency in 1860, and he repeated that message in his first<br />
inaugural address:<br />
Apprehension seems to exist among the people of the Southern<br />
States that by the accession of a Republican administration their<br />
property and their peace and personal security are to be<br />
endangered.... I have no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere<br />
with the institution of slavery in the states where it now exists. I<br />
believe I have no lawful right to do so, and I have no inclination to do<br />
so.<br />
Even after the outbreak of war in 1861, Lincoln confirmed his<br />
previous stand. He declared:<br />
My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and it is<br />
not either to save or destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without<br />
freeing any slave, I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing all the<br />
slaves, I would do it; and if I could do it by freeing some and leaving<br />
others alone, I would also do that.<br />
It may come as a surprise to learn that, by strict definition,<br />
Abraham Lincoln was a white supremacist. In his fourth debate<br />
with Senator Stephen Douglas, he addressed the subject bluntly:<br />
I am not nor ever have been in favor of bringing about in any way<br />
the social and political equality of the white and black races—that I am<br />
1. Don E. Fehrenbacher, ed., Abraham Lincoln: Speeches and Writings, 1859-1865<br />
(New York: Library of America, 1989), p. 215.<br />
2, Quoted by Robert L. Polley, ed., Lincoln: His Words and His World (Waukesha,<br />
Wisconsin: Country Beautiful Foundation, 1965), p. 54.<br />
not nor ever have been in favor of making voters or jurors of Negroes,<br />
nor of qualifying them to hold office, nor to intermarry with white<br />
people; and I will say in addition to this that there is a physical<br />
difference between the white and black races which I believe will<br />
forever forbid the two races living together on terms of social and<br />
political equality. And inasmuch as they cannot so live, while they do<br />
remain together there must be the position of superior and inferior,<br />
and I as much as any other man am in favor of having the superior<br />
position assigned to the white race. 1<br />
This is not to say that Lincoln was indifferent to the institution<br />
of slavery, for he felt strongly that it was a violation of personal and<br />
national<br />
morality, but he also knew that slavery was gradually<br />
being swept away all over the world—with the possible exception<br />
of Africa itself—and he believed that it would soon disappear in<br />
America simply by allowing the natural forces of enlightenment to<br />
work their way through the political system. He feared—and<br />
rightly so—that to demand immediate and total reform, not only<br />
would destroy the Union, it would lead to massive bloodshed and<br />
more human suffering than was endured even under slavery itself.<br />
He said:<br />
I have not allowed myself to forget that the abolition of the Slave<br />
trade by Great Britain was agitated a hundred years before it was a<br />
final success; that the measure had its open fire-eating opponents; its<br />
stealthy "don't-care" opponents; its dollar-and-cent opponents; its<br />
inferior-race opponents; its Negro-equality opponents; and its religion<br />
and good-order opponents; that all these opponents got offices, and<br />
their adversaries got none. But I have also remembered that though<br />
they blazed like tallow-candles for a century, at last they flickered in<br />
the socket, died out, stank in the dark for a brief season, and were<br />
remembered no more, even by the smell. School boys know that<br />
Wilbeforce and Granville Sharpe helped that cause forward; but who<br />
can now name a single man who labored to retard it? Remembering<br />
these things I cannot but regard it as possible that the higher object of<br />
this contest may not be completely attained within the term of my<br />
natural life.<br />
If Lincoln's primary goal in the War was not the abolition of<br />
slavery but simply to preserve the Union, the question arises: Why<br />
did the Union need preserving? Or, more pointedly, why did the<br />
Southern states want to secede?<br />
1. Fehrenbacher, p. 636.<br />
Ibid., p. 438.
372 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
LEGAL PLUNDER, NOT SLAVERY, THE CAUSE OF WAR<br />
The South, being predominantly an agricultural region, had to<br />
import practically all of its manufactured goods from the Northern<br />
states or from Europe, both of which reciprocated by providing a<br />
market for the South's cotton. However, many of the <strong>text</strong>iles and<br />
manufactured items were considerably cheaper from Europe, even<br />
after the cost of shipping had been added. The Southern states,<br />
therefore, often found it to their advantage to purchase these<br />
European goods rather than those made in the North. This put<br />
considerable competitive pressure on the American manufacturers<br />
to lower their prices and operate more efficiently.<br />
The Republicans were not satisfied with that arrangement.<br />
They decided to use the power of the federal government to tip the<br />
scales of competition in their favor. Claiming that this was in the<br />
"national interest/' they levied stiff import duties on almost every<br />
item coming from Europe that was also manufactured in the North.<br />
Not surprisingly, there was no duty applied to cotton which,<br />
presumedly, was not a commodity in the national interest One<br />
result was that European countries countered by stopping the<br />
purchase of U.S. cotton, which badly hurt the Southern economy.<br />
The other result was that manufacturers in the North were able to<br />
charge higher prices without fear of competition, and the South<br />
was forced to pay more for practically all of its necessities. It was a<br />
classic<br />
case of legalized plunder in which the law was used to<br />
enrich one group of citizens at the expense of another.<br />
Pressure from the North against slavery in the South made<br />
matters even more volatile. A fact often overlooked in this episode<br />
is that the cost of a slave was very high, around $1,500 each. A<br />
modest plantation with only forty or fifty slaves, therefore, had a<br />
large capital investment which, in terms of today's purchasing<br />
power, represented many millions of dollars. To the South, therefore,<br />
abolition meant, not only the loss of its ability to produce a<br />
cash crop, but the total destruction of an enormous capital base.<br />
Many Southern plantation owners were working toward the<br />
day when they could convert their investment to more profitable<br />
industrial production as had been done in the North, and others felt<br />
that freemen who were paid wages would be more efficient than<br />
slaves who had no incentive to work. For the present, however,<br />
they were stuck with the system they inherited. They felt<br />
that a<br />
LOAVES AND FISHES AND CIVIL WAR 373<br />
complete and sudden abolition of slavery with no transition period<br />
would destroy their economy and leave many of the former slaves<br />
to starve—all of which actually happened in due course. 1<br />
That was the situation that existed at the time of Lincoln's<br />
campaign and why, in his speeches, he attempted to calm the fears<br />
of the South about his intentions. But his words were mostly<br />
political rhetoric. Lincoln was a Republican, and he was totally<br />
dependent on the Northern industrialists who controlled the Party.<br />
Even if he had wanted to—and there is no indication that he<br />
did—he could not have reversed the trend of economic favoritism<br />
and protectionism that swept him into office.<br />
MEXICO AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE<br />
In addition to the conflicting interests between North and<br />
South, there were other forces also working to split the nation in<br />
two. Those forces were rooted in Europe and centered around the<br />
desire of France, Spain, and England to control the markets of Latin<br />
America. Mexico was the prime target. This was the reason the<br />
Monroe Doctrine had been formulated thirty-eight years previously.<br />
President James Monroe had put the European nations on<br />
notice that the United States would not interfere in their affairs, and<br />
that any interference by them in American affairs would not be<br />
tolerated. In particular, the proclamation said that the American<br />
continents were no longer to be considered as available for<br />
colonization.<br />
None of the European powers wanted to put this issue to the<br />
test, but they knew that if the United States were to become<br />
embroiled in a civil war, it could not also cross swords in Latin<br />
America. To encourage war between the states, therefore, was to<br />
pave the way for colonial expansion in Mexico. The Americas had<br />
become a giant chess board for the game of global politics.<br />
In the American Heritage Picture History of the Civil War, we read:<br />
The war had not progressed very far before it was clear that the<br />
ruling classes in each of these two countries [England and France]<br />
sympathized strongly with the Confederacy—so strongly that with<br />
just a little prodding they might be moved to intervene and bring<br />
about Southern independence by force of arms.... Europe's<br />
aristocracies had never been happy about the prodigious success of<br />
| See "No Civil War at All; Part One/' by WiUiam Mcllhany, Journal ofIndividualist<br />
Studies, Winter, 1992, p. 41.
374 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND LOAVES AND FISHES AND CIVIL WAR 375<br />
the Yankee democracy. If the nation now broke into halves, proving<br />
that democracy did not contain the stuff of survival, the rulers of<br />
Europe would be well pleased.<br />
The global chess match between Lincoln on the one side and<br />
England and France on the other was closely watched by the other<br />
leaders of Europe. One of the most candid observers at that time<br />
was the Chancellor of Germany, Otto von Bismarck. Since Bismarck<br />
was, himself, deeply obligated to the power of international<br />
finance, his observations are doubly revealing. He said:<br />
The division of the United States into federations of equal force<br />
was decided long before the Civil War by the high financial powers of<br />
Europe. These bankers were afraid that the United States, if they<br />
remained in one block and as one nation, would attain economic and<br />
financial independence, which would upset their financial domination<br />
over the Europe and the world. Of course, in the "inner circle" of<br />
Finance, the voice of the Rothschilds prevailed. They saw an<br />
opportunity for prodigious booty if they could substitute two feeble<br />
democracies, burdened with debt to the financiers,... in place of a<br />
vigorous Republic sufficient unto herself. Therefore, they sent<br />
their<br />
emissaries into the field to exploit the question of slavery and to drive<br />
a wedge between the two parts of the Union.. . .<br />
The rupture between<br />
the North and the South became inevitable; the masters of European<br />
finance employed all their forces to bring it about and to rum it to their<br />
advantage.<br />
The strategy was simple but effective. Within months after the<br />
first clash of arms between North and South, France had landed<br />
troops in Mexico. By 1864, the Mexicans were subdued, and the<br />
French monarch installed Ferdinand Maximilian as the puppet<br />
emperor. The Confederacy found a natural ally in Maximilian, and<br />
it was anticipated by both groups that, after the successful execution<br />
of the War, they would combine into a new nation<br />
dominated by the financial power of Rothschild, of course. At the<br />
same time, England moved eleven-thousand troops into Canada,<br />
1. Bruce Catton, author; Richard M. Ketchum, ed v The American Heritage Picture<br />
History of the Civil War (New York: American Heritage Publishing Co., I960), p. 249.<br />
2. This statement was quoted by Conrad Siem, a German who became a U.S.<br />
citizen and who wrote about the lifeand views of Bismark. It was published in La<br />
Vieille France, No. 216, March 17-24, 1921, pp. 13-16. The reader should be<br />
cautioned that Bismarck was no paragon of virtue and, as the father of modern<br />
socialism, his political views should be taken with a healthy degree of caution. All<br />
that aside, there is little doubt that this quotation represents an accurate appraisal<br />
of the machinations of the European Cabal at that time.<br />
positioned them menacingly along the Union's northern flank, and<br />
placed the British fleet onto war-time alert<br />
The European powers were closing in for a checkmate.<br />
SUMMARY<br />
The Second Bank of the United States was dead, but banking<br />
was very much alive. Many of the old problems continued, and<br />
new ones arrived. The issuance of banknotes had been severely<br />
limited, but that was largely offset by the increasing use of<br />
checkbook money, which had no limits at all on its issue.<br />
When the Bank of the U.S. slipped into history, the nation was<br />
nearing the end of the boom phase of a boom /bust cycle. When the<br />
inevitable contraction of the money supply came, politicians began<br />
to offer proposals on how to infuse stability into the banking<br />
system. None dealt with the real problem, which was fractionalreserve<br />
banking itself. They concentrated instead on proposals on<br />
how to make it work. All of these proposals were tried and they<br />
failed.<br />
These years are sometimes described as a period of free<br />
banking, which is an insult to truth. All that happened was that<br />
banks were converted from corporations to private associations, a<br />
change in form, not substance. They continued to be burdened by<br />
^government controls, regulations, supports, and other blocks<br />
against the free market.<br />
The economic chaos and conflict of this period was a major<br />
cause of the Civil War. Lincoln made it clear during his public<br />
speeches that slavery was not the issue. The basic problem was the<br />
North and the South were dependent on each other for trade. The<br />
industrialized North sold its products to the South which sold its<br />
•cotton to the North. The South also had a similar trade with<br />
Europe, and that was an annoyance to the North. Europe was<br />
selling many products at lower prices, and the North was losing<br />
-market share. Northern politicians passed protectionist legislation<br />
putting import duties on industrial products. This all but stopped<br />
§he importation of European goods and forced the South to buy<br />
(from the North at higher prices. Europe retaliated by curtailing the<br />
burchase of American cotton. That hurt the South even more. It was<br />
a classic case of legalized plunder, and the South wanted out.<br />
1 . Catton and Ketchum, p. 250. Also Otto Eisenschiml, The Hidden Face of the Civil<br />
War (New York: Bobbs-Merril, 1961), p. 25.
376 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
Meanwhile, there were powerful forces in Europe that wanted<br />
to see America embroiled in civil war. If she could be split into two<br />
hostile countries, there would be less obstacle to European expansion<br />
on the North American continent. France was eager to capture<br />
Mexico and graft it onto a new empire which would include many<br />
of the Southern states as well. England, on the other hand, had<br />
military forces poised along the Canadian border ready for action.<br />
Political agitators, funded and organized from Europe, were active<br />
on both sides of the Mason-Dixon line. The issue of slavery was but<br />
a ploy. America had become the target in a ruthless game of world<br />
economics and politics.<br />
Chapter Nineteen<br />
GREENBACKS AND<br />
OTHER CRIMES<br />
The causes of the Civil War shown to be economic<br />
and political, not the issue offreedom vs. slavery;<br />
the manner in which both sides used fiat money to<br />
finance the war; the important role played by<br />
foreign powers.<br />
In the previous chapter, we saw how the American continent<br />
had become a giant chess board in a game of global politics. The<br />
European powers had been anxious to see the United States<br />
become embroiled in a civil war and eventually break into two<br />
smaller and weaker nations. That would pave the way for their<br />
further colonization of Latin America without fear of the Americans<br />
being able to enforce the Monroe Doctrine. And so it was that,<br />
within a few months after the outbreak of war between North and<br />
South, France landed troops in Mexico and, by 1864, had installed<br />
Maximilian as her puppet monarch. Negotiations were begun<br />
immediately to bring Mexico into the war on the side of the<br />
Confederacy. England moved her troops to the Canadian border in<br />
a show of strength. America was facing what appeared to be a<br />
checkmate from the powers in Europe.<br />
RUSSIA AUGNS WITH THE NORTH<br />
It was a masterful move that possibly could have won the game<br />
had not an unexpected event tipped the scale against it. Tsar<br />
Alexander II—who, incidentally, had never allowed a central bank<br />
to be established in Russia —notified Lincoln that he stood ready<br />
to militarily align with the North. Although the Tsar had recently<br />
freed the serfs in his own country, his primary motivation for<br />
1- His grandson, Tsar Nicholas, II, did accept loans from J.P. Morgan. In a classic<br />
application of the Rothschild Formula, Morgan also funded the Mensheviks and the<br />
Bolsheviks. The Mensheviks forced Nicholas to abdicate, and the Bolsheviks executed<br />
him. See Chernow, pp. 195, 211.
378 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND GREENBACKS AND OTHER CRIMES 379<br />
coming to the aid of the Union undoubtedly had little to do with<br />
emancipating the slaves in the South. England and France had been<br />
maneuvering to break up the Russian empire by splitting off<br />
Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Crimea, and Georgia. Napoleon<br />
III,<br />
of France, proposed to Great Britain and Austria that the three<br />
nations immediately declare war on Russia to hasten this dismemberment.<br />
Knowing that war was being considered by his enemies, Tsar<br />
Alexander decided to play a chess game of his own. In September<br />
of 1863, he dispatched his Baltic fleet of war ships to Alexandria,<br />
Virginia, and his Asiatic fleet to San Francisco. The significance of<br />
this move was explained by Russian-born Carl Wrangell-<br />
Rokassowsky:<br />
No treaty was signed between Russia and the United States, but<br />
their mutual interest, and the threat of war to both, unified these two<br />
nations at this critical moment. By dispatching his Baltic Fleet to the<br />
North American harbors, the Tsar changed his position from a<br />
defensive to an offensive one. Paragraph 3 of the instructions given to<br />
Admiral Lessovsky by Admiral Krabbe, at that time Russian Secretary<br />
of the Navy, dated July 14th, 1863, ordered the Russian Fleet, in case of<br />
war, to attack the enemies' commercial shipping and their colonies so<br />
as to cause them the greatest possible damage. The same instructions<br />
were given to Admiral Popov, Commander of the Russian Asiatic<br />
Fleet.<br />
The presence of the Russian Navy helped the Union enforce a<br />
devastating naval blockade against the Southern states which<br />
denied them access to critical supplies from Europe. It was not that<br />
these ships single-handedly kept the French and English vessels at<br />
bay. Actually there is<br />
no record of them even firing upon each<br />
other, but that is the point. The fact that neither France nor England<br />
at that time wanted to risk becoming involved in an open war with<br />
the United States and Russia led them to be extremely cautious with<br />
overt military aid to the South. Throughout the entire conflict, they<br />
found it expedient to remain officially neutral. Without the inhibiting<br />
effect of the presence of the Russian fleet, the course of the war<br />
could have been significantly different.<br />
I<br />
The beginning of the war did not go well for the North, and in<br />
the early years, the outcome was far from certain. Not only did the<br />
Union army face repeated defeats on the battlefield, but enthusiasm<br />
from the people at home was badly sagging. As mentioned<br />
previously, at the outset this was not a popular war based on<br />
humanitarian principle; it was a war of business interests. That<br />
presented two serious problems for the North. The first was how to<br />
get people to fight, and the second was how to get them to pay.<br />
Both problems were solved by the simple expediency of violating<br />
the Constitution.<br />
THE EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION<br />
To get people to fight, it was decided to convert the war into an<br />
anti-slavery crusade. The Emancipation Proclamation was primarily<br />
a move on the part of Lincoln to fan the dying embers of support<br />
for the "Rich-man's war and the poor-man's fight/' as it was<br />
commonly called in the North. Furthermore, it was not an amendment<br />
to the Constitution nor even an act of Congress. It was issued,<br />
totally without constitutional authority, as the solitary order of<br />
Lincoln himself, acting as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces.<br />
Preservation of the Union was not enough to fire men's<br />
enthusiasm for war. Only the higher issue of freedom could do<br />
that. To make the cause of freedom synonymous with the cause of<br />
the North, there was no alternative but to officially declare against<br />
slavery. After having emphasized over and over again that slavery<br />
was not the reason for war, Lincoln later explained why he changed<br />
his course and issued the Proclamation:<br />
Things had gone from bad to worse until I felt we had reached the<br />
end of our rope on the plan we were pursuing; that we had about<br />
played our last card, and must change our tactics or lose the game. I<br />
now determined upon the adoption of the emancipation policy.<br />
The rhetoric of the Proclamation was superb, but the concept<br />
left a great deal to be desired. Bruce Catton, writing in the American<br />
Heritage Pictorial History of the Civil War explains:<br />
Technically, the proclamation was almost absurd. It proclaimed<br />
freedom for all slaves in precisely those areas where the United States<br />
could not make its authority effective, and allowed slavery to continue<br />
in slave states which remained under Federal control. . . . But in the end<br />
1. Carl Wrangell-Rokassowsky, Before the Storm (Ventimiglia, Italy: Tipo-<br />
Litografia Ligure, 1972), p. 57.<br />
1. Quoted by Charles Adams, Fight, Flight, Fraud: The Story of Taxation (Curacao,<br />
Th, The Netherlands: Euro-Dutch Publishers, 1982), p. 229.
380 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND GREENBACKS AND OTHER CRIMES 381<br />
it<br />
changed the whole character of the war and, more than any other<br />
single thing, doomed the Confederacy to defeat.<br />
The Proclamation had a profound impact on the European<br />
powers as well. As long as the war had been viewed as an attempt<br />
on the part of a government to put down rebellion, there was<br />
nothing sacred about it, and there was no stigma attached to<br />
helping either side. But now thatfreedom was the apparent issue, no<br />
government in Europe—least of all England and France—dared to<br />
anger its own subjects by taking sides against a country that was<br />
trying to destroy slavery. After 1862 the chance that Europe would<br />
militarily intervene on behalf of the Confederacy rapidly faded to<br />
zero. On the propaganda front, the South had been maneuvered<br />
into a position which could not be defended in the modern world.<br />
Converting the war into an antislavery crusade was a brilliant<br />
move on Lincoln's part, and it resulted in a surge of voluntary<br />
recruits into the Union army. But this did not last. Northerners may<br />
have disapproved of slavery in the South but, once the bloodletting<br />
began in earnest, their willingness to die for that conviction began<br />
to wane. At the beginning of the war, enlistments were for only<br />
three months and, when that period was over, many of the soldiers<br />
declined to renew. Lincoln faced the embarrassing reality that he<br />
soon would have no army to carry on the crusade.<br />
RAISING ARMIES ON BOTH SIDES<br />
Historically, men are willing to take up arms to defend their<br />
families, their homes, and their country when threatened by a<br />
hostile foe. But the only way to get them to fight in a war in which<br />
they have no perceived personal interest is either to pay them large<br />
bonuses and bounties or toforce them to do so by conscription. It is<br />
not surprising, therefore, that both methods were employed to<br />
keep the Union army in the field. Furthermore, although the<br />
Constitution specifies that only Congress can declare war and raise<br />
an army, Lincoln did so entirely on his own authority.<br />
The Northern states were given an opportunity to fill<br />
a specified<br />
quota with volunteers before conscription began. To meet<br />
these quotas and to avoid the draft, every state, township, and<br />
county developed an elaborate bounty system. By 1864, there were<br />
1 Catton and Ketchum, p. 252.<br />
2. Congress later ratified Lincoln's actions, but, by that time, it had little choice.<br />
The War was underway.<br />
many areas where a man could receive more than $1,000<br />
equivalent to over $50,000 today —<br />
just for joining the army. A<br />
person of wealth could avoid the draft simply by paying a<br />
commutation fee or by hiring someone else to serve in his place.<br />
In the South, the government was even more bold in its<br />
approach to conscription. Despite its cherished views on states'<br />
rights, the Confederacy immediately gathered into Richmond<br />
many of the powers and prerogatives of a centralized, national<br />
government. In 1862 it passed a conscription law which placed<br />
exclusive control over every male citizen between the ages of<br />
eighteen and thirty-five into the hands of the Confederate President.<br />
As in the North, there were important loopholes. The owner<br />
or overseer of twenty slaves, for example, could not be called into<br />
military service.<br />
In all fairness, it must be noted that many did not<br />
take advantage of this exclusion. In contrast to the North, soldiers<br />
perceived that they were fighting for the defense of their families,<br />
homes, and property rather than for an abstract cause or for a cash<br />
bounty.<br />
REBELLION IN THE NORTH<br />
When conscription was initiated by Lincoln in 1863, people in<br />
&he North were outraged. In New York's Madison Square,<br />
thousands of protesters marched in torch parades and attended<br />
anti-Lincoln rallies.<br />
Historian James Horan describes the mood:<br />
''When caricatures of the President were lifted above the speaker's<br />
stand, hisses rose to fill the night with the noise of a million angry<br />
bees/'<br />
Federal troops eventually had to be called in to put down<br />
Itfitidraft riots in Ohio and Illinois. In New York City, when the first<br />
names of the draft were published in the papers on July 12, mobs<br />
Stormed the draft offices and set fire to buildings. The riots<br />
continued for four days and were suppressed only when the<br />
federal Army of the Potomac was ordered to fire into the crowds.<br />
Over a thousand civilians were killed or wounded.<br />
After the passage of many years, it is easy to forget that Lincoln<br />
had an insurrection on his hands in the North as well as in the<br />
South. The shooting of a thousand civilians by soldiers of their own<br />
1. Catton and Ketchum, pp. 484-85.<br />
2. James D. Horan, Confederate Agent: A Discovery in History (New York: Crown,<br />
1954), p. 209.<br />
3. Catton and Ketchum, pp. 486, 511.
382 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND GREENBACKS AND OTHER CRIMES 383<br />
government is a tragedy of mammoth proportions and it tells much<br />
about the desperate state of the Union at that time. To control that<br />
insurrection, Lincoln ignored the Constitution once again by suspending<br />
the right of Imbeas corpus, which made it possible for the<br />
government to imprison its critics without formal charges and<br />
without trial. Thus, under the banner of opposing slavery,<br />
American citizens in the North, not only were killed on the streets<br />
of their own cities, they were put into military combat against their<br />
will and thrown into prison without due process of law. In other<br />
words, free men were enslaved so that slaves could be made free.<br />
Even if the pretended crusade had been genuine, it was a bad<br />
exchange.<br />
How to get people to pay for the war was handled in a similar<br />
fashion. If the Constitution could be pushed aside on the issue of<br />
personal rights and of war itself, it certainly would not stand in the<br />
way of mere funding.<br />
It has often been said that truth is the first casualty in war. To<br />
which we should add: money is the second. During the fiscal year<br />
ending in 1861, expenses of the federal government had been<br />
$67 million. After the first year of armed conflict they were<br />
$475 million and, by 1865, had risen to one billion, three-hundred<br />
million dollars. On the income side of the ledger, taxes covered only<br />
about eleven per cent of that figure. By the end of the war, the<br />
deficit had risen to $2.61 billion. That money had to come from<br />
somewhere.<br />
INCOME TAXES AND WAR BONDS<br />
The nation's first experiment with the income tax was tried at<br />
this time; another violation of the Constitution. By today's standards<br />
it was a small bite, but it was still an extremely unpopular<br />
measure, and Congress knew that any additional taxes would<br />
further fan the flames of rebellion.<br />
Previously, the traditional source of funding in time of war had<br />
been the banks which simply created money under the pretense of<br />
loaning it. But that method had been severely hampered by the<br />
demise of the Bank of the United States. The state banks were<br />
anxious to step into that role; but, by this time, most of them had<br />
already defaulted in their promise to pay in specie and were in no<br />
position to manufacture further money, at least not money which<br />
the public would be willing to accept.<br />
American banks may have been unable to supply adequate<br />
loans, but the Rothschild consortium in Britain was both able and<br />
willing. It was during this time that the Rothschilds were consolidating<br />
their new industrial holdings in the United States through<br />
their agent, August Belmont. Derek Wilson tells us: "They owned<br />
or had major shareholdings in Central American ironworks, North<br />
American canal construction companies, and a multiplicity of other<br />
concerns. They became the major importers of bullion from the<br />
newly discovered goldfields."<br />
Belmont had placed large amounts of Rothschild money into<br />
the bonds of state-sponsored banks in the South. Those bonds, of<br />
course, had fallen in value to practically zero. As the war shifted in<br />
favor of the North, however, he began to buy up as many<br />
additional bonds as he could, paying but a few pennies on each<br />
dollar of face value. It was his plan to have the Union force the<br />
Southern states at the end of the war to honor all of their pre-war<br />
debt obligations—in full. That, of course, would have been a source<br />
of gigantic speculative profits to the Rothschilds. Meanwhile, on<br />
the northern side of the Mason-Dixon Line, Belmont became the<br />
chief agent for the sale of Union bonds in England and France. It<br />
was rumored that, when Belmont called on President Lincoln and<br />
personally offered Rothschild money at 27 Vi per cent interest, he<br />
was rudely thrown out of the office. The story is doubtful, but it<br />
represents a larger truth. Profiting from war and placing money on<br />
both sides of the conflict were exactly the kind of maneuvers for<br />
which the Rothschilds had become famous throughout Europe and<br />
were now practicing in America.<br />
In the North, the sale of government bonds was the one<br />
measure for raising funds that seemed to work. Even that,<br />
however, with the lure of compounded interest to be paid in gold at<br />
a future date, failed to raise more than about half the needed<br />
amount. So the Union faced a real dilemma. The only options<br />
remaining were (1) terminate the war or (2) print fiat money. For<br />
Lincoln and the Republicans who controlled Congress, the choice<br />
Was never seriously in doubt.<br />
The precedent had already been set during the War of 1812. At<br />
that time, Secretary of the Treasury, Albert Gallatin, had abrogated<br />
the Constitutional ban against "bills of credit" by printing Treasury<br />
1- See Derek Wilson, p. 178.
384 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND GREENBACKS AND OTHER CRIMES 385<br />
notes, most of which paid interest at 5.4 per cent. The money was<br />
tender, and that probably was the basis on<br />
never declared legal<br />
which it was defended as constitutional.<br />
THE GREENBACKS<br />
By the time of the War Between the States, however, all<br />
pretense at constitutionality had been dropped. In 1862, Congress<br />
authorized the Treasury to print $150 million worth of bills of credit<br />
and put them into circulation as money to pay for its<br />
They were declared as legal tender for all<br />
expenses.<br />
private debts but could<br />
not be used for government duties or taxes. The notes were printed<br />
with green ink and, thus, became immortalized as "greenbacks."<br />
Voters were assured that this was a one-time emergency measure, a<br />
promise that was soon broken. By the end of the war, a total of<br />
$432 million in greenbacks had been issued.<br />
The pragmatic mood in Washington was that a constitution is<br />
nice to have in times of peace, but an unaffordable luxury in war.<br />
Salmon P. Chase, for example, as Secretary of the Treasury,<br />
strongly endorsed the greenbacks which were issued under his<br />
direction. They were, in his words, an "indispensable necessity."<br />
Eight years later, as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, he declared<br />
that they were unconstitutional. Had he changed his mind? Not at<br />
all. When he endorsed them, the nation was at war. When he<br />
declared them unconstitutional, it was at peace. It was merely<br />
another example of the universal trait of all governments in time of<br />
war. That trait was presented in a previous section as the premise<br />
of the Rothschild Formula: "The sanctity of its laws, the prosperity<br />
of its citizens, and the solvency of its treasury will be quickly<br />
sacrificed by any government in its primal act of self-survival."<br />
The pressure for issuance of greenbacks originated in Congress,<br />
but Lincoln was an enthusiastic supporter. His view was that:<br />
Government, possessing power to create and issue currency and<br />
credit as money and enjoying the right to withdraw currency and<br />
credit from circulation by taxation and otherwise, need not and should<br />
not borrow capital at interest... The privilege of creating and issuing<br />
money is not only the supreme prerogative of the government but it is<br />
the government's greatest creative opportunity.<br />
It would appear that Lincoln objected to having the government<br />
pay interest to the banks for money they create out of nothing<br />
when the government can create money out of nothing just as easily<br />
and not pay interest on it. If one ignores the fact that both of these<br />
schemes are forbidden by the Constitution and is willing to tolerate<br />
the plunder-by-inflation that is the consequence of both, then there<br />
is an appealing logic to the argument. The politicians continue to<br />
have their fiat money, but at least the banks are denied a free ride.<br />
LINCOLN'S MIXED VIEW OF BANKING<br />
It is apparent that Lincoln had undergone a change of heart<br />
regarding banks. Early in his political career, he had been a friend<br />
of the banking industry and an advocate of easy credit. As a<br />
member of the Whig political party in the 1830s—before becoming<br />
a Republican in his campaign for the Presidency—he had been a<br />
supporter of Biddle's Second Bank of the United States. During his<br />
famous debates with Senator Stephen Douglas, one of the points of<br />
contention between the two was that Lincoln defended the Bank<br />
and advocated its reestablishment. Furthermore, after becoming<br />
President, he took the initiative in requesting Congress to reestablish<br />
central banking.<br />
Lincoln appears to have been inconsistent, and one gets a<br />
gnawing feeling that, in his effort to finance an unpopular war, he<br />
sometimes found it necessary, like Salmon Chase and other politicians<br />
of the time, to anesthetize his personal convictions and do<br />
whatever was required to meet the exigencies of governmental<br />
survival.<br />
One thing, however, is clear. Regardless of Lincoln's personal<br />
rs on money, the greenbacks were not pleasing to the bankers<br />
who were thereby denied their customary override on government<br />
debt. They were anxious to have this federal fiat money replaced by<br />
bank fiat money. For that to be possible, it would be necessary to<br />
create a whole new monetary system with government bonds used<br />
as backing for the issuance of bank notes; in other words, a return<br />
to central banking. And that was precisely what Secretary Chase<br />
was preparing to establish.<br />
1. This is taken from an abstract of Lincoln's monetary policy that was prepared<br />
by the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress. Quoted by Owen,<br />
I. See Lincoln's speech on the Sub-Treasury, Fehrenbacher, pp. 56-57.<br />
i. See Lincoln's annual message to Congress, December 1, 1862, Fehrenbacher,<br />
p. 91. " p. 398.
, Another<br />
386 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND GREENBACKS AND OTHER CRIMES 387<br />
In 1862, the basic position of the bankers was outlined in a<br />
memo, called The Hazard Circular, prepared by an American agent<br />
of British financiers and circulated among the country's wealthy<br />
businessmen. It said:<br />
The great debt that capitalists will see to it is made out of the war<br />
must be used as a means to control the volume of money. To<br />
accomplish this the bonds must be used as a banking basis. We are<br />
now waiting for the Secretary of the Treasury to make this<br />
recommendation to Congress. It will not do to allow the greenback, as<br />
it is called, to circulate as money any length of time, as we cannot<br />
control that. But we can control the bonds and through them the bank<br />
issues.<br />
THE NATIONAL BANKING ACT<br />
On February 25, 1863, Congress passed the National Banking<br />
Act (with major amendments the following year) which established<br />
a new system of nationally-chartered banks. The structure was<br />
similar to the Bank of the United States with the exception that,<br />
instead of one central bank with power to influence the activities of<br />
the others, there were now to be many national banks with control<br />
over all of them coming from Washington. Most banking legislation<br />
is sold to the public under the attractive label of reform. The<br />
National Banking Act was one of the rare exceptions. It was<br />
promoted fairly honestly as a wartime emergency scheme to raise<br />
money for military expenses by creating a market for government<br />
bonds and then transforming those bonds into circulating money.<br />
Here is how it worked:<br />
When a national bank purchased government bonds, it did not<br />
hold on to them. It turned them back to the Treasury which<br />
exchanged them for an equal amount of "United States Bank<br />
Notes" with the bank's name engraved on them. The government<br />
declared these to be legal tender for taxes and duties, and that<br />
status caused them to be generally accepted by the public as<br />
money. The bank's net cost for these bonds was zero, because they<br />
got their money back immediately. Technically, the bank still<br />
owned the bonds and collected interest on them, but they also had<br />
the use of an equal amount of newly created bank-note money<br />
which also could be loaned out at interest. When all the smoke and<br />
1. The Hon. Charles A, Lindburgh, Banking and Currency and the Money Trust<br />
(Washington, D.C: National Capital Press, 1913), p. 102.<br />
mirrors were moved away, it was merely a variation on the ancient<br />
scheme. The monetary and political scientists had simply converted<br />
government debt into money, and the bankers were collecting a<br />
substantial fee at both ends for their service.<br />
The one shortcoming of the system, at least from the point of<br />
view of the manipulators, was that, even though the bank notes<br />
were widely circulated, they were not classified as "lawful" money.<br />
In other words, they were not legal tender for all debts, just for<br />
taxes and duties. Precious-metal coins and greenbacks were still the<br />
country's official money. It was not until the arrival of the Federal<br />
Reserve System fifty years later that government debt in the form<br />
of bank notes would be mandated as the nation's official money for<br />
all transactions—under penalty of law.<br />
The National Banking Act of 1863 required banks to keep a<br />
percentage of their notes and deposits in the form of lawful money<br />
(gold coins) as a reserve to cover the possibility of a run. That<br />
percentage varied depending on the size and location of the bank<br />
but, on an average, it was about twelve per cent. That means a bank<br />
with $1 million in coin deposits could use approximately $880,000<br />
of that ($1 million less 12%) to purchase government bonds,<br />
exchange the bonds for bank notes, lend out the bank notes, and<br />
collect interest on both the bonds and the loans. The bank could now<br />
earn interest on $880,000 loaned to the government in the form of<br />
coins plus interest on $880,000 loaned to its customers in the form of<br />
bank notes. That doubled the bank's income without the inconvenience<br />
of having to increase its capital. Needless to say, the<br />
bonds were gobbled up just as fast as they could be printed, and the<br />
problem of funding the war had been solved.<br />
consequence of the national banking system was to<br />
make it impossible from that date forward for the federal government<br />
ever to get out of debt- Please reread that statement. It is not<br />
an exaggeration. Even friends of central-banking are forced to<br />
admit this reality. Galbraith says gloomily:<br />
Rarely has economic circumstance managed more successfully to<br />
confound the most prudent in economic foresight. In numerous years<br />
1 That represents the theoretical maximum. The actual numbers would have been<br />
lightly less due to the fact that banks seldom were able to keep a full 100% of their<br />
bank notes circulating in the form of loans. The functional asset leverage probably<br />
averaged about 70% rather than 88%.
388 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND GREENBACKS AND OTHER CRIMES 389<br />
following the war the Federal government ran a heavy surplus. It<br />
could not pay off its debt, retire its securities, because to do so meant<br />
there would be no bonds to back the national bank notes. To pay off<br />
the debt was to destroy the money supply.<br />
As pointed out in a previous section, that is essentially the<br />
situation which exists today. Every dollar of our currency and<br />
checkbook money was created by the act of lending. If all debt were<br />
repaid, our entire money supply would vanish back into the<br />
inkwells and computers. The national debt is the principal foundation<br />
upon which money is created for private debt. To pay off or<br />
even greatly reduce the national debt would cripple our monetary<br />
system. No politician would dare to advocate that, even if surplus<br />
funds were available in the Treasury. The Federal Reserve System,<br />
therefore, has virtually locked our nation into perpetual debt.<br />
THE HIDDEN COST OF WAR<br />
The third consequence of the National Banking Act will come<br />
as no surprise to anyone who has survived the previous pages of<br />
this book. During the war, the purchasing power of the greenbacks<br />
fell by 65%. The money supply increased by 138%. Prices more than<br />
doubled while wages rose by less than half. By that mechanism,<br />
Americans surrendered to the government and to the banks more<br />
than half of all the money they earned or held during that<br />
period—in addition to their taxes.<br />
Financial conditions in the South were even worse. With the<br />
exception of the seizure of about $400,000 in gold from the Federal<br />
mint at New Orleans, almost all of the war was funded by the<br />
printing of fiat money. Confederate notes increased in volume by<br />
214% per year, while the volume of all money, including bank<br />
notes and check-book money, rose by over 300% per year. In<br />
addition to the Confederate notes, each of the Southern states<br />
issued its own fiat money and, by the end of the war, the total of all<br />
notes was about a billion dollars. Within the four-year period,<br />
prices shot up by 9,100%. After Appomattox, of course, Confederate<br />
notes and bonds alike were totally worthless.<br />
1. Galbraith, p. 90.<br />
2. See chapter ten, The Mandrake Mechanism.<br />
3. See Paul and Lehrman, pp. 80-81 ; Groseclose, Money and Man, p. 193; Galbraith,<br />
pp. 93-94; Rothbard, Mystery, p. 222.<br />
4. See Galbraith, p. 94. Also Paul and Lehrman, p. 81.<br />
As usual, the average citizen did not understand that the newly<br />
created money represented a hidden tax which he would soon have<br />
Ito pay in the form of higher prices. Voters in the Northern states<br />
certainly would not have tolerated an open and honest tax increase<br />
of that magnitude. Even in the South where the cause was<br />
perceived as one of self defense, it is possible that they would not<br />
have done so had they known in advance the true dimension of the<br />
assessment. But especially in the North, because they did not<br />
understand the secret science of money, Americans not only paid<br />
the hidden tax but applauded Congress for creating it.<br />
On June 25, 1863, exactly four months after the National Bank<br />
Act was signed into law, a confidential communique was sent from<br />
the Rothschild investment house in London to an associate banking<br />
firm in New York. It contained an amazingly frank and boastful<br />
summary:<br />
The few who understand the system [bank loans earning interest<br />
and also serving as money] will either be so interested in its profits or<br />
so dependent upon its favors that there will be no opposition from that<br />
class while, on the other hand, the great body of people, mentally<br />
incapable of comprehending,... will bear its burdens without<br />
complaint,<br />
LINCOLN'S CONCERN FOR THE FUTURE<br />
Lincoln was privately apprehensive about the Bank Act, but<br />
loyalty to his Party and the need to maintain unity in time of war<br />
compelled him to withhold his veto. His personal view, however,<br />
was unequivocal. In a letter to William Elkins the following year he<br />
said:<br />
The money power preys upon the nation in times of peace and<br />
conspires against it in times of adversity. It is more despotic than<br />
monarchy, more insolent than autocracy, more selfish than<br />
bureaucracy. I see in the near future a crisis approaching that unnerves<br />
me and causes me to tremble for the safety of my country.<br />
Corporations have been enthroned, an era of corruption will follow,<br />
and the money power of the country will endeavor to prolong its reign<br />
by working upon the prejudices of the people, until the wealth is<br />
aggregated in a few hands, and the republic destroyed. 2<br />
j* Quoted by Owen, pp. 99-100.<br />
2- A letter to William F. Elkins, November 21, 1864. Archer H. Shaw, ed., The<br />
uncoln Encyclopedia; The Spoken and Written Words of A. Lincoln (New York:<br />
MacmilJan Co., 1950), p. 40.
390 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND GREENBACKS AND OTHER CRIMES 391<br />
In reviewing Lincoln's role throughout this painful chapter of<br />
history, it is impossible not to feel ambivalence. On the one hand,<br />
he declared war without Congress, suspended the writ of habeas<br />
corpus, and issued the Emancipation Proclamation, not as an<br />
administrative executive carrying out the wishes of Congress, but<br />
as the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. Furthermore, the<br />
Proclamation was not issued out of humanitarian motives, as<br />
popular history portrays, but as a maneuver to generate popular<br />
support for the war. By participating in the issuance of the<br />
greenbacks, he violated one of the most clearly written and<br />
important sections of the Constitution. And by failing to veto the<br />
National Bank Act, he acquiesced in the delivery of the American<br />
people back into the hands of the international Cabal, an act which<br />
was similar in many ways to the forcible return of captured<br />
runaway slaves.<br />
On the positive side, there is no question of Lincoln's patriotism.<br />
His concern was in preserving the Union, not the Constitution,<br />
and his refusal to let the European powers split America into a<br />
cluster of warring nation-states was certainly wise. Lincoln<br />
believed that he had to violate part of the Constitution in order to<br />
save the whole. But that is dangerous reasoning. It can be used in<br />
almost any national crisis as the excuse for the expansion of<br />
totalitarian power. There is no reason to believe that the only way<br />
to save the Union was to scrap the Constitution. In fact, if the<br />
Constitution had been meticulously observed from the very beginning,<br />
the Southern minority could never have been legally plundered<br />
by the Northern majority and there likely would have been<br />
no movement for secession in the first place. And, even if there had<br />
been, a strict reading of the Constitution at that point could have<br />
led the way to an honorable and peaceful settlement of differences.<br />
The result would have been, not only the preservation of the Union<br />
without war, but Americans would be enjoying far less government<br />
intervention in their daily lives today.<br />
WITH MALICE TOWARD NONE<br />
There is one point that is clearly on Lincoln's side. While his<br />
political compatriots were howling for economic vengeance against<br />
the South, the President stood firmly against it. "With malice<br />
toward none" was more than a slogan with him, and he was willing<br />
to risk his political survival on that one issue. The reason he had<br />
vetoed the Wade-Davis emancipation bill was because it would<br />
have applied a lien against Southern cotton at the end of the war to<br />
the benefit of New England <strong>text</strong>ile manufactures. The cotton also<br />
would have been taken as security to pay off Southern debt which<br />
had been contracted before the war, thus providing the funds to<br />
buy back at face value all of the bonds which had been purchased at<br />
discount by Rothschild's agent, August Belmont. Such defiance of<br />
the financiers and speculators undoubtedly required great courage.<br />
But the issue ran deeper than that. Lincoln had offered a<br />
general amnesty to any citizen in the South who would agree to<br />
take a loyalty oath to the Union. When ten per cent of the voters<br />
had taken such an oath, he proposed that they could then elect<br />
Congressmen, Senators, and a state government which would be<br />
recognized as part of the Union once again. The Republicans, on<br />
the other hand, had incorporated into the Wade-Davis bill the<br />
provision that each seceded state was to be treated like a conquered<br />
country. Political<br />
representation was to be denied until fifty-one<br />
per cent, not ten per cent, had taken an oath. Former slaves were<br />
given the right to vote—although women had not yet gained that<br />
right even in the North—but, because of their lack of education and<br />
political awareness, no one expected them to play a meaningful<br />
role in government for many years to come. Furthermore, those<br />
taking the oath had to swear that they had never taken up arms<br />
against the Union. Since almost every able-bodied white male had<br />
done so, the effect would have been to deny the South political<br />
representation for at least two generations.<br />
Under Lincoln's amnesty policy, it would not be long before the<br />
Republicans would be overwhelmed in Congress by a large majority<br />
of Democrats. The Democrats in the North were already gaining<br />
strength on their own and, once they could be joined by the solid<br />
block of Democrats from the reunited South, the Republicans'<br />
political and economic power would be lost. So, when Lincoln<br />
vetoed the bill, his own Party bitterly turned against him.<br />
Running throughout these cross-currents of motives and special<br />
interests were two groups which found it increasingly to their<br />
advantage to have Lincoln out of the way. One group consisted of<br />
the financiers, Northern industrialists, and radical Republicans, all<br />
of whom wanted to legally plunder the South at the end of the war.<br />
The politicians within that group also looked forward to further<br />
consolidating their power and literally establishing a military
|<br />
stereotyped<br />
392 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND GREENBACKS AND OTHER CRIMES 393<br />
dictatorship. 1 The other group was smaller in size but equally<br />
dangerous. It consisted of hothead Confederate sympathizers—<br />
from both South and North—who sought revenge. Later events<br />
revealed that both of these groups had been involved in a conspiratorial<br />
liaison with an organization called the Knights of the Golden<br />
Circle.<br />
KNIGHTS OF THE GOLDEN CIRCLE<br />
The Order of the Knights of the Golden Circle was a<br />
secret<br />
organization dedicated to revolution and conquest. Two of its<br />
better known members were Jesse James and John Wilkes Booth. It<br />
was organized by George W.L. Bickley who established its first<br />
"castle" in Cincinnati in 1854, drawing membership primarily from<br />
Masonic lodges. It had close ties with a secret society in France<br />
called The Seasons, which itself was a branch of the Illuminati.<br />
After the beginning of the war, Bickley was made head of the<br />
Confederacy's secret service, and his organization quickly spread<br />
throughout the border and Southern states as well.<br />
In the North, the conspirators were seeking "to seize political<br />
power and overthrow the Lincoln government/ 7 In fact, the<br />
Northern anti-draft riots<br />
mentioned previously were largely the<br />
result of the planning and leadership of this group.<br />
In the South<br />
"they tried to promote the extension of slavery by the conquest of<br />
Mexico/ 75<br />
In partnership with Maximilian, the Knights hoped to<br />
establish a Mexican-American empire which would be an effective<br />
counter force against the North. In fact, the very name of the<br />
organization is based on their goal of carving an empire out of<br />
North America with geographical boundaries forming a circle with<br />
the center in Cuba, and its<br />
Pennsylvania, southward to Panama.<br />
circumference reaching northward to<br />
1 For highly readable accounts of this movement, see Theodore Roscoe, The Web<br />
of Conspiracy: The Complete Story of the Men Who Murdered Abraham Lincoln (Englewood<br />
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1959); also Claude G. Bowers, The Tragic<br />
Era: The Revolution after Lincoln, (New YoTk: Houghton Mifflin, 1957).<br />
2. "No Civil War at All, Part Two/' by Will^m Mcllhany, Journal of Individualist<br />
Studies, Fall, 1992, pp. 1&-20.<br />
3. Horan, p. 15.<br />
4. Ibid., pp. 20&-23.<br />
5. Ibid., p. 16. Regarding the annexation of Mexico, also see the Columbia Encyclopedia,<br />
Third Edition, p. 1143.<br />
In 1863 the group was reorganized as the Order of American<br />
Knights and, again the following year, as the Order of the Sons of<br />
Liberty. Its membership then was estimated at between 200,000 and<br />
300,000. After the war, it went further underground and remnants<br />
eventually emerged as the Ku Klux Klan.<br />
JOHN WILKES BOOTH<br />
One of the persistent legends of this period is that John Wilkes<br />
Booth was not killed in Garretfs barn, as generally accepted, but<br />
was allowed to escape; that the corpse actually was that of an<br />
accomplice; and that the government, under the firm control of<br />
War Secretary Edwin M. Stanton, moved heaven and earth to cover<br />
up the facts. On the face of it, that is an absurd story. But, when the<br />
voluminous files of the War Department were finally declassified<br />
and put into the public domain in the mid 1930s, historians were<br />
shocked to discover that there are many facts in those files which<br />
lend credence to the legend. The first to probe these amazing<br />
records was Otto Eisenschiml whose Why Was Lincoln Murdered?<br />
was published by Little, Brown and Company in 1937. The best and<br />
most readable compilation of the facts, however, was written<br />
twenty years later by Theodore Roscoe. In the preface to this work,<br />
he states the startling conclusions which emerge from those longhidden<br />
files:<br />
I<br />
Of the immense 19th century literature that exists on Lincoln's<br />
assassination, much of the writing treats the tragedy at Ford's theater<br />
as though it were Grand Opera.. . . Only a few have seen the crime as a<br />
murder case: Lincoln dying by crass felony, Booth a stalking gunman<br />
leading a gang of primed henchmen, the murder plot containing<br />
ingredients as base as the profit motive. Seventy years after the crime,<br />
writers were garbling it with a dignity it did not deserve: Lincoln, the<br />
martyr; Booth, the stereotyped villain; the assassination<br />
avenged by classic justice; conspiracy strangled; Virtue (in the robes of<br />
Government) emerging triumphant, and Lincoln "belonging to the<br />
ages."<br />
But the facts of the case are neither so satisfying nor so gratifying.<br />
For the facts indicate that the criminals responsible for Lincoln's death<br />
got away with murder.<br />
Izola Forrester was the granddaughter of John Wilkes Booth. In<br />
book entitled This One Mad Act, she tells of discovering the<br />
Roscoe, p. vii.
394 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND GREENBACKS AND OTHER CRIMES 395<br />
secret records of the Knights of the Golden Circle which had been<br />
SUMMARY<br />
carefully wrapped and placed in a government vault many decades<br />
It is time now to leave this tragic<br />
ago and designated as classified documents by<br />
episode<br />
Secretary Stanton.<br />
and move along. So let<br />
us summarize. America's bloodiest<br />
Since the assassination of Lincoln, no one had ever been allowed<br />
and most<br />
to<br />
devastating war was<br />
fought, not over the issue of<br />
examine that package. Because of her lineage to Booth and because<br />
freedom versus slavery, but because of<br />
clashing economic<br />
of her credentials as a professional writer, she was interests.<br />
eventually<br />
At the heart of this conflict were<br />
questions of legalized<br />
permitted to become the first person in all those years to examine<br />
plunder, banking monopolies, and even<br />
European territorial<br />
its contents. Forrester recounts the experience:<br />
expansion into Latin America. The boot print<br />
of the Rothschild formula is unmistakable across the<br />
It was five years before I was able to examine the contents of graves<br />
the<br />
of<br />
American soldiers on both sides.<br />
mysterious old package hidden away in the safe of the room which<br />
In the North,<br />
contained the relics and exhibits used in the Conspiracy<br />
neither<br />
Trial.... ]<br />
greenbacks, taxes, nor war bonds were<br />
would never have seen them, had I not knelt on the floor of the<br />
enough to<br />
cell five<br />
finance the war. So a national banking system was<br />
years ago and seen into the back of the old safe where the package lay.<br />
created to convert government bonds into fiat money, and the<br />
It is all part of the odd mystery thrown about the case by the officials<br />
people lost over half of their monetary assets to the hidden tax of<br />
of the war period—the concealment of these documents and articles,<br />
inflation. In the South, printing presses accomplished<br />
and the hiding away of the two flakes of bone with the bullet and<br />
the same<br />
effect, and the monetary loss<br />
pistol. What mind<br />
was total.<br />
ever grouped together such apparently<br />
The issuance of the<br />
incongruous and macabre<br />
Emancipation<br />
exhibits?...<br />
Proclamation by Lincoln and<br />
the<br />
Here at last was a link with my grandfather. I knew that he had<br />
naval assistance offered by Tsar Alexander, II, were largely<br />
been a member of the secret order founded by Bickley, the Knights of<br />
responsible for keeping England and France from intervening in<br />
the Golden Circle. I have an old photograph of him taken in a group of<br />
the war on the side of the Confederacy. Lincoln was assassinated<br />
the brotherhood, in full uniform, one that Harry's daughter had by a member of the Knights of the Golden Circle, a secret society<br />
discovered for me in our grandmother's Bible. I knew that the<br />
with rumored ties to American politicians<br />
newspapers, directly following the assassination, had denounced and<br />
the<br />
British financiers.<br />
Tsar Alexander<br />
order as having instigated the killing of Lincoln, and had proclaimed<br />
was assassinated a few years later by a member of<br />
Booth to have been its member and tool. And I was reminded again<br />
the<br />
of<br />
People's Will, a Nihilist secret society in Russia with rumored<br />
those words I had heard from my grandmother's lips, that her<br />
ties to financiers in New York City, specifically, Jacob Schiff and the<br />
husband had been "the tool of other men."<br />
firm of Kuhn, Loeb & Company.<br />
An interesting comment. One is compelled to wonder: The tool<br />
As for the Creature of central banking, there had been some<br />
of what other men? Was Forrester's grandmother referring to the<br />
victories and some defeats. The greenbacks had for a while<br />
leaders of the Knights of the Golden Circle? To agents of European deprived the bankers of their override on a small portion of<br />
financiers? Or was it to conspirators within Lincoln's own Party? government debt, but the National Banking Act quickly put a stop<br />
We shall probably never know with certainty the extent to which<br />
to that. Furthermore, by using government bonds as backing for<br />
any of these groups may have been involved in Lincoln's assassination,<br />
but we do know that there were powerful forces within the foundation was firmly in place, but the ultimate structure still<br />
the money supply, it locked the nation into perpetual debt. The<br />
federal government, centered around Secretary of War Stanton, needed to be erected. The monetary system was yet to be concentrated<br />
into one central-bank mechanism, and the control was yet to<br />
which actively concealed evidence and hastily terminated the<br />
investigation. Someone was protected.<br />
be taken away from the politicians and placed into the hands of the<br />
ankers themselves.<br />
1. Lzola Forrester, This One Mad Act (Boston: Hale, Cushman & Flint, 1937), p. 359- It was time for the Creature to visit Congress.
President Andrew Jackson put<br />
his political career on the line in<br />
1832 by vetoing renewal of the<br />
charter for the Second Bank of<br />
the United States. He called<br />
the Bank a monster and<br />
declared: am "1 ready with the<br />
screws to draw every tooth and<br />
then the stumps." Voters<br />
approved and re-elected him<br />
by a large margin.<br />
ZJL<br />
a<br />
During the Civil War, Lincoln<br />
had an insurrection on his<br />
hands in the North as well as<br />
the South, These two Leslie's<br />
engravings depict the 1 863<br />
anti-draft riots that occurred in<br />
"»
Library of Congress<br />
Hulton Deutsch<br />
I Montagu Norman (above) was head of the<br />
Bank of England during the first years of the<br />
Federal Reserve. He is shown here in 1931<br />
aboard the Duchess of York at Southampton.<br />
Norman frequently traveled to the U.S. to<br />
meet in secret with Benjamin Strong, head of<br />
the Federal Reserve. Strong agreed to use the<br />
Federal Reserve System to unofficially help<br />
Great Britain meet its financial obligations, and<br />
The crew of the Russian ship, Osliaba, posed for this photograph at Alexandria,<br />
Virginia, in 1863. Tsar Alexander II had dispatched his Baltic fleet to Alexandria and<br />
his Asiatic fleet to San Fransciso where they were committed to assist the Union<br />
-j<br />
blockade against the South. This had little to do with freeing the slaves. France ha
nmownrm<br />
V * ><br />
x<br />
John D. Rockefeller, III<br />
(right) presents a check in the amount<br />
of $8,500,000 to Trygve Lie, First Secretary-General of the<br />
United Nations. The date is March 25, 1947. The money is for<br />
buying the land on Manhattan Island which will house the LIN<br />
building. Through the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), the<br />
[Rockefellers have been in the forefront of the drive for a world<br />
government which is to be built upon the principles of<br />
socialism and feudalism. They have no doubt that they and<br />
their counterparts in other countries will be in control.<br />
s*.><br />
John D. Rockefeller, Sr., is shown here giving a dime to a child, while an admirij<br />
crowd looks on. This was one of his favorite publicity stunts, it was conceived by H<br />
public-relations staff as a means of offsetting adverse publicity regarding his busing<br />
dealings. Large-scale philanthropy was an extension of that same technique.<br />
400 401<br />
UPl/Settmann
Treasury Department<br />
'WM<br />
William Jennings Bryan (left) was one of the most powerful Democrats in<br />
Congress. He opposed the Federal Reserve Act because it would privately issue<br />
money rather than through the government. He was fooled into supporting the bill<br />
when phony compromises were made which gave the appearance of public<br />
control and government issue but which, in fact, did neither. Bryan was also<br />
rewarded with an appointment as Secretary of State. He became disillusioned by<br />
Ihe duplicity of his own government and resigned after Wilson failed to warn the<br />
public that the Lusitania was carrying munitions. He complained that it was "like<br />
Butting women and children in front of an army."<br />
Alan Greenspan (above), was an eloquent spokesman for the gold standard and<br />
a critic of the System's subservience to the banking cartel. That was in 1966.<br />
After he became a director of J. P. Morgan & Company and was appointed<br />
hairman of the Federal Reserve in 1987, he became silent on these issues and<br />
did nothing to anger the Creature he now served. Like Bryan, even the best of<br />
rnen can be corrupted by the rewards of politics.<br />
Betxmann Arcmve<br />
402<br />
403
IM<br />
Jmtr J * A A u<br />
ir<br />
Section V<br />
UPl/Bettmann<br />
The First National Bank in St.<br />
Petersburg, Florida experiences a<br />
run on June 12, 1930. Angry<br />
depositors want their money, butthij<br />
bank cannot pay them. Their money<br />
has been loaned to others. This<br />
scene has been repeated thousand<br />
of times throughout history and in<br />
every country. It is the consequence<br />
of fractional-reserve banking.<br />
John Kenneth Galbraith, well-kno^<br />
historian and professor at Harvard<br />
has verified that he was asked to u<br />
part of the team that put together<br />
Report from Iron Mountain, a thinktank<br />
study commissioned by the J<br />
Defense Department. The purpose.<br />
the study was to explore novel yw<br />
keeping the masses in subserviei*<br />
e£<br />
When a copy of the Report was<br />
|<br />
to the press, the government clai^j<br />
it was a hoax. Galbraith confirm^<br />
it was totally authentic.<br />
THE HARVEST<br />
Monetary and political scientists continue to<br />
expound the theoretical merits of the Federal<br />
Reserve System. It has become a modern act of<br />
faith that economic life simply could not go on<br />
without it. But the time for theory is past The<br />
Creature moved into its final lair in 1913 and has<br />
snorted and thrashed about the landscape ever<br />
since. If we wish to know if it is<br />
a creature of<br />
service or a beast of prey, we merely have to look<br />
at what it has done. And, after the test of all those<br />
years, we can be sure that what it has done, it will<br />
continue to do. Or, to use the Biblical axiom, a tree<br />
shall be known by the fruit it bears. Let us now<br />
examine the harvest.<br />
UPl/Bettmann<br />
404
Chapter Twenty<br />
THE LONDON<br />
CONNECTION<br />
The rise of the House of Morgan; Morgan's ties<br />
with England and the House of Rothschild; the<br />
connection between the Federal Reserve System<br />
and the Bank of England; the Fed's decision to<br />
inflate American dollars to assist the ailing<br />
British economy.<br />
The period between the Civil War and the enactment of the<br />
Federal Reserve System was one of great economic volatility and no<br />
small measure of chaos. The National Banking Acts of 1863-65<br />
established a system of federally chartered banks which were given<br />
significant privilege and power over the monetary system. They<br />
were granted a monopoly in the issuance of bank notes, and the<br />
government agreed to accept those notes for the payment of taxes<br />
and duties. They were allowed to back this money up to ninety per<br />
cent with government bonds instead of gold. And they were guaranteed<br />
that every bank in the system would have to accept the notes<br />
of every other bank at face value, regardless of how shaky their<br />
position. The net effect was that the banking system of the United<br />
States after the Civil War, far from being free and unregulated as<br />
some historians have claimed, was literally a halfway house to central<br />
banking.<br />
The notion of being able to generate prosperity simply by creating<br />
more money has always fascinated politicians and businessmen,<br />
but at no time in our history was it more in vogue than in the second<br />
half of the nineteenth century. The nation had gone mad with the<br />
Midas complex, a compulsion to turn everything into money<br />
through the magic of banking. Personal checks gradually had<br />
become accepted in commerce just as readily as bank notes, and the<br />
banks obliged their customers by entering into their passbooks just<br />
as many little numbers as they cared to "borrow." As Groseclose
408 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
observed: 'The manna of cheap money became the universal cry,<br />
and as with the Israelites, the easier the manna was acquired, the<br />
louder became the complaint, the less willing the people to struggle<br />
for it/' 1<br />
The prevailing philosophy of that time was aptly expressed by<br />
Jay Cooke, the famous financier who had marketed the huge Civil<br />
War loans of the federal government and who now was raising $100<br />
million for the Northern Pacific Railroad. Cooke had published a<br />
pamphlet which was aptly summarized by its own title: How Our<br />
National Debt May Be a National Blessing, The Debt is Public Wealth,<br />
Political<br />
Union, Protection of Industry, Secure Basis for National<br />
Currency. "Why," asked Cooke, "should this Grand and Glorious<br />
country be stunted and dwarfed—its activities chilled and its very<br />
life blood curdled by these miserable 'hard coin' theories—the<br />
musty theories of a bygone age." 2 As it turned out, however, the<br />
chilling and curdling came, not from the musty hard-coin theories<br />
of the past, but from the glittering easy-money theories of the present.<br />
The Northern Pacific went bankrupt and, as the mountain of<br />
imaginary money invested in it collapsed back into nothing,<br />
Cooke's giant investment firm disappeared along with it, triggering<br />
the panic of 1873 as it went. Matthew Josephson writes:<br />
"All about the failure of Jay Cooke!" newsboys hawked throughout<br />
the country....<br />
The largest and most pious bank in the Western world had fallen<br />
with the effect of a thunderclap. Soon allied brokers and national<br />
banks and 5,000 commercial houses followed it into the abyss of<br />
bankruptcy. All day long, in Wall Street, one suspension after another<br />
was announced; railroads failed; leading stocks lost 30 to 40 points, or<br />
half their value, within the hour; immeasurable waves of fear altered<br />
the movement of greed; the exchanges were closed; the stampede, the<br />
"greatest" crisis in American history, was on.<br />
AND STILL MORE BOOMS AND BUSTS<br />
Altogether, there were four major contractions of the money<br />
supply during this period: the so-called panics of 1873, 1884, 1893,<br />
and 1907. Each of them was characterized by inadequate bank<br />
reserves and the suspension of specie payment. Congress reacted,<br />
1 Groseclose, Money and Man, p. 202,<br />
2. Quoted by Rothbard, Mystery, p. 231<br />
3. Matthew Josephson, The Robber Barons: The Great American Capitalists, 1861-1901<br />
(New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1934), p- 170.<br />
THE LONDON CONNECTION 409<br />
not by requiring an increase in reserves which would have<br />
improved the safety margin, but by allowing a decrease. In June of<br />
1874, legislation was passed which permitted the banks to back their<br />
notes entirely with government bonds. That, of course, meant more<br />
fiat money for Congress, but it also meant that bank notes no longer<br />
had any specie backing at all, not even ten per cent. This released<br />
over $20 million from bank reserves which then could be used as the<br />
basis for pyramiding even more checkbook money into the economy.<br />
It has become accepted mythology that these panics were<br />
caused by seasonal demands for farm loans at harvest time. To supply<br />
those funds, the country banks had to draw down their cash<br />
reserves which generally were deposited with the larger city banks.<br />
This thinned out the reserves held in the cities, and the whole system<br />
became more vulnerable. Actually that part of the legend is<br />
true, but apparently no one is expected to ask questions about the<br />
rest of the story. Several of them come to mind. Why wasn't there a<br />
painic every Autumn instead of just every eleven years or so? Why<br />
didn't all<br />
banks—country or city—maintain adequate reserves to<br />
cover their depositor demands? And why didn't they do this in all<br />
seasons of the year? Why would merely saying no to some loan applicants<br />
cause hundreds of banks to fail? The myth falls apart under<br />
the weight of these questions.<br />
The truth is that, if it hadn't been seasonal demand by agriculture,<br />
the money magicians simply would have found another scapegoat.<br />
It would have been "immobile" reserves, lack of "elasticity" in<br />
the money supply, "imbalance" of international payments, or some<br />
other technocratic smoke screen to cover the real problem which<br />
Was—and always has been—fractional-reserve banking itself. The<br />
bottom line was that, in spite of an elaborate scheme to pool the<br />
minuscule reserves of country banks into larger regional banks<br />
where they could be rushed from town to town like a keg of coins on<br />
the old frontier, it still didn't work. The loaves and fishes stubbornly<br />
refused to multiply.<br />
Morgan prospers when others fail<br />
The monetary expansions and contractions of this period were<br />
large waves that capsized thousands of investment ships at sea. But<br />
there was one large vessel that, somehow, bobbed up and down<br />
With the surges quite well and could be seen throughout the storm
410 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
THE LONDON CONNECTION 411<br />
salvaging the abandoned cargoes of those that were in distress. This<br />
It was during this trip that Peabody opened an import-export<br />
vessel brought back to port untold riches that once had been the<br />
business at 22 Old Broad Street in London and began to provide<br />
property of others but now belonged to the master of the salvage<br />
loans and letters of credit to many of his shippers. That moved him<br />
ship in accordance with rules of the high sea. The captain's name<br />
into the investment business specializing in transactions between<br />
Britain and the United States.<br />
was J.P. Morgan.<br />
It will be recalled from a previous section that J.P. Morgan and<br />
It was fortunate liming. This was the beginning of a period of<br />
Company was no small player in the world chess match called<br />
rapid expansion in the United States, accompanied by an insatiable<br />
World War I. Morgan had been chosen by the French and British<br />
need for investment capital and a plethora of bond issues offering<br />
governments as the official agent to sell their war bonds in the U.S.<br />
tantalizing rates of return which were substantially higher than<br />
When the war began to go badly for them, the Morgan interests<br />
comparable offerings in Europe. Peabody's firm was in an unusual<br />
began to agitate for American entry into the conflict, a move which<br />
position to exploit this expanding market, and his firm grew rapidly.<br />
was calculated to save the loans. The Morgan firm also was the of h-<br />
cial U.S. trade agent for Britain. In violation of international treaty, it<br />
Peabody never married and, as he advanced in years, began to<br />
handled the purchase and shipping to England of all war material,<br />
look for someone to carry on the business. The qualifications for<br />
including the enormous cargo of munitions aboard the Lusitanw<br />
such a position were difficult. First, the man had to be an American<br />
when she went down.<br />
by birth in order to appear authentic as the representative of<br />
The close relationship between the Morgans and Great Britain<br />
American investments. Secondly, he had to be British by instinct<br />
was no accident. J.P. Morgan, Jr., was the driving force behind the<br />
and preference. This included being well educated and with good<br />
Council on Foreign Relations, the American branch of a secret society<br />
established by Cecil Rhodes for the expansion of the British<br />
breeding in order to be accepted by the aristocracy in London's<br />
financial world. Third, he had to have knowledge of Angloempire.<br />
In truth, the Morgans were more British than American.<br />
American finance. And fourth, Peabody had to like him.<br />
The reason for this is to be found in the origin of the Morgan<br />
dynasty. It all began with an American merchant from Danvers, JUNIUS MORGAN SELECTED BY PEABODY<br />
Massachusetts, by the name of George Peabody. In 1837, Peabody When the Boston merchant, Junius Morgan, met George<br />
travelled to England as a bond salesman for the Chesapeake and Peabody at a London dinner party in 1850, little did he realize that<br />
Ohio Canal, hoping to find British investors to replace the missing<br />
the elder financier took an immediate liking to him and began to<br />
ranks of Americans who, because of a recession at that time, showed<br />
discreetly inquire into his background and reputation. This began<br />
little interest in the project. He routinely was rejected by the large an extended period of business and social contact that eventually<br />
investment houses of London but, eventually, his persistence paid ended in 1854 when Junius moved his family to London and became<br />
off. Stanley Jackson, in his biography of Morgan, says of Peabody:<br />
a full partner in the firm which, eventually became known as<br />
When the panic [in the U.S.] at last started to subside, he called Peabody, Morgan & Company.<br />
time and again on the big City barons [in London] to assure them that<br />
In addition to selling bonds in England for American commercial<br />
ventures and state governments, the partnership also became<br />
Maryland and other states would honor their bonds. He also<br />
continued backing American securities with his personal funds.<br />
the chief fiscal agent for the Union government during the Civil<br />
Buying at almost giveaway levels, he later reaped a rich harvest. He<br />
War, and it was during this period that the firm's great profits<br />
unloaded most of the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal bonds and won<br />
pushed it into the<br />
acclaim back home for returning his $60,000 commission intact to<br />
top echelons of London's financial fraternity. In<br />
1864, Peabody finally retired and completely turned the business<br />
Maryland's meager treasury.<br />
over to Junius who immediately changed the firm's name to J.S.<br />
1. Stanley Jackson, J.P. Morgan (New York: Stein and Day, 1983), p. 37. Morgan and Company.
412 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
THE LONDON CONNECTION 413<br />
Junius's son, John Pierpont, attended the English High School in<br />
eventually was accomplished by the addition of Edward<br />
Boston but, during much of his youth, was enrolled in European<br />
Grenfell, a long-time director of the Bank of England, as the<br />
tThis<br />
new<br />
schools and became engulfed in British tradition. He had been born<br />
senior partner of what became Morgan, Grenfell & Company. But<br />
in the United States, however, and that made him ideally suited to<br />
none of this window dressing altered the reality that J.P. Morgan &<br />
carry on the Anglo-American role played so deftly by Peabody and<br />
Co. in New York remained more British in orientation than Ameri-<br />
Junius. It was inevitable that the boy would be trained in international<br />
finance and groomed to step into his father's shoes. The first<br />
A casual reading of the events of this period would lead to the<br />
can.<br />
move was to find employment for him in 1857 at the New York : conclusion that Peabody and Morgan were fierce competitors of the<br />
investment firm of Duncan, Sherman & Company. Seven years<br />
Rothschilds. It is true they often bid against each other for the same<br />
later, Junius acquired a competitor New York firm and set his son<br />
business, but it is also true that almost every biographer has told<br />
up as a partner in Dabney, Morgan & Company, which became the how the American newcomers to London were in awe of the great<br />
New York branch of the London firm. In 1871, with the addition of<br />
power of the Rothschilds and how they purposely cultivated their<br />
a third partner, Anthony Drexel from Philadelphia, the firm became<br />
friendship, a friendship that eventually became so intimate that the<br />
Drexel, Morgan & Company. In 1895, following the death of Drexel,<br />
Americans were received as the personal house guests of the<br />
there was a final change of name to J.P. Morgan & Company. A<br />
Rothschilds. The Morgan firm often worked closely with the House<br />
branch in Paris became known as Morgan, Harjes & Company.<br />
of Rothschild on large joint ventures, but that was—and still is<br />
AMERICANIZING THE NEW YORK BRANCH<br />
common practice among large investment houses. In light of subsequent<br />
events, however, it is appropriate to consider the possibility<br />
After the unexpected death of Junius in a carriage accident a few<br />
that an arrangement had<br />
years later, it was decided by Pierpont to reshape the image<br />
been worked out in which the<br />
of the<br />
Peabody<br />
London firm to be a more British operation. This would<br />
/Morgan firm went one step further and, on occasion,<br />
allow the<br />
became a secret Rothschild agent.<br />
New York branch to represent the American side with less suspicion<br />
of being essentially the same firm. By that time, his son, J.P. CONCEALED ALLIANCE WITH ROTHSCHILD?<br />
Morgan, Jr.—known as Jack by his friends—had already been<br />
Some writers have suggested that the clandestine relationship<br />
brought into the firm as a partner, and he was to play an important<br />
began almost from the beginning. Eustace Mullins, for example,<br />
role in the creation of that image. Biographer John Forbes tells us:<br />
writes:<br />
J.P, Morgan, Jr., became a partner in the London house of J.S.<br />
Soon after he arrived in London, George Peabody was surprised<br />
Morgan & Co. on January 1, 1898, and a fortnight later, with his wife<br />
to be summoned to an audience with the gruff Baron Nathan Mayer<br />
Jessie and their three children,... he left New York and took up<br />
Rothschild. Without mincing words, Rothschild revealed to Peabody<br />
residence in England for the next eight years.<br />
that much of the London aristocracy openly disliked Rothschild and<br />
Morgan was sent to London to do two specific things. The first<br />
refused his invitations. He proposed that Peabody, a man of modest<br />
was to learn at first hand how the British carried on a banking business<br />
means, be established as a lavish host whose entertainments would<br />
under a central banking system dominated by the Bank of England.<br />
soon be the talk of London. Rothschild would, of course, pay all the<br />
Morgan, Sr., anticipated the establishment of the Federal Reserve<br />
bills. Peabody accepted the offer and soon became known as the most<br />
System in the United States and wanted someone who would<br />
popular host in London. His annual Fourth-of-July dinner, celebrating<br />
eventually have authority in the Morgan firms to know how such a<br />
American Independence, became extremely popular with the English<br />
system worked. The second was quietly to look about the City and<br />
aristocracy, many of whom, while drinking Peabody's wine, regaled<br />
select British partners to convert the elder Morgan's privately owned<br />
each other with jokes about Rothschild's crudities and bad manners,<br />
J.S. Morgan & Co. into a British concern. 1<br />
1. John Douglas Forbes, ].P. Morgan, Jr. (Charlottesville: University Press of<br />
Virginia, 1981), p. 31.<br />
B. This apparently has not diminished over the years. The December 23, 1991,<br />
ffcsue of Business Week (p. 69) reminds us that the CEO of J.P. Morgan & Co., Dennis<br />
Weatherstone who lives in Connecticut, was knighted by Queen Elizabeth 11.
—<br />
414 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
without realizing that every drop they drank had been paid for by<br />
Rothschild. 1<br />
Mullins does not give a reference for the source of this story, and<br />
one cannot help being skeptical that such details could be proved.<br />
Nevertheless, a secret arrangement of this kind is not as absurd as it<br />
may sound. There is no question that the Rothschilds were quite<br />
capable of such a clandestine relationship and, in fact, this is exactly<br />
the kind of deception for which they had become famous. Furthermore,<br />
there was ample reason for them to do so. A strong anti-<br />
Semitic and anti-Rothschild sentiment had grown up in Europe and<br />
the United States, and the family often found it to its advantage to<br />
work through agents rather than to deal directly. Derek Wilson tells<br />
us: "The name 'Rothschild' was, thus, beginning to be heard in<br />
places far removed from sophisticated London and Paris. But the<br />
connection with the great bankers was sometimes tenuous.'"<br />
That tenuous connection was precisely the role to be played by<br />
August Belmont in the United States, and the anti-Semitism he<br />
found there was undoubtedly the reason he changed his name from<br />
Schoenberg to Belmont upon landing in New York in 1837. Prior to<br />
that, the Rothschild agent had been the firm of J.L. and S.I. Joseph &<br />
Company, about as American sounding as one can get. It was not<br />
long, however, before the Belmont-Rothschild connection became<br />
common knowledge, and the ploy ceased to be effective.<br />
In 1848, the family decided to send Alphonse Rothschild to the<br />
United States to check on Belmont's operations and to evaluate the<br />
possibility of replacing him with a direct Rothschild representative,<br />
perhaps Alphonse himself. After an extended visit, he wrote home:<br />
In a few years from now America will have attracted to itself the<br />
greater part of trade with China and the Indies and will be enthroned<br />
between the two oceans.... The country possesses such elements of<br />
prosperity that one would have to be blind not to recognize them. ... I<br />
have no hesitation in saying that a Rothschild house, and not just an<br />
agency, should be established in America.... Today we are presented<br />
with a fine opportunity. Later on, difficulties will of necessity arise as<br />
a result of competition from all sides.<br />
1. Eustace Mullins, Secrets of the Federal Reserve (Virginia: Bankers Research<br />
Institute, 1983), p. 49.<br />
2. Derek Wilson, p. 176.<br />
3. B. Gille, Histoire de la Maison Rothschild, Vol. 1, 1965-1967, p. 581, cited by Derek<br />
Wilson, p. 181.<br />
THE LONDON CONNECTION 415<br />
Some historians have expressed amazement over the fact that<br />
khe recommendation was never acted upon. Wilson says: "This was<br />
the greatest opportunity the Rothschilds ever lost." Those with a<br />
more skeptical bent are tempted to wonder if the opportunity really<br />
was lost or if it was merely taken in a more indirect fashion. It is<br />
significant that, precisely at this time, George Peabody was making<br />
a name for himself in London and had established a close relation-<br />
\<br />
ship with Nathan Rothschild. Is it possible that the Peabody firm<br />
was given the nod from the Rothschild consortium to represent<br />
them in America? And is it possible that the plan included allowing<br />
Belmont to operate as a known Rothschild agent while using<br />
Peabody & Company as an unknown agent, thus, providing their<br />
own competition?<br />
John Moody answers: "The Rothschilds were content to remain<br />
a close ally of Morgan rather than a competitor as far as the<br />
American field was concerned." Gabriel Kolko says: "Morgan's<br />
[activities in 1895-1896 in selling U.S. gold bonds in Europe were<br />
based on his alliance with the House of Rothschild." Sereno Pratt<br />
says: "These houses may, like J.P. Morgan & Company . . . represent<br />
here the great firms and institutions of Europe, just as August<br />
Belmont & Company have long represented the Rothschilds." And<br />
George Wheeler writes: "Part of the reality of the day was an ugly<br />
resurgence of anti-Semitism.... Someone was needed as a cover.<br />
Who better than J.<br />
Pierpont Morgan, a solid, Protestant exemplar of<br />
capitalism able to trace his family back to pre-Revolutionary<br />
times?" 5<br />
RISE OF THE HOUSE OF MORGAN<br />
With these considerations as background, the meteoric rise of<br />
Morgan's star over London and Wall Street can be readily understood.<br />
It is no longer surprising, for example, that Peabody &<br />
Company was the sole American investment firm to receive a<br />
gigantic loan from the Bank of England during the U.S. panic of<br />
1857, a loan which not only saved it from sinking, but made it<br />
1. Derek Wilson, p. 182.<br />
|- Moody, p. 27.<br />
3. Kolko, Triumph, p. 142.<br />
4. Sereno S. Pratt, The Work of Wall Street (New York: D. Appleton, 1916; rpt. New<br />
York: Arno Press, 1975), p. 349.<br />
5. Wheeler, pp. 17-18,42.
416 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
possible to seize and salvage many other ships that were then capsized<br />
on Wall Street.<br />
Peabody had become active in the business of discounting<br />
acceptances, which is banker language for insuring commercial<br />
loans issued for the purchase of goods. This is how it works: The<br />
seller issues a bill with a stipulation that he must be paid at a future<br />
date, usually ninety days. When the buyer receives the bill, his bank<br />
writes the word "accepted" across the face of it and adds the signature<br />
of an officer, making it<br />
a legally binding contract. In other<br />
words, the bank becomes a co-signer on the buyer's credit and guarantees<br />
payment even if the buyer should default.<br />
Naturally, there is a price for this guarantee. That price is stated<br />
as a percentage of the total bill and it is either added to the amount<br />
paid by the buyer or deducted from the amount received by the<br />
seller. Actually there is a fee paid at both ends of the transaction, one<br />
to the seller's bank which receives the acceptance and pays out the<br />
money, and one to the issuing bank which assumes the liability of<br />
guaranteeing payment. The sale is said to be "discounted" by the<br />
amount paid to the banks. And so it was that Peabody & Company<br />
had been active in the business of discounting acceptances, primarily<br />
between sellers in England and buyers in the United States.<br />
MORGAN AND THE PANIC OF 1857<br />
In the Wall Street panic of 1857, many U.S. buyers were unable<br />
to pay their bills, and Peabody and Morgan were expected to make<br />
good on their guarantees. Naturally, they didn't have the money,<br />
and the firm was facing certain bankruptcy unless the money could<br />
be obtained from somewhere. Stanley Jackson provides the details:<br />
The slump was catastrophic for Peabody & Co. It suddenly found<br />
itself committed to acceptances of £2 million and with no hope of<br />
discharging even part of a stockpile of depreciating bonds on New<br />
York brokers and bankers, themselves now desperately short of ready<br />
funds. The firm was soon paying out thousands of pounds a day.<br />
Without raising a large temporary loan the partners would be forced<br />
to suspend business altogether. 1<br />
Ron Chernow, in The House of Morgan, says: "Rumors raced<br />
through London that George Peabody and Company was about to<br />
fail, a prospect heartily relished by rivals.... The major London<br />
1. Jackson, p. 56.<br />
THE LONDON CONNECTION 417<br />
houses told Morgan they would bail out the firm—but only if<br />
Peabody shut down the bank within a year." Jackson continues the<br />
narrative:<br />
The clouds lifted dramatically when the Bank of England<br />
announced a loan to Peabody's of £800,000, at very reasonable interest,<br />
with the promise of further funds up to a million sterling if and when<br />
required. It was a remarkable vote of confidence as Thomas Hankey<br />
[governor of the Bank of England] had already rejected similar appeals<br />
from various American firms who did not measure up to his<br />
standards.... Peabody & Company recovered almost overnight and<br />
indeed hoisted its turnover above pre-slump levels.<br />
With an almost unlimited access to cash and credit backed by<br />
the Bank of England, Peabody and Morgan were able to wade hip<br />
deep through the depreciated stocks and bonds that were sold to<br />
them at sacrifice prices on Wall Street. Within only a few years,<br />
when sanity had been restored to American markets, the assets of<br />
the firm had grown to gigantic proportions.<br />
This event tells us a great deal about relationships. If<br />
Rothschilds truly had been competitors, they would have seized<br />
upon this opportunity and used their great influence within the<br />
Bank of England and the other investment houses in London to<br />
squeeze out Peabody, not to assist him. The Barings, in particular,<br />
were already trying to accomplish exactly that. The Rothschilds<br />
must have believed that a successful Peabody firm ultimately<br />
would be in their own best interest.<br />
ANTI-SEMITISM WAS PROFITABLE<br />
In later years, Jack Morgan Q.P., Jr.) would assume the role of a<br />
staunch anti-Semite, and this undoubtedly strengthened his hand at<br />
dealing with American investors and borrowers who were loath to<br />
have anything to do with Jewish bankers. That, of course, included<br />
officials of the U.S. Treasury. It was particularly helpful during the<br />
1896 rescue of the federal government from a decline in its gold<br />
reserves. Fearing that it would not be able to honor its promise to<br />
exchange paper money for gold coins, the government was forced<br />
to borrow $62 million in gold. The House of Rothschild was an<br />
obvious source for such a loan, but the Treasury wanted to avoid an<br />
1 Chernow, .<br />
p 1 1<br />
2- Jackson, pp. 56-57.<br />
3. Josephson, p. 60.<br />
the
418 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND THE LONDON CONNECTION 419<br />
anti-Semitic backlash. Everything fell into place, however, when<br />
Morgan and Company became the primary lender, with Rothschild<br />
apparently demoted to the role of a mere participant. Wheeler<br />
writes:<br />
The consummate politicians of the Cleveland administration ...<br />
were certainly aware of the dangers inherent in promoting a rescue<br />
effort for the United States Treasury that would be financed by those<br />
archetypes of "international Jewish financiers/' the Rothschilds. .<br />
During these developments, Pierpont Morgan took no direct part<br />
in the salvage effort. Up to this point it looked as if the aging<br />
financier—he would be fifty-eight in two months—would be merely<br />
one among many in this and whatever subsequent bond arrangements<br />
would be necessary. It seemed as though he would move on into old<br />
age with little more to round out his obituary than his awkward<br />
attempt to profiteer on the sale of rifles at the start of the Civil War, his<br />
minor shorting of the Union in gold trading toward the close, and a<br />
bold but largely unsuccessful move in the 1880s to impose an eastern<br />
capitalist cease-fire on the country's warring railroads.<br />
But there were steps being taken even now to bring him out of the<br />
financial backwaters—and they were not being taken by Pierpont<br />
Morgan himself. The first suggestion of his name for a role in the<br />
recharging of the reserve originated with the London branch of the<br />
House of Rothschild.<br />
The apparent anti-Semitism of J. P. Morgan, Jr., was again<br />
extremely profitable during World War 1, when it was widely publicized<br />
that the Kaiser was funded by German-Jew bankers. To deal<br />
with the Morgan group, therefore, as opposed to Kuhn Loeb, for<br />
example, was in some circles almost a point of national patriotism.<br />
When J. P. Morgan, Sr., died in 1913, people were shocked to<br />
learn that his estate was valued at only $68 million, a paltry sum<br />
compared to the fortunes held by the Vanderbilts, Astors, and<br />
Rockefellers. It was even more unbelievable when Jack Morgan<br />
died in 1943 and left an estate valued at only $16 million. A small<br />
amount had been transferred to members of their families prior to<br />
their deaths, but that did not account for the vast fortunes which<br />
they visibly controlled during their lives. Surely, there had been a<br />
bookkeeping sleight-of-hand. On the other hand, it may have been<br />
true. When Alphonse Rothschild died in Paris in 1905, it was revealed<br />
that his estate contained $60 million in American securities.<br />
1. Wheeler, pp. 16-17.<br />
.<br />
The Rothschilds in Britain undoubtedly held an equally large bloc.<br />
Furthermore, many of these securities were handled through the<br />
House of Morgan. The possibilities are obvious that a major portion<br />
of the wealth and power of the Morgan firm was, and always<br />
had been, merely the wealth and power of the Rothschilds who had<br />
raised it up in the beginning and who sustained it through its entire<br />
existence.<br />
How much of Morgan's apparent anti-Semitism was real and<br />
how much may have been a pragmatic guise is, in the final analysis,<br />
of little importance, and we should not give unwarranted emphasis<br />
to it<br />
here. Regardless of one's interpretation of the nature of the<br />
relationship between the Houses of Morgan and Rothschild, the fact<br />
remains that it was close, it was ongoing, and it was profitable to<br />
both. If Morgan truly did harbor feelings of anti-Semitism, neither<br />
he nor the Rothschilds ever allowed them to get in the way of their<br />
business.<br />
To put the London connection into proper perspective, it will be<br />
necessary once again to abandon a strict chronological sequence of<br />
events and jump ahead to the year 1924. So let us put our cast of<br />
characters on hold for a moment and, before allowing them to act<br />
out the drama of creating the Federal Reserve System, we shall pick<br />
up the storyline eleven years after that event had already taken<br />
place.<br />
ENGLAND FACES A DILEMMA<br />
At the end of World War I, Britain faced an economic dilemma.<br />
She had abandoned the gold standard early in the war in order to<br />
remove all limits from the creation of fiat money, and the result had<br />
been extreme inflation. But now she wanted to regain her former<br />
position of power and prestige in the world's financial markets and<br />
decided that, to accomplish this, it would be necessary to return to<br />
the gold standard. It was decided, further, to set the exchange value<br />
of the pound sterling (the British monetary unit) at exactly $4.86 in<br />
U.S. currency, which was approximately what it had been before the<br />
war began.<br />
To say that she wanted to return to the gold standard actually is<br />
misleading. It was not a pure standard in which every unit of money<br />
was totally backed by a stated weight of gold. Rather, it was a<br />
1. See "Head of Rothschilds' Paris House Is Dead/' The New York Times, May 27,<br />
1905, p. 9.
420 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
fractional gold standard in which only a certain fraction of all<br />
monetary units were so backed. But, even that was much to be desired<br />
over no backing whatsoever for three reasons. First, it created<br />
greater consumer confidence in the money system because of the<br />
implied promise to redeem all currency in gold—even though such<br />
promises are always broken when based on a fractional-reserve.<br />
Secondly, it provided an efficient means of settling financial accounts<br />
between nations, gold always being the international medium<br />
of choice. Thirdly, it applied some braking action to the<br />
production of fiat money, thus, providing a certain degree of restraint<br />
to inflation and the boom-bust cycle.<br />
The decision to return to a fractional gold standard, therefore,<br />
while it left much to be desired, was still a step in the right direction.<br />
But there were two serious problems with the plan. The first was<br />
that the exchange value of gold can never be decided by political<br />
decree. It will always be determined by the interplay of supply and<br />
demand within the marketplace. Trying to fix the number of dollars<br />
which people will be willing to exchange for a pound sterling was<br />
like trying to legislate how many baseball cards a schoolboy will<br />
give for a purple agate. The international currency market is like a<br />
huge auction. If the auctioneer sets the opening bid too high, there<br />
will be no takers—which is exactly what happened to the pound.<br />
The other problem was that, during the war, England had<br />
adopted a massive welfare program and a strong network of labor<br />
unions. The reason this was a problem was that the only way to<br />
make the pound acceptable in international trade was to allow its<br />
value to drop to a competitive and realistic level, and that would<br />
have meant, not only a drastic reduction in welfare benefits, but also<br />
a general lowering of prices—including the price of labor which is<br />
called wages. Politicians were quite willing to allow prices of commodities<br />
to move downward, but they did not have the courage to<br />
take any action which would reduce either welfare benefits or<br />
wages. To the contrary, they continued to bid for votes with promises<br />
of still more socialism and easy credit. Prices continued to rise.<br />
1 . The government hedged even on this provision. Only bars of gold bullion were<br />
available for redemption, not coins. This insured that gold would not circulate as<br />
money and that it would be used almost exclusively for large-scale international<br />
transactions.<br />
the<br />
THE LONDON CONNECTION 421<br />
ENGLAND IN DEPRESSION<br />
With the value of the pound set artificially high in order to sustain<br />
prices, wages, and profit levels, the cost of British exports also<br />
became high, and they ceased to be competitive in world markets.<br />
With exports in decline, the amount of money coming into the country<br />
also declined. England became a debtor nation, which means<br />
that her payments to other countries were larger than her income<br />
from those countries.<br />
As pointed out in chapter five, if<br />
an individual spends more<br />
than his income, he must either increase his income, dip into savings,<br />
sell off assets, create counterfeit, or borrow. The same is true of<br />
nations. England had already borrowed to the limit of her credit and<br />
was rapidly exhausting her savings in order to continue purchasing<br />
foreign goods to sustain the high standard of living to which she<br />
had grown accustomed. She couldn't counterfeit because payments<br />
for these imports had to be settled in gold, which meant that, as her<br />
national savings were spent, her gold supply moved out of the<br />
country. The handwriting was on the wall. If this process continued,<br />
the nation soon would be broke. It was a situation, incidentally,<br />
which was amazingly parallel to what has plagued the United<br />
States since the end of Word War II, and for mostly the same reasons.<br />
By March of 1919, England's trade was so depressed that she<br />
had no choice but to let the value of the pound "float," which means<br />
to seek its own level in response to supply and demand. Within a<br />
year it had dropped to $3.21, a loss of thirty-four per cent. Since the<br />
American dollar was the de facto world monetary standard at that<br />
time, receiving fewer dollars for each pound sterling meant that the<br />
pound was valued lower in all the markets of the world. The result<br />
was that the price Britishers had to pay for imported goods was<br />
becoming higher while the price she received for the export of her<br />
own goods was becoming lower. The British economy was, not only<br />
badly anemic, it was experiencing a monetary hangover from the<br />
vast inflation of World War I. In other words, it was undergoing a<br />
painful but, in the long run, healthy recovery and a return to reality.<br />
Such a condition was intolerable to the monetary and political<br />
Pcientists who were determined to find a quick and painless remedy<br />
which would allow the binge to continue. Several emergency<br />
therapies were administered. The first was to use the Financial
422 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
Committee of the League of Nations—which England dominated<br />
to require all the other European nations to follow similar inflationary<br />
monetary policies. They were also required to establish what<br />
was called the "gold exchange standard," a scheme whereby all<br />
countries based their currency, not on gold, but on the pound sterling.<br />
In that way, they could all inflate together without causing a<br />
disruptive flow of gold from one to the other, and England would<br />
act as the regulator and guarantor of the system. In other words,<br />
England used the power of her position within the League of Nations<br />
to establish the Bank of England as a master central bank for all<br />
the other central banks of Europe. It was the prototype for what the<br />
Cabal now is doing with Federal Reserve and the World Bank<br />
within the framework of the United Nations.<br />
PROBLEM OF AMERICAN PROSPERITY<br />
Europe was well in hand, but that still left the United States to be<br />
controlled. America had also inflated during the war but not nearly<br />
as much. She also had a fractional gold standard, but the stockpile of<br />
gold was very large and still growing. As long as America continued<br />
to exist as the producer of so many commodities that England<br />
needed for import, and as long as the value of the dollar continued<br />
to be high, the anemia of the pound sterling would continue.<br />
The therapy chosen for this problem was simple. Perform a<br />
monetary transfusion from a healthy patient to the unhealthy one.<br />
All the London financiers had to do was find a large and robust<br />
specimen who, without asking too many questions, would be willing<br />
to become the donor. The specimen selected, of course, was<br />
Uncle Sam himself. It was the prototype of the transfer mechanism,<br />
previously described, which has been the life support keeping alive<br />
the moribund Communist and Socialist countries since World War<br />
II.<br />
There are several ways the life blood of one nation can be transfused<br />
to another. The most direct method, of course, is to make an<br />
outright gift, such as the bizarre American ritual called foreign aid.<br />
Another is to make a gift disguised as something else, such as needlessly<br />
stationing military bases abroad for the sole purpose of bolstering<br />
the foreign economy, or granting a loan to a foreign<br />
1. For an overview of the foregoing developments, see "The Federal Reserve as A<br />
Cartelization Device/' by Murray N. Rothbard, in Money in Crisis, Barry N. Siegei<br />
ed. (New York: Ballinger, 1984), pp. 115-17.<br />
THE LONDON CONNECTION 423<br />
government at below market rates or—worse—with the full expectation<br />
that the loan will never be repaid. But the third way is the<br />
most ingenious of them all: to have one nation deliberately inflate its<br />
currency at a rate greater than the other nation so that real purchasing<br />
power, in terms of international trade, moves from the more inflating<br />
to the less inflating nation. This is a method truly worthy of<br />
the monetary scientists. It is so subtle and so sophisticated that not<br />
one in a thousand would even think of it, much less object to it. It<br />
was, therefore, the ideal method chosen in 1925 to benefit England<br />
at the expense of America. As Professor Rothbard observed:<br />
In short, the American public was nominated to suffer the burdens<br />
of inflation and subsequent collapse [the crash of 1929] in order to<br />
maintain the British government and the British trade union<br />
movement in the style to which they insisted on becoming<br />
accustomed.<br />
°<br />
At the inception of the Federal Reserve System, there had been a<br />
brief struggle for power but, within a few years, the contest was<br />
decisively won by the head of the New York Bank, Benjamin Strong.<br />
Strong, it will be recalled, previously had been head of Morgan's<br />
Bankers Trust Company and was one of the seven participants at<br />
the secret meeting on <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island. Professor Quigley reminds us<br />
that "Strong owed his career to the favor of the Morgan bank. ... He<br />
became Governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York as the<br />
joint nominee of Morgan and Kuhn, Loeb and Company." 2<br />
Strong was the ideal choice for the cartel. Not the least of his<br />
qualifications was his alliance with the financial powers of London.<br />
When Montagu Norman was made the Governor of the Bank of<br />
England in 1920, there began a close personal relationship between<br />
the two central bankers which lasted until Strong's sudden death in<br />
1928.<br />
Norman was considered by many to be eccentric if not mentally<br />
unbalanced. Quigley says:<br />
Norman was a strange man whose mental outlook was one of<br />
successfully suppressed hysteria or even paranoia. He had no use for<br />
government and feared democracy. Both of these seemed to him to be<br />
threats to private banking, and thus to all that was proper and<br />
[<br />
precious in human life.... When he rebuilt the Bank of England, he<br />
1 Rothbard, Crisis, pp. 131-32.<br />
2<br />
-<br />
Quigley, Tragedy, p. 326.
424 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND THE LONDON CONNECTION 425<br />
constructed it<br />
as a fortress prepared to defend itself against any<br />
popular revolt, with the sacred gold reserves hidden in deep vaults<br />
below the level of underground waters which could be released to<br />
cover them by pressing a button on the governor's desk. For much of<br />
his life, Norman rushed about the world by fast steamship, covering<br />
tens of thousands of miles each year, often travelling incognito,<br />
concealed by a black slouch hat and a long black cloak, under the<br />
assumed name of "Professor Skinner."...<br />
Norman had a devoted colleague in Benjamin Strong.,,. In the<br />
1920s, they were determined to use the financial power of Britain and<br />
of the United States to force all the major countries of the world to go<br />
on the gold standard [with an artificial value set for the benefit of<br />
England] and to operate it through central banks free from all political<br />
control, with all questions of international finance to be settled by<br />
agreements by such central banks without interference from<br />
governments.<br />
Strong and Norman spent many holidays together, sometimes<br />
in Bar Harbor, Maine, but usually in Southern France, and they<br />
crisscrossed the Atlantic on numerous other occasions to consult<br />
with each other on their plan for controlling the world economy.<br />
Lester Chandler tells us: 'Their associations were so frequent and<br />
prolonged and their collaboration so close that it is still impossible<br />
to determine accurately their relative roles in developing some of<br />
the ideas and projects that they shared."<br />
The Bank of England provided<br />
Strong with an office and a private secretary during his visits,<br />
and the two men kept in close contact with each other through the<br />
weekly exchange of private cables. All of these meetings and communiques<br />
were kept in strict secrecy. When their frequent visits<br />
drew inquiries from the press, the standard reply was that they<br />
were just friends getting together for recreation or informal chats.<br />
By 1926, the heads of the central banks of France and Germany were<br />
occasionally included in their meetings which, according to<br />
Norman's biographer, were "more secret than any ever held by<br />
Royal Arch Masons or by any Rosicrucian Order/<br />
1. Quigley, Tragedy, p. 326.<br />
2. Lester V. Chandler, Benjamin Strong, Central Banker (Washington, D.C.: Brookings<br />
Institution, 1958, reprinted by Arno Press, A New York Times Company, 1978),<br />
p. 259.<br />
3. John Hargrave, Montagu Norman (New York: Greystone Press, 1942), p. 108.<br />
SECRET MEETING OF 1927<br />
The culmination of these discussions took place at a secret meeting<br />
in 1927 at which it was agreed that the financial lifeblood of the<br />
American people would be donated for a massive transfusion to<br />
Great Britain. Galbraith sets the scene:<br />
On July 1, 1927, the Maureiania arrived in New York with two<br />
notable passengers, Montagu Norman, Governor of the Bank of<br />
England, and Hjalmar Schacht, head of the German Reichsbank.. . . The<br />
secrecy covering the visit was extreme and to a degree ostentatious.<br />
The names of neither of the great bankers appeared on the passenger<br />
list. Neither, on arriving, met with the press....<br />
In New York the two men were joined by Charles Rist, the Deputy<br />
Governor of the Banque de France, and they went into conference with<br />
Benjamin Strong, the Governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of New<br />
York....<br />
The principle, or in any case the ultimately important, subject of<br />
discussion was the persistently weak reserve position of the Bank of<br />
England. This, the bankers thought, could be helped if the Federal<br />
Reserve System would ease interest rates, encourage lending. Holders<br />
of gold would then seek the higher returns from keeping their metal in<br />
London. And, in time, higher prices in the United States would ease<br />
the competitive position of British industry and labor. 1<br />
Galbraith speaks with soft phrases to cushion a harsh reality.<br />
What he is saying is that the purpose of the meeting was to finalize<br />
a plan whereby the Governor of the Federal Reserve System was to<br />
deliberately create inflation in the U.S. so that American prices<br />
would rise, making U.S. goods less competitive in world markets<br />
and causing American gold to move to the Bank of England. Governor<br />
Strong needed little convincing. That is precisely what he and<br />
Norman had planned to do all along and, in fact, he had already<br />
begun to implement the plan. The purpose of inviting the Germans<br />
and the French to the meeting was to enlist their agreement to create<br />
inflation in their countries as well. Schacht and Rist would have no<br />
part of it and left the meeting early, leaving Strong and Norman to<br />
work out the final details between them.<br />
Strong was more concerned about British fortunes than<br />
American. In a letter written in May of 1924 to Secretary of the<br />
Treasury Andrew Mellon, he discussed the necessity of lowering<br />
American interest rates as a step toward money expansion with the<br />
Galbraith, pp. 174-75.
426 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
objective of raising American prices relative to those in Great<br />
Britain. He acknowledged that the goal was to protect England from<br />
having to cut back on wages, profits, and welfare. He said:<br />
At the present time it is probably true that British prices for goods<br />
internationally dealt in are as a whole, roughly, in the neighborhood of<br />
10 percent above our prices, and one of the preliminaries to the<br />
re-establishment of gold payment by Great Britain will be to facilitate<br />
a gradual readjustment of these price levels before monetary reform is<br />
undertaken. In other words, this means some small advance in prices<br />
here and possibly some small decline in their prices.. .<br />
The burden of this readjustment must fall more largely upon us<br />
than upon them. It will be difficult politically and socially for the<br />
British Government and the Bank of England to face a price<br />
liquidation in England ... in face of the fact that trade is poor and they<br />
have over a million unemployed people receiving government aid.<br />
BRINGING DOWN THE DOLLAR<br />
The Mandrake Mechanism of the Federal Reserve went into<br />
high gear on behalf of the Bank of England in 1924, several years<br />
before the historic meeting between Strong, Norman, and Rist.<br />
There were two great surges of monetary expansion. The first came<br />
with the monetization of $492 million in bonds plus almost twice as<br />
much in banker's acceptances. The second burst of inflation came in<br />
the latter half of 1927, immediately following the secret meeting<br />
between Strong, Norman, Schacht, and Rist. It involved the funding<br />
of $225 million in government bonds plus $220 million in banker's<br />
acceptances, for a total increase in bank reserves of $445 million. At<br />
the same time, the rediscount rate to member banks (the interest<br />
rate they pay to borrow from the Fed) was lowered from 4 to 3.5 per<br />
cent, making it<br />
easier for those banks to acquire additional<br />
"reserves" out of which they could create even more fiat dollars-<br />
The amount created on top of that by the commercial banks is about<br />
five and a-half times the amount created by the Fed, whic±i means a<br />
total money flood in excess of $10 billion in just six years.<br />
L Chandler, pp. 282-84. i<br />
2. Approximately $1,328,000,000 in the first burst, including bothbonds ana<br />
acceptances, plus"$445,000,000 in the second burst equals<br />
S^^^Jg<br />
amount multiplied by 5.5 equals $9,751,500,000. Add the original $1,773,000,000<br />
used as a base, and the total is $11,524,500,000. This estimate is reasonably close to<br />
the figure of $10,661,000,000 published by the Fed itself, which represents the<br />
growth in total deposits and currency in circulation during that period. See Depc*<br />
its and Currency," p. 34.<br />
THE LONDON CONNECTION 427<br />
Throughout this period, the demand by the System for government<br />
bonds and acceptances pushed interest rates down. As anticipated,<br />
people with gold then preferred to send it to London where<br />
it could earn a higher yield, and America's gold supply began to<br />
move abroad. Furthermore, as inflation began to eat its way into the<br />
purchasing power of the dollar, the prices of American-made goods<br />
began to rise in world markets making them less competitive; U.S.<br />
exports began to decline; unemployment began to rise; low interest<br />
rates and easy credit led to speculation in the securities markets;<br />
and the system lunged full speed ahead toward the Great Crash of<br />
1929. But that part of the story must wait for another chapter.<br />
The technician who actually drafted the final version of the<br />
Federal Reserve Act was H. Parker Willis. After the System was created,<br />
he was appointed as First Secretary of the Board of Governors.<br />
By 1929, he had become disillusioned with the cartel and, in an article<br />
published in The North American Review, he wrote:<br />
In the autumn of 1926 a group of bankers, among whom was one<br />
with a world famous name, were sitting at a table in a Washington<br />
hotel. One of them raised the question whether the low discount rates<br />
of the System were not likely to encourage speculation. "Yes," replied<br />
the conspicuous figure referred to, "they will, but that cannot be<br />
helped. It is the price we must pay for helping Europe."<br />
There can be little doubt that the banker in question was J.P.<br />
(Jack) Morgan, Jr. It was Jack who was imbued with English<br />
tradition from the earliest age, whose financial empire had its roots<br />
in London, whose family business was saved by the Bank of<br />
England, who spent six months out of every year of his later life as<br />
a resident of England, who had openly insisted that his junior partners<br />
demonstrate a "loyalty to Britain," and who had directed the<br />
Council on Foreign Relations, the American branch of a secret society<br />
dedicated to the supremacy of British tradition and political<br />
1- When an item is in demand, its price goes up. In the case of bonds and other<br />
interest-bearing debt instruments, the price is expressed in reverse of its interest<br />
yield. The higher the price, the lower the interest. In other words, the higher the<br />
price, the more one has to pay to obtain the same dollar return in interest. Therefore,<br />
when the Fed creates an artificial demand for bonds or commercial paper, such as<br />
acceptances, the interest yield on these items goes down, which makes them more<br />
costly as an investment.<br />
2 -<br />
"The Failure of the Federal Reserve," by H. Parker Willis, The North American<br />
Revieiv, May, 1929, p. 553.<br />
3-<br />
Chernow, p. 167.
428 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND THE LONDON CONNECTION 429<br />
power. It is only with that background that one can fully appreciate<br />
Reunion with her American children is the only sure way to<br />
the willingness to sacrifice American interests. Indeed, "it is the<br />
prevent continued decline.... Whatever obstructs reunion I oppose;<br />
whatever promotes reunion I favor. I judge all political questions from<br />
this standpoint...<br />
The Parliament of Man and the Federation of the World have<br />
already been hailed by the poet, and these mean a step much farther in<br />
advance of the proposed reunion of Britain and America.... I say that<br />
as surely as the sun in the heavens once shone upon Britain and<br />
Our policy of the last four years, up to this January, has been<br />
America united, so surely is it one morning to rise, shine upon, and<br />
effective in accomplishing the purpose for which it was designed. It<br />
greet again the reunited state, "The British-American Union/'<br />
has enabled monetary reorganization to be completed in Europe,<br />
which otherwise would have been impossible. It was undertaken with SUMMARY<br />
the well recognized hazard that we were liable to encounter a big<br />
After the Civil War, America experienced a series of expansions<br />
speculation and some expansion of credit. . .<br />
Our course was perfectly<br />
and contractions of the money supply leading directly to economic<br />
obvious. We had to undertake it. The conditions permitted it, and the<br />
booms and busts. This was the result of the creation of fiat money by<br />
possibility of damage abroad was at a minimum.<br />
a banking system which, far from being free and competitive, was a<br />
Damage abroad? What about damage at home? It is clear that<br />
half-way house to central banking. Throughout the chaos, one banking<br />
firm, the House of Morgan, was able to prosper out of the failure<br />
Strong saw little difference between the two. He was the forerunner<br />
of the internationalists who have operated the Federal Reserve ever<br />
of others. Morgan had close ties with the financial structure and culture<br />
of England and was, in fact, more British than American.<br />
since. He viewed the United States as but one piece in a complex<br />
world financial structure, and what was good for the world was<br />
Events suggest the possibility that Morgan and Company was in<br />
good for America. And, oh yes, what was good for England was<br />
concealed partnership with the House of Rothschild throughout<br />
good for the world!<br />
most of this period.<br />
THE BRITISH-AMERICAN UNION<br />
Benjamin Strong was a Morgan man and was appointed as the<br />
It is one of the least understood realities of modern history that<br />
first Governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York which rapidly<br />
assumed dominance over the System. Strong immediately<br />
many of America's most prominent political and financial figuresthen<br />
as now—have been willing to sacrifice the best interests of the<br />
entered into close alliance with Montagu Norman, Governor of the<br />
United States in order to further their goal of creating a one-world Bank of England, to save the English economy from depression.<br />
government. The strategy has remained unchanged since the formation<br />
of Cecil Rhodes' society and its offspring, the Round Table which caused an outflow of gold, a loss of foreign markets, unem-<br />
This was accomplished by deliberately creating inflation in the U.S.<br />
Groups. It is to merge the English-speaking nations into a single<br />
ployment, and speculation in the stock market, all of which were<br />
political entity, while at the same time creating similar groupings<br />
factors that propelled America into the crash of 1929 and the great<br />
for other geopolitical regions. After this is accomplished, all of these<br />
depression of the 30s.<br />
groupings are to be amalgamated into a global government, the<br />
Although not covered in this chapter, it must be remembered<br />
so-called Parliament of Man. And guess who is planning to control<br />
that the same forces were responsible for American involvement in<br />
that government from behind the scenes.<br />
both world wars to provide the economic and military resources<br />
This strategy was expressed aptly by Andrew Carnegie in his<br />
England<br />
book, Triumphant Democracy. Expressing concern that England was<br />
needed to survive. Furthermore, the key players in this<br />
in decline as a world power, he said:<br />
Andrew Carnegie, Triumphant Democracy (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,<br />
1893), pp. 530-49. This is a revised edition of the book which was originally written<br />
1. Chandler, p. 458. For additional clarification, also see pp. 459-63- *n 1886. Earlier editions do not contain these words.<br />
price we must pay for helping Europe."<br />
In spite of the growing signs of crisis in the American economy,<br />
Morgan's protege, Benjamin Strong, was nonetheless pleased with<br />
his accomplishment. In a letter written in 1929 to Parker Gilbert,<br />
who was the American Agent for Reparations, he said:
430 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
action were men who were part of the network of a secret society<br />
established by Cecil Rhodes for the expansion of the British empire.<br />
Chapter Twenty-One<br />
COMPETITION IS A SIN<br />
The story of how the New York investment<br />
bankers formed a cartel to avoid competition; the<br />
drafting of proposed legislation to legalize that<br />
cartel; the strategy to camouflage the true nature<br />
of the legislation; the failure of the deception and<br />
the defeat of the bill.<br />
We have travelled to many points on a large circle of time and<br />
now are reapproaching the journey to <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island where this book<br />
began.<br />
In the last chapter, we saw how the expansion and contraction<br />
Of the money supply following the Civil War led to a series of<br />
booms and busts. We saw how the firm of J.P. Morgan & Company,<br />
with help from financiers in London, was able to reap great profits<br />
from both sides of those cycles but particularly from the recessions.<br />
At that point, we jumped ahead in time to examine how J.P.<br />
Morgan and other leading American financiers were closely<br />
aligned with British interests. We also saw how, in the 1920s, the<br />
American dollar was deliberately weakened by Morgan agents<br />
within the Federal Reserve System in order to prop up the sagging<br />
British economy. Let us return now to the point of departure and<br />
allow our cast to resume playing out that most important prior<br />
scene: the actual creation of the Federal Reserve System itself.<br />
HALF-WAY HOUSE TO CENTRAL BANKING<br />
Historians seeking to justify governmental control of the monetary<br />
system have claimed that the booms and busts that occurred<br />
during this period were the result of free and competitive banking.<br />
As we have seen, however, these destructive cycles were the direct<br />
result of the creation and then extinguishing of fiat money through<br />
a system of federally chartered national banks—dominated by a<br />
handful of firms on Wall Street—which constituted a half-way<br />
house to central banking. None of these banks were truly free of<br />
state control nor were they competitive in the traditional sense of
432 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND COMPETITION IS A SIN 433<br />
the word. They were in fact subsidized by the government and had<br />
many monopolistic privileges. From the perspective of bankers on<br />
Wall Street, however, there was a great deal more to be desired. For<br />
one thing, America still did not have a "lender of last resort/' That<br />
is banker language for a full-blown central bank with the power to<br />
create unlimited amounts of fiat money which can be rushed to the<br />
aid of any individual bank that is under siege by its depositors<br />
wanting their money back. Having a lender of last resort is the only<br />
way a bank can create money out of nothing and still be protected<br />
from a potential "run" by its customers. In other words, it is the<br />
means by which the public is forced to pay a hidden tax of inflation<br />
to cover the shortfall of fractional-reserve banking. That is why the<br />
so-called virtue of a lender of last resort is taught with great<br />
reverence today in virtually all academic institutions offering<br />
degrees in banking and finance. It is one of the means by which the<br />
system perpetuates itself.<br />
The banks could now inflate more radically and more in unison<br />
than before the war but, when they pushed too far and too fast,<br />
their bank-generated booms still<br />
collapsed into recessions. While<br />
this could be highly profitable to the banks, it was also precarious.<br />
As the American economy expanded in size, the magnitude of the<br />
booms and busts increased also, and it was becoming more and<br />
more difficult for firms like Morgan & Company to safely ride out<br />
the storm. There was a growing dread that the next collapse might<br />
be more than even they could handle.<br />
In addition to these concerns was the fact that many state<br />
banks, mostly in the developing Southern and Western states, had<br />
elected not to join the national banking system and, consequently,<br />
had escaped control by the Wall-Street-Washington axis. As the<br />
population expanded south and westward, much of the nation's<br />
banking moved likewise, and the new banks were becoming an<br />
increasing source of competition to the New York power center. By<br />
1896, the number of non-national banks had grown to sixty-one per<br />
cent, and they already held fifty-four per cent of the country's total<br />
banking deposits. By 1913, the year in which the Federal Reserve<br />
Act was passed, those numbers had swelled to seventy-one per<br />
cent non-national banks holding fifty-seven per cent of the nation's<br />
deposits. 1 Something had to be done to stop this movement.<br />
Additional competition was developing from the trend in<br />
industry to finance itself from profits rather than borrowed capital.<br />
Between 1900 and 1910, seventy per cent of American corporate<br />
growth was funded internally, making industry increasingly independent<br />
of the banks. What the bankers wanted—and what many<br />
businessmen wanted also—was a more "flexible" or "elastic"<br />
money supply which would allow them to create enough of it at<br />
any point in time so as to be able to drive interest rates downward<br />
at will. That would make loans to businessmen so attractive they<br />
would have little choice but to return to the bankers' stable.<br />
TRUSTS AND CARTELS REPLACE COMPETITION<br />
One more problem facing Wall Street was the fact that the<br />
biggest investment houses, such as Morgan & Company and Kuhn,<br />
Loeb & Company, although they remained as competitors, were by<br />
this time so large they had ceased doing serious battle against each<br />
other. The concept of trusts and cartels had dawned in America<br />
and, to those who already had made it<br />
to the top, joint ventures,<br />
market sharing, price fixing, and mergers were far more profitable<br />
than free-enterprise competition. Ron Chernow explains:<br />
»Wall Street was snowballing into one big, Morgan-dominated<br />
institution. In December 1909, Pierpont had bought a majority stake in<br />
the Equitable Life Assurance Society from Thomas Fortune Ryan. This<br />
gave him strong influence over America's three biggest insurance<br />
companies—Mutual Life, Equitable, and New York Life.... His<br />
Bankers Trust had taken over three other banks. In 1909, he had gained<br />
control of Guaranty Trust, which through a series of mergers he<br />
converted into America's largest trust.... The core Money Trust group<br />
included J.P. Morgan and Company, First National Bank, and<br />
National City Bank.. .<br />
Wall Street bankers incestuously swapped seats on each others<br />
boards. Some banks had so many overlapping directors it was hard to<br />
separate them.... The banks also shared large equity stakes in each<br />
other....<br />
Why didn't banks just merge instead of carrying out the charade<br />
of swapping shares and board members? Most were private<br />
partnerships or closely held banks and could have done so. The<br />
answer harked back to traditional American antipathy against<br />
concentrated financial power. The Morgan-First National-National<br />
City trio feared public retribution if it openly declared its allegiance.<br />
1. See Kolko, Triumph, p. 140. f Chernow, pp. 152-53.
434 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
Interlocking directorates and other forms of hidden control<br />
were far more safe than open consolidation but they, too, had their<br />
limitations. For one thing, they could not penetrate the barriers of<br />
similar competitive groupings. As these combines became larger<br />
and larger, ways were sought to bring them together at the top<br />
rather than to capture the corporate entities which comprised them.<br />
Thus was born the concept of a cartel, a "community of interest"<br />
among businessmen in the same field, a mechanism for coming<br />
together as partners at a high level and to reduce or eliminate<br />
altogether the harsh necessity of competition.<br />
All cartels, however, have an internal self-destruct mechanism.<br />
Sooner or later, one of the members inevitably becomes dissatisfied<br />
with his agreed-upon piece of the pie. He decides to compete once<br />
again and seeks a greater share of the market. It was quickly<br />
recognized that the only way to prevent this from happening was<br />
to use the police power of government to enforce the cartel<br />
agreement. The procedure called for the passage of laws disguised<br />
as measures to protect the consumer but which actually worked to<br />
ensure the elimination of competition. Henry P. Davison, who was<br />
a Morgan partner, put it bluntly when he told a Congressional<br />
committee in 1912: '1 would rather have regulation and control<br />
than free competition/'<br />
John D Rockefeller was even more to the<br />
point in one of his often repeated comments: "Competition is a<br />
sin „2<br />
This trend was not unique to the banking industry. Ron Paul<br />
and Lewis Lehrman provide the historical perspective:<br />
After 1896 and 1900, then, America entered a progressive and<br />
predominantly Republican era. Compulsory cartelization in the name<br />
of "progressivism" began to invade every aspect of American<br />
economic life. The railroads had begun the parade with the formation<br />
of the ICC in the 1880s, but now field after field was being centralized<br />
and cartelized in the name of "efficiency," "stability," "progress," and<br />
the general welfare.... In particular, various big business groups, led<br />
by the J.P. Morgan interests, often gathered in the National Civic<br />
Federation and other think tanks and pressure organizations, saw that<br />
the voluntary cartels and the industrial merger movements of the late<br />
1 Quoted by Gabriel Kolko, Main Currents in Modern American History (New York:<br />
Harper & Row, 1976), p.. 13.<br />
2. Quoted by William Hoffman, David: A Report on a Rockefeller (New York: Lyle<br />
Stewart, Inc., 1971), p. 29.<br />
f<br />
1890s<br />
COMPETITION IS A SIN 435<br />
had failed to achieve monopoly prices in industry. Therefore,<br />
they decided to turn to governments, state and federal, to curb the<br />
winds of competition and to establish forms of compulsory cartels, in<br />
the name, of course, of "curbing big business monopoly" and<br />
advancing the general welfare.<br />
The challenge no longer was how to overcome one's adversaries,<br />
but how to keep new ones from entering the field. When John<br />
D. used his enormous profits from Standard Oil to take control of<br />
the Chase National Bank, and his<br />
brother, William, bought the<br />
National City Bank of New York, Wall Street had yet one more<br />
gladiator in the financial arena. Morgan found that he had no<br />
choice except to allow the Rockefellers into the club but, now that<br />
they were in, they all agreed that the influx of competitors had to be<br />
stopped. And that was to be the hidden purpose of federal<br />
legislation and government control. Gabriel Kolko explains:<br />
The sheer magnitude of many of the mergers, culminating in U.S.<br />
Steel, soon forced him [Morgan] to modify his stand, though at times<br />
he would have preferred total control. More important, by 1898 he<br />
could not ignore the massive power of new financial competitors and<br />
had to treat them with deference. Standard Oil Company, utilizing<br />
National City Bank for its investments, had fixed resources<br />
substantially larger than Morgan's, and by 1899 was ready to move<br />
into the general economy.... The test came, of course, in the Northern<br />
Securities battle, which was essentially an expensive draw. Morgan<br />
and Standard paid deference to each other thereafter, and mutual<br />
toleration among bankers increased sharply.... A benign armed<br />
neutrality, rather than positive affection, is as much a reason as any for<br />
the high number of interlocks among the five major New York<br />
banking houses.<br />
Writing in the year 1919, from the perspective of an inside view<br />
of Wall Street at that time, John Moody completes the picture:<br />
J-<br />
This remarkable welding together of great corporate interests<br />
could not, of course, have been accomplished if the "masters of<br />
capital" in Wall Street had not themselves during the same period<br />
become more closely allied. The rivalry of interests which was so<br />
characteristic during the reorganization period a few years before had<br />
very largely disappeared. Although the two great groups of financiers,<br />
represented on the one hand by Morgan and his allies and on the other<br />
by the Standard Oil forces, were still distinguishable, they were now<br />
Paul and Lehrman, p. 119.<br />
2- Kolko, Triumph, pp. 143-44.
436 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
working in practical harmony on the basis of a sort of mutual<br />
"community of interest" of their own. Thus the control of capital and<br />
credit through banking resources tended to become concentrated in<br />
the hands of fewer and fewer men.... Before long it could be said,<br />
indeed, that two rival banking groups no longer existed, but that one<br />
vast and harmonious banking power had taken their pLace.<br />
THE ALDRICH-VREELAND ACT<br />
The monetary contractions of 1879 and 1893 were handled by<br />
Wall Street fairly easily and without government intervention, but<br />
the crisis of 1907 pushed their resources close to the abyss. It<br />
became clear that two changes had to be made: all remnants of<br />
banking competition now had to be totally eliminated and replaced<br />
by a national cartel; and far greater sums of fiat money had to be<br />
made available to the banks to protect them from future runs by<br />
depositors. There was now no question that Congress would have<br />
to be brought in as a partner in order to use the power of<br />
government to accomplish these objectives. Kolko continues:<br />
The crisis of 1907, on the other hand, found the combined banking<br />
structure of New York inadequate to meet the challenge, and<br />
chastened any obstreperous financial powers who thought they might<br />
build their fortunes independently of the entire banking<br />
community.... The nation had grown too large, banking had become<br />
too complex. Wall Street, humbled and almost alone, turned from its<br />
own resources to the national government.<br />
The first step in this direction was openly a stop-gap measure.<br />
In 1908, Congress passed the Aldrich-Vreeland Act which, basically,<br />
accomplished two objectives. First, it authorized the national<br />
banks to issue an emergency currency, called script, to substitute<br />
for regular money when they found themselves unable to pay their<br />
depositors. Script had been used by the bank clearing houses<br />
during the panic of 1907 with partial success, but it had been a bold<br />
experiment with no legal foundation. Now Congress made it quite<br />
legal and, as Galbraith observed, "The new legislation regularized<br />
these arrangements. This could be done against the security of<br />
sundry bonds and commercial loans—these could, in effect, be<br />
turned into cash without being sold/'<br />
1. Moody, pp. 117-18, 150<br />
2. Ko\ko f<br />
Triumph, p. 144.<br />
3. This legalized script was used only once—in 1914 at the outbreak of World<br />
War I. See Galbraith, p. 120.<br />
COMPETITION IS A SIN 437<br />
The second and perhaps most important feature of the Act was<br />
to create a National Monetary Commission to study the problems<br />
of American banking and then make recommendations to Congress<br />
on how to stabilize the monetary system. The commission<br />
consisted of nine senators and nine representatives. The Vice-<br />
Chairman was Representative Edward Vreeland, a banker from the<br />
Buffalo area. The chairman, of course, was Senator Nelson Aldrich.<br />
From the start, it was obvious that the Commission was a sham.<br />
Aldrich conducted virtually a one-man show. The so-called factfinding<br />
body held no official meetings for almost two years while<br />
Aldrich toured Europe consulting with the top central bankers of<br />
England, France, and Germany. Three-hundred thousand tax dollars<br />
were spent on these junkets, and the only tangible product of<br />
the Commission's work was thirty-eight massive volumes of the<br />
history of European banking. None of the members of the Commission<br />
were ever consulted regarding the official recommendations<br />
issued by Aldrich in their name. Actually, these were the work of<br />
Aldrich and six men who were not even members of the Commission,<br />
and their report was drafted, not in a bare Congressional<br />
conference room in Washington, but in a plush private hunting<br />
resort in Georgia.<br />
And this event finally brings us back to that cold, blustery night<br />
at the New Jersey railway station where seven men, representing<br />
one-fourth of the wealth of the world, boarded the Aldrich private<br />
car for a clandestine journey to <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island.<br />
THE JEKYLL ISLAND PLAN<br />
As summarized in the opening chapter of this book, the<br />
purpose of that meeting was to work out a plain to achieve five<br />
primary objectives:<br />
1. How to stop the growing influence of small, rival banks and to<br />
insure that control over the nation's financial resources would<br />
remain in the hands of those present;<br />
2. How to make the money supply more elastic in order to reverse<br />
the trend of private capital formation and to recapture the<br />
industrial loan market;<br />
3- How to pool the meager reserves of all the nation's banks into<br />
one large reserve so that at least a few of them could protect
438 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND COMPETITION IS A SIN 439<br />
4. How to shift the inevitable losses from the owners of the banks to<br />
the taxpayers;<br />
5. How to convince Congress that the scheme was a measure to<br />
protect the public.<br />
It was decided that the first two objectives could be achieved<br />
simply by drafting the proper technical language into a cartel<br />
agreement and then re-working the vocabulary into legislative<br />
phraseology. The third and fourth could be achieved by including<br />
in<br />
that legislation the establishment of a lender of last resort; in<br />
other words, a true central bank with the ability to create unlimited<br />
amounts of fiat money. These were mostly technical matters and,<br />
although there was some disagreement on a few minor points,<br />
generally they were content to follow the advice of Paul Warburg,<br />
the man who had the most experience in these matters and who<br />
was regarded as the group's theoretician. The fifth objective was<br />
the critical one, and there was much discussion on how to achieve<br />
it.<br />
To convince Congress and the public that the establishment of a<br />
banking cartel was, somehow, a measure to protect the public, the<br />
<strong>Jekyll</strong> Island strategists laid down the following plan of action:<br />
1. Do not call it a cartel nor even a central bank.<br />
2. Make it look like a government agency.<br />
3. Establish regional branches to create the appearance of<br />
decentralization, not dominated by Wall Street banks.<br />
4. Begin with a conservative structure including many sound<br />
banking principles knowing that the provisions can be quietly<br />
altered or removed in subsequent years.<br />
5. Use the anger caused by recent panics and bank failures to create<br />
popular demand for monetary reform.<br />
6. Offer the <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island plan as though it were in response to that<br />
need.<br />
7. Employ university professors to give the plan the appearance of<br />
academic approval.<br />
8. Speak out against the plan to convince the public that Wall Street<br />
bankers do not want it.<br />
A CENTRAL BANK BY ANY OTHER NAME<br />
Americans would never have accepted the Federal Reserve<br />
System if they had known that it was half cartel and half central<br />
bank. Even though the concept of government protectionism was<br />
rapidly gaining acceptance in business, academic, and political<br />
circles, the idea of cartels, trusts, and restraint of free competition<br />
was still quite alien to the average voter. And within the halls of<br />
Congress, any forthright proposal for either a cartel or a central<br />
bank would have been soundly defeated. Congressman Everis<br />
Hayes of California warned: "Our people have set their faces like<br />
steel against a central bank/' 1 Senator John Shafroth of Colorado<br />
declared: "The Democratic Party is opposed to a central bank." 2<br />
The monetary scientists on <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island decided, therefore, to<br />
devise a name for their new creature which would avoid the word<br />
bank altogether and which would conjure the image of the federal<br />
government itself. And to create the deception that there would be<br />
no concentration of power in the large New York banks, the<br />
original plan calling for a central bank was replaced by a proposal<br />
for a network of regional institutions which supposedly would<br />
share and diffuse that power.<br />
Nathaniel<br />
Wright Stephenson, Senator Aldrich's biographer,<br />
tells us: "Aldrich entered the discussion at <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island an ardent<br />
convert to the idea of a central bank. His desire was to transplant<br />
the system of one of the great European banks, say the Bank of<br />
England, bodily to America." 3 Galbraith explains further: "It was<br />
his [Senator Aldrich's] thought to outflank the opposition by<br />
having not one central bank but many. And the word bank would<br />
itself be avoided/<br />
Frank Vanderlip tells us the regional concept was merely<br />
window dressing and that the network was always intended to<br />
operate as one central bank. He said: 'The law as enacted provided<br />
for twelve banks instead of one,... but the intent of the law was to<br />
coordinate the twelve through the Federal Reserve Board in<br />
Washington, so that in effect they would operate as a central<br />
bank." 5<br />
If not using the word bank was essential to the <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island<br />
plan, avoiding the word cartel was even more so. Yet, the cartel<br />
nature of the proposed central bank was obvious to any astute<br />
observer. In an address before the American Bankers Association,<br />
1-<br />
Congressional Record, pL 5, 1913, p. 4655.<br />
2- Congressional Record, pt 6, 1913, p. 6021<br />
3 -<br />
Stephenson, p. 378.<br />
4-<br />
Galbraith, p. 122.<br />
5 -<br />
Vanderlip,<br />
"From Farm Boy to Financier/' p, 72.
440 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND COMPETITION IS A SIN 441<br />
Aldrich laid it out plainly. He said: 'The organization proposed is<br />
not a bank, but a cooperative union of all the banks of the country<br />
for definite purposes." Two years later, in a speech before that<br />
same group of bankers, A. Barton Hepburn of Chase National Bank<br />
was even more candid. He said: "The measure recognizes and<br />
adopts the principles of a central bank. Indeed, if it works out as the<br />
sponsors of the law hope, it will make all incorporated banks<br />
together joint owners of a central dominating power/' It would be<br />
difficult to find a better definition of the word cartel than that.<br />
The plan to structure the Creature conservatively at the start<br />
and then to remove the safeguards later was the brainchild of Paul<br />
Warburg. The creation of a powerful Federal Reserve Board was<br />
also his idea as a means by which the regional branches could be<br />
absorbed into a central bank with control safely in New York.<br />
Professor Edwin Seligman, a member of the international banking<br />
family of J&W Seligman, and head of the Department of Economics<br />
at Columbia University, explains and praises the plan:<br />
It was in my study that Mr. Warburg first conceived the idea of<br />
presenting his views to the public. ... In its fundamental features the<br />
Federal Reserve Act is the work of Mr. Warburg more than any other<br />
man in the country.... The existence of a Federal Reserve Board<br />
creates, in everything but in name, a real central bank. . . Mr. Warburg<br />
had a practical object in view. ... It was incumbent on him to remember<br />
that the education of the country must be gradual and that a large part<br />
of the task was to break down prejudices and remove suspicion. His<br />
plans therefore contain all sorts of elaborate suggestions designed to<br />
guard the public against fancied dangers and to persuade the country<br />
that the general scheme was at all practicable. It was the hope of Mr.<br />
Warburg that with the lapse of time it may be possible to eliminate<br />
1. Krooss, Vol. HI, 1969 edition, p. 1202.<br />
2. Quoted by Kolko, Triumph, p. 235.<br />
3. Most historians share Seligman's view regarding Warburg's seminal role in the<br />
creation of the Federal Reserve System. Certain participants in the drama, however,<br />
apparently eager to capture some of the spotlight of fame for themselves, are in<br />
vigorous disagreement. For example, William McAdoo, Secretary of the Treasury<br />
at the time, says: "This assertion is so completely erroneous that it must have<br />
emanated from ignorance rather than mendacity." See McAdoo, p. 281. Competing<br />
egos notwithstanding, an objective reading of the record leads to the conclusion<br />
that, while others no doubt provided great input in the areas of technical drafts and<br />
political negotiations, the essence of the plan, its overall concept and the rationale that<br />
was put forward to sell the plan to Congress was essentially the product of<br />
Warburg's twisted genius.<br />
J<br />
from the law not a few clauses which were inserted largely, at his<br />
suggestion, for educational purposes. 1<br />
THE ALDRICH BILL<br />
The first draft of the <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island plan was submitted to the<br />
Senate by Nelson Aldrich but, due to the Senator's unexpected<br />
illness when he returned to Washington, it was actually written by<br />
Frank Vanderlip and Benjamin Strong. 2 Although it was coauthored<br />
by Congressman Vreeland, it immediately became<br />
known as the Aldrich Bill. Vreeland, by his own admission, had<br />
little to do with it either, but his willingness to be a team player in<br />
the game of national deception was of great value. Writing in the<br />
August 25, 1910, issue of The Independent, which incidentally was<br />
owned by Aldrich himself and was anything but independent,<br />
Vreeland said: "The bank I propose.... is an ideal method of<br />
fighting monopoly. It could not possibly itself become a monopoly<br />
and it would prevent other banks combining into monopolies. With<br />
earnings limited to four and one-half per cent, there could not be a<br />
monopoly.<br />
What an amazing statement. It is brilliantly insidious because of<br />
the half truths it contains. It is true that monopolies cannot—or at<br />
least do not-operate at four and one-half per cent interest. But it is<br />
untrue that the Federal Reserve banks were to be held to that lowly<br />
rate. It is true that four per cent was the stated amount they would<br />
earn on the stock purchased in the System, but it is also true that<br />
the real profits were to be made, not from stock dividends, but<br />
from the harvesting of interest payments on fiat money. To this was<br />
to be added the profits made possible from operating on smaller<br />
safety margins yet still being protected from bankruptcy. Furthermore,<br />
being on the inside of the nation's central bank would make<br />
Jhem privy to the important money-making data and decisions<br />
long before their competitors. The profits that could be derived<br />
from such an advantage would be equal to or even greater than<br />
those from the Mandrake Mechanism. It is<br />
true that the Federal<br />
Reserve was to be a private institution, but it is certainly not true<br />
| Edwin Seligman, Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, Vol IV, No. 4<br />
(New York: 1914), pp. 3-6.<br />
2- Vanderlip, "From Farm Boy to Financier," p. 72.<br />
l„/ A etteṛ ^ste of Banking<br />
?<br />
and Currency," by Edward B. Vreeland, The<br />
'"dependent, August 25, 1910, p. 394.
442 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
that this was to mark the disappearance of the government from<br />
the banking business. In fact, it was just the opposite, because it<br />
marked the appearance of the government as a partner with private<br />
bankers and as the enforcer of their cartel agreement. Government<br />
would now become more deeply involved than ever before in our<br />
history.<br />
Half truths and propaganda notwithstanding, the organizational<br />
structure proposed by the Aldrich Bill was similar in many<br />
ways to the old Bank of the United States. It was to have the right to<br />
convert federal debt into money, to loan that money to the<br />
government, to control the affairs of regional banks, and to be the<br />
depository of government funds. The dissimilarities were in those<br />
provisions which gave the Creature more privilege and power than<br />
the older central bank. The most important of these was the right to<br />
create the official money of the United States. For the first time in<br />
our history, the paper notes of a banking institution became legal<br />
tender, not only for public debts, but for private ones as well.<br />
Henceforth, anyone refusing to accept these notes would be sent to<br />
prison. The words "The United States of America" were to appear<br />
on the face of every note along with the great seal of the United<br />
States Treasury. And, of course, the signature of the Treasurer<br />
himself would be printed in a conspicuous location. All of this was<br />
designed to convince the public that the new institution was surely<br />
an agency of the government itself.<br />
TURNING THE OPPOSITION AGAINST ITSELF<br />
Now that the basic strategy was in place and a specific bill had<br />
been drafted, the next step was to create popular support for it.<br />
This was the critical part of the plan and it required the utmost<br />
finesse. The task actually was made easier by the fact that there was<br />
a great deal of genuine opposition to the concentration of financial<br />
power on Wall Street. Two of the most outspoken critics at that<br />
time were Wisconsin Senator Robert LaFollette and Minnesota<br />
Congressman Charles Lindbergh. Hardly a week passed without<br />
one of them delivering a scathing speech against what they called<br />
"the money trust" which was responsible, they said,<br />
for deliberately<br />
creating economic booms and busts in order to reap the<br />
profits of salvaging foreclosed homes, farms and businesses. If<br />
anyone doubted that such a trust really existed, their skepticism<br />
was abruptly terminated when LaFollette publicly charged that the<br />
COMPETITION IS A SIN 443<br />
entire country was controlled by just fifty men. The monetary<br />
scientists were not dismayed nor did they even bother to deny it. In<br />
fact, when George F. Baker, who was a partner of J.P. Morgan, was<br />
asked by reporters for his reaction to LaFollette's claim, he replied<br />
that it was totally absurd. He knew from personal knowledge, he<br />
said, that the number was not more than eight! 1<br />
The public was, of course, outraged, and the pressure predictably<br />
mounted for Congress to do something. The monetary scientists<br />
were fully prepared to turn this reaction to their own<br />
advantage. The strategy was simple: (1) set up a special Congressional<br />
committee to investigate the money trust; (2) make sure the<br />
committee is staffed by friends of the trust itself; and (3) conceal the<br />
full<br />
scope of the trust's operation while revealing just enough to<br />
intensify the public clamor for reform. Once the political climate<br />
was hot enough, then the Aldrich Bill could be put forward,<br />
supposedly as the answer to that need.<br />
This strategy was certainly not new. As Congressman<br />
Lindbergh explained:<br />
Ever since the Civil War, Congress has allowed the bankers to<br />
completely control financial legislation. The membership of the<br />
Finance Committee in the Senate and the Committee on Banking and<br />
Currency in the House, has been made up of bankers, their agents and<br />
attorneys. These committees have controlled the nature of the bills to<br />
be reported, the extent of them, and the debates that were to be held on<br />
them when they were being considered in the Senate and the House.<br />
No one, not on the committee, is recognized ... unless someone<br />
I<br />
favorable to the committee has been arranged for. 2<br />
nHE PUJO COMMITTEE<br />
The Pujo Committee was a perfect example of this kind of<br />
chicanery. It was a subcommittee of the House Committee on<br />
Banking and Currency and it was given the awesome responsibility<br />
of conducting the famous "Money Trust" investigation of 1912. Its<br />
chairman was Arsene Pujo of Louisiana who, true to form, was<br />
regarded by many as a spokesman for the "Oil Trust" The hearings<br />
dragged on for eight months producing volumes of dry statistics<br />
and self-serving testimony of the great Wall Street bankers themselves.<br />
At no time were the financiers asked any questions about<br />
I MulJins, p. 16.<br />
2. Lindbergh, p. 76.
1<br />
It<br />
444 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND COMPETITION IS A SIN 445<br />
their affairs with foreign investment houses. Nor were they asked<br />
about their response to competition from new banks. There were<br />
no questions about their plan to protect the speculative banks from<br />
currency drains; or their motive for wanting artificially low interest<br />
rates; or their formula for passing on their losses to the taxpayer.<br />
The public was given the impression that Congress was really<br />
prying off the lid of scandal and corruption, but the reality was<br />
more like a fireside chat between old friends. No matter what<br />
vagaries or absurdities fell from the bankers' lips, it was accepted<br />
without contest.<br />
These hearings were conducted largely as a result of the public<br />
accusations made by Congressmen Lindbergh and Senator<br />
LaFollette. Yet, when they requested to appear before the Committee,<br />
both of them were denied access. The only witnesses to testify<br />
were the bankers themselves and their friends. Kolko tells us:<br />
Fortunately for the reformers, the Pujo Committee swung into<br />
high gear in its investigation of the Money Trust during the summer of<br />
1912 and for eight months frightened the nation with its awesome, if<br />
inconclusive, statistics on the power of Wall Street over the nation's<br />
economy.... Five banking firms, the elaborate tables of the committee<br />
showed, held 341 directorships in 112 corporations with an aggregate<br />
capitalization of over $22 billion. The evidence seemed conclusive, and<br />
the nation was suitably frightened into realizing that reform of the<br />
banking system was urgent—presumably to bring Wall Street under<br />
control....<br />
The orgy of Wall Street was resurrected by the newspapers, who<br />
quite ignored the fact that the biggest advocates of banking reform<br />
were the bankers themselves, bankers with a somewhat different view<br />
of the problem.... Yet it was largely the Pujo hearings that made the<br />
topic of banking reform a serious one.<br />
Kolko has touched upon an interesting point. Almost no one<br />
put any significance to the fact that some of the biggest bankers on<br />
Wall Street were the first marchers to lead the parade for banking<br />
reform. The most conspicuous among these was Paul Warburg of<br />
Kuhn, Loeb & Company who, for seven years prior to passage of<br />
the Federal Reserve Act, travelled around the country doing<br />
nothing but giving "reform" speeches and writing scholarly articles<br />
for the media, including an eleven-part series for The New York<br />
Times. Spokesmen from the houses of Morgan and Rockefeller<br />
joined in and made regular appearances before professional and<br />
political bodies echoing the call<br />
attention to the unmistakable odor of fish.<br />
for reform. Yet no one paid any<br />
ENLISTING THE HELP OF ACADEMIA<br />
The speeches and articles by big-name bankers were never<br />
intended to sway the public at large. They served the function of<br />
putting forth the basic arguments and the technical details which<br />
were to be the starting point for the work of others who could not<br />
be accused of having self-serving motives. To carry the message to<br />
the voters, it was decided that representatives from the world of<br />
academia should be enlisted to provide the necessary aura of<br />
respectability and intellectual objectivity. For that purpose, the<br />
banks contributed a sum of $5 million to a special "educational"<br />
fund, and much of that money found its way into the environs of<br />
three universities: Princeton, Harvard, and the University of Chicago,<br />
all of which had been recipients of large endowments from<br />
the captains of industry and finance.<br />
was precisely at this time that the study of "economics" was<br />
becoming a new and acceptable field, and it was not difficult to find<br />
talented but slightly hungry professors who, in return for a grant or<br />
a prestigious appointment, were eager to expound the virtues of<br />
the <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island plan. Not only was such academic pursuit<br />
financially rewarding, it also provided national recognition for<br />
them as pioneers in the new field of economics. Galbraith says:<br />
Under Aldrich's direction a score or more of studies of monetary<br />
institutions in the United States and, more particularly, in other<br />
countries were commissioned from the emergent economics<br />
profession. It is at least possible that the reverence in which the Federal<br />
Reserve System has since been held by economists owes something to<br />
the circumstance that so many who pioneered in the profession<br />
participated also in its [the System's] birth.<br />
The principal accomplishment of the bank's educational fund<br />
Was to create an organization called the National Citizens' League.<br />
Although it was entirely financed and controlled by the banks<br />
under the personal guidance of Paul Warburg, it presented itself<br />
merely as a group of concerned citizens seeking banking reform.<br />
The function of the organization was to disseminate hundreds of<br />
1. Kolko, Triumph, p. 220.<br />
|<br />
Galbraith, p. 121.
446 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
thousands of "educational" pamphlets, to organize letter-writing<br />
campaigns to Congressmen, to supply quotable material to the<br />
news media, and in other ways to create the illusion of grass-roots<br />
support for the JekylJ Island plan.<br />
Nathaniel Stephenson, in his biography of Nelson Aldrich,<br />
says: "The league was non-partisan. It was careful to abstain from<br />
emphasizing Senator Aldrich.... First and last, hundreds of thousands<br />
of dollars were spent by the league in popularizing financial<br />
science/'<br />
The man chosen to head up that effort was an economics<br />
professor by the name of J.<br />
Laurence Laughlin. Kolko says that<br />
"Laughlin, nominally very orthodox in his commitment to laissez<br />
faire theory, was nevertheless a leading academic advocate of<br />
banking regulation . . . and was sensitive to the needs of banking as<br />
well as the realities of politics." Did his appointment bring<br />
intellectual objectivity to the new organization? Stephenson answers:<br />
"Professor Laughlin of the University of Chicago was given<br />
charge of the League's propaganda." To which Congressman<br />
Lindbergh adds this reminder: "The reader knows that the University<br />
of Chicago is<br />
an institution endowed by John D. Rockefeller<br />
with nearly fifty million dollars. It may truly be said to be the<br />
Rockefeller University.<br />
This does not necessarily mean that Laughlin was purchased<br />
like so many pounds of hamburger and told by Rockefeller what to<br />
say and do. It doesn't work that way. The professor undoubtedly<br />
believed in the virtue of the <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island plan, and the evidence is<br />
that he pursued his assignment with enthusiastic sincerity. But<br />
there is no doubt that he was selected for his new post precisely<br />
because he did support the concept of a partnership between<br />
banking and government as a healthy substitute for "destructive"<br />
competition. In other words, if he didn't honestly agree with John<br />
D. that competition was a sin, he probably never even would have<br />
been given a professorship in the first place.<br />
1. Stephenson, pp. 38&-89.<br />
2. Kolko, Triumph, p. 187.<br />
3. Stephenson, p. 388.<br />
4. Lindbergh, p. 131.<br />
5. For an excellent overview of the formation and activities of the League, see<br />
Kolko, Triumph, pp. 186-228.<br />
COMPETITION IS A SIN 447<br />
WILSON AND WALL STREET<br />
Woodrow Wilson was yet another academic who was brought<br />
into the national spotlight as a result of his views on banking<br />
reform. It will be recalled from a previous chapter that Wilson's<br />
name had been put into nomination for President at the Democratic<br />
national convention largely due to the influence of Col. Edward<br />
Mandell House. But that was 1912. Ten years prior to that, he was<br />
relatively unknown. In 1902 he had been elected as the president of<br />
Princeton University, a position he could not have held without the<br />
concurrence of the University's benefactors among Wall Street<br />
bankers. He was particularly close with Andrew Carnegie and had<br />
become a trustee of the Carnegie Foundation.<br />
Two of the most generous donors were Cleveland H. Dodge<br />
and Cyrus McCormick, directors of Rockefeller's National City<br />
Bank. They were part of that Wall Street elite which the Pujo<br />
Committee had described as America's "Money Trust" Both men<br />
had been Wilson's classmates at Princeton University. When Wilson<br />
returned to Princeton as a professor in 1890, Dodge and<br />
McCormick were, by reason of their wealth, University trustees,<br />
and they took it upon themselves to personally advance his career'<br />
Ferdinand Lundberg, in America's Sixty Families, says this:<br />
For nearly twenty years before his nomination Woodrow Wilson<br />
had moved in the shadow of Wall Street.... In 1898 Wilson, his salary<br />
unsatisfactory, besieged with offers of many university presidencies<br />
threatened to resign. Dodge and McCormick thereupon constituted<br />
themselves his financial guardians, and agreed to raise the additional<br />
informal stipendium that kept him at Princeton. The contributors to<br />
this private fund were Dodge, McCormick, and Moses Taylor Pyne<br />
and Percy R. Pyne, of the family that founded the National City Bank<br />
In 1902 this same group arranged Wilson's election as president of the<br />
university.<br />
A grateful Wilson often had spoken in glowing terms about the<br />
rise of vast corporations and had praised J.R Morgan as a great<br />
American leader. He also had come to acceptable conclusions about<br />
the value of a controlled economy. "The old time of individual<br />
competition is probably gone by," he said. "It may come back; I<br />
don't know; it will not come back within our time, I dare say." 2<br />
Lundberg, pp. 114-15.<br />
Greider, p. 276.
448 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
H.S. Kenan tells us the rest of the story:<br />
Woodrow Wilson, President of Princeton University, was the first<br />
prominent educator to speak in favor of the Aldrich Plan a gesture<br />
SSi immediately brought him the Govemorsh.p of New Jersey<br />
^<br />
later the Presidency of the United States. During the panic of 1907<br />
Wilson declared that: "all this trouble could be averted if we<br />
appointed a committee of six or seven public-spirited men like J.P.<br />
Morgan to handle the affairs of our country.<br />
OPPOSITION TO THE ALDRICH BILL<br />
One of the disagreements at the <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island meeting was over<br />
the name to be attached to the proposed legislation^ Warburg,<br />
being the master psychologist he was, wanted it to be called the<br />
National Reserve Bill or the Federal Reserve Bill, something which<br />
would conjure up the dual images of government and reserves,<br />
both of which were calculated to be subconsciously appealing.<br />
Aldrich, on the other hand, acting out of personal ego, insisted that<br />
his name be attached to the bill. Warburg pointed out that the<br />
Aldrich name was associated in the minds of the public with Wall<br />
Street interests, and that would be an unnecessary obstacle to<br />
achieving their goal. Aldrich said that, since he had been the<br />
chairman of the National Monetary Commission which was created<br />
specifically to make recommendations for banking reform,<br />
people would be confused if his name were not associated with the<br />
bill The debate, we are told, was long and heated. But, in the end,<br />
the politician's ego won out over the banker's logic.<br />
Warburg, of course, was right. Aldrich was well known as a<br />
Republican spokesman for big business and banking His loyal >es<br />
were further publicized by recently sponsored tariff bills to protect<br />
banking reform was an easy target for the opposition<br />
the tobacco and rubber trusts. The Aldrich name on a bill for<br />
On December<br />
15,<br />
Representatives and took careful aim:<br />
1911, Congressman Lindbergh rose before the House or<br />
The Aldrich Plan is the Wall Street Plan. It is a broad challenge to<br />
the government by the champion of the money trust. It means another<br />
panic, if necessary, to intimidate the people. Aldr.ch, paid by the<br />
government to represent the people, proposes a plan for the trustinstead.<br />
1. HS.Kenan,TheFederalReserveBank (Los Angeles: Noontide Press, 1966),p. 105-<br />
2. Quoted by H.S. Kenan, p. 118.<br />
COMPETITION IS A SIN 449<br />
The Aldrich Bill never came to a vote. When the Republicans<br />
lost control of the House in 1910 and then lost the Senate and the<br />
Presidency in 1912, any hope there may have been of putting<br />
through a Republican bill was lost. Aldrich had been voted out of<br />
the Senate by his constituents, and the ball was now squarely in the<br />
court of the Democrats and their new president, Woodrow Wilson.<br />
How this came to pass is an interesting lesson on reality<br />
politics, and we shall turn to that part of the story next.<br />
SUMMARY<br />
Banking in the period immediately prior to passage of the<br />
Federal Reserve Act was subject to a myriad of controls, regulations,<br />
subsidies, and privileges at both the federal and state levels.<br />
Popular history portrays this period as one of unbridled competition<br />
and free banking. It was, in fact, a half-way house to central<br />
banking. Wall Street, however, wanted more government participation.<br />
The New York bankers particularly wanted a "lender of last<br />
resort" to create unlimited amounts of fiat money for their use in<br />
the event they were exposed to bank runs or currency drains. They<br />
also wanted to force all banks to follow the same inadequate<br />
reserve policies so that more cautious ones would not draw down<br />
the reserves of the others. An additional objective was to limit the<br />
growth of new banks in the South and West.<br />
This was a time of growing enchantment with the idea of trusts<br />
and cartels. For those who had already made it to the top,<br />
competition was considered chaotic and wasteful. Wall Street was<br />
snowballing into two major banking groups: the Morgans and the<br />
Rockefellers, and even they had largely ceased competing with<br />
each other in favor of cooperative financial structures. But to keep<br />
these cartel combines from flying apart, a means of discipline was<br />
needed to force the participants to abide by the agreements. The<br />
federal government was brought in as a partner to serve that<br />
function.<br />
To sell the plan to Congress, the cartel reality had to be hidden<br />
and the name "central bank" had to be avoided. The word Federal<br />
'was chosen to make it sound like it was a government operation;<br />
the word Reserve was chosen to make it appear financially sound;<br />
fend the word System (the first drafts used the word Association) was<br />
chosen to conceal the fact that it was a central bank. A structure of<br />
12 regional institutions was conceived as a further ploy to create
450 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
the illusion of decentralization, but the mechanism was designed<br />
from the beginning to operate as a central bank closely modeled<br />
after the Bank of England.<br />
The first draft of the Federal Reserve Act was called the Aldrich<br />
Bill and was co-sponsored by Congressman Vreeland, but it was<br />
not the work of either of these politicians. It was the brainchild of<br />
banker Paul Warburg and was actually written by bankers Frank<br />
Vanderlip and Benjamin Strong.<br />
Aldrich' s name attached to a banking bill was bad strategy,<br />
because he was known as a Wall Street Senator. His bill was not<br />
politically acceptable and was never released from committee. The<br />
groundwork had been done, however, and the time had arrived to<br />
change labels and political parties. The measure would now<br />
undergo minor cosmetic surgery and reappear under the sponsorship<br />
of a politician whose name would be associated in the public<br />
mind with anti-Wall Street sentiments.<br />
Chapter Twenty-Two<br />
THE CREATURE<br />
SWALLOWS<br />
CONGRESS<br />
The second attempt to pass legislation to legalize<br />
the banking cartel; the bankers 1 selection of<br />
Woodrow Wilson as a Presidential candidate;<br />
their strategy to get him elected; the role played by<br />
Wilson to promote the cartels legislation; the<br />
final passage of the Federal Reserve Act.<br />
The election of 1912 was a <strong>text</strong>book example of power politics<br />
and voter deception. The Republican President, William Howard<br />
Taft, was up for reelection. Like most Republicans of that era, his<br />
political power was based upon the support of big-business and<br />
banking interests in the industrial regions. He had been elected to<br />
his first term in the expectation that he would continue the<br />
protectionist policies of his predecessor, Teddy Roosevelt, particularly<br />
in the expansion of cartel markets for sugar, coffee, and fruit<br />
from Latin America. Once in office, however, he grew more<br />
restrained in these measures and earned the animosity of many<br />
powerful Republicans, The ultimate breach occurred when Taft<br />
refused to support the Aldrich Plan. He objected, not because it<br />
would create a central bank which would impose government<br />
control over the economy, but because it would not offer enough<br />
government control. He recognized that the <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island formula<br />
Would place the bankers into the driver's seat with only nominal<br />
participation by the government. He did not object to the ancient<br />
partnership between monetary and political scientists, he merely<br />
Wanted a greater share for the political side. The bankers were not<br />
adverse to negotiating the balance of power nor were they unwilling<br />
to make compromises, but what they really needed at this<br />
juncture was a man in the White House who, instead of being
452 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
lukewarm on the plan, could be counted on to become its champion<br />
and who would use his influence as President to garner<br />
support from the fence straddlers in Congress. From that moment<br />
forward, Taft was marked for political extinction.<br />
This was a period of general prosperity, and Taft was popular<br />
with the voters as well as with the rank-and-file Party organization<br />
He had easily won the nomination at the Republican convention,<br />
and there was little doubt that he could take the presidential<br />
election as well. Wilson had been put forth as the Democratic<br />
challenger, but his dry personality and aloof mannerisms had<br />
failed to arouse sufficient voter interest to make him a serious<br />
contender.<br />
THE BULL MOOSE CANDIDATE<br />
However, when Teddy Roosevelt returned from his latest<br />
African safari, he was persuaded by Morgan's deputies, George<br />
Perkins and Frank Munsey, to challenge the President for the<br />
Party's nomination. When that effort failed, he was then persuaded<br />
to run against Taft as the "Bull Moose" candidate on the Progressive<br />
Party ticket. It is unclear what motivated him to accept such a<br />
proposition, but there is no doubt regarding the intent of his<br />
backers. They did not expect Roosevelt to win, but, as a former<br />
Republican President, they knew he would split the Party and, by<br />
pulling away votes from Taft, put Wilson into the White House.<br />
Presidential campaigns need money and lots of it. The Republican<br />
Party was well financed, largely from the same individuals<br />
who now wanted to see the defeat of its own candidate. It would<br />
not be possible to cut off this funding without causing too many<br />
questions. The solution, therefore, was to provide the financial<br />
resources for all three candidates, with special attention to the needs<br />
of Wilson and Roosevelt.<br />
Some historians, while admitting the facts, have scoffed at the<br />
conclusion that deception was intended. Ron Chernow says: "By<br />
1924, the House of Morgan was so influential in American politics<br />
that conspiracy buffs couldn't tell which presidential candidate was<br />
more beholden to the bank." 1 But one does not have to be a<br />
conspiracy buff to recognize the evidence of foul play. Ferdinand<br />
Lundberg tells us:<br />
1. Chemow, p. 254.<br />
THE CREATURE SWALLOWS CONGRESS 453<br />
J.P. Morgan and Company played the leading role in the national<br />
election of 1912.. . . Roosevelt's preconvention backers were George W.<br />
Perkins and Frank Munsey. These two, indeed, encouraged Roosevelt<br />
to contest Taffs nomination.... Munsey functioned in the newspaper<br />
field for J.P. Morgan and Company—buying, selling, creating, and<br />
suppressing newspapers in consonance with J.P. Morgan's shifting<br />
needs.. . . Perkins resigned from J.P. Morgan and Company on January<br />
1, 1911, to assume a larger political role...<br />
The suspicion seems justified that the two were not over-anxious<br />
to have Roosevelt win. The notion that Perkins and Munsey may have<br />
wanted Wilson to win ... is partly substantiated by the view that<br />
Perkins put a good deal of cash behind the Wilson campaign through<br />
Cleveland H. Dodge. Dodge and Perkins financed, to the extent of<br />
$35,500, the Trenton True American, a newspaper that circulated<br />
nationally with Wilson propaganda. . .<br />
Throughout the three-cornered fight, Roosevelt had Munsey and<br />
George Perkins constantly at his heels, supplying money, going over<br />
his speeches, bringing people from Wall Street in to help,<br />
and, in<br />
general, carrying the entire burden of the campaign against Taft...<br />
Perkins and J.P. Morgan and Company were the substance of the<br />
Progressive Party; everything else was trimming.... Munsey 's cash<br />
contribution to the Progressive Party brought his total political outlay<br />
for 1912 to $229,255.72. Perkins made their joint contribution more<br />
than $500,000, and Munsey expended $1,000,000 in cash additionally<br />
to acquire from Henry Einstein the New York Press so that Roosevelt<br />
would have a New York City morning newspaper. Perkins and<br />
Munsey, as the Clapp [Senate Privileges and Election] Committee<br />
learned from Roosevelt himself, also underwrote the heavy expense of<br />
Roosevelt's campaign train. In short, most of Roosevelfs campaign<br />
fund was supplied by the two Morgan hatchet men who were seeking<br />
Taft's scalp.<br />
Morgan & Company was not the only banking firm on Wall<br />
Street to endorse a three-way election as a means of defeating Taft.<br />
Within the firm of Kuhn, Loeb & Company, Felix Warburg was<br />
dutifully putting money into the Republican campaign as expected,<br />
but his brother, Paul Warburg and Jacob Schiff were backing<br />
Wilson, while yet another partner, Otto Kahn, supported<br />
Roosevelt. Other prominent Republicans who contributed to the<br />
Democratic campaign that year were Bernard Baruch, Henry<br />
Morganthau, and Thomas Fortune Ryan. And the Rockefeller<br />
1. Lundberg, pp. 106-12.<br />
2. Kolko, Triumph, pp. 205-11
454 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND THE CREATURE SWALLOWS CONGRESS 455<br />
component of the cartel was just as deeply involved. William<br />
McAdoo, who was Wilson's national campaign vice chairman, says<br />
that Cleveland Dodge of Rockefeller's National City Bank personally<br />
contributed $51,30C^-more than one-fourth the total raised<br />
from all other sources. In McAdoo's words, "He was a Godsend." 1<br />
Ferdinand Lundberg describes Dodge as "the financial genius<br />
behind Woodrow Wilson." Continuing, he says:<br />
Wilson's nomination represented a personal triumph for<br />
Cleveland H. Dodge, director of the National City Bank, scion of the<br />
Dodge copper and munitions fortune.... The nomination represented<br />
no less a triumph for Ryan, Harvey, and J.P. Morgan and Company.<br />
Sitting with Dodge as co-directors of the National Gty Bank at the<br />
time were the younger J.P. Morgan, now the head of the [Morgan]<br />
firm, Jacob Schiff, William Rockefeller, J.<br />
Ogden Armour, and James<br />
Stillman. In short, except for George F. Baker, everyone whom the Pujo<br />
Committee had termed rulers of the "Money Trust" was in this bank.<br />
And so it<br />
came to pass that the monetary scientists carefully<br />
selected their candidate and set about to clear the way for his<br />
victory. The maneuver was brilliant. Who would suspect that Wall<br />
Street would support a Democrat, especially when the Party<br />
platform contained this plank: "We oppose the so-called Aldrich<br />
Bill or the establishment of a central bank; and . . .<br />
what is known as<br />
the money trust."<br />
What irony it was. The Party of the working man, the Party of<br />
Thomas Jefferson—formed only a few generations earlier for the<br />
specific purpose of opposing a central bank—was now cheering a<br />
new leader who was a political captive of Wall Street bankers and<br />
who had agreed to the hidden agenda of establishing the Federal<br />
Reserve System. As George Harvey later boasted, the financiers<br />
"felt no animosity toward Mr. Wilson for such of his utterances as<br />
they regarded as radical and menacing to their interests. He had<br />
simply played the political game."<br />
William McAdoo, Wilson's national campaign vice chairman,<br />
destined to become Secretary of the Treasury, saw what was<br />
happening from a ringside seat He said:<br />
1. McAdoo, p. 117.<br />
2. Lundberg, pp. 109, 113.<br />
3. Quoted by Lundberg, p. 120.<br />
The major contributions to any candidate's campaign fund are<br />
made by men who have axes to grind—and the campaign chest is the<br />
grindstone.... The fact is that there is a serious danger of this country<br />
becoming a pluto-democracy; that is, a sham republic with the real<br />
government in the hands of a small clique of enormously wealthy<br />
men, who speak through their money, and whose influence, even<br />
today, radiates to every corner of the United States.<br />
Experience has shown that the most practicable method of getting<br />
hold of a political party is to furnish it with money in large quantities.<br />
This brings the big money-giver or givers into close communion with<br />
the party leaders. Contact and influence do the rest.<br />
THE MONEY TRUST THEY LOVE TO HATE<br />
Roosevelt actually had very little interest in the banking issue,<br />
probably because he didn't understand it Furthermore, in the<br />
unlikely event the blustery "trust buster" would actually win the<br />
election, the financiers still had little to fear. In spite of his<br />
well-publicized stance of opposing big business, his true convictions<br />
were quite acceptable to Wall Street. As Chernow observed:<br />
Although the Roosevelt-Morgan relationship is sometimes<br />
caricatured as that of trust buster versus trust king, it was far more<br />
complex than that. The public wrangling obscured deeper ideological<br />
affinities.... Roosevelt saw trusts as natural, organic outgrowths of<br />
economic development. Stopping them, he said, was like trying to<br />
dam the Mississippi River. Both TR and Morgan disliked the rugged,<br />
individualistic economy of the nineteenth century and favored big<br />
business.. . , In the sparring between Roosevelt and Morgan there was<br />
always a certain amount of shadow play, a pretense of greater<br />
animosity than actually existed.... Roosevelt and Morgan were secret<br />
blood brothers.<br />
It is not surprising, therefore, as Warburg noted in January,<br />
1912—ten months before the election—that Teddy had been "fairly<br />
won over to a favorable consideration of the Aldrich Plan."<br />
Inner convictions on these issues notwithstanding, both Wilson<br />
and Roosevelt played their roles to the hilt Privately financed by<br />
Wall Street's most powerful bankers, they publicly carried a<br />
flaming crusade against the "Money Trust" from one end of the<br />
country to the other. Roosevelt bellowed that the "issue of currency<br />
McAdoo, pp. 165-66.<br />
2. Chernow, pp. 106-12.<br />
\ Warburg, Vol. I, p. 78.
, Cabinet,<br />
456 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
should be lodged with the government and be protected from<br />
domination and manipulation by Wall Street/' 1<br />
And he quoted<br />
over and over again the Bull Moose (Progressive Party) platform<br />
which said: "We are opposed to the so-called Aldrich Currency Bill<br />
because its provisions would place our currency and credit system<br />
in private hands/' Meanwhile, at the other end of town, Wilson<br />
declared:<br />
There has come about an extraordinary and very sinister<br />
concentration in the control of business in the country.... The growth<br />
of our nation, therefore, and all our activities, are in the hands of a few<br />
men.. . . This money trust, or as it should be more properly called, this<br />
credit trust ... is no myth.<br />
Throughout the campaign, Taft was portrayed as the champion<br />
of big business and Wall Street banks—which, of course, he was.<br />
But so were Roosevelt and Wilson. The primary difference was that<br />
Taft, judged by his actual performance in office, was known to be<br />
such, whereas his opponents could only be judged by their words.<br />
The outcome of the election was exactly as the strategists had<br />
anticipated. Wilson won with only forty-two per cent of the<br />
popular vote, which means, of course, that fifty-eight per cent had<br />
been cast against him. Had Roosevelt not entered the race, most of<br />
his votes undoubtedly would have gone to Taft, and Wilson would<br />
have become a footnote. As Colonel House confided to author<br />
George Viereck years later, "Wilson was elected by Teddy<br />
Roosevelt/' 3<br />
Now that the Creature had moved into the White House,<br />
passage of the <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island plan went into its final phase. The last<br />
bastion of opposition in Congress consisted of the Populist wing of<br />
the Democratic Party under the<br />
leadership of William Jennings<br />
Bryan. The problem with this group was that they had taken their<br />
campaign platform seriously. They really were opposed to the<br />
Money Trust. While it may have been a simple matter to pull the<br />
would not be so easy to fool this<br />
wool over the eyes of voters, it<br />
group of experienced politicians. What was needed now was an<br />
1. Henry S. Commager, ed., Documents of American History (New York: F.S. Cofts<br />
& Co., 1940), pp. 77-79.<br />
2. Quoted by Carter Glass, Adventures in Constructive Finance (New York:<br />
Doubleday, 1927; rpt. Arno Press, a New York Times Co., 1975), p. 78-79.<br />
3. Viereck, p. 34.<br />
THE CREATURE SWALLOWS CONGRESS 457<br />
entirely new bill that, on the surface, would appear to contain<br />
changes of sufficient magnitude to allow the Bryan wing to change<br />
its position. The essential features of the plan, however, must not be<br />
abandoned. And, to coordinate this final strategy, the services of<br />
someone with great political skill would be essential. Fortunately<br />
for the planners, there was exactly such a man residing at the White<br />
House. It was not the President of the United States. It was Edward<br />
Mandell House.<br />
THE ROLE OF COLONEL HOUSE<br />
Colonel House, who had been educated in England and whose<br />
father represented England's merchant interests in the American<br />
South, had come into public life through the London Connection. It<br />
will be recalled from previous chapters that,<br />
perhaps more than<br />
|any other person in America, he had helped maneuver the United<br />
States into World War I on the side of a desperate Britain and, by so<br />
doing, had also rescued the massive loans to Britain and France<br />
made by the Morgan interests. Not only had he been responsible<br />
for Wilson's nomination at the Democratic convention, but had<br />
become the President's constant companion, his personal adviser,<br />
and in many respects his political superior. It was through House<br />
that Wilson was made aware of the wishes of the Money Trust, and<br />
it was House who guided the President in every aspect of foreign<br />
and economic policy. An admiring biographer, Arthur Smith,<br />
writing in the year 1918, says that House "holds a power never<br />
wielded before in this country by any man out of office, a power<br />
greater than that of any political boss or Cabinet member." A more<br />
recent biographer, George Viereck, was not exaggerating when he<br />
described House as "Chief Magistracy of the Republic," "Superambassador,"<br />
"The pilot who guided the ship."<br />
said:<br />
Continuing, he<br />
For six years two rooms were at his disposal in the North Wing of<br />
the White House.. .. In work and play their thoughts were one. House<br />
was the double of Wilson. It was House who made the slate for the<br />
formulated the first policies of the Administration and<br />
practically directed the foreign affairs of the United States. We had,<br />
indeed, two Presidents for one!...<br />
1 Arthur Smith, The Real Colonel House (New York: George H. Doran Company,<br />
1918), p. 14.<br />
$~ Viereck, p. 4.
458 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
The Schiffs, the Warburgs, the Kahns, the Rockefellers, the<br />
Morgans put their faith in House. When the Federal Reserve<br />
legislation at last assumed definite shape, House was the intermediary<br />
between the White House and the financiers.<br />
Daily entries in the personal journal of Colonel House reveal<br />
the extent to which his office had become the command post for the<br />
<strong>Jekyll</strong> Island team. The following sample notations are typical:<br />
December 19, 1912. I Talked with Paul Warburg over the<br />
telephone regarding the currency reform. I told of my<br />
Washington trip and what I had done there to get it in<br />
working order.<br />
March 24, 1913. 1 had an engagement with Carter Glass at five.<br />
We drove, in order not to be interrupted.... I spoke to the<br />
President about this after dinner and advised that McAdoo<br />
and I whip the Glass measure into final shape, which he<br />
could endorse and take to Owen [Chairman of the Senate<br />
Banking Committee] as his own.<br />
March 27, 1913. Mr. J.P. Morgan, Ir., and Mr. Denny of his firm,<br />
came promptly at five. McAdoo came about ten minutes<br />
afterwards. Morgan had a currency plan already formulated<br />
and printed. We discussed it at some length. I suggested he<br />
have it typewritten [so it would not seem too prearranged]<br />
and sent to us today.<br />
October 19, 1913. I saw Senator Reed of Missouri in the late<br />
afternoon and discussed the currency question with him.<br />
October 19, 1913. Paul Warburg was my first caller, and he came<br />
to discuss the currency measure.... Senator Murray Crane<br />
followed Warburg. He has been in touch with Senators<br />
Weeks and Nelson of the Currency Committee.<br />
November 17, 1913. Paul Warburg telephoned about his trip to<br />
Washington. He is much disturbed over the currency<br />
situation and requested an interview, along with lacob<br />
Schiff and Cleveland H. Dodge.<br />
January 21, 1914. After dinner we [Wilson and House] went to<br />
the President's study as usual and began work on the<br />
Federal Reserve Board appointments.<br />
1. Viereck,pp.4,35,37.<br />
2. Seymour, Vol. I pp. 161-68.<br />
THE CREATURE SWALLOWS CONGRESS 459<br />
As far as the banking issue was concerned, Colonel House was<br />
the President of the United States, and all interested parties knew it.<br />
Wilson made no pretense at knowledge of banking theory. He said:<br />
"The greatest embarrassment of my political career has been that<br />
active duties seem to deprive me of time for careful investigation. I<br />
seem almost obliged to form conclusions from impressions instead<br />
of from study.. . . I wish that I had more knowledge, more thorough<br />
acquaintance, with the matters involved." To which Charles<br />
Seymour adds: "Colonel House was indefatigable in providing for<br />
the President the knowledge that he sought. . . The Colonel was the<br />
unseen guardian angel of the bill,"<br />
DEATH OF THE ALDRICH PLAN<br />
The first task for the <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island team was to hold a funeral for<br />
the Aldrich Plan without actually burying it. Professor Laughlin<br />
had come to agree with Warburg regarding the inadvisability of<br />
having Aldrich's name attached to any banking bill, especially now<br />
that the Democrats were in control of both Congress and the White<br />
House, and he was anxious to give it a new identity. Writing in the<br />
periodical Banking Reform, which was the official publication of the<br />
National Citizens' League, Laughlin said:<br />
"It is progress that the<br />
Aldrich plan came and went. It is progress that the people have<br />
been aroused and interested." The League was now free, he said, to<br />
"try to help in getting a proper bill adopted by the Democrats," a<br />
bill that "in non-essentials . . . could be made different from the old<br />
plan." 3<br />
It did not take long for the Democrats to bring forth their own<br />
proposal. In fact, that process had begun even before the election of<br />
1912. One of the most outspoken critics of the Aldrich plan was the<br />
Democratic Chairman of the House Banking and Currency Committee,<br />
Congressman Carter Glass from Virginia. And it was Glass<br />
1. Seymour, Vol. 1, p. 160.<br />
2. Ibid. William McAdoo, Wilson's Secretary of the Treasury, was indignant over<br />
the credit generally given to Paul Warburg for his part in the creation of the Federal<br />
Reserve because McAdoo felt he should have received the recognition. Later, we<br />
find Carter Glass similarly piqued over Seymour's interpretation of House's importance.<br />
Glass' book, Adventures in Constructive Finance, was written primarily to<br />
show that it was he, not House, who rightfully deserved such glory. But neither<br />
McAdoo nor Glass were part of the hidden power which is the focus of this study<br />
and neither had any inkling of who was really calling the shots.<br />
3. Quoted by Kolko, Triumph, p. 222.
..<br />
460 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
THE CREATURE SWALLOWS CONGRESS 461<br />
who was given the responsibility of developing the new plan. By<br />
monopoly. All of which was correct. What the country needed,<br />
his own admission, however, he had virtually no technical knowledge<br />
of banking. To provide that expertise and to actually write the<br />
which was not written by agents of the Money Trust and which<br />
Glass said, was an entirely fresh approach, a genuine reform bill<br />
bill he hired an economics teacher from Washington and Lee<br />
would truly meet the needs of the common man. That, too, was<br />
University, Henry Parker Willis. We should not be surprised to<br />
quite correct. Then he brought forth his own bill, drafted by Willis<br />
learn that Willis had been a former student and protege of<br />
and inspired by Laughlin, which in every important detail was<br />
Professor Laughlin and had been retained by the National Citizens'<br />
merely the old corpse of the Aldrich Bill pulled from its casket,<br />
League as a technical writer. Explaining the significance of this<br />
freshly perfumed, and dressed in a new suit.<br />
relationship, Kolko<br />
The Glass Bill was soon reconciled with a similar measure<br />
says:<br />
sponsored by Senator Robert L. Owen and it emerged as the<br />
Throughout the spring of 1912 Willis wrote Laughlin about his<br />
work for the Glass Committee, his relationship to his superior, and<br />
Glass-Owen Bill. Although there were initially some minor differences<br />
between Glass and Owen on the proper degree of govern-<br />
Washington gossip. The advice of the old professor was much<br />
revered "When you arrive," he wrote Laughlin concerning a<br />
ment control over banking, Owen was basically of identical mind to<br />
memorandum he had written, "I should like to show it to you for such<br />
Willis and Laughlin. While serving in the Senate, he also was the<br />
criticisms as occur to you." The student-teacher relationship between<br />
president of a bank in Oklahoma. Like Aldrich, he had made<br />
the two men was still prominent ...<br />
several trips to Europe to study the central banks of England and<br />
Laughlin, Colonel House, and Glass were to frequently consult<br />
Germany,<br />
with major bankers about reform, and provided an importantand<br />
and these were the models for his legislation.<br />
continuous bridge for their ideas while bills were being drafted....<br />
The less technically minded members of the cartel became<br />
Colonel House, in addition, was talked to by Frick, Otto Kahn, and<br />
nervous over the anti-Wall Street rhetoric of the Bill's sponsors.<br />
others in late February, and the following month also met Vanderlip,<br />
Warburg, in an attempt to quell their fears and, at the same time,<br />
J<br />
P Morgan, Jr., and other bankers to discuss currency reform.... To<br />
strengthen his private boast that he had been the real author,<br />
make sure the reform was more to the liking of bankers, a steady<br />
published a side-by-side comparison of the Aldrich and Glass<br />
barrage of personal, unobtrusive communications with Glass, House,<br />
proposals. The analysis showed that, not only were the two bills in<br />
and Wilson was kept up throughout February and March^... The<br />
agreement<br />
[Citizens'] league was fulsome in its praise of Glass, and bankers on all essential provisions, but they even contained<br />
felt<br />
greater and greater confidence as Colonel House began visiting Glass<br />
entire sections that were identical in their wording. He wrote:<br />
and showing interest in his currency measure.. "Brushing aside, then, the external differences affecting the 'shells/<br />
.<br />
The new President admitted "he knew nothing" about banking we find the 'kernels' of the two systems very closely resembling<br />
theory or practice. Glass made the same confession to Colonel House<br />
and related to one another."<br />
in November, and this vacuum is of the utmost significance. The entire<br />
It was important for the success of the Glass Bill to create the<br />
banking reform movement, at all crucial stages, was centralized in the<br />
hands of a few men who for years were linked, ideologically and<br />
impression it was in response to the views of a broad cross section<br />
of the financial community. To this end, Glass and his committee<br />
personally with one another.<br />
staged public hearings for the announced purpose of giving<br />
THE GLASS-OWEN BILL EMERGES<br />
everyone a chance for input to the process. It was, of course, a<br />
In his Committee House Report in 1913, Glass objected to the<br />
sham. The first draft of the Bill had already been completed in<br />
Aldrich Bill on the following grounds: It lacked government<br />
secret several months before the hearings were held. And, as was<br />
control, he said; it concentrated power into the hands of the larger<br />
customary in such matters, Congressman Lindbergh and other<br />
New York banks; it opened the door to inflation; it was dishonest in<br />
witnesses opposing the <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island plan were not allowed to<br />
its estimate of cost to the taxpayer; and it established a banking<br />
'1. Warburg, Vol. I, p. 98.<br />
1 . Kolko, Triumph, pp. 219-28. 2. Md., p. 41Z
462 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
speak. 1<br />
The hearings were widely reported in the press, and the<br />
public was given the impression that the favorable testimony was<br />
truly representative of expert opinion. Kolko summarizes:<br />
keep the contents of their work<br />
Although they were careful to<br />
confidential to aid the passage of any bill that might be agreed upon<br />
Glass deemed it desirable to hold public hearings on the topic and to<br />
make sure the course of these hearings was not left to chance... The<br />
public assumption of the hearing was that no bills had been drafted,<br />
and Willis' draft was never mentioned, much less revealed.... The<br />
hearings of Glass' subcommittee in January and February, 1913, were<br />
nothing less than a love feast.<br />
BANKERS BECOME DIVIDED<br />
The public was not the only victim of deception- The bankers<br />
themselves were also targeted—at least the lesser ones who were<br />
not part of the Wall Street power center. As early as February, 1911,<br />
a group of twenty-two of the country's most powerful bankers met<br />
for three days behind closed doors in Atlantic City to work out a<br />
strategy for<br />
getting the smaller banks to support the concept of<br />
using the government to authorize and maintain their own cartel.<br />
The objective frankly discussed among those present was that the<br />
proposed cartel would bring the smaller banks under control of the<br />
larger ones, but that this fact had to be obscured when presenting it<br />
to them for endorsement.<br />
The annual meeting of the American Bankers Association was<br />
held a few months later, and a resolution endorsing the Aldrich Bill<br />
was steam rollered through the plenary session, much to the<br />
dismay of many of those present. Andrew Frame was one of them.<br />
Representing a group of Western bankers, he testified at the<br />
hearings of the Glass subcommittee, mentioned previously, and<br />
described the hoax:<br />
When that monetary bill was given to the country, it was but a few<br />
days previous to the meeting of the American Bankers Association in<br />
New Orleans in 1911. There was not one banker in a hundred who had<br />
read that bill. We had twelve addresses in favor of it. General Hamby<br />
of Austin, Texas, wrote a letter to President Watts asking for a hearing<br />
against the bill. He did not get a very courteous answer. I refused to<br />
1. Lindbergh, p. 129.<br />
2. Kolko, Triumph, p. 225.<br />
3. Rothbard, Crisis, p. 101. Also Kolko, Triumph, p. 186.<br />
THE CREATURE SWALLOWS CONGRESS 463<br />
vote on it, and a great many other bankers did likewise.. . . They would<br />
not allow anyone on the program who was not in favor of the bill.<br />
It is interesting that during Frame's testimony, Congressman<br />
Glass refrained<br />
from commenting on the unfairness of allowing<br />
only one side of an issue to be heard in a public forum. He could<br />
hardly afford to. That is exactly what he was then doing with his<br />
own agenda.<br />
As the Federal Reserve Act moved closer to its birth in the form<br />
of the Glass-Owen Bill (Owen was the co-sponsor in the Senate),<br />
both Aldrich and Vanderlip threw themselves into a great public<br />
display of opposition. No opportunity was overlooked to make a<br />
statement to the press—or anyone else of public prominence<br />
expressing their eternal animosity to this monstrous legislation.<br />
Vanderlip warned against the evils of fiat money and rampant<br />
inflation. Aldrich charged that the Glass-Owen Bill was inimical to<br />
sound banking and good government. Vanderlip predicted speculation<br />
and instability in the stock market. Aldrich sourly complained<br />
that the bill was "revolutionary in its character" (implying<br />
Bolshevistic) and "will be the first and most important step toward<br />
changing our form of government from a democracy to an autocracy."<br />
THE PRETENSE IS DROPPED<br />
That all of this was merely high-level showmanship was made<br />
clear when Vanderlip accepted a debate with Congressman Glass<br />
before the New York Economic Society on November 13. There<br />
were eleven hundred bankers and businessmen present, and<br />
Vanderlip was under pressure to make a good showing before this<br />
impressive group. The debate was going badly for him and, in a<br />
moment of desperation, he finally dropped the pretense. "For<br />
years/ he said, "bankers have been almost the sole advocates of<br />
just this sort of legislation that it is now hoped we will have, and it<br />
is unfair to accuse them of being in opposition to sound legislation/'<br />
Twenty-two years later, when the need for pretense had<br />
long passed, Vanderlip was even more candid. Writing in the<br />
I Quoted by Mullins, p. 13.<br />
2- Aldrich to John A. Sleicher, July 16, 1913; Aldrich to William Howard Taft,<br />
Oct. 3, 1913, Nelson Aldrich Papers, Library of Congress.<br />
3- Frank A. Vanderlip, Address Before the Economics Club of New York, November 13,<br />
1913, (New York: 1913), pp. 6, 11 ff. Also see Glass, pp. 125, 168-76.
464 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
THE CREATURE SWALLOWS CONGRESS<br />
2. pp. 3. Seymour, Vol. I, p. 173,<br />
465<br />
Saturday Evening Post, he said: "Although the Aldrich Federal<br />
the original intent. The goal was to get the bill passed and perfect it<br />
Reserve Plan was defeated when it bore the name Aldrich, nevertheless<br />
later.<br />
its essential points were all contained in the plan that finally<br />
House and Warburg feared that, if they waited until they had<br />
was adopted."<br />
everything they wanted, they would get nothing at all or, worse,<br />
In his autobiography, Treasury Secretary William McAdoo<br />
that opponents of a central bank would be able to muster their<br />
offers this view:<br />
forces and pass a reform bill of their own; a real one. Willis was<br />
quick to agree. In a letter to<br />
Bankers fought the Federal Reserve legislation—and<br />
his<br />
every<br />
former professor, he wrote: "It is<br />
provision of the Federal Reserve Act—with the tireless energy of men<br />
much better to take a half a loaf rather than to be absolutely<br />
fighting a forest fire. They said it was populistic, socialistic, half-baked,<br />
deprived of a chance of getting any bread whatsoever.... The<br />
destructive, infantile, badly conceived, and unworkable.. so-called 'progressive'<br />
.<br />
element—such as Lindbergh and his supporters—will<br />
be encouraged to enact dangerous legislation." 1<br />
Glass<br />
These interviews with bankers led me to an interesting conclusion.<br />
1 perceived gradually, through all the haze and smoke of controversy,<br />
echoed the sentiment. Directing his remarks at those smaller banks<br />
that the banking world was not really as opposed to the bill as it<br />
which were resisting domination by the New York banks, he said:<br />
pretended to be.<br />
"Unless the conservative bankers of the country are willing to yield<br />
That is the key to this entire episode: mass psychology. Since<br />
something and get behind the bill, we shall get legislation very<br />
Aldrich was recognized as associated with the Morgan interests much less to be desired, or have nothing done at all."<br />
and Vanderlip was President of Rockefeller's National City Bank,<br />
the public was skillfully led to believe that the "Money Trust" was<br />
BRYAN MAKES AN ULTIMATUM<br />
The Populist, William Jennings Bryan, was considered at that<br />
mortally afraid of the proposed Federal Reserve Act. The Nation<br />
time to be the most influential Democrat in Congress, and it was<br />
was the only prominent publication to point out that every one of<br />
clear from the start that the Federal Reserve Act could never be<br />
the horrors described by Aldrich and Vanderlip could have been<br />
passed without his approval and support. As Charles Seymour<br />
equally ascribed to the Aldrich Bill as well. But this lone voice was<br />
observed: "The Commoner's sense of loyalty [to the Party] had<br />
easily drowned by the great cacophony of deception and propaganda<br />
would appear,<br />
kept him from an attack upon the Federal Reserve Act which, it<br />
.<br />
he never entirely understood.... With his influence<br />
The Glass Bill was a flexible document which was designed<br />
in the Party, he could have destroyed the measure which failed to<br />
from the beginning to be altered in non-essential matters in order to<br />
accord with his personal doctrines." 3<br />
appear as though compromises were being made to satisfy the<br />
Bryan had said that he would not support any bill that resulted<br />
in<br />
various<br />
private<br />
political factions. Since very few understood central-bank<br />
money being issued by private banks. The money supply,<br />
he<br />
technicalities, the ploy was easy to execute. The basic strategy was<br />
insisted, must be government issue. When he finally saw an<br />
actual draft of the bill in<br />
to focus debate on such relatively unimportant items as the number<br />
midsummer of 1913, he was dismayed to<br />
find that, not only was the<br />
of regional banks, the structure of the governing board, and money to<br />
the<br />
be privately issued, but the<br />
entire governing body of the central<br />
process by which that board was<br />
bank<br />
to be selected. When was to be<br />
truly crucial<br />
composed of<br />
private bankers. His ultimatum was not long in<br />
matters<br />
coming.<br />
could not be avoided, the response was to agree to almost<br />
He hotly<br />
demanded (1) that the Federal-Reserve notes must be Treasury<br />
anything but to write the provisions in vague language. In that<br />
currency, issued and guaranteed by the government; and<br />
way, the back door would be left ajar for later implementation (2) that<br />
of<br />
I Letters from Willis to Laughlin, J. Laurence Laughlin Papers, Library of Congress,<br />
July 14 &.18, 1912.<br />
1. "From Farm Boy to Financier/' by Frank A. Vanderlip, Saturday Evening Post,<br />
February 9, 1935, p. 72.<br />
2. From a letter to Fesrus Wade. Quoted by Kolko, Triumph, p. 234.<br />
McAdoo, 213, 225-26.
466 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
the governing body must be appointed by the President and<br />
approved by the Senate.<br />
Colonel House and the other monetary scientists were reasonably<br />
sure that these provisions eventually would be required for<br />
final approval of the bill but, being master strategists, they deliberately<br />
withheld them from early drafts so they could be used as<br />
bargaining points and added later as concessions in a show of<br />
compromise. Furthermore, since practically no one really understood<br />
the technical aspects of the measure, they knew it would be<br />
easy to fool their opponents by creating the appearance of compromise<br />
when, in actual operation, the originally intended features<br />
would remain.<br />
AN AMAZING REVELATION<br />
The nature of this deception was spelled out years later by<br />
Carter Glass in his book, Adventures in<br />
Constructive Finance. From<br />
this source we learn that, after Bryan had delivered his ultimatum,<br />
Glass was summoned to the White House and told by Wilson that<br />
the decision had been made to make the Federal Reserve notes<br />
obligations of the United States government. "I was for an instant<br />
speechless!" wrote Glass who then explained how he reminded the<br />
President that the only backing for the new currency would be a<br />
small amount of gold, a large amount of government and commercial<br />
debt, and the private assets of the individual banks themselves.<br />
"It would be a pretense on its face," he said. "Was there ever a<br />
government note based primarily on the property of banking<br />
institutions? Was there ever a government issue not one dollar of<br />
which could be put out except by demand of a bank? The<br />
suggested government obligation is so remote it could never be<br />
discovered."<br />
To which the President replied: "Exactly so, Glass. Every word<br />
you say is true; the government liability is a mere thought. And so,<br />
if we can hold the substance of the thing and give the other fellow<br />
the shadow, why not do it, if thereby we may save our bill?"<br />
Years later, Paul Warburg would explain further:<br />
While technically and legally the Federal Reserve note is an<br />
obligation of the United States Government, in reality it is an<br />
obligation, the sole actual responsibility for which rests on the reserve<br />
1. Glass, pp. 124-25.<br />
THE CREATURE SWALLOWS CONGRESS 467<br />
banks.... The government could only be called upon to take them up<br />
after the reserve banks had failed. l<br />
Warburg's explanation should be carefully analyzed. It is an<br />
incredibly important statement. The man who masterminded the<br />
Federal Reserve System is telling us that Federal Reserve notes<br />
constitute privately issued money with the taxpayers standing by to cover<br />
the potential losses of those banks which issue it. One of the more<br />
controversial assertions of this book is that the objectives set forth<br />
at the <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island<br />
meeting included the shifting of the cartel's<br />
losses from the owners of the banks to the taxpayers. Warburg<br />
himself has confirmed it.<br />
But let us return to the great deceit of 1913. The second demand<br />
made by Bryan—political control over the System, not banker<br />
control—was met with an equally beguiling "compromise." In<br />
addition to<br />
the governing board of regional bankers previously<br />
proposed, there now would be a central regulatory commission, to<br />
be called the Federal Reserve Board, appointed by the President<br />
with the advice and consent of the Senate. 2 Thus, the public was to<br />
be protected through a sharing of power, a melding of interests, a<br />
system of checks and balances. In this way, said Wilson, "the banks<br />
may be instruments, not the masters, of business and of individual<br />
enterprise and initiative." 3<br />
The arrangement was heralded as a bold, new experiment in<br />
representative government. In reality, it was but the return of the<br />
ancient partnership between the monetary and political scientists.<br />
The only thing new was that power was now to be shared openly in<br />
plain view of the public. But, of course, there would not be much to<br />
see. All the deliberations and most of the decisions were to happen<br />
behind closed doors. Furthermore, the division of power and<br />
responsibility between these groups was left<br />
deliberately vague.<br />
Without a detailed line of command or even a clear concept of<br />
function, it was inevitable that, as with the drafting of the bill itself,<br />
real power would gravitate into the hands of those with technical<br />
[knowledge and Wall Street connections. To the monetary scientists<br />
drafting the bill and engineering the compromises, the eventual<br />
i- Warburg, Vol. I, p. 409.<br />
i The original plan called for the Secretary of the Treasury and the Comptroller<br />
or the Currency to be on the board also, but this was later dropped<br />
6<br />
- Quoted by Greider, p. 277.
468 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
concentration of effective control into their hands was never in<br />
serious doubt. And, as we shall see in the next chapter, subsequent<br />
events have proved the soundness of that strategy.<br />
BRYAN ENDORSES THE BILL<br />
Bryan was no match for the <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island strategists and he<br />
accepted the "compromises" at face value. Had there been any<br />
lingering doubts in his mind, they were swept away by gratitude<br />
for his appointment as Wilson's Secretary of State. Now that he was<br />
on the team, he declared:<br />
I<br />
appreciate so profoundly the service rendered by the President<br />
to the people in the stand he has taken on the fundamental principles<br />
involved in currency reform, that 1 am with him in all the details....<br />
The right of the government to issue money is not surrendered to the<br />
banks; the control over the money so issued is not relinquished by the<br />
government.... I am glad to endorse earnestly and unreservedly the<br />
currency bill as a much better measure than I supposed it possible to<br />
secure at this time.. . . Conflicting opinions have been reconciled with a<br />
success hardly to have been expected.<br />
With the conversion of Bryan, there was no longer any doubt<br />
about the final outcome. The Federal Reserve Act was released<br />
from the joint House and Senate conference committee on December<br />
22, 1913, just as Congress was preoccupied with departure for<br />
the Christmas recess and in no mood for debate. It quickly passed<br />
by a vote of 282 to 60 in the House and 43 to 23 in the Senate. The<br />
President signed it into law the next day.<br />
The Creature had swallowed Congress.<br />
SUMMARY<br />
President Taft, although a Republican spokesman for big<br />
business, refused to champion the Aldrich Bill<br />
This marked him for political extinction. The Money Trust wanted<br />
a President who would aggressively promote the bill, and the man<br />
selected was Woodrow Wilson who had already publicly declared<br />
for a central bank.<br />
his allegiance. Wilson's nomination at the Democratic national<br />
convention was secured by Colonel House, a close associate<br />
Morgan and Warburg. To make sure that Taft did not win his bid<br />
for reelection, the Money Trust encouraged the former Republican<br />
President, Teddy Roosevelt, to run on the Progressive ticket. The<br />
of<br />
THE CREATURE SWALLOWS CONGRESS 469<br />
result, as planned, was that Roosevelt pulled away Republican<br />
support from Taft, and Wilson won the election with less than a<br />
majority vote. Wilson and Roosevelt campaigned vigorously<br />
against the evils of the Money Trust while, all along, being<br />
dependent upon that same Trust for campaign funding.<br />
When Wilson was elected, Colonel House literally moved into<br />
the White House and became the unseen President of the United<br />
States. Under his guidance, the Aldrich Bill was given cosmetic<br />
surgery and emerged as the Glass-Owen Bill. Although sponsored<br />
by Democrats, in all essential features it was still the <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island<br />
plan. Aldrich, Vanderlip, and others identified with Wall Street put<br />
on a pretense of opposing the Glass-Owen Bill to convince<br />
Congress and the public that big bankers were fearful of it. The<br />
final bill was written with many sound features which were<br />
included to make it palatable during Congressional debate but<br />
which were predesigned to be dropped in later years. To win the<br />
support of the Populists under the leadership of William Jennings<br />
Bryan, the <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island team also engineered what appeared to be<br />
compromises but which in actual operation were, as Wilson called<br />
them, mere "shadows" while the "substance" remained. In short,<br />
Congress was outflanked, outfoxed, and outclassed by a deceptive,<br />
but brilliant, psycho-political attack. The result is that, on December<br />
23, 1913, America once again had a central bank.<br />
1. Glass, pp. 139-42.
Chapter Twenty-Three<br />
THE GREAT<br />
DUCK DINNER<br />
Haw Federal-Reserve policies led to<br />
the crash of<br />
1929; the expansion of the money supply as a<br />
means of helping the economy of England; the<br />
resulting wave of speculation in stocks and real<br />
estate; evidence that the Federal-Reserve Board<br />
had foreknowledge of the crash and even executed<br />
the events that were designed to trigger it.<br />
II<br />
The story is told of a New England farmer with a small pond in<br />
his pasture. Each summer, a group of wild ducks would frequent<br />
that pond but try as he would, the farmer could never catch one.<br />
No matter how early in the morning he approached, or how<br />
carefully he constructed a blind, or what kind of duck call he tried,<br />
somehow those crafty birds sensed the danger and managed to be<br />
out of range. Of course, when fall arrived, the ducks headed South,<br />
and the farmer's craving for a duck dinner only intensified.<br />
Then he got an idea. Early in the spring, he started scattering<br />
corn along the edge of the pond. The ducks liked the corn and,<br />
since it was always there, they soon gave up dipping and foraging<br />
for food of their own. After a while, they became used to the farmer<br />
and began to trust him. They could see he was their benefactor and<br />
they now walked close to him with no sense of fear. Life was so<br />
easy, they forgot how to fly. But that was unimportant, because<br />
they were now so fat they couldn't have gotten off the water even if<br />
they had tried-<br />
Fall came, and the ducks stayed. Winter came, and the pond<br />
. froze. The farmer built a shelter to keep them warm. The ducks<br />
I were happy because they didn't have to fly. And the farmer was<br />
l especially happy because, each week all winter long, he had a<br />
I delicious duck dinner.<br />
That is the story of America's Great Depression of the 1930s.
472 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
THE GREAT DUCK DINNER 473<br />
CONSOLIDATION OF POWER<br />
When the Federal Reserve Act was submitted to Congress,<br />
was head of the New York branch of the System which represented<br />
the nation's largest banks, the "money trust" itself. From the outset,<br />
many of its most important features were written in vague language.<br />
Some details were omitted entirely. That was a tactical move<br />
the national board and the regional branches were dominated by<br />
the New York branch. Strong ruled as an autocrat, determining Fed<br />
to avoid debate over fine points and to allow flexibility for future<br />
policy often without even consulting with the Federal Reserve<br />
interpretation. The goal was to get the bill passed and perfect it later.<br />
Since then, the Act has been amended 195 times, expanding the<br />
power and scope of the System to the point where, today, it would<br />
Board in Washington.<br />
The United States entry into World War I provided the impetus<br />
for increasing the power of the Fed. The System became the sole<br />
be almost unrecognizable to the Congressmen and Senators who<br />
fiscal agent of the Treasury, Federal Reserve Notes were issued,<br />
voted for<br />
virtually all of the<br />
it.<br />
gold reserves of the nation's commercial banks'<br />
In 1913, public distaste for concentration of financial power in<br />
were gathered together into the vaults of the Federal System, and<br />
the hands of a few Wall Street banks helped to fuel the fire for many of the legislative restraints placed into the original Act were<br />
passage of the Federal Reserve Act. To make it appear that the new<br />
abandoned. Voters ask fewer questions when their nation is at war.<br />
System would put an end to the New York "money trust," as it was<br />
The concentration of power into the hands of the very "money<br />
called, the public was told that the Federal Reserve would not<br />
trust" the Fed was supposed to defeat, is described by Ferdinand<br />
represent any one group or one region. Instead, it would have its<br />
Lundberg, author of America's Sixty Families:<br />
power diffused over twelve regional Federal Reserve Banks, and<br />
In practice, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York became the<br />
none would be able to dominate. As Galbraith pointed out,<br />
fountainhead of the system of twelve regional banks, for New York<br />
however, the regional design was "admirable for serving local<br />
was the money market of the nation. The other eleven banks were so<br />
pride and architectural ambition and for lulling the suspicions of<br />
many expensive mausoleums erected to salve the local pride and quell<br />
the<br />
the agrarians/'<br />
Jacksonian fears<br />
But that was not what the planners had in mind for<br />
of the hinterland. Benjamin Strong,... president of<br />
the Bankers Trust<br />
the long<br />
Company<br />
haul.<br />
[J.P. Morgan] was selected as the first<br />
Governor of the New York Reserve Bank.<br />
In the beginning, the regional branches took their autonomy<br />
An adept in high finance,<br />
Strong for many years manipulated the country's monetary system at<br />
seriously, and that led to conflict with members of the national<br />
the discretion of directors representing the leading New York banks.<br />
board. The Board of Governors was composed of political appointees<br />
representing diverse segments of the economy. They were<br />
brought into interlocking relations with the Bank of England and the<br />
Under Strong the Reserve System, unsuspected by the nation, was<br />
outclassed by the heads of the regional branches of the System who<br />
Bank of France.<br />
were bankers with bankers / experience.<br />
BAILING OUT EUROPE<br />
RETURN OF THE NEW YORK "MONEY TRUST"<br />
It will be recalled from Chapters Twelve and Twenty that it was<br />
The greatest power struggle arose from the New York Reserve<br />
this interlock during World War I that was responsible for the<br />
Bank which was headed by Benjamin Strong. Strong had the<br />
confiscation from American taxpayers of billions of dollars which<br />
contacts and the experience. It will be recalled that he was one of were given to the central banks of England and France. Much of<br />
the seven who drafted the cartel's structure at <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island. He had<br />
that money found its way to the associates of J.P. Morgan as<br />
been head of J.P. Morgan's Bankers Trust Company and was<br />
interest payments on war bonds and as fees for supplying munitions<br />
and other war materials.<br />
closely associated with Edward Mandell House. He had become a<br />
personal friend of Montagu Norman, head of the Bank of England;<br />
Seventy per cent of the cost of World War I was paid by<br />
and of Charles Rist, head of the Bank of France. Not least of all, he<br />
inflation rather than taxes, a process that was orchestrated by the<br />
Lundberg, p. 122.
474 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
Federal Reserve System. This was considered by the Fed's supporters<br />
as its first real test, and it passed with flying colors. American<br />
inflation during that period was only slightly less than in England,<br />
which had been more deeply committed to war and for a longer<br />
period of time. That is not surprising inasmuch as a large portion of<br />
Europe's war costs had been transferred to the American taxpayers.<br />
After the war was over, the transfusion of American dollars<br />
continued as part of a plan to pull England out of depression. The<br />
methods chosen for that transfer were artificially low interest rates<br />
and a deliberate inflation of the American money supply. That was<br />
calculated to weaken the value of the dollar relative to the English<br />
pound and cause gold reserves to move from America to England.<br />
Both operations were directed by Benjamin Strong and executed by<br />
the Federal Reserve. It was not hyperbole when President Herbert<br />
Hoover described Strong as "a mental annex to Europe/'<br />
Before Alan Greenspan was appointed as Chairman of the<br />
Federal Reserve by President Reagan in 1987, he had served on the<br />
Board of the J.P. Morgan Company. Before that however, he had<br />
been an outspoken champion of the gold standard and a critic of<br />
the System's subservience to the banking cartel. In 1966 he wrote:<br />
When business in the United States underwent a mild contraction<br />
in 1927, the Federal Reserve created more paper reserves in the hope<br />
of forestalling any possible bank reserve shortage. More disastrous,<br />
however, was the Federal Reserve's attempt to assist Great Britain<br />
who had been losing gold to us„ . . The ''Fed" succeeded: it stopped the<br />
gold loss, but it nearly destroyed the economies of the world in the<br />
process. The excess credit which the Fed pumped into the economy<br />
spilled over into the stock market—triggering a fantastic speculative<br />
boom.... As a result, the American economy collapsed.<br />
After his appointment to the Fed , Greenspan became silent on<br />
these issues and did nothing to anger the Creature he now served.<br />
AGENTS OF A HIGHER POWER<br />
When reviewing this aspect of the Fed's history, questions arise<br />
about the patriotic loyalty of men like Benjamin Strong. How is it<br />
possible for a man who enjoys the best that his nation can<br />
offer—security, wealth, prestige—to conspire to plunder his fellow<br />
citizens in order to assist politicians of other governments to<br />
1. Gaibraith, p. 180.<br />
2. Greenspan, pp. 99-100,<br />
THE GREAT DUCK DINNER 475<br />
continue plundering theirs? The first part of the answer was<br />
illustrated in earlier sections of this book. International money<br />
managers may be citizens of a particular country but, to many of<br />
them, that is a meaningless accident of birth. They consider<br />
themselves to be citizens of the world first. They speak of affection<br />
for all mankind, but their highest loyalty is to themselves and their<br />
profession.<br />
That is only half the answer. It must be remembered that the<br />
men who pulled the financial levers on this doomsday machine, the<br />
governors of the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve, were<br />
themselves tied to strings which were pulled by others above them.<br />
Their minds were not obsessed with concepts of nationalism or<br />
even internationalism. Their loyalties were to men. Professor<br />
Quigley reminds us:<br />
It must not be felt that these heads of the world's chief central<br />
banks were themselves substantive powers in<br />
world finance. They<br />
were not. Rather, they were the technicians and agents of the<br />
dominant investment bankers of their own countries, who had raised<br />
them up and were perfectly capable of throwing them down. The<br />
substantive financial powers of the world were in the hands of these<br />
investment bankers (also called "international" or "merchant"<br />
bankers) who remained largely behind the scenes in their own<br />
unincorporated private banks. These formed a system of international<br />
cooperation and national dominance which was more private, more<br />
powerful, and more secret than that of their agents in the central<br />
banks.<br />
So, we are not dealing with the actions of men who perceive<br />
themselves as betraying their nation, but technicians who are loyal<br />
to the monetary scientists and the political scientists who raised<br />
them up. Of the two groups, the financiers are dominant. Politicians<br />
come and go, but those who wield the power of money<br />
remain to pick their successors.<br />
FARMERS BECOME DUCK DINNER<br />
During the war, prices for agricultural products rose to an<br />
all-time high, and so did profits. Farmers had put part of that<br />
feioney into war bonds, but much of it had been placed into savings<br />
accounts at banks within the farming communities, which is to say,<br />
mostly in the Midwest and South. That was unacceptable to the<br />
Quigley, Tragedy, pp. 326-27.
.<br />
|<br />
Under<br />
476 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
New York banks which saw their share of the nation's deposits<br />
begin to decline. A way had to be devised to reclaim that money.<br />
The Federal Reserve System, which by then was the captive of the<br />
New York banks, was pressed into service to accomplish the deed.<br />
Few of those country banks had chosen to become members of<br />
the Federal Reserve System. That added insult to injury, and it also<br />
provided an excuse for the Fed to wage economic war against<br />
them. The plan was neither complex nor original; it had been used<br />
many times before by central bankers. It was (1) extend easy credit<br />
to the farmers to lure them into heavy debt, and then (2) create a<br />
recession which would decrease their income to the point where<br />
they could not make payments. The country banks then would find<br />
themselves holding non-performing loans and foreclosed property<br />
which they could not sell without tremendous losses. In the end,<br />
both the farmers and the banks would be wiped out. The banks<br />
were the target. Too bad about the farmers.<br />
Congressman Charles Lindbergh, Sr., father of the man who<br />
made the world's first solo transatlantic flight, explained it this<br />
way: "Under the Federal Reserve Act, panics are scientifically<br />
created; the present panic is the first scientifically created one,<br />
worked out as we figure a mathematical problem."<br />
The details of how this panic was created were explained in<br />
1939 by Senator Robert Owen, Chairman of the Senate Banking and<br />
Currency Committee. Owen, a banker himself, had been a coauthor<br />
of the Federal Reserve Act, a role he later regretted. Owen<br />
said:<br />
In May 1920 ... the farmers were exceedingly prosperous.. . .<br />
They<br />
were paying off their mortgages. They had bought a lot of new land, at<br />
the instance of the government—had borrowed money to do it—and<br />
then they were bankrupted by a sudden contraction of credit and<br />
currency, which took place in 1920.. .<br />
The Federal Reserve Board met in a meeting which was not<br />
was a<br />
disclosed to the public—they met on the 18th of May 1920; it<br />
secret meeting—and they spent all day; the minutes made 60 printed<br />
pages, and it appears in Senate Document 310 of February 10, 1923...<br />
Under action taken by the Reserve Board on May 18, 1920, there<br />
resulted a violent contraction of credit. . . . This contraction of credit and<br />
currency had the effect, the next year, of diminishing the national<br />
THE GREAT DUCK DINNER 477<br />
production $15,000,000,000; it had the effect of throwing millions of<br />
people out of employment; it had the effect of reducing the value of<br />
lands and ranches $20,000,000,000. l<br />
The contraction of credit had a disastrous effect on the nation as<br />
U. whole, not just farmers. But the farmers were more deeply<br />
involved, because the recently created Federal Farm Loan Board<br />
had lured them with easy credit—like ducks at the pond—into<br />
extreme debt ratios. Furthermore, the large-city banks which were<br />
members of the System were given support by the Fed during the<br />
summer of 1920 to enable them to extend credit to manufacturers<br />
and merchants. That allowed many of them to ride out the slump.<br />
There was no such support for the farmers or the country banks<br />
which, by 1921, were falling like dominoes. History books refer to<br />
this event as the Agricultural Depression of 1920-21. A better name<br />
would have been Country-Duck Dinner in New York.<br />
BUILDING THE MANDRAKE MECHANISM<br />
In Chapter Ten, we examined the three methods by which the<br />
Federal Reserve is able to create or extinguish money. Of the three,<br />
the purchase and sale of debt-related securities in the open market<br />
is the one that provides the greatest effect on the money supply.<br />
The purchase of securities by the Fed (with checks that have no<br />
money to back them) creates money; the sale of those securities<br />
extinguishes money. Although the Fed is authorized to buy and sell<br />
almost any kind of security that exists in the world, it is obligated to<br />
show preference for bonds and notes of the federal government.<br />
That is the way the monetary scientists discharge the commitment<br />
to create money for their partners, the political scientists. Without<br />
that service, the partnership would dissolve, and Congress would<br />
abolish the Fed.<br />
When the System was created in 1913, it was anticipated that<br />
the primary way to manipulate the money supply would be to<br />
control the "reserve ratios" and the "discount window." That is<br />
banker language for setting the level of mandatory bank reserves<br />
(as a percentage of deposits) and also setting the interest rate on<br />
loans made by the Fed to the banks themselves. The reserve ratio<br />
the old National Bank Act had been 25%. Under the Federal<br />
Reserve Act of 1913, it was reduced to 18% for the large New York<br />
1. Charles A. Lindbergh, Sr. The Economic Pinch (1923 rpt. Hawthorne, California:<br />
Omni Publications, 1968), p. 95.<br />
1 . U.S. Cong., Senate, Special Committee on the Investigation of Silver, Silver, Part<br />
5, 76th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1939), April 7, 1939, pp. 196-97.
478 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
banks, a drop of 28%. In 1917, just four years later, the reserve<br />
requirements for Central Reserve-City Banks were further dropped<br />
from 18% to 13% (with slightly lesser reductions for smaller banks).<br />
That was an additional 28% cut.<br />
It<br />
quickly became apparent that setting reserve ratios was an<br />
inefficient tool. The latitude of control was too small, and the<br />
amount of public attention too great. The second method, influencing<br />
the interest rate on commercial loans, was more useful. Here is<br />
how that works:<br />
Under a fractional-reserve banking system, a bank can create<br />
new money merely by issuing a loan. The amount of new money it<br />
creates is limited by the reserve ratio or "fraction" it is required to<br />
maintain to cover its cash-flow needs. If the reserve ratio is 10%,<br />
then each $10 it lends includes $9 that never existed before. A<br />
commercial bank, therefore, can create a sizable amount of money<br />
merely by making loans. But, once the bank is "loaned up," that is<br />
to say, once the bank has already loaned $9 for every $1 it holds in<br />
reserve, it must stop and wait for some of the old loans to be paid<br />
back before it<br />
can issue new ones. The only way to expand that<br />
process is to make the reserves larger. That can be accomplished in<br />
one of three ways: (1) use some of the bank's profits, (2) sell<br />
additional stock to investors, or (3) borrow money from the Fed.<br />
WHEN BANKS BORROW FROM THE FED<br />
The third option is the most popular and is called going to the<br />
"discount window." When banks go to the Fed's discount window<br />
to obtain a loan, they are expected to put up collateral. This can be<br />
almost any debt contract held by the bank, including government<br />
bonds, but it commonly consists of commercial loans. The Fed then<br />
grants credit to the bank in an amount equal to those contracts. In<br />
essence, this allows the bank to convert its old loans into new<br />
"reserves." Every dollar of those new reserves then can be used as<br />
the basis for lending nine more dollars in checkbook money!<br />
The process does not stop there. Once the new loans are made,,<br />
they, too, can be used as collateral at the Fed for still more reserves.<br />
The music goes 'round and 'round, with each new level of debt<br />
1. In 1980, statutory limits on reserve ratios were eliminated altogether. The<br />
Federal Reserve Board now has the option to lower the ratio to zero, which means<br />
the power to create unlimited quantities of money. It is the ultimate dream of central<br />
bankers.<br />
§1-<br />
THE GREAT DUCK DINNER 479<br />
becoming "reserves" for yet a higher level of loans, until it<br />
finally<br />
plays itself out at about twenty-eight times. That process is<br />
was one of<br />
commonly called "discounting commercial paper." It<br />
the means by which the Fed was able to flood the nation with new<br />
money prior to the Great Dam Rupture of 1929.<br />
But, there is a problem with that method, at least as far as the<br />
Fed is concerned. Even though interest rates at the discount<br />
window can be made so low that most bankers will line up like<br />
ducks looking for free corn, some of them — particularly those<br />
"hicks" in the country banks—have been known to resist the<br />
temptation. There is no way to force the banks to participate.<br />
Furthermore, the banks themselves are dependent upon the whims<br />
tof their customers who, for reasons known only to themselves, may<br />
not want to borrow as much as the bank wants to lend. If the<br />
customers stop borrowing, then the banks have no new loans to<br />
convert into further reserves.<br />
That left the third mechanism as the preferred option: the<br />
purchase and sale of bonds and other debt obligations in the open<br />
^market With the discount window, banks have to be enticed to<br />
borrow money which later must be repaid, and sometimes they are<br />
reluctant to do that. But with the open market, all the Fed has to do<br />
is write a fiat check to pay for the securities. When that check is<br />
cashed, the new money it created moves directly into the economy<br />
without any concurrence required from the recalcitrant banks.<br />
But, there was a problem with this method also. Before World<br />
War I, there were few government bonds available on the open<br />
market. Even after the war, the supply was limited. Which means<br />
the vast inflation that preceded the Crash of 1929 was not caused by<br />
deficit spending. In each year from 1920 through 1930 there was a<br />
surplus of government revenue over expenses. Surprising as it may<br />
be, on the eve of the depression, America was getting out of debt.<br />
As a consequence, there were few government bonds for the Fed to<br />
buy. Without government bonds, the open-market engine was<br />
constantly running out of gas.<br />
The solution to all these problems was to create a new market<br />
tailor-made to the Fed's needs, a kind of half-way house between<br />
See chapter ten for details.<br />
2- See Robert T. Patterson, The Great Boom and Panic; 1921-1929 (Chicago: Henry<br />
Regnery Company, 1965), p. 223.
480 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
the discount window and the open market. It was called the<br />
"acceptance window," and it was through that imagery that the<br />
System purchased a unique type of debt-related security called<br />
bankers acceptances.<br />
BANKER'S ACCEPTANCES<br />
Banker's acceptances are contracts promising payment for<br />
commercial goods scheduled for later delivery. They usually<br />
involve international trade where delays of three to six months are<br />
common. They are a means by which a seller in one country can<br />
ship goods to an unknown buyer in another country with confidence<br />
that he will be paid upon delivery. That is accomplished<br />
through guarantees made by the banks of both buyer and seller.<br />
First, the buyer's bank issues a letter of credit guaranteeing<br />
payment for the goods, even if the buyer should default. When the<br />
seller's bank receives this, one of its officers writes the word<br />
"accepted" on the contract and pays the seller the amount of the<br />
sale. The accepting bank, therefore, advances the money to the<br />
seller in expectation of receiving future payment from the buyer's<br />
bank. For this service, both banks charge a fee expressed as a<br />
percentage of the contract. Thus, the buyer pays a little more than<br />
the amount of the sales contract, and the seller receives a little less.<br />
Historically, these contracts have been safe, because the banks<br />
are careful to guarantee payment only for financially sound firms.<br />
But, in times of economic panic, even sound firms may be unable to<br />
honor their contracts. It was underwriting that kind of business that<br />
nearly bankrupted George Peabody and J.P. Morgan in London<br />
during the panic of 1857, and would have done so had they not<br />
been bailed out by the Bank of England.<br />
Acceptances, like commercial loan contracts, are negotiable<br />
instruments that can be traded in the securities market. The<br />
accepting banks have a choice of holding them until maturity or<br />
selling them. If they hold them, their profit will be realized when<br />
the underlying contract is eventually paid off and it will be equal to<br />
the amount of its "discount," which is banker language for its fee.<br />
Acceptances are said to be "rediscounted" when they are sold by<br />
the original discounter, the underwriter. The advantage of doing<br />
that is<br />
that they do not have to wait three to six months for their<br />
profit. They can acquire immediate capital which can be invested to<br />
earn interest.<br />
I<br />
THE GREAT DUCK DINNER 481<br />
The sale price of an acceptance is always less than the value of<br />
the underlying contracts; otherwise no one would buy them. The<br />
difference represents the potential profit to the buyer. It is expressed<br />
as a percentage and is called the "rate" of discount—or, in<br />
this case, rediscount. But the rate given by the seller must be lower<br />
than what he expects to earn with the money he receives, otherwise<br />
he will be better off not selling.<br />
Although bankers' acceptances were commonly traded in<br />
Europe, they were not popular in the United States.<br />
Before the<br />
Federal Reserve Act was passed, national banks had been prohibited<br />
from purchasing them. A market, therefore, had to be created.<br />
The Fed accomplished this by setting the discount rate on acceptances<br />
so low that underwriters would have been foolish not to take<br />
advantage of it. At a very low discount, they could acquire<br />
short-term funds which then could be invested at a higher rate of<br />
return. Thus, acceptances quickly became plentiful on the open<br />
market in the United States.<br />
But who would want to buy them at a low return? No one, of<br />
course. So, to create that market, not only did the Federal Reserve<br />
set the discount rate artificially low, it also pledged to buy all of the<br />
acceptances that were offered. The Fed, therefore, became the<br />
principal buyer of these securities. Banks also came into the market<br />
as buyers, but only because they knew that, at any time they<br />
wanted to sell, the Fed was pledged to buy.<br />
Since the money was being created out of nothing, the cost did<br />
not really matter, nor did the low profit potential. The Fed's goal<br />
was not to make a profit on investment. It was to increase the<br />
nation's money supply.<br />
WARBURG AND FRIENDS MAKE A LITTLE PROFIT<br />
The man who benefited most from this artificially created<br />
market was none other than Paul Warburg, a partner with Kuhn,<br />
Loeb and Co. Warburg was in attendance at the <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island<br />
meeting at which the Federal Reserve System was conceived. He<br />
was considered by all to have been the master theoretician who led<br />
the others in their deliberations. He was one of the most influential<br />
voices in the public debates that followed. He had been appointed<br />
as one of the first members of the Federal Reserve Board and later<br />
became its Vice Governor until outbreak of war, at which time he
482 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
German banking. He was a director of American I.G. Chemical<br />
Corp. and Agfa Ansco, Inc., firms that were controlled by I.G.<br />
Farben, the infamous German cartel that, only a few years later,<br />
would sponsor the rise to power of Adolph Hitler. He was also a<br />
director of the CFR (Council on Foreign Relations). It should not be<br />
surprising, therefore, to learn that he was able to position himself at<br />
the center of the huge cash flow resulting from the Fed's purchase<br />
of acceptances.<br />
Warburg was the founder and Chairman of the International<br />
Acceptance Bank of New York, the world's largest acceptance<br />
bank. He was also a director of several smaller "competitors,"<br />
including the prestigious Westinghouse Acceptance Bank. He was<br />
founder and Chairman of the American Acceptance Council.<br />
Warburg was the acceptance market in America. But he was not<br />
without friends who also swam in the river of money. Men who<br />
controlled America's largest financial institutions became directors<br />
or officers of the various acceptance banks. The list of companies<br />
that became part of the interlocking directorate included Kuhn,<br />
Loeb and Co.; New York Trust Co.; Bank of Manhattan Trust Co.;<br />
American Trust Co.; New York Title and Mortgage Co.; Chase<br />
National Bank; Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.; American Express<br />
Co.; the Carnegie Corp.; Guaranty Trust Co.; Mutual Life Insurance<br />
Co.; the Equitable Life Assurance Society of New York; and the<br />
First National Banks of Boston, St. Louis, and Los Angeles, to name<br />
just a few. The world of acceptance banking was the private<br />
domain of the financial elite of Wall Street<br />
Behind the American image, however, was a full partnership<br />
with investors from Europe. Total capital of the IAB's American<br />
shareholders was $276 million compared with $271 million from<br />
foreign investors. A significant portion of that was divided between<br />
the Warburgs in Germany and the Rothschilds in England.<br />
Just how large and free-flowing was that river of acceptance<br />
money? In 1929, it was 1.7 trillion-dollars wide. Throughout the<br />
1920s, it was over half of all the new money created by the Federal<br />
Reserve—greater than all the other purchases on the open market<br />
1. For a detailed account of this episode, see Part Two of the author's book, World<br />
without Cancer: The Story of Vitamin B17 (Westlake Village, California: American<br />
Media, 1974).<br />
2. Larry Schweikart, ed. The Encyclopedia of American History and Biography (New<br />
York: Facts on File, 1990), p. 448.<br />
THE GREAT DUCK DINNER 483<br />
plus all the loans to all the banks standing in line at the discount<br />
window.<br />
The monetary scientists who created the Federal Reserve, and<br />
their close business associates, were well-rewarded for their efforts.<br />
Profit-taking by insiders, however, is not the issue. Far more<br />
important is the fact that the consequence of this self-serving<br />
mechanism was the massive expansion of the money supply that<br />
made the Great Depression inevitable. And that is the topic which<br />
impelled us to look at acceptances in the first place.<br />
CONGRESS SUSPICIOUS BUT AFRAID TO TINKER<br />
By 1920, suspicions and resentment were growing in the halls<br />
of Congress. Politicians were not getting their share. It is possible<br />
that many of them failed to realize that, as partners in the scheme,<br />
they were entitled to a share. Nevertheless, they were dazzled by<br />
banker language and accounting tricks and were afraid to tinker<br />
with the System lest they accidentally push the wrong button.<br />
Watching with amusement from London was Fabian Socialist<br />
John Maynard Keynes. Speaking of the Federal Reserve's manipulation<br />
of the value of the dollar, he wrote:<br />
That is the way by which a rich country is able to combine new<br />
wisdom with old prejudice. It can enjoy the latest scientific<br />
improvements, devised in the economic laboratory of Harvard, whilst<br />
leaving Congress to believe that no rash departure will be<br />
permitted.. . . But there is in all such fictions a certain instability.. . . The<br />
suspicions of Congressmen may be aroused. One cannot be quite<br />
certain that some Senator might not read and understand this book.<br />
There was not much danger of that! By then, American politicians<br />
had acquired a taste for the heady wine of war funding and<br />
stopped asking questions. World War I had created enormous<br />
demands for money, and the Fed provided it. By the end of the<br />
war, Congressional hostility to the Federal Reserve became history.<br />
PAYING FOR WORLD WAR I<br />
Much of the war debt was absorbed by the public which<br />
responded to patriotic instincts and purchased war bonds. The<br />
Treasury launched a massive publicity campaign for "Liberty<br />
Loans" to reinforce that sentiment These small-denomination<br />
1- Ibid., p. 448; also Murray N. Rothbard, America's Great Depression (Kansas City:<br />
Sheed and Ward, 1963), p. 11 7.<br />
2. Keynes, A Tract on Monetary Reform, pp. 198-99-
484 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
THE GREAT DUCK DINNER 485<br />
bonds did not expand the money supply and did not cause<br />
the government did not pay off those bonds when they came due.<br />
inflation, because the money came from savings. It already existed.<br />
Instead, it rolled them over by offering new bonds to replace the<br />
However, many people who thought it was their patriotic duty to<br />
old. Why? Was it because Congress needed more money? No. The<br />
support the war effort went to their banks and borrowed money so<br />
bonds had become the basis for money in circulation and, if they<br />
they could buy bonds. The bank created most of that money out of<br />
had been redeemed, the money supply would have decreased. A<br />
nothing, drawing upon credits and bookkeeping entries from the<br />
decrease in the money supply is viewed by politicians and central<br />
Federal Reserve, so those purchases did inflate the money supply.<br />
bankers as a threat to economic stability. Thus, the government<br />
The same result could have been obtained more simply and less<br />
ifcund itself unable to get out of debt even when it had the money<br />
expensively by getting the money directly from the Fed, but the<br />
to do so, a dilemma that continues to this day.<br />
government encouraged the trend anyway, because of its psychological<br />
value in generating popular support for the war. When<br />
There is an apparent contradiction here. In his book, The Great<br />
Boom and Panic, Robert Patterson says that, on the eve of depression,<br />
America was getting out of debt. Yet, Rothbard tells us there<br />
people make sacrifices for an endeavor, it reinforces their belief that<br />
it must be worthy.<br />
were more government bonds held by the banking system than<br />
Although the war was financed partly by taxes and partly by<br />
during the war! The only way both statements can be true is if there<br />
Liberty Bonds purchased by the public, a significant portion was<br />
were, in fact, more bonds outstanding during the war but they<br />
covered by the sale of Treasury bonds to the Federal Reserve in the<br />
were held by the public, not by the banking system. That would<br />
open market. Benjamin Strong's biographer, Lester Chandler,<br />
make it possible for there to be fewer total bonds in 1928 and yet<br />
explains:<br />
the System could still hold more of them than previously. That<br />
The Federal Reserve System became an integral part of the war would be the expected result of the Fed's growing role in the open<br />
financing machinery. The System's overriding objective, both as a<br />
market. As the publicly-held bonds matured, the Treasury rolled<br />
creator of money and as fiscal agent, was to insure that the Treasury<br />
them over, and the Fed picked them up. Bonds purchased by the<br />
would be supplied with all the money it needed, and on terms fixed by<br />
Congress and the Treasury.... A grateful nation now hailed it as a<br />
public do not increase the money supply whereas those purchased<br />
major contributor to the winning of the war, an efficient fiscal agent for by banks do. Therefore, conditions in 1928 would have been far<br />
the Treasury, a great source of currency and reserve funds, and a<br />
jnore inflationary than during the war—even though the government<br />
was getting out of debt.<br />
permanent and indispensable part of the banking system.<br />
Before 1922, the Federal Reserve bought Treasury bonds primarily<br />
for three purposes: (1) for income to operate the system, (2)<br />
THE EMERGENCE OF GOVERNMENT DEBT<br />
The war years were largely a period of testing new strategies<br />
to pay for the newly issued Federal Reserve Notes which were<br />
and consolidating power. Ironically, it was not until after the<br />
replacing silver certificates, and<br />
war—when there was no longer a justification for deficit spending—that<br />
government debt became plentiful. Up until World War<br />
(3) to push down interest rates. The<br />
iriotive for manipulating interest rates was to encourage borrowing<br />
I, annual federal expenses had been running about $750 million. By<br />
from abroad in the United States (where rates were low). It also<br />
the end of the war, it was running $18 and-a-half billion, an increase<br />
encouraged investment from the United States into Europe (where<br />
of 2,466%. Approximately 70% of the cost of war had been financed<br />
rates were higher). By making it possible to borrow American<br />
by debt. Murray Rothbard reminds us that, on the eve of depression<br />
in 1928, ten years after the end of war, the banking system held<br />
Fed was deliberately moving money out of the United States, with<br />
dollars at one rate and invest them elsewhere at a higher rate, the<br />
more government bonds than during the war itself. That means<br />
gold reserves following behind. As President Kennedy had said in<br />
f.<br />
1. Chandler, pp. 101-102.<br />
Page 223.<br />
2.<br />
2. Depression, p. 125. Chandler, p. 211; also Rothbard, Depression, p. 127.
I<br />
486 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
his 1963 address at the IMF, the outflow of American gold "did not<br />
come about by chance/'<br />
THE "DISCOVERY" OF THE OPEN MARKET<br />
It is commonly asserted by writers on this topic that the power<br />
of the open-market mechanism to manipulate the money supply<br />
was "discovered" by the Fed in the early 1920s and that it came as a<br />
total surprise. Martin Mayer, for example, in his book, The Bankers,<br />
writes:<br />
Now, through an accident as startling as those which produced<br />
the discovery of X-Rays or penicillin, the central bank learned that<br />
"open market operations" could have a significant effect on the<br />
behavior of the banks.<br />
This makes the story interesting, but it is difficult to believe that<br />
Benjamin Strong, Paul Warburg, Montagu Norman, and the other<br />
monetary scientists who were pulling the levers at that time were<br />
taken by surprise. These men could not possibly have been<br />
ignorant of the effect of creating money out of nothing and pouring<br />
it into the economy. The open market was merely a differentfunnel<br />
If there was any element of surprise, it likely was only in the ease<br />
with which the mechanism could be activated. It is not important<br />
whether that part of the story is fact or fiction, except that it<br />
perpetuates the "accidental" view of history, the myth that no one<br />
is<br />
responsible for political or economic chaos: Things just happen.<br />
There was no master plan. No one is to blame. Everything is under<br />
control Relax, pay your taxes, and go back to sleep!<br />
In any event, by the end of the war, Congress had awakened to<br />
the fact that it could use the Federal Reserve System to obtain<br />
revenue without taxes. From that point forward, deficit spending<br />
became institutionalized. A gradually increasing issuance of Treasury<br />
bonds was encouraging to the Fed because it provided still one<br />
more source of debt to convert into money, a source that eventually<br />
would become far more reliable than either bank loans or banker's<br />
acceptances. Best of all, now that Congress was becoming dependent<br />
on the free corn, there was little chance it would find its wings<br />
and fly away. The more dependent it became, the more secure the<br />
System itself became.<br />
1. See Chapter six.<br />
2. Mayer, p. 401.<br />
j<br />
f<br />
THE GREAT DUCK DINNER 487<br />
In 1921, the twelve regional Reserve banks were separately<br />
buying and selling in the open market. But motives varied. Some<br />
merely needed income to cover their<br />
operating overhead, while<br />
others—notably the New York branch under Benjamin Strong<br />
were more interested in sending American gold to England. Strong<br />
began immediately to gather control of all open-market operations<br />
into the hands of his own bank. In June of 1922, the "Open-Market<br />
Committee" was formed to coordinate activities among the<br />
regional Governors. In April of the next year, however, the national<br />
board in Washington replaced the Governor's group with one of its<br />
own creation, the "Open-Market Investments Committee." Benjamin<br />
Strong was its chairman. The powers of that group were<br />
enhanced ten years later by legislation which made it mandatory<br />
for the regional branches to follow the Open-Market Committee's<br />
directives, but that was a mere formality, for the die had been cast<br />
much earlier. From 1923 forward, the Fed's open-market operations<br />
have been carried out by the New York Federal Reserve Bank.<br />
The money trust has always been in control.<br />
DROWNING IN CREDIT<br />
Actions have consequences, and one of the consequences of<br />
purchasing Treasury bonds and other debt-related securities in the<br />
open market is that the money created to purchase them eventually<br />
ends up in the commercial banks where it is used for the expansion<br />
of bank credit. "Credit" is another of those weasely words that<br />
have different meanings to different people. In banker language,<br />
the expansion of credit means the banks have "excess reserves"<br />
(bookkeeping entries) which can be multiplied by nine and earn<br />
interest for them—if only someone would be kind enough to<br />
borrow. It is money waiting to be created. The message is: "Come on<br />
to the bank, folks. Don't be bashful. We've got plenty of money to<br />
lend. You have credit you didn't even know you had."<br />
In the 1920s, the greater share of bank credit was bestowed<br />
upon business firms, wealthy investors, and other high rollers, but<br />
the little man was not ignored. In 1910, consumer credit accounted<br />
for only 10% of the nation's retail sales. By 1929, credit transactions<br />
were responsible for half of the $60 billion retail market. In his<br />
book, Money and Man, Elgin Groseclose says: "By 1929 the United<br />
itates was overwhelmed by a flood of credit. It had covered the<br />
—
488 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
THE GREAT DUCK DINNER 489<br />
Each cycle was at a higher level than the previous one. That is<br />
Groseclose, America's Money Machine, p. 154.<br />
land. It was pouring into every nook and cranny of the national<br />
1.<br />
and the boom returned.<br />
economy."<br />
because the busts that followed the booms were not allowed to play<br />
The impact of expanding credit was compounded by artificially<br />
themselves out. The monetary scientists now had so many mechanisms<br />
at their command they were able to initiate new expansions<br />
low interest rates—the other side of the same coin—which were<br />
intended to help the governments of Europe. But they also stimulated<br />
to cancel out the downward adjustments. It was like prescribing<br />
borrowing here at home. Since borrowing is what causes<br />
increasing doses of narcotics to postpone the awareness of an<br />
money to be created under fractional-reserve banking, the money<br />
supply in America began to expand. From 1921 through June of<br />
advancing disease. It increased the prestige of the doctor, but it did<br />
not bode well for the patient.<br />
1929, the quantity of dollars increased by 61.8%, substantially more THE ROLLER COASTER<br />
than the increase in national product. During that same time, the<br />
Between 1920 and 1929, there were three distinct business<br />
amount of currency in circulation remained virtually unchanged.<br />
cycles with several minor ones within them. For the average<br />
That means the expansion was comprised entirely of money<br />
American, it was confusing and destructive. For the investor, it was<br />
substitutes, such as bonds and loan contracts.<br />
a roller-coaster ride to oblivion:<br />
BOOMS AND BUSTS MADE WORSE<br />
UP! The Fed had inflated the money supply to pay for World<br />
The forces of the free market are amazingly flexible. Like the<br />
War I. The resulting boom caused prices to rise.<br />
black market, they manage to exert themselves in unexpected ways<br />
DOWN! In 1920, the Fed raised interest rates to cool off the<br />
in spite of political decree. That had been the case throughout most<br />
inflation. That caused a recession, and prices tumbled.<br />
of American history. Prior to the creation of the Federal Reserve,<br />
banking had been coddled and hobbled by government. Banks<br />
Farmers were hit<br />
banks were closed.<br />
the hardest, and hundreds of country<br />
were chartered by government, protected by government, and<br />
UP! In 1921, the Fed lowered interest rates to stop the recession<br />
regulated by government. They had been forced to serve the<br />
and to help the governments of Europe. Inflation and<br />
political agendas of those in power. Consequently, the landscape<br />
expanding debt resulted.<br />
was strewn with the tombstones of dead banks which had taken to<br />
DOWN! In 1923, the Fed tightened credit to put the brakes on<br />
their graves the life savings of their hapless depositors. But these<br />
inflation.<br />
were mostly regional tragedies that were offset by growth and<br />
UP! But that was offset by its simultaneous policy of lowering<br />
prosperity in other areas. Even within the communities most<br />
the rate at the discount window, thus encouraging banks to<br />
severely affected, recovery was swift.<br />
borrow new reserves to expand the money supply.<br />
Now that the cartel had firm control over the nation's money<br />
UP! In 1924, the Fed suddenly created $500 million dollars in<br />
supply, the pattern began to change. The corrective forces of the<br />
new money. Within one year, the commercial banks<br />
free market were more firmly straight-jacketed than ever. All banks<br />
parlayed that into more than $4 billion, an expansion of<br />
in the entire country were in lock step with each other. What<br />
eight-to-one. The boom that followed took on the character<br />
happened in one region is what happened in all regions. Banks<br />
of speculation rather than investment. Prices in the stock<br />
were not allowed to die, so there could be no adjustments after<br />
market rose drastically.<br />
their demise. Their illness was sustained and carried like a deadly<br />
DOWN! In 1926, the Florida land boom collapsed, and the<br />
virus to the others.<br />
The expansion of the money supply in the 1920s clearly shows<br />
that effect. It was not a steady advance but a series of convulsions.<br />
economy began to contract once again.<br />
UP! In 1927, Montagu Norman of the Bank of England visited<br />
the United States to consult with Benjamin Strong. Shortly<br />
after his visit, the Fed pumped new money into the system,
490 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
DOWN! In the spring of 1928, the Fed contracted credit to halt<br />
the boom.<br />
UP! But the banks shifted their reserves into time deposits<br />
(where customers agree to wait before withdrawing their<br />
money). Since time deposits require a smaller reserve ratio<br />
than demand deposits, the banks were able to issue more<br />
loans than before. That offset the Fed's contraction of credit.<br />
UP! By that time, the British government had consumed its<br />
previous subsidy which was used to maintain its<br />
state.<br />
welfare<br />
In the spring of 1928, the pound sterling was again<br />
sagging on the international market, and gold began to flow<br />
back into the United States. Once again, the fledgling<br />
Creature came to the aid of the Bank of England, its ailing<br />
parent. The Fed bought a huge volume of banker's<br />
acceptances to depress interest rates and halt the flow of<br />
gold. The money supply suddenly increased by almost<br />
$2 billion.<br />
DOWN! In August, the Fed reversed its expansionist policy by<br />
selling Treasury bonds in the open market and raising<br />
interest rates. The money supply began to contract.<br />
It was the final bubble.<br />
SIXTH REASON TO ABOLISH THE FED<br />
One of the myths about the Federal Reserve is that it is needed<br />
to stabilize the economy. Yet, it has achieved just the opposite.<br />
Destabilization is dramatically clear in the years prior to the Crash,<br />
but the same cause-and-effeet continues to this day. As long as men<br />
are given the power to tinker with the money supply, they will<br />
strive to circumvent the natural laws of supply and demand. No<br />
matter how high their intentions or pure their motives, they will<br />
cause disruptions in the natural flow. When these disruptions are<br />
perceived, they will try to compensate by causing opposite disruptions.<br />
But, long before they act, there will already be new forces at<br />
work which they cannot, in all their wisdom, perceive until they are<br />
already manifest. It is the height of egotistical folly for "experts" to<br />
think they can outsmart or do better than the combined, interactive<br />
decisions of hundreds of millions of people all acting in response to<br />
their own best judgment. Thus, the Fed is doomed to failure by its<br />
nature and its mission. That is the sixth reason it should be<br />
abolished: It destabilizes the economy.<br />
THE GREAT DUCK DINNER 491<br />
TULIPOMANIA<br />
Easy credit was not the only problem in this period. Equally<br />
important was the effect<br />
that had on the behavior patterns of the<br />
populace. Responding to herd instinct and a belief in the possibility<br />
of something-for-nothing, men were driven to the most bizarre<br />
form of investment speculation.<br />
This was not the first time such hysteria had seized a population.<br />
One of the most graphic examples occurred in Holland<br />
between the years 1634 and 1636. It came to pass that a new, rare<br />
flower, called the tulip, was discovered in the gardens of some of<br />
the more wealthy inhabitants of Constantinople, now known as<br />
Istanbul. When the root bulbs of these exotic blossoms were<br />
brought into Holland, they rapidly became a status symbol among<br />
the wealthy—much as race horses or rare breeds of dogs are today<br />
in our own society—and those with surplus funds found that an<br />
investment in tulips brought them significant social recognition.<br />
The price of tulip bulbs climbed steadily until they became, not<br />
merely symbols of status, but speculative investments as well. At<br />
one point, prices doubled every few days, and speculators were<br />
seen everywhere amassing great fortunes with no input of either<br />
labor or service. Many otherwise prudent people found themselves<br />
infected by the hysteria. They borrowed against their homes and<br />
invested their life savings to get in on the anticipated windfall. This<br />
pushed up prices even further and tended to create the fulfillment<br />
of its own prophecy. Contracts for the future delivery of tulip<br />
bulbs—a form of today's commodity market—became a dominant<br />
feature of Holland's stock market<br />
Tulip bulbs eventually became more precious than gemstones.<br />
As new varieties were developed, the market became more complex,<br />
requiring experts to certify their origin and their grade. Prices<br />
soared, and the herd went insane. One bulb of the species called<br />
Admiral Liefken was valued at 4,400 florins; a Semper Augustus,<br />
Worth 5,500 florins, was purchased for a new carriage, two gray<br />
horses, and a complete set of harnesses. It was recorded that, at one<br />
sale, a single Viceroy brought two lasts of wheat, four lasts of rye,<br />
four fat oxen, eight fat swine, twelve fat sheep, two hogsheads of<br />
wine, four casks of butter, one-thousand pounds of cheese, a bed<br />
and mattress, a suit of clothes, and a silver drinking cup.
492 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
Then, one day without warning, reality returned from her<br />
two-year vacation. By that time, everyone knew deep in their hearts<br />
that the spiralling prices bore no honest relationship to the value of<br />
the tulips and that, sooner or later, someone was going to get hurt.<br />
But they continued to speculate for fear of being too quick in their<br />
timing and losing out on profits yet to come. Everyone was<br />
confident they would sell out precisely at the top of the market. In<br />
any herd, however, there are always a few who will take the lead<br />
and, by 1636, all it took was one or two prominent merchants to sell<br />
out their stock. Overnight, there were no buyers whatsoever, at any<br />
price. The tulip market vanished, and speculators by the thousands<br />
saw their dreams of easy wealth—and, in many cases, their life<br />
savings also—disappear with it. Tulipomania, as it was called at the<br />
time, had come to an end.<br />
Or did it? As we have seen, the Federal Reserve can create large<br />
amounts of money simply by going into the open market and<br />
buying debt contracts. But, once it is in the mainstream of the<br />
economy, commercial banks can multiply that money by up to a<br />
factor of nine, and that is where the real inflationary action is. To<br />
protect that privilege is one of the reasons the banks formed this<br />
cartel in the first place. Nevertheless, the public still<br />
has the final<br />
say. If no one wants to borrow their money, the game is over.<br />
That possibility is more theoretical than real. Although men<br />
may be hesitant to go into debt for legitimate business ventures in<br />
times of economic uncertainty, they can be lured by easy credit to<br />
take a long shot. Dreams of instant wealth are powerful motivaters.<br />
Gaming casinos, poker parlors, race tracks, lottery windows, and<br />
other forms of tulipomania are convincing evidence that the lust for<br />
gambling is embedded in generic code. The public has always been<br />
interested in free corn.<br />
TULIPS IN THE STOCK MARKET<br />
During the final phase of America's credit expansion of the<br />
1920s, the rise in prices on the stock market was entirely speculative.<br />
Buyers did not care if their stocks were overpriced compared<br />
to the dividends they paid. Commonly traded issues were selling<br />
for 20 to 50 times their earnings; some traded at 100. Speculators<br />
acquired stock merely to hold for a while and then sell at a profit. It<br />
1. See Charles Mackay, LL.D., Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of<br />
Crowds (1841 rpt. New York: L.C Page & Company, 1932), pp. 89-97.<br />
THE GREAT DUCK DINNER 493<br />
was the "Greater-Fool" strategy. No matter how high the price is<br />
today, there will be a greater fool tomorrow who will buy at an<br />
even higher price. For a while, that strategy seemed to work.<br />
To make the game even more exciting, it was common for<br />
investors to purchase their stocks on margin. That means the buyer<br />
puts up a small amount of money as a deposit (the margin) and<br />
borrows the rest from his stockbroker—who gets it from the bank,<br />
which gets it from the Fed. In the 1920s, the margin for small<br />
investors was as low as 10%. Although the average stock yielded a<br />
modest 3% annual dividend, speculators were willing to pay over<br />
12% interest on their loans, meaning their stock had to appreciate<br />
about 9% per year just to break even.<br />
These margin accounts are sometimes referred to as "call loans"<br />
because the broker has the right to "call<br />
them in" on very short<br />
notice, often as short as twenty-four hours, If the broker calls the<br />
loan, the investor must produce the money immediately. If he<br />
cannot, the broker will obtain the money by selling the stock. In<br />
theory, the sale of the stock will be sufficient to cover the loan. But,<br />
in practice, about the only time brokers call their loans is when the<br />
market is<br />
tumbling. Under those conditions, the stock cannot be<br />
sold except at a loss: a total loss of the investor's margin; and a<br />
variable loss to the broker, depending on the severity of the price<br />
fall. To obtain even more leverage, investors sometimes use the<br />
stocks they already own as collateral for a margin loan on new<br />
stocks. Therefore, if they cannot cover a margin call on their new<br />
stocks, they will lose their old stocks as well.<br />
In any event, such silly concerns were not in vogue in the 1920s.<br />
From August of 1921 to September of 1929, the Dow-Jones industrial<br />
stock-price average went from 63.9 to 381.17, a rise of 597%.<br />
Credit was abundant, loans were cheap, profits were big.<br />
BANKS BECOME SPECULATORS<br />
The commercial banks were the middlemen in this giddy game.<br />
By the end of the decade, they were functioning more like<br />
speculators than banks. Instead of serving as dependable clearing<br />
houses for money, they also had become players in the market.<br />
Loans to commercial enterprises for the production of goods and<br />
services—which normally are the backbone of sound banking<br />
practice—were losing ground to loans for speculating in the stock<br />
market and in urban real estate. Between 1921 and 1929, while
494 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
THE GREAT DUCK DINNER 495<br />
commercial loans remained constant, total<br />
bank loans increased<br />
from $24,121 million to $35,711 million. Loans on securities and real<br />
estate rose nearly $8 billion. Thus, about 70% of the increase during<br />
this period was in speculative investments. And that money was<br />
created by the banks.<br />
New York banks and trust companies had over $7 billion<br />
loaned to brokers at the New York Stock Exchange for use in<br />
margin accounts. Before the war, there were 250 securities dealers.<br />
By 1929, the number had grown to 6,500.<br />
The banks not only generated the money for speculation, they<br />
became speculators themselves by purchasing large blocks of<br />
high-yield bonds, many of which were of dubious quality. Those<br />
were the kinds of securities that are difficult to liquidate in a<br />
declining market. Borrowing money on short term and investing<br />
on long term, the banks were maneuvering themselves into a<br />
precarious position.<br />
Did the Federal Reserve cause the speculation in the stock<br />
market? Of course not. Speculators did that. The Fed undoubtedly<br />
had other objects in mind, but that did not cancel its responsibility.<br />
It was acutely aware of the psychological effect of easy credit and<br />
had consciously used that knowledge to manipulate public behavior<br />
on numerous occasions. Behavioral psychology is<br />
a necessary<br />
tool of the trade. So it could claim neither ignorance nor innocence.<br />
In the unfolding of this tragedy, it was about as innocent as a spider<br />
whose web "accidentally" caught the fly.<br />
THE FINAL BUBBLE<br />
In the Spring of 1928, the Federal Reserve expressed concern<br />
over speculation in the stock market and raised interest rates<br />
curb the expansion of credit. The growth in the money supply<br />
began to slow down, and so did the rise in stock prices. It is<br />
conceivable that the soaring economy could have been brought in<br />
for a "soft landing"—except that there were other agendas to be<br />
considered. Professor Quigley had said that the central bankers<br />
were not substantive powers unto themselves but were as marionettes<br />
whose strings were pulled by others. Just as the speculation<br />
spree appeared to be coming under control, those strings were<br />
yanked, and the Federal Reserve flip-flopped once again.<br />
The strings originated in London. Even after seven years of<br />
subsidy by the Federal Reserve, the British economy was sagging<br />
to<br />
from the weight of its socialist system, and gold was moving back<br />
into the United States. The Fed, in spite of its own public condemnation<br />
of excessive speculation, reversed itself at the brink of<br />
success and purchased over $300 million of banker's acceptances in<br />
the last half of 1928, which caused an increase in the money supply<br />
of almost $2 billion. Professor Rothbard says:<br />
Europe, as we have noted, had found the benefits from the 1927<br />
inflation dissipated, and European opinion now clamored against any<br />
tighter money in the U.S. The easing in late 1928 prevented gold<br />
inflows into the UjS. from getting very large. Great Britain was again<br />
losing gold, and sterling was weak once more. The United States<br />
bowed once again to its overriding wish to see Europe avoid the<br />
inevitable consequences of its own inflationary policies. 1<br />
Prior to the Fed's reversal of policy, stock prices had actually<br />
declined by five per cent. Now, they went through the roof, rising<br />
twenty per cent from July to December. The boom had returned in<br />
spades.<br />
Then, in February of 1929, a curious event occurred. Montagu<br />
Norman travelled to the United States once again to confer<br />
privately with the officers of the Federal Reserve. He also met with<br />
Andrew Mellon, Secretary of the Treasury. There is no detailed<br />
public record of what transpired at these closed meetings, but we<br />
can be certain of three things: it was important; it concerned the<br />
economies of America and Great Britain; and it was thought best<br />
not to tell the public what was going on. It is not unreasonable to<br />
surmise that the central bankers had come to the conclusion that<br />
the bubble—not only in America, but in Europe—was probably<br />
going to rupture very soon. Rather than fight it, as they had in the<br />
past, it was time to stand back and let it happen, clear out the<br />
speculators, and return the markets to reality. As Galbraith put it:<br />
"How much better, as seen from the Federal Reserve, to let nature<br />
take its course and thus allow nature to take the blame." 2<br />
Mellon was even more emphatic. Herbert Hoover described<br />
Mellon's views as follows:<br />
Mr. Mellon had only one formula: "liquidate labor, liquidate<br />
stocks, liquidate the farmers, liquidate real estate." He insisted that,<br />
when the people get an inflation brainstorm, the only way to get it out<br />
1- Rothbard, Depression, p. 147.<br />
2- Galbraith, p. 181.
496 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
THE GREAT DUCK DINNER 497<br />
of their blood is<br />
to let it collapse. He held that even a panic was not<br />
altogether a bad thing. He said: "It will purge the rottenness out of the<br />
system. High costs of living and high living will come down. People<br />
will work harder, live a moral life. Values will be adjusted, and<br />
enterprising people will pick up the wrecks from less competent<br />
people."<br />
If this had been the mindset between Mellon and Norman and<br />
the Federal Reserve Board, the purpose of their meetings would<br />
have been to make sure that, when the implosion happened, the<br />
central banks could coordinate their policies. Rather than be<br />
overwhelmed by it, they should direct it as best they can and turn it<br />
ultimately to their advantage. Perhaps we shall never know if that<br />
scenario is accurate, but the events that followed strongly support<br />
such a view.<br />
ADVANCE WARNING FOR MEMBERS ONLY<br />
Immediately after the meetings, the monetary scientists began<br />
to issue warnings to their colleagues in the financial fraternity to get<br />
out of the market. On February 6, the Federal Reserve issued an<br />
advisory to its<br />
member banks to liquidate their holdings in the<br />
stock market. The following month, Paul Warburg gave the same<br />
advice in the annual report to the stockholders of his International<br />
Acceptance Bank. He explained the reason for that advice:<br />
If the orgies of unrestrained speculation are permitted to spread,<br />
the ultimate collapse is certain not only to affect the speculators<br />
themselves, but to bring about a general depression involving the<br />
entire country.<br />
Paul Warburg was a partner with Kuhn, Loeb & Co. which<br />
maintained a list of preferred customers. These were fellow bankers,<br />
wealthy industrialists, prominent politicians, and high officials<br />
in foreign governments. A similar list was maintained at J.P.<br />
Morgan Co. It was customary to give these men advance notice on<br />
important stock issues and an opportunity to purchase them at two<br />
to fifteen points below their price to the public. That was one of the<br />
means by which investment bankers maintained influence over the<br />
1. Quoted by Burton Hersh, The Melton Family: A Fortune in History (New York:<br />
William Morrow and Co., 1978), p. 290.<br />
2. This advice was reprinted in the Commercial ai\d Financial Chronicle, March 9,<br />
1929, p. 1444.<br />
affairs of the world. The men on these lists<br />
were notified of the<br />
coming crash.<br />
John D. Rockefeller, J.P. Morgan, Joseph P. Kennedy, Bernard<br />
Baruch, Henry Morganthau, Douglas Dillon—the biographies of all<br />
the Wall Street giants at that time boast that these men were "wise"<br />
enough to get out of the stock market just before the Crash. And it<br />
is true. Virtually all of the inner club was rescued. There is no<br />
record of any member of the interlocking directorate between the<br />
Federal Reserve, the major New York banks, and their prime<br />
customers having been caught by surprise. Wisdom, apparently,<br />
was greatly affected by whose list one was on.<br />
A MESSAGE OF COMFORT TO THE PUBLIC<br />
it<br />
While the crew was abandoning ship, the passengers were told<br />
was a lovely cruise. President Coolidge and Treasury Secretary<br />
Mellon had been vociferous in their public utterances that the<br />
economy was in better shape than ever. From his socialist perch in<br />
London, John Maynard Keynes exclaimed that the management of<br />
the dollar by the Federal Reserve Board was a "triumph" of man<br />
over money. And, from the plush offices of his New York Federal<br />
Reserve Bank, Benjamin Strong boasted:<br />
The very existence of the Federal Reserve System is a safeguard<br />
against anything like a calamity growing out of money rates.... In<br />
former days the psychology was different, because the facts of the<br />
banking situation were different. Mob panic, and consequently mob<br />
disaster, is less likely to arise.<br />
The public was comforted, and the balloon continued to<br />
expand. It was now time to sharpen the pin. On April 19, the Fed<br />
held an emergency meeting under cloak of great secrecy. The<br />
following day, the New York Times reported as follows:<br />
RESERVE COUNCIL CONFERS IN HASTE<br />
Atmosphere of Mystery Is Thrown<br />
about Its Meeting in Washington<br />
An atmosphere of deep mystery was thrown about the<br />
proceedings both by the board and the council. No advance<br />
announcement had been made that an extraordinary session<br />
of the council was contemplated, and the fact that the<br />
members were in the city became known only when<br />
I. Quoted by Greider, p. 298.
.<br />
498 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
newspaper correspondents happened to see some of them<br />
entering the Treasury Department building. Even after that,<br />
evasive replies were given.... While the joint meeting was<br />
in progress at the Treasury Department, every effort was<br />
made to guard the proceedings, and a group of newspaper<br />
correspondents were asked to leave the corridor.<br />
Let us return briefly to Montagu Norman. His biographer tells<br />
us that, after he became head of the Bank of England, his custom<br />
was to journey to the United States several times each year,<br />
although his arrival was seldom noted by the press. He travelled in<br />
disguise, wearing a long, black cloak and a large, broad-brimmed<br />
hat, and he used the pseudonym of Professor Skinner. It was on<br />
one of those unpublicized trips that he ran into a young Australian<br />
by the name of W.C. Wentworth. Sixty years later, Wentworth<br />
wrote a letter to The Australian, a newspaper in Sydney, and told of<br />
his encounter:<br />
In 1929 I<br />
was a member of the Oxford and Cambridge athletic<br />
team, visiting America to run against American Universities. Late in<br />
July we split up to return, and I, together with some other members,<br />
boarded a smallish passenger vessel in New York. (There were, of<br />
course, no aeroplanes in those days.)<br />
A fellow passenger was "Mr. Skinner," and a member of our team<br />
recognLzed him. He was Montagu Norman, returning to London, after<br />
a secret visit to the US Central Bank, travelling incognito.<br />
When we told him we knew who he was, he asked us not to blow<br />
his cover, because if the details of his movement were made public, it<br />
could have serious financial consequences. Naturally, we agreed, and<br />
on the days following, as we crossed the Atlantic, he talked to us very<br />
frankly.<br />
He said, "In the next few months there is going to be a shake-out<br />
But don't worry—it won't last for long."<br />
On August 9, just a few weeks after that ship-board encounter,<br />
the Federal Reserve Board reversed its easy-credit policy and raised<br />
the discount rate to six per cent. A few days later, the Bank of<br />
England raised its rate also. Bank reserves in both countries began<br />
to shrink and, along with them, so did the money supply. Simulta-<br />
1<br />
"Reserve Council Confers in Haste," New York Times, April 20, 1929, p. 89.<br />
2. Hargrave, p. 1.<br />
3. "Letters to the editor," The Australian (GPO Box 4162, Sydney, NSW. 2001),<br />
February 7, 1989.<br />
THE GREAT DUCK DINNER 499<br />
neously, the System began to sell securities in the open market, a<br />
maneuver that also contracts the money supply. Call rates on<br />
margin loans had jumped to fifteen, then twenty per cent. The pin<br />
had been inserted.<br />
THE DUCK DINNER BEGINS<br />
The securities market reached its high point on September 19.<br />
Then, it began to slide. The public was not yet aware that the end<br />
had arrived. The roller coaster had dipped before. Surely it would<br />
shoot upward again. For five more weeks, the public bought<br />
heavily on the way down. More than a million shares were traded<br />
during that period. Then, on Thursday, October 24, like a giant<br />
school of fish suddenly turning direction in response to an unseen<br />
signal, thousands of investors stampeded to sell The ticker tape<br />
was hopelessly overloaded. Prices tumbled. Thirteen million shares<br />
exchanged hands. Everyone said the bottom had dropped out of<br />
the market. They were wrong. Five days later, it did.<br />
On Tuesday, October 29, the exchanges were crushed by an<br />
avalanche of selling. At times there were no buyers at all. By the<br />
end of the trading session, over sixteen million shares had been<br />
dumped, in most cases at any price that was offered. Within a single<br />
day, millions of investors were wiped out. Within a few weeks of<br />
further decline, $3 billion of wealth had disappeared. Within<br />
twelve months, $40 billion had vanished. People who had counted<br />
their paper profits and thought they were rich suddenly found<br />
themselves to be very poor.<br />
The other side of the coin is that, for every seller, there was a<br />
buyer. The insiders who had moved their investments into cash<br />
and gold were the buyers. It must be remembered that falling stock<br />
prices didn't necessarily mean that there was anything wrong with<br />
the stocks. Those representing solid companies were still<br />
paying<br />
dividends and were good investments—at a realistic price. In the<br />
panic, prices had tumbled far below their natural levels. Those who<br />
had the cash picked them up for a small fraction of their true worth.<br />
Giant holding companies were formed for that task, such as Marine<br />
Midland Corporation, the Lehman Corporation, and the Equity<br />
Corporation. J.P. Morgan set up the food trust called Standard<br />
Brands. Like the shark swallowing the mackerel, the big speculators<br />
devoured the small.
500 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
There is no evidence that the Crash was planned for the<br />
purpose of profit taking. In fact, there is much to show that the<br />
monetary scientists tried mightily to avert it, and might have done<br />
so had not their higher-priority agendas gotten in the way. Yet,<br />
once they realized the inevitability of a collapse in the market, they<br />
were not bashful about using their privileged position to take full<br />
advantage of it.<br />
In that sense, FDR's son-in-law, Curtis Dall, was<br />
right when he wrote: 'It was the calculated 'shearing' of the public<br />
by the World Money Powers."<br />
NATURAL LAW NO. 5<br />
Here is another of those "natural laws" of economics that needs<br />
to be added to our list:<br />
LESSON: It is human nature for man to place persona]<br />
priorities ahead of all others. Even the best of men cannot long<br />
resist the temptation to benefit at the expense of their neighbors<br />
if the occasion is placed squarely before them. This is especially<br />
true when the means by which they benefit is obscure and not<br />
likely to be perceived as such. There may be exceptional men<br />
from time to time who can resist that temptation, but their<br />
numbers are small. The general rule will prevail in the long run.<br />
A managed economy presents men with precisely that kind<br />
of opportunity. The power to create and extinguish the nation's<br />
money supply provides unlimited potential for personal gain.<br />
Throughout history the granting of that power has been<br />
justified as being necessary to protect the public, but the results<br />
have always been the opposite. It<br />
has been used against the<br />
public and for the personal gain of those who control. Therefore,<br />
LAW: When men are entrusted with the power to control<br />
the money supply, they will eventually use that power to<br />
confiscate the wealth of their neighbors.<br />
There is no better illustration of that law than the Crash of 1929<br />
and the lingering depression that followed.<br />
1. Curtis B. Dall, FDR: My Exploited Father-In-Laiv (Tulsa, Oklahoma: Christian<br />
Crusade Publications, 1967), p. 49.<br />
THE GREAT DUCK DINNER 501<br />
FROM CRASH TO DEPRESSION<br />
The lingering depression is an important part of the story. The<br />
speculators had been ruined, but what they lost was money<br />
acquired without effort. There were some unfortunate souls who<br />
also lost their life<br />
savings on call<br />
savings, but only because they gambled those<br />
loans. Those who bought stock with money they<br />
actually possessed did not have to sell,<br />
and they did quite well in<br />
the long run. For the most part, something-for-nothing had merely<br />
been converted back into nothing. The price of stocks had plummeted,<br />
but the companies behind them were still producing<br />
products, still employing people, and still paying dividends. No<br />
jDne lost his job just because the market fell. The tulips were gone,<br />
but the wheat crop remained.<br />
So, where was the problem? In truth, there was none—at least<br />
not yet. The crash, as devastating as it was to the speculators, had<br />
little effect on the average American. Unemployment didn't<br />
become rampant until the depression years which came later and<br />
were caused by continued government restraint of the free market.<br />
The drop of prices in the stock market was really a long-overdue<br />
knd healthy adjustment to the economy. The stage was now set for<br />
recovery and sound economic growth, as always had happened in<br />
the past.<br />
It did not happen this time. The monetary and political<br />
scientists who had created the problem now were in full charge of<br />
the rescue. They saw the crash as a golden opportunity to justify<br />
even more controls than before. Herbert Hoover launched a<br />
multitude of government programs to bolster wage rates, prevent<br />
prices from dropping, prop up failing firms, stimulate construction,<br />
guarantee home loans, protect the depositors, rescue the banks,<br />
subsidize the farmers, and provide public works. FDR was swept<br />
into office by promising even more of the same under the slogan of<br />
a New Deal, And the Federal Reserve launched a series of "banking<br />
reforms," all<br />
over the money supply.<br />
of which were measures to further extend its power<br />
In 1931, fresh money was pumped into the economy to restart<br />
the cycle, but this time the rocket would not lift off. The dead<br />
Weight of new bureaucracies and government regulations and<br />
subsidies and taxes and welfare benefits and deficit spending and<br />
tinkering with prices had kept it on the launching pad.
502 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
THE GREAT DUCK DINNER 503<br />
Eventually, the productive foundation of the country also<br />
began to crumble under the weight. Taxes and regulatory agencies<br />
forced companies out of business. Those that remained had to<br />
curtail production. Unemployment began to spread. By every<br />
economic measure, the economy was no better or worse in 1939<br />
than it was in 1930 when the rescue began. It wasn't until the<br />
outbreak of World War II, and the tooling up for war production<br />
that followed, that the depression was finally brought to an end.<br />
It was a dubious save. In almost every way, it was a repeat of<br />
the drama played out with World War I, even to the names of two<br />
of its most important players. FDR and Churchill worked together<br />
behind the scenes to bring America into the conflict—Churchill<br />
wanting American assistance in a war England was losing and<br />
could not afford, FDR wanting a jolt to the economy for political<br />
reasons, and the financiers, gathered behind J.P. Morgan, wanting<br />
the profits of war. But that is another chapter, and this book is long<br />
enough.<br />
What happened after World War II was the focus of the first six<br />
chapters. That brings us to the end of historical record. It's time,<br />
now, to reset the coordinates on our time machine and return to the<br />
present.<br />
SUMMARY<br />
Congress had been assured that the Federal Reserve Act would<br />
decentralize banking power away from Wall Street. However,<br />
within a few years of its inception, the System was controlled by<br />
the New York Reserve Bank under the leadership of Benjamin<br />
Strong whose name was synonymous with the Wall Street money<br />
trust.<br />
During the nine years before the crash of 1929,<br />
the Federal<br />
Reserve was responsible for a massive expansion of the money<br />
supply. A primary motive for that policy was to assist the government<br />
of Great Britain to pay for its socialist programs which, by<br />
then, had drained its treasury. By devaluing the dollar and<br />
depressing interest rates in America, investors would move their<br />
money to England where rates and values were higher. That<br />
strategy succeeded in helping Great Britain for a while, but it set in<br />
motion the forces that made the stock-market crash inevitable.<br />
The money supply expanded throughout this period, but the<br />
trend was interspersed with short spasms of contraction which<br />
were the result of attempts to halt the expansions. Each resolve to<br />
use restraint was broken by the higher political agenda of helping<br />
the governments of Europe. In the long view, the result of plentiful<br />
money and easy credit was a wave of speculation in the stock<br />
market and urban real estate that intensified with each passing<br />
month.<br />
There is circumstantial evidence that the Bank of England and<br />
the Federal Reserve had concluded, at a secret meeting in February<br />
of 1929, that a collapse in the market was inevitable and that the<br />
best action was to let nature take its course. Immediately after that<br />
meeting, the financiers sent advisory warnings to lists of preferred<br />
customers—wealthy industrialists, prominent politicians, and high<br />
officials<br />
in foreign governments—to get out of the stock market.<br />
Meanwhile, the American people were being assured that the<br />
economy was in sound condition.<br />
On August 9, the Federal Reserve applied the pin to the bubble.<br />
It increased the bank-loan rate and began to sell securities in the<br />
open market. Both actions have the effect of reducing the money<br />
supply. Rates on brokers' loans jumped to 20%. On October 29, the<br />
stock market collapsed. Thousands of investors were wiped out in<br />
a single day. The insiders who were forewarned had converted<br />
their stocks into cash while prices were still high. They now became<br />
the buyers. Some of the greatest fortunes in America were made in<br />
that fashion.
Section VI<br />
TIME TRAVEL<br />
INTO THE FUTURE<br />
In the previous sections of this book, we have<br />
travelled through time. We began our journey by<br />
stepping into the past. As we crisscrossed the<br />
centuries, we observed wars, treachery,<br />
profiteering, and political deception. That has<br />
brought us to the present. Now we are prepared<br />
to ride our time machine into the future. It will be<br />
a hair-raising trip, and much of what lies ahead<br />
will be unpleasant. But it has not yet come to pass.<br />
It is merely the projection of present forces. If we<br />
do not like what we see, we still<br />
have an<br />
opportunity to change those forces. The future<br />
will be what we choose to make it.
1<br />
Chapter Twenty-Four<br />
DOOMSDAY<br />
MECHANISMS<br />
The decline of American prosperity; the increase<br />
in the size ofgovernment; the decrease in personal<br />
freedom; the growth of taxes; evidence that this is<br />
according to plan by an elite riding group which<br />
hopes to merge the United States into world<br />
government on the basis of "equality'' with lessdeveloped<br />
nations; the environmentalist<br />
movement shown to be an outgrowth of that plan.<br />
That's enough history for one book. It will soon be time to reset<br />
the coordinates on our time machine and jump into the future.<br />
Before activating that switch, however, let's take one last look<br />
around us. The future is molded by the present. Where we are now<br />
will greatly affect where we are going to be.<br />
MIRED IN DEBT<br />
One of the most obvious characteristics of our present time is<br />
the extent to which Americans and their government have become<br />
mired in debt. Annual federal deficits have grown steadily since<br />
1950, and the rate of growth is now in a vertical climb. It had taken<br />
198 years for the federal government to borrow the first trillion<br />
dollars. Then, in just twelve years—mostly under the Reagan<br />
Administration—it borrowed another three trillion. By the end of<br />
1995, after three years of the Clinton Administration, the debt had<br />
grown to about $5 trillion.<br />
It is difficult to comprehend numbers of that size or to translate<br />
them into their effect upon each of us. $5 trillion represents about<br />
80% of all the goods sold and all the services rendered in America<br />
throughout the entire year. If you had a stack of $100 bills 40 inches<br />
high, you would be a millionaire. $5 trillion would rise 3,350 miles<br />
into space.
508 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
By 1993, net interest payments on that debt were running $214<br />
billion per year- That consumed about 14% of all federal revenue.<br />
It now represents the government's largest single expense; greater<br />
than defense; larger than the combined cost of the departments of<br />
Agriculture, Education, Energy, Housing and Urban Development,<br />
Interior, Justice, Labor, State, Transportation, and Veterans' Affairs.<br />
These charges are not paid by the government; they are paid by<br />
you. You provide the money through taxes and inflation. The cost<br />
currently is<br />
about $4,500 for each family of four. All families pay<br />
through inflation but not all pay taxes. The cost to each taxpaying<br />
family, therefore, is higher. On average, over $5,000 is extracted<br />
from your family each year, not to provide government services or<br />
even to pay off previous debt. Nothing is produced by it, not even<br />
roads or government buildings. No welfare or medical benefits<br />
come out of it. No salaries are paid by it. The nation's standard of<br />
living is not raised by it. It does nothing except pay interest.<br />
Furthermore, the interest is compounded, which means, even if<br />
the government were to completely stop its<br />
deficit spending, the<br />
total debt would continue to grow as a result of interest on that<br />
portion which already exists. In 1995, interest on the national debt<br />
was already consuming 57% of all the revenue collected by income<br />
taxes. At the present rate of expansion, it will consume 100% by the<br />
year 2010. That includes corporate taxes. Interest will consume<br />
100% of our personal income taxes much sooner.<br />
Amazing isn't it? Without interest on the national debt, we<br />
would save enough to reduce corporate taxes and eliminate<br />
personal income taxes altogether. Unfortunately, under present<br />
policies and programs, that is not going to happen, because<br />
Congress does not live within its income. Many expenses are paid,<br />
not from taxes, but from selling government bonds and going<br />
deeper into debt each year. So, even though we could save enough<br />
to eliminate personal income taxes, it would not be enough. The<br />
1. The gross interest was running $300 billion. Some of that money, however, is<br />
paid to federal agencies which hold some of the debt, so it is a case of the government<br />
paying itself. Furthermore, the Federal Reserve returns to the Treasury some<br />
of the interest it receives—the amount left over after the cost of operating the<br />
system.<br />
2, See Harry Figgie, Jr., Bankruptcy 1995: The Coming Collapse ofAmerica and How to<br />
Stop It (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1992), pp. 24, 68. Also "Historical<br />
Tables," Budget oftte United States; Fiscal Year 1996, pp. 22, 103.<br />
DOOMSDAY MECHANISMS 509<br />
government would still go into the red to keep up its present life<br />
style. However, if a reduction in the size and scope of the<br />
bureaucracy were accomplished at the same time, then personal<br />
and corporate income taxes could be entirely eliminated, and the<br />
government would have an annual surplus.<br />
THE DOOMSDAY MECHANISM<br />
Unfortunately, the locomotive is running in the opposite direction.<br />
The size of government is growing larger, not smaller. There<br />
are more people working for government than for all manufacturing<br />
companies in the private sector. There are more bank regulators<br />
than bankers, more farm-bureau workers than farmers, more<br />
welfare administrators than recipients. There are more citizens<br />
receiving government checks than there are paying income taxes.<br />
By 1996, welfare benefits in 29 states were higher than the<br />
average secretary's wage; and in 6 states, they were more than the<br />
entry-level wage for computer programmers. When it is possible<br />
for people to vote on issues involving the transfer of wealth to<br />
themselves from others, the ballot box becomes a weapon with<br />
which the majority plunders the minority. That is the point of no<br />
return, the point where the doomsday mechanism begins to<br />
accelerates until the system self-destructs. The plundered grow<br />
weary of carrying the load and eventually join the plunderers. The<br />
productive base of the economy diminishes further and further<br />
until only the state remains.<br />
The doomsday mechanism is also operating within government<br />
itself. By 1992, more than half of all federal outlays went for what<br />
are called entitlements. Those are expenses—such as Medicare,<br />
Social Security, and government retirement programs—which are<br />
based on promises of future payments. Many of them are contractual<br />
obligations, and millions of people depend on them.<br />
That does not mean they cannot be eliminated. For example,<br />
entitlements include $24 billion per year for food stamps. There is<br />
no contractual obligation to continue those, only political expediency.<br />
By now, most Americans have stood in grocery lines and<br />
J- The federal government derives substantial revenue from sources other than<br />
income taxes, such as excise taxes and import taxes. These, plus occasional assessments<br />
to the states, were the only taxes which the founding fathers intended for the<br />
federal government. The arrangement worked well for 135 years until the incometax<br />
was adopted in 1913.
510 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
watched the well-dressed customer in front of them use food<br />
stamps for ice cream, pretzels, candy, and wine and then drive<br />
away in a late-model car. The political function of the food stamp<br />
program is not to help the hungry but to buy votes.<br />
The programs that do involve contractual obligations—such as<br />
Social Security and Medicare—could be turned over to private<br />
firms which would not only operate them more efficiently but also<br />
would pay out higher benefits. Congress, however, does not dare<br />
to touch any of these entitlements for fear of losing votes.<br />
Normally, with contracts for future obligations of this kind, the<br />
issuer is required by law to accumulate money into a fund to make<br />
sure that there will be enough available when future payments<br />
become due. The federal government does not abide by those laws.<br />
The funds exist on paper only. The money that comes in for future<br />
obligations is immediately spent and replaced by a government<br />
IOU. So, as those future payments come due, all of the money must<br />
come from revenue being collected at that time.<br />
Herein lies the doomsday mechanism. These obligations will be<br />
paid out of future taxes or inflation. Entitlements currently represent<br />
52% of all federal outlays, and they are growing at the rate of<br />
12% each year. When this is added to the 14% that is now being<br />
spent for interest payments on the national debt, we come to the<br />
startling conclusion that two-thirds of all federal expenses are now<br />
entirely automatic, and that percentage is growing each month.<br />
Even if Congress were to stop all of the spending programs in<br />
the normal budget—dismantle the armed forces, close down all of<br />
its agencies and bureaus, stop all of its subsidies, and board up all<br />
of its buildings, including the White House—it would be able to<br />
reduce its present spending by only one-third. And even that small<br />
amount is shrinking by 10 to 12% per year. That is a best-case<br />
scenario. The real-case is that Congress is accelerating its discretionary<br />
spending, not canceling it. One does not have to be a<br />
statistical analyst to figure out where this trend is headed.<br />
The biggest doomsday mechanism of all, however, is the<br />
Federal Reserve System. It will be recalled that every cent of our<br />
money supply—including coins, currency, and checkbook<br />
money—came into being for the purpose of being loaned to<br />
someone. These dollars will disappear when those loans are paid<br />
back. They exist only so long as the debt behind them exists.<br />
Underneath the pyramid of money, supporting the entire structure,<br />
DOOMSDAY MECHANISMS 511<br />
are the so-called reserves which represent the Fed's monetization of<br />
debt. If we tried to pay off the national debt, those reserves would<br />
also start to disappear, and our money supply would be undermined.<br />
The Federal Reserve would have to scramble into the<br />
money markets of the world and replace U.S. securities with bonds<br />
from corporations and other countries. Technically, that can be<br />
done, but the transition could be devastating. Under the Federal<br />
Reserve System, therefore, Congress would be fearful to eliminate<br />
the national debt even if it wanted to.<br />
These are the doomsday mechanisms already in operation. If<br />
we do not understand how they function, we will not be prepared<br />
for our trip into the future. The scenes that will unfold there will<br />
appear too bizarre,<br />
the events too shocking. We would be convinced<br />
that something surely had gone wrong with our time<br />
machine.<br />
WHO OWNS THE NATIONAL DEBT?<br />
It has been said that we need not worry about interest on the<br />
national debt because "We owe it to ourselves." Let's take a look at<br />
who owes what to whom.<br />
It may come as a surprise to learn that the Federal Reserve<br />
holds but a small portion of the national debt, only about 8%.<br />
Foreign investors own approximately 27%, and agencies of<br />
federal government have 28% (the lOUs that replaced money taken<br />
from the funds such as the Social Security Fund). Private-sector<br />
investors in the U.S. hold the largest share of about 37%. It is partly<br />
true, therefore, that "We owe it to ourselves" or at least that all of us<br />
owe it to some of us. The some of us who receive the interest are<br />
private investors seeking income that is exempt from state income<br />
taxes, and large institutions such as banks, corporations, insurance<br />
companies, and investment funds. With institutions,<br />
the<br />
the money<br />
represents pooled assets belonging to thousands of small investors.<br />
So, a major portion of the interest on the national debt does, indeed,<br />
accrue to the benefit of a large sector of the American people.<br />
That's the good news. The bad news is that the government<br />
obtains every cent of the money it pays to us by confiscating it from<br />
us in the first place. If it is true that we owe it to ourselves, then it is<br />
also true that we pay it to ourselves. The money goes out of one<br />
pocket back into the other—minus a handling fee. The government
512 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
takes $1000 from us in taxes and inflation and gives us back $350.<br />
The so-called "benefit" to the public is but a giant scam.<br />
And more bad news: When people purchase government<br />
bonds, there is less money available for investment in private<br />
industry. It is well known that government credit "crowds out"<br />
private credit. The result is that the productive side of the nation is<br />
handicapped by unfair competition for investment capital. To<br />
obtain new money for growth, private companies must pay higher<br />
interest rates. These are passed on to the consumer in the form of<br />
higher prices. Many companies are forced to curtail their plans for<br />
expansion, and potentially new jobs are never created. Some<br />
companies are forced out of business altogether, and their employees<br />
are put out of work. The economy is always retarded by<br />
government debt. The larger the debt, the greater the damage.<br />
The 27% portion of the national debt held by foreign investors<br />
may not seem like a large percentage, but it represents a huge<br />
amount of money nevertheless. A trillion dollars cannot be ignored.<br />
These bonds could become a great problem down the line as they<br />
mature. So far, they have been a partial blessing because they were<br />
purchased with money that already existed. Therefore, they were<br />
not inflationary. But it is not difficult to imagine future conditions<br />
under which the bond holders would decide not to renew. In order<br />
to pay off those bonds on maturity, the Treasury would have to<br />
issue new ones. The Federal Reserve then would have to purchase<br />
the new bonds with fiat<br />
money. Therefore, foreign-held federal<br />
debt is a ticking time bomb. If it should ever have to be picked up<br />
by the Fed, the inflationary impact on our country would be<br />
staggering.<br />
WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES IT MAKE?<br />
There is a tendency to read about these trends with a kind of<br />
detached fascination; Isn't that interesting* But where is the relevance?<br />
Why get excited over such technicalities and abstractions?<br />
So what if the government is mired in debt? Who cares if the<br />
interest will never be paid? What of it if we have a world currency<br />
or a world government? What difference will any of it make to me?<br />
The first step toward answering those questions is to see what<br />
difference it<br />
already has made. Our upcoming trip into the future<br />
will merely extend those lines.<br />
J<br />
DOOMSDAY MECHANISMS 513<br />
As illustrated in previous sections of this book, there has been a<br />
long-term policy at the highest levels of government to shift<br />
economic resources away from the United States. That policy has<br />
been successful. Based on doomsday predictions of environmental<br />
disaster, government has saddled private companies with such<br />
burdensome expenses for eliminating waste products that heavy<br />
industry, once the mainstay of American prosperity, has fled our<br />
shores. Because of concern over the natural habitat of the spotted<br />
owl and the desert kangaroo rat, millions of acres of timber and<br />
agricultural land have been taken out of production. High taxes,<br />
rules beyond reason for safety devices in the work place, so-called<br />
fair-employment practices, and mandatory health insurance are<br />
rapidly destroying what is left of America's private industry. The<br />
result is unemployment and dislocation for millions of American<br />
workers.<br />
Federal taxes, including social-security, now take more than<br />
40% of our private incomes. State, county, and local taxes are on top<br />
of that. Inflation feeds on what is left. We spend half of each year<br />
working for the government.<br />
A study by the AFL-CIO in 1977 revealed that, in spite of wage<br />
increases in terms of dollars, the real wages of the average<br />
American—in terms of what he can buy with those dollars—were<br />
going down. That trend was confirmed in 1980 by the U.S. Census<br />
Bureau. In 1992, the Consumers' Union analyzed how many hours<br />
one had to work to buy common items compared to thirty years<br />
previously. Some low-priced items—such as long-distance phone<br />
calls, gasoline, food products, and wrist-watches—were cheaper in<br />
1992 in terms of hours worked to acquire them. But the higherpriced<br />
items—such as housing, college educations, and health<br />
care—were far more costly than ever. The report concludes:<br />
The average U.S. household has maintained its<br />
living standard<br />
largely because families are working more hours. Millions of women<br />
entered the work force in the past 25 years. In 1970, about 21 million<br />
women worked full time. Now that figure is over 36 million. That has<br />
helped to keep family buying power fairly stable. But for many<br />
families, it now represents the labor of two earners rather than one.<br />
The message here is that real wages in America have declined.<br />
Young couples with a single income now have a lower standard of<br />
r l- "Has Our Living Standard Stalled?" Consumer Reports, June, 1992, p. 392,
514 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
living than their parents did. In spite of two incomes, the real net<br />
worth of the average household is falling. The amount of leisure<br />
time is shrinking. The percentage of Americans who own their<br />
homes is dropping. Tne age at which a family acquires a first home<br />
is rising. The number of families counted among the middle class is<br />
falling. The size of the family savings is smaller. The number of<br />
people living below the officially defined poverty level is rising.<br />
The rate of personal bankruptcy is triple of what it was in the 1960s.<br />
Over 90% of all Americans are broke at age 65.<br />
THE NEW WORLD ORDER<br />
None of this is happening by accident. Chapters five and six<br />
documented the currently unfolding plan to create a functional<br />
world government within the framework of the United Nations,<br />
Often referred to as Tlie New World Order by its advocates, the<br />
proposed global government is designed upon the principles of<br />
socialism. It is the dream-come-true for the world's socialist<br />
theoreticians, politicians, and technicians who see it as the ultimate<br />
laboratory for their social experiments upon mankind.<br />
There are two weapons of control now being readied at the UN.<br />
One is a world military command which eventually will control all<br />
national armies and super weapons. That is being accomplished<br />
under the slogans of peace and disarmament. The other is a world<br />
central bank, now called the IMF /World Bank, with the ability to<br />
issue a common money which all nations must accept. That is being<br />
accomplished under the slogans of international trade and economic<br />
growth.<br />
Of the two weapons, monetary control is the most important.<br />
The use of military force is viewed as a crude weapon in the arsenal<br />
of world government to be used only as a last resort. The effect of<br />
monetary control is more powerful than mega-tons of atomic<br />
energy. It reaches into every shop and home, a feat that could never<br />
be accomplished by standing armies. It can be used with precision<br />
against one nation, one group, or even one person while sparing or<br />
benefiting all others. Military force may be irresistible but it causes<br />
resentment and political unrest that can smolder for decades. Since<br />
monetary manipulation is seldom understood by its victims, it does<br />
not incur their wrath. In fact,<br />
the manipulators enjoy high social<br />
status and financial reward. For these reasons, monetary control is<br />
the weapon of choice in The New World Order.<br />
DOOMSDAY MECHANISMS 515<br />
A future world parliament based upon the concept of minimum<br />
coercion and maximum freedom could be a wonderful advent for<br />
mankind. Without trying to cram all nations into a centrallydirected<br />
beehive, it would welcome cultural and religious variety.<br />
Instead of trying to place the world into a collectivist straight-jacket<br />
of rules, regulations, quotas, and subsidies, it would encourage<br />
diversity and freedom-to-choose.<br />
Instead of levying ever-larger<br />
taxes on every conceivable economic activity and destroying<br />
human incentive in the process, it would encourage member<br />
nations to reduce the taxes that already exist and thereby stimulate<br />
production and creativity.<br />
A world parliament, dedicated to the concept of freedom,<br />
would have to withhold membership from any government that<br />
violated the basic rights of its citizens. It could be the means by<br />
which totalitarian governments would be encouraged to abandon<br />
their oppressive policies in order to obtain the economic and<br />
political advantages of acceptance in the world body. It could<br />
become the greatest force for peace and prosperity and freedom we<br />
have ever known.<br />
But The New World Order that is now incubating at the United<br />
Nations is an entirely different creature. Its members represent just<br />
about every dictator and warlord in the world. Its philosophy is<br />
built upon the socialist doctrine that all good flows from the state.<br />
Those who do not conform must be bent to the government's will<br />
or be eliminated. It<br />
reason that it is totalitarianism.<br />
cannot oppose totalitarianism for the simple<br />
AMERICA IS THE TARGET<br />
The New World Order cannot become a functional reality so<br />
long as the United States remains able to go it alone. America is<br />
viewed as a potential bull in the china shop. Right now, it is safely<br />
under control, but the world planners are worried it might break<br />
loose in the future. If the American people were to awaken to the<br />
realities of world politics and regain control over their government,<br />
they still would have the military and economic power to break<br />
away. Among the world planners, therefore, it has become the<br />
prime directive to weaken the United States both militarily and<br />
economically. And this directive has come from American leaders,<br />
not those of other countries. CFR members sitting in the White<br />
House, the State Department, the Defense Department, and the
516 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
Treasury are now working to finalize that part of the plan. It ls yet<br />
one more doomsday mechanism that, once it gains sufficient<br />
momentum, will pass the critical point of no return.<br />
The Korean War was the first time American soldiers fought<br />
under UN authority. That trend has accelerated and already<br />
includes military actions in Iraq, Yugoslavia, Bosnia, Somalia, and<br />
Haiti. By the time this book gets to print, there undoubtedly will be<br />
more. While the American military is being absorbed into the UN,<br />
steps are also underway to hand over American atomic weapons.<br />
When that happens, the doomsday mechanism will become activated.<br />
It will be too late to escape.<br />
Likewise, the IMF/World Bank is already functioning—in<br />
conjunction with the Federal Reserve System—as a world central<br />
bank. The American economy is being deliberately exhausted<br />
through foreign giveaways and domestic boondoggles. The object<br />
is, not to help those in need or to preserve the environment, but to<br />
bring the system dawn. When once-proud and independent Americans<br />
are standing in soup lines, they will be ready to accept the<br />
carefully arranged "rescue" by the world bank. A world currency is<br />
already designed, awaiting only an appropriate crisis to justify its<br />
introduction. From that, too, there will be no escape.<br />
THE REPORT FROM IRON MOUNTAIN<br />
The substance of these stratagems can be traced to a think-tank<br />
study released in 1966 called the Report from Iron Mountain.<br />
Although the origin of the report is highly debated, the document<br />
itself hints that it was commissioned by the Department of Defense<br />
under Defense Secretary, Robert McNamara and was produced by<br />
the Hudson Institute located at the base of Iron Mountain in<br />
Croton-on-Hudson, New York. The Hudson Institute was founded<br />
and directed by Herman Kahn, formerly of the Rand Corporation.<br />
Both McNamara and Kahn were members of the CFR.<br />
The self-proclaimed purpose of the study was to explore<br />
various ways to "stabilize society." Praiseworthy as that may<br />
sound, a reading of the Report soon reveals that the word society is<br />
used synonymously with the word government. Furthermore, the<br />
word stabilize is used as meaning to preserve and to perpetuate, It is<br />
clear from the start that the nature of the study was to analyze the.<br />
different ways a government can perpetuate itself in power, ways<br />
to control its citizens and prevent them from rebelling.<br />
DOOMSDAY MECHANISMS 517<br />
It was stated at the beginning of the report that morality was<br />
not an issue. The study did not address questions of right or wrong;<br />
nor did it deal with such concepts as freedom or human rights.<br />
Ideology was not an issue, nor patriotism, nor religious precepts.<br />
Its sole concern was how to perpetuate the existing government.<br />
The report said:<br />
Previous studies have taken the desirability of peace, the<br />
importance of human life, the superiority of democratic institutions,<br />
the greatest "good" for the greatest number, the "dignity" of the<br />
individual, the desirability of maximum health and longevity, and<br />
other such wishful premises as axiomatic values necessary for the<br />
justification of a study of peace issues. We have not found them so. We<br />
have attempted to apply the standards of physical science to our<br />
thinking, the principal characteristic of which is not quantification, as<br />
is popularly believed, but that, in Whitehead's words, "... it ignores all<br />
judgments of value; for instance, all esthetic and moral judgments."<br />
The major conclusion of the report was that, in the past, war has<br />
been the only reliable means to achieve that goal. It contends that<br />
only during times of war or the threat of war are the masses<br />
compliant enough to carry the yoke of government without complaint.<br />
Fear of conquest and pillage by an enemy can make almost<br />
any burden seem acceptable by comparison. War can be used to<br />
arouse human passion and patriotic feelings of loyalty to the<br />
nation's leaders. No amount of sacrifice in the name of victory will<br />
be rejected. Resistance is viewed as treason. But, in times of peace,<br />
people become resentful of high taxes, shortages, and bureaucratic<br />
intervention. When they become disrespectful of their leaders, they<br />
become dangerous. No government has long survived without<br />
enemies and armed conflict. War, therefore, has been an indispensable<br />
condition for "stabilizing society." These are the report's exact<br />
words:<br />
The war system not only has been essential to the existence of<br />
nations as independent political entities, but has been equally<br />
indispensable to their stable political structure. Without it, no<br />
government has ever been able to obtain acquiescence in its<br />
"legitimacy," or right to rule its society. The possibility of war<br />
provides the sense of external necessity without which no government<br />
can long remain in power. The historical record reveals one instance<br />
1 Leonard Lew in, ed ., Reportfrom Iron Mountain on the Possibility and Desirability of<br />
Peace (New York: Dell Publishing, 1967), pp. 13-14.
.<br />
518 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
DOOMSDAY MECHANISMS 519<br />
after another where the failure of a regime to maintain the credibility<br />
of a war threat led to its dissolution, by the forces of private interest, of<br />
reactions to social injustice, or of other disintegrative elements. The<br />
organization of society for the possibility of war is its principal<br />
political stabilizer.... It has enabled societies to maintain necessary<br />
class distinctions, and it has insured the subordination of the citizens<br />
to the state by virtue of the residual war powers inherent in the<br />
concept of nationhood.<br />
A NEW DEFINITION OF PEACE<br />
The report then explains that we are approaching a point in<br />
history where the old formulas may no longer work. Why? Because<br />
it may now be possible to create a world government in which all<br />
nations will be disarmed and disciplined by a world army, a<br />
condition which will be called peace. The report says: "The word<br />
peace, as we have used it in the following pages,... implies total and<br />
general disarmament/ 7<br />
Under that scenario, independent nations<br />
will no longer exist and governments will not have the capability to<br />
wage war. There could be military action by the world army<br />
against renegade political subdivisions, but these would be called<br />
peace-keeping operations, and soldiers would be called peace<br />
keepers. No matter how much property is destroyed or how much<br />
blood is spilled, the bullets will be "peaceful" bullets and the<br />
bombs—even atomic bombs, if necessary—will be "peaceful"<br />
bombs.<br />
The report then raises the question of whether there can ever be<br />
a suitable substitute for war? What else could the regional governments<br />
use—and what could the world government itself use—to<br />
legitimize and perpetuate itself? To provide an answer to that<br />
question was the stated purpose of the study.<br />
The Report from Iron Mountain concludes that there can be no<br />
substitute for war unless it possesses three properties. It must (1) be<br />
economically wasteful, (2) represent a credible threat of great<br />
magnitude, and (3) provide a logical excuse for compulsory service<br />
to the government.<br />
A SOPHISTICATED FORM OF SLAVERY<br />
On the subject of compulsory service, the report explains that<br />
one of the advantages of standing armies is that they provide a<br />
1. Ibid., pp. 39, 81.<br />
2. Ibid., p. 9.<br />
place for the government to put antisocial and dissident elements<br />
of society. In the absence of war, these forced-labor battalions<br />
would be told they are fighting poverty or cleaning up the planet or<br />
bolstering the economy or serving the common good in some other<br />
fashion. Every teenager would be required to serve^especially<br />
during those years in which young people are most rebellious<br />
against authority. Older people, too, would be drafted as a means<br />
of working off tax payments and fines. Dissidents would face<br />
heavy fines for "hate crimes" and politically incorrect attitudes so<br />
eventually, they would all be in the forced-labor battalions. The<br />
report says:<br />
We will examine ...<br />
the time-honored use of military institutions<br />
to provide anti-social elements with an acceptable role in the social<br />
structure.. . The current<br />
. euphemistic cliches—"juvenile delinquency"<br />
and "alienation"—have had their counterparts in every age. In earlier<br />
days these conditions were dealt with directly by the military without<br />
the complications of due process,<br />
usually through press eanes or<br />
outright enslavement.<br />
.<br />
Most proposals that address themselves, explicitly or otherwise to<br />
the postwar problem of controlling the socially alienated turn to some<br />
variant of the Peace Corps or the soiled Job Corps for a solution.<br />
The socially disaffected, the economically unprepared, the<br />
psychologically uncomfortable, the hard-core "delinquents/' the<br />
incorrigible "subversives," and the rest of the unemployable are seen<br />
as somehow transformed by the disciplines of a service modeled on<br />
military precedent into more or less dedicated social service<br />
workers....<br />
Another possible surrogate for the control of potential enemies of<br />
society is<br />
the rein traduction, in some form consistent with modern<br />
technology and political processes, of slavery.. . . It is entirely possible<br />
that the development of a sophisticated form of slavery may be an<br />
absolute prerequisite for social control in a world at peace. As a<br />
practical matter, conversion of the code of military discipline to a<br />
euphemized form of enslavement would entail surprisingly little<br />
revision; the logical first step would be the adoption of some form of<br />
"universal" military service.<br />
BLOOD GAMES<br />
The report considered ways in which the public could be<br />
preoccupied with non-important activities so that it would not<br />
fcave time to participate in political debate or resistance. Recreation,<br />
l- M* v pp. 41^12, 68, 70.
j<br />
520 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
DOOMSDAY MECHANISMS 521<br />
trivial game shows, pornography, and situation comedies could<br />
play an important role, but blood games were considered to be the<br />
most promising of all the options. Blood games are competitive<br />
events between individuals or teams that are sufficiently violent in<br />
nature to enable the spectators to vicariously work off their<br />
frustrations. As a minimum, these events must evoke a passionate<br />
team loyalty on the part of the fans and must include the expectation<br />
of pain and injury on the part of the players. Even better for<br />
their purpose is<br />
the spilling of blood and the possibility of death.<br />
The common man has a morbid fascination for violence and blood.<br />
Crowds gather to chant "Jump! Jump!" at the suicidal figure on the<br />
hotel roof. Cars slow to a near stop on the highway to gawk at<br />
broken bodies next to a collision. A schoolyard fight instantly<br />
draws a circle of spectators. Boxing matches and football games<br />
and hockey games and automobile races are telecast daily, attracting<br />
millions of cheering fans who give rapt attention to each<br />
moment of danger, each angry blow to the face, each broken bone,<br />
each knockout, each carrying away of the unconscious or possibly<br />
dying contestant. In this fashion, their anger at "society" is defused<br />
and focused, instead, on the opposing team. The emperors of Rome<br />
devised the Circuses and gladiator contests and public executions<br />
by wild beasts for precisely that purpose.<br />
Before jumping to the conclusion that such concepts are absurd<br />
in modern times, recall that during the 1985 European soccer<br />
championship in Belgium, the spectators became so emotionally<br />
involved in the contest that a bloody riot broke out in the bleachers<br />
leaving behind 38 dead and more that 400 injured. U.S. Neius &<br />
World Report gives this account:<br />
The root of the trouble: A tribal loyalty to home teams that<br />
surpasses an obsession and, say some experts, has become a substitute<br />
religion for many. The worst offenders include members of gangs such<br />
as Chelsea's Anti-Personnel Firm, made up of ill-educated young<br />
males who find in soccer rivalry an escape from boredom.<br />
Still, the British do not have a patent on soccer violence. On May<br />
26, eight people were killed and more than 50 injured in Mexico City, -<br />
a 1964 stadium riot in Lima, Peru, killed more than 300—and a hotly<br />
disputed 1969 match between El Salvador and Honduras led to a<br />
week-long shooting war between the two countries, causing hundreds<br />
of casualties.<br />
The U.S. is criticized for the gridiron violence of its favorite sport<br />
football, but outbursts in the bleachers are rare because loyalties are<br />
spread among many sports and national pride is not at stake. Said<br />
Thomas Tutko, professor of psychology at California's San Jose State<br />
University: "In these other countries, it used to be their armies. Now<br />
it's their competitive teams that stir passions." 1<br />
Having considered all<br />
the ramifications of blood games, the<br />
Report from Iron Mountain concluded that they were not an adequate<br />
substitute for war. It is true that violent sports are useful<br />
distracters and do, in fact, allow an outlet for boredom and fierce<br />
group loyalty, but their effect on the nation's psyche could not<br />
match the intensity of war hysteria. Until a better alternative could<br />
be found, world government would have to be postponed so that<br />
nations could continue to wage war.<br />
FINDING A CREDIBLE GLOBAL THREAT<br />
In time of war, most citizens uncomplainingly accept their low<br />
quality of life and remain fiercely loyal to their leaders. If a suitable<br />
substitute for war is to be found, then it must also elicit that same<br />
reaction. Therefore, a new enemy must be found that threatens the<br />
entire world, and the prospects of being overcome by that enemy<br />
must be just as terrifying as war itself. The report is emphatic on<br />
that point:<br />
Allegiance requires a cause; a cause requires an enemy. This much<br />
is obvious; the critical point is that the enemy that defines the cause<br />
must seem genuinely formidable. Roughly speaking, the presumed<br />
power of the "enemy" sufficient to warrant an individual sense of<br />
allegiance to a society must be proportionate to the size and<br />
complexity of the society. Today, of course, that power must be one of<br />
unprecedented magnitude and Mghtfulness. 2<br />
The first consideration in finding a suitable threat to serve as a<br />
global enemy was that it did not have to be real. A real one would<br />
be better, of course, but an invented one would work just as well,<br />
provided the masses could be convinced it was real. The public will<br />
more readily believe some fictions than others. Credibility would<br />
be more important than truth.<br />
Poverty was examined as a potential global enemy but rejected<br />
as not fearful enough. Most of the world was already in poverty.<br />
Only those who had never experienced poverty would see it as a<br />
global threat. For the rest, it was simply a fact of everyday life.<br />
1- "British Soccer's Day of Shame/' U.S. News & World Report.june 10, 1985, p. 11.<br />
U. Lewin, Report, p. 44.
i<br />
only<br />
.<br />
522 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
An invasion by aliens from outer space was given serious<br />
consideration. The report said that experiments along those lines<br />
already may have been tried. Public reaction, however, was not<br />
sufficiently predictable, because the threat was not "credible." Here<br />
is what the report had to say:<br />
Credibility, in fact, lies at the heart of the problem of developing a<br />
political substitute for war. This is where the space-race proposals, in<br />
many ways so well suited as economic substitutes for war, fall short<br />
The most ambitious and unrealistic space project cannot of itself<br />
generate a believable external menace. It has been hotly argued that<br />
such a menace would offer the "last best hope of peace," etc., by<br />
uniting mankind against the danger of destruction by "creatures"<br />
from other planets or from outer space. Experiments have been<br />
proposed to test the credibility of an out-of-our-world invasion threat;<br />
it is possible that a few of the more difficult-to-explain "flying saucer"<br />
incidents of recent years were in fact early experiments of this kind. If<br />
so, they could hardly have been judged encouraging.<br />
This report was released<br />
in 1966 when the idea of an alien<br />
presence seemed far fetched to the average person. In the ensuing<br />
years, however, that perception has changed. A growing segment<br />
of the population now believes that intelligent life forms may exist<br />
beyond our planet and could be monitoring our own civilization.<br />
Whether that belief is right or wrong is not the issue here. The point<br />
is that a dramatic encounter with aliens shown on network<br />
television—even if it were to be entirely fabricated by high-tech<br />
computer graphics or laser shows in the sky—could be used to<br />
stampede all nations into world government supposedly to defend<br />
the Earth from invasion. On the other hand, if the aliens were<br />
perceived to have peaceful intent, an alternative scenario would be<br />
to form world government to represent a unified human species<br />
speaking with a single voice in some kind of galactic federation-<br />
Either scenario would be far more credible today than in 1966.<br />
THE ENVIRONMENTAL-POLLUTION MODEL<br />
The final candidate for a useful global threat was pollution of<br />
the environment. This was viewed as the most likely to succeed<br />
because it could be related to observable conditions such as smog<br />
and water pollution—in other words, it would be based partly on<br />
fact and, therefore, be credible. Predictions could be made showing<br />
DOOMSDAY MECHANISMS 523<br />
end-of-earth scenarios just as horrible as atomic warfare. Accuracy<br />
in these predictions would not be important. Their purpose would<br />
be to frighten, not to inform. It might even be necessary to<br />
deliberately poison the environment to make the predictions more<br />
convincing and to focus the public mind on fighting a new enemy,<br />
more fearful than any invader from another nation—or even from<br />
outer space. The masses would more willingly accept a falling<br />
standard of living, tax increases, and bureaucratic intervention in<br />
their lives as simply "the price we must pay to save Mother Earth."<br />
If a vision of death and destruction from pollution could be<br />
implanted into the public subconscious mind, then the global battle<br />
against it could, indeed, replace war as the mechanism for control.<br />
Did the Report from Iron Mountain really say that? It certainly<br />
did—and much more. Here are just a few of the pertinent passages:<br />
When it comes to postulating a credible substitute for war ... the<br />
"alternate enemy" must imply a more immediate, tangible, and<br />
directly felt threat of destruction. It must justify the need for taking<br />
and paying a "blood price" in wide areas of human concern. In this<br />
respect, the possible substitute enemies noted earlier would be<br />
insufficient. One exception might be the environmental-pollution<br />
model, if the danger to society it posed was genuinely imminent. The<br />
fictive models would have to carry the weight of extraordinary<br />
conviction, underscored with a not inconsiderable actual sacrifice of<br />
life.... It may be, for instance, that gross pollution of the environment<br />
can eventually replace the possibility of mass destruction by nuclear<br />
weapons as the principal apparent threat to the survival of the species.<br />
Poisoning of the air, and of the principal sources of food and water<br />
supply, is already well advanced, and at first glance would seem<br />
promising in this respect; it constitutes a threat that can be dealt with<br />
through social organization and political power. . .<br />
It is true that the rate of pollution could be increased selectively for<br />
this purpose.... But the pollution problem has been so widely<br />
publicized in recent years that it seems highly improbable that a<br />
program of deliberate environmental poisoning could be<br />
implemented in a politically acceptable manner.<br />
However unlikely some of the possible alternative enemies we<br />
have mentioned may seem, we must emphasize that one must be<br />
found of credible quality and magnitude, if a transition to peace is ever<br />
to come about without social disintegration. It is more probable, in our<br />
judgment, that such a threat will have to be invented.<br />
1. Ibid., p. 66.<br />
I. Ibid., pp. 66-67, 70-71.
i<br />
524 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
—<br />
DOOMSDAY MECHANISMS 525<br />
AUTHENTICITY OF THE REPORT<br />
Tlie Report from Iron Mountain states that it was produced by a<br />
Special Study Group of fifteen men whose identities were to remain<br />
secret and that it was not intended to be made public. One member<br />
of the group, however, felt the report was too important to be kept<br />
under wraps. He was not in disagreement with its conclusions. He<br />
merely believed that more people should read it. He delivered his<br />
personal copy to Leonard Lewin, a well-known author and columnist<br />
who, in turn, negotiated its publication by Dial Press. It was<br />
then reprinted by Dell Publishing.<br />
This was during the lohnson Administration, and the President's<br />
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs was CFR<br />
member Walt Rostow. Rostow was quick to announce that the<br />
report was a spurious work. Herman Kahn, CFR director of the<br />
Hudson Institute, said it was not authentic. The Washington Post—<br />
which is owned and run by CFR member Katharine Graham<br />
called it "a delightful satire." Time magazine, founded by<br />
CFR-member Henry Luce, said it was a skillful hoax. Then, on<br />
November 26, 1967, the report was reviewed in the book section of<br />
the Washington Post by Herschel McLandress, which was the pen<br />
name for Harvard professor John Kenneth Galbraith. Galbraith,<br />
who also had been a member of the CFR, said that he knew<br />
firsthand of the report's authenticity because he had been invited to<br />
participate in it.<br />
Although he was unable to be part of the official<br />
group, he was consulted from time to time and had been asked to<br />
keep the project a secret. Furthermore, while he doubted the<br />
wisdom of letting the public know about the report, he agreed<br />
totally with its conclusions. He wrote:<br />
As I would put my personal repute behind the authenticity of this<br />
document, so would I testify to the validity of its conclusions. My<br />
reservations relate only to the wisdom of releasing it to an obviously<br />
unconditioned public.<br />
Six weeks later, in an Associated Press dispatch from London,<br />
Galbraith went even further and jokingly admitted that he was "a<br />
member of the conspiracy ,,2<br />
1. "News of War and Peace You're Not Ready For/' by Herschel McLandress, Book<br />
World, in The Washington Post, November 26, 1967, p. 5.<br />
2. "The Times Diary/' London Times, February 5, 1 968, p<br />
.<br />
8.<br />
That, however, did not settle the issue. The following day,<br />
Galbraith backed off. When asked about his "conspiracy" statement,<br />
he replied: "For the first time since Charles II The Times has<br />
been guilty of a misquotation. . . . Nothing shakes my conviction that<br />
,it was written by either Dean Rusk or Mrs. Clare Booth Luce."<br />
The reporter who conducted the original interview was embarassed<br />
by the allegation and did further research. Six days later,<br />
this is what he reported:<br />
Misquoting seems to be a hazard to which Professor Galbraith is<br />
prone. The latest edition of the Cambridge newspaper Varsity quotes<br />
the following (tape recorded) interchange:<br />
Interviewer: "Are you aware of the identity of the author of Report<br />
from Iron Mountain?"<br />
Galbraith: "I was in general a member of the conspiracy but I was<br />
not the author. I have always assumed that it was the man who wrote<br />
the foreword—Mr. Lewin/'<br />
So, on at least three occasions, Galbraith publicly endorsed the<br />
authenticity of the report but denied that he wrote it. Then who<br />
did? Was it Leonard Lewin, after all? In 1967 he said he did not. In<br />
1972 he said that he did. Writing in the New York Times Book Review<br />
Lewin explained: "I wrote the 'Report/ all of it.... What I intended<br />
was simply to pose the issues of war and peace in a provocative<br />
way.<br />
But wait! A few years before that, columnist William F, Buckley<br />
told the New York Times that he was the author. That statement was<br />
undoubtedly made tongue-in-cheek, but who—and what are we to<br />
believe? Was it written by Herman Kahn, John Kenneth Galbraith,<br />
[Dean Rusk, Clare Booth Luce, Leonard Lewin, or William F.<br />
Buckley?<br />
In the final analysis, it make little difference. The important<br />
point is<br />
that The Report from Iron Mountain, whether written as a<br />
think-tank study or a political satire, explains the reality that<br />
surrounds us. Regardless of its origin, the concepts presented in it<br />
^are now being implemented in almost every detail. All one has to<br />
po is hold the Report in one hand and the daily newspaper in the<br />
bther to realize that every major trend in American life is conform-<br />
1. "Galbraith Says He Was Misquoted,"London Times, February 6, 1968, p. 3.<br />
K "Touche, Vrofessor/'London Times, February 12, 1968, p. 8.<br />
3. "Report from Iron Mountain/'Nea; York Times, March 19, 1968, p. 8.
.<br />
526 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
ing to the blueprint. So many things that otherwise are incomprehensible<br />
suddenly become clear: foreign aid, wasteful spending /<br />
the destruction of American industry, a job corps, gun control, a<br />
national police force, the apparent demise of Soviet power, a UN<br />
army, disarmament, a world bank, a world money, the surrender of<br />
national independence through treaties, and the ecology hysteria.<br />
The Report from Iron Mountain is an accurate summary of the plan<br />
that has already created our present. It is now shaping our future.<br />
ENVIRONMENTALISM A SUBSTITUTE FOR WAR<br />
It is beyond the scope of this study to prove that currently<br />
accepted predictions of environmental doom are based on exaggerated<br />
and fraudulent "scientific studies/' But such proof is easily<br />
found if one is willing to look at the raw data and the assumptions<br />
upon which the projections are based. More important, however, is<br />
the question of why end-of-world scenarios based on phony<br />
scientific studies—or no studies at all—are uncritically publicized<br />
by the CFR-controlled media; or why radical environmental groups<br />
advocating socialist doctrine and anti-business programs are lavishly<br />
funded by CFR-dominated foundations/ banks, and corporations,<br />
the very groups that would appear to have the most to lose.<br />
The Reportfrom Iron Mountain answers those questions.<br />
As the Report pointed out, truth is not important in these<br />
matters. It's what people can be made to believe that counts.<br />
"Credibility" is the key, not reality. There is just enough truth in the<br />
fact of environmental pollution to make predictions of planetary<br />
doom in the year two-thousand-something seem believable. All<br />
that is required is media cooperation and repetition. The plan has<br />
apparently worked. People of the industrialized nations have been<br />
subjected to a barrage of documentaries, dramas, feature films,<br />
ballads, poems, bumper stickers, posters, marches, speeches, seminars,<br />
conferences, and concerts. The result has been phenomenal.<br />
Politicians are now elected to office on platforms consisting of<br />
nothing more than an expressed concern for the environment and a<br />
promise to clamp down on those nasty industries. No one questions<br />
the damage done to the economy or the nation. It makes no<br />
difference when the very planet on which we live is sick and dying-<br />
Not one in a thousand will question that underlying premise. How<br />
could it be false? Look at all the movie celebrities and rock stars<br />
who have joined the movement.<br />
DOOMSDAY MECHANISMS 527<br />
While the followers of the environmental movement are preoccupied<br />
with visions of planetary doom, let us see what the leaders<br />
are thinking. The first Earth Day was proclaimed on April 22, 1970,<br />
at a "Summit" meeting in Rio de Janeiro, attended by environmentalists<br />
and politicians from all over the world. A publication widely<br />
circulated at that meeting was entitled the Environmental Handbook.<br />
The main theme of the book was summarized by a quotation from<br />
Princeton Professor Richard A. Falk, a member of the CFR. Falk<br />
wrote that there are four interconnected threats to the planet—wars<br />
of mass destruction, overpopulation, pollution, and the depletion<br />
of resources. Then he said: "The basis of all four problems is the<br />
inadequacy of the sovereign states to manage the affairs of mankind<br />
in the twentieth century." 1<br />
The Handbook continued the CFR<br />
line by asking these rhetorical questions: "Are nation-states actually<br />
feasible, now that they have power to destroy each other in a<br />
t<br />
single afternoon?... What price would most people be willing to<br />
pay for a more durable kind of human organization—more taxes,<br />
giving up national flags, perhaps the sacrifice of some of our<br />
hard-won liberties?"<br />
In 1989, the CFR-owned Washington Post published an article<br />
written by CFR member George Kennan in which he said: "We<br />
must prepare instead for . . . an age where the great enemy is not the<br />
Soviet Union, but the rapid deterioration of our planet as a<br />
supporting structure for civilized life." 3<br />
On March 27, 1990, in the CFR-controiled New York Times, CFR<br />
member Michael Oppenheimer wrote: "Global warming, ozone<br />
depletion, deforestation and overpopulation are the four horsemen<br />
of a looming 21st century apocalypse As the cold war recedes,<br />
the environment is becoming the No. 1 international security<br />
concern."<br />
1. Garrett de Bell, ed v The Environmental Handbook (New York: Ballantine/Friends<br />
of the Earth, 1970), p. 138.<br />
2. Ibid.,p.U5.<br />
3. "A Europe Now Free from A Confining Cold War Vision/' by George Kennan,<br />
Washington Post syndication, Sacramento Bee, November 14, 1989, p. B7.<br />
The New York Times has been one of the principal means by which CFR policies<br />
are inserted into the mainstream of public opinion. The paper was purchased in<br />
1896 by Alfred Ochs, with financial backing from CFR pioneer J.P. Morgan, Rothschild<br />
agent August Belmont, and Jacob Schiff, a partner in Kuhn, Loeb & Co. It is<br />
now owned by CFR member Arthur Sulzberger, who is also the publisher, and it is<br />
staffed by numerous CFR editors and columnists. See Perloff, p. 181
.<br />
528 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
CFR member, Lester Brown, heads up another think tank called<br />
the Worldwatch Institute. In the Institute's annual report, entitled<br />
State of the World 1991, Brown said that "the battle to save the planet<br />
will replace the battle over ideology as the organizing theme of the<br />
new world order."<br />
In the official publication of the 1992 Earth Summit, we find<br />
this: "The world community now faces together greater risks to our<br />
common security through our impacts on the environment than<br />
from traditional military conflicts with one another."<br />
How many times does it have to be explained? The environmental<br />
movement was created by the CFR. It is a substitute for war<br />
that they hope will become the emotional and psychological<br />
foundation for world government<br />
HUMANITY ITSELF IS THE TARGET<br />
The Club of Rome is a group of global planners who annually<br />
release end-of-world scenarios based on predictions of overpopulation<br />
and famine. Their membership is international, but the American<br />
roster includes such well-known CFR members as Jimmy<br />
Carter, Harlan Cleveland, Claiburne Pell, and Sol Linowitz. Their<br />
solution to overpopulation? A world government to control birth<br />
rates and, if necessary, apply euthanasia. That is a gentle word for<br />
the deliberate killing of the old, the weak, and of course the<br />
uncooperative. Following the same reasoning advanced at Iron<br />
Mountain, the Club of Rome has concluded that fear of environmental<br />
disaster could be used as a substitute enemy for the purpose<br />
of unifying the masses behind their program. In their 1991 book<br />
entitled The First Global Revolution, we find this:<br />
In searching for a new enemy to unite us, we came up with the<br />
idea that pollution, the threat of global warming, water shortages,<br />
famine and the like would fit the bill..,. All these dangers are caused<br />
by human intervention.. . . The real enemy, then, is humanity itself.<br />
Socialist theoreticians have always been fascinated by the<br />
question of controlling population growth. It excites their imagination<br />
because it is the ultimate bureaucratic plan. If the real enemy is<br />
1. Lester R. Brown, "The New World Order/' in Lester R. Brown et aL, State of the<br />
World 1991: A Worldwatch Institute Report on Progress Toward a Sustainable Society<br />
(New York: W.W. Norton, 1991), p. 3.<br />
2. Alexander King and Bertrand Schneider, The First Global Revolution, A Report by<br />
the Council of the Club of Rome (New York: Pantheon Books, 1991), p. 115.<br />
DOOMSDAY MECHANISMS 529<br />
humanity itself, as the Club of Rome says, then humanity itself<br />
must become the target. Fabian Socialist Bertrand Russell 1<br />
expressed it thus:<br />
I do not pretend that birth control is the only way in which<br />
population can be kept from increasing.... War, as I remarked a<br />
moment ago, has hitherto been disappointing in this respect, but<br />
perhaps bacteriological war may prove more effective. If a Black Death<br />
could be spread throughout the world once in every generation,<br />
survivors could procreate freely without making the world too full.. .<br />
A scientific world society cannot be stable unless there is world<br />
government... It will be necessary to find ways of preventing an<br />
increase in world population. If this is to be done otherwise than by<br />
wars, pestilences and famines, it will demand a powerful international<br />
authority. This authority should deal out the world's food to the<br />
various nations in proportion to their population at the time of the<br />
establishments of the authority. If any nation subsequently increased<br />
its population, it should not on that account receive any more food.<br />
The motive for not increasing population would therefore be very<br />
compelling.<br />
Very compelling, indeed. These quiet-spoken socialists are not<br />
kidding around. For example, one of the most visible "environmentalists"<br />
and advocate of population control is Jacques Cousteau.<br />
Interviewed by the United Nations UNESCO Courier in November<br />
fcOf 1991, Cousteau spelled it out. Speaking of death by cancer, he<br />
said:<br />
Should we eliminate suffering diseases? The idea is beautiful, but<br />
perhaps not a benefit for the long term. We should not allow our dread<br />
of diseases to endanger the future of our species. This is a terrible thing<br />
to say. In order to stabilize world population, we must eliminate<br />
350,000 people per day. It is a horrible thing to say, but it's just as bad<br />
not to say it.<br />
GORBACHEV BECOMES AN ECOLOGY WARRIOR<br />
We can now understand how Mikhail Gorbachev, formerly the<br />
leader of one of the most repressive governments the world has<br />
known, became head of a new organization called the International<br />
Creen Cross, which supposedly is dedicated to environmental<br />
1- See Martin, pp. 171, 325, 463-69.<br />
2. Bertrand Arthur William Russell, The Impact of Science on Society (New York:<br />
Simon and Schuster, 1953), pp. 103-104, 111.<br />
3. Interviewed by Bahgat Eluadi and Adel Rifaat, Courrier de l'Unescc, November<br />
1991, p. 13.
.<br />
.<br />
530 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
issues. Gorbachev has never denounced socialism, only the label of<br />
a particular brand of socialism called Communism. His real interest<br />
is not ecology but world government with himself assured a major<br />
position in the socialist power structure. In a public appearance in<br />
Fulton, Missouri, he praised the Club of Rome, of which he is a<br />
member, for its position on population control. Then he said:<br />
One of the worst of the new dangers is ecological.. . Today,<br />
global<br />
climatic shifts; the greenhouse effect; the "ozone hole"; acid rain;<br />
contamination of the atmosphere, soil and water by industrial and<br />
household waste; the destruction of the forests; etc. all threaten the<br />
stability of the planet.<br />
Gorbachev proclaimed that global government was the answer<br />
to these threats and that the use of government force was essential.<br />
He said: "I believe that the new world order will not be fully<br />
realized unless the United Nations and its Security Council create<br />
structures . . . authorized to impose sanctions and make use of other<br />
measures of compulsion."<br />
Here is an arch criminal who fought his way up through the<br />
ranks of the Soviet Communist Party, became the protege of Yuri<br />
Andropov, head of the dreaded KGB, was a member of the USSR's<br />
ruling Politburo throughout the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan,<br />
and who was selected by the Politburo in 1985 as the supreme<br />
leader of world Communism. All of this was during one of the<br />
Soviet's most dismal periods of human-rights violations and subversive<br />
activities against the free world. Furthermore, he ruled over<br />
a nation with one of the worst possible records of environmental<br />
destruction. At no time while he was in power did he ever say or do<br />
anything to show concern over planet Earth.<br />
All that is now forgotten. Gorbachev has been transformed by<br />
the CFR-dominated media into an ecology warrior. He is calling for<br />
world government and telling us that such a government will use<br />
environmental issues as justification for sanctions and other "measures<br />
of compulsion." We cannot say that we were not warned.<br />
DOOMSDAY MECHANISMS 531<br />
U.S. BRANDED AS ECOLOGICAL AGGRESSOR<br />
The use of compulsion is an important point in these plans.<br />
People in the industrialized nations are not expected to cooperate<br />
in their own demise. They will have to be forced. They will not like<br />
it when their food is taken for global distribution. They will not<br />
approve when they are taxed by a world authority to finance<br />
foreign political<br />
projects. They will not voluntarily give up their<br />
cars or resettle into smaller houses or communal barracks to satisfy<br />
the resource-allocation quotas of a UN agency. Club-of-Rome<br />
member Maurice Strong states the problem:<br />
In effect, the United States is committing environmental<br />
aggression against the rest of the world.... At the military level, the<br />
United States is the custodian. At the environmental level, the United<br />
States is clearly the greatest risk.... One of the worst problems in the<br />
United States is energy prices—they're too low.. .<br />
It is clear that current lifestyles and consumption patterns of the<br />
affluent middle class ... involving high meat intake, consumption of<br />
large amounts of frozen and 'convenience' foods, ownership of<br />
motor-vehicles, numerous electric household appliances, home and<br />
work-place air-conditioning . . . expansive suburban housing . . . are not<br />
sustainable<br />
Mr. Strong's remarks were enthusiastically received by world<br />
environmental leaders, but they prompted this angry editorial<br />
response in the Arizona Republic:<br />
Translated from eco-speak, this means two things: (1) a reduction<br />
in the standard of living in Western nations through massive<br />
•<br />
new<br />
taxes and regulations, and (2) a wholesale transfer of wealth from<br />
industrialized to under-developed countries. The dubious premise<br />
here is that if the U.S. economy could be reduced to, say, the size of<br />
Malaysia's, the world would be a better place.... Most Americans<br />
probably would balk at the idea of the U.N. banning automobiles in<br />
the U.S.<br />
Who is this Maurice Strong who sees the United States as the<br />
[Environmental aggressor against the world? Does he live in poverty?<br />
Does he come from a backward country that is resentful of<br />
American prosperity? Does he himself live in modest circum-<br />
1 Michail Gorbachev, "The River o£ Time and the Necessity of Action/' 46th John<br />
Findley Green Foundation Lecture, Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri, May 6,<br />
1992, transcript from Westminster College Department of Press Relations, p. 6.<br />
2. Ibid., p. 9.<br />
1 "Ecology Remedy Costly," (AP), Sacramento Bee, March 12, 1992, p. A8. Also<br />
Maurice Strong, Introduction to Jim MacNeil, Pieter Winsemius, and Taizo<br />
Yakushiji, Beyond Interdependence (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. ix.<br />
2. "Road to Ruin/' Arizona Republic, March 26, 1992.
532 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
DOOMSDAY MECHANISMS 533<br />
stances, avoiding consumption in order to preserve our natural<br />
resources? None of the above. He is one of the wealthiest men in<br />
the world. He lives and travels in great comfort. He is a lavish<br />
entertainer. In addition to having great personal wealth derived<br />
from the oil industry in Canada—which he helped nationalize—<br />
Maurice Strong was the Secretary-General of the 1992 Earth Summit<br />
in Rio; head of the 1972 UN Conference on Human<br />
Environment in Stockholm; the first Secretary-General of the UN<br />
Environment Program; president of the World Federation of<br />
United Nations; co-chairman of the World Economic Forum; member<br />
of the Club of Rome; trustee of the Aspen Institute; and a<br />
director of the World Future Society. That is probably more than<br />
you wanted to know about this man, but it is necessary in order to<br />
appreciate the importance of what follows.<br />
A PLOT FOR ECONOMIC CRISIS<br />
Maurice Strong believes—or says that he believes—the world's<br />
ecosystems can be preserved only if the affluent nations of the<br />
world can be disciplined into lowering their standard of living.<br />
Production and consumption must be curtailed. To bring that<br />
about, those nations must submit to rationing, taxation, and<br />
political domination by world government. They will probably not<br />
do that voluntarily, he says, so they will have to be forced. To<br />
accomplish that, it will be necessary to engineer a global monetary<br />
crisis which will destroy their economic systems. Then they will<br />
have no choice but to accept assistance and control from the UN.<br />
This strategy was revealed in the May, 1990, issue of West<br />
magazine, published in Canada. In an article entitled "The Wizard<br />
of Baca Grande," journalist Daniel Wood described his week-long<br />
experience at<br />
Strong's private ranch in southern Colorado. This<br />
ranch has been visited by such CFR notables as David Rockefeller,<br />
Secretary-of-State Henry Kissinger, founder of the World Bank<br />
Robert McNamara, and the presidents of such organizations as<br />
IBM, Pan Am, and Harvard.<br />
During Wood's stay at the ranch, the tycoon talked freely about<br />
environmentalism and politics. To express his own world view, he<br />
said he was planning to write a<br />
novel about a group of world<br />
leaders who decided to save the planet. As the plot unfolded, it<br />
became obvious that it was based on real people and real events.<br />
Wood continues the story:<br />
Each year, he explains as background to the telling of the novel's<br />
plot, the World Economic Forum convenes in Davos, Switzerland.<br />
Over a thousand CEOs, prime ministers, finance ministers, and<br />
leading academics gather in February to attend meetings and set<br />
economic agendas for the year ahead. With this as a setting, he then<br />
says: "What if a small group of these world leaders were to conclude<br />
that the principal risk to the earth comes from the actions of the rich<br />
countries? And if the world is to survive, those rich countries would<br />
have to sign an agreement reducing their impact on the environment.<br />
Will they do it?... The group's conclusion is 'no.' the rich countries<br />
won't do it. They won't change. So, in order to save the planet, the<br />
group decides: Isn't the only hope for the planet that the industrialized<br />
civilizations collapse? Isn't it our responsibility to bring that about?."<br />
"This group of world leaders," he continues, "form a secret society<br />
to bring about an economic collapse. It's February. They're all at<br />
Davos. These aren't terrorists. They're world leaders. They have<br />
positioned themselves in the world's commodity and stock markets.<br />
They've engineered, using their access to stock exchanges and<br />
computers and gold supplies, a panic. Then, they prevent the world's<br />
stock markets from closing. They jam the gears. They hire mercenaries<br />
who hold the rest of the world leaders at Davos as hostages. The<br />
markets cant close. The rich countries..." And Strong makes a slight<br />
motion with his fingers as if he were flicking a cigarette butt out the<br />
window.<br />
I sit there spellbound. This is not any storyteller talking, this is<br />
Maurice Strong. He knows these world leaders. He is, in fact,<br />
co-chairman of the Council of the World Economic Forum. He sits at<br />
the fulcrum of power. He is in a position to do it.<br />
'T probably shouldn't be saying things like this," he says.<br />
Maurice Strong's fanciful plot probably shouldn't be taken too<br />
seriously, at least in terms of a literal reading of future events. It is<br />
unlikely they will unfold in exactly that manner—although it is not<br />
impossible. For one thing, it would not be necessary to hold the<br />
leaders of the industrialized nations at gun point. They would be<br />
the ones engineering this plot. Leaders from Third-World countries<br />
do not have the means to cause a global crisis. That would have to<br />
come from the money centers in New York, London, or Tokyo.<br />
(Furthermore, the masterminds behind this thrust for global government<br />
have always resided in the industrialized nations. They have<br />
come from the ranks of the CFR in America and from other<br />
p. 35.<br />
"The Wizard of Baca Grande," by Daniel Wood, West magazine, May, 1990,
534 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
DOOMSDAY MECHANISMS 535<br />
branches of the International Roundtable in England, France,<br />
Belgium, Canada, Japan, and elsewhere. They are the ideological<br />
descendants of Cecil Rhodes and they are fulfilling his dream.<br />
It is not important whether or not Maurice Strong's plot for<br />
global economic collapse is to be taken literally. What is important<br />
is that men like him are thinking along those lines. As Wood<br />
pointed out, they are in a position to do it. Or something like it. If it<br />
is not this scenario, they will consider another one with similar<br />
consequences. If history has proven anything, it is that men with<br />
financial and political power are quite capable of heinous plots<br />
against their fellow men. They have launched wars, caused depressions,<br />
and created famines to suit their personal agendas. We have<br />
little reason to believe that the world leaders of today are more<br />
saintly than their predecessors.<br />
Furthermore, we must not be fooled by pretended concern for<br />
Mother Earth. The call-to-arms for saving the planet is a gigantic<br />
ruse. There is just enough truth to environmental pollution to make<br />
the show "credible/' as The Report from Iron Mountain phrased it,<br />
but the end-of-earth scenarios which drive the movement forward<br />
are bogus. The real objective in all of this is world government, the<br />
ultimate doomsday mechanism from which there can be no escape.<br />
Destruction of the economic strength of the industrialized nations<br />
is merely a necessary prerequisite for ensnaring them into the<br />
global web. The thrust of the current ecology movement is directed<br />
totally to that end.<br />
SUMMARY<br />
debt.<br />
The United States government is mired in a 5-trillion-dollar<br />
By 1993, net interest payments on that debt were running<br />
$214 billion per year. That consumes about 14% of all federal<br />
revenue and costs the average family over $5,000 each year.<br />
Nothing is purchased by it. It merely pays interest. It represents the<br />
government's largest single expense. Interest on the national debt is<br />
already consuming more than 57% of all the revenue collected from<br />
income taxes. At the present rate of expansion, it will consume<br />
100% in 1998.<br />
By 1992, there were more people working for government than<br />
for manufacturing companies in the private sector. There are more<br />
citizens receiving government checks than there are paying income<br />
taxes. When it is possible for people to vote on issues involving the<br />
transfer of wealth to themselves from others, the ballot box<br />
becomes a weapon whereby the majority plunders the minority.<br />
That is the point of no return. It is a doomsday mechanism.<br />
By 1992, more than half of all federal outlays went for what are<br />
called entitlements. Here is another doomsday mechanism. Entitlements<br />
are expenses—such as Social Security and Medicare—which<br />
are based on promises of future payments. Entitlements represent<br />
52% of federal outlays. When this is added to the 14% that is now<br />
being spent for interest payments on the national debt, we come to<br />
the startling conclusion that two-thirds of all federal expenses are<br />
now entirely automatic, and that percentage is growing each<br />
month.<br />
The biggest doomsday mechanism of all is the Federal Reserve<br />
System. Every cent of our money supply came into being for the<br />
purpose of being loaned to someone. Those dollars will disappear<br />
when the loans are paid back. If we tried to pay off the national<br />
debt, our money supply would be undermined. Under the Federal<br />
Reserve System, therefore, Congress would be fearful to eliminate<br />
the national debt even if it wanted to.<br />
Political environmentalism has caused millions of acres of<br />
timber and agricultural land to be taken out of production. Heavy<br />
industry has been chased from our shores by our own government.<br />
High taxes, rules beyond reason for safety devices in the work<br />
place, so-called fair-employment practices, and mandatory health<br />
insurance are rapidly destroying what is left of the private sector.<br />
The result is unemployment and dislocation for millions of American<br />
workers. Government moves in to fill the void it creates, and<br />
bureaucracy grows by the hour.<br />
Federal taxes now take more than 40% of our private incomes.<br />
State, county, and local taxes are on top of that. Inflation feeds on<br />
what is left. We spend half of each year working for the government.<br />
Real wages in America have declined. Young couples with a<br />
single income have a lower standard of living than their parents<br />
did. The net worth of the average household is falling. The amount<br />
of leisure time is shrinking. The percentage of Americans who own<br />
their homes is dropping. The age at which a family acquires a first<br />
home is rising. The number of families counted among the middle<br />
class is falling. The number of people living below the officially<br />
defined poverty level is rising. Over 90% of all Americans are broke<br />
at age 65.
536 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
None of this is accidental. It is the fulfillment of a plan by<br />
members of the CFR who comprise the hidden government of the<br />
United States. Their goal is the deliberate weakening of the<br />
industrialized nations as a prerequisite to bringing them into a<br />
world government built upon the principles of socialism, with<br />
themselves in control.<br />
The origin of many of the stratagems in this plan can be traced<br />
to a government-sponsored think-tank study released in 1966<br />
called the Report from Iron Mountain. The purpose of the study was<br />
to analyze methods by which a government can perpetuate itself in<br />
power—ways to control its citizens and prevent them from rebelling.<br />
The conclusion of the report was that, in the past, war has<br />
been the only reliable means to achieve that goal. Under world<br />
government, however, war technically would be impossible. So the<br />
main purpose of the study was to explore other methods for<br />
controlling populations and keeping them loyal to their leaders. It<br />
was concluded that a suitable substitute for war would require a<br />
new enemy which posed a frightful threat to survival. Neither the<br />
threat nor the enemy had to be real. They merely had to be<br />
believable.<br />
Several surrogates for war were considered, but the only one<br />
holding real promise was the environmental-pollution model. This<br />
was viewed as the most likely to succeed because (1) it could be<br />
related<br />
to observable conditions such as smog and water pollution—in<br />
other words, it would be based partly on fact and,<br />
therefore, believable—and (2) predictions could be made showing<br />
end-of-earth scenarios just as horrible as atomic warfare. Accuracy<br />
in these predictions would not be important. Their purpose would<br />
be to frighten, not to inform.<br />
While the followers of the current environmental movement are<br />
preoccupied with visions of planetary doom, the leaders have an<br />
entirely different agenda. It is world government.<br />
Chapter Twenty-Five<br />
A PESSIMISTIC<br />
SCENARIO<br />
Thefuture portrayed as a continuation of present<br />
trends including a hypothetical banking crisis,<br />
massive inflation, collapse of the economy, domestic<br />
violence, the issuance ofa new UN money, the<br />
arrival ofUN "Peacekeeping" forces, and thefinal<br />
merger into<br />
high-tech feudalism.<br />
The New World Order, a form of<br />
We are ready now for the final trip in our time machine. On the<br />
control panel in front of us are several selector switches. The one on<br />
Jthe left indicates Direction of Time. Set it to Future. The switch on the<br />
right indicates Primary Assumptions. Set it to the first notch which<br />
reads: Present trends unaltered. Leave the Secondary-Assumption<br />
switch where it is. The lever in the center is a throttle to determine<br />
speed of travel. Nudge it forward—and hang on tight!<br />
A BANKING CRISIS<br />
It is 4:05 in the morning. While New York City sleeps, the<br />
:omputers on the fourth floor at Citibank are aware that a<br />
full-blown crisis is underway. It started in London—five hours<br />
ahead of the East coast—and within minutes had spread like an<br />
electronic virus to Tokyo and Hong Kong. That was an hour ago.<br />
Alarms are now sounding on computer terminals in all the trading<br />
centers of the world, and automatic dialing devices are summoning<br />
money managers to their board rooms.<br />
The panic started from rumors that one of the large U.S. banks<br />
was in trouble because of the simultaneous default of its loan to<br />
Mexico and the bankruptcy of its second-largest corporate borrower.<br />
Yesterday afternoon, the bank's president held a press<br />
conference and denied that these were serious problems. To<br />
reinforce his optimism, he announced that, on Friday, the bank will<br />
be paying a higher-than-usual quarterly dividend. The professional
538 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
money managers were not convinced. They knew that writing off<br />
these loans would wipe out the bank's entire net worth.<br />
All American banks are now so intertwined in their operations<br />
that trouble for one affects them all. By 5 A.M., the money-center<br />
banks are facing heavy withdrawals from overseas depositors. By<br />
the time the sun peeks between the New York skyscrapers,<br />
Americans are also taking their money. These are not small<br />
transactions. They involve other banks, insurance companies, and<br />
investment funds. The average withdrawal is over $3 million. The<br />
reservoir is draining fast.<br />
It is now 7:45. The banks will soon be opening their doors, and<br />
already newspaper reporters and TV crews are arriving outside. A<br />
plan of unified action must be made quickly.<br />
The Chairman of the Federal Reserve has arranged an emergency<br />
conference call with the CEOs of all the major banks,<br />
including one who was located at great effort at his fishing lodge in<br />
northern Canada. The President is also tied into the telephone<br />
network but on a "silent-monitor" basis. Other than the Chairman,<br />
no one else knows he is listening.<br />
TO SAVE THE BANKS IS TO SAVE THE WORLD<br />
The CEO at Citibank quickly summarizes the problem. None of<br />
the banks will be able to sustain withdrawals of this magnitude for<br />
more than about forty-eight hours. Perhaps less. The money is not<br />
in their vaults. It has been put into interest-bearing loans. Even if<br />
the loans were performing, they would not have the money. Now<br />
that some of the larger loans are in default, the problem is even<br />
worse. If the Fed doesn't provide the money, the banks will have no<br />
choice but to close their doors and go out of business. That would<br />
cause a collapse of the economy and untold suffering Would follow.<br />
Americans would be thrown out of work; families would go<br />
hungry; national security would be weakened. And it would<br />
undoubtedly spread to the entire world. Who knows what dire<br />
consequences would follow—chaos, famine, and riots here at<br />
home? Revolution abroad? The return of a militaristic regime in<br />
Russia? Atomic war?<br />
The Chairman cuts the monologue short. He is well aware that<br />
the banks must not be allowed to fail. That, after all, was one of the<br />
reasons the Federal Reserve was created. He wants to get on with<br />
the details of how to do it.<br />
A PESSIMISTIC SCENARIO 539<br />
Yes, the FDIC is already broke, but don't worry about that.<br />
Congress will authorize a "loan" or some other mechanism for the<br />
Fed to create whatever amount of new money the FDIC might<br />
need. If Congress moves too slowly, the Fed has other technical<br />
means to accomplish the same result. In the meantime, unlimited<br />
funding will be available at the Fed's discount window by 8 A.M.,<br />
Eastern Standard time. The printing presses are already running at<br />
full capacity to provide the currency. Heets of airplanes and<br />
armored cars are standing by to deliver it. Furthermore, don't give<br />
up on those defaulted loans. Congress will probably bailout the<br />
bankrupt American corporation. And the President has said he will<br />
ask for additional funding for the IMF/World Bank. That money<br />
will be created by the Fed and carry the stipulation that it must be<br />
used by Mexico and other defaulting countries to resume interest<br />
payments on their loans.<br />
The bankers are told to open their doors to the public and act<br />
calm. The press already knows that something is going on but not<br />
the seriousness of it. So tell them only what they already know.<br />
Nothing more. If people want to withdraw their money, give it to<br />
them. If lines should develop, call the police to maintain order, but<br />
continue paying out Offer to stay open after closing hours, if<br />
necessary, to accommodate everyone. Above all,<br />
have the tellers<br />
take their time. Check and double check each transaction, Move the<br />
lines slowly.<br />
The armored trucks will arrive at the busiest hours so the<br />
guards can carry sacks of money past the customers for visual<br />
confirmation that there is enough for everyone. A bank officer then<br />
should tell the crowd that a fresh delivery of money has just been<br />
made from the Federal Reserve System and that there is plenty<br />
more where that came from- Once people become convinced that<br />
the bank is able to pay, most of them will tire of the wait and go<br />
home.<br />
PANIC AVERTED<br />
It is now 6 P.M. of the following day. The plan was successful.<br />
Lines of anxious depositors had formed yesterday morning, mostly<br />
in the larger cities, and resumed again this morning. But there has<br />
been enough money for everyone. The news media treated<br />
story lightly, making sure to include sound bites from various<br />
experts that banks can no longer fail, thanks to the FDIC and the<br />
the
540 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
Federal Reserve System. More than half the video time is devoted<br />
to armored trucks and guards carrying sacks of money. The banks<br />
closed on schedule today, and there were no more lines.<br />
While everything appears calm to the passengers on deck, the<br />
fire still rages out of control in the boiler room. Over a billion<br />
dollars has already fled, mostly overseas, and the hemorrhage<br />
continues. The Fed is pumping in fresh money to replace it. Two of<br />
the banks have instructed their computer technicians to activate an<br />
incoming transactions. There is<br />
automatic two-hour delay on all<br />
talk of deliberately disabling the entire network and blaming the<br />
breakdown on overload, but the idea is abandoned. There are too<br />
many people in the system. Someone surely would leak the truth to<br />
the press.<br />
The danger of a run on the banks by private depositors used to<br />
be the nightmare of the Federal Reserve. Now it is nothing<br />
compared to the electronic run that is taking place involving<br />
institutional depositors around the world. These are professionals<br />
who are not impressed by armed guards carrying bags of currency.<br />
They want their money now—and they are getting it. Although<br />
they are receiving it in the form of electronic credits, they are<br />
immediately exchanging that for something more dependable, such<br />
as stocks, other currencies, and bullion.<br />
This is<br />
the Fed's finest hour. It is exercising its many powers,<br />
carefully accumulated over the years, to create money out of<br />
whatever is at hand: U.S. Treasury bonds, bonds from other<br />
governments, corporate debt obligations, even direct loans to<br />
individuals and partnerships. Billions of new dollars are springing<br />
into existence. They are spreading around the globe to fulfill<br />
banks' obligation to give people back their money.<br />
A REAL RUN ON THE BANKS<br />
It is now seven weeks later. Something happened, but no one<br />
knows what. Like a spark igniting a twig, spreading to a branch,<br />
and then engulfing the entire forest, the public has panicked.<br />
Responding to a primitive herd instinct, they are descending on the<br />
banks and the thrifts. They want their money. They want their<br />
savings.<br />
Perhaps it was the newly released statistics showing higher<br />
unemployment, or the continued rise in bankruptcies, or the<br />
Congressional vote to increase the national debt again, or the jump<br />
the<br />
A PESSIMISTIC SCENARIO 541<br />
in Social-Security taxes, or the loss of another 140,000 jobs to<br />
Mexico, or the riots in Chicago and Detroit for more food stamps<br />
and government housing, or the presence of<br />
•<br />
UN "Peacekeeping"<br />
troops to augment the National Guard, or the rumor that the Bank<br />
I of America was technically insolvent, or the UN World Court<br />
ruling that the number of American automobiles had to be cut by<br />
30% by December 31st, or the skeptical tone in the voice of the CBS<br />
news anchor as he quoted the latest prediction of renewed prosperity.<br />
Whatever it was, there are now long lines of sober-faced<br />
depositors outside every bank. There is not enough cash in the<br />
vaults to meet the demand. Most money is checkbook money,<br />
which means it consists merely of magnetic impulses in a computer.<br />
Only about five per cent of the monetary supply is in the<br />
form of coins or currency. Most of that is already outside the banks<br />
in cash registers, wallets, and mattresses. The amount inside the<br />
banks is only about one-half of one per cent. The Fed's emergency<br />
supply of currency—a large quantity warehoused for exactly this<br />
kind of crisis—is inadequate. This time, the printing presses cannot<br />
keep up.<br />
Spokesmen from the Treasury and the Federal Reserve appear<br />
on TV and assure the nation that there is no need for panic.<br />
Everything is under control. The only problem is the irrational<br />
behavior of alarmists who have no faith in their country.<br />
No one believes them. The lines grow longer, and the people<br />
become angry. Bank employees are jeered on their way to work.<br />
Bomb threats are made. Sporadic violence breaks out, and bank<br />
windows are smashed. The /nternational Guard is called up. The<br />
President declares a bank holiday.<br />
Since people cannot close out their bank accounts by withdrawing<br />
currency, they rush through the stores on checkbook-spending<br />
sprees. If they cannot get their money back, at least they can buy<br />
things with it. Garages and basements are filling up with canned<br />
goods, shoes, liquor, tires, ammunition. Goods are becoming<br />
scarce, pushing prices upward. The Dow Jones is going through the<br />
roof as investors empty their checking accounts to buy anything for<br />
sale. The Securities and Exchange Commission finally suspends<br />
trading.<br />
Nine months have now passed. The crisis has been a blessing
—<br />
542 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
because of it. It has given them an excuse to swarm through the<br />
country on fact-finding trips, to appear in shirt sleeves at town-hall<br />
meetings, to give speeches, and to be seen on television—all<br />
time expressing grave concern and appearing to take charge. It has<br />
legitimized their role and somehow made them seem more necessary<br />
than before. They have been converted in the public eye from<br />
oafs and bumpkins to serious-minded statesmen.<br />
The party in power said it inherited the mess. The previous<br />
party blamed the current one for dropping the ball. Both parties,<br />
however, agreed on the solution: more of exactly the same policies<br />
that created the crisis: expanded power to the Federal Reserve,<br />
more government control over the economy, more subsidies and<br />
benefits, and more international commitments. These were called<br />
"emergency reforms" and became law. The same men who created<br />
the problem prescribed the solution. The public was grateful to<br />
have leaders of such vision and wisdom.<br />
BANK BAILOUT AND MORE INFLATION<br />
The most important emergency reform was to bail out the<br />
banks with taxpayers' dollars. Defaulted foreign loans were taken<br />
over by the IMF/World Bank, and the failing corporate borrowers<br />
were given government grants disguised as loans—loans which<br />
everyone knew would never be paid back.<br />
Next, the banks were nationalized, at least in part. In return for<br />
the bailout money, they gave large blocks of stock to the government<br />
which now operates as an official business partner. This was<br />
not a drastic change. The banks were already heavily regulated by<br />
government, even to the point of determining their profits, dividends,<br />
and executive salaries. That is the way the cartel wanted it.<br />
It was the means by which competition was avoided and profits<br />
assured. Monetary scientists and political scientists have always<br />
worked as a hidden partnership. This merely made the relationship<br />
more visible.<br />
Technically, no bank was allowed to fail. The Fed kept its<br />
promise on that. When the troubled banks were taken over, all<br />
depositors with $100,000 or less were fully protected. If they<br />
wanted their money and the bank didn't have it, the Fed simply<br />
manufactured it.<br />
the<br />
No one was worried about the value of those<br />
dollars. They were just happy to have them.<br />
A PESSIMISTIC SCENARIO 543<br />
Ten more months have now passed. Those new dollars are<br />
flooding throughout the system. The money supply has increased<br />
by the amount of the bailout plus the amount of new spending for<br />
welfare, health care, interest on the national debt, and foreign aid,<br />
all of which are in a vertical climb. Inflation has become institutionalized.<br />
The dollar has been dethroned as the world's defacto currency.<br />
Foreign investors and central banks no longer have any use for<br />
dollars. They have sent them back to the United States from<br />
whence they came. Over a trillion of them have returned to our<br />
shores like a huge flock of homing pigeons that fills the sky from<br />
horizon to horizon. They are buying our refrigerators, automobiles,<br />
computers, airplanes, cargo ships, armored tanks, office buildings,<br />
factories, real estate — pushing prices to levels that would have<br />
seemed impossible a year ago. A single postage stamp costs as<br />
many dollars as once would have purchased a new TV set.<br />
Most stores have stopped accepting checks and credit cards.<br />
Workers are paid daily with bundles of paper money. People rush<br />
to the stores to purchase groceries before prices rise even further.<br />
Commerce is paralyzed. Bank loans and mortgages are unobtainable.<br />
Savings accounts have been destroyed, including the cash<br />
values of insurance policies. Factories are shutting down. Businesses<br />
are closing their doors. Barter is commonplace. Old silver<br />
coins come out of private hoards and a hundred-dollar bill is<br />
exchanged for one silver dime.<br />
Following the crash of 1929, the supply of paper money was<br />
limited because it was backed by silver, and the amount of silver<br />
itself was limited. Those who had money were able to buy up the<br />
assets of those who did not. Since prices were falling,<br />
the longer<br />
they held on to their dollars, the more they could buy. Now, things<br />
are exactly the opposite. There is nothing to back the money supply<br />
except politics. There is no limit to the amount of currency that can<br />
be created. It is just a question of printing and delivering it. Money<br />
is abundant, and prices are rising. Those who have money are<br />
spending it as soon as possible to prevent further loss of purchasing<br />
power. In the 1930s, everyone wanted dollars. Now, everyone<br />
wants to get rid of them.<br />
The Emergency Banking Regulation No. 1, originally issued in<br />
1961, empowered the Secretary of the Treasury<br />
without consent of<br />
Congress—to seize anyone's bank account, savings account, or
544 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
safe-deposit box. It also gave him the power to fix rents, prices,<br />
salaries, and hourly wages, and to impose rationing. This was to be<br />
done "in the event of attack on the United States/' That phrase now<br />
has been changed to read: "in the event of national emergency."<br />
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has been<br />
expanded to administer the directives of the Treasury. FEMA also<br />
has the power to detain and forcibly relocate any citizen "in the<br />
event of a national emergency."<br />
NEW MONEY<br />
Three more months have passed, and the President has declared<br />
a state of national emergency. Today, the Secretary of the<br />
Treasury announced that the nations of the world had ratified a<br />
multilateral treaty that would solve the inflationary problems of the<br />
United States. This will be accomplished through the issuance of a<br />
new world-wide monetary unit called the Bancor, the name<br />
proposed by John Maynard Keynes at the Bretton Woods Conference<br />
in 1944. This new money will restore our commerce and put a<br />
stop to inflation. At last said the Treasury Secretary, man will have<br />
total control over his economic destiny. Money will now become<br />
his servant instead of his master.<br />
The United States, he said, has agreed to accept the Bancor as<br />
legal tender for all debts, public and private. The old money will<br />
still be honored but will be phased out over a three-month period.<br />
After that date, Federal Reserve Notes will no longer be valid.<br />
During the transition period, the old money may be exchanged at<br />
any bank at the ratio of one Bancor for five-hundred dollars. All<br />
existing contracts expressed in dollars—including home mortgages—are<br />
now converted to Bancors in that same ratio.<br />
In the same announcement, the Secretary advised that the<br />
IMF/World Bank was backing this new money with something far<br />
more precious than gold. Instead, it will be backed by the assets of<br />
the world. These include bonds from the participating governments<br />
plus millions of acres of wilderness lands that have been<br />
deposited into the UN "Environmental Bank/' 1<br />
The National Parks<br />
1. "Debt-for-nature" swaps were proposed at the 4th World Wilderness Conference<br />
held in Denver, Colorado, in 1987 and they are being implemented right now.<br />
Costa Rica, Bolivia, and Ecuador have already agreed to swap their debt in exchange<br />
for a commitment to prevent wilderness areas from being developed. UN<br />
control over those lands is inevitable.<br />
A PESSIMISTIC SCENARIO 545<br />
and forests of the United States have been added to those reserves,<br />
and they will now be under the supervision of the UN Wilderness<br />
Asset Preservation and Enhancement Agency (WAPEA). From this<br />
date forward, the Federal Reserve System will operate as a subdivision<br />
of the IMF which is now the central bank of the world.<br />
Although the Secretary did not mention it in his public appearance,<br />
the UN treaty also obligated the government to put restrictions<br />
on the use of cash. Every citizen is to be issued an<br />
international ID card. The primary purpose of these machinereadable<br />
cards is to provide positive identification for all citizens at<br />
transportation depots and military checkpoints. They also can be<br />
used by the banks and stores to access checking accounts, which are<br />
now called debit accounts.<br />
Every citizen is being issued an account in a bank near his place<br />
of residence. All payments by employers or government agencies<br />
will be made by electronic transfer. Cash transactions larger than<br />
five Bancors will be illegal in three months. Most expenditures will<br />
be paid by debit card. That is the only way in which the UN<br />
Monetary Transaction Tracking Agency (MTTA) can combat counterfeiting<br />
and prevent money laundering by organized crime. That,<br />
of course, is camouflage. The government complex issuing the new<br />
money is the greatest perpetrator of counterfeiting and organized<br />
crime the world has ever seen. The real targets are political<br />
dissidents and those escaping taxes in the underground economy.<br />
No one will be allowed to earn or buy or sell without this ID<br />
card, nor will<br />
they be allowed to leave the country or even to<br />
migrate to another city. If any government agency has reason to<br />
red -flag an individual, his card will not clear, and he will be<br />
blocked from virtually all economic transactions and geographical<br />
movements. It is the ultimate control.<br />
The new money offers the Cabal yet one more benefit. There<br />
can never be another run on the banks, because it<br />
demand currency.<br />
is now illegal to<br />
1. That is not hyperbole. All fiat money is counterfeit. Furthermore, there is<br />
evidence that the CIA and the DEA have been deeply involved in the smuggling of<br />
illicit drugs. The money derived from those drugs was apparently laundered<br />
through Panamanian branches of U.S. banks and used to finance covert operations<br />
in Nicaragua and elsewhere. Virtually all governments have been involved in<br />
activities that would be criminal offenses if committed by ordinary citizens.
546 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
THE RISE OF REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS<br />
Hyperinflation is fertile ground for the seeds of revolution.<br />
Economic despair led the masses to grasp at the promises of Lenin<br />
in Russia, Hitler in Germany, Mussolini in Italy, and Mao in China.<br />
It has now been three years since that fateful run on the banks in<br />
New York, and inflation has not abated, even with the introduction<br />
of the Bancor. Now we are witnessing massive public demonstrations<br />
in every major city for higher wages, more jobs, larger<br />
government benefits, and more stringent price controls. Since there<br />
are practically no goods in the stores at any price, the demonstrators<br />
are also calling for higher output from government factories.<br />
The demonstrations have been organized by radical organizations<br />
advocating the overthrow of the "decadent capitalist" system and<br />
the enthronement of socialism in its place. The participants in the<br />
street do not understand the words they chant. They are unaware<br />
that capitalism has been dead in America for many years and that it<br />
is socialism they already have.<br />
Nevertheless, there are tens of thousands of desperate people<br />
who are attracted to the rhetoric of revolution. Terrorism and<br />
revolutionary insurgency have become common occurrences in the<br />
major urban areas. The ranks of the revolutionaries are swelled by<br />
those who come solely for the looting that always follows.<br />
People are frightened by these violent events and demand the<br />
restoration of law and order. They are relieved when martial law is<br />
declared. They are happy to see the International Guard patrolling<br />
their neighborhoods. They are not resentful of being confined in<br />
their homes or arbitrarily detained by soldiers. They are actually<br />
grateful for the omni-presence of the police state.<br />
It is curious that the revolutionary groups behind this violence<br />
have not been inhibited by the government. To the contrary, they<br />
have been given grants from CFR organizations, and their leaders<br />
have been treated courteously by CFR politicians. The CFR media<br />
have given them extended coverage in the news and has presented<br />
their cause with sympathy. A few dissidents have begun to wonder<br />
if the revolutionaries are but the unknowing pawns of those in<br />
power and that their primary function is to frighten the population<br />
into accepting the constraints of a police state.<br />
Such voices, however, are quickly silenced. Those who question<br />
the government or the media are branded as extremists at the<br />
A PESSIMISTIC SCENARIO 547<br />
lunatic fringe. Authorities say that they are the cause of our present<br />
woes. They are remnants of the old system based on profit-seeking<br />
and race-hating. They are guilty of politically-incorrect attitudes<br />
and hate crimes. They are sentenced to attitude-correction centers<br />
for psychological treatment and rehabilitation. Those who do not<br />
immediately recant are never seen again.<br />
HOMES ARE NATIONALIZED<br />
One of the first industries to feel the raw power of "emergency<br />
measures" was the home industry. During the early stages of<br />
inflation, people were applying their increasingly worthless dollars<br />
to pay down their mortgages. That was devastating to the lenders.<br />
They were being paid back in dollars that were worth only a<br />
fraction of the ones they had loaned out. The banking crisis had<br />
caused the disappearance of savings and investment capital,<br />
they were unable to issue new loans to replace the old. Besides,<br />
people were afraid to sell their homes under such chaotic times<br />
and, if<br />
they did, very few were willing to buy with interest rates<br />
piat high. Old loans were being paid off, and new loans were not<br />
^replacing them. The S&Ls, which in the 1980s had been in trouble<br />
because home prices were falling, now were going broke because<br />
prices were rising.<br />
Congress applied the expected political fix by bailing them out<br />
and taking them over. But that did not stop the losses. It merely<br />
transferred them to the taxpayers. To put an end to the losses,<br />
Congress passed the Housing Fairness and Reform Act (HFRA). It<br />
converted all Bancor-denominated contracts to a new unit of<br />
value—called the "Fairness Value"— which is determined by the<br />
National Average Price Index (NAPI) on Fridays of the preceding<br />
week. This has nothing to do with interest rates. It relates to Bancor<br />
values. For the purpose of illustration, let us convert Bancors back<br />
to dollars. A $50,000 loan on Friday became a $920,000 loan on<br />
Monday. Few people could afford the payments. Thousands of<br />
angry voters stormed the Capitol building in protest. While the<br />
mob shouted obscenities outside, Congress hastily voted to declare<br />
a moratorium on all mortgage payments. By the end of the day, no<br />
one had to pay anything! The people returned to their homes with<br />
satisfaction and gratitude for their wise and generous leaders.<br />
That was only an "emergency" measure to be handled on a<br />
more sound basis later on. Many months have now passed, and<br />
so
|<br />
competition,<br />
I<br />
J<br />
548 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
Congress has not dared to tamper with the arrangement. The voters<br />
would throw them out of office if they tried. Millions of people<br />
have been living in their homes at no cost, except for county taxes,<br />
which were also beyond the ability of anyone to pay. Following the<br />
lead of Congress, the counties also declared a moratorium on their<br />
taxes—but not until the federal government agreed to make up<br />
their losses under terms of the newly passed Aid to Local Governments<br />
Act (ALGA).<br />
Renters are now in the same position, because virtually all<br />
rental property has been nationalized, even that which had been<br />
totally paid for by their owners. Under HFRA, it<br />
is not "fair" for<br />
those who are buying their homes to have an advantage over those<br />
who are renting. Rent controls made it impossible for apartment<br />
owners to keep pace with the rising costs of maintenance and<br />
especially their rising taxes. Virtually all rental units have been<br />
seized by county governments for back taxes. And since the<br />
counties themselves are now dependent on the federal government<br />
for most of their revenue, their real estate has been transferred to<br />
federal agencies in return for federal aid.<br />
All of this was pleasing to the voters who were gratified that<br />
their leaders were "doing something" to solve their problems. It<br />
gradually became clear, however, that the federal government was<br />
now the owner of all their homes and apartments. The reality is<br />
that people are living in them only at the pleasure of the government.<br />
They can be relocated to other quarters if that is what the<br />
government wants.<br />
WAGE-PRICE CONTROLS AND WORK ARMIES<br />
Meanwhile, the UN Wage and Price Stabilization Agency<br />
(WPSA) has instituted wage and price controls to combat inflation.<br />
What few businesses were able to survive the ravages of inflation<br />
are knocked out by these measures. Vital industries have been<br />
seized by the WPSA and prevented from closing. When employees<br />
refuse to work for low, fixed wages or to take the jobs assigned to<br />
them, they are placed under arrest and convicted of anti-democratic<br />
activities. Given a choice between prison or "volunteering"<br />
for the UN Full Employment and Environmental Restoration Army<br />
(FEERA), most of them chose the army. They are now doing the<br />
work prescribed for them in return for food and shelter. Many have<br />
been reassigned to new jobs, new cities, even new countries/<br />
I<br />
I<br />
I<br />
A PESSIMISTIC SCENARIO 549<br />
depending on the employment quotas established by the UN<br />
International Human Resource Allocation Agency (IHRAA). Their<br />
families have been given living quarters which are appropriate to<br />
their work status and their willingness to cooperate.<br />
Automobiles are now used only by the ruling elite who hold<br />
government positions of authority. To the extent possible, workers<br />
have been relocated to barracks which were constructed within<br />
walking distance of major industries. Others use rapid-transit<br />
systems, which have been greatly expanded by FEERA. For middle<br />
management and the more skilled workers who are allowed to live<br />
in the suburbs, there are "Peoples' Van Pools" (PVPs) that shuttle<br />
them to and from assigned boarding areas.<br />
Last week, Maurice Strong, who is now the Director of IHRAA,<br />
toured the fifteen regional subdivisions that have been carved out<br />
of the North-American continent—including the former United<br />
States and Canada—and expressed gratification that America, at<br />
last, has ceased to be an aggressor against the world.<br />
Another twenty years have slipped by, and we now find<br />
ourselves in The New World Order. No one around us is sure<br />
exactly when it began. In fact, there was no official starting date, no<br />
announcement in the media, no ceremony with blaring of trumpets.<br />
Sometime during the past ten or fifteen years, it became<br />
obvious that it just was, and everyone accepted it as the natural<br />
evolution of political trends and necessities. Now, a whole genera-<br />
tion is in place that has no memory of another way of life. Many of<br />
the older folks have all but forgotten the details of their previous<br />
existence. And, of course, many of them have been eliminated.<br />
Schools and <strong>text</strong>books speak of the bygone era as one of unbridled<br />
selfishness, and injustice. Previously commonplace<br />
possessions such as automobiles and private homes and three pairs<br />
of shoes are hardly mentioned, and when they are, they are derided<br />
as wasteful artifacts of a decadent society that, fortunately, has<br />
ceased to exist<br />
NO TAXES OR INFLATION OR DEPRESSIONS<br />
The public is no longer concerned over high taxes. For the most<br />
part, there are none. Everyone works for the government—directly<br />
pr indirectly—and is paid by electronic transfer to a government-<br />
STegulated bank which controls all spending accounts. Even those<br />
large corporations which have been allowed to maintain the
550 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
appearance of private ownership are merely junior partners of<br />
government. They are totally regulated and, at the same time,<br />
totally protected from failure. The amount each citizen receives for<br />
his labor is determined by his technical usefulness and his political<br />
rank. His taxes are pleasantly low or non-existent. The cost of<br />
government now is derived almost totally from expansion of the<br />
money supply—and from the economic value of the work battalions.<br />
Each regional government of the world determines its spending<br />
needs and then offers to sell bonds in the open market to raise the<br />
money. The IMF/World Bank, acting as the UN's central bank, is<br />
the primary buyer. The Bank determines how much money to<br />
allow each regional government and then "purchases" that amount<br />
of bonds. It accomplishes that by making an electronic transfer of<br />
"credits" to one of its correspondent banks within the region<br />
receiving the money. Once that has happened, the local government<br />
can draw upon those credits to pay its bills. Not a single tax<br />
dollar is needed for any of that. The IMF/World bank simply<br />
creates the money and the regional governments spend it.<br />
In days gone by, this increase in the money supply would have<br />
caused prices and wages to go up almost immediately. Not<br />
anymore. Prices and wages are controlled. What does happen,<br />
however, is that the government is caught in its own trap. It needs<br />
to keep the workers happy by giving them wage increases, but it<br />
also needs to keep its factories functioning by allowing price<br />
increases as well. The wage-price spiral, therefore, is not eliminated.<br />
It is merely delayed a few months. And, instead of happening<br />
in response to the interplay of supply and demand in a free<br />
market, it is directed by bureaucratic formula. The end result is the<br />
same either way. The people of the world are still paying the cost of<br />
their international and local governments through the hidden<br />
taxation called inflation.<br />
In the chaotic past, the industrialized nations of the world went<br />
through phases of disruptive inflation often exceeding 1000% per<br />
year. That served a purpose in helping to destroy public faith in<br />
their existing national governments. It softened them up and made<br />
them more willing to accept drastic changes in their life styles and<br />
their political institutions. It paved the way to The New World<br />
Order. But now we have arrived, and extreme inflation rates—at<br />
least in the absence of war—would cause public dissatisfaction and<br />
be counterproductive. Inflation,<br />
A PESSIMISTIC SCENARIO 551<br />
therefore, has now been institutionalized<br />
at a fairly constant 5% per year. That has been determined<br />
to be the optimum level for generating the most revenue<br />
without causing public alarm. Five per cent, everyone agrees, is<br />
"moderate." They can live with that. But we tend to forget that it is<br />
5% per year, forever.<br />
A 5% devaluation applies, not only to the money earned this<br />
year, but to all that is left over from previous years. At the end of<br />
the first year, the original dollar is worth 95 cents. At the end of the<br />
second year, it is reduced again by 5% leaving its worth at 90 cents,<br />
and so on. After 20 years, the government will have confiscated<br />
64% of every dollar we saved at the beginning of our carreers. After<br />
working 45 years, the hidden tax on those dollars will be 90%. The<br />
government will take virtually all of them over our lifetime. Earned<br />
interest will partially offset this effect but it will not alter the<br />
underlying reality of government confiscation.<br />
EFFECT OF "MODEST" 5% INFLATION<br />
For the past forty years, all the published charts illustrating the<br />
decline of the dollar from such-and-such a date to the "present"<br />
show the following type of curve.<br />
PL<br />
$1.00.<br />
.90<br />
.80<br />
.70<br />
.60<br />
.50<br />
.40<br />
.30<br />
.20<br />
.10<br />
Years:<br />
TRCHASING POWER OF ONE DOLLAR<br />
DIMINISHED BY 5% EACH YEAR<br />
" ^/<br />
A 1<br />
S^r A 1 n<br />
CZAGjL aaaI*<br />
III<br />
1<br />
Confiscates yuvo during<br />
working years<br />
-<br />
S f<br />
To<br />
tal<br />
confiscation<br />
over lifetime<br />
- J^<br />
lO 20 30 40 50 60 70
552 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
— a<br />
A PESSIMISTIC SCENARIO 553<br />
These, of course, are averages. A few people in the middle class<br />
of the bureaucracy will have managed to place some of their dollars<br />
into tangible assets or income-producing securities—what few that<br />
remain—where they are somewhat protected from the effects of<br />
inflation. For the vast majority, however, inflation hedges constitute<br />
but a tiny fraction of all they have earned over a lifetime.<br />
And so we find that, in The New World Order, inflation has<br />
been institutionalized at a "modest" level of five per cent. Once in<br />
every five or six generations—as prices climb higher and higher—<br />
new monetary unit can be issued to replace the old in order to<br />
eliminate some of the zeros. But no one will live long enough to<br />
experience more than one devaluation. Each generation is unconcerned<br />
about the loss of the previous one. Young people come into<br />
the process without realizing it is circular instead of linear. They<br />
cannot comprehend the total<br />
because they were not alive at the<br />
beginning and will not be alive at the end. In fact, there need not<br />
even be an end. The process can be continued forever.<br />
By this mechanism—and with the output of work battalions<br />
government can operate entirely without taxes. The lifetime output<br />
of every human being is at its disposal. Workers are allowed a color<br />
TV, state-subsidized alcohol and recreational drugs, and violent<br />
sports to amuse them, but they have no other options. They cannot<br />
escape their class. Society is divided into the rulers and the ruled,<br />
with an administrative bureaucracy in between. Privilege is now<br />
largely a right of birth. The worker class and even most of the<br />
administrators serve masters whom they do not know by name.<br />
But serve they do. Their new lords are the monetary and political<br />
scientists who created and who now control The New World<br />
Order. All of mankind is in a condition of high-tech feudalism.<br />
HIGH-TECH FEUDALISM<br />
Inflation is not the only aspect of economic chaos that is now<br />
under control. Booms and busts in the business cycle are also a<br />
thing of the past Like direct taxes, there are no business cycles any<br />
more. Now that the government has firm control over every<br />
economic check point, business cycles simply are not allowed.<br />
There is no speculation in the market because no one has funds<br />
with which to speculate. There are no expansions of inventories or<br />
capital goods in order to maximize future profits, because inventories<br />
now are determined by formula. Besides, profits are also<br />
determined by formula and, although they are just large enough to<br />
keep pace with inflation, they are guaranteed.<br />
Chaos in the economy is now impossible because it is not<br />
tolerated. Neither is a depression. Yes, there are hundreds of<br />
millions of human beings living under conditions of extreme<br />
hardship, and thousands die of starvation every day, but depressions<br />
are outlawed. No politician, no author, no one in the media<br />
would dare to suggest that the system was a failure. Each month<br />
the government releases new statistics showing in some obscure<br />
way or another that the economy is steadily improving. Although<br />
people are starving everywhere, hunger does not exist anymore.<br />
Although work battalions are crammed into flimsy barracks and<br />
tents, and although older homes and apartment buildings are<br />
falling down for lack of maintenance, forcing more and more<br />
families to share their tiny, unheated dwellings—nevertheless, the<br />
housing shortage is officially being eliminated. There are no more<br />
problems in the economy, because they now are illegal.<br />
VOICES FROM THE PAST<br />
There is a message flashing on the front panel of our time<br />
machine. It reads: Duplicate sequence in memory bank Check years<br />
2826, 2832, 2904, and 1949, That tells us that the on-board computer<br />
has found a similarity between what we are now viewing in the<br />
future and something that was recorded in the past. We had better<br />
check it out. On your keyboard, type: Send data to printer and press<br />
the key labelled Execute.<br />
The first item is coming out of the printer now. It is a warning.<br />
In the year 1816, Thomas Jefferson wrote a letter to Sam Kercheval<br />
in which he said:<br />
We must make our election between economy and liberty, or<br />
profusion and servitude. If we run into such debts as that we must be<br />
taxed in our meat and in our drink, in our necessities and our<br />
comforts, in our labors and our amusements,... our people ... must<br />
come to labor sixteen hours in the twenty-four, give our earnings of<br />
fifteen of these to the government,... have no time to think, no means<br />
of calling our mis-managers to account; but be glad to obtain<br />
sustenance by hiring ourselves out to rivet their chains on the necks of<br />
our fellow-sufferers.... And this is the tendency of all human<br />
governments ... till the bulk of society is reduced to be mere<br />
automatons of misery.... And the forehorse of this frightful team is
.<br />
.<br />
554 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
public debt. Taxation follows that, and in its train wretchedness and<br />
oppression.<br />
Here is the second printout. It is a political commentary and a<br />
prophesy. In the year 1831, a young Frenchman, named Alexis de<br />
Tocqueville, toured the United States to prepare an official report to<br />
his government on the American prison system. His real interest,<br />
however, was the social and political environment in the New<br />
World. He found much to admire in America but he also observed<br />
what he thought were the seeds of its destruction. Upon his return<br />
to France the following year, he began work on a four-volume<br />
analysis of the strengths and weaknesses he found. His perceptivity<br />
was remarkable, and his work, entitled Democracy in America, has<br />
remained as one of the worlds classic works in political science.<br />
This is the part that our computer recognized:<br />
The Americans hold that in every state the supreme power ought<br />
to emanate from the people; but when once that power is constituted,<br />
they can conceive, as it were, no limits to it, and they are ready to<br />
admit that it has the right to do whatever it pleases.... The idea of<br />
rights inherent in certain individuals is rapidly disappearing from the<br />
minds of men; the idea of the omnipotence and sole authority of<br />
society at large rises to fill its place.. .<br />
The first thing that strikes the observation is an innumerable<br />
multitude of men, all equal and alike, incessantly endeavoring to<br />
procure the petty and paltry pleasures with which they glut their lives.<br />
Each of them, living apart, is a stranger to the fate of all the rest; his<br />
children and his private friends constitute to him the whole of<br />
mankind....<br />
Above this race of men stands an immense and tutelary power,<br />
which takes upon itself alone to secure their gratifications and to<br />
watch over their fate. That power is absolute, minute, regular,<br />
provident, and mild. It would be like the authority of a parent ifV like<br />
that authority, its object was to prepare men for manhood; but it seeks,<br />
on the contrary, to keep them in perpetual childhood: it is well content<br />
that the people should rejoice, provided they think of nothing but<br />
rejoicing...<br />
After having thus successively taken each member of the<br />
community in its powerful grasp and fashioned him at will, the<br />
supreme power then extends its arm over the whole community. It<br />
covers the surface of society with a network of small, complicated<br />
rules, minute and uniform, through which the most original minds<br />
1. Basic Writings (New York: Willey Book Co., 1944), pp. 749-50.<br />
A PESSIMISTIC SCENARIO 555<br />
and the most energetic characters cannot penetrate, to rise above the<br />
crowd. The will of man is not shattered, but softened, bent, and<br />
guided; men are seldom forced by it to act, but they are constantly<br />
restrained from acting. Such a power does not destroy, but it prevents<br />
existence; it does not tyrannize, but it compresses, enervates,<br />
extinguishes, and stupefies a people, till each nation is reduced to<br />
nothing better than a flock of timid and industrious animals, of which<br />
the government is the shepherd.. .<br />
Our contemporaries are constantly excited by two conflicting<br />
passions: they want to be led, and they wish to remain free. As they<br />
cannot destroy either the one or the other of these contrary<br />
propensities, they strive to satisfy them both at once. They devise a<br />
sole, tutelary, and all-powerful form of government, but elected by the<br />
people. They combine the principle of centralization and that of<br />
popular sovereignty; this gives them a respite: they console<br />
themselves for being in tutelage by the reflection that they have chosen<br />
their own guardians. Every man allows himself to be put in<br />
leading-strings, because he sees that it is not a person or a class of<br />
persons, but the people at large who hold the end of his chain. By this<br />
system the people shake off their state of dependence just long enough<br />
to select their master and then relapse into it again.<br />
EDUCATION AS A TOOL FOR HUMAN ENGINEERING<br />
The third printout is dated 1904 and is a report issued by the<br />
General Education Board, one of the first foundations established<br />
by John D. Rockefeller, Sr.. The purpose of the foundation was to<br />
use the power of money, not to raise the level of education in<br />
America, as was widely believed at the time, but to influence the<br />
direction of that education. Specifically, it was to promote the<br />
ideology of collectivism and internationalism. The object was to use<br />
the classroom to teach attitudes that encourage people to be passive<br />
and submissive to their rulers. The goal was—and is—to create<br />
citizens who are educated enough for productive work under<br />
supervision but not enough to question authority or seek to rise<br />
above their class. True education was to be restricted to the sons<br />
and daughters of the elite. For the rest, it would be better to<br />
produce skilled workers with no particular aspirations other than<br />
to enjoy life. It was enough, as de Tocqueville phrased it, "that the<br />
people should rejoice, provided they think of nothing but rejoicing."<br />
1 . Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Vol. II (New York: Alfred Knopf,<br />
1945), pp. 290-91, 318-19.
,<br />
and<br />
.<br />
556 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
A PESSIMISTIC SCENARIO 557<br />
In the first publication of the General Education Board, Fred<br />
Gates explained the plan:<br />
In our dreams we have limitless resources, and the people yield<br />
themselves with perfect docility to our molding hands. The present<br />
educational conventions fade from our minds, and unhampered by<br />
tradition, we work our own good upon a grateful and responsive rural<br />
folk. We shall not try to make these people or any of their children into<br />
philosophers of mental learning or of science. We have not to raise<br />
from among them authors, editors, poets, or men of letters. We shall<br />
not search for embryo great artists, painters, musicians, nor lawyers,<br />
doctors, preachers, politicians,<br />
statesmen of whom we have ample<br />
supply. The task we set before ourselves is very simple as well as a<br />
very beautiful one: To train these people as we find them to a perfectly<br />
ideal life just where they are.... in the homes, in the shop, and on the<br />
farm.<br />
BACK TO THE FUTURE<br />
Here is the fourth computer printout from the past. It is a<br />
satire—and a warning. In the year 1949, George Orwell wrote his<br />
classic novel entitled 2984. In it, he portrayed the same "futuristic"<br />
scenes that now lie before us as we sit in our time machine. His<br />
only error appears to have been the date that became the title of his<br />
book. If he were writing it today, it is likely he would call it 2054,<br />
Orwell described the world of our future as being divided into<br />
three regions called Oceania, Eurasia, and Eastasia. Oceania consists<br />
of the Americas plus England, Australia, and the Pacific<br />
Islands; Eurasia is<br />
Russia and continental Europe; Eastasia comprises<br />
China, Japan, Southeast Asia, & India. These superstates are<br />
constantly at war with each other.<br />
The wars are not fought to<br />
conquer the enemy, they are waged for the primary purpose of<br />
controlling the population. The people in all three territories<br />
tolerate their misery and oppression because sacrifices are necessary<br />
in time of war. Most of the stratagems outlined in The Report<br />
from Iron Mountain are to be found in Orwell's narrative, but Orwell<br />
described them first. The think-tank was even willing to credit<br />
Orwell as the source of some of its concepts. For example, on the<br />
subject of establishing a modern, sophisticated form of slavery, the<br />
group at Iron Mountain said:<br />
Up to now, this has been suggested only in fiction, notably in the<br />
works of Wells, Huxley, Orwell, and others engaged in the<br />
imaginative anticipation of the sociology of the future. But the<br />
fantasies projected in Brave New World and 1984 have seemed less and<br />
less implausible over the years since their publication. The traditional<br />
association of slavery with ancient preindustrial cultures should not<br />
blind us to its adaptability to advanced forms of social organization. 1<br />
From this we see that Orwell's work is far more than an<br />
entertaining novel. It is relevant to our present journey in time. Our<br />
would-be masters have studied him carefully. So should we. This is<br />
what he wrote:<br />
[<br />
These three superstates are permanently at war, and have been so<br />
for the past twenty-five years. War, however, is no longer the<br />
desperate, annihilating struggle that it was in the early decades of the<br />
twentieth century.... This is not to say that either the conduct of the<br />
war, or the prevailing attitude toward it, has become less bloodthirsty<br />
or more chivalrous. On the contrary, war hysteria is continuous and<br />
universal in all countries, and such acts as raping, looting, the<br />
slaughter of children, the reduction of whole populations to slavery,<br />
reprisals against prisoners which extend even to boiling and'<br />
burying alive, are looked upon as normal.. .<br />
The primary aim of modern warfare ... is to use up the products of<br />
the machine without raising the general standard of living. [The<br />
"machine" is society's technical and industrial capacity to produce<br />
goods.] ... From the moment when the machine first made its<br />
appearance it was clear to all thinking people that the need for human<br />
drudgery, and therefore to a great extent for human inequality, had<br />
disappeared. If the machine were used deliberately for that end,<br />
hunger, overwork, dirt, illiteracy, and disease could be eliminated<br />
within a few generations....<br />
But it was also clear that an all-around increase in wealth<br />
threatened the destruction—indeed in some cases was the<br />
destruction—of a hierarchical society. In a world in which everyone<br />
worked short hours, had enough to eat, lived in a house with a<br />
bathroom and a refrigerator, and possessed a motorcar or even an<br />
airplane, the most obvious and perhaps the most important form of<br />
inequality would already have disappeared. If it once became general,<br />
wealth would confer no distinction,... Such a society could not long<br />
remain stable. For if leisure and security were enjoyed by all alike, the<br />
great mass of human beings who are normally stupefied by poverty<br />
would become literate and would learn to think for themselves; and<br />
1. "Occasional Paper No. 1," General Education Board, 1904. 1 . Lewin, Report, p. 70.
.<br />
.<br />
.<br />
.<br />
.<br />
558 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
when once they had done this, they would sooner or later realize that<br />
the privileged minority had no function, and they would sweep it<br />
away. In the long run, a hierarchical society was only possible on a<br />
basis of poverty and ignorance. .<br />
.<br />
The essential act of war is destruction, not necessarily of human<br />
lives, but of the products of human labor. War is a way of shattering to<br />
pieces, or pouring into the stratosphere, or sinking into the depths of<br />
the sea, materials which might otherwise be used to make the masses<br />
too comfortable, and hence, in the long run, too intelligent.. .<br />
In practice the needs of the population are always underestimated,<br />
with the result that there is a chronic shortage of half the necessities of<br />
life; but this is looked on as an advantage. It is deliberate policy to keep<br />
even the favored groups somewhere near the brink of hardship,<br />
because a general state of scarcity increases the importance of small<br />
privileges and thus magnifies the distinction between one group and<br />
another.. . . The social atmosphere is that of a besieged city, where the<br />
possession of a lump of horseflesh makes the difference between<br />
wealth and poverty- And at the same time the consequences of being<br />
at war, and therefore in danger, makes the handing over of all power<br />
to a small caste seem the natural, unavoidable condition of survival. .<br />
War, it will be seen, not only accomplishes the necessary<br />
destruction, but accomplishes it in a psychologically acceptable way.<br />
In principle it would be quite simple to waste the surplus labor of the<br />
world by building temples and pyramids, by digging holes and filling<br />
them up again, or even by producing vast quantities of goods and then<br />
setting fire to them. But this would provide only the economic and not<br />
the emotional basis for a hierarchical society.. .<br />
War, it will be seen, is now a purely internal affair.... waged by<br />
each ruling group against its own subjects, and the object of the war is<br />
not to make or prevent conquests of territory, but to keep the structure<br />
of society intact.<br />
THE FUNCTION OF WASTE IN MODERN<br />
TOTALITARIANISM<br />
Once again, it is clear that Orwell's grim narrative was a<br />
primary model for The Report from Iron Mountain. The authors of<br />
that blueprint for our future spoke at length about the value of<br />
planned waste as a means of preventing the masses from improving<br />
their standard of living. They wrote:<br />
The production of weapons of mass destruction has always been<br />
associated with economic "waste." The term is pejorative, since it<br />
1. George Orwell, 1984 (New York: New American Library/Signet, 1949), pp<br />
153-164.<br />
A PESSIMISTIC SCENARIO 559<br />
implies a failure of function. But no human activity can properly be<br />
considered wasteful if it achieves its con<strong>text</strong>ual objective.. .<br />
In the case of military "waste," there is indeed a larger social<br />
utility.. . . In advanced modern democratic societies, the war system . .<br />
has served as the last great safeguard against the elimination of<br />
necessary social classes. As economic productivity increases to a level<br />
further and further above that of minimum subsistence, it becomes<br />
more and more difficult for a society to maintain distribution patterns<br />
insuring the existence of "hewers of wood and drawers of water."...<br />
The arbitrary nature of war expenditures and of other military<br />
activities make them ideally suited to control these essential class<br />
relationships.. . . The continuance of the war system must be assured, if<br />
for no other reason, among others, than to preserve whatever quality<br />
and degree of poverty a society requires as an incentive, as well as to<br />
maintain the stability of its internal organization of power.<br />
These documents from the real past and the imagined future<br />
can help us to better understand our present. The spectacle of<br />
wasteful government spending suddenly becomes logical. It is not<br />
stupidity that pays farmers to destroy their crops, or that purchases<br />
trillion-dollar weapons systems that are never deployed or in some<br />
cases not even completed, or that provides funding for studies of<br />
the sex life of the tse-tse fly, or that gives grants to pornographers<br />
posing as artists. The overriding object behind most of these<br />
boondoggles is to waste the resources of the nation. It is obvious by<br />
now that the decline in living standards in the Western world is<br />
associated with a widening gap between the haves and the<br />
have-nots. What is not so obvious, however, is that this is according<br />
to plan. To that end, massive waste in government spending is not<br />
an unfortunate by-product, it is the goal.<br />
That brings us back to the question of finding an acceptable<br />
substitute for war. War is not only the ultimate waste, it is also the<br />
[ultimate motivation for human action. As Orwell said, waste in the<br />
(absence of war "would provide only the economic and not the<br />
'emotional basis for a hierarchical society." Will the environmentalpollution<br />
model be able to sufficiently motivate human action to be<br />
a substitute for war?<br />
That is<br />
not a safe assumption. The possibility of war in our<br />
future cannot be ruled out. The environmental-pollution model is<br />
not yet thoroughly proven. It is working well for limited purposes<br />
1. Lewiii, Report, pp. 34-35, 40-41.
560 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
and on a limited scale, but it is still doubtful that it will ever equal<br />
the hysteria potential of a physical war. The world planners will<br />
not abandon the use of war until the new model has been proven<br />
over many years. On that point, the Report from Iron Mountain was<br />
emphatic:<br />
When asked how best to prepare for the advent of peace, we must<br />
first reply, as strongly as we can, that the war system cannot<br />
responsibly be allowed to disappear until 1) we know exactly what it<br />
is we plan to put in its place, and 2) we are certain, beyond reasonable<br />
doubt, that these substitute institutions will serve their purposes in<br />
terms of the survival and stability of society.... It is uncertain, at this<br />
time, whether peace will ever be possible. It is far more questionable<br />
. . . that it would be desirable even if it were demonstrably attainable.<br />
REGIONALISM AS A TRANSITION TO WORLD<br />
GOVERNMENT<br />
The coalescing of the world's nations into three regional<br />
superstates was already visible even before we activated our time<br />
machine. The first steps had been strictly economic but were soon<br />
followed by political and military consolidation. The European<br />
Union (EU), including Russia, began with the issuance of a<br />
common money and eventually merged into a functional regional<br />
government. It was Orwell's Eurasia, even though it avoided<br />
calling itself by that name. Treaties binding Canada, the United<br />
States,<br />
Mexico, and South America formed the basic outline of<br />
Oceania, built around the Federal-Reserve Note as the regional<br />
money. Japan eventually became hostile to the West when trading<br />
was no longer to her sole advantage and, along with China which<br />
had been built up by Western aid and technology, and with India<br />
which had been given atomic technology by the West, became the<br />
political center of Eastasia. Even as far back as the 1980s, it was<br />
known as the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere/' Its monetary<br />
system was to be based upon the Yen.<br />
The people of the former nations were not yet ready for a giant<br />
leap into world government. They had to be led to that goal by a<br />
series of shorter and less frightening steps. They were more willing<br />
to surrender their economic and military independence to regional<br />
groupings of people who were closer in ethnic and cultural origin<br />
and who shared common borders. Only after several decades of<br />
1. Ibid., pp. 88-90.<br />
transition was it<br />
A PESSIMISTIC SCENARIO 561<br />
possible to make the final merger. In the meantime,<br />
the world was plunged alternately between war and peace.<br />
After each cycle of war, the population was more frightened,<br />
impoverished, and collectivised. In the end, world government was<br />
irresistible. By that time, the environmental-pollution model and<br />
the alien-invasion model had been perfected to provide high levels<br />
of human motivation. But, even then, regional uprisings were<br />
occasionally engineered when necessary to justify massive<br />
"peacekeeping" operations. War was never fully abandoned. It<br />
remained, as it always had been, a necessity for the stabilization of<br />
society.<br />
HOW FIXED IS THE FUTURE?<br />
Let us return now to the present from which we departed and<br />
reflect upon our journey. The first thing that strikes us is that we<br />
cannot be certain the future will unfold exactly as we have seen it.<br />
There are too many variables. When we originally set our Primary-<br />
Assumption selector to Present trends unaltered, we left the Secondary-<br />
Assumption selector where it was. It was pointing to Banking Crisis.<br />
Had we chosen the next position, No Banking Crisis, our journey<br />
would have been different. We would not have seen long lines of<br />
depositors or panic-buying in<br />
the stores or closing of the stock<br />
market. But we would still have witnessed the same scenes of<br />
despair in the more distant future. We merely would have travelled<br />
a different path of events to get there.<br />
The forces driving our society into global totalitarianism would<br />
not change one iota. We still would have the doomsday mechanisms<br />
at work. We would have the CFR in control of the power<br />
centers of government and the media. And we would have an<br />
electorate which is<br />
unaware of what is being done to them and,<br />
therefore, unable to resist. Through environmental and economic<br />
treaties and through military disarmament to the UN, we would<br />
witness the same emergence of a world central bank, a world<br />
government, and a world army to enforce its dictates. Inflation and<br />
wage/price controls would have progressed more or less the same,<br />
driving consumer goods out of existence and men into bondage.<br />
Instead of moving toward The New World Order in a series of<br />
economic spasms, we merely would have travelled a less violent<br />
path and arrived at exactly the same destination.
I who<br />
562 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
A PESSIMISTIC SCENARIO 563<br />
There is little doubt that the master planners would prefer to<br />
follow the more tranquil route. Patient gradualism is less risky. But<br />
not everything is within their control. Events can get out of hand,<br />
and powerful economic forces can become suddenly unleashed.<br />
Banking crises can occur even without being deliberately caused.<br />
On the other hand, the Cabal also knows that crises are useful<br />
in driving the masses into the corral faster than they would<br />
otherwise move. Therefore, the application of some kind of scientifically<br />
engineered crisis cannot be ruled out. It could take many<br />
forms: Ethnic violence, terrorism, plague, even war itself. But none<br />
of that makes any difference. It will not alter our direction of travel<br />
through time. It will only determine our specific route. Like a<br />
flowing river, it may be diverted this way or that by natural<br />
barriers or even by man-made channels, dikes, and dams, but it<br />
eventually will reach the sea. Our concluding reflection, therefore,<br />
is that it is relatively unimportant whether there will be a banking<br />
crisis or any other cataclysmic event These are all secondary<br />
assumptions which are meaningless. Our only real hope for<br />
averting the new feudalism of the future is to change the Primary<br />
assumption. We must change it to read: Present Trends Reversed.<br />
SUMMARY<br />
A pessimistic scenario of future events includes a banking<br />
crisis, followed by a government bailout and the eventual nationalization<br />
of all banks. The final cost is staggering and is paid with<br />
money created by the Federal Reserve. It is passed on to the public<br />
in the form of inflation.<br />
Further inflation is caused by the continual expansion of<br />
welfare programs, socialized medicine, entitlement programs, and<br />
interest on the national debt. The dollar is finally abandoned as the<br />
defacto currency of the world. Trillions of dollars are sent back to<br />
the United States by foreign investors to be converted as quickly as<br />
possible into tangible assets. That causes even greater inflation than<br />
before. So massive is the inflationary pressure that industry and<br />
commerce come to a halt. Barter becomes the means of exchange.<br />
America takes her place among the depressed nations of South<br />
America, Africa, and Asia—mired together in economic equality.<br />
Politicians seize upon the opportunity and offer bold reforms.<br />
The reforms are more of exactly what created the problem in the<br />
first place: expanded governmental power, new regulatory agen-<br />
I<br />
i<br />
cies, and more restrictions on freedom. But this time, the programs<br />
begin to take on an international flavor. The American dollar is<br />
replaced by a new UN money, and the Federal Reserve System<br />
becomes a branch operation of the IMF/World Bank.<br />
Electronic transfers gradually replace cash and checking accounts.<br />
This permits UN agencies to monitor the financial activities<br />
of every person. A machine-readable ID card is used for that<br />
purpose. If an individual is red flagged by any government agency,<br />
the card does not clear, and he is cut off from all economic<br />
transactions and travel. It is the ultimate control.<br />
Increasing violence in the streets from revolutionary movements<br />
and ethnic clashes provide an excuse for martial law. The<br />
public is happy to see UN soldiers checking ID cards. The<br />
police-state arrives in the name of public safety.<br />
Eventually all private dwellings are taken over by the government<br />
as a result of bailing out the home-mortgage industry. Rental<br />
property is also taken, as former landlords are unable to pay<br />
property taxes. People are allowed to live in these dwellings at<br />
reasonable cost, or no cost at all. It gradually becomes clear,<br />
however, that the government is now the owner of all homes and<br />
apartments. People are living in them only at the pleasure of the<br />
government. They can be reassigned at any time.<br />
Wages and prices are controlled. Dissidents are placed into<br />
work armies. There are no more autos except for the ruling elite.<br />
Public transportation is provided for the masses, and those with<br />
limited skills live in government housing within walking distance<br />
of their assigned jobs. Men have been reduced to the level of serfs<br />
are subservient to their masters. Their condition of life can<br />
only be described as high-tech feudalism.<br />
There is no certainty that the future will unfold in exactly that<br />
manner, because there are too many variables. For example, if we<br />
had assumed that there will not be a banking crisis, then our<br />
journey would be different. We would not see long lines of<br />
depositors or panic-buying in the stores or closing of the stock<br />
market But we would still witness the same scenes of despair in<br />
the more distant future. We merely would have travelled a<br />
different path of events to get there. That is because the forces<br />
driving our society into global totalitarianism would not have<br />
changed one iota. We still would have the doomsday mechanisms<br />
at work. We would have the CFR in control of the power centers of
564 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
government and the media. We would have an electorate which is<br />
unaware of what is being done to them and, therefore, unable to<br />
resist. Through environmental and economic treaties and through<br />
military disarmament to the UN, we would witness the same<br />
emergence of a world central bank, a world government, and a<br />
world army to enforce its dictates. Inflation and wage/price<br />
controls would have progressed more or less<br />
the same, driving<br />
consumer goods out of existence and men into bondage. Instead of<br />
moving toward The New World Order in a series of economic<br />
spasms, we merely would have travelled a less violent path and<br />
arrived at exactly tine same destination.<br />
Chapter Twenty-Six<br />
A REALISTIC<br />
SCENARIO<br />
What must be done if we are to avert the<br />
pessimistic scenario; a list of specific measures<br />
that must be taken to stop the monetary binge; an<br />
appraisal of how severe the economic hangover<br />
will be; a checklist for personal survival— and<br />
beyond.<br />
The pessimistic scenario presented in the previous chapter is<br />
the kind of narrative that turns people off. No one wants to hear<br />
those things, even if<br />
they are true—or we should say especially if<br />
they are true. As Adlai Stevenson said when he was a candidate for<br />
President: "The contest between agreeable fancy and disagreeable<br />
fact is unequal. Americans are suckers for good news."<br />
So, where is<br />
the optimistic scenario in which everything turns<br />
out all right, in which prosperity is restored and freedom is<br />
preserved after all? Actually, it is not hard to locate. You can find it<br />
every day somewhere in your newspaper. It is the shared faith of<br />
almost all politicians, experts, and commentators. If that is what<br />
you want to hear, you have just wasted a lot of time reading this<br />
book.<br />
There is no optimistic scenario. Events have progressed too far<br />
for that. Even if we begin to turn things around by forcing<br />
Congress to cut spending, reduce the debt, and disentangle from<br />
UN treaties, the Cabal will not let go without a ferocious fight.<br />
When the Second Bank of the United States was struggling for its<br />
life in 1834, Nicholas Biddle, who controlled it, set about to cause as<br />
much havoc in the economy as possible and then to blame it on<br />
President Jackson's anti-bank policies. By suddenly tightening<br />
credit and withdrawing money from circulation, he triggered<br />
full-scale national depression. At the height of his attack, he<br />
declared: "All other banks and all the merchants may break, but the<br />
a
566 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND A REALISTIC SCENARIO 567<br />
Bank of the United States shall not break." The amount of<br />
devastation that could be caused by today's Federal Reserve is<br />
infinitely greater than what Biddle was able to unleash. It would be<br />
pure self-deception to think that the Cabal would quietly give up<br />
its power without exercising that option. We must conclude that no<br />
one is going to get out of this one unscathed. There is hell to pay,<br />
and it is we who are going to pay it.<br />
SEVENTH REASON TO ABOLISH THE FED<br />
What has any of this to do with the Federal Reserve System?<br />
The answer is that the Federal Reserve is the starting point of the<br />
pessimistic scenario. The chain of events begins with fiat money<br />
created by a central bank, which leads to government debt, which<br />
causes inflation, which destroys the economy, which impoverishes<br />
the people, which provides an excuse for increasing government<br />
power, which is £n on-going process culminating in totalitarianism.<br />
Eliminate the Federal Reserve from this equation, and the pessimistic<br />
scenario ceases to exist. That is the seventh and final reason to<br />
abolish the Fed: It is an instrument of totalitarianism.<br />
If the optimistic scenario is<br />
too optimistic and the pessimistic<br />
scenario is too pessimistic, then what is the scenario that we should<br />
hope lies in our future?<br />
There is a middle course that lies between optimism and<br />
pessimism. It is called realism. Calling it a realistic scenario is not<br />
meant to imply that it is predetermined to happen, nor that it is<br />
even likely to happen. It is realistic only in the sense that it can<br />
happen if certain conditions are met. The balance of this chapter<br />
will be devoted to an analysis of those conditions.<br />
Let us begin by allowing our opponent, Cynicism, to state the<br />
problem we face: "Is it realistic to believe that the current trends<br />
can actually be reversed? Isn't it just fantasy to think that anything<br />
can be done at this late date to break the CFR's hold over<br />
government, media, and education? Do we really expect the<br />
gum-chewing public to go upstream against the indoctrination of<br />
newspapers, magazines, television, and movies?"<br />
Apathy joins in: "Forget it. There's nothing you can do. The<br />
bankers and politicians have all the money and all the power. The<br />
1 . See chapter seventeen.<br />
game is already over. Make the most of it, and enjoy life while you<br />
can.<br />
Do not listen to Cynicism and Apathy. They are agents of your<br />
enemy. They want you to quietly get in line and submit without a<br />
struggle. However, they do make a point that must not be<br />
overlooked. The battle has progressed far, and our position is not<br />
good. If we are to reverse the present trends, we must be prepared<br />
to make a herculean effort. That does not mean "Write your<br />
Congressman" or ''Vote on Tuesday" or "Sign a petition" or "Send<br />
in a donation." That is far too easy. Those measures still play an<br />
important role in the battle plan but they fall far short of the need.<br />
Armchair campaigns will no longer do it.<br />
Before turning to the question of what kind of effort will be<br />
required, let us first be clear on what it is we want to accomplish.<br />
WHAT MUST NOT BE DONE<br />
Let us begin with the negatives: what must not be done. The<br />
most obvious item in this category is that we must not turn to<br />
government for more of the same "cures" that have made us ill. We<br />
do not want more power granted to the Fed or the Treasury or the<br />
President, nor do we need another government agency. We probably<br />
don't even need any new laws, with the possible exception of<br />
those legislative acts which repeal some of the old laws now on the<br />
books. Our goal is the reduction of government, not its expansion.<br />
We do not want to merely abolish the Fed and turn over its<br />
operation to the Treasury. That is a popular proposal among those<br />
who know there is a problem but who have not studied the history<br />
of central banking. It is a recurrent theme of the Populist movement<br />
and those advocating what they call Social Credit. Their argument<br />
is that the Federal Reserve is privately owned and is independent<br />
of political control. Only Congress is authorized to issue the<br />
nation's money, not a group of private bankers. Let the Treasury<br />
issue paper money and bank credit, they say, and we can have all<br />
the money we need without having to pay one penny in interest to<br />
the bankers.<br />
It is an appealing argument, but it contains serious flaws. First,<br />
the concept that the Fed is privately owned is a legal fiction The<br />
member banks hold stock, but it carries no voting weight. No<br />
matter how large the bank or how much capital is<br />
paid in, each<br />
bank has one vote. The stock cannot be sold or traded. Stockholders
568 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
have none of the usual elements of control that come with<br />
ownership and, in fact, they are subservient to the central board.<br />
The seven members of the Board of Governors are appointed by the<br />
President and confirmed by the Senate. It is true that the Fed is<br />
independent of direct political control, but it must never be forgotten<br />
that it was created by Congress and it can be extinguished by<br />
Congress. In truth, the Federal Reserve is neither an arm of<br />
government nor is it private. It is a hybrid. It is an association of the<br />
large commercial banks which has been granted special privileges<br />
by Congress. A more accurate description would be simply that it<br />
is a cartel protected by federal law.<br />
But the more important point is that it makes no difference<br />
whether the Fed is government or private. Even if it were entirely<br />
private, merely turning it over to the government would not alter<br />
its function. The same people undoubtedly would run it, and they<br />
would continue to create money for political purposes. The Bank of<br />
England is the granddaddy of central banks. It was privately<br />
owned at its inception but became an official arm of the British<br />
government in more recent times. It continues to operate as a<br />
central bank, and nothing of substance has changed. The central<br />
banks of all the other industrialized nations are direct arms of their<br />
respective governments. They are indistinguishable in function<br />
from the Federal Reserve. The technicalities of structure and<br />
ownership are not as important as function. Turning the Federal<br />
Reserve over to the Treasury without at the same time denuding it<br />
of its function as a central bank—that is, its ability to manipulate<br />
the money supply—would be a colossal waste of time.<br />
The proposal of having the Treasury issue the nation's money is<br />
another question and has nothing to do with who owns the Fed.<br />
There is nothing wrong with the federal government Issuing<br />
money so long as it abides by the Constitution and adheres to the<br />
principle of honesty. Both of these restraints forbid Congress from<br />
issuing paper money that is not 100% backed by gold or silver. If<br />
you are in doubt about the reasoning behind that statement, it<br />
would be a good idea to review chapter fifteen before continuing.<br />
It is true that, if Congress had the power to create as much<br />
money as it needs without the Federal Reserve System, interest<br />
would not have to be paid on the national debt. But the Fed holds<br />
only a small percentage of the debt. Over 90% of those bonds are<br />
held by individuals and institutions in the private sector. Terminat-<br />
A REALISTIC SCENARIO 569<br />
ing interest payments would not hurt those big, bad bankers nearly<br />
as much as it would the millions of people who would lose their<br />
insurance policies, investments, and retirement plans. The Social<br />
Credit scheme would wipe out the economy in one fell swoop.<br />
And we still would not have solved the deeper problem. The<br />
bankers would be cut out of the scam, but the politicians would<br />
remain. Congress would now be acting as its own central bank, the<br />
money supply would continue to expand, inflation would continue<br />
to roar, and the nation would continue to die. Besides, issuing<br />
money without gold or silver backing violates the Constitution.<br />
THE JFK RUMOR<br />
In 1981, a rumor was circulated that President Kennedy had<br />
been assassinated by agents of the hidden money power because he<br />
had signed Executive Order #11110 instructing the Treasury to<br />
print more than $4 billion in United States Notes. That is precisely<br />
the kind of money we are discussing: paper bills without gold or<br />
silver backing issued by the government, not the Federal Reserve.<br />
According to the rumor, the bankers were furious because they<br />
would lose interest payments on the money supply. When the<br />
Order was tracked down, however, it involved Silver Certificates,<br />
not United States Notes. Silver Certificates are backed by silver'<br />
which means they are real money, so the rumor was wrong on that<br />
point. But there is no interest paid on Silver Certificates either, so<br />
the rumor held up on that point. There was a third point, however,<br />
which everyone seemed to overlook. The Executive Order did not<br />
instruct the Treasury to issue Silver Certificates. It merely authorized<br />
it to do so. There is no evidence that this was ever done. If the<br />
Certificates were printed at all,<br />
they never found their way into<br />
circulation. In 1987, the order was rescinded by President Reagan.<br />
The Treasury did print a small supply of United States Notes in<br />
1963, but these were authorized by an 1878 act of Congress to<br />
replace Civil War Greenbacks which had been retired from circulation.<br />
JFK did not initiate that issue. The greatest quantity of those<br />
Notes to be in circulation since their last printing in 1969 was $322<br />
million—not a significant figure compared to Federal Reserve<br />
Notes. Most of them are now collectors' items. 1<br />
1. See Currency in U.S. History, (Kansas City: Federal Reserve Bank, n.d.), pp. 10, 11.
[<br />
570 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
A REALISTIC SCENARIO 571<br />
The persistent rumor regarding the bankers' role in JFK's death<br />
was reinforced by several books circulated in conservative circles.<br />
They contained an ominous passage from Kennedy's speech at<br />
Columbia University, just ten days before his assassination. He is<br />
quoted as saying: "The high office of President has been used to<br />
foment a plot to destroy the Americans' freedom, and before I leave<br />
office I must inform the citizen of his plight." However, when<br />
Columbia University was contacted to provide a transcript of the<br />
speech, it was learned that Kennedy never spoke there—neither ten<br />
days before his assassination nor at any other timel Ronald Whealan,<br />
head librarian at the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library in Boston,<br />
provides this additional information: "Ten days prior to the<br />
assassination he was at the White House meeting with, among<br />
others, the ambassador to the United States from Portugal."<br />
It is possible that the President did make the remarks attributed<br />
to him on a different date before a different audience. Even so, it is<br />
a cryptic message which could have several meanings. That he<br />
intended to expose the Fed is the least likely of them all. Kennedy<br />
had been a life-long socialist and internationalist. He had attended<br />
the Fabian London School of Economics; participated in the<br />
destruction of the American money supply; and engineered the<br />
transfer of American wealth to foreign nations. There is little reason<br />
to believe that he had suddenly "seen the light" and was preparing<br />
to reverse his life-long beliefs and commitments.<br />
MONETARISTS VS SUPPLY-SIDERS<br />
But we are off the topic. Let us return to those unworkable<br />
theories regarding monetary reform. Prominent in this category are<br />
the Monetarists and the Supply-Siders. The Monetarists, adhering<br />
to the theories of Milton Friedman, believe that money should<br />
continue to<br />
be be created by the Mandrake Mechanism of the<br />
Federal Reserve, but that the supply should be determined by a<br />
strict formula established by Congress, not the Fed. The Supplysiders,<br />
represented by Arthur Laffer and Charles Kadlec, believe in<br />
formulas also, but they have a different one. They want the<br />
1. Quoted by M.J. "Red" Beckman, Born Again Republic (Billings, Montana: Freedom<br />
Church, 1981), p. 23; also by Lindsey Williams, To Seduce A Nation (Kasilof,<br />
Arkansas: Worth Publishing, 1984), p. 26.<br />
2. Letter to Hoi lee Haswell, Curator at the Low Memorial Library, Columbia<br />
University, October 13, 1987.<br />
quantity of money to be determined by the current demand for<br />
gold. They are not talking about a true gold standard in which<br />
paper money is fully backed. By following what they call a<br />
''gold-price rule/' they would simply observe the price of gold in<br />
the free market and then tinker with the dollar by expanding or<br />
contracting the money supply to keep its relative value, compared<br />
to gold, fairly constant.<br />
These groups are alike in their underlying philosophy. Each has<br />
a different goal and a different formula, but they agree on method:<br />
manipulation of the money supply. They share the same conviction<br />
that the free market will not work without assistance; the same<br />
faith in the wisdom and integrity of politically-created formulas,<br />
bureaus, and agencies. The Fed remains unscathed throughout all<br />
these debates because it is the ultimate mechanism for intervention.<br />
These people don't really want to change it. They just want their<br />
turn at running it.<br />
Occasionally a truly original proposal appears that captures<br />
one's attention. Addressing a prestigious gathering of conservative<br />
monetary theorists in 1989, Jerry Jordan suggested that the monetary<br />
base could be expanded by holding a national lottery. The<br />
government would pay out more dollars in prize money than it<br />
received in ticket sales. The excess would represent the amount by<br />
which the monetary base would expand. Presumably, if they<br />
wanted to contract the money supply, they would pay out fewer<br />
dollars than taken in. It was an intriguing thought, but Mr. Jordan<br />
was quick to add: 'The problem, of course, is that there would not<br />
be any effective institutional restraint on the growth of the monetary<br />
base."<br />
Indeed, that is the problem with all schemes involving<br />
monetary control by men.<br />
BALANCED-BUDGET AMENDMENT<br />
A so-called balanced-budget amendment to the Constitution is<br />
not the answer either. In fact, it is an illusion and a fraud. Some of<br />
the biggest spenders in Congress are supporters. They know that it<br />
is<br />
popular with the voters but would not cramp their spending<br />
style in the least. If<br />
they were not permitted to spend more than<br />
they receive in taxes, they would have a perfect excuse for raising<br />
taxes. It would be a way of punishing the voters for placing limits<br />
"The Future of Price Stability in A Fiat Money World/' by Jerry L. Jordan, Dwell<br />
Journal ofMoney and Banking, August, 1989, p. 24.
572 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
on them. The voters, on the other hand, would collapse under the<br />
burden of higher taxes and demand that their Congressmen<br />
circumvent the very amendment they previously supported. And<br />
that would be easy. Most versions of the balanced-budget amendment<br />
have an escape hatch built for just that purpose. Congress<br />
shall balance its budget "except in cases of emergency." Who decides<br />
what constitutes an emergency? Congress, of course. In other<br />
words, Congress shall balance its budget except when it doesn't<br />
want to. So what else is new?<br />
A serious amendment would have to tackle, not balancing the<br />
budget, but limiting the spending. If that were done, the budget<br />
would take care of itself. But even that would be a waste of time<br />
considering the present composition of Congress. Instead of generating<br />
political pressure for a Constitutional amendment, we would<br />
be better off directing that same effort toward throwing the big<br />
spenders out of office. As long as the spenders are allowed to stay<br />
in there, they will find a way to get around any law—including the<br />
Constitution itself.<br />
Another flaw in most versions of the balanced-budget amendment<br />
is that it would not affect the off-budget expenditures called<br />
entitlements. They now represent 52% of all federal outlays and are<br />
growing by 12% each year. A strategy that ignores that backbreaking<br />
load is not worth even considering. Furthermore, even if<br />
Congress could be forced to stop deficit spending, the balancedbudget<br />
amendment would not solve the problem of inflation or<br />
paying off the national debt. The Federal Reserve can now inflate<br />
our money supply by using literally any debt in the world. It does<br />
not have to come from Congress. Unless we zero in on the Fed<br />
itself, we will just be playing political games with no chance of<br />
winning.<br />
Every year, a few concerned Congressmen submit a bill to<br />
investigate or audit the Federal Reserve System. They are to be<br />
commended for their effort, but the process has been an exercise in<br />
futility. Their bills receive little or no publicity and never get out of<br />
committee for a vote. Even if they did receive serious attention,<br />
however, they could actually be counterproductive.<br />
On the surface, it would appear that there is nothing wrong<br />
with a Congressional investigation or an audit, but what is there to<br />
investigate? We must assume the Fed is doing exactly what it says<br />
and is in total compliance with the law. A few minor improprieties<br />
"<br />
A REALISTIC SCENARIO 573<br />
probably would be discovered involving personal abuse of funds<br />
or insider profiteering, but that would be minor compared to the<br />
gigantic fraud that already is out in the open for all to see. The<br />
Federal Reserve is<br />
the world's largest and most successful scam.<br />
Anyone who understands the nature of money can see that without<br />
a team of investigators and auditors.<br />
The danger in a proposal to audit the Fed is that it would<br />
provide an excuse to delay serious action for several years while<br />
the audit is going on. It would give the public a false impression<br />
that Congress is doing something. It also would give the monetary<br />
technicians an opportunity to lay down a smoke screen of verbiage<br />
and confusing statistics. The public would expect that all the<br />
answers will be forthcoming from the investigation, but the very<br />
groups and combines that need to be investigated would be<br />
conducting, or at least confounding, the investigation. By the time<br />
fourteen volumes of testimony, charts, tables, and exhibits finally<br />
appear, the public would be intimidated and fatigued. The bottom<br />
line is that we do not need a bill to audit the Fed. We need one to<br />
abolish it.<br />
A PLAN FOR ELIMINATING THE FED<br />
So much for things not to do. Now let's get down to the<br />
business at hand. To abolish the Federal Reserve System would be<br />
quite simple. All that would be required is an act of Congress<br />
consisting of one sentence: The Federal Reserve Act and all of its<br />
amendments are hereby rescinded. But that would wipe out our<br />
monetary system overnight and create such havoc in the economy<br />
that it would play right into the hands of the globalists. They would<br />
use the resulting chaos as evidence that such a move was a mistake,<br />
and the American people would likely welcome a, rescue from the<br />
IMF/World Bank. We would find ourselves back in the Pessimistic<br />
Scenario even though we had done the right thing.<br />
There are certain steps that must precede the abandonment of<br />
the Fed if we are to have a safe passage. The first step is to convert<br />
our present fiat money into real money. That means we must create<br />
an entirely new money supply which is 100% backed by precious<br />
jQnetal—and we must do so within a reasonably short period of<br />
ime. To that end, we also must establish the true value of our<br />
present fiat money so it can be exchanged for new money on a
574 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
realistic basis and phased out of circulation. Here is how it can be<br />
done:<br />
1. Repeal the legal-tender laws. The federal government will<br />
continue accepting Federal Reserve Notes in the payment of<br />
taxes, but everyone else will be free to accept them, reject them,<br />
or discount them as they wish. There is no need to force people<br />
to accept honest money. Only fiat money needs the threat of<br />
imprisonment to back it up. Private institutions should be free to<br />
innovate and to compete. If people want to use Green Stamps or<br />
Disney-ride coupons or Bank-of-America Notes as a medium of<br />
exchange, they should be free to do so. The only requirement<br />
the Green-Stamp<br />
should be faithful fulfillment of contract. If<br />
company says it will give a crystal lamp for seven books of<br />
stamps, then it should be compelled to do so. Disney should be<br />
required to accept the coupon in exactly the manner printed on<br />
the back. And, if Bank of America tells its depositors they can<br />
have their dollars back any time they want, it shouJd be required<br />
to keep 100% backing (coins or Treasury Certificates) in its vault<br />
at all times. In the transition to a new money, it is anticipated<br />
that the old Federal Reserve Notes will continue to be widely<br />
used.<br />
2. Freeze the present supply of Federal Reserve Notes, except for<br />
what will he needed in step number eleven.<br />
3. Define the "real" dollar in terms of precious-metal content,<br />
preferably what it was in the past: 371.25 grains of silver. It<br />
could be another weight of silver or even another metal, but the<br />
old silver dollar is a proven winner.<br />
4. Establish gold as an auxiliary monetary reserve which can be<br />
substituted for silver, not at a fixed-price ratio, but at whatever<br />
ratio is set by the free market. Fixed ratios always become unfair<br />
over time as the prices of gold and silver drift relative to each<br />
other. Although gold may be substituted for silver at this ratio,<br />
it is only silver that is the foundation for the dollar.<br />
5. Restore free coinage at the U.S. Mint and issue silver "dollars"<br />
as well as gold "pieces." Both dollars and pieces will be defined<br />
by metal content, but only coins with silver content can be called<br />
dollars, half-dollars, quarter-dollars, or tenth-dollars (dimes). At<br />
first,<br />
these coins will be derived only from metal brought into<br />
A REALISTIC SCENARIO 575<br />
the Mint by private parties. They must not be drawn from the<br />
Treasury's supply which is reserved for use in step number six.<br />
6. Pay off the national debt with Federal Reserve Notes created for<br />
that purpose. Creating money without backing is forbidden by<br />
the Constitution; however, when no one is<br />
forced by law to<br />
accept Federal Reserve Notes as legal tender, they will no longer<br />
be the official money of the United States. They will be merely a<br />
kind of government script which no one is required to accept.<br />
Their utility will be determined by their usefulness in payment<br />
of taxes and by the public's anticipation of having them<br />
exchanged for real money at a later date. The creation of Federal<br />
Reserve Notes, with the understanding that they are not the<br />
official money of the United States, would therefore not be a<br />
violation of the Constitution. In any event, the deed is already<br />
done. The decision to redeem government bonds with Federal<br />
Reserve Notes is not ours. Congress decided that long ago, and<br />
the course was set at the instant those bonds were issued. We are<br />
merely playing out the hand. The money will be created for that<br />
purpose. Our only choice is when: now or later. If we allow the<br />
bonds to stand, the national debt will be repudiated by inflation.<br />
The value of the original dollars will gradually be reduced to<br />
zero while only the interest remains. Everyone's purchasing<br />
power will be destroyed, and the nation will die. But if we want<br />
not to repudiate the national debt and decide to pay it off now,<br />
we will be released from the burden of interest payments and, at<br />
the same time, prepare the way for a sound monetary system.<br />
7. Pledge the government's hoard of gold and silver (except the<br />
military stockpile) to be used as backing for all the Federal<br />
Reserve Notes in circulation. The denationalization of these<br />
assets is long overdue. At various times in recent history, it was<br />
illegal for Americans to own gold, and their private holdings<br />
were confiscated. The amount which was taken should be<br />
returned to the private sector as a matter of principle. The rest of<br />
the gold supply also belongs to the people, because they paid for<br />
it<br />
through taxes and inflation. The government has no use for<br />
gold or silver except to support the money supply. The time has<br />
come to give it back to the people and use it for that purpose.<br />
8. Determine the weight of all the gold and silver owned by the<br />
U.S. government and then calculate the total value of that<br />
supply in terms of real (silver) dollars.
576 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
9. Determine the number of all the Federal Reserve Notes in<br />
circulation and then calculate the real-dollar value of each one<br />
by dividing the value of the precious metals by the number of<br />
Notes.<br />
10. Retire all Federal Reserve Notes from circulation by offering to<br />
exchange them for dollars at the calculated ratio. There will be<br />
enough gold or silver to redeem every Federal Reserve Note in<br />
circulation.<br />
11. Convert all contracts based on Federal Reserve Notes to dollars<br />
using the same exchange ratio. That includes the contracts called<br />
mortgages and government bonds. In that way, monetary<br />
values expressed within debt obligations will be converted on<br />
the same basis and at the same time as currency.<br />
12. Issue Silver Certificates. As the Treasury redeems Federal<br />
Reserve Notes for dollars,<br />
recipients will have the option of<br />
taking coins or Treasury Certificates which are 100% backed.<br />
These Certificates will become the new paper currency.<br />
13. Abolish the Federal Reserve System. It would be possible to<br />
allow the System to continue as a check clearing-house so long<br />
as it did not function as a central bank. A check clearing-house<br />
will be needed, and the banks that presently own the Fed should<br />
be allowed to continue performing that service. However, they<br />
must no longer receive tax subsidies to operate, and competition<br />
must be allowed. However, the Federal Reserve System, as<br />
presently chartered by Congress, must be abolished.<br />
14. Introduce free banking. Banks should be deregulated and, at<br />
the same time, cut loose from protection at taxpayers' expense.<br />
No more bailouts. The FDIC and other government "insurance"<br />
agencies should be phased out, and their functions turned over<br />
to real insurance companies in the private sector. Banks should<br />
be required to keep 100% reserves for demand deposits, because<br />
that is a contractual obligation. All forms of time deposits<br />
should be presented to the public exactly as CDs are today. In<br />
other words, the depositor should be fully informed that his<br />
1. Since the value of FRNs would be firmly established in terms of real dollars,<br />
there would be no compelling reason to exchange them, and it is possible that<br />
people would continue to use them in daily commerce. Therefore, to retire the FRNs<br />
and make the transition as quickly as possible, it would be necessary to have the<br />
banks automatically exchange them for real dollars whenever they are deposited.<br />
In short order, they would become collectors' items and historical curiosities.<br />
A REALISTIC SCENARIO 577<br />
money is invested and he will have to wait a specified time<br />
before he can have it back. Competition will insure that those<br />
institutions that best serve their customers' needs will prosper.<br />
Those that do not will fall by the wayside—without the need of<br />
an army of bank regulators.<br />
15. Reduce the size and scope of government No solution to our<br />
economic problems is possible under socialism. It is the author's<br />
view that the government should be limited to the protection of<br />
life, liberty, and property—nothing more. That means the<br />
elimination of almost all of the socialist-oriented programs that<br />
now infest the federal bureaucracy. If we hope to<br />
retain—or<br />
perhaps to regain—our freedom, they simply have to go. To that<br />
end, the federal government should sell all assets not directly<br />
related to its primary function of protection; it should privately<br />
sub-contract as many of its services as possible; and it should<br />
greatly reduce and simplify its taxes.<br />
16. Restore national independence. A similar restraint must be<br />
applied at the international level. We must reverse all programs<br />
leading to disarmament and economic interdependence. The<br />
most significant step in that direction will be to Get us out of the<br />
UN and the UN out of the US, but that will be just the beginning.<br />
There are hundreds of treaties and administrative agreements<br />
that must be rescinded. There may be a few that are constructive<br />
and mutually beneficial to us and other nations, but the great<br />
majority of them will have to go. That is<br />
not because we are<br />
isolationist. It is simply because we want to avoid being<br />
engulfed in global tyranny.<br />
Some will say that paying off the national debt with Federal<br />
Reserve Notes amounts to a repudiation of the debt. Not so.<br />
Accepting the old Notes for payment of taxes is not repudiation.<br />
Exchanging them for their appropriate share of the nation's gold or<br />
silver is not repudiation. Converting them straight across to a<br />
sound money with little or no loss of purchasing power is not<br />
repudiation. The only thing that would be repudiated is<br />
the old<br />
I monetary system, but that was designed to be repudiated. The<br />
monetary and political scientists who created and sustained the<br />
Federal Reserve System never intended to repay the national debt.<br />
It has been their ticket to profit and power. Inflation is repudiation<br />
on the installment plan. The present system is a political trick, an
Although<br />
578 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
accounting gimmick. We are merely acknowledging what it is. We<br />
are simply refusing to pretend we don't understand what they are<br />
doing to us. We are refusing to play the game any longer.<br />
MEASURING THE SIZE OF THE HANGOVER<br />
So those are the sixteen steps, but what are their effects?<br />
should come as no surprise that there is a price to pay for a return<br />
to monetary sobriety. A hangover cannot be avoided, except by<br />
continuing the binge, which is the road to death. Lef s take a look at<br />
what this binge has already cost us. We will measure that by<br />
calculating how much each Federal Reserve Note will be worth<br />
when the new money appears.<br />
The following figures are presented for illustrative purposes<br />
only. The data are drawn from public sources and from the Federal<br />
Reserve itself, but there is no way to know how accurate they really<br />
are. In addition to the question of accuracy, there are some<br />
statistical items which are so obscure that not even the experts at<br />
the Fed are certain what they mean. When the time comes to apply<br />
this program, it will be necessary to assemble a task force of experts<br />
who can audit the books and assay the metals. Nevertheless, based<br />
on the best information available to the public, this is what we get:<br />
The total quantity of silver held by the government on<br />
September 30, 1993, was 30,200,000 troy ounces. If we<br />
assume the new dollar will be defined as 371.25 grains of<br />
silver (which equals .77344 troy ounces), then that supply is<br />
valued at $39,046,338. 1<br />
The price of gold on that date was 384.95 Federal-Reserve notes<br />
per ounce. Silver was 4.99 fiat dollars per ounce. The ratio<br />
between them, therefore, was 77-to-l.<br />
The supply of gold was 261,900,000 ounces. The value of the<br />
gold supply, therefore, (at 77 times its weight in ounces) was<br />
$26,073,517,000.<br />
The value of silver and gold combined would be<br />
$26,112,563,338.<br />
It<br />
I<br />
The<br />
A REALISTIC SCENARIO 579<br />
The number of Federal-Reserve notes this supply would have to<br />
redeem would be the combined total of the Ml money<br />
supply (currency and demand deposits) plus the additional<br />
number of notes needed to pay off the national debt. Ml on<br />
September 27, 1993, was 1,103,700,000,000 FRNs. 1 The<br />
national debt stood at 4,395,700,000,000 FRNs. The total<br />
amount to be redeemed, therefore, would be<br />
5,499,400,000,000 FRNs.<br />
bottom line of this calculation is that the value of each<br />
Federal-Reserve note will be equal to .0047 silver dollar. One<br />
silver dollar would be worth 213 Federal-Reserve notes!<br />
BAD, BUT NOT THAT BAD<br />
That will be a bitter pill to swallow, but it sounds worse than it<br />
really is.<br />
Remember that the new dollars will have more purchasing<br />
power than the old. Coins will play a larger role in everyday<br />
transactions. The nickel phone call and the ten-cent cigar will have<br />
returned. In the beginning at least, the price of these items probably<br />
will be less than that. As explained in chapter seven, any quantity of<br />
gold or silver will work as the foundation for a monetary system. If<br />
the quantity is low—as certainly will be the case at the time of<br />
transition—it merely means the value of each unit of measure will<br />
be high. In that case, coins will solve the problem. Pennies would<br />
be used for a cup of coffee; one mill (a tenth of a cent) would pay<br />
for a phone call, and so on. New, small-denomination tokens<br />
would fill that need. In a relatively short period of time, however,<br />
the monetary supply of gold and silver would increase in response<br />
to free-market demand. When the supply increases,<br />
the relative<br />
value will decrease until a natural equilibrium is reached—as<br />
always has happened in the past. At that point, the tokens will no<br />
longer be needed and can be phased out.<br />
An inconvenience? Yes. Vending machines will have to be<br />
retrofitted for the new coins, but that would be no more difficult<br />
than retrofitting them to take paper bills or plastic debit cards,<br />
which is what will be required if we do not adopt these measures. It<br />
is a small price to pay for an orderly return to real money.<br />
1 ,<br />
the weight of the silver-dollar is 412.5 grains (.8594 troy ounces), it is<br />
only 90% pure. Its silver content, however, is exactly 371.25 grains (.77344 troy<br />
ounces).<br />
1. For those who feel that M2 or M3 would be a more logical figure, see "Is Ml<br />
Subtractive or Accumulative?" in the Appendix, containing the author's notes and<br />
correspondence with the Federal Reserve.
580 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
Another possible solution would be to redefine the new dollar<br />
to contain a smaller quantity of silver. The advantage would be that<br />
we could continue to use our present coinage. On the negative side,<br />
however, is the fact that it would create headaches after the<br />
transition, because coinage then would be too cheap. Instead of<br />
changing over now, we would merely be postponing the task for<br />
later. Now is the time to do it—and do it right. The original value of<br />
a silver dollar was determined after centuries of trial and error. We<br />
don't have to reinvent the wheel. We know that it will work in the<br />
long run.<br />
In the past, the banks have enjoyed a bountiful cash flow from<br />
interest on money created out of nothing. That will change. They<br />
will have to make a clear distinction between demand deposits and<br />
time deposits. Customers wilJ be informed that, if they want the<br />
privilege of receiving their money back on demand, their deposit of<br />
coins or Treasury Certificates will be kept in<br />
the vault and not<br />
loaned to others. Therefore, it will not earn interest for the bank. If<br />
must charge<br />
the bank cannot make money on the deposit, then it<br />
the depositor a fee for safeguarding his money and for checking<br />
services. If the customer wants to earn interest on his deposit, then<br />
he will be informed that it will be invested or loaned out, in which<br />
case he cannot expect to get it back any time he wants. He will<br />
knowingly put his money into a time deposit with the agreement<br />
that a specified amount of time must pass before the investment<br />
matures.<br />
The effect of this practice on banking will be enormous. Banks<br />
will have to pay higher interest rates to attract investment capital.<br />
They will have to trim their overhead expenses and eliminate some<br />
of the plush. Profit margins will be tightened. Efficiency will<br />
improve. They used to offer "free" services which actually were<br />
paid out of interest earned on their customers' demand deposits.<br />
Now they will charge for those services, such as checking and safe<br />
storage of deposits. Customers probably will grumble at first at<br />
having to pay for those things, and there will be no more free<br />
toasters.<br />
Electronic transfer systems will probably become popular for<br />
their convenience, but they will be optional. Cash and check<br />
transactions will continue to play an important role. Government<br />
monitoring will be illegal. Although there will be fewer dollars in<br />
circulation than there were Federal Reserve Notes, the value of<br />
A REALISTIC SCENARIO 581<br />
each one will be correspondingly greater. Each person will end up<br />
with the same purchasing power he had before the conversion. For<br />
a<br />
short period, both the old and the new money will circulate<br />
together, and some people will have difficulty making the necessary<br />
calculations to determine their relative values. But that is<br />
routine operation for people who live in Europe or for anyone who<br />
travels to a foreign country. There is no reason to think that<br />
Americans are too stupid to handle it.<br />
SOME BAD NEWS AND SOME GOOD<br />
We should not delude ourselves into thinking that this will be<br />
an easy transition. It will be a very difficult period, and people will<br />
have to get used to a whole new way of thinking and doing. The<br />
freeze on the current money supply may trigger panic in the stock<br />
market and the business community. Stock prices could tumble,<br />
causing paper fortunes to disappear back into the computers from<br />
which they came. Some businesses may fold for a lack of easy<br />
credit. Weak banks will be allowed to close rather than be bailed<br />
out with taxes. Unemployment may worsen for a while. Those who<br />
have been used to a free ride will now have to walk or push or pay<br />
their way. The masses on welfare will not give up their checks and<br />
food stamps quietly. The media will fan the flames of discontent.<br />
The Cabal will be at every switch to derail the train.<br />
This will be the moment of our greatest danger, the moment<br />
when the people could tire of their hard journey in the desert and<br />
lose interest in the promised land. This is the time when they may<br />
long for a return to captivity and head back to the slave pits of<br />
Pharaoh.<br />
The important point, however, is that most of these problems<br />
would be temporary. They would be present only during the<br />
period of transition to a new money. As soon as free coinage is<br />
available at the Mint, and as soon as people see how much demand<br />
there is for silver and gold coins, there will be a steady stream of<br />
miners and jewelers who will add great new stores of precious<br />
metal to the nation's monetary stock. Foreigners undoubtedly will<br />
add to the inflow. Old silver and gold coins will also reappear in<br />
the market place. Very quickly, as the stores of precious metal<br />
respond to supply and demand, the quantity of money will<br />
increase and its per-unit value will drop to its natural equilibrium.<br />
a
582 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
'<br />
A REALISTIC SCENARIO 583<br />
Won't that be inflation? Yes it will, but it will be significantly<br />
different from inflation by fiat money on four counts: (1) instead of<br />
being caused by politicians and bankers attempting to manipulate<br />
the economy to enhance their personal agendas, it will be caused<br />
by natural economic forces seeking an equilibrium of supply and<br />
demand; (2) instead of being harmful to the nation, leading to the<br />
destruction of the economy, it<br />
will be part of a healing process,<br />
leading to prosperity; (3) it will be less severe than what we will<br />
experience if we do not make the transition; and (4), instead of<br />
being part of a continuum that is designed to go on forever, it will<br />
have a built-in termination point: the point of natural equilibrium<br />
where the human effort to mine gold and silver equals the effort to<br />
create those things which gold and silver can buy. When that point<br />
is<br />
reached, the money supply will cease to expand, and inflation<br />
will stop—once and for all. The hangover will be gone. From that<br />
point forward, prices will begin a gradual descent as advances in<br />
technology allow improved efficiency in production. With the<br />
arrival of lower prices, better job opportunities, and increasing<br />
prosperity, the voices of discontent will gradually fade. After the<br />
storm is over, America will have an honest money supply, a<br />
government with no national debt, and an economy without<br />
inflation.<br />
No matter what scenario unfolds in the future, there is white<br />
water ahead. We had better tighten our straps and prepare for the<br />
rapids. We owe it to ourselves and our families to take measures<br />
which will increase our chances of coming out at the other side. If<br />
the pessimistic scenario is played out, it will make little difference<br />
what we do, because there will be no other side. But in the realistic<br />
scenario, there are certain precautions that will make a big difference<br />
in our economic well being.<br />
To fully appreciate the wisdom of some of these measures, it is<br />
well for us to pause and consider the possibility that a transition to<br />
economic safety and sanity will not be orderly. Another variant of<br />
the realistic scenario is that our entire system could collapse,<br />
including the international structure being assembled at the UN. If<br />
that should happen, we won't have to worry about an orderly<br />
transition to a sound monetary system, because it won't happen.<br />
Our primary concern will be basic survival.<br />
Economic chaos and civil disorder would not necessarily have to<br />
be the prelude to world government. If a sufficient number of<br />
people were well enough informed to know in advance what the<br />
enemy's game plan is, and especially if they were in the right places<br />
within the system, they might be able to provide leadership at the<br />
critical moment. If there is blood in the streets and long periods of<br />
anarchy, it is theoretically possible that groups of enlightened<br />
individuals who have prepared in advance could move into the<br />
power vacuum and take charge. That may sound like another<br />
pessimistic scenario, but it is not. In the final analysis, it may be the<br />
most realistic one of all. But we should not hope for it. All we can<br />
do is prepare for it should it come to pass.<br />
HOW TO PREPARE<br />
What can we do to prepare financially? To avoid making this a<br />
lengthy dissertation, let's use the outline form. Elaboration should<br />
not be necessary.<br />
1. Get out of debt. A mortgage on one's home is a logical exception,<br />
provided the price is right. Borrowing for one's business is also<br />
an exception if based on a sound business plan. Speculative<br />
investments are not a good idea in these times unless they are<br />
made with money you can afford to lose.<br />
2. Pick a sound bank. Maintain accounts at several institutions. Do<br />
not keep over $100,000 in any one bank. Remember that not all<br />
types of accounts are covered by FDIC. Some institutions now<br />
offer private insurance. Make sure you know to what extent you<br />
are at risk.<br />
3. Diversify your investments among blue ribbon, over-thecounter,<br />
growth, income, large, small, mutuals, bonds, real<br />
estate, bullion coins, mining stock, and tangibles. Industries that<br />
do well in hard times are gambling, alcohol, and escapist<br />
entertainment. Study the fields and companies in which you<br />
invest. Personal knowledge is indispensable.<br />
:4. Avoid the most recent "best" performers. Their great track<br />
records are historical. They have no bearing on future<br />
performance. To the contrary, they may now be overpriced and<br />
1. That is not an easy assignment. It helps to have professional assistance from an<br />
independent source which is able to analyze asset quality> loan ratios, equity ratios,<br />
loan-loss reserves, and the like. One of the best sources of this kind of information<br />
is Veribanc. For a nominal fee, this bank-rating service will provide you with<br />
detailed reports on any bank or saving & loan in America. If you want their<br />
brochure, write to them at P.O. Box 461, Wakefield, MA 01880.
584 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
poised for a fall.<br />
See how an investment fared over the long<br />
run—at least fifteen years—and particularly how it performed<br />
during periods of economic downturn.<br />
5. When investing in coins, avoid those with high numismatic<br />
value—unless you are prepared to become an expert. As with<br />
other types of investments, seek advice but don't depend on it.<br />
The same is true for diamonds, art pieces, and other collectibles.<br />
Stay with what you know. Otherwise, you will be vulnerable in<br />
shark-infested waters where even the most experienced traders<br />
can lose money.<br />
6. Maintain a stash of cash, including some old silver coins. The<br />
currency should be enough to provide your family with<br />
necessities for about two months. The coins are for more severe<br />
and prolonged conditions. There is no "correct" quantity. It is a<br />
matter of personal judgment and financial ability.<br />
PROFITING FROM DISASTER<br />
All of this is aimed at surviving the storm and preparing<br />
ourselves to offer leadership in troubled times ahead. That is a<br />
rather negative view. There is a more positive outlook for those<br />
who are looking for good news, as Adlai Stevenson said. It is the<br />
exciting prospect that we can turn this calamity to our advantage.<br />
We can actually profit from the coming collapse. That thought has<br />
spawned hundreds of books and newsletters offering advice on<br />
how to get rich while others are being destroyed. There is even one<br />
that gives advice on how to cash in on the environmental-industry<br />
boom. The pitch is how to make a fortune on the downfall of<br />
America.<br />
There is no doubt that opportunities exist to profit from<br />
investment decisions based on a realistic appraisal of current<br />
trends. Most of those opportunities/ however depend on making<br />
market-timing decisions. One must know precisely when to buy,<br />
when to self, and at what price. To know all that, the investor must<br />
become expert on the nature of the industries involved and must<br />
monitor the daily shifts in market forces. He must attempt to<br />
complete his analysis and reach his conclusions in advance of the<br />
crowd. And, of course, he must be right Most investors are not<br />
prepared to do that, so they must depend on the services of<br />
professionals, usually the same experts who are encouraging them<br />
to invest in these kinds of enterprises. If the investment is<br />
profit-<br />
A REALISTIC SCENARIO 585<br />
able, the analyst receives an income. If the investment turns sour,<br />
the analyst still receives an income.<br />
That relationship is not unique to the "profit-from-crash"<br />
group, however. It is to be found at every level of the investment<br />
business as well as within the legal and medical professions. The<br />
customer pays for the advice regardless of its quality. What is<br />
disturbing about this investment concept is that it actually may<br />
help to make matters worse. By focusing on finding clever ways to<br />
avoid the effects of inflation or of making a profit from it, we are<br />
doing nothing to stop it and, thereby, encouraging its continuation.<br />
Those who are gaining from inflation are not likely to offer serious<br />
resistance to it. As they watch their profits pile up, they may<br />
become its most ardent supporters—
586 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND A REALISTIC SCENARIO 587<br />
working together, however, they multiply their efforts and<br />
equal a force of nine. That is the power of organization. When<br />
choosing an organization, look for experienced and principled<br />
leadership which has proven that it understands the deeper<br />
issues and cannot be sidetracked by the Cabal.<br />
4. Form an educational study group. Give it an enticing name such<br />
as The Reality Club or The Awareness Lunch Bunch. Make the<br />
meetings interesting and short. Use local speakers, ask members<br />
to give book reviews, show videos, have mock debates, throw<br />
parties. The goal is<br />
choir.<br />
to reach new people, not to preach to the<br />
5. Form ad-hoc committees, along with other like-minded friends,<br />
to promote specific projects and programs. Here are a few<br />
hypothetical examples covering a range of issues: The<br />
Committee for Sound Money, Parents for Better Education,<br />
Americans for Tax Relief, North-Bay Residents for Private<br />
Property. That is an excellent way to bring pressure to bear on<br />
the political structure and, at the same time, attract the support<br />
of new people who share your common objective.<br />
6. Expand your influence within the community. People seldom<br />
follow strangers. Become known and respected for your<br />
knowledge. Join groups which are influential within your city<br />
or profession. Political groups are particularly important,<br />
regardless of party. Volunteer for work and seek a leadership<br />
role. Personally visit your city and county politicians and<br />
maintain ongoing communication. Send them books, articles,<br />
baseball tickets—anything to make sure they don't forget who<br />
you are. This is doubly important for political candidates. If you<br />
have the talent and the aptitude, consider running for some kind<br />
of public office yourself.<br />
7. Use politics, don't be used by it We got into our present mess<br />
through politics and we must get out the same way; but getting<br />
out is a lot harder than getting in. The strategy, however, is<br />
simple: remove the big-spending internationalists from office<br />
and replace them with men and women dedicated to sound<br />
money and national independence. The way to remove the<br />
spenders is to expose their voting records to their constituents,<br />
most of whom have no idea how they vote on key issues. The<br />
way to get better candidates elected is to volunteer to work in<br />
their campaigns. Work within party organizations where<br />
possible but beware! Never allow loyalty to the party to<br />
override loyalty to principle. Political parties are always<br />
controlled from the top, and the major parties are controlled by<br />
the very forces we must oppose. It is imperative that you and<br />
your candidate remain independent of party control. Otherwise,<br />
your money and your effort eventually will be used against<br />
you.<br />
With that warning aside, we should be encouraged by the fact<br />
that the task is not as overwhelming as it seems. The power to<br />
reverse the present trend rests in the hands of only 535 people.<br />
There are 435 Representatives and 100 Senators. To control a<br />
majority, all we have to do is influence the election of 268 people. In<br />
reality, if we began to come even close to that figure, we likely<br />
would see a wave of sudden political conversions among those<br />
who remain in office. It is possible that we could achieve our goal<br />
by influencing the election in only 100 Congressional districts! By<br />
using the political freedom that yet remains in our system, we can<br />
overthrow the government of the United States every two years<br />
without firing a shot! But we had better get going on it. Time is<br />
running out.<br />
CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY<br />
We have finally come to the end of this book. It was not a<br />
<strong>text</strong>book on banking theory. It was a who-dunnit, and by now you<br />
know the answer.<br />
We have covered a vast expanse of history and have wandered<br />
yfar afield from our main topic. It was necessary. Without the larger<br />
TOew, the case against the Federal Reserve System would have been<br />
^veak. It would have omitted the elements of war, revolution,<br />
[depression, and fraud. Without that long journey, we would be<br />
limited to a sterile discussion of interest rates, discount policies,<br />
and reserve ratios. That is not where the body is hidden.<br />
In the foreword, it was stated that there were seven reasons to<br />
abolish the Federal Reserve System. It is time to repeat them here:<br />
1. An excellent analysis of the voting records of all Congressmen and Senators is<br />
published each year by The New American magazine, P.O. Box 8040, Appleton,<br />
Wisconsin 54913. The same organization makes available bulk supplies of<br />
pamphlets tailored to each Congressional district for distribution to the public. The<br />
big spenders hate them!
588 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND<br />
• It is incapable of accomplishing its stated objectives.<br />
• It is a cartel operating against the public interest.<br />
• It is the supreme instrument of usury.<br />
• It generates our most unfair tax.<br />
• It encourages war.<br />
• It destabilizes the economy.<br />
• It is an instrument of totalitarianism.<br />
The purpose of this book has been to demonstrate the accuracy<br />
of those assertions.<br />
A plan for recovery was finally presented which involves<br />
sixteen steps, each based upon lessons which emerged from<br />
history. These lessons were mingled with a large amount of theory<br />
which is traceable only to the mind of the author himself. Which is<br />
to say there is no guarantee the plan will work. But it is a plan. It is<br />
better to fail trying than to do nothing. Like men on a sinking ship,<br />
we must risk the water. We cannot stay where we are.<br />
There undoubtedly are technical flaws in these proposals, for<br />
the mechanism is merely a prototype. Someone surely will discover<br />
a gear that will not mesh or a lever that is disconnected. It will need<br />
the additional work of specialists in many diverse fields. Even then,<br />
the job will not be complete, for it must finally be handed over to<br />
those who are skilled in drafting legislation. Their task will be<br />
two-fold. First, they must make it workable in the real world of<br />
politics. Secondly, they must prevent loopholes and vagaries which<br />
could eventually subvert the plan.<br />
But none of these considerations should deter us from beginning<br />
the process. We may not have answers to all<br />
the technical<br />
questions, but we do have an answer to the big question. We do<br />
know that the Federal Reserve System must be abolished. Let us,<br />
therefore, begin.<br />
The Creature has grown large and powerful since its conception<br />
on <strong>Jekyll</strong> Island. It now roams across every continent and<br />
compels the masses to serve it, feed it, obey it, worship it. If it is not<br />
slain, it will become our eternal lord and master.<br />
Can it be slain? Yes it can.<br />
How will it be slain? By piercing it with a million lances of truth.<br />
Who will slay it? A million crusaders with determination and<br />
courage.<br />
The crusade has already begun.<br />
AN INVITATION<br />
If you would like to join me in this crusade to<br />
abolish the Federal Reserve and to restore American<br />
prosperity, let me know who you are. I will advise<br />
you of important developments and will put you in<br />
touch with others who are already in the battle. I<br />
will also send you a list of books, videos, pamphlets,<br />
and other materials you will need for carrying the<br />
message to your friends. Send a self-addressed,<br />
business-size envelope with two postage stamps to:<br />
G. Edward Griffin<br />
P.O. Box 4646<br />
Westlake Village, CA 91359-1646<br />
Materials may also be obtained at our website:<br />
www.realityzone.com
590 APPENDIX<br />
(A.) STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION<br />
OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM<br />
The three main components of the Fed are: (1) the national Board<br />
of Governors, (2) the regional Reserve Banks, and (3) the Federal Open<br />
Market Committee. Lesser components include: (4) the commercial<br />
banks which hold the stock, and (5) the advisory councils.<br />
The function of the national Board of Governors is to determine<br />
the system's monetary policy. The Board consists of seven members<br />
who are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.<br />
Their terms of office are fourteen years and are staggered so that they<br />
do not coincide with the presidential term of office. The purpose of this<br />
is to insure that no single President can dominate Fed policy by<br />
stacking the Board with his appointments. One Board member is<br />
appointed as the Chairman for four years and another as Vice<br />
Chairman for four years. The Chairman controls the staff and is the<br />
single most powerful influence within the system.<br />
Control is exercised by the Board and a handful of top staff<br />
employees. The Federal Reserve Act mandated that the President,<br />
when selecting Governors "shall have due regard to a fair representation<br />
of the financial, agricultural, industrial and commercial<br />
interests, and geographical divisions of the country." This mandate is<br />
now almost completely ignored, and the men come primarily from the<br />
fields of banking and finance.<br />
The function of the regional Reserve Banks is to hold cash reserves<br />
of the system, supply currency to member banks, clear checks, and act<br />
as fiscal agent for the government.<br />
The twelve regional Reserve Banks are located in Atlanta, Boston,<br />
Chicago, Cleveland, Dallas, Kansas City, Minneapolis, New York,<br />
Philadelphia, Richmond, San Francisco, and St. Louis. They are<br />
corporations with stock held by the commercial banks which are<br />
members of the system. Member banks elect the directors of the<br />
regional Reserve Banks of which they are a part. The larger banks hold<br />
more shares but they have only one vote in the selection of the<br />
Directors.<br />
Within each regional-bank system there are nine Directors. The<br />
member banks elect three Class-A directors who represent the banking<br />
industry and three Class-B directors who represent the general public.<br />
The remaining three Class-C directors are appointed by the national<br />
Board. The Chairman and Vice Chairman of each regional Reserve<br />
Bank must be Class-C directors. The selection of President and other<br />
officers is subject to veto by the national Board of Governors. In this<br />
way, the national Board is able to exercise control over the regional<br />
branches of the system.<br />
APPENDIX 591<br />
The function of the Federal Open Market Committee is to implement<br />
the monetary policy set by national Board, although it exercises<br />
considerable autonomy in setting its own policy. It manipulates the<br />
money supply and interest rates primarily by purchasing or selling<br />
government securities—although it also accomplishes that through the<br />
purchase or sale of foreign currencies and the securities of other<br />
governments as well. Money is<br />
created and interest rates go down<br />
when it purchases. Money is extinguished and interest rates go up<br />
when it sells. Policy is formulated on a daily basis. In fact, it is<br />
monitored by the minute and the Committee often intervenes in the<br />
market to affect immediate changes.<br />
The Open Market Committee is composed of the national Board of<br />
Governors plus five of the twelve regional Presidents who serve on a<br />
rotating basis. The exception to this is the President of the New York<br />
regional Bank who is always on the Committee. Thus, once again, the<br />
System is firmly in control of the national Board with the President of<br />
the New York regional Bank being more powerful than the others.<br />
Twenty-four bond dealers handle all sales of government securities.<br />
Government agencies cannot exchange with each other without<br />
going through dealers who earn commissions on each transaction.<br />
Decisions are made at secret meetings. A brief report is released to<br />
the public six weeks later, but transcripts of the deliberations are<br />
destroyed. That policy was begun in 1970 when the Freedom-of-Information<br />
Act was passed. Not even the CIA enjoys such secrecy.<br />
The function of the member banks is to conduct the nation's<br />
banking business and to implement the System's monetary policy in<br />
terms of putting money into or drawing it out of the system at the<br />
point of contact with individual or corporate borrowers.<br />
This leads to the troublesome question of ownership. The federal<br />
government does not own any stock in the System. In that sense, the<br />
Fed is privately owned. That, however, is misleading in that it implies<br />
a typical private-ownership relationship in which the stockholders<br />
own and control. Nothing could be further from the truth. In this case,<br />
the stock carries no proprietary interest, cannot be sold or pledged as<br />
collateral, and does not carry ordinary voting rights. Each bank is<br />
entitled to but one vote regardless of the amount of stock it holds. In<br />
reality, the stock is not evidence of "ownership" but simply certificates<br />
showing how much operating capital each bank has put into the<br />
System. It is not a government agency and it is not a private corporation<br />
in the normal sense of the word. It is subject to political control yet,<br />
because of its tremendous power over politicians and the elective<br />
process, it has managed to remain independent of political oversight.<br />
Simply stated, it is a cartel, and its organizational structure is uniquely<br />
structured to serve that end.
592 APPENDIX<br />
(B.) NATURAL LAWS<br />
OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR IN ECONOMICS<br />
NATURAL LAW NO. 1<br />
LESSON: When gold (or silver) is used as money and when the<br />
forces of supply and demand are not thwarted by government<br />
intervention, the amount of new metal added to the money supply<br />
will always be closely proportional to the expanding services and<br />
goods which can be purchased with it. Long-term stability of prices<br />
is the dependable result of these forces. This process is automatic<br />
and impartial. Any attempt by politicians to intervene will destroy<br />
the benefit for all. Therefore,<br />
LAW: Long-term price stability is possible only when the<br />
money supply is based upon the gold (or silver) supply without<br />
government interference.<br />
NATURAL LAW NO. 2<br />
LESSON: Whenever government sets out to manipulate the<br />
money supply, regardless of the intelligence or good intentions of<br />
those who attempt to direct the process, the result is inflation,<br />
economic chaos, and political upheaval. By contrast, whenever<br />
government is limited in its monetary power to only the<br />
maintenance of honest weights and measures of precious metals,<br />
the result is price stability, economic prosperity, and political<br />
tranquility. Therefore,<br />
LAW: For a nation to enjoy economic prosperity and political<br />
tranquility, the monetary power of its politicians must be limited<br />
solely to the maintenance of honest weights and measures of<br />
precious metals.<br />
NATURAL LAW NO. 3<br />
LESSON: Fiat money is paper money without precious-metal<br />
backing and which people are required by law to accept. It allows<br />
politicians to increase spending without raising taxes. Fiat money<br />
is the cause of inflation, and the amount which people lose in<br />
purchasing power is exactly the amount which was taken from<br />
them and transferred to their government by this process. Inflation,<br />
therefore, is a hidden tax. This tax is the most unfair of all because<br />
it falls most heavily on those who are least able to pay: the small<br />
wage earner and those on fixed incomes. It also punishes the thrifty<br />
by eroding the value of their savings. This creates resentment<br />
among the people/ leading always to political unrest and national<br />
disunity. Therefore,<br />
LAW: A nation that resorts to the use of hat money has doomed<br />
itself to economic hardship and political disunity.<br />
APPENDIX 593<br />
NATURAL LAW NO. 4<br />
LESSON: Fractional money is paper money which is backed by<br />
precious metals up to only a portion of the face amount. It is a<br />
hybrid, being part receipt money and part fiat money. Generally,<br />
the public is unaware of this fact and believes that fractional money<br />
can be redeemed in full at any time. When the truth is discovered,<br />
as periodically happens, there are runs on the bank, and only the<br />
first few depositors in line can be paid. Since fractional money<br />
earns just as much interest for the bankers as does gold or silver, the<br />
temptation is great for them to create as much of it as possible. As<br />
this happens, the fraction which represents the reserve becomes<br />
smaller and smaller until, eventually, it is reduced to zero.<br />
Therefore,<br />
LAW: Fractional money will always degenerate into fiat<br />
money. It is but fiat money in transition.<br />
NATURAL LAW NO. 5<br />
LESSON: It is human nature for man to place personal<br />
priorities ahead of all<br />
others. Even the best of men cannot long<br />
resist the temptation to benefit at the expense of their neighbors if<br />
the occasion is placed squarely before them. This is especially true<br />
when the means by which they benefit is obscure and not likely to<br />
be perceived as such. There may be exceptional men from time to<br />
time who can resist that temptation, but their numbers are small.<br />
The general rule will prevail in the long run.<br />
A managed economy presents men with precisely that kind of<br />
opportunity. The power to create and extinguish the nation's<br />
money supply provides unlimited potential for personal gain.<br />
Throughout history the granting of that power has been justified as<br />
being necessary to protect the public, but the results have always<br />
been the opposite. It has been used against the public and for the<br />
personal gain of those who control. Therefore,<br />
LAW: When men are entrusted with the power to control the<br />
money supply, they will eventually use that power to confiscate the<br />
wealth of their neighbors.
.<br />
594 APPENDIX APPENDIX 595<br />
(C.)<br />
IS M-l SUBTRACTIVE OR ACCUMULATIVE?<br />
Below is a copy of the author's letter to Mike Dubrow at the Public<br />
Information department of the Federal Reserve System. In a telephone<br />
conversation on February 14, 1994, Mr. Dubrow said that the assumption<br />
stated in the letter would be correct if it were not for the fact that<br />
the system is under the control of a central bank. The Federal Reserve,<br />
he said, would not allow that to happen, because it would be<br />
inflationary. The Fed would reduce the money supply to offset the<br />
effect of monetary expansion as dollars moved from M-l to M-2 and<br />
back to M-l again. In other words, the assumption is correct, but the<br />
Fed has the power to offset it—if it wants to. The bottom line is that<br />
M-l is accumulative. As such, it is the most meaningful measure of the<br />
money supply.<br />
Q. Cdwwtd Qfdffin<br />
ftaoc 4646, Wntfafa Vtfbtye OR 91359<br />
MikeDubrow<br />
FAX #(202) 452-2707<br />
FederalReserveSystem<br />
Washington.DC<br />
DearMr. Dubrow,<br />
January 19, 1994<br />
Aswe discussed duringourphoneconversation this<br />
morning, I am preparing a paper on the Federal Reserve<br />
System, and an interesting question has arisen. Jt is so<br />
fund amental that almost everyone withwhom I have spoken<br />
thought they knew the answer but, upon analysis,<br />
have concluded theywere not so su re after alJ<br />
IS Ml SUBTRACTIVE OR ACCUMULATIVE?<br />
It is my u nderstanding that there are three optional<br />
definitions ofthemoney supply:<br />
Ml = currency + short-term deposits.<br />
+ short-term time deposits,<br />
M2 = M 1<br />
M3 = M2 + institutional long-term deposits.<br />
It is clear that, when money is paid out ofa checking<br />
account and put into a savings account, it increases M2,<br />
but the question is: Does it remain as part ofM 1 or is it<br />
subtracted from it? Herbert Mayo, in his book Investments<br />
(Chicago: Dryden Press, 1983), says "If individuals<br />
shift funds from savings accounts to checking<br />
accounts, the money supply is increased under the<br />
narrow definition (M-l) but is unaffected if the<br />
broader definition (M-2) is employed." This implies<br />
that, when money is moved from a checking account<br />
to a savings account, it is subtracted from M 1 . Otherwise,<br />
it would not increase Ml when it is moved back<br />
again from savings to checking. When we spoke on<br />
the phone, you confirmed that his interpretation is<br />
correct.<br />
But how can that be?The money moved from checking<br />
to savings or any other investment does not d isappear<br />
into a vault. It is spent in fulfillment ofthe<br />
investment project. It is given to a vendor or a contractor<br />
or an employee and reappears in theircheckingaccounts<br />
where it becomes part ofM 1 once again. It would seem,<br />
therefore, that it doesn't really leave M 1 at all. It merely<br />
increases M2.<br />
I have hypothesized one possible explanation. It is<br />
that the money does, in fact, disappear into a vault, or<br />
at least into a bookkeeping ledger, for a short period of<br />
time. That would be the time between its deposit into<br />
the savings account and its subsequent transfer to<br />
the checking accounts of borrowers. The time period<br />
might be short — perhaps less than thirty days on the<br />
average—but it still needs to be considered when calculating<br />
the money aggregates. Therefore, Ml is reduced<br />
when money is transferred from checking to<br />
savings, but that is only a temporary effect. M 1 will<br />
be increased once again just as soon as the new M2<br />
money is redirected to borrowers. Is that a correct explanation?<br />
Thankyou foryou r help with these puzzling items.<br />
Sincerely,<br />
G.EdwardGriffin<br />
(805)496-1649
. Why<br />
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Siegel, Barry. Money in Crisis: The Federal Reserve, the Economy, and Monetary Reform.<br />
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger, 1984<br />
Simpson, Colin. The Lusitania. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1972.<br />
Smith, Arthur. The Real Colonel House. New York: George H. Doran Company, 1918.<br />
Smith, Vera C. The Rationale of Central Banking. London: P.S. King & Son, 1936.<br />
Smyth, Albert Henry, ed. The Writings of Benjamin Franklin. New York: Macmillan, 1906.<br />
VoL VU<br />
BIBUOGRAPHY 601<br />
Sprague, Irvine H. Bailout: An Insider's Account of Bank Failures and Rescues. New York:<br />
Basic Books, 1986.<br />
Steffens, Lincoln. The Letters of Lincoln Steffens. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1941.<br />
Stephenson, Nathaniel Wright. Nelson W. Aldrich in American Politics. New York:<br />
Scribners, 1930; rpt. New York: Kennikat Press, 1971.<br />
Sumner, William Graham. A History ofAmerican Currency. New York: Holt, 1884.<br />
Sutton, Anthony C The Best Enemy Money Can Buy. Billings, Montana: Liberty House<br />
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. National Suicide: Military Aid to the Soviet Union. New Rochelle. New York:<br />
Arlington House, 1973.<br />
Wall Street and the Bolshevik Revolution.<br />
House, 1974<br />
.<br />
—<br />
.<br />
New Rochelle, New York: Arlington<br />
Wall Street and FDR. New Rochelle, New York: Arlington House, 1975.<br />
Wall Street and the Rise of Hitler. Seal Beach, California; '76 Press, 1976.<br />
—. The War on Gold. Seal Beach, California: '76 Press, 1977.<br />
Tocqueville, Alexis de. Democracy in America, Vol. II. New York: Alfred Knopf, 1945.<br />
Trotsky, Leon. My Life. New York: Scribner's, 1930.<br />
Turner, Dennis. When Your Bank Fails. Princeton, New Jersey: Am well Publishing, Inc.,<br />
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. From Farm Boy to Financier. New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1935.<br />
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Wrangell-Rokassowsky, Carl. Before the Storm. Ventimiglia, Italy: Tipo-Litografia Ligure,<br />
1972.<br />
Yago, Glenn, junk Bonds: How High Yield Securities Restructured Corporate America. New<br />
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602 INDEX<br />
INDEX 603<br />
Acceptances: 416, 426-427, 480-483, 486,<br />
490, 495<br />
Adlai Stevenson: 565, 584<br />
Aeroflot: 301<br />
Agfa Ansco: 482<br />
Aldrich Bill: 441^143, 448, 456, 459, 462,<br />
464, 469<br />
Aldrich, Nelson: «, 20, 24, 205, 437,<br />
439, 441, 445, 448, 464, 469<br />
American Acceptance Council: 482<br />
American Bankers Association: 462<br />
American Express Company: 482<br />
American I.G. Chemical Corporation: 482<br />
American Trust Company: 482<br />
AMTRAX: 45, 63<br />
Andrew, Abraham Piatt: 5, 11, 24<br />
Andropov, Yuri: 530<br />
Anti-Semitism: 285, 289, 414-415, 417-419<br />
Archbold, John D.: 245<br />
Armour, J. Ogden: 454<br />
Articles of Confederation: 316, 318<br />
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation<br />
Agreement (APEC): 112<br />
Aspen Institute: 532<br />
Astor family: 272<br />
Bailey, Sir Abe: 272<br />
Baker, George F.: 6, 443, 454<br />
Baker, James: 116,118<br />
Balanced-budget amendment: 571-572<br />
Balfour, Arthur: 238, 271<br />
Ballard, Robert: 248<br />
Baltimore & Ohio Railway: 279<br />
Bancor: 544-547<br />
Bank notes: 174, 176, 178, 182<br />
Bank of America: 114<br />
Bank of England: 171, 174hl75, 177-183,<br />
223, 232, 269, 271, 311, 325, 330, 339,<br />
412, 415, 417, 422-427, 429, 439, 450,<br />
472-473, 475, 480, 489-490, 498, 503<br />
Bank of France: 183, 221, 269, 425, 472-<br />
473<br />
Bank of Intemaf 1 Settlements: 115, 119<br />
Bank of Manhattan Trust Company: 482<br />
Bank of North America: 325-328, 330, 339<br />
Bankers Trust Company: 5, 127, 423, 433,<br />
472-473<br />
BankOklahoma: 62<br />
Baring, Sir Francis: 222<br />
Barnes, Harry Elmer: 243<br />
Baruch, Bernard: 258, 453<br />
Bauer, Mayer Amschel: 218<br />
Beit brothers: 272<br />
Belmont, August: 208, 383, 391, 414^415<br />
Bezant: 149-150, 156<br />
Bickley, George W.L.: 392, 394<br />
Biddle, Nicholas: 341, 347-348, 351-352,<br />
354, 356-357, 360, 396, 565<br />
Bills of credit: 309-310, 316, 324, 346-347,<br />
383<br />
Bimetallism: 320, 323<br />
Bismarck, Otto von: 374<br />
Boer War: 277-278<br />
Bolshevik Revolution: 263, 267, 283<br />
Bolsheviks: 123, 125, 266, 276, 279-282,<br />
285-286, 289-293, 306<br />
Boom-bust cycle 343-345, 360, 420, 488-<br />
489, 552<br />
Booth, John Wilkes: 392-394<br />
Bovard, James: 122<br />
Brady, Nicholas: 75, 119<br />
Bretton Woods Conference: 85-86, 88,<br />
105,114,544<br />
Brown, Lester: 528<br />
Bryan, William Jennings: 241, 251, 256-<br />
257,403,456,465^59<br />
Brzezinski, Zbigniew: 110<br />
Buchanan, Sir George: 267, 274, 280<br />
Buckley, William: 525<br />
Bullard, Arthur: 290, 294<br />
Bunting, John: 53<br />
Burns, Arthur: 43-44<br />
Bush, George: 74, 76, 120, 126-130<br />
Bush, Prescott: 302<br />
Carnegie Corporation: 482<br />
Carnegie Foundation: 447<br />
Carnegie United Kingdom Trust: 272<br />
Carnegie, Andrew: 428<br />
Carter, Jimmy: 110-111, 528<br />
Casey, William: 299<br />
Castro, Fidel; 116<br />
Catton, Bruce: 379<br />
Celeste, Richard: 71<br />
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA): 72,<br />
Chandler, Lester 424, 484<br />
Chase Manhattan Bank: 41-42, 47,52-53,<br />
59, 64, 115, 299<br />
Chase National Bank: 19, 435, 440, 482<br />
Chase, Salmon P.: 384-385<br />
Chemical Bank: 41, 59<br />
Chernow, Ron: 9, 57, 120, 229, 246, 416,<br />
433,452,455<br />
China: 107, 121-123, 126, 132, 301-305<br />
Chrysler Corporation: 41, 44, 48-49, 64<br />
Churchill, Winston: 214, 248-249, 252-<br />
253, 255, 261, 502<br />
Citibank: 115, 123, 537^538<br />
Citicorp: 119, 297<br />
Civil War: 358, 361, 367, 369, 373-377,<br />
379, 397, 398, 407-408, 411, 418, 429<br />
Cleveland, Harlan: 528<br />
Clinton, George: 336<br />
Clinton, William: 82, 119, 267, 301, 507<br />
Club of Rome: 528-532<br />
Coe, Virginius Frank: 88<br />
Commodity Credit Corporation: 120, 126<br />
Commonwealth Bank of Detroit: 41, 51-<br />
53,64<br />
Commonwealth Savings Company of<br />
Lincoln: 71<br />
Communism/Communists: 67-68, 87-<br />
88, 105, 108, 122-126, 265, 267, 270,<br />
274, 282, 286, 298-299, 304, 529-530<br />
Coningsby: 227<br />
Continental Army: 312, 323<br />
Continental Congress: 311, 313, 318-319,<br />
325,339<br />
Continental Illinois: 41, 54-55, 57-62, 65<br />
Continentals: 161<br />
Cooke, Jay: 408<br />
Coolidge, Calvin: 497<br />
Cooper, Richard N.: Ill, 122<br />
Council on Foreign Relations (CFR): 88,<br />
110-111, 113,122, 129, 263, 273, 283,<br />
302, 304, 410, 427, 482, 515-516, 52^-<br />
528, 531, 533-536, 546, 561, 563<br />
Cousteau, Jacques: 529<br />
Crane, Charles: 288, 292<br />
Crane, Philip: 115<br />
Cunard Lines: 246-247, 262<br />
Dabney, Morgan & Company: 412<br />
Daddy Warbucks: 18<br />
Dall, Curtis: 500<br />
Davison, Henry P.: 5, 8-11, 24, 275, 434<br />
Deficit spending: 479, 484, 486, 501, 507<br />
Dillon, Read & Company: 295<br />
Disarmament: 514, 518, 526<br />
Discount Window: 44, 54, 193, 201, 477-<br />
479, 483, 489<br />
Disraeli, Benjamin: 227-228<br />
Dixon, Donald: 78<br />
Dodge, Cleveland H.: 239,447, 453-454,<br />
Douglas, Stephen: 370, 385<br />
Drachma: 149<br />
Drexel Burnham Lambert: 79, 81<br />
Drexel, Anthony: 412<br />
Duane, William: 353<br />
Dulles, John Foster: 110<br />
Duncan, Sherman & Company: 412<br />
Dutch East Indies Company: 173<br />
Earth Summit: 528, 532<br />
East India Company: 226<br />
Eccles, Marriner: 187<br />
Edison, Thomas: 190<br />
Eisenhower, Dwight: 110<br />
Ellsworth, Oliver: 315<br />
Emancipation Proclamation: 379-380,<br />
390, 395<br />
Entitlements: 509-510, 535<br />
Environmentalism: 516, 523, 526-536<br />
Equitable Life Assurance Society: 433,<br />
482<br />
Equitable Trust Company: 295<br />
Equity Corporation: 499<br />
Esher, Lord: 271, 277<br />
European Union (EU): 112, 560<br />
Export-Import Bank: 128, 130, 299<br />
Fabians: 87^88, 96, 105, 106, 109-111, 239,<br />
273, 483, 529, 570<br />
Falk, Richard A.: 527<br />
Fascism /Fascists: 270, 279<br />
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation<br />
(FDIC): 27, 49-54, 57, 60-61, 63-65,<br />
68-69, 7^-75, 89, 95, 327, 364, 539,<br />
576,583<br />
Federal Deposit Loan Corporation<br />
r<br />
(FDLCJ:27<br />
Federal Emergency Management<br />
Agency (FEMA): 544<br />
Federal Farm Loan Board: 477<br />
Federal Housing Authority (FHA): 68<br />
Federal Reserve Act: 463-465, 468, 472,<br />
476477,481,502<br />
Federal Reserve Board: 69, 71, 73<br />
Federal Savings & Loan Insurance Corporation<br />
(FSLIC): 68, 73-74, 77<br />
Ferrell, Robert: 238<br />
Fiat money: 155, 157-160, 162-165, 169-<br />
170, 186, 190-193, 195-203, 206-207,<br />
309-312, 314h316, 324, 352, 409, 419-<br />
420, 429, 566, 573-574, 582<br />
Financial Institutions Reform and<br />
Recovery Act: 74, 80<br />
First Arabian Corporation: 52<br />
First Bank of the United States: 325, 328,<br />
330-333,335,338-339<br />
First National Bank: 433<br />
First National Bank of Boston: 482<br />
First National Bank of Chicago: 115, 127<br />
First National Bank of Los Angeles: 482<br />
First National Bank of New York: 5<br />
First National Bank of St. Louis: 482<br />
First National City Bank: 41<br />
First Pennsylvania Bank of Philadelphia:<br />
53-54, 64, 327
604 INDEX<br />
INDEX 605<br />
Fisher, Irving. 188<br />
Forbes, B.C.: 9<br />
Forbes, John: 412<br />
Ford Motor Corporation: 49<br />
Forrestal, James: 295<br />
Forrester, Izola: 393<br />
Fractional money: 165, 167, 169-170, 174<br />
Fractional-reserve banking: 155, 167, 197,<br />
219, 341, 343, 362-363, 368, 375, 409,<br />
478, 488<br />
Frame, Andrew: 462<br />
Franklin, Benjamin: 158, 162<br />
Free banking: 366-367, 375, 576<br />
Free coinage: 321, 324<br />
Friedman, Milton: 570<br />
Galbraith, John Kenneth: 17, 86, 179, 330,<br />
334, 343, 351, 368-369, 387, 404, 425,<br />
436, 439, 445, 472, 495, 524, 525<br />
Gallatin, Albert: 383<br />
Gardner, I^ichard: 111<br />
Garn-St. Germain Act: 72<br />
Gates, Fred: 556<br />
Gelb, Leslie H.: 129<br />
Gelzer, Heinrich: 150<br />
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade<br />
(GATT):112,113<br />
General Education Board: 239, 555<br />
George, Lloyd: 280<br />
Glass Bill: 464<br />
Glass, Carter: 458^63, 465-466<br />
Glass-Owen Bill: 461, 463, 469<br />
Gorbachev, Mikhail: 123, 529-530<br />
Gouge, William: 346<br />
Goulevitch, Arsene de: 267<br />
Graham, Katharine: 524<br />
Grattan, C. Hartley: 241<br />
Gray, Edwin: 71<br />
Greenbacks: 384-385, 387-388, 390, 395<br />
Greenspan, Alan: 73, 76, 119, 148, 403, 474<br />
Greider, William: 22, 62, 117, 369<br />
Grenfell, Edward: 413<br />
Gresham's Law: 148<br />
Grey, Lord Albert: 271<br />
Grey, Sir Edward: 241, 253<br />
Groseclose, Elgin: 146, 175, 182, 322, 362-<br />
364, 407, 487<br />
Guaranty Trust Company: 292, 433, 482<br />
Gyohten, Toyoo: 112<br />
Hacker, Louis: 322<br />
Hagedorn, Hermann: 275<br />
Hamilton, Alexander: 316, 319, 328, 335<br />
Hammer, Armand: 293<br />
Harper & Brothers: 244<br />
Harriman, W. Averell: 293<br />
Harris Forbes & Company: 295<br />
Harvey, George: 454<br />
Hayes, Everis: 439<br />
Hazard Circular: 386<br />
Hazlitt, Henry: 585<br />
Hemphill, Robert: 188<br />
Hepburn, A. Barton: 19, 440<br />
Herzog, Jesus Silva: 116<br />
Hitler: 295, 546<br />
Home Savings Bank of Cincinnati: 71<br />
Hoover Institution for War, Revolution<br />
and Peace: 22<br />
Hoover, Herbert: 68, 293, 474, 495, 501<br />
Horan, James: 381<br />
House, Edward Mandell: 213, 239-245,<br />
253, 255, 257, 260-261, 266, 273, 281,<br />
290, 294, 456-460, 465^69, 472<br />
Hudson Institute: 516, 524<br />
Hussein, Saddam: 304, 305<br />
Huntington, Samuel: 111<br />
I.G. Farben: 295, 482<br />
Illuminati: 392<br />
Income tax: 204-205, 382, 508-509, 511,<br />
534<br />
Ingraham, Jane: 81, 300<br />
Insight magazine: 118<br />
International Acceptance Bank of New<br />
York: 482<br />
International Green Cross: 529<br />
International Monetary Fund<br />
(IMF/World Bank): 85-94, 97-108,<br />
112, 114-121, 124, 127-132, 296, 514,<br />
516, 539, 542, 544, 550, 563, 573<br />
Irving Trust: 127<br />
Islamic Fundamentalism: 304<br />
J.P. Morgan & Company: 431, 433, 453-<br />
Jackson, Andrew: 256, 341, 347-353, 355-<br />
356, 358-360, 396, 565<br />
Jackson, Stanley: 410, 416<br />
James, Jesse: 392<br />
Jameson, Sir Leander: 277<br />
Jastram, Roy: 181<br />
Jefferson, Thomas: 162, 190, 313, 319, 328,<br />
330, 332, 338, 341-342, 553<br />
<strong>Jekyll</strong> Island: 3, 6-11, 16-18, 23, 50, 60, 62,<br />
423, 437<br />
<strong>Jekyll</strong> Island Club: 6, 210<br />
Joachimsthalers; 318<br />
John Birch Society: 268<br />
Johnston, Sir Harry: 271<br />
Jordan, Jerry: 571<br />
Josephson, Matthew: 408<br />
Junk bonds: 78-79, 81<br />
Kadlec, Charles: 570<br />
Kahn, Herman: 516, 524, 525<br />
Kahn, Otto H.: 279, 453, 460<br />
Kane, Edward: 78<br />
Keating, Charles: 78<br />
Kelleher, Cornelius: 282<br />
Kellock, Harold: 23<br />
Kenan, H.S.: 448<br />
Kennan, George: 290, 527<br />
Kennedy, John R: 109, 485, 569-570<br />
Kenworthy, Joseph: 252<br />
Kerensky, Aleksandr: 276, 285, 289, 291<br />
Keynes, John Maynard: 87, 89-90, 105,<br />
146, 168, 212, 273, 483, 497, 544<br />
KGB: 270<br />
King George III: 359<br />
King George V: 253<br />
Kissinger, Henry: 113, 532<br />
Knights of the Golden Circle: 392-395<br />
Kolko, Gabriel: 415, 435-436, 444, 446,<br />
460, 462<br />
Korean War: 516<br />
Krooss, Herman: 345<br />
Kruger, Paul: 277<br />
Ku Klux Klan: 393<br />
Kuhn, Loeb & Company: 5, 18, 263, 279,<br />
292-293, 295, 395, 423, 433, 444, 453,<br />
481^82, 496<br />
Labouchere, Pierre-Cesar: 222<br />
Laffer, Arthur: 570<br />
LaFollette, Robert: 442<br />
Lamont, Corliss: 279<br />
Lamont, Thomas W.: 278<br />
Langdon, John: 315<br />
Laughlin, J. Laurence: 446, 459-461<br />
Lawrence, Richard: 357<br />
Lazard Brothers: 272<br />
League of Nations: 273, 422<br />
Lee, Ivy: 295<br />
Leffingwell, Russell C: 278<br />
Legal tender: 155-163, 169-170, 187, 207,<br />
311, 315, 321, 326, 330, 384, 386, 574<br />
Lehman Corporation: 499<br />
Lehman, John: 303<br />
Lehrman, Lewis: 434<br />
Lenin: 270, 276, 281-283, 286-287, 291,<br />
293, 297, 300, 305, 546<br />
Lewin, Leonard: 524, 525<br />
Lewinsohn, Richard: 217, 237<br />
Lie, Trygve: 401<br />
Lincoln Savings: 73-74, 78<br />
Lincoln, Abraham: 370-371, 373-375,<br />
377, 379-381, 383-385, 389-395<br />
Lindbergh, Sr„ Charles: 442-443, 446,<br />
448,461,465,476<br />
Linowitz, Sol: 528<br />
Lockhart, Bruce: 280-282, 290<br />
Lockheed: 41, 45-46, 63<br />
London School of Economics: 109, 570<br />
Luce, Clare Booth: 525<br />
Luce, Henry: 524<br />
Lundberg, Ferdinand: 239, 245, 258, 447,<br />
452,454,473<br />
Lusitania: 246-255, 260-262, 410<br />
Lyons, Eugene: 287<br />
Manufacturers Hanover: 41, 59<br />
Mao: 546<br />
Marine Midland Corporation: 499<br />
Marshall, John: 346<br />
Martin, Rose: 273<br />
Marx, Karl: 211, 266<br />
Mason, George: 315<br />
Masonic lodges: 392<br />
Massachusetts: 157-158, 160, 307, 310-<br />
311,362-364,367<br />
Mauretania: 246, 425<br />
Maximilian, Ferdinand: 374, 377, 392<br />
May, Max: 292<br />
Mayer, Martin: 486<br />
McAdoo, William: 238-239, 256, 258, 454,<br />
458, 464<br />
McCormick, Cyrus: 447<br />
McCulloch v. Maryland: 346, 351<br />
McLandress, Herschel: 524<br />
McLaughlin, Andrew: 163<br />
McNamara, Robert: 516, 532<br />
Medicare: 509-510, 535<br />
MelJon, Andrew: 425, 495, 497<br />
Mellen,CS.:244<br />
Mensheviks: 279-280<br />
Mersey, Lord: 214, 255<br />
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. 482<br />
Mexico: 104<br />
Midland Bank: 272<br />
Miliarense: 149<br />
Milken, Michael: 79, 81<br />
Milner, Lord Alfred: 267, 270-272, 274,<br />
277-280<br />
Minor, Robert: 211, 266<br />
Monetarists; 570<br />
Monetary Control Act of 1980: 115, 201<br />
Monroe Doctrine: 373, 377
606 INDEX<br />
INDEX 607<br />
Monroe, James: 373<br />
Monserrat: 264<br />
Moral hazard: 35, 36, 39<br />
Moody, John: 236, 415, 435<br />
Morgan Guaranty: 41, 56, 59, 127<br />
Morgan, Grenfell, and Company: 272<br />
Morgan, Harjes & Company; 412<br />
Morgan, House of: 119, 419, 429, 452<br />
Morgan, J .P.: 4^8, 23, 209, 235-239, 244-<br />
261, 266, 272-278, 283, 302, 410-418,<br />
427, 431, 433-434, 443, 447-448, 455,<br />
496, 499, 502<br />
Morgan, Jr., J.P.: 412, 417-^18, 454, 458,<br />
&0<br />
Morgan, Junius: 411<br />
Morgan thau, Henry: 453<br />
Morris, Edward: 292<br />
Morris, Robert: 325-326, 328, 330, 335<br />
Morrow, Dwight: 278<br />
Morton, Frederic: 218, 224-225<br />
Mullins, Eustace: 413<br />
Munsey, Frank: 452-453<br />
Murphy, Grayson: 278<br />
Mussolini: 546<br />
Mutual Life Insurance Company: 433, 482<br />
Myers, Gustavus: 331<br />
Napoleon Bonaparte: 173, 181, 183, 220-<br />
226<br />
Napoleon 111: 378<br />
National Banking Acts of 1863-65: 386-<br />
388,407<br />
National Citizens' League: 445, 459-460<br />
National City Bank: 5, 239, 258, 266, 276,<br />
292, 295, 433, 435, 447, 454, 464<br />
National Civic Federation: 434<br />
National debt: 388, 508, 510-512, 534,<br />
535, 568, 572, S75-S77, 579, 582<br />
National Monetary Commission: 437, 448<br />
Nazism /Nazis: 270, 295<br />
New Haven Railroad: 244<br />
New World Order: 109, 111-113, 122,<br />
125, 129, 132, 514, 528, 530, 549-550,<br />
552,561,564<br />
New York City: 41, 46-47, 64<br />
New York Life Insurance Company: 433<br />
New York Title and Mortgage Company:<br />
New York Trust Company: 482<br />
Nixon, Richard: 91, 302<br />
Norman, Montagu: 269, 399, 423, 425,<br />
429, 472, 486, 489, 495, 498<br />
North American Free Trade Agreement<br />
(NAFTA): 112, 113<br />
North, Douglass: 322<br />
Northern Pacific Railroad: 408<br />
Norton, Charles D.: 5, 24<br />
Nye, Gerald P.: 238<br />
Office of Thrift Supervision: 74<br />
Open Market: 194, 477, 479, 481-482, 484-<br />
487, 490, 492, 499, 503<br />
Oppenheimer, Michael: 527<br />
Order of American Knights: 393<br />
Order of the Sons of Liberty: 393<br />
Orwell, George: 556-557, 560<br />
Overseas Private Investment Corporation<br />
(OP1C): 128, 300<br />
Owen, Robert L.: 461, 476<br />
Page, Walter H.: 238-239, 241-242<br />
Paine, Thomas: 315<br />
Panama Canal: 115<br />
Passell, Peter 80<br />
Paterson, William: 175<br />
Patman, Wright: 42-43, 187<br />
Patterson, Robert P.: 295, 485<br />
Patterson, William: 177<br />
Paul, Ron: 434<br />
Peabody & Company: 415-417<br />
Peabody, George: 410-413, 415-416<br />
Peel, Sir Robert: 181<br />
Pel], Claiburne: 528<br />
Penn Central: 41-44, 55, 63<br />
Perm Square Bank of Oklahoma: 55<br />
Perkins, George W.: 266, 452-453<br />
Pieces of Eight: 318-319<br />
Pike, Henry: 277<br />
Planters Trust and Savings Bank of<br />
Opelousa: 61<br />
Poland: 126, 297<br />
Politburo: 530<br />
Polo, Marco; 155<br />
Poor, Henry: 365<br />
Pratt, Sereno: 415<br />
Pujo Committee: 443-444, 447, 454<br />
Pujo, Arsene: 6, 443<br />
Quigley, Carroll: 213, 267-272, 278, 282,<br />
423, 475, 494<br />
Rand Corporation: 516<br />
Randolph, John: 352<br />
Reagan, Ronald: 62, 71, 111, 126, 474, 507<br />
Reales: 318<br />
Red Cross: 263, 274-275, 279-284, 285,<br />
289, 291-292, 302, 306<br />
Reed, George: 315<br />
Reed, John: 119<br />
Regan, Donald. 58, 114<br />
Reichsbank: 18, 183, 269, 425<br />
Remini, Robert: 354, 356<br />
Report from Iron Mountain: 516, 518,<br />
521, 523-526, 534, 536, 556, 558, 560<br />
Resolution Funding Corporation: 74<br />
Resolution Trust Corporation: 81-82<br />
Resolution Trust Oversight Board: 74<br />
Rhodes, Cecil: 208, 219, 263, 270-272,<br />
277-278, 281-283, 410, 428, 430, 534<br />
Ricardo, David: 180<br />
Rist, Charles: 269, 425, 472<br />
Roberts, Paul: 96<br />
Robins, Raymond: 212, 281-282, 284, 290<br />
Rockefeller, David: 42, 47, 112-113, 123,<br />
297, 299, 532<br />
Rockefeller, John D.: 209, 266, 400, 434,<br />
446,555<br />
Rockefeller, John D. Ill: 401<br />
Rockefeller, Jr., John D.: 4r-5<br />
Rockefeller, William: 5, 454<br />
Rockefellers: 245, 272<br />
Roosevelt, Franklin Delano: 10, 68, 239,<br />
258,502<br />
Roosevelt, Theodore: 266, 451-453, 455-<br />
456, 468<br />
Roscoe, Theodore: 393<br />
Rostow, Walt: 524<br />
Rothbard, Murray: 142, 176, 327, 337,<br />
344, 362, 423, 484-485, 495<br />
Rothschild, Alphonse: 414, 418<br />
Rothschild, Amschel: 225<br />
Rothschild, House of: 5, 219-220, 227,<br />
232, 413, 415, 417-418, 429<br />
Rothschild, James (Jacob): 224, 228, 232<br />
Rothschild, Kalmann: 225<br />
Rothschild, Nathan: 22^227, 234, 271,<br />
331,413,415<br />
Rothschild, Salomon: 225, 231<br />
Rothschild Formula: Chap. 11 + 303-305<br />
Rothschilds: 234, 235, 240, 246, 271, 331,<br />
340, 374, 383, 389, 413-419, 482<br />
Round Table: 270, 272-275, 277-283, 291-<br />
292, 296^297, 302, 305, 428<br />
Royal Bank of Canada: 127<br />
Royal Institute of Intemtl Affairs: 273<br />
Rubin, Robert: 119<br />
Ruml, Beardsley: 204<br />
Rusk, Dean: 525<br />
Ruskin, John: 270-271<br />
Russell, Bertrand: 529<br />
Russia: 107, 124-132, 263-267, 27^276,<br />
279-296, 299-302, 306, 377-378, 395<br />
Russian Revolution: 263, 265, 267<br />
Ryan, John D.: 266<br />
Ryan, Thomas: 453<br />
S&Ls: 68-74, 76-81, 83^-84<br />
S.S. Kristianiafjord: 265, 288, 292<br />
Salinas, Carlos: 119<br />
Salomon Brothers: 81<br />
Sandinistas: 301<br />
Schacht, Hjalmar: 269, 425<br />
Schapiro, Leonard: 286<br />
Schiff, Jacob: 210, 263-266, 285, 292, 395,<br />
45^454, 458<br />
Schlicktenthalers: 318<br />
Schmidt, Helmut: 47<br />
Second Bank of the United States: 341-<br />
359, 375, 382-386, 442, 565<br />
Selgin, George: 366<br />
Seligman, Edwin: 17, 440<br />
Sennholz, Hans: 76, 82, 367<br />
Seymour, Charles: 241, 459, 465<br />
Shafroth, John: 439<br />
Shaw, George Bernard: 87, 101<br />
Sibley, Joseph: 245<br />
Sidonia: 227-228<br />
Silver certificates: 485<br />
Simpson, Colin: 246, 251, 254<br />
Sjaastad, Larry A.: 121<br />
Skull and Bones: 80<br />
Slavery: 370-377, 379, 382, 392, 395<br />
Smuts, Jan: 278<br />
Social Democrats: 12^125, 129<br />
Social Security: 509-510, 535<br />
Socialism/Socialists: 85-88, 95-106, 109,<br />
124, 266-267, 270, 420, 530, 535, 546<br />
Solidus: 149<br />
South Africa: 271-272, 276-278<br />
Soviet Union: 89, 100, 293, 296, 304<br />
Soviets: 121, 123-124, 126-129, 132<br />
Spanish dollar: 319, 324<br />
Special Drawing Right (SDR): 90<br />
Sprague, Irvine: 49-54, 57-61<br />
Standard Brands: 499<br />
Standard Oil Company; 245, 435<br />
Stanton, Edwin M.: 393-394<br />
Steffens, Lincoln: 288<br />
Stephenson, Nathaniel Wright: 10, 439,<br />
446<br />
Stillman, James: 454<br />
Stockman, David: 114<br />
Strong, Benjamin: 24, 258, 269, 423-429,<br />
441, 450, 472-^74, 484-489, 497, 502<br />
Strong, Maurice: 531^533, 549<br />
Sumner, William: 169<br />
Supply-siders: 570<br />
Supreme Court: 346-347, 349, 351
608 INDEX<br />
Sutton, Anthony: 22, 266, 275, 291, 303<br />
Swift, Harold: 292<br />
Swift, Helen: 292<br />
Taft, William Howard: 451-453, 456, 468<br />
Tawney, R.H: 273<br />
Taxes: 191, 193, 196, 199, 203-205<br />
Terrorism: 546, 562<br />
Thalers:318<br />
Theobald, Thomas: 297<br />
Thompson, William: 289-291<br />
Thompson, William Boyce: 275-276, 280-<br />
Tiananmen Square: 301<br />
Tocqueville, Alexis de: 554<br />
Torrijos: 115<br />
Toynbee, Arnold: 273<br />
Trade deficit: 91, 93-94<br />
Trafkant, Rep. James: 304, 305<br />
Transvaal: 277-278<br />
Trilateral Commission: 112<br />
Trotsky: 264-267, 282-283, 286-287, 291<br />
Truman, Harry: 88<br />
Tsar Alexander II: 377-378, 395<br />
Tsar Nicholas: 264-265, 267, 274, 280,<br />
283, 285, 288<br />
Tulipomania: 491-492<br />
Turner, Dennis: 77, 90<br />
Turner, Captain William: 255<br />
Tutko, Thomas: 521<br />
U-boat: 237, 248-249, 252-253, 261<br />
U.S. Steel; 435<br />
United Americans: 279<br />
United Nations: 86, 89, 108, 114, 422, 514-<br />
516, 526, 530-532, 541, 544-545, 548,<br />
550,561,563-564,577<br />
Unity Bank and Trust Company: 50-51<br />
Usury: 190-191, 207<br />
Vanderlip, Frank: 5, 11, 24, 439, 441, 450,<br />
460,463-464,469<br />
Vernon S&L: 78<br />
Vieira, Edwin: 318<br />
Viereck, George: 240-241, 251, 456-457<br />
Volcker, Paul; 54, 58, 60, 65, 71, 112, 116,<br />
117<br />
Vreeland, Edward: 437, 441, 450<br />
Wall Street: 4, 11, 18, 22-23, 72-^1, 236-<br />
237, 244, 257-259, 266, 276, 281, 288,<br />
29C-295, 302, 408, 415, 417, 431, 433,<br />
435, 442-448, 453-456, 461-462, 472,<br />
482, 497, 502<br />
Wall, M. Danny; 73<br />
Wallich, Henry: 116<br />
War Industries Board: 258-259<br />
War of 1812: 336, 340-341, 357, 359, 363<br />
Warburg & Company, M.M.: 18<br />
Warburg, Felix: 18, 453<br />
Warburg, James: 10<br />
Warburg, Max: 5, 18<br />
Warburg, Paul: 5, 9-10, 17-19, 22-24, 438,<br />
440, 444-445, 448, 450, 453, 455, 458,<br />
461, 465-466, 481-482, 486, 496<br />
Washington, George: 161, 164, 312, 314-<br />
315,322-323<br />
Waterloo: 224, 226-227, 233<br />
Watt, James: 114, 119<br />
Webb, Sidney and Beatrice: 87<br />
Webster, Daniel: 351<br />
Welles, Chris: 42, 44<br />
Wellington, Duke of: 224-227<br />
Wells, H.G.: 88<br />
Wenrworth, W.C: 399, 498<br />
Westinghouse Acceptance Bank: 482<br />
Westinghouse, H.H.: 279<br />
Wheeler, George: 244, 415<br />
White Star Lines: 246<br />
White, Harry Dexter: 87, 105, 212<br />
Whitney family: 272<br />
Wildcat banks: 333, 336-337, 340<br />
Willard, Daniel: 279<br />
Willing, Thomas: 330<br />
Willis, Henry Parker: 427, 460-462, 465<br />
Wilson, Derek: 219, 227, 331, 383, 414-415<br />
Wilson, James: 315<br />
Wilson, R. McNair: 221, 223<br />
Wilson, Woodrow: 238-243, 250-252,<br />
255-258, 260-261, 266, 275, 281, 288-<br />
289, 293, 447-449, 452-460, 466-469<br />
Wolf, George: 356<br />
Wood, Daniel: 532<br />
Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute: 254<br />
World Bank: 85-86, 88-89, 95-98, 100-<br />
103, 105-109, 118, 121, 124, 126, 130-<br />
132,296,301,302<br />
World Future Society: 532<br />
World Trade Organization (WTO): 1 13,<br />
114<br />
World War I: 235, 238, 259-261, 265, 275,<br />
473, 479, 483-484, 489, 502<br />
World War II: 502<br />
WorldWatch Institute: 528<br />
Wrangell-Rokassowsky, Carl: 378<br />
Yago, Glenn: 80<br />
Yeltsin, Boris: 300<br />
Yilin,Yao:122<br />
Zakaria, Fareed: 304<br />
understand. He has dealt with such diverse<br />
subjects as archaeology and ancient earth<br />
history, terrorism, international banking,<br />
internal subversion, the history of taxation,<br />
U.S. foreign policy, the science and politics<br />
of cancer therapy, the Supreme Court, and<br />
the United Nations. Some of his previous<br />
works include World without Cancer, The<br />
Discovery of Noah's Ark, Moles in High Places,<br />
The Open Gates of Troy, No Place to Hide, The<br />
Capitalist Conspiracy, More Deadly than War,<br />
The Grand Design, The Great Prison Break, and<br />
The Fearful Master.<br />
Mr. Griffin is<br />
a graduate of the University<br />
of Michigan where he majored in speech<br />
and communications. In preparation for<br />
writing this book, he enrolled in the College<br />
of Financial Planning located in Denver. His<br />
goal was not to become a professional financial<br />
planner but to better understand the real<br />
world of investments and money markets.<br />
He obtained his CFP designation (Certified<br />
Financial Planner) in 1989.<br />
Mr. Griffin is<br />
a recipient of the coveted<br />
Telly Award for excellence in television<br />
production, a Contributing Editor for The<br />
New American magazine, the creator of The<br />
Reality Zone Audio Archives, and is<br />
President<br />
of American Media, a publishing and videoproduction<br />
company in Southern California.
Where does money come from? Where does it go? Who<br />
makes it? The money magicians' secrets are unveiled. Here is a<br />
close look at<br />
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A boring subject? Just wait! You'll be hooked in five<br />
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all true. This book is about the most blatant scam of history. If s<br />
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prosperity. Your world view will definitely change.<br />
Putting it quite simply: this may be the most important<br />
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"A superb analysis deserving serious attention by all<br />
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House Banking Committee<br />
"What every American needs to know about central bank<br />
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Mark Thornton, Asst. Professor of Economics,<br />
Auburn University; Coordinator Academic Affairs,<br />
Ludwig von Mises Institute<br />
"A magnificent accomplishment - a train-load of heavy history,<br />
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Publisher/Editor, Dan Smoot Report<br />
"As a career banker and president of a bank consulting firm, I<br />
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