4 - The Naval Review

THE 

N AVA L 

REVIEW 

cC Think wisely. Plan boldly. Act swiftly." 

THE OBJECT 

THE NAVAL REVIEW, by providing a vehicle 

for the expression of personal opinions on 

matters of naval interest, aims to stimulate 

thought and discussion on such matters 

among naval officers and others connected 

with the Navies of the Commonwealth. 

The views of junior officers are especially 

welcome. Technical details, such as are 

more appropriate to text books, should be 

omitted from contributions. 

Founded in I 9 I 2 

ISSUED QUARTER1.Y FOR PRIVATE CIRCULATION 

For the Regulations of THE NAVAL REVIEW see overleaf. 

It is important that they be carefully studied. 

Copyrighted under Act of 191 1 

Vol. XLVII No. I January, I 959

Contents 

Page 

EDITOR'S NOTES AND NOTICES ..................... 1 

ARTICLES :- 

WAR ON SHIPPING.^^^^.^^^^ ........................ 3 

SWEDISH NAVAL BASES ........................... 14 

NAVAL NECBSSITIES ........................... 23 

ESCORT TYPES SINCE THE WAR ........................ 29 

GREY FUNNEL LINE ........................... 35 

THE SIZE AND SHAPE ........................... 40 

THE DEPARTMENT OF SHIPS ........................ 45 

THE ORIGINS OF OPERATION 'TORCH' ..................... 48 

SAILING AS AN EDUCATION FOR THE MODERN SEAMEN ............... 55 

SCAPA PLOW-AUGUST. 1939 ........................ 63 

THE BOMBAY EXPLOSION. 1944 ........................ 66 

FIRE DOWN BELOW ........................... 74 

DE~PATCH PROM BENIN ........................... 78 

AN ACCOUNT OF THE BATTLE OF LISSA ..................... 84 

A TRIP TO THE GULF OF MBXICO ..................... 87 

NAVAL AFFAIRS . ............................. 96 

BOOK REVIEWS :- 

...... 

THE VERNON PAPERS . Edited by B . McL . Ranft 

BRASSEY'S ANNUAL . Edited by Rear Admiral H . G . Thursfield 

VICTORY WITHOUT WAR . By George Fielding Eliot ...... 

THE SOVIET NAVY . Edited by Commander M . G . Saunders 

INSIDE RUSSIA TODAY . By John Gunther ......... ...... 

THE ART OF NAVIGATION IN ENGLAND IN ELIZABETHAN AND EARLY STUART TIMES . 

Lieut..Comrnander D . W . Waters ......... ...... 

GIVE m A SHIP TO SAIL . By Alan Villiers ......... 

WARM BODIES . By Donald R . Morris . ........... 

ADMIRALTY BRIEF . By Edward Terrell ......... 

........................... 

CORRESPONDENCE 122 

DISUPLINE.-CAN WB REDUCE OUR DEFAULTERS ?-'EAGLE'S' VISIT TO BARCELONA- 

THE HYDROGRAPHER AND THE NAVY-RANK AND COMMAND IN DESTROYER AND FRIGATE 

LEADERS .

Editor's Notes 

T HESE notes are being written in the closing days of 1958. Christmas is over, 

business is booming, the pound has been made convertible (for foreigners only) 

and the run-down of the fighting services proceeds merrily. Our Defence Policy, 

to quote from 'Report on Defence' (Cmd. 363 of February, 1958), is designed 'to 

enable Britain, without overstraining the economy, to fulfil her responsibilities over- 

seas and to bear her fair share of the collective defence of the free world'. The 

operative clause is 'without overstraining the economy'; this sets a limit to defence 

expenditure which, for the moment, seems to have been accepted as about fifteen 

hundred millions pounds a year. At present prices, this staggering sum is only 

sufficient to provide what really amounts to 'token' forces in all three Services, not 

forgetting a 'token' nuclear deterrent, with its defences, costing at present between 

two and three hundred millions a year (we learn that 'on the basis of present plans 

and estimates, it does not seem likely that these costs will increase significantly over 

the next few years'!). Some 'ceiling' for defence expenditure is obviously essential 

and it may be that fifteen hundred millions a year is a realistic figure. It may also 

be that the policy of playing off each Service against the others and allocating to 

each a sum sufficient to produce a 'token' force, is the right one to adopt at this 

particular moment. It may even be that the expenditure of two to three hundred 

millions on a 'token' deterrent is right, though one cannot help doubting it since, 

to quote again, to compare with 'the strength and constant readiness of the American 

Strategic Air Command, with its bases all round the world and its vast supply of 

megaton bombs', we have 'a substantial and growing stockpile of kiloton weapons . . . 

British megaton bombs are now in production and deliveries to the R.A.F. have 

begun'. 

But the result of the current defence policy, so far as the Navy is concerned, 

and this is the sphere in which we are all most interested, and the Service whose 

efficiency and good it is THE NAVAL REVIEW'S sole object to support, is quite terri- 

fyingly inadequate. This at any rate is felt by the writer and by all the retired naval 

officers, and quite a few serving ones, with whom he hobnobs. For we are promised, 

in 1960, an operational fleet based on six major warships-three carriers and three 

cruisers-and this really is beyond a joke. A defence policy which results in this 

country having a Navy of this pitiful size is a bad defence policy, and the sooner 

it is changed the better. True, the United States has an enormous Navy; true, the 

Dominions could provide a considerable reinforcement; but the growing Soviet 

Navy threatens us and no one else. In the words of Sir Arthur Bryant: 'Since the 

last war Soviet Russia, a land Power, has laid down the largest fleet of ocean-going 

submarines ever built. They can have been built for only one object-for they serve 

no defensive purpose whatever-for attack on any Power that lives by the sea. 

There is only one that does so wholly and that is Britain. Yet in the face of this, 

the most serious maritime threat in our history, we have allowed the Navy to sink 

to the lowest level known since the Dutch sailed up the Medway and towed away 

the British Flagship'. 

Whatever the 'ceiling' for defence expenditure in the future, the Navy must be 

expanded to a size more nearly in proportion to its responsibilities. Only when

2 NOTICE 

this has been done let the defence planners, if they can, justify keeping a British 

Army on the continent of Europe to save the Germans the trouble and expense of 

doing so, and pouring out treasure to add a puny contribution to America's already 

adequate stockpile of unusable 'H' bombs. Let us hope for a changed defence 

policy in the New Year. 

At their half-yearly meeting on the 9th December, the Trustees and Committee 

were informed that the nett membership had increased this year by 24, to a total 

of 1,967; the Editor's hope to reach the two thousand mark was therefore not 

fulfilled; let us all resolve to reach it this year! It was reported that the heavy 

increases in postal charges and the increased payments for original contributions 

(now El per N.R. page) had reduced the estimated credit balance to L160, as 

compared with E320 in 1957. Provided that the steady increase in membership 

can be maintained the position should be no worse in 1959 but it must be remembered 

that any general increase in printing or paper charges would put us in the red. 

Various steps to increase membership were discussed and will be tried, but the 

possibility of having to increase the annual subscription in the future was mentioned. 

The question of an improved cover for the journal, having been deferred from 

the previous meeting, was considered. It was agreed that the present financial 

position made it out of the question to adopt any change which would cost money 

but there was a clear majority in favour of the cover in which this edition appears, 

which involves no extra cost. A suggestion that the cover should be a different 

colour for each quarter, thereby making it easier for members to remember which 

editions they had read, received little support in committee but those who think 

this is a good idea can write to the Editor. 

The Annual General Meeting was held on 12th December at the Naval and 

Military Club, very smart after its recently completed reconstruction. It was, as 

usual, a useful and enjoyable function, and was slightly better attended than of late. 

The First Sea Lord, who is, of course, a member and who had been invited to 

attend, regretted that he was unable to do so but sent the Editor a very nice note 

in which he said of THE NAVAL REVIEW: 

'I am sure it does a lot of good and that 

the freedom of discussion and criticism which appears in its pages is invaluable'. 

The 1958 Prize Article Competition for members under thirty has not been very 

well patronised this year from the point of view of numbers of entrants. The Editor 

suggests that this Competition merits better support from the younger members. 

Apart from the opportunity to air one's views it can provide a painless and profitable 

method of 'bursting into print'. 

Matter for the April edition should reach the Editor by the 1st of March please, 

but the earlier the better. 

Notice 

1959 Prize Article Competition 

THE 

NAVAL REVIEW offers a prize of twenty pounds for the best article written by a 

member aged thirty years or under, and sent in between the 1st January and the 

31st December, 1959. Competitors may submit more,than one article and, when 

doing so, should state their date of birth. The prize may be divided at the Editor's. 

discretion.

War on Shipping (1914-1918) 

P RIOR to the outbreak of hostilities in 1914, Great Britain was dependent on 

overseas for 80 per cent of her wheat and 50 per cent of her meat. Our daily 

bread came to us not from our fields but from abroad in return for goods made in 

factories manned by people from a deserted countryside. To complicate the problem, 

these factories were also dependent for their raw materials on overseas. The textile 

industries employed over a million workers but all the cotton and 80 per cent of the 

wool came from abroad. Engineering and shipbuilding also relied largely on 

imports. About 50 per cent of the pig iron produced in the United Kingdom was 

smelted from foreign ore. The Navy, too, was becoming more dependent on 

imported fuel, to say nothing of petrol required for motor transport and aircraft. 

The weakness of Britain's industrial system was underpinned by the Navy. The 

protection of her seaborne trade constituted its principal function. Our military 

and economic survival depended on its ability to perform that task efficiently. 

Germany was less dependent on imports and less vulnerable to the pressure of sea- 

power. Britain, however, had two advantages-a more powerful Navy and a more 

favourable geographical position, lying like a great breakwater across Germany's 

path to the oceanic routes. The German Navy was not strong enough to challenge 

directly British seapower. Its chances of success depended therefore on a guerre de 

course against shipping. The naval operations of 1914-18 should be viewed against 

the background of these economic and strategic facts. 

Despite the advantages referred to above, attacks on shipping brought Britain 

within an ace of ruin and defeat. The tonnage sunk or captured by submarines, 

surface raiders and mines during 1914-18 totalled 12,800,000 tons, of which U boats 

accounted for 11,096,000 tons or 87 per cent of the total. But Germany required 

time to build up her submarine flotillas. During the first six months of the war, the 

attack on shipping was almost entirely confined to five German light cruisers and 

five armed merchant ships. All but one of these, the liner Kaiser Wilhelm Der Grosse, 

were in foreign waters when hostilities commenced. The light cruiser Emden cap- 

tured or sank 83,000 tons in the Indian Ocean, the Karlsruhe 77,000 in the West 

Atlantic and the arnled liner Kronprinz Wilhelm 66,000 in the South Atlantic. The 

Dresden and Leipzig sank 28,000 tons before joining Von Spee's squadron in the 

Pacific. Fuelling proved the Achilles heel of most of the others. The destruction 

of the cruiser Konigsberg and the armed liners Cap Trafalgar, Kaiser Wilhelm Der 

Grosse and the internment of the Cormoran and Prinz Eitel Frederich were directly 

or indirectly due to coaling difficulties. The internment of the Kronprinz Wilhelm 

at Newport News in April, 1915, brought this phase to an end. She was at sea for 

over eight months, without dropping anchor, coaling from supply ships and captured 

colliers. Finally, with fresh water tanks empty, her hull leaking and her crew down 

with beri beri, she entered Newport News. 

A few merchant ships with concealed armaments subsequently renewed the 

attack in 1916 and 1917. The first of these was the Moewe, displacing 5,000 tons, 

mounting four 5.9-inch guns, two torpedo tubes and carrying 500 mines. She 

made two very successful cruises during 1916-17 and returned safely to Germany, 

after accounting for 182,000 tons of shipping. The Wolf in 1917 cruised for fifteen

4 WAR ON SHIPPING, 1914-1918 

months in all the oceans, laying mines off Capetown, Bombay, New Zealand and 

Singapore, capturing or sinking 112,000 tons, mainly by mines. She also returned 

successfdy to Germany in February, 1917. The small auxiliary sailing ship Seeadler 

broke out in December, 1916, after being examined by an unsuspecting boarding 

party from H.M.S. Patia. She was the last of the surface raiders, as submarines 

were now considered more economical in men and material. These thirteen ships 

captured or sank a total of 621,000 tons. On the other side of the account, were 

two raiders sunk whilst trying to break out of the North Sea-the Greif by the light 

cruiser Comus and the armed liners Alcantaral and Andes on 28th February, 1916, 

and the Leopard by the cruiser Achilles and boarding vessel Dundee on 16th March, 

1917. These raiders, apart from the destruction they wrought, seriously delayed 

shipping in various parts of the world. Uncertainty concerning the Emden's movements, 

for example, held up trade at Aden, Bombay, Colombo, Singapore, etc., 

whilst the Calcutta Chamber of Commerce clamoured for convoys to get it moving 

again. 

British countermeasures consisted of searching or patrolling suspected areas or 

anchorages. They only succeeded in sinking two armed liners, Cap Trafalgar and 

Kaiser Wilhelm Der Grosse, which were caught coaling in the Atlantic. But the 

oceans are wide. A dozen cruisers searched unsuccessfullv for the Emden in the 

Indian Ocean. A lucky encounter was responsible for her destruction. On 9th 

November, 1914, the staff of the Cable Station at Cocos Islands sighted a German 

cruiser and sent out a hurried SOS. Sixty miles to the northward an Australian 

troop convoy happened to be passing, escorted by the light cruisers Sydney and 

Melbourne and the Japanese Ibuki. The Sydney went off at full speed and after a 

short sharp action left the Emden a battered wreck on the lonely reefs of Cocos 

Islands. Some fifteen cruisers combed the Caribbean and South Atlantic for the 

Karlsruhe in August, 1914. They searched the vicinity of the Azores and the West 

Coast of Africa whilst their target was operating 2,000 miles away in the Pernambuco 

area. Her end came unexpectedly. She blew up 300 miles to the westward of 

Trinidad on 4th November, 1914, with the loss of her Captain and 261 men. The 

survivors reached Germany in a captured ship, the Rio Negro, on 5th December, 

after a stormy passage between Iceland and the Faroes. These futile cruiser searches 

continued for some time after she had been sunk. The battle-cruiser Princess Royal, 

for example, arrived in the West Indies six weeks later to intensify the wild goose 

chase in these waters. 

Operations against the Moewe took much the same course. About twenty-four 

British and several French cruisers scoured the Atlantic in fruitless searches. Despite 

the expenditure of an enormous amount of fuel and energy, she continued to sink 

ship after ship with impunity. What is the use, it may be asked, of superior sea 

power, if a solitary ex-banana ship can achieve so much at so little cost ? The answer 

is simple. We had the seapower and did not know how to use it. These attacks 

could have been quickly brought to a full stop by convoy. More than sufficient 

cruisers and old battleships were available for the p~rpose.~ We preferred, however, 

to form them into more than a dozen Admirals' Commands to search vast ocean 

spaces covering millions of square miles where the chances of interception were 

negligible. A world-wide convoy system, which could be quickly started in any 

The Greif sank the Alcantara by a torpedo before she herself was sunk. 

Old battleships 24, old cruisers 60, most of them employed on useless patrolling.

WAR ON SHIPPING, 1914-1918 5 

threatened area, was eventually organised in 1918, after being rejected by the First 

Sea Lord in 1917, but the enemy had by then ceased using surface raiders and was 

relying entirely on submarines. The Admiralty learnt nothing from the past, could 

not cope with the present, and was too late for the future. 

Prior to the First World War, the mass of naval opinion was sublimely indifferent 

to the growing power of the submarine. There was no lack of inventive and technical 

ability-but little thought was given to anti-submarine weapons. The simple but 

effective depth charge, for example, did not appear on the scene until the middle 

of 1916. Nevertheless, there were warnings that German submarines might torpedo 

British shipping. Admiral Lord Fisher informed Mr. Churchill, First Lord of the 

Admiralty, in 1913, that they would certainly not hesitate to sink merchant ships 

which they could not bring into port. Admiral Sir Percy Scott also wrote a prophetic 

warning that the submarine would revolutionise war at sea.3 Other officers discounted 

the danger on the grounds that submarines would be unable to distinguish 

between neutral and belligerent ships or to fulfil the requirements of international 

law by placing their crews in a place of safety. No one could definitely foretell future 

developments, but the Admiralty should have prepared for the potential danger. 

'It is obviously necessary', said one writer, 'to admit the worst and make arrangements 

a~cordingly'.~ Initial German war plans did not include unrestricted attack 

on merchant ships but the wind soon commenced to blow in that direction. Admiral 

Tirpitz, interviewed by an American journalist in November, 1914, foreshadowed a 

vigorous submarine campaign against shipping. U-boats sank two ships and 

torpedoed a third without warning in the English Channel during October and 

November, 1914. Two more sinkings followed in the Channel and three in the Irish 

Sea during January, 1915. The Admiralty replied by sending destroyers to search 

the threatened areas. But the sea is wide and even the English Channel covers 

many thousands of square miles. When U 21 appeared off Liverpool in January, 

the Admiralty ordered a destroyer division from Harwich and one from the Grand 

Fleet to that area but by the time they arrived she was well on her way home. 

Then came the first signs of the coming storm. On 4th February, 1915, the 

German Government declared the waters around the British Isles a war zone in 

which hostile merchant ships would be sunk and neutrals exposed to s.erious risks 

after 18th February. hat-marked the beginning of the submarine campaign. At 

this stage, Germany had only twenty-eight U-boats, few of which were capable 

of operating for any length of time to the West of Ireland. On the British side, 

anti-submarine weapons were lacking and no preparations had been made to meet 

the attack, except in the case of military transports which were convoyed to their 

destinations. The following statement by Mr. Churchill indicates that he and his 

colleagues on the Board failed to appreciate rhe dangers of the situation:- 

'Having regard to the enormous volume of traffic moving in and out of the very 

numerous ports of the U.K. it seemed clear that no appreciable effect would in 

fact be produced upon our trade provided our ships continued boldly to put to seay.= 

The Times, 5th June, 1914. 

'Influence of Submarines on Naval Policy', THE NAVAL REVIEW, 1913, Vol. I, page 397. 

The World Crisis 1915, page 284. Winston S. Churchill. Mr. Churchill was First Lord of the 

Admiralty from 1911 to 26 May 1915.


His argument that only twenty-one ships were sunk in March, 1915, out of over 

six thousand entering and leaving United Kingdom ports was dangerous and entirely 

misleading. These entries and departures included all sorts of small ships engaged 

on coastal and cross-channel traffic, some of which were counted several times over, 

whereas our vital supplies were carried only in ocean-going vessels. After eliminating 

coastal and cross-channel traffic and ships chartered by the naval and military 

authorities, the entries and departures for March, 1915, numbered not six thousand 

but eight hundred. The Admiralty took no countermeasures until 11th February, 

when it decided to extend the Dover minefield, lay indicator nets in various 

localities, and arm one hundred trawlers. It also decided to provide defensive 

armaments for fifty merchant ships and to fit out a number of decoy ships. 

German submarines sank 80,000 tons of shipping during March, 1915, the first 

complete month of the new campaign. An average of only six to eight U-boats were 

operating around the British Isles during the summer, including one or two in the 

Western Approaches, where the great liner Lusitania was sunk by U 20 on 7th May 

with a loss of 1,198 lives including many American citizens, resulting in strong 

representations from Washington. UC-boats also commenced to lay mines off the 

East Coast at the end of May. Sinkings reached the high level of 165,000 tons in 

August. Then came a sudden check. On the 9th the liner Arabic was torpedoed 

and sunk off Ireland with a loss of forty-four lives, including three American citizens. 

Indignation in America flared up anew. A strong protest came from Washington. 

The German Government ordered all submarines to adhere strictly to the inter- 

national law of visit and search, in the case of passenger ships, which involved 

submarines coming to the surface. This restriction practically brought the sub- 

marine campaign to an end in the North Sea and Western Approaches for nearly 

six months, though sinkings continued in the Mediterranean and minelaying in the 

Channel by the Flanders Flotilla. 

Unrestricted warfare now became a burning question in Germany. The Naval 

Staff guaranteed that it would bring Britain to her knees within six months. It was 

decided therefore to try again. The lull arising from the Arabic incident ended in 

March, 1916, with a heavy attack to the southward of Ireland. Destroyers were 

sent from Devonport to search the area with the usual negative results. Then, just 

as the new attack was getting into its stride, fear of American intervention sounded 

once again' a warning note. UB 29 had torpedoed the cross-Channel packet Sussex 

off Dieppe on 24th March, 1916, without warning, killing several American 

passengers. When Washington threatened to break off diplomatic relations, Berlin 

agreed once again to conform to the general principle of visit and search. But 

Scheer, Commander-in-Chief of the High Sea Fleet, disapproved of this restricted 

warfare. He at once recalled all submarines under his command to carry out 

operations with the fleet, which practically stopped the campaign in the Western 

Approaches during May, June and July, 1916. 

The consequent fall in sinkings was however of short duration, for new U-boats, 

laid down in 1915, were now coming forward in considerable numbers. The Flanders 

Flotilla, consisting of small U-boats working from Zeebrugge alone, sank 50,000 

tons in the English Channel during the first fortnight of September. Nearly forty 

ships were successfully attacked without the intervention of a single patrol vessel. 

Scheer's submarines were now ordered to resume operations in the Western 

Approaches, under prize rules, but with the important qualification that armed


merchant ships were to be regarded as warships. They helped to swell the October 

sinkings to over 300,000 tons, a figure far in excess of any previous month. Convoy 

was still confined to troop transports and a few special ships, such as Admiralty 

colliers, wastefully escorted through the submarine zone one at a time. Ordinary 

shipping continued to sail independently and be sunk, except the Anglo-Dutch 

trade which the Harwich destroyers commenced convoying in July, 1916. Originating 

as a countermeasure to the Flanders torpedo boat flotilla, it had eliminated sinkings 

by submarines on the hitherto vulnerable Harwich-Hook route, but the success of 

this experiment seems to liave passed unnoticed at the Admiralty. 

The sinkings of October, 1916, aroused considerable anxiety. Sir John Jellicoe, 

Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet, wrote to the Prime Minister that shortage 

of shipping might necessitate the acceptance of peace terms by the early summer. 

Heavy sinkings in the English Channel during the last quarter of 1916 also caused 

a crisis in the important Anglo-French coal trade. Ships loaded with coal were held 

up in British ports while French factories were shutting down for lack of it. The 

French naval authorities and British Supply Committee urged the adoption of 

convoy for this traffic but the Naval War Staff stoutly opposed it. The French 

persisted and sent an officer to London with detailed plans. He stated that the 

U-boats had enforced a 30 to 4 per cent effective blockade during November and 

December. His figures were closely examined and entirely confirmed. Convoy of 

the Channel coal trade eventually commenced in February, 1917, and was 

immediately followed by a remarkable fall in sinkings. 

The results of the first two years of the submarine campaign, from February, 1915, 

to January, 1917, inclusive, can now be briefly reviewed. Sinkings totalled 3,075,000 

tons or an average of 128,000 per month. This comparatively low figure was due to 

paucity of U-boats rather than British countermeasures. Submarine mines should 

have proved an effective antidote in narrow areas such as Dover Straits and the 

Heligoland Bight, but the British pattern had proved seriously defective. Most of 

them failed to explode when struck or to maintain their depth and position when 

moored. They bumped harmlessly along the U-boats and revealed their position 

by floating on the surface. Hence the smaller U-boats were able to pass through 

Dover Straits and operate in the English Channel, whilst the larger ones could 

proceed direct to the Western Approaches instead of taking the longer route, north 

about. It was eventually decided to replace them by the horned type6 but it did 

not become available ii any quantity until the autumn of 1917. he lack of an 

efficient mine during the first three years of the war was a very serious handicap in 

the anti-submarine campaign. 

Mr. Churchill states that the Admiralty chiefly relied on arming an 'enormous 

mosquito fleet', indicator nets and decoy ships to destroy the German submarines.? 

These methods were quite inadequate. Only twenty-eight submarines or an average 

of 1.1 per month were destroyed during the first two years of the war. The enormous 

'mosquito fleet' of trawlers, drifters, etc., patrolling the English Channel and coast 

was most wasteful and inefficient. They had neither the guns nor the speed for 

the task. Their chances of locating, much less destroying, U-boats were negligible. 

Indicator nets proved almost entirely useless. The manufacture of hundreds of 

miles of nets and the attendance of hundreds of trawlers and drifters contributed 

The efficiency of the horned mine had been proved in the Russo- Japanese War, ten years earlier. 

' 'The World Crisis, 1915', page 290, Winston S. Churchill.

to the destruction of only two U-boats, one off Havre and one in the Straits of 

Otranto. Decoy ships were a more practicable proposition, so long as the submarines 

were attacking on the surface, but were useless during unrestricted warfare. They 

sank thirteen submarines up to August, 1917, for the loss of twenty Q ships. During 

that last fourteen months of the war twelve Q ships were sunk without destroying 

a single submarine. 

Mr. Churchill states that by the time he left the Admiralty in May, 1915, the 

feeble and premature submarine campaign was completely broken, and that it caused 

no appreciable inconvenience in the next eighteen months.8 This is very far from 

the truth. The 'feeble' campaign was by no means broken by May, 1915, for by the 

end of the year it had put down another 900,000 tons and so far from being of 'no 

appreciable inconvenience' it sank, in the eighteen months May to October, 1916, 

inclusive, 2,225,000 tons, locked up an enormous number of ships and men on anti- 

submarine operations, caused deep concern in shipping circles and led the c-in-C. 

Grand Fleet to express doubts as to the possibility of continuing the war. Mr. 

Churchill also claims that we owed our safety in the terrible years to come to the 

development of the anti-submarine measures initiated by his regime. As a matter 

of fact, the measures for which it was responsible, namely the patrol system, indicator 

nets and decoy ships, had all been abandoned or proved ineffective long before the 

submarine menace was got under control. The measures and material which 

defeated the submarine were in order of importance, first, the general convoy of 

merchant shipping (June, 1917); second, the H mine (August, 1917); third, the 

depth charge (1916). None of these were introduced by Mr. Churchill's regime. 

The first six months of 1917 was the most critical period of the war at sea. The 

number of U-boats available for active operations had trebled between February, 

1916, and March, 1917. Unrestricted warfare, which the German Naval Staff in 

1916 claimed would bring Britain to her knees in a few months, commenced again 

with renewed vigour on 1st February, 1917. Sinkings shot up most alarmingly to 

470,000, 500,000 and 837,000 in February, March and April, respectively. If they 

had continued on that scale for a few more months, the war must have ended in our 

defeat. The shipping available for carrying our vital supplies in 1918, after allowing 

for naval and military commitments, would have reached its critical limit and fallen 

below the gross sinkings of 1917. Hitherto we had been able to fall back on our 

reserves, but the withdrawal of ships from foreign trade and cutting down long 

voyages came to an end in 1917. Every ship sunk was now an irreplaceable loss. 

Nor did America's entry into the war in April, 1917, do much to lighten the gloomy 

outlook. We were already hard put to it to feed our own people, much less to 

transport large American armies across the sea. 

The existing anti-submarine measures offered no hope of escape from this 

desperate situation. They were still mainly focused on searching or patrolling the 

threatened areas with old destroyers, sloops and armed trawlers. But patrols could 

neither locate U-boats nor protect shipping, scattered over wide areas. The South- 

West Approaches, where most of the sinkings occurred, covered over 100,000 square 

miles. By the time patrols reached the scene of an attack, the submarine was often 

hundreds of miles away. The most the patrols could do was to rescue the ship- 

wrecked crew. The inefficiency of this system was accentuated at the end of 1916 

Ibid., page 293,294.

WAR ON SHIPPING, 1914-1918 9. 

by confining shipping in the Western Approaches to certain patrolled routes. There 

were four of these areas covering about 10,000 square miles. It was impossible to 

provide sufficient patrols but they enabled the U-boats to locate the traffic routes. 

The results were appalling. The area to the S.W. of Ireland became known as the 

graveyard of the Atlantic where ships were shepherded like sheep to the slaughter. 

The problem could only be solved by forming ships into groups protected by 

armed escorts. That principle applied just as much to submarines as to surface 

ships. It enabled the functions of interception, defence and counter-attack to be 

combined in a single escort force. The First Sea Lord and the Naval War Staff were, 

however, strongly opposed to general convoy. But suggestions on the subject, after 

being ignored by the Naval Staff, eventually reached members of the Government. 

On 2nd November, 1916, the Prime Minister (Mr. Lloyd George) and Mr. Bonar 

Law questioned the C.-in-C. Grand Fleet (Admiral Jellicoe) and Chief of the War 

Staff on the subject at a meeting of the War Cabinet. Both of them opposed the 

idea. In January, 1917, the Naval War Staff issued a printed memorandum 

condemning convoy in most specific terms, stating amongst other things that:- 

'The system of several ships sailing in convoy is not recommended in any 

area where submarine attack is a possibility'. 

The Admiralty's opposition did not diminish as the sinkings increased. Early in 

February, the First Sea Lord, now Admiral Jellicoe, informed the War Cabinet 

that the grave shipping situation could only be solved by a large increase in the 

number of patrol vessels. In a memorandum of 22nd April, he did not even mention 

convoy and only suggested the provision of more small craft $0 keep the U-boats 

down. Meanwhile, however, naval opinion outside the Admiralty, was moving in 

favour of convoy. In February, Vice-Admiral Sir Frederick Brock, Commanding 

Orkneys and Shetlands, commenced convoying on his own initiative the Scandina- 

vian trade to the eastward of the Orkneys. Early in April, Admiral Beatty, C.-in-C. 

Grand Fleet, proposed that the East Coast patrols should convoy the East Coast 

and Scandinavian trade. He pointed out that patrols provided no security for 

shipping and that as escorts could not be provided for each ship, the only alternative 

was convoy. 

The appalling losses of April, 1917, decided the Prime Minister to take peremptory 

action for the enforcement of convoy. On the 25th of that month he expressed his 

intention of visiting the Admiralty and personally holding an enquiry into the 

conduct of the anti-submarine war. This unorthodox procedure was viewed with 

alarm. A tremor ran through the halls of Neptune. Next day Their Lordships 

decided that the time had come to be ready to introduce a comprehensive scheme of 

convoy. 'Persistence of a few more weeks in the refusal to listen to advice from 

outside would', wrote Mr. Lloyd George, 'have meant irretrievable ruin 

to the Allies'. The convoy of homeward bound shipping commenced on a small 

scale in June, 1917, and was an immediate success. By the end of October ninety- 

nine homeward bound convoys consisting of 1,502 ships had arrived with a loss 

of only ten or .66 per cent of ships actually in convoy. A suggestion to extend convoy 

to outward bound ships in July was rejected by the First Sea Lord on the grounds 

that 'these ships were being sunk because patrols had been withdrawn to provide 

escorts for homeward convoys', thus delaying the extension until August. By the 

end of November, seventy-seven outward convoys had sailed with a loss of only 

.57 per cent. The general situation continued to improve during the fourth and


last year of the war. The graph of sinkings fell in almost direct proportion to the 

increasing number of ships under convoy. The percentage of losses amongst ships 

sailing independently was about ten times greater than those in convoy. 

The Allies' upward curve of new ship construction crossed the downward graph 

of sinkings in March, 1918. Anti-submarine measures were also much more effective 

during 1918. An average of 6.8 U-boats were destroyed per month compared with 

2.1 in the third year and 1.1 in the first two years. The increased number sunk 

in the fourth year was mainly due to more efficient mines in the Dover and Heligo- 

land Bight areas, a large scale use of depth charges and counter attacks by convoy 

escorts, where the submarines naturally gathered and became liable to attack. 

That convoy saved us from irretrievable disaster there can be no doubt. It made 

targets harder to find and attacks more difficult by exposing the U-boats to counter- 

attacks. Its earlier adoption, say at the beginning of 1916, would have saved a large 

volume of shipping, probably about three million tons. It might also have shortened 

the war, for faith in the submarine campaign strengthened the enemy's determination 

to continue fighting and in January, 1917, was his strongest bastion of moral support. 

It would, however, be a mistake to imagine that the submarine campaign was 

definitely defeated. It was not. The fact that sinkings averaged 230,000 tons per 

month during the last six months is sufficient proof of that. Though new mercantile 

construction exceeded sinkings after March, 1918, the desperate shortage of tonnage 

continued. Thousands of men had to be withdrawn from the Army and industry 

to the shipyards. Thus, America and Britain had to build more ships for the enemy 

to sink in the hope that he would leave sufficient number to maintain essential 

transport. It is also important to note that the vast majority of these sinkings 

occurred amongst ships proceeding singly and unescorted to the convoy assembly 

ports and from the convoy dispersal positions to their final destination. The enemy 

appears to have switched U-boats from the Western Approaches, where shipping 

was strongly escorted, to coastal areas where it was n0t.O 

The delay in adopting general convoy was much criticised after the war. A 

considerable controversy arose on the subject. Various excuses were made but the 

real causes of failure were not examined. What we want to know is-Why did the 

Admiralty oppose general convoy ? Why was the futility of patrolling the Western 

Approaches not realised sooner? Why, in short, were so many mistakes made in 

the face of plain facts ? If we can find the answers to these questions they may help 

to solve other problems, besides preventing similar mistakes in the future. First, 

consider the Admiralty's objection to general convoy, as stated officially and un- 

officially at the time. They are summarised below:- 

(a) Lack of sufficient escort vessels. 

(b) Slowing down of traffic. 

(c) Danger of escorting more than one ship. 

(d) Difficulties of station keeping. 

A simple calculation would have contradicted (a). Between 200 and 300 ocean- 

going ships entered and left the U.K. per week. About 100 destroyers or sloops 

@Definite 

information on this point is lacking. The German official history of the sub- 

marine campaign has only been published up to July, 1917.

WAR ON SHIPPING, 1914-1918 I I 

would have sufficed to escort them through the Western Approaches where most 

of the sinkings occurred. We had over 400 of these vessels in 1916, including a large 

number wastefully employed patrolling and escorting single ships. Numerous 

armed trawlers and P-boats were also available for coastal and cross-channel escorts. 

The real problem was, in fact, not so much lack of escorts but the more efficient 

use of those we had. Once the principle of general convoy was approved there was 

no difficulty in providing the escorts. A weekly return issued by the Admiralty to 

the Press misled the Government and the public on that point. It showed the 

number of ships sunk by enemy action and the number entering and leaving the 

U.K. per week. The latter figure, usually amounting to about 5,000 ships, included 

small coastal and cross-channel traffic, some of which were counted several times 

over and gave a most erroneous impression of the ships arriving from overseas. It 

was generally accepted by the War Staff up to May, 1917, that as many ships 

entered the United Kingdom per day as actually arrived per week, which, of course, 

increased the estimated escort requirements. Whilst the Admiralty was deceived 

by its own propaganda, the enemy had merely to refer to Lloyds List and Weekly 

Index to calculate the correct figures. 

With reference to (b) the Admiralty insisted that assembling and sailing ships in 

company slowed down traffic. But independent sailings also involved serious delays 

owing to diversions and closure of routes for days at a time, whereas convoys 

escorted by armed vessels could disregard the submarine situation in particular 

areas. For example, the ships of the first mercantile convoy which left Gibraltar 

on 10th May, 1917, arrived home two days earlier than if these ships had followed 

the devious routes prescribed for independent sailings. Also in the case of the French 

coal trade, convoy immediately freed a large volume of shipping that had been 

practically blockaded in British ports. Besides, the delays caused by ships of different 

speeds sailing in company could be, and were greatly reduced by instituting fast, 

medium and slow convoys. The convoy system might be uneconomical on safe 

routes but it was absolutely essential in dangerous areas, such as the Western 

Approaches. The real problem in that case was not so much the possibility of 

slowing down traffic, as the probability that rejection of convoy would eventually 

leave no ships to slow down. 

Thirdly, the Admiralty maintained that it would be dangerous to escort more 

than one or two ships at a time, owing to the size of the target. The available and 

subsequent experience entirely disproved that opinion. For instance, the numerous 

ships of the Grand Fleet when cruising in convoy formation escorted by destroyers 

not only escaped damage from submarines but rammed and sank two early in the 

war. Similarly, the immunity of the Anglo-Dutch trade, after switching to convoy 

in July, 1916, suggested that a number of ships zigzagging in the vicinity of a sub- 

marine restricted its freedom of movement and made attack more difficult. The 

fourth and final objection that merchant ships would be unable to keep station 

was also entirely imaginary. They could not be expected to maintain the meticulously 

accurate formation of warships. But that was unnecessary and had not prevented 

the safe arrival of large Canadian and Australian troop convoys early in the war. 

Station keeping of the first Transatlantic convoy to arrive home in June, 1917, was 

also reported as excellent. 

It is apparent, however, that these easily refuted objections did not fully explain 

the Admiralty's opposition to convoy and that the arguments used to justify its

I2 WAR ON SHIPPING, 1914-1918 

actions differed from the motives that governed them. The real reasons must be 

sought in certain complex and perhaps unconscious ideas. For one thing, naval 

training and environment focused naval thought too exclusively on the idea of 

battle and too little on the control of communications or the protection of trade. 

The tendency was to view maritime war merely as a kind of gladiatorial contest 

between two opposing fleets without ultimate aim or purpose, whereas its real 

object-control of passage by sea-was ignored. The mere fact that convoy might 

reduce the number of destroyers available for battle and the protection of battleships 

sufficed to condemn it irrevocably in some minds. That school of thought dreamed 

of ending the war by a victorious battle. Unfortunately the U-boats were winning 

it without one. 

It is true that the destruction of the High Sea Fleet would have been a heavy 

and perhaps decisive blow. The difficulty was to deliver it. Naval battles do not 

occur spontaneously and the weaker fleet naturally endeavours to avoid them. They 

usually result from applying strong pressure to the enemy or the resistance of 

pressure applied by him. British strategy should therefore have been mainly focused 

on the protection of shipping and throttling German trade. The more effectively 

these were done, the greater the possibility of the High Sea Fleet facing a battle. 

Instead of concentrating on the development of efficient anti-submarine measures 

and strong escort forces during 1914-15, Lord Fisher, the First Sea Lord, was 

preparing to land an army, which only existed in his imagination, on the German 

Baltic Coast and built a large number of special ships for the purpose.I0 Meanwhile, 

Mr. Churchill devised an equally impracticable plan for the North Sea. He proposed 

to capture the small island of Borkum, at the mouth of the River Ems, as an 

advanced base for a close blockade of the German coast. If Fisher's and Churchill's 

strategical ideas had been carried out, they would have dovetailed very neatly into 

Germany's 'Equalisation of Strength Policy' on which her hopes of victory at sea 

were built. They illustrate the risks we ran from an administration which did not 

understand the nature and meaning of maritime war. 

The Grand Fleet, including about 100 of our latest destroyers, stood aside from 

the anti-submarine war. Surfaced U-boats continued to pass to and from the 

Western Approaches within easy striking distance of Scapa Flow. British sea power 

was being steadily undermined, whilst the Grand Fleet and all its attendant light 

craft awaited a battle which the weaker High Sea Fleet had no intention of fighting. 

Its primary task was defined by Scheer, from 1917 onwards, as guarding the mine- 

sweepers clearing channels for U-boats through the Heligoland Bight minefields. 

If the Grand Fleet's primary function had been recognised as control of the narrow 

Orkney-Norway area, its destroyers could have been regularly employed on anti- 

submarine operations, but in that case its immediate readiness for battle would 

have been limited to that area. For example, Grand Fleet destroyers patrolled a 

section of the Heligoland-Fair Island submarine route during two days of October, 

1917, in order to drive the U-boats into a deep minefield, temporarily laid for the 

purpose. Despite the handicap of very bad weather, two large German submarines 

were destroyed. This successful experiment was not repeated because the idea of 

a victorious battle took precedence over the protection of shipping. The Grand 

Fleet was kept concentrated ready to intercept the High Sea Fleet to the southward 

"ncluding the Glorious class of monster unarmoured cruisers, monitors, landing craft, etc.


if it showed signs of movement. Though unwilling to miss any opportunity of 

engaging the enemy, the Commander-in-Chief (Admiral Beatty) expressed his 

willingness to employ destroyers on anti-submarine operations provided the 

Admiralty modified its policy in the North Sea. 

Faulty strategical conceptions do not, however, fully explain the opposition to 

convoy, the futile patrolling of the Western Approaches or the alleged shortage of 

escorts. A defective system of administration was a contributory factor. Prior to 

June, 1917, operations were exclusively controlled by the First Sea Lord and Chief 

of the Naval War Staff. Every paper or signal requiring a decision, however trivial, 

had to be referred to them. Operations Division had little or nothing to do with 

the conduct of operations. It minuted papers on a wide variety of routine and 

technical questions, many of which should have been dealt with by the executive 

authorities at sea. The lack of any clear distinction between the functional responsi- 

bilities of the Admiralty and executive Commands added to the burden of both. 

It was nobody's business in Operations or any other Division to think or plan 

ahead or to investigate important questions such as the relative merits or demerits 

of patrolling or convoy. That kind of work was not done because senior officers 

did not trust their subordinates and were themselves too busy to do it. Individuals 

or departments, overwhelmed with business, tend to oppose any extension of their 

functions. In the case of independent sailings, the Admiralty had merely to issue 

instructions as to routeing, and further responsibility fell on the Master. Convoy, 

on the other hand, placed much greater responsibilities on the Admiralty. It also 

meant a great deal of administrative work which eventually involved the creation 

of new departments and to some extent the eclipse of those divisions which had 

opposed the convoy system. Nor was there any systematic attempt to analyse or 

evaluate the experience of current operations. Valuable information, such as the 

decisive success of the convoy system on the Harwich-Hook route, passed practically 

unnoticed amongst the daily flood of reports, signals and paperasserie and no one 

was detailed to make a continuous and authoritative study of events in particular areas. 

Pseudo-disciplinary inhibitions also tended to block the advisory channels of 

communication between the First Sea Lord and members of the War Staff. The 

misunderstandings as to requirements in convoy escorts should, for example, have 

been quickly resolved by officers of the Trade Division, who knew the correct 

number of entries and departures of shipping. They maintained a discreet silence 

on the subject. Open disagreement with the First Sea Lord's policy might bring 

reprisals. It actually did in at least one case. An unwritten law of the Admiralty 

that no one must question or criticise any action or policy approved by the Board 

also tended to develop caution and concealment. The passionate belief of the 

permanent officials in centralised authority was a real danger in that respect. They 

controlled the papers and were liable to discredit valuable plans or proposals on the 

grounds that they questioned earlier Board decisions, though the writer might not 

even be aware of their existence. Similarly, many officers in destroyers, sloops, etc., 

realised the utter futility of searching or patrolling the submarine zones, but naval 

custom and tradition discouraged suggestion on subjects which were wrongly 

considered the monopoly of senior officers. The Naval Staff can never function 

effectively unless full use is made of specialised knowledge and experience. Of all 

the mistakes that High Authority can make in time of war, one of the worst is to 

penalise suggestion or honest expression of opinion because it conflcts with approved 

policy. 

K. G. B. DEWAR

Swedish Naval Bases 

This article is contributed by a distinguished Swedish Naval Officer, 

Commodore B. F. Thermaenius, whom many members will doubtless re- 

member from his long sojourn in London as Swedish Naval Attache'.-Ed. 

I N order to make it possible to develop the maximum effect of a fleet it is necessary 

that the ships should be continuously and well supplied with equipment, per- 

sonnel and provisions. 

War-damage must be repaired, ammunition and other warfare material made 

good or replaced and the ships companies completed. Therefore it is essential 

to have shore-contact with a view to arranging these matters. Also in peace time 

it is of course required to complete and test the equipment and replenish fuel, etc. 

In the naval bases the necessary steps are made to meet all these requirements in 

peace and war. The importance and need of naval bases have changed from 

time to time in history. The sailing fleets did not call for liquid fuel or coal, and in 

emergency repair could be done at sea or at some anchorage. Occasionally, ammuni- 

tion could be provided from captures as the caliber of the guns in those days were 

similar on most ships. The crews and provisions however, had to be rendered 

complete, and this could be done by impressment and requisition or purchase in a 

suitable port. All this applied principally to operations on the high seas, e.g. the 

French Admiral Suffren's distinguished naval contests in the East Indies and 

Lord Nelson's famous campaigns. In the northern waters the sailing vessels were 

forced by the climatic conditions with ice-covered waters to remain in port for the 

winter season. 

Since World War I1 seagoing fleets have become more and more independent 

of permanent naval bases. Completing of oilfuel and supplies is done at sea from 

tankers, and provisions are carried in the freezing rooms on board. Reconditioning 

could be done on board repair ships. First and foremost it is the threat from the 

air that has caused the abandonment of shore bases. In Scandinavian waters, 

especially in the Baltic, the circumstances are different. The entire coastline of 

Sweden except for the southern part is dominated by archipelagoes, islands, rocks, 

cliffs and inlets-a rather unique feature. Both within and beyond these skerries 

can be found good ports or suitable waters and sites for an enemy to land large 

numbers of troops and establish supply bases. 

On the other hand, these same places form excellent bases for the Swedish Navy. 

The islands of the coastline often consist of fairly high and steep cliffs of granite, 

which can be blasted to form underground rock shelters. In these caverns, ships 

can obtain reasonable security against various attacks by bombs. 

Another important circumstance must be stressed. There is practically no 

tide in the Baltic and very little, about 1 ft., on the Swedish west coast. The 

advantage of this fact, when constructing docks and rock shelters is obvious to 

every sailor. The location of the Swedish Navy at different parts of the coast 

has developed in step with the maritime interest of the country. In the following 

paragraphs the changes in the naval base-system are surveyed.

SWEDISH NAVAL BASES 15

I 6 - SWEDISH NAVAL BASES 

Since time out of mind seafaring has been practised round the Swedish coasts. 

'This is evident from the number of rock-carving and drawings on bronze, which 

the archaeologists have found at excavations. The ships were generally small 

and slender craft and propelled by rowing. Sails were used only with a stern wind 

right up to the 12th century. The traffic was mainly coastwise. The expeditions 

of the Vikings from Scandinavia were the first naval war-incidents recorded in the 

northern part of the world. Narratives of several actions at sea between Scandinavian 

kings have been handed down, e.g. the famous naval battle at Svolder 

near Riigen (17) (see Map) in the year 1000. A little later, in 1007, the first naval 

contest put on record took place in Swedish seas between Norwegian and Swedish 

Vikings at Olingsund (formerly Olovsund) in S. HHrsfjarden (10). This sound 

is quite close to the base, which later on was to become of foremost importance to 

the Swedish Navy. During the Viking Age (400-1100 A.D.) the coastal region 

of the country was divided into so called 'Skeppslag' (ship's district). The men 

in this territory belonged to a corporation, which was called 'Rodden' (the rowing 

crew). The naval conscript-organisation may be derived from this institution. 

The members of 'Rodden' were obliged by law to put a ship with full equipment 

at the King's disposal for naval war service when required. Such ship's district 

existed in 'Roslagen', which extended over the Stockholm Archipelago, where 

the fishermen and peasantry were trained sailors. It may also be mentioned that 

this 'Skargird' provided good anchorages and was close to a number of communities, 

among them the Swedish capital. Even at that early stage this district may therefore 

be called a naval base area. 

In the old days the vessels were assembled at 'Kungsgirdarna' (the Kings' Courtyards), 

whether they were situated close to the seaside, as was the rule at the Swedish 

South Coast or towards the Malar valley on the East Coast, well protected by the 

outer archipelago. Sometimes, the ships assembled at the Courtyards far inland, 

this being possible because the Viking craft were of shallow draft and could travel 

up the rivers or in case of need be dragged on the comparatively even ground or 

rolled on logs. With the development of the ships into square-rigged sailing vessels 

with different names, 'holkar', 'koggar' or 'skutor' (barges), the naval bases once 

for - all - moved out to the seaside and the Dorts. 

Now and then sea campaigns took place in the Baltic. Here shall only be 

mentioned one abortive attack against Gotland (14) in 1448, with the intention of 

the Swedish Crown to subdue this rich island. The various craft with the special 

names mentioned above were small merchant vessels, which were armed and 

equipped, thus being transformed into men-of-war with soldiers embarked besides 

the ships company. The ships were fitted out and furnished in the port-villages 

and brought together in an archipelago or a sea-town. In the early part of the 

sixteenth century, the powerful, Hanseatic League played an important role as a 

naval power in the Baltic with the old towns Liibeck (21), Visby (13) and Riga (9) 

as prominent members. The first naval battle in the open sea, in which Swedish 

sailing ships took part, was fought out at Bornholm (18) in 151 1, between Denmark 

and Holland on one side and Sweden and Liibeck on the other. The latter won 

the battle, but later on the Danes got the better of the struggle for power. King 

Gustavus I Wasa (1521-1560) was compelled to purchase a number of ships from

SWEDISH NAVAL BASES 17 

Liibeck. These ships formed the skeleton of a proper fleet. At the existing ship- 

yards some special ships were constructed. They were similar to galleys in the 

Mediterranean and were called 'galejor'. Thus, the Danish command of the sea 

could be successfully contested, and modern Sweden founded. The King signed 

his first Charter on board the flagship, the Swan, the day after the Danes had sur- 

rendered. With the new birth of the Navy there was a need for new bases. Even 

in those days they seemed to make a distinction between what later generations call 

onerational bases and naval bases. 

During Gustavus 1's time, the greater part of the Navy was stationed behind a 

pilework below the Royal Palace, 'Three Crowns', at the so called 'Lodgirden' in 

Stockholm (1). Since then, there has always been a Naval Station in or near the 

Swedish capital. This space, however, soon turned out to be insufficient, and 

during the reign of Gustavus' successor, Erik XIV, in 1564-65, the main ships 

were moved over the river Norrstrom to Blasieholmen, where a ship-yard and 

mooring berths were built and arranged. The famous Grand Hotel and its beauti- 

ful sister Grand Hotel Royal, are now rather suitably situated on that solid naval 

ground. 

When the Swedish Navy was founded in 1522, its strategic purpose was chiefly 

defensive vis-a-vis the principal enemy, the Danish Navy, which at that time was 

superior. The Swedish Navy's tasks were to prevent seaborne invasion, particularly 

in the direction of Stockholm's 'Surgird', the Danes would thus be forced to use the 

long and troublesome roads over land to reach the object in view; to keep the water- 

way to Finland open, that country at this time being part of Sweden; and to maintain 

free communication with the Baltic provinces Estonia and Latvia and the Hanseatic 

towns; from these places the very essential import of salt took place. 

The Swedish Naw had now been ~rovided with a central base within the main 

operational sphere and this was ~to&holm. Secondary points of support in the 

form of smaller shipyards were laid out and constructed at Abo (3) and Viborg (7) 

in Finland at Vastervik (IS), Nykijping (11) and Kalmar (16) on the Swedish Baltic 

Coast and at Elfsborg on the Kattegat Coast near the present Goteborg (23). At 

these places only parts of the fleet could be stationed. At the beginning of the 

seventeenth century, Elfsborg received a permanent squadron. Ordinarily, the 

small fleet was stationed at the Finnish ports, being ready for action at the eastern 

frontier against Russia. One reason for this deployment was the ice-conditions; 

it was necessary to be ready as near the enemy as possible when the ice loosened 

in the spring. 

As the power of the Swedish State increased and she strove to enlarge her in- 

fluence in the Baltic, the Navy gradually undertook offensive strategic tasks. For 

these purposes Stockholm was too remotely situated. Another disadvantage was 

the considerable navigational and manoeuvring difficulties it presented to a sailing 

fleet. At Elfsnabben and Nyhamn operational bases were built, where the ships 

assembled and the officers and soldiers embarked for transportation to the theatre 

of war. The importance of protection for the communication by sea with Finland 

decreased as the east and south coast of the Baltic to an ever increasing extent 

became Swedish. At this time the Baltic was swept clean of navies other than the 

Swedish and the Danish. The Polish fleet disappeared and the Hanseatic squadrons 

became unimportant from a military point of view. The need of a new naval base in 

the southern part of the Baltic was temporarily provided for by the setting up of a

18 SWEDISH NAVAL BASES 

secondary establishment at Wismar (20) in the north of Germany. The problem 

could not be solved definitely until the Scanian provinces had been annexed by 

Sweden in 1658 by the Peace of Roskilde, dictated by King Charles X Gustavus. 

With a view to being as close as possible to his Danish enemy in the south and to 

avoid being icebound in the northern bases, Charles XI resolved (1679) to found 

Karlskrona (17). This naval port was planned to supersede Stockholm as the 

main naval base. After a few years at Kalmar (16), the Swedish Navy was stationed 

at Karlskrona from the year 1685. The port is still the main naval base in peace- 

time. 

During the years 1680-1715 Stockholm was deserted by the Navy. The strate- 

gical change, which occured when Charles XI1 fought Czar Peter during the Great 

Nordic War, forced the Swedish Admiralty to pay new attention to the central part 

of the Baltic and the Swedish east coast. Particularly the last years of the war 

provided examples of the difficulties in defending the archipelago parts of the 

coastline with a Navy, consisting of mainly large ships based on Karlskrona. The 

Russians even attacked Elfsnabben (lo), one of the old operational bases, during 

their descent on the coast in 1719. This was the reason why it was resolved to 

maintain Karlskrona as the base and port for larger seagoing ships, while Stockholm 

had to look after the ships and craft intended for fighting the enemy in the 'Sklirgbd' 

or near the coastline. This rule was valid up to the beginning of the twentieth 

century. Complementary secondary naval establishments were built on the west 

coast at Nya Varvet, close to the old Elfsborg (23) and from the middle of the 

eighteenth century another secondary base was established at Sveaborg near Hel- 

singfors (4); this was intended as a primary base both for the 'Grand Fleet' and the 

'Archipelago or Small Fleet', but it was mainly used by the latter. 

During King Gustavus 111's war with Russia, the Swedish 'Grand Fleet' tried it's 

strength on the enemy at Hogland (5) in 1788, Reval (8) and the Bay of Viborg in 

1790. The 'Small Fleet' annihilated the Russian Navy at Svensksund in the south 

of Finland and the enemy was forced to conclude peace, being inferior at sea. 

During the Napoleonic War in 1805-1807, the last Swedish possessions in Ger- 

many were lost. Some years later Sweden was forced into a small war with England. 

In the beginning of 1809 Admiral Saumarez, flying his Flag in H.M.S. Victory, 

arrived at Vinga Sand outside Goteborg. War was however not declared until 

November the following year. In the winter 1810-11 the Swedish brigs Dolphin 

and Wait-a-Little kept an eye on the British squadron. The war was most peaceful, 

neither warm nor cold. This is evident from the fact, that both Commanders-in- 

Chief and their officers were invited to dine together and later on join in a ball, 

arranged by the civil authorities in Goteborg. They enjoyed themselves pretty well 

and only contested for the sweetest girls. Peace was concluded on the 18th of 

July, 1812. From that day the former enemies turned allies. They are still good 

friends. The result of this alliance was complete command of the sea in the Baltic 

and adjacent waters. The Swedish army under the command of Fieldmarshal 

Bernadotte, who had just been elected heir to the throne and Crown Prince of 

Sweden, could now be safely transported to Germany. This resulted inthe victory 

at Leipzig in 1813 and the beginning of the end of Napoleon. 

The change from sailing men-of-war to power-driven ships coincided closely 

with the renaissance of the Swedish Navy from its state of decay in the middle of the 

nineteenth century. It was not until the 1890's that the rebuilding had reached the

SWEDISH NAVAL BASES 19 

stage, when not only single modern ships but also squadrons were available. The 

naval base situation was then as follows: In Karlskrona the Navy had the use of a 

comparatively well protected, equipped and fortified establishment with a very good 

dockyard, a complete naval station with large barracks, a naval hospital, store- 

houses, etc. The civil population depended to a great extent on the Navy. The 

situation and lay-out of this naval port and town with a large roadstead behind a row 

of islands is reminiscent of Portsmouth. From a strategical point of view Karls- 

krona is well situated for action against Russian shipping and naval operations in the 

southern part of the Baltic. It was possible for a fleet with the duty of covering 

the Swedish east coast against Russian assault oversea to be based on Karlskrona, 

provided it had war-anchorages and footing elsewhere nearer to the enemy's route 

of attack. Various places in the 'Skiirgird' of Sodermanland and Ostergotland 

were suitable for this purpose, but those chiefly used were in Stockholm's archipel- 

ago. 

None of these bases, however, were effective during operations on the west 

coast or in the Gulf of Bothnia. After the naval depot at Goteborg had been de- 

molished in 1860, probably in order to save money, there were no bases in these 

regions of the country. As to the west coast that did not matter very much while 

Sweden and Norway were united, since Norwegian ports were available. The 

situation changed completely in 1905, when this alliance was broken and Sweden 

was thrown entirely on its own strength in the Skagerack and the Kattegatt. In 

the defence plan of 1914 it was also stated that new naval bases should be restored 

and established at Nya Varvet (23) near Goteborg and at Gustavsvik (2) near 

Harnosand on the Gulf of Bothnia. 

The military situation during the years between World War I and I1 produced 

no significant improvement or change in the Swedish naval bases. On the contrary, 

their resources and war-preparedness decreased considerably below the standard 

which was considered necessary in 1914. The important task of modernizing the 

naval bases was not set about until the late nineteen-thirties. The first step was to 

widen some of the fortifications in order to enlarge the defended zones, by making 

use of modern, long-range artillery. Within the limits of this work a new protected 

war-anchorage and base was built at Firosund (12) (Gotland). After the outbreak 

of World War I1 the task was undertaken of expanding the capacity of the naval 

dockyards. Attention was drawn especially to the old dockyard at Skeppsholmen, 

which for years had been left unmodernised, due to a proposal of many years' 

standing to remove this yard from its place in the centre of Stockholm. In 1942, 

the naval depot Nya Varvet near Goteborg was extended to a naval station and also 

provided with a repairing yard. In November, 1953, the Swedish Riksdag passed 

a resolution, that in principle the naval establishments at Skeppsholmen and Galar- 

varvet should be removed to Berga-Musko in the Archipelago. After further 

investigations, concerning the workshops, etc. in the dockyard, the transfer of 

schools and other activities, blasting of tunnel-docks began. A final plan for the 

removal was delivered on the 8th of November, 1958. 

THE CHOICE OF SITE FOR A MODERN BASE 

Clearly there are a number of important, and sometimes conflicting factors to 

consider, some of these are peculiar to the Baltic. The base must obviously be 

reasonably central to the required area of operations, so that no long passage is


required to reach the waters which it is intended to control. It should, if possible, 

have good landward communications but there are disadvantages in having a naval 

base in a densely populated area, especially a commercial port, where the move- 

ments or even presence of merchant ships may hamper naval activities. Though 

there are advantages in having available a pool of skilled and unskilled labour which 

can reach the base without difficulty the advantages of comparative isolation are 

probably overriding; secrecy of movement in wartime is easier to achieve and the 

base will function more effectively in peace if officers and men can be free from 

shore distractions during training periods. To site the base on an island obviously 

makes communication more difficult but may have defence advantages in war. 

Navigationally the base must provide adequate depth of water in approaches and 

berths, including alongside berths. It should have more than one easily defended 

approach and it must of course provide reliable shelter from bad weather. Their 

must be suitable traffic-free exercise areas within reasonable distance of the base. 

It must be sufficiently ice-free, even in a hard winter, not to hamper naval opera- 

tions; this applies particularly to 'coastal forces'. In this connection it is worth 

noting that ice conditions in the Baltic are much better for navigation on the western 

(Swedish) side than on the eastern (Estonian and Latvian) shore. And finally, it 

should, if possible, provide protection for the fleet and its services, from air attack. 

This brings us to the question of rock-tunnelling, which seems to be by far the most 

effective means of defence. 

OPERATION 'GRANITE' 

There are many places on the Swedish coast where the rock is suitable for blasting 

shelters of various sorts but it must not be thought that, wherever a cliff slopes down 

to deep water, one can blast a ship-tunnel, for such is far from the case. Where 

it is required to blast these vast caverns the rock must be of a very special consistency, 

must be free from cracks and must not flake; this has to be ascertained by test 

boring and far from all mountains are suitable. The best cliffs for the purpose 

consist of granite or gneiss, the latter being composed of the same constituents as 

granite but having a fairly well-marked layer structure of parallel veins. It is very 

hard and solid but is comparatively easy to break or blast and it is possible to split it 

in any direction. In the Stockholm archipelago the bedrock consists almost entirely 

of veined gneiss or granite of volcanic origin. Much experience has been necessary 

to find a satisfactory blasting technique but, not only is it now possible to blast 

practically smooth surfaces but, within the last decade the cost of rock blasting has 

been reduced by some 50%. This has the rather startling result that, apart from the 

cost of the very important ventilation system, it is cheaper to excavate needed 

accommodation out of the solid rock than it would be to build it above ground! 

One point that had to be considered is the fact that due to the movement of the 

earth's crust, the Swedish land mass is slowly rising. It is estimated that, since the 

ice age, the coastal area of the Gulf of Bothnia has risen 285 metres and the Stock- 

holm archipelago 150 metres. This elevation of the land is still going on except 

in the southern part of the country; it is now calculated to be half a centimetre per 

annum in the Stockholm area, so that this should not prejudice the subterranean 

docks for a long time. As has previously been noted, there is practically no tide 

in the Baltic, though the water level may change up to half a metre, due to winds 

and currents.

Swedish destroyer berthed underground 

Swedish submarine entering a tunnel-dock 

To face page ZI

SWEDISH NAVAL BASES 2 I 

The underground establishments are blasted out of the solid mountain, and there 

is no question of excavating natural caves or grottos. The new dockyard is situated 

on an island, called Musko. This is an advantage as attacks of an aggressor from the 

mainland could more easily be resisted. From a nautical point of view, the basin 

outside the entrance to the docks ought to be free from shoals and banks with at least 

two entrances, which could be protected. The communications with the mainland 

are planned to be kept up by fast ferry-boats; this is easily done over the short 

distance involved. The cost for traffic to an island is of course more expensive than 

to an establishment on the mainland. The ice-conditions in this region vary from 

one winter to another. Some years the waters are ice-bound from the end of 

January to the beginning of April. It will then be necessary to keep the fairways 

open by the ferryboats or ice-breakers. Other winters there are not more than a 

few weeks of ice-hindrance. 

As regards the construction of the naval dockyard, the building of the 'tunnel 

docks for ships', which is their proper name, is a most far-reaching and complicated 

work. As far as is known, no other similar undertaking exists and there is no 

pattern to follow. There are a number of problems, which have to be tackledand 

solved. A miscalculation or negligence at the planning is very difficult and ex- 

pensive to correct after being applied in the work at the rocks. Blasting ought not to 

be carried out later than when dock gates, pumps, cranes and sections with different 

kinds of machinery, etc., have been made ready and installed. The tunnel docks 

must be arranged according to berthing and drydocking of all different types of 

ships, both those in existence to-day and those planned for the future. It is there- 

fore vital to try and to be far-sighted. Special arrangements are finally necessary 

for handling and docking war-damaged ships. 

Tunnels are nothing new. Starting several years ago, factories and large shelters 

for the population and for storage have been built at different places in Sweden. 

But the combination tunnel-dock-repairshop is new and special measures are 

therefore required. Among those shall only be stated the problems of ventilation 

and transportation of heavy and bulky material from workshop to tunnel dock and 

vice-versa. These and other questions are rather interesting. For quite under- 

standable reasons, it is however, not expedient to discuss them any further. 

The Royal Swedish Navy must be prepared to operate in narrow waters on what 

may be called a hit-and-run basis-very often at night or in the darkness. When 

returning from operations, the ships must have access to hiding places, in which 

service, repair, refuelling, etc., can be carried out and the ships companies may be 

given the chance of a good rest. 

The predominant feature of the Swedish coast is the multitude of rocky islands, 

sounds and shallows. It is these geographical and geological features that have 

made it possible for the Swedish Navy to carry out 'Operation Granite'. This 

ambitious scheme was launched after the last war and is now in full swing. Some 

underground rock shelters have already been completed and put into operation. 

Their construction has fully justified expectations. The largest of these underground 

docks are wide and high enough to swallow a normally-sized 5-storey block of flats. 

The camouflaged entrances are fitted with special devices with a view to protecting 

the ships as far as possible from the air and water pressure waves set up by bomb


explosions. Inside the entrance may be found a system of quays, workshops and 

stores. 

The object of 'Operation Granite' is to provide the fleet with modern warbases, 

which can be used to augment the traditional bases. As is the case in most 

other navies, it is to these places that fleet units return for maintenance, repairs 

and refitting. Quite naturally, most of the traditional naval establishments are 

above ground, but the Stockholm Naval base (1) is due to be moved out into the 

archipelago and the docks, slipways and workshops hidden underground. 

The training bases have been sited in areas where naval training, the firing of 

artillery weapons and torpedoes, anti-submarine and mine-laying exercises can be 

carried out full-scale without interfering with merchant shipping and fishing. The 

main training base-Hirsfjarden (10)-is in the southern part of the Stockholm 

Archipelago. Here the vessels can replenish and the crews enjoy the facilities 

offered by sports grounds, cinemas and canteens. Stockholm, where the sailor's 

family or girl-friend may be awaiting him, is less than an hour's journey away. 

, Related to these places are up-to-date shore establishments, where the crews can 

receive instruction on Fire Control Trainers and Torpedo-Attack-Teacher and 

in such aspects of naval warfare as anti-submarine work, operations, and so forth, 

thus saving both time and fuel for more advanced exercises at sea. 

It is unlikely that any great use can be made of the peace-time establishments in 

times of war. For this reason, the Swedish Navy is building a system of bases at 

strategical points in the archipelagoes. These bases are capable of providing both 

protection and maintenance facilities. Technicians in ordnance, shipwright, electric 

and electronic branches would be available, transfer facilities for casualties, stores 

to issue replenishments of fuel, ammunition and provisions, etc. There are both 

subterranean docks and selected berthing sites, where ships lie close under screening 

cliffs and are camouflaged to blend with their surroundings. These berthing sites 

are widely dispersed, so that an atomic burst would not disable more than one or 

two ships. 

The maze of waterways from the open sea to the bases are difficult for an enemy 

to navigate. The coast watching service maintains a vigil against enemy mining, 

whilst surface and aerial defence is closely organized on a basis of co-operation 

between the Coast Artillery, the Air Force, and the Navy afloat. 

BROR FREDRIK THERMAENIUS

Naval Necessities 

'N AVAL Necessities' was the title given by Lord Fisher to his own inimitable 

'Way Ahead' Memoranda of 1904. Though it may seem presumptuous to use 

the title in such an article as this, it is done because the germs of the ideas here 

set out are to be found in those volumes now in the Admiralty archives, in Lord 

Fisher's 'Memories' and in the successive volumes of 'Fear God and Dread Nought'. 

In the early part of 'Naval Necessities' Lord Fisher wrote:- 

'Strategy should govern the types of ships to be designed'. 

'Ship design, as directed by strategy, should govern tactics'. 

'Tactics should govern details of armaments'. 

On the opposite page is his warning, 'The danger that is eternally present to the 

Navy is over confidence in our preparedness for war'. 

This article is not concerned with the needs of the cold war but with the instruments 

required to retain command of our sea communications and how best in our 

straitened circumstances we can produce and maintain them. Two writers who 

should know, state in the Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, that Japan 

was defeated (in the end) by 150 United States submarines and 4.5 per cent of the 

United States air sorties in the Pacific. The article goes on to say, 'These facts, also, 

are surely not without significance to an island people when seen against the sombre 

backcloth of 500 Soviet submarines and 3,500 Soviet maritime aircraft'. Finally, 

they quote the old words we all know so well: 'It may be said now to England, 

Martha, Martha, thou art busy about many things, but one thing is necessary. To 

the question, what shall we do to be saved in this world, there is no other answer 

but this, look to your moat . . .' 

If we try to look into the future and consider the attempts which will be made 

to deny the use of the Atlantic to our convoys, we must perhaps assume that attacks 

will come from atomic-powered submersibles and conventional submarines, both 

firing long-range torpedoes; controlled flying bombs from aircraft; rockets and 

other missiles discharged from submersibles or surface vessels in the vicinity and 

perhaps straightforward conventional attacks by surface raiders; whilst a proportion 

at least of all missiles will carry nuclear warheads. Attacks will without doubt be 

carefully co-ordinated and will come simultaneously from the air, from the surface 

and from below the surface, whilst to be effectively defeated they must be detected 

and overpowered at ranges from the convoy far in excess of those to which we have 

been accustomed. The three instruments mainly used to achieve this defence are 

advanced detection apparatus, superior weapons, and men to work and maintain 

the apparatus and to control the loading and despatch of the weapons. These three 

will have to be housed in vessels in appropriate positions around the convoy. 

England's greatest victories have rarely been won by a vast preponderance of 

ships but rather by a few ships whose superlative sea-keeping qualities and material 

endurance combined with the human endurance of their crews wore down her often 

more numerous adversaries. An effective Fleet or Task Force or Escort Group is 

not measured just by the number of ships that leave harbour but rather by the 

product of that number and the weeks or months for which they can sustain them- 

selves at sea without assistance. With only calls to replenish the water butts

24 NAVAL NECESSITIES 

Nelson's fleet had been at sea for years before Trafalgar. Lord Fisher turned the 

Navy over to oil not only because of the manoeuvring power and the reduction in 

complement that followed, but because at a stroke he reinforced the Fleet by 25 per 

cent, by the time saved in coaling. 

Three factors have dominated British warship design since the introduction of 

steam and iron. 

England's wooden walls of English oak gave way at the end of the nineteenth 

century to England's wrought iron walls of English wrought iron and, later in this 

twentieth century, to England's steel walls (at least in the Didos) of Czecho-Slovak 

steel. To the old philosophy of preventing your opponent pounding you with 

cannon balls has been added the need to prevent him sinking you with a ram and 

in more recent days with the mine and torpedo and high explosive or nuclear bomb. 

It was said recently that a naval constructor starts his training where the normal 

naval architect leaves off. Be that as it may, by his skill, ingenuity and hard work 

the naval constructor has sought to save the Fleet from destruction by any or all 

the weapons that may be hurled against it. To the massive framing needed to 

support the gun mountings and the stresses of gunfire has been added the 

strengthened plating and framing behind the armour needed to assist it in resisting 

penetration and the intense watertight sub-division of the warship type hull. To 

this also have been added arrangements to overcome gas or nuclear fall-out. All 

this adds up to a very tough ship built to resist every known weapon to such an 

extent that purely defensive considerations now prejudice the carrying of adequate 

offensive weapons, prejudice the maintenance of machinery and equipment, and 

prejudice even a minimum acceptable standard of habitability for those who must 

fight the ship. 

It was the weather gauge which allowed the successful Admiral to pile on sail to 

increase speed and to cross the enemy's T or break his line. Tsushima showed that 

the same tactics held good for the steam navy. The Queen Elizabeths, the fast 

division, were built for expressly this purpose and Jutland might have been won 

had they been properly employed. It was only one unhappy change of course that 

lost her bearing and offset the ideal attacking position across Bismarck's bows which 

Hood's speed had given her that caused the positions to be reversed and Hood's 

destruction. It was their excess speed over the submerged wolf packs which gave 

to the escort groups their mobility and punch. Speed then has always been a require- 

ment and despite the tremendous advance in design a large amount of space is 

devoted to the propulsion machinery. In the inescapable physical fact that approxi- 

mately the same power (i.e. machinery) is needed to drive the ship from 26 to 35 

knots as is needed to drive her from Stop to 25 knots also lies one of the great 

difficulties. Only half the machinery space is needed for about 60-70 per cent of 

maximum speed. In the hunt to save space, machinery rooms have become so 

cramped that refit and maintenance of machinery is not practicable, living conditions 

are shocking and a vast army of dockyard mateys are kept mobilised at great expense 

to the Navy Vote, so that ships may return at too frequent intervals for necessary 

repairs, which cannot adequately be completed at sea. 

The Navy would not accept steam until the result of the competition between 

Alecto and Rattler removed the need for paddles. Thenceforward the motive power 

could be placed below the waterline safe from shot and shell. To keep it below the 

waterline and to accommodate the boilers and engines, power units had to be placed

NAVAL NECESSlTIES 25 

amidships and there, despite their decreasing size, they have remained safe from 

shot and shell but providing an ideal target for torpedoes from the forward bulkhead 

of the forward boiler room to the stern. 

Let us now consider whether these three dominant features, toughness, relatively 

high speed and machinery placed amidships are still essential to the vehicles 

needed to carry the means of repelling the attacks described above. It cannot be 

denied that a tough ship is advantageous, but if such toughness can be bought only 

at the cost of space left for offensive weapons; at the cost of more complex weapons 

demanding a higher maintenance bill in manpower and man quality; at the cost of 

cramped living spaces and therefore poor morale and poor recruitment; at the cost 

of low seagoing endurance and therefore a smaller fleet, then it is time to consider 

whether the price is worth paying. If the effects of the speed requirement and the 

propulsion machinery position operate in the same general direction, then surely 

it is time to re-examine our ship designs from the start. 

Another design point which is always troublesome is the old one of how many 

eggs to put in one basket. Is it preferable to place a variety of detection equipments 

and weapons in one ship so that there is a balanced and integrated attacking capability 

the efficiency of which will depend largely on the size of ship; or is it better to build 

a large number of smaller ships limiting the individual function of each and relying 

on numbers to ensure that the loss of one does not destroy the efficiency of the 

team? This article does not attempt to answer this question, still less to go deeply 

into the re-design advocated. But as a first step it is suggested that the ships in an 

Escort Group of the future should be divided roughly into three types suitable to 

carry the sort of equipment listed below:- 

Shipborne apparatus to detect submersibles, aircraft, missiles and surface ships. 

~nti-submer$ble airborne guided missiles. 

u 

Close range anti-submersible weapons. 

Long range anti-aircraft and anti-missile weapons. 

Ship to ship missiles. 

The seaborne vehicles needed to house the Type I equipment require ample casgo 

space and auxiliary power, but, in view of the overwhelming speed of future submersibles, 

and the efficacy of long range ship to ship detection apparatus and missiles, 

the speed of such vehicles can be limited to 3 or 4 knots above large convoy speed. 

Type ZI 

Vertical take-off fighter and anti-submersible aircraft. 

Helicopters. 

These two type of aircraft will require garages, where ready-for-use V.T.O. aircraft 

and helicopters can be parked; mobile filling stations where both can refuel; major 

repair and servicing ships and (for long convoys) accommodation ships for aircraft 

and helicopter crews. 

Type ZZZ 

Fighter submersibles of high speed performance operating on sophisticated 

fuels from surface or (a bit further into the future) submersible carriers.


Hostile submersibles will be able to operate at speeds far in excess of surface ships 

(except for hydroplanes which are operational only in very calm weather) and it 

will be necessary to swim off fighter submersible patrols to attack the hostile sub- 

mersibles, or surface ships, at a safe distance, or to winkle out hostile submersibles 

if they take station beneath the convoy. This will necessitate large tanker type 

craft able to carry small submersibles and despatch them through doors in the hull 

bottom whenever offensive and defensive patrols are needed. 

This article so far has been concerned with the strategy, the defence of the trade 

routes that should dictate our surface ship design. It has also summarised some 

of the main points which seem to dictate our design today and lastly it has listed 

the types of weapons and equipment needed around a convoy to protect it from 

hostile forces. It is right perhaps here to underline one point that has already been 

mentioned and enlarge on it. The writer referred earlier to the strength of a fleet 

and to the part endurance plays. Endurance in the Royal Navy is nearly a lost art 

and even the feats which were performed in the Pacific War were commonplace 

occurrences to our Allies. Endurance is a product of several factors, some of which, 

such as fuel and water and ammunition, can be met by replenishment at sea; others, 

such as wear and tear of men and material, can only be met by a return to harbour 

for recreation and refit. Officers who really know the Lower Deck are aware that 

there is a point of view often expressed which says 'that ships are designed to take 

weapons and machinery, then space is allocated according to scale for the officers, 

and lastly the ratings required to look after the weapons, machinery and officers 

are crammed into what is left'. There is no doubt that many ratings feel that ships 

are not 'liveable-in' despite all the immense effort and money which has been 

allotted to remedying this deficiency. Many ratings and the majority of the artificer 

type come from exactly the same home and educational background as many of the 

officers and they look askance and indeed actively resent the different feeding 

standards, the bar and other privileges which officers receive. Civilian standards and 

Merchant Navy standards having risen so rapidly and warship standards having 

(on the whole) deteriorated, it is safe to say that no rating lives onboard in the sense 

that many pre-war ratings lived onboard with never a day's leave from the beginning 

to the end of the commission. Cadets at Dartmouth in the early thirties were 

taught that it was the German naval policy of so designing their ships that they 

could not be lived in that was the basic cause of the German naval mutinies. As 

the intellectual gap between officers and ratings has narrowed the sympathetic gap 

(if it can be called that) has widened immeasurably. There is little doubt in the 

minds of many thoughtful officers that we are sitting on a powder keg and though 

there will perhaps be no more than the type of minor explosions which have occurred 

on several occasions lately, the continued unsatisfactory state of re-engagement 

and the low recruiting figures are symptomatic of the general feelings. The present 

living arrangements for both officers and ratings are unsatisfactory and react adversely 

on weapon and equipment maintenance, already made unbelievably difficult by the 

complexities of ship design previously referred to. For all these reasons endurance 

is bad. 

Shortage of manpower is something that until now the Navy has not had to face 

for nearly a century. The superfluity of seamen, a relic of the days of sail and later 

of simple weapons requiring many operators and few maintainers, has bred a 

.contempt of labour-saving, that narrow margin of saving which helps to keep the

NAVAL NECESSITIES 27 

Merchant Navy alive. This prodigal outlook is similar in the supply of officers and 

the definition of an officer as a 'fighting leader skilled in his profession' recognisable 

though it was in World War I1 has now become submerged by the number of Special 

Duty officers and the need to give high pay and officer status in order to attract the 

increasing number of highly skilled technologists and technicians that the Navy 

requires. The question therefore has to be faced as to whether the types ofequip- 

ment indicated earlier and the men to operate them are to be housed in ships 

built to conventional warship design, involving all that this article has tried to 

describe, or whether there is an acceptable alternative. The writer believes that 

there is and also that if such an alternative is adopted the economies resulting will 

enable the Navy to build up a fleet of submersibles (now palpably beyond our means) 

and at the same time provide escort groups of surface ships able to contribute most 

effectively to the defence of sea communications. 

While the war in the Pacific was still being fought the writer recalls eating a 

tenderloin steak of extraordinary succulence in the Bachelor Officers' Quarters at 

Guam. A factory in Chicago had been set up to make very utility domestic auto- 

matic refrigerators. Steers had been killed, cut up and placed in these refrigerators 

which had then been transported by train and cargo ship from Chicago to San 

Francisco and from San Francisco to Guam, and on arrival had been stored in a 

cave. The secret in each case was the same-a simple diesel generator which supplied 

power to these refrigerators on the train, in whichever cargo ship was selected and 

in the cave. Thus the building of special refrigerator trains and ships was obviated 

and the loss of a single ship did not in any way prejudice future supplies. There 

seems to the writer to be a lesson in all this. Rightly or wrongly we surmise that 

escort vessels of the three types mentioned in this article require only to move at 

moderate speed, to have a considerable amount of auxiliary power and to have a 

large carrying capacity. In each case, in the writer's view, the need could be met 

by ships designed basically to the highest mercantile standards and altered only 

to install the extra power units and fuel tanks and the necessary weapon or detection 

systems. 

A typical modern cargo vessel of 11,000 tons gross registered tonnage and about 

15 knots (continuous) speed has at least 750,000 cubic feet of cargo space-the 

equivalent of any empty vessel 600 feet in length, 50 feet beam and 25 feet draught. 

To sail this cargo ship to and from New Zealand the following are provided:- 

4 Navigating Officers 10 Engineer Officers 

3 Warrant Officers 15 Greasers 

2 Radio Officers 

15 Deck Ratings 

and a Catering Staff of 12. Such a vessel adapted for use in the Royal Navy could 

perhaps carry in reasonable comfort (single or double cabins and reasonable mess 

rooms) the following :- 

Post and General List (13) 

Commanding Officer and Second-in-Command . . . . . . 

Navigation Officers (Bridge Watchkeeping Officers) . . . ... 3 2: 

Technical Officers (Propulsion and Power) . . . . . 

'; Communication Officers . . . . . . ... ... . . . . '. . . ~eneral 

Operational and Technical Weapons Officers . . . . . . ... 41 List


Restricted Duty List (13) 

Bo'sun ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 1 

Shipwright ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 1 

Propulsion and Power Officers ... ... ... ... ... 2 

Weapons Officers ... ... ... ... ... ... 6 

Doctor ... ... . . . ... ... ... ... ... 1 

Accountant and Supply Officers ... ... ... ... ... 2 

Ratings with 'Artificer type' intelligence and training 

not necessarily with leadership qualities (60) 

Propulsion and Power Engineers ... ... ... ... 12 

Communication Engineers ... .., ... ... ... 8 

Weapon Engineers ... ... ... ... ... ... 30 

Miscellaneous (Writer, Stores Assistant, Sickberth Attendants) 10 

Other Ratings (90) 

Able Seamen ... ... ... ... ... . . . ... 16 

Propulsion and Power Mechanics ... ... ... ... 16 

Weapon Mechanics ... ... ... ... ... ... 20 

Catering St& ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 30 

Miscellaneous ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 8 

The complement gives a total of 176. The crux of the matter seems to be whether 

such a small number would be sufficient to enable the ship to be fought through a 

long convoy action. Possibly this is a difficulty but the convoy would carry with it 

accommodation ships and a regular series of reliefs by helicopter would be a feature 

during lulls in the action. 

If a 40 per cent seatime to shore service ratio was instituted for all officers and 

ratings, a very rough estimate of the total bearing of officers and ratings required 

to man 100 such ships and spend 60 per cent of their time ashore would be about 

as follows :- 

Post and General List Officers ... 3,250 

Restricted Duty Officers ... ... 3,250 

Engineers (Artificer type rating) 15,000 

Junior Ratings ... ... ... ... 22,500 

--- 

44,000 

--- 

The conclusions which seem to emerge are as follows :- 

In a hopeless effort to build ships to withstand effectively every type of hostile 

weapon we have become 'Maginot-minded' and our ships are now little more than 

floating fortresses lacking a proper offensive capability. 

The advent of long range detection equipment and missiles has greatly reduced 

the importance of speed. 

In some ships at least this lower speed requirement opens up the possibility of 

concentrating the propulsion installation right aft, thereby lessening the torpedo 

target and enabling a much more conveniently arranged ship to be constructed. 

The effect of constructing fortress-like ships has resulted in a failure to build in 

and arrange weapon and propulsion equipments capable of being kept operational 

...

ESCORT TYPES SINCE THE WAR 29 

by shipborne personnel, and also a failure to provide, by modern standards, suitable 

living conditions for the adequate number of skilled personnel needed to do so. 

These deficiencies in their turn are the direct cause of bad endurance and a pro- 

liferation of naval and civilian shore-based repair organisations. 

If we accept Lord Fisher's doctrine of the inter-relation of Strategy, Ship design, 

Tactics and Armaments, one answer to the difficulties discussed above seems to lie 

in building standard convoy defence vehicles of almost unlimited endurance in which 

the different varieties of equipment can be housed, together with the necessary skilled 

shipborne maintenance teams for such equipment. Such measures would result 

in a seagoing fleet in the true sense of the word, capable of protecting the trade 

routes and, by its economy of operation, would allow a greater proportion of the Navy 

Vote to be spent on the development of submersibles for both strategic and tactical 

purposes. 

BELS 

Escort Types since the War 

ELSON is supposed to have bewailed his lack of frigates in claiming that the 

N word would be found written on his heart. The same plea has been repeated in 

two World Wars for the 'small ships' required to protect the Fleets and convoys. 

These ships are all 'escort types' and can broadly be divided into two classes: one 

the Fleet destroyer, descendant of the original 'torpedo-boat destroyer' and now 

adding the anti-aircraft and anti-submarine protection of the Fleet to its duties; 

and two, the smaller, simpler and usually slower convoy escort primarily designed 

for the A/S role. In considering the post-war development of these escort types 

it is necessary to look first at those produced by the victorious naval powers at the 

end of the war. 

AMERICAN AND BRITISH END-OF-WAR PROGRAMMES 

The massive scale of American production must give consideration of American 

ships pride of place. By 1943 eleven Fleet destroyers were being delivered every 

month and seventeen yards were mass-producing the smaller 'destroyer escorts', 

- of which some 350 were delivered in 1943-44. The destroyer programme cul- 

minated in 1945-46 with the production of some 110 ships of the Gearing class, 

many of which were modified for special tasks or otherwise re-armed in the post-war 

years. In fighting and steaming efficiency the Gearing class was greatly superior 

to any other type in the world. Some 2,400 tons in displacement and 390 feet long 

these ships carried three twin 5-inch 38 calibre gun turrets in addition to close 

range weapons, torpedo tubes and A/S depth charges, at 35 knots. In the 5"/38 

mounting and its associated Mark 37 control system designed just before the war 

the Americans had the first shipborne gunnery equipment really able to shoot down

30 ESCORT TYPES SINCE THE WAR 

aircraft. In speed and endurance these ships were outstanding due to a combination 

of higher pressure and temperature boiler design and the use of high speed 

turbines driving into double-reduction gearing. By the adoption of self-compensating 

oil fuel tanks more fighting equipment could be carried without loss of 

stability as fuel was consumed. A further factor prolonging the useful life of these 

ships was their alternating current electricity system, the American navy having 

changed to AC, in view of commercial practice, in the 1930's. 

The British effort, however understandably, is not so impressive. After a 

succession of 'emergency' destroyer classes basically of the same relatively simple 

type with four single 4.5-inch open gunmountings, the first ships of the Battle 

class were laid down at the end of 1942. Some 2,300 tons in displacement and 380 

feet long these were designed primarily for the anti-aircraft protection of the carriers 

in the war in the Pacific and were armed with two twin 4.5-inch gun turrets for'd 

and close range weapons aft, as well as with torpedo tubes and depth charges. In 

contrast with American production rates only 22 ships of this class were finally 

completed, the last of these not until 1948, and in fact only the first of the class 

served with the British Pacific Fleet before the war ended. It is also noteworthy that 

the American Mark 37 fire control system was adopted for the last 8 ships of the class. 

Coinciding with the later Battle's another large class of destroyer-type 'Fleet 

anti-submarine escorts', the Weapon class, was programmed, of which only 4 were 

eventually completed in 1947-48. Observing the current lessons of the Pacific 

war and the anti-aircraft emphasis of the Battle's it is not easy to understand the 

decision to abandon the concept of the more heavily armed Fleet destroyer. These 

ships did, however, serve to try out improved machinery and other equipment. 

In the convoy escort field the British wartime effort had been mainly remarkable 

for its variety, including corvettes, frigates, sloops and the small Hunt class 'destroyers'. 

This variety was still reflected at the war's end when large numbers of 

improved corvettes and frigates and some sloops were under construction. In the 

event some 20 Castle class corvettes, 35 Loch and Bay class frigates and 12 sloops 

were completed. Although identical in size and machinery the Loch's and Bay's 

were differentiated as A/S and AA escorts, the Bay's carrying a second twin 4-inch 

mounting. 

AMERICAN AND BRITISH POST-WAR PROGRAMMES 

The superiority of American destroyer design, as typified by the Gearing's, over 

our ships had not passed unnoticed, and a determined effort was made, particularly 

in the machinery and gunnery fields, to produce a British equivalent. So, with a 

return to the Fleet destroyer concept, was borne the wartime design of the Daring 

class, the first ships of which, however, were not laid down until the end of 1945. 

Similar in size to the Gearing's these ships were armed with a new twin 4.5-inch 

mounting based on the design of the American 5"j38 but controlled by a new 

British fire control system. Three of these mountings were fitted, in addition to 

close range weapons, torpedo tubes and improved A/S weapons. The same higher 

pressure and temperature boilers and double reduction gearing were introduced, 

and, greatly daring, four of the eight ships were given AC electrics for comparison 

with the normal DC installations. 

The effect of these very real advances in British naval construction were, unfortunately, 

largely nullified by the deplorable time taken to produce the ships.


The first two laid down were not launched for 4 and 5 years respectively, and the 

whole class was not completed until 1954, some 10 years after its initial design. 

Nothing better illustrates this fatal time lag than to look again at the Americans. 

Here there had been no need, or anxiety, to 'catch up'. It was not until 1948 there- 

fore that the first of a larger type of destroyer able to carry out more tasks and 

having improved facilities for the Command was ordered. In 1954 the four ships 

of this Mitscher class, as superior in fighting and steaming efficiency to the Daring's 

as the Gearing's had been to the Battle's, were completed. These large ships, some 

3,700 tons in displacement and 490 feet long, are fitted with a new generation of 

weapons including two single 5-inch 54 calibre gun turrets each capable of firing 

60 rounds per minute, two twin 3-inch 70 calibre gun turrets each barrel firing 

90 rounds per minute, and two A/S rocket launchers. Their boiler and machinery 

design is equally advanced and once again ahead of British practice. The advanced 

weapons and machinery of the Mitscher class were repeated to even greater effectin 

the Forrest Sherman class, the first of which was laid down in 1953. In spite of 

being some 800 tons and 70 feet smaller these ships carry a third 5"/54 mounting. 

Construction of the last of this class of 18 is continuing. 

With the advent of guided missiles the Americans are vigorously exploiting their 

use in small ships. In 1957 the Gyatt of the wartime Gearing class was fitted with 

the Terrier surface-to-air missile system aft and became the world's first guided 

missile destroyer. Terrier is now being fitted in place of the after 5"/54 mounting 

in 10 new ships of the Mitscher type, and a further 9 will be completely missile armed. 

A smaller surface-to-air missile Tartar is to be fitted in 18 more new ships based on 

the Forrest Sherman design. 

In complete contrast with these relatively large and complex destroyer designs 

the Americans have retained small size and simplicity in their only post-war design 

of convoy escort. This is the Dealey class of which 17 have been built since 1952. 

Of about 1,450 tons displacement and 315 feet long these little ships are equipped 

with an A/S rocket launcher and other A/S weapons and a 'self-defence' 3-inch 

gun armament. 

Meanwhile what of the British ? The outbreak of the Korean War drew atten- 

tion to the need for escorts and in 1952 a diverse programme of new construction 

was started. Basically this was of two types : one, relatively complex and expensive 

first rate frigates designed primarily for A/S, anti-aircraft, or aircraft direction pur- 

poses; and two, a simple second rate A/S type. Of these various ships the first 

rate A/S or Whitby class seems likely to prove the most useful. These are of about 

2,200 tons displacement and 370 feet long and carry two A/S triple mortars and 

12 A/S torpedo tubes at 30 knots on steam turbine machinery. For their size, 

and certainly in comparison with foreign ships of similar size, they are under-gunned, 

having only one twin 4.5-inch turret of the Daring type and one close range gun- 

mounting. More than 30 of these ships are being built for the British and Common- 

wealth navies. 

Both the first rate AA and A/D frigates (Leopard and Salisbury classes), have the 

same hull, some 10 feet shorter than the Whitby's, and are diesel drivenat24knots. 

The AA's have a second 4.5-inch turret while the AID'S carry additional radars for 

use in controlling and directing aircraft. Only 7 of the Leopard class, including 

3 for India, and 4 of the Salisbury class are being built at present. 

The second rate A/S type (Blackwood class) consists of 12 ships. These are fitted

32 

ESCORT TYPES SINCE THE WAR 

with two A/S triple mortars and a 'self-defence' close range gun armament, and are 

steam turbine driven at 24 knots. Some 1,100 tons in displacement and 310 feet 

long this class is very comparable to the American Dealey's. 

The obvious disadvantages of having three varieties of specialised first rate 

frigate, and the lack of Fleet speed of the AA and AID ones, led in 1955 to the 

ordering of a 'general purpose' type able to fulfil all roles. These are relatively 

large ships of about 2,800 tons displacement and 400 feet long, and will be driven 

by a combined steam and gas turbine machinery plant geared to one propellor 

shaft, at 30 knots. Their A/S equipment will be extensive and they will carry two 

single 4.5-inch guns in open mountings. Whatever the advantages of this new 

Tribal class, of which 7 have been ordered, their fighting qualities do not seem 

impressive in comparison with foreign warships of similar size. 

None of the new construction ships so far considered can in any way be said to 

succeed the Daring's in the Fleet destroyer role. The first ships to do so will be 

the guided missile destroyers of the new County class, the first of four having been 

ordered in 1955. These are large ships of some 4,000 tons and 500 feet in length 

and will be driven by steam and gas turbine boost machinery at 32 knots. They 

will be armed with the Seaslug surface-to-air guided missile system aft and two 

Daring type twin 4.5-inch gun turrets for'd, in addition to close range and A/S 

weapons. Again, however, their armament for their size is not impressive and 

seems to compare unfavourably with that of the missile armed Mitscher's. 

No review of British post-war construction would be complete without mention 

of the Canadian effort in this field. In 1950 Canada laid down the first of seven 

ships of the St. Laurent class. Based on the hull and machinery of the British 

Whitby class but completely re-designed and re-engineered to take advantage 

of Canadian production methods these ships are perhaps the finest and most modern 

looking convoy escorts in the world. A further seven ships were laid down in 1953 

and more are likely to be ordered. Later ships of this class are armed with the 

British version of the 3"/70 gunmounting fitted in the American Mitscher and 

Fowest Sherman classes. 

If new weapons are the inspiration of new ship designs the Swedish firm of 

Bofors must be held to play a leading part on this side of the Atlantic. In particular 

Bofors had developed by the end of the war a high rate of fire 4.8-inch mounting 

capable of 45 rounds per minute. The first navy to adopt this weapon was that of 

Holland, appropriately enough in the 4 Holland class destroyers completed between 

1950 and 1955. These ships of some 2,200 tons displacement and 370 feet long 

are armed with two of these twin mountings, Bofors' new 40 mm close range weapons 

and two quadruple A/S mortars also of Bofors design. This class was followed by 

8 similarly armed but some 300 tons and 10 feet larger ships of the Friesland class. 

These ships are also fitted with an outstanding air warning radar of Philips manu- 

facture and all in all are about the most compact and powerful ships of their size afloat. 

Contemporary with the Dutch Holland class Sweden built 2 similarly armed but 

somewhat larger destroyers of the Holland class, and in 1955 4 ships of the similar 

but smaller Ostergotland class were laid down. Sweden has also built two modified 

and even more powerful ships of the Holland class, mounting a third twin 4.8-inch 

gun turret, for the Colombian navy.


French post-war construction typifies most clearly the distinction between the 

Fleet destroyer and the convoy escort. For the former France has concentrated 

on the 2,750 ton and 420 feet long Surcouf class, the namesake of which was laid down 

in 1951. Since then 17 of these fine ships have been built, and further versions 

with improved and specialised armaments are being developed. All equipment 

is of French manufacture and the ships are armed with three twin gun turrets 

designed to take the American 5"/54 ammunition, 57 mm close range weapons, 

A/S mortars and torpedoes. 

For the convoy escort France has built since 1951 18 of the Le Corse class. Similar 

in size to the British Blackwood's and the American Dealey's these small ships are 

equipped with A/S mortars and torpedoes and carry an effective 'self-defence' 

armament of 57 mm close range weapons identical with those fitted in the Surcouf's. 

A further class of 9 somewhat larger diesel engined escorts are under construction 

of which the first, the Commandant Riviere, was launched in 1957. 

The reconstruction of the Italian navy has been mainly dependent on American 

ships and equipment and no new classes of any significant size have been produced 

as yet. Of 4 new Fleet destroyers armed with the American 5"/38 mounting 2 have 

been completed while the third will be fitted with the American Tartar sea-to-air 

missile system. Of the escort type Italy has built the Canopo class of 4 ships armed 

with a triple A/S mortar and two twin 3-inch 62 calibre gunmountings each barrel 

firing 60 rounds a minute. Four similarly armed but diesel engined ships of the 

Bergamini class are under construction. 

Finally Russia. Here again the distinction between Fleet destroyer and convoy 

escort is clearly drawn. The former is mainly represented by the 74 ships of the 

Skoryi class. Some 2,600 tons in displacement and 400 feet long these ships are 

armed with two twin 4.8-inch mountings, close range weapons, torpedoes and 

depth charges. Like all modern Russian ships they are some 4 knots faster than 

their Western counterparts. This class has been followed by the larger Kotlin's of 

which at least 20 are known to exist. These ships are armed with two twin 3.9-inch 

mountings and four quadruple 57 mm close range mountings and are particularly 

well equipped with radar. 

For the escort type Russia has developed a wartime German design of small 

destroyer again comparable in size to the Blackwood, Dealey and Le Corse classes 

but armed with 3 or 4 single 3.9-inch mountings. At least 36 of theseKola and 

Riga classes are known to exist. 

If the comparison of British and foreign escort types is generally an unhappy 

one-and no-one who has been on board a Whitby, a Forrest Sherman, a Friesland 

and a Surcouf could think otherwise-it is suggested that this is due to three main 

factors : 

(1) inefficient fighting equipment; 

(2) failure to hold to the Fleet destroyer concept; 

(3) slowness in production. 

The word 'inefficient' is used in (1) because not only the performance, but the 

performance for its size and weight, is the vital characteristic of any equipment. 

It may be, for example, that if the British A/S weapon 'Limbo' had been less cumber- 

some there might have been no need to consider separating the functions of the

34 ESCORT TYPES SINCE THE WAR 

first rate frigates: the Dutch manage to get 8 A/S mortar barrels into the all purpose 

Friesland's of similar size to the Whitby's. Again the Bofors twin 4.8-inch mounting 

of the former is more than twice as efficient in terms of output per mounting weight 

- - 

as the twin 4.5-inch mounting of the latter. 

Unfortunately this unfavourable trend seems to be repeated in much of our 

latest equipment, particularly in the radar and guided missile fields. The Seaslug 

guided missile system for example, is considerably more cumbersome than the 

American Terrier: thus either a larger ship is required to carry a similar armoury 

of missiles or a British ship of similar size is under-weaponed-as seems likely to 

be the case with the County class in comparison with the missile armed Mitscher's. 

Moreover the excessive size of Seaslug would seem to debar it from retrospective 

fitting in our existing ships such as the Daring's, let alone the Whitby's. This again 

is in contrast to Dutch plans for their destroyers, which, if 'Janes' is to be believed, 

will be fitted with an unspecified missile system in place of their after turret, be- 

ginning in 1960. 

Whatever the influence of equipment it is considered that the British failure to 

hold to the Fleet destroyer concept represents a major error of policy. With all 

- . 

the wartime evidence of the need for-the two basic Fleet destrover and convov 

escort types and the advantage to be gained by concentrating on these, the decision 

to build three specialised classes of frigate in addition to the convoy escort is difficult 

to exelain. That the AA's and AID'S should lack Fleet meed is almost incredible. 

It is impossible not to feel that sich decisions, as too the'simultaneous production 

of Weapon's and Battle's and differentiation between the A/S and AA frigates at the 

end of the war, owe more to parochial advocacy by specialist Staff or technical 

departments than to any balanced view of the Navy's needs. 

The decision to produce yet another 'general purpose' frigate would seem to 

do nothing to improve matters, nor is it clear in what way this ship is any more 

'general purpose', let alone cheaper, than a Whitby. Admittedly there is the new 

gas turbine boost machinery to be tried but this could surely be done in a Whitby 

or Blackwood hull. 

It is therefore considered that this class should be cancelled and further AA's 

and A/DYs suspended in favour of additional Whitby's. With the long overdue 

return of the destroyer concept in the County class the Whitby's should then be 

phased out in favour of a simple convoy escort derived from the Blackwood's. 

Finally, the rate of production. If the sorry example of the Daring's be remem- 

bered need any morebe said ? 

E.F.A.

Grey Funnel Line 

N OT long ago the Naval Correspondent of the 'Daily Telegraph' delivered 

himself of a powerful piece advocating that one or more of our light Fleet 

carriers now in reserve should be converted into Army transports to meet the 

recurring calls for the emergency movements of troops and equipment to the latest 

trouble spot and, as he put it, before it was 'too late' and those ships found them- 

selves on the scrapheap. 

The surprising thing really is that a Naval Correspondent has not written up the 

matter earlier. The meeting of these emergency calls has been taking place on 

and off since the end of the war, and has frequently been a fruitful subject for dis- 

cussion amongst Naval officers. The writer of this article alone, over a year ago, 

jotted down a note which read 'What does the Board feel about this continuing 

diversion of H.M. Ships from their proper function and ought not a firm line to be 

taken before it is 'too late' ?' 

The reason for the apparent public disinterest is probably that the whole thing 

is taken for granted. The attitude of 'when in doubt or trouble, the Navy will be 

there' is a healthy one; but if this additional role becomes accepted as a matter of 

course troubles are bound to arise sooner or later. 

Between the two wars there were probably isolated cases of the emergency carriage 

of troops, but they must have been very rare. The writer himself cannot now re- 

collect a single one. Since 1946, they have been frequent. That to-day's circum- 

stances give rise to the need for sudden 'out of routine' troop moves is understandable. 

The world's present political instability and the technique of covert 'threat' has 

meant that only emergency steps, firmly taken, firmly supported and maintained 

to the end, can prevent worse occurring. The paradox is that in the present air 

age these circumstances still require the Navy's direct help in getting the necessary 

force to the right place in time. 

The fact is that air transport is yet far from able to complete the job and except 

the hard-pressed taxpayer can be induced to cough up many millions of pounds, 

this circumstance is likely to remain for a long time to come yet. Air transport can 

carry the 'fire fighters' to the fire, but the firemen can only take with them little 

more than their fire-extinguishers. The needful 'follow-up' of the fire-engines, 

pumps, piping and salvage equipment is too bulky, and has to come by sea-and 

quickly. 

The Americans have recognised this and though possessing a vast air transport 

system, back it with a specialised fast sea transport service to provide the essential 

means of early support and ultimate consolidation. We certainly cannot afford 

things on such a scale, but perhaps we could still do something to improve upon the 

expedients to which we now resort. 

All three Services normally depend upon the Ministry of Transport to cater 

for the routine movement of personnel by sea, and a number of Merchant Navy- 

manned transports are maintained for this purpose. Economical operation calls 

for their continual use and so the degree to which overseas manpower exists 

governs the number of sea transports needed, and has made it even more improbable 

that in sudden emergency one or more of these transports will be in the right place

36 GREY FUNNEL LINE 

at the right moment. The position is further aggravated because the air transport 

substitute for the trooper is incapable of lifting the vehicles and heavier weapons 

essential to any but the initial 'fire fighters' if the forces being deployed are to possess 

a proper mobility and fighting capacity. 

So it is that when some local 'balloon goes up' the War Office turns (in despair!) 

to the Admiralty. 

'All hands' get busy, and 'the goods are delivered'. Inter-Service co-operation 

at its best, and a proper pride is taken in ensuring that the operation is put through 

as expeditiously as possible and with every regard for the well-being of the troops. 

The job becomes a challenge to both the operational planners and to the ship or 

ships detailed. In itself it is a good 'exercise'. It demands ingenuity, provides 

an unexpected change from routine (always stimulating) and, if only temporarily, 

brings the more junior officers and other ranks of the two Services together to the 

advantage of mutual understanding and camaraderie. 

But the Navy is not specially equipped to this end. There are no 'spare' ships 

in commission. The Navy Vote does not provide for such a luxury. The sudden 

diversion consequentially brings in its train repercussions of magnitude to the 

disadvantage of the Navy's readiness to function efficiently in the role with which 

it is properly charged. Anything should be done once-even twice-but it must 

not become an accepted practice regardless of the consequences. 

H.M. Ships are designed to fight, and therefore designed to carry their fighting 

complement, and no more. Warships do not have the sanitary facilities, the fresh- 

water-making plant, the cooking ranges, the sleeping or recreational space or even 

the life-saving equipment (inadequate, and accepted as an occupational hazard, even 

for the ship's company) to provide properly for a sudden and heavy influx of passen- 

gers, more often than not meaning a doubling of the numbers on board. There 

are other circumstances that make sea passage in a 'grey funnel' unsuitable and 

unavoidably different from those with which a transport is designed to cope. In 

the warship there will certainly be more discomfort all round, though the possible 

effect on the troops' morale is offset by the friendly and personal atmosphere. The 

sailor likes the chance of acting as a 'sea daddy' and it is remarkable what trouble 

he will take to make visitors at home. Let us, however, not strain his readiness to 

lend a hand too far. Each such circumstance occasions him considerable additional 

discomfort, and no one will suggest that he does not have to accept much in this 

way in the ordinary course of events. 

Above all it is certain that while the H.M. Ship is being employed on the carriage 

of 'bodies' and their equipment, she is no longer a jighting ship, and inevitably after 

the discharge of the 'cargo' some rehabilitation and re-training is essential before 

she can be accepted again as operationally efficient. This particularly applies to 

aircraft carriers, and it is to carriers that the job more often than not goes. Only 

such warships are suitable for the transport of vehicles in any quantity. But a 

carrier's front line air group only keeps up to the mark by constant flying on and 

off the deck. Every occasion of its eviction requires a subsequent 'recovery' period. 

An operational carrier is by no means 'out of action' just for the period of her 

emergency transport duties. 

Equally, and something seldom appreciated ashore, our peacetime Naval com- 

missioned strength has always with it a tight annual programme of training to get 

through. Regard has to be taken of essential refit periods, leave intervals and

GREY FUNNEL LINE 37 

recommissioning dates if there is not to be a deleterious chain reaction. Each 

transport emergency puts a spanner in the works somewhere. 

On every count, therefore, this kind of operation should not be allowed to become 

a habit. There are signs that this is just what is happening. Only lately H.M. 

Ships were even employed in the withdrawal of troops on the conclusion of an 

'affair'; by no stretch of imagination an emergency. No doubt the Navy was again 

called in for the simple reason that there was nothing else available to complete 

the move of the units concerned back to their normal stations. 

It is a bad and dangerous policy. Bad because it interferes with the Navy's 

training and readiness to fulfil its proper role. Dangerous because the calls could 

become a commonplace, and sooner or later there may be an occasion when the 

only available ships at the moment will either have to be withdrawn from an urgent 

operational task or the movement of the 'follow-up' will have to be postponed or 

even abandoned; and the planners will find themselves between the devil and the 

deep blue sea! 

On the face of it the solution in this air age is to follow the pattern already set in 

the provision of air transport to deliver the initial echelons of the 'fire brigade' to 

the threatened area and to expand this air lift availability to provide also for the 

manpower and material follow-up. The fact is, however, that we do not yet even 

possess enough air transport for the initial purpose. The intention to supplement 

the existing means with a Commando carrier will improve the position and so 

will the further transport aircraft which will be coming into service; but there is some 

way to go yet. To embark on a supplementary air programme to meet the needs 

of the inevitable 'follow-up' would be a prodigious undertaking and appallingly 

expensive; and, as is usually the case, could only be provided at the expense of some 

other offensive facet of the Defence Services. 

From the way things have gone in the 'local' emergencies that have arisen since 

the war, it rather seems as if it is not essential to bring forward the support to the 

initial force by air. At least it appears that fast warships have managed to deliver 

the supporting arms and equipment in time. Thus the construction of a pair, say, 

of fast, specially-designed transports capable of carrying and handling heavy vehicles, 

large quantities of equipment and stores, and providing austere accommodation 

for a maximum of troops as well, would seem to meet the case. The two ships, 

at a guess, could be built for little more than the price of one squadron of transport 

aircraft of the size necessary for the lifting of vehicles and heavy weapons. Clearly 

a more economical project, but still expensive. 

There remains the practicability of a cheaper provision, not ideally suitable 

perhaps, but good enough if future emergencies are likely to be in the general 

pattern of the immediate past. 

As is well known, we now have several light Fleet carriers on our hands no longer 

suitable for operational service. Their natural destiny is the scrap-heap if they 

cannot be disposed of otherwise. Alterations and additions to convert a couple 

of them into emergency transports would be quite straightforward, and one would 

hazard another guess that the whole cost of this conversion would prove less than 

the construction of one new transport aircraft. There is a very proper dislike of 

putting new wine into old bottles, but if we cannot afford better things, so be it. 

Those converted carriers should be good for twenty years yet, and their speed is 

adequate.

38 GREY FUNNEL LINE 

If the Admiralty were to be charged with this provision, and there are several 

excellent reasons why it should, we can be sure that it would produce the goods. 

The absolutely essential requisite would be that this new charge became a supple- 

mentary one and that its consequences should in no way impinge upon the Navy's 

active service manpower or ships and material either in commission or in operational 

reserve. Any attempt to make the Navy provide permanently for an emergency 

transport service at the cost of its planned future fighting strength would have to 

be resisted firmly; as we can be sure it would. 

With this important reservation, there is much to be said for not only leaving it 

to the Admiralty to undertake the conversion of the carriers but also leaving it to 

the Navy subsequently to operate and maintain them. Surely this would lead to 

less complications than turning them over to the Ministry of Transport? One 

cannot help harbouring a fear that in the course of time their emergency role might 

then become submerged in more humdrum routine transport activities and sooner 

or later they would be in the wrong place or already preoccupied at the crucial 

moment. It would be surprising if the Admiralty's proverbial firmness of purpose 

could not prevent that eventuality. In any case they are warships, and it would 

not only be nice but desirable that they should continue to belong to the Royal 

Navy. There are clear advantages in having the right to the kind of treatment 

accorded to the White Ensign, and the circumstances of their employment would 

fully justify their treatment as operational units. 

In the matter of finance, the responsibility for presenting the needs to Parliament 

ought to rest with the Ministry of Defence. The provision of this kind of fast 

transportation would be for all three Services. The Admiralty could then receive 

an annual 'grant in aid' from the Ministry of Defence vote, and this would certainly 

help to draw a clear distinction between the money directly voted to the Admiralty 

for the Navy proper and that provided to meet the inter-Service need. 

Finally, if this kind of conception ever transpired, would it not be best that these 

transports should be manned by Naval officers and men ? Indeed, they presumably 

would have to be if they were retained as White Ensign ships. The total strength 

would not be large. The writer hazards one more guess that each ship's company 

need not amount to more than 300, and these numbers could surely be entirely 

made up by engaging on special contracts retired officers and men. If the length 

of notice for readiness was not less than, say, a week, very small maintenance parties 

only would be required permanently, the remainder being volunteers undertaking 

to come up when called upon. Officers and men between the ages of 40 and 60 

would be eminently suitable to operate the service; disciplinary troubles would be 

negligible, and there must be many who would welcome such an opportunity to lend 

a hand in emergency and, let it be said, to supplement their pensions from time to 

time. 

As a tail-piece, a certain cruiser in October, 1942, was called upon at little more 

than 48 hours' notice to embark 600 American soldiers (and 70 special duty Naval 

ratings) at Belfast and carry this Algiers raiding party, for that is what it was, to a 

rendezvous off the North African coast. Needless to say this news was hardly 

welcome in a warship already bursting at the seams with an inflated war complement 

now to become just on doubled for a period of twelve days. It would have been 

bad enough if it were to have been the cruiser's sole occupation. In fact, her 

primary role was to provide close cover against surface attack to the fast troop

GREY FUNNEL LINE 39 

convoy of 39 transports on passage from the Clyde to the Straits of Gibraltar, and 

with a subsidiary role of refuelling the anti-submarine escorts en route. 

The Americans' sea experience had been confined to one Atlantic crossing in 

the bowels of a vast transport. None of them had ever before been on board a 

warship, let alone a British one. A hundred and one difficulties arose, and some of 

them remained with the Cruiser's harassed officers to the end. With the best will 

in the world on both sides, G.I.'s yet seeped into the most unexpected and un- 

desirable places. The sanitary facilities on board were quite inadequate; matches 

and lighters flashed on deck at night; pieces of cellophane drifted everywhere; 

the galley staff almost died on its feet providing two watch meals; the canteen 

was stripped bare; watertight doors were left half clipped or worse; and the passen- 

gers, when overcome by the ship's motion, never seemed able to determine the 

lee side. 

The discomfort to the ship's company was dreadful, and much to the detriment 

of the ship's fighting efficiency. The hazards of fire, inadvertent damage to fittings 

and actual physical obstruction in compartments and passageways in the event of 

emergency were great. 

No doubt the Admiralty Intelligence Service and the distant cover of the Home 

Fleet provided the real security against a surface attack and certainly obviated the 

likelihood of surprise, but the unexpected can always happen, and that cruiser's 

captain was not particularly enamoured of the possibility that he might have to 

fight a main armament surface engagement with nearly 700 extra alien bodies shut 

down below. 

Fortunately, the need did not arise. Nor even was there a call on the cruiser's 

A/A armament. No one did fall overboard, and the escorts were all refuelled. But 

it remains that this misemployment was greatly to the detriment of the cruiser's 

ability to carry out her proper role efficiently and effectively. 

Doubtless the planners had then no alternative. What is to be hoped is that 

such expedients will never be necessary again. 

ONLOORER

The Size and Shape 

I N the April and July issues of NAVAL REVIEW, P.H.D. wrote articles discussing 

the composition of the British Armed Forces and the future shape of the Navy. 

Although there are many of P.H.D.3 major points with which I do not agree, I do 

not intend to make a point by point answer but rather to set down some thoughts 

of mine to be read in conjunction with, and in some cases by way of contrast to, 

those of P.H.D. 

In determining the size and shape of the U.K. Forces there should be five basic 

stages : 

(a) Determining the desired United Kingdom strategy; 

(b) Deciding to what extent and in what circumstances our military effort 

should be integrated with that of our Allies; 

(c) Deciding on the military measures required to implement our strategy 

in the light of our Treaty arrangements; 

(d) Assessing what forces will be required to carry out the military measures; 

(e) Confirming that the necessary financial backing and manpower, scientific 

and industrial resources are available. If not, then hard bargaining 

about (a), (c) and (d) results-not least with the Foreign Office, Common- 

wealth Relations Office and the Colonial Office if it is suggested that our 

military commitments should be reduced. 

With regard to the above process, five points need particular stressing:- 

(a) A time scale must be applied, particularly as regards our future strategy 

and the forces needed to implement it. Clearly the answers for five 

and ten years hence will be different. 

(b) A period of about ten years is required to make major changes in the 

'shape' of the forces effective if new equipment is involved. Thus, 

any proposals for major changes in the 'shape' of our forces will almost 

certainly have to be examined against a background of our likely strategic 

requirements in the light of the estimated threat ten years hence. 

(c) Although it is not invariably so in comparatively minor affairs, our member- 

ship of N.A.T.O., Baghdad Pact and S.E.A.T.O. does materially improve 

our ability to withstand Communist aggression against our interests. 

This ability is by no means confined to the military sphere; great political 

and economic benefits accrue to us as well. In fact, it is no exaggeration 

to say that, except in the case of minor affairs, we no longer have anything 

like the resources to implement a 'go it alone' policy even if, in a fit of 

nostalgia we wished to do so. I think that few would deny that, faced 

with the present massive Russian threat, we no longer have the ability 

even to defend the U.K. by ourselves. 

(d) Not only are the financial and manpower resources of the U.K. insufficient 

to allow us to have forces completely adequate to cope with every type 

of threat, but the types of forces required for the various threats are often 

very dissimilar. For instance, Protector has a useful role to play in cold 

war only whilst at the other end of the scale minesweepers are basically 

designed for global and, to a lesser extent, limited war.

THE SIZE AND SHAPE 4 1- 

(e) 'Single Service' strategy is a completely out of date concept. Nowadays, 

pace the extremists of Bomber Command, individual services can no more 

'go in alone' than can our country in major military operations. The 

United Kingdom Forces must, as a whole, be balanced so that, jointly, 

they can best implement the U.K. strategy taking into account both our 

Treaty obligations and the assistance provided by Allies. 

STRATEGY 

The major threat to our interests comes at present from the Communist Bloc 

and I believe this will continue to be so for a long time to come. In the 1957 

Defence White Paper (Para. 8) it was stated that 

'Britain's Armed Forces must be capable of performing two main tasks:- 

(a) To play their part with the forces of allied countries in deterring and 

resisting aggression. 

(b) To defend British Colonies and Protected Countries against local attack, 

and undertake limited operations in overseas emergency'. 

I think that that statement remains basically valid now, but much political and 

scientific water has flowed since 1957 and I suggest that the above tasks should now 

be translated into the following strategic aims which I believe will still be valid for 

us in ten years time, although not necessarily in this order of priority:- 

(a) The prevention of global war. 

(b) The improvement of our position in the cold war. 

(c) In conjunction with our Allies, the achievement of such success in limited 

war as will enable us to attain our major political objectives. 

(d) Survival in a global war. 

THE DETERRENT 

The basic policy for preventing global war is that of threatening massive retalia- 

tion in the event of major aggression against interests vital to the U.S.A. or U.K., 

i.e. the deterrent policy. There are three points which merit serious thought by all 

officers-the validity of the deterrent policy, the need for an independent United 

Kingdom retaliatory force and the 'shield' concept. 

Validity. The deterrent policy is one of influencing the minds of the rulers 

of potential enemies so that they deem it exceedingly unprofitable to embark 

on major aggression against our vital interests. Thus, if our deterrent policy 

is to be valid we must ensure that those rulers are convinced of two things:- 

(a) That we have the necessary weapon power, with effective delivery systems, 

to create unacceptable devastation in their country; 

(b) That our rulers would have the will to use our retaliatory forces in the 

event of major aggression against our vital interests. 

It is on the latter point that one sometimes hears doubts expressed. As far 

as the use of the U.K. retaliatory forces is concerned, the two doubts usually 

raised are, firstly, would any U.K. Government ever initiate strategic nuclear 

attacks to counter massive attacks by conventional forces only, and secondly, 

would our Government ever unleash our retaliatory forces unless the United 

Kingdom (or U.S.A.) was directly and imminently threatened, even if nuclear 

attacks were being delivered against other Allies ? 

In this connection, there are some who believe that we should indulge in a 

much stronger 'survival' policy for our inhabitants, with a massive programme

42 THE SIZE AND SHAPE 

of shelters, etc., to reinforce the will of our rulers to use our retaliatory forces. 

Whilst I accept that such a policy would result in the desired reinforcement of 

will, I do not believe it is practical politics to spend very large sums of money 

on such a policy no matter what sense it may make in military terms. 

Independent United Kingdom Retaliatory Force. The basic justification for our 

having an independent retaliatory force, costly though it is, is to serve notice on 

Russia that if she attacks our vital interests she will be sorry as we will give her 

a really bloody nose. In this context, don't let us kid ourselves that such things 

as Middle East oil are so vital that we should be prepared to 'go it alone' to the 

extent of unleashing our nuclear retaliatory force. 

It is arguable that the existence of our independent retaliatory force will become 

increasingly important as the U.S.A. becomes more subject to I.C.B.M. attack. 

Could we be absolutely certain that, if Russia attacked the United Kingdom but 

not the U.S.A., the latter would come to our aid in the certainty that heavy 

I.C.B.M. attacks on their cities would follow? This, of course, supposes that 

both sides have reached a stage of nuclear sufficiency. A subsidiary justification 

for our having an independent retaliatory force is the increased influence it gives 

us in world affairs. This argument can be much overdone, particularly when 

discussing Afro-Asian affairs. 

There are few, I think, who would dispute that, taking the Western Alliance 

as a whole, the provision of the deterrent forces should be given top priority. 

But, in view of the size and power of American Strategic Air Command and of the 

N.A.T.O. I.R.B.M.'s, it is quite another thing to say that the U.K. should give 

top priority to the provision of her deterrent forces (both 'Sword' and 'Shield'- 

but principally the former). As readers of 'The Times' will know, good military 

arguments can be advanced for limiting the provision of the U.K. deterrent 

forces to third priority, after cold and limited war forces. Of course, if we could 

afford enough of every kind of force, it would be a mere academic problem, but 

unfortunately we just have not got enough money or other resources to go around. 

On balance, therefore, although I realize that it means placing tremendous faith 

in the Americans, I think that we should at least reduce the priority given to 

our 'Sword' force. 

'The Shield'. There are some who, like P.H.D., think that for us to have an 

Army and Tactical Air Force in Germany is a luxury we can no longer afford 

irrespective of our political commitment to Western European Union. It seems 

to me that this school of thought does not appreciate the true concept of the 

'Shield' (as opposed to the 'Tripwire'). 

No one would dispute, I am sure, that we must not allow the Russians to 

advance further into Western Europe and that our use of our retaliatory forces 

against Russia could only be justified by major aggression. Now if there were 

no 'Shield', the Russians would be able, by a series of small incidents, to nibble 

their way westwards into free Europe without ever committing aggression on a 

scale justifying our massive nuclear retaliation. Thus, by serving notice on the 

Russians that only by major aggression can their military forces advance into 

free Europe and that this would justify our massive nuclear retaliation, the 

'Shield' is an essential complement to the nuclear retaliatory forces (i.e. the 

'Sword'). Similarly, the N.A.T.O. maritime forces are an essential part of the 

'shield' to contain aggression by Russian naval forces.

THE SIZE AND SHAPE 43 

COLD WAR, LIMITED WAR AND GLOBAL WAR 

Not all will agree with my proposed strategic aims for cold, limited and global 

war, but I suggest that they are realistic in this day and age. In particular, it is so 

important to prevent a limited war (e.g. Korea), as opposed to a local incident (e.g. 

Muscat and Oman), from spreading into a global war, that I feel sure that both 

sides will be prepared for a negotiated settlement, if at all possible, rather than 

adopt the attitude of 'Let's hit them for six while we are at itY. 

The size of our forces cannot possibly be discussed without a knowledge of the 

overall financial ceiling for the Defence Budget, the slice costs (see note) for the 

various types of fighting unit and any restrictions of manpower, scientific and 

industrial effort. I shall therefore content myself with discussing, in broad terms 

only, the shape of the U.K. forces in ten years time. This avoidance of detail will 

enable me to skip one of the processes in assessing the required 'size and shapey- 

namely 'Military Measures required to implement our Strategy'. 

One is bound to make some assumptions about the conditions which will obtain 

in 1968 and here are mine:- 

(a) There will be no effective U.N. Police Force. 

(b) There will be no agreement banning the use of nuclear weapons. 

(c) There will be no agreement between the East and West which has resulted 

in large scale disarmament. 

(d) There will be military alliances, to which we and U.S.A. will belong, 

in the N. Atlantic, Middle East and Far East areas. 

(e) The U.K. defence budget will be relatively not substantially less than now. 

(f) The size of our military commitments is not increased and that in nature 

they remain substantially as at present. 

(g) The manpower ceiling for the U.K. forces is roughly as planned for 1963, 

i.e. a total of 375,000. 

(h) The elements of our basic strategy remain as at present. 

(i) The vast majority of the world cargoes are still carried by sea. 

THE ARMY 

Firstly, I think that the basic organisation and equipment of the Army will be on 

a much lighter and logistically less complicated scale than at present. For instance, 

if tanks have relevance in 1968, I would expect them to be much lighter than our 

present ones and air transportable. The majority of our soldiers' active service 

is normally spent on internal security duties (Cyprus, Malaya, Kenya, Aden, 

British Honduras) or local incidents (Muscat and Oman, Jordan). 

Secondly, the Army must be provided with much better strategic and tactical 

air and sea transport than at present. Indeed I think that both the Navy and the 

NOTE: Slice costs are a means of showing the actual annual cost of different fighting units 

in order that financial comparisons can be made. For instance, in assessing the slice 

costs of a ship the following items, amongst very many, would be takeninto account :- 

The costs for the crew of their wages, food, clothing and cash allowances. 

The proportionate costs of the above items for the personnel providing shore-based 

support for the ship (i.e. dockyard, medical, educational, supply, training, Admiralty 

and H.Q. personnel). 

The cost of ammunition and stores expended by the ship and by those giving admin- 

istrative and logistic backing to the ship.

44 THE SIZE AND SHAPE 

R.A.F. are guilty of wilful, but understandable, obstruction to the provision from 

their votes of proper transport facilities for the Army. I therefore foresee the 

establishment, on the lines of the American M.A.T.S. and M.S.T.S., of Military 

Air and Sea Transport Services, operated by the R.A.F. and Navy respectively but 

paid for out of the Ministry of Defence vote, for strategic military transport. Further- 

more I think that our amphibious force will have a considerably greater lift and 

speed than at present. 

Thirdly, I am sure that there will be a considerable expansion of the Army Air 

Corps which will assume responsibility for air transport on the battlefield and on 

short range L. of C. and for battlefield surveillance. 

It has already been decided and announced by the Minister of Defence that 

we are to build no more manned fighters and strategic bombers after the Lightning 

and V-bombers. Assuming that this decision remains and that foreign aircraft 

are not bought as replacements for the Lightning and V-bombers, it would seem 

that 1968 may well be about the time when Fighter and Bomber Commands are 

equipped exclusively with missiles. If so, this is the fundamental change to be 

expected in the shape of the R.A.F. It is so fundamental that it calls into question 

the continued existence of the R.A.F. as an independent air force. 

If, as I advocate, a Military Air Transport Service has been brought into existence 

by then, the only remaining major flying roles for the R.A.F. would be tactical in 

support of the Army and Maritime in conjunction with the Navy. It is at least 

arguable that logically the former role should then pass to the Army Air Corps 

and shore based Maritime Air Forces be absorbed into the Fleet Air Arm. Having 

got thus far it could be taken further so that the Gunners take over Fighter and 

Bomber Commands ! 

I, myself, doubt if it is practicable to abolish the R.A.F. in such a way and make 

the men in light blue change to dark blue or khaki. However it happened in reverse 

when the R.A.F. was formed and during the last war some R.A.F. men were trans- 

ferred to the Army when the latter's manpower needs became pressing. 

The first fundamental change to be expected is an obvious one. I am sure that 

from the mid-1960's onwards all our new major war vessels will be nuclear pro- 

pelled. 

Next let us consider types of ship that will be required in 1968. I make no 

attempt to argue each case in detail, but I hope that my general views will suffice. 

I believe that 

(a) There will still be a need for carriers of the Commando type and of the 

flexible general purpose type having A/S, air defence and strike capability. 

Their prime justification will be for cold and limited war. 

(b) There will be no adequate requirement to justify us building or acquiring 

missile firing submarines. I do, however, envisage submarines being 

on the threshold of superseding frigates for A/S duties. 

(c) Cruisers will be irrelevant for naval operations, except possibly in the 

cold war, unless they are re-equipped with S.A.G.W. in place of their 

guns.

THE DEPARTMENT OF SHIPS 45 

(d) There will be no requirement for ocean minesweepers but there will still 

be some requirement for coastal and inshore minesweepers as physical 

limitations will still preclude other methods of applying mine counter- 

measures, such as airborne or manual, from being very effective in all 

weather and tidal conditions. 

(e) As I have already said, our amphibious force must have greater lift capacity 

and greater speed. 

(f) A larger Underway Replenishment Force will be required and that it will 

be 'White Ensign' manned as is done in some other navies. 

E.30 

The Department of Ships 

0 N October lst, 1958, the Controller of the Navy unveiled a plaque on the brick 

wall of the southernmost hut at Foxhill, Bath, and the Department of Ships 

came into existence. Mr. Sims took up his office as Director General and another 

change had taken place in the Admiralty Organisation. 

Though an over-simplification it would be true to say that the new department 

has been created by bringing together the three design departments, Director of 

Naval Construction, Director of Electrical Engineering and Engineer-in-Chief 

(under its new title, Director of Marine Engineering) and the smaller Director of 

Naval Equipment group, under one head. It has been done by loosely joining these 

departments together and not by merging them. Each individual technical specialisa- 

tion at present clearly retains its identity within the new department and ship groups, 

although geographically located in the same huts, are still divided into the Con- 

struction, Electrical and Engineering groups looking up the administrative pyramid 

to their own specialised heads. The idea of the Department of Ships is an excellent 

one and long overdue, fifty years overdue, and was recommended by the writer 

in an article in THE NAVAL REVIEW in 1956. However, the present development 

has fallen far short of the Navy's needs. 

There has been some scurrilous comment in a national daily newspaper that 

Naval Engineering Officers resent working for a civilian. This is not, in my 

experience, true. Engineer Officers are prepared to work loyally within any efficient 

organisation which has the Navy's good as its clear aim but they are quick to sense 

and resent either inefficiency or Parkinsonian empire building ambitions which do not 

benefit the Navy and do not get us the ships, the well-found ships, we so seriously 

need. It is too early to say whether the Department of Ships will or will not succeed 

in attracting the loyalty and enthusiasm of the naval officers within it. It is certain 

all will try to make it a success and will speak out their criticisms which need not be 

resented. No criticism here is directed, personally, at the Director General, but 

rather in sympathy with his problems.

46 THE DEPARTMENT OF SHIPS 

The present Director General is a member of the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors 

and, in his position, is head of the Royal Corps. This is a very great 

handicap. Here we have the head of a department, with three different groups of 

people, also being head of one of these three groups. He can, therefore, never be 

impartial-he is forced to protect the interests of his one group, of Constructors, 

while necessarily appearing to deal fairly with all three groups. This is an impossible 

and quite unnecessary position. The remedy is simple. When an Admiralty Officer 

reaches the elevated rank of Director General, whatever his speciality he should 

break away from his own group to a higher Departmental and Admiralty loyalty. 

There remains within his department a Director of Naval Construction who as head 

of this speciality within the Admiralty should also be head of the Royal Corps. 

There appears to be an unwritten but nevertheless strong idea that all Directors 

General of the Department of Ships will be Constructor Officers. This is an unnecessary 

rule to establish at the outset of this experiment. There is no need to have 

inflexibility here and the younger officers would be far happier if it was felt that the 

best available senior officer was chosen to fill this position as it became vacant. 

There is nothing in the training of a Naval Constructor that makes him suitable 

for the administration of a large department. In fact it could be argued that his 

training, which is largely academic and concerns technical problems of naval architecture, 

positively develops the wrong type of personality. Only rarely does a 

Constructor get involved in man-management-he only goes to sea in a staff capacity 

-he rarely takes day-to-day administrative responsibility (except in dockyards). 

The Director General should be the best officer available within the Admiralty for 

the post whether he is naval or civilian, Constructor or Electrical Engineer. 

he Department of Ships has been formed by the simple process of putting 

another administrative layer on top of the three technical directors and thus increasing 

the already top-heavy pyramid. The Department has now a top level of Director 

General, five Directors reporting to him (Director of Ship Production being the 

other one), eight Deputy Directors reporting to them, and seventeen Assistant 

Directors, before getting down to the working level of Chief Constructor, Commander, 

Senior Electrical Engineer, Constructor and Electrical Engineer. These 

higher levels (all four of them) are policy makers and administrators above the daily 

workers who are actually designing and maintaining ships. The day-to-day business 

is done below the level of Assistant Director. There is no justification for this 

proliferation of higher posts. In fact it compares most unfavourably with the U.S. 

Navy's equivalent department, the Bureau of Ships. This Bureau which, sensibly, 

combines the duties of Department of Ships and Dockyard and Fleet Maintenance, 

has one Chief of the Bureau, one Deputy Chief, and about seven Assistant Chiefs 

above the working level. Of the ~ssistant Chiefs, two are usually Captains and the 

other five Rear-Admirals. This is a department of 4,000 people combining the 

duties of two of our Directors General for a navy six times the size of the Royal 

Navy and yet its administrative level is only one third the size. This may be partly 

accounted for by the better training for administration of U.S. naval officers, by the 

unification of the three technical specialisations (in 1939) and by the common 

training and common background of the E.D. officers who fill the executive posts 

within the organisation. No one can doubt the efficiency of this Bureau which since 

the war has produced ships far ahead of any other nation in the world in design 

and fighting capabilities, whether it is in nuclear submarines, guided missile cruisers 

or enormous aircraft carriers.

THE DEPARTMENT OF SHIPS 47 

There are few technical secrets in the U.S. Navy (except nuclear propulsion) 

withheld from the Royal Navy and it is primarily in the field of technical administration 

that they differ from us. It is in this area that we have most to learn. The 

Department of Ships would be far happier if it was a truly functional organisation. 

The Director General needs one Deputy only and then should have five Assistants 

for (a) Administration, (b) Ship Design, (c) Shipbuilding, (d) Research and Development, 

(e) Finance. Each Assistant would then be head of an integrated division with 

clear duties and responsibilities. This could be most quickly and efficiently achieved 

by 'navalisation' of the Royal Corps and the Electrical Engineers. The Department, 

which from its title and responsibilities, should be under naval direction, would 

then better serve the Navy rather than itself. To civilianise the Department would 

be fatal-it would break its already tenuous links with the Fleets and would increase 

the present tendency for civilians to become remote and only academically interested 

in the Navy. It is so easy at Bath to be a '9-5' man who sees only the paper and 

never the reality behind the paper. 

The present paperwork organisation itself is worth an article on its own, but in 

D.G.s.-it seems that '~a~er' is to become the master and not the servant of the 

technical working officer.- It flows forth in torrents on subjects far removed from 

day-to-day cares. Rigid Registry and Sub-Registry organisations are created which 

will increase the clerical stranglehold on the flow of paper. It may take days for an 

IN letter to reach the desk of the officer who must deal with it. This may be due 

to a clerical inborn fear of decentralisation, of uncontrolled paper flowing beyond 

their reach. What department can consider itself efficient if the morning's mail is 

not on the responsible officer's desk at least within the same day ? 

Finally, who cares if the Ship Department is or is not efficient? Who really 

cares enough to do something about it ? This is the most frightening aspect of the 

whole change. Who in five years' time is going to say the new organisation has been 

a success and by what yardstick is it to be measured? The hierarchy of the Department, 

being civilian, can only see it as the be all and end all of their careers. They 

cannot be judge in their own case. The Board of Admiralty relies upon the Director 

General of Ships as their technical adviser. He can only propose his case and there 

is none (until a technical officer is upon the Board) to question him. The quickest 

and most reliable method of improving the organisation would be to call in a firm 

of management consultants to advise and to take their advice in this complex 

problem. They couldn't make the situation any worse and might save millions of 

pounds annually. Those within the Admiralty who might consider themselves. 

qualified to do this cannot see the wood for the trees. 

D.P.T.B.

The Origins of Operation 'Torch'- 

~n~lo-American Assault on French 

North Africa 

There must be a great many readers who took part in Operation 'Torch' 

but had no idea of the doubts and arguments which attended its birth. It 

is no part of the business of THE NAVAL REVIEW to keep alive old disagreements 

between our allies and ourselves, or even to worry too much as to 

'who was right', but we should know the facts which are soon forgotten and 

often not even recorded. And we ought to learn the lesson, if there is one, 

which this brief glimpse of history provides. In his postscript the author 

draws attention to the signijicance of the personalities involved. The 

two main personalities being 'en rapport' the alliance worked amazingly 

well. But we have no right to assume, in a like case in future, that it 

would necessarily do so again.-Ed. 

EAR ADMIRAL Samuel E. Morison, U.S.N.R., the Historian for the 

R Official History of U.S. Naval Operations in World War 11, paid a visit to 

Oxford in May, 1957. While there, he gave two somewhat controversial lectures 

on the American contribution to the Strategic Planning for the defeat of the Axis 

and Japan. At the time, one of his objects, as far as I could understand, was to 

give a cold blast to Arthur Bryant and the Alanbrooke Diaries. A revised version 

of these two lectures was published in book form by the Oxford University 

Press early in 1958.* In this volume he discusses at some length the very heated 

arguments which went on between the Americans and ourselves regarding the 

establishment of a Second Front in 1942. Ultimately, as we know, agreement 

was reached in July, 1942, and planning was immediately put in hand for the 

execution of 'Torch' which took place in November, 1942. The decision to plan 

and execute 'Torch' affected all subsequent Anglo-American operations in the 

European theatre and determined the date for the final assault on the Normandy 

beaches on the 6th June, 1944, (Operations 'Neptune' and 'Overlord'). In fact, 

it was one of the great decisions which sealed the fate of the European Axis Powers. 

It is assumed that Admiral Morison's account is factually correct. However, 

until Volume I11 (Grand Strategy) of the United Kingdom Military Series is 

published, it is felt that some of his criticisms are very much open to question. It 

might, therefore, interest readers of THE NAVAL REVIEW to have a short chronological 

summary of the origins of 'Torch', it is hoped, from an impartial point of 

view. Lest the reader be tempted to assume that, except where particularly mentioned, 

these arguments and decisions were carried out without disturbance from 

current diversions and calamities, some marginal notes are added against the months 

mentioned in order to remind him of some of the shattering events which were 

occurring at the same time. 

*American Contributions to the Strategy of World War 11, Oxford University Press, 1958, 

reviewed in October, 1958, NAVAL REVIEW. 

48

December, 

1940. 

February 

and March, 

1941. 

February, 194 1. 

German 

bombing 

of Malta. 

Shipping 

losses 

increasing. 

May, 1941. 

Evacuation 

of Greece 

and Crete. 

June, 1941. 

Germans 

invaded 

Russia. 

August, 1941. 

THE ORIGINS OF OPERATION 'TORCH' 49 

1940 

After the fall of France, the Americans, though of course not yet 

at war, were very much concerned about the future of Algeria and 

Morocco. Admiral Leahy, U.S.N., was appointed Ambassador 

to the Vichy Government in December, 1940. His duty was to 

keep the President closely in touch with the activities of Marshal 

Petain and in particular Admiral Darlan, who later promised Hitler 

the use of French African base facilities. At about the same time 

as Admiral Leahy took up his post, Mr. Murphy was appointed 

American Consul-General in Algiers and gathered a troop of Vice- 

Consuls to supervise the distribution of food. Apart from the 

implementation of the Murphy-Weygand Agreement (Food), they 

were really Intelligence Officers. The Americans were apprehensive 

that the Germans would come down through Spain, capture Gibraltar, 

and extend their operations to North Africa and would eventually 

occupy Dakar. Should this occur, and should the U.S. become 

involved in war, sea communications with South America would be 

in great danger. Plans for the taking of Dakar had been prepared. 

This had a certain bearing on their later acceptance of 'Torch'. 

1941 

In February and March, 1941, nine months before the United 

States formally declared war, a secret conference was held in Washing- 

ton. The British Naval representatives were Rear Admiral Roger 

Bellairs and Rear Admiral Victor Danckwerts. Army and Air 

representatives of both nations contributed. After prolonged 

discussions, the A.B.C.I. staff agreement of the 27th March, 1941, 

was drafted. The big decision in this agreement was that if and 

when the United States became involved in war, even in a war on 

two Oceans, they would devote their first and principal efforts to 

the defeat of Germany. This policy was generally known as 'Beat 

Hitler First'. Other agreed objects were: 

(a) The early elimination of Italy. 

(b) The building up of the necessary forces for an eventual offensive 

against Germany. 

In August, 1941, the Atlantic Conference took place at Argentia. 

Mr. Churchill had only met President Roosevelt once before, during 

the First World War. The warm and deep personal relations 

established at this meeting continued throughout the war until the 

President's death in April, 1945, and had a marked influence on 

strategic decisions. The outcome of this Conference was mainly 

political and in Mr. Churchill's record of the meeting, the Atlantic 

Charter claims all his attention. The American Chiefs of Staff 

were debarred from making any commitments other than improving 

the position in the Battle of the Atlantic with particular reference to 

supplies to Russia. A general agreement on this matter was reached. 

However, the British Chiefs of Staff put forward an Appreciation 

which did not appeal to the American Chiefs of Staff. The urge

July, 1941. 

Japanese 

enter Indo- 

China. 

September, 

1941. 

November, 

1941. 

Ark Royal 

and Barham 

sunk. 

December, 1941. 

Prince of 

Wales and 

Repulse sunk. 

Hong Kong 

surrendered. 

Valiant and 

Q.E. disabled. 

January, 1942. 

Japanese 

invade Burma. 

Malaya 

conquered. 

Reverse in 

'the Desert. 

February, 1942. 

Fall of 

Singapore. 

to get America into the War, which it contained, was a theme which, 

at that time, did not meet with a favourable reception from the 

Americans. It would appear that the Americans did not fully 

appreciate the critical position of the British Commonwealth, nor 

did the British Chiefs of Staff realise the unpreparedness of the 

American Army. For the past year we had been fighting alone 

and were just hanging on 'by our eyelids' in many theatres. We 

felt that without active U.S. participation the future was pretty 

bleak. The Americans stated that they were unprepared for active 

operations, which was quite true, and that as the 'Arsenal for 

Democracy' as they termed it, their role was more suitable to the 

present situation. However, ultimately there was agreement on 

two very important points. Firstly, that the policy of 'Beat Hitler 

First' was confirmed. Secondly, that British assurance was given 

of their intention ultimately to land forces on the Continent. Plans 

were initiated in September by the British planners. 

In September the American Chiefs of Staff commented on the 

British Appreciation referred to above and were very critical on 

two points :- 

(a) It was their opinion that wars cannot be won without the 

use of land armies on a scale much larger than that envisaged 

by the British planners. 

(b) They doubted the value of the bombing offensive in winning 

the war. 

According to their Estimates, with the existing availability of shipping 

and the rate of mobilisation of man-power, the U.S. Army considered 

necessary for operations against the Continent could not be estab- 

lished in the British Isles until 1946! 

When America entered the War in December, 1941, as the result 

of Pearl Harbour, Mr. Churchill immediately proposed a meeting 

with the President and embarked on the 12th December in H.M.S. 

Duke of York, accompanied by the First Sea Lord, the Chief of the 

Air Staff and Field Marshal Dill who had been succeeded by General 

Brooke as C.I.G.S. (This was known as the 'Arcadia' Conference). 

There was some slight apprehension that the Americans, smarting 

under the surprise and devastating attack on Pearl Harbour, might 

be inclined to depart from the agreed policy of 'Beat Hitler First'. 

However, they remained firm. 

During the voyage Mr. Churchill produced a remarkable appre- 

ciation of the general situation for the benefit of the Americans and 

this is contained in detail in Volume I11 of the Second World War, 

pages 574 to 578. In it, he advocated that a campaign must be 

fought in 1942 to gain possession of the whole of the North African 

shore, and also Dakar and other French West African ports, and 

stressed that plans should be put on foot forthwith. He christened 

this Operation 'Gymnast' and it certainly had a very favourable 

reception from the President. This tendency on the part of the 

President to accept the North African Operation persisted when the

show-down in July, 1942 provided one of the bitterest Anglo- 

American arguments of the whole war. This will be related in its 

chronological sequence. The American Chiefs of Staff were 

divided in their opinion and on the whole lukewarm. The U.S. 

Navy was certainly against it. 

At this meeting ('Arcadia') the organisation for the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff was formed which lasted throughout the war. Among 

other results of the 'Arcadia' Conference were:- 

(i) That the policy of 'Beat Hitler First' was confirmed. 

(ii) That planning should go ahead for Operation 'Gymnast', 

but should not interfere with the approved transfer of U.S. 

troops to Iceland and Northern Ireland. 

The possibility of immediate pIanning for 'Gymnast' was side- 

tracked by a decision to send 37,000 troops to the S.W. Pacific to 

contain the Japanese advance. Ultimately in January, February and 

March this number increased to 79,000, over four times the number sent 

across the Atlantic in the same period. Apart from any delay due to 

shortage of shipping which these movements had on planning for 'Gym- 

nast', and the movement of troops to Iceland and Northern Ireland, 

they began to impinge on the agreed policy of 'Beat Hitler First'. 

January, 1942. General Eisenhower who had been appointed on the War Planning 

Staff, appreciated this dispersion of effort and on 22nd January, 

1942, wrote as follows: 

'The struggle to secure adoption by all concerned of a common 

concept of strategical objectives is wearing me down. Everybody 

is too much engaged with small things of his own. We have got 

to go to Europe and fight and we have got to quit wasting re- 

sources all over the world and still worse wasting time. If we 

would keep Japan in, save the Middle East, Russia and Burma, 

we have got to begin slugging-in with air forces at West Europe 

to be followed by land attack as soon as possible.' 

Further, this lack of shipping, which dominated all movements 

at the time, and the delay in the production of landing craft, in- 

fluenced the British Chiefs of St& to declare that 'Gymnast' would 

almost certainly be impossible during 1942. On 3rd March, the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff decided to drop 'Gymnast' as an immediate 

March, 1942. operational possibility. Mr. Churchill and the President agreed. 

Fall of 

Rangoon. 

This decision opened the way for General Eisenhower's plan to 

concentrate U.S. Forces in the British Isles for an all-out offensive 

against Germany. No time was wasted and by 1st April an outline 

plan for the strategy of war against the Axis was produced and 

April, 1942. 

approved by the President. This envisaged:- 

Japanese Fleet 

enter Indian (a) The build-up of American Forces in the British Isles to carry 

Ocean. out, with the British, an assault on the Continent in 1943. 

Raid on 

Ceylon. (b) The possibility of an Emergency Operation in 1942 to obtain 

a foothold on the Continent. The object would be to relieve 

pressure on the Russians and satisfy Stalin should a deterioration 

on the Russian Front become acute.

May, 1942. 

Heavy air 

raids on 

Malta. 

German 

offensive 

in Libya. 

British 

back to 

Indian 

frontier. 

April, 1942. 

June, 1942. 

Very heavy 

shipping 

losses in 

Atlantic. 

As this Emergency Operation was the source of so much argument 

in July, 1942, the idea of it, which was primarily American, needs a 

little explanation. After the invasion of Russia in June, 1941, and 

at the time the Russians were being badly hammered, Stalin de- 

manded, as early as July, and again in September, that a Second 

Front in Europe should be set up to draw off 40 German Divisions 

from the Russian Front. At that time no such project was possible 

and he was informed that, apart from the bombing of Germany and 

the supply of war material, nothing further could be done. 

However, after the entry of America into the war (December, 

1941), Stalin again became insistent that a Second Front on the 

Continent should be planned and carried out. To keep the Russians 

quiet, Roosevelt cabled to Stalin that he had an important Military 

proposal to make in order to relieve the Russian Front. He cabled 

suggesting that Molotov should come to Washington. This cable 

was sent on the 11th April before the plans which Eisenhower had 

produced for the Emergency Operation in 1942 had been considered 

in London. Molotov was delayed in passing through London, 

arriving in Washington at the end of May. In London he received 

no positive answer to the repeated demand for a Second Front in 

1942. However, in Washington, after much discussion, the President 

authorised Molotov to inform Stalin that the Americans expected to 

create a Second Front in Europe in 1942. Marshall advised that 

the year should be omitted, but Molotov insisted on it. On returning 

to Moscow, via London, Molotov endeavoured to get a more definite 

promise from Mr. Churchill; in this he failed, Mr. Churchill stating 

that, although planning would continue, no promise could be given. 

Both in London and Washington Molotov was informed that in 

order to create the possibility of a Second Front in 1942, convoys 

of war material to Murmansk would have to be curtailed. 

To revert to the plan which was initiated by General Eisenhower 

and was approved by the President on the 1st April. General 

Marshall and Mr. Harry Hopkins were instructed to proceed to 

London in order to get this outline plan accepted by Mr. Churchill, 

so that detailed planning on both sides could be commenced. Mr. 

Churchill gave a warm welcome to these proposals, and on 14th April 

the Chiefs of Staff accepted them with reservations. However, 

General Marshall received the impression that we were ready to plan 

for and carry out the Emergency Operation in 1942 which received 

the code name 'Sledgehammer'. On their return detailed planning 

was commenced, but at the beginning of June, it was clear to the 

British planners that this Emergency Operation was not possible. 

Admiral Mountbatten, Chief of Combined Operations, was sent 

over to explain to the President the difficulties which had been 

experienced. This created some very bad feeling with General 

Marshall and Admiral King, and although Mr. Churchill, in June, 

came over and further explained the difficulties, the feeling un- 

doubtedly remained. In fact it went so far as for General Marshall

THE ORIGINS OF OPERATION 'TORCH' 53 

and Admiral King to suggest that the policy of 'Beat Hitler First' 

should be abandoned and that the American effort should be directed' 

towards the war against Japan. However, the President would not 

accept this. 

During the time that Mr. Churchill was in America in June, 

Tobruk fell and Rommel was sweeping the Commonwealth Forces 

back to Alamein. Consequently, more attention was directed to 

saving the Middle East than to developing operations on the Continent. 

However, by July plans for the build-up of American forces 

in the British Isles were completed and were given the code name 

of 'Bolero'. Plans for the assault on the Continent to be carried out 

in 1943 were also completed and given the code name of 'Round-up' 

(afterwards 'Neptune' and 'Overlord'). The crucial question then 

arose as to whether in the event of the deterioration on the Russian 

front becoming serious, the proposed Emergency Operation ('Sledgehammer') 

could be carried out in September, 1942. 

JUIY, 1942. On 15th July, General Marshall, Admiral King and Mr. Harry 

Germans Hopkins left for London with a very firm directive from the President. 

reach 

EI Alarnein. He required decisions and agreement on the following particular 

Pall of 

Sebastopol. 

point in seven days. To quote from this directive. 

'Plans for 1942. 

'Investigation of possibility of executing "Sledgehammer". 

Urge immediate all-out preparations for it. 

'To be pushed with the utmost vigour whether or not Russian 

collapse becomes imminent. Only if you are completely convinced 

that "Sledgehammer" is impossible of execution, you are to 

inform me and determine on another place for U.S. troops to fight 

in 1942'. 

There were other points not specifically relevant to this Emergency 

Operation. 

'Sledgehammer' met with strong opposition from the Prime 

Minister, and the British Chiefs of Staff including Admiral Mount- 

batten, who emphasized the lack of training, shortage of landing craft 

and other specialist equipment. General Eisenhower, who had 

formulated this plan, was now in England in command of the Ameri- 

can Forces which were assembling. Naturally, he was in favour of 

'Sledgehammer'. General Marshall and Admiral King backed it. 

Admiral Stark who had arrived in England in March was not in 

favour. He had appreciated the difficulties from the Naval point 

of view. This deadlock was only resolved when on reporting 

back, the President took the initiative in ordering 'Gymnast' to be 

agreed to. This acceptance was sealed with a new code name 

'Torch'. General Eisenhower was designated as Supreme Com- 

mander for the Operation. Joint planning commenced at once to 

carry out the Invasion of North Africa ('Torch') in October, 1942. 

After the decision had been made, there is no question that General 

Marshall, General Eisenhower and Admiral King realised the 

futility of attempting 'Sledgehammer'. The fact that an Anglo-

?"*"', lg4~. American Combined Operation ('Torch') would take place in 1942 

Dieppe raid. gave reasonable satisfaction to all concerned, although the American 

Chiefs of Staff, and particularly Admiral King, always had a dislike 

for it. It gave great satisfaction to the President, who always had a 

leaning towards 'Torch'. Mr. Stimson expressed the belief that 

'it was the President's great secret baby'. It only remained for Mr. 

Churchill to carry out the unpleasant task of meeting Stalin and 

trying to explain why no landing on the Continent could be carried 

out before 1943. This he achieved with conspicuous success on his 

visit to Moscow in August, 1942. After an ugly start he convinced 

Stalin that Operation 'Torch' would be of great value in relieving 

German pressure on the Russian Front. 

POSTSCRIPT 

The pressures and tensions which have been outlined in this brief summary 

naturally involved an interplay of personalities. The following indications relative 

to this particular operation may be traced among those principally concerned. 

Mr. Churchill 

(a) The urge to return to offensive operations-many areas proposed, narrowing 

down to 'Gymnast' afterwards 'Torch', and 'Jupiter', return to Norway. 

This latter Operation remained a favourite for a very long period in spite 

of the unanimous opposition of the Chiefs of Staff and the Planners. 

(b) The constant persuasive influence on the President that 'Torch' was the 

only answer for 1942. 

IT, 

The President 

(a) Loyal adherence to 'Beat Hitler First' strategy in spite of attempts by 

General Marshall and in particular Admiral King to deflect him from it 

on occasions. 

(b) Loyalty to General Marshall, Admiral King and Mr. Stimson (Secretary 

for War). 

(c) Great reliance on Harry Hopkins and his opinions. 

(d) A very receptive ear to the persuasive arguments of Mr. Churchill. 

(e) An obsession that, in order to satisfy clamour, American Armed Forces 

must be in action against the Germans in 1942. 

General Marshall 

(a) An initial lack of appreciation regarding the difficulties of an opposed 

landing. 

(b) A fundamental objection to diversionary operations. 

(c) A complete faith in General Eisenhower and his plans. 

Admiral King 

Marched very much in step with General Marshall, except that he took every 

opportunity of looking over his shoulder at the Pacific which he regarded as 

the principal area of operations. Took a long time in demanding the construction 

of landing craft, the lack of which had a lasting effect throughout the War. 

General Eisenhower 

When initially appointed in June, 1942, to carry out the build-up of American 

Forces in Great Britain, he showed, like General Marshall, a lack of appreciation

SAILING AS AN EDUCATION FOR MODERN SEAMEN 55 

of the difficulties of a Cross Channel operation. From a personal record kept 

by Commander Butcher, it would appear that even in July, 1942, he was still 

unconvinced. He described the decision to abandon 'Sledgehammer' made 

on Wednesday, 22nd July, as the 'blackest day in history'. It must be remem- 

bered that this Emergency Operation was his particular plan which had apparently 

been accepted by the British in April, 1942. It was therefore natural that he 

should be dissatisfied when it was abandoned. 

G.B. 

Sailing as an Education for the Modern 

Seaman 

Since this article was written, early in 1958, for Brassey's Annual, the Board 

of Admiralty has placed orders for Jive 'Seamanship Training Craft' to 

replace the ex-German 'Windfall' yachts which were acquired as prizes of 

Hitler's War. The gloomy prophecy on the subject of these yachts, which 

appears towards the end of this article, has therefore been completely falsijied 

and the author has much pleasure in 'eating his words' ! As announced in 

'Naval Affairs' (page 102) the new ships are to be 12% tons T. M., sloop-rigged, 

and are to be built by Morgan Giles Ltd. of Teignmouth. The author, with 

the crack-brained enthusiasm of approaching senility, regards these ships as 

the most signijicant vessels which haveJigured in our naval building programme 

since the war, not excepting the Dreadnought. It is to be hoped that their 

construction heralds the first step in an Admiralty-sponsored renaissance of 

sail training. 

As regards the article itself, while apologising for its somewhat elementary 

approach to thesubject, the author would ask members to bear in mind that it 

was written for a public which includes a large lay element; he is indebted 

to the Editor and Publishers of Brassey's Annual (Wm. Clowes and Sons 

Ltd.) for permission to reprint it.-ED. 

OW that the ships of the Royal and Merchant Navies are becoming, daily, more 

N machine-ridden and complicated and relatively less at the mercy of the elements, 

it may seem paradoxical, indeed ridiculous, to suggest that there may be a need to 

revert to the ways of our forefathers and train young sea officers in 'sail'; yet there 

are still many who believe that we should be well advised to do so. 

Although this paper is concerned with sail training in 1958, it may be of interest 

to recall something of the history of this subject, about which controversy has often 

been widespread and bitter. So far as the Royal Navy is concerned, and it is 

primarily though not exclusively with the Royal Navy that it is proposed to deal, 

the history goes back to the beginning of this century. At that time the Navy was 

rapidly emerging from the era of sail into that of steam. It was in 1899 that the

56 

SAILING AS AN EDUCATION FOR MODERN SEAMEN 

Training Squadron was abolished and with it all formal practical training of naval 

officers and ratings in 'masts and yards'. At this date, though no more masted capital 

ships were being built, a large number of ships in commission, especially the smaller 

ones, carried sails. The Training Squadron consisted of four sloops and had been 

running for fourteen years; its existence bore witness to the fact that, although 

training and experience in masts and yards was still obtainable in a large number 

of H.M. ships then in commission, it was not obtainable in all, and hence some 

special arrangements had to be made to supplement it. 

In 1899 the South African War broke out and the Training Squadron was paid 

off as an emergency measure; it was not revived when the emergency passed. At 

the time of the abolition The Times newspaper, which in those days took an active 

interest in naval affairs, commented at some length in a leading article, from which 

the following are extracts :- 

'The accidental extinction of the old Training Squadron by the side-wind of a temporary 

emergency may be sound policy for the moment, nor are we in the least concerned to 

question the decision of the Admiralty in such a matter. But the real issues involved are 

far too important to be foreclosed in this way. Professional opinion is, as we know, sharply 

divided on the question. . . . The bluejacket in a modem man-of-war is admirably trained 

in the duties appertaining to his position. But they are largely mechanical duties, making 

little or no demand on his self-reliance and resource. What he learns is to do as he is told, 

and to do it well, willingly, and it may be intelligently. He has very little concern with 

the result of what he does, which is for the most part mechanically fore-ordained. But in 

the handling of masts and sails a man begins by learning that on his individual efforts and 

skill depend his own safety, and that of his shipmates. Whatever of fearlessness, of resource, 

of quick observation, of instant helpfulness reside in his nature is evoked by self-interest 

and quickened by comradeship; and the dullest cannot but realise that on the exercise of 

qualities such as these depend his success, his happiness, very often even his life. The 

same stimulating influence, heightened by an early and urgent sense of responsibility, is 

brought to bear on the young officer. The moment he takes up his duty every quality he 

has must be ready for instant service. He knows that men's lives depend on the quickness 

of his eye and the steadiness of his nerve. He is dealing with forces, inconstant and in- 

calculable, which may at any moment entail mishap or even disaster unless he is swift to 

perceive and prompt to remedy what has gone amiss. He learns too to understand men, 

because after all it is in emergency and not in routine that human nature comes to the 

front, and by understanding them in this common comradeship of danger he learns how to 

rule them. In a modern man-of-war such opprtunities as these are far less frequent both 

for officers and men, even if they exist at all. Whatever officers and men learn there they 

learn admirably, and, with the zeal, goodwill and good sense that animate the whole Service, 

they learn much more than might be expected. But the question still remains: do they 

and can they learn all that the discipline of masts and sails teaches them as a matter of course ? 

If they do, well and good. If they do not, can we afford to discard this invaluable discipline 

from the training of our future bluejackets and naval officers ?' 

There followed a prolonged series of letters and articles in The Times and other 

periodicals, as well as a formal debate on the subject at the Royal United Service 

Institution. During these proceedings and the years that followed it became clear 

that the Service continued to be sharply divided on the subject of sail training, and 

it is probably true to say that it has remained so ever since, for though the advocates 

of sail training who had themselves experenced service under sail, either in the 

Training Squadron or elsewhere, have naturally dwindled in numbers until now 

there are very few, if any, left; at the same time a generation has grown up which 

includes many enthusiasts for the sport of sailing in small vessels, now much more 

popular and widespread than fifty years ago. 

As time went on the Navy rapidly became more and more independent of sails, 

and the case of the opponents of sail training appeared, on the face of it, to become 

ever stronger and more self-evident. Its supporters held, however, and still do,


that to regard training in sail merely as a means of preserving and fostering the ability 

to handle sailing ships without the use of machinery was to take a superficial view. 

True this had been the original object, but the incidental merits of the training, 

its unique value as an education, as a builder of character, sea-sense, self-reliance, 

loyalty and comradeship had long been recognised and had tended to acquire more, 

not less, significance as the mechanisation of the Navy progressed. 

It is now nearly sixty years since the abolition of the Training Squadron; about 

half-way through this span of time, in 1933 to be exact, sail training came very 

near to being re-introduced into the Navy, for it was in that year that money was 

voted in the Navy Estimates for building a sailing training ship. It was surely no 

coincidence that the political head of the Navy at that time was himself a keen 

yachtsman. But the project was shelved at the last moment and has never seriously 

been taken up again. 

In the Merchant Marine sail training in Britain died a good deal harder than it 

did in the Royal Navy-indeed it is not completely dead yet though, as far as oceangoing 

ships are concerned the Kaiser's war brought it virtually to an end. Up to that 

time excellent training was available in the big sailing ships of the Devitt and Maore 

Ocean Training shipi~td. This firm is said to have owedits inception to a suggestion 

made, in 1890, by Lord Brassey, the founder of this Annual and a life-long enthusiast 

for sail. It was that a fleet of training ships engaged in regular trading should each 

be fitted out to carry, in addition to their normal crew, thirty to forty prerniumpaying 

cadets plus some extra instructor officers and schoolmasters. The 'watch on 

deck' of cadets assisted the crew to work the ship while the 'watch below' attended 

school during working hours. During the twenty-odd years of the company's 

operation their type of training ship changed from the early, clipper-type ships 

Harbinger and Hesperus, originally built as Orient Line passenger ships carrying little 

cargo, to the much larger, essentially cargo-carrying four-masted barques, Medway 

and Port Jackson, which were in use at the end of the period. This change, of course, 

reflected the ousting of 'sail' from the passenger-carrying trade and its last stand in 

the field of maritime commerce as a carrier of bulk cargoes. 

Though the Kaiser's war put an end to the activities of Devitt and Moore, one or 

two big shipping companies continued to operate sailing ships for training their own 

officers up to the 1920s, but the writing was on the wall; commercial 'sail' was on its 

way out, and so also was sail training as far as Britain was concerned. 

So much for the recent history of sail training: so far as the Merchant Navy is 

concerned it shows that there was a strong tendency, even after it had become clear 

that all seaborne trade would in future be carried in powered ships, to continue sail 

training and even to insist that part of an officer's sea apprenticeship should be 

served in 'sail'; but eventually even the enthusiasts had to admit that sail training 

did not make profits and so, shipping companies being strictly commercial concerns, 

there was no more to be said; it had to be discarded. So far as the Royal Navy 

is concerned the history suggests that there has always been a considerable body of 

professional opinion that, in abandoning sail training, the Admiralty had not merely 

lost the Navv's skill in this traditional art. which does not reallv matter, but had 

also sacrificed a well-tried means of educating officers and men" and giving them 

sea-sense which, failing adequate substitutes, matters a great deal. 

Although we pride ourselves on our long seafaring tradition, there are other 

European countries, like Portugal, Holland and ~orwa~, with even longer ones,

58 

SAILING AS AN EDUCATION FOR THE MODERN SEAMAN 

and it is obviously relevant to consider how they, and other modern seafaring nations, 

tackle the problem of training their sea officers. We find that nearly all still rely, 

to a greater or lesser extent, on sail training. Completely up-to-date statistics about 

sail training ships are not easy to come by, but a detailed and authoritative book* 

published three years ago serves to indicate what the rest of the world thinks of sail 

training. It may surprise most readers to learn that at that date fifty-nine sail training 

ships were in commission, many of them newly built. Square-rigged sail training 

ships were employed in 1955 by the United States, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, 

Germany, Belgium, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Poland, Russia, Roumania, 

Japan, Brazil and Argentina. But not all these countries use these ships to train 

naval officers and men; the United States ship, for instance, trains the coastguard. 

It is apparent that the large navies of the British Commonwealth and the United 

States disregard sail training for their officers whereas many of the smaller navies 

insist on it. One therefore wonders whether there is anything about a big navy 

which renders sail training less necessary or less practicable. The answer seems to 

be: less necessary-No; less practicable-Yes. Big navies are technically advanced 

navies and their officers have far more 'technics' to learn than those of small, less- 

modern-minded navies. The span of human life, and therefore the years available 

- in which to learn one's profession being common to all, it is an undoubted fact that 

technical matters have a higher claim on the time of big-navy officers than of small- 

navy officers. Should this result in the total exclusion of sail training in big navies ? 

This is the really important question. 

It can be argued that boat sailing has its place in the curriculum of young officers 

in both the British Commonwealth and United States navies, and this is true; there 

is training in handling boats under sail both at Dartmouth and at Annapolis. But 

it is of a type and duration obviously designed to inculcate a certain minimum 

knowledge of an art which all agree is obsolete, certainly not designed to take 

advantage of the character-building, self-reliance-building, sea-sense-building 

potentialities of sailing. 

There are various types of sail training, and the most important distinction between 

types concerns the size of the vessel in which it is carried out. Sixty years ago, when 

sails still provided the motive power for a proportion of the fleet, training was 

necessary with the types of sails that the fleet used, namely those of the 'square- 

rigged' ships; tiers of many square sails, set one above the other on very lofty masts. 

This was the only practicable sail plan for the really big sailing ship, which required 

an enormous sail area to drive her. To try to provide the necessary sail area with 

a few very big canvasses would have resulted in some which were too big to handle. 

But the tiers of square sails, while all of manageable size, had to be handled aloft 

on the yards which supported them, and this involved the crew in much arduous 

and dangerous activity, often working hundreds of feet above the deck; a most 

testing exercise, particularly in bad weather. Such work produced seamen who were 

active, strong and inured to danger, and officers to match. 

So long as the main purpose of the training ship was to teach sailing as practised 

in ships of the Navy, she had to be big; once this need had lapsed large size ceased 

to be an overriding requirement. However, a large training ship does have certain 

inherent advantages: she can make long voyages and keep her pupils at sea for long 

* 'Sail Training and Cadet Ships', by Harold Underhill, published by Brown, Son and Ferguson.


enough to allow them to absorb the value of their training slowly and therefore 

thoroughly and as a part of their life; she can visit distant foreign countries-in itself 

an educational asset; and the proportion of instructors to trainees can be such as to 

make her very economical in this particular respect. 

But the smaller ship also has advantages. Probably the most significant from the 

educational point of view is that, as the size of the ship, and therefore of her crew, 

diminish, each man on board becomes relatively more important. Whereas in a 

crew of sixty many individuals would be submerged in the mass, in a crew of twelve 

it would be possible to allocate some more or less vital job, for which he alone was 

responsible, to each man on board, and anyone who has experience of training will 

agree that this is important in developing character and a sense ofresponsibility. Then 

there is the fact that in a smaller ship one is physically closer to the sea, and there is 

little doubt that one gains familiarity with it quicker the closer one lives to it; with 

every foot that the freeboard decreases the process is accelerated and intensified. 

At the same time the particularly arduous and dangerous work aloft, which is in- 

separable from the use of square sails, can, if desired, be dispensed with in a smaller 

vessel since she can be propelled by sails of manageable size worked entirely from on 

deck, so that going aloft would seldom be necessary. 

There is also an important gain from medium-sized training ships in the matter 

of capital expenditure in that, say, four medium-sized vessels each accommodating 

fifteen trainees would cost far less to build than one big vessel accommodating sixty. 

It is true, as has been mentioned above, that the proportion of instructors to trainees 

necessarily increases as the ship becomes smaller until the point is reached, in a 

dinghy holding two people, where one instructor to one trainee must be the rule; 

but, in considering the needs of the Navy at any rate, this disadvantage of decreased 

size is more than offset by the fact that a large number of medium-sized vessels will 

provide much more command experience than a small number of big vessels. 

Experience of command for young officers is a consideration of very special 

importance in the Navy for, besides being the immediate ambition of most young 

naval officers, it is generally agreed to be by far the most valuable type of experience 

a young officer can have. To command a ship, whatever her size, is an experience 

unlike anything else; to be the one person on board to whom everyone looks for 

decisions as to what is to be done and how it is to be done, decisions which must 

affect the actions, and may affect the survival, of everyone on board; this is an 

experience which, in the opinion of those who have enjoyed it, builds character 

quicker than any other; to have this experience when still young is a privilege of 

the utmost value. 

But, apart from command experience, which is of special significance to the Navy, 

what are the particular educational influences which its supporters claim for sail 

training, whether or not a young man is destined for a sea calling? Perhaps it 

would be useful to divide them into two categories, those associated with any sort 

of seagoing and those associated particularly with seagoing under sail. The reader 

will no doubt realise that these influences are, almost by definition, intangible, their 

effects being incapable of proof, but the writer believes that they are none the less 

potent. 

The educational influences of mere seagoing are especially intangible, but they 

include separation, for the duration of each voyage, from all the noisy, vulgar and 

artificial activities of our modern civilisation; experience of the comradeship of being

60 SAILING AS AN EDUCATION FOR THE MODERN SEAhUN 

'one of a crew', bound together by common duties and interests (ultimately the 

safety of the ship) and controlled by a discipline which is so obviously necessary as 

to be unquestioned; experience of night work which is vouchsafed to so few ashore, 

to know what the world, the sea and the sky look like when most of mankind is 

asleep, to witness habitually the miracles of sunrise and sunset; experience of the 

discipline of 'watches', where the deck must be relieved punctually, day or night, 

not ten minutes, or even one minute late; and finally comes a decent humility and 

awareness of God, through being constantly face to face with nature. These are 

some of the rewards of seagoing, and the writer quite seriously believes that, because 

of them, a life at sea on the whole produces better human beings than a life ashore. 

Then there are the special educational influences of being at sea under sail. All 

the above ones apply, and probably the most important additional quality induced 

is self-reliance; life under sail is nearly always a perpetual struggle with the blind 

forces of nature which are no respecters of persons, nor can one contract out of this 

struggle; it has to be waged by each individual on board with the powers God gave 

him. Because sailing ships are often smaller than powered ones, and always more 

dependent on and susceptible to weather, a special discipline must prevail; the man 

in charge must be obeyed instantly in all conditions, very often conditions of extreme 

fatigue and discomfort; the discipline which the safety of the ship and her crew 

require must be, and is, accepted with willingness and alacrity. The occasional 

conditions of danger, or potential danger, while giving opportunities for the display 

of courage, quickly induce prudence and the habit of thinking ahead in a way that 

few other activities can rival. And finally, if, as is often the case, the crew is small, 

there is constant scope and encouragement for unselfishness-that most truly 

Christian of all qualities, willingness to bear one's share, and often more than one's 

share, of toil and danger because one is 'one of a crew'. These are the qualities 

which tend to be acquired automatically from experience under sail, whether or not 

the pupil is voluntarily, or even consciously, receptive of them; and it is to be 

doubted whether any other form of training can lay claim to such a list. Incidentally, 

those who have been connected with sail training unanimously agree that it demon- 

strates character quicker and more clearly than any other form of training; under 

sail sheep are unmistakably sheep and goats are unmistakably goats. 

And what of the young man who is training for a sea career? Sea-sense is an 

expression that has already been used more than once and, although it is well under- 

stood by seamen, it is perhaps worth while to attempt to define it. The need to 

acquire and exercise sea-sense arises from the fact that the sea's surface (or sub- 

surface) is not man's natural habitat and that conditions experienced at sea differ, 

sometimes widely, from those ashore, with which all human beings become auto- 

matically familiar by the mere process of living. Perhaps the simplest example of 

what is meant concerns the problems of relative motion. The comfort and safety 

of all of us depend on our ability to avoid collision with other moving bodies, be 

they motor cars, other people or even raindrops. Children, although they may not 

possess it at birth, rapidly acquire in their first walking years the ability to work 

out by eye quite complicated problems of relative motion, what the mathematician 

calls 'triangles of velocities'. When these problems arise on the public highway 

their solution becomes an important aspect of road sense. But the problems become 

more complicated when we forsake the dry land and venture into the sea or the air, 

which are fluid and, more often than not, moving bodily under the influence of

SAILING AS AN EDUCATION FOR MODERN SEAMEN 6 I 

wind or current. The seaman's problem may be to gain or avoid contact with 

another moving ship or with an object on land or under water. The wind or current 

will be acting, the latter usually quite unseen, on his own ship; if the other actor 

in the problem is another moving ship, they will be affecting her motion too, though 

not necessarily to an identical extent; if the other unit in the problem is on land or 

under water, like a rock or shoal which must be avoided or a jetty which he may 

wish to go alongside, the wind and current will be affecting only his own ship. This 

is a type of problem which, generally speaking, is not present on land but which 

constantly exercises the seaman. 

But sea-sense does not consist only in this ability to cope with special problems of 

relative velocity. It is concerned with a constant pre-occupation, waking or sleeping, 

with the weather and its effects, both now and in the foreseeable future, on the 

safety and movements of his ship; it is concerned with an ability to sense the stresses 

to which the ship is being subjected by rough seas and to take steps to relieve them 

before they become critical; it is concerned with a realisation of the sea's over- 

whelming power when in angry mood-the size and power of modern ships notwith- 

standing-and with the ability to react to a crisis, not with terror, which is the 

natural human reaction, but with coolness and judgment; it is concerned with 

thinking ahead and acting prudently, making things fast so that they are not only 

safe now but will remain safe in a few hours' time, when it is dark, the tide has 

turned and the wind increased; doing things, in short, in a 'seamanlike' manner or 

displaying 'good seamanship'. These, and many more things, are what sea-sense 

means, and there is but one school in which to learn them-the sea. 

It is, of course, true that the rudiments of theoretical seamanship can be, and are, 

taught ashore. When it comes to practical seamanship, though few would deny 

that this can be learned more urgently, more intensively and more thoroughly under 

sail, it is true that it can be learned in a ship or boat driven by power, and this is the 

method which is used in this country. So far as our great merchant fleet is con- 

cerned, because of the very high proportion of their time which all merchant ships 

must spend at sea in order to earn their keep, it is probable that reliance can quite 

properly be placed on this method to provide young officers and ratings with their 

training in seamanship and familiarity with the sea in all its moods. But the case 

of the Royal Navy is far different: in present-day conditions young officers and 

ratings spend a horrifyingly small proportion of their time actually at sea. Excluding 

war-time, when maintenance routines tend to go by the board, modern ships demand 

a lot of time in harbour and also, and this is the overriding consideration, consume 

large quantities of expensive fuel when they go to sea. Thus whereas our merchant 

ships cannot afford to stay long in harbour, our warships cannot afford not to. In 

these conditions it is to be doubted whether young officers and ratings in the Navy 

acquire their sea-sense anything like as early in life as they should and whether, in 

fact, most of them ever do acquire it thoroughly. 

Anyone who has read so far will be in no doubt as to the writer's conviction that 

sail training is a good thing and that there should be much more of it in this country. 

Surely a nation whose greatness was founded and built on the sea and whose con- 

tinued prosperity, nay existence, depends so much on shipping should be in the 

van of the sail-training fleet of the world, not crawling along, as Britain is, at the 

tail of the queue, apparently uncertain of its value and doubtful whether we can 

afford to build and run ships whose motive power is free to those who have the

62 SAILING AS AN EDUCATION FOR THE MODERN SEAMAN 

skill to use it. That there is quite widespread recognition of the value of sail training 

in developing the man, as opposed to the technician, is witnessed by the success and 

popularity of the Outward Bound Sea School. Started at Aberdovey in the darkest 

days of Hitler's war by the joint efforts of Mr. Lawrence Holt, of the Blue Funnel 

Line, and Dr. Kurt Hahn, Headmaster of Gordonstoun School, which had been 

evacuated to North Wales, the Sea School's original object was to give experience 

in handling ships' lifeboats to as many seafaring men as possible, to aid their survival 

in war. Since the war its objects have been widened to provide not only sea experi- 

ence but character training for any young man fortunate enough to obtain a vacancy 

in the course, whether or not he intends to follow a sea career, and it is supported 

not only by nautical schools but by many industrial and commercial organisations 

who realise its value. Thus there is at any rate one flourishing organisation in this 

country engaged in exploiting the unrivalled educative power of sail training, but its 

efforts are pitifully inadequate to the great task it has set itself. 

But what of the Admiralty's policy in this matter? As has been said earlier, a 

certain minimum amount of instruction is given at Dartmouth in boat sailing, but 

most of the sailing which takes place there is on a voluntary basis. A number of fine 

ex-German sailing yachts came into the Admiralty's hands as prizes at the end of 

the last war; their use by officers and men is permitted (encouraged would be far 

too strong a word), but purely on a recreational basis, and it is highly unlikely that 

money will be found to replace them when they are worn out. The fleet is also 

supplied with quite ample numbers of 14ft. sailing dinghies, which carry a crew 

of two or three but are quite unsuitable for offshore sailing. This is as far as the 

Admiralty go in encouraging sailing. During last year's international sailing race 

from Dartmouth to Lisbon it was possible for any British naval personnel to take 

part only through the generosity of a Greek shipowner, who lent the schooner Creole. 

Despite the ridiculously small amount of their time that naval officers and men 

as a whole now spend at sea, sail training, with its obvious economy in fuel, continues 

to be neglected, as it has been for the last sixty years. To those who advance the 

argument, if such it can be called, that we have won two world wars without the 

aid of sail training, and so there cannot be much wrong with our naval training 

methods, the reply is that it would be equally true to say that, in both those wars, 

we were brought to the very brink of defeat at sea, and so there must have been 

something radically wrong with the way our Navy was trained. Both these hypo- 

theses are equally unsatisfactory and equally futile. 

The fact is that, for the last forty years, successive Boards of Admiralty, engaged 

in a constant and losing struggle with the Treasury to equip the Navy with enough 

ships to carry out its task, have succumbed to wishful thinking on the subject of 

training and have persuaded themselves that naval personnel can obtain enough 

experience at sea in peace-time in the Navy's fighting ships, despite the facts that, 

except in war-time, the number of ships have dwindled continuously though the 

number of personnel has not; and that, again except in war-time, what ships there 

are spend less and less time at sea for reasons of economy. Yet the writer would 

hazard a confident guess that at this moment, and any time in the last forty years, 

any member of those successive Boards of Admiralty questioned, firstly, as to the 

relative importance of the moral to the material in war, would have echoed Napoleon's 

dictum of 'three to oneY; and secondly, as to whether he considered that officers 

and men as a whole got sufficient sea-time in peace, would have replied in the nega-

SCAPA FLOW-AUGUST, 1939 63- 

tive. If this is so, and the writer has little doubt that it is, what possible reason is 

there for failing to provide ocean-going sailing ships for the Navy ? 

The stock arguments against it can be grouped under three heads: lack of need; 

lack of time; lack of money. As to the need, the writer has done his best in this 

paper to demonstrate the need and he believes that few naval officers would dispute 

it. As to the time, it is true that naval officers and men have a great deal of technical 

knowledge to acquire and practically all of it must be acquired ashore for reasons of 

efficiency and economy, the result is that sea experience of any sort tends more and 

more to be curtailed; this seems to provide a strong argument for giving seagoing 

training of the most intensive and thorough kind, namely under sail. The teaching 

of the basic trade, to become a seaman, should surely have priority over all other 

training, but it is almost true to say that the Navy classes it as a recreation; this is 

equivalent to teaching an accountant all the intricacies of company law, cost 

accounting and so on and leaving him to master simple arithmetic, if he feels like it, 

in his spare time! As to the money, the capital cost would be pretty small when 

viewed against a background of a four hundred million pounds annual Naval Vote, 

and the absence of a fuel bill from the running costs would surely represent quite a 

significant saving. It seems certain that cost is not the deciding factor; if the Board 

of Admiralty were once convinced that sail training was necessary for the Navy, cost 

would not stand in the way. 

Sail training is still relied on by almost all European nations except Britain; of 

course it is just possible that we alone are right, but is it likely? 

AUBREY MANSERGH 

Scapa Flow-August , 

T HE article headed 'Scapa Flow' in the July number of THE NAVAL REVIEW states 

on page 319 that the anti-submarine defences of Scapa Flow in the main 

approaches were 'not found wanting'. I would like to correct that statement, and 

the following short account showing the actual condition of the defences may be 

of interest to readers, and even be a possible reminder to those bearing responsibility 

for these matters at the present time. 

As we knew then-and it has been confirmed by documents since the war-the 

days round 22nd August were especially critical, and war might have started any 

moment. Hider's land attacks on his various neighbours had all been sudden. 

Could anyone possibly suppose that a surprise attack on our sea defences and Fleet 

before war was declared any time in August could be ruled out, for if the risk might 

seem to the Nazis great, the prize could be tremendous. If the Nazis had but known, 

the risk was small, the chance of success very great. This account is written up 

partly from old signals and notes still in my possession and partly from memory, 

on which the failure to make this base ready for an emergency for a second time in 

our history made an indelible impression.

64 SCAPA FLOW-AUGUST, 1939 

I was at this time Captain of H.M.S. Ramillies, a Mediterranean battleship lent 

to the Home Fleet for some fleet exercises in the North Sea. These were completed 

on 21st August, 1939, when I was ordered into Scapa Flow. Here I found the 

Royal Sovereign (Captain L. V. Morgan) and the Royal Oak (Captain W. G. Benn), 

both recent arrivals. There were no other warships present, and I was the Senior 

Officer of this group. I was also completely ignorant of what the Admiralty policy 

was about the use and defences of Scapa Flow, and of what the attitude of the 

C.-in-C. Home Fleet towards this matter might be, though I could make a good 

guess. What was quite definite, however, was that I was the Senior Officer of three 

battleships lying in a harbour absolutely open to enemy attack, at a critical time 

when a 'bolt from the blue' attack might be expected, and that it behoved me to 

take what precautions I could. 

There was no naval base in Scapa Flow, and so no local S.N.O. I found there 

was a K.H.M. and S.N.O. for Kirkwall, distant eight miles across the Flow, plus 

three miles by land. The only naval officers ashore at Scapa were the Boom Defence 

Officers, with an able and energetic officer in charge, who reported on board imme- 

diately on my arrival. The date, it should be noted, was 21st August, 1939. He 

reported roughly at follows: The boom, a single one, at Hoxa, was in place, with 

the boom defence vessels placed marking the entrance (and through which I had 

just brought my ship); but there was still no gate and it would not be ready for 

some days yet. None of the other boom defences at another two entrances out of 

the seven were as far advanced as Hoxa; nor was there, as I found for myself, any 

covering fire or patrol vessels available; that is, all entrances were wide open to 

attack. It appeared that the B.D.O., who had been working on the booms for about 

one year, had, in spite of frequent requests, been refused permission to work over- 

time. As it was usually only possible to work in the strong tides for a few hours round 

slack water, progress had been extremely slow. This all seemed an appalling state 

of affairs, and it was with a sense of urgency that I instructed B.D.O. to work over- 

time and at full speed on the boom defences and at the same time I made a signal 

direct to the Admiralty repeated to all concerned that this had been ordered 'failing 

instructions from Their Lordships to the contrary', thus putting the responsibility 

squarely where it belonged. It should be noted that booms and nets alone do not 

give more than sixty per cent security, especially in a tideway. Guns, mines and 

loops have always been considered necessary to supplement boom defences. Of 

these there were none. 

At this time it was apparent that not only one, but a number of enemy submarines 

could have entered Scapa Flow even by the main entrance on the surface and in 

daylight, and not even have been reported. If flying the White Ensign as a ruse, or 

none at all, they would in all probability have been taken for our own ships. Here 

they could have sat on the bottom, and if the target of three older battleships was 

beneath their attention, they had only to wait and take a chance that an opportunity 

of torpedoing the latest vessels of the Home Fleet almost at their leisure would come 

their way. 

After meeting my brother Captains and inspecting Hoxa and other two booms, 

it was decided to man and arm our picket boats, and with them institute patrols 

at the Hoxa and other nearby entrances. Also a Yeoman of Signals and signalmen 

were sent to man the P.W.S.S. at Hoxa as lookouts. No depth charges were available 

for the picket boats, and the most we could hope from this would be a warning.

SCAPA FLOW-AUGUST, 1939 65 

But instead of having six picket boats available for this duty amongst the three 

battleships, we, alas, were able to raise only three in a fit condition, for over the 

years parsimonious Governments had refused to replace these boats which had 

long ago become absolutely worn out; and spent at least as much time inboard on 

repairs as in the water. 

On the 23rd August I endeavoured, in my motor pinnace, to proceed to the Holm 

Sound entrance to inspect it. These waters I had known well from World War I, 

as for three months early in 1915, when Captain of an old 'thirty-knotter' (H.M.S. 

Lively), I was one of the regular patrols in Holm Sound to prevent the entry of any 

submarine or enemy craft, and I knew those waters extremely well. Although 

then blocked by sunken ships, there was still in those days a small gap or two, and I 

well remember the rushing tide in the largest gap, about 90 feet across, between 

two of the block ships, against or with which I had to steam to get out of Scapa 

Flow into the Sound. It was at spring tides no mean waterfall, and always an interesting 

and exciting passage to make. However, my old and shaky pinnace broke down 

and failed to reach the entrance, and I spent most of the day in getting the old crock 

back to my ship! Had I reached this entrance, and found it completely wide open 

(as I would have), and made a report as coming from an officer with special local 

knowledge of these waters (as I certainly would have), I suppose it would be greatly 

flattering myself to believe that something might have then been done a bit quicker 

than it actually was in the way of hastening the defences and so saving the Royal 

Oak ? However, this is embarking on suppositions, and here I only wish to stick to 

- - 

actualities. Other facts were as follows. 

I found that two batteries of four of the latest A.A. guns had lately been mounted 

at Lyness. These, according to reliable information received at this time, had been 

manned for exercise between 12th August and 18th August by Territorials, who 

had on the latter date returned to the mainland, whence they had come. At the 

moment (21st August and the following days) the guns were plugged, ammunition 

and breech-blocks, etc., returned to some rather distant magazine, and no crews 

were available. What was the mentality, I wondered, that failed to keep these guns 

manned a bit longer? I then inspected the Boom Defence Vessels at the Hoxa 

entrance and found the crews to be civilian R.F.A., mostly from the Orkneys. 

Between the two crews there whs one World War I army artilleryman, who now 

knew just enough ro go over the single 3-inch A.A. gun in each vessel with an oil 

can. The guns were plugged, and there was no ammunition yet on board. Moreover, 

I found appreciable gaps between the shore and the ends of Hoxa, Switha and Hoy 

booms, through which-I estimated submarines could pass. 

Further, there was no War Signal Station manned, and what guns there were 

in the Hoxa Battery were still plugged and without crews. 

On the 24th August the Admiralty ordered the Home Fleet to its war stations; 

and it was on the 26th August, I believe, that Admiral Sir Charles Forbes arrived 

with the Home Fleet and two flotillas of destroyers at Scapa. In the meantime Rear 

Admiral Blagrove had joined the Royal Oak, and was made fully aware of the position. 

Within two months (14th September, 1939) he was to be lost, together with 833 

officers and men, in the Royal Oak, the Captain luckily surviving. 

On the 1st September I was ordered to Portland by the west about route, there 

to await instructions for escorting a convoy out to the Mediterranean. I left deeply 

in sympathy with Admiral Sir Charles Forbes for the difficult position he had

66 THE BOMBAY EXPLOSION, 1944 

inherited. The question now that naturally arises to my mind is whether, for a 

third time, for the lack of preparedness in the Orkneys and Shetlands we are going 

to suffer the loss not only of valuable ships and lives, but this time it may be of 

these key positions as well ? And the word 'key' I would like to emphasise. 

H. T. BAILLIE-GROHMAN. 

The Bombay Explosion, 1944 

HE history of the first World War is marked by a number of disastrous 

T explosions. Some, notably in the United States, could be attributed to German 

agents; but others, though rumour murmured 'sabotage' at the time, are likely to 

have been accidental. The Royal Navy suffered the loss of four ships, the battleships 

Bulwark at Sheerness and Vanguard at Scapa, the cruiser Natal at Cromarty and the 

monitor Glutton at Dover; all were sunk by internal explosions, the cause unstable 

ammunition. And, probably from the same cause, the German cruiser Karlsruhe 

disappeared mysteriously whilst acting as a lone raider in the Atlantic. There were 

also accidental explosions in munition factories, the worst perhaps that at Silvertown 

in the East End of London. But the biggest and most disastrous of all was undoubtedly 

that at Halifax, Nova Scotia, where,in 1917, the French ammunition ship Mont Blanc 

was in collision and set on fire. When she blew up, much of Halifax was destroyed 

with heavy loss of life. 

Twenty-seven years later and half the world away, the port of Bombay was 

stricken by an explosion similar to the Halifax disaster.l The ship that suffered 

the same unhappy fate as the Mont Blanc was the s.s. Fort Stikine. A single-screw, 

coal-burning freighter of 7,142 tons gross, she was built in Canada in 1942 at the 

cost of the U.S. Government and transferred to Britain under Lease-Lend. Her 

career was an uneventful one until the early days of 1944. Then at Birkenhead 

she loaded a cargo of aircraft, R.A.F. and general stores, together with explosives 

and ammunition for Karachi, and 1,395 tons of explosives and ammunition plus 

some service stores consigned to Bombay. With all this she sailed on 24th February 

under the command of captain A. J. Naismith on what was to be her last voyage. 

Her convoy made short stops at Port Said, Suez and Aden, but at none of these 

was the cargo disturbed, nor was it affected by adverse weather. The ships reached 

Karachi on 30th March, where the Fort Stikine berthed alongside, and the task of 

discharging the cargo destined for that port was immediately begun. The vacated 

space, some 286,000 cubic feet, was filled chiefly with cotton and lubricating oil, 

but also other commodities including scrap iron, sulphur, resin and timber. Antisabotage 

precautions were taken, but the danger of embarking a commercial cargo 

For the details of a story which received no publicity at the time, and is therefore little known, 

I am chiefly indebted to the official report of the subsequent inquiry ordered by the Govern- 

ment of India. But I have also been assisted by Mr. Brindley T. Oberst who, as is here 

recorded, has good reason to remember the disaster.

THE BOMBAY EXPLOSION, 1944 67 

of this nature in a ship still carrying a significant quantity of explosives was over- 

looked. For cotton is by nature inflammable, and if contaminated by oil is liable to 

spontaneous combustion, particularly if there is scrap iron in the same hold. 

The Ministry of War Transport Representative, who sanctioned embarkation of 

this cargo whilst rejecting 720 drums of turpentine, stated after the disaster that 

both the Master and Chief Officer were quite happy about this. But neither Captain 

Naismith, nor the Chief Officer, Mr. W. D. Henderson, survived, and the Second 

Officer, Mr. W. N. Harris, subsequently gave this evidence: 'The Chief Officer 

remarked to me that he was very worried about the cargo that came aboard . . . I 

knew him as a friend, and it was unlike him to be absolutely worried about anything 

as an ordinary rule. . . . I asked him whether he was going to take any additional 

fire precautions. He gave me an answer to the effect that "we shall make certain that 

everything is in working order so far as fire-fighting is concerned", and before we 

left Karachi we tested all our fire-fighting appliances.' 

There was a further contradiction in the evidence given at the inquiry: the 

M.O.W.T. Representative was certain that the cotton was not contaminated by the 

oil, but more than one member of the ship's company saw oil on the outside of the 

containers and at least one leaky drum. Be this as it may, the ship's officers covered 

the hatches of the lower holds in which the cotton was stowed with tarpaulins to 

prevent contamination by the oil from the drums stored on these hatchways. But 

these tarpaulins, the only ones available on board, were not adequate for the purpose, 

and no one consulted either an officer of the Fire Fighting Services at Karachi, or 

the Port Inspecting Ordnance Officer, either or both of whom might have given 

warning of the danger which was soon to destroy the Fort Stikine. 

The freighter sailed from Karachi on 9th April and reached Bombay without 

incident three days later. The pilot wanted the International Code signal indicative 

of a dangerous cargo hoisted: the ship's officers demurred on the grounds that this 

was not done in war because the signal, a red burgee, could be confused with the 

red flag meaning 'air raid warning red'. It was also said that the thus known presence 

of an ammunition ship might invite air attack. At 1130 the Fort Stikine was taken 

into No. 2 Victoria Dock and secured alongside, and at 1500 five gangs of stevedores 

began unloading her, priority being given to a consignment of dried fish because 

Captain Naismith and Chief Officer Henderson disliked its stench. For this reason, 

and because there was a delay in bringing the appropriate lighters and railway 

wagons alongside, no explosives or ammunition were unloaded until the Fort Stikine 

had been in port for more than twenty-four hours. That no cargo stowage plan 

had reached the Port Inspecting Ordnance Officer was a contributory difficulty. 

So we come to the 14th April, a pleasant spring day when Victoria Dock and the 

adjoining Prince's and Alexandra Docks were all filled with ships flying the flags 

of the Allies, the majority being laden with supplies required for the planned offensive 

in south-east Asia which it was hoped would lead to the defeat of Japan. The British 

cruiser Sussex, 10,000 tons, eight 8-inch guns, was there too, and the city of Bombay 

was thronged with Allied servicemen as well as its own people. That morning 

there were some 70-80 people, for the most part stevedores and Indian Ordnance 

sepoys, on board the Fort Stikine in addition to her crew. At 1230 these went 

ashore for the dinner hour; on deck there remained only two members of the crew. 

Their watch was not, however, as effective as the chance observations of individual 

members of the crews of other ships berthed in the same dock. Whilst those aboard


the Fort Stikine observed nothing unusual, the Chief Officer of the Fort Crevier 

saw wisps of smoke issuing from one of her ventilators very soon after 1230. There 

were others who gave similar evidence at the inquiry, but none realised that what 

they had seen was the first portent of the disaster which was soon to strike Bombay. 

Certainly none raised the alarm. 

At 1330 the gangs returned aboard the Fort Stikine to continue unloading 

explosives and ammunition from No. 2 hold between decks, and other cargo from 

No. 2 lower hold. And at approximately 1345, to quote one of those working in 

the latter: 'I saw smoke. I did not see any fire. I saw the bales of cotton from which 

the smoke was coming'. The stevedores immediately began to climb out of the 

hold, which attracted the attention of the ship's company working on deck. The 

fire alarm was given on board, and water hoses directed into the hold. These were 

not, however, long enough to enable the jets to be directed at the seat of the fire, 

and no one paused to consider that it might be more effective to close No. 2 lower 

hold and turn on the steam ejectors. 

Hearing the alarm, the crew of a trailer pump from the Bombay Fire Brigade 

Services, which was standing by on the jetty abreast the Fort Stikine, tried to take 

their hoses up the gangway. They were considerably delayed by the stevedores 

surging off the ship; and not until they were on board did the leader remember his 

duty to pass the alarm to the Fire Brigade Control Room. Moreover, when he then 

returned to the shore, he was unable to operate the telephone; he could do no more 

than ring the alarm bell, and this could not convey the information that a ship 

carrying explosives was on fire, with the result that only two pumps were dispatched 

-at 1416, half an hour after the first alarm. The fire was not, in fact, believed to be 

serious either by the Fire Brigade or the ship's officers. The latter, with the help 

of the trailer-pump party, thought they would soon have it under control. However, 

when the two Fire Brigade pumps arrived, their senior officer, learning that the Fort 

Stikine carried explosives, sent the proper alarm message to the Control Room at 

1430, which resulted in eight more pumps being sent out-forty-five minutes after 

the first discovery of the fire, nearly two hours after smoke was first seen by observers 

in other ships. 

Among those who heard the pumps on their way to Victoria Dock was Captain 

Brinley T. Oberst, attached to the Indian Army Ordnance Corps, who was in charge 

of ammunition operations in the docks. Hurrying onboard the Fort Stikine at 1425, 

he asked for the cargo stowage plan. Seeing the danger-that there were ammunition 

and explosives immediately above the burning cotton, he collected Second Officer 

Harris and hurried to see the Master. Saying in no uncertain terms that the freighter 

contained the equivalent of 150 'block busters', and that there was every risk of an 

explosion that would destroy the whole docks, he urged immediate scuttling. 

Captain Naismith, reluctant to assume responsibility for such a drastic course, asked 

Chief Engineer Gow if he could flood No. 2 hold. The answer was no; he could 

only flood the engine room and stokehold, but he doubted whether that would sink 

the ship; certainly it would not get water into No. 2 hold. Commander J. H. 

Longmire, R.I.N.R., Chief Salvage Officer, R.I.N., then arrived on board and joined 

Captain Oberst in urging Captain Naismith to scuttle his ship, but the latter refused 

to do this without the agreement of Lloyds Surveyors, who did not appear. 

At 1435 Mr. Norman Coombs, commanding Bombay Fire Brigade Services, 

appeared on the scene. 'I found most of the hatch covers covering the hold in which


the cotton was in position', he said, 'so it was not possible to see any fire through. 

There was a slight amount of smoke coming out and heat. It was just grey smoke. . . . 

When I saw the position I sent a message at 1440 to my Control Room asking 

Colonel Sadler, the General Manager of the Docks, to come down and see the 

position. At 1445 . . . I asked for five more pumps to be sent on . . . After that I 

found that in No. 1 hold there was a large quantity of sulphur and a large amount 

of detonators (in a magazine). I asked the Chief Officer of the ship whether he 

could get them removed and he arranged to do that (by Indian sepoys and British 

sergeants). After the other five pumps arrived, we had about thirty lines of hoses 

playing into the hold and there was some slight improvement, but still no flames 

were visible'. 'Playing into the hold'-still no effort was made to get the hoses 

down to the seat of the fire. Moreover the detonators, to which Mr. Coombs referred, 

were not taken up through No. 1 hatchway but only moved from against the bulk- 

head dividing Nos. 1 and 2 holds, which was warm, to the centre of the lower hatchway 

of No. 1 hold. 

At this stage the Fort Stikine began to list to starboard from the water pumped 

into her, and additional securing wires were run out. Between 1445 and 1500 

her port side abreast No. 2 hold was seen to be blistering under the heat; later it 

became red hot. This tell-tale indication of the seat of the fire prompted drastic 

action by the Fire Brigade Services. Mr. Coombs ordered a hole to be cut in the 

ship's side, using the gas cutting appliance available in the Emergency Tender, so 

that water could be directed on to the spot where it would be most effective. Un- 

fortunately, either the Emergency Tender crew was unable to operate this cutting 

appliance, or it was inadequate for plates of the thickness of the Fort Stikine's side. 

Various attempts were made to summon further cutting appliances, but without 

success-before it was too late. 

At about 1450 Colonel Sadler of the Royal Engineers, General Manager of the 

Bombay Port Trust, arrived and urged that the burning ship should be taken out 

of the docks. Mr. Coombs countered with, 'Ifyou do that, the vessel will blow up', 

because it would leave only the ship's own few hoses to fight the fire. Captain Oberst 

and Commander Longmire supported him; they still urged that the ship should be 

scuttled where she was. But no one was willing to override the ultimate responsibility 

of the Master for his ship; and Captain Naismith's hesitancy to authorise drastic 

action was not helped by the conflicting advice which he was receiving from the 

several experts on the spot. Here, indeed, was a tragic example of a man in authority 

who, faced with a dire emergency, was unable to measure up to his responsibilities. 

The Commodore, who as senior naval officer held the overriding authority, under 

the Defence of India Rules, to order a ship on fire in the docks to be sunk or beached, 

was still unaware that Victoria Dock held a waterborne bomb containing 1,000 tons 

of explosives that had been burning for nearly three hours. So, although the adjacent 

Alexandra Dock contained many other ships carrying explosives, nothing was 

done beyond increasing the number of hoses being directed into No. 2 hold by 

bringing a couple of waterboats alongside the Fort Stikine outboard. And at about 

1530 some of the burning cotton in the lower hold was buoyed up by the water 

into contact with the deck overhead on which stood explosives. Inevitably ignition 

followed. At about 1545 black smoke billowed up through the upper hatchway, 

and very soon afterwards fierce yellow flames appeared. The firemen fell back under 

the searing heat; they were rallied by Mr. Coombs, and the flames rose and fell


under their attack, but each rise roared higher and with greater vigour until they 

topped the masts. Within five minutes Mr. Coombs had to order his men to with- 

draw. Those to starboard jumped over the side; those to port hurried down the 

gangway on to the jetty, from where they continued to direct their hoses on the 

burning vessel. It is to their credit that they did not run to safety since it must have 

been clear that an explosion was imminent. The consequences of such a disaster 

do not appear to have been appreciated by more than a handful of people; certainly 

no action was taken on Captain Oberst's warning about the effect of 150 'block- 

busters'. The dock area was not cleared of people, nor a warning passed to the other 

ships in Victoria Dock. 

Soon after the firemen left the Fort Stikine, Captain Naismith ordered his own 

officers to clear the ship; the crew had already gone. With Chief Officer Henderson 

he was the last to leave her. At 1604, believing that there was nothing more that 

they could do, these two officers were following their men towards the dock gates. 

They were joined by Mr. Stevens, a marine surveyor who had been amongst those 

advising how best to deal with the incident. 

Just before 1606 Able Seaman Roy Hayward, serving onboard the Belray, which 

was lying in Prince's Dock, was watching the burning Fort Stikine. To quote 

him: 'Just before the explosion it was billows of thick yellow brown fire'. With 

experience of fighting fires in the blitz-he had been a member of the London 

National Fire Service-he knew what that meant. He also saw that 'everybody 

started to run from the ship and . . . all (the boats round the ship) were scared away. 

I thought something was going to happen'. Yelling 'Down!' to those near him, he 

flung himself prone behind the Belray's gun. 'Then there was an explosion'. A 

huge blaze roared up from the Fort Stikine, a flaming Roman candle higher than 

the masthead, that was followed by a shattering detonation. 'After the explosion I 

looked over. Shed No. 1, A shed and No. 15 shed had completely disappeared . . . 

It was just a black field'. For the next half-hour Hayward, who was not himself 

hurt, was busy succouring those of the Belray's crew who had been injured by the 

disaster. An Indian seaman, for example, had lost both his legs. 

In this, the first explosion, the ammunition in the Fort Stikine's No. 2 hold was 

detonated. The whole ship glowed red through a cloak of black fog. Vast quantities 

of burning debris spread a sea of fire over sheds and ships, and flying red-hot metal 

fragments destroyed all who stood in their path. Mr. Stevens, half-blinded and with 

his clothes blown off, was flung to the ground. Stunned, he lay for a time as the 

blast and smoke swept over him. When he managed to pick himself up, he found 

that Captain Naismith and Chief Officer Henderson had disappeared; neither was 

seen again. And around him Mr. Stevens saw firemen, all burned, some dead, some 

dying. 

The explosion shook the whole of Bombay. Many windows were shattered. An 

ingot of gold from the Fort Stikine's cargo crashed through the roof of a bungalow 

a mile from the docks. These repercussions and the column of black smoke billowing 

skywards from the scene of devastation, brought the first news that anything was 

amiss to Government House, the Bombay Municipality and Naval Headquarters. 

All the resources of the Fire Brigade were now urgently needed to fight numerous 

fires in the docks and to prevent them spreading to the town; but having concen- 

trated so many pumps on the Fort Stikine these resources had been seriously depleted. 

Moreover, sixty-six firemen had been killed and eighty-three injured, and many

THE BOMBAY EXPLOSION, 1944 7 1 

others were in similar condition. Colonel Sadler had been killed and Mr. Coombs 

was injured and suffering from burns and shock. The ships in Victoria Dock had 

suffered, too, both by the tidal wave thrown up by the explosion and from burning 

fragments. The 5,000-ton s.s. Japalanda, for example, was lifted sixty feet, to fall 

with her bow on the roof of a dockside shed and her back broken. And the Fort 

Crevier was showered with burning cotton that set a lifeboat on fire: scarcely had 

this been extinguished when a burning lighter drifted across her bows. 

There was more to come. Bombay had hardly recovered from the psychological 

shock of the first explosion, had scarcely had time to appreciate that the cause was 

other than an enemy attack and had only just begun rescue work and fire-fighting 

in the Prince's Dock area when, at 1640, there occurred a second much greater 

detonation. No. 4 hold of the Fort Stikine, which contained 500 tons of ammunition, 

went up. The first explosion had been largely lateral and fragmentary, damaging or 

setting on fire most of the ships in Victoria Dock and the warehouses surrounding it. 

The adjoining Prince's Dock was to a lesser extent similarly affected. There was 

also some destruction by blast and fire to the godown district just outside the dock 

area, but beyond this the effects were limited to the few stray fragments of hot 

metal that were hurled to distances of up to a mile, and bales of burning cotton 

which landed at Haji Bunder ammunition depot several miles away. The much 

more powerful second explosion threw up to a height of 3,000 feet many tons of 

incendiary material which fell over the whole of an area with a radius of more than 

half a mile. In Victoria and Prince's Docks twenty-seven ocean-going vessels were 

sunk, burnt out or badly damaged, a loss to the Allies of nearly 100,000 tons of 

shipping. Most fortunately the 20,000 tons U.S. transport Mariposa, carrying 4,000 

American troops, had cleared the harbour an hour before. To the shambles to which 

the warehouses around Victoria Dock had already been reduced, was added the 

destruction of those around the Alexandra and Prince's Docks. The main road 

serving the dock area was hopelessly blocked with debris. Worse, from the point 

of view of fire-fighting, the 24-inch water main serving the dock area was cut. Beyond 

this the inflammable godown area was swept by a holocaust of fire. Those sheds 

which were not ignited by burning fragments from the explosion were soon ablaze 

from sparks and debris carried into them from adjoining buildings by the wind. 

Yet further away the fire spread into the residential area, the two railway goods 

depots and the oil storage tank compound, though in these cases not to a disastrous 

extent. And amongst all this widespread damage lay countless dead, dying and 

injured. 

In August, 1941, an extensive A.R.P. organisation, embracing fourteen different 

services, those concerned with fire-fighting having as many as five hundred pumps 

at their disposal, had been established in Bombay with a strength of 17,000 men 

and women. It was never called upon to deal with an enemy air attack, and at the 

end of 1943 the threat had so far receded that the Government of India directed 

that this A.R.P. organisation was to be largely reduced. When, therefore, the Fort 

Stikine blew up, the fire, rescue, salvage and other services needed to deal with a 

disaster comparable with a major blitz on an English town were not available on 

the requisite scale. Moreover, a significant proportion of the resources of the Bombay 

Fire Services, both in pumps and trained men, employed fighting the fire in the 

Fort Stikine, had been destroyed by the first explosion, and their leader, Mr. 

Coombs, though he retained command, could not give of his best because he was


injured and suffering from shock and burns. On the other hand, compared with 

what would have been available in peace, there were at this time in Bombay many 

thousands from the Allied forces, with their own resources in disciplined men and 

suitable appliances, preparing for the assault in south-east Asia. And all these were 

immediately mobilised and rushed to the stricken area. 

What these men lacked in skill they made up for in unflagging energy. Two 

examples may be quoted to show the spirit that imbued them. First the generous 

attitude of the American armed forces; in the words of Major Farrow, U.S. Army: 

'We decided that since it was a British port we should not do anything on our own 

initiative, but should place ourselves in British charge. So our men and trucks were 

placed under their command'. Second, to show the way that all men, regardless of 

colour, nationality or service, worked with but one aim, from the evidence given at 

the subsequent inquiry by Lieutenant-Colonel James of the British Army: 'There 

was amazing co-operation of all ranks of all services throughout the night. You 

could see all-the American negro, the British sailor, and the British tommy, the 

Indian troops and American sergeants-working together as one group of men 

without any kind of distinction. On one occasion I happened to know an American 

negro sergeant, Sergeant Patton. I said, "Look here, I want twelve men", and 

walked along, and by the time I returned twelve men were there. I looked at them 

and they were all willing to serve under this American negro sergeant. The party 

consisted of two or three American troops, two negroes, two naval ratings, two 

Jaipur State guards and a couple of British tommies. They were all perfectly co- 

operating. . . It was magnificent. Nobody asked who was the senior. They went 

on with the job.' 

All through the night of the 14th115th April, by the light of the flames, and 

through the days and nights that followed, the fire brigade services, both regular 

and auxiliary, together with pumps made available by private concerns and manned 

by volunteer crews, fought a thousand fires, and toiled to prevent them spreading. 

The salvage services, aided by men from all the armed forces, Indian, British and 

Allied, worked for as long to clear roads of debris, to pull down dangerous buildings, 

to reach the dying and wounded. To them the rescue and ambulance services 

brought succour, carrying them to the Bombay hospitals which mobilised all their 

resources to meet this unprecedented emergency. And to the help of port officials 

came the officers and men of H.M.S. Sussex; they did more than help fight fires 

in burning ships in the Alexandra and Prince's Docks, whose entrances were blocked 

by swing bridges blown from their seatings, by a mound of tangled wreckage and, 

in one case, by a 500-ton ship sunk inside and a 300-ton water boat sunk outside. 

Providing berthing parties to handle securing wires and complete crews for tugs, 

they moved out of Alexandra Dock to the safety of the harbour within a period 

of nineteen hours no less than sixteen ocean-going ships, many laden with valuable 

war material, seven with explosives. 

Finally there were the dead to be buried. The total casualty roll from this disaster 

will never be known. Among civilians the figure for killed and missing was 

estimated to be at least five hundred, whilst more than two thousand injured were 

treated by the hospitals. The Bombay Fire Brigade Services lost sixty-six, with 

eight-three injured. For other organisations, including the armed forces, the figures 

were 165 killed and 393 injured. And after it was all over, after the last fire was 

extinguished on 1st May, it took 6,000 Indians and 2,000 British servicemen working


day and night, six months to move a million tons of debris, to clear the docks of the 

blackened hulls of twenty-seven ships, and to rebuild warehouses and jetties, before 

the port was once again working. 

The Commission of Inquiry ordered by the Government of India established five 

causes for the disaster:- 

1. The existence of a state of war, resultingin the practice of bringing into docks ships 

laden with explosives and ammunition. 

2. The stowage of s.s. Fort Stikine at Karachi in such a way that cotton was stowed 

above and below explosives and ammunition. 

3. Accidental ignition of the cotton in No. 2 lower hold.-Though the evidence 

could not be conclusive, 'by far the most probable cause . . . was the careless dis- 

carding of a cigarette or other smoking material by someone smoking in No. 2 lower 

holdy-that is by a stevedore or employee of the Bombay Port Trust. 

4. Failure at the outset of the fire by those present in authority to appreciate the 

gravity of the situation; and during the course of the fire failure by those present in 

authority to take energetic steps to extinguish the fire or to take alternative action to 

avert the disaster.-No action was taken to discover the heart of the fire; water 

from the hoses was merely projected into the hold. No attempt was made to batten 

down and use the steam ejectors. There was a delay in summoning the Fire Brigade 

Services. The gas cutting apparatus in the Fire Brigade's emergency tender was 

either defective, or was not properly operated by its crew. No one attempted to 

move the ship out of the dock to an anchorage which would have minimised the 

effects of an explosion. On this last point, admittedly the Fort Stikine's main engines 

were under repair, but tugs were available and, with a rising tide, there was enough 

water over the entrance sill at all material times, even allowing for the ship's 

increased draught due to the water pumped into No. 2 hold. To have reached a 

sufficiently isolated anchorage before 1600 hours, a decision to move the ship would, 

however, have had to be taken not later than 1430. To have scuttled the ship in her 

berth, in normal circumstances the best action to take with a burning munition ship, 

would not in itself have flooded No. 2 hold because there was only four feet of 

water under her keel: it would have been necessary to blow a hole in the ship's 

bottom to do this. 

5. The absence at the fire of a centralised executive control with power to issue 

paramount orders and co-ordiaate the various authorities and services concerned. The 

only man who was officially authorised to act as supreme commander in such an 

emergency was the Commodore, R.I.N., and Naval Officer in Charge of the port; 

but Naval Headquarters knew nothing of the fire until the first explosion occurred. 

The three men who exercised authority on the spot, each approaching a common 

problem from a different angle, failed to act in consort. The Master was unable to 

make up his mind in the face of conflicting advice to do, or allow to be done, anything 

effective towards saving the ship for which he was responsible. Colonel Sadler, 

representing the Bombay Port Trust, believed that the ship should be moved out 

of the dock but was swayed by the strongly expressed view of Mr. Coombs, the Chief 

Officer of the Fire Brigade Services, against his better judgment: 'If you do that, 

the vessel will blow up.' 

'Many errors and mistakes, both of omission and of commission, go to the building 

up of the final tragedy', said the Commission of Inquiry in its report, and listed 

fourteen of them. But amongst all their comments and criticism the most poignant

74 FIRE DOWN BELOW 

was surely this: 'If there had been present in time one single man assertive and 

strong enough to assume and exercise paramount command, the magnitude of the 

disaster would have been greatly modified, even if it had not been averted altogether'. 

The Commission was equally thorough in its inquiry into the action taken to deal 

with the effects of the two explosions. It was critical of the organisation for con- 

certing action by all the emergency services against a major disaster; it showed 

that the Fire Brigade Services did not call out one-third of the total of two hundred 

and eleven pumps available to them, and regretted that Mr. Coombs should have 

been allowed to continue in command when, after injury and shock, he was no 

longer properly fitted to exercise it. 

Be this as it may, there can be only one proper conclusion to this story, the final 

paragraph of the Commission of Inquiry's report: 'The criticism . . . of wasteful 

and disjointed action must not be allowed to detract from our high appreciation 

of the magnificent individual and collective effort of many thousands of the citizens 

of Bombay and men and women of all Services and in every walk of life and in 

every class of community in the face of a great and common danger'. 

WALRUS 

'F 

Fire Down Below 

IRE down below', like the cry 'Breakers ahead', used to be the dread of seamen 

in the days of sail but the fire hazard has remained with us through the many 

changes which have produced modern ships. Every year more than a hundred fires 

are reported in British merchantmen and the record in naval ships and establishments 

is not good. Once in a while the fire gets the upper hand and a ship is destroyed- 

the loss of Empire Windrush in March, 1954, was perhaps the most spectacular case 

of recent vears. 

Basic training in the Royal Navy includes fire-fighting and damage control but this 

instruction is based on the assumption that the ship is a going concern with a full 

complement and the overall picture shows that ships are safer from fire at sea than 

in harbour. I have found to my cost that the greatest risk develops when the ship 

is refitting with a depleted crew. 

I returned from a walk two summers ago to receive a message that I was required 

urgently by the ship. I dialled the dockyard number. 'The ship is on fire, Sir. She 

is well alight forward', a shrill voice informed me. 'I will come down right away', 

I replied and looked at my watch. The time was 1800 on a Saturday evening. No 

workmen on board and, as far as I knew, nothing inflammable in the ship. 

At the ship I was met by a grim scene and intense activity. Large numbers of 

men, using innumerable hoses and supported by half a dozen fire tenders, were 

attacking a blaze in the seamen's messdeck directly below the bridge. This com- 

partment had been used for stowing fibre glass before being fitted as insulation in 

the ship's refrigerator. The material is fireproof but it had been supplied in brown 

paper wrappings. These had caught fire in a corner of the messdeck and, in a matter

FIRE DOWN BELOW 75 

,of seconds, the flames spread to the whole stack. Over a thousand square yards of 

paper was burning, which gave sufficient heat to make the fibre glass glow and ignite 

all combustible materials in the vicinity. Corticene and paint quickly caught alight 

and the fire ran along electric leads to adjacent compartments. It was never dis- 

covered why the fire broke out but an abandoned cigarette was probably responsible. 

Even before this incident I had looked on refitting periods as difficult and even 

dangerous, as one can never tell what may happen in the dockyard. The ship's 

company tend to regard the refit as a time for relaxation at home with their family- 

so it is, up to a point, but even with the ship high and dry on the blocks there is 

ample reason to be on one's toes as snares lie at every turn to trap the unwary. Valuable 

gear has a habit of disappearing. Men fall into the dock or get into trouble while 

working aloft. Inside the ship there are a variety of hazards-bad air, escaping 

oxygen, poor lighting and pitfalls left by dockyard work. There are many traps for 

the fellow who does not keep his eyes open and his wits about him. 

I arrived two hours after the fire started but acrid smoke was still belching through 

scuttles and hatchways. The affected part was intensely hot, making the job of the 

firefighters very difficult. I could see paint peeling off, steel plates buckling and 

stanchions drooping in their efforts to support the weight of the overhead structure. 

Some men were sitting, temporarily knocked out by smoke and fumes, others were 

playing hoses on steaming decks and bulkheads. I viewed the damage with gloom 

but the immediate problem was to limit the fire and, as far as possible, control the 

water damage. Whether to fight a ship fire with large quantities of water is an old 

debate. This method will put it out but has great disadvantages. Oil fuel floats 

on the rising water level, which may spread the trouble and there is danger that the 

ship will develop a condition of loll, or sink. 

In 1953 the 20,000-ton passnger liner Empress of Canada was written off as a 

total loss by fire. The cost in material damage through the loss of this ship's services 

and of the berths in Gladstone Dock, Liverpool, where she sank, has been estimated 

at between E4 and A6 million. The liner was completing repairs when smoke was 

seen coming from the outboard side amidships, but was not recognised as an indication 

of fire until forty minutes later, and it was 16.10 when the alarm was raised. The 

fire brigade arrived at 16.19 and from then on fire-fighting proceeded under their 

direction. Water accumulated steadily on the port side of the ship, by 20.30 there 

was a 17 degree list and during the night the ship capsized and settled in the dock. 

In our case we were lucky. The surplus water flowed down a hatch to the double 

bottoms and through a hole in the keel to the dry dock. When the fire was out 

the seamen's messdeck looked like a bomb crater. The deck littered with a black 

and white waterlogged mess. Paint filling from the bulkheads in sheets. Electric 

cables hanging in grotesque shapes and the metalwork discoloured and bent. A hot 

smoke-laden atmosphere and grim scene of desolation. 

This experience gave me a severe test followed by a week of heart-searching which 

I would not willingly repeat. Penetrating questions were asked and it became 

abundantly clear that there is more in fire-fighting than giving the order 'Fetch a 

bucket of water boys' or 'Turn on the dockside hydrant'. I would like to pass on 

some of this hard-won experience, not in a spirit of bolting the stable door after 

the horse, but with the idea that it may help others faced with long periods in the 

dockyard, a small complement and, perhaps, no facilities for the crew to live in 

the ship.

76 FIRE DOWN BELOW 

There are two major fire risks during a refit-oil and the bad habits of smokers. 

Careless smoking is by far the most common cause of trouble and the least excusable. 

It is sheer laziness not to make sure a cigarette is out before disposing of it, yet, 

time and again, stubs are thrown away still burning. Cigarettes, smoked surrepti- 

tously, are abandoned and cause fires which can smoulder for days before bursting 

into flames. Butt-ends are thrown away on deck where the wind blows them into 

an open port. They are left on the edge of ashtrays or dropped from the hand as a 

man falls asleep. 

All types of oil are capable of giving off inflammable vapour although those 

commonly used at sea require heating before they vaporise freely enough to ignite, 

but oil spilling on an exposed diesel exhaust pipe or steam pipe can start its own 

fire without other means of ignition. Oil should be treated with a wholesome respect 

and removed from a ship where welding and burning is taking place. 

Refitting conditions require a carefully prepared security plan and, broadly 

speaking, it can be divided into two sections-organisation and responsibilities. 

Taking organisation first, I will suggest points that should be covered and, although 

these are applicable to a large ship, they can be adapted for use in smaller vessels. 

ORGANISATION 

Patrols and Firewatching.-The ratings carrying out these duties should wear a 

distinctive armband-red for firewatcher and white for patrol. This enables officers 

on their rounds to check that the necessary number of men are posted. They should 

be provided with first aid extinguishers and a police whistle to raise the alarm in an 

emergency. 

Shipkeepers, Drills and Communications.-If civilian shipkeepers are employed, their 

patrols should be integrated with those of the ship's company. Both the naval fire 

party and the shipkeepers must be given daily instruction in fire-fighting. During 

these drills the water pressure in the salt and fresh water mains must be checked so 

that a satisfactory working jet is available inboard-checking the pressure on the 

dockside is not good enough. Hoses need inspection to ensure that they are clear 

and in good condition. Communications are important and two telephones should 

be manned day and night but not in adjacent compartments. 

Fire Bases.-It is little use leaving fire-fighting gear in the normal stowages 

during a refit, as it will not remain there for long. At least four well-dispersed fire 

bases are required in locked compartments with a spare key, in a glass case, on the 

door. These bases should contain sufficient equipment to attack any type of fire 

until the arrival of the brigade, and include breathing apparatus, 'Fearnought' suits, 

portable lighting and tools-axes and 14 lb. hammers. This gear should only be 

used in an emergency and a separate store maintained to supply the needs of the 

firewatchers who must provide extinguishers at every position where welding or 

burning is taking place. A special team should be detailed to maintain the efficiency 

of fire-fighting equipment. 

Log Books and Records.-The standard rounds book and ship's log are unsuitable 

for use during a refit and it is suggested that a special fire and refit log is kept in 

which general information can be recorded. The positions of burning and welding 

in the ship, with the precautions taken. The times and details of musters, patrols

FIRE DOWN BELOW 77 

and checks, with space for men to sign when they have completed these routine 

tasks. A useful companion volume is a folder for the Duty Officer, containing the 

latest refit information, details of overtime being worked and nominal lists of men 

attached to the ship, giving their watches and duties. Also copies of the ship's fire 

and security orders. 

RESPONSIBILITIES 

In these days of strict economy in the use of manpower the numbers retained in 

ships refitting is reduced to a minimum, so a clear-cut agreement must be made 

with the dockyard about the responsibilities both for the ship and work to be carried 

out on board. 

Rubbish, Keys and Gangways.-Other questions requring a satisfactory answer 

are the disposal of rubbish, smoking regulations, issue and custody of keys, allocation 

of space for dockyard tool boxes, and arrangements to prevent these boxes being 

moved to unauthorised places. There is a requirement for two gangways, one for- 

ward and the other aft, to give quick approach to both ends of the ship and, finally, 

an organisation for informing ship's officers of the overtime being worked in the ship 

by the dockyard so that firewatchers can be arranged. 

The Chief Fire O#cer.-He should be counted among a man's best friends in 

the dockyard and anyone refitting is well advised to call on this gentleman. He has 

the business at his finger-tips and it is far better to have his advice before rather 

than after a fire. 

THE FIRE TRIANGLE 

In 1957 there was an explosion at Glasgow in the cruiser Blake-17 men were 

injured. Reading between the lines of this news item it appeared that an oxygen 

bottle blew up. This accident underlines a final point I would like to make. 

The fire triangle has three sides-fuel, heat and oxygen. Allow these three to 

come together and there will be trouble. Keep them apart and all will be well. In 

a ship refitting, the risks can be reduced by a determined effort to eliminate the first 

element. Keep rubbish and debris down. Remove oil, paper, rags and anything 

under the heading of fuel. Fires are like human beings-they always start in a small 

way. The economy axe may cause complements to be smaller still but a glance 

at the world situation shows that the refitting of ships is as important as ever. It 

may not be long before our harassed politicians give another cry for 'ships and men.' 

'CHARIOT'

Despatch from Benin 

N the last weeks of 1896 Mr. J. R. Phillips, the Acting Consul-Generalfor the Niger 

I Coast Protectorate, decided that it was necessary that he should visit the King of 

Benin to discuss trading concessions, if British trade on the coast was to be unhampered. 

On hearing of his intentions the King sent messages to say that the time was inconvenient 

as he was making Ju-Ju for the soul of his royal father. Since these ceremonies included 

the cruciJixion of numerous slaves his reluctance to receive a white man was natural. 

Nevertheless Phillips replied that he could not wait and started on 2nd January, 1897, 

with eight white companions and two hundred carriers. Taking many gifts for the King 

but no weapons, the party proceeded up Gwato Creek to the town of the same name 

and landing there, started to march the thirty-odd miles to Benin City. This was the 

only route by which the King had ever allowed anyone to approach his capital. Phillips 

had travelled about halfway when he walked into an ambush and only two white men 

survived the massacre. If any of the carriers escaped it is not recorded. 

In those days there was no United Nations, one of whose members could pat the King 

on the back and congratulate him on his patriotic stand against the bullying of a colonial 

pozver. It was realised that the only way to maintain peace was to exact retribution 

before similar incidents were encouraged to occur elsewhere. A wire was accordingly 

sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Rear Admiral Harry Rawson, asking how long it 

would take him to do the job and what it would cost. In reply he quoted E50,000 and 

asked for six weeks; actually, as it turned out, it took him four weeks and cost E30,000. 

Rawson had heard of the massacre on 10th January, on the 15th he received orders 

to proceed and on the 20th he left the Cape in his jagship, the St. George. Two other 

cruisers, the Theseus and Forte, were ordered from Malta, the P. & 0. Malacca was 

sent from home with additional marines and stores and to act as hospital ship. The 

other ships available were the third class cruisers Barrosa, Phoebe and Philomel, the 

gunboats Magpie and Widgeon, and the paddler Alecto. Some small river steamers 

were taken up. 

During the passage such preparations were made as the organisation of 56 lb. loads 

for native carriers. The St. George arrived at the Brass River, nearest telegraph to 

the scene of operations, on 30th January; by 9th February all ships had assembled at 

Forcados Bar, which was to be their anchorage. On the 11th the Navy landed at 

Warigi on the Benin River, having been preceded by an advance party of Houssa troops 

from the Protectorate. 

The plan of campaign was to seize Gwato, W.S. W. of Benin, with seamen from the 

Philomel, Barrosa and Widgeon under Captain M. P. OYCallaghan, and Sapobar 

to the E.S.E. with men drawn from the Phoebe, Widgeon and Alecto under Captain 

T. MacGill. It was hoped that these feints would cause a diversion and draw oflattentiotr 

from the Commander-in-Chief with the main body at Warigi, due South of Benin. 

Both these parties encountered heavy resistance and were later reinforced. 

The main force comprised about 560 seamen (chiejy drawn from the St. George and 

Theseus), 120 marines, 250 Houssa troops, 70 native scouts and about 2,000 cammers. 

It had been intended to march the seven miles from Warigi to Ceri, cross the Olagbo 

Creek andfollow its further bank until near Benin, thus arranging for a plentiful supply 

of water. This scheme was found to be impracticable as the creek was bordered by swamps

DESPATCH FROM BENIN 79 

and it was therefore determined to make a direct advance. The distance was expected 

to be 20 miles but turned out to be about 24. It was hoped to find suficient water at 

Cross Roads (five miles from the Olagbo) and Ogagi (nine miles) but the wells were dry. 

The lack of water was a serious matter in such a climate and a drastic alteration of 

plan had to be made. The Admiral decided to advance on Benin with 560 men only 

and a reduced force of 840 carriers, the remainder being left to guard communications 

and to build up supplies of water and stores at Ogagi. He took with him two 7-pounder 

guns, five maxims and two rocket tubes. His despatch takes up the story here. 

The Admiral's decision to risk the advance in that terrific heat with so little water 

was certainly a bold one, but it succeeded. Estimates of casualties in this little war diSfer. 

The Commander-in-Chief gave them as:-Navy: oficers killed 2, 1 died, 6 wounded; 

men, 5 killed, 5 died, 22 wounded; Houssas and carriers: 3 killed, 1 died, 22 wounded, 

with 72 cases of smallpox among the carriers. Malaria broke out after the men had 

returned to their ships and among about 1,000 men who had landed, 2,290 attacks were 

reported. In the St. George alone, 238 of the 338 men landed were stricken and endured 

443 attacks of fever. The Admiral was one of the worst sufferers. The gallant way 

in which at 52 he had marched with the men seems to have impressed everyone. 

W. E. MAY 

King's Palace, Benin City 

21st Feb. 1897 

Dear Sir Frederick, 

I hope to leave here tomorrow with the whole force, and the wounded, and to 

get down in three days as I can only carry water for that time. It is an awful journey 

for the wounded but I hope to get them down safely. We have had an awful time 

having to cut ourselves clear of our base and rush the distance, short of water, 

and with no actual knowledge of where or how far Benin City was, only that it was 

about 24 miles. I felt the responsibility greatly. Men and officers have behaved 

splendidly, but I dread the sickness for them afterwards as this place reeks of 

sacrifices and human blood, bodies in every stage of decay, wells full of newly killed 

crucified men on the Fetish trees (which we have blown up). One sees men retching 

everywhere. I've got the taste of blood in my mouth till I often vomit. No one 

can realise what it is without seeing it. But the men are so far well and all again 

full of go. Captain Egerton has been my Chief of the Staff and it is no exaggeration 

to say the success of the expedition is in a great degree due to his work. Captain 

Campbell has been indefatigable and I hope you will consider his name for the 

Training Squadron. I have not yet heard from my flanking parties at Gwato and 

Sapoba, but shall when I get down to Warrigi, from which place I will write my 

despatch. At present I have no secretary and am writing this on the chance of a 

runner getting down and catching the mail. The men taking my telegraph sent 

about the taking of the city were fired on and had to return; we got it through next 

day however under escort. I left my secretary behind at Olagbo; finding no water 

ahead I had to reduce the force to the number we could carry water for, which 

again was limited to the number of utensils we had to carry it in, these being mostly 

paraffin tins. I will now give a short diary of our movements. 

Sunday, 14th.-I sent the Houssas and Theseus's marines, under Colonel Hamilton, 

to seize the crossroads five miles from Olagbo and to destroy a large village a mile

80 DESPATCH FROM BENIN 

down the road on our left flank. About halfway they got into touch with the enemy 

and drove them before them past a large camp they had formed; loss, 1 killed and 

4 wounded. In the evening the 1st Division moved up to the crossroads with water 

and stores and the 2nd Division crossed Olagbo Creek (this is a 2-mile crossing, as 

Ciri on our side and Olagbo beach on the other are the only two hard landing places, 

the rest is swamp on both sides) and we also crossed some of the carrier column 

with reserve stores, the Headquarters being at Olagbo beach. 

Monday, 15th.-The Houssas and Theseus's marines advanced to Agagi, with 

orders to search villages for water. Headquarters and Marine Brigade advanced to 

crossroads. The 2nd Division moved up to Olagbo village, about a mile from Olagbo 

beach. At this time my plan was to have advanced from day to day with the whole 

force, about one stage between each part, and to concentrate on the last day about 

5 miles from Benin. We had heard that there were wells in each village, which 

anyhow would supply water for the carriers, but on 

Tuesday, 16th, at one a.m. 1 got a report from Colonel Hamilton saying he had 

got Ogagi, after some opposition, had searched every village and, though all had 

wells, they were all dry, that he had only one night's water for his men and none 

for his carriers, who were fainting. I had luckily got my depot of water at the cross- 

roads so instructed him at once to send his carriers back and from one a.m. to four 

a.m. Captain Egerton was reorganising as I decided to reduce my force to the 

amount of water we could carry for men and carriers, at two quarts per officer and 

man and one quart per carrier for all purposes; provisions for four days, to run to 

six if required; all baggage and tents to be left behind; each man to carry only 

blanket, flannel and socks. I chose the following force: the Houssas and Theseus's 

marines already at Ogagi, half the Marine battalion and one company of St. George's 

and one company of Theseus's bluejackets, and the rocket party. 

ORDER OF MARCH OF THE FLYING COLUMN 

Scouts 

Half Company of Houssas 

Maxim 

1st Division Rocket Tube 

under Half Company of Houssas 

Lt.-Col. Hamilton Demolition Party 

Two 7-pdr. guns 

St. George Bluejacket Company 

Maxim 

200 men 

Reserve under 

Malacca Half Company of Marines 

HEADQUARTERS 

C.-in-C. Malacca One Section of Marines 

Maxim 

Impedimenta of 

1st Division 

and Reserves 

f St. George water, ammunition and baggage 

4 Houssas water, ammunition and baggage 

1Two Companies of Houssas as guard 

f Malacca Marines' water, ammunition and 

4 bakxage 

(~alacca One Section Marines as guard 

177 men

DESPATCH FROM BENIN 

One Company of Houssas 

Maxim 

Reserve stores :-Water carriers, Provision 

carriers, Reserve ammunition 

2nd Division Theseus Marines as guard 

under Maxim 186 men 

Capt. Campbell Rocket Tube 

Water, ammunition and baggage of 2nd 

Division 

Theseus Bluejacket Company 

Maxim 

563 fighting men and 840 carriers - Total 1,403 

The St. George's company arrived at 8 a.m. and we were all away at 10 for Ogagi, 

where we were all concentrated. The Houssas and Theseus's marines were made to 

leave all their extra gear and another supply of water so as to start with full tins 

got up during the night and we cut ourselves free of base on 

Wednesday, 17th, advancing at 6 a.m. We marched till 3 p.m., harassed all the 

way by the enemy and losing a few men wounded. The column was over three 

miles long, in a narrow path that only one could move along and dense bush on 

each side with immense trees. In many places the enemy had cut flanking paths 

from which they fired. At 3 p.m. we got to Awoko and made camp, on which 

they fired, but we cut a clearing and fired some signal rockets, which 'fetish' kept 

them quiet. 

Thursday, 18th.-Left camp at 6 a.m. and had a bad time of it; fired at nearly 

all the way. Awfully hot and we lost one killed and five wounded. The water running 

short I could only press on without halting and we got to the road around the King's 

compound at 1.30; men awfully exhausted. Directly we entered the road from the 

bush a sharp fire was opened from the bush each side and from a large body in the 

centre who began cheering and charging. Quickly deploying the Houssas and St. 

George's seamen and opening fire with a maxim soon cleared the open, but the bush 

each side was troublesome. However we pressed forward with the Houssas, St. 

George's seamen and one section of the marine battalion, leaving the other section 

to guard the water column, etc., who were still in the path. After a sharp half-hour's 

fight with an unseen enemy we found our way to the King's compound, in front 

of which six guns were pointed at us; they only got one off as we rushed the others. 

Here we halted and sent back for the rear column to come up with the water and 

pick up the dead and wounded. When they got in I issued to each man one quart 

of water and kept the whole of the remaining water, which would run to one quart 

per man, for the morrow. The men, though exhausted, were cheerful; not one 

single man had fallen out since leaving. But I was very low as the water question 

was a serious one. However, I knew there was a stream of rapid, clear water and knew 

the direction but not the distance to it. 

Friday, 19th.-At daylight two-thirds of the force, with carriers carrying every- 

thing that could hold water, started, while I held the camp with the remainder, and 

thankful I was when the men returned loaded, the stream being two miles away, so 

I felt happy again. They reported the whole town deserted. We marched out in

82 DESPATCH FROM BENIN 

the afternoon and burned two of the largest Chief's compounds (about 90 to 100 

houses) and got four bullocks, which added to our commissariat. Found an old 

woman in a house near the King's palace and from her we found out the reason 

for the city being deserted so qbckly, which was that, about an hour before we 

arrived at the Benin road we had cleared an enemy camp and rested for a few minutes 

and to help scare the enemy had fired two 7-pounder shell to the right and three 

rockets to the left with extreme elevation, this being the direction we thought Benin 

City was in. Today we found these three rockets within sixty yards of the King's 

palace, having fallen into the houses, and all within 50 yards of each other. The 

old woman said that when they heard our guns and knew we had passed the sacrifices 

(newly cut-open slaves, which we did three times) and yet knew the white men 

were far off by the sound of the firing, suddenly bolts from above fell all round 

the palace of the King. Everyone fled from this part of the city but she, being old, 

was left behind. I can only call it Providential as, when fired we did not actually 

know in which direction the city was, much less the King's palace! 

Warrigi, Thursday, 25th.-When I had written so far on Sunday afternoon (21st) 

I had to run out as they reported fire a quarter of a mile away; in five minutes the 

whole compound was one roaring flame. I never saw, or have imagined, the way 

the flames whirled through the air. Captain Campbell had promptly got his men 

up and got the wounded out. I stood to see the last out and then ran through the 

palace which was all ablaze, seeing this letter and my writing case, which I picked 

up and got clear into the open. NO one was hurt but some arms, nearly all our 

provisions and half our water were all gone and we left with one day's provisions 

to get back with. However I did not mind that as we ought to find four days' 

provisions at Awoka. In an hour all was over and we had got the wounded and 

men back to roofless shelters. 

To go back now to where I left off. On Friday evening (19th) we sent runners 

off to hurry up provisions and reduced our issue to half rations and sent telegraphic 

despatch reporting taking of the city; I should have headed it 'King's palace' but 

forgot to do so. 

Saturday, 20th.-Got in more water and two parties were sent out, one to burn 

the Queen Mother's compound and the other the Great War Chief's. We blew 

up the sacrificial and crucifix trees and destroyed about 12 Juju houses and began 

making a defensive position for the N.C.P. to hold when we leave. It is hard work 

as, though only red clay, the walls are very solid. Wounded doing well; heat some- 

thing awful. Preparing to leave on Monday, 22nd; we have only two days' full 

provisions left but they must last till we join the Awoka column. Water on the way 

down is again our bugbear. 

Sunday, 2lst.-Got a good supply of water in. Protective ammunition arrived. 

Making defensive positions. Gave orders for a Grand Parade to hoist flag, cheer 

the Queen and have a short evening service. At 4 p.m. fire took place, burning 

most of our provisions, so parade fell through. About dark, Forte's company arrived 

with four days7 grub so wiare in clover and I can leave Houssa force well supplied. 

Our departure will only be delayed about two hours by the fire. 

Monday, 22nd.-Left at 8.30 and, after long and heavy march with wounded, 

got to Awoka at about 3.30. 

Tuesday, 23rd.-Started at 6.30, got to Agagi at 12.30. Up to this time not a 

single officer or man, either on the march up or down, had fallen out but, starting

DESPATCH FROM BENIN 83 

again at 2 p.m., so as to get all to the crossroads camp by night, I broke down and 

the Commander-in-Chief had to be carried in a hammock; the first and only one. 

It was rather humiliating but I was completely done and entirely played out. We 

got all the wounded and the force to the crossroads before dark, leaving a small 

force for another day at Agagi, until the N.C.P. stores there collected could be 

forwarded to Benin. Then they are to march down, clearing all camps and bases. 

Wounded doing well. 

Wednesday, 24th.-Left camp at daylight and got to Olagbo. Crossed 1st and 

2nd Divisions, sending wounded round in boat. Embarked the St. George's in 

Branch steamer, Theseus ditto, arrived at Warrigi. At the headquarters found that 

the whole of my kit, left behind when we did our forced march, had been lost in 

the bush through panic among carriers. I shall have to be content with what I've 

got, viz. a 'wash and wear', and very dirty at that. We none of us had a wash for 

four days, then one day's wash and then four days without. I have just had a real 

good tub. I am hurrying on the embarkation as quickly as possible. 

Thursday, 25th.-Got the Sapoba column back. The Gwato column must hold 

that place until Saturday, as a flying column from Benin will join them there to 

open up that road. Phoebes very sickly, am sending her to sea at once to the Cape. 

We had 80 cases altogether of smallpox amongst carriers but by isolation have 

prevented it spreading. I'm afraid we shall have awful sick lists later on . . . 

Our forces being so scattered medical men have been our difficulty; I ought to 

have asked for ten besides those in the hospital ship. One has been killed, one died 

and there are three sick. Theseus and Forte who should have brought four, only 

arrived with two. Our head doctor is useless from ill-health. 

We saw everyone embarked and away fiom Warrigi and left ourselves at 6 a.m. 

on Sunday, 28th, getting out to the squadron outside Forcados by 5 p.m. Sent 

Theseus off to Brass with telegraphs, and Malacca and Widgeon. Every ship has a 

great many sick and will, I am afraid, have a great many more. The hospital ship 

is full but I am glad to say most are mild cases; only a few really bad. Last night 

there were over 320 sick in the squadron; in this ship we have about 80. 

You certainly got the Malacca away quickly and I must thank you for the liberal 

outfit of stores sent out; we hardly used any though as she arrived late on the 8th 

and we started on the morning of the 9th. The pith hats I am certain have saved 

many lives. We shall all be at Brass tomorrow at the end of the Weri (?) when I 

shall get orders. 

Monday, lst, 7 p.m.-At Brass. All the ships will- be here tomorrow morning 

and as soon as possible I will get in and close accounts but things will be very mixed 

as so many officers are down sick; in this ship Captain, Commander, two Lieutenants, 

two Midshipmen, two of my office and two engineers and 90 men; but none I hope 

really bad; when we get to sea I trust we shall pull up. I expect you will have to 

put a sponge through many items unaccounted for as, between fire at Benin, carriers 

running with their loads, etc., stores cannot all be accounted for. 

Mr. Moor is sending later, on behalf of the whole force, to Her Majesty two 

tusks and two ivory leopards. We, the Navy and Marines are sending to the 

Admiralty for the new building a carved tusk, this goes in the Malacca. 

I hope you will have approved of my strategy which, by occupying and holding 

Gwato and Sapoba, so puzzled the enemy and kept large forces employed while 

we struck the real blow. I believe they thought it impossible to get up our way

84 

AN ACCOUNT OF THE BATTLE OF LISSA 

because of the water question. Egerton is bad today, but as soon as we get to sea 

I hope he may pick up. He has been worth his weight in gold to me and my staff 

have all worked themselves ill . . . I shall be glad to get things finished as I am 

nearly played out. 

Ever yours most sincerely 

HARRY H. RAWSON 

An Account of the Battle of Lissa 

Being a letter written to his father, the Reverend Geoffrey Hornby, by 

Captain Phipps Hornby, Commanding H.M.S. Volage 

H.M.S. Volage 

Lissa Harbour 

March, 19th. 1811 

My dear Father, 

In the letter I wrote to you the day after the action I had not time to enter into 

particulars of perhaps as glorious a battle as any that has ever been fought. Now 

however that we are in a safe port and our ships in a tolerably forward state of 

equipment, I have some leisure time which I cannot better employ than in relating 

to you some of the circumstances that took place on the fortunate 13th of March. 

Before I begin, I cannot help remarking how very providential every circumstance 

relating to that day has been, even in despite of ourselves we had been (I mean the 

whole squadron) long bewailing the unfortunate accident that some time since 

happened to this ship and the Amphion as having deprived us of an opportunity 

of an action with the enemv. but we now find it was to this verv circumstance that 

d - 

we are indebted for our present good fortune as the enemy were unapprised that 

either we or the Amphion had returned from Malta, and therefore trusted to finding 

our force reduced to two frigates and a sloop. The parting company from the sloop 

also, in the night, we had considered as inlucky i s it bas ody from her being 

missing that we were prevented from going straight off Ancona, which, had we done, 

we must inevitably have missed the Frenchmen, in the same way we did the last 

time they came out! In short, whoever has witnessed all the circumstances attending 

this battle must ever be convinced that in the end, however we may manage it, 

Providence has ordained all things for the best, and that we ought to await His 

dispensations with patience. 

1t was daylight on the morning of the 13th that we first discovered the enemy 

squadron to windward of us and close off the harbour of Lissa, whither they were 

bound, having troops onboard to garrison that island. This force consisted of five 

frigates, one corvette (so called by them though much bigger than Volage), one 

brig, two schooners and two gunboats, with 750 soldiers onboard: to oppose this 

we had the Amphion, Active, Cerberus and Volage, all except Active very small 

frigates and many short of complement. We at first made all sail towards them but,

AN ACCOUNT OF THE BATTLE OF LISSA 85 

finding that they were coming to us, we formed our line and waited their attack. 

It is not very often that the French have been the attackers by sea but their superiority 

in numbers gave them such confidence that their Commodore made them a signal 

that he expected it of his squadron that they would compel the English to strike 

in fifteen minutes. To do them justice they came down boldly, but unlike seamen, 

and seemingly very unaware of the business they had in hand. Their plan of attack 

seemed to be formed on Lord Nelson's famous one of the Battle of Trafalgar, but, 

unfortunately for them, they had only learned their lesson by halves, never having 

steadiness to pursue their original intention. The only signals our Commodore 

made were to form the line of battle and then a telegraphic message 'Remember 

Nelson'. It would be very difficult for me at all to convey to you any idea of the 

sensation with which these words appeared to affect our men, but there was some- 

thing finer in it than words can express. Before, the men had been all animation, 

cheering each others' ships as we passed but the instant the signal was made known 

to them you might have heard a pin drop and, though with almost tears in their 

eyes, their countenances manifested such a spirit of determination as nothing could 

overcome. It was worth a thousand cheers and never again as long as I live shall I 

see so interesting or so glorious a moment. 

The action commenced at a little before nine and lasted without the slightest 

interruption till twelve, when three of their ships having struck, the remainder 

began to make off, followed by such of our ships as were able to make sail; partial 

firing continued till near three, when the action totally ceased, leaving in our posses- 

sion three frigates, and the Commodore's ship on shore whom, to prevent falling 

into our hands, was set fire to by her own crew and it blew up with a tremendous 

explosion. Had they been a little farther off their own harbour not one of their larger 

ships would have escaped, but the vicinity of the port allowed even one of the frigates 

that had struck to get away, so that all the fruits of the victory we have to show 

are two frigates taken. What we shall gain in money matters by it will not be very 

large (perhaps about L800, out of which by my agreement I have to give the half) 

but we hope that our harvest of honour and credit will be large. Medals they will 

certainly give us, and make our Commodore a baronet and perhaps knight us all. 

This, however, is an honour I am not very ambitious of. Volage has suffered so 

much both in masts and hull as to render it absolutely requisite to send her to 

England, and I shall most likely come in her. I have not, however, quite made up 

my mind whether I shall not apply for the command of one of the French frigates, 

which they will of course give me; on this point however I shall not determine 

till I see Commissioner Fraser at Malta; he will be able to say whether they are in 

a state to be fitted out in this country without first visiting England. If they are 

I give up all thoughts of them, as I am bent on getting a look at you all this summer 

and they must give me a better ship in England when I choose to ask for one. I 

can't at all judge as yet what time you may expect me, but I fancy it will be late in 

the summer before we are in a state to proceed. 

I have to regret in this ship the loss of thirteen brave fellows killed and forty-three 

wounded, a proportion great indeed when it is considered we went into action only 

154 in all. The slaughter indeed throughout the squadron is uncommonly large, 

being in the proportion of about one in four: I speak of killed and wounded both. 

It is almost ridiculous to mention one's own individual escapes, where the shot 

were flying about so thick, but one or two were near touches; indeed I was talking

86 AN ACCOUNT OF THE BATTLE OF LISSA 

to a poor little boy who was my aide-de-camp, and holding him by the button of his 

jacket, when a shot came in and took off both his thighs close to his body, and of 

course killed him. The splinters it brought with it knocked me down quite over 

on the opposite side of the deck. I have also had the skin across my nose just cut 

with a grape shot, but which did no other mischief than for about a minute stupefying 

me, so that I did not know whether my head was on or off. Our Commodore is the 

only one amongst the Captains who is wounded, but is likely to do well. We are 

to remain in this port till our wounded get a little sound, when we make the best 

of our way to Malta. From thence I will again write immediately on my arrival 

to some of you. In the meantime believe me to be, my dear Father, 

Your affectionate and dutiful son, 

P.H. 

Phipps Hornby was born in 1785, jifth son among thirteen children of the Reverend 

Geoffrey Hornby, Rector of Winwick in Lancashire, and his wife Lucy, sister of the 

12th Earl of Derby. 

He went to sea in 1797 in the Latona frigate (Captain John Bligh),jlagship of Rear- 

Admiral the Hon. W. Waldegrave on the Newfoundland Station; and he served most 

of his Midshipman's time under the same oficers, following them from ship to ship. 

1804 found him serving as a Master's Mate in the Victory under Lord Nelson; but 

being made in that same year Acting Lieutenant in the Excellent (74) he missed 

Trafalgar. However, in 1806 he participated in the defence of Gaeta, and he com- 

manded the seamen and marines at the taking of Capri. Promoted Commander in 1808 

he commanded successively the Duchess of Bedford (16) and the Minorca sloop (la), 

and in both ships was in action with enemy small craft and shore batteries. He reached 

Post rank in 1810, at the early age of twenty-four; and after commanding temporarily 

the Fame (74) he was appointed to the Volage, a 22-gun corvette. In that ship he 

participated in Commodore Hoste's fine action off Lissa, 13th March, 1811; and his 

letter to his father describing the action is set out above. After the Volage he commanded 

in succession the frigates Stag (36) and Spartan (38), making a voyage to the Cape 

of Good Hope and back in the former. In 1815 he was made C.B. He paid off the 

Spartan in 1816 and then, like so many oficers caught in the 'run down' of the Fleet 

after the Napoleonic Wars, he embarked on a long spell of half pay. He was not re- 

employed until 1832, when he was appointed Superintendent of the Naval Hospital 

and Victualling Yard at Plymouth. In 1838 he became Superintendent of the Dockyard 

at Woolwich; and from 1841 until his advancement to Flag Rank in 1846 he was 

Comptroller General of the Coast Guard. 

The Woolwich Dockyard appointment carried with it the command of the William 

and Mary Yacht; but it was not until after an interlude of thirty-one years that Phipps 

Hornby resumed regular sea service, he being then sixty-two years old, yet only a Rear 

Admiral of the Blue. In 1847 he hoisted his Jlag in the Asia (84) as Commander-in- 

Chief on the Pacific Station. His three years' tenure of that command were relatively 

uneventful. In 1852 he became a naval member of the Board of Admiralty under the 

Duke of Northumberland, and he was made a K.C.B. But when, in that same year, 

the Tory Administration headed by his cousin Lord Derby was defeated, he vacated his 

seat on the Board in conformity with the then prevailing custom whereby professional 

as well as political members of the Board changed with a change of Government. He 

was never again employed; although in due course his services were recognised by his

A TRIP TO THE GULF OF MEXICO 87 

advancement to G.C.B. and his appointment to the office of Rear-Admiral of England. 

He passed the remainder of his days on the Sussex property inherited from his godfather, 

Mr. Thomas Peckham Phipps, and he died in 1867, shortly before his eighty-second 

birthday. He had been promoted to Vice-Admiral in 1853 and Admiral in 1858. 

Of the honours for the victory of Lissa which Captain Hmnby foresaw, Commodore 

Hoste duly received his baronetcy. The knighthoods, half apprehended, for the Captains 

did not materialise. But Commodore and Captains alike were given gold medals. Phipps 

Hornby's medal has been handed down to one of his posterity-but not, alas, the writer 

of this note ! W.M.P.H. 

A Trip to the Gulf of Mexico 

H AVING lately returned from a ten-week round trip to Havana, three ports 

in Mexico, and five Gulf ports in Louisiana, Alabama and Texas, I thought 

that brother Officers might be interested in some aspects of the voyage. I travelled 

in a 15 knot cargo ship of 17,000 tons, belonging to a well known foreign line, 

carrying twelve passengers and leaving Europe with about 5,500 tons of mixed cargo. 

The Captain who had served in Allied and British merchant ships during the war, 

(most of the time as Navigating Officer to Commodores of Convoys) was extremely 

pro-British; and kindly gave me the run of the bridge and chart house. 

Besides the Captain, there were five deck officers, one apprentice, one wireless 

operator, a Chief Engineer, nine Engineer officers including an electrician, and 

one Engineer Apprentice, a total of eighteen officers. There was also a Boatswain, 

Carpenter, Storekeeper, Lamptrimmer (responsible for ships lighting) twelve 

seamen including two boys, while in the Engine room there was one foreman, 

three firemen and eight other ratings. Nine stewards and pantrymen and three 

cooks brought the total ship's complement to 56; making 68 people on board including 

the twelve passengers. 

To the Naval Officer, this will not seem a very big complement to work such a 

large ship, but it must be remembered that the crew have nothing to do with un- 

loading and loading the ship, beyond maintaining the winches and whips, etc. Even 

removing and replacing hatches is the stevedores work. The crew are thus chiefly 

employed on maintenance work, and cleaning up after the stevedores have finished. 

There was only one galley and everyone had the same food, in theory at least! 

The ship herself had been built on the Clyde during the war and was a credit to 

our shipbuilders. She was, of course, single screw with turbines of 6,800 H.P., 

with three Diesel engines (British built) to supply power for the winches. Two 

boilers were situated in the for'd end of the engineroom compartment, superheated 

steam at 450 lbs./sq. inch pressure. Fuel consumption at 15 knots was 50 tons per 

day. The ship's steering was automatic and this was my first experience of this 

in action. The steering engine was hydraulic, with two rams on each side of the 

rudder head worked by the usual servomotor. It was absolutely silent, and with 

no vibration. I could not help comparing this with the gear in the Navy, both

88 A TRIP TO THE GULF OF MEXICO 

in destroyers and the older battleships, when one could often tell who was the 

Q.M. by how the gear rattled and shook! Perhaps nowadays there has been some 

improvement ! 

In calm weather the ship's wake was absolutely straight and the ship seldom 

as much as a degree off her course, three of four degrees of helm only being usually 

required. In a heavy gale from three points on the bow, accompanied by an 

extremely heavy swell from the same direction, the maximum yaw was six degrees 

or very occasionally seven degrees and possibly up to seven or eight degrees of 

helm was then used. The great saving of personnel, increased accuracy of naviga- 

tion and reduced wear and tear must be obvious. 

I might mention that the seaman's pay was between E35 and £40 per month 

with overtime: and the Chief Officer, aged 33, received the equivalent of about 

E75 per month, and of course no mess bill. 

The Chief Officer was responsible to the Captain for the Navigation though 

Officers all took their turn at sights, and he was responsible for the general stowage 

arrangements of the cargo which the 2nd Officer (known as the Cargo Officer) 

actually attended to, assisted by the other deck officers as necessary. The ships 

officers were not responsible for the tallying of cargo coming in or out, this being 

the responsibility of the Agents at the various ports. One point that the Naval 

Officer may not realise is the continuous work of the cargo ship carrying a mixed 

cargo in peace time, for she is rarely completely empty. At intervals one hold 

becomes empty and gets the chance of a clean out, but for long periods she is never 

less than half full, filling her spaces almost as soon as she empties them, from one 

port to another. One of the Agents said that this particular line had a very good 

reputation for arriving in Europe punctually. This means that the exporters of 

goods received payment for them when sold on the market, with the least possible 

delay. 

From Lisbon to Havana (via the N.W. Providence channel) took 14 days. From 

the day after we left the trade route off Portugal, until the seventh day, we sighted 

no ships, then we sighted one during the next two days. One advantage of travelling 

by cargo ship is that one gets three or four days possibly in each port, and also a 

berth alongside. We had four days alongside in lovely Havana. It was the cold 

season for this country (January) but still hot enough to make bathing a pleasure 

for us, and to enjoy this from some of the lovely country clubs along the coast, 

thanks to the kindness of some friends. Incidentally, the entrance fee to one of 

these clubs was 700 dollars (U.S.) I did not pay it! Cuba by the way is more 

expensive for the British tourist, than the United States. We were also shown 

over a famous cigar factory, and enjoyed the famous Baccardi and Darquiri cock- 

tails. Baccardi, by the way, is the best known rum that is made in Cuba. 

Hemingway has his home about 20 miles from Havana; but we did not join those 

tourists who stand and gape at his gate and sometimes even intrude further! After 

Havana, we were ten days on the Mexican coast calling at Vera Cruz-the largest 

Mexican port and the first Spanish settlement on this coast in 1517-the Port 

of Mexico (or Coatzacoalcos), and Tampico. 

Vera Cruz has a large modern harbour, Dutch engineers having constructed the 

breakwaters. The town showed Spanish influence in its old streets and buildings; 

and the language of course, is Spanish with a slight difference. 95 per cent. of the 

Mexican population is said to have Indian blood. Some of the passengers flew


to Mexico City for four of five days, a trip very much worth while if you have the 

money. They were more than amazed at the radical design of the many great 

buildings (one being 35 storeys high), the city's great spaciousness, and found the 

ruins of the older civilisations with which it is surrounded extremely interesting. 

But two months would be required really to see this fascinating city and its country 

round, not a few days. By the way, it lies at an altitude of 7,400 ft. above sea 

level. The chief cargo loaded at Vera Cruz was 1,750 tons of lead, coffee and 

sisal. For comparison with U.S. wages I would mention that the stevedores 

here earn about 2s. 2d. per hour. 

The Port of Mexico, 70 miles further South, is a small and undeveloped port, 

really unsuitable for a ship of our size, especially with the very inadequate tug 

available. We were here only one day, and then proceeded to Tampico, in the 

North of Mexico. Here oil interests are predominant. The port is some eight 

miles from the sea, approached by a good channel. Here we loaded sisal and resin. 

We left at night and from the upper bridge the lights of the town combined with 

those of the oil drilling installations on either side of the channel, the view was really 

fine. 

We now started on our round of American Gulf ports, starting with New Orleans 

(Louisiana) which, of course, is on the Mississippi and 107 miles from the sea. 

I see that reference books give the length of this river as 4,500 miles; the longest 

in the world. We entered it's muddy waters some 16 miles from the coast early 

one afternoon and soon after sighted what might have been an aircraft carrier 

some seven miles off towards the shore. This was, however, not a ship, but one of 

the many oil drilling platforms that have been erected along this coast, the oil 

companies having lately paid the Federal Government E500 million for the drilling 

rights within ten miles of the shore. As this develops, the question of the extent 

of territorial waters will no doubt become still more complicated. Sometimes 

four of these platforms were in sight at the same time. There are two main entrances 

to the Mississippi for big ships, the S.W. and the S.E. We proceeded by the S.W. 

entrance with the pilot on board, and in ten hours reached our berth four miles 

beyond New Orleans City. The first part of the river trip was between swamp 

lands, and later came scrub on flat land with occasional oil drilling stations standing 

starkly against the skyline. The river averaged about 800 yards in breadth, and the 

current against us was fairly strong, chiefly owing to recent heavy rains. The depth 

off New Orleans varies from 100 to 180 ft. in the centre, and 30 to 60 ft. alongside. 

The reason for the shallow draft steamers of the Man River' type is to enable 

them to use various canals and to proceed further up the river. Cargo ships of four 

and five thousand tons can get several hundred miles above New Orleans. 

I never made out why the early French settlers should have decided on this 

particular site for New Orleans when they came here from Mobile (their earliest 

settlement on this coast) in 1718. It is on a U-shaped bend in the river, 5 ft. below 

the river's mean water level. The resultant difficulties in flood prevention, drainage, 

drinking water, firm foundations for building even the smallest houses, burial, and 

so on have been colossal, and only overcome in the last fifty years. Miles of high 

banks, called 'levees', now protect the district from flooding; fresh water is purified 

from the river, huge pumps in great numbers carry away the city's drains and waste. 

Every building must be built on wooden piles, 30 to 40 ft. long driven into the earth 

and swamp under, three or four inches apart. This is sufficient to support the

90 

A TRIP TO THE GULF OF MEXICO 

largest buildings. Building is very expensive and more than one third of the total 

cost goes into the foundations. Most of the suburban houses-a large number of 

which are wooden and very satisfactory to live in too- stand on supports four to six 

fi. off the ground; the Yankees unkindly say to keep the alligators out! 

Owing to the high water level, a unique form of burial has been in existence 

since its earliest times. All burials are above ground, in brick or stone tombs. 

The coffin is hermetically sealed, and placed in the tomb for a time. The law 

lays down the minimum time as 1 year and 1 day, (which seemed to me rather short). 

After which the tomb and coffin are opened, and the remains of the 'loved one' 

tipped into a bin, or special compartment at the end of the tomb, and the empty 

coffin removed. Of course, there are some more elaborate versions of these arrange- 

ments. Having read Evelyn Waugh's book, it was somewhat amusing to hear our 

guide in the cemetery explaining how 'the last loved one finally joined the loved 

ones of previous generations, and so the family were together in death'-in the bin! 

I may say that our Captain told us that some years ago he had been flown 

out to New Orleans, to take the place of a Captain who had died there. He was taken 

to the 'funeral house' on arrival, where he was horrified to find the late Captain's 

body prepared for transport home with his features strongly rouged and powdered: 

and lipstick had also been used. 

New Orleans now consists of the new and the old town, and has about half a 

million inhabitants. The old town, which mostly dates from 1788, when a great fire 

swept the old town of 1718 away, shows a strong Spanish as well as French in- 

fluence; and there are some charming nooks and patios. The new town is very 

well laid out, the chief avenue being 12 miles long and 120 ft. broad, and others 

are nearly up to this standard. There are many fifteen and twenty storey buildings 

and its skyline is what we would call 'typically American'. The older suburbs 

consist chiefly of the wooden old Colonial style houses, some very attractive, usually 

all white with possibly green doors and shutters, and large verandahs. Houses 

are all close together and there is a complete absence of gardens round the houses 

and of fences. There are usually camellias and oleanders planted round. To the 

North of the town is an enormous salt water inlet, hundreds of square miles in extent; 

on which the Southern Yacht Club is situated. This is the second oldest yacht 

club in the States, founded in 1847. It has a wonderful yacht harbour and a very 

modern club house. 

In the port of New Orleans are extensive wharfs, canals and docks, and there are 

130 miles of water frontage. It is the second biggest shipping port in the States. 

Our ship shifted berth to an enormous grain elevator, where we took in 3,000 tons 

of grain in bulk in just over a day-very dirty work which reminded me of old coal- 

ship days, only then the dust was not white. 

The colour question is of course, always a predominant one in these parts. I 

tackled more than half a dozen people, all white, about it. Such a complicated 

problem can, of course, hardly be scratched here, but I will give their condensed 

local opinion, for what it is worth. They were all emphatic that the Yankees 

in the North did not understand the problem they had in the South, for the Northern 

cities, (with a few exceptions such as Washington) the negro population might be 

under 5 per cent., but in the South the proportion was 30 per cent. 'Here', they 

said, 'we give the coloured folk equal rights; for instance, their schools are the same 

as ours, but separate. We do not allow coloured people into our bars, hotels or


schools. Their wages are the same as white people for the same work. They have 

a vote same as the whites. We respect them as individuals, we believe this respect 

is mutual. We get along with them in this way very happily. We consider this 

system should be maintained for some time to come, and that it is in entire accord 

with the American constitution. The very high proportion of criminal offences 

committed by the coloured folk as compared to the white is only one indication of 

their lower standards which we don't want our children to absorb'. I certaidv 

could observe no bad feeling between the two races anywhere. A white taxi drive; 

will only take a coloured person if accompanied by a white. In the buses, one part 

was reserved for coloured folk and marked accordingly; the notice could be moved 

so as to allow for varied proportions. At the dock there were coloured and white 

stevedores, who usually kept each to their own holds and gangs, but seemed very 

friendly. All get the same wages, and this means that the coloured stevedore, with 

his lower, but nevertheless good, standard of living is likely to work only part of the 

year. Readers will probably know there is no segregation in the Armed Services 

of the United States. 

Sidelights on this problem; thousands of near whites become absorbed in the 

white population every year, and according to some, much of the agitation on the 

coloured question came from the half whites, who find themselves in a very unfortunate 

position. 

While on the subject of wages, perhaps the following notes will be of interest to 

some readers, showing as it does the high scale of living in the States. 

First of all, domestic. In New Orleans, as elsewhere I am told, maids in private 

houses are extremely hard to get. Here those available are all coloured. The 

minimum wage is 75 cents per hour, but they actually cannot be got under a dollar 

per hour. A dollar is 7s. 4d. so it will be seen that a daily help will easily cost 

30s. Od. per day. 

At the docks, the standard wage for a stevedore is 22.50 dollars (E8) for an eight 

hour day. Working a few minutes over an hour counts the full hour, so work 

sheets almost invariably show the work stopped ten or twelve minutes past the 

hour. By doing a little overtime, it is easy for a stevedore to earn 30 dollars per 

day (Ell 0s. Od.) or for a real long day 47.50 dollars (El7 q.p.) 

The linesmen, that is the men to take the ships' lines when ships come alongside 

and so on, and who do nothing else, received 700 dollars (E255) per month. 

Many of the linesmen can neither read nor write, I was informed. Nearly all 

the white stevedores, and many of the coloured, own their own cars, some of these 

being new looking Cadillacs, as I saw for myself. 

I trust officers, on reading this will not shed their uniforms and make a mad rush 

for the States! 

At Houston (in Texas) the ship's Agent told me that the stevedores owned a ranch, 

where they went 'hunting' and that he had been asked up there as their guest. As 

a sidelight. " in conversation with a taxi driver it came out that he went to Houston's 

2 

premier hotel for a manicure once a week, also that he was a keen dry-fly fisherman, 

spending one or two months in the season fishing in the Colorado district every year. 

Yes, it is a wonderful country! 

So far as many enquiries and seeing for myself in a few days could inform me, 

and not including such crowded cities as New York and Washington, while the 

cost of living is certainly more than in the U.K., it is not so much more as might be

92 

A TRIP TO THE GULF OF MEXICO 

gathered from the above scale of wages. The following are cheaper than in the 

U.K. Cars, for instance. For E250 a good looking car can be bought, and in good 

condition. Petrol costs 1s. 10d. to 2s. 2d. per gallon in the Southern States. Car 

tax per annum E4. 

The very excellent readymade clothing and fo~twear is cheaper than in the U.K. 

Food costs a little more, but not much. Labour and living in hotels is away up. 

Income Tax certainly not more than in U.K. Probably less. It depends on the 

number of one's dependants. The general standard of living for the ordinary 

working man is far higher than over here. 

Before leaving New Orleans, the ship received an unexpected cargo-15 U.S. 

Army five-ton lorries, each marked 'For mutual defence'. In order to be able to 

carry these, 350 tons of lead cargo had to be shifted, all in 100 lb. bars. This cost 

the company 2,600 dollars (E950) in stevedores wages, but as the freight for each 

lorry was 2,000 dollars (L730) it will be seen that this expenditure was well justified. 

These lorries, each weighing 12& tons, were hoisted in and secured by U.S. Army 

personnel, using a 50 ton U.S. Army floating crane. Incidentally, the freight 

charge for a Chevrolet car we also hoisted on board (U.S. to Antwerp) was 

400 dollars (E146). 

While on the subject of New Orleans, and the State of Lousiana in which it is 

situated, it is of interest to note that the whole of Louisiana territory was sold in 

1803 by Napoleon for 27,000,000 dollars.* Louisiana then extended over what is 

now seventeen States or parts of States, and as an American put it to me 'Was the 

best deal in real estate ever made, working out at four cents an acre, including 

all buildings'. As an historical footnote, there was a battle on the levees just outside 

New Orleans in 1812, between the British and Americans, which we lost, and in 

which our General (Packenham) was killed. 

After a short day's call at Mobile in Alabama, which was the earliest French 

settlement (1702) on this coast, and which has some lovely specimens of early 

colonial houses, the ship proceeded to Corpus Christi in Texas. After passing a 

narrow entrance, the ship steamed along a well buoyed channel through several 

shallow and attractive inland water inlets for some 15 miles, oil drilling platforms 

being conspicuous on either side of the water, and holiday camps on the shore and 

occasional fishing harbours, mostly for shrimpers. The town is modern and very 

well laid out with a charming 'bund', and palm trees and oleanders. A very cold 

North wind was rather a check on our enjoyment. 

As at all Gulf ports, the sea food, oysters, crabs, lobsters and so on were excellent. 

Here the ship took in cotton and hundreds of old car radiators, valuable for their 

copper. 

After this to nearby Brownsville, still in Texas and on the U.S.-Mexican border. 

This port lies 28 miles from the sea, and is approached by what is termed a canal, 

but a large ditch would be more accurate to describe it, for it is carved out of sand 

and for quite long stretches it was only a very little broader than the beam of the ship. 

Oil, agriculture and cotton are the basis of local prosperity at Brownsville; and it 

is also quite a holiday place for Americans, 'house-trailers' (caravans) and motels 

being much in evidence. The sea fishing is good. 

The next port to visit, and in some respects the most interesting was Houston 

*90 per cent of this was lent by British bankers.


(Texas), which lies 28 miles inland. After entering the narrow entrance to Galves- 

ton Bay, we proceeded up the Buffalo river, which has been dredged and artificially 

enlarged. This trip was done on a bright moonlight night, and the river winds in 

an incredible way through flat land. I had not been warned what to expect, and 

the sight was quite fantastic. From the upper bridge, an extensive view over the bank 

was obtained in the moonlight. There were large groups of highly lighted 

areas scattered on both sides of the river. Those closest to the banks showed 

ghostly and unrecognisable shapes round the lights. These were illuminated at 

times here and there by orange or crimson flames, from what cause it was impossible 

to tell, but it appeared that towns and factories were situated at intervals on both 

sides of the river. Steam issued from some groups near the bank, which poured their 

mist, usually coloured by lights or flames across the river accompanied by deafening 

noise. At one river bend, the ship was caught in an inferno of flame, noise, smell, 

mist and threatening shapes, and at the next turn this had vanished and all was 

silence and coloured lights, while buildings took on the friendly look of beauty, 

reminding one more of Venice on a similar night, an impression that was empha- 

sized by the sound of lapping water. 

As a spectacle at night, this scene must be hard to beat. As dawn approached, 

we passed the old battleship Texas, permanently moored in an inlet off the main 

channel, this being the American version of our Victory. Many enormous barges, 

pushed very efficiently by small tugs, were passed very close to. 

When daylight came, I could see that what could have been mistaken for towns 

were mostly groups of oil refineries and installations, some of which must have been 

a mile or two long, also of chemical works, grain elevators, papermills and so on, 

most of which were working 24 hour shifts. The scene in daylight after the very 

spectacular night was disappointing. Before we arrived at the port at 7.0 a.m., 

numerous cars could be seen moving along the roads. I learned later that nearly 

all the factory workers have their own cars, and all factories here regard large parking 

spaces as an essential part of their works, for the U.S. worker likes to be able to 

drive from his home to his work, door to door, and he is usually prepared to change 

his town and State to places where this can be done. 

It was quaint to see very modern wharfs complete with all the latest equipment 

established on the banks of the river with scrub land quite untouched on both sides 

close by; there being many square miles of land with river frontage still untouched 

and waiting to be developed. Later, the ship's agent took us round Houston, and he 

informed us that to attract factories, the town offers a 25 years' lease of land free 

and that this neighbourhood was likely to be the largest chemical production area 

in the States very soon. Houston itself is expanding very rapidly, the city popula- 

tion having increased by 50 per cent. since 1950, it being now about three-quarters 

of a million. 

An extensive system of good motor roads, of autobahn standard, with well de- 

signed run-outs, run-ins, and run-overs have been built, and are being added to. 

The Americans are more sensible than we are in realising the necessity of good 

roads for trade. There are stated to be, and I believe correctly, in and around 

Houston more than one thousand millionaires. A very modern medical centre 

has been built a few miles from the centre of the city, and one of the millionaires 

subscribed 150 million dollars (E56,250,000) towards its cost. My informant also 

said that the first millionaires in Texas in the early days made their money in

94 A TRIP TO THE GULP OF MEXICO 

lumber, then came the millionaire ranchers, now it is oil and in a dozen years or so 

there are likely to be uranium millionaires as this has now started. In this centre, 

there are separate buildings for surgical and medical, eye and dental cases for 

children, and for a very extensive library, and so on. Some of these buildings 

are built of a lovely pink limestone obtained locally. Internally, no expense has 

been spared. The most luxurious hotel, the Shamrock, was built by another 

millionaire, an Irishman from Ulster who struck oil. He has the swimming pool dyed 

orange colour on the appropriate day! 

Houston itself is a very modern and well laid out town. One highlight for us 

was the annual Texas Fat Stock Show with a Rodeo every evening, which was on at 

the time of our visit, in a covered arena. The entrance fee for some of the cowboy 

competitions was 100 dollars, in order to keep the number of the competitors down, 

and the highest winner won 2,200 dollars during the week. Some of the per- 

formers are professionals. The streets were made quite picturesque by the large 

number of cowboys and ranchers in their ten gallon hats, bright shirts, narrow 

trousers and Texas high heeled boots, and their girls in somewhat similar rig. No 

doubt there were a number of what are locally called 'drugstore' cowboys amongst 

them, that is, townsmen all dressed up. 

Besides the usual breeds of cattle usually seen in similar shows in England, there 

was the American breed of Brahmin cattle founded in 1924, and the magnificent 

(French) Charallaise, which won the prize for the heaviest beast in the show, 2,300 lbs. 

There was also a breed of horses not seen in the United Kingdom, the Appaloosa. 

Besides being noted for their great intelligence, their colour is distinctive being 

parti-coloured black and white spots mostly over their hind quarters, while the 

eye pupil is encircled with white like the human eye, and the hoofs are marked in 

black and white vertical stripes. They are said never to require shoeing. 

A new aspect to us were the high prices paid merely as advertisements. For 

instance, the champion capon (just one bird) had a large placard stating who had 

bought it and for how much. In this case 1,600 dollars for the one capon. While 

the champion turkey was sold for 1,250 dollars, and a pen of five white leghorns 

('fryors') for 2,025 dollars! 

After three days at Houston we proceeded down the river to Galveston, which 

is mainly a shrimping port and is a much older town than Houston and after a 

two day stay there, we sailed direct for Europe. 

Finally, here are some authoritative figures I was given. We returned with 10,090 

tons of mixed cargo valued at $15,000,000. Value of ship $3,500,000. Approx. 

freight paid $320,000. Estimated Net Profit to owners of this return voyage 160,000 

dollars q.p. (after allowing for all expenses, ship maintenance, fuel, wages and 

so on). 

This return cargo was made up as follows:- 

Lead ... ... ... 1,750 tons Grain in bulk ... 3,000 tons 

Coffee ... ... 150 ,, Soya beans and Seed 

Cotton ... ... ... 550,, cake (Cattle Fodder) 1,000 ,, 

Rice ... ... ... 200 ,, Corn Starch ... ... 200 ,, 

Flour ... ... ... 430,, Lubricating Oil ... 200 ,, 

Hides ... ... ... 360,, Peanuts ... ... 50 YY 

The freight for hides was especially high, 52 dollars per ton, on account of their 

strong smell which makes special storage necessary.


There were also fifteen lorries. one car and some miscellaneous items. 

When our political rulers talk in an airy way about the naval estimates and convoy 

protection and then let the Navy rot, it would be a good thing if they examined 

these figures in detail to see what one ship in a convoy carries, besides irreplaceable 

officers and men. Not that I personally would be hopeful of this making much 

impression, but still it might do some good. After all, the saving of even one cargo 

worth E54 million goes some way towards the cost of a cruiser: and the same cargo 

in war time has an even greater value to us than money. 

We left the Southern States grateful for the great courtesy and kindness we had 

been shown everywhere as tourists, and more conscious than ever of the advantages 

to any nation, employer and employees, of free enterprise, and the necessity for us to 

get ti know each-other far better.. Surely the policy which puts a 'dollar curtain' 

between us, the British on one hand, and the Americans on the other, and so prevents 

us getting to know them in their own country, is a short-sighted one. No 

short tri~ such as ours can be com~ared with residence for a few months in the 

country. When that same policy is applied to us and our Dominion of Canada, 

I believe we have gone beyond reasonable limits, whatever may be the arguments 

to the contrary. 

H. T. BAILLIE-GROHMAN.

Naval Affairs 

CONTINUING IMPORTANCE OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES 

The necessary, though painful, reorganisation of the Navy and the vital importance of con- 

ventional forces were the central theme of speeches made by the First Sea Lord, the Earl of 

Selkirk, in London during October. Addressing the Navy League's Trafalgar Day luncheon on 

October 20th, he stressed the essential need of up-to-date equipment in a modem Navy. The 

possibilities which scientific invention placed at the disposal of a sea power were vast but their 

development took much time and a great deal of money. To ensure that resources are used to 

produce the best results it is particularly necessary to be highly selective. 

'It is with that object', the First Lord said, 'that there have been extensive reorganisations 

of the shore establishments of the Royal Navy, much of which has been very painful, and there 

has been a reduction in many of the older ships held in reserve. We find it more important to 

concentrate our resources on modem equipment and on the whole I can, I think, claim to have 

kept the impetus here going steadily. No one, of course, can consider arming ourselves into 

bankruptcy: that would be just foolish. But I wonder sometimes whether everyone appreciates 

entirely the speed at which things have been and are developing at this very time. Aeroplanes 

of a similar type to 15-20 years ago are costing anything up to forty times as much as they did 

at that time. 

'We have stopped doing research on guns and barrels', continued the First Lord. 'The sort 

of missile which is taking their place is of almost unbelievable complexity. And if we turn to 

propulsion, we are just at the inception of the age of nuclear power for ships. This is not going 

to come quickly. It is a field of the utmost complexity in which quite frankly we, like all countries, 

have got to learn by experience how to put both submarines and, as I am anxious to do, civil 

mercantile ships, to sea under nuclear power'. 

The First Lord then referred to the fact that we were fast reaching a point where, because 

of their large stock-piles of nuclear weapons, neither side was likely to embark on a nuclear war 

for fear of the inevitable consequences. Thus the emphasis was likely, once again, to be placed 

on conventional weapons and forces; on limited war rather than global. 

'What I am sure of', he continued, 'is that sea power will always remain important. We have 

built the Commonwealth by sea power and if sea power is lost the Commonwealth will certainly 

not hold together. We have won this position by resolute determination and a quality of men 

unexcelled by any in the world: by understanding the significance of the versatility and mobility 

with which sea power can be used. I believe that much of the liberty and the peace which the 

world experienced in the nineteenth century, which I hope will lie ahead of us, has depended 

on the proper understanding of what these mean'. 

Commonwealth Navies 

Earlier in his speech the First Lord had reminded his listeners that we were no longer able 

to maintain control of the seas by ourselves. Today we recognised that we must exercise sea 

power with the United States and Commonwealth. The steady growth of the Commonwealth 

Navies throughout the world was the most important development in the last twenty years. 

Accordingly he had made it his business since becoming First Lord to visit as many as possible 

of the Commonwealth Navies. He had just returned, in fact, from a most profitable tour of the 

Far East and had had the pleasure of calling on the Commonwealth Navies in that area, including 

Australia and New Zealand. 

'It is quite obvious', he went on, 'that the complete freedom which these members of the 

Commonwealth have, inevitably involves differences of policy, differences of approach-that is 

understandable. Indeed, it would be very odd if a large number of Governments of different 

political, economic and geographic circumstances and with different traditions all thought the 

same about one subject. But it does not to my mind alter the position and on certain broad 

questions of principle all these forces are governed by the same ideas. Principles of human 

dignity: principles of ensuring the free access of the sea for peaceful purposes. I believe it is 

of the utmost importance that this should continue and for my part I hope one way or another 

to maintain the personal link between officers and ratings of all members of the Commonwealth 

by training, by loan of personnel or exchange of personnel, by meeting at staff colleges and 

exercising together. I think the long-term results will be of the utmost benefit to those of us in 

the Commonwealth, and ourselves in particular, who are so dependent for our economic strength 

on the stability of world affairs'. 

Specialisation and Citizenship 

Speaking at the annual reunion dinner of the R.N.V.R. Officers' Association on October 17th, 

the First Lord pointed out that this year was remarkable as being the centenary of the setting

NAVAL AFFAIRS 97 

up of the commission which resulted in the formation of naval reserves. He paid tribute to the 

way in which during one hundred years the R.N.V.R. and the Supplementary Reserve had 

served the Royal Navy. Referring to the reorganisation of the last twelve months, he said it 

had given unity, which was very important, and it had recognised the need for specialists in this 

world of specialisation. This would help to give us the readiness in a world in which things 

happened extremely quickly. 

'Sometimes in this world in which we live', he added, 'we are, I believe, occasionally mesmerised 

by atomic power. We should take account of it but I believe that a full appreciation of the broad 

situation makes us recognise this: that an immensely important role will always remain for what 

is called "conventional forces", and I think it would be utterly wrong to think that they are only 

supplemental and largely replaced by nuclear forces'. 

The First Lord said that we lived in a world in which specialisation and citizenship ran together. 

Defence was a highly specialised subject but it was one in which every citizen had to play his 

part inevitably, whether he willed it or not. That is what the Royal Naval Reserve was doing 

and we were fortunate in this country that we had people who were willing to volunteer and 

give their services in the national interest. 'Do not let us misconstrue or underrate the vital 

importance of that', he concluded. 

UNIFICATION OF NAVAL RESERVES 

The unification of the Royal Naval Reserve and Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, announced 

by the First Lord of the Admiralty in the House of Lords on December 4th, 1957, took effect 

on November lst, 1958. All permanent R.N.V.R. and R.N.V.(W.)R. officers serving on that 

date were invited to transfer to the R.N.R., and all R.N.V.R., R.N.V.(W.)R. and R.N.V.(P.)R. 

ratings were invited to re-engage in the R.N.R. 

The Royal Naval Reserve, as reorganised, consists of fifteen different training lists: the list 

to which each officer or rating is attached depends on his obligations for continuous and non- 

continuous training. No change is involved in the titJe, status or training of seagoing Merchant 

Service officers at present serving in the R.N.R. or of officers and ratings of the Fishing Fleets 

at present serving in the R.N.R. (Patrol Service). They will, in future, form Lists 1 and 2 

respectively in the R.N.R. Officers of the R.N.R. Air Branch were transferred to the Special 

Air List, on which there is no training obligation. 

R.N.V.R. officers and ratings were transferred to Lists 3 to 15 of the R.N.R., depending on 

the amount of training necessary to fit them to take their place in the Royal Navy in the event 

of mobilisation. This will vary from fourteen days' continuous training plus eighty hours (or 

eight week-ends) non-continuous training annually for those on List 3, to no training obligations 

for fully trained officers and ratings on List 15. Training will be carried out at Reserve Training 

Centres throughout the country, in minesweepers attached to Sea Training Centres and in H.M. 

ships and shore establishments. National Service officers, who at present hold temporary 

appointments in the R.N.V.R., were given temporary appointments in the R.N.R. to conform 

with the change of title of the permanent Reserves. 

On the same date the Women's Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve was renamed the Women's 

Royal Naval Reserve (W.R.N.R.) and the title of the existing W.R.N.R. (a list of ex-W.R.N.S. 

officers and ratings willing to be recalled in emergency) is changed to Women's Royal Naval 

Supplementary Reserve (W.R.N.S.R.). 

The position of officers holding appointments in the R.N.V.R. for service with the Sea Cadet 

Corps and Combined Cadet Force (Naval Sections) is still under consideration. 

The Royal Marine Forces Volunteer Reserve and the Royal Naval Volunteer Supplementary 

Reserve are not affected. 

Following the unification of the Reserves, the gilt buttons worn by all officers of the Royal 

Naval Reserve are to be R.N. pattern. 

BOARD EXPRESS APPRECIATION TO RESERVES 

The amalgamation of the Royal Naval Reserve and the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve became 

effective on November 1st. To mark the occasion the following message to the Fleet has been 

issued' by the Board of Admiralty:- 

The unification of the Naval Reserves affords Their Lordships a welcome opportunity 

to express their appreciation of the services rendered in the past by the officers and ratings 

of pll branches of the Reserves both in war and peace. 

Their Lordships are confident that the fine spirit of volunteer service shown in the past 

will continue to increase as a result of this new partnership and that the reorganised Royal 

Naval Reserve will grow in efficiency to meet the ever-changing needs of modern warfare'. 

NEW HONORARY COMMODORE, R.N.R. 

Her Majesty The Queen has been graciously pleased to approve the appointment of His Royal 

Highness The Duke of Gloucester, K.G., K.T., K.P., G.C.B., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., as an

98 NAVAL AFFAIRS 

Honorary Commodore in the Royal Naval Reserve with effect from November lst, 1958. The 

'warmest congratulations' of the officers and ratings in the Naval Reserve on his appointment 

have been conveyed to His Royal Highness by Vice-Admiral W. K. Edden, C.B., O.B.E., Admiral 

Commanding Reserves. In his reply the new Commodore said that he deeply appreciated the 

message and that he was honoured to become a member of the Royal Naval Reserve. 

The rank of Honorary Commodore in the Royal Naval Reserve was established by Order 

in Council in April, 1915. Sir Richard Williams-Bulkeley, who as an Honorary Captain R.N.R. 

was in command of the Naval Depot at the Crystal Palace, was then appointed to that rank. 

After World War I, the rank was granted to a limited number of senior Captains of the R.N.R. 

in recognition of particularly good service. H.R.H. The Duke of Gloucester was appointed 

Honorary Captain in the Royal Naval Volunteeer Reserve in May, 1937. 

COMMITTEE ON RECRUITING REPORTS 

The report of the Committee which was appointed last December, under Sir James Grigg, to 

examine the problems of recruiting personnel for the Armed Forces, was presented to Parliament 

on November 4th. Simultaneously the Government issued, in the form of a White Paper, its 

comments on the Committee's report and its decision to put the most important recommendations 

into effect. In general the main deterrent to recruiting is seen to be National Service. Since 

it is the Government's present plan to bring National Service to an end by December, 1962, 

the Committee confined themselves specifically to problems affecting recruiting for the all- 

regular forces, totalling about 375,000 men (Navy 88,000), which will be needed after that date. 

(It is of interest to note that during the inter-war period we maintained all-regular forces varying 

between about 320,000 and 375,000.) 

The report produced no surprises. It would have been a surprise had it done so. Most of 

the factors which have a material bearing on recruitment are well known. What the Committee 

set out to do was to assess the comparative importance of these factors and suggest what specific 

action might be taken to intensify their effects when favourable, and to reduce or remove them 

when unfavourable. Although the recruiting figures have improved remarkably since the Com- 

mittee started work the Minister of Defence has welcomed the report and has promised that 

none of the recommendations which has not so far been carried out will be pigeon-holed and 

forgotten. 

'The latest indjcations are that the Services should reach 375,000, or very near it, by 1963', 

the report says. Indeed, more than enough volunteers should be forthcoming for some arms. 

On the other hand there is likely to be diaculty over recruitment for the Royal Army Ordnance 

Corps and the signals-operating trades of the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force, and somewhat 

greater difficulty over Army medical orderlies and cooks. Thus the crux of the problem lies 

in discovering measures to prevent the particular shortages which are at present foreseen'. 

The following are the Committee's principal conclusions and recommendations affecting 

the R.N., R.M. and W.R.N.S., together with the comments of H.M. Government on each. 

OEFICERS AND RATINGS, R.N. (INCLUDING 

OFFICERS AND OTHER RANKS, R.M.) 

Remuneration 

'(I) That there should be an automatic biennial review of pay which should take into account 

movements in civilian earnings over a range of occupations to be determined by agreement 

between the Treasury and the Service departments. The first review should be carried out 

in time for change of rates to come into force on 1st April, 1960. The review should cover 

pensions also" 

Comment: H.M. Government agree that Service pay and pensions should be reviewed regularly 

at intervals of not more than two years. 

'(11) That the rates of disturbance allowance for ratings should be increased from El2 to A25 

for those going into Service accommodation, and from £22 10s. to E50 for those going 

into private accommodation. The rates for officers should be increased to E40 and £80 

respedvely'. 

Comment: H.M. Government accept this recommendation. The higher rates of disturbance 

allowance will be introduced on 1st April, 1959. 

'(111) That education allowance for children at boarding schools should be increased to E150, 

for the first child, El75 for the second and E200 for the third. The allowance for children 

boarded out with friends or relatives should be increased to £50. The rates (as now) should 

be the same for officers and ratings. The existing lower age-limit should be removed'. 

Comment: H.M. Government accept this recommendation. The higher rate of education 

allowance and improved conditions will be introduced on 1st April, 1959. 

'(IV) That immediate action should be taken to abolish one or two minor allowances . . .; to 

reduce the number of rates at which ,certain allowances . . . are paid; and to simplify the 

regulations governing entitlement . . .


Comment: H.M. Government accept the aim of this recommendation and are studying what 

can be done to simplify the code of allowances. 

Pensions 

The Committee reported that 'The present level of officers' pensions does not constitute a 

deterrent to recruitment. But when the career structure for officers is redesigned (see Recom- 

mendation IX) consideration should be given to allowing service beyond (say) 30 years to count 

for increments on existing pension scales'. This question is dealt with in the comments on 

Recommendation IX below. 

'(V) That ratings' pensions should be increased . . .' 

Comment: H.M. Government agree that increases of the order proposed in the Committee's 

report are justified and will introduce the higher rates on 1st April, 1959. 

'(VI) That future family pensions should be increased to give widows one-third of the pension 

which the husband was drawing or (in the case of those still serving) the pension he would 

have drawn had he been invalided. The ny-contributory scheme we propose would cover 

the widows of both officers and ratings . . . 

Comment: H.M. Government accept this recommendation. The higher rates of family 

pensions will be introduced on 1st April, 1959. 

Career 

'(IX) That the career structure for officers should be redesigned so that, in so far as it is possible, 

they have the choice of retirement before 40 (when their resettlement problems will be 

least) or employment to 60 or so (when resettlement problems will not exist)'. 

Comment: H.M. Government recognise that the limited length of most Service careers raises 

a serious problem. A full study is being made of the officer structure of the Services and 

of the related question of retired pay, with a view to finding some solution to this problem. 

Miscellaneous 

'(XVIII) That boarding facilities should be set up in connection with selected schools in the 

United Kingdom'. 

Comment: This recommendation is being discussed with local education authorities. 

'(XIX) That children left in the United Kingdom when their families are sent overseas should 

be allowed one free passage to the father's station each year, instead of one free passage 

during each tour of duty, as at present'. 

Comment: H.M. Government accept this recommendation. The improvement will be intro- 

duced on 1st April, 1959. 

W.R.N.S. 

In general H.M. Government comments on the recommendations regarding R.N. officers 

and ratings apply, where relevant, to the W.R.N.S., e.g. W.R.N.S. pay and pensions will also 

be reviewed biennially. 

Engagement Structure 

'(XXIV) That the engagement structure for women should be altered to allow them to leave 

at six months' notice after completing their initial engagement'. 

Comment: H.M. Government do not consider that such advantage as might accrue to 

recruiting from the introduction of this change would outweigh the adverse effect on 

morale and manpower planning. They accept, nevertheless, the principle that the engage- 

ment structure for women should be related to the needs of the Women's Services and 

not be based too closely on that for men. The present engagement structure is accordingly 

being reviewed to see what improvements can be made. 

Pensions and Gratuities 

'(XXV) That women's rates of pension (both for officers and ratings) should be raised to 85 per 

cent of the male rates'. 

Comment: H.M. Government accept this recommendation. The higher rates of pension will 

be introduced on 1st April, 1959. 

'(XXVI) . . . That (if Recommendation XXIV is accepted), consequential changes in the gratuity 

system for women should be introduced. If our recommendation is not accepted, then 

women's gratuities and bounties should be raised to 85 per cent of male rates'. 

Comment: Subject to any wider changes in the gratuity system which may result from the 

review referred to under Recommendation XXIV above, H.M. Government agree that 

gratuities and bounties for the Women's Services should be raised to 85 per cent of male 

rates.

I00 NAVAL AFFAIRS 

GENERAL 

Comments on other passages of the Committee's report included the following:- 

(i) ~90,000,000 is the amount to be spent on Service accommodation generally in the U.K. over a 

five-year period. In addition, large sums are being spent on accommodation at stations 

overseas . . . The extensive reorganisation of the Services now in progress has inevitably 

created temporary uncertainties about the precise distribution of the Forces. However, 

the necessary decisions of policy are being made as rapidly as possible and the building 

programme should now go ahead more smoothly. A fair share of the Services programmes 

for the construction and modernisation of accommodation will be devoted to the Women's 

Services. 

(ii) H.M. Government fully endorse the importance of making training interesting and providing 

adequate facilities. 

(iii) H.M. Government attach the greatest important to the role of the Women's Services in 

peace and war. 

(iv) H.M. Government are considering ways of increasing the opportunities for members of the 

Women's Services to serve overseas. 

FUTURE OF SHEERNESS DOCKYARD STILL UNDECIDED 

The First Lord of the Admiralty and the Parliamentary Secretary of the Board of Trade received 

a deputation at the Admiralty on November 24th from the Sheppey Development Committee, 

including the three local civic heads and representatives of the Kent County Council, Sheppey 

Trades Council, Chamber of Commerce and Sheerness Co-operative Society, to discuss progress 

in the disposal of H.M. Dockyard, Sheerness, which is to close in 1960. The deputation was 

introduced by Mr. Percy Wells, M.P., the Member for Faversham. 

The deputation was informed that efforts to dispose of the Yard to commercial interests had 

not so far succeeded in producing a satisfactory offer but were continuing. The First Lord 

repeated the assurance which had already been given that the Admiralty would not pay too much 

attention to price provided that the concern or concerns taking over the Yard would be likely 

to maintain employment. The Naval Stores Depot at Queenborough was in the process of 

being sold and would offer employment to a number of men in the Sheppey area. 

The deputation reiterated the urgency of finding an acceptable solution to the problem in the 

interests of the workpeople and the economy of the Isle of Sheppey, and were informed that 

the Admiralty and the Board of Trade recognised fully the importance of the matter and were 

making every possible effort to bring it to a conclusion. 

PORTLAND : CAPTAIN-IN-CHARGE POST ABOLISHED 

As a measure of economy the Flag OHicer Training, in addition to his main duties, has taken 

over those responsibilities remaining with the Captain-in-Charge, Portland, after the rundown 

of the Dockyard. As a result the Captain-in-Charge (Captain A. F. P. Lewis, R.N.) was not 

relieved when his appointment ended last month. There will thus be a saving of a Captain's 

post. 

FORMIDABLE ADDITION TO NAVAL STRIKING POWER 

A Government decision to make the Blackburn N.A.39 Strike Aircraft available to the Fleet 

Air Arm was contained in an announcement made by the Ministry of Defence on September 

16th. This decision has considerable significance as it will give the Navy its first aircraft to be 

specially designed for a naval role, and one which in every respect has no equal in its particular 

class. 'This aircraft will be capable of performing a strike role against targets at sea and on land 

and of providing air support for land operations', said the Ministry of Defence announcement, 

'and in the low level strike role the N.A.39 is ahead of any other aircraft in the world'. 

The N.A.39 was seen in public for the first time at this year's Farnborough Air Show, but 

ever since it made its maiden test flight from the Royal Aircraft Establishment's Aerodrome at 

Thurleigh, near Bedford, on April 30th, it has been the centre of interest and speculation in the 

world of aviation. For security reasons, little information about the aircraft has yet been rel- 

eased but sufficient is known to make it one of the most discussed aircraft of the decade. Its im- 

portance to the Navy is emphasised by the statement of the First Sea Lord last March when he 

described it as 'the world's first specially designed low level high speed strike aircraft', and by the 

comment contained in the explanatory statement to the Navy Estimates 1957158 that 'with its 

considerable range and ability to carry an atomic bomb this aircraft would be a most formidable 

addition to the striking power of the Royal Navy'. 

The immediate effect of the Government decision will be the placing of orders for long dated 

materials and the necessary jigs and tools for the first batch of the aircraft, but it has not been 

announced that any contract has yet been signed. Discussing the present state of development 

of the aircraft at a Press Conference in London shortly after the Government decision was made 

known, Mr. Eric Turner, Chairman and Managing Director of Blackburn and General Aircraft

NAVAL AFFAIRS I01 

Ltd., is reported to have said that the third prototype N.A.39 of an initial order for twenty 

development models would fly within the next few weeks. Plans had already been made for 

'tooling up' in anticipation of a Government production contract, but little more could be done 

in that direction until the rate of production and the total number of aircraft required were 

known. They had two million square feet of factory space at Brough and also had an arrange- 

ment with the Fairey Aviation Company and another unnamed firm for the manufacture of the 

aircraft in numbers should orders exceed Blackburn's production capacity. 

R.F.A. RELIANT 

The Royal Fleet Auxiliary Reliant, formerly a grain carrier working between the Gulf of Mexico 

and the United Kingdom, left Chatharn on November 4th for the Far East, to take up her role 

as the Royal Navy's first air-stores issuing-ship capable of replenishing aircraft carriers at sea. 

She has an endurance at sea of 50 days' steaming at 16 knots, and carries over 30,000 different 

types of aircraft spares and general naval stores, ranging from &-inch diameter washers to flight- 

deck tractors weighing two tons. Her six holds are fitted out to make her the most modem 

travelling storeroom afloat, and any one of the thousands of different items of stores can be 

located by the civilian store officers on board and taken up on deck within a few minutes. The 

very latest automatic tensioning winch on deck means the Reliant will be able to transfer stores 

to aircraft carriers in unfavourable weather conditions. 

Conversion of the former M.V. Somersby to the R.F.A. Reliant has been based by the Admiralty 

on the concept that aircraft carriers should be able to spend longer time at sea, independent of 

their shore bases. The M.V. Somersby was built in 1954 and traded for two years as a grain 

carrier before she was bought by the Admiralty and converted for her new role at North Shields. 

Her master is Captain H. D. Gausden, D.S.O., O.B.E., who has been in the Royal Fleet Auxiliary 

service for 32 years. The vessel carries a complement of 110 officers and men, and is fully air- 

conditioned for service in the tropics. Even the stores, stacked in hundreds of specially designed 

trays and storage cabinets, will benefit from cool-air ducts located in each of the six holds. 

Eventually Reliant will carry about 40,000 different patterns of stores, and two civilian officers 

will be permanently at work on board her maintaining store accounts and stock levels based 

on a 'stocktaking' which will never end all the time Reliant is in service. They will also assist 

the Naval Store Officer in maintaining ledgers which will show at a glance where each of the 

different items is stowed on the three deck levels. 

NEW CLASS OF SURVEYING VESSEL 

H.M.S. Echo, first of a new class of three inshore surveying craft, commissioned at the Cowes 

yard of Samuel White & Co. Ltd., on 12th September. Launched in May, 1957, the Echo, 

which has an overall length of 106 feet, a beam of 22 feet and a normal speed of 12 knots, has 

been built and specially equipped to carry out coastal and harbour hydrographic surveys around 

the coasts of the British Isles. 

She is the fourth vessel of the Royal Navy to bear her name and the second surveying ship. 

The former surveying ship, an early paddle-steamer, was commanded by Lieutenant Bullock 

from 1827 to 1829, when she discovered what was first named the 'Bullock Channel' while 

making a survey of the River Thames and its approaches. Deepened with the years, renamed 

the Duke of Edinburgh Channel when it was buoyed and opened for navigation by Trinity House, 

and later renamed the South Edinburgh Channel, it is re-surveyed annually and by chance this 

will be undertaken next year by the new Echo, whose predecessor was so closely associated with 

its discovery. 

To carry out her exacting work in shoal water, Echo is equipped with two echo-sounding 

machines, asdics for wreck location, radar and many surveying instruments. Two boats are 

carried, including a 20-foot motor dory, fitted with an echo-sounder for general purposes. The 

ship is also fitted with sweep wire gear for finding the minimum depth over wrecks or obstructions. 

The complement is two officers, two petty officers and fourteen ratings, all accommodated in 

small but compact messes. Cooking is done on an electric galley and all living and working 

spaces are ventilated by trunked air which can be heated in cold weather. The engines are two 

Paxman diesels of 350 h.p., each driving a controllable pitch propeller, giving good bridge control 

of speed and excellent manoeuvrability. The hull is all wood, with considerable use of glued 

laminated members. The displacement is 160 tons. This ship, and her two sisters, will replace 

the surveying motor launches which were built in the early 1940s as harbour defence launches. 

FIRST OF NEW CLASS OF OCEAN TUG LAUNCHED 

The first of a new class of ocean tug to be built for the Admiralty, H.M. Tug Typhoon, was 

launched from the shipyard of Messrs. Henry Robb & Co. Ltd., Leith, on October 14th. The 

class is an improved version of the 'Bustler' tugs of which the Turmoil is an illustrious member. 

They will have a length overall of 199 feet, beam 38 feet 6 inches. Extensive tank tests were

I02 NAVAL AFFAIRS 

carried out by William Denny & Bros. Ltd., Dumbarton, before the design was developed by 

the builders. Typhoon will be propelled by two diesel engines, manufactured by Messrs. Vickers- 

Armstrongs Ltd., of Barrow-in-Furness, geared to a single shaft with a controllable pitch propeller 

which is an innovation for Admiralty ocean tugs. She will be fitted with the latest equipment 

for firefighting, salvage and ocean rescue. 

MORE SAIL TRAINING FOR CADETS 

The Board of Admiralty have decided to give the Dartmouth Cadet more sail training-a timely 

reminder that, though we stand upon the threshold of an era of nuclear propulsion in ships and 

mechanical and electronic aids, the prime importance of good seamanship remains, and that 

no gadget can replace the knowledge bestowed by practical experience. 

Five new Seamanship Training Craft, as they will be called, are to be delivered next year. 

The new concept of training will include off-shore cruising, and ocean racing whenever oppor- 

tunity occurs. Their Lordships are convinced that this training will foster leadership, initiative, 

discipline and sea-sense, particularly in overcoming fear of the sea at close quarters, and will 

provide a substitute for the experience which young officers formerly acquired in boatwork 

during their time as midshipmen. 

Present sailing experience at Dartmouth is gained in ex-German 50-square-metre 'Windfall' 

vachts acauired at the end of World War 11. They are nearing the end of their useful life and, 

as they wire designed for the land-locked waters of the Baltic are not really suitable for naval 

training purposes in the weather and sea conditions normally expected in the Channel. 

An order for the five new craft, each of 122 tons Thames measurement, has been placed 

with Morgan Giles Ltd., at Teignmouth, and the first is expected to be ready in time for the 

start of next year's sailing season. They will be sloop-rigged, with a sail plan so designed that it 

can be handled easily by an inexperienced crew, yet adequate to make the craft a useful com- 

petitor in ocean racing; a large cockpit and large chart table are being included in the design 

to give facilities for navigational training. Below there will be austerity accommodation and 

berths for seven. 

By placing greater emphasis on seamanship the Board hope to make cadets of today even 

better fitted to command ships in the future. 

UNITED STATES NAVY HONOURS BRITISH NAVAL INVENTORS 

At a ceremony in the United States Embassy recently the Ambassador, the Honourable John 

Hay Whimey, presented United States naval awards to the men who made the operation of 

modern jet aircraft from carriers not only possible but swift, safe and smooth. The recipients, 

all British, are the inventors of the steam catapult, the deck mirror landing sight and the angled 

deck system, all of which have been adopted by the U.S. Navy. 

The Ambassador made the following presentations :- 

Angled Deck System: 

Rear Admiral D. R. F. Campbell, D.S.C.-The Legion of Merit (Degree of Officer). 

Mr. L. Boddington (Ministry of Supply)-The Medal of Freedom with Bronze Palm. 

Deck Mirror Landing Sight: 

Commander H. C. N. Goodhart, R.N.-The Legion of Merit (Degree of Legionnaire). 

Mr. D. Lean (Royal Aircraft Establishment)-The Medal of Freedom with Bronze Palm. 

Steam Catapult: 

Mr. C. C. Mitchell, O.B.E. (Messrs. Brown Brothers)-The Medal of Freedom with 

Bronze Palm. 

HOME STATION 

TWENTY-ONE YEARS IN COMMISSION 

An unusual anniversary occurred recently-H.M.S. Plciver, a coastal minelayer, had been con- 

tinuously in commission for twenty-one years. Provided for in the 1935 programme, she was 

laid down at the Dumbarton yard of Messrs. Denny & Brothers in October, 1936. She was 

launched in the following June and commissioned in September in the Vernon flotilla. 

Immediately before the outbreak of war she was at Rosyth for the Reserve Fleet exercises. 

At 17.00 on September 3rd, 1939, six hours after the declaration of war, she began laying the 

first minefield southward of Bass Rock. On the 6th September she arrived at Dover and was 

employed laying minefields all around the coast from Hartland Point north about to the East 

Coast Barrier, the latter stretching roughly from Scotland to the Thames. Further afield, she 

carried out 'lays' off Narvik and the coasts of Holland, Belgium and France, some of these latter 

being to cover the Normandy invasion forces from U-boat and E-boat attack.


Among the most highly-prized messages received by H.M.S. Plover during this period is a 

letter from the Admiralty which, after stating that the manner in which six recent operations 

had been completed, in bad weather conditions, reflected credit on all concerned, continues :- 

'Their Lordships have also observed with satisfaction the H.M.S. Plover has now laid 

over 10,000 mines since the outbreak of war, and that the work of the ship has been marked 

throughout by its persistence, accuracy and freedom from breakdown'. 

Since the war the ship has been engaged in a varied round of national and N.A.T.O. exercises. 

Since commissioning Plower has steamed nearly 150,000 miles. 

LONDON MARINES IN EXERCISE 'MICKEY FINN' 

For fourteen days beginning on September 8th, 250 officers and men of the Royal Marine Forces 

Volunteer Reserve (City of London) left their civilian jobs to take part in a novel annual training 

period of great interest to the Royal Marines and Amphibious Warfare Headquarters. They 

carried out training specially designed to prove their short notice operational efficiency. Assault 

and raiding craft crews and Commandos trained under war conditions, and briefings, rehearsals 

and joint schemes culminated in Exercise 'Mickey Finn'. Joint planning was completed in 

London by the raiding squadron and Command staffs in their normal volunteer training time. 

The force sailed from Plymouth on the morning of September 15th and landed near Dawlish, 

on the Devonshire coast. Exceptional problems of navigation and technique for the landing 

craft crews were included in the exercise, which was also a severe test of the endurance, fieldcraft 

and tactical skill of the Commandos. They had to move, undetected, over at least fifty miles 

of rough country, existing entirely on what they could carry. The 'enemy' force was provided 

by the Regular Army. Highlight of the exercise centred on the rescue of a 'political prisoner' 

from enemy-held territory during a secret move under heavy guard. The identity of the prisoner 

was kept as secret as the rescue details. He was flown out after rescue by a helicopter of the 

Fleet Air Arm. Average age of volunteers taking part was twenty-five, and they came from many 

trades and professions in the London area. 

FRENCH MIDSHIPMEN VISIT DARTMOUTH 

Four French frigates-the Gazelle, Chamois, Commandant de Pimodan and Le Boulonnais--of 

the French Naval Academy's Training Squadron arrived in the Dart on November 27th for a 

four-day visit. Some eighty Midshipmen arrived in the ships to visit their British counterparts 

at the Britannia Royal Naval College. With them came their Commanding Officer, Capitaine 

de Vaisseau P. Dufay, Commanding Officer of the Academy, which is located at Lanveoc-Poulmic, 

near Brest. Tours of South Devon, sporting events and social meetings with the British Mid- 

shipmen provided a full programme for their short stay. 

MEDITERRANEAN 

MEDITERRANEAN COMBINED EXERCISE 

Ships and aircraft of the Royal Navy, Royal Marine Commandos, and units of the British and 

Libyan Armies have been taking part in exercises in the Mediterranean area. At dawn on 

September 4th, 1,500 Marine Commandos swarmed the beach near the town of Horns, Libya, 

after beaching in assault and landing craft from the cruiser H.M.S. Ceylon. They were supported 

by Sea Hawk, Venom and Gannet aircraft from H.M.S. Eagle, and the first stage of the exercise 

was reported to have shown perfect co-ordination between the British and Libyan Force. Further 

landings from the naval assault force were carried out on the beaches west of Derna. Army 

units taking part in the exercise included 166 Amphibious Observation Battery, R.A., 8 Inde- 

pendent Recce Flight Army Air Corps, King's Royal Rae Corps and the Royal Sussex Regiment. 

CANADIAN, FRENCH AND BRITISH WARSHIPS EXERCISE IN 

MEDITERRANEAN 

Despite gale force winds and heavy seas Canadian, French and British ships successfully carried 

out a series of N.A.T.O. exercises off the South of France in November. Units of the British 

Mediterranean Fleet under the command of Rear Admiral R. A. Ewing, D.S.C., Flag Officer 

Flotillas (Mediterranean), in the cruiser Sh&eld, joined forces with ships of the Canadian 

Atlantic Fleet commanded by Commodore M. A. Medland, C.D., R.C.N., in the aircraft carrier 

Bonaventure, and units of the French Mediterranean Fleet under the command of Vice-Admiral 

Escadre E. Jozan in the cruiser De Grasse, to provide an excellent demonstration of the close 

co-operation and common tactical doctrine that now exists among the N.A.T.O. naval forces. 

One example of this excellent co-operation was given by a group of Canadian, French and 

British frigates. Commanded by a French Captain and assisted by Canadian helicopters, the 

group hunted and 'sank' a British submarine in difficult weather conditions.

104 NAVAL AFFAIRS 

H.M.S. EAGLE'S 10,000 DECK LANDINGS 

On October 2% a Skyraider of 849 Squadron made the 10,000th landing by fixed wing aircraft 

during the present commission of H.M.S. Eagle. In this 144-month period nearly 2,000 landings 

by helicopters were also logged. In addition to this not inconsiderable feat H.M.S. Eagle's 

commission has been full of variety and interest and has provided an excellent example of the 

versatility of the aircraft carrier. Exercises and operations have taken her from the Arctic Circle 

-Exercise 'Strikeback'-to the Eastern Mediterranean-the Lebanon and Jordan crises-and 

into the Black Sea for a visit to Istanbul. At the time of the Iraq coup Eagle was at 48 hours' 

notice for steam whilst carrying out maintenance in Malta. Thirty-six hours later she was at sea. 

This was made possible by great efforts on the part of the dockyard and ship's company. At 

the same time 802 Squadron of Sea Hawks, which had recently returned to the U.K. in H.M.S. 

Ark Royal, flew out to reinforce Eagle at only 24 hours' notice. 

During the commission it has become normal practice to replenish with fuel and stores at 

sea. Even personnel have been flown on board or embarked at sea. On one occasion 192 men 

were transferred in two hours from the destroyer Contest. Since February, 1957, Eagle has 

steamed 64,000 miles, using 75,000 tons of furnace fuel oil, 90,000 tons of avcat (jet aircraft fuel), 

215,000 gallons of high octane aircraft fuel (this would take a 30 m.p.g. car nearly 6& million 

miles). Her cooks have baked 200 tons of bread and enough sausages have been eaten to stretch 

22) miles! Last but not least, 91 banns of marriage have been read. In 1959 Eagle returns to 

this country to be taken in hand for modernisation to enable her to operate the Scimitar and 

the Sea Vixen, which by then will be in service, and to handle the modern weapons with which 

these aircraft will be equipped. 

EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN 'FLAG SHOWING' VISITS RESUMED 

With the return of more normal conditions in the Eastern Mediterranean, courtesy calls to foreign 

ports in the area by ships of the Mediterranean Fleet are to be resumed. Arrangements have 

been made for H.M. ships Dufton and Kildarton to visit Beirut at the end of November, while 

at the same time H.M.S. Sh&eld, escorted by the destroyers Trafalgar and Dunkirk, visited 

Haifa. 

The 1958 programme of visits has been seriously interfered with and the visits to Beirut, 

which is a popular port of call, have been out of the question during recent months. It is hoped 

that the recent improvement in the Middle East situation will make it possible for this form 

of friendly contact to be expanded again next year. 

EAST INDIES 

NAVY HELPS BURNING TANKERS 

While exercising in the Gulf of Oman on September 13th, H.M. ships Bulwark and Loch 

Killisport intercepted distress signals indicating that the Liberian tanker Melika and the French 

tanker Fernand Gilabert had collided some 150 miles to the southward and that both ships were 

ablaze and abandoned. The Bulwark recovered her aircraft, except for one Skyraider, and 

proceeded at best speed towards the collision area, telling Loch Killisport to follow. The Sky- 

raider went off to locate the stricken vessels. Puma and St. Brides Bay, who were in the area, 

were ordered to proceed to the scene of the collision. 

When the Skyraider reached the scene one tanker, down by the bow and burning fiercely 

forward, was in sight. Dense smoke made identification from the air impossible. The Swedish 

tankers Ceres and Sira and the British tankers Anglican Diligence and Border Hunter were picking 

up survivors. There was no sign of the second ianker. Those tankers who had injured survivors 

on board were asked to close the Bulwark, who was steaming towards them, so that helicopters 

could fly medical aid as soon as practicable. When the ships were in range doctors from the 

the Bulwark were flown ahead by helicopter. About an hour later the Bulwark joined company 

with the rescue tankers and the ships steamed southwards while helicopters of 845 Squadron 

transferred the Bulwark's Commander and a small firefighting team to the stricken tanker which 

was now about 12 miles away from the Bulwark and had been identified by a relief Skyraider 

as the Fernand Gilabert. 

Reports from the rescue ships and the survivors indicated that after the collision Melika had, 

although abandoned, continued to steam southwards at speed. About an hour later she was 

located by a searching Skyraider and reported on fire and listing, some 25 miles from the scene 

of the collision. Having embarked the injured, the Bulwark steamed south, passing close to 

Melika, who was on fire amidships. A party of four was put on board to fight the fire. Bulwark 

then steamed towards Masira to fly off a Skyraider and three helicopters with injured survivors 

to the R.A.F. Station at Masira for onward flinht to Bahrein and hospital.

NAVAL AFFAIRS 10s 

On her return to the Melika, H.M.S. Bulwark found the Puma standing by. Some of the 

Puma's ship's company had managed to get on board the after-end of Melika but they could not 

join with the Bulwark's party because fire amidships 'cut' the ship in two. The only com- 

munication between the parties was by radio-Bulwark's Commander reporting from the 

Fernand Gilabert that all fires were out and that St. Brides Bay and Loch Killisport were standing 

by her. 

Ablaze amidships, her gunwale awash and seas forming geysers through the mid-deck hatches, 

Melika made an impressive sight as Bulwark prepared to pass a tow. In the moderate swell 

both ships were rolling considerably, making boat work difficult. On one occasion a seaboat 

was caught under the Bulwark's counter, injuring two of the boat's crew, and on another the 

Melika's bows holed the Bulwark above the waterline. The tow was at last secured but progress 

was slow as Melika yawed widely. After only two hours the tow parted. 

Meanwhile H.M.S. St. Brides Bay had managed to get Fernand Gilabert in tow by the stem 

and was making for the shelter of Ras a1 Hadd. Progress was painfully slow and towing extremely 

dillicult. After only a few hours this tow parted. Bad weather temporarily prevented another 

tow being passed, but a party of engineers were flown on board the Fernand Gdabert by 

helicopter from the Bulwark, who had arrived to lend a hand. 

Eventually tows were successfully passed to both the tankers. Loch Killisport took the Fernand 

Gilabert slowly to Karachi while the Bulwark towed Melika to Muscat with H.M.S. Puma secured 

to the stern of Melika to make steering possible. 

CLOSING DOWN OF EAST INDIES STATION 

When the flag of the hundredth and last Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Navy's East Indies 

Station was struck at 9.0 a.m. on September 7th, the command ceased to exist. At the time 

his flag was flying in H.M.S. Jufair, the naval base at Bahrein. The intention to abolish the 

East Indies Command was announced by the Admiralty in February. Its responsibilities are 

being divided between the Commanders-in-Chief of the Far East and South Atlantic and South 

America Stations and the Commander of the new Arabian Seas and Persian Gulf Stations. The 

latter Station comprises the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, the Arabian Sea and a small area of the 

north-western part of the Indian Ocean. 

Captain G. F. M. Best, R.N., Senior Naval Officer Persian Gulf, assumed the new title of 

Commodore Arabian Seas and Persian Gulf on Seutember 7th. He will also be Naval Deuuty 

to the Commander, British Forces, Arabian ~eniniula, at Aden. For the present, however, hk 

will remain at Bahrein. 

QUEEN'S COLOUR LAID UP 

On November 6th, on Horse Guards Parade, and in the Church of St Martin's-in-the-Field, 

was enacted the final chapter in the 200 years-long history of the East Indies Station. First 

the Colour with Guard and Royal Marines Band was paraded before the hundredth and last 

Commander-in-Chief of the Station, Vice-Admiral Sir Hilary Biggs, K B.E., C.B., D.S.O. 

After the inspection the Guard, with bayonets fixed, escorted the Colour into St. Martins-inthe-Fields, 

there to be laid up in perpetuity in what is traditionally the parish church of the 

- .- 

Admiralty. 

In the congregation were no less than nine former Commanders-in-Chief of the Station and 

six members of the Board of Admiralty, including the First Lord, the Earl of Selkirk, who read 

lesson, and the First Sea Lord. After the singing of the sailors' hymn 'Eternal Father', the 

Queen's Colour of the East Indies Station, borne by a Lieutenant marching at the slow and 

escorted by two Leading Seamen and a Chief Petty Officer, was brought to the chancel steps, 

where it was taken by Vice-Admiral Biggs. As the escort presented arms, the Admiral slowly 

bore the Colour to the altar rails and there delivered it to the Vicar, the Reverend Austen Williams, 

using the time-honoured words :- 

'Reverend Sir, this, the last of the Queen's Colours carried in the Service of the Queen's 

Commonwealth by the East Indies Station, Royal Navy, I now deliver into your hands 

for safe custody within these ancient walls" 

The first naval ships were sent to the East Indies in 1744 at the request of the Honourable 

East India Company. In command of them was Commodore Curtis Bennet, first of one hundred 

officers, including such famous names as Boscawen, Vernon, Byron and Cornwallis and, more 

recently, Sir James Somenrille, to command the East Indies Station. 

The flag of Admiral Biggs was hauled down on September 7th and at that moment the 

Command, which embraced northern and central parts of the Indian Ocean and the naval bases 

at Trincomalee, Bahrein and Aden, ceased to exist. Its responsibilities are now divided between 

the Commanders-in-Chief of the Far East and the South Atlantic and South America Stations 

and the Commodore of the newly-formed Arabian Seas and Persian Gulf Station.

NAVAL AFFAIRS 

CANADA 

NEW TECHNICAL SCHOOL AT ESQUIMALT 

The Royal Canadian Navy's new Naval Technical School at Esquirnalt, B.C., was opened 

officially by the Hon. George R. Pearkes, V.C., Minister of National Defence, on October 18th. 

Purpose of the School is to provide naval technical personnel with the finest possible training 

from basic to advanced level. Completely modem in design and facilities, it will serve as a 

primary source of highly skilled personnel required to operate and maintain the increasing 

amount of technical equipment being developed for the ships of the fleet. Engineering, air 

engineering, electrical, electronics, ordnance and shipwright courses will be covered in the 

technical school. 

A w$g of the building is allocated for the elementary and classroom training of technical 

apprentices. However, they will do their advanced training in the shops of the main section. 

Still further benefits are the elimination of duplication of workshop training and the stream- 

lining of instructional procedures. Formerly separate, the ordnance, mechanical and electrical 

training establishments in H.M.C.S. Naden have been incorporated in the new school, as has 

the training establishment for naval technical apprentices. The apprentices formerly received 

their training at Halifax in the maintenance ship, H.M.C.S. Cape Breton. Transferred to the 

West Coast, the Cape Breton is being refitted to serve as a mobile repair ship for fleet support. 

R.C.N. PERSONNEL TO SERVE IN H.M.S. BRITANNIA DURING 1959 

With the approval of Her Majesty the Queen, the ship's company of H.M. Yacht Britannia 

will include representatives of the Royal Canadian Navy during her visit to Canada next year 

for the opening of the St. Lawrence Seaway. The contingent will be two officers and fifteen 

ratings strong and, in order to find the required vacancies in the yacht's complement as they arise, 

they will join in two drafts, the &st in January, 1959, before Britannia's world cruise with H.R.H. 

The Duke of Edinburgh, and the second in May, 1959, before the yacht sails for Canada.

Rook Reviews 

THE VERNON PAPERS 

Edited by B. McL. RANET 

(The Navy Records Society. Vol. XCIX. 45s.) 

THE 100th volume published by the Navy Records Society is devoted to Nelson. 

By a happy accident the 99th concerns a man who was in many respects Nelson's 

professional forerunner, and who also belonged to East Anglia, and was brought 

forward in the Service by an East Anglian Admiral. Vernon described the connection, 

when himself an Admiral, in a letter to the First Lord of the Admiralty 

forty years later: 'I rose gradually myself to be First Lieutenant under that gallant 

and experienced seaman and Admiral, Sir Cloudesley Shovell, whose memory I 

shall ever honour and whose calm temper and humane behaviour I shall ever pray 

God to be able to imitate him in. Vacancies in a fireship and a bomb happened 

abroad while I was so, which he very friendly advised me to decline, and when I 

came home advanced me to a post ship for my first command'. 

Incidentally this promotion direct to Captain, without serving as a Commander, 

made Vernon senior to Lestock, who was several years older and had been Vernon's 

senior as a Lieutenant in Shovell's flagship, Britannia. Lestock had accepted 'a 

vacancy in a fireship'-a Commander's command-but was not promoted Captain 

until after Vernon. We learn something of Vernon's character from the fact that 

w 

Lestock, so ready to quarrel with others, remained an admiring friend of Vernon 

after serving under him in the West Indies, and called him 'that provident great 

Admiral'. But how far Vernon was enabled to imitate his teacher's calm temper, 

the reader may judge from the letters Mr. Ranft has printed in this volume. 

These letters come in the main from the Vernon Papers in the National Maritime 

Museum, supplemented by other manuscripts at Greenwich and in the public records. 

They cover his two periods of service as a flag officer: in command of the Jamaica 

Station, 1739-42, and in the Downs, August to December, 1745. Mr. Ranft provides 

most admirable introductions for both parts, and has judged wisely in his selection 

of supplementary material. The principal events in Part One are the quick success 

at Porto Bello in November, 1739, and the dreadfully disappointing combined 

expedition against Cartagena in the spring of 1741-one feels that Shovell himself 

might have lost his temper at the way things were done on shore there! Besides 

the operations, however, there is a large section of documents about the administration 

of the command: stores and hospitals, health and discipline, and so on. These 

letters add to our knowledge (I think our rather slender knowledge) of the day-today 

life of the Service in the eighteenth century. It is in this his first command as an 

Admiral, too, that we meet with Vernon's tactical ideas and innovations. Mr. Rad suggests that in this Vernon was inspired by Shovell or by Norris, who had been 

Chief of Staff in the Britannia in the old days; however this may be, it is clear that 

Vernon's tactical innovations marked a stage on the road towards Nelson. 

At home in 1745, with renewed threat of invasion from France, for there had 

been an attempt the year before, Vernon was the natural successor to the aged Norris

I 08 THE VERNON PAPERS 

as Commander-in-Chief. That grand old man, when the former attempt had been 

repulsed, protested he had 'served the Crown longer as an Admiral than any man 

ever did'-since 1707-and begged leave to retire. At first, then, Vernon.was 

intended to take his place in command of everything at sea in home waters. In the 

end, however, he was restricted to the area of immediate danger, watching from 

the Downs the invasion pons of Ostend and Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne. The 

Western Squadron (Channel Fleet) based on Plymouth remained a separate com- 

mand; so did the shios held in reserve under the Commander-&Chief, Portsmouth; 

so also did a new &all squadron under Byng formed, at Vernon's own instigation; 

for the East Coast of Scotland when the Jacobite Rebellion had got under way. 

Mr. Ranft points out that the Admiral 'was then writing to the Admiralty at 

great length at least once a day and at this stage of his career was much given to 

prolixity and repetition'. There is a great deal of value in these letters all the same. 

They are full of information about the work of his ships in the North Sea and off 

the coast of Flanders, and of advice on various measures he thought necessary-and 

Mr. Ranft has pruned them of much of the repetition. The situation may be 

compared with that in 1803 when Keith was in Vernon's place, as described in 

Volume I11 of 'The Keith Papers', edited by Professor Lloyd. So may we compare 

the force Vernon was given fbr his task with the vastly greater force under Keith: 

indeed Vernon was little better off than Dover Command in 1940. As time went 

on he began to complain about this; but the Navy of that date was strangely lacking 

in the smaller cruisers, the equivalents of our destroyers and frigates. Vernon, 

Byng, the Western Squadron, let alone the foreign stations, could have easily em- 

ployed three times as many as they had. It was no more the fault of the existing 

Board of Admiralty (as they now and then ventured to remind him) than was the 

iniquitous system of manning the fleet by impressment, which Vernon occasionally 

railed against and which was to continue another hundred years. 

At any rate it was largely due to the services of his command that the British 

troops were brought home safely from the Continent to deal with the rising, that 

but few supplies of men or munitions reached the rebels in Scotland, and that the 

threat of invasion came to nothing, that the French were convinced that their plan 

would not work. But before this could be known in England, the Admiral was 

superseded in his command by Martin, from the western Squadron, in circum- 

stances that are well described in Mr. Ranft's introduction. Admiral Richmond, 

having Vernon's great qualities much in mind, thought him very badly treated: 'His 

offering of advice may perhaps have been unpalatable to the Duke of Bedford and 

Lord Sandwich, but it was the advice of an experienced seaman. Every proposal 

that he made was eventually adopted. . . .'1 Certainly there was nobody of Vernon's 

stature in the Admiralty, though Anson, then a junior Rear Admiral, was already 

proving his quality and the young Lord Sandwich, alert and active-minded, was 

Anson's earnest disciple: but for a long time Their Lordships did welcome the 

Admiral's advice. At length, however, his endless letters became too much, 

culminating in that of Christmas Day, of which No. 502 in this volume is an extract. 

Next day (No. 504) he was ordered to strike his flag and come ashore. 

J.H.O. 

1 'The Navy in the War of 1739-48', 11, p. 184. 

. . - - - . - -

BRASSEY'S ANNUAL : 

THE ARMED FORCES YEAR-BOOK, 1958 

Edited by Rear Admiral H. G. THURSFIELD 

(Wm. Clowes and Sons Ltd. 60s.) 

As usual this indispensable book ranges widely over many aspects of defence matters. 

Apart from the usual Reference Section, bringing together all the White Papers on 

Defence, Service Estimates, Pay and Organisation of the Fighting Services, there 

are, in the body of the book, twenty-nine chapters jam-packed with important and 

interesting facts and discussions, besides a large number of superlative photographs. 

Among the chapters on 'General' subjects is an interesting discussion on 'Limited 

War' by Dr. Bernard Brodie, an article by Major-General Wilson on 'The Modern 

Relationship of Statesmen and Military Leaders', in which the methods and per- 

sonal'lties of Stalin, Hitler, Mussolini, Roosevelt and Churchill are compared, 

followed by some thoughts on the future. Richard Goold-Adams writes on 'Those 

against the H-Bomb' and their various reasons for being so; he concludes that it 

would do no harm, and might help, if the Government were a bit less 'hush-hush' 

about the whole thing. There is an authoritative chapter on 'The Arab Shore 

of the Persian Gulf-Its Political and Military Problems' by Sir Rupert Hay who, 

after seven years as British High Commissioner in that area, clearly knows his 

subject. Brigadier Barclay contributes two chapters, one on 'A Career in the Fighting 

Services' and another on 'Selection and Training for High Command', in which 

he advocates the more purposeful and conscious education of officers of all three 

Services who are destined for the highest ranks, and whose personal experience in 

the last war may have little relevance to the present 'cold' or a future 'hot' war. He 

advocates retaining the I.D.C. for the 'higher direction' but he advocates also a 

three-Service (and Civil Service) War College for officers at BrigadierIMajor-General 

level with a course lasting one or even two years. In his discussion of these matters 

it is rather surprising that he does not mention the fact that the Navy has been 

running such a Senior Officers' War Course for years. There is a chapter on 'Guided 

Missiles' by W. T. Gunston which your reviewer found quite fascinating; it describes 

all the current miracles, and some which are just around the corner, in a matter-of- 

fact fashion, with the exception, of course, of those produced by Iron Curtain 

countries. 

Among the chapters devoted to the work of the three Services those on Air 

matters predominate. There is 'The Royal Air Force in the Atomic Age' by Air 

Marshal Saundby, 'New Men for a New Air Force' by Group Captain Foxley- 

Norris, 'The Changing Air Force' by D. M. Desoutter, and 'The Future of Air 

Power' by John W. R. Taylor. The writers of all these seem to have their feet 

firmly on the ground, if that is the right expression, and they all agree in denouncing 

that part of the 1957 White Paper on Defence which predicted that the end of 

manned strike and interceptor aircraft was in sight in this country. There is one 

statement in the last-named chapter where the author says: ' "Ban the Bomb" 

enthusiasts point out that the money saved by abandoning nuclear weapons could 

be spent on increasing our conventional forces; but this would achieve nothing. 

Paragraph 35 of the 1958 White Paper says in effect that expenditure on our nuclear 

striking force is less than 10 per cent of the total Defence Estimates. So if we spent

this money instead on conventional forces it would increase their fighting strength 

by no more than this percentage'. The italics are mine. This is surely thoroughly 

misleading; with a 'windfall' of 10 per cent of the entire Defence Budget it would 

obviously be possible, if we felt like it, enormously to increase, perhaps to double, 

our supply of some less exotic and expensive armaments, e.g. infantrymen. Air 

Marshal Yo01 contributes an interesting description of the United States Air Force; 

as President Eisenhower told Congress last January, 'The most powerful deterrent 

to war in the world today lies in the retaliatory power of our Strategic Air Command 

and the aircraft of our Navy. They present to any potential attacker who would 

unleash war upon the world the prospect of virtual annihilation of his own country'. 

Finally there is a fairly detailed chapter called 'Aircraft Development' by Group 

Captain Williamson which should not be missed. 

Chapters specifically on Army matters are 'Britain's Future Strategic Reserve' 

and 'Atomic Weapons in the Land Battle'. There is also a very lucid description 

of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation' by Colonel Wyndham. 

The naval articles include a penetrating discussion on 'Naval Strategy Today' 

against the background of an East/West trial of strength by Professor A. E. Sokol. 

Admiral Schofield again concisely reviews the year's progress of foreign navies and 

he has another chapter, entitled 'A Balanced Fleet', in which he reviews our own 

Navy and, finding that it is anything but 'balanced', suggest what we ought to build 

at once. There is a chapter by Captain Banks, R.M., on 'Cold Weather Warfare 

Training in the Royal Marinesy-very informative and well written. A chapter by 

Captain Asprey on 'The United States Marine Corps' makes one gasp at the scale 

on which they do things in America. The Marine Corps is being reduced next year 

to a strength of 175,000, just about twice the target figure for the whole of our Navy! 

Besides the detachments serving traditionally in the Fleet, the Corps disposes three 

active divisions of 19,000 each, three air wings of 8 to 10,000 each and each with 

an aircraft strength of something under 400, etc., etc. Truly an 'outfit' to make 

our Royals' mouths water! Admiral Horan has a chapter, distinctly heartening 

amid the current gloom on the subject of N.A.T.O., describing its major exercises 

during the year. There is a chapter by Commander Ross on the New Naval 

Discipline Act and another by Admiral Mansergh on his pet 'hobby-horse, 'Sail 

Training', as he tells me that it is being reprinted in this edition of THE NAVAL 

REVIEW comment would be superfluous! 

The Editor has his usual wise opening chapter, this time entitled 'The Object 

in War'. Altogether this 'Brassey's' is well up to its own very high standard; no 

wonder its study is regarded by M.P.s who see themselves as budding Service 

Ministers as a 'must'! 

G.M.

'VICTORY WITHOUT WAR, 1958-1961' 

By GEORGE FIELDING ELIOT 

Published by The United States Naval Institute, Annapolis. 

THIS 

book is reviewed at somewhat greater length than is usual, because it has not 

yet been published in this country and is difficult to acquire. 

It provides an enthusiastic, clear, and in many respects extremely convincing 

claim for the advantages of using a mobile sea-based striking force to provide the 

strategic deterrent against global war with Russia. The author starts by dis- 

cussing the threat posed by the Russians and describes their aims and objectives. 

He then covers the question of the 'nuclear sufficiency' situation which is expected 

to be on us soon, and indeed carries the arguments a little further than usual. He 

asserts that when Russia is able to make a massive attack with inter-continental 

ballistic missiles on the United States, a new situation will arise and will do so 

shortly. He argues that the main requirement for an effective deterrent is that it 

should be credible and convincing to the enemy. From this he goes on to say that 

in a short space of time Russia will have advanced so far in the art of ballistic missiles 

and will have built up such a formidable force of these weapons that she will be 

able to strike at the roots of American strategic air power, whether conducted by 

aircraft or ballistic missiles; whether from the United States or from U.S. advanced 

bases in other countries. When such a situation arises, he asserts, the Russians 

will no longer think that the American deterrent is convincing and will be tempted, 

and indeed are now planning, to conduct what he calls 'nibbling' operations all 

around the periphery of the Western world. 

He forecasts aggressive initiatives on the lines of Hider's moves before the last 

war and says that, if these are allowed to succeed, the fate of the West is sealed, 

for the Soviets will then have acquired freedom of action to pursue their political 

aim of world domination. 

Having discussed the Soviet threat, he considers the geographical factors at 

issue-the land-locked Soviet empire and the great stretches of ocean within easy 

reach of the Navies of the West. And he comes to the firm conclusion that 'the 

sea is our logical battleground'. From here, he goes on to describe the merits of 

the seaborne deterrent, exercised by aircraft carriers armed with jet bombers 

carrying nuclear weapons, with carriers and cruisers carrying the 'Regulus' super- 

sonic missile, with nuclear-powered submarines armed with the 'Polaris' inter- 

mediate-range ballistic missile and later with nuclear powered seaplanes. He 

urges that the size of the seaborne deterrent force should rapidly be increased, 

that the pace of modernisation, of new construction and of development of weapons 

should be markedly accelerated and that by 1961 at least 20% of the strategic striking 

power of the United States should be based on the sea. 

The British Navy is invited to contribute two carrier striking forces to the strategic 

deterrent now, though here the author shows an ignorance of the tactical points at 

issue and in particular does not appear to appreciate the worth of the N.A. 39 

Strike aircraft. He also suggests the use of the two new French carriers for such 

a role later on in 1960 but he gives few details of how this could be achieved. 

He argues that for a deterrent to be credible and convincing, the force which 

provides it must have three qualifications. Firstly, it must be sufficient in strength

I I 2 VICTORY WITHOUT WAR, 1958-1961 

to inflict unacceptable damage on Russia and its weapon carriers must be capable 

of certain penetration of the enemy defences and of high accuracy of aim. Secondly, 

the force must be reasonably immune from surprise attack. And thirdly, the force 

providing the deterrent, must be situated far away from populated areas, whether 

in the United States or in the territories of her allies. He asserts strongly that a 

seaborne deterrent force of the type previously described would fulfil all these 

requirements. Moreover, he claims that, unless such a step is taken and taken 

quickly, the N.A.T.O. alliance will crumble, because the European Nations will not 

believe that the United States will be willing to unleash the tremendous power 

of her strategic strike forces in the certain knowledge that to do so will be to commit 

suicide herself, and he draws comparisons with the time of Munich and the popular 

cry 'why risk bombs on London and on Paris to save Austria, the Sudetenland, 

and Danzig'. Will the U.S. risk certain suicide for Norway, for Hamburg? His 

answer is 'under the shield of a land based deterrent-No'. 

He predicts that the N.A.T.O. nations will become neutralist and that in this 

way the Russians will be well on the way to gaining their ends by comparatively 

peaceful means. With the formation of a strong seaborne deterrent force however, 

he believes that the deterrent will remain convincing and credible to the Russians 

and dependable to the N.A.T.O. alliance. He goes even further to claim that 

when such a seaborne force is available it will be possible to ban Russia's sub- 

marines from the oceans by political agreement, to take the political offensive against 

her and, in brief, to win the war without a fight. 

There is a tremendous amount of convincing and logical reasoning in this book. 

In particular, I liked the description of the fears induced in the European nations 

by the siting of ballistic missiles on their soils and the advantages gained when the 

missiles are placed at sea where the enemy can have little idea of their position and 

little opportunity to prevent their use. The author also points out that the 'time 

of decision' in a ballistic contest between land based missiles is very short-a matter 

of minutes; whereas seaborne retaliation need not be released without due pause for 

thought and possibly for negotiation. This particular argument is perfectly valid 

when considering the deterrent provided by bomber aircraft and by ballistic missiles 

sited above ground. When we get ballistic missiles placed underground where they 

may be invulnerable, the advantages of the seaborne deterrent will, from this point 

of view, become less. 

Unfortunately, the author seriously prejudices the strong case he would have 

made by exaggeration and by unsound assumptions. Everything connected with 

the seaborne deterrent must be good; everything connected with the strategic air 

command or with land-sited ballistic missiles must be ineffective. Perhaps the 

weakest feature is the tendency to make exaggerated claims, to over-emphasize the 

speed at which the Russian threat is becoming imminent and to claim faster pro- 

gress in the tactical field by the United States than sounds practicable. Indeed, 

the author basis his case on some assumptions which are to say the least ofit highly 

arguable. To take one or two examples, he states that all the U.S. strategic air 

command bases and missile sites will soon be capable of being neutralised by surprise 

Russian attack by inter-continental ballistic missiles, that the Russian air defences 

will have improved enormously and that therefore, by 1961 or 1962, the land-based 

allied deterrent will no longer be effective in its overall aim. He agrees that in 

these circumstances, a number of bombers could be airborne or could be got into the

THE SOVIET NAVY 113 

air at the time of surprise attack, but he does not consider that these bombers 

could penetrate sufficiently to deter Russia from such a 'bolt from the blue'. These 

assumptions seem incredible to me and spoil much of the argument. 

He also credits the United States anti-submarine effectiveness with startling 

improvements in the next few years and at the same time denies the Russians 

similar advances on the ground of lack of experience in anti-submarine warfare. 

He credits the hunter killer groups of A.S.W. carriers with high ability, both to 

kill submarines and remain afloat in the face of a submarine threat. He may be 

right-I hope that he is-but I do not consider that these assumptions are a safe 

basis for planning. 

In general, however, 1 commend this book strongly to all students of war and in 

particular to those engaged in the current search for the right answer to the in- 

tractable problems with which a state of 'nuclear sufficiency' will confront us. It 

seems madness to plaster this country with extremely expensive ballistic missiles 

if an effort comparable in size and effectiveness could be provided by nuclear- 

submarines for equivalent or smaller cost. It seems a matter of urgency to carry 

out a careful costing of the two systems-fixed land-based missiles on the one hand 

and missiles embarked in nuclear submarines on the other, and, after confirmation 

that the technical claims on each side can in fact be achieved, to take a firm decision 

on one or the other. There are few other factors to consider-the Cold and Limited 

war roles of either the Polaris submarine or the I.R.B.M. are negligible and the 

issue therefore boils down to a straight determination of which can provide the 

strongest effective, convincing, and economical deterrent to Global war. 

BLAKE. 

THE SOVIET NAVY 

Edited by Commander M. G. SAUNDERS 

(Weidenfeld and Nicolson 36s.) 

WE know that the Soviet has eased up the Iron Curtain of late but I confess to 

surprise at finding so much information of real importance as is contained in this 

book. This satisfactory accomplishment must be due to extensive and conscientious 

research and good teamwork; for the book is a compilation of articles written by 

eighteen experts of diverse nationalities : 6 British, 3 American, 2 German, 2 Swedish, 

2 Turkish, 1 French, 1 Danish and 1 Japanese. 

The subjects discussed are many and varied; there are chapters on the history 

and development of the Russian Navy, on political and strategical aspects of Soviet 

general and naval policy; others, more factual and technical, dealing with ships and 

armaments, including of course the naval air arm (which latter we are told is develop- 

ing but slowly); the merchant navy and fisheries; chapters on geography, including one 

entitled 'The Perimeter', which is a commentary on the position of Sweden, Den- 

mark, Turkey and Japan vis-a-vis Russia. From all this, and there is much more 

beside, it will be seen that the table is well spread and ready to satisfy the healthiest 

appetite.

114 INSIDE RUSSIA TODAY 

As we have all heard such a great deal on the general Russian political and military 

question readers of this book will no doubt find their main interest turning to those 

more concrete factors by which Soviet sea power is made possible, such as Russia's 

geography, her naval bases and shipping ports, her inland waterways which play 

an important part in the strategic movement of her forces, her merchant and fishing 

fleets. It is interesting to learn that her mercantile fleet will not meet even her 

peacetime requirements until 1960 and that the fishing industry is indispensable for 

the food supply of her population. The possibilities and limitations of the north 

Siberian sea route, the important part played by modern ice-breakers and freighter 

ice-breakers and many other such material factors, all demand attention if the 

strategic picture is to be understood. 

Students of war will, I think, find special food for thought in the 'Perimeter' 

article. Could Britain, assisted by other N.A.T.O. forces, once again make her 

sea power felt in the Baltic ? Could the allies operate in the Black sea and even in the 

Caspian ? 

The general arrangement of the book, might, I think, have been better in one 

respect. The Introduction deals very fully with the Russian question as a whole- 

Communism, Communistic methods, the threat to world peace, thermo-nuclear, 

atomic and 'conventional' war, general strategy and other such matters of which one 

has already heard so much, but which obviously call for recapitulation in a book of this 

sort. But it seems unnecessary to repeat these general matters in the chapters which 

follow and the reader may experience irritation at the repetition. However, this is 

but a minor defect and one which cannot detract from the very great value of the 

book which, in presenting so much pertinent information, enables the student of 

war to think out a strategy of his own, perhaps even a better one than that generally 

held. He may also, after studying some of the facts here provided, be able to give 

a tip as to the period left to us before war supervenes-if it ever does. 

The printing could not be better. There are several useful maps and tables. 

The 'jacket' catches the eye. 

G. C. DICKENS 

INSIDE RUSSIA TODAY 

By JOHN GUNTHER 

(Hamish Hamilton, 1958. 25s.) 

IN his section on 'Ballistic Missiles and the Sputniks' the remarkable author of 

this most important of all his 'Inside' series of books speaks of the disconcerting 

speed with which missiles have been and are being developed; only a newspaper 

or an almanac could keep up with a subject 'so unpredictable, reverberatingly con- 

fused and mercurial'. In a lesser degree this is true of his whole subject, Soviet 

Russia, 'this cumbrous, slippery giant, with its evolving strains and issues'. 

By 'today' the author means since Stalin's death in 1953. At once, within half 

an hour of Stalin's death, de-Stalinisation began, and in December of that year 

the detested Beria joined other Soviet police chiefs in death by execution. But it 

was not until February 1956 that the climax of de-Stalinisation came. In this

INSIDE RUSSIA TODAY 115 

month Kruschev made two notable speeches to the "Twentieth Congress", the second 

of which had a shattering impact both upon the U.S.S.R. and the world at large. 

In the first, on February 14th, Kruschev violently denounced the inevitability of 

war between capitalist and communist states; he declared with equal vigour that 

the co-existence of states with different social systems was a fundamental Leninist 

principle of Soviet foreign policy. The Soviet ship of state could hardly have been 

more violently put about! 

The text of Kruschev's second speech, that of February 24th and 25th (it began 

before midnight and lasted for six hours), has never been published in Russia, but 

the substance of it was conveyed, after its delivery to the 1,400 members of the 

Congress, to all members of 'the Party', and was relayed to vast numbers of non- 

party listeners. The full text leaked out to the West, and was published verbatim 

both in this country and in the U.S.A. In this speech Kruschev not only repudiated 

Stalin, but for his-own reasons found it necessary and advisable to 'trample on his 

grave'. Mr. Gunther rightly deals with the speech at some length, giving well- 

chosen extracts from it to illustrate Kruschev's powerful vituperation of his one-time 

chief. It is startling even today to read in this quarter descriptions of Stalin as 'a 

criminal murderer', 'a fabricator of dirty and shameful cases', and 'a brutal, despotic, 

capricious, irritable slanderery-this and much more from a man who, knowing 

better than any all that Stalin had stood for, raised no whisper against him during 

his lifetime; full well he knew that his head would be the price of utterance. Stalin's 

'Cult of the Individual', his over-weening self-glorification (in contrast to Lenin's 

modesty), his invention and use of the accusative formula 'Enemy of the People' 

for annihilating all who stood against him, his use of torture to extort false con- 

fessions, his decimation of the army by purges which deprived it of 50 per cent of 

its finest officers-all came under the lash of Kruschev's tongue. He goes on to 

deplore the novels and films which exalt Stalin into a war hero-'They make us 

feel sick'. 

Gunther shares with most post-Stalin writers on Russia the opinion that Russia's 

'new look' is genuine though limited, that there is a very real degree of liberalisation, 

that the days of purges and of open terror are over, along with the utter restriction 

and constriction of the Dast. This estimate and the considerations on which it is 

based are among the most important sections of the book. 

In the eyes of the men of the Kremlin the movement towards freedom seemed 

to be premature, for in June, after the speeches came the Poznan Riots in Poland; 

in October, the Hungarian Revolution burst upon them. To the events in Hungary 

and their implications is given in this book a breath-taking chapter. 

With great fairness every aspect of life in the U.S.S.R. is treated with that arresting 

power that has made Gunther's books each a landmark in international journalism: 

the queer relationship between Government and Party, the astonishing advances 

made in the space of forty years by a mainly peasant and illiterate collection of 

races-in the technical sciences, in the arts, in provision for health, in education, 

in sport, and in the bringing together (by whatever means) of fifteen 'republics' of 

almost countless races and tongues, covering a sixth of the land surfaces of the 

earth. At the same time the writer keeps in view the weaknesses of this 'sprawling 

gianty-weaknesses in agriculture, in its failure to bring into the lives of its millions 

of people that colour, that variety, that interest of which they are undoubtedly 

starved, and in the unsupplied demand for 'consumer goods' of every kind.

I I 6 THE ART OF NAVIGATION IN ENGLAND IN ELIZABETHAN AND EARLY STUART TIMES 

Mr. Gunther takes the reader with him in his wanderings into all the great cities, 

and into every type of country-from Arctic Siberia to the confines of Afghanistan, 

from the Black Sea in the west to Vladivostock on the Japan Sea, more than 6,000 

miles to the east. He takes him inside the Kremlin to talk with those in whose hands 

is more power than has perhaps ever been thus concentrated. He examines closely 

the economic pattern and the several 'Five Year Plans' which have brought it into 

being. He considers carefully the social picture, the place of women and children, 

crime and law, and the treatment of religion. Finally he gives careful and weighty 

consideration to such topics as 'The Russian Gamble for the World', 'What Has 

Russia Got ?-and what it hasn't got', and the chances of peaceful co-existence 

between the U.S.S.R. and the West. 

In his detailed treatment of 'The Soviet Armed Forces', some of Mr. Gunther's 

facts and comparisons are alarming-that 'the U.S.S.R. has the largest force of men 

under arms inthe world', that she has perhaps ten times as many divisions as N.A.T.O. 

can muster, that she has 'more glider troops and parachutists than all the armies 

of the rest of the world combined', that though she has no new battleships, no new 

heavy cruisers and no aircraft carriers, she has 'by far the largest submarine fleet 

in the world, probably 350 to 450 actually launched, with 600 as a goal; of these, 

100 to 200 are of long range', that her navy is 'the second navy in the world, having 

surpassed the British', that 'in 1957 Kruschev boasted that the Russians had a bomb 

so big that they did not dare to test itY. Some of these statements will be contro- 

verted. One hopes so. 

The book is a big one-568 closely packed pages, but the pages turn quickly and 

are 'unskippable'. The root of the matter is that 'it would be the gravest of errors 

to underestimate the power or to ignore or minimise the potentiality of the Soviet 

Union. . . . With the future of the world, no less, at stake, we at least owe it to 

ourselves to be informed. . . . It is our duty to learn more of the nature of the 

Russian people, who can be angels one minute and devils the next, and who, more 

than any other I know in the world, give constantly the note of striving for fulfilment, 

and have so much force, discipline and faith in spite of their bleak totalitarian 

surroundings'. 

THE ART OF NAVIGATION IN ENGLAND IN 

ELIZABETHAN AND EARLY STUART TIMES 

By Lieutenant-Commander DAVID W. WATERS, R.N. 

(Hollis & Carter, 1958. 84s.) 

GEORGE A. RIDING 

THIS 

is a massive book, both in physical size and in content. It is not the sort of 

book that it is any use borrowing from a library and returning. One must obtain 

one's own copy, read it and study it at leisure and ever afterwards keep handy on 

the shelf for quick reference. This is not to say that the treatment of the subject 

is unduly heavy. It is indeed a very readable book but the wealth of information 

that it conveys is such that only the reader who is exceptionally versed in the subject 

could hope to assimilate the contents at one reading. Anyone interested will want 

to return it to again and again.

THE ART OF NAVIGATION IN ENGLAND IN ELIZABETHAN AND EARLY STUART TIMES $17 

Until the reign of Henry VIII, English seaborne trade was largely coastal. Foreign 

trade extended to the Low Countries for European manufactures, to the Biscay 

ports and to Spain for wine, and to Iceland for fish. The ordinary tools of the pilot 

were the compass (with, perhaps, its accessory the lodestone), the lead and line, 

sand glasses, the rutter (as the early sailing directions were called) and primitive 

tide tables. Before the explorations of the Portuguese gathered momentum and 

their progress down the African coast made a knowledge of latitude most necessary, 

the southern European nations, who had formerly confined their voyaging to the 

Mediterranean, were in similar case. Except for the charts which served mainly to 

illustrate their sailing directions they had no additional aids. But about 1415 the 

quadrant, the earliest of marine instruments for finding altitude and hence latitude, 

first went to sea, to be followed in due course by the astrolabe, the cross-staff, 

declination tables. The voyages of Columbus and his successors led to improved 

methods of reckoning and soon the government-controlled navigation schools of 

Spain and Portugal produced a galaxy of ocean navigators who led the world 

in knowledge. The English lagged behind. Few men were interested in the new 

geographical knowledge, though John Cabot, a foreigner in a Bristol ship, had 

discovered Newfoundland in 1497, thereby inaugurating the cod fishery. But at 

last, when England found the traditional markets for her wool beginning to fail 

through cheaper competition, men turned their eyes to distant seas. At first reliance 

had to be placed in Spanish and sometimes in Portuguese or French navigators to 

guide them, so that it is said that in 1568 there was only one Englishman capable of 

conducting a ship on a voyage to the West Indies. Nevertheless, in the short space 

of twenty years from this date Englishmen had earned such a reputation that a 

Venetian reported of them that they were 'above all Western nations, expert and 

active in all naval operations, and great seadogs'. Progress had indeed been rapid. 

Old William Hawkins started his voyages to Guinea and Brazil about the year 

1530, but he had few imitators and it seems likely that the English incursions into the 

trade of the Spanish Indies would have remained spasmodic had it not been that 

in 1568 at St. Juan de Ulloa 'some idiot went too far' and treacherously attacked 

John Hawkins, son of William, and his companions. From this date the English 

can almost be said to have flocked to the ocean and soon they were finding a need 

to learn for themselves the methods of blue water navigation. The publication by 

William Bourne of his Regiment for the Sea in 1574 came at the right time. True, 

Eden's English translation of Cortes' Arte de Navegar had appeared some years 

earlier, but Bourne's was the first purely English original work on practical 

navigation and it was to prove the first of many. 

Bourne's first description of the log and line, and of the fitting of more than one 

cross to the cross-staff, Norman's discovery of magnetic dip, Borough's work on 

the variation of the compass, Wright's invention of the chart which bears Mercator's 

name, Davis' back-staff or quadrant-all these were the work of men with practical 

experience of the sea. They were ably seconded by the more theoretical practitioners 

such as Archdeacon Barlowe with his improvements to the compass, Hood with his 

public lectures, Molyneux with his globes. At the beginning of the 17th century 

such was their reputation abroad that Enashmen were employed by other nations 

as navigators, particularly by the early Dutch voyagers. What a change a few years 

had wrought ! 

The great impetus of the Elizabethan age carried on into the reign of James I.

118 GIVE ME A SHIP TO SAIL 

The early rather 'hit and miss' methods of navigation had given place to attempts 

to keep an accurate reckoning, first on a globe (which must have been a cumbersome 

object to take to sea), then by geometry on the Mercator's chart and then by arith- 

metical means-still very difficult for the calculations were long and complicated for 

the rather ill-educated mariner. Arithmetic was, however, greatly simplified by the 

decimal system and by the arrival of Napier's logarithms in 1614, followed a few years 

later by those of Briggs. It was brought within the capabilities of those who found 

even addition difficult by the invention in 1623 of Gunter's Scale, forerunner of the 

slide-rule. 

Such in very brief outline is the field covered by this great book. Every aspect of 

the story is explored in the fullest detail. Here one can find all the meat to be 

obtained from each of the authors of the period-the methods he taught, what he 

originated and his place vis-his his predecessors and contemporaries. All this 

cannot fail to be of the greatest value to the historian, particularly one interested in 

navigational methods, for most of these books are very rare and difficult to locate. 

Here we can also find the records of the navigating methods used by the more 

important voyagers, painstakingly abstracted from their journals. Interspersed 

among the matter of more immediate interest the reader will find himself con- 

tinuously coming across snippets of miscellaneous knowledge, such as that the i- 

and - signs were first adopted in 1489. A very full index makes it possible to find at 

need anything contained in this excellent book. Other most interesting features are 

the 33 Appendices giving extracts from contemporary works, valuable information 

on a variety of topics, an index to books published before 1640 and a bibliography 

of secondary sources. 

The iIlustrations are numerous and well chosen. The reader must not overlook 

the comments on them, which are printed, rather inconveniently, in the Contents 

instead of below the individual captions. We are filled with admiration for the 

labour and erudition which has gone into the production of this book, which is one 

that no student of maritime history will be able to afford to be without. 

'YAMEW' 

GIVE ME A SHIP TO SAIL 

By ALAN VILLIERS 

Hodder & Stoughton. Price 18s. 

THANKS 

largely to the medium of television and to the ballyhoo connected with the 

Mayflower project, Alan Villiers' name and face have now become as widely known 

as those of other less-deserving people who have been 'built-up' by modern publicity 

methods. In his case, however, this world-fame has been well earned, for he is a 

very remarkable man to whom the adjective 'unique' can be applied with truth. 

Alan Villiers is without doubt the most experienced and knowledgeable master- 

mariner in sail alive today, and he is still a comparatively young man. He has 

owned and commanded his own Barque, sailed as an apprentice in Cape Horners, 

visited the farthest corners of the earth in search of sailing ships, worked with the

GIVE ME A SHIP TO SAIL 1x9 

film industry as sailing master, and recently has crowned the whole of his life's 

endeavours by successfully sailing the Mayflower reproduction across the broad 

Atlantic, a truly remarkable feat in circumstances which prevented him from learning 

his ship before setting off. 

In addition to all this he has the gift of writing which makes the reader want to 

leave his armchair and go in search of adventures in sail, and he is also possessed 

of a comic genius which allows him to laugh but not sneer at his and other people's 

misfortunes. 

In 'Give me a ship to sail' he writes of his activities during the past four years, 

years crowned with Gilbertian situations and feats of seamanship enough to last a 

man a whole lifetime. 

The story of the filming of 'Moby Dick' is my favourite. He gives an extraordinary 

anda completely accurate picture of glorious muddle, single-minded effort amounting 

almost to heroism, and profligate waste of money which is the hall-mark of all 

imaginative Movie-moguls. The efforts of the director and his team of technicians 

to obtain satisfactory shots of masses of seagulls by strewing the waters of the Irish 

Sea with choice viands, the breaking away of the artificial whale, the patience of the 

Star and the persistence of the Continuity girl who was possessed of a Casabianca- 

like determination in the face of autumn gales could be the subject of a better fdm 

than 'Moby Dick' eventually became. 

The first half of the book covers a lot of ground-a description of the Tuna-fish 

Bullfight is not recommended for squeamish stomachs: there is a pleasant interlude 

in the Maldive Islands where the master-mariner dilates on local marriage customs; 

a brief and not very satisfactory account of the race for sailing school-ships, and an 

account of a protracted but eventually successful search for two vessels to be con- 

verted into Frigates for the making of the film 'The Life of Paul Jones'. 

The second part of the book is devoted to his own personal account of the May- 

Jower project, and makes interesting reading, not only as a straight narrative but 

because he was always at pains to compare this latter-day odyssey not only with 

its original, but with those of Christopher Columbus. A reflection of his is worth 

quoting :- 

'Columbus seems to have known of the North Atlantic's circulatory movements 

of air and water to help west-bound and east-bound ships, but if he were the true 

pioneer, how could he know such things? This was a seafaring mystery and 

we wondered often about it . . . .' 

He deals with the unsavoury financial debacle of 'Project Mayflower' with tact, 

and sums it up as follows:- 

'We had delivered her in good faith, by God's grace and the crew owed no one 

anything.. . . This is what mattered, debts or no debts, for the debts will 

pass away, and the symbol of the ship will abide'. 

This is a book for every library and is liberally illustrated by 29 photographs of 

the highest quality. 

Alan Villiers states over and over again his opinion of the necessity of re-intro- 

ducing sail-training as part of the educational system for young people. He is 

frankly pessimistic as to the attitude of the Royal Navy towards this project: he 

draws comparisons with other sea-faring nations to the disadvantage of his own, 

but takes some comfort from the enormous increase in public interest in small-boat 

sailing.

I20 WARM BODIES 

Those of us who wish to see the 'Outward-bound Westward Ho'! scheme brought 

into reality would know to whom to turn if our dreams were to come true. Alan 

Villiers beggared himself when he tried unsuccessfully to run his own training-ship 

as a private venture, and no man can do more to prove his convictions. 

G. H-J. 

WARM BODIES 

By DONALD R. MORRIS 

(Hammond & Hammond 12s. 6d.) 

THE United States Navy has not up to now fared well at the hands of American 

authors. 

A student of transatlantic fiction might well suppose that U.S. naval officers are 

either sadistic bullies or monomaniacs, and that all ratings are oversexed morons. 

Even a humorous book like 'Don't go near the Water' seeks to show the Service 

in a contemptuous light. What a pleasant surprise, therefore it is to come upon 

a really funny book about the U.S.N. which is written with no other object than 

to amuse and inform. 

A 'Warm Body', by definition, is 'a man who can pick up something when told 

to do so, carry boxes, collect small objects, turn on lights, chip paint, or sweep. 

At sea he is of relatively little value to a ship; in a shipyard he comes into his own.' 

A 'Brown-bagger' on the other hand, is a married officer whose whole aim in life 

is to see as much of his wife as is possible in a sea-going service. 

Donald Morris has selected an L.S.T. in peace-time for his story of some ordinary 

and a few extraordinary sea-faring men who spend a good deal of time at sea between 

Puerto Rico and Greenland. Curiously enough the Captain is a thoroughly decent 

chap and the other characters, though some could be easily certified, are not vicious. 

There is a delightful Red-Indian boatswain called 'Shrieking Eagle' who can be 

trusted to leave a trace of lunatic gold on anything he touches. There is a remarkable 

mascot goat called 'El Toro', and the hero (the first-lieutenant) is a likeable fellow 

who combines a considerable and legitimate desire to marry an attractive and 

entirely unreal young lady with a remarkable proclivity for getting into scrapes from 

which he inevitably emerges unscathed. 

I found this book very much to my liking and confidently recommend it to all 

whose sense of humour is not hopelessly atrophied. Incidentally, behind this 

cockeyed view of the U.S. Navy there is an occasional glimpse of the real thing, 

which should help us 'Limeys' to understand what makes these gum-chewing Yanks 

tick-far more so than do the Queegs of the more lurid best-sellers. 

EEYORE SMITH

ADMIRALTY BRIEF 

By EDWARD TERRELL 

(Harrap 21s.) 

ONE day in the middle of 1940 an R.N.V.R. Commander came into the office of the 

Naval Staff division which handled all problems dealing with anti-aircraft defence, 

and without further ado asked how badly we needed Oerlikon guns. The answer 

to that was easier than to most of the problems which were then almost overwhelm- 

ing the Naval Staff; for we needed them desperately, and knew that we would almost 

certainly not receive any more from Switzerland, where they were being made for 

the Admiralty. After a discussion on ways and means of starting manufacture in 

England, the Commander, whose name was Goodeve, went into action with tre- 

mendous energy and a considerable lack of orthodoxy. But he and his extraordinarily 

heterogeneous team were never daunted by difficulties, red tape or obstruction from 

the conventional departments, who were often horrified by their methods; and they 

generally managed to produce results. Mr. Terrell, a barrister by profession, 

served throughout the war in Goodeve's organisation, and had a hand in many of the 

developments which it fostered-notably in the production of 'plastic armour' as a 

substitute for the steel plates which we lacked in the early days. He was luckier than 

most inventors, for in 1949, it earned him an award of ~10,000-which caused some 

surprise among people who could compare its value with that of other war-time 

developments, for which, however, it was less easy to establish a claim before the 

Royal Commission. 

The plastic armour story occupies a considerable part of Mr. Terrell's remini- 

scences, but he also writes about such disparate matters as the making of a propa- 

ganda film for America, measures to suppress funnel smoke from merchantmen, and 

the development of the rocket-assisted bomb. He evidently has no inhibitions about 

the importance of the part he himself played, and that fact, combined with excessive 

emphasis of style and not a few questionable judgements on people, leaves the 

reader with a somewhat distasteful impression of the author's character. Indeed 

after reading this account it is hard not to feel a good deal of sympathy for those 

who did not take kindly to Mr. Terrell during the war. The accomplishments of 

Goodeve's Miscellaneous Weapons Department (as it finally became) were sufficiently 

significant to merit a sober and factual account from a less egoistical pen. 

MEMOR

Correspondence 

DISCIPLINE 

DEAR EDITOR,-I am sorry that THE NAVAL REVIEW should give renewed currency 

to a literary forgery of which the falsity was exposed half a century ago. The alleged 

letter from John Paul Jones to the Naval Committee of Congress, printed in your 

October issue, page 406, was not written 180 years ago, nor was it the work of 

Paul Jones. It was invented by one A. C. Buell, who published an entirely spurious 

Life of Paul Jones in 1900 and, not content with the actual achievements of Paul 

Jones on which his real fame rests, invented freely, not only the narrative of Jones's 

early naval career but documents to support his version. The standard life of Paul 

Jones, the work of Mrs. Anna de Koven, was published in 1913 by Scribners, of 

New York. Mrs. de Koven searched all the relevant records, her book is fully 

documented and it is accepted by all historians as accurate and authoritative. She 

describes Buell's fabricated letter which you quote as 'remarkable for its skill as for 

its well-nigh universal acceptance'; but she proves that not only was no such letter 

ever received by the Naval Committee, but that Jones was not even in communication 

with it at the date to which the letter is ascribed, and that many other statements 

of Buell's are pure inventions. Unfortunately, the 'well-nigh universal acceptance' 

of Buell's book seems to have survived Mrs. de Koven's demonstration of its utter 

unreliability. I remember a brief Life of Paul Jones published a few years ago 

by a prolific writer in which all Buell's fabrications were trotted out again-the 

author had evidently read Buell and nothing else! The mind of the literary forger 

is unfathomable by the ordinary person. Perhaps Mr. Buell said to himself: 'This is 

what the founder of the American Navy ought to have written, even if he did not; 

and as I am building up Paul Jones as the actual, as well as the spiritual father of 

the Navy, I must write it for him!' Something of that attitude is to be found in 

Clarke and McArthur, who in 1809 published the 'official' biography of Nelson. 

They did not, it is true, invent letters for him; but they 'edited' his letters to the 

extent of running extracts from two or more together, and amending the language 

from a desire, in the words of Sir Harris Nicolas, 'to exhibit Nelson's productions 

in what, they considered, a fitting epistolatory state: as if a Hero would never think, 

write, or speak naturally, but must always appear in full dress'. There is much for 

the naval officer of today to learn from the life and achievements of Paul Jones; 

but there is nothing of authority or value to be derived from what a literary hack 

has invented a century later and chosen to ascribe to him. 

H. G. THURSPIELD 

CAN WE REDUCE OUR DEFAULTERS? 

SIR,-I was extremely interested to read and not a little humbled by the replies 

in the October NAVAL REVIEW under the heading 'Discipline', commenting on my 

recent article entitled 'Can we reduce our Defaulters?' These were written by 

members with a great deal more experience than myself and I agree with much 

of what they say. Nevertheless through them all runs a common thread-the lessons

CORRESPONDENCE 123 

of the past-and that, in a nutshell, is my criticism. In my opinion we in the Service 

are still so dogged by our past that we have failed to look into the future and, as a 

result, find ourselves in our present sorry situation. I have no wish to belittle all 

the fine work that has been and is being done, but it is all ten years too late. 

If I had thought for a moment that my ship was a bad one I would have kept my 

mouth shut and very probably what D.B.N.M. says would have been true, but it 

was not. Our Captain was quite the fairest and most conscientious commanding 

officer I have ever served with and the ship's company held him in high regard; we 

were not an outstanding ship but the men were cheerful and willing and it was by 

far the happiest wardroom that I have ever been in; an agreeable surprise for a 

small-ship man like myself. 

Perhaps I should not have stated that our disciplinary record was better than 

most, for of course I cannot prove it, but the statement was made only after the 

question had been discussed with a cross-section of officers from all types of ships. 

Certainly most members with recent sea experience will know full well that the 

problem exists in every ship to a greater or less degree. My article was written in a 

provocative manner to highlight a matter of serious concern to us all, and to offer 

at least one solution. 

I would like to agree with you, Sir, that modern officers possess the ability to 

tackle successfully such a basic task, but one of my aims was to show the price 

that is being paid and to question whether it was not too high. D.B.N.M. suggests 

that better officers might have been more successful where we had failed so badly; 

of course this may be true. I can only say that, in the main, we are dealing with 

the same age group that has been proved responsible for the recent heavy increase 

in civil crime and nobody seems to have had much success in coping with it, either 

by psychological or preventive means. Perhaps I am being defeatist but all I am 

saying in effect is that nowadays we cannot afford the time and labour to redeem 

this type of person and should therefore get rid of him. I am sure that the views 

expressed by 'Jellicle' in his 'Psychological Pressgang' are extremely sound and 

may well be a big contributory factor. 

Finally, concerning my proposal to decentralise powers of punishment, the 

arguments against it, all based on past experience, are extremely strong; nevertheless 

I believe that this system, revolutionary as it may seem, could be made to work and 

bring many benefits, particularly a closer understanding between officers and men. 

D.B.N.M. comments on the great value of the defaulters' table and indeed so 

far as it goes he is right, but why on earth cannot the Captain impress his personality 

on his ship's company by means other than the archaic defaulters' table ? Surely, 

in 1958 he can leave his ivory tower and get round the ship more often and meet 

them? Alas, it is obvious that I myself am a most undisciplined person, and so, 

unfortunately, are the modern generation; subtler methods than the old ones are 

needed to tame us. 

Yours faithfully, 

HORNLI

124 CORRESPONDENCE 

EAGLE'S VISIT TO BARCELONA 

s~~,--Last May I happened to arrive in Barcelona while Eagle was there on an 

official visit. This was an enormous success, so much so that I never heard of 

any visit to a Spanish port marked by greater cordiality. One item in the pro- 

gramme, however, was outstanding in a special way. I refer to the day of flying 

exercises at sea which was attended by a number of senior Spanish officers and 

officials, including the Minister of Marine, himself an Admiral, and it was so 

impressive that their comments were almost out of this world. 

As a former naval attach6 to Spain, and by virtue of long acquaintance with that 

country, I count some of the Spaniards concerned as among my best friends. Frank- 

ness to a close friend is one of their characteristics, and I have never heard them 

speak so enthusiastically about anything. The Spanish Navy, although not of 

N.A.T.O. and not possessed of a single carrier, has seen a lot of carrier exercises 

in the last few years. This makes the effect of Eagle's demonstration all the more 

telling. After it was over, the Minister of Marine held a press conference on board, 

and what he said was prominently reported by every Spanish newspaper of import- 

ance. In the course of his conference he went out of his way to emphasise that the 

British were responsible for every notable advance in modern naval air, instancing 

particularly the steam catapult, the angled deck and the landing mirror. But I think 

what struck him most was the split-second timing and faultless adherence to a 

packed schedule, and the others who talked to me about it said the same. In a word, 

it was the efficiency which carried conviction. 

I was myself very much impressed by the spirit which seemed to permeate the 

ship, from the Admiral downwards, and the remarks of my Spanish friends showed 

that they had appreciated this, too. The Spaniards are a fine fighting race with whom 

we have much in common but with whom we have not always been allowed to be 

as friendly as many of us would have liked. Now that things are changing it is to be 

hoped that we shall respond to the Spaniards' readiness to like us. In this the Navy 

has a particular advantage because the Spanish naval officer is more akin to us than 

perhaps we have realised, and to say that is not to forget the natural affinity 

between naval officers of most nations. The Spanish Navy is still largely a family 

affair, and the sons of naval officers accept the tradition of service in full knowledge 

that there is no money in it. Furthermore, the Spanish naval officer feels himself 

intensely European. While admiring transatlantic might and 'know-how', he feels 

more at home with us, and I believe we should cultivate his friendship and help him 

forward as much as we can. 

The main point of all this is not, however, what I have just said, nor even to 

record the heartening fact that Eagle's show impressed a Spanish audience, but to 

acclaim the far more important fact that a British carrier could be so impressive. A 

retired officer's views are not worth much in these days of constant technical 

progress, but I do not think I am mistaken in concluding that the Service of today 

is better than it ever has been. Reduced in size and power, it seems to have acquired 

a compensating enthusiasm and eficiency often denied to the big battalions. Of 

course this is known to Their Lordships, but is it told to the chaps themselves ? I 

think it should be. A bit of appreciation goes a long way in a thankless world. 

Yours truly, 

ALAN HILLGARTH

CORRESPONDENCE 

THE HYDROGRAPHER AND THE NAVY 

S~~,-While I have no wish to enter into the discussion on the best way to run 

the Hydrographic Service, I feel that the criticisms levelled by 'Vertebra' and, to a 

lesser extent, by 'Watchkeeper' against Vidal in your issue of April, 1958, should 

not go unanswered. 

'Vertebra' appears to have forgotten that all ships must be a compromise between 

various requirements and that this is always the case whether the ship is designed 

and built by a commercial firm or by the Admiralty. In the case of Vidal the main 

requirements (not necessarily in order of importance) were: low cost-which is, 

of course, always highly important whether actually specified or not; great endurance; 

small size; economical speed of about 15 knots; and a very low 'creeping speed'. 

The requirement for a small ship with a very great endurance makes diesel pro- 

pulsion ofsome sort highly desirable and, of the various forms available, the geared, 

multi-engined layout with relatively high-speed engines enables the machinery to 

be made much lighter and smaller than the more usual commercial practice of one 

or two large slow-speed engines direct coupled to their shafts. The economical 

speed of the ship was designed as 14 knots and, although it has proved in practice 

to be nearer 10 knots, it should be pointed out that the fuel consumption at 15 knots 

is still much lower than it would be with any non-diesel form of propulsion. 

The choice of Admiralty Standard Range engines has admittedly caused a certain 

amount of 'teething' trouble-though 'Vertebra's' figures are misleading, as the 

fifteen months he quotes apparently include some of the normal trials period and 

normal refit and lay-up periods-but the advantages in respect of spare gear, 

experience of naval and dockyard personnel in running and refitting the standard 

machinery, etc., are very considerable. The transmission system, which caused a 

good deal of the trouble in the ship's early days, was chosen for the very simple 

reason that it was the onlv one available which would meet all the reauirements. 

'Vertebra's' statement that a 'simpler, merchant type system could be run by 

half the number of engine-room ratings' is another exaggeration. One watch in 

Vidal consists of one E.R.A., one P.O.M.(E.), one L.M.(E.) and five M.(E.); the 

minimum which this could be reduced to, whatever the type of machinery, is: one 

E.R.A., one P.O.M.(E.) and three M.(E.), a saving of 37.5 per cent in actual ratings 

(all of them junior ones) and of less than 25 per cent of the wage bill. The extra 

personnel are, incidently, needed as a result of the two separate engine-rooms required 

for Damage Control, and is nothing to do with the type of machinery itself. 

Whatever 'Vertebra's' view, the latest reports from sea indicate that the present 

ship's officers are entirely satisfied with the ship. 

This may seem unnecessarily lengthy and detailed, but I believe that more than 

the defence of one particular ship is involved here. 'Vertebra' is not by any means 

the only one of your contributors who appears to me to disparage certain aspects 

of the Navy by comparison with its commercial counterparts without full knowledge 

or consideration of the facts. It is easy to pick holes in a ship or a part of the Service 

which one knows intimately and it is tempting to say, as a sort of panacea, that 

commercial practice is cheaper, better, more economical, easier to run, etc.; but the 

plain truth is that the average naval officer, knowing so much more about the 

shortcomings of naval than of commercial practice, is liable to give the latter a quite 

undeserved lustre. Although 'Vertebra' does not fall into this particular pitfall, it

126 CORRESPONDENCE 

is worth noting that it is especially dangerous to make financial comparisons because 

almost all naval costs include enormous overheads to cover the 'non-productive' 

aspects of the Navy-which have to be paid for somehow or other anyway; in other 

words, if the particular project under discussion were 'farmed out' at apparently 

less cost, the overheads of other projects would have to be increased and the total 

cost to the Navy would be greater rather than less. Careful consideration of all the 

facts frequently reveals that naval practice is better than commercial for its particular 

purpose and quite as cheap. 

To end on a complimentary note, may I say how much I enjoyed and was 

reassured by 'Nico's' article in the same issue? It would be interesting to know 

how he would propose to apply his excellent conception of the Executive Officer 

as a 'fair and impartial umpire' to a small ship where the First Lieutenant must 

be Executive Officer and also, unavoidably, head of the Seamen Branch. 


'DICEY' 

RANK AND COMMAND IN DESTROYER AND FRIGATE 

LEADERS 

SIR,-T~~ 

subject or near equivalent, of 'Tasfly's' letter, published in the October 

Issue of THE NAVAL REVIEW, has been under discussion in Wardrooms (Gunrooms 

and Warrant Officers' Messes) for a great many years. I am surprised he has not 

mentioned the case of an Engineer Officer of a small ship who may be senior to the 

Commanding Officer; even to the extent of a half-stripe. Perhaps such circum- 

stances can arise, no longer? I suggest that the terms of Admiralty Fleet Order 

1/56 have not really altered the situation in ships and are unlikely to do so until, at 

least, a General List Officer of the Engineering, Electrical or Supply Specialisation 

is appointed as the Executive Officer of a ship! 

I am an Engineering Specialist. I do not agree with either of 'Tasfly's' sugges- 

tions. Appointments, 'for Squadron Duties', would not make sense when only 

one ship might be concerned. e.g. Daring's. I am well satisfied that the Executive 

Officer of a ship, irrespective of his seniority and age compared to other members 

of the Wardroom, is the officer best qualified by his duties and responsibilities to. 

carry out the duties of President. 

At the risk of boring the more elderly and because, possibly, it might interest 

'Tasfly' and younger officers, I would like to give two examples, one old and one 

recent, from my own experiences. Over 23 years ago, I started my first, proper 

sea-going appointment, as a Sub-Lieutenant (E), in the Gunroom of a battleship 

(Flag C. in C.) Soon after my arrival, the President shipped a second stripe and was 

relieved by a relatively junior Sub-Lieutenant. He, in turn, went sick for a few 

weeks and the Flag Captain directed me to take over the Presidency of the Gunroom 

Mess. My pleasure was somewhat dampened by his inference that he would have 

preferred to nominate the Senior Midshipman but, as I was the senior of a number 

of non-executive Sub-Lieutenants in a large Mess, etc., etc., I was to do the job. 

The incident is clearly imprinted in my mind as, except for initial introduction and

CORRESPONDENCE 127- 

saying good-bye from, it was the only occasion I can recall, in over two years, that I 

spoke to, as distinct to reported to, the Captain! In due course the Sub returned and 

took over and, later, I got my second stripe and departed to the Wardroom. Needless 

to say, the whole Gunroom backed me up most loyally during my short term of 

office. It was long enough, however, for me to realise that the Sub, irrespective 

of personalities, our relative seniorities or ages, but by reason of his general duties, 

was more suited to the Presidency than I, with my departmental limitations, ever 

would be. 

During my period in the ship, the Executive Officer changed once and the Engineer 

Officer twice. All five were promoted to Captain out of the ship or very soon after 

leaving. If my memory is not at fault, the practical promotion zone for 

Commanders, at that time, was not more than six years seniority whereas no Com- 

mander (E), in any job, was being promoted with less than twelve years seniority. 

All the Commanders' (E) had started in the Executive Branch, their seniorities as 

Lieutenants were 1913-14 and one, at least, had been First Lieutenant of a Destroyer 

and, temporarily, its C.O. In an earlier ship, a C or D Class Cruiser, this officer 

had paced the deck and taken over from, or turned over to, a more senior executive 

watchkeeping officer. This latter officer had since risen to become our Commander- 

in-Chief! Although I then was a dyed-in-the-purple engineer officer (and may be 

still!) and served under three 'Chiefs' whose betters I have still to meet, I do not 

remember any occasion when I could have honestly suggested that the Engineer 

Officer, as the most senior ship's officer, should have been President of the Ward- 

room Mess. The Commander, by reason of his duties and responsibilities, was, 

obviously, the right man for the job. 

Eighteen months ago I left my last sea-going appointment-Engineer Officer of a 

big ship (Flag, C.-in-C. part of the time). I served with three Executive Officers, 

all of whom were junior to me and one was so youthful that he had worn two stripes 

only, for over two years, after I had started wearing three! My last appointment 

gave me no reason for changing my views about who should be President of the 

Wardroom. Incidently, and although they were members of the Staff, the Mess 

included three General List Captains of the Engineering, Electrical and Supply 

Specialisations and two others of equivalent rank. Their situation, vis-a-vis a 

Captain of the Fleet, a General List Captain of the Seaman Specialisation, made an 

interesting discussion, but that is another story. 

Assuming 'Tasfly' is, at present, the Executive Officer of a Destroyer, he should 

be comforted by the thought that he is gaining valuable experience for Presidential 

duties, in a big ship, at a later date. If the Chief, Pay and 'L' are worth their salt, 

he should then have few difficulties but, if the boot was on the other foot, the diffi- 

culties might be harder to resolve, even with maximum co-operation from all 

concerned. 


'P.M.'

4 - The Naval Review

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